This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.
identifier | question |
---|---|
36434 | _ Cloth boards_ 2 6 Unsettled for Life; Or, What shall I be? |
16055 | ( To whom will my sad song go, and in whose ears will its accents sound?) |
16055 | 14, l. 83): Was this the face that launched a thousand ships And burnt the topless towers of Ilium? |
16055 | DIAMOND That diamond upon your finger, say, How came it yours? |
16055 | PEARLS Why, sir, what''cerns it you if I wear pearl and gold? |
16055 | PEARLS Will you have me, or your pearl again? |
16055 | ROCK- CRYSTAL To what, my love, shall I compare thine eye? |
16055 | The opening lines of Cervantes are: A quien yra mi doloroso canto O en cuya oreja sonara su acento? |
16055 | What can we learn from them of Shakespeare''s knowledge of the source, quality, and use of these precious stones? |
16715 | 1826? |
16715 | 2 vols., London, 187? |
16715 | In his"Reply to Blackwood''s Edinburgh Magazine,"Byron wrote:"What have we got instead[ of following Pope]? |
16715 | In the seventeenth stanza he changes,"A better rose will never spring Than him I''ve lost on Yarrow?" |
16715 | In the sixth stanza Scott changes the lines,"O ir ye come to drink the wine As we hae done before, O?" |
16715 | Paris, 1840? |
16715 | Scott wrote to Lockhart, May 30, 1826,"What do you about Shakspeare? |
16715 | Shakspeare[ edited by Scott and Lockhart? |
16715 | Was it because Scott''s genius clung to Scotland and Lamb''s to London, that the two seemed so little to notice each other? |
16715 | to"O come ye here to part your land, The bonnie forest thorough?" |
37711 | Wostow nat wel the olde clerkes sawe, That''who shal yeve a lover any lawe?'' 37711 Allas, fro whennes may this thing procede? 37711 And was it not Arcite''s duty and solemn pledge to help and not hinder him in his love? 37711 Did he not love the beautiful lady first and trust his secret to his cousin and sworn brother? 37711 How are both promises to be fulfilled? 37711 How mightestow for reuthe me bigyle? 37711 I, Nature, Thus can I forme and peynte a creature, Whan that me list; who can me countrefete? 37711 Is ther no grace, and shall I thus be spilt? 37711 Shal thus Criseyde awey, for that thou wilt? 37711 The question is simply, can the moon move from the 2nd degree of Taurus to the 1st of Cancer( through 59 degrees) in four days? 37711 What have I doon, what have I thus a- gilt? 37711 how maystow in thyn herte finde To been to me thus cruel and unkinde? 37711 what mayst thou seyn, That in the paleys of thy disturbaunce Art left behinde, in peril to be sleyn? 40841 ''And are etceteras nothing?'' 40841 ''Come we to full points here?'' 40841 Again, would Costard have so gratuitously used a typographical idea, had not the Poet''s mind been teeming with them? 40841 But where could Shakspere have picked up the word if not in the Printing- office? 40841 But why bring in the name of Richard Field? 40841 Does he call this to mind in Sonnet XVII? 40841 Might not the above works have been the mine from which he obtained his knowledge? 40841 Or what strong hand can hold Time''s swift foot back? 40841 Or who his spoil of beauty can forbid? 40841 Then, again, to a Printer''s widow, not over young, what more telling than the following reference? 40841 They were frequently libellous and grievously personal, and hence the point of Pistol''s remark: Fear we broadsides? 40841 Where did Shakspere learn his Italian, which, although then a court language, he quotes but rarely, and in an awkward manner? 40841 Wherefore stand you on nice points? 40841 _ Tit._ Lucius, what book is that she tosseth so? 40841 and are etceteras nothing? 63022 And now-- where is Hilda? 63022 And what sort of a house did Hilda live in? 63022 And what would Mr. Galsworthy see? 63022 And who are the judges of reality? 63022 But how was I to transmit it to you? 63022 But now with your Mrs. Brown-- how are we to believe in her? 63022 But, I ask myself, what is reality? 63022 Can we doubt that the walls of Doulton''s factory would take his fancy? 63022 Do you ask for more solemn instances of the power of the human race to change? 63022 Does not Mr. Bennett write novels himself? 63022 George will be there on Tuesday? |
63022 | How can she be alive? |
63022 | I asked them-- they are my elders and betters-- How shall I begin to describe this woman''s character? |
63022 | I presume to invent Mr. Bennett? |
63022 | It''ll be all right? |
63022 | What can Mr. Bennett be about? |
63022 | What was it composed of-- that overwhelming and peculiar impression? |
63022 | Why, then, is it so hard for novelists at present to create characters which seem real, not only to Mr. Bennett, but to the world at large? |
63022 | Why, when October comes round, do the publishers always fail to supply us with a masterpiece? |
28434 | ( 2) What they are? |
28434 | ( 3) What they are like? |
28434 | ( 4) Why they are? |
28434 | Admiral Smyth says that this noble passage is more correctly rendered as follows: Canst thou bind the delightful teemings of Cheemah? |
28434 | Are the two lesser stars consumed after the manner of the solar spots? |
28434 | But wherefore all night long shine these? |
28434 | Canst thou bring forth Mazzaroth in his season? |
28434 | Canst thou draw forth Mazzaroth in his season Or Ayeesh and his sons canst thou guide? |
28434 | For what God, after better, worse would build? |
28434 | For what purpose do those thousands of clustering orbs shine? |
28434 | Has Saturn, perhaps, devoured his own children? |
28434 | Have they vanished and suddenly fled? |
28434 | He then asks the following questions, and replies to them himself:( 1) Whether they exist? |
28434 | Knowest thou the ordinances of heaven? |
28434 | Or hear''st thou rather, pure Ethereal stream, Whose fountain who shall tell? |
28434 | Or of the Eternal co- eternal beam, May I express thee unblamed? |
28434 | Or the contractions of Chesil canst thou open? |
28434 | Or were the appearances, indeed, illusion or fraud, with which the glasses have so long deceived me, as well as many others to whom I have shown them? |
28434 | Shall we adventure into these deeper retirements? |
28434 | What then was to be done? |
28434 | Who can tell? |
28434 | canst thou set the dominion thereof in the earth? |
28434 | or canst thou guide Arcturus with his sons? |
35721 | Who is this King Lear? |
35721 | You wander about with a book in your hands; are you making plans? |
35721 | + Dr Arne''s+ version of"Who is Sylvia?" |
35721 | + Schubert''s+ setting of"Come, thou monarch of the vine"is not so successful as his"Who is Sylvia?" |
35721 | 3, is headed with these words from_ Macbeth_:"When shall we three meet again?" |
35721 | After a little dialogue comes Autolycus''s last song,"Will you buy any tape?" |
35721 | After four bars of slow music the theme of Ophelia''s song in_ Hamlet_,"How shall I my true love know? |
35721 | But if there is no song like"Sigh no more, ladies,"or"Who is Sylvia? |
35721 | But the best setting of"Who is Sylvia?" |
35721 | But why call it the"Overture to_ The Comedy of Errors_"? |
35721 | Could he not improve on Auber''s music and produce an opera in which the action should be equally swift? |
35721 | For some strange reason,"Who is Sylvia?" |
35721 | Here a great stirring is made in the orchestra, and a cry( violin solo) is heard:--_ Macbeth_: Wherefore was that cry? |
35721 | In any decent production the song must be given to Feste, but how often is it? |
35721 | It was produced in 1885, and the_ motto_ is from_ The Tempest_, Act iii., Scene 3:"What harmony is this? |
35721 | So why should not Ambroise Thomas have put a ballet in_ Hamlet_? |
35721 | The best chorus is"Who can resist such mighty charms? |
35721 | The music for the appearance of Fairies is by Purcell, to words by Dryden,"Where does the black fiend ambition reside? |
35721 | The next number is a quintet with words from_ The Two Gentlemen{ 154} of Verona_--"Who is Sylvia?" |
35721 | The scene- change music before Ophelia''s first scene is founded on"How shall I my true love know? |
35721 | The third act is brought to a brilliant finish by Bishop''s famous glee from_ As You Like It_,"What shall he have who killed the deer?" |
35721 | The words begin,"Art thou afeared?" |
35721 | This is quickly followed by a label, Act ii., Scene 3, Sir Toby,"Shall we rouse the night owl in a catch?" |
35721 | What more can one desire? |
35721 | Why, in the name of all things musical-- why?" |
35721 | _ Much Ado About Nothing_ one"spots"at once under the title_ Beaucoup de Bruit pour Rien_, or_ Béatrice et Bénédict_; but why_ Hero_ or_ Ero_? |
35721 | _ Romeo and Juliet_ is easy to discover under the title_ I Capuletti ed i Montecchi_; but why_ Les Amants de Verone_? |
35721 | { 158} THE TWO GENTLEMEN OF VERONA With the exception of the perfect lyric"Who is Sylvia?" |
5827 | ( 2) If so, what is its nature? |
5827 | ( 2) If so, what sort of object can it be? |
5827 | ( 2) If so, what sort of object can it be? |
5827 | APPEARANCE AND REALITY Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it? |
5827 | And if so, have we any means of finding out what it is like? |
5827 | Are good and evil of importance to the universe or only to man? |
5827 | Assuming that there is physical space, and that it does thus correspond to private spaces, what can we know about it? |
5827 | But are we to say that nothing is knowledge except what is validly deduced from true premisses? |
5827 | But if the reality is not what appears, have we any means of knowing whether there is any reality at all? |
5827 | But the real question is: Do_ any_ number of cases of a law being fulfilled in the past afford evidence that it will be fulfilled in the future? |
5827 | Has the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms? |
5827 | Hence, two very difficult questions at once arise; namely,( 1) Is there a real table at all? |
5827 | How are we to know, in a given case, that our belief is not erroneous? |
5827 | I exist, and my room exists; but does''in''exist? |
5827 | If any one asks:''Why should I accept the results of valid arguments based on true premisses?'' |
5827 | If we ask''Where and when does this relation exist?'' |
5827 | If, then, we can not trust what we see with the naked eye, why should we trust what we see through a microscope? |
5827 | In other words, can we ever_ know_ anything at all, or do we merely sometimes by good luck believe what is true? |
5827 | Is this belief a mere blind outcome of past experience, or can it be justified as a reasonable belief? |
5827 | It will be remembered that we asked two questions; namely,( 1) Is there a real table at all? |
5827 | The mental act is undoubtedly mental, but is there any reason to suppose that the thing apprehended is in any sense mental? |
5827 | The question we have to consider in this chapter is: What is the nature of this real table, which persists independently of my perception of it? |
5827 | The question which Kant put at the beginning of his philosophy, namely''How is pure mathematics possible?'' |
5827 | The question which must next occupy us is this: How is it possible that there should be such knowledge? |
5827 | There is, however, a preliminary question which is rather less difficult, and that is: What do we_ mean_ by truth and falsehood? |
5827 | Thus our two questions may be re- stated as follows:( 1) Is there any such thing as matter? |
5827 | We have experience of past futures, but not of future futures, and the question is: Will future futures resemble past futures? |
5827 | What reason, then, have we for believing that there are such public neutral objects? |
5827 | What things are there in the universe whose existence is known to us owing to our being acquainted with them? |
5827 | Which of these is the''real''table? |
5827 | Why? |
5827 | and''What beliefs are false?'' |
5827 | and''What is falsehood?'' |
5827 | not''What beliefs are true?'' |
16595 | & S._ 15) Original(?) |
16595 | ''A what?'' |
16595 | ''An excellent woman, that mother of yours, Christopher,''said Mr. Swiveller;''"Who ran to catch me when I fell, and kissed the place to make it well? |
16595 | ''And whose should you say it was?'' |
16595 | ''And wot''ud be the good of that?'' |
16595 | ''Daisy, you know-- Chigwell Church-- bell- ringer-- little desk on Sundays-- eh, Johnny?'' |
16595 | ''Did_ you_ ever hear a tom- tom, sir?'' |
16595 | ''Do they often go where glory waits''em?'' |
16595 | ''Nor a gum- gum?'' |
16595 | ''What should you say this was?'' |
16595 | ''What_ is_ a gum- gum?'' |
16595 | ''Whose?'' |
16595 | ''Wot do you mean?'' |
16595 | And how do ye thrive, And how many bairns hae ye now? |
16595 | Bishop._ And has she then failed in her truth, The beautiful maid I adore? |
16595 | Bishop._ If I had a beau, for a soldier who''d go, Do you think I''d say no? |
16595 | Did they inherit this love from their father? |
16595 | GO WHERE GLORY WAITS THEE(_ M.C._ 11)(''Do they often go where glory waits''em?'' |
16595 | In the proof Dickens struck out all the words after''when,''and inserted in their place the following:''King Charles the First had his head cut off?'' |
16595 | MASTER HUMPHREY''S CLOCK,''DID YOU HEAR ANYTHING KNOCK?'' |
16595 | O we''re a''noddin, nid nid noddin, O we''re a''noddin at our house at home; How''s o''wi''ye, kimmer? |
16595 | Richard?'' |
16595 | Shall I never again hear her voice, Nor see her lov''d form any more? |
16595 | Smallweed?'' |
16595 | The first verse of the song is as follows: If I''d a donkey wot would n''t go, D''ye think I''d wollop him? |
16595 | The word? |
16595 | WHAT ARE THE WILD WAVES SAYING? |
16595 | WHAT ARE THE WILD WAVES SAYING? |
16595 | WHAT ARE THE WILD WAVES SAYING? |
16595 | WHO PASSES BY THIS ROAD SO LATE? |
16595 | What art can wash her guilt away? |
16595 | What was John Browdie''s north- country song? |
16595 | What was Little Nell''s repertoire? |
16595 | When lovely woman stoops to folly, And finds, too late, that men betray, What charm can soothe her melancholy? |
16595 | Who''ll buy my grey sand? |
16595 | Will you, will you, will you, will you come to the Bower? |
16595 | Will you, will you, will you, will you come to the Bower? |
16595 | Would they never be still? |
16595 | [ Figure 3] or[ Figure 4] White sand and grey sand: Who''ll buy my white sand? |
16595 | _ Could_ you give us"British Grenadiers,"my fine fellow?'' |
16595 | you''re singing, are you?'' |
2529 | An egg for breakfast: well, what of it? |
2529 | ( 2) DOES EVERYTHING OBSERVABLE OBEY THE LAWS OF PHYSICS? |
2529 | ( 2) What are we feeling when we say this? |
2529 | ( 2) What is the relation of this present occurrence to the past event which is remembered? |
2529 | ( 3) CAN WE OBSERVE ANYTHING INTRINSICALLY DIFFERENT FROM SENSATIONS? |
2529 | And even if SOME image does persist, how do we know that it is the previous image unchanged? |
2529 | And what sort of evidence is logically possible? |
2529 | Buhler says( p. 303):"We ask ourselves the general question:''WHAT DO WE EXPERIENCE WHEN WE THINK?'' |
2529 | But why should we suppose that there is some one common cause of all these appearances? |
2529 | Can we constitute memory out of images together with suitable beliefs? |
2529 | Can we say, conversely, that it consists wholly of such accuracy of response? |
2529 | Does the image persist in presence of the sensation, so that we can compare the two? |
2529 | For what is it to imagine a winged horse but to affirm that the horse[ that horse, namely] has wings? |
2529 | How do I know that there is awareness? |
2529 | How do we know that the sensation resembles the previous image? |
2529 | How is it possible to know that a memory- image is an imperfect copy, without having a more accurate copy by which to replace it? |
2529 | How, then, are we to find any way of comparing the present image and the past sensation? |
2529 | If we are asked"What is the capital of France?" |
2529 | If we suppose it effected, what would become of the difference between vital and mechanical movements? |
2529 | If you ask a boy"What is twice two?" |
2529 | Is there ultimately no difference, or do images remain as irreducibly and exclusively psychological? |
2529 | Is"consciousness"ultimate and simple, something to be merely accepted and contemplated? |
2529 | It is clear that the question turns upon another, namely, which can we know best, the psychology of animals or that of human beings? |
2529 | It may be said: If there is no single existent which is the source of all these"aspects,"how are they collected together? |
2529 | Now, what are the occasions when, we actively believe that Charles I was executed? |
2529 | One of the laws which distinguish psychology( or nerve- physiology?) |
2529 | Or that insects, in laying eggs, are concerned for the preservation of their species? |
2529 | Or, to state the same question in other terms: How is psychology to be distinguished from physics? |
2529 | Our two questions are, in the case of memory:( 1) What is the present occurrence when we remember? |
2529 | Suppose two children in a school, both of whom are asked"What is six times nine?" |
2529 | There are two distinct questions to be asked:( 1) What causes us to say that a thing occurs? |
2529 | What sort of evidence is there? |
2529 | Who can believe, for example, that a new- born baby is aware of the necessity of food for preserving life? |
2529 | William James''s view was first set forth in an essay called"Does''consciousness''exist? |
4723 | And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? |
4723 | And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable? |
4723 | Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? |
4723 | BUT DO NOT YOU YOURSELF PERCEIVE OR THINK OF THEM ALL THE WHILE? |
4723 | But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction? |
4723 | But secondly, though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be? |
4723 | But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material SUBSTRATUM or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? |
4723 | But, since one idea can not be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion? |
4723 | But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter? |
4723 | Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? |
4723 | For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others? |
4723 | For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind? |
4723 | For, what are the fore- mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? |
4723 | If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? |
4723 | May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a GOOD THING, though we have not an idea of what it is? |
4723 | Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? |
4723 | What must we think of Moses''rod? |
4723 | What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? |
4723 | What therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? |
4723 | What therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion? |
4723 | Why does not an empty case serve as well as another? |
4723 | Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? |
4723 | and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? |
4723 | and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? |
4723 | and what do we PERCEIVE BESIDES OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS? |
4723 | was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators? |
4723 | what if I can not assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? |
12890 | Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased? |
12890 | Do you renounce the devils, and all their words and works; Thonar, Wodin, and Saxenote? |
12890 | _ Lear._ What hast thou been? 12890 ''Sancta Marie,''said he,''Bessie, why makes thow sa great dule and sair greting for ony wardlie thing?'' 12890 Are his words more cheerful than the heathen''s( Homer)? 12890 But at this point arises a further question to demand solution: what shall be hereafter? 12890 But how? 12890 But is it not better that somewhat too much should be written upon such a subject than too little? 12890 Can it be that evil influences have the upper hand in this world? 12890 For the devil most emphatically spoke through the witches; but how could he in any sense be said to speak through Norns? 12890 Hamlet responds to their entreaties not to follow the spectre thus--Why, what should be the fear? |
12890 | Have Norns chappy fingers, skinny lips, and beards? |
12890 | How were reasonable men to account for this manifest conflict between rigorous logic and more rigorous fact? |
12890 | I do not set my life at a pin''s fee; And, for my soul, what can it do to that, Being a thing immortal as itself?" |
12890 | If evil is supreme here, shall it not be so in that undiscovered country,--that life to come? |
12890 | In"King Lear,"what man shows any virtue who does not receive punishment for the same? |
12890 | It is not worth the living; for what power has man against the fiends? |
12890 | Live you, or are you aught That man may question? |
12890 | London: T. Harper, 1641(? |
12890 | May Macbeth, who would fain do right, were not evil so ever present with him, be juggled with and led to destruction by fiends? |
12890 | May a Hamlet, patiently struggling after truth and duty, be put upon and abused by the darker powers? |
12890 | May an undistinguishing fate sweep away at once the good with the evil-- Hamlet with Laertes; Desdemona with Iago; Cordelia with Edmund? |
12890 | Naturally alarmed, he cried out,"''In the name of God, what make I heere?'' |
12890 | The devil would occasionally appear in the likeness of a living person; and how could that be accounted for? |
12890 | The first again asks,''Where?'' |
12890 | The first begins by asking,''When shall we three meet again?'' |
12890 | The question is, did he retain both, or did he reject one and retain the other? |
12890 | What are these Powers? |
12890 | What do the simple people then? |
12890 | Will it apply with equal force to Norns? |
12890 | [ 1] Heerewith he began to curse and to banne, saying,''What a poxe do I heare? |
12890 | [ 2] Live you, or are you ought That man may question? |
12890 | [ 3]_ Macbeth._ Speak if you can, what are you? |
12890 | _ What else?_ And shall I couple hell? |
12890 | _ What else?_ And shall I couple hell? |
12890 | is his hope more near, his trust more sure, his reading of fate more happy? |
12890 | is not your husband mad? |
12890 | that, be a man never so honest, never so pure, he may nevertheless become the sport of blind chance or ruthless wickedness? |
34112 | ''Are those black doors the cells?'' 34112 ''But suppose a man were here for a twelve- month? |
34112 | ''Did you mean to say anything, you young shaver?'' 34112 ''Do they never walk in the yard?'' |
34112 | ''Do you hear his worship ask if you''ve anything to say?'' 34112 ''Do you mean to say that in all that time he would never come out at that little iron door for exercise?'' |
34112 | ''Has the boy ever been here before?'' 34112 ''Have you anything to ask this witness, boy?'' |
34112 | ''Have you anything to say at all?'' 34112 ''Hold your tongue, will you?'' |
34112 | ''How long has he been here?'' 34112 ''I beg your pardon,''replied Mr. Pickwick,''what did you say? |
34112 | ''I''m an Englishman, ai n''t I?'' 34112 ''Now then, where are the witnesses?'' |
34112 | ''Oh, you know me, do you?'' 34112 ''Possible?'' |
34112 | ''Pray, why do they call this place the Tombs?'' 34112 ''Sometimes, I suppose?'' |
34112 | ''Well, I do n''t mind that; it''s only a twopence apiece more,''said Mr. Martin;''What do you say now? 34112 ''What is this?'' |
34112 | ''What will you take to be paid out?'' 34112 ''When do the prisoners take exercise?'' |
34112 | ''When is that?'' 34112 ''When will he be tried?'' |
34112 | ''Will you open one of the doors?'' 34112 ''Yes''"''Are they all full?'' |
34112 | ''Childbed?'' |
34112 | ''Do n''t?'' |
34112 | ''Live down there? |
34112 | ''Live down there?'' |
34112 | ''Lord, why did n''t you say at first that you was willing to come down handsome?''" |
34112 | ''My friend,''said Mr. Pickwick,''you do n''t really mean to say that human beings live down these wretched dungeons?'' |
34112 | ''The regular chummage is two- and- six; will you take three bob?'' |
34112 | ''What will you take to go out?'' |
34112 | ''Where are my privileges?'' |
34112 | ''Where are they? |
34112 | ''Would you like to hear it read?'' |
34112 | As to escaping, what chances were there of escape? |
34112 | As to fire in the prison, if one were to break out while he lay there? |
34112 | Fagin, Fagin, are you a man?'' |
34112 | For what offense can that lonely child, of ten or twelve years old, be shut up here? |
34112 | How did I know it? |
34112 | If it was not a trick to frighten him, and those were the real hours treading on each other''s heels, where would he be, when they came around again? |
34112 | It was very dark; why did n''t they bring a light? |
34112 | Oh, that boy? |
34112 | Shall we go in? |
34112 | This is rather hard treatment for a young witness, is it not? |
34112 | To everybody in succession Captain Hopkins said:''Have you read it?'' |
34112 | To everybody in succession Captain Porter said:''Would you like to hear it read?'' |
34112 | What availed the noise and bustle of cheerful morning, which penetrated even there, to him? |
34112 | What could he say or write of it that had not been said or written by him already? |
34112 | What right have they to butcher me?''" |
34112 | What says our conductor? |
34112 | What with motions for new trials, arrest of judgment and what not, a prisoner might be here for twelve months, I take it, might he not?'' |
34112 | Whether a prisoner could scale the walls with a cord and grapple? |
34112 | Why?'' |
34112 | Wot is this here business? |
34112 | replied Mr. Roker, with indignant astonishment;''why should n''t I?'' |
15299 | Does Mr. Pitt,said he,"not know that Mr. Fox was of all persons most offensive to him?" |
15299 | Had not Fox always cheered the popular Government of France, and had he not always advocated peace with bloodstained rebels? 15299 Well, Hardy,"says Nelson to him,"how goes the battle?" |
15299 | What will Nelson think of us? |
15299 | Who has lived as long as he chose? 15299 Would our ancestors have done it?" |
15299 | And, after all, does not mine furnish, on the whole, a record which does me honour? |
15299 | But have I anything to resemble these? |
15299 | But what of Nelson? |
15299 | Do you not think more highly of Nelson than of the best engineers who construct fortifications? |
15299 | Do you suppose I did it in order that some disaster should be the result? |
15299 | Drake quickly disillusioned him, and demanded,"If we are not at war, why have English merchants been arrested?" |
15299 | For what other reason do you think I disobeyed orders? |
15299 | Hardy is long in coming; he fears that he may be killed, and calls out,"Will no one bring Hardy to me?" |
15299 | Is it an ideal ambition to bring it about? |
15299 | Is it possible that he knew that Nelson was her father, and believed in the purity of his friendship for Emma and himself? |
15299 | May not the people give their own Magistrate the name they choose?" |
15299 | The colonies are to France only a secondary object; and does not your Majesty already possess more than you know how to preserve? |
15299 | To destroy our finances? |
15299 | To form a coalition with some Powers on the Continent? |
15299 | To renew intestine troubles? |
15299 | To wrest from France her colonies? |
15299 | What business had he, as the first sailor in the world, to enter into such a compact with another man''s wife? |
15299 | What difference would his lack of knowledge have made? |
15299 | What family as numerous could make a finer impression?" |
15299 | What family, in similar circumstances, would have done better? |
15299 | What is the good of it if it turns out nothing but unrestrained confusion? |
15299 | What need was there for Nelson to take umbrage at and violate the treaty made by Foote in the British name? |
15299 | Where''s the foot will not flinch or fly? |
15299 | Where''s the heart that aspires the fray? |
15299 | Who can stop him?" |
15299 | Who so confident as to defy Time, the fellest of mortals''foes Joints in his armour who can spy? |
15299 | Why bleeds old England''s band By the fire of Danish land, That smites the very hand Stretched to save? |
15299 | Why ceased not here the strife, Oh, ye brave? |
15299 | Why"luckily"? |
15299 | Will they let us have any? |
15299 | Your nation is at the highest point of prosperity, what can it hope from war? |
15299 | _ 3rd Verse_: Drake, he''s in his hammock till the great Armadas come,( Capten, art tha sleepin''there below?) |
47658 | And suppose that he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? 47658 You have read him?" |
47658 | And have we in our limited experience anything that will guide us to the attainment of this object? |
47658 | And is their truth their correspondence? |
47658 | And so the question arises, how far are our ideas about things truths about reality? |
47658 | And to what shall we turn for truth? |
47658 | Are our ideas of this nature? |
47658 | Are they reality? |
47658 | Are we about to be forced to modify our conclusions? |
47658 | Are we, like people in a theatre queue, only able to move from behind forward as the place is vacated for us in front? |
47658 | But even so, the pragmatist will urge, is its truth anything else but its usefulness as shown in the practical consequences of believing it? |
47658 | But what was the nature of the need, and what was the method by which the postulate was called forth? |
47658 | Can we not, for example, have an idea of not- red just as well as an idea of red? |
47658 | Can we or can we not make our conceptions work? |
47658 | Clearly we can not claim to know it by direct experience, by acquaintance; it is not a_ that_ of which we can ask_ what_? |
47658 | Do we not judge its claim to truth by the practical consequences involved in accepting or rejecting it? |
47658 | Does it actually exist? |
47658 | Does not the history of science prove a continual expansion, an increasing{ 53} comprehension? |
47658 | Have we, in the new theory of life and knowledge of Bergson''s philosophy, an answer to the question, What is truth? |
47658 | He has defended that philosopher against the arguments of Plato in a polemical pamphlet entitled_ Plato or Protagoras?_( Oxford, Blackwell). |
47658 | He who knows, can not but know; and he who does not know, can not know.... Where, then, is false opinion? |
47658 | How can that which we perceive be something imperceptible? |
47658 | How, then, can universal illusion be consistent with the possession of truth? |
47658 | If the meaning the intellect assigns to truth is itself not true, how can the intellect serve us? |
47658 | If the salt have lost his savour, wherewith shall it be salted? |
47658 | If the usefulness of the intellect consists in the active production of an illusion, can we say that the intellect leads us to truth? |
47658 | If, then, the understanding works illusion for the sake of action, is it thereby disqualified as an instrument for the attainment of truth? |
47658 | In this way, then, we may answer the perplexing question, How can there be an object of thought in a false judgment? |
47658 | Is a perfectly true idea one in which there exists a point to point correspondence to the reality it represents? |
47658 | Is it not only if we can turn away from the intellect and obtain a non- intellectual intuition that we can know truth? |
47658 | Is not all progress in science made by suggesting a hypothesis, and testing it by experiment to see if it works? |
47658 | Is the Absolute more than an idea? |
47658 | Is there any other verification? |
47658 | It is the asking_ what?_ of every_ that_ of felt experience to which the mind attends. |
47658 | Knowing, then, what reality is, can we say that there is any actual object of thought that conforms to it? |
47658 | May not this be the reason of our failure and the whole explanation of the seeming contradiction? |
47658 | Must we not conclude that knowledge, however useful, is not true? |
47658 | Or does he think of something which he does not know as some other thing which he does not know?" |
47658 | Our problem, then, is to know what constitutes the nature of error in any one of these examples if it is, as each one may be, false? |
47658 | That is the whole meaning of asking, Are they true or false? |
47658 | The fact of error presented a difficulty distinct from the question, What is truth? |
47658 | The pragmatist when he asks, What is truth? |
47658 | The problem of truth is only raised when we ask, What does the agreement of an idea with reality mean? |
47658 | The question What is truth? |
47658 | The_ that_--a simple felt experience-- contains a meaning, brings a message, and we ask_ what_? |
47658 | There is, indeed, if this be so, a deeper irony in the question, What is truth? |
47658 | This is the simple pragmatist test,--does the laboratory worker add to it or find it in any respect insufficient? |
47658 | Was it not true while it was useful, and is it not only now false, if it is false, if it is actually discovered not to be useful? |
47658 | What else but the practical consequences of the truth claim in the form of the hypothesis of an undiscovered planet were ever in question? |
47658 | What is it? |
47658 | What is the nature of the seal by which we stamp this knowledge true? |
47658 | What is true about reality? |
47658 | What kind of knowledge is it that we acquire by description? |
47658 | What, then, is error? |
47658 | What, we shall now ask, can it be that binds together these sense qualities so that we speak of them as a thing? |
47658 | When, then, we ask ourselves, What is truth? |
47658 | Whether the Absolute does or does not exist, is it, either in idea or reality, of any use to us? |
47658 | Why was it felt that they must be other than they were seen to be unless there was another planet? |
47658 | Why were not the observed movements of Uranus accepted as what they were? |
47658 | Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?... |
47658 | nor even, What is true about truth? |
47658 | was the starting point, and not, What is truth? |
19676 | ''Dare any be so bold to sound retreat or parley, when I command them kill''? |
19676 | ( saith the one), you keepe not time in your proportions: you sing them false( saith the other), what proportion is this? |
19676 | (_ a_) And will he not come a- gain? |
19676 | (_ a_) How should I your true love know from a- noth- er one? |
19676 | ... Will you_ play upon this pipe_? |
19676 | Also in B. and F.''s_ Faithful Friends_--"_ Bell._--Shall''s have a_ catch_, my hearts? |
19676 | And will he not come a- gain? |
19676 | And will thy favour never better be? |
19676 | At this the rest of the company"wonder"--and some whisper to their neighbours,"How was he brought up?" |
19676 | Beaumont and Fletcher''s_ Coxcomb_ has"Where were the_ watch_ the while? |
19676 | But shall we make the welkin dance indeed? |
19676 | Canst thou hold up thy heavy eyes awhile, And_ touch_ thy_ instrument_ a_ strain_ or two? |
19676 | Do ye make an_ alehouse_ of my lady''s house, that ye squeak out your_ cozier''s catches_ without any mitigation or remorse of voice? |
19676 | Do you_ note_ me? |
19676 | Have you no wit, manners, nor honesty, but to_ gabble like tinkers_ at this time of night? |
19676 | How shall we find the_ concord of this discord_? |
19676 | If she does, she is accounted foolish( sotte), for if she does n''t want to dance, what is she sitting there for amongst the rest? |
19676 | Is there no respect of place, persons, or_ time_ in you? |
19676 | Rich.__ Music_ do I hear? |
19676 | Shall we do that? |
19676 | Shall we rouse the night- owl in a_ catch_, that will_ draw three souls out of one weaver_? |
19676 | TREBLE VIOL, as used in England and Italy; label inside-- Andreas(?) |
19676 | The first verse of''Fortune my foe''is as follows:--"Fortune my foe, why dost thou frown on me? |
19676 | Was it not to refresh the mind of man,_ After his studies_, or his usual pain? |
19676 | What dost thou mean? |
19676 | What hast here? |
19676 | What joy have ye to wander thus by night, Save that_ ill doers alway hate the light_?'' |
19676 | What pleasure take you in this your foolishness? |
19676 | What should this mean? |
19676 | Why should we not of her learn thus To live godly?'' |
19676 | Wilt thou, I say, for ever breed my pain, And wilt thou not restore my joyes again?" |
19676 | You would have them_ always_ play but_ one thing_? |
19676 | [ Footnote 18: What is a''woollen bagpipe''? |
19676 | [ To Cesario]--How dost thou like_ this tune_? |
19676 | [_ Music._]_ Enter Clown.__ Clo._ Why, masters,_ have your instruments been in Naples_, that they_ speak i''the nose_ thus? |
19676 | _ 1 Mus._ How, sir, how? |
19676 | _ 1 Mus._ Why"Heart''s ease?" |
19676 | _ 1 Page._ Shall we_ clap into''t roundly, without hawking, or spitting_, or_ saying we are hoarse_, which are the_ only prologues to a bad voice_? |
19676 | _ 1 Soldier._ What say you to his expertness in war? |
19676 | _ 4 Sold._ It signs well, does it not? |
19676 | _ 4 Soldier._... Peace, what noise? |
19676 | _ Arm._ How meanest thou? |
19676 | _ Bap._ How now, my friend? |
19676 | _ Bap._ What, will my daughter[ Kate] prove a good musician? |
19676 | _ Bap._ Why, how now, daughter Katherine? |
19676 | _ Bap._ Why, then thou canst not_ break her_ to the lute? |
19676 | _ Clo._ Are these, I pray you, called_ wind_-instruments? |
19676 | _ Clo._"Hold thy peace, thou knave,"knight? |
19676 | _ Countess._ Will your answer serve fit to all questions? |
19676 | _ Duke._ Who was it? |
19676 | _ Hor._ You''ll leave his lecture, when I am in tune? |
19676 | _ Host._ How do you, man? |
19676 | _ Host._ How? |
19676 | _ Host._ Why, my pretty youth? |
19676 | _ Jaques._ Have you no_ song_, forester, for this purpose? |
19676 | _ Jul._ And why not you? |
19676 | _ Jul._ But shall I_ hear him speak_? |
19676 | _ Jul._ You do not? |
19676 | _ Jul.__ Heavy?_ belike, it hath some_ burden_ then. |
19676 | _ Leon._---- still_ virginalling_ Upon his palm? |
19676 | _ Mal._ My masters, are you mad? |
19676 | _ Moth._ Master, will you win your love with a_ French brawl_? |
19676 | _ Pan._ At whose pleasure, friend? |
19676 | _ Pan._ Who play they to? |
19676 | _ Pandarus._ Know you the_ musicians_? |
19676 | _ Pandarus._ What music is this? |
19676 | _ Peter._ Pretty too!--what say_ you_, James_ Soundpost_? |
19676 | _ Peter._ Pretty!--what say_ you_, Hugh_ Rebeck_? |
19676 | _ Prince Henry._ Doth he still rage? |
19676 | _ Romeo._ How is''t, my soul? |
19676 | _ Sir And._ There''s a_ testril_ of me too; if one knight give a----_ Clown._ Would you have a_ love- song_, or a_ song of good life_? |
19676 | _ Sir To._ What is thy excellence in a_ galliard_, knight? |
19676 | _ Sir To._ Wherefore are these things hid?... |
19676 | _ Sir To._[ Drunk, and with a bloody coxcomb]--Sot, didst see Dick surgeon, sot? |
19676 | _ Ste._ What is this same? |
19676 | _ Theseus._ Say, what abridgment have you for this evening? |
19676 | _ Val._ Why, how know you that I am in love? |
19676 | _ What masque, what music?_...*****[ Reads from the paper]"A tedious brief scene of young Pyramus, And his love Thisbe; very tragical mirth." |
19676 | _ ballads_? |
19676 | _ brawling in French_? |
19676 | _ out of tune on the strings_? |
19676 | are there_ masques_? |
19676 | do you think I am_ easier to be played on than a pipe_? |
19676 | in your_ dumps_? |
19676 | is it a world to hide virtues in? |
19676 | or what are you? |
19676 | out of my conversation, that he dares in this manner assay me?'' |
19676 | what say you, Simon_ Catling_? |
19676 | why dost thou look so pale? |
19676 | why dost thou not_ go to church in a galliard_, and_ come home in a coranto_? |
19676 | why"music with her_ silver_ sound"? |
55761 | ( 2) When three persons are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there? |
55761 | ( 2) When three persons are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there? |
55761 | ( 2) Where are they united? |
55761 | ( 3) When two persons are alone together in a room, how many distinct persons are there? |
55761 | ( 3) When two persons are alone together in a room, how many distinct persons are there? |
55761 | And if not, with what other question must it necessarily be connected? |
55761 | And why are these feelings to be eliminated? |
55761 | Are the actions of men really all of one kind? |
55761 | But are we to trust to good luck, and experiment about until we hit by accident upon the right line? |
55761 | But how about the possibility of social life for men, if each aims only at asserting his own individuality? |
55761 | But how am I to know, prior to all knowledge, that the objects given to me are ideas? |
55761 | But how are we to make the actual calculation? |
55761 | But how else can this happen except we assign a content to the purely formal activity of the Ego? |
55761 | But is it justifiable to lump together actions of this kind with those in which a man is conscious not only of his actions but also of their causes? |
55761 | But is it not possible to make the old a measure for the new? |
55761 | But is this reflection capable of supporting any positive alternative? |
55761 | But what if this"thing- in- itself,"this whole transcendent ground of the world, should be nothing but a fiction? |
55761 | But what of the claim that this view is based on experience? |
55761 | But what of the freedom of an action about the motives of which we reflect? |
55761 | But what right have we to say that in the absence of sense- organs the whole process would not exist at all? |
55761 | But, is not precisely this actually the case with pure concepts and ideas? |
55761 | But, what if they are not valid at all? |
55761 | Can I say of it that it acts on my soul? |
55761 | Can we regard man as a whole in himself, in view of the fact that he grows out of a whole and fits as a member into a whole? |
55761 | Does freedom of will, then, mean being able to will without ground, without motive? |
55761 | Does not the world cause thoughts in the minds of men with the same necessity as it causes the blossoms on plants? |
55761 | Have I, then, any right at all to start from it in my arguments? |
55761 | Have they any intelligible meaning? |
55761 | Have we any right to consider the question of the freedom of the will by itself at all? |
55761 | He asks, How much can we learn about them indirectly, seeing that we can not observe them directly? |
55761 | He can not will what he wills? |
55761 | How comes it that the simple real manifests itself in a two- fold manner, if it is an indivisible unity? |
55761 | How do we come to differentiate ourselves from what is"objective,"and to contrast"Ego"and"Non- Ego?" |
55761 | How does Matter come to think of its own nature? |
55761 | How does the matter appear when we recognise the absoluteness of thought? |
55761 | How is it possible for my thought to be relevantly related to the object? |
55761 | How is it possible to start knowledge anywhere at all? |
55761 | How is it that we are compelled to make these continual corrections in our observations? |
55761 | How should I make of my thought an exception? |
55761 | How should Mind be aware of what goes on in Matter, seeing that the essential nature of Matter is quite alien to Mind? |
55761 | How should it matter to me whether I can do a thing or not, if I am forced by the motive to do it? |
55761 | How, in any case, is it possible for me to argue from my own subjective view of the world to that of another human being? |
55761 | How, then, do I know that he and I are in a common world? |
55761 | I can now ask myself: Over and above the percepts just mentioned, what else is there in the section of space in which they are? |
55761 | If human organisation has no part in the essential nature of thinking, what is its function within the whole nature of man? |
55761 | If the question be asked, What is man''s purpose in life? |
55761 | Is not every man compelled to measure the deliverances of his moral imagination by the standard of traditional moral principles? |
55761 | Is reason able also to strike the balance? |
55761 | Kant assumed their validity and only asks, What are the conditions of their validity? |
55761 | Metaphysical Realism must ask, What is it that gives us our percepts? |
55761 | Or how in these circumstances should Mind act upon Matter, so as to translate its intentions into actions? |
55761 | Our present question is, what do we gain by supplementing a process with a conceptual counterpart? |
55761 | Our questions are the following:( 1) Are things continuous or intermittent in their existence? |
55761 | Philosophers still ask such questions as, What is the purpose of the world? |
55761 | Seeing that, at the outset, we attach no predicates whatever to the Given, we are bound to ask: How is it that we are able to determine it at all? |
55761 | THE THEORY OF FREEDOM I CONSCIOUS HUMAN ACTION Is man free in action and thought, or is he bound by an iron necessity? |
55761 | The fundamental question of Kant''s Theory of Knowledge is, How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? |
55761 | This being so, is any individuality left at all? |
55761 | This last answer does, indeed, presuppose that it is legitimate to group together in the single question,''How many tables?'' |
55761 | This leads us to the question, What is the right method for striking the balance between the credit and the debit columns? |
55761 | Two questions arise:( 1) Where are the Given and the Concept differentiated? |
55761 | VII ARE THERE ANY LIMITS TO KNOWLEDGE? |
55761 | What does it mean to have knowledge of the motives of one''s actions? |
55761 | What does it signify for us to possess knowledge and science? |
55761 | What does willing mean if not to have grounds for doing, or striving to do, this rather than that? |
55761 | What else has he done except perceive what hundreds have failed to see? |
55761 | What follows from these facts? |
55761 | What follows from this fact? |
55761 | What follows? |
55761 | What is it that Kant has achieved? |
55761 | What is it that stimulates the subject? |
55761 | What is it that, in the first instance, I have before me when I confront another person? |
55761 | What is the function( and consequently the purpose) of man? |
55761 | What of the Spiritualistic theory? |
55761 | What precisely is it that is absolute in the affirmation of the Ego? |
55761 | What right have you to declare the world to be complete without thought? |
55761 | What then is a percept? |
55761 | When, next, the percept disappears from my field of vision, what remains? |
55761 | Where is the jumping- board which will launch us from the subjective into the trans- subjective? |
55761 | Which of us can say that he is really free in all his actions? |
55761 | Who does not know the pleasure which is caused by the hope of a remote but intensely desired enjoyment? |
55761 | Why do I not passively let the object impress itself on me? |
55761 | Why is it not simply satisfied with itself and content to accept its own existence? |
55761 | Why should this concept belong any less to the whole plant than leaf and blossom? |
55761 | Why, we ask, does the tree appear to us now at rest, then in motion? |
55761 | Yes, but what is it to do? |
55761 | [ 18] Are there any presuppositions in this question, as formulated by Kant? |
55761 | [ 45] Now let us ask ourselves, How do we come by such a view? |
55761 | [ 50] What does Fichte here mean by the activity of the"intelligence,"when we translate what he has obscurely felt into clear concepts? |
32701 | What are space and time? 32701 Whence has it[ i. e. the mind] all the materials of reason and knowledge? |
32701 | ''How is pure mathematics possible? |
32701 | ''How is pure natural science possible?'' |
32701 | ''What_ a priori_ judgements are essentially related to the faculty in question?'' |
32701 | ( 2)''Given that a corresponding object is possible, is it also real?'' |
32701 | ( 3)''Given that it is real, is it also necessary?'' |
32701 | Again, given that the belief has arisen, may it not after all be illusion? |
32701 | Again, if we know that the object of a conception is possible, how are we to determine whether it is also actual? |
32701 | And, secondly, how does thought in virtue of these conceptions originate synthetic_ a priori_ knowledge? |
32701 | Are they real existences? |
32701 | But do_ a priori_ synthetic judgements satisfy this condition? |
32701 | But how are we to know that what we judge_ is_ the true law? |
32701 | But if knowing is obviously different from making, why should Kant have apparently felt no difficulty in resolving knowing into making? |
32701 | But when he is asking''How does the manifold of sense become unified?'' |
32701 | But, in that case, what can be meant by a succession in the object? |
32701 | Firstly, how do these conceptions obtain a matter to which they can apply and without which they would be without content or empty? |
32701 | For how can it be possible to base the knowledge of what things are, independently of perception, upon the knowledge of what they look? |
32701 | For how can we advance from knowledge of what they look to knowledge of what they are but do not look? |
32701 | For the driving force of idealism is furnished by the question,''How can the mind and reality come into the relation which we call knowledge?'' |
32701 | For the problem''How do we, beginning with mere sensation, come to know a spatial and temporal world?'' |
32701 | For the question''Is a three- sided figure possible?'' |
32701 | For the two questions, the consideration of which leads to this conclusion, are,''What is the right or real colour of an individual thing?'' |
32701 | Further, if it is legitimate to ask,''How can we apprehend what does not belong to our being?'' |
32701 | He asks,''How can the subject perceive itself?'' |
32701 | He begins by raising the question,''What do we mean by the phrase''an object of representations''? |
32701 | He then asked,''What follows as to the nature of the objects known in mathematics from the fact that we really know them?'' |
32701 | Hence the problem arises,''How is it possible to subsume objects of empirical perception under pure conceptions?'' |
32701 | Hence the question,''How is pure mathematics possible?'' |
32701 | How can I make an assertion about any individual until I have had actual experience of it? |
32701 | How then can I be sure that all cases will conform to my judgement? |
32701 | How, then, does Kant obtain something of which space and time can be regarded as really relations? |
32701 | How, then, does Kant reach the second result? |
32701 | How, then, is it possible for human reason to accomplish such knowledge entirely_ a priori_?... |
32701 | How, then, is it possible for the belief that things_ are_ spatial to arise? |
32701 | If I am asked,''How do I know that my pen is black or my chair hard?'' |
32701 | If a question is to be put at all, it should take the form,''How is it possible to apprehend anything?'' |
32701 | If, however, the doctrine of an internal sense is obviously untenable from Kant''s own point of view, why does he hold it? |
32701 | In fact, how can I anticipate my experience at all? |
32701 | In the first place, the very question,''What does the process of knowing consist in?'' |
32701 | Is there, however, any relation of which it could be said that it is not given, and to which therefore Kant''s doctrine might seem to apply? |
32701 | It may be stated thus:''If the lines are not convergent, how is it possible even to say that they_ look_ convergent? |
32701 | It may, however, be objected that the question ought to mean simply''Is a three- sided figure possible?'' |
32701 | It should now be an easy matter to understand the problem expressed by the question,''How are_ a priori_ synthetic judgements possible?'' |
32701 | Its aim is to answer the question,''How far can reason go, without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience?'' |
32701 | Its definite formulation is expressed in the well- known question,''How are_ a priori_ synthetic judgements possible? |
32701 | Kant introduces it in effect by raising the question,''How is it that, beginning with the isolated data of sense, we come to acquire knowledge?'' |
32701 | Kant is therefore once more[23] forced to consider the question''What is meant by object of representations?'' |
32701 | Moreover, since it is plain that in knowing we are active, the question is apt to assume the form,''What do we_ do_ when we know or think?'' |
32701 | Must it not be implied that at least under_ certain_ circumstances we should perceive the lines as they are? |
32701 | Must there not, however, be some problem peculiar to_ a priori_ judgements? |
32701 | Now why does Kant think that this conclusion follows? |
32701 | Otherwise why should Kant have been led to suppose that his problem concerned them only? |
32701 | Otherwise why should the representations agree? |
32701 | Otherwise, why should we use the words''look''or''appear''at all? |
32701 | Similarly there is really no meaning in the question,''What is meant by an object corresponding to knowledge or to an idea?'' |
32701 | The problem then becomes''What renders possible or is presupposed by the conformity of individual things to certain laws of connexion?'' |
32701 | The question must mean''What are the kinds of unity produced by judgement?'' |
32701 | The question''Is a triangle, in the sense of a figure with three sides and three angles, possible?'' |
32701 | The question''Is an object corresponding to the conception of a man with six toes possible?'' |
32701 | Thus it turns out that the problem relates to the uniformity of nature, and that the question''How are_ a priori_ synthetic judgements possible?'' |
32701 | To the question, therefore,''What is meant by an object corresponding to knowledge and therefore distinct from it?'' |
32701 | To the question, therefore,''Why are we justified in saying that we do know phenomena, whereas we do not know the things which produce them?'' |
32701 | What then do we know? |
32701 | What then is the answer to this, the real problem? |
32701 | What, then, can be meant by such an object? |
32701 | What, then, is the cause of the unsatisfactory treatment of these problems and men''s consequent indifference? |
32701 | What, then, must be the representation of space, in order that such a knowledge of it may be possible? |
32701 | When he is asking''What is meant by the object( beyond the mind) corresponding to our representations?'' |
32701 | Yet why should reality conform? |
32701 | [ 4] Hence, the question,''How is pure natural science possible?'' |
32701 | [ 4] This is Kant''s way of putting the question which should be expressed by asking,''Are things spatial, or do they only look spatial?'' |
32701 | and''Has it really any colour at all, or does it only look coloured?'' |
32701 | and''How does an apprehension become related to an object? |
32701 | and''How is it that they are applicable to objects?'' |
32701 | it is equally legitimate to ask,''How can we apprehend what does belong to our own being?'' |
32701 | means''Granted the truth of mathematical judgements, what inference can we draw concerning the nature of the reality to which they relate? |
32701 | means''What justifies the assertion that the presuppositions of natural science are true?'' |
32701 | really means''Is it possible for a three- sided figure to have three angles?'' |
32701 | really means''Is it possible for three straight lines to form a figure, i. e. to enclose a space?'' |
32701 | that which concerns sensations? |
32701 | the physical world?'' |
9662 | A man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections? |
9662 | And how far it is possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty? |
9662 | And shall we, rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature? |
9662 | And under what pretence can you embrace the one, while you reject the other? |
9662 | And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings? |
9662 | And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? |
9662 | And what he proposes by all these curious researches?_ He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. |
9662 | And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present? |
9662 | Are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar? |
9662 | Are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects? |
9662 | Are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life, from infancy to old age? |
9662 | Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? |
9662 | But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? |
9662 | But if they had any idea of power, as it is in itself, why could not they Measure it in itself? |
9662 | But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? |
9662 | But still I ask; Why take these attributes for granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? |
9662 | But what do we mean by that affirmation? |
9662 | But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? |
9662 | But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning? |
9662 | But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? |
9662 | But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? |
9662 | By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate to our intellectual view? |
9662 | By what means has it become so prevalent among our modern metaphysicians? |
9662 | Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? |
9662 | Can we give any reason for these variations, except experience? |
9662 | Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? |
9662 | Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? |
9662 | For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy, upon such a supposition? |
9662 | For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? |
9662 | For what is meant by_ innate_? |
9662 | For what reason? |
9662 | Has not the same custom the same influence on all? |
9662 | How could_ politics_ be a science, if laws and forms of goverment had not a uniform influence upon society? |
9662 | How is this remedied by experience? |
9662 | How is this to be accounted for? |
9662 | How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? |
9662 | How many stories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected and exploded in their infancy? |
9662 | How often would the great names of Pascal, Racine, Amaud, Nicole, have resounded in our ears? |
9662 | How shall we reconcile these contradictions? |
9662 | Is it more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition? |
9662 | Is it not experience, which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? |
9662 | Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? |
9662 | Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other? |
9662 | Is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an idea of reflection? |
9662 | Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? |
9662 | May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? |
9662 | May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? |
9662 | On what is this inference based? |
9662 | Or what do you find in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the peace and order of society, is in the least concerned? |
9662 | The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person: Why? |
9662 | The question still recurs, on what process of argument this_ inference_ is founded? |
9662 | This begets a very natural question; What is meant by a sceptic? |
9662 | This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? |
9662 | We need only ask such a sceptic,_ What his meaning is? |
9662 | What logic, what process of argument secures you against this supposition? |
9662 | What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension? |
9662 | What would become of_ history,_ had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind? |
9662 | What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? |
9662 | When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? |
9662 | Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? |
9662 | Whence, do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? |
9662 | Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of each other? |
9662 | Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? |
9662 | Where then is the power, of which we pretend to be conscious? |
9662 | Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? |
9662 | Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a fiction and belief? |
9662 | Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or a tiger? |
9662 | Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a character? |
9662 | Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or liver? |
9662 | Why then do you refuse to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature? |
9662 | Why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them? |
9662 | Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? |
9662 | Why? |
9662 | Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? |
9662 | _ Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?_ No. |
30737 | Ah, Miller,he has said,"what matters it how I amuse myself? |
30737 | And do you deem that satisfactory? |
30737 | Brown? |
30737 | But do not they themselves,I asked,"want English?" |
30737 | Did we not think it right,he said,"that there should be evening worship in the family?" |
30737 | Do you know what you are doing, Sir? |
30737 | Had I read Reid? |
30737 | In a word,we find him saying,"do not herbs, plants, roots, grains, and all of this kind that the earth produces and nourishes, come from the sea? |
30737 | Is it true, Hugh,he inquired,"that the lecturer Walsh ridiculed you and your poems in the Council House last night?" |
30737 | Is that man also pitying me? |
30737 | Is this you, L----? |
30737 | It is Click- Clack the carter,said my comrade:"oh, what shall we do?" |
30737 | Jack,exclaimed the old woman, seizing him convulsively by both his hands,"where''s my cousin?--where''s Hugh?" |
30737 | O yes,he said,"but what does that signify? |
30737 | Od, laddie,he said,"what ca''ye this? |
30737 | Oh, and what of that? |
30737 | Oh,he asked, after the first greeting,"have you any salt?" |
30737 | Protection against what? |
30737 | Such is the scene seen at right angles with the plane in which the planets move; but what would be its aspect if I saw it in the line of the plane? 30737 There is mark about that old- fashioned man,"I said to myself:"who or what can he be?" |
30737 | Well, John,I asked one evening, speaking direct, to his evident embarrassment;"what is it?" |
30737 | What ails you? |
30737 | What has happened? |
30737 | What is the matter with you? |
30737 | What poets? |
30737 | What sonnet? |
30737 | What,I inquired of my companion,"are these kind people pitying me so very much for?" |
30737 | Where''s the whisky, Grimbo? |
30737 | Would you not like, Sir,he said, addressing himself to my minister, who sat beside him--"Would you not like to be a sea- gull? |
30737 | _ Hume?_"Yes. |
30737 | ''Come, tell me, Donald,''said my brother,''what you think this tree is like?'' |
30737 | ''What woman, Jack?'' |
30737 | A man of high spirit and influence-- a banker, and very much a Whig-- at once addressed me with a stern--"By what authority, Sir?" |
30737 | Against whom does the inscription testify? |
30737 | And have ye mark''d that pillar''d wreath, When sudden struck by northern blast, Amid the low and stunted heath, In broken volumes cast? |
30737 | And how would you answer that?" |
30737 | And such was one of the more special_ Providences_ of my life; for why should I give it a humbler name? |
30737 | And though I knew it might be asked, Why the interposition of a Providence to save_ you_, when he was left to perish? |
30737 | And was it not the great sea, asks the boy, that was so vastly broad, and so profoundly deep? |
30737 | Are his speculations sound, or precarious? |
30737 | Are we eels or puddocks, that we are sent to live in a loch?" |
30737 | Are we to infer that they are shells of more recent origin than the widely- diffused ones? |
30737 | But capacious as the human imagination has been deemed, can it conceive of an area of wider field? |
30737 | But what else could be expected by an ungainly, dust- besprinkled mechanic in his shirt sleeves, and with a leathern apron before him? |
30737 | But what gude o''greevin''as lang''s we are leevin''? |
30737 | But what, it may be asked, was the bearing of all this observation? |
30737 | But would you not better bid adieu to Cromarty, and come along with me? |
30737 | By the way, has he not something very ingenious about miracles? |
30737 | Ca''ye this_ brochan_?" |
30737 | Can Death be nigh, When thus, mute and unarm''d, his vassals lie? |
30737 | Can any cause be assigned why it is not as likely to break out in the nineteenth century as in the fifteenth?" |
30737 | Could I do nothing for my Church in her hour of peril? |
30737 | Could I not do something to bring up the people to their assistance? |
30737 | Could a man in quest of patronage, and actually at the time soliciting a favour, possibly contrive to say anything more imprudent? |
30737 | Could a soul not derived from our first parents be rendered vile simply by being put into a body derived from them? |
30737 | Did the other men take much more than a week to learn?" |
30737 | Do you remember his argument?" |
30737 | Does he float on wind bills, as boys swim on bladders? |
30737 | Dost thou see yon yard sae green, Spreckled wi''mony a mossy stane? |
30737 | For some little time she stood beside me without speaking, and then somewhat abruptly asked,--"What makes_ you_ work as a mason?" |
30737 | Have I not, I asked, crept along a roof of even a steeper slope than that of the shelf? |
30737 | Have ye not seen, from lonesome waste, The smoke- tower rising tall and slow, O''erlooking, like a stately tree, The russet plain below? |
30737 | How can a man get on in the world that wants Gaelic?" |
30737 | How could such a man pass from earth, and leave no trace behind him? |
30737 | How determine the point? |
30737 | How, may I ask, are you yourself provided with the sinews of war?" |
30737 | How, then, have I my conception of the earth as a whole-- of the solar system as a whole-- nay, of many systems as a whole? |
30737 | I had of course to receive a few palmies additional for the speech; but then,"who cared for that?" |
30737 | I know it now: wert thou not placed To catch the eye of him To whom, through glistening tears, earth''s gauds Worthless appear, and dim? |
30737 | I said;"who cares anything for the ridicule of a blockhead?" |
30737 | I was addressed by the recruiting serjeant of a Highland regiment, who asked me if I did not belong to the Aird? |
30737 | I would, of course, lose not only the lever in the torrent, but my trousers also; and how was I ever to get home without them? |
30737 | In stormy autumn day, when sad The boding peasant frets forlorn, Have ye not seen the mountain stream Bear down the standing corn? |
30737 | In what spirit, it has been asked, would Socrates have listened to the address of Paul on Mars Hill, had he lived a few ages later? |
30737 | Is he facile in lending the use of his name? |
30737 | Is his judgment good, or the contrary? |
30737 | Is his sense of monetary obligations nice, or obtuse? |
30737 | Is it not at least natural to think so, since we are certain that all our habitable lands came originally from the sea? |
30737 | Is it not so with genius of a certain altitude? |
30737 | Is there no way of getting a divorce?" |
30737 | Is there to be merely a repetition of the past-- an introduction a second time of"man made in the image of God?" |
30737 | Marge!--What is marge?" |
30737 | My illustration refers exclusively to the native powers; but may it not, I ask, bear also on the acquisition of knowledge? |
30737 | Or shall I put back the hurt altogether till you get home?" |
30737 | Poor bosom, why dost heave Thus wild? |
30737 | See you that large island? |
30737 | The question with him comes always to be a sternly naked one:--Is, or is not, Mr.---- a person fit to be trusted with the bank''s money? |
30737 | The snow- wreath shifting place? |
30737 | Thy way past finding out, Thy love, can tongue declare? |
30737 | What are his resources?--what his liabilities? |
30737 | What are ye aye troubling that decent lad Mr. Stewart for? |
30737 | What is the use of English in Gairloch?" |
30737 | What is to be the next advance? |
30737 | What warms the poet''s lays with generous fire, To which no toil can reach, no art aspire? |
30737 | What would be its appearance if I saw it edgewise? |
30737 | What, think you, could the great Kean make of feeble stuff like that? |
30737 | What,"he adds,"if the sweating sickness, emphatically called the English disease, were to show itself again? |
30737 | Where, in the name of wonder, should I get a kilt to borrow? |
30737 | Who are the brave in freedom''s cause? |
30737 | Who taught the sage, with deepest wisdom fraught, While scarce one pupil grasps the ponderous thought? |
30737 | Who, after once spending even a few hours in such a school, could avoid being a geologist? |
30737 | Why not give her what the length of the chain permitted-- the full range of the room? |
30737 | Why not, in like manner, creep along it to the nest, where there is firm footing? |
30737 | Why smile incred''lous? |
30737 | Why this strange thought? |
30737 | and was it for me, who have so barbarously used thee, that thou hast died? |
30737 | and what sort of a statesman would Robert Burns have made? |
30737 | and will you leave me here to perish?" |
30737 | do you ken Peter, the taxman an''writer? |
30737 | ejaculated Angus, quickening his trot into a canter;"what does he know about carrying sheep''s heads to the smithy?" |
30737 | he exclaimed;"was the elk a native of Scotland half a century ago? |
30737 | of scenes where Pleasure roves, And Peace, could gentle minstrel tire? |
30737 | or are they merely feebler in their reproductive powers? |
30737 | or is his paper representative of only real business transactions? |
30737 | said the tinker, springing to his feet with an agility wonderful for an age so advanced as his,"Have you drunk it all? |
30737 | the_ Incompetent_?" |
30737 | when passed their brief sojourn-- When Heaven''s dread doom is said-- Beats there the human heart could pour Like mockeries o''er the dead? |
30737 | why hasten on? |
53791 | After what manner therefore do they belong to self, and how are they connected with it? |
53791 | And how can the floor and roof ever meet, while they are separated by the four walls that lie in a contrary position? |
53791 | And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them? |
53791 | And to what end can it serve, either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest? |
53791 | And why is it contrary, unless it be more shocking than any delicate satire? |
53791 | Are not most studious men( and many of them more than I) subject to such reveries or fits of absence, without being exposed to such suspicions? |
53791 | But as we here not only_ feign_ but_ believe_ this continued existence, the question is,_ from whence arises such a belief_? |
53791 | But can any thing be imagined more absurd and contradictory than this reasoning? |
53791 | But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we consider the nature and effects of_ education_? |
53791 | But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? |
53791 | But what have I here said, that reflections very refined and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us? |
53791 | But what is the treachery? |
53791 | But what repose can be tasted in life, when the heart is agitated? |
53791 | Can I be sure that, in leaving all established opinions, I am following truth? |
53791 | Can any thing be supposed more extravagant? |
53791 | Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation? |
53791 | Could Mr Hume, after so many instances of disdain on my part, have still the astonishing generosity as to persevere sincerely to serve me? |
53791 | Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? |
53791 | Do you therefore mean, that it takes not the points in the same order and by the same rule, as is peculiar and essential to a right line? |
53791 | Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflection? |
53791 | Does it attend us at all times, or does it only return at intervals? |
53791 | First, for what reason we pronounce it_ necessary_, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, should also have a cause? |
53791 | For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness? |
53791 | For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? |
53791 | For how can the two walls, that run from south to north, touch each other, while they touch the opposite ends of two walls that run from east to west? |
53791 | For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory? |
53791 | For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different? |
53791 | For if they can not, what possibly can become of them? |
53791 | For what does he mean by_ production_? |
53791 | For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? |
53791 | For whence should it be derived? |
53791 | For why do we blame all gross and injurious language, unless it be, because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and humanity? |
53791 | For why, indeed, should I have any other? |
53791 | For, from what impression could this idea be derived? |
53791 | For, supposing such a conjunction, would the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body? |
53791 | From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? |
53791 | Here, therefore, I must ask,_ What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point_? |
53791 | How can he prove to me, for instance, that two right lines can not have one common segment? |
53791 | How does he know this? |
53791 | How else could any thing exist without length, without breadth, or without depth? |
53791 | How is it possible to make a man easy or happy in a world, to whose customs and maxims he is determined to run retrograde? |
53791 | How then is it possible, that the same substance can at once be modified into that square table, and into this round one? |
53791 | How then shall we adjust those principles together? |
53791 | I first ask mathematicians what they mean when they say one line or surface is_ equal_ to, or_ greater_, or_ less_ than another? |
53791 | I have declared my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surprised if they should express a hatred of mine and of my person? |
53791 | I therefore ask, wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition? |
53791 | If at intervals, at what times principally does it return, and by what causes is it produced? |
53791 | If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after what manner? |
53791 | Is it an impression of sensation or reflection? |
53791 | Is it in every part without being extended? |
53791 | Is it in this particular part, or in that other? |
53791 | Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent? |
53791 | Is it therefore nothing? |
53791 | Is the indivisible subject or immaterial substance, if you will, on the left or on the right hand of the perception? |
53791 | Now I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies or objects to which we suppose solidity to belong? |
53791 | Now''tis certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise, why do we talk and reason concerning it? |
53791 | Now, what idea have we of these bodies? |
53791 | Now, what impression do our senses here convey to us? |
53791 | Now, what is our idea of the moving body, without which motion is incomprehensible? |
53791 | Numquid quæ consecravimus perdidisse nos dicimus? |
53791 | On the back or fore- side of it? |
53791 | On the supposition of my entering into a project to ruin him, how could I think to bring it about by the services I did him? |
53791 | On the surface or in the middle? |
53791 | Or if these colours unite into one, what new colour will they produce by their union? |
53791 | Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest? |
53791 | Or that''tis impossible to draw more than one right line betwixt any two points? |
53791 | Pray, who knows when my door was open or shut, except Mr Hume, with whom I lived, and by whom every body was introduced that I saw? |
53791 | Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possessed of an idea, which is not preceded by any similar impression? |
53791 | Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? |
53791 | Shall we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received? |
53791 | The next question, then, should naturally be,_ how experience gives rise to such a principle_? |
53791 | Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time? |
53791 | We may well ask,_ What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body_? |
53791 | What beings surround me? |
53791 | What can he have said to them, for it is only through him they know any thing of me? |
53791 | What could I divine would be the consequence of such a beginning? |
53791 | What do they know of me, except that I am unhappy, and a friend to their friend Hume? |
53791 | What harm have I done, or could I do to Mr Rousseau? |
53791 | What have I done to Mr Walpole, whom I know full as little? |
53791 | What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? |
53791 | What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falsehood? |
53791 | What then is meant by a distinction of reason, since it implies neither a difference nor separation? |
53791 | What was his design in it? |
53791 | Where am I, or what? |
53791 | Where did he see them? |
53791 | Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated? |
53791 | Which of them shall we prefer? |
53791 | Who could have excited their enmity against me? |
53791 | Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? |
53791 | Why are those enemies all the friends of Mr Hume? |
53791 | Why should I have even them? |
53791 | [ 34] What have I done to Lord Littleton,[35] whom I do n''t even know? |
53791 | [ 34] Why indeed? |
53791 | [ 38] How was it possible for me to guess at such chimerical suspicions? |
53791 | _ What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together_? |
53791 | and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune should at last guide me on her footsteps? |
53791 | and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? |
53791 | but''tis in vain to ask,_ Whether there be body or not_? |
53791 | did this good man borrow those eyes he fixes so sternly and unaccountably on those of his friends? |
1580 | ), said he; did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? |
1580 | Admitting this view, I ask of you, what good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the science of itself, effect? |
1580 | And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her? |
1580 | And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their own business only? |
1580 | And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice? |
1580 | And can that be good which does not make men good? |
1580 | And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also? |
1580 | And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely? |
1580 | And he who does so does his duty? |
1580 | And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in what relates to these? |
1580 | And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous? |
1580 | And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness? |
1580 | And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness and agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad? |
1580 | And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far better than quietness and slowness? |
1580 | And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather than quietly and slowly? |
1580 | And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a quietness? |
1580 | And is temperance a good? |
1580 | And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject- matter of health and disease? |
1580 | And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of what? |
1580 | And the inference is that temperance can not be modesty-- if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good? |
1580 | And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation? |
1580 | And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium? |
1580 | And the temperate are also good? |
1580 | And they are right, and you would agree with them? |
1580 | And to read quickly or slowly? |
1580 | And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this? |
1580 | And what if I am? |
1580 | And what is it? |
1580 | And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? |
1580 | And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily, or quietly and slowly? |
1580 | And which, I said, is better-- facility in learning, or difficulty in learning? |
1580 | And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? |
1580 | And will wisdom give health? |
1580 | And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what was not your own business? |
1580 | And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate in doing another''s work, as well as in doing their own? |
1580 | And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good? |
1580 | Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom? |
1580 | Are you right, Charmides? |
1580 | But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine-- what is the subject of temperance or wisdom? |
1580 | But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge of medicine? |
1580 | But even if knowledge can know itself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what we do not know? |
1580 | But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice? |
1580 | But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to prove beneficial, and when not? |
1580 | But of what is this knowledge? |
1580 | But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no subject- matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences? |
1580 | But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always good? |
1580 | But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom? |
1580 | But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this? |
1580 | But where does Dr. Jackson find any such notion as this in Plato or anywhere in ancient philosophy? |
1580 | But which is best when you are at the writing- master''s, to write the same letters quickly or quietly? |
1580 | But which most tends to make him happy? |
1580 | But why do you not call him, and show him to us? |
1580 | Can you show me any such result of them? |
1580 | Can you tell me? |
1580 | Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? |
1580 | Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself, and of all other desires? |
1580 | Did you ever observe that this is what they say? |
1580 | Do you admit that? |
1580 | Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking? |
1580 | Do you mean that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of good actions, is temperance? |
1580 | For is not the discovery of things as they truly are, a good common to all mankind? |
1580 | For why should Aristotle, because he has quoted several Dialogues of Plato, have quoted them all? |
1580 | Has he not a beautiful face? |
1580 | Have we not long ago asseverated that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing else? |
1580 | He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right, in relation to health and disease? |
1580 | How can you think that I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself? |
1580 | How is that? |
1580 | How is this riddle to be explained? |
1580 | How so? |
1580 | How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage? |
1580 | How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building? |
1580 | I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same? |
1580 | I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another also? |
1580 | I said, or without my consent? |
1580 | I said; is not this rather the effect of medicine? |
1580 | I was, he replied; but what is your drift? |
1580 | In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is Temperance? |
1580 | Is it of him you are speaking or of some one else? |
1580 | Is not medicine, I said, the science of health? |
1580 | Is not that true? |
1580 | Is not that true? |
1580 | Is not that true? |
1580 | Is that true? |
1580 | Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes? |
1580 | Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something else? |
1580 | Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will he proceed? |
1580 | May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game of draughts? |
1580 | Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom is the science? |
1580 | Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes? |
1580 | Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has no object of fear? |
1580 | Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,--do they not each of them do their own work? |
1580 | Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half? |
1580 | Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort? |
1580 | Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them? |
1580 | Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general? |
1580 | Or of computation? |
1580 | Or of health? |
1580 | Or of working in brass? |
1580 | Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves? |
1580 | Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying;--have you or have you not this quality of temperance? |
1580 | Shall I tell you the nature of the difficulty? |
1580 | Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this? |
1580 | Shall we speak of the soul and its qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, as feminine or neuter? |
1580 | That is your meaning? |
1580 | The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate of human beings, is asked by Socrates,''What is Temperance?'' |
1580 | Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good? |
1580 | Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but not what he knows? |
1580 | Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows? |
1580 | Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate? |
1580 | Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one''s own business; not at least in this way, or doing things of this sort? |
1580 | Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest agility and quickness, is noblest and best? |
1580 | Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance? |
1580 | Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, naked and undisguised? |
1580 | Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good? |
1580 | Think over all this, and, like a brave youth, tell me-- What is temperance? |
1580 | Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name? |
1580 | Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is noble? |
1580 | Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question-- Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something? |
1580 | Was he a fool who told you, Charmides? |
1580 | Was he right who affirmed that? |
1580 | Was not that your statement? |
1580 | Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom-- to know what is known and what is unknown to us? |
1580 | Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, and is of a nature to be a science of something? |
1580 | Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says,''Modesty is not good for a needy man''? |
1580 | Were we not right in making that admission? |
1580 | What do you mean? |
1580 | What do you mean? |
1580 | What is that? |
1580 | What makes you think so? |
1580 | Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater? |
1580 | Who is he, I said; and who is his father? |
1580 | Why not, I said; but will he come? |
1580 | Why not? |
1580 | With my consent? |
1580 | Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly? |
1580 | Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? |
1580 | You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about? |
1580 | and in what cases do you mean? |
1580 | or do all equally make him happy? |
1580 | or must the craftsman necessarily know when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work which he is doing? |
1580 | the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing? |
10615 | And are there not places where, at a certain age, they kill or expose their parents, without any remorse at all? |
10615 | And are they those which are the first in children, and antecedent to all acquired ones? |
10615 | And if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth? |
10615 | And sensible qualities, as colours and smells,& c. what are they but the powers of different bodies, in relation to our perception,& c.? |
10615 | And were not he that proposed it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him? |
10615 | And what can hinder him from thinking them sacred, when he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts, and the most reverenced by others? |
10615 | And what doubt can there be made of it? |
10615 | And what is the will, but the faculty to do this? |
10615 | And when we find it there, how much more does it resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher, than represent the true God? |
10615 | And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable? |
10615 | And whether, in the second case, there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings? |
10615 | And which then shall be true? |
10615 | And, if considered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? |
10615 | Are they such as all mankind have, and bring into the world with them? |
10615 | But alas, amongst children, idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? |
10615 | But can any one think, or will any one say, that “ impossibility ” and “ identity ” are two innate IDEAS? |
10615 | But how late is it before any such notion is discoverable in children? |
10615 | But if a Hobbist be asked why? |
10615 | But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? |
10615 | But my question is,--whether one can not have the IDEA of one body moved, whilst others are at rest? |
10615 | But perhaps it will be said,--without a regular motion, such as of the sun, or some other, how could it ever be known that such periods were equal? |
10615 | But the question being here,--Whether the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of body? |
10615 | But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? |
10615 | But will any one say, that those that live by fraud or rapine have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow and assent to? |
10615 | Can another man perceive that I am conscious of anything, when I perceive it not myself? |
10615 | Can he be concerned in either of their actions? |
10615 | Can the soul think, and not the man? |
10615 | Concerning a man ’s liberty, there yet, therefore, is raised this further question, WHETHER A MAN BE FREE TO WILL? |
10615 | Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves, and therefore can it be doubted? |
10615 | Do we not see( will they be ready to say) the parts of bodies stick firmly together? |
10615 | For example, what is a watch? |
10615 | For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will? |
10615 | For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? |
10615 | For though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it? |
10615 | For, it being asked, what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs? |
10615 | For, our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts? |
10615 | For, who is it that sees not that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of substances, and not of powers themselves? |
10615 | Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity, before it has of white or black, sweet or bitter? |
10615 | How else could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep? |
10615 | How knows any one that the Soul always thinks? |
10615 | How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipsis, if we had no other idea of it, but some few of its properties? |
10615 | I ask those who say they have a positive idea of eternity, whether their idea of duration includes in it succession, or not? |
10615 | I ask whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? |
10615 | I ask, is not this stay voluntary? |
10615 | If it be further asked,--What it is moves desire? |
10615 | If they say that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking, I ask, How they know it? |
10615 | If this answer satisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the question, What determines the will? |
10615 | Is it worth the name of freedom to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man ’s self? |
10615 | Is there anything more common? |
10615 | Let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity? |
10615 | Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:--How comes it to be furnished? |
10615 | May he not, with more reason, assure him he was not asleep? |
10615 | Must it not be a most manifest wrong judgment that does not presently see to which side, in this case, the preference is to be given? |
10615 | Nay, whether the cock too, which had the same soul, were not the same, with both of them? |
10615 | Or a man think, and not be conscious of it? |
10615 | Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate? |
10615 | Or does the mind regulate itself and its assent by ideas that it never yet had? |
10615 | Or doth the proposing them print them clearer in the mind than nature did? |
10615 | Or rather, would he not have reason to think that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him? |
10615 | Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths? |
10615 | Or the understanding draw conclusions from principles which it never yet knew or understood? |
10615 | Or where is that universal consent that assures us there are such inbred rules? |
10615 | POWER being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they*[ lost line??] |
10615 | POWER being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they*[ lost line??] |
10615 | The question then is, Which of these are real, and which barely imaginary combinations? |
10615 | To return, then, to the inquiry, what is it that determines the will in regard to our actions? |
10615 | WHETHER MAN ’S WILL BE FREE OR NO? |
10615 | What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? |
10615 | What good would sight and hearing do to a creature that can not move itself to or from the objects wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? |
10615 | What is it, then, that makes it be thought confused, since the want of symmetry does not? |
10615 | What makes the same man? |
10615 | What moved? |
10615 | What real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in an body, but an alteration of the texture of it? |
10615 | What true or tolerable notion of a Deity could they have, who acknowledged and worshipped hundreds? |
10615 | What was it that made anything come out of the body? |
10615 | Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? |
10615 | Whence has it all the MATERIALS of reason and knowledge? |
10615 | Where is that practical truth that is universally received, without doubt or question, as it must be if innate? |
10615 | Where then are those innate principles of justice, piety, gratitude, equity, chastity? |
10615 | Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same men, though they lived several ages asunder? |
10615 | Which innate? |
10615 | Who in his wits would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery; which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? |
10615 | Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this? |
10615 | Would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before? |
10615 | and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? |
10615 | attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever existed? |
10615 | is this,--What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing, to this or that particular motion or rest? |
10615 | number, whose stock is inexhaustible and truly infinite: and what a large and immense field doth extension alone afford the mathematicians? |
10615 | what universal principles of knowledge? |
10615 | why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? |
39964 | And where were the others? |
39964 | Has the plant a soul? 39964 When a woman is strong, is n''t she strong after the same conception and the same strength? |
39964 | And do you not interchange the portrait for the person itself, without difficulty and misunderstanding? |
39964 | And how can any single brain assume to acquire all knowledge, to know everything? |
39964 | And how is a fact proven? |
39964 | And on the other hand, does not the promotion of our material interests require a penetration on our part of the wonders of creation? |
39964 | Are not these the concrete content of our material interests? |
39964 | Are there any stones that do not belong to the category of stones, or any kind of wood which is iron? |
39964 | Are they not simply substitutes? |
39964 | At best, will you not merely repeat what has long since been accomplished? |
39964 | Before, at, or after birth? |
39964 | But do not beasts, worms, and sensitive plants have that also? |
39964 | But how do I know what I state in such an offhand manner? |
39964 | But how is life infused into them? |
39964 | But how is that to be found? |
39964 | But how to explain that wonderful_ a priori_ knowledge which exceeds all experience? |
39964 | But is n''t it a contradiction that a special science wants to be general world wisdom? |
39964 | But is there anything which is absolutely good? |
39964 | But look here, has it not always been so? |
39964 | But the study of the anatomy of the hand can no more solve the question: What is writing? |
39964 | But was it founded on fact? |
39964 | But what about the question of the beginning and end of the world, or the question of the existence of God? |
39964 | But what else does the term material interests mean but the abstract expression of our existence, welfare, and development? |
39964 | But what good will it do a painter to have his special attention called to this fact? |
39964 | But what is there of unity that science teaches about them? |
39964 | But what thing is there that has any effects"in itself?" |
39964 | But where shall we draw the line in this comparison of images? |
39964 | But who claims that there are not many straight lines which are crooked at one end, which run straight on for a certain distance and then turn? |
39964 | But why do we call this the most essential part? |
39964 | By the help of brown- study from the interior of our brain, from revelation, or from experience? |
39964 | Can natural science do as much? |
39964 | Can the world be understood in a hermitage? |
39964 | Can we see the things themselves? |
39964 | Can we, by mere deduction through concepts which go beyond experience, arrive at truths? |
39964 | Could there not be some dogs who lacked the quality of watchfulness, and might not our pug- dog be very unreliable, in spite of all exact deductions? |
39964 | Do animals arise when the hot and the cold begin to disintegrate, as some claim? |
39964 | Do you not ask on seeing the portrait of some person unknown to you: Who is this? |
39964 | Does he not say explicitly that the penetration of the wonders of creation promotes our material interests? |
39964 | Does not this appear reasonable to you?... |
39964 | Does that require any explanation? |
39964 | Everything develops, why should not our intellects do so? |
39964 | For are not the effects tangible by which reason transforms nature and life? |
39964 | Has proud philosophy gained nothing since? |
39964 | Has the earth a soul? |
39964 | Have I now still to prove that all existence is of the same category? |
39964 | Have not your thoughts been connected always and everywhere with some worldly or real object? |
39964 | Have they a soul analogous to that of man? |
39964 | Have you ever seen a portrait or a copy that did not agree in some respect with the original? |
39964 | How are we to designate the species, how the genus? |
39964 | How can a man who is out of touch with the mass of the shifting population feel that he is one with the universe? |
39964 | How can thinkers who search for truth, being, relative causes, such as naturalists, be idealists? |
39964 | How can we see everything? |
39964 | How do we arrive at the knowledge of things which are not accessible to experience? |
39964 | How do we know that? |
39964 | How do we prove that a peach is a delicious fruit? |
39964 | How do we solve this contradiction? |
39964 | How is understanding possible? |
39964 | I remember reading in a satirical paper the question:"What is a gentleman? |
39964 | If the ancient Germans regarded the great oak as sacred and religious, why should not art and science become religious among the modern Germans? |
39964 | If the function of the heart may be referred to as material, why not the function of the brain? |
39964 | In certain shows, the clown is asked by the manager:"Clown, where have you been?" |
39964 | In seeking for an answer to the question: What is philosophy? |
39964 | In what respect are our material interests different from our mental penetration of things? |
39964 | Is it an idea? |
39964 | Is it not necessary, however, to make a distinction between poetry and truth? |
39964 | Is it the blood, which enables us to think, or the air or the fire? |
39964 | Is not everything a part, is not every part a thing? |
39964 | Is not general wisdom that which comprises all knowledge, all special science? |
39964 | Is not the air or the scent of flowers an ethereal body? |
39964 | Is not the material world and its understanding as essential as reason, as intellect, which bends to the task of exploring this world? |
39964 | Is the color of a leaf less of a thing than that leaf itself? |
39964 | Is the world a concept? |
39964 | Is this world- god a mere idea? |
39964 | It is the solution of the riddle of the ancient Eleatic philosophy: How can the one be contained in the many, and the many in one? |
39964 | It was the famous Kant who posed the question:"How is_ a priori_ knowledge possible?" |
39964 | May not our modern viewpoint, the category in which our present day science thinks, the category of cause and effect, be equally transitory? |
39964 | Mind and Matter: Which Is Primary, Which Is Secondary? |
39964 | Multiplicity, change, motion-- who is to split hairs about them, who will make fine distinctions? |
39964 | Must I not know everything in order to be world wise? |
39964 | Must I prove this? |
39964 | Now I ask: If nature, God, and absolute truth are one and the same thing, have we not learned something about the"final cause of all things?" |
39964 | Now you are familiar with that student''s song:"What''s Coming from the Heights?" |
39964 | Now, is this logic or is it theology? |
39964 | Or are you spiritualists who make a metaphysical distinction between the truth and the phenomenon? |
39964 | Or does it belong to the infinite and must it exist forever? |
39964 | Otherwise, how could misunderstandings arise? |
39964 | Our logic asks: Does wisdom descend mysteriously from the interior of the human brain, or does it come from the outer world like all experience? |
39964 | Scientists as well as scribes have ever embarrassed one another by the question: What is truth? |
39964 | Shall it be an idol or a king? |
39964 | Shall we use the intellect philosophically, or shall we use it empirically? |
39964 | Should not religion, which according to the words of a German emperor"must be preserved for the people,"also have its bounds in history? |
39964 | Should not that appear mysterious to it? |
39964 | Socrates in the market of Athens, and Plato in his dialogues, have probably said better things about the questions:"What is virtue? |
39964 | The fetish cult, the animal cult, the cult of the ideal and spiritual creator, or the cult of the real human mind? |
39964 | The great Kant has asked the plain question:"Is metaphysics practicable as a science?" |
39964 | The human understanding has its limits, why should it not? |
39964 | The next question is then: By what road do we arrive at its understanding? |
39964 | The philosophical celebrities and classic authorities are not even in accord on the question: What is philosophy and what is its aim? |
39964 | The question then arises: Which is the genuine and true division? |
39964 | The statements: I do, I work, I think, must be completed by an answer to the question: What are you doing, working, thinking? |
39964 | Thereupon Cebes asks:"Well, and what do you think of this now?" |
39964 | This book, its leaves, its letters, or their parts, are they units? |
39964 | Those sciences recognize only the phenomena of things; but where is the understanding which perceives the truth?" |
39964 | To analyze this idea means to solve the question, what is walking generally considered, what is the general nature of walking? |
39964 | What are all things? |
39964 | What can be more evident? |
39964 | What constitutes, then, this body which is distinguished from its transient form? |
39964 | What do I know about the shoe industry, if I know that it produces shoes? |
39964 | What good are all the treasures of Croesus, if health is lacking? |
39964 | What good is health to us, when we have nothing to bite? |
39964 | What is a"thing?" |
39964 | What is it that Lessing says? |
39964 | What is its beginning, what its end? |
39964 | What is its positive achievement? |
39964 | What is justice? |
39964 | What is justice? |
39964 | What is meant by political freedom? |
39964 | What is moral and reasonable?" |
39964 | What is not an image in the abstract, and what is more than an image in the concrete? |
39964 | What is the reason for this? |
39964 | What is the relation of the concrete to the abstract? |
39964 | What is the use of metaphysics under these circumstances? |
39964 | What would become of reason and language, if such a thing were to be considered? |
39964 | What, then, is religion and religious? |
39964 | Whence comes reason, where do we get our ideas, judgments, conclusions? |
39964 | Where and how are we to find a positive and definite knowledge of it? |
39964 | Where are we to begin and where to end? |
39964 | Where do I begin, where do I stop? |
39964 | Where do we find any indivisible unit outside of our abstract conceptions? |
39964 | Where do we find such eternal, imperishable, formless matter? |
39964 | Where does consciousness begin in the child? |
39964 | Where does the variety of science, its undecided vacillation end, and when does understanding become stable? |
39964 | Where is the consistent connection? |
39964 | Where, then, is the beginning and end, and how can we bring order into these relations? |
39964 | Where, who, what, is the supreme being to which everything else is subordinate, which brings system, consistency, logic, into our thought and actions? |
39964 | Who and what are now the objects of philosophy? |
39964 | Who has not heard the lament about the unreliability of the senses? |
39964 | Who or what is the intellect, whence does it come from, whither does it lead? |
39964 | Who will define to us what a line is? |
39964 | Who will deny that he can feel the force of heat, of cold, of gravitation? |
39964 | Who would be silly enough to deny that? |
39964 | Why do you want to be a theist, if you are a naturalist, or a naturalist if you are a theist? |
39964 | Why is not the"naturalistic"philosopher consistent by recognizing his special object, understanding, as a natural object? |
39964 | Why should not the action of the brain belong in the same category as the action of the heart? |
39964 | Why, then, speculate about God, freedom, and immortality, when indubitable knowledge may be obtained by the formal method of exact deductions? |
39964 | Would any one try to make us believe that there is a great and almighty eye that can look through blocks of metal the same as through glass? |
39964 | XII MIND AND MATTER: WHICH IS PRIMARY, WHICH SECONDARY? |
39964 | You know the old question: Which was first, the egg or the hen? |
39964 | You will probably ask: What has that to do with logic or the art of reasoning? |
39964 | than the physiological study of the brain can bring us nearer to the solution of the question: What is thought? |
10616 | ''But of what use is all this fine knowledge of MEN''S OWN IMAGINATIONS, to a man that inquires after the reality of things? |
10616 | ''Lead is a metal''to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for? |
10616 | ''The whole is equal to all its parts:''what real truth, I beseech you, does it teach us? |
10616 | ''the whole is equal to all its parts taken together?'' |
10616 | AUT EA QUOE VIZ SUMMA INGENII RATIONE COMPREHENDAT, NULLA RATIONE MOVERI PUTET?] |
10616 | And if they were asked what passage was, how would they better define it than by motion? |
10616 | And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man? |
10616 | And to what purpose make them general, unless it were that they might have general names for the convenience of discourse and communication? |
10616 | Are monsters really a distinct species? |
10616 | Are not they also, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into the complex idea signified by the name ZAHAB? |
10616 | Are these general maxims of no use? |
10616 | But of what use is all such truth to us? |
10616 | But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great God, who is there, that, by his own search and ability, can come to know? |
10616 | But what shall be here the criterion? |
10616 | But what shall be the criterion of this agreement? |
10616 | But who can help it, if truth will have it so? |
10616 | But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing, SINCE WE CANNOT POSSIBLY CONCEIVE IT? |
10616 | For by what right is it that fusibility comes to be a part of the essence signified by the word gold, and solubility but a property of it? |
10616 | For example: my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still: What causes rest in one, and motion in the other? |
10616 | For is it not at least as proper and significant to say, Passage is a motion from one place to another, as to say, Motion is a passage,& c.? |
10616 | For to what purpose should the memory charge itself with such compositions, unless it were by abstraction to make them general? |
10616 | For what is PASSAGE other than MOTION? |
10616 | For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new species? |
10616 | For what need of a sign, when the thing signified is present and in view? |
10616 | For when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? |
10616 | For, if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at last should we stop? |
10616 | For, though it may be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron? |
10616 | Had the upper part to the middle been of human shape, and all below swine, had it been murder to destroy it? |
10616 | Have the bulk of mankind no other guide but accident and blind chance to conduct them to their happiness or misery? |
10616 | He that uses words without any clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors? |
10616 | Here everybody will be ready to ask, If changelings may be supposed something between man and beast, pray what are they? |
10616 | How many men have no other ground for their tenets, than the supposed honesty, or learning, or number of those of the same profession? |
10616 | How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves? |
10616 | I ask, Whether these general maxims have not the same use in the study of divinity, and in theological questions, that they have in other sciences? |
10616 | I ask, whether the complex idea in Adam''s mind, which he called KINNEAH, were adequate or not? |
10616 | I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence? |
10616 | I. I would ask them, whether they imagine that all matter, EVERY PARTICLE OF MATTER, thinks? |
10616 | If all matter does not think, I next ask, Whether it be ONLY ONE ATOM that does so? |
10616 | If it be asked whether these be all men or no, all of human species? |
10616 | If men should do so in their reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? |
10616 | If not, what reason will there be shown more for the one than the other? |
10616 | Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce anything? |
10616 | Is it true of the IDEA of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones? |
10616 | Is not now ductility to be added to his former idea, and made part of the essence of the species that name ZAHAB stands for? |
10616 | Is there anything so extravagant as the imaginations of men''s brains? |
10616 | Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: but who knows what those ideas may be? |
10616 | Let them be so: what will your drivelling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be? |
10616 | Matter must be allowed eternal: Why? |
10616 | Objection, What shall become of those who want Proofs? |
10616 | Or can those be the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth, which teach one thing in Christendom and another in Turkey? |
10616 | Or is it true because any one has been witness to such an action? |
10616 | Or must the bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font or no? |
10616 | Or that at least, if this will happen, it should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so? |
10616 | Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all?'' |
10616 | Or who shall be the judge to determine? |
10616 | Or why is its colour part of the essence, and its malleableness but a property? |
10616 | Other spirits, who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things, how much must they exceed us in knowledge? |
10616 | QUID EST ENIM VERIUS, QUAM NEMINEM ESSE OPORTERE TAM STULTE AROGANTEM, UT IN SE MENTEM ET RATIONEM PUTET INESSE IN COELO MUNDOQUE NON PUTET? |
10616 | Shall a defect in the body make a monster; a defect in the mind( the far more noble, and, in the common phrase, the far more essential part) not? |
10616 | Shall the want of a nose, or a neck, make a monster, and put such issue out of the rank of men; the want of reason and understanding, not? |
10616 | So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me or any other particular corporeal being, to have reason? |
10616 | The atomists, who define motion to be''a passage from one place to another,''what do they more than put one synonymous word for another? |
10616 | There are some watches that are made with four wheels, others with five; is this a specific difference to the workman? |
10616 | To know whether his idea of ADULTERY or INCEST be right, will a man seek it anywhere amongst things existing? |
10616 | To this, perhaps will be said, Has not an opal, or the infusion of LIGNUM NEPHRITICUM, two colours at the same time? |
10616 | Upon which, his friend demanding what scarlet was? |
10616 | WHAT is truth? |
10616 | What confusion of virtues and vices, if every one may make what ideas of them he pleases? |
10616 | What greater light can be hoped for in the moral sciences? |
10616 | What instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before? |
10616 | What is this more than trifling with words? |
10616 | What makes lead and iron malleable, antimony and stones not? |
10616 | What more is contained in that maxim, than what the signification of the word TOTUM, or the WHOLE, does of itself import? |
10616 | What must we do for the rest? |
10616 | What need is there of REASON? |
10616 | What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract ideas of GLORY and AMBITION, before he has heard the names of them? |
10616 | What principle is requisite to prove that one and one are two, that two and two are four, that three times two are six? |
10616 | What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a case? |
10616 | What shall we say, then? |
10616 | What sort of outside is the certain sign that there is or is not such an inhabitant within? |
10616 | What will become of Changelings in a future state? |
10616 | What, then, are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings? |
10616 | Whence comes this, then? |
10616 | Where is the head that has no chimeras in it? |
10616 | Where now( I ask) shall be the just measure; which the utmost bounds of that shape, that carries with it a rational soul? |
10616 | Wherein, then, would I gladly know, consist the precise and unmovable boundaries of that species? |
10616 | Which is nothing else but to know what OTHER simple ideas do, or do not co- exist with those that make up that complex idea? |
10616 | Who ever that had a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of SEVEN, or a TRIANGLE? |
10616 | Who knows not what odd notions many men''s heads are filled with, and what strange ideas all men''s brains are capable of? |
10616 | Who of all these has established the right signification of the word, gold? |
10616 | Why do we say this is a horse, and that a mule; this is an animal, that an herb? |
10616 | Will you deprive changelings of a future state?) |
10616 | [ The reason whereof is plain: for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold, when we know not what is or is not gold? |
10616 | [ What shall we then say? |
10616 | because you can not conceive how it can be made out of nothing: why do you not also think yourself eternal? |
10616 | i. c. 3), with a man''s head and hog''s body? |
10616 | that themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined, their own opinions? |
4705 | A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: Why? |
4705 | After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it? |
4705 | An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? |
4705 | And how can the floor and roof ever meet, while they are separated by the four walls, that lie in a contrary position? |
4705 | And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them? |
4705 | And how distinguish that exactly from a probability? |
4705 | And if they were founded on original instincts, coued they have any greater stability? |
4705 | And to what end can it serve either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest? |
4705 | And what creature departs more widely, not only from right reason, but from his own character and disposition? |
4705 | And why is it contrary, unless it be more shocking than any delicate satire? |
4705 | And, Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object? |
4705 | Are the changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct? |
4705 | Are they therefore, upon that account, immoral? |
4705 | But after what manner does it give pleasure? |
4705 | But can anything be imagined more absurd and contradictory than this reasoning? |
4705 | But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? |
4705 | But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we consider the nature and effects Of EDUCATION? |
4705 | But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? |
4705 | But in what manner? |
4705 | But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible, without an antecedent morality? |
4705 | But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive? |
4705 | But shall we say upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour? |
4705 | But then I ask, if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred? |
4705 | But what do we mean by impossible? |
4705 | But what have I here said, that reflections very refined and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us? |
4705 | But what makes the end agreeable? |
4705 | But what passion? |
4705 | But who will assert, that this is the only foundation of justice? |
4705 | Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation? |
4705 | Do the children arise from this copulation more uniformly, than does the parents care for their safety and preservation? |
4705 | Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception? |
4705 | Do you therefore mean that it takes not the points in the same order and by the same rule, as is peculiar and essential to a right line? |
4705 | Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflection? |
4705 | Does it discover a relation or a matter of fact? |
4705 | For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness? |
4705 | For from what impression coued this idea be derived? |
4705 | For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? |
4705 | For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory? |
4705 | For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different? |
4705 | For if they can not, what possibly can become of them? |
4705 | For is it more certain, that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than that two young savages of different sexes will copulate? |
4705 | For supposing such a conjunction, would the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body? |
4705 | For what does he mean by production? |
4705 | For what does reason discover, when it pronounces any action vicious? |
4705 | For what if he be my enemy, and has given me just cause to hate him? |
4705 | For what is more capricious than human actions? |
4705 | For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? |
4705 | For what reason? |
4705 | For whence should it be derived? |
4705 | For why do we blame all gross and injurious language, unless it be, because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and humanity? |
4705 | For, who ever thought of forbearing any action, because others might possibly draw false conclusions from it? |
4705 | From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? |
4705 | From whence does this proceed, but that the memory in the first case assists the fancy and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions? |
4705 | Have you any notion of self or substance? |
4705 | Here therefore I must ask, What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point? |
4705 | How can he prove to me, for instance, that two right lines can not have one common segment? |
4705 | How do we separate this impossibility from an improbability? |
4705 | How else coued any thing exist without length, without breadth, or without depth? |
4705 | How is it possible they coued ever become objects of pride, except by means of that transition above- explained? |
4705 | How is this to be accounted for? |
4705 | How much more when aided by that circumstance? |
4705 | How then is it possible, that the same substance can at once be modifyed into that square table, and into this round one? |
4705 | How then shall we adjust those principles together? |
4705 | I Does it attend us at all times, or does it only return at intervals? |
4705 | I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? |
4705 | I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? |
4705 | I first ask mathematicians, what they mean when they say one line or surface is EQUAL to, or GREATER or LESS than another? |
4705 | I have declared my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surprized, if they should express a hatred of mine and of my person? |
4705 | I therefore ask, Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition? |
4705 | If at intervals, at what times principally does it return, and by what causes is it produced? |
4705 | If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? |
4705 | If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? |
4705 | If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? |
4705 | Is it an impression of sensation or of reflection? |
4705 | Is it because it is his duty to be grateful? |
4705 | Is it in every part without being extended? |
4705 | Is it in this particular part, or in that other? |
4705 | Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent? |
4705 | Is it therefore nothing? |
4705 | Is self the same with substance? |
4705 | Is the indivisible subject, or immaterial substance, if you will, on the left or on the right hand of the perception? |
4705 | Now I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies or objects, to which we suppose solidity to belong? |
4705 | Now after what manner are they related to ourselves? |
4705 | Now it is certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise why do we talk and reason concerning it? |
4705 | Now the question is, after what manner this utility and importance operate upon us? |
4705 | Now what idea have we of these bodies? |
4705 | Now what impression do oar senses here convey to us? |
4705 | Now what is our idea of the moving body, without which motion is incomprehensible? |
4705 | On the back or fore side of it? |
4705 | On the surface or in the middle? |
4705 | Or if it be possible to imagine, that such errors are the sources of all immorality? |
4705 | Or if it were, is an exception to a general rule in every case criminal, for no other reason than because it is an exception? |
4705 | Or if these colours unite into one, what new colour will they produce by their union? |
4705 | Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest? |
4705 | Or that it is impossible to draw more than one right line betwixt any two points? |
4705 | Or, who ever performed any, that he might give rise to true conclusions?] |
4705 | Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession to private families? |
4705 | Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possest of an idea, which is not preceded by any similar impression? |
4705 | Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? |
4705 | Shall we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received? |
4705 | Should it be asked, what proportion these two species of morality bear to each other? |
4705 | The next question is, Of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us? |
4705 | The next question, then, should naturally be, how experience gives rise to such a principle? |
4705 | The question is, whether these intervals do not afford us the idea of extension without body? |
4705 | Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time? |
4705 | WHETHER IT IS BY MEANS OF OUR IDEAS OR IMPRESSIONS WE DISTINGUISH BETWIXT VICE AND VIRTUE, AND PRONOUNCE AN ACTION BLAMEABLE OR PRAISEWORTHY? |
4705 | We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? |
4705 | What beings surround me? |
4705 | What farther proof can be desired for the present system? |
4705 | What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas? |
4705 | What follows? |
4705 | What if I be in necessity, and have urgent motives to acquire something to my family? |
4705 | What if he be a miser, and can make no use of what I would deprive him of? |
4705 | What if he be a profligate debauchee, and would rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions? |
4705 | What if he be a vicious man, and deserves the hatred of all mankind? |
4705 | What more inconstant than the desires of man? |
4705 | What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? |
4705 | What restraint, therefore, shall we impose on women, in order to counter- balance so strong a temptation as they have to infidelity? |
4705 | What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falshood? |
4705 | When it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable? |
4705 | Where am I, or what? |
4705 | Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated? |
4705 | Which of them shall we prefer? |
4705 | Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the 1st of January 1715, the 11th of March 1719, and the 3rd of August 1733? |
4705 | Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? |
4705 | Why then look any farther, or multiply suppositions without necessity? |
4705 | Why? |
4705 | Why? |
4705 | and on whom have, I any influence, or who have any influence on me? |
4705 | but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? |
4705 | in short, what character, or peculiar understanding, is more excellent than another? |
4705 | whether a clear head, or a copious invention? |
4705 | whether a profound genius, or a sure judgment? |
53792 | A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: why? |
53792 | All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the sun? |
53792 | An action, or sentiment, or character, is virtuous or vicious; why? |
53792 | And are you so late in perceiving it? |
53792 | And by being the first, replied Demea, might he not have been sensible of his error? |
53792 | And for what reason impose on himself such a violence? |
53792 | And have you at last, said Cleanthes smiling, betrayed your intentions, Philo? |
53792 | And how distinguish that exactly from a probability? |
53792 | And if it requires a cause in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of objects into a similar universe of ideas? |
53792 | And if they were founded on original instincts, could they have any greater stability? |
53792 | And is the slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both? |
53792 | And these whence? |
53792 | And what argument have you against such convulsions? |
53792 | And what creature departs more widely, not only from right reason, but from his own character and disposition? |
53792 | And what philosophers could possibly submit to so rigid a rule? |
53792 | And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?... |
53792 | And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? |
53792 | And where is the difficulty, replied Philo, of that supposition? |
53792 | And who can doubt of what all men declare from their own immediate feeling and experience? |
53792 | And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? |
53792 | And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and religious? |
53792 | And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all other animals? |
53792 | And, after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? |
53792 | And,_ Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object_? |
53792 | Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory? |
53792 | Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and along with these primary planets round the sun? |
53792 | Are the changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct? |
53792 | Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism? |
53792 | Are they, therefore, upon that account, immoral? |
53792 | Are you secretly, then, a more dangerous enemy than Cleanthes himself? |
53792 | Are you so late, says Philo, in teaching your children the principles of religion? |
53792 | Besides, consider, Demea: This very society, by which we surmount those wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to us? |
53792 | But according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and advantages which men and all animals possess? |
53792 | But after what manner does it give pleasure? |
53792 | But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? |
53792 | But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? |
53792 | But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this nature? |
53792 | But did the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater happiness? |
53792 | But farther, why may not die material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? |
53792 | But how is it conceivable, said Demea, that the world can arise from any thing similar to vegetation or generation? |
53792 | But how oft do they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society? |
53792 | But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself? |
53792 | But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist, why do they remain in life?.... |
53792 | But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? |
53792 | But if we stop, and go no farther; why go so far? |
53792 | But in what manner? |
53792 | But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? |
53792 | But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible without an antecedent morality? |
53792 | But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? |
53792 | But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive? |
53792 | But might not other particular volitions remedy this inconvenience? |
53792 | But shall we say, upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour? |
53792 | But then I ask, if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred? |
53792 | But what do we mean by impossible? |
53792 | But what is the consequence? |
53792 | But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk, said Demea? |
53792 | But what makes the end agreeable? |
53792 | But what passion? |
53792 | But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? |
53792 | But who will assert, that this is the only foundation of justice? |
53792 | Can the one opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so? |
53792 | Can we reach no farther in this subject than experience and probability? |
53792 | Can you explain their operations, and anatomize that fine internal structure on which they depend? |
53792 | Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house, find the generation of a universe? |
53792 | Do n''t you remember, said Philo, the excellent saying of Lord Bacon on this head? |
53792 | Do the children arise from this copulation more uniformly, than does the parents''care for their safety and preservation? |
53792 | Do we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form? |
53792 | Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception? |
53792 | Does it discover a relation or a matter of fact? |
53792 | Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? |
53792 | For how can an effect, which either is finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause? |
53792 | For instance, what if I should revive the old Epicurean hypothesis? |
53792 | For is it necessary to prove what every one feels within himself? |
53792 | For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to make discoveries especially in so late an age? |
53792 | For it is more certain that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than two young savages of different sexes will copulate? |
53792 | For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain? |
53792 | For what does reason discover, when it pronounces any action vicious? |
53792 | For what if he be my enemy, and has given me just cause to hate him? |
53792 | For what is more capricious than human actions? |
53792 | For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference? |
53792 | For what other name can I give them? |
53792 | For what reason? |
53792 | For whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? |
53792 | For who ever thought of forbearing any action, because others might possibly draw false conclusions from it? |
53792 | From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? |
53792 | From whence does this proceed, but that the memory in the first case assists the fancy, and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions? |
53792 | From_ their_ parents? |
53792 | Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? |
53792 | Have you any notion of_ self_ or_ substance_? |
53792 | Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? |
53792 | Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move? |
53792 | How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence? |
53792 | How can we satisfy ourselves without going on_ in infinitum_? |
53792 | How could things have been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order somewhere, in thought or in matter? |
53792 | How do we separate this impossibility from an improbability? |
53792 | How is it possible they could ever become objects of pride, except by means of that transition above explained? |
53792 | How is this compatible with that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe to the Deity? |
53792 | How is this to be accounted for? |
53792 | How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations? |
53792 | How many lie under the lingering torment of diseases? |
53792 | How then does the Divine benevolence display itself, in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? |
53792 | I would fain know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? |
53792 | If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? |
53792 | If no camels had been created for the use of man in the sandy deserts of Africa and Arabia, would the world have been dissolved? |
53792 | If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? |
53792 | If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? |
53792 | In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men? |
53792 | Is a very small part a rule for the universe? |
53792 | Is he able, but not willing? |
53792 | Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? |
53792 | Is it a rule for the whole? |
53792 | Is it any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of life? |
53792 | Is it because''tis his duty to be grateful? |
53792 | Is it contrary to his intention? |
53792 | Is it from the intention of the Deity? |
53792 | Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former? |
53792 | Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? |
53792 | Is not such an unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion? |
53792 | Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? |
53792 | Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow? |
53792 | Is the name, without any meaning, of such mighty importance? |
53792 | Is there any other rule than the greater similarity of the objects compared? |
53792 | Is_ self_ the same with_ substance_? |
53792 | JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? |
53792 | Justice, whether a natural or artificial Virtue? |
53792 | Now the question is, after what manner this utility and importance operate upon us? |
53792 | Now, after what manner are they related to ourselves? |
53792 | Now, as to the_ manner_ of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or suppose them any wise resembling? |
53792 | Objects, which are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard for each other? |
53792 | Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore prà ¦ sto? |
53792 | Or how can order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it bestows? |
53792 | Or if it be possible to imagine, that such errors are the sources of all immorality? |
53792 | Or if the tree was once transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? |
53792 | Or who ever performed any, that he might give rise to true conclusions? |
53792 | Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession to private families? |
53792 | Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? |
53792 | Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: but how often are they defective? |
53792 | Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any appearance of reason? |
53792 | Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? |
53792 | Should it be asked,_ what proportion these two species of morality bear to each other_? |
53792 | Since, therefore, this is the case with regard to property, and rights, and obligations, I ask, how it stands with regard to justice and injustice? |
53792 | The economy of final causes? |
53792 | The next question is, of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us? |
53792 | The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part? |
53792 | To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him a notion of its pleasures; whether should I conduct him? |
53792 | To what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such natural and such convincing arguments? |
53792 | Was it_ Nothing_? |
53792 | What devotion or worship address to them? |
53792 | What farther proof can be desired for the present system? |
53792 | What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas? |
53792 | What follows? |
53792 | What if I be in necessity, and have urgent motives to acquire something to my family? |
53792 | What if he be a miser, and can make no use of what I would deprive him of? |
53792 | What if he be a profligate debauchee, and would rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions? |
53792 | What if he be a vicious man, and deserves the hatred of all mankind? |
53792 | What is the soul of man? |
53792 | What more inconstant than the desires of man? |
53792 | What more useful than all the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity love, anger? |
53792 | What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call_ thought_, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe? |
53792 | What restraint, therefore, shall we impose on women, in order to counterbalance so strong a temptation as they have to infidelity? |
53792 | What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? |
53792 | What veneration or obedience pay them? |
53792 | What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? |
53792 | What wo and misery does it not occasion? |
53792 | What_ data_ have you for such extraordinary conclusions? |
53792 | When it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable? |
53792 | Whence arises the curious structure of an animal? |
53792 | Whence can any cause be known but from its known effects? |
53792 | Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? |
53792 | Where then is the difficulty? |
53792 | Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? |
53792 | Why have all men, I ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life?.... |
53792 | Why is there any misery at all in the world? |
53792 | Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? |
53792 | Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears,& c.? |
53792 | Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? |
53792 | Why then look any farther, or multiply suppositions without necessity? |
53792 | Why, then, should we think, that order is more essential to one than the other? |
53792 | Why? |
53792 | Why? |
53792 | Would the manner of a leaf''s blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree? |
53792 | You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me, what is the cause of this cause? |
53792 | _ First_, It is directly contrary to experience, and our immediate consciousness? |
53792 | and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose? |
53792 | and shall we build on that conjecture as on the most certain truth? |
53792 | cried Demea, interrupting him, where are we? |
53792 | cried Demea: Whither does your imagination hurry you? |
53792 | et omnes Ignibus à ¦ theriis terras suffire feraces? |
53792 | how often excessive? |
53792 | in short, what character, or peculiar understanding, is more excellent than another? |
53792 | nay often the absence of one good( and who can possess all?) |
53792 | or, why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority, before so young a man as Pamphilus? |
53792 | quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?'' |
53792 | qui minstri tanti muneris fuerunt? |
53792 | qui vectes? |
53792 | quà ¦ ferramenta? |
53792 | quà ¦ machinà ¦? |
53792 | quà ¦ molito? |
53792 | then is he malevolent Is he both able and willing? |
53792 | to a ball, to an opera, to court? |
53792 | whence then is evil? |
53792 | whether a clear head, or a copious invention? |
53792 | whether a profound genius, or a sure judgment? |
53792 | why not stop at the material world? |
37284 | A bad son, I am afraid? |
37284 | Ai n''t there really, though? |
37284 | All of''em, ma''am? |
37284 | And did none of them ever die? |
37284 | And did none of them ever grow older? |
37284 | And did the money never melt away? |
37284 | And do you always lock the babies up when you go out? |
37284 | And do you live alone here with these babies, Charley? |
37284 | And do you often go out? |
37284 | And do you suppose_ he_ minds such things as crocuses? |
37284 | And have the children looked after themselves at all, sir? |
37284 | And how do you do, sir? |
37284 | And how do you live, Charley? 37284 And is that why you would put tables and chairs upon them, and have people walking over them with heavy boots?" |
37284 | And please, what''s hulks? |
37284 | And so, Phil,says George of the Shooting Gallery, after several turns in silence,"you were dreaming of the country last night?" |
37284 | And what are you thinking about me? |
37284 | And what,asked Mr. Gradgrind in a still lower voice,"did you read to your father, Jupe?" |
37284 | And when did mother die? 37284 And which is Oliver?" |
37284 | And yet,said Mr. Dombey,"you are two or three and thirty, I suppose?" |
37284 | And you''ll soon be grown up now? |
37284 | Are you there? |
37284 | Art in Heaven-- is the light a- comin'', sir? |
37284 | But can you, oh, can you really believe that this delicate boy has been the voluntary associate of the worst outcasts of society? |
37284 | But what makes you say this along of Rob, father? |
37284 | But you''re coming back to speak to me, when you have seen the gentleman away? |
37284 | But-- but do you think it did Edward good? |
37284 | Can you read? |
37284 | Come in,he said,"come in; what is the child afraid of?" |
37284 | Corporal punishment dispensed with? |
37284 | David,he said, making his lips thin, by pressing them together,"if I have an obstinate horse or dog to deal with, what do you think I do?" |
37284 | Do n''t know? |
37284 | Do you hear, Paul? |
37284 | Do you hear? |
37284 | Do you know who I am? |
37284 | Do you mean pretending to go there, and not going? |
37284 | Do you remember when he did this? |
37284 | Do you remember when in his inheritance of your nature, and in your pampering of his pride and passion, he did this, and disfigured me for life? 37284 Do you see this?" |
37284 | Do you think it did Edward harm, Clara? |
37284 | Driven to do it, were you? |
37284 | Eh? |
37284 | Excepting what? |
37284 | Father-- when''s he coming home? |
37284 | Formed his daughter on his own model? |
37284 | Given to government, Joe? |
37284 | Had n''t he better let it go? |
37284 | Have you anything to say? |
37284 | Have you as many as eight vacancies? |
37284 | Have you nothing to say to me? |
37284 | Have you-- did anybody-- has nothing been heard-- about me? |
37284 | He ai n''t got to be at all secretlike-- has he, Polly? |
37284 | He did n''t take any notice of you, I suppose? |
37284 | He is a nice- looking boy, is he not? |
37284 | His daughter? 37284 How can you ask such things, sir? |
37284 | How could you give me life, and take from me all the inappreciable things that raise it from the state of conscious death? 37284 How did you know it was the country?" |
37284 | How old are you, Phil? |
37284 | How old are you? |
37284 | I suppose,said Mr. Toodle, relishing his meal infinitely,"as our Biler is a- doin''now about as well as a boy_ can_ do, eh, Polly?" |
37284 | I surprise you, sir? |
37284 | I wonder who''s put into prison ships, and why they''re put there? |
37284 | If the bull was mad,said Paul,"how did he know that the boy had asked questions? |
37284 | In numbers, how many? |
37284 | Is every boy here? |
37284 | Is he, indeed? |
37284 | Is yours a strong constitution? |
37284 | It sounds unnatural, do n''t it? |
37284 | Jo, can you say what I say? |
37284 | Just fill that mug up with lukewarm water, William, will you? |
37284 | Master Briggs? |
37284 | Miss Dartle,said I,"if you can be so obdurate as not to feel for this afflicted mother----""Who feels for me?" |
37284 | Mrs. Joe,said I, as a last resort,"I should like to know-- if you would n''t much mind-- where the firing comes from?" |
37284 | My dear Steerforth, what is the matter? |
37284 | My dear love,said the elder lady, as she folded the weeping girl to her bosom,"do you think I would harm a hair of his head?" |
37284 | Not if it should happen to have been a tame bull, you little infidel? |
37284 | Not polite? |
37284 | Not so much as one short prayer? |
37284 | Nothing, I suppose? |
37284 | Nothing, sir? |
37284 | Now, Dombey,said Miss Blimber,"how have you got on with those books?" |
37284 | Now, Marigold, tell me what more do you want your adopted daughter to know? |
37284 | Now, do you want any more? |
37284 | Shall we make a man of him? |
37284 | Shall we make a man of him? |
37284 | So long as that? |
37284 | So you would carpet your room-- or your husband''s room, if you were a grown woman and had a husband-- with representations of flowers, would you? 37284 That is to say,"said Arthur, with a growing admiration of his quiet companion,"you are not fully discouraged even now?" |
37284 | The country,says Mr. George, plying his knife and fork;"why, I suppose you never clapped your eyes on the country, Phil?" |
37284 | The town''s enough for you, eh? |
37284 | Then what did you say''nothing''for, sir? |
37284 | Then why do n''t you learn? |
37284 | Then why do n''t you let me have some money of my own? |
37284 | Then why do n''t you shut him up? 37284 There''s no harm in that, I hope?" |
37284 | They? 37284 This fellow,"said Mr. Carker to Polly, giving him a gentle shake,"is your son, eh, ma''am?" |
37284 | This is most extraordinary,says the gentleman;"is it possible that you have been her only teacher?" |
37284 | This is two penn''orth of milk, is it, waiter? |
37284 | Tired? 37284 To keep''em safe, sir, do n''t you see?" |
37284 | To the wery top, sir? |
37284 | To whom, then? |
37284 | Trouble? |
37284 | Vice,sighed the surgeon, replacing the curtain,"takes up her abode in many temples; and who can say that a fair outside shall not enshrine her?" |
37284 | Was you, indeed, commander? |
37284 | What am I like, Mr. Young Jackson? |
37284 | What am I like, Mr. Young Jackson? |
37284 | What am I like, Young Jackson? |
37284 | What are you bothering about there, Smike? |
37284 | What are you crying for? |
37284 | What can this mean? |
37284 | What do I remember if not you? 37284 What do you mean by we?" |
37284 | What do you see in it? |
37284 | What does that mean? |
37284 | What is that? |
37284 | What is the matter? 37284 What it was like?" |
37284 | What marshes? |
37284 | What was it like? |
37284 | What were the swans doing on the grass? |
37284 | What would you ride, sir? 37284 What''s gone of your father and your mother, eh?" |
37284 | What''s that, sir? |
37284 | What''s that, sir? |
37284 | What''s that? |
37284 | What''s the report of this boy? |
37284 | What''s your name, boy? |
37284 | What? |
37284 | What_ have_ I done? |
37284 | Where are they? |
37284 | Where do you live? |
37284 | Who cried stop? |
37284 | Who said that? |
37284 | Who''s firing? |
37284 | Why do n''t you want to see him, then? |
37284 | Why not? |
37284 | Why that''s the proper time for me to talk, is n''t it? |
37284 | Why? |
37284 | Why? |
37284 | With anything? |
37284 | With chalk, sir? |
37284 | With some money, of course? |
37284 | Wondering again? |
37284 | Would you have doomed me, at any time, to the frost and blight that have hardened and spoiled me? 37284 Write?" |
37284 | You do n''t believe it, sir? |
37284 | You have a bad father, have you? |
37284 | You have a son, I believe? |
37284 | You know you''ve got no father or mother, and that you were brought up by the parish, do n''t you? |
37284 | You remember Me, Mr. Young Jackson? |
37284 | You remember me, Mr. Young Jackson? |
37284 | You remember me, Young Jackson? |
37284 | You see that fellow? 37284 You sleep in my room, do n''t you?" |
37284 | You''re the waxwork child, are you not? |
37284 | *****"Berry''s very fond of you, ai n''t she?" |
37284 | A wild ass or zebra would be too tame for you, would n''t he, eh, sir? |
37284 | An''t my place dirty? |
37284 | And that''s how I know how; do n''t you see, sir?" |
37284 | And what did it matter? |
37284 | And what do you mean by pulling up the crocuses and snowdrops, eh, sir?" |
37284 | And when I says to the Major,"Major, ca n''t you by_ any_ means give us a communication with the guard?" |
37284 | Are they obliged to sit mumchance, and to be ordered about till they are the laughingstock of young and old? |
37284 | Are you going to kill the wintner, sir?" |
37284 | Are you ready?" |
37284 | Are you rewarded,_ now_, for your years of trouble?" |
37284 | Bishop said, dubiously, did he really think so? |
37284 | But have you been very dutiful to me?" |
37284 | But what about the hundreds of thousands of minds that have been deformed forever by the incapable pettifoggers who have pretended to form them? |
37284 | But what is a man to do? |
37284 | But why was Miss Monflathers always vexed and irritated with the poor apprentice-- how did that come to pass? |
37284 | But will you promise to have me took there, sir, and laid along with him?" |
37284 | Charley,"said my guardian, turning his face away for a moment,"how do you live?" |
37284 | Come back harder? |
37284 | David said:"It is laborious, is it not?" |
37284 | Dickens makes the artist in Somebody''s Luggage say:"Who are you passing every day at your competitive excruciations? |
37284 | Did Louisa see these things of herself? |
37284 | Did it bite, hey? |
37284 | Did it bite? |
37284 | Did you ever know a prayer?" |
37284 | Do I understand that he asked for more, after he had eaten the supper allotted by the dietary?" |
37284 | Do n''t they, Tom?" |
37284 | Do n''t you know that the harder you are at work, the happier you are?" |
37284 | Do you ever see horses walking up and down the sides of rooms in reality-- in fact? |
37284 | Do you mind?" |
37284 | Do you want to see the country, Phil?" |
37284 | Do you?" |
37284 | Dombey?" |
37284 | Every teacher should ask himself every day,"Am I a child- queller?" |
37284 | Had it a deep prong, hey? |
37284 | Have they no liberty, no will, no right to speak? |
37284 | He doctors sick horses, I dare say?" |
37284 | He then showed me the cane, and asked me what I thought of_ that_, for a tooth? |
37284 | Hey? |
37284 | Hey?" |
37284 | Hey?" |
37284 | Hey?" |
37284 | Hey?" |
37284 | How can you ask?" |
37284 | How could he? |
37284 | How did I know it? |
37284 | How do you communicate with her?" |
37284 | How do you like it, and what do you think of gin, instead? |
37284 | How much those benighted teachers who so tragically ask"What_ can_ you do with bad boys, if you do_ not_ use corporal punishment?" |
37284 | How old should you think my father was, cousin?" |
37284 | How would he do it? |
37284 | I am a very little boy, sir; and it is so-- so----""So what?" |
37284 | I began it, when I was but a child, because it brought me and other children into company, do n''t you see? |
37284 | I believe young people are quick enough to observe and imitate; and why or how should they respect whom no one else respects, and everybody slights? |
37284 | I know what you''re a- going to say, Pip? |
37284 | I understand you to have been in the habit of reading to your father?" |
37284 | I wonder where they_ do_ go, by the bye? |
37284 | Inspired? |
37284 | Is my daughter a- washin''? |
37284 | Is there any light a- comin''?" |
37284 | Jellyby''s?" |
37284 | Joey asked, when Mr. Wilding unfolded his plan:"Is all to live in the house, Young Master Wilding? |
37284 | Like a sort of rebel, do n''t you see?" |
37284 | Look at your boy: he is yourn, ai n''t he? |
37284 | Louisa sat looking at the fire so long that Tom asked,"Have you gone to sleep, Loo?" |
37284 | My childhood had no grace of childhood, my youth had no charm of youth, and what can be expected from such a lost beginning?" |
37284 | My misfortunes all began in wagging, sir, but what could I do, exceptin''wag?" |
37284 | Nickleby?" |
37284 | No? |
37284 | Now let me ask you girls and boys, would you paper a room with representations of horses?" |
37284 | Of what?" |
37284 | On leaving, Mr. Dombey said to Paul:"You''ll try and learn a great deal here, and be a clever man, wo n''t you?" |
37284 | One day he said to them:"Why are you not interested here? |
37284 | People that met us might stare a bit and laugh, but what did_ I_ care if she caught the idea? |
37284 | Perhaps your overhearing my little scholars sing some of their lessons has led you so far astray as to think me a good teacher? |
37284 | Redlaw, in The Haunted Man, said to the poor boy who came to his room:"What is your name?" |
37284 | Rosa Dartle asked Steerforth about"That sort of people-- are they really animals and clods, and beings of another order? |
37284 | Shall I tell you what I consider those eyes of hers that were here just now, to have always looked at, to get that expression? |
37284 | Spell it? |
37284 | The fortunate candidates whose heads and livers you have turned upside down for life? |
37284 | The happiness of the little"minders"at old Betty Higden''s is in sharp contrast to the misery of the boarders of the respectable(?) |
37284 | The two other cellarmen, the three porters, the two''prentices, and the odd men?" |
37284 | Thee wish to be made acquainted with the cage, dost thee-- the cage, the stocks, and the whipping post? |
37284 | They used to say to one another, sometimes, Supposing all the children upon earth were to die, would the flowers, and the water, and the sky be sorry? |
37284 | This early trial of yours, that is fit to make your little heart burst and your very eyes come out of your head with crying, what is it? |
37284 | Was Dickens consciously and intentionally an educator? |
37284 | Was it a double tooth, hey? |
37284 | Was it a sharp tooth, hey? |
37284 | What burying- ground, Jo?" |
37284 | What can I do to save him, sir?" |
37284 | What can you possibly want to know of circuses then? |
37284 | What childhood did you ever leave to me? |
37284 | What could a boy do but hate him? |
37284 | What do you mean, boy?" |
37284 | What does she make a sham for, and pretend to give me money, and take it away again? |
37284 | What else did you expect?" |
37284 | What escape have I had from problems that could be demonstrated, and realities that could be grasped?" |
37284 | What have paupers to do with soul or spirit? |
37284 | What have you done, O father, what have you done, with the garden that should have bloomed once, in this great wilderness here?" |
37284 | What is it? |
37284 | What is your father?" |
37284 | What more natural or more logical than the practice of checking the outflow of a child''s inner life if we believe his inner life to be depraved? |
37284 | What now?" |
37284 | What''s amiss, old boy? |
37284 | What''s come of all the boys? |
37284 | What''s home? |
37284 | What''s that?" |
37284 | What_ could_ the boy be crying for? |
37284 | When Edith upbraided her mother for practically compelling her to marry Mr. Dombey, her mother asked angrily:"What do you mean? |
37284 | When Guster, Mr. Snagsby''s servant, got him some food, she said:"Are you hungry?" |
37284 | When Lady Dedlock met Jo, she asked him:"Are you the boy I''ve read of in the papers?" |
37284 | When were travellers by wheels and hoofs seen with such red- hot cheeks as those? |
37284 | Where are the graces of my soul? |
37284 | Where are the sentiments of my heart? |
37284 | Where dost come from?" |
37284 | Where''s his religion, I should like to know, when he goes flying in the face of the Bible like that? |
37284 | Who are you? |
37284 | Who does not know what must be the central point of all the happiness of such a child? |
37284 | Who is that girl?" |
37284 | Who would exchange this rapid hurry of the blood for yonder stagnant misery, though its pace were twenty miles for one? |
37284 | Why are you fond of your sister Florence?" |
37284 | Why do you call it_ my_ allowance, and never let me spend it?" |
37284 | Why do you use me like this? |
37284 | Why would n''t you?" |
37284 | Why would you?" |
37284 | Will you hold that noise, sir?" |
37284 | Will, purpose, hope? |
37284 | Would you like to feel it? |
37284 | Would you use a carpet having a representation of flowers upon it?" |
37284 | You do n''t mind sleeping among the coffins, I suppose? |
37284 | You have been in the habit of reading to your father and those people I found you among, I dare say?" |
37284 | You have found it out at last, have you? |
37284 | You know you''re an orphan, I suppose?" |
37284 | You ordered that thick bread and butter for three, did you?" |
37284 | You remember?" |
37284 | You''d like to ride a roaring lion, would n''t you, sir, eh, sir? |
37284 | Your father breaks horses, do n''t he?" |
37284 | echoed my sister,"trouble?" |
37284 | he said to Mr. Dombey;"and how is my little friend?" |
37284 | it was n''t your fault; it was mine, I suppose-- eh?" |
37284 | it''s you, is it?" |
37284 | retorted Joe sorrowfully;"why do n''t you, father? |
37284 | said Edith, looking at her;"when was I a child? |
37284 | said Mr. Gradgrind, leading each away by a hand;"what do you do here?" |
37284 | sneezed, did you?" |
37284 | that''s all, is it?" |
37284 | that''s the milk and water, is it, William?" |
37284 | the Major says, quite huffy,"No, madam, it''s not to be done"; and when I says,"Why not?" |
37284 | what does it all mean?" |
37284 | what''s parents got in their heads? |
37284 | when were they so good- humouredly and merrily bloused? |
37284 | where''s ma''s duty as a parent?" |
1726 | ''And he who remembers, remembers that which he sees and knows?'' |
1726 | ''And he who sees knows?'' |
1726 | ''And if you say"Yes,"the tongue will escape conviction but not the mind, as Euripides would say?'' |
1726 | ''But Protagoras will retort:"Can anything be more or less without addition or subtraction?"'' |
1726 | ''But if he closes his eyes, does he not remember?'' |
1726 | ''Excellent; I want you to grow, and therefore I will leave that answer and ask another question: Is not seeing perceiving?'' |
1726 | ''That I should expect; but why did he not remain at Megara?'' |
1726 | ''What do you mean, Socrates?'' |
1726 | ''What do you mean?'' |
1726 | ''What may that be?'' |
1726 | ''Why, Socrates, how can you argue at all without using them?'' |
1726 | ( b) Would he have based the relativity of knowledge on the Heraclitean flux? |
1726 | ( c) Would he have asserted the absoluteness of sensation at each instant? |
1726 | --That will be our answer? |
1726 | Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your new- born child, of which I have delivered you? |
1726 | Am I not right? |
1726 | Am I not right? |
1726 | And could you repeat the conversation?'' |
1726 | And do you not like the taste of them in the mouth? |
1726 | And has Plato kept altogether clear of a confusion, which the analogous word logos tends to create, of a proposition and a definition? |
1726 | And how can any one be ignorant of either of them, and yet know both of them? |
1726 | And if they differ in opinion, which of them is likely to be right; or are they both right? |
1726 | And is not the confusion increased by the use of the analogous term''elements,''or''letters''? |
1726 | And now, what are you saying?--Are there two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and do you define knowledge to be the true? |
1726 | And so we must ask again, What is knowledge? |
1726 | And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else? |
1726 | And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion? |
1726 | And the same of perceiving: do you understand me? |
1726 | And therefore let us draw nearer, as the advocate of Protagoras desires; and give the truth of the universal flux a ring: is the theory sound or not? |
1726 | And what other case is conceivable, upon the supposition that we either know or do not know all things? |
1726 | And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting? |
1726 | Are its movements identical with those of the body, or only preconcerted and coincident with them, or is one simply an aspect of the other? |
1726 | Are not these speculations charming, Theaetetus, and very good for a person in your interesting situation? |
1726 | Are you so profoundly convinced of this? |
1726 | Are you still in labour, or have you brought all you have to say about knowledge to the birth? |
1726 | But I should like to know, Socrates, whether you mean to say that all this is untrue?'' |
1726 | But are we not inverting the natural order in looking for opinion before we have found knowledge? |
1726 | But did you ever say to yourself, that good is evil, or evil good? |
1726 | But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras? |
1726 | But have we not escaped one difficulty only to encounter a greater? |
1726 | But here we are met by a singular difficulty: How is false opinion possible? |
1726 | But how can he who knows the forms of knowledge and the forms of ignorance imagine one to be the other? |
1726 | But how can the syllable be known if the letter remains unknown? |
1726 | But how is false opinion possible? |
1726 | But if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between the true and the false in such cases? |
1726 | But is true opinion really distinct from knowledge? |
1726 | But may there not be''heterodoxy,''or transference of opinion;--I mean, may not one thing be supposed to be another? |
1726 | But still an old difficulty recurs; we ask ourselves,''How is false opinion possible?'' |
1726 | But tell me, Socrates, in heaven''s name, is this, after all, not the truth? |
1726 | But then, as Plato asks,--and we must repeat the question,--What becomes of the mind? |
1726 | But what is SO? |
1726 | But what is the third definition? |
1726 | But when the word''knowledge''was found how was it to be explained or defined? |
1726 | But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara? |
1726 | But would this hold in any parallel case? |
1726 | But, as we are at our wits''end, suppose that we do a shameless thing? |
1726 | But, seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say what knowing is? |
1726 | Can a man see and see nothing? |
1726 | Can a whole be something different from the parts? |
1726 | Can two unknowns make a known? |
1726 | Can we answer that question? |
1726 | Can we suppose one set of feelings or one part of the mind to interpret another? |
1726 | Could he have pretended to cite from a well- known writing what was not to be found there? |
1726 | Did Protagoras merely mean to assert the relativity of knowledge to the human mind? |
1726 | Did you ever hear that too? |
1726 | Do we not seem to perceive instinctively and as an act of sense the differences of articulate speech and of musical notes? |
1726 | Do you agree? |
1726 | Do you know the original principle on which the doctrine of Protagoras is based?'' |
1726 | Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearings of this tale on the preceding argument? |
1726 | Do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non- existing things? |
1726 | Does it differ as subject and object in the same manner? |
1726 | Does not explanation appear to be of this nature? |
1726 | EUCLID: Have you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion? |
1726 | Even in sleep, did you ever imagine that odd was even? |
1726 | For an objection occurs to him:--May there not be errors where there is no confusion of mind and sense? |
1726 | For how can the exchange of two kinds of knowledge ever become false opinion? |
1726 | For how can we know a compound of which the simple elements are unknown to us? |
1726 | For if the Heraclitean flux is extended to every sort of change in every instant of time, how can any thought or word be detained even for an instant? |
1726 | For must not opinion be equally expressed in a proposition? |
1726 | He asks whether a man can know and not know at the same time? |
1726 | How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it? |
1726 | How can you or any one maintain the contrary? |
1726 | How is this? |
1726 | How will Protagoras answer this argument? |
1726 | I dare say that you agree with me, do you not? |
1726 | I have, I fear, a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know? |
1726 | I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation? |
1726 | I suppose, Theodorus, that you have never seen them in time of peace, when they discourse at leisure to their disciples? |
1726 | I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes? |
1726 | I will make my meaning clearer by an example:--You admit that there is an art of arithmetic? |
1726 | If all that exists in time is illusion, we may well ask with Plato,''What becomes of the mind?'' |
1726 | In what does this differ from the saying of Theaetetus? |
1726 | Is he to be reared in any case, and not exposed? |
1726 | Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way? |
1726 | Is it not so? |
1726 | Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals? |
1726 | Is not this a"reductio ad absurdum"of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception? |
1726 | Is the introspecting thought the same with the thought which is introspected? |
1726 | Is the mind active or passive, or partly both? |
1726 | Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing? |
1726 | Is there only one kind of motion, or, as I rather incline to think, two? |
1726 | Is there some other form of knowledge which distinguishes them? |
1726 | Let us grant what you say-- then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion-- am I right? |
1726 | Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non- existence of things that are not:--You have read him? |
1726 | Must he not be talking''ad captandum''in all this? |
1726 | Must he not see, hear, or touch some one existing thing? |
1726 | Nay, not even in sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of the kind? |
1726 | O Theaetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honey? |
1726 | O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great? |
1726 | Once more then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question--"What is knowledge?" |
1726 | Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question,''What is knowledge?'' |
1726 | Or again, if we see letters which we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them? |
1726 | Or are they both right?--he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician''s judgment? |
1726 | Or did any man in his senses ever fancy that an ox was a horse, or that two are one? |
1726 | Or did he mean to deny that there is an objective standard of truth? |
1726 | Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets? |
1726 | Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him? |
1726 | Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing? |
1726 | Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts? |
1726 | Or, if he is afraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? |
1726 | Plato discards both figures, as not really solving the question which to us appears so simple:''How do we make mistakes?'' |
1726 | Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the same? |
1726 | SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all( in the plural) is there not one thing which we express? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Am I talking nonsense, then? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And another and another? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And astronomy and harmony and calculation? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And by wisdom the wise are wise? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And did you find such a class? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And do you mean by conceiving, the same which I mean? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks, think some one thing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about him which are numerable? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And he who hears anything, hears some one thing, and hears that which is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and therefore is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And how about Protagoras himself? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colours? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if he closed his eyes, would he forget? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he has seen? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, all things must always have every sort of motion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if unlike, they are other? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if not, not? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is Theodorus a painter? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb''to know''? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is memory of something or of nothing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is that different in any way from knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter, as just now said? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And must therefore be admitted to be unlike? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And of true opinion also? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And seeing is knowing, and therefore not- seeing is not- knowing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And that I myself practise midwifery? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And that both are two and each of them one? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And that is six? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And the race of animals is generated in the same way? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself to any one else? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And therefore not in science or knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished, that is to say, they move in place and are also changed? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, of all our notions, is the most universal? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And what of the mental habit? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And who could take up arms against such a great army having Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And would you say this also of like and unlike, same and other? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory? |
1726 | SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But can you certainly determine by any other means which of these opinions is true? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But is the aim attained always? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But is there any parallel to this? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But may not the following be the description of what we express by this name? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, have a conception either of both objects or of one of them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But surely he can not suppose what he knows to be what he does not know, or what he does not know to be what he knows? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But then, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is perception, or that to every man what appears is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But through what do you perceive all this about them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all? |
1726 | SOCRATES: But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a different person? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Can a man see something and yet see nothing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Capital; and what followed? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Do you see another question which can be raised about these phenomena, notably about dreaming and waking? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Either together or in succession? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not''knowable''? |
1726 | SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O? |
1726 | SOCRATES: He then who sees some one thing, sees something which is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: He who knows, can not but know; and he who does not know, can not know? |
1726 | SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction-- What is knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would admit that they both exist? |
1726 | SOCRATES: How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? |
1726 | SOCRATES: How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive? |
1726 | SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:--Theaetetus, he says, what is SO? |
1726 | SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S. THEAETETUS: But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an element? |
1726 | SOCRATES: If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he can not think that the one of them is the other? |
1726 | SOCRATES: If they only moved in place and were not changed, we should be able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux? |
1726 | SOCRATES: If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception can not come to you, either through the one or the other organ? |
1726 | SOCRATES: If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, when it becomes like we call it the same-- when unlike, other? |
1726 | SOCRATES: In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two arts? |
1726 | SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Is he a geometrician? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Is it still worth our while to resume the discussion touching opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: It is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of one thing as another? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing-- for example, What is clay? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:--What was the way in which we learned letters? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:--There is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick-- Are they like or unlike? |
1726 | SOCRATES: May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the other, can he think that one is the other? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Nor of any other science? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Of things learned and perceived, that is? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Often a man remembers that which he has seen? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Once more we shall have to begin, and ask''What is knowledge?'' |
1726 | SOCRATES: Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Perception would be the collective name of them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Shall I tell you the reason? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Shall we say that we know every thing which we see and hear? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Tell me, now-- How in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else? |
1726 | SOCRATES: That is good news; whose son is he? |
1726 | SOCRATES: That is of six? |
1726 | SOCRATES: That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading? |
1726 | SOCRATES: The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then do we not come back to the old difficulty? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere of being or of knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word''all''of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then it must appear so to each of them? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as to the body? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self- existent substance or as a predicate of something else? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:--Can a man know and also not know that which he knows? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you answered that knowledge is perception? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then right opinion implies the perception of differences? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then they must be distinguished? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then when any one thinks of one thing as another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must look at the matter in some other way? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility? |
1726 | SOCRATES: We have at length satisfactorily proven beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, and shall we do as he says? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, and what is the difficulty? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term''explanation''? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, but are we to assert that what you think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all( in the plural) and the all( in the singular)? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Well, may not a man''possess''and yet not''have''knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite? |
1726 | SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views? |
1726 | SOCRATES: What shall we say then? |
1726 | SOCRATES: What was it? |
1726 | SOCRATES: What was that, Theaetetus? |
1726 | SOCRATES: What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Where, then, is false opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Which is probably correct-- for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being? |
1726 | SOCRATES: Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know? |
1726 | SOCRATES: You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another? |
1726 | SOCRATES: You have heard the common explanation of the verb''to know''? |
1726 | Shall I answer for him? |
1726 | Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus? |
1726 | Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? |
1726 | Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what he already knows? |
1726 | Such are the lawyers; will you have the companion picture of philosophers? |
1726 | TERPSION: The dysentery, you mean? |
1726 | TERPSION: The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled; but what was the conversation? |
1726 | TERPSION: Was he alive or dead? |
1726 | TERPSION: Where then? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: About what? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: And do you not agree in that view, Socrates? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: And how would you amend the former statement? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: And is not that, Socrates, nobly said? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: And was that wrong? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: And why should that be shameless? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates...? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you ever argue at all? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: But what puts you out of heart? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Can you give me any example of such a definition? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How can he? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How could it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How do the two expressions differ? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How is that, and what profession do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How so? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: How? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: I should call all of them perceiving-- what other name could be given to them? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: I should reply S and O. SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: In what manner? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Let us imagine such an aviary-- and what is to follow? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Pray what is it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Then what is colour? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What are they? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What are they? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What are they? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What experience? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What hostages? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What is it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What is it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What is it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What is that? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What makes you say so? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What makes you say so? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What question? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What was it? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: What? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Who indeed, Socrates? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Who, Socrates, would dare to say so? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: Why? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables? |
1726 | THEAETETUS: You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole? |
1726 | THEODORUS: How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates? |
1726 | THEODORUS: How shall we answer, Theaetetus? |
1726 | THEODORUS: How so? |
1726 | THEODORUS: In what is the difference seen? |
1726 | THEODORUS: In what way? |
1726 | THEODORUS: Well, but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards? |
1726 | THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates? |
1726 | THEODORUS: What do you mean? |
1726 | THEODORUS: What is it? |
1726 | THEODORUS: What is that? |
1726 | THEODORUS: Who indeed? |
1726 | Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body? |
1726 | Tell me, then, what do you think of the notion that"All things are becoming"?'' |
1726 | Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know? |
1726 | The mind, when occupied by herself with being, is said to have opinion-- shall we say that''Knowledge is true opinion''? |
1726 | The multitude may not and do not agree in Protagoras''own thesis that''Man is the measure of all things;''and then who is to decide? |
1726 | They would say, as I imagine-- Can that which is wholly other than something, have the same quality as that from which it differs? |
1726 | Think: is not seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception? |
1726 | Upon his own showing must not his''truth''depend on the number of suffrages, and be more or less true in proportion as he has more or fewer of them? |
1726 | Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you? |
1726 | We are often told that we should enquire into all things before we accept them;--with what limitations is this true? |
1726 | Weary of asking''What is truth?'' |
1726 | Well, you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position? |
1726 | Were not you and Theodorus just now remarking very truly, that in discussions of this kind we may take our own time? |
1726 | What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus? |
1726 | What are we to think of time and space? |
1726 | What do they mean when they say that all things are in motion? |
1726 | What say you? |
1726 | What say you? |
1726 | What then is knowledge? |
1726 | What then is knowledge? |
1726 | What then is knowledge? |
1726 | When he says that''knowledge is in perception,''with what does he perceive? |
1726 | Who can divide the nerves or great nervous centres from the mind which uses them? |
1726 | Who can resist an idea which is presented to him in a general form in every moment of his life and of which he finds no instance to the contrary? |
1726 | Who can separate the pains and pleasures of the mind from the pains and pleasures of the body? |
1726 | Who is our judge? |
1726 | Who is the judge or where is the spectator, having a right to control us?'' |
1726 | Why should we not go a step further still and doubt the existence of the senses of all things? |
1726 | Why should we single out one of these abstractions to be the a priori condition of all the others? |
1726 | Will you answer me a question:''Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?'' |
1726 | Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument? |
1726 | Without further preface, but at the same time apologizing for his eagerness, he asks,''What is knowledge?'' |
1726 | Would an untrained man, for example, be as likely to know when he is going to have a fever, as the physician who attended him? |
1726 | Yes; but did you observe that Protagoras bade me be serious, and complained of our getting up a laugh against him with the aid of a boy? |
1726 | You remember? |
1726 | and another, and another? |
1726 | and of what sort do you mean? |
1726 | and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do? |
1726 | and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition? |
1726 | can you tell me? |
1726 | do not mistakes often happen? |
1726 | for example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not hear the language of foreigners when they speak to us? |
1726 | for what reason? |
1726 | here are six dice; they are more than four and less than twelve;"more and also less,"would you not say?'' |
1726 | or hear and hear nothing? |
1726 | or shall we aver that, seeing them, we must know them? |
1726 | or shall we say that we not only hear, but know what they are saying? |
1726 | or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows? |
1726 | or touch and touch nothing? |
1726 | or will this be too much of a digression? |
1726 | or will you bear to see him rejected, and not get into a passion if I take away your first- born? |
1726 | or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not? |
1726 | or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? |
1726 | the sound of words or the sight of letters in a foreign tongue?'' |
1726 | what is temperance? |
1726 | which of us will speak first? |