Questions

This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.

identifier	question
1571	For will any man of sense deny that you have spoken well?
1571	How shall I establish my words?
1571	and what part of it can be truly called a remnant of the land that then was?
1682	And ought not the country which the Gods praise to be praised by all mankind?
1682	And whom did they choose?
1682	And why should I say more?
1682	Are you from the Agora?
1682	For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times?
1682	For you know that there is to be a public funeral?
1682	MENEXENUS: And can you remember what Aspasia said?
1682	MENEXENUS: And what would you be able to say if you had to speak?
1682	MENEXENUS: And who is she?
1682	MENEXENUS: Do you think not, Socrates?
1682	MENEXENUS: Do you think that you could speak yourself if there should be a necessity, and if the Council were to choose you?
1682	MENEXENUS: Then why will you not rehearse what she said?
1682	SOCRATES: And what might you be doing at the Council?
1682	SOCRATES: But why, my friend, should he not have plenty to say?
1682	SOCRATES: Well, and do you not admire her, and are you not grateful for her speech?
1682	SOCRATES: Whence come you, Menexenus?
1682	What sort of a word will this be, and how shall we rightly begin the praises of these brave men?
1572	''And what was the subject of the poem?''
1572	''If they are the same, why have they different names; or if they are different, why have they the same name?''
1572	''What do you mean?''
1572	And how was the tale transferred to the poem of Solon?
1572	And is all that which we call an intelligible essence nothing at all, and only a name?
1572	And is the thought expressed in them to be attributed to the learning of the Egyptian priest, and not rather to the genius of Plato?
1572	And what was the tale about, Critias?
1572	And whence came the tradition to Egypt?
1572	And( b) what proof is there that the axis of the world revolves at all?
1572	Are not the words,''The truth of the story is a great advantage,''if we read between the lines, an indication of the fiction?
1572	Are we right in saying that there is one world, or that they are many and infinite?
1572	But are probabilities for which there is not a tittle of evidence, and which are without any parallel, to be deemed worthy of attention by the critic?
1572	But then why, when things are divided after their kinds, do they not cease from motion?
1572	Did Plato derive the legend of Atlantis from an Egyptian source?
1572	For how can that which is divided be like that which is undivided?
1572	Has not disease been regarded, like sin, sometimes as a negative and necessary, sometimes as a positive or malignant principle?
1572	Have not many discussions arisen about the Atomic theory in which a point has been confused with a material atom?
1572	Have not the natures of things been explained by imaginary entities, such as life or phlogiston, which exist in the mind only?
1572	How came the poem of Solon to disappear in antiquity?
1572	How can matter be conceived to exist without form?
1572	How can we doubt the word of the children of the Gods?
1572	How can we doubt the word of the children of the gods?
1572	How or where shall we find another if we abandon this?
1572	How, then, shall we settle this point, and what questions about the elements may be fairly raised?
1572	In what relation does the archetype stand to the Creator himself?
1572	Indeed, when it is in every direction similar, how can one rightly give to it names which imply opposition?
1572	Is there any self- existent fire?
1572	May they not have had, like the animals, an instinct of something more than they knew?
1572	May we not claim for Plato an anticipation of modern ideas as about some questions of astronomy and physics, so also about medicine?
1572	Or is there anything more, my dear Timaeus, which has been omitted?
1572	Or rather was not the proposal too singular to be forgotten?
1572	Or that which is changing be the copy of that which is unchanging?
1572	Or, how can the essences or forms of things be distinguished from the eternal ideas, or essence itself from the soul?
1572	Or, how could space or anything else have been eternal when time is only created?
1572	Or, how could the Creator have taken portions of an indivisible same?
1572	Or, how could the surfaces of geometrical figures have formed solids?
1572	Or, how could there have been a time when the world was not, if time was not?
1572	Or, how could there have been motion in the chaos when as yet time was not?
1572	Or, how did chaos come into existence, if not by the will of the Creator?
1572	Plato himself proposes the question, Why does motion continue at all when the elements are settled in their places?
1572	SOCRATES: And what about the procreation of children?
1572	SOCRATES: And what did we say of their education?
1572	SOCRATES: Did we not begin by separating the husbandmen and the artisans from the class of defenders of the State?
1572	SOCRATES: Do you remember what were the points of which I required you to speak?
1572	SOCRATES: One, two, three; but where, my dear Timaeus, is the fourth of those who were yesterday my guests and are to be my entertainers to- day?
1572	SOCRATES: Then have I now given you all the heads of our yesterday''s discussion?
1572	The prelude is charming, and is already accepted by us-- may we beg of you to proceed to the strain?
1572	This being supposed, let us proceed to the next stage: In the likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world?
1572	This is the greatest boon of sight: and of the lesser benefits why should I speak?
1572	Were they not to be trained in gymnastic, and music, and all other sorts of knowledge which were proper for them?
1572	What is this but the atoms of Democritus and the triangles of Plato?
1572	What makes fire burn?
1572	What nature are we to attribute to this new kind of being?
1572	When we accuse them of being under the influence of words, do we suppose that we are altogether free from this illusion?
1572	and do all those things which we call self- existent exist?
1572	or are only those things which we see, or in some way perceive through the bodily organs, truly existent, and nothing whatever besides them?
1572	or created, and had it a beginning?
1572	or in what does the story consist except in the war between the two rival powers and the submersion of both of them?
1572	or why did Plato, if the whole narrative was known to him, break off almost at the beginning of it?
1677	ALCIBIADES: And how long must I wait, Socrates, and who will be my teacher?
1677	ALCIBIADES: Certainly not: for then what use could I make of them?
1677	ALCIBIADES: How do you mean?
1677	ALCIBIADES: How do you mean?
1677	ALCIBIADES: How in the world, Socrates, do the words of the poet apply to him?
1677	ALCIBIADES: Of what do you suppose that I am thinking?
1677	ALCIBIADES: What is that, Socrates?
1677	ALCIBIADES: Why, Socrates, how is that possible?
1677	ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates, but you are speaking of a madman: surely you do not think that any one in his senses would venture to make such a prayer?
1677	And was not his prayer accomplished, and did not many and terrible evils thence arise, upon which I need not dilate?
1677	But perhaps we may consider the matter thus:-- ALCIBIADES: How?
1677	Can ignorance possibly be better than knowledge for any person in any conceivable case?
1677	Consider, my dear friend: may it not be quite otherwise?
1677	Did we not?
1677	Do you not speak of one who knows what is best in riding as a good rider?
1677	For tell me, by heaven, do you not think that in the city the wise are few, while the foolish, whom you call mad, are many?
1677	For we acknowledged that there are these two classes?
1677	In such a case should we not be right if we said that the state would be full of anarchy and lawlessness?
1677	May we not take an illustration from the artizans?
1677	Or do you believe that a man may labour under some other disease, even although he has none of these complaints?
1677	Or do you think that Orestes, had he been in his senses and knew what was best for him to do, would ever have dared to venture on such a crime?
1677	Or is there a difference between the clever artist and the wise man?
1677	Or what is your opinion?
1677	SOCRATES: A man must either be sick or be well?
1677	SOCRATES: And again, there are some who are in health?
1677	SOCRATES: And both to the person who is ignorant and everybody else?
1677	SOCRATES: And every disease ophthalmia?
1677	SOCRATES: And if he do the contrary, both he and the state will suffer?
1677	SOCRATES: And if you made many attempts, and each time failed to recognize Pericles, you would never attack him?
1677	SOCRATES: And in a similar way you speak of a good boxer or a good flute- player or a good performer in any other art?
1677	SOCRATES: And is every kind of ophthalmia a disease?
1677	SOCRATES: And must every sick person either have the gout, or be in a fever, or suffer from ophthalmia?
1677	SOCRATES: And some men seem to you to be discreet, and others the contrary?
1677	SOCRATES: And that there is no third or middle term between discretion and indiscretion?
1677	SOCRATES: And there can not be two opposites to one thing?
1677	SOCRATES: And there is still another case which will also perhaps appear strange to you, if you will consider it?
1677	SOCRATES: And they are not the same?
1677	SOCRATES: And would you accept them if you were likely to use them to a bad and mischievous end?
1677	SOCRATES: And you regard those as sensible who know what ought to be done or said?
1677	SOCRATES: And you use both the terms,''wise''and''foolish,''in reference to something?
1677	SOCRATES: Are you going, Alcibiades, to offer prayer to Zeus?
1677	SOCRATES: But how could we live in safety with so many crazy people?
1677	SOCRATES: But is it necessary that the man who is clever in any of these arts should be wise also in general?
1677	SOCRATES: But ought we not then, think you, either to fancy that we know or really to know, what we confidently propose to do or say?
1677	SOCRATES: But were you not saying that you would call the many unwise and the few wise?
1677	SOCRATES: Did you not acknowledge that madness was the opposite of discretion?
1677	SOCRATES: For you designed to kill, not the first who offered, but Pericles himself?
1677	SOCRATES: He did not intend to slay the first woman he came across, nor any one else''s mother, but only his own?
1677	SOCRATES: He must be either sane or insane?
1677	SOCRATES: Ignorance, then, is better for those who are in such a frame of mind, and have such ideas?
1677	SOCRATES: Madness, then, you consider to be the opposite of discretion?
1677	SOCRATES: Nor again, I suppose, a person who knows the art of war, but does not know whether it is better to go to war or for how long?
1677	SOCRATES: Nor are there any who are in neither state?
1677	SOCRATES: Nor would any one else, I fancy?
1677	SOCRATES: So I believe:--you do not think so?
1677	SOCRATES: That ignorance is bad then, it would appear, which is of the best and does not know what is best?
1677	SOCRATES: The latter will say or do what they ought not without their own knowledge?
1677	SOCRATES: The many are foolish, the few wise?
1677	SOCRATES: The senseless are those who do not know this?
1677	SOCRATES: Then madness and want of sense are the same?
1677	SOCRATES: Very good: and do you think the same about discretion and want of discretion?
1677	SOCRATES: We are agreed, then, that every form of ophthalmia is a disease, but not every disease ophthalmia?
1677	SOCRATES: Well, and are you of the same mind, as before?
1677	SOCRATES: Well, but if Orestes in like manner had not known his mother, do you think that he would ever have laid hands upon her?
1677	SOCRATES: While others are ailing?
1677	SOCRATES: Would you call a person wise who can give advice, but does not know whether or when it is better to carry out the advice?
1677	SOCRATES: Yet you would not accept the dominion and lordship of all the Hellenes and all the barbarians in exchange for your life?
1677	SOCRATES: You acknowledge that for some persons in certain cases the ignorance of some things is a good and not an evil, as you formerly supposed?
1677	SOCRATES:--If, then, you went indoors, and seeing him, did not know him, but thought that he was some one else, would you venture to slay him?
1677	Surely, they are not the only maladies which exist?
1677	Their envoys were also to ask,''Why the Gods always granted the victory to the Lacedaemonians?''
1677	We acknowledge that some are discreet, some foolish, and that some are mad?
1677	We think that some are sick; do we not?
1677	What do you think?
1677	You would distinguish the wise from the foolish?
1635	''Then why in this city of Athens, in which men of merit are always being sought after, is he not at once appointed a general?''
1635	''What about things of which he has no knowledge?''
1635	),''-- will the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode be better able to judge whether these lines are rightly expressed or not?
1635	Am I not right, Ion?
1635	And if I were to ask whether I and you became acquainted with this fact by the help of the same art of arithmetic, you would acknowledge that we did?
1635	And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be their general, and honour him, if he prove himself worthy?
1635	Are not these the themes of which Homer sings?
1635	Are you from your native city of Ephesus?
1635	As he does not know all of them, which of them will he know?
1635	But just now I should like to ask you a question: Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus, or to Homer only?
1635	But let me ask a prior question: You admit that there are differences of arts?
1635	Do you mean to say that the art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same?
1635	Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and do not want a general?
1635	Does not Homer speak of the same themes which all other poets handle?
1635	For the rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, but how can he interpret him well unless he knows what he means?
1635	Have you already forgotten what you were saying?
1635	ION: And what is there in Homer of which I have no knowledge?
1635	ION: Who may he be?
1635	ION: Why, what am I forgetting?
1635	Is not war his great argument?
1635	Let us consider this matter; is not the art of painting a whole?
1635	Must the same art have the same subject of knowledge, and different arts other subjects of knowledge?
1635	Now would you say that the art of the rhapsode or the art of medicine was better able to judge of the propriety of these lines?
1635	Now, Ion, will the charioteer or the physician be the better judge of the propriety of these lines?
1635	SOCRATES: And Homer in a better way?
1635	SOCRATES: And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most of the spectators?
1635	SOCRATES: And are you the best general, Ion?
1635	SOCRATES: And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what Hesiod says, about these matters in which they agree?
1635	SOCRATES: And do not the other poets sing of the same?
1635	SOCRATES: And do the Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes at the festival?
1635	SOCRATES: And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode?
1635	SOCRATES: And he who judges of the good will be the same as he who judges of the bad speakers?
1635	SOCRATES: And he will be the arithmetician?
1635	SOCRATES: And if a different knowledge, then a knowledge of different matters?
1635	SOCRATES: And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a horseman?
1635	SOCRATES: And if you knew the good speaker, you would also know the inferior speakers to be inferior?
1635	SOCRATES: And if you were a prophet, would you not be able to interpret them when they disagree as well as when they agree?
1635	SOCRATES: And in judging of the general''s art, do you judge of it as a general or a rhapsode?
1635	SOCRATES: And the art of the rhapsode is different from that of the charioteer?
1635	SOCRATES: And there are and have been many painters good and bad?
1635	SOCRATES: And this is true of all the arts;--that which we know with one art we do not know with the other?
1635	SOCRATES: And were you one of the competitors-- and did you succeed?
1635	SOCRATES: And who is he, and what is his name?
1635	SOCRATES: And will the reason be that this is his art, or will there be any other reason?
1635	SOCRATES: And you admitted that being different they would have different subjects of knowledge?
1635	SOCRATES: And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes?
1635	SOCRATES: And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the poets?
1635	SOCRATES: Are there any things about which Homer and Hesiod agree?
1635	SOCRATES: At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when exhorting his soldiers?
1635	SOCRATES: But he will know what a slave ought to say?
1635	SOCRATES: But he will know what a spinning- woman ought to say about the working of wool?
1635	SOCRATES: But how did you come to have this skill about Homer only, and not about Hesiod or the other poets?
1635	SOCRATES: Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings which, as I am saying, receive the power of the original magnet from one another?
1635	SOCRATES: Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot what the ruler of a sea- tossed vessel ought to say?
1635	SOCRATES: Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer?
1635	SOCRATES: Is not the same person skilful in both?
1635	SOCRATES: My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus?
1635	SOCRATES: Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter that which we know by the art of medicine?
1635	SOCRATES: Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say?
1635	SOCRATES: Surely not about things in Homer of which you have no knowledge?
1635	SOCRATES: Tell me, then, what I was intending to ask you,--whether this holds universally?
1635	SOCRATES: Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no right judgment of the sayings and doings of that art?
1635	SOCRATES: Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general?
1635	SOCRATES: Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything?
1635	SOCRATES: Then which will be a better judge of the lines which you were reciting from Homer, you or the charioteer?
1635	SOCRATES: Then you are the interpreters of interpreters?
1635	SOCRATES: Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general?
1635	SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1635	SOCRATES: What, in a worse way?
1635	SOCRATES: Why, does not Homer speak in many passages about arts?
1635	SOCRATES: You would argue, as I should, that when one art is of one kind of knowledge and another of another, they are different?
1635	Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs?
1635	Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians, and Ephesus is no mean city?
1635	Which do you prefer to be thought, dishonest or inspired?
1635	Would he rather be regarded as inspired or dishonest?''
1635	Would you like me to explain my meaning, Ion?
1635	You ask,''Why is this?''
1635	what is happening to you?
1681	And is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired by instruction?
1681	Are not certain things useful to the builder when he is building a house?
1681	But do we not deem those men who are most prosperous to be the happiest?
1681	But how do you mean, Socrates?
1681	But if we are further asked, What is that from which, if we were free, we should have no need of wealth?
1681	But surely, if they were a good, they could not appear bad for any one?
1681	But what particular thing is wealth, if not all things?
1681	But when have we the greatest and the most various needs, when we are sick or when we are well?
1681	But why do you not finish the argument which proves that gold and silver and other things which seem to be wealth are not real wealth?
1681	But why, as you have begun your argument so prettily, do you not go on with the rest?
1681	CRITIAS: And does injustice seem to you an evil or a good?
1681	CRITIAS: And if the wicked man has wealth and is willing to spend it, he will carry out his evil purposes?
1681	CRITIAS: I should like to follow up the argument, and will ask Eryxias whether he thinks that there are just and unjust men?
1681	CRITIAS: Well, and do you think that some men are intemperate?
1681	Can ignorance, for instance, be useful for knowledge, or disease for health, or vice for virtue?
1681	Can you repeat the discourse to us?
1681	Do we not employ in our intercourse with one another speech and violence(?)
1681	ERASISTRATUS: What would you wish to hear first?
1681	For do we not say that silver is useful because it enables us to supply our bodily needs?
1681	For instance, some men are gamblers, some drunkards, and some gluttons: and gambling and the love of drink and greediness are all desires?
1681	For what man of sense could ever be persuaded that the wisest and the richest are the same?
1681	For who has larger estates or more land at his disposal to cultivate if he please?
1681	He was about to add something more, when Critias interrupted him:--Do you really suppose so, Eryxias?
1681	Or how could he be the richest of men who might even have to go begging, because he had not wherewithal to live?
1681	Or is wisdom despised of men and can find no buyers, although cypress wood and marble of Pentelicus are eagerly bought by numerous purchasers?
1681	Or, again, should you call sickness a good or an evil?
1681	SOCRATES: And also the instruments by which wealth is procured?
1681	SOCRATES: And are not the healthy richer than the sick, since health is a possession more valuable than riches to the sick?
1681	SOCRATES: And are they not most prosperous who commit the fewest errors in respect either of themselves or of other men?
1681	SOCRATES: And do we think it possible that a thing should be useful for a purpose unless we have need of it for that purpose?
1681	SOCRATES: And does not this apply in other cases?
1681	SOCRATES: And he appears to you to be the richest who has goods of the greatest value?
1681	SOCRATES: And how would you answer another question?
1681	SOCRATES: And if any one gave you a choice, which of these would you prefer?
1681	SOCRATES: And if anything appeared to be more valuable than health, he would be the richest who possessed it?
1681	SOCRATES: And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not always to appear useless?
1681	SOCRATES: And so, too, physic is not useful to every one, but only to him who knows how to use it?
1681	SOCRATES: And the same is the case with everything else?
1681	SOCRATES: And therefore conditions which are not required for the existence of a thing are not useful for the production of it?
1681	SOCRATES: And we call those actions good which a man does for the sake of virtue?
1681	SOCRATES: And were we not saying before that it was the business of a good man and a gentleman to know where and how anything should be used?
1681	SOCRATES: And when we are in the worst state we have the greatest and most especial need and desire of bodily pleasures?
1681	SOCRATES: And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is taught by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction?
1681	SOCRATES: But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose?
1681	SOCRATES: But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is imparted by word of mouth if he is wholly deprived of the sense of hearing?
1681	SOCRATES: But can that which is evil be useful for virtue?
1681	SOCRATES: But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some precious stone, we should say that he was very rich?
1681	SOCRATES: But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine, shall we not regard wealth as useful for virtue?
1681	SOCRATES: Clearly we have not yet answered the question, What is wealth?
1681	SOCRATES: In which way do you think you would be the richer?
1681	SOCRATES: The reason is that the one is useless and the other useful?
1681	SOCRATES: The same to you, I said; have you any good news from Sicily to tell us?
1681	SOCRATES: Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs of the body, we must want them for that purpose?
1681	SOCRATES: Then if they procure by this means what they want for the purposes of life, that art will be useful towards life?
1681	SOCRATES: Then now we have to consider, What is money?
1681	SOCRATES: Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth is what is useful to this end?
1681	SOCRATES: Then you consider that a man never wants any of these things for the use of the body?
1681	SOCRATES: What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is useless to us is not wealth?
1681	Suppose that we are asked,''Is a horse useful to everybody?''
1681	The youth began by asking Prodicus, In what way did he think that riches were a good and in what an evil?
1681	There are persons, are there not, who teach music and grammar and other arts for pay, and thus procure those things of which they stand in need?
1681	What the Sicilians are doing, or how they are disposed towards our city?
1681	Where would be the advantage of wisdom then?
1681	and various other things?
1681	can we give an answer?
1681	whereas he who is short of means can not do what he fain would, and therefore does not sin?
1681	will not our reply be,''No, but only to those who know how to use a horse?''
1584	--or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtue which is concerned with the use of weapons--''What is Courage?''
1584	Am I not correct in saying so, Laches?
1584	And I will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage?
1584	And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the youths?
1584	And is not that generally thought to be courage?
1584	And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?
1584	Are you not risking the greatest of your possessions?
1584	But a better and more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask,''What is Virtue?''
1584	But what say you of the matter of which we were beginning to speak-- the art of fighting in armour?
1584	But why, instead of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates about the education of the youths?
1584	Do you imagine that I should call little children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none?
1584	Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man?
1584	Do you not agree to that, Laches?
1584	Do you now understand what I mean?
1584	Do you or do you not agree with me?
1584	For how can we advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we are wholly ignorant?
1584	For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is better?
1584	Had not many a man better never get up from a sick bed?
1584	How is this contradiction to be solved?
1584	In all things small as well as great?
1584	In the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue--''What is Courage?''
1584	Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?
1584	Is that a practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed?
1584	Is this a slight matter about which you and Lysimachus are deliberating?
1584	LACHES: How flying?
1584	LACHES: I have but one feeling, Nicias, or( shall I say?)
1584	LACHES: Indeed I do: who but he?
1584	LACHES: To what extent and what principle do you mean?
1584	LACHES: Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons, who have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some things?
1584	LACHES: What can he possibly mean, Socrates?
1584	LACHES: What do you mean, Socrates?
1584	LACHES: Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?
1584	LYSIMACHUS: Why do you say that, Nicias?
1584	LYSIMACHUS: Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this sort?
1584	LYSIMACHUS: Why, yes, Socrates; what else am I to do?
1584	Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires,''What sort of intelligence?''
1584	Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know the dangers of disease?
1584	May not death often be the better of the two?
1584	Must we not select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to conduce?
1584	NICIAS: And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who had better die, and to those who had better live?
1584	NICIAS: What is that?
1584	NICIAS: Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or ought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?
1584	SOCRATES: And are we right in saying so?
1584	SOCRATES: And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the end is the soul of youth?
1584	SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful?
1584	SOCRATES: And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?
1584	SOCRATES: And for this reason, as I imagine,--because a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers?
1584	SOCRATES: And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?
1584	SOCRATES: And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?
1584	SOCRATES: And is this condition of ours satisfactory?
1584	SOCRATES: And shall we invite Nicias to join us?
1584	SOCRATES: And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who fights flying, instead of remaining?
1584	SOCRATES: And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call quickness?
1584	SOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with our present view?
1584	SOCRATES: And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?
1584	SOCRATES: And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils?
1584	SOCRATES: And the knowledge of these things you call courage?
1584	SOCRATES: And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time?
1584	SOCRATES: And we are enquiring, Which of us is skilful or successful in the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?
1584	SOCRATES: And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse and at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle?
1584	SOCRATES: And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he too is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view?
1584	SOCRATES: And would you do so too, Melesias?
1584	SOCRATES: And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?
1584	SOCRATES: But as to the epithet''wise,''--wise in what?
1584	SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?
1584	SOCRATES: But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?
1584	SOCRATES: But what is this knowledge then, and of what?
1584	SOCRATES: But what would you say of a foolish endurance?
1584	SOCRATES: But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the art of which we want to find the masters?
1584	SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the track, and not be lazy?
1584	SOCRATES: But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the other?
1584	SOCRATES: Do you agree with me about the parts?
1584	SOCRATES: Do you hear him, Laches?
1584	SOCRATES: Do you understand his meaning, Laches?
1584	SOCRATES: Great care, then, is required in this matter?
1584	SOCRATES: His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?
1584	SOCRATES: How so?
1584	SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous who remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?
1584	SOCRATES: Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one of us who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating?
1584	SOCRATES: Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?
1584	SOCRATES: Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?
1584	SOCRATES: Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?
1584	SOCRATES: Then must we not first know the nature of virtue?
1584	SOCRATES: Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select?
1584	SOCRATES: Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage-- for it is not noble, but courage is noble?
1584	SOCRATES: Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue?
1584	SOCRATES: Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?
1584	SOCRATES: What is Laches saying, Nicias?
1584	SOCRATES: What is it, Nicias?
1584	SOCRATES: What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the majority?
1584	SOCRATES: Why do you say so, Laches?
1584	Should we not select him who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?
1584	Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers?
1584	Tell me, my boys, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?
1584	There is this sort of courage-- is there not, Laches?
1584	What do you say to that alteration in your statement?
1584	What do you say, Socrates-- will you comply?
1584	What do you say?
1584	Who are they who, having been inferior persons, have become under your care good and noble?
1584	Would you not say the same?
1584	do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear?
1584	or are the physicians the same as the courageous?
1584	or do the courageous know them?
1642	''Are they really true?''
1642	''Is all the just pious?''
1642	''Then what part of justice is piety?''
1642	And must you not allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another?
1642	Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?
1642	As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman''s art they are benefited and improved, are they not?
1642	But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me-- clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside?
1642	But Socrates would like first of all to have a more satisfactory answer to the question,''What is piety?''
1642	But although they are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return?
1642	But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better?
1642	But in what way does he say that you corrupt the young?
1642	But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is''piety''?
1642	But may there not be differences of opinion, as among men, so also among the gods?
1642	But what is the charge which he brings against you?
1642	But what is the meaning of''attending''to the gods?
1642	Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?
1642	Do you dissent?
1642	Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?
1642	Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?
1642	Do you not agree?
1642	Do you not agree?
1642	Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: And who is he?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: How do you mean, Socrates?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now saying, what pleases them?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: Why not, Socrates?
1642	For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?
1642	Have you forgotten?
1642	How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act?
1642	I suppose that you follow me now?
1642	Is it not so?
1642	Is not piety in every action always the same?
1642	Is not that true?
1642	Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship- builder with a view to the attainment of some result?
1642	SOCRATES: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs?
1642	SOCRATES: And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to them-- do you see?
1642	SOCRATES: And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them?
1642	SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?
1642	SOCRATES: And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given?
1642	SOCRATES: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
1642	SOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious?
1642	SOCRATES: And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish?
1642	SOCRATES: And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one?
1642	SOCRATES: And of what is he accused?
1642	SOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?
1642	SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature?
1642	SOCRATES: And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
1642	SOCRATES: And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?
1642	SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?
1642	SOCRATES: And well said?
1642	SOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety?
1642	SOCRATES: And what is your suit, Euthyphro?
1642	SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger?
1642	SOCRATES: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away?
1642	SOCRATES: As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?
1642	SOCRATES: As there is an art which ministers to the house- builder with a view to the building of a house?
1642	SOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
1642	SOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished?
1642	SOCRATES: But for their good?
1642	SOCRATES: But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: But what differences are there which can not be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another?
1642	SOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?
1642	SOCRATES: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety?
1642	SOCRATES: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?
1642	SOCRATES: In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?--that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
1642	SOCRATES: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering?
1642	SOCRATES: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
1642	SOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
1642	SOCRATES: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?
1642	SOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety-- that I can not away with these stories about the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in view the attainment of some object-- would you not say of health?
1642	SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?
1642	SOCRATES: Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
1642	SOCRATES: Of whom?
1642	SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by measuring?
1642	SOCRATES: Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others?
1642	SOCRATES: Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?
1642	SOCRATES: Tell me then, oh tell me-- what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations?
1642	SOCRATES: Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another?
1642	SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?
1642	SOCRATES: Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety?
1642	SOCRATES: Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part?
1642	SOCRATES: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?
1642	SOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil- doer ought to be let off?
1642	SOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?
1642	SOCRATES: What is the charge?
1642	SOCRATES: Who is he?
1642	SOCRATES: Why, has the fugitive wings?
1642	Shall I tell you in what respect?
1642	Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?
1642	Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner:''Is all the pious just?''
1642	Surely you can not be concerned in a suit before the King, like myself?
1642	Tell me, then-- Is not that which is pious necessarily just?
1642	To what end do we serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish?
1642	Was not that said?
1642	Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods?
1642	What are they?
1642	What do you say?
1642	What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them?
1642	What should I be good for without it?
1642	What then is piety?
1642	Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?
1642	Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
1642	You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies?
1642	and what are you doing in the Porch of the King Archon?
1642	are you the pursuer or the defendant?
1642	my companion, and will you leave me in despair?
1642	my good man?
1642	or, is that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?
1673	And that person is he who is good at calculation-- the arithmetician?
1673	But is it better to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally?
1673	But to return: what say you of Odysseus and Achilles?
1673	EUDICUS: Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display which Hippias has been making?
1673	For example, had a man better have a rudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily?
1673	For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times?
1673	HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; what makes you say so?
1673	HIPPIAS: Certainly; how can I have any other?
1673	HIPPIAS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1673	HIPPIAS: Where is that?
1673	He who runs slowly voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily?
1673	I will therefore remind you of what you were saying: were you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and wily?
1673	Is he not the good man?
1673	Is not he who is better made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and postures voluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily?
1673	Is not the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about diagrams; and he is-- the geometrician?
1673	Must it not be so?
1673	Must not justice, at all events, be one of these?
1673	Please to answer once more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both?
1673	SOCRATES: And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is not the same as the false?
1673	SOCRATES: And are you not likewise said to speak truly about calculation?
1673	SOCRATES: And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters of calculation, are you not also the best?
1673	SOCRATES: And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well?
1673	SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of astronomy?
1673	SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute and all other things?
1673	SOCRATES: And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they wise?
1673	SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs badly?
1673	SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs well?
1673	SOCRATES: And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is a bad runner?
1673	SOCRATES: And if a species of doing, a species of action?
1673	SOCRATES: And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust?
1673	SOCRATES: And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if you pleased?
1673	SOCRATES: And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what they do?
1673	SOCRATES: And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark?
1673	SOCRATES: And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match, to fall, or to throw another?
1673	SOCRATES: And is not blinking a defect in the eyes?
1673	SOCRATES: And is not running a species of doing?
1673	SOCRATES: And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action?
1673	SOCRATES: And is that your own opinion, Hippias?
1673	SOCRATES: And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to be false as well as true?
1673	SOCRATES: And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best state possible?
1673	SOCRATES: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and arithmetician?
1673	SOCRATES: And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal?
1673	SOCRATES: And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man is he who has the bad?
1673	SOCRATES: And the true differ from the false-- the true and the false are the very opposite of each other?
1673	SOCRATES: And there are bad runners?
1673	SOCRATES: And therefore you would be the most able to tell the truth about these matters, would you not?
1673	SOCRATES: And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is to do well?
1673	SOCRATES: And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to speak falsely about calculation?
1673	SOCRATES: And what do you say about grace, Hippias?
1673	SOCRATES: And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune?
1673	SOCRATES: And what would you say of the art of medicine;--has not the mind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art?
1673	SOCRATES: And what would you say of the characters of slaves?
1673	SOCRATES: And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: And would you choose to possess goods or evils?
1673	SOCRATES: And would you rather always have eyes with which you might voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily blink?
1673	SOCRATES: And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or involuntarily lame?
1673	SOCRATES: Are you not also skilled in geometry?
1673	SOCRATES: But is not lameness a defect or deformity?
1673	SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true about the same matters?
1673	SOCRATES: Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do things, or that they have the power to do things?
1673	SOCRATES: Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about number, or when he is making a calculation?
1673	SOCRATES: He and no one else is good at it?
1673	SOCRATES: I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to which are the better-- those who err voluntarily or involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the power to speak falsely?
1673	SOCRATES: Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters?
1673	SOCRATES: Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false?
1673	SOCRATES: O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find a difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times over?
1673	SOCRATES: Shall we examine other instances?
1673	SOCRATES: That would be the better horse?
1673	SOCRATES: The involuntary is the worse of the two?
1673	SOCRATES: The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and art-- and these either one or both of them are elements of justice?
1673	SOCRATES: Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than Achilles?
1673	SOCRATES: Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is ignorant can not be false?
1673	SOCRATES: Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a race than he who does them voluntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in a race?
1673	SOCRATES: Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and slowness is an evil quality?
1673	SOCRATES: Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false?
1673	SOCRATES: Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the involuntary?
1673	SOCRATES: Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts ill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill?
1673	SOCRATES: Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who are false about calculation and number?
1673	SOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul?
1673	SOCRATES: Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind which errs voluntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and truly about calculation?
1673	SOCRATES: Then they are prudent, I suppose?
1673	SOCRATES: Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame?
1673	SOCRATES: Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things, if there be such a man, will be the good man?
1673	SOCRATES: Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are they not?
1673	SOCRATES: Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are to be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise?
1673	SOCRATES: Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base and dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery?
1673	SOCRATES: Well, and does not the same hold in that science also?
1673	SOCRATES: Well, but at a wrestling match-- which is the better wrestler, he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: Which of the two then is a better runner?
1673	SOCRATES: Who can they be?
1673	SOCRATES: Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation?
1673	SOCRATES: Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be better than the involuntary?
1673	Which is the better of the two?
1673	Why do you not either refute his words, if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in commending him?
1673	Will you tell me, and then I shall perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles wily?
1673	Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters of calculation than you would be, if you chose?
1673	Would you not call a man able who could do that?
1673	and in what particular does either surpass the other?
1600	''And how, Socrates,''she said with a smile,''can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?''
1600	''And is that which is not wise, ignorant?
1600	''And is this wish and this desire common to all?
1600	''And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?''
1600	''And what does he gain who possesses the good?''
1600	''And what may that be?''
1600	''And what,''I said,''is his power?''
1600	''And who are they?''
1600	''And who,''I said,''was his father, and who his mother?''
1600	''And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?''
1600	''And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?''
1600	''But how can he be a god who has no portion in what is either good or fair?''
1600	''But who then, Diotima,''I said,''are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?''
1600	''But why of generation?''
1600	''By those who know or by those who do not know?''
1600	''Do you know what I am meditating?
1600	''How can that be?''
1600	''Hush,''she cried;''must that be foul which is not fair?''
1600	''Right opinion,''she replied;''which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge( for how can knowledge be devoid of reason?
1600	''Still,''she said,''the answer suggests a further question: What is given by the possession of beauty?''
1600	''Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further,''she said,''what is the manner of the pursuit?
1600	''Then love,''she said,''may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?''
1600	''To which must be added that they love the possession of the good?''
1600	''What are you meditating?''
1600	''What do you mean, Diotima,''I said,''is love then evil and foul?''
1600	''What is he, Diotima?''
1600	''What then is Love?''
1600	''What then?''
1600	''What then?''
1600	''Why, then,''she rejoined,''are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of them?
1600	''Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your revels?
1600	''Would you desire better witness?''
1600	And I remember her once saying to me,''What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire?
1600	And Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said: Tell me, son of Acumenus, was there not reason in my fears?
1600	And am I not right in asserting that there are two goddesses?
1600	And are you not a flute- player?
1600	And as you have spoken so eloquently of his nature, may I ask you further, Whether love is the love of something or of nothing?
1600	And does he possess, or does he not possess, that which he loves and desires?
1600	And first tell me, he said, were you present at this meeting?
1600	And if this is true, Love is the love of beauty and not of deformity?
1600	And now, said Socrates, I will ask about Love:--Is Love of something or of nothing?
1600	And suppose further, that when he saw their perplexity he said:''Do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another''s company?
1600	And the admission has been already made that Love is of something which a man wants and has not?
1600	And when you say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future?''
1600	And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty?
1600	And you would say the same of a mother?
1600	Are they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him?
1600	Are we to have neither conversation nor singing over our cups; but simply to drink as if we were thirsty?
1600	But Love desires the beautiful; and then arises the question, What does he desire of the beautiful?
1600	But before the many you would not be ashamed, if you thought that you were doing something disgraceful in their presence?
1600	But first tell me; if I come in shall we have the understanding of which I spoke( supra Will you have a very drunken man?
1600	But what have you done with Socrates?
1600	But why again does this extend not only to men but also to animals?
1600	By Heracles, he said, what is this?
1600	By all means; but who makes the third partner in our revels?
1600	Can you tell me why?''
1600	Consider then: How can the drinking be made easiest?
1600	Do you expect to shoot your bolt and escape, Aristophanes?
1600	Eryximachus said: What is this, Alcibiades?
1600	First, is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man?
1600	For he who is anything can not want to be that which he is?
1600	For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms?
1600	He desires, of course, the possession of the beautiful;--but what is given by that?
1600	He must agree with us-- must he not?
1600	I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words-- who could listen to them without amazement?
1600	I asked;''Is he mortal?''
1600	I said,''O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well; but, assuming Love to be such as you say, what is the use of him to men?''
1600	I was astonished at her words, and said:''Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima?''
1600	I will also tell, if you please-- and indeed I am bound to tell-- of his courage in battle; for who but he saved my life?
1600	Is he not like a Silenus in this?
1600	Is that the meaning of your praise?
1600	Is there anything?''
1600	Man may be supposed to act thus from reason; but why should animals have these passionate feelings?
1600	May I say without impiety or offence, that of all the blessed gods he is the most blessed because he is the fairest and best?
1600	Of what am I speaking?
1600	On his appearing he and the host jest a little; the question is then asked by Pausanias, one of the guests,''What shall they do about drinking?
1600	Or shall I crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away?
1600	Or who would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger?
1600	Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say?
1600	See you how fond he is of the fair?
1600	She said to me:''And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?''
1600	So I gave him a shake, and I said:''Socrates, are you asleep?''
1600	Socrates asks: Who are his father and mother?
1600	That is, of a brother or sister?
1600	The same to you, said Eryximachus; but what shall we do?
1600	Then Love wants and has not beauty?
1600	Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good?
1600	Then it must have been a long while ago, he said; and who told you-- did Socrates?
1600	Then would you still say that love is beautiful?
1600	Then, said Glaucon, let us have the tale over again; is not the road to Athens just made for conversation?
1600	What are you about?
1600	What do you suppose must have been my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my own dishonour?
1600	What do you think, Eryximachus?
1600	What do you think?
1600	What do you want?
1600	What say you to going with me unasked?
1600	Who will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing?
1600	Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory?
1600	Who would not sooner have these children of the mind than the ordinary human ones?
1600	Who, if not you, should be the reporter of the words of your friend?
1600	Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones?
1600	Why then is there all this flutter and excitement about love?
1600	Why, my dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse?
1600	Will that be agreeable to you?
1600	Will you drink with me or not?''
1600	Will you laugh at me because I am drunk?
1600	Would he who is great, desire to be great, or he who is strong, desire to be strong?
1600	Would that be an ignoble life?''
1600	Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning: Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something?
1600	You were quite right in coming, said Agathon; but where is he himself?
1600	and do all men always desire their own good, or only some men?--what say you?''
1600	and was I not a true prophet when I said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that I should be in a strait?
1600	and what is the object which they have in view?
1600	do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?''
1600	etc.)?
1600	said Alcibiades: shall I attack him and inflict the punishment before you all?
1600	said Socrates; are you going to raise a laugh at my expense?
1600	what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love?
1580	), said he; did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate?
1580	Admitting this view, I ask of you, what good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the science of itself, effect?
1580	And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her?
1580	And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their own business only?
1580	And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice?
1580	And can that be good which does not make men good?
1580	And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also?
1580	And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely?
1580	And he who does so does his duty?
1580	And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in what relates to these?
1580	And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous?
1580	And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness?
1580	And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness and agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad?
1580	And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far better than quietness and slowness?
1580	And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather than quietly and slowly?
1580	And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a quietness?
1580	And is temperance a good?
1580	And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject- matter of health and disease?
1580	And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of what?
1580	And the inference is that temperance can not be modesty-- if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good?
1580	And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation?
1580	And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium?
1580	And the temperate are also good?
1580	And they are right, and you would agree with them?
1580	And to read quickly or slowly?
1580	And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this?
1580	And what if I am?
1580	And what is it?
1580	And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business?
1580	And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily, or quietly and slowly?
1580	And which, I said, is better-- facility in learning, or difficulty in learning?
1580	And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use?
1580	And will wisdom give health?
1580	And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what was not your own business?
1580	And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate in doing another''s work, as well as in doing their own?
1580	And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good?
1580	Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom?
1580	Are you right, Charmides?
1580	But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine-- what is the subject of temperance or wisdom?
1580	But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge of medicine?
1580	But even if knowledge can know itself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what we do not know?
1580	But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice?
1580	But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to prove beneficial, and when not?
1580	But of what is this knowledge?
1580	But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no subject- matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences?
1580	But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always good?
1580	But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom?
1580	But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this?
1580	But where does Dr. Jackson find any such notion as this in Plato or anywhere in ancient philosophy?
1580	But which is best when you are at the writing- master''s, to write the same letters quickly or quietly?
1580	But which most tends to make him happy?
1580	But why do you not call him, and show him to us?
1580	Can you show me any such result of them?
1580	Can you tell me?
1580	Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates?
1580	Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself, and of all other desires?
1580	Did you ever observe that this is what they say?
1580	Do you admit that?
1580	Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking?
1580	Do you mean that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of good actions, is temperance?
1580	For is not the discovery of things as they truly are, a good common to all mankind?
1580	For why should Aristotle, because he has quoted several Dialogues of Plato, have quoted them all?
1580	Has he not a beautiful face?
1580	Have we not long ago asseverated that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing else?
1580	He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right, in relation to health and disease?
1580	How can you think that I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself?
1580	How is that?
1580	How is this riddle to be explained?
1580	How so?
1580	How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage?
1580	How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building?
1580	I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same?
1580	I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another also?
1580	I said, or without my consent?
1580	I said; is not this rather the effect of medicine?
1580	I was, he replied; but what is your drift?
1580	In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is Temperance?
1580	Is it of him you are speaking or of some one else?
1580	Is not medicine, I said, the science of health?
1580	Is not that true?
1580	Is not that true?
1580	Is not that true?
1580	Is that true?
1580	Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes?
1580	Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something else?
1580	Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will he proceed?
1580	May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game of draughts?
1580	Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom is the science?
1580	Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes?
1580	Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has no object of fear?
1580	Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,--do they not each of them do their own work?
1580	Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half?
1580	Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort?
1580	Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them?
1580	Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general?
1580	Or of computation?
1580	Or of health?
1580	Or of working in brass?
1580	Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves?
1580	Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying;--have you or have you not this quality of temperance?
1580	Shall I tell you the nature of the difficulty?
1580	Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this?
1580	Shall we speak of the soul and its qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, as feminine or neuter?
1580	That is your meaning?
1580	The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate of human beings, is asked by Socrates,''What is Temperance?''
1580	Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good?
1580	Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but not what he knows?
1580	Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows?
1580	Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?
1580	Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one''s own business; not at least in this way, or doing things of this sort?
1580	Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest agility and quickness, is noblest and best?
1580	Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance?
1580	Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, naked and undisguised?
1580	Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good?
1580	Think over all this, and, like a brave youth, tell me-- What is temperance?
1580	Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name?
1580	Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is noble?
1580	Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question-- Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something?
1580	Was he a fool who told you, Charmides?
1580	Was he right who affirmed that?
1580	Was not that your statement?
1580	Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom-- to know what is known and what is unknown to us?
1580	Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, and is of a nature to be a science of something?
1580	Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says,''Modesty is not good for a needy man''?
1580	Were we not right in making that admission?
1580	What do you mean?
1580	What do you mean?
1580	What is that?
1580	What makes you think so?
1580	Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater?
1580	Who is he, I said; and who is his father?
1580	Why not, I said; but will he come?
1580	Why not?
1580	With my consent?
1580	Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?
1580	Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy?
1580	You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about?
1580	and in what cases do you mean?
1580	or do all equally make him happy?
1580	or must the craftsman necessarily know when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work which he is doing?
1580	the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing?
1579	''But how is this?''
1579	After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, asks him a new question:''What is friendship?
1579	Am I not right?
1579	And also the vessel which contains the wine?
1579	And another disputed point is, which is the fairer?
1579	And are they right in saying this?
1579	And can he who is not loved be a friend?
1579	And did you ever behave ill to your father or your mother?
1579	And disease is an enemy?
1579	And disease is an evil?
1579	And do they entrust their property to him rather than to you?
1579	And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son?
1579	And do they then permit you to do what you like, and never rebuke you or hinder you from doing what you desire?
1579	And do they trust a hireling more than you?
1579	And does not this seem to put us in the right way?
1579	And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his son he will commit to us?
1579	And friends they can not be, unless they value one another?
1579	And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive and object?
1579	And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a reason?
1579	And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that like must love like?
1579	And he is in want of that of which he is deprived?
1579	And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the sake of health?
1579	And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?
1579	And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?
1579	And health is also dear?
1579	And if dear, then dear for the sake of something?
1579	And if neither can be of any use to the other, how can they be loved by one another?
1579	And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other?
1579	And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge, can you have any conceit of knowledge?
1579	And is he a slave or a free man?
1579	And is he a slave?
1579	And is health a friend, or not a friend?
1579	And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dear nor hateful to him?
1579	And may not the same be said of the friend?
1579	And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?
1579	And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as far as we are useless to them?
1579	And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the evil uncongenial to every one?
1579	And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful thing?
1579	And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous admissions?
1579	And that of which he is in want is dear to him?
1579	And that something dear involves something else dear?
1579	And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends of the art of medicine?
1579	And the good is loved for the sake of the evil?
1579	And the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy?
1579	And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated?
1579	And the more vain- glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture of them?
1579	And the same of thirst and the other desires,--that they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has perished?
1579	And there is Ctesippus himself: do you see him?
1579	And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the son will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his fingers?
1579	And what does he do with you?
1579	And what is this building, I asked; and what sort of entertainment have you?
1579	And what of health?
1579	And which is the nobler?
1579	And who is yours?
1579	And why do you not ask him?
1579	And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of friendship be erroneous?
1579	And yet whiteness would be present in them?
1579	And, if so, not the lover, but the beloved, is the friend or dear one?
1579	Answer me now: Are you your own master, or do they not even allow that?
1579	Are you disposed, he said, to go with me and see them?
1579	Aye, I said; and about your neighbour, too, does not the same rule hold as about your father?
1579	But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule- cart if you like;--they will permit that?
1579	But do you think that any one is happy who is in the condition of a slave, and who can not do what he likes?
1579	But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen vessel which contains them, equally with his son?
1579	But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both together, what are we to say?
1579	But if this can not be, the lover will be the friend of that which is loved?
1579	But is not some less exclusive form of friendship better suited to the condition and nature of man?
1579	But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not evil should perish with it?
1579	But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some other cause of friendship?
1579	But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is like; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is good?
1579	But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this-- are we not indeed entirely wrong?
1579	But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want?
1579	But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the presence of white in them-- they would not be white any more than black?
1579	But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil?
1579	But the sick loves him, because he is sick?
1579	But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be sufficient for himself?
1579	But then arises the consideration, how should these friends in youth or friends of the past regard or be regarded by one another?
1579	But what if the lover is not loved in return?
1579	But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or good?
1579	By heaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect?
1579	Can they now?
1579	Do any remain?
1579	Do they want you to be happy, and yet hinder you from doing what you like?
1579	Do you agree?
1579	Do you agree?
1579	Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the other, they are mutual friends?
1579	Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person whom he says that you love?
1579	Do you not agree with me?
1579	Do you not agree?
1579	Here, intending to revise the argument, I said: Can we point out any difference between the congenial and the like?
1579	How can such persons ever be induced to value one another?
1579	How do you mean?
1579	How do you mean?
1579	How so?
1579	I mean, for instance, if he knew that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would save him, he would value the wine?
1579	I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in our conclusions?
1579	I shall not ask which is the richer of the two, I said; for you are friends, are you not?
1579	I turned to Menexenus, and said: Son of Demophon, which of you two youths is the elder?
1579	If he is satisfied that you know more of housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs himself, or will he commit them to you?
1579	In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the colour or ointment?
1579	In that case, the one loves, and the other is loved?
1579	Is not friendship, even more than love, liable to be swayed by the caprices of fancy?
1579	Is not that true?
1579	Is not that true?
1579	Is not this rather the true state of the case?
1579	Is not this the nature of the good-- to be loved by us who are placed between the two, because of the evil?
1579	Is that also a matter of dispute?
1579	Is that good or evil, or neither?
1579	May not desire be the source of friendship?
1579	May we then infer that the good is the friend?
1579	Nay, but what do you think?
1579	Neither can he love that which he does not desire?
1579	Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love anybody else, in so far as they are useless to them?
1579	No answer is given in the Lysis to the question,''What is Friendship?''
1579	Now is not that ridiculous?
1579	Or are both friends?
1579	Or is, perhaps, even hated?
1579	Or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain, but not so as to be hurtful?
1579	Or rather is there anything to be done?
1579	Or rather shall I say, that to ask what either will be then or will not be is ridiculous, for who knows?
1579	Socrates asks Lysis whether his father and mother do not love him very much?
1579	Thank you, I said; and is there any teacher there?
1579	That I may make a fool of myself?
1579	The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend of the physician-- is he not?
1579	Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial to one another?
1579	Then nothing which does not love in return is beloved by a lover?
1579	Then now we know how to answer the question''Who are friends?''
1579	Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one another?
1579	Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by reason of the presence of evil?
1579	Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good because of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the friend?
1579	Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil, but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now?
1579	Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of the enemy?
1579	Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?
1579	Then what can be the reason, Lysis, I said, why they allow you to do the one and not the other?
1579	Then what is to be done?
1579	Then which is the friend of which?
1579	Then you have a master?
1579	Then, I said, may no one use the whip to the mules?
1579	Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evil will remain?
1579	Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of love or friendship?
1579	They had another perplexity: 8) How could one of the noblest feelings of human nature be so near to one of the most detestable corruptions of it?
1579	They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?
1579	This we do know, that in our present condition hunger may injure us, and may also benefit us:--Is not that true?
1579	Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of some one; is he not?
1579	Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the intemperate, or the good of the bad?
1579	What do the rest of you say?
1579	What do you mean?
1579	What do you mean?
1579	What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey, and made the capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult?
1579	When one man loves another, which is the friend-- he who loves, or he who is loved?
1579	Who are you, I said; and where am I to come?
1579	Who is Lysis?
1579	Whom are we to call friends to one another?
1579	Whom then will they allow?
1579	Why do you say so?
1579	Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them?
1579	Will you tell me by what words or actions I may become endeared to my love?
1579	Yes, I said; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me, and who is the favourite among you?
1579	Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer?
1579	You do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you?
1579	You remember that?
1579	You think not?
1579	You think that he is right?
1579	You will agree to that?
1579	You would agree-- would you not?
1579	and allow him to do what he likes, when they prohibit you?
1579	and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil?
1579	and do they pay him for this?
1579	and may he do what he likes with the horses?
1579	and may not the other theory have been only a long story about nothing?
1579	and what can that final cause or end of friendship be, other than the good?
1579	any more than in the Charmides to the question,''What is Temperance?''
1579	but may not that which is neither good nor evil still in some cases be the friend of the good?
1579	how can you be making and singing hymns in honour of yourself before you have won?
1579	will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, we should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar desire?
1636	''But did I call this"love"?
1636	Am I not right, Phaedrus?
1636	Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus?
1636	And are not they held to be the wisest physicians who have the greatest distrust of their art?
1636	And do you tell me, instead, what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law court-- are they not contending?
1636	And if I am to add the praises of the non- lover what will become of me?
1636	And if he came to his right mind, would he ever imagine that the desires were good which he conceived when in his wrong mind?
1636	And now, dear Phaedrus, I shall pause for an instant to ask whether you do not think me, as I appear to myself, inspired?
1636	And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine that I am going to improve upon the ingenuity of Lysias?
1636	And what is good or bad writing or speaking?
1636	But I should like to know whether you have the same feeling as I have about the rhetoricians?
1636	But how much is left?
1636	But if I am to read, where would you please to sit?
1636	But if this be true, must not the soul be the self- moving, and therefore of necessity unbegotten and immortal?
1636	But let me ask you, friend: have we not reached the plane- tree to which you were conducting us?
1636	But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthily?
1636	But what do you mean?
1636	But what pleasure or consolation can the beloved be receiving all this time?
1636	But why did you make your second oration so much finer than the first?
1636	But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech?
1636	Can I be wrong in supposing that Lysias gave you a feast of discourse?
1636	Can we suppose''the young man to have told such lies''about his master while he was still alive?
1636	Can we wonder that few of them''come sweetly from nature,''while ten thousand reviewers( mala murioi) are engaged in dissecting them?
1636	Do we see as clearly as Hippocrates''that the nature of the body can only be understood as a whole''?
1636	Do you ever cross the border?
1636	Do you not perceive that I am already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me?
1636	Do you think that a lover only can be a firm friend?
1636	Do you?
1636	Does he not define probability to be that which the many think?
1636	For do we not often make''the worse appear the better cause;''and do not''both parties sometimes agree to tell lies''?
1636	For example, are we to attribute his tripartite division of the soul to the gods?
1636	For example, when he is speaking of the soul does he mean the human or the divine soul?
1636	For lovers repent--''SOCRATES: Enough:--Now, shall I point out the rhetorical error of those words?
1636	For this is a necessary preliminary to the other question-- How is the non- lover to be distinguished from the lover?
1636	For what should a man live if not for the pleasures of discourse?
1636	How could there have been so much cultivation, so much diligence in writing, and so little mind or real creative power?
1636	Is he serious, again, in regarding love as''a madness''?
1636	Is not all literature passing into criticism, just as Athenian literature in the age of Plato was degenerating into sophistry and rhetoric?
1636	Is not legislation too a sort of literary effort, and might not statesmanship be described as the''art of enchanting''the house?
1636	Is not pleading''an art of speaking unconnected with the truth''?
1636	Is not the discourse excellent, more especially in the matter of the language?
1636	Is there any principle in them?
1636	Lysias then, I suppose, was in the town?
1636	May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry.--Anything more?
1636	Might he not argue,''that a rational being should not follow the dictates of passion in the most important act of his or her life''?
1636	Might he not ask, whether we''care more for the truth of religion, or for the speaker and the country from which the truth comes''?
1636	Nor, until they adopt our method of reading and writing, can we admit that they write by rules of art?
1636	Now I have no leisure for such enquiries; shall I tell you why?
1636	Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non- lover?
1636	Now what is that sort of thing but a regular piece of authorship?
1636	Now, Socrates, what do you think?
1636	Of the world which is beyond the heavens, who can tell?
1636	Or is he serious in holding that each soul bears the character of a god?
1636	Or is this merely assigned to them by way of parallelism with men?
1636	Or that Isocrates himself is the enemy of Plato and his school?
1636	Or, again, in his absurd derivation of mantike and oionistike and imeros( compare Cratylus)?
1636	PHAEDRUS: About what conclusion?
1636	PHAEDRUS: And is this the exact spot?
1636	PHAEDRUS: And what are these arguments, Socrates?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Do you see the tallest plane- tree in the distance?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Had not Protagoras something of the same sort?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How so?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How so?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How so?
1636	PHAEDRUS: I have never noticed it; but I beseech you to tell me, Socrates, do you believe this tale?
1636	PHAEDRUS: I think that I understand you; but will you explain yourself?
1636	PHAEDRUS: In what direction then?
1636	PHAEDRUS: In what way?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Isocrates the fair:--What message will you send to him, and how shall we describe him?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Need we?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Not yet, Socrates; not until the heat of the day has passed; do you not see that the hour is almost noon?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Show what?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Then why are you still at your tricks?
1636	PHAEDRUS: There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What are they?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What do you mean, my good Socrates?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What error?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What gifts do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What is our method?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What is the other principle, Socrates?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What is there remarkable in the epitaph?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What name would you assign to them?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What of that?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What shall we say to him?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What would you prophesy?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Who are they, and where did you hear anything better than this?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Whom do you mean, and what is his origin?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Will you go on?
1636	PHAEDRUS: You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image?
1636	SOCRATES: About the just and unjust-- that is the matter in dispute?
1636	SOCRATES: And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honourable has less understanding, than the husbandman, about his own seeds?
1636	SOCRATES: And do you think that you can know the nature of the soul intelligently without knowing the nature of the whole?
1636	SOCRATES: And how did he entertain you?
1636	SOCRATES: And when he speaks in the assembly, he will make the same things seem good to the city at one time, and at another time the reverse of good?
1636	SOCRATES: And when men are deceived and their notions are at variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through resemblances?
1636	SOCRATES: And will not Sophocles say to the display of the would- be tragedian, that this is not tragedy but the preliminaries of tragedy?
1636	SOCRATES: And will you go on with the narration?
1636	SOCRATES: And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at once?
1636	SOCRATES: But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves?
1636	SOCRATES: Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias?
1636	SOCRATES: Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God?
1636	SOCRATES: Do you mean that I am not in earnest?
1636	SOCRATES: Does not your simplicity observe that I have got out of dithyrambics into heroics, when only uttering a censure on the lover?
1636	SOCRATES: He, then, who would deceive others, and not be deceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences of things?
1636	SOCRATES: I have now said all that I have to say of the art of rhetoric: have you anything to add?
1636	SOCRATES: In good speaking should not the mind of the speaker know the truth of the matter about which he is going to speak?
1636	SOCRATES: In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?
1636	SOCRATES: It was foolish, I say,--to a certain extent, impious; can anything be more dreadful?
1636	SOCRATES: Let me put the matter thus: When will there be more chance of deception-- when the difference is large or small?
1636	SOCRATES: May not''the wolf,''as the proverb says,''claim a hearing''?
1636	SOCRATES: My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither are you going?
1636	SOCRATES: Now to which class does love belong-- to the debatable or to the undisputed class?
1636	SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I will do?
1636	SOCRATES: Shall we discuss the rules of writing and speech as we were proposing?
1636	SOCRATES: Should we not offer up a prayer first of all to the local deities?
1636	SOCRATES: Then as to the other topics-- are they not thrown down anyhow?
1636	SOCRATES: Then do you think that any one of this class, however ill- disposed, would reproach Lysias with being an author?
1636	SOCRATES: Then in some things we agree, but not in others?
1636	SOCRATES: Well, and is not Eros the son of Aphrodite, and a god?
1636	SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1636	SOCRATES: When any one speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all?
1636	SOCRATES: Who is he?
1636	SOCRATES: Why, do you not know that when a politician writes, he begins with the names of his approvers?
1636	Shall we say a word to him or not?
1636	Socrates as yet does not know himself; and why should he care to know about unearthly monsters?
1636	Then again in the noble art of politics, who thinks of first principles and of true ideas?
1636	These are the commonplaces of the subject which must come in( for what else is there to be said?)
1636	Was he equally serious in the rest?
1636	We may raise the same question in another form: Is marriage preferable with or without love?
1636	Well, the teacher will say, is this, Phaedrus and Socrates, your account of the so- called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another?
1636	What would Socrates think of our newspapers, of our theology?
1636	What would he have said of the discovery of Christian doctrines in these old Greek legends?
1636	What would he say of the Church, which we praise in like manner,''meaning ourselves,''without regard to history or experience?
1636	What would they say if they saw that we, like the many, are not conversing, but slumbering at mid- day, lulled by their voices, too indolent to think?
1636	While acknowledging that such interpretations are''very nice,''would he not have remarked that they are found in all sacred literatures?
1636	Who would imagine that Lysias, who is here assailed by Socrates, is the son of his old friend Cephalus?
1636	Who would suspect that the wise Critias, the virtuous Charmides, had ended their lives among the thirty tyrants?
1636	Who, for example, could speak on this thesis of yours without praising the discretion of the non- lover and blaming the indiscretion of the lover?
1636	Why did history degenerate into fable?
1636	Why did poetry droop and languish?
1636	Why did the physical sciences never arrive at any true knowledge or make any real progress?
1636	Why did words lose their power of expression?
1636	Why do I say so?
1636	Why do you not proceed?
1636	Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic?
1636	Why were ages of external greatness and magnificence attended by all the signs of decay in the human mind which are possible?
1636	Will he not choose a beloved who is delicate rather than sturdy and strong?
1636	Would he not have asked of us, or rather is he not asking of us, Whether we have ceased to prefer appearances to reality?
1636	Would they not have a right to laugh at us?
1636	Yes; but is not even a ridiculous friend better than a cunning enemy?
1636	and are they both equally self- moving and constructed on the same threefold principle?
1636	and will not Acumenus say the same of medicine to the would- be physician?
1636	or, whether the''select wise''are not''the many''after all?
1591	''And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?''
1591	''And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain?
1591	''And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the nature of the unholy?''
1591	''Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain?
1591	''But how,''he will reply,''can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good''?
1591	''But in what will he be better?''
1591	''By what?''
1591	''Shall this be the manner in which I am to distribute justice and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all?''
1591	( 3) Again, would parents who teach her sons lesser matters leave them ignorant of the common duty of citizens?
1591	--and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me or against me?
1591	--how would you answer him?
1591	--they would acknowledge that they were not?
1591	--they would agree to the latter alternative, if I am not mistaken?
1591	--they would assent to me?
1591	--we should answer,''Yes,''if I am not mistaken?
1591	Again we knocked, and he answered without opening: Did you not hear me say that he is not at home, fellows?
1591	And are justice and holiness opposed to one another?''
1591	And are not these confident persons also courageous?
1591	And because of that ignorance they are cowards?
1591	And by what is he overcome?
1591	And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue?
1591	And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, and better?
1591	And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom?
1591	And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?
1591	And do you think that the ode is a good composition, and true?
1591	And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness?
1591	And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent?
1591	And does not the poet proceed to say,''I do not agree with the word of Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man: Hardly can a man be good''?
1591	And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing, would you not?
1591	And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by temperance?
1591	And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?
1591	And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of dangers?
1591	And have you an answer for him?
1591	And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, and yet confident about them?
1591	And if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the manufacture over which he presides?--how should we answer him?
1591	And if honourable, then good?
1591	And if not base, then honourable?
1591	And in causing diseases do they not cause pain?
1591	And in opposite ways?
1591	And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful?
1591	And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good?
1591	And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters?
1591	And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly?
1591	And is the good that which is expedient for man?
1591	And is there anything good?
1591	And is there not a contradiction?
1591	And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter also: Do not they, too, know wise things?
1591	And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly?
1591	And shall I argue with them or with you?
1591	And suppose that he turned to you and said,''Is this true, Protagoras?
1591	And suppose that he went on to say:''Well now, is there also such a thing as holiness?''
1591	And suppose that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same thing, and asked him,''In what shall I become better day by day?''
1591	And temperance is good sense?
1591	And temperance makes them temperate?
1591	And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is weakly done, by weakness?
1591	And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?
1591	And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite?
1591	And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly?
1591	And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately?
1591	And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which was done foolishly by folly?
1591	And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence?
1591	And the ignorance of them is cowardice?
1591	And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and is opposed to the ignorance of these things?
1591	And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?
1591	And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?
1591	And then after this suppose that he came and asked us,''What were you saying just now?
1591	And there is the acute in sound?
1591	And therefore by opposites:--then folly is the opposite of temperance?
1591	And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and uninstructedness?
1591	And they are all different from one another?
1591	And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not temperate?
1591	And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and science?
1591	And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites?
1591	And we said that everything has only one opposite?
1591	And what am I doing?
1591	And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant?
1591	And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know?
1591	And what is your purpose?
1591	And what sort of well- doing makes a man a good physician?
1591	And what will he make of you?
1591	And what will they make of you?
1591	And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul?
1591	And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate?
1591	And when you speak of being overcome--''what do you mean,''he will say,''but that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good?''
1591	And who have confidence when fighting on horseback-- the skilled horseman or the unskilled?
1591	And who when fighting with light shields-- the peltasts or the nonpeltasts?
1591	And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras?
1591	And would you wish to begin the enquiry?
1591	And you think otherwise?
1591	And you would admit the existence of goods?
1591	And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?
1591	Are not all actions honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant?
1591	Are these the things which are good but painful?''
1591	Are they not the confident?
1591	Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?''
1591	Are you not of Homer''s opinion, who says''Youth is most charming when the beard first appears''?
1591	Are you satisfied, then, at having a life of pleasure which is without pain?
1591	Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability; and you say Where are the teachers?
1591	But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and pleasanter, and nobler?
1591	But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that case have lived well?
1591	But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true?
1591	But shall I tell you a strange thing?
1591	But short enough?
1591	But some one will ask, Why?
1591	But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about yourself?
1591	But suppose a person were to ask us: In what are the painters wise?
1591	But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice?
1591	But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the contrary, are base?
1591	But what matter?
1591	But what sort of doing is good in letters?
1591	But what would you like?
1591	But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing?
1591	But who is to be the umpire?
1591	But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill?
1591	But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them?
1591	By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist?
1591	COMPANION: And do you just come from an interview with him?
1591	COMPANION: And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love than the son of Cleinias?
1591	COMPANION: But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one?
1591	COMPANION: Of what country?
1591	COMPANION: Well, and how do matters proceed?
1591	COMPANION: What do you mean-- a citizen or a foreigner?
1591	COMPANION: What is the meaning of this?
1591	COMPANION: Where do you come from, Socrates?
1591	Delightful, I said; but what is the news?
1591	Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that''Hardly can a man become truly good''?
1591	Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that you teach the art of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens?
1591	Do they also differ from one another in themselves and in their functions?
1591	Do you admit the existence of folly?
1591	Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying?
1591	Do you know the poem?
1591	Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?
1591	Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the company?
1591	Does he agree with the common opinion that knowledge is overcome by passion?
1591	First of all we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one?
1591	For Socrates admits his inability to speak long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak short?
1591	Has Protagoras robbed you of anything?
1591	Has anything happened between you and him?
1591	Have you been visiting him, and was he gracious to you?
1591	He and his fellow- workmen have taught them to the best of their ability,--but who will carry them further in their arts?
1591	How is this to be reconciled?
1591	How should we answer him, Socrates?
1591	How so?
1591	How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you?
1591	I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you?
1591	I know that Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation is given to Protagoras?
1591	I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul?
1591	I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing?
1591	I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill?
1591	I said; or shall I begin?
1591	I want to know whether you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?
1591	I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the matter?
1591	If I am not mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing?
1591	If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed?
1591	Is Protagoras in Athens?
1591	Is not that true, Protagoras?
1591	Is not that true?
1591	Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and smaller, or more and fewer?
1591	Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil''?
1591	May I employ an illustration?
1591	Must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands?
1591	Now is that your view?
1591	Now when there is all this care about virtue private and public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether virtue can be taught?
1591	Now who becomes a bad physician?
1591	Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful?
1591	Or if a man has one part, must he also have all the others?
1591	Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned of their fathers?
1591	Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality of which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all?
1591	Protagoras has spoken of the virtues: are they many, or one?
1591	SOCRATES: And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend?
1591	SOCRATES: What of his beard?
1591	Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to you to be short enough?
1591	Shall I, as an elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I argue out the question?
1591	Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to know whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil?
1591	Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me:''Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways on this subject?''
1591	Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well?
1591	Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going?
1591	That is my opinion: would it not be yours also?
1591	The honourable work is also useful and good?
1591	The world will assent, will they not?
1591	Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you are incurring?
1591	Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent?
1591	Then against something different?
1591	Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it cowardice or courage?
1591	Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there is danger?
1591	Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more?
1591	Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is?
1591	Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice?
1591	Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the ignorance of them?
1591	Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately?
1591	Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil?
1591	Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist?
1591	Then who are the courageous?
1591	Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness?
1591	Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce?
1591	Then, my friends, what do you say to this?
1591	Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the nature of the just: would not you?
1591	This admission, which has been somewhat hastily made, is now taken up and cross- examined by Socrates:--''Is justice just, and is holiness holy?
1591	To which the only opposite is the evil?
1591	To which the only opposite is the grave?
1591	To which the only opposite is the ugly?
1591	Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go-- against the same dangers as the cowards?
1591	What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term''hard''?
1591	What do you mean?
1591	What does he think of knowledge?
1591	What else would you say?
1591	What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent?
1591	What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him?
1591	What would you say?
1591	When you speak of brave men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature?
1591	Which of these two assertions shall we renounce?
1591	Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing-- should we not say so?
1591	Who is so foolish as to chastise or instruct the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble?
1591	Why do I say all this?
1591	Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both?
1591	Will Protagoras answer these objections?
1591	Will you be so good?
1591	Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes this result is the art of measurement?
1591	Would not the art of measuring be the saving principle; or would the power of appearance?
1591	Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature?''
1591	Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true?
1591	Would you not answer in the same way?
1591	Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his arrival?
1591	You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek?
1591	You think that some men are temperate, and yet unjust?
1591	You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue?
1591	You, Socrates, are discontented, and why?
1591	and about what?
1591	and do you bring any news?
1591	and do you call the latter good?
1591	and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position?''
1591	and in causing poverty do they not cause pain;--they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken?
1591	and what sort of doing makes a man good in letters?
1591	and what will he make of you?
1591	and why do you give them this money?--how would you have answered?
1591	and why have you come hither at this unearthly hour?
1591	are they parts of a whole, or different names of the same thing?
1591	he said: how am I to shorten my answers?
1591	how is he designated?
1591	how would you have answered?
1591	or does he hold that knowledge is power?
1591	or shall I repeat the whole?
1591	shall I make them too short?
1643	''If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; and where are the teachers?''
1643	''To whom, then, shall Meno go?''
1643	''what is courage?''
1643	''what is temperance?''
1643	( To the Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a double line?
1643	ANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates?
1643	ANYTUS: Why do you not tell him yourself?
1643	ANYTUS: Why single out individuals?
1643	Am I not right?
1643	And am I to carry back this report of you to Thessaly?
1643	And if these were our reasons, should we not be right in sending him?
1643	And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno''s slave, are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal?
1643	And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know?
1643	And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?
1643	And now tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four?
1643	And yet, if there are no universal ideas, what becomes of philosophy?
1643	And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue?
1643	Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used?
1643	But I can not believe, Socrates, that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into existence?
1643	But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what virtue is?
1643	But how, asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into what he does not know?
1643	But is virtue taught or not?
1643	But what has been the result?
1643	But whence had the uneducated man this knowledge?
1643	But where are the teachers?
1643	Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?
1643	Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave?
1643	Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have been out of their minds?
1643	Can you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such confusion?
1643	Can you teach me how this is?
1643	Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good physician, to whom should we send him?
1643	Could you not answer that question, Meno?
1643	Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?
1643	Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?
1643	Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?
1643	Do you remember them?
1643	Do you think that I could?
1643	Have there not been many good men in this city?
1643	Have you not heard from our elders of him?
1643	Health and strength, and beauty and wealth-- these, and the like of these, we call profitable?
1643	Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak?
1643	How could that be?
1643	How would you answer me?
1643	How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble?
1643	If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide?
1643	Is he a bit better than any other mortal?
1643	Is there any difference?
1643	Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno?
1643	It was the natural answer to two questions,''Whence came the soul?
1643	Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once?
1643	Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,--in that case will it be taught or not?
1643	Let us take another,--Aristides, the son of Lysimachus: would you not acknowledge that he was a good man?
1643	Look at the matter in your own way: Would you not admit that Themistocles was a good man?
1643	MENO: And did you not think that he knew?
1643	MENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know?
1643	MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour?
1643	MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is-- what sort of answer would you have given him?
1643	MENO: How can it be otherwise?
1643	MENO: How do you mean, Socrates?
1643	MENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?
1643	MENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?
1643	MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?
1643	MENO: Well, what of that?
1643	MENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue?
1643	MENO: What do you mean by the word''right''?
1643	MENO: What do you mean, Socrates?
1643	MENO: What do you mean?
1643	MENO: What have they to do with the question?
1643	MENO: What of that?
1643	MENO: What was it?
1643	MENO: Where does he say so?
1643	MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates?
1643	MENO: Why do you think so?
1643	MENO: Why not?
1643	MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these?
1643	MENO: Why?
1643	MENO: Will you have one definition of them all?
1643	MENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection?
1643	Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too?
1643	Now, has any one ever taught him all this?
1643	Now, to whom should he go in order that he may learn this virtue?
1643	Now, when you say that they deceived and corrupted the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or unconsciously?
1643	Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which can be taught?
1643	Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?
1643	Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?
1643	Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are the teachers?
1643	SOCRATES: A square may be of any size?
1643	SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?
1643	SOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them?
1643	SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?
1643	SOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this space?
1643	SOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet?
1643	SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young?
1643	SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust?
1643	SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice?
1643	SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught?
1643	SOCRATES: And desire is of possession?
1643	SOCRATES: And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters?
1643	SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?
1643	SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill- fated?
1643	SOCRATES: And does he really know?
1643	SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?
1643	SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?
1643	SOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect each of these spaces?
1643	SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: And for this reason-- that there are other figures?
1643	SOCRATES: And four is how many times two?
1643	SOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?
1643	SOCRATES: And four times is not double?
1643	SOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure?
1643	SOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet?
1643	SOCRATES: And how many in this?
1643	SOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section?
1643	SOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other?
1643	SOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet?
1643	SOCRATES: And how much is the double of four?
1643	SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there?
1643	SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom?
1643	SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining it?
1643	SOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be?
1643	SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?
1643	SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?
1643	SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not?
1643	SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable?
1643	SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round?
1643	SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action-- there we were also right?
1643	SOCRATES: And is not that four times four?
1643	SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength?
1643	SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature?
1643	SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men''divine''who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?
1643	SOCRATES: And might not the same be said of flute- playing, and of the other arts?
1643	SOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines equal?
1643	SOCRATES: And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?
1643	SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching?
1643	SOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one?
1643	SOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square: this is two feet-- what will that be?
1643	SOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be?
1643	SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?
1643	SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you?
1643	SOCRATES: And so forth?
1643	SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large?
1643	SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful?
1643	SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good?
1643	SOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line?
1643	SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine-- do they not?
1643	SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?
1643	SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight?
1643	SOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal?
1643	SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same?
1643	SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have acquired or always possessed?
1643	SOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet?
1643	SOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is recollection?
1643	SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?
1643	SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good?
1643	SOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing can not be taught of which there are neither teachers nor disciples?
1643	SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and the like, were each of them a part of virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only professors?
1643	SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse?
1643	SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown- up person, in a woman or in a man?
1643	SOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge?
1643	SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you not think so?
1643	SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good?
1643	SOCRATES: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know?
1643	SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good?
1643	SOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?
1643	SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?
1643	SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill- fated?
1643	SOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father was?
1643	SOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here?
1643	SOCRATES: But how much?
1643	SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he must have had and learned it at some other time?
1643	SOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers?
1643	SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction?
1643	SOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, the whole space will be three times three feet?
1643	SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?
1643	SOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good?
1643	SOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet?
1643	SOCRATES: But still he had in him those notions of his-- had he not?
1643	SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: But why?
1643	SOCRATES: But would he not have wanted?
1643	SOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation?
1643	SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence?
1643	SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?
1643	SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?
1643	SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of recollection?
1643	SOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen-- are they not?
1643	SOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, and half the size of the other?
1643	SOCRATES: Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus?
1643	SOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces?
1643	SOCRATES: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?
1643	SOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces?
1643	SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and women who spoke of things divine that-- MENO: What did they say?
1643	SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom( or knowledge), then, as we thought, it was taught?
1643	SOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him the''torpedo''s shock,''have we done him any harm?
1643	SOCRATES: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?
1643	SOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is the figure of eight feet?
1643	SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him to the cobblers?
1643	SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you?
1643	SOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this one, and less than that one?
1643	SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner?
1643	SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?
1643	SOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of the figure of four feet?
1643	SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species?
1643	SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in the same virtues?
1643	SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good?
1643	SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?
1643	SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?
1643	SOCRATES: Then he was the better for the torpedo''s touch?
1643	SOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that which he does not know?
1643	SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good?
1643	SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?
1643	SOCRATES: Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity?
1643	SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?
1643	SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?
1643	SOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three?
1643	SOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet?
1643	SOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet?
1643	SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice?
1643	SOCRATES: Then virtue can not be taught?
1643	SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable?
1643	SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom?
1643	SOCRATES: Then you are entirely unacquainted with them?
1643	SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good?
1643	SOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good or bad of which you are wholly ignorant?
1643	SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil?
1643	SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just?
1643	SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure?
1643	SOCRATES: What are they?
1643	SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1643	SOCRATES: What do you say of him, Meno?
1643	SOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives one of sixteen feet;--do you see?
1643	SOCRATES: What, Anytus?
1643	SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he was not a man?
1643	SOCRATES: Why simple?
1643	SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions?
1643	SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you?
1643	SOCRATES: Would you say''virtue,''Meno, or''a virtue''?
1643	SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous?
1643	SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round?
1643	SOCRATES: You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people whom mankind call Sophists?
1643	SOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus( Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in your country?
1643	Should we not send him to the physicians?
1643	Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure?
1643	Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee?
1643	Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn?
1643	There is another sort of progress from the general notions of Socrates, who asked simply,''what is friendship?''
1643	This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be taught?
1643	Were not all these answers given out of his own head?
1643	Were we not right in admitting this?
1643	Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?
1643	What is the origin of evil?''
1643	What makes you so angry with them?
1643	What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry?
1643	When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?
1643	Whom would you name?
1643	Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole?
1643	Will Meno tell him his own notion, which is probably not very different from that of Gorgias?
1643	Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue?
1643	Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends among the Athenians and allies?
1643	Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is''the power of governing;''but do you not add''justly and not unjustly''?
1643	and do they agree that virtue is taught?
1643	and do they profess to be teachers?
1643	and who were they?
1643	or is there anything about which even the acknowledged''gentlemen''are sometimes saying that''this thing can be taught,''and sometimes the opposite?
1643	or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught?
1643	or, as we were just now saying,''remembered''?
1643	would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand?
1738	''And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of Cronos, or our present state of existence?''
1738	''But what, Stranger, is the deficiency of which you speak?''
1738	''Then why have we laws at all?''
1738	''You mean about the golden lamb?''
1738	( 4) But are we not exceeding all due limits; and is there not a measure of all arts and sciences, to which the art of discourse must conform?
1738	And do we wonder, when the foundation of politics is in the letter only, at the miseries of states?
1738	And here I will interpose a question: What are the true forms of government?
1738	And if the legislator, or another like him, comes back from a far country, is he to be prohibited from altering his own laws?
1738	And no doubt you have heard of the empire of Cronos, and of the earthborn men?
1738	Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing to their excessive love of the military life?
1738	Are they not divided by an interval which no geometrical ratio can express?
1738	Are they not three-- monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy?
1738	But are any of these governments worthy of the name?
1738	But how would you subdivide the herdsman''s art?
1738	But is a physician only to cure his patients by persuasion, and not by force?
1738	But supposing that he does use some gentle violence for their good, what is this violence to be called?
1738	But what shall be done with Theaetetus?
1738	But what would be the consequence?
1738	But why did we go through this circuitous process, instead of saying at once that weaving is the art of entwining the warp and the woof?
1738	Can the many attain to science?
1738	Can you remember?
1738	Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem the happier?
1738	Do you see why this is?
1738	How can we get the greatest intelligence combined with the greatest power?
1738	I think, however, that we may fairly assume something of this sort-- YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	Is he a worse physician who uses a little gentle violence in effecting the cure?
1738	Is not that true?
1738	Is not the definition, although true, wanting in clearness and completeness; for do not all those other arts require to be first cleared away?
1738	Is not this the true principle of government, according to which the wise and good man will order the affairs of his subjects?
1738	Let us next ask, which of these untrue forms of government is the least bad, and which of them is the worst?
1738	May not any man, rich or poor, with or without law, and whether the citizens like or not, do what is for their good?
1738	May not any man, rich or poor, with or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against the will of the citizens, do what is for their interest?
1738	Might not an idiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian?
1738	O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator and geometrician?
1738	Or ought this science to be the overseer and governor of all the others?
1738	Or rather, shall I tell you that the happiness of these children of Cronos must have depended on how they used their time?
1738	Or rather, shall we not first ask, whether the king, statesman, master, householder, practise one art or many?
1738	Or shall we assign to him the art of command-- for he is a ruler?
1738	Or shall we say, that the violence is just, if exercised by a rich man, and unjust, if by a poor man?
1738	Ought we not rather to admire the strength of the political bond?
1738	Ought we not rather to wonder at the natural strength of the political bond?
1738	SOCRATES: Does the great geometrician apply the same measure to all three?
1738	STRANGER: Again, a large household may be compared to a small state:--will they differ at all, as far as government is concerned?
1738	STRANGER: And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out of the rest as having a character which is at once judicial and authoritative?
1738	STRANGER: And are''statesman,''''king,''''master,''or''householder,''one and the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of these names?
1738	STRANGER: And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing out of themselves two other names?
1738	STRANGER: And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the others?
1738	STRANGER: And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?
1738	STRANGER: And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the other?
1738	STRANGER: And do you agree to his proposal?
1738	STRANGER: And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?
1738	STRANGER: And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you say?
1738	STRANGER: And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive orders, and in his turn give them to others?
1738	STRANGER: And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to improve our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally?
1738	STRANGER: And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we are to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different?
1738	STRANGER: And is there any higher art or science, having power to decide which of these arts are and are not to be learned;--what do you say?
1738	STRANGER: And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical science?
1738	STRANGER: And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on to divide the sphere of knowledge?
1738	STRANGER: And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the king?--Is he a judge and a kind of spectator?
1738	STRANGER: And of which has the Statesman charge,--of the mixed or of the unmixed race?
1738	STRANGER: And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no single science to any other?
1738	STRANGER: And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust?
1738	STRANGER: And the householder and master are the same?
1738	STRANGER: And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade or not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade?
1738	STRANGER: And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not horses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man collectively?
1738	STRANGER: And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are not to give up our former notion?
1738	STRANGER: And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by professional trainers or by others having similar authority?
1738	STRANGER: And when men have anything to do in common, that they should be of one mind is surely a desirable thing?
1738	STRANGER: And where shall we look for the political animal?
1738	STRANGER: And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last?
1738	STRANGER: And you would think temperance to be different from courage; and likewise to be a part of virtue?
1738	STRANGER: And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the few?
1738	STRANGER: And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war is, can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal?
1738	STRANGER: Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land?
1738	STRANGER: Are not examples formed in this manner?
1738	STRANGER: But if this is as you say, can our argument about the king be true and unimpeachable?
1738	STRANGER: But surely the science of a true king is royal science?
1738	STRANGER: But the first process is a separation of the clotted and matted fibres?
1738	STRANGER: But what would you say of some other serviceable officials?
1738	STRANGER: But what would you think of another sort of power or science?
1738	STRANGER: But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit?
1738	STRANGER: But yet the division will not be the same?
1738	STRANGER: But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a hundred, or say fifty, who could?
1738	STRANGER: Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom?
1738	STRANGER: Did you ever hear that the men of former times were earth- born, and not begotten of one another?
1738	STRANGER: Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is in point?
1738	STRANGER: Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political science?
1738	STRANGER: He contributes knowledge, not manual labour?
1738	STRANGER: How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet?
1738	STRANGER: I want to ask, whether any one of the other herdsmen has a rival who professes and claims to share with him in the management of the herd?
1738	STRANGER: If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science?
1738	STRANGER: If any one who is in a private station has the skill to advise one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician?
1738	STRANGER: Is not monarchy a recognized form of government?
1738	STRANGER: Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude, which is called by the name of democracy?
1738	STRANGER: Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would consider courage to be a part of virtue?
1738	STRANGER: May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of producing something?
1738	STRANGER: May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there are two divisions-- one which rules, and the other which judges?
1738	STRANGER: Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist, they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one another?
1738	STRANGER: Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract our words?
1738	STRANGER: Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and endeavour to assign to him what is his?
1738	STRANGER: Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the art of managing a herd, or the art of collective management?
1738	STRANGER: Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed?
1738	STRANGER: Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young Socrates, instead of him?
1738	STRANGER: Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of calculation?
1738	STRANGER: The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not political?
1738	STRANGER: The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the following:-- YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	STRANGER: The science which has to do with military operations against our enemies-- is that to be regarded as a science or not?
1738	STRANGER: Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of what was said in the enquiry about the Sophist?
1738	STRANGER: Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we compelled to make laws at all?
1738	STRANGER: Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?
1738	STRANGER: Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that the argument may proceed in a regular manner?
1738	STRANGER: Then the sciences must be divided as before?
1738	STRANGER: Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind about the fancies of others?
1738	STRANGER: Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving supplied?
1738	STRANGER: Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to knowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general?
1738	STRANGER: There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in general?
1738	STRANGER: There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the political, which had the charge of one particular herd?
1738	STRANGER: Together?
1738	STRANGER: Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?
1738	STRANGER: Weaving is a sort of uniting?
1738	STRANGER: Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts, merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?
1738	STRANGER: What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with the political occupation?
1738	STRANGER: Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman?
1738	STRANGER: Which was, unmistakeably, one of the arts of knowledge?
1738	STRANGER: Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?
1738	STRANGER: Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the productions of others, which have been sold before?
1738	STRANGER: Why, is not''care''of herds applicable to all?
1738	STRANGER: Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a knowledge of what they do not as yet know be-- YOUNG SOCRATES: Be what?
1738	STRANGER: Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by twisting, is the woof made?
1738	STRANGER: Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man''s side all through his life, prescribing for him the exact particulars of his duty?
1738	STRANGER: You know that the master- builder does not work himself, but is the ruler of workmen?
1738	Shall I explain the nature of what I call the second best?
1738	Shall we do as I say?
1738	THEODORUS: In what respect?
1738	THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1738	Tell me, then-- YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	Tell me, which is the happier of the two?
1738	The excessive length of a discourse may be blamed; but who can say what is excess, unless he is furnished with a measure or standard?
1738	The question is often asked, What are the limits of legislation in relation to morals?
1738	Under which of the two shall we place the Statesman?
1738	Viewed in the light of science and true art, would not all such enactments be utterly ridiculous?
1738	Viewed in the light of science, would not the continuance of such regulations be ridiculous?
1738	Were we right in selecting him out of ten thousand other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human flock?
1738	What do you advise?
1738	Who, Socrates, would be equal to such a task?
1738	Will you proceed?
1738	Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art, or a breach of the laws of health?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: And are they not right?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: And what is that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: And which are the kindred arts?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Are they not right in saying so?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Can not we have both ways?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining species?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be referring to manufacture of the warp?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Explain; what are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How and why is that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as other than a science?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How can they be made?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How can we be safe?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How could we?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that the cause?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that, and what bonds do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How is this?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How must I speak of them, then?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How shall I define them?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How so?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How so?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How so?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How then?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How was that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you make the division?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: In what direction?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: In what respect?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: In what way?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle of division?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right; but how shall we take the next step in the division?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those days; and in what way were they begotten of one another?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: True; and what is the next step?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Upon what principle?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but what is the imperfection which still remains?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: We had better not take the whole?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What class do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What did I hear, then?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean, Stranger?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What images?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is the error?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this new question?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is to be done in this case?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is your meaning?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What misfortune?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What question?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What road?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What science?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What sort of an image?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in our recent division?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What was this great error of which you speak?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Where would you make the division?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Which of the two halves do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they, and what services do they perform?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Who is he?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Whom can you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why is that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why so?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why strange?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; what else should it be?
1738	Yet perhaps the question what will or will not be is a foolish one, for who can tell?''
1738	You have heard what happened in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes?
1738	You have heard, no doubt, and remember what they say happened at that time?
1738	Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates is proposing?
1738	they raise up enemies against themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their native- land or enslave and subject it to its foes?
1598	''And are you an ox because you have an ox present with you?''
1598	''And dictation is a dictation of letters?''
1598	''And do they learn,''said Euthydemus,''what they know or what they do not know?''
1598	''And he is not wise yet?''
1598	''And what did you think of them?''
1598	''And you acquire that which you have not got already?''
1598	''And you know letters?''
1598	''And you see our garments?''
1598	''But are there any beautiful things?
1598	''But,''retorts Dionysodorus,''is not learning acquiring knowledge?''
1598	''Cleinias,''says Euthydemus,''who learn, the wise or the unwise?''
1598	''Crito,''said he to me,''are you giving no attention to these wise men?''
1598	''Do they know shoemaking, etc?''
1598	''Do you see,''retorts Euthydemus,''what has the quality of vision or what has not the quality of vision?''
1598	''Is a speaking of the silent possible?
1598	''What did I think of them?''
1598	''What does the word"non- plussed"mean?''
1598	''What was that?''
1598	''You want Cleinias to be wise?''
1598	A noble man or a mean man?
1598	A weak man or a strong man?
1598	All letters?
1598	Am I not right?
1598	Am I not right?
1598	Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots?
1598	And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man?
1598	And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones?
1598	And an indolent man less than an active man?
1598	And are not good things good, and evil things evil?
1598	And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?
1598	And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?
1598	And are not these gods animals?
1598	And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing?
1598	And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you?
1598	And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than gold, you are not gold?
1598	And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere?
1598	And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age?
1598	And clearly we do not want the art of the flute- maker; this is only another of the same sort?
1598	And did you always know this?
1598	And did you not say that you knew something?
1598	And do all other men know all things or nothing?
1598	And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not?
1598	And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and warm things of the warm?
1598	And do you know of any word which is alive?
1598	And do you know stitching?
1598	And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand?
1598	And do you know with what you know, or with something else?
1598	And do you please?
1598	And do you really and truly know all things, including carpentering and leather- cutting?
1598	And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man?
1598	And doing is making?
1598	And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers?
1598	And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus?
1598	And have you no need, Euthydemus?
1598	And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not?
1598	And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know, whether you make the addition of''when you know them''or not?
1598	And he has puppies?
1598	And he is not wise as yet?
1598	And he who says that thing says that which is?
1598	And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other?
1598	And if a man does his business he does rightly?
1598	And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them?
1598	And if there are such, are they the same or not the same as absolute beauty?''
1598	And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the gold?
1598	And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk-- in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?
1598	And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness-- a wise physician, or an ignorant one?
1598	And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not?
1598	And is Patrocles, he said, your brother?
1598	And is he not yours?
1598	And is that fair?
1598	And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing?
1598	And is this true?
1598	And knowing is having knowledge at the time?
1598	And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?
1598	And may there not be a silence of the speaker?
1598	And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time?
1598	And now answer: Do you always know with this?
1598	And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men desire happiness?
1598	And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge?
1598	And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do?
1598	And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as many spears and shields as possible?
1598	And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the places where most gold was hidden in the earth?
1598	And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us?
1598	And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father?
1598	And speaking is doing and making?
1598	And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?
1598	And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom?
1598	And that is a distinct thing apart from other things?
1598	And that is impossible?
1598	And that which is not is nowhere?
1598	And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted that?
1598	And the dog is the father of them?
1598	And they are the teachers of those who learn-- the grammar- master and the lyre- master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners?
1598	And to have money everywhere and always is a good?
1598	And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also?
1598	And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing to learn?
1598	And were you wise then?
1598	And what does that signify?
1598	And what is your notion?
1598	And what knowledge ought we to acquire?
1598	And what other goods are there?
1598	And what things do we esteem good?
1598	And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning?
1598	And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast?
1598	And who would do least-- a poor man or a rich man?
1598	And whose the making of pots?
1598	And why should you say so?
1598	And would not you, Crito, say the same?
1598	And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them?
1598	And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way?
1598	And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own?
1598	And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?''
1598	And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense;--what do you say, wise man?
1598	And you admit gold to be a good?
1598	And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased?
1598	And you also see that which has the quality of vision?
1598	And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are?
1598	And your mother, too, is the mother of all?
1598	And your papa is a dog?
1598	Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?
1598	Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked one?
1598	Are you not other than a stone?
1598	Are you prepared to make that good?
1598	Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously maintain no man to be ignorant?
1598	At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that?
1598	Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo?
1598	But are you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus?
1598	But can a father be other than a father?
1598	But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are describing the same thing?
1598	But can wisdom be taught?
1598	But did you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking?
1598	But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is impossible?
1598	But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another?
1598	But if he can not speak falsely, may he not think falsely?
1598	But if you were not wise you were unlearned?
1598	But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches-- would that be the art which would make us happy?
1598	But what need is there of good fortune when we have wisdom already:--in every art and business are not the wise also the fortunate?
1598	But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say something and you say nothing-- is there any contradiction?
1598	But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters?
1598	But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the silent?
1598	But why should I repeat the whole story?
1598	CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge?
1598	CRITO: And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this?
1598	CRITO: And were you not right, Socrates?
1598	CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old?
1598	CRITO: How did that happen, Socrates?
1598	CRITO: Well, and what came of that?
1598	CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates?
1598	CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum?
1598	CRITO: Why not, Socrates?
1598	Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one''s own land, are goods?
1598	Certainly; did you think we should say No to that?
1598	Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my father?
1598	Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied?
1598	Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what they do not know?
1598	Do you agree with me?
1598	Do you agree?
1598	Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing?
1598	Do you not know letters?
1598	Do you not remember?
1598	Do you suppose the same person to be a father and not a father?
1598	Do you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not?
1598	Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth?
1598	Does not your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake?
1598	Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not?
1598	Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are there not?
1598	Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to tell a lie?
1598	For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited?
1598	For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked?
1598	For tell me now, is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns?
1598	For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all?
1598	Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you mean, Dionysodorus?
1598	How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not?
1598	I can not say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men?
1598	I did, I said; what is going to happen to me?
1598	I said, and where did you learn that?
1598	I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons?
1598	I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus?
1598	Is not that your position?
1598	Is not the honourable honourable and the base base?
1598	Is not this the result-- that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil?
1598	Is that your difficulty?
1598	Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood?
1598	Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat this dog?
1598	Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes?
1598	May we not answer with absolute truth-- A knowledge which will do us good?
1598	Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak?
1598	Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things?
1598	Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how can I tell you to do that which is not?
1598	Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant?
1598	Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter?
1598	Of their existence or of their non- existence?
1598	Of what country are they, and what is their line of wisdom?
1598	Or a speaking of the silent?
1598	Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing?
1598	Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them?
1598	Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer?
1598	Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own?
1598	Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is, where did I learn that the good are unjust?
1598	SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good?
1598	SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful?
1598	SOCRATES: And surely it ought to do us some good?
1598	SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme power?
1598	SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have supreme authority over the subject arts-- what does that do?
1598	SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does?
1598	SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son?
1598	SOCRATES: Are you incredulous, Crito?
1598	SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it?
1598	SOCRATES: O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say?
1598	SOCRATES: There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean?
1598	SOCRATES: Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are ridiculous performers?
1598	SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect?
1598	Shall we not be happy if we have many good things?
1598	Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge by which we are to make other men good?
1598	Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest?
1598	Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not know others?
1598	That makes no difference;--and must you not, if you are knowing, know all things?
1598	That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is?
1598	Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball:''Who are they who learn dictation of the grammar- master; the wise or the foolish boys?''
1598	Then are they not animals?
1598	Then do you see our garments?
1598	Then he is the same?
1598	Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know?
1598	Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good- fortune but success?
1598	Then tell me, he said, do you know anything?
1598	Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they are?
1598	Then there is no such thing as false opinion?
1598	Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact?
1598	Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of those who have?
1598	Then we must surely be speaking the same thing?
1598	Then what are they professing to teach?''
1598	Then what is the inference?
1598	Then why did you ask me what sense my words had?
1598	Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them?
1598	Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything?
1598	Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus?
1598	Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes?
1598	Then, my good friend, do they all speak?
1598	Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters?
1598	Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only who does not know letters learns?
1598	Upon what principle?
1598	Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought to have one shield only, and one spear?
1598	Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdom-- among the goods or not?
1598	Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?
1598	Well, I said; but then what am I to do?
1598	Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing?
1598	Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you?
1598	Well, have not all things words expressive of them?
1598	Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise?
1598	Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful?
1598	What am I to do with them?
1598	What can make you tell such a lie about me and the others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish?
1598	What can they see?
1598	What do I know?
1598	What do you mean, Dionysodorus?
1598	What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing?
1598	What do you mean?
1598	What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate?
1598	What is that?
1598	What is that?
1598	What knowledge is there which has such a nature?
1598	What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time?
1598	What of that?
1598	What proof shall I give you?
1598	What then do you say?
1598	What then is the result of what has been said?
1598	What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this?
1598	What, before you, Dionysodorus?
1598	What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own?
1598	What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other animals?
1598	What, replied Dionysodorus in a moment; am I the brother of Euthydemus?
1598	What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent?
1598	What, said he, is the business of a good workman?
1598	When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one thing and I describe another, how can there be a contradiction?''
1598	When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all things?
1598	When you were children, and at your birth?
1598	Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse?
1598	Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful things?
1598	Why do you say so?
1598	Why not?
1598	Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks of things as they are?
1598	Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing?
1598	Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom?
1598	Will you not cease adding to your answers?
1598	Will you not take our word that we know all things?
1598	Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has?
1598	With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul?
1598	Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom?
1598	Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings?
1598	Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea- urchins then?
1598	You admit that?
1598	You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which I was just naming?
1598	You remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us?
1598	You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were learning?
1598	You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one?
1598	You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is?
1598	You wish him, he said, to become wise and not, to be ignorant?
1598	and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?
1598	and teach them all the arts,--carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them?
1598	and was not that our conclusion?
1598	and will you explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking?
1598	for you admit that all things which have life are animals; and have not these gods life?
1598	has he got to such a height of skill as that?
1598	if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes?
1598	or are you the same as a stone?
1598	tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering?
1658	''Why, is he not a philosopher?''
1658	):''Why Socrates, who was not a poet, while in prison had been putting Aesop into verse?''
1658	); or the mysterious reference to another science( mathematics?)
1658	Again, believing in the immortality of the soul, we must still ask the question of Socrates,''What is that which we suppose to be immortal?''
1658	Again, upon the supposition that the soul is a harmony, why is one soul better than another?
1658	Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two?
1658	And Socrates observing them asked what they thought of the argument, and whether there was anything wanting?
1658	And an absolute beauty and absolute good?
1658	And are not the temperate exactly in the same case?
1658	And are not we at this day seeking to discover that which Socrates in a glass darkly foresaw?
1658	And can all this be true, think you?
1658	And did he answer forcibly or feebly?
1658	And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon as we were born?
1658	And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet greater evils?
1658	And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?
1658	And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition in evil, the worst would be found to be very few?
1658	And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in which the elements are harmonized?
1658	And does the soul admit of death?
1658	And does the worship of God consist only of praise, or of many forms of service?
1658	And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality?
1658	And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony?
1658	And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?
1658	And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike?
1658	And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from his body and desires to be alone and by herself?
1658	And is death the assertion of this individuality in the higher nature, and the falling away into nothingness of the lower?
1658	And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her?
1658	And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic of the philosopher?
1658	And is not the feeling discreditable?
1658	And is not this the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body?
1658	And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body?
1658	And is the soul seen or not seen?
1658	And is the soul seen or not seen?
1658	And is there any opposite to life?
1658	And is this always the case?
1658	And is this true of all opposites?
1658	And may we say that this has been proven?
1658	And now the application has to be made: If the soul is immortal,''what manner of persons ought we to be?''
1658	And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle which repels the even?
1658	And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the opposite idea will never intrude?
1658	And one of the two processes or generations is visible-- for surely the act of dying is visible?
1658	And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the world of the living?
1658	And shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only?
1658	And so you think that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court?
1658	And that by greatness only great things become great and greater greater, and by smallness the less become less?
1658	And that principle which repels the musical, or the just?
1658	And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less harmonized?
1658	And that which is not more or less harmonized can not have more or less of harmony, but only an equal harmony?
1658	And the body is more like the changing?
1658	And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places answering to their several natures and propensities?
1658	And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice?
1658	And therefore has neither more nor less of discord, nor yet of harmony?
1658	And therefore, previously?
1658	And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and have there their two intermediate processes also?
1658	And they are generated one from the other?
1658	And this impress was given by the odd principle?
1658	And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death?
1658	And this state of the soul is called wisdom?
1658	And to the odd is opposed the even?
1658	And to which class is the body more alike and akin?
1658	And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may be inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one?
1658	And what about the pleasures of love-- should he care for them?
1658	And what do we call the principle which does not admit of death?
1658	And what from the dead?
1658	And what is it?
1658	And what is now your notion of such matters?
1658	And what is that process?
1658	And what is that?
1658	And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection?
1658	And what we mean by''seen''and''not seen''is that which is or is not visible to the eye of man?
1658	And whence did we obtain our knowledge?
1658	And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you are gone?
1658	And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer?
1658	And which does the soul resemble?
1658	And which of his friends were with him?
1658	And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea?
1658	And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using?
1658	And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number three?
1658	And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul?
1658	Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites?
1658	Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which we have to consider?
1658	Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal?
1658	Are they more or less harmonized, or is there one harmony within another?
1658	Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some opposite?
1658	Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses?
1658	Are we not at the same time describing them both in superlatives, only that we may satisfy the demands of rhetoric?
1658	At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will not be able to render an account of his knowledge?
1658	At the same time, turning to Cebes, he said: Are you at all disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend''s objection?
1658	But are real equals ever unequal?
1658	But are they the same as fire and snow?
1658	But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?
1658	But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates?
1658	But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very matters about which we are speaking?
1658	But does the soul admit of degrees?
1658	But enough of them:--let us discuss the matter among ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?
1658	But if it be true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution?
1658	But is this the only thing which is called odd?
1658	But what followed?
1658	But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals?
1658	But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?--not since we were born as men?
1658	But why, asks Cebes, if he is a possession of the gods, should he wish to die and leave them?
1658	By all means, replied Socrates; what else should I please?
1658	Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied?
1658	Cebes asks why suicide is thought not to be right, if death is to be accounted a good?
1658	Could he have written this under the idea that the soul is a harmony of the body?
1658	Did he appear to share the unpleasant feeling which you mention?
1658	Did you never observe this?
1658	Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind''s eye an image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs?
1658	Do we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or if not at what other time?
1658	Do you agree in this notion of the cause?
1658	Do you agree?
1658	Do you agree?
1658	Do you know of any?
1658	Do you not agree with me?
1658	Do you not agree?
1658	Does not the divine appear to you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that which is subject and servant?
1658	Does their life cease at death, or is there some''better thing reserved''also for them?
1658	ECHECRATES: And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus?
1658	ECHECRATES: Any one else?
1658	ECHECRATES: Well, and what did you talk about?
1658	ECHECRATES: Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates on the day when he drank the poison?
1658	ECHECRATES: What followed?
1658	ECHECRATES: What is this ship?
1658	ECHECRATES: What was the manner of his death, Phaedo?
1658	ECHECRATES: Who were present?
1658	Enough of them: the real question is, What is the nature of that death which he desires?
1658	For are we not imagining Heaven under the similitude of a church, and Hell as a prison, or perhaps a madhouse or chamber of horrors?
1658	For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul incline us against drinking?
1658	For example; Will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, while remaining three?
1658	For how can one be divided into two?
1658	For if the living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death?
1658	For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than himself?
1658	For what could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit?
1658	For what idea can we form of the soul when separated from the body?
1658	From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?
1658	Had we the knowledge at our birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our birth?
1658	Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs?
1658	Have we not seen dogs more faithful and intelligent than men, and men who are more stupid and brutal than any animals?
1658	He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument, or of a part only?
1658	He proceeds: When we fear that the soul will vanish away, let us ask ourselves what is that which we suppose to be liable to dissolution?
1658	Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with snow?
1658	How can she have, if the previous argument holds?
1658	How shall they bury him?
1658	How so?
1658	How so?
1658	I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them?
1658	I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance:--The knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?
1658	I will try to make this clearer by an example:--The odd number is always called by the name of odd?
1658	Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature needs?
1658	Is it not the separation of soul and body?
1658	Is it the personal and individual element in us, or the spiritual and universal?
1658	Is it the principle of knowledge or of goodness, or the union of the two?
1658	Is it the simple or the compound, the unchanging or the changing, the invisible idea or the visible object of sense?
1658	Is not death opposed to life?
1658	Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?
1658	Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?
1658	Is not this true, Cebes?
1658	Is the Pythagorean image of the harmony, or that of the monad, the truer expression?
1658	Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire?
1658	Is the soul related to the body as sight to the eye, or as the boatman to his boat?
1658	Is the suffering physical or mental?
1658	May I, or not?
1658	May not the science of physiology transform the world?
1658	May they not rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one another?
1658	May we be allowed to imagine the minds of men everywhere working together during many ages for the completion of our knowledge?
1658	Must we not rather assign to death some corresponding process of generation?
1658	Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves what that is which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered, and about which we fear?
1658	Nay rather, are we not contradicting Homer and ourselves in affirming anything of the sort?
1658	Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again?
1658	Now which of these two functions is akin to the divine?
1658	Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?
1658	Of what nature?
1658	Once more, he said, what ruler is there of the elements of human nature other than the soul, and especially the wise soul?
1658	Or are we vainly attempting to pass the boundaries of human thought?
1658	Or did the authorities forbid them to be present-- so that he had no friends near him when he died?
1658	Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer?
1658	Or how can the soul be united with the body and still be independent?
1658	Or look at the matter in another way:--Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?
1658	Or two be compounded into one?
1658	Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?
1658	PHAEDO: Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?
1658	Philosophers have spoken of them as forms of the human mind, but what is the mind without them?
1658	Please to tell me then, Cebes, he said, what was the difficulty which troubled you?
1658	Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable?
1658	Shall he make a libation of the poison?
1658	Shall we exclude the opposite process?
1658	Shall we say so?
1658	Shall we say with Aristotle, that the soul is the entelechy or form of an organized living body?
1658	Socrates alone retained his calmness: What is this strange outcry?
1658	Socrates replied with a smile: O Simmias, what are you saying?
1658	Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are the disciples of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?
1658	Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be imperishable?
1658	Tell me, I implore you, how did Socrates proceed?
1658	Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body alive?
1658	That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?
1658	The debt shall be paid, said Crito; is there anything else?
1658	The question,''Whence come our abstract ideas?''
1658	The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?
1658	The worst of men are objects of pity rather than of anger to the philanthropist; must they not be equally such to divine benevolence?
1658	Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?
1658	Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is not more or less harmonized?
1658	Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful?
1658	Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three?
1658	Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below?
1658	Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the dead?
1658	Then the soul is immortal?
1658	Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen?
1658	Then the triad or number three is uneven?
1658	Then these( so- called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?
1658	Then three has no part in the even?
1658	Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will never in any case be opposed to itself?
1658	Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time?
1658	Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?
1658	Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?
1658	Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good?
1658	They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before?
1658	True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a little of the probabilities of these things?
1658	Unseen then?
1658	Was not that a reasonable notion?
1658	We will do our best, said Crito: And in what way shall we bury you?
1658	Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of waking?
1658	Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied?
1658	Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice?
1658	Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre remember a man?
1658	What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?--is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper?
1658	What answer can be made to the old commonplace,''Is not God the author of evil, if he knowingly permitted, but could have prevented it?''
1658	What can I do better in the interval between this and the setting of the sun?
1658	What did he say in his last hours?
1658	What do you mean, Socrates?
1658	What do you mean, Socrates?
1658	What do you mean?
1658	What do you mean?
1658	What do you mean?
1658	What do you mean?
1658	What do you say?
1658	What do you say?
1658	What do you think?
1658	What is generated from the living?
1658	What is it, Socrates?
1658	What is that pain which does not become deadened after a thousand years?
1658	What is to become of the animals in a future state?
1658	What natures do you mean, Socrates?
1658	What shall I do with them?
1658	What then is to be the result?
1658	What was said or done?
1658	What was the reason of this?
1658	Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions?
1658	Where are the actions worthy of rewards greater than those which are conferred on the greatest benefactors of mankind?
1658	Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do that we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this life?
1658	Which might be like, or might be unlike them?
1658	Which of them will you retain?
1658	Why are they the happiest?
1658	Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?
1658	Why should the wicked suffer any more than ourselves?
1658	Why then should he repine when the hour of separation arrives?
1658	Why, if he is dead while he lives, should he fear that other death, through which alone he can behold wisdom in her purity?
1658	Why, said Socrates,--is not Evenus a philosopher?
1658	Will he not depart with joy?
1658	Will you not allow that I have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans?
1658	Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body?
1658	Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them?
1658	You must have observed this trait of character?
1658	You would agree; would you not?
1658	You would be afraid to draw such an inference, would you not?
1658	and are we convinced that all of them are generated out of opposites?
1658	and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember Cebes?
1658	and is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble?
1658	and what again is that about which we have no fear?
1658	and what is the impression produced by them?
1658	and when the body is hungry, against eating?
1658	and which to the mortal?
1658	and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?--for you will allow that they are the best of them?
1658	had we been placed in their circumstances should we have been any better than they?
1658	he said; for these are the consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a harmony?
1658	or did he calmly meet the attack?
1658	or do they fall short of this perfect equality in a measure?
1658	or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?
1658	or is she at variance with them?
1658	or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality?
1658	or what is the nature of that pleasure or happiness which never wearies by monotony?
1658	or with Plato, that she has a life of her own?
1658	whence but from the body and the lusts of the body?
1616	''And what are ion, reon, doun?''
1616	''But then, why, Socrates, is language so consistent?
1616	''But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus mystifies me; I should like to ask him, in your presence, what he means by the fitness of names?''
1616	''How do you explain pur n udor?''
1616	''Which of us by taking thought''can make new words or constructions?
1616	''Will you go on to the elements-- sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, seasons, years?''
1616	( Compare Plato, Laws):--''ATHENIAN STRANGER: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of government?
1616	ATHENIAN STRANGER: And have there not been thousands and thousands of cities which have come into being and perished during this period?
1616	ATHENIAN STRANGER: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and incalculable?
1616	ATHENIAN STRANGER: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?
1616	And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I saying?
1616	And Socrates?
1616	And even if this had been otherwise, who would learn of words when he might learn of things?
1616	And has not every place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising, and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?''
1616	And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?
1616	And let me ask another question,--If we had no faculty of speech, how should we communicate with one another?
1616	And not the rest?
1616	And now let me see; where are we?
1616	And what do you consider to be the meaning of this word?
1616	And what is the final result of the enquiry?
1616	And which are more likely to be right-- the wiser or the less wise, the men or the women?
1616	Are not actions also a class of being?
1616	Are there any names which witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness?
1616	Are we to count them like votes?
1616	Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is correctness of names to be determined by the voice of a majority?
1616	Are we to say of whichever sort there are most, those are the true ones?
1616	But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not said?
1616	But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?
1616	But an image in fact always falls short in some degree of the original, and if images are not exact counterparts, why should names be?
1616	But are not such distinctions an anachronism?
1616	But are words really consistent; are there not as many terms of praise which signify rest as which signify motion?
1616	But do you not see that there is a degree of deception about names?
1616	But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that which you were giving of Zeus?
1616	But how does the carpenter make or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look?
1616	But how shall we further analyse them, and where does the imitator begin?
1616	But let me ask you what is the use and force of names?
1616	But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is the use of them?
1616	But then, how do the primary names indicate anything?
1616	But then, why do the Eritreans call that skleroter which we call sklerotes?
1616	But to what are you referring?
1616	But what do you say of the month and the stars?
1616	But what is kakon?
1616	But who is to be the judge of the proper form?
1616	But who makes a name?
1616	But why do you not give me another word?
1616	But why should we not discuss another kind of Gods-- the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?
1616	CLEINIAS: How so?
1616	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1616	CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all?
1616	CRATYLUS: How so?
1616	CRATYLUS: How so?
1616	CRATYLUS: What do you mean?
1616	CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?--say something and yet say nothing?
1616	Can the thing beauty be vanishing away from us while the words are yet in our mouths?
1616	Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle?
1616	Did you ever observe in speaking that all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose?
1616	Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own?
1616	Do you agree with me that the letter rho is expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness?
1616	Do you agree with me?
1616	Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the discovery of things?
1616	Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of them?
1616	Do you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?
1616	Do you not suppose this to be true?
1616	Do you think that likely?
1616	Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names?
1616	Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?
1616	Does he not say that Hector''s son had two names--''Hector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax''?
1616	Does not Cratylus agree with him that names teach us the nature of things?
1616	Does not the law give names, and does not the teacher receive them from the legislator?
1616	For example, what business has the letter rho in the word katoptron, or the letter sigma in the word sphigx?
1616	For is not falsehood saying the thing which is not?
1616	For is there not a true beauty and a true good, which is always beautiful and always good?
1616	For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names; do you not think so?
1616	For were we not saying just now that he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion?
1616	HERMOGENES: And what are the traditions?
1616	HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites?
1616	HERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation?
1616	HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he say?
1616	HERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus?
1616	HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon?
1616	HERMOGENES: But what is selene( the moon)?
1616	HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a part in your previous discourse?
1616	HERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word?
1616	HERMOGENES: How do you make that out?
1616	HERMOGENES: How do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: How do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates?
1616	HERMOGENES: How plausible?
1616	HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect?
1616	HERMOGENES: How so?
1616	HERMOGENES: How so?
1616	HERMOGENES: How so?
1616	HERMOGENES: How so?
1616	HERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious?
1616	HERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next?
1616	HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I. SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name?
1616	HERMOGENES: Of what nature?
1616	HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument?
1616	HERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what is the meaning of the word''hero''?
1616	HERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?
1616	HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes?
1616	HERMOGENES: Well, and what of them?
1616	HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun( profitable)?
1616	HERMOGENES: What device?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone( pleasure), lupe( pain), epithumia( desire), and the like, Socrates?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur( fire) and udor( water)?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa( opinion), and that class of words?
1616	HERMOGENES: What is Ares?
1616	HERMOGENES: What is it?
1616	HERMOGENES: What is the inference?
1616	HERMOGENES: What is the inference?
1616	HERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?
1616	HERMOGENES: What of that?
1616	HERMOGENES: What other appellation?
1616	HERMOGENES: What then?
1616	HERMOGENES: What was the name?
1616	HERMOGENES: What way?
1616	HERMOGENES: Which are they?
1616	HERMOGENES: Why do you say so?
1616	HERMOGENES: Why not?
1616	HERMOGENES: Why, Socrates?
1616	HERMOGENES: Why, how is that?
1616	HERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name?
1616	HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible?
1616	Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:--has this proposition been sufficiently proven?
1616	Have you remarked this fact?
1616	How could there be names for all the numbers unless you allow that convention is used?
1616	How did the roots or substantial portions of words become modified or inflected?
1616	How they originated, who can tell?
1616	How, he would probably have argued, could men devoid of art have contrived a structure of such complexity?
1616	I utter a sound which I understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this is what you are saying?
1616	Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory of language, which he acknowledges to be imperfect?
1616	Is it the best sort of information?
1616	Is language conscious or unconscious?
1616	Is not all that quite possible?
1616	Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them purely accidental?
1616	Let me explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse?
1616	Let me put the matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have colour?
1616	Let us consider:--does he not himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,''For he alone defended their city and long walls''?
1616	May I not say to him--''This is your name''?
1616	May we suppose that Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by writing a comedy in the form of a prose dialogue?
1616	Now that we have a general notion, how shall we proceed?
1616	Now, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the other name was conferred by the women?
1616	Or about Batieia and Myrina?
1616	Or if this latter explanation is refuted by his silence, then in what relation does his account of language stand to the rest of his philosophy?
1616	Or may we be so bold as to deny the connexion between them?
1616	Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name?
1616	SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a colour, or sound?
1616	SOCRATES: And I ask again,''What do we do when we weave?''
1616	SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not?
1616	SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and some worse?
1616	SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?
1616	SOCRATES: And are not the good wise?
1616	SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and are not other works worthy of blame?
1616	SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser?
1616	SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the enquiry?
1616	SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the woman, and of the woman to the man?
1616	SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon?
1616	SOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things?
1616	SOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him be said to be of golden race?
1616	SOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?
1616	SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts?
1616	SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a dialectician?
1616	SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names?
1616	SOCRATES: And how to answer them?
1616	SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their uses?
1616	SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely?
1616	SOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should certainly infer, and not by necessity?
1616	SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action?
1616	SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication given by me to you?
1616	SOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be made better by associating with another?
1616	SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?
1616	SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?
1616	SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?
1616	SOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from all impurities?
1616	SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking?
1616	SOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is willing to come back to us?
1616	SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?
1616	SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general?
1616	SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king?
1616	SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their wives?
1616	SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both?
1616	SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers?
1616	SOCRATES: And not the rest?
1616	SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will you answer me?
1616	SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action?
1616	SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, looking to the broken one?
1616	SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the like?
1616	SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind?
1616	SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something?
1616	SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something?
1616	SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the name?
1616	SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?
1616	SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things?
1616	SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?
1616	SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given?
1616	SOCRATES: And there are many desires?
1616	SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions?
1616	SOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the greatest?
1616	SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator?
1616	SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions?
1616	SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions?
1616	SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own?
1616	SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda?
1616	SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention?
1616	SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names?
1616	SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this?
1616	SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are prodigies?
1616	SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well?
1616	SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?
1616	SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using well?
1616	SOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion?
1616	SOCRATES: And who are they?
1616	SOCRATES: And who is he?
1616	SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre- maker?
1616	SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country?
1616	SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright?
1616	SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases?
1616	SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are?
1616	SOCRATES: And with which we name?
1616	SOCRATES: And with which we weave?
1616	SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the thing?
1616	SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish?
1616	SOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a knowledge of the things which he named?
1616	SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in another way?
1616	SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike?
1616	SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible?
1616	SOCRATES: Athene?
1616	SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something?
1616	SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others?
1616	SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived?
1616	SOCRATES: But how about truth, then?
1616	SOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the primitive names were not yet given?
1616	SOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them?
1616	SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?
1616	SOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be known without names?
1616	SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue?
1616	SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we can not find a meeting- point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing named?
1616	SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with imitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music and drawing?
1616	SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used?
1616	SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names differ?
1616	SOCRATES: Can not you at least say who gives us the names which we use?
1616	SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things according to their natures?
1616	SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?
1616	SOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?
1616	SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single combat with Hephaestus?
1616	SOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came first?
1616	SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of the giver of the name?
1616	SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them?
1616	SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the actions which proceed from them?
1616	SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?
1616	SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give correct names?
1616	SOCRATES: How would you have me begin?
1616	SOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger?
1616	SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can tell me what is the meaning of the pur?
1616	SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike?
1616	SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?
1616	SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called( kalesan) things by their names, and is not mind the beautiful( kalon)?
1616	SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not the principle which imposes the name the cause?
1616	SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the names given to Hector''s son-- Astyanax or Scamandrius?
1616	SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?
1616	SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct?
1616	SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed?
1616	SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another?
1616	SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and show that they are rightly named Gods?
1616	SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the works of a carpenter?
1616	SOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?
1616	SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then?
1616	SOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light( Phaeos istora)?
1616	SOCRATES: Still you have found them?
1616	SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask,''What sort of instrument is a shuttle?''
1616	SOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of the first names, know or not know the things which they named?
1616	SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each that which belongs to them and is like them?
1616	SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the course of nature?
1616	SOCRATES: The two words selas( brightness) and phos( light) have much the same meaning?
1616	SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator names or imitates?
1616	SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed?
1616	SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying?
1616	SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius?
1616	SOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired being or God, to contradict himself?
1616	SOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same state?
1616	SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false?
1616	SOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry?
1616	SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good?
1616	SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?
1616	SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called irreligious?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the legislator?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well-- and well means like a weaver?
1616	SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse?
1616	SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false?
1616	SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?
1616	SOCRATES: Well, and about this river-- to know that he ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander-- is not that a solemn lesson?
1616	SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?
1616	SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing?
1616	SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them in this way?
1616	SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body?
1616	SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce?
1616	SOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?
1616	SOCRATES: What more names remain to us?
1616	SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus?
1616	SOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods?
1616	SOCRATES: What shall we take next?
1616	SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?
1616	SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signified-- did he not?
1616	SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?
1616	SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference?
1616	SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part?
1616	SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things( pan), and is always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false?
1616	SOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word?
1616	SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai( to seek)?
1616	SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him?
1616	SOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word psuche( soul), and then of the word soma( body)?
1616	Shall I take first of all him whom you mentioned first-- the sun?
1616	Shall we not be deceived by him?
1616	Should we not use signs, like the deaf and dumb?
1616	Socrates asks, whether the things differ as the words which represent them differ:--Are we to maintain with Protagoras, that what appears is?
1616	Suddenly, on some occasion of interest( at the approach of a wild beast, shall we say?
1616	Take, for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter rho inserted?
1616	Then how came the giver of names to contradict himself, and to make some names expressive of rest, and others of motion?
1616	Very good: and which shall I take first?
1616	Was I not telling you just now( but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to share the enquiry with you?
1616	Was there a correctness in words, and were they given by nature or convention?
1616	We can understand one another, although the letter rho accent is not equivalent to the letter s: why is this?
1616	Well, then, there is the letter lambda; what business has this in a word meaning hardness?
1616	Were we mistaken?
1616	Were we right or wrong in saying so?
1616	What did he mean who gave the name Hestia?
1616	What do you say to another?
1616	What do you say, Cratylus?
1616	What do you say?
1616	What do you think?
1616	What else but the soul?
1616	What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and nature of language?
1616	What names will afford the most crucial test of natural fitness?
1616	What principle of correctness is there in those charming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?''
1616	What principle of correctness is there in those charming words-- wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?
1616	What remains after justice?
1616	What will this imitator be called?
1616	What, then, is a name?
1616	Which of these two notions do you prefer?
1616	Why are some verbs impersonal?
1616	Why are there only so many parts of speech, and on what principle are they divided?
1616	Why do substantives often differ in meaning from the verbs to which they are related, adverbs from adjectives?
1616	Why do words differing in origin coalesce in the same sound though retaining their differences of meaning?
1616	Why does the meaning of words depart so widely from their etymology?
1616	Why is the number of words so small in which the sound is an echo of the sense?
1616	Will he not look at the ideal which he has in his mind?
1616	Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good and evil?
1616	Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not?
1616	Will not the user be the man?
1616	Will you help me in the search?
1616	Would that be your view?
1616	Would you not say so?
1616	You know the distinction of soul and body?
1616	You were saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he named; are you still of that opinion?
1616	and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us?
1616	and how did they receive separate meanings?
1616	and is correctness of names the voice of the majority?
1616	and the teacher will use the name well-- and well means like a teacher?
1616	and to what does he look?
1616	and which confines him more to the same spot,--desire or necessity?
1616	and will they be true names at the time of uttering them?
1616	have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man?
1616	or does he mean to imply that a perfect language can only be based on his own theory of ideas?
1616	or is there any other?
1616	or will he look to the form according to which he made the other?
1616	the carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use them?
1616	would these words be true or false?
1616	you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false?
1676	ALCIBIADES: And do you not think that I would enquire?
1676	ALCIBIADES: And was there not a time when I did so think?
1676	ALCIBIADES: And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery?
1676	ALCIBIADES: At what?
1676	ALCIBIADES: But do you not think that I could discover them?
1676	ALCIBIADES: But what can we do?
1676	ALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?
1676	ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what has that to do with the matter?
1676	ALCIBIADES: But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Did I, then?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Do you mean by''how,''Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?
1676	ALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates?
1676	ALCIBIADES: How could we?
1676	ALCIBIADES: How so?
1676	ALCIBIADES: How was that?
1676	ALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which are required, Socrates,--can you tell me?
1676	ALCIBIADES: In what respect?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going to ask you the very same question-- What do you want?
1676	ALCIBIADES: The Muses do you mean, Socrates?
1676	ALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What am I to consider?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What are they?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What caution?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What is it?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What is that?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What qualities?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What was that?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Why are you so sure?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Why is that?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Why, are they not able to teach?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and unjust?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there?
1676	And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman?
1676	And do you know whether you are a freeman or not?
1676	And does that which gives it to the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with himself and with another?
1676	And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which you speak?
1676	And what is their aim?
1676	And what is your motive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of coming?
1676	And who do them?
1676	At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage?
1676	But granting, if I must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance necessary to the attainment of them?
1676	But has he the knowledge which is necessary for carrying them out?
1676	But to be good in what?
1676	But to command what-- horses or men?
1676	But what business?
1676	But when is a city better?
1676	Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?
1676	Can you tell me why?
1676	Did you never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings?
1676	Does Alcibiades know?
1676	Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands?
1676	Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet?
1676	Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him?
1676	Does not the art of measure?
1676	Equestrian affairs?
1676	For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times?
1676	Have you not remarked their absence?
1676	He is going to persuade the Athenians-- about what?
1676	How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of which the other is in ignorance?
1676	I who put the question, or you who answer me?
1676	Is he good in the sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad?
1676	Is it not disgraceful?
1676	Is it not true?
1676	Is not that clear?
1676	Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?
1676	Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or evil?
1676	Now is this courage good or evil?
1676	Or did you think that you knew?
1676	Or is self- knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?
1676	SOCRATES: A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems?
1676	SOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge?
1676	SOCRATES: About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?
1676	SOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him?
1676	SOCRATES: Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance?
1676	SOCRATES: All just things are honourable?
1676	SOCRATES: And Alcibiades is my hearer?
1676	SOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?
1676	SOCRATES: And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic?
1676	SOCRATES: And I in talking use words?
1676	SOCRATES: And I was right?
1676	SOCRATES: And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?
1676	SOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one and persuade many?
1676	SOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer?
1676	SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good?
1676	SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good?
1676	SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing?
1676	SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend?
1676	SOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state?
1676	SOCRATES: And as much as is best?
1676	SOCRATES: And as much as is well?
1676	SOCRATES: And at such times as are best?
1676	SOCRATES: And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is better for men as well as for children?
1676	SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands?
1676	SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?
1676	SOCRATES: And by how much greater?
1676	SOCRATES: And can not you persuade one man about that of which you can persuade many?
1676	SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient?
1676	SOCRATES: And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse?
1676	SOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not know what we are ourselves?
1676	SOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?
1676	SOCRATES: And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how?
1676	SOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?
1676	SOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet?
1676	SOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take care of yourself?
1676	SOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?
1676	SOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body?
1676	SOCRATES: And does the body rule over itself?
1676	SOCRATES: And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?
1676	SOCRATES: And failing, will he not be miserable?
1676	SOCRATES: And for as long a time as is better?
1676	SOCRATES: And happiness is a good?
1676	SOCRATES: And have I not been the questioner all through?
1676	SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy?
1676	SOCRATES: And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?
1676	SOCRATES: And how can you say,''What was I to do''?
1676	SOCRATES: And how does this happen?
1676	SOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?
1676	SOCRATES: And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public and private capacity?
1676	SOCRATES: And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states?
1676	SOCRATES: And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is delivered from his misery?
1676	SOCRATES: And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?
1676	SOCRATES: And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings?
1676	SOCRATES: And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right in sending him to be taught by our friends the many?
1676	SOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic- master?
1676	SOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself?
1676	SOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?
1676	SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual singly and many individuals of the things which he knows?
1676	SOCRATES: And is self- knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi?
1676	SOCRATES: And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?
1676	SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not?
1676	SOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?
1676	SOCRATES: And more than four years ago you were a child-- were you not?
1676	SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters?
1676	SOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves?
1676	SOCRATES: And private individuals?
1676	SOCRATES: And self- knowledge we agree to be wisdom?
1676	SOCRATES: And so you will act rightly and well?
1676	SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?
1676	SOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board?
1676	SOCRATES: And taking proper care means improving?
1676	SOCRATES: And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?
1676	SOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you know?
1676	SOCRATES: And that which is better is also nobler?
1676	SOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used?
1676	SOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and the death another?
1676	SOCRATES: And the good is expedient?
1676	SOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and would least like to be deprived of them?
1676	SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good?
1676	SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good?
1676	SOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that?
1676	SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant?
1676	SOCRATES: And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body?
1676	SOCRATES: And the same holds of the balance?
1676	SOCRATES: And the shoe in like manner to the foot?
1676	SOCRATES: And the soul rules?
1676	SOCRATES: And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?
1676	SOCRATES: And the user of the body is the soul?
1676	SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?
1676	SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil?
1676	SOCRATES: And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly?
1676	SOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and their opposites you would least desire?
1676	SOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?
1676	SOCRATES: And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war?
1676	SOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise?
1676	SOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?
1676	SOCRATES: And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same?
1676	SOCRATES: And virtue to a freeman?
1676	SOCRATES: And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic?
1676	SOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses?
1676	SOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?
1676	SOCRATES: And what art makes each individual agree with himself?
1676	SOCRATES: And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the comparative length of the span and of the cubit?
1676	SOCRATES: And what do you call the art of fellow- citizens?
1676	SOCRATES: And what is nobler is more becoming?
1676	SOCRATES: And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and preserves the order of the city?
1676	SOCRATES: And what is the art which improves our shoes?
1676	SOCRATES: And what sort of an art is this?
1676	SOCRATES: And what will become of those for whom he is acting?
1676	SOCRATES: And what would you say of a state?
1676	SOCRATES: And when did you discover them-- not, surely, at the time when you thought that you knew them?
1676	SOCRATES: And when did you think that you were ignorant-- if you consider, you will find that there never was such a time?
1676	SOCRATES: And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust?
1676	SOCRATES: And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them?
1676	SOCRATES: And when it is better?
1676	SOCRATES: And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet?
1676	SOCRATES: And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the unwise?
1676	SOCRATES: And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?
1676	SOCRATES: And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, which she has never learned?
1676	SOCRATES: And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust?
1676	SOCRATES: And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew?
1676	SOCRATES: And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?
1676	SOCRATES: And would you say that they knew the things about which they differ?
1676	SOCRATES: And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly?
1676	SOCRATES: And you the answerer?
1676	SOCRATES: And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these matters, if you saw them at variance?
1676	SOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable, in as much as courage does a good work?
1676	SOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same?
1676	SOCRATES: And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided?
1676	SOCRATES: And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables them to rule over their fellow- singers?
1676	SOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be perfect in virtue?
1676	SOCRATES: Are they ruling over the signal- men who give the time to the rowers?
1676	SOCRATES: As I am, with you?
1676	SOCRATES: As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and divine, and act with a view to them?
1676	SOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose?
1676	SOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant?
1676	SOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better?
1676	SOCRATES: But can a man give that which he has not?
1676	SOCRATES: But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?
1676	SOCRATES: But can they be said to understand that about which they are quarrelling to the death?
1676	SOCRATES: But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man?
1676	SOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues?
1676	SOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds?
1676	SOCRATES: But good counsel?
1676	SOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?
1676	SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue?
1676	SOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover?
1676	SOCRATES: But how is this, friend Alcibiades?
1676	SOCRATES: But if we have no self- knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?
1676	SOCRATES: But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?
1676	SOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?
1676	SOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?
1676	SOCRATES: But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man?
1676	SOCRATES: But over men?
1676	SOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe?
1676	SOCRATES: But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?
1676	SOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool?
1676	SOCRATES: But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about what?
1676	SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others?
1676	SOCRATES: But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?
1676	SOCRATES: But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a thing is a correct expression?
1676	SOCRATES: But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute- players, who lead the singers and use the services of the dancers?
1676	SOCRATES: Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue?
1676	SOCRATES: Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing?--with whom but with me?
1676	SOCRATES: Did not I ask, and you answer the question?
1676	SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge?
1676	SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just?
1676	SOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?
1676	SOCRATES: Do you take refuge in them?
1676	SOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?
1676	SOCRATES: For the builder will advise better than you will about that?
1676	SOCRATES: Have we not made an advance?
1676	SOCRATES: Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?
1676	SOCRATES: He uses his hands too?
1676	SOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of a man, and not the man himself?
1676	SOCRATES: He will not know what he is doing?
1676	SOCRATES: He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful?
1676	SOCRATES: How?
1676	SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was dishonourable and yet just?
1676	SOCRATES: I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a male accomplishment?
1676	SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing?
1676	SOCRATES: I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:--is that the reason?
1676	SOCRATES: I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?
1676	SOCRATES: In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good?
1676	SOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are not?
1676	SOCRATES: In what sort of virtue?
1676	SOCRATES: Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and states, equally?
1676	SOCRATES: Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?
1676	SOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?
1676	SOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death and cowardice the worst?
1676	SOCRATES: It is subject, as we were saying?
1676	SOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others?
1676	SOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races?
1676	SOCRATES: Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only?
1676	SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honourably acts well?
1676	SOCRATES: No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we not wish to be as good as possible?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor about divination?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor an economist?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own work?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor men by women when they do their own work?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring?
1676	SOCRATES: Not, surely, over horses?
1676	SOCRATES: Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question and answer, who is the speaker,--the questioner or the answerer?
1676	SOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses?
1676	SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre?
1676	SOCRATES: Or on a voyage?
1676	SOCRATES: Or reaping the harvest?
1676	SOCRATES: Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker?
1676	SOCRATES: So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom?
1676	SOCRATES: That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?
1676	SOCRATES: That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement?
1676	SOCRATES: That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?
1676	SOCRATES: That would be the office of the pilot?
1676	SOCRATES: The bad, then, are miserable?
1676	SOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings?
1676	SOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades?
1676	SOCRATES: The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of shoes?
1676	SOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body?
1676	SOCRATES: Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?
1676	SOCRATES: Then acting well is a good?
1676	SOCRATES: Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet?
1676	SOCRATES: Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes?
1676	SOCRATES: Then he is good in that?
1676	SOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?
1676	SOCRATES: Then he who is not wise and good can not be happy?
1676	SOCRATES: Then how can they teach them?
1676	SOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art none of them is temperate?
1676	SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?
1676	SOCRATES: Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself?
1676	SOCRATES: Then in that he is bad?
1676	SOCRATES: Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men?
1676	SOCRATES: Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art?
1676	SOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent?
1676	SOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?
1676	SOCRATES: Then such a man can never be a statesman?
1676	SOCRATES: Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?
1676	SOCRATES: Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing?
1676	SOCRATES: Then the money- maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns?
1676	SOCRATES: Then the rescue of one''s friends is honourable in one point of view, but evil in another?
1676	SOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use?
1676	SOCRATES: Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know?
1676	SOCRATES: Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things?
1676	SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous?
1676	SOCRATES: Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?
1676	SOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also bad?
1676	SOCRATES: Then vice is only suited to a slave?
1676	SOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what affairs?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use other men?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them?
1676	SOCRATES: Then who is speaking?
1676	SOCRATES: Then whom do you call the good?
1676	SOCRATES: Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you did not learn them by discovering them?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the nature of just and unjust?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?
1676	SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?
1676	SOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we shall also find to be good?
1676	SOCRATES: Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge?
1676	SOCRATES: There is no subject about which they are more at variance?
1676	SOCRATES: They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you would acknowledge( would you not) to be a much smaller matter than justice?
1676	SOCRATES: Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the services of other men?
1676	SOCRATES: Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust?
1676	SOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was unable to impart his particular wisdom?
1676	SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making his sons wise?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one another, about the justice or injustice of men and things?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the nature of wood and stone?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, naval affairs?
1676	SOCRATES: What art makes cities agree about numbers?
1676	SOCRATES: What is he, then?
1676	SOCRATES: What is the inference?
1676	SOCRATES: What sort of affairs?
1676	SOCRATES: What things?
1676	SOCRATES: What would you say of courage?
1676	SOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded?
1676	SOCRATES: When does a man take care of his feet?
1676	SOCRATES: When it is well to do so?
1676	SOCRATES: When they are doing something or nothing?
1676	SOCRATES: When they are sick?
1676	SOCRATES: Which is gymnastic?
1676	SOCRATES: Which of us now says that two is more than one?
1676	SOCRATES: Which of us, then, was the speaker?
1676	SOCRATES: Who are good in what?
1676	SOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes?
1676	SOCRATES: Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher?
1676	SOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?
1676	SOCRATES: Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?
1676	SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after them?
1676	SOCRATES: You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act according to the will of God?
1676	SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians?
1676	SOCRATES: You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build?
1676	SOCRATES: You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?
1676	SOCRATES: You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?
1676	SOCRATES: You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?
1676	SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason-- because you would know?
1676	Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater number, two or one; you would reply''two''?
1676	Suppose that I ask you again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow- sailors,--how would you answer?
1676	Suppose you were to ask me, what is that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the body?
1676	Surely not about building?
1676	Then has he enquired for himself?
1676	They can not, of course, be those who know?
1676	To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle?
1676	To what does the word refer?
1676	Was not that said?
1676	Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and enquiry?
1676	What do you say to a year ago?
1676	What is that by the presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered?
1676	Who is he?
1676	Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the nature of justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them?
1676	Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?
1676	Will you tell me how?
1676	Would not his meaning be:--That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?
1676	You would say the same?
1676	and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece of wood or a stone?
1676	and if men, under what circumstances?
1676	and when does he take care?
1676	are they not agreed if you ask them what they are?
1676	if at the time you did not know whether you were wronged or not?
1676	what art can give that agreement?
1735	''And in becoming you participate through the bodily senses, and in being, by thought and the mind?''
1735	--and I should like to know, Theaetetus, how we can possibly answer the younker''s question?
1735	--do you know what sort of object he would single out in reply, and what answer he would make to the enquirer?
1735	And am I not contradicting myself at this moment, in speaking either in the singular or the plural of that to which I deny both plurality and unity?
1735	And are not''knowing''and''being known''active and passive?
1735	And can that be a true theory of the history of philosophy which, in Hegel''s own language,''does not allow the individual to have his right''?
1735	And is not''being''known?
1735	And the real''is,''and the not- real''is not''?
1735	And there is another part which is certainly not less ridiculous, but being a trade in learning must be called by some name germane to the matter?
1735	And therefore let us try another track in our pursuit of him: You are aware that there are certain menial occupations which have names among servants?
1735	And we rejoin: Does not the soul know?
1735	And what is the name?
1735	And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?
1735	And what more do we want?''
1735	And where does the danger lie?
1735	And who are the ministers of the purification?
1735	And who are these last?
1735	And you mean by the word''participation''a power of doing or suffering?
1735	And, indeed, how can we imagine that perfect being is a mere everlasting form, devoid of motion and soul?
1735	Are there two more kinds to be added to the three others?
1735	Are we not''seeking the living among the dead''and dignifying a mere logical skeleton with the name of philosophy and almost of God?
1735	But can he know all things?
1735	But could the Organon of Aristotle ever have been written unless the Sophist and Statesman had preceded?
1735	But how can anything be an appearance only?
1735	But how can there be anything which neither rests nor moves?
1735	But how can there be two names when there is nothing but one?
1735	But how could philosophy explain the connexion of ideas, how justify the passing of them into one another?
1735	But is it really true that the part has no meaning when separated from the whole, or that knowledge to be knowledge at all must be universal?
1735	But is there any meaning in reintroducing the forms of the old logic?
1735	But ought we to give him up?
1735	Can any one say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid being caught in a contradiction?
1735	Can we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?
1735	Do all abstractions shine only by the reflected light of other abstractions?
1735	Do not our household servants talk of sifting, straining, winnowing?
1735	Do not persons become ideas, and is there any distinction between them?
1735	Do we not make one house by the art of building, and another by the art of drawing, which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake?
1735	Do you agree with our recent definition?
1735	Do you see his point, Theaetetus?
1735	Do you understand?
1735	Do you, Theaetetus, still feel any doubt of this?
1735	Does he who affirms this mean to say that motion is rest, or rest motion?
1735	Does not the very number of them imply that the nature of his art is not understood?
1735	For he who would imitate you would surely know you and your figure?
1735	Have we not unearthed the Sophist?
1735	How are we to understand the word"are"?
1735	How then can he dispute satisfactorily with any one who knows?
1735	How will you maintain your ground against him?
1735	If not- being is inconceivable, how can not- being be refuted?
1735	In a word, is not the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things?
1735	Is being, then, one, because the parts of being are one, or shall we say that being is not a whole?
1735	Is he the philosopher or the Sophist?
1735	Is he the statesman or the popular orator?
1735	Is not that true?
1735	Is not the reconciliation of mind and body a necessity, not only of speculation but of practical life?
1735	Is there any doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children''s play?
1735	Is this possible?
1735	May I not say with confidence that not- being has an assured existence, and a nature of its own?
1735	May they not also find a nearer explanation in their relation to phenomena?
1735	May we not call these''appearances,''since they appear only and are not really like?
1735	May we not say that motion is other than the other, having been also proved by us to be other than the same and other than rest?
1735	Not- being can not be attributed to any being; for how can any being be wholly abstracted from being?
1735	Or are some things communicable and others not?--Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus, will they prefer?
1735	Or is art required in order to do so?
1735	Or is not the very opposite true?
1735	Or shall we gather all into one class of things communicable with one another?
1735	Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all?
1735	Or shall we say that they are created by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes from God?
1735	Or should we consider being and other to be two names of the same class?
1735	Real or not real?
1735	SOCRATES: But how can any one who is ignorant dispute in a rational manner against him who knows?
1735	SOCRATES: Is he not rather a god, Theodorus, who comes to us in the disguise of a stranger?
1735	STRANGER: A resemblance, then, is not really real, if, as you say, not true?
1735	STRANGER: Again, false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the opposite of the truth:--You would assent?
1735	STRANGER: Again, motion is other than the same?
1735	STRANGER: Again, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction be rightly said to be the remedy?
1735	STRANGER: Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity?
1735	STRANGER: And a little while ago I said that not- being is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable: do you follow?
1735	STRANGER: And about what does he profess that he teaches men to dispute?
1735	STRANGER: And all number is to be reckoned among things which are?
1735	STRANGER: And all the arts which were just now mentioned are characterized by this power of producing?
1735	STRANGER: And are we not now in as great a difficulty about being?
1735	STRANGER: And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, when they are not?
1735	STRANGER: And do they not acknowledge this to be a body having a soul?
1735	STRANGER: And do they not profess to make men able to dispute about law and about politics in general?
1735	STRANGER: And do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust, and that one soul is wise, and another foolish?
1735	STRANGER: And do you mean this something to be some other true thing, or what do you mean?
1735	STRANGER: And does he not also teach others the art of disputation?
1735	STRANGER: And does not false opinion also think that things which most certainly exist do not exist at all?
1735	STRANGER: And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything?
1735	STRANGER: And has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence as any other class?
1735	STRANGER: And here, again, is falsehood?
1735	STRANGER: And in the case of the body are there not two arts which have to do with the two bodily states?
1735	STRANGER: And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not- being as one?
1735	STRANGER: And is being the same as one, and do you apply two names to the same thing?
1735	STRANGER: And is deformity anything but the want of measure, which is always unsightly?
1735	STRANGER: And is knowing and being known doing or suffering, or both, or is the one doing and the other suffering, or has neither any share in either?
1735	STRANGER: And is not that part of exchange which takes place in the city, being about half of the whole, termed retailing?
1735	STRANGER: And is not the case the same with the parts of the other, which is also one?
1735	STRANGER: And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than imitation?
1735	STRANGER: And may not conquest be again subdivided?
1735	STRANGER: And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of reasoning?
1735	STRANGER: And may we not fairly call the sort of art, which produces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art?
1735	STRANGER: And now, do we seem to have gained a fair notion of being?
1735	STRANGER: And now, if we suppose that all things have the power of communion with one another-- what will follow?
1735	STRANGER: And of arts there are two kinds?
1735	STRANGER: And of persuasion, there may be said to be two kinds?
1735	STRANGER: And of swimming animals, one class lives on the wing and the other in the water?
1735	STRANGER: And of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one or many kinds?
1735	STRANGER: And purification was to leave the good and to cast out whatever is bad?
1735	STRANGER: And shall we call our new friend unskilled, or a thorough master of his craft?
1735	STRANGER: And shall we call the other a fifth class?
1735	STRANGER: And shall we further speak of this latter class as having one or two divisions?
1735	STRANGER: And that which being other is also like, may we not fairly call a likeness or image?
1735	STRANGER: And that which exchanges the goods of one city for those of another by selling and buying is the exchange of the merchant?
1735	STRANGER: And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to the philosopher pure and true?
1735	STRANGER: And the false says what is other than true?
1735	STRANGER: And the not true is that which is the opposite of the true?
1735	STRANGER: And the not- great may be said to exist, equally with the great?
1735	STRANGER: And the other is always relative to other?
1735	STRANGER: And there is a private sort of controversy, which is cut up into questions and answers, and this is commonly called disputation?
1735	STRANGER: And there is something which you call''being''?
1735	STRANGER: And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were?
1735	STRANGER: And therefore this first kind of capture may be called by us capture with enclosures, or something of that sort?
1735	STRANGER: And therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all- wise?
1735	STRANGER: And they dispute about all things?
1735	STRANGER: And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two principal kinds?
1735	STRANGER: And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness- making art?
1735	STRANGER: And we know that there exists in speech... THEAETETUS: What exists?
1735	STRANGER: And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all-- must we not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by''being''?
1735	STRANGER: And what do you say of the visible things in heaven and earth, and the like?
1735	STRANGER: And what is ignorance but the aberration of a mind which is bent on truth, and in which the process of understanding is perverted?
1735	STRANGER: And what is the name?
1735	STRANGER: And what is the quality of each of these two sentences?
1735	STRANGER: And what shall we call the other?
1735	STRANGER: And what shall we say of human art?
1735	STRANGER: And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general?
1735	STRANGER: And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a jest?
1735	STRANGER: And when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of sense, would you not call it imagination?
1735	STRANGER: And when the war is one of words, it may be termed controversy?
1735	STRANGER: And when you admit that both or either of them are, do you mean to say that both or either of them are in motion?
1735	STRANGER: And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise?
1735	STRANGER: And where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice, is not chastisement the art which is most required?
1735	STRANGER: And who are the ministers of this art?
1735	STRANGER: And who is the maker of the longer speeches?
1735	STRANGER: And would they say that the whole is other than the one that is, or the same with it?
1735	STRANGER: And would they say that they are corporeal?
1735	STRANGER: And would you not call by the same name him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?
1735	STRANGER: And yet they must all be akin?
1735	STRANGER: And yet you would say that both and either of them equally are?
1735	STRANGER: And you mean by true that which really is?
1735	STRANGER: And you remember that we subdivided the swimming and left the land animals, saying that there were many kinds of them?
1735	STRANGER: And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being?
1735	STRANGER: And, in the second place, it related to a subject?
1735	STRANGER: Any power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight was held by us to be a sufficient definition of being?
1735	STRANGER: But are we to conceive that being and the same are identical?
1735	STRANGER: But can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not?
1735	STRANGER: But does every one know what letters will unite with what?
1735	STRANGER: But how can a man either express in words or even conceive in thought things which are not or a thing which is not without number?
1735	STRANGER: But perhaps you mean to give the name of''being''to both of them together?
1735	STRANGER: But shall we say that has mind and not life?
1735	STRANGER: But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be admitted by them to exist?
1735	STRANGER: But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of anything?
1735	STRANGER: But that of which this is the condition can not be absolute unity?
1735	STRANGER: But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech?
1735	STRANGER: But then, what is the meaning of these two words,''same''and''other''?
1735	STRANGER: But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the not- beautiful a less real existence?
1735	STRANGER: But would either of them be if not participating in being?
1735	STRANGER: But you would agree, if I am not mistaken, that existences are relative as well as absolute?
1735	STRANGER: But, on the other hand, when we say''what is not,''do we not attribute unity?
1735	STRANGER: Can we find a suitable name for each of them?
1735	STRANGER: Can you see how without them mind could exist, or come into existence anywhere?
1735	STRANGER: Do we admit that virtue is distinct from vice in the soul?
1735	STRANGER: Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution of kindred elements, originating in some disagreement?
1735	STRANGER: Do you not see that when the professor of any art has one name and many kinds of knowledge, there must be something wrong?
1735	STRANGER: Do you observe that our scepticism has carried us beyond the range of Parmenides''prohibition?
1735	STRANGER: Do you speak advisedly, or are you carried away at the moment by the habit of assenting into giving a hasty answer?
1735	STRANGER: Do you think that sameness of condition and mode and subject could ever exist without a principle of rest?
1735	STRANGER: Does false opinion think that things which are not are not, or that in a certain sense they are?
1735	STRANGER: First there is motion, which we affirm to be absolutely''other''than rest: what else can we say?
1735	STRANGER: For which reason twig baskets, casting- nets, nooses, creels, and the like may all be termed''enclosures''?
1735	STRANGER: How are we to call it?
1735	STRANGER: How do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme and universal wisdom?
1735	STRANGER: How, then, can any one put any faith in me?
1735	STRANGER: How?
1735	STRANGER: Meaning to say that the soul is something which exists?
1735	STRANGER: Nevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not- being?
1735	STRANGER: O my friend, do you not see that nothing can exceed our ignorance, and yet we fancy that we are saying something good?
1735	STRANGER: Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be fairly termed the art of display?
1735	STRANGER: Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject?
1735	STRANGER: Open force may be called fighting, and secret force may have the general name of hunting?
1735	STRANGER: Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest, when you say that they are?
1735	STRANGER: Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being, but that it has no soul which contains them?
1735	STRANGER: Or that being has mind and life and soul, but although endowed with soul remains absolutely unmoved?
1735	STRANGER: Or this sentence, again-- THEAETETUS: What sentence?
1735	STRANGER: Seeing, then, that all arts are either acquisitive or creative, in which class shall we place the art of the angler?
1735	STRANGER: Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain from one end of his genealogy to the other?
1735	STRANGER: Shall we regard one as the simple imitator-- the other as the dissembling or ironical imitator?
1735	STRANGER: Shall we say that being is one and a whole, because it has the attribute of unity?
1735	STRANGER: Shall we say that this has or has not a name?
1735	STRANGER: Shall we then be so faint- hearted as to give him up?
1735	STRANGER: Some in the singular( ti) you would say is the sign of one, some in the dual( tine) of two, some in the plural( tines) of many?
1735	STRANGER: The first question about the angler was, whether he was a skilled artist or unskilled?
1735	STRANGER: The plain result is that motion, since it partakes of being, really is and also is not?
1735	STRANGER: The true says what is true about you?
1735	STRANGER: Then any taking away of evil from the soul may be properly called purification?
1735	STRANGER: Then if, as I was saying, there is one art which includes all of them, ought not that art to have one name?
1735	STRANGER: Then let them answer this question: One, you say, alone is?
1735	STRANGER: Then suppose that we work out some lesser example which will be a pattern of the greater?
1735	STRANGER: Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth?
1735	STRANGER: Then the not- beautiful turns out to be the opposition of being to being?
1735	STRANGER: Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as deformed and devoid of symmetry?
1735	STRANGER: Then we may without fear contend that motion is other than being?
1735	STRANGER: Then we must not attempt to attribute to not- being number either in the singular or plural?
1735	STRANGER: Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and disease of the soul?
1735	STRANGER: Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power?
1735	STRANGER: Then, according to this view, motion is other and also not other?
1735	STRANGER: There is some part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?
1735	STRANGER: These then are the two kinds of image- making-- the art of making likenesses, and phantastic or the art of making appearances?
1735	STRANGER: Thus far, then, the Sophist and the angler, starting from the art of acquiring, take the same road?
1735	STRANGER: To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but unity, is surely ridiculous?
1735	STRANGER: To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is?
1735	STRANGER: To them we say-- You would distinguish essence from generation?
1735	STRANGER: Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will become not- being?
1735	STRANGER: Very good; and now say, do we venture to utter the forbidden word''not- being''?
1735	STRANGER: Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know?
1735	STRANGER: We were saying of him, if I am not mistaken, that he was a disputer?
1735	STRANGER: Well, fair sirs, we say to them, what is this participation, which you assert of both?
1735	STRANGER: What art?
1735	STRANGER: What is the next step?
1735	STRANGER: What is there which is well known and not great, and is yet as susceptible of definition as any larger thing?
1735	STRANGER: What name, then, shall be given to the sort of instruction which gets rid of this?
1735	STRANGER: What then shall we call it?
1735	STRANGER: When I introduced the word''is,''did I not contradict what I said before?
1735	STRANGER: When any one says''A man learns,''should you not call this the simplest and least of sentences?
1735	STRANGER: When the affirmation or denial takes Place in silence and in the mind only, have you any other name by which to call it but opinion?
1735	STRANGER: When we speak of something as not great, does the expression seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal?
1735	STRANGER: When we speak of things which are not, are we not attributing plurality to not- being?
1735	STRANGER: When we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation of not- being, we were in the greatest difficulty:--do you remember?
1735	STRANGER: Where, then, is a man to look for help who would have any clear or fixed notion of being in his mind?
1735	STRANGER: Whereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both of them are?
1735	STRANGER: Who must be you, and can be nobody else?
1735	STRANGER: Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire opposition to one another?
1735	STRANGER: Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute?
1735	STRANGER: Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in all the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one?
1735	STRANGER: Yet they surely both partake of the same and of the other?
1735	STRANGER: You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel-- that I have no heart for this argument?
1735	STRANGER: You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must say some one thing?
1735	STRANGER: You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not?
1735	STRANGER: You mean to say, not in a true sense?
1735	STRANGER: You remember our division of hunting, into hunting after swimming animals and land animals?
1735	Shall I say an angler?
1735	Shall I tell you what we must do?
1735	Shall we assume( 1) that being and rest and motion, and all other things, are incommunicable with one another?
1735	THEAETETUS: Again I ask, What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: All things?
1735	THEAETETUS: And in what other way can it contain them?
1735	THEAETETUS: And is there not some truth in what they say?
1735	THEAETETUS: And what is the name of the art?
1735	THEAETETUS: And what is the question at issue about names?
1735	THEAETETUS: And what is their answer?
1735	THEAETETUS: And why?
1735	THEAETETUS: But are tame animals ever hunted?
1735	THEAETETUS: But are you sure, Stranger, that this will be quite so acceptable to the rest of the company as Socrates imagines?
1735	THEAETETUS: But how can he, Stranger?
1735	THEAETETUS: For what reason?
1735	THEAETETUS: How are we to distinguish the two?
1735	THEAETETUS: How can they?
1735	THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: How indeed?
1735	THEAETETUS: How is that possible?
1735	THEAETETUS: How is that?
1735	THEAETETUS: How is that?
1735	THEAETETUS: How is that?
1735	THEAETETUS: How shall we get it out of them?
1735	THEAETETUS: How shall we make the division?
1735	THEAETETUS: How so?
1735	THEAETETUS: How so?
1735	THEAETETUS: How so?
1735	THEAETETUS: How so?
1735	THEAETETUS: How so?
1735	THEAETETUS: How the Sophist?
1735	THEAETETUS: How would you make the division?
1735	THEAETETUS: How, Stranger, can I describe an image except as something fashioned in the likeness of the true?
1735	THEAETETUS: How?
1735	THEAETETUS: How?
1735	THEAETETUS: How?
1735	THEAETETUS: How?
1735	THEAETETUS: How?
1735	THEAETETUS: I suppose that you are referring to the precepts of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts?
1735	THEAETETUS: In what respect?
1735	THEAETETUS: In what way are they related?
1735	THEAETETUS: In what way?
1735	THEAETETUS: In what?
1735	THEAETETUS: Is not this always the aim of imitation?
1735	THEAETETUS: May I ask to what you are referring?
1735	THEAETETUS: Of what are they to be patterns, and what are we going to do with them all?
1735	THEAETETUS: Of what are you speaking?
1735	THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding?
1735	THEAETETUS: To what are you referring?
1735	THEAETETUS: To what do you refer?
1735	THEAETETUS: To what do you refer?
1735	THEAETETUS: Very likely; but will you tell me how?
1735	THEAETETUS: Well, and do you see what you are looking for?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they, and what is their name?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are you saying?
1735	THEAETETUS: What art?
1735	THEAETETUS: What can he mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What classification?
1735	THEAETETUS: What definition?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What explanation?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is that?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is that?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is the notion?
1735	THEAETETUS: What question?
1735	THEAETETUS: What questions?
1735	THEAETETUS: What shall be the divisions?
1735	THEAETETUS: What was that?
1735	THEAETETUS: What were they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What will be their answer, Stranger?
1735	THEAETETUS: What would he mean by''making''?
1735	THEAETETUS: What?
1735	THEAETETUS: What?
1735	THEAETETUS: What?
1735	THEAETETUS: Where shall we make the division?
1735	THEAETETUS: Where, indeed?
1735	THEAETETUS: Where?
1735	THEAETETUS: Which is--?
1735	THEAETETUS: Who are cousins?
1735	THEAETETUS: Who but he can be worthy?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why do you think so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why not?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why not?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why?
1735	THEAETETUS: Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of which you are speaking?
1735	THEAETETUS: Yes, there are many such; which of them do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: Yes; why should there not be another such art?
1735	THEODORUS: What is your difficulty about them, and what made you ask?
1735	THEODORUS: What terms?
1735	Tell me who?
1735	The Pre- Socratic philosophies are simpler, and we may observe a progress in them; but is there any regular succession?
1735	The unity of opposites was the crux of ancient thinkers in the age of Plato: How could one thing be or become another?
1735	Then we turn to the friends of ideas: to them we say,''You distinguish becoming from being?''
1735	Then what is the trick of his art, and why does he receive money from his admirers?
1735	There will be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question, either of the dualists or of the pluralists?
1735	Therefore not- being can not be predicated or expressed; for how can we say''is,''''are not,''without number?
1735	They were the symbols of different schools of philosophy: but in what relation did they stand to one another and to the world of sense?
1735	To begin at the beginning-- Does he make them able to dispute about divine things, which are invisible to men in general?
1735	To them we say: Are being and one two different names for the same thing?
1735	Turning to the dualist philosophers, we say to them: Is being a third element besides hot and cold?
1735	Upon your view, are we to suppose that there is a third principle over and above the other two,--three in all, and not two?
1735	We may call him an image- maker if we please, but he will only say,''And pray, what is an image?''
1735	What connexion is there between the proposition and our ideas of reciprocity, cause and effect, and similar relations?
1735	What do you say, Stranger?
1735	What is the meaning of these words,''same''and''other''?
1735	What is the teaching of Socrates apart from his personal history, or the doctrines of Christ apart from the Divine life in which they are embodied?
1735	What shall we name him?
1735	Whether they are right or not, who can say?
1735	Who ever thinks of the world as a syllogism?
1735	Will you recall them to my mind?
1735	Will you tell me?
1735	Would you object to begin with the consideration of the words themselves?
1735	Yet one thing may be said of them without offence-- THEAETETUS: What thing?
1735	You mean to say that he seems to have a knowledge of them?
1735	and is not Being capable of being known?
1735	has not Being mind?
1735	he and we are in the same difficulty with which we reproached the dualists; for motion and rest are contradictions-- how then can they both exist?
1735	is there a greater still behind?
1735	my dear youth, do you suppose this possible?
1735	or do you identify one or both of the two elements with being?
1735	or( 2) that they all have indiscriminate communion?
1735	or( 3) that there is communion of some and not of others?
1744	''But whither, Socrates, are you going?
1744	''How can I contribute to the greatest happiness of others?''
1744	''Is pleasure an evil?
1744	''What is the place of happiness or utility in a system of moral philosophy?''
1744	''Why, Socrates,''they will say,''how can we?
1744	''Yes, I know, but what is the application?''
1744	''good'') to pleasures in general, when he can not deny that they are different?
1744	--Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and true opinion?
1744	Am I not right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the satisfaction of their want?
1744	And he who thus deceives himself may be strong or weak?
1744	And here several questions arise for consideration:--What is the meaning of pure and impure, of moderate and immoderate?
1744	And if he is strong we fear him, and if he is weak we laugh at him, which is a pleasure, and yet we envy him, which is a pain?
1744	And ignorance is a misfortune?
1744	And in which is pleasure to find a place?
1744	And is not the element which makes this mixed life eligible more akin to mind than to pleasure?
1744	And is not this the science which has a firmer grasp of them than any other?
1744	And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small?
1744	And must I include music, which is admitted to be guess- work?
1744	And must I then finish the argument?
1744	And now I want to know whether I may depart; or will you keep me here until midnight?
1744	And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and mind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture?
1744	And now we turn to the pleasures; shall I admit them?
1744	And one form of ignorance is self- conceit-- a man may fancy himself richer, fairer, better, wiser than he is?
1744	And there are colours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning?
1744	And they will reply:--''What pleasures do you mean?''
1744	And what shall we say about the rest?
1744	And yet the envious man finds something pleasing in the misfortunes of others?
1744	And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and bereavement?
1744	Another question is raised: May not pleasures, like opinions, be true and false?
1744	Answer now, and tell me whether you see, I will not say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness than in temperance?
1744	Are we not desirous of happiness, at any rate for ourselves and our friends, if not for all mankind?
1744	Are we not liable, or rather certain, as in the case of sight, to be deceived by distance and relation?
1744	Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly unconscious of this and similar phenomena?''
1744	But at an early stage of the controversy another question was asked:''Do pleasures differ in kind?
1744	But how would you decide this question, Protarchus?
1744	But in passing from one to the other, do we not experience neutral states, which although they appear pleasureable or painful are really neither?
1744	But is it not distracting to the conscience of a man to be told that in the particular case they are opposed?
1744	But is the life of pleasure perfect and sufficient, when deprived of memory, consciousness, anticipation?
1744	But still we want truth?
1744	But what two notions can be more opposed in many cases than these?
1744	But whence comes this common inheritance or stock of moral ideas?
1744	But where shall we place mind?
1744	Can there be another source?
1744	Could this be otherwise?
1744	Do not certain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be grateful to them?
1744	Do you mean that you are to throw into the cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false measure and the false circle?
1744	Do you think that any one who asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some pleasures are good and others bad?
1744	Does not the more and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end?
1744	First we will take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the impure-- the art which uses the false rule and the false measure?
1744	For are not love and sorrow as well as anger''sweeter than honey,''and also full of pain?
1744	For have these unities of idea any real existence?
1744	For is there not also an absurdity in affirming that good is of the soul only; or in declaring that the best of men, if he be in pain, is bad?
1744	For must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,--that is, like itself?
1744	For what can be more reasonable than that God should will the happiness of all his creatures?
1744	For what in Heaven''s name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?--Pleasure or pain?
1744	Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of the argument?
1744	Have we not found that which Socrates and Plato''grew old in seeking''?
1744	How, as units, can they be divided and dispersed among different objects?
1744	How, if imperishable, can they enter into the world of generation?
1744	How, then, can we compare them?
1744	I am of opinion that they would certainly answer as follows: PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with her:--Am I not right?
1744	If we ask: Which of these many theories is the true one?
1744	If we say''Not pleasure, not virtue, not wisdom, nor yet any quality which we can abstract from these''--what then?
1744	Is mind or chance the lord of the universe?
1744	Is not and was not this what we were saying, Protarchus?
1744	Is not this the life of an oyster?
1744	Is not this the sort of enquiry in which his life is spent?
1744	Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?
1744	Is there not a mixture of feelings in the spectator of tragedy?
1744	Is there such a thing as opinion?
1744	May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other times be quite in despair?
1744	May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate state?
1744	Must not the union of the two be higher and more eligible than either separately?
1744	Or do they exist in their entirety in each object?
1744	Or is the life of mind sufficient, if devoid of any particle of pleasure?
1744	PHILEBUS: And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place?
1744	PHILEBUS: How so?
1744	PHILEBUS: I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon the argument?
1744	PHILEBUS: What is that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And pray, what is dialectic?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And what is this life of mind?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And what was that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And who may they be?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of resolution as well as a cause of composition?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the aforesaid classes is the mixed one?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains?
1744	PROTARCHUS: But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and acknowledged?
1744	PROTARCHUS: But when and how does he do this?
1744	PROTARCHUS: But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any more?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How can we make the further division which you suggest?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How can we?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How do they afford an illustration?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How indeed?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How is that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How is that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How shall I change them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How so?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How so?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How so?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How will that be?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How will you proceed?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How would you distinguish them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	PROTARCHUS: I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be a little plainer?
1744	PROTARCHUS: In the class of the infinite, you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: In what manner?
1744	PROTARCHUS: In what respect?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you speaking?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Of what nature?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Of what nature?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Of what?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in conceiving to be true?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Upon what principle would you make the division?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What am I to infer?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What answer?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are the two kinds?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how do you separate them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how shall we find them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are they?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are they?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are they?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What disorders?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do they mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by the class of the finite?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by''intermediate''?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what you are saying?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, my good friend?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What have you to say?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What instance shall we select?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is your explanation?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What life?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What manner of natures are they?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What phenomena do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What pleasures?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What point?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What principle?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What question?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What question?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What question?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What question?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What question?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What road?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What was it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What was that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What will that be?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What?
1744	PROTARCHUS: When can that be, Socrates?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Where shall we begin?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Which of them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Who is he?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why do you ask, Socrates?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why not, Socrates?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why should I?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why so?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his senses?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no cause?
1744	PROTARCHUS: You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure?
1744	PROTARCHUS: You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing?
1744	PROTARCHUS: You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed either for good or bad?
1744	PROTARCHUS: You want to know whether that which is called essence is, properly speaking, for the sake of generation?
1744	PROTARCHUS: You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have no longer a voice in the matter?
1744	Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer?
1744	SOCRATES: A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be-- PROTARCHUS: What?
1744	SOCRATES: A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he not?
1744	SOCRATES: And a man must be pleased by something?
1744	SOCRATES: And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with hopes?
1744	SOCRATES: And am I to include music, which, as I was saying just now, is full of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity?
1744	SOCRATES: And an opinion must be of something?
1744	SOCRATES: And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured most?
1744	SOCRATES: And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we are sick or when we are in health?
1744	SOCRATES: And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a mixed feeling of pain and pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are true or false?
1744	SOCRATES: And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient?
1744	SOCRATES: And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always spring from memory and perception?
1744	SOCRATES: And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely?
1744	SOCRATES: And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free from pain?
1744	SOCRATES: And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?
1744	SOCRATES: And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune?
1744	SOCRATES: And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned to you?
1744	SOCRATES: And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the seasons, and all the delights of life?
1744	SOCRATES: And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality?
1744	SOCRATES: And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain?
1744	SOCRATES: And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of certainty?
1744	SOCRATES: And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, will always have a real feeling of pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?
1744	SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry?
1744	SOCRATES: And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined?
1744	SOCRATES: And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name?
1744	SOCRATES: And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an evil?
1744	SOCRATES: And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates?
1744	SOCRATES: And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite of generation?
1744	SOCRATES: And is not our fire small and weak and mean?
1744	SOCRATES: And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; the agent and the cause may be rightly called one?
1744	SOCRATES: And is not thirst desire?
1744	SOCRATES: And is the good sufficient?
1744	SOCRATES: And is there not and was there not a further point which was conceded between us?
1744	SOCRATES: And may not all this be truly called an evil condition?
1744	SOCRATES: And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; are they not often false?
1744	SOCRATES: And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures?
1744	SOCRATES: And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule of the habitation of the good?
1744	SOCRATES: And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the preservation of consciousness?
1744	SOCRATES: And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory character?
1744	SOCRATES: And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus''goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good?
1744	SOCRATES: And now we must begin to mix them?
1744	SOCRATES: And now what is the next question, and how came we hither?
1744	SOCRATES: And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound kind?
1744	SOCRATES: And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to be given to the fairest things?
1744	SOCRATES: And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and see what makes them the greatest?
1744	SOCRATES: And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful pleasures?
1744	SOCRATES: And such a thing as pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which is not true, but false?
1744	SOCRATES: And that can not be the body, for the body is supposed to be emptied?
1744	SOCRATES: And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago discovered?
1744	SOCRATES: And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven to be distinct from them,--and may therefore be called a fourth principle?
1744	SOCRATES: And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we readily acknowledged it to be by nature one?
1744	SOCRATES: And the images answering to true opinions and words are true, and to false opinions and words false; are they not?
1744	SOCRATES: And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have often said, are the pleasures of the body?
1744	SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name-- shall we not?
1744	SOCRATES: And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but not of the second?
1744	SOCRATES: And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion would be properly called consciousness?
1744	SOCRATES: And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse?
1744	SOCRATES: And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of equal pitch:--may we affirm so much?
1744	SOCRATES: And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which exist in the minds of each of us?
1744	SOCRATES: And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being?
1744	SOCRATES: And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not right?
1744	SOCRATES: And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of friends?
1744	SOCRATES: And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural state is pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And we maintain that they are each of them one?
1744	SOCRATES: And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to what class it is to be assigned?
1744	SOCRATES: And what do you say, Philebus?
1744	SOCRATES: And what if there be a third state, which is better than either?
1744	SOCRATES: And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed?
1744	SOCRATES: And what would you say of the intermediate state?
1744	SOCRATES: And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; it will still be an opinion?
1744	SOCRATES: And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the admixture which takes place in comedy?
1744	SOCRATES: And will you help us to test these two lives?
1744	SOCRATES: And will you let me go?
1744	SOCRATES: And wisdom and mind can not exist without soul?
1744	SOCRATES: And yet he who desires, surely desires something?
1744	SOCRATES: And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of his neighbours at which he is pleased?
1744	SOCRATES: And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in view when we call them by a single name?
1744	SOCRATES: And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one another, and sometimes opposed?
1744	SOCRATES: And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the spectators smile through their tears?
1744	SOCRATES: And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a state?
1744	SOCRATES: Are not we the cup- bearers?
1744	SOCRATES: Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be shown?
1744	SOCRATES: Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the argument?
1744	SOCRATES: Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the question which, as you say, you have been so long asking?
1744	SOCRATES: But do we not distinguish memory from recollection?
1744	SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence?
1744	SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence?
1744	SOCRATES: But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our memories?
1744	SOCRATES: But how can we rightly judge of them?
1744	SOCRATES: But is such a life eligible?
1744	SOCRATES: But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends''misfortunes-- is not that wrong?
1744	SOCRATES: But were you right?
1744	SOCRATES: But what do you say of another question:--have we not heard that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being?
1744	SOCRATES: Capital; and now will you please to give me your best attention?
1744	SOCRATES: Certainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable into two kinds?
1744	SOCRATES: Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of which they were generated, furnish all the three classes?
1744	SOCRATES: Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?
1744	SOCRATES: Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of desires?
1744	SOCRATES: Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil?
1744	SOCRATES: Do not obvious and every- day phenomena furnish the simplest illustration?
1744	SOCRATES: Do we mean anything when we say''a man thirsts''?
1744	SOCRATES: Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true?
1744	SOCRATES: Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you?
1744	SOCRATES: Does not the right participation in the finite give health-- in disease, for instance?
1744	SOCRATES: Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious battle, in which such various points are at issue?
1744	SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?
1744	SOCRATES: Have we not found a road which leads towards the good?
1744	SOCRATES: He asks himself--''What is that which appears to be standing by the rock under the tree?''
1744	SOCRATES: He does not desire that which he experiences, for he experiences thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires replenishment?
1744	SOCRATES: Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we have described?
1744	SOCRATES: How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no fixedness?
1744	SOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity?
1744	SOCRATES: I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of the soul?
1744	SOCRATES: In what way?
1744	SOCRATES: Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous pain?
1744	SOCRATES: Is the good perfect or imperfect?
1744	SOCRATES: Knowledge has two parts,--the one productive, and the other educational?
1744	SOCRATES: Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle them?
1744	SOCRATES: Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures?
1744	SOCRATES: May I not have led you into a misapprehension?
1744	SOCRATES: May our body be said to have a soul?
1744	SOCRATES: Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature?
1744	SOCRATES: Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver?
1744	SOCRATES: Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;--do you agree?
1744	SOCRATES: Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities?
1744	SOCRATES: Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject?
1744	SOCRATES: Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you?
1744	SOCRATES: Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the occasion of raising a question?
1744	SOCRATES: Shall we further agree-- PROTARCHUS: To what?
1744	SOCRATES: Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: Sound is one in music as well as in grammar?
1744	SOCRATES: Tell me first;--should we be most likely to succeed if we mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom?
1744	SOCRATES: Tell us, O beloved-- shall we call you pleasures or by some other name?--would you rather live with or without wisdom?
1744	SOCRATES: That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are to say( are we?)
1744	SOCRATES: The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or effect naturally follows it?
1744	SOCRATES: The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures?
1744	SOCRATES: Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full?
1744	SOCRATES: Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of all lives?
1744	SOCRATES: Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of pain?
1744	SOCRATES: Then man and the other animals have at the same time both pleasure and pain?
1744	SOCRATES: Then many other cases still remain?
1744	SOCRATES: Then mind and science when employed about such changing things do not attain the highest truth?
1744	SOCRATES: Then now we know the meaning of the word?
1744	SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake of some essence?
1744	SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in some other class than that of good?
1744	SOCRATES: Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are not the same, but different?
1744	SOCRATES: Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good can not possibly be either of them?
1744	SOCRATES: Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some way apprehends replenishment?
1744	SOCRATES: Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which, upon your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of misinterpretation?
1744	SOCRATES: Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going up and down cause pleasures and pains?
1744	SOCRATES: Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real?
1744	SOCRATES: There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in the life which is well mixed than in that which is not?
1744	SOCRATES: There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies?
1744	SOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?
1744	SOCRATES: Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake of essence, or essence for the sake of generation?
1744	SOCRATES: We agree-- do we not?--that there is such a thing as false, and also such a thing as true opinion?
1744	SOCRATES: We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and the third which is neither; what say you?
1744	SOCRATES: We mean to say that he''is empty''?
1744	SOCRATES: We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the conqueror-- did we not?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind have the greatest desires?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, are there not pains of forgetting?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, tell me, is this question worth asking?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, then, my view is-- PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer poetically terms''a meeting of the waters''?
1744	SOCRATES: Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of existence, and also an infinite?
1744	SOCRATES: Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder?
1744	SOCRATES: What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains?
1744	SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1744	SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1744	SOCRATES: What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two?
1744	SOCRATES: What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by all?
1744	SOCRATES: When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth?
1744	SOCRATES: Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also?
1744	SOCRATES: Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we are speaking are true or false?
1744	SOCRATES: Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were?
1744	SOCRATES: Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only?
1744	SOCRATES: Why?
1744	SOCRATES: Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?
1744	SOCRATES: Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink?
1744	SOCRATES: Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased?
1744	SOCRATES: You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain?
1744	SOCRATES: You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not ashamed?
1744	SOCRATES: You will observe that I have spoken of three classes?
1744	Secondly, why is there no mention of the supreme mind?
1744	Shall I tell you how I mean to escape from them?
1744	Shall we begin thus?
1744	Shall we enquire into the truth of your opinion?
1744	Shall you and I sum up the two sides?
1744	Still the question recurs,''In what does the whole differ from all the parts?''
1744	The pleasure of yourself, or of your neighbour,--of the individual, or of the world?''
1744	The question Will such and such an action promote the happiness of myself, my family, my country, the world?
1744	Then both of us are vanquished-- are we not?
1744	To these ancient speculations the moderns have added a further question:--''Whose pleasure?
1744	To what then is to be attributed this opinion which has been often entertained about the uncertainty of morals?
1744	We understand what you mean; but is there no charm by which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way of arriving at the truth?
1744	Were we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom?
1744	What are they?
1744	What common property in all of them does he mean to indicate by the term''good''?
1744	What is the origin of pleasure?
1744	What more does he want?
1744	When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in one, did we not call them a body?
1744	When you speak of hotter and colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities?
1744	Whence comes the necessity of them?
1744	Which has the greater share of truth?
1744	Which of beauty?
1744	Which of symmetry?
1744	Who would prefer such an alternation to the equable life of pure thought?
1744	Why are some actions rather than others which equally tend to the happiness of mankind imposed upon us with the authority of law?
1744	Why do I say so at this moment?
1744	Why should we endeavour to bind all men within the limits of a single metaphysical conception?
1744	Would the world have been better if there had been no Stoics or Kantists, no Platonists or Cartesians?
1744	Yet about these too we must ask What will of God?
1744	a good?
1744	and are some bad, some good, and some neither bad nor good?''
1744	and of comedy also?
1744	because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which is an impossibility?
1744	how revealed to us, and by what proofs?
1744	is analogous to the question asked in the Philebus,''What rank does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?''
1744	need I remind you of the anger''Which stirs even a wise man to violence, And is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb?''
1744	or some true and some false?
1744	the only good?''
1744	which includes the lower and the higher kind of happiness, and is the aim of the noblest, as well as of the meanest of mankind?''
1744	would you not at any rate want sight?
1726	''And he who remembers, remembers that which he sees and knows?''
1726	''And he who sees knows?''
1726	''And if you say"Yes,"the tongue will escape conviction but not the mind, as Euripides would say?''
1726	''But Protagoras will retort:"Can anything be more or less without addition or subtraction?"''
1726	''But if he closes his eyes, does he not remember?''
1726	''Excellent; I want you to grow, and therefore I will leave that answer and ask another question: Is not seeing perceiving?''
1726	''That I should expect; but why did he not remain at Megara?''
1726	''What do you mean, Socrates?''
1726	''What do you mean?''
1726	''What may that be?''
1726	''Why, Socrates, how can you argue at all without using them?''
1726	( b) Would he have based the relativity of knowledge on the Heraclitean flux?
1726	( c) Would he have asserted the absoluteness of sensation at each instant?
1726	--That will be our answer?
1726	Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your new- born child, of which I have delivered you?
1726	Am I not right?
1726	Am I not right?
1726	And could you repeat the conversation?''
1726	And do you not like the taste of them in the mouth?
1726	And has Plato kept altogether clear of a confusion, which the analogous word logos tends to create, of a proposition and a definition?
1726	And how can any one be ignorant of either of them, and yet know both of them?
1726	And if they differ in opinion, which of them is likely to be right; or are they both right?
1726	And is not the confusion increased by the use of the analogous term''elements,''or''letters''?
1726	And now, what are you saying?--Are there two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and do you define knowledge to be the true?
1726	And so we must ask again, What is knowledge?
1726	And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else?
1726	And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion?
1726	And the same of perceiving: do you understand me?
1726	And therefore let us draw nearer, as the advocate of Protagoras desires; and give the truth of the universal flux a ring: is the theory sound or not?
1726	And what other case is conceivable, upon the supposition that we either know or do not know all things?
1726	And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting?
1726	Are its movements identical with those of the body, or only preconcerted and coincident with them, or is one simply an aspect of the other?
1726	Are not these speculations charming, Theaetetus, and very good for a person in your interesting situation?
1726	Are you so profoundly convinced of this?
1726	Are you still in labour, or have you brought all you have to say about knowledge to the birth?
1726	But I should like to know, Socrates, whether you mean to say that all this is untrue?''
1726	But are we not inverting the natural order in looking for opinion before we have found knowledge?
1726	But did you ever say to yourself, that good is evil, or evil good?
1726	But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras?
1726	But have we not escaped one difficulty only to encounter a greater?
1726	But here we are met by a singular difficulty: How is false opinion possible?
1726	But how can he who knows the forms of knowledge and the forms of ignorance imagine one to be the other?
1726	But how can the syllable be known if the letter remains unknown?
1726	But how is false opinion possible?
1726	But if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between the true and the false in such cases?
1726	But is true opinion really distinct from knowledge?
1726	But may there not be''heterodoxy,''or transference of opinion;--I mean, may not one thing be supposed to be another?
1726	But still an old difficulty recurs; we ask ourselves,''How is false opinion possible?''
1726	But tell me, Socrates, in heaven''s name, is this, after all, not the truth?
1726	But then, as Plato asks,--and we must repeat the question,--What becomes of the mind?
1726	But what is SO?
1726	But what is the third definition?
1726	But when the word''knowledge''was found how was it to be explained or defined?
1726	But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara?
1726	But would this hold in any parallel case?
1726	But, as we are at our wits''end, suppose that we do a shameless thing?
1726	But, seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say what knowing is?
1726	Can a man see and see nothing?
1726	Can a whole be something different from the parts?
1726	Can two unknowns make a known?
1726	Can we answer that question?
1726	Can we suppose one set of feelings or one part of the mind to interpret another?
1726	Could he have pretended to cite from a well- known writing what was not to be found there?
1726	Did Protagoras merely mean to assert the relativity of knowledge to the human mind?
1726	Did you ever hear that too?
1726	Do we not seem to perceive instinctively and as an act of sense the differences of articulate speech and of musical notes?
1726	Do you agree?
1726	Do you know the original principle on which the doctrine of Protagoras is based?''
1726	Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearings of this tale on the preceding argument?
1726	Do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non- existing things?
1726	Does it differ as subject and object in the same manner?
1726	Does not explanation appear to be of this nature?
1726	EUCLID: Have you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion?
1726	Even in sleep, did you ever imagine that odd was even?
1726	For an objection occurs to him:--May there not be errors where there is no confusion of mind and sense?
1726	For how can the exchange of two kinds of knowledge ever become false opinion?
1726	For how can we know a compound of which the simple elements are unknown to us?
1726	For if the Heraclitean flux is extended to every sort of change in every instant of time, how can any thought or word be detained even for an instant?
1726	For must not opinion be equally expressed in a proposition?
1726	He asks whether a man can know and not know at the same time?
1726	How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it?
1726	How can you or any one maintain the contrary?
1726	How is this?
1726	How will Protagoras answer this argument?
1726	I dare say that you agree with me, do you not?
1726	I have, I fear, a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know?
1726	I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation?
1726	I suppose, Theodorus, that you have never seen them in time of peace, when they discourse at leisure to their disciples?
1726	I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes?
1726	I will make my meaning clearer by an example:--You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?
1726	If all that exists in time is illusion, we may well ask with Plato,''What becomes of the mind?''
1726	In what does this differ from the saying of Theaetetus?
1726	Is he to be reared in any case, and not exposed?
1726	Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way?
1726	Is it not so?
1726	Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals?
1726	Is not this a"reductio ad absurdum"of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception?
1726	Is the introspecting thought the same with the thought which is introspected?
1726	Is the mind active or passive, or partly both?
1726	Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing?
1726	Is there only one kind of motion, or, as I rather incline to think, two?
1726	Is there some other form of knowledge which distinguishes them?
1726	Let us grant what you say-- then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion-- am I right?
1726	Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non- existence of things that are not:--You have read him?
1726	Must he not be talking''ad captandum''in all this?
1726	Must he not see, hear, or touch some one existing thing?
1726	Nay, not even in sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of the kind?
1726	O Theaetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honey?
1726	O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great?
1726	Once more then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question--"What is knowledge?"
1726	Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question,''What is knowledge?''
1726	Or again, if we see letters which we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them?
1726	Or are they both right?--he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician''s judgment?
1726	Or did any man in his senses ever fancy that an ox was a horse, or that two are one?
1726	Or did he mean to deny that there is an objective standard of truth?
1726	Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?
1726	Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him?
1726	Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing?
1726	Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts?
1726	Or, if he is afraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike?
1726	Plato discards both figures, as not really solving the question which to us appears so simple:''How do we make mistakes?''
1726	Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the same?
1726	SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all?
1726	SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all( in the plural) is there not one thing which we express?
1726	SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not?
1726	SOCRATES: Am I talking nonsense, then?
1726	SOCRATES: And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?
1726	SOCRATES: And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases?
1726	SOCRATES: And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different?
1726	SOCRATES: And another and another?
1726	SOCRATES: And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?
1726	SOCRATES: And astronomy and harmony and calculation?
1726	SOCRATES: And by wisdom the wise are wise?
1726	SOCRATES: And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?
1726	SOCRATES: And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?
1726	SOCRATES: And did you find such a class?
1726	SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them?
1726	SOCRATES: And do you mean by conceiving, the same which I mean?
1726	SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read?
1726	SOCRATES: And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise?
1726	SOCRATES: And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true?
1726	SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is?
1726	SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks, think some one thing?
1726	SOCRATES: And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up?
1726	SOCRATES: And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch?
1726	SOCRATES: And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?
1726	SOCRATES: And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about him which are numerable?
1726	SOCRATES: And he who hears anything, hears some one thing, and hears that which is?
1726	SOCRATES: And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all?
1726	SOCRATES: And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and therefore is?
1726	SOCRATES: And how about Protagoras himself?
1726	SOCRATES: And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colours?
1726	SOCRATES: And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?
1726	SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he has seen?
1726	SOCRATES: And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, all things must always have every sort of motion?
1726	SOCRATES: And if unlike, they are other?
1726	SOCRATES: And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if not, not?
1726	SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six?
1726	SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name?
1726	SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: And is Theodorus a painter?
1726	SOCRATES: And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man?
1726	SOCRATES: And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb''to know''?
1726	SOCRATES: And is memory of something or of nothing?
1726	SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent?
1726	SOCRATES: And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise?
1726	SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible?
1726	SOCRATES: And is that different in any way from knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter, as just now said?
1726	SOCRATES: And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time?
1726	SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders?
1726	SOCRATES: And must therefore be admitted to be unlike?
1726	SOCRATES: And of true opinion also?
1726	SOCRATES: And seeing is knowing, and therefore not- seeing is not- knowing?
1726	SOCRATES: And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And that I myself practise midwifery?
1726	SOCRATES: And that both are two and each of them one?
1726	SOCRATES: And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself?
1726	SOCRATES: And that is six?
1726	SOCRATES: And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived?
1726	SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing?
1726	SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each?
1726	SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium?
1726	SOCRATES: And the race of animals is generated in the same way?
1726	SOCRATES: And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself to any one else?
1726	SOCRATES: And therefore not in science or knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished, that is to say, they move in place and are also changed?
1726	SOCRATES: And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to?
1726	SOCRATES: And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, of all our notions, is the most universal?
1726	SOCRATES: And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?
1726	SOCRATES: And what of the mental habit?
1726	SOCRATES: And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception?
1726	SOCRATES: And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements?
1726	SOCRATES: And who could take up arms against such a great army having Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you say this also of like and unlike, same and other?
1726	SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?
1726	SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them?
1726	SOCRATES: Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?
1726	SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all?
1726	SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together?
1726	SOCRATES: But can you certainly determine by any other means which of these opinions is true?
1726	SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason?
1726	SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters?
1726	SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole?
1726	SOCRATES: But is the aim attained always?
1726	SOCRATES: But is there any parallel to this?
1726	SOCRATES: But may not the following be the description of what we express by this name?
1726	SOCRATES: But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, have a conception either of both objects or of one of them?
1726	SOCRATES: But surely he can not suppose what he knows to be what he does not know, or what he does not know to be what he knows?
1726	SOCRATES: But then, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is perception, or that to every man what appears is?
1726	SOCRATES: But through what do you perceive all this about them?
1726	SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all?
1726	SOCRATES: But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a different person?
1726	SOCRATES: Can a man see something and yet see nothing?
1726	SOCRATES: Capital; and what followed?
1726	SOCRATES: Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says?
1726	SOCRATES: Do you see another question which can be raised about these phenomena, notably about dreaming and waking?
1726	SOCRATES: Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?
1726	SOCRATES: Either together or in succession?
1726	SOCRATES: Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven?
1726	SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not''knowable''?
1726	SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O?
1726	SOCRATES: He then who sees some one thing, sees something which is?
1726	SOCRATES: He who knows, can not but know; and he who does not know, can not know?
1726	SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived?
1726	SOCRATES: Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction-- What is knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would admit that they both exist?
1726	SOCRATES: How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument?
1726	SOCRATES: How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive?
1726	SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:--Theaetetus, he says, what is SO?
1726	SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S. THEAETETUS: But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an element?
1726	SOCRATES: If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he can not think that the one of them is the other?
1726	SOCRATES: If they only moved in place and were not changed, we should be able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux?
1726	SOCRATES: If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception can not come to you, either through the one or the other organ?
1726	SOCRATES: If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, when it becomes like we call it the same-- when unlike, other?
1726	SOCRATES: In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two arts?
1726	SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps?
1726	SOCRATES: Is he a geometrician?
1726	SOCRATES: Is it still worth our while to resume the discussion touching opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: It is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of one thing as another?
1726	SOCRATES: Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing-- for example, What is clay?
1726	SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:--What was the way in which we learned letters?
1726	SOCRATES: Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:--There is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick-- Are they like or unlike?
1726	SOCRATES: May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds?
1726	SOCRATES: Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the other, can he think that one is the other?
1726	SOCRATES: Nor of any other science?
1726	SOCRATES: Of things learned and perceived, that is?
1726	SOCRATES: Often a man remembers that which he has seen?
1726	SOCRATES: Once more we shall have to begin, and ask''What is knowledge?''
1726	SOCRATES: Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man?
1726	SOCRATES: Perception would be the collective name of them?
1726	SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form?
1726	SOCRATES: Shall I tell you the reason?
1726	SOCRATES: Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras?
1726	SOCRATES: Shall we say that we know every thing which we see and hear?
1726	SOCRATES: Tell me, now-- How in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else?
1726	SOCRATES: That is good news; whose son is he?
1726	SOCRATES: That is of six?
1726	SOCRATES: That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading?
1726	SOCRATES: The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?
1726	SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts?
1726	SOCRATES: Then do we not come back to the old difficulty?
1726	SOCRATES: Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere of being or of knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?
1726	SOCRATES: Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing?
1726	SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance?
1726	SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word''all''of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural?
1726	SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form?
1726	SOCRATES: Then it must appear so to each of them?
1726	SOCRATES: Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as to the body?
1726	SOCRATES: Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self- existent substance or as a predicate of something else?
1726	SOCRATES: Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:--Can a man know and also not know that which he knows?
1726	SOCRATES: Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us?
1726	SOCRATES: Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you answered that knowledge is perception?
1726	SOCRATES: Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?
1726	SOCRATES: Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?
1726	SOCRATES: Then right opinion implies the perception of differences?
1726	SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts?
1726	SOCRATES: Then they must be distinguished?
1726	SOCRATES: Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not?
1726	SOCRATES: Then when any one thinks of one thing as another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another?
1726	SOCRATES: Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?
1726	SOCRATES: Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must look at the matter in some other way?
1726	SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it?
1726	SOCRATES: Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility?
1726	SOCRATES: We have at length satisfactorily proven beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, and shall we do as he says?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, and what is the difficulty?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term''explanation''?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but are we to assert that what you think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all( in the plural) and the all( in the singular)?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, may not a man''possess''and yet not''have''knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking?
1726	SOCRATES: Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite?
1726	SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views?
1726	SOCRATES: What shall we say then?
1726	SOCRATES: What was it?
1726	SOCRATES: What was that, Theaetetus?
1726	SOCRATES: What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Where, then, is false opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely?
1726	SOCRATES: Which is probably correct-- for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?
1726	SOCRATES: Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?
1726	SOCRATES: You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another?
1726	SOCRATES: You have heard the common explanation of the verb''to know''?
1726	Shall I answer for him?
1726	Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus?
1726	Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false?
1726	Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what he already knows?
1726	Such are the lawyers; will you have the companion picture of philosophers?
1726	TERPSION: The dysentery, you mean?
1726	TERPSION: The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled; but what was the conversation?
1726	TERPSION: Was he alive or dead?
1726	TERPSION: Where then?
1726	THEAETETUS: About what?
1726	THEAETETUS: And do you not agree in that view, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: And how would you amend the former statement?
1726	THEAETETUS: And is not that, Socrates, nobly said?
1726	THEAETETUS: And was that wrong?
1726	THEAETETUS: And why should that be shameless?
1726	THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates...?
1726	THEAETETUS: But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you ever argue at all?
1726	THEAETETUS: But what puts you out of heart?
1726	THEAETETUS: Can you give me any example of such a definition?
1726	THEAETETUS: How can he?
1726	THEAETETUS: How could it?
1726	THEAETETUS: How do the two expressions differ?
1726	THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: How is that, and what profession do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: How so?
1726	THEAETETUS: How?
1726	THEAETETUS: I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest?
1726	THEAETETUS: I should call all of them perceiving-- what other name could be given to them?
1726	THEAETETUS: I should reply S and O. SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable?
1726	THEAETETUS: In what manner?
1726	THEAETETUS: Let us imagine such an aviary-- and what is to follow?
1726	THEAETETUS: Pray what is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question?
1726	THEAETETUS: Then what is colour?
1726	THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding?
1726	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1726	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1726	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What experience?
1726	THEAETETUS: What hostages?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is that?
1726	THEAETETUS: What makes you say so?
1726	THEAETETUS: What makes you say so?
1726	THEAETETUS: What question?
1726	THEAETETUS: What was it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What?
1726	THEAETETUS: What?
1726	THEAETETUS: Who indeed, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: Who, Socrates, would dare to say so?
1726	THEAETETUS: Why?
1726	THEAETETUS: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables?
1726	THEAETETUS: You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole?
1726	THEODORUS: How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates?
1726	THEODORUS: How shall we answer, Theaetetus?
1726	THEODORUS: How so?
1726	THEODORUS: In what is the difference seen?
1726	THEODORUS: In what way?
1726	THEODORUS: Well, but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards?
1726	THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1726	THEODORUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEODORUS: What is it?
1726	THEODORUS: What is that?
1726	THEODORUS: Who indeed?
1726	Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body?
1726	Tell me, then, what do you think of the notion that"All things are becoming"?''
1726	Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know?
1726	The mind, when occupied by herself with being, is said to have opinion-- shall we say that''Knowledge is true opinion''?
1726	The multitude may not and do not agree in Protagoras''own thesis that''Man is the measure of all things;''and then who is to decide?
1726	They would say, as I imagine-- Can that which is wholly other than something, have the same quality as that from which it differs?
1726	Think: is not seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception?
1726	Upon his own showing must not his''truth''depend on the number of suffrages, and be more or less true in proportion as he has more or fewer of them?
1726	Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you?
1726	We are often told that we should enquire into all things before we accept them;--with what limitations is this true?
1726	Weary of asking''What is truth?''
1726	Well, you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position?
1726	Were not you and Theodorus just now remarking very truly, that in discussions of this kind we may take our own time?
1726	What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus?
1726	What are we to think of time and space?
1726	What do they mean when they say that all things are in motion?
1726	What say you?
1726	What say you?
1726	What then is knowledge?
1726	What then is knowledge?
1726	What then is knowledge?
1726	When he says that''knowledge is in perception,''with what does he perceive?
1726	Who can divide the nerves or great nervous centres from the mind which uses them?
1726	Who can resist an idea which is presented to him in a general form in every moment of his life and of which he finds no instance to the contrary?
1726	Who can separate the pains and pleasures of the mind from the pains and pleasures of the body?
1726	Who is our judge?
1726	Who is the judge or where is the spectator, having a right to control us?''
1726	Why should we not go a step further still and doubt the existence of the senses of all things?
1726	Why should we single out one of these abstractions to be the a priori condition of all the others?
1726	Will you answer me a question:''Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?''
1726	Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument?
1726	Without further preface, but at the same time apologizing for his eagerness, he asks,''What is knowledge?''
1726	Would an untrained man, for example, be as likely to know when he is going to have a fever, as the physician who attended him?
1726	Yes; but did you observe that Protagoras bade me be serious, and complained of our getting up a laugh against him with the aid of a boy?
1726	You remember?
1726	and another, and another?
1726	and of what sort do you mean?
1726	and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do?
1726	and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition?
1726	can you tell me?
1726	do not mistakes often happen?
1726	for example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not hear the language of foreigners when they speak to us?
1726	for what reason?
1726	here are six dice; they are more than four and less than twelve;"more and also less,"would you not say?''
1726	or hear and hear nothing?
1726	or shall we aver that, seeing them, we must know them?
1726	or shall we say that we not only hear, but know what they are saying?
1726	or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows?
1726	or touch and touch nothing?
1726	or will this be too much of a digression?
1726	or will you bear to see him rejected, and not get into a passion if I take away your first- born?
1726	or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not?
1726	or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know?
1726	the sound of words or the sight of letters in a foreign tongue?''
1726	what is temperance?
1726	which of us will speak first?
1687	''And can they hear the dialogue?''
1687	''And do you suppose the individual to partake of the whole, or of the part?''
1687	''And of human beings like ourselves, of water, fire, and the like?''
1687	''And what kind of discipline would you recommend?''
1687	''And who will answer me?
1687	''And would you like to say that the ideas are really divisible and yet remain one?''
1687	''And would you make abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good?''
1687	''And would you say that each man is covered by the whole sail, or by a part only?''
1687	''But how can individuals participate in ideas, except in the ways which I have mentioned?''
1687	''But must not the thought be of something which is the same in all and is the idea?
1687	''How do you mean?''
1687	''I quite believe you,''said Socrates;''but will you answer me a question?
1687	''If God is, what follows?
1687	''In the same sort of way,''said Parmenides,''as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many-- that is your meaning?''
1687	''Then how do you know that there are things in themselves?''
1687	''Then the beautiful and the good in their own nature are unknown to us?''
1687	''Then the ideas have parts, and the objects partake of a part of them only?''
1687	''Then will you, Zeno?''
1687	''Welcome, Cephalus: can we do anything for you in Athens?''
1687	''What difficulty?''
1687	''What is that?''
1687	''Why not of the whole?''
1687	''Yet if these difficulties induce you to give up universal ideas, what becomes of the mind?
1687	Again, how far can one touch itself and the others?
1687	Again, is the not- one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?
1687	Again, let us conceive of a one which by an effort of abstraction we separate from being: will this abstract one be one or many?
1687	Again, of the parts of the one, if it is-- I mean being and one-- does either fail to imply the other?
1687	Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?
1687	Am I not right?
1687	And a multitude implies a number larger than one?
1687	And all the parts are contained by the whole?
1687	And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?
1687	And also in other things?
1687	And also of one?
1687	And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?
1687	And are not things other in kind unlike?
1687	And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience separation and aggregation?
1687	And because having limits, also having extremes?
1687	And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself?
1687	And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one?
1687	And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose being?
1687	And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?
1687	And can you think of anything else which is between them other than equality?
1687	And change is motion-- we may say that?
1687	And could we hear it?
1687	And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of being and the loss of being?
1687	And do not''will be,''''will become,''''will have become,''signify a participation of future time?
1687	And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one?
1687	And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger?
1687	And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really exist?
1687	And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being?
1687	And greatness and smallness always stand apart?
1687	And has not- being also, if it is not?
1687	And have we not already shown that it can not be in anything?
1687	And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other,--in any such case do I not speak of both?
1687	And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also participate?
1687	And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?
1687	And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three?
1687	And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?
1687	And if the world partakes in the ideas, and the ideas are thoughts, must not all things think?
1687	And if there are not two, there is no contact?
1687	And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three?
1687	And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?
1687	And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be unlike them?
1687	And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be?
1687	And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two?
1687	And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?
1687	And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others are, and the one is not?
1687	And in that it was other it was shown to be like?
1687	And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many?
1687	And inequality implies greatness and smallness?
1687	And is each of these parts-- one and being-- to be simply called a part, or must the word''part''be relative to the word''whole''?
1687	And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself?
1687	And is not time always moving forward?
1687	And is not''other''a name given to a thing?
1687	And is the one a part of itself?
1687	And it is older( is it not?)
1687	And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?
1687	And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them appears to be one, though it is really many?
1687	And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation?--Where is the wonder?
1687	And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?
1687	And not having the same measures, the one can not be equal either with itself or with another?
1687	And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?
1687	And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?
1687	And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?
1687	And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to have come into existence?
1687	And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say what is?
1687	And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?
1687	And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity?
1687	And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?
1687	And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things?
1687	And so when he says''If one is not''he clearly means, that what''is not''is other than all others; we know what he means-- do we not?
1687	And surely there can not be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest?
1687	And that is the one?
1687	And that which contains, is a limit?
1687	And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are?
1687	And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?
1687	And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger?
1687	And that which is older is older than that which is younger?
1687	And that which is older, must always be older than something which is younger?
1687	And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge?
1687	And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?
1687	And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?
1687	And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?
1687	And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less?
1687	And the one is the whole?
1687	And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?
1687	And the other to the same?
1687	And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?
1687	And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the extremes?
1687	And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?
1687	And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no reality, if one is not?
1687	And therefore is and is not in the same state?
1687	And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be attributed to it?
1687	And therefore not other than itself?
1687	And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or different in relation to it?
1687	And they are unequal to an unequal?
1687	And things that are not equal are unequal?
1687	And three are odd, and two are even?
1687	And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation to itself or other?
1687	And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others?
1687	And we have not got the idea of knowledge?
1687	And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other?
1687	And we surely can not say that what is truly one has parts?
1687	And what are its relations to other things?
1687	And what are the relations of the one to the others?
1687	And what is a whole?
1687	And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend?
1687	And what of that?
1687	And what shall be our first hypothesis, if I am to attempt this laborious pastime?
1687	And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all?
1687	And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalized?
1687	And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?
1687	And when we put them together shortly, and say''One is,''that is equivalent to saying,''partakes of being''?
1687	And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way but is in another?
1687	And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name?
1687	And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated?
1687	And who will answer me?
1687	And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not- one?
1687	And will not knowledge-- I mean absolute knowledge-- answer to absolute truth?
1687	And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the idea itself?
1687	And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all, be an idea?
1687	And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it?
1687	And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not being one, if one is not?
1687	And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water?
1687	And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only, and different parts different men?
1687	And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end?
1687	And you may say the name once or oftener?
1687	And''is,''or''becomes,''signifies a participation of present time?
1687	And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way?
1687	And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of being?
1687	Because every part is part of a whole; is it not?
1687	But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these?
1687	But as I must attempt this laborious game, what shall be the subject?
1687	But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older nor younger, what shall we say?
1687	But can all this be true about the one?
1687	But can all this be true?
1687	But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing?
1687	But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being?
1687	But can one be in many places and yet be a whole?
1687	But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?
1687	But does one partake of time?
1687	But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible?
1687	But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?
1687	But how can not- being, which is nowhere, move or change, either from one place to another or in the same place?
1687	But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same measures or have anything else the same?
1687	But if anything is other than anything, will it not be other than other?
1687	But if it be not altered it can not be moved?
1687	But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same age with itself?
1687	But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and can not be none?
1687	But if one is, and both odd and even numbers are implied in one, must not every number exist?
1687	But if one is, what happens to the others, which in the first place are not one, yet may partake of one in a certain way?
1687	But if one is, what will happen to the others-- is not that also to be considered?
1687	But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another?
1687	But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?
1687	But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?
1687	But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact?
1687	But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another?
1687	But is the contradiction also the final conclusion?
1687	But is the one other than one?
1687	But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides?
1687	But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm?
1687	But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place?
1687	But reflect:--Can one, in its entirety, be in many places at the same time?
1687	But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to it?
1687	But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?
1687	But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, it can not change from one place to another?
1687	But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?
1687	But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?
1687	But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and can not have?
1687	But the one did not partake of those affections?
1687	But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never unlike itself or other?
1687	But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything?
1687	But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained?
1687	But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things?
1687	But to speak of the others implies difference-- the terms''other''and''different''are synonymous?
1687	But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another:--so we said?
1687	But what do you say to a new point of view?
1687	But when do all these changes take place?
1687	But why do you ask?''
1687	But why?
1687	But, again, assume the opposite hypothesis, that the one is not, and what is the consequence?
1687	But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would not be in the middle?
1687	But, consider:--Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another?
1687	But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?
1687	But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?
1687	But, then, what is to become of philosophy?
1687	Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?
1687	Can there be any other mode of participation?
1687	Do not the words''is not''signify absence of being in that to which we apply them?
1687	Do they participate in the ideas, or do they merely resemble them?
1687	Do you see my meaning?
1687	Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the ideas to be absolute?
1687	Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?
1687	Does the one also partake of time?
1687	For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others?
1687	For can anything be a whole without these three?
1687	Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained by the whole?
1687	Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being?
1687	Further-- is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?
1687	Here is the great though unconscious truth( shall we say?)
1687	How can he have ever persisted in them after seeing the fatal objections which might be urged against them?
1687	How can he have placed himself so completely without them?
1687	How can it?
1687	How can there be?
1687	How can they be?
1687	How can we conceive Him under the forms of time and space, who is out of time and space?
1687	How can we imagine His relation to the world or to ourselves?
1687	How could they investigate causes, when they had not as yet learned to distinguish between a cause and an end?
1687	How could they make any progress in the sciences without first arranging them?
1687	How could they?
1687	How do you mean?
1687	How do you mean?
1687	How do you mean?
1687	How do you mean?
1687	How get rid of such forms and see Him as He is?
1687	How is that?
1687	How is that?
1687	How is that?
1687	How is that?
1687	How not?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than anything, or have the same age with it?
1687	How then, without a word of explanation, could Plato assign to them the refutation of their own tenets?
1687	How, while mankind were disputing about universals, could they classify phenomena?
1687	How?
1687	How?
1687	I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a thing?
1687	If God is not, what follows?''
1687	If it be co- extensive with the one it will be co- equal with the one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one?
1687	If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one?
1687	If one is, being must be predicated of it?
1687	If one is, he said, the one can not be many?
1687	If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself?
1687	If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are two and thrice, there is thrice two?
1687	If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole?
1687	In all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of the many?
1687	In the first place, the others will not be one?
1687	In this way-- you may speak of being?
1687	In what way?
1687	In what way?
1687	In what way?
1687	Is it or does it become older or younger than they?
1687	Is it or does it become older or younger than they?
1687	Is not that true?
1687	Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you?
1687	Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions-- if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?
1687	Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?
1687	Is this true of becoming as well as being?
1687	It can not therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of nature?
1687	It is otherwise with the objection which follows: How are we to bridge the chasm between human truth and absolute truth, between gods and men?
1687	Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike?
1687	Let us see:--Must not the being of one be other than one?
1687	May we say, in Platonic language, that we still seem to see vestiges of a track which has not yet been taken?
1687	Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature?
1687	Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one?
1687	Nor as like or unlike?
1687	Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the same is, and that which is not can not be reckoned among things that are?
1687	Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with it?
1687	Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which stands must always be in one and the same spot?
1687	Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for if there had been, it would partake of being?
1687	Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others?
1687	Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest must stand still?
1687	Now there can not possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others?
1687	Of something which is or which is not?
1687	Once more, Is one equal and unequal to itself and the others?
1687	Once more, can one be older or younger than itself or other?
1687	Once more, if one is not, what becomes of the others?
1687	Once more, let us ask the question, If one is not, what happens in regard to one?
1687	Once more, let us inquire, If the one is not, and the others of the one are, what follows?
1687	One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion?
1687	One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist?
1687	Or can thought be without thought?''
1687	Other means other than other, and different, different from the different?
1687	Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?
1687	Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as different from the others?
1687	Shall I begin with myself, and take my own hypothesis the one?
1687	Shall I propose the youngest?
1687	Shall I propose the youngest?
1687	Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise?
1687	Since it is not a part in relation to itself it can not be related to itself as whole to part?
1687	Since then what is partakes of not- being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?
1687	So that the other is not the same-- either with the one or with being?
1687	Suppose the first; it will be either co- equal and co- extensive with the whole one, or will contain the one?
1687	The expression''is not''implies negation of being:--do we mean by this to say that a thing, which is not, in a certain sense is?
1687	The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite?
1687	The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion?
1687	The one then, since it in no way is, can not have or lose or assume being in any way?
1687	The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?
1687	The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself?
1687	The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others?
1687	The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised?
1687	The thought must be of something?
1687	Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the consequences?
1687	Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it?
1687	Then can the motion of the one be in place?
1687	Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many?
1687	Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea?
1687	Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?
1687	Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor can be conceived to be either one or many?
1687	Then if one is, number must also be?
1687	Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it can not either exceed or be exceeded by them?
1687	Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable?
1687	Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?
1687	Then it can not be like another, or like itself?
1687	Then it can not move by changing place?
1687	Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?
1687	Then it has the greatest number of parts?
1687	Then it is never in the same?
1687	Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be destroyed?
1687	Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?
1687	Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not?
1687	Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others?
1687	Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is?
1687	Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if there is no contact?
1687	Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge?
1687	Then not by virtue of being one will it be other?
1687	Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many?
1687	Then now we have spoken of either of them?
1687	Then one can not be anywhere, either in itself or in another?
1687	Then one can not be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself or with another?
1687	Then one is never in the same place?
1687	Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not- one, is the same with it?
1687	Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the same time?
1687	Then smallness can not be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only?
1687	Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time, become younger than itself?
1687	Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies between them?
1687	Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?
1687	Then the inference is that it would touch both?
1687	Then the least is the first?
1687	Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us?
1687	Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself?
1687	Then the one and the others are never in the same?
1687	Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?
1687	Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion?
1687	Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another or with itself?
1687	Then the one can not have parts, and can not be a whole?
1687	Then the one can not possibly partake of being?
1687	Then the one can not touch itself any more than it can be two?
1687	Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?
1687	Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number?
1687	Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward in time?
1687	Then the one is not at all?
1687	Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present?
1687	Then the one must have likeness to itself?
1687	Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are unequal to it?
1687	Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind?
1687	Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered?
1687	Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither perishes nor becomes?
1687	Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion?
1687	Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become?
1687	Then the one will be equal both to itself and the others?
1687	Then the one will be other than the others?
1687	Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike it?
1687	Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?
1687	Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts?
1687	Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two?
1687	Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of a straight or of a circular form?
1687	Then the one, being moved, is altered?
1687	Then the one, being of this nature, can not be in time at all; for must not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself?
1687	Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited?
1687	Then the one, if it is not, can not turn in that in which it is not?
1687	Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?
1687	Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is?
1687	Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness?
1687	Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?
1687	Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and smallness and equality?
1687	Then the other will never be either in the not- one, or in the one?
1687	Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?
1687	Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of any number?
1687	Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one?
1687	Then there is always something between them?
1687	Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor knowledge of it?
1687	Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity?
1687	Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part?
1687	Then they are separated from each other?
1687	Then they have no number, if they have no one in them?
1687	Then we can not suppose that there is anything different from them in which both the one and the others might exist?
1687	Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never moves?
1687	Then we will begin at the beginning:--If one is, can one be, and not partake of being?
1687	Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?
1687	Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?
1687	Then will you, Zeno?
1687	Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?
1687	Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one?
1687	Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not have parts?
1687	Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be other?
1687	Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a whole, and also as having parts?
1687	Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered?
1687	Then, that which is not can not be, or in any way participate in being?
1687	There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three?
1687	There is a natural realism which says,''Can there be a word devoid of meaning, or an idea which is an idea of nothing?''
1687	There is an ethical universal or idea, but is there also a universal of physics?--of the meanest things in the world as well as of the greatest?
1687	They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present?
1687	Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it changes from being to not- being?
1687	Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?
1687	Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself?
1687	Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?
1687	We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?
1687	We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?
1687	We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is?
1687	Welcome, Cephalus, said Adeimantus, taking me by the hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?
1687	Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or of the same age with it?
1687	Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be attributed to it?
1687	Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?
1687	Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not?
1687	Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?
1687	Well, but do not the expressions''was,''and''has become,''and''was becoming,''signify a participation of past time?
1687	Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?
1687	Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other?
1687	What difficulty?
1687	What direction?
1687	What do you mean, Parmenides?
1687	What do you mean?
1687	What do you mean?
1687	What do you mean?
1687	What is it?
1687	What is the meaning of the hypothesis-- If the one is not; is there any difference between this and the hypothesis-- If the not one is not?
1687	What may that be?
1687	What of that?
1687	What question?
1687	What thing?
1687	What would you say of another question?
1687	What?
1687	When does motion become rest, or rest motion?
1687	When then does it change; for it can not change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time?
1687	Whenever, then, you use the word''other,''whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?
1687	Where shall I begin?
1687	Whither shall we turn, if the ideas are unknown?
1687	Why not, Parmenides?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why so?
1687	Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are equidistant from the centre?
1687	Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?
1687	Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others?
1687	You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, there would be one whole including many-- is not that your meaning?
1687	and consider the consequences which follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not- being of one?
1687	and is this your own distinction?''
1687	and when more than once, is it something else which you mention?
1687	and where are the reasoning and reflecting powers?
1687	for the one is not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?
1687	for the same whole can not do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will be no longer one, but two?
1687	is the one wanting to being, or being to the one?
1687	or do we mean absolutely to deny being of it?
1687	or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no sort or way or kind participation of being?
1687	or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once?
1687	or of the same age with itself or other?
1687	would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole?
1672	''And do you think that a man who is unable to help himself is in a good condition?''
1672	''But is not rhetoric a fine thing?''
1672	''But what part?''
1672	''Certainly,''he will answer,''for is not health the greatest good?
1672	''Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?''
1672	''Health first, beauty next, wealth third,''in the words of the old song, or how would you rank them?
1672	''What do you mean?''
1672	''What is cookery?''
1672	''What is rhetoric?''
1672	''What is the art of Rhetoric?''
1672	''What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias?''
1672	''Who is Gorgias?''
1672	''Who knows,''as Euripides says,''whether life may not be death, and death life?''
1672	''Why will you continue splitting words?
1672	''Why, have they not great power, and can they not do whatever they desire?''
1672	), with the making of garments?
1672	All this is a hindrance to them; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the judged.--What is to be done?
1672	Am I not right Callicles?
1672	Am I not right in my recollection?
1672	Am I not right?
1672	And I am going to ask-- what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what?
1672	And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I asked,''What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?''
1672	And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good?
1672	And as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not examine him?
1672	And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man?
1672	And do you mean to say also that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?
1672	And if he asked again:''What is the art of calculation?''
1672	And if he further said,''Concerned with what?''
1672	And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order?
1672	And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement?
1672	And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good?
1672	And must he not be courageous?
1672	And of harp- playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say?
1672	And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only words-- he would ask,''Words about what, Socrates?''
1672	And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good?
1672	And that which is orderly is temperate?
1672	And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing?
1672	And the soul which has order is orderly?
1672	And the temperate soul is good?
1672	And then he will be sure to go on and ask,''What good?
1672	And then he would proceed to ask:''Words about what?''
1672	And to be itching and always scratching?
1672	And to indulge unnatural desires, if they are abundantly satisfied?
1672	And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them?
1672	And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states?
1672	And what is my sort?
1672	And what knowledge can be nobler?
1672	And when I ask, Who are you?
1672	And who are you?
1672	And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods and to men;--for he would not be temperate if he did not?
1672	And yet there is an inconsistency: for should not Socrates too have taught the citizens better than to put him to death?
1672	And yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in your refusal?
1672	And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant?
1672	Are the superior and better and stronger the same or different?
1672	Are you disposed to admit that?
1672	Are you of the same opinion still?
1672	As we likewise enquire, What will become of them after death?
1672	At your age, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over some verbal slip?
1672	Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?
1672	But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered,''What is rhetoric?''
1672	But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?
1672	But if there were no future, might he not still be happy in the performance of an action which was attended only by a painful death?
1672	But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?
1672	But is he as ignorant of just and unjust as he is of medicine or building?
1672	But is not virtue something different from saving and being saved?
1672	But please to refresh my memory a little; did you say--''in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant''?
1672	But tell me, Gorgias, what are the best?
1672	But to return to our argument:--Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment?
1672	But what do you mean by the better?
1672	But what reason is there in this?
1672	But where are the orators among whom you find the latter?
1672	But who would undertake a public building, if he had never had a teacher of the art of building, and had never constructed a building before?
1672	But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you?
1672	But, my good friend, where is the refutation?
1672	CALLICLES: And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenceless is in a good position?
1672	CALLICLES: And is not that just the provoking thing?
1672	CALLICLES: And what difference does that make?
1672	CALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say-- does he assent to this, or not?
1672	CALLICLES: And you are the man who can not speak unless there is some one to answer?
1672	CALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument?
1672	CALLICLES: Can not you finish without my help, either talking straight on, or questioning and answering yourself?
1672	CALLICLES: Do you want me to agree with you?
1672	CALLICLES: I suppose that you mean health and strength?
1672	CALLICLES: Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything?
1672	CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking?
1672	CALLICLES: Well, but how does that prove Pericles''badness?
1672	CALLICLES: What do you mean by his''ruling over himself''?
1672	CALLICLES: What do you mean?
1672	CALLICLES: What do you mean?
1672	CALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon-- does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?
1672	CALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates?
1672	CALLICLES: Why not give the name yourself, Socrates?
1672	CALLICLES: Why?
1672	CALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference?
1672	CALLICLES: Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?
1672	CALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?
1672	CHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than Gorgias?
1672	CHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?
1672	CHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician?
1672	CHAEREPHON: What do you mean?
1672	CHAEREPHON: What question?
1672	CHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him?
1672	Can anything be more irrational, my friends, than this?
1672	Consider:--You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected when you do wrong?
1672	Could he be said to regard even their pleasure?
1672	Did he perform with any view to the good of his hearers?
1672	Did not the very persons whom he was serving ostracize him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years?
1672	Did they employ these advantages with a view to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store of knowledge?
1672	Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?
1672	Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate?
1672	Do I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?
1672	Do they suppose that the rule of justice is the rule of the stronger or of the better?''
1672	Do we not often hear the novel writer censured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers?
1672	Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?
1672	Do you laugh, Polus?
1672	Do you mean that your art produces the greatest good?
1672	Do you not agree?
1672	Do you say''Yes''or''No''to that?
1672	Do you understand?
1672	Does Callicles agree to this division?
1672	Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?
1672	Does not the art of making money?
1672	Does not the art of medicine?
1672	For all our life long we are talking with ourselves:--What is thought but speech?
1672	For do not we too accuse as well as excuse ourselves?
1672	For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians?
1672	For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?
1672	For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or can not teach, the nature of justice?
1672	For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good-- would you not say so?
1672	For, first, you defined the superior to be the stronger, and then the wiser, and now something else;--what DO you mean?
1672	GORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates?
1672	GORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself?
1672	GORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1672	GORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates?
1672	GORGIAS: What matter?
1672	GORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?
1672	Have I not told you that the superior is the better?''
1672	Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure?
1672	Have they not very great power in states?
1672	Have we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a public man?
1672	How are they to be?
1672	How is the inconsistency to be explained?
1672	How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil?
1672	How will you answer them?
1672	How would Gorgias explain this phenomenon?
1672	I mean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the power?
1672	I mean to say-- Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?
1672	I mean, for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?
1672	I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?
1672	If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil?
1672	In the first division the question is asked-- What is rhetoric?
1672	In the first place, what say you of flute- playing?
1672	Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?
1672	Is not that true?
1672	Is not this a fact?
1672	Is not this true?
1672	Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when you are learning the potter''s art; which is a foolish thing?
1672	Is that the paradox which, as you say, can not be refuted?
1672	Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?
1672	Is there any comparison between him and the pleader?
1672	Is this true?
1672	Look at the matter in this way:--In respect of a man''s estate, do you see any greater evil than poverty?
1672	May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof?
1672	May I assume this to be your opinion?
1672	May not the service of God, which is the more disinterested, be in like manner the higher?
1672	Might not the novelist, too, make an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better than a thousand sermons?
1672	Must not the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils?
1672	Must not the very opposite be true,--if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and to have influence with him?
1672	Must we not try and make them as good as possible?
1672	Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse?
1672	Nay, will he not rather do all the evil which he can and escape?
1672	No other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any?
1672	Or do I fail to persuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still?
1672	Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric?
1672	Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these things first?
1672	Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want?
1672	Ought he not to have the name which is given to his brother?
1672	Ought the physician then to have a larger share of meats and drinks?
1672	POLUS: An experience in what?
1672	POLUS: And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for example, suffer rather than do injustice?
1672	POLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the idea that they are flatterers?
1672	POLUS: And are those of whom I spoke wretches?
1672	POLUS: And can not you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?
1672	POLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric?
1672	POLUS: And do you think that he is happy or miserable?
1672	POLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing?
1672	POLUS: And is not that a great power?
1672	POLUS: And noble or ignoble?
1672	POLUS: And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?
1672	POLUS: Ask:-- CHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him?
1672	POLUS: At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied?
1672	POLUS: But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow?
1672	POLUS: But is it the greatest?
1672	POLUS: But they do what they think best?
1672	POLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience?
1672	POLUS: Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?
1672	POLUS: How can that be, Socrates?
1672	POLUS: How not regarded?
1672	POLUS: How two questions?
1672	POLUS: I will ask and do you answer?
1672	POLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric?
1672	POLUS: In either case is he not equally to be envied?
1672	POLUS: In what?
1672	POLUS: Of what profession?
1672	POLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?
1672	POLUS: Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?
1672	POLUS: Then surely they do as they will?
1672	POLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?
1672	POLUS: Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?
1672	POLUS: Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?
1672	POLUS: Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable?
1672	POLUS: Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?
1672	POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1672	POLUS: What do you mean?
1672	POLUS: What do you mean?
1672	POLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?
1672	POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates?
1672	POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery?
1672	POLUS: What then?
1672	POLUS: What thing?
1672	POLUS: Why''forbear''?
1672	POLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?
1672	POLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best?
1672	POLUS: Will you enumerate them?
1672	POLUS: You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute that statement?
1672	POLUS: You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?
1672	Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?
1672	Polus asks,''What thing?''
1672	SOCRATES: A useful thing, then?
1672	SOCRATES: About that you and I may be supposed to agree?
1672	SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now speaking:--do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number?
1672	SOCRATES: Again, in a man''s bodily frame, you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity?
1672	SOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:--is he?
1672	SOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are punished are less miserable-- are you going to refute this proposition also?
1672	SOCRATES: And a foolish man too?
1672	SOCRATES: And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just man?
1672	SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and indifferent?
1672	SOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?--or are you of another mind?
1672	SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice-- if they do rejoice?
1672	SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?
1672	SOCRATES: And are they equally pained?
1672	SOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy''s departure?
1672	SOCRATES: And are we late for a feast?
1672	SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians?
1672	SOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august personage-- what are her aspirations?
1672	SOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?
1672	SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?
1672	SOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians?
1672	SOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?
1672	SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men?
1672	SOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as the superior?
1672	SOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own?
1672	SOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?
1672	SOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation?
1672	SOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body?
1672	SOCRATES: And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir?
1672	SOCRATES: And does not the same hold in all other cases?
1672	SOCRATES: And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from this evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?
1672	SOCRATES: And he is to be thirsting and drinking?
1672	SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?
1672	SOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?
1672	SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?
1672	SOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds-- there will be something cut?
1672	SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?
1672	SOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily?
1672	SOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the cut will be of the same nature?
1672	SOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?
1672	SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck will be struck violently or quickly?
1672	SOCRATES: And if they were more savage, must they not have been more unjust and inferior?
1672	SOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is either pleasant or useful?
1672	SOCRATES: And in pain?
1672	SOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?
1672	SOCRATES: And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?
1672	SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word''thirsty''implies pain?
1672	SOCRATES: And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your friends would say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury?
1672	SOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now describing as flattery?
1672	SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?
1672	SOCRATES: And is not this universally true?
1672	SOCRATES: And is the''having learned''the same as''having believed,''and are learning and belief the same things?
1672	SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?
1672	SOCRATES: And it has been proved to be true?
1672	SOCRATES: And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine of our vice?
1672	SOCRATES: And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?
1672	SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?
1672	SOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?
1672	SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?
1672	SOCRATES: And must not the just man always desire to do what is just?
1672	SOCRATES: And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our city and citizens?
1672	SOCRATES: And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to be most disgraceful?
1672	SOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric: which you would admit( would you not?)
1672	SOCRATES: And now, which will you do, ask or answer?
1672	SOCRATES: And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil-- must it not be so?
1672	SOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger share?
1672	SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?
1672	SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them are by nature good?
1672	SOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent?
1672	SOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils?
1672	SOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?
1672	SOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem?
1672	SOCRATES: And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar flattery:--was not that another of our conclusions?
1672	SOCRATES: And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which was ministered to, whether body or soul?
1672	SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?
1672	SOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship?
1672	SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human body?
1672	SOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes?
1672	SOCRATES: And the word''drinking''is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want?
1672	SOCRATES: And there is also''having believed''?
1672	SOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly?
1672	SOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them?
1672	SOCRATES: And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?
1672	SOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful?
1672	SOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?
1672	SOCRATES: And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and the like?
1672	SOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?
1672	SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her?
1672	SOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak?
1672	SOCRATES: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?
1672	SOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?
1672	SOCRATES: And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils, which is vice?
1672	SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge?
1672	SOCRATES: And what art frees us from disease?
1672	SOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly, yet as far as possible?
1672	SOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp- player?
1672	SOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry?--are not they of the same nature?
1672	SOCRATES: And what from vice and injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be?
1672	SOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul?
1672	SOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too?
1672	SOCRATES: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?
1672	SOCRATES: And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?--Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?
1672	SOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?
1672	SOCRATES: And why?
1672	SOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will not the suffering have the quality of the action?
1672	SOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is an animal?
1672	SOCRATES: And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best, this is a good, and would you call this great power?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in so far as they are just?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less one?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?
1672	SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded?
1672	SOCRATES: And you said the opposite?
1672	SOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another?
1672	SOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason?
1672	SOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him?
1672	SOCRATES: And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?
1672	SOCRATES: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?
1672	SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?
1672	SOCRATES: But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?
1672	SOCRATES: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil?
1672	SOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
1672	SOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?
1672	SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said?
1672	SOCRATES: But he surely can not have the same eyes well and sound at the same time?
1672	SOCRATES: But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?
1672	SOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both?
1672	SOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you would have answered very well?
1672	SOCRATES: But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made the citizens better instead of worse?
1672	SOCRATES: But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased?
1672	SOCRATES: But not the evil?
1672	SOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will never have done injustice at all?
1672	SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?
1672	SOCRATES: But then again, what was the observation which you just now made, about doing and suffering wrong?
1672	SOCRATES: But what if the itching is not confined to the head?
1672	SOCRATES: But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more than themselves, my friend?
1672	SOCRATES: But will he also escape from doing injury?
1672	SOCRATES: But will you answer?
1672	SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?
1672	SOCRATES: Consider again:--Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient?
1672	SOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term''benefited''?
1672	SOCRATES: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that further end for the sake of which they do a thing?
1672	SOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion?
1672	SOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an art?
1672	SOCRATES: Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this inconsistent manner?
1672	SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:--that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink?
1672	SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?
1672	SOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?
1672	SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man''s life if his body is in an evil plight-- in that case his life also is evil: am I not right?
1672	SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.--Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?
1672	SOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees?
1672	SOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?
1672	SOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?
1672	SOCRATES: I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?
1672	SOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns?
1672	SOCRATES: I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?
1672	SOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that can not be good and evil-- do we agree?
1672	SOCRATES: Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the greatest of evils?
1672	SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven?
1672	SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?
1672	SOCRATES: Justly or unjustly, do you mean?
1672	SOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as they are useful or pleasant or both?
1672	SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:--Is the pleasant the same as the good?
1672	SOCRATES: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good?
1672	SOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus,''Two men spoke before, but now one shall be enough''?
1672	SOCRATES: Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you can not remember, what will you do by- and- by, when you get older?
1672	SOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful?
1672	SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?
1672	SOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;--is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect?
1672	SOCRATES: Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty?
1672	SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases?
1672	SOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to you, he will be happy?
1672	SOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness?
1672	SOCRATES: Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?
1672	SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,--one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?
1672	SOCRATES: So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed out three corresponding evils-- injustice, disease, poverty?
1672	SOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself?
1672	SOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:--a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?
1672	SOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they are evil-- what principle do you lay down?
1672	SOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which are the greatest and best of human things?
1672	SOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?
1672	SOCRATES: That is to say, in evil?
1672	SOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd?
1672	SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?
1672	SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?
1672	SOCRATES: The flatterer?
1672	SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them?
1672	SOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician?
1672	SOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?
1672	SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests?
1672	SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil?
1672	SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion?
1672	SOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he is benefited?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good?
1672	SOCRATES: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have great power in a state?
1672	SOCRATES: Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the soul, are the greatest of evils?
1672	SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as''having learned''?
1672	SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse?
1672	SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?
1672	SOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?
1672	SOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring?
1672	SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?
1672	SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the art of money- making frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; that in which there is disorder, evil?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you were saying, they make the laws?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?
1672	SOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class are far better, as you were saying?
1672	SOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other?
1672	SOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain?
1672	SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?
1672	SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?
1672	SOCRATES: Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?
1672	SOCRATES: Then to which service of the State do you invite me?
1672	SOCRATES: Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?
1672	SOCRATES: Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art?
1672	SOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?
1672	SOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument?
1672	SOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?
1672	SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking?
1672	SOCRATES: To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?
1672	SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions?
1672	SOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and metre, there will remain speech?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me:--There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of any great pretensions?
1672	SOCRATES: What are we to do, then?
1672	SOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus?
1672	SOCRATES: What events?
1672	SOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body?
1672	SOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?--such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?
1672	SOCRATES: When you are thirsty?
1672	SOCRATES: Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance?
1672	SOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most-- the wise or the foolish?
1672	SOCRATES: Which, then, is the best of these three?
1672	SOCRATES: Why then?
1672	SOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they please?
1672	SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?
1672	SOCRATES: Will you understand my answer?
1672	SOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight gratification to me?
1672	SOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils?
1672	SOCRATES: Words which do what?
1672	SOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?
1672	SOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?
1672	SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul?
1672	SOCRATES: Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain-- that you get well?
1672	SOCRATES: You further said that the wrong- doer is happy if he be unpunished?
1672	SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?
1672	SOCRATES: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health?
1672	SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition of either of them?
1672	SOCRATES:--Who are to punish them?
1672	Shall I pursue the question?
1672	Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?
1672	Shall I tell you why I think so?
1672	Shall we break off in the middle?
1672	Shall we say that?
1672	Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with the office?
1672	Such are their respective lives:--And now would you say that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate?
1672	Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer?
1672	Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest, or only in jest?
1672	Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better?
1672	Than themselves?
1672	The answer depends on another question: What use did the children of Cronos make of their time?
1672	Then are not the many superior to the one, and the opinions of the many better?
1672	Then these are the points at issue between us-- are they not?
1672	There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is punished or when he is unpunished?
1672	This is what I believe that you mean( and you must not suppose that I am word- catching), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten thousand?
1672	Though we are not going to banish the poets, how can we suppose that such utterances have any healing or life- giving influence on the minds of men?
1672	To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend, and what is your business?
1672	To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate?
1672	Under his protection he will suffer no evil, but will he also do no evil?
1672	Was not this said?
1672	Was there ever a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good and noble?
1672	Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman?
1672	We ask the question, Where were men before birth?
1672	We may assume the existence of bodies and of souls?
1672	Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth?
1672	What do you mean?
1672	What do you say to this?
1672	What do you say?
1672	What do you say?
1672	What do you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament?
1672	What greater good can men have, Socrates?''
1672	What is feeling but rhetoric?
1672	What is to be said about all this?
1672	What nonsense are you talking?
1672	What part of flattery is rhetoric?
1672	What right have you to despise the engine- maker, and the others whom I was just now mentioning?
1672	What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other arts which have to do with words?
1672	What then is his meaning?
1672	When the assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel?
1672	Which of the arts then are flatteries?
1672	Who is the true poet?
1672	Whom did they make better?
1672	Whom has he made better?
1672	Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation?
1672	Why are you silent, Polus?
1672	Why do I say this?
1672	Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?
1672	Why do you not answer?
1672	Why will you not answer?
1672	Will Callicles still maintain this?
1672	Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as possible, and not be punished?
1672	Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order?
1672	Will you ask me another question-- What is cookery?
1672	Will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?
1672	Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer than they were when he received them?
1672	You mean to say that one man of sense ought to rule over ten thousand fools?
1672	You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a rhetorician?
1672	You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other?
1672	and does all happiness consist in this?
1672	and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman?
1672	and you said,''The painter of figures,''should I not be right in asking,''What kind of figures, and where do you find them?''
1672	are they not like tyrants?
1672	did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard yourself?
1672	do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?
1672	do you think that rhetoric is flattery?
1672	must he have the power, or only the will to obtain them?
1672	my philosopher, is that your line?
1672	or the good for the sake of the pleasant?
1672	or the weaver to have more coats, or the cobbler larger shoes, or the farmer more seed?
1672	or what ignorance more disgraceful than this?
1672	or who would undertake the duty of state- physician, if he had never cured either himself or any one else?
1672	or would you say that the coward has more?
1672	to be one of those arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words?
1672	will you ask him, Chaerephon--?
1672	you mean those fools,--the temperate?
1750	''And do not things which move move in a place, and are not the things which are at rest at rest in a place?''
1750	''And shall our patience, which was not exhausted in the enquiry about music or drink, fail now that we are discoursing about the Gods?
1750	''And some move or rest in one place and some in more places than one?''
1750	''And when are all things created and how?''
1750	''And would he not be right?''
1750	''But can such a quality be implanted?''
1750	''But have they any such use?''
1750	''But have we not often already done so?''
1750	''But how is the state to educate them when they are as yet unable to understand the meaning of words?''
1750	''But is there such a drug?''
1750	''But is this the practice elsewhere than in Crete and Lacedaemon?
1750	''But should all kinds of theft incur the same penalty?''
1750	''But why offer such an alternative?
1750	''Certainly?''
1750	''Good: but how can you create it?''
1750	''How can he?''
1750	''How can they be, when the very colours of their faces are different?''
1750	''How do you mean?''
1750	''How do you mean?''
1750	''How do you mean?''
1750	''How do you mean?''
1750	''How do you mean?''
1750	''How do you mean?''
1750	''If that is the case, what is to be done?''
1750	''In what respect?''
1750	''In what respect?''
1750	''In what way do you mean?''
1750	''Of what laws?''
1750	''Shall we suffer the Stranger, Cleinias, to run down Sparta in this way?''
1750	''Then how shall we reject some and select others?''
1750	''Then why speak of such matters?''
1750	''To what are you referring?''
1750	''To what are you referring?''
1750	''True; but what is this marvellous knowledge which youth are to acquire, and of which we are ignorant?''
1750	''What Cretan or Lacedaemonian would approve of your omitting gymnastic?''
1750	''What are these divine necessities of knowledge?''
1750	''What are they?''
1750	''What are they?''
1750	''What do you mean by cherishing them?''
1750	''What do you mean?''
1750	''What do you mean?''
1750	''What do you mean?''
1750	''What do you mean?''
1750	''What do you mean?''
1750	''What do you mean?''
1750	''What do you mean?''
1750	''What foundation would you lay?''
1750	''What is he to do then?''
1750	''What is it?''
1750	''What is it?''
1750	''What is that?''
1750	''What is that?''
1750	''What is the bearing of that remark?''
1750	''What is the remedy?''
1750	''What is their method?''
1750	''What is your drift?''
1750	''What makes you say so?''
1750	''What shall we say or do to such persons?''
1750	''What will be the best way of accomplishing such an object?''
1750	''What will they say?''
1750	''What, the bodies of young infants?''
1750	''Whom do you mean by the third chorus?''
1750	''Why do not you and Megillus join us?''
1750	''Why do you say"improperly"?''
1750	''Why?''
1750	''Yes, but how do you apply the figure?''
1750	''You imply that the regulation of convivial meetings is a part of education; how will you prove this?''
1750	( ATHENIAN: My good sir, what do you mean?)
1750	--how shall we answer the divine men?
1750	; the insipid forms,''What do you mean?''
1750	ATHENIAN: Again; might there not be a judge over these brethren, of whom we were speaking?
1750	ATHENIAN: Also that they go of their own accord for the sake of the subsequent benefit?
1750	ATHENIAN: And all the other artists just now mentioned, if they were bidden to offer up each their special prayer, would do so?
1750	ATHENIAN: And an evil life too?
1750	ATHENIAN: And are not all the Gods the chiefest of all guardians, and do they not guard our highest interests?
1750	ATHENIAN: And are perception and memory, and opinion and prudence, heightened and increased?
1750	ATHENIAN: And are there harbours on the seaboard?
1750	ATHENIAN: And are they to consider only, and to be unable to set forth what they think?
1750	ATHENIAN: And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move, however moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens?
1750	ATHENIAN: And can he who does not know what the exact object is which is imitated, ever know whether the resemblance is truthfully executed?
1750	ATHENIAN: And did any one ever see this sort of convivial meeting rightly ordered?
1750	ATHENIAN: And do not all these seem to you to be commensurable with themselves?
1750	ATHENIAN: And do we not further observe that the first shoot of every living thing is by far the greatest and fullest?
1750	ATHENIAN: And do you admit also that they have all power which mortals and immortals can have?
1750	ATHENIAN: And does not the legislator and every one who is good for anything, hold this fear in the greatest honour?
1750	ATHENIAN: And has the place a fair proportion of hill, and plain, and wood?
1750	ATHENIAN: And have not thousands and thousands of cities come into being during this period and as many perished?
1750	ATHENIAN: And if they were extended to the other Hellenes, would it be an improvement on the present state of things?
1750	ATHENIAN: And in the village will there be the same war of family against family, and of individual against individual?
1750	ATHENIAN: And is any harm done to the lover of vicious dances or songs, or any good done to the approver of the opposite sort of pleasure?
1750	ATHENIAN: And is not the aim of the legislator similar?
1750	ATHENIAN: And is not this what you and I have to do at the present moment?
1750	ATHENIAN: And is there any neighbouring State?
1750	ATHENIAN: And is what you say applicable only to states, or also to villages?
1750	ATHENIAN: And may we not now further confirm what was then mentioned?
1750	ATHENIAN: And may we suppose this immoderate spirit to be more fatal when found among kings than when among peoples?
1750	ATHENIAN: And must not that of which we are in need be the one to which we were just now alluding?
1750	ATHENIAN: And nothing can be plainer than that the fairest bodies are those which grow up from infancy in the best and straightest manner?
1750	ATHENIAN: And now do we still hold to our former assertion, that rhythms and music in general are imitations of good and evil characters in men?
1750	ATHENIAN: And now let me proceed to another question: Who are to be the colonists?
1750	ATHENIAN: And now, I beseech you, reflect-- you would admit that we have a threefold knowledge of things?
1750	ATHENIAN: And now, what is to be the next step?
1750	ATHENIAN: And now, what will this city be?
1750	ATHENIAN: And of cities or governments or legislation, about which we are now talking, do you suppose that they could have any recollection at all?
1750	ATHENIAN: And one part of this subject has been already discussed by us, and there still remains another to be discussed?
1750	ATHENIAN: And ought not the legislator to determine these classes?
1750	ATHENIAN: And should each man conceive himself to be his own enemy:--what shall we say?
1750	ATHENIAN: And surely justice does not grow apart from temperance?
1750	ATHENIAN: And surely they are not like charioteers who are bribed to give up the victory to other chariots?
1750	ATHENIAN: And surely we three and they two-- five in all-- have acknowledged that they are good and perfect?
1750	ATHENIAN: And that of things in motion some were moving in one place, and others in more than one?
1750	ATHENIAN: And the body should have the most exercise when it receives most nourishment?
1750	ATHENIAN: And the chorus is made up of two parts, dance and song?
1750	ATHENIAN: And the legislator would do likewise?
1750	ATHENIAN: And the one is honourable, and the other dishonourable?
1750	ATHENIAN: And the one, like other meaner things, is a human quality, but the Gods have no part in anything of the sort?
1750	ATHENIAN: And the same view may be taken of the pastime of drinking wine, if we are right in supposing that the same good effect follows?
1750	ATHENIAN: And the uneducated is he who has not been trained in the chorus, and the educated is he who has been well trained?
1750	ATHENIAN: And their opposites, therefore, would fall under the opposite class?
1750	ATHENIAN: And to what earthly rulers can they be compared, or who to them?
1750	ATHENIAN: And to which of the above- mentioned classes of guardians would any man compare the Gods without absurdity?
1750	ATHENIAN: And we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property of the Gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs?
1750	ATHENIAN: And we may conceive this to be true in the same way of other practices?
1750	ATHENIAN: And we must suppose this event to have taken place many ages after the deluge?
1750	ATHENIAN: And we ought, if possible, to provide them with a quiet ruler?
1750	ATHENIAN: And we were saying just now, that when men are at war the leader ought to be a brave man?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what are the principles on which men rule and obey in cities, whether great or small; and similarly in families?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what arrangement of life to be found anywhere is preferable to this community which we are now assigning to them?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what breadth is?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what comes third, and what fourth?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what has it been the object of our argument to show?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what if besides being a coward he has no skill?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what is beauty of figure, or beautiful melody?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what is the definition of that which is named''soul''?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what is the reason that dances and contests of this sort hardly ever exist in states, at least not to any extent worth speaking of?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what strain is suitable for heroes?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what strain will they sing, and what muse will they hymn?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what would you say about the body, my friend?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what would you say of the commander of an army?
1750	ATHENIAN: And what would you say of the state?
1750	ATHENIAN: And when rejoicing in our good fortune, we are unable to be still?
1750	ATHENIAN: And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same-- must we not admit that this is life?
1750	ATHENIAN: And which may be supposed to be the truer judgment-- that of the inferior or of the better soul?
1750	ATHENIAN: And which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being the mightiest and most efficient?
1750	ATHENIAN: And will he not be in a most wretched plight?
1750	ATHENIAN: And will he who does not know what is true be able to distinguish what is good and bad?
1750	ATHENIAN: And would not every one always make laws for the sake of the best?
1750	ATHENIAN: And would not that also be the desire of the legislator?
1750	ATHENIAN: And yet I have repeated what I am saying a good many times; but I suppose that you have never seen a city which is under a tyranny?
1750	ATHENIAN: And you know that these are two distinct things, and that there is a third thing called depth?
1750	ATHENIAN: And, according to the true order, the laws relating to marriage should be those which are first determined in every state?
1750	ATHENIAN: And, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters rule?
1750	ATHENIAN: Are we agreed thus far?
1750	ATHENIAN: Are we assured that there are two things which lead men to believe in the Gods, as we have already stated?
1750	ATHENIAN: Are you speaking of the soul?
1750	ATHENIAN: But are sure that it must be vast and incalculable?
1750	ATHENIAN: But can a kingship be destroyed, or was any other form of government ever destroyed, by any but the rulers themselves?
1750	ATHENIAN: But can a man who does not know a thing, as we were saying, know that the thing is right?
1750	ATHENIAN: But do we imagine carelessness and idleness and luxury to be virtues?
1750	ATHENIAN: But how can I in one word rightly comprehend all of them?
1750	ATHENIAN: But may we not also say that the soul of the slave is utterly corrupt, and that no man of sense ought to trust them?
1750	ATHENIAN: But then, my good friends, why did the settlement and legislation of their country turn out so badly?
1750	ATHENIAN: But what form of polity are we going to give the city?
1750	ATHENIAN: But what shall be our next musical law or type?
1750	ATHENIAN: But what was the ruin of this glorious confederacy?
1750	ATHENIAN: But, if they are such as we conceive them to be, can we possibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness and indolence?
1750	ATHENIAN: Can any of us imagine a better mode of effecting this object than that of the Egyptians?
1750	ATHENIAN: Can any one who makes such laws escape ridicule?
1750	ATHENIAN: Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul?
1750	ATHENIAN: Do we not consider each of ourselves to be one?
1750	ATHENIAN: Do we not regard all music as representative and imitative?
1750	ATHENIAN: Do you believe that there is any truth in ancient traditions?
1750	ATHENIAN: Do you imagine that I delay because I am in a perplexity?
1750	ATHENIAN: Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body?
1750	ATHENIAN: Does a captain require only to have nautical knowledge in order to be a good captain, whether he is sea- sick or not?
1750	ATHENIAN: Does he not return to the state of soul in which he was when a young child?
1750	ATHENIAN: Does not a little word extinguish all pleasures of that sort?
1750	ATHENIAN: Does not the discontented and ungracious nature appear to you to be full of lamentations and sorrows more than a good man ought to be?
1750	ATHENIAN: Does not the general aim at victory and superiority in war, and do not the physician and his assistants aim at producing health in the body?
1750	ATHENIAN: Does not this kind of fear preserve us in many important ways?
1750	ATHENIAN: Fifthly, if I am not mistaken, comes the principle that the stronger shall rule, and the weaker be ruled?
1750	ATHENIAN: Good; and what measures ought the legislator to have then taken in order to avert this calamity?
1750	ATHENIAN: Have you forgotten, Cleinias, the name of a friend who is really of yesterday?
1750	ATHENIAN: He sings well and dances well; now must we add that he sings what is good and dances what is good?
1750	ATHENIAN: How would you prove it?
1750	ATHENIAN: How, then, shall we reassure him, and get him to sing?
1750	ATHENIAN: How, then, was this advantage lost under Cambyses, and again recovered under Darius?
1750	ATHENIAN: I mean this: when one thing changes another, and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element?
1750	ATHENIAN: I should like to know whether temperance without the other virtues, existing alone in the soul of man, is rightly to be praised or blamed?
1750	ATHENIAN: I suppose that courage is a part of virtue?
1750	ATHENIAN: I suppose that our enquiry has reference to the soul?
1750	ATHENIAN: I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?
1750	ATHENIAN: I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion, but if I did not, let me now state-- CLEINIAS: What?
1750	ATHENIAN: I will:--''Surely,''they say,''the governing power makes whatever laws have authority in any state''?
1750	ATHENIAN: I will; or rather I will show you my meaning by a question, and do you please to answer me: You know, I suppose, what length is?
1750	ATHENIAN: If the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other stars, does she not carry round each individual of them?
1750	ATHENIAN: If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound-- how should we describe it?
1750	ATHENIAN: If, then, drinking and amusement were regulated in this way, would not the companions of our revels be improved?
1750	ATHENIAN: In all states the birth of children goes back to the connexion of marriage?
1750	ATHENIAN: In how many generations would this be attained?
1750	ATHENIAN: In the first place, then, the revellers as well as the soldiers will require a ruler?
1750	ATHENIAN: In what respect?
1750	ATHENIAN: In which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is any such guardian power to be found?
1750	ATHENIAN: Is not the effect of this quite the opposite of the effect of the other?
1750	ATHENIAN: Is there any argument which will prove to us that we ought to encourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to avoid it?
1750	ATHENIAN: Let us see; what are we saying?
1750	ATHENIAN: May I still make use of fable to some extent, in the hope that I may be better able to answer your question: shall I?
1750	ATHENIAN: May we not fairly make answer to him on behalf of the poets?
1750	ATHENIAN: Must not they be truly unfortunate whose souls are compelled to pass through life always hungering?
1750	ATHENIAN: Must we not appoint a sober man and a wise to be our master of the revels?
1750	ATHENIAN: Must we not, then, try in every possible way to prevent our youth from even desiring to imitate new modes either in dance or song?
1750	ATHENIAN: Next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the ignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey?
1750	ATHENIAN: No; but, if there had been, might not such a draught have been of use to the legislator as a test of courage?
1750	ATHENIAN: Now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is overcome by pleasure or by pain?
1750	ATHENIAN: Of what nature is the movement of mind?
1750	ATHENIAN: Once more, are all of us equally delighted with every sort of dance?
1750	ATHENIAN: One soul or more?
1750	ATHENIAN: Or an artist, who was clever in his profession, but a rogue?
1750	ATHENIAN: Reflect; may not banqueters and banquets be said to constitute a kind of meeting?
1750	ATHENIAN: Shall we say then that it is the soul which controls heaven and earth, and the whole world?
1750	ATHENIAN: Shall we, then, take this as the next point to which our attention should be directed?
1750	ATHENIAN: Should you like to see an example of the double and single method in legislation?
1750	ATHENIAN: Some one might say to us, What is the drift of all this?
1750	ATHENIAN: Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink,--what will be the effect on him?
1750	ATHENIAN: Surely God must not be supposed to have a nature which He Himself hates?
1750	ATHENIAN: Tell me, Strangers, is a God or some man supposed to be the author of your laws?
1750	ATHENIAN: That is to say, length is naturally commensurable with length, and breadth with breadth, and depth in like manner with depth?
1750	ATHENIAN: The brave man is less likely than the coward to be disturbed by fears?
1750	ATHENIAN: The case is the same?
1750	ATHENIAN: Then I suppose that we must consider this subject?
1750	ATHENIAN: Then at that time he will have the least control over himself?
1750	ATHENIAN: Then half the subject may now be considered to have been discussed; shall we proceed to the consideration of the other half?
1750	ATHENIAN: Then he who is well educated will be able to sing and dance well?
1750	ATHENIAN: Then how can we carry out our purpose with decorum?
1750	ATHENIAN: Then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second time a child?
1750	ATHENIAN: Then now I may proceed?
1750	ATHENIAN: Then the unjust life must not only be more base and depraved, but also more unpleasant than the just and holy life?
1750	ATHENIAN: Then what life is agreeable to God, and becoming in His followers?
1750	ATHENIAN: There are ten thousand likenesses of objects of sight?
1750	ATHENIAN: There is surely no difficulty in seeing, Cleinias, what is in accordance with the order of nature?
1750	ATHENIAN: They rank under the opposite class?
1750	ATHENIAN: This, then, has been said for the sake-- MEGILLUS: Of what?
1750	ATHENIAN: True, Cleinias; but then what should the lawgiver do when this evil is of long standing?
1750	ATHENIAN: Very good; but may I make one or two corrections in what I have been saying?
1750	ATHENIAN: Well, and about the good and the honourable, are we to take the same view?
1750	ATHENIAN: Well, and is not rapid growth without proper and abundant exercise the source endless evils in the body?
1750	ATHENIAN: Well, but let me ask, how is the country supplied with timber for ship- building?
1750	ATHENIAN: Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see where it is to be found?
1750	ATHENIAN: Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one common desire of all mankind?
1750	ATHENIAN: Well, then, by the Gods themselves I conjure you to tell me-- if they are to be propitiated, how are they to be propitiated?
1750	ATHENIAN: Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education, will you consider whether they satisfy you?
1750	ATHENIAN: Well, then, if neither of you can answer, shall I answer this question which you deem so absurd?
1750	ATHENIAN: Well, then, must we do as we said?
1750	ATHENIAN: Well, then; what shall we say or do?
1750	ATHENIAN: Were we not a little while ago quite convinced that no silver or golden Plutus should dwell in our state?
1750	ATHENIAN: What else can he say who declares that the Gods are always lenient to the doers of unjust acts, if they divide the spoil with them?
1750	ATHENIAN: What laws are more worthy of our attention than those which have regulated such cities?
1750	ATHENIAN: What will be our first law?
1750	ATHENIAN: What, then, leads us astray?
1750	ATHENIAN: Which of you will first tell me to which of these classes his own government is to be referred?
1750	ATHENIAN: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?
1750	ATHENIAN: Will he not live painfully and to his own disadvantage?
1750	ATHENIAN: Yes; and courage is a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice?
1750	ATHENIAN: You mean to say that there is more rock than plain?
1750	ATHENIAN: You will surely remember our saying that all things were either at rest or in motion?
1750	ATHENIAN:''And whoever transgresses these laws is punished as an evil- doer by the legislator, who calls the laws just''?
1750	ATHENIAN:''And you would rather have a touchstone in which there is no risk and no great danger than the reverse?''
1750	ATHENIAN:''Come, legislator,''we will say to him;''what are the conditions which you require in a state before you can organize it?''
1750	ATHENIAN:''Did we not hear you just now saying, that the legislator ought not to allow the poets to do what they liked?
1750	Again, when any one prefers beauty to virtue, what is this but the real and utter dishonour of the soul?
1750	All artists would pray for certain conditions under which to exercise their art: and would not the legislator do the same?
1750	Am I not right in maintaining that a good education is that which tends most to the improvement of mind and body?
1750	Am I not right in saying that a good education tends to the improvement of body and mind?
1750	Am I not right?
1750	And according to yet a third view, art has part with them, for surely in a storm it is well to have a pilot?
1750	And are there any other uses of well- ordered potations?
1750	And are there not three kinds of knowledge-- a knowledge( 1) of the essence,( 2) of the definition,( 3) of the name?
1750	And are there wars, not only of state against state, but of village against village, of family against family, of individual against individual?
1750	And did not this show that we were dissatisfied with the poets?
1750	And did we not say that the souls of the drinkers, when subdued by wine, are made softer and more malleable at the hand of the legislator?
1750	And did you ever observe that the gentlemen doctors practise upon freemen, and that slave doctors confine themselves to slaves?
1750	And do all men equally like all dances?
1750	And do not all human things share in soul, and is not man the most religious of animals and the possession of the Gods?
1750	And do they move and rest, some in one place, some in more?
1750	And do vicious measures and strains do any harm, or good measures any good to the lovers of them?
1750	And do we suppose that the ignorance of this truth is less fatal to kings than to peoples?
1750	And do you think that superiority in war is the proper aim of government?
1750	And does this extend to states and villages as well as to individuals?
1750	And does wine equally stimulate the reasoning faculties?
1750	And first, let me ask you who are to be the colonists?
1750	And further, that pleasure is different from anger, and has an opposite power, working by persuasion and deceit?
1750	And has not each of them had every form of government many times over, now growing larger, now smaller, and again improving or declining?
1750	And has this convivial society ever been rightly ordered?
1750	And have we not a similar object at the present moment?
1750	And have we not proved that the self- moved is the source of motion in other things?
1750	And having spoken well, may I add that you have been well answered?
1750	And how will they be best distributed?
1750	And if he replies''The pleasant,''then I should say to him,''O my father, did you not tell me that I should live as justly as possible''?
1750	And if so, are they not to be preferred to other modes of training because they are painless?
1750	And if so, we shall be right in saying that the soul is prior and superior to the body, and the body by nature subject and inferior to the soul?
1750	And if that is a ridiculous error in speaking of men, how much more in speaking of the Gods?
1750	And if they were boxers or wrestlers, would they think of entering the lists without many days''practice?
1750	And if this be true, are not the just and the honourable at one time all the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?
1750	And in time of war he must be a man of courage and absolutely devoid of fear, if this be possible?
1750	And is God to be conceived of as a careless, indolent fellow, such as the poet would compare to a stingless drone?
1750	And is a man his own enemy?
1750	And is it not as disgraceful for Solon and Lycurgus to lay down false precepts about the institutions of life as for Homer and Tyrtaeus?
1750	And is not courage a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice?
1750	And is not man the most religious of all animals?
1750	And is not this true of ideals of government in general?
1750	And is the surrounding country productive, or in need of importations?
1750	And is the surrounding country self- supporting?
1750	And is there a fair proportion of hill and plain and wood?
1750	And is there any higher knowledge than the knowledge of the existence and power of the Gods?
1750	And let me ask you a question:--Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very different?
1750	And may not convivial meetings have a similar remedial use?
1750	And may we not fear that, if they are allowed to utter injudicious prayers, they will bring the greatest misfortunes on the state?
1750	And now let us pass under review the examiners themselves; what will their examination be, and how conducted?
1750	And now shall we call in our colonists and make a speech to them?
1750	And now, Megillus and Cleinias, how can we put to the proof the value of our words?
1750	And now, has our discussion been of any use?
1750	And now, how shall we proceed?
1750	And now, what is this city?
1750	And now, who is to have the superintendence of the country, and what shall be the arrangement?
1750	And ought not the legislator to determine these classes?
1750	And shall our soldiers go out to fight for life and kindred and property unprepared, because sham fights are thought to be ridiculous?
1750	And soul too is life?
1750	And still more, who can compel women to eat and drink in public?
1750	And that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus gave us harmony and rhythm?
1750	And the motion which is not self- moved will be inferior to this?
1750	And the soul which orders all things must also order the heavens?
1750	And thinkest thou, bold man, that thou needest not to know this?
1750	And this soul of the sun, which is better than the sun, whether driving him in a chariot or employing any other agency, is by every man called a God?
1750	And to that I rejoin:--O my father, did you not wish me to live as happily as possible?
1750	And we agreed that if the soul was prior to the body, the things of the soul were prior to the things of the body?
1750	And what admonition can be more appropriate than the assurance which we formerly gave, that the souls of the dead watch over mortal affairs?
1750	And what can be worse than this?
1750	And what caused their ruin?
1750	And what greater good or evil can any destiny ever make us undergo?
1750	And what honours shall be paid to these examiners, whom the whole state counts worthy of the rewards of virtue?
1750	And what is a true taste?
1750	And what is the definition of the thing which is named''soul''?
1750	And what is the right way of living?
1750	And what shall be the punishment suited to him who has thrown away his weapons of defence?
1750	And what shall he suffer who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own best friend?
1750	And what songs shall he sing?
1750	And what, then, is to be regarded as the origin of government?
1750	And which is the truer judgment?
1750	And which is worse,--to be overcome by pain, or by pleasure?
1750	And who would ever think of establishing such a practice by law?
1750	And why?
1750	And will any legislator be found to make such actions legal?
1750	And yet if he goes to a doctor or a gymnastic master, does he not make himself ill in the hope of getting well?
1750	And yet, why am I disquieted, for I believe that the same principle applies equally to all human things?
1750	And you compel your poets to declare that the righteous are happy, and that the wicked man, even if he be as rich as Midas, is unhappy?
1750	And, further, may we not suppose that the fear of impiety will enable them to master that which other inferior people have mastered?
1750	Any neighbouring states?
1750	Any one may easily imagine the questions which have to be asked in all such cases: What did he wound, or whom, or how, or when?
1750	Are beautiful things not the same to us all, or are they the same in themselves, but not in our opinion of them?
1750	Are men who have these institutions only to eat and fatten like beasts?
1750	Are not those who train in gymnasia, at first beginning reduced to a state of weakness?
1750	Are our guardians only to know that each of them is many, or also how and in what way they are one?
1750	Are there harbours?
1750	Are they charioteers of contending pairs of steeds, or pilots of vessels?
1750	Are they not competitors in the greatest of all contests, and have they not innumerable rivals?
1750	Are they not strivers for mastery in the greatest of combats?
1750	Are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we can not tell whether virtue is many, or four, or one?
1750	Are we to live in sports always?
1750	Are you not surprised at any one of his own accord bringing upon himself deformity, leanness, ugliness, decrepitude?
1750	As far as we can guess at this distance of time, what happened was as follows:-- MEGILLUS: What?
1750	At the beginning of the third book, Plato abruptly asks the question, What is the origin of states?
1750	But admitting all this, what follows?
1750	But can any one form an estimate of any society, which is intended to have a ruler, and which he only sees in an unruly and lawless state?
1750	But did we not say that kingdoms or governments can only be subverted by themselves?
1750	But how can a state be in a right condition which can not justly award honour?
1750	But how can we make them sing?
1750	But how can we take precautions against the unnatural loves of either sex, from which innumerable evils have come upon individuals and cities?
1750	But how ought we to define courage?
1750	But if honour is to be attributed to justice, are just sufferings honourable, or only just actions?
1750	But is our own language consistent?
1750	But is there any potion which might serve as a test of overboldness and excessive and indiscreet boasting?
1750	But shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself?
1750	But then who is to arrange all this?
1750	But then, what should the lawgiver do?
1750	But to whom are they to be taught, and when?
1750	But what do I mean?
1750	But what is a true taste?
1750	But what weapons shall we use, and how shall we direct them?
1750	But where shall we find the magistrate who is worthy to supervise them or look into their short- comings and crooked ways?
1750	But who, Cleinias and Megillus, will order for us in the colony all this matter of the magistrates, and the scrutinies of them?
1750	But why are they so rarely practised?
1750	But why have I said all this?
1750	But, in the present unfortunate state of opinion, who would dare to establish them?
1750	CLEINIAS: About what thing?
1750	CLEINIAS: About what?
1750	CLEINIAS: About what?
1750	CLEINIAS: And can you show that what you have been saying is true?
1750	CLEINIAS: And how, Stranger, can we act most fairly under the circumstances?
1750	CLEINIAS: And that mind was the leader of the four, and that to her the three other virtues and all other things ought to have regard?
1750	CLEINIAS: And we said that virtue was of four kinds?
1750	CLEINIAS: And what are the laws about music and dancing in Egypt?
1750	CLEINIAS: And what do you call the true mode of service?
1750	CLEINIAS: And what is the inference?
1750	CLEINIAS: And what law would you advise them to pass if this one failed?
1750	CLEINIAS: And what necessities of knowledge are there, Stranger, which are divine and not human?
1750	CLEINIAS: And what ought the legislator to decide, and what ought he to leave to the courts of law?
1750	CLEINIAS: And who is this God?
1750	CLEINIAS: And would he not be right?
1750	CLEINIAS: Assuredly: but may we not now, Stranger, prescribe these studies as necessary, and so fill up the lacunae of our laws?
1750	CLEINIAS: But do you really imagine, Stranger, that this is the way in which poets generally compose in States at the present day?
1750	CLEINIAS: But has such a draught, Stranger, ever really been known among men?
1750	CLEINIAS: But how will an old man be able to attend to such great charges?
1750	CLEINIAS: But is there any difficulty in proving the existence of the Gods?
1750	CLEINIAS: But what is the fact?
1750	CLEINIAS: But why is the word''nature''wrong?
1750	CLEINIAS: But why, Stranger, do not you and Megillus take a part in our new city?
1750	CLEINIAS: But, Stranger, are we to impose this great amount of exercise upon newly- born infants?
1750	CLEINIAS: By what possible arguments, Stranger, can any man persuade himself of such a monstrous doctrine?
1750	CLEINIAS: Consistent in what?
1750	CLEINIAS: For example, where?
1750	CLEINIAS: Having what in view do you ask that question?
1750	CLEINIAS: How can I possibly say so?
1750	CLEINIAS: How can there be anything greater?
1750	CLEINIAS: How can they have any other?
1750	CLEINIAS: How can they, when the very colours of their faces differ?
1750	CLEINIAS: How can they?
1750	CLEINIAS: How can we have an examination and also a good one?
1750	CLEINIAS: How do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: How do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: How do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: How does that bear upon any of the matters of which we have been speaking?
1750	CLEINIAS: How is that arranged?
1750	CLEINIAS: How is that?
1750	CLEINIAS: How is that?
1750	CLEINIAS: How is that?
1750	CLEINIAS: How shall we proceed, Stranger?
1750	CLEINIAS: How so?
1750	CLEINIAS: How so?
1750	CLEINIAS: How so?
1750	CLEINIAS: How so?
1750	CLEINIAS: How two?
1750	CLEINIAS: How would that be?
1750	CLEINIAS: How would you advise the guardian of the law to act?
1750	CLEINIAS: How?
1750	CLEINIAS: How?
1750	CLEINIAS: How?
1750	CLEINIAS: How?
1750	CLEINIAS: How?
1750	CLEINIAS: I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of which the Stranger speaks, must be temperance?
1750	CLEINIAS: In what respect?
1750	CLEINIAS: In what respect?
1750	CLEINIAS: In what respect?
1750	CLEINIAS: In what way do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: In what way?
1750	CLEINIAS: In what way?
1750	CLEINIAS: Is not that true?
1750	CLEINIAS: Lies of what nature?
1750	CLEINIAS: Of what are you speaking?
1750	CLEINIAS: Of what victory are you speaking?
1750	CLEINIAS: Once more, what do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: Once more, what do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: Such as what?
1750	CLEINIAS: Then what are we to do in our own country, Stranger, seeing that there are such differences in the treatment of slaves by their owners?
1750	CLEINIAS: Then what is to be the inference?
1750	CLEINIAS: Then why was there any need to speak of the matter at all?
1750	CLEINIAS: To what are you referring?
1750	CLEINIAS: To what are you referring?
1750	CLEINIAS: To what are you referring?
1750	CLEINIAS: To what do you refer in this instance?
1750	CLEINIAS: To what do you refer?
1750	CLEINIAS: To what do you refer?
1750	CLEINIAS: To what?
1750	CLEINIAS: True; but what is this study which you describe as wonderful and fitting for youth to learn, but of which we are ignorant?
1750	CLEINIAS: Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these objections?
1750	CLEINIAS: Very good: And now what, according to you, is to be the salvation of our government and of our laws, and how is it to be effected?
1750	CLEINIAS: Well, Stranger, and may he not very fairly say so?
1750	CLEINIAS: Well, Stranger, and what is the reason of this?
1750	CLEINIAS: Well, and have we not already opposed the popular voice in many important enactments?
1750	CLEINIAS: What answer shall we make to him?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are the two kinds?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are they?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are they?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are they?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are they?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are they?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are they?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are they?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are they?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are we to observe about it?
1750	CLEINIAS: What are you going to ask?
1750	CLEINIAS: What consolation will you offer him?
1750	CLEINIAS: What direction?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you bid us keep in mind?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean, Stranger, by this remark?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean, Stranger?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean, and what new thing is this?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean, my good sir?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What doctrine do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What had you in your mind when you said that?
1750	CLEINIAS: What have we to do?
1750	CLEINIAS: What have you got to say?
1750	CLEINIAS: What have you to say, Stranger?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is it?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is it?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is it?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is it?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is it?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is it?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is it?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is it?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is it?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is it?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is that story?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is that?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is that?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is that?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is that?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is the cause, Stranger, of this extreme hesitation?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is the other half, and how do you divide the subject?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is their method?
1750	CLEINIAS: What is this, Stranger, that you are saying?
1750	CLEINIAS: What jests?
1750	CLEINIAS: What kind of ignorance do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: What makes you say so?
1750	CLEINIAS: What method can we devise of electing them?
1750	CLEINIAS: What more have you to say?
1750	CLEINIAS: What ought we to say then?
1750	CLEINIAS: What penalty?
1750	CLEINIAS: What question?
1750	CLEINIAS: What shall we say or do to these persons?
1750	CLEINIAS: What terms?
1750	CLEINIAS: What then are we to do, Stranger, under these circumstances?
1750	CLEINIAS: What traditions?
1750	CLEINIAS: What troubles you, Stranger?
1750	CLEINIAS: What was the error?
1750	CLEINIAS: What would you expect?
1750	CLEINIAS: What, Stranger, is the drift of your comparison?
1750	CLEINIAS: What?
1750	CLEINIAS: What?
1750	CLEINIAS: What?
1750	CLEINIAS: What?
1750	CLEINIAS: What?
1750	CLEINIAS: What?
1750	CLEINIAS: What?
1750	CLEINIAS: Which are they?
1750	CLEINIAS: Which do you mean?
1750	CLEINIAS: Which will you take?
1750	CLEINIAS: Who are those who compose the third choir, Stranger?
1750	CLEINIAS: Why so?
1750	CLEINIAS: Why, Stranger, what other reason is there?
1750	CLEINIAS: Will you try to be a little plainer?
1750	CLEINIAS: You are speaking of harmless pleasure, are you not?
1750	CLEINIAS: You mean that in each of them there is a principle of superiority or inferiority to self?
1750	CLEINIAS: You mean the evil of blaming antiquity in states?
1750	CLEINIAS: You mean to ask whether we should call such a self- moving power life?
1750	CLEINIAS: You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self- moved is the same with that which has the name soul?
1750	CLEINIAS: You mean, I suppose, their serious and noble pursuit?
1750	CLEINIAS: You would assume, as you say, a tyrant who was young, temperate, quick at learning, having a good memory, courageous, of a noble nature?
1750	CLEINIAS: Your words are reasonable enough; but shall we find any good or true notion about the stars?
1750	Can he who is good for anything be ignorant of all this without discredit where great and glorious truths are concerned?
1750	Can there be any more philosophical speculation than how to reduce many things which are unlike to one idea?
1750	Can we be right in praising any one who cares for great matters and leaves the small to take care of themselves?
1750	Can we conceive of any other than that which has been already given-- the motion which can move itself?
1750	Can we keep our temper with them, when they compel us to argue on such a theme?
1750	Can we say?
1750	Can you tell me?
1750	Come, legislator, let us say to him, and what are the conditions which you would have?
1750	Did we not arrive at the conclusion that parents ought to govern their children, and the elder the younger, and the noble the ignoble?
1750	Did we not imply that the poets are not always quite capable of knowing what is good or evil?
1750	Did you ever observe that there are beautiful things of which men often say,''What wonders they would have effected if rightly used?''
1750	Do not these qualities entirely desert a man if he becomes saturated with drink?
1750	Do some figures, then, appear to be beautiful which are not?
1750	Do we not often hear of wages being adjusted in proportion to the profits of employers?
1750	Do you agree with me thus far?
1750	Do you mean some form of democracy, or oligarchy, or aristocracy, or monarchy?
1750	Do you not see that a drunken pilot or a drunken ruler of any sort will ruin ship, chariot, army-- anything, in short, of which he has the direction?
1750	Do you remember the image in which I likened the men for whom laws are now made to slaves who are doctored by slaves?
1750	Do you remember the names of the Fates?
1750	For boys and girls ought to learn to dance and practise gymnastic exercises-- ought they not?
1750	For do not love, ignorance, avarice, wealth, beauty, strength, while they stimulate courage, also madden and intoxicate the soul?
1750	For of doctors are there not two kinds?
1750	For reflect-- if women are not to have the education of men, some other must be found for them, and what other can we propose?
1750	For surely neither of them can be charged with neglect if they fail to attend to something which is beyond their power?
1750	For there is a thing which has occurred times without number in states-- CLEINIAS: What thing?
1750	For what good can the just man have which is separated from pleasure?
1750	For why should a writer say over again, in a more imperfect form, what he had already said in his most finished style and manner?
1750	For, O my friends, how can there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony?
1750	Have we already forgotten what was said a little while ago?
1750	Have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another?
1750	Have we not already decided that no gold or silver Plutus shall be allowed in our city?
1750	Have we not heard of Iccus of Tarentum and other wrestlers who abstained wholly for a time?
1750	Have we not mentioned all motions that there are, and comprehended them under their kinds and numbered them with the exception, my friends, of two?
1750	He will say,--''May I not do what I will with my own, and give much to my friends, and little to my enemies?''
1750	Here are three kinds of love: ought the legislator to prohibit all of them equally, or to allow the virtuous love to remain?
1750	How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change?
1750	How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation?
1750	How can they be saved from those passions which reason forbids them to indulge, and which are the ruin of so many?
1750	How can we legislate about these consecrated strains without incurring ridicule?
1750	How can we prove that what I am saying is true?
1750	How could he have?
1750	How in the less can we find an image of the greater?
1750	How ought he to answer this question?
1750	How shall we devise a remedy and way of escape out of so great a danger?
1750	How shall we perfect the ideas of our guardians about virtue?
1750	How then can the advocate of justice be other than noble?
1750	How then can we rightly order the distribution of the land?
1750	I should like to know whether you and Megillus would agree with me in what I am about to say; for my opinion is-- CLEINIAS: What?
1750	I suppose that you have never seen a city which is subject to a tyranny?
1750	I will simply ask once more whether we shall lay down as one of our principles of song-- CLEINIAS: What?
1750	If so, in what kind of sports?
1750	If they do, how can they escape the fate of a fatted beast, which is to be torn in pieces by some other beast more valiant than himself?
1750	In a ship, when the pilot and the sailors unite their perceptions with the piloting mind, do they not save both themselves and their craft?
1750	In the first place, let us-- CLEINIAS: Do what?
1750	In the next place, we acknowledge that the soul is the cause of good and evil, just and unjust, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things?
1750	In the process of gestation?
1750	In what other manner could we ever study the art of self- defence?
1750	Is he the better who accomplishes his ends in a double way, or he who works in one way, and that the ruder and inferior?
1750	Is not justice noble, which has been the civiliser of humanity?
1750	Is not justice the civilizer of mankind?
1750	Is not such knowledge a disgrace to a man of sense, especially where great and glorious truths are concerned?
1750	Is not the origin of music as follows?
1750	Is not this the fact?
1750	Is the approval of gods and men to be deemed good and honourable, but unpleasant, and their disapproval the reverse?
1750	Is the poet to train his choruses as he pleases, without reference to virtue or vice?
1750	Is there any other way in which his neglect can be explained?
1750	Is there not one claim of authority which is always just,--that of fathers and mothers and in general of progenitors to rule over their offspring?
1750	Is there timber for ship- building?
1750	Is this due to the ignorance of mankind and their legislators?
1750	Let me ask again, Are you and I agreed about this?
1750	Let me ask another question: What is the name which is given to self- motion when manifested in any material substance?
1750	Let us see: Are there not two kinds of fear-- fear of evil and fear of an evil reputation?
1750	Let us then once more ask the question, To what end has all this been said?
1750	Looking at these and the like examples, what ought we to do concerning property in slaves?
1750	MEGILLUS: And would he not be justified?
1750	MEGILLUS: But were you not right and wise in speaking as you did, and we in assenting to you?
1750	MEGILLUS: How do you mean; and why do you blame them?
1750	MEGILLUS: How do you mean?
1750	MEGILLUS: Ought I to answer first, since I am the elder?
1750	MEGILLUS: To what are you referring, and what do you mean?
1750	MEGILLUS: What advantage?
1750	MEGILLUS: What do you mean, Stranger?
1750	MEGILLUS: What do you mean?
1750	MEGILLUS: What do you mean?
1750	MEGILLUS: What is it?
1750	MEGILLUS: What is it?
1750	MEGILLUS: What is it?
1750	MEGILLUS: What laws do you mean?
1750	MEGILLUS: What security?
1750	MEGILLUS: What shall we do, Cleinias?
1750	MEGILLUS: What word?
1750	MEGILLUS: When do you mean?
1750	MEGILLUS: When the son is young and foolish, you mean?
1750	MEGILLUS: Why, my good friend, how could any Lacedaemonian say anything else?
1750	MEGILLUS: Yes; but will he ever succeed in making all mankind use the same language about them?
1750	MEGILLUS: You are speaking of temperance?
1750	May any one come from any city of Crete?
1750	May any one come out of all Crete; and is the idea that the population in the several states is too numerous for the means of subsistence?
1750	May we not suppose that this was the intention with which the men of those days framed the constitutions of their states?
1750	May we not suppose the colonists to have arrived, and proceed to make our speech to them?
1750	May we say that they are?
1750	Mem.)?
1750	Must not he who maintains that the Gods can be propitiated argue thus?
1750	Must not that which is moved by others finally depend upon that which is moved by itself?
1750	Must they not be at least rulers who have to order unceasingly the whole heaven?
1750	Must we not reply,''The self- moved''?
1750	My first question is, Why has the law ordained that you should have common meals, and practise gymnastics, and bear arms?
1750	Next as to temperance: what institutions have you which are adapted to promote temperance?
1750	No; but suppose that there were; might not the legislator use such a mode of testing courage and cowardice?
1750	Now how can we create this quality of immobility in the laws?
1750	Now is not the use of both methods far better than the use of either alone?
1750	Now is this a true way of speaking or of acting?
1750	Now the voluntary can not be the involuntary; and if you two come to me and say,''Then shall we legislate for our city?''
1750	Now what class or institution is there in our state which has such a saving power?
1750	Now what course ought we to take?
1750	Now which is the better way of proceeding in a physician and in a trainer?
1750	Now which of them is right?
1750	Now, ought we not to forbid such strains as these?
1750	Now, what will be the form of such prefaces?
1750	Once more then, as I have asked more than once, shall this be our third law, and type, and model-- What do you say?
1750	One soul or more?
1750	Or a general who is sick and drunk with fear and ignorant of war a good general?
1750	Or can we give our guardians a more precise knowledge of virtue in speech and action than the many have?
1750	Or if we had no adversary at all, animate or inanimate, should we not venture in the dearth of antagonists to spar by ourselves?
1750	Or is the neither doing nor suffering evil good and honourable, although not pleasant?
1750	Or rather, do we not all know the reasons?
1750	Or shall we leave the preamble and go on to the laws?
1750	Or try the matter by the test which we apply to all laws,--who will say that the permission of such things tends to virtue?
1750	Or would you abstain from using the potion altogether, although you have no reason for abstaining?''
1750	Or would you ascertain whether he is licentious by putting your wife or daughter into his hands?
1750	Ought not prayers to be offered up to the Gods when we sacrifice?
1750	Our minister of education will have a great deal to do; and being an old man, how will he get through so much work?
1750	People say that he who gives us most pleasure at such festivals is to win the palm: are they right?
1750	Perhaps you will ask me what is the bearing of these remarks?
1750	Pol.)?
1750	Seeing then that there are these three sorts of love, ought the law to prohibit and forbid them all to exist among us?
1750	Shall I give his answer?
1750	Shall I tell you why?
1750	Shall I tell you?
1750	Shall I try to divine?
1750	Shall these be our rules, and shall we impose a penalty for the neglect of them?
1750	Shall they sing a choric strain?
1750	Shall they, like the women of Thrace, tend cattle and till the ground; or, like our own, spin and weave, and take care of the house?
1750	Shall this be our constitution, or shall all be educated alike, and the special training be given up?
1750	Shall we allow a stranger to run down Sparta in this fashion?
1750	Shall we assume so much, or do we still entertain doubts?
1750	Shall we be so foolish as to let them off who would give us the most beautiful and also the most useful of songs?
1750	Shall we begin, then, with the acknowledgment that education is first given through Apollo and the Muses?
1750	Shall we contrive some means of engrafting this knowledge on our state, or give the matter up?
1750	Shall we impose penalties for the neglect of these rules?
1750	Shall we make a defence of ourselves?
1750	Shall we now proceed to speak of this?
1750	Shall we proceed to the other half or not?
1750	Shall we propose this?
1750	Shall we say that glory and fame, coming from Gods and men, though good and noble, are nevertheless unpleasant, and infamy pleasant?
1750	Shall we suppose some impious man to charge us with assuming the existence of the Gods, and make a defence?
1750	Shall we then propose as one of our laws and models relating to the Muses-- CLEINIAS: What?
1750	Shall we try to prove that it is so?
1750	Some one will ask, why not?
1750	Strangers, let me ask a question of you-- Was a God or a man the author of your laws?
1750	Such a sadness was the natural effect of declining years and failing powers, which make men ask,''After all, what profit is there in life?''
1750	Suppose a person to express his admiration of wealth or rank, does he not do so under the idea that by the help of these he can attain his desires?
1750	Suppose a physician who had to cure a patient-- would he ever succeed if he attended to the great and neglected the little?
1750	Suppose that we make answer as follows: CLEINIAS: How would you answer?
1750	Suppose these competitors to meet, and not these only, but innumerable others as well-- can you tell me who ought to be the victor?
1750	Surely we should say that to be temperate and to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice?
1750	Tell me whether you assent to my words?
1750	Tell me, Megillus, were not the common meals and gymnastic training instituted by your legislator with a view to war?
1750	Tell me, by the Gods, I say, how the Gods are to be propitiated by us?
1750	Tell me, then, whence do you draw your recruits in the present enterprise?
1750	Tell me,--were not first the syssitia, and secondly the gymnasia, invented by your legislator with a view to war?
1750	The judge of the imitation is required to know, therefore, first the original, secondly the truth, and thirdly the merit of the execution?
1750	The legislator may be conceived to make the following address to himself:--With what object am I training my citizens?
1750	The legislator may be supposed to argue the question in his own mind: Who are my citizens for whom I have set in order the city?
1750	The question runs up into wider ones-- What is the general effect of asceticism on human nature?
1750	The true guardian of the laws ought to know their truth, and should also be able to interpret and execute them?
1750	Then every one should be both fearful and fearless?
1750	Then how can we believe that drinking should be encouraged?
1750	Then what was the reason why their legislation signally failed?
1750	Then, if we know what is good and bad in song and dance, we shall know what education is?
1750	There is a convivial form of society-- is there not?
1750	This makes us ask, What shall we do about slaves?
1750	This proves that the Gods hear the curses of parents who are wronged; and shall we doubt that they hear and fulfil their blessings too?''
1750	To which of these classes, Megillus, do you refer your own state?
1750	To whom shall we compare them?
1750	To whom then is our state to be entrusted?
1750	Was it because they did not know how wisely Hesiod spoke when he said that the half is often more than the whole?
1750	We are agreed( are we not?)
1750	Well, are we not agreed that our guardians ought to know, not only how the good and the honourable are many, but also how they are one?
1750	Well, but is courage only a combat against fear and pain, and not against pleasure and flattery?
1750	What are they, and how many in number?
1750	What better and more innocent test of character is there than festive intercourse?
1750	What constitution shall we give-- democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy?''
1750	What do you say, friend Megillus?
1750	What do you say?
1750	What do you say?
1750	What do you think of ancient traditions about deluges and destructions of mankind, and the preservation of a remnant?
1750	What do you think?
1750	What have you to say?
1750	What inference is to be drawn from all this?
1750	What is he to do?
1750	What is the inference?
1750	What is the nature of the movement of the soul?
1750	What is there cheaper, or more innocent?
1750	What is there which so surely gives victory and safety in war?
1750	What life, then, is pleasing to God?
1750	What other aim would they have had?
1750	What remedies can a city find for this disease?
1750	What remedy can a city of sense find against this disease?
1750	What say you?
1750	What shall the law prescribe, and what shall be left to the judge?
1750	What then shall we do?
1750	What would you like?
1750	What would you say then to leaving these matters for the present, and passing on to some other question of law?
1750	What, then, shall we do?
1750	Where is an ordinance about pleasure similar to that about pain to be found in your laws?
1750	Wherefore, also, the legislator ought often to impress upon himself the question--''What do I want?''
1750	Wherefore, seeing that human things are thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think''?
1750	Wherefore, seeing these things, what ought we to do or think?
1750	Which is the doubtful kind, and how are the two to be distinguished?
1750	Whither are we running away?
1750	Who are they, and what is their nature?
1750	Who can be calm when he is called upon to prove the existence of the Gods?
1750	Who could select 180 persons of each class, fitted to be senators?
1750	Who knows but we may be aiming at the greater, and fail of attaining the lesser?
1750	Who will ever believe this?
1750	Why do I mention this?
1750	Why do I say this?
1750	Why do we call virtue, which is a single thing, by the two names of wisdom and courage?
1750	Why have I made this remark?
1750	Why, surely our courage is shown in imagining that the new colonists will quietly receive our laws?
1750	Why, then, does any dishonour attach to a beneficent occupation?
1750	Will any one be able to imitate the human body, if he does not know the number, proportion, colour, or figure of the limbs?
1750	Will he be able to command merely because he has military skill if he be a coward, who, when danger comes, is sick and drunk with fear?
1750	Will he who is seduced learn the habit of courage; or will the seducer acquire temperance?
1750	Will not a man be able to judge of it best from a point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good or evil?
1750	Will not a man find abstinence more easy when his body is sound than when he is in ill- condition?
1750	Will not all men censure as womanly him who imitates the woman?
1750	Will not poets and spectators and actors all agree in this?
1750	Will not the fear of impiety enable them to conquer that which many who were inferior to them have conquered?
1750	Will not the legislator, observing the order of nature, begin by making regulations for states about births?
1750	Will such passions implant in the soul of him who is seduced the habit of courage, or in the soul of the seducer the principle of temperance?
1750	Will the same figures or sounds be equally well adapted to the manly and the cowardly when they are in trouble?
1750	Will this be the way?
1750	Will you admit that in all societies there must be a leader?
1750	Will you allow me then to explain how I should have liked to have heard you expound the matter?
1750	Will you hear me tell how great I deem the evil to be?
1750	Would a pilot who is sea- sick be a good pilot?
1750	Would any man willingly degrade or weaken that?
1750	Would not this have been the way?
1750	Would you make a bargain with a man in order to try whether he is honest?
1750	Yes; but may I tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had upon me?
1750	Yes; but of what nature is this union?
1750	You admit that wine stimulates the passions?
1750	You are aware that there are these two classes of doctors?
1750	You are speaking of the degradation of the soul: but how about the body?
1750	You know that there are such things as length, breadth, and depth?
1750	You will admit that anger is of a violent and destructive nature?
1750	You will say, How, and with what weapons?
1750	You will surely grant so much?
1750	You would agree?
1750	and if to be just is to be happy, what is that principle of happiness or good which is superior to pleasure?
1750	and should not other writings either agree with them, or if they disagree, be deemed ridiculous?
1750	and why are you so perplexed in your mind?
1750	and''Do I attain my aim, or do I miss the mark?''
1750	how shall we give our state a head and eyes?
1750	it was a question requiring serious consideration-- Who should execute a sentence?
1750	or are some things in motion, and some things at rest?
1750	or how can the lawgiver rightly direct you about them?
1750	or is there any way in which our city can be made to resemble the head and senses of rational beings because possessing such a guardian power?
1750	or rather, who will not blame the effeminacy of him who yields to pleasures and is unable to hold out against them?
1750	or shall we give heed to them above all?
1750	or shall we leave them and return to our laws, lest the prelude should become longer than the law?
1750	or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime?
1750	or what settlements of states are greater or more famous?
1750	or when wealth, beauty, strength, and all the intoxicating workings of pleasure madden us?
1750	that it is a principle of wisdom and virtue, or a principle which has neither wisdom nor virtue?
1750	will you explain the law more precisely?