Questions

This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.

identifier	question
1571	For will any man of sense deny that you have spoken well?
1571	How shall I establish my words?
1571	and what part of it can be truly called a remnant of the land that then was?
1176	the under( or hinder?) 1176 ( 14) Or,suspensory ligament"?
1176	It so happens that one of the hipparchs(?)
1176	knuckle- bones( hocks?)
26095	When they are examined, they are asked, first,''Who is your father, and of what deme?
26095	who is your father''s father?
26095	who is your mother''s father, and of what deme?''
26095	who is your mother?
1169	390- 389?
1169	And in the next place, what is more remote from dirge and lamentation than a life of glory crowned by seasonable death?
1169	As to this, what testimony can be more conclusive than the following?
1169	As touching, therefore, the excellency of his birth, what weightier, what nobler testimony can be adduced than this one fact?
1169	How then shall we who imitate him become his opposite, unholy, unjust, tyrannical, licentious?
1169	What could be clearer, therefore, than that he was about to make a dash at the satrap''s home in Caria?
1169	What more deserving of song and eulogy than resplendent victories and deeds of highest note?
1169	What, too, was his answer to Tithraustes when the satrap offered him countless gifts if he would but quit the country?
1169	Who, in discontentment at his own poor lot, would venture on revolution, knowing that the king himself could condescend to constitutional control?
1169	v. 28?
1179	( 33) Well then, it may be asked, why is it that there is not the same rush to make new cuttings now as in former times?
1179	( 58) But how is an enemy ever to march upon the mines in force?
1179	Again, is any one persuaded that, looking solely to riches and money- making, the state may find war more profitable than peace?
1179	Nay, did not the very Thebans, in return for certain benefits, grant to us Athenians to exercise leadership over them?
1179	Or once again, where are all those who seek to effect a rapid sale or purchase of a thousand commodities, to find what they want, if not at Athens?
1179	Since what possession I should like to know can be more serviceable for war than that of men?
1179	What will happen?
1172	How many?
1172	Knights,244( Demosthenes calls to the hipparchs(?
1172	( 15) Where?
1172	( 2) But how is this experience to be got?
1172	Assuming, then, your horses are all that horses ought to be, how is the trooper to attain a like degree of excellence?
1172	But what then of the residue not needed for outpost duty?
1172	Is it likely that a grown man, giving his whole mind to methods of chicanery, will fail of similar inventiveness?
1172	Is the author thinking of Boeotian emigres?
1172	Or again, as touching pride of ancestry, what have Athenians to fear as against Boeotians on that score?
1172	above?
1172	and is the scene of the{ dokimasiai} Phaleron?
1172	how many horns do I hold up?"
1172	v. 26 be more to the point?
1682	And ought not the country which the Gods praise to be praised by all mankind?
1682	And whom did they choose?
1682	And why should I say more?
1682	Are you from the Agora?
1682	For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times?
1682	For you know that there is to be a public funeral?
1682	MENEXENUS: And can you remember what Aspasia said?
1682	MENEXENUS: And what would you be able to say if you had to speak?
1682	MENEXENUS: And who is she?
1682	MENEXENUS: Do you think not, Socrates?
1682	MENEXENUS: Do you think that you could speak yourself if there should be a necessity, and if the Council were to choose you?
1682	MENEXENUS: Then why will you not rehearse what she said?
1682	SOCRATES: And what might you be doing at the Council?
1682	SOCRATES: But why, my friend, should he not have plenty to say?
1682	SOCRATES: Well, and do you not admire her, and are you not grateful for her speech?
1682	SOCRATES: Whence come you, Menexenus?
1682	What sort of a word will this be, and how shall we rightly begin the praises of these brave men?
1180	( 1)( 1) Or,"The question suggests itself-- how many instruments and of what sort are required by any one wishing to enter this field?
1180	( 13) These words are commonly regarded as an addition; and what does{ te} signify?
1180	( 19)"For what does a chivalrous education teach save to obey the law, and to make the theme of justice familiar to tongue and ear?"
1180	( 2) Or,"these hounds of the breed named must not be any ordinary specimens"; but what does Xenophon mean by{ ek toutou tou genous}?
1180	( 2) Who are these{ oi nun sophistai}?
1180	( 8) Or,"a hook- nosed(?
1180	? See Sturz, s.v.
1180	But what does Xenophon mean by{ tou autou genous}?
1180	I do not know that any one has answered Schneider''s question: Quidni sensum eundem servavit homo religiosus in hinnulis?
1180	Nay, what has sex to do with it?
1180	Query, in reference to{ enthumemata} above?
1180	What are the aids and implements of divers sorts with which he who would enter on this field must equip himself?
1180	my(?)
1180	{ upagein}--"stealthily?"
1171	And then the young-- how could I corrupt them by habituating them to manliness and frugality? 1171 Why do you weep now?
1171	And if to these be added the consciousness of failing powers, the sting of self- reproach, what prospect have I of any further joy in living?
1171	And when Hermogenes asked him,"How?"
1171	And when he perceived those who followed by his side in tears,"What is this?"
1171	Can you name another man of more independent spirit than myself, seeing that I accept from no one either gifts or pay?
1171	I ask you, is there any one[ 28] else, you know of, less enslaved than myself to the appetites[ 29] of the body?
1171	If in all I have said about myself no one can convict me of lying, is it not obvious that the praise I get from gods and men is justly earned?
1171	Whom have you any right to believe to be more just[ 30] than one so suited with what he has, that the things of others excite no craving in him?
1171	Why should these stories, if true, as no doubt they were, be omitted?]
1171	Why, what else do those who make use of the cries of birds or utterances of men draw their conclusions from if not from voices?
1171	[ 51] Do you not know that for many a long day, ever since I was born, sentence of death was passed upon me by nature?
1171	[ Footnote 44:{ eipein auton[ autos(?
1171	[ Footnote 51:"Why precisely now?"]
1171	do I not seem to you to have spent my whole life in meditating my defence?"
1171	he answered again:"Strange, do you call it, that to God it should seem better for me to die at once?
1171	your own selves aside, by comparison with those whom you believe to be the wisest authorities on military matters?"
1178	allied?
1178	( 11) The word{ masso} is"poetical"( old Attic?).
1178	( 12) If so, will any one say which ought, and which ought not, to be adjudicated on, there and then?
1178	( 12) Or,"how is it to dispose of the product?"
1178	( 14)?
1178	( 37) And why?
1178	( 4) Is this an autobiographical touch?
1178	432, 433; see"A Fragment of Xenophon"(?
1178	An objector may retort:"But if he thought it so fine a feat to steal, why did he inflict all those blows on the unfortunate who was caught?"
1178	And why?
1178	But how are we to expect that women nurtured in this fashion should produce a splendid offspring?
1178	How could incidents like these have taken place if an island had been their home?
1178	I put it to you, then: can any one suppose that all, or any, of these may dispense with adjudication?
1178	Is the author thinking of Socrates?
1178	It may be retorted:"And what sort of advantage either for himself or for the People can such a fellow be expected to hit upon?"
1178	Pericles says:"Reflect, if we were islanders, who would be more invulnerable?
1178	XIV( 1) Now, if the question be put to me, Do you maintain that the laws of Lycurgus remain still to this day unchanged?
1178	or"perioecid"?
1175	Is not the man who has it in his power, etc., far above being pitied?
1175	how could he replace in his own person the exact number of imprisonments which he has inflicted on others?
1175	( 11) Does{ o en tais polesi}="the citizen"?
1175	( 18) How can he show a cheerful countenance?
1175	( 19) how magnify himself on his achievement?
1175	( 2)( 2) Or,"would you oblige me by explaining certain matters, as to which your knowledge naturally transcends my own?"
1175	( 20) How could the life of any single tyrant suffice to square the account?
1175	( 21) Or,"how undergo in his own person the imprisonments he has inflicted?"
1175	( 21) how proffer lives enough to die in compensation of the dead men he has slain?
1175	( 24) What mirth, do you imagine, is to be extracted from their panegyrics who are suspected of bestowing praise out of mere flattery?
1175	( 8) In either case it is an honour, but which will be regarded with the greater gratitude, the monarch''s or the lesser man''s?
1175	( 8) Will not this standing army lead them to desire peace beyond all other things?
1175	(?
1175	And pray, what sort of things may those be( answered Hiero), of which I can have greater knowledge than yourself, who are so wise a man?
1175	And to put the whole of them to death or to imprison them is hardly possible; or who will be his subjects presently?
1175	And what will be the effect on the neighbour states conterminous with yours?
1175	Can you conceive a more troublesome circumstance?
1175	Can you suggest a means to avoid the hatred of which they are the cause?
1175	For consider, what are their objects of ambition?
1175	How fares it with the man who is beloved of friends?
1175	How is that, Hiero?
1175	How should he pay in full to the last farthing all the moneys of all whom he has robbed?
1175	How should the"faithful esquire"whose faith is mistrusted still be lief and dear?
1175	IV Again, without some moiety of faith and trust,( 1) how can a man not feel to be defrauded of a mighty blessing?
1175	In such a case, whose salutation will sound the pleasanter to him accosted?
1175	Is not this modelled on the{ krupteia}?
1175	Love''s strong passion for his soul''s beloved incapable of springing up in any monarch''s heart?
1175	Moreover, on an actual campaign, where will you find an arm of greater service to the citizens than these wage- earning troops?
1175	One may well ask: What fellowship, what converse, what society would be agreeable without confidence?
1175	Or is war a curse?
1175	Or will you tell me that a ruler who has won the affection of his subjects has no need for body- guards?
1175	Perhaps you will retort:"Why should he trouble to go abroad to seek for such things?
1175	Simonides answered laughingly: How say you, Hiero?
1175	Since how shall we assert that people who are forced to rise from their seats do really rise to honour those whom they regard as malefactors?
1175	Since what follows?
1175	Then have you ever noticed that crowned heads display more pleasure in attacking the bill of fare provided them, than private persons theirs?
1175	What happens when a state has gained the mastery in battle over her antagonist?
1175	What intercourse between man and wife be sweet apart from trustfulness?
1175	What is that?
1175	What is there to prevent the application of the principle to matters politic in general?
1175	What of your own passion for Dailochus, surnamed of men"most beautiful"?
1175	What peace can he have with those over whom he exercises his despotic sway?
1175	Whose compliments will carry farther, in the way of delectation, think you?
1175	Why should all men envy the despotic monarch?
1175	Would you be pleased to give me information, Hiero, upon certain matters, as to which it is likely you have greater knowledge than myself?
1175	X And Hiero replied: Thus far you reason prettily, methinks, Simonides; but about these mercenary troops have you aught to say?
1175	how die a thousand deaths?
1175	or that these others who step aside to let their betters pass them in the street, desire thus to show respect to miscreants?
1175	p. 248)?
1175	with what chains laid upon him make requital to all those he has thrust into felons''quarters?
1572	''And what was the subject of the poem?''
1572	''If they are the same, why have they different names; or if they are different, why have they the same name?''
1572	''What do you mean?''
1572	And how was the tale transferred to the poem of Solon?
1572	And is all that which we call an intelligible essence nothing at all, and only a name?
1572	And is the thought expressed in them to be attributed to the learning of the Egyptian priest, and not rather to the genius of Plato?
1572	And what was the tale about, Critias?
1572	And whence came the tradition to Egypt?
1572	And( b) what proof is there that the axis of the world revolves at all?
1572	Are not the words,''The truth of the story is a great advantage,''if we read between the lines, an indication of the fiction?
1572	Are we right in saying that there is one world, or that they are many and infinite?
1572	But are probabilities for which there is not a tittle of evidence, and which are without any parallel, to be deemed worthy of attention by the critic?
1572	But then why, when things are divided after their kinds, do they not cease from motion?
1572	Did Plato derive the legend of Atlantis from an Egyptian source?
1572	For how can that which is divided be like that which is undivided?
1572	Has not disease been regarded, like sin, sometimes as a negative and necessary, sometimes as a positive or malignant principle?
1572	Have not many discussions arisen about the Atomic theory in which a point has been confused with a material atom?
1572	Have not the natures of things been explained by imaginary entities, such as life or phlogiston, which exist in the mind only?
1572	How came the poem of Solon to disappear in antiquity?
1572	How can matter be conceived to exist without form?
1572	How can we doubt the word of the children of the Gods?
1572	How can we doubt the word of the children of the gods?
1572	How or where shall we find another if we abandon this?
1572	How, then, shall we settle this point, and what questions about the elements may be fairly raised?
1572	In what relation does the archetype stand to the Creator himself?
1572	Indeed, when it is in every direction similar, how can one rightly give to it names which imply opposition?
1572	Is there any self- existent fire?
1572	May they not have had, like the animals, an instinct of something more than they knew?
1572	May we not claim for Plato an anticipation of modern ideas as about some questions of astronomy and physics, so also about medicine?
1572	Or is there anything more, my dear Timaeus, which has been omitted?
1572	Or rather was not the proposal too singular to be forgotten?
1572	Or that which is changing be the copy of that which is unchanging?
1572	Or, how can the essences or forms of things be distinguished from the eternal ideas, or essence itself from the soul?
1572	Or, how could space or anything else have been eternal when time is only created?
1572	Or, how could the Creator have taken portions of an indivisible same?
1572	Or, how could the surfaces of geometrical figures have formed solids?
1572	Or, how could there have been a time when the world was not, if time was not?
1572	Or, how could there have been motion in the chaos when as yet time was not?
1572	Or, how did chaos come into existence, if not by the will of the Creator?
1572	Plato himself proposes the question, Why does motion continue at all when the elements are settled in their places?
1572	SOCRATES: And what about the procreation of children?
1572	SOCRATES: And what did we say of their education?
1572	SOCRATES: Did we not begin by separating the husbandmen and the artisans from the class of defenders of the State?
1572	SOCRATES: Do you remember what were the points of which I required you to speak?
1572	SOCRATES: One, two, three; but where, my dear Timaeus, is the fourth of those who were yesterday my guests and are to be my entertainers to- day?
1572	SOCRATES: Then have I now given you all the heads of our yesterday''s discussion?
1572	The prelude is charming, and is already accepted by us-- may we beg of you to proceed to the strain?
1572	This being supposed, let us proceed to the next stage: In the likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world?
1572	This is the greatest boon of sight: and of the lesser benefits why should I speak?
1572	Were they not to be trained in gymnastic, and music, and all other sorts of knowledge which were proper for them?
1572	What is this but the atoms of Democritus and the triangles of Plato?
1572	What makes fire burn?
1572	What nature are we to attribute to this new kind of being?
1572	When we accuse them of being under the influence of words, do we suppose that we are altogether free from this illusion?
1572	and do all those things which we call self- existent exist?
1572	or are only those things which we see, or in some way perceive through the bodily organs, truly existent, and nothing whatever besides them?
1572	or created, and had it a beginning?
1572	or in what does the story consist except in the war between the two rival powers and the submersion of both of them?
1572	or why did Plato, if the whole narrative was known to him, break off almost at the beginning of it?
1677	ALCIBIADES: And how long must I wait, Socrates, and who will be my teacher?
1677	ALCIBIADES: Certainly not: for then what use could I make of them?
1677	ALCIBIADES: How do you mean?
1677	ALCIBIADES: How do you mean?
1677	ALCIBIADES: How in the world, Socrates, do the words of the poet apply to him?
1677	ALCIBIADES: Of what do you suppose that I am thinking?
1677	ALCIBIADES: What is that, Socrates?
1677	ALCIBIADES: Why, Socrates, how is that possible?
1677	ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates, but you are speaking of a madman: surely you do not think that any one in his senses would venture to make such a prayer?
1677	And was not his prayer accomplished, and did not many and terrible evils thence arise, upon which I need not dilate?
1677	But perhaps we may consider the matter thus:-- ALCIBIADES: How?
1677	Can ignorance possibly be better than knowledge for any person in any conceivable case?
1677	Consider, my dear friend: may it not be quite otherwise?
1677	Did we not?
1677	Do you not speak of one who knows what is best in riding as a good rider?
1677	For tell me, by heaven, do you not think that in the city the wise are few, while the foolish, whom you call mad, are many?
1677	For we acknowledged that there are these two classes?
1677	In such a case should we not be right if we said that the state would be full of anarchy and lawlessness?
1677	May we not take an illustration from the artizans?
1677	Or do you believe that a man may labour under some other disease, even although he has none of these complaints?
1677	Or do you think that Orestes, had he been in his senses and knew what was best for him to do, would ever have dared to venture on such a crime?
1677	Or is there a difference between the clever artist and the wise man?
1677	Or what is your opinion?
1677	SOCRATES: A man must either be sick or be well?
1677	SOCRATES: And again, there are some who are in health?
1677	SOCRATES: And both to the person who is ignorant and everybody else?
1677	SOCRATES: And every disease ophthalmia?
1677	SOCRATES: And if he do the contrary, both he and the state will suffer?
1677	SOCRATES: And if you made many attempts, and each time failed to recognize Pericles, you would never attack him?
1677	SOCRATES: And in a similar way you speak of a good boxer or a good flute- player or a good performer in any other art?
1677	SOCRATES: And is every kind of ophthalmia a disease?
1677	SOCRATES: And must every sick person either have the gout, or be in a fever, or suffer from ophthalmia?
1677	SOCRATES: And some men seem to you to be discreet, and others the contrary?
1677	SOCRATES: And that there is no third or middle term between discretion and indiscretion?
1677	SOCRATES: And there can not be two opposites to one thing?
1677	SOCRATES: And there is still another case which will also perhaps appear strange to you, if you will consider it?
1677	SOCRATES: And they are not the same?
1677	SOCRATES: And would you accept them if you were likely to use them to a bad and mischievous end?
1677	SOCRATES: And you regard those as sensible who know what ought to be done or said?
1677	SOCRATES: And you use both the terms,''wise''and''foolish,''in reference to something?
1677	SOCRATES: Are you going, Alcibiades, to offer prayer to Zeus?
1677	SOCRATES: But how could we live in safety with so many crazy people?
1677	SOCRATES: But is it necessary that the man who is clever in any of these arts should be wise also in general?
1677	SOCRATES: But ought we not then, think you, either to fancy that we know or really to know, what we confidently propose to do or say?
1677	SOCRATES: But were you not saying that you would call the many unwise and the few wise?
1677	SOCRATES: Did you not acknowledge that madness was the opposite of discretion?
1677	SOCRATES: For you designed to kill, not the first who offered, but Pericles himself?
1677	SOCRATES: He did not intend to slay the first woman he came across, nor any one else''s mother, but only his own?
1677	SOCRATES: He must be either sane or insane?
1677	SOCRATES: Ignorance, then, is better for those who are in such a frame of mind, and have such ideas?
1677	SOCRATES: Madness, then, you consider to be the opposite of discretion?
1677	SOCRATES: Nor again, I suppose, a person who knows the art of war, but does not know whether it is better to go to war or for how long?
1677	SOCRATES: Nor are there any who are in neither state?
1677	SOCRATES: Nor would any one else, I fancy?
1677	SOCRATES: So I believe:--you do not think so?
1677	SOCRATES: That ignorance is bad then, it would appear, which is of the best and does not know what is best?
1677	SOCRATES: The latter will say or do what they ought not without their own knowledge?
1677	SOCRATES: The many are foolish, the few wise?
1677	SOCRATES: The senseless are those who do not know this?
1677	SOCRATES: Then madness and want of sense are the same?
1677	SOCRATES: Very good: and do you think the same about discretion and want of discretion?
1677	SOCRATES: We are agreed, then, that every form of ophthalmia is a disease, but not every disease ophthalmia?
1677	SOCRATES: Well, and are you of the same mind, as before?
1677	SOCRATES: Well, but if Orestes in like manner had not known his mother, do you think that he would ever have laid hands upon her?
1677	SOCRATES: While others are ailing?
1677	SOCRATES: Would you call a person wise who can give advice, but does not know whether or when it is better to carry out the advice?
1677	SOCRATES: Yet you would not accept the dominion and lordship of all the Hellenes and all the barbarians in exchange for your life?
1677	SOCRATES: You acknowledge that for some persons in certain cases the ignorance of some things is a good and not an evil, as you formerly supposed?
1677	SOCRATES:--If, then, you went indoors, and seeing him, did not know him, but thought that he was some one else, would you venture to slay him?
1677	Surely, they are not the only maladies which exist?
1677	Their envoys were also to ask,''Why the Gods always granted the victory to the Lacedaemonians?''
1677	We acknowledge that some are discreet, some foolish, and that some are mad?
1677	We think that some are sick; do we not?
1677	What do you think?
1677	You would distinguish the wise from the foolish?
1584	--or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtue which is concerned with the use of weapons--''What is Courage?''
1584	Am I not correct in saying so, Laches?
1584	And I will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage?
1584	And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the youths?
1584	And is not that generally thought to be courage?
1584	And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?
1584	Are you not risking the greatest of your possessions?
1584	But a better and more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask,''What is Virtue?''
1584	But what say you of the matter of which we were beginning to speak-- the art of fighting in armour?
1584	But why, instead of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates about the education of the youths?
1584	Do you imagine that I should call little children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none?
1584	Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man?
1584	Do you not agree to that, Laches?
1584	Do you now understand what I mean?
1584	Do you or do you not agree with me?
1584	For how can we advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we are wholly ignorant?
1584	For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is better?
1584	Had not many a man better never get up from a sick bed?
1584	How is this contradiction to be solved?
1584	In all things small as well as great?
1584	In the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue--''What is Courage?''
1584	Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?
1584	Is that a practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed?
1584	Is this a slight matter about which you and Lysimachus are deliberating?
1584	LACHES: How flying?
1584	LACHES: I have but one feeling, Nicias, or( shall I say?)
1584	LACHES: Indeed I do: who but he?
1584	LACHES: To what extent and what principle do you mean?
1584	LACHES: Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons, who have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some things?
1584	LACHES: What can he possibly mean, Socrates?
1584	LACHES: What do you mean, Socrates?
1584	LACHES: Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?
1584	LYSIMACHUS: Why do you say that, Nicias?
1584	LYSIMACHUS: Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this sort?
1584	LYSIMACHUS: Why, yes, Socrates; what else am I to do?
1584	Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires,''What sort of intelligence?''
1584	Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know the dangers of disease?
1584	May not death often be the better of the two?
1584	Must we not select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to conduce?
1584	NICIAS: And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who had better die, and to those who had better live?
1584	NICIAS: What is that?
1584	NICIAS: Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or ought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?
1584	SOCRATES: And are we right in saying so?
1584	SOCRATES: And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the end is the soul of youth?
1584	SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful?
1584	SOCRATES: And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?
1584	SOCRATES: And for this reason, as I imagine,--because a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers?
1584	SOCRATES: And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?
1584	SOCRATES: And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?
1584	SOCRATES: And is this condition of ours satisfactory?
1584	SOCRATES: And shall we invite Nicias to join us?
1584	SOCRATES: And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who fights flying, instead of remaining?
1584	SOCRATES: And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call quickness?
1584	SOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with our present view?
1584	SOCRATES: And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?
1584	SOCRATES: And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils?
1584	SOCRATES: And the knowledge of these things you call courage?
1584	SOCRATES: And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time?
1584	SOCRATES: And we are enquiring, Which of us is skilful or successful in the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?
1584	SOCRATES: And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse and at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle?
1584	SOCRATES: And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he too is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view?
1584	SOCRATES: And would you do so too, Melesias?
1584	SOCRATES: And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?
1584	SOCRATES: But as to the epithet''wise,''--wise in what?
1584	SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?
1584	SOCRATES: But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?
1584	SOCRATES: But what is this knowledge then, and of what?
1584	SOCRATES: But what would you say of a foolish endurance?
1584	SOCRATES: But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the art of which we want to find the masters?
1584	SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the track, and not be lazy?
1584	SOCRATES: But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the other?
1584	SOCRATES: Do you agree with me about the parts?
1584	SOCRATES: Do you hear him, Laches?
1584	SOCRATES: Do you understand his meaning, Laches?
1584	SOCRATES: Great care, then, is required in this matter?
1584	SOCRATES: His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?
1584	SOCRATES: How so?
1584	SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous who remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?
1584	SOCRATES: Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one of us who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating?
1584	SOCRATES: Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?
1584	SOCRATES: Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?
1584	SOCRATES: Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?
1584	SOCRATES: Then must we not first know the nature of virtue?
1584	SOCRATES: Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select?
1584	SOCRATES: Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage-- for it is not noble, but courage is noble?
1584	SOCRATES: Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue?
1584	SOCRATES: Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?
1584	SOCRATES: What is Laches saying, Nicias?
1584	SOCRATES: What is it, Nicias?
1584	SOCRATES: What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the majority?
1584	SOCRATES: Why do you say so, Laches?
1584	Should we not select him who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?
1584	Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers?
1584	Tell me, my boys, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?
1584	There is this sort of courage-- is there not, Laches?
1584	What do you say to that alteration in your statement?
1584	What do you say, Socrates-- will you comply?
1584	What do you say?
1584	Who are they who, having been inferior persons, have become under your care good and noble?
1584	Would you not say the same?
1584	do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear?
1584	or are the physicians the same as the courageous?
1584	or do the courageous know them?
1635	''Then why in this city of Athens, in which men of merit are always being sought after, is he not at once appointed a general?''
1635	''What about things of which he has no knowledge?''
1635	),''-- will the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode be better able to judge whether these lines are rightly expressed or not?
1635	Am I not right, Ion?
1635	And if I were to ask whether I and you became acquainted with this fact by the help of the same art of arithmetic, you would acknowledge that we did?
1635	And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be their general, and honour him, if he prove himself worthy?
1635	Are not these the themes of which Homer sings?
1635	Are you from your native city of Ephesus?
1635	As he does not know all of them, which of them will he know?
1635	But just now I should like to ask you a question: Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus, or to Homer only?
1635	But let me ask a prior question: You admit that there are differences of arts?
1635	Do you mean to say that the art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same?
1635	Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and do not want a general?
1635	Does not Homer speak of the same themes which all other poets handle?
1635	For the rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, but how can he interpret him well unless he knows what he means?
1635	Have you already forgotten what you were saying?
1635	ION: And what is there in Homer of which I have no knowledge?
1635	ION: Who may he be?
1635	ION: Why, what am I forgetting?
1635	Is not war his great argument?
1635	Let us consider this matter; is not the art of painting a whole?
1635	Must the same art have the same subject of knowledge, and different arts other subjects of knowledge?
1635	Now would you say that the art of the rhapsode or the art of medicine was better able to judge of the propriety of these lines?
1635	Now, Ion, will the charioteer or the physician be the better judge of the propriety of these lines?
1635	SOCRATES: And Homer in a better way?
1635	SOCRATES: And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most of the spectators?
1635	SOCRATES: And are you the best general, Ion?
1635	SOCRATES: And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what Hesiod says, about these matters in which they agree?
1635	SOCRATES: And do not the other poets sing of the same?
1635	SOCRATES: And do the Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes at the festival?
1635	SOCRATES: And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode?
1635	SOCRATES: And he who judges of the good will be the same as he who judges of the bad speakers?
1635	SOCRATES: And he will be the arithmetician?
1635	SOCRATES: And if a different knowledge, then a knowledge of different matters?
1635	SOCRATES: And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a horseman?
1635	SOCRATES: And if you knew the good speaker, you would also know the inferior speakers to be inferior?
1635	SOCRATES: And if you were a prophet, would you not be able to interpret them when they disagree as well as when they agree?
1635	SOCRATES: And in judging of the general''s art, do you judge of it as a general or a rhapsode?
1635	SOCRATES: And the art of the rhapsode is different from that of the charioteer?
1635	SOCRATES: And there are and have been many painters good and bad?
1635	SOCRATES: And this is true of all the arts;--that which we know with one art we do not know with the other?
1635	SOCRATES: And were you one of the competitors-- and did you succeed?
1635	SOCRATES: And who is he, and what is his name?
1635	SOCRATES: And will the reason be that this is his art, or will there be any other reason?
1635	SOCRATES: And you admitted that being different they would have different subjects of knowledge?
1635	SOCRATES: And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes?
1635	SOCRATES: And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the poets?
1635	SOCRATES: Are there any things about which Homer and Hesiod agree?
1635	SOCRATES: At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when exhorting his soldiers?
1635	SOCRATES: But he will know what a slave ought to say?
1635	SOCRATES: But he will know what a spinning- woman ought to say about the working of wool?
1635	SOCRATES: But how did you come to have this skill about Homer only, and not about Hesiod or the other poets?
1635	SOCRATES: Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings which, as I am saying, receive the power of the original magnet from one another?
1635	SOCRATES: Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot what the ruler of a sea- tossed vessel ought to say?
1635	SOCRATES: Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer?
1635	SOCRATES: Is not the same person skilful in both?
1635	SOCRATES: My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus?
1635	SOCRATES: Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter that which we know by the art of medicine?
1635	SOCRATES: Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say?
1635	SOCRATES: Surely not about things in Homer of which you have no knowledge?
1635	SOCRATES: Tell me, then, what I was intending to ask you,--whether this holds universally?
1635	SOCRATES: Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no right judgment of the sayings and doings of that art?
1635	SOCRATES: Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general?
1635	SOCRATES: Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything?
1635	SOCRATES: Then which will be a better judge of the lines which you were reciting from Homer, you or the charioteer?
1635	SOCRATES: Then you are the interpreters of interpreters?
1635	SOCRATES: Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general?
1635	SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1635	SOCRATES: What, in a worse way?
1635	SOCRATES: Why, does not Homer speak in many passages about arts?
1635	SOCRATES: You would argue, as I should, that when one art is of one kind of knowledge and another of another, they are different?
1635	Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs?
1635	Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians, and Ephesus is no mean city?
1635	Which do you prefer to be thought, dishonest or inspired?
1635	Would he rather be regarded as inspired or dishonest?''
1635	Would you like me to explain my meaning, Ion?
1635	You ask,''Why is this?''
1635	what is happening to you?
1681	And is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired by instruction?
1681	Are not certain things useful to the builder when he is building a house?
1681	But do we not deem those men who are most prosperous to be the happiest?
1681	But how do you mean, Socrates?
1681	But if we are further asked, What is that from which, if we were free, we should have no need of wealth?
1681	But surely, if they were a good, they could not appear bad for any one?
1681	But what particular thing is wealth, if not all things?
1681	But when have we the greatest and the most various needs, when we are sick or when we are well?
1681	But why do you not finish the argument which proves that gold and silver and other things which seem to be wealth are not real wealth?
1681	But why, as you have begun your argument so prettily, do you not go on with the rest?
1681	CRITIAS: And does injustice seem to you an evil or a good?
1681	CRITIAS: And if the wicked man has wealth and is willing to spend it, he will carry out his evil purposes?
1681	CRITIAS: I should like to follow up the argument, and will ask Eryxias whether he thinks that there are just and unjust men?
1681	CRITIAS: Well, and do you think that some men are intemperate?
1681	Can ignorance, for instance, be useful for knowledge, or disease for health, or vice for virtue?
1681	Can you repeat the discourse to us?
1681	Do we not employ in our intercourse with one another speech and violence(?)
1681	ERASISTRATUS: What would you wish to hear first?
1681	For do we not say that silver is useful because it enables us to supply our bodily needs?
1681	For instance, some men are gamblers, some drunkards, and some gluttons: and gambling and the love of drink and greediness are all desires?
1681	For what man of sense could ever be persuaded that the wisest and the richest are the same?
1681	For who has larger estates or more land at his disposal to cultivate if he please?
1681	He was about to add something more, when Critias interrupted him:--Do you really suppose so, Eryxias?
1681	Or how could he be the richest of men who might even have to go begging, because he had not wherewithal to live?
1681	Or is wisdom despised of men and can find no buyers, although cypress wood and marble of Pentelicus are eagerly bought by numerous purchasers?
1681	Or, again, should you call sickness a good or an evil?
1681	SOCRATES: And also the instruments by which wealth is procured?
1681	SOCRATES: And are not the healthy richer than the sick, since health is a possession more valuable than riches to the sick?
1681	SOCRATES: And are they not most prosperous who commit the fewest errors in respect either of themselves or of other men?
1681	SOCRATES: And do we think it possible that a thing should be useful for a purpose unless we have need of it for that purpose?
1681	SOCRATES: And does not this apply in other cases?
1681	SOCRATES: And he appears to you to be the richest who has goods of the greatest value?
1681	SOCRATES: And how would you answer another question?
1681	SOCRATES: And if any one gave you a choice, which of these would you prefer?
1681	SOCRATES: And if anything appeared to be more valuable than health, he would be the richest who possessed it?
1681	SOCRATES: And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not always to appear useless?
1681	SOCRATES: And so, too, physic is not useful to every one, but only to him who knows how to use it?
1681	SOCRATES: And the same is the case with everything else?
1681	SOCRATES: And therefore conditions which are not required for the existence of a thing are not useful for the production of it?
1681	SOCRATES: And we call those actions good which a man does for the sake of virtue?
1681	SOCRATES: And were we not saying before that it was the business of a good man and a gentleman to know where and how anything should be used?
1681	SOCRATES: And when we are in the worst state we have the greatest and most especial need and desire of bodily pleasures?
1681	SOCRATES: And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is taught by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction?
1681	SOCRATES: But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose?
1681	SOCRATES: But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is imparted by word of mouth if he is wholly deprived of the sense of hearing?
1681	SOCRATES: But can that which is evil be useful for virtue?
1681	SOCRATES: But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some precious stone, we should say that he was very rich?
1681	SOCRATES: But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine, shall we not regard wealth as useful for virtue?
1681	SOCRATES: Clearly we have not yet answered the question, What is wealth?
1681	SOCRATES: In which way do you think you would be the richer?
1681	SOCRATES: The reason is that the one is useless and the other useful?
1681	SOCRATES: The same to you, I said; have you any good news from Sicily to tell us?
1681	SOCRATES: Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs of the body, we must want them for that purpose?
1681	SOCRATES: Then if they procure by this means what they want for the purposes of life, that art will be useful towards life?
1681	SOCRATES: Then now we have to consider, What is money?
1681	SOCRATES: Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth is what is useful to this end?
1681	SOCRATES: Then you consider that a man never wants any of these things for the use of the body?
1681	SOCRATES: What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is useless to us is not wealth?
1681	Suppose that we are asked,''Is a horse useful to everybody?''
1681	The youth began by asking Prodicus, In what way did he think that riches were a good and in what an evil?
1681	There are persons, are there not, who teach music and grammar and other arts for pay, and thus procure those things of which they stand in need?
1681	What the Sicilians are doing, or how they are disposed towards our city?
1681	Where would be the advantage of wisdom then?
1681	and various other things?
1681	can we give an answer?
1681	whereas he who is short of means can not do what he fain would, and therefore does not sin?
1681	will not our reply be,''No, but only to those who know how to use a horse?''
1673	And that person is he who is good at calculation-- the arithmetician?
1673	But is it better to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally?
1673	But to return: what say you of Odysseus and Achilles?
1673	EUDICUS: Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display which Hippias has been making?
1673	For example, had a man better have a rudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily?
1673	For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times?
1673	HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; what makes you say so?
1673	HIPPIAS: Certainly; how can I have any other?
1673	HIPPIAS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1673	HIPPIAS: Where is that?
1673	He who runs slowly voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily?
1673	I will therefore remind you of what you were saying: were you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and wily?
1673	Is he not the good man?
1673	Is not he who is better made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and postures voluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily?
1673	Is not the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about diagrams; and he is-- the geometrician?
1673	Must it not be so?
1673	Must not justice, at all events, be one of these?
1673	Please to answer once more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both?
1673	SOCRATES: And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is not the same as the false?
1673	SOCRATES: And are you not likewise said to speak truly about calculation?
1673	SOCRATES: And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters of calculation, are you not also the best?
1673	SOCRATES: And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well?
1673	SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of astronomy?
1673	SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute and all other things?
1673	SOCRATES: And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they wise?
1673	SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs badly?
1673	SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs well?
1673	SOCRATES: And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is a bad runner?
1673	SOCRATES: And if a species of doing, a species of action?
1673	SOCRATES: And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust?
1673	SOCRATES: And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if you pleased?
1673	SOCRATES: And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what they do?
1673	SOCRATES: And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark?
1673	SOCRATES: And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match, to fall, or to throw another?
1673	SOCRATES: And is not blinking a defect in the eyes?
1673	SOCRATES: And is not running a species of doing?
1673	SOCRATES: And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action?
1673	SOCRATES: And is that your own opinion, Hippias?
1673	SOCRATES: And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to be false as well as true?
1673	SOCRATES: And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best state possible?
1673	SOCRATES: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and arithmetician?
1673	SOCRATES: And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal?
1673	SOCRATES: And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man is he who has the bad?
1673	SOCRATES: And the true differ from the false-- the true and the false are the very opposite of each other?
1673	SOCRATES: And there are bad runners?
1673	SOCRATES: And therefore you would be the most able to tell the truth about these matters, would you not?
1673	SOCRATES: And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is to do well?
1673	SOCRATES: And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to speak falsely about calculation?
1673	SOCRATES: And what do you say about grace, Hippias?
1673	SOCRATES: And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune?
1673	SOCRATES: And what would you say of the art of medicine;--has not the mind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art?
1673	SOCRATES: And what would you say of the characters of slaves?
1673	SOCRATES: And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: And would you choose to possess goods or evils?
1673	SOCRATES: And would you rather always have eyes with which you might voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily blink?
1673	SOCRATES: And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or involuntarily lame?
1673	SOCRATES: Are you not also skilled in geometry?
1673	SOCRATES: But is not lameness a defect or deformity?
1673	SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true about the same matters?
1673	SOCRATES: Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do things, or that they have the power to do things?
1673	SOCRATES: Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about number, or when he is making a calculation?
1673	SOCRATES: He and no one else is good at it?
1673	SOCRATES: I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to which are the better-- those who err voluntarily or involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the power to speak falsely?
1673	SOCRATES: Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters?
1673	SOCRATES: Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false?
1673	SOCRATES: O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find a difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times over?
1673	SOCRATES: Shall we examine other instances?
1673	SOCRATES: That would be the better horse?
1673	SOCRATES: The involuntary is the worse of the two?
1673	SOCRATES: The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and art-- and these either one or both of them are elements of justice?
1673	SOCRATES: Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than Achilles?
1673	SOCRATES: Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is ignorant can not be false?
1673	SOCRATES: Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a race than he who does them voluntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in a race?
1673	SOCRATES: Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and slowness is an evil quality?
1673	SOCRATES: Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false?
1673	SOCRATES: Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the involuntary?
1673	SOCRATES: Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts ill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill?
1673	SOCRATES: Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who are false about calculation and number?
1673	SOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul?
1673	SOCRATES: Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind which errs voluntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and truly about calculation?
1673	SOCRATES: Then they are prudent, I suppose?
1673	SOCRATES: Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame?
1673	SOCRATES: Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things, if there be such a man, will be the good man?
1673	SOCRATES: Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are they not?
1673	SOCRATES: Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are to be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise?
1673	SOCRATES: Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base and dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery?
1673	SOCRATES: Well, and does not the same hold in that science also?
1673	SOCRATES: Well, but at a wrestling match-- which is the better wrestler, he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily?
1673	SOCRATES: Which of the two then is a better runner?
1673	SOCRATES: Who can they be?
1673	SOCRATES: Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation?
1673	SOCRATES: Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be better than the involuntary?
1673	Which is the better of the two?
1673	Why do you not either refute his words, if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in commending him?
1673	Will you tell me, and then I shall perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles wily?
1673	Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters of calculation than you would be, if you chose?
1673	Would you not call a man able who could do that?
1673	and in what particular does either surpass the other?
1600	''And how, Socrates,''she said with a smile,''can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?''
1600	''And is that which is not wise, ignorant?
1600	''And is this wish and this desire common to all?
1600	''And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?''
1600	''And what does he gain who possesses the good?''
1600	''And what may that be?''
1600	''And what,''I said,''is his power?''
1600	''And who are they?''
1600	''And who,''I said,''was his father, and who his mother?''
1600	''And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?''
1600	''And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?''
1600	''But how can he be a god who has no portion in what is either good or fair?''
1600	''But who then, Diotima,''I said,''are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?''
1600	''But why of generation?''
1600	''By those who know or by those who do not know?''
1600	''Do you know what I am meditating?
1600	''How can that be?''
1600	''Hush,''she cried;''must that be foul which is not fair?''
1600	''Right opinion,''she replied;''which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge( for how can knowledge be devoid of reason?
1600	''Still,''she said,''the answer suggests a further question: What is given by the possession of beauty?''
1600	''Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further,''she said,''what is the manner of the pursuit?
1600	''Then love,''she said,''may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?''
1600	''To which must be added that they love the possession of the good?''
1600	''What are you meditating?''
1600	''What do you mean, Diotima,''I said,''is love then evil and foul?''
1600	''What is he, Diotima?''
1600	''What then is Love?''
1600	''What then?''
1600	''What then?''
1600	''Why, then,''she rejoined,''are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of them?
1600	''Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your revels?
1600	''Would you desire better witness?''
1600	And I remember her once saying to me,''What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire?
1600	And Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said: Tell me, son of Acumenus, was there not reason in my fears?
1600	And am I not right in asserting that there are two goddesses?
1600	And are you not a flute- player?
1600	And as you have spoken so eloquently of his nature, may I ask you further, Whether love is the love of something or of nothing?
1600	And does he possess, or does he not possess, that which he loves and desires?
1600	And first tell me, he said, were you present at this meeting?
1600	And if this is true, Love is the love of beauty and not of deformity?
1600	And now, said Socrates, I will ask about Love:--Is Love of something or of nothing?
1600	And suppose further, that when he saw their perplexity he said:''Do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another''s company?
1600	And the admission has been already made that Love is of something which a man wants and has not?
1600	And when you say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future?''
1600	And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty?
1600	And you would say the same of a mother?
1600	Are they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him?
1600	Are we to have neither conversation nor singing over our cups; but simply to drink as if we were thirsty?
1600	But Love desires the beautiful; and then arises the question, What does he desire of the beautiful?
1600	But before the many you would not be ashamed, if you thought that you were doing something disgraceful in their presence?
1600	But first tell me; if I come in shall we have the understanding of which I spoke( supra Will you have a very drunken man?
1600	But what have you done with Socrates?
1600	But why again does this extend not only to men but also to animals?
1600	By Heracles, he said, what is this?
1600	By all means; but who makes the third partner in our revels?
1600	Can you tell me why?''
1600	Consider then: How can the drinking be made easiest?
1600	Do you expect to shoot your bolt and escape, Aristophanes?
1600	Eryximachus said: What is this, Alcibiades?
1600	First, is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man?
1600	For he who is anything can not want to be that which he is?
1600	For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms?
1600	He desires, of course, the possession of the beautiful;--but what is given by that?
1600	He must agree with us-- must he not?
1600	I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words-- who could listen to them without amazement?
1600	I asked;''Is he mortal?''
1600	I said,''O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well; but, assuming Love to be such as you say, what is the use of him to men?''
1600	I was astonished at her words, and said:''Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima?''
1600	I will also tell, if you please-- and indeed I am bound to tell-- of his courage in battle; for who but he saved my life?
1600	Is he not like a Silenus in this?
1600	Is that the meaning of your praise?
1600	Is there anything?''
1600	Man may be supposed to act thus from reason; but why should animals have these passionate feelings?
1600	May I say without impiety or offence, that of all the blessed gods he is the most blessed because he is the fairest and best?
1600	Of what am I speaking?
1600	On his appearing he and the host jest a little; the question is then asked by Pausanias, one of the guests,''What shall they do about drinking?
1600	Or shall I crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away?
1600	Or who would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger?
1600	Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say?
1600	See you how fond he is of the fair?
1600	She said to me:''And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?''
1600	So I gave him a shake, and I said:''Socrates, are you asleep?''
1600	Socrates asks: Who are his father and mother?
1600	That is, of a brother or sister?
1600	The same to you, said Eryximachus; but what shall we do?
1600	Then Love wants and has not beauty?
1600	Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good?
1600	Then it must have been a long while ago, he said; and who told you-- did Socrates?
1600	Then would you still say that love is beautiful?
1600	Then, said Glaucon, let us have the tale over again; is not the road to Athens just made for conversation?
1600	What are you about?
1600	What do you suppose must have been my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my own dishonour?
1600	What do you think, Eryximachus?
1600	What do you think?
1600	What do you want?
1600	What say you to going with me unasked?
1600	Who will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing?
1600	Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory?
1600	Who would not sooner have these children of the mind than the ordinary human ones?
1600	Who, if not you, should be the reporter of the words of your friend?
1600	Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones?
1600	Why then is there all this flutter and excitement about love?
1600	Why, my dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse?
1600	Will that be agreeable to you?
1600	Will you drink with me or not?''
1600	Will you laugh at me because I am drunk?
1600	Would he who is great, desire to be great, or he who is strong, desire to be strong?
1600	Would that be an ignoble life?''
1600	Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning: Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something?
1600	You were quite right in coming, said Agathon; but where is he himself?
1600	and do all men always desire their own good, or only some men?--what say you?''
1600	and was I not a true prophet when I said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that I should be in a strait?
1600	and what is the object which they have in view?
1600	do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?''
1600	etc.)?
1600	said Alcibiades: shall I attack him and inflict the punishment before you all?
1600	said Socrates; are you going to raise a laugh at my expense?
1600	what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love?
1642	''Are they really true?''
1642	''Is all the just pious?''
1642	''Then what part of justice is piety?''
1642	And must you not allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another?
1642	Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?
1642	As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman''s art they are benefited and improved, are they not?
1642	But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me-- clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside?
1642	But Socrates would like first of all to have a more satisfactory answer to the question,''What is piety?''
1642	But although they are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return?
1642	But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better?
1642	But in what way does he say that you corrupt the young?
1642	But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is''piety''?
1642	But may there not be differences of opinion, as among men, so also among the gods?
1642	But what is the charge which he brings against you?
1642	But what is the meaning of''attending''to the gods?
1642	Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?
1642	Do you dissent?
1642	Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?
1642	Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?
1642	Do you not agree?
1642	Do you not agree?
1642	Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: And who is he?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: How do you mean, Socrates?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now saying, what pleases them?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates?
1642	EUTHYPHRO: Why not, Socrates?
1642	For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?
1642	Have you forgotten?
1642	How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act?
1642	I suppose that you follow me now?
1642	Is it not so?
1642	Is not piety in every action always the same?
1642	Is not that true?
1642	Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship- builder with a view to the attainment of some result?
1642	SOCRATES: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs?
1642	SOCRATES: And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to them-- do you see?
1642	SOCRATES: And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them?
1642	SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?
1642	SOCRATES: And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given?
1642	SOCRATES: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
1642	SOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious?
1642	SOCRATES: And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish?
1642	SOCRATES: And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one?
1642	SOCRATES: And of what is he accused?
1642	SOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?
1642	SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature?
1642	SOCRATES: And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
1642	SOCRATES: And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?
1642	SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?
1642	SOCRATES: And well said?
1642	SOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety?
1642	SOCRATES: And what is your suit, Euthyphro?
1642	SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger?
1642	SOCRATES: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away?
1642	SOCRATES: As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?
1642	SOCRATES: As there is an art which ministers to the house- builder with a view to the building of a house?
1642	SOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
1642	SOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished?
1642	SOCRATES: But for their good?
1642	SOCRATES: But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: But what differences are there which can not be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another?
1642	SOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?
1642	SOCRATES: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety?
1642	SOCRATES: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?
1642	SOCRATES: In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?--that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
1642	SOCRATES: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering?
1642	SOCRATES: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
1642	SOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
1642	SOCRATES: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?
1642	SOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety-- that I can not away with these stories about the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in view the attainment of some object-- would you not say of health?
1642	SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?
1642	SOCRATES: Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
1642	SOCRATES: Of whom?
1642	SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by measuring?
1642	SOCRATES: Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others?
1642	SOCRATES: Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?
1642	SOCRATES: Tell me then, oh tell me-- what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations?
1642	SOCRATES: Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods?
1642	SOCRATES: Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another?
1642	SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?
1642	SOCRATES: Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety?
1642	SOCRATES: Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part?
1642	SOCRATES: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?
1642	SOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil- doer ought to be let off?
1642	SOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?
1642	SOCRATES: What is the charge?
1642	SOCRATES: Who is he?
1642	SOCRATES: Why, has the fugitive wings?
1642	Shall I tell you in what respect?
1642	Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?
1642	Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner:''Is all the pious just?''
1642	Surely you can not be concerned in a suit before the King, like myself?
1642	Tell me, then-- Is not that which is pious necessarily just?
1642	To what end do we serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish?
1642	Was not that said?
1642	Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods?
1642	What are they?
1642	What do you say?
1642	What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them?
1642	What should I be good for without it?
1642	What then is piety?
1642	Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?
1642	Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
1642	You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies?
1642	and what are you doing in the Porch of the King Archon?
1642	are you the pursuer or the defendant?
1642	my companion, and will you leave me in despair?
1642	my good man?
1642	or, is that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?
1181	Laws,831 C. If it be pleaded that persuasion is his instrument, not violence; is that no reason rather for a deeper loathing?
1181	Rep.521 A;"Laws,"678 C. And you, Socrates, yourself( their host demanded), what is it you pride yourself upon?
1181	Where will he find a teacher to instruct him in that wisdom?
1181	( 13) Does not this worthy person strike you as somewhat like a bully seeking to pick a quarrel?
1181	( 16) But what( he added, turning to Critobulus) do you most pride yourself upon?
1181	( 2) Was it not enough to set before your guests a faultless dinner, but you must feast our eyes and ears on sights and sounds the most delicious?
1181	( 31) Now all is changed, and who will be at pains to ask me out to dinner any more?
1181	( 32) Philippus would seem to have anticipated Mr. Woodward; see Prologue to"She Stoops to Conquer": Pray, would you know the reason I''m crying?
1181	( 39) Are not all these the outward tokens of true loveliness?
1181	( 56) Is Antisthenes thinking of Callias and Hermogenes?
1181	( 6) Is that your statement?
1181	( 70) Is not Xenophon imputing himself to Socrates?
1181	( 8) Or,"Have you the knowledge also how to play the king?"
1181	( 83)( Socrates exclaimed, when he heard that), what crime can they conceive your boy is guilty of that they should wish to make an end of him?
1181	( 86) Is it not at your house that their noblest citizens are lodged as representatives of a foreign state?
1181	( 90) Are you agreed to that?
1181	( 92) Are you agreed to that?
1181	( 98)( 98) Or,"going to give up business, and hand on the trade to me as your successor?"
1181	( cried Antisthenes); and pray how?
1181	142 D. You have not forgotten( interposed Antisthenes), perhaps, that besides yourself there is not a rhapsodist who does not know these epics?
1181	158 C. The company were charmed to hear him speak, and turned and looked; and some one asked: On what is it then, Autolycus?
1181	And I must needs believe you, for are you not all honourable men?
1181	And amongst all animals, you will tell us that the crab has loveliest eyes?
1181	And did you ever come across a sillier tribe of people than these same rhapsodists?
1181	And do you pretend to make their souls more righteous by putting money in their pockets?
1181	And how do you do that, good sir?
1181	And if his name died on my lips, think you my mind would less recall his memory?
1181	And if that happened, you on your side, it appears, believe the boy will be corrupted?
1181	And is he the better go- between who can make his clients pleasing to one person only, or can make them pleasing to a number?
1181	And is there anything more transcendental than the gods?
1181	And now you, Lycon, tell us, wo n''t you( asked Antisthenes), what it is you take the greatest pride in?
1181	And now, sir, if you do not like this frigid( 10) argument, why do you cause me trouble?
1181	And pray, do they repay you these same moneys?
1181	And there are words that bear the stamp of hate, and words that tend to friendliness?
1181	And this friendship, what is it?
1181	And to this his very name bears witness, for is it not written in Homer?
1181	And what may that be?
1181	And what use will you make of them?
1181	And whence shall a man obtain this chrism?
1181	And why?
1181	And you, Hermogenes, on what do you plume yourself most highly?
1181	And, further, that towards agreeableness, one step at any rate consists in wearing a becoming fashion of the hair and dress?
1181	Are you agreed it is the business of a good go- between to make him( or her) on whom he plies his art agreeable to those with them?
1181	Are you agreed?
1181	Are you aware that you at present are annoying us by silence?
1181	Are you that person commonly nicknamed the thinker?
1181	At this remark they turned their eyes upon the speaker, and several spoke together, asking: Will you make them known to us?
1181	At which sight Callias, turning to the father: Do you know you are the richest man in the whole world, Lycon?
1181	But consider, a snubness of the nose, how is that more beautiful than straightness?
1181	But how is it that you alone, Antisthenes, you misanthrope, love nobody?
1181	But if my tongue is not to wag, whatever shall I do to earn my dinner?
1181	But the lover who depends upon the body,( 41) what of him?
1181	But what can he expect, who stretches forth an eager hand to clutch the body, save to be treated( 47) as a beggar?
1181	But what is it you keep on laughing at-- the wish on my part to reduce to moderate size a paunch a trifle too rotund?
1181	But whence, then?
1181	Can you explain to us?
1181	Can you tell me, then, what need is satisfied by our eyes?
1181	Did ever man anoint himself with oil of myrrh to please his fellow?
1181	Do you consider that the quality of beauty is confined to man, or is it to be found in other objects also?
1181	Do you hear that, my son?
1181	Do you hesitate?
1181	Eh, bless my ears, what''s that?
1181	First, why should love- for- love be given to such a lover?
1181	For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms?
1181	Have you the cramp?
1181	Here Callias demanded: And when our friend( Antisthenes) essays to cross- examine people( 3) at a banquet, what kind of piping( 4) should he have?
1181	Here Lycon interposed: That may be well enough for youths, but what shall we do whose gymnastic days are over?
1181	How can you boast of so discredited an art?
1181	How is it possible that things, in no respect resembling one another, should each and all be beautiful?
1181	How so?
1181	How value less the gods, not more, if being above us they make the void of use to send us rain, and cause their light to shine on us?
1181	How, in the first place, is it possible for him to hate a lover who, he knows, regards him as both beautiful and good?
1181	Is it not from want?
1181	Is that conclusive?
1181	Is that the source of merriment?
1181	Must I discourse to you in answer to the flute?
1181	No doubt, upon the boy?
1181	Oh, Socrates( he answered, deprecatingly), will you not leave it to the arbitrament of Cleinias?
1181	Or would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger?
1181	Pray how?
1181	Pray( interposed Antisthenes),( 7) do you also know the way to be a king?
1181	Pray, do you find it so ridiculous my wishing to improve my health by exercise?
1181	Pray, where''s the wonder?
1181	Sausage Seller.... What for?
1181	Shall we feast on perfumes also?
1181	Since when, then?
1181	Since when?
1181	So beautiful you claim to rival me, you boaster?
1181	Socrates replied: Do you suppose the sad condition of the patient dates from the moment only of our intimacy?
1181	The good go- between will therefore make his choice between them, and teach only what conduces to agreeableness?
1181	The other( in a tone of deep vexation): Pray, what thing of the sort are you aware I ever perpetrated?
1181	Then Callias: What ails you, sirrah?
1181	Then Socrates: Will you never tire of repeating that one name?
1181	Then you possess large property in land?
1181	They could hear the question asked by Dionysus, did she love him?
1181	This is obvious; or else, why do states and nations, one and all, inquire of the gods by divination what they ought to do and what they ought not?
1181	To come to our two noses, which is the more handsome, yours or mine?
1181	To which the host: And that reminds me, a supply of unguents might not be amiss;( 3) what say you?
1181	Was Cleinias there as a"muta persona"?
1181	Well then, do they requite your gifts of gold with gratitude?
1181	Well, and what is it you pride yourself upon, Antisthenes?
1181	Well, let that be( the other answered); answer me one question: How many fleas''feet distance is it, pray, from you to me?
1181	Well, on what then?
1181	What can it be, you laughter- making man, except to set folk laughing?
1181	What does it seem?
1181	What fragrance is left for us?
1181	What have you to say to justify your choice?
1181	What is your belief on this point?
1181	What( Socrates rejoined), shall you be able to maintain that by your beauty you can make us better?
1181	What, then, to nothing, and to nobody?
1181	What, whilst you are talking?
1181	What, would you have me imitate Nicostratus( 1) the actor, reciting his tetrameters( 2) to the music of the fife?
1181	What, would you have me then compare him to worse villains?
1181	When shall I find my willing heart All taken up by Thee?
1181	Whereat Socrates turned to the silent man, and thus accosted him: Hermogenes, what is a drunken brawl?
1181	Whereat Socrates: When will you have done with your gibes, Callias?
1181	Whereupon Hermogenes inquired: Had he then a large amount of money?
1181	Which surely is a better fate than to be called a thoughtless person?
1181	Whom do we choose to bear the sacred olive- shoot( 31) in honour of Athena?--whom else save beautiful old men?
1181	Why do men steal?
1181	You can render people just to all the world, but towards yourself you can not?
1181	You do n''t spend nights with him?
1181	and with the same tongue and lips and voice may speak with modesty or boastfulnes?
1181	and you, sir( turning to the Syracusan), what do you pride yourself upon?
1181	are you going to pass on the business?
1181	because, forsooth, he bestows upon himself what he desires, and upon his minion things of dire reproach?
1181	by teaching them some base mechanic art?
1181	exclaimed another; to which a third rejoined:"Why should it not be learnt as well as other things?"
1181	he there-- caught me only the other morning in the act of dancing?
1181	is it likely( he replied), considering I had to listen to them almost daily?
1181	or is it the sort of exercise I set my heart on?
1181	or teaching them nobility of soul?
1181	or that what he hastens to exact, infallibly must separate that other from his nearest friends?
1181	or to enjoy my victuals better?
1181	the toothache?
1181	to sleep better?
1181	what ampler greatcoat than the tiles above my head?
1181	what?
1181	why break burglariously into houses?
1181	why hale men and women captive and make slaves of them?
1181	will you devolve this art of yours on me as your successor, Socrates?
1181	you do n''t say so?
1174	And how many dwelling- houses have you? 1174 Are the men of Piraeus,"they asked,"prepared to surrender Piraeus and Munychia in the same way?
1174	As long as their own bodies were safe and sound, why need they take to heart the loss of a few wooden hulls? 1174 Do you not see,"he urged,"that your success followed close on the heels of necessity?
1174	I ask then is the man who tenders such advice in the full light of day justly to be regarded as a traitor, and not as a benefactor? 1174 Men of Lacedaemon and of the allied states,"he said,"are you aware of a silent but portentous growth within the bosom of Hellas?
1174	Such being our unbiased wishes,he continued,"for what earthly reason should( the Hellenes or) the king go to war with us?
1174	Was he to continue his advance?
1174	Were these magistrates, or merely popular leaders?
1174	While, then, I am on my way thither,rejoined Agesilaus,"will you support my army with provisions?"
1174	Why yield obedience to these Thirty?
1174	( 14) Or,"are you aware of a new power growing up in Hellas?"
1174	( 14) What is the date of this incident?
1174	( 5) Accordingly the ephors questioned their informant:"How say you the occurrence is to take place?"
1174	( 5) Is it not self- evident that your safety altogether depends upon the sea?
1174	( 7) Then, as the inquiry went on, the question came:"And where did they propose to find arms?"
1174	( 8) In what part of Hellas, tell me, sir, do Hellenes keep a truce with traitors, double- dyed deserters, and tyrants?
1174	( 8) Or,"what consistency is there between these precepts of yours and political independence?"
1174	369?
1174	400(?).
1174	400- 399(?).
1174	401(?).
1174	416?
1174	Accordingly he sent to Pharnabazus and put it to him point- blank: Which will you have, peace or war?
1174	Again he replied-- How could he trust to their words when they had lied to him already?
1174	Agesilaus:"Have you observed how beautiful his son is?"
1174	And as to men, which will be the better able to man vessels, think you-- Athens, or ourselves with our stalwart and numerous Penestae?
1174	And as to their confident spirit, who shall attempt to describe it?
1174	And being asked,"What act( would satisfy him)?"
1174	And what shall we say of the Corinthians?
1174	And when the latter demurred to that solution, asking"What sort of trial that would be where the offenders were also the judges?"
1174	But after dinner, when Cyrus drank to his health, asking him"What he could do to gratify him most?"
1174	But tell me, Cinadon,''I said to him,''why have you bidden me count them?''
1174	But the Eleians?
1174	But they seemed to tarry a long time, and Agesilaus asked:"What say you, King Otys-- shall we summon him hither ourselves?
1174	But what of the man who pleases neither?
1174	Can it be our duty at all to spare him?
1174	Did you not say just now, Sir, that you came to make an alliance on terms of absolute equality,''share and share alike''?
1174	Do you imagine that you may be robbed of the power of life and death over whom you please, should you condescend to a legal trial?
1174	Do you know the poem?"
1174	Do you not agree?
1174	Do you not think that the ephors themselves, and the whole commonwealth besides, would hold this renegade worthy of condign punishment?
1174	For what does the alternative mean?
1174	For what were their services to you?
1174	Had he not been defeated in Lacedaemon, with a large body of heavy infantry, by a handful of men?
1174	Had we been forced to meet them vanguard to vanguard, on an equal footing, who could have been surprised?
1174	Have I not avenged you of your enemy?"
1174	He said,"Men of Athens, do you not see how you are being deluded?
1174	He sat down, and then Procles of Phlius got up and spoke as follows:"What would happen, men of Athens, if the Lacedaemonians were well out of the way?
1174	How many friends have they left to them to- day?
1174	How shall I, who dealt justice upon him, justly suffer death at your hands?
1174	How shall you longer be held blameless before that fatherland which honours you and in which you fare so well?''
1174	If danger were ever again to visit Hellas from the barbarian world outside, in whom would you place your confidence if not in the Lacedaemonians?
1174	If so, what fairer test of courage will you propose than the arbitrament of war-- the war just ended?
1174	If, then, you have no monopoly of justice, can it be on the score of courage that you are warranted to hold your heads so high?
1174	In danger, do I say, of losing their lives?
1174	Is it not plain that these preparations are for an expedition which will do us some mischief?"
1174	Is it not then reasonable that out of agreement should spring concord rather than discord?
1174	Is it that you are more just than ourselves?
1174	Is it their wide empire of which you are afraid?
1174	It is this: Satyrus, bade him"Be silent, or he would rue the day;"to which he made answer,"And if I be silent, shall I not rue it?"
1174	Jason, if all you say be true, why do you hesitate?
1174	Leotychides:"How so, seeing that I am not dead?"
1174	Nor was Thebes an exception; for was not the governor a brother of Agesilaus?
1174	Of Pellene( or Pellana) in Laconia, not Pellene in Achaia?
1174	Or is it conceivable that he prefers spending money in making others great to finding his favourite projects realised without expense?
1174	Or is it on these Laconian friends of yours that you pride yourselves?
1174	Or,"upon the strand or coast road or coast land of Achaia"( aliter{ ten aigialon}(?)
1174	Otys asked:"Is Spithridates of one mind with you in this proposal?"
1174	Otys:"Why not ask if your project pleases Spithridates too?"
1174	Ought we not rather, when we know the doublings of his nature, to guard against them, lest we enable him presently to practise on ourselves?
1174	Pharnabazus replied:"Shall I tell you plainly what I will do?"
1174	Presently the question rose, How they were to get money to pay their guards?
1174	Suppose, then, we were to shake hands, from what quarter can we reasonably anticipate danger and trouble?
1174	That which I have pictured as desirable, or that which my colleagues yonder are producing?
1174	The Thebans, it was certain, would soon be with them; for had they not borrowed ten talents( 20) from Elis in order to be able to send aid?
1174	The ephors asked:"How many do you reckon are in the secret of this matter?"
1174	The two armies were now close together, when one of the older men lifted up his voice and cried:"Why need we fight, sirs?
1174	Then Meidias asked,"And where am I to live, Dercylidas?"
1174	Then, again, what was the proper depth of line to be given to the different army corps?
1174	Trubner, 1884)?
1174	Was Gytheum taken?
1174	Was ever bride led home by such an escort of cavalry and light- armed troops and heavy infantry, as shall escort your wife home to your palace?"
1174	Was it not the people itself, the democracy, who voted the constitution of the Four Hundred?
1174	Was it not, pray, the great king who demanded that all the states in Hellas should be independent?
1174	Was not my door open in old days to every comer?
1174	Was there not timber enough and to spare in the king''s territory?"
1174	Was this portion of the"Hellenica"written before the expedition of Cyrus?
1174	Well, then, freedom given and wealth added-- what more would you desire to fill the cup of happiness to overflowing?"
1174	Well, then, how does the matter stand?
1174	Were ever nuptials celebrated on so grand a scale before?
1174	What are you afraid of, that you press forward with such hot haste?
1174	What in heaven''s name are we to call him?
1174	What then, when he came furnished with vile moneys, to corrupt you therewith, to bribe you to make him once more lord and master of the state?
1174	What, I ask you, of a man who so openly studied the art of self- seeking, deaf alike to the pleas of honour and to the claims of friendship?
1174	When he had reached that city the first move was made by Tissaphernes, who sent asking,"With what purpose he was come thither?"
1174	When the inventory of the paternal property was completed, he proceeded:"Tell me, Meidias, to whom did Mania belong?"
1174	When they were seated Dercylidas put certain questions:"Tell me, Meidias, did your father leave you heir to his estates?"
1174	Who else but they have now brought it about that we should be fined for appearing at Lacedaemon?
1174	Why not rather make truce and part friends?"
1174	Will some one of you escort me to the place where the property of Mania and Pharnabazus lies?"
1174	With which condition of affairs here in Athens do you think will Thrasybulus and Anytus and the other exiles be the better pleased?
1174	Would not leniency towards such a creature be misplaced?
1174	and for what purpose but to deter any one else for the future from venturing to expose the proceedings at Phlius?"
1174	and what have we Athenians, who are in full agreement with the king, both in word and deed, to fear from him?
1174	how much pasturage?"
1174	how, again, was he to prevent Pharnabazus from overriding the Hellenic states in pure contempt with his cavalry?
1174	or is it not more likely a Persian or native word, Karanos?
1174	or is{ koiranos} the connecting link?
1174	or why should he expend his money?
1174	or why, when we tell them that we have no need of them at present, do they insist on preparing for a foreign campaign?
1174	the Achaeans?
1174	the Arcadians?
1174	they asked,"Why assign to them the privilege of destroying the State?"
1174	what evil have we wrought you at any time?
1174	what is it really that has brought us here?
1174	what landed estates?
1174	why do you not march at once against Pharsalia?"
1174	why would you slay us?
1174	you-- Critias?
1174	{ karenon})= chief?
1580	), said he; did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate?
1580	Admitting this view, I ask of you, what good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the science of itself, effect?
1580	And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her?
1580	And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their own business only?
1580	And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice?
1580	And can that be good which does not make men good?
1580	And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also?
1580	And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely?
1580	And he who does so does his duty?
1580	And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in what relates to these?
1580	And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous?
1580	And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness?
1580	And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness and agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad?
1580	And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far better than quietness and slowness?
1580	And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather than quietly and slowly?
1580	And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a quietness?
1580	And is temperance a good?
1580	And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject- matter of health and disease?
1580	And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of what?
1580	And the inference is that temperance can not be modesty-- if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good?
1580	And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation?
1580	And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium?
1580	And the temperate are also good?
1580	And they are right, and you would agree with them?
1580	And to read quickly or slowly?
1580	And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this?
1580	And what if I am?
1580	And what is it?
1580	And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business?
1580	And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily, or quietly and slowly?
1580	And which, I said, is better-- facility in learning, or difficulty in learning?
1580	And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use?
1580	And will wisdom give health?
1580	And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what was not your own business?
1580	And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate in doing another''s work, as well as in doing their own?
1580	And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good?
1580	Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom?
1580	Are you right, Charmides?
1580	But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine-- what is the subject of temperance or wisdom?
1580	But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge of medicine?
1580	But even if knowledge can know itself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what we do not know?
1580	But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice?
1580	But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to prove beneficial, and when not?
1580	But of what is this knowledge?
1580	But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no subject- matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences?
1580	But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always good?
1580	But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom?
1580	But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this?
1580	But where does Dr. Jackson find any such notion as this in Plato or anywhere in ancient philosophy?
1580	But which is best when you are at the writing- master''s, to write the same letters quickly or quietly?
1580	But which most tends to make him happy?
1580	But why do you not call him, and show him to us?
1580	Can you show me any such result of them?
1580	Can you tell me?
1580	Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates?
1580	Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself, and of all other desires?
1580	Did you ever observe that this is what they say?
1580	Do you admit that?
1580	Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking?
1580	Do you mean that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of good actions, is temperance?
1580	For is not the discovery of things as they truly are, a good common to all mankind?
1580	For why should Aristotle, because he has quoted several Dialogues of Plato, have quoted them all?
1580	Has he not a beautiful face?
1580	Have we not long ago asseverated that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing else?
1580	He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right, in relation to health and disease?
1580	How can you think that I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself?
1580	How is that?
1580	How is this riddle to be explained?
1580	How so?
1580	How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage?
1580	How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building?
1580	I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same?
1580	I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another also?
1580	I said, or without my consent?
1580	I said; is not this rather the effect of medicine?
1580	I was, he replied; but what is your drift?
1580	In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is Temperance?
1580	Is it of him you are speaking or of some one else?
1580	Is not medicine, I said, the science of health?
1580	Is not that true?
1580	Is not that true?
1580	Is not that true?
1580	Is that true?
1580	Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes?
1580	Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something else?
1580	Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will he proceed?
1580	May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game of draughts?
1580	Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom is the science?
1580	Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes?
1580	Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has no object of fear?
1580	Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,--do they not each of them do their own work?
1580	Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half?
1580	Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort?
1580	Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them?
1580	Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general?
1580	Or of computation?
1580	Or of health?
1580	Or of working in brass?
1580	Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves?
1580	Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying;--have you or have you not this quality of temperance?
1580	Shall I tell you the nature of the difficulty?
1580	Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this?
1580	Shall we speak of the soul and its qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, as feminine or neuter?
1580	That is your meaning?
1580	The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate of human beings, is asked by Socrates,''What is Temperance?''
1580	Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good?
1580	Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but not what he knows?
1580	Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows?
1580	Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?
1580	Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one''s own business; not at least in this way, or doing things of this sort?
1580	Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest agility and quickness, is noblest and best?
1580	Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance?
1580	Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, naked and undisguised?
1580	Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good?
1580	Think over all this, and, like a brave youth, tell me-- What is temperance?
1580	Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name?
1580	Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is noble?
1580	Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question-- Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something?
1580	Was he a fool who told you, Charmides?
1580	Was he right who affirmed that?
1580	Was not that your statement?
1580	Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom-- to know what is known and what is unknown to us?
1580	Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, and is of a nature to be a science of something?
1580	Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says,''Modesty is not good for a needy man''?
1580	Were we not right in making that admission?
1580	What do you mean?
1580	What do you mean?
1580	What is that?
1580	What makes you think so?
1580	Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater?
1580	Who is he, I said; and who is his father?
1580	Why not, I said; but will he come?
1580	Why not?
1580	With my consent?
1580	Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?
1580	Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy?
1580	You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about?
1580	and in what cases do you mean?
1580	or do all equally make him happy?
1580	or must the craftsman necessarily know when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work which he is doing?
1580	the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing?
1666	And Byrrhena spake unto mee and sayd, I pray you Cousine how like you our countrey?
1666	And dost thou live here as a ghost or hogge, to our great shame and ignominy?
1666	And if it had so come to passe that this fearefull maid had beene slaine by him, what danger had we beene in?
1666	And moreover she sayd, O Lucius, I have nourished thee with myne owne proper hand: and why not?
1666	And to counterfeit the matter, he would come to Charites and say: O what a losse have I had of my friend, my fellow, my companion Lepolemus?
1666	And when I was out I cried, O sirrah Hostler where art thou?
1666	And wil you not cease in your husbands armes?
1666	And you( you harlot) doe you not goe to see your parents?
1666	And( espying a Church on the top of a high hill) she said, What can I tell whether my husband and master be there or no?
1666	Are you in the mind that you will not tarry in Thessaly?
1666	Art thou afraid of the old woman more then halfe dead, whom with a stripe of thy heele thou maist easily dispatch?
1666	Be you not afraid of spirits?
1666	But I finely feigning and colouring the matter for the time, did breake off his talk, and tooke him by the hand and sayd, Why tarry we?
1666	But I pray you tell me how have you been the cause and mean of my trouble and sorrow?
1666	But Venus began to cry and sayd, What hath my sonne gotten any Love?
1666	But what gainest thou through my delay?
1666	But whither shall I fly?
1666	Canst thou not goe?
1666	Come on, we will beare you company?
1666	Commest thou hither to eat, where we should weepe and lament?
1666	Couldest not thou( that so often in his life time diddest spurne and kicke him) defend him now at the point of death by the like meane?
1666	Did not I alwayes give thee a charge?
1666	Did not I gently will thee to beware?
1666	Do dead men use to run away in this Countrey?
1666	Doest thou not know( Foole as thou art) if thou be naked, if ten Gyants should assaile thee, they could not spoyle or rob thee?
1666	Doth he seeme alwayes unto you to be a childe?
1666	For what availed the theeves: the beasts savage: thy great servitude: the ill and dangerous waits: the long passages: the feare of death every day?
1666	How happy shall we be, that shall see this Infant nourished amongst so great plenty of Treasure?
1666	How shall I represse this beast?
1666	I being then forced by necessity, though it were against my wil, uncovered the bodies: but O good Lord what a strange sight did I see, what a monster?
1666	I pray thee gentle bird that doest serve me so faithfully, tell me what she is, and what is her name that hath troubled my son in such sort?
1666	If Jupiter transformed himselfe into a Bull, why may it not be that under the shape of this Asse, is hidden the figure of a man, or some power divine?
1666	If you be a bird, where shall I seek you, and when shall I see you?
1666	In their returne homeward they murmured within themselves, saying, How say you sister to so apparent a lye of Psyches?
1666	In what cave or darknesse shall I hide my selfe, to avoid the furor of Venus?
1666	Is this an honest thing, is this honourable to thy parents?
1666	Know you not in what place you be?
1666	Know you not that we use to take no gage, unless it be either plate or Jewels?
1666	Knowst thou not that the theeves have ordained to slay thee?
1666	Mary( quoth shee) do you see these Bay windowes, which on one side abut to the gates of the city, and on the other side to the next lane?
1666	O rash and bold lampe, the vile ministery of love, how darest thou bee so bold as to burne the god of all fire?
1666	Or have you forgotten of what yeares he is?
1666	Or shall I seeke for counsel of every poore rusticall woman?
1666	Or why did they not slay thee likewise?
1666	Passe you all the day and the night in weeping?
1666	Saw you not sister what was in the house, what great store of jewels, what glittering robes, what Gemmes, what gold we trod on?
1666	Shall I aske ayd of myne enemy Sobriety, whom I have often offended to engender thee?
1666	The Hostler lying behinde the stable doore upon a pallet, and half asleepe, What( quoth hee) doe you not know that the wayes be very dangerous?
1666	Then Thrasillus having found opportunity to worke his treason, said to Lepolemus: What stand we here amazed?
1666	Then Venus with indignation cried out, What is it she?
1666	Then answered he, I will tell you soone, but brother I pray you tell mee of your comming from the isle of Euboea, and how you sped by the way?
1666	Then he laughed upon me saying: How long shall we nourish and keepe this fiery Asse in vaine?
1666	Then one of the shepheards said: Why doe we not make sacrifice of this common adulterous Asse?
1666	Then one of them that came last answered, Why are you only ignorant, that the greater the number is, the sooner they may rob and spoyle the house?
1666	Then said Fotis, Wil you go about to deceive me now, and inforce me to work my own sorrow?
1666	Then said I, It is well nigh day, and moreover, what can theeves take from him that hath nothing?
1666	Then said the shepheards, What?
1666	Then there came forth a maid which said, Ho sirrah that knocks so fast, in what kinde of sort will you borrow money?
1666	Then thought I with my selfe, Alasse where is faith?
1666	Then with resemblance of admiration, What( quoth I) is she so excellent a person as you name her to be?
1666	To what a point am I now driven?
1666	To whom I answered, I pray you maid speak more gently, and tel me whether thy master be within or no?
1666	To whom he made answere saying: Doe you looke for any meate or drinke, or any other refection here?
1666	To whom shall I seeme to tell any similitude of truth, when as I shall tell the trueth in deed?
1666	We most humbly intreat you to pardon his fault if he have accorded to the mind of any maiden: what do you not know that he is a young man?
1666	What a comfort will it be unto all the house?
1666	What crime hast thou committed?
1666	What did he think that I was a bawd, by whose shew he fell acquainted with the maid?
1666	What do I finde heere?
1666	What do I know whether he( whom I seeke for) be in his mothers house or no?
1666	What is he that in so short a space can become so old?
1666	What is that?
1666	What judgement was there likewise amongst the Athenian lawyers, sage and expert in all sciences?
1666	What lodging shall I seek?
1666	What meane you to revenge your selves upon us, that doe you no harme?
1666	What meane you to rise at this time of night?
1666	What shall I do?
1666	What sudden change of all my sorrows?
1666	What thinke you to gaine by us?
1666	What, dost thou make thy selfe ignorant, as though thou didst not understand what travell wee have taken in searching for thee?
1666	What, thinke you( quoth she) to deprive our young men of the price of your ransome?
1666	What?
1666	When night was passed Venus called Psyches, and said, Seest thou yonder Forest that extendeth out in length with the river?
1666	Where is his great and new cut?
1666	Where is his wound?
1666	Where is remorse of conscience?
1666	Where is the Sponge?
1666	Wherefore sell you this fish so deare, which is not worth a halfepenny?
1666	Which when I heard, I sayd to one who passed by, What is here to doe?
1666	Which when her husband did heare, he demanded of her by what reason she knew it?
1666	Whither shall I goe?
1666	Who is he that passeth by the way and will not take me up?
1666	Why did they spare thee that stood by and saw them commit that horrible fact?
1666	Why do I not take a good heart, and offer my selfe with humilitie unto her, whose anger I have wrought?
1666	Why do we not give him to some body for he earneth not his hay?
1666	Why doe I delay?
1666	Why dost thou not looke for thy death?
1666	Why dost thou not rather tell us where thou hast hidden the boy whom thou hast slaine?
1666	Why dost thou rashly yeeld unto thy last perill and danger?
1666	Why dost thou seek thine own harme, and mine likewise?
1666	Why knocke ye your breasts for me?
1666	Why leese we so worthy a prey with our feminine hearts?
1666	Why lose wee the pleasure of this faire morning?
1666	Why show we our selves like dastards?
1666	Why soyle ye your faces with teares, which I ought to adore and worship?
1666	Why teare you my eyes in yours?
1666	Why trouble you your spirits, which are more rather mine than yours?
1666	Why wilt thou not goe?
1666	Why wilt thou runne into destruction by meane of my feet?
1666	Why wouldst thou goe so willingly to hell?
1666	Will you blame his luxury?
1666	Will you bridle his love?
1666	Will you rob me?
1666	Yea verily( quoth I), why not?
1666	Yes( quoth shee) that he is, why doe you aske?
1666	You are his mother, and a kind woman, will you continually search out his dalliance?
1666	and why should you seeke the death of her, whom he doth fancie?
1666	and will you reprehend your owne art and delights in him?
1666	how faireth it with thee?
1666	seest thou not these sharpe and pointed flints which shall bruise and teare thee in peeces, if by adventure thou happen upon them?
1666	the usurper of my beauty, the Vicar of my name?
1666	thinkest thou we handle thee otherwise then thou deservest, which hast stollen away our Asse?
1666	what shall I do?
1666	whether shee be any of the Nymphs, of the number of the goddesses, of the company of the Muses, or of the mistery of the Graces?
1666	whither shall I go?
1666	why pull you your hory haires?
1636	''But did I call this"love"?
1636	Am I not right, Phaedrus?
1636	Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus?
1636	And are not they held to be the wisest physicians who have the greatest distrust of their art?
1636	And do you tell me, instead, what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law court-- are they not contending?
1636	And if I am to add the praises of the non- lover what will become of me?
1636	And if he came to his right mind, would he ever imagine that the desires were good which he conceived when in his wrong mind?
1636	And now, dear Phaedrus, I shall pause for an instant to ask whether you do not think me, as I appear to myself, inspired?
1636	And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine that I am going to improve upon the ingenuity of Lysias?
1636	And what is good or bad writing or speaking?
1636	But I should like to know whether you have the same feeling as I have about the rhetoricians?
1636	But how much is left?
1636	But if I am to read, where would you please to sit?
1636	But if this be true, must not the soul be the self- moving, and therefore of necessity unbegotten and immortal?
1636	But let me ask you, friend: have we not reached the plane- tree to which you were conducting us?
1636	But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthily?
1636	But what do you mean?
1636	But what pleasure or consolation can the beloved be receiving all this time?
1636	But why did you make your second oration so much finer than the first?
1636	But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech?
1636	Can I be wrong in supposing that Lysias gave you a feast of discourse?
1636	Can we suppose''the young man to have told such lies''about his master while he was still alive?
1636	Can we wonder that few of them''come sweetly from nature,''while ten thousand reviewers( mala murioi) are engaged in dissecting them?
1636	Do we see as clearly as Hippocrates''that the nature of the body can only be understood as a whole''?
1636	Do you ever cross the border?
1636	Do you not perceive that I am already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me?
1636	Do you think that a lover only can be a firm friend?
1636	Do you?
1636	Does he not define probability to be that which the many think?
1636	For do we not often make''the worse appear the better cause;''and do not''both parties sometimes agree to tell lies''?
1636	For example, are we to attribute his tripartite division of the soul to the gods?
1636	For example, when he is speaking of the soul does he mean the human or the divine soul?
1636	For lovers repent--''SOCRATES: Enough:--Now, shall I point out the rhetorical error of those words?
1636	For this is a necessary preliminary to the other question-- How is the non- lover to be distinguished from the lover?
1636	For what should a man live if not for the pleasures of discourse?
1636	How could there have been so much cultivation, so much diligence in writing, and so little mind or real creative power?
1636	Is he serious, again, in regarding love as''a madness''?
1636	Is not all literature passing into criticism, just as Athenian literature in the age of Plato was degenerating into sophistry and rhetoric?
1636	Is not legislation too a sort of literary effort, and might not statesmanship be described as the''art of enchanting''the house?
1636	Is not pleading''an art of speaking unconnected with the truth''?
1636	Is not the discourse excellent, more especially in the matter of the language?
1636	Is there any principle in them?
1636	Lysias then, I suppose, was in the town?
1636	May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry.--Anything more?
1636	Might he not argue,''that a rational being should not follow the dictates of passion in the most important act of his or her life''?
1636	Might he not ask, whether we''care more for the truth of religion, or for the speaker and the country from which the truth comes''?
1636	Nor, until they adopt our method of reading and writing, can we admit that they write by rules of art?
1636	Now I have no leisure for such enquiries; shall I tell you why?
1636	Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non- lover?
1636	Now what is that sort of thing but a regular piece of authorship?
1636	Now, Socrates, what do you think?
1636	Of the world which is beyond the heavens, who can tell?
1636	Or is he serious in holding that each soul bears the character of a god?
1636	Or is this merely assigned to them by way of parallelism with men?
1636	Or that Isocrates himself is the enemy of Plato and his school?
1636	Or, again, in his absurd derivation of mantike and oionistike and imeros( compare Cratylus)?
1636	PHAEDRUS: About what conclusion?
1636	PHAEDRUS: And is this the exact spot?
1636	PHAEDRUS: And what are these arguments, Socrates?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Do you see the tallest plane- tree in the distance?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Had not Protagoras something of the same sort?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How so?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How so?
1636	PHAEDRUS: How so?
1636	PHAEDRUS: I have never noticed it; but I beseech you to tell me, Socrates, do you believe this tale?
1636	PHAEDRUS: I think that I understand you; but will you explain yourself?
1636	PHAEDRUS: In what direction then?
1636	PHAEDRUS: In what way?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Isocrates the fair:--What message will you send to him, and how shall we describe him?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Need we?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Not yet, Socrates; not until the heat of the day has passed; do you not see that the hour is almost noon?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Show what?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Then why are you still at your tricks?
1636	PHAEDRUS: There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What are they?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What do you mean, my good Socrates?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What error?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What gifts do you mean?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What is our method?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What is the other principle, Socrates?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What is there remarkable in the epitaph?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What name would you assign to them?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What of that?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What shall we say to him?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What would you prophesy?
1636	PHAEDRUS: What?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Who are they, and where did you hear anything better than this?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Whom do you mean, and what is his origin?
1636	PHAEDRUS: Will you go on?
1636	PHAEDRUS: You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image?
1636	SOCRATES: About the just and unjust-- that is the matter in dispute?
1636	SOCRATES: And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honourable has less understanding, than the husbandman, about his own seeds?
1636	SOCRATES: And do you think that you can know the nature of the soul intelligently without knowing the nature of the whole?
1636	SOCRATES: And how did he entertain you?
1636	SOCRATES: And when he speaks in the assembly, he will make the same things seem good to the city at one time, and at another time the reverse of good?
1636	SOCRATES: And when men are deceived and their notions are at variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through resemblances?
1636	SOCRATES: And will not Sophocles say to the display of the would- be tragedian, that this is not tragedy but the preliminaries of tragedy?
1636	SOCRATES: And will you go on with the narration?
1636	SOCRATES: And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at once?
1636	SOCRATES: But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves?
1636	SOCRATES: Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias?
1636	SOCRATES: Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God?
1636	SOCRATES: Do you mean that I am not in earnest?
1636	SOCRATES: Does not your simplicity observe that I have got out of dithyrambics into heroics, when only uttering a censure on the lover?
1636	SOCRATES: He, then, who would deceive others, and not be deceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences of things?
1636	SOCRATES: I have now said all that I have to say of the art of rhetoric: have you anything to add?
1636	SOCRATES: In good speaking should not the mind of the speaker know the truth of the matter about which he is going to speak?
1636	SOCRATES: In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?
1636	SOCRATES: It was foolish, I say,--to a certain extent, impious; can anything be more dreadful?
1636	SOCRATES: Let me put the matter thus: When will there be more chance of deception-- when the difference is large or small?
1636	SOCRATES: May not''the wolf,''as the proverb says,''claim a hearing''?
1636	SOCRATES: My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither are you going?
1636	SOCRATES: Now to which class does love belong-- to the debatable or to the undisputed class?
1636	SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I will do?
1636	SOCRATES: Shall we discuss the rules of writing and speech as we were proposing?
1636	SOCRATES: Should we not offer up a prayer first of all to the local deities?
1636	SOCRATES: Then as to the other topics-- are they not thrown down anyhow?
1636	SOCRATES: Then do you think that any one of this class, however ill- disposed, would reproach Lysias with being an author?
1636	SOCRATES: Then in some things we agree, but not in others?
1636	SOCRATES: Well, and is not Eros the son of Aphrodite, and a god?
1636	SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1636	SOCRATES: When any one speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all?
1636	SOCRATES: Who is he?
1636	SOCRATES: Why, do you not know that when a politician writes, he begins with the names of his approvers?
1636	Shall we say a word to him or not?
1636	Socrates as yet does not know himself; and why should he care to know about unearthly monsters?
1636	Then again in the noble art of politics, who thinks of first principles and of true ideas?
1636	These are the commonplaces of the subject which must come in( for what else is there to be said?)
1636	Was he equally serious in the rest?
1636	We may raise the same question in another form: Is marriage preferable with or without love?
1636	Well, the teacher will say, is this, Phaedrus and Socrates, your account of the so- called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another?
1636	What would Socrates think of our newspapers, of our theology?
1636	What would he have said of the discovery of Christian doctrines in these old Greek legends?
1636	What would he say of the Church, which we praise in like manner,''meaning ourselves,''without regard to history or experience?
1636	What would they say if they saw that we, like the many, are not conversing, but slumbering at mid- day, lulled by their voices, too indolent to think?
1636	While acknowledging that such interpretations are''very nice,''would he not have remarked that they are found in all sacred literatures?
1636	Who would imagine that Lysias, who is here assailed by Socrates, is the son of his old friend Cephalus?
1636	Who would suspect that the wise Critias, the virtuous Charmides, had ended their lives among the thirty tyrants?
1636	Who, for example, could speak on this thesis of yours without praising the discretion of the non- lover and blaming the indiscretion of the lover?
1636	Why did history degenerate into fable?
1636	Why did poetry droop and languish?
1636	Why did the physical sciences never arrive at any true knowledge or make any real progress?
1636	Why did words lose their power of expression?
1636	Why do I say so?
1636	Why do you not proceed?
1636	Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic?
1636	Why were ages of external greatness and magnificence attended by all the signs of decay in the human mind which are possible?
1636	Will he not choose a beloved who is delicate rather than sturdy and strong?
1636	Would he not have asked of us, or rather is he not asking of us, Whether we have ceased to prefer appearances to reality?
1636	Would they not have a right to laugh at us?
1636	Yes; but is not even a ridiculous friend better than a cunning enemy?
1636	and are they both equally self- moving and constructed on the same threefold principle?
1636	and will not Acumenus say the same of medicine to the would- be physician?
1636	or, whether the''select wise''are not''the many''after all?
1170	A peltast, then?
1170	And the neighbouring country?
1170	And yet, if we yield ourselves and fall into the king''s power, need we ask what our fate will be? 1170 But consider one point,"urged Xenophon;"if we are to march by night, is not the Hellenic fashion best?
1170	But how,it was asked,"will they manage to wrestle on the hard scrubby ground?"
1170	But let me ask you, in what condition do you turn your backs on this 31 land to- day? 1170 But what right have I to be drawing conclusions about stealing in your presence, Cheirisophus?
1170	But when they have expended their ammunition,said Xenophon,"there is nothing else, is there, to hinder our passing?
1170	Dost thou not mark how my son has sneezed a blessing on all my words?
1170	Good,said Xenophon,"but to what use do you propose to put us, if we become your allies?
1170	How then are we to get them collected?
1170	Nay,retorted Xenophon,"by the same token we shall all one day be dead, but that is no reason why meantime we should all be buried alive?"
1170	Some one may say, are you not ashamed to be so taken in like a fool? 1170 Then what injury have you received from me,"Cyrus asked,"that now for the third time, you have been detected in a treasonous plot against me?"
1170	Then, once more having discovered the limits of your power, did you flee to the altar of Artemis, crying out that you repented? 1170 Well then,"said Xenophon,"supposing we came, what should you be able to give us?
1170	Well then,said they,"he will oppose our taking away the troops, will he not?"
1170	Well,said he,"was he any the less dead when I reported him to you?"
1170	What was the country?
1170	What, must we anticipate, will now be our fate? 1170 Why had he not invited Xenophon with the others?"
1170	Why, when we had it in our power to destroy you, did we not proceed to do it? 1170 ( 1) Can this be the same man whose escape is so graphically described above? 1170 --How say you the same views?"
1170	5 Then at last he recognised him, and inquired:"Are you the fellow who carried home the sick man?"
1170	After that they asked,"Were there any captains of light infantry willing to accompany the expedition?"
1170	After that,"and at this point Cyrus turned to Orontas, and addressed him personally--"after that, did I do you any wrong?"
1170	And Clearchus answered:"So, then, that is your 20 deliberate view?
1170	And again,"For whom are the horses being bred?"
1170	And how do you propose to stimulate their sense of awe, and keep them in good behaviour towards you?
1170	And now, since we have reached Hellenic cities, how has it fared with us?
1170	And what had we?
1170	And what will you in turn be able to do to assist our passage?"
1170	And you, who know all this, how can you say that it is mere nonsense to talk of self- defence?
1170	Are not all things in all ways subject to the gods?
1170	Are these things so?"
1170	Are you minded to stop and keep truce, or is there to be war?
1170	As soon as he was fully awake, the first clear thought which came into his head was, Why am I lying here?
1170	As to the generals, their immediate concern was to try and gain some information as to Seuthes:"Was he hostile or friendly?
1170	At this point he again questioned Medosades,"Whether the words attributed to him were exact?"
1170	But how so?
1170	But if he who partly gave you this security has failed to pay in full the wages due to you therefrom, is not that a terrible misfortune?
1170	But now, what do you think of their case, these men of Cerasus?
1170	But what is your behaviour?
1170	But you will tell me, perhaps, that I get from Seuthes what is by right yours, and that I deal subtly by you?
1170	But, granted that the rivers do bar our passage, and that guides are not forthcoming, what care we?
1170	Cheirisophus answered:"But why should you go and leave your command in the rear?
1170	Cheirisophus answered:"Look up there,"pointing as he spoke to the mountain,"do you see how inaccessible it all is?
1170	Clearchus listened to the reasoning, and then he asked the messenger,"How large the country between the Tigris and the canal might be?"
1170	Clearly, the attacking party must either conquer or be worsted: if they conquer, what need of their breaking down the bridge?
1170	Consider, then; is it better to go and meet the foe with arms advanced, or with arms reversed to watch him as he assails us on our rear?
1170	Could any one make you believe that the sun rises here and sets there, or that he sets here and rises there?
1170	Did Cheirisophus conceivably die of fever brought on by some poisonous draught?
1170	Did I ask you for something and, on your refusing it to me, did I proceed to beat you?
1170	Did any one ever die in battle from the bite or kick of a horse?
1170	Do I hinder any of them from speaking any word of import in his power?
1170	Do not the cities which gave us birth yield them obedience also?
1170	Do you not see all these great plains, which you find it hard enough to traverse even when they are friendly?
1170	Does not the surgeon also cauterise and cut us for our good?
1170	Eucleides congratulated Xenophon upon his safe return, and asked him how much gold he had got?
1170	For if I am not much mistaken, the enemy were close at our heels?"
1170	For what of the man who can not be trusted?
1170	Galloping up to the front himself, he asked:"Why do you summon me?"
1170	Have you not wintered here in the lap of plenty?
1170	Hearing this, Xenophon dismounted, and the other asked:"Why do you dismount just when speed is the thing we want?"
1170	How are we to march most safely?
1170	However, why do you address yourself to me?
1170	I ask then, with all these banded together against us, is there any one so insensate as to imagine that we can survive the contest?
1170	I ask you, does it seem to you that we lack the means, if we had the will, to destroy you?
1170	I now call upon you, and you first, Clearchus, to declare your opinion-- what think you?"
1170	If as our master, why need he ask for them rather than come and take them?
1170	If we can trust any guide whom Cyrus may vouchsafe to us, why not order Cyrus at once to occupy the pass on our behoof?
1170	In this way he contrived to turn back and consult the victims,"Would the gods allow him to try and bring the army over to Seuthes?"
1170	In your choice of leaders do I stand in the way of any one, is that it?
1170	It is a little dangerous for myself, is it not?
1170	Nay, if in a fit of madness we murdered you, what then?
1170	Now is that a point in which a man might hope to cheat you?
1170	Now, sirs, is it not clear that all these good things belong to whoever has strength to hold them?
1170	Or again, which will be the greater drain on your purse?
1170	Or do you impute the fault to some one not here?
1170	Other people with Cyrus won great success, they were told( 1); why should it not be so with them?
1170	Presently the Lacedaemonians asked:"What sort of man is Xenophon?"
1170	Seuthes put the question,"Would you like to die on his behalf, Episthenes?"
1170	Seuthes, turning to the boy, asked,"Shall I smite him instead of you?"
1170	Should we not ourselves bestow the worst of names on the perpetrators of like deeds?"
1170	The other again asked:"Peace or war, what answer shall I make?"
1170	The others asked,"Were they willing to give them pledges to that effect?"
1170	The soldiers held a meeting, and took counsel about the remainder of the journey: should they make their exit from the Pontus by sea or by land?
1170	The soldiers, on their side, laid the blame of course on Xenophon:"Where was their pay?"
1170	The two were brought up at once and questioned separately:"Did they know of any other road than the one visible?"
1170	Then the Arcadians inquired of Xenophon''s officers-- why they had quenched the watch- fires?
1170	There is no passing, 39 until we have dislodged these fellows; why have you not brought up the light infantry?"
1170	Thereupon they consulted together, and to Xenophon''s inquiry,"What it was which hindered their simply walking in?"
1170	They asked:"Does he play the popular leader?"
1170	Was I not actually on my road home when I turned back?
1170	Was I the worse for liquor, and behaving like a drunkard?"
1170	Was he really leading them to attack the king?
1170	Was it a debt, for which I demanded payment?
1170	Was it not rather, that they had noticed my abundant zeal on your behalf?
1170	Was it, do you suppose, because they detected some ill- will in me towards you that they made the allegation?
1170	What answer shall I take from you?"
1170	What follows?
1170	What friendly city will receive us when they see rampant lawlessness in our midst?
1170	What is it?
1170	What then did common sense suggest?
1170	What wrong did I commit in bringing you, whither you were eager to go?
1170	When Polynicus and I asked Seuthes, what sort of a man he was?
1170	When asked,"What shall you need?"
1170	When the man met each of these questions with a negative, he questioned him further:"Are you a heavy infantry soldier?"
1170	When, lithe of limb, she danced the Pyrrhic( 4), loud clapping followed; and the Paphlagonians asked,"If these women fought by their side in battle?"
1170	Where are the men posted to intercept us?
1170	Who indeed would care to carry a flag of truce, or go as a herald with 30 the blood of heralds upon his hands?
1170	Who was there now to furnish them with a market?
1170	Who will have the courage to afford us a market, when we prove our worthlessness in these weightiest concerns?
1170	Why should it be guarded since it was friendly?
1170	Why?
1170	Will you take us for your allies?
1170	Will you then please inform us as to that point also?
1170	Would you, Xenophon, repeat what you said to us?"
1170	Xenophon inquired:"And how far from the sea shall you expect the army to follow you?"
1170	Xenophon laughed and said:"But supposing these all together do not amount to the pay; for whom is the talent, shall I say?
1170	You ask what it is I would have you to do?
1170	You heard the threats?"
1170	a general to undertake the work?
1170	also, would they have to march through the Sacred mountain( 1), or round about through the middle of Thrace?"
1170	am I waiting till I am older mysef and of riper age?
1170	and all yonder great mountain chains left for you to cross, which we can at any time occupy in advance and render impassable?
1170	and did you thus work upon my feelings, that we a second time shook hands and made interchange of solemn pledges?
1170	and from what city?
1170	and what becomes of the praise we expect to win from the mouths of men?
1170	have we not horsemen enough, or infantry, or whatever other arm you like, whereby we may be able to injure you, without risk of suffering in return?
1170	how can you bid us go again and try the arts of persuasion?
1170	in slaying our benefactor should we not have challenged to enter the lists against us a more formidable antagonist in the king himself?
1170	is not their lordship over all alike outspread?
1170	of striking a blow in your behalf and his own, if that is his choice?
1170	or a quarrel about some boy or other?
1170	or did he die under treatment?
1170	or did he take poison whilst suffering from fever?
1170	or how shall we, who lay the knife to each other''s throats, give battle to our enemies?
1170	or where blows are needed, how are we to fight to the best advantage?
1170	or, finally, of keeping his eyes and ears open to secure your safety?
1170	or, possibly, do we seem to you 17 to lack the physical surroundings suitable for attacking you?
1170	the question arises, Was he equally good as a commander?
1170	the soldiers, the officers, and the generals?
1170	to pay off your present debt, or, with that still owing, to bid for more troops, and of a better quality?
1170	what am I waiting for?
1170	what did I say,"he asked,"at your next visit, when 28 you came to me in Selybria?"
1170	what is happening at this instant?
1170	while others hearing from us a hundred stories in your praise, hasten to present themselves at your desire?
1170	who will vouchsafe it to us, if this is our behaviour?
1170	why have I managed my affairs no better?
1579	''But how is this?''
1579	After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, asks him a new question:''What is friendship?
1579	Am I not right?
1579	And also the vessel which contains the wine?
1579	And another disputed point is, which is the fairer?
1579	And are they right in saying this?
1579	And can he who is not loved be a friend?
1579	And did you ever behave ill to your father or your mother?
1579	And disease is an enemy?
1579	And disease is an evil?
1579	And do they entrust their property to him rather than to you?
1579	And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son?
1579	And do they then permit you to do what you like, and never rebuke you or hinder you from doing what you desire?
1579	And do they trust a hireling more than you?
1579	And does not this seem to put us in the right way?
1579	And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his son he will commit to us?
1579	And friends they can not be, unless they value one another?
1579	And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive and object?
1579	And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a reason?
1579	And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that like must love like?
1579	And he is in want of that of which he is deprived?
1579	And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the sake of health?
1579	And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?
1579	And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?
1579	And health is also dear?
1579	And if dear, then dear for the sake of something?
1579	And if neither can be of any use to the other, how can they be loved by one another?
1579	And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other?
1579	And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge, can you have any conceit of knowledge?
1579	And is he a slave or a free man?
1579	And is he a slave?
1579	And is health a friend, or not a friend?
1579	And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dear nor hateful to him?
1579	And may not the same be said of the friend?
1579	And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?
1579	And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as far as we are useless to them?
1579	And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the evil uncongenial to every one?
1579	And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful thing?
1579	And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous admissions?
1579	And that of which he is in want is dear to him?
1579	And that something dear involves something else dear?
1579	And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends of the art of medicine?
1579	And the good is loved for the sake of the evil?
1579	And the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy?
1579	And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated?
1579	And the more vain- glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture of them?
1579	And the same of thirst and the other desires,--that they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has perished?
1579	And there is Ctesippus himself: do you see him?
1579	And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the son will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his fingers?
1579	And what does he do with you?
1579	And what is this building, I asked; and what sort of entertainment have you?
1579	And what of health?
1579	And which is the nobler?
1579	And who is yours?
1579	And why do you not ask him?
1579	And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of friendship be erroneous?
1579	And yet whiteness would be present in them?
1579	And, if so, not the lover, but the beloved, is the friend or dear one?
1579	Answer me now: Are you your own master, or do they not even allow that?
1579	Are you disposed, he said, to go with me and see them?
1579	Aye, I said; and about your neighbour, too, does not the same rule hold as about your father?
1579	But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule- cart if you like;--they will permit that?
1579	But do you think that any one is happy who is in the condition of a slave, and who can not do what he likes?
1579	But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen vessel which contains them, equally with his son?
1579	But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both together, what are we to say?
1579	But if this can not be, the lover will be the friend of that which is loved?
1579	But is not some less exclusive form of friendship better suited to the condition and nature of man?
1579	But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not evil should perish with it?
1579	But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some other cause of friendship?
1579	But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is like; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is good?
1579	But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this-- are we not indeed entirely wrong?
1579	But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want?
1579	But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the presence of white in them-- they would not be white any more than black?
1579	But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil?
1579	But the sick loves him, because he is sick?
1579	But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be sufficient for himself?
1579	But then arises the consideration, how should these friends in youth or friends of the past regard or be regarded by one another?
1579	But what if the lover is not loved in return?
1579	But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or good?
1579	By heaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect?
1579	Can they now?
1579	Do any remain?
1579	Do they want you to be happy, and yet hinder you from doing what you like?
1579	Do you agree?
1579	Do you agree?
1579	Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the other, they are mutual friends?
1579	Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person whom he says that you love?
1579	Do you not agree with me?
1579	Do you not agree?
1579	Here, intending to revise the argument, I said: Can we point out any difference between the congenial and the like?
1579	How can such persons ever be induced to value one another?
1579	How do you mean?
1579	How do you mean?
1579	How so?
1579	I mean, for instance, if he knew that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would save him, he would value the wine?
1579	I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in our conclusions?
1579	I shall not ask which is the richer of the two, I said; for you are friends, are you not?
1579	I turned to Menexenus, and said: Son of Demophon, which of you two youths is the elder?
1579	If he is satisfied that you know more of housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs himself, or will he commit them to you?
1579	In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the colour or ointment?
1579	In that case, the one loves, and the other is loved?
1579	Is not friendship, even more than love, liable to be swayed by the caprices of fancy?
1579	Is not that true?
1579	Is not that true?
1579	Is not this rather the true state of the case?
1579	Is not this the nature of the good-- to be loved by us who are placed between the two, because of the evil?
1579	Is that also a matter of dispute?
1579	Is that good or evil, or neither?
1579	May not desire be the source of friendship?
1579	May we then infer that the good is the friend?
1579	Nay, but what do you think?
1579	Neither can he love that which he does not desire?
1579	Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love anybody else, in so far as they are useless to them?
1579	No answer is given in the Lysis to the question,''What is Friendship?''
1579	Now is not that ridiculous?
1579	Or are both friends?
1579	Or is, perhaps, even hated?
1579	Or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain, but not so as to be hurtful?
1579	Or rather is there anything to be done?
1579	Or rather shall I say, that to ask what either will be then or will not be is ridiculous, for who knows?
1579	Socrates asks Lysis whether his father and mother do not love him very much?
1579	Thank you, I said; and is there any teacher there?
1579	That I may make a fool of myself?
1579	The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend of the physician-- is he not?
1579	Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial to one another?
1579	Then nothing which does not love in return is beloved by a lover?
1579	Then now we know how to answer the question''Who are friends?''
1579	Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one another?
1579	Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by reason of the presence of evil?
1579	Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good because of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the friend?
1579	Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil, but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now?
1579	Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of the enemy?
1579	Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?
1579	Then what can be the reason, Lysis, I said, why they allow you to do the one and not the other?
1579	Then what is to be done?
1579	Then which is the friend of which?
1579	Then you have a master?
1579	Then, I said, may no one use the whip to the mules?
1579	Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evil will remain?
1579	Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of love or friendship?
1579	They had another perplexity: 8) How could one of the noblest feelings of human nature be so near to one of the most detestable corruptions of it?
1579	They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?
1579	This we do know, that in our present condition hunger may injure us, and may also benefit us:--Is not that true?
1579	Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of some one; is he not?
1579	Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the intemperate, or the good of the bad?
1579	What do the rest of you say?
1579	What do you mean?
1579	What do you mean?
1579	What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey, and made the capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult?
1579	When one man loves another, which is the friend-- he who loves, or he who is loved?
1579	Who are you, I said; and where am I to come?
1579	Who is Lysis?
1579	Whom are we to call friends to one another?
1579	Whom then will they allow?
1579	Why do you say so?
1579	Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them?
1579	Will you tell me by what words or actions I may become endeared to my love?
1579	Yes, I said; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me, and who is the favourite among you?
1579	Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer?
1579	You do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you?
1579	You remember that?
1579	You think not?
1579	You think that he is right?
1579	You will agree to that?
1579	You would agree-- would you not?
1579	and allow him to do what he likes, when they prohibit you?
1579	and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil?
1579	and do they pay him for this?
1579	and may he do what he likes with the horses?
1579	and may not the other theory have been only a long story about nothing?
1579	and what can that final cause or end of friendship be, other than the good?
1579	any more than in the Charmides to the question,''What is Temperance?''
1579	but may not that which is neither good nor evil still in some cases be the friend of the good?
1579	how can you be making and singing hymns in honour of yourself before you have won?
1579	will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, we should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar desire?
1173	And are we two not come together,I continued,"for a closer partnership, being each a sharer in the other''s body?"
1173	And may we not, Meno, truly call those men divine who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?
1173	And what may these things be?
1173	And what sort of works are these?
1173	And why is this?
1173	But what is there that I can do,my wife inquired,"which will help to increase our joint estate?"
1173	Formal language,say you, Socrates?
1173	Has got?
1173	Is questioning after all a kind of teaching?
1173	Shall I then have to do these things?
1173	So I said to her,''Tell me, my wife, after which fashion would you find me the more delectable partner in our joint estate--were I to...? 1173 What art makes an ampler return for their labour to those who work for her?
1173	What art welcomes the stranger with greater prodigality?
1173	When will God moisten the earth,they ask,"and suffer men to sow their seed?"
1173	is it synonymous with dwelling- place, or is all that a man possesses outside his dwelling- place part of his house or estate?
1173	what kind of material, what kind of soil does not become manure when thrown into stagnant water?
1173	what kind of people can be taught them? 1173 when she heard did she give ear at all?"
1173	will he still need something further to complete him?
1173	( Critobulus exclaimed); do you, Socrates, really believe that the king of Persia pays a personal regard to husbandry, along with all his other cares?
1173	( I exclaimed): you mean to say you educate your bailiffs to that extent?
1173	A thing so easy to be learnt, you say?
1173	Actually you make them capable of rule?
1173	After what particular manner do you practise the arts of war?
1173	And are persons devoid of self- control in this respect the only people incapable of diligence and carefulness?
1173	And by the same token land itself is no wealth to a man who so works it that his tillage only brings him loss?
1173	And did your wife join in sacrifice and prayer to that effect?
1173	And does this method of planting apply also to the fig- tree?
1173	And how did you introduce the order she demanded, Ischomachus?
1173	And how do you expect your cutting to root best?--if set straight up from end to end, pointing to the sky?
1173	And how, in Heaven''s name( I asked), do you contrive to educate another in the skill to govern human beings?
1173	And how, in the name of all that is holy, do you pick out whom you will and teach him to have kindly feeling towards yourself and yours?
1173	And is there any one with whom you are less in the habit of conversing than with your wife?
1173	And pray, what may be the reason of that, Socrates?
1173	And should you merely sever the ears at top, or reap close to the ground?
1173	And so I seem to you ridiculous?
1173	And supposing another man''s house to be entrusted to him, he would be able, if he chose, to manage it as skilfully as his own, would he not?
1173	And the others?
1173	And the question which I put to you is this: Would you allow both sorts of soil an equal share of seed?
1173	And what of the foeman?
1173	And what when the weeds spring up together with the corn and choke it?
1173	And when you have no such business on hand( I said) where in heaven''s name do you spend your time and how do you employ yourself?
1173	And who, pray, are these lords that rule them and yet remain unseen?
1173	And why is it that, for all their crowding, the ship''s company[ 9] cause each other no distress?
1173	And, pray, how do you conduct your own case?
1173	And, pray, what is your system when you need a bailiff?
1173	Are they, too, incapable of being trained to give attention to field and farming operations?
1173	Are you not agreed the corn- fields sorely need relief at such a season?
1173	As I understand, you would limit the term to what we may call a man''s useful or advantageous possessions?
1173	At this point[ 4] he took me up, observing: So what you now command me is to teach the art itself of tillage, Socrates?
1173	At what point shall I begin then, Socrates, to revive your recollection[ 10] of the art of husbandry?
1173	Because, you know, we agreed that a man''s estate was identical with his possessions?
1173	But for ordinary people?
1173	But let me ask you a question, Socrates: have those happy husbands, you tell us of, who are blessed with good wives educated them themselves?
1173	But may I ask, is the planting of trees[ 1] a department in the art of husbandry?
1173	But now, should you content yourself with merely heaping up the earth, or will you press it firmly round your plant?
1173	But now, suppose you begin winnowing on the"lee"side of the threshing- floor?
1173	But perhaps, Socrates, you have already passed sentence on us-- we are rich enough already, and not in need of any further wealth?
1173	But suppose him to have learnt the whole routine of business, will he need aught else, or have we found at last your bailiff absolute?
1173	But what is the proof of sober- mindedness in man or woman?
1173	But what, Socrates, is your opinion?
1173	But when it comes to sowing, what is your opinion?
1173	Can you by eyesight recognise the difference between a dry soil and a moist?
1173	Can you call that[ 27] anything but idleness?
1173	Did I not tell you long ago that of all arts husbandry was the noblest, the most generous, just because it is the easiest to learn?
1173	Did you ever see a trench more than three feet broad?
1173	Did you ever see one more than three feet deep?
1173	Do you put defence and accusation into formal language?
1173	Does it not come to this, the hand needs practice( like the fingers of a harp- player) to obey the will?
1173	Does your eyesight take you further?
1173	Given they are self- controlled to suit your bidding,[ 17] given they possess a wholesome appetite for gain, how will you lesson them in carefulness?
1173	Granted, you see: what is there in the matter that you do not understand?
1173	How better than by lifting up and lightening the soil?
1173	How can such folk be other than sorry friends and ill defenders of the fatherland?
1173	How can you ask me?
1173	How do you take pains to create a surplus which will enable you to benefit your friends and to gratify the state?
1173	How is it, then, that I can know about the processes of sowing and at the same time have no knowledge about planting?
1173	How shall we aid the stricken portion lying mud- bedabbled?
1173	How shall we plant the olive, pray, Ischomachus?
1173	I do not follow; by"light"do you mean weak?
1173	I see, Critobulus, you wish to direct the discussion to the topic of slaves?
1173	I understand you to say, Ischomachus, that the weaker soil must receive a scantier dose of seed?
1173	IV But why need you illustrate all the sciences, Socrates?
1173	IX Well( I replied), and did your wife appear, Ischomachus, to lend a willing ear to what you tried thus earnestly to teach her?
1173	If I take your meaning rightly, you would say that those who enjoy your good things grow well disposed to you and seek to render you some good?
1173	If a man knows how to use his friends so as to be benefited by them, what of these?
1173	In planting, would you dig( what I may call) deep trenches in a dry soil or a moist?
1173	Is it possible for a man devoid of carefulness himself to render others more careful?
1173	Is it so certain that you have no knowledge?
1173	Is it your opinion that these animals know more than merely how to tread the corn while driven with the goad?
1173	Is there a subtle art in scattering the seed?
1173	It appears, you hold to the position that wealth consists of things which benefit, while things which injure are not wealth?
1173	It looks as if spring- time were the season to begin this work, then?
1173	It seems, then, you and I and all mankind hold one opinion on these matters?
1173	It would seem, it is the part of a good economist[ 15] to know how to deal with his own or his employer''s foes so as to get profit out of them?
1173	Nay, now in Heaven''s name, once more, how can that be?
1173	Now, suppose they are on the march; how are they to get along?
1173	Ought the husband or the wife to bear the blame of that?
1173	Perhaps you are ignorant how you are to lay the potsherd on the clay at top?
1173	Pray, how may that be?
1173	Pray, then, what sort of people have the privilege?
1173	Precisely so, but now suppose the soil is light in one part and heavy in another?
1173	Really, Ischomachus, I am disposed to ask:"Does teaching consist in putting questions?"
1173	She did, however, put to me a question: Could I advise her how she might become not in false show but really fair to look upon?
1173	So likewise as regards the processes of husbandry, think you the propitiation of heaven is less needed here?
1173	So then I stepped up boldly to the groom and asked him,"Has the horse much wealth?"
1173	So you wish me to set up as a breeder of young horses,[ 10] do you, Socrates?
1173	Socrates replied: What say you then?
1173	That the seed must be cast by hand, I presume you know yourself?
1173	The fellow looked at me as if I were hardly in my right mind to put the question, and retorted,"How can a horse have wealth?"
1173	The same things, in fact, are wealth or not wealth, according as a man knows or does not know the use to make of them?
1173	Then all else( said I) you taught your wife yourself, Ischomachus, until you had made her capable of attending carefully to her appointed duties?
1173	Then shall we say that a man''s enemies form part of his possessions?
1173	Then what is to be done, in your opinion?
1173	Then which are the arts you would counsel us to engage in?
1173	Then would it not be more astonishing that she should have real knowledge how to speak and act than that she should go altogether astray?
1173	Thus I addressed her, Socrates, and thus my wife made answer:"But how can I assist you?
1173	Thus far the statement of the case would seem to be conclusive-- but what are we to make of this?
1173	To begin then: You know that corn needs cutting?
1173	To- morrow is a good day to commence a course of virtue, is it not?
1173	Well then, a bed of earth must be laid beneath the plant?
1173	Well then, supposing we begin to plough our land in winter?
1173	Well then, what would you say to summer?
1173	Well, I suppose you are aware of this much: corn is threshed by beasts of burthen?
1173	Well, and what of those addicted to another passion, that of gain?
1173	Well, granted the man is well disposed to you does it therefore follow, Ischomachus, that he is fit to be your bailiff?
1173	Well, then, Ischomachus, supposing the man is now so fit to rule that he can compel obedience,[ 1] is he, I ask once more, your bailiff absolute?
1173	Well, then, the next point: in the act of cutting corn how will you choose to stand?
1173	Well, we shall not be ashamed, I hope, to imitate the kings of Persia?
1173	Were it better for a man to choose and turn to sole account a single sowing season, be it much he has to sow or be it little?
1173	What answer( said I) did she make, in Heaven''s name, to what you said?
1173	What art more sweetly welcomes him that is devoted to her?"
1173	What do you say?
1173	What good will he extract from it?
1173	What more can they know, being beasts of burthen?
1173	What particular toil do you impose on yourself in order to secure good health and strength?
1173	What say you?
1173	What sort of thing?
1173	What then?
1173	What topic, pray, was that?
1173	What( I exclaimed), can I believe my ears?
1173	What, then, if I exhibit to you a third contrast, which bears on the condition of domestic slaves?
1173	When, then( I asked), Ischomachus, how fared it?
1173	Where would be the use of farming the land by help of such an overseer?
1173	Whose but my own wife''s?
1173	Would not that argue great lack of understanding in our two selves?
1173	XII But( I continued presently), perhaps I am preventing you from going, as you long have wished to do, Ischomachus?
1173	You agree there is some show of reason for letting in these gangs of hoers?
1173	You have seen, I know, the sort of trenches which are dug for plants?
1173	You know, I daresay, that in winter there are heavy rains?
1173	You seem to say, Socrates, that money itself in the pockets of a man who does not know how to use it is not wealth?
1173	[ 10] Are we to regard these as the only people incapable of being taught this virtue of carefulness?
1173	[ 10] Or,"What then-- is the list exhausted?
1173	[ 11] Or,"Will you please answer me that question, teacher?"
1173	[ 12] or if you set it slantwise under its earthy covering, so as to lie like an inverted gamma?
1173	[ 13] But now, what shall we say of friends?
1173	[ 16] What reason indeed would there be for rejecting in the case of other plant- growths[ 17] what is found to answer so well with the vine?
1173	[ 21][ 21]"Does your practice include the art of translating into words your sentiments?"
1173	[ 27]{ ara},"as if he were asking himself,''Would this or this possibly be wanted for the ship''s service?''"
1173	[ 4] Or do you educate your bailiffs yourself?
1173	[ 7] Or would your citizen serve on foot?
1173	[ 9] Have you noticed at what season in either case[ 10] the plants must be embedded?
1173	[ 9] Should you mind pointing them out to me with some distinctness?
1173	and by"heavy"strong?
1173	and that other portion lying naked to the roots and defenceless, how aid it?
1173	and this word"house,"what are we to understand by it?
1173	but he may have got enemies?
1173	did you with your own hands plant some of these trees?"
1173	facing the way the wind blows,[ 1] or against the wind?
1173	how teach them growth in diligence to meet your wishes?
1173	is it not that the gallant ship sails so swiftly?
1173	now answer me this question: Did you ever see a trench less than one foot deep?
1173	or are there others in a like condition?
1173	or are there others in like case?
1173	or are we to include all a man''s possessions outside the actual dwelling- place?
1173	or even though possessed of all the qualifications you have named, does he still lack something?
1173	or is there aught else which he must learn in order to play the part of an efficient bailiff?
1173	or were I to...?''"
1173	or when it has to force its way through unbroken soil into the solid ground?
1173	or where, save afield, in summer rest more sweetly, lulled by babbling streams, soft airs, and tender shades?
1173	or which the larger?
1173	or would you have him begin his sowing with the earliest season, and sow right on continuously until the latest?
1173	she asked;"what has the queen- bee to do that she seems so like myself, or I like her in what I have to do?"
1173	since a man who is skilled in carpentry can work as well for another as for himself: and this ought to be equally true of the good economist?
1173	the domicile merely?
1173	was your wife disposed at all to lend a willing ear to what you told her?
1173	what is my ability?
1173	whereat the other:"Does that surprise you, Lysander?
1173	who but will gaze with wonderment as the squadrons of the cavalry dash past him at the gallop?
1173	you are aware that fallow must be broken up in readiness[ 11] for sowing?
1173	you seated here, you who are so little wo nt to be at leisure?
1173	{ dielemmenos}="to be taken apart and have..."And at whose bar( I asked) is the sentence given?
2562	( awakening) Pray, father, why are you peevish, and toss about the whole night?
2562	( discovering a variety of mathematical instruments) Why, what is this, in the name of heaven?
2562	( from within) Who''s there?
2562	A horse?
2562	A sword?
2562	About measures, or rhythms, or verses?
2562	About what?
2562	According to the dactyle?
2562	Ah me, what then, pray will become of me, wretched man?
2562	Alektryaina?
2562	Am I to feed upon wisdom like a dog?
2562	And do you now intend, on this account, to deny the debt?
2562	And do you then ask me for your money, being such an ignorant person?
2562	And for what did you come?
2562	And how then, you wretch does this become no way greater, though the rivers flow into it, while you seek to increase your money?
2562	And if he be a blackguard, what harm will he suffer?
2562	And so you look down upon the gods from your basket, and not from the earth?
2562	And to hold converse with the Clouds, our divinities?
2562	And what does it mean?
2562	And what this?
2562	And what, pray, have you thought?
2562	And will you be willing to deny these upon oath of the gods?
2562	And will you obey me at all?
2562	And yet, how could you, who are a mortal, have greater power than a god?
2562	And yet, on what principle do you blame the warm baths?
2562	And yet, what is life worth to you if you be deprived of these enjoyments?
2562	And yet, who was more valiant than he?
2562	And you appear to me, by Hermes, to be going to be summoned, if you will not pay me the money?
2562	Are they not males with you?
2562	Are they some heroines?
2562	Are you asleep?
2562	Are you not meditating?
2562	Both the same?
2562	But come, by the Earth, is not Jupiter, the Olympian, a god?
2562	But do you permit him?
2562	But from what class do the public orators come?
2562	But what debt came upon me after Pasias?
2562	But what good will rhythms do me for a living?
2562	But what if he should suffer the radish through obeying you, and be depillated with hot ashes?
2562	But what if, having the worst Cause, I shall conquer you in arguing, proving that it is right to beat one''s mother?
2562	But what is this?
2562	But what of that?
2562	But where is Lacedaemon?
2562	But why in the world do these look upon the ground?
2562	But why should I learn these things, that we all know?
2562	By doing what clever trick?
2562	By iron money, as in Byzantium?
2562	By no means; for how would you call Amynias, if you met him?
2562	By the gods, do you purpose to besiege me?
2562	By what do you swear?
2562	By what gods will you swear?
2562	Can not it?
2562	Come now, which of the two shall speak first?
2562	Come now; what do you now wish to learn first of those things in none of which you have ever been instructed?
2562	Come, how am I to believe this?
2562	Come, let me see: nay, what was the first?
2562	Come, let me see; what do I owe?
2562	Come, let me see; what do you consider this to be?
2562	Come, let me see; what do you do if any one beat you?
2562	Come, now, tell me; from what class do the advocates come?
2562	Come, tell me, which of the sons of Jupiter do you deem to have been the bravest in soul, and to have undergone most labours?
2562	Come, where have you ever seen him raining at any time without Clouds?
2562	Come, who is this man who is in the basket?
2562	Did you hear the voice, and the thunder which bellowed at the same time, feared as a god?
2562	Did you learn these clever things by going in just now to the Titans?
2562	Did you not, however, know, nor yet consider, these to be goddesses?
2562	Do I talk nonsense if I wish to recover my money?
2562	Do you abuse your teacher?
2562	Do you beat your father?
2562	Do you beat your father?
2562	Do you fly?
2562	Do you know that I take pleasure in being much abused?
2562	Do you mean the burning- glass?
2562	Do you not hear?
2562	Do you perceive that you are soon to obtain the greatest benefits through us alone of the gods?
2562	Do you see this little door and little house?
2562	Do you see what you are doing?
2562	Do you see?
2562	Do you see?
2562	Do you wish to know clearly celestial matters, what they rightly are?
2562	Does meditation attract the moisture to the water- cresses?
2562	Even if witnesses were present when I borrowed the money?
2562	For come, where is it?
2562	For ought you not then immediately to be beaten and trampled on, bidding me sing, just as if you were entertaining cicadae?
2562	For what has come into your heads that you acted insolently toward the gods, and pried into the seat of the moon?
2562	For what matter do you summon me?
2562	For what now was the first thing you were taught?
2562	For what purpose a chaplet?
2562	For what, pray, is the thunderbolt?
2562	For what, pray, shall I weep?
2562	For why ought your body to be exempt from blows and mine not?
2562	From what class do tragedians come?
2562	Have I done any wrong?
2562	Have you arrived at such a pitch of frenzy that you believe madmen?
2562	Have you ever seen this stone in the chemist''s shops, the beautiful and transparent one, from which they kindle fire?
2562	Have you ever, when you; looked up, seen a cloud like to a centaur, or a panther, or a wolf, or a bull?
2562	Have you got anything?
2562	Have you not heard me, that I said that the Clouds, when full of moisture, dash against each other and clap by reason of their density?
2562	How can this youth ever learn an acquittal from a trial or a legal summons, or persuasive refutation?
2562	How did you get in debt without observing it?
2562	How many courses will the war- chariots run?
2562	How now ought I to call them?
2562	How ought I to call it henceforth?
2562	How then can I awake him in the most agreeable manner?
2562	How then did he measure this?
2562	How then is it just that you should recover your money, if you know nothing of meteorological matters?
2562	How would I call?
2562	How, pray?
2562	How, pray?
2562	How, then, being an old man, shall I learn the subtleties of refined disquisitions?
2562	How, then, if justice exists, has Jupiter not perished, who bound his own father?
2562	How, then, will you be able to learn?
2562	How?
2562	How?
2562	How?
2562	How?
2562	How?
2562	I do not ask you this, but which you account the most beautiful measure; the trimetre or the tetrameter?
2562	I will be silent: what else can I do?
2562	I will pass over to that part of my discourse where you interrupted me; and first I will ask you this: Did you beat me when I was a boy?
2562	I''ll lay on you, goading you behind, you outrigger?
2562	I?
2562	If I be diligent and learn zealously, to which of your disciples shall I become like?
2562	In what then, pray, shall I obey you?
2562	In what way do I make kardopos masculine?
2562	In what way?
2562	In what way?
2562	Is it for this reason, pray, that you have also lost your cloak?
2562	Is it not Jupiter?
2562	Is it not just, however, that they should have their reward, on account of these?
2562	Is it not then with justice, who does not serve in the army?
2562	Is it possible that you consider the sea to be greater now than formerly?
2562	Is not this an insult, pray?
2562	Is the power of speaking, pray, implanted in your nature?
2562	Just Do you deny that it exists?
2562	Kardope in the feminine?
2562	My good sir, what is the matter with you, O father?
2562	Nay, what could he ever suffer still greater than this?
2562	Nay, what was the thing in which we knead our flour?
2562	Nothing at all?
2562	O Hercules, from what country are these wild beasts?
2562	Of what description?
2562	Of what kind?
2562	Of what two Causes?
2562	Oh, what shall I call you?
2562	Pasias( entering with his summons- witness) Then, ought a man to throw away any part of his own property?
2562	Phidippides, my little Phidippides?
2562	Pray where?
2562	Pray, of what nature are they?
2562	Proceed; why do you keep poking about the door?
2562	Seest thou, then, how good a thing is learning?
2562	Shall I bring him into court and convict him of lunacy, or shall I give information of his madness to the coffin- makers?
2562	Shall I then ever see this?
2562	Tell me now, what do you prescribe?
2562	Tell me now, whether you think that Jupiter always rains fresh rain on each occasion, or that the sun draws from below the same water back again?
2562	Tell me what is this?
2562	Tell me, O Socrates, I beseech you, by Jupiter, who are these that have uttered this grand song?
2562	Tell me, by doing what?
2562	Tell me, do you love me?
2562	Tell me, pray, if they are really clouds, what ails them, that they resemble mortal women?
2562	Tell us then boldly, what we must do for you?
2562	Tell us what you require?
2562	The better, or the worse?
2562	The boys weep, and do you not think it is right that a father should weep?
2562	Then have you perceived that you say nothing to the purpose?
2562	Then what shall I gain, pray?
2562	Then wo n''t you pay me?
2562	To what do they seem to you to be like?
2562	Vortex?
2562	Was it not then a man like you and me, who first proposed this law, and by speaking persuaded the ancients?
2562	Well, what is it?
2562	Were you ever, after being stuffed with broth at the Panathenaic festival, then disturbed in your belly, and did a tumult suddenly rumble through it?
2562	Were you not therefore justly beaten, who do not praise Euripides, the wisest of poets?
2562	What Jupiter?
2562	What ails you?
2562	What am I doing?
2562	What are you about?
2562	What are you doing, fellow?
2562	What are you doing, pray, you fellow on the roof?
2562	What argument will he be able to state, to prove that he is not a blackguard?
2562	What belongs to an allotment?
2562	What do you say?
2562	What do you say?
2562	What do you say?
2562	What do you say?
2562	What do you think he will do?
2562	What do you wonder at?
2562	What else but this finger?
2562	What evil, pray, has Tlepolemus ever done you?
2562	What gods?
2562	What good could any one learn from them?
2562	What good, pray, would this do you?
2562	What have you made of your slippers, you foolish man?
2562	What is this?
2562	What money is this?
2562	What must I do?
2562	What must I do?
2562	What names are masculine?
2562	What say you?
2562	What shall I do, my father being crazed?
2562	What shall I experience?
2562	What sort of animal is this interest?
2562	What then did he contrive for provisions?
2562	What then is the use of this?
2562	What then will you say if you be conquered by me in this?
2562	What then would you say if you heard another contrivance of Socrates?
2562	What then, pray, is this, father?
2562	What then?
2562	What then?
2562	What then?
2562	What then?
2562	What then?
2562	What was it?
2562	What was the fist?
2562	What''s the matter?
2562	What''s the matter?
2562	What, father?
2562	What, old man?
2562	What, pray, do you fear?
2562	What, really?
2562	What, then, did he say about the gnat?
2562	What, then, do you see?
2562	What, then, will you say?
2562	What?
2562	What?
2562	What?
2562	Where is Strepsiades?
2562	Where is it?
2562	Where is this man who asks me for his money?
2562	Where, pray, did you ever see cold Herculean baths?
2562	Who are they?
2562	Who are you?
2562	Who is it that compels them to borne along?
2562	Who it is that knocked at the door?
2562	Who rains then?
2562	Who says this?
2562	Who then?
2562	Who''s"Himself"?
2562	Who, O shameless fellow, reared you, understanding all your wishes, when you lisped what you meant?
2562	Whoever is this, who is lamenting?
2562	Why are you distressed?
2562	Why callest thou me, thou creature of a day?
2562	Why did I borrow them?
2562	Why did you light the thirsty lamp?
2562	Why do you delay?
2562	Why do you talk foolishly?
2562	Why do you talk nonsense?
2562	Why so, pray?
2562	Why so?
2562	Why then do we admire Thales?
2562	Why then does their rump look toward heaven?
2562	Why then is it less lawful for me also in turn to propose henceforth a new law for the sons, that they should beat their fathers in turn?
2562	Why then, since you imitate the cocks in all things, do you not both eat dung and sleep on a perch?
2562	Why thus do I loiter and not knock at the door?
2562	Why twelve minae to Pasias?
2562	Why, how can it be just to beat a father?
2562	Why, how with justice?
2562	Why, how, when my money is gone, my complexion gone, my life gone, and my slipper gone?
2562	Why, how?
2562	Why, is any day old and new?
2562	Why, is there any Jove?
2562	Why, pray, did he add the old day?
2562	Why, pray, did you laugh at this?
2562	Why, pray, did you not tell me this, then, but excited with hopes a rustic and aged man?
2562	Why, pray, do you talk nonsense, as if you had fallen from an ass?
2562	Why, pray?
2562	Why, then, do the magistrates not receive the deposits on the new moon, but on the Old and New?
2562	Why, what are these doing, who are bent down so much?
2562	Why, what else, than chopping logic with the beams of your house?
2562	Why, what good should I get else from his instruction?
2562	Why, what shall I learn?
2562	Why, what, if they should see Simon, a plunderer of the public property, what do they do?
2562	Why, where are my fellow- tribesmen of Cicynna?
2562	Will it never be day?
2562	Will you move quickly?
2562	Will you not pack off to the devil, you most forgetful and most stupid old man?
2562	Will you not quickly cover yourself up and think of something?
2562	Will you not take yourself off from my house?
2562	Will you not then pack off as fast as possible from my door?
2562	Will you not, pray, now believe in no god, except what we believe in-- this Chaos, and the Clouds, and the Tongue-- these three?
2562	Will you overcome me in this?
2562	Wo n''t you march, Mr. Blood- horse?
2562	Yes, by Jupiter, with justice?
2562	You destroy me?
2562	whether do you wish to take and lead away this your son, or shall I teach him to speak?
1591	''And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?''
1591	''And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain?
1591	''And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the nature of the unholy?''
1591	''Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain?
1591	''But how,''he will reply,''can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good''?
1591	''But in what will he be better?''
1591	''By what?''
1591	''Shall this be the manner in which I am to distribute justice and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all?''
1591	( 3) Again, would parents who teach her sons lesser matters leave them ignorant of the common duty of citizens?
1591	--and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me or against me?
1591	--how would you answer him?
1591	--they would acknowledge that they were not?
1591	--they would agree to the latter alternative, if I am not mistaken?
1591	--they would assent to me?
1591	--we should answer,''Yes,''if I am not mistaken?
1591	Again we knocked, and he answered without opening: Did you not hear me say that he is not at home, fellows?
1591	And are justice and holiness opposed to one another?''
1591	And are not these confident persons also courageous?
1591	And because of that ignorance they are cowards?
1591	And by what is he overcome?
1591	And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue?
1591	And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, and better?
1591	And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom?
1591	And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?
1591	And do you think that the ode is a good composition, and true?
1591	And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness?
1591	And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent?
1591	And does not the poet proceed to say,''I do not agree with the word of Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man: Hardly can a man be good''?
1591	And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing, would you not?
1591	And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by temperance?
1591	And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?
1591	And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of dangers?
1591	And have you an answer for him?
1591	And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, and yet confident about them?
1591	And if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the manufacture over which he presides?--how should we answer him?
1591	And if honourable, then good?
1591	And if not base, then honourable?
1591	And in causing diseases do they not cause pain?
1591	And in opposite ways?
1591	And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful?
1591	And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good?
1591	And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters?
1591	And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly?
1591	And is the good that which is expedient for man?
1591	And is there anything good?
1591	And is there not a contradiction?
1591	And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter also: Do not they, too, know wise things?
1591	And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly?
1591	And shall I argue with them or with you?
1591	And suppose that he turned to you and said,''Is this true, Protagoras?
1591	And suppose that he went on to say:''Well now, is there also such a thing as holiness?''
1591	And suppose that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same thing, and asked him,''In what shall I become better day by day?''
1591	And temperance is good sense?
1591	And temperance makes them temperate?
1591	And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is weakly done, by weakness?
1591	And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?
1591	And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite?
1591	And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly?
1591	And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately?
1591	And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which was done foolishly by folly?
1591	And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence?
1591	And the ignorance of them is cowardice?
1591	And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and is opposed to the ignorance of these things?
1591	And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?
1591	And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?
1591	And then after this suppose that he came and asked us,''What were you saying just now?
1591	And there is the acute in sound?
1591	And therefore by opposites:--then folly is the opposite of temperance?
1591	And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and uninstructedness?
1591	And they are all different from one another?
1591	And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not temperate?
1591	And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and science?
1591	And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites?
1591	And we said that everything has only one opposite?
1591	And what am I doing?
1591	And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant?
1591	And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know?
1591	And what is your purpose?
1591	And what sort of well- doing makes a man a good physician?
1591	And what will he make of you?
1591	And what will they make of you?
1591	And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul?
1591	And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate?
1591	And when you speak of being overcome--''what do you mean,''he will say,''but that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good?''
1591	And who have confidence when fighting on horseback-- the skilled horseman or the unskilled?
1591	And who when fighting with light shields-- the peltasts or the nonpeltasts?
1591	And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras?
1591	And would you wish to begin the enquiry?
1591	And you think otherwise?
1591	And you would admit the existence of goods?
1591	And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?
1591	Are not all actions honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant?
1591	Are these the things which are good but painful?''
1591	Are they not the confident?
1591	Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?''
1591	Are you not of Homer''s opinion, who says''Youth is most charming when the beard first appears''?
1591	Are you satisfied, then, at having a life of pleasure which is without pain?
1591	Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability; and you say Where are the teachers?
1591	But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and pleasanter, and nobler?
1591	But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that case have lived well?
1591	But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true?
1591	But shall I tell you a strange thing?
1591	But short enough?
1591	But some one will ask, Why?
1591	But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about yourself?
1591	But suppose a person were to ask us: In what are the painters wise?
1591	But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice?
1591	But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the contrary, are base?
1591	But what matter?
1591	But what sort of doing is good in letters?
1591	But what would you like?
1591	But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing?
1591	But who is to be the umpire?
1591	But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill?
1591	But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them?
1591	By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist?
1591	COMPANION: And do you just come from an interview with him?
1591	COMPANION: And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love than the son of Cleinias?
1591	COMPANION: But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one?
1591	COMPANION: Of what country?
1591	COMPANION: Well, and how do matters proceed?
1591	COMPANION: What do you mean-- a citizen or a foreigner?
1591	COMPANION: What is the meaning of this?
1591	COMPANION: Where do you come from, Socrates?
1591	Delightful, I said; but what is the news?
1591	Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that''Hardly can a man become truly good''?
1591	Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that you teach the art of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens?
1591	Do they also differ from one another in themselves and in their functions?
1591	Do you admit the existence of folly?
1591	Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying?
1591	Do you know the poem?
1591	Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?
1591	Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the company?
1591	Does he agree with the common opinion that knowledge is overcome by passion?
1591	First of all we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one?
1591	For Socrates admits his inability to speak long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak short?
1591	Has Protagoras robbed you of anything?
1591	Has anything happened between you and him?
1591	Have you been visiting him, and was he gracious to you?
1591	He and his fellow- workmen have taught them to the best of their ability,--but who will carry them further in their arts?
1591	How is this to be reconciled?
1591	How should we answer him, Socrates?
1591	How so?
1591	How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you?
1591	I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you?
1591	I know that Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation is given to Protagoras?
1591	I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul?
1591	I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing?
1591	I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill?
1591	I said; or shall I begin?
1591	I want to know whether you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?
1591	I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the matter?
1591	If I am not mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing?
1591	If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed?
1591	Is Protagoras in Athens?
1591	Is not that true, Protagoras?
1591	Is not that true?
1591	Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and smaller, or more and fewer?
1591	Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil''?
1591	May I employ an illustration?
1591	Must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands?
1591	Now is that your view?
1591	Now when there is all this care about virtue private and public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether virtue can be taught?
1591	Now who becomes a bad physician?
1591	Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful?
1591	Or if a man has one part, must he also have all the others?
1591	Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned of their fathers?
1591	Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality of which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all?
1591	Protagoras has spoken of the virtues: are they many, or one?
1591	SOCRATES: And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend?
1591	SOCRATES: What of his beard?
1591	Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to you to be short enough?
1591	Shall I, as an elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I argue out the question?
1591	Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to know whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil?
1591	Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me:''Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways on this subject?''
1591	Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well?
1591	Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going?
1591	That is my opinion: would it not be yours also?
1591	The honourable work is also useful and good?
1591	The world will assent, will they not?
1591	Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you are incurring?
1591	Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent?
1591	Then against something different?
1591	Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it cowardice or courage?
1591	Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there is danger?
1591	Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more?
1591	Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is?
1591	Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice?
1591	Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the ignorance of them?
1591	Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately?
1591	Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil?
1591	Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist?
1591	Then who are the courageous?
1591	Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness?
1591	Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce?
1591	Then, my friends, what do you say to this?
1591	Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the nature of the just: would not you?
1591	This admission, which has been somewhat hastily made, is now taken up and cross- examined by Socrates:--''Is justice just, and is holiness holy?
1591	To which the only opposite is the evil?
1591	To which the only opposite is the grave?
1591	To which the only opposite is the ugly?
1591	Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go-- against the same dangers as the cowards?
1591	What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term''hard''?
1591	What do you mean?
1591	What does he think of knowledge?
1591	What else would you say?
1591	What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent?
1591	What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him?
1591	What would you say?
1591	When you speak of brave men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature?
1591	Which of these two assertions shall we renounce?
1591	Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing-- should we not say so?
1591	Who is so foolish as to chastise or instruct the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble?
1591	Why do I say all this?
1591	Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both?
1591	Will Protagoras answer these objections?
1591	Will you be so good?
1591	Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes this result is the art of measurement?
1591	Would not the art of measuring be the saving principle; or would the power of appearance?
1591	Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature?''
1591	Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true?
1591	Would you not answer in the same way?
1591	Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his arrival?
1591	You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek?
1591	You think that some men are temperate, and yet unjust?
1591	You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue?
1591	You, Socrates, are discontented, and why?
1591	and about what?
1591	and do you bring any news?
1591	and do you call the latter good?
1591	and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position?''
1591	and in causing poverty do they not cause pain;--they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken?
1591	and what sort of doing makes a man good in letters?
1591	and what will he make of you?
1591	and why do you give them this money?--how would you have answered?
1591	and why have you come hither at this unearthly hour?
1591	are they parts of a whole, or different names of the same thing?
1591	he said: how am I to shorten my answers?
1591	how is he designated?
1591	how would you have answered?
1591	or does he hold that knowledge is power?
1591	or shall I repeat the whole?
1591	shall I make them too short?
1643	''If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; and where are the teachers?''
1643	''To whom, then, shall Meno go?''
1643	''what is courage?''
1643	''what is temperance?''
1643	( To the Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a double line?
1643	ANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates?
1643	ANYTUS: Why do you not tell him yourself?
1643	ANYTUS: Why single out individuals?
1643	Am I not right?
1643	And am I to carry back this report of you to Thessaly?
1643	And if these were our reasons, should we not be right in sending him?
1643	And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno''s slave, are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal?
1643	And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know?
1643	And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?
1643	And now tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four?
1643	And yet, if there are no universal ideas, what becomes of philosophy?
1643	And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue?
1643	Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used?
1643	But I can not believe, Socrates, that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into existence?
1643	But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what virtue is?
1643	But how, asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into what he does not know?
1643	But is virtue taught or not?
1643	But what has been the result?
1643	But whence had the uneducated man this knowledge?
1643	But where are the teachers?
1643	Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?
1643	Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave?
1643	Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have been out of their minds?
1643	Can you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such confusion?
1643	Can you teach me how this is?
1643	Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good physician, to whom should we send him?
1643	Could you not answer that question, Meno?
1643	Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?
1643	Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?
1643	Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?
1643	Do you remember them?
1643	Do you think that I could?
1643	Have there not been many good men in this city?
1643	Have you not heard from our elders of him?
1643	Health and strength, and beauty and wealth-- these, and the like of these, we call profitable?
1643	Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak?
1643	How could that be?
1643	How would you answer me?
1643	How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble?
1643	If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide?
1643	Is he a bit better than any other mortal?
1643	Is there any difference?
1643	Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno?
1643	It was the natural answer to two questions,''Whence came the soul?
1643	Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once?
1643	Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,--in that case will it be taught or not?
1643	Let us take another,--Aristides, the son of Lysimachus: would you not acknowledge that he was a good man?
1643	Look at the matter in your own way: Would you not admit that Themistocles was a good man?
1643	MENO: And did you not think that he knew?
1643	MENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know?
1643	MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour?
1643	MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is-- what sort of answer would you have given him?
1643	MENO: How can it be otherwise?
1643	MENO: How do you mean, Socrates?
1643	MENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?
1643	MENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?
1643	MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?
1643	MENO: Well, what of that?
1643	MENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue?
1643	MENO: What do you mean by the word''right''?
1643	MENO: What do you mean, Socrates?
1643	MENO: What do you mean?
1643	MENO: What have they to do with the question?
1643	MENO: What of that?
1643	MENO: What was it?
1643	MENO: Where does he say so?
1643	MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates?
1643	MENO: Why do you think so?
1643	MENO: Why not?
1643	MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these?
1643	MENO: Why?
1643	MENO: Will you have one definition of them all?
1643	MENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection?
1643	Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too?
1643	Now, has any one ever taught him all this?
1643	Now, to whom should he go in order that he may learn this virtue?
1643	Now, when you say that they deceived and corrupted the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or unconsciously?
1643	Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which can be taught?
1643	Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?
1643	Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?
1643	Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are the teachers?
1643	SOCRATES: A square may be of any size?
1643	SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?
1643	SOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them?
1643	SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?
1643	SOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this space?
1643	SOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet?
1643	SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young?
1643	SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust?
1643	SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice?
1643	SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught?
1643	SOCRATES: And desire is of possession?
1643	SOCRATES: And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters?
1643	SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?
1643	SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill- fated?
1643	SOCRATES: And does he really know?
1643	SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?
1643	SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?
1643	SOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect each of these spaces?
1643	SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: And for this reason-- that there are other figures?
1643	SOCRATES: And four is how many times two?
1643	SOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?
1643	SOCRATES: And four times is not double?
1643	SOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure?
1643	SOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet?
1643	SOCRATES: And how many in this?
1643	SOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section?
1643	SOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other?
1643	SOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet?
1643	SOCRATES: And how much is the double of four?
1643	SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there?
1643	SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom?
1643	SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining it?
1643	SOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be?
1643	SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?
1643	SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?
1643	SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not?
1643	SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable?
1643	SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round?
1643	SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action-- there we were also right?
1643	SOCRATES: And is not that four times four?
1643	SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength?
1643	SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature?
1643	SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men''divine''who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?
1643	SOCRATES: And might not the same be said of flute- playing, and of the other arts?
1643	SOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines equal?
1643	SOCRATES: And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?
1643	SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching?
1643	SOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one?
1643	SOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square: this is two feet-- what will that be?
1643	SOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be?
1643	SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?
1643	SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you?
1643	SOCRATES: And so forth?
1643	SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large?
1643	SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful?
1643	SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good?
1643	SOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line?
1643	SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine-- do they not?
1643	SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?
1643	SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight?
1643	SOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal?
1643	SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same?
1643	SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have acquired or always possessed?
1643	SOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet?
1643	SOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is recollection?
1643	SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?
1643	SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good?
1643	SOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing can not be taught of which there are neither teachers nor disciples?
1643	SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and the like, were each of them a part of virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only professors?
1643	SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse?
1643	SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown- up person, in a woman or in a man?
1643	SOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge?
1643	SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you not think so?
1643	SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good?
1643	SOCRATES: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know?
1643	SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good?
1643	SOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?
1643	SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?
1643	SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill- fated?
1643	SOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father was?
1643	SOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here?
1643	SOCRATES: But how much?
1643	SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he must have had and learned it at some other time?
1643	SOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers?
1643	SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction?
1643	SOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, the whole space will be three times three feet?
1643	SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?
1643	SOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good?
1643	SOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet?
1643	SOCRATES: But still he had in him those notions of his-- had he not?
1643	SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: But why?
1643	SOCRATES: But would he not have wanted?
1643	SOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation?
1643	SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence?
1643	SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?
1643	SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?
1643	SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of recollection?
1643	SOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen-- are they not?
1643	SOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, and half the size of the other?
1643	SOCRATES: Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus?
1643	SOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces?
1643	SOCRATES: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?
1643	SOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces?
1643	SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and women who spoke of things divine that-- MENO: What did they say?
1643	SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom( or knowledge), then, as we thought, it was taught?
1643	SOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him the''torpedo''s shock,''have we done him any harm?
1643	SOCRATES: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?
1643	SOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is the figure of eight feet?
1643	SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him to the cobblers?
1643	SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you?
1643	SOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this one, and less than that one?
1643	SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner?
1643	SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?
1643	SOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of the figure of four feet?
1643	SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species?
1643	SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in the same virtues?
1643	SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good?
1643	SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?
1643	SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?
1643	SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?
1643	SOCRATES: Then he was the better for the torpedo''s touch?
1643	SOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that which he does not know?
1643	SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good?
1643	SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?
1643	SOCRATES: Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity?
1643	SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?
1643	SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?
1643	SOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three?
1643	SOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet?
1643	SOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet?
1643	SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice?
1643	SOCRATES: Then virtue can not be taught?
1643	SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable?
1643	SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom?
1643	SOCRATES: Then you are entirely unacquainted with them?
1643	SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good?
1643	SOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good or bad of which you are wholly ignorant?
1643	SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil?
1643	SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just?
1643	SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure?
1643	SOCRATES: What are they?
1643	SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1643	SOCRATES: What do you say of him, Meno?
1643	SOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives one of sixteen feet;--do you see?
1643	SOCRATES: What, Anytus?
1643	SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he was not a man?
1643	SOCRATES: Why simple?
1643	SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions?
1643	SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you?
1643	SOCRATES: Would you say''virtue,''Meno, or''a virtue''?
1643	SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous?
1643	SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round?
1643	SOCRATES: You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people whom mankind call Sophists?
1643	SOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus( Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in your country?
1643	Should we not send him to the physicians?
1643	Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure?
1643	Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee?
1643	Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn?
1643	There is another sort of progress from the general notions of Socrates, who asked simply,''what is friendship?''
1643	This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be taught?
1643	Were not all these answers given out of his own head?
1643	Were we not right in admitting this?
1643	Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?
1643	What is the origin of evil?''
1643	What makes you so angry with them?
1643	What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry?
1643	When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?
1643	Whom would you name?
1643	Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole?
1643	Will Meno tell him his own notion, which is probably not very different from that of Gorgias?
1643	Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue?
1643	Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends among the Athenians and allies?
1643	Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is''the power of governing;''but do you not add''justly and not unjustly''?
1643	and do they agree that virtue is taught?
1643	and do they profess to be teachers?
1643	and who were they?
1643	or is there anything about which even the acknowledged''gentlemen''are sometimes saying that''this thing can be taught,''and sometimes the opposite?
1643	or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught?
1643	or, as we were just now saying,''remembered''?
1643	would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand?
14752	Almighty Father,he cried, raising his eyes and hands towards heaven,"why dost thou think me worthy of such shame as this?
14752	And how happens that? 14752 And pray what would satisfy you?"
14752	And what is there in this magnificent golden rose to make you cry?
14752	And what manner of youth is he?
14752	And will you carry me back when I have seen it?
14752	And will you never regret the possession of it?
14752	Are ye traders, or, haply, pirates?
14752	Are you indeed,he exclaimed,"come to me at last, my son?
14752	Art thou mad, O foster- son of Zeus? 14752 Barbarous wretch,"cried Mezentius,"thinkest thou to affright me with thy weapons, now that thou hast robbed me of my son?
14752	But can I do nothing to help them?
14752	Did you ever hear the like?
14752	Do you not know that this island is enchanted? 14752 Do you, indeed, my dear child?"
14752	Does it presume to be green, when I have bidden it be barren until my daughter shall be restored to my arms?
14752	Does the earth disobey me?
14752	Does your majesty intend to throw doubt on my story?
14752	Foolish woman,answered Ceres,"did you not promise to intrust this poor infant entirely to me?
14752	Have I not said that I doubted not?
14752	Have the proud lords come home from their ambush, or are they still waiting out yonder to take me as I return?
14752	Have they undergone a similar change, through the arts of this wicked Circe?
14752	Have you anything to tell me, little bird?
14752	How could it fail?
14752	Is it a wholesome wine?
14752	Is it much farther?
14752	Is it not a very pleasant stream?
14752	Light of my eyes, dear son, have you come home at last? 14752 My child,"said she,"did you taste any food while you were in King Pluto''s palace?"
14752	My pretty bird,said Eurylochus,--for he was a wary person, and let no token of harm escape his notice,--"my pretty bird, who sent you hither?
14752	O my son,he exclaimed,"was I possessed with such a fond desire of life as to suffer thee to offer thyself in my place to the relentless foe?
14752	Oh, my sweet violets, shall I never see you again?
14752	Oh, where is my dear child?
14752	Pray what is the matter with you, this bright morning?
14752	Pray, my good host, whence did you gather them?
14752	Pray, my young friend,said he, as they grew familiar together,"what may I call your name?"
14752	Pray, nurse,the queen kept saying,"how is it that you make the child thrive so?"
14752	Quicksilver? 14752 That little bird which met me at the edge of the cliff,"exclaimed Ulysses;"was he a human being once?"
14752	The Golden Touch,asked the stranger,"or your own little Marygold, warm, soft, and loving as she was an hour ago?"
14752	The Golden Touch,continued the stranger,"or a crust of bread?"
14752	Then you are not satisfied?
14752	Thoughtest thou, my father,he cried,"that I should flee and leave thee behind?
14752	Well, friend Midas,said the stranger,"pray how do you succeed with the Golden Touch?"
14752	What ails thee, my son?
14752	What can have befallen you?
14752	What could induce me?
14752	What does she possess that I have not in greater abundance? 14752 What does this mean?"
14752	What ill fortune brings thee into perils so great? 14752 What is the matter, father?"
14752	What is there to gratify her heart? 14752 What is your name, my fair minstrel?"
14752	What mean you, little bird?
14752	What news, good Eumæus?
14752	What,said Hecate,"the young man that always sits in the sunshine?
14752	Where are your two and twenty comrades?
14752	Where is Proserpina?
14752	Where is my child? 14752 Where was the sound, and which way did it seem to go?"
14752	Whither are you going in such a hurry, wise Ulysses?
14752	Whither,he cried,"my fellow countrymen, do you fly?
14752	Who are ye?
14752	Who knows?
14752	Who, O Deïphobus,he exclaimed,"could have inflicted such shameful wounds upon you?
14752	Why do you come alone?
14752	Why do you worship Latona before me?
14752	Why should you be so frightened, my pretty child?
14752	Why,she cried,"should I yet live, when thou, my son, my boast, my glory, art dead?
14752	Why,submissively answered Juno,"dost thou tease me, who am already oppressed with anguish for the fate of the people I befriend?
14752	Will not you stay a moment,asked Phoebus,"and hear me turn the pretty and touching story of Proserpina into extemporary verses?"
14752	Will the dog bite me?
14752	Will you trust the child entirely to me?
14752	Wretch,cried Circe, giving him a smart stroke with her wand,"how dare you keep your human shape a moment longer?
14752	A plague on you, swineherd, where are you taking that pitiful wretch?
14752	Alas, what had he done?
14752	Am I permitted once more to see your face, and to listen to the tones of your dear voice?
14752	Am I preserved at the cost of these cruel wounds?
14752	And Achilles wondered to see him, and said,"Who art thou that standest against me?"
14752	And Anna her sister heard it, and rushing through the midst called her by name:"O my sister, was this thy purpose?
14752	And Hector answered, but Patroclus was dead already,"Why dost thou prophesy death to me?
14752	And Mercury spake, saying,"Son of Venus, canst thou sleep?
14752	And Ulysses made answer,"What think you, if Father Zeus and the goddess Athene stood by our side?
14752	And can there be nation so savage that it receiveth not shipwrecked men on its shore, but beareth arms against them, and forbiddeth them to land?
14752	And do n''t you see how careful we are to let the surf wave break over us every moment or two, so as to keep ourselves comfortably moist?
14752	And hast thou no fear of winter storms that vex the sea?
14752	And he caught the reins and said,"What meaneth this sound of trouble and wailing that I hear?"
14752	And he cried out aloud to Achilles,"Surely, thou thinkest this very day to sack the proud city of Troy?
14752	And he is not ill- looking?"
14752	And her sister made answer,"Why wilt thou waste thy youth in sorrow, without child or husband?
14752	And his wrath was greatly kindled, and he cried with a dreadful voice,"Shalt thou who art clothed with the spoils of my friends escape me?
14752	And if I had perished, what then?
14752	And now do ye answer me this, Whence come ye, and whither do ye go?"
14752	And now tell me: would you rather go in alone and face the princes while I wait here, or will you stay behind and let me go in first?
14752	And now what shall I do?
14752	And now, my little auditors, shall I tell you something that will make you open your eyes very wide?
14752	And shall I suffer this city to be destroyed?
14752	And the Cyclops knew him as he passed, and said,--"How is this, thou who art the leader of the flock?
14752	And the spirit spake, saying,"Why art thou vainly troubled?
14752	And what can I do with all this treasure?
14752	And what could that favor be, unless to multiply his heaps of treasure?
14752	And what is the message which you bring?"
14752	And what was to be done?
14752	And when Æneas and Achates heard these things they were glad, and would have come forth from the cloud, and Achates said,"What thinkest thou?
14752	And why arouse me from the sleep that sweetly bound me and kept my eyelids closed?
14752	And why need you lie to please me?
14752	And your companion there?
14752	And, truly, my dear little folks, did you ever hear of such a pitiable case in all your lives?
14752	Another beggar, I suppose, to hang about the doors and cringe for the scraps and spoil our feasts?
14752	Are birds careful?
14752	Are not these gems, which I have ordered to be dug for you, and which are richer than any in my crown,--are they not prettier than a violet?"
14752	Are you not terribly hungry?
14752	Art thou he that shall rule Italy and its mighty men of war, and spread thy dominion to the ends of the world?
14752	As for me, I shall first go to my home, and to my wife and my little son; for who knoweth whether I shall ever return to them again?"
14752	But Antinous rebuked him, and spoke to him, and said,--"Leiodes, what words have passed the barrier of your teeth?
14752	But Apollo stood by Æneas, and spake to him:"Æneas, where are now thy boastings that thou wouldst meet Achilles face to face?"
14752	But Athene taunted Ulysses and spurred him to the fight:"Have you lost your strength and courage, Ulysses?
14752	But Eumæus only said,"How could I neglect a stranger, though he were a worse man than you?
14752	But Queen Juno spake to Juturna, the sister of Turnus, saying,"Seest thou how these two are now about to fight, face to face?
14752	But Telemachus said to her,"Mother, why make me think of trouble now, when I have just escaped from death?
14752	But Ulysses ate and drank eagerly, and when his strength had come again he asked Eumæus,"My friend, who is this master of yours you tell me of?
14752	But all the while the righteous Æneas, having his head bare, and holding neither spear nor sword, cried to the people,"What seek ye?
14752	But are you quite sure that this will satisfy you?"
14752	But as for the men of Troy, and their deeds in arms, who knows them not?
14752	But come, tell me, where have you left your ship?"
14752	But how can I shun the battle, like a coward, to be the mock of the Trojans, and of the Trojan dames with trailing robes?
14752	But how should he tell this purpose to the queen?
14752	But how thinkest thou to make the war to cease?"
14752	But shall I not go to Laertes on my way and tell him too?
14752	But tell me who is that huge Achaian warrior?
14752	But the suitors all broke into uproar in the hall, and a rude youth would say,"Where are you carrying the curved bow, you miserable swineherd?
14752	But what shall this profit you or me if this city being safe, nevertheless our children stand in peril of slavery and shame?"
14752	But when Dido saw it she called to Anna her sister and said,"Seest thou how they hasten the work along the shore?
14752	But who let it fly no man knoweth; for who, of a truth, would boast that he had wounded Æneas?
14752	But why do I hesitate?
14752	But why do I thus ponder in my mind?
14752	But why should there be war between us?
14752	But Æneas came on, shaking his spear that was like unto a tree, and said,"Why delayest thou, O Turnus?
14752	But, a little farther on, what should she behold?
14752	Can the two of us make head against the throng?"
14752	Can you guess who I am?
14752	Can you tell me what has become of my dear child Proserpina?"
14752	Carest thou not for her whom thou leavest to die?
14752	Did he pity my love?
14752	Did not Ulysses once shield your father from his enemies and save his life?
14752	Did not your majesty stake your crown against my lute, and can the royal word be broken?
14752	Did the roots extend down into some enchanted cavern?
14752	Did you not say he was lost for Agamemnon''s sake?
14752	Do the Achaians press thee hard?
14752	Do you dare to make war upon us after having slain our oxen, and to banish the innocent Harpies from the kingdom which is theirs by right?
14752	Do you imagine that earthly children are to become immortal without being tempered to it in the fiercest heat of the fire?
14752	Do you see that tall gateway before us?
14752	Do you see this splendid crown upon my head?
14752	Do you think I could pray to Zeus after that without a fear?
14752	Do your people hate you, or will your brothers give you no support?
14752	Dost thou come to make prayers to Father Zeus, from the Citadel?
14752	Dost thou not remember how thou fleddest before me in the day that I took Lyrnessus?"
14752	For if the immortal Gods have made him a great warrior, do they therefore grant him leave to speak lawless words?
14752	For what doth it profit me that thou shouldst die?
14752	For what hope was left?
14752	For who should move away the great rock that lay against the door of the cave?
14752	For why should I dissemble?
14752	For why should I wait for Turnus till it please him to meet me in battle?"
14752	Has he as strange a one?"
14752	Hast thou forgotten thy father Anchises, and thy wife, and thy little son?
14752	Hast thou heard evil news from Phthia?
14752	Hast thou no care for me?
14752	Hast thou no pity for thy infant child, and for thy hapless wife, who soon will be a widow?
14752	Have I not faithfully kept my promise with you?
14752	Have I not seen Murranus die, and Ufens the Æquian?
14752	Have you burnt your mouth?"
14752	Have you fought them for ten years without learning their devices?
14752	Have you not everything that your heart desired?"
14752	How comes it that this impulse possesses them?"
14752	How is it that Homer makes his stories seem so real?
14752	How many are they and what manner of men?
14752	How many days, think you, would he survive a continuance of this rich fare?
14752	How ready would you be to aid Ulysses if he should come from somewhere, thus, on a sudden, and a god should bring him home?
14752	How shall I venture again to enter the walls of Laurentum or look upon my camp?
14752	How, then, if I go forth to meet him?
14752	I, who have always fought in the van of battle, and won glory for my father and myself?
14752	If thou thyself forgettest these things, dost thou grudge to thy son the citadels of Rome?
14752	In those days, spectacles for common people had not been invented, but were already worn by kings; else, how could Midas have had any?
14752	Instead of his ordinary milk diet, did he not eat up two of our comrades for his supper, and a couple more for breakfast, and two at his supper again?
14752	Is any one robbing thee of thy sheep, or seeking to slay thee by craft or force?"
14752	Is it because I too am a king that you desire so earnestly to speak with me?
14752	Is it so hard to face the suitors in your own house and home?
14752	Is it to bring victory to the Greeks?
14752	Is there nothing which I can get you to eat?"
14752	Is this what thy mother promised of thee, twice saving thee from the spear of the Greeks?
14752	May I not run down to the shore, and ask some of the sea- nymphs to come up out of the waves and play with me?"
14752	Nay, quietly lay it by; and for the axes, what if we leave them standing?
14752	Nevertheless she dissembled with her tongue, and spake:"Who would not rather have peace with thee than war?
14752	No suitors indeed have pleased thee here or in Tyre, but wilt thou also contend with a love that is after thine own heart?
14752	O husband, husband, why did n''t we go without our supper?"
14752	Oh, what shall I do?
14752	On which side of us does it lie?
14752	Or art thou weeping for the Greeks, because they perish for their folly?"
14752	Or shall I fly by another way, and hide me in the spurs of Ida?
14752	Pray, why do you live in such a bad neighborhood?"
14752	Proserpina, did you call her name?"
14752	Quicksilver?"
14752	Seest thou Priam?
14752	Shall I ever be a coward and a weakling, or am I still but young and can not trust my arm to right me with the man who wrongs me first?
14752	Shall I never hear them again?
14752	Shall Troy be burnt and King Priam be slain, and she take no harm?
14752	Shall she see again her home and her children, with Trojan women forsooth to be her handmaidens?
14752	Shall this land see Turnus flee before his enemies?
14752	Shall we shut ourselves up in the city, where all our goods are wasted already, buying meat for the people?
14752	Should we still need other help?"
14752	So he made you a present of his cloak too, did he?"
14752	So you have made a discovery, since yesterday?"
14752	Tell me now, what is the most wicked thing, and what the cleverest, you ever did in your life?"
14752	Tell me, for pity''s sake, have you seen my poor child Proserpina pass by the mouth of your cavern?"
14752	Tell me, now, do you sincerely desire to rid yourself of this Golden Touch?"
14752	Tell me, you naughty sea- nymphs, have you enticed her under the sea?"
14752	Terrible was the flash of his eyes as he cried,"Art thou come, child of Zeus, to see the insolence of Agamemnon?
14752	The Almighty Father saith to thee,''What meanest thou?
14752	The Etrurian, on the other hand, replied,"Spiteful foe, why dost thou threaten and insult before thou strikest?
14752	The sickness which great Zeus may send, who can avoid?
14752	Then Achilles looked up to heaven and groaned, crying out,"O Zeus, will none of the Gods pity me, and save me from the River?
14752	Then Achilles was mad with anger, and he thought in his heart,"Shall I arise and slay this caitiff, or shall I keep down the wrath in my breast?"
14752	Then Hector stood over him and cried,--"Didst thou think to spoil our city, Patroclus, and to carry away our wives and daughters in the ships?
14752	Then Venus spake thus:"What meaneth all this rage, my son?
14752	Then came his mother, hearing his cry, from where she sat in the depths of the sea, and laid her hand on him and said,--"Why weepest thou, my son?
14752	Then he cried aloud to Juno, entreating her:"O Juno, why doth thy son torment me only among all?
14752	Then said Cincinnatus, being not a little astonished,"Is all well?"
14752	Then said he, not without tears,"Is there any land, O Achates, that is not filled with our sorrows?
14752	Then she kissed the bed and cried,"Shall I die unavenged?
14752	Then she smote upon her breast and tore her hair, and cried,"Shall this stranger mock us thus?
14752	Then spake Jupiter to Juno, where she sat in a cloud watching the battle,"How long wilt thou fight against fate?
14752	Then the son of Oïleus, Ajax, rebuked him in boorish fashion:"Idomeneus, why chatterest thou before the time?
14752	Then they turned in fury on Ulysses:"Madman, are you shooting at men?
14752	Then was his wrath kindled, and he spake to himself,"Shall this evil woman return safe to Sparta?
14752	Then wise Ulysses answered her and said,"Lady, why urge me so insistently to tell?
14752	Thinkest thou that there is care or remembrance of such things in the grave?
14752	Thou hast thy Carthage; why dost thou grudge Italy to us?
14752	To whom Æneas,"I have not seen nor heard sister of thine, O virgin-- for what shall I call thee?
14752	Was he moved at all my tears?
14752	Was it to see thy brother die?
14752	Was it well that Juturna-- for what could she avail without thy help?--should give back to Turnus his sword?
14752	Were the pile and the sword and the fire for this?
14752	What are all the splendors you speak of, without affection?
14752	What can I do better than set a thief to catch a thief?"
14752	What can have been the matter with them?"
14752	What do you think has happened?
14752	What doest thou here?
14752	What evil word is this that has fallen from thy lips?
14752	What harm can the lady of the palace and her maidens do to mariners and warriors like us?"
14752	What have I done to merit such a punishment?
14752	What have I to do with the strife and sorrow of men?"
14752	What purpose hast thou now in thy heart?
14752	What shall I do?
14752	What though I stand on the farther shore, Others have crossed the stream before-- Why weep in vain?
14752	Where is Glaucus?
14752	Whether shall we fly into the sea, or force our way toward the Trojans?"
14752	Which of these two things do you think is really worth the most,--the gift of the Golden Touch, or one cup of clear cold water?"
14752	Who could remember to be careful when he was to fly for the first time?
14752	Who set my bed elsewhere?
14752	Who then could bend a bow?
14752	Why camest thou down from heaven?
14752	Why did I not tear him to pieces, and slay his companions with the sword, and serve up the young Ascanius at his meal?
14752	Why did not I think of him before?
14752	Why do you fly from me?
14752	Why drawest thou back?
14752	Why lookest thou not to Italy?
14752	Why mock me when my heart is full of sorrow, telling wild tales like these?
14752	Why should I be blamed more than others that help the men of Troy?
14752	Why tarriest thou here?
14752	Why will you not speak to me?
14752	Why wouldst thou not suffer that I should die with thee?
14752	Why, then, count this a shame?
14752	Will not you like to ride a little way with me, in my beautiful chariot?"
14752	Will you go with me, Phoebus, to demand my daughter of this wicked Pluto?"
14752	Wilt thou not then be content?
14752	Would he be less so by dinner- time?
14752	Would you support the suitors or Ulysses?
14752	Wouldst thou indeed save a mortal long ago doomed by Fate?
14752	Yet you waste his substance and would murder his son?"
14752	Yet, what other loaf could it possibly be?
14752	You have been gathering flowers?
14752	[ Illustration:"DEAR SON, HAVE YOU COME HOME AT LAST?
14752	can ye see the horses as I do?
14752	cried little Marygold, who was a very affectionate child,"pray what is the matter?
14752	cried these kind- hearted old people,"what has become of our poor neighbors?"
14752	do you smell the feast?
14752	hath Zeus, the son of Cronos, laid on any other goddess in Olympus such grievous woes as on_ me_, unhappy that I am?
14752	he cried,"how can I testify my reverence for thy filial piety and thy undaunted valor?
14752	he exclaimed with tears,"was it then a true rumor that reached me of your having died after my departure, and by your own hand?
14752	nor taste those nice little savory dishes which my dearest wife knew how to serve up?"
14752	or why are ye thus come at the bidding of your master, King Porsenna, to rob others of the freedom that ye care not to have for yourselves?"
14752	seest thou not what perils surround thee, nor hearest how the favorable west wind calls?
14752	thou who wert once accounted wise-- what is this that thou hast done?
14752	what madness is this?
14752	what power drave thee to these savage shores?
14752	what words are these which have passed the barrier of thy teeth?
14752	whither am I borne?
14752	why comest thou to our house, thou, an infrequent guest?"
14752	why dost thou, being a mortal man, pursue_ me_ with thy swift feet, who am a deathless god?"
14752	why hast thou left the field?
14752	wouldst thou again deceive me?
1598	''And are you an ox because you have an ox present with you?''
1598	''And dictation is a dictation of letters?''
1598	''And do they learn,''said Euthydemus,''what they know or what they do not know?''
1598	''And he is not wise yet?''
1598	''And what did you think of them?''
1598	''And you acquire that which you have not got already?''
1598	''And you know letters?''
1598	''And you see our garments?''
1598	''But are there any beautiful things?
1598	''But,''retorts Dionysodorus,''is not learning acquiring knowledge?''
1598	''Cleinias,''says Euthydemus,''who learn, the wise or the unwise?''
1598	''Crito,''said he to me,''are you giving no attention to these wise men?''
1598	''Do they know shoemaking, etc?''
1598	''Do you see,''retorts Euthydemus,''what has the quality of vision or what has not the quality of vision?''
1598	''Is a speaking of the silent possible?
1598	''What did I think of them?''
1598	''What does the word"non- plussed"mean?''
1598	''What was that?''
1598	''You want Cleinias to be wise?''
1598	A noble man or a mean man?
1598	A weak man or a strong man?
1598	All letters?
1598	Am I not right?
1598	Am I not right?
1598	Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots?
1598	And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man?
1598	And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones?
1598	And an indolent man less than an active man?
1598	And are not good things good, and evil things evil?
1598	And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?
1598	And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?
1598	And are not these gods animals?
1598	And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing?
1598	And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you?
1598	And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than gold, you are not gold?
1598	And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere?
1598	And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age?
1598	And clearly we do not want the art of the flute- maker; this is only another of the same sort?
1598	And did you always know this?
1598	And did you not say that you knew something?
1598	And do all other men know all things or nothing?
1598	And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not?
1598	And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and warm things of the warm?
1598	And do you know of any word which is alive?
1598	And do you know stitching?
1598	And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand?
1598	And do you know with what you know, or with something else?
1598	And do you please?
1598	And do you really and truly know all things, including carpentering and leather- cutting?
1598	And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man?
1598	And doing is making?
1598	And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers?
1598	And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus?
1598	And have you no need, Euthydemus?
1598	And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not?
1598	And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know, whether you make the addition of''when you know them''or not?
1598	And he has puppies?
1598	And he is not wise as yet?
1598	And he who says that thing says that which is?
1598	And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other?
1598	And if a man does his business he does rightly?
1598	And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them?
1598	And if there are such, are they the same or not the same as absolute beauty?''
1598	And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the gold?
1598	And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk-- in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?
1598	And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness-- a wise physician, or an ignorant one?
1598	And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not?
1598	And is Patrocles, he said, your brother?
1598	And is he not yours?
1598	And is that fair?
1598	And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing?
1598	And is this true?
1598	And knowing is having knowledge at the time?
1598	And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?
1598	And may there not be a silence of the speaker?
1598	And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time?
1598	And now answer: Do you always know with this?
1598	And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men desire happiness?
1598	And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge?
1598	And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do?
1598	And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as many spears and shields as possible?
1598	And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the places where most gold was hidden in the earth?
1598	And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us?
1598	And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father?
1598	And speaking is doing and making?
1598	And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?
1598	And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom?
1598	And that is a distinct thing apart from other things?
1598	And that is impossible?
1598	And that which is not is nowhere?
1598	And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted that?
1598	And the dog is the father of them?
1598	And they are the teachers of those who learn-- the grammar- master and the lyre- master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners?
1598	And to have money everywhere and always is a good?
1598	And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also?
1598	And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing to learn?
1598	And were you wise then?
1598	And what does that signify?
1598	And what is your notion?
1598	And what knowledge ought we to acquire?
1598	And what other goods are there?
1598	And what things do we esteem good?
1598	And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning?
1598	And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast?
1598	And who would do least-- a poor man or a rich man?
1598	And whose the making of pots?
1598	And why should you say so?
1598	And would not you, Crito, say the same?
1598	And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them?
1598	And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way?
1598	And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own?
1598	And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?''
1598	And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense;--what do you say, wise man?
1598	And you admit gold to be a good?
1598	And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased?
1598	And you also see that which has the quality of vision?
1598	And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are?
1598	And your mother, too, is the mother of all?
1598	And your papa is a dog?
1598	Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?
1598	Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked one?
1598	Are you not other than a stone?
1598	Are you prepared to make that good?
1598	Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously maintain no man to be ignorant?
1598	At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that?
1598	Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo?
1598	But are you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus?
1598	But can a father be other than a father?
1598	But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are describing the same thing?
1598	But can wisdom be taught?
1598	But did you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking?
1598	But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is impossible?
1598	But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another?
1598	But if he can not speak falsely, may he not think falsely?
1598	But if you were not wise you were unlearned?
1598	But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches-- would that be the art which would make us happy?
1598	But what need is there of good fortune when we have wisdom already:--in every art and business are not the wise also the fortunate?
1598	But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say something and you say nothing-- is there any contradiction?
1598	But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters?
1598	But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the silent?
1598	But why should I repeat the whole story?
1598	CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge?
1598	CRITO: And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this?
1598	CRITO: And were you not right, Socrates?
1598	CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old?
1598	CRITO: How did that happen, Socrates?
1598	CRITO: Well, and what came of that?
1598	CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates?
1598	CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum?
1598	CRITO: Why not, Socrates?
1598	Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one''s own land, are goods?
1598	Certainly; did you think we should say No to that?
1598	Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my father?
1598	Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied?
1598	Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what they do not know?
1598	Do you agree with me?
1598	Do you agree?
1598	Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing?
1598	Do you not know letters?
1598	Do you not remember?
1598	Do you suppose the same person to be a father and not a father?
1598	Do you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not?
1598	Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth?
1598	Does not your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake?
1598	Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not?
1598	Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are there not?
1598	Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to tell a lie?
1598	For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited?
1598	For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked?
1598	For tell me now, is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns?
1598	For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all?
1598	Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you mean, Dionysodorus?
1598	How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not?
1598	I can not say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men?
1598	I did, I said; what is going to happen to me?
1598	I said, and where did you learn that?
1598	I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons?
1598	I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus?
1598	Is not that your position?
1598	Is not the honourable honourable and the base base?
1598	Is not this the result-- that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil?
1598	Is that your difficulty?
1598	Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood?
1598	Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat this dog?
1598	Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes?
1598	May we not answer with absolute truth-- A knowledge which will do us good?
1598	Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak?
1598	Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things?
1598	Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how can I tell you to do that which is not?
1598	Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant?
1598	Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter?
1598	Of their existence or of their non- existence?
1598	Of what country are they, and what is their line of wisdom?
1598	Or a speaking of the silent?
1598	Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing?
1598	Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them?
1598	Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer?
1598	Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own?
1598	Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is, where did I learn that the good are unjust?
1598	SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good?
1598	SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful?
1598	SOCRATES: And surely it ought to do us some good?
1598	SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme power?
1598	SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have supreme authority over the subject arts-- what does that do?
1598	SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does?
1598	SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son?
1598	SOCRATES: Are you incredulous, Crito?
1598	SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it?
1598	SOCRATES: O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say?
1598	SOCRATES: There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean?
1598	SOCRATES: Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are ridiculous performers?
1598	SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect?
1598	Shall we not be happy if we have many good things?
1598	Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge by which we are to make other men good?
1598	Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest?
1598	Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not know others?
1598	That makes no difference;--and must you not, if you are knowing, know all things?
1598	That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is?
1598	Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball:''Who are they who learn dictation of the grammar- master; the wise or the foolish boys?''
1598	Then are they not animals?
1598	Then do you see our garments?
1598	Then he is the same?
1598	Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know?
1598	Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good- fortune but success?
1598	Then tell me, he said, do you know anything?
1598	Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they are?
1598	Then there is no such thing as false opinion?
1598	Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact?
1598	Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of those who have?
1598	Then we must surely be speaking the same thing?
1598	Then what are they professing to teach?''
1598	Then what is the inference?
1598	Then why did you ask me what sense my words had?
1598	Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them?
1598	Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything?
1598	Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus?
1598	Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes?
1598	Then, my good friend, do they all speak?
1598	Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters?
1598	Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only who does not know letters learns?
1598	Upon what principle?
1598	Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought to have one shield only, and one spear?
1598	Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdom-- among the goods or not?
1598	Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?
1598	Well, I said; but then what am I to do?
1598	Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing?
1598	Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you?
1598	Well, have not all things words expressive of them?
1598	Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise?
1598	Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful?
1598	What am I to do with them?
1598	What can make you tell such a lie about me and the others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish?
1598	What can they see?
1598	What do I know?
1598	What do you mean, Dionysodorus?
1598	What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing?
1598	What do you mean?
1598	What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate?
1598	What is that?
1598	What is that?
1598	What knowledge is there which has such a nature?
1598	What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time?
1598	What of that?
1598	What proof shall I give you?
1598	What then do you say?
1598	What then is the result of what has been said?
1598	What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this?
1598	What, before you, Dionysodorus?
1598	What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own?
1598	What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other animals?
1598	What, replied Dionysodorus in a moment; am I the brother of Euthydemus?
1598	What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent?
1598	What, said he, is the business of a good workman?
1598	When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one thing and I describe another, how can there be a contradiction?''
1598	When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all things?
1598	When you were children, and at your birth?
1598	Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse?
1598	Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful things?
1598	Why do you say so?
1598	Why not?
1598	Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks of things as they are?
1598	Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing?
1598	Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom?
1598	Will you not cease adding to your answers?
1598	Will you not take our word that we know all things?
1598	Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has?
1598	With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul?
1598	Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom?
1598	Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings?
1598	Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea- urchins then?
1598	You admit that?
1598	You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which I was just naming?
1598	You remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us?
1598	You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were learning?
1598	You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one?
1598	You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is?
1598	You wish him, he said, to become wise and not, to be ignorant?
1598	and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?
1598	and teach them all the arts,--carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them?
1598	and was not that our conclusion?
1598	and will you explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking?
1598	for you admit that all things which have life are animals; and have not these gods life?
1598	has he got to such a height of skill as that?
1598	if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes?
1598	or are you the same as a stone?
1598	tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering?
1738	''And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of Cronos, or our present state of existence?''
1738	''But what, Stranger, is the deficiency of which you speak?''
1738	''Then why have we laws at all?''
1738	''You mean about the golden lamb?''
1738	( 4) But are we not exceeding all due limits; and is there not a measure of all arts and sciences, to which the art of discourse must conform?
1738	And do we wonder, when the foundation of politics is in the letter only, at the miseries of states?
1738	And here I will interpose a question: What are the true forms of government?
1738	And if the legislator, or another like him, comes back from a far country, is he to be prohibited from altering his own laws?
1738	And no doubt you have heard of the empire of Cronos, and of the earthborn men?
1738	Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing to their excessive love of the military life?
1738	Are they not divided by an interval which no geometrical ratio can express?
1738	Are they not three-- monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy?
1738	But are any of these governments worthy of the name?
1738	But how would you subdivide the herdsman''s art?
1738	But is a physician only to cure his patients by persuasion, and not by force?
1738	But supposing that he does use some gentle violence for their good, what is this violence to be called?
1738	But what shall be done with Theaetetus?
1738	But what would be the consequence?
1738	But why did we go through this circuitous process, instead of saying at once that weaving is the art of entwining the warp and the woof?
1738	Can the many attain to science?
1738	Can you remember?
1738	Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem the happier?
1738	Do you see why this is?
1738	How can we get the greatest intelligence combined with the greatest power?
1738	I think, however, that we may fairly assume something of this sort-- YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	Is he a worse physician who uses a little gentle violence in effecting the cure?
1738	Is not that true?
1738	Is not the definition, although true, wanting in clearness and completeness; for do not all those other arts require to be first cleared away?
1738	Is not this the true principle of government, according to which the wise and good man will order the affairs of his subjects?
1738	Let us next ask, which of these untrue forms of government is the least bad, and which of them is the worst?
1738	May not any man, rich or poor, with or without law, and whether the citizens like or not, do what is for their good?
1738	May not any man, rich or poor, with or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against the will of the citizens, do what is for their interest?
1738	Might not an idiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian?
1738	O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator and geometrician?
1738	Or ought this science to be the overseer and governor of all the others?
1738	Or rather, shall I tell you that the happiness of these children of Cronos must have depended on how they used their time?
1738	Or rather, shall we not first ask, whether the king, statesman, master, householder, practise one art or many?
1738	Or shall we assign to him the art of command-- for he is a ruler?
1738	Or shall we say, that the violence is just, if exercised by a rich man, and unjust, if by a poor man?
1738	Ought we not rather to admire the strength of the political bond?
1738	Ought we not rather to wonder at the natural strength of the political bond?
1738	SOCRATES: Does the great geometrician apply the same measure to all three?
1738	STRANGER: Again, a large household may be compared to a small state:--will they differ at all, as far as government is concerned?
1738	STRANGER: And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out of the rest as having a character which is at once judicial and authoritative?
1738	STRANGER: And are''statesman,''''king,''''master,''or''householder,''one and the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of these names?
1738	STRANGER: And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing out of themselves two other names?
1738	STRANGER: And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the others?
1738	STRANGER: And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?
1738	STRANGER: And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the other?
1738	STRANGER: And do you agree to his proposal?
1738	STRANGER: And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?
1738	STRANGER: And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you say?
1738	STRANGER: And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive orders, and in his turn give them to others?
1738	STRANGER: And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to improve our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally?
1738	STRANGER: And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we are to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different?
1738	STRANGER: And is there any higher art or science, having power to decide which of these arts are and are not to be learned;--what do you say?
1738	STRANGER: And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical science?
1738	STRANGER: And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on to divide the sphere of knowledge?
1738	STRANGER: And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the king?--Is he a judge and a kind of spectator?
1738	STRANGER: And of which has the Statesman charge,--of the mixed or of the unmixed race?
1738	STRANGER: And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no single science to any other?
1738	STRANGER: And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust?
1738	STRANGER: And the householder and master are the same?
1738	STRANGER: And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade or not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade?
1738	STRANGER: And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not horses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man collectively?
1738	STRANGER: And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are not to give up our former notion?
1738	STRANGER: And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by professional trainers or by others having similar authority?
1738	STRANGER: And when men have anything to do in common, that they should be of one mind is surely a desirable thing?
1738	STRANGER: And where shall we look for the political animal?
1738	STRANGER: And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last?
1738	STRANGER: And you would think temperance to be different from courage; and likewise to be a part of virtue?
1738	STRANGER: And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the few?
1738	STRANGER: And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war is, can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal?
1738	STRANGER: Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land?
1738	STRANGER: Are not examples formed in this manner?
1738	STRANGER: But if this is as you say, can our argument about the king be true and unimpeachable?
1738	STRANGER: But surely the science of a true king is royal science?
1738	STRANGER: But the first process is a separation of the clotted and matted fibres?
1738	STRANGER: But what would you say of some other serviceable officials?
1738	STRANGER: But what would you think of another sort of power or science?
1738	STRANGER: But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit?
1738	STRANGER: But yet the division will not be the same?
1738	STRANGER: But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a hundred, or say fifty, who could?
1738	STRANGER: Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom?
1738	STRANGER: Did you ever hear that the men of former times were earth- born, and not begotten of one another?
1738	STRANGER: Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is in point?
1738	STRANGER: Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political science?
1738	STRANGER: He contributes knowledge, not manual labour?
1738	STRANGER: How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet?
1738	STRANGER: I want to ask, whether any one of the other herdsmen has a rival who professes and claims to share with him in the management of the herd?
1738	STRANGER: If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science?
1738	STRANGER: If any one who is in a private station has the skill to advise one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician?
1738	STRANGER: Is not monarchy a recognized form of government?
1738	STRANGER: Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude, which is called by the name of democracy?
1738	STRANGER: Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would consider courage to be a part of virtue?
1738	STRANGER: May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of producing something?
1738	STRANGER: May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there are two divisions-- one which rules, and the other which judges?
1738	STRANGER: Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist, they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one another?
1738	STRANGER: Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract our words?
1738	STRANGER: Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and endeavour to assign to him what is his?
1738	STRANGER: Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the art of managing a herd, or the art of collective management?
1738	STRANGER: Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed?
1738	STRANGER: Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young Socrates, instead of him?
1738	STRANGER: Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of calculation?
1738	STRANGER: The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not political?
1738	STRANGER: The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the following:-- YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	STRANGER: The science which has to do with military operations against our enemies-- is that to be regarded as a science or not?
1738	STRANGER: Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of what was said in the enquiry about the Sophist?
1738	STRANGER: Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we compelled to make laws at all?
1738	STRANGER: Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?
1738	STRANGER: Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that the argument may proceed in a regular manner?
1738	STRANGER: Then the sciences must be divided as before?
1738	STRANGER: Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind about the fancies of others?
1738	STRANGER: Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving supplied?
1738	STRANGER: Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to knowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general?
1738	STRANGER: There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in general?
1738	STRANGER: There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the political, which had the charge of one particular herd?
1738	STRANGER: Together?
1738	STRANGER: Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?
1738	STRANGER: Weaving is a sort of uniting?
1738	STRANGER: Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts, merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?
1738	STRANGER: What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with the political occupation?
1738	STRANGER: Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman?
1738	STRANGER: Which was, unmistakeably, one of the arts of knowledge?
1738	STRANGER: Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?
1738	STRANGER: Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the productions of others, which have been sold before?
1738	STRANGER: Why, is not''care''of herds applicable to all?
1738	STRANGER: Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a knowledge of what they do not as yet know be-- YOUNG SOCRATES: Be what?
1738	STRANGER: Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by twisting, is the woof made?
1738	STRANGER: Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man''s side all through his life, prescribing for him the exact particulars of his duty?
1738	STRANGER: You know that the master- builder does not work himself, but is the ruler of workmen?
1738	Shall I explain the nature of what I call the second best?
1738	Shall we do as I say?
1738	THEODORUS: In what respect?
1738	THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1738	Tell me, then-- YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	Tell me, which is the happier of the two?
1738	The excessive length of a discourse may be blamed; but who can say what is excess, unless he is furnished with a measure or standard?
1738	The question is often asked, What are the limits of legislation in relation to morals?
1738	Under which of the two shall we place the Statesman?
1738	Viewed in the light of science and true art, would not all such enactments be utterly ridiculous?
1738	Viewed in the light of science, would not the continuance of such regulations be ridiculous?
1738	Were we right in selecting him out of ten thousand other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human flock?
1738	What do you advise?
1738	Who, Socrates, would be equal to such a task?
1738	Will you proceed?
1738	Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art, or a breach of the laws of health?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: And are they not right?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: And what is that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: And which are the kindred arts?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Are they not right in saying so?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Can not we have both ways?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining species?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be referring to manufacture of the warp?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Explain; what are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How and why is that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as other than a science?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How can they be made?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How can we be safe?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How could we?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that the cause?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that, and what bonds do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How is this?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How must I speak of them, then?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How shall I define them?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How so?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How so?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How so?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How then?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How was that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you make the division?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: How?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: In what direction?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: In what respect?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: In what way?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle of division?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right; but how shall we take the next step in the division?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those days; and in what way were they begotten of one another?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: True; and what is the next step?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Upon what principle?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but what is the imperfection which still remains?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: We had better not take the whole?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What class do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What did I hear, then?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean, Stranger?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What images?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is the error?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this new question?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is to be done in this case?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What is your meaning?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What misfortune?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What question?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What road?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What science?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What sort of an image?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in our recent division?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What was this great error of which you speak?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Where would you make the division?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Which of the two halves do you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they, and what services do they perform?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Who is he?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Whom can you mean?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why is that?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why so?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why strange?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Why?
1738	YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; what else should it be?
1738	Yet perhaps the question what will or will not be is a foolish one, for who can tell?''
1738	You have heard what happened in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes?
1738	You have heard, no doubt, and remember what they say happened at that time?
1738	Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates is proposing?
1738	they raise up enemies against themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their native- land or enslave and subject it to its foes?
1658	''Why, is he not a philosopher?''
1658	):''Why Socrates, who was not a poet, while in prison had been putting Aesop into verse?''
1658	); or the mysterious reference to another science( mathematics?)
1658	Again, believing in the immortality of the soul, we must still ask the question of Socrates,''What is that which we suppose to be immortal?''
1658	Again, upon the supposition that the soul is a harmony, why is one soul better than another?
1658	Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two?
1658	And Socrates observing them asked what they thought of the argument, and whether there was anything wanting?
1658	And an absolute beauty and absolute good?
1658	And are not the temperate exactly in the same case?
1658	And are not we at this day seeking to discover that which Socrates in a glass darkly foresaw?
1658	And can all this be true, think you?
1658	And did he answer forcibly or feebly?
1658	And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon as we were born?
1658	And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet greater evils?
1658	And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?
1658	And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition in evil, the worst would be found to be very few?
1658	And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in which the elements are harmonized?
1658	And does the soul admit of death?
1658	And does the worship of God consist only of praise, or of many forms of service?
1658	And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality?
1658	And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony?
1658	And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?
1658	And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike?
1658	And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from his body and desires to be alone and by herself?
1658	And is death the assertion of this individuality in the higher nature, and the falling away into nothingness of the lower?
1658	And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her?
1658	And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic of the philosopher?
1658	And is not the feeling discreditable?
1658	And is not this the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body?
1658	And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body?
1658	And is the soul seen or not seen?
1658	And is the soul seen or not seen?
1658	And is there any opposite to life?
1658	And is this always the case?
1658	And is this true of all opposites?
1658	And may we say that this has been proven?
1658	And now the application has to be made: If the soul is immortal,''what manner of persons ought we to be?''
1658	And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle which repels the even?
1658	And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the opposite idea will never intrude?
1658	And one of the two processes or generations is visible-- for surely the act of dying is visible?
1658	And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the world of the living?
1658	And shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only?
1658	And so you think that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court?
1658	And that by greatness only great things become great and greater greater, and by smallness the less become less?
1658	And that principle which repels the musical, or the just?
1658	And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less harmonized?
1658	And that which is not more or less harmonized can not have more or less of harmony, but only an equal harmony?
1658	And the body is more like the changing?
1658	And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places answering to their several natures and propensities?
1658	And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice?
1658	And therefore has neither more nor less of discord, nor yet of harmony?
1658	And therefore, previously?
1658	And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and have there their two intermediate processes also?
1658	And they are generated one from the other?
1658	And this impress was given by the odd principle?
1658	And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death?
1658	And this state of the soul is called wisdom?
1658	And to the odd is opposed the even?
1658	And to which class is the body more alike and akin?
1658	And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may be inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one?
1658	And what about the pleasures of love-- should he care for them?
1658	And what do we call the principle which does not admit of death?
1658	And what from the dead?
1658	And what is it?
1658	And what is now your notion of such matters?
1658	And what is that process?
1658	And what is that?
1658	And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection?
1658	And what we mean by''seen''and''not seen''is that which is or is not visible to the eye of man?
1658	And whence did we obtain our knowledge?
1658	And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you are gone?
1658	And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer?
1658	And which does the soul resemble?
1658	And which of his friends were with him?
1658	And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea?
1658	And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using?
1658	And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number three?
1658	And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul?
1658	Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites?
1658	Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which we have to consider?
1658	Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal?
1658	Are they more or less harmonized, or is there one harmony within another?
1658	Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some opposite?
1658	Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses?
1658	Are we not at the same time describing them both in superlatives, only that we may satisfy the demands of rhetoric?
1658	At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will not be able to render an account of his knowledge?
1658	At the same time, turning to Cebes, he said: Are you at all disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend''s objection?
1658	But are real equals ever unequal?
1658	But are they the same as fire and snow?
1658	But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?
1658	But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates?
1658	But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very matters about which we are speaking?
1658	But does the soul admit of degrees?
1658	But enough of them:--let us discuss the matter among ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?
1658	But if it be true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution?
1658	But is this the only thing which is called odd?
1658	But what followed?
1658	But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals?
1658	But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?--not since we were born as men?
1658	But why, asks Cebes, if he is a possession of the gods, should he wish to die and leave them?
1658	By all means, replied Socrates; what else should I please?
1658	Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied?
1658	Cebes asks why suicide is thought not to be right, if death is to be accounted a good?
1658	Could he have written this under the idea that the soul is a harmony of the body?
1658	Did he appear to share the unpleasant feeling which you mention?
1658	Did you never observe this?
1658	Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind''s eye an image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs?
1658	Do we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or if not at what other time?
1658	Do you agree in this notion of the cause?
1658	Do you agree?
1658	Do you agree?
1658	Do you know of any?
1658	Do you not agree with me?
1658	Do you not agree?
1658	Does not the divine appear to you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that which is subject and servant?
1658	Does their life cease at death, or is there some''better thing reserved''also for them?
1658	ECHECRATES: And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus?
1658	ECHECRATES: Any one else?
1658	ECHECRATES: Well, and what did you talk about?
1658	ECHECRATES: Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates on the day when he drank the poison?
1658	ECHECRATES: What followed?
1658	ECHECRATES: What is this ship?
1658	ECHECRATES: What was the manner of his death, Phaedo?
1658	ECHECRATES: Who were present?
1658	Enough of them: the real question is, What is the nature of that death which he desires?
1658	For are we not imagining Heaven under the similitude of a church, and Hell as a prison, or perhaps a madhouse or chamber of horrors?
1658	For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul incline us against drinking?
1658	For example; Will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, while remaining three?
1658	For how can one be divided into two?
1658	For if the living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death?
1658	For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than himself?
1658	For what could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit?
1658	For what idea can we form of the soul when separated from the body?
1658	From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?
1658	Had we the knowledge at our birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our birth?
1658	Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs?
1658	Have we not seen dogs more faithful and intelligent than men, and men who are more stupid and brutal than any animals?
1658	He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument, or of a part only?
1658	He proceeds: When we fear that the soul will vanish away, let us ask ourselves what is that which we suppose to be liable to dissolution?
1658	Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with snow?
1658	How can she have, if the previous argument holds?
1658	How shall they bury him?
1658	How so?
1658	How so?
1658	I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them?
1658	I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance:--The knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?
1658	I will try to make this clearer by an example:--The odd number is always called by the name of odd?
1658	Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature needs?
1658	Is it not the separation of soul and body?
1658	Is it the personal and individual element in us, or the spiritual and universal?
1658	Is it the principle of knowledge or of goodness, or the union of the two?
1658	Is it the simple or the compound, the unchanging or the changing, the invisible idea or the visible object of sense?
1658	Is not death opposed to life?
1658	Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?
1658	Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?
1658	Is not this true, Cebes?
1658	Is the Pythagorean image of the harmony, or that of the monad, the truer expression?
1658	Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire?
1658	Is the soul related to the body as sight to the eye, or as the boatman to his boat?
1658	Is the suffering physical or mental?
1658	May I, or not?
1658	May not the science of physiology transform the world?
1658	May they not rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one another?
1658	May we be allowed to imagine the minds of men everywhere working together during many ages for the completion of our knowledge?
1658	Must we not rather assign to death some corresponding process of generation?
1658	Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves what that is which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered, and about which we fear?
1658	Nay rather, are we not contradicting Homer and ourselves in affirming anything of the sort?
1658	Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again?
1658	Now which of these two functions is akin to the divine?
1658	Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?
1658	Of what nature?
1658	Once more, he said, what ruler is there of the elements of human nature other than the soul, and especially the wise soul?
1658	Or are we vainly attempting to pass the boundaries of human thought?
1658	Or did the authorities forbid them to be present-- so that he had no friends near him when he died?
1658	Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer?
1658	Or how can the soul be united with the body and still be independent?
1658	Or look at the matter in another way:--Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?
1658	Or two be compounded into one?
1658	Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?
1658	PHAEDO: Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?
1658	Philosophers have spoken of them as forms of the human mind, but what is the mind without them?
1658	Please to tell me then, Cebes, he said, what was the difficulty which troubled you?
1658	Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable?
1658	Shall he make a libation of the poison?
1658	Shall we exclude the opposite process?
1658	Shall we say so?
1658	Shall we say with Aristotle, that the soul is the entelechy or form of an organized living body?
1658	Socrates alone retained his calmness: What is this strange outcry?
1658	Socrates replied with a smile: O Simmias, what are you saying?
1658	Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are the disciples of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?
1658	Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be imperishable?
1658	Tell me, I implore you, how did Socrates proceed?
1658	Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body alive?
1658	That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?
1658	The debt shall be paid, said Crito; is there anything else?
1658	The question,''Whence come our abstract ideas?''
1658	The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?
1658	The worst of men are objects of pity rather than of anger to the philanthropist; must they not be equally such to divine benevolence?
1658	Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?
1658	Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is not more or less harmonized?
1658	Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful?
1658	Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three?
1658	Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below?
1658	Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the dead?
1658	Then the soul is immortal?
1658	Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen?
1658	Then the triad or number three is uneven?
1658	Then these( so- called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?
1658	Then three has no part in the even?
1658	Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will never in any case be opposed to itself?
1658	Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time?
1658	Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?
1658	Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?
1658	Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good?
1658	They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before?
1658	True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a little of the probabilities of these things?
1658	Unseen then?
1658	Was not that a reasonable notion?
1658	We will do our best, said Crito: And in what way shall we bury you?
1658	Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of waking?
1658	Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied?
1658	Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice?
1658	Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre remember a man?
1658	What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?--is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper?
1658	What answer can be made to the old commonplace,''Is not God the author of evil, if he knowingly permitted, but could have prevented it?''
1658	What can I do better in the interval between this and the setting of the sun?
1658	What did he say in his last hours?
1658	What do you mean, Socrates?
1658	What do you mean, Socrates?
1658	What do you mean?
1658	What do you mean?
1658	What do you mean?
1658	What do you mean?
1658	What do you say?
1658	What do you say?
1658	What do you think?
1658	What is generated from the living?
1658	What is it, Socrates?
1658	What is that pain which does not become deadened after a thousand years?
1658	What is to become of the animals in a future state?
1658	What natures do you mean, Socrates?
1658	What shall I do with them?
1658	What then is to be the result?
1658	What was said or done?
1658	What was the reason of this?
1658	Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions?
1658	Where are the actions worthy of rewards greater than those which are conferred on the greatest benefactors of mankind?
1658	Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do that we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this life?
1658	Which might be like, or might be unlike them?
1658	Which of them will you retain?
1658	Why are they the happiest?
1658	Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?
1658	Why should the wicked suffer any more than ourselves?
1658	Why then should he repine when the hour of separation arrives?
1658	Why, if he is dead while he lives, should he fear that other death, through which alone he can behold wisdom in her purity?
1658	Why, said Socrates,--is not Evenus a philosopher?
1658	Will he not depart with joy?
1658	Will you not allow that I have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans?
1658	Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body?
1658	Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them?
1658	You must have observed this trait of character?
1658	You would agree; would you not?
1658	You would be afraid to draw such an inference, would you not?
1658	and are we convinced that all of them are generated out of opposites?
1658	and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember Cebes?
1658	and is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble?
1658	and what again is that about which we have no fear?
1658	and what is the impression produced by them?
1658	and when the body is hungry, against eating?
1658	and which to the mortal?
1658	and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?--for you will allow that they are the best of them?
1658	had we been placed in their circumstances should we have been any better than they?
1658	he said; for these are the consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a harmony?
1658	or did he calmly meet the attack?
1658	or do they fall short of this perfect equality in a measure?
1658	or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?
1658	or is she at variance with them?
1658	or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality?
1658	or what is the nature of that pleasure or happiness which never wearies by monotony?
1658	or with Plato, that she has a life of her own?
1658	whence but from the body and the lusts of the body?
1616	''And what are ion, reon, doun?''
1616	''But then, why, Socrates, is language so consistent?
1616	''But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus mystifies me; I should like to ask him, in your presence, what he means by the fitness of names?''
1616	''How do you explain pur n udor?''
1616	''Which of us by taking thought''can make new words or constructions?
1616	''Will you go on to the elements-- sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, seasons, years?''
1616	( Compare Plato, Laws):--''ATHENIAN STRANGER: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of government?
1616	ATHENIAN STRANGER: And have there not been thousands and thousands of cities which have come into being and perished during this period?
1616	ATHENIAN STRANGER: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and incalculable?
1616	ATHENIAN STRANGER: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?
1616	And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I saying?
1616	And Socrates?
1616	And even if this had been otherwise, who would learn of words when he might learn of things?
1616	And has not every place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising, and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?''
1616	And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?
1616	And let me ask another question,--If we had no faculty of speech, how should we communicate with one another?
1616	And not the rest?
1616	And now let me see; where are we?
1616	And what do you consider to be the meaning of this word?
1616	And what is the final result of the enquiry?
1616	And which are more likely to be right-- the wiser or the less wise, the men or the women?
1616	Are not actions also a class of being?
1616	Are there any names which witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness?
1616	Are we to count them like votes?
1616	Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is correctness of names to be determined by the voice of a majority?
1616	Are we to say of whichever sort there are most, those are the true ones?
1616	But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not said?
1616	But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?
1616	But an image in fact always falls short in some degree of the original, and if images are not exact counterparts, why should names be?
1616	But are not such distinctions an anachronism?
1616	But are words really consistent; are there not as many terms of praise which signify rest as which signify motion?
1616	But do you not see that there is a degree of deception about names?
1616	But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that which you were giving of Zeus?
1616	But how does the carpenter make or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look?
1616	But how shall we further analyse them, and where does the imitator begin?
1616	But let me ask you what is the use and force of names?
1616	But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is the use of them?
1616	But then, how do the primary names indicate anything?
1616	But then, why do the Eritreans call that skleroter which we call sklerotes?
1616	But to what are you referring?
1616	But what do you say of the month and the stars?
1616	But what is kakon?
1616	But who is to be the judge of the proper form?
1616	But who makes a name?
1616	But why do you not give me another word?
1616	But why should we not discuss another kind of Gods-- the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?
1616	CLEINIAS: How so?
1616	CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
1616	CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all?
1616	CRATYLUS: How so?
1616	CRATYLUS: How so?
1616	CRATYLUS: What do you mean?
1616	CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?--say something and yet say nothing?
1616	Can the thing beauty be vanishing away from us while the words are yet in our mouths?
1616	Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle?
1616	Did you ever observe in speaking that all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose?
1616	Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own?
1616	Do you agree with me that the letter rho is expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness?
1616	Do you agree with me?
1616	Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the discovery of things?
1616	Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of them?
1616	Do you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?
1616	Do you not suppose this to be true?
1616	Do you think that likely?
1616	Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names?
1616	Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?
1616	Does he not say that Hector''s son had two names--''Hector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax''?
1616	Does not Cratylus agree with him that names teach us the nature of things?
1616	Does not the law give names, and does not the teacher receive them from the legislator?
1616	For example, what business has the letter rho in the word katoptron, or the letter sigma in the word sphigx?
1616	For is not falsehood saying the thing which is not?
1616	For is there not a true beauty and a true good, which is always beautiful and always good?
1616	For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names; do you not think so?
1616	For were we not saying just now that he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion?
1616	HERMOGENES: And what are the traditions?
1616	HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites?
1616	HERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation?
1616	HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he say?
1616	HERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus?
1616	HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon?
1616	HERMOGENES: But what is selene( the moon)?
1616	HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a part in your previous discourse?
1616	HERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word?
1616	HERMOGENES: How do you make that out?
1616	HERMOGENES: How do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: How do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates?
1616	HERMOGENES: How plausible?
1616	HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect?
1616	HERMOGENES: How so?
1616	HERMOGENES: How so?
1616	HERMOGENES: How so?
1616	HERMOGENES: How so?
1616	HERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious?
1616	HERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next?
1616	HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I. SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name?
1616	HERMOGENES: Of what nature?
1616	HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument?
1616	HERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what is the meaning of the word''hero''?
1616	HERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?
1616	HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes?
1616	HERMOGENES: Well, and what of them?
1616	HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun( profitable)?
1616	HERMOGENES: What device?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone( pleasure), lupe( pain), epithumia( desire), and the like, Socrates?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur( fire) and udor( water)?
1616	HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa( opinion), and that class of words?
1616	HERMOGENES: What is Ares?
1616	HERMOGENES: What is it?
1616	HERMOGENES: What is the inference?
1616	HERMOGENES: What is the inference?
1616	HERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?
1616	HERMOGENES: What of that?
1616	HERMOGENES: What other appellation?
1616	HERMOGENES: What then?
1616	HERMOGENES: What was the name?
1616	HERMOGENES: What way?
1616	HERMOGENES: Which are they?
1616	HERMOGENES: Why do you say so?
1616	HERMOGENES: Why not?
1616	HERMOGENES: Why, Socrates?
1616	HERMOGENES: Why, how is that?
1616	HERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name?
1616	HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible?
1616	Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:--has this proposition been sufficiently proven?
1616	Have you remarked this fact?
1616	How could there be names for all the numbers unless you allow that convention is used?
1616	How did the roots or substantial portions of words become modified or inflected?
1616	How they originated, who can tell?
1616	How, he would probably have argued, could men devoid of art have contrived a structure of such complexity?
1616	I utter a sound which I understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this is what you are saying?
1616	Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory of language, which he acknowledges to be imperfect?
1616	Is it the best sort of information?
1616	Is language conscious or unconscious?
1616	Is not all that quite possible?
1616	Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them purely accidental?
1616	Let me explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse?
1616	Let me put the matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have colour?
1616	Let us consider:--does he not himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,''For he alone defended their city and long walls''?
1616	May I not say to him--''This is your name''?
1616	May we suppose that Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by writing a comedy in the form of a prose dialogue?
1616	Now that we have a general notion, how shall we proceed?
1616	Now, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the other name was conferred by the women?
1616	Or about Batieia and Myrina?
1616	Or if this latter explanation is refuted by his silence, then in what relation does his account of language stand to the rest of his philosophy?
1616	Or may we be so bold as to deny the connexion between them?
1616	Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name?
1616	SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a colour, or sound?
1616	SOCRATES: And I ask again,''What do we do when we weave?''
1616	SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not?
1616	SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and some worse?
1616	SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?
1616	SOCRATES: And are not the good wise?
1616	SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and are not other works worthy of blame?
1616	SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser?
1616	SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the enquiry?
1616	SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the woman, and of the woman to the man?
1616	SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon?
1616	SOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things?
1616	SOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him be said to be of golden race?
1616	SOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?
1616	SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts?
1616	SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a dialectician?
1616	SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names?
1616	SOCRATES: And how to answer them?
1616	SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their uses?
1616	SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely?
1616	SOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should certainly infer, and not by necessity?
1616	SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action?
1616	SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication given by me to you?
1616	SOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be made better by associating with another?
1616	SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?
1616	SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?
1616	SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?
1616	SOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from all impurities?
1616	SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking?
1616	SOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is willing to come back to us?
1616	SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?
1616	SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general?
1616	SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king?
1616	SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their wives?
1616	SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both?
1616	SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers?
1616	SOCRATES: And not the rest?
1616	SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will you answer me?
1616	SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action?
1616	SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, looking to the broken one?
1616	SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the like?
1616	SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind?
1616	SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something?
1616	SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something?
1616	SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the name?
1616	SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?
1616	SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things?
1616	SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?
1616	SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given?
1616	SOCRATES: And there are many desires?
1616	SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions?
1616	SOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the greatest?
1616	SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator?
1616	SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions?
1616	SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions?
1616	SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own?
1616	SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda?
1616	SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention?
1616	SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names?
1616	SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this?
1616	SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are prodigies?
1616	SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well?
1616	SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?
1616	SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using well?
1616	SOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion?
1616	SOCRATES: And who are they?
1616	SOCRATES: And who is he?
1616	SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre- maker?
1616	SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country?
1616	SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright?
1616	SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases?
1616	SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are?
1616	SOCRATES: And with which we name?
1616	SOCRATES: And with which we weave?
1616	SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the thing?
1616	SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish?
1616	SOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a knowledge of the things which he named?
1616	SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in another way?
1616	SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike?
1616	SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible?
1616	SOCRATES: Athene?
1616	SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something?
1616	SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others?
1616	SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived?
1616	SOCRATES: But how about truth, then?
1616	SOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the primitive names were not yet given?
1616	SOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them?
1616	SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?
1616	SOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be known without names?
1616	SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue?
1616	SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we can not find a meeting- point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing named?
1616	SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with imitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music and drawing?
1616	SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used?
1616	SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names differ?
1616	SOCRATES: Can not you at least say who gives us the names which we use?
1616	SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things according to their natures?
1616	SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?
1616	SOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?
1616	SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single combat with Hephaestus?
1616	SOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came first?
1616	SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of the giver of the name?
1616	SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them?
1616	SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the actions which proceed from them?
1616	SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?
1616	SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give correct names?
1616	SOCRATES: How would you have me begin?
1616	SOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger?
1616	SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can tell me what is the meaning of the pur?
1616	SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike?
1616	SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?
1616	SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called( kalesan) things by their names, and is not mind the beautiful( kalon)?
1616	SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not the principle which imposes the name the cause?
1616	SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the names given to Hector''s son-- Astyanax or Scamandrius?
1616	SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?
1616	SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct?
1616	SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed?
1616	SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another?
1616	SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and show that they are rightly named Gods?
1616	SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the works of a carpenter?
1616	SOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?
1616	SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then?
1616	SOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light( Phaeos istora)?
1616	SOCRATES: Still you have found them?
1616	SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask,''What sort of instrument is a shuttle?''
1616	SOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of the first names, know or not know the things which they named?
1616	SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each that which belongs to them and is like them?
1616	SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the course of nature?
1616	SOCRATES: The two words selas( brightness) and phos( light) have much the same meaning?
1616	SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator names or imitates?
1616	SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed?
1616	SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying?
1616	SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius?
1616	SOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired being or God, to contradict himself?
1616	SOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same state?
1616	SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false?
1616	SOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry?
1616	SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good?
1616	SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?
1616	SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called irreligious?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the legislator?
1616	SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well-- and well means like a weaver?
1616	SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse?
1616	SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false?
1616	SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?
1616	SOCRATES: Well, and about this river-- to know that he ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander-- is not that a solemn lesson?
1616	SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?
1616	SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing?
1616	SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them in this way?
1616	SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body?
1616	SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce?
1616	SOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?
1616	SOCRATES: What more names remain to us?
1616	SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus?
1616	SOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods?
1616	SOCRATES: What shall we take next?
1616	SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?
1616	SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signified-- did he not?
1616	SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?
1616	SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference?
1616	SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part?
1616	SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things( pan), and is always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false?
1616	SOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word?
1616	SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai( to seek)?
1616	SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him?
1616	SOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word psuche( soul), and then of the word soma( body)?
1616	Shall I take first of all him whom you mentioned first-- the sun?
1616	Shall we not be deceived by him?
1616	Should we not use signs, like the deaf and dumb?
1616	Socrates asks, whether the things differ as the words which represent them differ:--Are we to maintain with Protagoras, that what appears is?
1616	Suddenly, on some occasion of interest( at the approach of a wild beast, shall we say?
1616	Take, for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter rho inserted?
1616	Then how came the giver of names to contradict himself, and to make some names expressive of rest, and others of motion?
1616	Very good: and which shall I take first?
1616	Was I not telling you just now( but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to share the enquiry with you?
1616	Was there a correctness in words, and were they given by nature or convention?
1616	We can understand one another, although the letter rho accent is not equivalent to the letter s: why is this?
1616	Well, then, there is the letter lambda; what business has this in a word meaning hardness?
1616	Were we mistaken?
1616	Were we right or wrong in saying so?
1616	What did he mean who gave the name Hestia?
1616	What do you say to another?
1616	What do you say, Cratylus?
1616	What do you say?
1616	What do you think?
1616	What else but the soul?
1616	What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and nature of language?
1616	What names will afford the most crucial test of natural fitness?
1616	What principle of correctness is there in those charming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?''
1616	What principle of correctness is there in those charming words-- wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?
1616	What remains after justice?
1616	What will this imitator be called?
1616	What, then, is a name?
1616	Which of these two notions do you prefer?
1616	Why are some verbs impersonal?
1616	Why are there only so many parts of speech, and on what principle are they divided?
1616	Why do substantives often differ in meaning from the verbs to which they are related, adverbs from adjectives?
1616	Why do words differing in origin coalesce in the same sound though retaining their differences of meaning?
1616	Why does the meaning of words depart so widely from their etymology?
1616	Why is the number of words so small in which the sound is an echo of the sense?
1616	Will he not look at the ideal which he has in his mind?
1616	Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good and evil?
1616	Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not?
1616	Will not the user be the man?
1616	Will you help me in the search?
1616	Would that be your view?
1616	Would you not say so?
1616	You know the distinction of soul and body?
1616	You were saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he named; are you still of that opinion?
1616	and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us?
1616	and how did they receive separate meanings?
1616	and is correctness of names the voice of the majority?
1616	and the teacher will use the name well-- and well means like a teacher?
1616	and to what does he look?
1616	and which confines him more to the same spot,--desire or necessity?
1616	and will they be true names at the time of uttering them?
1616	have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man?
1616	or does he mean to imply that a perfect language can only be based on his own theory of ideas?
1616	or is there any other?
1616	or will he look to the form according to which he made the other?
1616	the carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use them?
1616	would these words be true or false?
1616	you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false?
1676	ALCIBIADES: And do you not think that I would enquire?
1676	ALCIBIADES: And was there not a time when I did so think?
1676	ALCIBIADES: And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery?
1676	ALCIBIADES: At what?
1676	ALCIBIADES: But do you not think that I could discover them?
1676	ALCIBIADES: But what can we do?
1676	ALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?
1676	ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what has that to do with the matter?
1676	ALCIBIADES: But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Did I, then?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Do you mean by''how,''Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?
1676	ALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates?
1676	ALCIBIADES: How could we?
1676	ALCIBIADES: How so?
1676	ALCIBIADES: How was that?
1676	ALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which are required, Socrates,--can you tell me?
1676	ALCIBIADES: In what respect?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going to ask you the very same question-- What do you want?
1676	ALCIBIADES: The Muses do you mean, Socrates?
1676	ALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What am I to consider?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What are they?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What caution?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What is it?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What is that?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What qualities?
1676	ALCIBIADES: What was that?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Why are you so sure?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Why is that?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Why, are they not able to teach?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and unjust?
1676	ALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there?
1676	And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman?
1676	And do you know whether you are a freeman or not?
1676	And does that which gives it to the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with himself and with another?
1676	And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which you speak?
1676	And what is their aim?
1676	And what is your motive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of coming?
1676	And who do them?
1676	At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage?
1676	But granting, if I must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance necessary to the attainment of them?
1676	But has he the knowledge which is necessary for carrying them out?
1676	But to be good in what?
1676	But to command what-- horses or men?
1676	But what business?
1676	But when is a city better?
1676	Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?
1676	Can you tell me why?
1676	Did you never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings?
1676	Does Alcibiades know?
1676	Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands?
1676	Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet?
1676	Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him?
1676	Does not the art of measure?
1676	Equestrian affairs?
1676	For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times?
1676	Have you not remarked their absence?
1676	He is going to persuade the Athenians-- about what?
1676	How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of which the other is in ignorance?
1676	I who put the question, or you who answer me?
1676	Is he good in the sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad?
1676	Is it not disgraceful?
1676	Is it not true?
1676	Is not that clear?
1676	Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?
1676	Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or evil?
1676	Now is this courage good or evil?
1676	Or did you think that you knew?
1676	Or is self- knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?
1676	SOCRATES: A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems?
1676	SOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge?
1676	SOCRATES: About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?
1676	SOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him?
1676	SOCRATES: Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance?
1676	SOCRATES: All just things are honourable?
1676	SOCRATES: And Alcibiades is my hearer?
1676	SOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?
1676	SOCRATES: And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic?
1676	SOCRATES: And I in talking use words?
1676	SOCRATES: And I was right?
1676	SOCRATES: And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?
1676	SOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one and persuade many?
1676	SOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer?
1676	SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good?
1676	SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good?
1676	SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing?
1676	SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend?
1676	SOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state?
1676	SOCRATES: And as much as is best?
1676	SOCRATES: And as much as is well?
1676	SOCRATES: And at such times as are best?
1676	SOCRATES: And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is better for men as well as for children?
1676	SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands?
1676	SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?
1676	SOCRATES: And by how much greater?
1676	SOCRATES: And can not you persuade one man about that of which you can persuade many?
1676	SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient?
1676	SOCRATES: And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse?
1676	SOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not know what we are ourselves?
1676	SOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?
1676	SOCRATES: And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how?
1676	SOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?
1676	SOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet?
1676	SOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art?
1676	SOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take care of yourself?
1676	SOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?
1676	SOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body?
1676	SOCRATES: And does the body rule over itself?
1676	SOCRATES: And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?
1676	SOCRATES: And failing, will he not be miserable?
1676	SOCRATES: And for as long a time as is better?
1676	SOCRATES: And happiness is a good?
1676	SOCRATES: And have I not been the questioner all through?
1676	SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy?
1676	SOCRATES: And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?
1676	SOCRATES: And how can you say,''What was I to do''?
1676	SOCRATES: And how does this happen?
1676	SOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?
1676	SOCRATES: And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public and private capacity?
1676	SOCRATES: And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states?
1676	SOCRATES: And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is delivered from his misery?
1676	SOCRATES: And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?
1676	SOCRATES: And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings?
1676	SOCRATES: And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right in sending him to be taught by our friends the many?
1676	SOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic- master?
1676	SOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself?
1676	SOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?
1676	SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual singly and many individuals of the things which he knows?
1676	SOCRATES: And is self- knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi?
1676	SOCRATES: And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?
1676	SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not?
1676	SOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?
1676	SOCRATES: And more than four years ago you were a child-- were you not?
1676	SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters?
1676	SOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves?
1676	SOCRATES: And private individuals?
1676	SOCRATES: And self- knowledge we agree to be wisdom?
1676	SOCRATES: And so you will act rightly and well?
1676	SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?
1676	SOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board?
1676	SOCRATES: And taking proper care means improving?
1676	SOCRATES: And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?
1676	SOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you know?
1676	SOCRATES: And that which is better is also nobler?
1676	SOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used?
1676	SOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and the death another?
1676	SOCRATES: And the good is expedient?
1676	SOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and would least like to be deprived of them?
1676	SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good?
1676	SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good?
1676	SOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that?
1676	SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant?
1676	SOCRATES: And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body?
1676	SOCRATES: And the same holds of the balance?
1676	SOCRATES: And the shoe in like manner to the foot?
1676	SOCRATES: And the soul rules?
1676	SOCRATES: And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?
1676	SOCRATES: And the user of the body is the soul?
1676	SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?
1676	SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil?
1676	SOCRATES: And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly?
1676	SOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and their opposites you would least desire?
1676	SOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?
1676	SOCRATES: And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war?
1676	SOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise?
1676	SOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?
1676	SOCRATES: And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same?
1676	SOCRATES: And virtue to a freeman?
1676	SOCRATES: And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic?
1676	SOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses?
1676	SOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?
1676	SOCRATES: And what art makes each individual agree with himself?
1676	SOCRATES: And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the comparative length of the span and of the cubit?
1676	SOCRATES: And what do you call the art of fellow- citizens?
1676	SOCRATES: And what is nobler is more becoming?
1676	SOCRATES: And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and preserves the order of the city?
1676	SOCRATES: And what is the art which improves our shoes?
1676	SOCRATES: And what sort of an art is this?
1676	SOCRATES: And what will become of those for whom he is acting?
1676	SOCRATES: And what would you say of a state?
1676	SOCRATES: And when did you discover them-- not, surely, at the time when you thought that you knew them?
1676	SOCRATES: And when did you think that you were ignorant-- if you consider, you will find that there never was such a time?
1676	SOCRATES: And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust?
1676	SOCRATES: And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them?
1676	SOCRATES: And when it is better?
1676	SOCRATES: And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet?
1676	SOCRATES: And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the unwise?
1676	SOCRATES: And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?
1676	SOCRATES: And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, which she has never learned?
1676	SOCRATES: And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust?
1676	SOCRATES: And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew?
1676	SOCRATES: And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?
1676	SOCRATES: And would you say that they knew the things about which they differ?
1676	SOCRATES: And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly?
1676	SOCRATES: And you the answerer?
1676	SOCRATES: And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these matters, if you saw them at variance?
1676	SOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable, in as much as courage does a good work?
1676	SOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same?
1676	SOCRATES: And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided?
1676	SOCRATES: And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables them to rule over their fellow- singers?
1676	SOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be perfect in virtue?
1676	SOCRATES: Are they ruling over the signal- men who give the time to the rowers?
1676	SOCRATES: As I am, with you?
1676	SOCRATES: As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and divine, and act with a view to them?
1676	SOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose?
1676	SOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant?
1676	SOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better?
1676	SOCRATES: But can a man give that which he has not?
1676	SOCRATES: But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?
1676	SOCRATES: But can they be said to understand that about which they are quarrelling to the death?
1676	SOCRATES: But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man?
1676	SOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues?
1676	SOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds?
1676	SOCRATES: But good counsel?
1676	SOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?
1676	SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue?
1676	SOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover?
1676	SOCRATES: But how is this, friend Alcibiades?
1676	SOCRATES: But if we have no self- knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?
1676	SOCRATES: But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?
1676	SOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?
1676	SOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?
1676	SOCRATES: But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man?
1676	SOCRATES: But over men?
1676	SOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe?
1676	SOCRATES: But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?
1676	SOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool?
1676	SOCRATES: But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about what?
1676	SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others?
1676	SOCRATES: But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?
1676	SOCRATES: But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a thing is a correct expression?
1676	SOCRATES: But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute- players, who lead the singers and use the services of the dancers?
1676	SOCRATES: Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue?
1676	SOCRATES: Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing?--with whom but with me?
1676	SOCRATES: Did not I ask, and you answer the question?
1676	SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge?
1676	SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just?
1676	SOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?
1676	SOCRATES: Do you take refuge in them?
1676	SOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?
1676	SOCRATES: For the builder will advise better than you will about that?
1676	SOCRATES: Have we not made an advance?
1676	SOCRATES: Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?
1676	SOCRATES: He uses his hands too?
1676	SOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of a man, and not the man himself?
1676	SOCRATES: He will not know what he is doing?
1676	SOCRATES: He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful?
1676	SOCRATES: How?
1676	SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was dishonourable and yet just?
1676	SOCRATES: I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a male accomplishment?
1676	SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing?
1676	SOCRATES: I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:--is that the reason?
1676	SOCRATES: I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?
1676	SOCRATES: In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good?
1676	SOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are not?
1676	SOCRATES: In what sort of virtue?
1676	SOCRATES: Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and states, equally?
1676	SOCRATES: Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?
1676	SOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?
1676	SOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death and cowardice the worst?
1676	SOCRATES: It is subject, as we were saying?
1676	SOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others?
1676	SOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races?
1676	SOCRATES: Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only?
1676	SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honourably acts well?
1676	SOCRATES: No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we not wish to be as good as possible?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor about divination?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor an economist?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own work?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor men by women when they do their own work?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves?
1676	SOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring?
1676	SOCRATES: Not, surely, over horses?
1676	SOCRATES: Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question and answer, who is the speaker,--the questioner or the answerer?
1676	SOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses?
1676	SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre?
1676	SOCRATES: Or on a voyage?
1676	SOCRATES: Or reaping the harvest?
1676	SOCRATES: Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker?
1676	SOCRATES: So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom?
1676	SOCRATES: That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?
1676	SOCRATES: That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement?
1676	SOCRATES: That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?
1676	SOCRATES: That would be the office of the pilot?
1676	SOCRATES: The bad, then, are miserable?
1676	SOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings?
1676	SOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades?
1676	SOCRATES: The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of shoes?
1676	SOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body?
1676	SOCRATES: Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?
1676	SOCRATES: Then acting well is a good?
1676	SOCRATES: Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet?
1676	SOCRATES: Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes?
1676	SOCRATES: Then he is good in that?
1676	SOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?
1676	SOCRATES: Then he who is not wise and good can not be happy?
1676	SOCRATES: Then how can they teach them?
1676	SOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art none of them is temperate?
1676	SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?
1676	SOCRATES: Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself?
1676	SOCRATES: Then in that he is bad?
1676	SOCRATES: Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men?
1676	SOCRATES: Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art?
1676	SOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent?
1676	SOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?
1676	SOCRATES: Then such a man can never be a statesman?
1676	SOCRATES: Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?
1676	SOCRATES: Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing?
1676	SOCRATES: Then the money- maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns?
1676	SOCRATES: Then the rescue of one''s friends is honourable in one point of view, but evil in another?
1676	SOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use?
1676	SOCRATES: Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know?
1676	SOCRATES: Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things?
1676	SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous?
1676	SOCRATES: Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?
1676	SOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also bad?
1676	SOCRATES: Then vice is only suited to a slave?
1676	SOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what affairs?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use other men?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker?
1676	SOCRATES: Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them?
1676	SOCRATES: Then who is speaking?
1676	SOCRATES: Then whom do you call the good?
1676	SOCRATES: Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you did not learn them by discovering them?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the nature of just and unjust?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?
1676	SOCRATES: Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?
1676	SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?
1676	SOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we shall also find to be good?
1676	SOCRATES: Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge?
1676	SOCRATES: There is no subject about which they are more at variance?
1676	SOCRATES: They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you would acknowledge( would you not) to be a much smaller matter than justice?
1676	SOCRATES: Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the services of other men?
1676	SOCRATES: Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust?
1676	SOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was unable to impart his particular wisdom?
1676	SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making his sons wise?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one another, about the justice or injustice of men and things?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the nature of wood and stone?
1676	SOCRATES: Well, naval affairs?
1676	SOCRATES: What art makes cities agree about numbers?
1676	SOCRATES: What is he, then?
1676	SOCRATES: What is the inference?
1676	SOCRATES: What sort of affairs?
1676	SOCRATES: What things?
1676	SOCRATES: What would you say of courage?
1676	SOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded?
1676	SOCRATES: When does a man take care of his feet?
1676	SOCRATES: When it is well to do so?
1676	SOCRATES: When they are doing something or nothing?
1676	SOCRATES: When they are sick?
1676	SOCRATES: Which is gymnastic?
1676	SOCRATES: Which of us now says that two is more than one?
1676	SOCRATES: Which of us, then, was the speaker?
1676	SOCRATES: Who are good in what?
1676	SOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes?
1676	SOCRATES: Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher?
1676	SOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?
1676	SOCRATES: Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?
1676	SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after them?
1676	SOCRATES: You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act according to the will of God?
1676	SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians?
1676	SOCRATES: You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build?
1676	SOCRATES: You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?
1676	SOCRATES: You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?
1676	SOCRATES: You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?
1676	SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason-- because you would know?
1676	Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater number, two or one; you would reply''two''?
1676	Suppose that I ask you again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow- sailors,--how would you answer?
1676	Suppose you were to ask me, what is that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the body?
1676	Surely not about building?
1676	Then has he enquired for himself?
1676	They can not, of course, be those who know?
1676	To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle?
1676	To what does the word refer?
1676	Was not that said?
1676	Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and enquiry?
1676	What do you say to a year ago?
1676	What is that by the presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered?
1676	Who is he?
1676	Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the nature of justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them?
1676	Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?
1676	Will you tell me how?
1676	Would not his meaning be:--That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?
1676	You would say the same?
1676	and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece of wood or a stone?
1676	and if men, under what circumstances?
1676	and when does he take care?
1676	are they not agreed if you ask them what they are?
1676	if at the time you did not know whether you were wronged or not?
1676	what art can give that agreement?
1735	''And in becoming you participate through the bodily senses, and in being, by thought and the mind?''
1735	--and I should like to know, Theaetetus, how we can possibly answer the younker''s question?
1735	--do you know what sort of object he would single out in reply, and what answer he would make to the enquirer?
1735	And am I not contradicting myself at this moment, in speaking either in the singular or the plural of that to which I deny both plurality and unity?
1735	And are not''knowing''and''being known''active and passive?
1735	And can that be a true theory of the history of philosophy which, in Hegel''s own language,''does not allow the individual to have his right''?
1735	And is not''being''known?
1735	And the real''is,''and the not- real''is not''?
1735	And there is another part which is certainly not less ridiculous, but being a trade in learning must be called by some name germane to the matter?
1735	And therefore let us try another track in our pursuit of him: You are aware that there are certain menial occupations which have names among servants?
1735	And we rejoin: Does not the soul know?
1735	And what is the name?
1735	And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?
1735	And what more do we want?''
1735	And where does the danger lie?
1735	And who are the ministers of the purification?
1735	And who are these last?
1735	And you mean by the word''participation''a power of doing or suffering?
1735	And, indeed, how can we imagine that perfect being is a mere everlasting form, devoid of motion and soul?
1735	Are there two more kinds to be added to the three others?
1735	Are we not''seeking the living among the dead''and dignifying a mere logical skeleton with the name of philosophy and almost of God?
1735	But can he know all things?
1735	But could the Organon of Aristotle ever have been written unless the Sophist and Statesman had preceded?
1735	But how can anything be an appearance only?
1735	But how can there be anything which neither rests nor moves?
1735	But how can there be two names when there is nothing but one?
1735	But how could philosophy explain the connexion of ideas, how justify the passing of them into one another?
1735	But is it really true that the part has no meaning when separated from the whole, or that knowledge to be knowledge at all must be universal?
1735	But is there any meaning in reintroducing the forms of the old logic?
1735	But ought we to give him up?
1735	Can any one say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid being caught in a contradiction?
1735	Can we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?
1735	Do all abstractions shine only by the reflected light of other abstractions?
1735	Do not our household servants talk of sifting, straining, winnowing?
1735	Do not persons become ideas, and is there any distinction between them?
1735	Do we not make one house by the art of building, and another by the art of drawing, which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake?
1735	Do you agree with our recent definition?
1735	Do you see his point, Theaetetus?
1735	Do you understand?
1735	Do you, Theaetetus, still feel any doubt of this?
1735	Does he who affirms this mean to say that motion is rest, or rest motion?
1735	Does not the very number of them imply that the nature of his art is not understood?
1735	For he who would imitate you would surely know you and your figure?
1735	Have we not unearthed the Sophist?
1735	How are we to understand the word"are"?
1735	How then can he dispute satisfactorily with any one who knows?
1735	How will you maintain your ground against him?
1735	If not- being is inconceivable, how can not- being be refuted?
1735	In a word, is not the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things?
1735	Is being, then, one, because the parts of being are one, or shall we say that being is not a whole?
1735	Is he the philosopher or the Sophist?
1735	Is he the statesman or the popular orator?
1735	Is not that true?
1735	Is not the reconciliation of mind and body a necessity, not only of speculation but of practical life?
1735	Is there any doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children''s play?
1735	Is this possible?
1735	May I not say with confidence that not- being has an assured existence, and a nature of its own?
1735	May they not also find a nearer explanation in their relation to phenomena?
1735	May we not call these''appearances,''since they appear only and are not really like?
1735	May we not say that motion is other than the other, having been also proved by us to be other than the same and other than rest?
1735	Not- being can not be attributed to any being; for how can any being be wholly abstracted from being?
1735	Or are some things communicable and others not?--Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus, will they prefer?
1735	Or is art required in order to do so?
1735	Or is not the very opposite true?
1735	Or shall we gather all into one class of things communicable with one another?
1735	Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all?
1735	Or shall we say that they are created by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes from God?
1735	Or should we consider being and other to be two names of the same class?
1735	Real or not real?
1735	SOCRATES: But how can any one who is ignorant dispute in a rational manner against him who knows?
1735	SOCRATES: Is he not rather a god, Theodorus, who comes to us in the disguise of a stranger?
1735	STRANGER: A resemblance, then, is not really real, if, as you say, not true?
1735	STRANGER: Again, false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the opposite of the truth:--You would assent?
1735	STRANGER: Again, motion is other than the same?
1735	STRANGER: Again, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction be rightly said to be the remedy?
1735	STRANGER: Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity?
1735	STRANGER: And a little while ago I said that not- being is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable: do you follow?
1735	STRANGER: And about what does he profess that he teaches men to dispute?
1735	STRANGER: And all number is to be reckoned among things which are?
1735	STRANGER: And all the arts which were just now mentioned are characterized by this power of producing?
1735	STRANGER: And are we not now in as great a difficulty about being?
1735	STRANGER: And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, when they are not?
1735	STRANGER: And do they not acknowledge this to be a body having a soul?
1735	STRANGER: And do they not profess to make men able to dispute about law and about politics in general?
1735	STRANGER: And do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust, and that one soul is wise, and another foolish?
1735	STRANGER: And do you mean this something to be some other true thing, or what do you mean?
1735	STRANGER: And does he not also teach others the art of disputation?
1735	STRANGER: And does not false opinion also think that things which most certainly exist do not exist at all?
1735	STRANGER: And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything?
1735	STRANGER: And has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence as any other class?
1735	STRANGER: And here, again, is falsehood?
1735	STRANGER: And in the case of the body are there not two arts which have to do with the two bodily states?
1735	STRANGER: And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not- being as one?
1735	STRANGER: And is being the same as one, and do you apply two names to the same thing?
1735	STRANGER: And is deformity anything but the want of measure, which is always unsightly?
1735	STRANGER: And is knowing and being known doing or suffering, or both, or is the one doing and the other suffering, or has neither any share in either?
1735	STRANGER: And is not that part of exchange which takes place in the city, being about half of the whole, termed retailing?
1735	STRANGER: And is not the case the same with the parts of the other, which is also one?
1735	STRANGER: And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than imitation?
1735	STRANGER: And may not conquest be again subdivided?
1735	STRANGER: And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of reasoning?
1735	STRANGER: And may we not fairly call the sort of art, which produces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art?
1735	STRANGER: And now, do we seem to have gained a fair notion of being?
1735	STRANGER: And now, if we suppose that all things have the power of communion with one another-- what will follow?
1735	STRANGER: And of arts there are two kinds?
1735	STRANGER: And of persuasion, there may be said to be two kinds?
1735	STRANGER: And of swimming animals, one class lives on the wing and the other in the water?
1735	STRANGER: And of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one or many kinds?
1735	STRANGER: And purification was to leave the good and to cast out whatever is bad?
1735	STRANGER: And shall we call our new friend unskilled, or a thorough master of his craft?
1735	STRANGER: And shall we call the other a fifth class?
1735	STRANGER: And shall we further speak of this latter class as having one or two divisions?
1735	STRANGER: And that which being other is also like, may we not fairly call a likeness or image?
1735	STRANGER: And that which exchanges the goods of one city for those of another by selling and buying is the exchange of the merchant?
1735	STRANGER: And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to the philosopher pure and true?
1735	STRANGER: And the false says what is other than true?
1735	STRANGER: And the not true is that which is the opposite of the true?
1735	STRANGER: And the not- great may be said to exist, equally with the great?
1735	STRANGER: And the other is always relative to other?
1735	STRANGER: And there is a private sort of controversy, which is cut up into questions and answers, and this is commonly called disputation?
1735	STRANGER: And there is something which you call''being''?
1735	STRANGER: And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were?
1735	STRANGER: And therefore this first kind of capture may be called by us capture with enclosures, or something of that sort?
1735	STRANGER: And therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all- wise?
1735	STRANGER: And they dispute about all things?
1735	STRANGER: And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two principal kinds?
1735	STRANGER: And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness- making art?
1735	STRANGER: And we know that there exists in speech... THEAETETUS: What exists?
1735	STRANGER: And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all-- must we not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by''being''?
1735	STRANGER: And what do you say of the visible things in heaven and earth, and the like?
1735	STRANGER: And what is ignorance but the aberration of a mind which is bent on truth, and in which the process of understanding is perverted?
1735	STRANGER: And what is the name?
1735	STRANGER: And what is the quality of each of these two sentences?
1735	STRANGER: And what shall we call the other?
1735	STRANGER: And what shall we say of human art?
1735	STRANGER: And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general?
1735	STRANGER: And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a jest?
1735	STRANGER: And when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of sense, would you not call it imagination?
1735	STRANGER: And when the war is one of words, it may be termed controversy?
1735	STRANGER: And when you admit that both or either of them are, do you mean to say that both or either of them are in motion?
1735	STRANGER: And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise?
1735	STRANGER: And where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice, is not chastisement the art which is most required?
1735	STRANGER: And who are the ministers of this art?
1735	STRANGER: And who is the maker of the longer speeches?
1735	STRANGER: And would they say that the whole is other than the one that is, or the same with it?
1735	STRANGER: And would they say that they are corporeal?
1735	STRANGER: And would you not call by the same name him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?
1735	STRANGER: And yet they must all be akin?
1735	STRANGER: And yet you would say that both and either of them equally are?
1735	STRANGER: And you mean by true that which really is?
1735	STRANGER: And you remember that we subdivided the swimming and left the land animals, saying that there were many kinds of them?
1735	STRANGER: And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being?
1735	STRANGER: And, in the second place, it related to a subject?
1735	STRANGER: Any power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight was held by us to be a sufficient definition of being?
1735	STRANGER: But are we to conceive that being and the same are identical?
1735	STRANGER: But can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not?
1735	STRANGER: But does every one know what letters will unite with what?
1735	STRANGER: But how can a man either express in words or even conceive in thought things which are not or a thing which is not without number?
1735	STRANGER: But perhaps you mean to give the name of''being''to both of them together?
1735	STRANGER: But shall we say that has mind and not life?
1735	STRANGER: But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be admitted by them to exist?
1735	STRANGER: But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of anything?
1735	STRANGER: But that of which this is the condition can not be absolute unity?
1735	STRANGER: But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech?
1735	STRANGER: But then, what is the meaning of these two words,''same''and''other''?
1735	STRANGER: But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the not- beautiful a less real existence?
1735	STRANGER: But would either of them be if not participating in being?
1735	STRANGER: But you would agree, if I am not mistaken, that existences are relative as well as absolute?
1735	STRANGER: But, on the other hand, when we say''what is not,''do we not attribute unity?
1735	STRANGER: Can we find a suitable name for each of them?
1735	STRANGER: Can you see how without them mind could exist, or come into existence anywhere?
1735	STRANGER: Do we admit that virtue is distinct from vice in the soul?
1735	STRANGER: Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution of kindred elements, originating in some disagreement?
1735	STRANGER: Do you not see that when the professor of any art has one name and many kinds of knowledge, there must be something wrong?
1735	STRANGER: Do you observe that our scepticism has carried us beyond the range of Parmenides''prohibition?
1735	STRANGER: Do you speak advisedly, or are you carried away at the moment by the habit of assenting into giving a hasty answer?
1735	STRANGER: Do you think that sameness of condition and mode and subject could ever exist without a principle of rest?
1735	STRANGER: Does false opinion think that things which are not are not, or that in a certain sense they are?
1735	STRANGER: First there is motion, which we affirm to be absolutely''other''than rest: what else can we say?
1735	STRANGER: For which reason twig baskets, casting- nets, nooses, creels, and the like may all be termed''enclosures''?
1735	STRANGER: How are we to call it?
1735	STRANGER: How do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme and universal wisdom?
1735	STRANGER: How, then, can any one put any faith in me?
1735	STRANGER: How?
1735	STRANGER: Meaning to say that the soul is something which exists?
1735	STRANGER: Nevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not- being?
1735	STRANGER: O my friend, do you not see that nothing can exceed our ignorance, and yet we fancy that we are saying something good?
1735	STRANGER: Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be fairly termed the art of display?
1735	STRANGER: Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject?
1735	STRANGER: Open force may be called fighting, and secret force may have the general name of hunting?
1735	STRANGER: Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest, when you say that they are?
1735	STRANGER: Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being, but that it has no soul which contains them?
1735	STRANGER: Or that being has mind and life and soul, but although endowed with soul remains absolutely unmoved?
1735	STRANGER: Or this sentence, again-- THEAETETUS: What sentence?
1735	STRANGER: Seeing, then, that all arts are either acquisitive or creative, in which class shall we place the art of the angler?
1735	STRANGER: Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain from one end of his genealogy to the other?
1735	STRANGER: Shall we regard one as the simple imitator-- the other as the dissembling or ironical imitator?
1735	STRANGER: Shall we say that being is one and a whole, because it has the attribute of unity?
1735	STRANGER: Shall we say that this has or has not a name?
1735	STRANGER: Shall we then be so faint- hearted as to give him up?
1735	STRANGER: Some in the singular( ti) you would say is the sign of one, some in the dual( tine) of two, some in the plural( tines) of many?
1735	STRANGER: The first question about the angler was, whether he was a skilled artist or unskilled?
1735	STRANGER: The plain result is that motion, since it partakes of being, really is and also is not?
1735	STRANGER: The true says what is true about you?
1735	STRANGER: Then any taking away of evil from the soul may be properly called purification?
1735	STRANGER: Then if, as I was saying, there is one art which includes all of them, ought not that art to have one name?
1735	STRANGER: Then let them answer this question: One, you say, alone is?
1735	STRANGER: Then suppose that we work out some lesser example which will be a pattern of the greater?
1735	STRANGER: Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth?
1735	STRANGER: Then the not- beautiful turns out to be the opposition of being to being?
1735	STRANGER: Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as deformed and devoid of symmetry?
1735	STRANGER: Then we may without fear contend that motion is other than being?
1735	STRANGER: Then we must not attempt to attribute to not- being number either in the singular or plural?
1735	STRANGER: Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and disease of the soul?
1735	STRANGER: Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power?
1735	STRANGER: Then, according to this view, motion is other and also not other?
1735	STRANGER: There is some part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?
1735	STRANGER: These then are the two kinds of image- making-- the art of making likenesses, and phantastic or the art of making appearances?
1735	STRANGER: Thus far, then, the Sophist and the angler, starting from the art of acquiring, take the same road?
1735	STRANGER: To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but unity, is surely ridiculous?
1735	STRANGER: To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is?
1735	STRANGER: To them we say-- You would distinguish essence from generation?
1735	STRANGER: Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will become not- being?
1735	STRANGER: Very good; and now say, do we venture to utter the forbidden word''not- being''?
1735	STRANGER: Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know?
1735	STRANGER: We were saying of him, if I am not mistaken, that he was a disputer?
1735	STRANGER: Well, fair sirs, we say to them, what is this participation, which you assert of both?
1735	STRANGER: What art?
1735	STRANGER: What is the next step?
1735	STRANGER: What is there which is well known and not great, and is yet as susceptible of definition as any larger thing?
1735	STRANGER: What name, then, shall be given to the sort of instruction which gets rid of this?
1735	STRANGER: What then shall we call it?
1735	STRANGER: When I introduced the word''is,''did I not contradict what I said before?
1735	STRANGER: When any one says''A man learns,''should you not call this the simplest and least of sentences?
1735	STRANGER: When the affirmation or denial takes Place in silence and in the mind only, have you any other name by which to call it but opinion?
1735	STRANGER: When we speak of something as not great, does the expression seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal?
1735	STRANGER: When we speak of things which are not, are we not attributing plurality to not- being?
1735	STRANGER: When we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation of not- being, we were in the greatest difficulty:--do you remember?
1735	STRANGER: Where, then, is a man to look for help who would have any clear or fixed notion of being in his mind?
1735	STRANGER: Whereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both of them are?
1735	STRANGER: Who must be you, and can be nobody else?
1735	STRANGER: Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire opposition to one another?
1735	STRANGER: Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute?
1735	STRANGER: Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in all the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one?
1735	STRANGER: Yet they surely both partake of the same and of the other?
1735	STRANGER: You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel-- that I have no heart for this argument?
1735	STRANGER: You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must say some one thing?
1735	STRANGER: You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not?
1735	STRANGER: You mean to say, not in a true sense?
1735	STRANGER: You remember our division of hunting, into hunting after swimming animals and land animals?
1735	Shall I say an angler?
1735	Shall I tell you what we must do?
1735	Shall we assume( 1) that being and rest and motion, and all other things, are incommunicable with one another?
1735	THEAETETUS: Again I ask, What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: All things?
1735	THEAETETUS: And in what other way can it contain them?
1735	THEAETETUS: And is there not some truth in what they say?
1735	THEAETETUS: And what is the name of the art?
1735	THEAETETUS: And what is the question at issue about names?
1735	THEAETETUS: And what is their answer?
1735	THEAETETUS: And why?
1735	THEAETETUS: But are tame animals ever hunted?
1735	THEAETETUS: But are you sure, Stranger, that this will be quite so acceptable to the rest of the company as Socrates imagines?
1735	THEAETETUS: But how can he, Stranger?
1735	THEAETETUS: For what reason?
1735	THEAETETUS: How are we to distinguish the two?
1735	THEAETETUS: How can they?
1735	THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: How indeed?
1735	THEAETETUS: How is that possible?
1735	THEAETETUS: How is that?
1735	THEAETETUS: How is that?
1735	THEAETETUS: How is that?
1735	THEAETETUS: How shall we get it out of them?
1735	THEAETETUS: How shall we make the division?
1735	THEAETETUS: How so?
1735	THEAETETUS: How so?
1735	THEAETETUS: How so?
1735	THEAETETUS: How so?
1735	THEAETETUS: How so?
1735	THEAETETUS: How the Sophist?
1735	THEAETETUS: How would you make the division?
1735	THEAETETUS: How, Stranger, can I describe an image except as something fashioned in the likeness of the true?
1735	THEAETETUS: How?
1735	THEAETETUS: How?
1735	THEAETETUS: How?
1735	THEAETETUS: How?
1735	THEAETETUS: How?
1735	THEAETETUS: I suppose that you are referring to the precepts of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts?
1735	THEAETETUS: In what respect?
1735	THEAETETUS: In what way are they related?
1735	THEAETETUS: In what way?
1735	THEAETETUS: In what?
1735	THEAETETUS: Is not this always the aim of imitation?
1735	THEAETETUS: May I ask to what you are referring?
1735	THEAETETUS: Of what are they to be patterns, and what are we going to do with them all?
1735	THEAETETUS: Of what are you speaking?
1735	THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding?
1735	THEAETETUS: To what are you referring?
1735	THEAETETUS: To what do you refer?
1735	THEAETETUS: To what do you refer?
1735	THEAETETUS: Very likely; but will you tell me how?
1735	THEAETETUS: Well, and do you see what you are looking for?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they, and what is their name?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What are you saying?
1735	THEAETETUS: What art?
1735	THEAETETUS: What can he mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What classification?
1735	THEAETETUS: What definition?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: What explanation?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is that?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is that?
1735	THEAETETUS: What is the notion?
1735	THEAETETUS: What question?
1735	THEAETETUS: What questions?
1735	THEAETETUS: What shall be the divisions?
1735	THEAETETUS: What was that?
1735	THEAETETUS: What were they?
1735	THEAETETUS: What will be their answer, Stranger?
1735	THEAETETUS: What would he mean by''making''?
1735	THEAETETUS: What?
1735	THEAETETUS: What?
1735	THEAETETUS: What?
1735	THEAETETUS: Where shall we make the division?
1735	THEAETETUS: Where, indeed?
1735	THEAETETUS: Where?
1735	THEAETETUS: Which is--?
1735	THEAETETUS: Who are cousins?
1735	THEAETETUS: Who but he can be worthy?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why do you think so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why not?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why not?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why so?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why?
1735	THEAETETUS: Why?
1735	THEAETETUS: Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of which you are speaking?
1735	THEAETETUS: Yes, there are many such; which of them do you mean?
1735	THEAETETUS: Yes; why should there not be another such art?
1735	THEODORUS: What is your difficulty about them, and what made you ask?
1735	THEODORUS: What terms?
1735	Tell me who?
1735	The Pre- Socratic philosophies are simpler, and we may observe a progress in them; but is there any regular succession?
1735	The unity of opposites was the crux of ancient thinkers in the age of Plato: How could one thing be or become another?
1735	Then we turn to the friends of ideas: to them we say,''You distinguish becoming from being?''
1735	Then what is the trick of his art, and why does he receive money from his admirers?
1735	There will be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question, either of the dualists or of the pluralists?
1735	Therefore not- being can not be predicated or expressed; for how can we say''is,''''are not,''without number?
1735	They were the symbols of different schools of philosophy: but in what relation did they stand to one another and to the world of sense?
1735	To begin at the beginning-- Does he make them able to dispute about divine things, which are invisible to men in general?
1735	To them we say: Are being and one two different names for the same thing?
1735	Turning to the dualist philosophers, we say to them: Is being a third element besides hot and cold?
1735	Upon your view, are we to suppose that there is a third principle over and above the other two,--three in all, and not two?
1735	We may call him an image- maker if we please, but he will only say,''And pray, what is an image?''
1735	What connexion is there between the proposition and our ideas of reciprocity, cause and effect, and similar relations?
1735	What do you say, Stranger?
1735	What is the meaning of these words,''same''and''other''?
1735	What is the teaching of Socrates apart from his personal history, or the doctrines of Christ apart from the Divine life in which they are embodied?
1735	What shall we name him?
1735	Whether they are right or not, who can say?
1735	Who ever thinks of the world as a syllogism?
1735	Will you recall them to my mind?
1735	Will you tell me?
1735	Would you object to begin with the consideration of the words themselves?
1735	Yet one thing may be said of them without offence-- THEAETETUS: What thing?
1735	You mean to say that he seems to have a knowledge of them?
1735	and is not Being capable of being known?
1735	has not Being mind?
1735	he and we are in the same difficulty with which we reproached the dualists; for motion and rest are contradictions-- how then can they both exist?
1735	is there a greater still behind?
1735	my dear youth, do you suppose this possible?
1735	or do you identify one or both of the two elements with being?
1735	or( 2) that they all have indiscriminate communion?
1735	or( 3) that there is communion of some and not of others?
3794	Benefits, then, will be fewer, but more genuine: well, what harm is there in restricting people from giving recklessly?
3794	But how can you call a man ungrateful for not returning that which you say is not a benefit?
3794	But,say you,"if no occasion of repayment offers, am I always to remain in his debt?"
3794	But,says our adversary,"suppose that we gain nothing by this; suppose that he pretends that he has forgotten it, what ought I to do?"
3794	Could you, then, my general, recognize that man or that helmet?
3794	Do you remember, general,said he,"that in Spain you dislocated your ankle near the river Sucro[ Footnote: Xucar]?"
3794	Do you say,inquires my opponent,"that he who carries me gratis in a boat across the river Po, does not bestow any benefit upon me?"
3794	Do you say,we may be asked,"that eagerness to repay kindness belongs to a morbid feeling of gratitude?"
3794	Do you,asks our adversary,"call that by which he is displeased and hurt a benefit?"
3794	From whom, then, ought we to receive them?
3794	He has given me this,says he,"but how late, after how much toil?
3794	How,asks our opponent,"can any one be ungrateful to a bad man, since a bad man can not bestow a benefit?"
3794	How,do you ask,"can you make them your own?"
3794	If any one does us good for his own sake, are we,you ask,"under an obligation to him?
3794	If,they argue,"I can injure myself, why should I not be able also to bestow a benefit upon myself?
3794	What return does one get for benefits?
3794	What shall I gain,says my opponent,"if I do this bravely and gratefully?"
3794	What then? 3794 What,"asks our opponent,"does that matter to you?
3794	What,say you,"can a man repay a benefit, though he does nothing?"
3794	What,say you,"ought he not to know from whom he received it?"
3794	When?
3794	Where,you ask,"or who is he?
3794	Why not?
3794	27:"Quis est iste qui se profitetur omnibus legibus innocentem?"]
3794	After so many instances, can we doubt that a master may sometimes receive a benefit from a slave?
3794	All things that a son has belong to his father, yet who does not know that in spite of this a son can make presents to his father?
3794	Am I not to explain my wants to one does not know them?
3794	Am I not to point out a means of repayment to one who does not perceive it?
3794	Am I to live with an infamous person?
3794	Amidst all these restless passions, how can you hope to find a thing so full of rest as good faith?
3794	And what will you say when, as is sometimes the case, you hate the father, and yet save his son?
3794	Are our valuations to be restricted to pecuniary fines?
3794	Are they not?
3794	Are they ungrateful alone?
3794	Are we, then, to say that this assistance of the brute was a benefit?
3794	Aristides, who received a name for justice, is he unjust?
3794	At what sum can you estimate the value of a lodging in a wilderness, of a shelter in the rain, of a bath or fire in cold weather?
3794	Be sure that the comic poet speaks the most absolute truth in the verses:--"Know you not this?
3794	Because he has changed, ought he to change you?
3794	Besides this, why are those things not called benefits when I bestow them upon myself which would be called benefits if I bestowed them upon another?
3794	But take whichever you please to be true; what will this knowledge profit us?
3794	But what if the benefit turns out ill?
3794	But wherefore is it superior to virtue?
3794	But who would be affected by the spectacle of his punishment?
3794	Call a man a slave?
3794	Camillus a betrayer?"
3794	Can any benefits be greater than those which children receive from their parents?
3794	Can any one compare us with the animals over whom we rule?
3794	Can any one feel ashamed of adultery, now that things have come to such a pass that no woman keeps a husband at all unless it be to pique her lover?
3794	Can there be any doubt that all the private savings of a slave belong to his master as well as he himself?
3794	Can we doubt that the climate of this abode of the human race is regulated by the motion of the sun and moon in their orbits?
3794	Can we doubt that the converse of a benefit is an injury?
3794	Can you apply the name of friend to one who is admitted in his regular order to pay his respects to you?
3794	Can you be thought to have bestowed a benefit upon one whom you hated most bitterly while you were bestowing it?
3794	Can you call anything a benefit, if you feel ashamed to mention the person who gave it you?
3794	Can you desire me to do anything to express my gratitude to a man who did nothing in order to confer a benefit upon me?
3794	Can you tell me of anyone who saved his master more gloriously?
3794	Could Socrates not have made an adequate return to Archelaus, if he had taught him to reign?
3794	Could he blame them more gently?
3794	Did you admit a man who was so openly filthy to the fasces and the tribunal?
3794	Do I not return to him such a benefit, as he is now able to receive?
3794	Do you ask what service you can render to a prosperous man?
3794	Do you imagine that the matter in dispute between them is merely one of precedence?
3794	Do you imagine that those things which are loathed are not punished, or do you suppose that any punishment is greater than the hate of all men?
3794	Do you not owe a benefit for the life of one whose safety you value above your own?
3794	Do you not perceive that you are doing wrong, from the very fact that those to whom you are ungrateful fare better?
3794	Do you not perceive when you say this that you merely speak of God under another name?
3794	Do you not see how parents force children during their infancy to undergo what is useful for their health?
3794	Do you not think that it required a much greater man to refuse this reward than to earn it?
3794	Do you say,"I shall not be able to return them?"
3794	Do you suppose that he wished to do me any honour?
3794	Do you suppose that the crown was given to Arrhidaeus?
3794	Do you suppose, though this be the only point in question, that it is a mere matter of precedence?
3794	Do you think yourself grateful?
3794	Do you wish to know how far from a benefit it was to give life under such conditions?
3794	Do you wish to know how it differs from one?
3794	Do you wish to know this to be so, and that it is not bribed by ideas of profit?
3794	Do you wish to know what Socrates really meant?
3794	Do you wish to know when their service is not a benefit?
3794	Do you wish to return the benefit?
3794	Does Decius fear death?
3794	Duty, however, leaves one some choice; do you ask me, how I am to choose?
3794	Fabius, who''by delays retrieved the day,''is he rash?
3794	First of all I will prove that any chance would- be partner of mine has nothing in common with me: and why?
3794	For what are these respectable men summoned?
3794	For what does the order of the universe bring round the seasons?
3794	Has he forgotten two kindnesses?
3794	He gave it to me, of course, having both opportunity and means: is he a good man or a bad one?
3794	Here, however, what occasion is there for subtlety?
3794	How are so many thousands of insatiable men to be satiated?
3794	How can any man feel gratitude for benefits, if he skips through his whole life entirely engrossed with the present and the future?
3794	How can you tell whether I do not wish, or whether I do not know how to repay you: whether it be in intention or in opportunity that I am wanting?
3794	How comes it to be such happiness to parents that they should confess themselves outdone by the benefits bestowed by their children?
3794	How could a judge estimate the value of these things, when words, hesitation, or looks can destroy all their claim to gratitude?
3794	How do you feel when any one is spoken of as being ungrateful for great benefits conferred upon him by a friend?
3794	How does this contest become so desirable?
3794	How far more proper are such prayers as these, which do not put you off to some distant opportunity, but express your gratitude at once?
3794	How is a man to pay who owes his life, his position, his safety, or his reason to another?
3794	How is this?
3794	How long do you mean to lead me about?
3794	How long will you go on saying,"I saved you, I snatched you from the jaws of death?"
3794	How many are there who are unworthy of the light of day?
3794	How many complain because they have been born?
3794	How shall I be able to repay these favours?
3794	How, in that case, would you decide which was the greater; the present which the man has received, or the injury which has been done him?
3794	However unequally the blessings of after life may be dealt out to us, did nature give us too little when she gave us herself?
3794	I answer, in the first place, what does their real value matter, since the buyer and seller have settled the price between them?
3794	I did not expect this; I have been treated like one of the herd; did he really think that I only deserved so little?
3794	I do not regret it, nor shall I do so; nor shall fortune, however unjust she may be, ever hear me say,''What did I want?
3794	I do not wish to do so, yet what am I to do?
3794	If I save the life of one, do I confer a benefit upon the other, who will be sorry that his hated brother did not perish?"
3794	If any one gave you a few acres, you would say that you had received a benefit; can you deny that the boundless extent of the earth is a benefit?
3794	If there were no rogues, what glory would there be in doing good to many?
3794	If this is your way of returning a kindness, what would you do if you were exacting repayment of a debt?
3794	If you were to return it to me against my will, you would be ungrateful, how much more ungrateful are you, if you force me to wish for it?
3794	In dealing with such persons, what more can I do than wish to repay them?
3794	In the next place, I ask whether this man of yours be ferocious merely in intent, or whether he breaks out into actual outrages upon mankind?
3794	In this case, what ought he to have done?
3794	In what indeed did that frantic youth, whose only merit was his lucky audacity, resemble Hercules?
3794	In what virtue is there not?
3794	Is Mucius a traitor?
3794	Is a good man, then, not able to bestow a benefit, because he does what he ought to do, and is not able not to do what he ought to do?
3794	Is a man ungrateful for one benefit?
3794	Is it a debtor that you seek for?
3794	Is it ambition?
3794	Is it as though he had done something base, or had merely neglected to do something useful and likely to be profitable to himself?
3794	Is it fear?
3794	Is it profit?
3794	Is it the master who receives a benefit from his slave?
3794	Is it worth while to destroy all this merely in order to refute you?
3794	Is not this the universal reproach of the human race?
3794	Is the gift which is bestowed upon all alike, at their birth, not enough?
3794	Is there any one who does not regard the returning of a kindness, and the bestowal of a benefit, as distinct acts?
3794	It may be asked,"Why are you so careful in inquiring upon whom you bestow benefits, as though some day you meant to demand repayment of them?
3794	It seems to offer more opportunity for debate to consider what a captive ought to do, if a man of abominable vices offers him the price of his ransom?
3794	Marcus Cato said,"Borrow from yourself whatever you lack;"why, then, if I can lend myself anything, should I be unable to give myself anything?
3794	More has been given to those most villainous men than has been given to me; well, what is that to the purpose?
3794	Next, what punishment are we to appoint for the ungrateful?
3794	No one is justified in seeking an excuse for ingratitude in his own weakness or poverty, or in saying,"What am I to do, and how?
3794	Nor have I done any good to his son, for what advantage does he gain by my act?"
3794	Now what greater change can take place than that I should discover you to be a bad and ungrateful man?
3794	Now what is more honourable than gratitude?
3794	Now, how great is this benefit?
3794	Now, who will venture to raise the question whether it be honourable to be grateful?
3794	Observing the man''s hesitation, he said,"Why do you delay, as though the whole business was in your power?
3794	One equal to it; death?
3794	One less than the benefit?
3794	Ought we not to receive what Claudius gives?
3794	Ought we to call this receiving presents, or rather taking one''s pick of the senate?
3794	Plato, it is argued, was grateful to Socrates for having been taught by him; why should not Socrates be grateful to himself for having taught himself?
3794	Pray tell me what return one gets for righteousness, innocence, magnanimity, chastity, temperance?
3794	Pray tell me, what is it that urges us to do so?
3794	Pray, do we bestow benefits upon animals when we feed them for our use or for our table?
3794	Pray, what litigant, after having been successfully defended, retains any remembrance of so great a benefit for more than a few days?"
3794	Reflect, then, upon this: you say,"My kindness has met with no return, what am I to do?
3794	Shall I permit myself to be saved by a wretch?
3794	So when you have said,"Have I not bestowed a benefit upon the father by saving the son?"
3794	So, then, you would not save a man''s life in the dark?
3794	Suppose I were given something by a cruel and easily offended tyrant, who would take it as an affront if his bounty were slighted?
3794	Suppose that such men as these say,"I do not want it,""Let him keep it to himself,""Who asks him for it?"
3794	Taken singly, what should we be?
3794	Tell me, if the wise man possesses everything, how can one give anything to a wise man?
3794	The judge does not sit merely to decide between debtor and creditor, when he says,"You did lend the man money; but then, what followed?
3794	The more benefits a man bestows, the more beneficent he is, yet who ever was praised for having been of service to himself?
3794	There are many who say,"I know that this will do him no good, but what am I to do?
3794	There is no doubt that a slave can bestow a benefit upon anyone; why, then, not upon his master?
3794	There was a rivalry between them, as to who should give it; and how should there not be?
3794	This analogy is imperfect; and why?
3794	Those persons, therefore, are mistaken, who ask the Stoics,"What do you say, then?
3794	Tiberius Caesar, when some one addressed him with the words,"Do you remember....?"
3794	To himself?
3794	To what do we trust for safety, if not in mutual good offices one to another?
3794	Wait patiently; why are you unwilling to let my bounty abide with you?
3794	Was any man ever unwilling to do this, even though he were ungrateful?
3794	Was it not a small thing which Socrates received?
3794	We sometimes say,"What could Providence mean by placing an Arrhidaeus upon the throne?"
3794	Well, but I pray you, do you not say,"you have preserved my son for me; had he perished, I could not have survived him?"
3794	Well, what then?
3794	What am I to imagine?
3794	What am I to say of the third, he who, meaning to do an injury, blunders into bestowing a benefit?
3794	What are you doing, Avarice?
3794	What could be more inhuman than to cause benefits to result in cruelty?
3794	What did he do deserving of praise, in not receiving stolen goods, in choosing not to receive them, instead of returning them?
3794	What difference does it make to me whether I receive benefits or not?
3794	What do I gather from this?
3794	What follows, then?
3794	What follows, then?
3794	What grandeur is there in loving oneself, sparing oneself, gaining profit for oneself?
3794	What if I do not know what sort of repayment you wish for?
3794	What if, for example, my country orders me to give to her what I had promised to my friend?
3794	What inconsistency is this?
3794	What is more fortunate than that old man who declares everywhere to everyone that he has been conquered in benefits by his son?
3794	What is more praiseworthy, upon what are all men more universally agreed, than to return gratitude for good offices?
3794	What is that to the purpose?
3794	What is the aim of the grateful man?
3794	What is the meaning of this dance of sisters in a circle, hand in hand?
3794	What is the use of abuse, or of complaints?
3794	What is the use of laboriously untying knots which you yourself have tied, in order that you might untie them?
3794	What is there to prevent your returning your benefactor''s kindness, even while he is in prosperity?
3794	What is this but trampling upon the commonwealth, and that, too, with the left foot, though you may say that this point does not signify?
3794	What joy would he have experienced, if, after the putting down of the civil war, he had seen his son ruling the state in peace and security?
3794	What lately made Fabius Persicus a member of more than one college of priests, though even profligates avoided his kiss?
3794	What made Cicero''s son a consul, except his father?
3794	What madness is this, to call the gods in question for their bounty?
3794	What man is there of so firm and trustworthy a mind that you can safely invest your benefits in him?
3794	What need have you for disdainful airs, or swelling phrases?
3794	What need is there for you to speak, and to take the place which belongs to another?
3794	What now is the use of having meant well?''"
3794	What of the bursting forth of warm waters upon the seashore itself?
3794	What of the fountains of medicinal waters?
3794	What ought I to do?
3794	What profit can accrue to him from this latent feeling?
3794	What punishment is to be assigned to ingratitude for these?
3794	What should we say of a pilot who prayed to the gods for dreadful storms and tempests, in order that danger might make his skill more highly esteemed?
3794	What then is it?
3794	What then is our reason for owing them much?
3794	What then, I answer, shall we punish the undutiful, the malicious, the avaricious, the headstrong, and the cruel?
3794	What then?
3794	What then?
3794	What then?
3794	What then?
3794	What then?
3794	What then?
3794	What then?
3794	What value has the crown in itself?
3794	What virtue do we admire more than benevolence?
3794	What will you do in such a case?
3794	What would they have, if every man had his own?
3794	What, again, is more blissful than to be overcome in such a contest?
3794	What, then, is a benefit?
3794	What, then, will you do?
3794	What?
3794	What?
3794	What?
3794	What?
3794	When a man bestows a benefit, at what does he aim?
3794	When can I repay my debt to my superiors the lords of heaven and earth?"
3794	When safe, what recompense can I make to him?
3794	When the mind begins through weariness to hate the promised benefit, or while it is wavering in expectation of it, how can it feel grateful for it?
3794	When the question can be asked,"What if he had refused to do it?"
3794	When will the day come upon which I can prove my gratitude to him?"
3794	When?
3794	Whence comes the breath which you draw?
3794	Whence, then, comes all that you possess, that you give or refuse to give, that you hoard or steal?
3794	Where, then, does a benefit begin to stop?
3794	Wherefore then does he give?
3794	Wherefore?
3794	Whether the bestowal of benefits and the return of gratitude for them are desirable objects in themselves?
3794	Which do we encourage more?
3794	Which of the two do you call the worse-- he who is ungrateful for kindness, or he who does not even remember it?
3794	Who can be grateful for what has been disdainfully flung to him, or angrily cast at him, or been given him out of weariness, to avoid further trouble?
3794	Who can estimate the value of such services as these?
3794	Who denies it?
3794	Who does not leave the world with reluctance, and with lamentations?
3794	Who does not thinks that to have bestowed one benefit is a reason for bestowing a second?
3794	Who ever called a hunch of bread a benefit, or a farthing dole tossed to a beggar, or the means of lighting a fire?
3794	Who has ever thought it enough to be asked for anything in an off- hand manner, or to be asked only once?
3794	Who is there so poor, so uncared for, born to sorrow by so unkind a fate, as never to have felt the vast generosity of the Gods?
3794	Who ought to applaud it more than we Stoics, who preach the brotherhood of the human race?
3794	Who will compare these cases with one another, or weigh one against the other?
3794	Who would call Aeneas pious, if he wished that his native city might be captured, in order that he might save his father from captivity?
3794	Who would not be pleaded against?
3794	Who would not plead under it?
3794	Who, while he admires them, thinks of their being of use to him?
3794	Whom would you admire more than he who governs himself and has himself under command?
3794	Whose attention is not arrested by the universe itself, when by night it pours forth its fires and glitters with innumerable stars?
3794	Why are you in such haste to lose both your benefit and your friend?
3794	Why are you sparing of your property, as though it were your own?
3794	Why do we separate this which naturally is connected?
3794	Why do you call upon the gods to ruin me?
3794	Why do you chafe at being laid under an obligation?
3794	Why do you despair, before making a trial of me?
3794	Why do you offer to me what is the bane of all nations?
3794	Why do you say this, if you do not receive a benefit?
3794	Why do you wish me to get into trouble?
3794	Why need I hesitate to make such men as these better to themselves and to me?
3794	Why need the person of the giver detract from the thing which he gives?
3794	Why not rather wish that he to whom you owe most may be powerful and happy?
3794	Why should benefits not be included among those acts which require two persons to perform them?
3794	Why should he( if a bad man) have the excuse, or( if a good man) have the sorrow of not knowing them?
3794	Why should it not be forbidden to demand of this man repayment of former favours?
3794	Why then, by trying to protect the rights of the former class, should we reduce them to the level of the basest of mankind?
3794	Why, are not some fathers so cruel and so wicked that it is right and proper for their sons to turn away from them, and disown them?
3794	Why, do you suppose that it was given to him?
3794	Why, if you owed some wine to any man, and he bade you pour it into a net or a sieve, would you say that you had returned it?
3794	Why, then, did Socrates say this?
3794	Why, when you yourself were making Mamercus Scaurus consul, were you ignorant of his vices?
3794	Why?
3794	Would anyone have heard of Aristo and Gryllus except through Xenophon and Plato, their sons?
3794	Would it not, then, be more honourable to be deceived by some than to suspect all men of dishonesty?
3794	Yet there is a great difference between giving and receiving; how should there not be, seeing that these words are the converse of one another?
3794	Yet think whether it be not nearer the truth to regard all that I can do, and all that I have done, as mine, due to my own powers and my own will?
3794	Yet what credit is there in this?
3794	Yet who is so exalted, that fortune may not make him need the aid even of the lowliest?
3794	Yet, am I not to live with my preserver?
3794	Yet, often as it is the case, what can be more shameful than that there should be no difference between a benefit and hatred?
3794	Yet, pray, have they taken away the life which they gave?
3794	Yet, setting aside all this, would not the sun be a sight worthy to be contemplated and worshipped, if he did no more than rise and set?
3794	You ask,"What connection has this illustration with the subject?"
3794	You can not say"Why, what harm do I do him?"
3794	You might, moreover, find a great part of the human race guilty, for who is there who does not profit by his neighbour''s wants?
3794	You seem to say to me:"Why steer to seaward?
3794	You seem to say,"When shall I get free from this obligation?
3794	You, the slave of lust, of gluttony, of a harlot, nay, who are owned as a joint chattel by harlots, can you call anyone else a slave?
3794	am I not to accept it?
3794	and would this be so, if the act of giving did not itself give us pleasure?
3794	can hardly carry or remember, are those of friends?
3794	did he himself conceal them?
3794	did he wish to appear decent?
3794	do we bestow benefits upon trees when we tend them that they may not suffer from drought or from hardness of ground?
3794	do you not know that a debt can be paid even to a rich man?
3794	does it make any difference to us to whom we leave our property, seeing that we can not expect any return from any one?
3794	even if dutiful, does not think about it?
3794	even if moderate in his desires, does not look forward to it?
3794	for what do they impress their seals?
3794	for what does the sun make the day now longer and now shorter?
3794	for what is nature but God and divine reason, which pervades the universe and all its parts?
3794	for, as I have just said, what is there to prevent your returning the kindness even of those who enjoy the greatest prosperity?
3794	how long do you mean to forbid me to forget my adventure?
3794	how much more might I have earned if I had attached myself to So and so, or to So and so?
3794	how seldom does Fortune show judgment in her choice?
3794	interest?
3794	is Achilles timid?
3794	is it not to the door of some door- keeper, or to the gardens of some one who has not even a subordinate office?
3794	is it that his gratitude may win for him more friends and more benefits?
3794	is there to be one only for all, though the benefits which they have received are different?
3794	nay, who ever was ungrateful from any other motive than this?
3794	of him from whom I have received any kindness?
3794	of him who by his power of consolation brings back to the duties of life one who was plunged in grief, and eager to follow those whom he had lost?
3794	of him who holds you back when you would rush into crime?
3794	of him who strikes the sword from the hands of the suicide?
3794	or can you expect perfect loyalty from one who is forced to slip into your presence through a grudgingly- opened door?
3794	or for having rescued himself from brigands?
3794	or his grandfather?
3794	or his wife and his father- in- law?
3794	or if a law be passed forbidding any one to do what I had promised to do for him?
3794	or should the punishment be varying, greater or less according to the benefit which each has received?
3794	or the fasces?
3794	or the judgment- seat and car of triumph?
3794	or the purple- bordered robe?
3794	or upon his uncle?
3794	or would you be willing to return it in such a way that in the act of returning it was lost between you?"
3794	or would you do him these services and yet not give him anything?"
3794	out of the camp of the enemy and raised him to the consulate?
3794	shall I owe you nothing for it?
3794	shall the ungrateful man go unpunished?"
3794	tell me where I am to stop, how far I am to follow out the pedigree of the family?"
3794	that repose in which you are rotting and mouldering?
3794	that the fertility of the human race corresponds to the courses of the moon?
3794	that the sun by its revolution marks out the year, and that the moon, moving in a smaller orbit, marks out the months?
3794	the blood by whose circulation your vital warmth is maintained?
3794	the light by which you arrange and perform all the actions of your life?
3794	those meats which excite your palate by their delicate flavour after your hunger is appeased?
3794	those provocatives which rouse you when wearied with pleasure?
3794	though it be more useful, more creditable, more pleasant for him not to know his benefactor, will you not consent to stand aside?
3794	what are we to do, seeing that in some cases the benefit conferred is life, and things dearer than life?
3794	what young man, even if of innocent life, does not long for his father''s death?
3794	when a man is made happier by me and is freed from the greatest danger of unhappiness, does he not receive a benefit?
3794	whence come these innumerable delights of our eyes, our ears, and our minds?
3794	whence does he come?"
3794	whither are these men with their smart military- looking cloaks carrying you?
3794	who can bid us weigh dissimilar benefits one with another?
3794	who does not loathe the ungrateful man, useless as he is even to himself?
3794	why do you overwhelm him with reproaches?
3794	why do you set him free from his obligation?
3794	why should we decline to be its guardians?
3794	why, I pray you, whither are you being hurried by those bearers who carry your litter?
3794	why, as though you were dealing with a harsh usurer, are you in such a hurry to sign and seal an equivalent bond?
3794	why, what is there to boast of in having paid what you owe?
3794	would not the moon be worth looking at, even if it passed uselessly through the heavens?
3794	you ought to meet this with,"Have I, then, bestowed a benefit upon a father whom I do not know, whom I never thought of?"
1744	''But whither, Socrates, are you going?
1744	''How can I contribute to the greatest happiness of others?''
1744	''Is pleasure an evil?
1744	''What is the place of happiness or utility in a system of moral philosophy?''
1744	''Why, Socrates,''they will say,''how can we?
1744	''Yes, I know, but what is the application?''
1744	''good'') to pleasures in general, when he can not deny that they are different?
1744	--Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and true opinion?
1744	Am I not right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the satisfaction of their want?
1744	And he who thus deceives himself may be strong or weak?
1744	And here several questions arise for consideration:--What is the meaning of pure and impure, of moderate and immoderate?
1744	And if he is strong we fear him, and if he is weak we laugh at him, which is a pleasure, and yet we envy him, which is a pain?
1744	And ignorance is a misfortune?
1744	And in which is pleasure to find a place?
1744	And is not the element which makes this mixed life eligible more akin to mind than to pleasure?
1744	And is not this the science which has a firmer grasp of them than any other?
1744	And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small?
1744	And must I include music, which is admitted to be guess- work?
1744	And must I then finish the argument?
1744	And now I want to know whether I may depart; or will you keep me here until midnight?
1744	And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and mind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture?
1744	And now we turn to the pleasures; shall I admit them?
1744	And one form of ignorance is self- conceit-- a man may fancy himself richer, fairer, better, wiser than he is?
1744	And there are colours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning?
1744	And they will reply:--''What pleasures do you mean?''
1744	And what shall we say about the rest?
1744	And yet the envious man finds something pleasing in the misfortunes of others?
1744	And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and bereavement?
1744	Another question is raised: May not pleasures, like opinions, be true and false?
1744	Answer now, and tell me whether you see, I will not say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness than in temperance?
1744	Are we not desirous of happiness, at any rate for ourselves and our friends, if not for all mankind?
1744	Are we not liable, or rather certain, as in the case of sight, to be deceived by distance and relation?
1744	Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly unconscious of this and similar phenomena?''
1744	But at an early stage of the controversy another question was asked:''Do pleasures differ in kind?
1744	But how would you decide this question, Protarchus?
1744	But in passing from one to the other, do we not experience neutral states, which although they appear pleasureable or painful are really neither?
1744	But is it not distracting to the conscience of a man to be told that in the particular case they are opposed?
1744	But is the life of pleasure perfect and sufficient, when deprived of memory, consciousness, anticipation?
1744	But still we want truth?
1744	But what two notions can be more opposed in many cases than these?
1744	But whence comes this common inheritance or stock of moral ideas?
1744	But where shall we place mind?
1744	Can there be another source?
1744	Could this be otherwise?
1744	Do not certain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be grateful to them?
1744	Do you mean that you are to throw into the cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false measure and the false circle?
1744	Do you think that any one who asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some pleasures are good and others bad?
1744	Does not the more and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end?
1744	First we will take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the impure-- the art which uses the false rule and the false measure?
1744	For are not love and sorrow as well as anger''sweeter than honey,''and also full of pain?
1744	For have these unities of idea any real existence?
1744	For is there not also an absurdity in affirming that good is of the soul only; or in declaring that the best of men, if he be in pain, is bad?
1744	For must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,--that is, like itself?
1744	For what can be more reasonable than that God should will the happiness of all his creatures?
1744	For what in Heaven''s name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?--Pleasure or pain?
1744	Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of the argument?
1744	Have we not found that which Socrates and Plato''grew old in seeking''?
1744	How, as units, can they be divided and dispersed among different objects?
1744	How, if imperishable, can they enter into the world of generation?
1744	How, then, can we compare them?
1744	I am of opinion that they would certainly answer as follows: PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with her:--Am I not right?
1744	If we ask: Which of these many theories is the true one?
1744	If we say''Not pleasure, not virtue, not wisdom, nor yet any quality which we can abstract from these''--what then?
1744	Is mind or chance the lord of the universe?
1744	Is not and was not this what we were saying, Protarchus?
1744	Is not this the life of an oyster?
1744	Is not this the sort of enquiry in which his life is spent?
1744	Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?
1744	Is there not a mixture of feelings in the spectator of tragedy?
1744	Is there such a thing as opinion?
1744	May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other times be quite in despair?
1744	May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate state?
1744	Must not the union of the two be higher and more eligible than either separately?
1744	Or do they exist in their entirety in each object?
1744	Or is the life of mind sufficient, if devoid of any particle of pleasure?
1744	PHILEBUS: And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place?
1744	PHILEBUS: How so?
1744	PHILEBUS: I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon the argument?
1744	PHILEBUS: What is that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And pray, what is dialectic?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And what is this life of mind?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And what was that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And who may they be?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of resolution as well as a cause of composition?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the aforesaid classes is the mixed one?
1744	PROTARCHUS: And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains?
1744	PROTARCHUS: But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and acknowledged?
1744	PROTARCHUS: But when and how does he do this?
1744	PROTARCHUS: But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any more?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How can we make the further division which you suggest?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How can we?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How do they afford an illustration?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How indeed?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How is that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How is that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How shall I change them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How so?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How so?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How so?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How will that be?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How will you proceed?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How would you distinguish them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	PROTARCHUS: How?
1744	PROTARCHUS: I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be a little plainer?
1744	PROTARCHUS: In the class of the infinite, you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: In what manner?
1744	PROTARCHUS: In what respect?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you speaking?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Of what nature?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Of what nature?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Of what?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in conceiving to be true?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Upon what principle would you make the division?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What am I to infer?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What answer?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are the two kinds?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how do you separate them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how shall we find them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are they?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are they?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What are they?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What disorders?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do they mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by the class of the finite?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by''intermediate''?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what you are saying?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, my good friend?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What have you to say?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What instance shall we select?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What is your explanation?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What life?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What manner of natures are they?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What phenomena do you mean?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What pleasures?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What point?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What principle?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What question?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What question?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What question?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What question?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What question?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What road?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What was it?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What was that?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What will that be?
1744	PROTARCHUS: What?
1744	PROTARCHUS: When can that be, Socrates?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Where shall we begin?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Which of them?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Who is he?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why do you ask, Socrates?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why not, Socrates?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why should I?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why so?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his senses?
1744	PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no cause?
1744	PROTARCHUS: You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure?
1744	PROTARCHUS: You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing?
1744	PROTARCHUS: You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed either for good or bad?
1744	PROTARCHUS: You want to know whether that which is called essence is, properly speaking, for the sake of generation?
1744	PROTARCHUS: You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have no longer a voice in the matter?
1744	Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer?
1744	SOCRATES: A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be-- PROTARCHUS: What?
1744	SOCRATES: A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he not?
1744	SOCRATES: And a man must be pleased by something?
1744	SOCRATES: And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with hopes?
1744	SOCRATES: And am I to include music, which, as I was saying just now, is full of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity?
1744	SOCRATES: And an opinion must be of something?
1744	SOCRATES: And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured most?
1744	SOCRATES: And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we are sick or when we are in health?
1744	SOCRATES: And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a mixed feeling of pain and pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are true or false?
1744	SOCRATES: And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient?
1744	SOCRATES: And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always spring from memory and perception?
1744	SOCRATES: And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely?
1744	SOCRATES: And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free from pain?
1744	SOCRATES: And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?
1744	SOCRATES: And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune?
1744	SOCRATES: And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned to you?
1744	SOCRATES: And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the seasons, and all the delights of life?
1744	SOCRATES: And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality?
1744	SOCRATES: And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain?
1744	SOCRATES: And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of certainty?
1744	SOCRATES: And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, will always have a real feeling of pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?
1744	SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry?
1744	SOCRATES: And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined?
1744	SOCRATES: And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name?
1744	SOCRATES: And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an evil?
1744	SOCRATES: And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates?
1744	SOCRATES: And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite of generation?
1744	SOCRATES: And is not our fire small and weak and mean?
1744	SOCRATES: And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; the agent and the cause may be rightly called one?
1744	SOCRATES: And is not thirst desire?
1744	SOCRATES: And is the good sufficient?
1744	SOCRATES: And is there not and was there not a further point which was conceded between us?
1744	SOCRATES: And may not all this be truly called an evil condition?
1744	SOCRATES: And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; are they not often false?
1744	SOCRATES: And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures?
1744	SOCRATES: And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule of the habitation of the good?
1744	SOCRATES: And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the preservation of consciousness?
1744	SOCRATES: And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory character?
1744	SOCRATES: And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus''goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good?
1744	SOCRATES: And now we must begin to mix them?
1744	SOCRATES: And now what is the next question, and how came we hither?
1744	SOCRATES: And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound kind?
1744	SOCRATES: And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to be given to the fairest things?
1744	SOCRATES: And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and see what makes them the greatest?
1744	SOCRATES: And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful pleasures?
1744	SOCRATES: And such a thing as pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which is not true, but false?
1744	SOCRATES: And that can not be the body, for the body is supposed to be emptied?
1744	SOCRATES: And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago discovered?
1744	SOCRATES: And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven to be distinct from them,--and may therefore be called a fourth principle?
1744	SOCRATES: And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we readily acknowledged it to be by nature one?
1744	SOCRATES: And the images answering to true opinions and words are true, and to false opinions and words false; are they not?
1744	SOCRATES: And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have often said, are the pleasures of the body?
1744	SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name-- shall we not?
1744	SOCRATES: And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but not of the second?
1744	SOCRATES: And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion would be properly called consciousness?
1744	SOCRATES: And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse?
1744	SOCRATES: And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of equal pitch:--may we affirm so much?
1744	SOCRATES: And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which exist in the minds of each of us?
1744	SOCRATES: And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being?
1744	SOCRATES: And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not right?
1744	SOCRATES: And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of friends?
1744	SOCRATES: And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural state is pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: And we maintain that they are each of them one?
1744	SOCRATES: And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to what class it is to be assigned?
1744	SOCRATES: And what do you say, Philebus?
1744	SOCRATES: And what if there be a third state, which is better than either?
1744	SOCRATES: And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed?
1744	SOCRATES: And what would you say of the intermediate state?
1744	SOCRATES: And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; it will still be an opinion?
1744	SOCRATES: And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the admixture which takes place in comedy?
1744	SOCRATES: And will you help us to test these two lives?
1744	SOCRATES: And will you let me go?
1744	SOCRATES: And wisdom and mind can not exist without soul?
1744	SOCRATES: And yet he who desires, surely desires something?
1744	SOCRATES: And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of his neighbours at which he is pleased?
1744	SOCRATES: And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in view when we call them by a single name?
1744	SOCRATES: And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one another, and sometimes opposed?
1744	SOCRATES: And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the spectators smile through their tears?
1744	SOCRATES: And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a state?
1744	SOCRATES: Are not we the cup- bearers?
1744	SOCRATES: Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be shown?
1744	SOCRATES: Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the argument?
1744	SOCRATES: Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the question which, as you say, you have been so long asking?
1744	SOCRATES: But do we not distinguish memory from recollection?
1744	SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence?
1744	SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence?
1744	SOCRATES: But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our memories?
1744	SOCRATES: But how can we rightly judge of them?
1744	SOCRATES: But is such a life eligible?
1744	SOCRATES: But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends''misfortunes-- is not that wrong?
1744	SOCRATES: But were you right?
1744	SOCRATES: But what do you say of another question:--have we not heard that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being?
1744	SOCRATES: Capital; and now will you please to give me your best attention?
1744	SOCRATES: Certainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable into two kinds?
1744	SOCRATES: Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of which they were generated, furnish all the three classes?
1744	SOCRATES: Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?
1744	SOCRATES: Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of desires?
1744	SOCRATES: Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil?
1744	SOCRATES: Do not obvious and every- day phenomena furnish the simplest illustration?
1744	SOCRATES: Do we mean anything when we say''a man thirsts''?
1744	SOCRATES: Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true?
1744	SOCRATES: Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you?
1744	SOCRATES: Does not the right participation in the finite give health-- in disease, for instance?
1744	SOCRATES: Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious battle, in which such various points are at issue?
1744	SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?
1744	SOCRATES: Have we not found a road which leads towards the good?
1744	SOCRATES: He asks himself--''What is that which appears to be standing by the rock under the tree?''
1744	SOCRATES: He does not desire that which he experiences, for he experiences thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires replenishment?
1744	SOCRATES: Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we have described?
1744	SOCRATES: How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no fixedness?
1744	SOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity?
1744	SOCRATES: I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of the soul?
1744	SOCRATES: In what way?
1744	SOCRATES: Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous pain?
1744	SOCRATES: Is the good perfect or imperfect?
1744	SOCRATES: Knowledge has two parts,--the one productive, and the other educational?
1744	SOCRATES: Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle them?
1744	SOCRATES: Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures?
1744	SOCRATES: May I not have led you into a misapprehension?
1744	SOCRATES: May our body be said to have a soul?
1744	SOCRATES: Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature?
1744	SOCRATES: Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver?
1744	SOCRATES: Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;--do you agree?
1744	SOCRATES: Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities?
1744	SOCRATES: Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject?
1744	SOCRATES: Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you?
1744	SOCRATES: Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the occasion of raising a question?
1744	SOCRATES: Shall we further agree-- PROTARCHUS: To what?
1744	SOCRATES: Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: Sound is one in music as well as in grammar?
1744	SOCRATES: Tell me first;--should we be most likely to succeed if we mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom?
1744	SOCRATES: Tell us, O beloved-- shall we call you pleasures or by some other name?--would you rather live with or without wisdom?
1744	SOCRATES: That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are to say( are we?)
1744	SOCRATES: The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or effect naturally follows it?
1744	SOCRATES: The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures?
1744	SOCRATES: Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full?
1744	SOCRATES: Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of all lives?
1744	SOCRATES: Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of pain?
1744	SOCRATES: Then man and the other animals have at the same time both pleasure and pain?
1744	SOCRATES: Then many other cases still remain?
1744	SOCRATES: Then mind and science when employed about such changing things do not attain the highest truth?
1744	SOCRATES: Then now we know the meaning of the word?
1744	SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake of some essence?
1744	SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in some other class than that of good?
1744	SOCRATES: Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are not the same, but different?
1744	SOCRATES: Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good can not possibly be either of them?
1744	SOCRATES: Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some way apprehends replenishment?
1744	SOCRATES: Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which, upon your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of misinterpretation?
1744	SOCRATES: Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going up and down cause pleasures and pains?
1744	SOCRATES: Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real?
1744	SOCRATES: There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in the life which is well mixed than in that which is not?
1744	SOCRATES: There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies?
1744	SOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?
1744	SOCRATES: Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake of essence, or essence for the sake of generation?
1744	SOCRATES: We agree-- do we not?--that there is such a thing as false, and also such a thing as true opinion?
1744	SOCRATES: We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and the third which is neither; what say you?
1744	SOCRATES: We mean to say that he''is empty''?
1744	SOCRATES: We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the conqueror-- did we not?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind have the greatest desires?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, are there not pains of forgetting?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, tell me, is this question worth asking?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, then, my view is-- PROTARCHUS: What is it?
1744	SOCRATES: Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer poetically terms''a meeting of the waters''?
1744	SOCRATES: Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of existence, and also an infinite?
1744	SOCRATES: Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder?
1744	SOCRATES: What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains?
1744	SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1744	SOCRATES: What do you mean?
1744	SOCRATES: What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two?
1744	SOCRATES: What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by all?
1744	SOCRATES: When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth?
1744	SOCRATES: Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also?
1744	SOCRATES: Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we are speaking are true or false?
1744	SOCRATES: Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were?
1744	SOCRATES: Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only?
1744	SOCRATES: Why?
1744	SOCRATES: Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?
1744	SOCRATES: Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?
1744	SOCRATES: Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink?
1744	SOCRATES: Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased?
1744	SOCRATES: You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain?
1744	SOCRATES: You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not ashamed?
1744	SOCRATES: You will observe that I have spoken of three classes?
1744	Secondly, why is there no mention of the supreme mind?
1744	Shall I tell you how I mean to escape from them?
1744	Shall we begin thus?
1744	Shall we enquire into the truth of your opinion?
1744	Shall you and I sum up the two sides?
1744	Still the question recurs,''In what does the whole differ from all the parts?''
1744	The pleasure of yourself, or of your neighbour,--of the individual, or of the world?''
1744	The question Will such and such an action promote the happiness of myself, my family, my country, the world?
1744	Then both of us are vanquished-- are we not?
1744	To these ancient speculations the moderns have added a further question:--''Whose pleasure?
1744	To what then is to be attributed this opinion which has been often entertained about the uncertainty of morals?
1744	We understand what you mean; but is there no charm by which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way of arriving at the truth?
1744	Were we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom?
1744	What are they?
1744	What common property in all of them does he mean to indicate by the term''good''?
1744	What is the origin of pleasure?
1744	What more does he want?
1744	When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in one, did we not call them a body?
1744	When you speak of hotter and colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities?
1744	Whence comes the necessity of them?
1744	Which has the greater share of truth?
1744	Which of beauty?
1744	Which of symmetry?
1744	Who would prefer such an alternation to the equable life of pure thought?
1744	Why are some actions rather than others which equally tend to the happiness of mankind imposed upon us with the authority of law?
1744	Why do I say so at this moment?
1744	Why should we endeavour to bind all men within the limits of a single metaphysical conception?
1744	Would the world have been better if there had been no Stoics or Kantists, no Platonists or Cartesians?
1744	Yet about these too we must ask What will of God?
1744	a good?
1744	and are some bad, some good, and some neither bad nor good?''
1744	and of comedy also?
1744	because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which is an impossibility?
1744	how revealed to us, and by what proofs?
1744	is analogous to the question asked in the Philebus,''What rank does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?''
1744	need I remind you of the anger''Which stirs even a wise man to violence, And is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb?''
1744	or some true and some false?
1744	the only good?''
1744	which includes the lower and the higher kind of happiness, and is the aim of the noblest, as well as of the meanest of mankind?''
1744	would you not at any rate want sight?
1687	''And can they hear the dialogue?''
1687	''And do you suppose the individual to partake of the whole, or of the part?''
1687	''And of human beings like ourselves, of water, fire, and the like?''
1687	''And what kind of discipline would you recommend?''
1687	''And who will answer me?
1687	''And would you like to say that the ideas are really divisible and yet remain one?''
1687	''And would you make abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good?''
1687	''And would you say that each man is covered by the whole sail, or by a part only?''
1687	''But how can individuals participate in ideas, except in the ways which I have mentioned?''
1687	''But must not the thought be of something which is the same in all and is the idea?
1687	''How do you mean?''
1687	''I quite believe you,''said Socrates;''but will you answer me a question?
1687	''If God is, what follows?
1687	''In the same sort of way,''said Parmenides,''as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many-- that is your meaning?''
1687	''Then how do you know that there are things in themselves?''
1687	''Then the beautiful and the good in their own nature are unknown to us?''
1687	''Then the ideas have parts, and the objects partake of a part of them only?''
1687	''Then will you, Zeno?''
1687	''Welcome, Cephalus: can we do anything for you in Athens?''
1687	''What difficulty?''
1687	''What is that?''
1687	''Why not of the whole?''
1687	''Yet if these difficulties induce you to give up universal ideas, what becomes of the mind?
1687	Again, how far can one touch itself and the others?
1687	Again, is the not- one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?
1687	Again, let us conceive of a one which by an effort of abstraction we separate from being: will this abstract one be one or many?
1687	Again, of the parts of the one, if it is-- I mean being and one-- does either fail to imply the other?
1687	Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?
1687	Am I not right?
1687	And a multitude implies a number larger than one?
1687	And all the parts are contained by the whole?
1687	And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?
1687	And also in other things?
1687	And also of one?
1687	And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?
1687	And are not things other in kind unlike?
1687	And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience separation and aggregation?
1687	And because having limits, also having extremes?
1687	And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself?
1687	And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one?
1687	And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose being?
1687	And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?
1687	And can you think of anything else which is between them other than equality?
1687	And change is motion-- we may say that?
1687	And could we hear it?
1687	And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of being and the loss of being?
1687	And do not''will be,''''will become,''''will have become,''signify a participation of future time?
1687	And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one?
1687	And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger?
1687	And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really exist?
1687	And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being?
1687	And greatness and smallness always stand apart?
1687	And has not- being also, if it is not?
1687	And have we not already shown that it can not be in anything?
1687	And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other,--in any such case do I not speak of both?
1687	And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also participate?
1687	And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?
1687	And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three?
1687	And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?
1687	And if the world partakes in the ideas, and the ideas are thoughts, must not all things think?
1687	And if there are not two, there is no contact?
1687	And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three?
1687	And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?
1687	And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be unlike them?
1687	And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be?
1687	And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two?
1687	And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?
1687	And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others are, and the one is not?
1687	And in that it was other it was shown to be like?
1687	And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many?
1687	And inequality implies greatness and smallness?
1687	And is each of these parts-- one and being-- to be simply called a part, or must the word''part''be relative to the word''whole''?
1687	And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself?
1687	And is not time always moving forward?
1687	And is not''other''a name given to a thing?
1687	And is the one a part of itself?
1687	And it is older( is it not?)
1687	And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?
1687	And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them appears to be one, though it is really many?
1687	And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation?--Where is the wonder?
1687	And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?
1687	And not having the same measures, the one can not be equal either with itself or with another?
1687	And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?
1687	And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?
1687	And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?
1687	And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to have come into existence?
1687	And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say what is?
1687	And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?
1687	And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity?
1687	And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?
1687	And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things?
1687	And so when he says''If one is not''he clearly means, that what''is not''is other than all others; we know what he means-- do we not?
1687	And surely there can not be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest?
1687	And that is the one?
1687	And that which contains, is a limit?
1687	And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are?
1687	And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?
1687	And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger?
1687	And that which is older is older than that which is younger?
1687	And that which is older, must always be older than something which is younger?
1687	And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge?
1687	And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?
1687	And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?
1687	And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?
1687	And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less?
1687	And the one is the whole?
1687	And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?
1687	And the other to the same?
1687	And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?
1687	And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the extremes?
1687	And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?
1687	And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no reality, if one is not?
1687	And therefore is and is not in the same state?
1687	And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be attributed to it?
1687	And therefore not other than itself?
1687	And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or different in relation to it?
1687	And they are unequal to an unequal?
1687	And things that are not equal are unequal?
1687	And three are odd, and two are even?
1687	And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation to itself or other?
1687	And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others?
1687	And we have not got the idea of knowledge?
1687	And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other?
1687	And we surely can not say that what is truly one has parts?
1687	And what are its relations to other things?
1687	And what are the relations of the one to the others?
1687	And what is a whole?
1687	And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend?
1687	And what of that?
1687	And what shall be our first hypothesis, if I am to attempt this laborious pastime?
1687	And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all?
1687	And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalized?
1687	And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?
1687	And when we put them together shortly, and say''One is,''that is equivalent to saying,''partakes of being''?
1687	And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way but is in another?
1687	And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name?
1687	And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated?
1687	And who will answer me?
1687	And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not- one?
1687	And will not knowledge-- I mean absolute knowledge-- answer to absolute truth?
1687	And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the idea itself?
1687	And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all, be an idea?
1687	And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it?
1687	And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not being one, if one is not?
1687	And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water?
1687	And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only, and different parts different men?
1687	And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end?
1687	And you may say the name once or oftener?
1687	And''is,''or''becomes,''signifies a participation of present time?
1687	And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way?
1687	And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of being?
1687	Because every part is part of a whole; is it not?
1687	But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these?
1687	But as I must attempt this laborious game, what shall be the subject?
1687	But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older nor younger, what shall we say?
1687	But can all this be true about the one?
1687	But can all this be true?
1687	But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing?
1687	But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being?
1687	But can one be in many places and yet be a whole?
1687	But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?
1687	But does one partake of time?
1687	But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible?
1687	But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?
1687	But how can not- being, which is nowhere, move or change, either from one place to another or in the same place?
1687	But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same measures or have anything else the same?
1687	But if anything is other than anything, will it not be other than other?
1687	But if it be not altered it can not be moved?
1687	But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same age with itself?
1687	But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and can not be none?
1687	But if one is, and both odd and even numbers are implied in one, must not every number exist?
1687	But if one is, what happens to the others, which in the first place are not one, yet may partake of one in a certain way?
1687	But if one is, what will happen to the others-- is not that also to be considered?
1687	But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another?
1687	But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?
1687	But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?
1687	But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact?
1687	But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another?
1687	But is the contradiction also the final conclusion?
1687	But is the one other than one?
1687	But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides?
1687	But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm?
1687	But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place?
1687	But reflect:--Can one, in its entirety, be in many places at the same time?
1687	But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to it?
1687	But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?
1687	But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, it can not change from one place to another?
1687	But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?
1687	But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?
1687	But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and can not have?
1687	But the one did not partake of those affections?
1687	But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never unlike itself or other?
1687	But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything?
1687	But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained?
1687	But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things?
1687	But to speak of the others implies difference-- the terms''other''and''different''are synonymous?
1687	But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another:--so we said?
1687	But what do you say to a new point of view?
1687	But when do all these changes take place?
1687	But why do you ask?''
1687	But why?
1687	But, again, assume the opposite hypothesis, that the one is not, and what is the consequence?
1687	But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would not be in the middle?
1687	But, consider:--Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another?
1687	But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?
1687	But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?
1687	But, then, what is to become of philosophy?
1687	Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?
1687	Can there be any other mode of participation?
1687	Do not the words''is not''signify absence of being in that to which we apply them?
1687	Do they participate in the ideas, or do they merely resemble them?
1687	Do you see my meaning?
1687	Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the ideas to be absolute?
1687	Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?
1687	Does the one also partake of time?
1687	For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others?
1687	For can anything be a whole without these three?
1687	Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained by the whole?
1687	Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being?
1687	Further-- is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?
1687	Here is the great though unconscious truth( shall we say?)
1687	How can he have ever persisted in them after seeing the fatal objections which might be urged against them?
1687	How can he have placed himself so completely without them?
1687	How can it?
1687	How can there be?
1687	How can they be?
1687	How can we conceive Him under the forms of time and space, who is out of time and space?
1687	How can we imagine His relation to the world or to ourselves?
1687	How could they investigate causes, when they had not as yet learned to distinguish between a cause and an end?
1687	How could they make any progress in the sciences without first arranging them?
1687	How could they?
1687	How do you mean?
1687	How do you mean?
1687	How do you mean?
1687	How do you mean?
1687	How get rid of such forms and see Him as He is?
1687	How is that?
1687	How is that?
1687	How is that?
1687	How is that?
1687	How not?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How so?
1687	How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than anything, or have the same age with it?
1687	How then, without a word of explanation, could Plato assign to them the refutation of their own tenets?
1687	How, while mankind were disputing about universals, could they classify phenomena?
1687	How?
1687	How?
1687	I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a thing?
1687	If God is not, what follows?''
1687	If it be co- extensive with the one it will be co- equal with the one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one?
1687	If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one?
1687	If one is, being must be predicated of it?
1687	If one is, he said, the one can not be many?
1687	If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself?
1687	If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are two and thrice, there is thrice two?
1687	If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole?
1687	In all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of the many?
1687	In the first place, the others will not be one?
1687	In this way-- you may speak of being?
1687	In what way?
1687	In what way?
1687	In what way?
1687	Is it or does it become older or younger than they?
1687	Is it or does it become older or younger than they?
1687	Is not that true?
1687	Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you?
1687	Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions-- if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?
1687	Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?
1687	Is this true of becoming as well as being?
1687	It can not therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of nature?
1687	It is otherwise with the objection which follows: How are we to bridge the chasm between human truth and absolute truth, between gods and men?
1687	Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike?
1687	Let us see:--Must not the being of one be other than one?
1687	May we say, in Platonic language, that we still seem to see vestiges of a track which has not yet been taken?
1687	Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature?
1687	Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one?
1687	Nor as like or unlike?
1687	Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the same is, and that which is not can not be reckoned among things that are?
1687	Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with it?
1687	Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which stands must always be in one and the same spot?
1687	Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for if there had been, it would partake of being?
1687	Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others?
1687	Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest must stand still?
1687	Now there can not possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others?
1687	Of something which is or which is not?
1687	Once more, Is one equal and unequal to itself and the others?
1687	Once more, can one be older or younger than itself or other?
1687	Once more, if one is not, what becomes of the others?
1687	Once more, let us ask the question, If one is not, what happens in regard to one?
1687	Once more, let us inquire, If the one is not, and the others of the one are, what follows?
1687	One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion?
1687	One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist?
1687	Or can thought be without thought?''
1687	Other means other than other, and different, different from the different?
1687	Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?
1687	Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as different from the others?
1687	Shall I begin with myself, and take my own hypothesis the one?
1687	Shall I propose the youngest?
1687	Shall I propose the youngest?
1687	Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise?
1687	Since it is not a part in relation to itself it can not be related to itself as whole to part?
1687	Since then what is partakes of not- being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?
1687	So that the other is not the same-- either with the one or with being?
1687	Suppose the first; it will be either co- equal and co- extensive with the whole one, or will contain the one?
1687	The expression''is not''implies negation of being:--do we mean by this to say that a thing, which is not, in a certain sense is?
1687	The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite?
1687	The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion?
1687	The one then, since it in no way is, can not have or lose or assume being in any way?
1687	The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?
1687	The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself?
1687	The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others?
1687	The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised?
1687	The thought must be of something?
1687	Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the consequences?
1687	Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it?
1687	Then can the motion of the one be in place?
1687	Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many?
1687	Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea?
1687	Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?
1687	Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor can be conceived to be either one or many?
1687	Then if one is, number must also be?
1687	Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it can not either exceed or be exceeded by them?
1687	Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable?
1687	Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?
1687	Then it can not be like another, or like itself?
1687	Then it can not move by changing place?
1687	Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?
1687	Then it has the greatest number of parts?
1687	Then it is never in the same?
1687	Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be destroyed?
1687	Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?
1687	Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not?
1687	Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others?
1687	Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is?
1687	Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if there is no contact?
1687	Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge?
1687	Then not by virtue of being one will it be other?
1687	Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many?
1687	Then now we have spoken of either of them?
1687	Then one can not be anywhere, either in itself or in another?
1687	Then one can not be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself or with another?
1687	Then one is never in the same place?
1687	Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not- one, is the same with it?
1687	Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the same time?
1687	Then smallness can not be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only?
1687	Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time, become younger than itself?
1687	Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies between them?
1687	Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?
1687	Then the inference is that it would touch both?
1687	Then the least is the first?
1687	Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us?
1687	Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself?
1687	Then the one and the others are never in the same?
1687	Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?
1687	Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion?
1687	Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another or with itself?
1687	Then the one can not have parts, and can not be a whole?
1687	Then the one can not possibly partake of being?
1687	Then the one can not touch itself any more than it can be two?
1687	Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?
1687	Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number?
1687	Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward in time?
1687	Then the one is not at all?
1687	Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present?
1687	Then the one must have likeness to itself?
1687	Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are unequal to it?
1687	Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind?
1687	Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered?
1687	Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither perishes nor becomes?
1687	Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion?
1687	Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become?
1687	Then the one will be equal both to itself and the others?
1687	Then the one will be other than the others?
1687	Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike it?
1687	Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?
1687	Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts?
1687	Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two?
1687	Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of a straight or of a circular form?
1687	Then the one, being moved, is altered?
1687	Then the one, being of this nature, can not be in time at all; for must not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself?
1687	Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited?
1687	Then the one, if it is not, can not turn in that in which it is not?
1687	Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?
1687	Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is?
1687	Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness?
1687	Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?
1687	Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and smallness and equality?
1687	Then the other will never be either in the not- one, or in the one?
1687	Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?
1687	Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of any number?
1687	Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one?
1687	Then there is always something between them?
1687	Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor knowledge of it?
1687	Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity?
1687	Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part?
1687	Then they are separated from each other?
1687	Then they have no number, if they have no one in them?
1687	Then we can not suppose that there is anything different from them in which both the one and the others might exist?
1687	Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never moves?
1687	Then we will begin at the beginning:--If one is, can one be, and not partake of being?
1687	Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?
1687	Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?
1687	Then will you, Zeno?
1687	Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?
1687	Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one?
1687	Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not have parts?
1687	Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be other?
1687	Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a whole, and also as having parts?
1687	Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered?
1687	Then, that which is not can not be, or in any way participate in being?
1687	There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three?
1687	There is a natural realism which says,''Can there be a word devoid of meaning, or an idea which is an idea of nothing?''
1687	There is an ethical universal or idea, but is there also a universal of physics?--of the meanest things in the world as well as of the greatest?
1687	They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present?
1687	Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it changes from being to not- being?
1687	Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?
1687	Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself?
1687	Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?
1687	We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?
1687	We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?
1687	We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is?
1687	Welcome, Cephalus, said Adeimantus, taking me by the hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?
1687	Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or of the same age with it?
1687	Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be attributed to it?
1687	Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?
1687	Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not?
1687	Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?
1687	Well, but do not the expressions''was,''and''has become,''and''was becoming,''signify a participation of past time?
1687	Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?
1687	Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other?
1687	What difficulty?
1687	What direction?
1687	What do you mean, Parmenides?
1687	What do you mean?
1687	What do you mean?
1687	What do you mean?
1687	What is it?
1687	What is the meaning of the hypothesis-- If the one is not; is there any difference between this and the hypothesis-- If the not one is not?
1687	What may that be?
1687	What of that?
1687	What question?
1687	What thing?
1687	What would you say of another question?
1687	What?
1687	When does motion become rest, or rest motion?
1687	When then does it change; for it can not change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time?
1687	Whenever, then, you use the word''other,''whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?
1687	Where shall I begin?
1687	Whither shall we turn, if the ideas are unknown?
1687	Why not, Parmenides?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why not?
1687	Why so?
1687	Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are equidistant from the centre?
1687	Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?
1687	Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others?
1687	You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, there would be one whole including many-- is not that your meaning?
1687	and consider the consequences which follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not- being of one?
1687	and is this your own distinction?''
1687	and when more than once, is it something else which you mention?
1687	and where are the reasoning and reflecting powers?
1687	for the one is not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?
1687	for the same whole can not do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will be no longer one, but two?
1687	is the one wanting to being, or being to the one?
1687	or do we mean absolutely to deny being of it?
1687	or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no sort or way or kind participation of being?
1687	or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once?
1687	or of the same age with itself or other?
1687	would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole?
1726	''And he who remembers, remembers that which he sees and knows?''
1726	''And he who sees knows?''
1726	''And if you say"Yes,"the tongue will escape conviction but not the mind, as Euripides would say?''
1726	''But Protagoras will retort:"Can anything be more or less without addition or subtraction?"''
1726	''But if he closes his eyes, does he not remember?''
1726	''Excellent; I want you to grow, and therefore I will leave that answer and ask another question: Is not seeing perceiving?''
1726	''That I should expect; but why did he not remain at Megara?''
1726	''What do you mean, Socrates?''
1726	''What do you mean?''
1726	''What may that be?''
1726	''Why, Socrates, how can you argue at all without using them?''
1726	( b) Would he have based the relativity of knowledge on the Heraclitean flux?
1726	( c) Would he have asserted the absoluteness of sensation at each instant?
1726	--That will be our answer?
1726	Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your new- born child, of which I have delivered you?
1726	Am I not right?
1726	Am I not right?
1726	And could you repeat the conversation?''
1726	And do you not like the taste of them in the mouth?
1726	And has Plato kept altogether clear of a confusion, which the analogous word logos tends to create, of a proposition and a definition?
1726	And how can any one be ignorant of either of them, and yet know both of them?
1726	And if they differ in opinion, which of them is likely to be right; or are they both right?
1726	And is not the confusion increased by the use of the analogous term''elements,''or''letters''?
1726	And now, what are you saying?--Are there two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and do you define knowledge to be the true?
1726	And so we must ask again, What is knowledge?
1726	And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else?
1726	And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion?
1726	And the same of perceiving: do you understand me?
1726	And therefore let us draw nearer, as the advocate of Protagoras desires; and give the truth of the universal flux a ring: is the theory sound or not?
1726	And what other case is conceivable, upon the supposition that we either know or do not know all things?
1726	And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting?
1726	Are its movements identical with those of the body, or only preconcerted and coincident with them, or is one simply an aspect of the other?
1726	Are not these speculations charming, Theaetetus, and very good for a person in your interesting situation?
1726	Are you so profoundly convinced of this?
1726	Are you still in labour, or have you brought all you have to say about knowledge to the birth?
1726	But I should like to know, Socrates, whether you mean to say that all this is untrue?''
1726	But are we not inverting the natural order in looking for opinion before we have found knowledge?
1726	But did you ever say to yourself, that good is evil, or evil good?
1726	But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras?
1726	But have we not escaped one difficulty only to encounter a greater?
1726	But here we are met by a singular difficulty: How is false opinion possible?
1726	But how can he who knows the forms of knowledge and the forms of ignorance imagine one to be the other?
1726	But how can the syllable be known if the letter remains unknown?
1726	But how is false opinion possible?
1726	But if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between the true and the false in such cases?
1726	But is true opinion really distinct from knowledge?
1726	But may there not be''heterodoxy,''or transference of opinion;--I mean, may not one thing be supposed to be another?
1726	But still an old difficulty recurs; we ask ourselves,''How is false opinion possible?''
1726	But tell me, Socrates, in heaven''s name, is this, after all, not the truth?
1726	But then, as Plato asks,--and we must repeat the question,--What becomes of the mind?
1726	But what is SO?
1726	But what is the third definition?
1726	But when the word''knowledge''was found how was it to be explained or defined?
1726	But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara?
1726	But would this hold in any parallel case?
1726	But, as we are at our wits''end, suppose that we do a shameless thing?
1726	But, seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say what knowing is?
1726	Can a man see and see nothing?
1726	Can a whole be something different from the parts?
1726	Can two unknowns make a known?
1726	Can we answer that question?
1726	Can we suppose one set of feelings or one part of the mind to interpret another?
1726	Could he have pretended to cite from a well- known writing what was not to be found there?
1726	Did Protagoras merely mean to assert the relativity of knowledge to the human mind?
1726	Did you ever hear that too?
1726	Do we not seem to perceive instinctively and as an act of sense the differences of articulate speech and of musical notes?
1726	Do you agree?
1726	Do you know the original principle on which the doctrine of Protagoras is based?''
1726	Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearings of this tale on the preceding argument?
1726	Do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non- existing things?
1726	Does it differ as subject and object in the same manner?
1726	Does not explanation appear to be of this nature?
1726	EUCLID: Have you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion?
1726	Even in sleep, did you ever imagine that odd was even?
1726	For an objection occurs to him:--May there not be errors where there is no confusion of mind and sense?
1726	For how can the exchange of two kinds of knowledge ever become false opinion?
1726	For how can we know a compound of which the simple elements are unknown to us?
1726	For if the Heraclitean flux is extended to every sort of change in every instant of time, how can any thought or word be detained even for an instant?
1726	For must not opinion be equally expressed in a proposition?
1726	He asks whether a man can know and not know at the same time?
1726	How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it?
1726	How can you or any one maintain the contrary?
1726	How is this?
1726	How will Protagoras answer this argument?
1726	I dare say that you agree with me, do you not?
1726	I have, I fear, a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know?
1726	I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation?
1726	I suppose, Theodorus, that you have never seen them in time of peace, when they discourse at leisure to their disciples?
1726	I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes?
1726	I will make my meaning clearer by an example:--You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?
1726	If all that exists in time is illusion, we may well ask with Plato,''What becomes of the mind?''
1726	In what does this differ from the saying of Theaetetus?
1726	Is he to be reared in any case, and not exposed?
1726	Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way?
1726	Is it not so?
1726	Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals?
1726	Is not this a"reductio ad absurdum"of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception?
1726	Is the introspecting thought the same with the thought which is introspected?
1726	Is the mind active or passive, or partly both?
1726	Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing?
1726	Is there only one kind of motion, or, as I rather incline to think, two?
1726	Is there some other form of knowledge which distinguishes them?
1726	Let us grant what you say-- then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion-- am I right?
1726	Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non- existence of things that are not:--You have read him?
1726	Must he not be talking''ad captandum''in all this?
1726	Must he not see, hear, or touch some one existing thing?
1726	Nay, not even in sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of the kind?
1726	O Theaetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honey?
1726	O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great?
1726	Once more then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question--"What is knowledge?"
1726	Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question,''What is knowledge?''
1726	Or again, if we see letters which we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them?
1726	Or are they both right?--he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician''s judgment?
1726	Or did any man in his senses ever fancy that an ox was a horse, or that two are one?
1726	Or did he mean to deny that there is an objective standard of truth?
1726	Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?
1726	Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him?
1726	Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing?
1726	Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts?
1726	Or, if he is afraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike?
1726	Plato discards both figures, as not really solving the question which to us appears so simple:''How do we make mistakes?''
1726	Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the same?
1726	SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all?
1726	SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all( in the plural) is there not one thing which we express?
1726	SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not?
1726	SOCRATES: Am I talking nonsense, then?
1726	SOCRATES: And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?
1726	SOCRATES: And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases?
1726	SOCRATES: And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different?
1726	SOCRATES: And another and another?
1726	SOCRATES: And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?
1726	SOCRATES: And astronomy and harmony and calculation?
1726	SOCRATES: And by wisdom the wise are wise?
1726	SOCRATES: And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?
1726	SOCRATES: And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?
1726	SOCRATES: And did you find such a class?
1726	SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them?
1726	SOCRATES: And do you mean by conceiving, the same which I mean?
1726	SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read?
1726	SOCRATES: And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise?
1726	SOCRATES: And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true?
1726	SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is?
1726	SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks, think some one thing?
1726	SOCRATES: And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up?
1726	SOCRATES: And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch?
1726	SOCRATES: And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?
1726	SOCRATES: And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about him which are numerable?
1726	SOCRATES: And he who hears anything, hears some one thing, and hears that which is?
1726	SOCRATES: And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all?
1726	SOCRATES: And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and therefore is?
1726	SOCRATES: And how about Protagoras himself?
1726	SOCRATES: And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colours?
1726	SOCRATES: And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?
1726	SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he has seen?
1726	SOCRATES: And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, all things must always have every sort of motion?
1726	SOCRATES: And if unlike, they are other?
1726	SOCRATES: And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if not, not?
1726	SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six?
1726	SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name?
1726	SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: And is Theodorus a painter?
1726	SOCRATES: And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man?
1726	SOCRATES: And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb''to know''?
1726	SOCRATES: And is memory of something or of nothing?
1726	SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent?
1726	SOCRATES: And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise?
1726	SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible?
1726	SOCRATES: And is that different in any way from knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter, as just now said?
1726	SOCRATES: And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time?
1726	SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders?
1726	SOCRATES: And must therefore be admitted to be unlike?
1726	SOCRATES: And of true opinion also?
1726	SOCRATES: And seeing is knowing, and therefore not- seeing is not- knowing?
1726	SOCRATES: And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And that I myself practise midwifery?
1726	SOCRATES: And that both are two and each of them one?
1726	SOCRATES: And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself?
1726	SOCRATES: And that is six?
1726	SOCRATES: And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived?
1726	SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing?
1726	SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each?
1726	SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium?
1726	SOCRATES: And the race of animals is generated in the same way?
1726	SOCRATES: And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself to any one else?
1726	SOCRATES: And therefore not in science or knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished, that is to say, they move in place and are also changed?
1726	SOCRATES: And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to?
1726	SOCRATES: And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, of all our notions, is the most universal?
1726	SOCRATES: And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?
1726	SOCRATES: And what of the mental habit?
1726	SOCRATES: And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception?
1726	SOCRATES: And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements?
1726	SOCRATES: And who could take up arms against such a great army having Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you say this also of like and unlike, same and other?
1726	SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?
1726	SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them?
1726	SOCRATES: Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?
1726	SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all?
1726	SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together?
1726	SOCRATES: But can you certainly determine by any other means which of these opinions is true?
1726	SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason?
1726	SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters?
1726	SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole?
1726	SOCRATES: But is the aim attained always?
1726	SOCRATES: But is there any parallel to this?
1726	SOCRATES: But may not the following be the description of what we express by this name?
1726	SOCRATES: But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, have a conception either of both objects or of one of them?
1726	SOCRATES: But surely he can not suppose what he knows to be what he does not know, or what he does not know to be what he knows?
1726	SOCRATES: But then, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is perception, or that to every man what appears is?
1726	SOCRATES: But through what do you perceive all this about them?
1726	SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all?
1726	SOCRATES: But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a different person?
1726	SOCRATES: Can a man see something and yet see nothing?
1726	SOCRATES: Capital; and what followed?
1726	SOCRATES: Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says?
1726	SOCRATES: Do you see another question which can be raised about these phenomena, notably about dreaming and waking?
1726	SOCRATES: Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?
1726	SOCRATES: Either together or in succession?
1726	SOCRATES: Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven?
1726	SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not''knowable''?
1726	SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O?
1726	SOCRATES: He then who sees some one thing, sees something which is?
1726	SOCRATES: He who knows, can not but know; and he who does not know, can not know?
1726	SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived?
1726	SOCRATES: Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction-- What is knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would admit that they both exist?
1726	SOCRATES: How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument?
1726	SOCRATES: How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive?
1726	SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:--Theaetetus, he says, what is SO?
1726	SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S. THEAETETUS: But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an element?
1726	SOCRATES: If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he can not think that the one of them is the other?
1726	SOCRATES: If they only moved in place and were not changed, we should be able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux?
1726	SOCRATES: If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception can not come to you, either through the one or the other organ?
1726	SOCRATES: If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, when it becomes like we call it the same-- when unlike, other?
1726	SOCRATES: In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two arts?
1726	SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps?
1726	SOCRATES: Is he a geometrician?
1726	SOCRATES: Is it still worth our while to resume the discussion touching opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: It is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of one thing as another?
1726	SOCRATES: Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing-- for example, What is clay?
1726	SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:--What was the way in which we learned letters?
1726	SOCRATES: Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:--There is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick-- Are they like or unlike?
1726	SOCRATES: May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds?
1726	SOCRATES: Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the other, can he think that one is the other?
1726	SOCRATES: Nor of any other science?
1726	SOCRATES: Of things learned and perceived, that is?
1726	SOCRATES: Often a man remembers that which he has seen?
1726	SOCRATES: Once more we shall have to begin, and ask''What is knowledge?''
1726	SOCRATES: Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man?
1726	SOCRATES: Perception would be the collective name of them?
1726	SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form?
1726	SOCRATES: Shall I tell you the reason?
1726	SOCRATES: Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras?
1726	SOCRATES: Shall we say that we know every thing which we see and hear?
1726	SOCRATES: Tell me, now-- How in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else?
1726	SOCRATES: That is good news; whose son is he?
1726	SOCRATES: That is of six?
1726	SOCRATES: That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading?
1726	SOCRATES: The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?
1726	SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts?
1726	SOCRATES: Then do we not come back to the old difficulty?
1726	SOCRATES: Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere of being or of knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?
1726	SOCRATES: Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing?
1726	SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance?
1726	SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word''all''of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural?
1726	SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form?
1726	SOCRATES: Then it must appear so to each of them?
1726	SOCRATES: Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as to the body?
1726	SOCRATES: Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self- existent substance or as a predicate of something else?
1726	SOCRATES: Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:--Can a man know and also not know that which he knows?
1726	SOCRATES: Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us?
1726	SOCRATES: Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you answered that knowledge is perception?
1726	SOCRATES: Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?
1726	SOCRATES: Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?
1726	SOCRATES: Then right opinion implies the perception of differences?
1726	SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts?
1726	SOCRATES: Then they must be distinguished?
1726	SOCRATES: Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not?
1726	SOCRATES: Then when any one thinks of one thing as another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another?
1726	SOCRATES: Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?
1726	SOCRATES: Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must look at the matter in some other way?
1726	SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it?
1726	SOCRATES: Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility?
1726	SOCRATES: We have at length satisfactorily proven beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, and shall we do as he says?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, and what is the difficulty?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term''explanation''?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but are we to assert that what you think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all( in the plural) and the all( in the singular)?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, may not a man''possess''and yet not''have''knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking?
1726	SOCRATES: Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite?
1726	SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views?
1726	SOCRATES: What shall we say then?
1726	SOCRATES: What was it?
1726	SOCRATES: What was that, Theaetetus?
1726	SOCRATES: What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Where, then, is false opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely?
1726	SOCRATES: Which is probably correct-- for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?
1726	SOCRATES: Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?
1726	SOCRATES: You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another?
1726	SOCRATES: You have heard the common explanation of the verb''to know''?
1726	Shall I answer for him?
1726	Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus?
1726	Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false?
1726	Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what he already knows?
1726	Such are the lawyers; will you have the companion picture of philosophers?
1726	TERPSION: The dysentery, you mean?
1726	TERPSION: The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled; but what was the conversation?
1726	TERPSION: Was he alive or dead?
1726	TERPSION: Where then?
1726	THEAETETUS: About what?
1726	THEAETETUS: And do you not agree in that view, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: And how would you amend the former statement?
1726	THEAETETUS: And is not that, Socrates, nobly said?
1726	THEAETETUS: And was that wrong?
1726	THEAETETUS: And why should that be shameless?
1726	THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates...?
1726	THEAETETUS: But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you ever argue at all?
1726	THEAETETUS: But what puts you out of heart?
1726	THEAETETUS: Can you give me any example of such a definition?
1726	THEAETETUS: How can he?
1726	THEAETETUS: How could it?
1726	THEAETETUS: How do the two expressions differ?
1726	THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: How is that, and what profession do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: How so?
1726	THEAETETUS: How?
1726	THEAETETUS: I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest?
1726	THEAETETUS: I should call all of them perceiving-- what other name could be given to them?
1726	THEAETETUS: I should reply S and O. SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable?
1726	THEAETETUS: In what manner?
1726	THEAETETUS: Let us imagine such an aviary-- and what is to follow?
1726	THEAETETUS: Pray what is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question?
1726	THEAETETUS: Then what is colour?
1726	THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding?
1726	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1726	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1726	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What experience?
1726	THEAETETUS: What hostages?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is that?
1726	THEAETETUS: What makes you say so?
1726	THEAETETUS: What makes you say so?
1726	THEAETETUS: What question?
1726	THEAETETUS: What was it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What?
1726	THEAETETUS: What?
1726	THEAETETUS: Who indeed, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: Who, Socrates, would dare to say so?
1726	THEAETETUS: Why?
1726	THEAETETUS: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables?
1726	THEAETETUS: You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole?
1726	THEODORUS: How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates?
1726	THEODORUS: How shall we answer, Theaetetus?
1726	THEODORUS: How so?
1726	THEODORUS: In what is the difference seen?
1726	THEODORUS: In what way?
1726	THEODORUS: Well, but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards?
1726	THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1726	THEODORUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEODORUS: What is it?
1726	THEODORUS: What is that?
1726	THEODORUS: Who indeed?
1726	Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body?
1726	Tell me, then, what do you think of the notion that"All things are becoming"?''
1726	Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know?
1726	The mind, when occupied by herself with being, is said to have opinion-- shall we say that''Knowledge is true opinion''?
1726	The multitude may not and do not agree in Protagoras''own thesis that''Man is the measure of all things;''and then who is to decide?
1726	They would say, as I imagine-- Can that which is wholly other than something, have the same quality as that from which it differs?
1726	Think: is not seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception?
1726	Upon his own showing must not his''truth''depend on the number of suffrages, and be more or less true in proportion as he has more or fewer of them?
1726	Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you?
1726	We are often told that we should enquire into all things before we accept them;--with what limitations is this true?
1726	Weary of asking''What is truth?''
1726	Well, you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position?
1726	Were not you and Theodorus just now remarking very truly, that in discussions of this kind we may take our own time?
1726	What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus?
1726	What are we to think of time and space?
1726	What do they mean when they say that all things are in motion?
1726	What say you?
1726	What say you?
1726	What then is knowledge?
1726	What then is knowledge?
1726	What then is knowledge?
1726	When he says that''knowledge is in perception,''with what does he perceive?
1726	Who can divide the nerves or great nervous centres from the mind which uses them?
1726	Who can resist an idea which is presented to him in a general form in every moment of his life and of which he finds no instance to the contrary?
1726	Who can separate the pains and pleasures of the mind from the pains and pleasures of the body?
1726	Who is our judge?
1726	Who is the judge or where is the spectator, having a right to control us?''
1726	Why should we not go a step further still and doubt the existence of the senses of all things?
1726	Why should we single out one of these abstractions to be the a priori condition of all the others?
1726	Will you answer me a question:''Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?''
1726	Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument?
1726	Without further preface, but at the same time apologizing for his eagerness, he asks,''What is knowledge?''
1726	Would an untrained man, for example, be as likely to know when he is going to have a fever, as the physician who attended him?
1726	Yes; but did you observe that Protagoras bade me be serious, and complained of our getting up a laugh against him with the aid of a boy?
1726	You remember?
1726	and another, and another?
1726	and of what sort do you mean?
1726	and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do?
1726	and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition?
1726	can you tell me?
1726	do not mistakes often happen?
1726	for example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not hear the language of foreigners when they speak to us?
1726	for what reason?
1726	here are six dice; they are more than four and less than twelve;"more and also less,"would you not say?''
1726	or hear and hear nothing?
1726	or shall we aver that, seeing them, we must know them?
1726	or shall we say that we not only hear, but know what they are saying?
1726	or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows?
1726	or touch and touch nothing?
1726	or will this be too much of a digression?
1726	or will you bear to see him rejected, and not get into a passion if I take away your first- born?
1726	or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not?
1726	or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know?
1726	the sound of words or the sight of letters in a foreign tongue?''
1726	what is temperance?
1726	which of us will speak first?
3052	Why,says he,"do we tire ourselves in taking such care of ourselves, in desiring and longing after certain things, and shunning and avoiding others?
3052	( See"Phaedrus,"p. 246 D.) Is it because the discourse is of love, and love is of beauty inherent in a body?
3052	128):-- How long, my son, wilt thou thy soul consume with grief an mourning?
3052	128):-- How long, my son, wilt thou thy soul consume with grief and mourning?
3052	171):-- What doom overcame thee of death that lays men at their length?
3052	193):-- Up to this time he revolved these things in his mind and heart, that is, the intelligent part and what is opposed to it?
3052	243):-- Why stand ye thus like timid fawns?
3052	298):--- Or hast thou not heard what renown the goodly Orestes got among all men in that he slew the slayer of his father?
3052	40):-- How canst thou hope the sons of Greece shall prove Such heartless cowards as thy words suppose?
3052	7):-- Why weep over Patroclus as a girl?
3052	7):-- Why weeps Patroelus like an infant girl?
3052	============= And what meal is not expensive?
3052	AND ALSO, WHY DO THE ATHENIANS OMIT THE SECOND DAY OF THE MONTH BOEDROMION?
3052	AND ALSO, WHY, WHEN TWO ACCORDANT STRINGS ARE TOUCHED TOGETHER, IS THE MELODY ASCRIBED TO THE BASE?
3052	AND WHICH OF THE SECTIONS, THE INTELLIGIBLE OR THE SENSIBLE, IS THE GREATER?
3052	AND WHY DO THOSE SEEDS THAT FALL ON THE OXEN''S HORNS BECOME[ Greek omitted]?
3052	Again, Euripides saith, How can that man be called a slave, who slights Ev''n death itself, which servile spirits frights?
3052	And Aristo presently cried out: What then, for heaven''s sake, are there any that banish philosophy from company and wine?
3052	And Bias said: For where or in what company would a man more joyfully adventure to give his opinion than here in this?
3052	And are not then the evening, dawning, and midnight bodies?
3052	And are these things according to Nature chosen as good, or as having some fitness or preferences... either for this end or for something else?
3052	And at private entertainments among friends, for whom doth the table more justly make room or Bacchus give place than for Menander?
3052	And being deprived of some of his senses, does he not become weary even of life?
3052	And can we produce nothing from history to club to this discourse?
3052	And can you( looking upon me) offer any better reason?
3052	And could not Jupiter have found a means to bring into the world Hercules and Lycurgus, if he had not also made for us Sardanapalus and Phalaris?
3052	And do not you take away that which is apparent to all the world, that the young are contained in the nature of their parents?
3052	And do they not also determine the substance and generation of conception itself, even against the common conceptions?
3052	And do they not also profess themselves to stand at an implacable and irreconcilable defiance with whatever is generous and becoming?
3052	And for what other reason in truth should a man of parts and erudition be at the pains to frequent the theatre, but for the sake of Menander only?
3052	And he as smartly replied: Do you think that Agamemnon did so many famous exploits when he was inquiring who dressed congers in the camp?
3052	And how can the motion of the universe, extending as it does to particular ones, be undisturbed and unimpeached, if these are stopped and hindered?
3052	And how is it possible for him who is at Megara to come to Athens, if he is prohibited by Fate?
3052	And if any one should thus question him; What sayst thou, Epicurus, that this is voidness, and that the nature of voidness?
3052	And if circles, why may not also their diameters be neither equal nor unequal?
3052	And if so, why not also angles, triangles, parallelograms, parallelopipeds, and bodies?
3052	And if they are transgressors of the law, why is it not just they should be punished?
3052	And if they do not quadrate, how can it be but the one must exceed and the other fall short?
3052	And if they neither live nor can live who place generation in union and death in disunion, what else do these Epicureans?
3052	And in which of Plato''s commentaries has he found this hidden?
3052	And indeed what do they ever embrace or affect that is either genteel or regardable, when it hath nothing of pleasure to accompany it?
3052	And is not this discourse of Aristotle very probable?
3052	And must we be angry with our delight, unless hired to endure it?
3052	And one of the company saying, It is the Persian fashion, sir, to debate midst your cups; And why, said Glaucias rejoining, not the Grecian fashion?
3052	And should I not in hell tormented be, Could I be guilty of such sacrilege?
3052	And the tenth, the fifteenth, and the thirtieth, are they not bodies?
3052	And therefore why should any one, that believes men can be affected and prejudiced by the sight, imagine that they can not act and hurt is well?
3052	And was not the crown anciently of twined parsley?
3052	And what did he mean, do you think, who made this verse, You capers gnaw, when you may sturgeon eat?
3052	And what great difference is there between this and that?
3052	And what is prudence?
3052	And what shall I take for the principle of duty and matter of virtue, leaving Nature and that which is according to Nature?
3052	And what the pleasures of Aristotle, when he rebuilt his native city Stagira, then levelled with the ground, and brought back its exiled inhabitants?
3052	And what the pleasures of Theophrastus and of Phidias, when they cut off the tyrants of their respective countries?
3052	And what, Phaedo, might be the cause of it?
3052	And what, for God''s sake, do those men mean who, inviting one another to sumptuous collations, usually say: To- day we will dine upon the shore?
3052	And when are the playhouses better filled with men of letters, than when his comic mask is exhibited?
3052	And when in exhortations made to encourage soldiers to fight, he speaks in this manner:-- What mean you, Lycians?
3052	And yet he frequently even tires us with his praises of this saying:-- What need have men of more than these two things?
3052	And yet is it not evident that a man consists of more parts than a finger, and the world of more than a man?
3052	And yet who might better have them than he?
3052	Are they not those who declare that reigning and being a king is a mistaking the path and straying from the right way of felicity?
3052	Are they not those who withdraw themselves and their followers from all part in the government?
3052	Are we more healthy for being vicious, or do we more abound with necessaries?
3052	Are you not ashamed to mix tame fruits with blood and slaughter?
3052	Aristarchus placeth the sun amongst the fixed stars, and believeth that the earth[ the moon?]
3052	As first, you may say, why is it plastered?
3052	As soon as he had said this, Trypho the physician subjoined: How hath our art offended you, that you have shut the Museum against us?
3052	As-- to take that which comes next neither had heat when they came, nor are become hot after their being joined together?
3052	Aye; but how comes it then, my good friend, that you bid me eat and be merry?
3052	BUT WHAT DOES HE MEAN BY DIVIDING THE UNIVERSE INTO UNEQUAL PARTS?
3052	Be like to courteous guests, and him Who asks only fire and shelter: does this man now not need entertainment?
3052	Besides all this, what should hinder but there may be an understanding of evil, and an existence of good?
3052	Besides, if there are superficies neither equal nor unequal, what hinders but there may be also circles neither equal nor unequal?
3052	Bird or egg, which was first?
3052	But Aesop in her vindication asked: Is it not much more ridiculous that all present can not resolve the riddle she propounded to us before supper?
3052	But here Erato putting in said: What, is it decreed that no pleasure must be admitted without profit?
3052	But how do you prove that wine is cold?
3052	But how full of trouble and contradictions in respect of one another these things are, what need is there to say at present?
3052	But if he allows these a place in his city, why does he drive away his citizens from things that are pleasing and delight the ear?
3052	But if wise men command wicked ones indifferent things, what hinders but the commands of the law may be also such?
3052	But if, being mixed with these, it is altered and made like to them, how is it a habit or power or cause of these things by which it is subdued?
3052	But is it in this alone, that this excellent man shows himself-- To others a physician, whilst himself Is full of ulcers?
3052	But pray, continues he, wherefore is it that she shows such affection to Anacharsis?
3052	But pray, sirs, what is your opinion in these matters?
3052	But to pass by these considerations, is not accustoming one''s self to mildness and a human temper of mind an admirable thing?
3052	But to persist still in this matter, what is more repugnant to sense than the imagining of such things?
3052	But what hurt, I pray, have I done to the wine, by taking from it a turbulent and noisome quality, and giving it a better taste, though a paler color?
3052	But what is the cause of the rainbow?
3052	But what is the reason the air never draws a stone, nor wood, but iron only, to the loadstone?
3052	But what is this you say?
3052	But what need I instance in those that are consummately good?
3052	But where on earth is virtue to be met with?
3052	But who are they that utterly confound and abolish this?
3052	But who is ignorant that he who can not do a good deed can not also sin?
3052	But why should any one be angry with him about the Naxians?
3052	But why should this belong to the Muses more than any other of the gods?
3052	But why, sir, are you concerned at this?
3052	But will you speak a paradox indeed, both extravagant and singular?
3052	But yet how did the Thebans escape, the Thessalians helping them with their testimonies?
3052	But yet since you command me to make the election, How can I think a better choice to make Than the divine Ulysses?
3052	But, I pray, what kind of transfiguration of the passages is this which causes hunger and thirst?
3052	CHAPTER V. WHENCE DOES THE WORLD RECEIVE ITS NUTRIMENT?
3052	Can you tell me, said he, how to construe this, and what the sense of it may be?
3052	Could I Sleep, or live, if thee I should neglect?
3052	Did Argos hold him when the hero fell?
3052	Did Cleadas, O Herodotus, or some other, write this also, to oblige the cities by flattery?
3052	Did he resolve and answer every one of these questions?
3052	Do not the Stoics act in the very same manner?
3052	Do you ask this, who hold all the senses to be infallible, and the apprehensions of the imagination certain and true?
3052	Does he not show that not only oxen but all other living creatures, as sharers of the same common nature, are beloved by the gods?
3052	Does not also Zeno follow these, who hold Nature and that which is according to Nature to be the elements of happiness?
3052	Does the earth move like the sun, moon, and five planets, which for their motions he calls organs or instruments of time?
3052	Does the stretching out a finger prudently produce this joy?
3052	Dost thou fancy something better after this life than what thou hast here?
3052	Dost thou hope for any good from the gods for thy piety?
3052	FROM WHENCE IS IT THAT THE MOON RECEIVES HER LIGHT?
3052	Florus, when we were entertained at his house, put this question, What are those in the proverb who are said to be about the salt and cummin?
3052	For are not these things beseeming and answerable to the doctrine of Socrates?
3052	For did Alexander, think you,( or indeed could he possibly) forget the fight at Arbela?
3052	For how can it but be absurd to blame those who nourish these creatures, if he commends Providence which created them?
3052	For how can it possibly be frigid in others to praise any for such things, and not ridiculous for him to rejoice and glory in them?
3052	For how could he expect to gain the knowledge of other things, who has not been able to comprehend the principal element even of himself?
3052	For how is it possible that he should be susceptible of dying on the land, who is destined to die at sea?
3052	For if he thought that those who were not brisk would be useless, to what purpose was it to mix among his soldiers those that were suspected?
3052	For if it be divine and holy, why should they avoid it?
3052	For if the air wherein the vessel hangs be cold, how, I pray, does it heat the water?
3052	For if they quadrate, how is either the greater?
3052	For this being granted, how will the gods be rather givers of good than evil?
3052	For to whom shall we offer the sacrifices preceding the tilling of the ground?
3052	For what else has he done in these places, but shown the great diversity there is between these things?
3052	For what is it that Democritus says?
3052	For what is more principal than the permanency of the world, or that its essence, united in its parts, is contained in itself?
3052	For what is wanting to bring them to the highest degree of speaking paradoxes, but the saying of such things?
3052	For what man is there or ever was, except these, who does not believe the Divinity to be immortal and eternal?
3052	For what pain, what want, what poison so quickly and so easily cures a disease as seasonable bathing?
3052	For what should hinder him from erecting a tragical machine, who by his boasting excelled the tragedians in all other things?
3052	For when he asked,"Do you, Epicurus, say, that wine does not heat?"
3052	For who do more subvert the common conceptions than the Stoic school?
3052	For who ever drank so long as those that are in a fever are a- dry?
3052	For who is there that is not already full of the arguments brought against those paradoxes?
3052	For who would wrong or injure a man that is so sweetly and humanly disposed with respect to the ills of strangers that are not of his kind?
3052	For who, said he, doth not know, that the middle of wine, the top of oil, and the bottom of honey is the best?
3052	For why art thou so eager to catch him, if thou wilt let him go when he is caught?
3052	From what other place than here did originate that doctrine of the Stoics?
3052	God, the tutelary, of Rome; existence and essence of a; what is?
3052	HOW MANY SENSES ARE THERE?
3052	HOW WAS THIS WORLD COMPOSED IN THAT ORDER AND AFTER THAT MANNER IT IS?
3052	Had it not been allowable, if Apollo himself had come in with his harp ready to desire the god to forbear till the argument was out?
3052	Has Nature also made health for the sake of hellebore, instead of producing hellebore for the sake of health?
3052	Have you not heard how and in what manner the judgment passed?
3052	His answers to the foresaid questions I will read to you.--What is most ancient?
3052	How comes it to pass then, said he, Theognis that thou thyself being so poor pratest and gratest our ears in this manner?
3052	How did Homer appraise each of these?
3052	How then did there go forth from Sparta to Plataea a thousand and five men, having every one of them with him seven Helots?
3052	How then do they extricate themselves out of these difficulties?
3052	How then is it, that they admit and allow Nature, soul, and living creature?
3052	How then is vice useful, with which neither health nor abundance of riches nor advancement in virtue is profitable?
3052	How then?
3052	How will wickedness be displeasing to them, and hated by them?
3052	INTO HOW MANY ZONES IS THE EARTH DIVIDED?
3052	IS IT MORE PROBABLE THAT THE NUMBER OF THE STARS IS EVEN OR ODD?
3052	If Rhetoric is the power of persuasive speaking, who more than Homer depended on this power?
3052	If hot, how does it afterwards make it cold?
3052	If then it is so pleasant to do good to a few, how are their hearts dilated with joy who are benefactors to whole cities, provinces, and kingdoms?
3052	If we find out Homer supplying the beginnings and the seeds of all these, is he not, beyond all others, worthy of admiration?
3052	In what then is this to be preferred to indifferent things?
3052	Indeed what wonder is it if, when the foundation shakes, the superstructure totter?
3052	Is a prudent torture a thing desirable?
3052	Is he happy, who with reason breaks his neck?
3052	Is he more inclined to male or female love?
3052	Is it not that they suppose, what is certainly true, that a dinner upon the shore is of all others most delicious?
3052	Is it not therefore against sense to say that the seed is more and greater than that which is produced of it?
3052	Is not a month a body?
3052	Is not the end, according to them, to reason rightly in the election of things according to Nature?
3052	Is not then the first day of the month a body?
3052	Is not therefore also the aversion( called[ Greek omitted]) a prohibiting reason, and a disinclination, a disinclination agreeable to reason?
3052	Is that of the greatest dignity, which reason often chooses to let go for that which is not good?
3052	Is that perfect and self- sufficient, by enjoying which, if they possess not too indifferent things, they neither can nor will endure to live?
3052	Is their opinion true who think that he ascribed a dodecahedron to the globe, when he says that God made use of it in delineating the universe?
3052	Is there an election of magistrates?
3052	Is there then no good among the gods, because there is no evil?
3052	Let me know; And to your dear old Priam shall I go?
3052	May some say, do the rest of the parts conduce nothing to speech?
3052	Nature, sentiments concerning; what is?
3052	Nay then, said Theon, if you approve so highly of this subject, why do you not set in hand to it?
3052	Nay, what shall a man say, when he sees the dull unlearned fellows after supper minding such pleasures as have not the least relation to the body?
3052	Now I would gladly ask him, what he thinks of bees and honey?
3052	Now how can they make a body without quality, who understand no quality without a body?
3052	Now if a cup ought to have nothing that is nasty or loathsome in it, ought that which is drunk out of the cup to be full of dregs and filth?
3052	Now if these are the things that disturb and subvert human life, who are there that more offend in speech than you?
3052	Now what a kind of punishment was it the Corinthians would have inflicted on them?
3052	Now what can be more against sense than that, when Jupiter governs exceedingly well, we should be exceedingly miserable?
3052	Now what does Herodotus, when he comes to this?
3052	Now what else is there that makes a kind office a benefit, but that the bestower of it is, in some respect, useful to the needy receiver?
3052	Now what else will this show, but that to wicked men and fools not to live is more profitable than to live?
3052	Now what has Empedocles done else, but taught that Nature is nothing else save that which is born, and death no other thing but that which dies?
3052	Now what is more contrary to kindling than refrigeration, or to rarefaction than condensation?
3052	Now what man ever was there that lived the worse for this?
3052	Now, as for his doctrine of possibles, how can it but be repugnant to his doctrine of Fate?
3052	Now, pray sir, what reason can you find for these wonderful effects?
3052	Of the second, Why lovers are inclined to poetry?
3052	Or Pelopidas the tyrant Leontiadas?
3052	Or Phormio, when he thought he had treated Castor and Pollux at his house?
3052	Or Themistocles the engagement at Salamis?
3052	Or as Theophrastus, who twice delivered his city, when possessed and held by tyrants?
3052	Or between procreation and making?
3052	Or do you desire to understand the greatest sweetness of his eloquence and persuasion?
3052	Or does vice contribute anything to our beauty and strength?
3052	Or has Plato figuratively called the maker of the world the father of it?
3052	Or how came it that, exposing themselves to so many dangers, they vanquished and overthrew so many thousand barbarians?
3052	Or how can Bacchus be any longer termed the donor of all good things, if men make no further use of the good things he gives?
3052	Or how can God be spherical, and be inferior to man?
3052	Or how is he above being endamaged, when he is so cautious lest he be wronged of his recompense?
3052	Or is a right line in Nature prior to circumference; or is circumference but an accident of rectilinear?
3052	Or is not a day a body?
3052	Or is there any difference between a father and a maker?
3052	Or is there any solid reason that can be given to prove Adonis to be the same with Bacchus?
3052	Or may such discourse be otherwise allowed, and must they be thought unseemly problems to be proposed at table?
3052	Or rather, since the palm is common to both, may it be, as if lots had been cast, given to either, according to the inclination he chances to have?
3052	Or shall we be afraid to oppose that divine oracle to Epicurus?
3052	Or that, rising up to go forth into the market- place, he runs not his head against the wall, but takes his way directly to the door?"
3052	Or where are there any that are so long solaced with the conversation of friends as tyrants are racking and tormenting?
3052	Or who was ever so long eating as those that are besieged suffer hunger?
3052	Ought we not to time it well, and direct our embrace by reason?
3052	QUESTION I WHAT, AS XENOPHON INTIMATES, ARE THE MOST AGREEABLE QUESTIONS AND MOST PLEASANT RAILLERY AT AN ENTERTAINMENT?
3052	QUESTION V. WHAT IS THE REASON THAT PEBBLE STONES AND LEADEN BULLETS THROWN INTO THE WATER MAKE IT MORE COLD?
3052	QUESTION VI WHAT IS THE REASON THAT MEN PRESERVE SNOW BY COVERING IT WITH CHAFF AND CLOTHS?
3052	Racing, as at the Olympian games?
3052	Right, said Diogenianus, but what is this to the present question?
3052	Say you so?
3052	Shall we reckon a soul to be a small expense?
3052	Silence following upon this, What application, said I, shall reason make, or how shall it assist?
3052	Sir, I replied, do not you consider that the soul, when affected, works upon the body?
3052	Soon after he proposed that perplexed question, that plague of the inquisitive, Which was first, the bird or the egg?
3052	Such was the flatterer''s to Philip, who chided him: Sir, do n''t I keep you?
3052	Summer, autumn, and the year, are they not bodies?"
3052	That is, is it convenient to do things that are not convenient, and a duty to live even against duty?
3052	That they fled as conquered, whom the enemies after the fight could not believe to have fled, as having got much the better?
3052	The exactness of motions and harmony are definite, but the errors either in playing upon the harp, singing, or dancing, who can comprehend?
3052	The first question is, Whether at table it is allowable to philosophize?
3052	The stimulus to this came from Homer,--why should any one insist on the providence of the gods?
3052	Then said my brother cunningly: And do you imagine that any, upon a sudden, can produce any probable reasons?
3052	Then, said I, do you believe this to be my opinion?
3052	These things being thus in a manner said and delivered, what would these defenders of evidence and canonical masters of common conceptions have?
3052	Thirdly, how is the world perfect, if anything beyond it is possible to be moved about it?
3052	This discourse being ended, and Philinus hummed, Lysimachus began again, What sort of exercise then shall we imagine to be first?
3052	Thus Tigranes, when Cyrus asked him, What will your wife say when she hears that you are put to servile offices?
3052	Till Hector''s arm involve the ships in flame?
3052	To what purpose, said Solon, should I trouble him or myself to make inquiry in a matter so plain?
3052	To whom those for the obtaining of preservation?
3052	Upon this, all being silent, Florus began thus: What, shall we tamely suffer Plato to be run down?
3052	WHAT ARE PRINCIPLES?
3052	WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF SLEEP AND DEATH?
3052	WHAT ARE THOSE STARS WHICH ARE CALLED THE DIOSCURI, THE TWINS, OR CASTOR AND POLLUX?
3052	WHAT ARE THOSE THAT ARE SAID TO BE[ GREEK OMITTED], AND WHY HOMER CALLS SALT DIVINE?
3052	WHAT HUMORED MAN IS HE THAT PLATO CALLS[ Greek omitted]?
3052	WHAT IS GOD?
3052	WHAT IS IT THAT THE GIVES ECHO?
3052	WHAT IS NATURE?
3052	WHAT IS PLATO''S MEANING, WHEN HE SAYS THAT GOD ALWAYS PLAYS THE GEOMETER?
3052	WHAT IS SIGNIFIED BY THE FABLE ABOUT THE DEFEAT OF NEPTUNE?
3052	WHAT IS THE CAUSE OF ACCORD?
3052	WHAT IS THE CAUSE OF BULIMY OR THE GREEDY DISEASE?
3052	WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PRINCIPLE AND AN ELEMENT?
3052	WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IMAGINATION[ GREEK OMITTED], THE IMAGINABLE[ GREEK OMITTED], FANCY[ GREEK OMITTED], AND PHANTOM[ GREEK OMITTED]?
3052	WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE SAYING: DRINK EITHER FIVE OR THREE, BUT NOT FOUR?
3052	WHAT IS THE REASON THAT ALPHA IS PLACED FIRST IN THE ALPHABET, AND WHAT IS THE PROPORTION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF VOWELS AND SEMI- VOWELS?
3052	WHAT IS THE REASON THAT FLESH OF SACRIFICED BEASTS, AFTER BEING HUNG A WHILE UPON A FIG- TREE IS MORE TENDER THAN BEFORE?
3052	WHAT IS THE REASON THAT HUNGER IS ALLAYED BY DRINKING, BUT THIRST INCREASED BY EATING?
3052	WHAT IS THE REASON THAT THE FIG- TREE, BEING ITSELF OF A VERY SHARP AND BITTER TASTE, BEARS SO SWEET FRUIT?
3052	WHAT IS THE REASON THAT THOSE THAT ARE FASTING ARE MORE THIRSTY THAN HUNGRY?
3052	WHAT MANNER OF MAN SHOULD A DIRECTOR OF A FEAST BE?
3052	WHAT MEANS TIMAEUS( See"Timaeus,"p. 42 D.) WHEN HE SAYS THAT SOULS ARE DISPERSED INTO THE EARTH, THE MOON, AND INTO OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF TIME?
3052	WHAT SORT OF MUSIC IS FITTEST FOR AN ENTERTAINMENT?
3052	WHAT WAS, THE REASON OF THAT CUSTOM OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS TO REMOVE THE TABLE BEFORE ALL THE MEAT WAS EATEN, AND NOT TO PUT OUT THE LAMP?
3052	WHENCE ARISETH BARRENNESS IN WOMEN, AND IMPOTENCY IN MEN?
3052	WHENCE DID MEN OBTAIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE OF A DEITY?
3052	WHENCE DO THE STARS RECEIVE THEIR LIGHT?
3052	WHETHER AT TABLE IT IS ALLOWABLE TO PHILOSOPHIZE?
3052	WHETHER FLUTE- GIRLS ARE TO BE ALLOWED AT A FEAST?
3052	WHICH IS THE FITTEST TIME FOR A MAN TO KNOW HIS WIFE?
3052	WHICH WAS FIRST THE BIRD OR THE EGG?
3052	WHY DID GOD COMMAND SOCRATES TO ACT THE MIDWIFE''S PART TO OTHERS, BUT CHARGED HIMSELF NOT TO GENERATE; AS HE AFFIRMS IN THEAETETUS?
3052	WHY DO THOSE THAT ARE STARK DRUNK SEEM NOT SO MUCH DEBAUCHED AS THOSE THAT ARE BUT HALF FOXED?
3052	WHY DOES HE CALL THE SUPREME GOD FATHER AND MAKER OF ALL THINGS?
3052	WHY DOES HOMER APPROPRIATE A CERTAIN PECULIAR EPITHET TO EACH PARTICULAR LIQUID, AND CALL OIL ONLY LIQUID?
3052	WHY SAID PLATO, THAT SPEECH WAS COMPOSED OF NOUNS AND VERBS?
3052	WHY WAS THE PINE COUNTED SACRED TO NEPTUNE AND BACCHUS?
3052	Was it a slow disease, or did Artemis the archer slay them with the visitation of her gentle shafts?
3052	What beginnings do Xenocrates and Polemo take?
3052	What consent does it not turn upside down?
3052	What difficulty is there in that?
3052	What does this mean except that the world is conducted by civilized laws and the gods consult under the presidency of the father of gods and men?
3052	What first- fruits shall they offer?
3052	What is greatest?
3052	What is greatest?
3052	What is most Pernicious?
3052	What is most beautiful?
3052	What is most beautiful?
3052	What is most common?
3052	What is most easy?
3052	What is most easy?
3052	What is most pernicious?
3052	What is most profitable?
3052	What is most profitable?
3052	What is most strong?
3052	What is most wise?
3052	What is strongest?
3052	What is the reason that our cups are washed and made so clean that they shine and look bright?
3052	What is this?
3052	What is wisest?
3052	What kind of thing then is it in its own form?
3052	What manner of god then is Jupiter,--I mean Chrysippus''s Jupiter,--who punishes an act done neither willingly nor unprofitably?
3052	What natural or scientific art is left untouched?
3052	What need is there for mentioning anything else?
3052	What need of many instances?
3052	What other reprehender of his doctrines does this man then expect?
3052	What other thing is he establishing but a community of speech and a relation of soul between men and beasts?
3052	What problem was that?
3052	What question will you put them, said Protogenes?
3052	What record is there extant of one civil action in matter of government, performed by any of you?
3052	What sayest thou now, Epicurus?
3052	What shall men sacrifice?
3052	What then ails them, that they will not confess that to be evil which is worse than evil?
3052	What then follows from this, that the World alone is self- sufficient?
3052	What then is good?
3052	What then shall we say for Plato?
3052	What then, said Florus, shall we say that salt is termed divine for that reason?
3052	What then, shall we suffer those rhetoricians to be thought to have hit the mark when they bring arguments only from probabilities and conjectures?
3052	What then?
3052	What then?"
3052	What thing then is there so impossible in Nature as to be doubted of, if it is possible to believe such reveries as these?
3052	What would it have benefited Lichas, if being thrown by Hercules, as from a sling into the sea, he had been on a sudden changed from vice to virtue?"
3052	What, then, are these habits and motions of the parts?
3052	What, then, is the only thing that they shun?
3052	What, then, is this end?
3052	When I had said this, Lamprias, sitting( as he always doth) upon a low bed, cried out: Sirs, will you give me leave to correct this sottish judge?
3052	When I was curious to inquire who this lady was, he said, Do you not yet know the wise and famous Eumetis?
3052	When then will our life become savage, uncivilized, and bestial?
3052	Whether then shall we say, that neither consents nor virtues nor vices nor doing well nor doing ill is in our power?
3052	Who can therefore appear to speak things more contradictory to himself than he who says that the same god is now nourished and again not nourished?
3052	Who first determined this?
3052	Who has more skill than the artificer of such an art?
3052	Who is this that hath so many mouths for his belly and the kitchen?
3052	Who then are they that call in question things believed, and contend against things that are evident?
3052	Who then are they, O Colotes, that are endued with this privilege never to be wounded, never to be sick?
3052	Who would not have blamed another that should have omitted these things?
3052	Who, then, were the first authors of this opinion, that we owe no justice to dumb animals?
3052	Why do you belie the earth as unable to maintain you?
3052	Why do you profane the lawgiver Ceres, and shame the mild and gentle Bacchus, as not furnishing you with sufficiency?
3052	Why does it open especially on that side where it may have the best convenience for receiving the purest air, and the benefit of the evening sun?
3052	Why does the body rest?
3052	Why is it necessary to speak of the heroes in battle?
3052	Why not, quoth Anacharsis, when there is a reward promised to the hardest drinker?
3052	Why not?
3052	Why pray, is the number nine the most perfect?
3052	Why should we not ascribe to Homer every excellence?
3052	Why so, my friend?
3052	Why then, instead of fine flour, do not we thicken our broth with coarse bran?
3052	Why therefore should we rather say the clothes are hot, because they cause heat, than cold, because they cause cold?
3052	Why, Lord of lightning, hast thou summoned here The gods of council, dost thou aught desire Touching the Greeks and Trojans?
3052	Wilt thou get thee up betimes in the morning, and go to the theatre to hear the harpers and flutists play?
3052	With what, O good sir, do Aristotle and Theophrastus begin?
3052	With what, then, says he, shall I begin?
3052	Would not the river Nile sooner have given over to bear the paper- reed, than they have been weary of writing their brave exploits?
3052	Yea, why rather should he not struggle against Fortune, and raise himself above the pressures of his low circumstances?
3052	Yes, said he, whose else?
3052	Your words are great, but what''s this to your bride?
3052	Zeuxippus therefore subjoined and said: And must our present debate be left then unfinished because of that?
3052	and again, Exempt from sickness and old age are they, And free from toil, and have escaped the stream Of roaring Acheron?
3052	and again, What God those seeds of strife''twixt them did sow?
3052	and thus:-- What''s your command to Hector?
3052	and why, of the several kinds of music, will the chromatic diffuse and the harmonic compose the mind?
3052	corruption, are animals obnoxious to?
3052	if, when these are taken away, virtue will also vanish and be lost?
3052	is there the like danger if I refuse to eat flesh, as if I for want of faith murder my child or some other friend?
3052	of virtue, for which we were created?
3052	or deal in adulterate wares or griping usury, not minding anything that is great and worthy thy noble extraction?
3052	said I, and shall not Aristodemus then succeed me, if you are tired out yourself?
3052	some men may properly inquire:-- DID PLATO PLACE THE RATIONAL OR THE IRASCIBLE FACULTY IN THE MIDDLE?
3052	was it not but the other day that the Isthmian garland began to be made of pine?
3052	wherein differ they from what Plato says, that the divine nature is remote from both joy and grief?
1672	''And do you think that a man who is unable to help himself is in a good condition?''
1672	''But is not rhetoric a fine thing?''
1672	''But what part?''
1672	''Certainly,''he will answer,''for is not health the greatest good?
1672	''Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?''
1672	''Health first, beauty next, wealth third,''in the words of the old song, or how would you rank them?
1672	''What do you mean?''
1672	''What is cookery?''
1672	''What is rhetoric?''
1672	''What is the art of Rhetoric?''
1672	''What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias?''
1672	''Who is Gorgias?''
1672	''Who knows,''as Euripides says,''whether life may not be death, and death life?''
1672	''Why will you continue splitting words?
1672	''Why, have they not great power, and can they not do whatever they desire?''
1672	), with the making of garments?
1672	All this is a hindrance to them; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the judged.--What is to be done?
1672	Am I not right Callicles?
1672	Am I not right in my recollection?
1672	Am I not right?
1672	And I am going to ask-- what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what?
1672	And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I asked,''What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?''
1672	And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good?
1672	And as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not examine him?
1672	And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man?
1672	And do you mean to say also that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?
1672	And if he asked again:''What is the art of calculation?''
1672	And if he further said,''Concerned with what?''
1672	And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order?
1672	And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement?
1672	And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good?
1672	And must he not be courageous?
1672	And of harp- playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say?
1672	And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only words-- he would ask,''Words about what, Socrates?''
1672	And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good?
1672	And that which is orderly is temperate?
1672	And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing?
1672	And the soul which has order is orderly?
1672	And the temperate soul is good?
1672	And then he will be sure to go on and ask,''What good?
1672	And then he would proceed to ask:''Words about what?''
1672	And to be itching and always scratching?
1672	And to indulge unnatural desires, if they are abundantly satisfied?
1672	And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them?
1672	And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states?
1672	And what is my sort?
1672	And what knowledge can be nobler?
1672	And when I ask, Who are you?
1672	And who are you?
1672	And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods and to men;--for he would not be temperate if he did not?
1672	And yet there is an inconsistency: for should not Socrates too have taught the citizens better than to put him to death?
1672	And yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in your refusal?
1672	And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant?
1672	Are the superior and better and stronger the same or different?
1672	Are you disposed to admit that?
1672	Are you of the same opinion still?
1672	As we likewise enquire, What will become of them after death?
1672	At your age, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over some verbal slip?
1672	Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?
1672	But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered,''What is rhetoric?''
1672	But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?
1672	But if there were no future, might he not still be happy in the performance of an action which was attended only by a painful death?
1672	But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?
1672	But is he as ignorant of just and unjust as he is of medicine or building?
1672	But is not virtue something different from saving and being saved?
1672	But please to refresh my memory a little; did you say--''in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant''?
1672	But tell me, Gorgias, what are the best?
1672	But to return to our argument:--Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment?
1672	But what do you mean by the better?
1672	But what reason is there in this?
1672	But where are the orators among whom you find the latter?
1672	But who would undertake a public building, if he had never had a teacher of the art of building, and had never constructed a building before?
1672	But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you?
1672	But, my good friend, where is the refutation?
1672	CALLICLES: And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenceless is in a good position?
1672	CALLICLES: And is not that just the provoking thing?
1672	CALLICLES: And what difference does that make?
1672	CALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say-- does he assent to this, or not?
1672	CALLICLES: And you are the man who can not speak unless there is some one to answer?
1672	CALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument?
1672	CALLICLES: Can not you finish without my help, either talking straight on, or questioning and answering yourself?
1672	CALLICLES: Do you want me to agree with you?
1672	CALLICLES: I suppose that you mean health and strength?
1672	CALLICLES: Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything?
1672	CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking?
1672	CALLICLES: Well, but how does that prove Pericles''badness?
1672	CALLICLES: What do you mean by his''ruling over himself''?
1672	CALLICLES: What do you mean?
1672	CALLICLES: What do you mean?
1672	CALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon-- does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?
1672	CALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates?
1672	CALLICLES: Why not give the name yourself, Socrates?
1672	CALLICLES: Why?
1672	CALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference?
1672	CALLICLES: Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?
1672	CALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?
1672	CHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than Gorgias?
1672	CHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?
1672	CHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician?
1672	CHAEREPHON: What do you mean?
1672	CHAEREPHON: What question?
1672	CHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him?
1672	Can anything be more irrational, my friends, than this?
1672	Consider:--You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected when you do wrong?
1672	Could he be said to regard even their pleasure?
1672	Did he perform with any view to the good of his hearers?
1672	Did not the very persons whom he was serving ostracize him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years?
1672	Did they employ these advantages with a view to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store of knowledge?
1672	Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?
1672	Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate?
1672	Do I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?
1672	Do they suppose that the rule of justice is the rule of the stronger or of the better?''
1672	Do we not often hear the novel writer censured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers?
1672	Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?
1672	Do you laugh, Polus?
1672	Do you mean that your art produces the greatest good?
1672	Do you not agree?
1672	Do you say''Yes''or''No''to that?
1672	Do you understand?
1672	Does Callicles agree to this division?
1672	Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?
1672	Does not the art of making money?
1672	Does not the art of medicine?
1672	For all our life long we are talking with ourselves:--What is thought but speech?
1672	For do not we too accuse as well as excuse ourselves?
1672	For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians?
1672	For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?
1672	For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or can not teach, the nature of justice?
1672	For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good-- would you not say so?
1672	For, first, you defined the superior to be the stronger, and then the wiser, and now something else;--what DO you mean?
1672	GORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates?
1672	GORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself?
1672	GORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1672	GORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates?
1672	GORGIAS: What matter?
1672	GORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?
1672	Have I not told you that the superior is the better?''
1672	Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure?
1672	Have they not very great power in states?
1672	Have we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a public man?
1672	How are they to be?
1672	How is the inconsistency to be explained?
1672	How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil?
1672	How will you answer them?
1672	How would Gorgias explain this phenomenon?
1672	I mean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the power?
1672	I mean to say-- Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?
1672	I mean, for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?
1672	I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?
1672	If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil?
1672	In the first division the question is asked-- What is rhetoric?
1672	In the first place, what say you of flute- playing?
1672	Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?
1672	Is not that true?
1672	Is not this a fact?
1672	Is not this true?
1672	Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when you are learning the potter''s art; which is a foolish thing?
1672	Is that the paradox which, as you say, can not be refuted?
1672	Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?
1672	Is there any comparison between him and the pleader?
1672	Is this true?
1672	Look at the matter in this way:--In respect of a man''s estate, do you see any greater evil than poverty?
1672	May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof?
1672	May I assume this to be your opinion?
1672	May not the service of God, which is the more disinterested, be in like manner the higher?
1672	Might not the novelist, too, make an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better than a thousand sermons?
1672	Must not the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils?
1672	Must not the very opposite be true,--if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and to have influence with him?
1672	Must we not try and make them as good as possible?
1672	Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse?
1672	Nay, will he not rather do all the evil which he can and escape?
1672	No other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any?
1672	Or do I fail to persuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still?
1672	Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric?
1672	Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these things first?
1672	Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want?
1672	Ought he not to have the name which is given to his brother?
1672	Ought the physician then to have a larger share of meats and drinks?
1672	POLUS: An experience in what?
1672	POLUS: And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for example, suffer rather than do injustice?
1672	POLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the idea that they are flatterers?
1672	POLUS: And are those of whom I spoke wretches?
1672	POLUS: And can not you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?
1672	POLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric?
1672	POLUS: And do you think that he is happy or miserable?
1672	POLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing?
1672	POLUS: And is not that a great power?
1672	POLUS: And noble or ignoble?
1672	POLUS: And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?
1672	POLUS: Ask:-- CHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him?
1672	POLUS: At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied?
1672	POLUS: But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow?
1672	POLUS: But is it the greatest?
1672	POLUS: But they do what they think best?
1672	POLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience?
1672	POLUS: Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?
1672	POLUS: How can that be, Socrates?
1672	POLUS: How not regarded?
1672	POLUS: How two questions?
1672	POLUS: I will ask and do you answer?
1672	POLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric?
1672	POLUS: In either case is he not equally to be envied?
1672	POLUS: In what?
1672	POLUS: Of what profession?
1672	POLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?
1672	POLUS: Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?
1672	POLUS: Then surely they do as they will?
1672	POLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?
1672	POLUS: Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?
1672	POLUS: Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?
1672	POLUS: Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable?
1672	POLUS: Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?
1672	POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1672	POLUS: What do you mean?
1672	POLUS: What do you mean?
1672	POLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?
1672	POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates?
1672	POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery?
1672	POLUS: What then?
1672	POLUS: What thing?
1672	POLUS: Why''forbear''?
1672	POLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?
1672	POLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best?
1672	POLUS: Will you enumerate them?
1672	POLUS: You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute that statement?
1672	POLUS: You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?
1672	Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?
1672	Polus asks,''What thing?''
1672	SOCRATES: A useful thing, then?
1672	SOCRATES: About that you and I may be supposed to agree?
1672	SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now speaking:--do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number?
1672	SOCRATES: Again, in a man''s bodily frame, you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity?
1672	SOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:--is he?
1672	SOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are punished are less miserable-- are you going to refute this proposition also?
1672	SOCRATES: And a foolish man too?
1672	SOCRATES: And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just man?
1672	SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and indifferent?
1672	SOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?--or are you of another mind?
1672	SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice-- if they do rejoice?
1672	SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?
1672	SOCRATES: And are they equally pained?
1672	SOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy''s departure?
1672	SOCRATES: And are we late for a feast?
1672	SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians?
1672	SOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august personage-- what are her aspirations?
1672	SOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?
1672	SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?
1672	SOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians?
1672	SOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?
1672	SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men?
1672	SOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as the superior?
1672	SOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own?
1672	SOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?
1672	SOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation?
1672	SOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body?
1672	SOCRATES: And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir?
1672	SOCRATES: And does not the same hold in all other cases?
1672	SOCRATES: And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from this evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?
1672	SOCRATES: And he is to be thirsting and drinking?
1672	SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?
1672	SOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?
1672	SOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?
1672	SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?
1672	SOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds-- there will be something cut?
1672	SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?
1672	SOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily?
1672	SOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the cut will be of the same nature?
1672	SOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?
1672	SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck will be struck violently or quickly?
1672	SOCRATES: And if they were more savage, must they not have been more unjust and inferior?
1672	SOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is either pleasant or useful?
1672	SOCRATES: And in pain?
1672	SOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?
1672	SOCRATES: And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?
1672	SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word''thirsty''implies pain?
1672	SOCRATES: And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your friends would say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury?
1672	SOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now describing as flattery?
1672	SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?
1672	SOCRATES: And is not this universally true?
1672	SOCRATES: And is the''having learned''the same as''having believed,''and are learning and belief the same things?
1672	SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?
1672	SOCRATES: And it has been proved to be true?
1672	SOCRATES: And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine of our vice?
1672	SOCRATES: And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?
1672	SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?
1672	SOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?
1672	SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?
1672	SOCRATES: And must not the just man always desire to do what is just?
1672	SOCRATES: And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our city and citizens?
1672	SOCRATES: And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to be most disgraceful?
1672	SOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric: which you would admit( would you not?)
1672	SOCRATES: And now, which will you do, ask or answer?
1672	SOCRATES: And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil-- must it not be so?
1672	SOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger share?
1672	SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?
1672	SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them are by nature good?
1672	SOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent?
1672	SOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils?
1672	SOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?
1672	SOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem?
1672	SOCRATES: And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar flattery:--was not that another of our conclusions?
1672	SOCRATES: And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which was ministered to, whether body or soul?
1672	SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?
1672	SOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship?
1672	SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human body?
1672	SOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes?
1672	SOCRATES: And the word''drinking''is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want?
1672	SOCRATES: And there is also''having believed''?
1672	SOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly?
1672	SOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them?
1672	SOCRATES: And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?
1672	SOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful?
1672	SOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?
1672	SOCRATES: And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and the like?
1672	SOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?
1672	SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her?
1672	SOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak?
1672	SOCRATES: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?
1672	SOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?
1672	SOCRATES: And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils, which is vice?
1672	SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge?
1672	SOCRATES: And what art frees us from disease?
1672	SOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly, yet as far as possible?
1672	SOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp- player?
1672	SOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry?--are not they of the same nature?
1672	SOCRATES: And what from vice and injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be?
1672	SOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul?
1672	SOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too?
1672	SOCRATES: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?
1672	SOCRATES: And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?--Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?
1672	SOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?
1672	SOCRATES: And why?
1672	SOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will not the suffering have the quality of the action?
1672	SOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is an animal?
1672	SOCRATES: And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best, this is a good, and would you call this great power?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in so far as they are just?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less one?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same?
1672	SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?
1672	SOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?
1672	SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded?
1672	SOCRATES: And you said the opposite?
1672	SOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another?
1672	SOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason?
1672	SOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him?
1672	SOCRATES: And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?
1672	SOCRATES: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?
1672	SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?
1672	SOCRATES: But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?
1672	SOCRATES: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil?
1672	SOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
1672	SOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?
1672	SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said?
1672	SOCRATES: But he surely can not have the same eyes well and sound at the same time?
1672	SOCRATES: But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?
1672	SOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both?
1672	SOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you would have answered very well?
1672	SOCRATES: But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made the citizens better instead of worse?
1672	SOCRATES: But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased?
1672	SOCRATES: But not the evil?
1672	SOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will never have done injustice at all?
1672	SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?
1672	SOCRATES: But then again, what was the observation which you just now made, about doing and suffering wrong?
1672	SOCRATES: But what if the itching is not confined to the head?
1672	SOCRATES: But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more than themselves, my friend?
1672	SOCRATES: But will he also escape from doing injury?
1672	SOCRATES: But will you answer?
1672	SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?
1672	SOCRATES: Consider again:--Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient?
1672	SOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term''benefited''?
1672	SOCRATES: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that further end for the sake of which they do a thing?
1672	SOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion?
1672	SOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an art?
1672	SOCRATES: Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this inconsistent manner?
1672	SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:--that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink?
1672	SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?
1672	SOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?
1672	SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man''s life if his body is in an evil plight-- in that case his life also is evil: am I not right?
1672	SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.--Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?
1672	SOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees?
1672	SOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?
1672	SOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?
1672	SOCRATES: I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?
1672	SOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns?
1672	SOCRATES: I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?
1672	SOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that can not be good and evil-- do we agree?
1672	SOCRATES: Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the greatest of evils?
1672	SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven?
1672	SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?
1672	SOCRATES: Justly or unjustly, do you mean?
1672	SOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as they are useful or pleasant or both?
1672	SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:--Is the pleasant the same as the good?
1672	SOCRATES: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good?
1672	SOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus,''Two men spoke before, but now one shall be enough''?
1672	SOCRATES: Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you can not remember, what will you do by- and- by, when you get older?
1672	SOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful?
1672	SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?
1672	SOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;--is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect?
1672	SOCRATES: Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty?
1672	SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases?
1672	SOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to you, he will be happy?
1672	SOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness?
1672	SOCRATES: Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?
1672	SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,--one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?
1672	SOCRATES: So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed out three corresponding evils-- injustice, disease, poverty?
1672	SOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself?
1672	SOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:--a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?
1672	SOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they are evil-- what principle do you lay down?
1672	SOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which are the greatest and best of human things?
1672	SOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?
1672	SOCRATES: That is to say, in evil?
1672	SOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd?
1672	SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?
1672	SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?
1672	SOCRATES: The flatterer?
1672	SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them?
1672	SOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician?
1672	SOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?
1672	SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests?
1672	SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil?
1672	SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion?
1672	SOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he is benefited?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?
1672	SOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good?
1672	SOCRATES: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have great power in a state?
1672	SOCRATES: Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the soul, are the greatest of evils?
1672	SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as''having learned''?
1672	SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse?
1672	SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?
1672	SOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?
1672	SOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring?
1672	SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?
1672	SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the art of money- making frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; that in which there is disorder, evil?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you were saying, they make the laws?
1672	SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?
1672	SOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class are far better, as you were saying?
1672	SOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other?
1672	SOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain?
1672	SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?
1672	SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?
1672	SOCRATES: Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?
1672	SOCRATES: Then to which service of the State do you invite me?
1672	SOCRATES: Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?
1672	SOCRATES: Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art?
1672	SOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?
1672	SOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice?
1672	SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument?
1672	SOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?
1672	SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking?
1672	SOCRATES: To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?
1672	SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions?
1672	SOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and metre, there will remain speech?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me:--There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?
1672	SOCRATES: Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of any great pretensions?
1672	SOCRATES: What are we to do, then?
1672	SOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus?
1672	SOCRATES: What events?
1672	SOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body?
1672	SOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?--such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?
1672	SOCRATES: When you are thirsty?
1672	SOCRATES: Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance?
1672	SOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most-- the wise or the foolish?
1672	SOCRATES: Which, then, is the best of these three?
1672	SOCRATES: Why then?
1672	SOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they please?
1672	SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?
1672	SOCRATES: Will you understand my answer?
1672	SOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight gratification to me?
1672	SOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils?
1672	SOCRATES: Words which do what?
1672	SOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?
1672	SOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?
1672	SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul?
1672	SOCRATES: Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain-- that you get well?
1672	SOCRATES: You further said that the wrong- doer is happy if he be unpunished?
1672	SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?
1672	SOCRATES: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health?
1672	SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition of either of them?
1672	SOCRATES:--Who are to punish them?
1672	Shall I pursue the question?
1672	Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?
1672	Shall I tell you why I think so?
1672	Shall we break off in the middle?
1672	Shall we say that?
1672	Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with the office?
1672	Such are their respective lives:--And now would you say that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate?
1672	Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer?
1672	Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest, or only in jest?
1672	Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better?
1672	Than themselves?
1672	The answer depends on another question: What use did the children of Cronos make of their time?
1672	Then are not the many superior to the one, and the opinions of the many better?
1672	Then these are the points at issue between us-- are they not?
1672	There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is punished or when he is unpunished?
1672	This is what I believe that you mean( and you must not suppose that I am word- catching), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten thousand?
1672	Though we are not going to banish the poets, how can we suppose that such utterances have any healing or life- giving influence on the minds of men?
1672	To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend, and what is your business?
1672	To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate?
1672	Under his protection he will suffer no evil, but will he also do no evil?
1672	Was not this said?
1672	Was there ever a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good and noble?
1672	Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman?
1672	We ask the question, Where were men before birth?
1672	We may assume the existence of bodies and of souls?
1672	Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth?
1672	What do you mean?
1672	What do you say to this?
1672	What do you say?
1672	What do you say?
1672	What do you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament?
1672	What greater good can men have, Socrates?''
1672	What is feeling but rhetoric?
1672	What is to be said about all this?
1672	What nonsense are you talking?
1672	What part of flattery is rhetoric?
1672	What right have you to despise the engine- maker, and the others whom I was just now mentioning?
1672	What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other arts which have to do with words?
1672	What then is his meaning?
1672	When the assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel?
1672	Which of the arts then are flatteries?
1672	Who is the true poet?
1672	Whom did they make better?
1672	Whom has he made better?
1672	Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation?
1672	Why are you silent, Polus?
1672	Why do I say this?
1672	Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?
1672	Why do you not answer?
1672	Why will you not answer?
1672	Will Callicles still maintain this?
1672	Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as possible, and not be punished?
1672	Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order?
1672	Will you ask me another question-- What is cookery?
1672	Will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?
1672	Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer than they were when he received them?
1672	You mean to say that one man of sense ought to rule over ten thousand fools?
1672	You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a rhetorician?
1672	You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other?
1672	and does all happiness consist in this?
1672	and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman?
1672	and you said,''The painter of figures,''should I not be right in asking,''What kind of figures, and where do you find them?''
1672	are they not like tyrants?
1672	did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard yourself?
1672	do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?
1672	do you think that rhetoric is flattery?
1672	must he have the power, or only the will to obtain them?
1672	my philosopher, is that your line?
1672	or the good for the sake of the pleasant?
1672	or the weaver to have more coats, or the cobbler larger shoes, or the farmer more seed?
1672	or what ignorance more disgraceful than this?
1672	or who would undertake the duty of state- physician, if he had never cured either himself or any one else?
1672	or would you say that the coward has more?
1672	to be one of those arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words?
1672	will you ask him, Chaerephon--?
1672	you mean those fools,--the temperate?
1177	Do you admit that any one purposing to build a perfect house( 13) will plan to make it at once as pleasant and as useful to live in as possible?
1177	Do you think, sirs, that we ought to thank Theodote for displaying her beauty to us, or she us for coming to gaze at her?... 1177 From whom may the doer of a deed of kindness more confidently expect the recompense of gratitude than from your lover of the law?
1177	Heracles hearing these words made answer:''What, O lady, is the name you bear?'' 1177 It is pleasant to have one''s house cool in summer and warm in winter, is it not?"
1177	Or,interposed another,"what if the dainty dishes he devours are out of all proportion to the rest of his meal-- what of him?"
1177	Rep.372 C.( 5) Or,"The conversation had fallen upon names: what is the precise thing denoted under such and such a term?
1177	Shall I appoint a mariner to be skipper of my vessel, or a landsman?
1177	Then spoke Virtue:''Nay, wretched one, what good thing hast thou? 1177 Was it open to him,"Socrates inquired of the speaker,"in case he failed to understand their commands in any point, to ask for an explanation?"
1177	You have not( in your employ) a body of handicraftsmen of any sort?
1177	and what of the man who eats much{ opson} on the top of a little({ sitos})?
1177	could you say that the beneficial is anything else than good( or a good)?
1177	his practice must square with his knowledge and be the outward expression of his belief?
1177	( 1) Or,"When some one retorted upon him with the question:''Can courage be taught?''"
1177	( 11) But for me what disgrace is it that others should fail of a just decision and right acts concerning me?...
1177	( 12)( 12) Or,"how do you make a well- proportioned corselet fit an ill- proportioned body?
1177	( 12)( 12) Or,"may a man deal with his fellow- men arbitrarily according to his fancy?"
1177	( 14) Add,"Can service ally in friendship with disservice?
1177	( 14) Can service ally in friendship with disservice?
1177	( 14) The question arises: how far is the conversation historical or imaginary?
1177	( 14)( 14) Or,"Is that to choose the path of safety, think you?
1177	( 15) I suppose you try to run off one string of letters to- day and to- morrow another?
1177	( 18)( 18) Or,"and no one who knows what he must and should do imagines that he must and should not do it?"
1177	( 19)( 19) Or,"and nobody that you know of does the contrary of what he thinks he should do?"
1177	( 2) Or,"the money- lender?
1177	( 20) or( as the youth signified dissent) possibly a rhapsodist?
1177	( 21)( 21) Or,"is of greater evidential value,""ubi res adsunt, quid opus est verbis?"
1177	( 22)( 22) Or,"is not abstinence from wrongdoing synonymous with righteous behaviour?"
1177	( 28) How then should a man honour the gods with more beautiful or holier honour than by doing what they bid him?
1177	( 28) Why?
1177	( 3) Do not you see how each time he has been choragos( 4) he has been successful with one chorus after another?
1177	( 3) Or add,"''What is this among things?
1177	( 3) Was a man able on the one hand to recognise things beautiful and good sufficiently to live in them?
1177	( 33)( 33) Or,"Can it be said that those who are unable to cope nobly with their perilous surroundings know how they ought to deal with them?"
1177	( 38) Such being his conduct, was he not worthy of high honour from the state of Athens?
1177	( 41)( 41) Or,"In the management of moneys, then, his strength will consist in his rendering the state better provided with ways and means?"
1177	( 5) Whereupon Socrates, appealing to the company:"Can we explain why we call a man a''dainty fellow''?
1177	( 5)( 5) Or,"can you give me a definition of the pious man?
1177	( 6) Is it not so?
1177	( 6) this coping of the region above the eyes with cornice- work of eyebrow so that no drop of sweat fall from the head and injure them?
1177	( 6){ opsophagos}={ opson}( or relish) eater, and so a"gourmand"or"epicure"; but how to define a gourmand?
1177	( 8)"And if this be so concerning wisdom,{ sophia}, what of{ sophrasune}, soundness of soul-- sobriety?"
1177	( Let us pause and ask how could man die more nobly and more beautifully than in the way described?
1177	( rejoined Socrates), do you not see that to gratify a man like yourself is far pleasanter as a matter of self- interest than to quarrel with you?
1177	--"Do you find it strange"( he continued),"that to the Godhead it should appear better for me to close my life at once?
1177	7 D. In answer to the question: what is leisure?
1177	A man had administered a severe whipping to the slave in attendance on him, and when Socrates asked:"Why he was so wroth with his own serving- man?"
1177	After such sort he handled the question, what is the virtue of a good leader?
1177	Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them?
1177	Again, to chastise the bad and reward the good belongs to both alike, methinks?
1177	Ah, Glaucon( he exclaimed), so you have determined to become prime minister?
1177	And I presume that he who does what is just is just, and he who does what is unjust is unjust?
1177	And I presume the law- loving citizen will do what is just and right, while the lawless man will do what is unjust and wrong?
1177	And also to assign to those best qualified to perform them their distinctive tasks?
1177	And am I to hold away from their attendant topics also-- the just, the holy, and the like?
1177	And by things right and just you know what sort of things are meant?
1177	And by what like contrivance would you have me catch my lovers?
1177	And can worse befall a man, think you?
1177	And can you suppose any other people to be good in respect of such things except those who are able to cope with them and turn them to noble account?
1177	And can you tell me what sort of person the pious man is?
1177	And did the magic words of this spell serve for all men alike?
1177	And did you imagine( replied Socrates) that it was possible for a bad man to make good friends?
1177	And did you notice an inscription somewhere on the temple:{ GNOMI SEAUTON}--KNOW THYSELF?
1177	And do anxiety and relief of mind occasioned by the good or evil fortune of those we love both wear the same expression?
1177	And do you consider it to the interest of both alike to win the adherence of supporters and allies?
1177	And do you know of anybody doing other than what he feels bound to do?
1177	And do you not agree that he who is destined to rule must train himself to bear these things lightly?
1177	And do you not regard it as right and just to abstain from wrong?
1177	And do you suppose that any one who knows what things he ought to do supposes that he ought not to do them?
1177	And do you think the Boeotians could furnish a better pick of fine healthy men than the Athenians?
1177	And does any man honour the gods otherwise than he thinks he ought?
1177	And does he who lies and deceives with intent know what is right rather than he who does either or both unconsciously?
1177	And does it not closely concern them both to be good guardians of their respective charges?
1177	And does not the faithful imitation of the various affections of the body when engaged in any action impart a particular pleasure to the beholder?
1177	And for the better-- which?
1177	And has this mother ever done you any injury-- such as people frequently receive from beasts, by bite or kick?
1177	And have upright men( continued Socrates) their distinctive and appropriate works like those of carpenters or shoe- makers?
1177	And have you thought how to whet the courage of your troopers?
1177	And have you troubled your head at all to consider how you are to secure the obedience of your men?
1177	And have you understood what it is they do to get that bad name?
1177	And he who has the{ episteme} of things rightful is more righteous than he who lacks the{ episteme}?
1177	And he who honours as he ought is a pious man?
1177	And he who knows how he must honour the gods conceives that he ought not to do so except in the manner which accords with his knowledge?
1177	And how did Themistocles( 11) win our city''s love?
1177	And how did he come off on the journey?
1177	And how long do you expect your body to be equal to providing the necessaries of life for hire?
1177	And how many others, pray, do you suppose have been seized on account of their wisdom, and despatched to the great king and at his court enslaved?
1177	And how might I hit upon any artifice to attract him?
1177	And if he had faith in the gods, how could he fail to recognise them?
1177	And if there is to be no laying on of the hands, there must be no application either of the lips; is it agreed?
1177	And if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man have than obedience to the laws?
1177	And if you wanted to induce some friend to look after your affairs during your absence abroad, how would you achieve your purpose?
1177	And if you wished to get some foreign friend to take you under his roof while visiting his country, what would you do?
1177	And in the event of war, by rendering his state superior to her antagonists?
1177	And in your opinion, Hippias, is the legislation of the gods just and righteous, or the reverse of what is just and righteous?
1177	And is it allowable to honour the gods in any mode or fashion one likes?
1177	And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar?
1177	And is there anything else good except that which is beneficial, should you say?
1177	And is this, that, and the other thing beautiful for aught else except that to which it may be beautifully applied?
1177	And is wisdom anything else than that by which a man is wise, think you?
1177	And just as the carpenter is able to exhibit his works and products, the righteous man should be able to expound and set forth his, should he not?
1177	And let us not forget that the moon herself not only makes clear to us the quarters of the night, but of the month also?
1177	And loaves of bread?
1177	And pray what is this theory( 20) of yours on the subject?
1177	And should you say that any one obeys the laws without knowing what the laws ordain?
1177	And so I propound the question to myself as follows:"Have friends, like slaves, their market values?"
1177	And the beautiful: can we speak of a thing as beautiful in any other way than relatively?
1177	And the enslavement of free- born men?
1177	And the same pupil must be furnished with a power of holding out against thirst also when the craving to quench it comes upon him?
1177	And these things around and about us, enormous in size, infinite in number, owe their orderly arrangement, as you suppose, to some vacuity of wit?
1177	And they who deal well and nobly by mankind are well- doers in respect of human affairs?
1177	And they who deal with one another as they ought, deal well and nobly-- is it not so?
1177	And this I take to be the strictly legal view of the case, for what does the law require?
1177	And this too is plain, is it not: that through self- knowledge men meet with countless blessings, and through ignorance of themselves with many evils?
1177	And this, which is the source of opposite effects to the very worst, will be the very best of things?
1177	And those people who are of a kind to cope but badly with the same occurrences, it would seem, are bad?
1177	And thus, in the art of spinning wool, he liked to point out that women are the rulers of men-- and why?
1177	And to win the kindly feeling of their subordinates must surely be the noble ambition of both?
1177	And upon his asking"How?"
1177	And we can not allow any of these to lie on the R side of the account, to the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?
1177	And we may take it the state will grow wealthier in proportion as her revenues increase?
1177	And what has such a one to do with the spilling of blood?
1177	And what have you seen him doing, that you give him so bad a character?
1177	And what is it in which you desire to excel, Euthydemus, that you collect books?
1177	And what is the distinction, Euthydemus( he asked), between a man devoid of self- control and the dullest of brute beasts?
1177	And what is the inevitable penalty paid by those who, being related as parents and children, intermingle in marriage?
1177	And what of courage,( 29) Euthydemus?
1177	And what of measures passed by a minority, not by persuasion of the majority, but in the exercise of its power only?
1177	And what of this: that whereas we need nutriment, this too the heavenly powers yield us?
1177	And what shall we say that wisdom is?
1177	And what sort of lords and masters are those, think you, who at once put a stop to what is best and enforce what is worst?
1177	And what sort of slavery do you take to be the worst?
1177	And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should make, Socrates added: Possibly you want to be a great doctor?
1177	And when the other asked:"And what may that be?"
1177	And when( asked he), can health be a source of evil, or disease a source of good?
1177	And wherein have you detected in me this power, that you pass so severe a sentence upon me?
1177	And which among the components of happiness and well- being can possibly be questionable?
1177	And which is colder for bathing-- yours or the cold spring in the cave of Amphiaraus?
1177	And which of the two knows what is right-- he who intentionally lies and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously?
1177	And which of the two would you take to be the more united people-- the friendlier among themselves?
1177	And which should you say was more a man of letters( 34)--he who intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?
1177	And which should you say were the better human beings, the free- born members of your household or Ceramon''s slaves?
1177	And whom do you consider to be the people?
1177	And why do men go soldiering except to ameliorate existence?
1177	And why?
1177	And would it not seem to be a base thing for a man to be affected like the silliest bird or beast?
1177	And yet you imagine that elsewhere no spark of wisdom is to be found?
1177	And you admit that people reckon the ungrateful among wrongdoers?
1177	And you know the appellation given to certain people--"slavish,"( 39) or,"little better than a slave?"
1177	And( 8) soundness of soul, the spirit of temperate modesty?
1177	And, I presume, also the prohibition of intermarriage between parents and children?
1177	And, I presume, to honour parents is also customary everywhere?
1177	And, again, to have some one over you who will prevent you doing the like seems a loss of freedom?
1177	And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is more righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?
1177	Are not these intended for you also?
1177	Are they admired the rather or despised?
1177	Are they all like each other?
1177	Are we to be called dainty eaters because we like our bread buttered?"
1177	Are we, or are we not, to apply the term violence to these?
1177	Are you not a man?
1177	Are you not an Athenian?
1177	As though a man should inquire,"Am I to choose an expert driver as my coachman, or one who has never handled the reins?"
1177	Barley meal is a useful product, is it not?
1177	But do you know any other love- charms, Socrates?
1177	But do you not see that modesty and timidity are feelings implanted in man''s nature?
1177	But how are we to test these qualities, Socrates, before acquaintance?
1177	But how convert them into friends?
1177	But how or why should they breed them ill where nothing hinders them, being of a good stock themselves and producing from stock as good?
1177	But is it likely now?
1177	But may I ask is this judgment the result of personal inspection?
1177	But maybe there is another considerable advantage in this"fitting"?
1177	But now, Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to note one fact?
1177	But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws?
1177	But now, he who honours lawfully honours as he ought?
1177	But now, with regard to human beings; is it allowable to deal with men in any way one pleases?
1177	But perhaps you object to enthusiasm displayed in defence of one''s home and fatherland in war?
1177	But suppose I do, and suppose that, for all my attempts, he shows no change for the better?
1177	But suppose you sweep away the outposts( he asked), may not something worse, think you, be the consequence?
1177	But supposing a man to be elected general, and he succeeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state, are we to say that he is doing wrong?
1177	But tell me( he proceeded), do you owe service to any living being, think you?
1177	But tell me, did he teach you how to draw up troops in general, or specifically where and how to apply each particular kind of tactical arrangement?
1177	But tell me, how shall I assist you best, think you?
1177	But then are not the wearer''s bodies themselves( asked Socrates) some well proportioned and others ill?
1177	But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?
1177	But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?
1177	But would it not have been better to inquire first what is the work or function of a good citizen?
1177	But, Pericles, violence and lawlessness-- how do we define them?
1177	But, Socrates, what kind of man shall we endeavour to make our friend?
1177	By praising you falsely or by persuading you to try to be a good man?
1177	Can a man be said, do you think, to know himself who knows his own name and nothing more?
1177	Can anything more seriously militate against these than this same incontinence?
1177	Can it be said that those who are unable to cope well with them or to turn them to noble account know how they must and should deal with them?
1177	Can it be that you alone are excepted as a signal instance of Divine neglect?
1177	Can it be that you despise these penalties affixed to an evil habit?
1177	Can you tell us what set you wishing to be a general of cavalry, young sir?
1177	Can you then assert( asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men made them?
1177	Clearly they are wise in what they know;( 23) for how could a man have wisdom in that which he does not know?
1177	Come now, what when the people of Athens make inquiry by oracle, and the gods''answer comes?
1177	Could we expect such an one to save us or to master our foes?
1177	Deceit too is not uncommon?
1177	Did they not make the tongue also?
1177	Did you, possibly, pay no regard to the inscription?
1177	Do I understand you to ask me whether I know anything good for fever?
1177	Do human beings in general attain to well- tempered manhood by a course of idling, or by carefully attending to what will be of use?
1177	Do not you know that relatively to the same standard all things are at once beautiful and good?
1177	Do you agree, then, that we must hold aloof from every one so dominated?
1177	Do you find that your domestics seem to mind drinking it or washing in it?
1177	Do you imagine that one thing is good and another beautiful?
1177	Do you mean to assert that the same things may be beautiful and ugly?
1177	Do you mean to assert( he asked) that lawful and just are synonymous terms?
1177	Do you not know that even a weakling by nature may, by dint of exercise and practice, come to outdo a giant who neglects his body?
1177	Do you not know the sharper the appetite the less the need of sauces, the keener the thirst the less the desire for out- of- the- way drinks?
1177	Do you not note your brother''s character, proud and frank and sensitive to honour?
1177	Do you not observe their discipline in all naval matters?
1177	Do you not see how dangerous it is for a man to speak or act beyond the range( 14) of his knowledge?
1177	Do you not see( to speak of a much less noble sort of game) what a number of devices are needed to bag a hare?
1177	Do you pour contempt upon those blessings which flow from the healthy state?
1177	Do you really mean, Socrates, that it is the function of the same man to provide efficient choruses and to act as commander- in- chief?
1177	Do you think you could lightly endure them?
1177	Does it seem to you that the same thing is equally advantageous to all?
1177	Does it surprise you?
1177	Does not the term apply to all who can make any sort of useful product or commodity?
1177	Does not the very soundness imply at once health and strength?
1177	Does some terror confound?
1177	Does that sound like the perfection of athletic training?
1177	Doing?
1177	Empty- handed, or had he something to carry?
1177	Enact on the hypothesis that it is right to do what is good?
1177	Even so; but ought we to regard those things which at one moment benefit and at another moment injure us in any strict sense good rather than evil?
1177	For I presume you can not make them all exactly equal and of one pattern-- if you make them fit, as of course you do?
1177	For how can such people, the ungrateful, or reckless, or covetous, or faithless, or incontinent, adhere together as friends?
1177	For how long a time could the corn supplies from the country districts support the city?
1177	For how should they who do evil be friends with those who hate all evil- doing?
1177	For what other creature, to begin with, has a soul to appreciate the existence of the gods who have arranged this grand and beauteous universe?
1177	For who would care to have in his house a fellow with so slight a disposition to work and so strong a propensity to extravagance?
1177	From what source shall we learn them?
1177	From what source, then, do you get your means of subsistence?
1177	Had he, on the other hand, knowledge of the"base and foul"so as to beware of them?
1177	Had the Sirens only to utter this one incantation, and was every listener constrained to stay?
1177	Have you ever seen me battling with any one for shade on account of the heat?
1177	He did not, did not he?
1177	He would ask first: Did these investigators feel their knowledge of things human so complete that they betook themselves to these lofty speculations?
1177	He would be forced to imitate the good flute player in the externals of his art, would he not?
1177	Here would have been a fair test to apply to Socrates: Was he guilty of any base conduct himself?
1177	How am I to teach them that?
1177	How appropriate( 11) would such a preface sound on the lips of any one seeking, say, the office of state physician,( 12) would it not?
1177	How are we to inculcate this lesson?
1177	How are you to teach them that?
1177	How can you suppose that they do not so take thought?
1177	How could a man be wise in what he lacks the knowledge of?"
1177	How much sorrow and pain, when you were ill?
1177	How shall I woo and win you?
1177	How should I be ignorant of the art of dealing with my brother if I know the art of repaying kind words and good deeds in kind?
1177	How so?
1177	How so?
1177	How then shall I create this hunger in the heart of my friends?
1177	How then( he asked) can that be beautiful which is unlike the beautiful?
1177	How will you charge at the head of such a troop, and win glory for the state?
1177	I ask you, when you see all these things constructed with such show of foresight can you doubt whether they are products of chance or intelligence?
1177	I have fourteen free- born souls, I tell you, under my single roof, and how are we to live?
1177	I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right?
1177	I presume to turn a thing to its proper use is to apply it beautifully?
1177	I presume you also know who the rich are?
1177	I presume you rank courage among things beautiful?
1177	I suppose you mean that, besides his other qualifications a commandant of cavalry must have command of speech and argument?
1177	I suppose you refer to that judgment of the gods which, for their virtue''s sake, Cecrops and his followers were called on to decide?
1177	I suppose, Parrhasius( said he), painting may be defined as"a representation of visible objects,"may it not?
1177	I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?
1177	IV At another time, seeing Nicomachides on his way back from the elections( of magistrates),( 1) he asked him: Who are elected generals, Nicomachides?
1177	IX Being again asked by some one: could courage be taught,( 1) or did it come by nature?
1177	If this then be so concerning these virtues,( 9) what with regard to carefulness and devotion to all that ought to occupy us?
1177	If thou openest thy lips in speech, who will believe thy word?
1177	If, then, I can prove to my troopers that I am better than all of them, will that suffice to win their obedience?
1177	Ignorance, for instance, of smithying?
1177	In answer to the question: what is envy?
1177	In conduct and language his behaviour conformed to the rule laid down by the Pythia( 2) in reply to the question,"How shall we act?"
1177	In fact, then, the wise are wise in knowledge?
1177	In making a purchase even, I am not to ask, what is the price of this?
1177	In the first place, what evidence did they produce that Socrates refused to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state?
1177	In what way?
1177	Is he more likely to secure his salvation that way, think you, or to compass his own swift destruction?"
1177	Is he not expected to get up and offer him his seat, to pay him the honour of a soft couch,( 6) to yield him precedence in argument?
1177	Is it a term suggestive of the wisdom or the ignorance of those to whom it is applied?
1177	Is it not rather to sign his own death- warrent?"
1177	Is it not so?
1177	Is it not the custom everywhere for the younger to step aside when he meets his elder in the street and to give him place?
1177	Is it not when a stronger man forces a weaker to do what seems right to him-- not by persuasion but by compulsion?
1177	Is that the ground of your confidence?
1177	Is that your attitude, or do you admit that you owe allegiance to somebody?
1177	Is the author thinking of a life- and- death struggle with Thebes?
1177	Is the sequel extraordinary?
1177	Is there need of kindly action in any quarter?
1177	Is this possibly the explanation?
1177	It comes to this then: he who knows what the law requires in reference to the gods will honour the gods in the lawful way?
1177	It follows, then, that in proportion to the greatness of the benefit conferred, the greater his misdoing who fails to requite the kindness?
1177	It is a fair inference, is it not, that he who has the{ episteme} of grammar is more grammatical than he who has no such{ episteme}?
1177	It is a noble quality?
1177	It looks, does it not, Euthydemus, as if self- control were the best thing a man could have?
1177	It seems that those who have no fear in face of dangers, simply because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?
1177	It seems that you regard courage as useful to no mean end?
1177	It would appear that he who knows what the law requires with respect to the gods will correctly be defined as a pious man, and that is our definition?
1177	It would appear, then, that the law- loving man is just, and the lawless unjust?
1177	It would seem that he who knows what things are lawful( 20) as concerning men does the things that are just and right?
1177	It would seem that the seed of those who are not yet in their prime or have passed their prime is not good?
1177	It would seem that the useful is beautiful relatively to that for which it is of use?
1177	It would seem the wisdom of each is limited to his knowledge; each is wise only in what he knows?
1177	It would seem then that the sculptor is called upon to incorporate in his ideal form the workings and energies also of the soul?
1177	It would seem then( pursued Socrates) that the incontinent man is bound over to the worst sort of slavery, would it not?
1177	It would seem then, Hippias, the gods themselves are well pleased that"the lawful"and"the just"should be synonymous?
1177	It would seem to follow that if a tyrant, without persuading the citizens, drives them by enactment to do certain things-- that is lawlessness?
1177	It would seem to follow that knowledge and wisdom are the same?
1177	It would seem to follow that the beneficial is good relatively to him to whom it is beneficial?
1177	It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both do what is right and just and what they ought?
1177	It would seem to follow that those who have the knowledge how to behave are also those who have the power?
1177	It would seem you are decidedly of opinion that the incontinent are the reverse of free?
1177	It would seem, conversely, that they who cope ill have made some egregious blunder?
1177	Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to his detriment: which is the more wrongful-- to do so voluntarily or unintentionally?
1177	Lying exists among men, does it not?
1177	May I ask, does it seem to you possible for a man to know all the things that are?
1177	May it be that both one and the other class do use these circumstances as they think they must and should?
1177	May it not perhaps be( asked Socrates) that in this department they are officered by those who have the least knowledge?
1177	May our body be said to have a soul?
1177	Must there not be a reciprocity of service to make friendship lasting?"
1177	Must we not suppose that these too will take their sorrows lightly, looking to these high ends?
1177	Nay, how( he answered) should that be, for how could they all have come together from the ends of the earth?
1177	Nay, what sort of meshes have I?
1177	No doubt( replied Socrates) you have accomplished that initial step?
1177	No?
1177	Nor answers either, I suppose, if the inquiry concerns what I know, as, for instance, where does Charicles live?
1177	Now I ask you, have you ever noticed that I keep more within doors than others on account of the cold?
1177	Now is it not insensate stupidity( 8) to use for injury what was meant for advantage?
1177	Now you, I daresay, through versatility of knowledge,( 14) never say the same thing twice over on the same subject?
1177	Now, why?
1177	Obviously you propose to remove all those which are superfluous?
1177	Once more then: how should a man of this character corrupt the young?
1177	Only, will you be"at home"to me?
1177	Or again, what good would there be in odours if nostrils had not been bestowed upon us?
1177	Or did they maintain that they were playing their proper parts in thus neglecting the affairs of man to speculate on the concerns of God?
1177	Or do you believe that your mother is really ill disposed towards you?
1177	Or do you maintain that the evil habit is healthier, and in general more useful than the good?
1177	Or do you not think that a fact is worth more as evidence than a word?
1177	Or have the fruits of your marketing a flavour denied to mine?
1177	Or have you not heard of the"woes of Palamedes,"( 51) that commonest theme of song, how for his wisdom''s sake Odysseus envied him and slew him?
1177	Or how do you proceed when you discover the like tendency in one of your domestics?
1177	Or on an embassy as a diplomatist, I presume, by securing friends in place of enemies?
1177	Or steals and pillages their property?
1177	Or, to put it conversely, what slave of pleasure will not suffer degeneracy of soul and body?
1177	Please, Pericles, can you teach me what a law is?
1177	Possibly Xenophon is imitating( caricaturing?)
1177	Possibly in face of terrors and dangers you would consider it an advantage to be ignorant of them?
1177	Possibly( he answered); but why do you address these questions to me?
1177	Pray tell me, Theodote, have you an estate in the country?
1177	Pray, my son, did you ever hear of certain people being called ungrateful?
1177	Prepared not to please or try to please a single soul?
1177	Presently Socrates proceeded: Then this is clear, Glaucon, is it not?
1177	Shall the vanguard consist of men who are greediest of honour?
1177	Shall we begin our inquiry from the beginning, as it were, with the bare elements of food and nutriment?
1177	Shall we not admit that he is doing what is right?
1177	Shall we then at this point turn and inquire which of the two are likely to lead the pleasanter life, the rulers or the ruled?
1177	Shall we( Socrates continued), shall we balance the arguments for and against, and consider to what extent the possibility does exist?
1177	Should he not try to become as dear as possible, so that his friends will not care to give him up?
1177	Should you not have said that he was remarkable for his prudence rather than thoughtless or foolhardy?
1177	So here, maybe, you will try to add to the wealth of the state?
1177	So tell me, Aristodemus( he began), are there any human beings who have won your admiration for their wisdom?
1177	So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now have to be placed to the credit of Right?
1177	So then you would counsel me to weave myself some sort of net?
1177	Socrates said:( 5) Tell me, Euthydemus, has it ever struck you to observe what tender pains the gods have taken to furnish man with all his needs?
1177	Suppose we stop and consider that very point: how do masters deal with that sort of domestic?
1177	Suppose you wanted to get some acquaintance to invite you to dinner when he next keeps holy day,( 4) what steps would you take?
1177	Supposing it is not the majority, but, as in the case of an oligarchy, the minority, who meet and enact the rules of conduct, what are these?
1177	Tell me( said Socrates, addressing Critobulus), supposing we stood in need of a good friend, how should we set about his discovery?
1177	Tell me( said he), Euthydemus, what sort of thing you take piety to be?
1177	Tell me, Diodorus, if one of your slaves runs away, are you at pains to recover him?
1177	Tell me, Euthydemus( he began), do you believe freedom to be a noble and magnificent acquisition, whether for a man or for a state?
1177	Tell me, Xenophon, have you not always believed Critobulus to be a man of sound sense, not wild and self- willed?
1177	Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise in what they know,( 22) or are there any who are wise in what they know not?
1177	That is a true saying; but how, Socrates, should a man best bring them to this virtue?
1177	That much I made quite sure I knew, at any rate; since if I did not know even myself, what in the world did I know?
1177	The command to which you are appointed concerns horses and riders, does it not?
1177	The first thing will be to make them expert in mounting their chargers?
1177	The greatest of all penalties; for what worse calamity can human beings suffer in the production of offspring than to misbeget?
1177	The listener must needs be brought to ask himself,"Of what worth am I to my friends?"
1177	The works of the temperate spirit and the works of incontinency are, I take it, diametrically opposed?
1177	The wretch who can so behave must surely be tormented by an evil spirit?
1177	Then I presume even a basket for carrying dung( 11) is a beautiful thing?
1177	Then Socrates: Well, but the council which sits on Areopagos is composed of citizens of approved( 28) character, is it not?
1177	Then Socrates: Which, think you, would be harder to bear-- a wild beast''s savagery or a mother''s?
1177	Then Theodote: Oh why, Socrates, why are you not by my side( like the huntsman''s assistant) to help me catch my friends and lovers?
1177	Then children who are so produced are produced not as they ought to be?
1177	Then do you believe him to be a free man who is ruled by the pleasures of the body, and thereby can not perform what is best?
1177	Then do you wish to be an architect?
1177	Then do you wish to be an astronomer?
1177	Then for inflammation of the eyes?
1177	Then he who knows these laws will know how he must honour the gods?
1177	Then health and disease themselves when they prove to be sources of any good are good, but when of any evil, evil?
1177	Then here again are looks with it is possible to represent?
1177	Then how do you make this quality apparent to the customer so as to justify the higher price-- by measure or weight?
1177	Then how do you manage to make the corselet well proportioned if it is to fit an ill- proportioned body?
1177	Then if a tyrant, holding the chief power in the state, enacts rules of conduct for the citizens, are these enactments law?
1177	Then if that is how the matter stands, ingratitude would be an instance of pure unadulterate wrongdoing?
1177	Then is it not to the interest of both to get the upper hand of these?
1177	Then it equally concerns them both to be painstaking and prodigal of toil in all their doings?
1177	Then it would seem that it is impossible for a man to be all- wise?
1177	Then on whom, or what, was the assurance rooted, if not upon God?
1177	Then perhaps you possess a house and large revenues along with it?
1177	Then possibly ignorance of carpentering?
1177	Then the right way to produce children is not that way?
1177	Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the involuntary offender is an illiterate?
1177	Then these too may be imitated?
1177	Then this look, this glance, at any rate may be imitated in the eyes, may it not?
1177	Then those who deal with one another in this way, deal with each other as they ought?
1177	Then we must in every way strain every nerve to avoid the imputation of being slaves?
1177	Then we must keep away from him too?
1177	Then what if there is danger to be faced?
1177	Then why do you not keep a watchman willing and competent to ward off this pack of people who seek to injure you?
1177	Then would you for our benefit enumerate the land and naval forces first of Athens and then of our opponents?
1177	Then would you kindly tell us from what sources the revenues of the state are at present derived, and what is their present magnitude?
1177	Then you know who the poor are, of course?
1177	Then your household do not know how to make any of these?
1177	Then, by all that is sacred( Socrates continued), do not keep us in the dark, but tell us in what way do you propose first to benefit the state?
1177	Then, on the ground that they are free- born and your kinswomen, you think that they ought to do nothing but eat and sleep?
1177	Then, when you can not persuade your uncle, do you imagine you will be able to make the whole Athenian people, uncle and all, obey you?
1177	Thereupon Euthydemus: Be assured I fully concur in your opinion; the precept KNOW THYSELF can not be too highly valued; but what is the application?
1177	Thereupon Socrates: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?
1177	Think of a horse or a yoke of oxen; they have their worth; but who shall gauge the worth of a worthy friend?
1177	Think you not that to you also the answer is given?
1177	To obey neither general nor ruler of any sort?
1177	To which Socrates replied: Tell me, Crito, you keep dogs, do you not, to ward off wolves from your flocks?
1177	To which Socrates: Why do not you tell them the fable of the dog?
1177	To which Socrates:"Did it ever strike you to consider which of the two in that case the more deserves a whipping-- the master or the man?"
1177	To which side of the account then shall we place it?
1177	To which side shall we place deceit?
1177	Very good, no doubt, if the professor taught you to distinguish good and bad; but if not, where is the use of your learning?
1177	Was it that he did not sacrifice?
1177	Well now, tell me, is there nobody whom Chaerephon can please any more than he can please yourself; or do some people find him agreeable enough?
1177	Well then, for hunger?
1177	Well then, is it not a common duty of both to procure the ready obedience of those under them to their orders?
1177	Well then, until we have got beyond the region of conjecture shall we defer giving advice on the matter?
1177	Well then, you know that in point of numbers the Athenians are not inferior to the Boeotians?
1177	Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such knowledge?
1177	Well( replied Socrates), I presume you know quite well the distinction between good and bad things: your knowledge may be relied upon so far?
1177	Well, and a continence in regard to matters sexual so great that nothing of the sort shall prevent him from doing his duty?
1177	Well, and chicanery( 27) or mischief of any sort?
1177	Well, and doubtless you feel to have a spark of wisdom yourself?
1177	Well, and in parliamentary debate, by putting a stop to party strife and fostering civic concord?
1177	Well, and on which of the two shall be bestowed, as a further gift, the voluntary resolution to face toils rather than turn and flee from them?
1177	Well, and to which of them will it better accord to be taught all knowledge necessary towards the mastery of antagonists?
1177	Well, and what do you say to cloaks for men and for women-- tunics, mantles, vests?
1177	Well, and what of that other chance companion-- your fellow- traveller by land or sea?
1177	Well, and will you not lay your hand to improve the men themselves?
1177	Well, but now suppose you had had to carry his baggage, what would your condition have been like?
1177	Well, but the kindly look of love, the angry glance of hate at any one, do find expression in the human subject, do they not?
1177	Well, but when it comes to the hazard of engagement, what will you do then?
1177	Well, do you wish to be a mathematician, like Theodorus?
1177	Well, if one of your domestics is sick, do you tend him and call in the doctors to save his life?
1177	Well, ignorance of shoemaking?
1177	Well, it is a custom universally respected, is it not, to return good for good, and kindness with kindness?
1177	Well, now, is it possible to know what a popular state is without knowing who the people are?
1177	Well, prosperity, well- being( 53)( he exclaimed), must surely be a blessing, and that the most indisputable, Socrates?
1177	Well, shall we see, then, how we may best avoid making blunders between them?
1177	Well, shall you regard it as a part of your duty to see that as many of your men as possible can take aim and shoot on horseback?
1177	Well, then, we may expect, may we not, that a desire to grasp food at certain seasons will exhibit itself in both the children?
1177	Well; you take no notice of the dog''s ill- temper, you try to propitiate him by kindness; but your brother?
1177	Were it not well, Aristippus, to lay to heart these sayings, and to strive to bethink you somewhat of that which touches the future of our life?
1177	Were you travelling alone, or was your man- servant with you?
1177	Were you under the impression that the commandant was not to open his mouth?
1177	What are meant by just and unjust?
1177	What becomes of your cavalry force then?
1177	What can you expect but to make shipwreck of the craft and yourself together?
1177	What do you say?
1177	What do you take them to be?
1177	What fact?
1177	What father, himself sharing the society of his own children, is held to blame for their transgressions, if only his own goodness be established?
1177	What is a handicraftsman?
1177	What is a state?
1177	What is justice?
1177	What is left him but to lead a life stale and unprofitable, the scorn and mockery of men?
1177	What is piety?
1177	What is the beautiful?
1177	What is the particular action to which the term applies?
1177	What of this, since, to put it compendiously, there is nothing serviceable to the life of man worth speaking of but owes its fabrication to fire?
1177	What offspring then( he asked) will be ill produced, ill begotten, and ill born, if not these?
1177	What other tribe of animals save man can render service to the gods?
1177	What quarter of the world do you hail from, Eutherus?
1177	What sane man will venture to join thy rablle rout?
1177	What say you concerning such a boon?
1177	What say you, Antisthenes?--have friends their values like domestic slaves?
1177	What say you?
1177	What the noble?
1177	What the starting- point of self- examination?
1177	What then ought we to do now to recover our former virtue?
1177	What was your object?
1177	What way?
1177	What when they send portents to forewarn the states of Hellas?
1177	What, Hippias( Socrates retorted), have you not observed that I am in a chronic condition of proclaiming what I regard as just and upright?
1177	When put to the test would not your administration prove ruinous, and the figure you cut ridiculous?
1177	When shall we Athenians so obey our magistrates-- we who take a pride, as it were, in despising authority?
1177	When some one asked him:"What he regarded as the best pursuit or business( 15) for a man?"
1177	When some one else remarked"he was utterly prostrated after a long journey,"Socrates asked him:"Had he had any baggage to carry?"
1177	When some one was apprehending the journey to Olympia,"Why are you afraid of the long distance?"
1177	Where would you find a more arrant thief, savage, and murderer( 5) than the one?
1177	Which is hotter to the taste-- the water in your house or the hot spring in the temple of Asclepius?
1177	Which of them claims that?
1177	Which of these two sets respectively leads the happier life, in your opinion?
1177	Which, then, of the two must be trained, of his own free will,( 4) to prosecute a pressing business rather than gratify the belly?
1177	Who else, if not they?
1177	Who else, if not?
1177	Who has less claim to this than the incontinent man?
1177	Whom do you understand by poor and rich?
1177	Why did Homer, think you, designate Agamemnon"shepherd of the peoples"?
1177	Why, are you really versed in those things, Socrates?
1177	Why, bless your soul, do you not see he has only slaves and I have free- born souls to feed?
1177	Why, has not the fellow dared to steal a kiss from the son of Alcibiades, most fair of youths and in the golden prime?
1177	Why, how else should they deal with them?
1177	Why, in what else should a man be wise save only in knowledge?
1177	Why, surely you do not suppose you are going to ensnare that noblest of all game-- a lover, to wit-- in so artless a fashion?
1177	Why, to be sure; and is it not plain that these animals themselves are born and bred for the sake of man?
1177	Why, what will you have them to do, that you may believe and be persuaded that you too are in their thoughts?
1177	Will he, with the"beautiful and noble"at his side, be less able to aid his friends?
1177	Will not he rather, in proportion as the boy deteriorates in the company of the latter, bestow more heartfelt praise upon the former?
1177	Will they manipulate these and the like to suit their needs?
1177	Without self- restraint who can lay any good lesson to heart or practise it when learnt in any degree worth speaking of?
1177	Would not men have discovered the imposture in all this lapse of time?
1177	Would you mention to us their names?
1177	Yet they are both sure to meet with enemies?
1177	You are not an employer of labour on a large scale?
1177	You can not help feeling that they are costly to you, and they must see that you find them a burthen?
1177	You know how they capture the creatures on which they live;( 7) by weaving webs of gossamer, is it not?
1177	You mean it is a title particularly to those who are ignorant of the beautiful, the good, the just?
1177	You mean( Socrates continued) that it is not the exactly- modelled corselet which fits, but that which does not gall the wearer in the using?
1177	You state that so and so, whom you admire, is a better citizen that this other whom I admire?
1177	You understand what is meant by laws of a city or state?
1177	You wish to know what a law is?
1177	You would imply, Socrates, would you not, that if we want to win the love of any good man we need to be good ourselves in speech and action?
1177	You would say that a thing which is beneficial to one is sometimes hurtful to another?
1177	a Hellene?
1177	again this readiness of the ear to catch all sounds and yet not to be surcharged?
1177	and do you imagine that these lovely creatures infuse nothing with their kiss, simply because you do not see the poison?
1177	and even if they had so done, men are not all of one speech?
1177	and how are we to effect the capture of this friend of our choice, whom the gods approve?
1177	and what do you expect your fate to be after that kiss?
1177	and what is its definition?''
1177	and what of that other whose passion for money- making is so absorbing that he has no leisure for anything else, save how he may add to his gains?
1177	and what of the man whose strength lies in monetary transactions?
1177	and when we have discovered a man whose friendship is worth having, how ought we to make him our friend?
1177	and whom would one select as the recipient of kindness rather than a man susceptible of gratitude?"
1177	and, that even the winds of heaven may not visit them too roughly, this planting of the eyelashes as a protecting screen?
1177	come now, Euthydemus, as concerning the good: ought we to search for the good in this way?
1177	did not Socrates cause his associates to despise the established laws when he dwelt on the folly of appointing state officers by ballot?
1177	for possibly to perform what is best appears to you to savour of freedom?
1177	have you gone yourself and examined the defences?
1177	he answered:"Successful conduct";( 16) and to a second question:"Did he then regard good fortune as an end to be pursued?"
1177	how well proportioned?"
1177	if the vendor is under the age of thirty?
1177	is it indifferent to you whether these be friends or not, or do you admit that the goodwill of these is worth securing by some pains on your part?
1177	no one will buy it; money?
1177	of course we are to include these, for what would happiness be without these?
1177	or are you prepared to stand alone?
1177	or because they thought, if only we are leagued with him we shall become adepts in statecraft and unrivalled in the arts of speech and action?
1177	or can you name any beautiful thing, body, vessel, or whatever it be, which you know of as universally beautiful?
1177	or did you give it heed and try to discover who and what you were?
1177	or do you rather rest secure in the consciousness that you would prove such a slave as no master would care to keep?
1177	or else( 2)"and what is beneficial is good( or a good)?
1177	or has no such notion perhaps ever entered their heads, and will they be content simply to know how such things come into existence?
1177	or how do you know that they are all maintained as you say?
1177	or is all this quite incapable of being depicted?
1177	or is it anything else?"
1177	or that he dispensed with divination?
1177	or to a question of arithmetic,"Does twice five make ten?"
1177	or to all mankind?
1177	or to do what is bad?
1177	or what sweet thing art thou acquainted with-- that wilt stir neither hand nor foot to gain it?
1177	or where is Critias to be found?
1177	or will his power to benefit the community be shortened because the flower of that community are fellow- workers in that work?
1177	p. 381:"in regard to the question wherein consists{ to kalon}?"
1177	still repeating the same old talk,( 13) Socrates, which I used to hear from you long ago?
1177	that you must needs benefit the city, since you desire to reap her honours?
1177	the position of the mouth again, close to the eyes and nostrils as a portal of ingress for all the creature''s supplies?
1177	this capacity of the front teeth of all animals to cut and of the"grinders"to receive the food and reduce it to pulp?
1177	to follow none?
1177	to kindle in them rage to meet the enemy?--which things are but stimulants to make stout hearts stouter?
1177	what by courage and cowardice?
1177	what by sobriety and madness?
1177	what is a ruler over men?
1177	what is a ruling character?
1177	what is a statesman?
1177	what is he like?
1177	what is impiety?
1177	what is your starting- point?
1177	what of any others, you may light upon?
1177	what of the quarrelsome and factious person( 4) whose main object is to saddle his friends with a host of enemies?
1177	what the base?
1177	what the ugly?
1177	where shall goodwill and faithfulness be found among men?
1177	where such a portent of insolence, incontinence, and high- handedness as the other?
1177	where then is his liability to the indictment to be found?
1177	will not sheer plundering be free to any ruffian who likes?...
1177	will you tell me that?
1177	would he not be doing what is right?
1177	your answer to- day will differ from that of yesterday?
1497	Will he,in the language of Pindar,"make justice his high tower, or fortify himself with crooked deceit?"
1497	''And a true answer, of course:--but what more have they to say?''
1497	''And can we conceive things greater still?''
1497	''And do not the natures of men and women differ very much indeed?''
1497	''And how will they begin their work?''
1497	''And is her proper state ours or some other?''
1497	''And what are the highest?''
1497	''And what can I do more for you?''
1497	''And what will they say?''
1497	''But how shall we know the degrees of affinity, when all things are common?''
1497	''But if many states join their resources, shall we not be in danger?''
1497	''But then how will our poor city be able to go to war against an enemy who has money?''
1497	''But will curiosity make a philosopher?
1497	''But, Socrates, what is this supreme principle, knowledge or pleasure, or what?
1497	''But, my dear Socrates, you are forgetting the main question: Is such a State possible?
1497	''But,''said Glaucon, interposing,''are they not to have a relish?''
1497	''Do you ask whether tragedy and comedy are to be admitted?''
1497	''Glorious, indeed; but what is to follow?''
1497	''How can we resist such arguments in favour of injustice?
1497	''I do not understand what you mean?''
1497	''I should like to know of what constitutions you were speaking?''
1497	''Is it possible?
1497	''Lover of wisdom,''''lover of knowledge,''are titles which we may fitly apply to that part of the soul?
1497	''Socrates,''he says,''what folly is this?--Why do you agree to be vanquished by one another in a pretended argument?''
1497	''Surely you are not prepared to prove that?''
1497	''Sweet Sir,''we will say to him,''what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble?
1497	''Tell me, Socrates,''he says,''have you a nurse?''
1497	''Then how are we to describe the true?''
1497	''Then how is such an admission reconcileable with the doctrine that philosophers should be kings?''
1497	''Well, and what answer do you give?''
1497	''What appetites do you mean?''
1497	''What do you mean?''
1497	''What, then, shall a man profit, if he gain the whole world''and become more and more wicked?
1497	''When a lively- minded ingenuous youth hears all this, what will be his conclusion?
1497	''Who is that?''
1497	''Will they not think this a hardship?''
1497	''You do not mean to say that he will beat his father?''
1497	), having no reason in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?
1497	--How would you answer him?
1497	--What defence will you make for us, my good Sir, against any one who offers these objections?
1497	... He proceeds: What did Simonides mean by this saying of his?
1497	A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge?
1497	A second and greater wave is rolling in-- community of wives and children; is this either expedient or possible?
1497	A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about either-- that is what you mean?
1497	Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch- race on horseback in honour of the goddess which will take place in the evening?
1497	Admitting that women differ from men in capacity, do not men equally differ from one another?
1497	After this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?
1497	Again the old question returns upon us: Is justice or injustice the more profitable?
1497	Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses, what is to be the practice?
1497	Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the lover of honour of the pleasures of wisdom?
1497	Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering and getting fame?
1497	Again, pleasure and pain are motions, and the absence of them is rest; but if so, how can the absence of either of them be the other?
1497	Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be painful?
1497	All of whom will call one another citizens?
1497	All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and lower regions?
1497	Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice?
1497	Am I not right?
1497	Am I not right?
1497	Am I not right?
1497	Am I not right?
1497	Am I not right?
1497	And O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?
1497	And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves?
1497	And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites from time to time and in the intermediate passages?
1497	And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel?
1497	And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying that they will have their pleasures and pains in common?
1497	And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?
1497	And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?
1497	And also to be within and between them?
1497	And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?
1497	And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?
1497	And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord only-- a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?
1497	And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies?
1497	And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?
1497	And are not their praises of tyranny alone a sufficient reason why we should exclude them from our State?
1497	And are our friends to be only the good, and our enemies to be the evil?
1497	And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another''s, nor be deprived of what is his own?
1497	And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not?
1497	And are you stronger than all these?
1497	And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to man?
1497	And as we are to have the best of guardians for our city, must they not be those who have most the character of guardians?
1497	And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?
1497	And both should be in harmony?
1497	And by contracts you mean partnerships?
1497	And can any one of those many things which are called by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this?
1497	And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that excellence?
1497	And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?
1497	And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad?
1497	And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?
1497	And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?
1497	And can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female?
1497	And democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings her to dissolution?
1497	And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the enquiry?
1497	And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?
1497	And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all poetry, and every form of expression in words?
1497	And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?
1497	And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts?
1497	And do they not share?
1497	And do we know what we opine?
1497	And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who attains a conception of the essence of each thing?
1497	And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to breed from the best only?
1497	And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?
1497	And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat, Thrasymachus?
1497	And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind?
1497	And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them?
1497	And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you in the argument?
1497	And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?
1497	And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others will tell you of brightness and beauty?
1497	And does not the analogy apply still more to the State?
1497	And does not the latter-- I mean the rebellious principle-- furnish a great variety of materials for imitation?
1497	And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous?
1497	And does not the same principle hold in the sciences?
1497	And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from oligarchy-- I mean, after a sort?
1497	And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of essence?
1497	And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?
1497	And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one-- medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on?
1497	And each of them is such as his like is?
1497	And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?
1497	And even to this are there not exceptions?
1497	And everything else on the style?
1497	And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?
1497	And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?
1497	And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but by knowledge, do men counsel well?
1497	And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?
1497	And has not the eye an excellence?
1497	And has not the soul an excellence also?
1497	And have we not already condemned that State in which the same persons are warriors as well as shopkeepers?
1497	And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?
1497	And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy?
1497	And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?
1497	And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?
1497	And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best able to create one?
1497	And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?
1497	And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?
1497	And here, Glaucon, I should like to ask( as I know that you are a breeder of birds and animals), Do you not take the greatest care in the mating?
1497	And his friends and fellow- citizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes?
1497	And how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced by what I have just said; what more can I do for you?
1497	And how am I to do so?
1497	And how are they to be learned without education?
1497	And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?
1497	And how can we rightly answer that question?
1497	And how does such an one live?
1497	And how does the son come into being?
1497	And how is the error to be corrected?
1497	And how long is this stage of their lives to last?
1497	And how will they proceed?
1497	And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?
1497	And if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would greatly deteriorate?
1497	And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also be needed, and in considerable numbers?
1497	And if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim?
1497	And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been?
1497	And if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend?
1497	And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, will they be angry with philosophy?
1497	And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?
1497	And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?
1497	And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality which they should also possess?
1497	And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?
1497	And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?
1497	And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be perfectly ordered?
1497	And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?
1497	And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness?
1497	And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?
1497	And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers?
1497	And in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities?
1497	And in such a case what is one to say?
1497	And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good?
1497	And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call opinion?
1497	And in the first place, he will honour studies which impress these qualities on his soul and will disregard others?
1497	And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder?
1497	And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?
1497	And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?
1497	And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any other animal?
1497	And is he not truly good?
1497	And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State?
1497	And is not a State larger than an individual?
1497	And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also four in number?
1497	And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?
1497	And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from law and order?
1497	And is not the end of the soul happiness, and justice the excellence of the soul by which happiness is attained?
1497	And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?
1497	And is not the reason of this that the several principles, whether in the state or in the individual, do their own business?
1497	And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?
1497	And is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite charming?
1497	And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, or enchantment?
1497	And is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant?
1497	And is opinion also a faculty?
1497	And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?
1497	And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or can not share?
1497	And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?
1497	And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that which has more existence the truer?
1497	And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?
1497	And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?
1497	And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?
1497	And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?
1497	And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?
1497	And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?
1497	And literature may be either true or false?
1497	And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?
1497	And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this same creature, and make a coward of him?
1497	And may not the many which are doubles be also halves?--doubles, that is, of one thing, and halves of another?
1497	And may we not rightly call such men treacherous?
1497	And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole?
1497	And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?
1497	And may we not say the same of all things?
1497	And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are ill- educated, become pre- eminently bad?
1497	And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength?
1497	And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?
1497	And must not an animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?
1497	And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?
1497	And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul?
1497	And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft?
1497	And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the democratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the others?
1497	And must not we swim and try to reach the shore: we will hope that Arion''s dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?
1497	And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union of the two?
1497	And next, how does he live?
1497	And next, shall we enquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?
1497	And no good thing is hurtful?
1497	And not- being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing?
1497	And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?
1497	And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have they?
1497	And now what remains of the work of legislation?
1497	And now why do you not praise me?
1497	And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?
1497	And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?
1497	And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?
1497	And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?
1497	And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?
1497	And of truth in the same degree?
1497	And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion?
1497	And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God?
1497	And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?
1497	And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has spirit, and another is without spirit?
1497	And opinion is to have an opinion?
1497	And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?
1497	And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?
1497	And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?
1497	And shall I add,''whether seen or unseen by gods and men''?
1497	And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men?
1497	And shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one only of the two unmixed styles?
1497	And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole?
1497	And should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting such a change?
1497	And so let us have a final trial and proclamation; need we hire a herald, or shall I proclaim the result?
1497	And so of all other things;--justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful?
1497	And so of the other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters?
1497	And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other-- necessity is not too strong a word, I think?
1497	And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?
1497	And still there arises another question: Are friends to be interpreted as real or seeming; enemies as real or seeming?
1497	And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler''s interest?
1497	And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power?
1497	And suppose we make astronomy the third-- what do you say?
1497	And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?
1497	And that human virtue is justice?
1497	And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or impossibility?
1497	And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence?
1497	And that which hurts not does no evil?
1497	And that which is not hurtful hurts not?
1497	And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul?
1497	And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of acting voluntarily?
1497	And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?
1497	And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?
1497	And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation?
1497	And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found-- in the rulers or in the subjects?
1497	And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough?
1497	And the ear has an end and an excellence also?
1497	And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?
1497	And the fairest is also the loveliest?
1497	And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?
1497	And the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an interest, and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?
1497	And the good is advantageous?
1497	And the government is the ruling power in each state?
1497	And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?
1497	And the greatest degree of evil- doing to one''s own city would be termed by you injustice?
1497	And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous?
1497	And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and skill, and art, and application will be needed by him?
1497	And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the State is just?
1497	And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?
1497	And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for the sake of money- getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?
1497	And the interest of any art is the perfection of it-- this and nothing else?
1497	And the just is the good?
1497	And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?
1497	And the knowing is wise?
1497	And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,--and that is what you call justice?
1497	And the lover of honour-- what will be his opinion?
1497	And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest distance?
1497	And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the loveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?
1497	And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words?
1497	And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require?
1497	And the more hated he is, the more he will require trusty guards; but how will he obtain them?
1497	And the much greater to the much less?
1497	And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate between oligarchy and aristocracy?
1497	And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal and aristocratical?
1497	And the painter too is, as I conceive, just such another-- a creator of appearances, is he not?
1497	And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as they best can?
1497	And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors and not a mere sailor?
1497	And the pilot-- that is to say, the true pilot-- is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?
1497	And the possibility has been acknowledged?
1497	And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?
1497	And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether in ruling or being ruled?
1497	And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the State, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and children?
1497	And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?
1497	And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?
1497	And the royal and orderly desires are nearest?
1497	And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a special excellence?
1497	And the same observation will apply to all other things?
1497	And the same of horses and animals in general?
1497	And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be?
1497	And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?
1497	And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable?
1497	And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?
1497	And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all?
1497	And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?
1497	And the wise is good?
1497	And the work of the painter is a third?
1497	And the worker in leather and brass will make them?
1497	And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false?
1497	And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy?
1497	And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?
1497	And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?
1497	And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had suffered anything terrible?
1497	And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world?
1497	And therefore the cause of well- being?
1497	And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men-- you would agree with me there?
1497	And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?
1497	And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?
1497	And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be their leaders and teachers?
1497	And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the dangerous ones?
1497	And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names?
1497	And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?
1497	And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus?
1497	And this is equally true of imitation; no one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one?
1497	And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in such manner as we have described, will accomplish?
1497	And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul?
1497	And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task?
1497	And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special care of the State?
1497	And to which class do unity and number belong?
1497	And was I not right, Adeimantus?
1497	And was I not right?
1497	And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?
1497	And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially confined to the art?
1497	And what are these?
1497	And what do the Muses say next?
1497	And what do the rulers call one another in other States?
1497	And what do the rulers call the people?
1497	And what do they call them in other States?
1497	And what do they receive of men?
1497	And what do you say of lovers of wine?
1497	And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?
1497	And what do you think of a second principle?
1497	And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the pleasure which is next?
1497	And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?
1497	And what happens?
1497	And what in ours?
1497	And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?
1497	And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?
1497	And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge?
1497	And what is the next question?
1497	And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?
1497	And what is the prime of life?
1497	And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found?
1497	And what is your view about them?
1497	And what manner of government do you term oligarchy?
1497	And what manner of man answers to such a State?
1497	And what may that be?
1497	And what of passion, or spirit?
1497	And what of the ignorant?
1497	And what of the maker of the bed?
1497	And what of the unjust-- does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just?
1497	And what shall be their education?
1497	And what shall we say about men?
1497	And what shall we say of men?
1497	And what shall we say of the carpenter-- is not he also the maker of the bed?
1497	And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?
1497	And what then would you say?
1497	And what training will draw the soul upwards?
1497	And what would you say of the physician?
1497	And when all the world is telling a man that he is six feet high, and he has no measure, how can he believe anything else?
1497	And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?
1497	And when these fail?
1497	And when they meet in private will not people be saying to one another''Our warriors are not good for much''?
1497	And when truth is the captain, we can not suspect any evil of the band which he leads?
1497	And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man, what do you say of him?
1497	And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?
1497	And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better?
1497	And where do you find them?
1497	And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases?
1497	And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow?
1497	And which are the soft or drinking harmonies?
1497	And which are these two sorts?
1497	And which is wise and which is foolish?
1497	And which method do I understand you to prefer?
1497	And which of the three has the truest knowledge and the widest experience?
1497	And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer?
1497	And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this element?
1497	And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not found will be the residue?
1497	And who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?
1497	And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?
1497	And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach?
1497	And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another?
1497	And will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most godless and detestable?
1497	And will he sell his own fairer and diviner part without any compunction to the most godless and foul?
1497	And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse and more unsightly?
1497	And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the movements of the stars?
1497	And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most miserable?
1497	And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?
1497	And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by any external influence?
1497	And will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?
1497	And will not the same condition be best for our citizens?
1497	And will not the words and the character of the style depend on the temper of the soul?
1497	And will not their wives be the best women?
1497	And will the blindness and crookedness of opinion content you when you might have the light and certainty of science?
1497	And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them?
1497	And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher''s nature?
1497	And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?
1497	And will they be a class which is rarely found?
1497	And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own land, and share in the common temples?
1497	And will you be so very good as to answer one more question?
1497	And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, or when he has only one?
1497	And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense?
1497	And would he try to go beyond just action?
1497	And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?
1497	And would you call justice vice?
1497	And would you have the future rulers of your ideal State intelligent beings, or stupid as posts?
1497	And would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul of a freeman, or of a slave?
1497	And yet not so well as with a pruning- hook made for the purpose?
1497	And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?
1497	And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the same as opinion?
1497	And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a State?
1497	And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his unlike?
1497	And you are aware too that the latter can not explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?
1497	And you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind, will fancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the gods?
1497	And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,--will he not be perplexed?
1497	And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?
1497	And you would say the same of the conception of the good?
1497	And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?
1497	And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence?
1497	Another question has not been answered: Is the just or the unjust the happier?
1497	Another question is, Which of existing states is suited to her?
1497	Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance?
1497	Any more than heat can produce cold?
1497	Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once?
1497	Are not necessary pleasures those of which we can not get rid, and of which the satisfaction is a benefit to us?
1497	Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to commanders and self- control in sensual pleasures?
1497	Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists?
1497	Are not the tragic poets wise who magnify and exalt the tyrant, and say that he is wise by association with the wise?
1497	Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?
1497	Are the lovers of sights and sounds, who let out their ears to every chorus at the Dionysiac festivals, to be called philosophers?''
1497	Are they two or one, and is either of them the cause of the other?
1497	Are we not right in saying that the love of knowledge, no less than riches, may divert him?
1497	Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?
1497	Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?
1497	As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?
1497	As they are or as they appear?
1497	At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts-- the words, the melody, and the rhythm; that degree of knowledge I may presuppose?
1497	At what age?
1497	Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice?
1497	Because it has a particular quality which no other has?
1497	Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?
1497	Beginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved?
1497	Being is the sphere or subject- matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to know the nature of being?
1497	But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favourable circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was?
1497	But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft and deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?
1497	But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and with everybody else?
1497	But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?
1497	But are they really three or one?
1497	But can any of these reasons apply to God?
1497	But can that which is neither become both?
1497	But can that which is neither become both?
1497	But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?
1497	But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you?
1497	But can you tell me of any other suitable study?
1497	But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are bred and fed in the same way?
1497	But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike?
1497	But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of them?
1497	But do you know whom I think good?
1497	But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?
1497	But do you not admire their cleverness?
1497	But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready ministers of political corruption?
1497	But do you not see that there is a sense in which you could do the same?
1497	But do you observe the reason of this?
1497	But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?
1497	But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?
1497	But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins?
1497	But have we not here fallen into a contradiction?
1497	But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?
1497	But he may have friends who are senseless or mad?
1497	But he would claim to exceed the non- musician?
1497	But he would wish to go beyond the non- physician?
1497	But how did timocracy arise out of the perfect State?
1497	But how is the image applicable to the disciples of philosophy?
1497	But how will they draw out the plan of which you are speaking?
1497	But how will they know who are fathers and daughters, and so on?
1497	But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, that he was descending?
1497	But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most pleasantly?
1497	But if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be their friend?
1497	But if the process by which we are supposed to arrive at the idea of good be really imaginary, may not the idea itself be also a mere abstraction?
1497	But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act together better?
1497	But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons besides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death?
1497	But in what way good or harm?
1497	But is a man in harmony with himself when he is the subject of these conflicting influences?
1497	But is not this unjust?
1497	But is not war an art?
1497	But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a greater clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than ignorance?
1497	But is passion a third principle, or akin to desire?
1497	But is such a community possible?--as among the animals, so also among men; and if possible, in what way possible?
1497	But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts?
1497	But is there no difference between men and women?
1497	But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other States?
1497	But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers?
1497	But let me ask you another question: Has excess of pleasure any affinity to temperance?
1497	But may he not change and transform himself?
1497	But may not the stimulus which love has given to fancy be some day exhausted?
1497	But next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training for the great contest of all-- are they not?
1497	But ought the just to injure any one at all?
1497	But ought we to attempt to construct one?
1497	But ought we to render evil for evil at all, when to do so will only make men more evil?
1497	But shall we be right in getting rid of them?
1497	But should not life rest on the moral rather than upon the physical?
1497	But suppose that he were to retort,''Thrasymachus, what do you mean?
1497	But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?
1497	But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?
1497	But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion, and in a mean between them?
1497	But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?
1497	But the good are just and would not do an injustice?
1497	But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him?
1497	But the philosopher will still be justified in asking,''How may the heavenly gift of poesy be devoted to the good of mankind?''
1497	But the soul which can not be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be immortal?
1497	But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know, and not to have opinion only?
1497	But we should like to ask him a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing?
1497	But what branch of knowledge is there, my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts were reckoned mean by us?
1497	But what can show a more disgraceful state of education than to have to go abroad for justice because you have none of your own at home?
1497	But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge?
1497	But what do you say of music, which also entered to a certain extent into our former scheme?
1497	But what do you say to flute- makers and flute- players?
1497	But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, than any of these?
1497	But what if there are no gods?
1497	But what is the next step?
1497	But what of the world below?
1497	But what ought to be their course?
1497	But what shall be done to the hero?
1497	But what shall their education be?
1497	But what will be the process of delineation?''
1497	But what would you have, Glaucon?
1497	But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician?
1497	But when is this fault committed?
1497	But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them?
1497	But whence came division?
1497	But where are the two?
1497	But where, amid all this, is justice?
1497	But which is the happier?
1497	But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them?
1497	But who can doubt that philosophers should be chosen, if they have the other qualities which are required in a ruler?
1497	But why do you ask?
1497	But why do you ask?
1497	But why should we dispute about names when we have realities of such importance to consider?
1497	But why?
1497	But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he can not help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?
1497	But will he not desire to get them on the spot?
1497	But will the imitator have either?
1497	But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true?
1497	But would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a stranger?
1497	But would you call the painter a creator and maker?
1497	But you can cut off a vine- branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways?
1497	But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen?
1497	But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or teacher of any?
1497	By heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator?
1497	Can I say what I do not know?
1497	Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?
1497	Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?
1497	Can any other origin of a State be imagined?
1497	Can any reality come up to the idea?
1497	Can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing?
1497	Can justice produce injustice any more than the art of horsemanship can make bad horsemen, or heat produce cold?
1497	Can sight adequately perceive them?
1497	Can the god of Jealousy himself find any fault with such an assemblage of good qualities?
1497	Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?
1497	Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign?
1497	Can they have a better place than between being and not- being?
1497	Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money- maker answers to the oligarchical State?
1497	Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?
1497	Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?
1497	Can you tell me what imitation is?
1497	Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?
1497	Capital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family in name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to the name?
1497	Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any particular skill?
1497	Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?
1497	Did he mean that I was to give back arms to a madman?
1497	Did this never strike you as curious?
1497	Did you ever hear any of them which were not?
1497	Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was rehearsing?
1497	Did you never hear it?
1497	Did you never observe how the mind of a clever rogue peers out of his eyes, and the more clearly he sees, the more evil he does?
1497	Did you never observe in the arts how the potters''boys look on and help, long before they touch the wheel?
1497	Do I take you with me?
1497	Do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body?
1497	Do we admit the existence of opinion?
1497	Do you agree?
1497	Do you know of any other?
1497	Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his rogueries?
1497	Do you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other?
1497	Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things but in another not?
1497	Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken?
1497	Do you not know that all this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn?
1497	Do you not know that the soul is immortal?
1497	Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be allowed, is hated of gods and men?
1497	Do you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic has introduced?
1497	Do you not see them doing the same?
1497	Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?
1497	Do you remember?
1497	Do you see that there is a way in which you could make them all yourself?
1497	Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?
1497	Do you think it right that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they can help?
1497	Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good?
1497	Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in their case?
1497	Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather not have them?
1497	Does not like always attract like?
1497	Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle?
1497	Does not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise?
1497	Does that look well?
1497	Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her?
1497	Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?
1497	Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?
1497	Enough of gods and heroes;--what shall we say about men?
1497	Enough, my friend; but what is enough while anything remains wanting?
1497	Ethics),''Whether the virtues are one or many?''
1497	Every act does something to somebody; and following this analogy, Socrates asks, What is this due and proper thing which justice does, and to whom?
1497	Except a city?--or would you include a city?
1497	First of all, in regard to slavery?
1497	First you began with a geometry of plane surfaces?
1497	First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth?
1497	For all these things are only the prelude, and you surely do not suppose that a mere mathematician is also a dialectician?
1497	For concerning political measures, we chiefly ask: How will they affect the happiness of mankind?
1497	For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part?
1497	For if Agamemnon could not count his feet( and without number how could he?)
1497	For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said Thrasymachus,--to look for gold, or to hear discourse?
1497	For which the art has to consider and provide?
1497	For you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician?
1497	Further, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant?
1497	Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?
1497	Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right time?
1497	God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view?
1497	Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an imitator?
1497	Has he not, I said, an occupation; and what profit would there be in his life if he were deprived of his occupation?
1497	Has not nature scattered all the qualities which our citizens require indifferently up and down among the two sexes?
1497	Has not that been admitted?
1497	Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?
1497	Have I clearly explained the class which I mean?
1497	Have we not here a picture of his way of life?
1497	Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution?
1497	Having so many evils, will not the most miserable of men be still more miserable in a public station?
1497	He asks only''What good have they done?''
1497	He can hardly avoid saying Yes-- can he now?
1497	He is a soldier, and, like Adeimantus, has been distinguished at the battle of Megara( anno 456?
1497	He knows that this latter institution is not more than four or five thousand years old: may not the end revert to the beginning?
1497	He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to maintain this?
1497	He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another,''Where is Ardiaeus the Great?''
1497	He roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken possession of you all?
1497	He said: Who then are the true philosophers?
1497	He was present when one of the spirits asked-- Where is Ardiaeus the Great?
1497	He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?
1497	He will grow more and more indolent and careless?
1497	Hence arises the question,''What is great, what is small?''
1497	His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one?
1497	How can that be?
1497	How can that be?
1497	How can there be?
1497	How can they, he said, if they are blind and can not see?
1497	How can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to the callings of any of these?
1497	How can we?
1497	How cast off?
1497	How do they act?
1497	How do you distinguish them?
1497	How do you mean?
1497	How do you mean?
1497	How do you mean?
1497	How do you mean?
1497	How do you mean?
1497	How do you mean?
1497	How do you mean?
1497	How do you mean?
1497	How do you mean?
1497	How is he to be wise and also innocent?
1497	How many?
1497	How so?
1497	How so?
1497	How so?
1497	How so?
1497	How so?
1497	How so?
1497	How so?
1497	How so?
1497	How so?
1497	How so?
1497	How then can men and women have the same?
1497	How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant?
1497	How was that?
1497	How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles,--are you still the man you were?
1497	How will they proceed?
1497	How would they address us?
1497	How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?
1497	How?
1497	How?
1497	How?
1497	How?
1497	How?
1497	I am sure that I should be contented-- will not you?
1497	I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch; the democrat was in the middle?
1497	I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer?
1497	I do not know, do you?
1497	I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper excellence they can not fulfil their end?
1497	I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?
1497	I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?
1497	I repeated, Why am I especially not to be let off?
1497	I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?
1497	I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?
1497	I said; the prelude or what?
1497	I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this study?
1497	I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?
1497	I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language?
1497	I will be wiser now and acknowledge that we must go to the bottom of another question: What is to be the education of our guardians?
1497	I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen at a distance?
1497	I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some end?
1497	I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?
1497	If wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?
1497	Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree?
1497	In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?
1497	In the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom and frankness-- a man may say and do what he likes?
1497	In the next place our youth must be temperate?
1497	In these cases a man is not compelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger?
1497	In this both Plato and Kheyam rise above the level of many Christian(?)
1497	In what manner?
1497	In what manner?
1497	In what particulars?
1497	In what point of view?
1497	In what respect do you mean?
1497	In what respect?
1497	In what respects?
1497	In what way make allowance?
1497	In what way shown?
1497	In what way?
1497	Including the art of war?
1497	Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?
1497	Is God above or below the idea of good?
1497	Is any better than experience and wisdom and reason?
1497	Is any better than the old- fashioned sort which is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic?
1497	Is he not a true image of the State which he represents?
1497	Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding?
1497	Is it desirable?''
1497	Is it for this that we are asked to throw away the civilization which is the growth of ages?
1497	Is it not on this wise?--The good at which such a State aims is to become as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?
1497	Is not Polemarchus your heir?
1497	Is not absolute injustice absolute weakness also?
1497	Is not his case utterly miserable?
1497	Is not honesty the best policy?
1497	Is not that still more disgraceful?
1497	Is not that true, Thrasymachus?
1497	Is not the Republic the vehicle of three or four great truths which, to Plato''s own mind, are most naturally represented in the form of the State?
1497	Is not the double also the half, and are not heavy and light relative terms which pass into one another?
1497	Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the God in man; the ignoble, that which subjects the man to the beast?
1497	Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?''
1497	Is not the noble youth very like a well- bred dog in respect of guarding and watching?
1497	Is not the strength of injustice only a remnant of justice?
1497	Is not this the case?
1497	Is not this the way-- he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father who has trained him in his own habits?
1497	Is not this true?
1497	Is not this unavoidable?
1497	Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to possess the truth a good?
1497	Is passion then the same with reason?
1497	Is that true?
1497	Is the relation between them one of mutual antagonism or of mutual harmony?
1497	Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain?
1497	Is there any better criterion than experience and knowledge?
1497	Is there any city which he might name?
1497	Is there any city which professes to have received laws from you, as Sicily and Italy have from Charondas, Sparta from Lycurgus, Athens from Solon?
1497	Is there any other virtue remaining which can compete with wisdom and temperance and courage in the scale of political virtue?
1497	Is there anything more?
1497	Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?
1497	Is there not rather a contradiction in him?
1497	Is this a pattern laid up in heaven, or mere vacancy on which he is supposed to gaze with wondering eye?
1497	Is this ideal at all the worse for being impracticable?
1497	It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only?
1497	It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?
1497	Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?''
1497	Justice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will follow after?
1497	Labouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation?
1497	Last comes the lover of gain?
1497	Last of all comes the tyrannical man, about whom we have to enquire, Whence is he, and how does he live-- in happiness or in misery?
1497	Last of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more to ask, how is he formed out of the democratical?
1497	Let me ask you a question: Are not the several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate function?
1497	Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?
1497	Let us examine this: Is not pleasure opposed to pain, and is there not a mean state which is neither?
1497	Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the world-- plenty of them, are there not?
1497	Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?
1497	Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?
1497	Look at the matter thus:--Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions of the bodily state?
1497	Male and female animals have the same pursuits-- why not also the two sexes of man?
1497	May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you?
1497	May I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion?
1497	May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?
1497	May it not be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman''s life, and thirty in a man''s?
1497	May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?
1497	May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let us go?
1497	May we not be satisfied with that?
1497	May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because they conduce to production?
1497	May we not say that this is the end of a pruning- hook?
1497	May we say so, then?
1497	Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf-- that is, a tyrant?
1497	Must we not ask who are to be rulers and who subjects?
1497	Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?
1497	My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?
1497	Nay, are they not wholly different?
1497	Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?
1497	Need I recall the original image of the philosopher?
1497	Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or boatswains, or the like?
1497	Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices of slaves?
1497	Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?
1497	Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements?
1497	Neither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of Athenian confectionary?
1497	Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?
1497	Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but their armour?
1497	Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another and to their enemies?
1497	Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies?
1497	Next, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the pursuits or arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?
1497	Niebuhr has asked a trifling question, which may be briefly noticed in this place-- Was Plato a good citizen?
1497	No more than this?
1497	No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his father and mother, or to fail in his religious duties?
1497	No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses-- you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?
1497	Nonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search yourself, saying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?
1497	Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, I said, nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?
1497	Nor can the good harm any one?
1497	Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing?
1497	Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?
1497	Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would give the city the name of agricultural?
1497	Nor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a Corinthian girl as his fair friend?
1497	Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?
1497	Not, perhaps, in this brief span of life: but should an immortal being care about anything short of eternity?
1497	Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor arts, are philosophers?
1497	Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?
1497	Now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the true pilot be regarded?
1497	Now is there not here a third principle which is often found to come to the assistance of reason against desire, but never of desire against reason?
1497	Now to which of these classes does temperance belong?
1497	Now what man answers to this form of government- how did he come into being, and what is he like?
1497	Now what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be expected to overcome in such an unequal contest?
1497	Now which is the purer satisfaction-- that of eating and drinking, or that of knowledge?
1497	Now why is such an inference erroneous?
1497	Now you understand me?
1497	Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you ever attended to their pairing and breeding?
1497	Now, I said, every art has an interest?
1497	Now, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry?
1497	Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?
1497	Now, how shall we decide between them?
1497	Now, in such a State, can liberty have any limit?
1497	Now, ought a man to feel pleasure in seeing another do what he hates and abominates in himself?
1497	Now, will you appeal to mankind in general or to the philosopher?
1497	O my friend, is not that so?
1497	Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace?
1497	Of not- being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of being, knowledge?
1497	Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?
1497	Of the three individuals, which has the greatest experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated?
1497	Of what kind?
1497	Of what nature are you speaking?
1497	Of what nature?
1497	Of what sort?
1497	Of what tales are you speaking?
1497	On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice?
1497	Once more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the whole class or a part only?
1497	Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question-- whether the soul has these three principles or not?
1497	One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?
1497	One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in others, as may happen?
1497	One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and another has no music in her nature?
1497	Or any affinity to virtue in general?
1497	Or be jealous of one who has no jealousy?
1497	Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that the art of payment is medicine?
1497	Or can such an one account death fearful?
1497	Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body, although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a spendthrift?
1497	Or drought moisture?
1497	Or have the arts to look only after their own interests?
1497	Or hear, except with the ear?
1497	Or if honour or victory or courage, in that case the judgment of the ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?
1497	Or is the Idea of Good another mode of conceiving God?
1497	Or is there any Homeric way of life, such as the Pythagorean was, in which you instructed men, and which is called after you?
1497	Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,--that is what you mean?
1497	Or must we admit exceptions?
1497	Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?
1497	Or shall I guess for you?
1497	Or shall the dead be despoiled?
1497	Or suppose a better sort of man who is attracted towards philosophy, will they not make Herculean efforts to spoil and corrupt him?
1497	Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the highest good?
1497	Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?
1497	Or the verse''The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger?''
1497	Or was any war ever carried on by your counsels?
1497	Or what shall he profit by escaping discovery, if the concealment of evil prevents the cure?
1497	Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?
1497	Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected?
1497	Or, after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to speak so well?
1497	Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?
1497	Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to oligarchy arises?
1497	Ought I, for example, to put back into the hands of my friend, who has gone mad, the sword which I borrowed of him when he was in his right mind?
1497	Our State like every other has rulers and subjects?
1497	Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just; but why?
1497	Perhaps he of whom we say the last will be angry with us; can we pacify him without revealing the disorder of his mind?
1497	Presently he finds that imputations are cast upon them; a troublesome querist comes and asks,''What is the just and good?''
1497	Reflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object?
1497	Reflect: when a man has an opinion, has he not an opinion about something?
1497	Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State to be the most miserable of States?
1497	Salvation of what?
1497	Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?
1497	Shall Hellenes be enslaved?
1497	Shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and have before now met with such a person?
1497	Shall I give you an illustration of them?
1497	Shall I give you an illustration?
1497	Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?
1497	Shall I tell you why?
1497	Shall they listen to the narrative of Hephaestus binding his mother, and of Zeus sending him flying for helping her when she was beaten?
1497	Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having it?
1497	Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards?
1497	Shall we not?
1497	Shall we propose, as a third branch of our education, astronomy?
1497	Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell us''how discord first arose''?
1497	Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?
1497	Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?
1497	Socrates, what do you mean?
1497	Socrates, who is evidently preparing for an argument, next asks, What is the meaning of the word justice?
1497	Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired?
1497	Something that is or is not?
1497	Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?
1497	Still, I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking?
1497	Still, the dangers of war can not be always foreseen; there is a good deal of chance about them?
1497	Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?
1497	Such will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will they proceed?
1497	Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?
1497	Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire who this imitator is?
1497	Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious-- would the term be suitable?
1497	Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a general notion of them?
1497	Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you truly say, about justice?
1497	Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?
1497	Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?
1497	That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?
1497	That is his meaning then?
1497	That is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?
1497	That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?
1497	That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?
1497	That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?
1497	That will be the way?
1497	The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in counsel?
1497	The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, ill- training, and an evil constitution of the State?
1497	The good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it was maintained was excess of wealth-- am I not right?
1497	The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations?
1497	The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State?
1497	The man is mean, saving, toiling, the slave of one passion which is the master of the rest: Is he not the very image of the State?
1497	The next question is, How shall we treat our enemies?
1497	The next question is, Who are to be our rulers?
1497	The object of one is food, and of the other drink?
1497	The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of opinion?
1497	The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life?
1497	The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you, any longer take the same pains with his art?
1497	The question is asked,--Why are the citizens of states so hostile to philosophy?
1497	The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?
1497	The second paradox leads up to some curious and interesting questions-- How far can the mind control the body?
1497	The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and can not be compounded of many elements?
1497	The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?
1497	The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth?
1497	The very great benefit has next to be established?
1497	The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?
1497	Their pleasures are mixed with pains-- how can they be otherwise?
1497	Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?
1497	Then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge, but lighter than ignorance?
1497	Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?
1497	Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements?
1497	Then a soul which forgets can not be ranked among genuine philosophic natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?
1497	Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?
1497	Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the good soul a good ruler?
1497	Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women?
1497	Then carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers in our little State, which is already beginning to grow?
1497	Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?
1497	Then comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?
1497	Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is least liable to suffer change from without?
1497	Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes?
1497	Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?
1497	Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?
1497	Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations?
1497	Then hirelings will help to make up our population?
1497	Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human life?
1497	Then if being is the subject- matter of knowledge, something else must be the subject- matter of opinion?
1497	Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming only, it does not concern us?
1497	Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual minds will also be five?
1497	Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule prevail?
1497	Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation?
1497	Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with one another?
1497	Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?
1497	Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of imitation?
1497	Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human natures?
1497	Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?
1497	Then in time of peace what is the good of justice?
1497	Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city?
1497	Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?
1497	Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct spheres or subject- matters?
1497	Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body?
1497	Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?
1497	Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?
1497	Then must not a further admission be made?
1497	Then no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love?
1497	Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie?
1497	Then now comes the question,--How shall we create our rulers; what way is there from darkness to light?
1497	Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man''s own, and belongs to him?
1497	Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties?
1497	Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not- being?
1497	Then reflect; has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?
1497	Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth will study?
1497	Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is saying what is not true?
1497	Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover?
1497	Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?
1497	Then the art of war partakes of them?
1497	Then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the source of the greatest good to the State?
1497	Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?
1497	Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?
1497	Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?
1497	Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?
1497	Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill?
1497	Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for he has a double experience?
1497	Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?
1497	Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?
1497	Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by sight?
1497	Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood?
1497	Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number which is three times three?
1497	Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural pleasure, and the king at the least?
1497	Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?
1497	Then the world can not possibly be a philosopher?
1497	Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?
1497	Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from another city?
1497	Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled?
1497	Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?
1497	Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?
1497	Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?
1497	Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends?
1497	Then virtue is the health and beauty and well- being of the soul, and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?
1497	Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated?
1497	Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree beneficial to the State?
1497	Then we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second type of character?
1497	Then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or three times their own number?
1497	Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men-- lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain?
1497	Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?
1497	Then we shall want merchants?
1497	Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred?
1497	Then what is your meaning?
1497	Then what will you do with them?
1497	Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return?
1497	Then who is more miserable?
1497	Then why are they paid?
1497	Then why not sin and pay for indulgences out of your sin?
1497	Then why should you mind?
1497	Then will not the citizens be good and civilized?
1497	Then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war, which they must practise like the men?
1497	Then would you call injustice malignity?
1497	Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practise virtue?
1497	Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions?
1497	Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate?
1497	Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of Sicilian cookery?
1497	Then, I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and melodies, we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?
1497	Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?
1497	Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music?
1497	Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions?
1497	Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end?
1497	Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?
1497	Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the same nurture and education?
1497	Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate?
1497	There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?
1497	There is another which is the work of the carpenter?
1497	There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?
1497	There may come a time when the saying,''Have I not a right to do what I will with my own?''
1497	There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not?
1497	There you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such models to be found and of what tales are you speaking-- how shall we answer him?
1497	These are the three styles-- which of them is to be admitted into our State?
1497	These matters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to Damon himself, for the analysis of the subject would be difficult, you know?
1497	These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?
1497	These, then, are the two kinds of style?
1497	They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?
1497	They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?
1497	This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich?
1497	This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?
1497	Thrasymachus said,''Do you think that we have come hither to dig for gold, or to hear you discourse?''
1497	Thus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the end of music if not the love of beauty?
1497	To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?
1497	To return to the tyrant-- How will he support that rare army of his?
1497	To tell the truth and pay your debts?
1497	To what do you refer?
1497	To what do you refer?
1497	True, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk?
1497	True, he replied; but what of that?
1497	True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?
1497	Undoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts are also excluded, what remains?
1497	Union and force and rhetoric will do much; and if men say that they can not prevail over the gods, still how do we know that there are gods?
1497	Until some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may be the reverse of good?
1497	Very good, I said; then what is the next question?
1497	Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?
1497	Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse?
1497	Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as answer yet one more question?
1497	Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?
1497	Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our enquiry?
1497	Was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort?
1497	Was not this the beginning of the enquiry''What is great?''
1497	We acknowledged-- did we not?
1497	We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?
1497	We can not but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?
1497	We had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and secondly whether they were the most beneficial?
1497	We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?
1497	We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?
1497	We were saying, when we spoke of the subject- matter, that we had no need of lamentation and strains of sorrow?
1497	Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it?--to speak the truth and to pay your debts-- no more than this?
1497	Well then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by God, as I think that we may say-- for no one else can be the maker?
1497	Well then, is not- being the subject- matter of opinion?
1497	Well then, you would admit that the qualities of states mean the qualities of the individuals who compose them?
1497	Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy arise?
1497	Well, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?
1497	Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?
1497	Well, I said, and you would agree( would you not?)
1497	Well, I said, the subject has several difficulties-- What is possible?
1497	Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be effected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing?
1497	Well, and are these of any military use?
1497	Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead?
1497	Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?
1497	Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions of him?
1497	Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?
1497	Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?
1497	Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself?
1497	Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?
1497	Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some occasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?
1497	Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive?
1497	Well, but what ought to be the criterion?
1497	Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?
1497	Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming?
1497	Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?
1497	Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil?
1497	Were not these your words?
1497	What about this?
1497	What admission?
1497	What admissions?
1497	What are these corruptions?
1497	What are they, he said, and where shall I find them?
1497	What are they?
1497	What are they?
1497	What are they?
1497	What are you going to say?
1497	What causes?
1497	What defect?
1497	What did I borrow?
1497	What division?
1497	What do they say?
1497	What do you deserve to have done to you?
1497	What do you mean, Socrates?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you mean?
1497	What do you say?
1497	What do you say?
1497	What do you say?
1497	What do you say?''
1497	What do you think?
1497	What else can they do?
1497	What else then would you say?
1497	What else would you have?
1497	What evil?
1497	What evil?
1497	What evils?
1497	What faculty?
1497	What good?
1497	What is desirable?
1497	What is it?
1497	What is it?
1497	What is it?
1497	What is most required?
1497	What is that you are saying?
1497	What is that?
1497	What is that?
1497	What is that?
1497	What is that?
1497	What is that?
1497	What is that?
1497	What is that?
1497	What is the difference?
1497	What is the process?
1497	What is the proposition?
1497	What is there remaining?
1497	What is to be done then?
1497	What is your illustration?
1497	What is your notion?
1497	What is your proposal?
1497	What limit would you propose?
1497	What makes you say that?
1497	What may that be?
1497	What may that be?
1497	What may that be?
1497	What of this line,''O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag,''and of the words which follow?
1497	What point of view?
1497	What point?
1497	What point?
1497	What principle of rival Sophists or anybody else can overcome in such an unequal contest?
1497	What quality?
1497	What quality?
1497	What question?
1497	What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished?
1497	What shall we say to him?
1497	What should they fear?
1497	What sort of instances do you mean?
1497	What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to being?
1497	What sort of lie?
1497	What sort of mischief?
1497	What study do you mean-- of the prelude, or what?
1497	What tale?
1497	What the poets and story- tellers say-- that the wicked prosper and the righteous are afflicted, or that justice is another''s gain?
1497	What then is the real object of them?
1497	What then?
1497	What trait?
1497	What was the error, Polemarchus?
1497	What was the mistake?
1497	What was the omission?
1497	What way?
1497	What will be the issue of such marriages?
1497	What will be the issue of such marriages?
1497	What will they doubt?
1497	What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this?
1497	What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light?
1497	What, are there any greater still?
1497	What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this-- higher than justice and the other virtues?
1497	What, now, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up?
1497	What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?
1497	What, then, is the nature of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither?''
1497	What?
1497	What?
1497	When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not mean to include that case?
1497	When a man can not measure, and a great many others who can not measure declare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?
1497	When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?
1497	When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?
1497	When is this accomplished?
1497	When mankind see that the happiness of states is only to be found in that image, will they be angry with us for attempting to delineate it?
1497	When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?
1497	Where must I look?
1497	Where then is he to gain experience?
1497	Where then?
1497	Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the State did they spring up?
1497	Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher?
1497	Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?
1497	Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?
1497	Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order-- temperate and harmonious?
1497	Which appetites do you mean?
1497	Which are they?
1497	Which is a just principle?
1497	Which of us has spoken truly?
1497	Which years do you mean to include?
1497	Who better suited to raise the question of justice than Cephalus, whose life might seem to be the expression of it?
1497	Who can be at enmity with one who loves them, who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy?
1497	Who can hate a man who loves him?
1497	Who can measure probabilities against certainties?
1497	Who can weigh virtue, or even fortune against health, or moral and mental qualities against bodily?
1497	Who is he?
1497	Who is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off?
1497	Who is that?
1497	Who that is not a miserable caitiff will refrain from smiling at the praises of justice?
1497	Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians?
1497	Who then can be a guardian?
1497	Who was that?
1497	Whom, I said, are you not going to let off?
1497	Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear?
1497	Whose?
1497	Why do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be answering?
1497	Why do you ask?
1497	Why do you say so?
1497	Why great caution?
1497	Why indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of the mind with clearness?
1497	Why is that?
1497	Why not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?
1497	Why not?
1497	Why not?
1497	Why not?
1497	Why not?
1497	Why not?
1497	Why should he?
1497	Why should they not be?
1497	Why so?
1497	Why so?
1497	Why so?
1497	Why so?
1497	Why, I replied, what do you want more?
1497	Why, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good, and willingly of evil?
1497	Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time?
1497	Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some better than others?
1497	Why, what else is there?
1497	Why, where can they still find any ground for objection?
1497	Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak falsely?
1497	Why, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever identify that which is infallible with that which errs?
1497	Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence?
1497	Why?
1497	Why?
1497	Why?
1497	Why?
1497	Will any one deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature philosophers?
1497	Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion?
1497	Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful?
1497	Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?
1497	Will he not be called by them a prater, a star- gazer, a good- for- nothing?
1497	Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?
1497	Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have-- he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be?
1497	Will he not rather obtain them on the spot?
1497	Will he not think that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect manner?
1497	Will he not utterly hate a lie?
1497	Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race?
1497	Will not a young man''s heart leap amid these discordant sounds?
1497	Will not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?
1497	Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?
1497	Will not their eyes be dazzled, and will they not try to get away from the light to something which they are able to behold without blinking?
1497	Will our citizens ever believe all this?
1497	Will the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them?
1497	Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country?
1497	Will the just state or the just individual steal, lie, commit adultery, or be guilty of impiety to gods and men?
1497	Will they disbelieve us, when we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern?
1497	Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?
1497	Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true wisdom?
1497	Will they not be vile and bastard, devoid of truth and nature?
1497	Will they not be vile and bastard?
1497	Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves?
1497	Will you admit so much?
1497	Will you enquire yourself?
1497	Will you explain your meaning?
1497	Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?
1497	Will you say that the world is of another mind?
1497	Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?
1497	Will you tell me?
1497	Will you tell me?
1497	Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself?
1497	Would a man who wanted to be safe on a voyage take a bad pilot because he was rich, or refuse a good one because he was poor?
1497	Would any one deny this?
1497	Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if he had nothing higher in him?
1497	Would he not be worse than Eriphyle, who sold her husband''s life for a necklace?
1497	Would he not have had many devoted followers?
1497	Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?
1497	Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature, need to have the qualities of a philosopher?
1497	Would that be your way of speaking?
1497	Would the picture of a perfectly beautiful man be any the worse because no such man ever lived?
1497	Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at home with them?
1497	Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?
1497	Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?
1497	Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls?
1497	Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?
1497	Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?
1497	Would you say six or four years?
1497	Would you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better than another?
1497	Would you say that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?
1497	Yes, I said, a jest; and why?
1497	Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason?
1497	Yes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?
1497	Yes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in the first place, that he is of the golden race?
1497	Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered?
1497	Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?
1497	Yes, but also something more-- Is it not doubtful whether our guardians are to be imitators at all?
1497	Yes, but could this ever have happened if Homer had really been the educator of Hellas?
1497	Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely?
1497	Yes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with us and our argument?
1497	Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are the stories which you mean?
1497	Yes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form of government, and what are the defects of which we were speaking?
1497	Yes, he said; how can I deny it?
1497	Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question?--What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth?
1497	Yes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself?
1497	Yes; and is not this true of the government of anything?
1497	Yes; but how in such partnerships is the just man of more use than any other man?
1497	Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?
1497	Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?
1497	You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or to come?
1497	You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?
1497	You have answered me, I replied: Well, and may we not further say that our guardians are the best of our citizens?
1497	You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their servants?
1497	You mean geometry?
1497	You mean that they would shipwreck?
1497	You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule?
1497	You mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer?
1497	You mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being, will maintain him and his companions?
1497	You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?
1497	You mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted into our State?
1497	You recognise the truth of what I have been saying?
1497	You remember what people say when they are sick?
1497	You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?
1497	You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice?
1497	You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?
1497	You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is the same?
1497	You would agree with me?
1497	You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and middle region?
1497	You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?
1497	You would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no self- restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?
1497	You would not be inclined to say, would you, that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact use of language?
1497	You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?
1497	and are not the best judges in like manner those who are acquainted with all sorts of moral natures?
1497	and does not the actual tyrant lead a worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?
1497	and even in their peculiar pursuits, are not women often, though in some cases superior to men, ridiculously enough surpassed by them?
1497	and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most continually and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of men in general?
1497	and how does he live, in happiness or in misery?
1497	and how shall we manage the period between birth and education, which seems to require the greatest care?
1497	and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity?
1497	and must he not be represented as such?
1497	and will any education save him from being carried away by the torrent?
1497	and you would agree that to conceive things as they are is to possess the truth?
1497	and''What is small?''
1497	beat his father if he opposes him?
1497	he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?
1497	he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?
1497	he says;''would you have me put the words bodily into your souls?''
1497	or any greater good than the bond of unity?
1497	or is any invention attributed to you, as there is to Thales and Anacharsis?
1497	or is the subject- matter of opinion the same as the subject- matter of knowledge?
1497	or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake?
1497	or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?
1497	or will he be carried away by the stream?
1497	or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about what he should draw?
1497	or will you make allowance for them?
1497	or would you include the mixed?
1497	or would you prefer to look to yourself only?
1497	or, rather, how can there be an opinion at all about not- being?
1497	or, suppose them to have no care of human things-- why in either case should we mind about concealment?
1497	shall we condescend to legislate on any of these particulars?
1497	were you not saying that he too makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed?
1497	would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?
1497	you are incredulous, are you?