This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.
identifier | question |
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10574 | And are all our pious endeavours now frustrated by the dissolute lives of the priests? |
10574 | Augustine, WHETHER A WOMAN PREGNANT MIGHT BE BAPTIZED? |
10574 | BUT WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE KING OF THAT PROVINCE? |
10574 | Being reproved by William for this ill- timed generosity, he replied, WHAT, SHALL I SUFFER MY BROTHER TO DIE OF THIRST? |
10574 | Besides other queries which it is not material here to relate, Augustine asked, WHETHER COUSIN- GERMANS MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO MARRY? |
10574 | But the king replied:"How can I remedy the oppressions you complain of? |
10574 | Can it be supposed that men of so little weight or importance possessed a negative voice against the king and the barons? |
10574 | Did I deny support and establishments to the clergy and the convents? |
10574 | Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? |
10574 | HOW SOON A HUSBAND MIGHT HAVE COMMERCE WITH HIS WIFE AFTER HER DELIVERY? |
10574 | HOW SOON A MAN MIGHT ENTER THE CHURCH, OR RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT, AFTER HAVING HAD COMMERCE WITH HIS WIFE? |
10574 | HOW SOON AFTER THE BIRTH THE CHILD MIGHT RECEIVE BAPTISM? |
10574 | He sent for Gourdon, and asked him, WRETCH, WHAT HAVE I EVER DONE TO YOU, TO OBLIGE YOU TO SEEK MY LIFE?--WHAT HAVE YOU DONE TO ME? |
10574 | How can these accounts be reconciled to probability, and to the state of the navy in the time of Alfred? |
10574 | How many has he left you? |
10574 | Or that the King of England could not on demand, without oppressing his subjects, have been able to pay him the money? |
10574 | WHERE SHALL WE FIND ANOTHER WHEN HE IS GONE? |
10574 | Was my assistance ever wanting to the poor? |
10574 | When did you call for supplies which I refused you? |
10574 | When objections were made to this novelty, he replied, that the pope exercised that authority; and why might not he imitate the example? |
10574 | When this expedient was first proposed to him, he asked where he should find purchasers? |
10574 | Would it not be very praiseworthy, said the king, to give that poor man a warm coat in this severe season? |
9662 | A man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections? |
9662 | And how far it is possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty? |
9662 | And shall we, rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature? |
9662 | And under what pretence can you embrace the one, while you reject the other? |
9662 | And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings? |
9662 | And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? |
9662 | And what he proposes by all these curious researches?_ He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. |
9662 | And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present? |
9662 | Are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar? |
9662 | Are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects? |
9662 | Are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life, from infancy to old age? |
9662 | Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? |
9662 | But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? |
9662 | But if they had any idea of power, as it is in itself, why could not they Measure it in itself? |
9662 | But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? |
9662 | But still I ask; Why take these attributes for granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? |
9662 | But what do we mean by that affirmation? |
9662 | But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? |
9662 | But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning? |
9662 | But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? |
9662 | But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? |
9662 | By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate to our intellectual view? |
9662 | By what means has it become so prevalent among our modern metaphysicians? |
9662 | Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? |
9662 | Can we give any reason for these variations, except experience? |
9662 | Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? |
9662 | Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? |
9662 | For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy, upon such a supposition? |
9662 | For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? |
9662 | For what is meant by_ innate_? |
9662 | For what reason? |
9662 | Has not the same custom the same influence on all? |
9662 | How could_ politics_ be a science, if laws and forms of goverment had not a uniform influence upon society? |
9662 | How is this remedied by experience? |
9662 | How is this to be accounted for? |
9662 | How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? |
9662 | How many stories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected and exploded in their infancy? |
9662 | How often would the great names of Pascal, Racine, Amaud, Nicole, have resounded in our ears? |
9662 | How shall we reconcile these contradictions? |
9662 | Is it more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition? |
9662 | Is it not experience, which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? |
9662 | Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? |
9662 | Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other? |
9662 | Is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an idea of reflection? |
9662 | Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? |
9662 | May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? |
9662 | May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? |
9662 | On what is this inference based? |
9662 | Or what do you find in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the peace and order of society, is in the least concerned? |
9662 | The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person: Why? |
9662 | The question still recurs, on what process of argument this_ inference_ is founded? |
9662 | This begets a very natural question; What is meant by a sceptic? |
9662 | This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? |
9662 | We need only ask such a sceptic,_ What his meaning is? |
9662 | What logic, what process of argument secures you against this supposition? |
9662 | What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension? |
9662 | What would become of_ history,_ had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind? |
9662 | What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? |
9662 | When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? |
9662 | Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? |
9662 | Whence, do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? |
9662 | Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of each other? |
9662 | Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? |
9662 | Where then is the power, of which we pretend to be conscious? |
9662 | Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? |
9662 | Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a fiction and belief? |
9662 | Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or a tiger? |
9662 | Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a character? |
9662 | Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or liver? |
9662 | Why then do you refuse to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature? |
9662 | Why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them? |
9662 | Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? |
9662 | Why? |
9662 | Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? |
9662 | _ Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?_ No. |
4320 | AND CAN YOU THEN IMAGINE, cried the hero, that Iphicrates WOULD BE GUILTY? |
4320 | After what manner? |
4320 | And can not we easily distinguish between nature and accident, in the one case as well as in the other?] |
4320 | And indeed to what other purpose do all the ideas of chastity and modesty serve? |
4320 | And is not the chief object of vanity, our bravery or learning, our wit or breeding, our eloquence or address, our taste or abilities? |
4320 | And must not this argument bring as strong conviction, in moral as in natural disquisitions? |
4320 | And what has a few months afterwards become of it, when every disposition and thought of all the actors is totally altered or annihilated? |
4320 | And would not the same praise be given it, though snails or vermin had destroyed the peaches, before they came to full maturity? |
4320 | Are not justice, fidelity, honour, veracity, allegiance, chastity, esteemed solely on account of their tendency to promote the good of society? |
4320 | At what time, or on what subject it first began to exist? |
4320 | BUT WHAT RULE HAVE WE, BY WHICH WE CAN DISTINGUISH THESE OBJECTS? |
4320 | But can we ever be in love with the former? |
4320 | But what are the relations, I ask, of which you here talk? |
4320 | But when these different reflections and observations concur in establishing the same conclusion, must they not bestow an undisputed evidence upon it? |
4320 | But who is there that ever heard of such an instinct? |
4320 | But why, in the greater society or confederacy of mankind, should not the case be the same as in particular clubs and companies? |
4320 | But, USEFUL? |
4320 | Can any one seriously deliberate in the case? |
4320 | Does the crime consist in that relation? |
4320 | Does the morality consist in the relation of its parts to each other? |
4320 | For what else can have an influence of this nature? |
4320 | For what purpose make a partition of goods, where every one has already more than enough? |
4320 | For what? |
4320 | HAS HE WIT? |
4320 | HOW COULD SOCIETY SUBSIST UNDER SUCH DISORDERS? |
4320 | Have we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity and benevolence? |
4320 | Have we original innate ideas of praetors and chancellors and juries? |
4320 | How is it determined? |
4320 | How little is requisite to supply the necessities of nature? |
4320 | How? |
4320 | I.]? |
4320 | If the secret direction of the intention, said every man of sense, could invalidate a contract; where is our security? |
4320 | If you demand WHY? |
4320 | In morals too, is not THE TREE KNOWN BY THE FRUIT? |
4320 | In short, what character, or peculiar turn of understanding, is more excellent than another? |
4320 | In what does it consist? |
4320 | Is gratitude no affection of the human breast, or is that a word merely, without any meaning or reality? |
4320 | Is not this fine reasoning? |
4320 | It is by another original instinct, that we recognize the authority of kings and senates, and mark all the boundaries of their jurisdiction? |
4320 | Or if we admit a disinterested benevolence in the inferior species, by what rule of analogy can we refuse it in the superior? |
4320 | Or is this a subject in which new discoveries can be made? |
4320 | Or to conceive, that the very aspect of happiness, joy, prosperity, gives pleasure; that of pain, suffering, sorrow, communicates uneasiness? |
4320 | Or what is it commonly, that gives us any participation in it, even while alive and present, but our affection and regard to him? |
4320 | Shall we account for all THEIR sentiments, too, from refined deductions of self- interest? |
4320 | That it may be alienated by consent, in order to beget that commerce and intercourse, which is so BENEFICIAL to human society? |
4320 | That the property ought also to descend to children and relations, for the same USEFUL purpose? |
4320 | Thus, I have often observed, that, among the French, the first questions with regard to a stranger are, IS HE POLITE? |
4320 | WHAT IS A MAN''S PROPERTY? |
4320 | WHAT IS THAT TO ME? |
4320 | Were the distinction or separation of possessions entirely useless, can any one conceive, that it ever should have obtained in society? |
4320 | What else do we mean by saying that one is rich, the other poor? |
4320 | What habits, of consequence, more blameable? |
4320 | What is it then we can here dispute about? |
4320 | What is the reason, why, by the Athenian laws, one might marry a half- sister by the father, but not by the mother? |
4320 | What need of positive law where natural justice is, of itself, a sufficient restraint? |
4320 | What other passion is there where we shall find so many advantages united; an agreeable sentiment, a pleasing consciousness, a good reputation? |
4320 | What so natural, for instance, as the following dialogue? |
4320 | What then is this rule of right? |
4320 | When it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable? |
4320 | Whether a clear head or a copious invention? |
4320 | Whether a profound genius or a sure judgement? |
4320 | While we are ignorant whether a man were aggressor or not, how can we determine whether the person who killed him be criminal or innocent? |
4320 | Who did ever say, except by way of irony, that such a one was a man of great virtue, but an egregious blockhead? |
4320 | Who sees not, that all these institutions arise merely from the necessities of human society? |
4320 | Who would live amidst perpetual wrangling, and scolding, and mutual reproaches? |
4320 | Whose interest then? |
4320 | Why abridge our native freedom, when, in every instance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial? |
4320 | Why call this object MINE, when upon the seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand to possess myself to what is equally valuable? |
4320 | Why create magistrates, where there never arises any disorder or iniquity? |
4320 | Why dig up the pestilence from the pit in which it is buried? |
4320 | Why give rise to property, where there can not possibly be any injury? |
4320 | Why is this peach- tree said to be better than that other; but because it produces more or better fruit? |
4320 | Why rake into those corners of nature which spread a nuisance all around? |
4320 | Would any man, who is walking along, tread as willingly on another''s gouty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on the hard flint and pavement? |
4320 | Would you have your company coveted, admired, followed; rather than hated, despised, avoided? |
53791 | After what manner therefore do they belong to self, and how are they connected with it? |
53791 | And how can the floor and roof ever meet, while they are separated by the four walls that lie in a contrary position? |
53791 | And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them? |
53791 | And to what end can it serve, either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest? |
53791 | And why is it contrary, unless it be more shocking than any delicate satire? |
53791 | Are not most studious men( and many of them more than I) subject to such reveries or fits of absence, without being exposed to such suspicions? |
53791 | But as we here not only_ feign_ but_ believe_ this continued existence, the question is,_ from whence arises such a belief_? |
53791 | But can any thing be imagined more absurd and contradictory than this reasoning? |
53791 | But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we consider the nature and effects of_ education_? |
53791 | But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? |
53791 | But what have I here said, that reflections very refined and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us? |
53791 | But what is the treachery? |
53791 | But what repose can be tasted in life, when the heart is agitated? |
53791 | Can I be sure that, in leaving all established opinions, I am following truth? |
53791 | Can any thing be supposed more extravagant? |
53791 | Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation? |
53791 | Could Mr Hume, after so many instances of disdain on my part, have still the astonishing generosity as to persevere sincerely to serve me? |
53791 | Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? |
53791 | Do you therefore mean, that it takes not the points in the same order and by the same rule, as is peculiar and essential to a right line? |
53791 | Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflection? |
53791 | Does it attend us at all times, or does it only return at intervals? |
53791 | First, for what reason we pronounce it_ necessary_, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, should also have a cause? |
53791 | For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness? |
53791 | For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? |
53791 | For how can the two walls, that run from south to north, touch each other, while they touch the opposite ends of two walls that run from east to west? |
53791 | For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory? |
53791 | For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different? |
53791 | For if they can not, what possibly can become of them? |
53791 | For what does he mean by_ production_? |
53791 | For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? |
53791 | For whence should it be derived? |
53791 | For why do we blame all gross and injurious language, unless it be, because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and humanity? |
53791 | For why, indeed, should I have any other? |
53791 | For, from what impression could this idea be derived? |
53791 | For, supposing such a conjunction, would the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body? |
53791 | From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? |
53791 | Here, therefore, I must ask,_ What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point_? |
53791 | How can he prove to me, for instance, that two right lines can not have one common segment? |
53791 | How does he know this? |
53791 | How else could any thing exist without length, without breadth, or without depth? |
53791 | How is it possible to make a man easy or happy in a world, to whose customs and maxims he is determined to run retrograde? |
53791 | How then is it possible, that the same substance can at once be modified into that square table, and into this round one? |
53791 | How then shall we adjust those principles together? |
53791 | I first ask mathematicians what they mean when they say one line or surface is_ equal_ to, or_ greater_, or_ less_ than another? |
53791 | I have declared my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surprised if they should express a hatred of mine and of my person? |
53791 | I therefore ask, wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition? |
53791 | If at intervals, at what times principally does it return, and by what causes is it produced? |
53791 | If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after what manner? |
53791 | Is it an impression of sensation or reflection? |
53791 | Is it in every part without being extended? |
53791 | Is it in this particular part, or in that other? |
53791 | Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent? |
53791 | Is it therefore nothing? |
53791 | Is the indivisible subject or immaterial substance, if you will, on the left or on the right hand of the perception? |
53791 | Now I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies or objects to which we suppose solidity to belong? |
53791 | Now''tis certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise, why do we talk and reason concerning it? |
53791 | Now, what idea have we of these bodies? |
53791 | Now, what impression do our senses here convey to us? |
53791 | Now, what is our idea of the moving body, without which motion is incomprehensible? |
53791 | Numquid quæ consecravimus perdidisse nos dicimus? |
53791 | On the back or fore- side of it? |
53791 | On the supposition of my entering into a project to ruin him, how could I think to bring it about by the services I did him? |
53791 | On the surface or in the middle? |
53791 | Or if these colours unite into one, what new colour will they produce by their union? |
53791 | Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest? |
53791 | Or that''tis impossible to draw more than one right line betwixt any two points? |
53791 | Pray, who knows when my door was open or shut, except Mr Hume, with whom I lived, and by whom every body was introduced that I saw? |
53791 | Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possessed of an idea, which is not preceded by any similar impression? |
53791 | Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? |
53791 | Shall we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received? |
53791 | The next question, then, should naturally be,_ how experience gives rise to such a principle_? |
53791 | Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time? |
53791 | We may well ask,_ What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body_? |
53791 | What beings surround me? |
53791 | What can he have said to them, for it is only through him they know any thing of me? |
53791 | What could I divine would be the consequence of such a beginning? |
53791 | What do they know of me, except that I am unhappy, and a friend to their friend Hume? |
53791 | What harm have I done, or could I do to Mr Rousseau? |
53791 | What have I done to Mr Walpole, whom I know full as little? |
53791 | What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? |
53791 | What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falsehood? |
53791 | What then is meant by a distinction of reason, since it implies neither a difference nor separation? |
53791 | What was his design in it? |
53791 | Where am I, or what? |
53791 | Where did he see them? |
53791 | Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated? |
53791 | Which of them shall we prefer? |
53791 | Who could have excited their enmity against me? |
53791 | Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? |
53791 | Why are those enemies all the friends of Mr Hume? |
53791 | Why should I have even them? |
53791 | [ 34] What have I done to Lord Littleton,[35] whom I do n''t even know? |
53791 | [ 34] Why indeed? |
53791 | [ 38] How was it possible for me to guess at such chimerical suspicions? |
53791 | _ What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together_? |
53791 | and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune should at last guide me on her footsteps? |
53791 | and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? |
53791 | but''tis in vain to ask,_ Whether there be body or not_? |
53791 | did this good man borrow those eyes he fixes so sternly and unaccountably on those of his friends? |
4583 | All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the sun? |
4583 | And are you so late in perceiving it? |
4583 | And by being the first, replied DEMEA, might he not have been sensible of his error? |
4583 | And for what reason impose on himself such a violence? |
4583 | And have you at last, said CLEANTHES smiling, betrayed your intentions, PHILO? |
4583 | And if it requires a cause in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of objects into a similar universe of ideas? |
4583 | And is the slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both? |
4583 | And these whence? |
4583 | And what argument have you against such convulsions? |
4583 | And what is this delicacy, I ask, which you blame? |
4583 | And what philosophers could possibly submit to so rigid a rule? |
4583 | And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?... |
4583 | And what shadow of an argument, continued PHILO, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? |
4583 | And where is the difficulty, replied PHILO, of that supposition? |
4583 | And who can doubt of what all men declare from their own immediate feeling and experience? |
4583 | And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? |
4583 | And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and religious? |
4583 | And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all other animals? |
4583 | And, after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? |
4583 | Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory? |
4583 | Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and along with these primary planets round the sun? |
4583 | Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism? |
4583 | Are you secretly, then, a more dangerous enemy than CLEANTHES himself? |
4583 | Are you so late, says PHILO, in teaching your children the principles of religion? |
4583 | Besides, consider, DEMEA: This very society, by which we surmount those wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to us? |
4583 | But according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and advantages which men and all animals possess? |
4583 | But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? |
4583 | But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this nature? |
4583 | But did the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater happiness? |
4583 | But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? |
4583 | But how is it conceivable, said DEMEA, that the world can arise from any thing similar to vegetation or generation? |
4583 | But how oft do they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society? |
4583 | But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself? |
4583 | But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist, why do they remain in life?... |
4583 | But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? |
4583 | But if we stop, and go no further; why go so far? |
4583 | But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? |
4583 | But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? |
4583 | But might not other particular volitions remedy this inconvenience? |
4583 | But what is the consequence? |
4583 | But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk? |
4583 | But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? |
4583 | Can the one opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so? |
4583 | Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and probability? |
4583 | Can you explain their operations, and anatomise that fine internal structure on which they depend? |
4583 | Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of a universe? |
4583 | Do n''t you remember, said PHILO, the excellent saying of LORD BACON on this head? |
4583 | Do we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form? |
4583 | Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? |
4583 | For how can an effect, which either is finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause? |
4583 | For instance, what if I should revive the old EPICUREAN hypothesis? |
4583 | For is it necessary to prove what every one feels within himself? |
4583 | For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to make discoveries especially in so late an age? |
4583 | For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain? |
4583 | For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference? |
4583 | For what other name can I give them? |
4583 | For whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? |
4583 | From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? |
4583 | From their parents? |
4583 | Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? |
4583 | Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? |
4583 | Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move? |
4583 | How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence? |
4583 | How can we satisfy ourselves without going on in infinitum? |
4583 | How could things have been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order somewhere, in thought or in matter? |
4583 | How is this compatible with that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe to the Deity? |
4583 | How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations? |
4583 | How many lie under the lingering torment of diseases? |
4583 | How then does the Divine benevolence display itself, in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? |
4583 | I would fain know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? |
4583 | If no camels had been created for the use of man in the sandy deserts of AFRICA and ARABIA, would the world have been dissolved? |
4583 | If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? |
4583 | In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men? |
4583 | Is a very small part a rule for the universe? |
4583 | Is he able, but not willing? |
4583 | Is he both able and willing? |
4583 | Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? |
4583 | Is it a rule for the whole? |
4583 | Is it any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of life? |
4583 | Is it contrary to his intention? |
4583 | Is it from the intention of the Deity? |
4583 | Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former? |
4583 | Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? |
4583 | Is not such an unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion? |
4583 | Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? |
4583 | Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow? |
4583 | Is the name, without any meaning, of such mighty importance? |
4583 | Is there any other rule than the greater similarity of the objects compared? |
4583 | Now, as to the manner of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or suppose them any wise resembling? |
4583 | Objects, which are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard for each other? |
4583 | Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto? |
4583 | Or how can order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it bestows? |
4583 | Or if the tree was once transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? |
4583 | Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? |
4583 | Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: but how often are they defective? |
4583 | Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any appearance of reason? |
4583 | Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? |
4583 | The economy of final causes? |
4583 | The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part? |
4583 | To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him a notion of its pleasures; whither should I conduct him? |
4583 | To what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such natural and such convincing arguments? |
4583 | Was it Nothing? |
4583 | What data have you for such extraordinary conclusions? |
4583 | What devotion or worship address to them? |
4583 | What is the soul of man? |
4583 | What more useful than all the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, anger? |
4583 | What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe? |
4583 | What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? |
4583 | What veneration or obedience pay them? |
4583 | What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? |
4583 | What woe and misery does it not occasion? |
4583 | Whence arises the curious structure of an animal? |
4583 | Whence can any cause be known but from its known effects? |
4583 | Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? |
4583 | Where then is the difficulty? |
4583 | Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? |
4583 | Why have all men, I ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life?... |
4583 | Why is there any misery at all in the world? |
4583 | Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? |
4583 | Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears,& c.? |
4583 | Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? |
4583 | Why, then, should we think, that order is more essential to one than the other? |
4583 | Would the manner of a leaf''s blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree? |
4583 | You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me, what is the cause of this cause? |
4583 | and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose? |
4583 | and shall we build on that conjecture as on the most certain truth? |
4583 | cried DEMEA, interrupting him, where are we? |
4583 | cried DEMEA: Whither does your imagination hurry you? |
4583 | et omnes Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces? |
4583 | how often excessive? |
4583 | nay often the absence of one good( and who can possess all?) |
4583 | or, why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority, before so young a man as PAMPHILUS? |
4583 | quae ferramenta? |
4583 | quae machinae? |
4583 | quae molitio? |
4583 | quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?" |
4583 | qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? |
4583 | qui vectes? |
4583 | to a ball, to an opera, to court? |
4583 | whence then is evil? |
4583 | why not stop at the material world? |
4705 | A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: Why? |
4705 | After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it? |
4705 | An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? |
4705 | And how can the floor and roof ever meet, while they are separated by the four walls, that lie in a contrary position? |
4705 | And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them? |
4705 | And how distinguish that exactly from a probability? |
4705 | And if they were founded on original instincts, coued they have any greater stability? |
4705 | And to what end can it serve either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest? |
4705 | And what creature departs more widely, not only from right reason, but from his own character and disposition? |
4705 | And why is it contrary, unless it be more shocking than any delicate satire? |
4705 | And, Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object? |
4705 | Are the changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct? |
4705 | Are they therefore, upon that account, immoral? |
4705 | But after what manner does it give pleasure? |
4705 | But can anything be imagined more absurd and contradictory than this reasoning? |
4705 | But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? |
4705 | But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we consider the nature and effects Of EDUCATION? |
4705 | But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? |
4705 | But in what manner? |
4705 | But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible, without an antecedent morality? |
4705 | But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive? |
4705 | But shall we say upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour? |
4705 | But then I ask, if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred? |
4705 | But what do we mean by impossible? |
4705 | But what have I here said, that reflections very refined and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us? |
4705 | But what makes the end agreeable? |
4705 | But what passion? |
4705 | But who will assert, that this is the only foundation of justice? |
4705 | Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation? |
4705 | Do the children arise from this copulation more uniformly, than does the parents care for their safety and preservation? |
4705 | Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception? |
4705 | Do you therefore mean that it takes not the points in the same order and by the same rule, as is peculiar and essential to a right line? |
4705 | Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflection? |
4705 | Does it discover a relation or a matter of fact? |
4705 | For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness? |
4705 | For from what impression coued this idea be derived? |
4705 | For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? |
4705 | For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory? |
4705 | For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different? |
4705 | For if they can not, what possibly can become of them? |
4705 | For is it more certain, that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than that two young savages of different sexes will copulate? |
4705 | For supposing such a conjunction, would the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body? |
4705 | For what does he mean by production? |
4705 | For what does reason discover, when it pronounces any action vicious? |
4705 | For what if he be my enemy, and has given me just cause to hate him? |
4705 | For what is more capricious than human actions? |
4705 | For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? |
4705 | For what reason? |
4705 | For whence should it be derived? |
4705 | For why do we blame all gross and injurious language, unless it be, because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and humanity? |
4705 | For, who ever thought of forbearing any action, because others might possibly draw false conclusions from it? |
4705 | From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? |
4705 | From whence does this proceed, but that the memory in the first case assists the fancy and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions? |
4705 | Have you any notion of self or substance? |
4705 | Here therefore I must ask, What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point? |
4705 | How can he prove to me, for instance, that two right lines can not have one common segment? |
4705 | How do we separate this impossibility from an improbability? |
4705 | How else coued any thing exist without length, without breadth, or without depth? |
4705 | How is it possible they coued ever become objects of pride, except by means of that transition above- explained? |
4705 | How is this to be accounted for? |
4705 | How much more when aided by that circumstance? |
4705 | How then is it possible, that the same substance can at once be modifyed into that square table, and into this round one? |
4705 | How then shall we adjust those principles together? |
4705 | I Does it attend us at all times, or does it only return at intervals? |
4705 | I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? |
4705 | I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? |
4705 | I first ask mathematicians, what they mean when they say one line or surface is EQUAL to, or GREATER or LESS than another? |
4705 | I have declared my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surprized, if they should express a hatred of mine and of my person? |
4705 | I therefore ask, Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition? |
4705 | If at intervals, at what times principally does it return, and by what causes is it produced? |
4705 | If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? |
4705 | If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? |
4705 | If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? |
4705 | Is it an impression of sensation or of reflection? |
4705 | Is it because it is his duty to be grateful? |
4705 | Is it in every part without being extended? |
4705 | Is it in this particular part, or in that other? |
4705 | Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent? |
4705 | Is it therefore nothing? |
4705 | Is self the same with substance? |
4705 | Is the indivisible subject, or immaterial substance, if you will, on the left or on the right hand of the perception? |
4705 | Now I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies or objects, to which we suppose solidity to belong? |
4705 | Now after what manner are they related to ourselves? |
4705 | Now it is certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise why do we talk and reason concerning it? |
4705 | Now the question is, after what manner this utility and importance operate upon us? |
4705 | Now what idea have we of these bodies? |
4705 | Now what impression do oar senses here convey to us? |
4705 | Now what is our idea of the moving body, without which motion is incomprehensible? |
4705 | On the back or fore side of it? |
4705 | On the surface or in the middle? |
4705 | Or if it be possible to imagine, that such errors are the sources of all immorality? |
4705 | Or if it were, is an exception to a general rule in every case criminal, for no other reason than because it is an exception? |
4705 | Or if these colours unite into one, what new colour will they produce by their union? |
4705 | Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest? |
4705 | Or that it is impossible to draw more than one right line betwixt any two points? |
4705 | Or, who ever performed any, that he might give rise to true conclusions?] |
4705 | Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession to private families? |
4705 | Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possest of an idea, which is not preceded by any similar impression? |
4705 | Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? |
4705 | Shall we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received? |
4705 | Should it be asked, what proportion these two species of morality bear to each other? |
4705 | The next question is, Of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us? |
4705 | The next question, then, should naturally be, how experience gives rise to such a principle? |
4705 | The question is, whether these intervals do not afford us the idea of extension without body? |
4705 | Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time? |
4705 | WHETHER IT IS BY MEANS OF OUR IDEAS OR IMPRESSIONS WE DISTINGUISH BETWIXT VICE AND VIRTUE, AND PRONOUNCE AN ACTION BLAMEABLE OR PRAISEWORTHY? |
4705 | We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? |
4705 | What beings surround me? |
4705 | What farther proof can be desired for the present system? |
4705 | What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas? |
4705 | What follows? |
4705 | What if I be in necessity, and have urgent motives to acquire something to my family? |
4705 | What if he be a miser, and can make no use of what I would deprive him of? |
4705 | What if he be a profligate debauchee, and would rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions? |
4705 | What if he be a vicious man, and deserves the hatred of all mankind? |
4705 | What more inconstant than the desires of man? |
4705 | What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? |
4705 | What restraint, therefore, shall we impose on women, in order to counter- balance so strong a temptation as they have to infidelity? |
4705 | What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falshood? |
4705 | When it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable? |
4705 | Where am I, or what? |
4705 | Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated? |
4705 | Which of them shall we prefer? |
4705 | Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the 1st of January 1715, the 11th of March 1719, and the 3rd of August 1733? |
4705 | Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? |
4705 | Why then look any farther, or multiply suppositions without necessity? |
4705 | Why? |
4705 | Why? |
4705 | and on whom have, I any influence, or who have any influence on me? |
4705 | but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? |
4705 | in short, what character, or peculiar understanding, is more excellent than another? |
4705 | whether a clear head, or a copious invention? |
4705 | whether a profound genius, or a sure judgment? |
53792 | A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: why? |
53792 | All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the sun? |
53792 | An action, or sentiment, or character, is virtuous or vicious; why? |
53792 | And are you so late in perceiving it? |
53792 | And by being the first, replied Demea, might he not have been sensible of his error? |
53792 | And for what reason impose on himself such a violence? |
53792 | And have you at last, said Cleanthes smiling, betrayed your intentions, Philo? |
53792 | And how distinguish that exactly from a probability? |
53792 | And if it requires a cause in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of objects into a similar universe of ideas? |
53792 | And if they were founded on original instincts, could they have any greater stability? |
53792 | And is the slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both? |
53792 | And these whence? |
53792 | And what argument have you against such convulsions? |
53792 | And what creature departs more widely, not only from right reason, but from his own character and disposition? |
53792 | And what philosophers could possibly submit to so rigid a rule? |
53792 | And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?... |
53792 | And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? |
53792 | And where is the difficulty, replied Philo, of that supposition? |
53792 | And who can doubt of what all men declare from their own immediate feeling and experience? |
53792 | And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? |
53792 | And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and religious? |
53792 | And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all other animals? |
53792 | And, after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? |
53792 | And,_ Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object_? |
53792 | Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory? |
53792 | Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and along with these primary planets round the sun? |
53792 | Are the changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct? |
53792 | Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism? |
53792 | Are they, therefore, upon that account, immoral? |
53792 | Are you secretly, then, a more dangerous enemy than Cleanthes himself? |
53792 | Are you so late, says Philo, in teaching your children the principles of religion? |
53792 | Besides, consider, Demea: This very society, by which we surmount those wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to us? |
53792 | But according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and advantages which men and all animals possess? |
53792 | But after what manner does it give pleasure? |
53792 | But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? |
53792 | But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? |
53792 | But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this nature? |
53792 | But did the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater happiness? |
53792 | But farther, why may not die material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? |
53792 | But how is it conceivable, said Demea, that the world can arise from any thing similar to vegetation or generation? |
53792 | But how oft do they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society? |
53792 | But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself? |
53792 | But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist, why do they remain in life?.... |
53792 | But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? |
53792 | But if we stop, and go no farther; why go so far? |
53792 | But in what manner? |
53792 | But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? |
53792 | But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible without an antecedent morality? |
53792 | But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? |
53792 | But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive? |
53792 | But might not other particular volitions remedy this inconvenience? |
53792 | But shall we say, upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour? |
53792 | But then I ask, if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred? |
53792 | But what do we mean by impossible? |
53792 | But what is the consequence? |
53792 | But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk, said Demea? |
53792 | But what makes the end agreeable? |
53792 | But what passion? |
53792 | But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? |
53792 | But who will assert, that this is the only foundation of justice? |
53792 | Can the one opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so? |
53792 | Can we reach no farther in this subject than experience and probability? |
53792 | Can you explain their operations, and anatomize that fine internal structure on which they depend? |
53792 | Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house, find the generation of a universe? |
53792 | Do n''t you remember, said Philo, the excellent saying of Lord Bacon on this head? |
53792 | Do the children arise from this copulation more uniformly, than does the parents''care for their safety and preservation? |
53792 | Do we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form? |
53792 | Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception? |
53792 | Does it discover a relation or a matter of fact? |
53792 | Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? |
53792 | For how can an effect, which either is finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause? |
53792 | For instance, what if I should revive the old Epicurean hypothesis? |
53792 | For is it necessary to prove what every one feels within himself? |
53792 | For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to make discoveries especially in so late an age? |
53792 | For it is more certain that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than two young savages of different sexes will copulate? |
53792 | For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain? |
53792 | For what does reason discover, when it pronounces any action vicious? |
53792 | For what if he be my enemy, and has given me just cause to hate him? |
53792 | For what is more capricious than human actions? |
53792 | For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference? |
53792 | For what other name can I give them? |
53792 | For what reason? |
53792 | For whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? |
53792 | For who ever thought of forbearing any action, because others might possibly draw false conclusions from it? |
53792 | From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? |
53792 | From whence does this proceed, but that the memory in the first case assists the fancy, and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions? |
53792 | From_ their_ parents? |
53792 | Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? |
53792 | Have you any notion of_ self_ or_ substance_? |
53792 | Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? |
53792 | Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move? |
53792 | How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence? |
53792 | How can we satisfy ourselves without going on_ in infinitum_? |
53792 | How could things have been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order somewhere, in thought or in matter? |
53792 | How do we separate this impossibility from an improbability? |
53792 | How is it possible they could ever become objects of pride, except by means of that transition above explained? |
53792 | How is this compatible with that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe to the Deity? |
53792 | How is this to be accounted for? |
53792 | How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations? |
53792 | How many lie under the lingering torment of diseases? |
53792 | How then does the Divine benevolence display itself, in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? |
53792 | I would fain know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? |
53792 | If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? |
53792 | If no camels had been created for the use of man in the sandy deserts of Africa and Arabia, would the world have been dissolved? |
53792 | If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? |
53792 | If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? |
53792 | In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men? |
53792 | Is a very small part a rule for the universe? |
53792 | Is he able, but not willing? |
53792 | Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? |
53792 | Is it a rule for the whole? |
53792 | Is it any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of life? |
53792 | Is it because''tis his duty to be grateful? |
53792 | Is it contrary to his intention? |
53792 | Is it from the intention of the Deity? |
53792 | Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former? |
53792 | Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? |
53792 | Is not such an unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion? |
53792 | Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? |
53792 | Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow? |
53792 | Is the name, without any meaning, of such mighty importance? |
53792 | Is there any other rule than the greater similarity of the objects compared? |
53792 | Is_ self_ the same with_ substance_? |
53792 | JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? |
53792 | Justice, whether a natural or artificial Virtue? |
53792 | Now the question is, after what manner this utility and importance operate upon us? |
53792 | Now, after what manner are they related to ourselves? |
53792 | Now, as to the_ manner_ of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or suppose them any wise resembling? |
53792 | Objects, which are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard for each other? |
53792 | Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore prà ¦ sto? |
53792 | Or how can order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it bestows? |
53792 | Or if it be possible to imagine, that such errors are the sources of all immorality? |
53792 | Or if the tree was once transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? |
53792 | Or who ever performed any, that he might give rise to true conclusions? |
53792 | Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession to private families? |
53792 | Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? |
53792 | Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: but how often are they defective? |
53792 | Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any appearance of reason? |
53792 | Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? |
53792 | Should it be asked,_ what proportion these two species of morality bear to each other_? |
53792 | Since, therefore, this is the case with regard to property, and rights, and obligations, I ask, how it stands with regard to justice and injustice? |
53792 | The economy of final causes? |
53792 | The next question is, of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us? |
53792 | The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part? |
53792 | To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him a notion of its pleasures; whether should I conduct him? |
53792 | To what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such natural and such convincing arguments? |
53792 | Was it_ Nothing_? |
53792 | What devotion or worship address to them? |
53792 | What farther proof can be desired for the present system? |
53792 | What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas? |
53792 | What follows? |
53792 | What if I be in necessity, and have urgent motives to acquire something to my family? |
53792 | What if he be a miser, and can make no use of what I would deprive him of? |
53792 | What if he be a profligate debauchee, and would rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions? |
53792 | What if he be a vicious man, and deserves the hatred of all mankind? |
53792 | What is the soul of man? |
53792 | What more inconstant than the desires of man? |
53792 | What more useful than all the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity love, anger? |
53792 | What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call_ thought_, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe? |
53792 | What restraint, therefore, shall we impose on women, in order to counterbalance so strong a temptation as they have to infidelity? |
53792 | What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? |
53792 | What veneration or obedience pay them? |
53792 | What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? |
53792 | What wo and misery does it not occasion? |
53792 | What_ data_ have you for such extraordinary conclusions? |
53792 | When it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable? |
53792 | Whence arises the curious structure of an animal? |
53792 | Whence can any cause be known but from its known effects? |
53792 | Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? |
53792 | Where then is the difficulty? |
53792 | Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? |
53792 | Why have all men, I ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life?.... |
53792 | Why is there any misery at all in the world? |
53792 | Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? |
53792 | Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears,& c.? |
53792 | Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? |
53792 | Why then look any farther, or multiply suppositions without necessity? |
53792 | Why, then, should we think, that order is more essential to one than the other? |
53792 | Why? |
53792 | Why? |
53792 | Would the manner of a leaf''s blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree? |
53792 | You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me, what is the cause of this cause? |
53792 | _ First_, It is directly contrary to experience, and our immediate consciousness? |
53792 | and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose? |
53792 | and shall we build on that conjecture as on the most certain truth? |
53792 | cried Demea, interrupting him, where are we? |
53792 | cried Demea: Whither does your imagination hurry you? |
53792 | et omnes Ignibus à ¦ theriis terras suffire feraces? |
53792 | how often excessive? |
53792 | in short, what character, or peculiar understanding, is more excellent than another? |
53792 | nay often the absence of one good( and who can possess all?) |
53792 | or, why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority, before so young a man as Pamphilus? |
53792 | quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?'' |
53792 | qui minstri tanti muneris fuerunt? |
53792 | qui vectes? |
53792 | quà ¦ ferramenta? |
53792 | quà ¦ machinà ¦? |
53792 | quà ¦ molito? |
53792 | then is he malevolent Is he both able and willing? |
53792 | to a ball, to an opera, to court? |
53792 | whence then is evil? |
53792 | whether a clear head, or a copious invention? |
53792 | whether a profound genius, or a sure judgment? |
53792 | why not stop at the material world? |