This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.
identifier | question |
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5827 | ( 2) If so, what is its nature? |
5827 | ( 2) If so, what sort of object can it be? |
5827 | ( 2) If so, what sort of object can it be? |
5827 | APPEARANCE AND REALITY Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it? |
5827 | And if so, have we any means of finding out what it is like? |
5827 | Are good and evil of importance to the universe or only to man? |
5827 | Assuming that there is physical space, and that it does thus correspond to private spaces, what can we know about it? |
5827 | But are we to say that nothing is knowledge except what is validly deduced from true premisses? |
5827 | But if the reality is not what appears, have we any means of knowing whether there is any reality at all? |
5827 | But the real question is: Do_ any_ number of cases of a law being fulfilled in the past afford evidence that it will be fulfilled in the future? |
5827 | Has the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms? |
5827 | Hence, two very difficult questions at once arise; namely,( 1) Is there a real table at all? |
5827 | How are we to know, in a given case, that our belief is not erroneous? |
5827 | I exist, and my room exists; but does''in''exist? |
5827 | If any one asks:''Why should I accept the results of valid arguments based on true premisses?'' |
5827 | If we ask''Where and when does this relation exist?'' |
5827 | If, then, we can not trust what we see with the naked eye, why should we trust what we see through a microscope? |
5827 | In other words, can we ever_ know_ anything at all, or do we merely sometimes by good luck believe what is true? |
5827 | Is this belief a mere blind outcome of past experience, or can it be justified as a reasonable belief? |
5827 | It will be remembered that we asked two questions; namely,( 1) Is there a real table at all? |
5827 | The mental act is undoubtedly mental, but is there any reason to suppose that the thing apprehended is in any sense mental? |
5827 | The question we have to consider in this chapter is: What is the nature of this real table, which persists independently of my perception of it? |
5827 | The question which Kant put at the beginning of his philosophy, namely''How is pure mathematics possible?'' |
5827 | The question which must next occupy us is this: How is it possible that there should be such knowledge? |
5827 | There is, however, a preliminary question which is rather less difficult, and that is: What do we_ mean_ by truth and falsehood? |
5827 | Thus our two questions may be re- stated as follows:( 1) Is there any such thing as matter? |
5827 | We have experience of past futures, but not of future futures, and the question is: Will future futures resemble past futures? |
5827 | What reason, then, have we for believing that there are such public neutral objects? |
5827 | What things are there in the universe whose existence is known to us owing to our being acquainted with them? |
5827 | Which of these is the''real''table? |
5827 | Why? |
5827 | and''What beliefs are false?'' |
5827 | and''What is falsehood?'' |
5827 | not''What beliefs are true?'' |
2529 | An egg for breakfast: well, what of it? |
2529 | ( 2) DOES EVERYTHING OBSERVABLE OBEY THE LAWS OF PHYSICS? |
2529 | ( 2) What are we feeling when we say this? |
2529 | ( 2) What is the relation of this present occurrence to the past event which is remembered? |
2529 | ( 3) CAN WE OBSERVE ANYTHING INTRINSICALLY DIFFERENT FROM SENSATIONS? |
2529 | And even if SOME image does persist, how do we know that it is the previous image unchanged? |
2529 | And what sort of evidence is logically possible? |
2529 | Buhler says( p. 303):"We ask ourselves the general question:''WHAT DO WE EXPERIENCE WHEN WE THINK?'' |
2529 | But why should we suppose that there is some one common cause of all these appearances? |
2529 | Can we constitute memory out of images together with suitable beliefs? |
2529 | Can we say, conversely, that it consists wholly of such accuracy of response? |
2529 | Does the image persist in presence of the sensation, so that we can compare the two? |
2529 | For what is it to imagine a winged horse but to affirm that the horse[ that horse, namely] has wings? |
2529 | How do I know that there is awareness? |
2529 | How do we know that the sensation resembles the previous image? |
2529 | How is it possible to know that a memory- image is an imperfect copy, without having a more accurate copy by which to replace it? |
2529 | How, then, are we to find any way of comparing the present image and the past sensation? |
2529 | If we are asked"What is the capital of France?" |
2529 | If we suppose it effected, what would become of the difference between vital and mechanical movements? |
2529 | If you ask a boy"What is twice two?" |
2529 | Is there ultimately no difference, or do images remain as irreducibly and exclusively psychological? |
2529 | Is"consciousness"ultimate and simple, something to be merely accepted and contemplated? |
2529 | It is clear that the question turns upon another, namely, which can we know best, the psychology of animals or that of human beings? |
2529 | It may be said: If there is no single existent which is the source of all these"aspects,"how are they collected together? |
2529 | Now, what are the occasions when, we actively believe that Charles I was executed? |
2529 | One of the laws which distinguish psychology( or nerve- physiology?) |
2529 | Or that insects, in laying eggs, are concerned for the preservation of their species? |
2529 | Or, to state the same question in other terms: How is psychology to be distinguished from physics? |
2529 | Our two questions are, in the case of memory:( 1) What is the present occurrence when we remember? |
2529 | Suppose two children in a school, both of whom are asked"What is six times nine?" |
2529 | There are two distinct questions to be asked:( 1) What causes us to say that a thing occurs? |
2529 | What sort of evidence is there? |
2529 | Who can believe, for example, that a new- born baby is aware of the necessity of food for preserving life? |
2529 | William James''s view was first set forth in an essay called"Does''consciousness''exist? |
4723 | And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? |
4723 | And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable? |
4723 | Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? |
4723 | BUT DO NOT YOU YOURSELF PERCEIVE OR THINK OF THEM ALL THE WHILE? |
4723 | But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction? |
4723 | But secondly, though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be? |
4723 | But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material SUBSTRATUM or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? |
4723 | But, since one idea can not be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion? |
4723 | But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter? |
4723 | Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? |
4723 | For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others? |
4723 | For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind? |
4723 | For, what are the fore- mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? |
4723 | If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? |
4723 | May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a GOOD THING, though we have not an idea of what it is? |
4723 | Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? |
4723 | What must we think of Moses''rod? |
4723 | What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? |
4723 | What therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? |
4723 | What therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion? |
4723 | Why does not an empty case serve as well as another? |
4723 | Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? |
4723 | and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? |
4723 | and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? |
4723 | and what do we PERCEIVE BESIDES OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS? |
4723 | was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators? |
4723 | what if I can not assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? |
47658 | And suppose that he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? 47658 You have read him?" |
47658 | And have we in our limited experience anything that will guide us to the attainment of this object? |
47658 | And is their truth their correspondence? |
47658 | And so the question arises, how far are our ideas about things truths about reality? |
47658 | And to what shall we turn for truth? |
47658 | Are our ideas of this nature? |
47658 | Are they reality? |
47658 | Are we about to be forced to modify our conclusions? |
47658 | Are we, like people in a theatre queue, only able to move from behind forward as the place is vacated for us in front? |
47658 | But even so, the pragmatist will urge, is its truth anything else but its usefulness as shown in the practical consequences of believing it? |
47658 | But what was the nature of the need, and what was the method by which the postulate was called forth? |
47658 | Can we not, for example, have an idea of not- red just as well as an idea of red? |
47658 | Can we or can we not make our conceptions work? |
47658 | Clearly we can not claim to know it by direct experience, by acquaintance; it is not a_ that_ of which we can ask_ what_? |
47658 | Do we not judge its claim to truth by the practical consequences involved in accepting or rejecting it? |
47658 | Does it actually exist? |
47658 | Does not the history of science prove a continual expansion, an increasing{ 53} comprehension? |
47658 | Have we, in the new theory of life and knowledge of Bergson''s philosophy, an answer to the question, What is truth? |
47658 | He has defended that philosopher against the arguments of Plato in a polemical pamphlet entitled_ Plato or Protagoras?_( Oxford, Blackwell). |
47658 | He who knows, can not but know; and he who does not know, can not know.... Where, then, is false opinion? |
47658 | How can that which we perceive be something imperceptible? |
47658 | How, then, can universal illusion be consistent with the possession of truth? |
47658 | If the meaning the intellect assigns to truth is itself not true, how can the intellect serve us? |
47658 | If the salt have lost his savour, wherewith shall it be salted? |
47658 | If the usefulness of the intellect consists in the active production of an illusion, can we say that the intellect leads us to truth? |
47658 | If, then, the understanding works illusion for the sake of action, is it thereby disqualified as an instrument for the attainment of truth? |
47658 | In this way, then, we may answer the perplexing question, How can there be an object of thought in a false judgment? |
47658 | Is a perfectly true idea one in which there exists a point to point correspondence to the reality it represents? |
47658 | Is it not only if we can turn away from the intellect and obtain a non- intellectual intuition that we can know truth? |
47658 | Is not all progress in science made by suggesting a hypothesis, and testing it by experiment to see if it works? |
47658 | Is the Absolute more than an idea? |
47658 | Is there any other verification? |
47658 | It is the asking_ what?_ of every_ that_ of felt experience to which the mind attends. |
47658 | Knowing, then, what reality is, can we say that there is any actual object of thought that conforms to it? |
47658 | May not this be the reason of our failure and the whole explanation of the seeming contradiction? |
47658 | Must we not conclude that knowledge, however useful, is not true? |
47658 | Or does he think of something which he does not know as some other thing which he does not know?" |
47658 | Our problem, then, is to know what constitutes the nature of error in any one of these examples if it is, as each one may be, false? |
47658 | That is the whole meaning of asking, Are they true or false? |
47658 | The fact of error presented a difficulty distinct from the question, What is truth? |
47658 | The pragmatist when he asks, What is truth? |
47658 | The problem of truth is only raised when we ask, What does the agreement of an idea with reality mean? |
47658 | The question What is truth? |
47658 | The_ that_--a simple felt experience-- contains a meaning, brings a message, and we ask_ what_? |
47658 | There is, indeed, if this be so, a deeper irony in the question, What is truth? |
47658 | This is the simple pragmatist test,--does the laboratory worker add to it or find it in any respect insufficient? |
47658 | Was it not true while it was useful, and is it not only now false, if it is false, if it is actually discovered not to be useful? |
47658 | What else but the practical consequences of the truth claim in the form of the hypothesis of an undiscovered planet were ever in question? |
47658 | What is it? |
47658 | What is the nature of the seal by which we stamp this knowledge true? |
47658 | What is true about reality? |
47658 | What kind of knowledge is it that we acquire by description? |
47658 | What, then, is error? |
47658 | What, we shall now ask, can it be that binds together these sense qualities so that we speak of them as a thing? |
47658 | When, then, we ask ourselves, What is truth? |
47658 | Whether the Absolute does or does not exist, is it, either in idea or reality, of any use to us? |
47658 | Why was it felt that they must be other than they were seen to be unless there was another planet? |
47658 | Why were not the observed movements of Uranus accepted as what they were? |
47658 | Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?... |
47658 | nor even, What is true about truth? |
47658 | was the starting point, and not, What is truth? |
55761 | ( 2) When three persons are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there? |
55761 | ( 2) When three persons are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there? |
55761 | ( 2) Where are they united? |
55761 | ( 3) When two persons are alone together in a room, how many distinct persons are there? |
55761 | ( 3) When two persons are alone together in a room, how many distinct persons are there? |
55761 | And if not, with what other question must it necessarily be connected? |
55761 | And why are these feelings to be eliminated? |
55761 | Are the actions of men really all of one kind? |
55761 | But are we to trust to good luck, and experiment about until we hit by accident upon the right line? |
55761 | But how about the possibility of social life for men, if each aims only at asserting his own individuality? |
55761 | But how am I to know, prior to all knowledge, that the objects given to me are ideas? |
55761 | But how are we to make the actual calculation? |
55761 | But how else can this happen except we assign a content to the purely formal activity of the Ego? |
55761 | But is it justifiable to lump together actions of this kind with those in which a man is conscious not only of his actions but also of their causes? |
55761 | But is it not possible to make the old a measure for the new? |
55761 | But is this reflection capable of supporting any positive alternative? |
55761 | But what if this"thing- in- itself,"this whole transcendent ground of the world, should be nothing but a fiction? |
55761 | But what of the claim that this view is based on experience? |
55761 | But what of the freedom of an action about the motives of which we reflect? |
55761 | But what right have we to say that in the absence of sense- organs the whole process would not exist at all? |
55761 | But, is not precisely this actually the case with pure concepts and ideas? |
55761 | But, what if they are not valid at all? |
55761 | Can I say of it that it acts on my soul? |
55761 | Can we regard man as a whole in himself, in view of the fact that he grows out of a whole and fits as a member into a whole? |
55761 | Does freedom of will, then, mean being able to will without ground, without motive? |
55761 | Does not the world cause thoughts in the minds of men with the same necessity as it causes the blossoms on plants? |
55761 | Have I, then, any right at all to start from it in my arguments? |
55761 | Have they any intelligible meaning? |
55761 | Have we any right to consider the question of the freedom of the will by itself at all? |
55761 | He asks, How much can we learn about them indirectly, seeing that we can not observe them directly? |
55761 | He can not will what he wills? |
55761 | How comes it that the simple real manifests itself in a two- fold manner, if it is an indivisible unity? |
55761 | How do we come to differentiate ourselves from what is"objective,"and to contrast"Ego"and"Non- Ego?" |
55761 | How does Matter come to think of its own nature? |
55761 | How does the matter appear when we recognise the absoluteness of thought? |
55761 | How is it possible for my thought to be relevantly related to the object? |
55761 | How is it possible to start knowledge anywhere at all? |
55761 | How is it that we are compelled to make these continual corrections in our observations? |
55761 | How should I make of my thought an exception? |
55761 | How should Mind be aware of what goes on in Matter, seeing that the essential nature of Matter is quite alien to Mind? |
55761 | How should it matter to me whether I can do a thing or not, if I am forced by the motive to do it? |
55761 | How, in any case, is it possible for me to argue from my own subjective view of the world to that of another human being? |
55761 | How, then, do I know that he and I are in a common world? |
55761 | I can now ask myself: Over and above the percepts just mentioned, what else is there in the section of space in which they are? |
55761 | If human organisation has no part in the essential nature of thinking, what is its function within the whole nature of man? |
55761 | If the question be asked, What is man''s purpose in life? |
55761 | Is not every man compelled to measure the deliverances of his moral imagination by the standard of traditional moral principles? |
55761 | Is reason able also to strike the balance? |
55761 | Kant assumed their validity and only asks, What are the conditions of their validity? |
55761 | Metaphysical Realism must ask, What is it that gives us our percepts? |
55761 | Or how in these circumstances should Mind act upon Matter, so as to translate its intentions into actions? |
55761 | Our present question is, what do we gain by supplementing a process with a conceptual counterpart? |
55761 | Our questions are the following:( 1) Are things continuous or intermittent in their existence? |
55761 | Philosophers still ask such questions as, What is the purpose of the world? |
55761 | Seeing that, at the outset, we attach no predicates whatever to the Given, we are bound to ask: How is it that we are able to determine it at all? |
55761 | THE THEORY OF FREEDOM I CONSCIOUS HUMAN ACTION Is man free in action and thought, or is he bound by an iron necessity? |
55761 | The fundamental question of Kant''s Theory of Knowledge is, How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? |
55761 | This being so, is any individuality left at all? |
55761 | This last answer does, indeed, presuppose that it is legitimate to group together in the single question,''How many tables?'' |
55761 | This leads us to the question, What is the right method for striking the balance between the credit and the debit columns? |
55761 | Two questions arise:( 1) Where are the Given and the Concept differentiated? |
55761 | VII ARE THERE ANY LIMITS TO KNOWLEDGE? |
55761 | What does it mean to have knowledge of the motives of one''s actions? |
55761 | What does it signify for us to possess knowledge and science? |
55761 | What does willing mean if not to have grounds for doing, or striving to do, this rather than that? |
55761 | What else has he done except perceive what hundreds have failed to see? |
55761 | What follows from these facts? |
55761 | What follows from this fact? |
55761 | What follows? |
55761 | What is it that Kant has achieved? |
55761 | What is it that stimulates the subject? |
55761 | What is it that, in the first instance, I have before me when I confront another person? |
55761 | What is the function( and consequently the purpose) of man? |
55761 | What of the Spiritualistic theory? |
55761 | What precisely is it that is absolute in the affirmation of the Ego? |
55761 | What right have you to declare the world to be complete without thought? |
55761 | What then is a percept? |
55761 | When, next, the percept disappears from my field of vision, what remains? |
55761 | Where is the jumping- board which will launch us from the subjective into the trans- subjective? |
55761 | Which of us can say that he is really free in all his actions? |
55761 | Who does not know the pleasure which is caused by the hope of a remote but intensely desired enjoyment? |
55761 | Why do I not passively let the object impress itself on me? |
55761 | Why is it not simply satisfied with itself and content to accept its own existence? |
55761 | Why should this concept belong any less to the whole plant than leaf and blossom? |
55761 | Why, we ask, does the tree appear to us now at rest, then in motion? |
55761 | Yes, but what is it to do? |
55761 | [ 18] Are there any presuppositions in this question, as formulated by Kant? |
55761 | [ 45] Now let us ask ourselves, How do we come by such a view? |
55761 | [ 50] What does Fichte here mean by the activity of the"intelligence,"when we translate what he has obscurely felt into clear concepts? |
32701 | What are space and time? 32701 Whence has it[ i. e. the mind] all the materials of reason and knowledge? |
32701 | ''How is pure mathematics possible? |
32701 | ''How is pure natural science possible?'' |
32701 | ''What_ a priori_ judgements are essentially related to the faculty in question?'' |
32701 | ( 2)''Given that a corresponding object is possible, is it also real?'' |
32701 | ( 3)''Given that it is real, is it also necessary?'' |
32701 | Again, given that the belief has arisen, may it not after all be illusion? |
32701 | Again, if we know that the object of a conception is possible, how are we to determine whether it is also actual? |
32701 | And, secondly, how does thought in virtue of these conceptions originate synthetic_ a priori_ knowledge? |
32701 | Are they real existences? |
32701 | But do_ a priori_ synthetic judgements satisfy this condition? |
32701 | But how are we to know that what we judge_ is_ the true law? |
32701 | But if knowing is obviously different from making, why should Kant have apparently felt no difficulty in resolving knowing into making? |
32701 | But when he is asking''How does the manifold of sense become unified?'' |
32701 | But, in that case, what can be meant by a succession in the object? |
32701 | Firstly, how do these conceptions obtain a matter to which they can apply and without which they would be without content or empty? |
32701 | For how can it be possible to base the knowledge of what things are, independently of perception, upon the knowledge of what they look? |
32701 | For how can we advance from knowledge of what they look to knowledge of what they are but do not look? |
32701 | For the driving force of idealism is furnished by the question,''How can the mind and reality come into the relation which we call knowledge?'' |
32701 | For the problem''How do we, beginning with mere sensation, come to know a spatial and temporal world?'' |
32701 | For the question''Is a three- sided figure possible?'' |
32701 | For the two questions, the consideration of which leads to this conclusion, are,''What is the right or real colour of an individual thing?'' |
32701 | Further, if it is legitimate to ask,''How can we apprehend what does not belong to our being?'' |
32701 | He asks,''How can the subject perceive itself?'' |
32701 | He begins by raising the question,''What do we mean by the phrase''an object of representations''? |
32701 | He then asked,''What follows as to the nature of the objects known in mathematics from the fact that we really know them?'' |
32701 | Hence the problem arises,''How is it possible to subsume objects of empirical perception under pure conceptions?'' |
32701 | Hence the question,''How is pure mathematics possible?'' |
32701 | How can I make an assertion about any individual until I have had actual experience of it? |
32701 | How then can I be sure that all cases will conform to my judgement? |
32701 | How, then, does Kant obtain something of which space and time can be regarded as really relations? |
32701 | How, then, does Kant reach the second result? |
32701 | How, then, is it possible for human reason to accomplish such knowledge entirely_ a priori_?... |
32701 | How, then, is it possible for the belief that things_ are_ spatial to arise? |
32701 | If I am asked,''How do I know that my pen is black or my chair hard?'' |
32701 | If a question is to be put at all, it should take the form,''How is it possible to apprehend anything?'' |
32701 | If, however, the doctrine of an internal sense is obviously untenable from Kant''s own point of view, why does he hold it? |
32701 | In fact, how can I anticipate my experience at all? |
32701 | In the first place, the very question,''What does the process of knowing consist in?'' |
32701 | Is there, however, any relation of which it could be said that it is not given, and to which therefore Kant''s doctrine might seem to apply? |
32701 | It may be stated thus:''If the lines are not convergent, how is it possible even to say that they_ look_ convergent? |
32701 | It may, however, be objected that the question ought to mean simply''Is a three- sided figure possible?'' |
32701 | It should now be an easy matter to understand the problem expressed by the question,''How are_ a priori_ synthetic judgements possible?'' |
32701 | Its aim is to answer the question,''How far can reason go, without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience?'' |
32701 | Its definite formulation is expressed in the well- known question,''How are_ a priori_ synthetic judgements possible? |
32701 | Kant introduces it in effect by raising the question,''How is it that, beginning with the isolated data of sense, we come to acquire knowledge?'' |
32701 | Kant is therefore once more[23] forced to consider the question''What is meant by object of representations?'' |
32701 | Moreover, since it is plain that in knowing we are active, the question is apt to assume the form,''What do we_ do_ when we know or think?'' |
32701 | Must it not be implied that at least under_ certain_ circumstances we should perceive the lines as they are? |
32701 | Must there not, however, be some problem peculiar to_ a priori_ judgements? |
32701 | Now why does Kant think that this conclusion follows? |
32701 | Otherwise why should Kant have been led to suppose that his problem concerned them only? |
32701 | Otherwise why should the representations agree? |
32701 | Otherwise, why should we use the words''look''or''appear''at all? |
32701 | Similarly there is really no meaning in the question,''What is meant by an object corresponding to knowledge or to an idea?'' |
32701 | The problem then becomes''What renders possible or is presupposed by the conformity of individual things to certain laws of connexion?'' |
32701 | The question must mean''What are the kinds of unity produced by judgement?'' |
32701 | The question''Is a triangle, in the sense of a figure with three sides and three angles, possible?'' |
32701 | The question''Is an object corresponding to the conception of a man with six toes possible?'' |
32701 | Thus it turns out that the problem relates to the uniformity of nature, and that the question''How are_ a priori_ synthetic judgements possible?'' |
32701 | To the question, therefore,''What is meant by an object corresponding to knowledge and therefore distinct from it?'' |
32701 | To the question, therefore,''Why are we justified in saying that we do know phenomena, whereas we do not know the things which produce them?'' |
32701 | What then do we know? |
32701 | What then is the answer to this, the real problem? |
32701 | What, then, can be meant by such an object? |
32701 | What, then, is the cause of the unsatisfactory treatment of these problems and men''s consequent indifference? |
32701 | What, then, must be the representation of space, in order that such a knowledge of it may be possible? |
32701 | When he is asking''What is meant by the object( beyond the mind) corresponding to our representations?'' |
32701 | Yet why should reality conform? |
32701 | [ 4] Hence, the question,''How is pure natural science possible?'' |
32701 | [ 4] This is Kant''s way of putting the question which should be expressed by asking,''Are things spatial, or do they only look spatial?'' |
32701 | and''Has it really any colour at all, or does it only look coloured?'' |
32701 | and''How does an apprehension become related to an object? |
32701 | and''How is it that they are applicable to objects?'' |
32701 | it is equally legitimate to ask,''How can we apprehend what does belong to our own being?'' |
32701 | means''Granted the truth of mathematical judgements, what inference can we draw concerning the nature of the reality to which they relate? |
32701 | means''What justifies the assertion that the presuppositions of natural science are true?'' |
32701 | really means''Is it possible for a three- sided figure to have three angles?'' |
32701 | really means''Is it possible for three straight lines to form a figure, i. e. to enclose a space?'' |
32701 | that which concerns sensations? |
32701 | the physical world?'' |
9662 | A man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections? |
9662 | And how far it is possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty? |
9662 | And shall we, rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature? |
9662 | And under what pretence can you embrace the one, while you reject the other? |
9662 | And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings? |
9662 | And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? |
9662 | And what he proposes by all these curious researches?_ He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. |
9662 | And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present? |
9662 | Are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar? |
9662 | Are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects? |
9662 | Are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life, from infancy to old age? |
9662 | Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? |
9662 | But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? |
9662 | But if they had any idea of power, as it is in itself, why could not they Measure it in itself? |
9662 | But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? |
9662 | But still I ask; Why take these attributes for granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? |
9662 | But what do we mean by that affirmation? |
9662 | But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? |
9662 | But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning? |
9662 | But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? |
9662 | But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? |
9662 | By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate to our intellectual view? |
9662 | By what means has it become so prevalent among our modern metaphysicians? |
9662 | Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? |
9662 | Can we give any reason for these variations, except experience? |
9662 | Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? |
9662 | Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? |
9662 | For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy, upon such a supposition? |
9662 | For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? |
9662 | For what is meant by_ innate_? |
9662 | For what reason? |
9662 | Has not the same custom the same influence on all? |
9662 | How could_ politics_ be a science, if laws and forms of goverment had not a uniform influence upon society? |
9662 | How is this remedied by experience? |
9662 | How is this to be accounted for? |
9662 | How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? |
9662 | How many stories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected and exploded in their infancy? |
9662 | How often would the great names of Pascal, Racine, Amaud, Nicole, have resounded in our ears? |
9662 | How shall we reconcile these contradictions? |
9662 | Is it more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition? |
9662 | Is it not experience, which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? |
9662 | Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? |
9662 | Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other? |
9662 | Is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an idea of reflection? |
9662 | Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? |
9662 | May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? |
9662 | May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? |
9662 | On what is this inference based? |
9662 | Or what do you find in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the peace and order of society, is in the least concerned? |
9662 | The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person: Why? |
9662 | The question still recurs, on what process of argument this_ inference_ is founded? |
9662 | This begets a very natural question; What is meant by a sceptic? |
9662 | This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? |
9662 | We need only ask such a sceptic,_ What his meaning is? |
9662 | What logic, what process of argument secures you against this supposition? |
9662 | What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension? |
9662 | What would become of_ history,_ had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind? |
9662 | What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? |
9662 | When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? |
9662 | Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? |
9662 | Whence, do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? |
9662 | Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of each other? |
9662 | Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? |
9662 | Where then is the power, of which we pretend to be conscious? |
9662 | Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? |
9662 | Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a fiction and belief? |
9662 | Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or a tiger? |
9662 | Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a character? |
9662 | Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or liver? |
9662 | Why then do you refuse to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature? |
9662 | Why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them? |
9662 | Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? |
9662 | Why? |
9662 | Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? |
9662 | _ Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?_ No. |
53791 | After what manner therefore do they belong to self, and how are they connected with it? |
53791 | And how can the floor and roof ever meet, while they are separated by the four walls that lie in a contrary position? |
53791 | And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them? |
53791 | And to what end can it serve, either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest? |
53791 | And why is it contrary, unless it be more shocking than any delicate satire? |
53791 | Are not most studious men( and many of them more than I) subject to such reveries or fits of absence, without being exposed to such suspicions? |
53791 | But as we here not only_ feign_ but_ believe_ this continued existence, the question is,_ from whence arises such a belief_? |
53791 | But can any thing be imagined more absurd and contradictory than this reasoning? |
53791 | But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we consider the nature and effects of_ education_? |
53791 | But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? |
53791 | But what have I here said, that reflections very refined and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us? |
53791 | But what is the treachery? |
53791 | But what repose can be tasted in life, when the heart is agitated? |
53791 | Can I be sure that, in leaving all established opinions, I am following truth? |
53791 | Can any thing be supposed more extravagant? |
53791 | Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation? |
53791 | Could Mr Hume, after so many instances of disdain on my part, have still the astonishing generosity as to persevere sincerely to serve me? |
53791 | Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? |
53791 | Do you therefore mean, that it takes not the points in the same order and by the same rule, as is peculiar and essential to a right line? |
53791 | Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflection? |
53791 | Does it attend us at all times, or does it only return at intervals? |
53791 | First, for what reason we pronounce it_ necessary_, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, should also have a cause? |
53791 | For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness? |
53791 | For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? |
53791 | For how can the two walls, that run from south to north, touch each other, while they touch the opposite ends of two walls that run from east to west? |
53791 | For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory? |
53791 | For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different? |
53791 | For if they can not, what possibly can become of them? |
53791 | For what does he mean by_ production_? |
53791 | For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? |
53791 | For whence should it be derived? |
53791 | For why do we blame all gross and injurious language, unless it be, because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and humanity? |
53791 | For why, indeed, should I have any other? |
53791 | For, from what impression could this idea be derived? |
53791 | For, supposing such a conjunction, would the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body? |
53791 | From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? |
53791 | Here, therefore, I must ask,_ What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point_? |
53791 | How can he prove to me, for instance, that two right lines can not have one common segment? |
53791 | How does he know this? |
53791 | How else could any thing exist without length, without breadth, or without depth? |
53791 | How is it possible to make a man easy or happy in a world, to whose customs and maxims he is determined to run retrograde? |
53791 | How then is it possible, that the same substance can at once be modified into that square table, and into this round one? |
53791 | How then shall we adjust those principles together? |
53791 | I first ask mathematicians what they mean when they say one line or surface is_ equal_ to, or_ greater_, or_ less_ than another? |
53791 | I have declared my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surprised if they should express a hatred of mine and of my person? |
53791 | I therefore ask, wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition? |
53791 | If at intervals, at what times principally does it return, and by what causes is it produced? |
53791 | If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after what manner? |
53791 | Is it an impression of sensation or reflection? |
53791 | Is it in every part without being extended? |
53791 | Is it in this particular part, or in that other? |
53791 | Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent? |
53791 | Is it therefore nothing? |
53791 | Is the indivisible subject or immaterial substance, if you will, on the left or on the right hand of the perception? |
53791 | Now I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies or objects to which we suppose solidity to belong? |
53791 | Now''tis certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise, why do we talk and reason concerning it? |
53791 | Now, what idea have we of these bodies? |
53791 | Now, what impression do our senses here convey to us? |
53791 | Now, what is our idea of the moving body, without which motion is incomprehensible? |
53791 | Numquid quæ consecravimus perdidisse nos dicimus? |
53791 | On the back or fore- side of it? |
53791 | On the supposition of my entering into a project to ruin him, how could I think to bring it about by the services I did him? |
53791 | On the surface or in the middle? |
53791 | Or if these colours unite into one, what new colour will they produce by their union? |
53791 | Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest? |
53791 | Or that''tis impossible to draw more than one right line betwixt any two points? |
53791 | Pray, who knows when my door was open or shut, except Mr Hume, with whom I lived, and by whom every body was introduced that I saw? |
53791 | Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possessed of an idea, which is not preceded by any similar impression? |
53791 | Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? |
53791 | Shall we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received? |
53791 | The next question, then, should naturally be,_ how experience gives rise to such a principle_? |
53791 | Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time? |
53791 | We may well ask,_ What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body_? |
53791 | What beings surround me? |
53791 | What can he have said to them, for it is only through him they know any thing of me? |
53791 | What could I divine would be the consequence of such a beginning? |
53791 | What do they know of me, except that I am unhappy, and a friend to their friend Hume? |
53791 | What harm have I done, or could I do to Mr Rousseau? |
53791 | What have I done to Mr Walpole, whom I know full as little? |
53791 | What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? |
53791 | What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falsehood? |
53791 | What then is meant by a distinction of reason, since it implies neither a difference nor separation? |
53791 | What was his design in it? |
53791 | Where am I, or what? |
53791 | Where did he see them? |
53791 | Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated? |
53791 | Which of them shall we prefer? |
53791 | Who could have excited their enmity against me? |
53791 | Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? |
53791 | Why are those enemies all the friends of Mr Hume? |
53791 | Why should I have even them? |
53791 | [ 34] What have I done to Lord Littleton,[35] whom I do n''t even know? |
53791 | [ 34] Why indeed? |
53791 | [ 38] How was it possible for me to guess at such chimerical suspicions? |
53791 | _ What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together_? |
53791 | and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune should at last guide me on her footsteps? |
53791 | and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? |
53791 | but''tis in vain to ask,_ Whether there be body or not_? |
53791 | did this good man borrow those eyes he fixes so sternly and unaccountably on those of his friends? |
1580 | ), said he; did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? |
1580 | Admitting this view, I ask of you, what good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the science of itself, effect? |
1580 | And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her? |
1580 | And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their own business only? |
1580 | And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice? |
1580 | And can that be good which does not make men good? |
1580 | And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also? |
1580 | And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely? |
1580 | And he who does so does his duty? |
1580 | And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in what relates to these? |
1580 | And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous? |
1580 | And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness? |
1580 | And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness and agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad? |
1580 | And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far better than quietness and slowness? |
1580 | And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather than quietly and slowly? |
1580 | And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a quietness? |
1580 | And is temperance a good? |
1580 | And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject- matter of health and disease? |
1580 | And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of what? |
1580 | And the inference is that temperance can not be modesty-- if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good? |
1580 | And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation? |
1580 | And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium? |
1580 | And the temperate are also good? |
1580 | And they are right, and you would agree with them? |
1580 | And to read quickly or slowly? |
1580 | And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this? |
1580 | And what if I am? |
1580 | And what is it? |
1580 | And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? |
1580 | And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily, or quietly and slowly? |
1580 | And which, I said, is better-- facility in learning, or difficulty in learning? |
1580 | And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? |
1580 | And will wisdom give health? |
1580 | And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what was not your own business? |
1580 | And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate in doing another''s work, as well as in doing their own? |
1580 | And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good? |
1580 | Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom? |
1580 | Are you right, Charmides? |
1580 | But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine-- what is the subject of temperance or wisdom? |
1580 | But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge of medicine? |
1580 | But even if knowledge can know itself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what we do not know? |
1580 | But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice? |
1580 | But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to prove beneficial, and when not? |
1580 | But of what is this knowledge? |
1580 | But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no subject- matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences? |
1580 | But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always good? |
1580 | But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom? |
1580 | But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this? |
1580 | But where does Dr. Jackson find any such notion as this in Plato or anywhere in ancient philosophy? |
1580 | But which is best when you are at the writing- master''s, to write the same letters quickly or quietly? |
1580 | But which most tends to make him happy? |
1580 | But why do you not call him, and show him to us? |
1580 | Can you show me any such result of them? |
1580 | Can you tell me? |
1580 | Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? |
1580 | Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself, and of all other desires? |
1580 | Did you ever observe that this is what they say? |
1580 | Do you admit that? |
1580 | Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking? |
1580 | Do you mean that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of good actions, is temperance? |
1580 | For is not the discovery of things as they truly are, a good common to all mankind? |
1580 | For why should Aristotle, because he has quoted several Dialogues of Plato, have quoted them all? |
1580 | Has he not a beautiful face? |
1580 | Have we not long ago asseverated that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing else? |
1580 | He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right, in relation to health and disease? |
1580 | How can you think that I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself? |
1580 | How is that? |
1580 | How is this riddle to be explained? |
1580 | How so? |
1580 | How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage? |
1580 | How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building? |
1580 | I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same? |
1580 | I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another also? |
1580 | I said, or without my consent? |
1580 | I said; is not this rather the effect of medicine? |
1580 | I was, he replied; but what is your drift? |
1580 | In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is Temperance? |
1580 | Is it of him you are speaking or of some one else? |
1580 | Is not medicine, I said, the science of health? |
1580 | Is not that true? |
1580 | Is not that true? |
1580 | Is not that true? |
1580 | Is that true? |
1580 | Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes? |
1580 | Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something else? |
1580 | Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will he proceed? |
1580 | May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game of draughts? |
1580 | Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom is the science? |
1580 | Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes? |
1580 | Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has no object of fear? |
1580 | Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,--do they not each of them do their own work? |
1580 | Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half? |
1580 | Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort? |
1580 | Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them? |
1580 | Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general? |
1580 | Or of computation? |
1580 | Or of health? |
1580 | Or of working in brass? |
1580 | Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves? |
1580 | Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying;--have you or have you not this quality of temperance? |
1580 | Shall I tell you the nature of the difficulty? |
1580 | Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this? |
1580 | Shall we speak of the soul and its qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, as feminine or neuter? |
1580 | That is your meaning? |
1580 | The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate of human beings, is asked by Socrates,''What is Temperance?'' |
1580 | Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good? |
1580 | Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but not what he knows? |
1580 | Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows? |
1580 | Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate? |
1580 | Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one''s own business; not at least in this way, or doing things of this sort? |
1580 | Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest agility and quickness, is noblest and best? |
1580 | Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance? |
1580 | Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, naked and undisguised? |
1580 | Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good? |
1580 | Think over all this, and, like a brave youth, tell me-- What is temperance? |
1580 | Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name? |
1580 | Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is noble? |
1580 | Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question-- Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something? |
1580 | Was he a fool who told you, Charmides? |
1580 | Was he right who affirmed that? |
1580 | Was not that your statement? |
1580 | Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom-- to know what is known and what is unknown to us? |
1580 | Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, and is of a nature to be a science of something? |
1580 | Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says,''Modesty is not good for a needy man''? |
1580 | Were we not right in making that admission? |
1580 | What do you mean? |
1580 | What do you mean? |
1580 | What is that? |
1580 | What makes you think so? |
1580 | Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater? |
1580 | Who is he, I said; and who is his father? |
1580 | Why not, I said; but will he come? |
1580 | Why not? |
1580 | With my consent? |
1580 | Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly? |
1580 | Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? |
1580 | You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about? |
1580 | and in what cases do you mean? |
1580 | or do all equally make him happy? |
1580 | or must the craftsman necessarily know when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work which he is doing? |
1580 | the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing? |
10615 | And are there not places where, at a certain age, they kill or expose their parents, without any remorse at all? |
10615 | And are they those which are the first in children, and antecedent to all acquired ones? |
10615 | And if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth? |
10615 | And sensible qualities, as colours and smells,& c. what are they but the powers of different bodies, in relation to our perception,& c.? |
10615 | And were not he that proposed it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him? |
10615 | And what can hinder him from thinking them sacred, when he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts, and the most reverenced by others? |
10615 | And what doubt can there be made of it? |
10615 | And what is the will, but the faculty to do this? |
10615 | And when we find it there, how much more does it resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher, than represent the true God? |
10615 | And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable? |
10615 | And whether, in the second case, there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings? |
10615 | And which then shall be true? |
10615 | And, if considered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? |
10615 | Are they such as all mankind have, and bring into the world with them? |
10615 | But alas, amongst children, idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? |
10615 | But can any one think, or will any one say, that “ impossibility ” and “ identity ” are two innate IDEAS? |
10615 | But how late is it before any such notion is discoverable in children? |
10615 | But if a Hobbist be asked why? |
10615 | But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? |
10615 | But my question is,--whether one can not have the IDEA of one body moved, whilst others are at rest? |
10615 | But perhaps it will be said,--without a regular motion, such as of the sun, or some other, how could it ever be known that such periods were equal? |
10615 | But the question being here,--Whether the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of body? |
10615 | But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? |
10615 | But will any one say, that those that live by fraud or rapine have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow and assent to? |
10615 | Can another man perceive that I am conscious of anything, when I perceive it not myself? |
10615 | Can he be concerned in either of their actions? |
10615 | Can the soul think, and not the man? |
10615 | Concerning a man ’s liberty, there yet, therefore, is raised this further question, WHETHER A MAN BE FREE TO WILL? |
10615 | Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves, and therefore can it be doubted? |
10615 | Do we not see( will they be ready to say) the parts of bodies stick firmly together? |
10615 | For example, what is a watch? |
10615 | For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will? |
10615 | For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? |
10615 | For though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it? |
10615 | For, it being asked, what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs? |
10615 | For, our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts? |
10615 | For, who is it that sees not that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of substances, and not of powers themselves? |
10615 | Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity, before it has of white or black, sweet or bitter? |
10615 | How else could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep? |
10615 | How knows any one that the Soul always thinks? |
10615 | How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipsis, if we had no other idea of it, but some few of its properties? |
10615 | I ask those who say they have a positive idea of eternity, whether their idea of duration includes in it succession, or not? |
10615 | I ask whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? |
10615 | I ask, is not this stay voluntary? |
10615 | If it be further asked,--What it is moves desire? |
10615 | If they say that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking, I ask, How they know it? |
10615 | If this answer satisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the question, What determines the will? |
10615 | Is it worth the name of freedom to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man ’s self? |
10615 | Is there anything more common? |
10615 | Let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity? |
10615 | Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:--How comes it to be furnished? |
10615 | May he not, with more reason, assure him he was not asleep? |
10615 | Must it not be a most manifest wrong judgment that does not presently see to which side, in this case, the preference is to be given? |
10615 | Nay, whether the cock too, which had the same soul, were not the same, with both of them? |
10615 | Or a man think, and not be conscious of it? |
10615 | Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate? |
10615 | Or does the mind regulate itself and its assent by ideas that it never yet had? |
10615 | Or doth the proposing them print them clearer in the mind than nature did? |
10615 | Or rather, would he not have reason to think that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him? |
10615 | Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths? |
10615 | Or the understanding draw conclusions from principles which it never yet knew or understood? |
10615 | Or where is that universal consent that assures us there are such inbred rules? |
10615 | POWER being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they*[ lost line??] |
10615 | POWER being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they*[ lost line??] |
10615 | The question then is, Which of these are real, and which barely imaginary combinations? |
10615 | To return, then, to the inquiry, what is it that determines the will in regard to our actions? |
10615 | WHETHER MAN ’S WILL BE FREE OR NO? |
10615 | What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? |
10615 | What good would sight and hearing do to a creature that can not move itself to or from the objects wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? |
10615 | What is it, then, that makes it be thought confused, since the want of symmetry does not? |
10615 | What makes the same man? |
10615 | What moved? |
10615 | What real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in an body, but an alteration of the texture of it? |
10615 | What true or tolerable notion of a Deity could they have, who acknowledged and worshipped hundreds? |
10615 | What was it that made anything come out of the body? |
10615 | Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? |
10615 | Whence has it all the MATERIALS of reason and knowledge? |
10615 | Where is that practical truth that is universally received, without doubt or question, as it must be if innate? |
10615 | Where then are those innate principles of justice, piety, gratitude, equity, chastity? |
10615 | Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same men, though they lived several ages asunder? |
10615 | Which innate? |
10615 | Who in his wits would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery; which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? |
10615 | Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this? |
10615 | Would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before? |
10615 | and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? |
10615 | attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever existed? |
10615 | is this,--What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing, to this or that particular motion or rest? |
10615 | number, whose stock is inexhaustible and truly infinite: and what a large and immense field doth extension alone afford the mathematicians? |
10615 | what universal principles of knowledge? |
10615 | why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? |
10616 | ''But of what use is all this fine knowledge of MEN''S OWN IMAGINATIONS, to a man that inquires after the reality of things? |
10616 | ''Lead is a metal''to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for? |
10616 | ''The whole is equal to all its parts:''what real truth, I beseech you, does it teach us? |
10616 | ''the whole is equal to all its parts taken together?'' |
10616 | AUT EA QUOE VIZ SUMMA INGENII RATIONE COMPREHENDAT, NULLA RATIONE MOVERI PUTET?] |
10616 | And if they were asked what passage was, how would they better define it than by motion? |
10616 | And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man? |
10616 | And to what purpose make them general, unless it were that they might have general names for the convenience of discourse and communication? |
10616 | Are monsters really a distinct species? |
10616 | Are not they also, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into the complex idea signified by the name ZAHAB? |
10616 | Are these general maxims of no use? |
10616 | But of what use is all such truth to us? |
10616 | But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great God, who is there, that, by his own search and ability, can come to know? |
10616 | But what shall be here the criterion? |
10616 | But what shall be the criterion of this agreement? |
10616 | But who can help it, if truth will have it so? |
10616 | But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing, SINCE WE CANNOT POSSIBLY CONCEIVE IT? |
10616 | For by what right is it that fusibility comes to be a part of the essence signified by the word gold, and solubility but a property of it? |
10616 | For example: my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still: What causes rest in one, and motion in the other? |
10616 | For is it not at least as proper and significant to say, Passage is a motion from one place to another, as to say, Motion is a passage,& c.? |
10616 | For to what purpose should the memory charge itself with such compositions, unless it were by abstraction to make them general? |
10616 | For what is PASSAGE other than MOTION? |
10616 | For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new species? |
10616 | For what need of a sign, when the thing signified is present and in view? |
10616 | For when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? |
10616 | For, if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at last should we stop? |
10616 | For, though it may be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron? |
10616 | Had the upper part to the middle been of human shape, and all below swine, had it been murder to destroy it? |
10616 | Have the bulk of mankind no other guide but accident and blind chance to conduct them to their happiness or misery? |
10616 | He that uses words without any clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors? |
10616 | Here everybody will be ready to ask, If changelings may be supposed something between man and beast, pray what are they? |
10616 | How many men have no other ground for their tenets, than the supposed honesty, or learning, or number of those of the same profession? |
10616 | How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves? |
10616 | I ask, Whether these general maxims have not the same use in the study of divinity, and in theological questions, that they have in other sciences? |
10616 | I ask, whether the complex idea in Adam''s mind, which he called KINNEAH, were adequate or not? |
10616 | I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence? |
10616 | I. I would ask them, whether they imagine that all matter, EVERY PARTICLE OF MATTER, thinks? |
10616 | If all matter does not think, I next ask, Whether it be ONLY ONE ATOM that does so? |
10616 | If it be asked whether these be all men or no, all of human species? |
10616 | If men should do so in their reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? |
10616 | If not, what reason will there be shown more for the one than the other? |
10616 | Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce anything? |
10616 | Is it true of the IDEA of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones? |
10616 | Is not now ductility to be added to his former idea, and made part of the essence of the species that name ZAHAB stands for? |
10616 | Is there anything so extravagant as the imaginations of men''s brains? |
10616 | Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: but who knows what those ideas may be? |
10616 | Let them be so: what will your drivelling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be? |
10616 | Matter must be allowed eternal: Why? |
10616 | Objection, What shall become of those who want Proofs? |
10616 | Or can those be the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth, which teach one thing in Christendom and another in Turkey? |
10616 | Or is it true because any one has been witness to such an action? |
10616 | Or must the bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font or no? |
10616 | Or that at least, if this will happen, it should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so? |
10616 | Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all?'' |
10616 | Or who shall be the judge to determine? |
10616 | Or why is its colour part of the essence, and its malleableness but a property? |
10616 | Other spirits, who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things, how much must they exceed us in knowledge? |
10616 | QUID EST ENIM VERIUS, QUAM NEMINEM ESSE OPORTERE TAM STULTE AROGANTEM, UT IN SE MENTEM ET RATIONEM PUTET INESSE IN COELO MUNDOQUE NON PUTET? |
10616 | Shall a defect in the body make a monster; a defect in the mind( the far more noble, and, in the common phrase, the far more essential part) not? |
10616 | Shall the want of a nose, or a neck, make a monster, and put such issue out of the rank of men; the want of reason and understanding, not? |
10616 | So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me or any other particular corporeal being, to have reason? |
10616 | The atomists, who define motion to be''a passage from one place to another,''what do they more than put one synonymous word for another? |
10616 | There are some watches that are made with four wheels, others with five; is this a specific difference to the workman? |
10616 | To know whether his idea of ADULTERY or INCEST be right, will a man seek it anywhere amongst things existing? |
10616 | To this, perhaps will be said, Has not an opal, or the infusion of LIGNUM NEPHRITICUM, two colours at the same time? |
10616 | Upon which, his friend demanding what scarlet was? |
10616 | WHAT is truth? |
10616 | What confusion of virtues and vices, if every one may make what ideas of them he pleases? |
10616 | What greater light can be hoped for in the moral sciences? |
10616 | What instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before? |
10616 | What is this more than trifling with words? |
10616 | What makes lead and iron malleable, antimony and stones not? |
10616 | What more is contained in that maxim, than what the signification of the word TOTUM, or the WHOLE, does of itself import? |
10616 | What must we do for the rest? |
10616 | What need is there of REASON? |
10616 | What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract ideas of GLORY and AMBITION, before he has heard the names of them? |
10616 | What principle is requisite to prove that one and one are two, that two and two are four, that three times two are six? |
10616 | What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a case? |
10616 | What shall we say, then? |
10616 | What sort of outside is the certain sign that there is or is not such an inhabitant within? |
10616 | What will become of Changelings in a future state? |
10616 | What, then, are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings? |
10616 | Whence comes this, then? |
10616 | Where is the head that has no chimeras in it? |
10616 | Where now( I ask) shall be the just measure; which the utmost bounds of that shape, that carries with it a rational soul? |
10616 | Wherein, then, would I gladly know, consist the precise and unmovable boundaries of that species? |
10616 | Which is nothing else but to know what OTHER simple ideas do, or do not co- exist with those that make up that complex idea? |
10616 | Who ever that had a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of SEVEN, or a TRIANGLE? |
10616 | Who knows not what odd notions many men''s heads are filled with, and what strange ideas all men''s brains are capable of? |
10616 | Who of all these has established the right signification of the word, gold? |
10616 | Why do we say this is a horse, and that a mule; this is an animal, that an herb? |
10616 | Will you deprive changelings of a future state?) |
10616 | [ The reason whereof is plain: for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold, when we know not what is or is not gold? |
10616 | [ What shall we then say? |
10616 | because you can not conceive how it can be made out of nothing: why do you not also think yourself eternal? |
10616 | i. c. 3), with a man''s head and hog''s body? |
10616 | that themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined, their own opinions? |
39964 | And where were the others? |
39964 | Has the plant a soul? 39964 When a woman is strong, is n''t she strong after the same conception and the same strength? |
39964 | And do you not interchange the portrait for the person itself, without difficulty and misunderstanding? |
39964 | And how can any single brain assume to acquire all knowledge, to know everything? |
39964 | And how is a fact proven? |
39964 | And on the other hand, does not the promotion of our material interests require a penetration on our part of the wonders of creation? |
39964 | Are not these the concrete content of our material interests? |
39964 | Are there any stones that do not belong to the category of stones, or any kind of wood which is iron? |
39964 | Are they not simply substitutes? |
39964 | At best, will you not merely repeat what has long since been accomplished? |
39964 | Before, at, or after birth? |
39964 | But do not beasts, worms, and sensitive plants have that also? |
39964 | But how do I know what I state in such an offhand manner? |
39964 | But how is life infused into them? |
39964 | But how is that to be found? |
39964 | But how to explain that wonderful_ a priori_ knowledge which exceeds all experience? |
39964 | But is n''t it a contradiction that a special science wants to be general world wisdom? |
39964 | But is there anything which is absolutely good? |
39964 | But look here, has it not always been so? |
39964 | But the study of the anatomy of the hand can no more solve the question: What is writing? |
39964 | But was it founded on fact? |
39964 | But what about the question of the beginning and end of the world, or the question of the existence of God? |
39964 | But what else does the term material interests mean but the abstract expression of our existence, welfare, and development? |
39964 | But what good will it do a painter to have his special attention called to this fact? |
39964 | But what is there of unity that science teaches about them? |
39964 | But what thing is there that has any effects"in itself?" |
39964 | But where shall we draw the line in this comparison of images? |
39964 | But who claims that there are not many straight lines which are crooked at one end, which run straight on for a certain distance and then turn? |
39964 | But why do we call this the most essential part? |
39964 | By the help of brown- study from the interior of our brain, from revelation, or from experience? |
39964 | Can natural science do as much? |
39964 | Can the world be understood in a hermitage? |
39964 | Can we see the things themselves? |
39964 | Can we, by mere deduction through concepts which go beyond experience, arrive at truths? |
39964 | Could there not be some dogs who lacked the quality of watchfulness, and might not our pug- dog be very unreliable, in spite of all exact deductions? |
39964 | Do animals arise when the hot and the cold begin to disintegrate, as some claim? |
39964 | Do you not ask on seeing the portrait of some person unknown to you: Who is this? |
39964 | Does he not say explicitly that the penetration of the wonders of creation promotes our material interests? |
39964 | Does not this appear reasonable to you?... |
39964 | Does that require any explanation? |
39964 | Everything develops, why should not our intellects do so? |
39964 | For are not the effects tangible by which reason transforms nature and life? |
39964 | Has proud philosophy gained nothing since? |
39964 | Has the earth a soul? |
39964 | Have I now still to prove that all existence is of the same category? |
39964 | Have not your thoughts been connected always and everywhere with some worldly or real object? |
39964 | Have they a soul analogous to that of man? |
39964 | Have you ever seen a portrait or a copy that did not agree in some respect with the original? |
39964 | How are we to designate the species, how the genus? |
39964 | How can a man who is out of touch with the mass of the shifting population feel that he is one with the universe? |
39964 | How can thinkers who search for truth, being, relative causes, such as naturalists, be idealists? |
39964 | How can we see everything? |
39964 | How do we arrive at the knowledge of things which are not accessible to experience? |
39964 | How do we know that? |
39964 | How do we prove that a peach is a delicious fruit? |
39964 | How do we solve this contradiction? |
39964 | How is understanding possible? |
39964 | I remember reading in a satirical paper the question:"What is a gentleman? |
39964 | If the ancient Germans regarded the great oak as sacred and religious, why should not art and science become religious among the modern Germans? |
39964 | If the function of the heart may be referred to as material, why not the function of the brain? |
39964 | In certain shows, the clown is asked by the manager:"Clown, where have you been?" |
39964 | In seeking for an answer to the question: What is philosophy? |
39964 | In what respect are our material interests different from our mental penetration of things? |
39964 | Is it an idea? |
39964 | Is it not necessary, however, to make a distinction between poetry and truth? |
39964 | Is it the blood, which enables us to think, or the air or the fire? |
39964 | Is not everything a part, is not every part a thing? |
39964 | Is not general wisdom that which comprises all knowledge, all special science? |
39964 | Is not the air or the scent of flowers an ethereal body? |
39964 | Is not the material world and its understanding as essential as reason, as intellect, which bends to the task of exploring this world? |
39964 | Is the color of a leaf less of a thing than that leaf itself? |
39964 | Is the world a concept? |
39964 | Is this world- god a mere idea? |
39964 | It is the solution of the riddle of the ancient Eleatic philosophy: How can the one be contained in the many, and the many in one? |
39964 | It was the famous Kant who posed the question:"How is_ a priori_ knowledge possible?" |
39964 | May not our modern viewpoint, the category in which our present day science thinks, the category of cause and effect, be equally transitory? |
39964 | Mind and Matter: Which Is Primary, Which Is Secondary? |
39964 | Multiplicity, change, motion-- who is to split hairs about them, who will make fine distinctions? |
39964 | Must I not know everything in order to be world wise? |
39964 | Must I prove this? |
39964 | Now I ask: If nature, God, and absolute truth are one and the same thing, have we not learned something about the"final cause of all things?" |
39964 | Now you are familiar with that student''s song:"What''s Coming from the Heights?" |
39964 | Now, is this logic or is it theology? |
39964 | Or are you spiritualists who make a metaphysical distinction between the truth and the phenomenon? |
39964 | Or does it belong to the infinite and must it exist forever? |
39964 | Otherwise, how could misunderstandings arise? |
39964 | Our logic asks: Does wisdom descend mysteriously from the interior of the human brain, or does it come from the outer world like all experience? |
39964 | Scientists as well as scribes have ever embarrassed one another by the question: What is truth? |
39964 | Shall it be an idol or a king? |
39964 | Shall we use the intellect philosophically, or shall we use it empirically? |
39964 | Should not religion, which according to the words of a German emperor"must be preserved for the people,"also have its bounds in history? |
39964 | Should not that appear mysterious to it? |
39964 | Socrates in the market of Athens, and Plato in his dialogues, have probably said better things about the questions:"What is virtue? |
39964 | The fetish cult, the animal cult, the cult of the ideal and spiritual creator, or the cult of the real human mind? |
39964 | The great Kant has asked the plain question:"Is metaphysics practicable as a science?" |
39964 | The human understanding has its limits, why should it not? |
39964 | The next question is then: By what road do we arrive at its understanding? |
39964 | The philosophical celebrities and classic authorities are not even in accord on the question: What is philosophy and what is its aim? |
39964 | The question then arises: Which is the genuine and true division? |
39964 | The statements: I do, I work, I think, must be completed by an answer to the question: What are you doing, working, thinking? |
39964 | Thereupon Cebes asks:"Well, and what do you think of this now?" |
39964 | This book, its leaves, its letters, or their parts, are they units? |
39964 | Those sciences recognize only the phenomena of things; but where is the understanding which perceives the truth?" |
39964 | To analyze this idea means to solve the question, what is walking generally considered, what is the general nature of walking? |
39964 | What are all things? |
39964 | What can be more evident? |
39964 | What constitutes, then, this body which is distinguished from its transient form? |
39964 | What do I know about the shoe industry, if I know that it produces shoes? |
39964 | What good are all the treasures of Croesus, if health is lacking? |
39964 | What good is health to us, when we have nothing to bite? |
39964 | What is a"thing?" |
39964 | What is it that Lessing says? |
39964 | What is its beginning, what its end? |
39964 | What is its positive achievement? |
39964 | What is justice? |
39964 | What is justice? |
39964 | What is meant by political freedom? |
39964 | What is moral and reasonable?" |
39964 | What is not an image in the abstract, and what is more than an image in the concrete? |
39964 | What is the reason for this? |
39964 | What is the relation of the concrete to the abstract? |
39964 | What is the use of metaphysics under these circumstances? |
39964 | What would become of reason and language, if such a thing were to be considered? |
39964 | What, then, is religion and religious? |
39964 | Whence comes reason, where do we get our ideas, judgments, conclusions? |
39964 | Where and how are we to find a positive and definite knowledge of it? |
39964 | Where are we to begin and where to end? |
39964 | Where do I begin, where do I stop? |
39964 | Where do we find any indivisible unit outside of our abstract conceptions? |
39964 | Where do we find such eternal, imperishable, formless matter? |
39964 | Where does consciousness begin in the child? |
39964 | Where does the variety of science, its undecided vacillation end, and when does understanding become stable? |
39964 | Where is the consistent connection? |
39964 | Where, then, is the beginning and end, and how can we bring order into these relations? |
39964 | Where, who, what, is the supreme being to which everything else is subordinate, which brings system, consistency, logic, into our thought and actions? |
39964 | Who and what are now the objects of philosophy? |
39964 | Who has not heard the lament about the unreliability of the senses? |
39964 | Who or what is the intellect, whence does it come from, whither does it lead? |
39964 | Who will define to us what a line is? |
39964 | Who will deny that he can feel the force of heat, of cold, of gravitation? |
39964 | Who would be silly enough to deny that? |
39964 | Why do you want to be a theist, if you are a naturalist, or a naturalist if you are a theist? |
39964 | Why is not the"naturalistic"philosopher consistent by recognizing his special object, understanding, as a natural object? |
39964 | Why should not the action of the brain belong in the same category as the action of the heart? |
39964 | Why, then, speculate about God, freedom, and immortality, when indubitable knowledge may be obtained by the formal method of exact deductions? |
39964 | Would any one try to make us believe that there is a great and almighty eye that can look through blocks of metal the same as through glass? |
39964 | XII MIND AND MATTER: WHICH IS PRIMARY, WHICH SECONDARY? |
39964 | You know the old question: Which was first, the egg or the hen? |
39964 | You will probably ask: What has that to do with logic or the art of reasoning? |
39964 | than the physiological study of the brain can bring us nearer to the solution of the question: What is thought? |
4705 | A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: Why? |
4705 | After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it? |
4705 | An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? |
4705 | And how can the floor and roof ever meet, while they are separated by the four walls, that lie in a contrary position? |
4705 | And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them? |
4705 | And how distinguish that exactly from a probability? |
4705 | And if they were founded on original instincts, coued they have any greater stability? |
4705 | And to what end can it serve either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest? |
4705 | And what creature departs more widely, not only from right reason, but from his own character and disposition? |
4705 | And why is it contrary, unless it be more shocking than any delicate satire? |
4705 | And, Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object? |
4705 | Are the changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct? |
4705 | Are they therefore, upon that account, immoral? |
4705 | But after what manner does it give pleasure? |
4705 | But can anything be imagined more absurd and contradictory than this reasoning? |
4705 | But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? |
4705 | But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we consider the nature and effects Of EDUCATION? |
4705 | But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? |
4705 | But in what manner? |
4705 | But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible, without an antecedent morality? |
4705 | But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive? |
4705 | But shall we say upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour? |
4705 | But then I ask, if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred? |
4705 | But what do we mean by impossible? |
4705 | But what have I here said, that reflections very refined and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us? |
4705 | But what makes the end agreeable? |
4705 | But what passion? |
4705 | But who will assert, that this is the only foundation of justice? |
4705 | Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation? |
4705 | Do the children arise from this copulation more uniformly, than does the parents care for their safety and preservation? |
4705 | Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception? |
4705 | Do you therefore mean that it takes not the points in the same order and by the same rule, as is peculiar and essential to a right line? |
4705 | Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflection? |
4705 | Does it discover a relation or a matter of fact? |
4705 | For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness? |
4705 | For from what impression coued this idea be derived? |
4705 | For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? |
4705 | For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory? |
4705 | For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different? |
4705 | For if they can not, what possibly can become of them? |
4705 | For is it more certain, that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than that two young savages of different sexes will copulate? |
4705 | For supposing such a conjunction, would the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body? |
4705 | For what does he mean by production? |
4705 | For what does reason discover, when it pronounces any action vicious? |
4705 | For what if he be my enemy, and has given me just cause to hate him? |
4705 | For what is more capricious than human actions? |
4705 | For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? |
4705 | For what reason? |
4705 | For whence should it be derived? |
4705 | For why do we blame all gross and injurious language, unless it be, because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and humanity? |
4705 | For, who ever thought of forbearing any action, because others might possibly draw false conclusions from it? |
4705 | From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? |
4705 | From whence does this proceed, but that the memory in the first case assists the fancy and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions? |
4705 | Have you any notion of self or substance? |
4705 | Here therefore I must ask, What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point? |
4705 | How can he prove to me, for instance, that two right lines can not have one common segment? |
4705 | How do we separate this impossibility from an improbability? |
4705 | How else coued any thing exist without length, without breadth, or without depth? |
4705 | How is it possible they coued ever become objects of pride, except by means of that transition above- explained? |
4705 | How is this to be accounted for? |
4705 | How much more when aided by that circumstance? |
4705 | How then is it possible, that the same substance can at once be modifyed into that square table, and into this round one? |
4705 | How then shall we adjust those principles together? |
4705 | I Does it attend us at all times, or does it only return at intervals? |
4705 | I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? |
4705 | I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? |
4705 | I first ask mathematicians, what they mean when they say one line or surface is EQUAL to, or GREATER or LESS than another? |
4705 | I have declared my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surprized, if they should express a hatred of mine and of my person? |
4705 | I therefore ask, Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition? |
4705 | If at intervals, at what times principally does it return, and by what causes is it produced? |
4705 | If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? |
4705 | If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? |
4705 | If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? |
4705 | Is it an impression of sensation or of reflection? |
4705 | Is it because it is his duty to be grateful? |
4705 | Is it in every part without being extended? |
4705 | Is it in this particular part, or in that other? |
4705 | Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent? |
4705 | Is it therefore nothing? |
4705 | Is self the same with substance? |
4705 | Is the indivisible subject, or immaterial substance, if you will, on the left or on the right hand of the perception? |
4705 | Now I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies or objects, to which we suppose solidity to belong? |
4705 | Now after what manner are they related to ourselves? |
4705 | Now it is certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise why do we talk and reason concerning it? |
4705 | Now the question is, after what manner this utility and importance operate upon us? |
4705 | Now what idea have we of these bodies? |
4705 | Now what impression do oar senses here convey to us? |
4705 | Now what is our idea of the moving body, without which motion is incomprehensible? |
4705 | On the back or fore side of it? |
4705 | On the surface or in the middle? |
4705 | Or if it be possible to imagine, that such errors are the sources of all immorality? |
4705 | Or if it were, is an exception to a general rule in every case criminal, for no other reason than because it is an exception? |
4705 | Or if these colours unite into one, what new colour will they produce by their union? |
4705 | Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest? |
4705 | Or that it is impossible to draw more than one right line betwixt any two points? |
4705 | Or, who ever performed any, that he might give rise to true conclusions?] |
4705 | Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession to private families? |
4705 | Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possest of an idea, which is not preceded by any similar impression? |
4705 | Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? |
4705 | Shall we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received? |
4705 | Should it be asked, what proportion these two species of morality bear to each other? |
4705 | The next question is, Of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us? |
4705 | The next question, then, should naturally be, how experience gives rise to such a principle? |
4705 | The question is, whether these intervals do not afford us the idea of extension without body? |
4705 | Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time? |
4705 | WHETHER IT IS BY MEANS OF OUR IDEAS OR IMPRESSIONS WE DISTINGUISH BETWIXT VICE AND VIRTUE, AND PRONOUNCE AN ACTION BLAMEABLE OR PRAISEWORTHY? |
4705 | We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? |
4705 | What beings surround me? |
4705 | What farther proof can be desired for the present system? |
4705 | What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas? |
4705 | What follows? |
4705 | What if I be in necessity, and have urgent motives to acquire something to my family? |
4705 | What if he be a miser, and can make no use of what I would deprive him of? |
4705 | What if he be a profligate debauchee, and would rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions? |
4705 | What if he be a vicious man, and deserves the hatred of all mankind? |
4705 | What more inconstant than the desires of man? |
4705 | What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? |
4705 | What restraint, therefore, shall we impose on women, in order to counter- balance so strong a temptation as they have to infidelity? |
4705 | What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falshood? |
4705 | When it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable? |
4705 | Where am I, or what? |
4705 | Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated? |
4705 | Which of them shall we prefer? |
4705 | Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the 1st of January 1715, the 11th of March 1719, and the 3rd of August 1733? |
4705 | Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? |
4705 | Why then look any farther, or multiply suppositions without necessity? |
4705 | Why? |
4705 | Why? |
4705 | and on whom have, I any influence, or who have any influence on me? |
4705 | but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? |
4705 | in short, what character, or peculiar understanding, is more excellent than another? |
4705 | whether a clear head, or a copious invention? |
4705 | whether a profound genius, or a sure judgment? |
53792 | A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: why? |
53792 | All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the sun? |
53792 | An action, or sentiment, or character, is virtuous or vicious; why? |
53792 | And are you so late in perceiving it? |
53792 | And by being the first, replied Demea, might he not have been sensible of his error? |
53792 | And for what reason impose on himself such a violence? |
53792 | And have you at last, said Cleanthes smiling, betrayed your intentions, Philo? |
53792 | And how distinguish that exactly from a probability? |
53792 | And if it requires a cause in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of objects into a similar universe of ideas? |
53792 | And if they were founded on original instincts, could they have any greater stability? |
53792 | And is the slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both? |
53792 | And these whence? |
53792 | And what argument have you against such convulsions? |
53792 | And what creature departs more widely, not only from right reason, but from his own character and disposition? |
53792 | And what philosophers could possibly submit to so rigid a rule? |
53792 | And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?... |
53792 | And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? |
53792 | And where is the difficulty, replied Philo, of that supposition? |
53792 | And who can doubt of what all men declare from their own immediate feeling and experience? |
53792 | And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? |
53792 | And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and religious? |
53792 | And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all other animals? |
53792 | And, after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? |
53792 | And,_ Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object_? |
53792 | Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory? |
53792 | Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and along with these primary planets round the sun? |
53792 | Are the changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct? |
53792 | Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism? |
53792 | Are they, therefore, upon that account, immoral? |
53792 | Are you secretly, then, a more dangerous enemy than Cleanthes himself? |
53792 | Are you so late, says Philo, in teaching your children the principles of religion? |
53792 | Besides, consider, Demea: This very society, by which we surmount those wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to us? |
53792 | But according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and advantages which men and all animals possess? |
53792 | But after what manner does it give pleasure? |
53792 | But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? |
53792 | But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? |
53792 | But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this nature? |
53792 | But did the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater happiness? |
53792 | But farther, why may not die material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? |
53792 | But how is it conceivable, said Demea, that the world can arise from any thing similar to vegetation or generation? |
53792 | But how oft do they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society? |
53792 | But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself? |
53792 | But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist, why do they remain in life?.... |
53792 | But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? |
53792 | But if we stop, and go no farther; why go so far? |
53792 | But in what manner? |
53792 | But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? |
53792 | But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible without an antecedent morality? |
53792 | But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? |
53792 | But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive? |
53792 | But might not other particular volitions remedy this inconvenience? |
53792 | But shall we say, upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour? |
53792 | But then I ask, if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred? |
53792 | But what do we mean by impossible? |
53792 | But what is the consequence? |
53792 | But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk, said Demea? |
53792 | But what makes the end agreeable? |
53792 | But what passion? |
53792 | But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? |
53792 | But who will assert, that this is the only foundation of justice? |
53792 | Can the one opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so? |
53792 | Can we reach no farther in this subject than experience and probability? |
53792 | Can you explain their operations, and anatomize that fine internal structure on which they depend? |
53792 | Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house, find the generation of a universe? |
53792 | Do n''t you remember, said Philo, the excellent saying of Lord Bacon on this head? |
53792 | Do the children arise from this copulation more uniformly, than does the parents''care for their safety and preservation? |
53792 | Do we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form? |
53792 | Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception? |
53792 | Does it discover a relation or a matter of fact? |
53792 | Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? |
53792 | For how can an effect, which either is finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause? |
53792 | For instance, what if I should revive the old Epicurean hypothesis? |
53792 | For is it necessary to prove what every one feels within himself? |
53792 | For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to make discoveries especially in so late an age? |
53792 | For it is more certain that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than two young savages of different sexes will copulate? |
53792 | For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain? |
53792 | For what does reason discover, when it pronounces any action vicious? |
53792 | For what if he be my enemy, and has given me just cause to hate him? |
53792 | For what is more capricious than human actions? |
53792 | For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference? |
53792 | For what other name can I give them? |
53792 | For what reason? |
53792 | For whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? |
53792 | For who ever thought of forbearing any action, because others might possibly draw false conclusions from it? |
53792 | From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? |
53792 | From whence does this proceed, but that the memory in the first case assists the fancy, and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions? |
53792 | From_ their_ parents? |
53792 | Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? |
53792 | Have you any notion of_ self_ or_ substance_? |
53792 | Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? |
53792 | Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move? |
53792 | How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence? |
53792 | How can we satisfy ourselves without going on_ in infinitum_? |
53792 | How could things have been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order somewhere, in thought or in matter? |
53792 | How do we separate this impossibility from an improbability? |
53792 | How is it possible they could ever become objects of pride, except by means of that transition above explained? |
53792 | How is this compatible with that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe to the Deity? |
53792 | How is this to be accounted for? |
53792 | How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations? |
53792 | How many lie under the lingering torment of diseases? |
53792 | How then does the Divine benevolence display itself, in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? |
53792 | I would fain know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? |
53792 | If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? |
53792 | If no camels had been created for the use of man in the sandy deserts of Africa and Arabia, would the world have been dissolved? |
53792 | If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? |
53792 | If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? |
53792 | In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men? |
53792 | Is a very small part a rule for the universe? |
53792 | Is he able, but not willing? |
53792 | Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? |
53792 | Is it a rule for the whole? |
53792 | Is it any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of life? |
53792 | Is it because''tis his duty to be grateful? |
53792 | Is it contrary to his intention? |
53792 | Is it from the intention of the Deity? |
53792 | Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former? |
53792 | Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? |
53792 | Is not such an unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion? |
53792 | Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? |
53792 | Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow? |
53792 | Is the name, without any meaning, of such mighty importance? |
53792 | Is there any other rule than the greater similarity of the objects compared? |
53792 | Is_ self_ the same with_ substance_? |
53792 | JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? |
53792 | Justice, whether a natural or artificial Virtue? |
53792 | Now the question is, after what manner this utility and importance operate upon us? |
53792 | Now, after what manner are they related to ourselves? |
53792 | Now, as to the_ manner_ of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or suppose them any wise resembling? |
53792 | Objects, which are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard for each other? |
53792 | Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore prà ¦ sto? |
53792 | Or how can order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it bestows? |
53792 | Or if it be possible to imagine, that such errors are the sources of all immorality? |
53792 | Or if the tree was once transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? |
53792 | Or who ever performed any, that he might give rise to true conclusions? |
53792 | Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession to private families? |
53792 | Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? |
53792 | Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: but how often are they defective? |
53792 | Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any appearance of reason? |
53792 | Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? |
53792 | Should it be asked,_ what proportion these two species of morality bear to each other_? |
53792 | Since, therefore, this is the case with regard to property, and rights, and obligations, I ask, how it stands with regard to justice and injustice? |
53792 | The economy of final causes? |
53792 | The next question is, of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us? |
53792 | The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part? |
53792 | To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him a notion of its pleasures; whether should I conduct him? |
53792 | To what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such natural and such convincing arguments? |
53792 | Was it_ Nothing_? |
53792 | What devotion or worship address to them? |
53792 | What farther proof can be desired for the present system? |
53792 | What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas? |
53792 | What follows? |
53792 | What if I be in necessity, and have urgent motives to acquire something to my family? |
53792 | What if he be a miser, and can make no use of what I would deprive him of? |
53792 | What if he be a profligate debauchee, and would rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions? |
53792 | What if he be a vicious man, and deserves the hatred of all mankind? |
53792 | What is the soul of man? |
53792 | What more inconstant than the desires of man? |
53792 | What more useful than all the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity love, anger? |
53792 | What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call_ thought_, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe? |
53792 | What restraint, therefore, shall we impose on women, in order to counterbalance so strong a temptation as they have to infidelity? |
53792 | What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? |
53792 | What veneration or obedience pay them? |
53792 | What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? |
53792 | What wo and misery does it not occasion? |
53792 | What_ data_ have you for such extraordinary conclusions? |
53792 | When it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable? |
53792 | Whence arises the curious structure of an animal? |
53792 | Whence can any cause be known but from its known effects? |
53792 | Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? |
53792 | Where then is the difficulty? |
53792 | Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? |
53792 | Why have all men, I ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life?.... |
53792 | Why is there any misery at all in the world? |
53792 | Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? |
53792 | Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears,& c.? |
53792 | Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? |
53792 | Why then look any farther, or multiply suppositions without necessity? |
53792 | Why, then, should we think, that order is more essential to one than the other? |
53792 | Why? |
53792 | Why? |
53792 | Would the manner of a leaf''s blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree? |
53792 | You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me, what is the cause of this cause? |
53792 | _ First_, It is directly contrary to experience, and our immediate consciousness? |
53792 | and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose? |
53792 | and shall we build on that conjecture as on the most certain truth? |
53792 | cried Demea, interrupting him, where are we? |
53792 | cried Demea: Whither does your imagination hurry you? |
53792 | et omnes Ignibus à ¦ theriis terras suffire feraces? |
53792 | how often excessive? |
53792 | in short, what character, or peculiar understanding, is more excellent than another? |
53792 | nay often the absence of one good( and who can possess all?) |
53792 | or, why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority, before so young a man as Pamphilus? |
53792 | quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?'' |
53792 | qui minstri tanti muneris fuerunt? |
53792 | qui vectes? |
53792 | quà ¦ ferramenta? |
53792 | quà ¦ machinà ¦? |
53792 | quà ¦ molito? |
53792 | then is he malevolent Is he both able and willing? |
53792 | to a ball, to an opera, to court? |
53792 | whence then is evil? |
53792 | whether a clear head, or a copious invention? |
53792 | whether a profound genius, or a sure judgment? |
53792 | why not stop at the material world? |
1726 | ''And he who remembers, remembers that which he sees and knows?'' |
1726 | ''And he who sees knows?'' |
1726 | ''And if you say"Yes,"the tongue will escape conviction but not the mind, as Euripides would say?'' |
1726 | ''But Protagoras will retort:"Can anything be more or less without addition or subtraction?"'' |
1726 | ''But if he closes his eyes, does he not remember?'' |
1726 | ''Excellent; I want you to grow, and therefore I will leave that answer and ask another question: Is not seeing perceiving?'' |
1726 | ''That I should expect; but why did he not remain at Megara?'' |
1726 | ''What do you mean, Socrates?'' |
1726 | ''What do you mean?'' |
1726 | ''What may that be?'' |
1726 | ''Why, Socrates, how can you argue at all without using them?'' |
1726 | ( b) Would he have based the relativity of knowledge on the Heraclitean flux? |
1726 | ( c) Would he have asserted the absoluteness of sensation at each instant? |
1726 | --That will be our answer? |
1726 | Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your new- born child, of which I have delivered you? |
1726 | Am I not right? |
1726 | Am I not right? |
1726 | And could you repeat the conversation?'' |
1726 | And do you not like the taste of them in the mouth? |
1726 | And has Plato kept altogether clear of a confusion, which the analogous word logos tends to create, of a proposition and a definition? |
1726 | And how can any one be ignorant of either of them, and yet know both of them? |
1726 | And if they differ in opinion, which of them is likely to be right; or are they both right? |
1726 | And is not the confusion increased by the use of the analogous term''elements,''or''letters''? |
1726 | And now, what are you saying?--Are there two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and do you define knowledge to be the true? |
1726 | And so we must ask again, What is knowledge? |
1726 | And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else? |
1726 | And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion? |
1726 | And the same of perceiving: do you understand me? |
1726 | And therefore let us draw nearer, as the advocate of Protagoras desires; and give the truth of the universal flux a ring: is the theory sound or not? |
1726 | And what other case is conceivable, upon the supposition that we either know or do not know all things? |
1726 | And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting? |
1726 | Are its movements identical with those of the body, or only preconcerted and coincident with them, or is one simply an aspect of the other? |
1726 | Are not these speculations charming, Theaetetus, and very good for a person in your interesting situation? |
1726 | Are you so profoundly convinced of this? |
1726 | Are you still in labour, or have you brought all you have to say about knowledge to the birth? |
1726 | But I should like to know, Socrates, whether you mean to say that all this is untrue?'' |
1726 | But are we not inverting the natural order in looking for opinion before we have found knowledge? |
1726 | But did you ever say to yourself, that good is evil, or evil good? |
1726 | But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras? |
1726 | But have we not escaped one difficulty only to encounter a greater? |
1726 | But here we are met by a singular difficulty: How is false opinion possible? |
1726 | But how can he who knows the forms of knowledge and the forms of ignorance imagine one to be the other? |
1726 | But how can the syllable be known if the letter remains unknown? |
1726 | But how is false opinion possible? |
1726 | But if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between the true and the false in such cases? |
1726 | But is true opinion really distinct from knowledge? |
1726 | But may there not be''heterodoxy,''or transference of opinion;--I mean, may not one thing be supposed to be another? |
1726 | But still an old difficulty recurs; we ask ourselves,''How is false opinion possible?'' |
1726 | But tell me, Socrates, in heaven''s name, is this, after all, not the truth? |
1726 | But then, as Plato asks,--and we must repeat the question,--What becomes of the mind? |
1726 | But what is SO? |
1726 | But what is the third definition? |
1726 | But when the word''knowledge''was found how was it to be explained or defined? |
1726 | But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara? |
1726 | But would this hold in any parallel case? |
1726 | But, as we are at our wits''end, suppose that we do a shameless thing? |
1726 | But, seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say what knowing is? |
1726 | Can a man see and see nothing? |
1726 | Can a whole be something different from the parts? |
1726 | Can two unknowns make a known? |
1726 | Can we answer that question? |
1726 | Can we suppose one set of feelings or one part of the mind to interpret another? |
1726 | Could he have pretended to cite from a well- known writing what was not to be found there? |
1726 | Did Protagoras merely mean to assert the relativity of knowledge to the human mind? |
1726 | Did you ever hear that too? |
1726 | Do we not seem to perceive instinctively and as an act of sense the differences of articulate speech and of musical notes? |
1726 | Do you agree? |
1726 | Do you know the original principle on which the doctrine of Protagoras is based?'' |
1726 | Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearings of this tale on the preceding argument? |
1726 | Do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non- existing things? |
1726 | Does it differ as subject and object in the same manner? |
1726 | Does not explanation appear to be of this nature? |
1726 | EUCLID: Have you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion? |
1726 | Even in sleep, did you ever imagine that odd was even? |
1726 | For an objection occurs to him:--May there not be errors where there is no confusion of mind and sense? |
1726 | For how can the exchange of two kinds of knowledge ever become false opinion? |
1726 | For how can we know a compound of which the simple elements are unknown to us? |
1726 | For if the Heraclitean flux is extended to every sort of change in every instant of time, how can any thought or word be detained even for an instant? |
1726 | For must not opinion be equally expressed in a proposition? |
1726 | He asks whether a man can know and not know at the same time? |
1726 | How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it? |
1726 | How can you or any one maintain the contrary? |
1726 | How is this? |
1726 | How will Protagoras answer this argument? |
1726 | I dare say that you agree with me, do you not? |
1726 | I have, I fear, a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know? |
1726 | I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation? |
1726 | I suppose, Theodorus, that you have never seen them in time of peace, when they discourse at leisure to their disciples? |
1726 | I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes? |
1726 | I will make my meaning clearer by an example:--You admit that there is an art of arithmetic? |
1726 | If all that exists in time is illusion, we may well ask with Plato,''What becomes of the mind?'' |
1726 | In what does this differ from the saying of Theaetetus? |
1726 | Is he to be reared in any case, and not exposed? |
1726 | Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way? |
1726 | Is it not so? |
1726 | Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals? |
1726 | Is not this a"reductio ad absurdum"of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception? |
1726 | Is the introspecting thought the same with the thought which is introspected? |
1726 | Is the mind active or passive, or partly both? |
1726 | Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing? |
1726 | Is there only one kind of motion, or, as I rather incline to think, two? |
1726 | Is there some other form of knowledge which distinguishes them? |
1726 | Let us grant what you say-- then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion-- am I right? |
1726 | Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non- existence of things that are not:--You have read him? |
1726 | Must he not be talking''ad captandum''in all this? |
1726 | Must he not see, hear, or touch some one existing thing? |
1726 | Nay, not even in sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of the kind? |
1726 | O Theaetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honey? |
1726 | O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great? |
1726 | Once more then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question--"What is knowledge?" |
1726 | Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question,''What is knowledge?'' |
1726 | Or again, if we see letters which we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them? |
1726 | Or are they both right?--he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician''s judgment? |
1726 | Or did any man in his senses ever fancy that an ox was a horse, or that two are one? |
1726 | Or did he mean to deny that there is an objective standard of truth? |
1726 | Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets? |
1726 | Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him? |
1726 | Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing? |
1726 | Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts? |
1726 | Or, if he is afraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? |
1726 | Plato discards both figures, as not really solving the question which to us appears so simple:''How do we make mistakes?'' |
1726 | Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the same? |
1726 | SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all( in the plural) is there not one thing which we express? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Am I talking nonsense, then? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And another and another? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And astronomy and harmony and calculation? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And by wisdom the wise are wise? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And did you find such a class? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And do you mean by conceiving, the same which I mean? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks, think some one thing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about him which are numerable? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And he who hears anything, hears some one thing, and hears that which is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and therefore is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And how about Protagoras himself? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colours? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if he closed his eyes, would he forget? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he has seen? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, all things must always have every sort of motion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if unlike, they are other? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if not, not? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is Theodorus a painter? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb''to know''? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is memory of something or of nothing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is that different in any way from knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter, as just now said? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And must therefore be admitted to be unlike? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And of true opinion also? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And seeing is knowing, and therefore not- seeing is not- knowing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And that I myself practise midwifery? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And that both are two and each of them one? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And that is six? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And the race of animals is generated in the same way? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself to any one else? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And therefore not in science or knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished, that is to say, they move in place and are also changed? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, of all our notions, is the most universal? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And what of the mental habit? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And who could take up arms against such a great army having Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you say this also of like and unlike, same and other? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But can you certainly determine by any other means which of these opinions is true? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But is the aim attained always? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But is there any parallel to this? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But may not the following be the description of what we express by this name? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, have a conception either of both objects or of one of them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But surely he can not suppose what he knows to be what he does not know, or what he does not know to be what he knows? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But then, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is perception, or that to every man what appears is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But through what do you perceive all this about them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a different person? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Can a man see something and yet see nothing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Capital; and what followed? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Do you see another question which can be raised about these phenomena, notably about dreaming and waking? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Either together or in succession? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not''knowable''? |
1726 | SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O? |
1726 | SOCRATES: He then who sees some one thing, sees something which is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: He who knows, can not but know; and he who does not know, can not know? |
1726 | SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction-- What is knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would admit that they both exist? |
1726 | SOCRATES: How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? |
1726 | SOCRATES: How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive? |
1726 | SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:--Theaetetus, he says, what is SO? |
1726 | SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S. THEAETETUS: But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an element? |
1726 | SOCRATES: If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he can not think that the one of them is the other? |
1726 | SOCRATES: If they only moved in place and were not changed, we should be able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux? |
1726 | SOCRATES: If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception can not come to you, either through the one or the other organ? |
1726 | SOCRATES: If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, when it becomes like we call it the same-- when unlike, other? |
1726 | SOCRATES: In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two arts? |
1726 | SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Is he a geometrician? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Is it still worth our while to resume the discussion touching opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: It is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of one thing as another? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing-- for example, What is clay? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:--What was the way in which we learned letters? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:--There is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick-- Are they like or unlike? |
1726 | SOCRATES: May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the other, can he think that one is the other? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Nor of any other science? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Of things learned and perceived, that is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Often a man remembers that which he has seen? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Once more we shall have to begin, and ask''What is knowledge?'' |
1726 | SOCRATES: Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Perception would be the collective name of them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Shall I tell you the reason? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Shall we say that we know every thing which we see and hear? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Tell me, now-- How in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else? |
1726 | SOCRATES: That is good news; whose son is he? |
1726 | SOCRATES: That is of six? |
1726 | SOCRATES: That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading? |
1726 | SOCRATES: The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then do we not come back to the old difficulty? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere of being or of knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word''all''of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then it must appear so to each of them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as to the body? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self- existent substance or as a predicate of something else? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:--Can a man know and also not know that which he knows? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you answered that knowledge is perception? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then right opinion implies the perception of differences? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then they must be distinguished? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then when any one thinks of one thing as another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must look at the matter in some other way? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility? |
1726 | SOCRATES: We have at length satisfactorily proven beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, and shall we do as he says? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, and what is the difficulty? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term''explanation''? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, but are we to assert that what you think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all( in the plural) and the all( in the singular)? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, may not a man''possess''and yet not''have''knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite? |
1726 | SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views? |
1726 | SOCRATES: What shall we say then? |
1726 | SOCRATES: What was it? |
1726 | SOCRATES: What was that, Theaetetus? |
1726 | SOCRATES: What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Where, then, is false opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Which is probably correct-- for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know? |
1726 | SOCRATES: You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another? |
1726 | SOCRATES: You have heard the common explanation of the verb''to know''? |
1726 | Shall I answer for him? |
1726 | Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus? |
1726 | Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? |
1726 | Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what he already knows? |
1726 | Such are the lawyers; will you have the companion picture of philosophers? |
1726 | TERPSION: The dysentery, you mean? |
1726 | TERPSION: The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled; but what was the conversation? |
1726 | TERPSION: Was he alive or dead? |
1726 | TERPSION: Where then? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: About what? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: And do you not agree in that view, Socrates? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: And how would you amend the former statement? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: And is not that, Socrates, nobly said? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: And was that wrong? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: And why should that be shameless? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates...? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you ever argue at all? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: But what puts you out of heart? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Can you give me any example of such a definition? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How can he? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How could it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How do the two expressions differ? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How is that, and what profession do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How so? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: I should call all of them perceiving-- what other name could be given to them? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: I should reply S and O. SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: In what manner? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Let us imagine such an aviary-- and what is to follow? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Pray what is it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Then what is colour? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What are they? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What are they? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What are they? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What experience? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What hostages? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What is it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What is it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What is it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What is that? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What makes you say so? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What makes you say so? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What question? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What was it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Who indeed, Socrates? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Who, Socrates, would dare to say so? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Why? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole? |
1726 | THEODORUS: How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates? |
1726 | THEODORUS: How shall we answer, Theaetetus? |
1726 | THEODORUS: How so? |
1726 | THEODORUS: In what is the difference seen? |
1726 | THEODORUS: In what way? |
1726 | THEODORUS: Well, but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards? |
1726 | THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates? |
1726 | THEODORUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEODORUS: What is it? |
1726 | THEODORUS: What is that? |
1726 | THEODORUS: Who indeed? |
1726 | Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body? |
1726 | Tell me, then, what do you think of the notion that"All things are becoming"?'' |
1726 | Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know? |
1726 | The mind, when occupied by herself with being, is said to have opinion-- shall we say that''Knowledge is true opinion''? |
1726 | The multitude may not and do not agree in Protagoras''own thesis that''Man is the measure of all things;''and then who is to decide? |
1726 | They would say, as I imagine-- Can that which is wholly other than something, have the same quality as that from which it differs? |
1726 | Think: is not seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception? |
1726 | Upon his own showing must not his''truth''depend on the number of suffrages, and be more or less true in proportion as he has more or fewer of them? |
1726 | Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you? |
1726 | We are often told that we should enquire into all things before we accept them;--with what limitations is this true? |
1726 | Weary of asking''What is truth?'' |
1726 | Well, you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position? |
1726 | Were not you and Theodorus just now remarking very truly, that in discussions of this kind we may take our own time? |
1726 | What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus? |
1726 | What are we to think of time and space? |
1726 | What do they mean when they say that all things are in motion? |
1726 | What say you? |
1726 | What say you? |
1726 | What then is knowledge? |
1726 | What then is knowledge? |
1726 | What then is knowledge? |
1726 | When he says that''knowledge is in perception,''with what does he perceive? |
1726 | Who can divide the nerves or great nervous centres from the mind which uses them? |
1726 | Who can resist an idea which is presented to him in a general form in every moment of his life and of which he finds no instance to the contrary? |
1726 | Who can separate the pains and pleasures of the mind from the pains and pleasures of the body? |
1726 | Who is our judge? |
1726 | Who is the judge or where is the spectator, having a right to control us?'' |
1726 | Why should we not go a step further still and doubt the existence of the senses of all things? |
1726 | Why should we single out one of these abstractions to be the a priori condition of all the others? |
1726 | Will you answer me a question:''Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?'' |
1726 | Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument? |
1726 | Without further preface, but at the same time apologizing for his eagerness, he asks,''What is knowledge?'' |
1726 | Would an untrained man, for example, be as likely to know when he is going to have a fever, as the physician who attended him? |
1726 | Yes; but did you observe that Protagoras bade me be serious, and complained of our getting up a laugh against him with the aid of a boy? |
1726 | You remember? |
1726 | and another, and another? |
1726 | and of what sort do you mean? |
1726 | and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do? |
1726 | and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition? |
1726 | can you tell me? |
1726 | do not mistakes often happen? |
1726 | for example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not hear the language of foreigners when they speak to us? |
1726 | for what reason? |
1726 | here are six dice; they are more than four and less than twelve;"more and also less,"would you not say?'' |
1726 | or hear and hear nothing? |
1726 | or shall we aver that, seeing them, we must know them? |
1726 | or shall we say that we not only hear, but know what they are saying? |
1726 | or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows? |
1726 | or touch and touch nothing? |
1726 | or will this be too much of a digression? |
1726 | or will you bear to see him rejected, and not get into a passion if I take away your first- born? |
1726 | or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not? |
1726 | or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? |
1726 | the sound of words or the sight of letters in a foreign tongue?'' |
1726 | what is temperance? |
1726 | which of us will speak first? |