This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.
identifier | question |
---|---|
18818 | How has the small stock of words found as the basis of a language been thus combined and modified? |
12629 | Whom are you looking at? |
12629 | Whom did you see? |
12629 | Whom did you see? |
12629 | Whom did you see? |
12629 | [ 67] But is the Nootka correlate ofthe small fires in the house"the true equivalent of an English"_ the house- firelets_"? |
12629 | [ 6] What, then, is the objective criterion of the word? 12629 And is one point of view sufficient? 12629 And what types of concepts make up the content of these formal patterns? 12629 Are the subjective value of_ he_ and the objective value of_ him_ entirely, or even mainly, dependent on the difference of form? 12629 Are there resistances of a more intimate nature to the borrowing of words? 12629 Are we not giving language a power to change of its own accord over and above the involuntary tendency of individuals to vary the norm? 12629 Are we not on safe ground then? 12629 Are we, after all, justified in identifying it with a radical element? 12629 But are there not certain ideas that it is impossible to render except by way of such and such parts of speech? 12629 But is not the word, one may object, as much of an abstraction as the radical element? 12629 But was the sequence of phonetic changes anaccident"? |
12629 | But what if language is not so much a garment as a prepared road or groove? |
12629 | Can it be that so common a word as_ its_ is actually beginning to be difficult? |
12629 | Can such a concept as that of plurality ever be classified with the more material concepts of group II? |
12629 | Does it represent a simple correspondence between concept and linguistic expression? |
12629 | Does the breath pass freely through the mouth or is it impeded at some point and, if so, in what manner? |
12629 | Does the breath pass into the mouth alone or is it also allowed to stream into the nose? |
12629 | Does the difficulty of classification prove the uselessness of the task? |
12629 | Even now we may go so far as to say that the majority of us are secretly wishing they could say"Who did you see?" |
12629 | How are we to explain these and hundreds of similar phonetic convergences? |
12629 | How did such strikingly individual alternations as_ fot_:_ fet_,_ fuoss_:_ füesse_ develop? |
12629 | How do the peoples of the given area divide themselves as cultural beings? |
12629 | How is it with the alternation of subjective and objective in the pronoun? |
12629 | If function is not the ultimate criterion of the word, what is? |
12629 | Is it not as arbitrarily lifted out of the living sentence as is the minimum conceptual element out of the word? |
12629 | Is it only accidental that these dialects are spoken in proximity to French, which makes abundant use of nasalized vowels? |
12629 | Is it too doomed to disappear? |
12629 | Is not_ inikw- ihl-''minih-''is- it_ necessarily a verb:"several small fires were burning in the house"? |
12629 | Is the formative slant clearly towards the agglutinative method? |
12629 | Is the fusing technique thereby set off as the essence of inflection? |
12629 | Is thought possible without language? |
12629 | It is rather an abbreviated form of some such sentence as"Who, did you say, is coming to- night?" |
12629 | It is safe to prophesy that within a couple of hundred years from to- day not even the most learned jurist will be saying"Whom did you see?" |
12629 | John, a little taken aback, might mutter"Did you say me?" |
12629 | Must we not then hold to the preposition? |
12629 | Not quite relevant enough, the grammarian may remark, for a sentence like"Who did you say?" |
12629 | On what basis shall we classify? |
12629 | Ought not the norm, wherever and whenever threatened, automatically to reassert itself? |
12629 | Probably the majority of those who read these words feel that it is quite"incorrect"to say"Who did you see?" |
12629 | So are the numeral, the interrogative pronoun( e.g.,"to be what? |
12629 | The folk says_ it is me_, not_ it is I_, which is"correct"but just as falsely so as the_ whom did you see_? |
12629 | The more radical solution_ Who did you see?_ is the one the language is gradually making for. |
12629 | The solution_ Did you see whom?_ or_ You saw whom?_[135] is too contrary to the idiomatic drift of our language to receive acceptance. |
12629 | The speaker and hearer feel the word, let us grant, but how shall we justify their feeling? |
12629 | The uneducated folk that says"Who did you see?" |
12629 | There is likely to be a little hesitation in the choice of the form, but the precedent of usages like"Whom did you see?" |
12629 | They are common enough, but are they as alive, as little petrified or bookish, as our English_-ness_ and_-ful_ and_ un-_?] |
12629 | Threefold classification suggested: what types of concepts are expressed? |
12629 | Was the pre- Anglo- Saxon alternation of_ fot_ and_ föti_ an absolutely mechanical matter, without other than incidental morphological interest? |
12629 | We are likely to avoid the locution altogether and to say"Who was it you saw?" |
12629 | We do not secretly chafe at"Whom did you see?" |
12629 | We have discovered no less than four factors which enter into our subtle disinclination to say"Whom did you see?" |
12629 | We readers of many books are still very careful to say"Whom did you see?" |
12629 | What are the formal patterns of the language? |
12629 | What are the precise points of articulation in the mouth? |
12629 | What are we to do with the fusional and symbolic languages that do not express relational concepts in the word but leave them to the sentence? |
12629 | What can be done with the"to"of"he came to the house"? |
12629 | What if we add the preterit tense suffix_-it_? |
12629 | What point of view shall we adopt for our classification? |
12629 | Why emphasize both a technique and a particular content at one and the same time? |
12629 | Would we be so ready to die for"liberty,"to struggle for"ideals,"if the words themselves were not ringing within us? |
12629 | Yet the case is more hollow than the grammarian thinks it to be, for in reply to such a query as"You''re a good hand at bridge, John, are n''t you?" |
12629 | Yet the logic for the latter("Did you say I was a good hand at bridge?") |
12629 | You have not caught the name and ask, not"Whom did you say?" |
12629 | [ 171] Does it follow that the voiceless_ l_ of language B has had the same history? |
12629 | [ Footnote 132:"Its"was at one time as impertinent a departure as the"who"of"Who did you see?" |
12629 | [ Footnote 142: Aside from the interrogative:_ am I?__ is he?_ Emphasis counts for something. |
12629 | [ Footnote 142: Aside from the interrogative:_ am I?__ is he?_ Emphasis counts for something. |
12629 | but"Who did you say?" |
12629 | hardly"Did you say I?" |
12629 | is not strictly analogous to"Whom did you see?" |
12629 | might do for an epitaph, but"Who did you see?" |
12629 | or does that farmer( who lives in your neighborhood and whom we see over there) kill that duckling( that belongs to him)? |
12629 | or"Whom did you mean?" |
12629 | what is the degree of synthesis? |
12629 | what is the prevailing technique? |
12629 | will probably not seem quite strong enough to induce a"Whom did you say?" |
9306 | But if Poetry be a theoretic fact, in what way is it to be distinguished from science and from historical knowledge? |
9306 | How can you, a professor of philosophy, dare to praise lying and the mixture of truth and falsehood? |
9306 | If every Requiem, every lamenting Adagio, possessed the power to make us sad, who would be able to support existence in such conditions? 9306 Was Virgil a poet or an orator?" |
9306 | What proof givest thou of all this? |
9306 | Where,he exclaims,"is there any beauty that does not come from the feminine figure, the centre of all beauty? |
9306 | Admitting that language is a sign, are we to take that as signifying a spiritual necessity(_ phusis_) or as a psychological convention(_ nomos_)? |
9306 | And composition? |
9306 | And how can such a question be answered, save by giving the history of their art( of their literature, that is to say, of their language in action)? |
9306 | And if so, to what extent? |
9306 | And is not this last truly determined, when one unique function is attributed to it, not spatializing nor temporalizing, but characterizing? |
9306 | And style? |
9306 | And the point of view of the author? |
9306 | And what are the laws of_ words_ which are not at the same time laws of_ style_? |
9306 | And what are the words cruelty, idyll, knighthood, domestic life, and so on, but the expression of those concepts? |
9306 | And what could a( normative) grammar be, but just a technique of linguistic expression, that is to say, of a theoretic fact? |
9306 | Are we to call the sounds content? |
9306 | Art does not imitate nature, for what is nature, but that vast confusion of perceptions and representations that were referred to above? |
9306 | As they are excluded from Aesthetic, in what other part of Philosophy will they be received? |
9306 | But how can we pardon mediocre expression in pure artists? |
9306 | But is not the loftiness of the search the reason why no satisfactory result has hitherto been obtained? |
9306 | But the_ unconscious_ element In poetry? |
9306 | But what could such a spatial function be, that should control even time? |
9306 | But why? |
9306 | Do they remain equal? |
9306 | Do we ever, indeed, feel complete satisfaction before even the best of photographs? |
9306 | Do we not obtain more powerful effects by uniting several? |
9306 | Does it mean a qualitative, a formal difference? |
9306 | Does not morality presuppose logical distinctions? |
9306 | Does the aesthetic fact consist of content alone, or of form alone, or of both together? |
9306 | Does the hypothesis correspond to reality? |
9306 | Don Quixote is a type; but of whom is he a type, if not of all Don Quixotes? |
9306 | Even though she were not also darkened by time, would not the impression be altogether different? |
9306 | Expressive activity? |
9306 | Externally? |
9306 | From the same theory come the prejudices, owing to which at one time( and is it really passed?) |
9306 | Granted different arts, distinct and limited, the questions were asked: Which is the most powerful? |
9306 | Historical laws and historical concepts? |
9306 | How can we find the historical genesis of that which is a category, by means of which every historical genesis and fact are understood? |
9306 | How can we really will, if we do not know the world which surrounds us, and the manner of changing things by acting upon them? |
9306 | How could a proposition be clearly thought and confusedly written out? |
9306 | How could he will the_ rational_, unless he willed it also_ as his particular end_? |
9306 | How could humanity appreciate works of genius, he asks, were it without some common measure? |
9306 | How could that which is produced by a given activity be judged by a different activity? |
9306 | How could these be known, otherwise than by expressions and words, that is to say, in imaginative form? |
9306 | How could we judge what remained extraneous to us? |
9306 | How far has the author succeeded in doing what he intended? |
9306 | How obtain the same effect, when the conditions are no longer the same? |
9306 | How often do we strive to understand clearly what is passing within us? |
9306 | How should these contents be_ represented_? |
9306 | How was he to emerge from this uncertainty, this contradiction? |
9306 | How, indeed, could it be otherwise, if logical activity come after and contain in itself aesthetic activity? |
9306 | How, then, can a comparison be made, where there is no comparative term? |
9306 | If a landscape, why not a topographical sketch? |
9306 | If a story; why not the occasional note of the journalist? |
9306 | If an epigram be art, why not a single word? |
9306 | If art be intuition, would it therefore be any intuition that one might have of a_ physical_ object, appertaining to_ external nature_? |
9306 | If it be not deception, then what is the place of tragedy in philosophy and in the righteous life? |
9306 | If it be spiritual, what is its true nature, and in what way does it differ from art and science? |
9306 | If not, what becomes of the intuitive character, of which we have affirmed the equal necessity and also its identity with the former? |
9306 | If so, what becomes of the lyrical character, of which we have asserted the necessity? |
9306 | If utility were egoism, how could it be the duty of the altruist to behave like an egoist? |
9306 | In what did the general decadence of Italian literature at the end of the sixteenth century consist? |
9306 | In what other way could science be born, which, if aesthetic expressions be assumed in it, yet has for function to go beyond them? |
9306 | In what way? |
9306 | Inductive? |
9306 | Internally? |
9306 | Is art rational or irrational? |
9306 | Is it spiritual or animal? |
9306 | Is it their fitness which makes things seem beautiful? |
9306 | Is poetry a rational or an irrational thing? |
9306 | Is the beautiful that which seems ugly to no man? |
9306 | Is the beautiful the helpful, that which leads to the good? |
9306 | Is the beautiful to be found in ornament? |
9306 | Is there anything more beautiful than Iago? |
9306 | Let us assume that they limit themselves to the white race, and let us continue:"What sub- species of the white race?" |
9306 | May it not be a residuum of criticisms and of negations from which arises merely the necessity to posit a generic intuitive activity? |
9306 | Maybe they are visual? |
9306 | No one before him, in antiquity, in the Middle Age, or in modern times, had seriously asked: What is the value of the distinctions between the arts? |
9306 | Now why give oneself this trouble? |
9306 | Now without staying to consider these two remarkable instances, let us ask, what is this essential characteristic of Taine? |
9306 | Of what is it a mixture? |
9306 | Of what kind must be these laws, these universals? |
9306 | Of what use are they? |
9306 | Or does it mean greater complexity and complication, a quantitative, material difference? |
9306 | Or, better, when this is conceived as itself a category or function, which gives knowledge of things in their concretion and individuality? |
9306 | Or, if it be practical, how can it be theoretic? |
9306 | Perhaps it was all a pastime for him, like playing at patience, or collecting postage- stamps? |
9306 | Perhaps such epithets as"lower"and"lowest"are irreconcilable with the dignity and with the splendid beauty of art? |
9306 | Perhaps, as is generally said, because the correct word is in certain cases not so_ expressive_ as the so- called incorrect word or metaphor? |
9306 | Should a free course be allowed to its pleasures? |
9306 | Should it be submitted to a dialectic, by means of which it must be surpassed and dissolved into a more lofty point of view? |
9306 | Sounds again? |
9306 | The reader will probably ask here: But what, then, becomes of morality? |
9306 | These are,_ firstly_, what is its_ peculiarity_, in what way is it singular, how is it differentiated from other works? |
9306 | This, translated into scientific language, is tantamount to asking: What is the connexion between Acoustic and aesthetic expression? |
9306 | To what the ugly? |
9306 | To what unions of tones, colours, sizes, mathematically determinable? |
9306 | To what use should it be put? |
9306 | What are ever feelings that become apparent or manifest, but feelings objectified, intensified, expressed? |
9306 | What are the limits between the figurative and the auditional arts, between painting and sculpture, poetry and music? |
9306 | What are we to call form? |
9306 | What can be represented with colours, and what with sounds? |
9306 | What does Raphael mean by the"certain idea,"which he follows in his painting? |
9306 | What does he call this new science? |
9306 | What does secondary order mean here? |
9306 | What have we done in both cases? |
9306 | What is Aesthetic for Baumgarten? |
9306 | What is art for Schiller? |
9306 | What is it, then? |
9306 | What is knowledge by concepts? |
9306 | What is still lacking to him, that he may attain to speech? |
9306 | What is syllogistic? |
9306 | What is the aesthetic form of domestic life, of knighthood, of the idyll, of cruelty, and so forth? |
9306 | What is the art of a given people but the complex of all its artistic products? |
9306 | What is the beautiful? |
9306 | What is the character of an art( say, Hellenic art or Provençal literature), but the complex physiognomy of those products? |
9306 | What is the difference between their representation or image, and our intuitive knowledge? |
9306 | What is the reason for poetry being obliged to seek verisimilitude? |
9306 | What is this disinterested pleasure that we experience before pure colours, pure sounds, and flowers? |
9306 | What is this new operation? |
9306 | What is to be done if good taste and the real fact, put into formulas, sometimes assume the air of paradoxes? |
9306 | What was Kant''s idea of art? |
9306 | What weight did he attach to Schopenhauer''s much- vaunted writings on art? |
9306 | What were the ideas developed by Vico in his_ Scienza nuova_( 1725)? |
9306 | What will be their lot? |
9306 | What with notes, and what with metres and rhymes? |
9306 | What with simple monochromatic lines, and what with touches of various colours? |
9306 | What would a picture be for a hypothetical man, deprived of all or many of his senses, who should in an instant acquire the sole organ of sight? |
9306 | What would these Gods become without their limitations? |
9306 | What, it says, is intuitive knowledge without the light of intellective knowledge? |
9306 | What, then, is interesting? |
9306 | What, then, is the possible, the something more, and the particular of poetry? |
9306 | Whence does It come? |
9306 | Which is the lesser evil?--great erudition and defective taste, or natural good taste and great ignorance? |
9306 | Which of them comes first? |
9306 | Which second? |
9306 | Who among aestheticians has criticized this principle? |
9306 | Who can deny the necessity and the utility of these groupings? |
9306 | Who can help admiring their strength of will, although their activity is only economic, and is opposed to what we hold moral? |
9306 | Who does not recall the great part played in literary history by the criticism of the verisimilar? |
9306 | Who, without a similar act of interruptive reflexion, is conscious of temporal sequence while listening to a story or a piece of music? |
9306 | Why take the worse and longer road when you know the shorter and better road? |
9306 | Why, they asked with Aristotle, at the Renaissance, does poetry deal with the universal, history with the particular? |
9306 | Would not an artist vary and touch up much or little, remove or add something to any of them? |
9306 | Would one not attain to a work of art in this way, or at any rate to an artistic motive? |
9306 | [ Sidenote]_ Examples: definitions of the sublime, the comic, and the humoristic._ What is the sublime? |
9306 | and is the man at rest or at work, or is he occupied as is Paul Potter''s cow, or the Ganymede of Rembrandt?" |
1616 | ''And what are ion, reon, doun?'' |
1616 | ''But then, why, Socrates, is language so consistent? |
1616 | ''But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus mystifies me; I should like to ask him, in your presence, what he means by the fitness of names?'' |
1616 | ''How do you explain pur n udor?'' |
1616 | ''Which of us by taking thought''can make new words or constructions? |
1616 | ''Will you go on to the elements-- sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, seasons, years?'' |
1616 | ( Compare Plato, Laws):--''ATHENIAN STRANGER: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of government? |
1616 | ATHENIAN STRANGER: And have there not been thousands and thousands of cities which have come into being and perished during this period? |
1616 | ATHENIAN STRANGER: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and incalculable? |
1616 | ATHENIAN STRANGER: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them? |
1616 | And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I saying? |
1616 | And Socrates? |
1616 | And even if this had been otherwise, who would learn of words when he might learn of things? |
1616 | And has not every place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising, and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?'' |
1616 | And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence? |
1616 | And let me ask another question,--If we had no faculty of speech, how should we communicate with one another? |
1616 | And not the rest? |
1616 | And now let me see; where are we? |
1616 | And what do you consider to be the meaning of this word? |
1616 | And what is the final result of the enquiry? |
1616 | And which are more likely to be right-- the wiser or the less wise, the men or the women? |
1616 | Are not actions also a class of being? |
1616 | Are there any names which witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness? |
1616 | Are we to count them like votes? |
1616 | Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is correctness of names to be determined by the voice of a majority? |
1616 | Are we to say of whichever sort there are most, those are the true ones? |
1616 | But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not said? |
1616 | But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name? |
1616 | But an image in fact always falls short in some degree of the original, and if images are not exact counterparts, why should names be? |
1616 | But are not such distinctions an anachronism? |
1616 | But are words really consistent; are there not as many terms of praise which signify rest as which signify motion? |
1616 | But do you not see that there is a degree of deception about names? |
1616 | But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that which you were giving of Zeus? |
1616 | But how does the carpenter make or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? |
1616 | But how shall we further analyse them, and where does the imitator begin? |
1616 | But let me ask you what is the use and force of names? |
1616 | But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is the use of them? |
1616 | But then, how do the primary names indicate anything? |
1616 | But then, why do the Eritreans call that skleroter which we call sklerotes? |
1616 | But to what are you referring? |
1616 | But what do you say of the month and the stars? |
1616 | But what is kakon? |
1616 | But who is to be the judge of the proper form? |
1616 | But who makes a name? |
1616 | But why do you not give me another word? |
1616 | But why should we not discuss another kind of Gods-- the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year? |
1616 | CLEINIAS: How so? |
1616 | CLEINIAS: What do you mean? |
1616 | CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all? |
1616 | CRATYLUS: How so? |
1616 | CRATYLUS: How so? |
1616 | CRATYLUS: What do you mean? |
1616 | CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?--say something and yet say nothing? |
1616 | Can the thing beauty be vanishing away from us while the words are yet in our mouths? |
1616 | Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle? |
1616 | Did you ever observe in speaking that all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose? |
1616 | Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own? |
1616 | Do you agree with me that the letter rho is expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? |
1616 | Do you agree with me? |
1616 | Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the discovery of things? |
1616 | Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of them? |
1616 | Do you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent? |
1616 | Do you not suppose this to be true? |
1616 | Do you think that likely? |
1616 | Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names? |
1616 | Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle? |
1616 | Does he not say that Hector''s son had two names--''Hector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax''? |
1616 | Does not Cratylus agree with him that names teach us the nature of things? |
1616 | Does not the law give names, and does not the teacher receive them from the legislator? |
1616 | For example, what business has the letter rho in the word katoptron, or the letter sigma in the word sphigx? |
1616 | For is not falsehood saying the thing which is not? |
1616 | For is there not a true beauty and a true good, which is always beautiful and always good? |
1616 | For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names; do you not think so? |
1616 | For were we not saying just now that he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: And what are the traditions? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he say? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: But what is selene( the moon)? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a part in your previous discourse? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: How do you make that out? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: How do you mean? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: How do you mean? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: How plausible? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: How so? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: How so? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: How so? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: How so? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I. SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Of what nature? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what is the meaning of the word''hero''? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Well, and what of them? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun( profitable)? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What device? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What do you mean? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What do you mean? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What do you mean? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What do you mean? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What do you mean? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone( pleasure), lupe( pain), epithumia( desire), and the like, Socrates? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur( fire) and udor( water)? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa( opinion), and that class of words? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What is Ares? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What is it? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What is the inference? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What is the inference? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What of that? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What other appellation? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What then? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What was the name? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: What way? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Which are they? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Why do you say so? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Why not? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Why, Socrates? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Why, how is that? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name? |
1616 | HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible? |
1616 | Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:--has this proposition been sufficiently proven? |
1616 | Have you remarked this fact? |
1616 | How could there be names for all the numbers unless you allow that convention is used? |
1616 | How did the roots or substantial portions of words become modified or inflected? |
1616 | How they originated, who can tell? |
1616 | How, he would probably have argued, could men devoid of art have contrived a structure of such complexity? |
1616 | I utter a sound which I understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this is what you are saying? |
1616 | Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory of language, which he acknowledges to be imperfect? |
1616 | Is it the best sort of information? |
1616 | Is language conscious or unconscious? |
1616 | Is not all that quite possible? |
1616 | Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them purely accidental? |
1616 | Let me explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse? |
1616 | Let me put the matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have colour? |
1616 | Let us consider:--does he not himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,''For he alone defended their city and long walls''? |
1616 | May I not say to him--''This is your name''? |
1616 | May we suppose that Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by writing a comedy in the form of a prose dialogue? |
1616 | Now that we have a general notion, how shall we proceed? |
1616 | Now, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the other name was conferred by the women? |
1616 | Or about Batieia and Myrina? |
1616 | Or if this latter explanation is refuted by his silence, then in what relation does his account of language stand to the rest of his philosophy? |
1616 | Or may we be so bold as to deny the connexion between them? |
1616 | Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a colour, or sound? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And I ask again,''What do we do when we weave?'' |
1616 | SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and some worse? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And are not the good wise? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and are not other works worthy of blame? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the enquiry? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the woman, and of the woman to the man? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him be said to be of golden race? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a dialectician? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And how to answer them? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their uses? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should certainly infer, and not by necessity? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication given by me to you? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be made better by associating with another? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from all impurities? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is willing to come back to us? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their wives? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And not the rest? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will you answer me? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, looking to the broken one? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the like? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the name? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And there are many desires? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the greatest? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are prodigies? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using well? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And who are they? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And who is he? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre- maker? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And with which we name? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And with which we weave? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the thing? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a knowledge of the things which he named? |
1616 | SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in another way? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Athene? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the primitive names were not yet given? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be known without names? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we can not find a meeting- point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing named? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with imitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music and drawing? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? |
1616 | SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names differ? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Can not you at least say who gives us the names which we use? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things according to their natures? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single combat with Hephaestus? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came first? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of the giver of the name? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the actions which proceed from them? |
1616 | SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on? |
1616 | SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give correct names? |
1616 | SOCRATES: How would you have me begin? |
1616 | SOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? |
1616 | SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can tell me what is the meaning of the pur? |
1616 | SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called( kalesan) things by their names, and is not mind the beautiful( kalon)? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not the principle which imposes the name the cause? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the names given to Hector''s son-- Astyanax or Scamandrius? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and show that they are rightly named Gods? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the works of a carpenter? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light( Phaeos istora)? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Still you have found them? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask,''What sort of instrument is a shuttle?'' |
1616 | SOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of the first names, know or not know the things which they named? |
1616 | SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each that which belongs to them and is like them? |
1616 | SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the course of nature? |
1616 | SOCRATES: The two words selas( brightness) and phos( light) have much the same meaning? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator names or imitates? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired being or God, to contradict himself? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called irreligious? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the legislator? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well-- and well means like a weaver? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Well, and about this river-- to know that he ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander-- is not that a solemn lesson? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them in this way? |
1616 | SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body? |
1616 | SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce? |
1616 | SOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia? |
1616 | SOCRATES: What more names remain to us? |
1616 | SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus? |
1616 | SOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods? |
1616 | SOCRATES: What shall we take next? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signified-- did he not? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? |
1616 | SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part? |
1616 | SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things( pan), and is always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false? |
1616 | SOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word? |
1616 | SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai( to seek)? |
1616 | SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him? |
1616 | SOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word psuche( soul), and then of the word soma( body)? |
1616 | Shall I take first of all him whom you mentioned first-- the sun? |
1616 | Shall we not be deceived by him? |
1616 | Should we not use signs, like the deaf and dumb? |
1616 | Socrates asks, whether the things differ as the words which represent them differ:--Are we to maintain with Protagoras, that what appears is? |
1616 | Suddenly, on some occasion of interest( at the approach of a wild beast, shall we say? |
1616 | Take, for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter rho inserted? |
1616 | Then how came the giver of names to contradict himself, and to make some names expressive of rest, and others of motion? |
1616 | Very good: and which shall I take first? |
1616 | Was I not telling you just now( but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to share the enquiry with you? |
1616 | Was there a correctness in words, and were they given by nature or convention? |
1616 | We can understand one another, although the letter rho accent is not equivalent to the letter s: why is this? |
1616 | Well, then, there is the letter lambda; what business has this in a word meaning hardness? |
1616 | Were we mistaken? |
1616 | Were we right or wrong in saying so? |
1616 | What did he mean who gave the name Hestia? |
1616 | What do you say to another? |
1616 | What do you say, Cratylus? |
1616 | What do you say? |
1616 | What do you think? |
1616 | What else but the soul? |
1616 | What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and nature of language? |
1616 | What names will afford the most crucial test of natural fitness? |
1616 | What principle of correctness is there in those charming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?'' |
1616 | What principle of correctness is there in those charming words-- wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them? |
1616 | What remains after justice? |
1616 | What will this imitator be called? |
1616 | What, then, is a name? |
1616 | Which of these two notions do you prefer? |
1616 | Why are some verbs impersonal? |
1616 | Why are there only so many parts of speech, and on what principle are they divided? |
1616 | Why do substantives often differ in meaning from the verbs to which they are related, adverbs from adjectives? |
1616 | Why do words differing in origin coalesce in the same sound though retaining their differences of meaning? |
1616 | Why does the meaning of words depart so widely from their etymology? |
1616 | Why is the number of words so small in which the sound is an echo of the sense? |
1616 | Will he not look at the ideal which he has in his mind? |
1616 | Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good and evil? |
1616 | Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not? |
1616 | Will not the user be the man? |
1616 | Will you help me in the search? |
1616 | Would that be your view? |
1616 | Would you not say so? |
1616 | You know the distinction of soul and body? |
1616 | You were saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he named; are you still of that opinion? |
1616 | and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? |
1616 | and how did they receive separate meanings? |
1616 | and is correctness of names the voice of the majority? |
1616 | and the teacher will use the name well-- and well means like a teacher? |
1616 | and to what does he look? |
1616 | and which confines him more to the same spot,--desire or necessity? |
1616 | and will they be true names at the time of uttering them? |
1616 | have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man? |
1616 | or does he mean to imply that a perfect language can only be based on his own theory of ideas? |
1616 | or is there any other? |
1616 | or will he look to the form according to which he made the other? |
1616 | the carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use them? |
1616 | would these words be true or false? |
1616 | you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false? |