Questions

This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.

identifier	question
42968	And what becomes of the consciousness of the"immortal soul"when it no longer has the use of these organs?
42968	Do we find in every phase of it a lofty moral principle or a wise ruler, guiding the destinies of nations?
42968	Does the physicist investigate the purpose of electric force, or the chemist that of atomic weight?
42968	Has it been_ created_ by supernatural power, or has it been_ evolved_ by a natural process?
42968	How do animals evolve from ova?
42968	How does the plant come forth from the seed?
42968	How is the child formed in the mother''s womb?
42968	How would that be possible if consciousness were an immaterial entity, independent of these anatomical organs?
42968	May we consider this progressive development as the outcome of a conscious design or a moral order of the universe?
42968	Or will he return to an earlier stage of development?
42968	Phylogeny has to answer the much more obscure and difficult question:"What is the origin of the different organic species of plants and animals?"
42968	That gave us the solution of the great philosophic problem:"How can purposive contrivances be produced by purely mechanical processes without design?"
42968	What are the causes and the manner of this evolution?
42968	What is its relation to the"mind"?
42968	What is the difference between"intellect"and"reason"?
42968	What is the difference between"sensation"and"sentiment"?
42968	What is the inner meaning of"consciousness"?
42968	What is the meaning of"free will"?
42968	What is the relation between all these"psychic phenomena"and the"body"?
42968	What is the relation of modern Christianity to this vast and unparalleled progress of science?
42968	What is the relation of the ovum and the layers which arise from it to the tissues and cells which compose the fully developed organism?
42968	What is the true nature of"emotion"?
42968	What is the value of the immense progress which the passing nineteenth century has made in the knowledge of nature?
42968	What is"instinct"?
42968	What is"presentation"?
42968	What progress have we really made during its course towards that immeasurably distant goal?
42968	What stage in the attainment of truth have we actually arrived at in this closing year of the nineteenth century?
42968	What would Frederick the Great, the"crowned thanatist and atheist,"say, could he compare his monistic views with those of his successor of to- day?
42968	What, really, is the"soul"?
42968	Will the feeble, childish old man, who has filled the world with the fame of his deeds in the ripeness of his age, live forever in mental decay?
42968	Will the talented youth who has fallen in the wholesale murder of war unfold his rich, unused mental powers in Walhalla?
42968	Will truth e''er be delivered if ye your forces rend?"
4723	And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error?
4723	And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?
4723	Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy?
4723	BUT DO NOT YOU YOURSELF PERCEIVE OR THINK OF THEM ALL THE WHILE?
4723	But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction?
4723	But secondly, though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be?
4723	But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material SUBSTRATUM or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities?
4723	But, since one idea can not be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion?
4723	But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter?
4723	Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind?
4723	For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others?
4723	For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?
4723	For, what are the fore- mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense?
4723	If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together?
4723	May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a GOOD THING, though we have not an idea of what it is?
4723	Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken?
4723	What must we think of Moses''rod?
4723	What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies?
4723	What therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars?
4723	What therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion?
4723	Why does not an empty case serve as well as another?
4723	Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner?
4723	and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?
4723	and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception?
4723	and what do we PERCEIVE BESIDES OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS?
4723	was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators?
4723	what if I can not assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word?
26893	And he said unto them, Why have you saved the women and the children? 26893 How do you know?"
26893	What next is going to happen?
26893	When then,said Socrates, in the_ Phædo_,"does the soul light on the truth?
26893	: the intelligent Will of Man, determined to govern his own house, and responsible for results?
26893	Again I ask,"Is it not worth while?"
26893	And is this a"Study in Psychology"?
26893	And what has this to do with America?
26893	And what is all this but a lesson in practical psychology, the growth of the soul?
26893	And who_ constrains_ us but_ ourselves_?
26893	Can God and Nature be so prodigal, noting even the sparrows fall, and yet disregard the children of men?
26893	Can it be that there is no great truth back of all these struggles and aspirations of the human soul?
26893	Can the reader imagine such a degree of_ Self- Control_?
26893	Can you wonder that the real science of the Human Soul found little recognition, or that it was denied as possible to man?
26893	Can you wonder why so few"understand Browning"?
26893	Could many an English judge say the same?"
26893	Did Jesus of Nazareth differ in kind or in_ Degree_, from the rest of Humanity?
26893	Did it pay?
26893	Do not the principles that adhere in atom, molecule and mass, still hold in worlds and solar systems?
26893	Does it elevate or degrade him?
26893	Does it pay?
26893	How do you know anything, except as you see, or experience it?
26893	If man were built upon some other scheme or plan than the rest of nature, how could he apprehend or adjust himself to Nature?
26893	If this be true, and it is readily demonstrable, what subject is of equal importance; and what facts and considerations are so transcendent as these?
26893	Is Tantalus, after all, the creator and Father of Man?
26893	Is it not plain, therefore, how impossible it is to separate the Individual and the Social status?
26893	Is it not purely a question of_ fact_, and of scientific demonstration, to be determined by experiment?
26893	Is it not through personal experience?
26893	Is it not_ worth while_?
26893	Is it worth while?
26893	Is it_ worth while_?
26893	Is not this precisely what is meant by"The Reign of Law"?
26893	Is there not something after all in the_ Measure of Values_, and in the inexorable_ Law of Use_?
26893	It is awareness of an idea, percept, concept, or act awakened, called to attention by another, with the question, how does it strike you?
26893	It may be well to reflect a moment, and ask ourselves, how it is that we really know anything?
26893	May not the Individual Intelligence on the physical plane communicate with the denizens of the spiritual plane_ at his own volition, independently_?
26893	One further consideration remains to be noted at this time, as the question is sure to arise:"How about woman in the Great Work?"
26893	Put the question,"does it pay?"
26893	Shall we ever meet them again?
26893	Start almost any subject, propose almost any scheme, adventure, or investment, and the question is asked,"Will it pay?"
26893	That there is no possible realization back of these soulful endeavors?
26893	The Measure of Values, and the Law of Use_ hold everywhere_, in every department of human life; and the question,"Does it pay?"
26893	The aim and the results along these lines are often good and helpful; then why clothe them in the garb of absurdities?
26893	The foregoing quotations have been made from a little volume,"India: What Can It Teach Us?"
26893	The question is continually asked,"Why do the Masters of Wisdom Conceal their Knowledge?"
26893	The question is no longer,"What think ye of Jesus?"
26893	What are the_ facts_?
26893	What do they reveal and signify?
26893	What is this but the_ methods_ of Natural Science applied to Psychical Science upon the basis of the Unity of Natural Phenomena and Universal Law?
26893	What will become of us when we die?
26893	What will the new religion-- the new revelation-- be?
26893	What would I have my readers do?
26893	When asked by the average intelligence,"What does it all mean?"
26893	Where are they?
26893	Who can tell?
26893	Will it_ pay_?
26893	Will the day darken, the Light be quenched?
26893	With Psychology?
26893	With the Measure of Values?
26893	Would not Jesus become, indeed and in truth, a_ Living Example_, in place of a"Blood Offering"?
26893	_ And why not?_ If man can conceive it, why may he not_ realize_ it?
26893	_ And why not?_ If man can conceive it, why may he not_ realize_ it?
26893	_ Does it pay?_ It all depends on_ use_.
26893	_ Of what use to man_, measured by these scientific standards of value, are Popery and Priestcraft?
26893	and whence will it come?
26893	but"What_ know_ ye of your own soul?"
26893	inspired only by love of disappointment, defeat, and despair, in his children?
26893	or,"Does the real man ever die at all?"
26893	what do you think of it?
26893	what, if anything, do you wish, or propose to do about it?
16307	Ages ago, a lady there, At the farthest window facing the East Asked, Who rides by with the royal air?
16307	And is the man that is to be still far in the distance?
16307	And is there any absolute right?
16307	And we may venture to ask also-- Who started this movement in which we are all involved?
16307	And what more convincing evidence of the spiritual nature of man could be desired than that he asks such questions?
16307	Are all ideas concerning spiritual ministry delusions?
16307	Are all reverent, earnest, cheerful, optimistic?
16307	Are not some born moral cripples as others are born with physical deformities?
16307	Are not some spiritually deaf, dumb, and blind from birth?
16307	Are not such persons conscientious?
16307	Are temptation, sin, sorrow, and even death, angels of God sent forth to minister to the perfection of man?
16307	Are the hindrances in the path of the soul without any ministry?
16307	Are there any clearly defined paths by which this knowledge may be reached?
16307	Are they perfecting souls which at last are to be laid away with the bodies which were fortunate enough to win an earlier death?
16307	Are they taught as a duty in the Scriptures?
16307	Are they two experiences?
16307	Are we in the midst of a process of evolution?
16307	Are we now thinking of immensities, eternities, and the cosmic process?
16307	Are we thinking of Jehovah the God of Israel?
16307	But has no clearer voice spoken?
16307	But how do I know?
16307	But how is it to be taught to appreciate that one voice only in all that confusion of strange sounds should be heeded, and all the rest disregarded?
16307	But how shall it discern the morally excellent?
16307	But what efficacy will prayers for the dead have?
16307	But what then shall be said of heredity?
16307	But when we have ascended to such a height what does the word Father mean?
16307	But who ever bore the griefs of another before he himself had felt sadness?
16307	But why did He appear at all after death?
16307	By mother- love?
16307	Can we be sure that no malign spiritual influences hinder and bewilder?
16307	Did John Bunyan truly picture the ascent of the soul?
16307	Do love and mutual helpfulness prevail?
16307	Do the members of the family live as if God were a near and blessed reality, and right and duty were more sacred than life?
16307	Does any light from Jesus penetrate the mystery of death?
16307	Does its path, of necessity, lead through the Slough of Despond, through Vanity Fair, by Castle Dangerous, and into the realm of Giant Despair?
16307	Does the death of the body do anything more than change the mode of the spirit''s existence?
16307	Does this teaching seem mystical and fanciful?
16307	Given the spiritual being, what are the stages through which he will pass on his way to the goal toward which he is surely pressing?
16307	Has our idea expanded so as to include all the nations?
16307	Has the horizon been lifted to take in heavenly heights?
16307	Have they had a fair chance?
16307	How can our systems of education be justified, if the soul is perfected only to be destroyed?
16307	How can we say then that any are free?
16307	How could it be otherwise, since its being is derived from Him?
16307	How could it have been otherwise?
16307	How does the soul become adjusted to the moral order?
16307	How has this epoch in the ascent of the soul been treated in literature?
16307	How may it be adjusted to this knowledge?
16307	How may prayers for the dead be justified?
16307	How may sorrow, suffering, and even moral evil be made ministers of an upward movement?
16307	How shall the bitter injustice which is frequently found on the earth be explained?
16307	How shall we explain the singular devotion of Monica to Augustine?
16307	How, then, does it learn what truth and right are?
16307	IS DEATH THE END?
16307	If His teaching is true, is it not as reasonable to try to serve those of our loved ones who are out of the body as those who are in the body?
16307	If one asks for proof that the spirit persists, the only reply must be a Socratic one-- Can you prove that it is vitally connected with the body?
16307	If prayer helps any one, why not those who have passed from our sight?
16307	If that were true, how could we account for the enormous waste in discipline and culture, in education and affection?
16307	If we are thus helped why should we presume that they may not also, by such sweet hours, be strengthened for their duties?
16307	In other words, is not the fact that we are spirits all the proof that we need to have of the Father of Spirits?
16307	In the meantime let us ask, What aid does the soul need in its passage through its life on the earth?
16307	Indeed, may it not be assumed that physical differences are but expressions of still more clearly marked differences in spirits?
16307	Is Jesus Christ the brightness of the Father''s glory?
16307	Is Jesus the unique revelation of the divine?
16307	Is evolution alone a sufficient guarantee that it will some time reach its goal?
16307	Is he correct?
16307	Is it an end or a beginning?
16307	Is it difficult to select the one phrase of all human utterances which has exerted the largest influence in ameliorating the human condition?
16307	Is it from man himself?
16307	Is it necessary that any should fall in order that they may rise?
16307	Is it possible to believe that the man was less enduring than his work?
16307	Is not a single ray of light all the evidence which any one needs of the reality of the sun?
16307	Is not the presence of one spiritual being a demonstration of a greater Spirit somewhere?
16307	Is not truth a matter of education?
16307	Is that ethereal something which we call soul simply the result of the organization of atoms?
16307	Is the death of the body the end of the spirit?
16307	Is the old doctrine of Guardian Angels true?
16307	Is there no way by which a soul may be brought to the knowledge of God except by bitter trials?
16307	Is this all?
16307	Is this answer rejected as fanciful or superstitious?
16307	Is this environment of evil necessary to the development of the soul?
16307	Jesus has responded to the essential questions: For what have we been created?
16307	Job''s question,"If a man die shall he live again?"
16307	Just here we should ask, What do we mean by the soul?
16307	May those who have realized this experience help others to attain to it so that the process may be hastened and made easier?
16307	Must one pass through hell and purgatory before he may enjoy the"beatific vision?"
16307	No freedom?
16307	Of its enormity I have already spoken; but what about its origin, its uses, and its continuance?
16307	Of what value, then, is conscience?
16307	On what do we base our faith that the soul exists after death?
16307	One individual may help another to acquire other knowledge,--must it make an exception of things spiritual?
16307	Or is the body like a house in which a spiritual tenant dwells?
16307	Or that they are moral failures?
16307	Or, if we have not sufficient material for a positive statement, is there enough to make a strong affirmation of probability?
16307	Other teachers have tried to answer the inquiry, Does God exist?
16307	Shall it choose simply to exist?
16307	Shall it yield to the limitations and solicitations of the body?
16307	Should they be blamed or pitied?
16307	So we stand before the future, and ask, Toward what goal are all this education, experience and discipline tending?
16307	That many, or most, of these men have been essentially and totally bad?
16307	The call of his destiny finds every man, and, when he hears it, he asks: How may I reach that goal?
16307	The practical question, therefore, for all in this human world is not, are there spiritual laws?
16307	Then how shall we account for the imagination which is capable of giving birth to such magnificent dreams?
16307	Then what is conscience?
16307	Then, suddenly and swiftly, come the questions, Although my friend is called dead is he any less alive than when he was in the body?
16307	This answer only pushes the question one stage further back, and leaves us still inquiring, Where do the souls of men originally come from?
16307	Thus hope is born, and he who one moment cries, Who shall deliver from this body of death?
16307	VII_ THE PLACE OF JESUS CHRIST_ In the ascent of the soul do light and power come to its assistance from outside and from above?
16307	Was it the study of Plato?
16307	Well, then, whence does the soul come?
16307	What are some of these hindrances?
16307	What are the agencies which have most to do with promoting the ascent of the soul?
16307	What are the causes of this re- awakening?
16307	What are the qualities of the character of Christ?
16307	What art thou then?
16307	What awakens the soul?
16307	What caused it?
16307	What caused the revolution in the character of Augustine by which the sensualist became a saint?
16307	What do such facts signify?
16307	What has made the average of human life so much longer than it was formerly?
16307	What has occurred?
16307	What if it does?
16307	What is death?
16307	What is life?
16307	What is meant by prayers for the dead?
16307	What is our true home?
16307	What is the difference between the awakening of the soul and its re- awakening?
16307	What is the goal of personality?
16307	What is the teaching of the New Testament concerning this subject?
16307	What light does Jesus shed upon this mystery?
16307	What purpose does it serve?
16307	What shall be said of these facts which are so numerous and so evident as to make an effort at classification and explanation imperative?
16307	What shall it now do for itself?
16307	What shall one generation do for those which are to come after it?
16307	What shall the soul do for itself in order that it may promote its own growth?
16307	What shall we say of these confusing conditions?
16307	What should be the attitude of the soul in view of the hindrances by which it is environed?
16307	What will the re- awakened soul do?
16307	Whence came the soul?
16307	Whence did it come?
16307	Whence does this eagerness come?
16307	Whence is it?
16307	Where did this conviction originate?
16307	Which is the greater mystery, life or death?
16307	Who can exaggerate the delight and benefit of such an exercise?
16307	Who can govern the thinking of another?
16307	Who has been able exhaustively to delineate the soul''s humiliation?
16307	Who is not surprised every day at what he finds within himself?
16307	Who shall answer our questions?
16307	Who shall explore the contents of that great phrase?
16307	Whom shall we admire?
16307	Why are such ministries needed?
16307	Why are they allowed?
16307	Why are we so slow in learning that conscience, being divine, is authoritative and may be trusted?
16307	Why could not the ascent of the spirit be along an easier pathway?
16307	Why do men live in houses with scientific plumbing, fresh air, and have well- cooked food?
16307	Why is it?
16307	Why need sorrow, suffering, sin, and death invade the fair realm into which man has been born?
16307	Why not follow its suggestions at once and press on toward that fair land of truth and beauty which so earnestly invites?
16307	Why should it be necessary to write its history in tears and blood?
16307	Why should we say that what we call death, alone of all the changes through which we pass, leads to that which is unchangeable?
16307	Will not all that constituted his personality continue to grow in the future as in the past?
16307	Will their children have?
16307	Would a figure of clay ask whether it were the abode of a higher order of being?
16307	Yet they perform acts which are in themselves wrong?
16307	and what purpose do they serve?
16307	but, may we choose for ourselves whether we will obey or disobey them?
16307	or are they fiends which, in some foul way, have invaded the otherwise fair regions in which we dwell?
16307	or different phases of the same experience?
16307	or the prayers of Monica?
16307	or the preaching of Ambrose?
16307	or, shall it seek to prepare itself by discipline, and the cultivation of right choices, for the goal whose intimations it has heard?
16307	why not?
1636	''But did I call this"love"?
1636	Am I not right, Phaedrus?
1636	Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus?
1636	And are not they held to be the wisest physicians who have the greatest distrust of their art?
1636	And do you tell me, instead, what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law court-- are they not contending?
1636	And if I am to add the praises of the non- lover what will become of me?
1636	And if he came to his right mind, would he ever imagine that the desires were good which he conceived when in his wrong mind?
1636	And now, dear Phaedrus, I shall pause for an instant to ask whether you do not think me, as I appear to myself, inspired?
1636	And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine that I am going to improve upon the ingenuity of Lysias?
1636	And what is good or bad writing or speaking?
1636	But I should like to know whether you have the same feeling as I have about the rhetoricians?
1636	But how much is left?
1636	But if I am to read, where would you please to sit?
1636	But if this be true, must not the soul be the self- moving, and therefore of necessity unbegotten and immortal?
1636	But let me ask you, friend: have we not reached the plane- tree to which you were conducting us?
1636	But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthily?
1636	But what do you mean?
1636	But what pleasure or consolation can the beloved be receiving all this time?
1636	But why did you make your second oration so much finer than the first?
1636	But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech?
1636	Can I be wrong in supposing that Lysias gave you a feast of discourse?
1636	Can we suppose''the young man to have told such lies''about his master while he was still alive?
1636	Can we wonder that few of them''come sweetly from nature,''while ten thousand reviewers( mala murioi) are engaged in dissecting them?
1636	Do we see as clearly as Hippocrates''that the nature of the body can only be understood as a whole''?
1636	Do you ever cross the border?
1636	Do you not perceive that I am already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me?
1636	Do you think that a lover only can be a firm friend?
1636	Do you?
1636	Does he not define probability to be that which the many think?
1636	For do we not often make''the worse appear the better cause;''and do not''both parties sometimes agree to tell lies''?
1636	For example, are we to attribute his tripartite division of the soul to the gods?
1636	For example, when he is speaking of the soul does he mean the human or the divine soul?
1636	For lovers repent--''SOCRATES: Enough:--Now, shall I point out the rhetorical error of those words?
1636	For this is a necessary preliminary to the other question-- How is the non- lover to be distinguished from the lover?
1636	For what should a man live if not for the pleasures of discourse?
1636	How could there have been so much cultivation, so much diligence in writing, and so little mind or real creative power?
1636	Is he serious, again, in regarding love as''a madness''?
1636	Is not all literature passing into criticism, just as Athenian literature in the age of Plato was degenerating into sophistry and rhetoric?
1636	Is not legislation too a sort of literary effort, and might not statesmanship be described as the''art of enchanting''the house?
1636	Is not pleading''an art of speaking unconnected with the truth''?
1636	Is not the discourse excellent, more especially in the matter of the language?
1636	Is there any principle in them?
1636	Lysias then, I suppose, was in the town?
1636	May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry.--Anything more?
1636	Might he not argue,''that a rational being should not follow the dictates of passion in the most important act of his or her life''?
1636	Might he not ask, whether we''care more for the truth of religion, or for the speaker and the country from which the truth comes''?
1636	Nor, until they adopt our method of reading and writing, can we admit that they write by rules of art?
1636	Now I have no leisure for such enquiries; shall I tell you why?
1636	Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non- lover?
1636	Now what is that sort of thing but a regular piece of authorship?
1636	Now, Socrates, what do you think?
1636	Of the world which is beyond the heavens, who can tell?
1636	Or is he serious in holding that each soul bears the character of a god?
1636	Or is this merely assigned to them by way of parallelism with men?
1636	Or that Isocrates himself is the enemy of Plato and his school?
1636	Or, again, in his absurd derivation of mantike and oionistike and imeros( compare Cratylus)?
1636	PHAEDRUS: About what conclusion?
1636	PHAEDRUS: And is this the exact spot?
1636	PHAEDRUS: And what are these arguments, Socrates?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Do you see the tallest plane- tree in the distance?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Had not Protagoras something of the same sort?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How so?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How so?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How so?
1636	PHAEDRUS: I have never noticed it; but I beseech you to tell me, Socrates, do you believe this tale?
1636	PHAEDRUS: I think that I understand you; but will you explain yourself?
1636	PHAEDRUS: In what direction then?
1636	PHAEDRUS: In what way?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Isocrates the fair:--What message will you send to him, and how shall we describe him?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Need we?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Not yet, Socrates; not until the heat of the day has passed; do you not see that the hour is almost noon?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Show what?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Then why are you still at your tricks?
1636	PHAEDRUS: There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What are they?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What do you mean, my good Socrates?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What error?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What gifts do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What is our method?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What is the other principle, Socrates?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What is there remarkable in the epitaph?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What name would you assign to them?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What of that?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What shall we say to him?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What would you prophesy?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Who are they, and where did you hear anything better than this?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Whom do you mean, and what is his origin?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Will you go on?
1636	PHAEDRUS: You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image?
1636	SOCRATES: About the just and unjust-- that is the matter in dispute?
1636	SOCRATES: And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honourable has less understanding, than the husbandman, about his own seeds?
1636	SOCRATES: And do you think that you can know the nature of the soul intelligently without knowing the nature of the whole?
1636	SOCRATES: And how did he entertain you?
1636	SOCRATES: And when he speaks in the assembly, he will make the same things seem good to the city at one time, and at another time the reverse of good?
1636	SOCRATES: And when men are deceived and their notions are at variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through resemblances?
1636	SOCRATES: And will not Sophocles say to the display of the would- be tragedian, that this is not tragedy but the preliminaries of tragedy?
1636	SOCRATES: And will you go on with the narration?
1636	SOCRATES: And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at once?
1636	SOCRATES: But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves?
1636	SOCRATES: Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias?
1636	SOCRATES: Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God?
1636	SOCRATES: Do you mean that I am not in earnest?
1636	SOCRATES: Does not your simplicity observe that I have got out of dithyrambics into heroics, when only uttering a censure on the lover?
1636	SOCRATES: He, then, who would deceive others, and not be deceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences of things?
1636	SOCRATES: I have now said all that I have to say of the art of rhetoric: have you anything to add?
1636	SOCRATES: In good speaking should not the mind of the speaker know the truth of the matter about which he is going to speak?
1636	SOCRATES: In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?
1636	SOCRATES: It was foolish, I say,--to a certain extent, impious; can anything be more dreadful?
1636	SOCRATES: Let me put the matter thus: When will there be more chance of deception-- when the difference is large or small?
1636	SOCRATES: May not''the wolf,''as the proverb says,''claim a hearing''?
1636	SOCRATES: My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither are you going?
1636	SOCRATES: Now to which class does love belong-- to the debatable or to the undisputed class?
1636	SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I will do?
1636	SOCRATES: Shall we discuss the rules of writing and speech as we were proposing?
1636	SOCRATES: Should we not offer up a prayer first of all to the local deities?
1636	SOCRATES: Then as to the other topics-- are they not thrown down anyhow?
1636	SOCRATES: Then do you think that any one of this class, however ill- disposed, would reproach Lysias with being an author?
1636	SOCRATES: Then in some things we agree, but not in others?
1636	SOCRATES: Well, and is not Eros the son of Aphrodite, and a god?
1636	SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1636	SOCRATES: When any one speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all?
1636	SOCRATES: Who is he?
1636	SOCRATES: Why, do you not know that when a politician writes, he begins with the names of his approvers?
1636	Shall we say a word to him or not?
1636	Socrates as yet does not know himself; and why should he care to know about unearthly monsters?
1636	Then again in the noble art of politics, who thinks of first principles and of true ideas?
1636	These are the commonplaces of the subject which must come in( for what else is there to be said?)
1636	Was he equally serious in the rest?
1636	We may raise the same question in another form: Is marriage preferable with or without love?
1636	Well, the teacher will say, is this, Phaedrus and Socrates, your account of the so- called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another?
1636	What would Socrates think of our newspapers, of our theology?
1636	What would he have said of the discovery of Christian doctrines in these old Greek legends?
1636	What would he say of the Church, which we praise in like manner,''meaning ourselves,''without regard to history or experience?
1636	What would they say if they saw that we, like the many, are not conversing, but slumbering at mid- day, lulled by their voices, too indolent to think?
1636	While acknowledging that such interpretations are''very nice,''would he not have remarked that they are found in all sacred literatures?
1636	Who would imagine that Lysias, who is here assailed by Socrates, is the son of his old friend Cephalus?
1636	Who would suspect that the wise Critias, the virtuous Charmides, had ended their lives among the thirty tyrants?
1636	Who, for example, could speak on this thesis of yours without praising the discretion of the non- lover and blaming the indiscretion of the lover?
1636	Why did history degenerate into fable?
1636	Why did poetry droop and languish?
1636	Why did the physical sciences never arrive at any true knowledge or make any real progress?
1636	Why did words lose their power of expression?
1636	Why do I say so?
1636	Why do you not proceed?
1636	Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic?
1636	Why were ages of external greatness and magnificence attended by all the signs of decay in the human mind which are possible?
1636	Will he not choose a beloved who is delicate rather than sturdy and strong?
1636	Would he not have asked of us, or rather is he not asking of us, Whether we have ceased to prefer appearances to reality?
1636	Would they not have a right to laugh at us?
1636	Yes; but is not even a ridiculous friend better than a cunning enemy?
1636	and are they both equally self- moving and constructed on the same threefold principle?
1636	and will not Acumenus say the same of medicine to the would- be physician?
1636	or, whether the''select wise''are not''the many''after all?
40520	Ah, Mr. Charliewood, how do you do?
40520	And about the wine, sir?
40520	And at the other end?
40520	And do you know,Charliewood replied,"that I''m probably the most intimate friend William Gouldesbrough has in the world?"
40520	And now, which of you will submit himself to the next experiment?
40520	And now?
40520	And the letter?
40520	And then, Sir William?
40520	And then?
40520	And what is your idea?
40520	And when we''ve got him?
40520	And your dream?
40520	Another of your beastly experiments? 40520 Are you going to give us some tea?
40520	But how, why, what for?
40520	But why?
40520	Could it be,he asked himself,"could it possibly be that these people suspected or knew anything?"
40520	Do you know that I have n''t heard from you or seen you for nearly four days? 40520 Do you know who that is?"
40520	Do you really?
40520	Exactly,he said,"and in what way?
40520	Forget?
40520	Four days, is it?
40520	Had n''t you anything on to- night, then?
40520	Has he discovered anything, then?
40520	Have n''t you done almost everything for me? 40520 Have you been playing some infernal trick on me, Gouldesbrough?"
40520	Have you done what mother said in jest? 40520 Have you had any trouble, physical trouble I mean, with the subject?"
40520	Have you told him everything? 40520 Have you told him, William?"
40520	How are you, dearest?
40520	How do you do, Sir William? 40520 How do you do?"
40520	How do you mean?
40520	How do you mean?
40520	How grows?
40520	How is the man, in good health?
40520	How?
40520	I have n''t offended you?
40520	I say, Charlie,he said,"I''m going to motor down to Richmond this afternoon, just to get an appetite for dinner; will you come?"
40520	I suppose,Charliewood answered,"that there is no difficulty for you in getting to know anybody you want to?"
40520	I suppose,Gouldesbrough said with some slight hesitation,"you''ve gathered a good deal of the fellow''s opinions, memories, etc., lately?"
40520	In the course of my experiments I began more and more frequently to ask myself,''What is the exact nature of thought?'' 40520 Is Proctor disengaged?"
40520	Is it so marvellous as all that?
40520	It''s all over then?
40520	Know him?
40520	Meanwhile, my lord, I wonder if you would give Sir Harold Oliver a slight technical outline of my processes? 40520 Mr. Charliewood, sir?"
40520	My dear sir, how could I forget? 40520 My lord, will not you afford me the great privilege of being the first subject of the new experiment?"
40520	No; who is he?
40520	No; why?
40520	Now that Lord Malvin has told us so much, Sir William,he said,"wo n''t you tell us some more?
40520	Of course as yet,Gouldesbrough went on in calm, even tones,"the subject has not the slightest idea what the experiments mean?
40520	Oh yes, of course; he was engaged to the girl who chucked him over for the Johnny who has disappeared, was n''t he?
40520	Oh, tell me,she said,"what in life can be so strange, so terrible in its effects as this you speak of?"
40520	Quite well, my dear?
40520	She does not look much like a girl who is engaged to the most successful man of the day, does she?
40520	Sir,he said,"I am not afraid to display my thoughts to this company, but shall I be the first person who has ever done so?
40520	So Gouldesbrough has not yet come?
40520	So the matter rests there?
40520	The letter to Miss Poole?
40520	Then the series of experiments is complete?
40520	Then what do you propose, Guest?
40520	Then what does this mean?
40520	Then-- what-- then-- why? 40520 Then----?"
40520	Therefore?
40520	To see William?
40520	WILL YOU WALK INTO MY PARLOUR?
40520	Well then?
40520	Well, and how are you, William?
40520	Well, my dear Rathbone, how are you?
40520	Well, well,he said,"what is it now?
40520	Well, what is it?
40520	Well, what were you going to ask me to do?
40520	What are these devils doing to me?
40520	What are these fiends doing to me? 40520 What did he say?"
40520	What did you wire to me for?
40520	What do you mean?
40520	What do you want me to do now?
40520	What have you been doing, William?
40520	What is it? 40520 What is it?"
40520	What the deuce are you up to now, Gouldesbrough?
40520	What was it?
40520	What''s the man''s name?
40520	What''s the matter?
40520	Who is it addressed to?
40520	Why do n''t you have a try yourself, Sir William,he said, with a not very friendly grin;"or wo n''t what d''you call''em work for its master?
40520	Why, is n''t it the last condition of our experiments that we should have some one a slave, a dead man to the world, to use as we shall think fit? 40520 Why,"she said, in a whisper,"what do you mean, Billy?"
40520	Will you excuse me for a moment,he said to everybody there,"if I leave you in darkness again, until the man comes?
40520	Will you give Marjorie the enclosed little note of farewell? 40520 Will you go straight on to the study, sir?"
40520	Will you take me up to the fourth floor, please,he said,"to Mr. Eustace Charliewood''s room?"
40520	Yes?
40520	You do feel that, do you, dear?
40520	You do n''t really feel that, Charliewood?
40520	You know what LIGHT is? 40520 You think so?"
40520	You want to hear, dearest,he said,"you want to hear?
40520	''What?''
40520	A gentleman in ideas, as well as in position, clean living and all that?''
40520	About Rathbone you mean?"
40520	And did n''t I give you a drink just now?
40520	And how had the star of the morning fallen?
40520	And how is the electricity going?
40520	And now?
40520	And to whom would I rather tell my news?
40520	And what?
40520	And you really mean that you can be friends with me?"
40520	Are n''t I your best friend?
40520	Are we not all subject to the laws of destiny, the laws of chance?
40520	Are you ready?
40520	Are you strong enough?
40520	At whose feet would I rather lay the results of all I am and have done?
40520	But I would ask you, very, very earnestly, if you desire that the thoughts that animate me at this moment should be given to every one here?"
40520	But after that, will you let me take you in to have some supper?
40520	But difficulties were made to be overcome, were n''t they?
40520	But has it not occurred to you that we are close to the Regent''s Canal?
40520	But how can it be done?
40520	But how did you know?"
40520	But still, what is it?"
40520	But what answer did Marjorie make when you said all this to her?"
40520	But what did she say?"
40520	But what does it matter in such a time as this?"
40520	But what is it, after all?
40520	But what was it?
40520	But why had she come to see him?
40520	But why should I care?
40520	But you have really_ done_ this, Sir William?
40520	But, if the man is what I feel he is-- not man, but devil-- would he not have tortured me in another way before now?
40520	But,_ not until we''ve done with him, shall he_?"
40520	CHAPTER VI"WILL YOU WALK INTO MY PARLOUR?"
40520	Ca n''t Miss Marjorie make up her mind?
40520	Charliewood lived fairly well, and everybody said,"How on earth does he manage it?"
40520	Charliewood?"
40520	Charming, is n''t it?
40520	Could n''t you have your machine taken down to Capel Court?
40520	Could that be managed?"
40520	Dear, dare you fight through this for me?
40520	Do n''t I bring you your food every day?
40520	Do you know anything of the human mind?
40520	Do you know what I should like to do more than anything else, Eustace?''
40520	Do you think that I should have allowed that, Marjorie?
40520	Guy Rathbone, barrister- at- law, and what her thoughts were, who can say?
40520	Had any girl a real excuse for making a man like William Gouldesbrough unhappy?
40520	Have you indeed finally conquered the air?"
40520	He does n''t know why you fit on the receiver?
40520	He is quite in the dark?"
40520	He never said anything, of course, or left anything behind him?"
40520	How could you think it of me?"
40520	How did this bear upon the situation?
40520	How did this sinister and devilish gaoler know his intimate thoughts?
40520	How had this thing come into Sir William''s possession?
40520	How is a brain, not physically touching another brain, able to influence it?"
40520	How is your work going?"
40520	How was it that Lord Malvin and Sir William Gouldesbrough seemed to be in the twin positions of accuser and accused?
40520	I do n''t think you will want anything more to- night, will you?
40520	I do n''t want to pry into your private affairs-- I never did, did I?--but I presume something has gone wrong with your matrimonial affairs again?
40520	I suppose we''ve been running round a vicious circle and we''ve come to the last lap?"
40520	I suppose you can manage a little dinner here?"
40520	I suppose you have seen that Eustace Charliewood killed himself?"
40520	I suppose you know that all the world is waiting for a pronouncement?"
40520	I was fond of her, deeply fond of her; what man would not be?
40520	I''m right, am I not?
40520	Is he a decent sort of man?
40520	Is it impossible to touch you or move you in any way?"
40520	It surely would have been safer for him to have murdered me in this secret place, and buried me beneath the stone flags here?
40520	It was all so unusual, so unexpected-- why did this strange prophetic note come into the proceedings?
40520	Just watch him, poor wretch; does n''t he look pipped?"
40520	Megbie?"
40520	Now tell me, do n''t I?"
40520	Now then, Jones, what do you really think about the fall in South Africans?
40520	Now, may I ask you-- you will excuse an old man''s impatience-- may I ask you if you have finally succeeded?
40520	Oh, Mr. Rathbone, how could you say such cruel things to your good friend, Mr. Wilson Guest?
40520	Or was it rather instinct with a present meaning?
40520	Pity?
40520	Pity?
40520	Shall I go down- stairs and kill him?"
40520	Shall we say a little_ bisque_ for the soup?
40520	Shall you have penny- in- the- slot machines on all the stations of the Twopenny Tube?
40520	She put her hand upon the shining coil of hair and said--"Dear, do you think that you could bear to see him?"
40520	She was the sort of girl of whom people asked,"Who is she?"
40520	Should I be right in admitting the gentleman?"
40520	Shows one never knows, does n''t it, Marjorie?"
40520	That is right, is n''t it?"
40520	Then when, how and where did he make away with himself?
40520	There have been so many engagements, and I''m sure you have been entirely happy with the electricity, have n''t you?
40520	Was he alive?
40520	Was it not thus that Lucifer himself had spoken in Milton''s mighty poem?
40520	Was it_ right_?
40520	Was that little shining toy on the table a message from the past?
40520	What about Rathbone?
40520	What are you doing, William?"
40520	What are you trying to say to me about poor Guy Rathbone?
40520	What are you working at now?
40520	What communication had Gouldesbrough had with Guy Rathbone?
40520	What did that mean?
40520	What did you wire to me for?"
40520	What happened every day, sometimes two or three times a day?
40520	What is it?
40520	What is it?
40520	What is it?"
40520	What is it?"
40520	What is that?"
40520	What is the_ practical_ outcome of all this, this theoretical fact?"
40520	What should you say hypnotism was, for instance, in ordinary words?"
40520	What strange and secret duel, they asked themselves, was going on before them?
40520	What was all this?
40520	What was hidden in the old man''s brain?
40520	What was this fearful message that the agonized Thing was so eager and so horribly impotent to deliver?
40520	What_ is_ being done to me?
40520	Where was he?
40520	Where, then, was Guy Rathbone?
40520	Who can say, who can tell?
40520	Who could say?
40520	Who could tell?
40520	Who shall blame Lady Poole?
40520	Why do n''t you invent a flying- machine?
40520	Why have you called me in to a consultation?"
40520	Why should the pale ghost of Eustace Charliewood come to trouble him now?
40520	Will they recover in the next two months?
40520	Will you forgive me?"
40520	Will you send my letters into the study?"
40520	William, what is it?
40520	William, why do you have that horrid man, Eustace Charliewood, here?
40520	Would it give you too much pain?"
40520	You are all right now?"
40520	You are not merely advancing along the road which may some day lead to it?"
40520	You are not merely hoping to do it some day?
40520	You know how that happens sometimes?"
40520	You know that it can be split up into its component parts by means of the prism in the spectroscope?"
40520	You''ve an ice- pail for the champagne, have n''t you, William?"
40520	_ Can it be that anything is being taken away?_"He bent his head upon his hands and groaned in agony.
40520	_ What_ was this horrible prison with all its strange contrivances, its inexplicable mysteries?
40520	are you brave enough?"
40520	he said,"so you have destroyed this horrid thing?"
40520	she cried,"What is it?
40520	was he dead?
40520	when, each day, I am fixed rigidly upon that couch, and the brass helmet is put upon my head, what is going on?
40520	why, indeed, did he have Charliewood for a friend?
4724	A creation of what?
4724	APPARENT call you them?
4724	After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind?
4724	After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done?
4724	Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?
4724	Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property of any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself?
4724	Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance?
4724	An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs, wheels, and motions, of that instrument?
4724	And I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas?
4724	And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?
4724	And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from eternity?
4724	And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?
4724	And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are affected with ideas?
4724	And can a line so situated be perceived by sight?
4724	And can an idea exist without being actually perceived?
4724	And can any sensation exist without the mind?
4724	And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception?
4724	And consequently under extension?
4724	And doth not MATTER, in the common current acceptation of the word, signify an extended, solid, moveable, unthinking, inactive Substance?
4724	And have not you acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen evident reason for denying the possibility of such a substance?
4724	And have they not then the same appearance of being distant?
4724	And have true and real colours inhering in them?
4724	And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that Spirit God?
4724	And how are WE concerned any farther?
4724	And how could that which was eternal be created in time?
4724	And how could this be, if the taste was something really inherent in the food?
4724	And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure?
4724	And is it not evident the thing supported is different from the thing supporting?
4724	And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some spirit of another kind?
4724	And is not God an agent, a being purely active?
4724	And is not all this most plain and evident?
4724	And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain?
4724	And is not this a plain contradiction?
4724	And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?
4724	And is not this highly, absurd?
4724	And is not this, think you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its defence?
4724	And is not this, think you, a sign that they are genuine, that they proceed from nature, and are conformable to right reason?
4724	And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our minds?
4724	And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than what causes uneasiness, a pleasure?
4724	And is there nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?
4724	And of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being perceived?
4724	And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?
4724	And the latter consists in motion?
4724	And the pain?
4724	And this action can not exist in, or belong to, any unthinking thing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may?
4724	And to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense: is it not?
4724	And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger?
4724	And to suppose this, is it not begging the question?
4724	And were not all things eternally in the mind of God?
4724	And what can withstand demonstration?
4724	And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension?
4724	And what is conceived is surely in the mind?
4724	And what is more known than that the same bodies appear differently coloured by candle- light from what they do in the open day?
4724	And what is perceivable but an idea?
4724	And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being?
4724	And what reason have you to think this unknown, this inconceivable Somewhat doth exist?
4724	And what will you conclude from all this?
4724	And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more?
4724	And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I can not say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its heat or weight?
4724	And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar see as much?
4724	And would not all the difference consist in a sound?
4724	And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you can not so much as conceive?
4724	And, SECONDLY, Whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of language?
4724	And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive immediately?
4724	And, hath it not been made evident that no SUCH substance can possibly exist?
4724	And, if Matter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, may it not be thought with good grounds absolutely impossible?
4724	And, if you think so, pray how do you account for the origin of that primary idea or brain itself?
4724	And, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them?
4724	And, though it should be allowed to exist, yet how can that which is INACTIVE be a CAUSE; or that which is UNTHINKING be a CAUSE OF THOUGHT?
4724	And, with regard to these, I would fain know whether what hath been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them?
4724	Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings?
4724	Are not you too of opinion that we see all things in God?
4724	Are they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations?
4724	Are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other faculty?
4724	Are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately?
4724	Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some other Being?
4724	Are you not satisfied there is some peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your notions?
4724	Are you of the same mind?
4724	Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer think you he would make?
4724	Besides, allowing there are colours on external objects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive them?
4724	Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear as being in the same place?
4724	But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the creation more credible?
4724	But are not things imagined as truly IN THE MIND as things perceived?
4724	But are there no other things?
4724	But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world?
4724	But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?
4724	But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same place with extension and figures?
4724	But do you not think it looks very like a notion entertained by some eminent moderns, of SEEING ALL THINGS IN GOD?
4724	But does this latter fact ever happen?
4724	But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?
4724	But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit?
4724	But how can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible?
4724	But how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving substance?
4724	But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist without it?
4724	But is either of these smelling?
4724	But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses?
4724	But is it not the only proper genuine received sense?
4724	But is not MOTION a sensible quality?
4724	But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very great pain?
4724	But is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such external substances?
4724	But is there the like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy?
4724	But neither can this be called SMELLING: for, if it were, I should smell every time I breathed in that manner?
4724	But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?
4724	But what else is this than to play with words, and run into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason?
4724	But what if the same arguments which are brought against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these also?
4724	But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its existence?
4724	But what is this to the real tree or stone?
4724	But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of all sensible qualities, even extension itself?
4724	But what say you to PURE INTELLECT?
4724	But what say you to this?
4724	But what say you?
4724	But what think you of cold?
4724	But what would you infer from thence?
4724	But where are those mighty difficulties you insist on?
4724	But where is the revelation?
4724	But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be demonstrated between ideas?
4724	But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word?
4724	But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind?
4724	But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say, THERE IS NO HEAT IN THE FIRE?
4724	But, allowing that God is the supreme and universal Cause of an things, yet, may there not be still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas?
4724	But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind?
4724	But, do you in earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually perceived?
4724	But, doth it in like manner depend on YOUR will that in looking on this flower you perceive WHITE rather than any other colour?
4724	But, examine your own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I say?
4724	But, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word MOTION by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body?
4724	But, not to insist on that, have you not been allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased?
4724	But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it how we come by that belief?
4724	But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not be extended?
4724	But, though Matter may not be a cause, yet what hinders its being an INSTRUMENT, subservient to the supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?
4724	But, to make it still more plain: is not DISTANCE a line turned endwise to the eye?
4724	But, to say no more of that, are you sure then that sound is really nothing but motion?
4724	Can a real motion in any external body be at the same time very swift and very slow?
4724	Can a real thing, in itself INVISIBLE, be like a COLOUR; or a real thing, which is not AUDIBLE, be like a SOUND?
4724	Can a thing be spread without extension?
4724	Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an absurdity?
4724	Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet, or wormwood bitter?
4724	Can anything be clearer or better connected than this?
4724	Can anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects?
4724	Can anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into ideas?
4724	Can extended things be contained in that which is unextended?
4724	Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of different dimensions?
4724	Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an act of the will?
4724	Can there be a greater evidence of its truth?
4724	Can there be a pleasanter time of the day, or a more delightful season of the year?
4724	Can there be anything more extravagant than this?
4724	Can they account, by the laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course of things?
4724	Can this be paralleled in any art or science, any sect or profession of men?
4724	Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term SECONDARY?
4724	Can you expect I should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is?
4724	Can you imagine that I mean anything else?
4724	Can you then conceive it possible that they should exist in an unperceiving thing?
4724	Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect a degree as you?
4724	Consequently it is no action?
4724	Did they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you?
4724	Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of things-- the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal?
4724	Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?
4724	Do they ever represent a motion, or figure, as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities?
4724	Do they not measure areas round the sun ever proportioned to the times?
4724	Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off?
4724	Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?
4724	Do you imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of Matter, if there was no such thing?
4724	Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences?
4724	Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?
4724	Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their being in a mind?
4724	Do you not perfectly know your own ideas?
4724	Do you not?
4724	Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?
4724	Do you think, however, you shall persuade me that the natural philosophers have been dreaming all this while?
4724	Does not the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended?
4724	Does not this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?
4724	Doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it is not really inherent in the object?
4724	Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight?
4724	Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same thing?
4724	Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense degree?
4724	Doth the REALITY of sensible things consist in being perceived?
4724	Else how could anything be proved impossible?
4724	Even in rocks and deserts is there not an agreeable wildness?
4724	For what reason is there why you should call it Spirit?
4724	For, whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist out of the mind?
4724	HEAT then is a sensible thing?
4724	Hark; is not this the college bell?
4724	Has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting?
4724	Hath not everything you could say been heard and examined with all the fairness imaginable?
4724	Have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the figure and extension which they see and feel?
4724	Have they accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe?
4724	Have you already forgotten you were convinced; or are you willing I should repeat what has been said on that head?
4724	Have you anything to object against it?
4724	Have you not had the liberty of explaining yourself all manner of ways?
4724	Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without the mind?
4724	How can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really exists?
4724	How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pronounce me A SCEPTIC, because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence of Matter?
4724	How is that?
4724	How is this consistent either with common sense, or with what you just now granted?
4724	How many shapes is your Matter to take?
4724	How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing?
4724	How often must I inculcate the same thing?
4724	How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any one thing in the universe?
4724	How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?
4724	How should it be otherwise?
4724	How should those Principles be entertained that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare?
4724	How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?
4724	How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it can not in a material substance?
4724	How then can motion in general, or extension in general, exist in any corporeal substance?
4724	How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air, if by the AIR you mean a senseless substance existing without the mind?
4724	How then do you affirm that colours are in the light; since by LIGHT you understand a corporeal substance external to the mind?
4724	How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and constant?
4724	Howl Is there any thing perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived?
4724	Howl is light then a substance?
4724	I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained the idea of it?
4724	Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals insensible?
4724	If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable of harming them?
4724	If so, the word SUBSTRATUM should import that it is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents?
4724	If so, whence comes that disagreement?
4724	If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them?
4724	If there is no difference between them, how can this be accounted for?
4724	In a word have you not in every point been convinced out of your own mouth?
4724	In a word, can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea?
4724	In a word, may there not for all that be MATTER?
4724	In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I can not be said to hear the causes of those sounds?
4724	In the common sense of the word MATTER, is there any more implied than an extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind?
4724	In what sense, therefore, are we to understand those expressions?
4724	Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain?
4724	Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not?
4724	Is it come to that?
4724	Is it not a sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this GLOVE, that I see it, and feel it, and wear it?
4724	Is it not also active?
4724	Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God?
4724	Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at the same time both cold and warm?
4724	Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of CONCEIVING a thing which is UNCONCEIVED?
4724	Is it not certain I SEE THINGS at a distance?
4724	Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the doing those things only which can not be performed by the mere act of our wills?
4724	Is it not something sensible, as some degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each?
4724	Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term SUBSTRATUM, or SUBSTANCE?
4724	Is it not that it stands under accidents?
4724	Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds?
4724	Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of man?
4724	Is it not?
4724	Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point?
4724	Is it that which you see?
4724	Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature really hot?
4724	Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything nonsense and unintelligible?
4724	Is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance?
4724	Is not that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation?
4724	Is not the heat immediately perceived?
4724	Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given space?
4724	Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former?
4724	Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines?
4724	Is not this sufficient to denominate a man a SCEPTIC?
4724	Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?
4724	Is the mind extended or unextended?
4724	Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a microscope, or by the naked eye?
4724	Is there not something in the woods and groves, in the rivers and clear springs, that soothes, that delights, that transports the soul?
4724	Is this fair dealing?
4724	Is this reasonable, Hylas?
4724	Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed with sense and perception?
4724	It can not therefore be the subject of pain?
4724	It hath not therefore according to you, any REAL being?
4724	It is then immediately perceived?
4724	It is therefore itself unextended?
4724	It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct from extension?
4724	It seems then there are two sorts of sound-- the one vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical and real?
4724	It seems then, that by SENSIBLE THINGS you mean those only which can be perceived IMMEDIATELY by sense?
4724	It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?
4724	It should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory: should it not?
4724	KNOW?
4724	MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM call you it?
4724	May not abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty?
4724	May we not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas?
4724	May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the other forementioned qualities, that they can not exist in any but a perceiving substance or mind?
4724	Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of what?
4724	My glove for example?
4724	Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation?
4724	Nay, would it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes?
4724	No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of God?
4724	Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain?
4724	Odd, say you?
4724	Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells?
4724	Or do you imagine they have in themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour?
4724	Or have they any agency included in them?
4724	Or how is it possible these should be the effect of that?
4724	Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition?
4724	Or is there anything so barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common conversation?
4724	Or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you had offered, as best served your purpose?
4724	Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God, because there may be some particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it?
4724	Or, are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity?
4724	Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with the same smells which we perceive in them?
4724	Or, can you shew any example where an instrument is made use of in producing an effect IMMEDIATELY depending on the will of the agent?
4724	Or, directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun?
4724	Or, how often must it be proved not to exist, before you are content to part with it?
4724	Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones?
4724	Or, may those things properly be said to be SENSIBLE which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?
4724	Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or, in general of anything which is imperceptible, that a perceptible exists?
4724	Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?
4724	Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way?
4724	Pray are not the objects perceived by the SENSES of one, likewise perceivable to others present?
4724	Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them?
4724	Pray is not this arguing in a circle?
4724	Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you understand it in.--How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?
4724	Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter?
4724	Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of extension, from another?
4724	Pray what reasons have you not to believe it?
4724	Pray what think you of this?
4724	Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?
4724	Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers, extended?
4724	Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a SCEPTIC?
4724	Pray, Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you are now that it does not?
4724	Pray, by which of your senses came you acquainted with that being?
4724	Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, or made up of sensible qualities?
4724	Pray, what were those?
4724	Say you we can know nothing, Hylas?
4724	Secondly, whether you are informed, either by sense or reason, of the existence of those unknown originals?
4724	Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?
4724	Since therefore you have no IDEA of the mind of God, how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind?
4724	Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its EXISTENCE?
4724	Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?
4724	So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?
4724	So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is supposed to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension?
4724	Suppose you are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?
4724	Supposing you were annihilated, can not you conceive it possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist?
4724	Tell me now, whether SEEING consists in perceiving light and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?
4724	Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the current proper signification attached to a common name in any language?
4724	Tell me, Hylas, is it not as I say?
4724	Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, the idea of motion belongs?
4724	Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday''s meditation?
4724	That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you can not conceive?
4724	That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think you they are really in the gold?
4724	The mind therefore is to be accounted ACTIVE in its perceptions so far forth as VOLITION is included in them?
4724	The motion and situation of the planets, are they not admirable for use and order?
4724	The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal Substances existing without the mind?
4724	The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you?
4724	Then as to ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE; was there ever known a more jejune notion than that?
4724	Then as to SOUNDS, what must we think of them: are they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?
4724	Then for the Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, SUBSTRATUM, cause, instrument, or occasion?
4724	Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?
4724	They are then like external things?
4724	Think you the senses were bestowed upon all animals for their preservation and well- being in life?
4724	To be plain, can you expect this Scepticism of yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by all men of sense?
4724	To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in two cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?
4724	To suffer pain is an imperfection?
4724	To suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas?
4724	True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests something of OUTNESS OR DISTANCE?
4724	Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances?
4724	Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations?
4724	Was it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold was in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the other?
4724	Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things have a real existence; and that you are in truth an arrant sceptic?
4724	Well, but as to this decree of God''s, for making things perceptible, what say you, Philonous?
4724	Were any little slips in discourse laid hold and insisted on?
4724	Were those( miscalled ERRATIC) globes once known to stray, in their repeated journeys through the pathless void?
4724	What connexion is there between a motion in the nerves, and the sensations of sound or colour in the mind?
4724	What else think you I could mean?
4724	What mean you by Sensible Things?
4724	What mean you by the general nature or notion of INSTRUMENT?
4724	What mean you, Hylas, by the PHENOMENA?
4724	What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever?
4724	What object do you mean?
4724	What reason is there for that, Hylas?
4724	What say you to this?
4724	What say you to this?
4724	What say you to this?
4724	What shall we make then of the creation?
4724	What shall we say then of your external object; is it a material Substance, or no?
4724	What then?
4724	What things?
4724	What things?
4724	What think you of TASTES, do they exist without the mind, or no?
4724	What think you of those inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses?
4724	What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?
4724	What think you, therefore, of retaining the name MATTER, and applying it to SENSIBLE THINGS?
4724	What treatment, then, do those philosophers deserve, who would deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all REALITY?
4724	What tulip do you speak of?
4724	What would you have?
4724	What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent with the extension; is it not?
4724	What?
4724	Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be attributed to motion?
4724	When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and divide the fibres of your flesh?
4724	When is a thing shewn to be impossible?
4724	When is the mind said to be active?
4724	When, therefore, you say all ideas are occasioned by impressions in the brain, do you conceive this brain or no?
4724	When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have not any notion in your mind?
4724	Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not?
4724	Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or negative side of a question?
4724	Which are material objects in themselves-- perceptible or imperceptible?
4724	Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways?
4724	Why not, Philonous?
4724	Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?
4724	Would you think this reasonable?
4724	You acknowledge then that you can not possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in the mind?
4724	You are still then of opinion that EXTENSION and FIGURES are inherent in external unthinking substances?
4724	You are then in these respects altogether passive?
4724	You are then of opinion it is made up of unknown parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?
4724	and why should we use a microscope the better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked eye?
4724	and yet, are they able to comprehend how one body should move another?
4724	are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure?
4724	are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds really in them?
4724	are you then in that sceptical state of suspense, between affirming and denying?
4724	how shall we distinguish these apparent colours from real?
4724	is it as your legs support your body?
4724	is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities?
4724	is sound then a sensation?
4724	is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight?
4724	must we suppose they are all stark blind?
4724	of ideas?
4724	of unknown quiddities, of occasions, or SUBSTRATUM?
4724	or have you since seen cause to change your opinion?
4724	or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and yet be false?
4724	or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in SPREADING?
4724	or were they given to men alone for this end?
4724	or where is the evidence that extorts the belief of Matter?
4724	or, is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation?
4724	or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?
4724	sensible or intelligible?
4724	the greatest as well as the least?
4724	the object of the senses?
4724	to the hearing?
4724	to wit, whether what is perceived by different persons may yet have the term SAME applied to it?
4724	who ever thought it was?