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 OK THE 
 
 RIGHT USE OF REASON. 
 
 IK THK 
 
 INqUIRY AFTER TRUTH : 
 
 WITH 
 
 A VARIETY OP RULBB TO GUARD AGAINST ERROR IK THU 
 
 AFFAIRS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN LIFE, AS 
 
 WELL AS IN THE SCIENCES. 
 
 BY ISAAC WATTS, D. D. 
 
 ■\ 
 
 SIXTH AMERICAN EDITION. 
 
 y 
 
 BOSTON, 
 PUBLISHED BY WEST^ RICHAfiDSON & LORD* 
 
 E, P. Walton, Printer, Montpelier, Vt. 
 
 18i9. 
 
"P 
 
 
TO 
 SIR JOHN HARTOPP, Baronet. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 IT is fit the public should receive through your hands 
 what was written originally for the assistance of youir 
 younger studies, and was then presented to you. 
 
 It was by the repeatedimportunitiesofour learned friend 
 Mr. John Eamesy that I was persuaded to revise these rtidi- 
 ments of logic^ and when I had once suffered ray self to be- 
 gin the work, I was drawn still onward far beyond my first 
 design, even to the neglect, or too long delay of other 
 pressing and important demands that were upon mt^^ 
 
 It hajs been my endeavour to form every part of this 
 treatise both for the instruction of students, to open their 
 way into the sciences, and for the more extensive and gen- 
 eral service of mankind, that the gentleman and the Chris* 
 tian might find their account in the perusal as well as the 
 scholar. I have therefore collected and proposed the chief 
 principles and rul^ of ridit judisfment in matters of com- 
 mon and sacred importance, and pointed out our most fre- 
 quent mistakes and prejudices in the concerns of life and 
 religion, that we might better guard against the springs of 
 error, guilt and sorrow, which surround us in our state of 
 mortality. 
 
 You know, Sir, the great design of this noble science is 
 to rescue our reasoning powers from their unhappy slav- 
 ery and darkness 5 and thus, with all due submission and 
 deference, it offers an humble assistance to divine revela- 
 tions. Its chief business is to relieve the natural weakness- 
 es of the mind by some better efforts of nature; it is to 
 diffuse alight over the understanding in our inquiries after 
 truth, and not to furnish the tongue with debate and con- 
 troversy. True logic is not that noisy thing that deals all 
 in dispute and wrangling, to which former ages had debas- 
 ed and confined it 5 yet its disciples must acknowledge 
 also, that they are taught to vindicate and defend tha 
 
iv DEDICATION- 
 
 truth, as well as to seareh it out True logic doth DOt re- 
 quire a long detail of hard words to amuse mankind, and 
 to puff up the mind with empty sounds, and a pride of false 
 learning ; yet some distinctions and terms of art are ne- 
 cessary to range every idea in its proper class, and to keep 
 our thoughts from confusion. The world is now grown so 
 wise as not to suffer this valuable art to be engrossed by 
 the schools. In so polite and knowing an age every man 
 of reason will covet some acquaintance with logic^ since it 
 renders its daily service to ivisdom and vhiue^ and to the 
 affairs of common life, as well as the sciences. 
 
 I will not presume, Sir, that this little book is improved 
 since its first composure in proportion to the improvements 
 of 5^our manlj^ age. But when you shall please to review 
 it in your ret'red hours, perhaps you may refresh your 
 own memory in some of the early parts of learning : And 
 if yo. find all the additional remarks and rules made so 
 familiar to you already by your own observation, that 
 there is nothing new among them, it will be no unpleasing 
 reflection that you have so far anticipated the present zeal 
 and labour of, 
 
 SIRy 
 
 Your most FaithfuU and 
 
 Oiedimt Servant^ 
 
 I. WATTS- 
 London, Aug- 24, 1724. 
 
INTRODUCTION, 
 
 AND 
 
 GENERAL SCHEME. 
 
 LOGIC is the art of using Reason* well in our inquiries- 
 after truthy and the communication of it to others, 
 ^ Reason* is the glory of human nature; and one of the 
 chief eminences whereby we are raised above our fellow- 
 creatures, the brutes, in this lower world. 
 
 Reason as to the power and principles of it, is the com- 
 mon gift of God to all men ; though all are not favoured 
 with it by nature in an equal degree : But the acquired im" 
 provements of it, in different men, make a mucli greater 
 distinction between them than nature had made. I could 
 even venture to say, that the improvement of reason hath 
 raised the learned and tJie prudent, in the European world, 
 almost as much above the Hottentots^ and other savages of 
 Africa^ as those savages are by nature superior to the birds, 
 the beasts, and the fishes. 
 
 Now, the design of logic is to teach us the right use of 
 our reason^ or intellectual poioers, and the improvement of 
 them in ourselves and others ;. this is not only necessary, in 
 order to attain any competent knowledge in the sciences , or 
 the affairs of learning, but to govern botli the greater and 
 the meaner actions of life. It is the cultivation of our rea- 
 son, by which we are better enabled to distinguish g-ooc? 
 from evily as wellas truth fYom falsehood: And both these 
 are matters of the highest importance, whether we regard 
 this life, or the life to come. 
 
 The pursuit and acquisition of truth h of infinite con- 
 cernment to mankind. Hereby we become acquainted 
 
 * The word REASON^ in this place^ is not confined to the mere 
 faculty of reasoning, or infering one thing from another, but ingjudes 
 all the intellectual powers of man., 
 A2 
 
vi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 with the nature of things, both in heaven and earth, and 
 their various relations to each other. It is by this mean 
 we discover our duty to God and our fellow creatures : By 
 this we arrive at the knowledge of natural religion^ and 
 learn to confirm our faith in divine revelation^ as well as 
 to understand what is revealed. Our wisdom, prudence, 
 and piety, our present conduct, and our future hope, are 
 all influenced by the use oiowx rational powers in the search 
 after ti^th. 
 
 There are several things that make it very necessary 
 that our reason should have some assistance in the exer- 
 cise or use of it. 
 
 The first is the depth and difficulty of many truths. ?Lni 
 the weakness of our reason to see far into things at once, and 
 penetrate to the bottom of them. It was a saying among the 
 ancients, Feri^as inputco^ " Truth lies in a well^" and to 
 carry on this metaphor, we may very justly say, that logic 
 does, as it were, supply us with steps whereby we may go 
 down to reach the waier ; or it frames the links of a chain, 
 whereby we may draw the water up from the bottom. 
 Thus, by the means of many reasonings well connected 
 together, philosophers in our age have drawn a thousand 
 truths out of the depths of darkness, which our fathers 
 were utterly uij acquainted with. 
 
 Another thing that makes it necessary for our reason to 
 have some assistance given it, is the disguise and false coU 
 ours in ivhich many things appear to us in this present im* 
 perfect state : There are a thousand things which are not 
 in reality what they appear to be, and that both in the 
 natural and the moral world : So the mn appears lo be flat 
 as a plate of silver, and to be less than twelve inches in 
 diameter: The moon appears to be as big as the sun, and 
 the rainboNv appears to be a large substantial arch in the 
 sky ; all which are in reality gross falsehoods. So 
 knavery ipuis on the fsice of justice ^ hypocrisy and super- 
 stition, wear the vizard of piety ; deceit and evil are often 
 clothed in the sliapes and appearances of truth and good- 
 Qiess. Now, logic helps us to strip oft' the outward disguisa 
 qf things, and to behold them, and judge of them in their 
 own nature. 
 
INTRODUCTION. - vii 
 
 There is yet a further proof that our intellectual or ra- 
 tional powers need some assistance, and that is because 
 they are so frait and fallible in the present state : We are 
 imposed upon at home as well as abroad : We are deceived 
 by • our senses^ by our imaginations y by our passions and 
 appetites^ by the authority of men, by education and cus- 
 tom, &c. and we are led into frequent errors, by judging 
 according to the nature of things. Something of this frail- 
 ty is owing to our very constitution^ man being compound- 
 ed of flesh and spirit : Something of it arises from our m- 
 fant'Stat6y and our growing up by small degrees to man- 
 hood, so that we form a thousand judgments before our 
 reason is mature. But there is still more of it owing to 
 our original defection from God, and the foolish and evil 
 dispositions that are found in fallen man : So that one 
 great part of the design of logic is to guard us against the 
 delusive influences of our meaner powers, to cure the mis- 
 takes of immature judgment, and to rai^e us in some 
 measure from the ruins of our falL 
 
 It is evident enough, from all these things, that our rea^ 
 son needs the assistance of art m our inquiries after truth 
 or duttj ; and, without some skill and diligence, in forming 
 our judgments aright,, we shall be led into frequent mis- 
 takes, both in matters of scienee, and in matters of prac*' 
 tice; and some of these mistakes may prove fatal too. 
 
 The art oflogicy even as it assists us to gain the knowl- 
 edge of the sciences, leads us on toward virtue and happi- 
 ness I for all Q\xx speculative aGquaintance with things should 
 be made subservient to our better conduct in the civil and 
 religious life. This is infinitely more valuable than all 
 speculations y and a wise man will use them chiefly for 
 this better purpose. 
 
 All the good judgment and prudence that any man exp- 
 erts in his common concerns of life^ without the advan- 
 tage of learning, is called wiwraZ Zogt'c: And it is but a 
 higher advancement, and a farther assistance of our ra- 
 tional powers, that is designed by, and expected from, this 
 artificial logic. 
 
 In order to attain this, we must inquire what are the 
 principal operations of the mind ^ which are put foi^th in the 
 exercise of our reason ? and we &haU find them to be these. 
 
viii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 four, namely, perception^ judgment^ argumentation^ and 
 disposition » 
 
 Now, the Art of Logic is composed of those observa- 
 tions and ru'es which men have made about these four op- 
 erations of the mind, perception^ judgment, reasoning y and 
 disposition^ m order to assist and improve them. 
 
 I. PerceptioniConcepiiony or apprehensio?^, is the mere 
 simple contemplation of things ofiered to our minds, with- 
 out affirming or denying any thing concerning them. So 
 we conceive or think of a horse, a tree^ high, swift y slowy 
 animal, time, motion, matter, mind, life, death, 8[c, The 
 form under which these things appear to the mind, or the 
 result of our conception or apprehension, is called anirfea. 
 
 n. JiArdgment is that operation of the mind whereby we 
 join two or more ideas together by one affirmatidn or ne- 
 gation ; that is, we either affirm or deny this to be that. 
 So This tree is high ; That horse is^not swift ; The mind of 
 man is a thinking being ; Mere matter has no thought he- 
 longing to it; God is just ; Good men are often miser ahle 
 in the world ; A righteous governor will make a difference 
 hetwixt the evil and the good; which sentences are the ef- 
 fect of judgment^ and are called propositions^ 
 
 111. Argumentation or reasoning is that operation of the 
 mind, whereby we infer one thing, that is, one proposition 
 from two or more propositions premised. Or, it Is the 
 drawing a conclusion, which before was either unknown, 
 or dark, or doubtful, frem some propositions which are 
 more known and evident. So, when we have judged that 
 matter cannot think, and that the mind ofwMn doth think, 
 Ave then infer and conclude, that therefore the mind of man 
 is not Tnatter, 
 
 So we judge, that a just governor will make a difference 
 between the evil and the good; we judge also, that God is a 
 just governor; and from thence we conclude, that God 
 will make a difference between the evil and the good. 
 
 This argumentation may be carried on farther : Thus, 
 God will one time or another make a differefice between the 
 good and the evil: But there is little or no difercnce made 
 m this world : Therefore ihei^e must be anotlwr world where' 
 in this difference shall be made. 
 
INTRODUCTION. ix 
 
 These inferences or conclusions are the effects of reason- 
 ing 5 and the three propositions, taken all together, are 
 all called a syllogism or argument. 
 
 IV. Disposition is that operation of the mind, whereby 
 wa put the ideas, propositions, and arguments, which we 
 have formed concerning one subject, into such an order as 
 is fittest to gain the clearest knowledge of it, to retain it 
 longest, and to explain it to others in the best manner : 
 Or, in short, it is the ranging of our thoughts in such or- 
 der as is best for our own and others conception and mem- 
 ory. The effect of this operation is called method. This 
 very description of the four operations of the mind and 
 their effects^ in this order ^ is an instance or example of 
 method. 
 
 Now as the art of logic assists our conceptions, so it 
 gives us a large and comprehensive view of the subjects we 
 inquire into, as well as a clear and distinct knowledge of 
 them. As it regulates ouv judgment and our reasonings so 
 it secures us from mistakes, and gives us a true and certain 
 knowledge of things ; and, as it furnishes us with method, 
 so it makes our knowledge of things both easy and regular, 
 and guards our thoughts^from confusion. 
 
 Logic is divided into four parts, according to these four 
 operations of the mind, which it directs, and therefore we 
 shall treat of it in this order. 
 
THE 
 FIEST PART OF LOGIC- 
 
 OF PERCEPTIONS AND IDEAS. 
 
 THE first part of Logic contains observations and 
 precepts about the first operation of the mind, perception or 
 conception: And^ since all our knowledge, how wide and 
 large soever it grow, is founded upon our conception and 
 ideas, here we shall consider, 
 
 1. The general nature of them. 
 
 2. The objects ol our conception, or the archetypes or patterns of 
 these ideas. ^^ 
 
 3. The several divisions of them* 
 
 4. The words and terms whereby our ideas are expressed* 
 
 5. General directions about our ideas. 
 
 6* Special rules to direct our conceptions. 
 
 CHAfTEK 1. 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF IDEAS. 
 
 FIRST, the nature of conception or perception shall 
 just be mentioned,* though this may seem to belong to 
 another science rather than Logic. 
 
 Perception is that act of the mind, or (as some philoso- 
 phers call it) rather a passion or impression, whereby the 
 mind becomes conscious of anything; as, when I feel 
 hunger, thirst, or cold, or heat j when I see a horse, a tree 
 
 * Note— The words conception and per option are often used pro- 
 miscuously, as I have done here, because I would not embarrass a 
 learner with too many distinctions; but, if I were to distinguish 
 thenn, I would say, perception is the consciousness of an object when 
 present; conception is the fotmiv^ an idea of the object, whethe 
 present or absent. 
 
12 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 
 
 or a man ; when I hear a human voice, or thunder, I am 
 conscious of these things, and this is called perception. If 
 I study, meditate, wish, or fear, I am conscious of these 
 inward acts also, and my mind perceives its own thoughts^ 
 wishes^ fears y §-c. 
 
 An idea is generally defined a representation of a thing in 
 the mind; it is a representation of something that we have 
 see7ijfdtf heardy Sfc, or been conscious of. That notion or 
 form of a horse, a tree, or a man, which is in the mind, is 
 called the idea of a horse^ a tree, or a man. 
 
 That notion of hunger, cold, sound, colour, thought, or 
 wish, or fear, which is in the mind, is called the idea of 
 hunger, cold, sound, wish, &c* 
 
 It is not the outward object, or thing which is perceived^ 
 namely, the horse, the man, &c» nor is it the very pircep' 
 Hon or sense, and feeling, namely, of hunger, or cold, &c. 
 which is called the idea ; but it is the thing as it exists in 
 the mind by way of conception or representation, that is 
 properly called the idea^ whether the object be present or 
 absent. 
 
 As a horse, a man, a tree, are the outward objects of our 
 perception, and the outward archetypes or patter/is of our 
 ideas; so for our own sensations of hunger, cold, &c. are 
 also inward archetypes or 2^^ttems of oar ideas: But the no* 
 iions or pictures of these things, as they are considered, or 
 conceived in the mind, are precisely the ideas that we have 
 to do with in Logic. To see a horse, or to feel cold, is one 
 thing ; to thinlc of, and converse about a man, a horse, hun- 
 ger, or cold, is another. 
 
 Among all these ideas, such as represent bodies are gen- 
 erally called images, especially if the idea of the shape be 
 included. Those inward representations which we have of 
 spirit, thought^ love, hatred^ cause, effect, ^c. are more^i^r^ 
 and mental ideas, belonging more especially to the mind, 
 and carry nothing of shape or sense in them. But I shall 
 have occasion to speak more particularly of the original 
 and the distinction otideas in the third chapter. I proceed 
 therefore now to consider the objects ofowv ideas. 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. IS 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION. 
 SECT. I. 
 
 OF BEING IN GENERAL. 
 
 \ THE object of perception is that which is represented 
 in the idea, that which is the archetype or pattern^ accord- 
 ing to whi«h the idea is formed ; and XYms judgments^ pro^ 
 positions^ rectsons, and long discourses may all become the 
 objects of perception ; but in this place we speak chiefly 
 of the Jirst and most simple objects of it, before they are 
 joined and formed into propositions or discourses. 
 
 Every object of our idea is called a theme^ whether it be 
 a hehig or not-being ; for not-being may be proposed to 
 our thoughts, as well as that which has a real being. But 
 let us first treat of beings^ and that in the largest extent 
 of the word. 
 
 A being is considered as possible^ or as actual. 
 
 When it is considered as possible^ it is said to have an 
 essence or nature ; such were all things before their creation : 
 When it is considered as actual^ then it is said to have ix- 
 istence also ; such are all things zvhich m^e created^ and God 
 himself the creator. 
 
 Essence^ therefore, is but the very nature of any being, 
 whether it be actually existing or not. A rose in winter 
 has an essence^ in summer it has existence also. 
 
 'Note. — There is but one being which includes existencem 
 the very essence of it, and that is God, who therefore ac- 
 tually eocists by natural and eternal necessity ; but the ac- 
 tual existence of every creature is very distinct from its 
 essence^ for it may Z>e, or may not be^ as God pleases. 
 
 Again — Every being is considered either as subsisting in 
 and by itself, and then it is called a substance ; or it sub- 
 sists in and by another, and then it is called a mode or man- 
 ner of being ; though few writers allow mode to be called a 
 being in the same perfect sense as a substance is ; and some 
 Rhodes have evidently more of real entity or being than 
 others, as will appear when we come to treat of them. 
 These things will furnish us Avith matter for large discourse 
 in the following sections. 
 
 B 
 
14 LOGIC ; OR THE Part I. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 OF SUBSTANCES AND THEIR VARIOUS KINDS. 
 
 A SUBSTANCE is a being which can subsist by it- 
 self, witliout dependauce upon any other created being. 
 The notion of subsisting by itself gives occasion to logi- 
 cians to call it a substance. So a horse, a house, wood, 
 stone, water, fire, a spirit, a body, an angel, are called 
 substances, because they depend on nothing but God for 
 their existence. 
 
 It has been usual also, in the description of substance^ to 
 add, it is that which is the subject of modes or accidents : 
 a body is the substance or subject, its shape is the mode. 
 
 But, lest we be led into mistakes, let us here take notice, 
 that, when a substance is said to subsist without dependence 
 upon another created being; all that we mean is, that it 
 cannot be annihilated, or utterly destroyed and reduced to 
 nothing, by any power inferior to that of our Creator ; 
 though its present particular form, nature, and properties, 
 may be altered and destroyed by many inferior causes : A 
 horse may die, and t&rn to dust 3 wood may be turned in- 
 to fire, smoke, and ashes ; a house into rubbish, and water 
 into ice or vapour ; but the substance or matter of which 
 they are made stiil remains, though the forms and shapes 
 of it are altered. A body may ceaSe to be a house or a 
 horse, but it is a body still 5 and in this sense it depends 
 only upon God for its existence. 
 
 Among substances, some are thinking or conscious be- 
 ings, or have a power of thought, such as the mind of man, 
 Godj angels. Some are extended and solid or impenetrable, 
 that is, they have dimensions of length, breadth, and depth, 
 and have also a po.ver of resistance, or to exclude every 
 thing of the same kind from being in the same j)iace 
 This is the proper character of matter or body. 
 
 As for the idea 01 Space, whellier Jtbe void or fuH, that 
 i$, a vacuum or a plenum^ whether it be interspersed among 
 all bodies, or may be supposed to reach beyond the bounds 
 of the creation, it is an argument too long and too liard 
 to be disputed in this place what the nature of it is : It has 
 
Chap, II, RIGHT USE OF REASON, 15 
 
 been much debated whether it be a real substance, or a 
 mere conception of the mind ; whether it be the immensi- 
 ty of the divine nature, or the mere order of co-existent 
 beings ; whether it be the manner of our conception of the 
 distances of bodies, or a mere nothing. Therefore I drop 
 the mention of it here, and refer the reader to the first 
 essay among the Philosojihical EssaTjs, by 1, JF, published 
 m 1733, 
 
 Now if we seclude Space out of our consideration, tliere 
 wiil remain but two sorts of substances in the world, that 
 is, Matter and Mindy or as we otherwise call them, Body 
 and Spirit ; at least we have no ideas of any other sub- 
 stances but these.* 
 
 * Because men have different ideas end notions of Su bstances, I 
 thought it not proper entirely to omit all accounts of them, and there- 
 fore have thrown them into the margin, 
 
 Some philosophers suppose that our acquaintance with matter or 
 mind reaches no farther than the mere properties of them, and that 
 there is a sort of unknown being, which is the substance or the sub^ 
 ject by which these properties o£ solid extension and of cogitation are 
 supported, and in which these properties inhere or exist, But per- 
 haps this notion arises only from our turning the mere abstracted or 
 logical notion of substance or stlf-subsisting into the notiojri of a dis- 
 tinct physical or natural being, without any necessity. Solid extension: 
 seems, to me, to be the very substance of matter, or of all bodies 5 
 and a power of thinking, which is always in act, seems to be the ve- 
 ry substance of all spirits ; for God himself is an intelligent almighty- 
 power ; nor is there any need to seek for any other secret and un- 
 known being, or abstracted substance, entirely distinct from these, irr 
 order to support the several modes or properties of matter or mrnd» 
 for these two ideas are sufficient for that purpose ; therefore I rathec 
 think these are substances* 
 
 It must be confessed, when we say, Spirit is a thinking substance, 
 and Matter is an extended solid substance, we are sometimes ready to 
 imagine that extension and solidity are but n\ere modes and proper- 
 ties of a certain unknown substance or subject which supports them, 
 and which we call body ; and that a power of thinking is but a mere 
 mode and property of some unknown substance or subject which sup^ 
 ports it, and which we call spirit : But I rather take this to be a mere 
 mistake, which we are led into by the grammatical form and use o£ 
 words; and perhaps our logical way of thinking by substances and 
 modes, as well as our grammatical way of talking by substantives 
 and adjectives, help to delude us into the supposition. 
 
 However, that 1 may nor be wanting to any cf my readers, I would 
 let them know Mr, Locke's opinion, which has obtained much in the 
 present age; and it is this: *♦ That our idea of [any particular sub- 
 
16 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 Among substances, some are called simple, some are 
 compound^ whether the words be taken in a philosophical 
 or a vulgar sense. 
 
 Simple substances, in a philosophical seme are either spirits 
 which have no manner of composition in them, and in this 
 sense God is called a simple heiyig ^ or tliey are the first 
 principles of bodies, which are usually called elements, of 
 which all other bodies are compounded : Elements are such 
 substances as cannot be resolved, or reduced into two or 
 more substances of different kinds. 
 
 The various sects of philosophers have attributed the 
 honour of this name to various things. The Peripatetic, 
 or followers o^ Aristotle^ made, Fire, Air, Earth, and Wa- 
 ter, to be the four elements of which all earthly things vvere 
 compounded ; and they supposed the heavens to he 2i quint- 
 essences ox fifth sort of body, distinct from all these : But, 
 
 stance is only such a combination of simple ideas as represent that 
 thing as subsisting by itself, in which the supposed or confused idea 
 ef substance (such as it is) is always ready to offer itself. It is con. 
 junction of ideas co-existing in such a cause of their union, and makes 
 the whole subject subsist by itself, though the cause of their union be 
 unknown ; and our general idea of substance arises from the self* 
 subsistence of this collection of ideas. 
 
 Now if this notion of substance rest here, and be considered merely 
 as an unknown cause of the union of properties, it is much more easy 
 to be admitted; but, if we proceed to suppose a sort of real, substan- 
 tial, distinct being,, different from solid quantity or extension in bodies, 
 and different from a power of thinking in spirits, in my opinion it is 
 the introduction of a needless scholastical notion into the real nature 
 of things, and then fancying it to have a real existence. 
 
 Mr. Locke, in his Essay of Human understanding, Book 2. chap. 
 22, § 2» seems to ridicule this common idea of substance, which rrten 
 have generally supposed to be a sort of substratum, distinct from all 
 properties whatsoever, and to be the support of all properties. Yet, 
 in Book 4, chap, 3. § 6. he seenns to suppose there may be such an 
 unknown substratum, which may be capable of receiving the proper- 
 ties both of matter and of mind, namely, extension, solidity, and co- 
 gitation; for he supposes it possible for God to add cogitation lo that 
 substance which is corporeal, and thus to cause matter to think. If 
 this be true, then spirits (for aught we know) may be corporeal be- 
 ings, or thinking bodies^ which is a doctrine too favourable to the mor- 
 tality of the soul. But 1 leave these debates to the philosophers of the 
 age^ and will not be too positive in my opinion of this abstruse subject. 
 See more of this argument in Philosophical Essays^ before cited^ 
 F,5say 2d. 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 17 
 
 since experimental philosophy and mathematics have been 
 better understood, this doctrine has been abundantly re- 
 futed. The Chemists make Spirit, Salt, Sulphur , Water ^ 
 and Earthy to be their five elements^, because they can re- 
 duce all terrestrial things to these five : This seems to come 
 nearer the truth 5 though they are not all agreed in this 
 enumeration of elements. In short, our modern philoso- 
 phers generally suppose matter or body to be one simple 
 principle, or solid extension, which being diversified by its 
 various shapes, quantities, motions, and situations, makes 
 all the varieties that are found in the universe ; and theie- 
 fore they make little use of the word element. 
 
 Compound substances are made up of two or more simpl& 
 substances : So every thing in this whole material crea- 
 tion, that can be reduced by the art of man into two or 
 more different principles, or substances, is a compound bo-- 
 dy in the philosophical sense. 
 
 But, if we take the words simple and compound in a vul- 
 gar sense, then all those are simple substances which are 
 generally esteemed uniform in their nature. So every 
 herb is called a simple^ and every metal ^.mineral; though 
 the chemist perhaps may find all his several elements Ik 
 each of them. So a needle is ?i simple ho Ay , being only 
 made of steel ; but a sword or a knife is a compound, be- 
 cause its haft or handle is made of materials different from 
 the blade. So the Bark of Peru, or the Juice of the Sorrel, 
 is a simple medicine : But, when the apothecary^s art has 
 mingled several simples together^ it beconies a compound j 
 SiS Diascordium, ov Mithridate. 
 
 The terms of pure and mixt, when applied to bodies, are 
 much akin to simple and compound. So a guinea is pure 
 gold, if it has nothhig but gold in it, vvitliout any alloy of 
 baser metal : But, if any other mineral or metal be min- 
 gled with it, it is called a mixt substance or body. 
 
 Substances are also divided into animate and inanimate^ 
 Animated substances are either animal or vegetable,^ 
 
 * NOTE. — Vegetables, as well as animals,^ have gotten the name 
 of animated substances, because some ©f the ancients supposed herbs 
 and plants, beasts and birds^ 5;c» to have a sort of sdul^ distinct from, 
 luatter^ or body. 
 
 B S 
 
18 LOOrC : OR, THE Part. L 
 
 Some of the animal substances have various organical or 
 instrumental parts, fitted for a variety of motions from 
 place to place, and a spring of life within themselves, as 
 beasts, birds, fishes, and insects 5 these are called animals. 
 Other animated substances are called vegetables, whiclihave 
 within themselves the principles of another Sort of life and 
 growth, and of various productions of leaves, flowers and 
 fruits, such as we see in plants, herbs, and trees. 
 
 And there are other substances, which are called inani- 
 Tiiatey because tliey have no sort of life in them, as earth, 
 stone, air, water, &c. 
 
 There is also one sort of substance or being, which rs 
 compounded of hody^w^ mind, or a rational spirit united 
 to an animal ; such is mankind. Angels, or any other be- 
 iiigs of the spiritual and invisible world, who have assum- 
 ed visible sliapes for a season, can hardly be reckoned a- 
 mong this order of compounded beings ; because they 
 drop their bodies, and divest themselves of those visible 
 hapeS, when their particular message rs performed, arid 
 thereby shew that these bodies do not belong to their na- 
 AiTes. " 
 
 SECT. Ifl. 
 
 ^F udistMy Ayi^rlHEm vAitio^ kinds ; and j»irst> of essitn? 
 
 TIAL AND ACCrDENTAL MODES. 
 
 THE Ilex t sort of objects which are represented in our 
 ideas, are C2^\Qi^ modes or manners of being .'^ 
 
 A mode \s that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but 
 s shvays esteemed as belonging to, and subsisting by the 
 .elp of some substance, which^ for that reason, is called its 
 subject. A mode must depend on that substance for its ve- 
 ry existence and being ; and that not as a being depends 
 on its cause^ (for so substances themselves depend on God. 
 
 * Ko'TE — The term mode is by some authors appUed chiefly to 
 the relations, or relative manners of being. But in logical treatises^ 
 it is often used in a larger sense^ and extends to all attributes 'what- 
 soever^ andir.cludes the most essential and inward properties^ as well 
 as outv^^ard respects and relations^ ^nd reaches to actions themselver.^ 
 as w€ll t^s m;vuners of action. 
 
Chap, II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 19 
 
 their creator *^) but the very being of a mode depends on 
 some substance for its subject^ in which it is. or to which it 
 belongs 5 so motion, shape, quantity, weight, are modes of 
 the body; knowledge, wit, folly, love, doubting, judging, 
 SLYe modes of the mind ; for the one cannot subsist without 
 body^ and the other cannot subsist without mind. 
 
 Modes have their several divisions, as well as substances. 
 
 I. Modes are either essential or a>ccideutal. 
 
 kn essential mode ov attribute/\% that which belongs to 
 the very nature or essence of the subject wherein it is $ and 
 the subject can never have the same nature without it; 
 such is roundness in a bowl, hardness in a stone, softness in 
 water, vitalmotion in an animal, solidity in matters, think" 
 ing in a spirit ; for, though that piece of wood which is 
 now a bowl may be made square^ yet, if roundfiess be tak- 
 en away, it is no longer a bowl : so, that very flesh and 
 bones, which is now an anmaZ, may be without life or in- 
 ward motion ; but if all motion be entirely gone, it is no 
 longer an animal, but a carcass ; so, if a body or matter be 
 'Ahested o£ solidity, it is a nrere void space, or nothing; 
 and, if spirit be entirely without ^AmArin^, I have no idea 
 of any thing that is left in it; therefore, so far as I am 
 aWe to judge, co7iciou$ness must be its essential attribute.* 
 Thus all the perfections of God are called his uttributes^ 
 for he cannot i>e without them. 
 
 An essential m&de is either primary ox secondary, 
 
 A primary essentiail mode is the first or chief thing that 
 constitutes any being in its particular essence or nature, and 
 makes it to be that which it is, and distinguishes it from 
 all other beings : This is called the difference in the defi- 
 nition of things ; of which hereafter; So roundness is the 
 primary essential mode or difference of a bowl 5 themeeting 
 of two lines is the primary essential modfe, or the difference 
 of an angle; the perpendicularity of these lines to each oth- 
 
 * Note— When I call solid extensionan essential mode or attribute 
 of matter, and a power of thinking an essential mode or attributeof 
 a spirit, I do it in compliance with common forms of speech.- But 
 perhaps in reality these are very essences or substances themselves, 
 and the most substantial ideas that we can form of body and spirit^ 
 and have no need of any (we know not what) substratum^ or unintel- 
 ligible subst^nce^ to sujppi^rt tJt^m in tMr -eicistence or being. 
 
20 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 er is the difterence of a right angle : Solid eximsion is the 
 primary attribute or difference of ma//e?'.* Consciousmssy 
 or at least a power of thinkings is the difference or prima- 
 ry attribute of a spirit;^ and to fear and love God is the 
 primary attribute of a pious man, 
 
 A secondary essential mode is any other attribute of a 
 thing which is not of primary consideration : This is called 
 a property. Sometimes indeed it goes towards making up 
 the essence, especially of a complex beings so far as we are 
 acquainted with it; sometimes it depends upon, and fol- 
 lows from the essence of it ; so, volubility or aptness to roll, 
 is the property of a bowl, and is derived from its roundness. 
 Mobility y SLXiAfgiiref or shape are properties of matter; and 
 it is the property of a pious man to love his neighbour. 
 
 An accidental mode, or an accident^ is such a mode as is 
 not necessary to the being of a thing, for the subject may 
 be without it, and yet remain of the same nature that it 
 was before, or it is that mode which may be separated or 
 abolished from its subject : So, smoothness ovroughnessj 
 blackness or whiteriesSy motion or rest, are the accidents of 
 a bowl; for these may be all changed, and yet the body 
 remain a bowl still ; Learningy justice, f oily ^sickness^ health, 
 are the accidents of a man/ Motion, squareness, or any 
 particular shape or size, are the accidents of body : Yet, 
 shape and size, in general, are essential modes of it ; for a 
 body must have some size and shape ; nor can it be with^ 
 out them : Sa, hope, fear, wishing, assenting, and doubt- 
 ing, are accidents of tlie mind, though thinking, in general, 
 seems to be essential to it. 
 
 Here observe, that the name of accident has been often- 
 times given by the old Peripatetic philosophers to all 
 modes, whether essential or accidental ; but the moderns 
 confine this word accident to the sense in which I have 
 described it. 
 
 Here it should be noted also, that, though the word 
 property be limited sometimes, in logical treatises, to the 
 secondary essential mode, yet it is used in common language 
 to signify these four sorts of modes ; of which some are 
 me7itial, and some accidental, 
 
 * See preceding^ Not«* 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 21 
 
 1. Such as belong to every subject of that kind, but not 
 only to those subjects. So, yellow colour, and ductility , are 
 properties of gold ; they belong to all gold, but not only to 
 gold 5 for saffron is also yellow^ and lead is ductile. 
 
 2. Such as belong only to one kind of subject, but not to 
 every subject of that kind. So, learnings readhig^ and writ- 
 ing ^ are properties oi human nature; they belong only to 
 man, but not to all men. 
 
 3. Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and only 
 to them, but not always. So, speech or language is a pro- 
 perty of man, for it belongs to all men, and to men only ; 
 but men are not always speaking. 
 
 4* Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and to 
 them only and always. So, shajye and divisibility are pro- 
 perties of body ; so omniscierice and omnipotence are proper- 
 ties of divine Nature ; for in this sense properties and at- 
 tributes are the same ; and, except in logical treatises, 
 there is scare any distinction made between them. These 
 are called propria quarto modo in the school, or properties 
 of the fourth sort. 
 
 Note. — Where there is any one property or essential at- 
 tribute so superior to the rest, that it appears plainly that 
 all the rest are derived from it, and such as is sufficient to 
 give a full distinction of that subject from all other sub- 
 jects, this attribute or property is called the essential dif 
 Jerencef as is before declared ; and we commonly say, the 
 essence of the thing consists in it ; so the essence of matter 
 in general seems to consist in solidity, or solid extension. 
 But for the most part, we are so much at a loss in finding 
 out the intimate essence of particular natural bodies, that 
 we are forced to distinguish tlie essential difference of most 
 things by a combination of properties. So a sparrow is a 
 bird which has such coloured feathers, and sueh a partic- 
 ular size, shape and motion. So worinivood is an herb 
 which has such a leaf of such a colour, and shape, and 
 taste, and such a root and stalk. So beasts and fishes, 
 minerals, metals, and works of art sometimes, as well as 
 of nature, are distinguished by such a collection of proper- 
 He^. 
 
22 LOGIC : OR, THE Paet. I 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 ^ THE FARTHER DIVISIONS OF MODE. 
 
 THE second division of Modes is into absolute and rela- 
 tive. An absolute mode is tiiat which belongs to its sub- 
 ject, without respect to any other beings whatsoever : But 
 a relative mode is derived from the regard that one being 
 has to others. So roundness and smoothness are the a&50- 
 hite modes of a bowl ; for, if there were nothing else ex- 
 isting in the whole creation, a bowl might be raw»<i and 
 smooth : But greatness and smallness are relative modes 5 
 for the very ideas of them are derived merely from the 
 comparison of one being with others : A bowl of four 
 inches diameter is very great compared v*ith one of an 
 inch and a half: but it is very small in comparison of an- 
 other bowl whose diameter is eighteen or twenty inches. 
 Motion is the absolute mode of a body, but swiftness or 
 slowness are relative ideas ; foi the motion of a bowl on a 
 bovvlinggreen is swift when compared with a snail j and it 
 is slow when compared with a cannon- bullet. 
 
 These relative modes are largely treated of by some lo- 
 gical and metaphysical writers, under the name of rela-^ 
 tions : And these relations themselves are farther subdi- 
 vided into such as arise from the nature of things, and such 
 as arise merely from the operation of our minds ; one sort 
 are called reciL relations, the oilier mental ; so the likenes^s 
 of one egg to another is a real relation, because it arises 
 from the real nature of things ; for, whether there was 
 any man or mind to conceive it or not, one egg would be 
 like another : But, wiien we consider an egg as a noiin 
 substantive in grammar, or as signified by the letters egg, 
 these are mere mf^ntal relations, and derive their v^ry na- 
 ture from the mind of man. These sort of relations are 
 called by the schools entia rationis, or second notions ^ 
 which have no real being, but depend entirely on the op- 
 eration of the mind. 
 
 III. The third division of modes shews us they arc ei- 
 ther intrinsicaly or extnnsical. Intrinsical modes pre con- 
 
Chap. IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 23 
 
 ceived to be in the subject or substance, as when we say a 
 globe is round y or swift ^ rollings or at rest : Or when vyc say 
 a man is tallj or learned^ these are intrinsic modes : But ex- 
 trinsic modes are such as arise from something tliat is not 
 in the subject or substance itself 5 but it is a manner of be- 
 ing which some substances attain by reason of something 
 that is external or foreign to the subject : as this globe lies 
 within two yards of the ivall; or this man is beloved^ or hat- 
 ed. Note — Such sort of modes as this last example, are 
 called external denominations. 
 
 IV. There is ?l fourth division much akin to this, where^ 
 by modes are said to be inherent or adherent^ that is, proper 
 or improper. Adherent or improper modes arise from the 
 joining of some accidental substance to the chief subject, 
 which yet may be separated from it^ so Avhen a bowl is 
 we4, or a boy is clothed^ these are adher&nt modes ; for the 
 water and the clothes are distinct substances, which adhere 
 to the bowl^ or to the boy : But when we say the bowl is 
 swift or rounds when we say the hoy is stjong or ivitty^ 
 these ate proper or inherent modes^ for they have a sort of 
 in-being in the substance itself, and do not arise from the 
 addition of any other substance to it. 
 
 V. Action and passion are modes or manners which be- 
 long to substances, and sl.ould not entirely be omitted here. 
 When a smith with a hammer strikes a piece of iron^ the 
 hammer and the smith are both agents or subjects of action; 
 the one is the prime or supreme^ the other the subordinate : 
 The iron is Xhe patient, or the subject of passion, in a phi- 
 losophical sense, because it receives the operation of the 
 agent; though this sense of the words passion ^nd patient 
 difters much from the vulgar meaning of them.* 
 
 VI. The sixth division of modes m^ty he into physical ^ 
 that iSj natural^ civil, moral, and supernaturaU So when we 
 consider the a'postle Paul, who was a little man, a Roman 
 by the privilege of his birth, a man of virtue or honesty, 
 and an inspired apostle ; his low stature is a physical mode, 
 
 *NoTE — Agent signifies the doer, patieift the suiFerer ; action is 
 doing, passion is suffering; *\gent and action have retained their 
 original philosophical sense, trough patient and passion have ac- 
 quired a very different meaning in common language. 
 
24 LOGIC : OR, THE Pab'T L 
 
 his being a Roman is a mn'Z privilege, his honesty is a moml 
 consideration, and his being inspired is suptmaturaL 
 
 VII. Modes belong either to body or to 5;pm7, or to both. 
 Modes of body belong only to matter or to corporeal be- 
 ings ; and these ?Lxeshape^ size, situation orplace^ 8fc. Modes 
 of spirit belong only to minds ; such are 'knowledge^ assent^ 
 dissent^ doubting^ reasonings &c. Modes which belong to 
 both have been sometimes called mixed modes, or human 
 modes y for these are only found in human naturie, which is 
 compounded both of body and spirit; such are sensation^ 
 imagination, passion^ &c. in all which there is a concur- 
 rence of the operations both oi mind and body^ that is of 
 animal and intellectual nature. 
 
 But the modes of body may be yet farther distinguished. 
 Some of them are primary modts or qualities, for they be- 
 long to bodies considered in themselves, whether there were 
 any man to take notice of them or not ; such are those be- 
 fore mentioned, namely, shape, size, situation, ^c. Secondary 
 qualities, ov modes, are such ideas as we ascribe to bodies on 
 account of the various impressions which are made on the 
 senses of men by them ; and these are called sensible quali- 
 lies, which are very numerous ; such are all colours, as red, 
 green, blue, §c. such are all sounds, as sharp, shrilly loud, 
 hoarse ; all tastes, ?iS sweet, bitter, sour ; all smells, Avhether 
 jjleasant, offensive, or indifferent; and all tactile qualities, 
 or such as affect the touch or feeling, namely, heat, cold, <^x. 
 These are properly called secondary qualities; for, though 
 we are ready to conceive them as existing in the very bod- 
 ies themselves which affect our senses, yet true philosophy 
 has most undeniably proved that all these are really various 
 ideas or perceptions excited in human nature by the differ- 
 ent impressions that bodies make upon our senses, by their 
 primary medes, that is, by means of the diQerent shape, 
 size, motion, and position, of those little invisible parts 
 that compose them. Thence it follows that a sicondai^ 
 qudlity, considered as in the bodies themselves, is nothing 
 else but a power or aptitude to produce such sensations in 
 us: See Lockers Essay on the Understanding, Book II. 
 Ghap.8. 
 
 VIII. I might add, in the last place, that, as modes^ be- 
 long to substances, so tliere are some aUo that are but jnodts 
 
Thap. H. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 25 
 
 of other modes : For, though they subsist in and by the 
 substance^ as the original subject of them^ yet they are pro- 
 perly and directly attributed to some mode of that sub* 
 stance. Motion is the mode of a body; but the swiftness 
 or slowness of it, or its direction to the north or the south, 
 are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or man- 
 ner of a man, or of a beast ; but walking gracefully im- 
 plies a manner or mode superadded to that action. All 
 comparative and superlative degrees, of any quality, are 
 the modes of a mode, 3S swifter implies a greater measure 
 of swiftness. 
 
 It vi^ould be too tedious here to run through all the modes^ 
 accidents, and relations^ at large, that belong to various be- 
 ings, and are copiously treated of in general^ in the science 
 <:alled Metaphysics^ or, more properly Ontology : They are 
 also treated of, in particular^ in those sciences which have 
 assumed them severally as their proper subjects. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 OF THE TEN CATEGORifes, OF SUBSTANCE MODIFIED* 
 
 WE have thus given an account of the two chief objects 
 of our ideas, namely, substances and modes^ and their va- 
 rious kinds; and in these last sections we have briefly 
 comprised the greatest part of wlmt is necessary in the 
 famous ten ranks of being, cj^lled the ten predicaments or 
 categories of Aristotle^ on which there are endless volumes 
 of discourses formed by several of his followers. But that 
 the reader may not utterly be ignorant of them, let him 
 know the names are these; Substance, quantity^ quality^ re- 
 lationy action, passion, where, when, situation, and clothing. 
 It would be mere loss of time to shew how loose, how in- 
 judicious, and even ridiculous, this tenfold division of things 
 is : And whatsoever farther relates to them, and which 
 may tend to improve useful knowledge, should be sought 
 in Ontology, and in other sciences. 
 
 Besides substance and mode, some of the moderns would 
 have us consider the substance modified as a distinct object 
 of our ideas ; but I think there is nothing more that need 
 
26 LOGIC : OR THE Part L 
 
 be said on this subject, than this, namely, There is some 
 difference between a substance, when it is considered with 
 all its modes about it, or clothed in all its manners of ex- 
 istence, and when it is distinguished from them, and con- 
 sidered naked without them. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 OP NOT-BEING. 
 
 AS being is divided into substance and mode^ so we may 
 consider not-being with regard to both these. 
 
 I. JVoZ-Z^eing- is considered as excluding all substance, 
 and then all modes are also necessarily excluded ; and 
 this w€ call pure nihility^ or m^er^ nothing. 
 
 This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or ^ philosophi- 
 cal sense; so we say, There is nothing in the cup in a vuU 
 gar sense, when we mean tbere is no liquor in it ; but we 
 cannot say. There is nothing in the cup, in a strict philoso- 
 phical sense, where there is air in it, and perhaps a million 
 of rays of light are there. 
 
 II. Not-being, as it has relation to modes or manners of 
 being, may be considered either as a mere negation, or as 
 a privation. 
 
 A negation is the absence of that which does not natur- 
 ally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which has 
 no right, obligation, or necessity, to be present with it ; 
 as, when we say, a stone is inaniinate, or blind, or deaf; 
 that is, it has no life, nor sight, nor hearing ; nor when 
 we say, ai'carpenter, or 2l fisherman is unlearned, these are 
 mere negations. 
 
 But a privation is the absence of what does naturally be- 
 long to the tiling we arc speaking of, or which ought to be 
 present with it ; as when a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, 
 or dead ; or if a physician or a divine be unlearned, these 
 are called privatimis : So the sinfidness of any human ac- 
 tion is said to be a privation ; for sin is that want of con- 
 formity to the law of Cod which ought to be found in ev 
 ery action of man. 
 
 Note, — There are some writers who make all sorts of 
 relative modes or relations^ a3 >vel/ as all external denomin- 
 
Chap. Ill, RIGHT USE OF REASON. 27 
 
 ations, to be mere creatures of the mind, and entia rationis^ 
 and then they rank them also under the general head of 
 not-heings ; but it is my opinion, that whatsoever may be 
 determined concerning mere mental relations and external 
 denominations, which seem to have something less of enti- 
 ty or being in them, yet there are many real relations^ which 
 ought not to be reduced to so low a class; such are the 
 situation of bodies, their mutual distances^ their particular 
 proportiotis and measures^ the notions of fatherhood, broth- 
 erhoody sonship, Sfc. all which are relative ideas. The very 
 essence of virtues or holiness consists in the conformity of 
 our actions to the rule of right reason, or the law of God : 
 The nature and essence of sincerity, is the conformity of 
 our words and actions to our thoughts, all which are but 
 niere relations ; and I think we must not reduce such pos- 
 itive beings as piety, and virtue, and inifh, to the rank of 
 non.entities, which have nothing real in them, thougli sm, 
 or rather the sinfulness of an action, may be properly call- 
 ed a not-being ; for it is a want of pietv and virtue. This 
 is the most usual, and perhaps the justest way of repre- 
 senting these niatters. 
 
 CHAPTER in. 
 
 OF THE SEVERAL SORTS OF PERCEPTIONS 
 
 OR IDEAS. 
 
 IDEAS may be divided with regard to their originaL 
 their nature, their objects, and their qualities. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 OF SENSIBLE, SPIRITUAL, AND ABSTRACTED IDEAS. 
 
 THERE has been a great controversy about the on^m 
 of ideas, namely, whether any of our ideas are innats or 
 not, that IS, born with us and naturally belong to our 
 mnds. Mr. Locke utterly denies it ; others as positively 
 
28 LOGIC : OR, THE Paht. I. 
 
 affirm it. Now, though this controversy may be cpmpris* 
 ed, by allowiisg that there is a sense wherein our first 
 ideas of some things may be said to be innate (as I have 
 shewn in some remarks on Mr» Locke's Essay, which have 
 lain long by me) yet it does not belong to this place and 
 business to have that point debated at large, nor will it hin- 
 der our pursuit of the present work to pass over it in silence. 
 There is sufficient ground to say, that all our ideas with 
 regard to the original, may be divided into three sorts, 
 iiamely, sensible^ spirihtaly and aostracUd ideas. 
 
 I. Sensible or corporeal ideas, are derived originally from 
 our senses, and from the communication which the soul 
 has with the animal body in this present state 5 such are 
 the notions we frame of nil colours^ sounds, tastes, Jigures^ 
 or shapes and no lions ; for our senses being conversant a- 
 bout particular sensible objects, become the occasions of 
 several distinct perceptions in the mind ; and thus we come 
 by the ideas of yellow^ vjhite^ heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, 
 sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities. All 
 the ideas which we have of body, and the sensible modes 
 and properties that belong to it, seem to be derived from 
 sensation. 
 
 And howsoever these may be ti'easured up in the menv 
 ary, and by the work of fancy may be increased, dimin- 
 ished, compounded, divided, and diversified, (which we 
 are ready to call our invention^) yet they all derive their 
 first nature and being from something that has been let 
 into our minds by one or other of our senses. If 
 think of a golden mountain, or a sea of liquid jire, yet the 
 single ideas oi^ sea, fire, mountain, and gold, came into my 
 thoughts at first by sensation 5 the mind has only com- 
 pounded them. 
 
 II. Spiriiual* or intellectual ideas, are those which we 
 gain by reflecting on the nature and actions of our own 
 souls, and turning our thoughts within ourselves, and ob- 
 serving what is transacted in our own minds. Such ar 
 the ideas we have of thought, assent, dissent, judging, rta* 
 son, knowledge, understanding, will, love, fear, hope, 
 
 *♦ Here the word spiritual is used in a. mere natural, and not in 
 religious sense. 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 29 
 
 By sensation the soul contemplates things (as it were) 
 out of itself, and garns corporeal representations or sensi- 
 ble ideas : By reflection, the soul contemplates itself, and 
 things within itself, and by this mean it gains spiritual 
 ideas, or representations of things intellectual. 
 
 Here it may be noted, though the first original of these 
 two sorts of ideas, namely, sensible and spiritual^ may be 
 entirely owing to these two principles, sensation and reflec- 
 tion, yet the recollection^ and fresh excitation of them, may 
 be owing to a thousand other occasions and occurrences off 
 life. We could never inform a man who was born blind 
 or deaf what we mean by the words yellow, Hue, red, or by 
 the words loud or shrill, nor convey any just ideas of these 
 things to his mind, by all the powers of language, unless 
 he has experienced those sensations of sound and colour ; 
 nor could we ever gain the ideas of thought, judgement ^ rea^ 
 son, doubting, hoping, ^c, by all the words that man could 
 invent, without turning our thoughts inward upon the ac- 
 tions of our own souls. Yet, when once we have attained 
 these ideas, by sensation and reflection, they may be ex- 
 cited afresh by the use of names, words, signs, or by any 
 thing else that has been connected with them in our 
 thoughts^ for, when two or more ideas have been asso- 
 ciated together, whether it be by custom, or accident, oir 
 design, the one presently brings the other to mind. 
 
 III. Besides these two which we have named, there is a 
 third sort of ideas, which are commonly called abstracted 
 ideas, becausej though the original ground or occasion oC 
 them may be sensation, or reflection, or both, yet these 
 ideas are framed by another act of the mind, which we 
 usually call abstraction^ Now, the word abstraction signi- 
 fies a withdrawing some part of an idea from other parts of 
 it, by which, means such abstracted ideas are formed, as 
 neither represent any thing corporeal or spiritual, that is^^ 
 any thing peculiar or proper to mind or body. Now these 
 are of two kinds. 
 
 Some of these abstracted ideas are the most absolute^ 
 general and universal conceptions of things, considered in 
 5iemselves, without respect to others -, such as entity or 
 being, and not-being, essence, existence, act^ power, substance-^ 
 mode, accident, 8fc, 
 C2 
 
30 LOGIC : OR, THE Part L 
 
 The other sort of abstracted ideas is relative^ as when 
 we compare several things together, and consider merely 
 the relations of one thing to another, entirely dropping 
 the subject of those relations, whether they be corporeal 
 or spiritual 3 such are our ideas of cause^ ^ffed^ likeness^ 
 unlikenessy subject^ object y identity^ or sameness^ and contrari- 
 ety, order SLuA other things which are treated of in Ontology. 
 
 Most of the terms of art, in several sciences, may be 
 ranked under this head of abstracted ideas, as noun, pro- 
 noun, verb, in grammar, and the several particles of speech, 
 as wherefore, therefore, when, how, although, howsoever, ^c. 
 So connections^ transitions, similitudes, tropes, and their va* 
 rious forms in rhetoric. 
 
 These abstracted ideas, whether absolute or relative, 
 cannot so properly be said to derive their immediate, com- 
 plete and distinct original, either from sensation, or reflec- 
 tion, (1.) Because the nature and the actions, both of 
 body and spirit, give us occasion to frame exactly the 
 same ideas of essence, mode, cause^ ^ff^^t, likeness, contraries - 
 ty^ ^c. Therefore these cannot be called either sensible or 
 spiritual ideas, for they are not exact representations, ei- 
 ther of the peculiar qualities or actions of spirit or body, 
 but seem to be a distinct kind of idea framed, in the mind, 
 to represent our most general conceptions of things, or 
 their relations to one another, without any regard to their 
 natures, whether they be corporeal or spiritual. And, (2.) 
 the same general ideas, of cause and effect, likeness, ^c, may 
 be transferred to a thousand other kinds of being, whetlier 
 bodily or spiritual, besides those from whence we first de- 
 rived them : Even those abstracted ideas, which must be 
 iirst occasioned by bodies, may be as properly afterward 
 attributed to spirits, 
 
 Now^ though Mr. Locke supposes sensah'^n and reflection 
 to be the only two springs of all ideas, and that these (wo 
 are sufficient to furnish our minds with all that rich va- 
 riety of ideas which we have ; yet abstraction is certainly a 
 different act of the mind, whence these abstracted ideas 
 have their original; though perhaps sensation or reflec- 
 tion may furnish us with all the first objects and occasions 
 whence these abstracted ideas are excited and derived. 
 Nor in thi^ 5en5>c and view of things can T think Mr. Locke 
 
Ohaf, III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 31 
 
 himself would deny my representation of the original of 
 abstracted ideas, nor forbid them to stand for a distinct 
 species. 
 
 Note — Though we have divided ideas in this chapter 
 into three sorts, namelVj smsihle^ spiritual^ and abstracted^ 
 yet it may not ba amiss just to take notice here, that a 
 man may be called a compound substance y being made of 
 body and mind, and i\\e modes which arise from this com- 
 position are called mixed modes, such as sensation^ passion^ 
 discourse, &c. so the ideas of this substance or behig called 
 man, and of these mixed modes, may be called mixed ideas y 
 for the3/ are not properly and strictly spiritualy sensible 
 or abstracted. See a much larger account of every part 
 of this chapter in the Pkilosophical Essays, by L Wattt^ 
 Essay III. iV. &:c. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 OP SIMPLE AND COMPLEX, COMPOUND AND COLLECTIVE IDEAS* 
 
 IDEAS, considered in their nature, are either siwzpZe or 
 tomplex. 
 
 A simple idea is one uniform idea, which cannot be di- 
 vided or distinguished by the mind of man into two or more 
 ideas; such are a multitude of our sensations y as the idea 
 of sweet, hitter, cold, heat, white, red, blue, hard, soft, mo^ 
 Hon, rest, and perhaps extension and duration : Such are 
 also many of our spiritual ideas 5 such as thought, will^ 
 wish, knoivledge, &c. 
 
 A complex idea is made by joining two or more simple 
 ideas together ; as a square, a triangle, a cube! a pe7i, a ta- 
 hie, reading, writing, truth, falsehood, a body,, a maji, a 
 horse, an angel, a heavy body, a swift horse, &c. Every 
 thing that can be divided by the mind into two or more 
 ideas is called complex. 
 
 Complex ideas are often considered as single and distinct 
 beings, though they may be made up of several simple 
 ideas ; so a body, a spirit, a house, a tree, a floiver. But, 
 when several of these ideas of a different kind are joined to- 
 gether, which ai'^ wgnt to b^ eonsidei'^d ^S distinct singly 
 
32 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 
 
 beings, this is called a compound idea, whether these united 
 ideas be simple or complex. So, a man is compounded of 
 body and sjnrit ; so mithridate is a compound medicme^ be- 
 cause it is made of many different ingredients: This I have 
 shewn under the doctrine of sulstances. And modes also 
 may be compounded. HarnftfOny is a compound idea made 
 up of different sounds united : So, several different virtues 
 must be united to make up the compounded idea or char-^ 
 acter, either of a hero, or a saint. 
 
 But, when many ideas of the same kind are joined to- 
 gether, and united in one name, or under one view, it is 
 called a collective idea : so, an army^ or a parliament , is a 
 collection of men ^ a dictiorjLary or nomenclatura, is a col- 
 lection of words 5 a J?0€t is a collection of sheep; a forest, 
 or grove^ a collection of trees ; an heap, is a collection of 
 sand, or corn, or dust, &c. a city^ is a collection of houses 5 
 a nosegay, is a collection of flowers ; a month, or ^/^ar, is a 
 collection of days ; and a thousand, is a collection of units. 
 
 The precise difference between a compound and collective 
 idea is this, that a compound idea, unites things of a different 
 kind, but a collective idea things of the same kind : Though 
 this distinction in some cases is not accurately observed, 
 and custom oftentimes uses the word compound for collec-. 
 live. 
 
 SECT III. 
 
 OF UNIVERSAL ANP PARTICULAR IDEAS, REAL AND IMAGINARY. 
 
 IDEAS, according to their objects, may first be divided 
 into particular or universal. 
 
 A particular idea is that which represents one thing only. 
 
 Sometimes the one thing is represented in a loose and 
 indeterminate manner, as, when we say, some man, any 
 man, one man, another man ; some horse, any. horse ; one 
 city, or another ; which is called by the schools individuum 
 vagum- 
 
 Sometimes the /)ar^ici(Zar zcZga represents one thing in a 
 determinate manner, and then it is called a singular idea; 
 such is Bucephalus, or Alexanders horse, Cicero the orator, 
 Pe^er the apoistle, the p^ileice Qf V^rmUes^ this iook^ that 
 
Chap, IIT. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 8S 
 
 \mvery the New Forest^ or the city of London : That idea 
 which represents one particular determinate thing to me, 
 i^ called a singular idea^ whether it be simple, or compkx, 
 or compound. 
 
 The object of any particular idea, as well as the idea it- 
 self, is sometimes called an individual : So Peter is an in- 
 dividual man, London is an individual city. So, this loolcy 
 one Jiorse, a7iother horsey are all individuals 3 though the 
 word individual is more usually hmiled to one singular^ 
 certain and determined object. 
 
 An unwersal idea^ is that which represents a common 
 nature agreeing to several particular things 3 so a horse^ a 
 mauy or a book^ are called yniversal ideas ; because they 
 agree to all horses y m$nr or books. 
 
 And I think it not amiss to intimate, in this place, that 
 the universal ideas are formed by that act of the mind 
 which is called abstraction^ that is, a withdrawing some part 
 of an idea from other parts of it : For, when singular idias 
 are first let into the mind, by sensation or reflection, then, 
 in order to mako thern itniversaL we leave out, or drop all 
 those peculiar and determinate characters, qualities, modes 
 or circumstances, v/hieh belong merely to any particular 
 individual being, and b}?- which it differs from other beings ; 
 and we only contemplate those properties of it, wherein it 
 agrees with other beings. 
 
 Though, it must be confessed, that the name of abstract- 
 Qd ideas is sometimes attributed to universal ideas^ both sen-' 
 sible or spiritual yet this abstraction is not so great, as 
 when we drop out of our idea every sensible or spiritual 
 JFepresentation, and retain nothing but the most general 
 and absolute conceptions of things, or their mere relations 
 to one another, without any regard to their particular na- 
 tures, whether they be sensible or spiritual^ And it is to 
 this kind of conceptions we more properly give the name 
 o( abstracted ideas y as in the first section of this chapter. 
 
 An universal idea is either general or spirituaL 
 
 A general idea is called by the schools a genus ; and it 
 is one common nature agreeing to several other common 
 natures. So animal is a genus ; because it agrees to horse^ 
 liony whahp butterflyy which are also common ideas; sojish 
 is 2i genus ; because it agrees to trouty herring^craiy which 
 are common natures also. 
 
34 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 A special idea is called by the schools a species ; it is one 
 common nature that agrees to several singular individual 
 beings ; so horse is a special idea, or a species, because it 
 agrees to Bucephalus, Trott, and SnowhalL City is a sp&^ 
 cial idea, for it agrees to London, Paris, Bristal. 
 
 'Note 1st. — Some oi ih^seuniversals are g^eniises, if com- 
 pared with less common natures -, and they are species, if 
 compared with natures more common.. So bird is a genus, 
 if compared with eagle, sparroio, raven, which are also 
 common natures: But it is a species, if compared with the 
 more general nature, animal. The same may be said of 
 fish, leasts, ^c. 
 
 This sort of universal ideas, which may either be con- 
 sidered as a genus, or a species, is called subaltern : But 
 the highest genus, which is never a species, is called the 
 most general ; and lowest species, which is never a genus^ 
 is called the most special. 
 
 It may be observed here also, that that general nature 
 or property, wkerein one thing agrees with most other 
 things, is called its more remote genus : So substance \^ the 
 remote genus of bird, or beast, because it agrees not only to 
 all kinds of animals, but also to things inanimate, as sun, 
 stars, clouds, metals, stones, air, water, &c. But animal 
 is the pr&ximate or nearest genus of bird, because it agrees 
 to fewer other things. Those general natures which stand 
 between the nearest and most remote, Sire cMedintermediate. 
 
 Note 2d. — In universal ideas it is proper to consider 
 their comprehension and their exten'iion,^ 
 
 The comprehension of an idea regards all the essential 
 modes and properties of it 5 So body, in its comprehension, 
 takes in solidity, figures ^ quantity ^mobility, 8fc* So a bowl, 
 in its comprehension, includes roundness, volubility, 8fc. 
 
 The extension of an universal idea regards all the partic- 
 ular kinds and single beings that are contained under it. 
 So a body in its extension includes sun, moon, star, wood, 
 iron, plant, animal, &c. which are several species, or indi" 
 viduals, uDder the general n^me of body, So s, bowl, in 
 its extension, includes a wooden bowl, a brass bowl, a white 
 
 *NoTE — The word extension here is taken in a mere logical 
 sense, and not in a physical and mathematical sense. 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 35 
 
 and black ho^^l, a heavy bowl, &c» and all kinds of bowls, 
 together with all the particular individual bowls in the 
 world. 
 
 Note. The comprehensmi of an idea is sometimes taken 
 in so large a sense; as not only to include the essential at- 
 tributes, but all the properties, modes, and relations what- 
 soever, that belong to any being, as will appear. Chap. VI. 
 
 This account of genus and species is part of that famous 
 doctrine of universals, which is taught in the school, with 
 divers other formalities belonging to it^ for it is in this 
 place that they introduce difference^ which is the primary 
 essential mode^ and propertyy or the secondary essential 
 mode, and accident^ or the accidental mode ; and these 
 they call the five predicables^ because €very thing that is 
 affirmed concerning any being must be either the genus ^ 
 the species, the difference, some property, some accident: 
 But what farther is necessary to be said concerning these 
 things will be mentioned when we treat of definition. 
 
 Having finished the doctrine of imiversal and particular 
 ideas, I should take notice of another division of them, 
 which also hath respect to their objects ; and that is they 
 are either real or imaginary. 
 
 Real ideas are such as have a just foundation in nature, 
 and have real objects, or exemplars, which did, or do, or 
 may actually exist, according to the present state and na- 
 ture of things ; such are all our ideas of long, broad^ swift^ 
 slow, wood, iroiif men, horses, thoughts, spirits,. sl cruel maS' 
 t^r, a proud beggar, a man seven feet high. 
 
 Imaginary ideas, which are also called fantastical, or 
 chimerical, are such as are made by enlarging, diminishing, 
 uniting, dividing real ideas in the mind, in such a manner, 
 as no objects, or exemplars did or ever will exist, accord- 
 ing to the present course of nature, though the sevpral 
 parts of these ideas are borrowed from real objects ; such 
 are the conceptions we have of a centaur, a satyr, a golden 
 mountain, ^flying horse, a dog without a head, a bull less 
 than a mouss, or a mouse as big as a bull^ and a man twen- 
 \iy feet high. 
 
 ^ Some of these fantastic ideas are possible, that is, they 
 are not utterly inconsistent in the nature of things ; and 
 therefore it is within the reach of clivine power to make such 
 
Z6 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 objects; such are most of the instances ah'eady given ^ 
 But impossibles to carry an utter inconsistence in the ideas 
 which are joined; such are self-active matter, Sind irifi)iit£> 
 or eternal men^ a 2?iot«5 man iviihotit honesty j ov heavm 
 without holiness. 
 
 SECT. ly, 
 
 IHE DIVISrON OP IDEAS, WITH REGARD TO THEIR QUALITIE.S, 
 
 It>EAS, with regard to their qualities^ alTord l.s these 
 several divisions of thenie 1. They are either cZtjar and 
 distinct^ or oosciire and confused. 2. They are vulgar or 
 learned. 3. They are perfect or imperfect ^ 4, They are 
 true or false. 
 
 I. Our ideas are either <;Z^ar and distinct y or ohscure ^uA. 
 confused. 
 
 Several writers have distinguished the clear ideas from 
 thuse that are distinct ; and the confused ideas from those 
 that are obscure ; and it must be acknov/ledged there may 
 be some difference between them; for it is the clearness of 
 ideas for the most part makes them distircct; and the ob- 
 scurity of ideas is one thing that will aUyays bring a sort of 
 ■corfusion into them. Yet when these writers come to talk 
 largely upon this subject, and to explain and adjust their 
 meaning with great nicety, I have generally found that 
 they did not keep up the distinction they first designed, 
 but they confound the one with tne other. 1 shall there- 
 fore treat of char or distinct ideas, as one and the same 
 sort, and obscure or confused ideas, as another. 
 
 A clear and distinct idea, is that which represents the 
 object of the mind with full evidence and strength, and 
 plainly distinguishes it from all other objects whatsoever. 
 
 An obscure and confused idea represents the object ei- 
 ther so faintly, so impierfectly, or so mingled with other 
 ideas, that the object of it doth not appear plain to the 
 mind, nor purely in its ovvn nature, nor sufficiently dis- 
 tinguisiied from other things. 
 
 When we see the sea and sky nearer at hand, we have 
 a clear and distinct idea of each ; but, when we look far to- 
 
Chap. IIL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 37 
 
 ward the horizon, especially in a misty day, our ideas of 
 both are but obscure and confused^ for we know not which 
 is sea, and Avhich is sky. So when we look at the colours 
 of the rainbow, we have a clear idea of the red^ the blue^ the 
 green, in the middle of their several arches, and a distinct 
 idea too, while the eye fixes there; but, when we consider 
 the Jorrfer of those colours; they so run into one anotherj 
 that it renders their ideas e£)n/i«5^£? and obscure; So the idea 
 wliich we have of our brother, or our friend, whom we see 
 daily, is clear and distinct ; but, when the absence of many 
 years has injured the idea, it becomes obscme and confused. 
 
 Note here — That some of our ideas may be very clear 
 and distinct in one respect, and very obscure and confused 
 in another. So when we speak of a Chiliagonum, or a 
 figure of a thousand angles, we may have a clear and distinct 
 rational idea of the number one thousand angles ; for we 
 can demonstrate various properties concerning it by reason? 
 But the image, or sensible idea, which we have of the figure, 
 is but confused and obscure; for we cannot precisely distin- 
 guish it by fancy from the image of ^figure that has nine 
 hundred angles, or nine hundred and ninety. So when we 
 speak of the infinite divisibility of matter, we always keep 
 in our minds a very clear and distinct idea of division and 
 divisibility ; but, after we have made a little progress in 
 dividing, and come to parts that are far too small for the 
 reach of our senses, then our ideas or sensible images of 
 these little bodies become obscure and indistinct, and the 
 idea of infinite is very obscure, imperfect and confused. - 
 
 II. Ideas are either vulgar ov learned. A vulgar idea 
 represents to us the most obvious and sensible appearances 
 that are contained in the object of them : But a learned 
 idea penetrates farther into the nature, properties, reasons, 
 'Causes, and effects of things. This is best illustrated by 
 some examples. 
 
 It is a vulgar idea that we have of a rainbow, when we 
 conceive a large atch in the clouds, made up of various 
 colours parallel to each other : But it is a learned idea 
 which a philosopher has when he considers it as the vari- 
 ous reflections and refractions of ^un-beams, in drops of 
 falling rain. So it is a vulgar idea, which we have of the 
 colours of solid bodies^ when we perceive them to be, as it 
 
88 LOGIC : OR, THE Paet I. 
 
 were, a red, or blue, or green tincture of the surface of those 
 bodies ; but it is 3. philosophical idea^ when we consider the 
 various colours to be nothing else but different sensasions 
 excited in us by the variously refracted rays of light, reflect- 
 ed oirour eyes in a different manner, according to the dif- 
 ferent size, or shape, or situations of the particles of which 
 the surfaces of those bodies are composed. It is a vulgar 
 idea which we have of a watch or clock ^ when we conceive 
 of it as a pretty instrument, made to shew us the hour of 
 the day : But it is a learned idea which the watchmaker 
 has of it, who knows all the several parts of it, the spring, 
 the balance, the chain, the wheels, their axles, &c. togeth- 
 er with the various connections and adjustments of each 
 part, whence the exact and uniform motion of the index 
 is derived, which points to the minute or the hour. So, 
 when a common understanding reads VirgiVs jEneid, he 
 has but a vulgar idea of that poem, yet his mind is natur- 
 ally entertained with the story, and his ears with the verse: 
 But, when a critic, or a man who has skill in poesy, reads 
 it, he has a learned idea of its peculiar beauties, he tastes 
 and relishes a superior pleasure ^ he admires the Roman 
 Poet, and wishes he had known the Christian Theology, 
 ^vhich would have furnished him with nobler materials 
 and machines than all the Heathen idols. 
 
 It is with a vulgar idea that the world beholds the Car- 
 toons of Raphael at Hampton Court, and every one feels 
 his share of pleasure and entertainment : But a painter 
 contemplates the wonders of that Italian pencil, and sees a 
 thousand beauties in them which the vulgar eye neglected : 
 His learned ideas give him a transcendant delight, and 
 yet, at the same time, discover the blemishes which the 
 common gazer never observed. 
 
 III. Ideas are either perfect or imperfect, yihich are oth- 
 erwise called adequate or inadequate. 
 
 Those are adequate ideas which perfectly represent their 
 archetypes or objects. Inadequate ideas are but a partial, 
 or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which 
 they are lefened. 
 
 All OUT simple ideas are in some sense adequate or perfect, 
 because simple ideas, considered merely as our first per- 
 fj^eptions, have no parts in them : So we may be said to 
 
Chaf. Ill RIGHT USE OF REASON. 39 
 
 have a perfect idea of white, black, siveef, sour, length, light , 
 motion, rest, Sfc. VVe have also a perfect idea of various 
 figures, as a triangle, a square, a cylinder^ a cube, a sphere, 
 whicli are complex ideas : But, our idea or image of a 
 figure of a thousand sides, our idea of the city of London, 
 or Xhe powers of a loadstone, are very imperfect, as well as 
 our ideas oi infinite length or breadth, infinite power, wis- 
 dom, ov duration; for the idea of f?y?m^(j is endless and 
 ever growing, and can never be completed. 
 
 Note 1. — When we have a perfect idea of any thing in 
 all its parts, it is called a complete idea ; when in all its pro« 
 perties, it is called comprehensive. But when we have but 
 an inadequate and imperfect idea, we are only said to ap- 
 prehend it ; therefore we use the term apprehension when 
 we speak of our knowledge of God, who can never be 
 comprehended by his creatures. 
 
 Note 2. — Though there are a multitude of ideas which 
 may be called perfect, or adequate, in a vulgar sense, yet 
 there are scarce any ideas which are adequate, comprehen- 
 sive, and complete, in a philosophical sense ; for there is 
 scarce any thing in the world that we know, as to all the 
 parts^and powers and properties of it, in perfection. Even 
 so plain an idea as that o^ vl triangle, has, perhaps, infinite 
 properties belonging to it, of which we know but a few. 
 Who can tell what are the shapes and positions of those 
 particles, which cause all the variety of colours that ap- 
 pear on the surface of things ? Who knows what are the 
 figures of the little corpuscles that compose and distinguish 
 difierent bodies ? The ideas of brass, iron, gold, wood, stone^ 
 hysop, and rosemary, have an infinite variety of hidden 
 mysteries contained in the shape, size, motion, and position 
 of the httle particles of which they are composed ; and 
 perhaps, also infinite unknown properties and powers, that 
 may be derived from them. And, if we arise to the ani- 
 mal world, or the world o{ spirits, our knowledge of them 
 must be amazingly imperfect, when there is not the least 
 grain of sand, or em>pty space, but has too many questions 
 and difficulties belonging to it for the wisest philosopher 
 upon earth to answer and resolve. 
 
 IV. Our ideas are either true or false ; for an idea being 
 the representation of a thing in a mind, it must be either 
 
40 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. 1. 
 
 a true or ^Jalse representation of it. If the idea be con- 
 formable to the object or archetype of it, it is a true idea ; 
 if not^ it is ^fahe one. Sometimes our ideas are referred 
 to things really existing without us, as tiieir arclietypes. 
 If I see bodies in their proper colours^ T have a true idea : But, 
 when a man under the jaundice sees all bodies yellow, he has 
 a false idea of them. So, if we see the sim ormoon rising 
 or settings our idea represents them bigger than when they 
 are on tJhe meridian: And in this sense it is a false idea, 
 because those heavenly bodies are all day and all night of 
 the same bigness. Or, when i see a. straight staff appear 
 crooked while it is half under the water, I say the water 
 gives me a false idea of it. Sometimes our ideas refer to 
 tiie id^as of other men, denoted by such a particular word^ 
 as their archetypes : So, when I hear a P^rotestant use the 
 words church and sacraments, if I understand by these words 
 a congregation of faithful m^n, who profess Christianity, and 
 the two ordinances, baptism, and the Lord's supper, I have 
 a trus idea of those words in the common sense of Protest- 
 ants : But, if the man who speaks of them he a Papist, he 
 means the church of Rome and the seven sacraments, and 
 then I have a mistaken idea of those words, as spoken by 
 him, for he has a different sense and meaning : And, in 
 general, whensoever I mistake the sense of any speaker or 
 writer, I may be said to have a. false idea of it. 
 
 -Some think that truth or falsehood properly belongs on* 
 ly to propositions, which shall be the subject of discourse in 
 the Second Part of Logic; for, if we consider icZea as mere 
 impression upon the mind, made by outward objects, those 
 impressions will ever be conformable to the laws of nature 
 in such a case : The water will make a stick appear crook' 
 -ed, and the horizontal air will make the sun and moon ap^ 
 pear bigger* And, generally, where there is falsehood in 
 idea$, there seems to be some secret or latent proposition^ 
 \?hereby we judge falsely of things. This is more obvious 
 where we take up the words of a writer or speaker in a 
 mistaken sense, for we join his words to our own ideas, 
 which are different from his. But, after all, since ideas 
 are pictures of things, it can never be very improper to 
 pronounce them to be true or false, according to their cnn- 
 formity or nonconformity to their examplars. 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 41 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OF WORDS, AND THEIR SEVERAL DIVISIONS^ 
 
 TOGETHER WITH THE ADVANTAGE 
 
 AND DANGER OF THExM. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 OP WORDS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR USE. 
 
 THOUGH our ideas are first acquired by the percep- 
 tion of objects, or by various sensations and reflections j yet 
 we convey them to each other by the means of certain 
 sounds, or written marks, which we call loords ; and a 
 great part of our knowledge is both obtained and commu- 
 nicated by these means, which are called speech or language* 
 
 But, as we are led into the knowledge of things by words^ 
 so we are oftentimes led into errour or mistake by the use 
 or abuse of words also. And, in order to guard against 
 such mistakes, as well as to promote our improvement m 
 knowledge, it is necessary to acquaint ourselves a littie 
 with words and terms. We shall begin with these obser- 
 vations. 
 
 Observation 1. \Vords (whether they are spoken or writ- 
 ten) have no natural connection with the ideas they are de- 
 signed to signify, nor with the things which are represent- 
 ed in those ideas. There is no manner of affinity betweeu 
 the sounds lohiie in English, or blajic in French, and that 
 colour which we call by that name ; nor have the letters, of 
 which these words are composed, any natural aptness to 
 signify that colour rather than red or green. Words and 
 names, therefore, are mere arbitrary signs /in\ented by men 
 to communicate their thoughts or ideas to one another, 
 
 Observ, 2. If one simple word were appointed to ex- 
 press one simple idea, and nothing else, as white, blacky 
 sweety sour, sharp, bitter, extension, duration, there would 
 be scarce any mistake about them. 
 
 But alas ! it is a common unhappiness in language, that 
 different simple ideas are sometimes expre^ssed by the same 
 
 Da 
 
42 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 word ; so the words sioeet and sharp are applied both to 
 the objects of hearing and lasting, as we shall see hereaf- 
 ter ; and this, perhaps, may be one cause or foundation of 
 obscurity and errour arising from words. 
 
 Observ. 3. In communicating our complex ideas to one 
 another, if we could join as many peculiar and appropriat- 
 ed words together in one sound, as we join simple ideas to 
 make one complex one, we should seldom be in danger of 
 mistaking : When I express the taste of an apple, which 
 we call the bitter sweety none can mistake what I mean. 
 
 Yet this sort oi composition would make all language a 
 most tedious and unwieldy thing, since most of our ideas are 
 complex and many of them have eight or ten simple ideas 
 in them ; so that the remedy would be worse than the dis- 
 ease ; for, what is now expressed in one short word, as 
 montky or year^ would require two lines to express it. It is 
 necessary therefore, thai single words, bein vented to express 
 complex ideas, in order to make language short and useful* 
 
 But here is our great infelicity, that when single loords 
 signify complex ideas, one word can never distinctly mani- 
 fest all the parts of a complex idea ^ and thereby it will 
 often happen, that one man includes more or less in iiis idea 
 than another does, while he affixes the same word to it. 
 In this case, there will be danger of mistake between them, 
 for they do not mean the same object, though they use the 
 same name. So, if one person or nation, by the word year^ 
 mean twelve months of thirty days each, that is, three 
 hundred and sixty days, another intend a solar year of three 
 hundred sixty live days, and a third mean a lunar year, or 
 twelve luna/months, that is, three hundred fifty four days, 
 there will be a great variation and errour in their account 
 of things, unless they are well apprised of each other's mean- 
 ing before hand. This is supposed to be the reason why 
 some ancient histories, and prophecies, and accounts of 
 chronology, are so hard to be adjusted. And this is the true 
 reason of so furious and endless debates on many points of 
 divinity ; the wovdschurch/cuoi'bhipy idolatry yrepentancejfaith^ 
 election, merits grace, and many others, which signify very 
 com{)lex ideas, are not applied to include just the same sim- 
 ple ideas, and the same number of them by the various con- 
 tending parlies \ tiicuce avi^e coufusiou anul goatest, 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 43 
 
 Observ. 4. Though a single name does not certainly man- 
 ifest to us all the parts of a complex idea, yet it must be ac- 
 knowledged, that in many of our complex ideas, the single 
 name may point out to us some chief property which be- 
 longs to the thing that the word signifies ; especially when 
 the word or name is traced up to the original, through sev- 
 eral languages from whence it is borrowed. So an apostle 
 signifies one loho is sent forth ^ 
 
 But this tracing of a word to its original, (which is called 
 etyuwlogy) is sometimes a very precarious and uncertain 
 things and, after all, we have made but little progress t*)- 
 wards the attainment of the full meaning of a complex idea, 
 by knowing some one chief property of it. We know but 
 a small part of the notion of an apostle, by knowing bare- 
 ly that he is sent forth 
 
 Qbserv. 5. Many (if not most) of our words which are 
 applied to moral and intellectual ideas, when traced up to 
 their original in the learned languages, will be found to 
 signify sensible and corporeal things. Thus, the words op- 
 prehension, understanding, abstraction, invention p idea, in- 
 ference, prudence^ religion, church, adoration, Sfc. have all a 
 corporeal signification in their original. The name spirit 
 itself signifies breath or air, in Latin^ Greek, and Hebrew : 
 Such is the poverty of all languages, they are forced to use 
 these names for incorporeal ideas^ which thing has a ten- 
 dency to errour and confusion. 
 
 Observ, 6. The last thing I shall mention, that leads us 
 into many a mistake, is, the multitude of objects that one 
 name sometimes signifies : There is almost an infinite 
 variety of thine^sand ideas, both simple and complex, be- 
 yond all the words that are invented in any language 5 
 thence it becomes almost necessary that one name should 
 signify several things. Let us but consider the two col- 
 ours oiyclloio and blit^;^ if they are mingled together in 
 any considerable proportion they make a green : Now, 
 there may be infinite difierences of the proportions in the 
 mixture o^ yellow and blue ; and yet we have only these 
 three words, yelloio, blue, and green, to signify all ojihem^ 
 at least by one single term. 
 
 Wlien I use the word shore, I may intend thereby a coast 
 of laiid near the sea, 01: ^ drain to carry offwater^ ox a prap^ 
 
44 LOGIC ; OR THE Part L 
 
 to support a building ; and by the sound of the word porter^ 
 who can tell whetlier I mean a man who hears burdens y or 
 a servant ivho waits at a nobleman^ s gate ? The world is 
 fruitful in the invention of utensils of life, and new charac- 
 ters and offices of men, yet names entirely new are seldom 
 invented; therefore old names are almost necessarily used 
 to signify new things, which may occasion much confusion 
 and error in the receiving and communicating of knowledge. 
 Give me leave to propose one single instance, wherein 
 all these notes shall be remarkably exemplified. It is the 
 word bishop^ which in France is called evQque upon which 
 I would make these several observations* 1. That there 
 is no natural connection between the sacred office hereby 
 signified, and the letters or sounds which signify this of- 
 fice ; for both these words, ev^que or bishop^ signify the 
 same office^ though there is not one letter alike in them 5 
 nor have the letters which compose the English or the 
 French word any thing sacred belonging to them, more 
 than the letters that compose the words kifig or soldier. 
 2. If the meaning of a word could be learned by its deri- 
 vation or etymology, yet the original derivation of words 
 is oftentimes very dark and unsearchable; for who would 
 imagine that each of these words are derived from the 
 Latin episcopus^ or the Greek episkopos. Yet, in this in- 
 stance,* we happen to know certainly the true derivation; 
 the French being anciently writ evesque, is borrowed from 
 the first part of the Latin word; and the old English bis- 
 cop from the middle of it. 3. The original Greek word 
 signifies an overlooker, or one who stands higher than his 
 fellows and overlooks them : It is a compound word, that 
 primarily signifies sensible ideas, translated to signify or in- 
 clude several moral or intellectual ideas ; therefore all will 
 grant that the nature of the office can never be known by 
 tiie mere sound or sense of the word overlooker. 4. I add 
 farther, tiie word bishop or episcopus, even when it is thus 
 translated from a sensible idea, to include several intellect- 
 ual ideas, may yet equally signify an overseer of the poor; 
 an inspector of the customs ; a surveyor of the highways ; a 
 supervisor of the excise, &c. but by the consent of men, 
 and the language of scripture, it is appropriated to signify 
 ei swrei office in (h^ c/mrcft. &• Tbi;5 v^ry id^a and name, 
 
Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 45 
 
 til us translated from things sensible, to signify a spiritual 
 and sacred thing, contains but one property of it, namely, 
 one that has the oversight or care over others ; btit does not 
 tell us whether it includes a cafe over one church or rnany ; 
 over the laity, or the clergy. 6, Thence it follows, that 
 those who, in the complex idea of the word bishop, include 
 an oversight over the clergy, or over a whole diocese of 
 people, a superiority to presbyters, a distinct poicer of or- 
 dination, &c. must necessarily disagree with those who in- 
 clude in it only the care of a single congregation. Thus 
 according to the various opinions of men, this word signi- 
 fies as pope, a Galilean bishop, a Lutheran superintendant, 
 an English prelate, 3. pastor of a single assembly, or a pres- 
 byter or elder. Thus they quarrel with each other perpet- 
 ually 5 and it is well if any of them all have hit precisely 
 the' sense of the sacred writers, and include just the same 
 ideas in it, and no others. 
 
 I might make all the same remarks on the word church 
 or hirk, which is derived from Ktfltiou oikos, or the home 
 of the Lord, contracted into Kyrioick, which some suppose 
 to signify an assembly of Christians, some take it for all 
 the world that professes Christianity, and some make it to 
 mean only the clergy ; and on these accounts it has been 
 the occasion of as many and as furious controversies as 
 the word bishop which was mentioned before. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE TERMS. 
 
 FROM these, and other considerations, it will follow, 
 that, if we would avoid errour in our pursuit of knowledge, 
 we must take good heed to 'he use oi words and terms, and 
 be acquainted with the various kinds of them. 
 
 I. Terms^ are either positive or negative. 
 
 Negative terms are such as have a little word or syllable 
 of denying joined to them, according to the various idioms 
 of every language ; as unpleasant, imprudent, immortal, ir- 
 regular, ignorant, infinite, endless, lifeless, deathless, non- 
 
46 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 sense^ ahyss, anonymous where the propositions wm, im, m, 
 nouj a^ an, and the termination lessy signify a negation, ei- 
 ther in English, Latin^ or Greek. 
 
 Positive terms are those which have no such negative 
 appendices belonging to them, as life, deathy end, sense, 
 mortaL 
 
 But so unhappily are our words and ideas Hnked togeth- 
 er, that we can never know which are positive ideas, and 
 which are negative, by the word that is used to express 
 them, and tl>at for these reasons: 
 
 1 st, There are some positive terms which are made to 
 signify a negative idea; as dead is properly a thing that is 
 deprived of life ; blind implies a negation or privation of 
 sight ; deaf a want of hearing ; dumb a denial of speech. 
 
 2dly, There are also some negative terms which imply 
 positive ideas, such as immortal and deathless, which signify 
 evir living, or a continuance in life : Insolent, signifies rude 
 and haughty f indemnify, to keep safe; and hfinite, per- 
 haps has a positive idea too, for it is aii idea ever growing ; 
 and when it is applied to God, it signifies his complete per- 
 fection* 
 
 Sdly, There are both positive and negative terms, invent- 
 ed to signify the same, instead of contrary ideas: as un- 
 happy and miserable ; sinless, and holy ; pure and undefiled ; 
 impure a.nd f Ithy ; unkind and cruel; irreligious and pro- 
 fane ; unforgiving and revengeful, &c. and there is a great 
 deal of beauty and convenience derived to any language 
 fiom this variety of expression ; though sometimes it a 
 little confounds our conceptions of being and not-being, 
 our positive and negative ideas. 
 
 4ithly, I may add also, that there are some words which 
 are negative in their original language, but s^em positive to 
 an Englishman, because the negation is unknown ; an 
 abyss, a place without a bottom ; anodyne, an easing medi- 
 cine; amnesty, an unremembrance, or general pardon; 
 anarchy, a state without government; anonymous, that is, 
 nameless ; inapt, that is, not fit ; iniquity, that is, unright- 
 eousness; infant^ one that cannot speak, namely, a child; 
 injurious, not doing justice or right. 
 
 The way therefore to know whether any idea be nega- 
 five or not. is to consider whether it primarily imply the 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 47 
 
 absence of any positive being, or mode of being 5 if it doth, 
 then it is a negation^ or negative idea ; otlierwLse it is a 
 positine one, whether the word that expresses it be positive 
 or negative. Yet, after all, in many cases, this is very 
 hard to determine, as in amnesty^ infinite^ abyss^ which are 
 originally relative terms, but ihey signify pardon^ &c. 
 which seems to be positive. So darkness ^ madness, clown, 
 are positive terms^ but they imply the want of light, the 
 want of reason, and the want of mannen ; and perhaps 
 these may be ranked among the negative ideas. 
 
 Here note, That in the English tongue two negative 
 terms are equal to one positive^ and signify the same thing, 
 as not unhappy, signifies happy ; 7iot imsnortal, signifies 
 mortal; he is, no imprudent man, that is he is a man of 
 prudence: But the sense and force of the word, in such a 
 negative way of expression, seem to be a little diminished. 
 
 SECT HI. 
 
 OF SIMPLE AND COMPLEX TERMS. 
 
 TI. TERMS are divided into simpU or complex, A sim- 
 ple term is one word,^ complex term is when more words 
 are used to signify one thing. • 
 
 Some terms are complex in words, but not in sense ; such 
 is the second Emperor of Rome ; for it excites in our mind 
 onl}'' the idea of one man, namely, Aiigmtus. 
 
 Some terms are complex in sense, hut not in words ; so 
 when I say an army, ^ forest^ I mean a multitude of men or 
 trees : and almost all our moral ideas, as well as many of 
 our natural ones are expressed in this manner ; Religion, 
 piety, loyalty, knavery, theft, include a variety of ideas in 
 each term. 
 
 There ar€ other terms which are compUx loth in words 
 and sense ; so when I say, 21 fierce dog, or a pious man, it 
 excites an idea, not only of those two creatures, but of 
 their peculiar characters also. 
 
 Among, the terms that are complex in sense, hut not in 
 ivords, we may reckon those simple terms which contain 
 a primary and a secondary idea in them 5 as when I hear 
 
48 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I- 
 
 my neighbour speak that which is not true, and I say to 
 him, This is not true^ or this is false, I only convey to him 
 the naked idea of his errour ; this is the primary idea : But 
 if I say it is a lie, the word lie carries also a secondary idea 
 in it, for it implies both the falsehood of the speech and 
 my reproach and censure of the speaker. On the other 
 hand, if I say it is a mistake, this carries also a secondary 
 idea with it; for it not only refers to the falsehood of his 
 speech, but includes my tenderness and civility to him at 
 the same time. Another instance may be this 5 when I 
 use the word incest, adultery, and murder, 1 convey to an- 
 other not only the primary idea of those actions, but I in- 
 clude also the secondary idea of their unlawfulness, and 
 my abhorrence of them. 
 
 Note 1st* — Hence it comes to pass, that among words 
 which signify the same principal ideas, some are clean and 
 decent, others unclean ; some chaste, others oh scene ^ some 
 are kind, others are affronting and reproachful, because of 
 the secondary idea which custom has affixed to them. And 
 it is the part of a wise man, when there is a necessity of 
 expressing any ^vil actions, to do it either by a word that 
 has a secondary idea of kindness or softness, or a word that 
 carries with it an idea of rebuke and severity, according as 
 the case requires: So when there is a necessity of expres- 
 sing things unclean ov obscene, a wise man will do it in the 
 most decent language, to excite as few uncleanly ideas as 
 possible in the minds of the hearers. 
 
 Note 2d. — Jn length of time, and by the power of cus- 
 tom, words sometimes change their primary ideas^ as shaU 
 be declared, and sometimes they have changed their seco7id- 
 ary ideas ^ though the primary ideas may remain : So words 
 that were once chaste by frequent use grow ohsiene and 
 uncleanly; and words that were once honourable may, in 
 the next generation, grow mean and contemptible. So the 
 word dame originally signified a mistress of a family, who 
 was a lady ; and it is used still in the English law to signi- 
 fy a lady, but in common use now a-days it represents a 
 farmer^ s wife, or a mistress of a family of the lower rank in 
 the country^ So those words oT Habshaketh^ Isa. xxxvi. 12. 
 in our tran^lrtion, (eat their own dung, 8fc.) were doubt- 
 less decent and clean language, when our translators 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 49 
 
 wrote them, above a hundred years ago. The word eat 
 has maintained its old secondary idea and inoffensive sense 
 to this day; but the other word in that sentence has by 
 custom acquired a more uncleanly idea, and should now 
 rather be changed into a more decent term, and so it 
 should be read in public, unless it should be thought more 
 proper to omit the sentence.* 
 
 For this reason it is that the Jewish Rabbins have sup- 
 plied other chaste words in the margin of the Hebrew Bi- 
 ble, where the words of the text, through time and cus- 
 tom, are degenerated, so as to carry any base and unclean 
 secondary idea in them ; and they read the word which is 
 in the margin, which they call fceri, and not that which 
 wa5 written in the text, which they called chetib. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 OP WORDS COMMON AND PROPERr 
 
 III. WORDS and names are either common or proper. 
 Common names are such as stand for universal ideas, or a 
 whole rank of beings, whether general or special. These 
 are called appellatives ; so Jishj bird, man, city, river, are 
 common names; and so are trotit, eel, lobster, for they all 
 agree to many individuals, and some of them to many spe- 
 cies ; But Cicero, Virgil^ Bucephalus, London, Rome, JEtna, 
 the Thames, are proper names, for each of them agrees on- 
 ly to one single being. 
 
 Note here first. That a proper name may become in some 
 sense common, when it hath been given to several beings of 
 the same kind ; so Caesar, which was the proper name of 
 the first emperor Julius, became also a common name to 
 all the following emperors. And tea, which was the prop- 
 er name of one sort of Indian leaf, is now-a-days become a 
 common name for many infusions of herbs, or plants, in 
 water ; as sage tea^ ale hoof tea, limon tea, 8fc. So Peter ^ 
 
 *Note — So in sortie places of the sacted historians, where it is 
 written, every oiie that pisseth against the wall, we should read, ev- 
 ery male^ 
 
 E 
 
50 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 
 
 TJiomaSj John, William^ may be reckoned common names 
 also, because they are given to many persons, unless they 
 are determined to signify a single person at any particular 
 time or place. 
 
 Note in the second place, That a common name may be- 
 come proper by custom, or by the time, or place, or per- 
 sons that use it ; as in Great- Britain, when we say the hing^ 
 i-ve mean our present rightful sovereign King George, who 
 now reigns; when we speak of Me prince^ we intend his 
 royal highness George Prince of Wales : If we mention 
 the city, when we are near London, we generally mean the 
 city of London: When in a country town we say the parson 
 or the esquire, all the parish knows who are the single per- 
 sons intended by it; so when we are speaking of the histo- 
 ry of the New Testament, and use the words Peter, Paul] 
 John, we mean those three apostles. 
 
 Note in the third place. That any common name whatso- 
 ever is mside proper by terms of particularity added to it, as 
 the common words pope, king^ horse, garden, book, knife, 
 &c. are designed to signify a singular idea, when we say, the 
 present pope ; the king 0/ Great Britain ; the horse that won 
 the last plate at Newmarket ; the royal garden at Kensing- 
 ton ; this book, that knife, ^c. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 OF CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT TERMS. 
 
 IV. WORDS or terms are divided into abstract and con-' 
 
 Crete, 
 
 Abstradfierws signify the mode or quality of a being, 
 without any regard to the subject in which it is; as white^ 
 ness, roundness, length, hreadth,wisdom,mortality, life, death. 
 
 Concrete terms, while they express the quality, do also 
 either express or imply, or refer to some subject to which 
 it belongs ; as ichite^ round, long, broad, wise, mortal, liv- 
 ing, death. But these are not always noun adjectives in a 
 grammatical sense; for a fool, a knave, n p^iilosopher, and 
 many other concretes, are substantives, as well as knavery, 
 folly and philosophy, which are the abstmct terms that be- 
 long to them. ^ 
 
Chap, lY. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 51 
 
 SECT. VL 
 
 OP UNIVOCAL AND EQUIVOCAL WORDS. 
 
 V. WORDS and terms are either univocal or equivocau 
 Univocal words are such as signify but one idea, or at least 
 but one sort of thing ; equwocal words are such as signify 
 two or more different ideas, or different sorts of objects. 
 The words hook^ bible, Jish, house, elephant, may be called 
 univocal words; for I know not that they signify any 
 thing else but tliose ideas to which they are generally af- 
 fixed; but head is an equivocal word, for ft signifies the head 
 of a nail, or of a pin, as well as of an animal^ Nail is an 
 equivocal word, it is used for the nail of the hand, or foot., 
 and for an iron nail to fasten any thing. Post is equivocal, 
 it is Q. piece of timber, or a swift messenger, A church is a 
 religious assembly, or the large fare Ijuilding where they 
 meet ; and sometimes the same word means a sytiod of 
 bishops^ or o£ ptesbyters, and in some places it is the pop& 
 and a general counciL 
 
 Here let it be noted, that when two or more v/ords sig- 
 nify the same thing, as wave and billow, mead and meadow^ 
 they are usually called synonymous words : But it seems 
 very strange, that words, which are directly contrary to 
 each other, should sometimes represent almost the same 
 ideas; yet thus it is in some few instances ; a valuable, or 
 an invaluable blessing) a shameful, or a shameless villian / 
 a thick skull, or a thin skulV d fellow , a xneve paper skull ; a 
 man of a large conscience, little conscience, or no conscience ^ 
 a famous rascal, or an infamous one. So uncertain a thing 
 is human language, whose foundation and support is custom! 
 
 As wot*ds signifying the same thing are called synony- 
 mous, so equivocal words, or those which signify several 
 things, are called homonymous, or ambiguous ; ^nd when 
 persons use such ambiguous words with a design to de- 
 ceive, it is called equivocafiofi. 
 
 Our simple ideas, and especially the sensible qualities, fur- 
 nish us with a great variety of equivocal or ambiguous words; 
 for these being the first and most natural ideas we have, 
 we borrow some of their names, to signify many other 
 
62 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 ideas, both simple and complex. The word sweet express^ 
 es the pleasant perceptions of almost every sense 5 sugar is 
 sweet, but it hath not the same sweetness as music : Nor 
 hath music the sweetness of a rose; and a sweet prospect 
 differs from them all : Nor yet have any of these the same 
 sweetness as discourse^ council^ or meditation hath ; y«t the 
 royal Psalmist saith of aman, }Ve took siveet council to geth^ 
 er ; and of God, My meditation of him shall h^ sweet. Bit- 
 ier is also such an equivocal word 5 there is bitter worm- 
 woody there are bitter words, there are bitter enemies^ and 
 a bitter cold mornifig. So there is a sharpness in vinegary 
 and there is a sharpness in pain, in sorrow.^nd in reproach/ 
 there is a sharp eye, a sharp wit, and a sharp sword: But 
 there is not one of these seven sharpnesses the same as an- 
 other of them 5 and a sharp east wind is different from 
 them all. 
 
 There are also verbs, or words of action, which are equiv- 
 ocal, as well as nouns or names. The words to Z^eao to 
 take, to come, to get, are sufficient instances of it ; as when 
 we say, to bear a burden, to bear sorrow or reproach, to 
 bear a name, to bear a grudge, to ht^v fruit, or bear chiU 
 dren; the word bear is used in very different senses: And 
 'AQ is the word get, when we s^ay, to get money ^ to get in, 
 to get off, to get ready, Xo get a stomach, and to get a cold, 8^c, 
 
 There is also a great deal of ambiguity in many of the 
 English particles ; as but, before, beside, with, without, that, 
 then, there, for, forth, above, about, &c. of which grammars 
 and dictionaries will sufficiently inform us. 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 VARIOUS KINDS OP EQUIVOCAL WORDS. 
 
 IT would be endless to run through all the varieties of 
 words and terms which have different senses applied to 
 ihem : I shall only mention therefore a few of the most 
 remarkable and most useful distinctions among them. 
 
 1st, The first division of equivocal words lets us know 
 that some are equivocal only in their sound ov jyronunciation ; 
 othei'S are equivocal only in writing ; others both in wriiing 
 and in sound. 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 53 
 
 Words equivocal in sound only are such as these } the 
 rem of a bridle, which hath the same sound with the reign 
 of a king, or shower of rain ; but all three have different 
 letters, and distinct speUing. So, mighty or strength, is 
 equivocal in sound, but differs in writing from mitey a lit- 
 tle animal, or small piece of money. And the verb to 
 write has the same sound with wright a woAman, right os: 
 equity, and rite or ceremony 5 but it is spelled very differ- 
 ently in them all. 
 
 Words equivocal iii writing only are such as these. To 
 tear to pieces, has the same spelling with a tear : To lead^ 
 or guide, 2ias the same letters as Zejad, the metal; and a 
 howl for recreation, is written the same way as a hoipl 
 for drinking ; but the pronunciation for all these is differ- 
 ent. 
 
 But those words which are most commonl)^ and justly 
 called equivocal^ are such as are both written and pronoun- 
 ced the same way, and yet have different senses, or ideas 
 belonging to them : Sueh are all the instances v/hich were 
 given in the preceding section. 
 
 Among the words which are equivocal in sound onbjp 
 and not in writing, there is a large field for persons who 
 dehght in jests and puns, in riddles and quibbles, to sport 
 themselves. This sort of words is also used by wanton 
 persons to convey lewd ideas, under the covert of expres- 
 sions capable of a chaste meaning, which are called double 
 entendres ^ or when persons speak falsehood with a design 
 to deceive, under the covert of truth; though it must be 
 confessed, that all sorts of equivocal words yiel«l sufficient 
 matter for such purposes* 
 
 There are many cases also, wherein an equivocal word 
 is used, for the sake of decency, to cover a. foul idea : For 
 the most chaste and modest, and well bred persons, hav- 
 ing sometimes a necessity to speak of the things of nature, 
 convey their ideas in the most inoffensive language by this 
 mean. And indeed, the mere poverty of all languages 
 makes it necessary to use equivocal words upon many oc- 
 casions, as the common writings of men, and even the ho- 
 ly book of God, sufficiently manifest. 
 
 2dly, Equivocal words are usually distinguished, accord- 
 ing to their original^ into 3ucb, whose various senses arise 
 E2 
 
54 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. L 
 
 from viere chance or accident, and such as are made equivo- 
 cal by design ; as the word hear signifies ft shaggy htast^ 
 and it signifies, also to hear or carry a hurden ; this seems 
 to be the mere effect o£ chance: But if I call my dog hear, 
 because he is shaggy, or call one of the northern constel- 
 lations by that name, from a fancied situation of the stars 
 in the shape of that animal, then it is by design that the 
 >vord is made yet further equivocal. 
 
 But because 1 think this common account of the spring 
 or origin of equivocal words is too slight and imperfect, I 
 shall reserve this subject to be treated of by itself, and 
 proceed to the third division. 
 
 Sdly, Ambiguous or equivocal words are such as are 
 sometimes taken in a large and general sense, and some- 
 times in a sense more strict and limited^ and have diiferent 
 ideas affixed to them accordingly. Religion, or virtuey 
 taken ia a large sense, includes both our duty to God and 
 our neighbour^ but in a more strict, limited, and proper 
 sense, virtue signifies our duty towards men, and religion 
 our duty to God, Virtue may yet be taken in the strictest 
 sense, and then it signifies power or courage, which is the 
 sense of it in some places of the New-Testament. So 
 grace, taken in a large sense, means the favour of God^ 
 and all the spiritual blessings that proceed from it, (which, 
 is a frequent sense of it in the bible) but in a limited sense 
 it signifies the habit of holiness wrought in us by divine fa- 
 vour, 01- a complex idea of the Christian virtues. It may 
 also betaken in the strictest sense, and thus it signifies 
 any singfe Christian virtue^ as in 2 Cor. viii. 6, 7,, where it 
 is used for liberality. So a city, in a strict and proper 
 <!eiise, means the houses enclosed within the walls ; in a 
 large sense it reaches to all tlie suburbs. 
 
 This larger and stricter sense of a word is used in almost 
 all the sciences, as well as in theology, and in common 
 ^ife. The word geography, taken in a strict sense, signifies 
 the knowledge of the circles of the earthly globe, and the 
 ^situation of the various parts of the earth ; when it is ta- 
 ken in a little larger sense, it includes the knowledge of 
 the seas also ; and in the largest sense of all, it extends to 
 the various customs, habits and governments of nations. — 
 Wh^n an asironompjr uses the woid star \i\ its proper and 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 55 
 
 strict sense, it is applied only to ilie Jlxed stars, but in a 
 large sense it includes the planets also. 
 
 This equivocal sense of words belongs also to many 
 proper names : So Asia, taken in the largest sense is one 
 quarter of the world; in a more liniited sense it signifies 
 Natolia, or the Lesser Asia ; but in the strictest sense it 
 means no more than one little province in Natolia, where 
 stood the cities of Ephesus, Smyrna, Sardis^^c. And this 
 is the most frequent sense of the New-Tesiament. Flan- 
 ders, and Holland, in a strict sense, are but two single pro- 
 vinces annong the seventeen, but in a large sense Holland 
 includes seven of them, and Flanders ten. 
 
 There are also some very common and little words in 
 all languages, that are used in a more extensive, or more 
 limited sense; such as, all, every, luhatsocver, 8^c, When 
 the apostle says, all men have sinned and all men trmst die, 
 all is taken in its most universal and extensive sense, in- * 
 eluding all mankind, RoxTi, v. 12. When he appoints 
 prayer to he made for all meiin it appears, by the following 
 verses, that he restrains tlie word all to signify chiefly all 
 ra?ik$ and degrees of men, 1 Tim. ii. I. But when St. Paul 
 says, I please all men in all things, 1 Cor. x. 33, the word 
 all is exceedingly limited, for it reaches no farther than 
 that he pleased all those men whom he conversed with in 
 all things that were lawfiiL 
 
 4thly, Equivocal words are, in the fourth place, distin- 
 guished by their literal or figurative sense. Words are us- 
 ed in a proper ov literal sense when they are designed to 
 signify those ideas for which they were originally made, 
 or to which they are primarily and generally annexed ; but 
 they are used in a figurative or tropical sense when tfiev 
 are made to signify some things, which only bear either a 
 reference or a resemblance to the primary ideas of tbem. — 
 So when two princes contend by their armies, we say they 
 are at loar in a proper sense; but when we say there is 
 ^'war betwixt the winds and the waves in a storm, this is 
 csiWedfgurative, and the peculiar figure is a metaphor. So 
 when the scripture SdLvs, Riches make themselves wings, and 
 fly away as an eagle towards heaven, the wings, and the 
 flight of the eagle are proper expressions ; hut "when flight 
 and wings are applied to riches^ it is only by wBLyoffguret 
 
56 LOGIC : OR, THE Part t 
 
 and metaphor. So when a man is said to repent, or laugh, 
 or grieve, it is literally taken ; but when God is said to be 
 grieved, to repent, or laugh, Sfc. these are all figurative ex- 
 pressions borrowed from a resemblance to mankind. — 
 And when the words Job qr Esther are used to signify those 
 very persons, it is the literal sense of them ; but when they 
 signify those two books of scripture, this is a figurative 
 sense. The names of Horace, Juvenal, and Milton^ are 
 used, in the same manner, either for books or men. 
 
 When a word, which originally signifies any particular 
 idea or object, is attributed to several other objects, not so 
 much by way of resemblance, but rather on the account of 
 some evident reference or relation to the original idea, this 
 is sometimes peculiarly called an analogical word ', so a 
 sound, or healthy pulse, a souyid digestion, sound sleep, are 
 all so called with reference to a sound and healthy constitu- 
 tion ; but if you speak of sound doctrine, or sound speech, 
 this is by way of resemblance to health ; and the words are 
 metaphorical: Yet many times analogy and 7netaphor are us- 
 ed promiscuously in the same sense, and not distinguished. 
 
 Here note, That the design o{ metaphorical language, and 
 figures of speech, is not merely to represent our ideas, but 
 to represent them with vivacit}', spirit, affection and pow- 
 er 5 and though they often mal^e a deeper impression on 
 the mind of the hearer, yet they do as often lead him into 
 a mistake, if they are used at improper times and places. 
 Therefore, where the design of the speaker or writer is 
 merely to explain, instruct, and to lead into the knowledge 
 of naked truth, he ought for the most part to use plain, 
 and proper words if the language afibrds them, and not to 
 deal much in figurative speech. But this sort of terms is 
 used very profitably by poets and orators whose business 
 is to move and persuade, and work on the passions, as 
 well as on the understanding. Figures are also happily 
 employed in proverbial moral ^ sayings, by the wisest and 
 the best of men, to impress them deeper on the memory 
 by sensible images ; and they are often used for other val- 
 uable purposes in the sacred writings, 
 
 5thly, I might adjoin another 50?Y of equivocal words; as 
 there are some which have a difierent meaning in common 
 language from what they Ijiavg in the sciciKCs ; the word 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 57 
 
 passion signifies the receiving any action in a large philoso- 
 phical sense 5 in a more limited philosophical sense, it 
 signifies any of the affections of human natu/re, as love^fear, 
 joyy sorrow^ Sfc, But the common people confine it only 
 to anger : So the word simple philosophically signifies 5iw- 
 gle, but vulgarly it is used for foolish, 
 
 6thlyy Other equivocal words are used sometimes in an 
 absolute sense, as when God is called perfect ; which allows 
 of no defect j and sometimes in a comparative sense, as 
 good men are oftentimes called perfect in scripture, in 
 comparison of those who are much inferior to them in 
 knowledge or holiness : But I have dwelt rather too long 
 upon this subject already, therefore I add no more^ 
 
 SECT. VIIL 
 
 THE ORIGIN OR CAUSES OF EQUIVOCAL WORDS, 
 
 NOW, that we may become more skillful in guarding 
 ourselves and others against the danger of mistakes which 
 may arise from equivocal words, it may not be amiss to 
 conclude this chapter with a short account of the various 
 ways or means whereby a Avord changes its signification, 
 or acquires any new sense, and thus becomes equivocal^ 
 especially if it keeps its old sense also. 
 
 J. Mere chance sometimes gives the same word difierent 
 senses ; as the word light signifies a body that is not heavy ; 
 and it also signifies the effect of sun beams or the medium 
 ivhereby we see objects : This is merely accidental, for there 
 seenis to be no connection between these two senses, nor 
 any reason for them. 
 
 2. Error and mistake is another occasion of giving vari- 
 ous senses to the same words 5 as when different persons 
 read the names of priest^ bishop, church, Easter, &c. in the 
 New Testament, they affix different ideas to them, for 
 want of acquaintance with the true meaning of the sacred 
 writer ; though it must be confessed, these various senses, 
 which might arise at first fiom honest mistake, may be 
 culpably supported and propagated by interest, ambition, 
 prejudice, and a party spirit on any side. 
 
58 LOGIC : OR THE Part I. 
 
 3. Time and Custom alters the meaning of words. Knave 
 heretofore signified a diligent servant (Gnavus) and a vil- 
 lain was an under tenant to the lord of the manor (vilUcus) 
 but now boch these words carry an idea of wickedness and 
 reproach with them. A ballad once signified a solemn and 
 sacred song, as well as one that is trivial, when Solomon's 
 Song was called the ballad of ballads ; but now it is ap- 
 plied to nothing but trifling verse, or comical subjects. 
 
 4. Words change their senses hy figures and metaphors^ 
 which are derived from some real analogy or resemblance 
 betv/een several things ^ as when wings avkd flight are appli* 
 ed to riches^ it signifies only, that the owner may as easily 
 lose them as he would lose a bird who flew away with wings. 
 
 And I think, under this head, we may rank those words 
 which signify different ideas, by a sort of an unaccounta- 
 ble far-fetched analogy^ or distant resemblance, that fancy 
 has introduced between one thing and another ; as when 
 we say, the meat is green^ when it is half -roasted : We 
 speak of airing linen by the fire ^ when we mean drying or 
 warming it : We call for round coals for the chimney when 
 we mean large square ones : And we talk of the wing of a 
 rabbit J when we meznihe fore-leg : The true reason of 
 these appellations we leave to the critics. 
 
 5. Words also change their sense by the special occasion 
 of using them, the peculiar manner of pronunciation^ the 
 sound of the voice^ the motion of the face ^ or gestures of the 
 body ; so when an angry master says to his servant, it is 
 bravely done I or you are a fine gentleman ! he means the 
 contrary ; namely, it is very ill done ; you are a sori^ fel- 
 low : It is one way of giving a severe reproach, for the 
 words are spoken by way of sarcasm, or irony. 
 
 6. Words are applied to various senses, by new ideas 
 appearing or arising faster than 7uw words are framed. 
 So when gunpowder was found out, the word powdery vfh'ich 
 before signified only dust, was made then to signify that 
 mixture or composition of nitre, charcoal, Sfc. And the 
 name cannon, which before signified a law or a rule, is 
 now also given to a great gun, which gives laws to nations. 
 So footboys, who had frequently the common name of 
 Jack given them, were kept to turn the spit, or to pull oflf 
 their masters boots -, but when instruments were invented 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 59 
 
 for both those services, they w^re both called Jacfo, though 
 one was of iron the other of wood, and very different in 
 their form. 
 
 7. Words alter their significations according to the ideas 
 of the various persons^ sects^ or parties, who use them, as 
 we have hinted before ^ so when a Papist uses the word 
 heretics, he generally means the Protestants ; when a Fro^ 
 testant uses the word, he means any persons who are iviU 
 fully (and perhaps contentiously) obstinate in fundumental 
 erroiirs. When a Jew speaks of the true religion, he means 
 the institution of Moses ; when a Turk mentions it, he in- 
 tends the doctrine of Mahomet: but when a Christian makes 
 use of it, he designs to signify Christianity, otihe truths 
 and the precepts of the gospel, 
 
 8. Words have different significations according to the 
 hook, writing, or discourse in which they stand. So in a 
 treaties oi anatomy, ^.foot signifies that member of the body 
 of a man: But in a book of geometry or mensuration, it 
 signifies twelves inches. 
 
 If I had room to exemplify most of these particulars in 
 one single word, I know not where to choose a fitter than 
 the word sound, which it seems as it were by chance to sig- 
 nify three distinct ideas, namely, healthy j (from sanus) as a 
 sound body ; 7ioise, (from sonus) as a shrill sound ; and to 
 sound the sea (perhaps from the French sonde, a probe, or 
 an instrument to find the depth of water ) From these 
 three, which I may call original senses, various dtrivative 
 senses arise ; as sound sleep, sound lungs, sound wind and 
 limb, a sound heart, a sound mind^ sound doctrine, a sound 
 divine, sound reason, a sound cask, sound timber, a sound 
 reproof to beat one soundly, to sound one's meaning or 
 inclination, and a sound or narrow sea; turn these all into 
 Latin, and the variety will appear plain. 
 
 I confess some few of these which I have mentioned, as 
 the diflerent springs of equivocal words, may be reduced in 
 some cases to the same original: But it must also be grant- 
 ed, that there may be other ways besides these whereby a 
 word comes to extend its signification, to include various 
 ideas, and become equivocal. And though it is the busi- 
 ness of a grammarian to pursue these remarks with more 
 variety and particularity, yet it is also the work of a logi- 
 
60 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 cia7i to give notice of these things, lest darkness, confu- 
 sion, and perplexity, be brought into our corsceptions, by 
 the means of words, and thence our judgments and reason' 
 ing become erroneous. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 GENERAL DIRECTIONS RELATING TO OUR 
 
 IDEAS. 
 
 DiREc. 1. FURNISH yourselves with a variety of 
 ideas ; acquaint yourselves with things ancient and mod- 
 ern ; things natural, civil and religious ; things domestic 
 and national ; things of your native land, and of foreign 
 countries; things present, past and future; and above all, 
 be well acquainted with God and yourselves; learn animal 
 nature, and the workings of your own spirits. 
 
 Such a general acquaintance with things will be of very 
 great advantage. 
 
 The j'?r5^ benefit of it is this ; it will assist the use of rea- 
 son in all its following operations ; it will teach you to 
 judge of things aright, to argue justly, and to methodise 
 your thoughts with accuracy. When you shall find several 
 things akin to each other, and several diflerent from each 
 other, agreeing in some -part of their idea, and disagreeing 
 in other parts, you will range your ideas in better order, 
 you will be more easily led into a distinct knowledge of 
 things, and will obtain a rich store of proper thoughts and 
 arguments upon all occasions. 
 
 You will tell me, perhaps, that you design, the study of 
 the law or divinity ; and what good can natural philosO' 
 phy or mathematics do you, or any other science, not direct- 
 ly subordinitte to your chief design ? But let it be consid- 
 ered, that all sciences have a sort of mutual connection ; 
 and knowledge of all kinds fits the mind to reason and 
 judge belter concerning any particular subject. I have 
 
Chap, V- RIGHT USE OF REASON. 61 
 
 known a judge upon tlie bench betray his ignorance, and 
 appear a Hltle confused in his sentiments, about a case of 
 suspected murder brought before him, for want of some 
 acquaintance with animal nature and philosophy. 
 
 Another ??e/i£^^ of it is this.- such a large and general 
 acquaintance with things will secure you from perpetual 
 admirations and surprises, and guarxl you against the weak- 
 ness of ignorant persons who have never seen any thing 
 beyond the confines of their own dwelling, and therefore 
 they wonder at almost every thing they see; every thing 
 beyond the smoke of their own chimney, and the reach of 
 their own windows, is new and strange to them. 
 
 A third benefit of such an universal acquaintance with 
 things is this ; it will keep you from being too positive and 
 dogmatical, from an excess of credulity and unbelief, that 
 is, a readiness to believe or to deny every thing at first 
 hearing ; when you shall have often seen that strange and 
 uncommon things, which often seem incredible, are found 
 to be true; and things very commonly received as true, 
 have been found false. 
 
 The Way of attaining such an extensive treasure of ideas, 
 is with diligence to apply yourself to read the best books ; 
 converse with the most knowing and the wisest of men ; 
 and endeavour to improve by every person in whose com- 
 pany you are ; suffer no hour to pass away in lazy idle- 
 ness, and impertinent chattering, or useless trifles : Visit 
 other cities and countries when you have seen your own, 
 under the care of one who can teach you to profit by trav- 
 elling, and to make wise observations; indulge a just curi- 
 osity in seeing*the wonders of art and nature ; search into 
 things yourselves, as well as learn them from others ; be 
 acquainted with men as well as books; learn all things as 
 much as you can at first hand; and let as many of your 
 ideas as possible be the representations of things, and not 
 merely the representations of other mens ideas : Thus 
 your soul, like some noble building, shall be richly fur- 
 nished with original paintings, and not with mere copies. 
 
 Direct II. Use the most proper fnethods to retain that 
 treasure of ideas which you have acquired ; for the mind is 
 ready to let many of them slip unless some pains and la- 
 bour be taken io fix them upon the memory, 
 
 F 
 
62 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. i. 
 
 And more especially let those ideas be laid up and pre- 
 served with the greatest care, which are most directly- 
 suited, either to your eternal 'welfare as a Christian, or to 
 your particular station and 'profession in this life ; for 
 though the former rule recommends an universal acquaint- 
 ance with things, yet it is but a more general and, superfi- 
 cial knowledge that is required or expected of any man, in 
 things which are utterly foreign to his own business : Bat 
 it is necessary you should have a more particular and ac- 
 curate acquaintance with those things that refer to your 
 peculiar province and duty in this life, or your happiness 
 in another. 
 
 There are some persons who never arrive at any deep, 
 solid, or valuable knowledge in any science, or any busi- 
 ness of Hfe, because they are perpetually fluttering over 
 the surface of things in a curious and wandering search of 
 infinite variety ; ever hearing, reading, or asking after 
 something new, but impatient of any labour to lay up and 
 preserve the ideas they have gained : Their souls may be 
 compared to a looking glass, that wheresoever you turn it., 
 it receives the images of all objects but retains none. 
 
 In order to preserve your treasure <>f ideas, and the 
 knowledge you have gained, pursue the following advices., 
 especially in your younger years. 
 
 1. Recollect evenj day the things 'youhave seen, or heard y 
 or ready which may have made an addition to your under- 
 Standing : Read the writings of God and men with dili^ 
 gence and perpetual reviews: Be not fond of hastening to 
 a new book, or a new cjiapter, till you have well fixed and 
 established in your mind what was useful in the last; 
 make use of your memory in this manner, and you will 
 sensibly experience a gradual improvement of it while you 
 take care not to load it to excess. 
 
 2. Talk over the things which you have seen, hean^d, or 
 learnt y with some proper acquaintance : This will make a 
 fresh impression on your memory; and if you have no 
 fellow-student at hand, none of equal rank with yourselves, 
 tell it over to any of your acquaintance, where you can do 
 it with propriety and decency ; and whether they learn any 
 thing by it or not, your own repetition of it will be an im- 
 provement to yourself : And this practice also will fur- 
 
Chap. Y. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 6S 
 
 nish you with a variety of words) and copious language, to 
 express your thoughts upon all occasions. 
 
 3. Commit to writing some of the most considerable 
 imprevements which you daily make, at least such hints 
 as may recal them again to your mind, when perhaps 
 they are vanished and lost. And here I think Mr. Lockers 
 method of adve'rsariayov commoji places, which he describes 
 in the end of the first volume of his posthumous works is 
 the best; using no learned method at all. setting down 
 things as they occur, leaving a distinct page for each sub- 
 ject, and making an index to the pages. 
 
 At the end of ever5^ week, or month, or year, you may 
 review your remarks, for these reasons ; First, to judge of 
 your own improvement ; when you shall find that many of 
 your younger collections are either weak and trifling; or 
 if they are just and proper, yet they are grown now so fa- 
 miliar to you, that you will tliereby see your own advance- 
 ment in knowledge. And, in the next place, what re- 
 marks you find there worthy of 3^our riper observation, 
 you may note them in a marginal slar, instead of transcrib* 
 ing them, as being worthy of your second year^g review, 
 when others are neglected. 
 
 To shorten something of this labour, if the books which 
 you read are your own, mark with a pen, or pencil, the 
 most considerable things in them which you desire to re- 
 member. Thus you may read that book the second time 
 over with half the trouble, by your eye running over the 
 paragraphs which your pencil has noted. It is but a very 
 weak objection against this practice to say, I shall spoilmy 
 hook ; for I persuade myself, that 3'ou did not buy it as a 
 hookseller^Xo sell it again for gain, but as a scholar, to im- 
 prove your mind by it 5 and if the mind be improved,- your 
 advantage is abundant, though your book yields less monev 
 to your executors^ 
 
 * Note — This advA of writing;, marking, and reviewing your 
 marks, refers chiefly to those occasional notions you meet with eith- 
 er in reading or in conversation : But when you are direcily and pro- 
 fessedly pursuing any subject of knowledge in a good system in your 
 younger years, the system itself is your commonplace-book, and 
 must he entirely reviewed. The same may be said concerning anv 
 treatise which closely, succinctly^ :xn6. accurately handU^s anv psrtici^* 
 lav theme. 
 
64 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 Direct. 111. As you proceed both in learning and in life, 
 make a wise observation ivhat are the ideas ^ what the discour- 
 ses and the parts of knowledge that have been more or less 
 useful to yourself or others. In our younger years, while 
 we are furnishing our minds with a treasure of ideas, ouf 
 experieiiee is but small, andour judgment weak 5 it is there- 
 fore impossible at that age to determine aright concerning 
 the real advantage and itsefulness of many things we learn. 
 3ut, when age aud experience have matured your judg- 
 ment, then you will gradually drop the more useless part 
 of your y o linger furniture f and be more solicitous to retain 
 that which is most necessary for your welfare hi this life, 
 or a better. Hereby you will come to make the same 
 complaint that almost every learned man has done after 
 long experience in Itudy and in the affairs of human hfe 
 and religion: Alas I how many hours, and days, and 
 months, have I lost in pursuing some parts of learning, and 
 in reading some authors, which have turned to no other ac- 
 count, but to inform me that they were not worth my labour 
 and pursuit / Happy the man who has a wise tutor to con- 
 duct him through ali the sciences in the first years of his 
 study ; and who has a prudent friend always at hand to 
 point out to him, from experience, how much of every 
 science is worth nis pursuit ! And happy the student that 
 is so wise as to follow such advice I 
 
 Direct. IV. Learn to acquire a government over your 
 ideas and your thoughts, that they may come ivhen they are 
 called, and depart when they are bidden. There are some 
 thoughts that arise and intrude upon us while we shun 
 them; there are others that fly from us, when we would 
 hold and fix them. 
 
 If the ideas which you would willingly make the matter 
 of your present meditation are ready -to fly from you, you 
 must be obstinate in the pursuit of them by an habit of 
 fixed meditation ; you must keep youi^oul to the work, 
 when it is ready to start aside every moment, unless you 
 will abandon yourself to be a slave to every wild imagi- 
 nation. It is a common, but it is an unhappy and a 
 shameful thing, that every trifle that comes across the 
 senses or fancy should divert us, that a buzzmg fly should 
 teaz.e our spirits, and scatter our best ideas ; But we must 
 
Chap, V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 65 
 
 learn to be deaf to, and regardless of other things, besides 
 that which we make the present subject of our medita- 
 tion : And in order to help a wandering and fickle humour, 
 it is proper to have a book or paper in our hands, whicli 
 has some proper hints of the subject we design to pursue. 
 We must be resolute and laborious, and sometimes conflict 
 with ourselves, if we would be wise and learned. 
 
 Yet I would not be too severe in this ride : It must be 
 confessed there are seasons when the mind, or rather the 
 brain, is over tired or jaded with study and thinking; or 
 upon some other accounts, animal nature may be languid 
 or cloudy^ and unfit to assist the spirit in rneditalioo; at 
 such seasons (provided that they return not too often) it 
 is better sometimes to yield to the present indisposition j 
 for if nature entirely resist, nothing can be done to the 
 purpose, at least in that subject or science. Then you may 
 think it proper to ^ive yourself up to some hours o( leisure 
 and recreation^ or useful idleness ; or if not, then turn your 
 thoughts to some other alluring subject, and pore no longei: 
 upon the Jirst^ till some brighter or more favourable mo- 
 ments arise. A student shall do more in one hour, when 
 all things concur to invite him to any special study, than 
 in four hours, at a dull and improper season. 
 
 I would also give the same advice \£ some ram, or worth-' 
 less, or foolish idea, will crowd itself into your thoughts; 
 and if you find that all your labour and wrestling cannot 
 defend yourself from it, then divert the importunity of 
 that which offends you, by turning your thoughts to some 
 entertaining subject, that may amuse you a little, and 
 draw you off from the troublesome and imposing guest; 
 and many a time also, in such a case, when the imperti- 
 nent and intruding ideas would divert from present duty, 
 devotion ^nd prayer have been very successful to overcome 
 such obstinate troublers of the peace and profit of the 
 soul. 
 
 If the natural genius and temper be too volatile, fickle and 
 ivandering, such persons ought in a more special manner 
 to apply themselves to mathematical learning, and to be- 
 gin their studies with arithAnetic and geometry; wherein 
 liew truths continually arising to the mind, out of the 
 
 FS 
 
66 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 
 
 plainest and easiest principles^ will allure th^ thoughts 
 with incredible pleasure in the pursuit: this will give the 
 student such a delightful taste of reasoning, as will fix his 
 attention to the single subject which he pursues, and by 
 degrees will cure the habitual levity of his spirit : But let 
 him not indulge and pursue these so far, as to neglect *^r 
 prime studies of his designed profession. 
 
 CHAPTER VL 
 
 SPECIAL RULES TO DIRECT OUR CONCEP i ION> 
 
 OF THINGS. 
 
 A GREAT part of what has heen already written k 
 designed to lay a foundation for those rules which may 
 guide and regulate our conceptions of things ; this is our 
 main business and design in the Jzrsi part of logic. Now, if 
 we can but direct our thoughts to a jiist and happy man- 
 ner in forming our ideas of things, the other operations of 
 the mind will not so easily be perverted ; because most 
 of our errors in judgment^ and the weakness, fallacy, and 
 mistakes of our argumentation proceed from the dark- 
 ness, confusion, defect, or some other irregularity in our 
 ^conceptions. 
 
 The rules to assist and direct our conceptions are tliese: 
 
 1. Conceive of things deaWi/ and di5/27?c% in their aM;M 
 natures, 
 
 2. Conceive of things completely in all ihe\r parts. 
 
 3. Conceive of things comprehcndvely in all their prop- 
 erties and relations, 
 
 4. Conceive of things extensively in all their kinds, 
 
 5. Conceive of things orderly or in a proper method. 
 
Chap. V L RIGHT USE OF REASON. 67 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 OF GAINING CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS, 
 
 THE first rule is thiSj Seek after a clear and distinct 
 conception of things as they are in their own nature^ and do 
 not content yourselves ivith obscure and confused ideas^ where 
 dearer are to be attained. 
 
 There are some things indeed whereof distinct ideas are 
 scarce attainable ; they seem to surpass the capacity of 
 the understanding in our present state ; such are the no- 
 tions of eternal^ immense ^ infnite^ whether this infinity ^ be 
 applied to number^ as an infinite multitude ; to quantity^ 
 as infinite length, or breadth ; to powers and perfections^ 
 as strength, wisdom, or goodness, infinite, &c. Though 
 mathematicians, in their way, demonstrate several things, 
 in the doctrine of infinites yet there are still some insolv- 
 able difficulties that attend the ideas of infinite^ when it is 
 applied to mind or body 5 and while it is in reality but 
 an idea €(cer growings we cannot have so clear and dis?» 
 tinct a conception of it as to secure us from mistakes in 
 some of ^ur reasonings about it. 
 
 There are many other things that belong to the mate- 
 rial world, wherein the sharpest philosophers have never, 
 yet arrived at clear and distinct ideas ; such as the par- 
 ticular shape, situation^ contexture, and motion of the small 
 particles of minerals, metals, plants, ^c, whereby their ve- 
 ry natures and essences are distinguished from each other. 
 Nor'have we either senses or instruments sufficiently nice 
 and accurate to find them out. There are other things 
 in the world of spirits wherein our ideas are very dark and 
 confused, such as their union with animal nature, the way of 
 their acting on material beings, and their converse with each 
 other,. And though it is a laudable ambition to search 
 what may be known of the^ matters, yet it is a vast hin«- 
 derance to the enrichment of our understandings, if we 
 spend too much of our time and pains among infinites 
 and unsearchables, and those things for the investigation 
 whereof we are not furnished with proper faculties in the 
 
68 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. t. 
 
 present state. It is therefore of great service in the true 
 improvement of the mind to distinguish well between 
 knowables and unknovjables. 
 
 As far as things txrelcnowalU by us, it is of excellent use 
 to accustom ourselves to clear and distinct ideas. Now, 
 among other occasions of the darkness and mistakes of 
 our minds, there are these two things which most remark-, 
 ably bring confusion into our ideas - 
 
 1. That from our infancy we have had the ideas of 
 things so far connected with the ideas of words^ that we 
 often mistake words for things, we mingle and confound 
 one with the other. 
 
 2. From our youngest years we have been ever ready 
 to consider things not so much in their own natures, as in 
 their various respects to ourselves, and chiefly to our sens* 
 es ; and we have also joined and mingled the ideas of 
 some things, with many other ideas^ to which they were not 
 akin in their own natures. 
 
 In order therefore to a clear and distinct knowledge of 
 things, we must unclothe them of all these relations and 
 mixtures^ that we may contemplate them naked, and in, 
 their own natures^ and distinguish the subject that we have 
 in view from all other subjects whatsoever : Now, to per*^ 
 form this well, we must here consider the definition of 
 ivordsy and the definition of things. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 OP THE DEFINITION OF WORDS OR NAMES. 
 
 IF we could conceive of things as angels and unbodied 
 spirits do, without involving them in those clouds which 
 words and language throw upon them, we should seldom 
 be in danger of such mistakes, as are perpetually commit- 
 ted by us in the present stat*; and indeed it would be of 
 unknown advantage to us to accustom ourselves to form 
 ideas of things without wordsy that we might known them 
 in their ow7i proper natures. But, since we must use ivords 
 both to learn and CQnunuuicate most of our notions we 
 
Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 69 
 
 should do it with just rules of caution. I have already de- 
 clared in part, how often and by what means our words 
 become the occasion of errors in our conception^ of things. 
 To remedy such inconveniences^, we must get an exact 
 definition of the words we make use of, that is, we must 
 determine precisely the sen^e of our words, which is call- 
 ed the definition of tlie name. 
 
 Now a definition of the name being only a declaration in 
 what sense the word is used, or what idea or object we 
 mean by it, this may be expressed by any one or more of 
 the properties, effects, or circumstances of that object 
 which do sufficiently distinguish it from other objects: As, 
 if I were to tell what I mean by the word air, I may say, 
 it is that thin matter which we Ireathein and breathe out 
 continually ; or it is that fiuid body in ivhich the birds fly a 
 little a^ove the earth: or it is that invisible matter which 
 fills all places near the earthy or which immediately encom^ 
 pasess the glohe of earth and water. So if I would tell what 
 I mean by light I would say it is that medium whereby we 
 see the colours and shapes of things ; or it is that which dis" 
 tinguishes the day from the night. If I were asked what 
 I mean by religion, I would answer, it is a collection of all 
 our duties to God, if taken in a strict and h'mited sense; 
 but if taken in a large sense, it is a collection of all our du- 
 ties bath to God and man. These are called the definitions 
 of the name. 
 
 Note — In defining the name there is no necessity thai we 
 should be acquainted with the intimate essence or nature 
 of the things ; for any manner of description that will but 
 sufficiently acquaint another person what we mean by 
 such a word, is a sufficient definition for the name. And 
 on this account a synonymous word, or a mere negation of 
 the contrary, a translation of the word into another tongue, 
 or a grammatical explication of Ity is sometimes sufficient 
 for this purpose; as if one would know wliat I mean by a 
 sphere, I tell him it is a globe ; if he ask what is a triangle^ 
 it is that which has three angles / or an oval is that which 
 has tlie shape of an egg. Dark is that which has no light; 
 asthma is a difficulty of breathing ; a diaphoretic medicine, 
 or a sudorific, is something that will provoke sweating ; 
 sind an insolvent^ is a man that cannot pay his debts. 
 
70 LOGIC : OR, THE Part L 
 
 Since it is the design of Logic^ not only to assist us in 
 learning but in teaching also, it is necessary that we should 
 be furnished with some particular directions relating to 
 lie definition ofnamesp both in teaching and learning. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 DIRECTIONS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF NAMES. 
 
 DiREc. 1. HAVE a care of malcing use of mere words ^ 
 instead of ideas, that is, such words as have no meaning, 
 no definition belonging to them : Do not always imagine 
 that there are ideas wheresoever there are names : For, though 
 mankind hath so many millions of ideas more than they 
 have names, yet so foolish and lavish are we, that too of^ 
 ten we use some words in mere waste, and have no ideas 
 for them; or, at least, our ideas are so exceedingly shatter- 
 ed and confused, broken and blended, various and unset- 
 tled, that they can signify nothing ♦oward the improve- 
 ment of the understanding. You will find a great deal of 
 reason for this remark, if you read the popish schoolmeji, 
 or the mystic divines. 
 
 Never rest satisfied therefore with words which have no 
 ideas belonging to them, or at least no settled and determin- 
 ed ideas. Deal not in such empty ware, whether you are a 
 learner or a teacher ; for hereby some persons have made 
 ■hemselves rich in words and learned in their own esteem; 
 .vherea^, in reality, their understandings have been poor, 
 and they knew nothing. 
 
 Let nic give, for instance, some of those writers or talk- 
 ers who deal much in the words nature, fate, luck, chance, 
 perfection, power, life, fortune, instinct, Sfc. and that even 
 in the most calm and instructive parts of their discourse ; 
 though neither they themselves nor their hearers have any 
 settled meaning under those words; and thus they build 
 up their reasonings, and infer what they please, with an 
 ambition of the name of learning, or of sublime elevations 
 in religion ; whereas in truth, they do but amuse them- 
 selves and their admirers with swelling loords of vanity, 
 understanding neither what they say, nor ivhereof they affirm. 
 
Chap. VL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 71 
 
 But this sort of talk was reproved of old by the two chief 
 apostles, St. Peter and St. Pauly 1 Tirn. i. 7. and 2 Peter 
 ii. 18. 
 
 When pretenders to philosophy or good sense grow 
 fond of this sort of learning, they dazzle and confound 
 their weaker hearers, but fall under the neglect of the 
 wise. The Epecurians are guilty of this fault when they 
 ascribe the formation of the world to chance : The Aris- 
 totelimis, when they say, Nature abhors a vacuum : The 
 Stoicks, when they talk of fate^ which is superior to the 
 gods : And the gamesters^ when they curse their ill'lucl^ 
 or hope for the ftivours oi fortune. Whereas if they would 
 tell us, that, by the word nature they mean the properties 
 of any beings or th§ order of things established at the crea* 
 Hon ; that by the word fate intend the decrees of Gody or 
 the 7iecessary connection and influence of second causes and 
 effects ; if by the word luck or chance they signify the abso- 
 lute negation of any determinate cause or only their igno- 
 rance of any such cause, we should know how to converse 
 with them, and to assent to, or dissent from, their opin- 
 ions. But, while they flutter in the dark, and make a 
 noise with words which have no fixed ideas, they talk to 
 the wind, and ijever can profit. 
 
 I would make this matter a little plainer still by instan- 
 ces borrowed from the Peripatetic philosophy, which was 
 once taught in all the scliools. The professor fancies he 
 has assigned the true reson why all heavy bodies tend doivn^ 
 ward J why amber ^i 'II draw feathers or straivs, and the load- 
 stone draw iron wli »n he tells you that this is done by cer- 
 tain gravitating and attractive qualities^ which proceed from 
 the substantial forms of those various bodies. He imagines 
 that he has explained why the loadstone'^ s north pole^ shall 
 repel the north end of a magnetic needle^ and attract the south, 
 when he affirms, that this is done by its sympathy with one 
 end of it. and its antipathy against the otlier end. Where- 
 as in truth all these names o^ sympathy, antipathy^ substan- 
 tial forms, and qualities, when they are put for the causes 
 
 * Note — Soriie writers call that the south pole of a loadstone which 
 attracts the south end of the needle ; but I choose to follow those 
 who call it the north pole. 
 
72 LOGIC : OR THE Part, J. 
 
 of these effects in bodies, are but hard words, which only 
 express a learned and pompous ignorance of the true cause 
 of natural appearances 5 and in this sense they are mere 
 words without ideas* 
 
 This will evidently appear, if one ask me, Why a con^ 
 cave mirror or convex glass. will burn wood in the son beams, 
 orwhy a wedge will cleave it? And I should tell him, it 
 is by an ustorioiLs quality in the mirror or glass, and by a 
 cleaving power in the wedge, nnsing from a certain un- 
 known substantial form in them, whence they derive these 
 qualities ; or if he should ask me, Why a clock strikes and 
 points to the hour ? and I should say, it is by an indicative 
 form and sonorific quality ; whereas I ought to tell him 
 how the sun beams are collected and united by a burning- 
 glass ; whence the mechanical force of a wedge is deriv- 
 ed ; and what are the wheels and springs^ the pointer^ and 
 hammer^ and bell, whereby a dock gives notice of the time, 
 both to the eye and the ear. But these ustorious and cleav- 
 ing poivers, sonorous and indicative forms and qualities, do 
 either teach the enquirer nothing at all but what he knew 
 before, or they are mere words loithout ideas,* 
 
 And there is many a man in the vulgar and in the learn- 
 ed world, who imagines himself deeply skilled in the con- 
 tTOversies of divinity whereas he has only furnished him- 
 self with a parcel o^ scholastic or mystic words, under some 
 of which the authors themselves had no just ideas 5 and 
 the learner, when he hears, or pronounces them, hath 
 
 * It may be objected here, ** And what does the modem philoso- 
 pher, with all his detail of mathematical numbers, and diagrams, do 
 more than this towards the solmion of these difficulties ? Does he not 
 describe gravity by a certain unknown foice, whereby bodies tend 
 downward to the centre \ Hath he found the certain and mechanical 
 reasons of attraction, magnetism, &c. ?" I answer, that the moderns 
 have found a thousand thiligs by applying mathematics to natural 
 philosophy, which the ancients were ignorant of , and when they 
 use any names of this kind, viz. gravitation, attraction. &.c, they use 
 them only to signify that there are such effects and such causes, with 
 a frequent confession of their ignorance of the true springs of them : 
 They do not pretend to make these words stand for the real causes of 
 things as th( ugh they thereby assigned the true philosophical solution 
 of these difficulties ; for in this sense they will still be words without 
 ideas, whether in the mouth of an old philosopher or a new one* 
 
Chap. VI- RIGHT USE OF REASON. 73 
 
 scarce any ideas at all. Such sort of words sometimes 
 have become matters of immortal contention, as though 
 the gospel could not stand without them ; and yet the zeal- 
 ot perhaps knows little more of them than he does o£ Shib' 
 holeth, or Higgaion, Selah, Judges xii. 6» Psal ix. 16. 
 
 Yet here I would lay down this caution, that there are 
 several objects of which we have not a clear and distinct 
 idea, much less an adequate or comprehensive one, and 
 yet we cannot call the names of these things ivords without 
 ideas ; such are the infinity and eternity of God himself^ 
 the union of our own soul and body, the union of the divine 
 and human natures in Jesus Christ, the operation of the Ho- 
 ly Spirit on the mind of man, &c. These ought not to be 
 called ivords without ideas, for there is sufficient evidence 
 for the reality and certainty of the existence of their ob- 
 jects ', though there is some confusion in our clearest con- 
 ceptions of them ; and our ideas of them, though imper- 
 fect, are yet sufficient to converse about them, so far as 
 we have need, and to determine so much as is necessary 
 for our own faith and practice. 
 
 Direct. II, Do not suppose that the natures or essences of 
 things always differ from one another as much as their names 
 do. There are various purposes in human life, for which 
 we put very different names on the same thing, or on 
 things whose natures are near akin ; and thereby often- 
 times, by making a new nominal species, we are ready to 
 deceive ourselves with the idea of another real species of 
 things : And those, whose understandings are led away by 
 the mere sound of words, fancy the nature of those things 
 to be very different whose names are so, and judge of 
 them accordingly. 
 
 I may borrow a remarkable instance for my purpose 
 almost out of every garden which contains a variety of 
 plants in it. Most or all plants agree in this, that they 
 have a root, a stalk, leaves, buds^ blossams, and seeds : But 
 the gardener ranges them under very different names, as 
 though they were really different kinds of beings, merely 
 because of the different use and service to which they are 
 apphed by men : As, for instance, those plants whose 
 roots are eaten, shall appropriate the names of roots to 
 themselves ; such are carrots^ turnips, radishes, ^c. If the 
 G 
 
74 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I^ 
 
 leaves are of chief use to us, then we call them herbs; as 
 sage, mint, thyme. If the leaves are eaten raw, they are 
 termed sallad; as lettuce, purcelain. If boiled, they become 
 potherbs; as spinnage, colworts ; and some of those same 
 plants, which are potherbs, in one family, are sallad in an- 
 other. If the buds are made our food, they are called heads 
 or tops ; so cabbage heads, heads of asparagus and arti^ 
 ehoaks. If the blossom be of the most importance, we call 
 it 2i flower ; such are daizies, tulips, and carnations, which 
 are the mere blossoms of those plants. If the husk or seeds 
 are eaten, they are called the f units of the ground, as peasy 
 leans, strawberries, &c. If any part of the plant be of 
 known and common use to us in medicine, we call it a phy- 
 sical herb, as car dims, scurvy- grass; but if we count no part 
 useful, we call it a weed, and throw it out of the garden ; 
 and yet j)erhaps our next neighbour knows some valuable 
 property and use of it ; he plants it in his garden, and gives 
 it the title of an herb, or a flower. Tou see here how 
 small is the real distinction of these several plants, con- 
 sidered in their general nature as the lesser vegetables : 
 Yet what very different ideas we vulgarly form concern- 
 ing them, and make different species of them, chiefly be-* 
 cause of the different names given them. 
 
 Now, when things are set in this clear light, it appears 
 how ridiculous it would be for two persons to contend, 
 whether dajidelion be an herb or a weed ; whether it be a 
 potherb or sallad ; when, by the custom or fancy of differ- 
 ent families, this one plant obtains j^ll these names ac- 
 cording to the several uses of it, and the value that is put 
 upon it. 
 
 Note here — ^^That I find no manner of fault with the va-^ 
 3iety of names which are given to several plants, accord- 
 ing to the various use we make of them. But I would not 
 have our judgments injposed upon hereby, to think that 
 these mere nominal species, namely, herbs, sallad, and 
 weeds, become three really different species of beings, on 
 this account, that they have different names and uses. 
 But I proceed to other instances. 
 
 It has been the custom of mankind, when they have 
 been angry with any thing, to add a new ill name to it, 
 fliat they may CORvey thereby a hateful idea of it, tliougb 
 
Chap. VI. RIGHT tSE OF REASON. 75 
 
 the nature of the thing still abides the same. So the Pa- 
 pists call the Protestants Heretics ; a profane person calls 
 a man of piety a Precisian; and in the times of the 
 civil war, in the last century, the Royalists called the Par- 
 liamentarians Fanatic^ Roundheads^ and Sectaries, And 
 they in requital called the Royalists Malignants : But the 
 partizans on each side were really neither better nor worse 
 for these names. 
 
 It has also been a frequent practice, on the other hand, 
 to put new favourable names upon ill ideas ^ on purpose to 
 take off the odium of them. But, notwithstanding all these 
 flattering names and titles, a man of profuse generosity is 
 h\x\r ^ spendthrift ; a natural son is a bastard still; a gal- 
 lant is an adulterer ; and a lady of pleasure is a whore. 
 
 Direct. IIL Talce heed of believing the nature and essence 
 of two or more things to be certainly the same, because they 
 may have the same name given them. This has- been an un- 
 happy and fatal occasion of a thousand mistakes in the 
 natural, in the civil, and religious affairs of life, both a- 
 mongst the vulgar and the learned. I shall give two or 
 three instances, chief! j^ in the matters of natural philosophy ^ 
 having hinted several dangers of this kmd relating to the^ 
 ology in the foregoing discourse concerning equivocal words. 
 
 Our elder philosophers have generally made use of the 
 word Soul to signify that principle whereby a plant grows, 
 and they call it the vegetative soul : The principle of the 
 animal motion of a brute has been likewise called a soul, 
 and we have been taught to name it the sensitive soul ; 
 they have also given the name soul to that superior prin- 
 ciple in man, whereby he thinks, judges, reasons, &c. and 
 though they distinguished this by the honourable title of 
 the rational soul, yet in common discourse and writing, 
 we leave out the words vegetation, sensitive and rational^ 
 and make the word soul serve for all these principles : 
 Thence we are led into this imagination, that thereis a sort 
 of spiritual being in plants and in brutes, like that in men. 
 Whereas, if we did but abstract and separate these things 
 from words, and compare the cause of growth in a plant, 
 with Xhe csLUse of reasoning in man, (without the word soul) 
 we should never think that these two principles were at all 
 like one another ; nor should we perhaps so easily and 
 
T6 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 peremptorily conclude that brutes need an intelligent mind 
 to perform their animal actions. 
 
 Another instance may be the word Life, which being at- 
 tri baled to plants ^ to brutes, and to men, and in each of 
 them ascribed to ihe soul, has very easily betrayed us from 
 our infancy into this mistake, that the spirit or mind, or 
 thinking principle in man is the spring of vegetative and an- 
 imal life in his body : Whereas it is evident, that if the spir- 
 it or thinking principle of man gave life to his animal na- 
 ture, the way to save men from dying would not be to use 
 medicines, but to persuade the spirit to abide in the body. 
 
 I might ^derive a third instance from the word Heat, 
 which is used to signify tlie sensation ive have when we are 
 near the fire, as well as the cause of that sensation, which 
 is in the fire itself; and thence we conclude from our in- 
 fancy, that there is a sort of heat in the fire resembling our 
 sensation, or the heat which ice feel : Whereas, in the fire, 
 there is nothing but little particles of matter, of such par- 
 ticular shapes, sizes, situation and motions, as are fitted 
 to impress such motion on our flesh or nerves as excite 
 the sense of heat^ Now if this cause of our sensation in 
 the fire had been always called by a distinct name, per- 
 haps we had not been so rooted in this mistake, that tfie 
 fire is hot with the same sort of heat that we feel. This will 
 appear with more evidence when we consider, that we are 
 secure from the same mistake where there have been two 
 different names allotted to our sensation, and to the cause 
 ofit; as, we do not say, pain is in the fire that burns us, 
 ov in the knife that cuts and wounds us; for we call it 
 burning in the fire, cutting in the knife^ and, pain only 
 when it is in ourselves. 
 
 Numerous instances of this kind might be derived from 
 the words sweet, sour, loud, shrill, and almost all the sensi* 
 lie qualities, whose real natures we mistake from our very 
 infancy, and we are ready to suppose them to be the same 
 in us, and in. the bodies that cause them; partly, because 
 the words which signify our own sensations are applied 
 also to signify those unknown shapes and motions of the 
 tittle corpuscles which excite and cause those sensations. 
 
 Direct, IV. In conversation or reading, be diligent to find 
 oxki ihe true sense, or diatvict idea^ which the speaker or wrU 
 
Chap, VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 77 
 
 ter affixes to his words, and especially to those words which 
 are the chief subjects of his discourse. As far as possible 
 take heed lest you put more or fewer ideas into one word 
 than the person did when he wrote or spoke; and endeav- 
 our that your ideas of every word may be the same as 
 his were : Then you will judge better of what he speaks 
 or writes. 
 
 It is for want of this that men quarrel in the dark ; and 
 that there are so many contentions in the several sciences, 
 and especially in dimnity. Multitudes of them arise A onn 
 a mistake of the true sense or complete meaning in which 
 words are used by the writer or speaker ; and hereby 
 sometimes they seem to agree when tliey really differ in theirr 
 sentiments ] and sometimes they seem to differ when they reg- 
 ally agree. Let me give aa instance of both. 
 
 When one man by the word church shall understand all 
 that believe in Christ; and another by the word church 
 means only the church of Rome; they may both assent to 
 this proposition. There is no salvation out of the churchy 
 and yet their inward sentiments may be widely different. 
 
 Again, if one writer shall affirm that virtu,e added to 
 faith is sufficient to make a Christian, and another shall as 
 zealously deny this proposition, they seem to differ wide- 
 ly in words, and yet perhaps they may both really agree 
 in sentiment 5 if, by the word virtue, the affirraer intends 
 our whole duty to God and man ; and the denier by the 
 word virtue means only courage, or at most our duty tO" 
 wards our neighbour, without inckiding in the idea of it 
 the duty which we owe to Gx>d\ 
 
 Many such sort of contentions, as these are, traced to 
 their original, will be found to be mere logomachies, or 
 strifes and'^qiiarrels about names and words, and vainjang-* 
 lings, as the apostle calls them in his first letter of advice 
 to Timothy. 
 
 In order therefore to attain char and distinct ideas of 
 what we read and hear, we must search the sense of words ; 
 we must consider what is their original and derivation in 
 our own or foreign languages ; what is their common 
 sense among mankind, or in other authors, especially such 
 ^ wrote in the same country, in the same age, about the 
 SAnae time, and upon the same subjects : Wq must con- 
 
78 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 sider in what sense the same author uses any particular 
 word or phrase^ and that when he is discoursing on the 
 same matter, and especially about the same parts or para- 
 graphs of his writing: We must consider whether the 
 word be used in a strict or limited, or in a large and gen- 
 eral sense; whether in a hteral, in a figurative, or in a 
 prophetic sense ; whether it has any secondary idea an- 
 nexed to itj besides the prnnary or chief sense. We must 
 inquire further, what is the scope and design of the writer 5 
 and wlmt is the connection of that sentence with those 
 that go before it, and those which follow it. By these 
 and other methods we are to search out the definition of 
 names J tliat is the true sense and meaning in which any 
 author or speaker uses any word, which may be the chief 
 subject of discourse, or may carry any considerable im- 
 portance in it. 
 
 Direct. V. When ive communicate our notions to others, 
 merely ivifh a design to inform mid improve their knowledge, 
 let us in the beginning of our discourse take care to adjust the 
 definition of names wheresoever there is need of it ; tiiat is, 
 to determine plainly what we mean by the chief words 
 which are the subject of our discourse ; and be sure always 
 to keep the same ideas, whensoever we use the same words 
 unless we give due notice of the change. This will have a 
 very large and happy influence, in securing not only others 
 but ourselves too fi om confusion and mistake ; for even 
 writers and speakers themselves, for want of due watchful- 
 ness, are ready to affix different ideas to their own words, in 
 different parts of their discourses, and hereby bring perplex- 
 ity into their own reasonings, and confound their hearers. 
 
 it is by an observation of this rule that niathematicians^ 
 liave so happily secured themselves, and ihe sciences which 
 Ihey have professed, from wranghng and controversy; 
 because r/hcnsoever, in the progress of their tieatises, tliey 
 have occasion to use a new and unknown word, they al- 
 ways define it, and tell in what sense they shall take it ; 
 and in many of their writings you find a heixp of definitions 
 at tlie very beginning. Now. if the writers o£ naiwal phi* 
 losophj and nioralit/h^d used the same accuracy and care, 
 they liad elTecturilly secluded a multitude of noisy and 
 iruitlcys de\)atc3 out of th^ir own sev^j,ol provinces : Nor 
 
Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 79 
 
 had that sacred theme of divinity been perplexed with so 
 many intricate disputes^ nor the church of Christ been torn 
 to pieces by so many sects and factions, if the words grace^ 
 faitkj righteousness y repentance, justijicationy worship^ churchy 
 bishop, presbyter, &c. had been well defined, and ttieir sig- 
 nifications adjusted, as near as possible, by the use of 
 those words in the New Testament ; or at least, if every 
 writer had told us at first in what sense he would use thos^ 
 words. 
 
 Direct. VI. In your own studies as well as in the commu- 
 nication of your thoughts to others merely for their informa-^ 
 Hon, avoid ambiguous and equivocal terms as much as pos' 
 sible. Do not use such words as have two or three defini- 
 tions of the name belonging to them, that is, such words as 
 have two or three senses, where there is any danger of 
 mistake. Where your chief business is to inform the 
 judgment, and to explain a matter rather than to persuade 
 or affect, be not fond of expressing yourselves in figura- 
 tive language, when there are any proper words that signify 
 the same idea in the literal sense It is the ambiguity of 
 names^ as we have often said, that brings almost infinite 
 confusion into our conceptions of things. 
 
 But where there is necessity of using an ambiguous 
 word, there let double care be used in defining that word^ 
 and declaring in what sense ydu take it. And be sure to 
 suffer no ambiguous word ever to coiiiC into your defini- 
 tions. 
 
 Direct. VIT. In communicating your fiotions, use every: 
 word as near as possible in the same sense in ivhich mankind 
 commonly use it, or which writers that have gone before you 
 have usually affixed to it, upon condition that it is free from 
 ambiguity. Though names are in their original merely 
 arbitrary, yet we sliould always keep to the established 
 meaning of them, unless great necessity requires the alte- 
 ration ; for, when any word has been used to signify an 
 idea, that old idea will recur in the mind when the word is 
 heard or read, rather than any new idea which we may 
 fasten to it. And this is one reason why the received defi^ 
 niiion of names should be changed as little as possible. 
 
 But iadd further, that, though a word entirely new in- 
 troduced into ^ Isinguage may |)^ affixed to whs^t idea you 
 
80 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. L 
 
 please, yet an old word ought never to be fixed to an un- 
 accustomed idea, without just and evident necessity, or 
 without present or previous notice, lest we introduce there- 
 by a licence for all manner of pernicious equivocations and 
 falsehoods ; as for instance, when an idle boy, who has 
 not seen his book all the morning, shall tell his master 
 that he has learned his lesson^ he can never excuse himself 
 by saying, that by the word lessoii he meant his hrealcfastj 
 and by the word learnt he meant eating ; surely this would 
 be construed a downright lie, and his fancied wit would 
 hardly procure him a pardon. 
 
 In using an ambiguous word, which has been used in 
 different senses, we may choose what we think the most 
 proper sense, as I have done, p, 72, in naming the poles of 
 the loadstone^ north or south. 
 
 And, when a word has been used in two or three senses, 
 and has made a great inroad for errour upon that account, 
 it is of good service to drop one or two of those senses, 
 and leave it only one rema^ining, and affix the other senses 
 or ideas to other words. So the modern philosophers, 
 when they treat of the human souly they call it the inind or 
 mens humana and leave the w^ord aniniay or soul^ to signify 
 the principle of life and motion in mere animal beings. 
 
 The poet Juvenal has long ago given us a hint of this 
 accuracy and distinction, when he says of irutes and mm, 
 
 Indulsit fnundi communis conditor illis 
 Tantam animas ; nobis animum quoque. 
 
 Sat. ix. v. 134. 
 Exception. There is one case, wherein some of these 
 last rules concerning the definition of words may be in some 
 tneasure dispensed with ; and that is, when strong and 
 rooted prejudice hath established some favorite word or 
 phrase, and long used it to express some mistaken notion, 
 or to unite some inconsistent ideas 5 tor then it is some- 
 limes much easier .to lead the world into truth, by indalg- 
 ing their fondness for a phrase, and by assigning and ap- 
 plying new ideas and notions to their favorite word ; and 
 this is much safer also than to awaken all their passions 
 by rejecting both their old words and phrases, and no- 
 tjiops, and introducing all new at once : Therefore we 
 
Chap, VI, RIGHT USE OF REASON. 81 
 
 continue to say, there is heat in the fire^ there is coldness in 
 ice, rather than invent new words to express the powers 
 which are in fire or ice, to excite the sensations o( heat or 
 cold in us. For the same reason, some words, and phras- 
 es, which are less proper, may be continued in theology^ 
 while people are led into clearer ideas with much more ease 
 and success, than if an attempt was made to change all 
 their beloved forms of speech. 
 
 In other cases, these logical directions should generally 
 be observed, and different names affixed to different ideas. 
 
 Here I cannot but take occasion to remark, that it is a 
 considerable advantage to any language to have a variety 
 of new words ininoduced into it f ih2Lt when, in course of 
 time, new objects and new ideas arise, there may be 7iew 
 words and names assigned to them : And also where one 
 single name has sustained two or three ideas in time past, 
 these new words may remove the ambiguity by being af- 
 fixed to some of those ideas. This practice would, by de- 
 grees, take away part of the uncertainty of language. 
 And for this reason I cannot but congratulate our English 
 tongue, that it has been abundantly enriched with the 
 translation of words from all our neighbor nations, as well 
 as from ancient languages, and these words have been as 
 it were infranchised amofi^st us 5 for French, Latiji, 
 Greek, and German names, will ^gnify English ideas, as 
 well as words that are anciently ^d entirely English. 
 
 It may not be^miss to mention in this place, that, as 
 the determination of the particular sense in which any 
 word is used is called the definition of the name, so the enu- 
 meration of the various senses of an equivocal word is 
 sometimes called the division or distinction of the name 5 
 and for this purpose good doctrines are of excellent use. 
 
 This distinction of the name or word is greatly necessary 
 in argumentation or dispute ; when a fallacious argument 
 is used, he that answers it distinguishes the several senses 
 of some word or phrase in it, and shews in what sense it is 
 true^ and in^what sense it \\e\'\deui\y false. 
 
8? LOGIC : OR THE Part. I- 
 
 SECT, IV. 
 
 OP THE DEFlNIflON OP THINGS, 
 
 AS there is much confusion introduced into our ideaSy 
 by the means of those words to which they are afBxed, so 
 the mingling our ideas with each other without caution, is 
 a farther occasion whereby they become confused. A court 
 ladyy born and bred up amongst pomp and equipage^ and 
 the vain notions of birth and quality constantly joins and 
 mixes all these with the idea of herself, and she imagines 
 these to be essential to her tiature^ and as it were, necessary 
 to her being ; tijence slie is tempted to look upon menial 
 servantSym\A the lowest rank oT \xi^vi\imAy as another species 
 of beings quite distinct from herself. X plow-boy ^Xh^Xlms 
 never travelled beyond his own village, and has seen 
 nothing bat thatched houses and his parish churchy is natu- 
 rally led to imagine that thatch belongs to the very nature 
 of a houscy and that that must be a church which is built of 
 stone, and especmlly if it has a spire upon it. A child 
 wlu>se uncle has been excessive fond, and his schoolmastef 
 very severe, easily believes that fondness always belongs 
 to uncles, and tiiat severity is essential to masters or in* 
 struciors. He lias seen also soldiers with red coats, or min- 
 is ter s mih long black gowns y and therefore he persuades 
 himself that these garbs are essential to those characters, 
 and that he is not a minister who has not a long black gown, 
 nor can he be a soldier who is not dressed in red. It would 
 be well if all sacli mistakes ended with childhood. 
 
 It might be also subjoined, that our complex ideas be- 
 come confused, not only by uniting or blending together 
 more simple or single ideas than really belong to them as 
 in the instances just mentioned ; but obscurity and confu- 
 sion sometimes come upon ouj^ ideas also, /<9r want afuni- 
 ting a sufficient number of single ideas to make the com- 
 plex one: So if I conceive of a leopard only as a spotted 
 bsasty this does not distinguish it from a tyger or a lynXf 
 nor from many dogs or horses, which are spotted too 5 and 
 
Chap. VL RIGHT USE OF REASON. S3 
 
 therefore a leopard must have some more ideas added to 
 complete and distii guish it. 
 
 J grant that it is a large and free acquamtance with the 
 world, a watchful observation and diligent search into the 
 nature of things, that must fully correct this kind of er- 
 rors: The rules of logic 2ixe not sufficient to doit: But 
 yet the rules of logic may instruct us by v'hat means to dis- 
 tinguish one thing from another, and how to search and 
 mark out, as far as may be, the cotitents and limits of the 
 nature of distinct beings, and thus may give us^reat as- 
 sistance towards the remedy of these mistakes. 
 
 As the definition of names free us from ♦hat confusion 
 which words introduce, so the definition of things will in 
 some measure guard us against that confusion which min^ 
 gled ideas have introduced : For, as a definition of the 
 name explains what any word means, so a definition of the 
 thing explains what is the nature of that thing. 
 
 In order to form a definition of any thing, we must put 
 forth these three aqts ol the mind. 
 
 First, compare the thing to be defined with other things 
 that are most like to itself, and see wherein its essence or 
 nature agrees with them ; and this is called the general 
 nature or genus in a definition : So if you would define 
 what wine is, first compare it with other things like itself, 
 as cider^ perrys &c. and you will find it is a sort ofjuice^ 
 
 Secondly, Consider the most remarkable and primary 
 attribute, property, or idea wherein this thing difiers from 
 those other things that are mostlikGit; and that is, its 
 ^isential or specific difference : So K;me differs from cider 
 and perry, and all other juices, in that it is pressed from a 
 grape. This may be called its special nature^ which dis- 
 tinguishes it from oiher juices. 
 
 Thirdly, Join the general and special nature together, 
 or (which is all one) the genus and tlie difference^ and 
 these make up a definition. So (he juice of a grape, or 
 juice pressed from grapes, is the defiirUion of wine. 
 
 So, if I would define what winter is, J consider first 
 wherein it agrees with other things which are most like it, 
 namely, summer, spring, autumn,^ and I find they are all 
 seasons of the year ; therefore a season of the year is the §•«- 
 
84 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I- 
 
 Htis. Then I observe wherein it differs from these, and 
 that is in the shortness of the days; for it is this which 
 does primarily distinguish it from other seasons ; there- 
 fore this may be called its spmal nature or its difference. 
 Then, by joining these together, I make a definition. Win^ 
 ter is that season of the year wherein the days are shortist^ 
 I confess indeed this is but a ruder definition of it, for to 
 define it as an accurate astronomer, I must limit the days, 
 hours, and minutes. 
 
 After the same manner, if we would explain or define 
 what the picture of a man is, we consider first the genus or 
 general nature of it, which is a representation ; and herein 
 it agrees with many other things, as a statue, a shadow, a 
 print, a verbal description of a man, &c. Then we consid- 
 er wherein it differs from these, and we find it differs from 
 a verbal description, in that it is a representation to the 
 eye and not to the ear : It differs from a statue, in that it 
 is a representation upon a flat surface, and not iif a solid 
 figure: It differs f vom a ihadow, in that it is an abiding 
 representation, and, and not a fleeting one: It differs from 
 a, print or draught, because it represents the colours by 
 paint, as well as the shape of the object by delineation. 
 Now, so many, or rather so few of these ideas put togeth- 
 er, as are just suflicient to distinguish a picture from all 
 other representations, make up its essential difference, or 
 its special nature ; and all these are included in its being 
 painted on a plain surface. Then join this to the genus, 
 which is a representation ; and thus you have the complete 
 definition of a man, namely, it is the representation of a man 
 in paint upon a surface, (or a plane,) 
 
 Here it must be observed, that when we speak of the 
 genus and difference as composing a definition, it must al- 
 ways be understood that the nearest genus, and the specific 
 difference, are required. 
 
 The next general nature, or the 7uarest genus, must be 
 used in a definition, because it includes all the rest as parts 
 of its complex idea ; as if I would define wine, I must say, 
 wine is a juice, which is the nearest genus; and not say, 
 wine is a liquid, which is a remote general nature -, or, 
 wine is a substance, which is yet more remote ; for juice 
 includes both substance and liquid. Besides, neither of 
 
Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 85 
 
 these two remote general natures would make any distinc- 
 tion between wi7ie^ and a thousand other substances^ or oth- 
 er liquidsj a remote genus leaves the thing too much un- 
 distinguished. 
 
 The specific difference is that primary attribute which 
 distinguishes each species from one another, while they 
 stand ranked under the sam© general nature or genus. Tho' 
 wine differs from other liquids in that it is the juice of a 
 certain fruity yet this is but a general or generic difference^ 
 for it does not distinguish wine from cider or perry '^ the 
 specif c difference of wine therefore is its pressure from the 
 grape: as cider is pressed from apples^ and perry from pears. 
 
 In definitions also, we must use the primary attribute 
 that distinguishes the species ©r special nature, and not at- 
 tempt to define wine by its peculiar tastes, or effects, or 
 other properties, which are but secondary or consequential ^ 
 when its pressure from the grape is the most obvious and 
 primary distinction of it from all other juices. I confess 
 in some cases it is not so easily known which is the pri- 
 mary idea that distinguishes one thing from another; and 
 therefore some would as soon define winter by the cold-^ 
 ness of the season, as by the shortness of the days ; though 
 the shortness of the days is doubtless the most just, primary 
 and phil4b)phical difiference betwixt that and the other 
 seasons of the year, since winter days are always shortest 
 but not always the coldest ; I add also, that the shortness 
 of the days is one cause of the coldness, but the cold is no 
 cause of their shortness^ 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 BULES OP THE DEFINITION OP THE THING. 
 
 THE special rules of a good definition are the follow- 
 ing: 
 
 Rule l.-^A definition must be universal^ or, as some cell 
 it, adequate; that is, it must agree to all the particular 
 species or individuals that are included under the same 
 idea ; so the juice of a grape agrees to all proper wines^ 
 whether ted, white, French, Spanish, Florence^ &c* 
 
 H 
 
^ LOGIC : ORf THE Part, i. 
 
 'Rule II.— J^ must lejiroper and peculiar to the thing define 
 ed and agree to that alone; for it is the very design ol a 
 definition effectually to distinguish one thing from all oth- 
 ers : So the juice of a grape agrees to no other substance, 
 to no other liquid, to no other being h\x\ wine. 
 
 These two rules being observed, will always render n 
 definition reciprocal with the things defined; which is a 
 scholastic way of speaking, to signify thaft the definition 
 jnay be used in any sentence in the place of the thing de- 
 fined, or they may bemutualh^ confirmedxoncerningeach 
 other, or substituted in the room of each other. The juice 
 of the grape is loinCyOr wine is the juice of the grape. And 
 ^vheresoever the word wine is used, you may put the juice 
 of the gm^e instead of it, except when you consider wine 
 rather as a ivord than a thinf, or when it is mentioned in 
 such logical rules, 
 
 ■ Rule III.-^^ definition ought to he clear and plain ; for 
 the design of it is to lead us into the knowledge of the 
 thing defined. 
 
 Hence it will follow, that the words used in a definition 
 ought not to be doubtful^ or equivocal and obscure^ but as 
 plain and easy as the language will a^Q^^d : And indeed it 
 is a general rule concerning the definition both of namet 
 and things, that no 'vl'Ord should be used in eithei^f tlieni 
 %vhich has any darkness or difficulty in it, unless it has 
 been before explained or defined. 
 
 Hence it will follow also, th^it there are many things 
 vvhich cannot well be defined, either as to iheiiame or tins 
 thing, unless it be by S}^onymous words, or by a negation 
 of the contrary idea, &c. for learned men know not how 
 to make tliem more evideM, or tnt)te intelligible, thnn the 
 ideas which «very man has gained by the vulgar methods 
 of teaching. Siich are the ideas of extension ^ duration^ con- 
 .sciousness, and most of our simple ideas, and particularly 
 .sensible qualities, as ivhite^ blue^ red, cold, /leat, shrill, hit- 
 fery sour, ^c. 
 
 We can say of duration, tluU it is a continuance in being, 
 t>r a 7wt ceasing to be ; we can say of conscious7icss, that it 
 is as it were a feeling tcithin ourselves ; we may say, heat 
 is that which is not cold; or sour is tliat which is like vin- 
 egar ; or we may poi?U Jo the clear sky^ and say^ that i^ 
 
Chap. VL RIGHT USE OF REASON, 8t 
 
 hlue. These are vulgar meihods of teaching the deJinitiofh§ 
 oj names, or meaning of words. But there are some phi- 
 losopherSj whose attempts to define the«e things learnedly 
 have wrapt up their ideas in greater darkness, and exposed 
 themselves to ridicule and contempt; as when tiiey define 
 heat, they say it is Qifalitas eongregans homogenia, and sc- 
 grigans heterogenea ; that i^, a quality gathering together 
 things of the same kind, and separating things of a differ- 
 ent kind. So they define ii^hite, a colour arising from the. 
 prevalence of brightness : But every child knows Aof and, 
 'white better without these definitions* 
 
 There are many other definitions given by the Peripa- 
 tetick philosophers, which are very faulty, by reason of 
 their obscnrity ; asviolioii is defined by them the act of a be- 
 ing in power, so far forth as it is in power. Time is the 
 measure or number of motion cccordlng to pctst. present and 
 fuiiire. The soul is the act (fanorganical natural body hav- 
 ing life in power ; and several others of the same stamp. 
 
 Rule IV. — It is also commonly prescribed amongst the 
 rules of definition, that it should ha short, so that it musi; 
 have no tautology in it, nor any ivords superfluous, I confess 
 deffinitions ought to be expressed in as few words as is 
 consistent with a clear and just explication of the nature 
 of the thing defined, and a distinction of it from all other 
 things besides: but it is of much more importance, and 
 far better, that a definition should explain clearly the sub-s 
 ject we treat of, though the words be many, than to leave 
 obscurities in the sentence by confining i*^ withirr too nar- 
 row hmits. So in the definition which we have given of 
 logic, that is the art of using reason ivell in the search after 
 truth, and the communication of i't to others, it has indeed 
 many words in it, but it could not be well short^f. Art is 
 the genus wherein it agrees with r^hetoric, poesy, arithmeticJc, 
 wrestling, sailing, building, &c. for all these are a?'^salso : 
 But the difference or special nature of it is drawn from 
 its oh jeci, Teas 071 ; from the act using it ivell, and from its 
 two great ends or designs, namely, the search after truths 
 and the communication of it ; nor can it be justly described 
 and explained in fewer ideas. 
 
 V. — If we add a fifth rule, it must be, that neither the 
 tJmig defined, nor a mere synonymous name, should make- a 
 
88 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 
 
 part of the definition^ for this would be no explication of /Ae 
 nature of the thing ; ai^d a synonymous word at best could 
 only be a definition of the name. 
 
 SECT. VL 
 
 OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OP THING1». 
 
 a 
 
 BEFORE I part with this subject, I must propose sev- 
 eral observations which relate to the definition of things. 
 
 1st Observ, There is no need that, in defnitiony we 
 should be confined to one single attribute or property ^ in or- 
 der to express the difference of the thing defined, for 
 sometimes the essential difference consists in two or three 
 ideas or attributes. So 3, grocer is a man who buys and 
 sells sugar, and plumbs and spices Jor gain, A clock is an en- 
 gine with weights and wheels^ that shows the hour of the day 
 both by pointing and striking : And if I were to define a 
 repeating clock, I must add another property, namely, that 
 it also repeats the hour. So that the true and primary es- 
 sential difference of some complex ideas consisting in sev- 
 eral distinct properties, cannot be well expressed without 
 conjunctive particles of speech. 
 
 2d, Observ, There is no need that definitions should al- 
 ways be positive^ for some things differ from others mere- 
 ly by a defect of what others have; as, if a chair be defin- 
 ed a scat for a single person with a back belonging to it^ 
 then a a stool is a seat for a single person without a back; 
 and a foi^m is a seat for several persons without a back : 
 These are negative differences. So siii is a want of con^ 
 fennity to the law of God ; blindness is a want of sight ; a 
 vagabond is a person without a' home. Some ideas are mg- 
 ative^ and their definition ou^it to be so too. 
 
 3d. Observ, Some things may have two or more defini- 
 iionsy and each of them equally just and good ; as a mile 
 is the length of eight furlongs j or it is the third part of a 
 league^ Eternal is that which ever was^ and ever shall be ; 
 or it is that ivhich had no beginning and shall have no end. 
 
Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 89 
 
 Man* is usually defined a rational animal: But it may be 
 much better to define him a spirit united to an animal of 
 such a shape, or an animal of such a peculiar shape united to 
 a spirit, or a teing composed of such an animal and a mind. 
 Uh Ohserv. Where the essences of things are evident, 
 and clearly distinct from each other, there we may be 
 more accurate and exact in the dejinitions of them : But, 
 where their essences approach near to each other, the defi-^ 
 nition is more difficult. A bird may be defined 2i feathered 
 animal with wings, a ship may be defined a large hollow- 
 building made to pass over the water with sails : But if you 
 ask me to define a bat, which is between a bird and a beast, 
 or to define a barge and hoy, which are between a boat and 
 a ship, it is much harder to define them, or to adjust the 
 ,^ bounds of their essence. This is very evident in all mon^ 
 ' strous births, and irregular productions of nature, as well as 
 in m3,ny woj^ks of art, which partake so much of one species^ 
 and so much of another, that we cannot tell under which 
 species to rank them, or how to determine their specific 
 difference. 
 
 The several species of beings are seldom precisely limit- 
 ed in the nature of things by any uncertain and unaltera- 
 ble bounds : The essences of many things do not consist 
 in indivisibili, or in one evident indivisible point, as some 
 have imagined ; but by various degrees they approach 
 nearer to, or differ more from, others that are of a kindred 
 nature. So (as I have hinted before) in the very middle 
 of each of the arches of a rainbow, the colours of g-reen, 
 yellow and red are sufficiently distinguished ; but near the 
 borders of th« several arches they run into one another, 
 so that you liard!y know how to limit the colours, nor 
 whether to call it red or yellow, green or bine. 
 
 5th Observ. As the highest or chxef genuses, namely, bc- 
 
 * The common definition of man, namely a rational animal, is 
 very faulty. J. because the animal is not rational ; the rationality, 
 of man arises from the mind to which the animal is united. 2. Be- 
 cause if a spirit should be united to a horse, and make it a rational 
 being, surely this would not be a man : It is evident therefore that 
 the peculiar shape must enter into the definition of a man to render 
 it just and perfect ; and for want of a full description the^reof, all 
 our definitions are defective. 
 
 H2 
 
90 LOGIC: OR, THE Part I. 
 
 big and not-being^ can never be defined, because there is 
 no genus superior to them : so neither can singular ideas 
 or mdividiials be well defined, because either they have no 
 essential differences from other individuals, or their difter- 
 ences are not known ; and therefore individuals are only 
 to be described by their particular circumstances : So 
 King George is distinguished from all other men and other 
 kings, by describing him as the Jirst king of Great Britain 
 of the house of Brunswick ; and Westminister HaZZ is des- 
 cribed by its situation and its use, ^c. 
 
 That individual bodies can hardly have any essential 
 difference, at least within the reach of our knowledge, n^ay 
 be made thus to appear : Methuselah^ when he was nine 
 hundred and sixty years old^ and perhaps worn out with 
 age and weakness, was the same person as when he wasiin 
 his full vigour of manhood, or when he was an infant, new- 
 ly born ; but how far was his body the same ? Wiio can 
 tell whether there was any fibre of his flesh or his bones 
 that continued the same throughout his whole liTe? Or 
 who can determine which are those fibres? The ship in 
 which Sir Francis Drake sailed round the world might be 
 new built, and refitted so often, that few of the same tim- 
 bers remained i and who can say whether it must be call- 
 ed the same ship or not? And what is its essential diifer- 
 ence? tiow shall we define^ Sir Francis Drake^s ship, or 
 inake a definition for Methuselah ? 
 
 To this head belongs that most difiicult question, What 
 is the principle vf individuatio7i ? Ox what is it that makes 
 any one thing the same as it was sometime before? This- 
 !s too large and laborious an inquiry to dwell upon in this 
 nlaco: Yet I cannot forbear to mention this hint, namely, 
 Since our own bodies must rise at the last da}'- for us ti> 
 receive rewards, or punishments in them, there may be 
 perhaps some original fibres of each human body, some 
 stamina vicoCfOvprinievdil seed of Ufe, which may refrain 
 unchanged through all the stages of life, death, nnd the 
 grave ; these may become the springs and principles of a 
 resurrection, and sufficient to denominate it that same body. 
 But. if there be any such constant and vital atoirjs which 
 distinguish every human body, they are known to God 
 only. 
 
Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 91 
 
 6f/i Observ, Where we cannot find out the essence or 
 essential difference of any species or kind of beings that we 
 would define, we must content ourselves witli a collectioa 
 of such chief parts or properties of it as may best explain it, 
 so far as it is known, and best distinguish it from other 
 things : So a marigold is ^fiower ivhick hath many long and 
 yelloiv leaves , round a Utile knot of seeds in the midsty with 
 such a peculiar stalk, &c. So if we would define silver, we 
 say it jsBi white and hard metal^ next in weight to gold : If 
 we would define an elder tree, we might say it is one among 
 the lesser trees, whose younger branches are soft and full 
 of pith, whose leaves are jagged or indented, and of such a 
 particular shape, and it hears large clusters of small Mack 
 berries : So we must define earth, stone, a lion, an eagle, a 
 serpent, and the greatest part of ?ia^ii?^aL_beings, by a coU 
 lection of those properties, which according to our obser- 
 vation distinguish them from all other things. This is 
 what Mr Locke calls nominal essence^ and norriinal defi- 
 nitions. And indeed^ since the essential differences of the 
 various natural beings or bodies round about us arise 
 from a peculiar shape^ size, motion, and situation of the 
 small particles of which they are composed, and since we 
 have no sufficient method to inform us what these are, we 
 must be contented with such a sar/ of definition of the 
 bodies they compose. 
 
 Here note, That this sort of definition, which is made- 
 up of a mere collection of the most remarkable parts or, 
 properties, is calledan imperfect definition, or a description ^. 
 whereas the definition is c^Wed perfect when it is composed, 
 of the essential difference^ added to the general nature or 
 genus, 
 
 1th Observ. The perfect defnilian of any being always in- 
 cludes the definition of the name whereby it is called, for it 
 informs us of the sense or meaning of that word, andi 
 siiews us what idea that word is affixed to 5 But the c?e- 
 fnition of the name does by no means include SLperftct defi^. 
 nition of the thing ; foj', as we have said before, a mere sy- 
 nonymous word, a negation of the contrary, or the men= 
 tion of any one or two distinguishmg properties of the 
 thing, may be a sufiicient definition of the name. Yet in 
 those cases where the e^seuti^l difierewces or eijsenge of a 
 
92 LOGIC . OR, THE Part. I. 
 
 thing is unknown, there a definition of the name^ by the chief 
 properties, and a description of the thing, are much the same. 
 
 And here I think it necessary to take notice of one gen- 
 eral sentiment, that se^ms to run through that excellent 
 performance, Mr. Lockers essay on human understanding ^ 
 and that is ; That the essence of things are utterly un- 
 known to us, and therefore all our pretences to distinguish 
 the essences of things can reach no farther than mere nom^ 
 inal essences ; or a collection of such poperties as we know 5 
 to some of which we affix particular names, and others we 
 bundle up, several together, under one name : And that 
 all our attempts to rank beings into different kinds of spe- 
 cies can reach no farther than to make mere nominal spe^ 
 sies ; and therefore our definitions of things are but mere 
 nominal descriptions or definitions of the name.'' 
 
 Now, that we may do justice to that great author, we 
 ought to consider that he confines this sort of discourse 
 only to the essence of simple ideas, and to the essence of 
 substances^ as appears evident in the fourth and sixth chap- 
 ters of his third book ; for he allows the names of mixed 
 modes always to signify the real essences of their species ^ 
 Chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial things to have real 
 distinct species ; and that, in the distinction of their essen- 
 ces, there is generally less confusion and uncertainty than in 
 natural, Chap. VI. sect. 40,41, though it «iust be confessed 
 that he scarcely makes any distinction between the defi- 
 nition of the name and the definition of the things IV. and 
 sometimes the current of his discourse decries the knowl- 
 edge of essences in such general terms as may justly give 
 occasion to mistake. 
 
 It must be granted, that the esences of most of our sm- 
 pZeicZeas, and the greatest part of particular natural sub- 
 stances are much unknown to us ; and therefore the essen- 
 tial difference of different qualities, and of the various 
 kinds of bodies (as I have said before) he beyond the reach 
 of our understandings : We know not what makes the pri- 
 mary real inward distinctionsbetweenre(;?,g'r6e?i^si(;^e/,sowr, 
 &;c. between wood, iron, oil, stone, fire, water, flesh, clay in 
 their general natures ; nor do we know what are the in- 
 ward and prime distinctions between all the particular kinds 
 w speciesin the vegetable^ animalimineral^ metallic* or liquid 
 
Chap, VI, RIGHT USE OF REASOxN. 93 
 
 world of things. See Philosophical Essays^ Essay xi. sec 1. 
 But still there is a very large field for the knowledge of 
 the essences of things, and for the use of perfect definitions 
 amongst our complex ideasy the modal appearances and chan* 
 ges of nature f the ivorks of art ^ the matters of science^ and 
 jail the affairs of the civil the moral, and the religious life : 
 And indeed it is of much more importance to all man- 
 kind to have a better acquaintance with the works of art 
 for their own livelihood and daily use, with the affairs 
 <?/ morality for their behaviour in this world, and with the 
 matters of religion^ that they may be prepared for the 
 world to come, than to be able to give a perfect definition 
 of the works of nature. 
 
 If the particular essences of natural bodies are unknown 
 to us, we maj- be yet good philosophers, good artists, good 
 neighbors, good subjects, and good Christians, without 
 that knowledge 3 and we have just reason to be content. 
 
 Now that the essences of some o£ihe modal appearan- 
 ces and changes in nature as well as things of arty science^ 
 and morality y are sufficiently known to us to msike perfect 
 definitions of them, will appear by the specimen of a few 
 definitions of these t|iings. 
 
 Motion is a change of a place. Swiftness is the passing 
 over a long space in a short time. A natural day is the 
 time of one alternaterevolutionof hght and darkness, or it 
 is the duration of twenty-four hours. An eclipse of the sun 
 is a defect in the sun's transmition of light to us by the 
 moon interposing. *Snow is congealed vapour. ^Hail is 
 congealed rain. An Hsland is a piece of land rising above 
 the surrounding water. An ^hillis an elevated part of the 
 earth, and a ^grove is a piece of ground thick set with 
 trees. An house is a building made to dwell in, A cot- 
 tage is a mean house in the country. A supper is that 
 meal which we make in the evening. A triangle is a fig- 
 ure composed of three sides. A gallon is a measure con- 
 
 *NoTE — Island, hill, grove, are not .defined here in their more 
 rennote and substantial nature Sj (if I may so express it) or as the 
 matter of them is earth : for in this sense we know not their es. 
 sence, but only as considered in their modal appearances whereby 
 one part of earth is distinguished from another. The same may 
 be said of snow, hail, & c. 
 
94 LOGIC : OR, THE Part L 
 
 taining eight pints. A Porter is a man who carries bur- 
 dens for hire. A A:mg' is the chief ruler in a kingdom. — 
 Veracity is the conformity of our words to our thoughts, 
 Covetousness is an -excessive love of money, or other pos- 
 sessions, Killi?ig is the taking away the life of an animal. 
 Murder is the unlawful kiUing of a man. Rhetoric is the 
 art of speaking in a manner St to persuade. Natural phi- 
 losophy is the knowledge of the properties of bodies, and 
 the various effects of them, or it is the knowledge of the 
 various appearance in nature, and their caus^es^ and Logic 
 is the art of using our reason well, &c. 
 
 Thus you see the essential difference of various beings 
 may be known, and are borrowed from their qualities and 
 properties y their causes, effects, objects y adjunct ends, &c, and 
 indeed, as infinitely various as the essences of things are, 
 their definitions must needs have various forms. 
 
 After all it must be confessed, that many logicians and 
 philosophers in the former ages have made too great a bus- 
 tle about the exactness of their definitions of things, and 
 entered into long, fruitless controversies, and very ridicu- 
 lous debates in the several sciences, about adjusting the 
 logical formalities o^ evexy definition ; whereas that sort of: 
 wrangling is ik>w grown very justly contemptible, since it 
 is agreed that true learning and the knowledge of things 
 depend much more upon a large acquaintance with their 
 various properties, causes, effects, subject, object, ends and 
 designs, than it does upon the formal and scholastick nice- 
 ties of genus and difference. 
 
 Sect. vtt. 
 
 OP A COiMPLETE CONCEPTION OF THINGS. 
 
 HAVING dwelt so long^ upon the first rule to direct 
 oufc* conceptions, and given an account of the definitior 
 both of names ^wAthings, in order to gain clear and distinc 
 ideas, we make iiaste now to the second rule, to guide our 
 conceptions, and that is, Conceive of things completely in 
 all their parts. 
 
CsAp. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 9a 
 
 All parts have a reference to some whole : Now there is 
 an old distinction which logical writers make of a whole 
 and its parts into four several kinds/ and it may be propet 
 just to mention them here. 
 
 1. There \s ^Mnetaphysical whole ^ y^\\en ihe essence of 
 a thing is said to consist of two parts, the genus and the 
 difference^ that is, the general and the special nature, which 
 being joined together make up ^-definition. This has been 
 tlie subject of the foregoing sections. 
 
 2. Tijere is a mathematical whole, v/hich is better call- 
 ed integral, Avhen the several parts which go to make up 
 the whole are really distinct from one another and each 
 of them may subsist apart. So the 7?eac?, the limbs, and 
 the trunk, 2ire the integral parts of any large number^ so 
 these discourses which I have written concerning percep- 
 tion, judgment, reasoning, and disposition, ave four integral 
 parts of Zog-ic. This sort of parts goes to make up the 
 
 -completeness of any subject ; and this is the chief and most 
 direct matter of our discourse in this section. 
 
 3. There is a physical or essential whole, which is usually 
 made to signify a.nd include only the iwo essential jiarts of 
 man, body and souL But I think the sense of it may bet- 
 ter be altered, or at least enlarged, and so include all the 
 essential modes, attributes, or properties, which are con- 
 tained in the comprehension of afiy idea. This shall be the 
 subject of discourse under the tJdrd rule to direct our con- 
 ceptions. 
 
 4. There is a logical whole, which is also called an urd- 
 cemal ; and the parts of it are all tiie particular ideas to 
 which tills universal nature exten^g. So a genus is a ivhole 
 in respect to several species which are its parts. So the* 
 species is a whole and alMhe individuals are the pdrtiot it. 
 This shall be treated of, in the fourth nde to guide our con- 
 ceptions. 
 
 At present we consider an idea as mi integral whole, and 
 our second rule directs us to contemplate it in all its parts ^ 
 But this can only refer to complex ideas, for simple ideas 
 feave no parts. 
 
96 LOGIC : OR, THE Pakt I. 
 
 SECT, vm, 
 
 OF DIVISION AND THE RULES OF IT. 
 
 SINCE our minds are narrow in their capacity, and 
 cannot survey the several parts of any complex being, 
 with one single view, as God sees all things at once ; there- 
 fore we must, as it were, take it to pieces, and consider of 
 the parts separately, that we may have a more complete 
 conception of the whole. So that, if 1 would learn the na- 
 ture of a watch the workman takes it to pieces and shews 
 me the springs the wheels^ the axles^ the pinions^ the hal^ 
 ance, the dial-plate pointer^ the case, &c. and describes each 
 of these things to me apart, together with their figures and 
 their uses. If I would know what an animal is, the anat- 
 omist considers the head, the trunk, the limbs^ the towels^ 
 apart from each other, and gives me distinct lectures upon 
 each of them. So a kingdom is divided into its several 
 provinces; a hook into its several chapters ; and any science 
 is divided according to the several subjects of which it treats. 
 
 This is what we properly call the division of an idea^ 
 which is an explication of the whole by its several parts, or 
 an enumeration of the several parts that go to compose any 
 whole idea, and to render it complete. And I think when 
 man is divided into body and soul, it properly comes under 
 this part of the doctrine of integral division, as well as 
 when the mere body is divided into head, trunk, ?iXidi limbs : 
 This division is sometimes called />ar/i7i(;n. 
 
 When any of the parts of any idea are yet farther divi- 
 ded in order to a clear explication of the whole, this is call- 
 ed a subdivision ; as when a year is divided into months^ 
 each month into days, and each day into hours^ which may 
 also be farther subdivided into 7ninutes, and seconds. 
 
 It is necessary, in order to a full explication of any be- 
 ing, to consider each part, and the properties ofit^ distinct 
 hy itself, aS well as in its relation to the whole: For there 
 are many properties that belong to the several parts of a 
 being which cannot properly be ascrij^ed to the whole, 
 
Chap. VI. niGHT USE OP REASON, 97 
 
 though these properties may fit each part for its propet 
 station, and as it stands iii that relation to the whole com- 
 plex being : As in a hoiisey the doors are moveable, the 
 rooms square, the ceilings white, the windows transparent, 
 yet the house is neither moveable, nor square, nor white^ 
 nor transparent. 
 
 The special Rules of a good Division are these. 
 
 1 Rule— ^£ac^ part singly taken must contain less than 
 "he whole^ hut all the parts taken collectively y (or together j) 
 fnust contain neither more nor less than the whole. There- 
 fore, if in discoursing of a tree you divide it into the trunk 
 and leaves, it is an imperfect division, because the root and 
 the branches are needful to make up the whole. So logic 
 would be ill divided into apprehension, judgment and rea-' 
 sotiing ; ioM method is a considerable part of the art which 
 teaches us to use our reason right, and should by no means 
 be omitted. 
 
 Upon this account, in every division wherein we diesigtl 
 a perfect exactness, it is necessary to examine the whole 
 idea with diligence, lest we omit any parts of it through 
 want of care; though in some cases it is not possible, and 
 tn others it is not necessary, that we should descend to the 
 minutest parts. 
 
 II Rule. — In all divisions we shouti first consider the lar^ 
 ger and more immediate parts of the subject, and not divide 
 it at once into the more minute and remote parts. It would 
 by no means be proper to divide a kingdom first m\6 
 streets^ and lanes, ^hd fields ; but it must be first divided 
 inio provinces o\ counties, then those counties, may be Aivi' 
 ded into towns, viltages, field Sy&c.^^nd towns into streets 
 and lanes. 
 
 III Rule. — The several parts of a division ought to te fjp- 
 posite, that is, one part ought not to contain another. It 
 would be a ridiculous division of an animal into head, Vimb^ 
 Tfody^ and brain, for the &ram^ are contained in the head. 
 
 Yet here it must be noted, A\kt sometime^ the subjects 
 of any treatise, or the objects of atiy particular science, 
 may be properly and necessarily so divided, that the second 
 may include tlie first, and the third may include the first 
 and 3ecotid; without offending against this rule, because 
 
OS LOGIC : OR, THE Part I 
 
 in the second or following parts of the science or discourse 
 these objects are not considered in the same manner as in 
 the first; as for instance, geometry divides its objects into 
 lines, surfaces, and solids : Now, though a line be contain- 
 ed in a surface or a solid, yet it is not considered in a sur- 
 face, separate and alone, or as a niere line, as it is in the 
 first part of geometry, which treats of lines. So logic is 
 Tightly Ai\lded inio conception, judgment, reasoning, and 
 method. For, though^d^as ot conceptions are contained in 
 the following parts of logic, yet they are not there treated 
 of as separate ideas, which are the proper subject of the 
 iirstpart. 
 
 IV Rule. — Ijct not sul divisions he too numerous without 
 necessity : For it is better many times to distinguish more 
 parts at once, if the subject will bear it, than to mince the 
 discourse by excessive dividing and subdividing. It is 
 preferable therefore, in a treatise of geography, to say, that 
 in a city we will consider its walls, its gates, its buildings., 
 its streets, and lanes, than to divide it formally first into 
 the encompassing and the encompassed parts; the encom- 
 passing parts are the walls and gates, the encompassed 
 parts include the ways and buildings ^ the ways are the 
 streets arid the lanes; buildings ^consist of the foundations 
 and the superstructure, ^c. 
 
 Too great a number of subdivisions has been affected by 
 some persons in sermons, treatises, instructions, &c. under 
 pretence of great accuracy: But this sort of subtilities 
 hath often caused great confusion to the understanding, 
 and sometimes more difiiculty to the memory. In these 
 cases it is only a good judgment can determine what sub- 
 divisions are uselul. 
 
 y Rule. — Divide every subject accordrt\g to the special de* 
 sign you have in vieio. One and the some idea or subject 
 may be divided in very different manners, accoiding to 
 the diflerent purposes we have in discoursing of it. So, if 
 a printer were to consider the several parts of a book^ he 
 must divide it into sheets, the sheets \Mo pages, the pages 
 into lines, and the li7ies into letters, Bui ^grammarian di- 
 ji'idQS a hook into periods, sentences, and ivords, or parts of 
 speech, as noun, pronoun.^ verb, <^c. A logician considers a 
 book as divided into chapters, sections, arguments, proposi- 
 tions, ideas; and, with the help of ontology, he divides tlie 
 
eHAP. VL RIGHT USE OF REASOxN. 99^ 
 
 propositions inlo suhjecty object, property ^ relation, action^ 
 passion, cause^ ^ff^ct, 8[c. But it would be very ridiculous 
 for a logician to divide a look into sheets, pageSy and lines ; 
 or for a printer to divide it into no^ms and pronouns, or iur 
 tor propositions, ideas, properties, or causes, 
 
 VI Rule. — In all your divisions observe with the greatest 
 exactness the nature of things. And here I am constrained 
 to make a subdivision of tliis rule into two very necessary 
 particulars. 
 
 (1.) Let the parts of your divisions be such as are prop- 
 erly distihguished in nature. Do not divide asupder those 
 parts of tlie idea which are intimately united in nature, nor 
 unite those things into one part which nature has evident- 
 ly disjoined : Thtfs it would be very improper, in treating^ 
 Ofi 2iVi animal body^ to divide it into xhe superior smd inferior 
 halves ; for it would be hard to say how much belongs by 
 nature to the inferior half, and how much to the superior. 
 Much more improper would it be still to divide the animal 
 into the right hand parts and left hand parts, which would 
 bring greater confusion. This would be as unnatural as if 
 a man should cleave a hazle rmt in halves through the husky 
 the shell, and the kernel, at once, and say, a nut is divided 
 into these two parts ; whereas nature leads plainly to the 
 threefold distinction o^ husk, shell, and kernel. 
 
 (2.) Do not affect duphcates, nor triplicates, nor any 
 certain number of parts in your division of things ; for we 
 know of no such certain number of parts which God the 
 Creator has observed in forming all the varieties of his 
 creatures; nor is there any uniform determined number 
 of parts in the varioirs subjects of human art or science; 
 yet some persons have disturbed the order of nature, and 
 abused their readers, by an affectation o^f dichotomies, trich- 
 otomies, sevens, twelves, ^e. Let the nature of the subject, 
 considered together with the design which you have in 
 view always determine the number of parts into which you 
 divide it. 
 
 After all, it must be confessed, that an intimate knowl- 
 edge of things, and a judicious observation, will assist in 
 the business of division, as well as o^ definition, heXiex than 
 too nice and curious an attention to the mere formalities of 
 logical writers, witlwut a real acquaintance witli things. 
 
100 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I^ 
 
 SECT. IX. 
 
 QF A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPTION OF THINGS, AND OF AB- 
 STRACTION. 
 
 THE third rule to direct our conceptions requires us to 
 conceive of things comprehensively. As we must survey an 
 object in all its parts^ to obtain a complete idea of it, so we 
 must consider it in all its modesy attributesy properties, and 
 relations^ in order to obtain a comprehensive conception 
 of it. 
 
 The comprehension ot?iniie^y as it was explained under 
 tlie docfrine of universale, includes only the essential 
 modes or attrihuies of thatid^a/ but in this place the word 
 is taken in a larger sense, and implies also the various (?c- 
 casional properties, accidental modes ^ and relations. 
 
 The necessity of this rule is founded upon the same rea- 
 son as the former, namely. That our minds are narrow 
 and scanty in their capacities, and as they are not able to 
 consider all the ^ar^s of a complex idea at oncey so neither 
 can they a^ once contemplate all the different attributes 
 and circumstances of it : We must therefore consider things 
 successively and gradually in tlieir various appearances 
 and circumstances : As our natural eye cannot at once 
 behold the six sides of a die or cube, nor take cognizance 
 of all the points that are marked on them, and therefore 
 we turn up the sides successively, and thus survey and 
 number the points that are marked on each side^ that we 
 may know the whole^ 
 
 In order to a comprehensive view of any idea, we must 
 first consider, whether, the object of it has an existence as 
 well as essence; whether it be a simple or complex idea; 
 whether it be a substance or a mode. If it be a substance^ 
 then we must inquire what are the essential modes of it 
 which are necessary to its nature, and what are those 
 properties or accidents of it which belong to it occasionally, 
 or as it is placed in some particular circumstances : We 
 must view it in its internal and absolute modes, and observe 
 it in those various external relations in which it stands to 
 
Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON 101 
 
 other beings : We must consider it in its powers and capa^ 
 cities either to do or suffer : We must trace it up to its va- 
 rious causes, whether supreme or subordinate. We must 
 descend to the variety of its effects, and take notice of the 
 several ends and designs which are to be attained by it» 
 We must conceive of it as it is either an object or a subject^ 
 what are the things that are akin to it, and what are the op- 
 posiies or contraries of it ; for many things are to be known 
 both by their contrary and kindred ideas. 
 
 If the thing we discourse of be a mere 7node, we must in- 
 quire whether it belongs to spirits or bodies; whether il be 
 3. physical or moral mode^ If moral, then we must consider 
 its relation to God, to our selves, io ouv neighbour ; its ref- 
 erence to this life^ or the life to come- If it be a virtue, we 
 must seek what are the principles of it, what are the rules. 
 of it, what are the tendencies of it, and what are thefalsz 
 virtues that counterfeit it, and what are the real vices that 
 oppose it, what are the evils which attend the neglect of it^ 
 and what are the rewards of the practice of it, both here and 
 hereafter. 
 
 If the subject be historical, or a matter of fact, we may 
 then inquire whether the action was don£ at all; whether 
 it was done m such a manner, or by such persons as is re- 
 ported-3 at what time it was. done; inivhat place; hy what 
 motive, and for what design; what is the evidences of the 
 fact; loho are the witnesses ; what is their character and 
 credibility; what 5zg'?is there are of such a fact; what con- 
 current circumstances which may either support the truth of 
 it, or render it doubtful. 
 
 In order to make due inquiries into all these, and many- 
 other particulars which go towards the coinplete and com-- 
 prehensive idea of any being, the science of ontology is ex- 
 ceeding necessary. This is what was wont to be called 
 the frst of metaphysics in the Peripatetick schools, it treats 
 of being in its most general nature, and of all its affections 
 and relations. I confess the old Popisii schoolmen have 
 mingled a number of useless subtiiities with this science; 
 they have exhausted their own spirits, and the spirits of 
 their readers, in many laborious and intricate trifles ; and 
 some of their writings have been fruitful of names without 
 ideas, which have done much injury to the isacred istudv of 
 12 
 
102 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I- 
 
 divinity. Upon this account many of the moderns have 
 most unjustly abandoned the whole science at once, and 
 throw abundance of contempt and raillery upon the very 
 name of metaphysics ; but this contempt and censure is ve- 
 ry unreasonable ; for this science, separated from some Ar- 
 ristotelian fooleries, and scholastic subtilities, is so neces- 
 sary to a distinct conception, solid judgment, and just rea- 
 soning on many subjects, that sometimes it is introduced 
 as a part oflogic^ and not without reason. And those who 
 utterly despise and ridicule it, either betray their own ig- 
 norance, or will be supposed to make their wit and banter 
 a refuge and excuse for their own laziness. Yet this much 
 I would add, that the later writers of ontology are general- 
 ly the best on this account, because they have left out 
 much of the ancient jargon, ^^e the Brief Sclieme of (hi- 
 iology in the Philosophical Essays^ by L Watts, ' 
 
 Here let it be noted, that it is neither useful, necessary^ 
 or possible, to run through all the modes^ circmnstances and 
 relations of every subject we take in hand 5 but in ontology 
 we enumerate a great variety of them, that so a judicious 
 mind may choose what are those circumstances ^ relaticns., 
 and properties of any subject, which are most necessary 
 to the present design of him that speaks or writes, either 
 to explain, to illustrate, or 10 prove the point. 
 
 As v^e arrive at that complete knowledge of an idea in all 
 its parts y by that act of the mind which is called division y so 
 we come to a comprehensive conception of a thing in its 
 several properties and relations^ by that ^ct of the mind 
 which is called abstraction : that is, we consider each sin- 
 gle relation or property of the subject alone 5 and thus we 
 do as it were withdraw and separate it in our minds, boUi 
 from the subject itself, as well as from other properties and 
 relations, in order to make a fuller observation of it. 
 
 This act 01 abstraction is said to be twofold, either preci- 
 sive or negative, 
 
 Precisive ahstraciion is when we consider those things 
 apart which cannot really exist apart ; as when we consid* 
 er a mode without considering its substance and subject ^ or 
 one ccsential mode without another. Negative ahstr action is,. 
 \yhcn we .consider one thing separate from auother, which 
 
Chap, VI, RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 103 
 
 may also exist without it ; as when we conceive of a 
 subject without conceiving of its accidental mode» or reZa- 
 tiu3is ; or when we conceive of 07ie accident without think- 
 y ing of another. Jf I think of reading or writing without 
 the express idea of some manythis \s precisive abstraction^ 
 or if I think of the attraction of iron, without the express 
 idea of some particular magnetic body. But, when T think 
 of a needle without an idea of its sharpness^Xhxs is negative 
 abstraction ; and it is the same when I think of its sharp-^ 
 ness without considering its lengtlu 
 
 SECT. X. 
 
 OF THE EXTENSIVE CONCEPTION OF THINGS, AND OF DIS- 
 TRIBUTION. 
 
 AS the completeness of an idea refers to the several j?ar/s 
 that compose it, and the comprehension of an idea inckides 
 its various properties; so the extension of an idea denotes 
 the various sorts or kinds of beings to which the same idea 
 belongs ; And i^ we would be fully acquainted with a sub- 
 jectj we must observe 
 
 This fourth rule to direct our conceptions, namely, Co^i- 
 ceive of things in all their extension ; that is, we must search 
 out the various species or special natures which are con- 
 tained under it, as a gemis or general nature. If we would 
 know the nature of an animal perfectly, we must take 
 cogniz»ance of beasts y birds, fshes and insects, as well as 
 men, all which are contained under the general nature and 
 name of animal. 
 
 As an integral whole is distinguished into its several parts 
 by division; so the word distribution is most properly used 
 when we distinguish an universal whole into its several 
 kinds or species : And perhaps U had been better, if this 
 word had been always con/itied to its signification, though 
 it must be confessed that we frequently speak of the di- 
 vision of an idea into its several kinds, as well as into its 
 several parts. 
 
 The rules of a good distribution are-miiCh the same with 
 those which wq have before applied to diiimn^ which 
 
104 LOGIC : OR, THE Part 1. 
 
 must be just repeated again in the briefest manner, in or- 
 der to give examples of them. 
 
 Rule I.— Each part singly taken must contain less than 
 the whole^ but all the parts taken collectively ^ or together j 
 must contain neither more nor less than the whole ; or, 
 as logicians sometimes express it, the parts of the division 
 ought to exhaust the ivhole thing which is divided. So ined^ 
 W>feis justly distributed into prophylactic^ or the art of 
 preserving health ; and therapeutic, or the art of restoring 
 health; for there is no other sort of medicine besides these 
 two. But men are not well distributed into tall or shorty 
 for there are some of a middle stature. 
 
 Rule If. — In all distributions we should first consider 
 the larger and naare immediate kinds of species, or ranks 
 of being, and not divide a thing at once into the more m5>- 
 iiute and remote. A genus should not at once be divided 
 into individuals^ or even into the lowest species^ if there be 
 a species superior. Thus it would be very improper to di- 
 vide animal into trout^ lobster^ eely dog, bear, eagle, dove^* 
 worm and butterfly, for there are inferior kinds 5 whereas 
 animal ought first to be distributed into man, beast, bird, 
 fish, insect ; and then beast should be distributed into dog^ 
 bear, &c. Bird into eagle, dovey&c. Fishinio trout, eel y 
 lobster, &;c. 
 
 it is irregular also to join any species in the same rank 
 or order with the superior ; as, if we should distinguish 
 animals into birds, bears, and oysters, &c. it would be a ri- 
 diculous distribution. 
 
 Rule III. — The several parts of a distribution ought to 
 be opposite ; that is, one species or class of beings in the 
 same rank of division, ought not to contain or include 
 another 5 so men ought not to be divided into the rich, the 
 poor .^ the learned, and the tall ; for poor men may be both 
 learned and tall, and so may the rich. 
 
 But it will be objected, Are not animated bodies rightly 
 distributed into vegetative and animal, or (as they are usu- 
 ally called) sensitive? Now the sensitive contains the vege* 
 tative nature in it, for animals grow as well as plants. I an- 
 swer, that in this, and in all such distributions, the word 
 vegetative signifies merely vegetation ; and in this sen^re^- 
 ^tativ^ will b^ gujici^ntiy oppofit^ tp mUmlj for it can- 
 
Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 105 
 
 not be said af aii animal that it contains mere vegetation 
 in the idea of it. 
 
 Rule IV. — Let not subdivisions be too numerous with- 
 out nece&sity ; therefore I think quantity is better distin- 
 gui»!ied at once into a liney surface^ and a solid ; than to 
 say, ^s Ramus does, that quantity is either a line or a 
 thing lined ^ and a thing lined is either aline or a solid. . 
 
 Rule V. — Distribute every Subject according to thespe- 
 cial design you have in view, so far as is necessary or 
 useful to your present inquiry. Thus a poUticiofn distrib- 
 utes mankind according to th^ir civil characters into the 
 tillers and ihe ruled ; ar^d a physician divides them into the 
 side ov the healthy ', but a divine distributes them into 
 Turks y Heathens^ Jews or Christians, 
 
 Here note. That it is a very useless thing to distribute 
 any idea into such kinds or members as have no different 
 properties to be spoken of; as it is mere trifling to divide 
 right angles into such whose legs are equals and ivhose legs 
 are unequal, for as to the mere right angles they have no 
 different properties. 
 
 Rale VI. — In all your distributions observe the nature 
 of things with great exactness, and do not affect any par- 
 ticular form of distribution ^ as some persons have done 
 by dividing evei^y genus into two species ; or into three spe* 
 cies ; whereas nature is infinitely various, and human af- 
 fairs and human sciences have as great a variety 5 nor is 
 there any one form of distribution that will exactly suit 
 with all subjects. 
 
 'Note.-^li is to this doctrine of distribution of genus into 
 its several species we must also refer the distribution of a 
 cause according to its several effects, as some medicines are, 
 heatings some are cooling ; or aa effect, when it is distin- 
 guished byits^causes, as faith is either built upon divine 
 testimony or human. It is to this head we refer particu- 
 lar artificial bodies, when they are distinguished according 
 to the ma//^r they are made of, as a statue is either of brass ^ 
 of marble, or ofwood, &c. and any other beings, when they 
 are distinguished according to iheir end and design, ^s the 
 furniture of body or mind is either for ornament or use. 
 To this head also we refer subjects when they are divided 
 according to tjbeir modes or accidents ; as men are either 
 
lOS LOGIC : OR, THE Pakt t 
 
 Iherry, or grave, or sad ; and modes^ when they are divid- 
 ed by their subjects^ as distempers belong to the fluids, or 
 to the sohd parts of the animal. 
 
 It is also to this place we reduce the proposals of a dif- 
 ficulty under its various cases, whether it be in speculation 
 or practice : As, to shew the reason of sunbeam-^ burning 
 wood, ivhether it be done by a conmx glass or a concave ; or 
 to slievv tlie construction and mensuration of triangles^ wheth- 
 er you have two angles and a side given, or two sides 
 and an angle, or only three sides. Here rt is necessa- 
 ry to distribute or divideadiiiiculty ina41 its cases, in or- 
 der to gain a perfect knowledge of the subject you con- 
 tern plate. 
 
 It might be observed here, that logicians have sometimes 
 given a mark or sign to distinguish when it is an intC" 
 gral whole that is divided into its parts ov members^ or when 
 it is a genus^ an universal ivhole, that is distributed into its 
 species and individuals. The rule they gy\e is this : When^ 
 soever the whole idea can be directly and properly affirm- 
 ed of each part, as, a bird is an animal, a fish is an animaly 
 Bucephalus is a horse^ Peter is a man, then it is a distribu- 
 tion Q^ ^ genus into its species, or a species into its individ'- 
 uals: But when the whole cannot be thus directly affirm- 
 ed concerning every part, then it is a division of an inte- 
 gral inio its several /?ar/5 or members ; as we cannot say 
 the head the breast, the hand, or the foot is an animal, but 
 we say, the head is a part of the a?2i??inZ, and the foot is an- 
 other part. 
 
 This rule may hold true generally in corporeal beings, 
 or perhaps in all substances : But. when we say the fear 
 of God is wisdom, and so is human civility; criticism is 
 true learning, and so is philosophy : To execute a murder- 
 er is justice, and to save and defend the innocent is justice 
 too. In these cases it is not so easily determined, Nvheth- 
 er an integral whole be divided into its parts, or an univer- 
 sal into its species : For the fear of God may be called 
 either one part, or one kiiid of ivisdom : Criticism is one 
 pait, or one kind o^ learning : And the execution ofamuV' 
 dei^er may be called a species of justice, as well as apart of 
 it. Nor indeed is it a matter of great importance to de- 
 termine this controversy. 
 
eKAp.VL ' RIGHT USE OF REASON. 107 
 
 SECT. XI. 
 
 OP AN ORDERLY CONCEPTION OF THINGS. 
 
 THE last rule to direct our conceptions is, that we 
 should rank and place tbem in proper method and just or- 
 der. This is of necessary use to prevent confusion ; for, 
 as a trader who never places his goods in his shop or ware- 
 house in a regular order, nor keeps his accounts of his 
 buying and selhng, paying and receiving, in a just method, 
 is in the utmost danger of plunging all his affairs into 
 confusion and ruin ] so a. studmt who is in the search of 
 truth, or an author or teacher who communicates knowl- 
 edge to others, will very mach obstruct his design, and 
 confound his own mind or the minds of his hearers, un- 
 less he range his ideas in just order. 
 
 If we would therefore become successful learners or 
 teachers we must not conceive of things in ^confused hmp^ 
 but dispose our ideas in some certain method^ which may be 
 most easy and useful both for the understandicg and 
 znemory ; and be sure, as much as may be, to follow the 
 nature of things, for which many rules might be given 5 
 namely, 
 
 1. Conceive as much as you can o?i\ie essentials of any 
 subject, before you consider its accidentals.^ 
 
 2. Survey first the general par^s and properties of any 
 subjectj^ before you extend your thoughts to discourse of 
 the particular kinds or species of it. 
 
 3. Contemplate things fiisi m tlieir own simple natures^ 
 and afterwards view them in composition with other things; 
 unless it be your present purpose to take ^compound hein^ 
 to pieces, in order to find out, or to shew the nature of it, 
 by searching and discovering of what simples it is com- 
 posed. 
 
 4. Consider the absolute modes ot affections of any being 
 as it is in itself, before you proceed to consider it relatively y 
 or to survey the various relations in which it stands to oth- 
 er beings, &c. 
 
 Note. — These rules chiefly belong to the method of in- 
 .struction which the learned call sijnthetic. 
 
108 LOGIC: OR> THE PartI. 
 
 But in the regulation of our ideas, there is seldom an 
 absolute necessity that we should place them in this or the 
 other particular method : It is possible in some cases that 
 many methods may be equally good, that is, may equally 
 assist the understanding and the memory : To frame a 
 method exquisitely accurate, according to the strict nature 
 of things, and to maintain this accuracy from the begin- 
 ing to the end of a treatise, is a most rare and difiicult 
 thing, if not impossible. But a larger account of method 
 ^'ould be very improper in this place, lest we anticipate 
 what belongs to ihe fourth part of logic. 
 
 SECT. XIL 
 
 THESE FIVE KULES OF CONCEPTION EXEMPLIFIED© 
 
 IT may be useful here to give a specimen of the five 
 •^special rules to direct our cohceptions, which have beeii 
 the chief subject of this long chapter, and represent them 
 practically in one view. 
 
 Suppose the theme dfour discourse was the passions of 
 the mind, 
 
 \st. To gain a clear and distinct idea ofj^ctssiouy we must 
 'def7ie both the name and the thing. 
 
 To begin with the defnition of Ike name. We are not 
 here to understand the word passion in its vulgar and most 
 limited sense, as it signifies merely anger ovfiiry; nor do 
 we take it in its most extensive philosophical sense, for the 
 sustai7iing the action of i\n agent; biit in the more limited 
 philosophical sense, passions signify tlie various affections 
 of the mind, such as admiration^ love, or hatred: this is the 
 definition of the name. 
 
 We proceed to the definition of the thing Passio7i is de* 
 fined a sensation of some speciaJ comfnotv n in anitKal nature 
 vc<:asioned hythe mind^s percBption of some object suited to eift* 
 
Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 109. 
 
 cite that commotion* Here* the genus, or general nature 
 o{ passion f is a sensation oj some special commotion in ani- 
 mal nature; and herein it agrees with hunger, thirst, pain, 
 &c. The essential difference of it is, that this commotion 
 arises from a thought or perception of the mind ^w[id hereby, 
 it is distinguished from hunger, thirst, or pain. 
 
 2dly^ We must conceiveof it c(?mpZe^eZi/, oi* survey the 
 several parts that compose it These are, (1 ) the mind^s 
 perception of some object. (2.) The consequent ruffle^ or spc' 
 cial commotion of the nerves, and blood, and animal spirits. 
 And (3 ) The sensation of this imvard commotion. 
 
 Sdli/y We must consider it comprehensively, in its various 
 properties. The most essential attributes that make up its 
 nature have been already mentioned under the foregoing 
 heads. Some of the most considerable properties that re- 
 main are these, namely, That passion belongs to all mankind 
 in greater or lesser degrees : It is not constantly present with 
 us, but upon some certain occasions : It is appointed by our 
 Creator for various useful ends and purposes, namely, to give 
 us vigour in the pursuit of what is good and agreeable to 
 us, or in the avoidance of what is hurtful ; It is very prop- 
 er for our state of trial in this world : It is not utterly to 
 be rooted out of our nature, but to be moderated and gov- 
 erned according to the rules of virtue and religion, &c. 
 
 Athly, We must take cognizance of the various kinds of 
 it, which is called an extensive conception of it. If the ob-" 
 ject which the mind perceives be very uncommon^ it excites 
 the passion oi admiration : If the object appears agreeable^ 
 it raises love : If the agreeable object be absent and attain-^ 
 ablcy it causes de5i?'e ; If likely to be obtained^ it excites 
 
 * Since this was written, I have published a short treatise of the 
 passions, wherein I have so far varied from this definition, as to call 
 thena sensible commotions of onr whole nature, both soul and body 
 occasioned by the mind's perceptions of sonae object, &c I made 
 this alteration in the description of the passions in that book chiefly to 
 include in a more explicit manner, the passions of desire and aver- 
 sion, which are acts of volition rather than sensations Yet since 
 some commotions^ of animal nature attend all the passions, and since 
 there is always a sensation of these commotions, I shall not change 
 the definition I have written here ; for this will agree to all the pas- 
 sions whether they include any act of volition or not ; r40r indeed is 
 tli6 matter of any great importance, Nov, IT, 172B, 
 
 K 
 
no LOGIC: OR, THE Part I. 
 
 liop^ : If U7iatfainahle, despair ^ If it be present and posses'^s^ 
 ed^ it is the passion of joy : If lost^ it excites sorrow : If the 
 object be disagreeable, it causes, in general, hatred or ar^r- 
 sio7i: If it be absent, and yet we are in danger of it, it rais- 
 es our /gar; If it be ^pr^sm/, it is sorrow, and sadness^ &c. 
 
 dthly^ All these things and many more, which go to 
 compose a treatise on this subject, must be placed in their 
 proper order : A slight specimen of which is exhibited in 
 this short account oT passion, and which that admirable au- 
 thor Descartes has treated of at large ; though for want of 
 sufficient experiments and observations in natural philoso- 
 phy, there aresom^ few mistakes in his account of animal 
 nature. 
 
 SECT. XIII. 
 
 AN ILLUSTRATION OF THESE FIVE HVLES BY SIIMILITUDES. 
 
 THUS we have brought the first part of logic to a con- 
 clusion: And it may not be improper here lo represent 
 its excellencies (so far as we have gone) by general hints 
 i}f'its chief design and use, as well as by a various compari* 
 son of it to those instruments which mankind have invented 
 for their several conveniences and improvements. 
 
 The design of logic is not to furnish us with the perceiv- 
 nig faculty, but only direct and nssist us in the use of it : It 
 doth not give irs the objects of our ideas, but only casts such a 
 light on those objects which nature furnishes us with, that 
 they may be the more clearly and distinctly known : It 
 doth not add new parts or properties to things, but it dis- 
 covers the various parts, properties, relations and depen- 
 dencies of one thing upon another, and by rnnking alt 
 things under general and special hrnds^ it renders the na- 
 ture, or any of the properties, powers, and uses of a thing, 
 more easy "to be found out, when we seek in what rank of 
 beings it lies, and wJierein it agrees with, and wherein it 
 clifi'ers from others. 
 
 If any comparisons would illustrate this, it may be thu$ 
 represented. 
 
 i, W]\en loeic assists us to attain a clear and disfinct 
 
Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. Hi 
 
 conception of the nature of things by definition, it is Hke 
 those glasses whereby we behold such objects disiirwtly^ as, 
 by reason of their smallness, or their great distance, ap- 
 pear in confusion to the naked eye : So the telescope dis« 
 covers to us distant wonders in the heavens, and shews the 
 milky way, and the bright cloudy spots in a very dark sky, 
 to be a collection of little stars, which the eye unassisted 
 beholds in a mingled confusion. Sa when bodies are too 
 small for our sight to survey them distinctly, then the mic- 
 roscope is at hand for our assistance, to shew us all the 
 liinbs Siwd Jeatures of the most minute animals y with great 
 clearness and distinction. 
 
 II. When we are taught by logic to view a thing com- 
 pletely m all its parts^ by the help of division, it has the use 
 of an anatomical knife^ which dissects an aiiimal body, and 
 separates the veins, arteries, nerves, rmiscles, membranes, Sfc, 
 and shews us the several parts which go to the composi- 
 tion of a complete animal. 
 
 III. Wlien logic instructs us to surve}?- an object compre- 
 hensively in all the modes^ properties, relations, faces, and 
 appearances of it, it is of the same use as a terrestrial globe, 
 which turning round on its axis represents to us all the va- 
 riety of lands and seas, kingdoms 2iXid ^lations, on the sur- 
 face of the earth, in a very short succession of times shews 
 the situations and various relations of them to each other, 
 and gives a comprehensive view of them in miniature. 
 
 IV. When this art teaches us to distribute any extensive 
 idea into its different kinds or species, it may be compared 
 to the prismatic glass, that receives the sun-beams or rays 
 of light, which seem to be uniform when falUng upon it, 
 but it separates and distributes them into their different 
 kinds siud colours, and ranks them in their proper succession. 
 
 Or, if we descend to subdivisions and subordipate ranks 
 of being, then distribution may also be said to form the re- 
 semblance of a natural tree, wherein the genus or general 
 idea stands for the root or stock, and the several kinds or 
 species, and individuals, are distributed abroad, and repre- 
 sented in their dependence and connection, like the seve- 
 ral boughs^ branches, and lesser shoots. For instance let 
 animal be the root of a logical tree, the resemblance is 
 seen by mere inspection , though the root be not placed at 
 the bottom of the page- 
 
112 
 
 LOGIC : OR, THE 
 
 Part L 
 
 Man 
 
 r Philip, 
 James, 
 Peter, 
 
 Thomas, &c, 
 
 Beas^t 
 
 Animal ^ 
 
 Bird 
 
 Fish 
 
 I Bear, &c. 
 C Eagle, 
 J Lark, 
 
 i Duck 
 
 I Goose, &c. 
 
 Trout, 
 
 Whale, 
 
 Oyster, &c. 
 
 5 Trot, 
 ( Bayard 
 
 '^Mastifi; 
 Spaniel, 
 Greyhound, 
 
 I Beagle, &c. 
 
 English, 
 Muscovy, 
 Hook-Bill, &c= 
 
 Wasp, 
 Bee, &c. 
 Worm, 
 
 r Flying 
 
 Insect^ Creepmg — ^ Ant, 
 l^ I C Catterpillarj &c. 
 
 The same similitude will serve also to illustrate the di- 
 vision and subdivision of an integral whole into its several 
 parts. 
 
 When logic directs us to place all our ideas in a proper 
 methodj most convenient both for instruction and memory, 
 it doth the same service as the cases ofivell contrived shelves 
 in a large library^ yvherein folios, quartos y octavos, and less- 
 69' volumes, are disposed in such exact order, under the par- 
 ticular head§ of divinity, history, mathematics, ancient and 
 miscellaneous learning, &c. that the student knows where 
 to find every book, and has them all as it were within his 
 command at once^ because of the exact order wherein they 
 are placed. 
 
 The man who has such assistants as these at hand, in 
 order to manage his conceptions and regulate his ideas, is 
 well prepared to improve his knowledge, and to join these 
 ideas together in a regular manner hy judgment, which is 
 the second operation of the mindj and will be the subject 
 of the second part of logic. 
 
THE 
 
 SECOND PART OF LOGIC 
 
 OF JUDGMENT AND PROPOSITION. 
 
 WHEN the mind lias got acquaintance with things by 
 framing ic^eas of them, it proceeds to the next operation^ 
 and that is, to compare lliese ideas together, and to join 
 them by affirmation^ or disjoin them by negation, accord- 
 ing as we find them to agree or disagree. This act of the 
 imnAiscaWeA judgment ; as wlien we have by perceptioa 
 obtained the ideas o^ Plato a 'philosopher^ man innocent^ we 
 form these judgments; Plato was a philosoplur : No mait 
 is innocent. 
 
 Some writers have asserted, ihsd judgrmnt consists in a 
 mere perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. 
 But I rather think there is an act of the will (at least in 
 most cases) necessary to. form a judgment ; for, though we 
 do perceive, or tliink we perceive, ideas to agree or disagree, 
 yet we may sometimes refrain from judging or assenting to 
 thq perception,^ for fear lest the perception should not be 
 sufficiently clear, and we should be mistaken : And I am 
 well assured at other times, that there are multitudes of 
 judgments formed^ and a firm assent given to ide^s joined or 
 disjoined^ before there is any clear perception whether they 
 agree or disagree 5 and this is the reason of so m^ny false 
 judgments or mistakes among men. Both these practices 
 ace a ^voof^ ihdii judgment has something of the will in it^ 
 and does not merely consist in perception; since we some- 
 times j udge (though unhappily) without perceiving, a^d 
 sametiojes we perceive without immediate judging. 
 K2 . 
 
114 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. tl. 
 
 As an idea is the result of our conception or apprthensiony 
 so ^proposition is the effect of judgment. The foregoing 
 sentences, which are examples "of the act of judgment, are 
 properly called propositions. Plato is a philosopher, &c. 
 
 Here let us consider, 
 
 1. The generkl nature of a proposition, and the parts of which it is 
 
 composed, 
 
 2. The various divisions or kinds of propositions. 
 
 3. The springs of false judgment, or the doctrine of prejudices. 
 
 4. General directions to assist us in judging right. 
 
 5. Special rules to direct us in fudging particular objects. 
 
 GHAPTER I. 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF A PROPOSITION, AND ITS 
 SEVERAL PAftTS. 
 
 A PROPOSITION is a sentence wherein two ar more 
 ideas or terms are joifted or disjoined by one affirmation or 
 negation, as Plato was a philosopher : Every angle is form' 
 ed hy two lines meeting : No man living on earth can be 
 completely happy. When there are ever so many ideas or 
 terms in the sentence, yet if they are joined or disjoined 
 merely by one single affirmation or negation, they are 
 properly called but one proposition^ though they may be 
 resolved into several propositions which are implied there- 
 in, as will hereafter appear. 
 
 In describing a proposition, I use Ihe word terms as well 
 as ic^^as, because, when mere ideas are joined in the mind 
 without words, it is rather called a judgment ; but when 
 clothed with words it is called 3. proposition^ even though 
 it be in the mind only, as well as wJien it is expressed by 
 speaking or writing. 
 
 There are three things which go to the nature and con- 
 stitution of a proposition, namely; \\i^ mhject^Wi^ predicate^ 
 and the copaif^. 
 
Chap. L RIGHT USE OF REASON. 115 
 
 The subject of a proposition is^ that concerning which 
 any thing is affirmed or denied : So Plato^ angle, man liv 
 ing on earth, are the subjects of the foregoing propositions. 
 
 The predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of the 
 subject; so philosopher is the predicate of the first propo- 
 sition ; formed by two lines meeting, is the predicate of thcr 
 second ; capable of being completely happy, the proper jror 
 (licat^ of the third. 
 
 The subject and predicate of a proposition taken together,, 
 are called the matter oiWy for these are the materials oC 
 which it is made. 
 
 The copula is iheform of a proposition ; it represents 
 the act of the mind affirming or denying, and it is ex- 
 pressed by the words, a^m^ art, is, are, <fec. or am not, art 
 not, is not, are not, &c. 
 
 It is not a thing of importance enough to create dispute, 
 whether the words, no, none, not, never, &c. which disjoin 
 the idea or terms in a negative proposition, shall be called 
 a part of the subject of the copula, or of the predicate. 
 Sometimes p(5rhaps they may seem most naturally to be 
 included in one and sometimes in the other of these, 
 though a proposition is usually denominated affirmative or 
 negative itom lis copula, as hereafter. 
 
 ]Vb/e 1 .— Where^ each of these partsof a proposition is 
 not expressed di-stinctly in so many words, yet they are all 
 understood^ and implicitly contained therein 5 as Socrates 
 disputed, is a complete proposition, for it signifies Socrates 
 was disputing^ So I die, signifies J am^ dying. I can write, 
 that is, lam able to write. In Latin and Greek one single 
 word is Hiany times a complete composition. 
 
 Note, ^-^Ihese YfmA^nam^ art, 2>, &c. when they are 
 used alone without any other predicate, signify both the 
 aotofthe mind judging, which includes the copula and sig- 
 nify also actual existence, which is the predicate of that 
 proposition So Rome is, signifies Kome is existent : There 
 are some strange monsters : that is. Some strange monsters 
 are existent ; Carthage is no more, that is, Carthage has no 
 being 
 
 Note 3. — The subject and predicate of a proposition are 
 not always to be known and distinguished by the placing 
 of the words ia the geatence^ bui by reflecting duly on the 
 
116 LOGIC: OR, THE Part 11, 
 
 sense of the words^ and on the mind and design of the 
 speaker or writer : As if I say, Li Jfrica there are many 
 lions, I mean many lions are existent in Africa : Many lions^ 
 is the subject, and existent in Africa is the predicate. 
 It is jproperfor a pkilosapher to understand geometry ; here 
 the word proper is the predicate, and all the rest is the 
 subject, except Is the copula. 
 
 Note 4. — The subject and predicate of a proposition 
 ought always to be iwo different ideas^ or two different 
 terms ^ for, where both the terms and ideas are the same, it 
 is called an identical proposition^ which is mere tricing, and 
 cannot tend to promote knowledge ; such as, A rule is a 
 rule, or A good man is a good man.. But there are some 
 propositions, wherein the tenns of the subject and predicate 
 seem to be the same; yet the ideas B.re not the same; 
 nor can these be called purely identical or trifling proposi- 
 tions : such as Home is home^ that is Hoine is a concenient 
 or delightsome place ; Socrates is Socrates still ; that is, Th& 
 inan Socrates is still a philosopher : The hero was not a hero, 
 that is, The hero did not sheiv his courage ] fV hat I have 
 written^ I have written; that is. What I ivrote I still approve ^ 
 and will not alter it : What is done is done ; that is, it can- 
 not he undone. It may be easily observed in these proposi- 
 tions the term is equivocal^ for in the predicate it has a dif- 
 ferent idea from what it has in the subject. 
 
 There are also some propositions whereia the terms of 
 the subject and predicate differ, but the ideas are the same ; 
 and these are not merely identical or trifling propositions j 
 as impudent is shameless; a billow is^a wave; or fluctus 
 (in Latin) is a wave ; a globe is a round body. In these 
 propositions^ either the words are explained by a definition 
 of the name, or the ideas by a definition of the ihiiig, and 
 .therefore they aie by no means useless when formed for 
 this purpose. 
 
Chap. IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. tlT 
 
 CHAPTER n. 
 
 OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS* 
 
 PROPOSITIONS may be distributed into various 
 kinds> according to their subject^ their copula^ Xheir predi- 
 caiCf their nature or composition, their sensCy and their evU 
 denccy which distributions will be explained in the follow- 
 ing sections. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 OP UNIVERSAL, PAETICULAR, INDEFINITE, AND SINGULAR 
 
 PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 PROPOSITIONS m2cy be drvided, according to their 
 siibjecty into universal and particular ; this is usually call- 
 ed a division arising from the quantity. 
 
 An universal proposition is when the subject is taken ac- 
 cording to the whole of its extension ; so, if the subject 
 be a genus^ or a general nature, it includes all '\i% species or 
 kinds: If the subject be a 5peae5, it includes all individu- 
 als. This universality is usually signified by these words, 
 allj every, no, none, or the like ; as, All must die : No man, 
 is almighty: Every creature had a beginnings 
 
 A particular proposition^ is when the subject is not ta- 
 ken according to its whole extension 5 that is, when the 
 term is limited and restrained to some one or more of those 
 species or individuals whose general nature it expresses 
 but Veaches not to all 5 and this is usually denoted bv the 
 words, some, many, few, there, are, which, &c. as Some birds 
 can sing well ; Few men are truly wise : There are parrots 
 ivhich will talk an hundred things. 
 
 A singular proposition is when the subject is a singulai: 
 or individual term or idea : as, Descartes was an inge7iious 
 philosopher : Sir Isaac Newton has far exceeded all his prede^ 
 cessors: The palace at Hampton Court is a pleasant dwelling : 
 This day is very cold. The subject here must be taken »€«■ 
 
118 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II. 
 
 cording to the whole of its extension, because, being an 
 individual^ it can only extend to one, and it must therefore 
 be regulated by the laws of universal propositions , 
 
 An indefinite propositiofi, i^ when no note, either of uui- 
 versaiity or particularity, is prefixed to a subject, which 
 is in its own natore general 5 as, A planet is ever changing 
 its place: AngeU are nohh creatures. Now this sort of 
 proposition, especially when it describes the nature of 
 things, is usually counted universal also, and it supposes 
 the subject to be taken in its whole extension : For, if 
 there were any plauet which did not change its place^ or 
 an}'' angel that were not a noble creature, these propositions 
 would not be strictly true. 
 
 Yet, in order to secure us against mistakes in judging 
 o[%miversal, particular and indefinite propositions, it is ne- 
 cessary to make these following remarks. 
 
 I. Concerning universal propositions. 
 
 Note 1. — Universal terms may either defiote a meta- 
 physical, 3,phyical or a moral universality. 
 
 A metaphyical ar matheniatical universality, is, when all 
 the particulars contained under any general idea have the 
 same predicate belonging to them, without any exception 
 whatsoever; or when the predicate is so essential to the uni- 
 versal object, that it destroys the very nature of the subject 
 to be without it; as, All circles have a centre and ^ cir- 
 cumference: All spirits in their own nature are immortal. 
 
 A physical or natural universalit}^, is when, according 
 to the order and common course of nature, a predicate 
 agrees to all the subjects of that kind, tliough there may be 
 some accidental and preternatural exceptions ; as All men 
 use words to express their thoughts, yet dwnb persons are 
 excepted, for they cannot speak. All beasts I•a^e four 
 feet, yet there may be some monsters with five; 01: maimed 
 who have but three. 
 
 A moral universality, is when the predicate agrees to 
 the greatest part of the particulars which are contained 
 under the universal subject ; as All negroes are stupid crea- 
 tures : All men are governed by afiection rather than by 
 reason : All the old Romans loved their country : And the 
 scripture uses this language, when St. Paul telLs us, TAa 
 Greie^ are always liars. 
 
Chap, II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 119 
 
 Now it is Evident, that a special or singular conclusion 
 cannot be inferred from a moral universality^ nor always 
 and irifaiLbly from a physical one, though it may be always 
 inferred from an universality which is metaphysical^ with- 
 out any danger or possiWlity of a mistake. 
 
 Let it be observed also, that usually we make little or no 
 distinction in common language, between a subject that 
 is physically or metaphysically universal, 
 
 Noie2. — An universal term is sometimes i^keu coUec*- 
 lively for all its particular ideas united together, and some- 
 times distrihuHvely, meaning each of them single and alone. 
 
 Instances of a collectively universal are such as these : All 
 these apples will Jill a bushel : All the hours of the night are 
 sufficient for sleep: All the rules of Grammar overload the 
 memory. In these propositions it is evident, that the pre- 
 dicate belongs not to the individual, separately ^ but to the 
 whole collective idea; fov we cannot affirm the same predi*- 
 cate if we change the word all into one or into evei^y we 
 cannot say one apple or every apple ivillfUla bushel. Now 
 such a collective idea^ when it becomes the suhject of a 
 proposition, ought to be esteemed as one single thing; and 
 this renders the propositions singular or indefinite^ as we 
 shall shew immediately . 
 
 A distributive univei^al will allow the word all to be 
 •hanged into every , or into one^ and by this means is dis- 
 tinguished from a colled ive. 
 
 Instances of a disirihulive universal are the most common 
 on every occasion ; as, All men are mortal : Every man is 
 a sinner^ &c. But; in ih\^ sovt o^ universal there is a dis- 
 tinction to be made, wl.ich follows in the next remark. 
 
 ISiote -3. — When an universal term is taken distributivelyy 
 sometimes it includes all the individuals contained in its 
 inferior spec'es : As when I sa}-, Every sickness has a teii- 
 dency to death ; I mean etei^ individtkil sithiess^ as well as 
 every kind. But sometimes it includes no more than mere- 
 ly each species or kind; as, when the Evangelist says, Christ 
 healed every disease, or every disease ivas healed by Christ; 
 that is, every kind of disease. The first of these logicians 
 cdll the distribution of an universal in singula generum; 
 the 7a5^ is a distribution in genera singuforum. Bui, ei- 
 ther of them joined to the subjecti- render a proposition 
 univer^aL 
 
120 LOGIC: OR, THE Part IL 
 
 NoU 4. — The universality of a subject is often restrained 
 by a part of the predicate; as when wae say, AH men learn 
 wisdom by experience : the universal subject, all men^ is 
 limited to signify only all those men who learn wisdom. The 
 scripture also uses this sort of language, when it speaks of 
 ^*all men being jusiifieci by the righteousness of one/^ Ro. 
 V. 10 that is, all men who are justified obtain it in this way. 
 
 Observe here, That not only a metaphysical or natural, 
 but a moral universality also is ofteniinies to be restrained 
 by a part of the predjcate;; as when we say. All the Dutch 
 are good seamen: All the Italians are subtil politicians; 
 that is, those among the Dutch that are seamen are good 
 seamen ; and those among the Italians who ar« politicians 
 are subtil politicians, that is, they ar« generally so 
 
 Note 5. — The universality of a term is many times re- 
 strained by the particular time, place, circumstance, &c. 
 or the design of the speaker; as, if we were in the city of 
 London, and say, All the weavers went to present their pe- 
 tition ; we mean only. All the weavers who dwelt in the 
 city. So when it is said in the gospel, All men did mar- 
 vel, Mark v, 20. it reaches only to All those men who 
 heard of the miracles of our Saviour. 
 
 Here also it should be observed, that a moral universality 
 is restrained by time, place, emd other circumstances, as well 
 as a natural ; so that by these means the word all some- 
 limes does not extend to a tenth part of those who at first 
 might seem to be included in that word. 
 
 One occasion of these difficulties and ambiguities,that be- 
 long to wmtJergaZ propositions h the common humor and 
 temper of mankind, who generally have an inclination to 
 magnify their ideas, and to talk roundly and umversally 
 concerning any thing they speak of; wliich has introduced 
 universal terms of speech into custom and habit, in all 
 nations and all languages, more than nature or reason 
 would dictate; yet, when this custom is introduced, it is 
 not at all improper to use Uiis sort of language in solemn 
 and sacred writings, as well as in familiar discourse. 
 
 II Remarks concernwg indejinite propositions. 
 
 Note 1. — Propositions carrying in them universal forms 
 of expression may sometimes drop the note af universalitij 
 and become indefinite and yet retain the same universal 
 
Chap. IL RIGHT USE OF BEASON, 121 
 
 sense, whether metaphysical^ natural^ or moral, whether 
 collective or distributive^ 
 
 We may give instances of each of these. 
 
 Metaphysical ; as, A circle has a centre arid circumference. 
 Natural 5 as, Beasts have four feet. Moral ; as, Negroes 
 are stupid creatures. Collective; SiS^ The apples will Jill a 
 bushel. Distributive ; a-, Men aremortul. 
 
 Note 2. — There are laiany cases wherein a collective idea 
 is expressed in a proposition by an indefinite term, and 
 that wheie it describes the nature or quality of the subject, 
 as well as when it declares some past matters of fact; as, 
 Fir trees set in good order will give a charming prospect ; 
 this must sigJiify a collection, for one makes no prospect. 
 In matters of fact this is more evident and frequent; as^ 
 The Romans overcame (he Gauls : The robbers surrounded, 
 the coach: The wild geese few over the Thames in the form 
 of a wedge. All these are collective subjects. 
 
 Note 3. — In indefinite propositions the subject is often re- 
 strained by the predicate, or by the Special time, place, or 
 circumstances, as well as in propositions which are ex« 
 pressly universal ; as, The Chinese are ingenious silk weav- 
 ers ; that is, those Chinese which are silk-weavers are m- 
 genious at their work. The stars appear to us when the 
 twilight is gone; this can signify no more than the stars 
 which are above our horizon. 
 
 Note 4. — All these restrictions tend to reduce some in- 
 definite propositions almost into particular^ as will appear 
 under the next remarks. 
 
 1 1 1. Remarks concerni n g particular propositions. 
 
 Note 1.— As particular propositions may sometimes be 
 expressed indefinitely , without any notie of particularity 
 prefixed to the subject ; as, In times of confusion laws are 
 not executed: Men of virtue are disgraced, and murderers eS'> 
 cape ; that is^ some laws^ some men ofvirtiiCy some murder^ 
 ers : Unless we should call this languagfe amoral universal^ 
 ity, though I think it can hardly extend So far. 
 
 Note 2.^^The words some, a few, &C. though they gen- 
 erally denote a proper particularity^ yet sometimes they 
 espvoss ei collective idea; as, Some of the memies beset the 
 general around: A few Greeks woiild beni a thousund In^ 
 
 h 
 
122 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 I conclude this section with a few general remarks oa 
 this subject, namely. 
 
 Gen. Rem. I. Since Universal, indefinite and particular 
 terms, in the plural number, may either be taken in a col-- 
 iective or distributive sense, there is one short and easy 
 'Way to find when they are collective, and when distributive ; 
 jiamely, if the plural number maybe cli^anged ir4o the sin- 
 gular, that is, if the predicate will agree to one single sub- 
 ject, it is a distribuHve idea ; if not, it is collective. 
 
 Gen Rem. JI. Universal and particular terms, in the plu- 
 yal number; such as, all, some, few, many, Sfc when they 
 are taken in their distributive sense, represent several sin- 
 gle ideas ; and when they are thus affixed to the subject 
 of a proposition, render that proposition, universal or parr 
 iicular, according to the universality or particularity of 
 the terms affixed. 
 
 Gen Rein. HI. Universal ^w(}l particular terms, in the 
 plural number, taken in their collective sense, represent 
 generally one collective idea. 
 
 If this one collective idea be tiius represented, (whether 
 by universal or particular terms) as the subject of a prop- 
 osition, which describes the nature of a thing, it properly 
 Hiakes either a singular or an indefinite projwsition ; for 
 the words all^ some, a few, &c* do not then denote the 
 giean^i/i/ of the proposition, but are esteemed merely as 
 terms which connect Uie individuals together, in order to 
 com\io^e one collective idea . Observe tiiese instances ; All 
 the sycamores in the gajden would make a l^) ge grove ; that 
 is, tins one collection of S3^camore, which h a singular idea. 
 Some of the sycamores, in t!ie garden vtould make a fine 
 grove : sycamores wouicJ make a noble grove : In these 
 last the subject is rather indefinite than siugnhr. But it is 
 very evident, that in each of these pro]»osi<h»ns the predi- 
 cate can only belong to ^.collective idea, and therefore ilyd 
 subject must be esteemed a collective. 
 
 If iW\s collective idea (whether represented by universal 
 or particular terms) be used in desciibing past matters of 
 fact, then it is generally to be esteemed a si7igular idea, 
 and renders the proposition si7igu!.ar; ^^^All the scddiers 
 of Alexander made but a little army: A fw Macedonians 
 vanquished the large army tf Darius : ^^iome grenadiers in 
 the camp plundered aid the ■neighbouring towns. 
 
GftAp. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 123 
 
 Now we have shewn before, that if a proposition describe 
 ing the 7iatufe of things has an mdefinitt subject, it is gen- 
 erally to be esteemed universal in its prepositional sense 5 
 And J if it has a singular subject y m its propositional sens^ 
 it is always ranked with wiiversals.' 
 
 After all, we must be forced to confess, that the lan- 
 guage of mankind, and the idioms of speech, are so ex- 
 ceeding various, that it is hard to reduce them to a few 
 rules; and, if we would, gain a just and precise idea of ev- 
 ery universal particular and indefinite expression, we must 
 not only consider the pecuhar idioms of the language, but 
 the time, the place, the occasion, the circumstances of the 
 matter spoken of, and thus penetrate, as far as possible^ 
 into the design of the speaker or writer. 
 
 SECT. IL 
 
 OP AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS; 
 
 WHEN a proposition is considered with regard to its 
 copula^ it m?y be divided into affirmative and negative $ 
 for it is the copula }o\ns or. disjoins the two ideas. Others 
 call this a division of propositions according to their qual- 
 ity, . 
 
 An affinnativt proposition is when the idea of the' predi- 
 cate is supposed to agree to the idea of the subject, and is^ 
 joined to it by the word fs, or are^ which is the copula ; as, 
 All men are sinners. But, when the predicate is not sup- 
 posed to agree with the subject, and is disjoined from if 
 by the particles, is not y are not, &c, the proposition is 7ie* 
 gative ; as Man is not innocent ; or, No man is innocents. 
 In an affirmative proposition, we assert one thing to be* 
 long to another, and, as it were, unite them in tliought 
 and word : In negative propositions, we separate one 
 thing from another and deny their agreement. 
 
 It may seem something odd, that two ideas or terms are 
 said to be disjoined by a copula : But, if we can but suppoijC 
 
lU LOGIC: OR, THE Part II. 
 
 the negaitive particles do really belong to the copula of 
 negative propositions, it takes away the harshness of the 
 expression ; and, to make it yet softer, we may consider 
 that the predicate and subject may be properly said to be 
 joined in a form of words as a proposition, by connective 
 particles in grammar or logic, though they are disjoined 
 in their sense and signification. Every youth who has 
 learned his grammar, knows there are such words as dis^ 
 junctive proposmofu. 
 
 Several things are worthy our notice on this subject. 
 
 Note 1st. — As there are some terms y or words, and ideas ^ 
 (as I have shewn before) concerning which it is hard to de- 
 termine whetJi^r they are negative or positive, so there are 
 %ome propositions concerning which it may be difficult to 
 say whether they affirm or deny : As, when we say, Plato 
 was no fool : Cicero was no unskilful orator : Csesar made 
 no expedition to Muscovy : An oyster has no part like an 
 eel: It is not necessary for a physician to speak French i 
 and for a physician to speak French is needless. 
 
 ^YkQ sense of these propositions is very plain and easy, 
 though logicians might squabble perhaps a whole day, 
 whether they should rank them under the names of nega^ 
 Uve or affirmative. 
 
 Note 2d, — In Latin and English, two negatives joined 
 in one sentence make an affirmative f as when we declare 
 No man is not mortal ; it is the same as though we said, 
 Man is mortal. But, in Greek, and oftentimes in French, 
 two negatives make but a stronger denial. 
 
 Note 3 A — If the mere negative term not be added to the 
 copula of an universal affirmative proposition, it reduces it 
 to a particular negative ; as, ^11 men are not wise, signifies 
 the same as, Some men are not wise. 
 
 Note 4th. — In all affirmative propositions, the predicate 
 is taken in its whole comprehension ; that is, every essen- 
 tial part and attribute of it is affirmed concerning the sub- 
 ject ; as when I say, j4 ti-'ue christian is an honest man, eve- 
 ry thing that belongs to honesty is affirmed concerning a 
 true christian. 
 
 Note ^th. — In all neg^ative propositions the predicate is 
 takeu in its whole exten.^iQn ; that is, every ,5pecies and 
 
Cha?. II. RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 123 
 
 individual that is contained in the general idea of the pred- 
 icate, is utterly denied concerning tlie subject.: So ni this 
 proposition, A spirit is not an animal, we exclude all sorts 
 and kinds and particular animals whatsoever from the idea 
 of a spirit. 
 
 From these two last remarks we may derive this infer- 
 ence, that we ought to attend to the entwe comprehension of 
 our ideas,^ and to the universal extension of them, as far as 
 we have proper capacity for it, before we grow too confi- 
 dent of our affirming or denying any thing which may 
 have the least darkness, doubt or difficult/ attending it i 
 It is the want of this attention that betrays us into many 
 mistakes. 
 
 SECT. IIL 
 
 OF THE OPPOSITION AND CONVERSION OP PROPOSITIONS, 
 
 ANY two ideas being joined or disjoined in various 
 forms, will affi>rd us several propositions. All these may 
 be distinguished according to their quantity and their qiml* 
 ity* into four, which are marked or denoted by the letters, 
 A, E, I, O, thus : 
 
 f Universal affirmative, 
 denotes J Universal negative. 
 
 ^ j Particular affirmative. 
 l^ Particular negative, 
 according' to the old Latin rhymes— 
 
 Asserit A, negat E, verum generaliter amhae. 
 Asserit I, negat O, sed, particulariter amOo, 
 This may be exemplified by these two ideas, a vine and. 
 a tree* 
 
 \ A Every vine is a tree. 
 E No vine is a tree, 
 I Some vine is a tree- 
 O Some vine is not a iree^ 
 
 
 ^ The reader should remember bere^ that a proposition according^ 
 to its quantity is called universal or particular ; and according to its 
 <3i«ality, it is either affirmative or nesatiye. 
 
126 LOGIC : OR, THE Paet. II; 
 
 The logicians of the schools have written many large 
 trifles concerning the opposition and cotiversions of proposi- 
 tions. It will be sufficient here to give a few brief hints of 
 these things, that the learner may not be utterly ignorant 
 of them. 
 
 Propositions which are made of the same subject and 
 predicate, are said to be opposite^ when that which is deni- 
 ed in one is affirmed in the other, either in whole or in 
 part, without any consideration whether the propositions 
 be true or not. 
 
 If they differ both in quantity and qnality, they are call- 
 ed contradictory ; as, 
 
 A Every vine is a ^ 
 
 tree f These can never be both true or both 
 
 OSome vine is not \ false at the same lime. 
 a tree, J 
 
 If two universals differ in quahty, they are contraries ; a5, 
 
 A Eveiy vine is a^ 
 
 tree. ! These can never be both true together^ 
 
 E No vine is a \ but they may be both false. 
 
 tree, ^ 
 
 If two particular propositions differ in quality, they are 
 ^ihcontraries ^ as, 
 
 I Some vine is a 7 
 
 tree, I These may be both true together, but 
 
 O Some vine is not f they can never be both false. 
 
 a tree, } 
 
 Both particular and universal propositions, which agree 
 in quality, but not in quantity^ are called subaltern^ though 
 these are not properly opposite; as, 
 
 A Every viiu is a tree. 
 I Some vine is a tree. 
 Or thus : — E No vine is a tree, 
 
 O Some vine is not a tree. 
 
 The canons of subaltern propositions are usually reckon- 
 ed these three ; namely, (1.) If an universal proposition 
 he true, tl]Q particular will be true silso^ but not on the 
 
Chap, II. RIGHT USE OF REASOPf. 1^7 
 
 contrary. And (2.) K sl particular proposition be false^ 
 ihe universal must be false too, but not on the contrary. 
 (3.) Subaltern propositions y whether universal or particular,, 
 may sometimes be both tiue, and sometimes both false. 
 
 The conversion oj propositions^ is when the subject and 
 predicate change their places with preservation of the truth* 
 This may be done with coustant certainty in all universal 
 negatives and particular affirmatives ; as, iVo spirit is an ani* 
 maly may be converted. No animal is a spirit : and, Some 
 tree is a vine, may be converted, Some vine is a tree. But 
 there is more of formal trifling in this sort of discourse 
 than there is of solid improvement, because this sort of 
 cmiversion arises merely from the form of words, as con- 
 uecied in a proposition, rather than from ihe matter. 
 
 Yet it may be useful to observe, that there are some 
 propositions, which, by reason of the ideas or matter of 
 -which they are composed, may be converted with con- 
 stant truth : Such are those propositions whose predicate 
 is a nominal or real definition of the subject, or the differ- 
 ence of it, or a property of the fourth kind, or a superla^^ 
 tive degree of any property or quality whatsoever ; or, in 
 short wheresoever the predicate and the subject have ex- 
 actly the same extension, or the same comprehension ; as, 
 Every vine is a tree bearing grapes j^ and, Every tree bear^ 
 ing grapes is a vine : Religion is the truest wisdom; and, TAd 
 truest wisdom is religion : Julius Caesar was the first emperor 
 •f Rome J and, The first emperor Rome was Julius Ccesar* 
 These are the propositions which are properly convertiblej^^ 
 and they are called reciprocal propositions. 
 
 SECT. IT- 
 
 ©r PURE AND MODAL PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 ANOTHER division of propositions among the schol- 
 ^s^tic writers is iuto;>wre and modal. This may be called 
 Qbr distinction sake) a division according to the predicate* 
 
128 LOGIC: OR, THE Part II. 
 
 When a propostion merely expresses that the predicate 
 is connected with the subject, it is called a pure proposition ;. 
 SiSy Every true Christiaji is an honest man. But, when it 
 also includes the way and manner wherein the predicate iSL 
 connected with the subject, it is called a modal proposition ; 
 as when< l say, Jj( is necessary that a true Christian should b& 
 an honest mem*. 
 
 Logical writers generally make the modality of this prop- 
 osition to belong to the copula, because it shews the man- 
 ner of the connection between the subject and predicate. 
 Buf, if the form of^he seRtence ^s 3, logical proposition be 
 duly considered, the mode itself is the very predicate of the 
 proposition, and it must run thus; That a true Christian 
 should be an honest man is a necessary things and then the 
 whole primary proposition is included in the subject of the 
 modal proposition. 
 
 There ixxefour modes of connecting the predicate with 
 the subject, which are usually reckoned upon this occa- 
 sion, namely, necessity and contingency y wiiich are two oppo* 
 sites ; possiiility and impossibility which are also opposites ; 
 as, It is necessary that a globe should be round : That a 
 globe be n^ade of wood or glass, is a necessary or contin- 
 gent thing : It is impossible that a globe should be square ;. 
 It is possible that a globe niay be made of water. 
 
 With regard to the modal propositions which the schools 
 have introduced, I would make these two remarks. 
 
 Remark 1. These propositions in English are formed by 
 the resolution of the words, must be, might not bi, can be^ 
 and cannot be^ into those more explicate forms of logical 
 copula and predicate, is necessary ^ is contingent, is possible, 
 is impossible : For it is necessary that a ghbe should be round^ 
 signifies no more than than that a globe must be round. 
 
 Remark 2. Let it be noted, that this quadruple modality 
 is only an enumeration of the natural modes or manners 
 wherein the predicate is connected with the subject : We 
 might also describe several moral and civil modes of con- 
 necting two ideas together, namely, lawfulness and unlawful" 
 ness, conveniency and znconveniency, &c. whence we may form 
 sod. modal propositions as these; It is unlaw tul for any per- 
 son to kill auniuQceat man. It is unlawful for Christians 
 
Ghap, II, RIGHT USE OF REASON. 129^ 
 
 to eat flesh in lent : To tell all that we think is inexpe- 
 dient : for a man to be aifabie lo his neighbor is very con«^ 
 venient, &c. 
 
 There are several other modes of speaking whereby a 
 predicate is connected with a subject : i^uch as, it rs certain, 
 it is doubtfLil, it is probable, it is improbable, it is agreed, it 
 is granted, it is said by the ancie its, it is written, &;c. all 
 which will form other kinds of modal propositions. 
 
 But, whether the modality be natural^ morale &c. yet in 
 all tiiese propositions, it is ihemodey is the proper predicate^ 
 and all the rest of the propositions, except the copula (or 
 word i6',) belongs to the subject ^ e^nd thus they become 
 pure propositions oC SL com/^Zejic nature, of which we shall 
 treat in the next section ; so ihat there is no great need of 
 making modah of a distinct &nrt. 
 
 There are many little subtiUies which the schools ac- 
 quaint us with concerning the conversion and oppositioriy 
 and equipollence of these modal propositions, suited to the 
 Latin or Greek tongues, rather than the English, and fit 
 to pass away the idle time of a student, rather than to en^ 
 rich his understanding* 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 OF SINGLE PROPOSITIONS, WHETHER SIMPLE OR COMPLEX. 
 
 WHEN w^e consider the nature of propositions^ together 
 with ihefmmation of them, and divide the materials whereof 
 they are made, we divide them into single ^wd compound* 
 
 A single proposition, is that which has but one subject 
 and one predicate 5 but if it has more subjects or more pre- 
 dicates, it is called a compound proposition, and indeed it 
 contains two or more propositions in it. 
 
 A single proposition (which is also called categorical) 
 may be divided again into simple and complex,^ 
 
 */Vs simple ideas are opposed to complex, and single ideas to cora» 
 pound, so propositi ns are distinguished in the same manner: The 
 English tongue, in tnis respect, having some advantage above the 
 learned language, vrhich have no usval Vv^prd to distinguish single 
 from simple. 
 
130 LOGIC : OR, THiE Pakt U. 
 
 A purely simple proposition is that whose subject and pre- 
 dicate are made up of single terms 5 as, Virtue is desira- 
 ble : Evdy penitent is pardoned : No man is innocent. 
 
 When the subject or predicate^ or both, are made up of 
 complex terms, it is called a complex proposition ; as, Every 
 sincere penitent is pardoned : Virtue is desirable for its 
 own sake: No man alive is perfectly innocent. 
 
 If the term which is added to the subject of a complex 
 proposition be either essential or any way necessary to it, 
 then it is called explicative^ for it only explains the subject : 
 as. Every mortal man is a son of Adam. But if the term 
 added to make up the complex subject does not necessarily 
 Qr constantly belong to it, then it is determinative^ and 
 Kmits the subject to a particular part of its extension ; as, 
 Every pious man shall be happy. In the first proposition 
 the word mortal is.merely explicative : In the second prop- 
 osition the word pious is determinative. 
 
 Here note, that whatsoever may be affirnried ov denied 
 concerningany subject, with an explicative addition, may 
 be also affirmed or denied of that subject without it^f as we 
 may boldly say. Every man is a son of Adam, as well as 
 every mortal man : But it is not so, where the addition is 
 determinative, for we cannot say, Every man shall be hap- 
 py, though eveiy pious man shall be so. 
 
 In a complex proposition, the predicate or subject is 
 sometuaes made complex by the proiroims who, which, 
 whose, to whom, &c. which make another proposition; as, 
 Every man who i^ pious shall be saved : Julius, whose sir 
 name was Caesar, overcame Pompey : Bodies, which are 
 transparent; have many pores. tJeie the wliole proposi- 
 tion is called the primary or chief, and the additional pro- 
 position is called an incident proposition. But it is still to 
 be esteemed in this case merely as a part of the complex 
 term, and the truth or falsehood of the whole complex 
 proposition is not to be judged by the truth or falsehood of 
 the incident proposition, but by the connection of the 
 whole subject with the predicate. For the incident prop- 
 osition may be false, and absurd, or impossible, and yet 
 the whole complex proposition may be true ; as, A horse' 
 which has wings might fly over the Thames* 
 
Chap. n. RIGHT USE OF REASON- 131 
 
 Besides this complexion which belongs to the subject or 
 -predicate, logical writers useto^ay, there is a complexion 
 wliich may fa»l upon the copula also : But this F have ac- 
 counted for hi the section concerning modal propositi on^s; 
 and itideed it is riOt of much importance whether it were 
 .placed there or here. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 OF COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 A COMPOUND proposition is made up of two or more 
 ^subjects or predKates, or both ; and it contains in it two or 
 rinore propositici s, which are either plainly expressed, or 
 concealed and implied. 
 
 The first sort of compound propositions are those whereiu 
 the composition is expressed and evident, and they are 
 ^istin^i ished into these six kinds, namely, copulative, dis- 
 junctive, conditional, causal, relative, and discretive. 
 
 I. Copulative propositions, are those which have more 
 subjects or predicates connected by affirmative ur negative 
 conjunctions ; as. Riches and honor are temptations to 
 pride: Caesar conquered the l^auls and Britous : Neither 
 gold or jewels will purchase immortality. These proposi- 
 tions are evidently compounded, for each of them may be 
 resolved into two propositions, namely. Riches are tempt- 
 ations to pride J and Honor is a temptation to pride 5 and 
 so the rest. 
 
 The truth of copulative propositions depends upon the 
 truth of all the parts of them j for ifCsesar had conquered 
 the Gauls, and not the Britons, or the Britons, and not the 
 Gauls, the second copulative proposition had not heen true. 
 
 Here note. Those propositions, which cannot be resolved 
 into two or more simple propositions, are not properly 
 co))ulative, though two or more ideas be connected and 
 coupled by such conjunctions, either In the subject or pre- 
 dicate; fif.5 Two and three make five : Majesty and meekness 
 do not ofven meet: The sun, moon, and stars, are not all 
 to be seen at once. Such propositions are to be ester med 
 merely complex, because the predicate cannot be affirmed 
 of each single subjectj but only all of thejn together as a 
 collective subject. 
 
1S2 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. IL 
 
 II. Disjunctivepropositions^ave when the pavts are dis- 
 joined or opposed to one another by disjunctive particles ; 
 as, It is either day or night : The weatlier is either shining 
 or rainy : Quantity is either length, breadth, or depth. 
 
 The truth of disjunctives depends on the necessary and 
 immediate oppositions of the parts ; therefore only the last 
 of these examples is true; but the two first are not strictly 
 true, because twilight is a medium between day and night $ 
 and dry cloudy weather h a medmmhetvfeen shining and 
 raining. 
 
 HI. Conditional or hypothetical propositions ^ are those 
 whose parts are united by the conditional part'cle i/; as, 
 J/* the sun be fi^ed the earth must move : If there be no 
 fire, there will be no smoke. 
 
 Note — The first part of these propositions, or that where- 
 in the conditional is Contained, is called the antecedent, the 
 other \s C8i\\tid the consequent. 
 
 The truth of these piopositions depends not at all on the 
 truth or falsehood of their two parts, but on the truth of 
 the connection of them ; for each part of them may be ^Ise, 
 and yet the whole proposition true; aSj If there be no 
 providence, there will be no future punisijment* 
 
 IV. Causal propositions, are wliere two propositions are 
 joined by causal particles; as, Houses were not built that 
 they might be destro} ed : Rehoboam waB unhappy because 
 lie followed fevil counsel 
 
 The truth of a lixusdl proposition arises hot from the 
 truth of the parts, but from the causal iit/lnence that the 
 one part has upon the other; for both parts may be true, 
 yet the proposition false, if one part be not the cause of 
 the other. 
 
 Some logicians refer reduplicate propositions to thiis 
 place ; as, Men, considered as men, are rational creatures, 
 that is, becmise tfiey are men. 
 
 V. Relative proposHunis have their partsjoined by such 
 particles as ex])iess a relation or comparison of one thing 
 to another ; as. When you are silent 1 will speak : As much 
 Es you are worth so much shall you beiSleemed : .As i| 
 the father, so is the son : Where there is no tale-l>eaie'rf 
 tJonteation wiil ceajsfe; 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 133 
 
 These are very much akin to conditional propositions, 
 and the truth of them depends upon the justness of their 
 connection. 
 
 VI. Discretiv^ propositions are such wherein various and 
 seemingly opposite judgments are made, whose variety or 
 distinction is noted by the particles, but, ihough,yet^ Sfc. as, 
 Travellers may change their climate but not their temper : 
 Job was patient, though his grief was great. 
 
 The truth and goodness of a discretive proposition depends 
 on the truth of both parts, and their contradistinction to 
 one another; for, though both parts should be true, yet if 
 there be no seeming opposition betv\een them, it is an use- 
 less assertion, though we cannot call it a false one ; as, 
 Descartes was a philosopher, yet he was a B renchman : 
 The Romans were valiant, but they spoke Latin ; both 
 which propositions are ridiculous, for want of a seeming 
 opposition between the parts. 
 
 Since we have declared wherein the truth and falsehood 
 of these compound popositions consist, it is proper also to 
 give some intimations how any of these propositions, when 
 they are false, may be opposed or contradicted. 
 
 All compound propositions, except copulatives and dis" 
 aretivesy are properly denied or contradicted when the ne- 
 gation affects their conjunctive particles; as, if the dis- 
 junctive proposition asserts. It is either day or night ; the 
 opponent says. It is not either day or night ; or. It is uot 
 necessary that it should be either day or night : so the %- 
 pothetical proposition is denied, by saying, It does not fol- 
 low that the earth must move if the sun be fixed, 
 
 A disjunctive pi oposition^ may be contrr dieted also by de- 
 nying all the parts ; as, It is neither day nor night. 
 
 And a causal proposition may be denied or opposed in- 
 directly and improperly^ when either part of thr piopositioa 
 is denied ; and it must be f^^ilse if eitlier p'jrt be false : But 
 the design of the proposition being to sht^w the causal con* 
 nection of the two parts, each part is supposed to be true, 
 and it is not properly contradicted as a causal propt sition^ 
 unless one part of it be de ied to ht: the cause of <he oiher. 
 
 As for copulatives and discretive^, because their truth de- 
 pends more on the truth of their parts, therefore these may 
 be opposed or denied, as many ways as the parts of which 
 M 
 
134 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. H. 
 
 they are composed ra^y be denied 5 so this copulative pro- 
 
 EositroD, Riches and honor are temptations to pride, may 
 e denied by saying, Riches are not temptations, though 
 honor may be : or, Honor is not a temptation, though 
 riches may be : or, Neither riches nor honor are tempta- 
 tions, &c. 
 
 So this discreiive proposition, Job was patient, though 
 !iis grief was great, is denied by saymg, Job was not pa- 
 tient, though his grief was great : or, Job was patient, but 
 his grief y. as not great: or. Job was not patient, nor was 
 his ^rief great. 
 
 We proceed now to the second sort of compound p^-oposi- 
 tipns, namely, such whose composition is not expressed^ but 
 latent or concealed ; yet a small attention will find two pro- 
 positions included in them. Such are these th^t follow. 
 
 1. Exclusives 5 as, The pious man alone is happy. It 
 is only Sir Isaac Newton could find out true philosophy. 
 
 2. Exceptives; as. None of the ancients but Plato well 
 defended the soul's immortality. The protestants worship 
 none but God. 
 
 3 Comparatives ; as, Pain is the greatest affliction. No 
 Turk was fiercer than the Spaniards at Mexico. 
 
 Here note, That the comparative degree does not always 
 imply the />05i7ii;« ; as, if I say, A fool is better than a 
 knave; this does not affirm Xlmi folly is good, but that it is 
 a less evil than knavery. 
 
 4. Inceptives and desitives, which relate to the beginning 
 or ending of any thing ; as. The Latin tongue is not yet 
 forgotten. No man before Orpheus wrote Greek verge. 
 Peter, Czar of Muscovy, began to civilize his nation. 
 
 To these may be added contiiiiuitives ; as, Rome remains 
 to this day, which includes at least two proposiiions, 
 namely, Rome was, and Rome is. 
 
 Here let other authors spend time and pains in giving 
 the precise definitions in all these sorts of propositions 
 which may be as well understood by their names and ex- 
 amples. Here let them tell what their truth depends up- 
 on, and how they are to be opposed or contradicttd 5 but 
 a moderate share of common sense, with a review of what 
 is said on the former compounds, will sufiice for all these 
 nurposes; without tlie formality of rules. 
 
eBAp.IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 186 
 
 SECT. VIL 
 
 OP TRUE AND FALSE PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 PROPOSITIONS are next to be considered according 
 to their se7is6 or signification, and thus they are distributed 
 into true amd false. A true proposition represents things as 
 they are in themselves 5 but, if things are represented oth- 
 erwise than they are in themselves, the proposition \s false. 
 
 Or we may describe them more particularly thus ; a truei 
 proposition joins those ideas and terms together whose ob- 
 jects are joined and agree; or it disjoins those ideas and 
 terms whose objects disagree, or are disjoined ; as, Every 
 bird has wings : A Brute is not immortal. 
 
 A false proposition joins those ideals or terms whose ob- 
 jects disagree, or it disjoins those whose objects agree ; as. 
 Birds have no wings : Brutes are immortaK 
 
 Note — It is impossible that the same propositions should 
 be both true and false at the same time, in the same sense, 
 land in the same respect 5 because a proposition is but the 
 representation of the agreement or disagreement of things : 
 Now it is impossible that the same thing should be and not 
 be, or, that the same thing should agree, and not agree, at 
 the same time, and in the same respect. This is a first 
 principle of human knowledge. 
 
 Yet some propositions may seem to contradict one an- 
 other, though they may be both true, but in different sens- 
 es, or respects, or ttmes| aSj Man was immortal in para« 
 dise, and Man was mortal in paradise. But these two pro* 
 positions must be referred to different times ; as, Man &g- 
 fore his fall was immortal, but at the fall he became mortaK 
 So we may say now, Man is mortal^ or man is immortal^ 
 if we take these propositions in different respects : as, Man 
 is an immortal creature as to his soul, but mortal as to his 
 body, A great variety of difficulties and seeming contra- 
 dictions, both in Holy Scripture, and other writings, may 
 be solved and explained ia this manner* 
 
136 LOGIC: OR, THE Part U. 
 
 The most important question on this subject is this. 
 What is the criterion or distinguishing mark of truth ? How 
 shall we know when a proposition is really true or false ? 
 There are so many disguises of truth in the world, so ma- 
 ny f>itee^^ppearances of truth, that some sects have declar- 
 ed there is no possibility of distinguishing truth horn false- 
 hood ; and therefore they have abandoned ail pretences to 
 knowledge, and maintain strenuously that nothing is to be 
 Jcnown^ 
 
 The first men of this humour make themselves famous 
 in Greece by the name of sceptics^ ihat is, seekers. They 
 were also called academics^ borrowing their name from aca- 
 demiay their school or place of study. li\\ey taught that all 
 things are 'uucertain^ though they allowed that some are 
 mt'T-e probable tiian others. After these arose the sects of 
 Fxjrrhonics^ so named from Pyrrho their master, who would 
 not allow one proposition to be more probable than anotli* 
 er ; but professed that all things are equally uncertain. 
 Now all these men (as an ingenious author expresses it) 
 were rather to be called a sect of liars than philosophers. 
 and that censure is just for two reasons : (1.) Because they 
 determined concerning every proposition that it was uncev' 
 tain, and believed that as a certain truth, while they pro- 
 fessed /A^re was nothing certain^ and that nothing could be 
 determined concernitig truth or falsehood ; and thus their 
 very doctrine gave itself the lie. (2.) Because they judged 
 and acted as other men did in the common affairs of life j 
 thej^ woiild neither run into fire nor water, though they pro- 
 fessed ignorance and uncertainty, whether the one would 
 burn, or the other drown them. 
 
 There have been some in all ages who have too mucli 
 affected this humour, who dispute against every thing, un- 
 der pretence that truth has no certain mark to distinguish 
 it Let U9 therefore inquire what is the general criterion 
 of truth? And, in order to this, it is proper to consider 
 what is the reason why we assent to those propositions 
 which coiitain the most certain and iv dubitable truths, 
 jsuch as these. The whole is greater than a paxt : Two 
 and three make five. 
 
 Tlie only reason why we believe these propositions to 
 be true; is because the ideas of the subjects and predicates 
 
Chap, II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. Uy 
 
 appear with so much clearness and strength of evidence to 
 agree to each other, that the mind cannot help discerning 
 the agreement, and cannot doubt of the truth of them, it is 
 constrained to judge them true. So, when we compare the 
 ideas of a circle and a trianghy or the ideas of an oyster 
 and buUei^y, we see such an evident disagreement between 
 them that we are sure that a hutterjlyis not an oyster^ nor is 
 a triangle a circle. There is nothing: but the evidence of 
 the agreement or disagreement between two ideas that 
 makes us affirm or deny the one or the other. 
 
 Now it will follow from hence, that a clear and distinct 
 perception or full evidence of the agreement and disagreement 
 of OUT ideas to one another, or to things, is a certain criteri- 
 on of truth : For, since our minds are of such a make, that 
 where the evidence is exceeding plain and strong, we can- 
 not withhold our assent 5 we should then be necessarily ex« 
 posed to believe falsehood, if cf)mplete evidence should be 
 found in any propositions that are not true* But surely 
 the God of perfect wisdom, truth and goodness, would nev- 
 er oblige his creatures to be thus deceived 5 and therefore 
 he would never have constituted us of such a frame as 
 would render, it naturally impossible to guard against er- 
 rour. 
 
 Another consequence is naturally derived from the for- 
 mer, and that is, that the only reason why we fall into 
 mistake, is because we ate impatient to forrii a judgment 
 of thiiigs before we. have axlear and evident perception of 
 their agreement or disagreement ; and, if we will make 
 haste to judg^e while our ideas are obscure and confused, 
 or before we see whether tbey agree or disagree, we shall 
 plunge ourselves into perpetual errors. See more on this 
 subject in an Essay on th$ Freedom of will in God and Man^ 
 published in 1732, section 1; page 13.; 
 
 Note — -What Is here asserted concerning the necessity of 
 clear and distinct ideas, refers chiefly to propositions which 
 we form ourselves by our own powers : As for propositions 
 which we derive from the testimony of others, they will be 
 aiGCOunted for in Chap. IV. 
 
138 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II. 
 
 SECT. VIM. 
 
 OF CERTAIN AND DUBIOUS PROPOSITIONS OP KNOWLEDGE AND 
 
 OPINION. 
 
 SINCE we have found that evidence is the great crite- 
 rioxi, and the sure mark of truth, this leads us directly to 
 coiij^ider propositions according to their evidence 5 and here 
 we must take notice both of the different degrees of evi- 
 dence, and the different kinds of it. 
 
 Propositions, according to their different degrees of evi- 
 dence, are distinguished into certain and dubious.* 
 
 Where tiie evidence of the agreement or disagreement 
 of the ideas is so strong and plain, tliat we cannot forbid 
 nor delay our assent, the prop^^sition is called certain: as. 
 Every circle hath a centre : The world did not create it- 
 self. An assent to such propositions is honored with the 
 name of knowledge. 
 
 But when there is any obscurity upon the agreement or 
 disagreement of the ideas, so that the mind does not clear- 
 ly perceive it, and is not compelled to assent or dissent, 
 then the proposition, in a proper and philosophical sense, 
 is called doubtful or imcertain; as. The planets are inhab- 
 ited , The souls of brutes are mere matter; The world 
 Aviil not stand a thousand years longer ; Dido built the 
 city of Carthage, &c. Such imcertain propositions are 
 called opinions. 
 
 When we consider ourselves as philosophers, or search- 
 ers after truth^ it would be well if we always suspended a 
 full judgment or determination about any thing, and 
 
 * it may be objected, that this certainty and uncertainty being, 
 only in the nnind, the division belongs to propositions rather, accord- 
 ing to the decrees of our assent, than the degrees of evidence. But 
 it may be well answered, that the evidence here intended is that 
 "which appears so to the mind, and not the mere evidence in the na- 
 ture of things. Bcbides (as we shall shew immediately,) the degree 
 of assent ought to be exactly proportionable 10 the degree of evidence. 
 And therefore the difference is not great^ wheiher propobitions be 
 called certain or uncertain, according to ibe measure of evidence, or 
 of assent. 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 139 
 
 made farther inquiries, where this plain and perfect evi- 
 dence is wanting : but we are so prone of ourselves to 
 judge without full evidence, and in some cases the neci^s- 
 sity of action in the affairs of life constrains us to judge 
 and determine upon a tolerable degree of evidence, tiiat 
 we vulgarly call ihose propositions certain, where we have 
 but very little room or reason to doubt of them, though 
 the evidence be noi complete and resistless. 
 
 Cei^iainty, according to the schools, is distinguished into 
 ohjective and subjective. ' Objedive certainry, is when the 
 proposition is certanily true iiself 5^ and suhjeUive, wi en we 
 are certain of the truth of it. The one is in things^ the 
 oihei is in our minds. 
 
 But let it be observed here, that every proposition in it- 
 Self is Certainly true or certainly talse. For, though doubt- 
 fnUiess or unceriaiitv seems to be a medium between cer- 
 tain truth and certain falsehood in our minds, yet there is 
 no such medium m thmgs themselves, no, not even in fu- 
 ture events : For now at this lime it is certain in itself, that 
 midsummer-day seven years hence will be serene, or it is 
 certasn It ivlll be cloudy, though we aie uncertain and ut- 
 terly ignorant what sort of a day it will be : The certainty 
 of distant futurities is known to God only. 
 
 Uncertain or dubious propositions, that is, opinions, are 
 distinguished into probable or improb-ible. 
 
 When the evidence of any proposition is greater than 
 the evidence of tne conuary, then it is a probabie opinion : 
 Where the evidence and arguments are stronger on the 
 contrary side, we call it improbable. But, vUiile the ar- 
 guments on either side seem to be equally strong, and the 
 evidence for, and against any proposition appears equal to 
 the mind, then in common language we call it a doubiful 
 matter. We also call it a dubious or doubtful proposition, 
 when there are no arguments on either side, as, Next 
 Christmas-day will be a very sharp frost. And in general, 
 all those propositions aredoubiful^ wherein we can perceive 
 no sufficient marks or evidences of truth or falsehood. In 
 such a case, the mind winch is searching for truth ought 
 to remain in a state of doubt or suspense, until s-rperior ev- 
 idence on one side o^* the other incline the balance of the 
 judgment, and determine the probabiUty or certainty to 
 ihe one side. 
 
140 LOGIC : OR, THE ' Part. H. 
 
 A great many propositions which we generally believe 
 or m'sbelieve in human affairs, or in the sciences, have 
 very various degrees of evidence, which yet arise not to 
 complete certainty, either of truth or falsehood. Thus it 
 comes to pass that there are such various and almost infi- 
 nite degrees of probability and improbability. To a weak 
 probdbihty we should give a weak assent; and a stronger 
 assent is due where the evidence is greater, and the mat- 
 ter more probable. If we proportion our assent in ail 
 things to the degrees of evidence, we do the utmost that 
 human nature is capable of^ in a rational way to secure 
 itself from error. 
 
 SECT. IX 
 
 OF SENSE, CONSCIOUSNESS, INTELLIGENCE, KEASON; FAITK, 
 AND INSPIRATION, 
 
 AFTER we have considered the evidence of propositions 
 in the various degrees of it, we come to survey the several 
 kinds of evidence or the different ways whereby truth is 
 let into the mi ^d, and which produce accordingly several 
 kinds of knowledge. We shall distribute them into these 
 six ; namely, Sense, Consciousness, Intelligence, Reason, 
 Faith, and Inspiration 3 and then distinguish the proposi- 
 tions, which are derived from them> 
 
 I. The evidence of sense is, when we frame a proposi- 
 tion acx^ording to the dictates of any of our senses; so we 
 judt^e that grass is green; that a trumpet gives a pleasant 
 sound; that fire burns wood , water is soft, and iron is 
 hard; for we have seen, heard or felt all these. It is up- 
 on this.evidence of sense, that we know and beheve the 
 daily occurrences of human hfe; and almost all the histo- 
 ries of mankind, that are written by eye or ear witnesses, 
 are built upon this pririciple. 
 
 Under the evidence of sense we do not only include 
 that knowledge which is derived to us by our outward 
 senses of hearing, seeing, feeling, tasting, and smelling j 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASOiN. 141 
 
 but that also which is derived from the inward sensa- 
 tions and appetites of hunger, thirst, ease, pleasure, pain, 
 weariness, rest, &c. And all those things svhich belong 
 to the body ; as Hunger is a painful appetite / Light i$ 
 pleasant ; Rest is sweet to the weary limhs. 
 
 Propositions which are built on this evidence, may be 
 named sensible propositions, or the dictates of sense. 
 
 ir. As we learn what belongs to the body bv the evi- 
 dence of sense, so we learn what belongs to the soul by aa 
 inward consciousness, which mjiy be called a sort of inter- 
 nal feeling, or spiritual sensation of what passes in the 
 mind; as, I think before I speak; I desire large knowl- 
 edge; 1 suspect my own practice; I studied hard to-day 5 
 My conscience bears witness of my sincerity ; My soul 
 hates vain thoughts ; Fear is an easy passion ; Long med- 
 itation on one thing is tiresome. 
 
 Thus it appears that we obtain the knowledge of a 
 multitude of propositions, as well as of sir^gle ideas, by 
 those two principles which Mr. Locke calls sensation and 
 reflection : One of them is a sort of consciousness of what 
 affects the body, and the other is a consciousness of what 
 passes in the mind. 
 
 Propositions which are built on this internal conscious- 
 ness, have yet no particular or distinguishing name assign- 
 ed to them« 
 
 Ifl. Intelligence relates chiefly to those abstracted pro- 
 positions which carry their own evidence with them, and 
 admit no doubt about them. Our perception of this self- 
 evidence i» any proposition is called intelligence. It is 
 eur knowledge of those first principles of truth which are, 
 as it were, wrought into the very nature and make of our 
 minds : They are so evident in themselves to every man 
 who attends to them, that they need no proof. It is tlie 
 prerogative and peculiar excellence of those proposriioris 
 that they can scarce either W proved, or denied : They 
 cannot easily be proved^ because tiiere is nothing supposed 
 to be more clear or certain, from whicii an argument may 
 be drawn to prove them. Tliey cai not well be denied, 
 because their own evidence is so brigi't and convincing, 
 that as soon as tlie terms are understood the mind neces- 
 
142 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II, 
 
 Safily assents 5 such are thes6, Whatsoever acteth hath 
 a being ; Nothing has no properties; A partis less than 
 the whole ; Nothing can be ihe cause of itself. 
 
 These propositions are called axioms, or maxims, or 
 first principles; these are the very foundations of all im- 
 proved knowledge and reasonings, and on that account 
 these have been thought to be intimate propositions, or 
 truths born with us. 
 
 Some suppose that a great part of the knowledge of an- 
 gels and human souls in the separate state is obtained in 
 this manner, namely, by such an immediate view of things 
 in their own nature, which is called intuition. 
 
 IV. Reasoning is the next sort of evidence, and that is, 
 when one truth is inferred or drawn from others by natu- 
 ral and just methods of argument ; as, if there be much 
 light at midnight, I infer, it proceeds from the moon ; 
 because the sun is under the earth.* If J see a cottage in 
 a forest, I conclude, some man has been there and built 
 it. Or when I survey the heavens and earth, this gives 
 evidence ta my reason^ that there is a God who made 
 them. 
 
 The propositions" wWch I believe u^on this kind of ev- 
 idence, are called conclusions, or rational truths ; and the 
 knowledge that we gain this way is properly called science. 
 
 Yet let it be noted, that the word science is usually ap- 
 plied to a whole body of regular and methodical observa- 
 tions or propositions, which learned men have formed 
 concerning any subject of speculation, deriving one truth 
 from another by a train of arguments. If this knowledge 
 chiefly directs our practice, it is usually called an art. 
 And this is the most remarkable distinction between an 
 art and a science, namely, the one refers chiefly to prac- 
 tice, the other to speculation. Natural philosophy, or 
 physics, and ontology, are sciences ; logic and rhetoric 
 are called arts ; but mathematics, include both art and 
 science : for they have much of speculation, and much of 
 practice in them. 
 
 * Note — Since this book was wrhten^ we have had so many ap- 
 pearances of the aurora borealis as reduces this inference only to ^ 
 probability, 
 
Chap. TI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 14S 
 
 Observe here, That, when the evidence of a proposition 
 derived froin sense, consciousness, intelligence, or reason, 
 is firnri and indubitable^ it produces such assent as we call 
 a natural certainty. 
 
 V. When we derive the evidence of any proposition 
 from the testimony of others, it is called the evidence of 
 faith : and this is a large part of our knowledge. Ten 
 thousand things there are which we believe merely upon 
 tlie authority or credit of those who have spoken or writ- 
 ten of them. It is by this evidence that we know tiiere is 
 such a country as China, and there was such a man as 
 Cicero who dwelt in Rome. It is by this that most of the 
 transactions inhuman life are managed: We know our 
 parents and our kindred by this mean ; we know the per- 
 sons and laws of our present governors, as well as things 
 that are at a vast distance from us in foreign nations, or 
 in ancient ages. 
 
 According as the persons that inform us of any thing 
 are many or few, or more or less wise, and fai thinly and 
 credible, so our faith is more or less iii m or vvavering and 
 the proposition believed is either certain or doubtful ; but 
 in matters of faith, an exceeding great probability is call- 
 ed a moral certainty. 
 
 Faith is generally distinguished into divine and human, 
 not with regaid to the propc^sitions that are believed, but 
 with regard t6 the testimony upon which we believe 
 them. Wlien God reveals any thing to us, this gives us 
 the evidence of divine failii ; but what man only acquaints 
 us with, produces a human failh in us; the or.e being 
 built upon the word of man, arises but to moi ;il certaiiKy ; 
 but the other being founded upon the word of God, arises 
 to an absolute and infa^llible assurance, so far as we under- 
 stand the meaning of this word. This is called supernat- 
 ural certainty. 
 
 Propositions which we believe upon the evidence of hu- 
 man testimony are called narratives, relations, reports, 
 historical observations, &c. b<U such as are built on divine 
 testimony, are termed mauers of revelation ; and, if they 
 are of great importance in rehgion, they are called arti- 
 cles of faith. 
 
144 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IL 
 
 There are some propositions or parts of knowledge, 
 which are said \o be derived from observation and expe- 
 rience, that is experience in ourselves and the observa- 
 tions we have made on other persons or things ; but these 
 are made up of some of the former springs of knowledge 
 joined together, namely, sense, consciousness, reason, 
 faiih, &c. and therefore are not reckoned a distinct kind 
 of evidence. 
 
 VI. Inspiration is a sort of evidence distinct from all 
 the former, and that is. when such an overpowering im- 
 pression of any proposition is made upon the mind by 
 God himself, that gives a convincing and indubitable evi- 
 dence of the truth and divinity of it^ So were the pro- 
 phets and the apostles inspired.* 
 
 Sometimes God may have been pleased to make use of 
 the outward senses, or the inward workings of the imagi- 
 nation, of dreams, apparitions, visions, and voices, or rea- 
 soning, or perhaps human narration, to convey diviue 
 truths to the mnid of the prophet 5 buc none of these 
 wonld be sufficient to deserve the name of inspiration, 
 without a superior or divine light and power attending 
 them 
 
 This sort ^f evidence is also very distinct from what we 
 usually call divine faith ; for every common Christian ex- 
 ercises divine faith when he believes any proposition which 
 God has revealed in the bible upon this account, because 
 G >d has said it, though it was by a train of reasonings 
 that he was led to believe that this is the word of God. 
 Whereas in the case of inspiranon, the propliet not only 
 exercises divine faith in believing what God reveals, but 
 he is under a superior heavenly impression, light and evi- 
 dence, whereby he is assured that God reveals it. This 
 is the most eminent kind of supernatural certainty. 
 
 Though persons might be assured of their own inspira- 
 tion, by some peculiar and inexpressible consciousness of 
 this divine inspiration and evidence in their own spirits, 
 yet it is hard to make out this inspiration to others, and 
 to convince them of it, except by some a^iteccdent or con- 
 
 * Note here, I speak chiefly of the highest kind of inspiration, 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 145 
 
 sequent prophecies or .miracles^ or some public appearan- 
 ces more than human. 
 
 The propositions which are attained by this sort of ev- 
 idence aie called inspned truths. This is divine revela- 
 tion at first hand, and the dictates of God in an immedi- 
 ate manner, of which theological writers discourse ai large : 
 But since it belongs only to a few favourites of heaven to 
 be inspired, and not tlie bulk of mankind, it is not necessa- 
 ry to speak more ol it in a treatise of logic, «vhich is de- 
 signed for the general improvement of human reason. 
 
 The various kmds of evidence upon vihich we believe 
 any proposition, afford us these three remarks: 
 
 Remark I. The s?»me proposition may be known to us 
 by the different kinds of evidence : That the whole is big- 
 ger than a part, is known by our senses, and it is known 
 by the self-evidence of the thnig to our mind. That God 
 created the heavens and the earth is known to us by rea- 
 son, and is known also by divine testimony or faith. 
 
 Remark II. Among these various kinds of evidence 
 some are generally stronger than others in their own na- 
 ture, and give a better ground for certainty. Inward con- 
 sciousness and intelligence, »s well as divine faith and in- 
 s.piration, usually carry much more force with them than 
 sense or human faith, which are often fallible; though 
 there are instances wherein human faith, sense and reason- 
 ing lay a foundation also for complete assurance, and leave 
 no room for doubt. 
 
 Reason in its own nature would always lead us into the 
 truth in matters within its compass, if it were used aright, 
 or it would require us to suspend our juiigment where 
 there is a want of evidence. But it is our sloth, precipi- 
 tancy, sense, passion, and many other things, that lead 
 our reason astray in this degeiterate and imperfect state : 
 Hence it comes to pass that we are guilty of so many er- 
 rors in reasoning, e.^pecially about divine things, becanse 
 our reason either is busy to inquire, and resolved to deter- 
 mine about matters that are above our present react) 5 or 
 because we mingle many prejudices gi;d sr.rret influences 
 of sense, fancy, fashion, ircli" ation, &c. with our exercises 
 of reason, and judge and determine according to their ir- 
 regular instances. 
 
 N 
 
i4C LOGIC : OR, THE Part II. 
 
 Divine faith would never admit of any controversies or 
 doublings, if we were but assured thai God had spoken, 
 and that we rightly understood his meaning. 
 
 Remark IIL The greatest evidence and certainty of 
 any proposition does not depend on the variety of the 
 ways or kinds of evidence whereby it is known^ but rather 
 upon the strength and degree of evidence, and the clear- 
 ness of that hght in or by which it appears to the mind, 
 for a proposition that is known only one way may be 
 much more certain, and have stronger evidence, than 
 another that is sujpposed to be known many ways There- 
 fore these propositions. Nothing has no proj erties ; Noth- 
 ing can make itself; which areknown only by intelligence, 
 are much surer than this proposition, The rainbow has 
 real and inherent colours in it; or than this, The sun 
 rolls round the earth : though we seem to know both 
 these last by our senses, and by the common testimony of 
 our neighbors. So any proposition that is clearly evident 
 to our own consciousness or diving faith, is much nioe cer- 
 tain to us than a thousand others that have only the evi- 
 dence of feeble and obscure sensations of mere probable 
 reasonings and doubtful arguments, or the witness of fal- 
 lible mm, or even though all these should join together. 
 
 CHAPTER in. 
 
 THE SPRINGS OF FALSE JUDGMENT, OR THE 
 DOCTRINE OF PREJUDICES. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. , 
 
 IN the end of the foregoing chapter, we have survey- 
 ed the several sorts of evidence on which we build our 
 assent to propositions These are indeed the general 
 grounds upon which we form our judgment conceming 
 things. What remains in this Second Fart of Logic is to 
 point out tlie several spMT^s and causes of oi r mistakes 
 in judging, and to lay down some rules by which we 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. UH 
 
 should conduct ourselves in passing a judgment upon ev- 
 ery thing that is proposed to" us. 
 
 I confess many things which will be mentioned in the'?e 
 following chapters might be as well referred to the Third 
 Part of Logic, where we shall treat of Reasoning and ar- 
 gument ; for most of our false judgments seem to include 
 a secret bad reasoning in them; and while we shew the 
 springs of error, and the rules of true judgment, we do at 
 the same .time discover which arguments are fallacious, 
 which reasonings are weak, and which are just and strong, 
 JTet since this is usually called a judging ill, or judging 
 ^ell, I think we may without any impropriety treat of it 
 here 5 and this will lay a sure foundation for all sorts of 
 ratiocination and argument. 
 
 Rash judgments are called prejudices, and so are the 
 springs of them. This word in common life signifies an 
 ill opinion which we have conceived of some <»ther person, 
 or some injury done to him. But when we use the word 
 in matters of science, it signifies a judgment that is form- 
 ed concerning any person or thing before suiicient exam- 
 ination^ and generally we suppose it to mean a false judg- 
 ment or mistake : At least, it is an opinion taken up with- 
 out solid reason for it, or an assent given to a propositioa 
 before we have a just evidence of the truth of it, thought 
 the thing itself may happen to be true. 
 
 Sometimes these rash judgments are called preposses-* 
 sionsj whereby is meant, that some particufer opmion has 
 possessed the mind, and engaged the assent^ without suffi- 
 cient search or evidence of the truth of it. 
 
 There is a vast variety of these prejudices and prepos- 
 sessions which attejid mankind in every age and condition 
 of life; they lay the foundations of many an error^ and 
 many an unhappy practice, both in the aifairs of religion, 
 and in other civil concernments ; as well as in matters of 
 learning. It is necessary for a man who pursues truth 
 to inquire into these springs of error, that as far as possi- 
 ble he may rid himself of old prejudices, and watch hour- 
 ly against new ones. 
 
 The number of them is so great, and they are so inter- 
 woven with each other, as well as with the powers of hu- 
 man nature, that it is sometimes hard to distinguish IheiB 
 
U8 LOGIC I OR, THE Part It 
 
 apart ; yet for method's sake we shall reduce them to these 
 four general heads, namely, prejudices arising from things> 
 orfr^m vvordr, from ourselves, or from other persons 5 
 and, after the description of each prejudice, we shall pro- 
 pose one or more ways of curing it. 
 
 SECT I. 
 
 FREJUDtCES ARISING FROM THINGS. 
 
 THE first sort of prejudices are those which arisd 
 from the things themselves about which we judge. But 
 here let it be observed, that there is nothing in the na- 
 ture of things that will necessarily lead us into error, if 
 we do but use our reason aright, and withhold our judg- 
 ment till there appears sufficient evidence of truth. But 
 since we are sa unhappily prone to take advantage of ev- 
 ery doubtful appearance and circumstance of tilings to 
 form a wrong judgment, and plunge ourselves into mis- 
 take, therefore it is proper to consider what there is in the 
 things themselves that may occasion our errors. 
 
 I. Theob curity of some truths, and the difficulty of 
 searching them out, is one occasion of rash and mistaken 
 judgment. 
 
 Some truths are difficult because they lie remote from 
 the first principles of knowledge, and want a long chain 
 of argument to come at them : Such are many of the deep 
 things of algebra and geometry, and some of the theorems 
 and problems of most parts of the mathematics. Many 
 things also in natural philosophy are dark and intricate 
 upo.) this account, because we cannot come at any certain 
 knowledge of them without the labour of many and diffi- 
 cuU, as well as chargeable experiments. 
 
 There are other truths which have great darkness upon 
 them, because we have no pjoper means or mediums to 
 come at the knowledge of them. 1 hough in our age we 
 have found out many of the deep things of nature, by the 
 assistance of glasses and other instruments; yet wearenot 
 hitherto arrived at any sufficient methods to discover the 
 ghape of those little particles of matter which distinguish 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 149 
 
 the several sapours, odours, and colours of bodies 5 nor to 
 iiud what sort of atoms compose liquids or solids, and dis^ 
 tinguish wood, minerals, metals, glass, stone, &c. There 
 is a darkness also lies upon the actions of the intellectual or 
 angelical world ; their manners of subsistance And agency, 
 the power of spirits to move bodies, and the union of our 
 souls with this animal body of ours, are much unknown to 
 us on this account. 
 
 Now HI many of these cases, a great part of mankind are 
 not content to Le entirely ignorant; but they rather choose 
 to form rash and hasty judgments, to guess at things with- 
 out just evidence, to b-^lieve somethmg concerning tiiem 
 before they can know them 5 and thereby fall into error. 
 
 This sort of prejudice, as well as most others, is cured 
 by patience and diligenoe in inquiry and reasoning, and a 
 suspension of judgment, till we have attained some proper 
 mediums of knowledge, and till we see sufficient evidence 
 of the truth. 
 
 II. The appearance of thing«< in a disguise is another 
 spring of prejudice, or rash judgment. The outside of 
 things, which iirst strikes us, is oftentimes different from 
 their inward nature; and we are tempted to judge sud- 
 denly according to outward ai3pearances. If a picture is 
 daubed with many bright and glaring colours, the vulgar 
 eye admires it as an excellent piece; whereas the same 
 person judges very contemptuously of some admirable de- 
 sign, sketched out only with a black pencil or a coarse 
 paper, though by the hand of a Raphael. So the scholar 
 spies the name of a new book in a public news paper, he is 
 charmed with the title, he purchases, he reads with huge 
 expectations, and (indsit all trash and impertinence: This 
 is a prejudice derived from the appearance; we are too 
 ready to judge that voluaie valuable which liad so good a 
 frontispiece. The large heap of encomiums and swelling 
 words of assurance, that are bestowed on quack medicineK 
 injiiibhc advertisements, tempts many a reader to judge 
 them infallible, and to use the pdls or the plaister, with 
 vast hope and frequent disappointment. 
 
 We are tempted to form our judg nent of persons as 
 well as things by these outward apoearafices. Where 
 there is wealth, equipage, and splendor, we are^reaJy ta 
 
150 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 call that man liappy ; but we see not the vexing disquie- 
 tudes of his soul : And when we spy a person in ragged 
 garments, vveform a despicable opinion of hira too sudden- 
 ly; we can hardl} think him either happy or wise, our 
 judgment is so strangely biassed by outward and sensible 
 things. It was through the power of this prejudice, that 
 the Jews rejected our blessed Saviour ; they could not suf- 
 fer themselves to believe that the man who appeared as 
 the son of a carpenter was also ihe Son of God. And be- 
 cause St. Paul was of tittle stature, a mean presence, and 
 his voice contemptible, some of the Corinthians were temp- 
 ted to doubt whether he was inspired or not. 
 
 This prejuJice is cured by long acquaintance with the 
 world, and a just observation that things are sometimes 
 tetter and so iietimes worse than they appear to be. We 
 ought tiieiefore to restrain our excessive forwardness to 
 form our opinion of persons or things before we have op- 
 portunity to search into them more perfectly. Remem- 
 ber that a grey beard does not r£i;^ke a philosopher; all is 
 not gold that glistens i and a rough diamond may be worth 
 an immense sum. 
 
 III. A mixture of different qualities in the same thing*?, 
 is another temptation to judge amiss. We are ready to be 
 carried away by that quality which strikes the iiist or the 
 strongest impressions upon us, and we judge of the whole 
 object according to tliat quality, regardless of all the rest ; 
 or sometimes we colour over all the other quahties with 
 that one tincture, whether it be bad or good. 
 
 When we have just reason to admire a man for his vir- 
 tues, we are sometimes inclined not only to neglect his 
 weaknesses, but even to put a good colour crpon them, and 
 to think them amiable. When we read a book that has 
 many excellent truths in it, and divine sentiments, we are 
 tempted to approve not only that whole book, but even all 
 the writings of that author. When a poet, an orator, er a 
 painter, has performed admirably in several illustrious 
 pieces, we sometimes also admire his very errours, we 
 mistake his blunders for beauties, and are so ignorantly 
 fond as to copy after them. 
 
 It is this prejudice th^t has rendered so many great 
 scholars perfectly bigots^ siud inclined th^m to defend Ho- 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 151 
 
 mer or Horace, Livy or Cicero, in tlieir mistakes, and 
 vindicate all the foliies of their favourite author. Ii is 
 IhiSj that tempts some great writers to support thi savings 
 of almost ail tlie ancient fathers of the church, aud ad?- 
 mire them even in tneir very reveries. 
 
 On the other hand, if an autiioi n as professed heretical 
 sentiments m religion, we lliow our scorn upoD every ihmg 
 he writes, we despis*^* even his critical or mathematical 
 learning, and wih haid'y allow him cosnmon sense. — If a 
 poem has some biemishes in Jt, there is a set of false critics 
 who decry it universally^ and will allow no beauties there. 
 
 This sort of prejndice is relieved by learning to distin- 
 guish things vvsli, and not to judge in the lump. There is 
 scarce any thing in the world of nature or art, in the world 
 of morahty or religion, that is perfectly uniform — There 
 k a mixture of wihdom and folly, vice and virtue, good 
 and evil, Ixith in men and things. We should rememb^ 
 that some persons have great wit and little judgment; 
 others are judicious, but not vyitty. Some are good hu- 
 moured without compliment ; others have all the formali- 
 ties of complaisance, but no f^ood humour, We ought to 
 know that one man may be vicious and learned^ while an- 
 other has virtue without learning. That many a man 
 thinks admirably Avell, who has a poor uttei^ance; while 
 others have a charming manner of speecli, but their thoughts 
 are trifling and impertinent. Some are good neighbours, 
 and courteous, and charitable towards men, who have no 
 piety tow-ards God ; others are truly religious, but of mo- 
 rose natural tempers. Some excellent sayings are found 
 in very silly books, and some silly thoughts appear in books 
 of value^ W^e should neither praise nor dispraise by whole- 
 sale, but separate the good from the evil, and judge of them 
 apait: The accuracy of a good judgment consists much 
 in making sucii distinction;^. 
 
 Yet let it be noted too, that in common discourse we 
 usually denom.inate persons and things according to the 
 major part of their ciiaracter. He is to be called a wise 
 man who has bat few follies : He is a good philosopher who 
 knows much of nature, atid for the most part reasons well 
 in matters of human science; and that boou should be CcS* 
 teemed well wt itten, which has more of good 3ense m it 
 than it has of impertiaeuc^* 
 
152 LOGIC : OR, THE Part If. 
 
 IV. Though a thing be uniform in its owji nature, yet 
 the different lights in which it may be placed, and the dif- 
 ferent views in which it appears to uf^ will be ready to ex- 
 cite in us mistaken judgments concerning it Lei an erect 
 cone be placed on a horizontal plane, at a great distance 
 from the eve, and it appears a plain triangle 5 but we shall 
 judge that very cone to be nothing but a flat circle if its 
 b^^se be obverted towards us. Set a common round plate 
 a little obhquely before our eyes afar off, and we shall 
 think it an cival figure: But if the very edge of it be turned 
 towards us, we shall take it for a straight line. So when 
 we view the several folds of a changeable silk, we pronounce 
 this part red, and that yellow, because of its different posi- 
 tion to the light, though the silk laid smooth in oi;e light 
 appears all of one c< lour. 
 
 When we survey the miseries of mankind, and think of 
 the sorrows of millions, both on earth and in heli, the di- 
 vine government has a terrible aspect, and we may be 
 tempted to think hardly even of God himself: But if we 
 view ihe profusion of his bounty and grace among his crea- 
 tures on earth, or the happy spirits in heaven, we shall 
 have so exalted an idea of his goodness as to forget his 
 vengeance. Some men dwell entirely upon the promises 
 of his gospel, and think him all mercy: Others, under a 
 melancholy frame, dwell upon his terrors and his threatnings 
 and are overwhelmed with the thoughts of his severity and 
 vengeance, as though there were no mercy in him. 
 
 The true method of delivering ourselves from this pre- 
 judicCj is to view a thing on all sides, to compare all the 
 various appearances of the same thing with one another, 
 and let each of them have its full weight in the balance of 
 our judgment, befoie we fully determine our o])inion. It 
 was by this mean that the modern astronomers came to 
 find out that the planet Saturn hath a flat broad circle 
 round its globe, which is called its ring, by observing the 
 different appearances as a narrow or a broader oval, or, as 
 it sometimes seems to be a straight line, in the different 
 parts of its twenty nine years revolution through the eclip- 
 iic. And if we take the same just and religious survey of 
 ^he gieat and blessed God m all the discoveries of lus 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. i5» 
 
 vengeance and his mercy, we shall at last conclude him to 
 be both just and good. 
 
 V. The casual association of many of our ideas becomes 
 the spring of another prejudice or rash judgment, to which 
 we are sometimes exposed ff in our younger years we 
 have taken. medicines that have b^en nauseous, when any 
 medicine whatsoever is afterwards proposed to us under 
 sickness, we immediately judge it nauseous : Our fancy has 
 so closely joined these ideas together, that we know not 
 how to separate them : Then the stomach feels the disgust, 
 and perhaps refuses the only drug that can preserve life. 
 So a child who has been let blood, joins the ideas of pain 
 ancl the surgeon together, and he hates the sight of the 
 surgeon because he thinks of his pain : Or if he has drank 
 a buter potion, he conceives a bitter idea of thecup which 
 held'it, and will drink nothing out of that cup. 
 
 It is for the same reason that the bulk of the common 
 people are so superstitiously fond of the psjlms translated 
 by Hopkins and Sternhold, andtiiink them sacred and di- 
 vine, because they have been now for n\o%2 than an hun- 
 dred years bound up in the same covers with our bibles. 
 
 The best rehef against this prejudice of association is to 
 consider, whether there beany natural and necessary con- 
 nection between these ideas, which fanc)^, custom, or 
 chance, hath thus joined together ; and if nature has not 
 joined them, let our judgment correct the folly of our im- 
 agination^ and separate these ideas again* 
 
 SECT. II> 
 
 PREJUDICES ARISmo FROM W^ORDS. 
 
 OUR ideas and words are so linked <ogether, that while 
 we judge of things according to worus, we are led into sev- 
 eral mistakes. These may be distributed under two gen- 
 eral heads, namely, such as arise from single words or 
 phrases, or such as arise from words joined in speech, and 
 composing a discourse. 
 
154 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IL 
 
 1. The most eminent and remarkfible errours of the 
 first kind are these three. (1.) When our words are ih- 
 significant, and have no ideas ; as when the mystical di- 
 vines talk of the prayer of silence, the superjjatural and 
 passive night of the soul, the vicinity of powers^ the suspen- 
 sion of all thoughts : Or (2.) When our words are law, 
 equivocal, and signify two or more ideas 5 as the words, 
 Iaw% light, flesh, spirit, righteousness, and many other terms 
 in scripture : Or (3.) When two or three words are synon- 
 ymous, and signify one idea, as regeneration and new crea- 
 tion in the New Testament; both which mean only a 
 change of the heart from sin to holiness y or, as the Elec- 
 tor of Cologn and the Bishop of Cologn are two titles of 
 the same man. 
 
 These kinds of phrases are the occasion of various mis- 
 takes; but none so unhappy as thos^ in theology: both 
 words without ideas, as well as synonymous and equivocal 
 words, have been used and abused by the humours, pas- 
 sions, interests, or by the real ignorance and weakness of 
 men, to beget terrible contests among Christiarns. 
 
 But to relieve us under all those dangers, and to remove 
 these sort of prejudices which arise from sh\g]e words or 
 phrases, I must remit the reader to Part T. chap. IV. whrre 
 I have treated about words, and to those directions wliich 
 I have given concerning the definition of names, Part I. 
 chap. VI. sect 3. 
 
 IL There is another sort of false judgments, or mistakes 
 which we are exposed t6 by words ; and that is when they 
 are joined in speech, and compose a discourse 5 and here 
 we are in danger two ways. 
 
 The one is, when a man writes good sense, or speaks 
 much to the purpose, but he has Jiot a happy and engag- 
 ing manner of expression. Perhaps he uses coarse and 
 vulgar words, or old, obsolete, and unfashionable language 
 or terms, and phrases that are foreign, latinized, scholastic, 
 very uncommon, and hard to be understood : And this is 
 still worse, if his sentences are long and intricate, or the 
 sound of them harsh and grating to the ear. All these 
 indeed are defects in stile, and lead some nice aud un- 
 tUmking hearers or readers into au ill opinion of all 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 155 
 
 that such a person speak*? or writes. Many an excellent 
 dicourse of our forefatiiers has had abundance of contempt 
 cast, upon it by our modern pretenders to sense, for want 
 of their distinguishing between tne Jauguage'and the ]d«.as. 
 
 On the other hand, when a man of eloquence speaks or 
 writes upon any subject, wear- too ready to run into his 
 sentiinents, being sweetly and inseusibly drawn by liie 
 smoothness of h»s harargue, and the paUielio power of his 
 language. Rhetoric will varnish every error, so that it 
 shall appear in the dres^ <*f truih, aud put such ornaments 
 upon vice, as to make it look ]?ke virtue : It is an art of 
 wondrous and extensive influence : it often conceals, ob- 
 scures or overwiielms the truth, and places sometimes a 
 gross falsehood in a more alluring light. The decency of 
 action, the music of the voice, the harmony of the periods, 
 the beauty of the sivle, a^d all ttie engaging airs of the 
 speaker, have ofte:n|charued the hearers into error, and 
 persuaded them to approve whatsoever is proposed in so 
 agreeable a manner. A large assembly st^^nds exposed at 
 once to the power of these prejudiaes, and imbibes them 
 all. So Cicero and Demosthenes made the Romans and 
 the Atrjenians believe almost whatsoever they pleased. 
 
 Theb:st defence against both tl^ese dangers, is to learn 
 the skill (as much as possible) of separating our thoughts 
 and ideas from words aud phrases, to judge of the things 
 in their own natures, and in their natural or just relation to 
 one another, abstracted from the use of language, and to 
 maintain a steady and obstinate resolution, to hearken to 
 nothing but tru h. in whatsoever style or dress il appears. 
 
 Then we shall hear a sermon of pious and jupt senti- 
 ments withesieem and reverdnce, thrugjj the preacher has 
 but an unpolished style, and many defects in ilie manner 
 of his delivery. Then we shall neglect and disregard all 
 the flattering insinuations, whereby the orator would make 
 way for his own sentiments to take possession of our souls, 
 ifhehasnot solid and instructive sense equal to his lan- 
 guage. Oratory is a happy talent, when it is rightly 
 employed, to excite the passions to the prrchce of virtue 
 and piety: but, to Fpeak propeily, this ait has nothing (o 
 do in the search after truth. 
 
136 I.OGIC : OR, TH€ f>ART H. 
 
 ^CT. III. 
 
 PREJUDICES ARISING PROM OURSELVES. 
 
 NEITHER ivor.ls nor things ss onld so often lead us a- 
 stray from ti uth, if we had not within ourselves such springs 
 of error as these that follow. 
 
 L M:^ny errors are derived from our weakness of rea- 
 son, and incapacity lo judge of things in our infant state. 
 These are called tlie prejudices of infancy. We frame early 
 mistakes about the com noi^ objects which surround us, and 
 the common affairs of life : We fancy the nui se is our best 
 frierjd, because children recejve from their nurses tlreir 
 food and other converuences of life. We judge that books 
 are very unpleasant thmgs, because perhaps we have been 
 driven to tl^em by the scourge W« judge also that the 
 sky touches the distant hills, because we cannot inform 
 ourselves better in childhood. We believe the stars are 
 not risen till the sun is set, because we never see them by 
 day. But some of these errors may iseem to be derived 
 from the next spring. 
 
 The way to cure the prejudices of infancy, is lo distin- 
 guish, as far as we can. which are those opinions which we 
 framed in perfect childhood ; to rejmember that at that 
 time our reason was incapable of forming a right judgment, 
 and to bring these propositions again to be examined at 
 the bar of mature reason. 
 
 If. Our senses give us many a false information of things, 
 and tempt us to jud^e amiss This is called prejudice of 
 sense : as, when we suppose the sun and moon to be flat 
 bodies, and to be but a few inches broad, because they ap- 
 pear so to the eye Sense inclines us to judge that air has 
 no weight, because we do not feel it press heavy upon us 5 
 and we judge also by our senses that cold and heat, sweet 
 and sour, red and blue, &c. are such real properties in the 
 objects themselves, and exactly like those sensations which 
 they excite in us. 
 
 Note — Those mistakes of this sort, which all mankind 
 drop and lose in their advancing age, are called mere 
 prejudices QfiufaDcyj but thojs^ which abide with the 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 157 
 
 vKlgar part of the world, and generally with all men, till 
 learning and philosophy cure them; more properly attain 
 the name of prejudices of sense. 
 
 These prejudices are to be removed sereral ways. (1.) 
 By the assistance of one sense we cure the mistake of an- 
 other: as, when a stick thrust into the water seems crook- 
 ed, we are prevented from judging it to be really so in itself; 
 for, when we take it out of the water, both our sight and 
 feeling agree and determine it to l>e straight. (2.) The ex- 
 ercise of our re ?^.son, and an application to mathematical 
 and philosophical studies, cures many other prejudices of 
 sense, both with relation to the heavenly and earthly bod- 
 ies. (3.) We should remember that otir senses have of- 
 ten deceived us in various instances; that they give but a 
 confused and imperfect representation of things in many 
 cases; that they often represent falsely those very objects 
 to which they seem to be suited, such as the shape,motion^ 
 size J and situation of gross bodies, if they are but placed at 
 a distance from us 5 and as for the minute particles of which 
 bodies are composed, our senses cannot distinguish them. 
 (4.) We should remember also, that one prime and orig- 
 inal design of our senses, is to inform us what various re- 
 lations the bodies that are round about us bear to our own 
 animal body, and to give us notice what is pleasant and 
 useful and what is painful or injurious to us ; but they are 
 not sufficient of themselves to lead us into a philosophical 
 acquaintance with the inward nature of things. It must 
 be confessed, it is by the assistance of the eye and the ear 
 especially (which are called the seiises of discipline) that 
 our minds are furnished with various parts of knowledge, 
 by reading, hearing, and observing things divine and hu- 
 man ; yet reason ought always to accompany the exercise 
 of our senses, whenever we would form a just judgment of 
 things proposed to our inquiry. 
 
 Here it is proper to observe ^Iso, that as the weakness 
 of reason in Our infancy^ and the dictates of our senses, 
 sometimes in advancing years, lead the wiser part of man- 
 kind astray from truth; so the meaner parts of our spe- 
 cies, persons whose genius is very low, whose judgment is 
 always weak, who are ever indulging the dictates of sense 
 and humofjarebut children of a large size, they stand ex- 
 O 
 
158 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II. 
 
 posed to everlasting mistakes in life, and live and die in the 
 midst of pn=»judices. 
 
 III. imagination is another fruitful spring of false judg- 
 ments. Our imagination is nothing else but the various 
 appearances of our sensible ideas in the brain, where the 
 soul frequently works in uniting, disjoining, multiplying^ 
 magnifying, diminishing, and altering the several shapes, 
 colours, sounds, motions, words and things, that have been 
 communicated to us by the outward organs of sense. It 
 -^is no wonder therefore if fancy leads us into many mis- 
 lakes, for it^is but sense at second liand. Whatever is 
 strongly impressed upon the imagination, some persons be- 
 lieve to be true. Some will choose a particular number 
 in a lottery, or lay a large wager on a single chance of a 
 dye, and doubt not of success, because their fancy feels so 
 powerful an impi-cssion, as assures them it will be pros- 
 perous. A thousand pretended prophecies and inspira- 
 tions, and all the freaks of enthusiasm have been derived 
 from this spring. Dreams are nothing else but the de- 
 ceptions of fancy ; A delirium is but a short wildness of 
 the imagination ; and a settled irregularity of fancy, is 
 distraction and madness. 
 
 One way to gain a victory over this unruly faculty, is to 
 set a watch upon it perpetually, and to bridle it in all its 
 extravagances ; never to believe any thing merely be- 
 cause fancy dictates itj any more than I would believe a 
 midnight-dream, nor to trust fancy any farther than it is 
 attended with severe reason. It is a very useful anden- 
 tCTtaining power of human nature, in matters of illustra- 
 tion, persuasion, oratory, poetry, wit, conversation, &c. 
 but in the calm inquiry after truth, and the final judgment 
 of things, fancy should retire and stand aside, unless it be 
 called in to explain and illustrate a difficult point by a si- 
 militude. 
 
 Another method of deliverance from these prejudices 
 of fancy, is to compare the ideas that arise in our imagina- 
 tions with the real nature of things, as often as we have 
 occasion to judge concerning them; and let calm and se- 
 date reason govern and determine our opinions, though 
 fancy should shew never so great a reluctance. Fancy is 
 the inferior faculty, and it ought to obey* 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 159 
 
 IV. The various passions or affections of the mind, 
 are numerous and endless springs of prejudice. They dis- 
 guise every object they converse with, and put tiieir own 
 colours upon it, and thus lead the judgment astray from 
 truth. It is love that makes the mother think her own 
 child the fairest, and will sometimes persuade us that a 
 blemish is a beauty. Hope and desire make an hour of 
 delay seem as long as two or three hours : Hope inclines 
 us to think there is nothing too difficult to be attempted: 
 Despair telb us that a brave attempt is mere rashness, and 
 that every difficulty is insurmountable. Fear makes us 
 imagine that a l>ush shaken with the wind has some sav- 
 age beast in it, and multiplies the dangers that attend our 
 path: But still there is a more unhappy effect of fear, 
 when it keeps millions of souls in slavery to the errors of es- 
 tablished reUgion : What could persuade the wise men and 
 philosophers of a popish country to believe the gross ab- 
 surdities of the Romish church, but the fear of torture, or 
 death, the galley, or the inquisition ? Sorrow and melan- 
 choly tempt us to think our circumstances much more 
 dismal than they are, that we may have some excuse for 
 mourning : And envy represents the condition of our 
 neighbor better than it is, that there might be some pre- 
 tence for her own vexation and uneasiness^. Anger, wrath, 
 and revenge, and all those hateful passions, excite in us 
 far worse ideas of men than they deserve, and persuade us 
 to believe all that is ill of them. A detail of the evil in- 
 fluence of the affections of the mind upon our own judg- 
 ment would make a large volume. 
 
 The cure of these preju<iices is attained by a constant 
 jealousy of ourselves, and watchfulness over our passions, 
 that they may never interpose when we are called to pass 
 a judgment of any thing; And when our affections are 
 warmly engaged, let us abstain from judging. It would 
 be also of great use to us to form our deliberate judgments 
 of persons and things in the calmest and serenest hours 
 of life, when the passions of nature are all silent, and the 
 mind enjoys its most perfect composure: and these judg- 
 ments so formed should be treasured up in the mind, that 
 we might have recourse to them in hours of seed. See 
 
16d LOGIC : OR, THE Part. EI. 
 
 many sentiments and directions relating to Uiis subject, 
 in my Doctrine of the Passions, a nevi edition enlarged. 
 
 V. The fondness we have for selfy and the relation 
 M'hich other persons and things have to ourselves, furnish 
 us with another long list of prejudices. This indeed might 
 be reduced to the passion of self-love ^ but it is so copious 
 an head that I choose to tiaine it a distinct spring of false 
 judgments. We are generally ready to fancy every thing 
 of our own i^as something peculiarly valuable in it, when 
 indeed there is no other reason but because it is our own. 
 Were we born among the gardens of Ital}^, the rocks of 
 Switzerland, or the ice and snows of Russia and Sweden, 
 still we would imagine peculiar excellencies in our native 
 land. We conceive a good idea of the town and village 
 where we first breathed, and tliink the better of a man for 
 being born near us. We entertain the best opinion of the 
 persons of our own party, and easily believe evil reports 
 of persons of a different sect or faction. Our own sex^ our 
 kindred, our houses, and our very names, seem to have 
 something g.ood and desirable in them. We are ready 
 to mingle ail these vvith ourselves, and cannot bear to have 
 others think meanly of them. 
 
 So good an opinion have we of our sentiments and prac- 
 tices, that it is very difficult to believe what a reprover 
 says of our conduct 5 and we are as ready to assent to all 
 the language of flattery. We set up our own opinions in 
 religion and philosophy as the tests of orthodoxy and truth ; 
 and we are prone to judge every practice of other men 
 either a duty or a crime, which we think would be a crime 
 or a duty in us, though their circumstances are vastly 
 diflTerent from our own. This humor prevails sometimes 
 to such a degree, that we would make our own taste and 
 inclination the standard by which to judge of every dish 
 of meat that is set upon the table, every book in a Ubrary, 
 every employment, study, and business of life, as well as 
 every recreation. 
 
 It is from this evil principle of setting up self for a mod- 
 el of what other men ought to be, that the anti-christian 
 spirit of impositon £ind persecution had its original: 
 Though there is no more reason for it than there was for 
 the practice of that tyrant, who having a bed fit for his 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 161 
 
 own size, was reported to stretch men of low stature upon 
 the rack, till they were drawn out of the length of his bed ; 
 and some add also, that he cut off the legs of any whom 
 he found too long for it. 
 
 It is also from a principle near akin to this, that we per- 
 vert and strain the writings of many venerable authors, and 
 especially the sacred books of scripture, to make them 
 speak our own sense. Tli rough tlie influence which our 
 own schemes or hypotheses have upon the mind, we some- 
 times become so sharp-sighted as to find these schemes in 
 those places of scripture where the holy writers never 
 thought of them, nor the holy spirit intended them. At 
 other times this prejudice brings such a dimness upon the 
 sight, that we cannot read any thing that opposes our own 
 scheme, though it be written as with sun-beams, and in 
 th^ plainest language; and perhaps we are in danger in 
 such a case of winking a Uttle against the light. 
 
 We ought to bring our minds free, unbiassed, and teach* 
 able, to learn our religion from the word of Gad ; but we 
 have generally formed all the lesser as well as the greater 
 points of our religion before- hand, and then we read the 
 prophets and apostles only to pervert them to confirm our 
 own opinions. Were it not for this influence of self^ and 
 a bigotry to our own tenets, we could hardly imagine that 
 so many strange, absurd, inconsistent, wicked mischiev- 
 ous, and bloody principles, should pretend to support and 
 defend themselves by the gospel of Christ. 
 
 Every learned critic has his own hypothesis ; and if the 
 common text be not favourable to his opinion, a various 
 selection shall be made authentic. The text must be sup- 
 posed to be defective or redundant ; and the sense of it 
 shall be literal or metaphorical, according as it best sup- 
 ports his own scheme. Whole chapters or books shall be 
 added or left out of the sacred canon, or be turned into par- 
 ables by this influence. Luther knew not well how to re- 
 concile the episll^e of St. James to the doctrine.of justifica- 
 tion by faith alone, and so- he could not allow it to be di- 
 vine. The Papists bring all the apocrypha into their bi- 
 ble, and stamp divinity upon it : for they can fancy pur* 
 gatory is there, and they find prayers for the dead. But 
 they leave out the second commandment, because it for- 
 Q Z 
 
162 LOGIC: OR, THE PautIL 
 
 bid* the worship of images. Others suppose the Mosaic 
 historv of the creation, aitd the fall of man, to be oriental 
 ornaments, or a mere allegory, because the literal sense of 
 tliose three chapters of Genesis do not agree wiili iheir 
 theories. Even an honest, plain-hearted and unlearned 
 Christian is ready to find something in every chapter of 
 the bible to countenance his own private sentiments ; but 
 he loves those chapters best which speak his own opinion 
 plainest: This is a prejudice that sticks very close to our 
 natures ; the scholar is infested with it daily, and the me- 
 chanic is not free. 
 
 Self has yet a farther and more pQrnicious influence up- 
 on our understandings^ and is an unhappy guide in the 
 search after truth. When our own inciination, or our 
 ease, and honor, or our profit, tempt us to the practice of 
 any thing of suspected lawfulness, how do we strain our 
 thoughts to find arguments for it and persuade ourselves it 
 is lawful ? We colour over iniquity and sinful compliance 
 with the names of virtue and innocence, or at least of con- 
 straint and necessity. All the difterent and opposite 
 sentunentsand practices of majikind are too much influen* 
 ced by this mean bribery, and give too just occasion for 
 satyi'ical writers to say, that self interest governs all man- 
 I^ind. 
 
 When the judge bad awarded due damages to a person 
 into whose field a neghbor'S oxen had broke, it is reported 
 that he reversed his own sentence, when he heard that 
 the oxen which had done this mischief were his^ own. 
 Whether this be a history or a parpale, it is still a just rep- 
 resentation of the wretched iniliience of self io corrupt 
 the judgment. 
 
 One way to amend tins prejudice, is to ihvusi self s^o far 
 out of the questioi3, that it may have no manner of influ- 
 ence whensoever we are called to judge and consider the 
 iiaked nature, truth, and justice of things. In matters of 
 equity between man and man, our Saviour has taught us 
 an eflectual means of guarding against this prejudice, and 
 that is, to put my neighbor in the place of myself, and 
 myself in the place of my neighbor, rather than be brib^ 
 ed by this corrupt principle of self love to do injury tp 
 
Chap. HI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 163 
 
 our neighbours. Thence arises that golden rule of dealing 
 with others as we would have others deal with us. 
 
 In the judgment of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, 
 good and eviJ, we ought to consider that every man has a 
 SELF as well as we ; and that the tastes, passion, inclina- 
 tions and interests of different men are very different, and 
 often contrary, and that they dictate contrary things: Un- 
 less therefore all manner of different and contrary proposi- 
 tions can be true at once, self cd^n never be a just test, cu: 
 standard of truth and falsehood, good and evil. 
 
 VI. Tempers, humours, and peculiar turns of the mind^ 
 whether they be natural or acquired, have a great influence 
 upon our judgment, and become the occasion of many mis- 
 takes. Let us survey a few of them. 
 
 (1.) Some persons are of an easyapd credulous temper, 
 while others are perpetually discovering a spirit of contra- 
 diction. 
 
 The credulous man is ready to receive every thing fox 
 truth that has but a shadow of evidence ; every new book 
 that he reads, and every ingenious man with whom he 
 converses, has power enough to draw him into the senti- 
 ments of the speaker or writer. He basso much com- 
 plaisance in him, or weakness of soul, that he is ready to 
 resign his own opinion to the ffrst objection which he 
 hears, and to receive any sentiments of another that are 
 asserted v/ith a positive air and much assurance. Thus he 
 is under a kind of necessity, through the indulgence of this 
 credulous humour, either to be often changing his opinions, 
 or to believe inconsistencies. 
 
 The man of contradiction is of a contrary humour,* for 
 he stands ready to opp.ose every thing that is said : He 
 gives but a slight attention to iiie reasons of other men, 
 iVom an inward and scornful presumption that they have 
 110 strength in theoi. When he reads or hears a discourse 
 different from his own sentiments, he does not give him- 
 self leave to consider whether that discourse may be true i 
 but employs all his powers immediately to confute it. — 
 Your great disputers, and your men of controversy, are in 
 continual danger of this ^ort of prejudice : they contend 
 often for victory, and will maintain whatsoever they have 
 asserted, while tjuth is lost in the noi^e and tumult of jf€- 
 
164 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. iC 
 
 c\\ivoa\] contradictions ; and it frequently happens that a- 
 debate about opinions is turned into a mutual reproach of 
 
 persons. 
 
 The prejudice of credulity may m some measure be cur- 
 ed, by learning to set a high value on truth, and by taking 
 more pains to attain it; remembering that truth oftentimes 
 lies dark and deep, and requires us to dig for it as hid 
 treasure ; and that falsehood often puts on a Tair disguise, 
 and therefore we should not yield up our judgment to ev- 
 ery plausible appearance. It is no part of civility or good 
 breeding to part with truth, but tom.aintain it with decen- 
 cy and candour. 
 
 A spirit of contradiction is so pedantic and hateful, that 
 a man should take much pains with himself to svatch a- 
 gainst every instance of it: He should learn so much good 
 humour, at least, as never to oppose any thing without 
 just and solid reason for it: He should abate some degrees 
 of pride and moroseness, which are never failing ingredi- 
 ents in this sort of temper, and should seek after so much 
 honesty and conscience as never to contend for conquest or 
 triumph ; but to review his own reasons, and to read the 
 arguments of his opponents (if possible) with an equal in- 
 differency, and be glad to spy truth, and to submit 16 it, 
 though it appear on the opposite side. 
 
 (2.) There is another pair of prejudices, derived from 
 two tempers of mind, near akin to those I have just bow 
 mentioned ; and these are the dogmatical and the sceptical 
 humour, that is, alwa37S positive, or always doubting. 
 
 By what means soever the dogmatist came by hh opin- 
 ions, whether by his senses or by his fancy, his education 
 or his own reading, yet he believed them all with th^* same 
 assurances that he does a mathematical truth ; he has 
 scacre any mere probabilities that belong to him; every 
 thing with him is certain and infallible; every punctilio in 
 religion is an article of his faith ; and he answers all man- 
 ner of objections by a sovereign contempt. 
 
 Persons of this temper are seldom to be convinced of any 
 mistake : A full assurance of their own notions makes ail 
 the difficulties on their own side vanish so entirely, that 
 they think every pointof their belief is written as with sun- 
 besiins, and wondex any ow should find ^ difficulty in it. 
 
Chap. IIL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 165 
 
 They are amazed that learned men should make a contro- 
 versy of what is to tiiem so perspicuous and indubitable. 
 The lowest rank of people, botli^ in learned and in vulgar 
 life, is very subject to this obstinacy. 
 
 Scepticism is a cowtrar}' prejudice. The dogmatist is 
 sure of every thingjand the sceptic believes nothing. Per- 
 haps he has found himself often mistaken in matters of 
 which he thougiit himself well assured in his younger days, 
 and therefore he is afraid to g:ive his assent to any thing 
 agaiii. He sees so much shew of reason for every opinionj 
 and so many objections also arising against every doctrincj 
 that he is ready to throw off the belief of every thing: He 
 renounces at once the pursuit of tru^^th^and contents him- 
 self to say, There is nothing certain. It is well, if through 
 the influence of such a temper he does not cast away his 
 religion as well as his philosophy, and abandon himself to 
 a profane course of iife, regardless of hell or of heaven. 
 
 Both these prejudices last raentioned, though they are 
 so opposite to each other, yet they arise from the same 
 spring, and that i:^, impatience of study, and want of dili- 
 gent attention in search of truth. Tiie dogmatist is in 
 haste to believe something; he cannot keep himself long 
 enough in suspence,^ till some bright and convincing evi- 
 dence appear on one side, but throws himself casually into 
 the sentiments of one party or another, and then he will 
 hear no argument to the contrary. The sceptic will not 
 take pains to search things to the bottom, but when he sees 
 difficulties on both sides, resolves to believe neither of them. 
 Humility of soul, patience in study, diligence in inquiry, 
 with an honest zeal for truth, would go a great way tow- 
 ards the cure of both thes^ follies. 
 
 (3.) Another sort of temper that is very injurious to a 
 right judgment of things, is an inconstant, fickle, changea- 
 ble spirit, and a very uneven temper of mind. When such 
 persons are in one humour, they pass a judgment of things 
 agreeable to it; when their humour changes, ihey reverse 
 tiieir first judgment, and embrace a new opinion. They 
 have no steadiness of soul; they want firmness of mind 
 sufficient to establish themselves in any truth, and are 
 ready to change it for the next alluring falsehood that is 
 agreeable to their change ofhuiii^ur. This fickleness is 
 
166 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IT. 
 
 sometimes so mingled with their very constitution by na- 
 lure, or by distemoer of body, that a cloudy day and a 
 lowering skv shall strongly incHne them to form an opm- 
 ion both of themselves and of persons and things round 
 about them, quite different from what they believe when 
 the sun shines, and the heavens are serene. ^ 
 
 This sort of people ought to judge of things and persons 
 in their most sedate, peaceful, and composed hours ot lue, 
 and reserve these judgments for their conduct at more un- 
 happy seasons. 
 
 (4.) Some persons have a violent and turgid manner 
 both of talking and thinking; whatsoever they judge of, it 
 is always with a tincture of this vanity. They are always 
 in extremes, and pronounce concerning every thing m tte 
 superlative. If they think a man to be learned, he is the 
 chief scholar of the age ; If another has low parts, he is the 
 greatest blockhead in nature : If they approve any book on 
 divine subjects, it is the best book in the world next to the hi- 
 hie : If they speak of a storm of rain or hail, it is She most 
 terrible storm that fell since the creation : And a cold win- 
 ter day the coldest that ever was knoivn^ 
 
 But the men of this swelling language ought to remem- 
 ber, that nature has ten thousand moderate things in it, 
 and does not always deal in extremes as they do. 
 
 (5.) I think it may be called another sort of prejudice 
 derived from humour, when some men believe a doctrine 
 merely because it is ancient, and has been long believed ; 
 others are so fond of novelty, that nothing prevails upon 
 their assent so much as new thoughts and new notions — 
 Again, there are some who set a high esteem upon every 
 thing that is foreign and far fetched; therefore China pic- 
 tures are admired, how awkward soever: Others value 
 things the more for being of our own native grow th, inven- 
 tion or manufacture, and these as much despise foreign 
 things. 
 
 Some men of letters and theology will not believe a pro- 
 position even concerning a sublime subject, till every thing 
 mysterious, deep, and difficult, is cut off from it, though 
 the scripture asserts it never so plninh^ ; others are so fond 
 of a mystery and things incomprehensible, that they would 
 scarce believe the doctipt<? of th^ Trinity, if it could be ex- 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 167 
 
 plained ; they incline to that foolish rant of one of the an- 
 cients, Credo quia impossibile est s I beheve it because it is 
 impossible. 
 
 To cure these mistakes, remenriber that neither antique 
 nor novel, foreign nor native, mysterious nor plain, are 
 certain characters either of truth or of falsehood. 
 
 I might mention various other humours of men that excite 
 in them various prejudices, and leads ihem into rash and 
 mistaken judgments 5 but these are sufficient for a specimen. 
 
 Vrr. There are several other weaknesses which faeiorg 
 to human nature, whereby we are led into mistakes, and 
 indeed are rendered almost incapableofpassinga solid judg- 
 ment in matters of great depth and difficulty. Some have 
 a native obscurity of perception, (or shall I call it a want of 
 natural sagacity?) whereby they are hindered from attain- 
 ing clear and distinct ideas. Their thoughts always seem 
 to have something confused and cloudy in tjiem, and there- 
 fore they judge in the dark. Some have a defect of memo- 
 ry, and then they are not capable of comparing their pres- 
 ent ideas with a great variety of others, in order to secure 
 themselves from inconsistency in judgment. Others may 
 have a memory large enough, yet they are subject to the 
 same errors, from a narrowness of soul, and such a fixation 
 and confinement of thought to a few objects, that they 
 scarce ever take a survey of things wide enough to judge 
 wisely and well, and to secure themselves from all incon- 
 sistencies. 
 
 Though these are natural defects and weaknesses^ yet they 
 may in some measure, be relieved by labour, diligence, 
 and a due attention to proper rules. 
 
 But among all the causes of false judgment which are 
 within ourselves, I ought by no means to leave out that 
 universal and original spring of error, of which we are in- 
 formed by the word of God ^ and that is, the sin and de- 
 fection of our first parents 5 whereby all our best natural 
 powers, both of mind and body, are impaired and rendered 
 very much inferiour to what they were in a slate of inno- 
 cence. Our understanding is darkened, our memory con- 
 tracted, our corrupt humours and passions are grown pre- 
 dominant, our reason enfeebled, and various disorders at- 
 
168 LOOfCrOR, THE Paht. IL 
 
 tend our constitution and animal nature, whereby the mind 
 is strangely imposed upon in its judgment of things. Nor 
 is there any perfect rehef to be expected on earth. There 
 is no hope of ever recovering^ from these malndies, but by a 
 sincere return to God in the ways of hi« own appointment, 
 whereby we shall be kept safe from all dangerous and per- 
 nicious errors in the matters of religion ; and though im- 
 perfections and mistakes will hang about us in the present 
 life as the effects of our original apostacy from God, yet 
 we hope for a full deliverance from them when we arrive 
 at heaven. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 PREiUDlCES ARISING FROM OTHER PERSONS. 
 
 WERE it not for the springs of prejudice that are lurk- 
 ing in ourselves, we should not be subjett to so many mis- 
 lakes from the influence of others : But, since our nature 
 is so susceptive of errors on all sides, it is fit w^e should 
 have hints and notices given us, how far other person-s 
 may have power over us, and become the causes of all our 
 false judgments. 71ns might also be <^ast into one heap, 
 for they are all near iakin, and mingle with each other; 
 but for distinction sake let them be called the prejudices of 
 education, of custom, of authority, and such as arise from 
 the manner of proposal. 
 
 I. Those with whom our education is intrusted may lay 
 the first foundationof many mistakes in our j^ounger years. 
 How many fooleries and errors are instilled into us by our 
 nurses, our fellow-children; bv servants or unskilled teach- 
 ers; which are not only maintained through the fol- 
 lowing pfirt5 of iife^ but sometimes have a veiy unhappy 
 influence upon us ! We are taught that theie are bug- 
 bears and goblins in the dark ; our young minds are croud- 
 ed with tlie terrible ideas of ghosts appearing upon ev- 
 ery occasion, or with the pleasanter tales of fairies danc- 
 ing at midnight. We learn (o prophecy betimes, to fore- 
 it;li futurities by good or evil omens^ and to presage ap^ 
 
Chap. TIL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 169 
 
 preaching death in a family by ravens and little worms, 
 which we therefore call a death watch. We are taught to 
 know beforehand, for a twelvemonth together, which days 
 of the week will be fair or foul, which will be lucky or un- 
 lucky ; nor is there any thing so silly, but may be impos- 
 ed upon our understandings in that early part of life 3 and 
 these ridiculous stories abide with us too long, and too far 
 influence the weaker part of mankind. 
 
 We choose our particular set and party in the civil, the 
 religious, and the learned hfe, by the influence of educa- 
 tion. In the colleges of learning, some are for the nomi- 
 nals, and some for the realists, in the science of metaphy- 
 sics, because their tutors were devoted to these parties. 
 The old philosophy and the new have gained thousands of 
 partisans the same way : And every rehgion has its infant 
 votaries, who are born, live and die in the same faith, 
 without examination of any article. The Turks are taught 
 early to believe in Mahomet 5 the Jews in Moses i the 
 heathens worship a multitude of gods, under the force of 
 their education. And it would be well if there were not 
 millions of Christians, who have little more to say for their 
 religion, than that they were born and bred up in it. The 
 greatest part of the Christian world can hardly give any 
 reason why they believe the Bible to be the word of God, 
 but because they have always believed it and they were 
 taught so from their infancy. As Jews and Turks, and 
 American Heathens, believe the most monstrous and in- 
 credible stories, because they have been trained up amongst 
 them, as articles of faith ; so the Papists believe their 
 transubstantiaiion, and make no difficulty of assenting to 
 impossibilities, since it is the current doctrine of their cate- 
 chisms. By the same means, the several sects and par- 
 ties in Christianity believe all the strained interpretations 
 of scripture by which they have been taught to support 
 their own tenets : They find nothing difficult in all the ab- 
 surd glosses and far-fetched senses, that are sometimes put 
 ^iipon the words of the sacred writers, because their ears 
 have been always accustomed to these glosses; and there- 
 fore they sit so smooth and easy upon their understandings, 
 that thejT^ know not how to admit the most natural and 
 eajsy interpretation in opposition to them. 
 P 
 
170 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 Ill llie same manner, we are nursed up in many silly and 
 gross mistakes about domestic affairs, as well as in matters 
 of political concernment. It is upon the same ground that 
 children are trained up to be Whigs and Tories betimes ; 
 and every one learns the distinguishing terms of his own 
 party, as the Papists learn to say their prayers in Latin, 
 without any meaning, reason, or devotion. 
 
 This sort of prejudice must be cured by calling all the 
 principles of our young years to the bar of more mature 
 reason, that we may judge of the things of nature and po- 
 litical affairs by juster rules of philosophy and observation : 
 And even the matters of religion must be first inquired in- 
 to by reason and conscience, and when these have led us 
 to believe scripture to be the word of God, then that be- 
 comes our sovereign guide, and reason and conscience must 
 submit to receive its dictates. 
 
 II. The next prejudice which I shall mention, is that 
 which arises from the custom or fashion of those amongst 
 whom we live. Suppose we have freed ourselves from the 
 j^ounger prejudices of our education, yet we are in danger 
 of having our mind turned aside from truth by the influ- 
 ence of general custom. 
 
 Our opinion of meats and drinks, of garments and forms 
 of salutation, are influenced much more by custom, than 
 by the eye, the ear, or the taste. Custom prevails even 
 over sense itself, and therefore no wonder if it prevail 
 over reason too. What is it but custom that renders ma- 
 ny of the maxims of food and sauces elegant in Britain, 
 which would be awkward and nauseous to the inlmbitants 
 of China, and indeed were nauseous to us when we first 
 tasted them ? What but custom could make those saluta- 
 tions polite in Muscovy, which are ridiculous in France 
 or England ? AVe call ourselves indeed the politer nations, 
 tut it is we who judge thus of ourselves; and that fan- 
 cied politeness is oftentimes more owing to custom than 
 reason. Why are theforms of our present garments count- 
 ed beautiful, and those fashions of our ancestors the mat- 
 ter of scoff and contempt, which in their day were all de- 
 cent and genteel ? It is custom that forms our opinion of 
 dress, and reconciles by degrees to those habits wWch at 
 fir^st seemed very odd and monstrous. It must be grant- 
 
Chap, III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 171 
 
 ed, there are some garments and habits which have a 
 natural congruity, or incongruity, modesty, or immodesty, 
 decency, or indecency, gaudery, or gravity ; though foe 
 the most part there is but little of reason in these affairs : 
 But what little there is of reason or natural decency, cus- 
 tom triumphs over all. It is almost impossible to per- 
 suade a gay lady that any thing can be decent which is 
 out of the fashion : And it were well if fashion stretched 
 its powers no farther than (he business of drapery and the 
 fair sex. 
 
 The methods of our education are governed by custom. 
 It is custom, and not reason, that sends every boy to learn 
 the Roman poets, and begin a little acquaintance with 
 Greek, before he is bound an apprentice to a soapboiler or 
 leather seller. It is custom alone that leaches us Latin 
 by the rules of a Latin grammar : a tedious and absurd 
 method ! And what is it but custom that has for past cen- 
 turies confined the brightest geniuses, even of the highest 
 rank in the female world, to the business of the needle on- 
 ly, and secluded them most unmercifully from the pleasure 
 of knowledge, and the divine improvement of reason ? But 
 we begin to break all these chains, and reason begins to 
 dictate the education of youth. May the grov,i'ng age be 
 learned and wise I 
 
 It is by the prejudice arising from our own customs, 
 that we judge of all otiier civil and religious forms and 
 practices. The rites and ceremonies of war and peace in 
 other nations, the forms of weddings and funerals, the 
 several ranks of magistracy, the trades and employments 
 of both sexes, the public and the domestic affairs oi life, 
 and almost every thing of foreign customs is judged irreg- 
 ular. It is all imagined to be unreasonable or unnatural, 
 by those who have no otlier rule to judge of nature, and 
 reason, but the customs of their own country, or the little 
 town where they dwell. Custom is called a second na- 
 ture, but we often mistake it for nature itself. 
 
 Besides all this, lliere is a fashion in opinions, there is 
 a fashion in writing and printing, in style and language. 
 In our day it is the vogue of the nation that parliaments 
 may settle the succession of the crown, and that a people 
 can make a king; in the last age this vvas a doctrine akin 
 
172 LOGIC ; OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 to treason. Citations from the Latin poets were an em- 
 bellishment of style in the last century, and whole pages in 
 that day '*ere covered with them ; it is forbidden by cus- 
 tom and exposed by the name of pedantry; whereas in 
 truth both these are extremes. Sometimes our printed 
 books shall abound in capitals, and sometimes reject them 
 all. Now we deal much in essavs, and most unreasonably 
 despise systematic learning, whereas our fathers had a just 
 value for regularity and systems ; then folios and quartos 
 were the fashionable sizes, as volumes in octavo are now. 
 We are ever ready to run into extremes, and j^et custom 
 still persuades us that reason and nature are on our side. 
 
 This business of the fashion has a most powerful influ- 
 ence on our judgments 3 for it employs those two strong 
 engines of fear and shame to operate upon our understand- 
 ings with unhappy success. We are ashamed to believe 
 or profess an unfashionable opinion in philosophy; and a 
 cowardly soul dares not so much as indulge a thought 
 contrary to the estabhshed or fashionable faith, nor act in 
 opposition to custom, though it be according to the dic- 
 tates of reason. 
 
 I confess there is a respect due to mankind, which 
 should incline even the wisest of men to follow the inno- 
 cent customs of their country in the outward practices of 
 civil life, and in some measure to submit to fashion in all 
 indifferent affairs, where reason and scripture make no 
 remonstrances against it. But the judgments of the mind 
 ought to be for ever free, and not biassed by the customs 
 and fashions of any age or nation whatsoever. 
 
 To deliver our understandings from this danger and sla- 
 very, we should consider three things. 
 
 1. That the greatest part of the civil customs of any 
 particular nation or age spring from humour rather than 
 reason. Sometimes the humour of the prince prevails, 
 and sometimes the humour of the people. It is either 
 the great or the many who dictate the fashion, and these 
 have not always the highest reason on their side, 
 
 2. Consider also, that the customs of the same nations 
 in diUferent ages, the customs of different nations in the 
 same age, and the customs of different towns and villages 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 173 
 
 in the same natiorij are very various and contrary to each 
 olher. The fashionable learning, language, sentiments, 
 and rules of politeness, differ greatly in different countries 
 and ages of mankind 5 but tiuth and reason are of a more 
 uniform and steady nature, and do not change with the 
 fashion. Upon this account, to cure the prepossessions 
 which arise from custom, it is of excellent use to travel 
 and seethe customs of various countries, and to Kcad the 
 travels of other men, and the history of past ages, that ev- 
 ery thing may not seem strange and uncouth whicii is not 
 practised within the limits of our parish, or in the narrow 
 space of our own life-time. 
 
 3. Consider yet again, how often we ourselves have 
 changed our opinions concerning the decency, propriety, 
 or congruity of several modes or practises in the world, 
 especially if we have lived to the age of thirty or forty. 
 Custom or fashion, even in all its changes^ has been read^** 
 to have some degree of ascendency over our understand- 
 ings, and what at one time seemed decent, appears obso- 
 lete and disagreeable afterward, when the fashion chan- 
 ges. Let us learn therefore to abstract as much as possi- 
 ble from custom and fashion, when we would pass a judg- 
 ment concerning the real value & intrinsic nature of things. 
 
 III. The authority of men is the spring of another 
 rank of prejudices. ^ 
 
 Among these, the authority of our forefathers and an- 
 cient authors is most remarkable. We pay deference to 
 the opinion of others merely because they lived a thous- 
 and years before us ; and even the trifles and impertinen- 
 ces that have a mark af antiquity upon them are reveren- 
 ced for this reason, because they came from the ancients* 
 
 It is granted that the ancients had many wise and great 
 men among them, and some af their writings, which time 
 hath delivered down to us, are truly valuable : But those 
 writers lived rather in the infant state of the world 3 and 
 the philosophers, as well as the polite authors of our age, 
 are properly the elders who have seen the mistakes of the 
 younger ages of mankind, and corrected them by obser- 
 vation and experience. 
 
 Some borrow all their religion from the fathers of the 
 Christian church, or from their synods or councils; but 
 P2 
 
174 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. 11. 
 
 lie that will read Monsieur Daille on the use of the fathers, 
 will find many reasons why they are by no means fit to 
 dictate our faith, since we have the gospel of Christ, and 
 the writings of the apostles and prophets in our hands. 
 
 Some persons believe every thing that their kindred, 
 their parents and their tutors believe. The veneration 
 and the love which they have for their ancestors, incline 
 them to swallow down all their opinions at once, without 
 examining what truth or falsehood there is in them. Men 
 make up their principles by inheritance, and defend them 
 as they would their estates, because they are born heirs to 
 them. I freely grant, that parents are appointed by God 
 and nature to teach us all the sentiments and practice of 
 our younger years ; and happy are those whose parents 
 lead them into the paths of wisdom and truth ! I grant far- 
 ther, that when persons come to years of discretion, and 
 judge for themselves, they ought to examine the opinions 
 of their parents with the greatest modesty, and with an 
 humble deference to their superior character ; they ought 
 in matters perfectly dubious to give the preference to 
 their parents' advice, and always to pay them the first 
 respect, nor ever depart from their opinions and practice, 
 till reason and conscience make it necessary. But, after 
 all, it is possible tliat parents may be mistaken, and there- 
 fore reason and scripture ought^obe our final rules of de- 
 termination in matters that relate to this world and that 
 which is to come. 
 
 Sometimes a favorite author, or a writer of great name, 
 drags a thousand followers afler him into his own mistakes, 
 merely by the authority of his name and cliaracter. The 
 sentiments of Aristotle were imbibed and maintained by 
 all the schools in Europe for several centuries; and a ci- 
 tation from his writings was thought a sufficient proof of 
 any proposition. The great Descartes had also too many 
 implicit believers in the last age, though he himself, in 
 his philosophy, disclaims all such iniiuence over the minds 
 of his readers, Calvin and Luther, in the days of re- 
 formation from Popery, were learned and pioijs men; 
 and there have been a succession of their disciples, ev- 
 en to this day, who pay loo much reverence to the words 
 oi their masters. There are others wlio renounce theu: 
 
Chap, Iir, RIGHT USE OF REASON. 175 
 
 authority, but give themselves up, in too servile a manner, 
 to the opinion and authority of other masters, and follow 
 as bad or worse guides in religion. 
 
 If only learned, and wise, and good men had influence 
 on the sentiments of others, it would be at least a more ex- 
 cusable sort of prejudice, and there would be some colour 
 of shadow and reason for it: But that riches, honours, and 
 outward splendour, should set up persons for dictators to 
 all the rest of mankind ; this is a most shameful invasion of 
 the right of our understanding on the one hand, and as 
 shameful a slavery of the soul on the other. The poor man^ 
 or the labourer, too often believes such a principle in poli^ 
 tics, or in morahty, and judges concerning the rights of 
 the king and the peoplejust as his wealthy neighbour does. 
 Half the parish follows the opinion of the esquire; and the 
 tenants of a manor fall into the sentiments of their lord, 
 especially if he lives among them. How unreasonable, 
 and yet how common is this ! 
 
 As for the principles of religion^ we frequently find how 
 they are taken up and forsaken, changed and resumed by 
 the influence of princes. In all nations, the priests have 
 much power also in dictating the religion of the people, 
 but the princes dictate to them : And, where there is a gre^t 
 pomp and grandeur attending the priesthood in any religion 
 whatsoever, with so much the more reverence and stronger 
 faith do the people believe whatever they teach them: 
 Yet it is too evident, that riches and dominions, and high 
 titles, in church or state, have no manner of pretence to 
 truth and certainty, wisdom and goodness, above the rest 
 of mortals, because the superiorities in this world are not 
 always conferred according to merit. 
 
 I confess, where a man of wisdom and years, of obser- 
 vation and experience, gives us his opinion and advice in 
 matters of the civil or moral lile ; reason tells us we should 
 pay a great attention to him, and it is probable he may be 
 in the right. Where a man of long exercise in piety speaks 
 of practical religion, there is due deference to be paid to 
 his sentiments : And the same we may say concerning an 
 ingenious man, long versed in any art or science, he may 
 justly expect du^ regard wh^n he speaks of his own affaires, 
 
176 LOGIx^ : OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 and proper business. But^ in other things, each of these 
 may be ignorant enough, notwithstanding ali their piety 
 and years^ and particular skill ; Nor even in their own 
 proper province are they to be believed in every thing, 
 without reserve and without examination. 
 
 To free ourselves from these prejudices^ it is sufficient 
 to remember, that there is no rank or character among 
 mankind, which has any such pretence to sway the judg- 
 ments of other men by their authority ; For there have 
 been persons of the same rank and character who have 
 maintained different and contrary sentiments; but all 
 these can never be true, and therefore the mere name or 
 reputation that any of them possess is not a sufficient ev- 
 idence of truth. 
 
 Shall we believe the ancients in philosophy ? But some 
 of the ancients were Stoics, some Peripatetics, some Pla- 
 tonics, and some Epicureans, some Cynics, and some 
 Sceptics. Shall we judge of matters of the Christian faith 
 by the fathers, or primitive writers for three or four hun- 
 dred years after Christ ? But they often contradicted one 
 another, and themselves too 5 and, what is worse, they 
 sometimes contradicted the scripture itself. Now, among 
 all these different and contrary sentiments in philosophy 
 and religion, which of the ancients must we believe, for 
 we cannot believe them all ? 
 
 Again, To believe in all things as our predecessors did, 
 is the ready way to keep mankind in an everlasting state 
 of infancy, and to lay an eternal bar against all the im- 
 provements of our reason and our happiness. Had the 
 present age of philosophers, satisfied themselves with the 
 substantial forms and occult qualities of Aristotle, with the 
 solid spheres, eccentrics, and epicycles of Ptolemy, and 
 the ancient astronomers ; then the great Lord Bacon, Co- 
 pernicus, and Descartes, with the greater Sir Isaac New- 
 town, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Boyle, had risen in our world 
 in vain> We must have blundered en still, in successive 
 generations amon^jj absurdities and thick darkness, and a 
 hundred useful inventions for the happiness of human life 
 had rever been known. 
 
 Thus it is in the matters of philosophy and science. — 
 But, you will say, shall not our own ancestors determine 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 177 
 
 our judgment in matters of civil or religious concernment ? 
 If they must, then the child of a Heathen must beheve 
 that Heathenism is truth ; the son of a Papist must assent 
 to all the absurdities of Popery ; the posterity of the Jews 
 and Socinians must forever be Soeinians and Jews; and a 
 man whose father was of Republican principles, must 
 make a succession of Republicans in his family to the end 
 of the world. If we ought always to believe whatsoever 
 our parents; our priesis or our princes believe, the inhab- 
 itants of China ought to worship their own idols, and the 
 savages of Africa ought to believe all the nonsense, and 
 practise the idolatry of their Negro fathers and kings. 
 The British nation, when it was Heathen, could never have 
 become Christian; and, when it was a slave to Rome, it 
 could never have been reformed. 
 
 Besides, let us consider, that the great God, our common 
 Maker, has never given one man's understanding a legal 
 and rightful sovereignty to determine truths for others, at 
 least after they are past the state of childhood or minority. 
 
 No single person, how learned and J^e, and great so- 
 evei, or whatsoever natural, or civil, or ecclesiastical^ re- 
 lations he may have to us, can claiin this dominion over 
 our faith. St. Paul the apostle, in his private capacity, 
 would not do it ; nor hath an inspired man any such au- 
 thority, until he makes divine commissions appear. Our 
 Saviour himself tells the Jews, that if he had not done such 
 monstrous v/orks among them, they had not sinned in dis- 
 beheving his doctrines, and refusing him for the Messiah. 
 No bishop or presbyter, nor synod or council, no church 
 or assembly of men, since the days of inspiration, hath 
 power derived to them from God to make creeds or arti- 
 cles of faith for us, and impose them upon our under- 
 standings. We must all act according to the best of our 
 hght and the judgment of our own consciences, using the 
 best advantages which providence hath given us, with an 
 honest and impartial diligence to inquire and search out 
 the truth : For every one of us must give an account of 
 himself to God. To believe as the church, or the court 
 believes, is but a sorry and a dangerous faith : This prin- 
 ciple would make more Heathens than Christians, and 
 
178 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II. 
 
 more Papists than Protestants 5 and perhaps lead more 
 souls to hell than to heaven 5 for our Saviour himself hath 
 plainly told us, that if the blind will be lead by the blind, 
 they must both fall into the ditch. 
 
 Though there be so much danger of error arising from 
 the three prejudices last mentioned, yetj before I dismiss 
 this head, I think it proper to take notice, that, as educa- 
 tion, custom, and authority, are no sure evidences of truth, 
 so neither are they certain marks of falsehood; for rea- 
 son and scripture may join to dictate the same things 
 which our i>arentS;, our nurses, our tutors, our friends, and 
 our country believe and profess. If there appears some- 
 times in our age a pride and petulancy in youth, zealous 
 to cast off the sentiments of their fathers, and teachers, on 
 purpose to shew that they carry none of the prejudices of 
 education and authority about them ; they indulge all 
 manner of licentious opinions and practices, from a vain 
 pretence of asserting their liberty. But alas ! This is but 
 changing one prejudice for another; and sometimes it 
 happens by this rijf ans, that they make a sacrifice both of 
 truth and virtue to the vile prejudices of their pride and 
 sensuality. 
 
 IV. There is another tribe of prejudices which are near 
 akin to tiiose of authorit}^, and that is, when we receive a 
 doctrine because of the manner in which it is proposed to 
 us by others. I have already mentioned the powerful in- 
 fluence that oratory and fine words have to insinuate a 
 false opinion ; and sometimes truth is refused, and suffers 
 contempt in the lips of a wise man, for want of the charms 
 of language : But there are several other manners of pro- 
 posal, whereby mistaken sentiments are powerfully con- 
 veyed into the mind. 
 
 Some persons are easily persuaded to believe what an- 
 other dictates with a positive air, and a great degree of as- 
 surance : They feel the overbearing force of a confident 
 dictator, especially if he be of a superior rank or character 
 to themselves. 
 
 Some are quickly convinced of the truth of any doc- 
 trine, when he that proposes it puts on all the airs of piety, 
 and makes solemn appeals to heaven, and protestations 
 of the truth of it : The pious mind of a weaker Christian 
 
Chap. IIL RIGHT USE OF REASON. "179 
 
 is ready to receive any thing that is pronounced with such 
 an awful solemnity. 
 
 It is a prejudice near akin to this, when an humble soul 
 is frightened into any particular sentiments of rehgion, be- 
 cause a man of great name or character pronounces here- 
 sy upon the contrary sentiments, cdsts the disbeliever out 
 of the church, and forbids him the gates of Iieaven. 
 
 Others are allured into particular opinions by gentler 
 practices on the understanding : Not only the soft tem- 
 pers of mankind^ but even hardy and rugged souls, are 
 sometimes led captives to error hy the soft air of address, 
 and the sweet and engaging methods of persuasion and 
 kindness. 
 
 J grant, w^here natural or revealed religion plainly dic- 
 tate to us the infinite and everlasting importance of any 
 sacred docirine, it cannot be improper to use any of these 
 ][wethods,' to persuade men to receive and obey the truth, 
 afier we have given sufficient reason and argument to con- 
 vince their uuderstandings. Yet all these methods, con- 
 sidered in themselves, have been often used to convey 
 falsehood into the soul as well as truth ; and if we build 
 our faith merely upon these foundatioKS, without*regard 
 to the evidence of truth, and the strength of argument, our 
 belief is but the effect of prejudice : For neither the posi- 
 tive, the awful or solemn, the terrible or the gentle meth- 
 ods of address carry any certain evidence with them that 
 truth lies on that side. 
 
 There is another manner of proposing our own opin- 
 ion or rather opposing the opinions of others, Avhich de- 
 mands a mention here, and that is when persons make a 
 jest serve instead of an argument ; when they refute what 
 they caii errour, by a turn of wit, and answer every ob- 
 jection against their own sentiments by casting a sneer up- 
 on the objector. These scoffers practise with success up- 
 on weak and cowardly spirits : Such as have not been well 
 established in religion or morality, have been laughed oiit 
 of the best principles by a confident buffoon : They have 
 yielded up their own opinions to a witty banterer, and sold 
 their faith and religion for a jest. 
 
 There is no way to cure these evils in such a degener- 
 ate world as we live in, but by learning to distinguish well 
 
180 LOGIC: OR, THE ^ Part. IL 
 
 between the substance of any doctrine, and the manner of 
 address, either in proposing, attacking, or defending it ; 
 and then by setting a just and severe guard of reason and 
 conscience over all the exercises of our judgment, resolv- 
 ing to yield to nothing but the convincing evidence of truth, 
 rehgiously obeying the light of reason, in matters of pure 
 reason, and the dictates of revelation in things that relate 
 to our faith. 
 
 Thus we have taken a brief survey of some of the infi- 
 nite varieties of prejudice that attend mankind on every 
 side of the present state, and the dangers of errour, or of 
 rash judgment, we are perpetually exposed to in this life : 
 This chapter shall conclude with one remark, and one 
 piece of advice. 
 
 The remark is this. The same opinon, whether false or 
 true, may be dictated by many prejudices a^ the same 
 time; for, as I hinted before, prejudice may happen to 
 dictate truth sometimes as well as errour. But, when two 
 or more prejudices oppose one another, as it often hap- 
 pens, the stronger prevails and gains the assent : Yet how 
 seldom does reason interpose with sufficient power to get 
 the ascendant of them all, as it ought to do ! 
 
 The advice follows, namely. Since we find such a swarm 
 of prejudices attending us both within and without 5 since 
 we feel the weakness of our reason, the frailty of our na- 
 tures, and our insufficiency to guard ourselves from errour 
 upon this account, it is not at all unbecoming the charac- 
 ter of a logician or a philosopher, together with the ad- 
 vice already given, to direct every person in his search af- 
 ter truth to make his daily addresses to heaverc, and im- 
 plore the God of truth to lead him into all truth, and to 
 ask wisdom of him who giveth liberally to them that ask 
 it, and upbraideth us nofwith our follies. 
 
 Such a devout practice will be an excellent preparative 
 for the best improvement of all tbe directions and rules 
 proposed in the two following chapters. 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 181 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 GENERAL DIRECTIONS TO ASSIST US IN JUDG- 
 ING ARIGHT. 
 
 THE chief design of the art of logic is to assist us in 
 forming a true judgment of things 5 a few proper observa-* 
 lions for this end have b«en dropt occasionally in some of 
 the foregoing chapters : Yet it is necessary to mention them 
 again in this place, that we may have a more complete and 
 simultaneous view of the general directions, which are ne- 
 cessary in order to judge aright. A multitude of advices 
 may be framed for this purpose ; the chief of them may^ 
 for order sake, be reduced to the following heads. 
 
 Direction I. " When we consider ourselves as philoso- 
 phers, or searchers after truth, we should examine all our 
 old opinions afresh, and inquire what was the ground of 
 them, and whether our assent was built on just evidence 5 
 and then we should cast off all those judgments which 
 were formed heretofore without due examination." A man 
 in pursuit of knowledge should throw off all those preju- 
 dices which he had imbibed in times past, and guard against 
 all the springs of errour mentioned in the preceding chap- 
 ter, with the utmost watchfulness, for time to come. 
 
 Observe here, That this rule of casting away all our fol:- 
 mer prejudicale opinions and sentiments is not proposed to 
 any of us to be practised at once, considered as men of bu- 
 siness or religion, as friends or neighbors, as fathers or sons, 
 as magistrates, subjects, or christians ; but merely as phi- 
 losophers and searchers after truth : And though it may 
 be well presumed that many of our judgments, both true 
 and false, together with the practices built thereon in the 
 natural, the civil, and the religious life, were formed with- 
 out sufficient evidence ; yet an universal rejection of all 
 these might destroy at once our present sense and prac- 
 tice of duty with regard to God, ourselves, and our fellow- 
 creatures. Mankind would be hereby thrown into such a 
 Q 
 
182 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 State of doubting and indifference, that it would be too long 
 ere they recovered any principles of virtue or religion by 
 a train of reasonings. 
 
 Besides, the common affairs of human life often demand 
 a much speedier determination, and we must many times 
 act upon present probabilities : The bulk of mankind have 
 not time and leisure, and advantage sufficient to begin all 
 their knowledge anew, and to build up every single opin- 
 ion and practice afresh, upon the justest grounds of evi- 
 dence. 
 
 Yet let it be observed also, that so far as any person is 
 capable of forming and correcting his notions, and his 
 rules of conduct in the natural, civil, and religious life, 
 by the strict rules of logic 5 and so far as he hath time and 
 capacity to review his old opinions, to re-examine all those 
 which are any ways doubtful, and to determine nothing 
 ivithout just evidence, he is likely to become so much the 
 wiser and the happier man : and, if divine grace assist him, 
 so much the better Christian. And though this cannot be 
 done all at once, yet it may be done by prudent steps and 
 degrees, till our whole set of opinions and principles be in 
 time corrected and reformed, or at least established upon 
 juster foundations. 
 
 Direction II. " Endeavour that all your ideas of those 
 objects, concerning which you pass any judgment, be clear 
 and distinct, complete, comprehensive, extensive, and or- 
 derly, as far as you have occasion to judge concerning 
 them.^' This is the substance of the last chapter of the 
 first part of logic. The rules which direct our conceptions 
 must be reviewed, if we would form our judgments aright. 
 But if we will make haste to judge at all adventures, while 
 our ideas are dark and confused, and very imperfect, we 
 shall be in danger of running into many mistakes. This 
 is like a person who would pretend to give the sum total of 
 a large account in arithmetic, without surveying all the 
 particulars 5 or as a painter, who professes to draw a fair 
 and distinct landscape in the twilight, when he can hardly 
 distinguish a house from a tree. 
 
 Observe here, That this direction does not require us 
 to gain clear, distinct, complete ideas of things in all their 
 purts, powers^ and qualities, in an absolute senses for this 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 183 
 
 belongs to God alone, and is impossible for us to attain : 
 But it is expressed in a relative or limited sense; that is, 
 our ideas should be clear, distinct, and con:prehensive, &c. 
 at least so far as we have occasion at that time to judge 
 concerning them. We may form many true and certain 
 judgments concerning God, angels, men, heaven, hell, &c. 
 by those partial and very imperfectcoaceptions of them to 
 which we have attained, if we judge no further concerning 
 them than our conceptions reach. 
 
 We may have a clear and distinct idea of the existence 
 of many things in nature, and affirm that they do exist, 
 though our ideas of their intimate essences and causes, 
 their relations and manners of action, are very confused 
 and obscure. We may judge well concerning several 
 properties of any being, though other properties are un- 
 known ; for perhaps we know not all the properties of any 
 being whatsoever. 
 
 Sometimes we have clear 'ideas of the absolute proper- 
 ties of an object 5 and we may judge of them with certain- 
 ty, while the relative properties are very obscure and un- 
 known to us. So we may have a clear and just idea of 
 the area of a parallelogram, without knowing what rela- 
 tion it bears to the area of a triangle, or a polygon : I may- 
 know the length of the diameter of a circle, without know- 
 ing what proportion it has to the circumference. 
 
 There are other things, whose external relative proper- 
 ties, with respect to each other, or whose relation to us 
 we know better than their own inward and absolute prop- 
 erties, or their essential distinguishing attributes. We 
 perceive clearly, that fire will warm or burn us, and will 
 evaporate water 5 and that w^ter will allay our thirst, or 
 quench the fire, though we know not the inward distin- 
 guishing particles, or prime essential properties of fire 01: 
 water, We may know the King, and Lord Chancellor, 
 and affirm many things of them in their legal characters, 
 though we can have but a confused idea of their persons 
 or natural features, if we have never seen their faces. So 
 the scripture has revealed God himself to us, as our Crea- 
 tor, Preserver, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, and as the ob- 
 ject of our worship, in clearer ideas than it has reveal- 
 ed many other abstruse questions which may be raised 
 
184 LOGIC: OR, TttE Part. 11; 
 
 about his divine essence or substance, his immensity or 
 omnipresence. 
 
 This therefore is the general observation in order to 
 guide our judgments, " That we should not allow ourselves 
 to form a judgment concerning things farther than our 
 clear and distinct ideas reach, and then Tvearenot in dan- 
 ger of errour." 
 
 But there is one considerable objection against this rule, 
 and which is necessary to be answered ^ and there is one- 
 just and reasonable exception, which is as needful to be 
 mentioned. 
 
 The objection is this: May we not judge safely con- 
 cerning some total or complete ideas, when we have a 
 clear perception only of some parts or properties of them ? 
 May we not affirm, that all that is in God is eternal, or 
 that all his unknown attributes are infinite, though we 
 have so very imperfect an idea of God, eternity, and infin- 
 ity ? Again, May we not safely judge of particular objects, 
 whose idea is obscure, by a clear idea of the general ? May 
 I not affirm. That every unknown species of animals has^ 
 inward springs of motion, because I have a clear idea that- 
 these inward springs belong to an animal in general ? 
 
 Answer. All those supposed unknown parts, properties, 
 orspecies, are clearly and distinctly perceived to be con- 
 nected with, or contained in the unknown parts, properties^. 
 or general ideas, which we suppose to be clear and distinct, 
 as far as we judge of them: And as we have no particular 
 idea of those unknown divine attributes, or unknown spe- 
 cies of animals 5 so there is nothing particular affil-med 
 concerning them beyond what belongs to the general idea 
 of divine attributes, or animals, with which I clearly and 
 distinctly perceive^em to be connected. 
 
 It may be illustrated in this manner. Suppose a long 
 chain lies before me, whose nearest links I see are iron 
 rings, and I see them fastened to a post near me, but the 
 most distant links lie beyond the reach of my sight, so that 
 I know not whether they are oval or round, brass or iron : 
 Now I may boldly affirm, the whole length of this chain is 
 fastened to the post, for I have a clear idea that the near- 
 est links are thus fastened, and a clear idea that the dis- 
 tinct links are connected with the nearest, if X can draw 
 the whol^ chain by onq link. 
 
Chap, IV- RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 18& 
 
 Or thus : If two known ideas, A and B, are evidently- 
 joined, or agree, and if C unknown be included in A, and 
 also D unknown be included in B, then I may affirm that 
 C and D are joined and agree : For I have a clear percep- 
 tion of the union of the two known ideas A and B ; and 
 also a clear perception of the connexion of the unknown 
 ideas with the known. So that clear and distinct ideas must 
 still abide as a general necessary qualification, in order to 
 form a right judgment: And indeed it is upon this foot that 
 all ratiocination is built, and the conclusions are thus form- 
 ed, which reduce things unknown from things known. 
 
 Yet it seems to m% that there is one just limitation or 
 exception to this general rule of judgment, as built on 
 clear and distinct ideas, and it is this. 
 
 Exception. In matter of mere testimony, whether hu« 
 man or divine, there is not always a necessity of clear and 
 distinct ideas of the things which are believed. Though 
 the evidence of propositions, which are entirely formed by 
 ourselves depends on the clearness And distinctness of those 
 ideas of which they are composed, and on our own clear 
 perception of their agreement or disagreement, yet we may 
 justly assent to propositions formed by others, when we 
 have neither a very clear conception In ourselves of the true 
 ideas contained in the words, aor how they agree or disa- 
 gree ; provided always, that we have a clear and sufficient 
 evidence of the credibility of the persons who inform us. 
 
 Thus when we read in scripture the great doctrines of 
 the deity of Christ, of the union of the divine and human 
 natures^ in him, of the divine agency of the blessed Spirit^ 
 that the Son is the brightness of the Father's glory, that 
 all things were created by him and for him, that the Son 
 shall give up the kingdom to the Father, and that God 
 shall be all in all 5 we may safely believe them : For, tho* 
 the ideas of these subjects themselves are )iot sufficiently 
 clear, distinct, and perfect, for our own minds to form 
 tliese judgments or propositions concerning them, yet we 
 Imve a clear and distinct perception of God^s revealing^ 
 them, or that they are contained in scripture : and this iy 
 sufficient evidence to determine our assent. 
 
 Q2 
 
186 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IL 
 
 The same thing holds true in some measure, where cred- 
 ible human testimony assures us of some propositions, 
 while we have no sufficient ideas of the subject and predi- 
 cate of them to determine our assent. So when an hon- 
 est and learned mathematician assures a plougiiman that 
 the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, 
 or that the square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled 
 triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides 5 
 the ploughman, who has but confused ideas of these things, 
 may firmly and easilj' believe these propositions, upon the 
 same ground because he has evidence of the skill and faith* 
 fulness of his informer.* • 
 
 * Perhaps some may object against this representation of things, 
 and say, that ** We cannot properly be said to believe a proposition 
 any further than we ourselves have ideas under the terms : Therefore^ 
 if v^^e have no ideas under the terms^ we believe nothing but the con- 
 nection of words or sounds ; and, if we have but obscure and inade- 
 quate ideas under the terms, then we partly believe a connection of 
 things, and partly a connection of sounds* But that we cannot pro- 
 perly be said to believe the proposition, for our faith can never go be- 
 yond our ideas." 
 
 Now^ to set this matter in a clear light^ I suppose that every prop- 
 osition which is proposed to my assent^ is a sentence made up of 
 terms which have some ideas under them known or unknown to me. 
 1 confess, if I believe there are no ideas at all under the terms, and , 
 ^here is nothing meant by them^ then indeed, with regard to me, it 
 2S the mere joining of sounds : But if, for instance, a ploughman has 
 credible information from an honest and skillful mathematician, that 
 un ellipsis is made by the section of a cone^ he believes the proposi- 
 tion, or he believes the sentence is IruCj as it is made up of terms . 
 which his informant understands, tlu)ugh the ideas be unknown to 
 him; that is^ he believes there are some ideas which his informant 
 has uader these words which are really connected. And, I think, 
 this may be called believing the proposition, for it is a belief of some- 
 thing more than the mere joining of sounds; it is a belief of the real 
 -onnection of some unknown ideas belonging to those sounds ; and 
 u this sense a man may be said to believe the truth of a proposition, 
 vhich he doth not understand at all. 
 
 With more reason still may we be said to believe a proposition 
 j.pon credible testimony, if v/e have some sort of ideas under th« 
 terms^ though they are but partial or inadequate and obscure ; such 
 ns Divine answers were given by Urim and Fhummim.- Forj since 
 !t is purely upon testimony we believe the known parts of the ideas* 
 i,ignifietl by those words to be connected, upon the same testimony 
 -ve may aho believe all the unknown parts of the ideas signified by; 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 187 
 
 Direction III. " When you have obtained as clear and 
 comprehensive ideas as needful, both of the subject 
 and predicate of a proposition, then compare those ideas 
 of the subject and predicate together with the utmost at- 
 tention, and observe how far they agree, and wherein they 
 difler.'^ Whether the proposition may be affirmed abso- 
 lutely or relatively, whether in whole or in part, whether 
 universally or particularlyj and then under what particu- 
 lar limitations. Turn these ideas about in your mind, 
 and take a view of them on all sides, just as a mason would 
 do to see whether two hewn stones exactly suit each other 
 
 those words to be connected, namely, because our informant is know- 
 ing and faithful. And in this sense we may justly be said to believe 
 a proposition of scripture entirely, which we understand but very 
 imperfectly, because God who reveals it is knowing and faithful in 
 perfection. 
 
 And indeed^ unless this representation of the matter be allowed, 
 there are but very few propositions in the world^ even in human 
 things, to which we give an entire assent, or which we may be said 
 either to know, or believe, because there is scarce any thing on earth 
 of which we have an ade(|uate, and most perfect idea. And it is 
 evident^ that in divine things there is scarce any thing which we 
 could either know or believe, without this allowance : For, though 
 reason and revelation join to inform me, that God is holy, how ex- 
 ceeding inadequate are my ideas of God, and of his holiness ? Yet I 
 may boldly and entirely assent to this whole proposition, since 1 am 
 sure that every known and unknown idea signified by the term God^ 
 is connected with the ideas of the term holiness, because reason part- 
 ly informs me, but especially because the divine testimony which 
 has connected them is certainly credible. 
 
 I might argue from this head perhaps more forcibly from the doc- 
 trine of God's incomprehensibleness* If we could believe nothing 
 but what wc have ideas of, it would be impossible for us to believe 
 that God is incomprehensible: For this implies in it a belief that 
 there are some unknown ideas belonging to the nature of God. — 
 Therefore we both believe and profess that something concerning 
 unknowif ideas, when we believe and profess that God is imprehen- 
 sible. 
 
 I persuade myself that most of those very persons who object a- 
 gainst my representation of things, will yet readily confess, ihey be- 
 lieve all the propositions in scripture, rather than to declare they do . 
 not believe several of them ; though they must acknowledge that sev- 
 eral of them are far above their understanding, or that they have 
 scarce any ideas of the true sense of them* And therefore, where 
 propositions derived from credibk testimony stre ma(J« up oi durk or 
 
188 LOGIC: OR, THE Pakt. IL 
 
 in every part, and are fit to be joined in erecting a carved 
 or fluted pillar. 
 
 Compare the whole subject with the whole predicate in 
 their several parts : Take heed in this matter that you 
 neither add to, nor diminish the ideas contained in the 
 subject or in the predicate ; for such an inadvertence or 
 mistake will expose yoa to great errour in judgment. 
 
 Direction IV. " Search for evidence of truth with dili- 
 gence and honesty, and be heartily ready to receive evi- 
 dence whether for the agreement or disagreement of 
 ideas.'* 
 
 Search with diligence; spare no labour in searching for 
 the truth, in due proportion to the importance of the pro- 
 position. Read the best authors who have writ on that 
 subject ; consult your wise and learned friends in conver* 
 sation ; and be not unwilliag to borrow hints toward your 
 
 inadequate ideas, I think it is much more proper to say we believe 
 them, than that we do not believe them, lest we cut off a multitude 
 of ihe propositions of the bible front our assent of faith. 
 
 Yet let it be observed here, that when we believe a proposition on 
 mere testimony, of which we have no ideas at all» we can only be 
 said to give a general implicit assent to the truth of that proposition, 
 without any particular knowledge of, or explicit assent to the special 
 truth contained in that proposition: And thus our implicit assent is 
 of very little use, unless it be to testify our belief of the knowledge 
 and veracity of hinn that informs us. 
 
 As our ideas of a proposition are more or less clear and adequate, as 
 well as just and proper, so we do explicitly assent more or less to the 
 particular truth contained in that proposition, And our assent here- 
 by becomes more or less useful for the increase o^ our knowledge, 
 or the direction, of our practice. 
 
 When divine testimony plainly proposes to our faith such a propo- 
 sition whereof we have but obscure, doubtful^ and inadequate ideas, 
 we are bound implicitly to believe the truth of it, as expressed in 
 those terms, in order to shew our subnnission to God who revealed it, 
 as a God of perfect knowledge and veracity: But it is our duty to 
 use all proper methods to obtain a farther and explicit knowledge of 
 the particular truth contained in the proposition, if we would im- 
 prove by it either in knowledge or virtue. All necessary rules of 
 grammar and criticism should be employed to find out the Very ideas 
 that belong to those words, and which were designed by the divine 
 speaker or writer. Though we may believe the truth of a proposi- 
 tion which we do not understand, yet we should endeavour iO under- 
 hand every propositiQawUigh we believe to be true* 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 189 
 
 improvement from the meanest person, nor to receive 
 any glimpse of light from the most unlearned. Diligence 
 and humility is the way to thrive in the riches of the 
 understanding, as well as in gold or silver. Search care- 
 fully for the evidence of truth, and dig for wisdom as for 
 hid treasure. 
 
 Search with a steady honesty of soul, and a sincere im* 
 partiality, to find the truth. Watch against every temp- 
 tation that might bribe your judgment, or warp it aside 
 from truth. Do not indulge yourself to wish any unex- 
 amined proposition were true or falsle. A wish often per- 
 verts the judgment, and tempts the mind strangely to be- 
 lieve upon slight evidence whatsoever we wish to be true 
 or false. 
 
 Direction V. "Since the evidence of the agreement or 
 cUsagreement of two ideas is the ground of our assent to 
 any proposition, or the great criterion of truth ; therefore 
 we should suspend our judgment, and neither affirm or de- 
 ny till this evidence appear.^^ 
 
 This direction is different from the second^ for, though 
 the evidence of the agreement or disagreement of two 
 ideas *most times depends on the clearness and distinct- 
 ness of the ideas themselves, yet it does not always arise 
 hence. Testimony may be sufficient evidence of the a- 
 greement or disagreement of two obscure ideas, as we have 
 seen just before in the exception under the second direc- 
 tion. Therefore, though we are not universally and in 
 all cases bound to suspend our judgment till our ideas of 
 the objects themselves are clear and distinct, yet we must 
 always suspend our judgment, and withhold our assent to, 
 or denial of any proposition, till some just evidence appear 
 of its truth or falsehood. It is an impatience of doubt and 
 suspense, a rashness and precipitance of judgment, and 
 hastiness to believe something on one side or the other, 
 that plunges us into many errours. 
 
 This direction to dela)'- and to suspend our assent is 
 more particularly necessary to be observed, when such 
 propositions offer themselves to us as are supported by 
 education, authority, custom, inclination, interest, or other 
 powerful prejudices: for our judgment is led away in- 
 i^ensibly to believe all that they dictate ; and, where pre- 
 
190 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 judices and dangers of errour are multiplied^ we should set 
 the strictest guard upon our assent. 
 
 Yet remember the caution or limitation liere whicTi I 
 gave under the first objection, namely, that this is not to 
 be too strictly applied lo, in matters of daily practice, ei- 
 ther in human life or religion; but when we consider our- 
 selves as philosophers, or searchers after truth, we should 
 always withhold our assent where there is not just evi- 
 dence : And, as far and as fast as we can, in a due consist- 
 ence with our daily necessary duties, we should also re- 
 form and adjust all our principles and practices, both in 
 rehgion and the civil life, by these rules. 
 
 Direction VI. " We must judge of every proposition 
 by those proper and pecuhar mediums or means, whereby 
 the evidence of it is to be obtained, whether it be sense, 
 consciousness, intelligence, reason or testimony. All our 
 faculties and po v/ers are to be employed in judging of their 
 proper objects. '^ 
 
 If we judge of sounds, colours, odours, sapors, the 
 smoothness, roughness, softness, or hardness of bodies, it 
 must be done by the use of our senses : But then we must 
 take heed that our senses are well disposed, as shall be 
 shevsn afterward. 
 
 And since our senses in their various exercises are i^ 
 some cases liable to be deceived, and more especially when 
 by our eyes or our ears we judge of the figure, quantity, 
 distance, and position of objects that are afar off, we ought 
 to call our reason in to the assistance of our senses, and 
 correct the errours of one sense by the help of another. 
 
 It is by the powers of sense and reason joined together, 
 that we must judge philosophically of the inward nature, 
 the secret properties and powers, the causes and effects, 
 the relations and proportions, of a thousand corporeal ob- 
 jects which surround us on earth, or are placed at a distance 
 in the heavens. If a man, on the one hand, confines 
 himself only to sensible experiments, and does not exor- 
 cise reason upon them, he may surprise himself and oth- 
 ers with strange appearances, and learn to entertain the 
 world with sights and shews, but never become a philoso- 
 pher; And, on the other hand, if a man imprisoned him- 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 191 
 
 self in his closet, and employ the most exquisite powers 
 of reason to find out the nature of things in the corporeal 
 world, without the use of his senses, and the practice of 
 experiments, he will frame to himself a scheme of chime- 
 ras, instead of true philosophy. Hence came the inven- 
 tion of substantial forms and qualities, of materia prima 
 3Xid privatio7i, with all the insignificant names used by the 
 Peripatetic writers ; and it was for want of more experi- 
 ments that the great Descartes failed in several parts of 
 his pliilosophical writings. 
 
 In the abstracted and speculative parts of the mathe- 
 matics, which treat of quantity and number, the faculty of 
 reason must be chiefly employed to perceive the relation 
 of various quantities, and draw certain and useful conclu- 
 sions ; but it wants the assistance of sense also to be ac- 
 quainted with lines, angles, and figures. And in practical 
 mathematics our senses have still greater employment. 
 
 If we would judge of the pure properties and actions of 
 the mind, of the nature of spirits, their various perceptions 
 and powers, we must not inquire of our eyes and our ears, 
 nor the images or shapes laid up in the brain, but we must 
 have recourse to our own consciousness of what passes 
 within our own mind. 
 
 If we are to pass a judgment upon any thing that ref- 
 lates to spirits in a state of union with animal nature, and 
 the mixt properties of sensation, fancy, appetite, passion, 
 pleasure and pain, which arise thence, we must consult 
 our own sensations, and the other powers which we find 
 in ourselves considered as men or creatures made up of a 
 mind and an animal, and by just reasonings deduce proper 
 consequences, and improve our knowledge in these sub- 
 jects. 
 
 If we have occasion to judge concerning matters done 
 in past ages, or in distant countries, and where we our- 
 selves cannot be present, the powers of sense and reason, 
 for the most part, are not sufficient to inform us, and we 
 must therefore have recourse to the testimony of others : 
 And this is either divine or human. 
 
 In matters of mere human prudence, we shall find the 
 greatest advantage by making wise observations on our 
 own conduct, and the conduct of others, and a survey of 
 
192 LOGIC : OR, THE Part H. 
 
 the events attending such conduct. Experience in this 
 case is equal to a natural sagacity^ or rather superior, A 
 treasureof observations and experiences, collected by wise 
 men, is of admirable service here. And perhaps there 
 is nothing in the world of this kind equal to the sacred 
 book of Proverbs, even if we look on it as a mere human 
 writing. 
 
 In questions of natural religion, we must exercise the 
 faculty of reason which God hath given us 5 and, since he 
 has been pleased to afford us his word, we should confirm 
 and improve, or correct our reasonings on this subject by 
 the divine assistance of the Bible. 
 
 In matters of revealed rehgion, that is, Christianity, Ju- 
 daism, &c. which we could nev^r have known by the light 
 of nature, the word of God is our only foundation and 
 chief hght; though here our reason must be used both to 
 iind out the true meaning of God in his word, and to de- 
 rive just inferences from what God has written, as well to 
 judge of the credentials vvhereby divine testimony is dis- 
 tinguished from mere human testimony or from impos- 
 ture. 
 
 As divine revelation can never contradict right reason^ 
 for tiiey are two great lights given us by our Creator for 
 our conduct, so reason ought by no means to assume to 
 itself a power to contradict divine revelation. 
 
 Though revelation be not contrary to reason, yet there 
 are four classes wherein matters of revelation may be said 
 to rise above, or go beyond our reason. 
 
 1. When revelation asserts two things X)f which we have 
 clear ideas, to be joined, whose connection or agreement 
 is not discoverable by reason ; as when scripture informs 
 us, that The dead shall rise, that The earth shall he burnt 
 np, and the Man Christ Jesus shall return from heaven^ 
 none of these things could ever be found out or proved by 
 reason. 
 
 2. When revelation affirms any proposition, while rea- 
 son has no clear and distinct ideas of the subject or of the 
 predicate ; as, God created all things by Jes7is Christ : By 
 the Urim and Tliummim God gave forth divine oracles. 
 Tlie predicate of each of these propositions is to us an ob- 
 scure idea, for we know not what was the peculiar agen- 
 
Chap, IV. RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 193 
 
 cy of Jesus Christ when God the Father created the world 
 by him ; nor have we any clear and certain conception 
 what the Urim and Thummim were, nor how God gave 
 answers to his people by them. 
 
 3. When revelation, in plain and express language, de- 
 clares some doctrine which our reason at present knows 
 with evidence and certainty, how or in what sense to re- 
 concile to some of its own principles ; as, that the child 
 Jesus is the mighty God, Isa. ix. 6, which proportion car- 
 ries a seeming opposition to the unity and spirituality of 
 the Godhead, which are principles of reason. 
 
 4. When two proposition]? or doctrines are plainly as- 
 serted by divine revelation, which our reason at present 
 knows not how or in what sense, with evidence and cer- 
 tainty, to reconcile with one another ; as. The Father is 
 the only true God^ John xvii. 3, and yet Christ is over all, 
 God blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 6. 
 
 Now divine revelation having declared all these propo- 
 sitions, reason is bound to receive them, because it can- 
 not prove them to be utterly inconsistent or impossible, 
 though the ideas of them may be obscure, though we our- 
 selves see not the rational connection of them, and though 
 we know not certainly how to reconcile them. In these 
 cases, reason must submit to faith ; that is, we are bound 
 to believe what God asserts, and wait till he shall clear up 
 that which seems dark and difficult, and till the mysteries 
 of faith shall be farther explained to us either in this world 
 or in the worfd to come,* and reason itself dictates this 
 submission. 
 
 Direction VII. " It is very useful to have some general 
 principles of truth settled in the mind, whose evidence is 
 great and obvious, that they may be always at hand to 
 assist us in judging of the great variety of things which 
 occur. These may be called first notions, or fundamen- 
 tal principles ; for, though many of them are deduced 
 from each other, yet most or all of them may be called 
 principles when compared with a thousand other judg- 
 ments which we form under the regulation and influence 
 of these primary propositions." 
 
 * See something more on this subject, Direction IL precediiij;^ 
 and chap, v, sec, o. 
 R 
 
194 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. U. 
 
 Every art and science, as well as the affairs of civil 
 life and religioHj have peculiar principles of tliis kind be- 
 longing to them. There are metaphysical, physical, ma- 
 them^atical, political, economical, medicinal, theological, 
 moral and prudential principles of judgment. It would 
 be too tedious to give a specimen of them all in this place. 
 Those which are of the most universal use to us, both as 
 men and as Christians, may be found in the following 
 chapter among the rules of judgment about particular ob- 
 jects. 
 
 Direction VIII. "Let the degrees of your assent to ev- 
 ery proposition bear an exact proportion to the different 
 degrees of evidence.^^ Remember this is one of the great- 
 est principles of wisdom that man can arrive at in this 
 ^vorld, and the best human security against dangerous mis- 
 takes in speculation or practice. 
 
 In the nature of things of which our knowledge is made 
 up, there is infinite variety in their degrees of evidence. 
 And, as God hath given our minds a power to suspend 
 their assent till the evidence be plain, so we have a power 
 to receive things which are proposed to us with a strong- 
 er or weaker belief, in infinite variety of degrees, propor- 
 tionable to their evidence, I believe that planets are in- 
 habited, and I beheve that the earth rolls among them 
 yearly round the sun ; but I do not believe both these 
 propositions with an equal firmnes-s of assent, because the 
 arguments for the latter are drawn from mathematical 
 observations ; but the arguments for the former are but 
 probable conjectures and moral reasonings. Yet neither 
 do I believe either of these propositions so firmly as I do 
 that the earth is about twenty four thousand miles round, 
 because the mathematical proof of this is much easier, 
 plainer and stronger. And yet farther, when I say that 
 the earth was created by the power of God, I have still a 
 more infallible assurance of this than of all the rest, be- 
 cause reason and scripture join to assure me of it. 
 
 Direction IX. '^ Keep j-our mind always open to re- 
 ceive truth, and never set limits to your own improvement. 
 Be ready always to hear what may be objected against 
 your favourite opinions, and those which have had longest 
 possession of your assent. Aad if there should be ^ny new 
 
Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 195 
 
 and uneontrolable evidence brought against these old or 
 l>eloved sentiments, do not wink your eyes fast against the 
 light, but part with any thing for the sake of truth : Re- 
 ilstober when you overcome an errour you gain truth , the 
 victory is on your side, and the advantage is all your own." 
 I confess those grand principles or belief and practice 
 which universally influence our conduct, both with regard 
 to this life and the life to come, should be supposed to be 
 well settled in the first years of our studies ; such as, the 
 existence and {Providence of God, the truth of Christiani- 
 t}^, the authority of scripture, the great rules of morality, 
 &c. We should avoid a light fluttering genius, ever ready 
 to change our foundations, and to be carried about with 
 every wind of doctrine. To guard against which incon- 
 venience, we should labour with earnest diligence and fer- 
 vent prayer, that our most fundamental and important 
 points of belief and practice may be established upon just 
 grounds of reason and scripture, when we come to years 
 of discretion, and fit to judge for ourselves in such impor- 
 tant points. Yet, since it is possible that the folly or pre- 
 judices of young^rr years may have established persons in 
 some mistaken sentiments, even in very important mat- 
 ters, we should always hold ourselves ready to receive any 
 new advantage toward the correction or improvement 
 evenjof our established principles, as well as opinions of 
 lesser moment. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SPECIAL RULES TO DIRECT US IN JUDGING OF 
 PARTICULAR OBJECTS. 
 
 IT would be endless to rnn through all those partic- 
 ular' objects concerning which we have occasion to pass a 
 ju|gment at one time or another. Things of the most 
 frequent occurrence, of the widest extent, and of the 
 
J% LOGIC: OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 greatest importance^, are the objects and exercises of sersse^ 
 of reason^ and speculation 5 the matters of morality, relig- 
 ion, and prudence, of human and divine testimony, to- 
 gether with the essays of reasoning upon things past ar^ 
 future. Special rules relating to all these will be the sub- 
 ject of the followinor sections. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 PKiNCIPLEB AND KULES OF JUDG3iENT CONCJEftNING THE OB- 
 JECTS OF SENSE. 
 
 THOUGH our senses are sometimes liable to be de- 
 eeived, yet when they are rightly disposed, and fitly exer- 
 cised about their proper objects, with the just assistance of 
 reason, they give us sufScient evidence of truth. 
 
 This may be proved by an argument drawn from tha 
 ^visdom, goodness, and faithfulness of God our Creator. 
 It was he gave us our senses and he would not make us of 
 such a constitution as to be liable to perpetual deception, 
 and unavoidable errour, in using these faculties of sense 
 in the best manner we are capable of, about those very 
 things which are the proper objects of them. 
 
 This may be proved also by tlie ill consequences that 
 would follow from the supposition of the contrary. If we 
 could have no certainty of the dictates of our senses, we 
 could never be sure of any of the common affairs and oc* 
 currences of life. Men could not transact any of their 
 civil or moral concerns with any certainty of justice; nor 
 indeed could we eat or drink, walk or move, with safety. 
 Our senses direct u3 in all these. 
 
 Again, the matters of religion depend in some measure 
 upon thecertainty of the dictates of sense; for faith comes 
 by hearing; and it is to our senses that God appeals in 
 working miracles to prove his own revelation. Now, if, 
 when our eyes and ears, and other organs of sense are 
 rightly disposed and exercised about their proper objects, 
 they were always liable to be deceived, there could be no 
 knowledge of the gospel, no proof of divine revelation by 
 visions, voices or miracles. 
 
Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 197 
 
 Our sense will discover things near us and round about 
 us, which are necessary for our present state, with suffi- 
 cient exactness 5 and things distant also, so far as they 
 relate to our necessary use of them. 
 
 Nor is there need of any more accurate rules for the use 
 of our senses, in the judgment of all the common affairs 
 of life, or even of miraculous and divine operations, than 
 the vulgar part of mankind are sufficiently acquainted witii 
 by nature, and by their own daily observations. 
 
 But if we would express these rules in a more exact 
 manner, how to judge by the dictates of our senses, ihey 
 should be represented thus ; 
 
 1, We must take care that the organs of our senses be 
 rightly disposed, and not under the power of any distem- 
 per or considerable decay; as, for instance, that our eyes 
 are not tinctured with the jaundice, when we could judge 
 of colours, lest we pronounce them all yellow : That 
 our hands are not burning in a fever, nor benimibed witli 
 frost or the palsy, when we would judge of the heat 01: 
 coldness of any object. That our palate be not vitiated 
 by any disease, or by some other improper taste, when we 
 would judge of the true taste of any solid or liquid. This 
 direction relates to all our senses ; but the following rules 
 chiefly refer to our sight, 
 
 2. We must observe whether the object be at a proper 
 distance; for, if it be too near or too far off, our eyes will 
 not sufficiently distinguish many things which are proper- 
 ly the objects of sight ; and therefore (if possible) we must 
 make nearer approaches to the object, or remove farther 
 from it, till we have obtained that due distance which gives 
 us the clearest perception. 
 
 3. We must not employ our sight to take a full survey 
 at once of objects that are too large for it ; but we must 
 view them by parts, and then judge of the whole: Nor 
 must our senses judge of objects too small, for some things 
 which appear through glasses to be really and distinctly 
 existent, are either utterly invisible, or greatly confused, 
 when we would judge of them by the naked eye. ' 
 
 4, We must place ourselves in such a position toward the 
 object, or place the object in such a position toward our 
 eve, as may give us the clearest representation of it ; for a 
 
 R2 
 
198 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. lie 
 
 different position greatly alters the appearance ofthe shape 
 of bodies. And for this reason we should change the po- 
 sition both of the eye and the object in some cases, that 
 by viewing the object in several appearances, we may pass 
 a more complete and certain judgment concerning it. 
 
 6. We must consider what the medium is by which ob- 
 jects are represented to our senses 5 whether it be thinner 
 or thicker 5 whether it be air or vapour, or water, or glass, 
 &c. whether it be duly enlightened or dusky, whether it 
 reflect or refract, or only transmit the appearance of the 
 object; and whether it be tinctured with any particular 
 colour : Whether it be moving or at rest. 
 
 6. We must sometimes use other helps to assist our sen- 
 ses ; and, if we make use of glasses, we must make all just 
 allowances for the thickness or thinness of them, for the 
 clearness or dulness, for the smoothness or roughness, for 
 the plainness, the convexity or concavity of them, and for 
 the distance at which these glasses are placed from the 
 eye, or from the object, (or from one another, if there be 
 two or more glasses used,) and all this according to the 
 rules of art. The same sort of caution should be used al- 
 so in mediums which assist the hearing, such as speaking 
 trumpets, hearing trumpets, &c. 
 
 7. If the object may be proposed to more senses than 
 jone, let us call ^n the substance of some other senses ta 
 examine it and this will increase the evidence of what one 
 sense dictates. For example. Our ear may assist our eye 
 in judging of the distance of bodies which are both visible 
 :and sonorous, as an exploded cannon, or a cloud charged 
 with thunder. Our feeling may assist our sight in judging 
 of the kind, the shape, situation, or distance of bodies that 
 jire near at hawd, as whether a garment be silk or stuff, 
 &c. So, if I both see, hear, and embrace my friend, I 
 am sure he is present. 
 
 8. We should also make several trials, at some distant 
 times, and in different circumstances, comparing former 
 experiments with latter, and our own observations with 
 those of other persons. 
 
 It is by such methods as these that modern philosophy 
 has been so greatly improved by the use of sensible ex* 
 periments. 
 
Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 199 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF REASON 
 
 AND SPECULATION. 
 
 IT is by reason we judge both in matters of speculation 
 and practice ; there are peculiar rules which relate to things 
 practical, whether they be matters of rehgion, morality, 
 or prudence, yet many things in this section ma}^ be ap- 
 plied to practical inquiries and matters of faith, though it 
 chiefly relates to knowledge, or speculations of reason. 
 
 1. Whatsoever clear ideas we can join together without 
 inconsistenc}^, are to be counted possible, because almighty 
 power can make whatsoever we can conceive. 
 
 2. From the mere possibility of a thing we cannot infer 
 its actual existence ; nor from the non-existence of it can 
 we infer its impossibihty. 
 
 Note — The idea of God seems to claim an exemption 
 from this general rule; for, if he be possible, he certainly 
 exists, because the very idea includes eternity 5 and he 
 cannot begin to be : If he exist not, he is impossible for the 
 very same reason. 
 
 3. Whatsoever is evidently contained in the idea of any 
 thing, may be affirmed of that thing with certainty. Rea- 
 son is contained in the idea of a man 5 and existence is 
 contained in the idea of God ; and therefore we may af- 
 firm God exists, and man is reasonable. 
 
 4. It is impossible that the same thing should be, and 
 not be at the same time, and in the samt respect. Thence 
 it follows that two contradictory ideas cannot be joined in 
 the same part of the same subject, at the same time, and 
 in the same respects : Or that two contradictory propo- 
 sitions can never be both true. 
 
 5. The more we converse with any subject in its various 
 properties, the better knowledge of it we are likely to at- 
 tain ; and by frequent and repeated inquiries and experi- 
 ments, reasonings and conversations about it, we confirm 
 our true judgments of that thing, and correct our former 
 mistake^. 
 
209 ^ LOGIC: OR, THE Part. IL 
 
 6. Yet, after our utmost inquiries, we can never be as- 
 sured by reason, that we know ail the powers and proper- 
 ties of any finite being. 
 
 7. If finite beings are not adequately known by us, much 
 less the things infinite: For it is of the nature of a finite 
 mind not to be able to comprehend what is infinite. 
 
 8. We may judge and argue very justly and certainly 
 concerning infinites, in some parts of them, or so far as 
 our ideas reach, though the infinity of them hath some- 
 thing incomprehensible in it. And this is built on the gen- 
 eral rule folio wing J namely, 
 
 9. Whatsoever is sufficiently clear and evident, ouglit 
 not to be denied, though there are other things belonging 
 to the same subject which cannot be comprehended • I 
 may affirm many things with certainty concerning human 
 souls, their union with bodies, concerning the divisibility 
 of matter, an:l the attributes of God, though many other 
 things relating to them are all darkness to us. 
 
 10. If any opinion proposed has either no arguments, or 
 equal arguments for and against it, we must remain in per- 
 fect suspense about it, till convincing evidence appear on 
 one side. 
 
 11. Where present necessity of action does not constrain 
 to determine, we should not immediately yield up our as- 
 sent to mere probable arguments, without due reserve, if 
 we have any reasonable hope of obtaining greater light and 
 evidence on one side or the other : for, when the balance 
 of the judgment once resigns its equilibrium or neutrality 
 to a mere probable argument, it is too ready to settle itself 
 on that side, so that the mind will not easily change that 
 judgment, though bright and strong evidence appear after- 
 wards on the other side. 
 
 12. Of two opinions, if one has unanswerable difficulties 
 attending it, we must not reject it immediatel}'^^, till we ex- 
 amine whether the contrary opinion has not difliculties as 
 unanswerable, 
 
 13. If each opinion has objections against it, which we 
 cannot answer, or reconcile, we should rather embrace 
 that which has the least difficulties in it, and which has the 
 best arguments to support it: And let our assent b^ar pro- 
 portion to the 3upenoi: evidenc^r 
 
Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 201 
 
 14. If any doctrine hath very strong and sufSdcient hght 
 nnd evidence to command our assent, we should not reject 
 it because there is an objection or two against it which we 
 ure not able to answer; for, upon this foot a common 
 Christian would be baffled out of every article of his faith, 
 and must renounce even the dictates of his reason and his 
 senses ; and tlie most learned man perhaps would hold 
 but very few of them fast: For some objections which at- 
 tend the sacred doctrine of the eternity and the omnipre- 
 sence of God, and tfie philosophical doctrines of light, 
 atoms, space, motion, &c. are hardly solvable to this day. 
 
 15. VViiere two extremes are proposed, either in matters 
 of speculation or practice, and neither of them has certain 
 and convincing evidence, it is generally safest to take the 
 middle way. Moderation is more likely to come near the 
 tiiith than doubtful extremes. This is an excellent rule to 
 judge of the characters and value of the greatest part of 
 persons and things ; for nature seldom deals in superlatives. 
 It is a good rule also by which to form our judgment in 
 many speculative controversies; a reconciling medium in 
 such cases does often best secure truth as well as peace. 
 
 16. When two different propositions have each a very 
 strong and cogent evidence, and do not plainly appear in- 
 consistent, we may believe both of them, though we can- 
 not at present see the way to reconcile them. Reason, as 
 well as our own consciousness, assure us, that the will of 
 men is free, and that the multitudes of human actions are 
 in that respect contingent; and yet reason and scripture 
 assure us, that God foreknows them all; and thisimpHes a 
 certain fatality. Now, though learned men have not to 
 this day hit on any so clear and happy method as is de- 
 sired to reconcile these propositions, yet since we do not 
 see a plain inconsistency in them, we justly believe them 
 both, because their evidence is great. 
 
 17. Let us not therefore too suddenly determine in diffi- 
 cult matters, that two things are utterly inconsistent : For 
 there are many propositions which may appear incon- 
 sistent at first, and yet afterwards we find their consisten- 
 cy, and the way of reconciling them may be made plain 
 and easy; as also, there are other propositions which 
 
202 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. IL 
 
 may appear consistent at first, but after due examination, 
 Ave find their inconsistency. 
 
 18. For the same reason, we 'should not call those dif- 
 ficulties utterly insolvable, or those objections unanswera- 
 ble which we are not presently able to answer: Time and 
 -diligence may give farther light. 
 
 19. In short, if Ave will secure ourselves from error, we 
 should not be too frequent or hasty in asserting the certain 
 consistency or inconsistency, the absolute universality, ne- 
 cessity, or impossibility of things, where there is not the 
 brightest evidence. He is but a ^'^oung and raw philoso- 
 pher, who, when he sees two particular ideas evidently a- 
 gree, immediately asserts them to agree universally, to a- 
 gree necessarily, and that it is impossible it should be oth- 
 erwise. Or when he sees evidently that two particular 
 ideas happen to disagree, he presently asserts their con- 
 stant and natural inconsistency, their utter impossibility of 
 agreement, and calls every thing contrary to his opinion 
 absurdity and non-sense. A true philosopher will affirm or 
 deny with much caution and modest}', unless he has thor- 
 oughly examined and found the evidence of every part of 
 his assertion exceeding plain. 
 
 20. Let us have a care of builJing our assurance of any 
 important point of doctrine upon one single argument if 
 there are more to be obtained. W§ should not slight and 
 reject all other arguments which support the same doctrine, 
 lest if our favorite argument should be refuted, and fail n^, 
 we should be tempted to abandon that important principle 
 of truth. I think this was a very culpable practice in Des- 
 cartes, and some of his followers, who, when he had found 
 out the argument for the existence of God, derived from the 
 idea of a most perfect and self-existent being, he seemed to 
 despise and abandon all other arguments against Atheism. 
 
 21. If we happen to have our chief arguments for any 
 opinion refuted, we should not immediately give up the 
 opinion itself; for perhaps it may be a truth still, and we 
 may find it to be justly supported by other arguments, 
 which we might once think weaker, or perhaps by new ar- 
 guments which we knew not before. 
 
 22. We ought to esteem that to be sufficient evidence 
 of a proposition, where both the kind and the force of the 
 
Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 203 
 
 arguments or proofs are as great as the nature of the 
 thing admits, and as the necessity or exigence of the case 
 requires. So, if we have a credible and certain testimony 
 that Christ rose from the dead, it is enough ; we are not to 
 expect mathematical or occular demonstration for it 5 at 
 least in our day. 
 
 23. Though we should seek what proofs may be attain- 
 ed of any proposition, and we should receive any number 
 of arguments which are just and evident for the confirma- 
 tion of the same truth, yet we must not jud^e of the truth 
 of any proposition by the nunber of arguments which 
 are brought to support^it, buv by the strength and -weight 
 of them : A building will stand firmer and longer on four 
 large pillars of marble, than on ten of sand, or earth, or 
 timber. 
 
 24. Yet where certain evidence is not to be found or ex- 
 pected, a considerable number of probable arguments car- 
 ry great weight with them even in matters of speculation. 
 That is a probable hypothesis in philosophy or in theolo- 
 gy, which goes farthest toward the solution of many diffi- 
 .cult questions arising on any subject. 
 
 SECT. IIL 
 
 t»RlNClPLES AND RULES OF JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF MORAL- 
 ITY AND RELIGION. 
 
 HERE it may be proper, in the first place, to mention 
 a few definitions of words or terms. 
 
 By matters of morality and religion, I mean tliose things 
 which relate to our duty to God, ourselves, or our fellow- 
 creatures. 
 
 Moral good, or virtue, or holiness, is an action or tem- 
 tempcr conformable to the rule of our duty. Moral evil, 
 or vice, or sin, is an action or temper wnconformable to 
 the rule of our duty, or a neglect to fulfil it. 
 
 Note — The words vice or virtue, chiefly imply the re- 
 lation of our actions to men and this world. Sin and ho- 
 
204 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IL 
 
 liness, rather imply their relation to God and the other 
 world. 
 
 Natural good is that which gives us pleasure or satisfac- 
 tion. Natural evil is that which gives us pain or grief. 
 
 Happiness consists in the attainment of the highest and 
 most lasting natural good. Misery consists in suffering the 
 highest and most lasting natural evil ; that is in short, 
 heaven or hell. 
 
 Though this be a just account of perfect happiness and 
 perfect misery, y^t wheresoever pain overbalances pleas- 
 ure, there is a degree of misery ; and wheresover pleasure 
 overbalances pain, there is a degree of happiness. 
 
 I proceed now to lay down some principles and rules of 
 judgment in matters of moralit3' and religion. 
 
 1. The will of our Maker, whether discovered by reason 
 or revelation, carries the highest authority with it, and is 
 thereiore the highest rule of duty to intelligent creatures; 
 a conformity t)r non-conformity to it determines their ac- 
 tions to be morally good or evil. 
 
 2. Whatsoever is really an immediate duty toward our- 
 selves, or toward our fellow-creatures, is more remotely a 
 duty to God i and therefore in the practice of it we should 
 have an eye to the will of God as our ruk. and to his 
 glory as our end. 
 
 8. Our wise and gracious Creator has closely united our 
 duty and our happiness together; and has connected sin, 
 or vice, and punishment; that is, he has ordained that the 
 highest natural good and evil, should have a close connec- 
 tion with moral good and evil, and that both in the nature 
 of things, and by his own positive appointment. 
 
 4. Conscience should seek all due information, in order 
 to determine what is duty, and what is sin, because happi- 
 ness and misery depend upon it. 
 
 6. On this account our inchnation to present temporal 
 good, and our aversion to present temporal evil, must be 
 wisely overbalanced by the consideration of future and 
 eternal good or evil, that is, happiness or misery. And 
 for this reason we should not omit a duty, or commit a sin, 
 to gain any temporal good, or to avoid any temporal evil. 
 
 6. Though our natural reason in a state of innocence 
 might be sufficient to find out those duties which were 
 
Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 205 
 
 necessary for an innocent creature, in order to abide in the 
 favour of his maker, yet in a fallen state, our natural rea- 
 son is by no means sufficient to find out all that is necessa- 
 ry to restore a sinful creature to the divine favour. 
 
 7. Therefore God hath condescended in various ages of 
 mankind, to reveal to sinful men what he requires of them 
 in order to their restoration, and has appointed in his word 
 some pecuhar matters of faith and practice, in order to 
 their salvation. This is called revealed religion, as the 
 things knowable concerning God and our duty by the light 
 of nature, are called natural religion. 
 
 8. There are also many parts of morality and natural 
 religion, or many natural duties relating to God, to our- 
 selves, and to our neighbours, which would be exceeding 
 difficult and tedious for the bulk of mankind to find out and 
 determine by natural reason ; therefore it has pleased God, 
 in his sacred book of divine revelation, to express the 
 most necessary duties of this kind in a very plain and easy 
 manner, and make them intelligible to souls of the lowest 
 capacity ; or they may be very easily derived thence by 
 the use of reason. 
 
 9. As there are some duties much more necessary, and 
 more important than others are, so every duty requires 
 our application to understand and practise it in proportion 
 to its necessity and importance. 
 
 10. Where two duties seem to stand in opposition to 
 each other, and we cannot practise both, the less must give 
 way to the greater, and the omission of the less is not sin- 
 ful. So ceremonial laws give way to moral: God will 
 have mercy and not sacrifice. 
 
 11. In duties of natural religion, we may judge of the 
 different degrees of their necessity and importance by rea- 
 son, according to their greater or more apparent tendency 
 to the honor of God, and the good of men : But in matters 
 of revealed religion, it is only divine revelation can cer- 
 tainly inform us what is most necessary and important ; 
 yet we may be assisted also in that search by the exercises 
 of reason. 
 
 12. In actions wherein there may be some scruple about 
 the duty or lawfulness of them, we should choose always 
 
206 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 the safest side, and abstain as far as we can from the prscc- 
 tice 01 things whose lawfulness we suspect. 
 
 13. Points of the greatest importance in human life, or 
 in religion, are generally the most evident, both in the na- 
 ture of things, and in the word of God; and, wJiere points 
 of faith or practice are exceeding difficult to find out, they 
 cannot be exceeding important. This proposition may be 
 proved by the goodness and faithfulness of God, as well as 
 by experience and observation. 
 
 14. In some of the outward practices and forms of reli- 
 gion, as well as hunaan affairs, there is frequently a present 
 necessity of speedy action one way or another : In such a 
 case, having surveyed arguments on both sides, as far as 
 our time and circumstances admit, we must guide our 
 practice by those reasons which appear most probable, 
 and seem at that time to overbalance the rest ; yet always 
 reserving room to admit farther light and evidence, when 
 such occurrences return again. It is a preponderation of 
 circumstantial argument that must determine our actions 
 in a thousand occurrences. 
 
 15. We may also determine upon probable arguments 
 where the matter is of small consequence, and would not 
 answer the trouble of seeking after certainty. Life and 
 time are more precious than to have a large share of thorn 
 laid out in scrupulous inquiries, whether smoking tobacco, 
 or wearing a periwig be lawful or not. 
 
 16. In affairs of greater importance, and which may 
 have a long, lasting, and extensive influence on our future 
 conduct or happiness, we should not take up with proba- 
 bilities, if certainty may be attained. Where there is any 
 doubt on the mind in such cases, we should call in the as- 
 sistance of all manner of circumstances, reasons, motives, 
 consequences on all sides : We must wait longer, and with 
 earnest request seek human and divine advice before we 
 fully determine our judgment and our practice, according 
 to the old Roman sentence, Quod statuendum est semely de- 
 liberandum est did; We should belong in considering what 
 we must determine once for all/' 
 
Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 207 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OP HUMAN 
 
 PRUDENCE. ^ 
 
 THE great design of prudence, as distinct from morality 
 and religion, is to determine aitd manage ever}^ aflair with 
 decency, and to the best advantage. 
 
 Thai is decent which is agreeable to our state, condi* 
 tion, or circumstances, whether it be in behaviour, dis- 
 course, or action. 
 
 That is advantageous which attains the most and best 
 purposes, and avoids the most and greatest inconveniences. 
 
 As there is infinite variety in the circumstances of per- 
 sons, things, actions, times and places, so we must be fur- 
 nished with such genera] rules as are accommodable to all 
 this variety by a wise judgmerit and discretion: For what 
 is an act of consummate prudence in^some times, places, 
 and circumstances, v/ould be consummate folly in otiiers. 
 Now these rules may be ranged in the following manner. 
 
 1. Our regard to persons or tilings should be governed 
 by the degrees of concernment we have with them, the re- 
 lation we have to them, or the expectation we have from 
 them. These should be the measures by which we should 
 proportion our diligence and application in any thing that 
 relates to them. 
 
 2. We should always consider whether the thing we pur- 
 sue be attainable; whether it be worthy our pursuit; 
 whether it be worthy of the degree of pursuit ; whether it 
 be worthy of the means used in order to attain it. Vhis 
 rule is necessary both in matters of knowledge, and mat- 
 ters of practice. 
 
 3. When the advantages and disadvantages, convenien- 
 ces and inconveniences of any action are balanced togeth- 
 er, we must finally determine on tliat side which has the su- 
 perior weight; and the sooner in things which are neces- 
 sarily and speedily to be done or determined. 
 
 4. If advantages and disadvantages in their own nature 
 are equal, then those which are most certain or likely as to 
 the event should turn the scale of our judgment and deter- 
 mine our practice. 
 
^,08 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 5. Where the improbabilities of success or advantage are 
 greater than the probabiHties, it is not prudent to act or 
 venture^ if the action may be atten^pd with danger or loss 
 equal to the proposed gain. It is proper to inquire whether 
 this be not the case in almost all lotteries ; for they that 
 hold stakes will certainly secure part to themselves ; and 
 only the remainder being divided into prizes must render 
 the improbability of gain to each adventurer greater than 
 the probability. 
 
 6. We should not despise nor neglect any real advan- 
 tage, and abandon the pursuit of it, though we cannot at- 
 tain all the advantages that we desire. This would be to 
 act like children, who are fond of something which strikes^ 
 their fancy most, and sullen and regardless of every thing 
 else, if they are not humoured in that fancy. 
 
 7. Though a general knowledge of things be useful in 
 science and human life, yet we should content ourselves 
 with a more superficial knowledge of those things which 
 liave the least relation to our chief end and design. 
 
 8. This rule holds good also in matters of business and 
 practice, as well as in matters of knowledge ; and therefore 
 we should not grasp at every thing, lest in the end we at- 
 tain notbing. Persons that, either by an inconstancy of 
 temper, or by a vain ambition, will pursue every sort of art 
 and science, study and business, seldom grow excellent in 
 anyone of them i And projectors who form twenty schemes 
 seldom use sufficient application to finish one of them, or 
 make it turn to good account. 
 
 0. Take heed of delaying aftd trifling amongst the means 
 instead of reaching at the end. Take heed of wasting a 
 life in mere speculative studies, which is called to action 
 and employment : Dwell not too long in philosophical, 
 mathematical, or grammatical parts of learning, when 
 your chief design is law, physic, or divinity. Do not spend 
 the day in gathering flowers by the way-side, lest night 
 come upon you before you arrive at your journey ^s end, 
 and then you will not reach it. 
 
 10. Where the case and circumstances of wise and good 
 men resemble our own case and circumstances, we may 
 borrow a great deal of instruction toward our prudent con- 
 
Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 209 
 
 duct from their example 5 as well as in all cases we may 
 learn much from their conversation and advice. 
 
 11. After all other rules remember this, that mere spec- 
 ulation in matters of human prudence, can never be a per- 
 fect director, without experience and observation. We 
 may be content therefore in our younger years to commit 
 some unavoidable mistakes in point of prudence, and we 
 shall see mistakes enough in the conduct of others, both 
 which ought to be treasured up amongst our useful obser- 
 vations, in order to teach us better judgment in time to 
 come. Sometimes the mistakes, imprudencies, and foiiies, 
 which ourselves or others have been guilty of, give us 
 brighter and more effectual lessons of prudence, than the 
 wisest counsels and the fairest examples could ever have 
 dpne, 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OP HUMAN 
 
 TESTIMONY. 
 
 THE evidence of human testimony is not so proper to 
 lead us into the knowledge of the essence and inward na- 
 ture of things, as to acquaint us with the existence of 
 things, and to inform us of matters of fact both past and 
 present. And though there be a great deal of fallibility 
 in the testimony of men, yet there are some things we 
 may be almost as certain of as that the sun shines, or that 
 five twenties make an hundred. Who is there at Londoa 
 that knows any thing of the world, but believes there is 
 such a city as Paris in France ; that the Pope dwells at 
 Rome 5 that Julius Caesar was an emperor, or that LuUiei: 
 had a great hand in the reformation. 
 
 If we observe the following rules, we may arrive at sucli 
 a certainty in many things^^ of human testimony, as that it 
 is morally impossible we should be deceived, that is, we 
 may obtain a moral certainty. 
 
 1. Let us consider whether the thing reported be in 
 itself possible ^ if not, can never be credible, whosoever 
 relates it. 
 
 S2 
 
210 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 2. Consider farther whether it be possiblej ^Iiether 
 there are any concurring circumstances to prove it, beside 
 the mere testimony of the person that relates it» I con- 
 fess, if these last conditions are wantingj the thing may be 
 true, but then it ought to have the stronger testimony to 
 support it. 
 
 S. Consider whether the person that relates it be capa- 
 ble of knowing the truth: Whether he be a skillful judge 
 in such matters; if it be a business of art, or a nice appear- 
 ance in nature, or some carious experiment in philosophy. 
 But if it be a mere occurrence in life, a plain, sensible mat* 
 ter of fact, it is enough to inquire whether he who relates 
 it were an eye or ear-witness, or whether he himself had 
 it only by hearsay^ or can trace it up to the original. 
 
 4. Consider whether the narrator be honest and faithful, 
 as well as skillful : Whether he has no bias upon his mind, 
 no peculiar gain or profit by believing or reporting it, no 
 interest or principle which might warp his own belief aside 
 from truth ; or which might tempt him to prevaricate, to 
 speak falsely, or to give a representation a little different 
 from the naked truth of things. In short, whether there 
 be no occasion of suspicion concerning his report. 
 
 5. Consider whether several persons agree together in 
 the report of this matter ^ and if so, then whether those 
 persons who joined together in their testimony might not 
 be supposed to combine together in falsehood. Whether 
 they are persons of sufficient skill, probity and credit. It 
 might be also inquired, whether they are of different na- 
 tions, sects, parties, opinions, or interests. For the more 
 divided ihey are in all these, the more likely is their re- 
 port to be true, if they agree togetiier in their account of 
 the same thing ; and especially if they persist in it without 
 iivavering. 
 
 6. Consider farther, whether the report were capable 
 of being easily refuted at first if it had not been true j if 
 sOy this confirms the testimony. 
 
 7. Inquire yet again, whether there has been a con- 
 stant, uniform tradition and belief of this matter, from the 
 very first age or time wJien the thing was transacted, with- 
 out any reasonable doubts or contradictions. Or^ 
 
Chap, V, RIGHT USE OF REASOxV. 211 
 
 8. If any part of it hath been doubted by any consider- 
 able persons^ whether it has been searched out and after- 
 wards confirmed, by having all the scruples and doubts re- 
 moved. In either of these cases the testimony becomes 
 more firm and credible. 
 
 9. Inquire on the other hand, whether there are any 
 considerable objections remaining against the belief of that 
 proposition so attested. Whether there be any thing very 
 improbable in the thing itself. Whether any concurrent 
 circumstances seem to oppose it. Whether any person 
 or persons give a positive and plain testimony against it. 
 Whether they are equally skillful and equally faithful as 
 those who assert it. Whether there be as many or more 
 in number, and whether they might have any secret bias 
 or influence on them to contradict it. 
 
 10. Sometimes the entire silence of a thing may have 
 something of weight toward the decision of a doubtful 
 point of history, or a matter of human faith, namely, 
 where the fact is pretended to be public, if the persons who 
 were silent about it were skillful to observe, and could not 
 but know such an occurrence 5 if they were engaged by 
 principles or by interest to have declared it : And these 
 things may tend to make a matter suspicious, if it be not 
 very well attested by positive proof. 
 
 lis Remember that in some reports there ai'e more 
 marks of falsehood than of truth, and in others there are 
 more marks of truth than of falsehood. By a comparison 
 of all these things together, and putting every argument 
 on one side and the others into the balance, w^ must form 
 as good a judgment as we can which side preponderates ; 
 and give a strong or feeble assent or dissent, or withhold 
 our judgment entirely, according to greater or lesser evi- 
 dence, according to mpre plain or dubious marks of truth 
 or falsehood. 
 
 12. Observe that in matters of human testimony there 
 is oftentimes a great mixture of truth an'd falsehood in the 
 report itself: Some parts of the story may be peifectly 
 true, and some utterly false 5 and some may have such a 
 blended confusion of circumstances which are a little wrapt 
 a^ide from the truth, and nai^represented, that there i$ 
 
112 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. II. 
 
 need of good skill and accuracy to form a judgment con- 
 cerning them, and determine which part is true, and which 
 is false. The whole report is not to he believed, because 
 some parts are indubitably true, nor is the whole to be re^ 
 jected, because some parts are as evident falsehoods. 
 
 We may dravv two remarkable observations from this 
 section. 
 
 Observ, I. How certain is the truth of the christian re^ 
 ligion, and particularly of the resurrection of Christ, which 
 is a matter of fact on which Christianity is built I We 
 have almost all the concurrent evidences that can be de- 
 rived from human testimony joining to confirm this glori- 
 ous truth. The fact is not impossible ; concurrent cir- 
 cumstances cast a favourable aspect on it 3 it was foretold 
 by one who wrought miracles, and therefore not unlikely, 
 nor unexpected : The apostles and first disciples were eye 
 and ear-witnesses, for they conversed with their risen 
 Lord 5 they were the most plain, honest men in them- 
 selves 'y the temptations of wordly interest did rather dis- 
 courage their belief and report of it : They all agree in 
 this matter, though they were men of different characters: 
 Pharisees and fishermen^ and 'publicans^ men of Judea and 
 Galileey and perhaps some heathens^ who were early con- 
 verted : The thing might easily have been disproved if it 
 were false ; it hath been conveyed by constant tradition 
 and writing down to our times j those who at first doubt- 
 ed, were afterwards convinced by certain proofs j nor 
 have any pretended to give any prjjof of the contrary, 
 but merely denied the fact with impudence, in opposition 
 to all these evidences. 
 
 Observ. Ih How weak is the faith which is due to a 
 multitude of things in ancient human history \ For, though 
 many of these criteria^ or marks of credibility, are found 
 plainly in the more general and public facts, yet as to 
 multitude of particular facts and circumstances, how defi- 
 cient are they in such evidence as should demand our as- 
 sent : Perhaps there is nothing that ever was done in all 
 past ages, and which was not a pabhc fact, so well attest- 
 ed as the resurrection of Christ* 
 
Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF RfiASQN. 213 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 PRINCIPLES AND RULES OP JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OP DIVINE 
 
 TESTIMONY. 
 
 AS human testimony acquaints us with matters of fact^ 
 both j^ast and present, which he beyond the reach of our 
 personal notice ; so divine testimony is suited to inform 
 us both of the nature of things, as well as matters of fact, 
 and of things future, as well as present or past. 
 
 Whatsoever is dictated to us by God himself, or by men 
 who are divinely inspired, must be believed with full as- 
 surance. Reason demands us to believe whatsoever di- 
 vine revelation dictates 5 For God is perfectly wise, and 
 cannot be deceived ; he is faithful and good, and will not 
 deceive his creatures : And when reason has found out the 
 certain marks or credentials of divine testimony to belong 
 to any proposition, their remains then no farther inquiry 
 to be made, but only to find out the true sense and mean- 
 ing of that which God has revealed, for reason itself de- 
 mands the belief of it. 
 
 Now divine testimony or revelation requires these fol- 
 lowing credentials* 
 
 1. That the propositions or doctrines revealed be not 
 inconsistent with reason ; for intelligent c-reatures can 
 never be bound to believe real inconsistencies. Therefore, 
 w^e are sure the popish doctrine ©f transubstantiation is 
 not a matter of divine revelation, because it is contrary to 
 all our senses and our reason, even in their proper exercises* 
 
 God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of himself, 
 and agreeable to his own nature and divine perfections. 
 Now many of these perfections are discoverable by the 
 light of reason, and whatsoever is inconsistent with these 
 perfections cannot be a divine revelation. 
 
 But let it be noted, that in matters of practice towards 
 our fellow-creatures, God may command us to act in a 
 manner contrary to what reason would direct antecedent 
 to that command. So Abraham was commanded to ofler 
 up his son a sacrifice : The Israelites were ordered to 
 borrow of the Egyptians without spaying them, and to 
 
214 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. II* 
 
 plunder and slay the inhabitants of Canaan : Because God 
 has a sovereign right to all things, and can with equity 
 disposses his creatures of life, and every thing which he 
 has given them, and especially Such sinful creatures as 
 mankind ; and he can appoint whom he pleases to be the 
 instruments of this just dispossession or deprivation. So 
 that these divine commands are not really inconsistent 
 with right reason ; for whatsoever is so cannot be believ- 
 ed, where that inconsistency appears. 
 
 2. Upon the same account, the whole doctrine of reve- 
 lation must be consistent with itself; every part of it must 
 be consistent with each other : And though in points of 
 practice latter revelation may repeal or cancel former laws, 
 yet in matters of belief no latter revelation can be incon- 
 sistent with what has been heretofore revealed. 
 
 3. Divine revelation must be confirmed by some divine 
 and supernatural appearances, some extraordinary signs 
 or tokens, visions, voices, or miracles, wrought^ or pro- 
 phecies fulfilled. There must be some demonstrations of 
 the presence and power of God, superiour to all the powers 
 of nature, or the settled connections which God as Creator 
 has established among his creatures in this visible world. 
 
 4. If there are any such extraordinary and wonderful 
 appearances and operations brought to contest with, or to 
 oppose divine revelation, there must and alwa}^s will be 
 such a superiority on the side of that revelation which is 
 truly divine, as to manifest that God is there. This was 
 the case when the Egyptian sorcerer contended with Mo- 
 ses. But the wonders which Moses wrought did so far 
 transcend the powers of the magicians, as made them con- 
 fess it was the finger of God. 
 
 5. These divine appearances or attestations to revela- 
 tion must be either known to ourselves, by our own per- 
 sonal observation of tKem, or they must be sufiiciently at- 
 tested by others, according to the principles and rules by 
 which matters of human faith are to be judged in the fore- 
 going section. 
 
 Some of those, who lived in the nations and ages where 
 miracles were wrought, were eye and ear witnesses of the 
 truth and divinity of the revelation ; but we who live in 
 these distant ages^ must have them derived down to us 
 
Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 215 
 
 by just and incontestible history and tradition. We also, 
 even in these limes, may see the accomplishment of some 
 ancient predictions, and thereby obtain that advantage to- 
 ward tlie confirmation of our faith in divine revelation ^ 
 beyond what those persons enjoyed who lived -when the 
 predictions were pronounced. 
 
 6. There is another very considerable confirmation of 
 divine testimony ; and that is when the doctrines them- 
 selves, either on the publication or the belief of them, pro- 
 duce supernatural effects. Such were the miraculous pow- 
 ers Avhich were communicated to believers in the first ages 
 of Christianity, the conversion of the Jews or Gentiles, 
 the amazing success of the gospel of Christ, without hu- 
 man aid, and in opposition to a thousand impediments ; 
 its power in changing the hearts and lives of ignorant and 
 vicious heathens, and wicked and profane creatures in all 
 nations, and filHng them with a spirit of virtue, piety and 
 goodness^ Wheresoever persons have found this effect in 
 their own hearts, wrought by a belief of the gospel of 
 Christ they have a witness in themselves of the truth of it, 
 and abundant reason to believe it divine. 
 
 Of the difference between reason and revelation, and in 
 what sense the latter is superior, see more in Chapter II, 
 sec. 9. and Chap. IV. direct, 6» 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 PRINCIPLES AMD RULES OF JUDGING CONCERNING THINGS PAST, 
 PRESENT, AND TO COME, BY THE iMERE USE OF BBASON. 
 
 THOUGH we attain the greatest assurance of things 
 past and future by divine faith, and learn many matters 
 of fact, both past and present by human faith, yet reason 
 also may in a good degree assist us to judge of matters of 
 fact both past, present, and to come, by the following 
 principles. 
 
 1. There is a system of beings round about us, of which 
 we ourselves are a part, which we call the world, and in 
 this world there is a course of nature, or a settled order 
 
216 LOGIC: OR, THE Part II. 
 
 of causes, effects, antecedents, concomitants, consequences, 
 &:c. from which the author of nature doth not vary but 
 upoH very important occasions. 
 
 2. Where aotecedents, concomitants, and consequents, 
 causes and effects, signs and things signified, subjects and 
 adjuncts, are necessarily connected with each other, we 
 may infer the causes from the effects, and effects from 
 causes, the antecedents from the consequents, as well as 
 consequents from antecedents, &c. and thereby be pretty 
 certain of many things both past, present, and to come. 
 It is by this principle that astronomers can tell what day 
 and hour the sun and moon were eclipsed five hundred 
 years ago, and predict all future eclipses as long as the 
 world shall stand. They can tell precisely at what minute 
 the sun rises or sets at Fekin in China, or what altitude 
 the dog-star had at midnight or midnoon in Rome on the 
 day when Julias Csesar was slain. Gardeners upon the 
 same principle can foretell the months when every plant 
 will be in bloom, and the ploughman knows the weeks of 
 harvest : We are sure, if there be a chicken, there was an 
 egg : If there be a rainbow, we are certain it rains not far 
 off: If we behold a tree growing on the earth, we know it 
 has naturally a root under ground. 
 
 3. Where there is a necessary connection between caus- 
 es and effects, antecedents and consequents, signs and 
 things signified, we know also that like causes will have 
 like effects, and proportionable causes will have propor- 
 tionable effects, contrary causes will have contrary effects ; 
 and observing men may form many judgments by the rwles 
 of similitude and proportion, where the causes, efiects,&:c, 
 are not entirely the same. 
 
 4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain connec- 
 tion between antecedents, concomitants and consequents, 
 we can give but a conjecture, or a probable determination. 
 If the clouds gather, or the weather glass sinks, we suppose 
 it will be rain. If a man spit blood frequently with cough- 
 ing, we suppose his lungs are hurt : If very dangerous 
 symptoms appear, y\e expect his death. 
 
 5. Where causes operate freely, with a liberty of indif- 
 ference to this or the contrary, there we cannot certainly 
 know what the effects will be : For it seems to be con- 
 
Ohap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 211 
 
 tingent, and the certain knowledge of it belongs only to 
 God. This is the case in the greatest part of human ac- 
 tions. 
 
 6. Yet wise men, by a just observation of human nature, 
 will give very probable conjectures in this matter, also con- 
 cerning things past, or things future, because human na- 
 ture in all ages and nations has such a conformity to itself. 
 By a knowledge of the tempers of men, and their present 
 circumstances, we may be able to give a happy guess what 
 their conduct will be, and what will be the event, by an 
 observation of the like cases in former times. This made 
 the Emperor Marcus Antonius to say, " By looking back 
 into history, and considering the fate and revolutions of 
 governments, you will be able to form a guess and almost 
 prophecy upon the future. For things past, present, and 
 to come, are strangely uniform, and of a colour ; and are 
 commonly cast in the same mould. So that upon the 
 matter, forty years of human life may serve for a sample 
 of ten thousands.^' Collier's Antonius, Book VII. sec. 50. 
 
 7. There are also some other principles of judging con- 
 cerning the past actions of men in former ages, besides 
 books, histories and traditions, which are the mediums 
 of conveying human testimony ; as we may infer the skill 
 and magnificence of the ancients by some fragments of their 
 statutes, and ruins of their buildings. We know what 
 Roman legions came into Great Britain by numbers of 
 bricks dug out of the earth in some parts of the island, 
 with the marks of some particular legion upon them, which 
 must have been employed there in brick-making. We 
 rectify some mistakes in history by statutes, coins, old al- 
 tars, utensils of war, &c. We confirm and disprove some 
 pretended traditions and historical writings, by medals, 
 images, pictures, urns, &c. 
 
 Thus I have gone through all those particular objects 
 of our judgment which I first proposed, and have laid 
 down principles and rules by which we may safely conduct 
 ourselves therein. There is a variety of other objects, 
 concerning which we are occasionally called to pass a 
 judgment, namely, the characters of persons, the value 
 and worth of things, the sense and meaning of particular 
 writers, matters of wit, oratory, poesv, matters of equity 
 T 
 
218 LOGIC, &c. Part. II. 
 
 in judicial courts, matters of traffic and commerce be- 
 tween man and man^ which would be endless to enumer- 
 ate. But if the general and special rules of judgment 
 which have been mentioned in these two last chapters are 
 treasured up in the mind, and wrought into the very tem- 
 per of our souls in our younger years, they will Jay a 
 foundation for just and regular judgment concerning a 
 thousand special occurrences in the religious, civil, and 
 learned life. 
 
THE 
 
 THIRD PART OF LOGIC. 
 
 OF REASONING ON SYLLOGISM. 
 
 AS the first work of the mind is perception, whereby 
 our ideas are formed, and the second is judgment, which 
 joins or disjoins our ideas and forms a proposition, so the 
 third operation of the mind is reasoning, which joins sev- 
 eral propositions together, and makes a syllogism, that is^ 
 an argument whereby we are wont to infer something that 
 is less known, from truths which are more evident. 
 
 In treating of this subject, let us consider more particu- 
 larly, 
 
 1. The nature of a syllogism, and the parts of which it is composed, 
 
 2. The several kinds of syllogisms, with particular rules relating to 
 them. 
 
 3. The doctrine of sophisms, or false reasoning, together with the 
 means of avoiding them, and the manner of solving or answering 
 them* 
 
 4. Some general rules to direct our reasoning. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF A SYLLOGISM, AND THE 
 PARTS OF WHICH IT IS COMPOSED. 
 
 IF the mere perception and comparison of two ideas 
 would always shew us whether they agree or disagree, 
 then all rational propositions would be matters of intelli- 
 gence, or first principles, and there would be no use ojf 
 
220 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. Ht 
 
 reasoning^ or drawing any consequences. It is the narrow- 
 ness of the human mind which introduces the necessity of 
 reasoning. When we are unable to judge of the truth or 
 lalsehood of a proposition in an immediate manner, by the 
 mere contemplation of its subject and predicate, we are 
 then constrained to use a medium, and to compare each of 
 them with some third idea, that by seeing how far they 
 agree or disagree with it, we may be able to judge how far 
 they agree or disagree among themselves : As, if there are 
 two lines, A and B, and 1 know not whether they are equal 
 or not, I take a third line C, or an inch, and apply it to 
 each of them : If it agree with them both, then I infer that 
 A and B, are equal : but if it agree with one, and not with 
 the other, then I conclude A and B are unequal : If it agree 
 with neither of them, there can be no comparison. 
 
 So if the question be whether God must be worshipped^ we 
 seek a third idea, suppose the idea of a Creator, and say, 
 
 Our Creator must he worshipped ; 
 
 God is our Creator ; 
 
 Therefore God must he worshipped. 
 
 The comparison of this third idea with the two distinct 
 pgyts of the question, usually requires two propositions, 
 which are called the premises : The third proposition which 
 is drawn from them is the conclusion, wherein the question 
 itself is answered, and the subject and predicate joined ei- 
 ther in the negative or the affirmative. 
 
 The foundation of all affirmative conclusions is laid in 
 this general truth, that as far as two proposed ideas agree 
 to any third idea, they agree also among themselves. The 
 character of Creator agrees to God, and worship agrees 
 to a Creator, therefore worship agrees to God. 
 
 The foundation of all negative conclusions is this, that 
 where one of the two proposed ideas agrees with the third 
 idea, and the other disagrees with it, they must needs dis- 
 agree so far also with one another; as, if no sinners ar& 
 happy, and if angels are happy ^ then angels are not sinneris. 
 
 Thus it appears what is the strict and just notion of a 
 syllogism : It is a sentence or argument made up of three 
 propositions so disposed, as that the last is necessarily in- 
 ferred from those which go before, as in the instances 
 which have been just mentioned. 
 
Chap. I. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 221 
 
 In the constitution of a syllogism two things may be 
 considered, viz. the matter and form of it. 
 
 The matter of which a syllogism is made up, is three 
 propositions ; and these three propositions are made up 
 of three ideas or terms variously joined. 
 
 The three terms are called the remote matter of a syl* 
 logism ; and the three propositions the proxime or imme- 
 diate matter of it. 
 
 The three terms are named the major, the minor, and 
 the middle. 
 
 The predicate of the conclusion is called the major ierm^ 
 because it is generally of a larger extension than the mi- 
 nor term, or the subject. The major and minor terms 
 are called the extremes^ 
 
 The middle terra is the third idea invented, and dispos- 
 ed in two propositions, in such a manner as to shew the 
 connection between the major and minor term in the con- 
 clusion ; for which reason the middle term itself is some- 
 times called the argument. 
 
 That proposition which contains the predicate of the 
 conclusion connected with the middle term, is usually call- 
 ed the major propositian^ whereas the minor propositioti 
 connects the middle term with the subject of the conclu- 
 sion, and is sometimes called the assumption. 
 
 Note — This exact distinction of the several parts of a 
 syllogism, and of the major and minor terms connected 
 with the middle term in the major and minor propositions, 
 does chiefly belong to simple or categorical syllogisms, 
 of which we shall Sj^eak in the next chapter, though all 
 syllogisms whatever have something analogical to it. 
 
 Note farther, That the major proposition is generally 
 placed first, and the minor second, and the conclusion in 
 the last place, where the syllogism is regularly composed 
 and represented. 
 
 The form of a syllogism is the framing and disposing of 
 the premises according to art or just principles of reason- 
 ing, and the regular inference of the conclusion from 
 tliem. 
 
 The act of reasoning, or inferring one thing from anoth- 
 er, is generally expressed and known by the particle ther»- 
 forej when the argument is formed according to the rules 
 T2 
 
222 LOGIC : OR THE Part. III. 
 
 of art ; though, in common discourse or writing, such cam- 
 al particles as for^ because^ manifest the act of reasoning 
 as well as the illative particles then and therefore : And 
 wheresoever any of these words are used, there is a per- 
 fect syllogism expressed or implied, though perhaps the 
 three propositions do not appear, or are not placed in re- 
 gular form. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF SYLLOGISMS, WITH 
 PARTICULAR RULES RELATING TO THEM. 
 
 SYLLOGISMS are divided into various kinds, either 
 according to the question which is proved by them, accord- 
 ing to the nature and composition of them, or according-^ 
 to the middle term, which is used to prove the question^ 
 
 SECT, h 
 
 OF L'NIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR SYLLOGISMS, BOTH NEGATIVE 
 
 AND AFFIRiVlATIVE. 
 
 ACCORDING to the question which Is to be proved, so 
 syllogisms are divided into universal affirmative, universal 
 negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative. — 
 This is often called a division of syllogisms drawn from 
 the conclusion ^ for so many sorts of conclusions there 
 may be, which are marked with the letters, A, E, I, O. 
 
 In an universal affirmative syllogism, one idea is proved 
 universally to agree with another, and may be universally 
 affirmed of it, as, Every sin deserves deaths every unlawful 
 wish is sin ; therefore, every unlawful wish deserves death. 
 
 In an universal negative syllogism, one idea is proved 
 tp disagree viih i^Qtbcr idiea uiiiv^rsally) ^nd may b§ 
 
Chap, II- RIGHT USE OF REASON. 22S 
 
 thus denied of it : as, No injustice can be pleasing to God ; 
 all persecution for the sake of conscience is injustice; 
 therefore no persecution for conscience sake can be pleas- 
 ing to God, 
 
 Particular affirmative, and particular negative syllo- 
 gisms may be easily understood by what is said of univer- 
 sals, and there will be sufficient examples given of all these 
 in the next section. 
 
 The general principle upon which these universal and * 
 particular syllogisms are founded, is this, Whatsoever is 
 affirmed or denied universally of any idea, may be affirm- 
 ed or denied of all the particular kinds of beings which are 
 contained in the extension of that universal idea. So the 
 desert of death is affirmed universally of sin, and an un- 
 lawful wish is one particular kin(l of sin, therefore the de- 
 sert of death may be affirmed concerning an unlawful wish,. 
 And so of the rest. 
 
 Note. — In the doctrine of syllogisms, a singular and an 
 indefinite proposition are ranked among universals, as was,; 
 before observed in the doctrine of propositions. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 QP PLAIN, SIMPLE SYLLOGISMS, AND THEIR RULES. 
 
 THE next division of syllogisms is into single and conv 
 l^aund. This is drawn from the nature and composition 
 of them. 
 
 Single syllogisms are made up of three propositions: 
 Compound syllogisms contain more than three proposi- 
 tions, and may be formed into two or more S3^11ogisms. 
 
 Single syllogisms, for distinction's sake, may be divided 
 into simple,* complex, and conjunctive. 
 
 Those are properly calleci siniple oi: categorical syllo- 
 gisms, which are made up of three plain, single, or cate- 
 gorical propositions, wherein the middle term is evidently 
 
 *As ideas and proposition? are divided into single and compound, 
 and single are subdivided into simple and complex ; sa there jvre i)\Q- 
 same divisions ?vnd subdivisions applied to syllogismsi 
 
224 LOGIC : OR, THE Part, III. 
 
 and regularly joined with one part of the question in the 
 major proposition, and with the other in the minor, whence 
 there follows a plain single conclusion; as. Every human 
 virtue is to be sought with diligence; prudence is a human 
 virtue; therefore prudence is to be sought dihgently. 
 
 Note — Though the terms of propositions may be com- 
 plex ; yet where the composition of the whole argument 
 is thus plain, simple, and regular, it is properly called a 
 simple syllogism, since the complexion does not belong to 
 the syllogistic form of it. 
 
 Simple syllogisms have several rules belonging to them^ 
 which being observed, will generally secure us from false 
 inferences : But these rules being founded on four general 
 axioms, it is necessary to mention these axioms beforehand, 
 for the use of those who will enter into the speculative rea- 
 son of all these rules. 
 
 Axiom 1. Particular propositions are contained in uni- 
 versal, and may be inferred from them; but universals 
 are not contained in particulars, nor can be inferred from 
 them. 
 
 Axiom 2. In all universal propositions, the subject is 
 particular. 
 
 Axiom 3. In all affirmative propositions, the predicate 
 has no greater extension than the subject ; for its exten- 
 sion is restrained by the subject, and therefore it is always 
 to be esteemed as a particular idea. It is by mere acci- 
 dent, if it ever be taken universally, and cannot happen 
 but in such universal or singular propositions as are recip- 
 rocal* 
 
 Axiom 4. The predicate of a negative proposition is al- 
 ways taken universally, for in its whole extention it is de- 
 nied of the subject : If we say. No stone is vegetable, we 
 deny all sorts of vegetation concerning stones. 
 
 The rules of simple, regular Syllogisms are these. 
 
 Rule I. The middle term must not be taken twice par- 
 ticularly, but once at least universally. For if the middle 
 term be taken for two different parts or kinds of the same 
 universal idea, theu the subject of the conclugiou 13 coiupar- 
 
Chap. IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 22S 
 
 ed with one of these parts, and the predicate with another 
 part, and this will never shew whether that subject and 
 predicate agree or disagree : There will then be four dis- 
 tinct terms in the syllogism, and the two parts of the 
 question will not be compared with the same third idea ; 
 as if I say, Some men are pious, and some men are rob- 
 bers, 1 can never infer that some robbers are pious, for 
 the middle terra men being taken twice particularly, it is 
 not the same men who are spoken of in the major and mi- 
 nor propositions. 
 
 Rule II. The terms in the conclusion must never be tak- 
 en more universally than they are in the premises. The 
 reason is derived from the first axiom, that generals can 
 never be inferred frqm particulars. 
 
 Rule III. A negative conclusion cannot be proved by 
 two affirmative premises. For, when two terms of the con- 
 clusion are united or agree to the middle term, it does not 
 follow by no means that they disagree with one another. 
 
 Rule IV. If one of the premises be negative, tlte con- 
 clusion must be negative. For, if the middle term be de- 
 nied of either part of the conclusion, it may shew that tha 
 terms of the conclusion disagree^ but it can never shew 
 that they agree. 
 
 Rule V. If either of the premises be negative, the con- 
 clusion must be particular. This may be proved for the 
 most part from the first axiom. 
 
 These two last rules are sometimes united in this single 
 sentence. The conclusion always follows the weaker part 
 of the premises. Now negatives and particulars are 
 counted inferior to affirmative and universals. 
 
 Rule VI. From two negative premises nothing can be 
 concluded. For they separate the middle term both from 
 the subject and predicate of the conclusion ; and when two 
 ideas disagree to a third, we cannot infer that they either 
 agree or disagree with each other. 
 
 Yet where the negation is a part of the middle term, the 
 two premises may look like negatives according to the 
 words, but one of them is affirmative in sense: as, IHiat 
 has no thought cannot reason ; but a worm has no thought ; 
 therefore a worm cannot reason. The minor proposition 
 does really affirm the middle term concerning the subject? 
 
226 LOGIC : OR, THE Part HI. 
 
 namely, a worm has no thought^ and thus it is properly in 
 this syllogism an affirmative proposition. 
 
 Rule VII. From two particular premises, nothing can 
 be concluded. This rule depends chiefly on the first'axiom. 
 
 A more laborious and accurate proof of these rules, and 
 the derivation of every part of them in all possible cases, 
 from the foregoing axioms^ require so much time, and are 
 of so little importance to assist the right use of reason, that 
 it is needless to insist longer upon them here. See all this 
 done ingeniously in the Logic called the Art of Thinkings 
 Part IIL Chap. III. &c. 
 
 SECT. Ill 
 
 OP THE MODES AND FIGURES OP SIMPLE SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 SIMPLE syllogisms are adorned and surrounded in the 
 common books of logic with a variety of inventions about 
 moods and figures, wherein, by the artificial contexture of 
 the letters A, E, I, and O, men have endeavoured to trans- 
 form logic, or the art of reasoning, into a sort of mechan- 
 ism, and to teach boys to syllogise, or frame arguments 
 and refute them, without any real inward knowledge of 
 the question. This is almost in the same manner as 
 school-boys have been taught perhaps in their trifling 
 years to compose Latin verses, that is, by certain tables 
 and squares, with a variety of letters in them, wherein by 
 counting every sixth, seventh, or eighth letter, certain 
 Latin words should be framed in the form of hexameters or 
 pentameters; and this may be done by those who know 
 nothing of Latin or of verses. 
 
 I confess some of these logical subtilties have much 
 more use than those versifying tables, and there is much 
 ingenuity discovered in determining the precise number 
 of syllogisms that may be formed in every figure, and giv- 
 ing the reasons of them; yetthehght of nature, a good 
 judgment, and due consideration of things, tend more to 
 true reasoning, than all the trappings of moods and figures. 
 
ChjLp. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 227 
 
 But lest this book be charged with too great defects and 
 iinperfections^it may be proper to give short hints of that 
 which some logicians have spent so much time and paper 
 upon. 
 
 All the possible compositions of three of the letters, A^ 
 E, T, O, to make three propositions, amount to sixty-four ; 
 but fifty -four of them are excluded from forming true syl- 
 logisms by the the seven rules in the foregoing section : 
 The remaining ten are variously diversified by figures and 
 moods into fourteen syllogisms. 
 
 The figure of a syllogism is the proper disposition of the 
 middle term with the parts of the question. 
 
 A mood is the regular determination of propositions ac- 
 cording to their quantity and quality, that is, their univer- 
 sal or particular affirmation or negation : which are sig- 
 nified by certain artificial words wherein the consonants 
 are neglected, and these four vowels. A, E, I, 0, are only 
 regarded. 
 
 There are generally counted three figures. 
 
 In the first of them the middle term is the subject of the 
 major proposition, and the predicate of the minor. This 
 contains four moods, called Barbara^ Celarenty Darii^ Fe- 
 rio. And it is the excellency of this figure, that all sorts 
 of questions or conclusions may be proved by it, whether 
 A, E, I, or O, that is, universal or particular, affirmative 
 or negative ; as, 
 
 Bar- Every wicked man is truly miserable : 
 da- All tyrants ?».re wicked men ; - 
 ra. Therefore all tyrants are truly miserable. 
 Ce- He that is always in fear is not happy ; 
 lO" Covetous men are always in fear ; 
 rent. Therefore covetous men are not happy. 
 Da- Whatsoever furthers our salvation is good for us : 
 rz- Some afflictions further our salvation ; 
 i. Therefore some afflictions are good for us. 
 Fe- Nothing that must be repented of is truly desirable^ 
 rU Some pleasures must be repented of; 
 0. Therefore there are some pleasures which are not 
 truly desirable* 
 
228 <LOGIC: OR, THE Part. III. 
 
 In the second figure the middle t#rm is the predicate of 
 Jo#A the premises ; this contains four moods, namely, Ce- 
 sare^ Camesfresy Fesfino, BarocOy and it admits only of ne- 
 gative conclusions ; as, 
 
 Ce- No liar is fit to be believed ; 
 sa- Every good christian is fit to be believed ; 
 Te. Therefore no good Christian is a liar. 
 The reader may easily form examples of the rest. 
 The third figure requires that the middle term be the 
 subject of both the premises. It has six moods, namely, 
 Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison : 
 And it admits only of particular conclusions; as, 
 Da- Whosoever loves God shall be saved 4 
 rap- All the lovers of God have their imperfections: 
 ii. Therefore some who have imperfections shall be 
 
 saved. 
 I leave the reader to form examples of the rest. 
 The moods of these three figures are comprised in four 
 Latin verses. 
 
 Barbara, Celarent, Darii^Ferio^ quoque primse. 
 Cesare^ CamestreSy FestinOy Baroco^ secundae. 
 Tertia Darapii sibi vindicate nique Felapt(m. 
 Adjungens Disamis ^ Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison. 
 The special rules of the three figures are these. 
 In the first figure the major proposition must always be 
 universal and the minor affirmative. 
 
 In the second figure also the major must be trniversalj 
 and one of the premises, together with the conelnsion, 
 must be negative. 
 
 In the third figure the minor must be affirmative, and 
 the conclusion always particular. 
 
 There is also a fourth figure, wherein the middle term is 
 predicated in the major proposition, and subjected in the 
 minor: But this is a very indirect and obhque manner of 
 concluding, and is never used in the sciences, nor in hu- 
 man life, and t lerefore I call it useless. — Some logicians 
 will allow it to be nothing else but a mere inversion of the 
 first figure; the moods of it, namely Baralipton y or Bar ba- 
 riy Calentesy Dibatis, Fespamoy Fresisom^ are not worthy to 
 be explained by one example. 
 
€tiAp. II RIGHT USE OF REASON. 229 
 
 SECT. IV- 
 
 OF COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 . It is not the mere use of complex terms in a syllogism 
 that gives it this name, though one of the terms is us- 
 ually complex ^ but those are properly called complex syU 
 logismsy in which the middle term is not connected with 
 the whole subject, or the whole predicate rn two distinct 
 propositions, but is intermingled and compared with thehi 
 by parts, or in a more cofifused manner, in different 
 forms of speech 3 as. 
 
 The Sim is a senseless being '; 
 
 The Persians worshipped the tun ; 
 
 Therefore the Persians ivorshippeda stnseless being. 
 
 Here the predicate of the conclusion is, worshipped a 
 senseless being, part of which is joined with the middle 
 term sun in the major proposition, and the other part in 
 the minor. 
 
 Though this sort of argument is confessed to be entan- 
 gled or confused, and irregular, if examined by the rules 
 of simple syllogisms ) yet there are a great variety of ar- 
 guments used in books of learning, and in common life, 
 whose consequence is strong and evident, and which must 
 be ranked under this head 5 as, 
 
 I Exclusive propositions will form a complex argu- 
 ment ; as. Pious men are the only favorites of heaven ; True 
 Christians are favorites oj- heaven; Therefore ^n«e CA?7S- 
 iians are pious men. Or thus. Hypocrites are not pious men ; 
 Therefore hypocrites are not favorites of heaven. 
 
 IL Exceptive propositions will make such complex 
 syllogisms ; as^, None but physicians came to the consultation ; 
 The nurse is no physician 5 Therefore the nurse came not to 
 the consultation. 
 
 III. Or comparative propositions ; as. Knowledge is bet- 
 ter than riches ; virtue is better than knowledge ; therefore 
 virtue is better than riches. Or thus A dove will fly a mile 
 in a minute ; A swallow flies swifter than a dove ; There- 
 fore a swallow will fly more than a mile in a minute. 
 
 IV. Or inceptive and desistive propositions j a^, The 
 
 U 
 
^30 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 
 
 fogs vanish as the sun rises ; But the fogs have not yet &e- 
 gim to vanish $ Therefore the smi is not yet risen, 
 
 V. Or modal propositions ; as, It is necessary that a gen- 
 eral understand the art of war ^ But Caius does not mider» 
 stand ihe^art of war j Therefore it is necessary Caius should 
 Viot be a general. Or thus, A total eclipse of the swl would 
 cause darkness at noon ; It is possible that the moon at that 
 time may totally eclipse the sun; Therefore i7 is possible that 
 the moon may cause darkness at noon. 
 
 Besides all these there is a great number o( complex syl- 
 logisms which can hardly be reduced under any particu- 
 lar titles, because the f(Tms of human language are so ex- 
 ceeding various ; as, 
 
 Christianity requires us to believe what the apostles 
 wrote 5 St. Paul is an apostle; Therefore Christianity re- 
 quires us to believe what St. Paul wrote. 
 
 No human artist can make an animal ; A fly or a worm 
 is an animal; Therefore no human artist can make a fly 
 or a worm. 
 
 The father always lived in London ; The son always 
 lived with the father i Therefore the son always lived in 
 London, 
 
 The blossom soon follows the bud ; this pear tree hath ma- 
 ny full buds 5 Therefore it will shortly have many blossoms. 
 
 One hall stone never falls alone ; But a hailstone fell 
 just now ; Therefore others fell with it. 
 
 Thunder seldom comes without lightning; But it thun- 
 dered yesterday ; Therefore probably it lightened also. 
 
 Moses wrote before the Trojan war ; the fii^st Greek 
 historians wrote after the Trojan war 3 therefore the first 
 Greek historians wrote after Moses.* 
 
 Now the force of all these arguments is so evident and 
 conclusive, that though the form of the syllogism be nev- 
 er so irregular, yet we are sure the inferences are just and 
 true; for the premises, according to the reason of things, 
 do really contain the conclusion that is deduced from 
 
 ♦ Perhaps some of these s\llogisms may be reduced to those 
 which I call connective afterward; but it is of little moment to what 
 species they belong: For it is not any formal set of rules, so much 
 as the evidence and force of reason, that must determine the truth 
 or falsehood of all such syllogisms. 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 231 
 
 them, which is a never failing test of a true syllogism, as 
 shall be shewn hereafter. 
 
 The truth of most of these complex syllogisms may also 
 be made to appear, if needfulj by reducmg them either to 
 regular, simple syllogisms, or to some of the conjunctive 
 syllogisms which are described in the next section. 1 will 
 give an instance only in the first, and leave the rest to ex- 
 ercise the ingenuity of the reader. 
 
 The first argument may be reduced to a syllogism in 
 Barbara, thus : 
 
 Th& sun is a senseless being ; 
 
 What the Persians worshipped is the sun; 
 
 Therefore what the Persians worshippedis a senseleis heing* 
 
 Though the conclusive force of this argument is evident^ 
 ly without this reduction. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 OF CONJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 THOSE are called conjunctive syllogisms \yhere\n one of 
 the premises, namely, the major, has distinct parts, which 
 are joined by a conjunction, or some such particle of speech. 
 Most times the major or minor, or both, are explicitly com- 
 pound propositions 5 and generally the major proposition 
 is made up of two distinct parts or propositions, in such a 
 manner as that, by the assertion of one in the minor, the 
 other is either asserted or denied in the conclusion : Or, by 
 the denial of one in the minor, the other is either asserted 
 or denied in the conclusion. It is hardly possible indeed 
 to fit any short definition to include all the kinds of them; 
 but the chief amongst them are the conditional syllogism, 
 the disjunctive, the relative, and the connective. 
 
 I. The conditional, or hypothetical syllogism, is that 
 whose major or minor, or bolh, are conditional proposi- 
 tions ; as, If there be a God, the world is governed by 
 providence ; but there is a God ; therefore the world is 
 governed by providence. 
 
 These syllogisms admit two sorts of true argumentation, 
 where the major is conditionaL 
 
532 LOGIC: OR, THE Part. III. 
 
 1. When the antecedent is asserted in the minor, that 
 the consequent may be asserted in the conclusion 5 such is 
 the preceding example. This is called arguing from the 
 position of the antecedent to the position of the consequent. 
 
 2. When the consequent is contradicted in the minor 
 proposition, that the antecedent may be contradicted in 
 the conclusion ; as, If Atlieists are in the right, then the 
 world exists withaut a cause 5 but the world does not ex- 
 ist without a c^ui^e ; therefore Atheists are not in the right. 
 This is called arguing from the removing of the conse* 
 quent to the removing of the antecedent. 
 
 To remove the antecedent or consequent here, does not 
 merely signify the denial of it, but the contradiction of it 5 
 for the mere denial of it by a contrary proposition will not 
 make a true syllogism, as appears thus: If every creature 
 be reasonable, every brute is reasonable; but no brute is 
 reasonable 5 therefore no creature is reasonable. Where- 
 as if you say in the minor, but every brute is not reason- 
 able, then it would follow tinily in the conclusion, there- 
 fore every creature is not reasonable. 
 
 When the antecedent or consequent are .negative pro- 
 positions, they are removed by an afBrmative; as, If there 
 be no God, then the world does not discover creating wis- 
 dom : But the world does discover creating wisdom; there- 
 fore there is a God. In this instance the consequent is 
 removed or contradicted in the minor, that the antecedent 
 may be contradicted in the conclusion. So in this argu- 
 ment of St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. If the dead rise not, Christ 
 died in vain ; but Christ did not die in vain ; therefore 
 the dead shall rise. 
 
 There are also two sorts of false arguing, namely, (1.) 
 From the removing of the antecedent to the removing of 
 the consequent 5 (2.) or, From the position of the conse- 
 quent, to the position of the antecedent. Examples of 
 these are easily framed ; as, 
 
 (1.) If a minister were a prince he must be honoured f 
 but a minister is not a prince; therefore he must not be 
 honoured. 
 
 (2 ) If a minister were a prince he must be honoured ; 
 but a minister must be honoured ; therefore he is a prince. 
 
 Who sees not the ridiculous falsehood of both th^se syl- 
 logisms ? 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON- 23S 
 
 Observ. I. If the subject of the antecedent and the con- 
 sequent be the same, then the hypothetical syllogism may 
 be turned into a categorical one 5 as, If Csesar be a king 
 he must be honoured: But Csesar is a king; therefore, &c. 
 This may be changed thus, Every king must be honoured; 
 but Csesar is king , therefore, &c. 
 
 Observ, II. If the major proposition only be condition- 
 al, the conclusion is categorical ; But if the minor or both 
 be conditional, the conclusion is also conditional; as, The 
 worshippers of images are idolaters ; If the Papists wor- 
 ship a crucifix they are worshippers of an image ; there- 
 fore, If the Papists worship a crucifix they are idolaters^. 
 But this sort of syllogisms should be avoided as much as 
 possible in disputation, because they greatly embarrass a 
 cause : The syllogisms, whose major only is hypothetical^ 
 are very frequent, and used with great advantage. 
 
 II. A disjunctive syllogism, is when the major proposi- 
 tion is disjunctive; as. The earth moves in a circle or a;i 
 ellipsis; but it does not move in a circle; therefore, it 
 Elioves in an ellipsis. 
 
 A disjunctive syllogism may have many members or 
 parts ; thus, It is either spring, summer, autumn, or win- 
 ter; but it is not spring, autumn or winter; therefore, it 
 is summer. 
 
 The true method of arguing here, is from the assertion 
 of one to the denial of the rest, or from the denial of one 
 or more to the assertion of what remains; but the major 
 should be so framed, that the several parts of it cannot be 
 true together, though one of them is evidently tiue. 
 
 III. A relative syllogism requires the major proposi- 
 tion to be relative; as. Where Christ is, there shall his 
 servants be; but Christ is in heaven ; therefore his ser- 
 vants shall be there also. Or, As is the captain so are 
 his soldiers; but the captain is a coward ; therefore, his 
 soldiers are so too. 
 
 Arguments that relate to the doctrine of proportion 
 must be referred to this head ; as. As two are to four, sq 
 are three to six ; but two make the half of four; there- 
 fore, three make the half of six. 
 
 Besides these, there is another sort of syllogism which 
 is verv natural and common;> and yet authors take very 
 U2 
 
^34 ^ LOGIC : OR, THE Part lil, 
 
 little notice of it, call it by an improper name; and de- 
 scribe it very defectively ; and that is, 
 
 IV. A connective syllogism. This, some have called 
 copulative 5 but it does by no means require the major to 
 be a copulative nor a compound proposition (according to 
 the definition, given of it, Part II. chap. 11. sec= 6,) but it 
 requires that two or more ideas be so connected either in 
 the complex subject or predicate of the major, that if one 
 of them be affirmed or denied in the minor, common sense 
 will naturally shew us what will be the consequence. It 
 would be very tedious and useless to frame particular rules 
 about them, as will appear by the following examples, 
 which are very various, and yet may be farther multiplied. 
 
 (i.) Meekness and humility always go together 5 Moses 
 was a man of meekness ; therefore Moses was also hum- 
 ble. Or we may form this minor, Pharaoh was no hum- 
 ble man ; therefore he was not meek. 
 
 (2.) No man can serve God and mammon 5 the covet- 
 ous man serves mammon^ therefore he cannot serve God. 
 Or, the minor may run thus. The true Christian serves 
 God ; therefore he does not serve mammon. 
 
 (S.) Genius must join with study to make a great rnan ; 
 Fiorino has genius but he cannot study; therefore Flori- 
 1:0 will never be a great man. Or thus, Quintjus studies 
 hard, but has no genius j therefore Quintus will never be 
 a great man. 
 
 (4.) Gulo cannot make a dinner without flesh and fish : 
 there was no fish to be gotten to-day ; therefore Gulo this 
 day car.no t make a dinner. 
 
 (0.) London and Paris are indifferent latitudes; the 
 latitude of London is 51 1-2 degrees 5 therefore this can- 
 not be the latitude of Paris. 
 
 (6.) The father and the son are of equal stature ; the fa- 
 ther is six feet high ; therefore the son is six feet high also. 
 
 (7.) Joseph and Benjamin had one mother ; Rachel 
 was the mother of Joseph 5 therefore she was Benjamin's 
 mother too. 
 
 (SJ Pride is inconsistent Nvith innocence ; Angels have 
 innocence ; therefore they have no pride. Or thus^ Dev- 
 ils have pride ; therefore they have not innocence. 
 
 I might multiply other instances of these connective 
 syllogisms, by bringing in all sorl3 of e-Kepti^'C; exclusive, 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 235 
 
 comparative, and mod^^i propositions, into theconjposition. 
 of them 5 for all these may be wrought into conjunctive, 
 as well as into simple syllogisms, and thereby we may ren- 
 der them complex. But it would waste time and paper 
 w'itiiout equal profit. 
 
 Concerning these various kinds of conjunctive syllo- 
 gismSj take these two observations. 
 
 Observ. I. Most of them may be transformed into cate*- 
 gorical syllogisms b^ those who have a mind to prove the; 
 truth of them that way ; or they may be easily converted 
 into each other by changing the forms of speech. 
 
 Observ. II. These conjunctive syllogisms are seldom de- 
 ficient or faulty in the form of them 5 for such a deficience 
 would be discovefed at first glance generally by common 
 reason,* without any artificial rules of logic : Tlie chief care 
 therefore is to see that the major proposition be true, upon 
 \vhich the whole force of the argumeut usually depends, 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 0? COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 AVE properly call those compound syllogisms, which are 
 madeof two or more simple syllogisms, and may be re* 
 solved into tAem. The chief kinds are these j Epichire^ 
 ma, Dilemma, Prosyllogismus, and Sorites. 
 
 I. Epichirema is -a syllogism which contains the proof 
 of the major or minor, or both, before it draws the con- 
 clusion. This is often used in writing, in public speeches, 
 and in common conversation ; that so each part of the dis> 
 course may be confirmed and put out of doubt, as it moves 
 on to>vard the conclusion which was chiefly designed. — • 
 Take this instance. 
 
 Sickness "may be good for us, for it weans us from the 
 pleasures of life, and makes us think of dyings 
 
 Bui we are uneasy under sickness, which appears by our 
 impatience^ complaints, groanings, &c. 
 
 Therefore' we are uneasy sometimes under that which is 
 good for us. 
 
 Another instance you may see in Cicero^s oration in de- 
 fence of Milo; who had ^lain Clodiu§. His major proposi- 
 
236 LOGIC : OR, THE Part Ilf. 
 
 tion is, that, it is lawful for one man to kill another who 
 lies in wait to kill him 5 wiiich he proves from the custom 
 of nations, from natural equity, examples, &c. his minor is, 
 that Clodius laid wait for Milo ; which he proves by his 
 arms, guards, &c. and then infers the conclusion ; that, it 
 was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius. 
 
 II. A dilemma is an argument which divides the whole 
 into all its parts or members by a disjunctive proposition, 
 and then infers something concerning each part which is 
 finally inferred concerning the whole. Instances of this 
 are frequent ; as, In this life we must either obey our vi- 
 cious inclinations, or resist them ; to obey them will bring 
 sin and sorrow ; to resist them is laborious and painful ^ 
 Therefore we cannot be perfectly free from sorrow or pain 
 in this Hfe. 
 
 A dilemma becomes faulty or iaefiectqal three ways: First 
 When the members of the division are not well opposed, or 
 not fully enumerated ; for then the major is false. Second- 
 ly, When what is asserted concerning each partis not just 3 
 for then the minor is not true. Thirdly, When it may be 
 retorted with equal force upon him who utters it. 
 
 There was a famous ancient instance of this case, where- 
 in a dilemma was retorted. Euathlus promised Protagoras 
 a reward when he had taught him the art of pleading, and 
 it was to be paid the first day that he gained any cause in 
 the court. After a considerable time Protagoras goes to 
 law with Euathlus for the reward, and uses this dilemma : 
 Either the cause will go on my side, or on yours y if the 
 cause goes on my side, you must pay me according to the 
 sentence of the judge : if the cause goes on your side, you 
 must pay me according to your bargain : Therefore wheth- 
 er the cause goes for or against me, you must pay me the 
 reward. But Euathlus retorted the dilemma thus : Either 
 I shall gain the cause or lose it : if I gain the cause, then 
 nothing will be due to you according to the sentence of 
 the judge : But if I lose the cause, nothing will be due to 
 you according to my bargain :. TA^re/br^, whether I lose 
 or gain the cause, I will not pay you, for nothing will be 
 due to you. 
 
 Note. — A dilemma is usually described as though it al- 
 my% proved the absurdity. inconTenienCe, or unreasona- 
 
Chap. il. RIGHT USE OF REASON^ 23? 
 
 lileness of some opinion or practice ; and this is the most 
 common design of it 5 but it is plain, that it may be also 
 used to prove the truth or advantage of any thing propos- 
 ed ; as, In heaven we shall either have desires or not : if 
 we have no desires, then we have full satisfaction ; if we 
 have desires they shall be satisfied as fast as they arise j 
 Therefore in heaven v,e shall be completely satisfied. 
 
 Note 2, — This sort of argument may be composed of 
 three or more members, and may be called a trilcmma. 
 
 III. A prosyllogism is when two or more syllogisms are 
 so connected together, that the conclusion of the former is 
 the major or the minor of the follgwing; as. Blood cannot 
 think ^ but the soul of man thinks 5 therefore the soul of 
 man is not blood f but the soul of a brute is his blood, ac- 
 cording to the scripture : therefore the soul of man is dif- 
 ferent from that of a brute. See another instance in the 
 introduction to this treatise, p. 9. 
 
 IV. A sorites, is when several middle terms are chosen to 
 connect one another successively in several propositions^ 
 till tfie last proposition connects its predicate with the first 
 subject — Thus, All men of revenge have their souls often 
 uneasy 5 uneasy souls are a plague to themselves 5 now to 
 be one's own plague is folly in tiie extreme ; therefore, all 
 men of revenge are extreme fools. 
 
 'i'he apostle, Rom. viii. 29, gives us an instance of this 
 sort of argument, if it were reduced to exact form : 
 Whom he foreknew, those he predestinated : whom he 
 predestinated he called; whom he called he justified; 
 whom he justified, he glorified; therefore, whom he fore- 
 knew he glorified. 
 
 To these syllogisms it may not be improper to add 
 hiduction, which is, when from several particular proposi- 
 tions we infer one general ; as. The doctrine of the Socin- 
 ians cannot be proved from the gospels, it cannot be prov- 
 ed from the Acts of the Apostles, it cannot be proved from 
 the epistles, nor the book of revelation ; therefore it can- 
 not be proved from the New Testament. 
 
 Note — This sort of argument is often defective, because 
 there is no due care taken to enumerate all the particulars 
 on which the conclusion should depend. 
 
 All these four kinds of syllogisms in this section may be 
 
238 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IIL 
 
 called redundant, because they have more than three 
 propositions. But there is one sort of syllogism which is 
 defective, and is called an enthymem^ because only the con- 
 clusion with one of the premises is expressed while the 
 other is supposed and reserved in the mind.- thus, There 
 is no true religion without good morals : therefore, a 
 knave cannot be truly religious : Or thus, it is our duly to 
 love our neighbor as ourselves 5 therefore, there are but 
 few who perform their duty. 
 
 Note-This is the most common sort of argument amongst 
 mankind both in writing and in speaking; for it would 
 take up too much time, and too much retard the discourse 
 to draw out all our arguments in mood and figure. Be- 
 sides, mankind love to have so much comphment paid to 
 Iheir understandings, as to suppose that they know the 
 major or minor, which is suppressed and imphed, whea 
 you pronounce the other premises and the conclusion. 
 
 Tf there be any debate about this argument, the syllc^ 
 gism must be completed, in order to try its force ''and^ 
 goodness, by adding the absent propositions. 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE TEKMS, OF COMMON PLACES OB TOPICS, 
 AND INVENTION OF ARGUMENTS. 
 
 TITE next division of syllogisms is according to the mid- 
 dle term, which is made use of in the proof of the propo- 
 sition. Now the middle term (as we have hinted before) 
 is often called argument, because the force of the syllo- 
 gism depends upon it. We must make a little delay here 
 to treat briefly of the doctrine of topics, or places whence 
 middle terms or arguments are drawn. 
 
 All arts and sciences have some general subjects which 
 belong to them, which are called topics, or common pla- 
 ces ; because middle terms are borrowed, and arguments 
 derived from them for the proof of the various propositions 
 which we have occasion to discourse of. The topics of 
 grammar are etymology, noun, verb, construction, signi- 
 fication, &c. The topics of logic are genus, species, dif- 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 239 
 
 ference, property, definition, division, Sic. The topics 
 of ontology, or metaphysics, are cause, effect, action, pas- 
 sion, identity, opposition, subject, adjunct, sign, &c. The 
 topics of morality, or ethics, are law, sin, duty, authority, 
 freedom of will, command, threatening, reward, punish- 
 ment, &c. The topics of theology, are God, Christ, faith, 
 hope, worship, salvation, &c. 
 
 To these several topics, there belong particular observa- 
 tions, axioms, canons, or rules,* which are laid down in 
 their proper sciences 5 as, 
 
 Grammar hath such canons, namely, Words in a differ- 
 ent construction obtain a different sense. Words derived 
 from the^ame primative may probably have some affinity 
 in their original meaning, &c. 
 
 Canons in logic are such as these, Every part of a di- 
 vision singly taken must contain less than the whole A 
 definition must be peculiar and proper to the thing defined. 
 Whatever is affirmed or denied of the genus, may be af- 
 firmed or denied of the species, &c. 
 
 Metaphysical canons are such as these ^ Final causes be- 
 long only to intelligent agents. If a natural and necessa- 
 ry cause operate, the effect will follow, &c. and there are 
 large catalogues of many more in each distinct science. 
 
 Now it has been the custom of those who teach Icgic or 
 -rhetoric, to direct their disciples, when they want an ar- 
 gument, to consult the several topics which are suited to 
 their subject of discourse, and to rummage over the defi- 
 nitions, divisions, and canons, that belong to each topic. 
 This is called the invention of argument 3 and it is taught 
 with much solemnity in some schools. 
 
 I grant there may be good use of this practice for per- 
 sons of a lower genius, when they are to compose any dis- 
 course for the public; or for those of superior parts to re- 
 fresh their memory, and revive their acquaintance with a 
 subject which has been long absent from their thoughts, or 
 when their natural spirits labour under indisposition and 
 languor ; but when a man of moderate sagacity has made 
 himself master of his theme by just dihgence and inquiry^ 
 
 *A canon is a proposition declaring some property of the subject 
 ■which is not expressed in the definition or division of it, 
 
^240 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 
 
 he has seldom need to run knocking at the doors of all the 
 topics that he ma 3^ furnish himself with argument or mat- 
 ter of speaking: Audindeed it is only a man of sense and 
 judgment that can use common places or topics well ; for 
 amongst this variety he only kno^vs what is fit to be left 
 out, as well as what is fit to be spoken. 
 
 By some logical writers this business oftopics and inven- 
 tion is treated of in such a manner, with mathematical fig- 
 ures and diagrams^ filled with the barbarous technical 
 words, Napeas, Nipcis, Ropcros, Nosrop, &c. as though an 
 ignorant lad were to be led mechanically in certain artifi- 
 cial harnesses and trammels to find out arguments to prove 
 or refute any proposition whatsoever without any rational 
 knowledge of the ideas. Now there is no need to throw 
 words of contempt on such a practice ; the very descrip- 
 tion of it carries reproof and ridicule in abundance. 
 
 SECT. vm. 
 
 OF SEVERAL KINDS OF ARGUMENTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS. 
 
 WE proceed now^ to the division of syllogisms according 
 to the middle term; and in this part of our treatise the 
 syllogisms themselves are properl}'- called arguments, and 
 me thus distributed. 
 
 I. Arguments are called grammatical, metaphysical, 
 physical, moral, mechanical, theological, &c. according to 
 the art, science, or subject, whence the middle term or top- 
 ic is borrowed. Thus, if we prove that no man should 
 steal from his neighbour, because the scripture forbids it, 
 tins is a theological argument : If we prove it from the laws 
 of the land, it is political ; but if we prove it from the prin- 
 ciples of reason and equity, the argument is moral. 
 
 II. Argum.ents are either certain and evident, or doubt- 
 ful and merely probable. 
 
 Probable arguments are those whose conclusions are 
 proved by some probable mediumst as, This hill was once 
 a church-yard, or a field of battle, because there are many 
 human bones found here. This is not a certain argument. 
 
Chap. Ho RIGHT USE OF REASON. 241 
 
 for human bones might have been conveyed there some 
 other way. 
 
 Evident and certain arguments are called demonstra- 
 tfons ; for they prove their conclusions by clear mediums 
 and undoubted principles 5 and they are generally divided 
 into these two sorts. 
 
 1. Demonstrations a p'lort, which prove the effect by ^ 
 its necessary cause ; as, I prove the scripture is infallibly 
 true^ because it is the word of God who caHnot lie. 
 
 2. Demonstrations a posteriori, which infer the cause 
 from its necessary effect 5 «s, I infer there hath been the 
 hand of some artificer here, because I find a curious engine ; 
 Or, I infer there is ^ God, from the works of his wisdom 
 in the visible world. 
 
 The last of these is called demonstratio tou oti, because it 
 proves only the existence of a thing 5 the first is named 
 demonstratio tou dioti^ because it shews also the cause of 
 existence. 
 
 But note, That thongh these two sorts of arguments are 
 most peculiarly called demonstrations y yet generally any 
 strong and convincing argument obtains that name ; and 
 it is the custom of mathematicians to call their argu- 
 ments demonstrations y from what medium soever they de^ 
 rive them. 
 
 III. Arguments are divided into artificial and inartificial. 
 
 An artificial argument is taken from the nature and cir- 
 cumstances of the things; and if the argument be strong, 
 it produces a natural certainty 5 as, The world was first 
 created by God, because nothing can create itself. 
 '" An inartificial argument is the testimony of another, and 
 this is called original, when our information proceeds im» 
 mediately from the persons concerned, or from eye or ear 
 .witnesses of a fact : It is called tradition when it is de- 
 livered by the report of others- 
 
 We have taken notice before, that testimony is either 
 divine or human. If the human testimony be strong, it 
 produces a moral certainty ; but divine testimony produc- 
 es a supernatural certainty, which is far superior. 
 
 Note — Arguments taken from human testimony, as well 
 as from laws and rules of equity, are called moral; and 
 indeed the same nanjc is also applied to every sort of ar- 
 W 
 
^42 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 
 
 gument which is drawn from the free actions of God, or 
 the contingent actions of men, wherein we cannot arise to 
 a natural certainty, but content ourselves with an high 
 degree of probability, which in many cases is scarce infe- 
 rior to natural certainty. 
 
 IV. Arguments are either direct or indirect. It is a di- 
 rect argument, wherein the middle term is such as proves 
 the question itself, and infers that very proposition which 
 was the matter of inquiry. An indirect, or obhque argu- 
 ment, proves or refutes some other proposition, and ihere^ 
 by makes the thing inquired appear to be true by plain 
 consequence. 
 
 Several arguments are called indirect; as (I.) When 
 some contradictory proposition is proved to be false, im- 
 probable, or impossible : Or when upon supposition of the 
 falsehood, or denial of the original proposition, some ab- 
 surditj^ is inferred. This is called a proof per impossihile^ 
 or 3. redudio ab absurdavi. (2) When some other pro- 
 position is proved to be true which is less probable, and 
 thence it follows that the original proposition is true, be- 
 cause it is more probable. This is an argument ex minus 
 jyrohohili ad magis, (3.) When any other proposition is 
 proved, upon which it was before agreed to yield the ori- 
 ginal question. This is an argument tx concesso, 
 
 V. There is yet another rank of arguments which have 
 Latin names ; their true distinction is derived from the 
 topics or middle terms which are used in them^ though 
 they are called an address to our judgmeut, our faith, our 
 ignorance, our profession, our modesty, and our passions, 
 
 I. If an argument be taken from the nature or existence 
 of things, and addressed to the reason of mankind, it is 
 called argumentum ad judicium. 
 
 2. When it is borrowed from some Convincing testimony^ 
 it is argumentum ad fidem^ an address to our faith. 
 
 3. When it is drawn from any insufficient medium 
 whatsoever, and yet the opposer has not skill to refute or 
 answer it, this is argumenium ad ig^wrantiwn^ an ad- 
 dress to our igiioranQe. 
 
 4. When it is built upon the professed prfnciples or opin- 
 ions of the person with whom we argue, whether th^ 
 
Chap, II, RIGHT USE Ot^ REASON. 243 
 
 opinions be true or false, it is named argiimentum adiiom^ 
 inem^ an address to our prof essed principles. St. Paul often 
 uses this argument when he reasons with the Jews, and 
 when he says, I speak as a man. 
 
 5. When the argument is fetched from the sentiments of 
 some wise, great, or good men, whose authority we rever- 
 ence, and hardly dare oppose, it is called argumenium ad 
 verecundiam, an address to our modesty. 
 
 6. I add finally, When an argument is borrowed from 
 any topics which are suited to engage the inclinations and 
 passions of the hearers on the gide of the speaker, rather 
 than to convince the judgment, this is argumentiim ad pas^ 
 siones, an address to the pas siofis ; or if it be made pub- 
 licU^, it is called ad populunij or an appeal to the people. 
 
 After all these divisions of syllogisms or arguments aris- 
 ing from the middle term, there is one distinction proper to 
 be mentioned, which arises fiom the premises. An argu- 
 ment is called uniform, when both the premises are derived 
 from the same spring of knowledge, >vhether it be seiise, 
 reason, consciousness, human faith, or divine faith : But 
 when tlie two premises are derived from diflerent springs 
 of knowledge, it is called a mixt argument. 
 
 Whether the conclusion must be called human or divine, 
 when one er both premises are matters of divine faith, but 
 the conclusion is drawn by human reason, I leave it to be 
 disputed and determined in the schools of theology. 
 
 Thus the second chapter is finished, and a particular ac- 
 count given of all the chief kinds of syllogisms, or argu- 
 ments which are made use of among men, or treated of in 
 logic, together with special rules foi'tlie formation of them, 
 so far as is necessary. 
 
 If a syllogism agrees with the rules which uxe given for 
 the construction and regulation of it^ it is called a true ar- 
 -gument : If it disagrees with these rules, it is a paralogism^ 
 or false argument : But when a false argument puts on the 
 face and appearance of a true one, then it is properly call- 
 ed a sophis?n or faUacij^ which shall be the subject of the 
 next chapter. 
 
2U LOGIC : OR, THE Part. III. 
 
 GH AFTER Iir. 
 
 OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOPHISMS. 
 
 FROM truth nothing can really follow but what is true .-^ 
 Whensoever therefore vre find a false conclusion drawn 
 from premises which seem ta be true, there must be some 
 fault in the deduction or inference ; or else one of the 
 premises is not true in the sense in which it is used in that 
 argument. 
 
 When art argument carri^ the face of truth with it, and 
 yet leads us into mistake, it is a sophism; and there is 
 some need of a particular description of these fallacious 
 arguments, that we may with more ease and readiness, de- 
 tect and solve them. 
 
 SECT. L 
 
 OF SEVERAL KINDS OP SOPHISMS, AND THEIR SOLUTIOlf. 
 
 AS the rules of right judgment, and of good ratiocina- 
 tion, often coincide with each other, so the doctrine of pre- 
 judices, wbicli was treated of in the second part of logic, 
 has anticipated a great deal of what might be said on the 
 subject of sophisms 5 yet I shall mention the most remark- 
 able springs of false argumentation, which are reduced by 
 logicians to some of the following heads. 
 
 I. The first sort of sophism iscslied ignoratio elenclii^ or 
 a mistake of the ^lees^ion; that is, when something else is 
 proved which has neither aoy necessary connexion or con- 
 sistency with the thing inquired, and consequently gives no 
 determination to the inquiry, though it may seem at first 
 sight to determine the question ; as, if any should conclude 
 that St. Paul was not a native Jew, by proving that he was 
 born a Roman; or if they should pretend to determine 
 that he was neither Roman nor Jew, by proving that he 
 was born at Tarsus in Cilicia: These sophisms are refuted 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 245 
 
 by shewing that all these three may be true 5 for he was 
 born of Jewish parents in the city of Tarsus, and by some 
 peculiar privilege granted to his parents, or his native city, 
 he was born a denizen of Rome. Thus there^ is neither of 
 these three characters of the apostle inconsistent willi each 
 otherj and therefore the proving of them true does not re- 
 fute the others. 
 
 Or if the question be proposed, Whqther excess of wine 
 'can be hurtful to him that drinks it? And the sophister 
 should prove that it revives his spirits, it exhiler^tes his 
 soul, it gives a man courage, and makes him strong iHid 
 active; and then he takes it for granted that he had proved 
 his point. 
 
 But the respondent may easily shew, that though wine 
 may do all this, yet it may be finally hurtful both to the 
 soul and body of him that drinks it to excess. 
 
 Disputers, when they grow warm, are ready to run into 
 this fallacy : They dress up the opinion of their adversary 
 as they please, and ascribe sentiments to him which he 
 doth not acknowledge; and when they have, with a great 
 deal of pomp, attacked and confounded these images of 
 straw of their own making, they triumph over iheir adver- 
 sar}^ as though they had utterly confuted his opinion. 
 
 It is a fallacy of the same kind which a disputant is 
 guilty of, when he finds that his adversary is too hard for 
 him, and that he cannot fairly prove the question first pro- 
 posed 5 he then, with slyness and subtilty, turns the dis- 
 course aside to some other kindred point which he can 
 prove, and exults in that new argument wherein his oppo- 
 nent never contradicted him. 
 
 The way to prevent this fallacy is by keeping the eye 
 fixt on the precise point of dispute, and neither wandering 
 from it ourselves, nor suffering our antagonist to wander 
 from it, or substitute any Ihing else in its room. 
 
 TI. The next sophism is called petitio pincipii, or a sup- 
 position ofiuhat is not granted ; that is, when any propo- 
 sition is proved by the same proposition in other words, or 
 by something that- is equally uncertain and disputed : As if 
 any one undertake to prove that -the human soul is extend- 
 ed through all the parts of the body, because it resides iu 
 
 W2 
 
246 LOGIC : OR THE Part. III. 
 
 every member, which is but the same thing in other words. 
 Or, if a Papist should pretend to prove that his religion is 
 the only catholic religion ; and is derived from Christ and 
 his apostles, because it agrees with the doctrine of all the 
 fathers of the church, all the holy martyrs, and all the 
 Christian world throughout all ages : Whereas this is the 
 great point in contest, whether their religion does agree 
 with that of all the ^ncient and the primitive Christians, or 
 not. 
 
 III. That sort of fallacy which is called a circle, is very 
 Dear akin to X\\e peiitio principii ; as when one of the pre- 
 mises in a syllogism is questioned and opposed, and we in- 
 tend to prove it by the conclusion : Or, when in a train of 
 syllogisms we prove the last by recurring to what was the 
 conclusion of the first : the Papists are famoi»s at this sort 
 of fallacy, when they prove the scriptures to be the word 
 of God by the authority or infallible testimony of their 
 church ; and when they are called to shew the infallible 
 authority of their church, they pretend to prove it bv the 
 scriptures. 
 
 IV. The next kind of sophism is called ntm causa pro? 
 causa^ov tl>e a^signati^i of a false cause^ This the Peri- 
 patetic philosophers were guilty ofcontinually j^ when they 
 told us that certain beings, which they called substantial 
 forms, were the springs of colonr, motion, vegetation, and 
 the various operations of natural beings in the animate 
 and inanimate world 5^^ when they informed us that Nature 
 was teiribly afraid of a vacuum, and that this was the 
 cause why th^ water would not fall out of a long tube if it 
 was turned upside down : The moderns as well as the an- 
 cients ihll often into this fallacy, when they positively as- 
 sign the reasons of natural appearances, without sufficient 
 experiments to prove them. 
 
 Astrologers are overrun with this sort of fallacies, and 
 they cheat the people grossly, by pretending to tell for- 
 tunes, and to deduce the cause of the various occurrences 
 in the lives of men from the various positions of the stars 
 and planets, which ihey call aspects. 
 
 When comets and eclipses of the sun and moon are 
 con$tnie4:l to signify the fate of princes, the revolution of 
 
Chap. HI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 247 
 
 states, famine, wars and calamities of all kinds, it is a fal- 
 lacy that belongs to this rank of sophisms. 
 
 There is scarce any thing more common in human life 
 than this sort of human argument. If any two accidental 
 events happen to concur, one is perfectly made the cause 
 of the other. If Tiiius wronged his neighbour of a guioea,^ 
 and in six months after he fell down and broke bis leg^ 
 weak men will impute it to divine vengeance on Titius for 
 his former injustice. This sophism was found also in the 
 early days of the world : For, when holy Job was sur- 
 rounded with uncommon miseries, his own friends inferred, 
 that he was a most heinous criminal, and charged him with 
 aggravated guilt as the caune of his calamities ; though 
 God himself by a voice from heaven solved this uncharita- 
 ble sopliisra, and cleared his servant Job of that charge. 
 
 How frequent is it among men to impute crimes to 
 wrong persons ? We too often charge that upon the wick- 
 ed contrivance and premeditated malice of a neighbour, 
 which arose merely from ignorance, or from unguarded 
 temper. And, on the other hand, when we have a mind 
 to excuse ourselves, we practise the same sophism, and 
 charge that upon our inadvertence or our ignorance, wliich 
 perhaps was designed wickedness. What is really done 
 by a necessity of circumstances, we sometimes, impute to. 
 choice. And again, we charge that upon necessity which, 
 was really desired and chosen. 
 
 Sometimes a person acts out of judgment, in opposition 
 to his inclination ; another person perhaps acts the same 
 thing out of inclination, and against his judgment. It is 
 hard for us to determine with assurance, what are the in- 
 ward springs and secret causes of every man's conduct; 
 and therefore we should be cautious and slow in passing a 
 judgment where the case is not exceeding evident; and 
 if we should mistake, let it rather be on tlie charitable^ 
 than on the censorious side. 
 
 It is the same sophism that charges mathematical learn- 
 ing with leading the minds of men to scepticism and in- 
 fitklity, and as unjustly accuses the new philosophy of 
 pavinj the way to heresy and schism. Thus the reforma- 
 tion from Popery bg^s been charged with the murder and 
 
248 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 
 
 blood of millions, which in truth to be is imputed to the 
 tyraipay of (he princes and the priests, who would not suf- 
 fer the people to reform their sentiments and their prac- 
 tices according to the word of God. Thus Christianity in 
 the primitive ages was charged by the Heathens with all 
 the calamities which befei the Roman empire, because the 
 Christians renounced the heathen gods and idols. 
 
 The way to relieve ourselves from those sophisms, and 
 to secure ourselves from the danger of falling into them, is 
 an honest and diligent inquiry into the real nature. and 
 causes of things. With a constant watchfulness against all 
 those prejudices that might warp the judgment aside from 
 truth in that inquiry. 
 
 V. The next is called /^ZZacia accidentis, or a sophism 
 wherein we pronounce concerning the nature and essential 
 properties of any subject according to something which is 
 merely accidental to it. This is akm to the former, and 
 is also very frequent in human life. So if opium or the 
 Peruvian bark has been used imprudently or unsuccessful- 
 ly, whereby the patient has received injury, some weaker 
 people absolutely pronounce against the use of the barker 
 opium i^pon all occasions whatsoever, and are ready to call 
 them poison. So wine has been the accidental occasion 
 of drunkenness and quarrels '^ learning and printing may 
 have been the accidental cause of sedition in a state 5 the 
 reading of the bible, by accident has been used to promote 
 heresies or destructive errors ; and for these reasons they 
 have been all pronounced evil things. Mahomet forbade 
 his followers to the use of wine ; tlie Turks discourage 
 learning in their dominions 5 and the Papists forbid the 
 sik'iptures to be read by the laity. But liow very unrea- 
 sonable are these inferences, and these prohibitions which 
 are built upon them. 
 
 VI. The next sophism borders upon the former; and 
 that is, when v/e argue from that which is true in particu- 
 lar circumstances, to prove the same thing true absolutely, 
 simpU' and abstracted from all circumstances; this is call- 
 ed in "the schools a sophism a dido secundum quid ad dictum 
 sinifjli€ifor; as, That ivhich is bought in the shambles is eat^ 
 en for dinner ; Rciio meat is bought in the shambles ; there- 
 fore raw meat is eaten for dimmer* Ojr thus, Livy writes fa- 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 24^ 
 
 iles and improbabilities when he describes prodigies and o- 
 mens ; therefore Livy^s Roman history is never to be believed 
 m any thing. Or thus, There may be some mistakes of 
 transcribers in ^ome part of the scriptures ; therefpre scrip' 
 tare alone is not a safe guide for our faith. 
 
 This sort of sophism has its reverse also ; as when we 
 argue from that which is true simply and absolutely, to 
 prove the same thing true in all particular circumstan- 
 ces whatsoever;* as if a traitor should argue from the 
 sixth commandment, Thou shalt not kill a man^ to prove 
 that he himself ought not to be hanged: Or if a madman 
 should tell me, I ought not to withhold his sword from him^ 
 because no man ought to withhold the property of another. 
 
 These two last species of sophisms are easily solved, by 
 shewing the difference betwixt things in their absolute na- 
 ture, and the same things surrounded with peculiar cir- 
 cumstances^ and considered in regard to special times, pla-* 
 ces, persona and occasions 5 or by shewing the difference 
 between a moral and a metaph;ysical universality, and that 
 the proposition will hold good in one case, but not in the 
 other. 
 
 VII. The sophisms of composition and division come 
 next to be mentioned. 
 
 The sophism of composition, is when we infer any thing 
 concerning ideas in a compound sense, which is only true 
 m a divided sense. And when it is said in the gospel that 
 Christ made the blind to see, and the deaf to hear, and the 
 lame to walk, we ouglit not to infer hence that Christ per- 
 formed contradictions 5 but those who were blind before^ 
 were made to see, and those who were deaf before, were 
 made to hear, &;c. So when the scripture assures us. The 
 worst of sinnei's may be saved; it signifies only, that 
 they who have been the worst of sinners may repent and 
 be saved, not that they shall be saved in their sins. Or if 
 any one should argue thus. Two and three are even and odd;. 
 Five are two and three ; therefore fve are even and odd. 
 Here that is very falsely inferred concerning two and' threes 
 in uniony which is only true of them divided. 
 
 * This is arguing from a moral universality, which admits of 
 some exceptions, in the same manner as may be argued from meta' 
 physicali or st natural universality, which admits of no exception^ 
 
250 LOGIC : OR, THE PXrt. III. 
 
 The sophism of division, is when we infer the same thing 
 concerning ideas in a divided sense, which is only true in a 
 compound sense ; as, if we should pretend to prove that 
 every soldier in the Grecian army put an hundred thou- 
 sand Persians to flight, because tlie Grecian soldiers did so. 
 Or if a man should argue, thus, Five is one number ; Two 
 and three are Jive ; therefore two and three are one numher. 
 
 This sort of sophism is committed when the word All 
 is taken in a collective and a distributive sense, without a 
 due disunction ; as, if any one should reason thus, All the 
 musical instruments of the Jewish temple made a noble 
 concert 5 The harp was a musical instrument of the Jewish 
 temple 5 therefore the harp made a noble concert. Here 
 the w^ord All in the major is collective, whereas such a con- 
 clusion requires that the w^ord ^ZZ should be distributive. 
 
 It is the same fallacy when the universal word All or 
 No refers to species-in one proposition and to individuals 
 in another; as, All animals were in Noah^s Ark ; therefore 
 No animals perished in the flood: Whereas in the premise 
 all animals signifies every hind of animal y which does not 
 exclude or deny the drowning of a thousand individuals. 
 
 VIII The last sort of sophism arises from our abuse of 
 the ambiguity of words, which is the largest and most ex- 
 tensive kind of fallacy ; and indeed several of the former 
 fallacies might be reduced to this head. 
 
 When the words or phrases are plainly equivocal, they 
 are called sophisms Ol equivocation ; as, if we should argue 
 thus : He that sends forth a book into the light, desires it 
 to be read ; He that throws a book into the fire, sends it 
 into the light 3 therefore, He that throws a book into the 
 fire desires it to be read. 
 
 This sophism, as well as the foregoing, and all of the 
 like nature, are solved by shewing the different senses of 
 the words, terms or phrases. Here light in the mojor pro- 
 position signifies the public vino of the vjorld ; in the mi- 
 nor it signifies the brightness of flame andflre; and there- 
 fore the syllogism has four terms, or rather, it has no mid- 
 dle term, and proves nothing. 
 
 But %here such gross equivocations and ambiguities ap- 
 pear m arguments, there is httle danger of imposing up- 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 251 
 
 on ourselves or others. The greatest danger, and which 
 we are perpetually exposed to in reasoning is, where the 
 two senses or significations of one term as near akin, and 
 not plainly distinguished, and yet they are really sufficient- 
 ly different in their sense, to lead us into great mistakes, 
 if we are not watchful. And indeed the greatest part of 
 controversies in the sacred or citil life arise from the dif- 
 ierent senses that are put upon words, and the different 
 ideas which are included in tliem ; as have been shewn at 
 large in the First Part of Logic^ Chap. IV. which treats 
 of words and terms. 
 
 There is, after all these, another sort of sophisms, which 
 is wont to be called an imperfect enumeration^ or a false 
 induction^ when from a few experiments or observations 
 men infer general theorems and universal propositions. 
 But this is sufficiently noticed in the foregoing chapter^ 
 where we treated of that sort of syllogiism which is called 
 •induction. 
 
 SECT. If. 
 
 two GENERAL TESTS OF TRUE SYLLOGISMS, AND METHODS 
 OF SOLVING ALL SOPHLSMS. 
 
 BESIDES the special description of true* syllogisms 
 and sophisms already given, and the rules by which the one 
 are framed, and the other refuted, there are these two gen- 
 eral methods of reducing all syllogisms whatsoever to a 
 lest of their truth ^r falsehood. 
 
 I. The first is, that the premises must, at least implicit- 
 ly, contain the conclusion ; or thus, One ^£)f the premises 
 must contain the conclusion, and the other must shew that 
 the conclusion is contained in it. The reason of this r ^le 
 is this; when any proposition is offered to be proved it is 
 necessary to find another proposition which confirms it, 
 Vvhich may be called the containing proposition; but be- 
 -fcause the second must not contain the first in an expresiS 
 
Sm LOGIC : OR, THE Pam III 
 
 naanner, and in the same words,* therefore it is necessary 
 that a third or, ostensive proposition be found out, to shew 
 tfiat the second proposition contains the first which was to 
 be proved. L^t us make an experiment of this syllogism : 
 Whosoever is a slave to his natural inclination is miserable 5 
 The wjcked man is a slave to his natural inclination ; 
 therefore, The wicked man is miserable. Here it is evident 
 that the major proposition contains the conclusion ; for, 
 under a general character of a slave to natyral inclina- 
 tions, a wicked man is contair^d or included ; and the mi- 
 nor proposition declares it ; whence the conclusion is ev- 
 idently deduced, thai the wicked man is miserable. 
 
 In ma4iy affirmative syllogisms we may suppose either 
 the major or the minor to contain the conclusion, and the 
 other to shew it 5 for there is no great difierence. But in 
 negative syllogisms it is the negative proposition that con- 
 tains the conclusion and the affirmative proposition shews 
 it ; as, Every wise man masters his passions ; No angry man 
 masters his passions ; therefore, No angry man is wise. 
 Here it is more natural to suppose the minor to be the con- 
 tained proposition ; it is the minor implicitly denies wis- 
 dom concerning an angry man, because mastering the pas- 
 sions is included in wisdom, and the major shews it. 
 
 Note. — This rule may be applied to complex and con- 
 junctive^ as well as simple syllogisms^ and is adapted to 
 shew the truth or falsehood of any of them- 
 
 11. The second is this ; As the terms in every syllogism 
 are usually repeated twice, so they must be taken precise- 
 ly in the same sense in both places : For the greatest part 
 of mistakes that arise in forming syllogisms, is derived 
 from some little difference in the sense of one of the terms 
 in the two parts of the syllogism wherein it is used. Let 
 us consider the following sophisms* 
 
 1. It is a si7i to kill a man ; A murderer is a man; there- 
 fore. It is a bin to kill a murderer. Here the word kill in the 
 
 *It is confessed that conditional and disjunctive major proposi- 
 
 .tions do expressly contain all that is in the conclusion; but thtn it is 
 
 not in a certain and conclusive manner, but only in a dubious form 
 
 of speech, and mingled with other terms ; and therefore it is not the 
 
 sj^me express proposition. 
 
Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 25$ 
 
 iirst proposition signifies to kill unjustly, or without law 5 
 in the conclusion it is taken absolutely for putting a man 
 to death in general, and therefore the inference is not 
 good. 
 
 2. JVhat I am, you are not ; but I am a man ; therefore 
 You are not a man. This is a Relative syllogism : But if 
 it be reduced to a regular categorical form, it will appear 
 there is ambiguity in the terras, thus ; WTiat I am is a 
 man ; You are not what 1 am ; therefore You are not a man* 
 Here what lam in the major proposition hieiken specially 
 for my nature ; but in the minor proposition the same 
 >vords are X^ke\x individually fov my person; therefore the 
 inference must be false, for the syllogism does not take the 
 term what lam both times in the same sense. 
 
 3. He that says you are an animal, says true ; but JEfe that 
 says you are a goose, says you are an animal ; therefore H& 
 that says you are a goose, says true. In the major propo- 
 sition the word animal is the predicate of an iaccidental 
 proposition ; which accidental proposition being afiirma-* 
 tive, renders the predicate of it particular, according to 
 chap. XL sec. 2 axiom 3. and consequently the word am- 
 "inal there signifies only human dnimality. In the minor 
 proposition the wor^ animal, for the same reason, signi- 
 fies the animality of a goose; whereby 'it becomes an am- 
 higuous term and unfit to build the conclusion upon. Or 
 if you say, the word animal in the minor is taken for 
 human animality, then the minor is evidently false. 
 
 It is from this lasi general test of syllogisms that we de- 
 rive the custom of the respondent in answering the argu- 
 ments of the opponent, which is to distinguish upon the 
 major or minor proposition, and declare which term is 
 used in two senses, and in what sense the proposition may 
 be true, and^n what sense it is false. 
 
 X 
 
254 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. III. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 SOME GENERAL RULES TO DIRECT OUR REA. 
 
 SONING. 
 
 MOST of the general and special directions given to 
 form our judgment aright in the preceeding part of logic 
 might be rehearsed here ; for the judgments which we 
 pass upon things are generally built on some secret reason- 
 ing or argument by which the proposition is supposed to 
 he proved. But there may be yet some farther assistance 
 given to our reasoning powers in their search after truth, 
 and an observation of the following rules will be of great 
 importance for that end. 
 
 Rule I. ^^ Accustom yourselves to clear and distinct 
 ideas, to evident propositions, to strong and convincing 
 arguments.'^ Converse much with those friends, and 
 those books, and those parts of learning, where you meet 
 with the greatest clearness of thought, and force of rea- 
 soning. The mathematical sciences, and particularly a- 
 rithmetic, geometry, and mechanics, abound with these 
 advantages. And if there were nothing valuable in them 
 for the uses of human life, yet the very speculative parts 
 of this sort of learning are well wcrth our study; for by 
 perpetual examples they teach us to conceive with clear- 
 ness, to connect our ideas and propositions in a train of 
 dependence, to reason with strength and demonstration, 
 and to distinguish between truth and falsehood. Some- 
 thing of these sciences should be studied by every man who 
 pretends to learning, and that,^s Mr. Locke expresses it, 
 not so much to make us mathematicians, as to make us 
 reasonable creatures. 
 
 We should gain such a familiarity with evidence of per- 
 ception and force of reasoning, and get such a habit of dis- 
 cerning clear truths, that the mind may be soon oflended 
 with obscurity and confusion : Then we shall, as it were, 
 naturally and witli ease restrain our minds from rash judg- 
 ment, before we attain just evidence of the proposition 
 whtch is offered to us j and we shall with the same ease, 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 255 
 
 and, as it were naturally, seize and embrace every truth 
 (hat is proposed with just evidence. 
 
 Tlie habit of conceiving clearly, of judging justly, and 
 of reasoning we!l^ is not to be attained merely by the hap- 
 piness of constitution, the brightness of genius, the best nat- 
 ural partS) or the best collection of logical precepts: It is 
 custom and practice that must form and establish this hab- 
 it. We must apply ourselves to it till we perform all this 
 readily, and without reflecting on rules. A coherent think- 
 er and a strict reasoner is not to be made at once by a set 
 of rules, any more than a good painter or musician may 
 be formed extempore, by an excellent lecture on music 
 or painting. It is of infinite importance therefore in our 
 younger years to be tauglit both the value and the prac- 
 tice of conceiving clearly and reasoning right : For, when 
 we are grown up to the middle of life, or past it, it is no 
 wonder that we should not learn good reasoning, any more 
 than that an ignorant clown should not be able to learn 
 fine language, dancing, or a courtly behaviour, when his 
 rustic airs have grown up with him till the age of forty. 
 
 For want of this care, some persons of rank and educa- 
 tion dwell all their days among obscure ideas; they con- 
 ceive and jud^e always in confusion j they take weak 
 arguments for demonstration ; they are led away withi|he 
 disguises and shadows of truth. Now, if such personshap- 
 pen to have a bright imagination, a volubiUty of speech, 
 and a copiousness of language, they not only impose many 
 errors upon their own understandings, but they stamp the 
 image of their own mistakes, upon their neighbors also, 
 and spread their errors abroad. 
 
 It is a matter of just lamentation and pity, to consider 
 the weakness of the common i^ultitude of mankind in this 
 respect, how they receive any thing into their assent upon 
 the most trifling grounds. True reasoning hath very lit- 
 tle share in forming their opinions. They resist the most 
 convincing arguments by an obstinate adherence to their 
 prejudices, and believe the most improbable things with 
 the greatest assurance. They talk of the abstrusest mys- 
 teries, and determine upon them with the utmost confi- 
 dence, and without just evidence either from reason ox" 
 
^56 LD&I6: OR, THE Part tit 
 
 revelation. A confused heap of dark and inconsistent 
 ideas, make up a good part of their knowledge in matters 
 of philosophy" as well as religion, hstving never been taught 
 ihe use and value of clear and just reasoning. 
 
 Yet it must be still confessed that there are some mys- 
 teries in religion, both natural and revealed, as well as 
 some abstruse points in philosophy, wherein the wise as 
 well as the unwise must he content with obscure ideas. 
 There are several things, especially relating to the invisi- 
 ble* world, which are unseaiehable in our present state, 
 and therefore we must believe what revelation plainly dic- 
 tates, though the ideas may be obscure. Reason itself de- 
 mands this of us; but we should seek for the brightest ev- 
 idence both of the ideas, and of tiie connexion of them 
 wheresoever it is attainable. 
 
 Rule II. " Enlarge your general acquaintance with 
 things daily, in arder to attain a rich furniture of topics, 
 or middle terms, whereby those propositions which occur 
 \iiay be either proved or disproved; but especially medi- 
 tate and inquire with great diligence and exactness into 
 the nature, properties, circumstances, and relations of the 
 particular subject about which you judge or argue/'^ 
 Consider its causes, effects, consequences, adjuncts, oppo- 
 >it^, signs,^&c. so far as is needful to your present pur- 
 pose. You should survey a question round about, and on 
 rill sides, and extend your views as far as possible to every 
 thing that has a connexion with it. This practice has 
 many advantages in it; as 
 
 1. It will be a means to suggest to your mind proper 
 topics for argument about any proposition that relates to 
 the same subject. 
 
 2. It will enable you with greater readiness and justness 
 of thought to give an answer to any sudden question upon 
 ihat subject, whether it arises in your own mind, or is 
 proposed by others. 
 
 3. This will instruct yau to give a plainer and speedier 
 solution of any difficulties that may attend the theme of 
 your discourse, and to refute the objections of those who 
 have espoused a contrary opinion. 
 
 4. By such a large survey of the whole subject in all its 
 properties and relations, you will be better secured from 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 257 
 
 inconsistencies, that is, from asserting or denying any 
 thing in one place, which contradicts what you have as- 
 serted or denied in another : And to attain these ends, an 
 extensiveness of understanding, and a large memory, are 
 of unspeakable service. 
 
 One would be ready to wonder sometimes how easily 
 great, wise, and learned men are led into assertions in some 
 parts of the same treatise, which are found to be scarce 
 consistent with what they have asserted in other places : 
 But the true reason is, the narrowness of the mind of man, 
 that it cannot take in all the innumerable properties and 
 relations of one subject with a single view 5 and therefore, 
 whilst they are intent on one particular part of their theme, 
 they bend all their force of thought to prove or disprove 
 some proposition that relates to that part, without atten- 
 tion to the consequences which may flow from it, and 
 which may unhappily affect another part of the same sub- 
 ject 5 and by this mean they are sometimes led to say 
 things which are inconsistent. In such a case, the great 
 dealers in dispute and controversy take pleasure to cast 
 nonsense and self contradiction on their antagonist, with 
 huge and hateful reproaches. For my part, I rather choose 
 to pity human nature, whose necessary narrowness of un- 
 derstanding expose us all to some degrees of this frailty. 
 But the most extensive survey possible of our whole sub« 
 ject is the best remedy against it. It is our judging and 
 arguing upon a partial view of tbings, that exposes us to 
 mistakes, and pushes us into absurdities, or at least to the 
 very borders of them. 
 
 Rule III. " In searching the knowledge of things, al- 
 ways keep , the precise point of the present question in 
 your eye. ^Take heed that you add nothing to it while 
 you are a^uing, nor omit any part of it.'* Watch care- 
 fully lest any new ideas slide in to mingle themselves either 
 with the subject or the predicate. See that the question 
 be not altered by the ambiguity of any word taken in dif- 
 ferent senses ; nor let any secret prejudices of your own^ 
 or the sophistical arts of others, cheat your understanding 
 by changing the question, or shuffling in any thin^else m 
 its room. 
 
258 LOGIC : OR, THE Past IIL 
 
 And for this end it is useful to keep the precise ingftter 
 of inquiry as sm/>Ze as may be, and disengaged from a 
 comphcation ofideas^ which do not necessarily belong to 
 it. By admitting a complication of ideas, and taking too 
 many things at once into one question, the irind is some- 
 times dazzled and bewildered ; and the truth is lost in 
 such a variety and confusion of ideas 5 whereas, by limit- 
 ing and narrowing the question, you take a fuller survey 
 of the whole of it. 
 
 By keeping the whole point of inquiry in our constant 
 \iew, we shall be secured from sudden, rash, and imperti- 
 nent responses and determinations, which some have ob- 
 truded instead of solutions and solid answers, before they 
 perfectly knew the question. 
 
 Rule IV. " When you have exactly considered the pre- 
 cise point of inquiry, or what is unknown in the question, 
 ihen consider what and how much you know already of 
 this question, or of the ideas and terms of which it is com- 
 posed.'^ It is by a comparison of the known and unknown 
 parts of the question together that you find what reference 
 the part known hath unto, or what connection it hath 
 with the thing that is sought : Those ideas, whereby tha 
 knowft 'dnd unknown parts of the question are connected,, 
 willfarnish you with middle terms or arguments whereby 
 ilie thing proposed may be proved or disproved. 
 
 In thisj>art of your work, namely, comparing ideas to- 
 gether, take due time, and be not too liasty to come to a 
 delermiaation, especially in points of importance. Some 
 men when they see a little agreement or disagreement be- 
 ivveen ideas, they presume a great deal, and so jump into 
 the conclusion : This is a short way to fancy, opinion and 
 conceit, but a most unsafe and uncertain w||^ to true 
 knowledge and wisdom. 
 
 Rule V, '* Jn choosing your middle terms or arguments^ 
 to prove any question, always take such topics as are 
 surest, and least fallible, and which carry the greatest evi^ 
 dence and strength with them.'^ Be not so solicitous 
 about the number, as the weiglit of your arguraenls, es- 
 pecially in proving any proposition which admits of nat- 
 ural certainty, or of complete demonstration. Many 
 limes we do iiyury to a cause \py dwdling upon trifling 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON- 259 
 
 arguments. We amuse our hearers with uncertainties, by 
 multiplying the miniber of feeble reasonings, before we 
 mention those which are more substantial, conclusive, and 
 convincing. And too often we yield up our assent to mere 
 probable arguments, where certain proofs may be obtained. 
 
 Yet it must be confessed, there are many c^ses wherein 
 the growing numbers of probable arguments increases the 
 degree of probability, and gives a great and sufficient con- 
 firmation to the truth which is sought i as, 
 
 (I.) When we are inquiring the true sense of any word 
 or phrase, we are more confirmed in the signification of it, 
 by finding the same expression so used in several authors^^ 
 or in several places of the same author. 
 
 (2.) When we are searching out the true meaning or 
 opinion of any writer, or inquiring into any sacred doctrine 
 of scripture, we come to a surer determination of the truth 
 by several distinct places wherein the same thing is ex^ 
 pressed or plainly implied ; because it is not so probable 
 that Jin honest skilful reader should mistake the meaning 
 of the writer in many places, as he may in one or two. 
 
 (3 ) When we would prove the importance of any scrip- 
 tural doctrine or duty, the multitude of texts, wherein it is 
 repeated and inculcated upon the reader, seems naturally 
 to instruct us that it is a matter of greater importance 
 than other things which are but slightly or singly men- 
 tioned in the Bible. 
 
 (4.) In searching out matters of fact in limes past or in 
 distant places, in which case moral evidence is sufficient, 
 and moral certainty is the utmost which can be attained, 
 here we derive a greater assurance of the truth of rt by a 
 number of persons, or a multitude of eircnmstances con- 
 curring to bear witness to it. 
 
 (5.) From many experiments in natural philosophy, we 
 more safely infer a general theorem, than we can from one 
 or two. 
 
 (6.) In matters which require present practice, both sa- 
 cred and civil, we must content ourselves oftentimes with 
 a mere preponderation of probable reasons or arguments. 
 Where there are several reasons on each side, for and 
 against a thing that is to be done or omitted, a small argu» 
 m^nt added to the heap may justly turn the balance on 
 
260 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 
 
 one side, and determine the judgment, as I have noted ih 
 the Second part of Logic. 
 
 To conclude: A growing acquaintance with matters of 
 learning) and a daily improvement of our understandings 
 in affairs human and divine, will best teach us to judge and 
 distinguish in what cases the number of arguments adds to 
 their weight and force : It is only experience can fully in- 
 form us when we must be determined by probable topics, 
 and when we must seek and expect demonstrations. 
 
 Rule VI. "Prove your conclusion (as far as possible) by 
 some propositions that are in themselves more plain, evi-' 
 dent, and certain, than the conclusion ; or at least such as 
 are more known, and more intelligible to the person whom 
 you would convince." If we shall neglect this rule, we 
 shall endeavour to enlighten that which isobscuie by some-, 
 thing equally or more obscure, and to confirm that which 
 is doubtful by something equally or more uncertain. Com- 
 mon sense dictates to all men, thatit is impossible to estab- 
 hsh any truth, and to convince others of it, but by some^ 
 thing that is better known*to them than that truth is. 
 
 Rule VII. " Labour in all your arguings to enlighten the 
 understanding, as well as to conquer and captivate the 
 judgment.'^ Argue in such a manner as may give a natu- 
 ral, distinct, and solid knowledge of things to your hear- 
 ers, as well as to force their assent by a mere proof of the 
 question. Now, to attain this end, the chief topic or me- 
 dium of your demonstration should be fetched, as much as 
 possible, from the nature of the thing to be proved, or from 
 those things which are most naturally connected with it. 
 
 Geometricians sometimes break this rule without neces- 
 sity, two ways, namely, 
 1. When they prove one proposition only by shewing that 
 absurdities will follow if the contradictory proposition be 
 supposed or admitted: This is called Rediiciio ad alsurdum^^ 
 
 *Note — This rule chiefly refers to the establishment of some truth 
 rather than the refutation of error. It is a very common and useful 
 way of arguing, to refute a false proposition, by shewing what evi- 
 dent falsehood or absurdity will follow from it : For what proposj. 
 tion soever is really absurd and false, does eflfectually prove that prin- 
 ciple to be false, from which it is derived ; so that this way of re- 
 futing an error is not S9 usually called Reductio ad absurdnnOjL 
 
CaAP, IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 261 
 
 or Demonstratio per impossibile. As, for instance, When 
 they prove all the radii of a circle to be equal, by suppos- 
 ing one radius to be longer or shorter than another, and 
 then shewing what consequences will follow. This, 1 con- 
 fess, forces the assent, but it does not enhghten the mind, 
 by shewing the true reason and cause why all radii are 
 equal, which is derived from the very construction of /i cir- 
 cle : For, since a circle is formed by fixing one encTof a 
 straight line in the centre, and moving the other end round, 
 (or, which is all one, by compasses kept open to a certain 
 extent,) it follows evidently that every part of the circum- 
 ference being thus described, must be equally distant from 
 the centre, and therefore the Radii which are lines from 
 the centre to the circumference, must be all equal. 
 
 2. Geometriciatis forget this rule when they heap up ma- 
 ny far fetched lines, figures, and propositions to prove 
 some plam, simple, and obvious proposition. This is call- 
 ed a Demonstration per aliena et remota. or an argument 
 from unnatural and remote mediums : As if, in order to 
 prove the radii of a circle are all equal, I should make sev- 
 eral triangles and squares about the circle, and then from 
 some properties and propositions of squares and triangles 
 prove that ihe radii of a circle are eq^iial. 
 
 Yet it must be confessed, that sometimes such questions 
 happen, that it is hardly possible to prove them by direct 
 arguments drawn from the nature of things, &c. and then 
 it may not only hf lawful but necessary to use indirect 
 proofs, and arguments drawn from remote mediums, or 
 from the absurdity of the contradictory suppositions. 
 
 Such indirect and remote arguments may also be some- 
 times used to confirm a proposition, which has been before 
 proved by arguments more direct and immediate* 
 
 Rule VIIL Though arguments should give light to the 
 ^ibject, as well as constrain the assent, yet you must learn 
 '- to distinguish well between an explication and in argu- 
 ment; and neither impose upon yourselves, ^nor sufier 
 yourselves to be imposed upon by others, by mistaking a 
 mere illustration for a convincing reason.'^ " 
 
 Axioms themselves, or self evident propositions, may 
 want an explication or illustration, though they are not ta 
 be proved by reasoning. 
 
262 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 
 
 Sinijlitudes and allusions have oftentimes a very happy 
 influence to explain some difficult truth, and to render the 
 idea of it familiar and easy. Where the resemblance is 
 just and accurate, Che influence of a simile may proceed so 
 far as to shew the possibility of the thing in question : But 
 similitudes must not be taken as a solid proof of the truth 
 or existence of those thifigs to which they have a resem- 
 blance, A too great deference paid to similitudes, or an 
 utter rejection of them, seem to be two extremes, and 
 ought to be avoided. The late ingenious Mr, Locke, even 
 in his inquiries after truth, makes great use of simiUs for 
 frequent illustration, and is very happy in the invention of 
 them I though he warns us also lest we mistake them for 
 conclusive arguments. 
 
 Yet let it be noted here, that a parable or similitude used 
 by an author, may give a sufficient proof of the true sense 
 and meaning of that author, provided that he draw not this 
 similitude beyond the scope and design for which it was 
 brought; as when our Saviour affirms. Rev, iii. 3. I will 
 come on thee as a thief; this will plainly prove that he de- 
 scribes the unexpectedness of his appearance, though it is 
 by no means to be drawn to signify any injustice in his 
 design. 
 
 Rule IX. ^^ In your whole course of reasoning, keep 
 your mind sincerely intent on the pursuit of truth 5 and 
 follow solid argument wheresoever it leads you. Let not 
 a party spirit, nor any passion or prejudice whatsoever, 
 stop or avert the current of your reasoning in quest of true 
 knowledge.'' 
 
 When you are inquiring therefore into any subject, 
 maintain a due regard to the arguments and objections on 
 both sides of a question : Consider, compare, and balance 
 them well before you determine for one side. It is a fre- 
 quent, but a very faulty practice, to hunt after arguments 
 only to make good one side of a question, and entirely to 
 neglect and refuse those which favour the other side. If 
 we have not given a due weight to arguments on both sides, 
 we do but wilfully misguide our judgment, and abuse our 
 reason, by forbidding its search after truth. When we 
 espouse opinions by a secret bias on the mind, through 
 the influence of fear, hope, honour, credit, interest, or any 
 
Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 263 
 
 • 
 
 Other prejudice, and then seek arguments only to support 
 those opinions, we have neither done our duty to God, nor 
 to ourselves, and it is a matter of mere chance if we stum- 
 ble upon truth in our way to ease and preferment. The 
 power of reasoning was given us by our Maker for this 
 very end, to pursue truth ; and we abuse one of his richest 
 gifts, if we basely yield it up to be led astray b}^ any of 
 the meaner powers of nature, or the perishing interests of 
 this hfe. Reason itself, if honestly obeyed, will lead us to 
 receive the divine revelation of the gospel where it is duly 
 proposed, and this yyill shew us tlie path of life everlasting. 
 
tHE 
 
 FOUBTH PART OF LOGICe 
 
 OF DISPOSITION AND METHOD. 
 
 IT is not merely a clear and distinct idea, a well fof med 
 proposition, or a just argument, tbiat is sufficient to search 
 out and communicate the knowledge of a subject. There 
 must be a variety and series of them disposed in a due 
 manner, in order to attain this end : And therefore it is the 
 design of the last part of Logic to teach us the art of 
 method. It is that must secure our thoughts from that, 
 confusion, darkness, and mistake, which unavoidably at- 
 tend the meditations and discourse even of the brightest 
 genius who despises the rules of it. 
 
 I. We shall here consider the nature of method, and the 
 several kinds of it. 
 
 II. Lay down the general rules of method, with a few 
 particulars under them. 
 
 CHAPTER t 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF METHOD, AKd THE SEVE- 
 RAL KINDS OF IT, NAMELY, NATURAL AND 
 ARBITRARY, SYNTHETIC AND ANALYTIC. 
 
 METHOD, taken in the largest sense, implies the plac- 
 ing of several things, or performing several operations in 
 sucli an order, as is most convenient to attain some end pror! 
 posed : And in this sense it is applied to all the works ot 
 nature and art, to all thfe divine affairs of creation and prov- 
 
Chap. 1. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 266 
 
 idence; and to the artifices, schemes, contrivances, and 
 practices of mankind, whether in natural, civil, or sacred 
 affairs. 
 
 Now this orderly disposition of things, includes tile 
 ideas of prior, posterior, and simultaneous 5 of superior, 
 inferior, and equal; of beginning, end, and middle, &c. 
 which are described more particularly among the general 
 affections of being, in ontology. 
 
 But in logic, the method is usually taken in a more lim- 
 ited sense, and the nature of it is thus described ; Method 
 is the disposition of a variety of thoughts on any subject in 
 such order as may best serve to find out unknown truths, 
 to explain and confirm truths that are known, or to fix 
 them to the memory. 
 
 It is distributed into two general kinds, namely, natural 
 and arbitrary. 
 
 Natural method is that which observes the order of na- 
 ture, and proceeds in such a manner as that the knowledge 
 of the things which follow depends in a great measure on 
 the things which go before, and this is two fold, viz. syn-* 
 thUic and analytic,'^ 
 
 * The word analysis has three or four senses, which it may not be 
 inaproper to take notice of here. 
 
 J . li signifies the general and particular heads of a discourse with 
 their mutual connexions, both co-ordinate and subordinate, drawn 
 out by way of abstract in one or more tables, which are frequently- 
 placed like an index at the bc^ginning or end of a book. 
 
 2. It signifies the resolving of a discourse into its various subjects 
 and arguments, as when any writing of the ancient prophets is re- 
 solved into the prophetical, historical, doctrinal, and practical parls 
 of it ; it is said to be analysed in general. When a sentence is dis- 
 tinguished into the nouns, the verbs^ pronoUns, adverbs^ and other 
 particles of speech, which compose it, then it is said to be analysed 
 grammatically. When the same sentence is distinguished into sub- 
 ject and predicate, proposition, argument, act, object^ cause, effect, 
 adjunct, opposite^ &c. then it is analysed logically and metaphysically. 
 This last is what is chiefly meant in the theological school, when 
 they Speak of analysing a text of scripture, 
 
 3. Analysis signifies particularly the science of algebra, whereiii 
 a question being proposed, one Or more letters, as^ x, y, z, or vowels, 
 ias, a, e^ i, &c. are linade use of to signify the "unknown number 
 ^hith being intermingled with ^several kuown numbers in the qu^s' 
 
266 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. IV- 
 
 Synthetic method is that which begins with the parts,* 
 and leads onward to the knowledge of the whole 5 it be- 
 gins with the most simple principles, and general truths, 
 and proceeds by degrees to that which is drawn from them, 
 or compounded of them : And therefore it is called the 
 method of composition. 
 
 Analytic method takes the whole compourxd as it finds 
 it whether it be a species or an individual, and leads us into 
 the knowledge of it, by resolving it into its first principles 
 or parts, its generic nature, and its special properties 5 and 
 therefore it is called the method of resolution. 
 
 As synthetic method is generally used in teaching^he 
 sciences after they are invented, so analytic is most prac- 
 tised in finding out things unknown. Though it must be 
 confessed that both methods are sometimes employed to 
 find out truth and tc» communicate it. 
 
 If we know the parts of any subject easier and better 
 than the whole, we consider the parts distinctly, and by put- 
 ting them together^ we come to the knowledge of the whole. 
 So in grammar we learn first to know letters, we join 
 them to make syllables, out of syllables we compose words, 
 and of words we make sentences and discourses. So the 
 physician and the apothecary knows the nature and pow- 
 ers of his simples, namely, his drugs, his herbs, his miner- 
 als, &c. and putting them together, and considering their 
 several virtues, he finds what will be the nature and pow- 
 ers of the bolus, or any compound medicine : This is the 
 synthetic method. 
 
 But if we are better acquainted with the whole than 
 we are with particular parts, then we divide or resolve the 
 
 tion^ is at last, by the rules of r.rt, separated or released from that en- 
 tanglement, and its particular value is found ou\ by shewing its equa- 
 tion or equality to some known number. 
 
 4. It signifies analytical method, as here explained in logic. 
 
 *Notej It is confessed that synthesis often begins with the genus 
 and proceeds to the species and individuals. But the genus or gen- 
 eric nature is then considered only as a physical or essential part of 
 the species, though it be sometimes called an universal or logical 
 whole. Thus synthetic method maintains its own description still; 
 for it begins with the parts^ and proceeds to tlK whole j which is 
 composed of them. 
 
Chap. I. RIGHT USE OF REASON, 267 
 
 whole into its parts, and thereby gain a distinct knowledge 
 of them. So in vulgar hfe we learn in the gross what 
 plants or minerals are^ and then by chemistry we gain 
 the knowledge of salt, sulphur, spirit, water, earth, which 
 are the principles of them. So we are first acquainted 
 with the whole body of an animal, and then by anatomy 
 or dissection we come to learn all the inward and outward 
 parts of it. This is the analytic method. 
 
 According to this most general and obvious idea of syn- 
 thetic and analytic method, they differ from each other 
 as the way which leads up from a valley to a mountain 
 differs from itself, considered as it leads down from the 
 mountain to the valley; or, as St. Matthew and St. Luke 
 prove Christ to be the son of Abraham ; Luke finds it out by 
 analysis, rising from Christ to his ancestors ; Matthew 
 teaches it in the synthetic method, beginning from Abra- 
 ham, and shewing that Christ is found among his poster- 
 ity. Therefore it is a useful thing in the sciences, when 
 we have by analysis found out a truth, we use the synthet- 
 ic method to explain and deliver it, and prove it to be true. 
 
 In this easy view of things, these two kinds of method 
 may be preserved conspicuously, and entirely distinct : 
 But the subjects of knowledge being infinite, and the 
 ways whereby we arrive at this knowledge being almost 
 infinitely various, it Is very difficult, and almost impossi- 
 ble, ahvays to maintain the precise distinction between 
 these two methods. 
 
 This will appear evidently in the following observa- 
 tion^. 
 
 Observ. T. The analytic method being used chiefly to 
 find out things unknown, it is not limited or confined 
 merely to begin with some whole subject, and proceed to 
 the knowledge of its parts, but it takes its rise sometimes 
 from any single part or property, or from any thing what- 
 soever that belongs to a subject which happens to be first 
 and most easily known, and thereby inquires into the more 
 abstruse and unknown parts, propertie:?, causes, eflfects, 
 and modes of it, whether absolute or relative : As, for in- 
 stance. 
 
 (1.) Analysis finds out causes by their effects. So in 
 the speculative part of natural philosophy, when we observe 
 
'288 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IV. 
 
 Irght, colours, mation, hardness, softness, and oilier proper- 
 ties and powers of bodi-es, or any of the comnnon or un- 
 common appearances of things, either on earth or in heav- 
 en, we search out tire causes of thenfy. So by the various 
 creatures we find out the Creator, and learn his wisdom, 
 power and goodness. 
 
 (2.) It finds out effects by their causes. So the practic- 
 al and meclianical part of natural philosopliy considers 
 such powers of motion, as the wind, the ftre, and tlie wa- 
 ter, &c and then contrives what uses they may be applied 
 to, and what will be their effects, in order to make mills 
 snd engines of various kinds. 
 
 (3.) It finds out the general and special nature of a thing 
 by considering the various attributes of the individuals, and 
 -observing what is common and what is proper, w4iat is 
 accidental and what is essential. *So by surveying the col- 
 our, the shape, naotion, rest, place, solidity, and extension 
 of bodies, we come to find that the nature of body in gen- 
 eral is solid extension ; because all other qualities of bodies 
 are changeable ; but this belongs to all bodies, and it en- 
 dures through all changes ; and because this is proper to 
 body alone, and agrees not to any thing else : and it is the 
 foundation of all other properties. 
 
 (4.) Itfindsoutthe remaining properties or parts of a 
 thing, by having some parts or properties given. So the 
 area of a triangle is found by knowing the height and the 
 base. So by having two sides and an angle of a triangle 
 given, we find the remaining side and angles. So when 
 we know cogitation is the pnme attribute of a spirit, we 
 infer its immateriality, and thence its immortality. 
 
 (5.) Analysis finds the means necessary to attain apro- 
 ])0se4 end, by having the end first assigned. So in moral, 
 political, economical affairs, having proposed the govern- 
 ment of self, a family, a society, or a nation, in order to 
 their best interest, we consider and search out what are the 
 proper laws, rules and means to efiect it. So in the prac- 
 tices of artificers, manufacturers of varoius kinds, the end 
 being proposed, as making cloth, houses, ships, &c. we 
 find out ways of composing those things for the several 
 uses of human life. But the putting any of these means 
 in execution to attain the end, is synthetic method. 
 
Chap. I. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 269 
 
 Many other particulars might be represented to shew the 
 various forms of analytic method, whereby truth is found 
 out, and some of them come very near to S3'^nthetic, so 
 hardly as to be distinguished. 
 
 Observ. II. Not only the investigation of truth, but the^ 
 communication of it also, is often practised in such a method 
 as neither agrees precisely to synthetic or analytic. Some 
 sciences, if you consider the whole of them in general, are 
 treated in synthetic order 5 so physics, or natural philoso- 
 phy, begins usually with an account of the general nature 
 and properties of matter or bodies, and by degrees descend 
 to consider the particular species of bodies, with their 
 powers and properties ; yet it is very evident, that when 
 philosophers come to particular plants and animals, then 
 by chemistry and anatomy they analyse or resolve those 
 bodies into their several constituent parts. On the other 
 hand, logic is begun in analytic method; the whole is divid- 
 ed into its integral parts, according to the four operations 
 t)f the mind; yet here and there synthetic method is used 
 in the particular branches of it, for it treats of ideas in 
 general first, and then descends to the several species of 
 them; it teaches how propositions are made up of ideas,, 
 and syllogisms of propositions, which is the order of com- 
 position. 
 
 The ancient scholastic writers have taken a great deal of 
 pains, and engaged in useless disputes, about these twa 
 methods, and after all have not been able to give such an 
 account of them as to keep them entirely distinct from 
 each other, neither in the theory nor in the practice. Some 
 of the moderns have avoided this confusion in some mea;s- 
 ure by confining themselvss to describe almost nothing 
 else but the synthetic, analytic methods of geometricians 
 and algebraists, whereby they have too much narrowed the 
 nature and rules of method, as though every thing were 
 to be treated in mathematical forms. 
 
 Upon the whole, I conclude that neither of these two 
 methods should be too scrupulously and superstitiously 
 pursued, either in the invention or the communication 
 of knowledge. It is enough, if the order of nature be but 
 observed in making the knowledge of things, following^ 
 depend on the knowledge of the things which go before* 
 
270 LOGIC: OR, THE PaIit. IV. 
 
 Oftentimes a mixed method will be found most efiectual 
 for these purposes 5 and indeed a wise and judicious pros- 
 pect of our main end and design must regulate all method 
 whatsoever. 
 
 Here the rules of natural method ought to be proposed, 
 (whether it be analytic or synthetic, or mixed :) but it is 
 proper first to give some account of arbitrary method, lest 
 it be thrust at too great a distance from the first mention 
 of it. 
 
 Arbitrary method leaves the order of nature, and accom- 
 modates itself to many purposes; such as, to treasure up 
 things,^ and retain them in memory ; to harrangue and per- 
 suade mankind to any practice in the religious or the civil 
 life; or to delight, amuse, or entertain the mind. 
 
 As for the assistance of the memory^ in most things a nat- 
 ural order has an happy influence ; for reason itself deduc- 
 ing one thing from another, greatly assists the memory by 
 the natural connection and mutual dependence of things^ 
 But there are various other methods which mankind have 
 made use of for this purpose, and indeed there are some 
 subjects that can hardly be reduced either to analysis or 
 ^synthesis. 
 
 In reading or writing history, some follow the order of 
 file governors of a nation, and dispose every transaction 
 under their particular reigns : So the sacred books of Kings 
 and Chroniclesare written. Some write in annals or jour- 
 nals, and make a new chapter of every year. Some put 
 all those transactions together which relate to one subject ; 
 that is, all the affairs of one war, one league, one confed- 
 eracy, one council, <fec. though it lasted many years, and 
 under many rulers. 
 
 So in writing the lives of men, which is called hiography^ 
 some authors follow the tract of their years, and place every 
 thing in the precise order of time when it occurred : Others 
 throw the temper and character of the person, their private 
 life, their public stations, their personal occurrences, their 
 domestic condtjct, their speeches, their books or writings, 
 their sickness and death, into so many distinct chapters. 
 
 In chronology some writers make their epochas to begin 
 all with one letter : So in the book called Ductor llistoricus^ 
 
Chap, L RIGHT USE OF REASON. 271 
 
 the periods all begin with C. : as, Creation, Cataclysm, or 
 deluge, Chaldean Empire, Cyrus, Christ, Constantine,&c. 
 Some divide their accounts of time according to the four 
 great monarchies; Assyrian, Persian, Grecian, and Rom- 
 an. Others think it serves the memory best to divide all 
 their subjects into the remarkable number of sevens: so 
 Prideaux has written an introduction to history. And 
 there is a book of diyinity cMed Fasicidus Contriver sarium^ 
 by an author of the same name, written in the same meth- 
 od, wherein every controversy has seven questions belong- 
 ing to it ; tho' the order of nature seems to be too much 
 neglected by confinement ta this septenary number. 
 
 Those writers and speakers whose chief business is to 
 amuse or delight, to allure, terrify, or persuade mankind, 
 do not confine themselves to any natural order, but in a 
 cryptical or hidden method adapt every thing to their de- 
 signed ends. Sometimes they omit those things which 
 might injure their design, or grow tedious to their hear- 
 ers, though they seem to have a necessary relatioa to the 
 point in hand: Sometimes they add those things which 
 have no great references to the subject, but are suited to. 
 allure or refresh the mind and the e^r. They dilate some-- 
 time, and flourish long upon little incidents, and they skip 
 over, and but shghtly touch the drier parts of their theme. 
 They place the first things last^and the last things first, 
 with wondrous art"; and yet so manage it as to conceal 
 their artifice^ and lead the senses and passions of their 
 hearers intp a pleasing and powerful captivity. 
 
 It is chiefly poesy and oratory that require the practice 
 of this kind of arbitrary method t They omit things essen- 
 tial which are not beautiful, they insert little needless cir» 
 cumstances^ and beautiful digressions, they invert times 
 and actions, in order to place every thing in the most af- 
 fecting light ^ and for this end, in their practice they neg- 
 lect all logical forms ; yet a good acquaintance with the 
 forms of logic and natural method is of admirable use to 
 those who would attain these arts in perfection ; hereby 
 they will be able to range their own thoughts in such a 
 method and scheme^ as tcf take a more large and compre- 
 
272 LOGIC : OR, THE • Part IV. 
 
 hensive survey of iheir subject and design in all the parts 
 of it; and by this mean they will better judge what to 
 choose and what to refuse, and how to dress and manage 
 the whole scene before tliem, so as to attain their own 
 ends with greater glory and success. 
 
 CHAPTER IL 
 
 THE RULES OF METHOD, GENERAL AND PAR^ 
 
 TICULAR. 
 
 THE general rules of true method in the pursuit or com- 
 munication of knowledge, may be all comprised under the 
 following heads. It must be (L) Safe. (2.) Plain fnxii easy ^ 
 (3.) Distinct. (4) Full or without defect. (5.) Short or 
 without superfluity. (6.) Proper to the subject and the de-* 
 sign. (7.) Connected^ 
 
 Rule L Among all the qualifications of a good method, 
 there is none more, necessary and important than that it 
 should be safe, and secure from, error \ and to this end 
 these four particular or special directions should be observ- 
 ed. 4 
 
 L ^* Use great care and circumspection in laying the 
 foundation of your discourse, or your scheme of thoughts 
 upon any subject." Those propositions which are to stand 
 as first principles, and on which the whole argument de- 
 pends, must be viewed on all sides with the utmost accura- 
 cy, lest an error being admitted there, should diffuse itself 
 through the whole subje(^ See therefore that your gen- 
 eral definitions ordeecrijnions are as accurate as the nature 
 of the thing will bear : See that your general divisions and 
 distributions be just and exact, according to the rules given 
 in the first part of logic : See that your axioms be suffi- 
 ciently evident, so as to demand the assent of those that 
 examine them with due attention: See that your first and 
 more immediate consequences from these principles be well 
 
Chap. IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 273^ 
 
 drawn ; and take the same care of all other propositions 
 that have a powerful and spreading influence through the 
 several parts of your discourse. 
 
 For want of this carcj sometimes a large treatise has 
 been written by a long deduction of consequences from one 
 or two doubtful principles, which principles have been ef- 
 fectually refuted in a fesv lines, and thus the whole treatise 
 has been destroyed at once : So the largest and fairest 
 building sinks and tumbles to the ground, if the foundation 
 and corner-stones of it are feeble and insufficient. 
 
 2, *' It is a very advisable thing that your primary and 
 fundamental propositions be not onlj^ evident and true, but 
 they should be made a Ut^le familiar to the mind by dwell- 
 ing upon them before you proceed farther.'^ By thts mea» 
 you will gain so full an acquaintance with them, that you 
 may draw consequences from them with much more free- 
 dom, with greater variety, brighter evidence, and with a 
 firmer certainty, than if you have but a slight and sudderi- 
 view of them. 
 
 3\ "As you proceed in connexion of your arguments^ 
 see that your ground be made lirm in every step.'' See 
 that every link of yoiur chain of reasoning be strong and 
 good : For if but one link be feeble and doubtful, the whole 
 chain of arguments feels the weakness of it^ and lies ex- 
 posed to every objector, and the original question remains 
 undetermined. 
 
 4. " Draw up all your propositions and arguments with 
 so much caution, and express your ideas with such a just 
 limitation, as may preclude or anticipate any objections.'^ 
 Yet remember this is only to be done, as far as it is possi- 
 ble, without toa much entangling the question, or introduc- 
 ing complicated ideas, and obscuring the sense. But if 
 such a cautious and limited dress of the question should 
 render the ideas too much complicated, or the sense ob- 
 scure, then it is better to keep the argument more simple, 
 clear, and easy to be understood, and afterwards mention 
 the objections distinctly in their full strength, and give a 
 distinct answer to them. 
 
 Rule II. Let your method be plain and easy, so that 
 your hearers or readers^ as well as youiselff may run 
 
274 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IV- 
 
 through it without embarrassment, and may take a clear 
 and comprehensive view of the whole scheme. To this 
 end the following particular directions will be useful. 
 
 1. ^^ Begin always with those things which are best 
 known and most obvious, whereby the mind may have no 
 difficulty or fatigue, and proceed by regular and easy steps 
 to things that are more difficult.'^ And as far as possible, 
 let not the understanding, or the proof of any of your po- 
 sitions, depend on the positions that follow, but always on 
 those which go before. It is a matter of wonder that in 
 so knowing an age as this, there should be so many persons 
 offering violence daily to this rule, by teaching the Latin 
 language by a grammar written in Latin; which method 
 seems to require a perfect knowledge of an unknown 
 tongue, in order to learn the first rudiments of it. 
 
 2. " Do not effect excessive haste in learnin^or teaching 
 any science, nor hurry at once into the midst of it, lest you 
 be too soon involved in several new and strange ideas and 
 propositions which cannot be well understood without a 
 longer and closer attention to those which go before.'^ — 
 Such sort of speed is but a waste of time, and will constrain 
 you to take many steps backward again, if you would ar- 
 rive at a regular and complete knowledge of the subject. 
 
 3. " Be not fond of crowding too many thoughts and 
 reasonings into one sentence or paragraph, beyond the ap- 
 prehension or capacity of your readers or hearers.'^ There 
 are some persons of a good genius and a capacious mind, 
 who write and speak very obscurely upon this account ; 
 they affect a Jong train of dependencies, before they come 
 to a period; they imagine that they can never fill their 
 page with too much sense ; but they little think how they 
 bury their own best ideas in the crowd, and render them in 
 a manner invisible and useless to the greatest part of man- 
 kind. Such men may be great scholars, yet they are but 
 poor teachers. 
 
 4. " For the same reason, avoid too many subdivisions. 
 Contrive your scheme of thoughts in such a manner as 
 will finish your whole argument with as few inferiour 
 branches as reason will admit 3 and let them be such as 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 2i5 
 
 are obvious and open to the understanding, that they may 
 be within one single view of the mind '^ This will not only 
 assist the understanding to receive, but it will aid the 
 memory also to retain truth : Whereas a discourse cut out 
 into a vast multitude of gradual subordinations, has many 
 inconveniences in it; it gives pain to the mind and memo- 
 ry, in surveying and retaining the scheme of discourse, and 
 exposes the unskilful hearer to mingle the superior and in- 
 ferior particulars together 5 it leads lliem into a thick wood 
 instead of open day-light, and places them in a labyrinth 
 instead of a plain path. 
 
 5. ^' Give all diligCLce in your younger years to obtain 
 a clear and easy way of expressing your conceptions, that 
 your words, as fast as you utter them, may stamp your 
 own ideas exactly on the mind of the hearer." This is a 
 most happy talent for the conveyance of truth, and an ex- 
 cellent security against mistakes and needless controver- 
 sies. 
 
 Rule III. Let your method be distinct, and without the 
 perplexing mixture of things that ought to be kept sepa- 
 rate, and this will be easily practised by four directions. 
 
 1* " Do not bring unnecessary or heterogeneous* matter 
 into your discourse on any subject 5 that is, do not mingle 
 an argument on one subject with matters that relate en- 
 tirely to another, but just so far as is necessary to give a 
 clearer knowledge of the subject in hand.'^ Examples in 
 logic may be borrowed from any of the sciences to illus- 
 trate the rules; but long interpositions of natural philoso- 
 phy, of the imagination and passions, of agency of spirits 
 united to bodies, &c. break the thread of discourse, and 
 perplex the subject. 
 
 2. ^' Let every complicated theme or idea be divided 
 into its distinct single parts, as far as the nature of the 
 subject and your present design require it." Though you 
 must not abound in needless subdivisions, yet something 
 of this work is very necessary; and it is a good judgment 
 alone can dictate how far to proce:/ed in it, and when to 
 {Jtop. 
 
 « Things of otie kind are called homogeneousi things of different 
 kinds are heterogeneous. 
 
■^ 
 
 S76 LOGIC : OR, THE Pakt IV. 
 
 Compound ideas must be reduced to a simple form in 
 order to understand them well. You may easily master 
 that subject in all the charts of it by a regular succession, 
 which would confound the understanding to survey them 
 at once. So we conie at the knowledge of a verjr complet- 
 ed diagram in geometry, or a complicated machine in me- 
 chanics, by having it parcelled out to us in its several 
 parts and principles, according to this and the foregoing 
 rules of method. 
 ^3. " Call every idea, proposition and argument to its 
 wn place. Put those things all together that belong to 
 'one part or property, one consideration or view of your 
 Siibject.'^ This will prevent needless repetitii^ns, and 
 keep you from intermixing things which are different. — 
 We must maintain this distinction of things and places if 
 we would be safe from error, ft is confusion that leads us 
 into endless mistakes, which naturally arise from a variety 
 of ideas ill-joined, ill-sorted, ,or ill-disposed. It is one 
 great use of method, that a multitude of thoughts and 
 propositions may be so distinctly ranged in their proper 
 situations, that the mind may not be overwhelmed with a 
 confused attention to them all at once, nor be distracted 
 with their variety, nor be tempted to unite things which 
 ought to be separated, nor to disjoin things which should 
 be united. 
 
 4. '' In the partition of your discourse into distinct 
 heads, take heed that your particulars do not interfere 
 with the generals, nor with each other.'^ Think it is not 
 enough that you make use of distinct expressions in each 
 particular, but take care that the ideas be distinct also. It 
 is mere foolery to multiply distinct particulars in treating 
 X)f things, where the difference of your particulars lies on- 
 ly in names and words. 
 
 Rule IV. The method of treating a subject should be 
 plenary or full, so that noihing may be wanting; nothing 
 which is necessary or proper should be omitted. 
 
 When you are called to explain a subject, do not pass 
 by, nor skip over any thing in it which is very difficult or 
 obscure^ 
 
Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 277 
 
 When you enumerate the parts or the properties of any 
 subject, do it in a complete and comprehensive manner. 
 
 When you are asserting or proving any truth, see that 
 every doubtful or disputable part of the argument be well 
 supported and confirmed. 
 
 If you are to illustrate or argue a point of difficulty, be 
 not too scanty of words but rather become a litUe copious 
 and diffiisive in your language : Set the truth before the 
 reader in several lights, turn the various sides of it to view, 
 in order to give a full idea and firm evidence of the prop- 
 osition. 
 
 When you are drawing up a narrative of any matter of 
 fact, see that no important circumstances be omitted. 
 
 When you propose the solution of any difficulty, con- 
 sider all the various cases wherein it can happen, and shew 
 how they may be solved. 
 
 In short, let your enumerations, your division, and dis- 
 tributions of things, be so accurate, that no needful idea or 
 part may be left out. 
 
 This fulness of method does not require that every thing 
 should be said which can be said upon any subject ; for 
 this would make each single science endless : But you 
 should say every thing which is necessary to the design in 
 view, and which has a proper and direct t€i?dency to this 
 end; always proportioning the amplitude of your malter^ 
 and the fulness of your disccurse, to your great design, to 
 the length of your time, to the convenience, delight, and 
 profit of your hearers. 
 
 Rule V. As your method must be full without deficien- 
 cy, so it must be short, or without superfluity. Tlie fulness 
 of a discourse enlarges our knowledge, and the well co>«cer- 
 ted brevity saves our time* In order to observe this rule, 
 it will be enough to point out the chief of those superflui- 
 ties or redundancies, which some persons are guilty of in 
 their discourses, with a due caution against them. 
 
 1. "Avoid all needless repetitions of the same thing in 
 different parts of your discourse." It must be confr^srd 
 there are several cases wher-ein a review of some foregoiMg 
 proposition is needful to explain or prove several of the fol- 
 lowing positions; but let your method be so connived, as 
 far as possible, that it may occasiou the tiewest rehearsals 
 Z 
 
^78 LOGIC : OR, THE Part lY^ 
 
 nOf the same thing; for it is not grateful to the hearers, 
 without evident necessity. 
 
 2. ^' Have a care of tedious proHxity, or drawing out 
 any part of your discourse to ah unnecessary and tiresonie 
 length.'^ It is much more honorable for an instructor, an 
 orator, a pleader, or a preacher, that his hearers should 
 say, I was afraid he would havedone, than that they should 
 be tempted to shew signs of uneasiness, and long for the 
 conclusion. 
 
 ^Besides, there is another inconvenience in it; when you 
 affect to amplify on the former branches of a discourse, 
 you will often lay a necessity uponyourself of contr?*cting 
 the latter and most useful parts of it, and perhaps prevent 
 yours^'f in the most important part of your design. Many 
 a preacher has been guilty of Xh'is fault in former days; 
 nor is the present age without some instances of this weak- 
 .Bess. 
 
 3. '* Do not multiply explications where there is no 
 difficulty, or darkness, or danger of mistake.'^ Be not fond 
 of tracing every word of your theme, through all thegram- 
 xnaticai, the logical, and metaphysical characters and rela- 
 tions of it; nor shew your critical learning in spreading 
 abroad the various senses of a word, and 4he various ori- 
 gins of those senses, the etymology of terms, the synony- 
 mous and the paronymous or kindred names, &c. where 
 the chief point of discourse docs not at all require it* You 
 
 ,would laugh at a pedant, who, professing to explain the 
 Athanasian creed, should acquaint you that Alhanasius i& 
 derived from a Greek word, which signifies imiriortality, 
 and that the same word Athanasius signifies also the herb 
 
 . ianzy. 
 
 Ihere are some persons so fond of their learned distinc- 
 
 . lions, that they will shew their subtilty b)^ distinguishing 
 
 /where there is no difference. And the same silly affecta- 
 tion will introduce distinctions upon every occurrence, and 
 bring three or four negatives upon every suhject of dis- 
 course ; first to declare what it is not, and then what it is : 
 Whereas such negatives ought never to be mentioned 
 where there is no apparent danger of mistake. How ri- 
 diculous would that writer, who, if he were speaking of 
 
 ftjie Nicene creed, should declare negatively, (1.) That he 
 
CffAp. II. RIGHT USE OF REASO>f, 270 
 
 did not mean the doctrine which the inhabitants of Nice 
 believed ; nor, (2.) A creed written by them ; but, (3.) 
 Positivelyj a creed composed by several Christian bishops 
 met together in the city of Nice ? The positive is sufficient 
 here, and the two negatives are impertinent. 
 
 4. " Be not fond of proving those things which need no 
 proof Such as self-evident propositions and truths uni- 
 versally confessed, or such as are entirely agreed to, and 
 granted b}' our opponents. It is this vain affectation of 
 proving every thing that has led geometricians to form 
 useless and intricate demonstrations to support som'e theo- 
 rems, which are sufficiently evident to the eye by inspec- 
 tion; or to the mind by the first mention of them; and it 
 is the same humour that reigns sometimes in the pulpit, 
 •and spends half the sermon in proving some general truths ' 
 which is never disputed or doubted, and thereby robs the 
 anditory of more useful entertainment. 
 
 5. As there are some things so evidently true, that they 
 want no proof, so there are others so evidently false, that 
 they want no refutation. It is mere trifling, and a waste 
 of our precious moments, to invert a'nd raise such objections 
 as no man would ever make in earnest, and that merely 
 for the sake of answering and solving them : This break;s 
 in notoriously upon the due brevity of method. 
 
 6. "Avoid in general all learned formsj all trappinggof 
 art, and ceremonies of the schools^ where there is no need 
 of them*" It is reported concierning the late Czar of Mus- 
 covy, that when he first acquainted himself with mathe- 
 matical learning, he practised all the rules of circum valla- 
 tk>n and contravallaiion, at the siege of a town in Livo- 
 nia ; and by the length of those formahties he lost the op* 
 portunity of taking the town. 
 
 7. "Do not suffer every occasional and incidental thought 
 to carry you away into a long parenthesis, and thus to 
 stretch out your discourse, and divert you from the point 
 in hand.'' In the pursuit of your subject, if any useful 
 thought occur which belongs to some other theme, note it 
 down for the sake of your memory on some other paper^j 
 and lay it by in reserve for its proper place and season : 
 but let it not incorporate itself with your present theme^ 
 nor draw off your mind from your main business^ tfiougb 
 
280 LOGIC : OR, THE Fart IV. 
 
 it should be ever so inviting. A man who walks directly 
 but slowly toward his journey*s end, will arrive thither 
 much sooner than his neighbour, who runs into every 
 crooked turning which he meets, and wanders aside to gaze 
 at every thing that strikes his eyes by the way, or to gather 
 every gaudy flower that grows by the side of the road. 
 
 To sum up all : "There is a happy medium to be ob- 
 served in our' method, so that the brevity may not render 
 the sense obscure, nor the argument feeble^ nor our knowl- 
 edge merely supei-ficial : And on the other hand, that the 
 fulness and copiousuess of our method may not waste the 
 time, tire the learner, or fill the mind with trifles and im- 
 pertinencies." 
 
 The copious and the contracted way of writing have each 
 their peculiar advantages. Tiiere is a proper use to be 
 made of large pai-aphrases, and full, particular, and diffu- 
 sive explications and arguments; these are fittest fjr those 
 who design to be acquainted thoroughly with every part 
 of the subject. There is also an use of shorter hints, ab- 
 stracts, and compendiums, to instruct those who seek only 
 a slight and general knowledge, as well as to refresh the 
 memory of those who have learned the science already, 
 and gone through a large scheme. But it is a gross abuse 
 of tliese various methods of instruction, when a person has 
 read a mere compendium or epitome of any science, and 
 he vainly imagines that he understands the whole science. 
 So one br)y may become a philosopher by reading over the 
 mere dry definitions and divisions of Scheibler^s Compendi- 
 um of Peripateticism : So another may boast that he un- 
 derstands anatomy because he has seen a skeletoi] ; and a 
 third profess himself a learned divine, when he can repeat 
 the apostles' creed. 
 
 Rule VI. «' Take care that your method be proper to 
 the subject in hand, proper to your present design, as well 
 as proper to the age and place wherein you dwell. 
 
 1. Let your method be proper to the subject. All sci- 
 ences must not be learned or taught in one method. Mo- 
 rality and theology, metaphysics and logic, will not be 
 easily and happily reduced to strict mathematical method, 
 Tiiose who have tried, have found much inconvenience 
 therein. 
 
Chap. It RIGHT USE OF REASON, 2fffl 
 
 Some things have more need to be explained than to be 
 proved j as axioms, or self-evident propositions ; and in- 
 deed all the first great principles, the chief and most im- 
 portant doctrines both of natural and revealed religion ; for 
 when the sense of them is clearly explained, they appeat 
 so evident in the light of nature or scripture, that they 
 want no other proof. There are other things that stand in 
 need of proof, as well as explication, as many mathemati- 
 cal theorems, and several deep controversies in morality 
 and divinity. There are yet other sorts of subjects whicfi 
 want rather to be warmly impressed upon the mmd by fer- 
 vent exhortation, and stand in more need of this than tney 
 do either of proof or explication ; such are the most gene^ 
 ral, plain, and obvious duties of piety towards God, and 
 love towards men, with the governments of all our inclina- 
 tions and passions. Now these several subjects ought to, 
 be treated in a different manner and method* 
 
 Again there are some subjects in the same treatise which 
 are more useful and necessary than others, and some parts 
 of a subject which are eminently and chiefly designed by a 
 writer or speaker : True method will teach us to dwell 
 longer upon these themes, and to lay out more thought 
 and labour upon them; whereas the same art of method 
 will teach us to cut short those things which are used only 
 to introduce our main subject, and to st^nd as scaffolding 
 merely to aid the structure of our discourse. It will teach 
 us also to content ourselves with brief hints of those mat- 
 ters ^vhich are merely occasional and incidental. 
 
 2 Your method must be adjusted by your design ; for 
 if you treat of the same subject with two different views 
 and designs, you will find it necessary to use different 
 methods. Suppose the doctrine of the sacred Trinity were 
 your theme, and you were to read a lecture to young stu- 
 dents on the subject, or if you designed a treatise for the 
 conviction of learned men, you would pursue a very differ- 
 ent method from that which would be proper to regulate a 
 practical discourse or a sermon to instruct common chris- 
 tians merely in the pious impr )ve-nent of this doctrine, and' 
 shaken them to the duties which are derived thence. 
 
 Z2 
 
S82 LOGIC : OR, THE Paet. IV. 
 
 In short we must not first lay down certain and precise 
 rules of method, and resolve to confine the matter we dis« 
 course of, to that particular form and order of topics ; but 
 we must well consider, and study the subject of our dis- 
 course thoroughly, and take a just survey of our present 
 design, and these will give sufBcient hints of the particular 
 form and order in vvhich we should handle it, provided 
 that we are moderately skilled in the general laws of meth- 
 od and order. 
 
 Yet let it be noted here, that neither the subject, nor 
 matter of a discourse, nor the particular design of it, can 
 so precisely determine the method, as to leave no room 
 for liberty and variety. The very same theme may be 
 handled, and that also with the same design, in several 
 different methods, among which it is hard to say which is 
 the best. In writing a system of divinity, some begin 
 with the scriptures, and thence deduce all other doctrines 
 and duties. Some begin with the being of God and his 
 attributes, so far as he is known by the light of nature f 
 and then proceed to the doctrines of revelation. Some 
 distinguish the whole subject into the credenda and agen- 
 da, that is^ Things to be believed, and things to be done. 
 Some tliink it best to explain the whole Christian religion 
 by an historical detail of all the discoveries which God has 
 made of himself to this lower world, beginning at the 
 creation in the first chapter of Genesis, and so proceeding 
 onward according to the narrative of the Old and New 
 Testameni= And there are others that endeavour to in- 
 clude the whole of rehgion under these four heads, namely, 
 The apostles' creed^ the Loi^d^s prayer, the ten commaiidents^ 
 and the two sacraments / though I cannot but think this is 
 the least accurate of any. The same variety may be al- 
 lowed in treating other subjects. This very treatise of lo- 
 gic is an instance of it, whose method diflers very consid- 
 erably from any others which I have seen, as they difier 
 also greatly from one another, though several of them are 
 confessed to be well written. 
 
 3. Though a just view of our subject and our design 
 may dictate proper rules of natural method, yet there must 
 be some little difference at least paid to the custom of 
 the age wb^r^iii w^ live, and to the humour and genius 
 
Chaf. II. right use of REASON. 283 
 
 of our readers or hearers : which if we utterly reject and 
 disdain, our performances will fail of the desired success, 
 even though we may have followed the just rules of meth- 
 od, I will mention but this one instance 5 In the former 
 century it was frequent with learned men to divide their 
 theme or subject into a great multitude of co-ordinate 
 members or parts, they abounded also in the forms of lo- 
 gic and distinction, and indulged numerous ranks of sub- 
 ordination. Nowj though we ought not to abandon the 
 rules of just method and division, in order to compare 
 with the modish writers in our age who have renounced 
 them, yet it is prudent to pay so much respect to the cus- 
 tom of the age, as to use these forms of division with due 
 moderation, and not affect to multiply them in such a 
 manner, as to give an early and needless disgust to the 
 generality of your present readers* The same may be 
 said concerning various other methods of conduct in the 
 affairs of learning, as well as the affa rs of life, wherein 
 we must indulge a little to custom : And yet we must by 
 no means suffer ourselves so far to be imposed upon and 
 governed by it as to neglect those rules of method which 
 are necessary for the safe, easy, and complete inquiry in- 
 to truth, or the ready and effectual communication of it 
 to others. 
 
 Rule VII. The last requisite of method is, that the 
 parts of a discoure should be well connected ; and these 
 three short directions will suffice for this purpose. 
 
 1. " Keep your main end and design ever in view, and 
 let all the parts of your discourse have a tendency towards 
 it, and as far as possible make that tendency visible all 
 the way :'' Otherwise the readers or hearers will have 
 reason to wonder for what end that or this particular was 
 introduced, 
 
 2. " Let the mutual relation and dependence of the 
 several branches of your discourse be so just and evide» t, 
 that every part may naturally lead onward to the i;ext, 
 without any huge chasms or breaks which interrupt and 
 deform the scheme." The connexion of truths should 
 arise and appear in their successive rank and order, as 
 the several parts of a fine prospect jiscend just behind Ciich 
 other, in their natural and regular elevations and distan** 
 
284 LOGIC. PartVL 
 
 ces and invite the eye to climb onward with constant plea- 
 sure till it reach the sky. Whatsoever hori id beauty a 
 precipice or a cataract may add to the prospect of a coun- 
 try, yet such sort of hideous and abrupt appearances in a 
 scene of reasoning are real blemishes and not beauties. 
 When the reader is passing over such a treatise, he often 
 finds a wide vacancy, and makes an uneasy stop, and 
 knows not how to transport his thoughts over to the next 
 particular, for want of some clue orjConnecting idea to lay 
 hold of. 
 
 3. " Acquaint yourself with all the proper and decent 
 forms of transition from one part of a discourse to anotln 
 er, and practise them as occasion offers." Where the ideas, 
 propositions and arguments, are happily disposed, and 
 well connected, the truth indeed is secure 5 but it renders 
 the discourse much more agreeable, when proper and 
 graceful expression joins the parts of it together in so en^ 
 tertaining a manner, that the reader knows not how to 
 leave off till he hath arrived at tiie end. 
 
 These are the general and most important rules of true 
 Method ; and though they belong chiefly to the communi- 
 cation of knowledge, yet an early and thorough acquaint- 
 ance with them will be of considerable use to towards the 
 pursuit and attainment of it. 
 
 Those persons who have never any occasion to commu- 
 nicate knowledge by writing or by public discourses, may 
 also with great advantage peruse these rules of method, 
 that they may learn to judge with justice and accuracy 
 concerning the performances of otliers. And besides, a 
 good acquaintance with method, will greatly assist every 
 one in ranging, disposing and managing all human affairs. 
 The particular means or method for a farther improvement 
 of the understanding are very various, such as meditation, 
 readmg, conversing, disputing, by speech or by writing, 
 question and answer, &c. And in each of these practices 
 some special forms may be observed, and special rules 
 may be given to facilitate and secure our inquiries after 
 truth: But this would require a little volume by itself, and 
 a treatise of Logic has always been esteemed sufficiently 
 (Cpii^lete without it. 
 
 THE ENI>- 
 
A TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 THE IiUroduction or general Scheme, pagt 6 
 
 THE FIRST PART, Viz. 
 
 Of Perception and Ideas, 
 
 CHAP. I. Ofthe nature of Ideas. p. 11 
 
 CHAP. 11. Of the Objects of Perception. Sect. 1. Of 
 Being in general, p, 13. Sect. 2. Of Substances and 
 their various kinds, p. 14. Sect. 3. Of Modes and their 
 various kinds ^ and first of essential and accidental 
 modeSj p. 18. Sect. 4. The farther divisions of raode, 
 p. 22. Sect. 5. Of the Ten Categories— Of Substance 
 modified, p. 25. Sect. 6. Of Not-being, p. 26. 
 
 CHAP. III. Of the several sorts of Perception or Ideas. 
 Sect. 1. Of sensible, spiritual, and abstracted ideas, p. 
 27. Sect. 2, Of simple and complex, compound and 
 collective ideas, p, 31. Sect. 3. Of universal and par- 
 ticular ideas, real and imaginary, p. 32. Sect. 4. The 
 division of ideas with regard to their quaUties, p. 36. 
 
 CHAP. IV. Of words, and their several divisions, togeth- 
 er with the advantage and danger of them. Sect I. Of 
 words in general and their use, p. 41. Sect. 2. Of nega- 
 tive and positive terms, p. 45. Sect. 3. Of Simple and 
 complex terms, p. 47. Sect, 4. Of words common and 
 proper, p, 49- Sect. 5. Of concrete and ab.^tract terms, 
 p. 50. Sect. 6 Of uni vocal and rqui vocal words, p. 51. 
 Sect, 7. Various kinds of equivocal words, p. 52. Sect. 
 8. The origin or causes of equivocal words, p. 57. 
 
286 A TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. V. General directions relating to our ideas, 
 namely, L Of acquiring a treaj<ure of ideas — 2. Of re- 
 taining ideas in memory — 3. Of selecting useful ideas — 
 4. Of the goverment of our thoughts, p. 60. 
 
 CHAP. VI. Special rules to direct our conceptions of 
 things, p. 66, Sect 1, Of gaining clear and distinct 
 ideas, p. 67. Sect. 2. Of the definition of words or 
 names, p. 69. Sect 3. Directions concerning the defi- 
 nition of names, p. 70. Sect. 4. Of the definition of 
 things, p. 82. Sect. 5. Rules of Definition of the thing, 
 p. 85. Sect. 6. Observatians concerning the definition 
 of things, p. 88. Sect 7. Of a complete conception of 
 things, p. 94. Sect. 8. Of division and the rules of it, 
 p. 96. Sect. 9. Of a comprehensive coHception of 
 things, and of abstraction, p. 100. Sect. 10 Of the ex- 
 tensive conception of things, and of distribution, p. 103. 
 Sect. 11. Of an orderly conception of things, p. 107^ 
 Sect. 12. These five rules of conception exemplified, p. 
 108. Sect 13. An illustration of these five rules by 
 similitudes, p. 110. 
 
 THE SEC OJSrD PART, Viz. 
 
 Of Judgment and proposition, 
 
 CHAP. I. Of the nature of a propositit)a and its several 
 paits, p. 114. 
 
 CHAP. IL Of the various kinds of propositions. Sect. 
 1. Of universal, particular, indefinite, and singular pro- 
 positions, p. 117. Sect. 2.^ Of afiirmitive and negative 
 propositions, p. 125. Sect. 3. Of the opposition and 
 conversion of propositions, p. 125 Sect. 4. Of pure 
 and modal propositions, p. 127. Sect. 5. Of single pro- 
 positions, whether simple or complex, p. 129. Sect. 6. 
 Of compound propositions, p 131, Sect. 7. Of true 
 a!id false propositions, p. 135. Sect 8. Of certain and 
 doubtful propositions of knowledge and opinion, p. 138. 
 Sect. 9. Of sense, consciousness, intelligence, reason, 
 faith, and inspiration, p. 140. 
 
A TABLE OF CONTENTS. 28? 
 
 €H4P. III. The springs of false judgment, or the doc- 
 trine of prejudices, p 146. Sect. 1. Prejudices arising 
 from things, p. 148. Sect. 2 Prejudices arising from 
 words, p. 153, Sect. 3. Prejudices arising from our- 
 selves, p 156. Sect. 4. Prejudices arising from other 
 persons, p. 168. 
 
 CHAP. IV. General directions to assist us in judging 
 aright, p. 181. 
 
 CHAP. V. Special Rules to direct us in judging particu- 
 lar objects, p 195- Sect. 1. Principles and rules of 
 judgment concerning the objects of sense, p. 196. 
 Sect. 2. Principles and rules of judgment in matters of 
 reason and speculation, p. 199. Sect. 3. Principles 
 and rules of judgment in matters of morality and reli- 
 gion, p. 203. Sect. 4. Principles and rules of judgment 
 in matters of human prudence, p. 207. Sect. 5. Prin- 
 ciples and rules of judgment in matters of human testi- 
 mony, p 209. Sect 6. Principles and rules of judg- 
 ment in matters of divine testimony, p. 213. Sect. 7. 
 Principles and ru^es of judgment concerning things p^^stj 
 present, and to come, by the mere use of reason p. 216* 
 
 THE THIRD PART, Viz. 
 
 Of Reasoning and Syllogism, 
 
 CHAP. I. Of the nature of a syllogism, and of the parts 
 of which it is composed, p 219. 
 
 CHAP. 11. Of the various kinds of syllogisms, with par- 
 ticular rules relating to them. Sect. 1. Of Universal 
 and particular syllogisms both negative »nd affirmative, 
 p. 222. Sect. 2 Of plain, simple syllogisms, and their 
 rules, p. 223. Sect. 3. Of the moods and figures of sim- 
 ple syllogisms, p 226 Sect 4. Of complex syllogisms, 
 p. 229. Sect. 5 Of conjunctive syllogisms, p. 23i. 
 Sect. 6. Of compouijd syllogisms, p 235, Sect. 7. Of 
 the middle termsi of common places or topics, and in- 
 
288 A TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 venlion of arguments, p. 238. Sect 8. Of several kinds 
 of arguments and demonstrations^ p. 240. 
 
 CHAP in. The doctrines of sophisms. Sect. 1. Of 
 several kinds of sophisms, and their solution, p. 244. 
 Sect. 2. Two general tests of true syllogisms, and 
 methods of solving all sophisms, p. 251. 
 
 CHAP. IV. Some general rules to direct our reasoning^ 
 page 254. 
 
 THE FOURTH PART, Viz. 
 
 Of Disposition and Method. 
 CHAP, I. The nature and kinds of method, p. 264. 
 CHAP. II. General and special rules of method, p. 272. 
 
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