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LOGICK: 
 
 Or, The RIGHT USE of 
 
 REASON 
 
 I N X T H E 
 
 Enquiry after TRUTH. 
 
 WITH 
 
 A Variety of Ru l e s to guard againft Error, 
 
 in the Affairs of Religion and 
 
 Human Life, as well as 
 
 in the Sciences. 
 
 By ISAAC WATTS, D. D. 
 The Fourth Edition, Corrected. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed /^Emanuel Matthews, at the Bible In 
 Pater-nofter-Row ; Richard Ford, at the Angel, 
 <2WRichard Hett, at the Bible and Crown, both 
 in the Poultry. MDCCXXXI. 
 
S OS *4 
 
1 
 
 T O V: 
 
 Sir John Hartopp, Bar c . 
 
 Sir, 
 
 IT is fit the Publick fhould receive 
 thro' your Hands what was written 
 originally for the Affiftance of your 
 younger Studies, and was then prefent- 
 ed to you. 
 
 It was by the repeated Importunities 
 of our Learned Friend Ms. John Eames, 
 that I was perfuaded to revife thefe 
 Rudiments of Logick ; and when I had 
 once fuffered myfelf to begin the 
 Work, I was drawn ftill onward far 
 beyond my firft Defign, even to the 
 Negledl, or too long Delay of other 
 prefling and important Demands that 
 were upon me. 
 
 It has been my Endeavour to form 
 
 every Part of thisTreatife both for the 
 
 A z Inftruc- 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 Inftrudion of Students to open their 
 Way into the Sciences, and for the 
 more extenfive and general Service of 
 Mankind, that the Gentleman and the 
 Chrift'tan might find their Account in 
 the Perufal as well as the Scholar. I 
 have therefore collected and propos'd 
 the chief Principles and Rules of right 
 Judgment in Matters of common and 
 facred Importance, and pointed out 
 our moft frequent Miftakes and Preju- 
 dices in the Concerns of Life and Re- 
 ligion, that we might better guard a- 
 gainft the Springs of Error, Guilt and 
 Sorrow, which furround us in every 
 Stage of Mortality. 
 
 You know, Sir> the great Defign of 
 this noble Science is to refcue our rea- 
 foning Powers from their unhappy Sla- 
 very and Darknefs ; and thus with all 
 due Submiflion and Deference it offers 
 a humble Afiiftance to divine Reve- 
 lation. Its chief Bufinefs is to relieve 
 the natural Weakneffes of the Mind by 
 fome better Efforts of Nature j it is to 
 
 diffufe 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 diffufe a Light over the Underfxanding 
 in our Enquiries after Truth, and not 
 to furnifh the Tongue with Debate and 
 Controverfy. True Logtck is not that 
 noify Thing that deals all in Difpute 
 and Wrangling, to which former Ages 
 had debafed and confined it 5 yet its 
 Difciples muft acknowledge alfo, that 
 they are taught to vindicate and defend 
 the Truth, as well as to fearch it out. 
 True Logtck doth not require a long 
 Detail of hard Words to amufe Man- 
 kind, and to puff up the Mind with 
 empty Sounds, and a Pride of falfe 
 Learning ; yet fome Diftin&ions and 
 Terms of Art are neceflary to range 
 every Idea in its proper Clafs, and 
 to keep our Thoughts from Confufion, 
 The World is now grown fo wife as 
 not to fuffer this valuable Art to be 
 engroft by the Schools. In fo polite 
 and knowing an Age, every Man of 
 Rcafon will covet fome Acquaintance 
 with Logtck) fince it tenders its daily 
 Service to Wtfdom and Virtue^ and to 
 A j the 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 the Affairs of common Life as well as 
 to the Sciences. 
 
 I will not prefume, Sir, that this 
 little Book is improved fince its firft 
 Compofure, in Proportion to the Im- 
 provements of your manly Age. But 
 when you fhall pleafe to review it in 
 your retired Hours, perhaps you may 
 refrefh your own Memory in fome of 
 the early Parts of Learning : And if 
 you find all the additional Remarks 
 and Rules made fo familiar to you al- 
 ready by your own Obfervation, that 
 there is nothing new among them, it 
 will be no unpleafing Reflection that 
 you have fo far anticipated the prefent 
 Zeal and Labour of, 
 
 SIR, 
 
 Tour moji faithful and 
 obedient Servant, 
 
 London Aug. 24. 
 1724. 
 
 I. WATTS. 
 
( I ) 
 
 L O G I C K 
 
 O R, 
 
 The Right Ufe of Reason, 
 
 The Introduction and general Scheme. 
 
 LO G I C K is the Art ofufing Reafon * well 
 in our Enquiries after Truth* and the Com- 
 munication of it to others. 
 
 Reafon * is the Glory of human Nature, 
 and one of the chief Eminencies whereby we are 
 railed above our Fellow-Creatures the Brutes in 
 this lower World. 
 
 Reafon, as to the Power and Principle of it, h 
 the common Gift of God to all Men •, tho' all 
 are not favour'd with it by Nature in an equal 
 Degree : But the acquired Improvements of it in 
 different Men, make a much greater Diftindtion 
 between them than Nature had made. I could 
 even venture to fay, that the Improvement of Rea- 
 fon hath raifed the Learned and the Prudent in 
 the European World, almoft as much above the 
 Hottentots ', and other Savages of Africa, as thofe 
 Savages are by Nature fuperior to the Birds, the 
 Bealts, and the Fillies. 
 
 Now the Dcfign of Logick is to teach us the 
 right Ufe of our Reafon, or Iv.td'.ctlual Powers^ 
 and the Improvement of thern in our fclves and 
 others -, this is not only neceflary in order to at- 
 
 • The Word Ru/im in chii Place is nor confin'd to tKe mere Ftculcv of 
 rcafonin£ or Inferring one ihicg from anjthe/, but iQ^uilet ill cbc ictellec- 
 (utl Foweri of Miu, 
 
 A 4 tain 
 
2 L G I C K: Or, 
 
 tain any competent Knowledge in the Sciences, or 
 the Affairs of Learning, but to govern both the 
 greater and the meaner Anions of Life. It is the 
 Cultivation of our Reafon by which we are better 
 enabled to diftinguifh Good from Evil, as well as 
 'Truth from Faljhood : And both thefe are Matters 
 of the higheft Importance, whether we regard this 
 Life, or the Life to come. 
 
 ' The Purfait and Acquifition of Truth is of infi- 
 nite Concernment to Mankind. Hereby we be- 
 come acquainted with the Nature of Things both 
 in Heaven and Earth, and their various Relations 
 to each other. It is by this means we difcover 
 our Duty to God and our Fellow-Creatures : By 
 this we arrive at the Knowledge of natural Reli- 
 gion, and learn to confirm our Faith in divine Re- 
 velation, as well as to underftand what is revealed. 
 Our Wifdom, Prudence and Piety, our prefent 
 Conduct and our future Hope, are all influenced 
 by the Ufe of our rational Powers in the Search 
 after Truth. 
 
 There are feveral Things that make it very ne- 
 ceflary that our Reafon mould have fome Aflif- 
 tance in the Exercife or Ufe of it. v 
 
 The flrft is, the Depth and Difficulty of many 
 Truths, and the Weaknefs of our Reafon to fee far 
 into Things at once, and penetrate to the Bottom of 
 them. It was a Saying among the Ancients, Ve- 
 ritas in Puteo, Truth lies in a Well ; and to car- 
 ry on this Metaphor we may very juftly fay, that 
 Logick does, as it were, fupply us with Steps 
 whereby we may go down to reach the Water -> 
 or it frames the Links of a Chain whereby we 
 may draw the Water up from the Bottom. Thus, 
 by the Means of many Reafonings well connect- 
 ed together, Philofophers in our Age have drawn 
 a thoufand Truths out of the Depths of Dark- 
 
 nefs, 
 
the right life of Reafon. 3 
 
 nefs, which our Fathers were utterly unacquaint- 
 ed with. 
 
 Another Thing that makes it neceiTary for our 
 Reafon to have fome Afliftance given it, is the 
 Di/guifi ard falfc Colours in which many things ap- 
 pear to us in this prefent imperfecl State: There are 
 a thoufand things which are not in reality what 
 they appear to be, and that both in the natural 
 and the moral World : So the Sun appears to be 
 flat as a Plate of Silver, and to be lefs than twelve 
 Inches in Diameter ; the Moon appears to be as 
 big as the Sun, and the Rainbow appears to be a 
 large fubftantial Arch in the Sky, all which are 
 in reality grofs Falfhoods. So Knavery puts on 
 the Face ofjujlice, Hypocrify and Superftition wear 
 the Vizard of Piety, Deceit and Evil are often 
 clothed in the Shapes and Appearances of Truth 
 and Goodnefs. Now Logick helps us to ftrip off 
 the outward Difguife of Things, and to behold 
 them and judge of them in their own Nature. 
 
 There is yet a further Proof that our intellectual 
 or rational Powers need fome AfTiftance, and that 
 is becaufe they are fo frail and fallible in the pre- 
 fent State ; we are impofed upon at home as well as 
 abroad-, we are deceiv'd by our Senfes, by our Ima- 
 ginations, by our Pajfons and Appetites \ by the Au- 
 thority of Men, by Education and Cuflom, Sec. and 
 we are led into frequent Errors, by judging accord- 
 ing to theft folic and flattering Principles, rather 
 than according to the Nature of Things. Some- 
 thing of this Frailty is owing to our very Confti* 
 tution, Man being compounded of Flefh and Spi- 
 rit: Something of it arifes from our infant State, 
 and our growing up by (low Degrees to Manhood, 
 fo that we form a thou 'and Judgments before our 
 Reafon is mature. But there is if ill more of it 
 owing to our original Dfcclion from God, and 
 
 the 
 
4 L O G I C K: Or, 
 
 the foolifh and evil Difpofitions that are found in 
 fallen Man : So that one great Part of the Defign 
 of Logick is to guard us againft the delufive Influ- 
 ences of our meaner Powers, to cure the Miftakes 
 of immature Judgment, and to raife us in fome 
 meafure from the Ruins of our Fall. 
 
 It is evident enough from all thefe Things, that 
 our Reafon needs the Afli fiance of Art in our En- 
 quiries after Truth or Duty •, and without fomc 
 Skill and Diligence in forming our Judgments a- 
 right, we fhail be led into frequent Miftakes, both 
 in Matters of Science, and in Matters of Praclice 9 
 and fome of thefe Miftakes may prove fatal too. 
 
 The Art of Logick, even as it afllfts us to gain 
 the Knowledge of the Sciences, leads us on to- 
 ward Virtue and Happinefs ; for all our fpecula- 
 tive Acquaintance with Things mould be made fub- 
 fervient to our better Conducl in the civil and the 
 religious Life. This is infinitely more valuable 
 than all Speculations, and a wife Man will ufe 
 them chiefly for this better Purpofe. 
 
 All the good Judgment and Prudence that any 
 Man exerts in his common Concerns of Life, 
 without the Advantages of Learning, is caJled 
 natural Logick: And it is but a higher Advance- 
 ment, and a firmer AfTiftance of our rational 
 Powers that is defign'd by and expected from this 
 artificial Logick. 
 
 In order to attain this, we muft enquire what 
 are the principal Operations of the Mind, which 
 are put forth in the Exercife of our Reafon: And 
 we mall find them to be thefe four, (viz.) Per- 
 ception, Judgment, Argumentation, and Difpofition. 
 
 Now the Art of Logick is compos'd of thofe Cb- 
 fervations and Rules, which Men have made about 
 thefe four Operations of the Mind, Perception* 
 Judgment, Reafoning, and Difpofition^ in order to 
 afliit and improve them, I. Per- 
 
The right Ufe of Reafon. 5 
 
 I. Perception, Conception, or Apprehenfion, is the 
 mere fimple Contemplation of Things offered to 
 our Minds, without affirming or denying any 
 Thing concerning them. So we conceive or 
 think of a Horfe, a Tree, High, Swift, Slow, A- 
 nimal, Time, Motion, Matter, Mind, Life, Deaths 
 (sfc. The Form under which thefe Things ap- 
 pear to the Mind, or the Refult of our Concep- 
 tion or Apprehenfion, is call'd an Idea. 
 
 II. Judgment is that Operation of the Mind, 
 whereby we join two or more Ideas together by 
 one Affirmation or Negation, that is, we either 
 affirm or deny this to be that. So This Tree is 
 high ; That Horfe is not fwift ; The Mind §f Man 
 is a thinking Being ; Mere Matter has no Thought be- 
 longing to it -, God is juft -, Good Men are often mife- 
 rable in this World ; A righteous Governor will 
 make a Difference betwixt the Evil and the Good > 
 which Sentences are the Effect of Judgment, and 
 are called Proportions. 
 
 III. Argumentation or Reasoning is that Opera- 
 tion of the Mind, whereby we infer one Thing, 
 i. e. one Propofition, from two or more Propor- 
 tions premifed. Or it is the drawing a Conclufion, 
 which before was either unknown, or dark, or 
 doubtful, from fome Propofitions which are more 
 known and evident. So when we have judged that 
 Matter cannot think, and that the Mind of Man 
 doth think, we then infer and conclude, that there- 
 fore the Mind of Alan is not Matter. 
 
 So we judge that A juft Governor will make a. 
 Difference betwixt the Evil and the Good ; we judge 
 alio that God is a juft Governor-, and from thence 
 we conclude, that God will make a Difference be- 
 twixt the Evil and the Good. 
 
 This 
 
o L G 1 C K: Or, 
 
 This Argumentation may be carried on further, 
 thus, God will one Time cr another make a Differ- 
 ence between the Good and the Evil: But there is 
 little or no Difference made in this World \ Therefore 
 there muft be another World wherein this Difference 
 /hall be made. 
 
 Thefe Inferences or Conclufwns are the Effects of 
 Reafoning, and the three Proportions taken alto- 
 gether are called a Syllogifm* or Argument. 
 
 IV. Difpofition is that Operation of the Mind, 
 whereby we put the Ideas, Propofitions and Ar- 
 guments, which we have formed concerning one 
 Subject, into fuch an Order as is fitted to gain 
 the cleared Knowledge of it, to retain it longed, 
 and to explain it to others in the bed manner : 
 Or, in fhort, it is the Ranging of our Thoughts 
 in fuch Order, as is bed for our own and others 
 Conception and Memory. The Effect of this 
 Operation is called Method. This very Defcrip- 
 tion of the four Operations of the Mind and their Ef- 
 fects in this Order, is an Indance or Example of 
 Method. 
 
 Now as the Art of Logick afTifts our Concep- 
 tion, fo it gives us a large and comprehenfvve View 
 of the Subjects we enquire into, as well as a clear 
 and difiincl Knowledge of them. As it regulates 
 our Judgment and our Reafoning, fo it fecures us 
 from Miftakes, and gives us a true and certain 
 Knowledge of Things ; and as it furnifhes us with 
 Method^ fo it makes our Knowledge of Things 
 both eafy and regular, and guards our Thoughts 
 from Confufion. 
 
 Logick is divided into four Parts, according tfo 
 thefe four Operations of the Mind, which it di- 
 rects, and therefore we (hall treat of it in this 
 Order. 
 
 THE 
 
T'he right Ufe of Reafon. 
 
 THE 
 
 FIRST PART 
 
 O F 
 
 L O G I C K. 
 
 Of Perceptions and Ideas. 
 
 TH E firft Part of Logic k contains Ob- 
 fervations and Precepts about the firft 
 Operation of the Mind, Perception or 
 Conception : And fince all our Know- 
 ledge, how wide and large foever it grow, is 
 founded upon our Conceptions and Ideas, here we 
 fhall confider, 
 
 i . The general Nature of them. 
 
 2. The Objecls of our Conception, or die Arche- 
 types or Patterns of thefe Ideas. 
 
 3. The fever al Divifwns of them. 
 
 4. The Words and Terms whereby our Ideas are 
 expreft. 
 
 5. General Direclions about our Ideas. 
 
 6. Special Rules to direel our Conceptions. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
$ LOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Nature of Ideas. 
 
 FIRST, the Nature of Conception or Percep- 
 tion t fliall juft be mention'd, tho' this may 
 feem to belong to another Science rather than 
 Logick. 
 
 Perception is that Aft of the Mind (or as fomc 
 Philofophers call it, rather a Paffion or Impreffon) 
 whereby the Mind becomes confeious of any Thing, 
 as when I feel Hunger , Thirft, or Cold, or Heat ; 
 when I fee a Horfe, a Tra, or a Aftf* $ when I 
 hear a human Voice^ or Thundery I am confeious of 
 thefe Things, and this is called Perception. If I 
 y/W)>, meditate, wifh ox fear, I am confeious of thefc 
 inward Acts alfo, and my Mind perceives its own 
 Thoughts, Wifhes, Fears, &c. 
 
 An Idea is generally defin'd a Reprefentation of 
 a Thing in the Mind\ it is a Reprefentation of fome- 
 thihg that we have feen, felt, heard, &c. or been 
 confiious of. That Notion or Form of a Horfe, 
 a Tree, or a Man, which is in the Mind, is 
 called the Idea of a Horfe, a Tree, or a Mtfw. 
 That Notion of Hunger, Cold, Sound, Colour, 
 Thought, or Wifh, or Fear, which is in the 
 Mind, is called the Idea of Hunger, Cold, Sound, 
 Wijh,^ &c. 
 
 It is not the outward Object, or Thing which is 
 perceived, (viz.) the Horfe, the Man, &c. nor 
 
 f Note, The Ward; Conception and Perctpticn areef'en ufed pxom\ fcuvuOj* 
 as I have doaa her*, becaufe 1 would natt ambarrais a Learner with too 
 inaayDiftin&ioru; bu<- if I were to d.fiirguifli them, I would fsy Percep* 
 tlcn is the Confcioufi efsjof an Obje& u ben prefeat: Cotceptitu ii tht form- 
 ing an Idea of the Objtft, wkecher prefeat or abfent. 
 
 IS 
 
C. I. ¥he right life of Reafon. 9 
 
 is it the very Perception or Senfe, and Feeling, (viz.) 
 of Hunger, or Cold, exfr. which is called tho 
 Idea \ but it is the Thing as it exifts in the Mind 
 by Way of Conception or Representation, that is pro- 
 perly called the Idea, whether the Objecl be pre- 
 sent or abfent. 
 
 As a Horfe, a Man, a Tree, are the outward 
 Objecls of our Perception, and the outward Arche- 
 types or Patterns of eur Ideas *, fo our own Scnfa- 
 tions of Hunger, Cold, &c. are alfo inward Ar- 
 chetypes or Patterns of our Ideas: But the Notions 
 or Pictures of thefe Things, as they are consider- 
 ed, or conceived in the Mind, are precifely the 
 Ideas that we have to do with in Logick. To fee 
 a Horfe, or to feel Cold, is one Thing - 9 to think of> 
 and converfe about a Man, a Horfe, Hunger , or 
 Cold, is another. 
 
 Among all thefe Ideas, fuch as reprefent Bodies, 
 are generally calPd Images, efpecially if the Idea 
 of the Shape be included. Thofe inward Repre- 
 fentations which we have of Spirit, 'Thought, Love 9 
 Hatred, Caufe, Effecl, &c. are more pure and 
 mental Ideas, belonging more efpecially to the 
 Mind, and carry nothing of Shape or Senfe in 
 them. But I mail have occafion to fpeak more 
 particularly of the Original and the Dijlintlion of 
 Ideas in the third Chapter. I proceed therefore 
 now to confidcr the Objects of our Ideas, 
 
 C H A P. 
 
io LOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the Objects of Perception. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 Of Being in general. 
 
 THE Objecl of Perception is that which is re-, 
 prefented in the Idea, that which is the Ar- 
 chetype or Pattern, according to which the Idea 
 is form'd -, and thus Judgments, Proportions, Reafon- 
 ings, and long Difcourfes, may all become the Ob- 
 jects of Perception ; but in this Place we fpeak 
 chiefly of the firft and more fimple QbjeRs of it, be- 
 fore they are join'd and form'd into Propofitions 
 or Difcourfes. 
 
 Every Object of our Ideas is call'd a Theme, whe- 
 ther it be a Being or Not Being j for Not Being 
 may be propofed to our Thoughts, as well as 
 that which has a real Being. But let us firft treat 
 of Beings, and that in the largeft Extent of the 
 Word. 
 
 A Being is confider'd as poffible, or as aclual. 
 
 When it is confider'd as poj/ible, it is faid to 
 have an Effence or Nature -, fuch were all Things 
 before their Creation: When it is confider'd as ac- 
 tual, then it is faid to have Exigence alfo ; fuch are 
 all Things which are created, and God himfelf the 
 Creator. 
 
 ' Effence therefore is but the very Nature of any 
 Being, whether it be actually exifting or no. A 
 Rofe in Winter has an Effence, in Summer it has 
 Exiftence alfo. 
 
 2 Note* 
 
C. II. S. 2. the right Ufc of Reafon. I i 
 
 Note, there is but one Being which includes 
 Exiftence in the very Effence of it, and that is God y 
 who therefore actually exifts by natural and eternal 
 Neceflity : But the actual Exiftence of every Crea- 
 ture is very diftinct from its Effence, for it may be, 
 or may not be, as God pleafe. 
 
 Again, Every Being is confider'd either as fab- 
 fifting in and by its felf, and then it is called a 
 Subftance , or it fubfifts in and by another, and then 
 it is call'd a Mode or Manner of Being. Tho' few 
 Writers allow Mode to be call'd a Being in the 
 fame perfect Senfe as a Subftance is ; and fome 
 Modes have evidently more of real Entity or Being 
 than others, as will appear when we come to treat 
 of them. Thefe Things will furnifh us with Mat- 
 ter for larger Difcourfe in the following Sections. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 Of Subflances and their various Kinds. 
 
 A Subftance is a Being which can fubfift by it- 
 felf, without Dependence upon any other 
 created Being. The Notion of fubfifting by itfelf 
 gives occafion to Logicians to call it a Subftance. So 
 a Horfe, a Houfe, Wood, Stone, Water, Fire, a Spirit 9 
 a Body, an Angel are called Subflances, becaufe they 
 depend on nothing but God for their Exiftence. 
 
 It has been ufual alio in the Defcription of Sub- 
 ftance to add, it is that which is the Subject of 
 Modes or Accidents ; a Body is the Subftance or 
 Subject, its Shape is the Mode. 
 
 But left we be led into Miftakes, let us here take 
 Notice that when a Subftance is faid to fubfift with- 
 out Dependence upon another created Being, all that 
 we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utter- 
 ly deftroy'd and reduced to nothing, by any Power 
 
 B inferior 
 
H L G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 inferior to that of our Creator •, tho' its prefen-t 
 particular Form, Nature and Properties may be 
 alter'd and deftroy'd by many inferior Caufes : a 
 Horfe may dye and turn to Duft; Wood may be 
 turned into Fire, Smoak and AJhes\ a Houfc into 
 Rubbifo, and Water into Ice or Vapour ; but the 
 Subiiance or Matter of which they are made (till 
 remains, tho' the Forms and Shapes of it are al- 
 ter'd. A Body may ceafe to be a Houfe or a Horft 9 
 hut it is a Body (till ; and in this Senfe it depends 
 only upon God for its Exiflence. 
 
 Among Subfiances fome are thinking or confcious 
 Beings, or have a Power of Thought, fuch as the 
 Mind of Man, God, Angels. Some are extended 
 and folid or impenetrable, that is, they have Di- 
 mensions of Length, Breadth, and Depth, and: 
 have alfo a Power of Refinance, or exclude 
 every thing of the fame kind from being in 
 the fame Place. This is the proper Character 
 of Matter or Body. 
 
 As for the Idea of Space, whether it be void or 
 /*//, i. e. a Vacuum or a Plenum, whether it be in- 
 terfpers'd among all Bodies, or may be fuppos'd? 
 to reach beyond the Bounds of the Creation, it is 
 an Argument too long and too hard to be disput- 
 ed in this Place what the Nature of ir is r It has 
 been much debated whether it be a real Subftance,, 
 or a mere Conception of the Mind, whether it 
 be the Immenfity of the Divine Nature, or the 
 mere Order of co-exiftent Beings, whether it be 
 the manner of our Conception of the Diftances of 
 Bodies, or a mere Nothing. Therefore I drop the 
 Mention of it here. 
 
 Now if we feclude Space out of our Considera- 
 tion, there will remain but two Sorts of Subftances 
 in the World, i. e. Matter and Mind, or as we 
 otherwife call them, Body and Spirit \ at lead, we 
 
 have 
 
C. II. S. 2. The right life of Reafon. 13 
 
 have no Ideas of any other Subftance but thefe *. 
 
 Among Subftances, fome are called Simple , 
 fome are Compownd, whether the Words be taken 
 in a philofophical or a vulgar Senfe. 
 
 Simple Subftances in a. philofophical Senfe, are either 
 Spirits which have no manner of Compofition in 
 them, and in this Senfe GWis called nfimple Being $ 
 or they are the firft Principles of Bodies, which 
 are ufually called Elements, of which all other 
 Bodies are compounded : Elements are fuch Sub- 
 fiances as cannot be refolved, or reduced, into two 
 or more Subftances of different Kinds. 
 
 The 
 
 * Becaufe Men hare different Ideas or Notions of Sulflartet, I thought it 
 rot proper entirely to omit all Account or them, and therefore have thrown 
 them into the Margin. 
 
 Some Philofophers fuppofit that owr Acquaintance wrh Matter or Mind 
 reaches no farther than the mere Properties of :hem, and that there is a 
 fort of unknown Being, which is the Subftance o: ±e ^uU'tel by which thefa 
 Propertiei of folid Extanfion, and of Ctfh.uion ae f'jppot:ed,_and in which 
 thefe Propertiei inhere or exiit. But pern-ps ;his Notion ari:e» only from 
 CMr turning the mere abfba&ed or Ugital Notion or Subftance or Self'-fub/ijl- 
 mg into the Notion of a diltinct phyfical or natural Bei g, without any Ne- 
 ceflity. Solid ExtenJUn feems t > me to be the very bubtla'ice of Matter or 
 ot ail Bodiei : and a Itrctr ef thit.kin*, voUcb is fJmatfi in aci % fsems to be 
 rhe very Subftance or ail Spirits ; r«^r Cod himfc.; i; an ittel.sgent, almighty 
 fever ; nor is there any need to icek for any ochei fe;ret and unknown Be- 
 iiig, or abflratled Sh 1 . fiance entirely diftincl iiom chefe, ia order to fjpport: 
 rhe feverai Modes or iroperties of Matter or Mtrd, tor thefe two Idc*s are 
 Ajfficieijt J01 that P'jrpofe; therefore I ra.cer tnr.ik thefe aie i>nbft&n€ti. 
 
 It mart be onreft, when we i\, , Spirit is a tuinking Sn^iance, and Mat- 
 :tr is an extended (tHd Sulfjnce, we are tcmc:iir.e$ ready tc> imagine tha: 
 Lxterfian ana Stltdity are but mere Meat s and friterrpa ot" a a. tin „ 
 known "ubfiance or Subject which fuppertS them, and which we Ciii Bcdy ~, 
 and that a Forcer of thinking, is but a'meie M'.de ana Fr^erty ot lemc u - 
 known bttbjtanct or SuDjedt whica fuppoiTI if, z ic uhi.n we ca!l tpint ? 
 But i lather take this to be a m:;e Miiuke, u. ; <ed into b } 
 
 grammatical Kerm and Ule ot Words ; and pe.hnp, on Lgical V. ay ct 
 r ujg by Subjtai.ies and Mtdet, as v. c as o .1 cramjmatitd Way of talk- 
 *•■£ ty sw.jtuntiKcs ai.d *Ad_cJlivcs % hc;ps to ce.;,cc us latg thi| Sappcji 
 
 However, thai I may not be v,*:i ::.. to any ot (ny Reacers, 1 wo. 
 ;hem know Mi. itcke't Opinion, wiucn has ..n in the piefeni 
 
 A^e, and it ii this : " Tnat our lea of any particular Smbfia- 
 *' fuch a Combination ot hmplc Ideas as repreieot? that thin- as fubiillji g 
 " by itfeit, iu which the fuppofed oi contufcd Jcea ot Subftance (fikh as il 
 M isj is always ready ro otfci itte.t. Jt is a lomj j.ic 1 eai co-exift- 
 
 " kg »n fucb a Caul'e ot theiiUnh), as makci the whJe Su jeet f .b.Jt by 
 " itte'f, though ibe Caufe ot then Union be i; ki:uwn ; and out gernrui 
 * Idea of Subjtante arifcstiom die 5plt-luoiiUc:ite ot u.i* Lolleciion ot id. as. 
 
 Now it this Notion ot Suljtamt red here, a- d be c„i tiderd merely as an 
 ■ nktiown Caufe ot the Urflon ot froper.ies, it is wwclx more cafy to o- . 
 fnitted: But if we pioceed to fnppofc a fort oi ;cal, fubflaotial, diitii ct iic- 
 iog, di&ter.t from jiiid ^Han'ii) »* kxttnjitn in B.uio, ioA4u 
 
 t» * • i ■ 
 
H Logic K: 6% Part t 
 
 The various Sects of Philofophers have attri- 
 buted the Honour of this Name to various Things. 
 The Peripatetkks, or Followers of Arijlotle, made 
 Fire 9 Air, Earth and Water to be the four Ele- 
 ments, of which all earthly Things were com- 
 pounded •, and they fuppos'd the- Heavens to be a 
 Quinteffence, or fifth fort of Body diftinct from 
 all thefe : But, fmce experimental Philofophy and 
 Mathematics have been better underftood, this 
 Doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The Chy- 
 -mifls make Spirit) Salt, Sulphur, Water and Earth 
 to be their five Elements, becaufe they can re- 
 duce all terreftrial Things to thefe five: This 
 feems to come nearer the Truth •, though they arc 
 not all agreed in this Enumeration of Elements, 
 In fhort, our modern Philofophers generally fup- 
 pofe Matter or Body to be one fimple Princi- 
 ple, or folid Extenfwn , which being diveriified 
 by its various Shapes, Quantities, Motions and 
 Situations, makes all the Varieties that are found 
 in the Univerfe *, and therefore they make little 
 Ule of the Word Element. 
 
 Compound Subftances are made up of two or 
 more fimple Subltances: So every Thing in this 
 whole material Creation, that can be reduced by 
 the Art of Man into two or more different Prin- 
 
 a Power of thinking in Spirits, in my Opinion it is the Introduction of a need- 
 Jefs fcholaltical Notion into the real Nature of Things, and then fancying 
 it to have a real Exiftence. 
 
 Mr. Locke in his EJfay cf Hum. Vnd- Rook II. Ch. 22. J. 2. feems to ridi- 
 cule this common Idea or SuO'Unce, which Men have generally fuppofed to 
 be a fort of SHkflratum dii\\u£l rrom all Properties whatfoever, and to be 
 the Support of all Propeitics. Yet in Book IV. Ch. 3. £. 6. he feems to 
 fuppofe there may be fonie fwch unknown Subjirawm, which may be capa- 
 ble of receiving the Properties both of Matter and of Mhd (viz-) Extenfion t 
 Solidity, and Cogitation ; for he fuppofes it poflible for God to add Cogitation 
 to that Subjiance which is corporeal, and thus to caufe Matter to think' it 
 this be true, then Spirits (tor ought we know) may be corporeal Beings 
 or thinking Bodies, Which is a Do&iine too favourable to the Mortality of 'tf.-g 
 Soul. But I leave thefe Debates to the Philofophers of the Age, and will 
 \^i be coo pofitiYC in my Opinion ui this aoftrufc iubjeft. 
 
 ciplcs 
 
C. II. S. 2. the right UfeofReafon. x$ 
 
 ciples or Subflances, is a compound Body in the 
 philofophical Senfe. 
 
 But if we take the Words Simple and Compound 
 in a vulgar Senfe, then all thofe arc Jimp le Sub- 
 flances which are generally efteem'd uniform in 
 their Natures. So every Herb is calPd a fimple ; 
 and every Metal and Mineral •, tho' the Chymift 
 perhaps may find all his feveral Elements in each 
 of them. So a Needle is a fimple Body, being 
 made only of Steel ; but a Sword or a Knife is a 
 compound, becaufe its Haft or Handle is made of 
 Materials different from the Blade. So the Bark 
 of Peru, or the Juice of Sorrel is a fimple Medicine: 
 But when the Apothecaries Art has mingled feve- 
 ral Simples together, it becomes a Compound, as 
 Diafcordium or Mithridate. 
 
 The Terms of pure and mixt, when applied to 
 Bodies, are much -akin to fimple and compound. So 
 a Guinea is pure Gold, if it has nothing but Gold 
 in it, without any Alloy or bafer Metal : But if 
 any other Mineral or Metal be mingled with it, 
 it is calPd a mixt Subftance, or Body. 
 
 Subflances are alfo divided into animate and in- 
 animate. Animated Subftances are either animal 
 or vegetable *. 
 
 Some of the animated Subflances have various 
 organical or inilrumental Parts, fitted for a Va- 
 riety of Motions from Place to Place, and a 
 Spring of Life within t hem fe Ives, as Beafls, Birds \ 
 Fijhes, and Infecls j thefe are calPd Animals. O- 
 ther animated Subflances are calPd Vegetables which 
 have within themfelvcs the Principles of another 
 fort of Life and Growth, and ot various Pro- 
 
 • Note, Vtgtta'blet as well at Animals have gotten the Name of animated 
 Subftaicei, became fomo ot the Ancients fuppoitd Htrbt and Plants, Btjf.i 
 
 *Qd Qirdi t fo. w t\v;c * fan oi SmU iitboGt now M*ftjr or Bod). 
 
 B 3 iluclions 
 
j6 L O G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 diictiom of Leaves, Flowers and Fruit, fuch as 
 wc fee in Plants, Herbs, and Trees. 
 
 And there are other Subftances, which are call'd 
 inanimate, becaufe they have no fore of Life in 
 them, as Earth, Stone, Air, Water, &c. 
 
 There is alfo one fort of Subftance, or Being, 
 which is compounded of Body and Mind, or a ra- 
 tional Spirit united to an Animal -, fuch is Man- 
 kind. Angels, or any other Beings of the fpiritu- 
 al and inviiible World, who have afliim'd vifible 
 Shapes for a Seafon, can hardly be reckoned a- 
 mong this order of compounded Beings $ becaufe 
 they drop their Bodies, and diveft themfelves of 
 thole vifible Shapes, when their particular MelTage 
 is perform'd, and thereby fhew that chefe Bodies 
 do not belong to their Natures. 
 
 Sect. III. 
 
 Of Modes and their various Kinds, and fir ft of effen- 
 tial and accidental Modes. 
 
 TH E next fort of Objects which are repre- 
 fented in our Ideas, are call'd Modes, or 
 Manners of Being f. 
 
 A Mode is that which cannot fubfift in and of 
 itfelf, but is always efteem'd as belonging to, and 
 lubfifting by, the Help of fome Subftance, which, 
 for that Reafon, is calPd its Subjetl. A Mode 
 muft depend on that Subftance for its very Exist- 
 ence and Being ; and that not as a Being depends 
 on i:s Cayfe, (for fo Subjlances themfelves depend, 
 
 f Note, The Term Mode \s by fome Authors applied chiefly to the RrU- 
 iunsot relative Manners of Being. But in logical Trearifes it is often uftd 
 in a larger Senfe, and extends to all Attributes whatfoever, and includes the 
 mofteliential and inward Properties -as well as outward Refpec"ts and Relati- 
 on, and rei;he» to Affiws themfayesas well as Manners of Aftion. 
 
 on 
 
C. II. S. 3 . the right Ufe vf Reafon. 17 
 
 on God their Creator ;) but the very Being of a 
 Mode depends on fome Subltance for .its Subjeel, 
 in which it is, or to which it belongs ; fo Moti- 
 on, Shape, Quantity, Weight, are Modes of Body i 
 Knowledge, Wit, Folly, Love, Doubting, Judging, 
 are Modes of the Mind ; for the one cannot fub- 
 fifl without Body, and the other cannot fubfift 
 without Mind. 
 
 Modes have their feveral Divifions, as well as 
 Subilances. 
 
 I. Modes are either ejjential, or accidental. 
 
 An ejjential Mode, or Attribute, is that which 
 belongs to the very Nature or Effence of the Sub- 
 ject wherein it is ; and the Subject can never have 
 the fame Nature without it •, iuch is Roundncfi in 
 a Bowl, Hardnefs in a Stone, Softnefs in Water 9 
 'vital Motion in an Animal, Solidity in Matter, 
 Thinking in a Spirit ; for tho' that piece of Wood 
 which is now a Bowl may be made fquare, yet if 
 Round nefs be taken away, it is no longer a BowL 
 So that very Flefh and Bones, which is now an 
 Animal, may be without Life or inward Motion ; 
 but if all Motion be entirely gone, k is no longer 
 an Animal, but a Carcafc: So if a Body or Mat- 
 ter, be divefted of Solidity, it is a mere void Space 
 or Nothing -, and if Spirit be entirely without 
 Thinking, I have no Idea of any thing that is 
 left in it \ therefore fo far as I am able to judge, 
 Confcioufnefs muit be its elTcntial Attribute * : 
 Thus all the Perjeclions of God are call'd his At- 
 tributes, for he cannot be without them. 
 
 ' • Note, When I call foiid Extenfion an efTertial Mode or Amibiite of 
 Matter, and z ioner oflhinking an cflenttal Mode or Attribute ol zSpnit, I 
 do it in compliance with common Foims oi Speech: but perhaps in reali- 
 ty thefc are the very Efl'eocei or Subilances themfelves, and the mod fub- 
 flantial Ideas that we can frame ot £od> and Spirit, and have no need ol any 
 (we know not what) Subflratum or unintelligible Su&itiUice 10 fuppon them 
 JW [hur Exiitencc gr. Being. 
 
 B 4 M 
 
s8 L G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 An rjfential Mode is cither primary or fecondary. 
 
 A primary effential Mode is the firfl, or chief 
 Thing, that conflitutes any Being in its particular 
 Effencc, or Nature, and makes it to be that which 
 it is, and diftinguifhes it from all other Beings: 
 This is call'd the Difference in the Definition of 
 Things, of which hereafter : So Roundnefs is the 
 primary effential Mode, or Difference of a Bowl\ 
 the meeting of fm Lines is the primary ehential 
 Mode, or the Difference of an jingle ; the perpen- 
 dicularity of thefe Lines to each other is the Differ- 
 ence of a right Angle : Solid Extenjion is the primary 
 Attribute, or Difference of Matter: Confcioufnefs, 
 or at leaft a Power of Thinking, is the Difference, 
 or primary Attribute of a Spirit *j and to fear and 
 love God is the primary Attribute of a pious Man. 
 
 A fecojidary effential Mode is any other Attri- 
 bute of a Thing, which is not of primary Con- 
 iideration: This is call'd a Property: Sometimes 
 indeed it goes toward making up the Effence, 
 especially of a complex Being, fo far as we are ac- 
 quainted with it ; Sometimes it depends upon, and 
 follows from the Effence of it > fo Volubility, or 
 Aptnefs to roul, is the Property of a Bowl, and is 
 derived from its Roundnefs. Mobility, and Figure 
 or Shape, are Properties of Matter -, and it is the 
 Property of a pious Man to love his Neighbour. 
 
 An accidental Mode, or an Accident, i§ fuch a 
 Mode, as is not neceffary to the Being of a Thing, 
 for the Subject may be without it, and yet re- 
 main of the fame Nature that it was before *, or 
 it is that Mode, which may be feparated or abo- 
 lifht from its Subject \ fo Smoothnefs or Roughnefs, 
 Blacknefs or V/hitenefs, Motion or Reft, are the Ac- 
 cidents of a Bowl-, for thefe may be all chang'd, 
 and yet the Body remain a Bowl (till : Learning^ 
 
 * See :he Jsocs ia chc foregoing pagf, 
 
 Jufiice % 
 
C. H. S. 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 9 
 
 Juftice, Folly, Sicknefs, Health, arc the Accidents 
 of a Man : Motion, Squarenefs, or any particular 
 Shape or Size, are the Accidents of Body: Yet 
 Shape and Size in general are effential Modes of it ; 
 for a Body mult have fome Size and Shape, nor 
 can it it be without them : So Hope, Fear, Wifo- 
 ing, Affenting, and Doubting, are Accidents of the 
 Mind, tho' Thinking in general fcems to be eiTen- 
 tial to it. 
 
 Here obfervc, that the Name of Accident has 
 been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetic Phi- 
 iofophers to all Modes, whether efTcntial or acci- 
 dental ; but the Moderns confine this Word Ac- 
 cident to the Senfe in which I Jiave defer ibed it. 
 
 Here it mould be noted alfo, that tho' the 
 Word Property be limited fometimes in logical 
 Treatifes to the fecondary effential Mode, yet it is 
 ufed in common Language to fignify thefe four 
 forts of Modes ; of which fome are effential, and 
 fome accidental. 
 
 (1.) Such as belong to every Subject of that 
 kind, but not only to thofe Subjects. So yellow 
 Colour and Duclility are Properties of Geld; they 
 belong to all Gold, but not only to Gold ; for 
 Saffron is alfo yellow, and Lead is duclile. 
 
 (2.) Such as belong only to one kind of Subject 
 but not to every Subject of that kind. So Learn- 
 ing, Reading, and Writing, are Properties of hu- 
 man Nature-, they belong only to Man, but not 
 to all Men. 
 
 (2.) Suchas belong to every Subject of one kind, 
 and only to them, but not always. So Speech or 
 Language is a Property of Man for it belongs 
 to all Men, and to Men only ; but Men are not 
 always fpcaking. 
 
 (4.) Such as belong to every Subject or one 
 kind, and to them onty andtf/wv*. So Shape and 
 
 Divijibility 
 
2Q L O G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 Divifibility are Properties of Body •, fo Omnifcience 
 and Omnipotence are Properties of the divine Na- 
 ture, for in this Senfe Properties and Attributes are 
 the fame, and except in logical Treatifes there is 
 fcarce any Diftindtion made between them. Thefe 
 are call'd Propria quarto modo in the Schools, or 
 Properties of the fourth Sort. 
 
 Note, Where there is any one Property or ejfcn- 
 tial Attribute fo fuperior to the reft, that it ap- 
 pears plainly that all the reft are deriv'd from it, 
 and fuch as is fufficient to give a full Diftindtion 
 of that Subject from all other Subjects, this At- 
 tribute, or Property, is call'd the ejfential Dif- 
 ference, as is before declared; and we commonly 
 iay, the EJfence of the Thing confifts in it ; fo the 
 Ejfence of Matter in general feems to confift in 
 Solidity, or folid Ex ten/ion. But for the moft part, 
 we are fo much at a Lofs in finding out the inti- 
 mate ElTence of particular natural Bodies, that we 
 are forced to diitinguifh the ejfential Difference of 
 moft Things by a Combination of Properties. So 
 a Sparrow is a Bird, which has fuch colour'd 
 Feathers, and fuch a particular Size, Shape and 
 Motion. So Wormwood is a Herb, which has fuch 
 a Leaf of fuch a Colour, and Shape, and Tafte, 
 and fuch a Root and Stalk. So Beafts and Fifties, 
 Minerals, Metals and Works of Art fometimes, 
 as well as of Nature, are diftinguifhed by fuch a 
 Collection of Properties. 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 
 The further Divifwns of Mode. 
 
 II, fHp* H E fecond Divifion of Modes is into cb- 
 
 \ folute and relative. An abfolute Mode is 
 
 that which belongs to its Subject, without Re- 
 
 fped 
 
C. II. S. 4. "The right Ufe of Reafon. 2 r 
 
 fpect to any other Beings whatfoever: But a re- 
 lative Mode is derived from the Regard that one 
 Being has to others. So Roundnefs and Smooth- 
 tiefs are the abfolute Modes of a Bowl \ for if there 
 were nothing elfe exifting in the whole Creation, 
 a Bowl might be round and fmooth : But Greatnefs 
 and Smallnefs are relative Modes -, for the very- 
 Ideas of them are deriv'd merely from the Com- 
 parifon of one Being with othere: a Bowl of four 
 Inches Diameter is very great, compar'd with one 
 of an Inch and a half-, but it is [very fmall in 
 Comparifon of another Bowl, whofe Diameter is 
 eighteen or twenty Inches. Motion is the abfolute 
 Mode of a Body, but Swift nefs or Slownefs are 
 relative Ideas •, for the Motion of a Bowl on a 
 Bowling-Green is fwift, when compar'd with a 
 Snail ; and it is flow, when compar'd with a Can- 
 non-Bullet. 
 
 Thefe relative Modes are largely treated of by 
 fome logical and metaphsfical Writers under the 
 Name of Relation : And thefe Relations them- 
 felves are farther fubdivided into fuc has arife from 
 the Nature of Things, and fuch as arife merely 
 from the Operation of our Minds ; one fort are cal- 
 led real Relations, the other mental ; fo the Like- 
 Tiefs of one Egg to another is a real Relation, be- 
 caufe it arifes from the real Nature of Things ; 
 for whether there was any Man or Mind to con- 
 ceive it or no, one Egg would be like another: 
 But when we confider an Egg as a Noun Subflan- 
 tive in Grammar, or as fignificd by the Letters 
 e, g, g, thefe are mere mental Relations, and derive 
 their very Nature from the Mind of Man. Thefe 
 fort of Relations are call'd by the Schools Entia 
 Rationis, or fecond Notions, which have no real 
 Being, but by the Operation of the Mind. 
 
 III. The 
 
22 LOGICK: Or, Parti 
 
 III. The third Divifion of Modes fhews us, 
 they are either intrinftcal or extrinftcal. Intrinft- 
 cal Modes are conceiv'd to be in the Subject or 
 Subftance, as when we fay a Globe is round, or 
 fwift, rolling, or at reft : Or when we fay a Man 
 is tall, or learned, thefc are intrinfic Modes : But 
 extrinjic Modes are fuch as arife from fomething 
 that is not in the Subject or Subftance it felf-, 
 but it is a manner of Reing which fome Sub- 
 fiances attain by Reafon of fomething that is ex- 
 ternal or foreign to the Subject •, as, This Globe 
 lies within two Yards of the Wall ; or this Man is 
 leloifd or hated. Note, Such fort of Modes, as 
 this laft Example, are call'd external Denomina- 
 tions. 
 
 IV. There is a fourth Divifion much akin to 
 this, whereby Modes are faid to be Inherent or 
 Adherent, that is, Proper or Improper. Adherent 
 or improper Modes arife from the joining of fome 
 accidental Subftance to the chief Subjeft, which 
 yet may be feparated from it •, fo when a Bowl is 
 wet, or a Boy is cloath'd, thefe are adherent Modes ; 
 for the Water and the Cloaths are diftinct Sub- 
 ftances which adhere to the Bowl, or to the Boy : 
 But when we fay, the Bowl is fwift or round ; 
 when we fay, the Boy isftrong or witty, thefe are 
 proper or inherent Modes, for they have a fort of 
 In-being in the Subftance it felf, and don't a- 
 rife from the Addition of any other Subftance 
 to it. 
 
 V. AlfioH and Paffion are Modes or Manners 
 which belong to Subftances, and fhould not en- 
 tirely be omitted here. When a Smith with a 
 Hammer ftrikes a piece of Iron, the Hammer and 
 the Smith are both Agents* or Subjects of Ac- 
 tion ; 
 
C. II. S. 4. The right life of Reafon. 23 
 
 tion -, the one is the Prime or Supreme, the other 
 the Subordinate: The Iron is the Patient, or the 
 Subject of Paflion, in a philofophical Senfe, be- 
 cause it receives the Operation of the Agent: 
 Tho' this Senfe of the Words Paffion and Pa- 
 tient differs much from the vulgar Meaning of 
 them*. 
 
 VI. The ft xth Divifion of Modes may be into 
 Phyftcal, i.e. Natural, Civil, Moral, and Super* 
 -natural. So when we con fide r the Apoftle Paul, 
 who was a little Man, a Roman by the Privilege 
 of his Birth, a Man of Virtue or Honefty, and 
 an infpired Apoftle ; his low Stature is a phyftcal 
 Mode, his being a Roman is a civil Privilege, his 
 Honefty is a moral Con fidera tion, and his being 
 infpired is fuper natural, 
 
 VII. Modes belong either to Body or to Spi- 
 rit* or to both. Modes of Body belong only to 
 Matter or to corporeal Beings j and thefe are 
 Shape, Size, Situation, or Place, &c. Modes of 
 Spirit belong only to Minds; fuch are Knowledge* 
 Ajfent, Biffent, Doubting, Reafoning, &c. Modes 
 which belong to both have been lometimes call'd 
 mist Modes, or human Modes, for thefe are only 
 found in human Nature, which is compounded 
 both of Body and Spirit •, fuch are Senfation, Ima- 
 gination, Paffwn, &c. in all which there is a Con- 
 currence of the Operations both of Mind and 
 Body, i.e. of animal and intellectual Nature. 
 
 But the Modes of Body may be yet farther dif- 
 tinguifh'd. Some of them axe primary Modes or 
 
 • Note, ^Agmt fignifies the Deer, Patient the Sufferer, ^Olicn ii Doing, 
 Tafien is Suffering, ^igent and ^itihn have retained their original and phi- 
 losophical Senfe, tho Patient and Pajitn ha,Y* at^uiied a very oifTcicm 
 fcUauij'B (q common Language. 
 
 1 SuaHtics, 
 
24 LOGIC K: Of, Part L 
 
 Qualities, for they belong to Bodies confider'd in 
 themfelves, whether there were any Man to take 
 Notice of them or no •, fuch are thofe beforemen- 
 tion'd (viz ) Shape, Size, Situation, &c. Secon- 
 dary Qualities, or Modes, are fuch Ideas as we af- 
 cribe to Bodies on account of the various Im/- 
 prefllons which are made on the Senfes of Men 
 by them *, and thefe are call'd fenfible Qualities, 
 which are very numerous ; fuch are all Colours, as 
 Red, Green, Blue, &c. fuch are all Sounds, as 
 Sharp, Shrill, Loud, Hoarfe ; all Taftes, as Sweet, 
 Bitter, Sour •, all Smells, whether Pleafant, Of- 
 fenfive, or Indifferent ; and all TatJile Qualities, or 
 fuch as affect the Touch or Feeling (viz.) Heat, 
 Cold, Sec. Thefe are properly call'd fecondary 
 Qualities, for tho' we are ready to conceive them 
 as exifting in the very Bodies themfelves which 
 affect our Senfes, yet true Philofophy has moft un- 
 deniably prov'd that all thefe are really various 
 Ideas or Perceptions excited in human Nature, 
 by the different Impreflions that Bodies make up- 
 on our Senfes by their primary Modes, i. e. by 
 Means of the different Shape, Size, Motion and 
 Pofition of thofe little invifible Parts that com- 
 pofe them. Thence it follows that a fecondary 
 Quality confider'd as in the Bodies themfelves, is 
 nothing clfe but a Power or Aptitude to produce 
 fuch Senfations in us. See Locke's Effay of the Un- 
 der/binding, Book 2. Ch. 8. 
 
 VIII. I might add in the laft Place, that as 
 Modes belong to Subjiances, fo there are fome alfo 
 that are but Modes of other Modes : For tho' they 
 fubiift in and by the Subftance, as the original 
 Subject of them, yet they are properly and di- 
 rectly attributed to fome Mode of that Subftance. 
 Motion is the Mode of a Body -, but the Swift- 
 i nefs t 
 
C. II. S. 5. The right life of Reafon.' 15 
 
 nefs, or Slownefs of it, or its Direction to the North 
 or South, are but Modes of Motion. Walking 
 is the Mode or Manner of Man, or of a Beaft ; 
 but Walking gracefully implies a Manner or 
 Mode fuperadded to that Action. All compara- 
 tive and fuperlative Degrees of any Quality, are 
 the Modes of a Mode, as Swifter implies a greater 
 Meafure of Swiftnefs. 
 
 It would be too tedious here to run thro* all 
 the Modes, Accidents, and Relations at large than 
 belong to various Beings, and are copioufly treat- 
 ed of in general, in the Science call'd Metaphy- 
 fuks, or more properly Ontology: They are alfo 
 treated of in particular in thofe Sciences which 
 have aflum'd them feverally as their proper Sub- 
 jects. 
 
 Sect. V. 
 Of the ten Categories. Of Sub fiance modify* d* 
 
 WE have thus given an Account of the two 
 chief Objetls of our Ideas (viz.) Sub fiances 
 and Modes, and their various Kinds : And in 
 thefe laft Sections we have briefly compriz'd the 
 greateft part of what is neceflary in the famous 
 ten Ranks of Being, call'd the ten Predicaments 
 or Categories of ArifiotU, on which there are end- 
 lefs Volumes of Difcourfes form'd by feveral of 
 his Followers. But that the Reader may not ut- 
 terly be ignorant of them, let him know the 
 Names are thefe: Subftance, Quantity, Quality, 
 Relation, Aclion, Paffton, PVliere, When, Situa- 
 tion and Cloathing. It would be mere Lofs of 
 Time to fhew how loofe, how injudicious, and 
 even ridiculous, is this ten-fold Divifion of Things : 
 And whatfocver farther relates to them, and which 
 
 mav 
 
26 LOGIC K: Or, Part h 
 
 may tend to improve ufeful Knowledge, mould 
 be fought in Ontology, and in other Sciences. 
 
 Befides Subjtancc and Mode, fome of the Mo- 
 derns would have us confider the Subjlance modi- 
 fied, as a diftinct Object of our Ideas ; but I think 
 there is nothing more that need befaid on this Sub- 
 ject, than this, (viz.) There is fome Difference 
 between a Subftance when it is confider'd with all 
 its Modes about it, or cloath'd in all its Manners 
 of Exiftence, and when it is diftinguifh'd from 
 them, and confider'd naked without them. 
 
 Sect. VI. 
 Of Not-Being. 
 
 A 
 
 S Being is divided into Subjlance and Mode, 
 fo we may confider Not-Being with Re- 
 gard to both thefe. 
 
 I. Not-Being is confider'd as excluding all Sub- 
 jlance, and then all Modes are alfo neceffarily ex- 
 cluded, and this we call pure Nihility, or mere 
 Nothing. 
 
 This Nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a 
 philofophkal Senfc $ fo we fay there is nothing in the 
 Cup, in a vulgar Senfe, when we mean there is 
 710 Liquor in it ; but we cannot fay there is nothing 
 in the Cup, in a ftrict philofophical Senfe, while 
 there is Air in it, and perhaps a Million of Rays 
 of Light are there. 
 
 II. Not- Being, as it has relation to Modes or 
 Manners of Being, may be confider'd either as a 
 mere Negation, or as a Privation. 
 
 A Negation is the Abfence of that which does 
 not naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeak- 
 ing of, or which has no Right, Obligation, or 
 Neceflity to be prefent with it * as when we fay 
 
 Stone 
 
C. II. S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. zy 
 
 a Stone is Inanimate, or Blind, or Deaf, i.e. it 
 has no Life, nor Sight, or Hearing \ or when we 
 fay a Carpenter or a Fijherman is unlearned ; thefe 
 are mere Negations. 
 
 But a Privation is the Abfence of what does 
 naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeaking of* 
 or which ought to be prefent with it, as when 
 a Man, or a Horfe is ^/, or £/*W, or dead, or 
 if a Phyfician or a Divine be unlearned, thefe are 
 calPd Privations: So the Sinfulnefs of any human 
 Atlion is faid to be a Privation ; for ft* is that 
 want of Conformity to the Law of God, which 
 ought to be found in every Action of Man. 
 
 Note, There are fome Writers who make all 
 fort of relative Modes or Relations, as well as all 
 external Denominations to be mere Creatures of the 
 Mind, and entia Rationis, and then they rank 
 them alfo under the general Head of Not-Beings \ 
 but it is my Opinion, that whatsoever may, be 
 determin'd concerning mere mental Relations and 
 external Denominations, which feem to have fome- 
 thing lefs of Entity or Being in them, yet there 
 are many real Relations, which ought not to be 
 reduc'd to lb low a Clafs •, fuch are the Situation 
 of Bodies, their mutual Dijlances, their particu- 
 lar Proportions and Meafures, the Notions of Fa- 
 therhood, Brotherhood, Sonfhip, 6cc. all which are 
 relative Ideas. The very KiTence of Virtue or 
 Holinefs conliils in the Conformity of our Ac- 
 tions to the Rule of Right Reafon, or the Law 
 of God : The Nature and EfTence of Sincerity 
 is the Conformity of our Words and Actions to 
 our Thoughts, all which are but mere Relations, 
 and I think we mud not reduce fuch pofitive Be- 
 ings as Piety, and Virtue, and Truth, to the Rank 
 of Non-Entities, which have nothing real in them, 
 tbo' Sin (or rather the Sinfulnefs of an Action) 
 
 C may 
 
28 L O G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 may be properly calPd a Not- Being, for it is a want 
 of. Piety and Virtue. This is the moil ufual and per- 
 haps the juilefl Way of reprefenting thefe Matters, 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of the fever al Sorts of Perceptions or Ideas. 
 
 IDEAS may be divided with Regard to their 
 Original, their Nature, their Objetls and their 
 ■Qualities. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 Offenfible, fpiritual, and abjlracled Ideas. 
 
 THERE has been a great Controverfy, 
 about the Origin of Ideas, (viz.) whether any 
 of our Ideas are innate or no, i. e. born with us, 
 and naturally belonging to our Minds. Mr. Locke 
 utterly denies it •, others as pofitively affirm it. 
 Now, though this Controverfy may be compro- 
 mifcd, by allowing that there is a Senfe, wherein 
 our firfl Ideas of fome Things may be faid to be 
 innate, (as I have (hewn in fome Remarks on 
 Mr. Locke 9 s EfTay, which have lain long by me) 
 yet it does not belong to this Place and Bufinefs 
 to have that Point debated at large, nor will it 
 hinder our Purfuit of the prefent Work to pafs it 
 over in Silence. 
 
 There is fufficient Ground to fay, that all our 
 Ideas, with Regard to their Original, may be di- 
 vided into three forts (viz.) fenfible^ fpiritual, and 
 abftratled Ideas. 
 
 I. Seifible or corporeal Ideas are deriv'd originally 
 from our Senfes, and from the Communication 
 
 which 
 
C. III. S. i . the right XJfe of Reafon. 29 
 
 which the Soul has with the animal Body in this 
 prefent State ; fuch are the Notions we frame of 
 all Colours, Sounds, Tafles, Figures, or Shapes and 
 Motions ; for our Senfes being converfant about 
 particular fenfible Objects become the Occafions 
 of feveral diftincl Perceptions in the Mind; and 
 thus we come by the Ideas of Yellow, White, 
 Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all 
 thofe which we call fenfible Qualities. All the 
 Ideas which we have of Body, and the feveral 
 Modes and Properties that belong to it, feem to 
 be deriv'd from Senfation. 
 
 And howfoever thefe may be treafured up in 
 the Memory, and by the Work of Fancy may be 
 increas'd, diminiuYd, compounded, divided, and 
 diverfified, (which we are ready to call our In- 
 vention) yet they all derive their firft Nature and 
 Being from fomething that has been let into our 
 Minds by one or other of our Senfes. If I think 
 of a golden Mountain, or a Sea of liquid Fire, yet 
 the fingle Ideas of Sea, Fire, Mountain, and Gold 
 came into my Thoughts at firft by Senfation j the 
 Mind has only compounded them. 
 
 II.* Spiritual or intellectual Ideas are thofe which 
 we gain by reflecting on the Nature and Actions 
 of our own Souls, and turning our Thoughts 
 within our felves, and obferving what is tranf- 
 acted in our own Minds. Such are the Ideas we 
 have of Thought, Ajfent, Dijfent, Judging, Rea- 
 fon, Knowledge, Under/landing, Will, Love, Fear, 
 Hope. 
 
 By Senfation the Soul contemplates Things (as 
 it were) out of itfelf, and gains corporeal Repre- 
 fentations or fenfible Ideas: By Reflection the Soul 
 contemplates itfelf, and Things within itfelf, and 
 
 * Note, Here the Woii $firit*sl is ufed in a mere natural, and n«t in • 
 leligioui Scnfe. 
 
 C 2 by 
 
30 L G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 by this Means it gains fpiritual Ideas, or Repre- 
 fentations of Things intelleffual. 
 
 Here it may be noted, that tho' the firft Ori- 
 ginal of thefe two Sorts of Ideas, (viz.) Senfible 
 and Spiritual, may be entirely owing to thefe 
 two Principles, Senfation and Reflexion, yet the 
 Recollection and frelh Excitation of them may be 
 owing to a thoufand other Occafions and Occur- 
 rences of Life. We could never inform a Man 
 who was born Blind or Deaf, what we mean by 
 the Words Yellow, Blue, Red, or by the Words 
 Loud or Shrill, nor convey any juft Ideas of thefe 
 Things to his Mind, by all the Powers of Lan- 
 guage, unlefs he has experienc'd thofe Senfations 
 of Sound and Colour-, nor could we ever gain 
 the Ideas of Thought, Judgment, Re a/on, Doubt- 
 ing^ Hoping, &c. by all the Words that Man 
 could invent, without turning our Thoughts in- 
 ward upon the Actions of our own Souls. Yet 
 when once we have attain' d thefe Ideas by Senfa- 
 tion and Refletlion, they may be excited afrefh by 
 the Ufe of Names, Words, Signs, or by any 
 Thing elfe that has been connected with them in 
 our Thoughts ; for when two or more Ideas have 
 been afibciated together, whether it be by Cuf- 
 tom, or Accident, or Defign, the one prefently 
 brings the other to Mind. 
 
 III. Befides thefe two which we have nam'd, 
 there is a third fort of Ideas, which are commonly 
 call'd abftrailed Ideas, becaufe tho' the original 
 Ground or Occafion of them may be Senfation, or 
 Reflection, or both, yet thefe Ideas are fram'd by 
 another Act of the Mind which we ufually call 
 dbftrallion. Now the Word Abftraftion fignifies 
 a withdrawing fome Parts of an Idea from other 
 Parts of it) by which Means fuch abflracled Ideas 
 are form'd, as neither reprefent any Thing corpo- 
 4 real 
 
C. III. S. i . the right Ufe of Reafon. 3 1 
 
 real or fpiritual, i.e. any thing peculiar or proper 
 to Mind or Body. Now thefe are of two kinds. 
 
 Some of thefe abftracled Ideas are the mod ab- 
 folute, general and univerfal Conceptions of Things 
 confider'd in themfelves, without Refpect to o- 
 thers, fuch as Entity or Being, and Not-being, Ef- 
 fence, Exigence, Acl, Power, Subftance, Mode, Ac- 
 cident, Sec. 
 
 The other fort of abftracled Ideas is relative, as 
 when we compare feveral Things together, and 
 confider merely the Relations of one Thing to 
 another, entirely dropping the Subjects of thofe 
 Relations, whether they be corporeal or fpiritnal ; 
 fuch are our Ideas of Caufe, Effecl, Likenefs, Un- 
 likene/s, Subjecl, Objetl , Identity, or Samenefs, 
 and Contrariety, Order, and other Things which 
 are treated of in Ontology. 
 
 Mod of the Terms of Art in feveral Sciences 
 may be rank'd under this Head of abftracled Ideas, 
 as Noun, Pronoun, Verb, in Grammar, and the 
 feveral Particles of Speech, as wherefore, there- 
 fore^ when, how, altho y , howfoever, See. So Con- 
 necfionS) Tranfitions, Similitudes, Tropes, and their 
 various Forms in Rhetorick. 
 
 Thefe abftracled Ideas, whether abfolute or re- 
 lative, cannot fo properly be faid to derive their 
 immediate, compleat and drfthtct Original, either 
 from Senfation or Reflection, (1.) Becaufe the 
 Nature and the Actions both of Body and Spirit 
 give us Occafion to frame exactly the fame Ideas 
 of Ejfence, Mode, Caufe, Effetl, Likenefs, Contra- 
 riety, cvc. Therefore thefe ( unnot be call'd ei- 
 ther fenfible or fpiritual Ideas, for they are not ex- 
 act Reprefentations either of the peculiar Qualities or 
 Actions of Spirit or Body, but feem to be a diftinet 
 kind of Idea fram'd in the Mind, to rep! 
 our moft general Concept tens of Things or their 
 C 3 Relatione 
 
32 LOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 Relations to one another ', without any Regard to 
 their Natures, whether they be corporeal or fpi- 
 ritual. And (2.) the fame general Ideas, of Caufe 
 and Effeft, Likenefs, &c. may be transferr'd to a 
 thoufand other kinds of Being, whether bodily 
 or fpirirual, befides thofe from whence we firft 
 deriv'd them : Even thofe ibftraRed Ideas, which 
 might be firft occafion'd by Bodies, may be as 
 properly afterward attributed to Spirits. 
 
 Now, though Mr. Locke fuppofes Senfation and 
 Reflection to be the two only Springs of all Ideas, 
 and that thefe two are fuflicient to furnifb our 
 Minds with all that rich Variety of Ideas which 
 we have ; yet Abftrafticn is certainly a different 
 Act ©f the Mind, whence thefe abjlrafted Ideas 
 have their Original ; tho' perhaps Senfation or 
 Reflection may furnifh us with all the firft Ob- 
 jects and Occafions whence thefe abftratted Ideas 
 are excited and deriv'd. Nor in this Senfe and 
 View of Things can I think Mr. Locke himfelf 
 would deny my Reprefentation of the Original 
 of abflracfed Ideas, nor forbid them to ftand for a 
 dillinct Species. 
 
 Note, Tho 5 we have divided Ideas in this Chap- 
 ter into three Sorts {viz.) fenfible, fpiritual, and 
 abftraued, yet it may not be amifs juft to take 
 notice here, that as Man may be called a com- 
 found Sulftance, being made up of Body and 
 Mind, and the Modes which arifc from this Com- 
 pofition are called mixed Modes, fuch as Senfation^ 
 Ptffion, Difcourfe, &c. So the Ideas of this Sub- 
 ftance or Being called Man, and of thefe mixed 
 Modes, may be called mixt Ideas, for they are 
 not properly and ftrictly fpiritual ^ Jenfible> or ab- 
 firaeled. . 
 
 Sect, 
 
C. III. S. 2. the right Ufe of Reafon. 3 3 
 
 Sect. II. 
 Of fimple and complex-, compound and collective Ideas. 
 
 IDEAS confider'd in their Nature, are richer 
 ftmple or complex. 
 
 K fimple Idea is one uniform Idea which can- 
 not be divided or diitinguifh'd by the Mind of 
 Man into two or more Ideas; fuch are a Multi- 
 tude of our Senfations, as the Idea of Sweet, Bit- 
 ter, Cold y Heat, White, Red, Blue, Hard, Soft, 
 Motion, Reft, and perhaps Extenfion and Duration: 
 Such are alfo many of our fpiritual Ideas; fuch 
 as IbougU, Will, JVifh, Knowledge, &c. 
 
 A complex Idea is made by joining two or more 
 fimple Ideas together ; as a Square, a Triangle, a 
 Cube, a Pen, a Table, Reading, Writing, Truth, 
 Faljhood, a Body, a Man, a Horfe, an Angel, a 
 heavy Body, a fwift Horfe, &c. Every Thing 
 that can be divided by the Mind into two or more 
 Ideas is call'd complex. 
 
 Complex Ideas are often confider'd as Jingle and 
 diftmil Beings, tho' they may be made up of fe- 
 veral fimple Ideas •, fo a Body, a Spirit, a Houfe, 
 a Tree, a Flower. But when feveral of thefe I- 
 deas of a different Kind are join'd together, which 
 are wont to be confider'd as diftinct lingle Beings, 
 this is call'd a compounded Idea, whether thefe u- 
 nited Ideas be fimple or complex. So a Man is 
 compounded of Body and Spirit, fo Mithridate is 
 a compound Medicine, becaule it is made of many 
 different Ingredients: This I have fhewn under 
 the Doctrine of Subftances. And Modes alio may 
 be compounded •, Harmony is a compound Idea, 
 mode up of different Sounds united ; fo feveral dif- 
 ferent Virtues nuift be united to make up the 
 C 4 compounded 
 
34 LOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 compounded Idea or Character, either of a Hero, 
 or a Saint. 
 
 But when many Ideas of the fame Kind arc 
 pin'd together and united in one Name, or un- 
 der one View, it is call'd a colleclive Idea •, fo an 
 Army, or a Parliament, is a Collection of Men -, 
 a Dictionary or Nomenclatura is a Collection of 
 "Words •, a H0f& is a Collection of Sheep •, a Fo- 
 reft, or Grove, a Collection of Trees * a Heap is 
 a Collection of Sand, or Corn, or Dull, &c. a 
 City is a Collection of Houfes ; a Nofegay is a 
 Collection of Flowers -, a Month, or a 7><?r, is a 
 Collection of Days, and a Thoufand is a Collec- 
 tion of Units. 
 
 The precife Difference between a compound and 
 colleclive Idea is this, that a compound Idea unites 
 Things of a different Kind, but a colleclive Idea 
 Things of the fame Kind: tho' this Diftinction 
 in fo me Cafes is not accurately obferv'd, andCuflom 
 oftentimes ufes the Word compound for colleclive. 
 
 Sect. III. 
 
 Of univerfal and -particular Ideas, real and 
 imaginary. 
 
 M DE AS, according to their Objects, may firft 
 J^ be divided into particular or univerfal. 
 
 A particular Idea is that which reprefents one 
 Thing only. 
 
 Sometimes the one Thing is reprefented in a 
 Joofe and indeterminate manner, as when we fay 
 fame Man, any Man, eve Man, another Man \ 
 fame Horfe, any Horfe; one City, or another, which 
 is calPd by the Schools Individuum Vagum. 
 
 Sometimes the particular Idea reprefents one 
 Thing in a determinate manner, and then it is 
 
 call'd 
 
C. III. S. 3 . The right Ufc of Rcafon. 3 5 
 
 call'd * ftngular Idea *, fuch is Bucephalus or Alex- 
 ander's Horfe, Cicero the Orator. Peter the Apo- 
 ftle, the Palace of Verfailles, this Book, that Ri- 
 ver, the new For eft, or the City of London : That 
 Idea which represents one particular determinate 
 Thing to me is call'd a ftngular Idea, whether it 
 be fimple, or complex, or compound. 
 
 The Objecl of any particular Idea, as well as 
 the Idea itfelf, is fometimes call'd an Individual: 
 So Peter is an individual Man, London is an indi- 
 vidual City. So this Book, one Horfe, another Horfe, 
 are all Individuals 5 tho' the Word Individual is 
 more ufually limited to one ftngular, certain,v\\ 
 determined Objecl:. 
 
 An univerfal Idea is that which reprefents a 
 common Nature agreeing to feveral particular 
 Things ; lb a Horfe, a Man, or a Book, are call'd 
 univerfal Ideas, becauie they agree to all Horfes y 
 Men, or Books. 
 
 And I think it is not amifs to intimate, in this 
 Place, that thefe univerfal Ideas are form'd by 
 that Act of the Mind which is call'd Abftraftion* 
 i. e. a withdrawing fome part of an Idea from 
 other Parts of it : For when ftngular Ideas are 
 firft let into the Mind by Senfation or Reflection, 
 then, in order to make them univerfal, we leave 
 out, or drop, all thofe peculiar and determinate 
 Characters, Qualities, Modes, or Circumftances, 
 which belong merely to any particular individual 
 Being, and by which it differs from other Beings ; 
 and we only contemplate thole Properties of it, 
 wherein it agrees with other Beings. 
 
 Tho' it muft be confefs'd, that the Name of 
 dbflra&ed Ideas is fometimes attributed to univer- 
 fal Ideas, both fenjible or ftiritual, yet this Ab- 
 jlratlion is not fo great *, as when we drop out of 
 our Idea every fenfeblc or ffiri total Reprefentation, 
 
 and 
 
36 LOGICK: Or, Parti. 
 
 and retain nothing but the mod general and ab- 
 folute Conceptions ;of Things, or their mere Re- 
 lations to one another, without any Regard to their 
 particular Natures, whether they be fenfble or 
 fpiritual. And it is to this Kind of Conceptions 
 we more properly give the Name of abftrafted Ideas 
 as in the firfl Section of this Chapter. 
 
 An univerfal Idea is either general or /pedal. 
 
 A general Idea is call'd by the Schools a Genus ; 
 and it is one common Nature agreeing to feveral 
 other common Natures. So Animal is a Genus, 
 becaufe it agrees to Horfe, Lyon, Whale, Butterfly, 
 which are alio common Ideas ; fo Fijh is a Genus, 
 becaufe it agrees to Trout, Herring, Crab, which 
 are common Natures alfo. 
 
 A fpecial Idea is call'd by the Schools, a Species \ 
 it is one common Nature that agrees to feveral 
 fingular individual Beings •, fo Horfe is a fpecial 
 Idea, or a Species, becaufe it agrees to Bucephalus, 
 Trott and Snow-ball. City is a fpecial Idea, for it 
 2grees to London, Paris, Briftol. 
 
 Note, I fc , Some of thefe Univerfals are Genus's, 
 if compar'd with Jefs common Natures •, and they 
 are Species's, if compar'd with Natures more com- 
 mon. So Bird is a Genus, if compar'd with Ea- 
 gle, Sparrow, Raven, which are alfo common Na- 
 tures: But it is a Species, if compar'd with the 
 more general Nature, Animal. The fame may 
 be faid of Fijh, Beaft, &c. 
 
 This fort of univerfal Ideas, which may either 
 be confidered as a Genus, or a Species, is call'd 
 Subaltern: But the highefb Genus, which is never 
 a Species, is call'd the moft general ; and the low- 
 ed Species, which is never a Genus, is call'd the 
 moft fpecial. 
 
 It may be obferved here alfo, that that general 
 Nature or Property wherein one thing agrees with 
 
 moft 
 
C. III. S. 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon. 3 7 
 
 moft other things is call'd its more remote Genus: 
 So Subftance is a remote Genus of Bird, or Beaft, 
 becaufe it agrees not only to all kinds of Animals, 
 but alfo to things inanimate, as Sun, Stars, Clouds, 
 Metals, Stones, Air, Water, &V. But Animal 
 is a proximate or near eft Genus of Bird, becaufe 
 it agrees to feweil other things. Thofe general 
 Natures which fland between the neareft and 
 mod remote are call'd Intermediate. 
 
 Note, II dl y, In univerfal Ideas it is proper to 
 confider their Comprehenfion and their Extenfion*. 
 
 The Comprehenfion of an Idea regards all the 
 efTential Modes and Properties of it : So Body in 
 its Comprehenfion takes in Solidity, Figure, Quan- 
 tity, Mobility, &c. So a Bowl in its Comprehen- 
 fion includes Roundnefs, Volubility, &c. 
 
 The Extenfion of an univerfal Idea regards all 
 the particular Kinds and fingle Beings that arc 
 contain'd under it. So a Body in its Extenfion in- 
 cludes Sun, Moon, Star, Wood, Iron, Plant, Ani- 
 mal, &c. which are feveral Species, or Individuals^ 
 under the general Name of Body. So a Bowl, in 
 its Extenfion, includes a wooden Bowl, a brafs Bowl, 
 a white and a black Bowl, a heavy Bowl, £srV. and 
 all Kinds of Bowls, together with all the particu- 
 lar individual Bowls in the World. 
 
 Note, The Comprehenfion of an Idea is fometimes 
 taken in fo large a Senfe, as not only to include 
 the efTential Attributes, but all the Properties, 
 Modes and Relations whatsoever, that belong to 
 any Being, as will appear Chap. VI. 
 
 This Account of Genus and Species is part of 
 that famous Doctrine of Umverfals, which is taught 
 in the Schools, with diverfe other Formalities be- 
 longing to it -, for it is in this Place that they in- 
 
 • Note, The Word Exter.fizn hpre \i taken in l mere logical Senfir, and 
 not in a fbyfiigl md mathematical Scufc. 
 
 I trodqec 
 
38 L G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 troducc Difference, which is the primary elTential 
 Mode, and Property or the fecondary eflential 
 Mode, and Accident or the accidental Mode *, and 
 thefe they call the five Predicables, becaufe every 
 Thing that is affirm'd concerning any Being, mull 
 be either the Genus, the Species, the Difference, 
 fome Property, or fome Accident: But what farther 
 is ncceflary to be faid concerning thefe Things, 
 will be mention'd when we treat of Definition. 
 
 Having finifh'd the Doctrine of univerfal and 
 particular Ideas, I Jfhould take notice of another 
 Divifion of them , which alfo hath Refpect to 
 their ObjecJs *, and that is, they are either real or 
 imaginary. 
 
 Real Ideas are fuch as have a juft Foundation 
 in Nature, and have real Objects, or Exemplars, 
 which did, or do, or may actually exift, accord- 
 ing to the prefent State and Nature of Things •, 
 fuch are all our Ideas of Long, Broad, Swift, Slow, 
 Wood, Iron, Men, Horfes, Thoughts, Spirits, & cruel 
 Mafter, a proud Beggar, a Man feven Foot high. 
 
 Imaginary Ideas, which are alfo caWdfantaftical, 
 or chimerical, are fuch as are made by enlarging, 
 diminifhing, uniting, dividing real Ideas in the 
 Mind, in fuch a manner, as no Objects, or Ex- 
 emplars, did or will ever exift, according to the 
 prefent Courfe of Nature, tho' the feveral Parts of 
 thefe Ideas are borrowed from real Objects •, fuch 
 are the Conceptions we have of a Centaur, a Sa- 
 ppr, a golden Mountain, a flying Horfe, a Dog with- 
 out a Head, a Bull lefs than a Moufe, or a Moufe 
 as big as a Bull, and a Man twenty Foot high. 
 
 Some of thefe fantaftic Ideas are poffible, that 
 is, they are not utterly inconfillent in the Nature 
 of Things; and therefore it is within the Reach 
 of Divine Power to make fuch Objects ; fuch are 
 rnoit of the Inftances already given: But Impofflbles 
 
 carry 
 
C III. S. 4. <The right U/e of Reafon. 59 
 
 carry an utter Inconfiftence in the Ideas which are 
 join'd •, fuch are felf-aclive Matter, and infinite or 
 eternal Men, a pious Man without Honefiy, or Hea- 
 ven without Holinefs. 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 
 The Divifion of Ideas, with Regard to their Qualities. 
 
 IDEAS, with Regard to their Qualities, afford 
 us thefe feveral Divifions of them. 1. They 
 are either clear and difiintl, or obfcure and confufed. 
 2. They are vulgar or learned. 3. They are^r- 
 fetl or imperfetl. 4. They are true or falfe. 
 
 I. Our Ideas are either clear and difiintl, or ob- 
 fcure and confufed. 
 
 Several Writers have diftinguifhed the clear I- 
 deas from thofe that are difiintl \ and the confufd 
 Ideas from thofe that are obfcure \ and it muft be 
 acknowledged there may be fome Difference be- 
 tween them -, for it is the Clear nefs of Ideas for 
 the mod part makes them difiintl \ and the Ob- 
 fcurity of Ideas is one Thing that will always bring 
 a fort of Confufion into them. Yet when thefe 
 Writers come to talk largely upon this Subject, 
 and to explain and adjufl their Meaning with 
 great Nicety, I have generally found that they 
 did not keep up the Diftinction they firft de- 
 fign'd, but they confound the one with the other. 
 I fhall therefore treat of clear or difiintl Ideas, as 
 one and the fame fort, and obfcure or coyfufed I- 
 deas, as another. 
 
 A clear and difiintl Idea is that which reprefents 
 the Object to the Mind with full Evidence and 
 Strengch, and plainly diflingui.fhes it from all o- 
 ther Obje&s whatfoever. 
 
 An 
 
40 LOG IC K: Or, Part I 
 
 An obfcure and confufed Idea reprcfents the Ob- 
 ject either fo faintly, fo im perfectly, or fo ming- 
 led with other Ideas, that the Object of it doth 
 not appear plain to the Mind, nor purely in its 
 own Nature, nor fufrkiently diftinguifh'd from 
 other Things. 
 
 When we fee the Sea and Sky nearer at Hand, 
 we have a clear and diftintl Idea of each ; but 
 when we look far toward the Horizon, efpecially 
 in a mifty Day, our Ideas of both are but obfcure 
 and confufed \ for we know not which is Sea and 
 which is Sky. So when we look at the Colours 
 of the Rainbow, we have a clear Idea of the red, 
 the blue, the green in the Middle of their feveral 
 Arches, and a diftintl Idea too, while the Eye 
 fixes there •, but when we confider the Border of 
 thofe Colours, they fo run into one another that 
 renders their Ideas confufed and obfcure. So the 
 Idea which we have of our Brother ', or our Friend^ 
 whom we fee daily, is clear and diftintl-, but 
 when the Abfence of many Years has injured the 
 Idea, it becomes obfcure and confufed. 
 
 Note here, that fome of our Ideas may be very 
 clear and diftintl in one Refpect, and very obfcure 
 and confufed in another. So when we fpeak of a 
 Chiliagonum, or a Figure of a thoufand Angles, we 
 may have a clear and diftintl rational Idea of the 
 Number one thoufand Angles, for we can demon- 
 ftrate various Properties concerning it by Reafon : 
 But the Image, or fenfible Idea, which we have of 
 the Figure, is but confufed and obfcure ; for we 
 cannot precifely diftinguifh it by Fancy from the 
 Image of a Figure that has nine hundred Angles or 
 nine hundred and ninety. So when we fpeak of the 
 infinite Divifibility of Matter, we always keep in 
 our Minds a very clear and diftinct Idea of Divi- 
 fion and Divifibility : But after we have made a 
 
 little 
 
C. III. S. 4. The right Ufe of Reafon. 4 1 
 
 little Progrefs in dividing, and come to Parts 
 that are far too fmall for the Reach of ourSenfes, 
 then our Ideas, or fenfible Images of thefe little 
 Bodies, become obfcure and indiftincl, and the 
 Idea of Infinite is very obfcure, imferfeff and con- 
 fufed. 
 
 II. Ideas are either vulgar or learned. A vul- 
 gar Idea reprefents to us the moft obvious and 
 fenfible Appearances that are contained in the Ob- 
 ject of them : But a learned Idea penetrates farther 
 into the Nature, Properties, Reafons, Caufes and 
 Effects of Things. This is beft illuftratedby fome 
 Examples. 
 
 It is a vulgar Idea that we have of a Rainbow, 
 when we conceive a large Arch in the Clouds, 
 made up of various Colours parallel to each other : 
 But it is a learned Idea which a Phil Gopher has 
 when he confiders it as the various Reflections and 
 Refractions of Sun- Beams, in Drops of falling 
 Rain. So it is a vulgar Idea which we have of 
 the Colours of folid Bodies, when we perceive them 
 to be, as it were, a red, or blue, or green Tincture 
 of the Surface of thofe Bodies: But it is a philo- 
 fophical Idea when we confider the various Colours 
 to be nothing elfe but different Senfations exci- 
 ted in us by the variouQy refracted Rays of 
 Light, reflected on our Eyes in a different Man- 
 ner, according to the different Size, or Shape 
 or Situation of the Particles of which the Surfa- 
 ces of thofe Bodies are compos'd. It is a vul- 
 gar Idea which we have of a Watch or Clock, 
 when we conceive of it as a pretty Inftrument, 
 made to fhew us the Hour of the Day : But it is 
 a learned Idea which the Watchmaker has of it, 
 who knows all the feveral Parts of it, the Spring, 
 the Balance, the Chain, the Wheels, their Axles, 
 &c, together with the various Connections and 
 
 Adjuftments 
 
42 ZOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 Adjuftments of each Part, whence the exact and 
 uniform Motion of the Index is deriv'd, which 
 points to the Minute or the Hour. So when a 
 common Underftanding reads Virgil's JEneid, he 
 has but a vulgar Idea of that Poem, yet his Mind 
 is naturally entertained with the Story, and his 
 Ears with the Verfe : But when a Critick or a 
 Man who has Skill in Poefy, reads it, he has a 
 learned Idea of its peculiar Beauties, he taftes and 
 relifhes a fuperior Pleafure •, he admires the Ro- 
 man Poet, and wifhes he had known the Chrijlian 
 Theology, which would have furnifh'd him with 
 nobler Materials and Machines than all the Hea- 
 then Idols. 
 
 It is with a vulgar Idea that the World beholds 
 the Cartoons of Raphael at Hampton-Court, and e- 
 very one feels his Share of Pleafure and Entertain- 
 ment: But a Painter contemplates the Wonders of 
 that Italian Pencil, and kes a thoufand Beauties 
 in them which the vulgar Eye neglected: His 
 learned Ideas give him a tranfeendent Delight, and 
 yet, at the fame Time, difcover the Blemifhes 
 which the common Gazer never obferv'd. 
 
 III. Ideas are either perfect or imperfeel, which 
 are otherwife call'd adequate or inadequate, 
 
 Thofe are adequate Ideas which perfectly repre- 
 fent their Archetypes or Objects. Inadequate I- 
 deas are but a partial, or incomplete Reprefenta- 
 tion of thofe Archetypes to which they are re- 
 ferr'd. 
 
 All our fimple Ideas are in fome Senfe adequate 
 or ferfetl, becaufe ftmple Ideas, confider'd merely 
 as our firft Perceptions, have no Parts in them : 
 So we may be faid to have a perfect Idea of 
 White, Black, Sweet, Sour, Length, Light, Mo- 
 tion, Reft, &c. We have alio a perfect Idea of 
 various Figures, as a Triangle, a Square, a Cylin- 
 der, 
 
C. III. S. 4. the right Ufe of Reafon. 43 
 
 der, a Cube, a Sphere, which are complex Ideas : 
 But our Idea or Image of a Fingure of a tboufand 
 Sides, our Idea of the City of London, or the Pow- 
 ers of a Loadjlone, are very imperfect, as well as 
 all our Ideas of infinite Length or Breadth, infinite 
 Power, Wifdom or Duration ; for the Idea of in- 
 finite is endlefs and ever growing, and can never be 
 compleated. 
 
 Note, 1 . When we have a perfect Idea of any- 
 thing in all its Parts, it is call'd a complete Idea ; 
 when in all its Properties, it is calPd co?nprehenfive. 
 But when we have but an inadequate and imperfect 
 Idea, we are only faid to apprehend it ; therefore 
 we ufe the Term Apprehenfwn, when we fpeak of 
 our Knowledge of God, who can never be com- 
 prehended by his Creatures. 
 
 Note, 2. Tho' there area Multitude of Ideas 
 which may be call'd perfect, or adequate in a vulgar 
 Senfe, yet there are fcarce any Ideas which are ade- 
 quate, comprehenfive and complete in a philofophical 
 Senfe \ for there is fcarce any thing in the World 
 that we know, as to all the Parts and Powers, and 
 Properties of it in Perfection. Even fo plain an 
 Idea as that of a Triangle, has, perhaps, infinite 
 Properties belonging to it, of which we know but 
 a few. Who can tell what are the Shapes and Po- 
 fitions of thofe Particles, which caufe all the Va- 
 riety of Colours that appear on the Surface of 
 Things? Who knows what are the Figures of the 
 little Corpufcles that compofe and diltinguifh dif- 
 ferent Bodies? The Ideas of B rajs, Iron, Gold, 
 Wood, Stone, Hxjfop, and Rofemary have an infi- 
 nite Variety of hidden Myfteries contain'd in the 
 Shape, Size, Motion and Pofuion of the little Par- 
 ticles, of which they are compo^di and, perhaps, 
 alfo infinite unknown Properties and Powers, that 
 may be dcriv'd from them. And if we arife to 
 
 D the 
 
44 L O G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 the Animal World, or the World of Spirits, our 
 Knowledge of them mull be amazingly imperfect, 
 when there is not the kail Grain of Sand, or empty 
 Space, but has too many Queilions and Difficul- 
 ties belonging to it for the wifeft Philofopher upon 
 Earth to aniwer and rtfolve. 
 
 IV. Our Ideas are either true or falfe ; for an Idea 
 being the Reprefentation of a thing in the Mind, 
 it mufl be either a true or a falfe Reprefentation of 
 it. If the Idea be conformable to the Object or 
 Archetype of it, it is a true Idea •, if not, it is a 
 falfe one. Sometimes our Ideas are referr'd to 
 tilings really exifting without us as their Archetypes. 
 If I fee Bodies /;/ their proper Colours I have a true 
 Idea : But when a Man under the Jaundice fees all 
 Bodies yellow, he has a falfe Idea of them. So if 
 we fee the Sun or Moon, rifing or fetting, our Idea 
 reprefents them bigger than when they are on the 
 Meridian: And in this Senfe it is a falfe Idea, be- 
 caufe chofe heavenly Bodies are all Day, and all 
 Night, of the fame Bignefs. Or when I fee ajtrait 
 Staff" appear crooked while it is half under the Water ; 
 I fay, the Water gives me a falfe Idea of it. Some- 
 times our Ideas refer to the Ideas of other Men de- 
 noted by fuch a particular Word, as their Arche- 
 types : So when I hear a Trot eft ant ufe the Words 
 Church and Sacraments -, if I underftand by thefe 
 Words, a Congregation of faithful Men who profefs 
 Chriftiamty, and the two Ordinances, Baptifm and 
 the Lord's Supper, I have a true Idea of thofe 
 Words in the common Senfe of P rot eft ants: But if 
 the Man who fpeaks of them be a Papifi, he means 
 the Church of Rome and the f even S acraments ,and then 
 I have a mifiaken Idea of^ thofe Words^ as fpoken 
 by him, for he has a different Senfe and Meaning : 
 And in general whenfoever I miflake the Senfe of 
 any Speaker or Writer, I may be faid to have a 
 falfe Idea of it. Some 
 
C. IV. S. i . The right Ufe of Reafon. 45 
 
 Some think that Truths or Fal/hood properly be- 
 longs only to Proportions, which mall be the Sub- 
 ject of Difcourfe in the fecond Part of Logic ; for 
 if we confider Ideas as mere Impreflions upon the 
 Mind, made by outward Objects, thofe Impref- 
 fions will ever be conformable to the Laws of Na- 
 ture in fuch a Cafe : The JVater will make a Stick 
 appear crooked, and the horizontal Air will make 
 the Sun and Moon appear bigger. And generally 
 where there is Falfhood in Ideas, there feems to be 
 fomefecret or latent Propofition, whereby we judge 
 falfly of things: This is more obvious where we 
 take up the Words of a Writer or Speaker in a 
 miftaken Senfe, for we join his Words to our own 
 Ideas, which are different from his. But after all, 
 fince Ideas are Pictures of Things, it can never be 
 very improper to pronounce them to be true or 
 falfe, according to their Conformity or Nonconfor- 
 mity to their Exemplars. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of Words and their fever al Divifons, together 
 with the Advantage and Danger of them. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 Of Words in general, and their Uje. 
 
 TH O' our Ideas arc firfl acquirM by the Per- 
 ception of Objects, or by various Senfatwm 
 and Refletlions, yet we convey them to each" other 
 by the Means of certain Sounds, or written Marks, 
 which we call Words-, and a great Part of our 
 Knowledge is both obtain'd and communicated by 
 thefe Means, which are call'd Spf<qb or Language. 
 
 D 2 But 
 
46 L O G I C K: Or, Part L 
 
 But as we are led into the Knowledge of things 
 by Words, fo we are oftentimes led into Error, 
 or Miitake, by the Ufe or Abufe of Words alfo. 
 And in order to guard againft fuch Miftakes, as 
 well as to promote xxir Improvement in Know- 
 ledge, it is neceffary to acquaint ourfelves a ljttle 
 with Words and 'Terms. We fhall begin with thefe 
 Obfervations. 
 
 Obferv. i. Words (whether they are fpoken 
 or written) have no natural Connection with the 
 Ideas they are defign'd to fignify, nor with the 
 things which are reprefented in thofe Ideas. There 
 is no manner of Affinity between the Sounds 
 white in Englijh, or blanc in French, and that Co- 
 lour which we call by that Name -, nor have the 
 Letters, of which thefe Words are compos'd, 
 any natural Aptnefs to fignify that Colour rather 
 than red or green. Words and Names therefore 
 are mere arbitrary Signs invented by Men to 
 communicate their Thoughts, or Ideas, to one 
 another. 
 
 Obferv. 2. If one fingle Word were appointed 
 to exprefs but one fimple Idea, and nothing elfe, 
 as White, Black, Sweet, Sour, Sharp, Bitter, Ex- 
 tenfion, Duration, there would be fcarce any Mif- 
 take about them. 
 
 But alas ! It is a common Unhappinefs in Lan- 
 guage, that different fimple Ideas are fometimes 
 exprefs'd by die fame Word \ fo the Words Jweet 
 and /harp, are applied both to the Objects of hear- 
 ing and tailing, as we fhall fee hereafter > and 
 this, perhaps, may be one Caufe or Foundation of 
 Obfcurityand Error arifing from Words. 
 
 Obferv. 3. In communicating our complex 
 
 Ideas to one another, if we could join as many 
 
 peculiar and appropriated Words together in one 
 
 Sound, as we join fimple Ideas to make one com- 
 
 2 plex 
 
C. IV. S. i . the right U/e of Reafon. 47 
 
 plex one, we mould feldom be in Danger of mis- 
 taking: When I exprefs the Tafte of an Apple, 
 which we call the Bitter-Sweet? none can miftake 
 what I mean. 
 
 Yet this fort of Compofition would make all 
 Language a mod tedious and unweildy thing, 
 fince moft of our Ideas are complex, and many 
 of them have eight or ten fimple Ideas in 
 them •, fo that the Remedy would be worfe than 
 the Difeafe •, for what is now exprefs'd in one 
 fhort Word, as Month? or Tear? would require 
 two Lines to exprefs it. It is necefTary, there- 
 fore, that ft ngle Words be invented to exprefs com- 
 plex Ideas? in order to make Language fhort and 
 ufeful. 
 
 But here is our great Infelicity, that when 
 fingle Words fignify complex Ideas? one Word can 
 never diftinctly manifeit all the Parts of a com- 
 plex Idea, and thereby it will often happen, that 
 one Man includes more or lefs in his Idea, than 
 another does, while he affixes the fame Word to 
 it. In this Cafe there will be Danger of Mif- 
 take between them, for they do not mean the 
 fame Objecl? tho' they ufe the fame Name. So if 
 one Perfon, or Nation, by the Word Tear mean 
 twelve Months of thirty Days each, i. e. three 
 hundred and fixty Days, another intend a Solar 
 Tear of three hundred fixty five Days, and a 
 third mean a Lunar Tear? or twelve Lunar Months? 
 i. e. three hundred fifty four Days, there will be 
 a great Variation and Error in their Account of 
 things, unlcfs they arc well apprized of each o- 
 ther's meaning beforehand. This is fuppos'd to 
 be the Reafon, why fome ancient Hijlories? and 
 Prophefies? and Accounts of Chronology are fo 
 hard to be adjufted. And this is the true Reafon 
 of fo furious and endlels Debates on many Points 
 
 D 3 in 
 
48 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 in Divinity j the Words Church, Worfljip, Ido- 
 latry, Repentance, Faith, Eletlion, Merit, Grace, 
 and many others which fignify very complex Ideas, 
 are not applied to include juft the fame fimple 
 Ideas, and the dime Number of them, by the va- 
 rious contending Parties ; thence arife Confufion 
 and Conteft. 
 
 Obferv. 4. Tho' a Jingle Name does not cer- 
 tainly manifeft to us all the Parts of a complex 
 Idea, yet it muft be acknowledg'd, that in many 
 of our complex Ideas, the fingle Name may Point 
 out to us fome chief Property which belongs to 
 the thing that the Word fignifies •, efpecially 
 when the Word, or Name, is trae'd up to its 
 Original thro' feveral Languages from whence it 
 is borrowed. So an Apoftle fignifies one who is fent 
 forth. 
 
 But this tracing of a Word to its Original 
 (which is call'd Etymology) is fometimes a very 
 precarious and uncertain Thing : And after all, 
 we have made but little Progrefs towards the 
 Attainment of the full Meaning of a complex 
 Idea, by knowing fome one chief Property of it. 
 We know but a fmall Part of the Notion of 
 an Apoftle, by knowing barely that he is fent 
 forth. 
 
 Obferv. 5. Many (if not mod) of our Words 
 which are applied to moral and intelletlual Ideas, 
 when traced up to their Original in the learned 
 Languages, will be found to fignify fenjible and 
 corporeal Things: Thus the Words Apprehenfion, 
 Under/landing, Abflraclion, Invention^ Idea, In- 
 ference, Prudence, Religion, Churchy Adoration, 
 &x. have all a corporeal Signification in their O- 
 riginal. The Name Spirit itfelf fignifies Breath 
 or Air, in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew: Such is 
 the Poverty of all Languages, they are fore'd to, 
 
 uie 
 
C. IV. S. i. the right life of Reafon. 49 
 
 ufe chefe Names for incorporeal Ideas, which thing 
 has a tendency to Error and Confufion. 
 
 Obferv. 6. The laft thing I fhall mention that 
 leads us into many a Miftake, is, the Multitude 
 of Objects that one Name fometimes fignifies : 
 There is almoft an infinite Variety of things and 
 Ideas both fimple and complex, beyond all the 
 Words that are invented in any Language •, thence 
 it becomes almoft neceffary that one Name mould 
 fignify feveral things. Let us but confider the 
 two Colours of Yellow and Blue, if they arc ming- 
 led together in any confiderable Proportion they 
 make a Green : Now there may be infinite Diffe- 
 rences of the Proportions in the Mixture of Yel- 
 low and Blue-, and yet we have only theft three 
 Words, Yellow, Blue, and Green, to fignify all of 
 them, at lead by one fingle Term. 
 
 When I ufe the Word Shore, I may intend 
 thereby a Co aft of Land near the Sea, or a Drain 
 to carry off Water, or a Prop to fupport a Building ; 
 and by the Sound of the Word Porter, who can 
 tell whether I mean a Man who bears Burdens, or 
 a Servant who waits at a Nobleman's Gate? The 
 World is fruitful in the Invention of Utenfils of 
 Life, and new Characters and Offices of Men, yet 
 Names entirely new are fcldom invented •, there- 
 fore old Names are almoft: neceffarily us'd to fig- 
 nify new things, which may occalion much Con- 
 fufion and Error in the receiving and communica- 
 ting of Knowledge. 
 
 Give me leave to propofe one fingle Jnftance, 
 wherein all thefe Notes ih.ill be remarkably ex- 
 emplified. It is the Word B'ifnop, whiJi in 
 French is calPd Evcoue \ upon which I would make 
 thefe leveral Oblervaiions. (f.) That there is 
 no naniral Connection between the facfed Of- 
 fice. hereby fignified, an 1 the Letters or Scki.u* 
 
 i) 4 which 
 
£0 LOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 which fignify this Office * for both thefc Words 1 , 
 Eveque and Bijhop fignify the fame Office , tho* 
 there is not one Letter alike in them ; nor have 
 the Letters which compoie the Englijh or the 
 French Word any thing facred belonging to them, 
 more than the Letters that compoie the Words 
 King or Soldier. (2.) If the the Meaning of a Word 
 could be learnt by its Derivation or Etymology, 
 yet the original Derivation of Words is often- 
 times very dark and unfearchable ; for who would 
 imagine that each of thefe Words are deriv'd 
 from the Latin Epifc opts, or the Greek 'E^iVxow^ ? 
 Yet in this Iniiance we happen to know certainly 
 the true Derivation ; the French being anciently 
 writ Evefque, is borrow'd from the firft Part of 
 the Latin Wordj and the old Engli/b Bifcop from 
 the middle of it. (3.) The original Greek Word 
 iignifies an Overlooker^ or one who Hands higher 
 than his Fellows and overlooks them : It is a 
 compound Word, that primarily fignifies fenfible 
 Ideas , tranflated to fignify or include feveral moral 
 or intellectual Ideas -, therefore all will grant, that 
 the Nature of the Office can never be known by 
 the mere Sound of the Word Overlooker. (4.) I 
 add farther, the Word Bijloop, or Epifcopus, even 
 when it is thus tranflated from a fenfible Idea, to 
 include feveral intellectual Ideas, may yet equally 
 fignify an Overfeer of the Poor-, an Infpeclor of 
 the Cuftoms -, a Surveyor of the Highways ; a 
 Supervifor of the Excife, &c. but by the Confent 
 of Men, and the Language of Scripture, it is 
 appropriated to fignify a j facred Office in the Church. 
 (5.) This very Idea and Name, thus tranflated 
 from things fenfible, to fignify a fpiritual and fa- 
 cred thing, contains but one Property of it, 
 (viz.) one that has an Overfight> or Care over 0- 
 ihers: But it does not tell us, whether it includes 
 
 a Care 
 
C. I V. S. 2 . fbe right life of Reafon. 5 1 
 
 a Care over one Church, or many -, over the Laity y 
 or the Clergy. (6.) Thence it follows, that thofe 
 who in the complex Idea of the Word Bijhop 
 include an Overfight over the Clergy, or over a 
 whole Diocefe of People, a Superiority to Pref- 
 byters, a diftindt Power of Ordination, l£c . mufb 
 necefTarily difagree with thofe who include in it 
 only the Care of a fingle Congregation. Thus 
 according to the various Opinions of Men, this 
 Word fignifies a Pope, a Galtican Bijhop, a Lu- 
 theran Superintendent, an Englijh Prelate, a Pajlor 
 of a fingle Jffembly, or a Presbyter or Elder. Thus 
 they quarrel with each other perpetually •, and it 
 is well if any of them all have hit precifely the 
 Senfe of the facred Writers, and included juft 
 the fame Ideas in it, and no others. 
 
 I might make all the fame Remarks on the Word 
 Church, or Kirk, which is derived from Ku^» oix@* 
 or the Houfe of the Lord, contracted into Kyrioikj 
 which fome fuppofe to fignify an Jffembly of Chrif- 
 tians, fome take it for all the IVorld that prof effes 
 Chrtftianity, and fome make it to mean only the 
 Clergy ; and on thefe Accounts it has been the Oc- 
 cafion of as many and as furious Controverfies as 
 the Word Bifiop which was mention'd before. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 Of negative and pofitive Terms. 
 
 FROM thefe and other Confiderations it will 
 follow, that if we would avoid Error in our 
 Purfuit of Knowledge, we muft take good heed 
 to the Ufe of Words and Terms , and be acquaint- 
 ed with the various Kinds of them. 
 
 I. Terms are either pofitive or negative. 
 
 Negative 
 
52 L G 1 C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 Negative Terms are fuch as have a little Word 
 or Syllable of denying join'd to them, according 
 to the various Idioms of every Languge, as Un- 
 pleafant, Imprudent, Immortal, Irregular, Ignorant, 
 Infinite, Endlefs, Lifelefs, Deathlefs, Nonfenfe, A- 
 byfs, Anonymous, where the Prepofitions Un, Im y 
 In, Non, A, An, and the Termination lefs, fignify 
 a Negation, either in Engliflj, Latin, or Greek. 
 
 Pofttive Terms are thofe which have no fuch 
 negative Appendices belonging to them, as Life* 
 Death, End, Senfe, Mortal. 
 
 But fo unhappily are our Words and Ideas 
 Jink'd together, that we can never know which 
 are pofitive Ideas and which are negative, by the 
 Word that is ufed to exprefs them, and that for 
 thefe Reafons. 
 
 i fc , There are fome pofttive Terms which are 
 made to fignify a negative Idea ; as Dead is pro- 
 perly a Thing that is depriv'd of Life -, Blind im- 
 plies a Negation or Privation of Sight-, Deaf a 
 Want of Hearing; Dumb a Denial of Speech. 
 
 z^y, There are alio fome negative Terms, which 
 imply pofitive Ideas, fuch as immortal and death- 
 kfi, which fignify ever-living, or a Continuance 
 in Life : Infolent figniries rude and haughty : In- 
 demnify to keep fafe -, and Infinite perhaps has a 
 pofitive Idea too, for it is an Idea ever growing ; 
 and when it is applied to God it fignifies his com* 
 pleat Perfection. 
 
 3 dl >', There are both pofitive and negative Terms, 
 invented to fignify the fame, and contrary Ideas ; 
 as Unhappy and Miferable, Sinlefs and Holy, Pure 
 and Undefiled, Impure and Filthy, Unkind and Cruel, 
 Irreligious and Profane, Unforgiving and Revenge- 
 ful, &c. and there is a great deal of Benuty and 
 Convenience deriv'd to any Language from this 
 Variety of ExprerTion ; tho 1 fometimes it a little 
 4 confounds 
 
C. IV. S. 2. lie right Ufe of Reafon. 53 
 
 confounds our Conceptions of Being and Not-Be- 
 ing, our pofitive and negative Ideas. 
 
 4 thl >', I may add alfo, that there are fome Words 
 which are negative in their original Language, but 
 feem pofitive to an Englifhman, becaufe the Nega- 
 tion is unknown ; as Abyfs, a Place without a Bot- 
 tom ; Anodyne, an eaiing Medicine ; Amnefty, an 
 Unremembrance or general Pardon ; Anarchy, a 
 State without Government j Anonymous, i. e. name- 
 lefs •, Inept, i. e. not fit •, Iniquity, i. e. Unright- 
 eoufnefs ; Infant, one that can't fpeak, (viz.) a 
 Child ; Injurious, not doing Juftice or Right. 
 
 The Way therefore to know whether any Idea 
 be negative or not, is, to confider whether it pri- 
 marily imply the Abfence of any pofitive Being, 
 or Mode of Being ; if it doth, then it is a Nega- 
 tion or negative Idea •, otherwife it is a pofitive one, 
 whether the Word that exprefTes it be pofitive or 
 negative. Yet after all, in many Cafes this is 
 very hard to determine -, as in Amnefty, Infinite^ 
 Abyfs, which are originally negative Terms, but 
 they fignify Pardon, &c. which fcem to be Pofi- 
 tives. So Darknefs, Madnefs, Clown, arc pofitive 
 Terms, but they imply the Want of Light, the 
 Want of Reafon, and the Want of Manners •, and 
 perhaps thefe may be rank'd among the negative 
 Ideas. 
 
 Here note, that in the Engliflj Tongue two 
 negative Terms are equal to one pofitive, and fig- 
 nify the fame Thing, as, not unhappy fignifies hap- 
 py, not immortal, fignifies mortal ; he is no imjru- 
 ilent Man, i. e. he is a Man of Prudence: But the 
 Senfe and Force of the Word in fuel 1 a negative 
 Way of Expreffiort, feems to be a little. 1 
 nifh'd. 
 
54 LOG ICK: Or, Parti. 
 
 Sect. III. 
 
 Of fimple and complex Terms. 
 
 1\J~T^ERMS are divided into fmple pr complex. 
 X A fimple Term is one Word/ a complex 
 Term is when more Words are ufed to ilgnify one 
 Thing. 
 
 Some Terms are complex in Words, but not in 
 Senfe, fuch is the fecond Emperor of Rome ; for it 
 excites in our Mind only the Idea of one Man (viz.) 
 Auguftus. 
 
 Some Terms are complex in Senfe, but not in 
 Words ; fo when I fay an Army, a Foreft, I mean 
 a Multitude of Men, or Trees ; and almoft all our 
 moral Ideas, as well as many of our natural ones, 
 are exprefs'd in this Manner; Religion, Piety, Loy- 
 alty, Knavery, Theft, include a Variety of Ideas 
 in each Term. 
 
 There are other Terms which are complex both 
 in Words and Senfe; fo when I fay, a. fierce Dog, 
 or a pious Man, it excites an Idea, not only of 
 thofe two Creatures, but of their peculiar Charac- 
 ters alfo. 
 
 Among the Terms that are complex in Senfe but 
 not in Words, we may reckon thofe fimple Terms 
 which contain a primary and a fecondary Idea in 
 them ; as when I hear my Neighbour fpeak that 
 which is not true, and I fay to him this is not 
 true, or this is falfe, I only convey to him the 
 naked Idea of his Error •, this is the primary Idea : 
 But if I fay it is a Lye, the Word Lye carries alfo 
 a jecondary Idea in it, for it implies both the Falf- 
 hood of the Speech, and my Reproach and Cen- 
 fure of the Speaker. On the other hand, if I fay it 
 is a Miftake, this carries alfo a fecondary Idea with 
 
 it; 
 
C. IV. S. 3 . The fight Ufe of Reafon. 55 
 
 it ; for it not only refers to the Falfhood of his 
 Speech, but it includes my Tendernefs and Civi- 
 lity to him at the fame Time. Another Inftance 
 may be this $ when I ufe the Word Inceft, Adul- 
 tery, and Murder, I convey to another not only 
 the primary Idea of thofe Actions, but I include 
 alio the fecondary Idea of their Unlawfulnefs, and 
 my Abhorrence of them. 
 
 Note, i ft , Hence it comes topafs, that among 
 Words which fignify the fame principal Ideas^ 
 fome are clean and decent, others unclean -, fome 
 chafte, others obfcene -, fome are kind, others are 
 affronting and reproachful, becaufe of the fecondary 
 Idea which Cuftom has affix'd to them. And it 
 is the Part of a wife Man, when there is a Ne- 
 ceflity of expreffing any evil Atlions, to do it ci- 
 ther by a Word that has a fecondary Idea of Kind- 
 nefi, or Softnefs-, or a Word that carries in it an 
 Idea of Rebuke and Severity, according as the Cafe 
 requires: So when there is a NecefTity of expref- 
 fing things unclean or obfcene, a wife Man will do 
 it in the mod decent Language, to excite as few 
 uncleanly Ideas as poflible in the Minds of the 
 Hearers. 
 
 Note, 2 d , in Length of Time, and by the 
 Power of Cuftom, Words fometimes change their 
 primary Ideas, as fhall be declar'd, and fometimes 
 they have chang'd their fecondary Ideas, tho' the 
 primary Ideas may remain : So Words that were 
 once chafte, by frequent Ufe grow obfcene and un- 
 cleanly ; and Words that were once honourable, 
 may in the next Generation grow mean and con- 
 temptible. So the Word Dame originally iiimiri- 
 ed a Miftrefs of a Family,, who was a Lady, and 
 it is ufed ftill in the Englijh Law to Ggnify, a 
 Lady *, but in common Ufe no^. \ it repre- 
 
 fents a Farmer's Wife, or a M\ , a Family 
 
56 LOGIC K: Or, Parti, 
 
 of the lower Rank in the Country. So thofe Words 
 of Rabjhakeh, Ifa. xxxvi. 12. in our Tranflacion, 
 {Eat their own Dung, &c.) were doubtlefs decent 
 and clean Language, when our Tranflators wrote 
 them above a hundred Years ago. The Word 
 Dung has maintain'd its old fecondary Idea and 
 inoirenfive Senfe to this Day> but the other Word 
 in that Sentence has by Cuilom acquired a more 
 uncleanly Idea, and ihould now rather be chang'd 
 into a more decent Term, and lb it mould be 
 read in publick, unlefs it fhould be thought more 
 proper to omit the Sentence*. 
 
 For this Reafon it is, that the Jew'jh Rabbins 
 have fupplied other chafle Words in the Margin 
 of the Hebrew Bible, where the Words of the 
 Text, thro' Time and Cuftom, are degenerated, 
 fo as to carry any bafe and unclean fecondary Idea 
 in them -, and they read the Word which is in the 
 Margin, which they call Keri, and not that 
 which was written in the Text, which they call 
 Chetib. 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 
 Of Words common and proper. 
 
 III. f 1CTORDS and Names are either common or 
 VV proper. Common Names are fuch as 
 fland for univerfal Ideas, or a whole Rank of Be- 
 ings, whether general or fpecial. Thefe are call'd 
 Appellatives -, fo Fijh, Bird, Man, City, River, are 
 common Names •, and fo are Trout, Eel, Lobfter, 
 for they all agree to many Individuals, and fome 
 of them to many Species: But Cicero, Virgil, Buce- 
 
 * So in fome Places of the facred Hitrorians, where it is written, Every 
 tut that piffet a^ainji the Wdl t we fliould read Every Male. 
 
 phalus, 
 
C. IV. S. 4. The right Ufe of Reafon. 57 
 
 -phalus, London, Rome, JEtna, the Thames, are 
 proper Names, for each of them agrees only to 
 out fingle Being. 
 
 Note here/r/?, that a^rName may become 
 in fome Senfe common, when it hath been given 
 to feveral Beings of the fame Kind ; fo Ccefar, 
 which was the proper Name of the firft Emperor 
 Julius, became alfo a common Name to all the 
 following Emperors. And Tea, which was the 
 proper Name of one fort of Indian Leaf, is now- 
 a-days become a common Name for many Infu- 
 fions of Herbs, or Plants, in Water \ as Sage-Tea, 
 Alehoof-Tea, Limon-Tea, &c. So Peter, Thomas, 
 John, IVilliam, may be reckon'd common Names 
 alfo, becaufe they are given to many Perfons, un- 
 lefs they are determin'd to fignify a fingle Perfon 
 at any particular Time, or Place. 
 
 Note in the fecond Place, that a co?nmon Name 
 may become proper by Cuitom, or by the Time, 
 or Place, or Perfons that ufe it ; as in Great Bri- 
 tain, when we fay the King, we mean our prefent 
 rightful Sovereign King George, who now reigns •, 
 when we fpeak of the Prince, we intend his 
 Royal Highnefs George Prince of IV ales : If we 
 mention the City when we are near London, we 
 generally mean the City of London ; when in a 
 Country Town, we fay the Parfon or the Efquire^ 
 all the Parifh knows who are the fingle Perfons 
 intended by it ; fo when we are fpeaking of the 
 Hiflory of the New Teltament, and ufe the 
 Words Peter, Paul, John, we mean thofe three 
 Apoftles. 
 
 Note in the third Place, that any common Name 
 whatfoever is made proper, by Terms of Particu- 
 larity added to it, as the common Words Pope, 
 King, Horfe, Garden, Book, Knife, &c. are oe- 
 fign'd to fignify a fingular Idea, when ue fay 
 
 the 
 
58 LOG I CK: Or, Parti. 
 
 the prefent Pope *, the King of Great Britain *, the 
 Horfe that won the laft Plate at New- Market \ 
 the Royal Garden at Kenfington ; this Book -, that 
 Knife, &c. 
 
 Sect. V. 
 Of concrete and abftracl Terms. 
 
 IV.T7TTORDS or Terms are divided into ab- 
 V V ftracl and concrete. 
 
 Abftracl Terms fignify the Mode or Quality 
 of a Being, without any Regard to the Subject 
 in which it is ; as Whitenefs, Roundnefs, Length, 
 Breadth, JVifdom, Mortality, Life, Death. 
 
 Concrete Terms, while they exprefs the Quali- 
 ty, do alfo either exprefs, or imply, or refer to 
 fome Subject; to which it belongs •, as white, 
 round, long, broad, wife, mortal, living, dead. 
 But thefe are not always Noun Adjetlives in a 
 grammatical Senfe •, for a Fool, a Knave, a Philo- 
 fopher, and many other Concretes are Subftan- 
 tives, as well as Knavery, Folly, and Philofophy, 
 which are the abftracl: Teirns that belong to 
 them. 
 
 Sect. VI. 
 Of univocal and equivocal Words. 
 
 V. T T J R D S and Terms are either univocal or 
 V V equivocal. Univocal Words are fuch as 
 fignify but one Idea, or at leaft but one fort of 
 Thing ; equivocal Words are fuch as fignify two 
 or more different Ideas, or different forts of Ob- 
 jects. The Words Book, Bible, Fifh, Hcufe, E- 
 lephayit, may be called univocal Words ; for I 
 
 know 
 
C. IV. S. 6. the right Vfe of Reafon. cq 
 
 know not that they fignify any thing elfe but 
 thofe Ideas to which they are generally affixt; 
 but Head is an equivocal Word, for it figniries 
 the Head of a Nail, or a Pin, as well as of an 
 Animal: Nail is an equivocal Word, it is ufed for 
 the Nail of the Hand or Foot , and for an iron 
 Nail to r'aften any thing. Poft is equivocal, it 
 is a Piece of Timber, or a furift Meffenger. A 
 Church is a religious AJJembly, or the large fair 
 Building where they meet •, and fometimes the 
 fame Word means a Synod of Bifhops, or of PreJ- 
 byters, and in fome Places it is the Pope and a ge- 
 neral Council. 
 
 Here let it be noted, that when two or more 
 Words fignify the fame Thing, as Wave and Bil- 
 low, Mead and ' Meadow, they are ufually called 
 fynonymous Words : But it feems very ftrange, 
 that Words which are directly contrary to each 
 other, ihould fometimes reprefent almoft the 
 fame Ideas •, yet thus it is in fome few Inftances ; 
 a valuable, or an invaluable Blefling ; a JljamefuU 
 or a Jhamelefs Villia.n ; a thick Skull, or a thin 
 Jkulled Fellow, a mere Paper Skull-, a Man of a 
 large Conscience, little Confcience, or no Confcicnce ; 
 a famous Rafcal, or an i? famous one : So uncer- 
 tain a Thing is human Language, whofe Founda- 
 tion and Support is Cuftom. 
 
 As Words fignify ing the fame Thing are call'd 
 fynonymous \ fo equivocal Words, or thofc which 
 fignify feveral Things, are call'd homonymous, or 
 ambiguous *, and when Perfons life fuch ambiguous 
 Words, with a Defign to deceive, it is call'd E- 
 quivocation. 
 
 Our funple Ideas^ and cfpecally the fexftble Qua- 
 lities, furnifh us with a great Variety of equivo- 
 cal, or ambiguous Words ; for thefe being the rirlt, 
 and molt natural Ideas we have, we borrow fome 
 
 E of 
 
6® L G I C K: Or, Part L 
 
 of their Names, to fignify many other Ideas, 
 both fimple and complex. The Word Sweet ex- 
 prefles the pleafant Perceptions of almoft every 
 Senfe ; Sugar is fweet, but it hath not the fame 
 Sweetneis as Mufick •, nor hath Mufick the Sweet- 
 nefs of a Rofe •, and a fweet Profpetl differs from 
 them all : Nor yet have any of thefe the fame 
 Sweetnefs as Difcourfe, Counfel, or Meditation hath ; 
 yet the royal Pfalmift faith of a Man, We took 
 fweet Counfel together •, and of God, My Medita- 
 tion of him Jhall he fweet. Bitter is alfo fuch an 
 equivocal Word •, there is bitter Wormwood, there 
 are bitter Words, there are bitter Enemies, and a 
 bitter cold Morning. So there is a Sharpnefs in 
 Vinegar, and there is a Sharpnefs in Pain, in Sor- 
 row, and in Reproach •■> there is a (harp Eye, a 
 iharp Wit, and a fliarp .Sword: But there is not 
 one of thefe feven Sharpnejfes, the fame as ano- 
 ther of them, and a fharp Eaft Wind is different 
 from them all. 
 
 There are alfo Verbs, or Words of Action, 
 which are equivocal as well as Nouns, or Names. 
 The Words to bear, to take, to come, to get, are 
 fufficient Inftances of it •, as when we fay, to bear 
 a Burden, to bear Sorrow or Reproach, to bear a 
 Name, to bear a Grudge, to bear Fruit, or to bear 
 Children \ the Word bear is ufed in very different 
 Senfes. And fo is the Word get, when we fay, 
 to get Money, to get in, to get off, to get ready \ 
 to get a Stomach, and to get a Cold, &c. 
 
 There is alio a great deal of Ambiguity in 
 many of the Englijh Particles, as, but, before, he- 
 fide, with, without, that, then, there, for, forth, 
 above, about, dec. of which Grammars and Dictio- 
 naries will furriciently inform us. 
 
 Sect, 
 
C IV. S. 7. the right Ufe of Reafon. 6 1 
 
 Sect. VII. 
 Various Kinds of equivocal Words. »? > * 
 
 T T would be enleis to run through all the Va- 
 J[ rieties of Words, and Terms, which have dif- 
 ferent Senfes applied to them ; I fhallonly mend- 
 on, therefore, a few of the moil remarkable and 
 moft ufeful DiftinbJions among them. 
 
 i lc , The firft Bivifion of equivocal Words 
 lets us know that fome are equivocal only in their 
 Sound or Pronounciation ; others are equivocal only 
 in Writing •> and others, both in Writings and in 
 Sound. 
 
 Words equivocal in Sound only, are fuch as 
 thefe ; the Rein of a Bridle, which hath the fame 
 Sound with the Reign of a King or a Shower of 
 Rain, but all three have different Letters, and 
 diftincf. Spelling. So Might, or Strength, is equi- 
 vocal in Sound, but differs in Writing from Mite y 
 a little Animal, or a fmall Piece of Money. And 
 the Verb to write, has the fame Sound with 
 Wright a Workman, Right or Equity, and Rite 
 or Ceremony •, but it is fpelled very differently 
 from them all. 
 
 Words equivocal in Writing only, are fuch as 
 thefe •, to tear in Pieces, has the fame Spelling 
 with a Tear: To lead, or guide, has the fame 
 Letters as Lead the Metal : And a Bowl for Re- 
 creation is written the fame Way as a Bowl for 
 drinking, but the Pronunciation of all thefe is 
 different. 
 
 But thofe Words which are moft commonly 
 and juftly call'd equivocal, are fuch as are both 
 written and pronoune'd the fame Way, and yet 
 have different Senfes or Ideas belonging to them ; 
 
 E 2 fuch 
 
62 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 fuch are all the Inftances which were given in 
 
 the preceding Section. 
 
 Among the Words which are equivocal in 
 Sound only, and not in Writing, there is a large 
 Field for Perfons who delight in Jefts and Puns y 
 in Riddles and Quibbles , to fport themfelves. 
 This fort of Words is alfo ufed by wanton Per- 
 fons, to convey lewd Ideas, under the Covert of 
 Exprefjlcns capable of a chafte Meaning, which 
 are called double Entendres •, or when Perfons 
 fpeak Faljhood with a Deiign to deceive, under 
 the Covert of Truth. Tho' it muft be confeft, 
 that all forts of equivocal Words yield fufficient 
 iVIatter for fuch Purpofes. 
 
 There are many Cafes alfo ^wherein an equivo- 
 cal Word is us'd for the fake of Decency to cover 
 ii foul Idea: For the moft chafte and modefl, and 
 well-bred Perfons, having fometimes a Neceflity 
 to fpeak of the Things of Nature, convey their 
 Ideas in the moft inoftenfive Language by this 
 Means. And indeed, the mere Poverty of all 
 Languages makes it neceflary to ufe equivocal 
 Words upon many Occafions, as the common 
 Writings of Men, and even the holy Book of 
 God furHciently manifeft. 
 
 z^y, Equivocal Words are ufually diftinguifh- 
 ed, according to their Original, into fuch, whofe 
 various Senfes arife from mere Chance or Accident^ 
 and fuch as are made equivocal by Defign -, as the 
 Word Bear fignifies a Jhaggy Beafi, and it figni- 
 fies alfo to bear or carry a Burden \ this feems to 
 be the mere effect of Chance : But if I call my 
 -Dog, Bear, becaufe he is fhaggy, or call one of 
 the Northern Confiellations by that Name, from a 
 •fancied Situation of the Stars in the Shape of that 
 Animal, then it is by Dejign that the Word is 
 made yet farther equivocal. 
 
 2 But 
 
C. IV. S.7. the right Vfi of Reafon. 63 
 
 But becaufe I think this common Account of 
 the Spring or Origin of equivocal Words is too 
 flight and imperfect, I mail referve this Subject 
 to be treated of by itfelf, and proceed to the third 
 Divifwn. 
 
 3 d] y, Ambiguous or equivocal Words, are 
 fuch as arefometimes taken in a large and general 
 Senfe, and fometimes in a Senfe more ftricl and 
 limited? and have different Ideas affix'd to them 
 accordingly. Religion or Virtue, taken in a large 
 Senfe, includes both our Duty to God and our 
 Neighbour ; but in a more flrict, limited, and pro- 
 per Senfe, Virtue lignifies our Duty towards Metu 
 and Religion our Duty to God. Virtue may yet be 
 taken in the ilricteft Senfe, and then it fignifies 
 Tower or Courage, which is the Senfe of it in fome 
 Places of the New Teftament. So Grace, taken 
 in a large Senfe, means the Fa vour of fiod, and all 
 the fpiritual Bleflings that proceed from it (which 
 is a frequent Senfe of it in the Bible) but in a 
 limited Senfe it fignifies the Habit of Holt 
 wrought in us by Divine Favour, or a compter 
 Idea of the Chriftian Virtues. It may be alio tak- 
 en in the flricteft Senfe ; and thus it fignifies any 
 fingle Chriftian Virtue, as in 2 Cor. viii. 6, 7. where 
 it is us'd for Liberality. So a City, in a Ijtrict and 
 proper Senfe, means the Houfes inclofed within the 
 Walls ; in a larger Senfe it reaches to all the 
 Suburbs. 
 
 This larger and ftricler Senfe of a Word is us'd 
 in almoft all the Sciences, as well as in Theolo- 
 gy, and in common Life. The Word Qeqg 
 taken in a ftritl Senfe, fignifies the Knowledge of 
 the Circles of the earthly Globe, and the Situati- 
 on of the various Parts of the Earth -, when it U 
 taken in a little larger Senfe, it includes the Kno . 
 ledge of the Se.u alfo \ and in the lane ft Senfe of 
 
 E 3 all. 
 
64 LOG ICK: Or, Parti. 
 
 all, it extends to the various Cuftoms, Habits, 
 and Governments of Nations. When an Aftro- 
 nomer ufes the Word Star in its proper and ftrict 
 Senfe, it is applied only to the fixed Stars, but in 
 a large Senfe it includes the Planets alfo. 
 
 This equivocal Senfe of Words belongs alfo to 
 many proper Names: So J ft a taken in the largeft 
 Senfe is one quarter of the World j in a more li- 
 mited Senfe it fignifles Natolia, or the lefier Afia ; 
 but in the ftricteft. Senfe it means no more than 
 one little Province of Natolia, where flood the 
 Cities of Ephefus, Smyrna, Sardis, &c. and this 
 is the moft frequent Senfe of it in the New Tefta- 
 ment. Flanders and Holland, in a ftricl: Senfe, 
 are but two fingle Provinces among thefeventeen ; 
 but in a large Senfe Holland inculdes feven of 
 them, and Flanders ten. 
 
 There are alfo fome very common and little 
 Words in all Languages, that are us'd in a more 
 exienfive or more limited Senfe ; fuch as all, every, 
 whofoever, &c. When the Apoftle fays, all Men 
 have finned, and all Men muft die, all is taken in 
 its moft univerfal and extenflve Senfe, including 
 all Mankind, Rom. v. 12. When he appoints 
 Prayer to be made for all Men, it appears by the 
 following Verfes, that he reftrains the Word all 
 to fignify chiefly all Ranks and Degrees of Men, 
 1 Tim. ii. 1 . But when St. Paul fays, I pleafe all 
 Men in all things, 1 Cor. x. 33. the Word all is 
 exceedingly limited, for it reaches no farther than 
 that he pleas'd all thofe Men whom he conversed 
 with, in all things that were lawful. 
 
 4 thl y, Equivocal Words are in the fourth Place 
 diftinguifh'd by their literal or figurative Senfe. 
 Words are us'd in a proper or literal Senfe, when 
 they are defign'd to fignify thofe Ideas for which 
 they were originally made, or to which they arc 
 2 primarily 
 
C. IV. S. 7. "The right Ufe of Reafon. 65 
 
 primarily and generally annexed ; but they are 
 us'd in a figurative or tropical Senfe, when they 
 are made to fignify fome things, which only 
 bear either a Reference or a Refemblance to the pri- 
 mary Ideas of them. So when two Princes con- 
 tend by their Armies, we fay they are at War in 
 a proper Senfe •, but when we fay there is a War 1 , 
 betwixt the Winds and the Waves in a Storm, i 1J Y c * 
 this is calPd Figurative, and the peculiar Figure 
 is a Metaphor. So when the Scripture fays, Riches 
 make them/elves Wings, and fly away as an Eagle 
 toward Heaven, the Wings and the Flight of the 
 Eagle are proper Expreffions ; but when Flight 
 and Wings are applied to Riches, it is only by 
 Way of Figure and Metaphor. So when Man is 
 faid to repent, or laugh, or grieve, it is literally 
 taken •, but when God is faid to be grieved, to re- 
 pent, to laugh, &c. thefe are all figurative Ex- 
 prefiions, borrow'd from a Refemblance to Man- 
 kind. And when the Words Job or Efther are 
 us'd to fignify thofe very Perfons, it is the literal ' 
 Senfe of them ; but when they fignify thofe two *** 
 Books of Scripture, this is a figurative Senfe. 
 The Names of Horace, Juvenal, and Milton, are 
 us'd in the fame manner, either for Books or 
 Men. 
 
 When a Word, which originally fignifies any 
 particular Idea or Object, is attributed to feveral 
 other Objects, not fo much by way of Refem- 
 blance, but rather on the Account of fome evi- 
 dent Reference or Relation to the original Idea, 
 this is fometimes peculiarly call'd an analogical 
 Word ; lb a found or healthy Purfii a found Di- 
 gejlion; found Sleep, are allfo call'd, with Reference 
 to a found and healthy Conititution ; but if you 
 fpeak of found Doctrine, or found Speech, this 
 is by way of Refemblance to Health, and the 
 
 E 4 Words 
 
66 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 "Words are metaphorical: Yet many Times Ana- 
 logy and Metaphor arc us'd promifcuoufly in the 
 fame Senfe, and not diftinguifh'd. 
 
 Here note, That the Defign of metaphorical 
 Language and Figures of Speech is not merely to 
 reprefent our Ideas, but to reprefent them with 
 Vivacity, Spirit, Affection, and Power ; and 
 tho' they often make a deeper Impreflion on the 
 Mind of the Hearer, yet they do as often lead 
 him into a Miflake, if they are us'd at improper 
 Times and Places. Therefore, where the Defign 
 of the Speaker or Writer is merely to explain, to 
 inftrutJ, and to lead into the Knowledge of naked 
 Truth, he ought, for the mod part, to ufe plain 
 and proper Words, if the Language affords them, 
 and not to deal much in figurative Speech. But 
 this fort of Terms is us'd very profitably by Poets 
 and Orators, whofe Bufinefs is to move, and per- 
 fuade, and work on the Paffions, as well as on the 
 Underflanding. Figures are alfo happily employ- 
 ed in proverbial moral Sayings by the wifeft and 
 the left of Men, to imprefs them deeper on the 
 Memory by fenfible Images -, and they are often 
 us'd for other valuable ^Purpofes in the facred 
 Writings. 
 
 5 chl y, I might adjoin another fort of equivocal 
 Words 5 as there are fome which have a different 
 Meaning in common Language, from what they 
 have in the Sciences ; the Word Paffion fignifies 
 the receiving any Atlion in a large philofophical 
 Senfe •, in a more limited philofophical Senfe, it 
 fignifies any of the Affeclions of human Nature, as 
 Love, Fear, Joy, Sorrow, &c. But the common 
 People confine it only to Anger. So the Word 
 Sim^philofophically fignifies Single, but vulgar- 
 ly it is us'd for Foolifh, 
 
 6%, 
 
C. IV. S. 8. The right Ufe of Reafon. 67 
 
 6 thl y, Other equivocal Words are us'd fome- 
 times in an abfolute Senfe, as when God is call'd 
 perfecl, which allows of no Defect ; and fome- 
 times in a comparative Senfe, as good Men are 
 oftentimes call'd perfect in Scripture, in Compa- 
 rifon of thofe who are much inferior to them in 
 Knowledge or Holinefs: But I have dwelt rather 
 too long upon this Subject already, therefore I 
 add no more. 
 
 Sect. VIII. 
 The Origin or Caufes of equivocal Words. 
 
 NO W, that we may become more fkilful in 
 guarding ourfelves and others againft the 
 Dangers of Miftake which may arife from equivo- 
 cal Words, it may not be amifs to conclude this 
 Chapter with a fhort Account of the various 
 Ways or Means whereby a Word changes its Sig- 
 nification, or acquires any new Senfe, and thus 
 becomes equivocal ', efpecially if it keeps its old 
 Senfe alio. 
 
 1 . Mere Chance fometimes gives the fame Word 
 different Senfes > as the Word Light fignifies a 
 Body that is not heavy ; and it alfo fignifies the 
 Effect of Sun-Beams, or the Medium whereby we 
 fee Objecls: This is merely accidental, for there 
 feems to be no Connection between thefe two 
 Senfes, nor any Reafon for them. 
 
 2. Error and Miftake is another Occafion of 
 giving various Senfes to the fame Word ; as when 
 different Perfons read the Names of Prieft, Bi- 
 fhop, Church* Eafter y &c. in the New Teflament, 
 they affix different Ideas to them, for want ot 
 Acquaintance with the true Meaning of the fa- 
 rreci Writer 3 the/ it muft be confeiVd, thefe va- 
 rious 
 
68 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 rious Senfes, which might arife at firft from ho- 
 ned Miftake may be culpably fupported and pro- 
 pagated by Interejl, Ambition, Prejudice, and a 
 Party-Spirit on any Side\ 
 
 3 . Time and Cuftom alters the Meaning of Words. 
 Knave heretofore fignified a diligent Servant (Gna- 
 vits \) and a Villain was a meaner Tenant to the Lord 
 cf the Manor (Villicus \) but now both thofe Words 
 carry an Idea of Wickednefs and Reproach in 
 them. A Ballad once fignified a folemn and fa- 
 cred Song, as well as one that is trivial, when 
 Solomon's Song was call'd the Ballad of Ballads ; 
 but now it is applied to nothing but trifling Verle, 
 or comical Subjects. 
 
 4. Words change their Senfe by Figures and 
 Metaphors, which are deriv'd from fome real A- 
 nalogy or Refemblance between feveral things -, as 
 when Wings and Flight are applied to Riches, it 
 fignifies only, that the Owner may as eafily lofe 
 them, as he would lofe a Bird who flew away with 
 Wings. 
 
 And I think, under this Head, we may rank 
 thofe Words, which fignify different Ideas, by a 
 fort of an unaccountable far-fetcht Analogy, or di- 
 flant Refemblance, that Fancy has introduced be- 
 tween one thing and another $ as when we fay, 
 the Meat is green when it is halfroafted: We fpeak 
 of airing Linen by the Fire, when we mean drying 
 or warming it: We call for round Coals for the 
 Chimney, when we mean large fquare ones: And 
 we talk of the Wing of a Rabbit, when we mean the 
 Fore-Leg: The true Reafon of thefe Appellations 
 we leave to the Criticks. 
 
 5. Words alfo change their Senfe by the fpecial 
 Occafion of ufing them, the peculiar manner of 
 Pronunciation, the Sound of the Voice y the Motion 
 of the Face, or Ge • (lures of the Body\ fo when an 
 
 angry 
 
CIV. S.8. the right Ufe of 'Reafon. 69 
 
 angry Mailer fays to his Servant, it is bravely done y 
 or you are a fine Gentleman, he means juft the con- 
 trary •, namely it is very ill done\ you are aforry 
 fellow : It is one way of giving a fevere Reproach, 
 for the Words are fpoken by way of Sarcafm or 
 Irony. 
 
 6. Words are applied to various Senfes, by new 
 Ideas appearing or arifing fatter than new Words 
 are framed. So when Gun-Powder was found out, 
 the Word Powder, which before fignified only 
 "Duft, was made then to fignify that Mixture or 
 Compofition of Nitre, Charcoal, &c. and the Name 
 Canon, which before fignified a Law or a Rule, 
 is now alfo given to a great Gun, which gives 
 Laws to Nations. So Footboys, who had fre- 
 quently the common Name of Jack given them, 
 were kept to turn the Spit, or to pull off their 
 Mailer's Boots •, but when Inftruments were in- 
 vented for both thofe Services, they were both 
 call'd Jacks, tho' one was of Iron, the other of 
 Wood, and very different in their Form. 
 
 7. Words alter their Significations according to 
 the Ideas of the various Perfons, Seels, or Parties 
 who ufe them, as we have hinted before •, fo when 
 a Papift ufes the Word Hereticks he generally means 
 the Proteftants ; when a Proteftant ufes the Word, 
 he means any Perfons who were willfully (and per- 
 haps contcntioufly) obflinate in fundamental Errors. 
 When a Jew fpeaks of the true Religion, he means 
 the Inftitutions of Mofes *, when a Turk mentions 
 it he intends the Doclrine of Mahomet ; but when 
 a Chriftian makes ufe of it, he defigns to fignify 
 Chriftianity, or the Truths and Precepts of the 
 Gofpel. 
 
 8. Words have different Significations accord- 
 ing to the Book* Writing, or Bifcoutfe in which 
 they iland. So in a Treatife of Anatomy, a Foot 
 
 fignifiea 
 
jo LOGICK:Or y Parti. 
 
 fignifies that Member in the Body of Man: But in 
 a Book of Geometry or Menfuration it fignifies 
 twelve Inches. 
 
 If I had Room to exemplify moft of thefe Par- 
 ticulars in one fingle Word, I know not where 
 to chufe a fitter than the Word Sound, which 
 feems (as it were) by Chance, to fignify three dif- 
 tincl: Ideas, {viz.) Healthy^ (from Sanus) as a 
 found Body -, Noife (ivom'Soitus) as a Jhr ill Sound ; 
 and to found the Sea (perhaps from the French 
 Sonde, a Probe, or an Instrument to find the Depth 
 of Water.) From thefe three, which I may call 
 original Senfes, various derivative Senfes arife •, as 
 found Sleep, found Lungs, found Wind and Limb, 
 a found Heart, a found Mind, found Doclrine, a 
 found Divine, found Reafon, a found Cajk, found 
 timber, a found Reproof, to beat one foundly, to 
 found one's Meaning or Inclination^ and a found or 
 narrow Sea, turn thefe all into Latin, and the 
 ( Variety will appear plain. 
 
 I confefs, fome few of thefe which I have men- 
 tion'd, as the dilferent Springs of equivocal Words, 
 may be reduced in fome Cafes to the fame Origi- 
 nal : But it muft alfo be granted, that there may 
 be other Ways befide thefe whereby a Word comes 
 to extend its Signification, to include various I- 
 deas, and become equivocal. And tho' it is the 
 Bufmefs of a Grammarian to purfue thefe Remarks 
 with more Variety and Particularity, yet it is 
 alfo the Work of a Logician to give Notice of 
 thefe Things, left Darknefs, Confufion, and Per- 
 plexity be brought into our Conceptions by the 
 Means of Words, and thence our Judgments and 
 Reafonings become erroneous* 
 
 CHAP. 
 
C V. The right Ufe of Reafon. 7 1 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 General Directions relating to ow Ideas. 
 
 Direction I. \^ Umijh your/elves with a rich Variety 
 X/ of Ideas ; acquaint yourfelves with 
 things ancient and modern •, things natural, civil 
 and religious •, things domeflick and national ; 
 things of your native Land, and of foreign Coun- 
 tries -, things prefent, pad and future -, and above 
 all, be well acquainted with God and yourfelves ; 
 learn animal Nature, and the Workings of your 
 own Spirits. 
 
 Such a general Acquaintance with things will 
 be of very great Advantage. 
 
 Tht firft Benefit of it is this •, it will aflift the 
 Ufe of Reafon in all its following Operations; it 
 will teach you to judge of things aright ', to argue 
 juftly, and to metbodije your Thoughts with Accu- 
 racy When you fhall find feveral things akin to 
 each other, and feveral different from each other, 
 agreeing in fome Part of their Idea, and disagree- 
 ing in other Parts, you will range your Ideas in 
 better order, you will be more eafily led into a 
 diftinct Knowledge of things, and will obtain a 
 rich Store of proper Thoughts and Arguments 
 upon all Occafions. 
 
 You will tell me perhaps that you defign 
 Study of the Law or Divinity •, and what Good 
 can natural Philofophy or Mathem .. > you, or 
 
 any other Science, not directly fubordinate ro 
 your chief Defign ? But let it be confide] ' 
 all Sciences have a fortof mutual Connection •, and 
 Knowledge of all Ki the Mind to r 
 
 and judge better concernin 5 any pa 
 
72 LOG IC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 jec"t. I have known a Judge upon the Bench be- 
 tray his Ignorance, and appear a little confus'd in 
 his Sentiments about a Cafe of fufpe&ed Murder 
 brought before him for want of fome Acquaint- 
 ance with animal Nature and Philofopby. 
 
 Another Benefit of it is this •, fuch a large and 
 general Acquaintance with things will fecure you 
 from perpetual Admirations and Surprifes, and guard 
 you againft that Weaknefs of ignorant Perfons, 
 who have never feen any thing beyond the Con- 
 fines of their own Dwelling, and therefore they 
 wonder at almoft every thing they fee; every 
 thing beyond the Smoke of their own Chimney, 
 and the Reach of their own Windows, is new 
 and It range to them. 
 
 A third Benefit of fuch an univerfal Acquaintance 
 with things, is this; it will keep you from being 
 too pofuive and dogmatical, from an Excefs of Cre- 
 dulity and Unbelief, i. e. a Readinefs to believe, or 
 to deny every thing at firft hearing ; when you 
 ihall have often feen, that flrange and uncommon 
 things, which once feem'd incredible, are found 
 to be true-, and things very commonly receiv'd 
 have been found falfe. 
 
 The Way of attaining fuch an extenfive Treajure 
 of Ideas, is, with Diligence to apply yourfelf to 
 read the belt Books > converfe with the moil 
 knowing and the wifefl of Men, and endeavour 
 to improve by every Perfon in whofe Company 
 you are •, furler no Hour to pafs away in a lazy 
 Idlenefs, an impertinent Chattering or ufelels 
 Trifles: Vifit other Cities and Countries when 
 you have feen your own, under the Care of one 
 who can teach you to Profit by Travelling, and 
 to make wife Obfervations ; indulge a juft Curio- 
 tity in feeing the Wonders of Art and Nature ; 
 fearch into things yourfelves, as well as learn 
 
 them 
 
C. V. The right life of Reafon. 7 3 
 
 them from others; be acquainted with Men as 
 well as Books •, learn all things as much as you 
 can at firft Hand; and let as many of your Ideas 
 as poflible be the Reprefentations of things, and 
 not merely the Reprefentations of other Mens Ideas: 
 Thus your Soul, like fome noble Building, fhall 
 be richly furnifh'd with original Paintings, and 
 not with mere Copies. 
 
 Direct. II. Ufe the mo ft proper Methods to retain 
 that 'Treafure of Ideas which sou have acquired •, for 
 the Mind is ready to let many of them flip, unlefs 
 fome Pains and Labour be taken to fix them upon 
 the Memory. 
 
 And more efpecially let thofe Ideas be laid up 
 and preferv'd with the greateft Care, which are 
 mod directly fuited, either to your eternal Wel- 
 fare as a Chriftian, or to your particular Station, 
 and ProfeJJion in this Life •, for tho' the former 
 Rule recommends an univerfal Acquaintance with 
 Things, yet it is but a more general and fuperfi- 
 cial Knowledge that is requited or expected of 
 any Man, in things which are utterly foreign to 
 his own Bufinefs; but it is neceflary you mould 
 have a more particular and accurate Acquaintance 
 with thofe things that refer to your peculiar Pro- 
 vince and Duty in this Life, or your Happinefi 
 in another. 
 
 There are fome Perfons who never arrive at any 
 deep, folid, or valuable Knowledge in any Sci- 
 ence or any Bufinefs of Life, becaufc they are 
 perpetually fluttering over the Surface of things 
 in a curious and wandring Search of infinite Va- 
 riety •, ever hearing, reading, or afking after 
 fomjthing new, but impatient of any Labour to 
 lay up and preferve the Ideas they have gained : 
 Their Souls may be compar'd to a Looking-Glafs, 
 
 that 
 
74 LOGIC K: Or, Part I 
 
 that wherefoever you turn it, it receives the Images 
 of all Objects, but retains none. 
 
 In order to preferve your Treafure of Ideas and 
 the Knowledge you have gain'd, purfue thefe Ad- 
 vices efpecially in your younger Years. 
 
 i . Rccollecl every Day the things you have feen, 
 er heard, or read, which may have made any Ad- 
 dition to your Underftanding : Read the Writings 
 of God and Men with Diligence and perpetual 
 Reviews : Be not fond of haftning to a new Book, 
 or a new Chapter, till you hove well fix'd and 
 eftablihYd in your Minds what was ufeful in the 
 lafl : Make ufe of your Memory in this manner, 
 and you will fenfibly experience a gradual Im- 
 provement of it, while you take Care not to load 
 it to excels. 
 
 2. Talk over the things ivhich you have fee n, 
 heard or learnt ivith fome proper Acquaintance ; this 
 will make a frefii Imprefiion upon your Memory ; 
 snd if you have no fellow r Student at hand, none 
 of equal Rank with yourfelves, tell it over to any 
 of your Acquaintance, where you can do it with 
 Propriety and Decency •, and whether they learn 
 any thing by it or no, your own Repetition of 
 it will be an Improvement to yourfelf : And this 
 Practice alio will furnifli you with a Variety of Words 
 and copious Language, to exprefs your Thoughts 
 upon all Occafions. 
 
 3. Commit to writing fome of the moft con- 
 fiderable Improvements which you daily make,, at 
 lead fuch Hints as may recall them again to your 
 Mind, when perhaps they are vanifti'd and loft. 
 And here I think Mr. Locke's Method of jiaver- 
 
 Jaria or common Places, which he defcribes in the 
 End of the firfl Volume of his poft humous lVorks 9 
 is the beft ; ufing no learned Method at all, fet- 
 ting down things as they occur, leaving a dif- 
 
 tincb 
 
C V. the right Ufe of Reaion. 75 
 
 tinct Page for each Subject, and making an Index 
 to the Pages. 
 
 At the End of every Week, or Month, or 
 Year you may review your Remarks for thefe 
 Reafons: Firft, to judge of your own Improve- 
 ment, when you fhall find that many of your 
 younger Collections are either weak and trifling ; 
 or if they are juft and proper, yet they are 
 grown now fo familiar to you, that you will 
 thereby fee your own Advancement in Know- 
 ledge. And in the next Place what Remarks 
 you find there worthy of your riper Obfervation, 
 you may note them with a marginal Star, inflead 
 of transcribing them, as being worthy of your 
 fecond Year's Review, when the others are neg- 
 lected. 
 
 To fhorten fomething of this Labour, if the 
 Books which you lead are your own, mark with 
 a Pen, or Pencil, the moll confiderable tnings 
 in them which you defire to remember. Thus 
 you may read that Book the fecond Time over 
 with half the Trouble, by your Eye running 
 over the Paragraphs which your Pencil has 
 noted. It is but a very weak Objection againfl 
 this Practice to fay, I Jhall fpoil my Book', for I 
 perfuade myfelf that you did not buy it as a 
 Bookfeller to fell it again for Gain, but as a 
 Scholar to improve your Mind by it; and if the 
 Mind be improv'd, your Advantage is abundant, 
 though your Book yield lefs Money to your Exe- 
 cutors. 
 
 Nott, This Advice of Writing, Marling, and Rtviiwimg your Markl, re- 
 fer* chiefly to rhole occafional Xcnoni yuu rwect w-itl. either in Reading or 
 in Convei lation : Buc wne.i you aic diredly and fr»ffjjcjiy puilui g any Sub- 
 ject or Knowledge in a good S/frem in your youn^ci Years, ihc Sjjttm ic 
 fell is your Common- 1' laic B»»{ and mutt be enciic.y ieview*ti. Tnc l*am# 
 may be faid concerning any lrcaiijt which clolciy, luccinttly a. id accurately 
 handle* any pam.u.ar rheme. 
 
 F Direct. 
 
76 LOGIC K: Or, Part L 
 
 Direct. III. As you proceed both in Learning a)td' 
 in Life, ?nake a wife Obfervalion what are the Ideas , 
 what the Difcourfes and the Parts of Knowledge that 
 have been more or lefs ufeful to yowfelf or others. Ini 
 our younger Years, while we are fu miming our 
 Minds with a Treafure of Ideas, our Experience 
 is but fmall, and our Judgment weak} it is 
 therefore impoflibleat that Age to determine aright 
 concerning the real Advantage and Ufefiilnefsot many- 
 things we learn. But when Age and Experience 
 have matur'd your Judgment, then you will 
 gradually drop the more ufelefs Part of your 
 younger Furniture, and be more follicitous to re- 
 tain that which is mod neceflary for your Wel- 
 fare in this Life, or a better. Hereby you will 
 come to make the fame Complaint that almoft 
 every learned Man has done after long Experi- 
 ence in Study, and in the Affairs of human Life 
 and Religion; Alas! how many -Hours, and Hay:, 
 and Months, have I loft in purfuingfome Parts of 
 Learning, and in reading fome Authors, which have' 
 turned' to no other Account, but to inform me, that 
 they were not worth ?ny Labour and Purfuit! Happy 
 the Man who has a wife Tutor to conduct him 
 through all the Sciences in the firfl: Years of his 
 Study -, and who has a prudent Friend always at 
 Hand to point out to him from Experience how 
 much of every Science is worth his Purfuit ! And 
 happy the Student that is lb wife as to follow fuch 
 Advice ! 
 
 Direct. IV. Learn to acquire a Government over 
 your Ideas and your thoughts, that they may come 
 when they are called, and depart when they are bid' 
 din. There are fome Thoughts that rife and in- 
 trude upon us while we fliun them; there are 
 
 others 
 
C. V. The right life of Realbn. 7 7 
 
 others chat fly from us, when we would hold and 
 fix them. 
 
 Jf the Ideas which you would willingly make 
 the Matter of your prefent Meditation are ready 
 to fl\ from you, you muft be obftinate in the Pur- 
 fiiit of them by an Habit of fixed Meditation ; 
 you muft keep your Soul to the Work, when it 
 is ready to ftart afide every Moment, unlefs you 
 will abandon yourlelf to be a Slave to every 
 wild Imagination. It is a common, but it is an 
 unhappy and a ifiameful thing, that every Trifle 
 that comes acrois the Senfes or Fancy mould divert 
 1$, that a buzzing Fly fnould teize our Spirits, and 
 fcatter our belt Ideas: But we muft learn to be 
 deaf and regardlefs oP other things, befides that 
 which we make the prefent Subject of our Me- 
 ditation: And in order to help a wandring and 
 fickle Humour, it is ufeful to have a Book or Pa- 
 per in our Hands, which has fome proper Hints 
 of the Subject that we defign to purfue. We 
 muft be refolute and laborious, and fometimes 
 conflict with ourfelves if we would be wife and 
 learned. 
 
 Yet I would not be too fevere in this Rule: It 
 muft be confefs'd there -vczSeafons when the Mind, 
 or rather the Brain is overtired or jaded with Study 
 or thinking i or upon fome other Accounts ani- 
 mal- Nature may be languid or cloudy and unfit to 
 affift the Spirit in Meditation ; at fuch Seafons (pro- 
 vided that they return not too often) it is better 
 fometimes to yield to the prefent Indifpofition ; 
 for it' Nature intircly refill, nothing can be done 
 to the Purpofe, at lca.lt in that Subject or Sci- 
 ence. Then you may think it proper to give 
 yourfelf up to fome Flours ol Letjure and Recrea- 
 tion, or ufeful Idlenefs ; or if not, then turn your 
 Thought) to fome other alluring Subjett^ and pore 
 
 F - 1 no 
 
78 L O G I C K: Or, Part t 
 
 no longer upon the firjl, till fome brighter or more 
 favourable Moments a rife. A Student fhall do 
 more in one Hour, when all things concur to in- 
 vite him to any fpecial Study, than in four Hours, 
 at a dull and improper Seafon. 
 
 I would alfo give the fame Advice, if fome vain, 
 or zvorthlefs, or fooli/h Idea will crowd itfelf into 
 your Thoughts ; and if you find that all your La- 
 bour and Wreftling cannot defend yourfelf from 
 it, then divert the Importunity of that which of- 
 fends you by turning your Thoughts to fome enter 
 taining Subject, that may amufe a little and draw 
 you off from the treublefome and impofing Gueft ; 
 and many a Time alfo in fuch a Cafe, when the 
 impertinent and intruding Ideas would divert from 
 prefent Duty, I Devotion and Prayer have been very 
 fuccefsful to overcome fuch obflinate Troublers of 
 the Peace and Profit of the Soul. 
 
 If the natural Genius and Temper be too vola- 
 tile , fickle ;,md wandring, fuch Perfons ought in a 
 more efpecial manner to apply themfelves to ma- 
 thematic al Learning, and to begin their Studies 
 with Arithmetick and Geometry -, wherein new 
 Truths, continually arifing to the Mind out of 
 the plaineit and eafieft Principles, will allure the 
 Thoughts with incredible Pleafure in the Purfuit: 
 This will give the Student fuch a delightful Tafle 
 of Reafoning, as will fix his Attention to the 
 fingle Subject which he purfues and by Degrees 
 will cure the habitual Levity of his Spirit: But 
 let him not indulge and purfue thefe fo far, as to 
 neglect the prime Studies of his defign'd Profef- 
 fion. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
C. VI. The right Ufe of Reafon. 79 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Special Rules to dire 51 our Conceptions of things, 
 
 A Great Part of what has been already writ- 
 ten is defign'd to lay a Foundation for 
 thofe Rules, which may guide and regulate our 
 Conceptions of things ; this is our main Bufinefs 
 and Defign in xhzfirft Part of Logick. Now if we 
 can but direct our Thoughts to a juft and happy 
 Manner informing our Ideas of things, the other 
 Operations of the Mind will not fo eafily be per- 
 verted; becaufe mod of our Errors in Judgment^ 
 and the Weaknefs, Fallacy and Mtftake of our 
 Argumentation proceed from the Darknefs, Con- 
 fufion, Defect, or fomc other Irregularity in our 
 Conceptions. 
 
 The Rules to afllft and direct our Conceptions 
 are thefe. 
 
 1. Conceive of things clearly and diflintlly in 
 their own Natures, 
 
 2. Conceive of things completely in all their 
 Parts. 
 
 3. Conceive of things comprehenfively in all their 
 Properties and Relations. 
 
 4. Conceive of things extenfively in all their 
 Kinds. 
 
 5. Conceive of things orderly, or in a proper 
 Method. 
 
 F3 Sect, 
 
8o LOGICK: Or, Parti. 
 
 Sect. P. 
 
 Of gaining clear and diftinft Ideas. 
 
 THE firft Rule is this, Seek after a clear and 
 difiintl Conception of things as they are in their 
 ffik Nature, and do not content you rj elves with ob- 
 fcure and confufed Ideas, where clearer are to be at- 
 tained. 
 
 There are fome things indeed whereof diftinclt 
 Ideas are fcarce attainable, they feem to furpafs 
 the Capacity of the Underftanding in our pre- 
 fent State -, fuch are the Notions of Eternal, Im- 
 menfe, Infinite, whether this Infinity be applied to 
 Number, as an infinite Multitude ; to Quantity, as 
 infinite Length, Breadth •, to Powers and Perfec- 
 tions, as Strength, Wifdom, or Goodnefs infi- 
 nite, &c. Tho' Mathematicians in their way 
 demonftrate feveral things in the Doctrine of 
 Infinites, yet there are (till fome infolvable Diffi- 
 culties that attend the Ideas of Infinity, when it 
 is applied to Mind or Body, and while it is -in 
 Reality but an Idea ever growing, we cannot have 
 fo clear and difbinct a Conception of it as to fe- 
 cure us from Miftakes in fome of our Reafonings 
 about it. 
 
 There are many other things that belong to 
 the material World, wherein the fharpeii Philo- 
 fophers have never yet arriv'd at clear and diftincl: 
 Ideas, fuch as the particular Shape, Situation, 
 Contexture, Motion ofthe fmall Particles of Miner als y 
 Metals, Plants, &c. whereby their very Natures, 
 and EfTences are diftinguifh'd from each other. 
 Nor have we either Senfes or Inftruments fuf- 
 ficiently nice and accurate to find them out. 
 There are other things in the World of Spirits 
 
 wherein 
 
C. VI. S. i . 'The right Ufe 0/ Reafon. 8 1 
 
 wherein our Ideas are very dark and confufed, 
 fuch as their Union with animal Nature, the W&y 
 of their atling on material Beings, and their Con- 
 verfe with each other. And tho' it is a laudable 
 Ambition to fearch what may be known of thefe 
 Matters, yet it is a van; Hindrance to the Enrich- 
 ment of our Underftandings, if we fpend too 
 much of our Time and Pains among Infinites and 
 Unfearchables, and thofe things for the Investi- 
 gation whereof we are not furnifhed with proper 
 Faculties in the prefent State. It is therefore of 
 great Service to the true Improvement of the 
 Mind to diftinguifh well between Knowables and 
 Vnknowablts. 
 
 As far as things are knowable by us, it is of 
 excellent Ufe to accuflom ourfelves to clear and «- 
 ftincl Ideas. Now among many other Occafions 
 of the Darknefs and Miftakes of our Minds, there 
 are thefe two things which moil: remarkably bring 
 Covfufton into our Ideas. 
 
 i. That from our Infancy we have had the Ideas 
 of things fo far connected with the Ideas of Words, 
 that we often miftake Words for things, we min- 
 gle and confound one with the other. 
 
 2. From our youngeft Years we have been ever 
 ready to confider things not fo much in their own 
 Natures, as in their various Refpetls to curfekes, 
 and chiefly to our Senfes-, and we have alio join'd 
 and mingled the Ideas of fome tJAngs, with many 
 ether Ideas, to which they are not akin in their 
 own Natures. 
 
 In order therefore to a clear and diflincl Know- 
 ledge of things, we muft uncloath them of all 
 thefe Relations and Mixtures, that we may con- 
 template them naked, and in their own Natures \ 
 and diftinguifh the Subject that we have in View 
 from all other Subjects whatsoever: Now to per- 
 
 F 4 form 
 
$2 LOG I CK: Or, Parti. 
 
 form th well, we mull: here confider the Defini- 
 tion of L , and the Definition of things. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 Of the Definition of Words or Names. 
 
 IF we could conceive of things as Angels and 
 unbodied Spirits do, without involving them 
 in thofe Clouds which Words and Language throw 
 upon them, we fhould feldom be in Danger of 
 fuch Miftakes as are perpetually committed by us 
 in the prefent State -, and indeed it would be of 
 unknown Advantage to us to accuftom ourfelves 
 to form ideas of things without Words, that we might 
 know them in their own proper Natures. But fince 
 we muff, ufe Words, both to learn and to com- 
 municate moll of our Notions, we fhould do it 
 with j uft Rules of Caution. I have already de- 
 clar'd in part, how often and by what Means our 
 Words become the Occafions of Errors in our 
 Conceptions of things. To remedy fuch Incon- 
 veniences, we mu ft get an exact Definition of the 
 Words we make ufe of, i. e. we muit determine 
 preciflly the Senfe of our Words, which is calPd 
 the Definition of ths Name. 
 
 Now a Definition of the Name being only a 
 Declaration in what Senfe the Word is ufed, or 
 what Idea or Object we mean by it, this may be 
 exprefs'd by any one or more of the Properties, 
 Effects or Circumitances of that Object which 
 do furHciently diftinguifh it from other Objects : 
 As if I were to tell what I mean by the Word 
 Air, I might fay it is that thin Matter which we 
 breathe in and breathe out continually ; or it is that 
 fluid Body in which the Birds fly a little above the 
 Earth ; or it is that invijible Matter which fills all 
 
 Places 
 
C. VI. S. 2. The right UfeofKtdSon. 83 
 
 Places near the Earth, or which immediately encom- 
 pajfes the Globe of Earth and Water. So if I would 
 teJl what I mean by Light, I would fay, it is that 
 Medium whereby we fee the Colours and Shapes of 
 things ; or it is that which diflinguijhes the Day from 
 the Night, If I were afk'd what I mean by Reli- 
 gion, I would anfwer, it is a Collection of all our 
 Duties to God, if laken in a ftrict and limited Senfe ; 
 but if taken in a large Senfe, it is a Colletlion of all 
 cur Duties both to God and Man. Thefe are call'd 
 the Definitions of the Name. 
 
 Note, In defining the Name there is no Necefllty 
 that we mould be acquainted with the intimate Ef- 
 fence or Nature of the thing ; for any manner of 
 Defcription that will but fufficiently acquaint an- 
 ocner Perfon what we mean by fuch a Word, is a 
 fufficient Definition for the Name. And on this Ac- 
 count, a fynonymous Word, or a mere Negation of 
 the contrary, a Tranfiation of the Word into another 
 Tongue, or a grammatical Explication of it, is 
 fometimes fufficient for this Purpofe ; as if one 
 would know what I mean by a Sphere, I tell him 
 it is a Globe; if he afk what is a Triangle, it is 
 that which has three Angles -, or an Oval is that which 
 has the Shape of an Egg. Dark is that which has 
 no Light *, Jfthma is a Difficulty of Breathing \ a 
 Diapboretick Medicine, or a Sudorifick, is fome- 
 Ching that will provoke Sweating \ and an Infolvent 
 is a Man that cannot pay his Debts. 
 
 Since it is the Defign of Logick, not only to ai- 
 filt us in Learning but in leaching alio, it is necef- 
 fixy that we mould be furnihYd with fome parti- 
 cular Directions relating to the Definition of Namcs y 
 both in Teaching arid Learning. 
 
 Sect, 
 
84 LOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 Sect. HI, 
 
 Direclions concerning the Definition of Names. 
 
 Direct. I. TT^^£ a Cure of making 7 fe -of mere 
 Xi Words, in fie ad of Ideas -, i.e. fuch 
 Words as have no Meaning, no Definition be- 
 longing to them : Bo not always imagine that 
 there are Ideas wherefoever there are Names ; for 
 tho' Mankind hath fo many Millions of Ideas 
 more than they have Names, yet fo foolifh and 
 lavifh are we, that too often we ufe fome Words 
 in mere Wafte, and have no Ideas for them ; or 
 at leaft, our Ideas are fo exceedingly mattered 
 and confus'd, broken and blended, various and 
 unfettled, that they can fignify nothing toward 
 the Improvement of the Understanding. You 
 will find a great deal of Reafon for this Remark, 
 if you read the Popi/b School-men, or the myftuk 
 Divines. 
 
 Never reft fatisfied therefore with mere Words 
 which have no Ideas belonging to them, or at leaft 
 
 j 710 fettled and determinate Ideas. Deal not in fuch 
 
 /< empty Ware, whether you are a Learner or a 
 
 Teacher; for hereby fome Perfons have made 
 
 themfelves rich in Words, and learned in their 
 
 , own -Efteem; whereas in reality their Under- 
 
 fbndings have been poor and they knew no- 
 thing. 
 
 Let me give for inftance fome of thofe Writ- 
 
 ; ters or Talkers who deal much in the Words Na- 
 
 ture, Fate, Luck, Chance, Perfection, Power, Life, 
 Fortune, Inftincl, &c. and that even in the moil 
 calm and inftructive Parts of their Difcourfe; 
 though neither they themfelves nor their Hearers 
 have any fettled Meaning under thofe Words > 
 2 and 
 
C. VI. S.3. fhe right Ufe of R&tfbn. 85 
 
 and thus they build up their Reafonings, and in- 
 fer what they pleafe, with an Ambition of the 
 Name of Learning or of fublime Elevations in 
 Religion ; whereas in truth, they do but amufe 
 themfelves and their Admirers with fuelling 
 Words of Vanity underft art ding neither what they 
 fay, nor whereof they affirm. But this fort of 
 Talk was reproved of old by the two chief 
 Apoftles St. Peter and St. Paul, 1 Tim. i. 7. and 
 2 Pet. ii. 18. 
 
 When Pretenders to Philofophy or good Scnfe 
 grow fond of this fort of Learning, they dazzle 
 and confound their weaker Hearers, but fall under 
 the Neglect of the Wife. The Epicureans are 
 guilty of this Fault, when they afcribe the For- 
 mation of this World to Chance : The Arifto- 
 telians, when they fay, Nature abhors a Vacuum: 
 The Stoicks when they talk of Fate, which is 
 fuperior to the Gods: And the Gamcfters when 
 they curfe their Ill-Luck, or hope for the Favours 
 of Fortune. Whereas, if they would tell us, that 
 by the Word Nature they mean the Properties of 
 any Being, or the order of things eftablifhed at the 
 Creation , that by the Word Fate they intend the 
 Decrees of God, or the necejfary Connection and In- 
 fluence of fecond Caufes and Effects ; if by the Word 
 Luck or Chance they fignify the abfolute Negation 
 of any determinate Caufe, or only their Ignorance of 
 any fucb Caufe, we mould know how to converfe 
 with them, and to aflfent to, or diffent from 
 their Opinions. But while they flutter in the 
 dark, and make a Noife with Words which have 
 no fixt Ideas, they talk to the Wind, and can 
 never profit. 
 
 I would make this Matter a little plainer (till 
 by Inftances borrowed from the Peripatctick Phi- 
 lofophy, which was taught once in all the 
 
 Schools. 
 
86 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 Schools. The Profeflbr fancies he has afiign'd the 
 true Reafon, why all heavy Bodies tend downward, 
 why Amber will draw Feathers and Straws, and the 
 Loadjlone draw Iron, when he tells you, that this 
 is done by certain gravitating and attratlive Qua- 
 lities, which proceed from the fubftantial Forms of 
 thofe various Bodies. He imagines that he has 
 explain'd why the Loadjlone' f s * North Pole, Jhall 
 repel the North End of a magnetick Needle, and at- 
 lraft the South, when he affirms, that this is done 
 by its Sympathy, with one End of it, and its An- 
 tipathy againft the other End. Whereas in truth, 
 all thefe Names of Sympathy, Antipathy, fubftan- 
 tial Forms and Qualities, when they are put for the 
 Caafcs of thefe Effects in Bodies, are but hard 
 Words, which only exprefs a learned and pom- 
 pous Ignorance of the true Caufe of natural Ap- 
 pearances •, and in this Senfe they are mere Words 
 without Ideas. 
 
 This will evidently appear, if one afk me, why 
 a concave Mirrour or convex Glafs will burn Wood 
 in the Sun-Beams, or why a Wedge will cleave 
 it? And I fhould tell him, it is by an uftorious 
 Quality in the Mirrour or Glafs, and by a cleaving 
 Tower in the Wedge, arifing from a certain un- 
 known fubftantial Form in them, whence they 
 derive thefe Qualities \ or if he mould afk me 
 why a Clock ftrikes, and points to the Hour, and I 
 mould lay, it is by an indicating Form and fonorific 
 Quality ; whereas, I ought to tell him how the 
 Sun-Beams are collected and united by a burning 
 Glafs \ whence the mechanical Force of a Wedge 
 is deriv'd i and what are the Wheels and Springs, 
 
 * Kcte, Some Writers call that the Soutlj-Pde of a Loadflone which at- 
 t ra£b the South-Er.il oi the Neeaie; but 1 chufe to follow thofc who call « 
 
 t^c fonij-Pole. 
 
 the 
 
C. VI. S. 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon. 87 
 
 the Pointer and Hammer, and Bell, whereby a 
 Clock gives notice of the Time, both to the Eye 
 and the Ear. But thefe nftorious and cleaving 
 Powers, fonorous and indicating Forms and Qualities, 
 do either teach the Enquirer nothing at all but 
 what he knew before, or they are mere Words with- 
 out Ideas*. 
 
 And there is many a Man in the vulgar and 
 in the learned World, who imagines himfelf 
 deeply fkilled in the Controverfies of Divinity , 
 whereas, he has only furnifhed himfelf with 'a 
 Parcel of fcbolaftick or myftick Words, under fome 
 of which the Authors themfelves had no juft Ideas, 
 and the Learner when he hears, or pronounces 
 them, hath fcarce any Ideas at all. Such fort of 
 W r ords fometimes have become Matters of im- 
 mortal Contention, as though the Gofpel could 
 not (land without them ; and yet the Zealot per- 
 haps knows little more of them than he does of 
 Shibboleth, or Higgaion. Selah. Judges xii. 6. PfaL 
 ix. 16. 
 
 Yet here I would lay down this Caution, that 
 there are feveral Objects of which we have not a 
 clear and diftinct. Idea, much lefs an adequate or 
 comprehenfive one, and yet we cannot call the 
 Names of thefe things Words without Ideas; 
 
 • It may be objetled here, " And what do?i the rmdern Philofbuher, 
 *• wirh a!l his detail ot mathematical Number* and Diagrams, do mora 
 •' than this toward the Solution ot thefe Dirh\ u;iei' Does he not defciibc 
 ** Gravity by a certain unknown Force, whereby Bodies tend d.rvnwurd to tha 
 " Center f Hath he iound the certain and mechanical Realbns oi ^ittrac}$o n% 
 ** biagnetifm* &c. ? " I ^nfiver. That the Moderns have found a thoufaod 
 things by applying Mathemancks to natural Pmlofophy, wnich the Anci- 
 ents were ignoian: or J and when they ufe any Names of this Kind, vfo 
 Gravitation, ^4; raili n, &o they ulc ihcm Only to figtiity, that there aio 
 lu h KfTixls and Inch Caufes, with a nc <uent Cunteffio.i of rhcir Iguc-ranco 
 ot the true springs ot tnem S They dj Dot pretend to mike thefe \V»dt 
 ltaad tor the rtal Caufts of things, as tho' they tnereby ailig cd 1/ e uue 
 philofophical Solution of thefe Difficulties ; tor in this Scnfe they will ttil 
 be Wards mtUnt Ideas, whecner in thf Momh ot an t id rtuloiophci or 4 
 tifw one 
 
 4 iuch 
 
88 LOG IC K: Or, Part L 
 
 fuch are the Infinity and Eternity of God himfelf, 
 the Union of cur ozcn Soul and Body, the Union of 
 the divine and human Natures in Jefus Chrift, the 
 Operation of the holy Spirit on the Mind of Man, 
 &c. Thefe ought not to be call'd Words with- 
 out Ideas, for there is fufficient Evidence for the 
 Reality and Certainty of the Exiftence of their 
 Objects, tho' there is fome Conrufion in our clear- 
 eft Conceptions of them ; and our Ideas of them, 
 tho' imperfect , are yet fufficient to converfe about 
 them, fo far as we have Need, and to determine" 
 fo much as is neceffary for our own Faith and 
 Practice. 
 
 Direct. II. Do not fuppofe that the Natures or 
 Fffences of things always differ from one another* 
 as much as their Names do. There are various 
 Purpofes in human Lite, for which we put very 
 different Names on the fame thing, or on things, 
 whofe Natures are near akin -, and thereby often- 
 times, by making a new nominal Species, we are 
 ready to deceive ourielves with the Idea of another 
 real Species of Beings : And diofe whofe Under- 
 ftandings are led away by the mere Sound of 
 Words, fancy the Nature of thofe things to be very 
 different, whofe Names are fo, and judge of them 
 accordingly. 
 
 I may borrow a remarkable Inftance for my 
 Purpofe almoft out of every Garden, which con- 
 tains a Variety of Plants in it. Mod or all Plants- 
 agree in thir, that they have a Root, a Stalk, 
 Leaves, Buds, Bloffoms and Seeds: But the Gar- 
 diner ranges them under very different Names, as 
 tho' they were really different Kinds of Beings,, 
 merely becaufe of the different Lte and Service to 
 Which they are applied by Men : Avfor Inftance, 
 
 thofe 
 
C VI. S. 3 . The right Ufe of R^afon. 8y 
 
 thofe Plants whafe Roots are eaten flia.ll appro- 
 priate the Name of Roots to themfelves •,. fuch arc 
 Carrots, Turnips, Radijhes, &c. It the Leaves are 
 ©f chief ufe to us, then we call them Herbs ; as 
 Sage, Mint, Thyme : If the Leaves are eaten raw 
 they are termed Sallad ; as Lettuce, Purjlain : If 
 boiled, they become Pot-herbs •, as Spinage, Cole- 
 worts \ and fome of thofe fame Plants, which are 
 Pot-herbs in one Family, are Sallad in another. 
 If the Buds are made our Food, they are call'd 
 Heads, or Topi •, fo Cabbage Heads, Pleads of Af- 
 paragus and Artichoaks. If the Blcjfom be of molt 
 Importance, we call it a Flower ; fuch are Dai- 
 fies, Tulips, and Carnations, which are the mere 
 BlofToms of thofe Plants. If the Hufk or Seeds 
 are eaten, they are call'd the Fruits of the Ground, 
 as Peafe, Beans, Strawberries, &c. If any Pare 
 of the Plant be of known and common Ufe to us: 
 in Medicine, we call ir zphyjicalHerb, as Carduus r 
 Scwrveygrafs ; but if we count no Part ufeful, we 
 call it a Weed, and throw it out of the Garden $ 
 and yet perhaps our next Neighbour knows fome 
 valuable Property and Ufe of it -, he Plants it in 
 his Garden, and gives it the Title of an Herb or 
 a Flower. You fee here how fundi is the real Di- 
 ltindtion of thefe feveral Plants, confider'd in 
 their general Nature as the leffer Vegetables; yer 
 what very different Ideas we vulgarly form con- 
 cerning them, and make different Species of them, 
 chiefly becaufe of the different Names given 
 them. 
 
 Now when things arc let in this dear Light, 
 it appears how ridiculous it would be for two 
 Perfons to contend, whether Dandelion be a Herb, 
 or a Weed ; whether it be a Pot-herb or Sallad \ 
 when by the Cultuin or Faney ot different Fami- 
 lies, this one Plant obtains all theic Names, ac- 
 
 cording 
 
9 o LOGIC K: Or, Part L 
 
 cording to the feveral Ufes of it, and the Value 
 that is put upon it. 
 
 Note here, that I find no manner of Fault with 
 the Variety of Names which are given to feveral 
 Plants, according to the various Ufes we make of 
 them. But I would not have our Judgments im- 
 pos'd upon hereby, to think that thefe mere no- 
 minal Species, viz. Herbs, Sallad and Weeds be- 
 come three really different Species of Beings, on 
 this Account, that they have different Names and 
 Ufes. But I proceed to other Inftances. 
 
 It has been the Cuftom of Mankind, when 
 they have been angry with any thing, to add a 
 mew ill Name to it, that they may convey there- 
 by a hateful Idea of it, tho' the Nature of the 
 thing ftill abides the fame. So the Papifts call 
 ihtProteftants Hereticks: A prophane Perfon calls 
 a Man of Piety, a Precifian : And in the Times 
 of the Civil War in the Lift Century, the Royalifts 
 call'd the Parliamentarians, Fanalich, Roundheads 
 and Sectaries: And they in Requital call'd the 
 Royalifts, Malignants : But the Partizans on each 
 fide were really neither better nor worfe for thefe 
 Names. 
 
 It has alfo been a frequent Practice on the 
 other Hand, to put new favourable Names upon ill 
 Ideas, on purpofe to take off the Odium of them. 
 But notwithftanding all thefe flattering Names 
 and Titles, a Man of profufe Generofity is but a 
 Spendthrift ; a natural Son is a BaftardiiiU -, a Gal- 
 lant is an Adulterer, and a Lady of Pleafure is a 
 Whore. 
 
 Direct. III. Take heed of believing the Nature 
 and EJfence of two or more things to be certainly the 
 fame, becaufe they may have the fame Name given 
 them. This has been an unhappy and faxal Gee - 
 
 fion 
 
C. VI. S. 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon, 91 
 
 fion of a thoufand Miftakes in the natural, in the 
 civil, and in the religious Affairs of Life, botha- 
 mongft the Vulgar and the Learned. I fball give 
 two or three Instances, chiefly in the Matters of 
 Natural Philofophy, having hinted feveral Dangers 
 of this Kind, relating to Theology in the foregoing 
 Difcourfe concerning Equivocal iVords. 
 
 Our elder Philolbphers have generally made ufe 
 of the Word SouLto fignify that Principle where- 
 by a Plant grows, and they call'd it the vege- 
 tative Soul: The Principle of the animal Motion 
 of a Brute has been likewife calPd a Soul, and we 
 have been taught to name it the fenfitive Soul: 
 They have alfo given the Name Soul to that fu- 
 perior Principle in Man , whereby he thinks, 
 judges, reafons, &c. and tho' they diftinguihYd 
 this by the honourable Title of the rational Soul, 
 yet in common Difcourfe and Writing we leave 
 out the Words vegetative, fenfitive and rational ; 
 and make the Word Soul ferve for all thefe Prin- 
 ciples: Thence we are led early into this Imagi- 
 nation , that there is a fort ef fpiritual Being in 
 Plants and in Brutes, like that in Men. Where- 
 as, if we did butabftract and feparate thefe Things 
 from Words, and compare the Caufe of Growth 
 in a Plane, with the Caufe of Reafoning in Man 
 (without the Word Soul) we fhould never think 
 that thefe two Principles were at all like one an- 
 other •, nor Ihoukl we perhaps fo cafily and pe- 
 remptorily conclude, that Brutes need an intelli- 
 gent Mind to perforin their animal Actions. 
 
 Another Jnltance may be the Word Life, 
 which being attributed to Plants* to Brutes^ and 
 to Men, and in each of them afcribed to the Soul, 
 has very eafily betrayed us from our Infancy into 
 this Miltake, that the Spirit, or Min f, or think- 
 ing Principle in Man y is the Spring oj 
 
 G and 
 
92 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 an animal life to his body : Whereas it is evident, 
 that if the Spirit or thinking Principle of Man 
 gave Life to his animal Nature, the Way to 
 fave Men from dying would not be to ufe Medi- 
 cines, but to perfuade the Spirit to abide in the 
 Body. 
 
 I might derive a third Inftance from the Word 
 Heat •, which is us'd to fignify the Senfation we 
 have when we are near the Fire, as well as the 
 Caufe of that Senfation which is in the Fire it felf j 
 and thence we conclude from our Infancy, that 
 there is a fort, of Heat in the Fire refembli?ig our own 
 Senfation, or the Heat which we feel: Whereas in 
 the Fire there is nothing but little Particles of 
 Matter, of fuch particular Shapes, Sizes, Situa- 
 tions and Motions, as are fitted to imprefs fuch 
 Motions on our Flefh or Nerves as excite the 
 Senfe of Heat. Now if this Caufe of our Senfa- 
 tion in the Fire had been always call'd by a di- 
 ll i net Name, perhaps we had not been fo rooted 
 in this Miftake, that the Fire is hot with the fame 
 fort of hie at that we feel. This will appear with 
 more Evidence, when we confider that we are 
 iecure from the fame Miftake where there have 
 been two different Names allotted to our Senfation, 
 and to the Caufe of it ; as, we do not fay, Pain is 
 in the Fire that burns us, or in the Knife that cuts 
 and wounds us •, for we call it burning in the Fire, 
 cutting in the Knife, and Fain only, when ic is 
 in our f elves. 
 
 Numerous Inftances of this Kind might be de- 
 rived from the Words fweet, four, loud, Jhrill, and 
 almoft all the fenfible Qualities, whofe real Na- 
 tures we miftake from our very Infancy, and we 
 are ready to fuppofe them to be the fame in us, 
 and in the Bodies that caufe them ; partly, be- 
 caufe the Words, which fignify our own Senfati- 
 
 ons. 
 
C. VI. S. 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon. 93 
 
 ons, are applied alio to flgnify thofe unknown 
 Shapes and Motions of the little Corpufcles which 
 excite and caufe thofe Senfations. 
 
 Direct IV. In Converfatlon or Reading be dili- 
 gent to find out the trv.e Senfe, or diftintl Idea, 
 which the Speaker or Writer affixes to his Words ; 
 and efpecially to thofe Words which are the chief 
 Subjecl of his Difcourfe. As far as pofllble take 
 heed, left you put more or fewer Ideas into one 
 Word, than the Perfon did when he wrote or 
 fpoke; and endeavour that your Ideas of every 
 Word may be the fame as his were : Then 
 you will judge better of what he fpeaks or 
 writes. 
 
 It is for want of this that Men quarrel in the 
 Dark •, and that there are fo many Contentions in 
 the feveral Sciences, and efpecially in Divinity 
 Multitudes of them arife from a Miftake of the 
 true Senfe or compleat Meaning, in which Words 
 are us'd by the Writer or Speaker ; and hereby 
 fometimes they feem to agree, when they really differ 
 in their Sentiments; and fometimes they feem to 
 differ when they really agree. Let me give an In- 
 ftance of both. 
 
 When one Man by the Word Church fhall 
 undcrftand all that believe in Chrift •, and another 
 by the Word Church means only the Church of 
 Rome , they may both a (Tent to this Propofi- 
 tion, There is no Salvation out of the Churchy and 
 yet their inward Sentiments may be widely dif- 
 ferent. 
 
 Agiin, if one Writer fhall affirm that Virtue 
 added to Faith is fufficient to make a Chrift ian, and 
 another fhall as zealoully deny this Proportion, 
 they feem to differ widely in Words, and yet 
 perhapa they may both really agree in Sentiment .* 
 
 G 1 If 
 
94 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 If by the Word Virtue, the Afrirmer intends our 
 whole Duty to God and Man \ and the Denier by 
 the Word Virtue means only Courage, or at moft 
 our Duty toward our Neighbour, without includ- 
 ing in the Idea of it the Duty which we owe to 
 God. 
 
 Many fuch fort of Contentions as thefe are, if 
 traced to their Original, will be found to be mere 
 Logomachies, or Strifes and Quarrels about Names 
 and Words, and vain J anglings, as the Apoftle 
 calls them in his firft Letter of Advice to Ti- 
 mothy. 
 
 In order therefore to attain clear and diftinft 
 Ideas of what we read or hear, we mud fearch 
 the Senfe of Words ; we muft confider what is 
 their Original and Derivation in our own or fo- 
 reign Languages •, what is their common Senfe 
 amongft Mankind, or in other Authors, efpecial- 
 ly fuch as wrote in the fame Country, in the fame 
 Age, about the fame Time, and upon the fame 
 Subjects: We muft confider in what Senfe the 
 fame Author ufes any particular Word or Phrafe, 
 and that when he is difcourfing on the fame Mat- 
 ter, and efpecially about the fame Parts or Para- 
 graphs of his Writing: We muft confider whe- 
 ther the Word be ufed in a ftric~t and limited, or 
 in a large and general Senfe •, whether in a literal, 
 in a figurative, or in a prophetick Senfe ; whe- 
 ther it has any fecondary Idea annext to it befides 
 the primary or chief Senfe. We muft enquire 
 farther, what is the Scope and Defign of the 
 Writer *, and what is the Connection of that Sen- 
 tence with thofe that go before it, and thofe which 
 follow it. By thefe and other Methods we are to 
 fearch out the Definition of Names, i. e. the true 
 Senfe and Meaning in which any Author or Speaker 
 ufes any Word, which may be the chief Sub] eel 
 
 of 
 
C. VI. S. 3. The right Ufe of Reafon. 95 
 
 of Difcourfe, or may carry any considerable Im- 
 portance in ic. 
 
 Direct. V. When we communicate our Notions to 
 others, merely with a Defign to inform and improve 
 their Knowledge, let us in the beginning of our Dif- 
 courfe take care to adjuft the Definition of Names 
 wherefoever there is need of it ; that is, to determine 
 plainly what we mean by the chief Words which 
 are the Subjed of our Difcourfe \ and be fure always 
 to keep the fame Ideas, whensoever we ufe the fame 
 Words , unlefs we give due Notice of the Change. 
 This will have a very large and happy Influence/"* 
 in fecuring not only others but our felves too from 
 Confufion and Miftake *, for even Writers and 
 Speakers themfelves, for want of due Watchful- 
 nefs, are ready to affix different Ideas to their own 
 Words, in different Parts of their Difcourfes, and 
 hereby bring Perplexity into their own Reafon- 
 ings, and confound their Hearers. 
 
 It is by an obfervation of this Rule, that Ma- 
 thematicians have fo happily fecured themfelves, 
 and the Sciences which they have profeft, from 
 Wrangling and Controverfy ; becaufe whenfoever 
 in the Progrefs of their Treatifes they have Oc- 
 cafion to ufe a new and unknov/n Word, they al- 
 ways define it, and tell in what Scnie they mall 
 take it -, and in many of their Writings you find 
 a heap of Definitions at the very beginning. Now 
 if the Writers of Natural Philofophy and Morality 
 had us'd the fame Accuracy and Care, they had 
 effectually fecluded a Multitude of noify and fruit- 
 lefs Debates out of their feveral Provinces: Nor 
 had that (acred Theme of Divinity been perplex- 
 ed with fo many intricate Difputes, nor the Church 
 of Chrift been torn to pieces by fo many . 
 and Factions, if the Words Grace, Faith, Righte- 
 G 3 oujh , 
 
w ) 
 
 96 LOG IC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 cufnefs, Repentance, Jujiification, Worfhip, Church, 
 Bifhop, Prefbyter, &c. had been well defined, and 
 their Significations adjufted, as near as poflible, 
 by the Ufe of thofe Words in the new Teftament ; 
 or at lcaft, if every Writer had told us at firft irt 
 what Strit he would ufe thofe Words. 
 
 Direct. VI. In your own Studies, as well as in 
 the Co?n?nunication of your Thoughts to others, mere- 
 ly for their Information, avoid ambiguous and equi- 
 vocal Terms as much as poffible. Do not ufe fuch 
 Words as have two or three Definitions of the 
 Name belonging to them, i. e. fuch Words as 
 have two or three Senfes , where there is any 
 Danger of Miftake. Where your chief Bufinefs 
 is to inform the Judgment, and to explain a Mat- 
 ter, rather than to perfuade or affect, be not fond 
 of exprefling your felves in figurative Language, 
 when there are any proper Words that fignify the 
 fame Idea in their literal Senfe. It is the Ambi- 
 guity of Names, as we have often faid, that brings 
 almoft infinite Confufion into our Conceptions of 
 'Things. 
 
 But where there is a necefiity of ufing an am- 
 higuous Word, there let double Care be us'd in de- 
 fining that Word, and declaring in what Senfe you 
 take it. And be fure to ftjffer no a?nbiguous Word 
 ever to come into your Definitions. 
 
 Direct. VII. In communicating your Notions, ufe 
 every Word as near as poffible in the fame Senfe in 
 which Mankind commonly ufes it \ or which Writers 
 L that have gone before you have ufually affixt to it, 
 * upon Condition that it is free from Ambiguity. Tho* 
 Names are in their Original merely arbitrary, yet 
 we mould always keep to the eftablifh'd Meaning 
 of them, unlefs great Necefiity require the Al- 
 teration * 
 
C. VI. S. 3 . fbe right Ufe of Reafon. 97 
 
 teration •, for when any Word has been us'd to 
 fignify an Idea, that old Idea will recur in the 
 Mind when the Word is heard or read, rather 
 than any new Idea which we may fallen to it. 
 And this is one Reafon why the received Defini- 
 tions of Names fhould be changM as little as 
 poflible. 
 
 But I add farther, that tho a Word entirely 
 new, introduced into a Language, may be affixed 
 to what Idea you pleafe, yet an old Word ought 
 never to be fixt to an unaccuftomed Idea, without 
 juft and evident Necefllty , or without prefent 
 or previous Notice, left we introduce thereby a 
 Licenfe for all manner of pernicious Equivocations 
 and Falfhoods ; as for Inftance, when an idle Boy 
 who has not feen his Book all the Morning fhall 
 tell his Mafter that be has learnt his Lejfon, he can 
 never excufe himfelf by faying, that by the Word 
 L'ffon he meant his Breakfaft, and by the Word 
 learn he meant eating\ furely this would be con- 
 ftrued a downright Lye, and his fancied Wit 
 would hardly procure his Pardon. 
 
 In ufing an ambiguous Word which has been 
 us'd in different Senfes, we may chuie what we 
 think the mod proper Senfe, as I have done^. 86. 
 in naming the Poles of the Loadftone^ North or 
 South. 
 
 And when a Word has been us'd in two or 
 three Senfes, and has made a great Inroad for Er- 
 ror upon that account, it is of good Service to 
 drop one or two of thofe Senfes, and leave it only 
 one remaining, and affix the other Senfes or Ideas 
 to other Words. So the modern Philofophers, 
 when they treat of the human Soul, they call ic 
 the Mind or Mens hvjnana, and leave the Word 
 Anima or Soul to fignify the Principle of Life and 
 Motion in mere animal Beings, 
 
 G 4 The 
 
98 LOGICK: Or, Parti. 
 
 The Poet Juvenal has long ago given us a hint 
 of this Accuracy and Diftinction when he fays of 
 Brutes and Men, 
 
 Induljit mundi communis Conditor Mis 
 Tantum Animas; nobis Animum quoque. 
 
 Sat. xvi. v> 134. 
 
 Exception. There is one Cafe wherein fome of 
 thefe kit Rules concerning the Definition of Words 
 may be in fome meafure difpenfed with ; and that 
 is, when ftrong and rooted Prejudice hath efta- 
 blifh'd fome favourite Word or Phrafe, and long 
 us'd it to exprefs fome miftaken Notion, or to 
 unite fome inconfiftent Ideas -, for then it is fome- 
 times much eafier to lead the World into Truth 
 by indulging their fondnefs for a Phrafe, and by 
 afllgning and applying new Ideas and Notions to 
 their favourite Wordj and this is, much fafer alfo 
 than to awaken all their Paflions by rejecting both 
 their old Words, and Phrafes, and Notions, and 
 introducing all new at once: Therefore we con- 
 tinue to fay, There is Heat in the Fire-, there is 
 Coldnefs in Ice, rather than invent new Words to 
 exprefs the Powers which are in Fire or Ice, to 
 excite the Senfations of Heat or Cold in us. For 
 the fame Reafon fome Words and Phrafes which 
 are lefs proper may be continued in Theology, while 
 People are led into clearer Ideas with much more 
 Eafe and Succefs, than if an Attempt were made 
 to change all their beloved Forms of Speech. 
 
 In other Cafes thefe logical Direclions mould 
 generally be obferved, and different Names affixc 
 to different Ideas, 
 
 Here I cannot but take Occafion to remark, 
 that it is a considerable Advantage to any Lan- 
 guage to have a Variety of new Words introdue'd* 
 
 into. 
 
C. VI. S. 3 . The right life of Reafon. 99 
 
 into it, that when in Courfe of Time new Objecls 
 and new Ideas arife, there may be new Words and 
 Names aflign'd to them : And alfo where one Tin- 
 gle Name has fuftain'd two or three Ideas in Time 
 pad, thefe new Words may remove the Ambi- 
 guity by being afExt to fome of thofe Ideas. This 
 Practice would by degrees take away part of the 
 Uncertainty of Language. And for this Reafon 
 I cannot but congratulate our Englijh Tongue, that 
 it has been abundantly enrich'd with the Tranfla- 
 tion of Words from all our neighbour Nations, 
 as well as from antient Languages , and thefe 
 Words have been as it were cnfranchifed amongtl: 
 us *, for French i Latin, Greek and German Names 
 will fignify Englijh Ideas, as well as Words that 
 are antiently and intirely Englijh. 
 
 It may not be amifs to mention in this Place, 
 that as the Determination of the particular Senfe 
 in which any Word is us'd is calPd the Definition 
 of the Name, fo the Enumeration of the various 
 Senfes of any equivocal Word is fometimes calPd 
 the Divifwn or Dijlinclion of the Name ; • and for 
 this Purpofe good Dictionaries are of excellent 
 Ufe. t 
 
 This Dijlinclion of the Name or Word is greatly 
 neceflary in Argumentation or Difpute ; when a 
 fallacious Argument is us'd, he that anfwers it 
 diitinguilTies the feveral Senfes of fome Word or 
 Phrafe in it, and fhews in what Senfe it it true 
 and in what Senfe it is as evidently/^.- 
 
 SlTCT, 
 
103 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 Of the Definition of Things. 
 
 AS there is much Confufion introduced into 
 our Ideas, by the Means of thofe Words 
 to which they are affix'd ; fo the minting our I- 
 deas with each other without Caution, is a far- 
 ther Occafion whereby they become confus'd. A 
 Court-Lady i born and bred up amongft Pomp and 
 Equipage, and the vain Notions of Birth and Qua- 
 lity, conftantly joins and mixes all thefe with the 
 Idea of her felf, and fhe imagines thefe to be ef- 
 fential to her Nature, and as it were neceffary to her 
 Being\ thence fhe is tempted to look upon menial 
 Servants, and the loweft Rank of Mankind, as 
 another Species of Beings quite diftincl: from her 
 felf. A Plough Boy that has never travelled be- 
 yond his own Village, and has feen nothing but 
 thatched Houfes and his Parijh -Church, is natural- 
 ly led to imagine that Thatch belongs to the very 
 Nature of a Houfe, and that that mult be a Church 
 which is built of Stone, and efpecially if it has a 
 Spire upon it. A Child whofe Uncle has been ex- 
 cefllve fond, and his Schoohnafter very fevere, 
 eafily believes that Fondnefs always belongs to 
 Uncles, and that Severity is efiential to Maflers of 
 Infirutlors. He has feen alfo Soldiers with red 
 Coats, or Minifters with long black Gowns, and 
 therefore he perfuades himfelf that thefe Garbs 
 are effential to the Characters, and that he is not 
 a Minifter who has not a long black Gown, nor can 
 he be a Soldier who is not drefs'd in red. It 
 would be well if all fuch Miftakes ended with 
 Childhood, 
 
 It; 
 
C. VI. S.4. The right Ufe of Reafbn. 10 1 
 
 It might be alfo libjoin'd, that our complex 
 Ideas become confus'd, not only by uniting or 
 blending together more fimple or Jingle Ideas than 
 really belong to them, as in the Inflancesjuft men- 
 tioned ; but Obfcurity and Confufion fometimes 
 come upon our Ideas alfo, for want of uniting a 
 fujficient Number offingle Ideas to make the com- 
 plex one : So if I conceive of a Leopard only as 
 2.fpotted Beaft y this does not diftinguifh it from a 
 Tiger or a Lynx, nor from many Dogs or Horfes y 
 which are fpotted too •, and therefore a Leopard 
 muft have fome more Ideas added to complete and 
 diftinguifh it. 
 
 I grant that it is a large and free Acquaintance 
 with the World, a watchful Obfervation and di- 
 ligent Search into the Nature of things that muft 
 fully correct this kind of Errors : The Rules of 
 Logick are not fufficient to do it : But yet the Rules 
 of Logic k may inftrucl: us by what means to diftin- 
 guifh one thing from another, and how to fearch 
 and mark out as far as may be the Contents and 
 Limits of the Nature of diftincl: Beings, and thus 
 may give us great Afiiftance towards the Remedy 
 of thefe Miftakes. 
 
 As the Definition of Names frees us from that 
 Confufion which Words introduce, fo the Defini- 
 tion of Things will in fome Meafure guard us a- 
 gainft that Confufion which mingled Ideas have 
 introduced : For as a Definition of the Name ex- 
 plains what any Word means, fo a Definition of 
 the Thing explain* what is the Nature of that 
 thing. 
 
 In order to form a Definition of any thing 
 we muft put forth thefe three Acts of the 
 Mind. 
 
 i ft , Compare the thing to be defined with 
 
 Other things that arc moil like to itfelf, and fee 
 
 I wherein 
 
102 LOGIC K: Or, Part L 
 
 wherein its Effence or Nature agrees with them \ 
 and that is call'd the general Nature or Genus in a 
 Definition : So if you would define what Wine 
 is, firft compare it with other Things like itfelf, 
 as Cyder j Perry, &c. and you will find it agrees 
 effcn daily with them in this, that it is a fort of 
 Juice. 
 
 2 dl y, Confider the moft remarkable and prima- 
 ry Attribute, Property, or Idea wherein this 
 Thing differs from thofe other Things that are 
 molt like it ; and that is its effential or fpecific 
 Difference: So Wine differs from Cyder and Perry , 
 and all other Juices, in that it is preffed from a 
 Grape. This may be call'd its fpecial Nature* 
 which diftinguifhes it from other Juices. 
 
 3 dl y, Join the general and fpecial Nature toge- 
 ther, or (which is all one) the Genus and the Dif- 
 ference, and thefe make up a Definition. So the 
 Juice of a Grape, or Juice prefi from Grapes is the 
 Definition of Wine. 
 
 So if I would define what Winter is, I confider 
 firft wherein it agrees with other Things which 
 are moft like it (viz.) Summer, Spring, Autumn, 
 and I find they are all Seafons of the Tear ; there- 
 fore a Seafon of the Tear is the Genus. Then I 
 obferve wherein it differs from thefe, and that is 
 in the fhortnefs of the Days ; for it is this which 
 does primarily diftinguifh it from other Seafons j 
 therefore this may be call'd its fpecial Nature or 
 its Difference. Then by joining thefe together 
 I make a Definition. Winter is that Seafon of the 
 Tear wherein the Days are fljorteft. I confefs indeed 
 this is but a ruder Definition of it, for to define it 
 as an accurate Aftronomer I muft limit the Days* 
 Hours and Minutes. 
 
 After the fame manner if we would explain or 
 
 define what the Piclure of a Man is, we confider 
 
 4 " firft 
 
C. VI. S. 4. fhe right Ufe of Reafon. 1 03 
 
 firfl: the Genus or general Nature of it, which is a 
 Reprefentation \ and herein it agrees with many 
 other Things, as a Statue, a Shadow, z. Print, a 
 verbal Defcription of a Man, is V. Then we con- 
 fider wherein it differs from thefe, and we find it 
 differs from a verbal Defcription in that it is a Re- 
 prefentation to the Eye and not to the Ear: It dif- 
 fers from a Statue in that it is a Reprefentation 
 upon a flat Surface, and not in a folid Figure : It 
 differs from a Shadow in that it is an abiding Re- 
 prefentation and not a fleeting one : It differs from 
 a Print or Draught, becaufe it reprefents the Co- 
 lours by Paint as well as the Shape of the Object 
 by Delineation. Now fo many, or rather fo few 
 of thefe Ideas put together, as are juft fufficient to 
 diflinguifh a Picture from all other Reprefentati- 
 ons, make up its effential Difference or its fpecial 
 Nature ; and all thefe are included in its beingpaint- 
 edon a plain Surface. Then join this to the Genus > 
 which is a Reprefentation ; and thus you have 
 the compleat Definition of the Piclure of a Man, 
 viz. it is the Reprefentation of a Man in Paint upon 
 a Surface (or a Plane.) 
 
 Here it muft be obferved, that when we fpeak 
 of the Genus and Difference as compofing a Defi- 
 nition, it muft always be underftood that the 
 neareft Genus and the fpecifick Difference are re- 
 quired. 
 
 The next general Nature or the neareft Genus 
 mufl be us'd in a Definition, becaufe it includes 
 all the reft $ as if I would define Wine, I mull: 
 fay Wine is a Juice, which is the neareft Genus ; 
 and not fay, Wine is a Liquid, which is a re- 
 mote general Nature ; or Wine is a Subflance, 
 which is yet more remote, for Juice includes 
 both Subflance and Liquid. Befidcs, neither of 
 thefe r,WQ remote general Natures would make 
 
 any 
 
104 LOG IC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 any Diftinction betwixt Wine and a thoufand other 
 Subjlances, or other Liquids ; a remote Genus leaves 
 the thing too much undiftinguifh'd. 
 
 The fpecifick Difference is that primary Attribute 
 which diftinguifhes each Species from one another, 
 while they (land ranked under the fame general 
 Nature or Genus. Tho' Wine differs from other 
 Liquids in that it is the Juice of a certain Fruity 
 yet this is but a general or generic k Difference ■, for 
 it does not diftinguifh Wine from Cyder or Perry ; 
 the fpecifick Difference of Wine therefore is its Pref- 
 fure from the Grape, as Cyder is prefs'd from Apples y 
 and Perry from Pears. 
 
 In Definitions alfo we muft ufe the primary At- 
 tribute that diftinguifhes the Species or fpecial Na- 
 ture, and not attempt to define Wine by its parti- 
 cular Taftes, or Effects, or other Properties, 
 which are but fecondary or confequential, when its 
 Preffure from the Grape is the molt obvious and 
 primary Diftinction of it from all other Juices. 
 I confefs in fome Cafes it is not fo eafily known 
 which is the primary Idea that diftinguifhes one 
 thing from another ; and therefore fome would as 
 foon define Winter by the Coldnefs of the Seafon, 
 as by the Shortnefs of the Days ; though the Short- 
 nefs of the Days is doubtlefs the moll juft, primary 
 and philofophical Difference betwixt that and the 
 other Seafons of the Year, fince Winter Days are 
 always fhorteft^ but not always the coldeft : I add 
 alfo, that the Shortnefs of the Days is one Caufe 
 of the Coldnefiy but the Cold is no Caufe of their 
 Shortnefs. 
 
 Sect, 
 
C. VI. S. 5. The right Ufe of Rcafon. J 0£ 
 
 Sect. V. 
 Rules of Definition of the thing. 
 
 TH E fpecial Rules of a good Definition are 
 thefe : 
 
 Rule I. A Definition muft be univerfal* or as 
 fome call it, adequate * that is, it muft agree to 
 all the particular Species or Individuals that are 
 included under the fame Idea •, fo the Juice of a 
 Grape agrees to all proper Wines* whether Red* 
 White* French^ Spanijh* Florence* &c. 
 
 Rule II. // muft be proper and peculiar to the 
 thing defined* and agree to that alone * for it is the 
 very Defign of a Definition effectually to diftin- 
 guifli one thing from all others : So the Juice of 
 a Grape agrees to no other Subftance, to no other 
 Liquid, to no other Being but Wine. 
 
 Thefe two Rules being obferved will always 
 render a Definition reciprocal with the thing de- 
 fined * which is a fcholaflick Way of fpeaking, 
 to fignify that the Definition may be ufed in any 
 Sentence in the Place of the thing defined* or 
 they may be mutually affirmed concerning each 
 other, or fubftituted in the room of each other. 
 The Juice of the Grape is Wine* or Wine is the Juice 
 of the Grape. And wherefoever the Word Wine 
 is us'd, you may put the Juice of the Grape inftead 
 of it, except when you conlider Wine rather as 
 a Word than a Thing* or when it is mentioned in 
 fuch logical Rules. 
 
 Rule 
 
to6 LOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 Rule III. A Definition ought to be clear and plain % 
 for the Defign of it is to lead us into the Know- 
 ledge of the thing defined. 
 
 Hence it will follow that the Words us'd in a 
 Definition ought not to be doubtful, and equivo- 
 sal, and obfcure, but as plain and eafy as the Lan- 
 guage will afford : And indeed it is a general Rule 
 concerning the Definition both of Names and 
 Things, that no Word fhould be us'd in either of 
 them which has any Darknefs or Difficulty in it, 
 unlefs it has been before explain'd or defin'd. 
 
 Hence it will follow alfo, that there are many 
 Things which cannot well be defin'd either as to 
 the Name or the Thing, unlefs it be by fynonymous 
 Words, or by a Negation of the contrary Idea, 
 &c. for learned Men know not how to make 
 them more evident or more intelligible than the 
 Ideas which every Man has gained by the vulgar 
 Methods of teaching. Such are the Ideas of Ex- 
 tenfion, Duration, Thought, Confcioufnefs, and mod 
 of our fimplc Ideas, and particularly fenfible Qua- 
 lities, as White, Blue, Red, Cold, Heat, Shrill, 
 Bitter, Sour, Gfr. 
 
 We can fay of Duration that it is a Continuance 
 in Being, or a not ceafing to be\ we can fay of 
 Confcioufnefs, that it is as it were a Feeling within 
 our f elves ', we may fay Heat is that which is not 
 Cold -, or Sour is that which is like Vinegar ; or 
 we may point to the clear Sky, and fay that is 
 Blue. Thefe are the vulgar Methods of teaching 
 the Definitions of Names, or Meaning of Words. 
 But there are iome Philofophers whofe Attempt 
 to define thefe Things learnedly have wrapt up 
 their Ideas in greater Darknefs, andexpos'd them- 
 felves to ridicule and Contempt ; as when they 
 define Heat they fay, it is gualitas congregans ho- 
 
 momenta 
 
C. VI. S. 5. "The right life of Reafon. 107 
 
 mogenea & fegregans heterogenea, i. e. a Quality ga- 
 thering together Things of the fame Kind, and 
 feparating Things of a different Kind. So they 
 define IVhite, a Colour arifing from the Prevalence 
 of Brightnefs : But every Child knows Hot and 
 White better without thefe Definitions. 
 
 There are many other Definitions given by the 
 peripatetick Philofophers, which are very faulty 
 by Reafon of their Obfcurity ; as Motion is defin- 
 ed by them the All of a Being in Power fo far 
 forth as it is in Power, Time is the Meafure or 
 Number of Motion accorclbg to paft, prefent and 
 future. The Soul is the Acl of an organical natural 
 Body, having Life in Power -, and feveral others 
 of the fame Sump. 
 
 Rule IV. It is alfo commonly prefcribed a- 
 mongft the Rules of Definition, that it fhould be 
 Jhort, fo that it mufl have no Tautology in it, nor 
 any Words fuperfluous. I confefs Definitions ought 
 to be exprefs'd in as few Words as is confiftent 
 with a clear and juft Explication of the Nature 
 of the Thing defin'd, and a Diftinction of it from 
 all other Things befide : But it is of much more 
 Importance , and far better , that a Definition 
 fhould explain clearly the Subject we treat of, 
 tho' the Words be many, than to leave Obfcuri- 
 ties in the Sentence, by confining it within too 
 narrow Limits. So in the Definition which we 
 have given of Logick, that it is the Art of ujlng 
 Reafon well in the Search after Truth and tl I 
 munication of it to others, it has indeed many Words 
 in it, but it could not well be Ihorter. Art is the 
 Genus wherein it agrees with A' 
 Arithmetic, Wi 
 
 all chefc are Arts alio: But the Difference or i. 
 rial Nature of it h drawn from i;s Obiccl, R 
 
 H 
 
108 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 fon ; from the Act ufing it well, and from its two 
 great Ends or Defigns, viz. the Search of Truth, 
 and the Communication of it: Nor can it bejuftly 
 defcribed and explained in fewer Ideas. 
 
 V. If we add a fifth Rule, it muft be that nei- 
 ther the thing defined, nor a mere fynony?nous Name 
 Jhould make any part of the Definition^ for this 
 would be no Explication of the Nature of the Thing ; 
 and a fynonymous Word at belt could only be a 
 Definition of the Name. 
 
 Sect. VI. 
 Obfervations concerning the Definition of Things. 
 
 BEfore I part with this Subject I muft propofe 
 feveral Obfervations which relate to the De- 
 finition of Things. 
 
 i fc Obferv. There is no need that in Definitions 
 we fhouid be confined to one fingle Attribute or 
 Property-, in order to exprefs the Difference of the 
 Thing defined, for fometimes the eftential Dif- 
 ference confifts in two or three Ideas or Attributes. 
 So a Grocer is a Man who buys and fells Sugar and 
 Plumbs and Spices for Gain. A Clock is an Engine 
 with Weights and Wheels, that fhews the Hour of 
 the Day both by pointing andflriking : And if I were 
 to define a Repeating Clock I muft add another 
 Property, viz. that it alfo repeats the Hour. So 
 that the true and primary eftential Difference of 
 feme complex Ideas confiding in feveral diftinct 
 Properties cannot be well expreiVd without con- 
 junctive Particles of Speech. 
 
 2 d Obferv. There is no need that Definitions fhouid 
 
 Always hzpofitive, for fome Things differ from others 
 
 2 merely 
 
C VI. S. 6. The right Ufe of 'Reafon. 109 
 
 merely by a Defect of what others have •, as if a 
 Chair be defined a Seat for a fingle Perfon with a 
 Back belonging to it, then a Stool is a Seat for a 
 fingle Perfon without a Back \ and a Form is a Seat 
 for fever al Perjons without a Back: Thefe are nega- 
 tive Differences. So Sin is a want of Conformity 
 to the Law of God; Blindnefs is a want of Sight. 
 A Vagabond is a Perfon without a Home. Some 
 Ideas are negative, and their Definitions ought to 
 be fo too. 
 
 j d Obferv. Some Things may have two or more 
 Definitions? and each of them equally juft and 
 good ; as a Mile is the Length of eight Furlongs^ 
 or it is the third part of a League. Eternal is that ■ 
 which ever was and ever JJo all be , or it is that which 
 had no Beginning and fhall have no End. * Man is 
 ufually defined a rational Animal: But it may be 
 much better to define him a Spirit united to an A- 
 nimal of fuch a Shape, or an Animal of fuch a pe- 
 culiar Shape united to a Spirit? or a Being compofed 
 of fuch an Animal and a Mind. 
 
 4 th Obferv. Where the EJfences of Things are 
 evident, and clearly diftinct from each other, there 
 we may be more exact and accurate in the Defi- 
 nitions of them : But where their EJfences approach 
 nearer to each other, the Definition is morj diffi- 
 cult. A Bird may be defined a feathered Animal 
 with Wings, a Ship may be defined a large hollow 
 Building made to pafs over the Sea with Sails: But 
 if you ask me to define a Batt, which is b, tw en 
 a Bird and a Beafl, or to define a Bj?ge and IIoy y 
 
 * The common Definition of Man, viz.. a rational minimal, is very faulty* 
 1. Becaufe the ^Animal i» not ratio id ; the Rationality of Man atiirs trom 
 :he Mind to which the Animal if united. 2. Beeaufo if u b r iiic (hould be 
 usited to a Horfe ana imke it a rational Being, lurciy this would nor be a 
 Man: It is evident therefore thu the piculur Sh*pc mufl 
 hnitioA of a \4*n to render it ju(t and perfect ; «nd fol want oi a full Dc- 
 i":riprion :heicof aj] fui De&ii.ioni are dcic: 
 
 H 2 which 
 
iio L G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 which arc between a Boat and a Ship, it is much 
 harder to define them, or to adjuft the Bounds 
 of their Eflence. This is very evident in all mon- 
 ftrous Births and irregular Productions of Nature, as 
 well as in many Works of Art, which partake fo 
 much of one Species and fo much of another, that 
 we cannot tell under which Species to rank them, 
 or how to determine their fpecifick Difference. 
 
 The feveral Species of Beings are feldom pre- 
 cifely limited in the Nature of Things by any 
 certain and unalterable Bounds : The Faiences of 
 many Things do not confift in indivifibili, or in 
 one evident indivifible Point, as fome have ima- 
 gined •, but by various Degrees they approach 
 nearer to, or differ more from others that are of a 
 Kindred Nature. So (as I have hinted before) in 
 the very middle of each of the Arches of a Rain- 
 bow the Colours of green, yellow, and redwz fuf- 
 iiciently diftinguifhed -, but near the Borders of 
 the feveral Arches they run into one another, fo 
 that you hardly know how to limit the Colours, 
 nor whether to call it red or yellow, green, or 
 blue. 
 
 5 th Obferv. As the higheft or chief Genus' j, viz. 
 Being and Not-Being can never be defined, becaufe 
 there is no Genus luperior to them - y fo neither can 
 fingidar Ideas or Individuals be well defined, be- 
 caufe either they have no ejfential Differences from 
 other Individuals, or their Differences are not 
 known ; and therefore Individuals are only to be 
 defcrib'd by their particular Circumftances : So 
 King George is diftinguifh'd from all other Men 
 and other Kings, by defcribing him as the firft 
 King of Great Britain of the Houfe of Brunfwick: 
 and Weftminfter-Uall is defer ibed by its Situation 
 and its Ufe, &c, 
 
 That 
 
C. VL S. 6. the right life of Reafon. 1 1 1 
 
 That individual Bodies can hardly have any 
 efTenrial Difference, at leafl within the Reach of 
 our Knowledge, may be made thus to appear -, 
 Methufelab, when he was nine hundred and fixty 
 Years old, and perhaps worn out with Age and 
 Weaknefs, was the fame Perfon as when he was 
 in his full Vigour of Manhood, or when he was 
 an Infant newly born ; but how far was his Body 
 the fame? who can tell whether there was any 
 Fibre of his Flefh or his Bones that continued the 
 fame throughout his whole Life ? or who can de- 
 termine which were thole Fibres? The Ship in 
 which Sir Francis Brake failed round the World 
 might be new built and refitted fo often, that 
 few of the fame Timbers remained ; and who can 
 fay whether it mull be call'd the fame Ship or 
 no? and what is its eiTential Difference? How 
 fhall we define Sir Francis Drake's Ship, or make 
 a Definition for Metbufelah? 
 
 To this Head belongs that molt difficult Que- 
 ll ion, What is the Principle of Inviduation f or 
 what is it that makes any one Thing the fame as 
 it was fometime before? This is too large and 
 laborious an Enquiry to dwell upon it in this Place: 
 Yet I cannot forbear to mention this Hint, viz. 
 Since our own Bodies mull rife at the hit Day 
 for us to receive Rewards or Punifhments in them, 
 there may be perhaps fomc original Fibres of each 
 human Body , fome Stamina Vita, or primeval 
 Seeds of Life, which may remain unchanged thro' 
 all the Stages of Life, Death -and the Grave; 
 thefc may become the Springs and Principles of a 
 Refurreetion, and fufticient to denominate it the 
 • Body. But If there be any fuch conftartf 
 and vital Atoms which diftinguiih every humaa 
 Body, they are known to God only. 
 
 II 3 6 th 0\ 
 
U2 LOG IC K: Or, Part L 
 
 6 th Obferv. Where we cannot find out the Efi 
 fence or ejfential Difference of any Species or Kind 
 of Beings that we would define, we muft con- 
 tent our felves with a Collection of fuch chief 
 Parts or Properties of it as may bed explain it fo 
 far as it is known, and bed: diftinguifh it from o- 
 ther Things : So a Marigold 'is a Flower which hath 
 fo many long yellow Leaves round a little Knot of 
 Seeds in the midft with fuch a peculiar Stalky &c. 
 So if we would define Silver ; we fay it is a white 
 and hard Metal, next in Weight to Gold: If we 
 would define an Elder-Tree, we might fay it is 
 one among the hfjer Trees, whofe younger Branches 
 are feft and full of Pith, whofe Leaves are jagged 
 or indented, and of fuch a particular Shape, and it 
 tears large Clufters of f nail Hack Berries: So we 
 muft define Water, Earth, Stone, a Lyon, an Ea- 
 gle, a Serpent, and the greateft pare of natural 
 Beings, by a Collection of thofe Properties, which 
 according to our Obfervation diftinguifh them 
 from all other Things. This is what Mr. Locke 
 calls nominal Ejfences, and nominal Definitions. And 
 indeed fince the ejfential Differences of the various 
 natural Beings or Bodies round about us arifefrom 
 a peculiar Shape, Size, Motion and Situation of 
 the fmall Particles of which they are compos'd, 
 and fince we have no fufticient Method to inform 
 us what thefe are, we muft be contented with 
 fuch a fort of Definition of the Bodies they com- 
 pofe. 
 
 Here note that this fort of Definition, which 
 is made up of a mere Collection of the moft re- 
 markable Parts or Properties, is call'd an imperfeel 
 Definition, or a Defcription •, whereas the Defini- 
 tion is call'd perfetl when it is compos'd of the cf- 
 fential Difference added to the general Nature or 
 Genus. 
 
 7 th Obfcrv. 
 
G VI. S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 1 3 
 
 7 th Obferv. The per/eft Definition of any Being 
 always includes the Definition ofi the Name where- 
 by it is called, for it informs us of the Seofe or 
 Meaning of that Word, and fhews us what Idea 
 that Word is affixed to: But the Definition ofi the 
 Name does by no means include a perfetl Definiti- 
 on ofi the Thing ; for as we have faid before, a 
 mere fynonymous Word, a Negation of the con- 
 trary, or the mention of any one or two diftin- 
 guifhing Properties of the Thing may be a fuffi- 
 cient Definition of the Name. Yet in thofe Cafes 
 where the eflential Difference or EfTence of a 
 Thing is unknown, there a Definition ofi the Name 
 by the chief Properties, and a Definition ofi the 
 Thing are much the fame. 
 
 And here I think it necefiary to take Notice of 
 one general Sentiment that feems to run thro' 
 that excellent Performance, Mr. Locke's Ejfay 
 of Human Underftandiv.g, and that is, " That 
 " the EiTences of Things are utterly unknown 
 " to us, and therefore all our Pretences to diftin- 
 " guifh the Effences of Things can reach no far- 
 " ther than mere nominal Effences -, or a Colledti- 
 4C on of fuch Properties as we know \ to fome of 
 " which we affix particular Names, and others 
 <c we bundle up, feveral together, under one 
 " Name : And that all our Attempts to rank Be- 
 u ings into different Kinds of Species's can reach 
 " no farther than to make mere nominal Species ; 
 u Mid therefore our Definitions of Things are but 
 M mere nominal Defcriptions or Definitions of the 
 4c Name. 
 
 .Now that we may do Juftice to this great slu- 
 toor, we ought to con fide r that he confines this 
 Sort of Difcourfe only to the E /fence of fimple I- 
 deas, and to the Ejfence of Subftances, as appears 
 evident in the fourth and iixth Chapters of his 
 H 4 Third 
 
H4 I G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 Third Book : for he allows the Names of mixed 
 Mcdes always to fignify the real EJfences of their 
 Species, Chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial 
 things to have diftintl Species , and that in the Dif- 
 tinction of their ElTences there is generally lefs 
 Confufton and Uncertainty than in natural, Ch. VI. 
 Seel. 40, 41 . tho' it mull be confefs'd that he fcarce 
 makes any Diftinction between the Definition of 
 the Name and the Definition of the thing, as Ch, 
 IV. and fometimes the Current of his Difcourfe 
 decries the Knowledge of EJfences in fuch gene- 
 ral Terms as may juftly give Occafion to mif- 
 take. 
 
 It muft be granted, that the Eflence of moil 
 of our Jimple Ideas and the greeted part of parti- 
 cular natural Subflances are much unknown to us •, 
 and therefore the efiential Differences of fenfible 
 Qualities and of the various Kinds of Bodies, (as 
 I have faid before^) lye beyond the Reach of our 
 Underftandings: We know not what makes the 
 primary real inward Diftinction between Red, 
 Green* Sweet, Sour, &c. between Wood, Iron, 
 Oil, Stone, Fire, Water, Flefjj, Clay, in their ge- 
 neral Natures, nor do we know what are the in- 
 ward and prime Diftindtions between all the par- 
 ticular Kjnds or Species in the Vegetable, Animal, 
 Mineral, Metallick, or Liquid World of Things. 
 But dill there is a very large Field for the Know- 
 ledge of the ElTences of Things, and for the Ufe 
 of perfect Definitions amongft our complex Ideas* 
 the modal Appearances and Changes of Nature, the 
 Works of Art, the Matters of Science, and all the 
 Affairs of the civil, the moral and the religious 
 Life: and indeed it is of much more Importance 
 to all Mankind to have a better Acquaintance with 
 the Works of Art for their own Livelihood and 
 daily ufe, with the Affairs of Morality for their 
 
 Behaviour 
 
C. VI. S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 1 £ 
 
 Behaviour in this World, and with the Matters of 
 Religion, that they may be prepar'd for the World 
 to come, than to be able to give a perfect Deiini- 
 tion of the Works of Nature. 
 
 If the particular EfTences of Natural Bodies arc 
 unknown to us, we may yet be good Philofo- 
 phers, good Artifts, good Neighbours, good Sub- 
 jects and good Chriftians without that Knowledge, 
 and we have juft Reafon to be content. 
 
 Now that the EfTences of fome of the modal 
 Appearances and Changes in Nature, as well as 
 Things of Art, Science and Morality are fufficiently 
 known to us to make perfect Definitions of them, 
 will appear by the Specimen of a few Definitions 
 of thefe Things. 
 
 Motion is a Change of Place. Swiftnefs is the 
 palling over a long Space in a fhort Time. A 
 natural Day is the Time of one alternate Revoluti- 
 on of Light and Darknefs, or it is the Duration of 
 twenty four Flours. An Eclipfe of the Sun is a De- 
 fect in the Sun's Tranfmifiion of Light to us by the 
 Moon interpofing. * Snow is congealed Vapour. 
 * Hail is congeal'd Rain. An * IJland is a Piece of 
 Land rifing above the furrounding Water. An*///'// 
 is an elevated Part of the Earth, and a * Grove is a 
 Piece of Ground thick fet with Trees. An Houfe 
 is a Building made to dwell in. A Cottage is a 
 mean Houfe in the Country. A Supper is that 
 Meal which we make in the Evening. A Tri- 
 angle is a Figure compos'd of three Sides. A 
 Gallon is a Meafure containing eight Pints. A 
 Porter is a Man who carries Burdens for Hire, A 
 
 • Nore, IPiir.d. Hill, Grove, are noc defined here in their more 
 
 a, (it I may fo expref* ir) or is the Mail r or them \s 
 Marti , tor in tin* Senfe wfl know not their Eflrnce, b-.t i rily is confider'd 
 in their m.dal ^ppeartncci, wherebyon. .>tb is diilirgjiih; froiq 
 
 \i s Tiie i*rac maybe faid of i&MfPj Hj l 3 ftfc 
 
u6 L O G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 King is the chief Ruler in a Kingdom. Veracity 
 is the Conformity of our Words to our Thoughts. 
 Covetoufnefs is an excefiive Love of Money, or 
 other PofTeflions. Killing is the taking away the 
 Life of an Animal. Murder is the unlawful kil- 
 ling of a Man. Rhetorick is the Art offpeaking 
 in a manner fit to perfuade. Natural Philofophy 
 is the Knowledge of the Properties of Bodies and 
 the various Effects of them, or it is the Know- 
 ledge of the various Appearances in Nature and 
 their Caufes $ and Logick is the Art of ufing our 
 Reafon well, fcfr. 
 
 Thus you fee the eflential Differences of vari- 
 ous Beings may be known, and are borrowed from 
 their Qualities and Properties, their Caufes, EffecJs, 
 Objetls, Adjuntls, Ends, &X. and indeed as infinite- 
 ly various as the EJfences of Things are, their De- 
 finitions muft needs have very various Forms. 
 
 After all it muft be confefs'd, that many Logi- 
 cians and Philofophers in the former Ages have 
 made too great a Buflle about the Exadtnefs of 
 their Definitions of Things, and enter'd into long 
 fruitlefs Controveriies and very ridiculous Debates 
 in the feveral Sciences about adjufting the Logical 
 Formalities of every Definition -, whereas that fort 
 of Wrangling is now grown very juftly contemp- 
 tible, fince it is agreed that true Learning and the 
 Knowledge of Things depends much more upon 
 a large Acquaintance with their various Proper- 
 ties, Caufes, Effects, Subject, Object, Ends and 
 Defigns, than it does upon the formal and fcho- 
 laftick Niceties of Genus and Difference. 
 
 Sect. 
 
C. VI. S.7. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 17 
 
 Sect. VII. 
 
 Of a compleat Conception of Things. 
 
 HAVING dwelt To long upon the firft Rule 
 to direct our Conceptions, and given an 
 Account of the Definition both of Names and Things 
 in order to gain clear and diflincl Ideas, we make 
 hade now to thefecond Rule to guide our Concep- 
 tions, and that is, Conceive of Things co?npleatly in 
 all their Parts. 
 
 All Parts have a Reference to fome Whole: 
 Now there is an old Diftinction which logical 
 Writers make of a Whole and its Parts into four 
 feveral Kinds, and it may be proper juft to men- 
 tion them here. 
 
 1. There is a metaphy/ical Whole , when the 
 Eflence of a Thing is faid to confiit of two Parts, 
 the Genus and the Difference^ i. e. the general and 
 the fpecial Nature, which being join'd together 
 make up a Definition. This has been the Subject 
 of the foregoing Sections. 
 
 2. There is a mathematical Whole which is bet- 
 ter call'd integral, when the feveral Parts which 
 go to make up the Whole are really diftinct from 
 one another, an I each of them may fubfift apart. 
 So the Head, the Limbs and the Trunk are the 
 integral Parts of an animal Body ; lb Unites are 
 the integral Parts of any large Number ; lb thefe 
 Difcourfes which I have written concerning Per- 
 ception, Judgment , Reafoning and Difpofitwn are 
 the four integral Parts of Logick. This fort of 
 Parts goes to make up the Compleatnefs of any 
 Subject, and this is the chief and molt direct Mat- 
 ter of our Difcourfe in this Section. 
 
 3- There 
 
*i8 LOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 3. There is a phyfical or effential Whole, which 
 is ufually made to fignify and include only the 
 two effential Parts of Man, Body and Soul: But I 
 think the Senfe of it may better be altered, or 
 at lead enlarged, and fo include all the effential 
 Modes, Attributes or Properties which are con- 
 tained in the Comprchenfwn of any Idea. This 
 fhall be the Subject of Difcourfe under the third 
 Rule to direct our Conceptions. 
 
 4. There is a logical Whole, which is alfo call'd 
 an univerfal; and the Parts of it are all the par- 
 ticular Ideas to which this univerfal Nature ex- 
 tends. So a Genus is a Whole in refpecl of the fe- 
 veral Species which are its Parts. So the Species 
 Is a Whole, and all the Individuals are the Parts 
 of it. This fhall be treated of in the fourth Rule 
 to guide our Conceptions. 
 
 At prefent we confider an Idea as an integral 
 Whole, and our fecond Rule directs us to contem- 
 plate it in all its Parts : But this can only refer 
 to complex Ideas, for fimple Ideas have no Parts, 
 
 Sect. VIII. 
 
 Of Divifwn, and the Rules of it. 
 
 Since our Minds are narrow in their Capacity, 
 and cannot furvey the feveral Parts of any 
 complex Being with one fingle View, as God fees 
 all Things at once, therefore we mud as it were 
 take it to Pieces, and confider of the Parts fepa 
 rately that we may have a more compleat Concep- 
 tion of the Whole. So if I would learn the Na- 
 ture of a Watch, the Workman takes it to pieces 
 and fhews me the Spring, the Wheels, the Axles y 
 the Pinions, the Balance, the Dial-Plate, the Poin- 
 ter > the Cafe, &c. *nd defcribes each ofthefc Things 
 
 to 
 
C. VI. S. 8. The right Ufe of Reafon. i 1 9 
 
 to me apart, together with their Figures and their 
 Ufes. If I would know what an Animal is, the 
 Anatomift confiders the Head, the Trunk, the 
 Limbs, the Bowels apart from each other, and 
 gives me diftinct Lectures upon each of them, 
 So a Kingdom is divided into its feveral Provinces : 
 A Book into its feveral Chapters ; and any Science 
 is divided according to the feveral Subjects of 
 which it treats. 
 
 This is what we properly call the Divi/wn of 
 an Idea, which is an Explication of tlye Whole by 
 its feveral Parts, or an Enumeration of the feveral 
 Parts that go to compofe any Whole Idea, and to 
 render it compleat. And I think when Man is 
 divided into Body and Soul, it properly comes un- 
 der this Part of the Doctrine of integral Divifion 9 
 as well as when the mere Body is divided into 
 Head, Trunk and Limbs: This Divifion is fome- 
 times call*d Partition. 
 
 When any of the Parts of any Idea are yet 
 farther divided in order to a clear Explication of 
 the Whole, this is call'd a Subdivifwn \ as when a 
 Tear is divided into Months, each Month into Days, 
 and eat:, Day into Hours, which may alfo be far- 
 ther Jubdrvided into Minutes and Seconds. 
 
 It is try in order to the full Explication 
 
 of any Being to confider each Part, and the Pro- 
 perties of it, diftinct by it felf, as well as ;';; its Re- 
 lation to the Whole: for there are many Proper- 
 ties that belong to the Parts of a Being which 
 cannot properly be afcrib'd to • the Whole, tho* 
 thefe Properties may lit each Part for its proper 
 Station, and as it Hands in that Relation to the 
 whole complex Being : as in a Houfe, the Doors 
 are moveable, the /tow/j fqiure, the Cif/ttg J white, 
 the Windows transparent, yet the Houfi is neither 
 moveable, nor fquare, nor white, nor tranfparcnt. 
 
 The 
 
120 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 Thefpecial Rules of a good Divifion are thefe. 
 
 i. Rule. Each Part fingly taken muft contain lefs 
 than the whole, but all the Parts taken colleclively 
 (or together) muft contain neither more nor lefs than 
 the whole. Therefore if in difcourfing of a Tree 
 you divide it into the Trunk and Leaves it is an 
 imperfect Divifion, becaufe the Root and the 
 Branches are needful to make up the Whole. So 
 Logick would be ill divided into Apprehenfion, 
 "Judgment and Reafoning, for Method is a confider- 
 able Part of the Art which teaches us to ufe our 
 Reafon right, and mould by no Means be 
 omitted. 
 
 Upon this Account, in every Divifion wherein 
 we defign a perfect exaclnefs, it is neceffary to 
 examine the whole Idea with Diligence, left we 
 omit any Part of it thro' want of Care; tho' in 
 fome Cafes it is not poffible, and in others it is 
 not neceffary that we mould defcend to the mi- 
 nuteft Parts. 
 
 2. Rule. In all Divifwns we jhould firft confider 
 the larger and more immediate Parts of the SuljeEI, 
 and not divide it at once into the more minute and 
 remote Parts. It would by no means be proper 
 to divide a Kingdom firft into Streets, and Lanes, 
 and Fields, but it muft be firft divided into Pro- 
 vinces or Counties, then thofe Counties may be di- 
 vided into Towns, Villages^ Fields, &c. and the 
 Towns into Streets^ and Lanes. 
 
 3. Rule. The fever al Parts of a Divifion ought 
 to be oppofite, i. e. one Part ought not to contain an- 
 other. It would be a ridiculous Divifion of an 
 Animal into Head, Limbs, Body and Brain, for the 
 Brains are contain'd in the Head. 
 
 Yet 
 
C. VI. S. 8. The rightVfe o/Reafon. 121 
 
 Yet here it rnuft be noted, that fometimes the 
 Subjects of any Treatife, or the Obj eels of a par- 
 ticular Science may be properly and neceflarily fo 
 divided, that the fecond may include the firft, and 
 the third may include the firft and fecond, with- 
 out offending againft this Rule, becaufe in the fe- 
 cond or following Parts of the Science or Dif- 
 courfe, thefe Objects are not confider'd in the fame 
 manner as in the firft ; as for Inftance, Geometry 
 divides its Objects into Lines, Surfaces and Solids: 
 Now tho* a Line be contain'd in a Surface or 
 a Solid, yet it is not confider'd in them fepa- 
 rate and alone, or as a mere Line, as it is in the 
 firft Part of Geometry which treats of Lines. So 
 Logick is rightly divided into Conception, Judg- 
 ment, Reafoning and Method ; for tho' Ideas or 
 Conceptions are contain'd in the following Parts of 
 Logic^ yet they are not there treated of as fepa- 
 rate Ideas, which are the proper Subject of the 
 firft Part. 
 
 4. Rule. Let not Subdivifions be too numerous with- 
 out NeceJJity : for it is better many Times to di- 
 ftinguifh more Parts at once if the Subject will 
 bear it, than to mince the Difcourfe by excefiive 
 dividing and fubdividing. It is preferable there- 
 fore in a Treatife of Geography to fay that in a 
 City we will confider its Walls, its Gates, its Build- 
 ings, its Streets and Lanes, than to divide it for- 
 mally firft into the encompaffing and die encompajfed 
 Parts •, the encompaffing Parts are the Walls and 
 Gates - y the encompafied Part includes the Ways 
 and the Buildings; the Ways arc the Streets and 
 the Lanes ; Buildings confift of the Fow 
 And the Superftr*8ure % &c. 
 
122 LOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 Too great a Number of Subdivifions has been 
 affected by fome Perfons in Sermons, Treatifes, 
 Instructions, t£c. under Pretence of greater Ac- 
 curacy : But this fort of Subtilties hath often giv- 
 en greater Confufion to the Underftanding, and 
 fometimes more Difficulty to the Memory. In 
 thefe Cafes it is only a good Judgment can deter- 
 mine what Subdivifions are needful. 
 
 5. Rule. Divide every Subjecl according to the 
 fpecial Defign you have in View, One Idea or 
 Subject may be divided in very different Manners 
 according to the different Purpofes we have in 
 difcourfing of it. So if a Printer were to con* 
 fider the fevcral Parts of a Bock, he muft divide 
 it into Sheets, the Sheets into Pages, the Pages 
 into Lines, and the Lines into Letters. But a 
 Grammarian divides a Book into Periods, Sentences 
 and Words, or Parts of Speech, as Noun, Pronoun, 
 Verb, &X. A Logician confiders a Book as divid- 
 ed into Chapters, Seel ions, Arguments, Propofi- 
 tions, Ideas, and with the Help of Ontology, he di- 
 vides the Propofitions into Subjecl, Objecl, Proper- 
 ty, Relation, Aclion, PaJJion, Caufe, Effecl, &c. 
 But it would be very ridiculous for a Logician 
 to divide a Book into Sheets, Pages, and Lines > 
 or for a Printer to divide it into Nouns and Pro- 
 nouns, or into Proportions, Ideas, Properties, or 
 Caufes. 
 
 6. Rule. In all your Divifions obferve with great - 
 eft Exaclnefs the Nature of Things. And here I am 
 conftrain'd to make a Subdivifion of this Rule 
 into two very neceffary Particulars. 
 
 (1.) Let the Parts cf your Bivifon be fuch as 
 are properly diftinguifhed in Nature. Do not di- 
 vide afunder thofe Parts of the Idea which are in- 
 
 4 timately 
 
C. VI S. 8. fhe rigbtXJfeofRttfon. 123 
 
 rimately united in Nature, nor unite trfofe Things 
 jnto one Part which Nature has evidently dif- 
 joined : Thus it would be very improper in treat- 
 ing of an Animal Body to divide it into the fupe- 
 rior and inferior Halves-, for it would be hard to 
 fay how much belongs by Nature to the inferior 
 Half, and how much to the fuperior. Much more 
 improper would it be dill to divide the Animal 
 into the right Hand Parts and left Hand Parts* 
 which would bring greater Confufion. This 
 would be as unnatural as a Man who mould 
 cleave a Hazel Nut in Halves thro' the Hufk y the 
 Shell and the Kernel at once, and fay a Nut is 
 divided into thefe two Parts \ whereas Nature leads 
 plainly to the threefold Dxftindlion of Hujk, Shell 
 and Kernel. 
 
 (2.) Do not aff ell Duplicities nor Triplicities, nor 
 any certain Number of Parts in your Divifwn of 
 Things i for we know of no fuch certain Number 
 of Parts which God the Creator has obferved in 
 forming all the Varieties of his Creatures, nor is 
 there any uniform determined Number of Parts 
 in the various Subjects of human Art or Science » 
 yet fome Perfons have diflurbed the Order of Na- 
 ture and abufed their Readers by an Affectation of 
 Dichotomies Thrichotomies, Srcens, Twelves, &c. 
 Let the Nature of the Subject, conlidered together 
 with the Dejign which you have in view, always 
 determine the Number of Parts into which you 
 divide ir. 
 
 After all, it mull be confefs'd that an intimate 
 Knowledge of Things and a judicious Obk-rvati- 
 on will alTilt in the Bufinds of Divifwn, as well 
 as of Dc ., better than too nice and curious 
 
 an Attention to the mere Formalities of logi- 
 cal^ Writers, without a real Acquaintance with 
 Thing?, 
 
 I Si< 
 
I2 4 L G I C K: Or, Parti 
 
 Sect. IX. 
 
 Of a comprehenfive Conception of Things, and of 
 Abflraftion. 
 
 TH E third Rule to direct our Conception re- 
 quires us to conceive of Things comprehenfive- 
 ly. As we mult furvey an Object in all its Parts 
 to obtain a compleat Idea of it, fo we mud confi- 
 der it in all its Modes, Attributes, Properties and 
 Relations, in order to obtain a comprehenfive Con- 
 ception of it. 
 
 The Comprehenfion of an Idea, as it was ex- 
 plain'd under the Doctrine of Univerfals, includes 
 only the efential Modes or Attributes of that Idea •, 
 but in this Place the Word is taken in a larger 
 Senfe, and implies alfo the various occafional Pro- 
 perties, accidental Modes and Relations. 
 
 The Neceffity of this Rule is founded upon 
 the lame Reafon as the former, viz. That our 
 Minds are narrow and fcanty in their Capacities, 
 and as they are not able to confider all the Parts 
 of a complex Idea at once, fo neither can they at 
 once contemplate all the different Attributes and 
 Circumftances of it : We muft therefore confider 
 Things fucceffively and gradually in their various 
 Appearances and Circumftances: As our natural 
 Eye cannot at once behold the fix Sides of a Dye 
 or Cube, nor take Cognizance of all the Points 
 that are mark'd on them, and therefore we turn 
 up the Sides fucceffively, and thus furvey and num- 
 ber the Points that are mark'd on each Side, that 
 we may know the whole. 
 
 In 
 
C.VI. S. 9. The right Ufe of HeiSon. X25 
 
 In order to a ccmprehenfive View of any Idea, we 
 mud firft confider whether the Objed: of it has 
 an Exiftence as well as an Effence 5 whether it be 
 a fimple or a complex Idea \ whether it be a Sub- 
 fiance or a Mode \ if it be a Subfiance, then we 
 muft enquire what are the ejfential Modes of it, 
 which are necefiary to its Nature, and what are 
 thofe Properties or Accidents of it, which belong 
 to it occafionally, or as it is placed in fome par- 
 ticular Circumftances : We muft view it in its 
 internal and abfolute Modes, andobferve it in thofe 
 various external Relations in which it (lands to other 
 Beings: We muft confider it in its Powers and 
 Capacities either to do or fuffer: We muft trace 
 it up to its various Caufes, whether fupream or 
 fubordinate. We muft defcend to the Variety 
 of its EffeclS) and take notice of the feveral Ends 
 and Dejigns which are to be attained by it. We 
 muft conceive of it as it is either an Object or a 
 Subjetl *, what are the Things that are akin to it, 
 and what are the Oppofites or Contraries of it ; for 
 many Things are to be known both by their con- 
 trary and their kindred Ideas. 
 
 If the thing we difcourfe of be a mere Mode, we 
 muft enquire whether it belong to Spirits or Bodies ; 
 whether it be a phyfical or moral Mode : If mo- 
 ral^ then we muft confider its Relation to God, to 
 our J "elves, to our Neighbours \ its reference to this 
 Life or the Life to come. If it be a Virtue, we 
 muft leek what are the Principles of it, what 
 are the Rules of it, what are the Tendencies of 
 it, and what are the falfe Virtues that counterfeit 
 it, and what are the real Vices that oppofe it, 
 what are tjie Evils which attend the Neglect of 
 it, what are the Rewards of the Pr it 
 
 both hey 
 
 I Z If 
 
126 LOCICK:Or, Parti. 
 
 If the Subject be biftorical or a Matter of Facl 9 
 we may then enquire whether the Action was 
 don'e at all •, whether it was done in fuch a ?nanner, 
 or by fuch Perfons as is reported •, at what Time 
 it was done •, in what Place ; by what Motive, and 
 for what Dejtgn \ what is the Evidence of the 
 Fact ; who are the Witnejfes \ what is their Cha- 
 ler and Credibility ; what Signs there are of 
 fuch a Fact •, what concurrent Circumftances which 
 may either fupport the Truth of it, or render it 
 doubtful . 
 
 In order to make due Enquiries into all thefc 
 and many other Particulars which go towards the 
 compleat and comprehenfive Idea of any Being, the 
 Science of Ontology is exceeding neceffary. This 
 is what was wont to be call'd the firft Part of Me- 
 taphyficks in the Peripatetick Schools. It treats of 
 Being in its mo ft general Nature, and of all its Af- 
 fections and Relations. I confefs the old popijb 
 Schoolmen have mingled a Number of ufelefs Sub- 
 tilties with this Science -, they have exhaufted their 
 own Spirits, and the Spirits of their Readers in 
 many laborious and intricate Trifles, and fome 
 of their Writings have been fruitful of Names 
 without Ideas, which hath done much Injury to 
 the facred Study of Divinity. Upon this Account 
 many of die Moderns have molt unjuftly aban- 
 doned the whole Science at once, and thrown A- 
 bundance of Contempt and Raillery upon the 
 very Name of Metapbxficks j but this Contempt 
 and Cenfure is very unrcafonable, for this Science 
 feparateel from fome Ariftoi-elian Fooleries and fcho- 
 laftic Subtilties is fo neceffary to a diftinct Con- 
 ception, folid Judgment, and juit Rcafoning on 
 many Subjects, that fometimes it is introduced as 
 a Part of Logick^ and not without Reafon. And 
 thofe who utterly defpiie and ridicule it, either 
 
 betray 
 
C. VI. S. 9. the right Ufe of Reafon. 1 2 7 
 
 betray their own Ignorance, or will be fupposM 
 to make their Wit and Banter a Refuge and Ex- 
 cufe for their own Lazinefs. Yet thus much I 
 would add, that the later Writers of Ontology are 
 generally the beft on this account, bccaufe they 
 have left out much of the antient Jargon. 
 
 Here let it be noted that it is neither ufeful, 
 neceffary, or poflible to run thro' all the Modes \ 
 Circumjlances and Relations of every Subject we 
 take in Hand •, but in Ontology we enumerate a 
 great Variety of them, that fo a judicious Mind 
 may choofe what are thofe Circumjlances, Relations 
 and Properties of any Subject, which are moil 
 neceffary to the prefent Defign of him that fpeaks 
 or writes, either to explain, to illuftrate, or to 
 prove the Point. 
 
 As we arrive at the compleat Knowledge of an 
 Idea in all its Parts, by that Act of the Mind 
 which is call'd Divijion, fo we come to a compre- 
 henfive Conception of a Thing in its feveral Pro- 
 perties and Relations, by that Act of the Mind which 
 is call'd Abftraclion, i. e. we confider each fingle 
 Relation or Property of the Subject alone, and 
 thus we do as it were withdraw and feparate it in 
 our Minds both from the Subject it klt\ as well as 
 from other Properties and Relations in order to 
 make a fuller Obfervation of it. 
 
 This Act of Ahflraclion is fuid to be twofold, 
 either Precifive or Negative. 
 
 Precifive AbftraRion is when we confider thofe 
 Things apart which cannot really exifl apart ; as 
 when we confider a Mode without confidering its 
 Subftance and Subject, or one ejfential Mode with- 
 out another. Negative Abjlraction is when we con- 
 fider one Thing feparate from another, which 
 may alfo Gxifl without it •, as when we conceive 
 
 I 3 Of 
 
128 LOG ICK: Or, Parti. 
 
 of a Subject without conceiving of its accidental 
 Modes or Relations ; or when we conceive of one 
 Occident without thinking of another *, if I think 
 of reading or writing without the exprefs Idea of 
 ibme Man, this is precifive Abftraclion ; or if I 
 think of the Attraclion of Iron-, without the ex- 
 prefs Idea of fome particular magnetick Body. But 
 when I think of a Needle without an Idea of its 
 Sharpnefs, this is negative Abftraclion - y and it is the 
 fame when I think of its Sharpnefs without confi- 
 dering its Length. 
 
 Sect. X. 
 
 Of the extenfive Conception ef Things, and of 
 
 Diftrjbution. 
 
 AS the Compkatnefs of an Idea refers to the fe- 
 veral Parts that compofe it, and the Corn- 
 er ehenfwn of an Idea includes its various Proper- 
 ties, fo the Extenfion of an Idea denotes the vari- 
 ous Sorts or Kinds of Beings to which the fame Idea 
 belongs: And if we would be fully acquainted 
 with a Subject, we muft obferve 
 
 This fourth Rule to direct our Conceptions, viz. 
 Conceive of Things in all their Extenfion, i. e. we 
 mull fearch out the various Species or fpecial Na- 
 tures which are contain'd under it as a Genus or 
 general Nature. If we would know the Nature of 
 an Animal perfectly, we muft take Cognizance of 
 Beafts, Birds, Fifties and Infetls, as well as Men, 
 all which are contain'd under the general Nature 
 and Name of AnimaL 
 
 As 
 
C. VI. S. io. The right life of Reafon. 129 
 
 As an integral Whole is diftinguifh'd into its fe- 
 veral Parts by Divifwn, fo the Word Diftributi- 
 on is mod properly us'd when we diftinguifh an 
 univerfal Wljole into its feveral Kinds or Species : 
 And perhaps it had been better if this Word had 
 been always confin'd to this Signification, tho' it 
 mu ft be confeft, that we frequently fpeak of the 
 Divifwn of an Idea into its feveral Kinds, as well 
 as into its feveral Parts. 
 
 The Rules of a good Diflribution are much the 
 fame with thofe which we have before applied 
 to Divifwn, which may be juft repeated again in 
 the briefeft manner, in order to give Examples 
 to them. 
 
 I. Rule- Each Part fngly taken muft contain lefs 
 than the Whole, but all the Parts taken collective- 
 ly or together, muft contain neither more nor lefs 
 than the Whole -, or as Logicians fometimes exprefs 
 it, the Parts of the Divifwn ought to exhauft the 
 iv hole Thing which is divided. So Medicine is juft ly 
 diftributed into Prophylaciick, or the Art of pre- 
 fer ving Health ; and Therapeutick, or the Art 
 of reftoring Health ; for there is no other fort 
 of Medicine be fide thefe two. But Men are not 
 well diftributed into tall or fjort, for there are 
 forae of a middle Stature. 
 
 II. Rule. In all Bijlributions we fhould flrft 
 confider the larger and more immediate Kinds or 
 Species or Ranks of Being, and not divide a 
 Thing at once into the more minute and remote. 
 A Genus fhould not at once be divided into Indi- 
 viduals, or even into the lovceft Species, if there 
 be a Species fuperior. Thus it would be very im- 
 proper to divide Animal into Tout, Lobjlcr, Eel, 
 Dog, Bear } Eagle, Dove, Worm and Butterfly, tor 
 
 I 4 chcff 
 
130 £ G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 thefe arc inferior Kinds-, whereas Animal ought 
 ftrft ro be diftributed into Man, Beaft, Bird, Fifh, 
 Infefjf: And then Bead fhould be diftributed into 
 Dog, Bear, &c. Bird into Eagle, Dove, Sec. Fifh 
 into Trout, Eel, Lobfter, &c. 
 
 It is irregular alfo to join any inferior Species in 
 in the fame Rank or Order with the Superior •, as 
 if we would diftinguifh Animals into Birds, Bears 
 and Gxfters, &c. it would be a ridiculous Diftri- 
 bution. 
 
 III. Rule. The feveral Parts of a Diftribution 
 ought to be oppofite •, that is, one Species or Clafs 
 of Beings in the fame Rank of Diviiion ought not 
 to contain or include another -, fo Men ought not 
 to be divided into the Rich, the Poor, the Learned 
 and the "Tall j for poor Men may be both learned 
 and tall, and fo may the rich. 
 
 But it will be objected, are* not animated Bodies 
 nghtly diftributed into Vegetative and Animal, or 
 (as they are ufually called) Senfitive? Now the Sen- 
 fitive contains the Vegetative Nature in it, for A- 
 nimals grow as well as Plants. I anfvver that in 
 this and all fuch Diftributions the Word Vegeta- 
 tive fignifies merely Vegetative •, and in this Senfe 
 Vegetative will be fufficiently oppofite to Animal, 
 for it cannot be faid of an Animal that it contains 
 mere Vegetation in the Idea of it. 
 
 IV. Rule. Let not Subdivifions be too nume- 
 rous without Neceflity •, therefore I think Quan- 
 tity is better diftinguifhed at once into a Line, a 
 Surface and a Solid, than to fay as Ramus does, that 
 Quantity is either a Line, or a Thing lined , and a 
 Thing lined is either a Surface or a Solid, 
 
 V. Rule 
 
C. VI. S. i o. The right TJfe of Rcafon, 1 3 1 
 
 V. Rule Diftribute every Subject according to 
 the fpecial Defign you have in View, fo far as is 
 neceflary or ufef ul to your prefent Enquiry. Thus 
 a Politician diftributes Mankind according to their 
 civil Characters, into the Rulers and the Ruled-, 
 and a Phyfician divides them into the Sick or the 
 Healthy ; but a Divine diftributes them into Turks y 
 Heathens, Jews, or Chriftians. 
 
 Here Note, that it is a very ufelefs Thing to 
 diftribute any Idea into fuch Kinds or Members 
 as have no different Properties to be fpoken of> 
 as it is mere trifling to divide right Angles into 
 fuch whofe Legs are equal, and whofe Legs are un- 
 equal^ for as to the mere right Angle they have no 
 different Properties. 
 
 VI Rule. In all your Diftributions obferve the 
 Nature of Things with great Exaetnefs ; and 
 don't affect any particular Form of Diftribution, 
 as fome Perfons have done, by dividing every Ge- 
 nus into two Species, or into three Species ', where- 
 as Nature is infinitely various, and human Affairs 
 and human Sciences have as great a Variety, nor 
 is there any one Form of Diftribution that will 
 exactly fuit with all Subjects. 
 
 Note, It is to this Doctrine of Diftribution of 
 a Genus into its fever al Species, we muft alfo refer 
 the Diftribution of a Caufe according to its feve- 
 ral Effecls, as fome Medicines are beating, fome arc 
 tooling -, or an Effect when it is diftinguiih'd by 
 its Caufes, as Faith is either built ujon aivir.e Tes- 
 timony or human. It is to this Head we refer par- 
 ticular artificial Bodies, when they are diilinguifh- 
 ed according to the Matter they arc made of, as 
 a Statue is either of Brais, of Marble, or IVcod^ 
 fee, and any other Be'v.gs when they arc diilin- 
 4 ' guiihM 
 
132 LOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 guifli'd according to their End and Defign, as the 
 Furniture of Body or Mind is either for Ornament 
 or Ufe. To this Head alfo we refer SubjecJs when 
 they are divided according to their Modes or Ac- 
 cidents \ as Men are either merry, or grave, or fad ; 
 and Modes when they are divided by their Subjects, 
 as Diflempers bebng to the Fluids , or to the folid 
 Parts of the Animal. 
 
 It is alfo to this Place we reduce the Propofals 
 of a Difficulty under its various Cafes, whether it 
 be in Speculation or Practice: As to (hew the 
 Reafon of the Sun-beams burning Woody whether 
 it be done by a convex Glafs or a concave ; or to 
 fhew the Ccnftrutlion and Menfuration of Trian- 
 gles, whether you have two Angles and a Side 
 given, or two Sides and an Angle, or only three 
 Sides. Here it is necedary to diftribute or divide 
 a Difficulty into all its Cafes, in order to gain a per- 
 fect Knowledge of the Subject you contemplate. 
 
 It might be obferved here, that Logicians have 
 fometimes given a Mark or Sign to diflinguifh 
 when it is an integral Whole, that is divided into 
 its Parts or Members, or when it is a Genus, an 
 univerfal Whole, that is diftributed into its Species 
 and Individuals. The Rule they give is this: 
 Whenfoever the whole Idea can be directly and 
 properly affirm'd of each Part, as a Bird is an A- 
 nimal, a Fijh is an Animal, Bucephalus is a Horfe, 
 Peter is a Man, then it is a Diftribution of a Ge- 
 nus into its Species, or a Species into its Individu- 
 als: But when the whole cannot be thus directly 
 affirmed concerning every Part, then it is a Divi- 
 fioh of an integral into its feveral Species or Mem- 
 bers *, as we cannot fay the Head, the Breaft, the 
 Hand or the Foot is an Animal ; but we fay the 
 Head is a Part of the Animal^ and the Foot is an- 
 other Part, 
 
 This 
 
C.VI. S.ii. The right U/e of Retfon. 133 
 
 This Rule may hold true generally in corporeal 
 Beings, or perhaps in all Subftances : But when 
 we fay the Fear of God is Wifdom, and fo is human 
 Civility. Criticifm is true Learning, and fo is Phi- 
 lofophy : To execute a Murderer is Juft ice, and to 
 fave and defend the Innocent is Juftice too : In thefe 
 Cafes it is not fo eafily determin'd, whether an 
 integral Whole be divided into its Parts, or an uni- 
 verfal into its Species : For the Fear of God may 
 be calPd either one Part, or one Kind of Wifdom : 
 Criticifm is one Part, or one Kind of Learning : 
 And the Execution of a Murderer may be call'd a 
 Species of Juftice, as well as a Part of it. Nor in- 
 deed is it a Matter of great Importance to deter- 
 mine this Controverfy. 
 
 Sect. XI. 
 
 Of an orderly Conception of Things. 
 
 THE loft Rule to direct our Conceptions, is, 
 that we Jhould rank and place them in a pro- 
 per Method and juft Order. This is of neceflary 
 Ufe to prevent Confufion ; for as a Trader who 
 never places his Goods in his Shop or Warehoufe 
 in a regular Order, nor keeps the Accounts of his 
 buying and felling, paying and receiving in a juft 
 Method, is in utmolt Danger of plunging all his 
 Affairs into Confufion and Ruin *, fo a Student 
 who is in the Search of Truth, or an Author or 
 Teacher who communicates Knowledge to others, 
 will very much obftruct his Defign, and confound 
 his own Mind or the Mind of his Hearers, unlels 
 he range his Ideas in juft Order. 
 
 If we would therefore become fuccefsful Learn- 
 ers or Teachers, we muft not conceive of Things 
 in a confufed Heap, but difpofe our Ideas in fome 
 certain Method, which may be molt eafy and ufc- 
 
 ful 
 
134 LOGIC K: Or, Part L 
 
 ful both for the Underftanding and Memory ; 
 and be fure as much as may be to follow the Na- 
 ture of 'Things, for which many Rules might be 
 given, viz. 
 
 i . Conceive as much as you can of the EJfen- 
 tiah of any Subject, before you confider its Acci- 
 dentals. 
 
 2. Survey firft the general Parts and Properties 
 of any Subject, before you extend your Thoughts 
 to difcourfe of the particular Kinds or Species 
 of it. 
 
 3. Contemplate Things firft in their own fimple 
 Natures, and afterward view them in Compofition 
 with other Things ; unlefs it be your prefent Pur- 
 pofe to take a compound Being to pieces, in order 
 to find out or to fhew the Nature of it by fearch- 
 sng and difcovering of what Simples it is com- 
 pofed. 
 
 4. Confider the abfolute Modes or Affections 
 of any Being as it is in itielf, before you proceed 
 to confider it relatively, or to furvey the vari- 
 ous Relations in which it Hands to other Be- 
 ings, l$c. 
 
 Note, Thefe Rules chiefly belong to the Me- 
 thod of Inftruclion which the Learned call Syn- 
 thetich 
 
 But in the Regulation of our Ideas there is 
 feldom an abfolute NecefTity that we mould place 
 them in this or the other , particular Method : It 
 is poflible in fome Cafes that many Methods may 
 be equally good, that is, may equally aflifb the 
 Underftanding and the Memory : To frame a 
 Method exquifitely accurate, according to the 
 itrict Nature of Things, and to maintain this Ac- 
 curacy from the Beginning to the End of a Trea- 
 tife, is a moft rare and difficult Thing, if not irrN 
 poflible. JBut a larger Account of Method would 
 
 be 
 
C. VI. S. 1 2. The right TJfe of Reafon. 135 
 
 be very improper in this Place, left we anticipate 
 what belongs to the fourth Part of Logic k. 
 
 Sect. XII. 
 Theft five Rules of Conception exemplified. 
 
 IT may be ufeful here to give a Specimen of the 
 fivt fpecial Rules to dir 'eel our Conceptions, which 
 have been the chief Subject of this long Chapter, 
 and reprefent them practically in one View, 
 
 Suppofe the Theme of our Difcourfe were the 
 Paffwns of the Mind. 
 
 i fc , To gain a clear and difiinel Idea of Paffion y 
 we mud defint both the Name and the Thing. 
 
 To begin with the Definition of the Name ; we 
 are not here to underftand the Word Paffion in 
 its vulgar and molt limited Senfe, as it fignifies 
 merely Anger or Fury -, nor do we take it in its 
 mod extenfive philofophical Senfe, for the fuf- 
 taining the Aft ion of an Agent ; but in the more li- 
 mited philofophical Senfe, Paffwns fignify the va- 
 rious Aff eel ions of the Mind, fuch as Admiration, 
 Love, or Hatred; this is the Definition of the Name. 
 
 We proceed to the Definition of the Thing. 
 Paffion is defined a Senfation of fonie fpecial Commotion 
 in animal Nature, occasioned by the Mind's Perception 
 effome Object finite d to excite that Commotion. * Here 
 the Genus or general Nature of Pajfion is a Sin- 
 
 • Since thi* wai written } have published aihortTreatifeof the Pajps/u, 
 wherein I have fo far varied from this Definition as to call them Stnftblt 
 Camm'J iitts of our ivbo/e Nature. both Soul and "B.dy, tctcfitlfd ly'.le M.r.d't 
 Perception of fume Ob^il , &c. I mad* this Alceration in the Defcription of 
 rhePaflions in that Book chiefly to include in a more Explicit manner the 
 Paflloniof Defire ind sfverficn w'u t \ l rather than Sen- 
 
 fj.'ions. Yet fince fume Commotions 1 1 mimal Nature urcrnd all the Pdffionf, 
 and firce thtre isa'.ways a Sen'aV' MimoCtOOti I fhall not change 
 
 the Dtfinition 1 have written he ( . P r this will apree to all the PafT»on« 
 whether they include any Ad of Volirionor not; Nv;r indeed is tbc Matter 
 tf a»y great Impoicancv. Nov. 17. 172&. 
 
 fat'iQn 
 
l 3 6 LOG IC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 fation of fome fpecial Co?n?notlon in animal Nature ; 
 and herein it agrees with Hunger, Thirft, Pain, 
 &c. The effential Difference of it is, that this Com- 
 motion arifes from a Thought or Perception of the 
 Mind, and hereby it is diftinguifhed from Hunger, 
 Thirft, or Pain. 
 
 2 dl y, We muft conceive of it compleatly, or 
 furvey the feveral Parts that compofe it. Thefe 
 are (i.) The Mind's Perception of fome Objecl. (2.) 
 The confequent Ruffle or fpecial Commotion of the 
 Nerves, and Blood, and animal Spirits. And (3.) 
 The Senfation of this inward Commotion. 
 
 3 dl y, We muft confider it comprehenfively in its 
 various Properties. The moft effential Attributes 
 that make up its Nature have been already men- 
 tioned under the foregoing Heads. Some of the 
 moft confiderable Properties that remain are thefe, 
 viz. That Paffon belongs to all Mankind, in greater 
 or lefler Degrees : // is not conftantly prefent with 
 us, but upon fome certain Occafions: It is appointed 
 by cur Creator for various ufeful Ends and Purpofes, 
 viz. to give us Vigour in the Purfuit of what is 
 good and agreeable to us, or in the Avoidance of 
 what is hurtful : It is very proper for our State of 
 "Trial in this World: It is not utterly to be rooted out 
 of our Nature, but to be ?noderated and governed ac- 
 tor ding to Rules of Virtue and Religion, &c. 
 
 4 thi y, We muft take Cognizance of the various 
 Kinds of it, which is call'd an er.tenfive Conception 
 of it. If the Object which the Mind perceives 
 be very uncommon, it excites the Paflion of Ad- 
 miration. If the Objecl: appear agreeable it raifes 
 Love : If the agreeable Objecl be abfent and at- 
 tainable it is Defire: If likely to be obtain'd, it 
 excites Hope: If unattainable, Defpair : If it be 
 prefent and poffeft^ it is the Paflion of Joy : If loft, 
 it excites Sorrow. If the Objecl be difagreeable, 
 
 it 
 
G. VI. S. 1 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 3 7 
 
 it caufes in general Hatred or Averfion : If it be 
 abfent and yet we are in Danger of ir, it raifes 
 our Fear: If it be prefent, it is Sorrow and Sad- 
 nefsy &c. 
 
 5 thl y, All thefe Things and many more which 
 go to compofe a Treatife on this Subject muft be 
 placed in their proper Order: A flight Specimen 
 of which is exhibited in this fhort Account of 
 Pafiion, and which that admirable Author Def- 
 eases has treated of at large •, tho' for want of 
 fufHcient Experiments and Obfervations in natural 
 Philofophy, there are fome few Miftakes in his 
 Account of animal Nature. 
 
 Sect. XIII. 
 
 An illujlration of thefe five Rules by Similitudes. 
 
 THUS we have brought the firft Part of Lo- 
 gick to a Conclufion : And it may not be 
 improper here to reprefent its Excellencies (fo far 
 as we have gone) by general Hints of its chief De- 
 fign and Ufe, as well as by a various Comparifon of it 
 tothofelnftruments which Mankind have invented 
 for their feveral Conveniences and Improvements. 
 The Defign of Logick is not to furnifh us with 
 the perceiving Faculty, but only to direel and af- 
 fift us in the Ufe of it : It doth not give us the 
 Objects of our Ideas, but only cafis fitch a Light 
 on thofe Objects which Nature furnifhes us with, 
 that they may be the more clearly and distinctly 
 known : It doth not add new Parts or Properties 
 to Things, but it difcovers the various Parts, Pro- 
 perties, Relations and Dependencies of one Thing 
 upon another, and by ranking all Things under ge- 
 neral and fpecial Heads, it renders the Nature, or 
 any of the Properties, Powers, and Ulcs of a thing 
 2 more 
 
133 LOGIC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 mcfc eafy to be found out, when we feek in what 
 Rank of Beings it lies, and wherein it agrees with, 
 and wherein ic differs from others. 
 
 If any Comparifons would illuftrate this, it may 
 be thus reprefented. 
 
 I. When Logick aflifts us to attain a clear and 
 diftintl Conception of the Nature of Things by 
 Definition* it is like thofe GlaJJes whereby we be- 
 hold fuch Objects diftinctly, as by Reafon of their 
 Smallnefs or their great Diftance appear in Con- 
 fufion to the naked Eye: So the Tele/cope difco- 
 vers to us diftant Wonders in the Heavens, and 
 jfhews the milky JVay^ and the bright cloudy Spots 
 in a very dark Skie tO~ be a Collection of little 
 Stars, which the Eye unaflifted beholds in mingled 
 Confufion. So when Bodies are too fmall for our 
 Sight to furvey them diftinctly, then the Micro- 
 fcope is at Hand for our Afliftance, to Ihew us all 
 
 the Limbs and Features of the mojt minute Animals* 
 with great Clearnefs and Diftinction. 
 
 II. When we are taught by Logick to view a 
 Thing compleatly in all its Paris by the Help of 
 Dfcifwn* it has the Ufe of an anatomical Knife* 
 which di fleets an animal Body, and feparates the 
 Veins* Arteries* Nerves* Mufcles* Membranes* &c. 
 and lhews us the feveral Parts which go to the 
 Compofition of a compleat Animal. 
 
 III. When Logick inftructs us to furvey an 
 Object comprehenfively in all the Modes* Properties* 
 Relations* Faces and Appearances of ic, it is of 
 the fame Ufe as a terreftrial Globe* which turning 
 round on its Axis, reprefents to us all the variety 
 of Lands* and Seas* Kingdoms and Nations on the 
 Surface of the Earth in a very fhort Succeffion of 
 
 Time* 
 
C. VI. S. 13. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 3 9 
 
 Time, mews the Situation and various Relation 
 of them to each other, and gives a comprehenfivc 
 View of them in Miniature. 
 
 IV. When this Art teaches us to diftribute any 
 extenjtve Idea into its different Kinds or Species, it 
 may be compared to the prifmatick Glafs, that re- 
 ceives the Sun-Beams or Rays of Light, which 
 feem to be uniform when falling upon it, but it 
 feparates and distributes them into their different 
 Kinds and Colours, and ranks them in their pro- 
 per Succeifion. 
 
 Or if we defcend to Subdivifions and fubordi- 
 nate Ranks of Being, then Difiributlon may alfo 
 be faidtoform the Refemblance of a natural Tree, 
 wherein the Genus or general Idea {lands for the 
 Root or Stock, and the feveral Kinds or Species, and 
 Individuals, are diftributed abroad, and reprefent- 
 ed in their Dependence and Connection, like the 
 feveral Boughs, Branches , and lejjer Shoots, For 
 Inflance, let Animalbc the Root of a logical Tree, 
 the Refemblance is feen by mere Infpettion, tho* 
 the Root be not placed at the bottom of the 
 Page. 
 
 K Animai 
 
14° 
 
 L G I C K: Or, 
 
 Part I. 
 
 Philip 
 ,.,, \f antes 
 
 c fho??ias* &c. 
 
 Horfc 
 
 I Squirrel 
 
 Be ^Lion 
 
 Dos — 
 
 Animal < 
 
 Bird 
 
 Bear, &c. 
 
 Eagle 
 iLark 
 [Duck 
 
 VTrott. 
 
 i Bayard, &c. 
 
 Maftiff. 
 (Spaniel. 
 (Grey-hound. 
 Beagle, &f^. 
 
 CEngliJb. 
 \ Mufcovy. 
 
 Goofe, &c. tHook-Bill, &rV. 
 
 fTrouc 
 Fifli C Whale 
 
 (.Oyfter, cjtV. 
 
 Flying. 
 
 CWafp. 
 1 
 
 Bee, fcfr. 
 
 '\_Infecl:< TWorm. 
 
 Creeping C Ant. 
 
 {^Caterpillar, fcrV # 
 
 The fame Similitude will ferve alfo to illuftrate 
 the Divi/ion and Siibdivifion of an integral Whole* 
 into its feveral Parts. 
 
 When Logick directs us to place all our Ideas 
 in a proper Method* moil convenient both for In- 
 duction and Memory, it doth the fame Service 
 
 as 
 
C. VI. S. 1 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon . 141 
 
 as the Cafes of well contrived Shelves in a large Li- 
 brary wherein Folio's, Quarto's, Oilavo's, and lefjer 
 Volumes, are difpoied in fuch exact Order under 
 the particular Heads of Divinity, Hiftory, Ma- 
 thematicks, antient and viifcellaneous Learning, &c. 
 that the Student knows where to find every Book, 
 and has them all as it were within his Command 
 at once, becaufe of the exact Order wherein they 
 are placed. 
 
 The Man who has fuch Afliftances as thefe at 
 Hand, in order to manage his Conceptions and re- 
 gulate his Ideas, is well prepared to improve his 
 Knowledge, and to join thefe Ideas together in a 
 regular manner by Judgment, which is the fecond 
 Operation of the Mind, and will be the Subject 
 of the fecond Fart of Logick. 
 
 K 2 TUL 
 
142 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 THE 
 
 SECOND PART 
 
 O F 
 
 L O GICK. 
 
 Of Judgment and Proportion. 
 
 WHEN the Mind has got Acquaintance 
 with Things by framing Ideas o^ them, 
 it proceeds to the next Operation, and 
 that is, to compare thefe Ideas together, and to 
 join them by Affirmation, or disjoin them by Ne- 
 gation, according as we find them to agree or dif- 
 agree. This Act of the Mind is called Judgment - y 
 as when we have by Perception obtained the 
 Ideas of Plato, a Philofopher y Man, Innocent, we- 
 form thefe Judgments 3 Plato was a Pbilofopher ; 
 no Man is innocent. ' 
 
 Some Writers have afferted, that Judgment con- 
 fifts in a mere Perception of the Agreement or Difa- 
 gree?nent of Ideas. But I rather think there is an Act 
 of the Will (at lead in moil: Cafes) neceffary to form 
 a Judgment \ for tho' we do perceive, or think we 
 perceive Ideas to agree or diftgree, yet we may 
 fometimes refrain from judging or aiTenting to the 
 Perception, for fear kit the Perception Ihould 
 
 hoc 
 
The right TJfe of Reafon. 1 4 3 
 
 not be fufficiently clear, and we fhould be mifta- 
 ken: And I am well allured at other Times, that 
 there are Multitudes of Judgments fanned, and a 
 firm ArTent given to Ideas joined or disjoined, be- 
 fore there is any clear Perception whether they 
 agree or difagree ; and this is the Reafon of fo 
 many falfe Judgments or Miftakes among Men. 
 Eoth thefe Practices are a Proof that Judgment has 
 fomething of the Will in it, and does not merely con- 
 fift in Perception, fince we fometimes judge (tho' 
 unhappily) without perceiving, and fometimes we 
 perceive without immediate judging. 
 
 As an Idea is the Refultof our Conception or Ap- 
 prehenfion, fo a Propofition is the Effect of Judg- 
 ment. The foregoing Sentences which are Ex- 
 amples of the Act of Judgment are properly cal- 
 led Proportions. Plato is a Philofopher, &c. 
 Here let us confider, 
 
 1. The general Nature of a Propofition, and the 
 Parts of which it is compofed. 
 
 2. The various Divi/ions or Kinds of Propofi- 
 tions. 
 
 3. The Springs of falfe Judgment, or the Doclrine 
 of Prejudices. 
 
 4. General Direclions to affifl us in judging aright. 
 
 5 . Special Rules to direel us in judging particular 
 Objctts. 
 
 K 3 CHAP. 
 
I 4 4 LOGIC K: Or* Part II. 
 
 CHAP. I, 
 
 Of the Nature of a Propoftion* and its 
 federal Parts. 
 
 A Propofition is a Sentence wherein two or 
 more Ideas or forms ►in'd or disjoin'd 
 
 by one Affirmation or Negation, as Plato was a 
 Philofopher : Every single i: d by two Lines 
 
 meeting: No Man living on Earth can be compleatly 
 happy. When there are never fo nuny Ideas or 
 Terms in the Sentence, yet if tli?y are joined or 
 disjoined merely by one Tingle A Era ation or Ne r 
 gation, they are properly cailM but one Propofiti- 
 on* tho' they may be refclved into feveral Pro- 
 poiitions which are implied therein, as will ap- 
 pear hereafter. 
 
 In defcribing a Propofition* I ufe the Word 
 'Terms as well as Ideas* becaufe when mere Ideas 
 are join'd in the Mind without Words, it is ra- 
 ther call'd a Judgment* but when clothed with 
 Words, it is called a Proportion* even tho' it be 
 in the Mind only, as well as when it is expreft by 
 fpeaking or writing. 
 
 There are three Things which go to the Nature 
 and Conftitution of a Proportion {viz.) The Sub- 
 jeel, the Predicate and the Copula. 
 
 The Subjetl of a Propofition is that concerning 
 which any thing is affirmed or denied : So Plato* 
 Angle* Man living on Earth* are the Subjects of 
 the foregoing Propofitions. 
 
 The Predicate is that which is affirmed or deni- 
 ed of the Subject ; fo Philofopher is the Predicate 
 of the firft Propofition ; formed by two Lines meet- 
 ing* is the Predicate of the fecond ; capable of be- 
 ing 
 
C. I. the right life of Reafon. 1 4^ 
 
 ing compleatly happy* is the proper Predicate of 
 the third. 
 
 The Subject and Predicate of a Propofition ta- 
 ken together are called the Matter of it , for thefc 
 are the Materials of which it is made. 
 
 The Copula is the Form of a Propofition *, it re- 
 prefents the Act of the Mind affirming or deny- 
 ing, and it is expreft by the Words, am* art* is* 
 are* &c. or, am not* art not* is not* are not, &c 
 
 It is not a Thing of Importance enough to 
 create a Difpute, whether the Words no* none* 
 not* never* &c. which disjoin the Ideas or Terms 
 in a negative Propofition, fhall be call'd a Part of 
 the Subjecl* of the Copula* or of the Predicate. 
 Sometimes perhaps they may feem molt naturally 
 to be included in one, and fomerimes in another 
 of thefe, tho' a Propofition is ufually denominat- 
 ed affirmative or negative by its Copula* as here- 
 after. 
 
 Note 1. Where each of thefe Parts of a Pro- 
 pofition is not expreft diftinctly in fo many Words, 
 yet they arc all underftood and implicitly contain- 
 ed therein-, as, Socrates difputed* is a compkat Pro- 
 portion, for it fignifies, Socrates was difputing. So, 
 I dye* fignifies / am dying. I can write* i. e. I ant 
 able to write. In Latin and Greek one fingle Word 
 is many Times a compleat Propofition. 
 
 Note 2. Thefe Words, am, art* is* &r. when 
 they are ufed alone without any other Predicate, 
 fignify both the Ail of the Mind judging, which 
 includes the Copula* and fignify alfo aclual Exift- 
 ence* which is the Predicate of that Propofition. 
 So Rome is* fignifies Rome is exiftent: There are 
 fome Jlrange Monfters* that is, jome ft range Mon- 
 fters are exiftent. Carthage is no more, i. e. Car- 
 thage has no Being. 
 
 K 4 A- 
 
146 LOGICK: Or, Part II. 
 
 Note 3. The Subjedt and Predicate of a Pro- 
 pofition are not always to be known and diftin- 
 guifh'd by the placing of the Words in the Sen- 
 tence, but by reflecting duly on the Senfe of the 
 Words, and on the Mind and Defign of the Speak- 
 er or Writer : As if I fay, in Africa there are many 
 Lions, I mean many Lions are exifent in Africa : 
 Many Lions is the Subjecl, and exiftent in Africa 
 is the Predicate. It is proper for a Philofopber to 
 under/land Geometry •, here the Word Proper h the 
 Predicate, and all the reft is the Subject, except 
 Is the Copula. 
 
 Note 4. The Subjecl: and Predicate of a Pro- 
 portion ought always to be two different Ideas, 
 or two different Terms •, for where both the Terms 
 and Ideas are the fame, it is callNd an identical Pro- 
 pofition, which is mere trifling, and cannot tend 
 to promote Knowledge, fuch as, a Rule is a Rule* 
 or a good Man is a good Man. 
 
 But there are fome Proportions, wherein the 
 Verms of the Subjecl and Predicate feem to be the 
 fame, yet the Ideas are not the fame ; nor can 
 thefe be call'd purely identical or trifling Proporti- 
 ons ; fuch as Home is Home-, that is, Home is a 
 convenient or delightful Place: Socrates is Socrates 
 fill -, that is, the Man Socrates is fill a Philofo- 
 pber: The Hero was not a Hero -, that is, the Hero 
 did not fhew his Courage : JVhat I have written, I 
 have written : that is, what I wrote I fill approve 
 arid will net alter it : What is done, is done ; that 
 is, it cannot be undone. It may be eafily obferved 
 }n thefe Proportions the Term is equivocal, for in 
 the Predicate it has a different Idea from what it 
 has in the Subjecl. 
 
 There are alfo fome Proportions wherein the 
 
 Terms of the Subject and Predicate differ, but the 
 
 Ideas are the fame* and thefe are nor. merely \den- 
 
 4 tical 
 
C. II. S. I . The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 47 
 
 tical or trifling Propofitions ; as, impudent is fhame- 
 lefs ; a Billow is a Wave -, or Fluftus (in Latin) is 
 a Wave \ a Globe is a round Body. In thefe Pro- 
 pofitions either the Words are explain'd by a De- 
 finition of the Name, or the Ideas by a Defini- 
 tion of the Thing, and therefore they are by no 
 Means ufelefs, when formed for this Purpofe. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the various Kinds of Propofitions. 
 
 PRopofitions may be diftributed into various 
 Kinds according to their Subjecl, their Copula, 
 their Predicate, their Nature or Compofition, their 
 Senfe, and their Evidence, which Diltributions will 
 be explain'd in the following Sections. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 Of univerfal, particular, indefinite, and Jingular 
 Propofitions. 
 
 PRopofitions may be divided according to their 
 Subjetl into univerfal and particular ; this is 
 ufually call'd a Divifion arifing from the Quantity. 
 
 An univerfal Proportion is when the Subject is 
 taken according to the whole of its Extenfion ; 
 ft) if the Subject be a Genus or general Nature, 
 it includes all its Species or Kinds: If the Subject: 
 be a Species, it includes all its Individuals. This 
 Univerfaljty is ufually fignified by thefe Words, 
 *//, every, no, none, or the like j as, all Men muil 
 
 dye : 
 
148 LOGIC K: Or, PartIL 
 
 dye : No Alan is Almighty : Every Creature had a 
 beginning. 
 
 A particular Propofttion is when the Subject is 
 not taken according to its whole Extenfion •, that 
 is, when the Term is limited and reftrained to 
 fome one or more of thofe Species or Individuals, 
 whofe general Nature it exprefies, but reaches 
 not to all ; and this is ufually denoted by the 
 Words, fome, many, a few, there are which, &c. 
 as, fome Birds can fing well : Few Men are truly 
 wife : There are Parrots which will talk a hundred 
 Things. 
 
 Under the general Name of univerfal Propor- 
 tions, we may juftly include thofe that are fingu- 
 lar, and for the moft Part thofe that are indefinite 
 alfo. 
 
 A fingular Propofttion is when the Subject is a 
 lingular or individual Term or Idea •, as Defcartes 
 was an ingenious Philofopher : Sir Ifaac Newton 
 has far exceeded all his Predeceffors : The Palace at 
 Hampton- Court i s a pie af ant Dwelling: This Day 
 ts very cold. The Subject here mud be taken ac- 
 cording to the whole of its Extenfion, becaufe 
 being an individual, it can extend only to one, and 
 it rnufl therefore be regulated by the Laws of uni- 
 verfal Propofttions. 
 
 An indefinite Propofttion, is, when no Note, ei- 
 ther of Univerfality or Particularity, is prefixed to 
 a Subject, which is in its own Nature general ; 
 as, a Planet is ever changing its Place : Angels are 
 noble Creatures. Now this fort of Propofition, 
 efpecially when it defcribes the Nature of Things, 
 is ufually counted univerfal alfo, and it fuppofes 
 the Subject^ to be taken in its whole Extenfion •, 
 for if there were any Planet which did not change 
 :is Place, or any Angel that were not a noble 
 
 Creature.^ 
 
C. II. S. i . The right life of Reafon. 1 49 
 
 Creature, thefe Proportions would not be ftrictly 
 true. 
 
 Yet in order to fecure us againft M iftakes in 
 judging of univerfal, particular and indefinite Pro- 
 portions, it is necefTary to make thefe following 
 Remarks. 
 
 I. Concerning univerfal Propofitions. 
 
 Note 1. Univerfal Terms may either denote a 
 metaphyfical, zphyfical, or a moral Univerfality. 
 
 A metaphyfical, or mathematical Univerfality is 
 when all the Particulars contain'd under any ge- 
 neral Idea have the fame Predicate belonging to 
 them without any Exception whatfoever; or when 
 the Predicate is fo efTential to the univerfal Sub- 
 ject, that it deftroys the very Nature of the Sub- 
 ject to be without it ; as, all Circles have a Centre 
 and Circumference : All Spirits in their own Nature 
 are immortal. 
 
 A phyftcal or natural Univerfality, is, when ac- 
 cording to the Order and common Courfe of Na- 
 ture, a Predicate agrees to all the Subjects of that 
 Kind, tho* there may be fome accidental and pre- 
 ternatural Exceptions -, as, all Men ufe Words to 
 exprefs their Thoughts, yet dumb Perfons are ex- 
 cepted, for they cannot fpeak. All Beafls have 
 four Feet, yet there may be fome Monfters with 
 five •, or maim'd, who have but three. 
 
 A moral Univerfality, is when the Predicate a- 
 grees to the greateft part of the Particulars which 
 are contain'd under the univerfal Subject ; as, all 
 Negroes are Jlupid Creatures: All Men are governed 
 by Affetlion rather than by Reafon : All the old Ro- 
 mans loved their Country : And the Scripture ufes 
 this Language, when St. Paul tells us, The Cretcs 
 are always Liar.. 
 
 Now 
 
ISO L O G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Now it is evident, that a fpecial or fingular 
 Conclufion cannot be infer'd from a moral Uni- 
 verfality, nor always and infallibly from a phyfieal 
 one, tho' it may be always inferred from a Uni- 
 verfality which is metaphyfieal, without any Dan- 
 ger, or Pofiibility of Miftake. 
 
 Let it be obferved alfo, that ufually we make 
 little or no Diftinction in common Language, be- 
 tween a Subject that is phyfieally or met aphyfic ally 
 univerfal. 
 
 Note 2. An univerfal Term is fometimes taken 
 collectively for all its particular Ideas united toge- 
 ther, and fometimes difiributively y meaning each 
 of them fingle and alone. 
 
 Inftances of a collective Univerfal are fuch as 
 thefe: All thefe Apples will fill a Bufijel : All the 
 Hours of the Night are fuffieient for Sleep : All the 
 Rules of Grammar overload the Memory. In thefe 
 Proportions it is evident, that the Predicate be- 
 longs not to the Individuals feparatcly, but to the 
 whole collective Idea \ for we cannot affirm the 
 fame Predicate, if we change the Word all into 
 one, or into every, we cannot fay one Apple or 
 every Apple will fill a Bufhel, &c. Now fuch a 
 collective Idea wnen it becomes the Subject of a 
 Propofition, ought to be efteem'd as one fingle 
 Thing, and this renders the Propofition fingular 
 or indefinite, as we mail mew immediately. 
 
 A difirihutive Univerfal will allow the Word all 
 to be chang'd into every, or into one, and by this 
 Means is diftinguifh'd from a collective. 
 
 Inftances of a difirihutive Univerfal, are the mod 
 common on every Occafion ; as, all Men are mor- 
 tal : Every Man is a Sinner, &c. But in this fort 
 of Univerfal there is a Diftinclion to be made, 
 which follows in the next Remark. 
 
 Note 
 
C. II. S. i . The right Vfe of Reafon. | r i 
 
 Note 3. When an univerfal Term is taken dif- 
 tributively, fometimes it includes all the Individu- 
 als contain'd in its inferior Species : as when I 
 fay every Sicknefs has a Tendency to Death ; I mean 
 every Individual Sicknefs as well as every Kind. 
 But fometimes it includes no more than merely 
 each Species or Kind ; as when the Evangelift fays 
 Chrift healed every Difeafe, or every Difeafe was 
 healed by Chrift ; that is, every kind of Difeafe, 
 Thefirftot thefe, Logicians call the Distribution 
 of an Univerfal in fingula generum *, the I aft is a 
 Diftribution in genera fwgulorum. But either of 
 them joined to the Subject render a Proportion 
 univerfal. 
 
 Note 4. The Univerfality of a Subject is often 
 rellrained by a Part of the Predicate ; as when 
 we fay all Men learn Wifdom by Experience : The 
 univerfal Subject, all Men, is limited to fignify 
 only, all thofe Men ivho learn Wifdom. The Scrip- 
 ture alfo ufes this fort of Language, when ic 
 fpeaks of all Men being juftified by the Right eouf- 
 nefs of one, Rom. v. 18. that is all Men who arc 
 juftified obtain it this way. 
 
 Obferve here, that not only a metaphyftcal or na- 
 tural, but a moral Univerfality alio is oftentimes 
 to be rellrained by a part of the Predicate ; as 
 when we fay, all the Dutch are good Seamen : All 
 the Italians are fulile Politicians ; that is, thofe a- 
 mong the Dutch, who are Seamen, are good Sea- 
 men •, and thofe among the Italians, who are Po- 
 liticians, are fubtle Politicians, i. e. they are gene- 
 rally fo. 
 
 Note 5. The Univerfality of a Term is many 
 times rellrained by the particular Time, PLce, Cir- 
 cumftance, &c. or the Dtfign of the Speaker •, as 
 if we are in the City of London, and fay, all the 
 Weavers went to frefent their Petition -, \\v m 
 
152 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 only all the Weavers who dwell in the City. So 
 when it is (aid in the Gofpel, all Men did marvel, 
 Mark v. 20. it reaches only to all thofe Men who 
 heard of the Miracles of our Saviour. 
 
 Here alfo it fhould be obferv'd, that a moral 
 Univerfality is retrained by Time, Place, and o- 
 ther Circumftances as well as a natural ; fo that by 
 thefe Means the Word all fometimes does not ex- 
 tend to a tenth Part of thofe who at firft might 
 feem to be included in that Word. 
 
 One Occafion of thefe Difficulties and Ambi- 
 guities, that belong to univerfal Propofitions, is the 
 common Humour and Temper of Mankind, who 
 generally have an Inclination to magnify their 
 Ideas, and to talk roundly and univerfally concern- 
 ing any thing they fpeak of; which has intro- 
 duced univerfal Terms of Speech into Cuftom and 
 Habit, in all Nations and all Languages, more 
 than Nature or Reafon would dictate ; yet when 
 this Cuftom is introduced, it is not at all impro- 
 per to ufe this fort of Language in folemn and fa- 
 cred Writings, as well as in familiar Difcourfe. 
 
 II. Remarks concerning indefinite Propofitions. 
 
 Note 1. Propofitions carrying in them univer- 
 fal Forms of ExpreiTion, may fometimes drop the 
 Note of Univerfality^ and become indefinite, and 
 yet retain the fame univerfal Senfe, whether me- 
 taphyfical, natural or moral, whether collective or 
 diftributive. 
 
 We may give Inftances of each of thefe. 
 
 Metaphyfical ; as, a Circle has a Center and Cir- 
 cumference . Natural •, as, Be aft s have four Feet, 
 Moral •, as, Negroes are ftupid Creatures. Collec- 
 tive 5 as, the Apples will fill a BufheL Diftribu- 
 tive j as, Men are tnortal. 
 
 1 Note 2. 
 
C. II. S. i . The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 5 3 
 
 Note 2. There are many Cafes wherein a col- 
 lective Idea is expreft in a Proportion by an inde- 
 finite Term, and that where it defcribes the Na- 
 ture or Quality of the Subject, as well as when it 
 declares fome pafl Matters of FaR ; as, Fir-trees 
 fet in good Order will give a charming Projpetl ; 
 this muft fignify a Collection of Fir-Trees, for one 
 makes no Profpect. In Matters of Fact this is 
 more evident and frequent ; as the Romans over- 
 came tfe Gauls : The Robbers furrounded the Coach: 
 The wild Geefe flew over the Thames in the Form 
 of a Wedge. All thefe are collective Subjects. 
 
 Note 2,. In indefinite Propfitions the Subject is 
 often reltrained by the Predicate, or by the fpe- 
 cial Time, Place, or Ci re um fiances, as well as in 
 Proportions which are exprefly univerfal ; as, the 
 Chinefes are ingenious Silk-Weavers, i. e. thofe 
 Chinefes, which are Silk-Weavers are ingenious at 
 their Work. The Stars appear to us when the 
 Twilight is gone. This can fignify no more than 
 the Stars which are above our Horizon. 
 
 Note 4. All thefe Reflections tend to reduce 
 fome indefinite Propofitions almoft into particular , 
 as will appear under the next Remarks. 
 
 III. Remarks concerning particular Propofitions. 
 
 Note 1. A particular Propofition may fometimes 
 be expreft indefinitely, without any Note of Par- 
 ticularity prefixt to the Subject ; as, in times of 
 Confufion Laws are not executed : Men of Virtue 
 are difgraced, and Murthers efcape, i. e. fome 
 Laws, fome Men of Virtue, fome Murt her ers : Ui\- 
 lefs we fhould call this Language a moral Unh 
 fality* tho' I think it can hardly extend io fir. 
 
 Note 2. The Words fome, a few, &c. tho' they ge- 
 nerally denote a proper Particularity, yet fometimes 
 they exprefs a collcfiiv: Uea ; as, fome of the En*- 
 
154 LOG IC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 tnies befet the General around. A few Greeks would 
 beat a tboufand Indians. 
 
 I conclude this Setlion with a few general Re- 
 marks on this Subject (viz.) 
 
 Gen. Rem. I. Since univerfal, indefinite and par- 
 ticular Terms in the plural Number may either be 
 taken in a colleclive or a diftributive Senfe, there is 
 one fhort and eafy Way to find when they are collect 
 five and when diftributive (viz.) If the Plural Num- 
 ber may be chang'd into the fingular, i. e. if the 
 Predicate will agree to one fingle Subject, it is a 
 diftributive Idea ; if not, it is colleclive. 
 
 Gen. Rem. II. Univerfal and particular Terms in 
 the plural Number, fuch as, all, fome, few, many, 
 &c. when they are taken in their diftributiveSenfe, 
 reprefcnt fever al fingle Ideas -, and when they are 
 thus affixed to the Subject of a Propofition, render 
 thatPropofition univerfal or particular, according to 
 theuniverfality or particularity of the Terms affix c- 
 
 Gen. Rem. III. Univerfal and particular Terms 
 in the plural Number, taken in their colleclive 
 Senfe, reprefent generally one colleclive Idea. 
 
 If this one colleclive Idea be thus reprefented 
 (whether by univerfal or particular Terms) as the 
 Subject of a Propofition which defcribes the Na~ 
 tare of a Thing, it properly makes either a fingu- 
 lar or an indefinite Propofition ; for the Words, all* 
 fome, a few, &c. do not then denote the Quanti- 
 ty of the Propofition, but are cfleem'd merely as 
 Terms which connect the Individuals together in 
 order to compofe one colleclive Idea. Obferve 
 thefe Inflances, all the Sycamores in the Garden 
 would make a large Grove ; i. e. this one Col- 
 lection of SycamoreSj which is ajingular Idea. 
 
 Some 
 
C. II. JT. i . The right life of Rcafon . r$£ 
 
 Some of the Sycamores in the Garden would make a fine 
 Grove . Sycamores would make a noble Grove : In 
 thefe lad the Subject is rather indefinite than fingu- 
 lar. But it is very evident, that in each of chefe 
 Propofitions the Predicate can only belong to a 
 collective Idea, and therefore the Subject mult be 
 efteem'd a colletlive. 
 
 If this colletlive Idea (whether reprefented by 
 univerfal or particular Terms) be ufed in deferr- 
 ing paft Matters of Fail, then it is generally to be 
 efteem'd -x fingular Idea, and renders the Propofi- 
 tion fingular ; as, all the Soldiers 0/* Alexander made 
 hut a little Army \ A few Macedonians vanquifhed 
 the large Army of Darius : Some Grenadiers in the 
 Camp plundered all the neighbouring Towns, 
 
 Now \ye have fhewn before, that if a Propo- 
 rtion defcribing the Nature of Things has an indefi- 
 nite Subject, it is generally to be efteem'd univerfal 
 in its propofuional Senfe: And it has a fingular 
 SubjecJ, in its propofitional Senfe it is always rankt 
 with Univerfals. 
 
 After all we muft be forced to confefs, that 
 the Language of Mankind, and the Idioms of 
 Speech are fo exceeding various, that it is hard to 
 reduce them to a few Rules-, and if we would 
 gain a juft and precife Idea of every univerfal y 
 particular and indefinite Expreflion, we mult not. 
 only confider the peculiar Idiom of the Lan- 
 guage, but the Time, the Place, the Occafion, 
 the Circumftances of the Matter fpoken of, and 
 thus penetrate as far as pofTible into the Dvrfign of 
 fhe Speaker or Writer. 
 
 S I C T 
 
156 LOGIC K: Or, Part IL 
 
 Sect. II. 
 Of affirmative and negative Propofitions. 
 
 WH E N a Propofition is confider'd with Re- 
 gard to its Copula, it may be divided into 
 affirmative an d negative -, for it is the Copula joins 
 or disjoins the two Ideas. Others call this a Di- 
 vifion of Propofitions according to their Quality. 
 
 An affirmative Propofition is when the Idea of 
 the Predicate is fuppos'd to agree to the Idea of 
 the Subject, and is joined to it by the Word is, 
 or are, which is the Copula-, as, all Men are Sin- 
 ners. But when the Predicate is not fuppos'd to 
 agree with the Subject, and is disjoined from it 
 by the Particles is ?:ot, are not, &c. the Propor- 
 tion is negative ', as, Man is not innocent ; or, no 
 Man is innocent. In an affirmative Propofition we 
 afiert one Thing to belong to another, and, as it 
 were, unite them in Thought and Word: In ne- 
 gative Propofitions we feparate one Thing from an- 
 other, and deny their Agreement. 
 
 It may feem ibmething odd, that two Ideas or 
 Terms are faid to be disjoined as well as joined by 
 a Copula: But if we can but fuppofe the negative 
 Particles do really belong to the Copula of nega- 
 tive Propofitions, it takes away the Harfhnefs of 
 the Expreflion : and to make it yet fofter, we may 
 conlider that the Predicate and Subject may be 
 properly faid to be joined in a Form of Words as 
 a Propofition, by connexive Particles in Grammar 
 or Logick, tho' they are disjoined in their Senfe 
 and Signification. Every Youth, who has learnt 
 his Grammar, knows there arefuch Words as dif~ 
 jm ntfive Conjunctions* 
 
 Several 
 
C.H. S. 2. the right Ufe of 'Reafon. 157 
 
 Several Things are worthy our Notice on this 
 Subject. 
 
 i ft Note. As there are fome Terms y or Words y 
 and Ideas (as I have fhewn before^ concerning 
 which it is hard to determine whether they are 
 negative or pofitive, fo there are fome Proportions 
 concerning which it may be difficult to fay, whe- 
 ther they affirm or deny \ as, when we fay, Plato 
 was no Pool: Cicero was no iinfkilful Orator: Cae- 
 far made no Expedition to Mufcovy : An Oyfter has 
 no part like an Eel: It is not neceffary for a Phyfi- 
 cian to /peak French, and for a Phyfician to Jpeak 
 French is needlefs. The Senfe of thefe Propofi- 
 tions is very plain and eafy, tho' Logicians might 
 fquabble perhaps a whole Day , whether they 
 fhould rank them under the Names of negative or 
 affirmative. 
 
 2 d Note. In Latin and Englijh two Negatives 
 joined in one Sentence make an Affirmative -, as 
 when we declare no Man is not mortal, it is the 
 fame as tho' wefaid, Man is mortal. But in Greek 
 and oftentimes in French two Negatives make but 
 a llronger Denial. 
 
 3 d Note. If the mere negative Term, Not, be ad- 
 ded to the Copula of an univerfal affirmative Pro- 
 portion, it reduces it to a particular Negative \ as, 
 ail Men are not wife, figniiies the fame as, fome 
 Men are not wife. 
 
 4 th Note. In all affirmative Propofitions, the 
 Predicate is taken in its whole Compreheniion -, 
 that is, every effential Part and \ttribute of it is 
 affirmed concerning the Subject ; as when I fay, 
 a true Chriflian is an honeft Man, every Thing 
 that belongs to Honefly is affirmed concerning a 
 true Chriflu 
 
 L z 5 th NotCy 
 
15& L G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 5 th Note. In all negative Propofitions the Predi- 
 cate is taken in its whole Extenfion; that is, e- 
 very Species and Individual that is contained in 
 the general Idea of the Predicate, is utterly denied 
 concerning the Subject:: So in this Proposition, a 
 Spirit is not an Animal, we exclude all forts and 
 kinds, and particular Animals whatfoever from the 
 Idea of a Spirit. 
 
 From thefe two lafl Remarks we may derive 
 this Inference, that we ought to attend to the en- 
 tire Comprehenfwn of our Ideas, and to the uni- 
 yerfal Extenfion of them, as far as we have proper 
 Capacity for it, before we grow too confident in 
 our affirming or denying any Thing, which may 
 have the leaft Darknefs, Doubt or Difficulty at- 
 tending it : It is the want of this Attention that 
 betrays us into many Miftakes. 
 
 Sect. III. 
 Of the Oppofition and Converfion of Propofitions. 
 
 AN Y two Ideas being joined or disjoined in 
 various Forms will afford us feveral Propo- 
 fitions : All thefe may be diftinguifhed according to 
 their Quantity and their Quality* into four, which 
 are markt or denoted by the Letters, A, E, I 3 O, 
 thus : 
 
 rUniverial Affirmative. 
 
 denotes a J Univerfal Negative, 
 denotes a J Particular Affirmative. 
 
 (Particular Negative, 
 according to thefe old Latin Rhymes 
 
 * The Reader fliould remember here, that a Propofuion according to iff 
 Quantity i5 called universal or particular, and according CO Hi Quality, ic is 
 •tibcr affirmative or negative, 
 
 i AJferit 
 
C, II. S. 3 . The right Vfe of Reafon. 159 
 
 Afferit A, Negat E, verum generaliter Arnbce* 
 Ajjerit I, Negat O, y^<i particulariter Ambo. 
 
 This may be exemplified by thefe two Ideas, a 
 ^7^ and a Tra. 
 
 A Every Vine is a Tree. 
 E No Vine is a Tree. 
 
 I Some Vine is a Tree. l 
 
 O Some Vine is not a Tree. 
 The Logicians of the Schools have written 
 many large Trifles concerning the Oppofition and 
 Converfion of Propofitions. It will be fufficient 
 here to give a few brief Hints of thefe Things, 
 that the Learner may not be utterly ignorant of 
 them. 
 
 Propofitions which are made of the fame Sub- 
 ject and Predicate are fa id to be oppofete, when that 
 which is denied in one is affirmed in the other, 
 either in whole or in part, without any Coniide- 
 ration whether the Propofitions be true or no. 
 
 If they differ both in Quantity and Quality 
 they are call'd Contradictory, as, 
 
 A TnP VWe ^ ? Thefecan never b2 both true, 
 r\ n l jz- .> or both falfe at the fame 
 
 U Some Vine is notC a- 
 .-r> \ 1 ime. 
 
 a Tree. J 
 
 If two Univerfals differ in Quality they arc 
 
 Contraries, as, 
 
 AEveryVineisaJ TMc can neyer be ^ ^ 
 
 E No 6 ' Vine is a? to S ether l buC thc y m:l Y be 
 fc m Vine is at fa ^ f , f 
 
 Tree. J 
 
 If two particular Propofitions differ in Quality 
 
 they are Subcontraries, as, 
 
 L 2 I Somi 
 
l6o LOGJCK: Or, Part \I. 
 
 I Some Vine is Thefennyhe both .true to- 
 
 r\ J e ' rr • b gcther, but they can never 
 O Some Vine, snot? g,, both felfc> 
 
 a Tree. J 
 
 Both particular and univerfal Propofitions which 
 agree in Quality but not in Quantity are call'd 
 Subaltern* tho thefe arc not properly oppofite* as, 
 A Every Vine is a free, 
 I Some Vine is a 'Tree. 
 Or thus, 
 
 E No Vine is a Tree* 
 O Some Vine is not a Tree. 
 
 The Canons of Jut 'alternate Pr pofttions re u- 
 fually reckoned thefe three (viz.) °(i.) If an uni- 
 verfal Propofition be true, the particular will be 
 true alfo, but not on the contrary. And (2.) If a 
 particular Propofition be falfe, the univerfal muft 
 be falfe too, but not on die contrary. (3.) Sub- 
 altern Proportions* whether univerial or particu- 
 lar, may fometimes be both true, and fometimes 
 both falfe. 
 
 The Converfion of Propofition s is when the Sub- 
 ject and Predicate change their Places with Pre- 
 fervation of the Truth. This may be done with 
 conftant Certainty in all univerfal Negatives and 
 particular Affirmatives * as no Spirit is an Animal* 
 may be converted , no Animal is a Spirit * and 
 feme Tree is a Vine* may be converted, fome Vine 
 is a Tree. But there is more formal Trifling in 
 this fort of Difcourfe than there- is of folid Im- 
 provement, becaufe this fort of Converfion arifes 
 merely from the Form of Words* as connected in, 
 a Propofition, rather than from the Matter. 
 
 Yet it may be ufeful to obferve, that there are 
 fome Propofitions, which by Reafon of the Ideas. 
 or Matter of which they are compos'd may be 
 converted with conftant. Truth: Such are thofe 
 
 Propofitions 
 
C.II.S.4. The right Vfe of Reafon. 161 
 
 Propofitions whofe Predicate is a nominal or real 
 Definition of the Subject, or the Difference of 
 it, or a Property of the fourth Kind, or a fuper- 
 lative Degree of any Property or Quality what- 
 foever, or in fhort, whereibever the Predicate 
 and the Subject have exactly the fame Extenfion 
 or the fame Comprehenfion •, as, every Vine is a 
 'Tree bearing Grapes -, and every Tree bearing Grapes 
 is a Vine : Religion is the trueft IVifdom \ and the 
 true ft Wifdom is Religion: Julius Caefar was the 
 firft Emperor of Rome •, and the firft Emperor of 
 Rome was Julius Csefar. Thefe are the Propofi- 
 tions which are properly convertible, and they 
 are call'd reciprocal Propofitions, 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 Of pure and modal Propofitions, 
 
 ANother Divifion of Propofitions among the 
 fcholaftick Writers is into pure and modal. 
 This may be call'd (for Distinction fake) a Divi- 
 fion according to the Predicate. 
 
 When a Propofition merely expretfes that the 
 Predicate is connected with the Subject, it is call'd 
 a pure Propofition \ as, every true Chriflian is an 
 honeft Man. But when it includes alfo the Way 
 and Manner wherein the Predicate is connected 
 with the Subject, it is call'd a modal Propofition* 
 as, when I fay, it is neceffary that a true Chriftian 
 fhould be an honeft Man, 
 
 Logical Writers generally make the Modality 
 of this Propofition to belong to the Cofida, be- 
 caufe it (hews the Manner of the Connection be- 
 tween Subject and Predicate. But it the Form 
 of the Sentence as a logical Propofition be duly 
 confider'd, the Mode itfelf is the very Predicate 
 L 4 °f 
 
162 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 of the Propofition, and it mud run thus: That a 
 true Cbriftian Jhould be an honefl Alan is a necejfary 
 Thing, and then the whole primary Propoiition is 
 included in the Subject of the modal Propofition. 
 
 There zxzfour Modes of connecting the Predi- 
 cate with the Subject, which are ufually reckon- 
 ed up on this Occafion (viz.) Necejfity and Con tin- 
 gency which are two Oppofites, Pojfibility and Im* 
 pojfibility which are alfo Oppofites* as, it is ne- 
 cejfary that a Globe JJooukl be round: That a Globe 
 he made of Wood or Glafs is an unneceffary or con- 
 tingent Thing : It is impoffible that a Globe jhould 
 be fquare : It is pojfble that a Globe may be made of 
 Water. 
 
 With Regard to thefe modal Propofitions which 
 the Schools have introduced, I would make thefe 
 two Remarks. 
 
 Remark i. Thefe Propofitions in Englifij are 
 form'd by the Refolution of the Words, mufi, be-, 
 might not be, can be, and cannot be, into thofemore 
 explicate Forms of a logical Copula and Predi- 
 cate, is necejfary, is contingent, is pojf.ble, is impof- 
 fible: For it is necejfary that a Globe Jhould be round, 
 fignifies no more tnan that a Globe mv.fi fe 
 round- 
 
 Remark 2. Let it be noted that this quadru- 
 ple Modality is only an Enumeration of the na- 
 tural Modes or Manners wherein the Predicate is 
 connected with the Subject: W T e might alfo de- 
 fcribe feveral moral and civil Modes of connecting 
 two Ideas together (viz.) Lazvfulnefs and Unlazv- 
 fulnefs, Conveniency and Inconveniency, &c. whence 
 we may form fuch modal Propofitions as thefe. It 
 is unlawful for any Perfon to kill an innocent Man: 
 It is lawful for Chriftians to eat Flefh in Lent: To 
 
 tell 
 
C. II. S. 5. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 63 
 
 tell all that we think is inexpedient : For a Man to 
 be affable to his Neighbour is very convenient, &c. 
 
 There are feveral other Modes of fpeaking 
 whereby a Predicate is connected with a Subject: 
 fuch as, it is certain, it is doubtful, it is probable, 
 it is improbable, it is agreed, it is granted, it is /aid 
 by the Ancients, it is written, &c. all which will 
 form other kinds of modal Proportions. 
 
 But whether the Modality be natural, moral, 
 &c. yet in all thefe Propofitions it is the Mode is 
 the proper Predicate, and all the reft of the Pro- 
 pofition, except the Copula (or Word is) belongs 
 to the Subjetl ; and thus they become pure Pro- 
 pofitions of a complex Nature, of which we mall 
 treat in the next Seclion, fo that there' is no great 
 Need of making Modals a diftinct Sort. 
 
 There are many little Subtilties which the 
 Schools acquaint us with concerning the Conver- 
 fion and Oppofition, and Equipollence of thefe mo- 
 dal Propositions, fuited to the Latin or Greek 
 Tongues, rather than the Engli/b, and fit to pafs 
 away the idle Time of a Student, rather than to 
 enrich his Underftanding. 
 
 Sect. V. 
 Of fingle Propofitions, whether fnnple or complex. 
 
 WHEN we confider the Nature of Propofi- 
 tions, together with the Formation of them, 
 and the Materials whereof they are made, we di- 
 vide them into Jingle and compound. 
 
 A fingle Propofition is that which has but one 
 Subject and one Predicate ; but if it has more 
 Subjects or more Predicates, it is call'd a compound 
 Propofition, and indued it contains two or more 
 proportions in it. 
 
 A fingle 
 
164 LOGIC K: Or y Part II. 
 
 A fingle Propofition (which is alfo call'd cate- 
 gorical) may be divided again into fimple and 
 complex *. 
 
 A purely fimple Propofition is that whofe Subject 
 and Predicate are made up of fingle Terms ; as, 
 Virtue is defirable : Every Penitent is pardoned : No 
 Man is innocent. 
 
 When the Subject, or Predicate, or both, are 
 made up of complex Terms, it is called a complex 
 Propofition , as every fincere Penitent is pardon *d ; 
 Virtue is defirable for its own Sake : No Man alive 
 is perfeclly innocent. 
 
 If the Term which is added to the Subject of 
 a complex Propofition be either effential or any 
 Way neceffary to it, then it is call'd explicative, 
 for it only explains the Subject-, as every mortal 
 Man is a Son of Adam. But if the Term added 
 to make up the complex Subject does not necef- 
 farily or conflantly belong to it, then it is deter- 
 minative, and limits the Subject to a particular 
 part of its Extenfion , as, every pious Man fhall 
 be happy. In the firft Propofition the Word mor- 
 tal is merely explicative: in the fecond Propofition 
 the Word pious is determinative. 
 
 Here note, that whatfoever may be affirm'd or 
 denied concerning any Subject with an explicative 
 Addition, may be alfo affirm'd or denied of that 
 Subject without it , as we may boldly fay, every 
 Man is a Son of Adam, as well as, every mortal 
 Man: But it is not fo, where the Addition is de- 
 terminative, for we cannot fay, every Man fhall be 
 happy, tho' every pious Man lhall be fo. 
 
 * At Jtmple Ideas arc oppofed to complex, and /Ingle Ideas to compound, fo 
 Proportions are diftinguifri'd in the fame manner; The Englifb Tongue i» 
 this Refpeft having fome Advantage above the learned Language*, which 
 have no ufua! Word :o ci.ilinguifli fmgli ftomjinpU. 
 
 In 
 
C.H. S. 6. The right Ufe of Retfon. 165 
 
 In a complex Proportion the Predicate or Sub- 
 ject is fometimes made complex by the Pronouns, 
 who, which, whofe, to whom, &c. which make 
 another Proposition •, as every Man, who is pious, 
 Jhall be faved : Julius, whofe Sirname was Ccefar 7 
 overcame Pompey : Bodies, which are tranfparent, 
 have many Pores. Here the whole Proportion is 
 call'd the primary or chief, and the additional Pro- 
 portion is call'd an incident Propofition. But it is 
 (till to be eileem'd in this Cafe merely as a part 
 of the complex Term ; and the Truth or Falf- 
 hood of the whole complex Propofition is not to be 
 judged by the Truth or Falfhood of the incident 
 Propofition, but by the Connection of the whole 
 Subject with the Predicate. For the incident 
 Propofition may be falfe, and abfurd, or impofli- 
 ble, and yet the whole complex Propofition may 
 be true, as, a Horfe, which has Wings, might fly 
 over the Thames. 
 
 Befide this Complexion which belongs to the 
 Subjecl or Predicate, logical Writers uie to fay, 
 there is a Complexion which may fall upon the Co- 
 pula alfo : But this I have accounted for in the 
 Seclion concerning modal Propofitions ; and indeed 
 it is not of much Importance whether it were 
 placed there or here. 
 
 Sect. VI. 
 
 Of compound Propofitions. 
 
 A Compound Propofition is made up of two or 
 more Subjects or Predicates, or both; and 
 it contains in it two or more Propofitions, which 
 •ire cither plainly expreft, or conceal' d and imply' d. 
 
 The 
 
1 66 L G 1 C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Thtfrft fort of compound Propofitions are thofe 
 wherein the Compofition is expreft and evident, 
 and they are diftinguifh'd into thefe fix Kinds, 
 (viz.) Copulative , Disjunctive, Conditional, Caufal, 
 Relative and Bifcretive. 
 
 I. Copulative Propofitions are thofe which have 
 more Subjects or Predicates connected by affirma- 
 tive or negative Conjunctions •, as, Riches and Ho- 
 nours are Temptations to Pride : Csefar conquered the 
 Gauls and the Britons : Neither Gold nor Jewels 
 will pur chafe Immortality Thefe Proportions are 
 evidently compounded, for each of them may be 
 refolv'd into two Proportions, (viz.) Riches are 
 Temptations to Pride ; and Honour is a Temptation 
 to Pride \ and fo the reft. 
 
 The Truth of copulative Proportions depends 
 upon the Truth of all the Parts of them *, for if 
 Cafar had conquer'd the Gauls, and not the BrU 
 ions, or the Britons and not the Gauls, the fecond 
 copulative Propofition had not been true. 
 
 Here note, thofe Propofitions, which cannot be 
 refolved into two or more fimple Propofitions, 
 are not properly copulative ', tho' two or more I- 
 deas be connected and coupled by fuch Conjunc- 
 tions, either in the Subject: or Predicate \ as, two 
 and three make five : Majefly and Meeknefs don't 
 often meet : The Sun, Moon, and Stars are not all 
 to be feen at once. Such Propofitions are to be 
 efteem'd merely complex, becaufe the Predicate 
 cannot be affirm 'd of each fingle Subject, but on- 
 ly of all of them together as a collective Subject. 
 
 II. Disjunctive Propofitions are when the Parts 
 are disjoined or oppofed to one another by dis- 
 junctive Particles ; as, it is either Day or Night: 
 
 The 
 
C. II. S. 6. the right Ufe of Reafon. f 6 7 
 
 the Weather is either Jhining or rainy : Quantity is 
 cither Lengthy Breadth, or Depth. 
 
 The Truth of Disjunctives depends on the ne- 
 cefTary and immediate Oppofition of the Parts > 
 therefore only the laft of thefe Examples is true •, 
 but the two firft are not ftriclly true, becaufe 
 twilight is a Medium between Day and Night ; 
 and dry, cloudy Weather is a Medium between 
 Jhining and raining. 
 
 III. Conditional or hypothetical Proportions are 
 thofe whofe Parts are united by the conditional 
 Particle if ; as, If the Sun be Jixt, the Earth mufl 
 move : If there be no Fire, there will be no Smoke. 
 
 Note, The firft Part of thefe Propofitions, or 
 that wherein the Condition is contain'd, is call'd 
 the antecedent, the other is call'd the confequent. 
 
 The Truth of thefe Propofitions depends not 
 at all on the Truth and Falfhood of their two 
 Parts, but on the Truth of the Connexion of 
 them ; for each part of them may be fa lie, and 
 yet the whole Propofition true ; as, if there be no 
 Providence, there will be no future Punijhment. 
 
 IV. Caufal Propofitions are where two Propo- 
 fitions are joined by caufal Particles •, as, Houfes 
 were not built that they might be dejlroyed : Reho- 
 boam was unhappy becaufe be followed evil Ccunfel. 
 
 The Truth of a caufal Propofition ariils not 
 from the Truth of the Parts, but from the caufal 
 Influence that the one Part of it has upon the o- 
 ther •, for both Parts may be true, yet the Propo- 
 fition falic, if one Part be not the Caufe of the 
 other. 
 
 Some Logicians refer Propofitions 
 
 to this Place, as, Men, conJiJered as Men, are ra- 
 tional Creatures, i, c . Men. 
 
 Re- 
 
1 68 LOG IC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 V. Relative Propofitiorts have their Parts joined 
 by fuch Particles, as exprefs a Relation or Com- 
 panion of one Thing to another; as, when you 
 are filent I will [peak: Js Dutch as you are worth, 
 fo much you Jhall be efteemed : As is the Father , fo 
 is the Son : Where there is no Tale-Bearer, Conten- 
 tion will ceafe. 
 
 Thefe are very much akin to conditional Propo- 
 rtions, and the Truth of them depends upon the 
 Juftnefs of their Connexion. 
 
 VI. Difcretive Proportions are fuch wherein va- 
 rious and fecmingly oppofite Judgments are made 
 whofe Variety or Diftinction is noted by the Par- 
 ticles, but, tho\ yet, &c. as, Travellers may change 
 their Climate but not their Temper: Job was Pati- 
 ent, tbd* his Grief was great. 
 
 The Truth and Goodnefs of a difcretive Pro- 
 portion depends on the Truth of both Parts, and 
 their Contradiftinction to one another $ for tho' 
 both Parrs fhould be true , yet if there be no 
 fceming Oppofition between them, it is an ufe- 
 lefs After tion, tho* we cannot call it a falfe one ; 
 as, Defcartes was a Philofopher, yet he was a 
 Frenchman: The Romans were valiant, but they 
 fpoke Latin *, both which Propofitions are ridicu- 
 lous, for want of a feeming Oppofition between 
 the Parts. 
 
 Since we have declared wherein the Truth and 
 Faljhood of thefe compound Proportions confift, it 
 is proper alfo to give fome intimations how any 
 of thefe Propofitions when they are falfe may be 
 oppofed or contradicled. 
 
 All compound Propofitions, except Copulatives 
 a'nd Difcrelives, are properly denied or contradicl- 
 ed when the Negation affects their conjunctive 
 Particles •, as, if the disjunctive Propofition af- 
 
 2 ferts. 
 
C. II. S. 6 . The right Vfe of Reafon. 1 69 
 
 terts, /'/ is 'either Day or Night: The Opponent 
 fays, It is not either Day or Night, or it is not ne- 
 ceffary that it Jhould be either Day or Night, fo the 
 hypothetical Propofition is denied by faying, it does 
 not follow that the Earth muft move if the Sun be fix 9 d. 
 
 A disjunctive Propofition may be contradicted 
 alfo by denying all the Parts, as, it is neither Day 
 nor Night. 
 
 And a caufal Propofition may be denied or op- 
 pofed indirectly and improperly, when either part 
 of the Propofition is denied •, and it muft be folfe 
 if either Part be falfe: But the Defign of the 
 Propofition being to fhew the caufal Connexion of 
 the two Parts, each Part is fuppos'd to be true, 
 and it is not properly contradicted as a caufal Pro- 
 poftion, unlefs one Part of it be denied to be the 
 Caufe of the other. 
 
 As for Copulatives and Difcretives, becaufe their 
 Truth depends more on the Truth of their Parts, 
 therefore thefe may be oppos'd or denied as many 
 Ways, as the Parts of which they are compos'd 
 may be denied •, fo this copulative Propofition, 
 Riches and Honour are Temptations to Pride, may 
 be denied by faying, Riches are not Temptations, 
 Sho' Honour may be: or, Honour is not a Temptation, 
 the? Riches may be: or neither Riches nor Honour 
 are Temptations, &c. 
 
 So this difcretive Propofition, Job was patient, 
 tho 9 his Grief was great, is denied by faying, Job 
 was not patient, tho* his Grief was great: or, Job 
 was patient, but his Grief was not great : or Job 
 was not patient, nor was his Grief great. 
 
 We proceed now to the fecomi J or: of compound 
 Proportions, (viz.) fuch whofe Compojiticn is not 
 expreffed, but latent or conccalW^ yet a final 1 At- 
 tention will find two Propofitions included in them. 
 Such are thefe that follow, 
 
 1 Exclufn 
 
170 LO G IC K: Or, Part IL 
 
 1. Exclu fives •, as, The pious Man alone is hap- 
 py. It is only Sir Ifaac Newton could find out true 
 Philofophy. 
 
 2. Exceptives •, as, None of the Ancients but 
 Plato well defended the Soul's Immortality. The 
 Proteftants worfhip none but God. 
 
 3. Comparatives ; as, Pain is the greateft Af- 
 fliction. No Turk was fiercer than the Spaniards. 
 at Mexico. 
 
 Here note, that the comparative Degree does 
 not always imply the Pofitive ; as if I fay, A Fool 
 is better than a Knave -, this does not affirm that 
 Folly is good, but that it is a lefs Evil than Kna- 
 very. 
 
 4. Inceptives and Defitives, which relate to the 
 beginning or ending of any thing ; as, the Latin 
 Tongue is not yet forgotten. No Man before Orpheus 
 wrote Greek Verfe \ Peter Czar of Mufcovy begun 
 to civilize his Nation. 
 
 To thefe may be added Continuatives ; as, Rome 
 remains to this Day y which includes at leaf! two 
 Proportions, {viz,) Rome was y and Rome is. 
 
 Here let other Authors fpend Time and Pains 
 in giving the precife Definitions of all thefe forts 
 of Propofitions, which may be as well underftood 
 by their Names and Examples : Here let them 
 tell what their Truth depends upon, and how, 
 they are to be oppofed or contradicted ; but a 
 moderate Share of common Senfe, with a Review 
 of what is faid on the former Compounds , will 
 fuffice for all thefe Purpofes without the Formali- 
 ty of Rules. 
 
 Sect, 
 
C II. S. 7. The right Ufe of Rcafon . 171 
 
 Sect. VII. 
 
 Of true and falfe Propofit'ions. 
 
 PRopofitions are next to be coniider'd accord- 
 ing to their Senfe or Signification, and thus 
 they are diftributed into true and falfe. A true 
 Proportion reprefents Things as they arc in them- 
 felvesj but if Things are reprefented otherwife 
 than they are in themfelves, the Proportion is 
 falfe. 
 
 Or we may defcribe them more particularly 
 thus •, a true Proportion joins thofe Ideas and Terms 
 together whofe Objects are join'd and agree, or 
 it disjoins thofe Ideas and Terms, whofe Objects 
 difagree or are disjoin' d ; as, every Bird has Wings^ 
 a Brute is not immortal. 
 
 A falfe Propofition joins thofe Ideas or Terms 
 whofe Objects difagree, or it disjoins thofe whofe 
 Objects agree ; as Birds have ?jo Wings, Brutes 
 are immortal. 
 
 Note, It is impoflible that the fame Propofition 
 mould be both true and falfe at the fame Time, 
 in the fame Senfe, and in the fame Refpect •, be- 
 caufe a Propofition is but the Reprefentation of 
 the Agreement or Difagreement of Things : Now 
 it is impoffible that the fame Thing fhould be and not 
 we, or that the fame Things fhould agree and not a- 
 gree at the fame Time and in the fame Rtj/e:?. This 
 is a rirft Principle of human Knowledge. 
 
 Yet fomc Propositions may fccm to contradict 
 one another, tho' they may be both true, but in 
 d iffe rent Senfe s or Refpe&S or Times: as, Man 
 
 adifij and Man wat mor:. 
 Paradije. But chefe two Proportions mult be 
 fcrcnt Times; as, Man 
 
 M was 
 
172 L O G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 was immortal, but at the Fall he became mortal. 
 So we may lay now, Man is mortal, or Man is 
 immortal, if we take thefe Propofitions in diffe- 
 rent Reipe6ls 3 as, Man is an immortal Creature 
 as to bis Soul, but mortal as to his Bods. A great 
 Variety of Difficulties and feeming Contradictions, 
 both in holy Scripture and other Writings, may 
 be folved and explain'd in this manner. 
 
 The moft important Queflion on this Subject 
 is this, What is the Criterion or diftinguijhing Mark 
 of 'Truth? How fhall we know when a Propofi- 
 tion is really true or falfe ? There are fo many Dif- 
 guifes of Truth in the World, fo many falfe Ap- 
 pearances of Truth, that fome Sects have decla- 
 red there is no Poflibility of diftinguifhing Truth 
 from Faljhood ; and therefore they have abandon'd 
 all Pretences to Knowledge, and maintain'd ftre- 
 nuoufly that nothing is to be known. 
 
 The firft Men of this Humour made themfelves 
 famous in Greece, by the Name of Scepticks ; that 
 is, Seekers: They were alfo call'd Academicks, 
 borrowing their Name from Academia, their 
 School or Place of Study. They taught that all 
 Things are uncertain, tho' they allow'd that fome 
 are more probable than others. After thefe arofe 
 the Sect of Pyrrhonicks, named from Fyrrho their 
 Matter, who would not allow one Proportion to 
 be more probable than another ; but profels'd that 
 all Things were equally uncertain. Now all thefe 
 Men (as an ingenious Author exprefTes it) were 
 rather to be call'd a Seel of Liars than Philofo- 
 fhers, and that Cenfure isjuft for twoReafons; 
 (1.) Becaufe they determined concerning every 
 Propofition that it was uncertain, and believed 
 that as a certain Truth, while they profefTed there 
 was nothing certain, and that nothing could be 
 determined concerning Truth or Falfhood -, and 
 
 thus 
 
C. IL S. 7. The right Ufe of Reafon . 1 73 
 
 thus their very Doctrine gave itfelf the Lie. (2.) 
 Becaufe they judged and acted as other Men did 
 in the common Affairs of Life •, they would nei- 
 ther run into Fire nor Water, tho' they profefs'd 
 Ignorance and Uncertainty, whether the one 
 would burn, or the other drown them. 
 
 There have been fome in all Ages who have 
 too much affected this Humour, who difpute a- 
 gainft every thing, under Pretence that Truth has 
 no certain Mark to diftinguifh it. Let us therefore 
 enquire, what is the general Criterion of Truth ? 
 And in order to this, it is proper to confider what 
 is the Reafon why we affent to thofe Propofitions, 
 which contain the moft certain and indubitable 
 Truths, fuch as thefe, the Whole is greater than & 
 Part ; two and three make five. 
 
 7'he only Reafon why we believe thefe Propo- 
 fitions to be true, is becaufe the Ideas of the Sub- 
 jects and Predicates appear with fo much Clear- 
 nefs and Strength of Evidence to agree to each 
 other, that the Mind cannot help difcerning the 
 Agreement, and cannot really doubt of the Truth 
 of them, but is conftrain'd to judge them true. 
 So when we compare the Ideas of a Circle and a 
 Triangle, or the Ideas of an Oyfter and a Butterfly, 
 we fee fuch an evident Difagreement between 
 them, that we are fure that a Butterfly is not an 
 Oyfter - 9 nor is a Triangle a Circle. There is no- 
 thing but the Evidence of the Agreement or Dif- 
 agreement between two Ideas, that makes us af- 
 firm or deny the one or the other. 
 
 Now it will follow from hence that a clear and 
 diflincl Perception or full Evidence of the Agreement 
 and Difagreement of our Ideas to one another, or to 
 things, is a certain Criterion of Truth : For fince 
 our Minds are of fuch a Make, that where the E- 
 vidence is exceeding plain and ftrong, we cannot 
 M 2 withhold 
 
174 L G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 withhold our Aflent; we fhould then be necefla- 
 rily expos' d to believe Falfhood, if compleat Evi- 
 dence fhould be found in any Proportions that 
 are not true. But furely the God of perfect Wif- 
 dom, Truth and Goodnefs would never oblige 
 his Creatures to be thus deceiv'd ; and therefore 
 he v/ould never have conftituted us of fuch a 
 Frame, as would render it naturally impoflible to 
 guard againft Error. 
 
 Another Confequence is naturally deriv'd from 
 the former •, and that is, that the only Reafon 
 why we fall into a Miftake is becaufe we are im- 
 patient to form a Judgment of Things before we 
 have a clear and evident Perception of their A- 
 greement or Difagreement ; and if we will make 
 Hafte to judge while our Ideas are obfcure and 
 confus'd, or before we fee whether they agree or 
 difagree, we fhall plunge our felves into perpetual 
 Errors. 
 
 Note, What is here aflferted concerning the Ne- 
 ceflity of clear and diftinct Ideas refers chiefly to 
 Propofitions, which we form our felves by our 
 own Powers : As for Propofitions which we de- 
 rive from the Te/lwiony of others, they will be ac- 
 counted for in Chap. IV, 
 
 Scet. VIII. 
 
 Of certain and dubious Propofitions, $f Knowledge 
 and Opinion. 
 
 Since wc have found that Evidence is the great 
 Criterion and the lure Mark of Truth ; this 
 leads us directly to confider Propofitions accord- 
 ing to their Evidence \ and here we muft take 
 Notice both of the different Degrees of Evidence, 
 and the differtnt Kinds of it. 
 
 Pro- 
 
C. II. S. 8. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 75 
 
 Propofitions according to their different Degrees 
 of Evidence are diltinguiih'd into certain and du- 
 bious f. 
 
 Where the Evidence of the Agreement or Dif- 
 agreement of the Ideas is fo ftrong and plain, that 
 we cannot forbid nor delay our AfTent ; the Pro- 
 position is call'd certain, as, every Circle hath a 
 Centre *, the World did not create it felf. An Aj]ent 
 to fuch Propofitions is honour'd with the Name of 
 Knowledge. 
 
 But when there is any Obfcurity upon the A- 
 greement or Difagreement of the Ideas, fo that 
 the Mind does not clearly perceive it, and is not 
 compell'd to aflent or difTent, then the Propofi- 
 tion, in a proper and philofophical Senfe, is calFd 
 doubtful or uncertain ', as, the Planets are inhabited ; 
 the Souls of Brutes are mere Matter •, the JVorld 
 will not ft and a thoufand Tears longer •, Dido built 
 the City of Carthage, l£c. Such uncertain Propo- 
 fitions are call'd Opinions. 
 
 When we confider our felves as Philofophers or 
 Searchers of Truth, it would be well if we always 
 fufpended a full Judgment or Determination about 
 any thing, and made farther Inquiries, where this 
 plain and perfect Evidence is wanting •, but we 
 are fo prone of our felves to judge without full 
 Evidence, and in fome Cafes the Necellity of 
 Aclion in the Affairs of Life conftrains us to judge 
 and determine upon a tolerable Degree of Evi- 
 dence, that we vulgarly call thofe Propofitions 
 
 f It maybe objected, char this Cm.-.. :ty and Unetrtsintt being only in the 
 Mind, the Divi'-.on belongs to Propoficioni rarhtr according to tlie Decrees 
 of our jljjcit, than the Degrees of E-v. dn.ee. But it may we 1 be anhvered> 
 that ti&ttvi&enct here intended is iha: which appears I • /, and 
 
 nut the mere Evidence in the K ip: BeliJes (as we iha!l thrw 
 
 immediately) tie Decree of Aflent uu^ht to be exictly proporinnable to the 
 ji-.d therefore the Difference is not greit, whether I'ro- 
 pofitioni be cill'd ccrtair. or unci I -»ng to the MeaTlilt ot Evidcr.c*, 
 
 til ol Jljfrri:. 
 
 M j 
 
176 LOGICK: Or, Part II. 
 
 certain, where we have but very little Room or 
 Reafon to doubt of them, tho* the Evidence be 
 not compleat and refiftlefs. 
 
 Certainty, according to the Schools, is diftin- 
 guifhed into Objective and Subjective. Objective 
 Certainty is when the Propofition is certainly true 
 in it felf ; and Subjective, when we are certain of 
 the Truth of it. The one is in Things, the other 
 is in our Minds. 
 
 But let it be obferved here, that every Propofi- 
 tion in it felf is certainly true or certainly falfe. For 
 tho' Doubtfulnefs or Uncertainty feems to be a Me- 
 dium between certain Truth and certain Falfhood 
 in our Minds, yet there is no fuch Medium in 
 Things themfelves ; no, not even in future E- 
 vents : for now at this time it is certain in it k\f, 
 that M'idfummer-Dayfeven 2 ears hence will beferene, 
 or it is certain it will be cloudy, tho' we are uncer- 
 tain and utterly ignorant what fort of Day it will 
 be : This Certainty of diflant Futurities is known 
 to God only. 
 
 Uncertain or dubious Propofitions, i. e. Opinions, 
 are diftinguifh'd into probable or improbable. 
 
 When the Evidence of any Propofition is great- 
 er than the Evidence of the contrary, then it is a 
 probable Opinion : Where the Evidence and Argu- 
 ments are ftronger on the contrary Side, we call 
 it improbable. But while the Arguments on ei- 
 ther Side feem to be equally flrong, and the Evi- 
 dence for and againft any Propofition appears 
 equal to the Mind, then in common Language we 
 call it a doubtful Matter. We alfo call it a dubi- 
 ous or doubtful Propofition when there are no Ar- 
 guments on either Side, as next Chriftmas-Day 
 will be a very fharp Frojl. And in general all thefe 
 Propofitions are doubtful, wherein we can per- 
 ceive no fufficient Marks or Evidences of Truth 
 
 or 
 
C. II. S. 9. "The right life of Reafon. 1 77 
 
 or Falfhood. In fuch a Cafe the Mind which is 
 fearching for Truth ought to remain in a State 
 of Doubt and Sufpence, until fuperior Evidence on 
 one Side or the other incline the Balance of the 
 Judgment, and determine the Probability or Cer- 
 tainty to one Side. 
 
 A great many Propofitions which we generally 
 believe or disbelieve in human Affairs, or in the 
 Sciences, have very various Degrees of Evidence, 
 which yet arife not to complete Certainty either 
 of Truth or Falfhood. Thus it comes to pafs 
 that there are fuch various and almofl infinite De- 
 grees of Probability and Improbability. To a weak 
 Probability we fhould give a weak Ajfent ; and a 
 ftronger Affcnt is due where the Evidence is greater, 
 and the Matter more probable. If we proportion 
 our Affent in all Things to the Degree of Evidence* 
 we do the utmoft that human Nature is capable 
 of in a rational Way to fecure it felf from Error, 
 
 Sect. IX. 
 
 Of Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reafon, Faith 
 and Infpiration. 
 
 AFTER we have confider'd the Evidence of 
 Propofitions in the various Degrees of it, 
 we come to furvey the fever al Kinds of Evidence, 
 or the different Ways whereby Truth is let into 
 the Mind, and which produce accordingly leveral 
 kinds of Knowledge. We fhall diftribute them 
 into thefe fix, (viz.) Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelli- 
 gence, Reafon, Faith and Infpiration^ and then di- 
 lHnguifh the Propofitions which are derived from 
 them. 
 
 M 4 L The 
 
178 . LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 I. The Evidence of Senfe is when we frame a 
 Propofition according to the Dictate of any of 
 our Senfes ; fo we judge that Grafs is green ; that 
 a Trumpet gives a pleafant Sound ; the Fire bums 
 Wood; Water is foft, and Iron is hard', for we 
 have feen, heard or felt all thefe. It is upon this 
 Evidence of Senfe that we know and believe the 
 daily Occurrences in human Life; and almoft all 
 the Hiftories of Mankind that are written by 
 Eye or Ear-Witneffes are built upon this Prin- 
 ciple. 
 
 Under the Evidence of Senfe we don't only in- 
 clude that Knowledge which is derived to us by 
 our outward Senfes of Hearing, Seeing, Feeling, 
 Tafting and Smelling, but that alfo which is de- 
 riv'd from the inward Senfations and Appetites 
 of Hunger, Thirft, Eafe, Pleafure, Pain, IVeari- 
 nefs, Reft, &c. and all thofe Things which belong 
 to the Body ; as Hunger is a painful Appetite, Light 
 is pleafant: Reft is fweet to the weary Limbs. 
 
 Propofitions which are built on this Evidence 
 may be named fenfi Me Propofitions, or the Diclates 
 of Senfe. 
 
 II. As we learn what belongs to the Body by 
 the Evidence of Senfe, fo we learn what belongs 
 to the Soul by an inward Confcioufnefs, which 
 may be call'd a fort of internal Feeling, or fpiri- 
 tual Senfation of what palTes in the Mind; as, / 
 think before I fpeak ; / defire large Knowledge ; / 
 fufpeel my own Praftice ; / ftudied hard to Day ; 
 my Confcience bears Witnefs of my Sincerity ; my 
 Soul hates vain Thoughts ; Fear is an uneafy Paffwn \ 
 long Meditation en one thing is tirefome. 
 
 Thus 
 
C. II. S. 9. The right Ufe of Reafon. iyg 
 
 Thus it appears that we obtain the Knowledge 
 of a Multitude of Proportions, as well as of fingle 
 Ideas by thofe two Principles which Mr. Locke calls 
 Senfation and Reflection : One of them is a fort of 
 Confcioufnefs of what affects the Body, and the o- 
 ther is a Confcioufnefs of what paries in the Mind. 
 
 Propofitions which are built on this internal 
 Confcioufnefs, have yet no particular or diftinguifh- 
 ing Name ailign'd to them. 
 
 III. Intelligence relates chiefly to thofe abftract- 
 ed Propofitions which carry their own Evidence 
 with them, and admit no Doubt about them. 
 Our Perception of this Self-Evidence in any Pro- 
 position is call'd Intelligence. It is our Knowledge 
 of thofe firft Principles of Truth which are fas it 
 were) wrought into the very Nature and Make 
 of our Minds : They are fo evident in them- 
 felves to every Man who attends to them, that 
 they need no Proof. It is the Prerogative and 
 peculiar Excellence of thefe Propofitions, that 
 they can fcarce ever be prov'd or denied : They 
 cannot eafily be prov'd, becaufe there is no- 
 thing fuppos'd to be more clear or certain, from 
 which an Argument may be drawn to prove 
 them. They cannot well be denied, becaufe 
 their own Evidence is fo bright and convincing, 
 that as foon as the Terms are underftood the 
 Mind neceffarily aflents : Such are thefe, What- 
 foevcr acleth hath a Being ; Nothing has no Proper- 
 ties \ a Part is lefs than the Whole ; Nothing can 
 be the Caufe of it/elf 
 
 Thefe Piopolitions arc called Axioms, or Max- 
 ims, or firft Principles j thefe arc the very Founda- 
 tions of .ill improv'd Knowledge and Keafonings, 
 and on this Account thefe have been thought to 
 be innate Propofitions^ or Truths born with us. 
 
 2 Some 
 
lSo LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Some fuppofe that a great part of the Know- 
 ledge of Angels and human Souls in the feparate 
 State is obtain'd in this manner, (viz.) by fuch an 
 immediate View of Things in their own Nature, 
 which is call'd Intuition. 
 
 IV. Reafoning is the next fort of Evidence, and 
 that is when one Truth is infer'd or drawn from 
 others by natural and juft Methods of Argument 
 as, if there be much Light at Midnight, I infer* 
 it -proceeds from the Moon, becaufe the Sun is un- 
 der the Earth. If I fee a Cottage in a Foreft, I 
 conclude, fome Man has been there and built it. Or 
 when I furvey the Heavens and Earth, this gives 
 Evidence to my Reafon, that there is a God who 
 made them. 
 
 The Proportions which I believe upon this 
 kind of Evidence, are call'd Conclusions, or rational 
 Truths, and the Knowledge that we gain this Way 
 is properly call'd Science. 
 
 Yet let it be noted, that the Word Science is 
 ufually applied to a whole Body of regular or me- 
 thodical Obfervations or Propofitions which learn- 
 ed Men have formed concerning any Subject of 
 Speculation, deriving one Truth from another by 
 % Train of Arguments. If this Knowledge chief- 
 ly directs our Practice, it is ufually call'd an Art: 
 And this is the mod remarkable Diftinction be- 
 tween an Art and a Science, (viz.) the one refers 
 chiefly to Praclice, the other to Speculation. Na- 
 tural Philofophy or Phyficks, and Ontology are &*- 
 ences, Logick and Rhetorick are call'd Arts ; but 
 Mathematics include both Art and Science ; for 
 they have much of Speculation, and much of Prac- 
 tice in them. 
 
 Obferve 
 
C.II. S. 9. The right life of Reafon. 1 8 1 
 
 Qbferoe here, that when the Evidence of a 
 Propofkion deriv'd from Senfe, I far/s, In- 
 
 telligence, ox Reafon is firm and indubitable, it pro- 
 duces fuch an Afltnt as v/e call a natural Cer- 
 tainty. 
 
 V. When we derive the Evidence of any Pro- 
 pofition from the Teftimony of others, it is call'd 
 the Evidence of Faith ; and this is a large Part of 
 our Knowledge. Ten thoufand Things there are 
 which we believe merely upon the Authority or 
 Credit of thofe who have fpoken or written of 
 them. It is by this Evidence that wc know there 
 is fuch a Country as China, and there was fuch a 
 Man as Cicero who dwelt in Rome. It is by this 
 that moil of the Tranfactions in human Life are 
 manag'd : We know our Parents and our Kin- 
 dred by this Means, we know the Perfons and 
 Laws of our prefent Governors, as well as Things 
 that are at a vaft Diftance from us in foreign Na- 
 tions, or in ancient Ages. 
 
 According as the Perfons that inform us of any 
 tiling are many or few, are more or lefs wife, and 
 faithful, and credible, fo our Faith is more or lefs 
 firm or wavering, and the Proportion believed is 
 either certain or doubtful ; but in Matters of Faith, 
 an exceeding great Probability is call'd a moral 
 Certainty. 
 
 Faith is generally diftinguiuYd into Divine and 
 Human, not with Regard to the Proportions that 
 are believed, but with Regard to the Teftimony 
 upon which we believe them. When God re- 
 veals any thing to us, this gives us the Evidence 
 of Divine Faith ; but what Man only acquaints 
 us with proJuces a human Faith in us ; the one, 
 being built upon the Word of Man, arifes but to 
 moral Certainty •, but the other being founded on 
 2 the 
 
182 LOGIC K: Or y Part II. 
 
 the Word of God, arifes to an abfolute and infal- 
 lible AJfurance, fo far as we underftand the Mean- 
 ing of his Word. This is call'd fupernatural Cer- 
 tainty. 
 
 Propofitions which we believe upon the Evi- 
 dence of human Teftimony are call'd Narratives, 
 Relations, Reports, Hiftorical Obfervations, &c. 
 but fuch as are built on Divine Teftimony are term- 
 ed Matters of Revelation ; and if they are of great 
 Importance in Religion, they are call'd Articles of 
 Faith. 
 
 There are fome Propofitions, or Parts of Know- 
 ledge, which are faid to be deriv'd from Obferva- 
 tion and Experience, that is, Experience in our- 
 felves, and the Obfervations we have made on o- 
 ther Perfons or Things •, but thefe are made up of 
 fome of the former Springs of Knowledge join'd 
 together, (viz.) Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Reafon, Faith, 
 £cc. and therefore are not reckon'd a diftinct kind 
 of Evidence. 
 
 VI. Infpiration is a fort of Evidence diftinct 
 from all the former, and that is, when fuch an 
 overpowering Impreflion of any Proportion is 
 made upon the Mind by God himfelf, that gives 
 a convincing and indubitable Evidence of the 
 Truth and Divinity of it : So were the Prophets 
 and the Apoftles infpir'd *. 
 
 Sometimes God may have been pleafed to make 
 life of the outward Senfes, or the inward Work- 
 ings of the Imagination, of Dreams, Apparitions, 
 Vifions and Voices, or Reafoning, or perhaps hu- 
 man Narration, to convey divine Truths to the 
 Mind of the Prophet ; but none of thefe would 
 be fufficient to deferve the Name of Infpiration, 
 
 * Note here, 1 fpeak chiefly of the higheft Kind of Infpiration. 
 
 .without 
 
C. II. S. 9. fbe right Ufe of Reafon. 183 
 
 without a fuperior or Divine Light and Power at- 
 tending them. 
 
 This fort of Evidence is alfo very did in 61: from 
 what we ufually call Divine Faith -, for every com- 
 mon Chriftian exercifes Divine Faith when he be- 
 lieves any Proportion which God has revealed in 
 the Bible upon this Account, becaufe God has /aid 
 it, tho' it was by a Train of Realbnings that he 
 was led to believe that this is the Word of God : 
 Whereas in the Cafe of Infpiration, the Prophet 
 not only exercifes Divine Faith, in believing what 
 God reveals, but he is under a fuperior heavenly 
 Imprefiion, Light, and Evidence, whereby he is 
 allured that God reveals it. This is the moft e- 
 minent kind of fupernatural Certainty. 
 
 Tho' Perfons might be allured of their own 
 Infpiration by fome peculiar and inexpreffible Con- 
 fcioufnefs of this divine Infpiration and Evidence 
 in their own Spirits, yen it is hard to make out 
 this Infpiration to others, and to convince them 
 of it, except by fome antecedent or confequent 
 Prophecies or Miracles, or fome publick Appear- 
 ances more than human. 
 
 The Propofitions which are attained by this fort 
 of Evidence are call'd infpir'd Truths. This is 
 Divine Revelation at firft hand, and the Diclates. 
 of God in an immediate manner, of which Theo- 
 logical Writers difcourfe at large ; but fince it 
 belongs only to a few Favourites of Heaven to 
 be infpir'd, and not the Bulk of Mankind, it is 
 not neceflary to fpeak more of it in a Treatife of 
 Logick, which is dcfign'd for the general Improve- 
 ment of human Reafon. 
 
 The various kinds of Evidence, upon which we 
 believe any Propofition, afford us thefc three Re- 
 marks. 
 
 I. 
 
lU LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 I. Remark. The fame Propofition may be known 
 to us by different kinds of Evidence: That the 
 whole is bigger than a part is known by our Senfe s, 
 and it is known by the Self -Evidence of the Thing 
 to our Mind. That God created the Heavens and 
 the Earth is known to us by Reafon, and is known 
 alfo by Divine Tejlimony or Faith, 
 
 II d Remark. Among thefe various Kinds of 
 Evidence, fome are generally ftronger than others 
 in their own Nature, and give a better Ground 
 for Certainty. Inward Confcioufnefs and Intelli- 
 gence, as well as Divine Faith and Inspiration, ufu- 
 ally carry much more Force with them than Senfe 
 or hmnan Faith, which are often fallible , tho* 
 there are Inftances wherein human Faith, Senfe 
 and Reafoning lay a Foundation alfo for compleat 
 AfTurance, and leave no room for Doubt. 
 
 Reafon in its own Nature would always lead us 
 into the Truth in Matters within its Compafs, if 
 it were us'd aright, or it would require us to fuf- 
 pend our Judgment where there is want of Evi- 
 dence. But it is our Sloth, Precipitancy, Senfe, 
 PaJJion, and many other Things that lead our 
 Reafon aft ray in this degenerate and impe/fecl: 
 Eftate : Hence it comes to pafs that we are guilty 
 of fo many Errors in Reafoning, efpecially about 
 divine Things, becaufe our Reafon either is bufy 
 to enquire, and refov'd to determine about Mat- 
 ters that are above our prefent Reach ; or' becaufe 
 we mingle many Prejudices and fecret Influences 
 of Senfe, Fancy, PaJJion, Inclination, &c. with 
 our Exercifes of Reafon, and judge and determine 
 according to thefe irregular Influences. 
 
 Divine 
 
C. II. S.9. The rightUfe o/Reafoh. 185 
 
 Divine Faith would never admit of any Con- 
 troverfies or Doubtings, if we were but afTur'd 
 that God had fpoken, and that we rightly under- 
 ftood his Meaning. 
 
 III d Remark. The greater! Evidence and Cer- 
 tainty of any Propofition does not depend up- 
 on the Variety of the Ways or Kinds of Evi- 
 dence, whereby it is known, but rather upon 
 the Strength and Degree of Evidence, and the 
 Clearnefs of that Light in or by which it appears 
 to the Mind. For a Propofition that is known 
 only one Way may be much more certain, and 
 have ftronger Evidence than another that is fup- 
 pos'd to be known many Ways. Therefore thefe 
 Propofitions, Nothing has no Properties, Nothing 
 can make it/elf, which are known only by Intelli- 
 gence, are much furer and truer than this Propo- 
 fition, 'The Rainbow has real and inherent Colours in 
 it, or than this, the Sun rolls round the Earth ; tho' 
 we fcem to know both thefe laft by our Senfes, 
 and by the common Tejli??wny of our Neighbours. 
 So any Propofition that is clearly evident to our 
 own Confcioufnefs or Divine Faith, is much more 
 certain to us than a thoufand others that have on- 
 ly the Evidence of feeble and obfeure Senfations> 
 of mere probable Reafonings and doubtful Argu- 
 ments , or the Witnefs of fallible Men, or even tho' 
 all thefe mould join together. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 * 
 
186 LOG IC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 The Springs of falfe 'Judgment, or the Doc- 
 trine of Prejudices. 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 IN the End of the foregoing Chapter we 
 have furvey'd the feveral Sorts of Evidence, 
 on which we build our Affent to' Propofitions. 
 Thefe are indeed the general Grounds upon 
 which we form our Judgments concerning Things. 
 What remains in this fecond Part of Logick is 
 to point out the feveral Springs and Caufes of our 
 Mi flakes in judging, and to lay down fome Rules 
 by which we mould conduct ourfelves in palling 
 a Judgment of every Thing that is propofed to 
 us. 
 
 I confefs many Things which will be mention- 
 ed in thefe following Chapters might be as well 
 refer'd to the third Part of Logick, where we 
 jhall treat of R.eafoning and Argument ', for mod 
 of our falfe Judgments feem to include a fecret bad 
 Reafoning in them ; and while we fhew the Springs 
 of Error, and the Rules of true Judgment, we do 
 at the lame time difcover which Arguments are 
 fallacious, which Reafonings are weak, and which 
 are juft and ftrong. Yet fince this is ufually cal- 
 led a judging ill, or judging well, I think we may 
 without any Impropriety treat of it here ; and 
 this will lay a furer Foundation for all forts of Ra- 
 tiocination and Argument. 
 
 Rafh Judgments are call'd Prejudices, and fo 
 are the Springs of them. This Word in com- 
 mon Life fignines an ill Opinion which we have 
 
 conceived 
 
C. III. The right Ufe of Reafon. \ 87 
 
 conceived of fame other Per/on, or fome Injury done 
 to him. But when we ufe the Word in Matters 
 of Science, it fignifies a Judgment that is formed 
 concerning any P erf on or Thing before fufficient Exa- 
 mination-, and generally we fuppofe it to mean a 
 falfe Judgment or Miflake : At leaft, it is an Opi- 
 nion taken up without folic! Reafon for it, or an 
 Aflent given to a Propofition before we have jufr. 
 Evidence of the Truth of it, tho' the thing itfelf 
 may happen to be true. 
 
 Sometimes thefe rafh Judgments are caird Pre- 
 pojfejfions, whereby is meant, that fome particular 
 Opinion has pofTefTed the Mind, and engag'd the 
 Aflent without fufficient Search or Evidence of 
 the Truth of it. 
 
 There is a vaft Variety of thefe Prejudices and 
 Prepojfefjlons which attend Mankind in every Age 
 and Condition of Life ; they lay the Foundations 
 of many an Error, and many an unhappy Praclice, 
 both in the Affairs of Religion, and in our civil 
 Concernments, as well as in Matters of Learning, 
 It is ncceffary for a Man who purfues Truth to 
 enquire into thefe Springs of Error, that as far as 
 poflible he may rid himfelf of old Prejudices, and 
 watch hourly againft new ones. 
 
 The number of them is fo great, and they arc 
 fo interwoven with each other, as well as witn 
 the Powers of human Nature, that it isibmetimes 
 hard to dillinguiiri them apart*, yet for Method 
 Sake we fhall reduce them to thefe four general 
 Heads, (viz.) Prejudices a riling from Things, or 
 from Words, from cur . iclves, or from otber Perfons\ 
 and after the Ddcription of each Prejudice 
 fhall propofe DllC or more Ways of curing ir 
 
 N Sect. 
 
188 LOGICK:Or 9 Part II. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 Prejudices arifing from Things, 
 
 THE fir ft fort of Prejudices are thofe which a- 
 i i i e from the Things themfelves about which 
 we judge. But here let it be obferved that there 
 is nothing in the Nature of Things that will necef- 
 farily lead us into Error, if we do but ufe our 
 Reafon aright, and withhold our Judgment till 
 there appear fufficient Evidence of Truth. But 
 fince we are fo unhappily prone to take Advan- 
 tage of every doubtful Appearance arid Circum- 
 ftance of Things to form a wrong Judgment, and 
 plunge our felves into Miftake, therefore it is pro- 
 per to confider what there is in the Things them- 
 felves that may occafion our Errors. 
 
 I. The Obfcurity of fome Truths, and the Diffi- 
 culty of fearching them out, is one Occafion of rafh 
 and miilaken Judgment. 
 
 Some Truths are difficult becaufe they lye re- 
 mote from the firft Principles of Knowledge, and 
 want a long Chain of Argument to come at them : 
 Such are many of the deep Things of Algebra and 
 Geometry, and fome of the Theorems and Pro- 
 blems of moft Parts of the Mathematics. Many 
 Things alfo in natural Philofophy are dark and in- 
 tricate upon this Account, becaufe we cannot 
 come at any certain Knowledge of them without 
 the Labour of many and difficult, as well as charge- 
 able Experiments. 
 
 There are other Truths which have great Dark- 
 
 nefs upon them, becaufe we have no proper Means 
 
 or Mediums to come at the Knowledge of them. 
 
 Tho* in our i^ge we have found out many of the 
 
 2 deep 
 
C IK S. i. The right Ufe of Reafon. 189 
 
 deep Things of Nature by the Afliftartcc of Glaf- 
 fes and other Inftruments ; yet we are not hither- 
 to arrived at any fufficient Methods to difcover 
 the Shape of thofe little Particles of Matter which 
 diftinguiih the various Sapcurs, Odours and Colours 
 of Bodies ; nor to find what fort of Atoms com- 
 pofe Liquids or Solids, and diftinguifh Wood, Mi- 
 nerals, Metals, Glafs, Stone, &c. There is a 
 Darknefs alfo lies upon the Actions of the intellec- 
 tual or angelical World -, their Manners of Subfift- 
 ence and Agency, the Power of Spirits to move 
 Bodies, and the Union of our Souls with this ani- 
 mal Body "of ours are much unknown to us on 
 this Account. 
 
 Now in many of thefe Cafes a great part of 
 Mankind is not content to be entirely ignorant > 
 but they rather choofe to form rafli and hafty 
 Judgments, to guefs at Things without juft Evi r 
 dencc, to believe fomething concerning them bt- 
 fore they can know them, and thereby they fall 
 into Error. 
 
 This fort of Prejudice, as well as mod: others, 
 is cured by Patience and Diligence in Inquiry and 
 Reafoning, and a Sufpenfion of Judgment till we 
 have attain'd fome proper Mediums of Know- 
 ledge, and till we fee fufficient Evidence of the 
 Truth. 
 
 II. Ihe Appearance of Things in a Difguife is. 
 another Spring of Prejudice or rafli Judgment. 
 The outfide of Things which firft ftrikes us i$ 
 oftentimes different from their inward Nature, 
 and we are tempted to judge fuddenly according 
 to outward Appearances. It' a Picture U daub'd 
 with many bright and glaring Colours, the vul- 
 gar Eye admires it as an excellent Piece •, whereas 
 the fame Perfon judges very contemptuou(ly of 
 
 N 2, fome 
 
190 LOG I C K: Or, Part H. 
 
 Tome admirable Defign fketch'd out only with a 
 black Pencil on a coarfe Paper, tho' by the Hand 
 of Raphael. So the Scholar fpies the Name of a 
 new Book in a publick News-Paper, he is charm- 
 ed with the Title, he purchafes, he reads with 
 huge Expectations, and finds it all Tram and Im- 
 pertinence: This is a Prejudice deriv'd from the 
 appearance *, we are too ready to judge that Vo- 
 lume valuable which had ib good a Frontifpicce. 
 The large Heap of Encomiums and fwelling Words 
 of AfTurance that are befbowed on ^uack Medi- 
 cines in publick Advertifements tempt many a 
 Reader to judge them infallible, and to ufe the 
 Pills or the Plaifter with vaft Hope and frequent 
 Difappointment. 
 
 We are tempted to form our Judgment of Per- 
 fons as well as Things by thefe outward Appearances. 
 Where there is Wealth, Equipage and Splendor we are 
 ready to call that Man happy, but we fee not the 
 -vexing Difquietudes of his Soul: And when we 
 fpy a Perfon in ragged Garments, we form a des- 
 picable Opinion of him too Suddenly; we can 
 hardly think him either happy or wife, our Judg- 
 ment is fo ftrangely biafs'd by outward and fenfible 
 Things. It was thro* the Power of this Prejudice 
 that the Jews rejected our bleffed Saviour-, they 
 could not fuffer themfelves to believe that the Man 
 who appeared as the Son of a Carpenter was alfo 
 the Son of God. And becaufe St. Paul was of a 
 little Stature, a mean Prefence, and his Voice con- 
 temptible, fome of the Corinthians were tempted 
 to doubt whether he were infpired or no. 
 
 This Prejudice is cur'd by a longer Acquain- 
 tance with the World, and a ju/l Obfervation that 
 'Things are fometimes better and fomctimes worfe than 
 they appear to be. We ought therefore to re- 
 ftrairi our execflive Forwardnefs to form our O- 
 
 pinion 
 
C. III. S. i . The right life of Rcafon. 1 9 1 
 
 pinion of Perfons or Things before we have Op- 
 portunity to fearch into them more perfectly. Re- 
 member that a grey Beard does not make a Philofo- 
 pher ; all is not Gold that glifters ; and a rough 
 Diamond may be worth an immenfe Sum. 
 
 III. A Mixture of different Qualities in the fame 
 thing is another Temptation to judge amifs. We 
 are ready to be carried away by that Quality which 
 ftrikes zhefrji or the ftrongeft Impreffions upon us, 
 and we judge of the whole Object according to 
 that Quality, regard lefs of all the reft •, or fome- 
 times we colour over all the other Qualities with 
 that one Tincture, whether it be bad or good. 
 
 When we have juft reafon to admire a Man for 
 his Virtues, we are fometimes inclin'd not only to 
 neglect his Weakneffts, but even to put a good 
 Colour upon them, and to think them amiable. 
 When we read a Book that has many excellent 
 Truths in it and Divine Sentiments, we are 
 tempted to approve not only that whole Book, 
 but even all the Writings of that Author. When 
 a Poet, an Orator or a Painter has performed ad- 
 mirably in feveral ill uftrious Places, we fometimes 
 alio admire his very Errors, we miftake his Blun- 
 ders for Beauties, and are fo ignorantly fond as to 
 copy after them. 
 
 It is this Prejudice that has render'd fo many 
 great Scholars perfect Bigots, and inclin'd them 
 to defend Horner or Horace, Livy or Cicero, in all 
 their Miftakes, and vindicate all the Follies of 
 their favourite Author. It is this that temprs fomc 
 great Writers to fupport the Sayings of almoll all 
 the antinit Fathers of the Church, and admire them 
 even in their very Reveries. 
 
 N 3 On 
 
igi L O G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 On the other hand, if an Author has profefs'd 
 heretical Sentiments in Religion, we throw our 
 Scorn upon every thing he writes, we defpifc e- 
 Ven his critical or mathematical Learning, and will 
 hardly allow him common Senfe. If a Poem has 
 Tome Blemifhes in it, there is a Set of falfe Cri- 
 ticks who decry it univerfally, and will allow no 
 Beauties there. 
 
 This fort of Prejudice is relieved by learning to 
 diftinguifh Things well, and not to judge in the 
 hump. There is fcarce any Thing in the World 
 of Nature or Art> in the World of. Morality or 
 Religion, that is perfectly uniform. There is a 
 Mixture of Wifdom and Folly, Vice and Virtue, 
 Good and Evil, both in Men and Things. We 
 fhould remember that fome Pcrfons have great Wit 
 and little Judgment \ others are judicious, but not 
 witty. Some are good humour- d without Compli- 
 ment \ others have all the formalities of Complai- 
 sance, but no good Humour. We ought to know 
 that one Man may be vicious and learned, while 
 another has Virtue without Learning: That ma- 
 ny a Man thinks admirably well who has a poor 
 utterance ; v/hile others have a charming manner 
 of Speech, but their Thoughts are trifling and 
 impertinent. Some are good Neighbours, and cour- 
 teous and charitable toward Men who have no 
 Piety toward God-, others are truly religious, but 
 of a morofe natural Temper. Some excellent Say- 
 ings are found in very filly Books, and fome filly- 
 Thoughts appear in Books of Value. We fhould 
 neither praife nor difpraife by Wholefale, but fepa- 
 rate the Good from the Evil, and judge of them 
 apart: The Accuracy of a good Judgment con- 
 
 Fills much in making fuch Diftinctionl 
 
 Yet 
 
C.m. S.i. The right Uje of 'Reafon. 193 
 
 Yet let it be noted too, that in common Dif- 
 courfe we ufually denominate Perfons and Things 
 according to the major Part of their Character. 
 He is to be calPd a wife Man who has but few 
 Follies : He is a good Philofopher who knows much 
 of Nature, and for the mod. Part reafons well in 
 Matters of human Science: And that Book fhould 
 be efteem'd well written, which has much more 
 of good Senfe in it than it has of Impertinence. 
 
 IV. Tho' a Thing be uniform in its own Na- 
 ture, yet the different Lights in which it may be 
 placed, and the different Views in which it appears 
 to us, will be ready to excite in us miftaken Judg- 
 ments concerning it. Let an erect Cone be placed 
 in a horizontal Plane, at a great Diftance from 
 the Eye, and it appears a plain triangle; buE we 
 fhall judge that very Cone to be nothing but 2. flat 
 Circle, if its Bafe be ob verted towards us. Set a 
 common round Plate a little obliquely before our 
 Eye afar off, and we fhall think it an oval Figure; 
 but if the very Edge of it he turned towards us, 
 we fhall take it for a ftrait Line. So when we 
 view the feveral Folds of a changeable Silk, we pro- 
 nounce this Part red, and that yellow, becaufe of 
 its different Pofition to the Light, tho' the Silk 
 laid fmooth in one Light appears all of one Co- 
 lour. 
 
 When we furvey the Miferies of Mankind, and 
 think of the Sorrows of Millions, both on Earth 
 and in Hell, the Divine J^ 'over ntnent has a terrible 
 Afpetl, and we may be tempted to think hardly- 
 even of God himfelf : But if we view the Profu- 
 fion of his Bounty and Grace amongft his Crea- 
 tures on Earth, or the happy Spirits in Heaven, 
 we (hall have fo exalted an Idea of his GocJnefs as 
 to forget his Vengeance. Some Men dwell en- 
 
 N 4 tircly 
 
i 9 4 LOG ICK: Or, Part II. 
 
 tirely upon the Promifes of his Gofpcl, and think 
 him all Mercs : Others under a melancholy Frame, 
 dwell upon his Terrors and his Threatnings, and 
 are overwhelmed with the Thought of his Seve- 
 rity and Vengeance, as tho' there were no Mercy 
 in him. 
 
 The true Method of delivering ourfelves from 
 this Prejudice is to view a thing on all fides, to 
 compare all the various Appearances of the fame 
 thing with one another, and let each of them have 
 its full Weight in the Balance of our Judgment, 
 before we fully determine our Opinion. It was by 
 this Means that the modern Aftronomcrs came to 
 find out that the Planet Saturn hath a flat broad 
 Circle round its Globe, which is call'd its Ring, by 
 oblerving the different Appearances as a narrow 
 or a broader Oval, or as it lometimes feems to be a 
 ft rait Line, in the different Parts of its twenty 
 nine Years Revolution thro the Ecliptic. And if 
 we take the fame juft and religious Survey of the 
 great and bleffed God in all the Difcoveries of his 
 Vengeance and his Mercy, we fhall at laft con- 
 clude him to be both juft and good. 
 
 V. The cafual Affectation of many of our Ideas 
 becomes the Spring of another Prejudice or rafh 
 Judgment, to which we are fometimes expos'd. 
 If in our younger years we have taken Medicines 
 that have been naufeous, when any Medicine what- 
 Ibever is afterward propos'd to us under Sicknefs, 
 we immediately judge it naufeous: Our Fancy has 
 fo clofely join'd thefe Ideas together, that we 
 know not how to feparate them : Then the Stc- 
 mach feels the Difguft, and perhaps refufes the 
 only Drug that can preferve Life. So a Child 
 who has been let Blood joins the Ideas of Pain 
 and the Surgeon together, and he hates the Sight 
 
 of 
 
C.III.S.2. The right Ufe of Rcafon. 195 
 
 of the Surgeon, becaufe he thinks of his Pain; 
 Or if he has drunk a bitter Potion, he conceives 
 a bitter Idea of the Cup which held it, and will 
 drink nothing out of that Cup. 
 
 It is for the fame Reafon that the Bulk of the 
 common People are fo fuperftitioufly fond of the 
 Pfalms tranflated by Hopkins and Sternhold, and 
 think them facred and divine, becaufe they have 
 been now for more than an hundred Years bound 
 up in the fame Covers with our Bibles. 
 
 The belt Relief againft this Prejudice of Affe- 
 ctation is to confider, whether there be any natu- 
 ral and necefTary Connection between thole Ideas 
 which Fancy, Cuftom, or Chance hath thus join'd 
 together : And if Nature has not join'd them, let 
 our Judgment correct: the Folly of our Imagina- 
 tion, and feparate thefe Ideas again. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 Prejudices arifing from Words. 
 
 OU R Ideas and Words are fo linkt together, 
 that while we judge of Things according to 
 Words, we are led into feveral Miltakes. Thefe 
 may be diftributed under two general Heads, 
 (viz.) Such as arile from fingle Words or Phrafes, 
 or fuch as arile from Words join'd in Speech, and 
 comfo/ing a Dijlourfe. 
 
 I. The mod eminent and remarkable Errors of 
 the firfr. Kind, are thefe three. (1.) When our 
 Words, are injignificant, and have no Ideas \ as 
 when the myftical Divines talk of the Praxer of 
 Silence, the Jupernatural and pa/five Night of tie 
 Soul, the Vacuity of Pozvers^ the Suffenjion of ail 
 Thoughts: Or >., When our Words are equivo- 
 cal 
 
lycnt^ 
 
 <X' 
 
 #■&« 196 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 *4 and fignify two or more Ideas, as the Words 
 
 fc Law, Light, Flejh, Sprit, Righteoufnefs, and ma- 
 
 ^ ny other Terms in Scripture: Or (3.) When two 
 
 c or three Words are fynonymous, and fignify one 
 
 Idea, as Regeneration and new Creation in the new 
 
 Teftament; both which mean only ^ Chang e of 
 
 • the Heart from Sin to Holinefs ; or as the Elector of 
 
 ***/**** Cologn and the Bifhop of Cologn are two Titles of 
 
 /"*~ the fame Man. 
 
 /&~y* /2*f! Thefe kinds of Phrafes are the Occafions of 
 
 *+ */■'■' *^ various Miflakes •„ but none fo unhappy as thofe 
 
 -><*^Uf <%** in Theology: For both Words without Ideas, as 
 
 well as fynonymous and equivocal Words, have been 
 
 [ ^^/ us 5 c i and abus'd by the Humours, Pafllons, Inte- 
 
 y*^- reds, or by the real Ignorance and Weaknefs of 
 
 *£ <-<m*J» ^ Men to beget terrible Contefts among Chrif- 
 
 tians. 
 
 ^ *. fr*f^ B ut to relieve us under all thofe Dangers, and 
 
 /*jfj^ j <^. to remove thefe forts of Prejudices which arife 
 
 r~/ from Jingle Words or Phrafes, I mud remit the 
 
 """^Reader to Part I. Chap. 4. where I have treated 
 
 C sr*^**/irfbout Words, and to thofe DirecJions which I 
 
 have given concerning the Definition of Names, 
 
 Parti. Chap. 6. Seel. 3. 
 
 
 / ^-<f Sa**. 
 
 . II. There is another fort of falfe Judgments or 
 
 *#* ^ Miftakes which we are expos'd to by Words-, and 
 
 that is, when they are joined in Speech, and com* 
 
 pofe a Difcourfe ', and here we are in Danger two 
 
 Ways. 
 
 -'; f The one is, when a Man writes good Senfe, or 
 
 , * ; _, € -f' fpeaks much to the Purpofe, but he has not a 
 
 happy and engaging manner of Expreflion. Per- 
 
 - ' — « haps he ufes coarie and vulgar Words, or old, ob- 
 
 folete, and unfafhionable Language, or Terms 
 
 and Phrafes that are foreign, latiniz'd, fcholaftick, 
 
 very uncommon, arid hard to be underftood: And 
 
 this 
 
 - 
 
C.III.S. 2.. <¥be right Vfe of 'Reafon. 197 
 
 this is flill worfc, if his Sentences are long. and 
 intricate, or the Sound of them harih and grat- 
 ing to the Ear. All thefe indeed are Defects in 
 Style, and lead fomc nice and unthinking Hearers 
 or Readers into an ill Opinion of all that fuch a 
 Perfon fpeaks or writes. Many an excellent Dif- 
 courfe of our Forefathers has had Abundance of 
 Contempt caft upon it by our modern Pretenders 
 to Senfe, for want of their diftinguifriing between 
 the Language and the Ideas. 
 
 On the other hand, when a Man of Eloquence 
 fpeaks or writes upon any Subject, we are too 
 ready to run into his Sentiments, being fweetly 
 and infenfibly drawn by the Smoothnefs of his 
 Harangue, and the pathetic Power of his Language. 
 Rhetorkk will varnifh every Error fo that it fhall 
 appear in the Drefs of Truth, and put fuch Orna- 
 ments upon Vice as to make it look like Virtue : 
 It is an Art of wondrous and extenfive Influence ; 
 it often conceals, obfeures or overwhelms the 
 Truth, and places fometimes a grofs Falfhood in 
 a moil alluring Light. The Decency of Action, 
 the Mufick of the Voice, the Harmony of the 
 Periods, the Beauty of the Stile, and all the en- 
 gaging Airs of the Speaker have often charm'd 
 the Hearers intp Error, and perfuaded them to 
 approve whatfoever is propos'd in fo agreeable a 
 manner. A large Aflembly (lands expos'd at once 
 to the Power of thefe" Prejudices, and imbibes 
 them all. So Cicero and Demofthenes made the 
 Romans and the At hen i an s believe almoit whatfo- 
 ever they pleafcd. 
 
 The belt Defence againfl both thefe Dangers 
 is to learn the Skill (as much as pofllble) dffepa- 
 rating our Thoughts and Ideas from IVords and Phra* 
 fes, to judge of Things in their own Natures, 
 and in their natural or juft Relation to one an- 
 other, 
 
198 L G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 ther abftractcd from the Ufe of Language, and 
 to maintain a fteady and obftinate Refolution to 
 hearken to nothing but Truth, in whatfoever 
 Style or Drefs it appears. 
 
 Then we fhall hear a Sermon of pious and juft 
 Sentiments with Efteem and Reverence, tho' the 
 Preacher has but an unpolifh'd Style, and many 
 Defects in the manner of his Delivery. Then 
 we mall neglect and difregard all the flattering In- 
 finuations whereby the Orator would make Way 
 for his own Sentiments to take PorTeflion of our 
 Souls, if he has not folid and inftructive Senfe 
 equal to his Language. Oratory is a happy Talent 
 when it is rightly employ'd to excite the Paflions 
 to the Practice of Virtue and Piety •, but to fpeak 
 properly, this Art has nothing to do in the Search 
 after Truth. 
 
 Sect. III. 
 
 Prejudices arifing from ourfelves. 
 
 N Either Words nor Things would [o often lead 
 us aftray from Truth, if we had not with- 
 in our felves fuch Springs of Error as thefe that 
 follow. 
 
 I. Many Errors are deriv'd from our Weaknefs 
 of Reafon, and Incapacity to judge of Things in our 
 infant State. Thefe are calPd the Prejudices of 
 Infancy. We frame early Miftakes about the 
 common Objects which furround us, and the com- 
 mon Affairs of Life : We fancy the Nurfe is our 
 beft Friend, becaufe Children receive from their 
 Nurfes their Food and other Conveniences of 
 Life. We judge that Books are very unpleafant 
 Things, becaufe perhaps we have been driven to 
 
 them 
 
C. III. S. 3 . The right life of Rcafon. 1 99 
 
 them by the Scourge. We judge alfo that the 
 Skie touches the dijiant Hills, becaufe we cannot 
 inform our felves better in Childhood. We be- 
 lieve the Stars are not rifen till the Sun is fet, be- 
 caufe we never fee them by Day. But fome of 
 thefe Errors may feem to be dcriv'd from the next 
 Spring. 
 
 The Way to cure the Prejudices of Infancy is 
 to diftinguifh, as far as we can, which are thofe 
 Opinions which we fram'd in perfect Childhood, 
 to remember that at that Time our Reafon was 
 incapable of forming a right Judgment, and to 
 bring thefe Propofitions again to be examined at 
 the Bar of maturer Reafon. 
 
 II. Our Senfes give us many a falfe Informati- 
 on of Things, and tempt us to judge amifs. This 
 is call'd the Prejudice of Senfe, as when we fup- 
 pofe the Sun and Moon to be flat Bodies, and to 
 be but a few Inches broad, becaufe they appear fo 
 to the Eye. Senfe inclines us to judge that Air 
 has no Weight, becaufe we don't feel it prefs heavy 
 upon us-, and we judge alfo by our Senfes that 
 Cold and Heat, Sweet and Sour, Red and Blue, &c. 
 are fuch real Properties in the Objects themfelves, 
 and exactly like thofe Senfations which they excite 
 in us. 
 
 Note, Thofe Miitakes of this fort which all 
 Mankind drop and lofe in their advancing Age are 
 call'd mere Prejudices of Infancy, but thofe which 
 abide with the vulgar Part of the World, and 
 generally with all Men, till Learning and Philo- 
 fophy cure them, more properly retain theNam^ 
 of Prejudices of Senfe. 
 
 Thefe Prejudices are to be remov'd fcvenl Ways 
 (1.) By the Afliftance of one Senfe we cure trie 
 Miftakes of another, as when a Stick thru 
 
 4 tbt 
 
200 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 the IVaier feems crooked* we are prevented from 
 judging it to be really fo in itfelf, for when we 
 take it out of the Water* both our Sight and our 
 'Feeling agree and determine it to be flrait. (2.) 
 The Exercife of our Reafon, and an Application 
 to mathematical and phUofophical Studies, cures 
 many other Prejudices of Senfe both with Rela- 
 tion to the heavenly and earthly Bodies. (2.) We 
 mould remember that our Senfes have often de- 
 ceiv'd us in various Inftances, that they give but 
 a confus'd and imperfect Reprefentation of things 
 in many Cafes, that they often reprefent falfly 
 thofe very Objects to which they feem to be fuit- 
 ed, fuch as the Shape* Motion* Size and Situation 
 of grofs Bodies, if they are but placed at a Dif- 
 tance from us , and as for the minute Particles of 
 which Bodies are compos'd, our Senfes cannot 
 diftinguifh them. (4.) We ihould remember alfo 
 that one prime and original Defign of our Senfes 
 is to inform us what various Relations the Bodies 
 that are round about us bear to our own animal 
 Body, and to give us Notice what is pleafant and 
 ufeful, or what is painful and injurious to us j but 
 they are not fufficient of themfelves to lead us in- 
 to a philofophical Acquaintance with the inward 
 Nature of Things. It muft be confefs'd it is by 
 the Affiftance of the Eye and the Ear efpecially 
 (which are cali'd the Senfes of Difcipline) that our 
 Minds are furniuYd with various Parts of Know- 
 ledge, by reading, hearing, and oblerving Things 
 divine and human - y yet Reafon ought always to 
 accompany the Exercife of our Senfes whenever 
 we would form a jufl Judgment of Things pro? 
 pos'd to our Enquiry. 
 
 Here it is proper to obferve alfo, that as the 
 Weaknefs of Reafon in our Infancy* and the Dic- 
 tates oj cur Senfes fometimes in advancing Tears* 
 
 Jeac} 
 
C. III. S. 3 . "the right life of Reafon. 20 1 
 
 lead the wifer part of Mankind aft ray from Truth ♦, 
 fo the meaner Parts of our Species, Perfons whofe 
 Genius is very low, whofe Judgment is always 
 weak, who are ever indulging the Diclates of 
 Senfe and Humour^ are but Children of a larger 
 Size •, they ftand expos'd to everlafting Miftakes 
 in Life, and live and die in the midit of Preju- 
 dices. 
 
 III. Imagination is another fruitful Spring of 
 falfe Judgments. Our Imagination is nothing elfe 
 but the various Appearances of our fenfible Ideas 
 in the Brain, where the Soul frequently works in 
 uniting, disjoining, multiplying, magnifying, di- 
 minifhing and altering the feveral Shapes, Colours, 
 Sounds, Motions, Words and Things that have 
 been communicated to us by the outward Organs 
 of Senfe. It is no wonder therefore if Fancy 
 lead us into many Miftakes, for it is but Senfe 
 at ftcond-hand. Whatever is itrongly impreft upon 
 the Imagination fome Perfons believe to be true. 
 Some will choofe a particular Number in a Lot- 
 tery, or lay a large Wager on a fingk Chance of a 
 Dye, and doubt not of Succels, becaufe their 
 Fancy feels fo powerful an ImpreiTion, and allures 
 them it will be profperous. A thoufand pretended 
 Prophefies and Infpirations, and all the Freaks of 
 Entbufiafm have been derived from this Spring. 
 Breams arc nothing elfc but the Deceptions of 
 Fancy: A Delirium is but a fhort Wikineis of the 
 Imagination i and a fettled Irregularity of Fancy 
 is Diftraclion and Madnefs. 
 
 One Way to gain a Victory over this unruly 
 Faculty, is to fee a Watch upon it perpetually, 
 and to bridle it in all its Extravagances ; never to 
 believe any thing merely becaufe Fancy dictates it 
 *ny more than 1 would believe a Midnight Dream, 
 
 nor 
 
202 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 nor to truft Fancy any farther than it is attended 
 with fever e Reafon. It is a very ufeful and enter- 
 taining Power of human Nature in Matters of 
 Illuftration, Perfuafwn, Oratory, ' Poefy, Wit, Con- 
 versation, &c. but in the calm Enquiry after Truth 
 and final Judgment of Things Fancy mould re- 
 tire, and ftand afide, unlefs it be calFd in to ex- 
 plain or illuftrate a difficult Point by a Simi- 
 litude. 
 
 Another Method of Deliverance from thefe 
 Prejudices of Fancy, is to compare the Ideas that 
 arife in our Imaginations with the real Nature of 
 Things, as often as we have occafion to judge 
 concerning them \ and let calm and fedate Reafon 
 govern and determine our Opinions, tho' Fancy 
 fhould fhew never fo great a Reluctance. Fancy 
 is the inferior Faculty, and it ought to obey. 
 
 IV. The various Paffwns cr Affetlions of the 
 Mind are numerous and endlefs Springs of Pre- 
 judice. They difguife every Object they converfe 
 with, and put their own Colours upon it, and 
 thus lead the Judgment aftray from Truth. It is 
 Love that makes the Mother think her own Child 
 the faired, and will fometimes perfuade us that a 
 Blemi/h is a Beauty. Hope and Defire make an 
 Hour of Delay feem as long as two or three 
 Hours ; Hope inclines us to think there is nothing 
 too difficult to be attempted •, Defpair tells us that 
 a brave Attempt is mere Rafhnefs, and that every 
 Difficulty is unfurmountable. Fear makes us 
 imagine that a Bufh fhaken with the Wind has 
 fome favage Bead in it, and multiplies the Dan- 
 gers that attend our Path : But itill there is a 
 more unhappy Effect of Fear when it keeps Mil- 
 lions of Souls in Slavery to the Errors of an efta- 
 bliftud Religion : What could perfuade the wife 
 
 Men 
 
C. III. The right Ufe of Reafon. 203 
 
 Men and Philofophers of a Popijh Country to be, 
 lieve the grofs Abfurdities of the Roman Church, 
 but the Fear of Torture or Death, the Galleys or 
 the Inquifetion? Sorrow and Melancholy tempt us 
 to think our Circumftances much more difmal 
 than they are, that we may have fome Excufe for 
 Mourning ! And Envy reprefents the Condition of 
 our Neighbour better than it is, that there might 
 be fome Pretence for her own Vexation and Un- 
 eafinefs. Anger and Wrath and Revenge, and all 
 thofe hateful Paffions excite in us far worfe Ideas 
 of Men than they deferve, and perfuade us to be- 
 lieve all that is ill of them. A Detail of the Evil 
 Influence of the Affeclions of the Mind upon our 
 Judgment would make a large Volume. 
 
 The Cure of thefe Prejudices is attain'd by a 
 conftant Jealoufy of our felves, and Watchfulnefe 
 over our Paffions, that they may never interpofe 
 when we are calPd to pafs a Judgment of any thing: 
 And when our Affedtions are warmly engaged, let 
 us abftain from judging. It would be alio of great 
 Ufe to us to form our deliberate Judgments of 
 Perfons and Things in the calmeft and ftreneft 
 Hours of Life, when the PaJJions of Nature are 
 all filent, and the Mind enjoys its moll perfecl: 
 Compofure: And thefe Judgments fo formed fhould 
 t>e treafur'd up in the Mind, that we might have 
 Jlecourfe to them in Hours of Need. 
 
 V. The Fondnefs we have for Self, and the 
 Relation which other Perfons and Things have to 
 our Selves, furnifh us with another long Rank 
 of Prejudices. This indeed might be reducecj 
 to the Paffwn of Self-Love, but; it is fo copious 
 an Head that I chofe to name it as a dilrindt 
 jSpring of falfe Judgments. We are generally 
 ready to fancy every thing of 9Hr own has fome- 
 
 O thing 
 
204 LOGIC K: 0r 9 Part II. 
 
 thing peculiarly valuable in it, when indeed there 
 is no other Reafon, but becaufe it is our own. 
 Were we born amongft the Gardens of Italy, the 
 Rocks of Switzerland, or the Ice and Snows of 
 Rujfia and Sweden, ftill we fhould imagine pecu- 
 liar Excellencies in our native Land. We con- 
 ceive a good Idea of the Town and Village where 
 we firft breathed, and think the better of a Man 
 for being born near us. We entertain the beft 
 Opinion of the Perfons of our own Party, and ea- 
 fily believe evil Reports of Perfons of a different 
 Seel or Fatlion. Our own Sex, our Kindred, our 
 Houfes, and our very Names, feem to have fome- 
 thing good and defirable in them. We are ready- 
 to mingle all thefe with our felves, and cannot 
 bear to have others think meanly of them. 
 
 So good an Opinion have we of our own Senti- 
 ments and Practices, that it is very difficult to be- 
 lieve what a Reprover fays of our Conduct •, and 
 we are as ready to affent to all the Language of 
 Flattery. We fet up our own Opinions in Religi- 
 on and Philofophy as the Tefts of Orthodoxy and 
 *Truth\ and we are prone to judge every Practice 
 of other Men either a Duty or a Crime which 
 we think would be a Crime or a Duty to us, tho* 
 their Circumftances are vaftly different from our 
 own. This Humour prevails fometimes to fuch 
 a Degree, that we would make onr own Fafte and 
 Inclination the Standard by which to judge of 
 every Difh of Meat that is fet upon the Table, 
 every Book in a Library, every Employment, 
 Study and Bufinefs of Life, as well as every Re- 
 creation. 
 
 It is from this evil Principle of fetting up felf 
 for a Model what other Men ought to be, that the 
 Antichriftian Spirit of Impofition and Perfecution 
 had its Original : tho* there is no more Reafon 
 
 for 
 
C. III. S. 3. The right Ufc of Ktzfon. 205 
 
 for it than there was for the Practice of that Ty- 
 rant, who having a Bed fit for his own Size, was 
 reported to ftretch Men of low Stature upon the 
 Rack, till they were drawn out to the Length of 
 his Bed ; and fome add alfo that he cut off the 
 Legs of any whom he found too long for it. 
 
 It is alfo from a Principle near akin to this that 
 we pervert and ftrain the Writings of any vene- 
 rable Authors, and efpecially the facred Books of 
 Scripture to make them fpeak our own Senfe, 
 Thro' the Influence which our own Schemes or 
 Hypothefes have upon the Mind, we fometimes 
 become fo fharp-fighted as to find thefe Schemes 
 in thofe Places of Scripture where the holy Wri- 
 ters never thought of them, nor the holy Spirit 
 intended them. At other times this Prejudice 
 brings fuch a Dimnefsupon the Sight, that we can^ 
 not read any thing that oppofes our own Scheme, 
 tho' it be written as with Sun-beams, and in the 
 plaineft Language j and perhaps we are in Dan- 
 ger in fuch a Cafe of winking a little againft the 
 Light, 
 
 We ought to bring our Minds free, unbiafiVJ 
 and teachable to learn our Religion from the 
 Word of God ; but we have generally form'd all 
 the lefTer as well as the greater Points of our Re- 
 ligion beforehand, and then we read theProphers 
 and Apoflles only to perfuade them to confirm 
 our own Opinions. Were it not for this Influ- 
 ence of Sel[\ and a Bigotry to our own Tenets, 
 we could hardly imagine that fo many flrange, 
 abfurd, inconfiltent, wicked, mifchievous, and 
 bloody Principles fhould pretend to fupport and 
 defend themfelvcs by the Gofpel of Cbriji. 
 
 Every learned Cntick has bis oiin Hypothecs; 
 and if the common Ttxl be not favourable to his 
 Opinion, a various Letlwn ihall be made authen- 
 
 O l tick 
 
2o6 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 tick. The Text mud be fuppos'd to be defective 
 or redundant, and the. Senfe of it fhall be literal 
 or metaphorical^ according as it bed fupports his 
 own Scheme. Whole Chapters or Books fhall 
 be added or left out of the facred Canon, or be 
 turn'd into Parables by this Influence. Luther 
 knew not well how to reconcile the Epiftle of St. 
 James to the Doctrine of Juftification by Faith 
 alone, and fo he could not allow it to be Divine. 
 The Papifts bring all the Apocrypha into their 
 Bible, and (lamp Divinity upon it •, for they can 
 fancy -Purgatory is there and they find Prayers for 
 the Dead. But they leave out the fecond Com- 
 mandment becauje it forbids the Worftjip of Images. 
 Others fuppofe the Mofaick Hijlory of the Creation 
 and the Fall of Man to be oriental Ornaments, or 
 a mere Allegory, becaufe the literal Senfe of thofe 
 three Chapters of Genefis don't agree with their 
 Theories. Even an honeft plain-hearted and un- 
 learned Chriftian is ready to find fomething in e- 
 very Chapter of the Bible, to countenance his 
 own private Sentiments ; but he loves thofe Chap- 
 ters befl which fpeak his own Opinions plainer!: : 
 This is a Prejudice that (licks very clofe to our 
 Natures •, the Scholar is infefted with it daily, and 
 the Mechanick is not free. 
 
 Self has yet a farther and pernicious Influence 
 upon our Underftandings, and is an unhappy 
 Guide in the Search after Truth. When our own 
 Inclination, or our Eafe, our Honour or our Profit 
 tempts us to the Practice of any thing of fufpect- 
 ed Lawfulnefs, how do we (train our Thoughts 
 to find Arguments for it, and perfuade our felves 
 it is lawful : We "colour over Iniquity and finful 
 Compliance with the Names of Virtue and Inno- 
 cence, or at lead of Conftraint and JSecefftty. All 
 the different and oppofite Sentiments and Practi- 
 ces 
 
C. III. S. 3. The right XJfe of Reafon. 207 
 
 ces of Mankind are too much influenced by this 
 mean Bribery, and give too juft Occafion for fa- 
 tyrical Writers to fay that Self- Inter eft governs all 
 Mankind. 
 
 When the Judge had awarded due Damages to 
 a Perfon into whofe Field a Neighbour's Oxen 
 had broke, it is reported that he reverfed his own 
 Sentence, when he heard that the Oxen which 
 had done this Mifchief were his own. Whether 
 this be a Hiftory or a Parable, it is dill a juft Re- 
 prefentation of the wretched Influence of Self to 
 corrupt the Judgment. 
 
 One Way to amend this Prejudice is to thrufl 
 Self fo far out of the Queftion that it may have 
 no manner of Influence whenfoever we are call'd 
 to judge and confider the naked Nature, Truth 
 and Juftice of Things. In Matters of Equity 
 between Man and Man, our Saviour has taught 
 us an effectual Means of guarding againft this Pre- 
 judice, and that is to put my Neighbour in the 
 Place of my Self, and my Self in the Place of my 
 Neighbour, rather than be brib'd by this corrupt 
 Principle of Self-Love to do Injury to our Neigh- 
 bours. Thence arifes that Golden Rule of dealing 
 with others as we would have others deal with us. 
 
 In the Judgment of Truth and Falfhood, Right 
 and Wrong, Good and Evil, we ought to confider 
 that every Man has a Self as well as we •, and 
 that the Taftes, Pafllons, Inclinations and Inte- 
 refts of different Men are very different, and often 
 contrary, and that they dictate contrary Things: 
 Unlefs therefore all manner of different and con- 
 trary Propofitions could be true at once, Self can 
 never be a juft Tell or Standard of Truth and 
 Falfiood) Good and Evil. 
 
 O ? VI. The 
 
ao8 LO G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 VI. The Tempers, Hiimours, and peculiar Turns 
 of the Mind? whether they be natural or acquir'd, 
 have a great Influence upon our Judgment, and 
 become the Occafion of many Miftakes. Let us 
 furvey a few of them. 
 
 (i.) Some Perfons are of an dafy and credulous 
 Temper, while others are perpetually difcovering a 
 Spirit of Contradiction. 
 
 The credulous Man is ready to receive every thing 
 for Truth, that has but a Shadow of Evidence \ 
 every new Book that he reads, and every ingeni- 
 ous Man with whom he converfes, has Power e- 
 nough to draw him into the Sentiments of the 
 Speaker or Writer. He has fo much Complai- 
 fance in him, or Weaknefs of Soul, that he is 
 ready to refign his own Opinion to the firfl Ob- 
 jection w r hich he hears, and to receive any Senti- 
 ments cf another that are afTerted with a pofitive 
 Air and much AfTurance. Thus he is under a 
 kind of Necefilty, thro' the Indulgence of this 
 credulous Humour, either to be often changing 
 his Opinions, or to believe Inconfiftencies. 
 
 The Man of Contradiction is of a contrary Hu- 
 mour> for he (lands ready to oppofe every thing 
 that is faid : he gives a flight Attention to the 
 Reafons of other Men, from an inward fcornful 
 Prefumption that they have no Strength in them. 
 "When he reads or hears a Difcourfe different from 
 his own Sentiments, he does not give himfelf leave 
 to confider whether that Difcourfe may be true •, 
 but employs all his Powers immediately to con- 
 fute it. Your great Difputers and your Men of 
 Controvert are in continual Danger of this fort of 
 Prejudice: they contend often for Victory, and 
 will maintain whatfoever they have afTerted, while 
 Truth is loft in the Noife and Tumult of reci- 
 procal 
 
CJII. S. 3. tte right Ufe gfReafon. 209 
 
 procal Contradictions* and it frequently happens 
 that a Debate about Opinions is turned into a mu- 
 tual Reproach of Perfons. 
 
 The Prejudices of Credulity may in fome Mea- 
 fure be cur'd by learning to fet a high Value on 
 Truth, and by taking more Pains to attain it 5 re- 
 membring that Truth oftentimes lies dark and 
 deep, and requires us to dig for it as for hid Trea- 
 fure i and that Falfhood often puts on a fair Dif- 
 guife, and therefore we fhould not yield up our 
 Judgment to every plaufible Appearance. It is 
 no part of Civility or good Breeding to part with 
 Truth, but to maintain it with Decency and 
 Candor. 
 
 A Spirit of Contradiction is fo pedantick and 
 hateful that a Man fhould take much Pains with 
 himfelf to watch againft every Inftance of it : He 
 fhould learn fo much good Humour at lead as ne- 
 ver to oppofe any thing without juft and folid 
 Reafon for it : He fhould abate fome Degrees of 
 Pride and Morofenefs, which are never failing In- 
 gredients in this fort of Temper, and fhould feek 
 after fo much Honefty and Confcience as never to 
 contend for Conqueft or Triumph ; but to re- 
 view his own Reafons, and to read the Arguments 
 of his Opponents (if poffihle.) with an equal In- 
 differency, and be glad to fpy Truth, and to fub- 
 mit to it, tho' it appear on the oppofite Side. 
 
 (2.) There is another Pair of Prejudices deriv'd 
 from two Tempers of Mind, near akin to thofe I 
 have juft mentioned; and thefe are die dogmatical 
 and the fceptical Humour •, i. e. always pofitive^ or 
 always doubting. 
 
 By what means foever the Dogmatift came by 
 his Opinions, whether by his Senfes, or by his 
 Fancy, his Education, or his own Reading, yet 
 he believes them all with the fame Affurance that 
 
 O 4 he 
 
gio LOGICK: Or, Part ft 
 
 he does a mathematical Truth ; he has fcarce any 
 fnere Probabilities that belong to him -, every thing 
 with him is certain and infallible ; every Punctilio 
 in Religion is an Article of his Faith, and he an- 
 fwers all manner of Objections by a fovereign 
 Contempt. 
 
 Perfons of this Temper are feldom to be con- 
 vinced of any Miftake: A full Aflurance of their 
 own Notions makes all the Difficulties of their 
 own Side vanifh fo entirely, that they think eve- 
 ry Point of their Belief is written as with Sun- 
 beams, and wonder any one fhould find a Diffi- 
 culty in it. They are amazed that learned Men 
 fhould make a Controverfy of what is to them 
 fo perfpicuous and indubitable. The loweft Rank 
 of People both in learned and in vulgar Life is 
 Very fubject to this G'Sftinacy. 
 
 Scepticifm is a contrary Prejudice. The Dogma- 
 tift is fure of every thing, and the Seep tick be- 
 lieves nothing. Perhaps he has found himfelf of- 
 ten miftaken in Matters of which he thought 
 himfelf well afiur'd in his younger Days, and 
 therefore he is afraid to give AfTent to any 
 thing again. He fees fo much Shew of Reafon 
 for every Opinion, and fo many Objections alfo 
 arifing againft every Doctrine, that he is ready- 
 to throw off the Belief of every thing : He re- 
 nounces at once the Purfuit of Truth, and contents 
 himfelf to fay, There is nothing certain. It is well 
 if thro' the Influence of fuch a Temper he docs 
 not caft away his Religion as well as his Philofo- 
 fhy, and abandon himfelf to a profane Courfe of 
 Life, regard lefs of Hell and Heaven. 
 
 Both thefe Prejudices laft mentioned, tho' they 
 ate fo oppolite to each other, yet they arife from 
 the fame Spring, and that is, Impatience of Study, 
 &nd Want of diligent Attention in the Search of 
 
 Truth. 
 
C. III. S. 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon. 2 1 1 
 
 Truth. The Dogmatift is in hade to believe fome- 
 thing •, he can't keep himfelf long enough in Suf- 
 pence till fome bright and convincing Evidence 
 appear on one Side •, but throws himfelf cafually 
 into the Sentiments of one Party or another, and 
 then he will hear no Argument to the contrary. 
 The Sceptick will not take Pains to fearch Things 
 to the Bottom, but when he fees Difficulties on 
 both Sides refolves to believe neither of them. 
 Humility of Soul, Patience in Studs, Diligence in 
 Enquiry, with an honeft Zeal for Truth, would go 
 a great way towards the Cure of both thefe Fol- 
 lies. 
 
 (3.) Another fort of Temper that is very injuri- 
 ous to a right Judgment of things is an inconftant^ 
 fickle, changeable Spirit, and a very uneven Temper 
 of Mind. When fuch Perfons are in one Hu- 
 mour, they pafs a Judgment of Things agreeable 
 to it •, when their Humour changes, they reverfc 
 their firft Judgment, and embrace a new Opinion. 
 They have no Steadinefs of Soul ; they want Firm- 
 nefs of Mind fufficient to eftablim themfelves in 
 any Truth, and are ready to change it for the 
 next alluring Falfhood that is agreeable to their 
 Change of Humour. This Ficklenefs is fometimes 
 fo mingled with their very Conftitution by Na- 
 ture or by Diftemper of Body, that a cloudy Bay 
 and a lowing She fhall ftrongly incline them to 
 form an Opinion, both of themfelves and of Per- 
 fons and Things round about them, quite different 
 from what they believe when the Sun J/jines and 
 the Heavens are ferene. 
 
 This fort of People ought to judge of Things 
 and Perfons in their moft fedate, peaceful and 
 compofed Hours of Life, and referve thefe Judg- 
 ments for their Conduct at more unhappy Sea- 
 Tons. 
 
 (4.) Some 
 
212 LOGIC K: Or y PartIL 
 
 (4.) Some Perfons have a violent and turgid Man- 
 ner both of Talking and Thinking \ whatfoever they 
 judge of, it is always with a Tincture of this Va- 
 nity. They are always in Extremes, and pro 
 nounce concerning every thing in the Superlative. 
 If they think a Man to be learned, he is the chief 
 Scholar of the Age ; if another has low Parts, be 
 is the great eft Blockhead in Nature : If they ap- 
 prove any Book on divine Subjects, it is the heft 
 Book in the World next to the B'ble, if they fpeak 
 of a Storm of Rain or Hail, it is the moft terrible 
 Storm that fell face the Creation s and a cold Win- 
 ter Day is the coldefl that ever was known. 
 
 But die Men of u\\t -i idling Language ought 
 to remember that Nature has ten thoufand mode- 
 rate Things in ir, and does not always deal in Ex- 
 tremes as they do. 
 
 {5.) I think it may be call'd another fort of 
 Prejudices derived from Humour, when fome Men 
 believe a Dotlrine merely becanfe it is ancient and 
 has been long beiiev'd; others are fo fond of No- 
 velty, that nodiing prevails upon their AfTent fo 
 jnuch as new Thoughts and new Notions. Again, 
 there are fome who fet a high Efteem upon every 
 thing that is foreign, ami far '-fetched; therefore 
 China Piclures are admir'd, how aukward foever: 
 Others value Things the more for being of our 
 own native Growth, Invention, or Manufacture y 
 And thefe as much defpife foreign Things. 
 
 Some Men of Letters and Theology will not be- 
 lieve a Proportion even concerning a fublime Sub- 
 ject, till every thing myfterious, deep and diffi- 
 cult is cut off from it, tho' the Scripture afferts 
 it never fo plainly, others are fo fond of a My- 
 ftcry and Things incomprehenfible, that they would 
 fcarce believe die Doctrine of the Trinity^ if it 
 could be explain'd \ they incline to that foolifh 
 
 Rant 
 
C.III.S. 3. TherightUfecfRttfoxi. 213 
 
 Rant of one of the Antients, Credo quia impcjji- 
 bile eft -, I believe ic becaufe it is impoflible. 
 
 To cure thefe Miftakes remember that neither 
 antique or novel, foreign or native, myfterious or 
 plain, are certain Characters either of Truth or 
 Falfhood. 
 
 I might mention various other Humours of Men 
 that excite in them various Prejudices, and lead 
 them into rafh and miitaken Judgments.^ but thefe 
 are fufficient for a Specimen. 
 
 VII. There are feveral other JVeahieffes which 
 belong to human Nature, whereby we are led in- 
 to Miftakes, and indeed are render'd almoft unca- 
 pable of palling a folid Judgment in Matters of 
 great Depth and Difficulty. Some have a native 
 Obfcurity of Perception, (or fha.Il I call it a want 
 of natural Sagacity? whereby they are hinder'd 
 from attaining clear and diitincl: Ideas. Their 
 Thoughts always feem to have fomething con- 
 fus'd and cloudy in them, and therefore they judge 
 in the dark. Some have zDefeel in Memory, and 
 then they are not capable of comparing their pre- 
 fent Ideas with a great Variety of other, in or- 
 der to fecure themfelves from Inconfiilency in 
 Judgment. Others may have a Memory large 
 enough, yet they are fu eject to the fame Errors 
 from a Narrownefs of Soul, and fuch a Fixation and 
 Confinement of Thought to a few Objecls, that they 
 fcarce ever take a Survey of Things wide enough 
 to judge wifely and well, and to fecure themfelves 
 from all Inconfiftencies. 
 
 Tho' thefe are natural Defects and Weakneffct 
 yet they may in fome meafure be relieved by La- 
 bour, Diligence and a due Attention to proper 
 Rules. 
 
 But 
 
214 LOGIC R: Or, Part II. 
 
 But among all the Caufes of falfe Judgment 
 which are within our/elves, I ought by no means 
 to leave out that univerfal and original Spring of 
 Error, which we are inform'd of by the Word 
 of God, and that is the Sin and Defeclion of our 
 firft Parents, whereby all our belt natural Powers 
 both of Mind and Body are impair'd, and ren- 
 dered very much inferior to what they were in 
 a State of Innocence. Our Underftanding is 
 darken'd, our Memory contracted, our corrupt 
 Humours and PafTions are grown predominant, 
 our Reafon infeebled, and various Disorders attend 
 our Conftitution and animal Nature, whereby the 
 Mind is ftrangely impos'd upon in its judgment 
 of Things. Nor is there any perfect Relief to 
 be expected on Earth. There is no hope of ever 
 recovering from thefe Maladies, but by ^fincere 
 Return to God in the Ways of his own Appoint- 
 ment, whereby we mail be kept fafe from all dan- 
 gerous and pernicious Errors in the Matters of 
 Religion j and tho 5 Imperfections and Mijlakes will 
 hang about us in the v prefent Life as the Effects 
 of our original Apoftacy from God, yet we hope 
 for a full Deliverance from them when we arrive 
 at Heaven. 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 
 Prejudices ariftng from other Perfons. 
 
 WERE it not for the Springs of Prejudice, 
 that are lurking in our J elves, we mould not 
 be fubject to fo many Miftakes from the Influence 
 of others : But fince our Nature is fo fufceptive 
 of Errors on all Sides, it is fit we mould have 
 Hints and Notices given us, how far other Per- 
 fons may have Power over us, and become the 
 2 Caufes 
 
C. III. S. 4. The right life of Reafon. 2 1 5 
 
 Caufes of our falfe Judgments. This might aft 
 be caft into one Heap, for they are all near akin, 
 and mingle with each other : But for Diftinclion 
 fake let them be callM the Prejudices of Education , 
 of Cufiom, of Authority, and fuch as arife from the 
 manner of Proposal. 
 
 I. Thofe with whom our Education is entruft- 
 ed may lay the firft Foundation of many Miftakes 
 in our younger Years. How many Fooleries and 
 Errors are inftilPd into us by our Nurfes, our 
 Fellow-Children, by Servants or unfkilful Teach- 
 ers, which are not only maintain'd through the fol- 
 lowing Parts of Life, but fometimes have a very 
 unhappy Influence upon us ! We are taught that 
 there are Goblings and Bugbears in the Dark j our 
 young Minds are crouded with the terrible Ideas 
 of Ghofts appearing upon every Occafwn, or with the 
 pleafanter Tales of Fairies dancing at Midnight. 
 We learn to prophefy betimes, to foretel Futurities 
 by good or evil Omens, and to prefage approaching 
 Death in a Family by Ravens and little Worms, 
 which we therefore call a Death-watch. We arc 
 taught to know beforehand, for a Twelvemonth 
 together, which Days of the Week will be fair or 
 foul, which will be lucky or unlucky -, nor is there 
 any Thing fo filly, but may be impos'd upon our 
 Underltandings in that early part of Lifej and 
 thefe ridiculous Stories abide with us too long, 
 and too far influence the weaker Part of Man- 
 kind. 
 
 We chufe our particular Seel and Party in the 
 civil, the religious and the learned Life, by the In- 
 fluence of Education. In the Colleges of Learn- 
 ing, fome are for the Nomina Is, and fome for the 
 Realifls in the Science of Metaphy licks, becaufe 
 their Tutors were devoted to thefe Parties. The 
 
 old 
 
2i6 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 old Philofophy and the nezv have gained thoufands 
 of Partizans the fame Way : And every Religion 
 has its Infant Votaries,, who are born, live and die 
 in the fame F'aith without Examination of any 
 Article. The Turks are taught early to believe in 
 Mahomet ; the Jews in Mofes ; the Heathens wor- 
 fhip a Multitude of Gods under the Force of their 
 Education. And it would be well if there were 
 not Millions of Cbrijlians, who have little more 
 to fay for their Religion, than that they were 
 born and bred up in it. The greated part of the 
 Chriftian World can hardly give any Reafon why 
 they believe the Bible to be the Word of God, but 
 becaufe they have always believ'd it, and they 
 were taught fo from their Infancy. As Jews and 
 Turks, and American Heathens believe the moft 
 monftrous and incredible Stories, becaufe they 
 have been train'd up amongft them, as Articles of 
 Faith -, fo the Papifts believe their Tranfubftanti- 
 ation, and make no Difficulty of aifenting to Im- 
 pofiibilities, fince it is the current Doctrine of 
 their Catechifms. By the fame Means the feveral 
 Sects and Parties in Chriftianity believe all the 
 framed Interpretations of Scripture by which they 
 have been taught to fupport their own Tenets : 
 They find nothing difficult in all the abfurd Glof- 
 fes and far-fetch* d Senfes that are fometimes put up- 
 on the Words of the facred Writers, becaufe their 
 Ears have been always accuftom'd to thefe Glofles \ 
 and therefore they fit fo fmooth and eafy upon 
 their Understandings, that they know not how 
 to admit the moil natural and eafy Interpretation 
 in Oppolition to them. 
 
 In the fame manner we are nurft up in many 
 filly and grofs Miftakcs about domeftick Affairs as 
 well as in Matters of political Concernment. It 
 is upon the fame Ground that Children are train'd 
 
 UP 
 
C. HI. S. 4. The right Ufe of Reafon. 2 1 7 
 
 tip to be TV bigs and Tories betimes •, and every one 
 learns the diftinguifhing Terms of his own Party, 
 as the Papijls learn to fay tbeir Prayers in Latin , 
 without any Meaning, Reafon, or Devotion. 
 
 This fort of Prejudice muft be cur'd by calling 
 all the Principles of our younger Years to the Bar 
 of more mature Reafon, that we may judge of 
 the Things of Nature and political Affairs by juft- 
 cr Rules of Philofophy and Obfervation : And e- 
 ven the Matters of Religion muft be firft enquir'd. 
 into by Reafon and Conscience, and when thefe have 
 led us to believe Scripture to be the Word of God, 
 then that becomes our fovereign Guide, and Rea- 
 fon and Confcience muft fubmit to receive its 
 Dictates. 
 
 II. The next Prejudice which I (hall mentioa 
 is, that which arifes from the Cuftom or FafJoion cf 
 thofe amongft whom we live. Suppofe we have 
 freed our felves from the younger Prejudices of our 
 Education, yet we are in Danger of having our 
 Mind turned afide from Truth by the Influence 
 of general Cuftom. 
 
 Our Opinion of Meats and Brinks, of Gar- 
 ments and Forms of Salutation are influenc'd much 
 more by Cuftom than by the Eye, rhe Ear, or the 
 Tafte. Cuftom prevails even over Senfe itfelf, and 
 therefore no Wonder if it prevail over Reafon too. 
 What is it but Cuftom that renders many of the 
 Mixtures of Food and Sauces elegant in Britain y 
 which would be aukward and naufeous to the In- 
 habitants of China, and indeed were naufeous to 
 us when we firft rafted them ; What but Cuftom 
 could make thofe Salutations polite in Alufcovy, 
 which are ridiculous in France <# England? We 
 call our felves indeed the politer Nations, but it is 
 we who judge thus of ourfdvesi and that ran- 
 2 cicd 
 
218 LOG IC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 cied Polltenefs is oftentimes more owing to Cuftom 
 than Reafon. Why are the Forms of our prefent 
 Garments counted beautiful, and thofe Fafhions of 
 our Anceftors the Matter of Scoff and Contempt, 
 which in their Day were all decent and genteel } 
 It is Cuftom that forms our Opinion of Drefs, and 
 reconciles us by Degrees to thofe Habits which 
 at firft feem'd very odd and monftrous. It muft 
 be granted there are fome Garments and Habits 
 which have a natural Congruity or Incongruity, 
 Modefty or Immodefty. Decency or Indecency, 
 Gaudery or Gravity ; tho' for the moft part there 
 is but little of Reafon in thefe Affairs : But what; 
 little there is of Reafon or natural Decency, Cuftom 
 triumphs over it all. It is almoft impoflible to 
 perfuade a gay Lady that any thing can be de- 
 cent which is out of Fajhion: And it were well if 
 Fajbion ftretch'd its Powers no farther than the 
 Bufmcfs of Drapery and the Fair Sex. 
 
 The Methods of our Education are govern'd 
 by Cuftom. It is Cuftom and not Reafon that fends 
 every Boy to learn the Roman Poets, and begin a 
 little Acquaintance with Greek, before he is bound 
 an Apprentice to a Soapboiler or Leatherfeller. 
 It is Cuftom alone that teaches us Latin by the 
 Rules of a Latin Grammar •, a tedious and abfurd 
 Method ! And what is it but Cuftom that has for 
 paft Centuries confin'd the brighteft Genius's e- 
 ven of high Rank in the Female World to the 
 only Bufinefs of the Needle, and fecluded them 
 moil unmercifully from the Pleafures of Know- 
 ledge, and the Divine Improvements of Reafon ? 
 But we begin to break all thefe Chains, and Rea^ 
 fon begins to diclate the Education of Youth, 
 May the growing Age be learned and wife ! 
 
 U 
 
C. III. S. 4. The right tf/^Reafon, 2 r 9 
 It is by the Prejudice arifing from ou'r own Cuf- 
 torn, that we judge of all other civil and religious 
 Forms and Praclices. The Rites and Ceremonies 
 of War and /\f£tt in other Nations, the Forms 
 of Wedding and Funerals* the feveral Ranks of 
 Magiftracy* the Trades and Employments of both 
 Sexes, the publick and the domejlick Affairs of Life, 
 and almoft every thing of foreign Cuftoms is judg'd 
 irregular. It is all imagin'd to be unreafonable or 
 unnatural, by thofe who have no other Rule to 
 judge of Nature and Reafon* but the Cuftoms of 
 their own Country, or the little Town where they 
 dwell. Cuftom is call'd zfecond Nature* but we 
 often miftake it for Nature itfelf 
 
 Befides all this, there is a Faftiion in Opinions* 
 there is a Fafliion in Writing and Printing, in 
 Style and Language. In our Day it is the Vogue 
 of the Nation, that Parliaments may fettle the 
 Succeffion of the Crown^ and that a People can make 
 a King *, in the lad Age this was a Doctrine akin 
 to Treafon. Citations from the Latin Poets were 
 an Embellifhment of Style in the laft Century, 
 and whole Pages in that Day were cover'd with 
 them-, it is now forbidden by Cuftom, and ex- 
 pos'd by the Name of Pedantry ; whereas in 
 Truth both thefe are Extremes. Sometimes our 
 printed Books fhall abound in Capitals* and fome- 
 times reject them all. Now we deal much in Ef- 
 faySy and mod unreafonably defpife fyflematic 
 Learning, whereas our Fathers had a juft Value 
 for Regularity and Syjlems ; then Folio's and 
 Quarto's were the fafhionable Sizes, as Volumes 
 in OUavo are now. We are ever ready to run in- 
 to Extremes, and yet Cujlom ftill perfuades us 
 that Fjafon and Nature are on our Side. 
 
 P This 
 
22o LOG I CK: Or, Part II. 
 
 This Bufincfs of the Fafhion has a molt power- 
 ful Influence on our Judgments •, for it employs 
 thofc two ftrong Engines of Fear and Shame to 
 operate upon our Underftandings with unhappy 
 Succefs. We are afham'd to believe or profefs an 
 unfafhionable Opinion in Philofophy, and a cow- 
 ardly Soul dares not fo much as indulge a Thought 
 contrary to the eftabliflfd or fajhionable Faith, nor 
 act in Oppofition to Cuftmn, tho' it be according 
 to the Dictates of Reafon. 
 
 I confefs, there is a Refpect due to Mankind 
 which fhould incline even the wifeft of Men to 
 follow the innocent Cuftoms of their Country in 
 outward Practices of the Civil Life, and in fome 
 Meafure to fubmit to Fafhion in all indifferent Af- 
 fairs, where Reafon and Scripture make no Re- 
 monflrances againfl it. But the Judgments of the 
 Mind ought to be for ever free, and not biais'd 
 by the Cufloms and Fajhions of any Age or Nati- 
 on whatfoever. 
 
 To deliver our Underftandings from this Dan- 
 ger and Slavery, we mould confider thefe three 
 Things. 
 
 i. That the grcateft Part of the Civil Cuftoms 
 of any particular Nation or Age fpring from 
 Humour rather than Reafon. Sometimes the Hu- 
 mour of the Prince prevails, and fome times the 
 Humour of the People. It is either the Great or 
 the Many who dictate the Fafhion, and thefe have 
 not always the higheft Reafon on their Side. 
 
 2. Confider alio, that the Cufloms of the fame 
 Nation in different Ages, the Cuftoms of different 
 Nations in the fame Age, and the Cuftoms of dif- 
 ferent Towns and Villages in the fame Nation, are 
 very various and contrary to each other. The 
 fafhionable Learning, Language, Sentiments and 
 Rule* of Politenefs differ greatly in different Coun- 
 tries 
 
C. 1IL 5. 4. The right UftofRczfon. 22 1 
 
 tries and Ages of Mankind $ but Thrift and Reafon 
 are of a more uniform and fteady Nature, and 
 don't change with the Fafhion. Upon this Ac- 
 count, to cure the Prepoffeffwns which arife from 
 Cuftom, it is of excellent Ufe to travel, and fee the 
 Cufloms of various Countries, and to read the 
 Travels of other Men, and the Hiftory of pad 
 Ages, that every thing may not feem ftrange and 
 uncouth which is not pra&is'd within the Limits 
 of our own Parifh, or in the narrow Space of ou t 
 own Life-time. 
 
 3. Confider yet again, how often we our felves 
 have chang'd our own Opinions concerning the 
 Decency, Propriety, or Congruity of feveral 
 Modes or Practices in the World, efpecially if we 
 have lived to the Age of thirty or forty. Cuftom 
 or Fafhion , even in all its Changes, has been rea- 
 dy to have fome Degree of Afcendency over our 
 Undcrftanding, and what at one time feem'd de- 
 cent, appears obfolete and difagreeable afterward, 
 when the Fafhion changes. Let us learn there- 
 fore to abftract as much as pofliblc from Cuftom 
 and Fafhion, when we would pafs a Judgment 
 concerning the real Value and intrinfic Nature of 
 Things. 
 
 III. The Authority of Men is the Spring of another 
 Rank of Prejudices. 
 
 Among thcfe the Authority of our Forefathers 
 and ancient Authors is mod remarkable. We pay 
 Deference to the Opinions of others, merely be- 
 caufe they liv'd a thoufand Years before us ; and 
 even the Trifles and Impertinencics that have a 
 Mark of Antiquity upon them are revercnc'd for 
 this Reifon, becaufe they came from t!ie Anci- 
 ents. It is granted, that the Ancients had many 
 wife and great Men among them, and fome of 
 P 2 their 
 
112 LOG I CK: Or, Part II. 
 
 their Writings, which Time hath deliver'd down 
 to us, as truly valuable : But thofe Writers lived 
 rather in the Infant-State of the World ; and the 
 Pbilofopbers, as well as the polite Autbors of our 
 Age, are properly the Elders, who have feen the 
 Mi (lakes of the younger Ages of Mankind, and 
 corrected them by Observation and Experience. 
 
 Some borrow all their Religion from the Fa- 
 thers of the Chriftian Church, or from their Sy- 
 nods or Councils s but he that will read Monfieur 
 Daille on the Ufe of the Fathers will find many 
 Reafons why they are by no means fit to dictate 
 our Faith, fince we have the Gofpel of Chrift, 
 and the Writings of the Apoflles and Prophets in 
 our own Hands. 
 
 Some Perfons believe every thing that their 
 Kindred, their Parents, and their Tutors believe. 
 The Veneration and the Love which they have 
 for their Anceftors inclines them to fwallow down 
 all their Opinions at once, without examining 
 what Truth or Falfhood there is in them. Men 
 take up their Principles by Inheritance, and de- 
 fend them as they would their Eftates, becaufe 
 they are born Heirs to them. I freely grant, that 
 Parents are appointed by God and Nature to teach 
 us all the Sentiments and Practices of our younger 
 Years; and happy are thofe whofe Parents lead 
 them into the Paths of Wifdom and Truth ! I 
 grant farther, that when Perfons come to Years 
 of Difcretion, and judge for themfelves, they 
 ought to examine the Opinions of their Parents 
 with the greateft Modefty, and with a humble 
 Deference to their fuperior Character ; they ought 
 in Matters perfectly dubious to give the Prefer- 
 ence to their Parents Advice, and always to pay 
 them the firft Refpect, nor ever depart from their 
 Opinions and Practice, till Reaibn and Confciencc 
 
 4 make 
 
C. III. S. 4. "The right Ufe 0/* Reafon. 223 
 
 make it neceflary. But after all, it is pofiible that 
 Parents may be miftaken, and therefore Reafon 
 and Scripture ought to be our final Rules of De- 
 termination in Matters that relate to this World, 
 and that which is to come. 
 
 Sometimes a favourite Author, or a Writer of 
 great Name, drags a thoufand Followers after him 
 into his own Miflakes, merely by the Authority 
 of his Name and Character. The Sentiments of 
 Ariftotle were imbib'd and maintain'd by all the 
 Schools in Europe for feveral Centuries ; and a 
 Citation from his Writings was thought a fuffi- 
 cient Proof of any Propofition. The great Def 
 cartes had alfo too many implicit Believers in the 
 lafl Age, tho' he himfelf, in his Philofophy, dis- 
 claims all fuch Influence over the Minds of his 
 Readers. Calvin and Luther, in the Days of Re- 
 formation from Popery, were learned and pious 
 Men, and there have been a SuccefTion of their 
 Difciples even to this Day, who pay too much 
 Reverence to the Words of their Mailers. There 
 are others who renounce their Authority, but 
 give themfelves up in too fervile a manner to the 
 Opinion and Authority of other Maftera, and fol- 
 low as bad or worfe Guides in Religion. 
 
 If only learned, and wife, and good Men had 
 Influence on the Sentiments of others, it would 
 be at leaft a more excufable fort of Prejudice, and 
 there would be fome Colour and Shadow of Rea- 
 fon for it: But that Riches, Honours, and outward 
 Splendour mould fet up Perfons for Dictators to all 
 the reft of Mankind ; this is a moil fhameful In- 
 vafion of the Right of our Underftandings on the 
 one hand, and as fhameful a Slavery of the Soul 
 on the other. The poor Man or the Labourer too 
 often believes fuch a Principle in Politicks, or in 
 Morality, and judges concerning the Rights of the 
 
 P 3 King 
 
224 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 King and the People, juft as his wealthy Neighbour 
 does. Half the Parifh follows the Opinion of 
 the Efquire, and the 'Tenants of a Manor fall into 
 the Sentiments of their Lord, efpecially if he lives 
 amongft them. How unreafonable and yet how 
 common is this? 
 
 As for Principles of Religion, we frequently 
 find how they are taken up and forfaken, chang'd 
 and refum'd by the Influence of Princes. In all 
 Nations the Priefis have much Power alfo in dic- 
 tating the Religion of the People, but the Princes 
 didbate to them : And where there is a great Pomp 
 -and Grandeur attending the Priefthood in any 
 Religion whatsoever, with fo much the more Re- 
 verence and ftronger Faith do the People believe 
 whatever they teach them : Yet it is too often 
 evident that Riches, and Dominions, and high Ti- 
 tles in Church or State have no manner of Pre- 
 tence to Truth and Certainty, Wifdom and Good- 
 jiefs, above the reft of Mortals, becaufe thefe Su- 
 periorities in this World are not always confer'd 
 according to Merit. 
 
 I confefs, where a Man of JVifdom and Tears, 
 of Ohfervation and Experience, gives us his Opi- 
 nion and Advice in Matters of the civil or the 
 moral Life, Reafon tells us we fhould pay a great 
 Attention to him, it is probable he may be in the 
 Right. Where a Man of long Exercife in Piety 
 fpeaks of practical Religion, there is a due Defe- 
 rence to be paid to his Sentiments : And the fame 
 we may fay concerning an ingenious Man long verf- 
 ed in any Art or Science, he may juitly expecl due 
 Regard when he fpeaks of his own Affairs and 
 proper Bufinefs. But in other Things each of thefe 
 may be ignorant enough, notwithstanding all their 
 Piety, and Years, and particular Skill : Nor even 
 in their own proper Province 'arc they to be believ*d 
 
 in 
 
CIII.S. 4- The right Vf< of 'Reafon. 225 
 
 in every thing without Referve, and without Ex- 
 amination. 
 
 To free our felves from thefe Prejudices, it is 
 fufficient to remember that there is no Rank nor 
 Character among Mankind, which has any juft 
 Pretence to fway the Judgments of other Men 
 by their Authority : For there have been Perfons 
 of the fame Rank and Character who have main- 
 tain'd different and contrary Sentiments ; but all 
 thefe can never be true, and therefore the mere 
 Name or Reputation that any of them poiTeflcs, 
 is not a fufficient Evidence of Truth. 
 
 Shall we believe the Ancients in Philofophy ? But 
 fome of the Ancients were S tricks, fomc Pcripa- 
 leticks, fome Platonicks, and fome Epicureans, fome 
 Cynics, and fome Sceptics. Shall we judge of Mat- 
 ters of the Chriftian Faith by the Fathers or Pri- 
 mitive Writers for three or four hundred Year* 
 after Chrift ? But they often contradicted one an- 
 other, and themfelves too ; and what is worfe, 
 they fometimes contradicted the Scripture itfelf. 
 Now among all thefe different and contrary Sen- 
 timents in Philofophy and Religion, which of the 
 Ancients mult we believe, for we cannot believe 
 them all ? 
 
 Again, To believe in all Things as our Prede- 
 ceflbrs did, is the ready way to keep Mankind in 
 an evcrlafting State of Infancy, and to lay an e- 
 ternal Bar againft all the Improvements of our 
 Reafon and our Happinefs. Had the prefent Age 
 of Philofophers fatislied themfelves with the fub- 
 ftantial Forms, and occult Qualities of Ariflot/e 9 
 with the folid Spheres, Fxcentricks and Epycicles of 
 Ptolomy, and the ancient Aftronomeri ; then, the 
 great Lord Bacon, Copernicus, and Defcartes, with 
 the greater Sir Ifaac Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr. 
 Boyle, had rifen in our World in vain. We muft 
 P 4 have 
 
Zi6 L G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 have blunder'd on dill in fucceflivc Generations 
 amongft Abfurdities and thick Darknefs, and a 
 hundred ufeful Inventions for the Happinefs of 
 human Life had never been known. 
 
 Thus it is in Matters of Philofopby and Science. 
 But, you will fay, fhall not our own Anceftors de- 
 termine our Judgment in Matters of civil or religi- 
 ous Concernment ? If they muft, then the Child 
 of a Heathen muft believe that Heathenifm is 
 Truth •, the Son of a Papift muft affent to all the 
 Abfurdities of Popery •, the Pofterity of the Jews 
 and Socinians muft for ever be Socinians and Jews * 
 and a Man, whofe Father was of Republican Prin- 
 ciples, muft make a Succeflion of Republicans in 
 his Family to the end of the World. If wc 
 ought always to believe whatfoever our Parents, 
 or our Priefts, or our Princes believe, the Inhabi- 
 tants of China ought to worfhip their own Idols, 
 and the Savages or Africa ought to believe all the 
 Nonfenfe, and practife the Idolatry of their Ne- 
 gro Fathers and Kings. The Britifh Nation, when 
 it was Heathen, could never have become Chrifiian \ 
 and when it was a Slave to Rome, it could never 
 have been reformed. 
 
 Befides, let us confider that the great God, our 
 common Maker, has never given one Man's Un- 
 derstanding a legal and rightful Sovereignty to de- 
 termine Truth for others, at leaft after they are paft 
 the State of Childhood or Minority. No Angle 
 Perfon, how learned and wife, and great focver, or 
 whatfoever natural, or civil, or ecclefiajlical Rela- 
 tion he may have to us, can claim this Dominion 
 over our Faith. St. Paul the Apoftle, in his pri*. 
 vate Capacity would not do it i nor hath an in- 
 fpir'd Man any fuch Authority, until he make his 
 divine Commiflion appear. Our Saviour himfelf 
 tells the Jews, that if he had not done fuch won- 
 drous 
 
C.IH.S.4. The right Ufe of Rctfon. 227 
 
 drous Works among them, they bad not finned in 
 difbelieving his Doctrines, and refilling him for 
 the Meffiah. No Bifhop or Presbyter, no Synod 
 or Council, no Church or AfTembly of Men, (fincc 
 the Days of Infpiration) hath Power derived to 
 them from God to make Creeds or Articles of 
 Faith for us, and impofe them upon our Under- 
 flaiidings. We muft all act according to the beft 
 of our own Light, and the Judgment of our own 
 Confciences, ufing the beft Advantages which 
 Providence hath given us, with an honefl and im- 
 partial Diligence to enquire and fearch out the 
 Truth : For every one of us muft give an Account of 
 bimfelf to God. To believe as the Church* or the 
 Court believes, is but a forry and a dangerous 
 Faith : This Principle would make more Heathens 
 than Chriftians, and more Papfts than Proteftants ; 
 and perhaps lead more Souls to Hell than to Hea- 
 ven \ for our Saviour himfelf has plainly told us, 
 that if the Blind will be led by the Blind, they muft 
 both fall into the Bitch. 
 
 Tho' there be fo much Danger of Error arifing 
 from the three Prejudices laft mention'd, yet be- 
 fore I difmifs this Head, I think it proper to take 
 Notice, that as Education, Cuftom and Authority 
 are no fure Evidences of Truth, fo neither are they 
 certain Marks of Falfhood \ for Reafon and Scrip- 
 ture may join to dictate the fame Things which 
 our Parents, our Nurfes, our Tutors, our Friends, 
 and our Country believe and profefs. Yet there 
 appears fometimes in our Age a Pride and Petu* 
 lancy in Youth, zealous to call off the Sentiments 
 of their Fathers and Teachers on Purpoie to fhew 
 that they carry none of the Prejudices of Educa- 
 tion and Authority about them. They indulge all 
 manner of licentious Opinions and Practices, from 
 a vain Pretence of aliening their Liberty. But 
 
 alasi 
 
228 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 alas ! This is but changing one Prejudice for an- 
 other ; and fometimes it happens by this means, 
 that they make a Sacrifice both of Truth and 
 Virtue to the vile Prejudices of their Pride and 
 
 Sen/utility. 
 
 IV. There is another Tribe of Prejudices which 
 are near akin to thofe of Authority -, and that is 
 when we receive a Doctrine becaufe of the Man- 
 ner in which it is proposed to us by others. I have 
 already mentioned the powerful Influence that O- 
 ratory and fine Words have to infinuate a falfe O- 
 pinion, and fometimes Truth is refus'd, and fuf- 
 fers Contempt in the Lips of a wife Man, for 
 want of the Charms of Language ; But there arc 
 feveral other Manners of Propofal whereby mif- 
 taken Sentiments are powerfully conveyed into 
 the Mind. 
 
 Some Perfons are eafily perfuaded to believe 
 what another dictates with a pofitive Air and a 
 great Degree of Affurance: They feel the over- 
 bearing Force of a confident Dictator, efpecially 
 if he be of fuperior Rank or Character to them- 
 felves. 
 
 Some are quickly convinced of the Truth of 
 any Doctrine, when he that propofes it puts on 
 all the Airs of Piety, and makes folemn Appeals to 
 Heaven, and Proteftations of the Truth of it: The 
 pious Mind of a weaker Chriftian is ready to re- 
 ceive any thing that is pronounced with fuch an 
 awful Solemnity. 
 
 It is a Prejudice near akin to this, when a hum- 
 ble Soul is frighted into any particular Sentiments 
 of Religion, becaufe a Man of great Name or 
 Character pronounces Herefy upon the contrary 
 Sentiments, cafk theDisbelieveroutofthe Church, 
 and forbids him the 'Gates of Heaven. 
 
 Others 
 
CHI. S. 4. The right life of Reafon. 229 
 
 Others are allured into particular Opinions by 
 gentler Practices on the Underftanding : Not on- 
 ly the fofter Tempers of Mankind, but even har- 
 dy and rugged Souls are fometimes led away Cap- 
 tives to Error by the foft Airs of Addrefs, and the 
 fweet and engaging Methods of Perfuafion and Kind- 
 nefs. 
 
 I grant, where natural or reveal'd Religion 
 plainly dictate to us the infinite and everlafling 
 Importance of any facred Doctrine, it cannot be 
 improper to ufe any of thefe Methods to pcrfuade 
 Men to receive and obey the Truth, after we have 
 given fufficient Reafon and Argument to convince 
 their Underftandings. Yet all thefe Methods con- 
 fidered in themfelves, have been often us'd to con- 
 vey Falfhood into the Soul as well as Truth ; and 
 if we build our Faith merely upon thefe Founda- 
 tions, without Regard to the Evidence of Truth 
 and the Strength of Argument, our Belief is but 
 the Effetl of Prejudice : For neither the pofttive, 
 the awful or folemn, the terrible or the gentle Me- 
 thods of Addrefs carry any certain Evidence with 
 them that Truth lies on that Side. 
 
 There is another Manner of propofing our own 
 Opinion, or rather oppofing the Opinions of others, 
 which demands a mention here, and that is when 
 Perfons make a J eft ferve inftead of an Argument ; 
 when they refute what they call Error by a "Turn 
 of IVit, and anfwer every Objection againft their 
 own Sentiments, by calling a Sneer upon the Ob- 
 jector. Thefe Scoffers practife with Succefs upon 
 weak and cowardly Spirits: Such as have not been 
 well eftabliftYd in Religion or Morality, have 
 been laugh'd out of the bed Principles by a con- 
 jident Buffoon ; they have yielded up their Opi- 
 nions to a witty Banter, and fold their Faith and 
 Religion for a J eft. 
 
 There 
 
230 LOGIC K: Or y Part II. 
 
 There is no Way to cure thefc Evils in fuch a 
 degenerate World as we live in, but by learning 
 to diftinguifh well between the Subfiance of any 
 Doftrinty and the manner of Addrefs either in pro- 
 pofing, attacking, or defending it j and then by 
 Jetting a juft and fevere Guard of Reafon and 
 Confcience over all the Exercifes of our Judg- 
 ment, refolving to yield to nothing but the con- 
 vincing Evidence of Truth, religioufly obeying 
 the Light of Reafon in Matters of pure Reafon, 
 and the Dictates of Revelation in Things that re- 
 late to our Faith. 
 
 Thus we have taken a brief Survey of fome of 
 the infinite Varieties of Prejudice that attend Man- 
 kind on every fide in the prefent State, and the 
 Dangers of Error or of rajh Judgment, we are 
 perpetually expos'd to in this Life : This Chapter 
 fhall conclude with one Remark, and one Piece 
 of Advice. 
 
 The Remark is this. The fame Opinion, whe- 
 ther/^ or true, may be dictated by many Pre- 
 judices at the fame time •, for, as I hinted before, 
 Prejudice may happen to dictate Truth fometimes 
 as well as Error. B u t where two or more Prejudices 
 oppofe one another, as it often happens, the ftrong- 
 cr prevails and gains the Afient : Yet how feldom 
 does Reafon interpofe with fufficient Power to 
 get the Afcendant of them all as it ought to do ! 
 
 The Advice follows, (viz.) Since we find fuch 
 a fwarm of Prejudices attending us both within 
 and without; fince we feel the Weaknefs of our 
 Reafon, the Frailty of our Natures, and our In- 
 fufficiency to guard our felves from Error upon 
 this Account, it is not at all unbecoming the Cha- 
 racter of a Logician or a Philofopher (together with 
 the Advices already given) to direct every Perfon 
 in his Search after Truth to make his daily Ad- 
 
 drefTes 
 
C. IV. The right Ufe of Reafon. 23 1 
 
 dreflcs to Heaven, and implore the God of Truth 
 to lead him into all Truth, and to afk JVifdom of 
 him who giveth liberally to them that afk it, and 
 upbraideth us not with our own Follies. 
 
 Such a devout Practice will be an excellent Pre- 
 parative for the beft Improvement of all the Di- 
 rections and Rules propos'd in the two following 
 Chapters. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 General Directions to qffijl us in judging 
 aright. 
 
 THE chief Defign of the Art of Logick is to 
 afiift us in forming a true Judgment of 
 Things •, a few proper Obfervations for this End 
 have been dropt occafionally in fome of the fore- 
 going Chapters : Yet it is neceflary to mention 
 them again in this Place, that we may have a 
 more compleat and fimultaneous View of the ge- 
 neral Directions, which are neceflary in order to 
 judge aright. A Multitude of Advices may be 
 framed for this Purpofe •, the chief of them may, 
 for Order fake, be reduced to the following 
 Heads. 
 
 I. Direft. When we confider our felves a3 Phi- 
 lofophers, or Searchers after Truth, we fhould ex- 
 amine all our old Opinions afrefh, and enquire what 
 was the Ground of them, and whether our Ajfent 
 were built on jujl Evidence •, and then we fhould caft 
 off all thofe Judgments which were formed hereto- 
 fore without due Examination. A Man in purfuic 
 of Knowledge mould throw off all thofe Preju- 
 
 duei 
 
232 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 dices which he had imbib'd in Times pall, and 
 guard againft all the Springs of Error mention'd 
 in the preceding Chapter, with utmoft Watchful- 
 nefs for Time to come. 
 
 Obferve here, that this Rule of cajling away all 
 cur former prejudicate Opinions and Sentiments, is 
 not propos'd to any of us to be practifed at once, 
 confider'd as Men of Buftnefs or Religion, as Friends, 
 or Neighbours, as Fathers or Sons, as Magijlrates, 
 Subjects or Chriftians \ but merely as Philofopben 
 and Searchers after Truth? And tho' it may be 
 well prefum'd that many of our Judgments, both 
 true and falfe, together with the Practices built 
 thereon in the natural, the civil and the religious 
 Life were form'd without fufricient Evidence ; 
 yet an univerfal Rejection of all thefe might deflroy 
 at once our prefent Senfe and Practice of Duty 
 with Regard to God, our Selves, and our Fellow- 
 Creatures. Mankind would be hereby thrown in- 
 to fuch a State of Doubting and Indifference, that 
 it would be too long e're they recover'd any 
 Principles of Virtue or Religion by a Train of 
 Reafonings. 
 
 Befides^ the common Affairs of human Life of- 
 ten demand a much fpeedier Determination, and 
 we mull many times act upon prefent Probabili- 
 ties : The Bulk of Mankind have not Time and 
 Leifure, and Advantages fufricient to begin all 
 their Knowledge anew, and to build up every 
 fingle Opinion and Practice afrefhupon the jufteit 
 Grounds of Evidence. 
 
 Yet let it be obferv'd alfo, that fo far as any 
 Perfon is capable of forming and correcting his 
 Notions and his Rules of Conduct in the natural, 
 civil and religious Life by the ftrict Rules of Lq- 
 gick •, and fo far as he hath Time and Capacity to 
 review his old Opinions, to re-examine ?ll thofe 
 
 i which 
 
C. IV. S. 4. The right life of Reafon. 233 
 
 which are any Way doubtful, and to determine 
 nothing without juft Evidence, he is likely to be- 
 come fo much the wifer, and the happier Man, 
 and (if Divine Grace aflift him) fo much the bet- 
 ter Chriftian. And tho* this cannot be done all 
 at once, yet it may be done by prudent Steps and 
 Degrees, till our whole Set of Opinions and Prin- 
 ciples be in time corrected and reform'd, or at 
 leait eftablifh'd upon jufter Foundations. 
 
 II. Dire ft. Endeavour that all your Ideas of tho ft 
 Objects concerning which you pafs any Judgment, be 
 clear and diftintl, compleat, compr 'ehenfive, extenfive 
 and orderly ', as far as you have Occafion to judge 
 concerning them. This is the Subflance of the lafi 
 Chapter of the firjl Part of Logick. The Rules 
 which direcl our Conceptions, muft be review'd, if 
 we would form our Judgments aright. But if 
 we will make hafte to judge at all Adventures, 
 while our Ideas are dark and confused and very 
 imperfeel, we fhall be in Danger of running into 
 many Miftakes. This is like a Perfon who would 
 pretend to give the Sum total of a large Account 
 in Arithmetick, without furveying all the Particu- 
 lars *, or as a Painter who profefles to draw a fair 
 and diftinct Landfkip in the Twilight, when he 
 can hardly diftinguifh a Houfe from a Tree. 
 
 Obferve here, that this Bircclicn does not re- 
 quire us to gain clear, diftindr., compleat Ideas of 
 Things in all their Parts, Powers, and Qualities 
 in an abfolute Senfe, for this belongs to God alone, 
 and is impoffible for us to attain : But it is expreft 
 in a relative or limited Senfe ; that is, our Ideas 
 mould be clear, diftincTt and comprehenfive, &c. 
 at lead fo far as we have Occafion at that time to 
 judge concerning them. We may form many true 
 and certain Judgments concerning God, Angels, A- 
 
 nimaft. 
 
234 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 mmals, Men, Heaven, Hell, &c. by thofe partial 
 and very imperfect Conceptions of them to which 
 we have attain'd, if we judge no farther concern- 
 ing them than our Conceptions reach. 
 
 We may have a clear and diftin6t Idea of the 
 Exigence of many Things in Nature, and affirm 
 that they do exift, tho our Ideas of their intimate 
 EJfences and Caufes, their Relations and Manners of 
 Aclion are very confus'd and obfcure. We may 
 judge well concerning feveral Properties of any 
 Being, tho' other Properties are unknown, for per- 
 haps we know not all the Properties of any Being 
 whatfoever. 
 
 Sometimes we have clear Ideas of the abfolute 
 Properties of an Object ; and we may judge of 
 them with Certainty, while the relative Proper- 
 ties are very obfcure and unknown to us. So we 
 may have a clear and juft Idea of the Area of a 
 Parallelogram without knowing what Relation it 
 bears to the Area of a Triangle or a Polygon, I may 
 know the length of the Diameter of a Circle, with- 
 out knowing what Proportion it has to the Cir- 
 cumference. 
 
 There are other Things whofe external Relative 
 Properties with refpcct to each other, or whofe 
 Relations to us we know better than their own 
 inward and abfolute Properties, or their efifential 
 diftinguifhing Attributes. We perceive clearly, 
 that Fire will warm or burn us, and will evaporate 
 Water •, and that Water will allay our Thirft, or 
 quench the Fire, tho' we know not the inward dif- 
 tinguifhing Particles or prime efTcntiai Properties 
 of Fire or Water. We may know the King, and 
 Lord Chancellor, and affirm many Things of them 
 in their legal Characters, tho* we can have but a 
 confus'd Idea of their Perfons or natural Features y 
 if we have never feen their Faces. So the Scrip- 
 ture 
 
C. IV. The right Ufe of Rcafon . 235 
 
 cure has reveal'd God himfelf to us, 2s our Cre- 
 ator, Preferver, Redeemer, and Sanclifier, and as 
 the Objetl of our Worjhip in clearer Ideas than it 
 has reveal'd many other abftrufe Queftions which 
 may be rais'd about his own Divine EJfence or 
 Subfiance, his Immenfity or Omniprefence. 
 
 This therefore is the general Obfervation in or- 
 der to guide our Judgments, that wejhould not al- 
 low our /elves to form a Judgment concerning Things 
 farther than our clear and diflincl Ideas reach y and 
 then we are not in danger of Error. 
 
 But there is one confiderable Objeclion againft 
 this Rule which is neceffary to be anfwer'd ; and 
 there is one juft and reafonable Exception, which is 
 as needful to be mention'd. 
 
 The Objeclion is this: May we not judge fafely 
 concerning fome total or compleat Ideas, when we 
 have a clear Perception only of fome Parts or 
 Properties of them? May we not affirm, that All 
 that is in God is eternal, or that all his unknown 
 Attributes are infinite, tho* we have fo very imper- 
 fect an Idea of God, Eternity and Infinity ? Again 9 
 May we not fafely judge of particular Objects 
 whofe Idea is obfcure by a clear Idea of the Ge- 
 neral? May I not affirm, that every unknown Spe- 
 cies of Animals has inward Springs of Motion, be- 
 caufe I have a clear Idea that thefe inward Springs 
 belong to an Animal in general ? 
 
 Anfwer. All ihoiciw^o^d unknown Parts, Pro- 
 perties or Species are clearly and diftinctly perceiv- 
 ed to be connected with, or contain'd in the 
 known Parts, Properties or general Ideas, which 
 we fuppofe to be clear and diftinct as far as we 
 judge of them: And as we have no particular I- 
 dea of thofe unknown divine Attributes, or unknown 
 Species of Animals •, fo there is nothing particular 
 affirtn'd concerning them beyond what belongs to 
 
 Q. the 
 
236 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 the general Idea of Divine Attributes or Animals* 
 with which I clearly and diftinctly perceive them 
 to be connected. 
 
 It may be illuftrated in this manner. Suppofe 
 a long Chain lies before me, whofe near eft Links I 
 fee are Iron Rings, and I fee them faften'd to a Poll 
 near me, but the mod diftant Links lie beyond the 
 reach of my Sight, fo that I know not whether 
 they are Oval or Round, Brafs or Iron : Now I 
 may boldly affirm the whole Length of this Chain 
 is faften'd to the Poft, for I have a clear Idea that 
 the neareft Links are thus faften'd, and a clear 
 Idea that the diftant Links are connected with the 
 neareft, if I can draw the whole Chain by one 
 Link. 
 
 Or thus •, If two known Ideas, A and B are e- 
 vidently join'd, or agree, and if C unknown be 
 included in A, and alfo D unknown be included 
 in B, then I may affirm that C and D are join'd 
 and agree •, for I have a clear Perception of the 
 Union of the two known Ideas A and B •, and 
 alfo a clear Perception of the Connexion of the 
 unknown Ideas with the known. So that clear 
 and diftinSi Ideas muft ftill abide as a general ne- 
 ceffary Qualification in order to form right Judg- 
 ments : and indeed, it is upon this Foot that all 
 Ratiocination is built, and the Conclufions are thus 
 formed, which deduce Things unknown from 
 Things known. 
 
 Yet it feems to me that there is one juft Limita- 
 tion or Exception to this general Rule of J 'udgment, as 
 built on clear and diftincl: Ideas, and it is this •, 
 
 Exception. In Matters of mere Teftimony, whether 
 human or divine, there is not always a NeceJ/ity of clear 
 and diftincl Ideas of the Things which are believd .T\\o* 
 the Evidence of Propofitions, which are entirely 
 form'd by curfelves, depends on the Clearnefs and 
 
 Diftin&nefs 
 
C. IV. the right Ufe of Reafon. 237 
 
 Diftinclnefs of thofe Ideas of which' they are 
 compos'd, and on our own clear Perception of 
 their Agreement or Difagreement, yet we may 
 juftly affent to Proportions fornid by others, when 
 we have neither a very clear Conception in our 
 felves of the two Ideas contained in the Words, 
 nor how they agree or difagree ; provided always 
 that we have a clear and fufficient Evidence of the 
 Credibility of the Perfons who inform us. 
 
 Thus when we read in Scripture the great Doc- 
 trines of the Deity of Chrift, of the Union of the di- 
 vine and human Natures in him, of the divine Agen- 
 cy of the bleffed Spirit, that the Son is the Bright nefs 
 of his Father's Glory> that all Things were created 
 by him, and for him, that the Son jh all give up his 
 Kingdo?n to the Father, and that God foall be all 
 in all, we may fafely believe them : For tho' our 
 Ideas of thefe Objects themfelves are not fufficient- 
 ly clear, diftincl, and perfect, for our own Minds 
 to form thefe Judgments or Propofitions concern- 
 ing them, yet we have a clear and diftincl: Per- 
 ception of God's ^H lJB S fh pm - or that they 
 are containM in Scriprure •, and this is fufficienc 
 Evidence to determine our Aflent. 
 
 The fame Thing holds true in fome meafure, 
 where credible human Teflimony afiures us of fome 
 Propofitions, while we have no fufficient Ideas of 
 the Subject and Predicate of them to determine 
 our Affent. So when an honeft and learned Ma- 
 thematician allures a Plowman that the three An- 
 gles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles, or 
 that the Square of the Uypotenufe of a right-angled 
 Triangle is equal to the Sum of the Squares of the 
 two Sides \ the Plowman, who has but confusM 
 Ideas of thefe Things, may firmly and fafely be- 
 lieve thefe Proportions upon the fame Ground, 
 Q^ 2 becauib 
 
238 LOG I CK: Or, Part II. 
 
 becaufe he has Evidence of the Skill and Faith- 
 fulnefs of his Informer *. 
 
 III. Direction. When you have obtain'd as 
 clear and comprehenfive Ideas as is needful, both 
 of the Subject and Predicate of a Propofition, 
 then compare thofe Ideas of the Subject and Predi- 
 cate 
 
 * Perhaps fome may objeft againft this Reprefen ration of Things, and 
 fay, that *' We cannot properly be faid to believe a Prof option any farther 
 *' than we Ouf felves have ideas under the Terms : Ther-. fore if we have no 
 «« Ideas under the Terms, we believe nothing but the Connection of Words 
 «« or Sounds,' and if we have but obfeure and inadequate Ideas under the 
 «« Termi, then we partly believe a Connexion of Things* and partly a. 
 « Connexion of Sounds: but that we cannot properly be faid to believe tbt 
 «' Propofition, for our Faith can never go beyond our Ideas. 
 
 Now to fet this Matter in a clear Light, I fuppofe that every Propofition 
 which is propoled to my Aflent, is a Sentence made up of Terms which 
 have fome Ideas under them, known or unknown to me. I eorfefs, if I 
 believe there are no Ideas at all under the Terms, and there is nothing 
 meant by them, then indeed (with regard to me) it is the mere joining of 
 Sounds : But if (for inftance) a Plowman has credible Information from an 
 honeft and skilful Mathematician, that an Ellipjis is made by the SeElion of 
 a Cone, he believes the Propofition, or he believrs the Sentence is true, as it 
 is made up of Terms which his Informant underflands, tho' the Ideas be 
 unknown to him ; that is, he believes there are fome Ideas which his In- 
 formant has under thefe Words which are really connected. And, I think 
 rhis may juftly be called, believing the Propofition, for it is a Belief of fome- 
 thing more than the mere joining of Sounds^ it is a Belief of the real Con- 
 nexion of fome unknown Ideis belonging to thofe Sounds: and in this 
 Senfe a Man msy be fa:d to believe the Truth of a Propofition, which he 
 dorh not underftard at a'l. 
 
 With more Reafon ftill may we he faid to believe a Proportion upon cre- 
 dible Teftimony, if we have feme fort of Ideas under the Terms, tho* they 
 are but partial or inadequate, and obfeure; fuch as Divine Anfivers ivere 
 given by Urim and Tbummim: For fince it is purely upon Teftimony we 
 Believe the known Partsoi rheldf2sfienified by thofe Words to be connected, 
 upon the fame Teftimony we may alfo believe all the unknown Parts of the 
 Ideas fignihed by thofe Words to beconnefted, (vix.) becaufe our Informant 
 is knowing and futhful. And in this Senfe we may juftly be faid to be- 
 lieve a Propofition of Scripture entirely, which we undeiftand but very im- 
 ptrfefily, becaufe God who reveals it is knowing and faithful in Perfection. 
 
 And indeed, ur.lefs thisReprefentanon of the Matter be allowed, thereare 
 but very few Propofuions in the World, even in human Things, to which 
 •we can give an entire Affent, or which we may be faid either to know, or 
 to believe, becaufe there is fcarce any thing on Earth of which we have an 
 adequate and moft perfect Idea. And it is evident that in Divine Things 
 there is fcarce any thing which we could either know or believe without 
 this Allowance: For tho' Reafon and Revelation join to inform me, that 
 God is holy* how exceeding inadequate are my Ideas »f God, and of hisifr- 
 linefs? yet I may boldly and entirely aflent to this whole Propofition, fine* 
 I am fure thai every known md unkoownjdea figtrified by the T«rm God 
 
C IV. the right Ufe of Reafon. 239 
 
 c ate together with utmoft Attention, and obferve how 
 far they agree, and wherein they differ : Whether 
 the Proportion may be affirmed Abfolutely or Re- 
 latively whether in Whole or in Part, whether 
 Univerfally or Particularly, and then under what 
 particular Limitations. Turn thefe Ideas about in 
 your Mind, and take a View of them on all Sides, 
 juft as a Ma/on would do to fee whether two hewn 
 Stones exactly fuit each other in every Part, and 
 
 is connected with the Ideas of the Term Helinefs, becaufe Reafon partly in- 
 f irmj me, buc efpecially becaufe the Divine Teilimor;y w hich has connected 
 them, is certainly credible. 
 
 I might argue upon this Head perhaps mere forcibly from the Do&rine 
 or Gcd'x licomprebenjiblenefs. If we could believe nothingbut what wehave 
 Ideas of, ic would beimpoifib.e for us to believe that G:d is Incomprebenfi- 
 ble : For this implies in it a Belief that there are fome unknown Ideas be- 
 longing to the Nature of God. Therefore we do both believe and prof eft 
 fometbmg concerning ur.known ideas, when we believe and profeis that 
 God is Incomprehenfible. 
 
 I perfuade myfelf that moft it thofe very P^rfons who object againft my 
 Reprefentation of Things, will yet readily confefs, r/v-y bclicv fall the Propo- 
 sitions in Scripture, rarner than declare They do net believe federal of tbem\ 
 th V they mufl acknowledge that feveral of them are far above their Under- 
 Handing, or that they have fcarce any Ideas i,f the true Senfe of them. And 
 therefore where Propofn'ions deriv'd from credible Teflimony are made up 
 of dark or inadequate Ideas, I think it is much more proper to fiy, We be- 
 lieve them, than that We do not believe tbern, left we cut 'off a Multitude of 
 the Proportions of the Bible from our AfTent of Faith. 
 
 Yet let it be obferv'd here, that when we belie.e a Propofuion on mera 
 Teflimony, rf which we have no Ideas at ail, we can only be faidtogivea 
 general implicit Affent to tbt Truth of that Proportion, wirhout any particular 
 Knowledge of, or explicit jffent to the fpecial Truth contained in that Prepo- 
 Jkion : And this our implicit Ajjent is of very little Wfe, unlets it be to 
 teflify our Belief of the Knowledge and Veracity of him that informs us. 
 
 As our Ideas of a Propofuion are more or lefs clear ard adequate, as well 
 ■s juft and proper, fo we do explicitly affmt more or lefs to the particular 
 Truth contained in that PrupoGtion. And our Afl'ent hereby becomes moro 
 or lefs ufeful for the Encreafe of our Knowledge or the Direction of our 
 Praaice. 
 
 When Divine Teflimony plainly propofes to our Faith fu L h a Propofuion 
 whereot we have but obfeure, doubtful and inadequate Ideas, we are bound 
 implicitly to believe the Truth of it, as exprtft in thofe Terms, in order to 
 fhew our Submiffion to God who revealed it, as a God of perfect Know- 
 ledge and Veracity: But it is our Duty to ufe all proper Methods to obtain 
 a farther and explicit Knowledge of the particular T/uth contain'd in the 
 Propofuion, if we would improve by ic either in Knowledgeor Virtue. All 
 neceflary Rules of Grammar and Cnticifm fhould b<- employed to find out 
 the very Ideas that belong to thof« Words, and which were defign'd by the 
 Divine Speaker or Writer. Tho' we may btlieve the Truth of a l'r -petiti- 
 on which wedo not underfland, yet we (hould endeavour to undciiUnd every 
 Propofuion which we believe to be true. 
 
 CU 
 
 are 
 
240 LOGIC K: Or, PartIL 
 
 are fit to be join'd in erecting a carved or fluted 
 Pillar. 
 
 Compare the whole Subjetl with the whole Pre- 
 dicate in their feveral Parts: Take heed in this 
 Matter that you neither add to, or diminifh the 
 Ideas contain'd in the Subject or in the Predicate j 
 for fuch an Inadvertence or Miftake will expofe 
 you to great Error in Judgment. 
 
 IV. Direcl. Search for Evidence of Truth with 
 Diligence and Honefty, and be heartily ready to re- 
 ceive Evidence, whether for the Agreement or Dif- 
 agreement of Ideas. 
 
 Search with Diligence ; fpare no Labour in fearch- 
 ing for the Truth in due proportion to the Im- 
 portance of the Propofition. Read the bed Au- 
 thors who have writ on that Subject •, confult 
 your wife and learned Friends in Converfation ; 
 and be not unwilling to borrow Hints toward 
 your Improvement, from the meaneft Perfon, nor 
 to receive any Glimpfe of Light from the moft 
 Unlearned. Diligence and Humility is the Way 
 to thrive in the Riches of the Underftanding, as 
 well as in Gold or Silver. Search carefully for 
 the Evidence of Truth, and dig for Wifdom as for 
 hid Treafure. 
 
 Search with a fteady Honefty of Soul, and a fin- 
 cere Impartiality to find the Truth. Watch a- 
 gainft every Temptation that might bribe your 
 Judgment, or warp it afide from Truth. Do not 
 indulge yourfelf to wijh any unexa??iined Propofi- 
 tion were true or falfe. A Wifh often perverts the 
 Judgment, and tempts the Mind ftrangely to be- 
 lieve upon flight Evidence whatfoever we wifh to 
 be true, or to renounce whatfoever we wifh to be 
 falfe. 
 
 i V. Direct. 
 
 
C. IV. "The right Ufe of Reafon. 24 1 
 
 V. DirecJ. Since the Evidence of the Agree- 
 ment or Difagreement of two Ideas is the Ground 
 of our AfTent to any Propofition, or the great Cri- 
 terion of Truth ; therefore we Jhould fufpend our 
 Judgment, and neither affirm or deny till this Evi- 
 dence appear. 
 
 This Direction is different from t\\zfecond\ for 
 tho' the Evidence of the Agreement or Difagreement 
 of two Ideas mod times depend on the Clear nefs 
 and Diftinclnefs of the Ideas themfelves, yet it docs 
 not always arife thence. Tefti?nony may be a fuf- 
 ficient Evidence of the Agreement or Difagree- 
 ment of two obfcure Ideas, as we have fctn juft 
 before in the Exception under the fecond Direction. 
 Therefore, tho' we are not univerfalJy, and in all 
 Cafes bound to fufpend our Judgment till our Ideas 
 of the Objecls themfelves are clear and diflin5l, yet 
 we muft always fufpend our Judgment, and with- 
 hold our AfTent to, or Denial of any Propofiti- 
 on, //'// fome juft Evidence appear of its Truth or 
 Faljhood. It is an Impatience of Doubt and Suf- 
 pence, a Rafhnefs and Precipitance of Judgment, 
 and Haftinels to believe fomething on one Side or 
 the other, that plunges us into many Errors. 
 
 This Direclion to delay and fufpend our AfTent, 
 is more particularly necefTary tobeobferved when 
 fuch Propofitions offer themfelves to us as are 
 fupported by Education, Authority, Cuftom, Incli- 
 nation, Intereft, or other powerful Prejudices •, for 
 our Judgment is led away infenfibly to believe all 
 that they dictate $ and where Prejudices and Dan- 
 gers of Error are multiplied, we mould let the 
 itricter Guard upon our AfTent. 
 
 Yet remember the Caution or Limitation here 
 which I gave under t\vz firft Direction, (viz.) that 
 this is not to be too flridtly applied to Matters of 
 daily Prac/ice, either in human Life or Religion i 
 
 Q^4 but 
 
242 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 but when we confider ourfelves as Philofophers or 
 Searchers after Truth, we mould always with-hold 
 our Aflent where there is not juft Evidence : 
 And as far and as faft as we can in a due Confif- 
 tence with our daily necefiary Duties we fhould 
 alfo reform and adjuft all our Principles and Prac- 
 tices both in Religion and the civil Life by thefe 
 Rules. 
 
 VI. Dirccl. We mud judge of every Proportion 
 by thofe proper and peculiar Mediums or Means 
 whereby the Evidence of it is to be obtained, whe- 
 ther it be Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Rea- 
 fon, or Teftimcny. All our Faculties and Powers 
 are to be employ'd in judging of their proper 
 Objeds. 
 
 If we judge of Sounds, Colours, Odours, Sapors, 
 the Smoothnefs^ Rcughnefs, Softnefs or Hardnefs of 
 Bodies, it muft be done by the Ufe of our Senfes : 
 But then we muft take heed that our Senfes are 
 well difpos'd, as fhall be fhewn afterward. 
 
 And fince our Senfes in their various Exercifes 
 are in fome Cafes liable to be deceiv'd, and more 
 efpecially when by our Eyes or Ears we judge of 
 the Figure , Quantity, Diftancc, and Pcfition of Ob- 
 jects that are afar off, we ought to call our Reafon 
 into the Afiiftance of our Senfes, and correct the 
 Errors of one Senfe by the help of another. 
 
 It is by the Powers of Senfe and Reafon join'd 
 together that we muft judge philofophically of 
 the inward Nature, the fecret Properties and Pow- 
 ers, the Caufes and Effetls, the Relations and Pro- 
 portions of a thoufand corporeal Objects which 
 furround us on Earth, or are placed at a diftance 
 in the Heavens. If a Man on the one hand con- 
 fines himfelf only to fenfible Experiments, and does 
 not exercife Reafon upon them, he may furprife 
 
 himfelf 
 
C. IV. tte right Ufe of Rcafon. 243 
 
 himfelf and others with ftrange Appearances, and 
 learn to entertain the World with Sights and 
 Shews, but will never become a Philofopher: And 
 on the other hand, if a Man imprifon himfelf in 
 his Clofct, and employ the moft exquilite Powers 
 of Reafon to find out the Nature of Things in 
 the corporeal World, without the Ufe of his 
 Senfes, and the Practice of Experiments, he will 
 frame to himfelf a Scheme of Chimeras inftead of 
 true Philofophy. Hence came the Invention of 
 fubftantial Forms and Qualities, of Materia Prima 
 and Privation^ with all the infignificant Names 
 us'd by the Peripatetick Writers , and it was for 
 want of more Experiments that the Great Def- 
 eases fail'd in fcveral Parts of his philofophical 
 Writings. 
 
 In the abfiratled and fpeculative Parts of the 
 Mathematicks, which treat of Quantity and Num- 
 ber, the Faculty of Reafon mult be chiefly em- 
 ploy'd to perceive the Relation of various Quan- 
 tities, and draw certain and ufeful Conclufions ; but 
 it wants the Afiiftance oS Senfe 2M0X.0 be acquaint- 
 ed with Lines, Angles and Figures. And in practical 
 Mathematicks our Senfes have ftill greater Employ- 
 ment. 
 
 If we would judge of the pure Properties, and 
 Aclions of the Mind, of the Nature of Spirits, 
 their various Perceptions and Powers, we mud not 
 enquire of our Eyes and our Ears, nor the Images or 
 Shapes laid up in the Brain, but we muft have re- 
 courfe to our own Confcioufnefs of what paries with- 
 in our own Mind. 
 
 If we are to pals a Judgment upon any thing that 
 relates to Spirits in a State of Union with Animal Na- 
 ture, and the mixt Properties of S enj at is ti^Fancy, Ap- 
 petite^ affwn, Pleafure and Pain, which arife thence, 
 we muft confult our own Sulfations and the other 
 
 Powers 
 
244 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Powers which we find in ourfelves confider'd as Men 
 or Creatures made up of a Mind and an Animal ; and 
 by juft Reafonings deduce proper Confequences, 
 and improve our Knowledge in thefe Subjects. 
 
 If we have Occafion to judge concerning Mat- 
 ten done in paft Ages, or in diftant Countries, and 
 where we ourfelves cannot be prefent, the Pow- 
 ers of Senfe and Reafon (for the mod part) are not 
 fufficient to inform us, and we muft therefore have 
 recourfe to the Teftimony of others : and this is 
 either divine or human. 
 
 In Matters of mere human Prudence, we fhall 
 find the greateft Advantage by making wife Qb- 
 feruations on our own ConduEl, and the Conduct 
 of others, and a Survey of the Events attending 
 fuch Conduct. Experience in this Cafe is equal to 
 a natural Sagacity, or rather fuperior. A Treafure 
 of Qbfervations and Experiences collected by wife 
 Men, is of admirable Service here. And perhaps 
 there is nothing in the World of this kind equal 
 to the facred Book of Proverbs, even if we look on 
 it as a mere human Writing. 
 
 In Queftions of Natural Religion we muft ex- 
 ercife the Faculty of Reafon which God has given 
 us ; and fince he has been pleafed to afford us his 
 Word, we mould confirm and improve or correct 
 our Reafonings on this Subject by the Divine Af- 
 liftance of the Bible. 
 
 In Matters of revealed Religion, that is, Chri- 
 fiianity, Judaifm, &c. which we could never have 
 known by the Light of Nature, the Word of 
 God is our only Foundation and chief Light ; tho' 
 here our Reafon mud be us'd both to find out the 
 true Meaning of God in his Word, and to derive 
 juft Inferences from what God has written, as well 
 as to judge of the Credentials whereby Divine Tefti- 
 mony is diftinguifrYd from mere human Teftimony, 
 or from Impofture* As 
 
C. IV. "The right life of Reafon. 245 
 
 As Divine Revelation can never contradict right 
 Reafon, (for they are two great Lights given us 
 by our Creator for our Conduct) fo Reafon ought 
 by no Means to aflume to itfelf a Power to con- 
 tradict Divine Revelation. 
 
 Tho' Revelation be not contrary to Reafon, yet 
 there are four Cafes wherein Matters of Revela- 
 tion may be faid to rife above, or go beyond our 
 Reafon. 
 
 1 . When Revelation ajferts two Things of which 
 we have clear Ideas, to be join* d, whofe Connexion or 
 Agreement is not difcoverable by Reafon ; as when 
 Scripture informs us that The Dead fhall rife, that 
 The Earth floall be burnt up, and the Man Chrift 
 Jefus fhall return from Heaven, none of thefe 
 Things could ever be found out or prov'd by 
 Reafon. 
 
 2. Wloen Revelation affirms any Proportion, 
 while Reafon has no clear and diftincl Ideas of the 
 Subjecl, or of the Predicate -, as God created all 
 Things by Jefus Chrift: By the Urim and Thum- 
 mim God gave forth Divine Oracles. The Predi- 
 cate of each of thefe Propofitions is to us an ob- 
 fcure Idea, for we know not what was the peculiar 
 Agency of J ejus Chrift when God the Father created 
 the World by him •, nor have we any clear and 
 certain Conception what the Urim and Thummim 
 were, nor how God gave Anfwers to his People 
 by them. 
 
 3. When Revelation, in plain andexprefs Language, 
 declares fome Dotlrine which our Reafon at prefent 
 knows not with evidence and certainty how or in what 
 Senfe to reconcile to fome of its own Principles ; as, that 
 the Child Jefus is the mighty God, Efa. ix. 6. which 
 carries afeemingOppoiition to the Unity and Spiri- 
 tuality of the Godhead, which arc Principlesof Reafon. 
 
 4. When two Propofitions or Doftrines are plainly 
 
 afferted 
 
246 LOGIC K: Or, Part II 
 
 • 
 
 afferttd by divine Revehtlon y wbicb our Reafon at pre- 
 fent knows not how or in what Senfe with Evidence and 
 Certainty to reconcile with one another ; as, The Father 
 is the only true God, John xvii. 3. and yet Chrifi is 
 over all, God blejfedfor ever, Rom. ix. 5. 
 
 Now divine Revelation having declar'd all thefe 
 Proportions, Reafon is bound to receive them, be- 
 cause it cannot prove them to be utterly inconfif- 
 tent or impofiible, tho' the Ideas of them may be 
 obfcure, tho' we ourfelves fee not the rational Con- 
 nection of them, and tho' we know not certainly 
 how to reconcile them. In thefe Cafes Reafon muft 
 fubmit to Faith ; that is, we are bound to believe 
 what God afferts, and wait till he fhall clear up 
 that which feems dark and difficult, and till the 
 Myfteries of Faith fhall be farther explain'd to us 
 either in this World or in the World to come *, 
 and Reafon itfelf dictates this Submimon. 
 
 VII th Direction. It is very ufeful to havefome ge- 
 neral Principles of Truth fettled in the Mind, whofe 
 Evidence is great and obvious, that they in ay be al- 
 ways ready at hand to afjift us in judging of the 
 great Variety of Things which occur. Thefe may 
 be call'd firft Notions, or fundamental Principles ; 
 for tho' many of them are deduced from each o- 
 ther, yet mofl or all of them may be call'd Prin- 
 ciples when compar'd with a thoufand other Judg- 
 ments which we form under the Regulation and 
 Influence of thefe primary Propofitions. 
 
 Every Art and Science, as well as the Affairs of 
 civil Life and Religion, have peculiar Principles 
 of this kind belonging to them. There are Me- 
 taphyseal, Phyfical, Mathematical, Political, Oe- 
 tonomical) Medicinal, Theological, Moral and Pru- 
 
 • See fometfaing more on chis Subje&, Dircft. ll. prectd. and Cbaf>. V. 
 
 dentm 
 
C. IV. The right Vfe of Reafon. 247 
 
 dential Principles of Judgment. It would be too 
 tedious to give a Specimen of them all in this 
 Place. Thofe which are of the molt univerfal 
 Ufe to us both as Men and as Chriftians, may be 
 found in the following Chapter among the Rules 
 of Judgment about particular ObjetJs. 
 
 VIII th Direction. Let the Degrees of your Ajfent 
 to every Propofition bear an exatl Proportion to the 
 different Degrees of Evidence. Remember this is 
 one of the greateft Principles of Wifdom that Man 
 can arrive at in this World, and the beft human 
 Security againft dangerous Miftakes in Specula- 
 tion or Practice. 
 
 In the Nature of Things of which our Know- 
 ledge is made up there is infinite Variety in their 
 Degrees of Evidence. And as God hath given 
 our Minds a Power to fufpend their AfTent till 
 the Evidence be plain, fo we have a Power to re- 
 ceive Things which are propos'd to us with a 
 ftronger or weaker Belief in infinite Variety ot 
 Degrees proportionable to their Evidence. I be- 
 lieve that the Planets are inhabited, and I believe 
 that the Earth rolls amongft them yearly round the 
 Sun *, but I don't believe both thefe Propofitions 
 with an equal Firmnefs of Aflent, becaufe the Ar- 
 guments for the latter are drawn from mathematical 
 Obfervations -, but the Arguments for the former are 
 but probable Conjeclures and moral Re afonings. Yet 
 neither do I believe either of thefe Propofitions fo 
 firmly, as I do that the Earth is about twenty four 
 thoufand Miles round, becaufe the mathematical 
 Proof of this is much eafier, plainer and ftronger. 
 And yet farther, when I fay that the Earth was 
 created by the Power of God, I have (till a more in- 
 fallible AfTurance of this than of all the reft, becaufe 
 Reafon and Scripture join to aflure me of it. 
 
 IX* Di- 
 
248 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 IX th Bireclion. Keep your Mind always open to 
 receive Truths and never fet Limits to your own Im-, 
 provemcnts. Be ready always to hear what may be 
 objected even againft your favourite Opinions, and 
 thofe which have had longeft PofTefiion of your 
 Aflent. And if there mould be any new and un- 
 controulable Evidence brought againft thefe old or 
 beloved Sentiments, don't wink your Eyes faft a- 
 gainft the Light, but part with any thing for the 
 fake of Truth: Remember when you overcome 
 an Error you gain Truth -, the Victory is on your 
 Side, and the Advantage is all your own. 
 
 I confefs thofe grand Principles of Belief and 
 Praclice which univerfally influence our Conduct 
 both with Regard to this Life and the Life to 
 come, mould be fuppos'd to be well fettled in the 
 firft Years of our Studies, fuch as, the Exiftence 
 and Providence of God, the Truth of Chriftianity, 
 the Authority of Scripture, the great Rules of Mo- 
 rality, &c. We mould avoid a light fluttering 
 Genius, ever ready to change our Foundations, 
 and to be carried about with every Wind of Doc- 
 trine. To guard againft which Inconvenience, 
 we mould labour with earneft Diligence and fer- 
 vent Prayer, that our moft fundamental and im- 
 portant Points of Belief and Practice may be e- 
 ftablifh'd upon juft Grounds of Reafon and Scrip- 
 ture when we come to Years of Difcretion, and 
 fit to judge for ourfelves in fuch important Points. 
 Yet fince it is impoflible that the Folly or Prejudices 
 of younger Years may have eftablifh'd Perlbns in 
 fome miftaken Sentiments, even in very important 
 Matters, we mould always hold ourfelves ready to 
 receive any new Advantage toward the Correction 
 or Improvement even of our eftablifh'd Principles, 
 as well as Opinions of lefier Moment. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
C. V. S. i . the right Ufe of Reafon. 249 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Special Rules to direct us in judging of par- 
 ticular Objects. 
 
 IT would be endlefs to run thro' all thofe par- 
 ticular Objects concerning which we have Oc- 
 cafion to pafs a Judgment at one time or an- 
 other. Things of the mod frequent Occurrence, 
 of the wideft Extent, and of the greater! Im- 
 portance, are the Objects and Exercifcs of Senfe 9 
 of Reafon and Speculation, the Matters of Mora- 
 lity, Religion and Prudence, of human and divine 
 Teftirnony, together with the EJfays of Reafoning 
 upon Things p aft and future. Special Rules relating 
 to all thefe will be the Subject of the following 
 Sections. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment concerning the 
 Objecls of Senfe. 
 
 THO' our Senfes are fometimes liable to be 
 deceiv'd, yet when they are rightly difpofed 9 
 and fitly exercifed about their proper Objecls, with 
 the juit Afliftance of Reafon, they give us fufri- 
 cient Evidence of Truth. 
 
 This may be prov'd by an Argument drawn 
 from the fVifdom, Goodnefs^ and Faitbfulnefs of 
 God our Creator. It was he gave us our Senfes \ 
 and he would not make us of fuch a Conftitution 
 as to be liable to perpetual Deception and una- 
 voidable Error in ufing thefe Faculties of Senfe in 
 the belt manner we are capable of, about thefe 
 
 very 
 
2SO LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 very Things which are the proper Objects of 
 them. 
 
 This may be prov'd alfo by the ill Confequences 
 that would follow from the Suppofition of the con- 
 trary. If we could have no Certainty of the 
 Dictates of our Senfes, we could never be fure of 
 any of the common Affairs and Occurrences of 
 Life. Men could not tranfact any of their civil 
 or moral Concerns with any Certainty or Juftice ; 
 nor indeed could we eat or drink, walk or move 
 with Safety. Our Senfes direct us in all thefe. 
 
 Again, the Matters of Religion depend in fome 
 Meaiure upon the Certainty of the Diclates of 
 Senfe ; for Faith comes by Hearing ; and it is to 
 our Senfes that God appeals in working Miracles 
 to prove his own Revelation. Now if when our 
 Eyes and Ears, and other Organs of Senfe are 
 rightly difpos'd and exercis'd about their proper 
 Objects, they were always liable to be deceiv'd, 
 there could be no Knowledge of the Gofpel, no 
 Proof of divine Revelation by Vifions, Voices, 
 or Miracles. 
 
 Our Senfes will difcover Things near us and 
 round about us, which are neceflary for our pre- 
 fent State with fufficient Exactnefs, and Things 
 diftant alfo, fo far as they relate to our neceflary 
 Ufe of them. 
 
 Nor is there need of any more accurate Rules 
 for the Ufe of our Senfes in the Judgment of all 
 the common Affairs of Life, or even of miraculous 
 and divine Operations, than the vulgar Part of 
 Mankind are fufficiently acquainted with by Na- 
 ture, and by their own daily Obfervations. 
 
 But if we would exprefs thefe Rules in a more 
 exact manner, how to judge by the Diclates of our 
 Senfes, they fhould be reprefentetf thus. 
 
 i, We 
 
C. V. S. i . The right life of Reafon. 2 5 1 
 
 1. We mud take care that the Organs of our 
 Senfe be tightly difpos'd, and not under the Power 
 of any Diitemper or considerable Decay, as for 
 Indance, that our Eyes are not tinctured with the 
 Jaundice, when we 'would judge of Colours, left 
 we pronounce them all yellow: That our Hands 
 are not burning in a Fever, nor benumm'd with 
 Froft or the Palfy, when we would judge of the 
 Heat or Coldnefs of any Object: That our Palate 
 bs not vitiated by any Difeafe, or by fome other 
 improper Tajle, when we would judge of the true 
 Tafte of any Solid or Liquid. This Direction re- 
 lates to all our Senfes, but the following Rules 
 chiefly refer to our Sight. 
 
 2. We muft obfcrve whether the Objetl be at 
 a proper Diflance, for if it be too near or too far 
 off, our Eyes will not fufficiently didinguifh ma- 
 ny Things which are properly the Objects of 
 Sight *, and therefore (if poflible) we muil make 
 nearer Approaches to the Object, or remove far- 
 ther from it, till we have obtained that due Dif- 
 tance which gives us the cleared Perception. 
 
 3. We muft not employ our Sight to take a 
 full Survey at once of Objetls that are too large for 
 it, but we muft view them by Parts, and then 
 judge of the Whole: Nor muft our Senfes judge 
 of Objetls too fmall, for fome Things which ap- 
 pear thro' Glalles to be really and diilinctly exift- 
 cnt, are either utterly inviiible, or greatly con- 
 fus'd when we would judge of them by the naked 
 Eye. 
 
 4. We muft place our/elves in fuch a Pofuion 
 toward the Objetl, or place the Object in fuch a 
 Pofition toward our Eye, as may give us the clear- 
 ed Reprefentation of it •, for a different Pofuion 
 greatly alters the Appearance of the Shape of Bo- 
 dies. And tor this Reafon we fliould change the 
 
 R PoJ\ 
 
^2 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Pojltion both of the Eye and the Object in fome 
 Cafes, that by viewing the Objetl in feveral Ap- 
 pearances we may pafs a more compleat and cer- 
 tain Judgment concerning it. 
 
 5. We mint confider what the Medium is by 
 which Objects are reprefented to our Senfes ; whe- 
 ther it be thinner or thicker •, whether it be Air, 
 or Vapour, or Water, or Glafs, csV. whether it 
 be duly enlightned or dufky ; whether it reflect, 
 or refract, or only tranfmit the Appearance of the 
 Object ; and whether it be tinctur'd with any 
 particular Colour; whether it be moving or at 
 Reft. 
 
 6. We muft fometimes ufe other Helps to aflift 
 our Senfes •, and if we make ufe of Glaffes, we 
 muft make all juft Allowances for the Thicknefs 
 or Thinnefs of them, for the Clearnefs or Dul- 
 nefs, for the Smoothnefs or Roughnefs, for the 
 Plainnefs, the Convexity or Concavity of them, 
 and for the Diftance at which thefe GlafTes are 
 placed from the Eye, or from the Object, (or 
 from one another, if there be two or more Glaf- 
 fes ufedj and all this according to the Rules of 
 Art. The fame fort of Caution fliould be ufed 
 alfo in Mediums which a (Tift the Hearing, fuch as 
 Speaking-Trumpets, Hearing-Trumpets, &c. 
 
 7. If the Object may be propofed to more Sen- 
 fes than one, let us call in the Afliftance of fome 
 other Senfes to examine it, and this will increafe 
 the Evidence of what one Senfe dictates. Ex. gr. 
 Our Ear may aflift our Eye in judging of the Di- 
 ftance of Bodies, which are both vilible and fo- 
 norous, as an exploded Canon, or a Cloud charged 
 with Thunder. Our Feeling may aflift our Sight in 
 judging of the Kind, the Shape, Situation or Di- 
 ftance of Bodies that are near at Hand, as whe- 
 ther a Garment be Silk or Stuff, &c. So if I both 
 
 1 fie* 
 
C. V. S. 2. The rightVfe of Reafon. *g 
 
 /£?, kr, and embrace my Friend, I am fure he is 
 prefer) t. 
 
 8. We fhould alfo make fever al Trials, at fome 
 diftant Times, and in different Circumftances, 
 comparing former Experiments with later, and 
 our own Obfervations with thofe of other Per- 
 fons. 
 
 It is by fuch Methods as thefe that modern Pbi- 
 lofophy has been fo greatly improved by the ufe of 
 finjible Experiments. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 Reafon and Speculation. 
 
 IT is by Reafon we judge both in Matters of 
 Speculation and Praclice > there are peculiar 
 Rules which relate to Things praclical, whether 
 they be Matters of Religion, Morality, or Prudence, 
 yet many Things in this Section may be applied 
 to praclical Enquiries, and Matters of Faith, tho* 
 it chiefly relates to Knowledge or Speculations of 
 Reafon. 
 
 r. Whatfoever clear Ideas we can join toge- 
 ther without Inconfiftency, are to be counted pof- 
 fible, becaufe Almighty Power can make whatfo- 
 ever we can conceive. 
 
 2. From the mere Pofjibility of a Thing we can- 
 not infer its atlual Exiflence j nor from the Non~ 
 Exiflence of it can we infer its bnpoffibility. 
 
 Note, The Idea of God feems to claim an Ex- 
 emption from this general Rule ; for if he be pof- 
 fible, he certainly exiits, becaufe the very Idea 
 includes Eternity, and he cannot begin to be : If 
 he exift not, he is impoftible, for the very fame 
 Reafon, 
 
 R 2 a, What- 
 
254 LOGIC K: Or, Part If. 
 
 3. Whatfbever is evidently contained in the Idea 
 of any thing, may be affirmed of that thing with 
 Certainty. Reafon is contained in the Idea of a 
 Man \ and Exiftence is contained in the Idea of 
 God ; and therefore we may affirm God exifts, and 
 Man is reasonable. 
 
 4. It is impoffible that the fame thing mould 
 be, and not be at the fame Time, and in the fame 
 Refpect. Thence it follows, that two contradic- 
 tory Ideas cannot be pined in the fame Part of the 
 fameSubjecl, at the fame Time, and in the fame Re- 
 fpetls: Or, that two contradictory Proportions can 
 never be both true. 
 
 5- The more we converfe with any Subject in 
 its various Properties, the better Knowledge of it 
 we are likely to attain ; and by frequent and re- 
 peated Enquiries and Experiments, Reafonings 
 and Conversations about it, we confirm our true 
 Judgments of that Thing, and correct our for- 
 mer Miftakes. 
 
 6. Yet after our utmoft Enquiries, we can ne- 
 ver be allured by Reafon, that we know all the 
 Powers and Properties of any finite Being. 
 
 7. Infinite Beings are not adequately known by 
 us, much lefs are Things infinite: For it is of the 
 Nature of a finite Mind not to be able to compre- 
 hend what is infinite. 
 
 8. We may judge and argue very juftly and 
 certainly concerning Infinites, in fome Parts of 
 them, or fo far as our Ideas reach, tho* the Infi- 
 nity of them hath fomething incomprehenfible in 
 it. And this is built on the general Rule follow- 
 ing, (viz.) 
 
 9. Whatfoever is Efficiently clear and evident 
 ought not to be denied, tho' there are other things 
 belonging to the fame Subject which cannot be 
 comprehended. J may affirm many Things with 
 
 Certainty 
 
CV.S.2. the right Ufe of Reafon. 255 
 
 Certainty concerning human Souls, their Union with 
 Bodies, concerning the Divifibility of Matter, and 
 the Attributes of God, tho' many other Things re- 
 lating to them are all Darknefs to us. 
 
 10. If an Opinion propos'd has either no Argu- 
 ments, or equal Arguments for and againfl it, we 
 mult remain in perfect Sufpence about it, till con- 
 vincing Evidence appear on one Side. 
 
 11. Where prefent Neceflity of Action does 
 not conftrain us to determine, we mould not im- 
 mediately yield up our Aflent to mere probable 
 Arguments, without a due Referve, if we have any 
 reafonable Hope of attaining greater Light and 
 Evidence on one Side or the other : For when the 
 Balance of the Judgment once refigns its Equili- 
 brium oy Neutrality to a mere probable Argument, 
 it is too ready to fettle itfelf on that Side, fo that 
 the Mind will not eafily change that Judgment, 
 tho' bright and ftrong Evidence appear afterwards 
 on the other Side. 
 
 12. Of two Opinions if one has unanfwerable 
 "Difficulties attending it, we mud not reject it im- 
 mediately, till we examine whether the contrary 
 Opinion has not Difficulties as unanfwerable. 
 
 13. If each Opinion has Objeclions againfl it 
 which we cannot anfwer, or reconcile, we mould 
 rather embrace that which has the leaf Difficul- 
 ties in it, and which has the left Arguments to fup- 
 port it: And let our AflTent bear Proportion to 
 the fuperior Evidence. 
 
 14. If any Doctrine hath very ftrong and fuf- 
 fcient Light and Evidence to command our AfTent, 
 we mould not reject it becaufe there is an Objec* 
 lion or two againit it which we are not able to 
 anfwer •, for upon this Foot a common Chriftian 
 would be baffled out of every Article of his Faith t 
 ^nd mult renounce even the Diclatcs of his Reo- 
 
 K 3 fin 
 
256 LOG ICK: Or, Part II. 
 
 fon and his Senfes •, and the moft learned Man per- 
 haps would hold but very few of them faft ; for 
 fome Objections which attend the facred Doc- 
 trines of the Eternity and the Omniprefence of God, 
 and the philofophical Doctrines of Light, Atoms, 
 Space, Motion, &fr. are hardly folvable to this 
 Day. 
 
 15. Where two Extremes are propofed, either 
 in Matters of Speculation or Practice, and neither 
 of them has certain and convincing Evidence, it is 
 generally fafeft to take the middle Way. Modera- 
 tion is more likely to come near the Truth than 
 doubtful Extremes. This is an excellent Rule to 
 judge of the Characters and Value of the greateil 
 Part of Perfons and Things -, for Nature fddom 
 deals in Superlatives. It is a good Rule alfo by 
 which to form our Judgment in many fpeculative 
 Controverftes -, a reconciling Medium in fuch Cafes 
 does often bed fecure Truth as well as Peace. 
 
 16. When two different Propositions have each 
 3 veryftrong and cogent Evidence, and do not plain- 
 ly appear inconfiflent, we may believe both of 
 them, tho' we cannot at prefent fee the Way to 
 reconcile them. Reafon, as well as our own Con- 
 fcioufnefs, allures us that the Will of Man is free, 
 and that Multitudes of human Aclions are in that 
 Refpecl contingent ; and yet Reafon and Scriptw* 
 aflure us that God foreknows them all, and this im- 
 plies a certain Futurity. Now tho' learned Men 
 have not to this Day hit on any fo clear and hap- 
 py Method as is defued to reconcile thefe Pro- 
 pofitions, yet fince we do not fee a plain Incon- 
 fiftency in them, we juftly believe them both, be- 
 caufe their Evidence is great. 
 
 17. Let us not therefore too iuddenly determine 
 in difficult Matters that two Things are utterly in- 
 confiflent: For there are many Proportions which 
 
 may 
 
C. V.S. 2. The right life of Reafon. 257 
 
 may appear inconfiftent at firft, and yet afterwards 
 we find their Confiftency, and the Way of recon- 
 ciling them may be made plain and eafy : As alfo, 
 there are other Propositions which may appear 
 conftftent at firft, but after due Examination we 
 find their Inconfiflency. 
 
 18. For the fame Reafon we fhould not call 
 thofe Difficulties utterly infolvable y or thofe Ob- 
 jections unan fiver 'able ', which we are not prefently 
 able to anfwer: Time and Diligence may give far- 
 ther Light. 
 
 19. In fhort, if we will fecure ourfelves from 
 Error, we fhould not be too frequent or hafty in 
 afTerting the certain Conjijlency or Inconfiflency, the 
 abfolute Univerfality, Necejfity, or ImpoJJibility of 
 Things, where there is not the brightelt Evidence. 
 He is but a young and raw Philofopher, who, 
 when he fees two particular Ideas evidently agree, 
 immediately afferts them to agree univerfalU, to 
 agree necejfiarily, and that it is impofjlble it Jhould be 
 otberwife: Or when he fees evidently that two par- 
 ticular Ideas happen to di/agree, he prefently aflerts 
 their conftant and natural Inconfiflency^ their w 
 Impojflbility of Agreement, and calls every thing 
 contrary to his Opinion Abfurdity and Nonfenfe. A 
 true Philofopher will affirm or deny with much 
 Caution orModefty, unlefs he has thoroughly ex- 
 amin'd and found the Evidence of every Part of his 
 Alfertion exceeding plain. 
 
 20. Let us have a Care of building our Aflfu- 
 rance of any important Point of Doctrine upon one 
 Jingle Argument^ If there are more to be obtain'd. 
 We fhould not flight and reject all other Argu- 
 ments which fupport the fame Doctrine, left if 
 ouv favourite Argument fhould be refuted, and fail 
 us, we fhould be tempted to abandon that impor- 
 tant Principle of Truth. I think this was a very 
 
 R 4 culpable 
 
258 LOGICK: Or, Part II. 
 
 culpable Practice in Defcartes, and fome of his 
 Followers, who when he had found out the Ar- 
 gument for the Exiftence of God, deriv'd from the 
 Idea of a mo ft perfect and felf-exiftent Being, he 
 feem'd to defpife and abandon all other Arguments 
 again ft Atheifm. 
 
 21. If we happen to have our chief Arguments 
 for any Opinion refuted, we mould not immedi- 
 ately give up the Opinion itfelf •, for perhaps it 
 may be a Truth dill, and we may find it to be 
 juflly fupported by other Arguments, which we 
 might once think weaker, or perhaps by new Ar- 
 guments which we knew not before. 
 
 22. We ought to eftecm that to be fuffcient E~ 
 vidence of a Proportion, where both the Kind and 
 the Force of the Arguments or Proofs are as great 
 as the Nature of the Thing admits, and as the 
 Necefilty or Exigence of the Cafe requires. So if 
 we have a credible and certain Teftimony that Cbrift 
 rofe from the Bead, it is enough •, we are not to 
 expect mathematical or ocular Demonflration for it, 
 at lead in our Day. 
 
 23. Tho' we mould feek what Proofs may be 
 attain'd of any Propofition, and we mould receive 
 any Number of Arguments which are jufr and 
 evident for the Confirmation of the fame Truth f 
 yet we mufl not judge of the Truth of any Pro- 
 pofition by the Number of Arguments which are 
 brought to fupport it, but by the Strength and 
 Weight of them: A Building will Hand firmer and 
 longer on four large Pillars of Marble, than on 
 ten of Sand, or Earth, or Timber. 
 
 24. Yet where certain Evidence is not to be 
 found or expected, a confiderable Number of pro- 
 bable Arguments carry great Weight with them 
 even in Matters of Speculation. That is a proba- 
 ble Hypothecs in Philofophy or in Theology, which 
 
 goes 
 
C.V.S. 3. The right Ufelf Rzzton. 259 
 
 goes fartheft toward the Solution of many diffi- 
 cult Queflions arifmg on any Subject. 
 
 Sect. III. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 Morality and Religion. 
 
 HERE it may be proper in the firft Place 
 to mention a few Definitions of Words or 
 Terms. 
 
 By Matters of Morality and Religion, I mean 
 thofe things which relate to our Duty to God, 
 our Selves, or our Fellow-Creatures. 
 
 Moral Good, or Virtue, or Holinefs, in an Ac- 
 tion or Temper conformable to the Rule of our 
 Duty. Moral Evil, or Vice, or Sin, is an Action 
 or Temper unconformable to the Rule of our 
 Duty, or a Neglect to fulfil it. 
 
 Note, The Words Vice or Virtue, chiefly imply 
 the Relation of our Actions to Men and this 
 World : Sin and Holinefs rather imply their Re- 
 lation to God and the other World. 
 
 Natural Good is that which gives us Pleafure or 
 Satisfaction. Natural Evil is that which gives us 
 Pain or Grief. 
 
 Happinefs confifts in the Attainment of the 
 highefl and mod lafting natural Good. Mifery 
 confifts in fuffering the higheft and mod lafting 
 natural Evil •, that is, in fhort, Heaven or Hell. 
 
 Tho' this be a juft Account of perfect Happi- 
 nefs and perfecl Mifery, yet wherefoever Pain o- 
 vcrbalances Pleafure, there is a Degree of Mifery, 
 and wherefoever Pleafure overbalances Pain, there 
 is a Degree of Happinefs, 
 
 I proceed 
 
26o L G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 I proceed now to lay down fome Principles and 
 Rules of Judgment in Matters of Morality and Re- 
 ligion. 
 
 i. The Will of our Maker, whether difcover- 
 cd by Reafon or Revelation, carries the higheft 
 Authority with it, and is therefore the higheft Rule 
 of Duty to intelligent Creatures •, a Conformity or 
 Non-conformity to it determines their Actions to 
 be morally good or evil. 
 
 2. Whatfoever is really an immediate Duty to- 
 ward our felves, or toward our Fellow-Creatures, 
 is more remotely z. Duty to God •, and therefore in 
 the Practice of it we mould have an Eye to the 
 Will of God as our Rule, and to his Glory as our 
 End. 
 
 3. Our wife and gracious Creator has clofely 
 united our Duty and our Happinefs together •, and 
 has connected Sin or Vice, and Punijhment ; that 
 is, he has ordain'd that the higheft natural Good 
 and Evil mould have a clofe Connection with mo- 
 ral Good and Evil, and that both in the Nature 
 of Things, and by his own pofitive Appoint- 
 ment. 
 
 4. Confcience mould feek all due Information 
 in order to determine what is Duty, and what 
 is Sin, becaufe Happinefs and Mifery depend 
 upon it. 
 
 5. On this Account our Inclination to prefent 
 temporal Good, and our Averfion to prefent tempo- 
 ral Evil, muft be wifely overbalanced by the Con- 
 fideration of future and eternal Good or Evil 9 that 
 is, Happinefs or Mifery. And for this Reafon we 
 mould not omit a Duty, or commit a Sin, to 
 gain any temporal Good, or to avoid any temporal 
 Evil, 
 
 6. Tho» 
 
C.V.S. 3. The right Ufe of Reafon. 261 
 
 6. Tho' our natural Reafon in a State of Inno- 
 cence might be fufRcient to find out thofe Duties 
 which were neceflary for an innocent Creature, in 
 order to abide in the Favour of his Maker, yet in 
 a fallen State our natural Reafon is by no means 
 fufficient to find out all that is neceflary to reftore 
 a fmful Creature to the divine Favour. 
 
 7. Therefore God hath condefcended in vari- 
 ous Ages of Mankind to reveal to finful Men what 
 he requires of them in order to their Refloration, 
 and has appointed in his Word fome peculiar Mat- 
 ters of Faith and Practice, in order to their Sal- 
 vation. This is call'd reveal* d Religion, as the 
 Things knowable concerning God, and our Du- 
 ty by the Light of Nature are call'd natural Reli- 
 gion. 
 
 8. There are alfo many Parts of Morality, and 
 natural Religion, or many natural Duties relating 
 to God, to our felves, and to our Neighbours, 
 which would be exceeding difficult and tedious 
 for the Bulk of Mankind to find out and deter- 
 mine by natural Reafon •, therefore it has pleafed 
 God in this facred Book of Divine Revelation to 
 exprefs the moll neceflary Duties of this kind in 
 a very plain and eafy manner, and made them in- 
 telligible to Souls of the loweft Capacity -, or they 
 may be very eafily deriv'd thence by the Ufe of 
 Reafon. 
 
 9. As there are fome Duties much more n 
 fary, and more important than others are, fo every 
 Duty requires our Application to underltand and 
 pradtife it in Proportion to its Necejity and Im- 
 portance. 
 
 10. Where two Duties fcem to ftand in Op- 
 pofition to each other, and wc cannot practife 
 both, the lejs mud give Way to the greater, and 
 (he Omiflion of the lcis is not finful. So ceremo- 
 nial 
 
&6z LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 nial Laws give Way to moral: God will have 
 Mercy and not Sacrifice. 
 
 ii. In Duties of natural Religion, we may 
 judge of the different Degrees of their Necefiity 
 and Importance by Reafon, according to their 
 greater or more apparent Tendency to the Ho- 
 nour of God and the good of Men : But in Mat- 
 ters of reveal 9 d Religion, it is only divine Revela- 
 tion can certainly inform us what is moil ne- 
 ceffary and moft important j yet we may be 
 a (Tifted alfo in that Search by the Exercifes of 
 Reafon. 
 
 12. In Actions wherein there may be fome fcru- 
 ple about the Duty or Lawfulnefs of them, we 
 fhould choofe always the faf eft Side, and abftain 
 as far as we can from the Practice of Things whofe 
 Lawfulnefs we fufpect, 
 
 13. Points of the greateft Importance in human 
 Life, or in Religion, are generally the moft evi- 
 dent, both in the Nature of Things and in the 
 Word of God; and where Points of Faith or 
 Practice are exceeding difficult to find out, they 
 cannot be exceeding important. This Propofition 
 may be proved by the Goodnefs and Faithfulnefs 
 of God, as well as by Experience and Obfer- 
 vation. 
 
 14. In fome of the outward Practices and 
 Forms of Religion, as well as human Affairs, 
 there is frequently a prefent Neceffity offpeedy Ac- 
 tion one Way or another : In fuch a Cafe, hav* 
 ing furveyed Arguments on both Sides, as far as 
 our Time and Circumftances admit, we mult 
 guide our Practice by tbofe Reafons which appear 
 moft probable, and feem at that Time to overbalance 
 the reft •, yet always referving room to admit far- 
 ther Light and Evidence, when fuch Occurrences 
 return again. It is a Preponderation of circumftantial 
 
 Arguments 
 
C.V-S. 4. The right Ufe of Reafon. 263 
 
 Arguments that muft determine our Actions in a 
 thoufand Occurrences. 
 
 15. We may alfo determine upon probable Ar- 
 guments where the matter is of fmall Confequence 
 and would not anfwer the Trouble of feeking af- 
 ter Certainty. Life and Time are more precious 
 than to have a large Share of them laid out in 
 fcrupulous Enquiries, whether fmoaking Tobacco, 
 or wearing a Periwig be lawful or no. 
 
 16. In Affairs of greater Importance, and which 
 may have a long and lading, and extenfive Influ- 
 ence on our future Conduct or Happinefs, we 
 mould not take up with Probabilities, if Certain- 
 ty may be attain'd. Where there is any Doubt 
 on the Mind, in fuch Cafes we mould call in the 
 Aflitlance of all manner of Circumflances, Rea- 
 fons, Motives, Confequences on all Sides: We 
 muft wait longer and with earned Requefl feek 
 human and divine Advice before we fully deter- 
 mine our Judgment and our Practice, according 
 to the old Roman Sentence, Quod ftatuendum eft 
 femel, deliberandum eft diu. We mould be long 
 in confidering what we mull determine once 
 for all. 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of hu- 
 man Prudence. 
 
 TH E great Defign of Prudence, as diftinft 
 from Morality and Religion, is to determine 
 and manage every Affair with Decency, and to 
 the bed Advantage. 
 
 That is decent, which is agreeable to our State, 
 Condition, or Circumdances, whether it be in 
 Behaviour, Difcourfe, or Action, 
 
 That 
 
264 LOG IC K: Or, Part 11/ 
 
 That is advantageous which attains the mod and 
 beft Purpofes, and avoids the moft and greateft 
 Inconveniences. 
 
 As there is infinite Variety in the Circumftances 
 of Perfons, Things, Anions, Times and Places, fo 
 we muft be furniuYd with fuch general Rules as 
 are accommodable to all this Variety by a wife 
 Judgment and Difcretion: For what is an Act of 
 confummate Prudence in fome Times, Places and 
 Circumftances, would be confummate Folly in others. 
 Now thefe Rules may be rang'd in the following 
 manner. 
 
 1. Our Regard to Perfons or Things mould be 
 govern'd by the Degree of Concernment we have 
 with them, the Relation we have to them, or the 
 Expectation we have from them. Thefe mould 
 be the Meafures by which we mould proportion 
 our Diligence and Application in any thing that 
 relates to them. 
 
 2. We fhould always confider whether the 
 Thing we purfue be attainable \ whether it be 
 worthy our Purfuit \ whether it be worthy the 
 Degree of Purfuit -, whether it be worthy of the 
 Means ufed in order to attain it. This Rule is 
 necelTary both in Matters of Knowledge, and Mat- 
 ters of Practice. 
 
 3. When the Advantages and Difadv ant ages, 
 Conveniencies and Inconveniencies of any Action are 
 balanc'd together, we mull: finally determine on 
 that Side which has the fuperior Weight ; and 
 the fooner in things which are neceiTarily and fpee- 
 dily to be done or determin'd. 
 
 4. If Advantages and Difadvantages in their 
 own Nature are equal, then thofe which are moil 
 certain or likely as to the Event mould turn the 
 Scale of our Judgment, and determine our Prac- 
 tice. 
 
 5. Where 
 
C. V. S. 4. The rightUfe o/Reafon. 265 
 
 5. Where the Improbabilities of Succefs or Ad- 
 vantage are greater than the Probabilities , it is 
 not Prudence to act or venture. It is proper to 
 enquire whether this be not the Cafe in almoft all 
 Lotteries ; for they that hold Stakes will certainly 
 fecure Part to themfelves •, and only the Remain- 
 der being divided into Prizes mult render the Im~ 
 probability of Gain to each Adventurer greater than 
 the Probability, 
 
 6. We mould not defpife or neglect any real 
 Advantage, and abandon the Purfuit of it, tho' 
 we cannot attain all the Advantages that we de- 
 fire. This would be to act like Children, who 
 are fond of fomething which ftrikes their Fancy 
 mod, and fullen and regardlefs of every thing elfe, 
 if they are not humour' d in that Fancy. 
 
 7. Tho' a general Knowledge of Things be ufe- 
 ful in Science and in human Life, yet we mould 
 content our felves with a more fuperficial Know- 
 ledge of thofe things which have the leaft Rela- 
 tion to our chief End and Delign. 
 
 8. This Rule holds good alio in Matters of Bu- 
 finefs and Practice, as well as in Matters of Know- 
 ledge - y and therefore we JJjould not grafp at every 
 -thing, left in the end we attain nothing. Perfons 
 that either by an Inconftancy of Temper, or by 
 a vain Ambition, will purfue every fort of Art 
 and Science, Study and Bufmefs, ieldom grow ex- 
 cellent in any one of them : And Projectors who 
 form twenty Schemes ieldom ufe fufficient Ap- 
 plication to finifh one of them, or make it turn 
 to good Account. 
 
 9. Take heed of delaying and trifling amongii 
 the Means inftead of reaching at the End. Take 
 heed of waiting a Life in mere fpeculative Studies, 
 which is calPd to Action and Employment : Dwell 
 toot too long in pbilofopbical, mathematical, or 
 
 grammatical 
 
266 LOG IC K: Or, Par c II. 
 
 grammatical Parrs of Learning, when your chief 
 Defign is Law, Phyfick, or Divinity. Don't 
 fpend the Day in gathering Flowers by the Way 
 Side, leil Night come upon you before you ar- 
 rive at your Journey's End, and then you will not 
 reach it. 
 
 10. Where the Cafe and Circumftances of wife 
 and good Men relemble our own Cafe and Circum- 
 ftances, we may borrow a great deal of Inftructi- 
 on toward our prudent Conduct from their Exam- 
 'pie, as well as in all Cafes we may learn much 
 from their Converfation and Advice. 
 
 ii. After all other Rule s remember this, that 
 mere Speculation in Matters of human Prudence can 
 never be a perfect Director without Experience and 
 Obfervation. We may be content therefore in 
 our younger Years to commit fome unavoidable 
 Miftakes in Point of Prudence, and we fhall fee 
 Miftakes enough in the Conduct of others, both 
 which ought to be treafur'd up amongfr our ufe- 
 ful Obfervations, in order to teach us better Judg- 
 ment for Time to come. Sometimes the Mif- 
 takes, Imprudences and Follies, which our felves or 
 others have been guilty of, give us brighter and 
 more effectual LeiTons of Prudence, than the wi- 
 fefl Counfels, and the faired Examples could ever 
 have done. 
 
 Sect. V. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 human Tejlimony. 
 
 rr^HE Evidence of human Tejlimony is not fo 
 
 JL proper to lead us into the Knowledge of 
 
 the Effence and inward Nature of Things, as to 
 
 Hcquajnt us with the Exiftence. of Things, and to 
 
 inform 
 
C. V. S. 5. The right Uje of Reafon. 267 
 
 inform us of Matters of Facl both paft and pre- 
 fent. And tho' there be a great deal of Fallibility 
 in the Teftimony of Men, yet there are fome 
 Things we may be almoft as certain of, as that 
 the Sun Jhines, or that five 'Twenties make a Hun- 
 dred. Who is there at London that knows any 
 thing of the World, but believes there is fuch a 
 City as Paris in France ; that the Pope dwells at 
 Rome •, that Julius Csefar was an Emperor ', or that 
 Luther had a great Hand in the Reformation? 
 
 If we obferve the following Rules, we may ar- 
 rive at fuch a Certainty in many Things of human 
 Teftimony, as that it is morally impofllble we 
 ihould be deceived, i. e. we may obtain a moral 
 Certainty. 
 
 1. Let us confider whether the Thing report- 
 ed be in itfelf pojfible ; if not, it can never be cre- 
 dible^ whofoever relates it. 
 
 2. Confider farther whether it be probable, whe- 
 ther there are any concurring Circumftances to prove 
 it, befide the mere Teftimony of the Perfon that 
 relates it. I confef* if thefe laft Cdnditions are 
 wanting, the thing may be true, but then it 
 ought to have the ftronger Teftimony to fup- 
 port it. 
 
 3. Confider whether the Perfon who relates it 
 be capable of knowing the Truth : Whether he be 
 ijkilful Judge in fuch Matters, if it be a Bufmcfs 
 of Art, or a nice Appearance in Nature, or fome 
 curious Experiment in Philofophy. But it it be 
 a mere Occurrence in Lite, a plain, fenlible Mat* 
 ter or Fact, it is enough to enquire whether he 
 who relates it were an Eye or Ear-lVitnefs, or 
 whether he himfelf bad it only by i or can 
 trace it up to the Original. 
 
 S 4. Con- 
 
268 LOGIC K: Or, Part II, 
 
 4. Confider whether the Narrator be honeft and 
 faithful, as well as (kilful : Whether he hath no 
 
 Biafs upon his Mind, no peculiar Gain or Profit 
 by believing or reporting it, no Intereft or Prin- 
 ciple which might warp his own Belief afide from 
 Truth, or which might tempt him to prevaricate, 
 to fpeak filfly, or to give a Reprefentation a lit- 
 tle different from the naked Truth of Things. In 
 fhort, whether there be no Occafion of Sufpicion 
 concerning his Report. 
 
 5. Confider whether feveral Perfons agree toge- 
 ther in the Report of this Matter* and if fo, then 
 whether thefe Perfons who join'd together in their 
 Teitimony might not be fuppos'd to combine to- 
 gether in a Falfhood. Whether they are Perfons 
 of fufficient Skill, Probity and Credit. It might be 
 alfo enquired whether they are of different Na- 
 tions, Seels, Parties, Opinions, or Interefts. For 
 the more divided they are in all thefe, the more 
 likely is their Report to be true, if they agree to- 
 gether in their Account of the fame Thing; 
 and efpecially if they perfift in it without waver- 
 ing. 
 
 6. Confider farther, whether the Report were 
 capable of being eafily refuted at firft if it had not 
 been true 5 if fo, this confirms the Teftimony. 
 
 7. Enquire yet again, whether there hath been 
 a conftant, uniform tradition and Belief of this Mat- 
 ter from the very firft Age or Time when the 
 Thing was transacted, without any reafonable 
 Doubts or Contradictions. Or, 
 
 8. If any Part of it hath been doubted by any 
 confiderable Perfons, whether it has been fearsb- 
 td out and afterwards confirmed, by having all the 
 Scruples and Doubts removed. In either of thefe 
 Cafes the Teftimony becomes more firm and cre- 
 dible. 
 
 9. En- 
 
C. V. S. 5. The rigk Z7/e of Reafon. 269 
 
 9. Enquire on the other Hand, whether there 
 are any confiderable Objections remaining againft the 
 Belief of that Proportion fo attefted. Whether 
 there be any thing very improbable in the thing it 
 felf. Whether any coricurrent Circumftances feem 
 to oppofe it. Whether any Perfon or Perfons give 
 a pofitive and plain Teftimony againft it. Whether 
 they are equally JkilfuU and equally faithful as thole 
 who aflert it. Whether they be as many or more 
 in Number, and whether they might have any 
 fecret Biafs or Influence on them to contradict 
 it. 
 
 10. Sometimes the entire Silence of a Thing may 
 have fomething of Weight toward the Decifion 
 of a doubtful Point of Hiftory, or a Matter of 
 human Faith, (viz.) where the Fad is pretended 
 to be publicic, if the Perfons who are filent about 
 it were fkilful to obferve, and could not but know 
 fuch an Occurrence ; if they were engaged by 
 Principle or by Intereft to have declared it ; if 
 they had fair Opportunity to fpeak of it : And 
 thele Things may tend to make a Matter fufpi- 
 cious, if it be not very well attefted by pofitivs, 
 Proof. 
 
 1 1. Remember that in fome Reports there are 
 more Marks of Faljhood than of Truth* and in o- 
 thers there are more Marks of Truth than of Falf- 
 hood. By a Companion of all thefe tkings toge- 
 ther, and putting every Argument on one Side 
 and the other into the Balance, we mult torm as 
 good a Judgment as we can which Side prepon- 
 derates y and give a ftrong or a feeble Aiilnt or 
 Diflcnt, or with-hold our Judgment entirely, ac- 
 cording to greater or le/Jer L viing to 
 more plain or dubious Marh cj Truth 01 
 hood, 
 
 S 2 j 2. Ob- 
 
270 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 12. Obfcrvc that in Matters of human Tefti- 
 mony, there is oftentimes a great Mixture of Truth 
 with Faljhood in the Report itfelf : Some Parts of 
 the Story may be perfectly true, and fome utter- 
 ly falfe ; and fome may have fuch a blended Con- 
 fufion of Circumflances which are a little warpt 
 afide from the Truth, and mifreprefented, that 
 there is need of good Skill and Accuracy to form 
 a Judgment concerning them, and determine 
 which Part is true, and which is falfe. The whole 
 Report is not to be believed, becaufe fome Parts 
 are indubitably true, nor the whole to be rejected, 
 becaufe fome Parts are as evident Fal/hoods. 
 
 We may draw two remarkable Obfervations 
 from this Seffion. 
 
 Obferv. I. How certain is the Truth of the 
 Chriftian Religion, and particularly of the Refur- 
 reftion of Chrift, which is a Matter of Fact on 
 which Chrijlianity is built ! We have almofl all 
 the concurrent Evidences that can be derived from 
 human Tefiimony joining to confirm this glorious 
 Truth. The Fact is not impoffible ; concurrent 
 Circumflances call a favourable Afpect on it 5 it 
 was foretold by one who wrought Miracles, and 
 therefore not unlikely, nor unexpected : The A- 
 poftles and firft Difciples were Eye and Ear-Wit- 
 nefTes, for they converfed with their rifen Lord ; 
 they were the moil plain, honeft Men in them- 
 felves •, the Temptations of worldly Interefls did 
 rather diicourage their Belief and Report of it : 
 They all agree in this Matter, tho' they were 
 Men of different Characters ; Pharifees and Fi/her- 
 -men, and Publicans, Men of Judea and Galilee, 
 and perhaps fome Heathens, who were early con- 
 verted : The Thing might eafily have been dis- 
 proved if it were falfe ; it hath been conveyed by 
 2 conftanc 
 
C.V.S.6. The right Ufe of Reafon. 271 
 
 conftant Tradition and Writing down to our 
 Times; thofe who at firft doubted were after- 
 wards convinced by certain Proofs; nor have any 
 pretended to give any Proof of the contrary, but 
 merely denied the Fact with Impudence in Oppo- 
 fition to all thefe Evidences. 
 
 Obferv. II. How weak is the Faith which is due 
 to a Multitude of things in antient human Hifto- 
 ry ! For tho' many of thefe Criteria, or Marks of 
 Credibility are found plainly in the more general 
 andpublick Fafts, yet as to a Multitude of particu- 
 lar Fails and Circumftances, how deficient are they 
 in fuch Evidence as fhould demand our AiTcnt 1 . 
 Perhaps there is nothing that ever was done in all 
 pad Ages, and which was not a publick Fact, fo 
 well attefted as the Refurrection of Chrift. 
 
 Sect. VI. 
 
 Principles and Rides of Judgment in Matters of di- 
 vine Tejlimony. 
 
 AS human Tejlimony acquaints us with Matters 
 of Facl, both paft and prejent, which lye 
 beyond the Reach of our own perfonal Notice ; 
 fo divine Tejlimony is fuited to inform us both of 
 the Nature of Things, as well as Matters of Facl y 
 and of Things future, as well as prefent ox paft. 
 
 Whatfoever is dictated to us by God himfelf, 
 or by Men who are divinely infpired, mud be be- 
 lieved with full A(Tu ranee. Reafon demands us to 
 believe whatfoever divine Revelation dictates : For 
 God is perfectly wife, and cannot be deceived ; he 
 is faithful and good, and will not deceive his Crea- 
 tures : And when Reafon has found out the cer- 
 tain Marks or Credentials of divine Tejlimony to 
 
 S 3 belong 
 
272 LOGIC K: Or, Part XL 
 
 belong to any Proportion, there remains then no 
 farther Enquiry to be made, but only to find out 
 the true Senfe and Meaning of that which God 
 has revealed, for Reafon it felf demands the Belief 
 of it. 
 
 Now divine ( Teflimom or Revelation requires thefe 
 following Credentials. 
 
 1. That the Propofitions or Doctrines reveal- 
 ed be not inconfiftent with Reafon •, for intelligent 
 Creatures can never be bound to believe real In- 
 confiftencies. Therefore we are fure the Popifh 
 Doctrine of Tranfubflantiation is not a Matter of 
 divine Revelation^ becaufe it is contrary to all our 
 Senfes and our Reafon^ even in their proper Ex- 
 ercifes. 
 
 God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of 
 himfelf, and agreeable to his own Nature and di- 
 vine Perfections. Now many of thefe Perfecti- 
 ons are difcoverable by the Light of Reafon^ and 
 whatfoever is inconfiftent with thefe Perfections, 
 cajinot be a divine Revelation. 
 
 But let it be noted that in Matters of Pratlice 
 toward our Fellow-Creatures, God may command 
 us to act in a Manner contrary to what Reafon 
 would direct antecedent to that Command. So 
 Abraham was commanded to offer up his Son a 
 Sacrifice : The Ifmclites were ordered to borrow 
 of the Egyptians without paying them, and to 
 plunder and flay the Inhabitants of Canaan: Be* 
 caufe God has a ibvereign Right to all Things, 
 and can with Equity difpoffefs his Creitures of 
 Life, and every Thing which he has given them, 
 and efpecially fuch finful Creatures as Mankind : , 
 and he can appoint whoni he pleafes to be the In- 
 struments of this juil Difpofleflion or Depriva- 
 tion. So that thefe divine Commands are not 
 really inconfiftent with right Reafon \ for whatfoever 
 
 is 
 
C. V.S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. 273 
 
 is fo cannot be believed where that Inconfiflency 
 appears. 
 
 2. Upon the fame Account the whole Botlrine 
 of Revelation muft be confiftent with it/elf; every 
 Part of it muft be confiftent with each other: 
 And tho* in Points of Prague latter Revelation 
 may repeal or cancel former divine Laws, yet in 
 Matters of Belief no latter Revelation can be in- 
 confiftent with what has been heretofore re- 
 vealed. 
 
 3. Divine Revelation muft be confirm'd by 
 fome divine and fupernatural Appearances, fom£ 
 extraordinary Signs or Tokens, Vifions, Voices, or 
 Miracles wrought, or Prophecies fulmTd. There 
 muft be fome Demonftrations of the Prefence and 
 Power of God, fuperior to all the Powers of Na- 
 ture, or the fettled Connection which God as 
 Creator has eftablifh'd among his Creatures in 
 this vifible World, 
 
 4. If there are any fuch extraordinary and won- 
 derful Appearances and Operations brought to 
 conteft with, or to oppofe divine Revelation, there 
 muft and always will be fuch a Superiority on the 
 Side of that Revelation which is truly divine, a$ 
 to manifeft that God is there. This was the 
 Cafe whrrv the Egyptian Sorcerers contended with 
 Mofes. But (he Wonders which Mofes wrought 
 did fo far transcend the Power of the Magicians, 
 as made them confefs, // was the Finger of God. 
 
 5. Thefe divine Appearances or Atteftations to 
 Revelation muft be either known to our f elves, by 
 our own peribnal Obfervation of them, or they 
 muft be fktfkienily erttefled by others, according to 
 the Principles and Rules by which Matters of hu- 
 man Faith are to be judged in the foregoing Sec- 
 tion, 
 
 S 4 Some 
 
274 LOG I CK: Or, Part II. 
 
 Some of thofe who liv'd in the Nations and 
 Ages where Miracles were wrought, were Eye and 
 Ear-Witneffes of the Truth and Divinity of the 
 Revelation ; but we who live in thefe diftant Ages, 
 mult have them deriv'd down to us by juft and in- 
 contcftable Hiftory and Tradition. We alfo even 
 in thefe diftant Times may fee the Accomplifli- 
 ments of fome ancient Predictions, and thereby ob- 
 tain that Advantage toward the Confirmation of 
 our Faith in divine Revelation beyond what thofe 
 Perfons enjoy'd who liv'd when the Prediclions 
 were pronounc'd. 
 
 6. There is another very confiderable Confir- 
 mation of divine Teftimony ; and that is, when the 
 Doctrines themfelves either on the Publication or 
 the Belief of them produce fupernatural Effects. 
 Such were the miraculous Powers which were com- 
 municated to Believers in the firft Ages of Chri- 
 ftianity, the Conversion .of Jews or Gentiles , the 
 amazing Succefs of the Go/pel of Chrift without 
 human Aid, and in Opposition to a thoufand Im- 
 pediments, its Power in changing the Hearts and 
 Lives of ignorant and vicious Heathens, and wic- 
 ked and profane Creatures in all Nations, and fil- 
 ling them with a Spirit of Virtue, Piety and Good- 
 neis. Wherefoever Perfons have found this Ef- 
 fect in their own Hearts, wrought by a Belief of 
 {he Gofpel of Chrift, they have a Witnefs in 
 themfelves of the Truth of it, and abundant Rea- 
 fon to believe it divine. 
 
 Of the Difference between Reafon and Revela- 
 tion, and in what Senfe the latter is fuperior, fee 
 more in Chap. 11. Seft. 9. and Chap. IV. Direct. 6. 
 
 Sict. 
 
C. V. S. 7. The right Ufe of Reafon. 275 
 
 Sect. VII. 
 
 Principles and Rules of judging, concerning Things 
 pafi, prefent, and to come, by the mere Ufe of 
 Reafon. 
 
 T Hough we attain the greatefl Afiurance of 
 Things paft and future by divine Faith, and 
 learn many Matters of Fact, both paft and prefent, 
 by human Faith, yet Reafon alfo may in a good 
 Degree aflift us to judge of Matters of Fact both 
 paft, prefent, and to come, by the following Prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 1. There is a Syftem of Beings round about us, 
 of which we ourf elves are a Part, which we call 
 the World ; and in this World there is a Courfe of 
 Nature, or a fettl'd Order of Caufes, Effects, An- 
 tecedents, Concomitants, Confequents, &c. from which 
 the Author of Nature doth not vary but upon very 
 important Occafions. 
 
 2. Where Antecedents, Concomitants and Con/e- 
 quentSy Caufes and Effetls, Signs and Things figni- 
 fted, Subjects and Adjuncts are necefifatily connect- 
 ed with each other, we may infer the Caufes from 
 the Effects, and Effects from Caufer, the Antece- 
 dents from the Confequents, as well as Confequents 
 from Antecedents, &c. and thereby be pretty cer- 
 tain of many Things both paft, prefect, and to 
 come. It is by this Principle that siftronomers can 
 tell what Day and Hour the Sun and Moon were 
 eclipfed five hundred Tears ago, and predict all /«- 
 turc Edipjes as long as the World fhall (band. They 
 can tell precifely at what Minute the Sun rifes or 
 jets this Day at Pequin /';; China, or what Alti- 
 tude the Dog-ftar had at Midnight or Midnoon in 
 Rome, on the Day when Julius Cadar was ftain. 
 
 Gardiners 
 
276 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Gardiners upon the fame Principle can foretel the 
 Months when every Plant will be in Bloom, and the 
 Plowman knows the Weeks of Harveft: We are 
 fure if there be a Chicken, there was an Egg: If 
 there be a Rainbow, we are certain it rains not fat- 
 off: If we behold a Tree growing on the Earth, we 
 know it has naturally a Root under Ground. 
 
 |. Where there is fuch a neceffary Connection 
 between Caufes and Effects, Antecedents and Confc- 
 quents, Signs and Things fegnified, we know alfo 
 that like Caufes will have like Effects, and propor- 
 tionable Caufes will have proportionable Effects, con- 
 trary Caufes will have contrary Effects f and obferv- 
 ing Men may form many Judgments by the Rules 
 of Similitude and Proportion, where the Caufes, 
 Effects, &c. are not entirely the fame. 
 
 4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain 
 Connection between Antecedents, Concomitants arid 
 Confequents, we can give but a Conjecture, or a pro- 
 bable Determination. If the Clouds gather, or the 
 Weather-glafs finks, we fuppofe it will rain : If a 
 Man fpit Blood frequently with coughing, we fup- 
 pofe his Lungs are hurt : If very dangerous Symp- 
 toms appear, we expect his Death. 
 
 5. Where Caufes operate freely with a Liberty 
 ef Indifference to this or the contrary, there we can- 
 not certainly know what the Effects will be : For 
 it feems to be contingent, and the certain Know- 
 ledge of it belongs only to God. This is the Cafe 
 in the greatefb Part of human Actions. 
 
 6. Yet wife Men by a juft Obfervation of hu- 
 man Nature will give very probable Conjectures 
 in this Matter alfo concerning Things pafl, or 
 Things future, becaufe human Nature in all Ages 
 and Nations has fuch a Conformity to' itfclf. By 
 a Knowledge of the Tempers of Men and their 
 prefent Circumftances, we may be able to give a 
 
 happy 
 
C V. S/7. The right life of Reafon. 277 
 
 happy Guefs what their Conduct will be, and what 
 will be the Event, by an Obfervation of the like 
 Cafes in former Times. This made the Emperor 
 Marcus Antoninus to fay, " By looking back into 
 " Hi/lory, and confidtring the Fate and Revolutions 
 * l of Governments, you will be able to form a Guefs, 
 '« and almofi prophefy upon the future. For Things 
 44 paft, prefent) and to come, are flrangely uniform, 
 •f and of a Colour-, and are commonly cafi in the 
 M fame Mould. So that upon the Matter, forty 
 M Tears of human Life may ferve for a Sample of 
 u ten thoufand." Collier'j Antoninus, Book VII. 
 Seel. 50. 
 
 7. There are alfo fome other Principles of judg- 
 ing concerning the paft Actions of Men in former 
 Ages, befide Bocks, Hiftories, and Traditions, which 
 are the Mediums of conveying human Teftimony ; 
 as we may infer the Skill and Magnificence of the 
 Antients by fome Fragments of their Statues, and 
 Ruins of their Buildings. We know what Roman 
 Legions came into Great Britain by Numbers of 
 Bricks dug out of the Earth in fome Parts of the 
 Ifland, with the Marks of fome particular Legion 
 upon them, which muft have been employ'd there 
 in Brick-making. We rectify fome Miftakes in 
 Hiftory by Statues, Coins, old Altars, Utenfils of 
 War, &c. We confirm or difprove fome pre- 
 tended Traditions and hiftorical Writings, by Me- 
 dals, Images, PiZlures, Urns, &c. 
 
 Thus I have gone thro' all thofe particular Ob- 
 jecls of our Judgment which I firft proposed, and 
 have laid down Principles and Rules by which we 
 may fafely conduct ourfelves therein. There is a 
 Variety of other Objects concerning which we 
 are occafionally call'd to pafs a Judgment, (viz.) 
 The Characters of Perfons, the Value and Worth 
 
278 LOGIC K: Or, PartIL 
 
 cf Things, the Senfe and Meaning of particular 
 Writers, Matters of Wit, Oratory, Poefy, Matters 
 of Equity in judicial Courts, Matters of Traffick and 
 Commerce betwixt Man and Msn, which would be 
 endlefs to enumerate. But if the general and fpe- 
 cial Rules of Judgment which have been mention'd 
 in thefe two laft Chapters are treafur'd up in the 
 Mind, and wrought into the very Temper of our 
 Souls in our younger Years, they will lay a Foun- 
 dation for juft and regular Judgment concerning 
 a thoufand fpecial Occurrences in the religious^ civil 
 and learned Life. 
 
 THE 
 
279 
 
 THE 
 
 THIRD PART 
 
 O F 
 
 L O G I C K- 
 
 Of Reafoning and Syllogifm. 
 
 AS the firft Work of the Mind is Percepti- 
 on^ whereby our Ideas are fram'd, and 
 the fecond is Judgment, which joins or 
 disjoins our Ideas, and forms a Proportion , fo the 
 third Operation of the Mind is Reafoning, which 
 joins feveral Propofitions together, and makes a 
 Syllogifm, that is, an Argument whereby we are 
 wont to infer fometbing that is lefs known, from Truths 
 which are more evident. 
 
 In treating of this Subject, let us confider more 
 particularly 
 
 1. The Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Parts of 
 which it is composed. 
 
 2. The feveral kinds of Syllogifms, arti- 
 cular Rules relating h them, 
 
2 8o LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 3. The Doclrine of Sophifms, or falfe Reafoning, 
 together with the Means of avoiding them* and the 
 Manner of folving or anfwering them* 
 
 4. Some general Rules to direel our Reafoning. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Parts 
 of which it is compos d. 
 
 IF the mere Perception and Cotnparifin of two 
 Ideas would always fhew us whether they agree 
 or difagree •, then all rational Propofitions would 
 be Matters of Intelligence, or fir ft Principles, and 
 there would be no Ufe of Reafoning, or drawing 
 any Confequences. It is the Narrownefs of the 
 human Mind which introduces the Neceflity of 
 Reafoning. When we are unable to judge of the 
 Truth or Falfhood of a Propofition in an imme- 
 diate Manner, by the mere Contemplation of its 
 Subject and Predicate, we are then conftrain'd to 
 ufe a Medium, and to compare each of them with 
 fome third Idea, that by feeing how far they agree 
 or difagree with it, we may be able to judge how 
 far they agree or difagree among themfelves : As, 
 if there are two Lines A and B, and I know not 
 whether they are equal or no, I take a third Line 
 C, or an Inch, and apply it to each of them -, if it 
 agree with them both, then I infer that A and B 
 are equal \ but if it agree with one and not with 
 the other, then I conclude A and B are unequal: 
 If it agree with neither of them, there can be no 
 Companion. 
 
 So 
 
C. I. fbe right life of Reafon. 28 1 
 
 So if the Queftion be whether God muft be wor- 
 Jbipped, we feek a third Idea, fuppofe the Idea of 
 a Creator, and fay, 
 
 Our Creator muft be ivorjhipped. 
 
 God is our Creator. 
 
 Therefore God muft be ivorjhipped. 
 
 The Comparifon of this third Idea, with the 
 twodiftinct Parts of the Queftion, ufually requires 
 two Propofitions, which are call'd the Premijfes: 
 The third Propofition which is drawn from them 
 is the Conclusion, wherein the Queftion itfelf is an- 
 swered, and the Subject and Predicate joined ei- 
 ther in the Negative or the Affirmative. 
 
 The Foundation of all Affirmative Conclusions is 
 laid in this general Truth, that fo far as two pro- 
 pos'd Ideas agree to any third Idea, they agree al- 
 io among themfelves. The Character of Creator 
 agrees to Go d, and Worjhip agrees to a Creator, 
 therefore Worjhip agrees to God. 
 
 The Foundation oj all negative Conclusions is 
 this, that where one of the two propofed Ideas 
 agrees with the third Idea, and the other difagrees 
 with it, they muft needs difagree fo far alio with 
 one another ; as, if no Sinners are happy, and it 
 Angels are happy, then Angels are not Sinners. 
 
 Thus it appears what is the ftricl: and juft No- 
 tion of a Syl/ogifm: It is a Sentence or Argument 
 made up of three Propofitions fo dilpofed, as that 
 the laft is neceiTarily infer'd from thole which go 
 before, as in the Inftanccs which have been jult 
 mentioned. 
 
 In the Conftitution of a Syllogifm two Things 
 may be confidcrcd (viz.) the Muter and the Form 
 of it. 
 
 The Matter of which a Syllogifm is made up, 
 
 is three Propofitions \ and thcfc three Propofitions 
 
 are made up pf three Ideas or Terms varioullv join- 
 
 4 ' cd 
 
282 LOG IC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 ed. The three Terms are call'd the remote Matter 
 of a Syllogifm •, and the three Propofitions, the 
 proxime or immediate Matter of it. 
 
 The three Terms are nam'd the Major, the Mi- 
 nor, and the Middle. 
 
 The Predicate of the Conclufion is call'd the 
 major Term, becaufe it is generally of larger Ex- 
 tenfion than the minor Term, or the Subjecl. The 
 major and minor Terms are call'd the Extremes. 
 
 The middle Term is the third Idea invented and 
 difpos'd in two Propofitions in fuch a manner as 
 to fhew the Connection between the major and 
 minor Term in the Conclufion ; for which Reafon 
 the middle Term itfelf is fometimes call'd the Ar- 
 gument. 
 
 That Propofition which contains the Predicate 
 of the Conclufion, connected with the middle 
 Term, is ufually call'd the major Propofition, where- 
 as the minor Propofition connects the middle Term 
 with the Subjecl: of the Conclufion, and is fome- 
 times call'd the Affwnption. 
 
 Note, This exact Diftinction of the feveral Parts 
 of a Syllogifm, and of the major and minor Terms 
 connected with the middle Term, in the major and 
 minor Propofitions, does chiefly belong to fimple 
 or categorical Syllogifms, of which we fhall fpeak 
 in the next Chapter, tho' all Syllogifms whatfo- 
 ever have fomething analogical to it. 
 
 Note farther, that the major Propofition is ge- 
 nerally plac'd firft, and the minor fecond, and the 
 Conclufion in the lad Place, where the Syllogifm 
 is regularly compos'd and reprefented. 
 
 The Form of a Syllogifm is the framing and dif- 
 pofing of the PremifTes according to Art, or juft 
 Principles of Reafoning, and the regular Infe- 
 rence of the Conclufion from them. 
 
 The 
 
C. II. S. i. "the right Ufe of Reafon, 283 
 
 The Act of Rtafoning or inferring one th|ng 
 from another, is generally expreft and known by 
 the Particle Therefore, when the Argument 19 
 formed according to the Rules of Art ; tho 3 in 
 common Difcourfe or Writing, fuch caufal Par- 
 ticles as For, Becaufe, manifeft the Act of Reafon- 
 ing as well as the illative Particles Then and There^ 
 fore: And wherefoever any of thefe Words are 
 ufed, there is a perfect Syllogifm expreft or im- 
 ply'd, tho* perhaps the three Propofitions do not 
 appear, or are not placed in regular Form, 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the various Kinds of Syllogifms, with par* 
 ticular Rules relating to them. 
 
 SYJlogifms are divided into various Kinds, ei- 
 ther according to the Queftion which is prov. 
 ed by them, according to the Nature and Compa- 
 ction of them, or according to the middle Term % 
 which is ufed to prove the Queftion, 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 Of univerfal and particular Syllogifms, both negative 
 and affirmative. 
 
 According to the ^rt eft ion which is to be 
 proved, fo Syllogifms are divided into unu 
 verfal Affirmative, univerfal Negative, particular 
 Affirmative, and particular Negative. This is often 
 called a Divifion of Syllogifms drawn from the 
 Conclufion | for fo many Sorts of Conditions there 
 
 T may 
 
284 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 may be which arc marked with the Letters A, 
 E, I, O. 
 
 In an univerfal affirmative Syllogifm, one Idea is 
 proved univerfally to agree with another, and may 
 be univerfally affirmed of it, as every Sin deferves 
 Deaths every unlawful Wijh is a Sin ; therefore eve- 
 ry unlawful Wijh deferves Death. 
 
 In an univerfal negative Syllogifm, one Idea is 
 proved to difigree with another Idea univerfally, 
 and may be thus denied of it ; as, no Injuftice can 
 be pleafing to God\ all Perfecution for the Sake of 
 Confcience is Injuftice -, therefore no Perfecution for 
 Confcience Sake can be pleafing to God. 
 
 Particular affirmative, and particular negative 
 Syllogifms may be eafily underftood by what is faid 
 of Univerfals, and there will be fufficient Examples 
 given of all thefe in the next Section. 
 
 The general Principle upon which thefe univer- 
 fal and particular Syllogifms are founded is this ; 
 whatfoever is affirmed or denied univerfally of any 
 Idea, may be affirmed or denied of all the parti- 
 cular Kinds or Beings, which are contained in the 
 Extenfion of that univerfal Idea. So the Defert 
 of Death is affirmed univerfally of Sin, and an un- 
 lawful Wijh is one particular Kind of Sin, which 
 is contained in the univerfal Idea of Sin, therefore 
 the Defert of Death may be affirmed concerning 
 an unlawful VAjh. And fo of the reft.- 
 
 Note, In the Doctrine of Syllogifms, zfingular 
 and an indefinite Propofition are ranked among 
 Univerfals, as was before obferved in the Doctrine 
 of Propofitions. 
 
 Sect. 
 
G II. S. 2. The right U/e c/ReaCon. 2S5 
 
 Sect. II. 
 Of plain, fimpk Syllogifms, and their Rules. 
 
 THE nextDivifion of Syllogifms is into fingle 
 and compound. This is drawn from the jVtf- 
 ture and Compofition of them. 
 
 Single Syllogifms are made up of three Propofi- 
 tions : Compound Syllogifms contain more than 
 three Propofitions, and may be formed into two 
 or more Syllogifms. 
 
 Single Syllogifms, for Diftinction Sake, may 
 be divided into * Simple, Complex and Conjunc- 
 tive. 
 
 Thofe are properly called fimple or categorical 
 Syllogifms, which are made up of three plain, fin- 
 gle, or categorical Propofitions, wherein the middle 
 Term is evidently and regularly joined with one 
 Part of the Queftion in the major Propofition, 
 and with the other in the minor, whence there 
 follows a plain, fingle Conclufion •, as, every hu- 
 man Virtue is to be fought with Diligence •, Prudence 
 is a human Virtue ', therefore Prudence is to he fought 
 diligently. 
 
 Note j Tho' the Terms of Propofitions may be 
 complex ; yet where the Compofition of the whole 
 Argument is thus plain, fimple and regular ', it is 
 properly called a fimple Syllcgifm, fince the Com- 
 pleclitn does not belong to the fyllogiltic Form 
 of it. 
 
 * At ld«ai md Proportion* are dividad \n:o fingle and amp unJ.znd Jingle 
 are lat4, vidcd into fimflt anJ cnplex , fo tt.crc are :b« fame Dmlijni and 
 -v'.Iogifmi. 
 
 T z Simple 
 
286 L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 Simple Syllogifms have feveral Rules belonging 
 to them, which being obferved, will generally fe- 
 cure us from falfe Inferences: But thefe Rules be- 
 ing founded on four general Axioms, it is neceflary 
 to mention thefe Axioms beforehand, for the Ufe 
 of thofe who will enter into the fpeculative Reafon 
 of all thefe Rules. 
 
 Axiom i. Particular Propofitions are contained 
 in Univerfals, and may be infer'd from them ; but 
 Univerfals are not contained in Particulars, nor 
 can be infer'd from them. 
 
 Axiom 2. In all univerfal Propofitions, the Sub- 
 ject isuniverfal: In all particular Propofitions, the 
 Subject is particular. 
 
 Axiom 3. In all affirmative Propofitions, the 
 Predicate has no greater Extenfion than the Sub- 
 ject •, for its Extenfion is restrained by the Sub- 
 ject, and therefore it is always to be efteemed as a 
 particular Idea. It is by mere Accident, if it e- 
 ver be taken univerfally, and cannot happen but 
 in fuch univerfal or fingular Propofitions as are 
 reciprocal. 
 
 Axiom 4. The Predicate of a negative Propo- 
 fition is always taken univerfally, for in its whole 
 Extenfion it is denied of the Subject. If we fay 
 m Stone is vegetable, we deny all forts of Vegeta- 
 tion concern in g Stones. 
 
 The Rules ofjimple, regular Syllogifms arc 
 thefe. 
 
 Rule 1. The middle Term muft not he taken twice 
 particularly, but once at leafi univerfally. For if 
 the middle Term be taken for two different Parts 
 or Kinds of the fame univerfal Idffl, then the Sub- 
 ject of the Conelufion is co|npared with one of 
 2 . thefe 
 
C. II S. 2. The right life of Rcafon. 287 
 
 thefe Parts, and the Predicate with another Parr, 
 
 and this will never fhew whether that Subject and 
 
 Predicate agree or difagree : There will then be 
 
 four diftincl Terms in the Syllogifm, and the two 
 
 Parts of the Queftion will not be compared with 
 
 the fame third Idea -, as if I fay, fome Men are pons, 
 
 and fome Men are Robbers, I can never infer that 
 
 fome Robbers are pious, for the middle Term Men 
 
 being taken twice particularly, it is not the fame 
 
 Men who are fpoken of in the major and minor 
 
 Proportions. 
 
 Rule II. The Terms in the Conclufion muft never 
 be taken more univerfally than they are in the Pre- 
 miffes. The Reafon is derived from the firft Ax- 
 iom, that Generals can never be inferred from Par- 
 ticulars, 
 
 Rule III. A negative Conclufion cannot he proved 
 by two affirmative Premijfes. For when the two 
 Terms of the Conclufion are united or agree to 
 the middle Term, it does not follow by any Means 
 that they difagree with one another. 
 
 Rule IV. If one of the Premijfes be negative, the 
 Conclufion muft be negative. For if the middle 
 Term be denied of either Part of the Conclufi- 
 on, it may fhew that the Terms of the Conclu- 
 fion difagree, but it can never fhew that they 
 agree. 
 
 Rule V. If either of the Premijfes be particular, the 
 Conclufion muft be particular. This may be proved - 
 for the mod part from the iirft Axiom. 
 
 Thefe two laft Rules are fometimts united in 
 this fingle Sentence, The Conclufion always follows 
 the weaker Part of the Premijfes. Now Negatives 
 
 T 3 and 
 
288 LOGICK: Or, Part III. 
 
 and Particulars are counted inferior to Affirmatives 
 and Univerfals. 
 
 Rule VI. From two negative Premiffes nothing 
 can be concluded. For they feparate the middle 
 Term both from the Subject and Predicate of the 
 Conclufion, and when two Ideas difagree to a 
 third, we cannot infer that they either agree or 
 difagree with each other. 
 
 Yet where the Negation is a Part of the middle 
 Term, the two PremifTes may look like Negatives 
 according to the Words, but one of them is af- 
 finitive in Senfe ; as, What has no Thought can- 
 not reafon \ but a Worm has no Thought \ therefore a 
 Worm cannot reafon. The minor Proportion does 
 really affirm the middle Term concerning the Sub- 
 ject (viz.) a Worm is what has no Thought , and 
 thus it is properly in this Syllogifm an affirmative 
 Proportion. 
 
 Rule VII. From two particular Premiffes, no- 
 thing can be concluded. This Rule depends chiefly 
 on the firft Axiom. 
 
 A more laborious and accurate Proof of thefe 
 Rules, and the Derivation of every Part of them 
 in all pofiible Cafes, from the foregoing Axioms, 
 require fo much Time, and are of fo little Im- 
 portance to afiift the right Ufe of Reafon, that it 
 is needlefs to infift longer upon them here. See 
 all this done ingenioufly in the Logick call'd, the 
 An of Thinking, Part iii. Chap. iii. &c. 
 
 Sect. 
 
C. II. S. 3. <fbe right Ufe of Reafon. 289 
 
 Sect. III. 
 Of the Moods and Figures of fimple Syllogifms. 
 
 Simple Syllogifms are adorn 1 d and furrounded in 
 the common Books of Logick with a Varie- 
 ty of Inventions about Moods and Figures, where- 
 in by the artificial Contexture of the Letters A, 
 E, I, and O, Men have endeavour'd to transform 
 Logick) or the Art of Reafoning, into a fort of 
 Mechanifm, and to teach Boys to fyllogize, or 
 frame Arguments and refute them, without any 
 real inward Knowledge of the Queftion. This is 
 almoft in the fame Manner as School-boys have 
 been taught perhaps in their trifling Years to com- 
 pofe Latin Verfes *, i. e. by certain Tables and 
 Squares, with a Variety of Letters in them, where- 
 in by counting every fixth, feventh, or eighth Let- 
 ter, certain Latin Words mould be fram'd in the 
 Form of Hexameters or Pentameters •, and this may 
 be done by thofe who know nothing of Latin or 
 of Verfes. 
 
 I confefs fome of thefe logical Subtilties have 
 much more Ufe than thofe verfifying Tables, and 
 there is much Ingenuity difcover'd in determining 
 the precife Number of Syllogifms that may be 
 form'd in every Figure, and giving the Reafons of 
 themj yet the Light of Nature, a good Judg- 
 ment, and due Confideration of Things tend more 
 to true Reafoning than all the Trappings of Moods 
 and Figures. 
 
 But left this Book be charged with too great 
 Defects and Imperfections, it may be proper to 
 give fhort Hints of that which lbme Logicians 
 have fpent fo much Time and Paper upon. 
 
 T 4 All 
 
290 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 All the pofliblc Combinations of three of the 
 Letters A, E, I, O, to make three Propofitions 
 amount to fiixty four ; but fifty four of them are 
 excluded from forming true Syllogifms by the fe* 
 ven Rules in the foregoing Section : The remaining 
 Ten are varioufly diverfified by Figures and Mood* 
 into fourteen Syllogifms. 
 
 The Figure of a Syllogifm is the proper Difpo- 
 fition of the middle Term with the Parts of the 
 Queftion. 
 
 A Mood is the regular Determination of Pro- 
 pofitions according to their Quantity and Quality, 
 i. e. their univerfal or particular Affirmation or 
 Negation ; which are fignified by certain artifi- 
 cial Words wherein the Confonants are neglected, 
 and thefe four Vowels, A* E, I, O, are only re- 
 garded. 
 
 There are generally counted three Figures. 
 
 In the fir ft of them the middle Term k the 
 Subject of the major Propofition, and the Predi- 
 cate of the minor. This contains four Moods 
 (viz.) Barbara, Celarent, Darn, Ferio. And it 
 is the Excellency of this Figure that all Sorts of 
 Queftions or Conclufions may be prov'd by it, 
 Whether A, E, I, or O, i.e. univerfal or parti- 
 cular, affirmative or negative, as, 
 
 £ar- Every wicked Man is truly miferable. 
 ba- All Tyrants are wicked Men j 
 ra. Therefore all Tyrants are truly miferable. 
 
 Ce- He that's always in Fear is not happy •, 
 la- Covetous Men are always in Fear ; 
 rent. Therefore covetous Men are not happy. 
 
C. II. S. 3 . "the right Vfe of Reafon. 29 1 
 
 Da- Whatfoever furthers our Salvation is good 
 for us •, 
 ri- Some Afflictions further our Salvation •, 
 i. Therefore fome Afflictions are good for us. 
 
 o v 
 
 Fe- Nothing that muft be repented of is truly 
 defirable ; 
 ri~ Some Pleafures muft be repented of; 
 0. Therefore there are fome Pleafures which are 
 not truly defirable. 
 
 In the fecond Figure the middle Term is the 
 Predicate of both the Premifles ; this contains 
 four Moods (viz.) Cefare, Cameftres, Fefiino> Ba- 
 rocoy and it admits only of negative Conclufions j 
 as, 
 
 Ce- No Liar is fit to be believed ; 
 
 fa- Every good Chriftian is fit to be believed j 
 
 re. Therefore no good Chriftian is a Liar. 
 
 The Reader may eafily form Examples of thp 
 reft. 
 
 The third Figure requires that the middle Term 
 be the Subject of both the Premifles. It has fix 
 Moods (viz.) Darafli, Felapton, Difamis, Datifi, 
 Bocardo, Ferifon: And it admits only of particu- 
 lar Conclufions •, as, 
 
 Da- Whofoever loves God (hall be faved ; 
 rap- All the Lovers of God have their Imper- 
 fections *, 
 /i- Therefore fome who have Imperfections fhall 
 be faved. 
 
 I leave the Reader to form Examples of the 
 reft. 
 
 The 
 
292 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 The Moods of thefe three Figures are comprized 
 in four Latin Verfes. 
 
 Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio quoque primae. 
 Ce[are, Camejlres, Fejlino, Baroco, fccundae. 
 Tertia Darapti fibi vindicat, atque Felapton, 
 Adjungens Difamis, Datifi, Bocardo, Ferifon. 
 
 The [fecial Rules of the three Figures arc thefe. 
 
 In the firft Figure the major Propofition mult 
 always be univcrfal, and the minor affirmative. 
 
 In the [econd Figure alfo the major muft be uni- 
 verfal, and one of the PremifTes, together with 
 the Conclufion, muft be negative. 
 
 In the third Figure the minor muft be affirma- 
 tive, and the Conclufion always particular. 
 
 There is alfo a fourth Figure wherein the middle 
 Term is predicated in the major Propofition, and 
 fubjected in the minor : But this is a very indirect 
 and oblique manner of concluding, and is never 
 ufed in the Sciences, nor in human Life, and 
 
 therefore I call it ufelefs. Some Logicians will 
 
 allow it to be nothing elfe but a mere Inverfion 
 of the firft Figure ♦, the Moods of it, (viz.) Ba- 
 ralipton, or Barbaric Calentes, Dibatis, Fejpamo, 
 Frefipm, are not worthy to be explain'd by one 
 Example. 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 
 Of Complex Syllogifms. 
 
 IT is not the mere Ufe of complex Terms in a 
 Syllogifm that gives it this Name, tho' one 
 of the Terms is ufually complex ; but thofe are 
 properly called complex Syllogifms, in which the 
 middle Term is not connected with the whole 
 
 Subject:, 
 
C. II. S. 4. the right Ufe of Reafon. 293 
 
 Subject, or the whole Predicate in two diftincl: 
 Proportions, but is intermingled and compar'd 
 with them by Parts, or in a more confus'd man- 
 ner, in different Forms of Speech ; as, 
 
 The Sun is a fenfelefs Being - y 
 
 The Perfians worjhipped the Sun \ 
 
 Therefore the Perfians worjhipped a fenfelefs Be- 
 ing. 
 
 Here the Predicate of the Conclufion is wor- 
 jhipped a fenfelefs Being, part of which is join'd 
 with the middle Term Sun in the major Propor- 
 tion, and the other Part in the minor. 
 
 Tho' this fort of Argument is confefs'd to be 
 entangled, or confufed, and irregular, if examined 
 by the Rules of fimple Syllogifms ; yet there is a 
 great Variety of Arguments ufed in Books of 
 Learning, and in common Life, whofe Confe- 
 quence is ftrong and evident, and which mud be 
 rank'd under this Head 5 as, 
 
 I. Exclufive Propofitions will form a complex 
 Argument ; as, pious Men are the only Favourites 
 of Heaven ; true Chriflians are Favourites of Hea- 
 ven > therefore true Chriflians are pious Men. Or 
 thus, Hypocrites are not pious Men \ therefore Hy- 
 pocrites are no Favourites of Heaven. 
 
 II. Exceptive Propofitions will make fuch com- 
 plex Syllogifms ; as, None but Phyficians came to 
 the Confutation ; the Nurfe is no Pbyfician i there- 
 fore the Nurfe came not to the Confultation. 
 
 III. Or, Comparative Propofitions ; as, Know- 
 
 ledge is better than Riches •, Virtue is better than 
 Knowledge ; therefore Virtue is better than Riches. 
 Or thus, a Dove will fly a Mile in a Minute \ a 
 
 Swallow 
 
m LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 Swallow flies fwifter than a Dove ; there fore a 
 Swallow will fly more than a Mile in a Minute, 
 
 IV. Or Inceptive and Dejitive Proportions ; as, 
 the Fogs vanifi as the Sun arifes ; but the Fogs 
 have not yet begun to vanijh \ therefore the Sun is 
 
 not yet rifen. 
 
 V. Or Modal Propofitions ; as, // is neceffary 
 that a General underftand the Art of War -, but 
 Caius does not underftand the Art of War ; there- 
 fore it is neceffary Caius Jhould not be a General. 
 Or thus, A total Eclipfe of the Sun would caufe 
 Darknefs at Noon ; it is pqffible that the Moon at 
 that Time may totally eclipfe the Sun ; therefore it 
 is poffible that the Moon may caufe Darknefs at 
 Noon. 
 
 Befide all thefe, there is a great Number of 
 complex Syllogifms which can hardly be reduced 
 under any particular Tides, becaufe the Forms 
 of human Language are fo exceeding various ; as, 
 
 Chriftianity requires us to believe what the Apoftles 
 'wrote ', St. Paul is an Apoflle -, therefore Chriftianity 
 requires us to believe what St. Paul wrote. 
 
 No human Artift can make an Animal \ a Fly or 
 a Worm is an Animal \ therefore no human Artift 
 can make a Fly or a Worm. 
 
 The Father always lived in London ; the Son al- 
 ways Hv'd with the Father •, therefore the Son always 
 liv 9 d in London. 
 
 The Bloffom foon follows the full Bud \ this P ear- 
 Tree hath many full Buds ; therefore it will Jhortly 
 have many Bloffoms. 
 
 One Hailftone never falls alone ; but a Hailjlone 
 fell juft now i therefore others fell with it. 
 
 Thunder 
 
C. II. S. 4. the right Ufe of Reafon. 295 
 
 'Thunder feldom comes without Lightning -, but it 
 thundered Tefterday -, therefore probably it ligbtned 
 alfo. 
 
 Mofes wrote before the Trojan War ; the firft 
 Greek Hiftorians wrote after the Trojan War ; 
 therefore the firft Greek Hiftorians wrote after 
 Mofes *. 
 
 Now the Force of all thefe Arguments is fo 
 evident and conclufive, that tho' the Form of the 
 Syllogifm be never fo irregular, yet we are furc 
 the Inferences are juft and true ; for the Premijfes* 
 according to the Reafon of Things, do really con- 
 tain the Conclufwn that is deduced from them, which 
 is a never failing Ted of true Syllogifms, as mall 
 be fhewn hereafter. 
 
 The Truth of mod of thefe complex Syllogifms 
 may alfo be made to appear (if needful) by redu- 
 cing them either to regular, fimple Syllogifms, or 
 to fome of the- conjunctive Syllogifms, which are de- 
 fcribed in the next Section. I will give an In- 
 flance only in the firft, and leave the reft to ex- 
 ercife the Ingenuity of the Reader. 
 
 The firft Argument may be reduced to a Syl- 
 logifm in Barbara thus, 
 
 The Sun is a fenfelefs Being ; 
 
 What the Pcrfians worshipped is the Sun ; 
 
 Therefore what the Pcrfians worfhipped is a 
 fenfelefs Being. Tho* the conclufive Force of this 
 Argument is evident without this Reduction. 
 
 * Perbapt fome of thefe Syllogifms may be reduced to thofe which 1 
 call Connexi'vt afterward ; but it is of litrlt Moment to what Sfecitt thef b#- 
 long : tor ic is not any formal Sett or Rules fo much as the Evidefcc* and 
 Force of Rtafon tbtt rrjuitdewrainj the Trucb or F\ilfhood 6f »U fuch fyl- 
 logifmi, 
 
 S*CT. 
 
296 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 Sect. V. 
 
 Of conjunctive Syllogifms. 
 
 THofe are called conjunctive Syllogifms, wherein 
 one of the PremifTes, namely the major, has 
 diftincT Parts, which are join'd by a Conjunction, 
 or fome fuch Particle of Speech. Molt Times 
 the major or minor, or both, are explicitly com- 
 pound Proportions : And generally the major Pro- 
 portion is made up of two diftincl Parts or Pro- 
 portions in fuch a manner, as that by the AfTer- 
 tion of one in the minor, the other is either af- 
 ferted or denied in the Conclufwn : Or by the De- 
 nial of one in the minor, the other is either afferted 
 or denied in the Conclufion. It is hardly poflible 
 indeed to fit any fhort Definition to include all 
 the Kinds of them ; but the chief amongft them 
 are the conditional Syllogifm, the disjunctive, the 
 relative, and the connexive. 
 
 1. The conditional or hypothetical Syllogifm is 
 whofe major or minor, or both, are conditional 
 Propofirions ; as, If there be a God, the World is 
 governed by Providence -, but there is a God ; there- 
 fore the World is governed by Providence. 
 
 Thefe Syllogifms admit two forts of true Argu- 
 mentation, where the major is conditional. 
 
 i . When the Antecedent is alferted in the mi- 
 nor, that the Confequent may be afferted in the 
 Conclufion ; fuch is the preceding Example. This 
 is called arguing from the Pofition of the Antecedent 
 to the Pofition of the Confequent. 
 
 2. When the Confequent is contradicted in 
 the minor Propofition, that the Antecedent may 
 be contradicted in the Conclufion ; as, If Atheifls 
 
 2 are 
 
CU. & 5. The right Ufe s/ReafoiL 297 
 
 are in the right, then the World exijls without a 
 Caufe ; but the World does not exijt without a 
 Caufe •, therefore Atheifts are not in the right. This 
 is called arguing from the removing of the Confc- 
 quent to the removing of the Antecedent. 
 
 To remove the Antecedent or Confequent here 
 does not merely fignify the Denial of it, but the 
 Contradiction of it ; for the mere Denial of it by 
 a contrary Propofition will not make a true Syllo- 
 gifm, as appears thus : If every Creature be rea- 
 finable, every Brute is reafonable ; but no Brute is 
 reafonable ; therefore no Creature is reafonable. 
 Whereas if you fay in the minor, but every Brute 
 is not reafonable, then it would follow truly in the 
 Conclufion, therefore every Creature is not rea- 
 fonable. 
 
 When the Antecedent or Confequent are nega- 
 tive Propofitions, they are remov'd by an Affir- 
 mative ; as, If there be no God, then the World 
 does not difcover creating Wifdom ; but the World 
 does difcover creating Wifdom -, therefore there is a 
 God. In this Inftance the Confequent is remov'd 
 or contradicted in the minor, that the Antecedent 
 may be contradicted in the Conclufion. So in this 
 Argument of St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. If the Dead rife 
 not, Chrift died in vain \ but Chrift did not die in 
 vain ; therefore the Dead/hall rife. 
 
 There are alfo two forts of falfe Arguing, (viz.) 
 (1.) From the removing of the Antecedent to the re- 
 moving of the Confequent •, or, (2.) From the Pofi- 
 tion of the Confequent to the Pofition of the Antece- 
 dent. Examples of thefe are eafily frum'd •, 
 
 (1.) If a Minifter were a Prince he mujl be ho- 
 noured', But a Minifter is not a Prince i 
 
 Therefore he muft not be honour* d. 
 
 < 
 
298 LOGIC K: Or, ParcIIL 
 
 (2. ) If a Minifter were a Prince, he muft be ho- 
 noured ; But a Minifter muft be honoured ; 
 
 Therefore he is a Prince. 
 
 Who fees not the ridiculous Falfhood of both 
 thefe Syllogifms ? 
 
 Obferv. I. If the Subject of the Antecedent and 
 the Confequent be the fame, then the hypothetical 
 Syllogifm may be turned into a categorical One ; 
 as, If Caefar be a King he muft be honoured -, but 
 Casfar is a King •, therefore, Qc. This may be 
 changed thus, Every King muft be honoured ; but 
 Csefar is a King ; therefore, &c. 
 
 Obferv. II. If the major Propofition only be 
 conditional, the Conclufion is categorical: But if 
 the minor or both be conditional, the Conclufion is 
 alfo conditional ; as, The Worfhippers of Images are 
 Idolaters ; If the Papifts worjlnp a Crucifix, they 
 are Worfhippers of an Image ; therefore if the Pa- 
 pifts worfhip a Crucifix, they are Idolaters. But 
 this fort of Syllogifms ihould be avoided as much 
 ,as potfible in Difputation, becaufe they greatly 
 embarrafs a Caufe : Tho Syllogifms, whofe major 
 only is hypothetical, are very frequent, and us'd 
 witn great Advantage. 
 
 II. A disjuntlive Syllogifm is when the major 
 Propofition is disjunctive •, as, The Earth moves 
 in a Circle or an Ellipfis ; but it does not move in a 
 Circle j therefore it moves in an Ellipfis. 
 
 A disjuntlive Syllogifm may have many Members 
 or Parts thus *, it is either Spring, Summer, Au- 
 tumn, or Winter ; but it is not Spring, Autumn, or 
 Winter ; therefore it is Summer. 
 
 The true Method of arguing here is from the 
 Affertion of one, to the Venial of the reft, or from 
 
 the 
 
C. II. S. 5. The right Uje ^Reafon. 299 
 
 the Denial of one or more, to the Ajfertion of what 
 remains: but the major mould be io framed, that 
 the feveral Parts of it can't be true together, tho* 
 one of them is evidently true. 
 
 III. A relative Syliogym requires the major Pro- 
 pofition to be relative •, as IVhere Chrift is there 
 /hall bis Servants be •, but Chrijl is in Heaven ; 
 
 therefore his Servants foall be there alfo. Or, As 
 is the Captain, fo are his Soldiers -, but the .Captain 
 is a Coward-, therefore his Soldiers are fo too. 
 
 Arguments that relate to the Doctrine of Pro- 
 portion mult be referred to this Head ; as, As 
 two are to four, fo are three to Jix -, but two make 
 the half of four; therefore three make the half of 
 fix. 
 
 Befides thcf*, there is another fort of Syllogifm 
 which is very natural and common, and yet Au- 
 thors take very little notice of it, call it by an 
 improper Name, and defcribe it very defectively, 
 and that is, 
 
 IV. A connexive Sxllogifm. This fome have 
 called copulative ; but it does by no means require 
 the major to be a copulative nor a compound Pro- 
 portion (according to the Definition given of it 
 Part II a , Chap. II d , Setl. 6.) but it requires that 
 two or more Ideas be fo connected either in the 
 complex Subject or Predicate of the major, that 
 if one of them be affirmed or denied in the minor, 
 
 _ common Senfe will naturally mew us whac will 
 be the Confequence. It would be very tedious 
 and ufelefs to frame particular Rules about them, 
 as will appear by the following Earampfc -h 
 
 are very various, and may yet be farther multi- 
 plied. 
 
 U -i M 
 
300 L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 (1.) Meeknefs and Humility always go together, 
 Mofes was a Man of Meeknefs, therefore Mofes 
 was alfo humble. Or we may form this minor, 
 Pharaoh was no humble Alan ; therefore he was not 
 meek. 
 
 (t.) No Man can ferve God and Mammon ; the 
 covetous Man ferves Mammon ; therefore he can- 
 not ferve God. Or the minor may run thus, the 
 true Chriftian ferves God', therefore be does not ferve 
 Mammon. 
 
 (3.) Genius muft join with Study to make a great 
 Man\ Florino has Genius but he cannot Jludy ; there- 
 fore Florino will never be a great Man. Or thus, 
 Quintus Jludies hard but has no Genius > therefore 
 Quintus will never be a great Man. 
 
 (4.) Gulo carCt make a Dinner without Flefh and 
 Fifh ; there was no Fifh to be gotten to day -, there- 
 fore Gulo this Day cannot make a Dinner. 
 
 (5. ) London and Paris are in different Latitudes ; 
 the Latitude of London is 51* Deg. therefore this 
 cannot be the Latitude of Paris. 
 
 (6.) Jofeph and Benjamin had one Mother ; 
 Rachel was the Mother of Jofeph •, therefore Jhe 
 was Benjamin'f Mother too. 
 
 (7. ) The Father and the Son are of equal Stature ; 
 The Father is fix Foot high ; therefore the Son is fix 
 Foot high alfo. 
 
 (8.) Pride is inconfiftent with Innocence ; Angels 
 have Innocence ; therefore they have no Pride. Or 
 thus ; Devils have Pride ; therefore they have not 
 Innocence. 
 
 I might multiply other Instances of thefe con- 
 nexive Syllogifms, by bringing in all forts of ex- 
 ceptive, exdufive, comparative, and modal Propo- 
 rtions into the Compofition of them -, for all 
 thefe may be wrought into conjunctive, as well as 
 Into Jimple Syllogifms, and thereby we may render 
 ■<. % them 
 
C. II. S. 6. lfa right Ufe of Reafon. 3 o 1 
 
 them complex. But it would wafte Time and Pa- 
 per without equal Profit. 
 
 Concerning thefe various Kinds of conjunctive 
 Syllogifms, take thefe two Obfervations. 
 
 Obferv. I. Mod of them may be transformed 
 into categorical Syllogifms by thofe who have a 
 mind to prove the Truth of them that Way ; oc 
 they may be eafily converted into each other by 
 changing the Forms of Speech. 
 
 Obferv. II. Thefe conjunllive Syllogifms are kU 
 dom deficient or faulty in the Form of them ; for 
 fuch a Deficience would be difcovered at firft 
 Glance generally by common Reafon, without 
 any artificial Rules of Logick : The chief Care 
 therefore is to fee that the major Propofition be 
 true, upon which the whole Force of the Argu- 
 ment ufually depends. 
 
 Sect. VI. 
 
 Of compound Syllogifms. 
 
 WE properly call thofe compound Syllogifms, . 
 which are made up of tw| or more Jingle ** 
 Syllogifms, and may be refolved into them. The 
 chief Kinds are thefe, Epicbirema, Dilemma^ Pro- 
 fyllogifmusy and Sorites. 
 
 I. Epicbirema is a Syllogifm which contains the 
 Proof of the major or minor, or both, before ic 
 draws the Conclufion. This is often ufed in Wri- 
 ting, in publick Speeches, and in common Con- 
 vention, that fo each Part of the Difcourfe may 
 be confirmed and put out of Doubt, as ic moves 
 U 2 on 
 
3 o2 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 on toward the Conclufion, which was chiefly de- 
 signed. Take this Inftance ; 
 
 Sicknefs may be good for us \ for it weans us from 
 the Pleafures of Life, and makes us think of dy- 
 ing ; 
 
 But we are uneafy under Sicknefs, which ap- 
 pears by our Impatience, Complaints, Groanings, 
 &c. 
 
 Therefore we are uneafy fometimes under that 
 which is good for us. 
 
 Another Inftance you may fee in Cicero\ Ora- 
 tion in Defence of Milo, who had flain Clodius. His 
 major Proportion is, that it is lawful for one Man 
 to kill another who lies in wait to kill him ; which 
 he proves from the Cuflom of Nations, from natural 
 Equity, Examples, &c. his minor is, that Clodius 
 laid Wait for Milo ; which he proves by his Arms* 
 Guards, &c. and then infers the Conclufion, that 
 it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius. 
 
 II. A Dilem?na is an Argument which divides 
 the whole into all its Parts or Members by a dif- 
 junclive Proportion, and then infers fomething 
 concerning each Part which is finally inferr'd con- 
 cerning the whole. Inftances of this are frequent ; 
 V a6, In this Life we muft either obey our vicious In- 
 clinations or refifi them : To obey them will bring Sin 
 and Sorrow, to refift them is laborious and painful ; 
 Therefore we cannot be perfectly free from Sorrow 
 or Pain in this Life. 
 
 A Dilemma becomes faulty or ineffeclual three 
 Ways : Fir ft, When the Members of the Divifion 
 are not welloppos'd, or not fully enumerated j for 
 then the major is falle. Secondly, When what is 
 aflerted concerning each part is not juft -, for then 
 the minor is not true. Thirdly, When it may be 
 
 retorted 
 
C. II S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. 303 
 
 retorted with equal Force upon him who ut- 
 ters it. 
 
 There was a famous ancient Inftance of this 
 Cafe wherein a Dilemma was retorted. Euathlus 
 promifed Protagoras a Reward when he had taught 
 him the Art of Pleading, and it was to be paid the 
 firft Day that he gain'd any Caufe in the Court. 
 After a confiderabJe time Protagoras goes to Law 
 with Euathlus for the Reward, and ufes this Di- 
 lemma ; Either the Caufe will go on my Side or on 
 yours : If the Cnufe goes on my Side, you mufi pay 
 me according to the Sentence of the Judge : if the 
 Caufe gees on your Side, you muft pay me according 
 to your Bargain: Therefore whether the Caufe goes 
 for me or againft me you muft pay ?ne the Reward. But 
 Euathlus retorted this Dilemma thus ; Either I 
 /ball gain the Caufe or lofs it : If I gain the Caufe , 
 then nothing will be due to you according to the Sen- 
 tence of the Judge : But if I lofe the Caufe, nothing 
 will be due to you according to my Bargain : There- 
 fore whether I lofe or gain the Caufe I will not pay 
 you, for nothing will be due to you. 
 
 Note I ft , A Dilemma is ufually defcribed as tho* 
 it always proved the Abfurdity, Inconvenience, or 
 Unreafonablenefs of fome Opinion or Practice ; 
 and this is the mod common Defign of it •, but it 
 is plain, that it may alfo be ufed to prove the Truth 
 or Advantage of any tiling propofed ; as, /;; Hea- 
 ven we /hall either have De fires or not : If we have 
 no Defires, then we have full Satisfaclion ; if ws 
 have Defires, they /hall be fatisfied as faft as they 
 arife ; therefore in Heaven we fhall be compleatly 
 fatisfied. 
 
 Note 2 d , This fort of Argument may be com- 
 pofed of three or more Members, and may be 
 calkd a Tnleinma. 
 
 U 3 III. A 
 
304 LOG 1CK: Or, Part III. 
 
 III. A Profyllogifm is when two or more Syllo- 
 gifms are fo connected together, that the Con- 
 clufion of the former is the major or the minor of 
 the following •, as, Blood can't think ; but the Soul 
 of Man thinks ; therefore the Soul of Man is not 
 Blood -, but the Soul of a Brute is his Blood accord- 
 ing to the Scripture •, therefore the Soul of Man 
 is different from the Soul of a Brute. See another 
 Inftance in the Introduction to this Treatife, p. 5. 
 
 IV. A Sorites is when feveral middle Terms are 
 chofen to connect one another fuccefiively in feve- 
 ral Propofitions, till the laft Propofition connects 
 its Predicate with the firft Subject. Thus, All 
 Men of Revenge have their Souls often uneafy •, un- 
 eafj Souls are a Plague to themf elves ; now to be 
 ones own Plague is Folly in the extreme > therefore 
 all Men of Revenge are extreme Fools. 
 
 The Apoftle, Rom.vm. 29. gives us an Inftance 
 of this fort of Argument if it were reduced to ex- 
 act Form ; Whom he foreknew thofe he predeftinated \ 
 whom he predeftinated he called ; whom he called he 
 juftifed \ whom he juftified he glorified j therefore 
 whom he foreknew he glorified. 
 
 To thefe Syllogifms it may not be improper to 
 add Induftion, which is, when from feveral parti- 
 cular Propofitions we infer one general ; as, The 
 Doclrine of the Socinians cannot be proved from the 
 Gofpels, it cannot be proved from the Acls of the 
 Apoftles, it cannot be proved from the Epijlles, nor 
 the Book of Revelations ; therefore it cannot be proved 
 from the New Teftament. 
 
 Note, This fort of Argument is often defective, 
 becaufe there is not due Care taken to enumerate 
 all the Particulars on which the Conclulion mould 
 depend. 
 
 AH 
 
C. II. S. 7. The right Ufe of Reafon. '305 
 
 All thefe four Kinds ofSyllogifms in this Section 
 may be called redundant, becaufe they have more 
 than three Proportions. But there is one fort of 
 Syllogifm which is defective, and is call'd an En- 
 thymem, becaufe only the Conclufion with one of 
 the PremifTes is expreft, while the other is fuppofed 
 and referv'd in the Mind : Thus, There is no true 
 Religion without good Morals ; therefore a Knave 
 cannot be truly religious : Or thus, // is our Duty to 
 love our Neighbours as Gurf elves ; therefore there are 
 but few who perform their Duty. 
 
 Note, This is the moft common fort of Argu- 
 ment amongft Mankind both in Writing and in 
 Speaking $ for it would take up too much Time, 
 and too much retard the Difcourfe to draw out all 
 our Arguments in Mood and Figure. Befides, Man- 
 kind love to have fo much Compliment paid to 
 their Understandings as to fuppofe that they know 
 the Major or Minor, which is fuppreffed and im- 
 plied, when you pronounce the other Premifs and 
 the Conclufion, 
 
 If there be any Debate about this Argument, 
 the Syllogifm muft be compleated in order to try 
 its Force and Goodnefs by adding the abfent Pro- 
 pofition. 
 
 Sect. VII. 
 
 Of the middle Terms, of common Places or Topics, 
 and Invention of Arguments. 
 
 THE next Divifion ofSyllogifms is according 
 to the middle Term, which is made ufe of in 
 the Proof of any Proportion. Now the middle 
 Term (as we have hinted before) is often called the 
 Argument, becaufe the Force or the Syllogifm de- 
 pends upon it: We mud make a little Delay here 
 
 U 4 10 
 
206 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 to treat briefly of the Doctrine of Topic s, or Places 
 whence middle Terms or Arguments are draicn. 
 
 All Arts and Sciences have fome general Sub- 
 jects which belong to them, which are calPd To- 
 pics, or common Places •, becaufe middle Terms are 
 borrow'd, and Arguments deriv'd from them for 
 the Proof of the various Propofitions which we 
 have occafion to difcourfe of. The Topics of 
 Grammar are Etymology, Noun, Verb, Conftrufti- 
 bn, Signification, &c. The Topics of Logic are 
 Genus, Species, Difference, Property, Definition, 
 Divifion, &c. The Topics of Ontology or Meta- 
 phyfics are Caufe, Effetl, Atlion, Faff on, Identi- 
 ty^ Oppofition, Subject, Adjuntl, Sign, &c. The 
 Topics of Morality or Ethics are Law, Sin, Du- 
 ty, Authority, Freedom of Will, Co?nmand, Threat- 
 ning, Reward, Punifhment, &c. The Topics of 
 Theology are God, Chrift, Faith, Hope, Worfhip, 
 Salvation, &:c. 
 
 To thefe feveral Topics there belong particular 
 Cbfervations, Axioms, Canons 01 Rules*, which 
 are laid down in their proper Sciences •, as, 
 
 Grammar hath fuch Canons, (viz.) Words in a 
 different Conftrutlion obtain a different Senfe. Words 
 deriv' d from the fame Primitive may probably have 
 fome Affinity in their original Meaning, &c. 
 
 Canons in Logic are fuch as thefe, Every Part 
 of a Divifion fingly taken muft contain lefs than 
 the Whole. A Definition muft be peculiar and pro- 
 per to the Thing defined. Whatever is affirmed or 
 denied of the Genus, may be affirmed or denied of the 
 Species, Sec. 
 
 Metaphyfical Canons are fuch as thefe ; final 
 Caufes belong only to intelligent Agents. If a natural 
 and neceffary Caufe operate, the Effetl will follow, 
 
 * A Canon is aPropofition declaring fome Property of the Subjcft, vhich 
 i» not expreft in the Definition or Divifion vf it. 
 
 &C. 
 
C. II. S. 7. The right Ufe of Rcafon. 307 
 
 (£c. and there are large Catalogues of many more 
 in each diftinct Science. 
 
 Now it has been the Cuflom of thofe who 
 reach Logick or Rhetcrick to direct their Difciple% 
 when they want an Argument, to confult the fe- 
 veral Topics which are fuited to their Subject of 
 Difcourfe, and to rummage over the Definitions x 
 Divifwns and Canons that belong to each Topic, 
 This is call'd the Invention of an Argument ; and 
 it is taught with much Solemnity in fome Schools. 
 
 I grant there may be good Ufe of this Practice 
 for Perfons of a lower Genius, when they are to 
 compofe any Difcourfe for the Publick - y or for 
 thofe of fuperior Parts to refrem their Memory, 
 and revive their Acquaintance with a Subject 
 which has been long abfent from their Thoughts; 
 or when their natural Spirits labour under Indifpo- 
 fition and Languor-, but when a Man of moderate 
 Sagacity has made himfelf Mailer of his Theme 
 by juit Diligence and Enquiry, he has feldom need 
 to run knocking at the Doors of all the Topics that 
 he may furniffi himfelf with Argument or Matter 
 of fpeaking : And indeed it is only a Man of Senfe 
 and Judgment that can ufe common Places or To- 
 pics well •, for amongft this Variety he only knows 
 what is fit to be left out, as well as what is fit to 
 be fpoken. 
 
 By fome logical Writers this Bufincfs of Topics^ 
 and Invention is treated of in fuch a manner with 
 mathematical Figures and Diagrams, rill'd with 
 tke barbarous technical Words, Napras y Nipcis, 
 Ropcos, Nofropi &c. as tho' an ignorant Lad were 
 to be led mechanically in certain artificial Harnef- 
 ics and Trammels to find out Arguments to prove 
 or refute any Proportion whatsoever, without any 
 rational Knowledge of the Ideas. Now there is 
 no Need to throw Words of Contempt on fuch 
 
 a Practice ; 
 
So8 L G I C K: Or, PartlH. 
 
 a Practice •, the very Defcription of it carries Re- 
 proof and Ridicule in Abundance. 
 
 Sect. VIII. 
 ' Of fever al Kinds of Arguments and Demonflrations. 
 
 WE proceed now to the Ditifion of Syllo- 
 gifms according to the middle Term *, and 
 in this Part of our Treatife the Syllogifms them- 
 felves are properly called Arguments, and are thus 
 diflributed. 
 
 I. Arguments are call'd Grammatical, Logical, 
 Metaphyseal, Phyfical, Moral, Mechanical, Theo- 
 logical, &c. according to the Art, Science, or Sub- 
 ject whence the middle Term or Topick is bor- 
 row'd. Thus if we prove that no Man fhould fteal 
 from his Neighbour becaufe the Scripture forbids it, 
 this is a theological Argument : If we prove it from 
 the Laws' of the Land, it is political j but if we prove 
 it from the Principles of Reafon and Equity, the 
 Argument is moral. 
 
 II. Arguments are either certain and evident, or 
 doubtful and merely probable. 
 
 Probable Arguments are thofe whofe Conclufi- 
 ons are prov'd by fome probable Medium ; as, 
 This Hill was once a Church-Yard, or a Field of 
 Battle, becaufe there are many human Bones found 
 here. This is not a certain Argument, for human 
 Bones might have been convey'd there fome other 
 Way. 
 
 Evident and certain Arguments are call'd ~De~ 
 monj 'rations ', for they prove their Conclufions by 
 clear Mediums and undoubted Principles ; and 
 they are generally divided into thefe two Sorts. 
 
 i. Demon- 
 
C. II. S. 8. The right Ufe of Reafon. 309 
 
 1. Demonftrations a Priori, which prove the 
 Effect by its neceffary Caufe ; as, I prove the 
 Scripture is infallibly true, becaufe it is the Word of 
 God, who cannot lye. 
 
 2. Demonftrations a Pofteriori, which infer the 
 Caufe from its neceffary Effect ; as, I infer thne 
 hath been the Hand of fome Artificer here^ becaufe 
 I find a curious Engine. Or, I infer there is a God, 
 
 from the Works of his Wifdom in the vifible World. 
 
 The laft of thefe is calTd Demonfl ratio t* hi, 
 becaufe it proves only the Exiftence of a Thing ; 
 the firft is nam'd Bemonflratio rx JYo-n, becaufe it 
 ihews alfo the Caufe of its Exiftence. 
 
 But Note, That tho' thefe two forts of Argu- 
 ments are moft peculiarly call'd Demonftrations, 
 yet generally any ftrong and convincing Argument 
 obtains that Name \ and it is the Cuftom of Ma- 
 thematicians to call all their Arguments 'Demon- 
 ftrations, from what Medium foever they derive 
 them. 
 
 III. Arguments are divided into artificial and 
 inartificial. 
 
 An artificial Argument is taken from the Na- 
 ture and Circumftances of the Things ; and if the 
 Argument be ftrong it produces a natural Certain- 
 ty, as The World was firft created by God, becaufe 
 nothing can create it f elf. 
 
 , An inartificial Argument is the Teflimony of 
 another, and this is call'd original, when our In- 
 formation proceeds immediately from the Perfons 
 concern'd, or from Eye or Ear-Witneffes of a Fact : 
 k is calPd 'Tradition when it is dcliver'd by the Re- 
 port of others. 
 
 We have taken Notice before, that Teftimony 
 is either divine or human. If the human Tefti- 
 mony be llrong, it produces a moral Certainty, 
 
 but 
 
310 L G 1 C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 but divine Teftimony produces zfuper natural Cer- 
 tainty which is far fuperior. 
 
 Note\ Arguments taken from human Tejlimony 
 as well as from Laws and Rules of Equity, are cal- 
 led mooal ; and indeed the fame Name is alfo ap- 
 plied to every fort of Argument which is drawn 
 from the free Anions of God, or the contingent Ac- 
 tions of Men, wherein we cannot arife to a natural 
 Certainty^ but content ourfelves with an high De- 
 gree of Probability* which in many Cafes is fcarce 
 inferior to natural Certainty, 
 
 IV. Arguments are either direcl or indirecl. It 
 is a direcl Argument where the middle Term is 
 fach as proves the Queftion itfelf, and infers that 
 very Proportion which was the Matter of En- 
 quiry. An indirect or oblique Argument proves or 
 refutes fome other Propofition, and thereby makes 
 the Thing enquir'd appear to be true by plain 
 Confequence. 
 
 Several Arguments are call'd indirecl \ as, (i.) 
 When fome contradictory Propofition is prov'd 
 to be falfe, improbable or impoflible: Or when 
 upon Suppofkion of the Falfhood or Denial of 
 the original Propofition, fome Abfurdity is infer- 
 red. This is called a Proof per impofjibile, or a 
 Reduclio ad abfurdum. (2.) When fome other 
 Propofition is prov'd to be true which is lefs pro- 
 bable, and thence it follows that the original Pro- 
 pofition is true, becaufe it is more probable. This 
 is an Argument ex magis probabili ad minus. (3.) 
 When any other Propofition is prov'd upon which 
 it was before agreed to yield the original Queftion. 
 This is an Argumcut ex Concejfo. 
 
 V. There is yet another Rank of Arguments 
 which have Latin Names \ their true Diitinclion 
 
 is 
 
C. II. S . 8 . the right Ufe of Reafon. 3 1 1 
 
 is deriv'd from the Topics or mkldle Terms which 
 are ufed in them, tho' they are called an Addrefs 
 to our Judgment, our Faith, our Ignorance, our 
 Profejfwn^ our Modejty, and our Pajfions. 
 
 1. If an Argument be taken from the Nature 
 or Exiitence of Things, and addreft to the Rea- 
 fon of Mankind^ it is called Argumentum ad Judi- 
 cium. 
 
 2. When it is borrow'd from fome convincing 
 Teftimony, it is Argumentum ad Fidem, an Addrcis 
 to our Faith. 
 
 3. When it is drawn from any inefficient Me- 
 dium whatfoever, and yet the Oppofer has not 
 Skill to refute or anfwer it, this is Argumentum ad 
 Ignorantiam, an Addrefs to our Ignorance. 
 
 4. When it is built upon the profeft Principles 
 or Opinions of the Perfon with whom we argue, 
 whether thefe Opinions be true or falfe, it is named 
 Argumentum ad Hominem, an Addrefs to our jro- 
 feft Principles. St. Paul often ufes this Argument 
 when he reafon s with the Jews, and when he fays, 
 I /peak as a Man. 
 
 5. When the Argument is fetch'd from the 
 Sentiments of fome wife, great, or good Men, 
 whofe Authority we reverence and hardly dare op- 
 pofe, it is called Argumentum ad Verccundiam, an 
 Addrefs to our Modejly. 
 
 6. I add finally, when an Argument is borrow- 
 ed from any Topics which are fuiccd to engage 
 the Inclinations and Pafllons of the Hearers on 
 the Side of the Speaker, rather than to convince 
 the Judgment, this is Argumentum ad Paffic 
 
 an Addrefs to the PaJJions \ or if ic be made pub- 
 lickly, it is calPd ad w, or u 
 
 the Pc. 
 
3 i2 LOGICK.Or, Part III. 
 
 After all thefe Divifions of Syllogifm or Argu- 
 ment arifing from the middle Term, there is one 
 Diftinction proper to be mention'd which arifes 
 from the Premiffes. An Argument is call'd uni- 
 form when both the Premiffes are deriv'd from the 
 fame Springs of Knowledge, whether it be Senfe y 
 Rcafon, Confcioufnefs, human Faith > or divine Faith: 
 But when the two Premiffes are deriv'd from dif- 
 ferent Springs of Knowledge, it is call'd a ?nixt 
 Argument. 
 
 Whether the Conclufion muft be call'd Human 
 or Divine, when one or both Premiffes are Mat- 
 ters of Divine Faith but the Conclufion is drawn 
 by human Reafon, I leave to be difputed and de- 
 termined in the Schools of Theology. 
 
 Thus the fecond Chapter is finim'd, and a par- 
 ticular Account given of all the chief Kinds of Syl- 
 logifms or Arguments which are made ufe of among 
 Men, or treated of in Logic k> together with Jpe- 
 cial Rules for the Formation of them, as far as is 
 neceffary. 
 
 If a Syllogifm agree with the Rules which are 
 given for the Conftruction and Regulation of it, 
 it is called a true Argument: If it difagree with 
 thefe Rules, it is a Paralogifm, or falfe Argument: 
 But when a falfe Argument puts on the Face and 
 Appearance of a true one, then it is properly cal- 
 led a Sopbifm or Fallacy, which mall be the Subject 
 of the next Chapter. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
CHI. S.i. The right life of Reafon. 31 j 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 The Doftrine of Sophifms. 
 
 FROM Truth nothing can really follow but 
 what is true : Whenfoever therefore we find 
 a falfe Conclufio?i drawn from Premifles which feem 
 to be true, there muft be fome Fault in the De- 
 duction or Inference •, or elfe one of the PremifTes 
 is not true in the Senfe in which it is ufed in that 
 Argument. 
 
 When an Argument carries the Face of Truth 
 with it, and yet leads us into Miftake, it is a So- 
 pbifm •, and there is fome Need of a particular De- 
 scription of thefe fallacious Arguments, that wc 
 may with more Eafe and Readinefs detect and 
 folve them. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 Of fever al Kinds of Sophifms, and their Solution. 
 
 AS the Rules of right Judgment and of good 
 Ratiocination often coincide with each o- 
 ther, fo the Doctrine of Prejudices, which was 
 treated of in the fccond Part of Logick, has anti- 
 cipated a great deal of what might be laid on the 
 Subjecl of Sophifms j yet I fh all mention the moll 
 remarkable Springs of falfe Argumentation, which 
 are redue'd by Logicians to fome of the following; 
 Heads. 
 
 L The 
 
314- LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 I. The firft fort of Sophifm is call'd Ignoratio 
 Elenchi, or a Mifiake of the Queftion *, chat is, 
 when fomcthing ejfe is prov'd which has neither 
 any neccffiry Connection or Inconfiftency with 
 the Thing enquired, and confequently gives no 
 Determination to the Enquiry, tho' it may feem 
 at firft Sight to determine the Queilion •, as, if 
 any fhould conclude that St. Paul was not a na- 
 tive Jezv, by proving that he was horn a Roman ; 
 -or if they fhould pretend to determine that be was 
 neither Roman, nor Jew, by proving that he was 
 horn at Tarfus in Cilicia: Thefe Sophifms are re- 
 futed by mewing that all thefe three may be true ; 
 for he was born of JewiJJj Parents in the City of 
 "Tarfus, and by fome peculiar Privilege granted to 
 his Parents, or his native City, he was born a 
 Denizon of Rome. Thus there is neither of thefe 
 three Characters of the Apoftle inconfiftent with 
 each other, and therefore the proving one of them 
 true does not refute the others. 
 
 Or if the Queilion be propos'd, Whether Excefs 
 cf Wine can he hurtful to him that drinks it, and 
 theSophifler fhould prove that it revives his Spirits, 
 it exhilarates bis Soul, it gives a Alan Courage, and 
 makes him ftrong and auiive, and then he takes it 
 for granted that he has prov'd his Point. 
 
 But the Respondent may eafily fhew that tho' 
 lf r tne may do all this, yet it may be finally Jwrtful 
 both to the Soul and Body of him that drinks it to 
 excefs. 
 
 Difputers when they grow warm are ready to 
 jim into this Fallacy : They chefs up the Opinion 
 of their Advcrfary as they pleafe, and afcribe Sen- 
 timents to him which he doth not acknowledge ; 
 and when they have with a great deal of Pomp 
 attack'd and confounded thefe Images of Straw 
 
 2 Of 
 
C III. 8. i. The right Uje 0/Rtafon. 315 
 
 of their own making, they triumph- over their 
 Adverfary as tho* they had utterly confuted his 
 Opinion. 
 
 It is a Fallacy of the fame kind which a Difpu- 
 tant is guilty or when he finds that his Adverfary 
 is too hard for him, and that he cannot fairly 
 prove the Queftion firft propos'd ; he then with 
 Slynefs and Subtilty turn^s the Difcourfe afide to 
 fome other kindred Pojnt which he can prove, 
 and exults in that new Argument wherein his Op- 
 ponent never contradicted him. 
 
 The Way to prevent this Fallacy is by keeping 
 the Eye fixt on the precife Point of Difpute, and 
 neither wandring from it ourfelves, nor furTering 
 our Antagonift to wander from it, or fulgftitute 
 any thing elfe in its Room. 
 
 II. The next Sophifm is called Petitio Principii,. 
 or a Suppofition of what is not granted ; that is, whca 
 any Propofition is proved by the fame Propoficion 
 in other Words, or by fomething that is equally 
 uncertain and difputed : As if any one undertake 
 to prove that the human Soul is extended thro 9 all 
 the Parts of the Body, becaufe it refides in every 
 Member ■, which is but the fame Thing in other 
 Words* Or if a Papift mould pretend to prove 
 that his Religion is the only Catholic k Religion, and 
 is derived from Chrift and his Jpcftles, becaufe it 
 agrees with the Doclrine of all the Fathers cf the 
 Church, all the holy Martyrs, and all the Cht tflian 
 World throughout all Ages: Whereas this u a great 
 Point in Con tell: , whether their Religion dc 
 gree with that of all the AntientS and the primi- 
 tive Chriftians, or no. * 
 
 III. That Sort of Fallacy which is called a 
 Circle is very near akin to the , as, 
 
 \ when 
 
316 LOGICK:Or, Part III. 
 
 when one of the Premifles in a Syllogifm is quef- 
 tioned and oppofed, and we intend to prove it 
 by the Conclufion : Or, when in a Train of Syl- 
 logifms we prove the lad by recurring to what 
 was the Conclufion of the firft. The Papifts are 
 famous at this Sort of Fallacy, when they prove 
 the Scripture to be the Word of God by the Authority 
 or infallible Teftimony of their Church j and when 
 they are called to ihew the infallible Authority of 
 their Churchy they pretend to prove it by the 
 Scripture. 
 
 IV. The next kind of Sophifm is called non 
 Caufa pro Caufd, or the Affignation of afalfe Caufe. 
 This the peripatetic Philofophers were guilty of 
 continually, when they told us that certain Beings, 
 which they called fubftantial Ferms, were the 
 Springs of Colour, Motion, Vegetation, and the 
 various Operations of natural Beings in the ani- 
 mate and inanimate World ; when they informed 
 us that Nature ivas terribly afraid of Vacuum, and 
 that this was the Caufe why the Water would not 
 fall out of a long Tube if it was turned upfidc 
 down : The Moderns as well as the Antients fall 
 often into this Fallacy when they pofitively afTign 
 the Reafons of natural Appearances, without fuf- 
 ficient Experiments to prove them. 
 
 Afirologers are overrun with this Sort of Falla- 
 cies, and they client the People grofly by pretend- 
 ing to tell Fortunes, and to deduce the Caufe of 
 the various Occurrences in the Lives of Men, 
 from the various P of t ions of the Stars and Planets, 
 which they call Aftetls. 
 
 When Comets and Eclipfes of the Sun and Moon 
 arc conftrued to fignify the Fate of Princes, the 
 Revolution of States, Famine, Wars and Calami- 
 ties 
 
C. III. S. i . The right life of Reafon. 3 1 7 
 
 ties of all Kinds, it is a Fallacy that belongs to 
 this Rank of Sopbifms. 
 
 There is fcarce any thing more common in hu- 
 man Life than this Sort of deceitful Argument. 
 If any two accidental Events happen to concur, 
 one is prefently made the Caufe of the other. If 
 Titius wronged his Neighbour of a Guinea, and in 
 fix Months after he fell down and broke his Leg, 
 weak Men will impute it to the divine Vengeance 
 on Titius for his former Injuftice. This Sophilhi 
 was found alfo in the early Days of the World: 
 For when holy Job was furrounded with uncommon 
 Miferies, his own Friends inferr'd, that he was a 
 mofi heinous Criminal, and charged him with ag- 
 gravated Guilt as the Caufe of his Calamities ; tho' 
 God himfelf by a Voice from Heaven folv'd this 
 uncharitable Sophifm, and cleared his Servant Job 
 of that Charge. 
 
 How frequent is it among Men to impute 
 Crimes to wrong Perfons ? We too often charge 
 that upon the wicked Contrivance and premedi- 
 tated Malice of a Neighbour, which arofe merely 
 from Ignorance, or from unguarded Temper. 
 And on the other hand, when we have a Mind to 
 excufe ourfelves, we praclife the f\me Sophifm, 
 and charge that upon our Inadvertence or our Ig- 
 norance, which perhaps was defign'd Wickedneis. 
 What is really done by a NecefTity of Circumftan- 
 ces, we fometimes impute to Choice: And again, 
 we charge that upon NecefTity, which was really 
 defired and choicn. 
 
 Sometimes a Pcrfon afts out of Judgment in 
 
 Oppofition to his Inclination ; another Perfon 
 
 perhaps atts the fame Thing out of Inclination, 
 
 linfi his Judgment. 'Tis hard for us to 
 
 deter: with A durance what are the inward 
 
 X . Springs 
 
3i8 LOGICK:Or y Part III. 
 
 Springs and fecret Caufes of every Man's Con- 
 duel ; and therefore we mould be cautious and 
 flow in pa fling a Judgment, where the Cafe is 
 not exceeding evident : And if we mould miftake, 
 let it rather be on the charitable than on the cen- 
 forious Side. 
 
 'Tis the fame Sophifm that charges mathemati- 
 cal Learning with leading the Minds of Men to 
 Scepticifm and Infidelity * and as unjuftly accufes 
 the new Philofophy of paving the Way to Herefy 
 and Schifm. Thus the Reformation from Popery 
 has been charged with the Murder and Blood of 
 Millions, which in Truth is to be imputed to the 
 Tyranny of the Princes and the Pricfls, who would 
 not fufrer the People to reform their Sentiments 
 and their Practices according to the Word of 
 God. Thus Chrifiianity in the primitive Ages 
 was charged by the Heathens with all the Cala- 
 mities which befel the Roman Empire, becaufe 
 the Chriftians renounced the Heathen Gods and 
 Idols. 
 
 The Way to relieve ourfelves from thefe So- 
 phifms, and to fecure ourfelves from the Danger 
 of falling into them, is an honeft and diligent 
 Enquiry into the real Nature and Caufes of Things, 
 with a conftant Watchfulnefs againfl all thofe Pre- 
 judices that might warp the Judgment afide from 
 Truth in that Enquiry. 
 
 V. The next is called fallacia Accidentis, or a 
 Sophifm wherein we pronounce concerning the 
 Nature and effential Properties of any Subject ac- 
 cording to lomething which is merely accidental 
 to it. This is akin to the former, and is alfo ve- 
 ry frequent in human Life. So if Opium or the 
 Peruvian Bark has been ufed imprudently or un- 
 
 fuccefsfully> 
 
C. III. S.i. "The right Ufe of Reafon. 3 1 9 
 
 fuccefsfully, whereby the Patient has received In- 
 jury, fome weaker People abfolutely pronounce 
 againft the Ufe of the Bark or Opium upon all 
 Occafions whatfoever, and are ready to call them 
 Poifon. So Wine has been the accidental Occa- 
 fion of Drunkennefs and Quarrels ; Learning and 
 Printing may have been the accidental Caufe of 
 Sedition in a State ; the Reading of the Bible by 
 Accident hath been abufcd to promote Herefies or 
 deftruclive Errors ; and for thefe Reafons they have 
 been all pronounced evil Things. Mahomet forbad 
 his Followers the Ufe of Wine ; the "Turks dif- 
 courage Learning in their Dominions ; and the 
 Papifts forbid the Scripture to be read by the Laity. 
 But how very unreafonable are thefe Inferen- 
 ces, and thefe Prohibitions which are built upon 
 them! 
 
 VI. The next Sophifm borders upon the former; 
 and that is when we argue from that which is true 
 in particular Circumjiances to prove the fime 
 thing true abfolutely, fimply, and abftratled from 
 all Circumjiances *, this is called in the Schools a 
 Sophifm a ditlo fecundum quid ad diclum /implicit er ; 
 as, That which is bought in the Shambles is eaten for 
 Dinner \ raw Meat is bought in the Shambles; there- 
 fore raw Meat is eaten for Dinner. Or thus, Livy 
 writes Fables and Improbabilities when be defcribes 
 Prodigies and Omens ; therefore Livy' 3 Roman Hif- 
 tory is never to be believed in any thing. Or thus, 
 There may be fome Miftake of Transcribers in fome 
 Part of Scripture ; therefore Scripture alone is not a 
 fafe Guide for our Faith. 
 
 This Sort of Sophifm has \xs Reverfe alfoj as, 
 when we argue from that which is true fimply and 
 abfolutely to prove the fame thing true in all parti- 
 
 X 3 cular 
 
320 LOGICK: Or, Part III. 
 
 cular Cir cum fiances whatfoever* \ as if a Tray tor 
 fhould argue from the fixth Commandment, Thou 
 JJjalt not kill a Alan, to prove that he himfelf ought 
 not to be hanged: Or if a Madman fhould tell me, 
 / ought not to withhold his Sword from him, be- 
 caufe no Man ought to withhold the Property of an- 
 other. 
 
 Thefe two lafh Species of Sophifms are eafily folv- 
 cd by fhewing the Difference betwixt Things in 
 their abfolute Nature, and the fame Things fur- 
 rounded with peculiar Circumftanccs, and confider- 
 ed in Regard to fpecial Times, Places, Perfons 
 and Occafions •, or by fhewing the Difference be- 
 tween a moral and a metaphyseal Univerfality, and 
 that the Proportion will hold good in one Cafe, 
 but not in the other. 
 
 VII. The Sophifms of Compofiiion and Divifwn 
 come next to be mentioned. 
 
 The Sophifm of Compofition is when we infer 
 any thing concerning Ideas in a compounded Senfe, 
 which is only true in a divided Senfe. As when it 
 is faid in the Gofpel that Chrift made the Blind to 
 fee, and the Deaf to hear, and the Lame to walk, 
 we ought not to infer hence that Chrift performed 
 Contradictions *, but thofe who were blind before 
 were made to fee, and thofe who were deaf before 
 were made to hear, &c. So when the Scripture 
 affuies us the worft of Sinners may be faved, it fig- 
 nifies only that they who have been the worft of 
 Sinners may repent and be faved, not that they 
 fhall be faved in their Sins. Or if any one mould 
 argue thus, Two and three are even and odd ; five 
 
 * This is arguing from a moral Ufliverfalhj vhich admits of fome Ex- 
 ceptions, in the fame manner as maybe argued from mttofkyfical or a na- 
 tural VniverfaUty which admits of no Exception*. 
 
 are 
 
C. III. S. I . The right life of Reafon. 3 2 1 
 
 are two and three -, therefore five are even and odd* 
 Here that is very falfely infer'd concerning two 
 er three in Union, which is only true of them di- 
 vided. 
 
 The Sophifm of Divifion is when we infer the 
 fame Thing concerning Ideas in a divided Senfe, 
 which is only true in a compounded Senfe ; as, if 
 we fhould pretend to prove that every Soldier in the 
 Grecian Army put an hundred thou/and Perfians to 
 Flight, becaufe the Grecian Soldiers didfo. Or if a 
 Man mould argue thus -, five is one Number ; 
 two and three are five ; therefore two and three are 
 one Number. 
 
 This fort of Sophifms is committed when the 
 Word All is taken in a collective and a diftributive 
 Senfe, without a due Diftinclion •, as, if any one 
 fhould reafon thus •, All the mufical Inflruments of the 
 Jewifh Temple made a noble Concert, The Harp was a 
 mufical Inftrument of the Jewifh Temple ; therefore 
 the Harp made a noble Concert. Here the Word All 
 in the Major is collective, whereas fuch a Conclu- 
 fion requires that the Word All mould be diftribu- 
 tive. 
 
 It is the fame Fallacy when the univerfal Word 
 All or No refers to Species in one Propofition, and 
 to Individuals in another ; as, All Animals were in 
 Noah' j Ark ; therefore no Animals periftfd in the 
 Flood: Whereas in the Prcrniie all Animals \]g\\\ht% 
 every kind of Animals, which does not exclude or 
 deny the drowning of a thoufand Individuals. 
 
 VIII. The lafl fort of Sophifms arifrs from our 
 Abufe of the Ambiguity of IVords, which is the 
 Jargefl and molt extcnfive kind of Fallacy ; and 
 indeed fever&l of the former Fallacies might be re- 
 duced to this Head. 
 
 X 4 When 
 
322 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 When the Words orPhrafes are plainly equivocal, 
 vi they are called Sophifm s of Equivocation ; as, if we 
 fhould argue thus, He that fends forth a Book into the 
 Light, defires it to he read ', He that throws a Book 
 into the Fire, fends it into the Light •, therefore, he that 
 throws a Book into the Fire defires it to be read. 
 
 ThisSophifm, as well as the foregoing, and all 
 of the like Nature are folved by (hewing the 
 different Senfes of the Words, Terms or Phrafes. 
 Here Light in the major Propofition fignifies the 
 fublic View of the World \ in the minor it figni- 
 fies the Brightnefs of Flame or Fire, and therefore 
 the Syllogifm has four Terms, or rather it has no 
 middle Terms, and proves nothing. 
 
 But where fuch grofs Equivocations and Ambi- 
 guities appear in Arguments, there is little Danger 
 of impofing upon ourfelves or others. The great- 
 eft Danger, and which we are perpetually expofed 
 to in Reafoning, is, where the two Senfes or Sig- 
 nifications of one Term are near akin, and not 
 plainly diftinguiflhed, and yet they are really fuf- 
 ficiently different in their Senfe to lead us into 
 great Miftakes, if we are not watchful. And in- 
 deed the greateft Part of Controverfies in the fa- 
 cred or civil Life arife from the different Senfes 
 that are put upon Words, and the different Ideas 
 which are included in them ; as has been fhewn at 
 large in the firft Part of Logick, Chap.lV. which 
 treats of IVords and Terms. 
 
 There is after all thefe, another fort of So- 
 phifm which is wont to be called an i?nperfecl Enu- 
 meration, or afalfe Induction, when from a few Ex- 
 periments or Obfervations Men infer general Theo 
 rems and univerfal Propofuions. But this is furri*. 
 uently nptic'd in the foregoing Chapter, where we 
 treated of that iort of Syllogifm which is call'd In* 
 dhcfio'i. 
 
 SfCT, 
 
C.IILS.2. TherightXJfe o/Reafon. 323 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 Two general Tefis of true Syllogifms, and Methods of 
 folving all Sophifms. 
 
 BEfides the fpccial Defcription of true Syllogifms 
 and Sophifm: already given, and the Rules by 
 which the one are fram'd, and the other refuted, 
 there are thefe two general Methods of reducing 
 all Syllogifms whatfocver to a Teft of their Truth 
 or Falfhood. 
 
 I. The firft is that the Premiffes mufl (at leaft 
 implicitly) contain the Conclufion 5 or thus, One 
 of the Premiffes mufl contain the Conclufion, and 
 the other mufl fhew that the Conclufion is contained 
 in it. The Reafon of this Rule is this •, When 
 any Propofition is offered to be proved, it is ne- 
 ceilary to find another Propofition which con- 
 firms it, which may be called the containing Pro- 
 portion * but becaufe the fecond mufl: not contain 
 the firft in an exprefs manner, and in the fame 
 "Words*, therefore it is necefiliry that a third or 
 oftenftve Propofition be found out to fhew that 
 the fecond Propofition contains the 'firft which 
 was to be prov'd. Let us make an Experiment 
 of this Syllogifm. IVhofoever is a Slave to bis 
 natural Inclinations is mifcrable j the wicked Man 
 is a Slave to his natural Inclinations *, therefore the 
 wicked Man is miferable. Here it is evident that 
 the major Propofition contains the Conclufion ; 
 
 • It II cor.fefVd that cndir.tnsl and di. ju~.il ivt major PropofitionJ do 
 txprrfly contain ill that is in the Conclufiuri', hut th^n it n not ma certain 
 ;r.d <:rchf.~t Manner, but only in a dubicui Konu of Sptfchi and mingled 
 vcith v:htr Terms, and therefore » it &oj tht J me tj^rtfi T< ft jft i—. 
 
 a 
 
 for 
 
324 L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 for under the general Character of a Slave to na- 
 tural Inclinations, a wicked Man is contain'd or 
 included •, and the minor Propofition declares it ; 
 whence the Conclufion is evidently deduc'd that 
 the wicked Man is miferable. 
 
 In many affirmative Syllogifms we may fuppofc 
 either the major or the minor to contain the 
 Conclufion, and the other to fhew it ; for there 
 is no great Difference. But in negative Syllo- 
 gifms it is the negative Propofition that contains 
 the Conclufion, and the affirmative Propofition 
 fhews it ; as, every wife Man mafters his Paffions ; 
 7io angry Man mafters his PaJJions \ therefore no 
 angry Man is wife. Here it is more natural to 
 iuppofe the minor to be the containing Propofi- 
 tion ; it is the minor implicitly denies Wifdom 
 concerning an angry Man, becaufe maftering the 
 Paffions is included in iVifdom^ and the major 
 fhews it. 
 
 Note, This Rule may be applied to complex and 
 conjunctive, as well as fimple Syllogifms, and is 
 adapted to fhew the Truth or Falfhood of any 
 of them. 
 
 II. The fecond is this ; As the Terms in every 
 Syllogifm are vfually repeated twice, fo they muft be 
 taken precifely in the fame Senfe in both Places : 
 For the greatefl Part of Miftakes, that arife in 
 forming Syllogifms, is deriv'd from fome little 
 Difference* in the Senfe of one of the Terms in 
 the two Parts of the Syllogifm wherein it is ufed. 
 Let us confider the following Sophifms. 
 
 i . 7/ is a Sin to kill a Man , a Murderer is a 
 Man -, therefore it is a Sin to kill a Murderer. 
 Here the Word Kill in the firft Propofition fig- 
 nines to kill unjuflly, or without a Law \ in the 
 Conclufion it is taken abfolutely for putting a 
 
 Man 
 
C. III. S. 2. The right Vfe of Reafon. 325 
 
 Man to Death in general, and therefore the Inference 
 is not good. 
 
 2. What I am, you are not \ but I am a Man ; 
 therefore you are not a Man. This is a relative 
 Syllogifm: But if it be reduc'd to a regular cate- 
 gorical Form, it will appear there is Ambiguity in 
 the Terms, thus •, What I am, is a Man \ you are 
 not what I am ; therefore you are not a Man. Here 
 what I am, in the major Proportion, is taken fpe~ 
 cifically for my Nature ; but in the minor Propo- 
 rtion the fame Words are taken individually for my 
 Per/on ; therefore the Inference mud: be falfe, for 
 the Syllogifm doth not take the Term what I am 
 both Times in the fame Senfe. 
 
 3. He that fays you are an Animal, fays true ; but 
 he that fays you are a Goofe, fays you are an Animal ; 
 therefore he that fays you are a Goofe, fays true. In 
 the major Propofition the Word Animal is the 
 Predicate of an incidental Propofition ; which in- 
 cidental Propofition being affirmative renders the 
 Predicate of it particular, according to Chap. II d , 
 Seel. 2 d , Axiom. 3. and confequently the Word A- 
 nimal there fignifies only human Animality. In 
 the minor Propofition, the Wc ; d Animal, for the 
 fame Reafon, fignifies the Animality of a Goofe *, 
 thereby it becomes an ambiguous Term, and unfit 
 to build the Conclufion upon. Or if you fay, the 
 Word Animal in the Minor is taken for human 
 Animality, then the Minor is evidently falfe. 
 
 It is from this laft general Tefl of Syllogifms that 
 we derive the Cuftom of the Refpondent in an- 
 fwering the Arguments of the Opponent, which is 
 todiftinguifhupon the major or minor Propofiti- 
 on, and declare which Term is ufed in twoSenfes, 
 and in what Senfe the Propofition may be true, 
 and in what Senfe it is falfe. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
326 L O G 1 C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Some general Rules to direft our Reafoning. 
 
 MOST of the general and fpecia I Directions 
 given to form our Judgments aright in the 
 preceding Part of Logick might be rehearfed here ; 
 for the Judgments which we pafs upon Things are 
 generally built on fome fecret Reafoning or Argu- 
 ment by which the Propofition is fuppofed to be 
 proved. But there may be yet fome farther Af- 
 fiftances given to our reafoning Powers in their 
 Search after Truth, and an Obfervation of the fol- 
 lowing Rules will be of great Importance for rhat 
 End. 
 
 I. Rule. Accuftotn yourfelves to clear and diftincJ 
 Ideas, to evident Proportions, to firong and convin- 
 cing Arguments. Converfe much with thofe Friends, 
 and thofe Books, and thofe Parts of Learning 
 where you meet with the greater! Clearnefs of 
 Thought and Force of Rxafoning. The mathe- 
 matical Sciences, and particularly Arithmetic^ 
 Geometry, and Mechanicks abound with thefe Ad- 
 vantages : And if there were nothing valuable in 
 them for the Ufes of human Life, yet the very 
 fpeculative Parts of this fort of Learning are well 
 worth our Study •, for by perpetual Examples 
 they teach us to conceive with Clearnefs, to con- 
 nect our Ideas and Propoiitions in a Train of De- 
 pendence, to reafon with Strength and Demon- 
 It ration, and to diftinguifh between Truth and 
 Falfhood. Something of thefe Sciences mould be 
 ftudied by every Man who pretends to Learning,, 
 and that (as Mr. JLocke exprefles it) not fo much to 
 4 make 
 
C. IV. the right life of Reafon. 327 
 
 make us Mathematicians, as to make us reafonable 
 Creatures. 
 
 We fhould gain fuch a Familiarity with Evi- 
 dence of Perception and Force of Reafoning, and 
 get fuch a Habit of difcerning clear Truths, that 
 the Mind may be foon offended with Obfcurity 
 and Confuiion : Then we mall (as it were) natu- 
 rally and with Eafe reflrain our Minds from rafh 
 Judgment, before we attain juft Evidence of the 
 Propofition which is offer'd to us ; and we fhall 
 with the fameEafe, and (as it were) naturally feize 
 and embrace every Truth that is propos'd with juft: 
 Evidence. 
 
 This Habit of conceiving clearly , of judging 
 juftly, and of reafoning well, is not to be attain'a 
 merely by the Happinefs of Conftitution, the 
 S Brightnefs of Genius, the bed natural Parts, or 
 the bed Collection of logical Precepts. It is 
 Cujlom and Pratlice that muft form and eftablifli 
 this Habit. We muft apply ourfelves to it till 
 J*~ we perform all this readily, and without reflect- 
 ing on Rules. A coherent Thinker, and a ftricl 
 Reafoner is not to be made at once by a Set of 
 Rules, any more than a good Painter or Mufician 
 may be form'd extempore by an excellent Lecture 
 on Mufic or Painting. It is of infinite Impor- 
 tance therefore in our younger Years to be taught 
 both the Value and the Practice of conceiving 
 clearly and reafoning right: For when we are 
 grown up to the middle of Life, or paft it, it is 
 no Wonder that we fhculd not learn good Rea- 
 foning, any more than that an ignorant Clown 
 (hould not be able to learn fine Language, Danc- 
 ing, or a courtly Behaviour, when his rultic Airs 
 have grown up with him till the Age of Forty. 
 
 For 
 
3 28 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 For want of this Cart fome Perfons of Rank and 
 Education dwell all their Days among obfcure 
 Ideas ; they conceive and judge always in Confu- 
 fion, they take weak Arguments for Demonftration, 
 they are led away with the Difguifes and Shadows 
 of Truth. Now if fuch Perfons happen to have 
 a bright Imagination, a Volubility of Speech, and 
 a Copioufnefs of Language, they not only impofe 
 many Errors upon their own Underflandings, but 
 they ftamp the Image of their own Miftakes up- 
 on their Neighbours alfo, and fpread their Errors 
 abroad. 
 
 It is a Matter of juft Lamentation and Pity to 
 confider the Weaknefs of the common Multitude 
 of Mankind in this Refpe£t, how they receive any 
 thing into their Affent upon the moft trifling 
 Grounds. True Reafoning hath very little Share 
 in forming their Opinions. They refift the moft 
 convincing Arguments by an obftinate Adherence 
 to their Prejudices, and believe the moft impro- 
 bable Things with the greateft Aflurance. They 
 talk of the abftrufeft Myfteries, and determine up- 
 on them with the utmoft Confidence, and with- 
 out juft Evidence either from Reafon or Revela- 
 tion. A confufed Heap of dark and inconfiftcnt 
 Ideas make up a good Part of their Knowledge 
 in Matters of Philofophy as well as Religion, hav- 
 ing never been taught the Ufe and Value of clear 
 and juft Reafoning. 
 
 Yet it muft be ftill confeft that there arc fome 
 Myfteries in Religion, both natural and revealed, as 
 well as fome abjlrufe Points in Pbilofopby, where- 
 in the Wife as well as the Unvvife muft be con- 
 tent with obfcure Ideas. There are feveral Things, 
 efpecially relating to the inviiible World, which 
 are unfearchable in our prefent State,' and there- 
 fore we muft believe what Revelation plainly dic- 
 2 tates, 
 
C. IV. The right U/e of Reafon. 3 2 9 
 
 tates, tho s the Ideas may beobfcure. Reafon it- 
 felf demands this of us ; but we mould feek for 
 the brighteft Evidence both of Ideas, and of the 
 Connection of them, whereibever it is attain- 
 able. 
 
 II d Rule. Enlarge your general Acquaintance 
 with Things daily, in order to attain a rich Furniture 
 of Topics, or middle Terms, whereby thofe Propor- 
 tions which occur may be either proved or di/proved ; 
 but efpecially meditate and enquire with great Dili- 
 gence and Exaclnefs into the Nature, Properties, Cir- 
 cumflances and Relations of the particular Sub j eel about 
 which you judge or argue. Confidcr its Caufes, Ef- 
 fects, Confequences, Adjuncts, Oppofites, Signs, 
 &V. fo far as is needful to your prefent Purpoie. 
 You mould furvey a Queftion round about, and 
 on all Sides, and extend your Views as far aspof- 
 fible, to every Thing that has a Connection with ir. 
 This Practice has many Advantages in it ; as, 
 
 1. It will be a Means to fuggelt to your Minds 
 proper Topics for Argument about any Propor- 
 tion that relates to the fame Subject. 
 
 2. It will enable you with greater Readinefs and 
 Juflnefs of Thought to give an Anfwer to any 
 fudden Queftion upon that Subject, whether it 
 arifes in your own Mind, or to be propofed by 
 others. 
 
 3. This will inftruct you to give a plainer 
 fpeedier Solution of any Difficulties that may at 
 tend the Theme of your Difcourfe, and to refiice 
 the Objections of thofe who have efpoufed a con- 
 trary Opinion. 
 
 4. By fuch a large Survey cf the wh 
 
 ject in all its Properties and Relation ill be 
 
 better fecured from Inconfifi; •'. e. fro: 
 
 ferting or denying an in one Place, v, 
 
 contradicts what you 
 
33° LOGIC K: Or, Part HI. 
 
 other : And to attain thefe Ends, an Extenfivenefs 
 of Underftanding, and a large Memory are of un- 
 lpeakable Service. 
 
 One would be ready to wonder fomerjmes how 
 eafily great and wife, and learned Men are led in- 
 to AiTertions in fome Parts of the fame Treatife, 
 which are found to be fcarce confiftent with what 
 they have afTcrted in other Places : But the true 
 Reafon is the Narrownefs of the Mind of Man, 
 that it cannot take in all the innumerable Proper- 
 ties and Relations of one Subject with a fingle 
 View •, and therefore whilft they are intent on one 
 particular Part of their Theme, they bend all their 
 Force of Thought to prove or difprove fome Pro- 
 pofition that relates to that Part, without a fuffi- 
 cient Attention to the Confequences which may 
 flow from it, and which may unhappily affect an- 
 other Part of the fame Subject, and by this Means 
 they are fometimes led to fay things which are in- 
 confiftent. In fuch a Cafe the great Dealers in Dif- 
 putc and Controverfy take pleafure to cait Non- 
 fenfe and SelfContradiclion on their Antagonilt 
 with huge and hateful Reproaches. For my part, 
 I rather choofe to pity human Nature, whofe ne- 
 ceiTary Narrownefs of Underftanding expofes us 
 all to fome Degrees of this Frailty. But the moil 
 extenfive Survey poflible of our whole Subject is 
 the belt Remedy againit it. It is our judging and 
 arguing upon a partial View of Things, that ex- 
 pofes us to Miltakes, and pufhes us into Abfurdi- 
 ties, or at lean: to the very Borders of them. 
 
 III d Rule. In fe arching the Knowledge of Things , 
 always keep the precife Point of the prefent Quef- 
 tion in your Eye, Take heed that you add nothing to 
 it while you are arguing? nor omit any Part of it. 
 
 Watch 
 
C. IV. The right Ufe of Reafon. 3 3 1 
 
 Watch carefully left any new Ideas ilide in to 
 mingle themfelves either with the Subject or the 
 Predicate. See that the Queftion be not altered 
 by the Ambiguity of any Word taken in different 
 Senfes ; nor let any fecret Prejudices of your own, 
 or the fophiftical Arts of others, cheat your Un- 
 derftanding by changing the Queftion, or muf- 
 fling in any thing eife in its room. 
 
 And for this End it is ufeful to keep the precife 
 Matter of Enquiry as fimple as may be, and difen- 
 gaged from a Complication of Ideas, which do not 
 neceflarily belong to it. By admitting a Complica- 
 tion of Ideas, and taking too many Things at once 
 into one Queftion, the Mind is fometimes dazzled 
 and bewildered •, and the Truth is loft in fuch a 
 Variety and Confufion of Ideas - y whereas by li- 
 miting and narrowing the Queftion, you take a 
 fuller Survey of the whole of it. 
 
 By keeping the fmgle Point of Enquiry in our 
 conftant View, we fhall be fccured from fudden, 
 rafh, and impertinent Refponfes and Determina- 
 tions, which fome have obtruded inftead of Solu- 
 tions and folid Anfwers, before they perfectly know 
 the Queftion. 
 
 IV th Rule. IVhen you have exaclly confidered 
 the precife Point of Enquiry, or what is unknown in 
 the Queftion, then confider what, and how much you 
 know already of this Queftion, or of the Ideas and 
 Terms ofwbii b it is compofed. It is by a Compari- 
 fon of the known and unknown Parts of the Quef- 
 tion together, that you find what Reference the 
 Part known hath unto, or what Connection it hath 
 with the Thing that is fought: Thole Ideas where- 
 by the known and unknown Parts of the Queftion 
 are connected, will furnifh you with middle Terms 
 
 Y or 
 
332 LOGICK:Or y Part in. 
 
 or Arguments whereby the Thing propofcd may 
 be prov'd or difprov'd. 
 
 In this Part of your Work, (viz.) Comparing 
 Ideas together, take due time, and be not coo hafty 
 to come to a Determination, efpecially in Points 
 of Importance. Some Men when they fee a little 
 Agreement or Difagreement between Ideas, they 
 prefume a great deal, and fo jump into the Con- 
 clufion : This is a fhort Way to Fancy, Opinion 
 and Conceit, but amoft unfafe and uncertain Way 
 to true Knowledge and Wifdom. 
 
 V th Rule. In cboofing your middle Terms or Ar- 
 guments to prove any §>ueftion, always take fetch To- 
 pics as are fur eft, and le aft fallible, and which carry 
 the greateft Evidence and Strength with them. Be 
 not fo folicitous about the Number, as the Weight 
 of your Arguments, efpecially in proving any Pro- 
 portion which admits of natural Certainty, or of 
 compleat Demonftration. Many times we do In- 
 jury to a Caufe by dwelling upon trifling Argu- 
 ments. We amufe our Hearers with Uncertain- 
 ties by multiplying the Number of feeble Reafon- 
 ings, before we mention thofe which are more 
 fubflantial, conclufive and convincing. And too 
 often we yield up our own AfTent to mere proba- 
 ble Arguments, v/here certain Proofs may be ob- 
 tained. 
 
 Yet it mud be confefs'd there are many Cafes 
 wherein the growing Number of probable Arguments 
 increafes the Degree of Probability, and gives a 
 great and fufficient Confirmation to the Truth 
 which is fought •, as, 
 
 (i.) When we are enquiring the true Senfe of 
 any Word or Phrafe, we are more confirmed in 
 the Signification of it by finding the fame Ex- 
 
 preflion 
 
C. IV. The right Ufe of Reafon. 333 
 
 predion fo ufcd in fevcral Authors, or in feveral 
 Places of the fame Author. 
 
 (2.) When we are fearching out the true Mean- 
 ing or Opinion of any Writer, or enquiring into 
 any facred Doctrine of Scripture, we come to a 
 furer Determination of the Truth by feveral dif- 
 tindt Places wherein the fame Thing is exprefs'd 
 or plainly implied ; becaufe it is not fo probable 
 that an honed skilful Reader mould miftake the 
 Meaning of the Writer in many Places, as he may 
 in one or two. 
 
 (3.) When we would prove the Importance of 
 any fcriptural Doctrine or Duty, the Multitude 
 of Texts, wherein it is repeated and inculcated upon 
 the Reader, feem naturally to inftruct us that it is 
 a Matter of greater Importance, than other Things 
 which are but (lightly or fingly mentioned in the 
 Bible. 
 
 (4.J In fearching out Matters of Fact in Times 
 pall or in diftant Places (in which Cafe moral Evi- 
 dence is fufrlcient, and moral Certainty is the ut- 
 moft which can be attained) here we derive a 
 greater Affurance of the Truth of it by a Num- 
 ber of Perfons, or a Multitude of Circumilances 
 concurring to bear Witnefs to it. 
 
 (5.) From many Experiments in natural Philo- 
 fophy we more fafely infer a general Theorem, 
 than we can from one or two. 
 
 (6.) In Matters which require prefent Practice, 
 both facred and civil, we mud content ourfelves 
 oftentimes with a mere Preponderation of probable 
 Reafons or Arguments. Where there are feveral 
 Reafons on each Side, for and againft a Thing 
 that is to be done or omitted, a fmall Argument 
 added to the Heap may jultly turn the Balance on 
 one Side, and determine the Judgment, as I hav< 
 noted in the z d Part of Logick. 
 
 Y 2 io 
 
334 L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 To conclude -, a growing Acquaintance with 
 Matters of Learning, and a daily Improvement of 
 our Underftandings in Affairs human and divine, 
 will befl teach us to judge and diflinguifh in what 
 Cafes the Number of Arguments adds to their 
 Weight and Force: It is only Experience can fully 
 inform us when we mufl be determin'd by probable 
 Topics, and when we mufl feek and expect De- 
 monjlrations . 
 
 VI th Rule. Prove your Conclufion {as far as 
 poffible) by fome Propofitions that are in them/elves 
 more plain^ evident, and certain than the Conclufion > 
 or at leaft fuch as are more known, and more intelli- 
 gible to the Perfon whom you would convince. If we 
 neglect this Rule, we (hall endeavour to enlighten 
 that which is obfeure by fomething equally or 
 more obfeure, and to confirm that which is doubt- 
 ful by fomething equally or more uncertain. Com- 
 mon Senfe dictates to all Men, that it is impoflible 
 toeflablifh any Truth, and to convince others of 
 it, but by fomething that is better known to them 
 than that Truth is. 
 
 VII th Rule. Labour in all your Arguings to en- 
 lighten the Underflanding, as well as to conquer and 
 captivate the Judgment. Argue in fuch a manner 
 as may give a natural, diflinct, and folid Know- 
 ledge of Things to your Hearers, as well as to 
 force their AfTent by a mere Proof of the Quef- 
 tion. Now to attain this End, the chief Topic 
 or Medium of your Demonflration mould be 
 fetch'd, <is much as poffible, from the Nature of 
 the Thing to be proved, or from thofe Things 
 which are moil naturally connected with it. 
 
 Gcome- 
 
C. IV. "The right life *f Reafon. 335 
 
 Geometricians fometimes break this Rule with- 
 out Necefilty, two Ways, (viz.) 
 
 1. When they prove one Propofition only by 
 fhewing what Abfurdities will follow if the con- 
 tradictory Propofition be fuppofed or admitted ; 
 This is called Reduclio ad abfurdum *, or Demo li- 
 ft ratio per impojfibile ; as for Inftance, When they 
 prove all the Radii of a Circle to be equal, by fup- 
 pofing one Radius to be longer or fhorter than an- 
 other, and then (hewing what abfurd Confequen- 
 ces will follow. This, I confefs, forces the Af- 
 fent, but it does not enlighten the Mind by fhew- 
 ing the true Reafon and Caufe why all Radii are 
 equaU which is derived from the very Conftruc- 
 tion of a Circle: For fince a Circle is formed by 
 fixing one End of a ftrait Line in the Centre, 
 and moving the other End round (or, which is all 
 one, by CompaiTes kept open to a certain Extent) 
 it follows evidently that every Part of the Cir- 
 cumference being thus defcribed mud be equally 
 diftant from the Centre, and therefore the Radii) 
 which are Lines from the Center to the Circum- 
 ference, muft all be equal. 
 
 2. Geometricians forget this Rule when they 
 heap up many far-fetch'd Lines, Figures and Pro- 
 portions to prove fome plain, fimple and obvi- 
 ous Propofition. This is called a Demonftration 
 per aliena £s? remota, or an Argument from unna- 
 tural and remote Mediums : As if in order to prove 
 the Radii of a Circle are all equal I mould make 
 fevcral Triangles and Squares about the Circle, 
 
 * Nae, Thii Rule chit fly r frn ro the WfsUiJbmni of fome Trurh, ra- 
 ther than to the Rtfmtstitn of Error. It is a very common and ufelul \Vjy 
 or arjumg to refute a ralfr Proportion by fhewing whac evident Fj 
 or Abfurdiry wiii fo.low from it: For what I'rorxibtuin f>evcr is rea« y ab- 
 furd and fa. (it, doe* erTeflualj prove that Principle ro be t«-!e tru.n wnuh 
 it i« derived} To that chit Way of refuting an trr^r it nut (o ufually U U" 
 Re du CI it ad abfurdum. 
 
 Y 7 and 
 
%%6 LOGICK: Or, Part III. 
 
 and then form fome Properties and Proportions 
 of Squares and Triangles prove that the Radii of 
 a Circle are equal. 
 
 Yet it muft be confefs'd, that fometimes fuch 
 Queftions happen, that it is hardly pofiible to 
 prove them by direcl Arguments drawn from the 
 Nature of Things, &c. and then it may not only 
 be lawful, but necefiary to ufe indire ft Proofs, and 
 Arguments drawn from remote Mediums, or from 
 the Abfurdity of the contradictory Suppofttion. 
 
 Such indireel and remote Arguments may alfo 
 be fometimes ufed to confirm a Propofition which 
 has been before proved by Arguments more direcl 
 and immediate, 
 
 VIII t]l Rule. Tho' Arguments mould give 
 Light to the Subject, as well as conflrain the Af- 
 fent, yet you muft learn to diftinguifh well between 
 an Explication and an Argument \ and neither im- 
 pofe upon yourfehes, nor fuffer yourfehes to be im- 
 posed upon by others, by mijlaking a mere Illufiration 
 for a convincing Reafon. 
 
 Axioms themfelves, or felf- Evident Propofitions 
 may want an Explication or Illufiration, tho' they 
 are not to be proved by Reafoning. 
 
 Similitudes and Allufions have oftentimes a very 
 happy Influence to explain fome difficult Truth, 
 and to render the Idea of it familiar and eafy. 
 Where the Refemblance is juft and accurate, the 
 Influence of a Simile may proceed fo far as # to 
 mew the Pofiibilky of the Thing in Queftion : 
 But Similitudes muft not be taken as a folid Proof 
 of the Truth or Exiftence of thofe Things to 
 which they have a Refemblance. A too great 
 Deference paid to Similitudes, or an utter Rejec- 
 tion of diem feem to be two Extremes, and ought 
 to be avoided. The late ingenious Mr. Locke, 
 
 even 
 
C. IV. fbe right Ufe of Reafon. 337 
 
 even in his Enquiries after Truth, makes greae 
 Ufe of Similes for frequent Illuftration, and is very 
 happy in the Invention of them, tho' he warns us 
 alfo left we miftake them for Concluiive Argu- 
 ments. 
 
 Yet let it be noted here, that a Parable or a Si- 
 militude ufed by any Author, may give a fufficicac 
 Proof of the true Senfe and Meaning of that Au- 
 thor, provided that we draw not this Similitude 
 beyond the Scope and Defign for which it was 
 brought ; as when our Saviour affirms, Rev. iii. 3. 
 / will come on thee as a Ihief, this will plainly 
 prove that he defcribes the Unexpectedness of his 
 Appearance, tho' it will bv no means be drawn to 
 fignify any Injuftice in his Defign. 
 
 IX th Rule. /;/ your whole Ccurfe of Reafoning 
 keep your Mind fencer ely intent in the Purfuit of 
 Truth -, and follow folia Argument wherefoever it 
 leads you. Let not a Party-Spirit, or any Paffion 
 or Prejudice whatfoever, flop or avert the Cur- 
 rent of your Reafoning in the Queft of true Know- 
 ledge. 
 
 When you are enquiring therefore into any Sub- 
 ject, maintain a due Regard to the Arguments and 
 Objections on both Sides of a Quettion : Confi- 
 der, compare, and balance them well before you 
 determine for one Side. It is a frequent, but a. 
 very faulty Practice to hunt after Arguments only 
 to make good one Side of a Queftion, and en- 
 tirely to neglect and refufe thofe which favour the 
 other Side. If we have not given a due Weight 
 10 Arguments on both Sides, we do but wilfully 
 milguide our Judgment, and abufe our Reafon, by 
 forbidding its Search after Truth, \\hcn we ei- 
 poufe Opinions by a fecret Biafs on the Mind 
 thro' the Influences of Fear, Hope, Honour, Crc~ 
 Y 4 
 
333 L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 dit, Intereft, or any other Prejudice, and then feek 
 Arguments only to fupport thofe Opinions, we 
 have neither done our Duty to God or to our 
 felves *, and it is a Matter of mere Chance if we 
 Humble upon Truth in our Way to Eafe and Pre- 
 ferment. The Power of Reafoning was given us 
 by our Maker for this very End, to purfue Truth ; 
 and we abufe one of his richefl Gifts, if we bafe- 
 ly yield it up to be led aftray by any of the mean- 
 er Powers of Nature, or the perifhing Interefts 
 of this Life. Reafon itfelf, if honeftly obey'd, 
 will lead us to receive the divine Revelation of the 
 Gofpel, where it is duly propofed, and this will 
 fhew us the Path of Life everlafting. 
 
 THE 
 
The right Uje of Reafon . 339 
 THE 
 
 FOURTH PART 
 
 O F 
 
 L O GICK. 
 
 Of Difpofition and Method. 
 
 IT is not merely a clear and diftintt Idea, a 
 well-form 9 d Propofition, or a juft Argument, 
 that is fufficient to fcarch out and communi- 
 cate the Knowledge of a Subject. There mull 
 be a Variety and Series of them difpos'd in a due 
 manner in order to attain this End : And there- 
 fore it is the Defign of the I aft Part of Logick to 
 teach us the Art of Method. It is that muft fe- 
 cure our Thoughts from that Confufion, Dark- 
 nefs, and Miftake which unavoidably attend the 
 Meditations and Difcourfes even of the brighteft 
 Genius who defpifes the Rules of it. 
 
 1. We fhall here confider the Nature of Me- 
 thod, and the fever al kinds of it. 
 
 2. Lay down the general Rules of Method, with 
 a few Particulars under them, 
 
 CHAP. 
 
340 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 CHAP. L 
 
 Of the Nature of Method, and the feveral 
 Kinds of it, (viz.) Natural and Arbitrary >, 
 Synthetic and Analytic. 
 
 MEthod, taken in the largeft Senfe, implies 
 the placing of feveral Things, or performing 
 feveral Operations in fuch an Order as is moft conve- 
 nient to attain fome End propofed: And in this Senfe 
 it is applied to all the Works of Nature and Art, 
 to all the divine Affairs of Creation and Provi- 
 dence -, and to the Artifices, Schemes, Contrivances 
 and Practices of Mankind, whether in natural, 
 civil, or facred Affairs. 
 
 Now this orderly Difpofition of Things includes 
 the Ideas of Prior, Pofterior, and Simultaneous-, of 
 Superior, Inferior, and Equal-, of Beginning, End, 
 and Middle, &c. which are defcribed more par- 
 ticularly among the general Affellions of Being in 
 Ontology. 
 
 But in Lcgick Method is ufually taken in a more 
 limited Senfe, and the Nature of it is thus de- 
 fcribed : Method is the Difpofition of a Variety of 
 Thoughts on any Subjecl in fuch Order as may beft 
 ferve to find out unknown Truths, to explain and 
 confirm Truths that are known, or to fix them in the 
 Memory. 
 
 It is diftributed into two general Kinds, (viz.) 
 Natural and Arbitrary. 
 
 Natural Method is that which obferves the Or- 
 der of Nature, and proceeds in fuch a manner as 
 that the Knowledge of -the Things which follow 
 depends in a great meafure on the Things which 
 go before, and this is. twofold, (viz.) Synthetic 
 
 and 
 
C. I. The right Up of Rcafon . 3 4 1 
 
 and Analytic, which arc fcmetimes called Syntbefis 
 and Analyfis*. 
 
 Syntbetick Method is that which begins with the 
 Parts f, and leads onward to the Knowledge of 
 the Whole •, it begins with the mod iimple Princi- 
 ples, and general Truths, and proceeds by degrees 
 to that which is drawn from them or compounded 
 of them : And therefore it is calPd the Method of 
 Compofttion. 
 
 Analytic Method takes the whole Compound as 
 it finds it, whether it be a Species or an Individual, 
 and leads us into the Knowledge of it by refolv- 
 ing it into its firft Principles or Parts, its generic 
 Nature, and its fpecial Properties ; and therefore 
 it is called the Method of Refolution. 
 
 As fynthetic Method is generally ufed in teach- 
 ing the Sciences after they are invented, fo 
 
 • The W*ri Analy/is has three or four Senfes, which it may not be im- 
 proper to take Notice of here. 
 
 1. It Hgnifies tht general and particular Heads of a Difcourfe, with their 
 mutual Connexions, both coordinate and fuhordinate, drawn out by way ot 
 Abftricl into one or more Tables, which are frequently placed like m Index 
 «t the Beginning or End of a Book. 
 
 i. It hgninei the refolving of a Difcourfe into i r s various Subjects and 
 Arguments, as when any Writing of the ancient Prophets is refjlv'd into the 
 pr-pbetieaf, bi/iirical, dcflrinal, ind praelical Partsofitj it isfaidtobe ana- 
 lysed in gernrjj. When a Sentence is diftinguiftu into the N.uns, the Verbs, 
 Pronouns, Adverbs, and ether Particles of Speech which compofeir, then it is 
 fiid tobeanj/yi'd grammatically. Whin the fame Sentence is diftirtguiftVd 
 into Subject and Predicate, Proptfttion, Argument, AB, Objctl, Caufe, Ejfeel, 
 oidjur.tl. Oppopte, &c. then it is analys'd logically and metaphyficatly. This 
 lift is what is chiefly meen: in the tbiolcgical Schools, when they fpeak of 
 analyftng a text of Scripture. 
 
 5. Analyfis fignifies particularly the Science of Algebra, wherein a Que- 
 flion being propos'd, one or more Letters, 2t,x,y, k, or Vowels, as, a,e, t, 
 &c. it mideufeof tufignify the unknown Number, which being mrermin- 
 gied with leveml known Numbers m the-Q^e/lion, is at laft by the Rules of 
 Art fepirated or releas'd from that Entanglement, and its particular Value is 
 fotnJ t ly (hewing \uEauatiow t or Equality to fome known Number. 
 
 4. It fignifies analytical Method, as here explained imLsgick. 
 
 + N :e It if confer] -hat Syr.tbefis often begins with the Genus, and pro- 
 ceeds ro the Species tndlr.di'vidujls. Bur the (/minor genem Njture is then 
 confidti'd only as a pbyfical w efftntial Part of the Spec es.th / it befome- 
 times call' d an univerfal or logical While. Thus fynthetic Method maintains 
 ks ovn Drfcnp!ion itill, for it begui with tht Parts, and proceeds to tht 
 tybilt which is compos'd 01 ibem. 
 
 analytic 
 
342 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 analytic is mod practis'd in finding out Things 
 unknown. Though it mull be confeft that both 
 Methods are fometimes employ 'd both to find out 
 Truth and to communicate it. 
 
 If we know the Parts of any Subjeft eafier and 
 better than the Whole, we confider the Parts 
 diftinctly, and by putting them together we come 
 to the Knowledge of the Whole. So in Grammar 
 we learn firft to know Letters, we join them to 
 make Syllables, out of Syllables we compofe Words, 
 and out of Words we make Sentences and Difcourfts. 
 So the Pbyfician or Apothecary knows the Nature 
 and Powers of his Simples, {viz.) his Drugs, his 
 Herbs, his Minerals, &c. and putting them toge- 
 ther, and confidering their feveral Virtues, he 
 finds what will be the Nature and Powers of the 
 Bolus, or any compound Medicine: This is the^w- 
 thetic Method. 
 
 But if we are better acquainted with the Whole 
 than we are with particular Parts, then we divide 
 or refolve the Whole into its Parts, and thereby 
 gain a diftinct Knowledge of them. So in vulgar 
 Life we learn in the Grofs what Plants or Minerals 
 are ; and then by Chymiftry we gain the Know- 
 ledge of Salt, Sulphur, Spirit, Water, Earth, 
 which are the Principles of them. So we are firft 
 acquainted with the whole Body of an Animal, 
 and then by Anatomy or Dijfeclion, we come to 
 learn all the inward and outward Parts of it. This 
 is analytic Method. 
 
 According to this moil general and obvious I- 
 dea of fynthetic and analytic Method, they differ 
 from each other as the Way which leads up from 
 a Valley to a Mountain differs from it felf, confi- 
 der'd as it leads down from the Mountain to the 
 Valley -, or as St. Matthew and St. Luke prove 
 Chrifi to be the Son of Abraham \ Luke finds it out 
 2 by 
 
C. I. The right Ufe of Reafon. 343 
 
 by AnahfiSi riling from Cbrift to his Anceftors ; 
 Matthew teaches it in fynthetic Method, begin- 
 ning from Abraham^ and fhewing that Cbrift is 
 found among his Pofierity. Therefore it is a 
 ufual Thing in the Sciences, when we have by 
 Analyfts found out a Truth, we ufe fynthetic Me- 
 thod to explain and deliver it, and prove it to be 
 true. 
 
 In this eafy View of Things, thcfe two kinds of 
 Method may be preferved confpicuoufly, and en- 
 tirely diftinct: But the Subjects of Knowledge 
 being infinite, and the Ways whereby we arrive 
 at this Knowledge being almoft infinitely various, 
 it is very difficult, and almoft impoflible, always 
 to maintain the precife Diftin&ion betv/een thcfe 
 two Methods. 
 
 This will evidently appear in the following Ob- 
 servations. 
 
 Obf. I. Analytick Method being ufed chiefly to 
 find out Things unknown, it is not limited or 
 confined merely to begin with fome whole Sub- 
 ject, and proceed to the Knowledge of its Paris y 
 but it takes its Rife fometimes from any finglc 
 Part or Property, or from any thing whatfoever 
 that belongs to a Subject which happens to be 
 firft and mod eafily known, and thereby enquires 
 into the more abftrufe and unknown Parts, Pro- 
 perties, Caufes, Effects, and Modes of it, whe- 
 ther abfolute or relative •, as for inftance, 
 
 (1.) Analyfts finds out Caufes by chcir Effects, 
 So in the fpeculative Part of natural Phil 
 when we obferve Light > Colours , Motion*, h 
 
 Softnefs, and other Properties and Powers or 
 Bodies, or any of the common or uncom 
 Appearances ofT. 1, or in I 
 
 ven, we fearch out the Caufes of them. So by 
 
344 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 the various Creatures we find out the Creator, and 
 learn his Wifdom, Power and Goodnefs. 
 
 (2.) It finds out Effects by their Caufes. So 
 the practical and mechanical Part of natural Phi- 
 lofophy confiders fuch Powers of Motion, as the 
 Wind, the Fire, and the Water, &c. and then 
 contrives what Ufes they may be applied to, and 
 what will be their Effects in order to make Mills 
 and Engines of various Kinds. 
 
 (3.) It finds out the general and fpecial Nature 
 of a Thing by confidering the various Attributes 
 of the Individuals, and obferving what is com- 
 mon, and what is proper, what is accidental and 
 what is effential. So by furveying the Colour, the 
 Shape, Motion, Reft, Place, Solidity, Extenfwn of 
 Bodies, we come to find that the Nature of Body 
 in general is [olid Extenfwn , becaufe all other Qua- 
 lities of Bodies are changeable, but this belongs 
 to all Bodies, and it endures thro' all Changes > 
 and becaufe this is proper to Body alone, and a- 
 grees not to any thing elfe ; and it is the Founda- 
 tion of all other Properties. 
 
 (4.) It finds out the remaining Properties or 
 Parts of a Thing, by having fome Parts or Pro- 
 perties given. So the Area of a Triangle is found 
 by knowing the Height and the Bafe. So by hav- 
 ing two Sides, and an Angle of a Triangle given, 
 we find the remaining Side and Angles. So when 
 we know Cogitation is the prime Attribute of a 
 Spirit, we infer its Immateriality, and thence its 
 Immortality. 
 
 (5.) Analyfis finds the Means neceflfary to at- 
 tain a propofed End by having the End firft af- 
 figned. So in moral, political, economical Affairs, 
 having propofed the Government of Self, a Family, 
 a Society, or a Nation, in order to their belt Inte- 
 reft, we confider and fearch out what are the pro- 
 2 per 
 
C. I. The right lift of Reafon. 3 45 
 
 per Laws, Rules and Means to effect it. So in 
 the Practices of Artificers, and die Manufactures 
 of various Kinds, the End being propofed, as 
 making Cloth, Houfes, Ship, Qfi. we find out 
 Ways of compofing thefe things for the feveral 
 Ufes of human Life. By the putting any of thefe 
 Means in Execution to attain the End, is fyntbetic 
 Method. 
 
 Many other Particulars might be reprefented to 
 {hew the various Forms of analytic Method, where- 
 by Truth is found out, and fome of them come 
 very near to fyntbetic, fo as hardly to be diftin- 
 guifhed. 
 
 Obf.H. Not only the Inveftigation of Truth, 
 but the Communication of it alfo is often practif- 
 ed in fuch a Method, as neither agrees precifely to 
 fyntbetic or analytic. Some Sciences, if you con- 
 sider the whole of them in general, are treated in 
 fyntbetic Order •, fo Pbyfics or natural Philofophy 
 begins ufually with an Account of the general 
 Nature and Properties of Matter or Bodies, and 
 by Degrees defcends to confider the particular 
 Species of Bodies, with their Powers and Proper- 
 ties i yet it is very evident that when Philofophers 
 come to particular Plants and Animals, then by 
 Chymiftry and Anatomy they analyfe or reiblve thole- 
 Bodies into their feveral conllituent Parts. On 
 the other hand, Logick is begun in analytic Method ; 
 the wholt is divided into its integral Parts, accord- 
 ing to the four Operations of the Mind ; yet l>ere 
 and there fyntbetic Method is ufed in the particu- 
 lar Branches of it, for it treats of Ideas in general 
 fir ft, and then defcends to the feveral Species of 
 them ; it teaches us how Proportions arc made up 
 of Ideas, and Syllogifms of Projofttbr.s, which is the 
 Order of Comfoj;. 
 
 The 
 
346 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 The antient fcholajlick Writers have taken a great 
 deal of Pains, and engaged in ufelefs Difputes a- 
 bout thefc two Methods, and after all have not 
 been able to give fuch an Account of them as to 
 keep them entirely diftincl; from each other, nei- 
 ther in the Theory or in the Practice. Some of 
 the Moderns have avoided this Confufion in fome 
 Meafure by confining themfelves to defcribe almoft 
 nothing elfe but the fynthetic and analytic Methods 
 of Geometricians and Algebraijls, whereby they have 
 too much narrowed the Nature and Rules of Me- 
 thod, as tho' every thing were to be treated in 
 mathematical Forms. 
 
 Upon the whole I conclude, that neither of 
 thefe two Methods fhould be too fcrupuloufly 
 and fuperflitioufly purfued, either in the Inven- 
 tion or in the Communication of Knowledge. It 
 is enough if the Order of Nature be but obferved 
 in making the Knowledge of Things following 
 depend on the Knowledge of the Things which 
 go before. Oftentimes a mixed Method will be 
 found molt effectual for thefe Purpofes; and in- 
 deed a wife and judicious Profped: of our main 
 End and Defign mult regulate all Method what- 
 foever. 
 
 Here the Rules of natural Method ought to be 
 propofed, ("whether it be analytic, or fynthetic, or 
 mixt:) but it is proper firft to give fome Account 
 of arbitrary Method, left it be thruft at too great 
 a Diftance from the firft Mention of it. 
 
 Arbitrary Method leaves the Order of Nature, 
 and accommodates itlelf to many Purpofes \ fuch 
 as, to treafure up Things, and retain them in 
 Memory •, to harangue and perfuade Mankind to 
 any Practice in the religious or the civil Life ; or 
 to delight, amufe, or entertain the Mind. 
 
 As 
 
C. I. The right Ufe of Reafon. 347 
 
 As for the AJJiftance of the Memory, in mod 
 Things a natural Order has an happy Influence ; 
 for Reafon itfelf deducing one Thing from another, 
 greatly aflifts the Memory by the natural Con- 
 nection and mutual Dependence of Things. Buc 
 there are various other Methods which Mankind 
 have made ufe of for this Purpofe, and indeed 
 there are fome Subjects that can hardly be re- 
 duced to Analyfis or Synthefis. 
 
 In reading or writing Hi/lory, fome follow the 
 Order of the Governors of a Nation, and difpofe 
 every Tranfaction under their particular Reigns: 
 So the facred Books of Kings and Chronicles are 
 written. Some write in Annals and Journals, and 
 make a new Chapter of every Year. Some put 
 all thofe Tranfactions together which relate to 
 one Subjecl-y that is, all the Affairs of one War, 
 one League, one Confederacy; one Council, &c. tho' 
 it laded many Years, and under many Rulers. 
 
 So in writing the Lives of Men, which is called 
 Biography, fome Authors follow the Track of 
 their Tears, and place every thing in the precife 
 Order of Time when it occurr'd : Others throw 
 the Temper and Character of the Perfons, their 
 private Life, their public Stations, their perfonal Oc- 
 currences, their domefiic Conducl, their Speeches, 
 their Books or Writings, their Sicknefs and Death, 
 into fo many diftinct Chapters. 
 
 In Chronology fome Writers make their Epochas 
 to begin all with one Letter: So in the Book 
 called Dutlor Hiftoricus, the Period* all begin with 
 C i as, Creation, Cataclyfm, or Deluge, Chaldean 
 Empire, Cyrus, Chrifl, Conjlantine, &c. Some 
 divide their Accounts of Time according to the 
 four great Monarchies ; Ajfyrian, Perfan, Ore- 
 cian and Roman. Others chink it ferves the Me- 
 mory bed to divide all their Subjects into the rc- 
 
 Z m.irkuble 
 
348 L O G I C K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 markable Number of Sevens •, (o Prideaux has 
 written an Introduction to Hifiory. And there is a 
 Book of Divinity called Fajciculus Control erfiarum y 
 by an Author of the fame Name, written in the 
 fame Method, wherein every Controverfy has fe- 
 ven Queftions belonging to it ; tho' the Order of 
 Nature feems to be too much neglected by a Con- 
 finement to this feptenary Number. 
 
 Thofe IVr iters and Speakers > whofe chief Bufi- 
 nefs is to amufe or delight, to allure, terrify, or 
 perfuade Mankind, do not confine themfelves to 
 any natural Order , but in a cryptical or bidden Me- 
 thod adapt every thing to their defigned Ends. 
 Sometimes they omit thofe Things which might 
 injure their Defign, or grow tedious to their 
 Hearers, tho' they feem to have a necefTary Re- 
 lation to the Point in hand : Sometimes they add 
 thofe Things which have no great Reference to 1 
 the Subject, but ate fenced to allure or refrem the 
 Mind and the Ear. They dilate fometimes, and 
 flourifh long upon little Incidents, and they fkip 
 over, and but lightly touch the drier Part of their 
 Theme. They place thefirft Things laft, and the 
 laft Things firft y with wondrous Art, and yet fo 
 manage it as to conceal their Artifice, and lead 
 the Senfes and Pa'ffions of their Hearers into a 
 pleafing and powerful Captivity. 
 
 It is chiefly Poefy and Oratory that require the 
 Practice of this kind of arbitrary Method: They 
 omit Things eflential which are not beautiful, 
 they infert little needlefs Cir cum {lances, and beau- 
 tiful DigreiTions, they invert Times and Actions^ 
 in order to place every Thing in the moft alien- 
 ing Light, and for this End in their Practice they 
 neglect all logical Forms \ yet a good Acquaintance 
 with the Forms of Loglck and natural Method is of 
 admirable Ufe to thofe who would attain theft 
 
 Am 
 
C. II. Tihe right U/e of Reafon. 3 451 
 
 Arts in Perfection. Hereby they will be able to 
 range their own Thoughts in fuch a Method and 
 Scheme, as to take a more large and comprehea- 
 five Survey of their Subject and Defign in all the 
 Parts of it} and by this Means they will better 
 judge what Co chufe and what to refufe 5 and how 
 to drefs and manage the whole Scene before them, 
 fo as to attain their own Ends with greater Glory 
 and Succels. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Tie Rules of Method, general andfpeciah 
 
 H E General Requifites of true Method in 
 the Purfujt or Communication of Know- 
 JecFge, may be all comprized under the following 
 Heads. It muft be (1.) Safe. (2.) Plain and 
 Eafy. (3.) Biftincl. (4.) Full or without Z>- 
 fell. (5.) Short or without Superfluity (6.) Pro- 
 per to the SukjeJl and the Defgn. (7.) &** 
 ncRcd. 
 
 I. Rule. Among all the Qualifications of 
 a good Method, there is none more nee 
 and important than that it mould be /// 
 fecure from Error \ an 1 to this End thefe four 
 particular or Jpecial Directions mould be ob- 
 served . 
 
 1 . U/e great Care ami Circumfjrslion in laying th; 
 Foundations of your Dijioitrfe, or your Sfhcmt of 
 Thoughts Upon any Subject. Thefe Proportions 
 which are to (land as firlt Prfnciples, and on 
 which the whole Argument depends, muft he 
 yiewed on all Sides with ucmoft Accuracy, left an 
 Z 2 Error 
 
350 L0GICK:0r, Part IV. 
 
 Error being admitted there, mould diffufe itfelf 
 thro' the whole Subject. See therefore that your 
 general Definitions or Defer ipions are as accurate 
 as the Nature of the Thing will bear : See that 
 your general Divifions and Diftributions be juft and 
 exact, according to the Rules given in the firft 
 Part of Logick: See that your Axioms be fuffici- 
 cntly evident, fo as to demand the Aflent of thofc 
 that examine them with due Attention. See that 
 your firft and more immediate Conferences from 
 thefe Principles be well drawn i and take the fame 
 Care of all other Propofitions that have a powerful 
 and fpreading Influence thro' the feveral Parts of 
 your Difcourfe. 
 
 For want of this Care, fometimes, a large Trea- 
 tife has been written by a long Deduction of Con- 
 fequences from one or two doubtful Principles, 
 which Principles have been effectually refuted in 
 a few Lines, and thus the whole Treatife has been 
 deflroyed at once: So the largefl and faireft Build- 
 ing finks and tumbles to the Ground, if the Foun- 
 dations and Corner-Stones of it are feeble and in- 
 efficient. 
 
 2. It is a very advifable Thing that your prima- 
 ry and fundamental Propofitions be not only evident 
 and true, but they Jhould be made a little familiar 
 to the Mind by dwelling upon them before you proceed 
 
 farther. By this Means you will gain fo full an 
 Acquaintance with them, that you may draw 
 Confequences from them with much more Free- 
 dom, with greater Variety, brighter Evidence, 
 and with a firmer Certainty, than if you have but 
 a flight and fudden View of them. 
 
 3. As you proceed in the Connection of your 
 Arguments, fee that your Ground be made firm in 
 every Step. See that every Link of your Chain 
 of Reafoning be ftrong and good : For if but 
 
 one 
 
C. IL The right Ufe ^Rcafon. 35 1 
 
 one Link be feeble and doubtful, the whole Chain 
 of Arguments feels the Weaknefs of it, and lie 
 expofed to every Objector, and the original Que- 
 ftion remains undetermined. 
 
 4. Draw up all your Proportions and Arguments 
 with fo much Caution, and exprefs your Ideas with 
 Juch a juft Limitation as may preclude or anticipate 
 any Objections. Yet remember this is only to be 
 done as far as it is pofiible, without too much en- 
 tangling the Queftion, or introducing complicat- 
 ed Ideas, and obfcuring the Senfe. But if fuch a 
 cautious and limited Drefs of the Queftion fhould 
 render the Ideas too much complicated, or the 
 Senk obfcure, then it is better to keep the Argu- 
 ment more fimple, clear and eafy to be under- 
 ftood, and afterwards mention the Objetlions di- 
 ftindtly in their full Strength, and give a diftindt 
 Anfwer to them. 
 
 II d Ru l e. Let your Method be plain and eafy, 
 fo that your Hearers or Readers, as well as your 
 fdf may run thro* it without Embarraflment, and 
 may take a clear and comprehenfive View of the 
 whole Scheme. To this End the following parti- 
 cular Directions will be ufeful. 
 
 1 . Begin always with thofe Things which are beft 
 known, and moft obvious, whereby the Mind may 
 have no Difficulty or Fatigue, and proceed by regu- 
 lar and eafy Steps to Things that are more difficult. 
 And as far as pofiible, let not the Underftanding, 
 or the Proof of any of your Poiitions, depend on 
 the Pofitions that follow, but always on thofe 
 which go before. It is a Matter of Wonder that 
 in fo knowing an Age as this, there mould be fo 
 many Perfons offering Violence daily to this Rule, 
 by teaching the Latin Language by a Grammar writ- 
 ten in Latin, which Method lcems to require a 
 
 Z 3 perfect 
 
352 L0GlCK:Or y Part IV. 
 
 perfect Knowledge of an unknown Tongue, in 
 order to learn the firft Rudiments of it. 
 
 '2. Do net aff eft lexceff.ve Nafte in learning or 
 teaching any Science ', nor hurry at once in the midfi 
 of it, left you be too foon involved in fevetal new 
 and ftrange Ideas and Propofitions, which cannot 
 be well underftood without a longer and clofer 
 Attention to thofe which go before. Such fort 
 of Speed is but a waile of Time, and will con- 
 flrain you to take many Steps backward again, if 
 you would arrive at a regular and compleat Know- 
 ledge of the Subject, 
 
 3. Be not fond of crowding too many 'Thoughts and 
 Reafmings into one Sentence or Paragraph, beyond 
 the Apprehenfion or Capacity of your Readers or 
 Hearers. There are fome Perfons of a good Ge- 
 nius, and a capacious Mind, who write and fpeak 
 very obfeurely upon this Account \ they affect a 
 long Train of Dependencies, before they come to 
 a Period ; they imagine that they can never fill 
 their Page with too much Senfe ; but they little 
 think how they bury their own beft Ideas in the 
 Croud, and render them in a manner invifible and 
 ufelefs to the greateit Part of Mankind. Such 
 Men may be great Scholars, yet they are but poor 
 Teachers. 
 
 4. For the fame Reafon a h joid too many Sub- 
 droifions. Contrive your Scheme of Thoughts in 
 fuch a manner as may finifh your whole Argu- 
 ment with as few inferior Branchings as Reafon 
 will admit •, and let them be fuch as are obvious 
 and open to the Understanding, that they may- 
 come within one iingle View of the Mind. This 
 will not only aftift the Underflanding to receive, 
 but it will aid the Memory alfo to retain Truth: 
 whereas a Bifcourfe cut out into a van: Multitude 
 of gradual Subordinations, has many inconveni- 
 ences 
 
CII. Tie right Ufi of R&fon. 353 
 
 cnces in it ; it gives Pain to the Mind and Me- 
 mory, in furveying and retaining the Scheme of 
 Difcourfe, and expofes the unfkilful Hearers to 
 mingle the fuperior and inferior Particulars to. 
 ther, it leads them into a thick Wood inftead of 
 open Day-light, and places them in a Labyrinth 
 inftead of a plain Path. 
 
 5. Give all Diligence in your younger Tears to ob- 
 tain a clear and eafy IV ay of expreffing your Con- 
 ceptions, that your Words, as faft as you utter 
 them, may ftamp your own Ideas exactly on the 
 Mind of the Hearer. This is a mod happy Ta- 
 lent for the Conveyance of Truth, and an excel- 
 lent Security againff. Miftakcs and needle is Con- 
 troverfies. 
 
 III d Rule, Let your Method be dijlincl, and 
 without the perplexing Mixture of Things that 
 ought to be kept fe pa rate, and this will be eafily 
 practifed by four Dire 3 ions. 
 
 1. Don't bring unnecejfary heterogeneous *M 
 ter in your Difcourfe on any Subjecl ; that is, don't 
 mingle an Argument on one Subjecl: with Mat- 
 ters that relate entirely to another, but juft fo , 
 as is neceflary to give a clearer Knowledge of the 
 Subject in hand. Examples in Logick may be bor- 
 rowed from any of the Sciences to illuilrat ■.* I 
 Rules: But long Interpofitions of natural \ 
 fophy y of the Imagination and Paffions, of slgency of 
 
 Spirits united to Bodies, &c. break the Thread 
 
 Difcourfe, and perplex the Subject. 
 
 2, Let every complicated Theme or Idea be 
 into its dijlincl Jingle Parts, as far as the Nature of 
 the Subjecl and your pre fent Drfign requires it. TLo* 
 
 • Things of om K nJ m ci I'd - . I -;i gl differs K.r.di 
 
 are Ltrtr»gfrn;us. 
 
 / 
 
 you 
 
354 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 you mufl not abound in nccdlcfs Subdivifions, yet 
 Something of this Work is very neceflary ; and it 
 is a good Judgment alone can dictate how far to 
 proceed in it, and when to ftop. 
 
 Compound Ideas muft be reduced to a fimple 
 Form in order to underftand them well. You 
 may eafily matter that Subject in all the Parts of 
 it by a regular Succeflion, which would confound 
 the Underftanding to furvey them at once. So 
 we come to the Knowledge of a very perplex 9 d 
 Diagram in Geometry, or a complicated Machine in 
 Mechanics, by having it parcell'd out to us into 
 its feveral Parts and Principles, according to this, 
 and the foregoing Rule of Method. 
 
 3. Call every Idea, Proportion and Argument to 
 its proper Clafs, and keep each Part of the Subject 
 in its own Place. Put thofe things all together 
 that belong to one Part or Property, one Confi- 
 deration or View of your Subjedt. This will 
 prevent needlefs Repetitions, and keep you from 
 intermixing Things which are different. We 
 rnuft maintain this Diftinction of Things and Pla- 
 ces if we would be fafe from Error. It is Confu- 
 fion that leads us into endlefs Miftakes, which na- 
 turally arife from a Variety of Ideas ill-joined, ill— 
 forted, or iil-difpofed. It is one great ufe of Me- 
 thod, that a Multitude of Thoughts and Propo- 
 rtions may be fo diftinctly ranged in their pro- 
 per Situations, that the Mind may not be over- 
 whelmed with a confufed Attention to them all at 
 once, nor be diftracted with their Variety, nor 
 be tempted to unite Things which ought to be 
 feparated, nor to disjoin Things which fhould be 
 united. 
 
 4. In the Partition of your Difcourfe into diflinft 
 Heads, take heed that your Particulars do not inter- 
 fere with the General, nor with each other. Think 
 
 it 
 
C. II. The right Uje of Rcafon. 355 
 
 it is not enough that you make ufe of diftinct Ex- 
 prefiions in each Particular, but take care that the 
 Ideas be diftinct alfo. It is mere Foolery to mul- 
 tiply diftinct Particulars in treating of Things, 
 where the Difference of your Particulars lies only 
 in Names and Words. 
 
 IV th Rule. The Method of treating a Sub- 
 ject fhould be plenary or full, fo that nothing may 
 be wanting ; nothing which is neceffary or proper 
 fhould be omitted. 
 
 When you are call'd to explain a Subject, don't 
 pafs by, nor fkip over any thing in it which is ve- 
 ry difficult or obfcure. 
 
 When you enumerate the Parts or the Properties 
 of any Subject, do it in a complete and compre- 
 henfive manner. 
 
 When you are afferting or proving any Truth, 
 fee that every doubtful or difputable Part of the 
 Argument be well fupported and confirmed. 
 
 If you are to illuftrate or argue a Point of 'Dif- 
 ficulty, be not too fcinty of Words, but rather 
 become a little copious and dirTufive in your Lan- 
 guage : Set the Truth before the Reader in federal 
 Lights, turn the various Sides of it to view, in 
 order to give a full Idea, and firm Evidence of 
 the Propofition. 
 
 When you are drawing up a Narrative of any 
 Matter of Fact, fee that no important Circum- 
 ftance be omitted. 
 
 When you propofe the Solution of any Difficul- 
 ty, confider all the various Caies wherein it can 
 happen, and fhew how thty may be lblved. 
 
 In fhort, let your Enumerations, your Dhifions 
 and Diflributions of Things be fo accurate, that 
 no needful Part or Idea may be left out. 
 
 This 
 
35& LOG I C K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 This Fulnefs of Method does not require that 
 every thing mould be faid which can be faid upon 
 any Subject ; for this would make each Tingle 
 Science endlefs : But you fhould fay every thing 
 which is neceffary to the Defign in View, and 
 which has a proper and direel; Tendency to this 
 End •, always proportioning the Amplitude of your 
 Matter, and the Fulnefs of your Difcourfe to your 
 great Defign, to the Length of your Time, to the 
 Convenience, Delight and Profit of your Hearers. 
 
 V th Rule. As your Method mull be full with- 
 out Deficiency, fo it muft bejhort, or without Su- 
 perfluity. The Fulnefs of a Difcourfe enlarges our 
 Knowledge, and the well-concerted Brevity faves 
 our Time. In order to obferve this Rule, it will 
 be enough to point out the chief of thofe Super- 
 fluities or Redundancies, which fome Perfons are 
 guilty of in their Difcourfes, with a due Caution 
 againft them. 
 
 i. Avoid all needlefs Repetitions of the fame Thing 
 in different Parts of your Difcourfe. It muft be 
 confefs'd there are feveral Cafes wherein a Review 
 of the fame foregoing Propofition is needful to 
 explain or prove feveral of the following Pofiti- 
 ons •, but let your Method be fo contrived, as far 
 as poflible, that it may occafion the feweft Re- 
 hear fals of the fame Thing ; for it is not grateful 
 to the Hearers without evident Neceflity. 
 
 2. Have a Care of a tedious Prolixity, or draw- 
 ing out any Part of your Difcourfe to an unneceffary 
 and tire fome Length. It is much more honourable 
 for an Inftru&or, an Orator, a Pleader, or a Preach* 
 er, that his Hearers fhould fay, I was afraid he 
 would have done, than that they mould be tempt- 
 ed to [hew Signs of Uneafincfs, and long for the 
 Gondii ft on. 
 
 Befides, 
 
C. II. Hh right XJfi of Reafofi. 357 
 
 Befides, there is another Inconvenience in it ; 
 when you affect to amplify on the former Branch- 
 es of a Difcourfe, you will ofcen lay a Neceflity 
 upon yourfelf of contracting the latter and moft 
 ulcful Parts of it, and perhaps prevent yourfelf 
 in the moft important Part of your Defign. Ma* 
 ny a Preacher has been guilty of this fault in for- 
 mer Days, nor is the prefent Age without fomeln* 
 (lances of this Weaknefs. 
 
 3. Do nut multiply Explications where there is m 
 Difficulty, trD&rknefs, or Danger of Mi flake. Be 
 not fond of tracing every Word of your Theme 
 thro' all the grammatical, the logical and metaphy- 
 fud Characters and Relations of it, nor fhew your 
 critical Learning in fpreading abroad the various 
 Senfes of a Word, and the various Origin of thole 
 Senfes, the Etymology of Terms, the fynonymeus 
 and the paronymous or kindred Names, 13c. where 
 the chief Point of Difcourfe does not at all re- 
 quire it. You would laugh at a Pedant, who 
 profefiing to explain the Atbanafian Creed, mould 
 acquaint you, that Aihanafius is derrv'd from a 
 Greek Word, which fignifies Immortality, and 
 that the fame Word "A^mracu* fignifies alfo the 
 Herb Tanfit. 
 
 There are fome Perfons fo fond of their learned 
 Diftinctions, that they will mew their Subtilty 
 by difiinpdflAng 'where then is no Difference : And 
 the fame filly Affectation will introduce Dijlincli- 
 ens upon every Occurrence, and bring three or 
 four Negatives upon every Subject of Difcourfe • 
 firft to declare what it is not, and then what it is : 
 Whereas fuch Negatives ought never to be men- 
 tioned where there rs no apparent Danger of Mif- 
 takc. How ridiculous would that Writer be, 
 who, if he were f]>eaking of the Nicene Creed; 
 ftouW declare negatively, 1. That he did not 
 
 mean 
 
358 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 mean the Dofirine which the Inhabitants of Nice 
 peluyed, nor (2.) A Creed written by them, but 
 ($.) Pofitively a Creed compofed by fever at Chris- 
 tian Bifhops ??iet together in the City of Nice ? The 
 Pqfitive is fufficient here, and the two Negatives 
 are impertinent. 
 
 4. Be not fond of proving thofe Things which need 
 no Proof, fuch as felf-evident Proportions and 
 Truths univerfally confefs'd, or fuch as are intire- 
 ]y agreed to and granted by our Opponents. It is 
 this vain Affectation of proving every thing that 
 has led Geometricians to form ufelefs and intricate 
 Demonftrations to fupport fome Theorems, which 
 are fufficiently evident to the Eye by Infpection, 
 or to the Mind by the firft mention of them -, and 
 it is the fame Humour that reigns fometimes in 
 the Pulpit, and fpends half the Sermon in proving 
 fome general Truth which is never difputed or 
 doubted, and thereby robs the Auditory of more 
 ufeful Entertainment. 
 
 5. As there are fome things fo evidently true, 
 that they want no Proof, fo there are others fo 
 evidently fa Iff that they want no Refutation. It is 
 mere trifling, and a wade of our precious Mo- 
 ments, to invent and raife fuch Objections as no 
 Man would ever make in earned, and that merely 
 for the fake of anfwering and folving them : This 
 breaks in notorioufly upon the due Brevity of Me- 
 thod. 
 
 6. Avoid in general all learned Forms, all Trap- 
 pings of Art, and Ceremonies of the School^, where 
 there is no need of them. It is reported Concern- 
 ing the late Czar of Mufcovy, that when he 
 firft acquainted himfelf with mathematical Learn- 
 ing, he practis'd all the Rules of Circumvallation 
 and Conn :on, at the Siege of a Town in 
 
 Livonia ; 
 
 4 
 
C.1I. The right life of Reafon. 359 
 
 Livonia ; and by the Length of thofe Formalities 
 he loft the Opportunity of taking the Town. 
 
 7. Don't fuffer every occafwnal and incidental 
 'Thought to carry you azvay into a long Parenthefis, 
 and thus to flretch out your Difcourfe, and divert 
 you from the Point in Hand. In the Purfuit of 
 your Subject, if any ufeful Thought occur which 
 belongs to fome other Theme, note it down for 
 the fake of your Memory on fome other Paper, 
 and lay it by in referve for its proper Place and 
 Sea fon : But let it not incorporate itfelf with 
 your prefent Theme, nor draw off your Mind 
 from your main Bufinefs, tho' it mould be never 
 fo inviting. A Man who walks directly but flow- 
 ly towards his Journey's End, will arrive thither 
 much fooner than his Neighbour, who runs into 
 every crooked Turning which he meets, and wan- 
 ders afide to gaze at every thing that ftrikes hrs 
 Eyes by the Way, or to gather every gaudy Flow- 
 er that grows by the fide of the Road. 
 
 To fum up all i There is an happy Medium to bt 
 ebferv'd in our Method, fo that the Brevity may not 
 render the Senfe obfcure, nor the Argument feeble y 
 nor our Knowledge merely fuperficial : And on the 
 other Hand, that the Fulnefs and Copioufnefs of cur 
 Method may not wafte the Time, tire the Learner, or 
 fill the Mind with Trifles and hnpertinencies. 
 
 The copious and the contracted Way of* writing 
 have each their peculiar Advantages. There is a 
 proper Ufe to be made of large Parapbrafes, and 
 /////, particular, and diffufive Explications and Ar- 
 gwnenti •, thefe are fitted for thofe who defign ta 
 be acquainted thoroughly with every Part of the 
 Subject. There is alio a Ufe of fJjorter Hmts % 
 Abflracls and Compendiums to inllruct thofe who 
 feck only a flight and general Knowledge, as well 
 as to 1 cfrefli the Mcmorv ot thofe who have learnt 
 
 the 
 
360 LOG IC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 the Science already, and gone thro' a largerScheme, 
 But it is a grofs Abufe of thefe various Methods 
 of Inftruclion, when a Perfon has read a mere com- 
 pact or Epitome of any Science, and he vainly ima- 
 gines that he underftands the whole Science. So 
 one Boy may become a Pbilofopher by reading 
 over the mere dry Definitions and Divifions of 
 Scheibler's Compendium of Peripateticifm : So an- 
 other may boatt that he underftands Anatomy be- 
 caufe he has ieen a Skeleton ; and a third profefa 
 himfclf a learned Divine, when he can repeat the 
 Apoftles Creed. 
 
 VI th Rule. Take care that your Method be 
 proper to the Subjetl in Hand, proper to your pre- 
 fent Defign, as well as proper to the Age and Place' 
 wherein you dwell. 
 
 i. Let your Method be proper to the Subjetl. All 
 Sciences muft not be learnt or taught in one Me- 
 thod. Morality and Theology, Metaphyfics and 
 Lcgkk, will not be eafily and happily reduc'd to a 
 ftricl: mathematical Method : Thofe who have tried 
 have found much Inconvenience therein. 
 
 Some things have more need to be explained 
 than to be proved \ z% Axioms or [elf- evident Pro^ 
 pofitions ; and indeed all the firft great Principles, 
 the chief and moft important Doctrines both of 
 natural and reveaVd Religion \ for when the Senfe 
 gf them is clearly explam'd, they appear fo evi- 
 dent in the Light of Nature or Scripture, that 
 they want no other Proof. There are other Things 
 that ftand in need of Proof as well as Explication, 
 as many mathematical Theorems, and feveral deep 
 Controverfies in Morality and Divinity. There are 
 yet other forts of Subjects which want rather to; 
 be warmly imprell upon the Mind by fervent Ex- 
 bortations, and ftand in more need of this than 
 
 tfley 
 
C. II . The right Iffe of Reafon. 3 6 1 
 
 they do either of Proof or Explication j fuch are 
 the moft general, plain and obvious Duties of 
 Piety towards God, and love toward Men, with fc 
 Government of all our Inclinations and Pajfions. 
 Now thefe feveral Subjects ought to be treated in 
 a different Manner and Method. 
 
 Again, There are fome Subjects in the fame 
 Treatife which are more ufeful and necejjary than 
 others, and fome Parts of a Subject which are 
 eminently and chief y defigtfd by a Writer or Speak- 
 er : True Method will teach us to dwell longer 
 upon thefe Themes, and to lay out more Thought 
 and Language upon them ; whereas the fame Art 
 of Method will teach us to curt ihort thofe things 
 which are ufed only to introduce our main Subject, 
 and to (land as a Scaffolding merely to aid the 
 Structure of our Difcourfe. It will teach us alio 
 to content ourfelves with brief Hints of thofe 
 Matters which are merely occafional and inci- 
 dental. 
 
 2. Your Method muft be adjufed by your Defign ; 
 For if you treat of the fame Subject with two dif- 
 ferent Views and Defjgns, you will find it necef- 
 fary to ufe different Methods. Suppofe the Doc- 
 trine of the facred Trinity were your Theme, and 
 you were to read a Lecture to young Students on 
 that Subject, or if you defign'd a Trcatife for the 
 Conviction of learned Men, you would burfue a 
 very different Method from that which would be 
 proper to regulate a practical Difcourfe, or a Ser- 
 mon to inftruct vulgar Chriftians merely in the pi- 
 ous Improvement of this Doctrine, and awaken 
 chem to their Duties which are deriv'd thence. 
 
 In fliort, we muff not hrlt lay down certain 
 and precifc Rules of Method, and refbfve to con- 
 line the Matter we difcourfe of to that particular 
 Form and Order of Topicks ; but we mull well 
 4 coil I 
 
362 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 confidcr and ftudy the Subjecl of our Difcourfe 
 throughly, and take a juft Survey of our prefent 
 Defign, and thefe will give fufficient Hints of the 
 particular Form and Order in which we fhould 
 handle it, provided that we are moderately skilPd 
 in the general Laws of Method and Order. 
 
 Yet let it be noted here, that neither the Sub- 
 jeft or Matter of a Difcourfe, nor the particular 
 Defign of it, can fo precifely determine the Me- 
 thod, as to leave no room for Liberty and Va- 
 riety. The very fame Theme may be handled, and 
 that alfo with the fame Defign, in feveral different 
 Methods, among which it is hard to fay which is 
 the beft. In writing a Syftem of Divinity fome 
 begin with the Scriptures* and thence deduce all 
 other Doctrines and Duties. Some begin with 
 the Being of God and his Attributes, fo far as he 
 is known by the Light of Nature, and then pro- 
 ceed to the Doctrines of Revelation. Some di- 
 flinguifh the whole Subject into the Credenda and 
 Agenda, that is, Things to be believed, and Things 
 to be done. Some think it beft to explain the 
 whole Chriftian Religion by an hiftorical Detail 
 of all the Difcoveries which God has made of him- 
 felf to this lower World, beginning at the Creation 
 in the firft Chapter of Genefis, and fo proceeding 
 onward according to the Narrative of the Old and 
 New Teflament. And there are others that en- 
 deavour to include the whole of Religion under 
 thefe four Heads, (viz.) The Apoftles Creed, the 
 Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments, and the two 
 Sacraments •, tho' I cannot but think this is the 
 lead accurate of any. The fame Variety may be 
 allowed in treating other Subjects •, this very Trea- 
 tife of Logick is an Inftance of it, whofe Method 
 differs very confiderably from any others which I 
 have feen, as they differ alfo greatly from one an- 
 other 
 
C. II. The right life of Reafon. 363 
 
 other, tho' feveral of them are confefs'd to be well 
 written. 
 
 3. Tho' a juft View of our Subjetl and our Be- 
 fign may dictate proper Rules of natural Method, 
 yet there muft be fome little Deference at leaft paid 
 to the Cujtom of the dge wherein we dwell, and to 
 the Humour and Genius of our Readers or Hearers* 
 which if we utterly reject and difdain, our Per- 
 formances will fail of defired Succefs, even tho' 
 we may have followed the juft Rules of Method. 
 I will mention but this one Inftance : In the for- 
 mer Century it was frequent with learned Men to 
 divide their Theme or Subject into a great Mul- 
 titude of coordinate Members or Parts, they a- 
 bounded alfo in the Forms of Logick and Diftintli- 
 cn, and indulged numerous Ranks of Subordination. 
 Now tho' we ought not to abandon the Rules of 
 juft Method and Bivifwn, in order to comport with 
 the modifh Writers in our Age who have renoun- 
 ced them, yet it is prudent to pay fo much Refpect 
 to the Cultom of the Age, as to ufe thefe Forms 
 of Divi/ion with due Moderation, and not affect 
 to multiply them in fuch a manner as to give an 
 early and needlefs Difguft to the generality of our 
 prefent Readers. The fame may be faid concern* 
 ing various other Methods of Conduct in the Af- 
 fairs of Learning as well as the Affairs of Life, 
 wherein we muft indulge a little to Cuftom : And 
 yet we muft by no means fuller ourfelves fo far to 
 DC impofed upon and governed by it, as to neglect 
 thofe Rules of Method which are neceffary for the 
 fafe, eafy and compleat Enquiry into Truth, or 
 the ready and effectual Communication of it to o» 
 thers. 
 
 Vll'k Ruli. The laft Requifite of Method \ Sf 
 that the Parts of a Difcourfe Jhculd be well conned - 
 
364 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 ed -, and thefe three fhort Directions will fufHcc for 
 this Purpofe. 
 
 1 . Keep your main End and Defign ever in view, 
 and let all the Parts of your Difcourfe have a 'Ten- 
 dency toward it, and, as far as poffible, make that 
 tendency vifible all the Way : Otherwife the Readers 
 or Hearers will have reafon to wonder for what 
 End this or that Particular was introduced. 
 
 2. Let the mutual Relation and Depend ance of 
 the fever al Branches of your Difcourfe be fo juft and 
 evident, that every Part may naturally lead onward 
 to the next, without any huge Chafms or Breaks 
 which interrupt and deform the Scheme. The Con- 
 nection of Truths mould arife and appear in their 
 fuccefiive Ranks and Order, as. the feveral Parts 
 of a fine Profpect afcend juft behind each other, 
 in their natural and regular Elevations and Diftan- 
 res, and invite the Eye to climb onward with con. 
 ftant Pleafure till it reach the Sky. Whatfoever 
 horrid Beauty a Precipice or a Cataract may add 
 to the Profpect of a Country, yet fuch fort of hi- 
 deous and abrupt Appearances in a Scene of Rea- 
 foning are real Blemiihes and not Beauties. When 
 the Reader is pafling over fuch a Treatife, he often 
 rinds 'a wide Vacancy, and makes an uneafy Stop, 
 and knows not how to tranfport his Thoughts over 
 to the next Particular, for want of fome Clue or 
 connecting Idea to lay hold of. 
 
 3. Jc quaint your f elf with all the proper and decent 
 Forms of Tranfition from one Part of a Difcourfe to 
 another, andpraclife them as Occafwn offers. Where 
 the Ideas, Proportions and Arguments are hap-, 
 pily difpoled, and well connected, the Truth in- 
 deed is fecure ; but it renders the Difcourfe much 
 more agreeable, when proper and graceful Expref- 
 iion joins the Parts- of it together in fo entertain- 
 ing 
 
C. II. Tbi right U/e of Reafun. 3 65 
 
 ing a manner, that the Reader knows not how 
 to leave off till he hath arrived at the End. 
 
 Thefe are the general and moft important Rules 
 of true Method •, and tho' they belong chiefly to 
 the Communication of Knowledge, yet an early 
 and thorough Acquaintance with them will be of 
 confiderable Ufe toward the Purfuit and Attain- 
 ment of it. 
 
 Thofe Perfons who have never any Occafion to 
 communicate Knowledge by Writing or by pub- 
 lick Difcourfes, may alfo with great Advantage 
 perufe thefe Rules of Meth$d, that they may learn 
 to judge with Juftice and Accuracy concerning 
 the Performance of others. And befides, a good 
 Acquaintance v/ith Method will greatly a (fid every 
 one in ranging, difpofing and managing all human 
 Affairs. 
 
 The particular Means or Methods for a farther 
 Improvement of the Underftanding are very va- 
 rious, ■ fuch as, Meditation, Reading, Converftng, 
 Dijputing by Speech or by Writing, Quefiion and 
 Anfwer, &c. And in each of thefe Practices 
 fome fpecial Forms may be obferved, and fpecial 
 Rules may be given to facilitate and fecure our 
 Enquiries after Truth : But this would require 
 a little Volume by itfelf, and a Treatiie of Loghk 
 has always beenefteem'd fufficiently compka: with- 
 out it. 
 
 F I N I S. 
 
 A a 2 
 
THE 
 
 TABLE 
 
 O F T H E 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 HP H E Introduction or general Scheme. Page i . 
 
 The Firjl Part (viz.) Of Perceptions and 
 Ideas. 
 
 Ch a p . I. Of the Nature of Ideas , 8 
 
 Chap. II. Of the Objetls of Perception. Seft. i. 
 Of Being in general, p. 10. Sedt. 2. Of Sub- 
 fiances and their various Kinds, p. 11. Sect. 3. 
 Of Modes and their various Kinds ; and firft of 
 ejfeatial and accidental Modes, p. 16. Se6t. 4. 
 The further Divijions of Mode, p. 20. Sed. 5. 
 0/ the ten Categories. Of Subftance modify d. 
 p. 25. Sed. 6. Of Not Being, p. 26. 
 
 Chap. III. 0/"/itf fever at forts of Perceptions or 
 Ideas. Se£t. 1 . Of fenfible, fpiritual, and ab- 
 flratled Ideas, p. 28. Sett. 2. Of fimple ard 
 complex, compound and collective Ideas, p. 33* 
 2 Sed. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Sett. 3. Of univerfal and particular Ideas, real 
 and imaginary, p. 34. Sett. 4. The Divifwn of 
 Ideas, with Regard to their Qualities, p. 39. 
 
 Chap. IV. Of Words and their fever al Divifwns, 
 together with the Advantage and Danger of them. 
 Sett. 1 . Of Words in general and their Ufe, p. 45. 
 Sett. 2. Of negative and pcfitive Terms, p. 51. 
 Scd:. 3. Of fimple and complex Terms, p. 54. 
 Sett. 4. 0/* Words common and proper, p. 56. 
 Sett. 5. Of concrete and abjlracl Terms, p. 58. 
 Sett. 6. Of univocal and equivocal Words, ibid. 
 Sett. 7. Various Kinds of equivocal Words, p. 61. 
 Sett. 8. 72v Origin or Caufes of equivocal Words \ 
 
 p. 67. 
 
 Chap. V. General Direclions relating to our Ideas, 
 
 (viz.) 1. Of acquiring a Treafure of Ideas. 2. Of 
 
 retaining Ideas in Memory. 3. Of fele cling ufe- 
 
 ful Ideas. 4. Of the Government of our Thoughts , 
 
 p. 71. 
 
 Chap. VI. Special Rules to diretl our Conception of 
 Things, p. 79. Sett. 1. Of gaining clear and di- 
 flintl Ideas, p. 80. Sc£t. 2. Of the Definition 
 of Words or Names, p. 82. Scd. 3. Directi- 
 ons concerning the Definition of Names, p. 84. 
 Std:. 4. Of the Definition of Things, p. 100. 
 Sett. 5. Rules of Definition of the Thing, p. 105. 
 Sett. 6. Obfervations concerning the Definition of 
 
 . Things, p. 108. Sett. 7. Of a compleat Concep- 
 tion of Things, p. 117. Sti\. 8. Of Divifwn , 
 tf;;J /£<f Rules of it, p. 1 1 8. Sc6t. 9. Of a com- 
 prehenfive Conception of Things, and of Abftrac- 
 tion, p. 124. Scc2. 10. Of the extenftve Con- 
 tion of Things, and of Dijlribution, p. 128. 
 Sett. 11, Of an orderly Conception of Things^ 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 p. 133. Sedt. 12. Thefe five Rules of Conception 
 exemplify' d, p. 135. Sedt. 13. An Illuftration of 
 thefe five Rules by Similitudes, p. 137. 
 
 The Second Part, (viz.) of Judgment and 
 Propofition. 
 
 CHAP- 1. Of the Nature of a Propofition and its 
 fever al Parts, p. 144. 
 
 Chap. II. Of the various Kinds of Proportions. 
 Sedt. 1. Of univerfal, particular, indefinite, and 
 fingular Propofitions, p. 147. Sedt. 2. Of af- 
 firmative and negative Propofitions, p. 156. 
 Sedt. 3. Of the Oppofition and Converfion of Pro- 
 pofitions, p. 158. Sedt. 4. Of pure and modal 
 Propofitions, p. 161. Sedt. 5. Of fingle Propo- 
 fitions, whether ftmple or complex, p. 163. Sedt. 6. 
 Of compeund Propofitions, p. 165. Sedt. 7. Of 
 true and falfe Propofitions, p. 171. Sedt. 8. 0/* 
 certain and doubtful Propofitions, of Knowledge 
 and Opinion, p. 174- Sedt. 9- Qf &«/&» C<w- 
 fcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reafon, Faith and Infpi- 
 ration, p. 177. 
 
 Chap. III. The Springs of falfe Judgment, or the 
 Doctrine of Prejudices, p. 186. Sedt. 1. Preju- 
 dices arifingfrom Things, p. 188. Sedt. 2. Pre- 
 judicesarifingfromIVcrds,p.i95. Sedt. 3. iV?- 
 judices arifing from ourfelves, p. 198. Sedt. 4. 
 Prejudices arifingfrom other Perfons, p. 2 14, 
 
 Chap- 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Chap. IV. General Directions to ajfift us in judging 
 aright y p. 231. 
 
 Chap.V. Special Rules to direcl us in judging of 
 particular ObjecJs. Sett. 1 . Principles and Rules 
 of Judgment concerning the Ob j eels of Senfe, p. 249. 
 Sedt. 2. Principles and Rules of Judgment in Mat- 
 ters of Reafon and Speculation, p. 253. Se&. 3. 
 
 • Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 Morality and Religion, p. 259. Sedt. 4. Prin- 
 ciples and Rules of Judgment in Matters of hu- 
 
 • man Prudence, p. 263. Sedt. 5. Principles and 
 Rules of Judgment in Matters of human Teftimo- 
 
 ■ ny, p. 266. Sc£t. 6. Principles and Rules of 
 Judgment in Matters of divine Teftimony, p. 271. 
 Se£t. 7. Principles and Rules of Judging concern- 
 ing Things paft, prefent, and to come, by the mere 
 
 ,' Vfe of Reafon, p. 275. 
 
 The Third Part, (viz.) Of Reafoning and 
 Syllogifm. 
 
 >HAP. I. Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and of 
 the Parts of which it is comfofea, p. 280. 
 
 Chap. II. Of the various Kinds of Syllogifms, with 
 particular Rules relating to them. Soft. 1. Of 
 univerfal and particular Syllogifms, both negative 
 and affirmative, p. 283. Sc&. 2. Of plain, Jimfld 
 Syllogifms, and their Rules, p. 285. Seft. 3, Of 
 the Moods and Figures of fimple Syllogifms, p. 289, 
 Scft . 4. Of com; lex S \ Hog . m J , | 
 Of conjunPhe Syllooijms, \ l S. Of 
 
 compound Sdlcgifms, p. 301. 
 
 . . . : 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 middle Terms, of common Places or Topics, and 
 Invention of Arguments, p. 30 15. Scd. 8. Of fe- 
 veral Kinds of Arguments and Demonftrations, 
 
 p. 308. 
 
 Chap. III. The Doclrine of Sophifms. Sett. 1. Of 
 feveral Kinds of Sophifms, and their Solution, 
 p. 313. Se6t 2. Two general Tefts of true Syl- 
 logtfms, and Methods of folving all Sophifms, 
 
 P-3 2 3- 
 
 Chap. IV. Some general Rules to direcl ourReafon- 
 ing. p. 326. 
 
 The Fourth Part, (viz.) Of Method. 
 
 CHAP. I. The Nature and Kinds of Method, 
 p. 340. 
 
 Chap. II. General and fpecial Rules of Method, 
 
 P« 349. 
 
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