This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.
| identifier | question |
|---|---|
| 2412 | What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? |
| 1681 | And is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired by instruction? |
| 1681 | Are not certain things useful to the builder when he is building a house? |
| 1681 | But do we not deem those men who are most prosperous to be the happiest? |
| 1681 | But how do you mean, Socrates? |
| 1681 | But if we are further asked, What is that from which, if we were free, we should have no need of wealth? |
| 1681 | But surely, if they were a good, they could not appear bad for any one? |
| 1681 | But what particular thing is wealth, if not all things? |
| 1681 | But when have we the greatest and the most various needs, when we are sick or when we are well? |
| 1681 | But why do you not finish the argument which proves that gold and silver and other things which seem to be wealth are not real wealth? |
| 1681 | But why, as you have begun your argument so prettily, do you not go on with the rest? |
| 1681 | CRITIAS: And does injustice seem to you an evil or a good? |
| 1681 | CRITIAS: And if the wicked man has wealth and is willing to spend it, he will carry out his evil purposes? |
| 1681 | CRITIAS: I should like to follow up the argument, and will ask Eryxias whether he thinks that there are just and unjust men? |
| 1681 | CRITIAS: Well, and do you think that some men are intemperate? |
| 1681 | Can ignorance, for instance, be useful for knowledge, or disease for health, or vice for virtue? |
| 1681 | Can you repeat the discourse to us? |
| 1681 | Do we not employ in our intercourse with one another speech and violence(?) |
| 1681 | ERASISTRATUS: What would you wish to hear first? |
| 1681 | For do we not say that silver is useful because it enables us to supply our bodily needs? |
| 1681 | For instance, some men are gamblers, some drunkards, and some gluttons: and gambling and the love of drink and greediness are all desires? |
| 1681 | For what man of sense could ever be persuaded that the wisest and the richest are the same? |
| 1681 | For who has larger estates or more land at his disposal to cultivate if he please? |
| 1681 | He was about to add something more, when Critias interrupted him:--Do you really suppose so, Eryxias? |
| 1681 | Or how could he be the richest of men who might even have to go begging, because he had not wherewithal to live? |
| 1681 | Or is wisdom despised of men and can find no buyers, although cypress wood and marble of Pentelicus are eagerly bought by numerous purchasers? |
| 1681 | Or, again, should you call sickness a good or an evil? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And also the instruments by which wealth is procured? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And are not the healthy richer than the sick, since health is a possession more valuable than riches to the sick? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And are they not most prosperous who commit the fewest errors in respect either of themselves or of other men? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And do we think it possible that a thing should be useful for a purpose unless we have need of it for that purpose? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And does not this apply in other cases? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And he appears to you to be the richest who has goods of the greatest value? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And how would you answer another question? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And if any one gave you a choice, which of these would you prefer? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And if anything appeared to be more valuable than health, he would be the richest who possessed it? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not always to appear useless? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And so, too, physic is not useful to every one, but only to him who knows how to use it? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And the same is the case with everything else? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And therefore conditions which are not required for the existence of a thing are not useful for the production of it? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And we call those actions good which a man does for the sake of virtue? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And were we not saying before that it was the business of a good man and a gentleman to know where and how anything should be used? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And when we are in the worst state we have the greatest and most especial need and desire of bodily pleasures? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is taught by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is imparted by word of mouth if he is wholly deprived of the sense of hearing? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: But can that which is evil be useful for virtue? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some precious stone, we should say that he was very rich? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine, shall we not regard wealth as useful for virtue? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: Clearly we have not yet answered the question, What is wealth? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: In which way do you think you would be the richer? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: The reason is that the one is useless and the other useful? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: The same to you, I said; have you any good news from Sicily to tell us? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs of the body, we must want them for that purpose? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: Then if they procure by this means what they want for the purposes of life, that art will be useful towards life? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: Then now we have to consider, What is money? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth is what is useful to this end? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: Then you consider that a man never wants any of these things for the use of the body? |
| 1681 | SOCRATES: What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is useless to us is not wealth? |
| 1681 | Suppose that we are asked,''Is a horse useful to everybody?'' |
| 1681 | The youth began by asking Prodicus, In what way did he think that riches were a good and in what an evil? |
| 1681 | There are persons, are there not, who teach music and grammar and other arts for pay, and thus procure those things of which they stand in need? |
| 1681 | What the Sicilians are doing, or how they are disposed towards our city? |
| 1681 | Where would be the advantage of wisdom then? |
| 1681 | and various other things? |
| 1681 | can we give an answer? |
| 1681 | whereas he who is short of means can not do what he fain would, and therefore does not sin? |
| 1681 | will not our reply be,''No, but only to those who know how to use a horse?'' |
| 20500 | But,says Socrates,"there must be certain acts which are the proper products of justice, as of other functions or skills?" |
| 20500 | Is Love,he asks,"a cause of mixtures of any sort, or only of such sorts as Logos dictates? |
| 20500 | What is_ my_ position with regard to this eternally- existing reality? |
| 20500 | ''Then how do you know what is Revelation, or that there is one at all?'' |
| 20500 | ''What may that be?'' |
| 20500 | ''What,''it was asked,''of_ progress_ in goodness? |
| 20500 | --"And cheating?" |
| 20500 | --"And stealing?" |
| 20500 | --"And the man who is better versed in justice must be the juster man?" |
| 20500 | --"But I thought you said there must be no cheating of friends?" |
| 20500 | --"Do you consider that justice is a matter of knowledge just as much( say) as writing?" |
| 20500 | --"I agree,"says Euthydemus.--"Well now, what of falsehood? |
| 20500 | --"If he carries off the enemy''s goods or cheats him in his strategy, what about these acts?" |
| 20500 | --"Not one of these can go to the just column?" |
| 20500 | --"Or suppose you find a friend in a desperate frenzy, and steal his sword from him, for fear he should kill himself; what do you say to that theft?" |
| 20500 | --"Then in some cases we shall have to put these very same acts in both columns?" |
| 20500 | --"Then of course you can tell us what{ 117} those acts or products are?" |
| 20500 | --''Then how do you know that there are things in themselves?'' |
| 20500 | 158; differentia of, possession of reason, 191; function of, 193; a political animal, 197; wisest of animals, why? |
| 20500 | A physician? |
| 20500 | An architect? |
| 20500 | And after this''fitful fever''is over, may there not be a greater bliss beyond? |
| 20500 | And if its results were not true or real, what was their nature? |
| 20500 | And whether then is Love identical with this Logos, or are they separate and distinct; and if so, what settles their separate functions?" |
| 20500 | At these times especially was it meet for us to take account of our soul and its doings; in the evening to ask,"Wherein have I transgressed? |
| 20500 | But how great, think you, must now be my disappointment, when I find myself unable to answer the simplest question on the subject?" |
| 20500 | But if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between the true and the false in such cases? |
| 20500 | Does each individual actually_ partake_ in the thought of God through{ 158} the ideas, or are his ideas only_ resemblances_ of the eternal? |
| 20500 | For what is the_ differentia_, the distinguishing character of the life of man? |
| 20500 | He may imagine he has the same idea as the speaker, but where is he going to get the common test by which to establish the identity? |
| 20500 | He, no more than they, seems to have definitely raised the question, How are we to account for, or formulate, the principle of_ difference_ or change? |
| 20500 | How did it operate? |
| 20500 | How is this process to begin? |
| 20500 | How will Protagoras answer this argument? |
| 20500 | I was astonished at her words, and said:"Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima?" |
| 20500 | If this be so, he argues, may we not by analogy argue for a like four- fold order in the universe? |
| 20500 | In the morning,"What must I do? |
| 20500 | In which column shall we put it?" |
| 20500 | Is it a matter imposed by God upon the heart and conscience of each individual? |
| 20500 | Is it dictated by the general sense of the community? |
| 20500 | Is it pleasure? |
| 20500 | Is it the product of Utility? |
| 20500 | Is it wisdom? |
| 20500 | Is not this what we mean by the Divine?" |
| 20500 | Is this a middle state between good and evil; or if a middle state between good and evil be a contradiction, in terms, how may we characterise it?'' |
| 20500 | Must there not also be the Great Cause, even Divine Wisdom, ordering and governing all things? |
| 20500 | Or is it both? |
| 20500 | Or theologically, Why did God make the world? |
| 20500 | Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say? |
| 20500 | Or, putting it in Aristotle''s formula, Why this relation of potentiality and actuality? |
| 20500 | Shall I tell you what amazes me in your friend Protagoras? |
| 20500 | The multitude may not and do not agree in Protagoras''own thesis,''that man is the measure of all things,''and then who is to decide? |
| 20500 | Then of course he hopes to be a just man himself? |
| 20500 | Upon hip own showing must not his''truth''depend on the number of suffrages, and be more or less true in proportion as he has more or fewer of them? |
| 20500 | Was thought a mere process in an unmeaning circle, the''upward and downward way''of Plato? |
| 20500 | We never find him asking,"What is to become of_ me_ in all this?" |
| 20500 | What about this cheating of one''s friends?" |
| 20500 | What done? |
| 20500 | What failed to do?" |
| 20500 | What is it that causes things to come into being out of, or recalls them back from being into, the infinite void? |
| 20500 | What is it? |
| 20500 | What is the meaning of this''Ultimately''? |
| 20500 | What now is man''s special function? |
| 20500 | What then according to the Cyrenaics was the End of life? |
| 20500 | What was the nature of its subject matter? |
| 20500 | What was this opinion? |
| 20500 | What, Parmenides asks, is the relation of these, as eternally existing in the mind of God, to the same ideas as possessed by individual men? |
| 20500 | Wherein repair past days''forgetfulness?" |
| 20500 | Whether do you think the man more unjust who is a voluntary violator of justice, or he who is an involuntary violator of it?" |
| 20500 | Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory? |
| 20500 | Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets,{ 140} would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? |
| 20500 | Why then is not this true of every portion of the universe? |
| 20500 | Why this eternal coming to be, even if the coming to be is no unreasoned accident, but a coming to be of that which is vitally or in germ_ there_? |
| 20500 | Why this groaning and travailing of the creature? |
| 20500 | Would that be an ignoble life?" |
| 20500 | { 112}"Have we not here a key to the great secret? |
| 1642 | ''Are they really true?'' |
| 1642 | ''Is all the just pious?'' |
| 1642 | ''Then what part of justice is piety?'' |
| 1642 | And must you not allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another? |
| 1642 | Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro? |
| 1642 | As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman''s art they are benefited and improved, are they not? |
| 1642 | But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me-- clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside? |
| 1642 | But Socrates would like first of all to have a more satisfactory answer to the question,''What is piety?'' |
| 1642 | But although they are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return? |
| 1642 | But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better? |
| 1642 | But in what way does he say that you corrupt the young? |
| 1642 | But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is''piety''? |
| 1642 | But may there not be differences of opinion, as among men, so also among the gods? |
| 1642 | But what is the charge which he brings against you? |
| 1642 | But what is the meaning of''attending''to the gods? |
| 1642 | Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum? |
| 1642 | Do you dissent? |
| 1642 | Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing? |
| 1642 | Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them? |
| 1642 | Do you not agree? |
| 1642 | Do you not agree? |
| 1642 | Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: And who is he? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: How do you mean, Socrates? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: Then some one else has been prosecuting you? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now saying, what pleases them? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: Why not, Socrates? |
| 1642 | For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished? |
| 1642 | Have you forgotten? |
| 1642 | How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? |
| 1642 | I suppose that you follow me now? |
| 1642 | Is it not so? |
| 1642 | Is not piety in every action always the same? |
| 1642 | Is not that true? |
| 1642 | Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship- builder with a view to the attainment of some result? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to them-- do you see? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And of what is he accused? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And well said? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And what is your suit, Euthyphro? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: As there is an art which ministers to the house- builder with a view to the building of a house? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: But for their good? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: But what differences are there which can not be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?--that would be your meaning, Euthyphro? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety-- that I can not away with these stories about the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in view the attainment of some object-- would you not say of health? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Of whom? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by measuring? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Tell me then, oh tell me-- what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil- doer ought to be let off? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: What is the charge? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Who is he? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Why, has the fugitive wings? |
| 1642 | Shall I tell you in what respect? |
| 1642 | Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety? |
| 1642 | Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner:''Is all the pious just?'' |
| 1642 | Surely you can not be concerned in a suit before the King, like myself? |
| 1642 | Tell me, then-- Is not that which is pious necessarily just? |
| 1642 | To what end do we serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? |
| 1642 | Was not that said? |
| 1642 | Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? |
| 1642 | What are they? |
| 1642 | What do you say? |
| 1642 | What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them? |
| 1642 | What should I be good for without it? |
| 1642 | What then is piety? |
| 1642 | Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them? |
| 1642 | Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better? |
| 1642 | You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies? |
| 1642 | and what are you doing in the Porch of the King Archon? |
| 1642 | are you the pursuer or the defendant? |
| 1642 | my companion, and will you leave me in despair? |
| 1642 | my good man? |
| 1642 | or, is that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious? |
| 1673 | And that person is he who is good at calculation-- the arithmetician? |
| 1673 | But is it better to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally? |
| 1673 | But to return: what say you of Odysseus and Achilles? |
| 1673 | EUDICUS: Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display which Hippias has been making? |
| 1673 | For example, had a man better have a rudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily? |
| 1673 | For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times? |
| 1673 | HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; what makes you say so? |
| 1673 | HIPPIAS: Certainly; how can I have any other? |
| 1673 | HIPPIAS: What do you mean, Socrates? |
| 1673 | HIPPIAS: Where is that? |
| 1673 | He who runs slowly voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily? |
| 1673 | I will therefore remind you of what you were saying: were you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and wily? |
| 1673 | Is he not the good man? |
| 1673 | Is not he who is better made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and postures voluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily? |
| 1673 | Is not the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about diagrams; and he is-- the geometrician? |
| 1673 | Must it not be so? |
| 1673 | Must not justice, at all events, be one of these? |
| 1673 | Please to answer once more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is not the same as the false? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And are you not likewise said to speak truly about calculation? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters of calculation, are you not also the best? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of astronomy? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute and all other things? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they wise? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs badly? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs well? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is a bad runner? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And if a species of doing, a species of action? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if you pleased? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what they do? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match, to fall, or to throw another? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And is not blinking a defect in the eyes? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And is not running a species of doing? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And is that your own opinion, Hippias? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to be false as well as true? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best state possible? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and arithmetician? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man is he who has the bad? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And the true differ from the false-- the true and the false are the very opposite of each other? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And there are bad runners? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And therefore you would be the most able to tell the truth about these matters, would you not? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is to do well? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to speak falsely about calculation? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And what do you say about grace, Hippias? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And what would you say of the art of medicine;--has not the mind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And what would you say of the characters of slaves? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And would you choose to possess goods or evils? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And would you rather always have eyes with which you might voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily blink? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or involuntarily lame? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Are you not also skilled in geometry? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: But is not lameness a defect or deformity? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true about the same matters? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do things, or that they have the power to do things? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about number, or when he is making a calculation? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: He and no one else is good at it? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to which are the better-- those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the power to speak falsely? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find a difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times over? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Shall we examine other instances? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: That would be the better horse? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: The involuntary is the worse of the two? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and art-- and these either one or both of them are elements of justice? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than Achilles? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is ignorant can not be false? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a race than he who does them voluntarily? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in a race? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and slowness is an evil quality? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the involuntary? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts ill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who are false about calculation and number? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind which errs voluntarily? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and truly about calculation? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then they are prudent, I suppose? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things, if there be such a man, will be the good man? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are they not? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are to be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base and dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them involuntarily? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Well, and does not the same hold in that science also? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Well, but at a wrestling match-- which is the better wrestler, he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Which of the two then is a better runner? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Who can they be? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation? |
| 1673 | SOCRATES: Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be better than the involuntary? |
| 1673 | Which is the better of the two? |
| 1673 | Why do you not either refute his words, if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in commending him? |
| 1673 | Will you tell me, and then I shall perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles wily? |
| 1673 | Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters of calculation than you would be, if you chose? |
| 1673 | Would you not call a man able who could do that? |
| 1673 | and in what particular does either surpass the other? |
| 1600 | ''And how, Socrates,''she said with a smile,''can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?'' |
| 1600 | ''And is that which is not wise, ignorant? |
| 1600 | ''And is this wish and this desire common to all? |
| 1600 | ''And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?'' |
| 1600 | ''And what does he gain who possesses the good?'' |
| 1600 | ''And what may that be?'' |
| 1600 | ''And what,''I said,''is his power?'' |
| 1600 | ''And who are they?'' |
| 1600 | ''And who,''I said,''was his father, and who his mother?'' |
| 1600 | ''And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?'' |
| 1600 | ''And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?'' |
| 1600 | ''But how can he be a god who has no portion in what is either good or fair?'' |
| 1600 | ''But who then, Diotima,''I said,''are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?'' |
| 1600 | ''But why of generation?'' |
| 1600 | ''By those who know or by those who do not know?'' |
| 1600 | ''Do you know what I am meditating? |
| 1600 | ''How can that be?'' |
| 1600 | ''Hush,''she cried;''must that be foul which is not fair?'' |
| 1600 | ''Right opinion,''she replied;''which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge( for how can knowledge be devoid of reason? |
| 1600 | ''Still,''she said,''the answer suggests a further question: What is given by the possession of beauty?'' |
| 1600 | ''Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further,''she said,''what is the manner of the pursuit? |
| 1600 | ''Then love,''she said,''may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?'' |
| 1600 | ''To which must be added that they love the possession of the good?'' |
| 1600 | ''What are you meditating?'' |
| 1600 | ''What do you mean, Diotima,''I said,''is love then evil and foul?'' |
| 1600 | ''What is he, Diotima?'' |
| 1600 | ''What then is Love?'' |
| 1600 | ''What then?'' |
| 1600 | ''What then?'' |
| 1600 | ''Why, then,''she rejoined,''are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of them? |
| 1600 | ''Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your revels? |
| 1600 | ''Would you desire better witness?'' |
| 1600 | And I remember her once saying to me,''What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire? |
| 1600 | And Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said: Tell me, son of Acumenus, was there not reason in my fears? |
| 1600 | And am I not right in asserting that there are two goddesses? |
| 1600 | And are you not a flute- player? |
| 1600 | And as you have spoken so eloquently of his nature, may I ask you further, Whether love is the love of something or of nothing? |
| 1600 | And does he possess, or does he not possess, that which he loves and desires? |
| 1600 | And first tell me, he said, were you present at this meeting? |
| 1600 | And if this is true, Love is the love of beauty and not of deformity? |
| 1600 | And now, said Socrates, I will ask about Love:--Is Love of something or of nothing? |
| 1600 | And suppose further, that when he saw their perplexity he said:''Do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another''s company? |
| 1600 | And the admission has been already made that Love is of something which a man wants and has not? |
| 1600 | And when you say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future?'' |
| 1600 | And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty? |
| 1600 | And you would say the same of a mother? |
| 1600 | Are they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him? |
| 1600 | Are we to have neither conversation nor singing over our cups; but simply to drink as if we were thirsty? |
| 1600 | But Love desires the beautiful; and then arises the question, What does he desire of the beautiful? |
| 1600 | But before the many you would not be ashamed, if you thought that you were doing something disgraceful in their presence? |
| 1600 | But first tell me; if I come in shall we have the understanding of which I spoke( supra Will you have a very drunken man? |
| 1600 | But what have you done with Socrates? |
| 1600 | But why again does this extend not only to men but also to animals? |
| 1600 | By Heracles, he said, what is this? |
| 1600 | By all means; but who makes the third partner in our revels? |
| 1600 | Can you tell me why?'' |
| 1600 | Consider then: How can the drinking be made easiest? |
| 1600 | Do you expect to shoot your bolt and escape, Aristophanes? |
| 1600 | Eryximachus said: What is this, Alcibiades? |
| 1600 | First, is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man? |
| 1600 | For he who is anything can not want to be that which he is? |
| 1600 | For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms? |
| 1600 | He desires, of course, the possession of the beautiful;--but what is given by that? |
| 1600 | He must agree with us-- must he not? |
| 1600 | I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words-- who could listen to them without amazement? |
| 1600 | I asked;''Is he mortal?'' |
| 1600 | I said,''O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well; but, assuming Love to be such as you say, what is the use of him to men?'' |
| 1600 | I was astonished at her words, and said:''Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima?'' |
| 1600 | I will also tell, if you please-- and indeed I am bound to tell-- of his courage in battle; for who but he saved my life? |
| 1600 | Is he not like a Silenus in this? |
| 1600 | Is that the meaning of your praise? |
| 1600 | Is there anything?'' |
| 1600 | Man may be supposed to act thus from reason; but why should animals have these passionate feelings? |
| 1600 | May I say without impiety or offence, that of all the blessed gods he is the most blessed because he is the fairest and best? |
| 1600 | Of what am I speaking? |
| 1600 | On his appearing he and the host jest a little; the question is then asked by Pausanias, one of the guests,''What shall they do about drinking? |
| 1600 | Or shall I crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away? |
| 1600 | Or who would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger? |
| 1600 | Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say? |
| 1600 | See you how fond he is of the fair? |
| 1600 | She said to me:''And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?'' |
| 1600 | So I gave him a shake, and I said:''Socrates, are you asleep?'' |
| 1600 | Socrates asks: Who are his father and mother? |
| 1600 | That is, of a brother or sister? |
| 1600 | The same to you, said Eryximachus; but what shall we do? |
| 1600 | Then Love wants and has not beauty? |
| 1600 | Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good? |
| 1600 | Then it must have been a long while ago, he said; and who told you-- did Socrates? |
| 1600 | Then would you still say that love is beautiful? |
| 1600 | Then, said Glaucon, let us have the tale over again; is not the road to Athens just made for conversation? |
| 1600 | What are you about? |
| 1600 | What do you suppose must have been my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my own dishonour? |
| 1600 | What do you think, Eryximachus? |
| 1600 | What do you think? |
| 1600 | What do you want? |
| 1600 | What say you to going with me unasked? |
| 1600 | Who will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing? |
| 1600 | Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory? |
| 1600 | Who would not sooner have these children of the mind than the ordinary human ones? |
| 1600 | Who, if not you, should be the reporter of the words of your friend? |
| 1600 | Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? |
| 1600 | Why then is there all this flutter and excitement about love? |
| 1600 | Why, my dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse? |
| 1600 | Will that be agreeable to you? |
| 1600 | Will you drink with me or not?'' |
| 1600 | Will you laugh at me because I am drunk? |
| 1600 | Would he who is great, desire to be great, or he who is strong, desire to be strong? |
| 1600 | Would that be an ignoble life?'' |
| 1600 | Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning: Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something? |
| 1600 | You were quite right in coming, said Agathon; but where is he himself? |
| 1600 | and do all men always desire their own good, or only some men?--what say you?'' |
| 1600 | and was I not a true prophet when I said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that I should be in a strait? |
| 1600 | and what is the object which they have in view? |
| 1600 | do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?'' |
| 1600 | etc.)? |
| 1600 | said Alcibiades: shall I attack him and inflict the punishment before you all? |
| 1600 | said Socrates; are you going to raise a laugh at my expense? |
| 1600 | what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love? |
| 39065 | How would a man profit if he receive gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? 39065 Is not this man likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous elements on the vacant throne? |
| 39065 | Must my leg be lamed? |
| 39065 | Thou, O World, how wilt thou secure thyself against this man? 39065 What is the use of having great schemes if you have n''t the means to carry them out?" |
| 39065 | Why rewrite the last chapter? |
| 39065 | Why to Apollo''s shrine repair New hallowed? 39065 Wretch, do you then on account of one poor leg find fault with the world? |
| 39065 | Ye are the salt of the earth; but if the salt have lost its savour, wherewith shall it be salted? 39065 And do you feel no shame in delivering up your mind to any reviler, to be disconcerted and confounded? |
| 39065 | And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? |
| 39065 | And what can be so good, so desirable to impart, as this very Spirit of Love, which is Christianity itself? |
| 39065 | And wherein does its unrighteousness consist? |
| 39065 | And which of you by being anxious can add one cubit unto his stature? |
| 39065 | And why are ye anxious concerning raiment? |
| 39065 | And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother''s eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye? |
| 39065 | And will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who sells his own divine being to that which is most godless and detestable and has no pity? |
| 39065 | Anything more? |
| 39065 | Are faithfulness, and love, and sweet grateful memories no good? |
| 39065 | Are not ye of much more value than they? |
| 39065 | Are there any people in the world whose interests you deliberately disregard? |
| 39065 | Be not therefore anxious, saying, What shall we eat? |
| 39065 | But what is it to you by whose hands the giver demanded it back? |
| 39065 | But where, amid all this, Plato asks, is righteousness? |
| 39065 | Can we reconcile these two seemingly contradictory statements? |
| 39065 | Can we tell why a man with such a ring on his finger should not do any unjust, unkind, impure, or dishonourable deed? |
| 39065 | Can you honestly say that your neighbour gets represented in your mind in this imaginative, sympathetic, helpful way? |
| 39065 | Could we trust ourselves to wear that ring night and day? |
| 39065 | Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? |
| 39065 | Do you care for your family like that? |
| 39065 | Do you care for your profession in that way? |
| 39065 | Do you love your country with such jealous solicitude for its honour and prosperity? |
| 39065 | Do you think of God''s great universe as something in the goodness of which you rejoice, and for the welfare of which you are earnestly enlisted? |
| 39065 | Do you wish, then, to know precisely where you stand in the scale of personality? |
| 39065 | Does any man hinder me from going with smiles and cheerfulness and contentment?" |
| 39065 | Does it justify drawing a salary for which no adequate services are rendered? |
| 39065 | Does it justify the raising of money by a lottery? |
| 39065 | For if ye love them that love you, what reward have ye? |
| 39065 | For what end? |
| 39065 | For who is the master of things like these? |
| 39065 | Has not this been also restored? |
| 39065 | Has your estate been taken from you? |
| 39065 | Have I wished to transgress the relations of things? |
| 39065 | He asks what he shall pray for? |
| 39065 | He can shout with more than Stoic defiance:"O death, where is thy sting? |
| 39065 | He even pushes the question a step further and asks,"What shall a man be profited by unrighteousness even if his unrighteousness be undetected? |
| 39065 | How late shall the student study at night? |
| 39065 | How many of us are slaving all day and late into the night to add artificial superfluities to the simple necessities? |
| 39065 | How many of us know how to stop working when it begins to encroach upon our health; and to cut off anxiety and worry altogether? |
| 39065 | If Epicurus chances to be seated on the throne, he asks the candidate,"Have you had a good time?" |
| 39065 | If I send this cook away, shall I be a long while without any; and after much vexation probably put up with another not half so good? |
| 39065 | If you wish not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desires contrary to your principles? |
| 39065 | If you wish to be a man of modesty and fidelity, who shall prevent you? |
| 39065 | In what does this priceless pearl consist? |
| 39065 | Is Aristotle, then, a gross materialist, a mere money- getter, pleasure- lover, office- seeker? |
| 39065 | Is it no good that a just life should be justly honoured? |
| 39065 | Is it no good that we should keep our silent promises on which others build because they believe in our love and truth? |
| 39065 | Is not Aristotle right? |
| 39065 | Is not the life more than the food, and the body than the raiment? |
| 39065 | Is such an exercise of spirit a virtuous act? |
| 39065 | Is the lot of any poor man harder, or the life of any unhappy woman more sad and bitter, for aught that we have done or left undone? |
| 39065 | Is the world a happier, holier, better world because we are here in it, helping on God''s good- will for men? |
| 39065 | Is there any sphere of human welfare to which you are indifferent? |
| 39065 | Is there then no virtue in man only, and must we look to our hair, and our clothes, and to our ancestors?" |
| 39065 | Is your child dead? |
| 39065 | Is your wife dead? |
| 39065 | It will prevent misunderstanding later, if we put the question squarely here, Does the end justify the means? |
| 39065 | Know you not how small a part you are compared with the whole?" |
| 39065 | Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy by thy name, and by thy name cast out devils, and by thy name do many mighty works? |
| 39065 | Must I then die lamenting? |
| 39065 | O grave, where is thy victory?" |
| 39065 | On the other hand, is there a single point on which we deliberately are working evil? |
| 39065 | On the other hand, shall he fritter away all his evenings with convivial fellows, and the society butterflies? |
| 39065 | On the other hand, will you have no recreation the evening before the game; but simply sit in your room and mope? |
| 39065 | Or how wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me cast out the mote out of thine eye, and lo, the beam is in thine own eye? |
| 39065 | Or what man is there of you, who, if his son shall ask him for a loaf, will give him a stone, or if he shall ask for a fish, will give him a serpent? |
| 39065 | Or, is it good that we should harden our hearts against all the wants and hopes of those who have depended on us? |
| 39065 | Shall he keep on until past midnight year after year? |
| 39065 | Shall tribulation, or anguish, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? |
| 39065 | Should we not at once recognise, that in spite of his original declaration, he is not the consistently mercenary being he professed himself to be? |
| 39065 | Since, then, desire and aversion are in your power, for what have you to be anxious?" |
| 39065 | The essential question which Love, and Jesus as the Lord and Master of Love, puts to a man is not"How much money have you?" |
| 39065 | The judge, perhaps, will pass a sentence against you which he thinks formidable; but can he likewise make you receive it with shrinking? |
| 39065 | To do so, he must have loved Baldassarre devotedly, and he did not love him: was that his own fault? |
| 39065 | To the question in its Jewish form,"What is the great commandment?" |
| 39065 | VI THE BLESSEDNESS OF LOVE Does virtue bring happiness? |
| 39065 | What comes of this entirely unegoistic course? |
| 39065 | What does reason say? |
| 39065 | What else had Tito''s crime toward Baldassarre been but that abandonment working itself out to the most hideous extreme of falsity and ingratitude? |
| 39065 | What good can belong to men who have such souls? |
| 39065 | What is the point? |
| 39065 | What though I can not pay my bills? |
| 39065 | What though I suffer toothache''s ills? |
| 39065 | What though I swallow countless pills? |
| 39065 | What though I''m in a sorry case? |
| 39065 | What was the end which Aristotle set before himself and his disciples? |
| 39065 | What, then, in contrast to this would be a righteous state? |
| 39065 | What, then, is the difference between a righteous and unrighteous state? |
| 39065 | What, then, is the good, according to Plato? |
| 39065 | What, then, is their place? |
| 39065 | What, then, is this good, which is neither a sum of pleasures, nor conformity to law; nor yet superiority to appetite and passion? |
| 39065 | What, then, is virtue? |
| 39065 | Where is the limit? |
| 39065 | Wherein, then, does the difference between an unrighteous and a righteous state consist? |
| 39065 | Which breakfast will enable you to do the best forenoon''s work? |
| 39065 | Which of the two men would we rather be? |
| 39065 | Which one will give you acute headache and chronic dyspepsia? |
| 39065 | While you wish to preserve that freedom which belongs to you, and are contented with that, for what have you longer to be anxious? |
| 39065 | Who can take them away? |
| 39065 | Who then is the consistent Epicurean man? |
| 39065 | Why a new edition under a new title? |
| 39065 | Why present with prayer Libation? |
| 39065 | Why then pursue an object like this, which is at the disposal of others?" |
| 39065 | Why, you may ask, should he give us a treatise on politics in answer to a question of personal character? |
| 39065 | Why? |
| 39065 | Will hospitality be made impossible? |
| 39065 | Will my household be thrown into confusion? |
| 39065 | Will the working power of the members of my household be impaired by lack of well- prepared, promptly served food? |
| 39065 | Wilt thou not willingly surrender it for the whole? |
| 39065 | Would we, with such a ring on our finger, stand fast in righteousness? |
| 39065 | but"What use do you intend to make of whatever you have, be that little or much?" |
| 39065 | do not even the Gentiles the same? |
| 39065 | do not even the publicans the same? |
| 39065 | have I been discontented with anything that happens or wished it to be otherwise? |
| 39065 | or a little fruit and a cereal, a roll, and a couple of eggs? |
| 39065 | or, What shall we drink? |
| 39065 | or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? |
| 39065 | to aversions contrary to your opinion? |
| 785 | Again, Where can the billows yield a way, so long As ever the fish are powerless to go? |
| 785 | Again, behold we not the monuments Of heroes, now in ruins, asking us, In their turn likewise, if we do n''t believe They also age with eld? |
| 785 | Again, gold unto gold Doth not one substance bind, and only one? |
| 785 | Again, shall taste Accuse this touch or shall the nose confute Or eyes defeat it? |
| 785 | Again, why never hurtles Jupiter A bolt upon the lands nor pours abroad Clap upon clap, when skies are cloudless all? |
| 785 | Again, why see we among objects some Of heavier weight, but of no bulkier size? |
| 785 | And O how Canst thou believe he shoots at one same time Into diverse directions? |
| 785 | And first, Why doth the mind of one to whom the whim To think has come behold forthwith that thing? |
| 785 | And hast thou never marked With what a force the water will disgorge Timber and beam? |
| 785 | And is not brass by tin joined unto brass? |
| 785 | And out of what does Ether feed the stars? |
| 785 | And seest thou not how those whom mutual pleasure Hath bound are tortured in their common bonds? |
| 785 | And seest thou not, indeed, How widely one small water- spring may wet The meadow- lands at times and flood the fields? |
| 785 | And so I''ll follow on, and whereso''er thou set The extreme coasts, I''ll query,"what becomes Thereafter of thy spear?" |
| 785 | And the mare''s filly why not trained so well As sturdy strength of steed? |
| 785 | And the rest Of all those monsters slain, even if alive, Unconquered still, what injury could they do? |
| 785 | And too, when all is said, What evil lust of life is this so great Subdues us to live, so dreadfully distraught In perils and alarms? |
| 785 | And what besides of those first particles Whence soul and mind must fashioned be?--Seest not How nice and how minute? |
| 785 | And what is there so horrible appears? |
| 785 | And what motions, too, They give and get among themselves? |
| 785 | And why Doth he himself allow it, nor spare the same Even for his enemies? |
| 785 | And why is never a child''s a prudent soul? |
| 785 | And, contrariwise, if wills he to o''erwhelm us, Quite off our guard, with fire, why thunders he Off in yon quarter, so that we may shun? |
| 785 | BOOK V PROEM O WHO can build with puissant breast a song Worthy the majesty of these great finds? |
| 785 | Beside these matters, why Doth nature feed and foster on land and sea The dreadful breed of savage beasts, the foes Of the human clan? |
| 785 | Besides are seeds of soul there left behind In the breathless body, or not? |
| 785 | Besides, if''tis his will that we beware Against the lightning- stroke, why feareth he To grant us power for to behold the shot? |
| 785 | But ask the mourner what''s the bitterness That man should waste in an eternal grief, If, after all, the thing''s but sleep and rest? |
| 785 | But should some say that always souls of men Go into human bodies, I will ask: How can a wise become a dullard soul? |
| 785 | For hast thou not observed How eyes, essaying to perceive the fine, Will strain in preparation, otherwise Unable sharply to perceive at all? |
| 785 | For how, I ask, can things so varied be, If formed of fire, single and pure? |
| 785 | For what could hurt us now that mighty maw Of Nemeaean Lion, or what the Boar Who bristled in Arcadia? |
| 785 | For what may we surmise A blow inflicted can achieve besides Shaking asunder and loosening all apart? |
| 785 | For where can scaly creatures forward dart, Save where the waters give them room? |
| 785 | For which will last against the grip and crush Under the teeth of death? |
| 785 | For whither shall we make appeal? |
| 785 | For who of us Wondereth if some one gets into his joints A fever, gathering head with fiery heat, Or any other dolorous disease Along his members? |
| 785 | For why could he mark everything by words And utter the various sounds of tongue, what time The rest may be supposed powerless To do the same? |
| 785 | How stars and constellations drop to earth, Seest not? |
| 785 | Indeed, and were there not For each its procreant atoms, could things have Each its unalterable mother old? |
| 785 | Is''t not serener far than any sleep? |
| 785 | Nay, why, then, aim they at eternal wastes, And spend themselves in vain?--perchance, even so To exercise their arms and strengthen shoulders? |
| 785 | Now what is there so sad about it all? |
| 785 | O why most oft Aims he at lofty places? |
| 785 | O why not rather make an end of life, Of labour? |
| 785 | Or darest thou Contend that never hath it come to pass That divers strokes have happened at one time? |
| 785 | Or do the idols watch upon our will, And doth an image unto us occur, Directly we desire-- if heart prefer The sea, the land, or after all the sky? |
| 785 | Or else the air? |
| 785 | Or how can mind wax strong Coequally with body and attain The craved flower of life, unless it be The body''s colleague in its origins? |
| 785 | Or how, when thus restored, may daedal Earth Foster and plenish with her ancient food, Which, kind by kind, she offers unto each? |
| 785 | Or lest its house, Outworn by venerable length of days, May topple down upon it? |
| 785 | Or shall the ears have power to blame the eyes, Or yet the touch the ears? |
| 785 | Or what new factor could, After so long a time, inveigle them-- The hitherto reposeful-- to desire To change their former life? |
| 785 | Or what''s the purport of its going forth From aged limbs?--fears it, perhaps, to stay, Pent in a crumbled body? |
| 785 | Or, again, O what could Cretan Bull, or Hydra, pest Of Lerna, fenced with vipers venomous? |
| 785 | Our gratefulness, O what emoluments could it confer Upon Immortals and upon the Blessed That they should take a step to manage aught For sake of us? |
| 785 | Seest thou not also how the clouds be sped By contrary winds to regions contrary, The lower clouds diversely from the upper? |
| 785 | Seest thou not, Besides, how drops of water falling down Against the stones at last bore through the stones? |
| 785 | Then for what reason shoots he at the sea?-- What sacrilege have waves and bulk of brine And floating fields of foam been guilty of? |
| 785 | Then what the difference''twixt the sum and least? |
| 785 | Then, why may yonder stars in ether there Along their mighty orbits not be borne By currents opposite the one to other? |
| 785 | What marvel, then, that mind doth lose the rest, Save those to which''thas given up itself? |
| 785 | What power, in sum, Can raise with agile leap our body aloft, Save energy of mind which steers the limbs? |
| 785 | What then? |
| 785 | What, then''s, the principle? |
| 785 | Whence may the water- springs, beneath the sea, Or inland rivers, far and wide away, Keep the unfathomable ocean full? |
| 785 | Wherefore stalks at large Death, so untimely? |
| 785 | Whither have sunk so oft so many deeds Of heroes? |
| 785 | Why behold we Marks of his lightnings most on mountain tops? |
| 785 | Why do the seasons bring Distempers with them? |
| 785 | Why do those deeds live no more, Ingrafted in eternal monuments Of glory? |
| 785 | Why rouseth he beforehand darkling air And the far din and rumblings? |
| 785 | Why suffer they the Father''s javelin To be so blunted on the earth? |
| 785 | Why this bemoaning and beweeping death? |
| 785 | for what More certain than our senses can there be Whereby to mark asunder error and truth? |
| 785 | the blood? |
| 785 | the bones? |
| 785 | the fire? |
| 785 | the moist? |
| 785 | which then? |
| 785 | why keep we not Some footprints of the things we did of, old? |
| 785 | why not with mind content Take now, thou fool, thy unafflicted rest? |
| 1181 | Laws,831 C. If it be pleaded that persuasion is his instrument, not violence; is that no reason rather for a deeper loathing? |
| 1181 | Rep.521 A;"Laws,"678 C. And you, Socrates, yourself( their host demanded), what is it you pride yourself upon? |
| 1181 | Where will he find a teacher to instruct him in that wisdom? |
| 1181 | ( 13) Does not this worthy person strike you as somewhat like a bully seeking to pick a quarrel? |
| 1181 | ( 16) But what( he added, turning to Critobulus) do you most pride yourself upon? |
| 1181 | ( 2) Was it not enough to set before your guests a faultless dinner, but you must feast our eyes and ears on sights and sounds the most delicious? |
| 1181 | ( 31) Now all is changed, and who will be at pains to ask me out to dinner any more? |
| 1181 | ( 32) Philippus would seem to have anticipated Mr. Woodward; see Prologue to"She Stoops to Conquer": Pray, would you know the reason I''m crying? |
| 1181 | ( 39) Are not all these the outward tokens of true loveliness? |
| 1181 | ( 56) Is Antisthenes thinking of Callias and Hermogenes? |
| 1181 | ( 6) Is that your statement? |
| 1181 | ( 70) Is not Xenophon imputing himself to Socrates? |
| 1181 | ( 8) Or,"Have you the knowledge also how to play the king?" |
| 1181 | ( 83)( Socrates exclaimed, when he heard that), what crime can they conceive your boy is guilty of that they should wish to make an end of him? |
| 1181 | ( 86) Is it not at your house that their noblest citizens are lodged as representatives of a foreign state? |
| 1181 | ( 90) Are you agreed to that? |
| 1181 | ( 92) Are you agreed to that? |
| 1181 | ( 98)( 98) Or,"going to give up business, and hand on the trade to me as your successor?" |
| 1181 | ( cried Antisthenes); and pray how? |
| 1181 | 142 D. You have not forgotten( interposed Antisthenes), perhaps, that besides yourself there is not a rhapsodist who does not know these epics? |
| 1181 | 158 C. The company were charmed to hear him speak, and turned and looked; and some one asked: On what is it then, Autolycus? |
| 1181 | And I must needs believe you, for are you not all honourable men? |
| 1181 | And amongst all animals, you will tell us that the crab has loveliest eyes? |
| 1181 | And did you ever come across a sillier tribe of people than these same rhapsodists? |
| 1181 | And do you pretend to make their souls more righteous by putting money in their pockets? |
| 1181 | And how do you do that, good sir? |
| 1181 | And if his name died on my lips, think you my mind would less recall his memory? |
| 1181 | And if that happened, you on your side, it appears, believe the boy will be corrupted? |
| 1181 | And is he the better go- between who can make his clients pleasing to one person only, or can make them pleasing to a number? |
| 1181 | And is there anything more transcendental than the gods? |
| 1181 | And now you, Lycon, tell us, wo n''t you( asked Antisthenes), what it is you take the greatest pride in? |
| 1181 | And now, sir, if you do not like this frigid( 10) argument, why do you cause me trouble? |
| 1181 | And pray, do they repay you these same moneys? |
| 1181 | And there are words that bear the stamp of hate, and words that tend to friendliness? |
| 1181 | And this friendship, what is it? |
| 1181 | And to this his very name bears witness, for is it not written in Homer? |
| 1181 | And what may that be? |
| 1181 | And what use will you make of them? |
| 1181 | And whence shall a man obtain this chrism? |
| 1181 | And why? |
| 1181 | And you, Hermogenes, on what do you plume yourself most highly? |
| 1181 | And, further, that towards agreeableness, one step at any rate consists in wearing a becoming fashion of the hair and dress? |
| 1181 | Are you agreed it is the business of a good go- between to make him( or her) on whom he plies his art agreeable to those with them? |
| 1181 | Are you agreed? |
| 1181 | Are you aware that you at present are annoying us by silence? |
| 1181 | Are you that person commonly nicknamed the thinker? |
| 1181 | At this remark they turned their eyes upon the speaker, and several spoke together, asking: Will you make them known to us? |
| 1181 | At which sight Callias, turning to the father: Do you know you are the richest man in the whole world, Lycon? |
| 1181 | But consider, a snubness of the nose, how is that more beautiful than straightness? |
| 1181 | But how is it that you alone, Antisthenes, you misanthrope, love nobody? |
| 1181 | But if my tongue is not to wag, whatever shall I do to earn my dinner? |
| 1181 | But the lover who depends upon the body,( 41) what of him? |
| 1181 | But what can he expect, who stretches forth an eager hand to clutch the body, save to be treated( 47) as a beggar? |
| 1181 | But what is it you keep on laughing at-- the wish on my part to reduce to moderate size a paunch a trifle too rotund? |
| 1181 | But whence, then? |
| 1181 | Can you explain to us? |
| 1181 | Can you tell me, then, what need is satisfied by our eyes? |
| 1181 | Did ever man anoint himself with oil of myrrh to please his fellow? |
| 1181 | Do you consider that the quality of beauty is confined to man, or is it to be found in other objects also? |
| 1181 | Do you hear that, my son? |
| 1181 | Do you hesitate? |
| 1181 | Eh, bless my ears, what''s that? |
| 1181 | First, why should love- for- love be given to such a lover? |
| 1181 | For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms? |
| 1181 | Have you the cramp? |
| 1181 | Here Callias demanded: And when our friend( Antisthenes) essays to cross- examine people( 3) at a banquet, what kind of piping( 4) should he have? |
| 1181 | Here Lycon interposed: That may be well enough for youths, but what shall we do whose gymnastic days are over? |
| 1181 | How can you boast of so discredited an art? |
| 1181 | How is it possible that things, in no respect resembling one another, should each and all be beautiful? |
| 1181 | How so? |
| 1181 | How value less the gods, not more, if being above us they make the void of use to send us rain, and cause their light to shine on us? |
| 1181 | How, in the first place, is it possible for him to hate a lover who, he knows, regards him as both beautiful and good? |
| 1181 | Is it not from want? |
| 1181 | Is that conclusive? |
| 1181 | Is that the source of merriment? |
| 1181 | Must I discourse to you in answer to the flute? |
| 1181 | No doubt, upon the boy? |
| 1181 | Oh, Socrates( he answered, deprecatingly), will you not leave it to the arbitrament of Cleinias? |
| 1181 | Or would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger? |
| 1181 | Pray how? |
| 1181 | Pray( interposed Antisthenes),( 7) do you also know the way to be a king? |
| 1181 | Pray, do you find it so ridiculous my wishing to improve my health by exercise? |
| 1181 | Pray, where''s the wonder? |
| 1181 | Sausage Seller.... What for? |
| 1181 | Shall we feast on perfumes also? |
| 1181 | Since when, then? |
| 1181 | Since when? |
| 1181 | So beautiful you claim to rival me, you boaster? |
| 1181 | Socrates replied: Do you suppose the sad condition of the patient dates from the moment only of our intimacy? |
| 1181 | The good go- between will therefore make his choice between them, and teach only what conduces to agreeableness? |
| 1181 | The other( in a tone of deep vexation): Pray, what thing of the sort are you aware I ever perpetrated? |
| 1181 | Then Callias: What ails you, sirrah? |
| 1181 | Then Socrates: Will you never tire of repeating that one name? |
| 1181 | Then you possess large property in land? |
| 1181 | They could hear the question asked by Dionysus, did she love him? |
| 1181 | This is obvious; or else, why do states and nations, one and all, inquire of the gods by divination what they ought to do and what they ought not? |
| 1181 | To come to our two noses, which is the more handsome, yours or mine? |
| 1181 | To which the host: And that reminds me, a supply of unguents might not be amiss;( 3) what say you? |
| 1181 | Was Cleinias there as a"muta persona"? |
| 1181 | Well then, do they requite your gifts of gold with gratitude? |
| 1181 | Well, and what is it you pride yourself upon, Antisthenes? |
| 1181 | Well, let that be( the other answered); answer me one question: How many fleas''feet distance is it, pray, from you to me? |
| 1181 | Well, on what then? |
| 1181 | What can it be, you laughter- making man, except to set folk laughing? |
| 1181 | What does it seem? |
| 1181 | What fragrance is left for us? |
| 1181 | What have you to say to justify your choice? |
| 1181 | What is your belief on this point? |
| 1181 | What( Socrates rejoined), shall you be able to maintain that by your beauty you can make us better? |
| 1181 | What, then, to nothing, and to nobody? |
| 1181 | What, whilst you are talking? |
| 1181 | What, would you have me imitate Nicostratus( 1) the actor, reciting his tetrameters( 2) to the music of the fife? |
| 1181 | What, would you have me then compare him to worse villains? |
| 1181 | When shall I find my willing heart All taken up by Thee? |
| 1181 | Whereat Socrates turned to the silent man, and thus accosted him: Hermogenes, what is a drunken brawl? |
| 1181 | Whereat Socrates: When will you have done with your gibes, Callias? |
| 1181 | Whereupon Hermogenes inquired: Had he then a large amount of money? |
| 1181 | Which surely is a better fate than to be called a thoughtless person? |
| 1181 | Whom do we choose to bear the sacred olive- shoot( 31) in honour of Athena?--whom else save beautiful old men? |
| 1181 | Why do men steal? |
| 1181 | You can render people just to all the world, but towards yourself you can not? |
| 1181 | You do n''t spend nights with him? |
| 1181 | and with the same tongue and lips and voice may speak with modesty or boastfulnes? |
| 1181 | and you, sir( turning to the Syracusan), what do you pride yourself upon? |
| 1181 | are you going to pass on the business? |
| 1181 | because, forsooth, he bestows upon himself what he desires, and upon his minion things of dire reproach? |
| 1181 | by teaching them some base mechanic art? |
| 1181 | exclaimed another; to which a third rejoined:"Why should it not be learnt as well as other things?" |
| 1181 | he there-- caught me only the other morning in the act of dancing? |
| 1181 | is it likely( he replied), considering I had to listen to them almost daily? |
| 1181 | or is it the sort of exercise I set my heart on? |
| 1181 | or teaching them nobility of soul? |
| 1181 | or that what he hastens to exact, infallibly must separate that other from his nearest friends? |
| 1181 | or to enjoy my victuals better? |
| 1181 | the toothache? |
| 1181 | to sleep better? |
| 1181 | what ampler greatcoat than the tiles above my head? |
| 1181 | what? |
| 1181 | why break burglariously into houses? |
| 1181 | why hale men and women captive and make slaves of them? |
| 1181 | will you devolve this art of yours on me as your successor, Socrates? |
| 1181 | you do n''t say so? |
| 33411 | ,what is temperance? |
| 33411 | At the back of? |
| 33411 | What is prudence? |
| 33411 | What is temperance? |
| 33411 | ''What are you doing, my admirable friends? |
| 33411 | --meaning thereby"what are the true concepts or definitions of these things?" |
| 33411 | All things being material, what is the original kind of matter, or stuff, out of which the world is made? |
| 33411 | Am I to be called a materialist? |
| 33411 | Am I to be supposed to mean that Plato''s mind occupies more space than that of Callias? |
| 33411 | And Socrates, on seeing the man, said,''Well, my good friend, as you are skilled in these matters, what must I do?'' |
| 33411 | And by what process does water, in his opinion, come to be changed into other things; how was the universe formed out of water? |
| 33411 | And if it is good, how is it that there is evil in the world? |
| 33411 | And if so, what sort of a reality is it? |
| 33411 | And this gives us, too, the clue to the problem, what is the end of the State? |
| 33411 | And we are still left to enquire: what is the_ summum bonum_? |
| 33411 | Are not we, if we interpret him as an idealist, reading into him later ideas? |
| 33411 | At what position in this circular movement is our present world to be placed? |
| 33411 | But even if they had solved this minor problem, the greater question still remained in the background, what does this becoming mean? |
| 33411 | But has anybody since ever explained it better? |
| 33411 | But how are we to understand this"participation"? |
| 33411 | But how do we know the truth of this law of causation itself? |
| 33411 | But how is sensation more rational than nutrition? |
| 33411 | But how is this mixing of Being and not- being brought about? |
| 33411 | But if Plato, in answering the question,"What is knowledge?" |
| 33411 | But if knowledge is recollection, it may be asked, why is it that we do not remember at once? |
| 33411 | But if reality is not existence, what is it? |
| 33411 | But in that case why is there an Idea of whiteness? |
| 33411 | But in what relation does this supreme God stand to the Ideas, and especially to the Idea of the Good? |
| 33411 | But is it really surmounted? |
| 33411 | But it might be asked how we know that this universal tendency is right? |
| 33411 | But still, it may be asked, which is the true view of Parmenides? |
| 33411 | But the thought of what? |
| 33411 | But what concepts? |
| 33411 | But what is this matter, and where does it spring from? |
| 33411 | But why is it better to be more organized? |
| 33411 | But why should any cause be the first? |
| 33411 | But why should not sensation pass through nutrition into human reason? |
| 33411 | But why should the Idea of whiteness produce white things? |
| 33411 | But why should there be any copies of the Ideas? |
| 33411 | But why should there be such an Idea? |
| 33411 | But, quite shortly, the question is-- Is there any reason for believing that the ultimate explanation of things must be one? |
| 33411 | Did Zeno mean to say that when he walked about the streets of Elea, it was not true that he walked about? |
| 33411 | Did he mean that it was not a fact that he moved from place to place? |
| 33411 | Do they believe as they speak, or as they act? |
| 33411 | Do we feel that all our difficulties about the existence of evil are solved? |
| 33411 | Do we not mean that the thing appears to us irrational, and we want it shown that it is rational? |
| 33411 | Does his principle explain the world, and does it explain itself? |
| 33411 | Does it explain the world? |
| 33411 | Does this make the matter any clearer? |
| 33411 | Even if the Idea of whiteness explains white objects, yet why do these objects arise, develop, decay, and cease to exist? |
| 33411 | First, does it explain the world? |
| 33411 | For the fundamental problem here is, if we speak of higher and lower beings, what rational ground have we for calling them higher and lower? |
| 33411 | For what is the whole of Aristotle''s philosophy, put in a nutshell? |
| 33411 | Has not Plato asserted that the ultimate reason and ground of all the lower Ideas will be found in the supreme Idea of{ 244} the Good? |
| 33411 | Has the mind got a front and a back? |
| 33411 | He went about enquiring,"What is virtue?" |
| 33411 | How about the millions that have never been observed at all? |
| 33411 | How are we to characterize his system? |
| 33411 | How are we to know what is the proper mean in any matter? |
| 33411 | How are we to know whether any particular concept is part of the system of reason or not? |
| 33411 | How are we to know whether our ideas are correct copies of things? |
| 33411 | How are we to reconcile these two conflicting views of Parmenides? |
| 33411 | How can all the riches and variety of the world come out of this emptiness? |
| 33411 | How can design, order, harmony and beauty be brought about by blind forces acting upon chaotic matter? |
| 33411 | How can this air which has not in it the qualities of things we see, develop them? |
| 33411 | How can we hope to explain the world, if our very first principle itself contains irrationalities? |
| 33411 | How did Plato arrive at this doctrine? |
| 33411 | How did they{ 68} explain the existence of the world? |
| 33411 | How distinguish between reality and imagination, dreams, or illusions? |
| 33411 | How do the Ideas come to have their images stamped upon matter? |
| 33411 | How do we know that it is not merely a universal error? |
| 33411 | How do we know that this is true at those regions of the earth where no one has ever been to see? |
| 33411 | How do we know that water always freezes at 0Â ° centigrade( neglecting questions of pressure, etc.)? |
| 33411 | How do you know that they are similar? |
| 33411 | How does it help thus to duplicate everything? |
| 33411 | How is becoming possible? |
| 33411 | How is form a necessary and self- determining principle? |
| 33411 | How is it that some propositions can be self- evident and others must be proved? |
| 33411 | How is it that they are thus self- evident, that the mind can make these definite and far- reaching assertions without any evidence at all? |
| 33411 | How then can Parmenides be called a materialist? |
| 33411 | How then can the quality of things issue from it? |
| 33411 | How then did they derive the actual world from that principle? |
| 33411 | How then is reason to gain control over the appetites? |
| 33411 | How, now, have these various worlds been formed out of the formless, indefinite, indeterminate matter of{ 26} Anaximander? |
| 33411 | How, now, is the movement of the atoms brought about? |
| 33411 | If knowledge is neither perception nor opinion, what is it? |
| 33411 | If not, how do these properties arise? |
| 33411 | If the clod of earth, like the saintliest man, is God, and there is no more to say of the matter, then how is the saint higher than the clod of earth? |
| 33411 | If the world is illusion, then the problem is, how does that illusion arise? |
| 33411 | If the world is reality, then the problem of philosophy is, how does that reality arise? |
| 33411 | If virtue is the sole end of life, what precisely is virtue? |
| 33411 | In other words, the Ideas being the absolute reality, how does the world of sense, and, in general, the existent universe, arise out of the Ideas? |
| 33411 | In what sense, then, is this a theory of development or evolution? |
| 33411 | Is Being absolutely excludent of not- being? |
| 33411 | Is Spencer''s doctrine a theory of development at all? |
| 33411 | Is his philosophy a pure monism? |
| 33411 | Is it a pluralism? |
| 33411 | Is it good or evil? |
| 33411 | Is it matter, or mind, or something different from both? |
| 33411 | Is it, for example, a personal being like the God of the Christians? |
| 33411 | Is it, in the first place, really conceived as purely non- material and incorporeal? |
| 33411 | Is it{ 6} true, for example, that there is some single ultimate reality which produces all things? |
| 33411 | Is not even an appearance real? |
| 33411 | Is not the essential maxim of modern science to assume nothing, to take nothing for granted, to assert nothing without demonstration, to prove all? |
| 33411 | Is the Absolute an abstract One, utterly exclusive of the many? |
| 33411 | Is the actual existence of things, horses, trees, stars, men, explained by it? |
| 33411 | Is the principle of Ideas a self- explanatory principle? |
| 33411 | Is there development here, that is, is it a movement from something really lower to something really higher? |
| 33411 | Is there improvement, or only difference? |
| 33411 | Is there no logical or philosophical basis for the belief that the ultimate explanation of things must be one? |
| 33411 | It begins when men for the first time attempted to give a scientific reply to the question,"what is the explanation of the world?" |
| 33411 | Moreover, just as Socrates had occupied himself in attempting to fix the concepts of the virtues, asking"what is prudence? |
| 33411 | Moreover, what were the Stoics to say about themselves? |
| 33411 | Now if we try to go on asking,"why is it better to be more rational?" |
| 33411 | Now what does this mean? |
| 33411 | Now, keeping this in mind, are universals, as Plato asserts, substances? |
| 33411 | Of what kinds of things are there Ideas? |
| 33411 | Or does the scale stop there? |
| 33411 | Or is it a combination of the two? |
| 33411 | Or is it merely change from one indifferent thing to another? |
| 33411 | Or is it not rather simply a theory of change? |
| 33411 | Or suppose, in tracing back the chain of causes, we come upon one which we have reason to say is really the first, is anything explained thereby? |
| 33411 | Secondly, is the principle of form self- explanatory? |
| 33411 | So is not the distinction between appearance and reality itself meaningless? |
| 33411 | Suppose I ask you the question,"What is beauty?" |
| 33411 | The earliest Greek philosophers, the Ionics, propounded the question,"what is the ultimate principle of things?" |
| 33411 | The problem of all philosophers from Thales to Anaxagoras was, what is the nature of that first principle from which all things have issued? |
| 33411 | The question still remains, why do such copies exist, how do they arise? |
| 33411 | Their existence, we are told, is explained by the Idea of whiteness? |
| 33411 | Then what is happiness? |
| 33411 | Then what relation does X bear to Y? |
| 33411 | Then why is there an Idea of the Good? |
| 33411 | This does not mean, how has the State arisen in history? |
| 33411 | To put the matter bluntly, why is a man higher than a horse, or a horse than a sponge? |
| 33411 | Virtue is knowledge, but knowledge of what? |
| 33411 | Virtue is knowledge, but knowledge of what? |
| 33411 | Was not Plato in interpreting him idealistically reading his own thought into Parmenides? |
| 33411 | We are still left with the question,"what is virtue?" |
| 33411 | Were they wise men or fools? |
| 33411 | What alone interested them was the question, how am I to live? |
| 33411 | What can be more thoroughly intelligible than reason? |
| 33411 | What can he mean then, when he asserts that I am the wisest of men? |
| 33411 | What can thought understand, if not thought? |
| 33411 | What do such men really believe? |
| 33411 | What ground is there for regarding Parmenides as an idealist? |
| 33411 | What has Aristotle in common with such a writer a Herbert Spencer? |
| 33411 | What is a concept? |
| 33411 | What is it we want? |
| 33411 | What is knowledge? |
| 33411 | What is philosophy about? |
| 33411 | What is reality? |
| 33411 | What is substance? |
| 33411 | What is the cause then of the popular notion that{ 256} Aristotle was the opposite of Plato? |
| 33411 | What is the criterion here? |
| 33411 | What is the criterion of truth? |
| 33411 | What is the difference? |
| 33411 | What is the end of moral activity? |
| 33411 | What is the ground of this distinction? |
| 33411 | What is the necessity of that? |
| 33411 | What is the next step? |
| 33411 | What is the supreme good, the_ summum bonum_? |
| 33411 | What is this moving force? |
| 33411 | What is truth? |
| 33411 | What position, now, are we to assign to Parmenides in philosophy? |
| 33411 | What then is the end? |
| 33411 | What then were the real reasons for these accusations? |
| 33411 | What then? |
| 33411 | What was it, now, which led Anaxagoras to the doctrine of a world- governing intelligence? |
| 33411 | What was their moving force, if it was not weight? |
| 33411 | What, in the first place, is the relation between things and the Ideas? |
| 33411 | What, in the philosophy of Anaxagoras, is this force? |
| 33411 | What, then, is its form? |
| 33411 | What, then, is the good? |
| 33411 | What, then, is the special sphere of philosophy? |
| 33411 | What, then, is"whiteness"? |
| 33411 | When I heard the answer, I asked myself: What can the god mean? |
| 33411 | When I move my arms, did he mean that I am not moving my arms, but that they really remain at rest all the time? |
| 33411 | When death comes we shall not feel it, for is it not the end of all feeling and consciousness? |
| 33411 | When we demand the explanation of anything, what do we mean by explanation? |
| 33411 | Where does this matter come from? |
| 33411 | Which is the historical Parmenides? |
| 33411 | Which of all these impressions is true? |
| 33411 | Which of these will naturally be regarded as the most real? |
| 33411 | Who and what were the Sophists? |
| 33411 | Who is to judge? |
| 33411 | Why avoid evil, when evil is as much a manifestation of God as good? |
| 33411 | Why did Thales choose water as the first principle? |
| 33411 | Why do I call it paper? |
| 33411 | Why is the tedious process of education in mathematics necessary? |
| 33411 | Why should it not be the other way about? |
| 33411 | Why should it not remain by itself, apart, sterile, in the world of Ideas, for all eternity? |
| 33411 | Why should it stir itself? |
| 33411 | Why should not the order be reversed? |
| 33411 | Why should one ever struggle towards higher things, when in reality all are equally high? |
| 33411 | Why should philosophy be said to begin here in particular? |
| 33411 | Why should the Ideas give rise to copies of themselves, and how is the production of these copies effected? |
| 33411 | Why should there be a State at all? |
| 33411 | Why should there be such a principle as form? |
| 33411 | Why should they burden themselves with the control of that which nowise concerns them? |
| 33411 | Why should they go out of themselves into things? |
| 33411 | Why should they need to reproduce themselves in objects? |
| 33411 | Why should they not remain in themselves and by themselves? |
| 33411 | Why should we stop anywhere in the chain of causes? |
| 33411 | Why, then, should they not remain for ever simply as they are? |
| 33411 | what can he be hinting? |
| 33411 | what is happiness? |
| 33411 | { 98} What is the character of the Nous, according to Anaxagoras? |
| 40435 | Disgraced in the opinion of every one,replies Sokrates? |
| 40435 | Scais- tu au moins ce que c''est que la matière? 40435 What are the conditions under which subordinates will cheerfully obey their commanders?" |
| 40435 | Wheat is the Holy, what is the Unholy? 40435 Why are you so curious to know what_ I myself_ have determined on the point? |
| 40435 | ( said he) have none of us before your time talked about the Good and the Just? |
| 40435 | 38- 39:--"The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any supposed moral standard, What is its sanction? |
| 40435 | After the decease of these last- mentioned authors, who can say what became of their MSS.? |
| 40435 | Again, as to predicates-- when you say,_ The man runs_, or_ The man is good_, what do you mean by the predicate_ runs_, or is_ good_? |
| 40435 | And if, adopting any one of them, we reject the others, upon what grounds are we to justify our preference? |
| 40435 | Another argument of Zeno is to the following effect:--"Does a grain of millet, when dropped upon the floor, make sound? |
| 40435 | Are not you aware that the hemlock of Sokrates is in store for_ you_ also?" |
| 40435 | Are there no limits( as Hobbes is so much denounced for maintaining)? |
| 40435 | Are these virtues teachable? |
| 40435 | Are three grains few, and four_ many_?--or, where will you draw the line between Few and Many? |
| 40435 | As we know little about Plato except from his works, the first question to be decided is, Which_ are_ his real works? |
| 40435 | But can we do this with our present scanty information? |
| 40435 | But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can Time possibly be present, to which such continuity is essential?" |
| 40435 | But is all that is just necessarily holy? |
| 40435 | But the question asked was-- What is Holiness generally? |
| 40435 | But what are those great works which the Gods bring about by our agency? |
| 40435 | But what is this_ true determinately_, but true_ upon our knowledge_ or_ evidently true_? |
| 40435 | But what other name was so natural or likely for Anaxagoras himself to choose?] |
| 40435 | But what part? |
| 40435 | Did he publish any of them during the lifetime of Sokrates? |
| 40435 | Do you imagine, that the Good is one thing, and the Beautiful another? |
| 40435 | Do you not know that all things are good and beautiful in relation to the same purpose? |
| 40435 | Eh bien( dit le Sirien), cette chose qui te paroît être divisible, pésante, et grise, me dirois tu bien ce que c''est? |
| 40435 | Erdmann,"Comment seroit il possible qu''aucune chose existât, si l''être même, ipsum Esse, n''avoit l''existence? |
| 40435 | He may have done this: but how are we to prove it? |
| 40435 | How can you properly say( he argues) that you_ know_ the compound AB, when you know neither A nor B separately? |
| 40435 | How did he get his reputation?] |
| 40435 | How happens it that no despot has ever yet done this? |
| 40435 | How much does it attenuate the value of his intentions, as proofs of an internal philosophical sequence? |
| 40435 | How therefore can it be present at all in any of them? |
| 40435 | How? |
| 40435 | How? |
| 40435 | If that were so( Ast argues), how can we explain the fact, that in most of the dialogues there is no philosophical result at all? |
| 40435 | If you speak of Man in general( he said), what, or whom, do you mean? |
| 40435 | In appreciating a philosopher, it is usual to ask, What authoritative creed has he proclaimed, for disciples to swear allegiance to? |
| 40435 | In other words, how can the One be Many, and how can the Many be One? |
| 40435 | In regard to the question, Which were Plato''s genuine works? |
| 40435 | In what manner does ministration, called_ holiness_, benefit or improve the Gods? |
| 40435 | In what then does its essence consist? |
| 40435 | In what then does its essence consist? |
| 40435 | Is it possible that any one can have preferred an indictment against you? |
| 40435 | Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? |
| 40435 | Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? |
| 40435 | It is that branch which concerns ministration by men to the Gods 447 Ministration to the Gods? |
| 40435 | Krobylus, one of the accusers, said to him,"Are_ you_ come to plead on behalf of another? |
| 40435 | Mais qu''est ce donc_ qu''une pleurésie_? |
| 40435 | Moreover, at the very outset of the enquiry, we have to ask, At what period of life did Plato begin to publish his dialogues? |
| 40435 | Next, by what arguments has he enforced or made them good? |
| 40435 | No.--Does a bushel of millet make sound under the same circumstances? |
| 40435 | O(/ti e)kei= noi me\n ta\ sapra\ tau= ta a)po\ dogma/ tôn lalou= sin? |
| 40435 | Or do you suppose that we can not follow out what each of them is, and that we pronounce the words as empty and unmeaning sounds? |
| 40435 | Or does the earliest of them date from a time after the death of Sokrates? |
| 40435 | Or is it holy for this reason, because they do love it? |
| 40435 | Ou)dei\s ê(mô= n pro\ sou= e)/legen a)gatho\n ê)\ di/ kaion? |
| 40435 | Qu''est- ce que la loi de la pesanteur? |
| 40435 | Quanti Platonis vel libros novêre vel nomen? |
| 40435 | Qui a démontré qu''il sera demain jour, et que nous mourrons-- et qu''y a- t- il de plus cru? |
| 40435 | Quid ergo? |
| 40435 | Quotusquisque nunc Aristotelem legit? |
| 40435 | Si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto majus omnes? |
| 40435 | Sokrates asks him-- What is Holiness? |
| 40435 | Sokrates asks him-- What is Holiness?] |
| 40435 | Tell me what is the general constituent feature of_ Holiness_? |
| 40435 | Tell me-- to what end does the work conduce? |
| 40435 | That we are gainers by what they give, is clear enough; but what do they gain on their side? |
| 40435 | The first of the two is an obscure and imperfect reply to the great Sokratic problem-- What is Justice? |
| 40435 | The latter asked Sokrates,"Do you know anything good?" |
| 40435 | The like question about the hairs on a man''s head-- How many must he lose before he can be said to have only a few, or to be bald?] |
| 40435 | The question asked was, not What are the antecedent conditions or causes of rain, thunder, or earthquakes, but Who rains and thunders? |
| 40435 | The questions about which you and I and other men quarrel are, What is just or unjust, honourable or base, good or evil? |
| 40435 | This antithesis appears as an answer when we put the question-- What is the ultimate authority? |
| 40435 | This is what gives rise to the question-- What is the essential scheme for the Individual? |
| 40435 | Ti/ ga\r le/ gei? |
| 40435 | To the Sokratic question, What is the Bonum? |
| 40435 | To what did the dialogues composed by the first Aristippus refer? |
| 40435 | To what ought he to conform-- what shall he aim at? |
| 40435 | To what purpose? |
| 40435 | To what purpose? |
| 40435 | To\ poi= on dê/? |
| 40435 | Tu vois quelques attributs: mais le fond de la chose, le connois tu? |
| 40435 | Ubi apud antiquiores latuit amor iste investigandæ veritatis?" |
| 40435 | Was he right in disobeying? |
| 40435 | Were they not also in the library at the time when Kallimachus compiled his tables? |
| 40435 | What are the motives to obey it? |
| 40435 | What brings you here, Sokrates( asks Euthyphron), away from your usual haunts? |
| 40435 | What is Injustice? |
| 40435 | What is a law? |
| 40435 | What is justice? |
| 40435 | What is that common essence, or same character, which belongs to and distinguishes all holy or pious acts? |
| 40435 | What is that end which the Gods accomplish, through our agency as workmen? |
| 40435 | What is that specific property, by the common possession of which all holy things are entitled to be called holy? |
| 40435 | What is the Honourable and the Base? |
| 40435 | What is the Just and the Unjust? |
| 40435 | What number of grains make a heap-- or are many? |
| 40435 | What positive system, or positive truths previously unknown or unproved, has he established? |
| 40435 | Whence does it derive its binding force? |
| 40435 | Where are we to find a trustworthy Platonic Canon? |
| 40435 | Where was any certain permanent custody provided for them? |
| 40435 | Where, however, is the security that the undertaking would produce three oboli a day to each subscriber?" |
| 40435 | Which was in the right here? |
| 40435 | Who produces earthquakes? |
| 40435 | Why then should any one wish to read written reports of his conversations? |
| 40435 | Xenophon accordingly went to Delphi: but instead of asking the question broadly--"Shall I go, or shall I decline to go?" |
| 40435 | Yes.--Is there not a determinate proportion between the bushel and the grain? |
| 40435 | [ 119] Which of them are we to follow? |
| 40435 | [ 133] How can the Form( Man, White, Good,& c.) be present at one and the same time in many distinct individuals? |
| 40435 | [ 149]--Which of the two do you consider to live most pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled? |
| 40435 | [ 41] Otherwise, why do you not throw up your sceptre? |
| 40435 | [ 44] What is that something-- the common essence or idea? |
| 40435 | [ 49] Tell me, what is the characteristic essence of piety as well as impiety?" |
| 40435 | [ Footnote 2: Aristophanes, Nubes, 368,[ Greek: A)lla\ ti/ s u(/ei?] |
| 40435 | [ Footnote 70: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 156 D- E.[ Greek: Po/ t''ou)=n, metaba/ llei? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: A)=r''ou)=n e)sti/ to\ a)/topon tou= to, e)n ô)=| to/ t''a)\n ei)/ê o(/te metaba/ llei? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Dia\ ti/ ou)=n e)kei= noi( oi( polloi\, oi( i)diô= tai) u(mô= n( tôn philoso/ phôn) i)schuro/ teroi? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Po/ te ga\r e)n ê(mi= n au)toi= s ou)k e)/stin o( tha/ natos? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Pô= s ô)= Zê/ nôn, tou= to le/ geis? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Ti/ de\ oi( polue/ laioi? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Ti/ ou)=n? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Ti/ s ou)=n pot''e)sti\ te/ chnê tê= s paraskeuê= s tou= mêde\n a)dikei= sthai ê)\ ô(s o)li/ gista? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: a)/xion ga\r pa= n tô= n o)/ntôn pou= ei)=nai; ei) de\ o( to/ pos tô= n o)/ntôn, pou= a)\n ei)/ê?]] |
| 40435 | [ Greek: kai\ tou= to pô= s ou)k a)mathi/ a e)sti\n au)tê\ ê( e)ponei/ distos, ê( tou= oi)/esthai ei)de/ nai a(\ ou)k oi)=den?]] |
| 40435 | [ Greek: tau= ta ga\r e)gô\ a)kou/ sas e)nethumou/ mên ou(tôsi/, Ti/ pote le/ gei o( theo\s kai\ ti/ pote ai)ni/ ttetai? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: ti/ ga\r kai\ phê/ somen, oi(/ ge kai\ au)toi\ o(mologou= men peri\ au)tô= n mêde\n ei)de/ nai?]] |
| 40435 | [ Greek: to\ o)rtha\ doxa/ zein kai\ a)/neu tou= e)/chein lo/ gon dou= nai, ou)k oi)=sth''o(/ti ou)/te e)pi/ stasthai e)stin? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: tou/ tôn tô= n pollô= n kalô= n mô= n ti e)/stin, o( ou)k ai)schro\n phanê/ setai? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: ê)\ a)rkei= u(mi= n to\ ê(de/ ôs katabiô= nai to\n bi/ on a)/neu lupô= n? |
| 40435 | [ Side- note: Ministration to the Gods? |
| 40435 | [ Side- note: When did Plato begin to compose? |
| 40435 | ]\_ Sokr._--What sort of ministration? |
| 40435 | _ Sokr._--Do the Gods love the holy, because it_ is_ holy? |
| 40435 | _ Sokr._--Then it appears that the holy is what the Gods love? |
| 40435 | _ Which_ Dionysius is meant?--the elder or the younger? |
| 40435 | _ istius vitii num nostra culpa est_? |
| 40435 | a)/logon ga\r pra= gma pô= s a)\n ei)/ê e)pistê/ mê?] |
| 40435 | and if so, which? |
| 40435 | c. 14, p. 26 D.[ Greek: ô)= thauma/ sie Me/ lête, i(na ti/ tau= ta le/ geis? |
| 40435 | c. 4, p. 20 B- C.[ Greek: ti/ s tê= s toiau/ tês a)retê= s, tê= s a)nthrôpi/ nês te kai\ politikê= s, e)pistê/ môn e)sti/ n? |
| 40435 | e)/ti de\ e(/na e)o/ nta to\n Ê(rakle/ a, kai\ e)/ti a)/nthrôpon, ô(s dê/ phasi, kô= s phu/ sin e)/chei polla\s muria/ das phoneu= sai? |
| 40435 | e)gô\ ga\r dê\ ou)/te me/ ga ou)/te smikro\n xu/ noida e)mautô=| sopho\s ô)/n; ti/ ou)=n pote le/ gei pha/ skôn e)me\ sophô/ taton ei)=nai? |
| 40435 | kai\ nê\ Di/ a pa/ lin le/ ontos kai\ kuno\s to\ tre/ chein, katêgorou= men? |
| 40435 | kai\ tô= n dikai/ ôn, o(\ ou)k a)/dikon? |
| 40435 | kai\ tô= n o(si/ ôn, o(\ ou)k a)no/ sion?] |
| 40435 | or how is it to be distinguished from other parts or branches of the just? |
| 40435 | or more specifically, What is the source of its obligation? |
| 40435 | or that Sokrates in the Philêbus and Republic is older than in the Kratylus or Gorgias? |
| 40435 | ou)de\ ê(/lion ou)de\ selê/ nên a)/ra nomi/ zô theou\s ei)=nai, ô(/sper oi( a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi?]] |
| 40435 | the four obedient citizens, or the one disobedient? |
| 40435 | ti/ de\ oi( gnô/ mê| kai\ a)rguri/ ô| duna/ menoi chrêmati/ zesthai? |
| 40435 | ti/ de\ oi( polupro/ batoi? |
| 40435 | what are temperance and courage? |
| 40435 | what are the limits of obedience to the laws? |
| 40435 | what is injustice? |
| 40435 | what is law, lawlessness, democracy, aristocracy? |
| 40435 | what is the government of mankind, and the attributes which qualify any one for exercising such government? |
| 40435 | what number are few? |
| 40435 | where does the right of final decision reside, on problems and disputes ethical, political, æsthetical? |
| 40435 | ê)\ mê\ parakolouthou= ntes ti/ e)sti tou/ tôn e(/kaston, a)sê/ môs kai\ kenô= s e)phtheggo/ metha ta\s phôna/ s?] |
| 40438 | But will you not admit that such a man lives basely or dishonourably? |
| 40438 | Car enfin qu''y a- t- il de grand dans la connoissance des mouvemens des planètes? 40438 Is that your explanation of justice( asks Sokrates): that it consists in telling truth, and rendering to every one what you have had from him?" |
| 40438 | Nam quæ est superstitio? 40438 What then-- do you not grant farther, that he lives badly, disagreeably, disadvantageously, to himself?" |
| 40438 | What? 40438 -- Pô= s dê= ta di/ kês ou)/sês, o( Zeu\s ou)k a)po/ lôlen, to\n pate/ r''au(tou= dê/ sas? 40438 10), citing Aristobulus and Numenius, says[ Greek: Ti/ ga\r e)/sti Pla/ tôn, ê)\ Môu+sê\s a)ttiki/ zôn?] 40438 243; of all three parts of soul? 40438 27; is it teachable by system? 40438 333 E:[ Greek: Ou)k a)\n ou)=n pa/ nu ge/ ti spoudai= on ei)/ê ê( dikaiosu/ nê, ei) pro\s ta\ a)/chrêsta chrê/ simon o)\n tugcha/ nei?]] 40438 447; not a right traffic between men and gods, 448; is it holy? 40438 A)/llo ti ou)=n, e)/phê, kai\ su\ ou(/tô poiê/ seis? 40438 Are they one thing, or two separate things? 40438 Are you going to give me one of those answers which I forbade? 40438 Are you satisfied that their courage( or self- command) shall be lame or one- sided-- good against pains, but not good against pleasures? 40438 But do there really exist any such Forms or Ideas-- as Fire_ per se_, the Generic Fire-- Water_ per se_, the Generic Water, invisible and intangible? 40438 But how can such restriction be enforced, since no individual paternity or maternity is recognised in the Commonwealth? 40438 But how can we implant such unanimous and unshaken belief, in a story altogether untrue? 40438 But how is such activity to be obtained? 40438 But is it the fact that there are in each man three such mental constituents-- three different classes, sorts, or varieties, of mind? 40438 But is it true that women are competent to the function of Guardians? 40438 But tell me, Sokrates( asks Adeimantus), what do_ you_ conceive the Good to be-- Intelligence or Pleasure, or any other thing different from these? 40438 But we must ask him farther-- Proper and suitable-- how? 40438 But what is Good? 40438 But what is Good?] 40438 But what is this Something, midway between Ens and Particulars Non- Ens, and partaking of both-- which is the object of Opination? 40438 But what_ is_ the good and honourable-- or the bad and dishonourable? 40438 Can you specify in what particular transactions the just man has any superior usefulness as a co- operator? 40438 Do the names in the first triplet mean substantially the same thing, only looked at in different aspects and under different conditions? 40438 Do you wish me not to be happy? 40438 Does the internal reason and sentiment of the agent coincide with that of his countrymen, as to what is just and unjust? 40438 Does there exist nothing really anywhere, beyond the visible objects which we see and touch? 40438 First, What is Justice? 40438 For when a man says that Intelligence is the Good, our next question to him must be, What sort of Intelligence do you mean?--Intelligence of what? 40438 Here then the question is opened, Which of the three is in the right? 40438 Holiness, what is? 40438 How are philosophers to be formed? 40438 How can we expect that such a man should prefer justice, when the rewards of injustice on its largest scale are within his reach? 40438 How is it( says the Athenian) that you deal so differently with pains and pleasures? 40438 How is the Platonic colony to be first set on its march, and by whom are its first magistrates to be named? 40438 If you ask men-- How much is twelve? 40438 If you say that the agreeable course is the happiest, what do you mean by always exhorting me to be just? 40438 Illud ab hoc igitur quærendum est, quid sit amari Tantopere, ad somnum si res redit atque quietem Cur quisquam æterno possit tabescere luctu? 40438 In a word, whenever a man is effective as a guard of any thing, is he not also effective as a thief of it? 40438 In boxing or in battle, is not he who is best in striking, best also in defending himself? 40438 In like manner, the cases must be specified in which justice renders what is proper and suitable-- to whom, how, or what? 40438 In regard to disease, is not he who can best guard himself against it, the most formidable for imparting it to others? 40438 In the body of Guardians or Soldiers 35 Where is the Temperance? 40438 Interroganti porro illi, Quid hoc? 40438 Is he essentially homogeneous with his countrymen( to use the language of Plato in the Gorgias[57]), a chip of the same block? 40438 Is not the general who watches best over his own camp, also the most effective in surprising and over- reaching the enemy? 40438 Is the female nature endued with the same aptitudes for such duties as the male? 40438 Is the just man happy in or by reason of his justice? 40438 Is the unjust man unhappy by reason of his injustice? 40438 It resides in the few elder Rulers_ ib._ Where is the Courage? 40438 Kai\ mê\n to/ ge ê(du\ e)n psuchê=| gigno/ menon kai\ to\ lupêro\n ki/ nêsi/ s tis a)mphote/ rô e)/ston? 40438 Kai\ pô/ s a)\n tau= ta/ g''e)/ti xugchôroi= men? 40438 Kakourgi/ an de\ tê\n megi/ stên tê= s e(autou= po/ leôs ou)k a)diki/ an phê/ seis ei)=nai? 40438 Meat and drink-- or true opinions, knowledge, intelligence, and virtue? 40438 Nevertheless the avowed purpose of the treatise is, not to depict the ideal of a commonwealth, but to solve the questions, What is Justice? 40438 Now as to the question, What Good is? 40438 Now tell me-- In what manner are the objects here defined ensured by the institutions of Apollo and Zeus at Sparta and Krete? 40438 Now which of these two judgments shall we pronounce to be the truth? 40438 O(/pôs? 40438 Or do they mean three distinct things, separable and occurring the one without the other? 40438 Or is it profitable to him to be unjust, if he can contrive to escape detection and punishment? 40438 Or that which embraces the mortal, the transient, and the ever variable-- being itself of kindred nature? 40438 Ou)kou= n e)peidê\ du/ o, kai\ e(\n e)ka/ teron? 40438 Ou)kou= n, o(/, ti a)\n au)tô= n eu(/rômen e)n au)tê=|, to\ u(po/ loipon e)/stai to\ ou)ch eu(rême/ non?] 40438 Pain, Evil, Unhappiness? 40438 Poi/ an? 40438 Poi= on ti? 40438 Pô= s ou)=n o)rthô= s e)/sti to\ mê\ a)lgei= n ê(du\ ê(gei= sthai, ê)\ to\ mê\ chai/ rein a)niaro/ n? 40438 Question-- How are Happiness and Misery apportioned among them? 40438 Question-- How are Happiness and Misery apportioned among them?] 40438 Quo audito, Chalifam ab eo quæsivisse, Quidnam Bonum esset? 40438 Quærenti Chalifæ quid hoc esset? 40438 Secondly, To which of the three classes of good things does Justice belong? 40438 Superiors rule and Inferiors obey_ ib._ Where is the Justice? 40438 Tell me for what want or acquisition justice is useful during peace? 40438 That which embraces the true, eternal, and unchangeable-- and which is itself of similar nature? 40438 The professed subject is-- What is Justice? 40438 There is perfect unanimity between them as to the point-- Who ought to command, and who ought to obey? 40438 Thirdly, wherein resides the Temperance of the city? 40438 Ti/ de/? 40438 Ti/ de/? 40438 To his own judgment? 40438 To\ de\ mê/ te ê(du\ mê/ te lupêro\n ou)chi\ ê(suchi/ a me/ ntoi kai\ e)n me/ sô| tou/ tôn e)pha/ nê a)/rti? 40438 Tripartite distribution of Good-- To which of the three heads does Justice belong? 40438 Tripartite distribution of Good-- To which of the three heads does Justice belong?] 40438 Under what circumstances is Justice useful? 40438 Under what circumstances is Justice useful?] 40438 We must decline the problem, What Good itself is? 40438 What are the characteristic points of difference, by reason of which Virtue sometimes receives one of these names, sometimes another? 40438 What are those modes of jointly employing money, in which the just man is more useful than others? 40438 What course of life are they likely to choose? 40438 What good_ can_ he possess, apart from pleasure? 40438 What if the powerful man mistakes his own advantage? 40438 What if the powerful man mistakes his own advantage?] 40438 What is Injustice? 40438 What is that common object? 40438 What is the common property, or point of similarity between Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice-- by reason of which each is termed Virtue? 40438 What is the explanation which he himself gives( in this very Republic) of the primary origin of a city? 40438 What is the relation between Pleasure, Good, and Happiness? 40438 What is the supreme object of knowledge? 40438 What necessity was there to copy the worst parts of the Generic Animal as well as the best? 40438 What other Sophist, or what private exhortation, can contend successfully against teachers such as these? 40438 What penalty will you then impose upon yourself? 40438 What restriction is to be placed upon his power of making a valid will? 40438 What then is the object of Opining? 40438 When Plato speaks of the just or the unjust man, to whose judgment does he make appeal? 40438 Where is its Justice? 40438 Where is its Justice?] 40438 Where is the motive, operative, demiurgic force, ready to translate such an idea into reality? 40438 Wherein does the Justice of the city reside? 40438 Which of the three varieties of pleasure and modes of life is the more honourable or base, the better or worse, the more pleasurable or painful? 40438 Which of the two exists most perfectly? 40438 Which of the two is most existent? 40438 Which of the two partakes most of pure essence? 40438 Which of the two will have the happiest life? 40438 Who is to fix the limit of admissible divergence between the various compositions of a man like Plato? 40438 Whom does Plato intend for the fourth person, unnamed and absent? 40438 [ 100] Long- haired men are different from bald- heads: but shall we conclude, that if the former are fit to make shoes, the latter are unfit? 40438 [ 13]_ T._--What will you say if I show you another answer better than all of them? 40438 [ 186] But what are the highest studies? 40438 [ 195] What then is this Real Good-- the Noumenon, Idea, or form of Good? 40438 [ 221] Now what cognitions, calculated to aid such a purpose, can we find to teach? 40438 [ 290] By what criterion, or by whose judgment, is this question to be decided? 40438 [ 295] How is he to carry out this maxim in his laws? 40438 [ 367] Now which of the two( asks Plato) directs the movements of the celestial sphere, the Sun, Moon, and Stars? 40438 [ 63] You agree with me in this, do you not? |
| 40438 | [ 66] Or is this mere unfounded speech? |
| 40438 | [ 67] He obtains praise and honour:--Is_ that_ good, but disagreeable-- and would the contrary, infamy, be agreeable? |
| 40438 | [ 7][ Footnote 5: Plato, Republic, i. p. 332 D.[ Greek: ê( ou)=n dê\ ti/ si ti/ a)podidou= sa te/ chnê dikaiosu/ nê a)\n kaloi= to?]] |
| 40438 | [ Footnote 129: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 C.] How is the father to know his own daughter( it is asked), or the son his own mother? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Bou/ lei ou)=n e)/nthende a)rxô/ metha e)piskopou/ ntes, e)k tê= s ei)ôthui/ as metho/ dou? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n mousikê/ n ge pa= sa/ n phamen ei)kastikê/ n te ei)=nai kai\ mimêtikê/ n?]] |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n tau= ta pa/ schoi a)\n pa/ nta dia\ to\ mê\ e)/mpeiros ei)=nai tou= a)lêthinô= s a)/nô te o)/ntos kai\ e)n me/ sô|? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Plê/ rôsis de\ a)lêtheste/ ra tou= ê(=tton ê)\ tou= ma= llon o)/ntos? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Pou= ou)=n a)/n pote e)n au)tê=|( tê=| po/ lei) ei)/ê ê(/ te dikaiosu/ nê kai\ ê( a)diki/ a? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Ti/ de\ dê/? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Ti/ ga/ r e)sti to\ e)rgazo/ menon, pro\s ta\s i)de/ as a)poble/ pon?] |
| 40438 | [ Greek: ei)/th''o(/stis o(mologei= tau= ta, u(pome/ nei mê\ theô= n ei)=nai plê/ rê pa/ nta?]] |
| 40438 | [ Greek: to\_ de\ dê\ loipo\n ei)=dos_, di''o(\ a)\n e)/ti a)retê= s mete/ choi po/ lis, ti/ pot''a)\n ei)/ê? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: ê)= kai\ dialektiko\n kalei= s to\n lo/ gon e(/kastou lamba/ nonta tê= s ou)si/ as?]] |
| 40438 | [ Greek: ê)\ tou= to me/ n i)/sôs a)\n xugchôrê/ saite, to/ ge ai)schrô= s( zê= n)? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Explanation by Polemarchus-- Farther interrogations by Sokrates-- Justice renders what is proper and suitable: but how? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: First, where is the wisdom of the city? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: How is such a fiction to be accredited in the first instance? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Question-- How is the scheme practicable? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Where is the Courage? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Where is the Justice? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Where is the Temperance? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Why are not the citizens tested in like manner, in regard to resistance against the seductions of pleasure?] |
| 40438 | _ S._--But is not a man often mistaken in this belief? |
| 40438 | _ S._--How can I possibly answer, when you prescribe beforehand what I am to say or not to say? |
| 40438 | _ S._--In what matters is it that the just man shows his special efficiency, to benefit friends and hurt enemies? |
| 40438 | _ S._--Who is it that is most efficient in benefiting his friends and injuring his enemies, as to health or disease? |
| 40438 | _ S._--Who, in reference to the dangers in navigation by sea? |
| 40438 | _ S._--Why not similar? |
| 40438 | _ S._--You mean, then, that it is just to hurt unjust men, and to benefit just men? |
| 40438 | _ T._--Is that what you intend to do? |
| 40438 | _ ib._ First, where is the wisdom of the city? |
| 40438 | _ ê(\ chalepo\n eu(rei= n belti/ ô tê= s u(po\ tou= pollou= chro/ nou eu(rême/ nês_? |
| 40438 | and at the same time say-- Don''t tell me that it is twice six, or three times four, or four times three-- how can any man answer your question? |
| 40438 | e)n au)tê=| tê=| po/ lei pô= s a)llê/ lois metadô/ sousin ô(=n a)\n e(/kastoi e)rga/ zôntai? |
| 40438 | e._ things good_ per se_, and good also in their consequences? |
| 40438 | e._ things not good_ per se_, but good only in their consequences? |
| 40438 | ei) ou)=n o(/moios a)nê\r tê=| po/ lei, ou) kai\ e)n e)kei/ nô| a)na/ gkê tê\n au)tê\n ta/ xin e)nei= nai?] |
| 40438 | et n''en sçavons nous pas assez présentement pour régler nos mois et nos années? |
| 40438 | in what cases, proper? |
| 40438 | in what cases, proper? |
| 40438 | in what cases? |
| 40438 | or to which of the numerous other dissentient judgments? |
| 40438 | p. 376 E.[ Greek: Ti/ s ou)=n ê( paidei/ a? |
| 40438 | p. 376 E.[ Greek: Ti/ s ou)=n ê( paidei/ a? |
| 40438 | p. 412 C.[ Greek: Ou)kou= n phroni/ mous te ei)s tou= to dei= u(pa/ rchein kai\ dunatou\s kai\ e)/ti kêdemo/ nas tê= s po/ leôs? |
| 40438 | p. 415 C- D.[ Greek: Tou= ton ou)=n to\n mu= thon o(/pôs a)\n peisthei= en, e)/cheis tina\ mêchanê/ n? |
| 40438 | p. 415 C- D[ Greek: Tou= ton ou)=n to\n mu= thon o(/pôs a)\n peisthei= en, e)/cheis tina\ mêchanê/ n? |
| 40438 | p. 505 D.][ Side- note: What is the Good? |
| 40438 | p. 521 C.[ Greek: Ti/ a)\n ou)=n ei)/ê ma/ thêma psuchê= s o(lko\n a)po\ tou= gignome/ nou e)pi\ to\ o)/n?]] |
| 40438 | p. 532 D.][ Side- note: Question by Glaukon-- What is the Dialectic Power? |
| 40438 | p. 584 C.[ Greek: Nomi/ zeis ti e)n tê=| phu/ sei ei)=nai to\ me\n a)/nô, to\ de\ ka/ tô, to\ de\ me/ son? |
| 40438 | p. 664 D.][ Side- note: Pleasure-- Good-- Happiness-- What is the relation between them?] |
| 40438 | paideu/ ein de\ teleô/ tata kai\ a)perga/ zesthai oi(/ous bou/ lontai ei)=nai kai\ ne/ ous kai\ presbute/ rous kai\ a)/ndras kai\ gunai= kas?]] |
| 40438 | po/ then a)/llothen ê)\ e)k tô= n a)natomô= n?]] |
| 40438 | qui gradus? |
| 40438 | quæ harum species? |
| 40438 | quæ[ Greek: a)theo/ tês]? |
| 40438 | ti/ a)\n oi)/ei au)tou\s a)pokri/ nasthai? |
| 40438 | ti/ ga\r dê\ dikai/ ô| chôrizo/ menon ê(donê= s a)gatho\n a)\n gi/ gnoito?]] |
| 40438 | to whom? |
| 40438 | to\ kai\ a)êdô/ s kai\ mê\ xumphero/ ntôs au)tô=|? |
| 40438 | to\ kai\ kakô= s? |
| 40438 | whatever consequences may befall him? |
| 40438 | Ê)= kai\ dunato\n to\ mêde/ tera o)\n a)mpho/ tera gi/ gnesthai? |
| 40438 | Ê)\ ou)k oi)=stha o(/ti to\n mê\ peitho/ menon a)timi/ ais te kai\ chrê/ masi kai\ thana/ tois kola/ zousin? |
| 40438 | Ô)= thauma/ sie, su\ de\ dê\ poi= skopei= s? |
| 40438 | ê)\ ou)/? |
| 40438 | ê)\ ou)ch ou(/tô plou/ tou a)retê\ die/ stêken, ô(/sper e)n pla/ stiggi zugou= keime/ nou e(kate/ rou a)ei\ tou)nanti/ on r(e/ ponte?] |
| 40438 | ô(=n e)gô\ a)pei= pon, tou/ tôn ti a)pokrinei=? |
| 1598 | ''And are you an ox because you have an ox present with you?'' |
| 1598 | ''And dictation is a dictation of letters?'' |
| 1598 | ''And do they learn,''said Euthydemus,''what they know or what they do not know?'' |
| 1598 | ''And he is not wise yet?'' |
| 1598 | ''And what did you think of them?'' |
| 1598 | ''And you acquire that which you have not got already?'' |
| 1598 | ''And you know letters?'' |
| 1598 | ''And you see our garments?'' |
| 1598 | ''But are there any beautiful things? |
| 1598 | ''But,''retorts Dionysodorus,''is not learning acquiring knowledge?'' |
| 1598 | ''Cleinias,''says Euthydemus,''who learn, the wise or the unwise?'' |
| 1598 | ''Crito,''said he to me,''are you giving no attention to these wise men?'' |
| 1598 | ''Do they know shoemaking, etc?'' |
| 1598 | ''Do you see,''retorts Euthydemus,''what has the quality of vision or what has not the quality of vision?'' |
| 1598 | ''Is a speaking of the silent possible? |
| 1598 | ''What did I think of them?'' |
| 1598 | ''What does the word"non- plussed"mean?'' |
| 1598 | ''What was that?'' |
| 1598 | ''You want Cleinias to be wise?'' |
| 1598 | A noble man or a mean man? |
| 1598 | A weak man or a strong man? |
| 1598 | All letters? |
| 1598 | Am I not right? |
| 1598 | Am I not right? |
| 1598 | Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots? |
| 1598 | And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man? |
| 1598 | And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones? |
| 1598 | And an indolent man less than an active man? |
| 1598 | And are not good things good, and evil things evil? |
| 1598 | And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts? |
| 1598 | And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters? |
| 1598 | And are not these gods animals? |
| 1598 | And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing? |
| 1598 | And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you? |
| 1598 | And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than gold, you are not gold? |
| 1598 | And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere? |
| 1598 | And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? |
| 1598 | And clearly we do not want the art of the flute- maker; this is only another of the same sort? |
| 1598 | And did you always know this? |
| 1598 | And did you not say that you knew something? |
| 1598 | And do all other men know all things or nothing? |
| 1598 | And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not? |
| 1598 | And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and warm things of the warm? |
| 1598 | And do you know of any word which is alive? |
| 1598 | And do you know stitching? |
| 1598 | And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand? |
| 1598 | And do you know with what you know, or with something else? |
| 1598 | And do you please? |
| 1598 | And do you really and truly know all things, including carpentering and leather- cutting? |
| 1598 | And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man? |
| 1598 | And doing is making? |
| 1598 | And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers? |
| 1598 | And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus? |
| 1598 | And have you no need, Euthydemus? |
| 1598 | And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not? |
| 1598 | And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know, whether you make the addition of''when you know them''or not? |
| 1598 | And he has puppies? |
| 1598 | And he is not wise as yet? |
| 1598 | And he who says that thing says that which is? |
| 1598 | And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other? |
| 1598 | And if a man does his business he does rightly? |
| 1598 | And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them? |
| 1598 | And if there are such, are they the same or not the same as absolute beauty?'' |
| 1598 | And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the gold? |
| 1598 | And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk-- in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one? |
| 1598 | And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness-- a wise physician, or an ignorant one? |
| 1598 | And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not? |
| 1598 | And is Patrocles, he said, your brother? |
| 1598 | And is he not yours? |
| 1598 | And is that fair? |
| 1598 | And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing? |
| 1598 | And is this true? |
| 1598 | And knowing is having knowledge at the time? |
| 1598 | And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly? |
| 1598 | And may there not be a silence of the speaker? |
| 1598 | And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time? |
| 1598 | And now answer: Do you always know with this? |
| 1598 | And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men desire happiness? |
| 1598 | And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge? |
| 1598 | And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do? |
| 1598 | And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as many spears and shields as possible? |
| 1598 | And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the places where most gold was hidden in the earth? |
| 1598 | And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us? |
| 1598 | And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father? |
| 1598 | And speaking is doing and making? |
| 1598 | And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them? |
| 1598 | And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom? |
| 1598 | And that is a distinct thing apart from other things? |
| 1598 | And that is impossible? |
| 1598 | And that which is not is nowhere? |
| 1598 | And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted that? |
| 1598 | And the dog is the father of them? |
| 1598 | And they are the teachers of those who learn-- the grammar- master and the lyre- master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners? |
| 1598 | And to have money everywhere and always is a good? |
| 1598 | And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also? |
| 1598 | And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing to learn? |
| 1598 | And were you wise then? |
| 1598 | And what does that signify? |
| 1598 | And what is your notion? |
| 1598 | And what knowledge ought we to acquire? |
| 1598 | And what other goods are there? |
| 1598 | And what things do we esteem good? |
| 1598 | And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning? |
| 1598 | And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast? |
| 1598 | And who would do least-- a poor man or a rich man? |
| 1598 | And whose the making of pots? |
| 1598 | And why should you say so? |
| 1598 | And would not you, Crito, say the same? |
| 1598 | And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? |
| 1598 | And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? |
| 1598 | And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own? |
| 1598 | And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?'' |
| 1598 | And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense;--what do you say, wise man? |
| 1598 | And you admit gold to be a good? |
| 1598 | And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased? |
| 1598 | And you also see that which has the quality of vision? |
| 1598 | And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are? |
| 1598 | And your mother, too, is the mother of all? |
| 1598 | And your papa is a dog? |
| 1598 | Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless? |
| 1598 | Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked one? |
| 1598 | Are you not other than a stone? |
| 1598 | Are you prepared to make that good? |
| 1598 | Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously maintain no man to be ignorant? |
| 1598 | At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that? |
| 1598 | Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo? |
| 1598 | But are you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? |
| 1598 | But can a father be other than a father? |
| 1598 | But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are describing the same thing? |
| 1598 | But can wisdom be taught? |
| 1598 | But did you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking? |
| 1598 | But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is impossible? |
| 1598 | But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another? |
| 1598 | But if he can not speak falsely, may he not think falsely? |
| 1598 | But if you were not wise you were unlearned? |
| 1598 | But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches-- would that be the art which would make us happy? |
| 1598 | But what need is there of good fortune when we have wisdom already:--in every art and business are not the wise also the fortunate? |
| 1598 | But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say something and you say nothing-- is there any contradiction? |
| 1598 | But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters? |
| 1598 | But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the silent? |
| 1598 | But why should I repeat the whole story? |
| 1598 | CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge? |
| 1598 | CRITO: And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this? |
| 1598 | CRITO: And were you not right, Socrates? |
| 1598 | CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old? |
| 1598 | CRITO: How did that happen, Socrates? |
| 1598 | CRITO: Well, and what came of that? |
| 1598 | CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates? |
| 1598 | CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum? |
| 1598 | CRITO: Why not, Socrates? |
| 1598 | Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one''s own land, are goods? |
| 1598 | Certainly; did you think we should say No to that? |
| 1598 | Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my father? |
| 1598 | Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied? |
| 1598 | Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what they do not know? |
| 1598 | Do you agree with me? |
| 1598 | Do you agree? |
| 1598 | Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing? |
| 1598 | Do you not know letters? |
| 1598 | Do you not remember? |
| 1598 | Do you suppose the same person to be a father and not a father? |
| 1598 | Do you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not? |
| 1598 | Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth? |
| 1598 | Does not your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake? |
| 1598 | Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not? |
| 1598 | Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are there not? |
| 1598 | Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to tell a lie? |
| 1598 | For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited? |
| 1598 | For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked? |
| 1598 | For tell me now, is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns? |
| 1598 | For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all? |
| 1598 | Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you mean, Dionysodorus? |
| 1598 | How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not? |
| 1598 | I can not say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men? |
| 1598 | I did, I said; what is going to happen to me? |
| 1598 | I said, and where did you learn that? |
| 1598 | I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? |
| 1598 | I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? |
| 1598 | Is not that your position? |
| 1598 | Is not the honourable honourable and the base base? |
| 1598 | Is not this the result-- that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil? |
| 1598 | Is that your difficulty? |
| 1598 | Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood? |
| 1598 | Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat this dog? |
| 1598 | Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? |
| 1598 | May we not answer with absolute truth-- A knowledge which will do us good? |
| 1598 | Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak? |
| 1598 | Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things? |
| 1598 | Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how can I tell you to do that which is not? |
| 1598 | Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant? |
| 1598 | Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter? |
| 1598 | Of their existence or of their non- existence? |
| 1598 | Of what country are they, and what is their line of wisdom? |
| 1598 | Or a speaking of the silent? |
| 1598 | Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? |
| 1598 | Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? |
| 1598 | Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer? |
| 1598 | Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own? |
| 1598 | Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is, where did I learn that the good are unjust? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And surely it ought to do us some good? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme power? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have supreme authority over the subject arts-- what does that do? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: Are you incredulous, Crito? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are ridiculous performers? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect? |
| 1598 | Shall we not be happy if we have many good things? |
| 1598 | Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge by which we are to make other men good? |
| 1598 | Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest? |
| 1598 | Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not know others? |
| 1598 | That makes no difference;--and must you not, if you are knowing, know all things? |
| 1598 | That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is? |
| 1598 | Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball:''Who are they who learn dictation of the grammar- master; the wise or the foolish boys?'' |
| 1598 | Then are they not animals? |
| 1598 | Then do you see our garments? |
| 1598 | Then he is the same? |
| 1598 | Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know? |
| 1598 | Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good- fortune but success? |
| 1598 | Then tell me, he said, do you know anything? |
| 1598 | Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they are? |
| 1598 | Then there is no such thing as false opinion? |
| 1598 | Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact? |
| 1598 | Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of those who have? |
| 1598 | Then we must surely be speaking the same thing? |
| 1598 | Then what are they professing to teach?'' |
| 1598 | Then what is the inference? |
| 1598 | Then why did you ask me what sense my words had? |
| 1598 | Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them? |
| 1598 | Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything? |
| 1598 | Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? |
| 1598 | Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes? |
| 1598 | Then, my good friend, do they all speak? |
| 1598 | Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters? |
| 1598 | Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only who does not know letters learns? |
| 1598 | Upon what principle? |
| 1598 | Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought to have one shield only, and one spear? |
| 1598 | Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdom-- among the goods or not? |
| 1598 | Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness? |
| 1598 | Well, I said; but then what am I to do? |
| 1598 | Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing? |
| 1598 | Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? |
| 1598 | Well, have not all things words expressive of them? |
| 1598 | Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise? |
| 1598 | Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful? |
| 1598 | What am I to do with them? |
| 1598 | What can make you tell such a lie about me and the others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish? |
| 1598 | What can they see? |
| 1598 | What do I know? |
| 1598 | What do you mean, Dionysodorus? |
| 1598 | What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing? |
| 1598 | What do you mean? |
| 1598 | What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? |
| 1598 | What is that? |
| 1598 | What is that? |
| 1598 | What knowledge is there which has such a nature? |
| 1598 | What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? |
| 1598 | What of that? |
| 1598 | What proof shall I give you? |
| 1598 | What then do you say? |
| 1598 | What then is the result of what has been said? |
| 1598 | What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this? |
| 1598 | What, before you, Dionysodorus? |
| 1598 | What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own? |
| 1598 | What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other animals? |
| 1598 | What, replied Dionysodorus in a moment; am I the brother of Euthydemus? |
| 1598 | What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent? |
| 1598 | What, said he, is the business of a good workman? |
| 1598 | When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one thing and I describe another, how can there be a contradiction?'' |
| 1598 | When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all things? |
| 1598 | When you were children, and at your birth? |
| 1598 | Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse? |
| 1598 | Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful things? |
| 1598 | Why do you say so? |
| 1598 | Why not? |
| 1598 | Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks of things as they are? |
| 1598 | Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing? |
| 1598 | Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? |
| 1598 | Will you not cease adding to your answers? |
| 1598 | Will you not take our word that we know all things? |
| 1598 | Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? |
| 1598 | With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul? |
| 1598 | Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? |
| 1598 | Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings? |
| 1598 | Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea- urchins then? |
| 1598 | You admit that? |
| 1598 | You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which I was just naming? |
| 1598 | You remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us? |
| 1598 | You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were learning? |
| 1598 | You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one? |
| 1598 | You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is? |
| 1598 | You wish him, he said, to become wise and not, to be ignorant? |
| 1598 | and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable? |
| 1598 | and teach them all the arts,--carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them? |
| 1598 | and was not that our conclusion? |
| 1598 | and will you explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? |
| 1598 | for you admit that all things which have life are animals; and have not these gods life? |
| 1598 | has he got to such a height of skill as that? |
| 1598 | if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? |
| 1598 | or are you the same as a stone? |
| 1598 | tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering? |
| 40437 | But if any one demand here, where this[ Greek: a)ki/ nêtos ou)si/ a], these immutable Entities do exist? 40437 Du reste, quand même cette ressemblance serait aussi réelle qu''elle est fausse, en quoi prouverait- il l''identité nécessaire des intelligences? |
| 40437 | Indem wir Denken und Sein unterscheiden, fragen wir, wie ist es möglich, dass sich i m Erkennen Denken und Sein vereinigt? 40437 Quid ipsum Bonum? |
| 40437 | Would you choose? 40437 Would_ you_ be satisfied( he asks Protarchus) to live your life through in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? |
| 40437 | ( replies Sokrates) must he have cognition not only of the true line and circle, but also of the false, the variable, the uncertain? |
| 40437 | --423 D:[ Greek: ou) kai\_ ou)si/ a dokei=_ soi ei)=nai e(ka/ stô|, ô(/sper kai\ chrô= ma kai\ a(\ nu= n dê\ e)le/ gomen? |
| 40437 | 1, where he deals with the like confusion--[Greek: a)=r''ei) mê\ dikai/ ôs poli/ tês, ou) poli/ tês?]] |
| 40437 | A)lla\ tino/ s? |
| 40437 | After all this debate( continues Kleitophon) I addressed the same question to yourself, Sokrates-- What is Justice? |
| 40437 | Ai( de\ pra/ xeis e)pha/ nêsan ê(mi= n ou) pro\s ê(ma= s ou)=sai, a)ll''au(tô= n tina i)di/ an phu/ sin e)/chousai? |
| 40437 | Are all sensible objects, even such as are vulgar, repulsive, and contemptible, represented in this higher world? |
| 40437 | Are the Forms or Ideas mere conceptions of the mind and nothing more? |
| 40437 | Are they not eternal, unchangeable and stationary? |
| 40437 | Are we to pass our whole lives in stimulating those who have not yet been stimulated, in order that they in their turn may stimulate others? |
| 40437 | But how can any one conceive the non- existent? |
| 40437 | But how can anything be distinct from both? |
| 40437 | But how can anything be distinct from both?] |
| 40437 | But how can false opinions be possible? |
| 40437 | But how can false opinions be possible? |
| 40437 | But how do Socher and Stallbaum know that this extreme minuteness of subdivision into classes_ was_ a characteristic of the Megaric philosophers? |
| 40437 | But how far is writing, even when art is applied to it, capable of producing real and permanent effect? |
| 40437 | But how if the theory be not true? |
| 40437 | But how is it possible that he should confound a non- cognition with a cognition, or_ vice versâ_? |
| 40437 | But how is such alternation or change intelligible? |
| 40437 | But what about the other doctrine, which he declares to be a part of the same programme--_Homo Mensura_--the Protagorean formula? |
| 40437 | But what do they mean( continues the Eleate) by this"holding of communion"? |
| 40437 | But what ground have we for presuming that Plato''s views on the subject were more correct? |
| 40437 | But when we ask Intelligence,_ of what_? |
| 40437 | But( asks Plato in reply) what do you mean by"the mind holding communion"with the intelligible world? |
| 40437 | Can it be taught upon system or principle? |
| 40437 | Can it be taught upon system or principle? |
| 40437 | Can not we make advance towards virtue and get full possession of it? |
| 40437 | Could you not have reached this point by a shorter road?" |
| 40437 | Do you mean that Unum is identical with Ens-- and are they only two names for the same One and only thing? |
| 40437 | Do you mean that existence is something belonging to both and affirmed of both? |
| 40437 | Does not an angler belong to the general class-- men of art or craft? |
| 40437 | Does not he know the one from the other? |
| 40437 | Enquirers often ask--"How can the One be Many? |
| 40437 | Equality is in all equal objects: but how can a part of the Form equality, less than the whole, make objects equal? |
| 40437 | First, Do such unities or monads really and truly exist? |
| 40437 | He spares no labour in investigating-- What is man in general? |
| 40437 | How are they to be mixed? |
| 40437 | How are they to be mixed?] |
| 40437 | How are we to explain these three different modes of handling the same question by the same philosopher? |
| 40437 | How are we to set to work in regard to the learning of justice? |
| 40437 | How can a man who opines or affirms, opine or affirm falsely-- that is, opine or affirm the thing that is not? |
| 40437 | How can a thing appear to be what it is not? |
| 40437 | How can any man judge or opine falsely? |
| 40437 | How can any one, then, choose such an evil willingly? |
| 40437 | How can any thing be neither in motion nor at rest; standing apart from both? |
| 40437 | How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely? |
| 40437 | How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely?] |
| 40437 | How can knowledge betray a man into such error? |
| 40437 | How can pleasures or pains be either true or false? |
| 40437 | How can the Form, essentially One, belong at once to a multitude of particulars? |
| 40437 | How can the Many be One? |
| 40437 | How can the Many be One? |
| 40437 | How can the Many be One? |
| 40437 | How can the One be Many? |
| 40437 | How can the One be Many? |
| 40437 | How can the same thing be both One and Many?" |
| 40437 | How can these four propositions all be true--_Unum est Unum_--_Unum est Multa_--_Unum non est Unum_--_Unum non est Multa_? |
| 40437 | How can this be possible? |
| 40437 | How can we conceive Non- Ens: or confound together two distinct realities? |
| 40437 | How can we conceive Non- Ens: or confound together two distinct realities?.] |
| 40437 | How can we know that a forty- horse power is always equal to itself, unless we assume that all horses are of equal strength? |
| 40437 | How can we know that one pound and one pound make two pounds, if one of the pounds may be troy and the other avoirdupois? |
| 40437 | How does this One become Many, or how do these Many become One? |
| 40437 | How far is there any natural adaptation, or special fitness, of each name to the thing named? |
| 40437 | How is a false proposition possible? |
| 40437 | How is he distinguished from other persons or other things? |
| 40437 | How is the Universal Beautiful( The Self- Beautiful-- Beauty) in all and each beautiful thing? |
| 40437 | How is this possible? |
| 40437 | How then can either of them become either greater or less? |
| 40437 | How will Sokrates or his friends answer the corresponding question in their case? |
| 40437 | How( asks Parmenides) can such participation take place? |
| 40437 | How( to use Aristotelian language[28]) can the essence be separated from that of which it is the essence? |
| 40437 | How, for example, does Plato prove, in his Timæus, the objective reality of Ideas or Forms? |
| 40437 | If I am not allowed to judge of truth and falsehood for myself, who is to judge for me? |
| 40437 | If Many, how Many? |
| 40437 | If Many, how Many? |
| 40437 | If he knows A, and knows B-- how can he mistake A for B? |
| 40437 | In answer to the question put by Sokrates-- What is Knowledge or Cognition? |
| 40437 | In replying to those objectors,[1] he enquires, What is meant by long or short-- excessive or deficient-- great or little? |
| 40437 | In the Menon also the same question is broached as in the Protagoras, whether virtue is teachable or not? |
| 40437 | In the first place-- Are the three really distinct characters? |
| 40437 | In what is it that they both agree? |
| 40437 | In what other dialogue has Plato answered them? |
| 40437 | Is Good identical with pleasure, or with intelligence, or is it a Tertium Quid, distinct from both? |
| 40437 | Is each of them dispersed and parcelled out among countless individuals? |
| 40437 | Is existence any thing distinct from Hot and Cold? |
| 40437 | Is it not an action or a passion produced by a certain power of agent and patient coming into co- operation with each other? |
| 40437 | Is it really impossible for a man to conceive, that a thing, which he knows, is another thing which he does not know? |
| 40437 | Is the Universal Man distributed among all individual men, or is he one and entire in each of them? |
| 40437 | Is the entire Form in each individual object? |
| 40437 | Is this distinction your own? |
| 40437 | Is this to be all? |
| 40437 | It is declared by Aristotle to be the question first and most disputed in Philosophia Prima, Quid est Ens? |
| 40437 | It will be found, however, that when Parmenides comes to question Sokrates, What[ Greek: ei)/dê] do you recognise? |
| 40437 | Its teaching province is plain enough-- to maintain the succession of just men: but what is its working province? |
| 40437 | Kai\ ti/ e)/stai e)kei/ nô| ô(=| a)\n ge/ nêtai ta)gatha/? |
| 40437 | Lastly, who, if any, are the opponents thus intended to be ridiculed? |
| 40437 | Le feu ne manifesterait plus aucune des propriétés que nous lui connaissons: que serait- il? |
| 40437 | Likeness and Unlikeness-- One and Many-- Just, Beautiful, Good,& c.--are all these Forms absolute and existent_ per se_? |
| 40437 | Logical maxim of contradiction 239 Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato-- How do we know that one is true, the other false? |
| 40437 | Ne faut- il pas plutôt admirer l''opiniâtre vitalité des différences originelles qui résistent à tant de causes de nivellement? |
| 40437 | Next, assuming that they do exist, how do they come into communion with generated and perishable particulars, infinite in number? |
| 40437 | No time can be assigned for the change: neither the present, nor the past, nor the future: how then can the change occur at all? |
| 40437 | No true or pure pleasure therein 350 Can pleasures be true or false? |
| 40437 | Now this_ knowing_, is it not an action-- and is not the_ being known_, a passion? |
| 40437 | Now what is the end to be attained, by this our enquiry into the definition of a Statesman? |
| 40437 | O)/ntos ê)\ ou)k o)/ntos? |
| 40437 | Of Hair, Mud,& c.? |
| 40437 | Of Hair, Mud,& c.? |
| 40437 | Of Man, Horse,& c.? |
| 40437 | Of Man, Horse,& c.? |
| 40437 | Of the Just and Good? |
| 40437 | Of the Just and Good? |
| 40437 | Or are these two-- Same and Different-- essential appendages of the three before- named? |
| 40437 | Or are they external, separate, self- existent realities? |
| 40437 | Or do we want anything more besides? |
| 40437 | Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack? |
| 40437 | Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack?.] |
| 40437 | Orelli):--"An vero, inquit, voluptates corporis expetendæ, quæ veré et graviter dictæ sunt à Platone illecebræ et escæ malorum? |
| 40437 | Ou)ch e(no/ s tinos, o(\ e)pi\ pa= sin e)kei= no to\ no/ êma e)po\n noei=, mi/ an tina\ ou)=san i)de/ an? |
| 40437 | Ou)kou= n kai\ o( Chaire/ dêmos, e)/phê, e(/teros ô)\n patro/ s, ou)k a)\n patê\r ei)/ê?] |
| 40437 | Ou)kou= n kai\ poio/ n tina au)to\n ei)=nai dei=?] |
| 40437 | Ou)kou= n kai\_ poi= o/ n tina_ au)to\n ei)=nai dei=?]] |
| 40437 | Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas 60 What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? |
| 40437 | Plato himself, in many passages, insists emphatically upon the dissensions in mankind respecting the question--"_Who are_ the good and wise men?" |
| 40437 | Po/ teron o( E)/rôs e)kei/ nou ou(= e)/stin e)/rôs, e)pithumei= au)tou= ê)\ ou)/? |
| 40437 | Prô= ton me\n, a(plou= n ê)\ polueide/ s e)stin, ou(= peri\ boulêso/ metha ei)=nai au)toi\ technikoi\ kai\ a)/llon dunatoi\ poiei= n? |
| 40437 | Pô= s ga\r ou)/? |
| 40437 | Quid igitur? |
| 40437 | Quid ipsum Pulchrum? |
| 40437 | Quis autem bonâ mente præditus, non mallet nullas omnino nobis à naturâ voluptates esse datas?" |
| 40437 | Si_ Unum non est_, what is true about Cætera? |
| 40437 | Subjects and personages in the Theætêtus 110 Question raised by Sokrates-- What is knowledge or Cognition? |
| 40437 | The interpreters are dissentient; and which of them is to hold the privilege of infallibility? |
| 40437 | The main question canvassed is, What is Knowledge-- Cognition-- Science? |
| 40437 | The passage does not prove this; but if it did, what did Protagoras teach in the book? |
| 40437 | The second of these propositions( says Plato) affirms_ what is not_, as if it were, respecting the subject But how do we know this to be so? |
| 40437 | Then what is the characteristic function of each? |
| 40437 | Theories of various philosophers about Ens_ ib._ Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non- Ens 201 Whether Ens is Many or One? |
| 40437 | Through what bodily organ do we derive these judgments respecting what is common to all? |
| 40437 | Ti/ de/; i(kano\n ta)gatho/ n? |
| 40437 | Ti/ de/? |
| 40437 | Ti/ ou)=n? |
| 40437 | Ti/ ou)=n? |
| 40437 | To what does the lawgiver look when he frames a name? |
| 40437 | To which of the four above- mentioned Genera( says Sokrates) does Pleasure belong? |
| 40437 | To which of the four does Intelligence or Cognition belong? |
| 40437 | To whom does Plato here make allusion, under the general title of the Fastidious([ Greek: oi( duscherei= s]) Pleasure- haters? |
| 40437 | Upon which Simplikius remarks, What are these few things? |
| 40437 | We have thus, in enquiring-- What is Knowledge or Cognition? |
| 40437 | What can this Something be? |
| 40437 | What circumstances are we at liberty to suppose to be suppressed, modified, or reversed? |
| 40437 | What common property in all of them, is it, that you signify by the name_ good_? |
| 40437 | What constitutes happiness and misery? |
| 40437 | What constitutes right and legitimate Name- giving? |
| 40437 | What constitutes right or legitimate sociality? |
| 40437 | What do these philosophers mean by saying that Ens is double or triple? |
| 40437 | What do they mean by existence, if this be not so? |
| 40437 | What do you mean by saying that Hot and Cold_ exist_? |
| 40437 | What do you mean( asks Protarchus) by true pleasures or pains? |
| 40437 | What else is there worth having( says Sokrates), which these professors teach? |
| 40437 | What is a Sophist? |
| 40437 | What is a philosopher? |
| 40437 | What is a politician or statesman? |
| 40437 | What is it here? |
| 40437 | What is there in like manner capable of serving as illustrative contrast? |
| 40437 | What mental condition is it which bears that name? |
| 40437 | What number and variety of these intelligible Forms do you recognise--(asks Parmenides)? |
| 40437 | What other professions or occupations are there analogous to those of Sophist and Statesman, so as to afford an illustrative comparison? |
| 40437 | What sort of exercise must I go through? |
| 40437 | What then is the purpose or value of the dialogue? |
| 40437 | What would have been_ his_ answer? |
| 40437 | What_ are_ Virtue, Courage, Temperance? |
| 40437 | When foreigners talk to us in a strange language, are we to say that we do not hear what they say, or that we both hear and know it? |
| 40437 | When unlettered men look at an inscription, shall we contend that they do not see the writing, or that they both see and know it? |
| 40437 | Wherein do they differ from each other or from other things? |
| 40437 | Wherein does the difference consist? |
| 40437 | Which of the three dialogues represents Plato''s real opinion on the question? |
| 40437 | Which of the two do you choose? |
| 40437 | Which varieties of knowledge, science, or art, are the purest from heterogeneous elements, and bear most closely upon truth? |
| 40437 | Which way are we to turn then, if these Forms be beyond our knowledge? |
| 40437 | Who is to judge whether this process has been well or ill performed? |
| 40437 | Why do you stray so widely from your professed topic? |
| 40437 | Why should a Megaric author embody in his two dialogues a false pretence and assurance, that they are sequel of the Platonic Theætêtus? |
| 40437 | Why should so acute a writer( as Socher admits him to be) go out of his way to suppress his own personality, and merge his fame in that of Plato? |
| 40437 | Why? |
| 40437 | Will such a combination suffice to constitute Good, or an all- sufficient and all- satisfactory existence? |
| 40437 | Would_ any one_ be satisfied?" |
| 40437 | Y- a- t- il lieu de nous enquérir si nous percevons_ les choses telles qu''elles sont? |
| 40437 | Yet how can such a confusion be possible? |
| 40437 | Yet how can this be? |
| 40437 | You talk about true and false opinions: but how can false opinions be possible? |
| 40437 | [ 113] The Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias consoles the speechless men by saying-- What does this signify, provided you are just and virtuous? |
| 40437 | [ 145] But to what Items does Sokrates intend the measure to be applied? |
| 40437 | [ 14] How? |
| 40437 | [ 2] You asked them,"Whither are you drifting, my friends? |
| 40437 | [ 61] Is there any art or systematic method, capable of being laid down beforehand and defended upon principle, for accomplishing the object_ well_? |
| 40437 | [ 75] Are not such existences real? |
| 40437 | [ 7]"To what does all this tend? |
| 40437 | [ 82] But what is the cause that it is so? |
| 40437 | [ Footnote 27: Plato, Philêbus, p. 29 C. 30 A:[ Greek: To\ par''ê(mi= n sô= ma a)=r''ou) psuchê\n phê/ somen e)/chein? |
| 40437 | [ Footnote 4: Plato, Philêbus, p. 11 C. 20 C- D:[ Greek: Tê\n ta)gathou= moi= ran po/ teron a)na/ gkê te/ leon ê)\ mê\ te/ leon ei)=nai? |
| 40437 | [ Footnote 74: Plato, Phædrus, p. 270 D.[ Greek: A)=r''ou)ch ô(=de dei= dianoei= sthai peri\ o(touou= n phu/ seôs? |
| 40437 | [ Footnote 8: Plato, Politikus, p. 285 D.[ Greek:_ Xen_.--Ti/ d''au)=? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: A)/llo ti ou)=n e(/teros, ê)= d''o(/s]( Dionysodorus),[ Greek: ô)\n li/ thou, ou) li/ thos ei)=? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Bou/ lei ou)=n e)pi\ tê\n u(po/ thesin pa/ lin e)x a)rchê= s e)pane/ lthômen, e)a/ n ti ê(mi= n e)paniou= sin a)lloi= on phanê=|?]] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: O( E)/rôs e)/rôs e)sti\n ou)deno\s ê(\ tino/ s? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ou)d''a)/ra e)pistê/ mên u(podêma/ tôn suni/ êsin, o( e)pistê/ mên mê\ ei)dio/ s? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n ei)ko/ s ge ou)/te chai/ rein theou\s ou)/te to\ e)nanti/ on? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n tê\n au(tou= a)\n pseudê= xugchôroi=, ei) tê\n tô= n ê(goume/ nôn au)to\n pseu/ desthai o(mologei= a)lêthê= ei)=nai?]] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Phe/ re, o( e)rô= n tô= n a)gathô= n, ti/ e)ra=|? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ti/ e)/stin ai)/tion tou= sugkatati/ thesthai/ tini? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ti/ na de\ ta\ o)li/ ga e)sti/ n, e)ph''ô(=n a(/ma tô=| e)pistêtô=| ê( e)pistê/ mê e)sti/ n? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ti/ nes ou)=n oi( philosophou= ntes, ei) mê/ te oi( sophoi\ mê/ te oi( a)mathei= s? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: de/ xai''a)\n su/, Prô/ tarche, zê= n to\n bi/ on a(/panta ê(do/ menos ê(dona\s ta\s megi/ stas?] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: e)re/ sthai ei) prosepi/ statai kai\ ou(sti/ nas dei= kai\ o(po/ te e(/kasta tou/ tôn poiei= n, kai\ me/ chri o(po/ sou?]] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: o( gignô/ skôn gignô/ skei ti\ ê)\ ou)de\n? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: ou)kou= n tau= ta me\n a(/panta ê( maieutikê\ ê(mi= n te/ chnê a)nemiai= a/ phêsi gegenê= sthai kai\ ou)k a)/xia trophê= s?]] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: spouda/ zei tau= ta Sôkra/ tês ê)\ pai/ zei?] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: ti/ ga\r matho/ nt''e)s tou\s theou\s u(bri/ zeton, kai\ tê= s selê/ nês e)skopei= sthe tê\n e)/dran?] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: to\ d''e(/teron, o(\ du/ natai poiei= n ê(mi= n e)/rgon o( di/ kaios, ti/ tou= to/ phamen? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: ê( de\ par''ê(mi= n e)pistê/ mê ou) tê= s par''ê(mi= n a)\n a)lêthei/ as ei)/ê? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: ê)\ e)kei= no ê(mi= n thaumaste/ on ma= llon, ô(s i)schuro/ n ti po/ lis e)sti\ phu/ sei?]] |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing more? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Can pleasures be true or false? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Enquiry-- What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato-- How do we know that one is true, the other false?] |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Holding communion-- What? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Question raised by Sokrates-- What is knowledge or Cognition? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Second Question-- Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: What causes the excellence of this mixture? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: What is the Good? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Whether Ens is Many or One? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description? |
| 40437 | _ But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while?_ This therefore is nothing to the purpose. |
| 40437 | _ Menex._--Could you recollect what Aspasia said? |
| 40437 | _ Menex._--What would you have to say, if the duty were imposed upon you? |
| 40437 | _ Menex._--Why do you not proceed with it then? |
| 40437 | _ Si Unum non est_, what is to become of_ Cætera_? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._--But you are here assuming that there_ are_ false opinions? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._--If you are asked, With what does a man perceive white and black? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._--Shall we admit, that when we perceive things by sight or hearing, we at the same time_ know_ them all? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._--Well then, do n''t you admire her? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._--What have you been doing at the Senate- house, Menexenus? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ti/ ou)=n? |
| 40437 | _ Ti/ tou)nteu= then_? |
| 40437 | and are you not grateful to her for the harangue? |
| 40437 | and how any virtue can exist, when there are no special teachers, and no special learners of virtue? |
| 40437 | and if the name- givers were mistaken on this fundamental point? |
| 40437 | and if they are not possible, what is the meaning of_ true_, as applied to opinions? |
| 40437 | and is that cause more akin to Reason or to Pleasure? |
| 40437 | and that etymologies which to them appeared admissible, would be regarded by him as absurd and ridiculous? |
| 40437 | and what are the attributes, active and passive, which distinguish man from other things? |
| 40437 | and what proof can be furnished that he was able to answer them? |
| 40437 | do you think you would be competent to deliver the harangue yourself, if the Senate were to elect you? |
| 40437 | et même, vu le caractère indéterminé des causes que nous concevons dans les corps, y- a- t- il quelque chose de plus à savoir? |
| 40437 | kai\ au)= e(ka/ stê ê( par''ê(mi= n e(pistê/ mê tô= n par''ê(mi= n o)/ntôn e(ka/ stou a)\n e)pistê/ mê xu/ mbainoi ei)=nai?] |
| 40437 | kai\ au)= e(ka/ stê ê( par''ê(mi= n e)pistê/ mê tô= n par''ê(mi= n o)/ntôn e(ka/ stou a)\n e)pistê/ mê su/ mbainoi ei)=nai?] |
| 40437 | kai\ e(/teros ô)\n chrusou=, ou) chruso\s ei)=? |
| 40437 | kai\ ou(/tô me\n a)\n ple/ on ti poioi= men kai\ o)noma/ zoimen, a)/llôs de\ ou)/?] |
| 40437 | or how can either_ really be_ so, when they were not so before? |
| 40437 | or indeed of having art applied to it at all? |
| 40437 | or is it found, whole and entire, in each individual, maintaining itself as one and the same, and yet being parted from itself? |
| 40437 | p. 132 D.[ Greek: ou)k a)na/ gkê, ei) ta)/lla phê\| tô= n ei)dô= n mete/ chein, ê)\ dokei= n soi e)k noê/ mata o)/nta a)no/ êta ei)=nai? |
| 40437 | p. 135 E.][ Side- note: What sort of exercise? |
| 40437 | p. 136) says respecting the Jewish Cabbala:--"Que dirai- je de leur_ Cabale_? |
| 40437 | p. 254 E.[ Greek: ti/ pot''au)= nu= n ou(/tôs ei)rê/ kamen to/ te tau)to\n kai\ tha/ teron? |
| 40437 | p. 256 D.[ Greek: ou)kou= n dê\ saphô= s ê( ki/ nêsis o)/ntôs ou)k o)/n e)sti kai\ o)\n, e)pei/ per tou= o)/ntos mete/ chei?]] |
| 40437 | p. 300 C.[ Greek: A)ll''ou) tou= to e)rôtô=, a)lla\ ta\ pa/ nta siga=| ê)\ le/ gei? |
| 40437 | p. 387 C.[ Greek: Ou)kou= n kai\ to\ o)noma/ zein pra= xis ti/ s e)stin, ei)/per kai\ to\ le/ gein pra= xis tis ê)=n peri\ ta\ pra/ gmata? |
| 40437 | p. 418 C.[ Greek: Oi)=stha ou)=n o(/ti mo/ non tou= to dêloi= to\ a)rchai= on o)/noma tê\n dia/ noian tou= theme/ nou?] |
| 40437 | p. 429 B- C._ Sokr._[ Greek: Pa/ nta a)/ra ta\ o)no/ mata o)rthôs kei= tai?] |
| 40437 | p. 439 D.[ Greek: A)=r''ou)=n oi(=on te proseipei= n au)to\ o)rthôs, ei) a)ei\ u(pexe/ chetai?]] |
| 40437 | pha/ nai, e(\n e(/kasto/ n e)sti tô= n noêma/ tôn, no/ êma de\ ou)deno/ s? |
| 40437 | pô= s a)/rchesthai dei= n phame\n dikaiosu/ nês peri\ mathê/ seôs?]] |
| 40437 | that there are two distinct existing elements-- Hot and Cold-- or three? |
| 40437 | to\ ginô/ skein ê)\ gignô/ skesthai phate\ poi/ êma ê)\ pa/ thos ê)\ a)mpho/ teron?]] |
| 40437 | tou/ toin de\ duoi= n o)/ntoin kai\ e)me\ kai\ se\ kai\ ta\ a)/lla a(\ dê\ polla\ kalou= men, metalamba/ nein?]] |
| 40437 | what are the numerical ratios upon which they depend-- the rhythmical and harmonic systems? |
| 40437 | what is the work which the just man does for us? |
| 40437 | you will answer, with his eyes: shrill or grave sounds? |
| 40437 | Ê( de\ par''ê(mi= n e)pistê/ mê ou) tê= s par''ê(mi= n a)\n a)lêthei/ as ei)/ê? |
| 40437 | ê)\ a)na/ gkê a)/ma ê(mô= n lego/ ntôn a)/llo au)to\ eu)thu\s gi/ gnesthai kai\ u(pexie/ nai, kai\ mêke/ ti ou(/tôs e)/chein? |
| 40437 | ê)\_ a)po\ kunêgesi/ ou tou=_ peri\ tê\n A)lkibia/ dou ô(/ran?] |
| 1687 | ''And can they hear the dialogue?'' |
| 1687 | ''And do you suppose the individual to partake of the whole, or of the part?'' |
| 1687 | ''And of human beings like ourselves, of water, fire, and the like?'' |
| 1687 | ''And what kind of discipline would you recommend?'' |
| 1687 | ''And who will answer me? |
| 1687 | ''And would you like to say that the ideas are really divisible and yet remain one?'' |
| 1687 | ''And would you make abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good?'' |
| 1687 | ''And would you say that each man is covered by the whole sail, or by a part only?'' |
| 1687 | ''But how can individuals participate in ideas, except in the ways which I have mentioned?'' |
| 1687 | ''But must not the thought be of something which is the same in all and is the idea? |
| 1687 | ''How do you mean?'' |
| 1687 | ''I quite believe you,''said Socrates;''but will you answer me a question? |
| 1687 | ''If God is, what follows? |
| 1687 | ''In the same sort of way,''said Parmenides,''as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many-- that is your meaning?'' |
| 1687 | ''Then how do you know that there are things in themselves?'' |
| 1687 | ''Then the beautiful and the good in their own nature are unknown to us?'' |
| 1687 | ''Then the ideas have parts, and the objects partake of a part of them only?'' |
| 1687 | ''Then will you, Zeno?'' |
| 1687 | ''Welcome, Cephalus: can we do anything for you in Athens?'' |
| 1687 | ''What difficulty?'' |
| 1687 | ''What is that?'' |
| 1687 | ''Why not of the whole?'' |
| 1687 | ''Yet if these difficulties induce you to give up universal ideas, what becomes of the mind? |
| 1687 | Again, how far can one touch itself and the others? |
| 1687 | Again, is the not- one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one? |
| 1687 | Again, let us conceive of a one which by an effort of abstraction we separate from being: will this abstract one be one or many? |
| 1687 | Again, of the parts of the one, if it is-- I mean being and one-- does either fail to imply the other? |
| 1687 | Again, the like is opposed to the unlike? |
| 1687 | Am I not right? |
| 1687 | And a multitude implies a number larger than one? |
| 1687 | And all the parts are contained by the whole? |
| 1687 | And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one? |
| 1687 | And also in other things? |
| 1687 | And also of one? |
| 1687 | And are not things of a different kind also other in kind? |
| 1687 | And are not things other in kind unlike? |
| 1687 | And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience separation and aggregation? |
| 1687 | And because having limits, also having extremes? |
| 1687 | And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself? |
| 1687 | And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one? |
| 1687 | And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose being? |
| 1687 | And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing? |
| 1687 | And can you think of anything else which is between them other than equality? |
| 1687 | And change is motion-- we may say that? |
| 1687 | And could we hear it? |
| 1687 | And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of being and the loss of being? |
| 1687 | And do not''will be,''''will become,''''will have become,''signify a participation of future time? |
| 1687 | And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one? |
| 1687 | And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger? |
| 1687 | And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really exist? |
| 1687 | And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being? |
| 1687 | And greatness and smallness always stand apart? |
| 1687 | And has not- being also, if it is not? |
| 1687 | And have we not already shown that it can not be in anything? |
| 1687 | And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other,--in any such case do I not speak of both? |
| 1687 | And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also participate? |
| 1687 | And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole? |
| 1687 | And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three? |
| 1687 | And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree? |
| 1687 | And if the world partakes in the ideas, and the ideas are thoughts, must not all things think? |
| 1687 | And if there are not two, there is no contact? |
| 1687 | And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three? |
| 1687 | And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge? |
| 1687 | And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be unlike them? |
| 1687 | And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be? |
| 1687 | And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two? |
| 1687 | And in either case, the one would be many, and not one? |
| 1687 | And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others are, and the one is not? |
| 1687 | And in that it was other it was shown to be like? |
| 1687 | And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many? |
| 1687 | And inequality implies greatness and smallness? |
| 1687 | And is each of these parts-- one and being-- to be simply called a part, or must the word''part''be relative to the word''whole''? |
| 1687 | And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself? |
| 1687 | And is not time always moving forward? |
| 1687 | And is not''other''a name given to a thing? |
| 1687 | And is the one a part of itself? |
| 1687 | And it is older( is it not?) |
| 1687 | And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others? |
| 1687 | And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them appears to be one, though it is really many? |
| 1687 | And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation?--Where is the wonder? |
| 1687 | And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two? |
| 1687 | And not having the same measures, the one can not be equal either with itself or with another? |
| 1687 | And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one? |
| 1687 | And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole? |
| 1687 | And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness? |
| 1687 | And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to have come into existence? |
| 1687 | And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say what is? |
| 1687 | And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it? |
| 1687 | And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity? |
| 1687 | And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity? |
| 1687 | And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things? |
| 1687 | And so when he says''If one is not''he clearly means, that what''is not''is other than all others; we know what he means-- do we not? |
| 1687 | And surely there can not be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest? |
| 1687 | And that is the one? |
| 1687 | And that which contains, is a limit? |
| 1687 | And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are? |
| 1687 | And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest? |
| 1687 | And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger? |
| 1687 | And that which is older is older than that which is younger? |
| 1687 | And that which is older, must always be older than something which is younger? |
| 1687 | And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge? |
| 1687 | And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming? |
| 1687 | And the one has been proved both to be and not to be? |
| 1687 | And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all? |
| 1687 | And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less? |
| 1687 | And the one is the whole? |
| 1687 | And the one was also shown to be the same with the others? |
| 1687 | And the other to the same? |
| 1687 | And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction? |
| 1687 | And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the extremes? |
| 1687 | And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it? |
| 1687 | And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no reality, if one is not? |
| 1687 | And therefore is and is not in the same state? |
| 1687 | And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be attributed to it? |
| 1687 | And therefore not other than itself? |
| 1687 | And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or different in relation to it? |
| 1687 | And they are unequal to an unequal? |
| 1687 | And things that are not equal are unequal? |
| 1687 | And three are odd, and two are even? |
| 1687 | And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation to itself or other? |
| 1687 | And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others? |
| 1687 | And we have not got the idea of knowledge? |
| 1687 | And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other? |
| 1687 | And we surely can not say that what is truly one has parts? |
| 1687 | And what are its relations to other things? |
| 1687 | And what are the relations of the one to the others? |
| 1687 | And what is a whole? |
| 1687 | And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend? |
| 1687 | And what of that? |
| 1687 | And what shall be our first hypothesis, if I am to attempt this laborious pastime? |
| 1687 | And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all? |
| 1687 | And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalized? |
| 1687 | And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea? |
| 1687 | And when we put them together shortly, and say''One is,''that is equivalent to saying,''partakes of being''? |
| 1687 | And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way but is in another? |
| 1687 | And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? |
| 1687 | And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated? |
| 1687 | And who will answer me? |
| 1687 | And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not- one? |
| 1687 | And will not knowledge-- I mean absolute knowledge-- answer to absolute truth? |
| 1687 | And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the idea itself? |
| 1687 | And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all, be an idea? |
| 1687 | And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it? |
| 1687 | And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not being one, if one is not? |
| 1687 | And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water? |
| 1687 | And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only, and different parts different men? |
| 1687 | And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end? |
| 1687 | And you may say the name once or oftener? |
| 1687 | And''is,''or''becomes,''signifies a participation of present time? |
| 1687 | And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way? |
| 1687 | And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of being? |
| 1687 | Because every part is part of a whole; is it not? |
| 1687 | But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these? |
| 1687 | But as I must attempt this laborious game, what shall be the subject? |
| 1687 | But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older nor younger, what shall we say? |
| 1687 | But can all this be true about the one? |
| 1687 | But can all this be true? |
| 1687 | But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing? |
| 1687 | But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being? |
| 1687 | But can one be in many places and yet be a whole? |
| 1687 | But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions? |
| 1687 | But does one partake of time? |
| 1687 | But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible? |
| 1687 | But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round? |
| 1687 | But how can not- being, which is nowhere, move or change, either from one place to another or in the same place? |
| 1687 | But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same measures or have anything else the same? |
| 1687 | But if anything is other than anything, will it not be other than other? |
| 1687 | But if it be not altered it can not be moved? |
| 1687 | But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same age with itself? |
| 1687 | But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and can not be none? |
| 1687 | But if one is, and both odd and even numbers are implied in one, must not every number exist? |
| 1687 | But if one is, what happens to the others, which in the first place are not one, yet may partake of one in a certain way? |
| 1687 | But if one is, what will happen to the others-- is not that also to be considered? |
| 1687 | But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another? |
| 1687 | But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion? |
| 1687 | But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all? |
| 1687 | But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact? |
| 1687 | But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another? |
| 1687 | But is the contradiction also the final conclusion? |
| 1687 | But is the one other than one? |
| 1687 | But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? |
| 1687 | But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm? |
| 1687 | But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place? |
| 1687 | But reflect:--Can one, in its entirety, be in many places at the same time? |
| 1687 | But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to it? |
| 1687 | But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future? |
| 1687 | But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, it can not change from one place to another? |
| 1687 | But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest? |
| 1687 | But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation? |
| 1687 | But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and can not have? |
| 1687 | But the one did not partake of those affections? |
| 1687 | But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never unlike itself or other? |
| 1687 | But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything? |
| 1687 | But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained? |
| 1687 | But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things? |
| 1687 | But to speak of the others implies difference-- the terms''other''and''different''are synonymous? |
| 1687 | But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another:--so we said? |
| 1687 | But what do you say to a new point of view? |
| 1687 | But when do all these changes take place? |
| 1687 | But why do you ask?'' |
| 1687 | But why? |
| 1687 | But, again, assume the opposite hypothesis, that the one is not, and what is the consequence? |
| 1687 | But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would not be in the middle? |
| 1687 | But, consider:--Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another? |
| 1687 | But, surely, it ought to be one and not many? |
| 1687 | But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere? |
| 1687 | But, then, what is to become of philosophy? |
| 1687 | Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible? |
| 1687 | Can there be any other mode of participation? |
| 1687 | Do not the words''is not''signify absence of being in that to which we apply them? |
| 1687 | Do they participate in the ideas, or do they merely resemble them? |
| 1687 | Do you see my meaning? |
| 1687 | Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the ideas to be absolute? |
| 1687 | Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts? |
| 1687 | Does the one also partake of time? |
| 1687 | For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others? |
| 1687 | For can anything be a whole without these three? |
| 1687 | Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained by the whole? |
| 1687 | Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being? |
| 1687 | Further-- is the one equal and unequal to itself and others? |
| 1687 | Here is the great though unconscious truth( shall we say?) |
| 1687 | How can he have ever persisted in them after seeing the fatal objections which might be urged against them? |
| 1687 | How can he have placed himself so completely without them? |
| 1687 | How can it? |
| 1687 | How can there be? |
| 1687 | How can they be? |
| 1687 | How can we conceive Him under the forms of time and space, who is out of time and space? |
| 1687 | How can we imagine His relation to the world or to ourselves? |
| 1687 | How could they investigate causes, when they had not as yet learned to distinguish between a cause and an end? |
| 1687 | How could they make any progress in the sciences without first arranging them? |
| 1687 | How could they? |
| 1687 | How do you mean? |
| 1687 | How do you mean? |
| 1687 | How do you mean? |
| 1687 | How do you mean? |
| 1687 | How get rid of such forms and see Him as He is? |
| 1687 | How is that? |
| 1687 | How is that? |
| 1687 | How is that? |
| 1687 | How is that? |
| 1687 | How not? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than anything, or have the same age with it? |
| 1687 | How then, without a word of explanation, could Plato assign to them the refutation of their own tenets? |
| 1687 | How, while mankind were disputing about universals, could they classify phenomena? |
| 1687 | How? |
| 1687 | How? |
| 1687 | I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a thing? |
| 1687 | If God is not, what follows?'' |
| 1687 | If it be co- extensive with the one it will be co- equal with the one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one? |
| 1687 | If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one? |
| 1687 | If one is, being must be predicated of it? |
| 1687 | If one is, he said, the one can not be many? |
| 1687 | If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself? |
| 1687 | If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are two and thrice, there is thrice two? |
| 1687 | If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole? |
| 1687 | In all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of the many? |
| 1687 | In the first place, the others will not be one? |
| 1687 | In this way-- you may speak of being? |
| 1687 | In what way? |
| 1687 | In what way? |
| 1687 | In what way? |
| 1687 | Is it or does it become older or younger than they? |
| 1687 | Is it or does it become older or younger than they? |
| 1687 | Is not that true? |
| 1687 | Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you? |
| 1687 | Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions-- if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed? |
| 1687 | Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part? |
| 1687 | Is this true of becoming as well as being? |
| 1687 | It can not therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of nature? |
| 1687 | It is otherwise with the objection which follows: How are we to bridge the chasm between human truth and absolute truth, between gods and men? |
| 1687 | Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike? |
| 1687 | Let us see:--Must not the being of one be other than one? |
| 1687 | May we say, in Platonic language, that we still seem to see vestiges of a track which has not yet been taken? |
| 1687 | Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature? |
| 1687 | Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one? |
| 1687 | Nor as like or unlike? |
| 1687 | Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the same is, and that which is not can not be reckoned among things that are? |
| 1687 | Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with it? |
| 1687 | Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which stands must always be in one and the same spot? |
| 1687 | Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for if there had been, it would partake of being? |
| 1687 | Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others? |
| 1687 | Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest must stand still? |
| 1687 | Now there can not possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others? |
| 1687 | Of something which is or which is not? |
| 1687 | Once more, Is one equal and unequal to itself and the others? |
| 1687 | Once more, can one be older or younger than itself or other? |
| 1687 | Once more, if one is not, what becomes of the others? |
| 1687 | Once more, let us ask the question, If one is not, what happens in regard to one? |
| 1687 | Once more, let us inquire, If the one is not, and the others of the one are, what follows? |
| 1687 | One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion? |
| 1687 | One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist? |
| 1687 | Or can thought be without thought?'' |
| 1687 | Other means other than other, and different, different from the different? |
| 1687 | Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class? |
| 1687 | Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as different from the others? |
| 1687 | Shall I begin with myself, and take my own hypothesis the one? |
| 1687 | Shall I propose the youngest? |
| 1687 | Shall I propose the youngest? |
| 1687 | Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise? |
| 1687 | Since it is not a part in relation to itself it can not be related to itself as whole to part? |
| 1687 | Since then what is partakes of not- being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be? |
| 1687 | So that the other is not the same-- either with the one or with being? |
| 1687 | Suppose the first; it will be either co- equal and co- extensive with the whole one, or will contain the one? |
| 1687 | The expression''is not''implies negation of being:--do we mean by this to say that a thing, which is not, in a certain sense is? |
| 1687 | The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite? |
| 1687 | The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion? |
| 1687 | The one then, since it in no way is, can not have or lose or assume being in any way? |
| 1687 | The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole? |
| 1687 | The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself? |
| 1687 | The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others? |
| 1687 | The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised? |
| 1687 | The thought must be of something? |
| 1687 | Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the consequences? |
| 1687 | Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it? |
| 1687 | Then can the motion of the one be in place? |
| 1687 | Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many? |
| 1687 | Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea? |
| 1687 | Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change? |
| 1687 | Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor can be conceived to be either one or many? |
| 1687 | Then if one is, number must also be? |
| 1687 | Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it can not either exceed or be exceeded by them? |
| 1687 | Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable? |
| 1687 | Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes? |
| 1687 | Then it can not be like another, or like itself? |
| 1687 | Then it can not move by changing place? |
| 1687 | Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time? |
| 1687 | Then it has the greatest number of parts? |
| 1687 | Then it is never in the same? |
| 1687 | Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be destroyed? |
| 1687 | Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself? |
| 1687 | Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not? |
| 1687 | Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others? |
| 1687 | Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is? |
| 1687 | Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if there is no contact? |
| 1687 | Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge? |
| 1687 | Then not by virtue of being one will it be other? |
| 1687 | Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many? |
| 1687 | Then now we have spoken of either of them? |
| 1687 | Then one can not be anywhere, either in itself or in another? |
| 1687 | Then one can not be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself or with another? |
| 1687 | Then one is never in the same place? |
| 1687 | Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not- one, is the same with it? |
| 1687 | Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the same time? |
| 1687 | Then smallness can not be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only? |
| 1687 | Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time, become younger than itself? |
| 1687 | Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies between them? |
| 1687 | Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part? |
| 1687 | Then the inference is that it would touch both? |
| 1687 | Then the least is the first? |
| 1687 | Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us? |
| 1687 | Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself? |
| 1687 | Then the one and the others are never in the same? |
| 1687 | Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it? |
| 1687 | Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion? |
| 1687 | Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another or with itself? |
| 1687 | Then the one can not have parts, and can not be a whole? |
| 1687 | Then the one can not possibly partake of being? |
| 1687 | Then the one can not touch itself any more than it can be two? |
| 1687 | Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another? |
| 1687 | Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number? |
| 1687 | Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward in time? |
| 1687 | Then the one is not at all? |
| 1687 | Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present? |
| 1687 | Then the one must have likeness to itself? |
| 1687 | Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are unequal to it? |
| 1687 | Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind? |
| 1687 | Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered? |
| 1687 | Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither perishes nor becomes? |
| 1687 | Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion? |
| 1687 | Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become? |
| 1687 | Then the one will be equal both to itself and the others? |
| 1687 | Then the one will be other than the others? |
| 1687 | Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike it? |
| 1687 | Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other? |
| 1687 | Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts? |
| 1687 | Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two? |
| 1687 | Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of a straight or of a circular form? |
| 1687 | Then the one, being moved, is altered? |
| 1687 | Then the one, being of this nature, can not be in time at all; for must not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself? |
| 1687 | Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited? |
| 1687 | Then the one, if it is not, can not turn in that in which it is not? |
| 1687 | Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being? |
| 1687 | Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is? |
| 1687 | Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness? |
| 1687 | Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time? |
| 1687 | Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and smallness and equality? |
| 1687 | Then the other will never be either in the not- one, or in the one? |
| 1687 | Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another? |
| 1687 | Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of any number? |
| 1687 | Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one? |
| 1687 | Then there is always something between them? |
| 1687 | Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor knowledge of it? |
| 1687 | Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity? |
| 1687 | Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part? |
| 1687 | Then they are separated from each other? |
| 1687 | Then they have no number, if they have no one in them? |
| 1687 | Then we can not suppose that there is anything different from them in which both the one and the others might exist? |
| 1687 | Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never moves? |
| 1687 | Then we will begin at the beginning:--If one is, can one be, and not partake of being? |
| 1687 | Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same? |
| 1687 | Then will they not appear to be like and unlike? |
| 1687 | Then will you, Zeno? |
| 1687 | Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one? |
| 1687 | Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one? |
| 1687 | Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not have parts? |
| 1687 | Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be other? |
| 1687 | Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a whole, and also as having parts? |
| 1687 | Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered? |
| 1687 | Then, that which is not can not be, or in any way participate in being? |
| 1687 | There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three? |
| 1687 | There is a natural realism which says,''Can there be a word devoid of meaning, or an idea which is an idea of nothing?'' |
| 1687 | There is an ethical universal or idea, but is there also a universal of physics?--of the meanest things in the world as well as of the greatest? |
| 1687 | They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present? |
| 1687 | Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it changes from being to not- being? |
| 1687 | Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself? |
| 1687 | Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself? |
| 1687 | Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible? |
| 1687 | We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one? |
| 1687 | We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is? |
| 1687 | We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is? |
| 1687 | Welcome, Cephalus, said Adeimantus, taking me by the hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens? |
| 1687 | Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or of the same age with it? |
| 1687 | Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be attributed to it? |
| 1687 | Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one? |
| 1687 | Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not? |
| 1687 | Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both? |
| 1687 | Well, but do not the expressions''was,''and''has become,''and''was becoming,''signify a participation of past time? |
| 1687 | Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question? |
| 1687 | Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other? |
| 1687 | What difficulty? |
| 1687 | What direction? |
| 1687 | What do you mean, Parmenides? |
| 1687 | What do you mean? |
| 1687 | What do you mean? |
| 1687 | What do you mean? |
| 1687 | What is it? |
| 1687 | What is the meaning of the hypothesis-- If the one is not; is there any difference between this and the hypothesis-- If the not one is not? |
| 1687 | What may that be? |
| 1687 | What of that? |
| 1687 | What question? |
| 1687 | What thing? |
| 1687 | What would you say of another question? |
| 1687 | What? |
| 1687 | When does motion become rest, or rest motion? |
| 1687 | When then does it change; for it can not change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time? |
| 1687 | Whenever, then, you use the word''other,''whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name? |
| 1687 | Where shall I begin? |
| 1687 | Whither shall we turn, if the ideas are unknown? |
| 1687 | Why not, Parmenides? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why so? |
| 1687 | Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are equidistant from the centre? |
| 1687 | Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask? |
| 1687 | Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others? |
| 1687 | You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, there would be one whole including many-- is not that your meaning? |
| 1687 | and consider the consequences which follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not- being of one? |
| 1687 | and is this your own distinction?'' |
| 1687 | and when more than once, is it something else which you mention? |
| 1687 | and where are the reasoning and reflecting powers? |
| 1687 | for the one is not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being? |
| 1687 | for the same whole can not do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will be no longer one, but two? |
| 1687 | is the one wanting to being, or being to the one? |
| 1687 | or do we mean absolutely to deny being of it? |
| 1687 | or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no sort or way or kind participation of being? |
| 1687 | or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once? |
| 1687 | or of the same age with itself or other? |
| 1687 | would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole? |
| 40436 | But what intelligence do we want for the purpose? 40436 It shall be done"( answered Kriton);"have you any other injunctions?" |
| 40436 | Quæstio est, Virtusne doceri possit? 40436 Suppose however that any one impugned this hypothesis itself? |
| 40436 | Well, Sokrates, what do you think now of all these reasonings of yours? 40436 Where then can we find such an art-- such a variety of knowledge or intelligence-- as we are seeking? |
| 40436 | [ 12][ Footnote 12: Plato, Lachês, 190 D- E.][ Side- note: Question-- what is courage? 40436 --must be regarded as secondary and dependent, not capable of being clearly understood until the primary and principal question--What is virtue?" |
| 40436 | 114 E.[ Greek: Ou)kou= n ei) le/ geis o(/ti tau= th''ou(/tôs e)/chei, ma/ list''a)\n ei)/ês pepeisme/ nos?]] |
| 40436 | 130 D.[ Greek: Ê(ni/ ka de/ soi parege/ neto( ê( du/ namis), po/ teron matho/ nti par''e)mou= ti parege/ neto, ê)/ tini a)/llô| tro/ pô|? |
| 40436 | 159 C--160 D.[ Greek: ou) tô= n kalô= n me/ ntoi ê( sôphrosu/ nê e)sti/ n? |
| 40436 | 174 E.[ Greek: Ou)k a)/ra u(giei/ as e)/stai dêmiourgo/ s? |
| 40436 | 230 E.[ Greek: dia\ ti/ pote a)mpho/ tera au)ta\ ke/ rdos kalei= s? |
| 40436 | 375 D.[ Greek: ê( dikaiosu/ nê ou)chi ê)\ du/ nami/ s ti/ s e)stin, ê)\ e)pistê/ mê, ê)\ a)mpho/ tera?]] |
| 40436 | 39 Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it-- What is the Beautiful? |
| 40436 | A man, who endures the loss of money, understanding well that he will thereby gain a larger sum, is he courageous? |
| 40436 | A)/llês ga\r ê)=n te/ chnês u(gi/ eia? |
| 40436 | A)/llês ga\r ê)=n te/ chnês u(giei/ a, ê)\ ou)/? |
| 40436 | A)/llês; Ou)d''a)/ra ô)phelei/ as, ô)= e(tai= re; a)/llê| ga\r au)= a)pe/ domen tou= to to\ e)/rgon te/ chnê| nu= n dê/; ê)= ga\r? |
| 40436 | A)=r''a)\n o(mologoi= en oi( a)/nthrôpoi pro\s tau= ta ê(ma= s tê\n metrêtikê\n sô/ zein a)\n te/ chnên, ê)\ a)/llên?]] |
| 40436 | A)r''ou)=n kai\ ê)=| a)gatho\n kalo/ n,--ê)=| de\ kako\n ai)schro/ n? |
| 40436 | A)tha/ naton a)/ra ê( psuchê/? |
| 40436 | About what is Rhetoric as a cognition concerned, Gorgias? |
| 40436 | About_ what_ is it that the Sophist forms able speakers: of course about that which he himself knows? |
| 40436 | All law is the same,_ quatenus_ law: what is the common constituent attribute? |
| 40436 | All law is the same,_ quatenus_ law: what is the common constituent attribute?] |
| 40436 | All these are the writings of persons, knowing in each of the respective pursuits? |
| 40436 | All this is greatly expanded in the dialogue-- p. 128 D:[ Greek: Ou)k a)/ra o)/tan tô= n sautou= e)pimelê=|, sautou= e)pime/ lei?] |
| 40436 | Am I to proclaim this respecting you, when I go home? |
| 40436 | Am I to tell him, it is because a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing? |
| 40436 | And again, subject to the like limitation, are not all painful things evil, so far forth as they are painful? |
| 40436 | And is it not in this ignorance, or stupid estimate of things terrible, and things not terrible-- that cowardice consists? |
| 40436 | And then what is meant by_ intelligent_? |
| 40436 | And thus( concludes Sokrates) the answer to the question originally started by Menon--"Whether virtue is teachable?" |
| 40436 | And what are we to understand by the Profitable? |
| 40436 | And when you possessed it( I asked), did you get it by learning from me? |
| 40436 | Are not all fine or honourable things, such as bodies, colours, figures, voices, pursuits,& c., so denominated from some common property? |
| 40436 | Are not most of those who undertake these pursuits ridiculously silly? |
| 40436 | Are there_ any_ matters or circumstances in which it is better for a man to be ignorant, than to know? |
| 40436 | Are they at bottom one and the same thing under different names? |
| 40436 | Are they homogeneous, differing only in quantity or has each of them its own specific essence and peculiarity? |
| 40436 | Are they not all inseparable acquirements of one and the same intelligent mind? |
| 40436 | Are they not cowards from stupidity, or a stupid estimate of things terrible? |
| 40436 | Are they not the writings of those who know how to govern-- kings, statesmen, and men of superior excellence? |
| 40436 | Are those things good, which are profitable to mankind? |
| 40436 | Are we on the right scent? |
| 40436 | Are we to say for that reason that he is not temperate? |
| 40436 | Are you of the common opinion on this point also? |
| 40436 | Are you worthy of freedom? |
| 40436 | But by what measure are we to determine_ when_ a man is in a good or bad mental state? |
| 40436 | But does the well- doer always and certainly know that he is doing well? |
| 40436 | But how can there be intelligence respecting the future, except in conjunction with intelligence respecting the present and the past? |
| 40436 | But how does Plato explain this? |
| 40436 | But if this be all that temperance can do, of what use is it to us( continues Sokrates)? |
| 40436 | But if your opponent impugns the hypothesis itself, how are you to defend it? |
| 40436 | But in what sort of virtue? |
| 40436 | But is it really true, Sokrates, that you do not know what virtue is? |
| 40436 | But is their belief well founded? |
| 40436 | But is there any real difference between what is akin and what is like? |
| 40436 | But now comes the important question-- In what sense are we to understand the words Good and Evil? |
| 40436 | But shall I, like an old man addressing his juniors, recount to you an illustrative mythe? |
| 40436 | But should we for that reason do well and be happy? |
| 40436 | But tell me farther: do they allow you to direct yourself-- or do not they even trust you so far as that? |
| 40436 | But tell me: you say that if a man lays out little and acquires much, that is gain? |
| 40436 | But then the beautiful would be different from the good, and the good different from the beautiful? |
| 40436 | But what are we to understand by the_ Good_, about which there are so many disputes, according to the acknowledgment of Plato as well as of Sokrates? |
| 40436 | But what is it that he does, as your director? |
| 40436 | But what is that common, generic, quality, designated well as good by the word_ gain_, apart from these two distinctive epithets? |
| 40436 | But what is the peculiar of the philosopher? |
| 40436 | But what is the work which this art performs? |
| 40436 | But when Sokrates tries to determine, Wherein consists this Law- Type? |
| 40436 | But when you talk about_ better_, in wrestling or singing, what standard do you refer to? |
| 40436 | But who are the[ Greek: ei)dô= n phi/ loi], attacked in the Sophistês? |
| 40436 | But worse, for whom? |
| 40436 | But( replies Sokrates) are they not all the same,_ quatenus_ virtue? |
| 40436 | By his own feelings? |
| 40436 | By my judgment? |
| 40436 | By the judgment of by- standers? |
| 40436 | By what tests is the right order to be distinguished from the wrong? |
| 40436 | Can not I know about justice and injustice, without a master? |
| 40436 | Can that be made out, Kritias? |
| 40436 | Come now, can you tell me, What is the Beautiful? |
| 40436 | Courage therefore must consist in knowledge or intelligence? |
| 40436 | Did he mean the same as mankind generally? |
| 40436 | Did the capacity( I,_ Sokrates_, asked Aristeides) forsake you all at once, or little by little? |
| 40436 | Did you ever know any predication that had a soul?" |
| 40436 | Do n''t you admit this? |
| 40436 | Do not good Rhetors possess great power in their respective cities? |
| 40436 | Do not the enactors enact it as the maximum of good, without which the citizens can not live a regulated life? |
| 40436 | Do not they, like despots, kill, impoverish, and expel any one whom they please? |
| 40436 | Do not you know what are the usual grounds and complaints urged when war is undertaken? |
| 40436 | Do they and their elegant spokesman Protagoras, know what virtue is? |
| 40436 | Do you admit that this is the case? |
| 40436 | Do you affirm that the rhapsodic art, and the strategic art, are one? |
| 40436 | Do you call these latter_ good_ also? |
| 40436 | Do you deny that these others( those of taste, smell, eating, drinking, sex) are really pleasures? |
| 40436 | Do you intend to advise the Athenians when they are debating about letters, or about harp- playing, or about gymnastics? |
| 40436 | Do you intend to qualify yourself for becoming a schoolmaster or a professor?" |
| 40436 | Do you mean shorter than the case requires? |
| 40436 | Do you mean that unjust is essentially the friend of just-- temperate of intemperate-- good of evil? |
| 40436 | Do you mean that virtue is a Whole, and that these three names denote distinct parts of it? |
| 40436 | Do you mean, to all things alike, great as well as little?" |
| 40436 | Do you share the opinion of mankind generally about it, as you do about pleasure and pain? |
| 40436 | Do you still adhere to that opinion? |
| 40436 | Do you still think, as you said before, that there are some men extremely stupid, but extremely courageous? |
| 40436 | Do you think that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress? |
| 40436 | Does a man who acts unjustly conduct himself with moderation? |
| 40436 | Does he who loves, become the friend of him whom he loves, whether the latter returns the affection or not? |
| 40436 | Does it not partake of the essence and come under the definition, of what is fine or and honourable? |
| 40436 | Does not the arithmetical teacher, and every other teacher, produce persuasion? |
| 40436 | Does the doer of wrong endure more pain than the sufferer? |
| 40436 | Does the man want to know what is a beautiful thing? |
| 40436 | Does the temperate man know his own temperance? |
| 40436 | Du/ namis me\n a)/ra kalo/ n-- a)dunami/ a de\ ai)schro/ n?]] |
| 40436 | Ei) a)ph''e(te/ rou e(/teron e)nnoou= men? |
| 40436 | Ei) de\ kala/, kai\ a)gatha/?]] |
| 40436 | Ei) de\ mê\ ai)schra/, a)=r''ou) kala/? |
| 40436 | Emotions of Sokrates 153 Question, What is Temperance? |
| 40436 | Even if you do find it, how can you ever know that you have found it? |
| 40436 | For example-- From what cause does a man grow? |
| 40436 | For the persons who suffer by his proceedings? |
| 40436 | For the spectators, who declare the proceedings of Archelaus to be disgraceful? |
| 40436 | For what is meant by_ right use_? |
| 40436 | From whom have you learnt-- or when did you find out for yourself? |
| 40436 | Good is the object of the Regal or political intelligence; but what is Good? |
| 40436 | Have any of them ever injured you? |
| 40436 | Have mankind generally one uniform meaning? |
| 40436 | Have you done any wrong to your father and mother? |
| 40436 | Have you frequented some master, without my knowledge, to teach you this? |
| 40436 | He first enquires from the athletic Erastes, What is it that these two youths are so intently engaged upon? |
| 40436 | He surprised me by the interrogation-- How do you know, Sokrates, what things are beautiful, and what are ugly? |
| 40436 | He urges continuance of search by both 237 But how is the process of search available to any purpose? |
| 40436 | He will ask us-- Upon what ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures of sight and hearing, and other pleasures? |
| 40436 | He will ask you whether a wooden soup- ladle is not more beautiful than a ladle of gold,--since it is more suitable and becoming? |
| 40436 | He will laugh at your answer, and ask you-- Do you think, then, that Pheidias did not know his profession as a sculptor? |
| 40436 | He will say-- Is not a beautiful mare a beautiful thing also? |
| 40436 | Health,_ quatenus_ Health, is the same in a man or a woman: is not the case similar with virtue? |
| 40436 | Here is the same error in replying, as was committed by Euthyphron when asked, What is the Holy? |
| 40436 | Hipparchus-- Question-- What is the definition of Lover of Gain? |
| 40436 | How are they distinguished from Rhetoric? |
| 40436 | How are we to distinguish which of them? |
| 40436 | How are we to explain or define it? |
| 40436 | How can I tell( rejoins Charmides) whether I possess it or not: since even men like you and Kritias can not discover what it is? |
| 40436 | How can good men care much for each other, seeing that they thus neither regret each other when absent, nor have need of each other when present? |
| 40436 | How can the two objects, which when separate were each one, be made_ two_, by the fact that they are brought together? |
| 40436 | How can there be any cognition, which is not cognition of a given_ cognitum_, but cognition merely of other cognitions and non- cognitions? |
| 40436 | How can there be reciprocal love between parties who render to each other no reciprocal aid? |
| 40436 | How can you distinguish a true solution from another which is untrue, but plausible?" |
| 40436 | How could any of us live safely in the society of so many mad- men? |
| 40436 | How do you know, or where have you learnt, to distinguish just from unjust? |
| 40436 | How do you mean_ fine_( replies the athlete)? |
| 40436 | How does each of them describe and distinguish the permanent elements, and the transient elements, involved in human agency? |
| 40436 | How does the Rhetor differ from them? |
| 40436 | How far is he to question, or expose, or require to be proved, that which the majority believe without proof? |
| 40436 | How far justice is like to holiness? |
| 40436 | How far justice is like to holiness? |
| 40436 | How is Menon to learn virtue, and from whom? |
| 40436 | How is he to be treated by the government, or by the orthodox majority of society in their individual capacity? |
| 40436 | How is the business of mental training to be brought to a beneficial issue without him? |
| 40436 | How say you? |
| 40436 | How( they asked) does it happen that this reminiscence brings up often what is false or absurd? |
| 40436 | However, answer me once more-- Is not justice either a certain mental capacity? |
| 40436 | I should say that it was just: what do you say? |
| 40436 | I think it is some thing: are you of the same opinion? |
| 40436 | If a statesman knows war, but does not know whether it is best to go to war, or at what juncture it is best-- should we call him wise? |
| 40436 | If any men embark in these dangers, without such preliminary knowledge, do you consider them men of courage? |
| 40436 | If by its results, by_ what_ results?--calculations for minimising pains, and maximising pleasures, being excluded by the supposition? |
| 40436 | If not_ then_, upon what other occasions will you tender your counsel? |
| 40436 | If punished, the wrong- doer is of course punished justly; and are not all just things fine or honourable, in so far as they are just? |
| 40436 | If so, does it confer every variety of knowledge-- that of the carpenter, currier,& c., as well as others? |
| 40436 | If so, how can you reconcile that with your former declaration, that no one of the parts of virtue is like any other part? |
| 40436 | If so, is it dear to us on account of evil? |
| 40436 | If so,_ how_ do they know it, and can they explain it? |
| 40436 | If such reminiscence exists( asked Straton) how comes it that we require demonstrations to conduct us to knowledge? |
| 40436 | If that be meant, we must go and consult horse- trainers or mariners? |
| 40436 | If then we are asked, What is that, the presence of which makes a body hot? |
| 40436 | If this be so, are not all those actions, which conduct to a life of pleasure or to a life free from pain, honourable? |
| 40436 | If virtue is not acquired by teaching and does not come by nature, how are there any virtuous men? |
| 40436 | If we say, that we shall render other men_ good_--the question again recurs,_ Good_--in what respect? |
| 40436 | If you fall sick will you send for one of_ them_, or for a professional physician? |
| 40436 | If you know matters belonging to military command, do you know them in your capacity of general, or in your capacity of rhapsode? |
| 40436 | If, then, we see some doing this, are we to declare them knowing or ignorant? |
| 40436 | Ignorance of what? |
| 40436 | Ignorance of_ what?_ Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always.] |
| 40436 | Ignorance of_ what?_ Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always_ ib._ Wise public counsellors are few. |
| 40436 | In like manner, the question being asked, What is that, which, being in the body, will give it life? |
| 40436 | In the art of mensuration, or in the apparent impression? |
| 40436 | In the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue,[133] we find him proclaiming, that the first of all problems to be solved was, What virtue really is? |
| 40436 | In what does the analogy or the sameness consist? |
| 40436 | In what manner does one man become the friend of another? |
| 40436 | In what relation does it stand to the Pleasurable and the Painful? |
| 40436 | Intelligence of what? |
| 40436 | Intelligent-- of what-- or to what end? |
| 40436 | Is a man''s bodily condition benefited by taking as much exercise, or as much nourishment, as possible? |
| 40436 | Is he a powerful speaker himself in the Dikastery? |
| 40436 | Is he, in your opinion, happy or miserable? |
| 40436 | Is it Isokrates? |
| 40436 | Is it Isokrates?] |
| 40436 | Is it because they impart pleasure at the moment, or because they prepare disease, poverty, and other such things, for the future? |
| 40436 | Is it not the same art, which punishes men rightly, makes them better, and best distinguishes the good from the bad? |
| 40436 | Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art? |
| 40436 | Is it possible then, Lysis, for a man to think highly of himself on those matters on which he does not yet think aright? |
| 40436 | Is it the blood through which we think-- or air, or fire? |
| 40436 | Is it the blood, or air, or fire, whereby we think? |
| 40436 | Is it the dominant agency in the mind? |
| 40436 | Is it the dominant agency in the mind? |
| 40436 | Is it then true( continues Sokrates) that good is our_ primum amabile_, and dear to us in itself? |
| 40436 | Is it true that evil is the cause why any thing is dear to us? |
| 40436 | Is it_ all_ intelligence? |
| 40436 | Is not ivory also beautiful, and particular kinds of stone? |
| 40436 | Is not the good man, so far forth as good, sufficient to himself,--standing in need of no one-- and therefore loving no one? |
| 40436 | Is not the wise man, he who knows what it is proper to say and do-- and the unwise man, he who does not know? |
| 40436 | Is not the wooden ladle, therefore, better than the golden? |
| 40436 | Is not this the case with gymnastic, commercial business, rhetoric, military command? |
| 40436 | Is such very great quantity good for the body? |
| 40436 | Is that which they esteem, really virtue? |
| 40436 | Is there any Athenian, yourself included, who would not rather be Archelaus than any other man in Macedonia? |
| 40436 | Is there any other reason, or any other ulterior end, to which you look when you pronounce pleasure to be evil? |
| 40436 | It is about this as a whole that I ask you-- What is Law? |
| 40436 | It is intelligence or knowledge,--But_ of what_? |
| 40436 | It is not the custom of the country for the Spartans to do right, but to do wrong? |
| 40436 | It must surely be something very fine, to judge by the eagerness which they display? |
| 40436 | It relates to Law, or The Law--_ Sokr._--What is Law( asks Sokrates)? |
| 40436 | It was a second question-- important, yet still second and presupposing the solution of the first-- Whether virtue is teachable? |
| 40436 | Its single purpose is to produce persuasion in the minds of hearers? |
| 40436 | Kai\ pô= s a)\n? |
| 40436 | Kalliklês defends the negative 343 Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? |
| 40436 | Moreover, must we not superadd the condition, to command justly, and not unjustly? |
| 40436 | Nevertheless the question which we have just discussed--"How virtue arises or is generated?" |
| 40436 | Next, granting it to be possible, in what way do we gain by it? |
| 40436 | No tenable definition found 83 Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word_ gain_**? |
| 40436 | No way out of it is shown, and how is he to find one? |
| 40436 | Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen performs his own special duties? |
| 40436 | Not when you already believed yourself to know: and what time was there when you did not believe yourself to know? |
| 40436 | Now then that we are to go in all this hurry to Protagoras, tell me who he is and what title he bears, as we called Pheidias a sculptor? |
| 40436 | Now then, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias( continues Sokrates), I turn to you, and ask, whether you account my reasoning true or false? |
| 40436 | Now upon what ground do we call these few, wise and useful public counsellors? |
| 40436 | Now what is that, of which temperance is the knowledge,--distinct from temperance itself? |
| 40436 | Now, Protagoras, what are these things which the courageous men alone are prepared to attempt? |
| 40436 | Now, if to do wrong be more disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be because it has a preponderance either of pain or of evil? |
| 40436 | O(/ti Stra/ tôn ê)po/ rei, ei) e)/stin a)namnêsis, pô= s a)/neu a)podei/ xeôn ou) gigno/ metha e)pistê/ mones? |
| 40436 | O(\ d''a)\n tha/ naton mê\ de/ chêtai, ti/ kalou= men? |
| 40436 | Of course, this implies that we know what virtue is: otherwise how can we give advice as to the means of acquiring it? |
| 40436 | Of leather- cutting, brazen work, wool, wood,& c.? |
| 40436 | Of these three relieving forces, which is the most honourable? |
| 40436 | Or are the three names all equivalent to virtue, different names for one and are the same thing? |
| 40436 | Or are there any pleasurable things which are not good? |
| 40436 | Or are they like the parts of gold, homogeneous with each other and with the whole, differing only in magnitude? |
| 40436 | Or are they not distinct, in each of the three cases-- and is not Law also one thing, the various customs and beliefs another? |
| 40436 | Or are they to be apportioned in a certain dose to every man? |
| 40436 | Or for Archelaus himself? |
| 40436 | Or how can it have any object at all? |
| 40436 | Or is Protagoras the man to supply such a demand? |
| 40436 | Or is he only a composer of discourses to be spoken by others? |
| 40436 | Or is it necessary that he who possesses one part, should possess all? |
| 40436 | Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? |
| 40436 | Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? |
| 40436 | Or is reciprocity of affection necessary, in order that either shall be the friend of the other? |
| 40436 | Or is the person loved, whatever be his own dispositions, the friend of the person who loves him? |
| 40436 | Or is there any one single variety of intelligence, by the possession of which we shall become good and happy? |
| 40436 | Or is this true only of some things and not of all-- so that cognition may be something in the latter category? |
| 40436 | Otherwise what can be meant by this charge of"cunning reticence or keeping back?" |
| 40436 | Ou)d''a)/ra ô)phelei/ as, ô)= e(/taire; a)/llê| ga\r au)= a)pe/ domen tou= to to\ e)/rgon te/ chnê| nu= n dê/; ê)= ga/ r? |
| 40436 | Ou)kou= n a)ei\ tou= to ou(/tôs e)/chei? |
| 40436 | Ou)kou= n ou)deno\s dida/ xantos a)ll''e)rôtê/ santos e)pistê/ setai, a)nalabô\n au)to\s e)x au)tou= tê\n e)pistê/ mên?]] |
| 40436 | Ou)kou= n tê\n me\n ê(donê\n diô/ kete ô(s a)gatho\n o)/n, tê\n de\ lu/ pên pheu/ gete ô(s kako/ n?]] |
| 40436 | Ought he not to do as he would do if he wished to learn medicine or music: to put himself under some paid professional man as teacher?" |
| 40436 | Persons of the Dialogue 232 Question put by Menon-- Is virtue teachable? |
| 40436 | Persuasion about what? |
| 40436 | Plato, Menon, p. 78 C._ Sokr._[ Greek: A)gatha\ de\ kalei= s ou)chi oi(=on u(gi/ eia/ n te kai\ plou= ton? |
| 40436 | Po/ teron d''e)/sti ti zôê=| e)nanti/ on, ê)\ ou)de/ n? |
| 40436 | Pô= s ga\r ou)/?]] |
| 40436 | Pô= s ga\r ou)/?]] |
| 40436 | Pô= s ga\r ou)chi/? |
| 40436 | Pô= s ou)=n ô)phe/ limos e)/stai ê( sôphrosu/ nê, ou)demia= s ô)phelei/ as ou)=sa dêmiourgo/ s? |
| 40436 | Pô= s ou)=n ô)phe/ limos e)/stai ê(sôphrosu/ nê, ou)demia= s ô)phelei/ as ou)=sa dêmiourgo/ s? |
| 40436 | Question-- What is the characteristic property connoted by the word[ Greek: No/ mos] or law? |
| 40436 | Question-- What is the characteristic property connoted by the word[ Greek: No/ mos] or law?] |
| 40436 | Questions of Sokrates to him-- How happens it that you can not talk equally upon other poets? |
| 40436 | Questions of Sokrates to him-- How happens it that you can not talk equally upon other poets? |
| 40436 | Respecting what subject? |
| 40436 | Shall he be required to profess, or to obey, or to refrain from contradicting, religious or ethical doctrines which he has examined and rejected? |
| 40436 | Shall we say that good is of a nature akin to every one, and evil of a nature foreign to every one? |
| 40436 | Since you are in a condition so disgraceful, can you think life better for you than death? |
| 40436 | So that though you said-- The Self- Beautiful is Gold-- you are now obliged to acknowledge that gold is not more beautiful than fig- tree wood? |
| 40436 | Sokrates asks Hippias what sort of lectures they were that he delivered with so much success at Sparta? |
| 40436 | Sokrates provides a basis for his intended proof by asking Polus,[45] which of the two is most disgraceful-- To do wrong-- or to suffer wrong? |
| 40436 | Sokrates questions the slave of Menon 238 Enquiry taken up-- Whether virtue is teachable? |
| 40436 | Some of the fallacies in the dialogue([ Greek: Po/ teron o(rô= sin oi( a)/nthrôpoi ta\ dunata\ o(ra=|n ê)\ ta\ a)du/ nata? |
| 40436 | Still how does this prove that there can be cognition of non- cognition? |
| 40436 | Such being the case, what is that common quality possessed by both, which induces you to call them by the same name_ Gain_? |
| 40436 | Such discriminating intelligence, which in this dialogue is called the Regal or political art,--what is the object of it? |
| 40436 | Such then being the care bestowed, both publicly and privately, to foster virtue, can you really doubt, Sokrates, whether it be teachable? |
| 40436 | Sugchôrei= s ou(/tôs e)/chein? |
| 40436 | Suppose a man by laying out one pound of gold acquires two pounds of silver, is it gain or loss? |
| 40436 | Suppose a man to know every thing past, present, and future; which among the fractions of such omniscience would contribute most to make him happy? |
| 40436 | Surely not_ all_ endurance( rejoins Sokrates)? |
| 40436 | Ta/ xeis, a)reta/ s, o(pli/ seis a)ndrô= n? |
| 40436 | Tell me again, do you think that the pleasurable and the good are identical? |
| 40436 | Tell me in like manner, what is the common fact or attribute pervading all cases of courage? |
| 40436 | Tell me what the Beautiful is? |
| 40436 | Tell me-- is justice some thing, or no thing? |
| 40436 | That by which men manage chariots? |
| 40436 | That gain is the opposite of loss: that to gain is the opposite of to lose? |
| 40436 | That is a cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to his inquisitive feelings 404 Dissension and perplexity on the question.--What is a cause? |
| 40436 | That loss( to be a loser) is evil? |
| 40436 | That to gain, as being the opposite of evil is a good thing? |
| 40436 | That which you now know, therefore, there was a time when you believed yourself not to know? |
| 40436 | The dialogue is begun by Menon, in a manner quite as abrupt as the Hipparchus and Minos:[ Side- note: Question put by Menon-- Is virtue teachable? |
| 40436 | The former topic of enquiry is now resumed: but at the instance of Menon, the question taken up, is not--"What is virtue?" |
| 40436 | The main subject of this short dialogue is-- What is philosophy? |
| 40436 | The medical art is dear to us, because health is dear: but is there any thing behind, for the sake of which health also is dear? |
| 40436 | The question here raised is present to Plato''s mind in other dialogues, and occurs under other words, as for example, What is good? |
| 40436 | The question still continues, What is virtue? |
| 40436 | The question then stands thus--"Is virtue knowledge?" |
| 40436 | The question, proposed at the outset, Whether virtue is teachable? |
| 40436 | The questions are put to him by Sokrates--"Is virtue teachable? |
| 40436 | The regal art can thus impart no knowledge except itself; and what is_ itself_? |
| 40436 | The regal or political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? |
| 40436 | The regal or political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? |
| 40436 | The same man thus, in your view, will be both good and bad? |
| 40436 | The valuable is that which is valuable to possess: is that the profitable, or the unprofitable? |
| 40436 | There is thus some common constituent: tell me what it is, according to you and Gorgias? |
| 40436 | Though the subject of direct debate in the Menon is the same as that in the Protagoras( whether virtue be teachable?) |
| 40436 | Though there are many diverse virtues, have not all of them one and the same form in common, through the communion of which they_ are_ virtues? |
| 40436 | Thus when Lachês, after having given as his first answer( to the question, What is Courage?) |
| 40436 | Ti/? |
| 40436 | To a man like Orestes, so misguided on the question,"What is good?" |
| 40436 | To just and unjust 3 How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? |
| 40436 | To match them, Alkibiades must make himself as good as possible 8 But good-- for what end, and under what circumstances? |
| 40436 | To what ends are the gifts here enumerated to be turned, in order to constitute right use? |
| 40436 | To what standard, or to what end, do you refer? |
| 40436 | To\ poi= on, ê)=n d''e)gô/? |
| 40436 | Turpe is defined to be either what causes immediate pain to the spectator, or ulterior hurt-- to whom? |
| 40436 | Upon points which you know better than they? |
| 40436 | Upon this Sokrates asks-- In which of the cities were your gains the largest: probably at Sparta? |
| 40436 | Upon this answer Sokrates proceeds to cross- examine:_ Sokr._--Do you think that good men are useful, bad men useless? |
| 40436 | Upon what ground do we call these few wise? |
| 40436 | Upon what ground do we call these few wise? |
| 40436 | Upon what matters is he competent to advise? |
| 40436 | Upon what matters is he competent to advise?] |
| 40436 | Upon what points do you intend to advise them? |
| 40436 | Upon what then can the Rhetor advise-- upon just and unjust-- nothing else? |
| 40436 | Upon which of them can you discourse? |
| 40436 | Was it last year? |
| 40436 | We must fight those whom it is better to fight-- to what standard does better refer? |
| 40436 | We must fight those whom it is better to fight-- to what standard does better refer? |
| 40436 | Were not your lectures calculated to improve the Spartan youth? |
| 40436 | What again is meant by_ knowledge_? |
| 40436 | What alteration has happened in their nature? |
| 40436 | What are the five different parts of virtue? |
| 40436 | What are the separate parts of virtue-- justice, moderation, holiness,& c.? |
| 40436 | What did Plato mean by them? |
| 40436 | What does he intend to advise them upon? |
| 40436 | What does he intend to advise them upon? |
| 40436 | What function does each of them assign to the permanent element? |
| 40436 | What good does it effect? |
| 40436 | What good does self- knowledge procure for us? |
| 40436 | What good does self- knowledge procure for us? |
| 40436 | What good, or what harm, can like do to like, which it does not also do to itself? |
| 40436 | What ground have you for complaining of him? |
| 40436 | What has he learnt, and what does he know? |
| 40436 | What has he learnt, and what does he know?] |
| 40436 | What in this last case do you mean by_ better_? |
| 40436 | What is Beauty, or the Beautiful? |
| 40436 | What is Beauty, or the Beautiful?] |
| 40436 | What is Law, or The Law? |
| 40436 | What is Law, or The Law? |
| 40436 | What is it, that a man must know, in order that his justice or courage may become profitable? |
| 40436 | What is it? |
| 40436 | What is its province and purport? |
| 40436 | What is its province? |
| 40436 | What is its province?] |
| 40436 | What is likely to be his character, if compelled to suppress all declaration of his own creed, and to act and speak as if he were believer in another? |
| 40436 | What is that object towards which our love or friendship is determined? |
| 40436 | What is that, the presence or absence of which makes_ better_ or_ worse_? |
| 40436 | What is the art or science for realising it? |
| 40436 | What is the best conjecture? |
| 40436 | What is the best conjecture? |
| 40436 | What is the common attribute which in all these cases constitutes Courage? |
| 40436 | What is the common property, in virtue of which both are called Gain? |
| 40436 | What is the common property, in virtue of which both are called Gain? |
| 40436 | What is the object known, in this case? |
| 40436 | What is the object known, in this case? |
| 40436 | What is the proper treatment of the mind? |
| 40436 | What is the regal or political art which directs or regulates all others? |
| 40436 | What is the relation which they bear to each other and to the whole-- virtue? |
| 40436 | What is there peculiar in them, which gives them a title to such distinction? |
| 40436 | What is this friendship or unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become good men? |
| 40436 | What mode of persuasion does he bring about? |
| 40436 | What other exchangeable value can there be between pleasures and pains, except in the ratio of quantity-- greater or less, more or fewer? |
| 40436 | What product does it yield, as the medical art supplies good health, and the farmer''s art, provision? |
| 40436 | What reason is there to determine, on the part of the indifferent, attachment to the good? |
| 40436 | What reply will you make, in the case of the city? |
| 40436 | What sort of workmanship does he direct? |
| 40436 | When one man loves another, which becomes the friend of which? |
| 40436 | Where then can you find a lover of gain? |
| 40436 | Wherein consists the process called verification and proof, of that which is first presented as an hypothesis? |
| 40436 | Whether all varieties of desire are good? |
| 40436 | Whether all varieties of desire are good? |
| 40436 | Whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous? |
| 40436 | Whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous?] |
| 40436 | Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical? |
| 40436 | Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical?] |
| 40436 | Which of the two does the Rhetor bring about? |
| 40436 | Which of your admissions do you wish to retract-- That all men desire good things? |
| 40436 | Who can admit this? |
| 40436 | Who can your disputatious friend be? |
| 40436 | Who have been their fellow- pupils? |
| 40436 | Who is the judge to determine this measure? |
| 40436 | Who is the judge to determine this measure?] |
| 40436 | Who is to be called a friend? |
| 40436 | Who is to be called a friend? |
| 40436 | Whom can I find so competent as you, for questioning and communication on these very subjects? |
| 40436 | Why are you so bitter against the Sophists? |
| 40436 | Why the Spartans did not admit his instructions-- their law forbids_ ib._ Question, What is law? |
| 40436 | Why? |
| 40436 | Will not the golden ladle spoil the soup, and the wooden ladle turn it out good? |
| 40436 | Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for one who gives directions about the treatment of a sick man, better than the physician? |
| 40436 | Will they attempt terrible things, believing them to be terrible? |
| 40436 | Would it be that by which he knew the art of gaming? |
| 40436 | Would not the objectors themselves acknowledge that there was no other safety, except in the art of mensuration? |
| 40436 | Would they all contribute equally? |
| 40436 | Would you say the same? |
| 40436 | Yet where is he to be found? |
| 40436 | You beat your dog sometimes? |
| 40436 | You defined law to be the decree of the city: Are not some decrees good, others evil? |
| 40436 | [ 100]_ Sokr._--You call those things pleasurable, which either partake of the nature of pleasure, or cause pleasure? |
| 40436 | [ 102] What is your opinion about knowledge? |
| 40436 | [ 108] Or can you indicate any other end, to which men look when they call these matters evil? |
| 40436 | [ 10] How does it happen( asked Sokrates) that you have so much to say about Homer, and nothing at all about other poets? |
| 40436 | [ 10] Would you call_ Gain_ any acquisition which one makes either with a smaller outlay or with no outlay at all? |
| 40436 | [ 111] How can it be wrong, that a man should yield to the influence of good? |
| 40436 | [ 121]_ Prot._--How can this be? |
| 40436 | [ 124]_ Sokr._--Is it then knowingly that cowards refuse to go into war, which is both more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? |
| 40436 | [ 125] On the contrary, cowards, impudent men, and madmen, both fear, and feel confidence, on dishonourable occasions? |
| 40436 | [ 127]_ Sokr._--Why will you not answer my question, either affirmatively or negatively? |
| 40436 | [ 13] But is this true? |
| 40436 | [ 14]_ Sokr._--If this be so, it will of course be a knowledge of ignorance, as well as a knowledge of knowledge? |
| 40436 | [ 15]_ Sokr._--Do you think, then, that discourse is, the things spoken: that sight is, the things seen? |
| 40436 | [ 18]_ Lachês._--Where is there any such man? |
| 40436 | [ 18]_ Sokr._--But what do you mean by_ better_? |
| 40436 | [ 1] Does he do this( asks Sokrates) knowing that the things are worth nothing? |
| 40436 | [ 21]_ Sokr._--Of course he will; there is nothing surprising in that: but towards_ what_, and about_ what_, will he make progress? |
| 40436 | [ 23] How are we to know our own minds? |
| 40436 | [ 23]_ Sokr._--In like manner, what are the laws respecting the government of a city? |
| 40436 | [ 25][ Footnote 25: Plato, Ion, 536 E.][ Side- note: Homer talks upon all subjects-- Is Ion competent to explain what Homer says upon all of them? |
| 40436 | [ 25]_ Polus._--Then Archelaus is miserable, according to your doctrine? |
| 40436 | [ 25]_ Sokr._--But according to knowledge, of_ what_? |
| 40436 | [ 27] Do you think that Archelaus would have been a happy man, if he had been defeated in his conspiracy and punished? |
| 40436 | [ 28] or shall I go through an expository discourse? |
| 40436 | [ 28]_ Polus._--How say you? |
| 40436 | [ 31] Hermês asked Zeus-- Upon what principle shall I distribute these gifts among mankind? |
| 40436 | [ 33] How does a man become the object of friendship or love from another? |
| 40436 | [ 34]_ Sokr._--In what manner is he profited? |
| 40436 | [ 36] Does the regal art then confer knowledge? |
| 40436 | [ 36]_ Alk._--When shall I be able to learn this, and who is there to teach me? |
| 40436 | [ 3] But you doubtless recollect, and can tell me, both from yourself, and from him, what virtue is? |
| 40436 | [ 47] The like may be said about the fallacy in page 284 D--"Are there persons who speak of things as they are? |
| 40436 | [ 4] Sokrates accordingly asks Gorgias what his profession is? |
| 40436 | [ 4]_ Nikias._--Surely the point before us is, whether it be wise to put these young men under the lessons of the master of arms? |
| 40436 | [ 4]_ Sokr._--We are going to pay him then as a Sophist? |
| 40436 | [ 5]_ Sokr._ How, then, can we say that the multitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely dispute about it among themselves? |
| 40436 | [ 6][ Footnote 6: Plato, Lysis, 210 D.[ Greek: Oi(=o/ n te ou)=n e)pi\ tou/ tois, ô)= Lu/ si, me/ ga phronei= n, e)n oi(=s tis mê/ pô phronei=? |
| 40436 | [ 6]_ Sokr._--You think philosophy not only a fine thing, but good? |
| 40436 | [ 70]_ Sokr._--Do you mean those things which are not profitable to any_ man_, or those which are not profitable to any creature whatever? |
| 40436 | [ 77] But upon what criterion is the scientific man to proceed? |
| 40436 | [ 7] It is for you therefore, Lysimachus, to ask Nikias and Lachês,--Who have been their masters? |
| 40436 | [ 7]_ Menon._--How do you mean? |
| 40436 | [ 7]_ Sokr._--But what? |
| 40436 | [ 7]_ Sokr_--Do you then profess to know what is expedient or inexpedient? |
| 40436 | [ 83][ Footnote 83: Plato, Phædon, p. 105 C- E.[ Greek: A)pokri/ nou dê/, ô(=| a)\n ti/ e)gge/ nêtai sô/ mati, zô= n e)/stai? |
| 40436 | [ 8][ Footnote 6: Plato, Menon, p. 73 D.][ Footnote 7: Plato, Menon, p. 73 E.[ Greek: Po/ teron a)retê/, ô)= Me/ nôn, ê)\ a)retê/ tis?]] |
| 40436 | [ 8]_ Sokr._--But what can your father do for you better than this, Theagês? |
| 40436 | [ 94]_ Sokr._--Do you consider that all virtue, and each separate part of it, is fine and honourable? |
| 40436 | [ 9] Tell me, What is this same common figure and property in both, which makes you call both of them figure-- both of them colour? |
| 40436 | [ Footnote 40: In regard to the question, Wherein consists[ Greek: To\ Kalo/ n]? |
| 40436 | [ Footnote 58: Plato, Phædon, p. 101 B- C.[ Greek: ti/ de/? |
| 40436 | [ Footnote 5: Plato, Gorgias, p. 449 E.[ Greek: Ou)kou= n peri\ ô(=nper le/ gein, kai\ phronei= n? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: A)=r''ou)=n panto\s a)ndro/ s** e)stin e)kle/ xasthai poi= a a)/gatha\ tô= n ê(de/ ôn e)sti\ kai\ o(poi= a kaka/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: A)=ra e)rôtta=|s ei)/ tina e)/chô ei)pei= n lo/ gon makro/ n, oi(/ous dê\ a)kou/ ein ei)/thisai? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Kai\ mê\n du/ o ge u(penanti/ a e(ni\ pra/ gmati pô= s a)\n ei)/ê?] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: O(/ti Bi/ ôn ê)po/ rei peri\ tou= pseu/ dous, ei) kai\ au)to\ kat''a)na/ mnêsin, ô(s to\ e)nanti/ on ge, ê)\ ou)/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n ei) a)ei\ ê( a)lê/ theia ê(mi= n tô= n o)/ntôn e)sti\n e)n tê=| psuchê=|, a)tha/ natos a)\n ê( psuchê\ ei)/ê?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n ê( a)lêthê\s do/ xa tou= o)/ntos e)stin e)xeu/ resis? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n, ê)\n d''e)gô/, ei)/per kalo\n kai\ a)gatho/ n, kai\ ê(du/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Po/ teron de\ ta\ plei= on e)/lkonta baru/ tera nomi/ zetai e)ntha/ de, ta\ de\ e)/latton, koupho/ tera, ê)\ tou)nanti/ on?] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Tau= ta ou)=n pote\ me\n ô)phelou= nta pote\ de\ bla/ ptonta, ti/ ma= llon a)gatha\ ê)\ kaka/ e)stin?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Ti/ dai/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Ti/ ou)=n a)/llo no/ mos ei)/ê a)\n a)ll''ê)\ ta\ nomizo/ mena?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: a)gatha\ de\ poi= a a)/ra tô= n o)/ntôn tugcha/ nei ê(mi= n o)/nta? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: ai( e)pi\ tou/ tou pra/ xeis a(/pasai e)pi\ tou= a)lu/ pôs zê= n kai\ ê)de/ ôs, a)=r''ou) kalai/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: e)n e(ka/ stê| tou/ tôn tou\s pollou\s pro\s e(/kaston to\ e)/rgon ou) katagela/ stous o(ra=|s?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: e)peidê\ no/ mô| ta\ nomizo/ mena nomi/ zetai, ti/ ni o)/nti tô=| no/ mô| nomi/ zetai?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: e)peidê\ no/ mô| ta\ nomizo/ mena nomi/ zetai, ti/ ni o)/nti tô=| no/ mô| nomi/ zetai?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: i)/thi dê/, kai\ to\ en tô=| polemei= n be/ ltion kai\ to\ en tô=| ei)rê/ nên a)/gein, tou= to to\ be/ ltion ti/ o)noma/ zeis? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: kai\ ti/ s a)/llê a)xi/ a ê(donê=| pro\s lu/ pôn e)sti\n a)ll''ê)\ u(perbolê\ a)llê/ lôn kai\ e)/lleipsis? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: kai\ tou= to pô= s ou)k a)mathi/ a e)sti\n au(/tê ê( e)ponei/ distos, ê( tou= oi)/esthai ei)de/ nai a(\ ou)k oi)=den?] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: su\ de/, ê)=n d''e)gô/, pro\s theô= n, ou)k a)\n ai)schu/ noio ei)s tou\s E(/llênas sauto\n sophistê\n pare/ chôn? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: ti/ de/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: ti/ n''a)\n tro/ pon eu(rethei/ ê_ au)to\ to\ au)to/_?]] |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word_ gain_? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: But good-- for what end, and under what circumstances? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: But how is the process of search available to any purpose? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: But intelligence-- of what? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Dissension and perplexity on the question.--What is a cause? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind-- how far correct?] |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Enquiry taken up-- Whether virtue is teachable? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Hipparchus-- Question-- What is the definition of Lover of Gain? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Know Thyself-- Delphian maxim-- its urgent importance-- What is myself? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: On what occasions can such second- best men be useful? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it-- What is the Beautiful?] |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Question put by Sokrates-- What is philosophy? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Question, What is Temperance? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Question, What is law? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Questions by Sokrates-- Whether virtue is one and indivisible, or composed of different parts? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what?] |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: The Good-- the Profitable-- what is it?--How are we to know it? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to well- doing or happiness? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Who is the person here intended by Plato, half- philosopher, half- politician? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Worse or better-- for whom? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--But what if I had no master? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--How? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--Oedipus was mad: what man in his senses would put up such a prayer? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--Was there not a time when I really believed myself not to know it? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--What am I to do, now that I have made it? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--You mean, whether justly or unjustly? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._[ Greek: Ti/ ou)=n to\n ai(stho/ menon chrê\ poiei= n?] |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--How do you mean? |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--Perhaps you mean the Lacedæmonians and Lykurgus? |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--Respecting what sort of Law do you enquire( replies the Companion)? |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--What is it that Homer and Hesiod say about Minos? |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--What should Law be, Sokrates, other than the various assemblage of consecrated and binding customs and beliefs? |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--Whom do you mean: and what do you mean? |
| 40436 | _ Hip._--How, Sokrates? |
| 40436 | _ Kall._--But if he does not liken himself to the despot, the despot may put him to death, if he chooses? |
| 40436 | _ Krit._--What do you say to their reasoning, Sokrates? |
| 40436 | _ Lysis._--Allow me? |
| 40436 | _ Lysis._--How can it be possible? |
| 40436 | _ Lysis._--How can you imagine that they trust me? |
| 40436 | _ Menon._--But how are you to search for that of which you are altogether ignorant? |
| 40436 | _ Polus._--Cannot you tell without that, whether he is happy or not? |
| 40436 | _ Polus._--How can that be? |
| 40436 | _ Polus._--How? |
| 40436 | _ Polus._--Then you will not call even the Great King happy? |
| 40436 | _ Polus._[ Greek: A)=r''ou)=n dokou= si/ soi ô(s ko/ lakes e)n tai= s po/ lesi phau= loi nomi/ zesthai oi( a)gathoi\ r(ê/ tores? |
| 40436 | _ Prot._--But who is to be judge of the brevity necessary, you or I? |
| 40436 | _ Prot._--Do you wish to ta]k to me alone, or in presence of the rest? |
| 40436 | _ Prot._--What do you mean by asking me to make shorter answers? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--About what discourses? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--According to your doctrine then, all men are lovers of gain, the good men as well as the evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--And of course, whoever is a good general, is also a good rhapsode? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--And what are you to become by going to him? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--And who is the competent judge, how much of either is right measure for the body? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Are not things which weigh more, accounted heavier; and things which weigh less, accounted lighter, here, at Carthage, and everywhere else? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Are you then also the best general in Greece? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--At what moment did you first find it out? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Ay, but what kind of business? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But about what affairs of their own? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But are there not other persons besides the Rhetor, who produce persuasion? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But can you not say which among the Greeks have the most ancient laws? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But does any one else direct you? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But doubtless, I imagine, they trust the team of mules to your direction; and if you chose to take the whip and flog, they would allow you? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But each thing can have but one opposite:[27] to be unwise, and to be mad, are therefore identical? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But how can there be unanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of them knows, and the other does not know? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But if from the banquet you acquire health, would that be gain or loss? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But if going to war be an honourable and good thing, it is also pleasurable? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But if he passes his life pleasurably until its close, does he not then appear to you to have lived well? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But is the case similar in regard to gymnastic? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But surely they would do right, in educating their children better and not worse? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But the profitable is good? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But to command whom or what-- horses or men? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But what if you were to purchase it with your life, or to damage yourself by the employment of it? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But what men, and under what circumstances? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But what men? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But what sort of intelligence? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But which of them most of all? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But whom do they allow, then? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But would not you be ashamed of presenting yourself to the Grecian public as a Sophist? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But you do maintain, that whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But you yourself stated that evil men love all gains, small and great? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do not all men in all communities, among the Persians as well as here, now as well as formerly, think so too? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do not you yourself love good-- all good things? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do they become losers by gain, or by loss? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you call law a hurt or benefit to the city? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you know any public speakers who aim at anything more than gratifying the public, or who care to make the public better? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you know then what you are going to do? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you know those good kings of Krete, from whom these laws are derived-- Minos and Rhadamanthus, sons of Zeus and Europa? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you mean to advise the Athenians to fight those who behave justly, or those who behave unjustly? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you see then to what danger you are going to submit your mind? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you think any man happy, who is a slave, and who is not allowed to do any thing that he desires? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you think then that justice and holiness have only a small point of analogy between them? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you think_ that_ a sufficient reason for avoiding all these pursuits yourself, and keeping your son out of them also? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Does it appear to you that any useful and good thing is evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--For example, if after being at a banquet, not only without any outlay, but receiving an excellent dinner, you acquire an illness? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--From what provocation is it, then, that they prevent you in this terrible way, from being happy and doing what you wish? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Has it a preponderance of pain? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Holiness also is some thing: is the thing called_ holiness_, itself holy or unholy? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How can we say, therefore, that they are fit to teach others: and how can you pretend to know, who have learnt from no other teachers? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How is this, by Heraklês? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How is this? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How is this? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How say you? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How say you? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How so? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How then can you know about this matter, how far it is good or bad, if you have no experience whatever about it? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--If I am right, then, you think that the Kretans have more ancient laws than any other Greeks? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--If more ugly and disgraceful, is it not then worse? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--If most honourable, it confers either most pleasure or most profit? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--If you stand in need of a teacher, you do not yet think aright? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--In what way can it benefit us? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is he a slave or free? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is he a slave? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is it honourable to go to war, or dishonourable? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is it virtue-- or is it one particular variety of virtue? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is not temperance a fine and honourable thing? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is not the case similar with men? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is not this badness of mind the greatest evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--It appears then that the lovers of good are those whom you call lovers of gain? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--It is not about all discourses? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--It seems, then, that honourable things are accounted honourable everywhere, and dishonourable things dishonourable? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Justice being admitted to be just, and holiness to be holy-- do not you think that justice also is holy, and that holiness is just? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Nor friendship, if unanimity and friendship go together? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Now if a man be punished for wrong doing, he suffers what is just, and the punisher does what is just? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Now this thing which you call_ justice_: is it itself just or unjust? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Now, about the question, What is just and unjust-- are the multitude all of one mind, or do they differ among themselves? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Of course therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be defined by the contrary, by reference to pain or to evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Or that by which he knew the art of computing? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Or that by which he knew the conditions of health? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Ought they not to rule themselves as well as others:[67] to control their own pleasures and desires: to be sober and temperate? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Physicians write respecting matters of health what they account to be true, and these writings of theirs are the medical laws? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--That is no answer: I wish to know, which of the two you will send for first and by preference? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--The Many; is it_ they_ who know what truth is? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--The Spartans therefore act unlawfully, when they refuse to give you money and to confide to you their sons? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--The unwise man will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or done? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then it is the Kretans who have the most ancient laws in Greece? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then it must have a preponderance of evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then my friend will ask you in return, whether the race of maidens is not as much inferior to the race of Gods, as the pot to the maiden? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then when you spoke about_ better_, in reference to war or peace, what you meant was_ juster_--you had in view justice and injustice? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then you have no experience whatever about the Sophists? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--This unanimity, of what nature is it? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--To do wrong therefore is worse than to suffer wrong, as well as more disgraceful? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Under what circumstances? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Upon what occasions, then, do you propose to give advice? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--We affirm ourselves therefore to know what virtue is? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--We have seen that they will be better if they do mischief and go wrong wilfully, than if they do so unwillingly? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Well, then two years, three years,& c., ago? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Well, then, Gorgias, on what matters will the Rhetor be competent to advise? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What about the courageous man? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What good does this knowledge procure for us? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What is meant by a man_ taking care of himself_? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What kind of person is this censor of philosophy? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What men? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What then is that, about which the Sophist is himself cognizant, and makes his pupil cognizant? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--When men are in communion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we name the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--When men are in social and political communion, to what purpose does the art of commanding them tend? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--When they thus view with confidence things dishonourable and evil, is it from any other reason than from ignorance and stupidity? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Which are those who do? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Which of the two is it, who( you say) are unwilling to go into war; it being an honourable and good thing? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Which of the two is the most disgraceful? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Which of the two is worst: to do wrong, or to suffer wrong? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Which of them then would contribute most? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Who is the competent judge, how much seed is right measure for sowing a field? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Whom do you call wise and unwise? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Whom then do you mean, when you talk of_ the good_? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Why is it, then, that they do not hinder you in this last case, as they did in the cases before mentioned? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Why, the Lacedæmonian laws are hardly more than three hundred years old: besides, whence is it that the best of them come? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Wisdom and courage then, both of them, are parts of virtue? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Wise men are only few, the majority of our citizens are unwise: but do you really think them mad? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Yes, but_ good_, in what matters? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You affirm besides, that things more profitable are at the same time more lawful? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You are yourself the best rhapsode in Greece? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You desire wisdom: but what kind of wisdom? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You do not admit, then, Nikias, that lions, tigers, boars,& c., and such animals, are courageous? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You do not think then that the good-- and the fine or honourable-- are one and the same; nor the bad-- and the ugly or disgraceful? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You knew, then, even in your boyhood, what was just and what was unjust? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You mean when they are discussing the question with whom they shall make war or peace, and in what manner? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You see that neither does your father love you, nor does any man love another, in so far as he is useless? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You think philosophy a fine thing? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You think that philosophers, as you describe them, are useful? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You think then, it appears, that some gain is good, other gain evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--[Greek: O(ra=|s ou)=n? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: A)meinon de\ dioikei= tai kai\ sô/ zetai ti/ nos paragignome/ nou ê)\ a)pogignomenou?]] |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ou)kou= n kai\ tô= n mathêma/ tôn ka/ llos ô(sau/ tôs?] |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ou)kou= n nu= n pa/ nta ta\ ke/ rdê o( lo/ gos ê(ma= s ê)na/ gkake kai\ smikra\ kai\ mega/ la o(mologei= n a)gatha\ ei)=nai?] |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ou)kou= n to\ ai)schro\n tô=| e)nanti/ ô|,_ lu/ pê| te kai\ kakô=|_?] |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ti/ de/? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ti/ de\ dê\? |
| 40436 | _ Theag._--Why will not you take me yourself, Sokrates? |
| 40436 | _ ib._ Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? |
| 40436 | _ useful_--for what purpose? |
| 40436 | a)=r''ou) tou= to me\n a(plou= n, o(/ti tau/ tên ê(/tis ê(ma= s o)nê/ sei?]] |
| 40436 | a)=ra ê( metrêtikê\ te/ chnê, ê)\ ê( tou= phainome/ nou du/ namis? |
| 40436 | and a beautiful lyre as well? |
| 40436 | and do they give him pay besides for doing so? |
| 40436 | and how is it that no man can play on the flute or the harp without practice? |
| 40436 | and is not the honourable deed, good and profitable? |
| 40436 | and that Minos and Rhadamanthus are the best of all ancient lawgivers, rulers, and shepherds of mankind? |
| 40436 | and under what modifications of persons and circumstances? |
| 40436 | and which of them has ever made the public better? |
| 40436 | as medical knowledge procures for us health-- architectural knowledge, buildings,& c.? |
| 40436 | business relating to horses, or to navigation? |
| 40436 | but, why( he will ask) do you single out these pleasures of sight and hearing, as beautiful exclusively? |
| 40436 | but--"Is virtue teachable or not?" |
| 40436 | di''ou)de\n a)/llo tau= ta kaka\ o)/nta, ê)\ dio/ ti ei)s a)ni/ as te a)poteleuta=| kai\ a)/llôn ê(donô= n a)posterei=?]] |
| 40436 | do they permit a hireling, in preference to_ you_, to do what he wishes with the horses? |
| 40436 | do you concur with the generality of people in calling some pleasurable things evil, and some painful things good? |
| 40436 | do you think that just things are just and unjust things are unjust? |
| 40436 | do_ they_ govern you also, these teachers? |
| 40436 | does all happiness consist in that? |
| 40436 | does not he affront or go at what is more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? |
| 40436 | e)moi\ me\n ga\r dokei=; ti/ de\ soi/?]] |
| 40436 | have you not seen Gorgias at Athens, and did not he appear to you to know? |
| 40436 | how are we to use it? |
| 40436 | i)/dômen dê/, ê( ei)s ti phro/ nimos; ê)\ ê( ei)s a(/panta kai\ ta\ mega/ la kai\ ta\ smikra/?]] |
| 40436 | i)/dômen dê/,_ ê( ei)s ti/_ phro/ nimos; ê)\ ê( ei)s a(/panta kai\ ta\ mega/ la kai\ ta\ smikra/?]] |
| 40436 | in other words, to mensuration, art, or science? |
| 40436 | is no one allowed to flog them? |
| 40436 | is the opposite essentially a friend to its opposite? |
| 40436 | is there any difference between one law and another law, as to that identical circumstance, of being Law? |
| 40436 | kai\ chrusi/ on le/ gô kai\ a)rgu/ rion kta= sthai kai\ tima\s e)n po/ lei kai\ a)rcha/ s? |
| 40436 | kai\ di/ kên dê\ kai\ ai)dô= ou(/tô thô= e)n toi= s a)nthrô/ pois, ê)\ e)pi\ pa/ ntas nei/ mô? |
| 40436 | kai\ ti/ ê( a)logi/ a? |
| 40436 | kai\ to\ di/ pêchu tou= pêchuai/ ou ê(mi/ sei mei= zon ei)=nai, a)ll''ou) mege/ thei?]] |
| 40436 | kai\ to\ kalo\n e)/rgon, a)gatho/ n te kai\ ô)phe/ limon?]] |
| 40436 | keeping you the whole day in servitude to some one, and never your own master? |
| 40436 | knowledge of what? |
| 40436 | ma/ lista peri\ au)tô= n diaphe/ resthai?] |
| 40436 | mê\ a)/ll''a)/tta le/ geis ta)gatha\ ê)\ ta\ toiau= ta?] |
| 40436 | not considered? |
| 40436 | o( no/ mos a)/ra bou/ letai tou= o)/ntos ei)=nai e)xeu/ resis?]] |
| 40436 | oi)/ei tina ei)de/ nai mo/ rion a)retê= s o(/ ti e)/stin, au)tê\n mê\ ei)do/ ta? |
| 40436 | oi)o/ menoi a)/meinon ei)=nai ê(mi= n tau= ta ê)\ mê/? |
| 40436 | or all which do not belong to one or the other? |
| 40436 | or both together? |
| 40436 | or did not the Spartans desire to have their youth improved? |
| 40436 | or else knowledge? |
| 40436 | or govern horses? |
| 40436 | or had they no money? |
| 40436 | or in what other way? |
| 40436 | or not knowing? |
| 40436 | or pilot ships? |
| 40436 | or the ignorant? |
| 40436 | or( which is the same thing) when each citizen acts justly? |
| 40436 | ou)k oi)=den, e)/phê, pri\n soi\ suggene/ sthai, oi(=on ê)=n to\ a)ndra/ podon?]] |
| 40436 | ou)kou= n ê( psuchê\ to\ e)nanti/ on ô(=| au)tê\ e)piphe/ rei a)ei\ ou) mê/ pote de/ xêtai, ô(s e)k tô= n pro/ sthen ô(molo/ gêtai? |
| 40436 | p. 288 D.[ Greek: ti/ na pot''ou)=n a)\n ktêsa/ menoi e)pistê/ mên o)rthô= s ktêsai/ metha? |
| 40436 | p. 292 D.[ Greek: A)lla\ ti/ na dê\ e)pistê/ mên? |
| 40436 | p. 312 D.[ Greek: poi/ as e)rgasi/ as e)pista/ tês? |
| 40436 | p. 320 C.[ Greek: po/ teron u(mi= n, ô(s presbu/ teros neôte/ rois, mu= thon le/ gôn e)pidei/ xô, ê)\ lo/ gô| diexelthô/ n?] |
| 40436 | p. 330 C.[ Greek: tou= to to\ pra= gma o(/ ô)noma/ sate a)/rti, ê( dikaiosu/ nê, au)to\ tou= to di/ kaio/ n e)stin ê)\ a)/dikon?]] |
| 40436 | p. 351 C.[ Greek: To\ me\n a)/ra ê(de/ ôs zê= n, a)gatho/ n, to\ d''a)êdô= s, kako/ n? |
| 40436 | p. 352 B- C.[ Greek: po/ teron kai\ tou= to/ soi dokei= ô(/sper toi= s polloi= s a)nthrô/ pois ê)\ a)/llôs? |
| 40436 | p. 353 D.[ Greek: ponêra\ de\ au)ta\ pê=| phate ei)=nai? |
| 40436 | p. 354 B- C.[ Greek: Tau= ta de\ a)gatha/ e)sti di''a)/llo ti ê)\ o(/ti ei)s ê(dona\s a)poteleuta=| kai\ lupô= n a)pallaga\s kai\ a)potropa/ s? |
| 40436 | p. 359 E.[ Greek: po/ teron kalo\n o(\n i)e/ nai( ei)s to\n po/ lemon) ê)\ ai)schro/ n? |
| 40436 | p. 360 D.[ Greek: Ou)kou= n ê( tô= n deinôn kai\ mê\ deinô= n a)mathi/ a deili/ a a)\n ei)/ê? |
| 40436 | p. 474 D.[ Greek: e)a\n e)n tô=| theôrei= sthai chai/ rein poiê=| tou\s theôrou= ntas?]] |
| 40436 | p.290 C- D.][ Side- note: Where is such an art to be found? |
| 40436 | pa= s ga\r a)\n ê(mi= n ei)/poi o(/ti to\ ploutei= n a)gatho/ n?]] |
| 40436 | pro\s ti/ teinei to\ e)n tô=| ei)rê/ nên te a)/gein a)/meinon kai\ to\ e)n tô=| polemei= n oi(=s dei=?] |
| 40436 | prô= ton me\n to\ toio/ nde; ê( dikaiosu/ nê pra= gma/ ti/ e)stin? |
| 40436 | pô= s de\ ou)dei\s au)lêtê\s ê)\ kitharistê\s ge/ gonen a)/neu mele/ tês?]] |
| 40436 | says Menon,"am I really to state respecting you, that you do not know what virtue is?" |
| 40436 | should we not wish to have our own minds as good as possible? |
| 40436 | sick men, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in harvesting, or in what occupations? |
| 40436 | such as inform sick men how they are to get well? |
| 40436 | that a man can know both what he knows and what he does not know? |
| 40436 | that hearing is, the things heard? |
| 40436 | that is, only as a remedy for evil; so that if evil were totally banished, good would cease to be prized? |
| 40436 | the knowing? |
| 40436 | those in a state of sickness-- or those who are singing in a chorus-- or those who are under gymnastic training? |
| 40436 | ti/ ga\r dê\ dikai/ ô| chôrizo/ menon ê(donê= s a)gatho\n a)\n ge/ noito?] |
| 40436 | ti/ tau)to\n e)n a)mphote/ rois o(rô= n?]] |
| 40436 | tou\s dê\ toiou/ tous ti/ s mêchanê\ peri\ pollou= poiei= sthai a)llêlous?]] |
| 40436 | v. p. 528) respecting an allusion made by Pindar to Hesiod--"Num malé intellexit poeta intelligentissimus perspicua verba Hesiodi? |
| 40436 | what did you say about doing wrong and suffering wrong? |
| 40436 | what is the definition of rhetoric? |
| 40436 | what it is that he teaches? |
| 40436 | whether applied to one, few, or many? |
| 40436 | whether the most beautiful maiden will not appear ugly, when compared to a Goddess? |
| 40436 | Ê( psuchê\ a)/ra o(/, ti a)\n au)tê\ kata/ schê|, a)ei\ ê(/kei e)p''e)kei= no phe/ rousa zôê/ n? |
| 40436 | Ê( sophi/ a a)/ra tô= n deinô= n kai\ mê\ deinô= n, a)ndrei/ a e)sti/ n, e)nanti/ a ou)=sa tê=| tou/ tôn a)mathi/ a|?]] |
| 40436 | Ê)= ou)ch oi(=o/ n te sigô= nta le/ gein?] |
| 40436 | Ô)/nêto a)/ra narkê/ sas?]] |
| 40436 | ê(=| ti/ chrêso/ metha? |
| 40436 | ê)/ o( a)mathê\s ei)s logismou\s du/ nait''a)\n sou= ma= llon pseu/ desthai boulome/ nou? |
| 40436 | ê)\ e)/chete/ ti a)/llo te/ los le/ gein, ei)s o(\ a)poble/ psantes au)ta\ a)gatha\ kalei= te, a)ll''ê)\ ê(dona/ s te kai\ lu/ pas? |
| 40436 | ê)\ ou) chalepo\n ou)de\ semnou= a)ndro\s pa/ nu ti ou)de\ tou= to e)/oiken ei)=nai eu(rei= n? |
| 40436 | ê)\ ou)/? |
| 40436 | ê)\ ou)/pô katamantha/ neis o(\ le/ gô?] |
| 40436 | ê)\ ou)de\n pra= gma? |
| 40436 | ê)\ ou)k oi)=stha o(/ti e)ristiko/ s e)sti? |
| 40436 | ê)\ technikou= dei= ei)s e(/kaston? |
| 40436 | ê)\n su\ kalei= s eu)bouli/ an, ei)s ti/ e)stin?] |