^^^^ CORNhLL tgj UNIVERSITY ^/^ LIBRARY DATE DUE ' 1 2003' "■' ^*^01 ,^ 2 il 1 1 .— I GAYLORD PRINTED IN U.SA w Cornell University Library B2778.E5 M94 1896 3 1924 032 328 860 olln Cornell University Library The original of tliis bool< is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924032328860 \.' IMMANUEL KANT'S Critique of Pure Reason In Commnn0ration of t\jt (Emtmarg of itg jfixst Publication TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY F. MAX MULLER WeiD gorfe THE MACMILLAN COMPANY LONDON : MACMILLAN & CO., LTD. 1896' All rights reserved B Copyright, 1896, By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. First edition printed 1881. Reprinted with alterations, 1896. J. S. Ciisluiig & Co. - Bcrwiuk &l Smith Norwood Mns3. U.S.A. TABLE OF CONTENTS Dedication . . ..... Table of Contents to First Edition Preface to First Edition rlntro_duction . .... I. The Idea of Transcendental Philosophy II. Division of Transcendental Philosophy . PACE xiii XV xvii I-I2 10 I. The Elements of Transcendentalism First Part. Transcendental /Esthetic First Section. Of Space Second Section. Of Time General Observations on Transcendental Esthetic Second Part. Transcendental Logic Introduction. The Idea of a Transcendental Logic I. Of Logic in General ..... II. Of Transcendental Logic III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic ... . . IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Tran- scendental Analytic and Dialectic . First Division. Transcendental Analytic . . . 52-237 Book I. Analytic of Concepts . . . 54-106 Chapter I. Method of Discovering all Pure Concepts of the Understanding . . . -55 Section i. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General ... ... 56 15-39 15-39 18 24 34 40-51 40 40 44 46 49 vi Table of Contents PAGE (Book I. Chapter I.) Section 2. Of the Logical Function of the Under- standing in Judgments . . • ■ • 5° Section 3. Of the Pure Concepts of the Understand- ing, or of the Categories • 63 Chapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding . . . 70 Section i. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in General .... 70 Section 2. Of the « priori Grounds for the Possibil- ity of Experience . . 79 1. Of the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition 82 « 2. Of the Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination 83 3. Of the Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts . 85 4. Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the Categories as Knowledge a priori ... 91 Section 3. Of the Relation of the Understanding to Objects in General, and the Possibility of Know- ing them a priori ... ... 94 Summary Representation of the Correctness, and of the Only Possibility of this Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding .... 105 Book II. Analytic of Principles .... 107-237 Introduction. Of the Transcendental Faculty of Judg- ment in General . 108 Chapter I. Of the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding . . .112 Chapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure Under- standing . ... 121 Section r. Of the Highest Principle of all Analytical Judgments ... .123 Section 2. Of tlie Highest Principle of all Synthetical Judgments . .126 Table of Contents vii (Book II. Chapter II.) Section 3. Systematical Representation of all Syn- thetical Principles of the Pure Understanding . 129 1. A.xioms of Intuition . . . 133 2. Anticipations of Perception . . 136 3. Analogies of Experience .... 144 First Analogy. Principle of Permanence . 149 Second Analogy. Principle of Production 155 Third Analogy. Principle of Community . 172 4. The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General 178 Chapter III. On the Ground of Distinction of all Sub- jects into Phenomena and Noumena . 192 Appendix. Of the .A.mphiboly of Reflective Concepts, owing to the Confusion of the Empirical with the Transcendental Use of the Understanding . .212 Second Division. Transcendental Dialectic . . 238-564 Introduction . . 238 1. Of Transcendental Appearance (Illusion) . . 238 2. Of Pure Reason as the seat of Transcendental Illu- sion . . . 242 A. Of Reason in General B. Of the Logical Use of Reason C. Of the Pure Use of Reason 242 246 247 Book I. Of the Concepts of Pure Reason . 252-274 Section I. Of Ideas in General 254 Section 2. Of Transcendental Ideas .... 261 Section 3. System of Transcendental Ideas . 270 Book II. Of the Dialectical Conclusions of Pure Reason 275-564 Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason . . 278 First Paralogism. Of Substantiality . . . 284 Second Paralogism. Of Simplicity . • . 286 Third Paralogism. Of Personality .... 294 Fourth Paralogism. Of Ideality ... . 298 viii Table of Contetits PAGE (Book II. Chapter 1.) Consideration on tlie Whole of Pure Psychology, as affected by these Paralogisms . . 3°^ Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason . 328 Section i. System of Cosmological Ideas . . 330 Section 2. Antithetic of Pure Reason . . . 339 First Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas . 344 Second Conflict . 352 Third Conflict 362 Fourth Conflict ...... 370 Section 3. Of the Interest of Reason in these Con- flicts . . . ... 379 Section 4. Of the Transcendental Problems of Pure Reason, and the Absolute Necessity of their Solution . . .... 389 Section 5. Sceptical Representation of the Cosmolog- ical Questions in the Four Transcendental Ideas . 396 Section 6. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of Cosmological Dialectic . 400 Section 7. Critical Decision of the Cosmological Conflict of Reason with itself 405 Section 8. The Regulative Principle of Pure Reason with Regard to the Cosmological Ideas . . 413 Section 9. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason with Regard to all Cosmoloo-- ical Ideas I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Total- ity of the Composition of Phenomena in an Universe . . . . II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Total- ity of the Division of a Whole given in Intu- ition 42^ 419 420 Tabic of Contents ix (Book II. Chapter II. Section 9.) Concluding Remarks on the Solution of the Transcendental-mathematical Ideas, and Pre- liminary Remark for the Solution of the Transcendental-dynamical Ideas . 428 III. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas with Regard to the Totality of the Derivation of Cosmical Events from their Causes . . 432 Possibility of a Causality through Freedom, in Har- mony with the Universal Law of Necessity . 436 Explanation of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Connection with the General Necessity of Nature . . . 439 IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Total- ity of the Dependence of Phenomena, with Regard to their Existence in General . 452 Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason . . 459 Section i. Of the Ideal in General . 459 Section 2. Of the Transcendental Ideal . . . 462 Section 3. Of the Arguments of Speculative Reason in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being . 471 Section 4. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God .... 477 Section 5. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God . 486 Discovery and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion in all Transcendental Proofs of the Existence of a Necessary Being . . . . 495 Section 6. Of the Impossibility of the Physico-theo- logical Proof .... . . 499 Section 7. Criticism of all Theology based on Spec- ulative Principles of Reason . . . . 508 X Table of Contents FACE (Book II. Chapter III. Section 7.) Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. Of tlie Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason ■ 516 Of the Ultimate Aim of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason . . , ■ • 537 II. Method of Transcendentalism . . . 565-686 Chapter 1. The Discipline of Pure Reason . . 569 Section i. The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dog- matical Use ... . . 572 Section 2. The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Polem- ical Use .... . - . 593 The Impossibility of a Sceptical Satisfaction of Pure Reason in Conflict with itself . ■ • . 608 Section 3. The Discipline of Pure Reason Avith Regard to Hypotheses ..... 617 Section 4. The Discipline of Pure Reason Avith Regard to its Proofs . . . . ' . . . . 627 Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason . . . 638 Section i. Of the Ultimate Aim of the Pure Use of our Reason ... . 640 Section 2. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as determining the Ultimate Aim of Pure Reason 645 Section 3. Of Trowing, Knowing, and Believing . . 657 Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason , . 667 Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason . . 683 Supplements . . . . 687-808 TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE ROYAL MINISTER OF STATE BARON VON ZEDLITZ DEDICATION Sir, To further, so far as in us lies, the growth of the sciences is to work in your Excellency's own interest, your own interest being intimately connected with them, not only through the exalted position of a patron of science, but through the far more intimate relation of a lover and enlightened judge. For that reason I avail myself of the only means within my power of proving my gratitude for the gracious confidence with which your Excellency honours me, as if I too could help toward your noble work. [Whoever dehghts in a speculative hfe finds with moderate wishes the approval of an enlightened and kind judge a powerful incentive to studies the results of which are great, but remote, and therefore entirely ignored by vulgar eyes.J To you, as such a judge, and to your kind attention I now sub- mit this book, placing all other concerns of my literary future under your special protection, and remaining with profound respect ^ Your Excellency's Most obedient Servant, IMMANUEL KANT. KONIGSBERG, March 29, 1781. 1 The second paragraph is left out and the last sentence slightly altered in the Second Edition. TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE FIRST EDITION^ PAGES Introduction . . . . . . i (i) I. ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM. PART I. Transcendental /Esthetic . . -17 (19) Section I. Of Space 20 (22) Section II. Of Time ... 27 (30) PART II. Transcendental Logic . . 44 (50) Division I. Transcendental Analytic in two books, with their chapters and sections . . 56 (64) Division II. Transcendental Dialectic in two books, with their chapters and sections . . . 254 (293) II. METHOD OF' TRANSCENDENTALISM. Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason . . 607 (708) Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason . 682 (795) Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason 714 (832) Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason 731 (852) 1 Instead of this simple Table of Contents, later editions have a much fuller one (Supplement III), which, as Rosenkranz observes, obscures rather than illustrates the articulation of the book. PREFACE 1 Our reason (Vernunft) has this peculiar fate that, with reference to one class of its knowledge, it is always troubled with questions which cannot be ignored, because they spring from the very nature of reason, and which cannot be answered, because they transcend the powers of human reason. Nor is human reason to be blamed for this. It begins with principles which, in the course of experience, it must follow, and which are sufficiently confirmed by _experience^__ With these again, according to the necessities of its nature, it rises higher and higljer to more remote conditions. But when it perceives that in this way its work remains for ever incomplete, because the questions never cease, it finds itself constrained to take refuge in principles which exceed every possible experimental application, and never- theless seem so unobjectionable that even ordinary com-^ mon sense agrees with them. Thua.^ however, reason. becomes involve d in darkness and contradictions, from which, no do ubt, it may conclude tnat errors must be lurking c^t]r|fwhprp hnj- without beui" iiblfc! U) discover Jhern.. because the principles which it follows transcend all the limits of experience and therefore withdraw them- 1 This preface is left out in later editions, and replaced by a new preface; see Supplement II (Vol. I, p. 364). xvii xviii Preface "^selves from all experimental tests. It is the battle-fieM of these endless controversies which is c'aS}i^''Metaphystcy There was a time when Metaphysic held a royal^Tjiate- among all the sciences, and, if the will were taken for the deed, the exceeding importance of her subject might well have secured to her that place of honour. At present it is the fashion to despise Metaphysic, and the poor matron, forlorn and forsaken, complains like Hecuba, Modo max- ivia rerum, tot generis natisque pot ens — mmc trahor exid, inops {Ovid, Metam. xiii. 508). At first the rule of Metaphysic, under the dominion of the dogmatists, was despotic. But as the laws still bore the traces of an old barbarism, intestine wars and complete anarchy broke out, and the sceptics, a kind of nomads, despising all settled culture of the land, broke up from time to time all civil society. Fortunately their number was small, and they could not prevent the old settlers from returning to cultivate the ground afresh, though without any fixed plan or agreement. Not long ago one might have thought, indeed, that all these quarrels were to have been settled and the legitimacy of her claims decided once for all through a certain physiology of the human understanding, the work of the celebrated Locke. But, though the descent of that royal pretender, traced back as it had been to the lowest mob of common ex- perience, ought to have rendered her claims very sus- picious, yet, as that genealogy turned out to be in reality a false invention, the old queen (Metaphysic) continued to maintain her claims, everything fell back into the oM rotten dogmatism, and the contempt from which metaphy- sical science was to have been rescued, remained the same as ever. At present, after everything has been tried, so Preface xix they say, and tried in vain, there reign in philosophy weariness and complete indifferentism, the mother of chaos and night in all sciences but, at the same time, the spring or, at least, the prelude of their near reform and of a new light, after an ill-applied study has rendered them dark, confused, and useless. (. It is in vain to assume a kind of artificial indifferentism in respect to enquiries the object of which cannot be in- different to human nature. Nay, those pretended indif- ferentists (however they may try to disguise themselves by changing scholastic terminology into popular language), if they think at all, fall back inevitably into those very metaphysjfal-^^p-rnas which they profess to despise. Nevertheless this indifferentism, showing itself in the very midst of tjhe most flourishing state of all sciences, and affecting those very sciences the teachings of which, if they could be had, would be the last to be surrendered, is a phenomenon well worthy of our attention and considera- tion. It is clearly the result, not of the carelessness, but of the matured judgment^ of our age, which will no longer rest satisfied with the mere appearance of know- ' We often hear complaints against the shallo\vness of thought in our own time, and the decay of sound knowledge. (But I do not see that sciences which rest on a solid foutfthrti on, 5iiS>airffra :thematics, physics, etc., deserve this reproach in the least. On the contrary, they maiiitain their old reputa- tion of solidity, and with regard to physics, even surpass it.) The same spirit would manifest itself in other branches of knowledge, iLpnly their principles had first been, properly determined. Till that is done, indifferentism and doubt, and ultimately severe criticism, are rather^aigns of honest thought. Our age is, in every sense of the word, tl>e,_age of criticis&Jjand everything ' must submit to it. Religion, on the strength of its sanctity, and law, on the j strength of its majesty, try to withdraw themselves from it; but by so doing they arouse just suspicions, and cannot claim that sincere respect which reason pays to those only who have been able to stand its free and open examination. XX Preface ledge. It is, at the same time, a powerful appeal to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of its duties, namely, self-knowledge, and to institute a court of appeal which should protect the just rights of reason, but dismiss all groundless claims, and should do this not by means of irresponsible decrees, but according to the eternal and unalterable laws of reason. This court of appeal is no other than the Critique of Pure Reason. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systejns, but of the faculty of__ reason in general, touching that whole class of knowledge which it may strive after, uit assisted by experience. This must decide the question of the possibility or impossibility of metaphysic in general, and the determination of its sources, its extent, and its limits — and all this according to fixed principles. ', This, the only way that was left, I have followed, and I flatter myself that I have thus removed all those errors which have hitherto brought reason, whenever it was unassisted by experience, into conflict with itself. I have not evaded its questions by pleading the insufficiency of human reason, but I have classified them according to principles, and, after showing the point where reason begins to misunderstand itself, solved them satisfactorily. It is true that the answer of those questions is not such as a dogma-enamoured curiosity might wish for, for such curi- osity could not have been satisfied except by juggling tricks in which I am no adept. But this was not the intention of the natural destiny of our reason, and it became the duty of philosophy to remove the deception which arose from a false interpretation, even thouo-h many a vaunted and cherished dream should vanish at the same time. In this work I have chiefly aimed at Preface xxi completeness, and I venture to maintain that there ought not to be one single metaphysical problem that has not been solved here, or to the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied. In fact Pure Reason is so- perfect a unity that, if its principle should prove insuffi- cient to answer any one of the many questions started by its very nature, one might throw it away altogether, as insufficient to answer the other questions with perfect certainty. [ While I am saying this I fancy I observe in the face of my readers an expression of indignation, mixed with contempt, at pretensions apparently so self-glorious and extravagant ; and yet they are in reality far more moder- ate than those made by the writer of the commonest essay professing to prove the simple nature of the soul or the necessity of a first beginning of the world. For, while he pretends to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of all possible experience, I confess most humbly that this is entirely beyond my power. ^ llf" nnlir tn I n iil ii T reason and its pure thinking, a know ledge of which is not very far to seek, c onsiderin g that it is to be found within myse lf. Common logic gives an instance how all the' simple acts of reason can be enumerated completely and systematically. \Only between the common logic and my work there is this difference, that my question is, — what can we hope to achieve with reason, when all the material and assistance of experience is taken away iy So much with regard to the completeness in our laying hold of every single object, and the thoroughness in our laying hold of all objects, as the material of our critical en- quiries — a completeness and thoroughness determined, not by a casual idea, but by the nature of our knowledge itself. xxii Preface Besides this, certainty and clearness with regard to form are two essential demands that may very properly be addressed to an author who ventures on so slippery an undertaking. First, with regard to certainty, I have pronounced judg- ment against myself by saying that in this kind of enquiries it is in no way permissible to propound mere opinions, and that everything looking like a hypothesis is countefband, that must not be offered for sale at however low a price, but must, as soon as it has been discovered, be confiscated. For every kind of knowledge which professes to be cer- tain a priori, proclaims itself that it means to be taken for absolutely necessary. ' And this applies, therefore, still more to a definition of all pure knowledge a priori, which is to be the measure, and therefore also an example, of all apodictic philosophical certainty. Whether I have ful- filled what I have here undertaken to do, must be left to the judgment of the reader ; for it only behoves the author to propound his arguments, and not to determine before- hand the effect which they ought to produce on his judges. But, in order to prevent any unnecessary weakening of those arguments, he may be allowed to point out himself certain passages which, though they refer to collateral objects only, might occasion some mistrust, and thus to counteract in time the influence which the least hesitation of the reader in respect to these minor points might exer- cise with regard to the principal object. I know of no enquiries which are more important for determining that faculty which we call understanding (Verstand), and for fixing its rules and its limits, than those in the Second Chapter of my Transcendental Ana- lytic, under the title of ' Deduction of the Pure Concepts Preface xxiii ofjthe Understanding.' They have given me the greatest but, I hope, not altogether useless trouble. This enquiry, which rests on a deep foundation, has two sides. The one refers to the objects of the pure understanding, and is intended to show and explain the objective value of its concepts a priori. It is, therefore, of essential importance for my purposes. The other is intended to enquire into the pure understanding itself, its possibility, and the powers of knowledge on which it rests, therefore its sub- jective character ; a subject which, though important for my principal object, yet forms no essential part of it, be- cause mj; principal problem is and remains. What an d h ow m uch may understanding (Verst and) and reason (Ver - r uinft'l know without an exDe i-]|enre .Land not. Hnw i.s the - facult y of thought possible ? ( The latter would be an en- quiry into a cause of a given effect; it would, therefore, be of the nature of an hypothesis (though, as I shall show elsewhere, this is not quite so) ; and it might seem as if I had here allowed myself to propound a mere opinion, leav- ing the reader free to hold another opinion also. I thef^ fore warn the reader, in case my su^bjectiye deduction should not produce that complete conviction which I ex- pect, that the objectivs deduction, in which I am here chiefly concerned, must still retain its full strength. For^ this, what has been said on pp'. 82, 83 (92, 93) may possi- bly by itself be sufficient. Secondly, as to clearness, the reader has a right to demand not only what may be called logical or discursive clearness, which is based on concepts, but also what may be called zesthetic or intuitjve clearness produced by intui- tions, i.e. by examples and concrete illustrations. With regard to the former I have made ample provision. That xxiv Preface arose from the very nature of my purpose, but it became at the same time the reason why I could not fully satisfy the latter, if not absolute, yet very just claim. Nearly through the whole of my work I have felt doubtful what to do. Examples and illustrations seemed always to be necessary, and therefore found their way into the first sketch of my work. But I soon perceived the magnitude of my task and the number of objects I should have to treat; and, when I saw that even in their driest scholastic form they would considerably swell my book, I did not consider it expedient to extend it still further through examples and illustrations required for popular purposes only. This work ran ne ver satisfy thp popular t aste, and tJie few w ho know do not reqinVp tViat- hpip whjr h. though i> I'c phvcyc -nfgipni-np ypi- micrVit- here have defeated its very j>iirpo<) e. . The Abb^ Terrasson -^ writes indeed that, if we measured the greatness of a book, not by the number of its pages, but by the time we require for mastering it, many a book might be said to be much shorter, if it were not so short.". But, on the other hand, if we ask how a complicated, yet in principle coherent whole of specula- tive thought can best be rendered intelligible, we might be equally justified in saying that many a book would have been more intelligible, if it had not tried to be so very intelligible. For the helps fo clearness, though they may be missed 2 with regard to details, often distract with re- gard to the whole. The reader does not arrive quickly enough at a survey of the whole, because the bright col- 1 Terrasson, Philosophie nach ihrem allgemeinen Einflusse auf alle Gegen- stande des Geistes und der Sitten, Berlin, 1762, p. 117. 2 Rosenkranz and others change fehlen into helfen, without necessity 1 think. Preface xxv ours of illustrations hide and distort the articulation and concatenation of the whole system, which, after all, if we want to judge of its unity and sufficiency, are more im- portant than anything else. Surely it should be an attraction to the reader if he is asked to join his own efforts with those of the author in order to carry out a great and important work, according to the plan here proposed, in a complete and lasting man- ner. Metapjiysic, according to the definitiaas— here given, is the o nly one of all sciences which, thro ugh a small but tinltea e ttort, may count o n s uch completeness in a shor t time, so '^ \ \ -?^ nritViinrr ^irill romiir, fr,.- p n ntfrity V.1,<- ^-^^ arrange evervthiny according to its own views for didactic purposes, without being ^^Ip \<^ ""'"' o^yfu;r.|g ^n thp cuK- jSCLitaelf.^ For it is in reality nothing but an inventory of all our possessions acquired through Pure Reason, systematically arranged. Nothing can escape us, becaus e whatever reason produces enti rely out of itself, cann ot nide iisiilf. but \s biuuullL Lo light by reason itself, so soon as tne common principle ^'';^i h"°" ^l•■^^^^,^j^1-Q^ This abso- lute completeness is rendered not only possible, but neces- sary, through the perfect unity of this kind of knowledge, all derived from pure concepts, without any influence from experience, or from special intuitions leading to a definite kind of experience, that might serve to enlarge and in- crease it. Tecum habita et noris quam sit tibi ciirta supel- /(?A' (Persius, Sat. iv. 52). Such a system of pure (speculative) reason I hope myself to produce under the title of ' Metaphysic of Nature.' It will not be half so large, yet infinitely richer than this Critique of Pure Reason, which has, first of all, to discover its source, nay, the conditions of its possibility, xxvi Preface in fact, to clear and level a soil quite overgrown with weeds. Here I expect from my readers the patience and impartiality of a judge, there the goodwill and aid of a fellow-worker. For however completely all the principles of the system have been propounded in my Critique, the completeness of the whole system requires also that no derivative concepts should be omitted, such as cannot be found out by an estimate a priori, but have to be dis- covered step by step. There the synthesis of concepts has been exhausted, here it will be requisite to do the same for their analysis, a task which is easy and aii amusement rather than a labour. I have only a few words to add with respect to the printing of my book. As the beginning had been delayed, I was not able to see a clean sheet of more than about half of it. I now find some misprints, though they do not spoil the sense, except on p. 379, line 4 from below, where specific should be used instead of sceptic. The antinomy of pure reason from p. 425 to p. 461 has been arranged in a tabular form, so that all that belongs, to the thesis stands on the left, what belongs to the antithesis on the right side. I did this in order that thesis and antithesis might be more easily compared. INTRODUCTION [p-i] THE IDEA OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY [Experience i is no doubt the first product of our un- derstanding, while employed in fashioning the raw material of our sensations. It is therefore our first instruction, and ittils progress so rich in new lessons that the chain of all futi^ire generations will never be in want of new informa- tion that may be gathered on that field. Nevertheless, exiierience is by no means the only field to which our understanding can be confined. Experience tells us what is, but not that it must be necessarily as it is, and not otherwise. It therefore never gives us any really gen- eral truths, and our reason, which is particularly anxious for that class of knowledge, is roused by it rather than satisfied. General truths, which at the same time [p. 2] beat the character of an inward necessity, must be in- dependent of experience, — clear and certain by them- selves. They are therefore called knowledge a priori, while what is simply taken from experience is said to bt, in ordinary parlance, known a posteriori or empiri- cai'y only. ' The beginning of this Introduction down to ' But what is still more ex- trao-dinary,' is left out in the Second Edition. Instead of it Supplement IV. 2 Introduction Now it appears, and this is extremely curious, that even with our experiences different kinds of knowledge are mixed up, which must have their origin a prion, and which perhaps serve only to produce a certain connec- tion between our sensuous representations. For even if we remove from exioerience everything that belongs to the senses, there remain nevertheless certain original con- cepts, and certain judgments derived from them, which must have had their origin entirely a priori, and inde- pendent of all experience, because it is owing to them that we are able, or imagine we are able, to predicate more of the objects of our senses than can be leaiint from mere experience, and that our propositions contain real generality and strict necessity, such as mere empinfcal knowledge can never supply.] But^ what is still more extraordinary is this, that cer- tain kinds of knowledge leave the field of all pos- [p. 3] sible experience, and seem to enlarge the sphere of our judgments beyond the limits of experience by means of concepts to which experience can never supply any cor- responding objects. And it is in this very kind of knowledge which tran- scends the world of the senses, and where experieiice can neither guide nor correct us, that reason prosecutes its investigations, which by their importance we consider far more excellent and by their tendency far more ele- vated than anything the understanding can find in the sphere of phenomena. Nay, we risk rather anything, even at the peril of error, than that we should surrender iThe Second Edition gives here a new heading: — III, Philosoph/ re- quires a science to determine the possibility, the principles, and the e.xteik of all cognitions a priori. Introduction 3 such investigations, either on the ground of their uncer- tainty, or from any feeHng of indifference or contempt. 1 Now it might seem natural that, after we have left the solid ground of experience, we should not at once proceed to erect an edifice with knowledge which we possess without knowing whence it came, and trust to principles the origin of which is unknown, without hav- ing made sure of the safety of the foundations by means of careful examination. It would seem natural, I say, that philosophers should first of all have asked the ques- tion how the mere understanding could arrive at all this knowledge a priori, and what extent, what truth, and what value it could possess. If we take natural [p. 4J to mean what is just and reasonable, then indeed nothing could be more natural. But if we understand by natural what takes place ordinarily, then, on the contrary, nothing is more natural and more intelligible than that this exami- nation should have been neglected for so long a time. For one part of this knowledge, namely, the mathematical, has always been in possession of perfect trustworthiness ; and thus produces a favourable presumption with regard to other parts also, although these may be of a totally dif- ferent nature. Besides, once beyond the precincts of ex- perience, and we are certain that experience can never contradict us, while the charm of enlarging our know- ledge is so great that nothing will stop our progress until we encounter a clear contradiction. This can be 'The Second Edition adds here: 'These inevitable problems of pure reason itself are, God, Freedom, and Immortality. The science which with ,' all its apparatus is really intended for the solution of these problems, is called Metaphysic. Its procedure is at first dogmatic, i.e. unchecked by a previous examination of what reason can and cannot do, before it engages confidently in so arduous an undertaking.' 4 Introduction avoided if only we are cautious in our imaginations, which nevertheless remain what they are, imaginations only. How far we can advance independent of all ex- perience in a priori knowledge is shown by the brilliant example of mathematics. It is true they deal with objects and knowledge so far only as they can be represented in intuition. But this is easily overlooked, because that intuition itself may be given a priori, and be difficult to distinguish from a pure concept. Thus inspirited [p. 5] by a splendid proof of the power of reason, the desire of enlarging our knowledge sees no limits. The light dove, piercing in her easy flight the air and perceiving its resist- ance, imagines that flight would be easier still in empty space. It was thus that Plajo left the world of sense, as opposing so many hindrances to our understanding, and ventured beyond on the wings of his ideas into the empty space of pure understanding. He did not perceive that he was making no progress by these endeavours, because he had no resistance as a fulcrum on which to rest or to apply his powers, in order to cause the understand- ing to advance. It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only to enquire whether the , foundation be sure. Then all sorts of excuses are made in order to assure us as to its solidity, or to decline alto- gether such a late and dangerous enquiry. The reason why during the time of building we feel free from all anxiety and suspicion and believe in the apparent solidity of our foundation, is this: — A great, perhaps the greatest portion of what our reason finds to do consists in the analysis of our concepts of objects. This gives us a great deal of knowledge which, though it consists in no Introduction S more than in simplifications and explanations of [p. 6] what is comprehended in our concepts (though in a con- fused manner), is yet considered as equal, at least in form, to new knowledge. It only separates and arranges our concepts, it does not enlarge them in matter or con- tents. As by this process we gain a kind of real know- ledge a priori, which progresses safely and usefully, it happens that our reason, without being aware of it, ap- propriates under that pretence propositions of a totally different character, adding to given concepts new and strange ones a priori, without knowing whence they come, nay without even thinking of such a question. I shall therefore at the ver)' outset treat of the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge. '^ Of the Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judg7ne7its In all judgnients in which there is a relation between subject and predicate (I speak of affirmative judgments only, the application to negative ones being easy), that relation can be of two kinds. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something contained (though covertly) in the concept A ; or B lies outside the sphere of the concept A, though somehow connected with it. In the former case I call the judgment analytical, in the latter synthetical. Analytical judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the [p. 7J predicate with the subject is conceived through identity, while others in which that connection is conceived withgut identity, may be called synthetical."" The former might be called illustrating, the latter expanding judgments, because in the former nothing is added by the predicate to the 6 Introduction concept of the subject, but the concept is only divided into its constituent concepts which were always conceived as existing within it, though confusedly ; while the latter add to the concept of the subject a predicate not conceived as existing within it, and not to be extracted from it by any process of mere analysis. \If I say, for instance, All bodies are extended, this is an analytical judgment. I need not go beyond the concept connected with the name of body, in order to find that extension is connected with it. I have only to analyse that concept and become conscious of the manifold elements always contained in it, in order to find that predicate. This is therefore an analytical judg- ment. But if I say. All bodies are heavy, the predicate is something quite different from what I think as the mere concept of body. The addition of such a predicate gives us a synthetical judgment. [It becomes clear from this,^ [i. That our knowledge is in no way extended by analytical judgments, but that all they effect is [p. 8] to put the concepts which we possess into better order and render them more intelligible. 2. That in synthetical judgments I must have besides the concept of the subject something else (.r) on which the understanding rehes in order to know that a predicate, not contained in the concept, nevertheless belongs to it. In empirical judgments this causes no^ difficulty, because this X is here simply the complete experience of an object which I conceive by the concept A, that concept forming one part only of my experience. For though I do not in- clude the predicate of gravity in the general concept of 1 These two paragraphs to ' In synthetical judgments a priori, however ' are left out in the Second Edition, and replaced by Supplement V, Introduction 7 body, that concept nevertheless indicates the complete experience through one of its parts, so that I may add other parts also of the same experience, all belonging to that concept. I may first, by an analytical process, realise the concept of body through the predicates of extension, impermeability, form, etc., all of which are contained in it. Afterwards I expand my knowledge, and looking back to the experience from which my concept of body was ab- stracted, I find gravity always connected with the before- mentioned predicates. Experience therefore is the x which lies beyond the concept A, and on which rests the possibility of a synthesis of the predicate of gravity B with the concept A.] In synthetical judgments a priori, however, that [p. 9] help is entirely wanting. If I want to go beyond the con- cept A in order to find another concept B connected with it, where is there anything on which I may rest and through which a synthesis might become possible, con- sidering that I cannot have the advantage of looking about in the field of experience .■' Take the proposition that all which happens has its cause. In the concept of something that happens I no doubt conceive of something existing preceded by time, and from this certain analytical judgments may be deduced. But the concept of cause is entirely outside that concept, and indicates something different from that which happens, and is by no means contained in that representation. How can I venture then to predicate of that which happens something totally different from it, and to represent the concept of cause, though not contained in it, as belonging to it, and belong- ing to it by necessity ? What is here the unknown x, on which the understanding may rest in order to find beyond 8 Introdiictioji the concept A a foreign predicate B, which nevertheless is believed to be connected with it ? It cannot be ex- perience, because the proposition that all which happens has its cause represents this second predicate as added to the subject not only with greater generality than experience, can ever supply, but also with a character of necessity, and therefore purely a priori, and based on concepts. All our speculative knowledge a priori aims at and rests on such synthetical, i.e. expanding propositions, for [p. lo] the analytical are no doubt very important and necessary, yet only in order to arrive at that clearness of concepts which is requisite for a safe and wide synthesis, serving as a really new addition to what we possess already. [We 1 have here a certain mystery ^ before us, which must be cleared up before any advance into the unlimited field of a pure knowledge of the understanding can become safe and trustworthy. We must discover on the largest scale the ground of the possibility of synthetical judgments a priori ; we must understand the conditions which render every class of them possible, and endeavour not only to indicate in a sketchy outline, but to define in its fulness and practical completeness, the whole of that knowledge, which forms a class by itself, systematically arranged according to its original sources, its divisions, its extent and its limits. So much for the present with regard to the peculiar character of synthetical judgments.] "^'/-'Vi/' It will now be seen how there can be a special [p. nj 1 This paragraph left out in the Second Edition, and replaced by Supple- ment VI. ■ i '■ '- ,' .n -i^ d 2 If any of the ancients had ever thought of asldng this question, this alone would have formed a powerful barrier against all systems of pure reason to the present day, and would have saved many vain attempts undertaken blindly and without a true knowledge of the subject in hand. Introduction g science serving as a critique of pure reason. [Every kind of Icnowledge is called pure, if not mixed with any- thing heterogeneous. But more particularly is that know- ledge called absolutely pure, which is not mixed up with any experience or sensation, and is therefore possible en- tirely a priori. "[ <(Reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of knowledge a priori. Pure reason therefore is that faculty which supplies the principles of knowing anything entirely a priori^ An Organum of pure reason ought to comprehend all the principles by which pure knowledge a priori can be acquired and fully established. A complete application of such an Organum would give us a System of Pure Reason. But as that would be a difficult task, and as at present it is still doubtful whether and when such an expansion of our knowledge is here possible, we may look on a mere criticism of pure reason, its sources and limits, as a kind of preparation for a com- plete system of pure reason. It should be called a critjque, np,t a doctrine, of pure reason. Its usefulness would be negative only, serving for a purging rather than for an expansion of our reason, and, what after all is a consid- erable gain, guarding reason against errors. I call all knowledge traiiscendental which is occupied not so much with objects, as with our a priori concepts of objects. 1 A system of such concepts might be [p. 12] called Transcendental Philosophy. But for the present this is again too great an undertaking. We should have to treat therein completely both of analytical knowledge, and of synthetical knowledge a priori, which is more than we intend to do, being satisfied to carry on the analysis so 1 ' As with our manner of knowing objects, so far as this is meant to be possible a priori' Second Edition. lo Introdicction far only as is indispensably necessary in order to recognise in their whole extent the principles of synthesis a priori, which alone concern us. This investigation which should be called a transcendental critique, but not a systematic doctrine, is all we are occupied with at present. It is n^t meant to extend our knowledge, but only to rectify, it, and to become the test of the value of all a priori knowledge. Such a critique therefore is a preparation for a New Organum, or, if that should not be possible, for a Canon at least, according to which hereafter a complete system of a philosophy of pure reason, whether it serve for an expansion or merely for a limitation of it, may be carried out, both analytically and synthetically. That such a system is possible, nay that it need not be so com- prehensive as to prevent the hope of its completion, may be gathered from the fact that it would have to deal, not with the nature of things, which is endless, but with the understanding which judges of the nature of [p. 13] things, and this again so far only as its knowledge a priori is concerned. Whatever the understanding pos- sesses a priori, as it has not to be looked for without, can hardly escape our notice, nor is there any reason to suppose that it will prove too extensive for a complete inventory, and for such a valuation as shall assign to it its true merits or demerits.-^ II DIVISION OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY Transcendental Philosophy is with us an idea (of a science) only, for which the critique of pure reason should ^ Here follows Supplement VII in Second Edition. Introduction 1 1 trace, according to fixed principles, an architectonic plan, guaranteeing the completeness and certainty of all parts of which the building consists. (It is a system of all principles of pure reason.)^ The reason why we do not call such a critique a transcendental philosophy in itself is simply this, that in order to be a complete system, it ought to contain likewise a complete analysis of the whole of human knowledge a priori. ( It is true that our critique must produce a complete list of all the fundamental con- cepts which constitute pure knowledge.) But it need not give a detailed analysis of these concepts, nor a complete list of all derivative concepts. Such an analysis would be out of place, because it is not beset with the [p. 14J doubts and difficulties which are inherent in synthesis, and which alone necessitate a critique of pure reason. Nor would it answer our purpose to take the responsi- bility of the completeness of such an analysis and deriva- tion. This completeness of analysis, however, and of derivation from such a priori concepts as we shall have to deal with presently, may easily be supplied, if only they have first been laid down as perfect principles of synthesis, and nothing is wanting to them in that respect. All that constitutes transcendental philosophy belongs to the critique of pure reason, nay it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but not yet the whole of that philosophy itself, because it carries the analysis so far only as is requisite for a complete examination of synthetical knowledge a priori. The most important consideration in the arrangement of such a science is that no concepts should be admitted ^ Addition in the Second Edition. 1 2 IntrodiLction which contain anything empirical, and that the a priori knowledge shall be perfectly pure. Therefore, although the highest principles of morality and their fundamental concepts are a priori knowledge, they do not [p. 1 5 ] belong to transcendental philosophy, because the con- cepts of pleasure and pain, desire, inclination, free-will, etc., which are all of empirical origin, must here be pre- supposed. Transcendental philosophy is the wisdom of pure speculative reason. Everything practical, so far as it contains motives, has reference to sentiments, and these belong to empirical sources of knowledge. If we wish to carry out a proper division of our science systematically, it must contain first a doctrine of the ele- inents, secondly, a doctrine of the method of pure reason. Each of these principal divisions will have its subdivisions, the grounds of which cannot however be explained here. So much only seems necessary for previous information, that there are two stems of human knowledge, which per- haps may spring from a common root, unknown to us, viz. sensibility and the understanding, objects being given by the former and thought by the latter. If our sensibility should contain a priori representations, constituting con- ditions under which alone objects can be given, it would belong to transcendental philosophy, and the doctrine of this transcendental sense-perception would neces- [p. i6] sarily form the first part of the doctrine of elements, be- cause the conditions under which alone objects of human knowledge can be given must precede those under which they are thought. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON I THE ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM THE ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM [p- 19] FIRST PART TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC Whatever the process and the means may be by which knowledge reaches its objects, there is one that reaches them directly, and forms the ultirnate material of all thought, viz. intuition (Anschauung). This is pos- sible only when the object is given, and the object can be given only (to human beings at least) through a cer- tain affection of the mind (Gemiith). This faculty (receptivity) of receiving representations (Vorstellungen), according to the manner in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility (Sinnlichkeit). Objects therefore are given to us through our sensi- bility. Sensibility alone supplies us with intuitions (An- schauungen). These intuitions become thought through the understanding (Verstand), and hence arise conceptions (Begriffe). All thought therefore must, directly or indi- rectly, go back to intuitions (Anschauungen), i.e. to our , sensibility, because in no other way can objects be given to us. 15 1 6 Transcendental yEst/iettc The effect produced by an object upon the faculty of representation (Vorstellungsfahigkeit), so far as we [p. 20] are affected by it, is called sensation (Empfindung^. An intuition (Anschauung) of an object, by means of sensa- tion, is called empirical. The undefined object of such an empirical intuition is called phenomenon (Erscheinung). I In a phenomenon I call that which corresponds to the sensation its matter; but that which causes the manifold matter of the phenomenon to be perceived as arranged in a certain order, I call its form. Now it is clear that it cannot be sensation again through which sensations are arranged and placed in certain forms. The matter only of all phenomena is given us a posteriori ; but their form must be ready for them in the mind (Gemiith) a priori, and must therefore be capable of being considered as separate from all sen- sations. (_ K>7v7I-^/.o^--'..t\ I call all representations in which there is nothing that belongs to sensation, pure (in a transcendental sense). The pure form therefore of all sensuous intuitions, that form in which the manifold elements of the phenomena are seen in a certain order, must be found in the mind a pi'iori. And this pure form of sensibility may be called the pure intuition (Anschauung). Thus, if we deduct from the representation (Vorstel- lung) of a body, what belongs, to the thinking of the understanding, viz. substance, force'; divisibility, etc.. and likewise what belongs to sensation, viz. impermeability, hardness, colour, etc., there still remains some- [p. 21] thing of that empirical intuition (Anschauung), viz. exten- sion and forai. These belong to pure intuition, which a priori, and even without a real object of the senses or of Transcendental ALsthetic 17 sensation, exists in the mind as a mere form of sensi- bility./ The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori I call Transcendental yEsthetic} There must be such a science, forming the first part of the Elements of Transcendentalism, as opposed to that which treats of the principles of pure thought, and which should be called Transcendental Logic. (^ In Transcendental Esthetic therefore we shall [p. 22] first isolate sensibility, by separating everything which the understanding adds by means of its concepts, so that nothing remains but empirical intuition (Anschauung). '), Secondly, we shall separate from this all that belongs to sensation (Empfindung), so that nothing remains but pure intuition (reine Anschauung) or the mere form of the phenomena, which is the only thing which sensibility a priori can supply. In the course of this investigation it will appear that there are, as principles of a priori know- ledge, two pure forms of sensuous intuition (Anschauung), namely. Space and Time. We now proceed to consider these more in detail. ^ The Germans are the only people who at present (1781) use the word aesthetic for what others call criticism of taste. There is implied in that name a false hope, first conceived by the excellent analytical philosopher, Baum- garten, of bringing the critical judgment of the beautiful under rational prin- ciples, and to raise its rules to the rank of a science. But such endeavours are vain. For such rules or criteria are, according to their principal sources, empirical only, and can never serve as definite a priori rules for our judgment in matters of taste; on the contrary, our judgment is the real test of the truth of such rules. It would be advisable therefore to drop the name in that sense, and to apply it to a doctrine which is a real science, thus approaching more nearly to the language and meaning of the ancients with whom the division into al(sSi]Th. Kal voTjrd was very famous (or to share that name in common with speculative philosophy, and thus to use sesthetic sometimes in a transcen- dental, sometimes in a psychological sense). C 1 8 Of Space First Section of the Transcendental ^Esthetic Of Space By means of our external sense, a property of our mind (Gemuth), we represent to ourselves objects as external or outside ourselves, and all of these in space. It is within space that their form, size, and relative position are fixed or can be fixed. The internal sense by means of which the mind perceives itself or its internal state, does not give an intuition (Anschauung) of the soul (Seele) itself, as an object, but it is nevertheless a fixed form under which alone an intuition of its internal state is [p. 23] possible, so that whatever belongs to its internal determi- nations (Bestimmungen) must be represented in relations of time. Time cannot be perceived (angeschaut) externally, as little as space can be perceived as something within us. ) What then are space and time .'' Are they real beings? Or, if not that, are they determinations or relations of things, but such as would belong to them even if they were not perceived.? Or lastly, are they determinations and relations which are inherent in the form of intuition only, and therefore in the subjective nature of our mind, without which such predicates as space and time would never be ascribed to anything.? In order to understand this more clearly, let us first con- sider space. I. Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from external experience. For in order that cer- tain sensations should be referred to something outside myself, i.e. to something in a different part of space from that where I am ; again, in order that I may be able to Of space ig represent them (vorstellen) as side by side, that is, not only as different, but as in different places, the representa- tion (Vorstellung) of space must already be there. There- fore the representation of space cannot be borrowed through experience from relations of external phenomena, but, on the contrary, this external experience becomes ' possible only by means of the representation of space. 2. Space i| a necessary representation a priori, form- ing the very foundation of all external intuitions, [p. 24J It is impossible to imagine that there should be no space, though one might very well imagine that there should be space without objects to fill it. Space is therefore regarded as a condition of the possibility of phenomena, not as a determination produced by them ; it is a repre- sentation a priori which necessarily precedes all external phenomena. [3. On this necessity of an a priori representation of space rests the apodictic certainty of all geometrical prin- ciples, and the possibility of their construction a prioid. For if the intuition of space were a concept gained a posteriori, borrowed from general external experience, the first principles of mathematical definition would be noth- ing but perceptions. They would be exposed to all the accidents of perception, and there being but one straight line between two points would not be a necessity, but only something taught in each case by experience. What- ever is derived from experience possesses a relative generality only, based on induction. We should there- fore not be able to say more than that, so far as hitherto observed, no space has yet been found having more than three dimensions.] 4. Space is not a discursive or so-called general [p. 25] 20 Of Space concept of the relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first of all, we can imagine one space only, and if we speak of many spaces, we mean parts only of one and the same space, v Nor can these parts be considered as antecedent to the one and all-embracing space and, as it were, its component parts out of which an aggregate is formed, but they can be thought of as existing within it only.) Space is essentially one ; its multiplicity, and therefore the general concept of spaces in general, arises entirely from limitations. Hence it follows that, with respect to space, an intuition a priori, which is not empirical, must form the foundation of all conceptions of space. In the same manner all geomet- rical principles, e.g. 'that in every triangle two sides together are greater than the third,' are never to be derived from the general concepts of side and triangle, but from an intuition, and that a priori, with apodictic certainty. [5. Space is represented as an infinite quantity. Now a general concept of space, which is found in a foot as well as in an ell, could tell us nothing in respect to the quantity of the space. If there were not infinity in the progression of intuition, no concept of relations of space could ever contain a principle of infinity.^] t: - Conclusions from the Foregoing Concepts [p. 26] a. Space does not represent any quality of objects by themselves, or objects in their relation to one another-Le. space does not represent any determination which is inherent in the objects themselves, and would remain 1 No. 5 (No. 4) is differently worded in the Second Edition • see Supnls-: ment VIII. 'V 1> , . ' V)l Of space 21 even if all subjective conditions of intuition were removed. For no determinations of objects, whether belonging to them absolutely or in relation to others, can enter into our intuition before the actual existence of the objects them- selves, that is to say, they can never be intuitions a priori. h. Space is_ nothing but the form of all phenomena of the external senses; it is the subjective condition of our sensibility, without which no external intuition is possible for us. If then we consider that the receptivity of the subject, its capacity of being affected by objects, must necessarily precede all intuition of objects, we shall under- stand how the form of all phenomena may be given before all real perceptions, may be, in fact, a priori in the soul, and may, as a pure intuition, by which all objects must be determined, contain, prior to all experience, principles regulating their relations. ''--/ ' ;"'"- ■-■'" It is therefore from the humeri standpoint only that we can speak of space, extended objects, etc. If we drop the subjective condition under which alone we can gain external intuition, that is, so far as we ourselves may be affected by objects, the representation of space means nothing. For this predicate is applied to objects only in so far as they appear to us, and are objects of our [p. 27] senses. The constant form of this receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all relations in which objects, as without us, can be perceived ; and, when abstraction is made of these objects, what remains is that pure intuition which we call space. As the peculiar con- ditions of our sensibility cannot be looked upon as condi- tions of the possibility of the objects themselves, but only of their appearance as phenomena to us, we may say indeed that space comprehends all things which may 2 2 Of Space appear to us externally, but not all things by themselves, whether perceived by us or not, or by any subject what- soever. We cannot judge whether the intuitions of other thinking beings are subject to the same conditions which determine our intuition, and which for us are generally binding. If we add the limitation of a judgment to a subjective concept, the judgment gains absolute validity. The proposition 'all things are beside each other in space,' is valid only under the limitation that things are taken as objects of our sensuous intuition (Anschauung). If I add that limitation to the concept and say ' all things, as exter- nal phenomena, are beside each other in space,' the rule obtains universal and unlimited validity. Our discussions teach therefore the reality, i.e. the objective validity, of space with regard to all that can come to us exter- [p. 28] nally as an object, but likewise the ideality of space with regard to things, when they are considered in themselves by our reason, and independent of the nature of our senses. We maintain the empirical reality of space, so far as every possible external experience is concerned, but at the same time its transcendental ideality ; that is to say, we maintain that space is nothing, if we leave out of consideration the condition of a possible experience, and accept it as something on which things by themselves are in any way dependent. With the exception of space there is no other subjective representation (Vorstellung) referring to something exter- nal, that would be called a priori objective. [This ^ sub- jective condition of all external phenomena cannot there- fore be compared to any other. The taste of wine does 1 This passage to 'my object in what I have said' is dififerently worded in the Second Edition; see Supplement IX. f [^■'y 3 j ) ^j-hm,/ Of space 23 not belong to the objective determinations of wine, con- sidered as an object, even as a phenomenal object, but to the peculiar nature of the sense belonging to the subject that tastes the wine. Colours are not qualities of a body, though inherent in its intuition, but they are likewise mod- ifications only of the sense of sight, as it is affected in dif- ferent ways by light. Space, on the contrary, as the very condition of external objects, is essential to their appear- ance or intuition. Taste and colour are by no means necessary conditions under which alone things [p. 29] can become to us objects of sensuous perception. They are connected with their appearance, as accidentally added effects only of our peculiar organisation. They are not therefore representations a priori, but are dependent on sensation (Empfindung), nay taste even on an affection (Gefiihl) of pleasure and pain, which is the result of a sensation. No one can have a priori, an idea (Vorstellung) either of colour or of taste, but space refers to the pure form of intuition only, and involves no kind of sensation, nothing empirical; nay all kinds and determinations of space can and must be represented a priori, if concepts of forms and their relations are to arise. Through it alone is it possible that things should become external objects to us.] My object in what I have said just now is only to pre- vent people from imagining that they can elucidate the ideality of space by illustrations which are altogether insufficient, such as colour, taste, etc., which should never be considered as qualities of things, but as modifications of the subject, and which therefore may be different with different people. For in. this case that which originally is itself a phenomenon only, as for instance, a rose, is taken 24 Of Time by the empirical understanding for a thing by itself, which nevertheless, with regard to colour, may appear [p. 30] different to every eye. The transcendental conception, on the contrary, of all phenomena in space, is a critical warn- ing that nothing which is seen in space is a thing by itself, nor space a form of things supposed to belong to them by themselves, but that objects by themselves are not known to us at all, and that what we call external objects are nothing but representations of our senses, the form of which is space, and the true correlative of which, that is the thing by itself, is not known, nor can be known by these representations, nor do we care to know anything about it in our daily experience. Second Section of the Transcendental Esthetic Of Time -:-' . ' ' '-l I. Time is not an emp^ical concept deduced from any experience, for njnther coexistence nor succession would enter into our perception, if the representation of time were not given a priori. Only when this representation a priori is given, can we imagine that certain things happen at the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (successively). [p. 31] II. Time is a necessary representation on which all intuitions depend. We cannot take away time from phenomena in general, though we can well take away phenomena out of time. Time therefore is given a priori. In time alone is reality of phenomena possible. All 1 In the Second Edition tlie title is, Metaphysical exposition of the concept of time, with reference to par. 5, I'ranscendental exposition of the concept of time. Of Time 25 phenomena may vanish, but time itself (as the general condition of their possibility) cannot be done away with. IJ III. On this a priori necessity depends also the possi- bility of apodictic principles of the relations of time, or of axioms of time in general. Time has one dimension only ; different times are not simultaneous, but successive, while different spaces are never successive, but simultaneous. Such principles cannot be derived from experience, because experience could not impart to them absolute universality nor apodictic certainty. We should only be able to say that common experience teaches us that it is so, but not that it must be so. These principles are valid as rules under which alone experience is possible ; they teach us before experience, not by means of experience. ^ IV. Time is not a discursive, or what is called a general concept, but a pure form of sensuous intuition. Different times are parts only of one and the same time. Repre- sentation, which can be produced by a single [p. 32] object only, is called an intuition. The proposition that different times cannot exist at the same time cannot be deduced from any general concept. Such a proposition is synthetical, and cannot be deduced from concepts only. It is contained immediately in the intuition and representa- tion of time. V. To say that time is infinite means no more than that every definite quantity of time is possible only by limita- tions of one time which forms the foundation of all times. The original representation of time must therefore be ^ I retain the reading of the First Edition, vor derselben, nicht durch dieselbe. Von denselben, the reading of later editions, is wrong; the emendation of Rosenkranz, vor denselben, nicht diirch dieselben, unnecessary. The Second Edition has likewise vor derselben. 26 Of Time given as unlimited. But when the parts themselves and every quantity of an object can be represented as deter- mined by limitation only, the whole representation cannot be given by concepts (for in that case the partial repre- sentations come first), but it must be founded on immediate intuitiorisi^ \i^' . Conclusions from the foregoing concepts a. Time is not something existing by itself, or inherent in things as an objective determination of them, something therefore that might remain when abstraction is made of all subjective conditions of intuition. For in the former case it would be something real, without being a real object. In the latter it could not, as a deter- [p. 33] mination or order inherent in things themselves, be antece- dent to things as their condition, and be known and per- ceived by means of synthetical propositions a priori. All this is perfectly possible if time is nothing but a subjec- tive condition under which alone ^ intuitions take place within us. For in that case this form of internal intui- tion can be represented prior to the objects themselves, , . . . I that is, a prion. b. Time is nothing but the form of the internal sense, that is, of our intuition of ourselves, and of our internal state. Time cannot be a determination peculiar to exter- nal phenomena. It refers neither to their shape, nor their position, etc., it only determines the relation of rep- resentations in our internal state. And exactly because this internal intuition supplies no shape, we try to make good this deficiency by means of analogies, and represent ^ VHere follows in the Second Edition, Supplement X. ' •, / '^ Read allein instead of alU. i' Of Time 27 to ourselves the succession of time by a line progressing to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series of one dimension only ; , and we conclude from the properties of this line as to all the properties of time, with one excep- tion, i.e. that the parts of the former are simultaneous, those of the latter successive. From this it becomes clear also, that the representation of time is itself an intuition, because all its relations can be expressed by means of an external intuition. c. 1 Tirne is the formal condition, a priori, of all phenom- ena whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of all [p. 34] external intuition, is a condition, a priori, of external phe- nomena only. But, as all representations, whether they have for their objects external things or not, belong by themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state, and as this inner state falls under the formal con- ditions of internal intuition, and therefore of time, time is a condition, a priori, of all phenomena whatsoever, and is so directly as a condition of internal phenomena (of our mind) and thereby indirectly of external phenom- ena also. If I am able to say, a priori, that all external phenomena are in space, and are determined, a priori, according to the relations of space, I can, according to the principle of the internal sense, make the general assertion that all phenomena, that is, all objects of the senses, are in time, and stand necessarily in relations of time. If we drop our manner of looking at ourselves inter- nally, and of comprehending by means of that intuition all external intuitions also within our power of represen- tation, and thus take objects as they may be by them- selves, then time is nothing. /Time has objective validity 28 Of Time with reference to phenomena only, because these are themselves things which we accept as objects of our senses; but time is no longer objective, if we [p. 35 J remove the sensuous character of our intuitions, that is to say, that mode of representation which is peculiar to ourselves, and speak of things in general. "~' Time is there- fore simply a subjective condition of our (human) intui- tion (which is always sensuous, that is so far as we are affected by objects), but by itself, apart from the subject, nothing. Nevertheless, with respect to all phenomena, that is, all things which can come within our experience, time is necessarily objective. We cannot say that all things are in time, because, if we speak of things in gen- eral, nothing is said about the manner of intuition, which is the real condition under which time enters into our rep- resentation of things. If therefore this condition is added to the concept, and if we say that all things as phenomena (as objects of sensuous intuition) are in time, then such J a proposition has its full objective validity and a priori ' universality. What we insist on therefore is the empirical reality of time, that is, its objective validity, with reference to all objects which can ever come before our senses. And as our intuition must at all times be sensuous, no object can ever fall under our experience that does not come under the conditions of time. What we deny is, that time has any claim on absolute reality, so that, without Pp. 36] taking into account the form of our sensuous condition, it should by itself be a condition or quality inherent in things ; for such qualities which belong to things by themselves can never be given to us through the senses. This is what constitutes the transcendental ideality of Of Time 2g time, so that, if we take no account of the subjective con- i ditions of our sensuous intuitions, time is nothing, and can- not be added to the objects by themselves (without their relation to our intuition) whether as subsisting or inherent. ( This ideality of time, however, as well as that of space, should not be confounded with the deceptions of our sen- sations, because in their case we always suppose that the phenomenon to which such predicates belong has objective reality, which is not at all the case here, except so far as this objective reality is purely empirical, that is, so far as the object itself is looked upon as a mere phenomenon. On this subject see a previous note, in section i, on Space. Explanation Against this theory which claims empirical, but denies absolute and transcendental reality to time, even intelli- gent men have protested so unanimously, that I suppose that every reader who is unaccustomed to these consider- ations may naturally be of the same opinion. What they object to is this : Changes, they say, are real (this is proved by the change of our own representations, even [p. 37] if all external phenomena and their changes be denied). Changes, however, are possible in time only, and there- fore time must be something real. The answer is easy enough. I grant the whole argument. Time certainly is something real, namely, the real form of our internal intuition. Time therefore haa subjective reality with regard to internal experience : that is, I really have the representation of time and of my determinations in it. Time therefore is to be considered as real, not so far as it is an object, but so far as it is the representation of myself as an object. If either I myself or any other being could 3o Of Time see me without this condition of sensibility, then these self -same determinations which we now represent to^our- selves as changes, would give us a kind of knowledge in which the representation of time, and therefore of change also, would have no place. There remains therefore the empirical reality of time only, as the condition of all our experience, while absolute reality cannot, according to what has just been shown, be conceded to it. Time is nothing but the form of our own internal intuition. ^ Take away the peculiar condition of our sensibility, and the idea of time vanishes, because it is not inherent in the ob- jects, but in the subject only that perceives them. [p. 38] The reason why this objection is raised so unanimously, and even by those who have nothing very tangible to say against the doctrine of the ideality of space, is this. ' They could never hope to prove apodictically the absolute real- ity of space, because they are confronted by idealism, ; which has shown that the reality of external objects does not admit of strict proof, while the reality of the object of our internal perceptions (the perception of my own self and of my own status) is clear immediately through our consciousness. The former might be merely phenomenal, but the latter, according to their opinion, is undeniably something real. They did not see that both, without denying to them their reality as representations, belong nevertheless to the phenomenon only, which must always have two sides, the one when the object is considered by itself (without regard to the manner in which it is per- 1 I can say indeed that my representations follow one another, but this means no more than that we are conscious of them as in a temporal succes- sion, that is, according to the form of our own internal sense. Time, therefore, is nothing by itself, nor is it a determination inherent objectively in things. Of Time 31 ceived, its quality therefore remaining always problemati- cal), the other, when the form of the perception of the object is taken into consideration; this form belonging ■not to the object in itself, but to the subject which per- ceives it, though nevertheless belonging really and neces- sarily to the object as a phenomenon. Time and space are therefore two sources of knowledge from which various a priori synthetical cognitions [p. 39] can be derived. Of this pure mathematics give a splendid example in the case of our cognitions of space and its vari- ous relations. As they are both pure forms of sensuous intuition, they render synthetical propositions a priori pos- sible. But these sourqes of knowledge a priori (being con- ditions of our sensibility only) fix^eir own limits, in that they can refer to objects only in so far as they are consid- ered as phenomena, but cannot represent things as they are by themselves. That is the only field in which they are valid ; beyond it they admit of no objective applica- tion. This ideality of space and time, however, leaves the truthfulness of our experience quite untouched, because we are equally sure of it, whether these forms are inher- ent in things by themselves, or by necessity in our intui- tion of them only. Those, on the contrary, who maintain the absolute reality of space and tirne, whether as subsist- ing or only as inherent, must come into conflict with the principles of experience -itself. For if they admit space ' and time as subsisting (which is generally the view of mathematical students of nature) they have to admit two eternal infinite and self-subsisting nonentities (space and time), which exist without their being anything real, only in order to comprehend all that is real. If they take the second view (held by some metaphysical students [p. 40] 32 Of Time ' of nature), and look upon space and time as relations of phe- nomena, simultaneous or successive, abstract^ed from expe- rience, though represented confusedly in their abstracted form, they are obliged to deny to mathematical proposi-' tions a priori their validity with regard to real things (for instance in space), or at all events their apodictic cer- tainty, which cannot take place a posteriori, while the a priori conceptions of space and time are, according to their opinion, creations of our imagination only. Their source, they hold, must really be looked for in experience, imagination framing out of the relations abstracted from experience something which contains the general charac- ter of these relations, but which canRot exist without the restrictions which nature has imposed on them. The former gain so much that they keep at least the sphere of phenomena free for mathematical propositions ; but, as soon as the understanding endeavours to transcend that sphere, they become bewildered by these very conditions. The latter have this advantage that they are not bewil- dered by the representations of space and time when they wish to form judgments of objects, not as phenom- ena, but only as considered by the understanding; but they can neither account for the possibility of mathemati- cal knowledge a priori (there being, according to them, no true and objectively valid intuition a priori), nor can they bring the laws of experience into true harmony with the a priori doctrines of mathematics. According to our theory of the true character of these original [p. 41] forms of sensibility, both difficulties vanish. Lastly, that transcendental aesthetic cannot contain more than these two elements, namely, space and time, becomes clear from the fact that all other concepts belong- Of Time 33 ing to the senses, even that of motion, which combines both, presuppose something empirical. Motion presup- poses the perception of something moving. In space, however, considered by itself, there is nothing that moves. Hence that which moves must be something which, as in space, can be given by experience only, therefore an empir- ical datum. On the same ground, transcendental assthetic cannot count the concept of change among its a priori data, because time itself does not change, but only some- thing which is in time. For this, the perception of some- thing existing and of the succession of its determinations, in other words, experience, is required. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON TRANSCEN- DENTAL /ESTHETIC In order to avoid all misapprehensions it will be neces- sary, first of all, to declare, as clearly as possible, what is our view with regard to the fundamental nature of [p. 42] sensuous knowledge. What we meant to say was this, that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena ; that things which we see are not bx themselves what we see, nor their relations by themselves such as they appear to us, so that, if we drop our subject or the subjective form of our senses, all qualities, all relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish. They cannot, as phenomena, exist by themselves, but in us only. It remains completely unknown to us what objects may be by themselves and apart from the recep- tivity of our senses. We know nothing but our manner of perceiving them, that manner being peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared in by every being, though, no doubt, by every human being. This is what alone concerns us. Space and time are pure forms of our intuition, while sensation forms its matter. What we can Vx\q-\n a priori — before all real intuition, are the forms of space and time, which are therefore called pure intuition, while sensation is that which causes our" knowledge to be called a poste- rioi'i knowledge, i.e. empirical intuition. Whatever our sensation may be, these forms are necessarily inherent 34 Transcendental yEstkeiic 35 in it, while sensations themselves may be of the most different character. Even if we could impart the [p. 43] highest degree of clearness to our intuition, we should not come one step nearer to the nature of objects by themselves. We should know our mode of intuition, i.e. our sensibility, more completely, but always under the indefeasible conditions of space and time. What the objects are by themselves would never become known to us, even through the clearest knowledge of that which alone is given us, the phenomenon. It would vitiate the concept of sensibility and phenom- ena, and render our whole doctrine useless and empty, if we were to accept the view (of Leibniz and Wolf), that our whole sensibility is really but a confused representa- tion of things, simply containing what belongs to them by themselves, though smothered under an accumulation of signs (Merkmal) and partial concepts, which we do not consciously disentangle. ' The distinction between con- fused and well-ordered representation is logical only, and does not touch the contents of our knowledge.^ Thus the concept of Right, as employed by people of comrnpn sen^e, contains neither more nor less than the subtlest specula- tion can draw out of it, only that in the ordinary practical use of the word we are not always conscious of the mani- fold ideas contained in that thought. But no one would say therefore that the ordinary concept of Right was sensuous, containing a mere phenomenon ; for Right can never become a phenomenon, being a concept of [p. 44] the understanding, and representing" a moral quality be- longing to actions by themselves. The representation of a Body, on the contrary, contains nothing in intuition that could belong to an object by itself, but is merely 36 Tt'anscend^ntal ySst/ietic the phenomenal appearance of something, and the man- ner in which we are affected by it. This receptivity of our knowledge is called sensibility. Even if we could see to the very bottom of a phenomenon, it would remain for ever altogether different from the knowledge of the thing by itself. ; This shows that the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolf has given a totally wrong direction to all investigations into the nature and origin of our knowledge, by repre- senting the difference between the sensible and the intel- ligible as logical only. > That difference is in truth tran- scendental. It affects not the form only, as being more or less confused, but the origin and contents of our knowledge ; so that by our sensibility we know the nat- ure of things by themselves not confusedly only, but not at all. If we drop our subjective condition, the object, as represented with its qualities bestowed on it by sensuous intuition, is nowhere to be found, and cannot possibly be found ; because its form, as phenomenal appearance, is determined by those very subjective conditions. It has been the custom to distinguish in phe- [p. 45] nomena that which is essentially inherent in their intuition and is recognised by every human being, from that which belongs to their intuition accidentally only, being valid not for sensibility in general, but only for a particular position and organisation of this or that sense. In that case the former kind of knowledge is said to represent the object by itself, the latter its appearance only. But that distinction is merely empirical. If, as generally hap- pens, people are satisfied with that distinction, without again, as they ought, treating the first empirical intuition as purely phenomenal also, in which nothing can be found Transcende7ital ^stlietic 37 belonging to the thing by itself, our transcendental dis- tinction is lost, and we believe that we know things by themselves, though in the world of sense, however far we may carry our investigation, we can never have anything before us but mere phenomena. To give an illustration. People might call the rainbow a mere phenomenal appear- ance during a sunny shower, but the rain itself the thing by itself. (This would be quite right, physically speaking, and taking rain as something which, in our ordinary experience and under all possible relations to our senses, can be determined thus and thus only in our intuition. But if we take the empirical in general, and ask, [p. 46] without caring whether it is the same with every particu- lar observer, whether it represents a thing by itself (not the drops of rain, for these are already, as phenomena, empirical objects), then the question as to the relation between the representation and the object becomes tran- scendental, and not only the drops are mere phenomena, but even their round shape, nay even the space in which they fall, are nothing by themselves, but only modifica- tions or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous intuition, the transcendental object remaining unknown to us. The second important poijit in our transcendental aes- thetic is, that it should not only gain favour as a plausible hypothesis, but assume as certain and undoubted a charac- ter as can be demanded of any theory which is to serve as an organum. In order to make this certainty self- evident we shall select a case which will make its validity palpable. Let us suppose that space and time are in themselves objective, and conditions of the possibility of things by themselves. Now there is with regard to both a large 38 Transcendental ALsthetic number of a priori apodictic and synthetical propositions, and particularly with regard to space, which for this rea- son we shall chiefly investigate here as an illustration. As the propositions of geometry are known synthetically a priori, and with apodictic certainty, I ask, whence do you take such propositions? and what does the [p. 47] understanding rely on in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and universally valid truths ? There is no other way but by concepts and intuitions, and both as given either a priori or a posteriori. The latter, namely em- pirical concepts, as well as the empirical intuition on which they are founded, cannot yield any synthetical propositions except such as are themselves also empirical only, that is, empirical propositions, which can never possess that necessity and absolute universality which are characteristic of all geometrical propositions. As to the other and only means of arriving at such knowledge through mere concepts or intuitions a priori, it must be clear that only analytical, but no synthetical knowledge can ever be derived from mere concepts. Take the proposition that two straight lines cannot enclose a space and cannot therefore form a figure, and try to deduce it from the concept of straight lines and the number two ; or take the proposition that with three straight lines it is possible to form a figure, and try to deduce that from those concepts. All your labour will be lost, and in the end you will be obliged to have recourse to intuition, as is always done in geometry. You then give yourselves an object in intuition. But of what kind is it ? [p. 48] Is it a pure intuition a priori or an empirical one } In the latter case, you would never arrive at a universally valid, still less at an apodictic proposition, because ex- Transcetidcntal Esthetic 39 perience can never yield such. You must therefore take the object as given a priori in intuition, and found your synthetical proposition on that. If you did not possess in yourselves the power of a priori intuition, if that subjective condition were not at the same time, as to the form, the general condition a priori under which alone the object of that (external) intuition becomes possible, if, in fact, the object (the triangle) were something by itself without any reference to you as the subject, how could you say that what exists necessarily in your subjective conditions of constructing a triangle, belongs of necessity to the triangle itself 1 For you could not add something entirely new (the figure) to your concepts of three lines, something which should of necessity belong to the object, as that object is given before your knowledge of it, and not by it. If therefore space, and time also, were not pure forms of your intuition, which contains the a priori conditions under which alone things can become external objects to you, while, without that subjective condition, they are nothing, you could not predicate anything of external objects a priori and synthetically. It is there- fore beyond the reach of doubt, and not possible [p. 49] only or probable, that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all experience, external and internal, are purely subjective conditions of our intuition, and that, with reference to them, all things are phenomena only, and not things thus existing by themselves in such or such wise. Hence, so far as their form is concerned, much may be predicated of them a priori, but nothing whatever of the things by themselves on which these phenomena may be grounded. ^ 1 Here follows in the Second Edition, Supplement XI. ill ■( THE ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM [p- 50] SECOND PART TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC INTRODUCTION THE IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC ,1^ Of Logic in General Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of our soul ; the first receives representations (receptivity of impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object by these representations (spontaneity of concepts). By the first an object is givejt us, by the second the object is thought, in relation to that representation which is a mere determination of the soul. ( Intuition therefore and concepts constitute the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition correspond- ing to them, nor intuition without concepts can yield any real knowledge. Both are either pure or empirical. They are empirical when sensation, presupposing the actual presence of the 40 Transcendental Logic 41 object, is contained in it. They are pure when no sensa- tion is mixed up with the representation. ^ The latter may be called the material of sensuous knowledge. Pure intui- tion therefore contains the form only by which [p. 51] something is seen, and pure conception the form only by which an object is thought. Pure intuitions and pure concepts only are possible a priori, empirical intuitions and empirical concepts a posteriori. We call sensibility the receptivity of our soul, or its power of receiving representations whenever it is in any wise affected, while the understanding, on the contrary, is with us the power of producing representa- tions, or the spontaneity of knowledge. We are so con- stituted that our intuition must always be sensuous, and consist of the mode in which we are affected by objects. What enables us to think the objects of our sensuous intuition is the understanding. Neither of these qualities oi^Jaculties is preferable to the other. (Without sensibility objects would not be given to us, without understanding they would not be thought by us. Thoughts without con- tents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. ) 'Therefore it is equally necessary to make our concepts sensuous, i.e. to add to them their object in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, i.e. to bring them under concepts.) These two powers or faculties cannot ex- change their functions. The understanding cannot see, the senses cannot think. By their union only can know- ledge be produced. But this is no reason for confounding the share which belongs to each in the production of knowledge. On the contrary, they should al- [p. 52] ways be carefully separated and distinguished, and we have therefore divided the science of the rules of sen- 42 Transcendental Logic sibility in general, i.e. aesthetic, from the science of the rules of the understanding in general, i.e. logic. (Logic again can be taken in hand for two objects, either as logic of the general or of a particular use of the understanding. ; The former contains all necessary rules of thought without which the understanding cannot be used at all. It treats of the understanding without any regard to the different objects to which it may be directed. Logic of the particular use of the understanding contains rules how to think correctly on certain classes of objects. The former may be called Elementary Logic, the latter the Orgamim of this or that science. ^ The latter is generally taught in the schools as a preparation for certain sciences, though, according to the real progress of the human understanding, it is the latest achievement, which does not become possible till the science itself is really made, and requires only a few touches for its correction and ' completion. For it is clear that the objects themselves must be very well known before it is possible to give rules according to which a science of them may be established. General logic is either pure or applied. In the [p. 53] former no account is taken of any empirical conditions under which our understanding acts, i.e. of the influence of the senses, the play of imagination, the laws of mem- ory, the force of habit, the inclinations, and therefore the sources of prejudice also, nor of anything which supplies or seems to supply particular kinds of knowledge ; for all this applies to the understanding under certain circum- stances of its application only, and requires experience as a condition of knowledge. General but pure logic has to deal with principles a priori only, and is a canon of the understanding and of reason, though with reference to its Transcendental Logic 43 formal application only, irrespective of any contents, whether empirical or transcendental. General logic is called applied, if it refers to the rules of the use of our understanding under the subjective empirical conditions laid down in psychology. It therefore contains empirical principles, yet it is general, because referring to the use of the understanding, whatever its objects may be. It is neither a canon of the understanding in general nor an organum of any particular science, but simply a cathar- ticon of the ordinary understanding. In general logic, therefore, that part which is to con- stitute the science of pure reason must be entirely sepa- rated from that which forms applied, but for all [p. 54J that still general logic. The former alone is a real science, though short and dry, as a practical exposition of an elementary science of the understanding ought to be.} In this logicians should never lose sight of two rules : — 1. As general logic it takes no account of the contents of the knowledge of the understanding nor of the differ- ence of its objects. It treats of nothing but the mere form of thought. 2. As pure logic it has nothing to do with empirical principles, and borrows nothing from psychology (as some have imagined) ; psychology, therefore, has no influence whatever on the canon of the understanding. It proceeds by way of demonstration, and everything in it must be completely a priori. What I call applied logic (contrary to common usage according to which it contains certain exercises on the rules of pure logic) is a representation of the understand- ing and of the rules according to which it is necessarily 44 Transcende7ital Logic applied in concreto, i.e. under the acddental conditions of the subject, which may hinder or help its application, and are all given empirically only. It treats of attention, its impediments and their consequences, the sources of error, the states of doubt, hesitation, and conviction, etc., 'and general and pure logic stands to it in [p. 55 J the same relation as pure ethics, which treat only of the necessary moral laws of a free will, to applied ethics, which consider these laws as under the influence of sen- timents, inclinations, and passions to which all human beings are more or less subject. This can never con- stitute a true and demonstrated science, because, like applied logic, it depends on empirical and psychological principles. II Of Transcendental Logic Genejal logic, as we saw, takes no account of the coji- tenjs of knowledge, i.e. of any relation between it and its objects, and considers the logical form only i n the relation of cognitions to each other, that is, it treats of the form of thought in general. • But as we found, when treating of Transcendental ^Esthetic, that there are pure as well as empirical intuitions, it is possible that a similar distinction might appear between pure and empirical thinking."^ In this case we should have a logic in which the contents of knowledge are not entirely ignored, for such a logic which should contain the rules of pure thouo-ht only, would exclude only all knowledge of a merely empirical character. It would also treat of the origin of our know- ledge of objects, so far as that origin cannot be attributed" Transcendental Logic 45 to the objects, while general logic is not at all [p. 56] concerned with the origin of our knowledge, but only con- siders representations (whether existing originally a p7-iori in ourselves or empirically given to us), according to the laws followed by the understanding, when thinking and treating them in their relation to each other. It is con- fined therefore to the form imparted by the understanding to the representations, whatever may be their origin. And here I make a remark which should never be lost sight of, as it extends its influence on all that follows. Not every kind of knowledge_(r /wrz should be called transcendental (i.e. occupied with the possibility or the use of knowledge a priori\ but that only by which we know that and how certain representations (intuitional or con- ceptual) can be used or are possible a priori only. Neither space nor any a priori geometrical determination of it is a transcendental representation ; but that knowledge only is rightly called transcendental which teaches us that these representations cannot be of empirical origin, and how they can yet refer a priori to objects of experience. The application of space to objects in general would likewise be transcendental, but, if restricted to objects of sense, it is empirical. The distinction between transcen- [p. 57] dental and empirical belongs therefore to the critique of knowledge, and does not affect the relation of that know- ledge to its objects. On the supposition therefore that there may be con- cepts, having an a priori reference to objects, not as pure or sensuous intuitions, but as acts of pure thought, being concepts in fact, but neither of empirical nor assthetic origin, we form by anticipation an idea of a science of that knowledge which belongs to the pure understanding 46 Transcendental Logic and reason, and by which we may think objects entirely a priori.- (?i\xc\\. a science, which has to determine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such knowledge, might be called Transcendental Logic,Ja.-aNmg to deal with the laws of the understanding and reason in so far only as they refer a priori to objects, and not, as general logic, in so far as they refer promiscuously to the empirical as well as to the pure knowledge of reason. Ill Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic What is truth ? is an old and famous question by which people thought they could drive logicians into a corner, and either make them take refuge in a mere circle,^ or make them confess their ignorance and conse- [p. 58] quently the vanity of their whole art. The nominal defi- nition of truth, that it is the agreement of the cognition with its object, is granted. What is wanted is to know a general and safe criterion of the truth of any and every kind of knowledge. It is a great and necessary proof of wisdom and sagac- ity to know what questions may be reasonably asked. For if a question is absurd in itself and calls for an answer where there is no answer, it does not only throw disgrace on the questioner, but often tempts an uncautious listener into absurd answers, thus presenting, as the ancients said, the spectacle of one person milking a he-goat, and of another holding the sieve. If truth consists in the agreement of knowledge with I The First Edition has Diallele, the Second, Dialexe. Transce7idental Logic 47 its object, that object must thereby be distinguished from other objects ; for knowledge is untrue if it does not agree with its object, though it contains something which may be affirmed of other objects. A general criterium of truth ought really to be valid with regard to every kind of knowledge, whatever the objects may be. But it is clear, as no account is thus taken of the contents of knowledge (relation to its object), while truth concerns these very contents, that it is impossible and absurd to ask [p. 59] for a sign of the truth of the contents of that knowledge, and that therefore a sufficient and at the same time general mark of truth cannot possibly be found. As we have before called the contents of knowledge its material, it will be right to say that of the truth of the knowledge, so far as its material is concerned, no general mark can be demanded, because it would be self-contradictory. But, when we speak of knowledge with reference to its form only, without taking account of its contents, it is equally clear that logic, as it propounds the general and necessary rules of the understanding, must furnish in these rules criteria of truth. For whatever contradicts those rules is false, because the understanding Would thus contradict the general rules of thought, that is, itself. These criteria, however, refer only to the form of truth or of thought in general. They are quite correct so far, but they are not sufficient. For although our knowledge may be in accordance with logical rule, that is, may not contradict itself, it is quite possible that it may be in contradiction with its object. Therefore the purely ^ logical criterium of truth, namely, the agreement of knowledge with the general and formal laws of the understanding and reason, is no doubt a conditio sine 48 Transcendental Logic qua non, or a negative condition of all truth. [p. 60] But logic can go no further, and it has no test for dis- covering error with regard to the contents, and not the form, of a proposition. General logic resolves the whole formal action of the understanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits them as principles for all logical criticism of our know- ledge. This part of logic may therefore be called Ana - Ijtjc, and is at least a negative test of truth, because all knowledge must first be examined and estimated, so far as its form is concerned, according to these rules, before it is itself tested according to its contents, in order to see whether it contains positive truth with regard to its object. But as the mere form of knowledge, however much it may be in agreement with logical laws, is far from being sufficient to establish the material or objec- tive truth of our knowledge, no one can venture_ with logic alone to judge of objects, or to make any assertion, without having first collected, apart from logic, trust- worthy information, in order afterwards to attempt its application and connection in a coherent whole accord- ing to logical laws, or, still better, merely to test it by them. However, there is something so tempting in this specious art of giving to all our knowledge the form of the understanding, though being utterly ignorant [p^ 61] as to the contents thereof, that general logic, which is meant to be a mere canon of criticism, has been employed as if it were an organum, for the real production of at least the semblance of objective assertions, or, more truly, has been misemployed for that purpose. This general logic, which assumes the semblance of an organum, is ' called Dialectic. Tratiscendental Logic 40 Different as are the significations in which the ancients ' used this name of a science or art, it is easy to gather from its actual employment that with them it was nothing but a logic of semblance. It was a sophistic art of giving to one's ignorance, nay, to one's intentional casuistry, the outward appearance of truth, by imitating the accurate method which logic always requires, and by using its topic as a cloak for every empty assertion. sNow it may be taken as a sure and very useful warning that general logic, if treated as an organum, is always an illusive logic, that is, dialectical. ' For as logic teaches nothing with regard to the contents of knowledge, but lays down the formal conditions only of an agreement with the under- standing, which, so far as the objects are concerned, are totally indifferent, any attempt at using it as an organum in order to extend and enlarge our knowledge, at least in appearance, can end in nothing but mere talk, [p. 62] by asserting with a certain plausibility anything one likes, or, if one likes, denying it. Such instruction is quite beneath the dignity of philos- ophy. Therefore the title of Dialectic has rather been added to logic, as a critique of dialectical semblance ; and it is in that sense that we also use it. IV Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcen- dental Analytic and Dialectic In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding, as before in transcendental aesthetic the sensibility, and fix our attention on that part of thought only which has its origin entirely in the understanding. The application of 50 Transcendental Logic this pure knowledge has for its condition that objects are given in intuition, to which it can be applied, for without intuition all our knowledge would be without objects, and it would therefore remain entirely empty. 'That part of transcendental logic therefore which teaches the elements of the pure knowledge of the understanding, and the prin- ciples without which no object can be thought, is transcen- dent_al Analytic, and at the same time a logic of truth.) No knowledge can contradict it without losing at the same time all contents, that is, all relation to any [p. 63] object, and therefore all truth. But as it is very tempt- ing to use this pure knowledge of the understanding and its principles by themselves, and even beyond the limits of all experience, which alone can,, supply the material or the objects to which those pure concepts of the understanding can be applied, the understanding runs the risk of making, through mere sophisms, a material use of the purely for- mal principles of the pure understanding, and thus of judging indiscriminately of objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps can never be given. As it is properly meant to be a mere canon for criticising the empirical use of the understanding, it is a real abuse if it is allowed as an organum of its general and unlimited application, by our venturing, with the pure understanding alone, to judge synthetically of objects in general, or to affirm and decide anything about them. In this case the employment of the pure understanding would become dialectical. The second part of transcendental logic must therefore form a critique of that dialectical semblance, and is called transcendental Dialectic, not as an art of producing dog- matically such semblance (an art but too popular with many metaphysical jugglers), but as a critique of the Transcendental Logic 51 understanding and reason with regard to their hyper- physi cal employment, in order thus to lay bare the false semblance of its groundless pretensions, and to [p. 64J reduce its claims to discovery and expansion, which was to be achieved by means of transcendental principles only, to a mere critique, serving as a protection of the pure understanding against all sophistical illusions. 52 Transcendental Logic TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC First Division Tra7tscendental Analytic Transcendental Analytic consists in the dissection of all our knowledge a priori into the eleme_nts which constitute . the knowledge of the pure understanding. Four points are here essential : first, that the concepts should be pure and not empirical ; secondly, that they should not belong to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understand- ing ; thirdly, that the concepts should be elementary and carefully distinguished from derivative or composite con- cepts ; fourthly, that our tables should be compjete and that they should cover the whole field of the pure under- standing. ( This completeness of a science cannot be confidently accepted on the strength of a mere estimate, or by means of repeated experirnents only ; ■' what is required for it is an idea of the totality of the a priori knowledge of the under- standing, and a classification of the concepts based [p. 65] upon it; in fact, a systematic treatment. Pure under- standing must be distinguished, not merely from all that is empirical, but even from all sensibility. It constitutes therefore a unity independent in itself, self-sufficient, and not to be increased by any additions from without. ''The sum of its knowledge must constitute a system, compre- Transcendental Logic 53 hended and determined by one idea, and its completeness and articulation must form the test of the correctness and genuineness of its component parts. ^ This part of transcendental logic consists of two books, the one containing the cojwepts, the other the principles of pure understanding. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC BOOK I ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS By Analytic of concepts I do not understand their analysis, or the ordinary process in philosophical dis- quisitions of dissecting any given concepts according to their contents, and thus rendering them more distinct; but a hitherto seldom attempted dissection of the faculty of the understanding itself, with the sole object of dis- covering the possibility of concepts a priori, by looking for 'them nowhere but in the understanding itself [p. 66J as their birthplace, and analysing the pure use of the understanding. This is the proper task of a transcen- dental philosophy, all the rest is mere logical treatment of concepts. We shall therefore follow up the pure con- cepts to their first germs and beginnings in the human understanding, in which they lie prepared, till at last, on the occasion of experience, they become developed, and are represented by the same understanding in their full purity, freed from all inherent empirical conditions. 54 Transcendental Analytic ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS CHAPTER I METHOD OF DISCOVERING ALL PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING When we watch any faculty of knowledge, different concepts, characteristic of that faculty, manifest them- selves according to different circumstances, which, as the observation has been carried on for a longer or shorter time, or with more or less accuracy, may be gathered up into a more or less complete collection. Where this collection will be complete, it is impossible to say beforehand, when we follow this almost mechan- ical process. Concepts thus discovered fortuitously only, possess neither order nor systematic unity, but [p. 67J are paired in the end according to similarities, and, accord- ing to their contents, arranged as more or less complex in various series, which are nothing less than systematical, though to a certain extent put together methodically. <1 Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, but also the duty of discovering its concepts according to affixed ^principle. As they spring pure and unmixed from the understanding as an absolute unity, they must be connected with each other, according to one concept or idea. "> This connection supplies us at the same time with a ruje, according to which the place of each pure concept of the understanding and the systematical com- 56 Transcendental Analytic pleteness of all of them can be determined a prion, m- stead of being dependent on arbitrary choice or chance. TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD OF THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDER- STANDING Section I Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General We have before defined the understanding negatively only, as a non-sensuous faculty of knowledge. As with- out sensibility we cannot have any intuition, [p. 68] it is clear that the understanding is no t a faculty of intui- tion. Besides intuition, however, there is no other kind ■ of knowledge e.xcept by means of concepts. The know- ledge therefore of every understanding, or at least of the human understanding, must be by means of concepts, not intuitive, but discursive. <^ AH intuitions, being sen- suous, depend on affections, concepts on functions.) By this function I mean the unity of the act of arranging different representations under one common representa- tion. Concepts are based therefore on the spontaneity of thought, sensuous intuitions on the receptivity of impressions. The only use which the understanding can make of these concepts is to form judgments by them. (As no representation, except the intuitional, refers imme- diately to an object, no concept is ever referred to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it, whether it be an intuition, or itself a concept. A judg- ment is therefore a mediate knowledge of an object or a representation of a representation of it. In every judg- ment we find a concept applying to many, and compre- Transcendental Analytic 57 hending among the many one single representation, which is referred immediately to the object. Thus in the judg- ment that all bodies are divisible/ the concept of divisible applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept of body to certain phenomena of our experience, [p. 69] These objects therefore are represented mediately by the concept of divisibility. ( All judgments therefore are functions of unity among our representations, the know- ledge of an object being brought about, not by an imme- diate representation, but by a higher one, comprehending this and several others, so that many possible cognitions are collected into one. j As all acts of the understanding can be reduced to judgments, the understanding may be defined as the faculty of judging. For we saw before that the understanding is the faculty of thinking, and thinking is knowledge by means of concepts, while con- cepts, as predicates of possible judgments, refer to some representation of an object yet undetermined. Thus the concept of body means something, for instance, metal, which can be known by that concept. It is only a con- cept, because it comprehends other representations, by means of which it can be referred to objects. It is there- fore the predicate of a possible judgment, such as, that every metal is a body. Thus the functions of the under- standing can be discovered in their completeness, if it is possible to represent the functions of unity in judgments. That this is possible will be seen in the following section. 1 Verdnderlic/i in the First Edition is rightly corrected into ilieilbar in later editions, though in the Second it is still verdiiderlich. 58 Tratiscendental Aiialytic METHOD OF THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CON- CEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING [p. 7°] Section II Of the Logical Ftinciion of the Understanding in Judgments [ If we leave out of consideration the contents of any judgment and fix our attention on the mere form of the understanding,)we find that the function of thought in a judgment can be brought under four heads, each of them with three subdivisions. They may be represented in the following table : — • Quantity of fudgments Universal. Particular. II Singular. Ill Quality Relation Affirmative. Categorical. Negative. Hypothetical, Infinite. - IV Modality Problematical. Assertory. Apodictic. Disjunctive. As this classification may seem to differ in some, though not very essential points, from the usual technicalities of logicians, the following reservations against any [p. 71] possible misunderstanding will not be out of place. I. Logicians are quite right in saying that in using judgments in syllogisms, singular judgments may be Tratiscendental Analytic 59 treated like universal ones. ' For as they have no extent at_allj the predicate cannot refer to part only of that which is contained in the concept of the subject, and be excluded from the rest. The predicate is valid therefore of that concept, without any exception, as if it were a general concept, having an extent to the whole of which the predicate applies. But if we compare a singular with a general judgment, looking only at the quantity of know- ledge conveyed by it, the singular judgment stands to the universal judgment as unity to infinity, and is therefore essentially different from it. It is therefore, when we consider a singular judgment (^judicium singulare), not only according to its own validity, but according to the quantity of k nowledge which it conveys, as compared with other kinds of knowledge, that we see how different it is from general judgments {jiidicia comniunia), and how well it deserves a separate place in a complete table of the varieties of thought in general, though not in a logic limited to the use of judgments in reference to each other. 2. In like manner infinite judgments must, in trau- scendental logic, be distinguished from affirmative ones, though in general logic they are properly classed to- gether, and do not constitute a separate part in [p. 72] the classification. Genexal logic takes no account of the contents of the predicate (though it be negative), it only asks whether the predicate be affirmed or denied. -Tran- scendejital logic, on the contrary, considers a judgment according to the value also or the contents of a logical affirmation by means of a purely negative predicate, and asks how much is gained by that affirmation, with refer- ence to the sum total of knowledge, y If I had said of the soul, that it is not mortal, I should, by means of a nega- 6o Transcendental Analytic tive judgment, have at least warded off an error. Now it is true that, so far as the logical form is concerned, I have really affirmed by saying that the soul is non-mortal, because I thus place the soul in the unlimited sphere_of non-mortal beings. As the mortal forms one part of the whole sphere of possible beings, the non-mortal the other, I have said no more by my proposition than that the soul is one of the infinite number of things which remain, when I take away all that is mortal. But by this the infinite sphere of all that is possible becomes limited only in so far that all that is mortal is excluded from it, and that afterwards the soul is placed in the remaining part of its original extent. This part, however, even after its limitation, still remains infinite, and several more parts of it may be taken away without extending thereby in the least the concept of the soul, or affirmatively de- [p. 73] termining it. These judgments, therefore, though infi- nite in respect to their logic_al extent, are, with respect to their contents, limitative only, and cannot therefore be passed over in a transcendental table of all varieties of thought in judgments, it being quite possible that the function of the understanding exercised in them may become of great importance in the field of its pure a priori knowledge. 3. The following are all the relations of thought in j udgm_ents : — , a. Relation of the predicate to the subject. ., b. Relation of the cause to its effect. '^" c. Relation of subdivided knowledge, and of the col- lected members of the subdivision to each other. In the first class of judgments we consider two con- cepts, in the second two judgments, in the third several Transcendental Analytic 6i judgments in their relation to each other. The hypo- thetical proposition, if perfect justice exists, the obsti- nately wicked is punished, contains really the relation of two propositions, namely, there is a perfect justice, and the obstinately wicked is punished. Whether both these propositions are true remains unsettled. It is only the consequence which is laid down by this judgment. The disjunctive judgment contains the relation of two or more propositions to each other, but not as a conse- quence, but in the form of a logical opposition, the sphere of the one excluding the sphere of the other, and at the same time in the form of community, all the propositions together filling the whole sphere of the intended know- ledge. The disjunctive judgment contains there- [p. 74] fore a relation of the parts of the whole sphere of a given knowledge, in which the sphere of each part forms the complement of the sphere of the other, all being con- tained within the whole sphere of the subdivided know- ledge. We may say, for instance, the world exists either ' by blind chance, or by internal necessity, or by an exter- nal cause. Each of these sentences occupies a part of ; the sphere of all possible knowledge with regard to the existence of the world, while all together occupy the whole sphere. To take away the knowledge from one of these spheres is the same as to place it into one of the other spheres, and to place it in one sphere is the same as to take it away from the others. There exists therefore in disjunctive judgments a certain community of the differ- ent divisions of knowledge, so that they mutually exclude each other, and yet thereby determine in their totality the true knowledge, because, if taken together, they constitute the whole contents of one given knowledge. This is all 62 Transcendental Analytic I have to observe here for the sake of what is to follow hereafter. 4. The modality of judgments is a very peculiar func- tion, for it contributes nothing to the contents of a judg- ment (because, besides quantity, quality, and relation, there is nothing else that could constitute the contents of a judgment), but refers only to the nature of the copula in relation to thought in general. Problematical judg- ments, are those in which affirmation or negation are taken as possible (optional) only, while in assertory judg- ments affirmation or negation is taken as real (true), in apodictic as necessary. ^ Thus the two judg- [p. 75] ments, the relation of which constitutes the hypothetical judgment {antecedcns et conseqitens) and likewise the judgments the reciprocal relation of which forms the dis- junctive judgment (members of subdivision), are always problematical only. In the example given above, the proposition, there exists a perfect justice, is not made as an assertory, but only as an optional judgment, which may be accepted or not, the consequence only being assertory. It is clear therefore that some of these judg- ments may be wrong, and may yet, if taken problemati- cally, contain the conditions of the knowledge of truth. Thus, in our disjunctive judgment, one of its component judgments, namely, the world exists by blind chance, has a problematical meaning only, on the supposition that some one might for one moment take such a view, but serves, at the same time, like the indication of a false road among all the roads that might be taken, to find out the true one. 1 As if in the first, tTiought were a function of the understandintr, in the second, of the faculty of judgment, in the third, of reason; a remark which will receive its elucidation in the sequel. , Transcendental Analytic 63 The problematical proposition is therefore that which ex- presses logical (not objective) possibility only, that is, a free choice of admitting such a proposition, and a purely optional admission of it into the understanding. The assertory proposition implies logical reality or truth. Thus, for instance, in a hypothetical syllogism the ante- cedens in the major is problematical, in the [p. 'j6'\ minor assertory, showing that the proposition conforms to the understanding according to its laws. The apo- dictic proposition represents the assertory as determined by these very laws of the understanding, and therefore as asserting a priori, and thus expresses logical necessity. As in this way everything is arranged step by step in the understanding, inasmuch as we begin with judging prob- lematically, then proceed to an assertory acceptation, and finally maintain our proposition as inseparably united with the understanding, that is as necessary and apodictic, we may be allowed to call these three functions of modality so many varieties or momenta of thought. METHOD OF THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CON- CEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING Section III Of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or of the Categories General logic, as we have often said, takes no account of the contents of our knowledge, but expects that repre- sentations will come from elsewhere in order to be turned into concepts by an analytical process. Transcendental logic, on the contrary, has before it the manifold contents 64 Transcendental Afialytic < of sensibility a priori, supplied by transcendental [p. 'J'j'\ aesthetic as the material for the concepts of the pure understanding, without which those concepts would_be without any contents, therefore entirely empty. It is true that space and time contain what is manifold in the pure intuition a priori, but they belong also to the conditions of the receptivity of our mind under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and which therefore must affect the concepts of them also. The spontaneity of our thought requires that what is manifold in the pure intuition should first be in a certain way examined, received, and connected, in order to produce a knowledge of it. This act I call synthesis. In its most general sense, I understand by synthesis the act of arranging different representations together, and of comprehending what is manifold in them under one form of knowledge. \ Such a synthesis is pure, if the manifold is no_t given empirically, but a priori (as in time and space). Before we can proceed to an analysis of our representations, these must first be given, and, as far as their contents are concerned, no concepts can arise ana- lytically. ' Knowledge is first produced by the synthesis of what is manifold (whether given empirically or a priori). ^ That knowledge may at first be crude and confused and in need of analysis, but it is synthesis which really collects the elements of knowledge, and unites them to a certain extent. It is therefore the first thing which we [p. 78] have to consider, if we want to form an opinion on the first origin of our knowledge. We shall see hereafter that synthesis in general is the mere result of what I call the faculty of imagination a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without Transcendental Analytic 65 which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of ! the existence of which we are scarcely conscious. But' to reduce this synthesis to concepts is a function that ■belongs to the understan.ding, and by which the under- standing supplies us for the first time with knowledge pr_0£erly so called. LPure synthesis in its most general meaning gives us the pure concept of the understanding. By this pure syn- thesis I mean that which rests on the foundation of what I call synthetical unity a priori. Thus our counting (as we best perceive when dealing with higher numbers) is a synthesis according to concepts, because resting on a common ground of unity, as for instance, the decade. The unity of the synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary under this concept. By means of analysis different representations are brought under one concept, a task treated of in general logic ; but how to bring, not the representations, but the pure synthesis of representations, under concepts, that is what transcendental logic means to teach. The first that must be given us a priori for the sake of knowledge of all objects, is the manifold in pure intuition. The second is, the synthesis of the manifold by means of [p. 79] imagination. But this does not yet produce true know- ledge. The concepts which impart unity to this pure synthesis and consist entirely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, add the third contribution towards the knowledge of an object, and rest on the understanding. The same function which imparts unity to various rep- resentations in one judgment imparts unity likewise to the mere synthesis of various representations in one intuition. 66 Transcendental Analytic which in a general way may be called the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, and by the same operations by which in concepts it achieves through analytical unity the logical form of a judgment, introduces also, through the synthetical unity of the mani- fold in intuition, a transcendental element into its repre- sentations./ They are therefore called pure concepts of the understanding, and they refer a priori to objects, which would be quite impossible in general logic. In this manner there arise exactly so many pure con- cepts of the understanding which refer a priori to objects of intuition in general, as there were in our table logical functions in all possible judgments, because those func- tions completely exhaust the understanding, and compre- hend every one of its faculties. Borrowing a term of Aristotle, we shall call these concepts categories, [p. 8o] our intention being originally the same as his, though widely diverging from it in its practical application. TABLE OF CATEGORIES I ^ Of Quantity Unity. Plurality. Totality. n III Of Quality Of Relation Reality. Of Inherence and Subsistence Negation. {substantia et accidens). Limitation. / Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect). Of Community (reciprocity be- tween the active and the passive) . Transcendental Analytic 6"] IV Of Modality Possibility. Impossibility. Existence. Non-existence. Necessity. Contingency. This then is a list of aU original purej:oncepts of syn- thesis, which belong to the understanding a priori, and for which alone it is called pure understanding ; for it is by the m alone that it can understand something in the manifold of intuition, that is, think an object in it. The classification is systematical, and founded on a common principle, namely, the faculty of judging (which is the same as the faculty of thinking). It is not the [p. 8i] result of a search after pure concepts undertaken at hap- hazard, the completeness of which, as based on induc- tion only, could never be guaranteed. Nor could we otherwise understand why these concepts only, and no others, abide in the pure understanding. It was an enter- prise worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle to try to discover these fundamental concepts ; but as he had no guiding principle he merely picked them up as they occurred to him, and at first gathered up ten of them, which he called categories or predicaments. Afterwards he thought he had discovered five more of them, which he added under the name of post-predicaments. But his table remained imperfect for all that, not to mention that we find in it some modes of pure sensibility {quando, ubi, situs, also prills, simnl), also an empirical concept {motus), none of which can belong to this geneajogical register of the understanding. ' Besides, there are some derivative concepts, counted among the fundamental concepts (actio, passio), while some of the latter are entirely wanting. 68 Transcendental Analytic With regard to these, it should be remarked that the categories, as the true fundamental concepts of the pure understanding, have also their pure derivative concepts. These could not be passed over in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, but in a merely critical [p. 82] essay the mention of the fact may suffice. I should like to be allowed to call these pure but deriva- tive concepts of the understanding the predicabilia, in opposition to the predicamenta of the pure understanding. If we are once in possession of the fundamental and primitive concepts, it is easy to add the derivative and secondary, and thus to give a complete image of the genealogical tree of the pure understanding. As at pres- ent I am concerned not with the completeness, but only with the principles of a system, I leave this supplemen- tary work for a future occasion. In order to carry it out, one need only consult any of the ontological manuals, and place, for instance, under the category of causality t\i^ pre- dicabilia of force, of action, and of passion ; under the category of community the predicabilia of presence and resistance ; under the predicaments of modality the pre- dicabilia of origin, extinction, change, etc. If we asso- ciate the categories among themselves or with the modes of pure sensibility, they yield us a large number of de- rivative concepts a priori, which it would be useful and interesting to mark and, if possible, to bring to a certain completeness, though this is not essential for our present purpose. I intentionally omit here the definitions of these cate- gories, though I may be in possession of them.i In the 1 See, however, Karl's remarks on p. 210 (p. 241 of First Edition). Transcendental Analytic 69 sequel I shall dissect these concepts so far as is [p. 83J sufficient for the purpose of the method which I am pre- paring. In a complete system of pure reason they might be justly demanded, but at present they would only make us lose sight of the principal object of our investigation, by rousing doubts and objections which, without injury to our essential object, may well be relegated to another time. The little I have said ought to be sufficient to show clearly that a_cpmplete dictionary of these concepts with .all requisite explanations is not only possible, but easy, The compartments exist ; they have only to be filled, and with a systematic topic like the present the proper place to which each concept belongs cannot easily be missed, nor compartments be passed over which are still empty. ^ ^ Here follows in the Second Edition, Supplement XII. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC [p. 84] CHAPTER II OF THE DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING "■ Section I Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in Getieral Jurists, when speaking of rights and claims, distin- guish in every lawsuit the question of right (quid juris) from the question of fa^t (quid facti), and in demanding proof of both t hey call the former, which is to show the right or, it may be, the claim, the deduction. We, not being jurists, make use of a number of empirical concepts, without opposition from anybody, and consider ourselves justified, without any deduction, in attaching to them a sense or imaginary meaning, because we can always appeal to experience to prove their objective real- ity. There exist however illegitimate concepts also, such as, for instance, chance, or faje, which through an almost general indulgence are allowed to be current, but are yet from time to time challenged by the question quid juris. In that case we are greatly embarrassed in looking for their deduction, there being no clear legal title, whether 70 Transcendental Analytic 71 from experience or from reason, on which their [p. 85 J claim to employment could be clearly established. Among the many concepts, however, which enter into the complicated code of human knowledge, there are some which are destined for pure use a priori, indepen- dent of all experience, and such a claim requires at all times a deduction,! because proofs from experience would not be sufB.cient to establish the legitimacy of such a use, though it is necessary to know how much concepts can refer to objects which they do not find in experience. I call the explar^tion of the manner how such concepts can a priori refer to objects their transcendental deduc- tion, and distinguish it from the empirical deduction which shows the manner how a concept may be gained by experience and by reflection on experience ; this does not touch the legitimacy, but only the fact whence the possession of the concept arose. 1^ We have already become acquainted with two totally distinct classes of concepts, which nevertheless agree in this, that they both refer a priori to objects, namely, the concepts of space and tinje as forms of sensibility, and the categojies as concepts of the understanding. ' It would be labour lost to attempt an empirical deduction of them, because their distinguishing characteristic is that they refer to objects without having borrowed any- thing from experience for their representation, [p. ?,6'] If therefore a deduction of them is necessary, it can only be transcendental. ("it is possible, however, with regard to these concepts, as with regard to all knowledge, to try to discover in 1 That is a transcendental deduction. 72 Transcendental Analytic experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the contingent causes of their production. And here we see that the impressions of the senses give the first impulse to the whole faculty of knowledge with respect to them, : and thus produce experience which consists of two very heterogeneous elements, namely, matter for knowledge, derived from the senses, and a certain form according to which it is arranged, derived from the inter- nal source of pure intuition and pure thought, first brought • into action by the former, and then producing concepts. Such an investigation of the first efforts of our faculty of knowledge, beginning with single perceptions and ris- ing to general concepts, is no doubt very useful, and we have to thank the famous Locke for having been the first to open the way to it. ; A deduction of the pure concepts a priori, however, is quite impossible in that way.^ It lies in a different direction, because, with refer- ence to their future use, which is to be entirely indepen- dent of experience, a very different certificate of birth will be required from that of mere descent from experi- ence. We may call this attempted physiological deriva- tion (which cannot properly be called deduction, [p. 87] because it refers to a qnacstio facti), the explanation of the possession of pure knowledge. It is clear therefore that of these pure concepts a prion a transcendental deduction only is possible, and that to attempt an empiri- cal deduction of them is mere waste of time, which no one would think of except those who have never under- stood the very peculiar nature of that kind of knowledge. But though it may be admitted that the only possible deduction of pure knowledge a priori must be transcen- dental, it has not yet been proved that such a deduction Transcendental Analytic 73 is absolutely necessary. We have before, by means of a transcendental deduction, followed up the concepts of space and tiijie to their very sources, and explained and defined their objective validity a priori. (Geometry, how- ever, moves along with a steady step, through every kind of knowledge a priori, without having to ask for a cer- tificate from philosophy as to the pure legitimate descent of its fundamental concept of space. > But it should be remarked that in geometry this concept is used with reference to the outer world of sense only, of which space is the pure form of intuition, and where geometri- cal knowledge, being based on a priori intuition, possesses immediate evidence, the obj,ects being givgn, so far as their form is concerned, through their very knowledge a priori in intuition. When we come, however, [p. 88] ^ to the pjjre concepts of the understanding, it becomes absolutely necessary to look for a transcendental deduc- tion, not only for them, but for space also, because they, not being founded on experience, apply to objects gener- ally, without any of the conditions of sensibility ; and, speaking of objects, not through predicates of intuition and sensibility, but of pure thought a priori, are not able to produce in intuition a priori any object on which, previous to all experience, their synthesis was founded. These concepts of pure understanding, therefore, not only excite suspicion with regard to the objective validity and the limits of their own application, but render even the concept of space equivocal, because of an inclination to apply it beyond the conditions of sensuous intuition, which was the very reason that made a transcendental deduction of it, such as we gave before, necessary. Be- fore the reader has made a single step in the field of 74 Transcendental Analytic pure reason, he must be convinced of the inevitable necessity of such a transcendental deduction, otherwise he would walk on blindly and, after having strayed in every direction, he would only return to the same igno- rance from which he started. He must at the same time perceive the inevitable difficulty of such a deduction, so that he may not complain about obscurity where the object itself is obscure, or weary too soon with our re- moval of obstacles, the fact being that we have [p. 89] either to surrender altogether all claims to the know- ledge of pure reason — the most favourite iield of all philosophers, because extending beyond the limits of all possible experience — or to bring this critical investigation to perfection. It was easy to show before, when treating of the con- cepts of space and time, how these, though being know- ledge a priori, refer necessarily to objects, and how they make a synthetical knowledge of them possible, which is independent of all experience. For, as no object can appear to us, that is, become an object of empirical intui- tion, except through such pure forms of sensibility, space and time are pure intuitions which contain a priori the con- ditions of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and the synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective validity. The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, are not conditions under which objects can be given in intuition, and it is guite possible therefore that objects should appear to us without any necessary reference to^ the functions of the understanding, thus showing that the understanding contains by no means any of their con- ditions a priori. There arises therefore here a difficulty, which we did not meet with in the field of sensibility, Transcendental Analytic 75 namely, how subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity, that is, become conditions of the possi- bility of the knowledge of objects. ( It cannot be [p. 90] denied that phenomena may be given in intuition without the functions of the understanding. 1 For if we take, for instance, the concept of cause, which implies a peculiar kind of synthesis, consisting in placing according to a rule after something called A something totally different from it, B, we cannot say that it is a priori clear why phenomena should contain something of this kind. We cannot appeal ' for it to experience, because what has to be proved is the objective validity of this concept a priori. It would re- main therefore a priori doubtful whether such a concept be not altogether empty, and without any corresponding object among phenomena- It is different with objects of ' sensuous intuition. They must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility existing a priori in the mind, because otherwise they could in no way be objects to us. But why besides this they should conform to the condi- tions which the understj^nding requires for the synthetical unity of thought, does not seem to follow quite so easily. For we could quite well imagine that phenomena might possjbly be such that the understanding should not find them conforming to the conditions of its synthetical unity, and all might be in such confusion that nothing should appear in the succession of phenomena which could sup- ply a rule of synthesis, and correspond, for instance, to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would thus be quite empty, null, and meaningless. With all this phenomena would offer objects to our intuition, because intuition by itself does not require the functions [p. 91 J of thought. ■ 76 Transcendental Analytic It might be imagined that we could escape from the trouble of these investigations by saying that experience offers continually examples of such regularity of phe- nomena as to induce us to abstract from it the concept of cause, and it might be attempted to prove thereby the objective validity of such a concept. But it ought to be seen that in this way the concept of cause cannot possibly arise, and that such a concept ought either to be founded a priori in the understanding or be surrendered altogether as a mere hallucination. For this concept requires strictly that something, A, should be of such a nature that some- thing else, B, follows from it necessarily and according to an absolutely universal rule. Phenomena no doubt supply us with cases from which a rule becomes possible accord- ing to which something happens usually, but never so that the result should be necessary. There is a dignity in the synthesis of cause and effect which cannot be expressed empirically, for it implies that the effect is not only an accessory to the cause, but given by it and springing from it. Nor is the absolute universality of the rule a quality inherent in empirical rules, which by means of induction cannot receive any but a relative universality, that [p. 92] is, a more or less extended applicability. If we were to treat the pure concepts of the understanding as merely empirical products, we should completely change their character and their use. / Transition to a Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Two ways only are possible in which synthetical repre- sentations and their objects can agr^e, can refer to each other with necessity, and so to say meet each other. Either it is the object alone that makes the representation Transcendental Analytic 77 possible, or it is the representation alone that makes the 1 object possible. ' In the former case their relation is em- pirical only, and the representation therefore never possible a priori.' This applies to phenomena with reference to whatever in them belongs to sensadon. In the latter case, though representation by itself (for we do not speak here of its ^ causality by means of the will) cannot produce its object so far as its existence is concerned, nevertheless the representation determines the object a priori, if through it alone it is possible to know anything as an object. To know a thing as an object is possjble only under two conditions. F"irst, there must be intuition by which the object is given us, though as a phenomenon only, secondly, there must be a concept by which [p. 93 J an object is thought as corresponding to that intuition. "' From what we have said before it is clear that the first condition, namely, that under which alone objects can be seen, exists, so far as the form of intuition is concerned, in the soul a priori. AU phenomena therefore must con- form to that forrnal condition of sensibjlity, because it is through it alone that they appear, that is, that they are given and empirically seen. Now the questjpn arises whether there are not also antecedent concepts a priori, forming conditions under which alone something can be, if not seen, yet thought as an object in^eneral ; for in that case all empirical know- ledge of objects would necessarily conform to such con- cepts, it being impossible that anything should become an object of experience without them. All experience con- tains, besides the intuition of the senses by which some- ^ Read deren instead of Jessen. 78 Transcendental Analytic thing is given, a concept also of the object, which is given in intuition as a phenomenon. Such concepts of objects in general therefore must form conditions a prion of all knowledge produced by experience, and .the objective validity of the categories, as being such concepts a priori, rests on this very fact that by thern alone, so far as the form of thought is concerned, experience becomes possi- ble. > If by them only it is possible to think any object of experience, it follows that they refer by necessity and a priori to all objects of experience. There is therefore a principle for the trans- [p. 94] cendental deduction of all concepts a priori which must guide the whole of our investigation, namely, that all must be recognized as conditions a priori oi the possibility of experience, whether of intuition, which is found in it, or of thought. Concepts which supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are for that very reason necessary. An analysis of the experience in which they are found would not be a deduction, but a mere illus- tration, because they would there have an accidental char- acter only. Nay, without their original relation to all possible experience in which objects of knowledge occur, their relation to any single object would be quite incom- prehensible. [There are three original sources, or call them faculties or powers of the soul, which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and which themselves cannot be derived from any other faculty, namely, sense, imagma- tioji, and apperception. On them is founded -1- 1. The synopsis of the manifold a priori through the senses. 2. The synthesis of this manifold through the iniao-ination. Transcendental Analytic 79 3. The unity of that synthesis by means of original apperception. Besides their empirical use all these faculties have a transcendental use also, referring to the form only and possible a priori. With regard to the senses we have dis- cussed that transcendental use in the first part, [p. 95J and we shall now proceed to an investigation of the re- maining two, according to their true nature.^] DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING Section II Of the a priori Gi'otinds for the Possibility of Experience [That a concept should be produced entirely a prion and yet refer to an object, though itself neither belonging to the sphere of possible experience, nor consisting of the elements of such an experience, is self-contradictory and impossible. It would have no contents, because no intui- tion corresponds to it, and intuitions by which objects are given to us constitute the whole field or the complete object of possible experience. An « /rzcirz concept there- fore n_ot referring to experience would be the logical form only of a concept, but not the concept itself by which something is thought. If therefore there exist any pure concepts a prion, though they cannot contain anything empirical, they must nevertheless all be conditions a priori of a possible ex- perience, on which alone their objective reality depends. 1 The last paragraph is omiUed in the Second SdMon. , There is instead a criticism of Locke and Hume, Supplement XIII., The Deduction of the Categories is much changed, as seen in Supplement XIV. I , ■ ' , 8o Transcendetital Analytic If therefore we wish to know how pure concepts of the understanding are possible, we must try to find out what are the conditions a priori on which the pgssibihty [p. 96] of experience depends, nay, on which it is founded, apart from all that is empirical in phenomena. A concept ex- pressing this formal and objective condition of experience with sufficient generality might properly be called a pure concept of the understanding. If we once have these pure concepts of the understanding, we may also imagine objects which are either impossible, or, if not impossible in themselves, yet can never be given in any experience. We have only in the connection of those concepts to leave out something which necessarily belongs to the conditions of a possible experience (concept of a spirit), or to extend pure concepts of the understanding beyond what can be reached by experience (concept of God). But the ele- ments of all knowledge a pi'iori, even of gratuitous and preposterous fancies, though not borrowed from experi- ence (for in that case they would not be knowledge a priori) must nevertheless contain the pure conditions a priori of a possible experience and its object, otherwise not only would nothing be thought by them, but they themselves, being without data, could never arise in our mind. ( Such concepts, then, which comprehend the pure think- 1 ing a priori involved in every experience, are discovered in the categories, and it is really a sufficient deduction of them and a justification of their objective validity, if we succeed in proving that by them alone an object [p. 97] can be thought. But as in such a process of thinking more is at work than the faculty of thinking only, namely, the understanding, and as the understanding, as a faculty Transcendental Analytic 8 1 of knowledge which is meant to refer to objects, requires quite as much an explanation as to the possibility of such a reference,' it is necessary for us to consider the subjective sources which form the foundation a priori for the possi- bility of experience, not according to their empirical, but according to their transcendental character. ( If every single representation stood by itself, as if isolated and separated from the others, nothing like what we call knowledge could ever arise, because knowledge forms a whole of representations connected and compared with each other. ) If therefore I ascribe to the senses a synapsis, because in their intuition they contain something manifold, there corresponds to it always a synthesis, and recegtjyity can make knowledge possible only when joined with spontaneity. /This spontaneity, now, appears as a threefold synth^esis which must necessarily take place in every kind of knowledge, namely, firjt, that of the apprehension of representations as modificatjons of the soul in intuition, secondly, of the reprodicction of them in the imagination, and, thir_dly, that of their recognition in concepts.^ This leads us to- three subjective sources of knowledge which render possible the understanding, and through it all experience as an empirical product of the understanding. [p- 98] Preliminary Remark The deduction of the categories is beset with so many difficulties and obliges us to enter so deeply into the first grounds of the possibility of our knowledge in general, that I thought it more expedient, in order to avoid the lengthiness of a complete theory, and yet to omit noth.ing in so essential an investigation, to add the following four G 82 Transcendental Analytic paragraphs with a view of preparing rather than instruct- ing the reader. After that only I shall in the third sec- tion proceed to a systematical discussion of these elements of the understanding. Till then the reader must not allow himself to be frightened by a certain amount of obscurity which at first is inevitable on a road never trodden before, but which, when we come to that section, will give way, 1 hope, to a complete comprehension. ) I Of the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition Whatever the orig_in of our representations may be, whether they be due to the influence of external things or to internal causes, whether they have arisen a priori or empirically as phenomena, as modifications of the mind they must always belong to the internal [p. 99] sense, and all our knowledge must therefore finally be subject to the forrnal condition of that internal sense, namely, tirqe, ! in which they are all arranged, joined, and brought into certain relations to each other.] This is a general remark which must never be forgotten in all that follows. Every representation contains something manifold, which could not be represented as such, unless the mind distinguished the time in the succession of one impression after another; (for as contained in one monient, each representation can never be anything but absolute unity.) In order to change this manifold into a unity of intuition (as, for instance, in the repre- sentation of space), it is necessary first to run through the manifold and then to hold it together. It is this Traiiscendental Analytic S3 act which I call the synthesis of apprehension, because it refers directly to intuition which no doubt offers some- thing manifold, but which, without a synthesis, can never make it such, as it is contained in one representation. This synthesis of apprehension must itself be carried out a priori also, that is, with reference to representations which are not empirical. For without it we should never be able to have the representations either of space or time a priori, because these cannot be produced except [p. 100] by a synthesis of the manifold which the senses offer in their original receptivity. It follows therefore that we have a pure synthesis of apprehension. II Of the Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination It is no doubt nothing but an empirical law according to which representations which have often followed or ac£ompanied one another, become associated in the end and so closely united that, even without the presence of the object, one of these representations will, according to an invariable law, produce a transition of the mind to the other. This law of reproduction, however, presupposes that the phenomena themselves are really subject to such a rule, and that there is in the variety of these representa- tions a sequence and concomitancy subject to certain rules ; for without this the faculty of empirical imagina- tion would never find anything to do that it is able to do, and remain therefore buried within our mind as a dead faculty, unknown to ourselves. If cinnabar were 1 sometimes red and sometimes black, sometimes light and sometimes heavy, if a man could be changed now into 84 Transcendental Analytic this, now into another animal shape, if on the longest day the fields were sometimes covered with fruit, [p. lOi] sometimes with ice and snow, the faculty of my empirical imagination would never be in a position, when represent- ing red colour, to think of heavy cinnabar. 1 Nor, if a cer- tain name could be given sometimes to this, sometimes to that object, or if that the same object could sometimes be called by one, and sometimes by another name, with- out any rule to which representations are subject by them- selves, would it be possible that any empirical synthesis of reproduction should ever take place. There must therefore be something to make this repro- duction of phenomena possible by being itself the founda^ tion a priori of a necessary synthetical unity of them. This becomes clear if we only remember that all phe- nomena are not things by themselves, but only the play of our representations, all of which are in the end deter- minations only of the internal sense. } If therefore we could prove that even our purest intuitions a priori give us no knowledge, unless they contain such a combination of the manifold as to render a constant synthesis of repro- duction possible, it would follow that this synthesis of the imagination is, before all experience, founded on principles a priori, and that <3ve must admit a pure transcendental synthesis of imagination which forms even the foundation of the possibility of all experience, such experience being impossible without the reproductibility of phe- [p. 102] nomena. ' Now, when I draw a line in thought, or if I think the time from one noon to another, or if I only represent to myself a certain number, it is clear that I must first necessarily apprehend one of these manifold representations after another. If I were to lose from my Transcendental Analytic 85 thoughts what precedes, whether the first parts of a line or the antecedent portions of time, or the numerical unities representing one after the other, and if, while I proceed to what follows, I were unable to reproduce what came before, there would never be a complete representation, and none of the before-mentioned thoughts, not even the first and purest representations of space and time, could ever arise within us. The synthesis of apprehension is therefore inseparably connected with the synthesis of reproduction, and as the former constitutes the transcendental ground of the possi- bility of all knowledge in general (not only of empirical, but also of pure a priori knowledge), it follows that a reproductive synthesis of imagination belongs to the tran- scendental acts of the soul. We may therefore call this faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination. Ill [p. 103] Of the Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts Without our being conscious that what we are thinking now is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be vain. Each representation would, in its present state, be a new one, and in no wise belonging to the act by which it was to be produced by degrees, and the manifold in it would never form a whole, because deprived of that unity which consciousness alone can impart to it. If in counting I for- get that the unities which now present themselves to my mind have been added gradually one to the other, I should not know the production of the quantity by the successive addition of one to one, nor should I know consequently 86 Transcendental Analytic the number, produced by the counting, this number being a concept consisting entirely in the consciousness of that unity of synthesis. The very word sf- concept (Begriff) could have sug- gested this remark, for it is the one consciousness which unites the manifold that has been perceived successively, and afterwards reproduced into one representation. This consciousness may often be very faint, and we may con- nect it with the effect only, and not with the act itself, i.e. with the production of a representation. But in [p. 104] spite of this, that consciousness, though deficient in pointed clearness, must always be there, and without it, concepts, and with them, knowledge of objects are perfectly impos- sible. And here we must needs arrive at a clear understanding of what we mean by an object of representations. We said before that phenornena are nothing but sensuous rep- resentations, which therefore by themselves must not be taken for objects outside our faculty of representation. What then do we mean if we speak of an object corre- sponding to, and therefore also different from our know- ledge .-" It is easy to see that such an object can only be conceived as something in general =.r: becau se, beside our knowledge, we have absolutely nothing which we_cpuld put down as corresponding to that knowledge. Now we find that our conception of the relation of all knowledge to its object contains something of necessity, the object being looked upon as that which prevents our knowledge from being determined at haphazard, and causes it to be determined a priori in a certain way, be- cause, as they are all to refer to an object, they must necessarily, with regard to that object, agree with each Transcendental Analytic 87 iLher, that is to say, possess that unity which [p. 105] constitutes the concept of an object. It is clear also that, as we can only deal with the mani- fold in our representations, and as the x corresponding to them (the object), since it is to be something different from all our representations, is really nothing to us, it is clear, I say, that the unity, necessitated by the object, can- not be anything but the formal unity of our consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold in our representations. ^Then and then only do we say that we know an object, if we have produced synthetical unity in the manifold of intuition./ Such unity is impossible, if the intuition could not be produced, according to a rule, by such a function of synthesis as makes the reproduction of the manifold « /r/<7rz' necessary, and a concept in which that manifold is united, possible. Thus we conceive a triangle as an object, if we are conscious of the combination of three straight lines, according to a rule, which renders such an intuition possible at all times. This unity of ride deter- mines the manifold and limits it to conditions which ren- der the unity of apperception possible, and the concept of that unity is really the representation of the object = x, which I think, by means of the predicates of a triangle. No knowledge is possible without a concept, [p. 106] however obscure or imperfect it may be, and a concept is always, with regard to its form, something general, something that can serve as a rule. Thus the concept of bo_dy serves as a rule to our knowledge of external phe- nomena, according to the unity of the manifold which is thought by it. It can only be such a rule of intuitions because representing, in any given phenomena, the neces- sary reproduction of their manifold elements, or the syn- 88 Transcendental Analytic thetical unity in our consciousness of them. Thus the concept of body, whenever we perceive something outside us, necessitates the representation of extension, and, with it, those of impermeabiUty, shape, etc. ; Necessity is always founded on transcendental condi- tions. There must be therefore a transcendental ground of the unity of our consciousness in the synthesis of the man- ifold of all our intuitions, and therefore also a transcendental ground of all concepts of objects in general, and therefore again of all objects of experience, without which it would be impossible to add to our intuitions the thought of an object, for the object is no more than that something of which the concept predicates such a necessity of synthesis. That original and transcendental condition is nothing else but what I call transcendental apperception, [p. 107] The consciousness of oneself, according to the determina- tions of our state, is, with all our internal perceptions, em- pirical only, and always transient. ' There can be no fixed or permanent self in that stream of internal phenomena. It is generally called the internal sense, or the empirical apperception. What is necessarily to be represented as numerically identical with itself, cannot be thought as such by means of empirical data only. It must be a con- dition which precedes all experience, and in fact renders it possible, for thus only could such a transcendental suppo- sition acquire validity. ~ No knowledge can take place in us, no conjunction or unity of one kind of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intui- tion, and without reference to which no representation of objects is possible. This pure, original, and unchange- able consciousness I shall call transcendental apperception. Transcendental Analytic 89 That it deserves such a name may be seen from the fact that even the purest objective unity, namely, that of the concepts a priori (space and time), is possible only by a reference of all intuitions to it. The numerical unity of that apperception therefore forms the a priori condition of all concepts, as does the manifoldness of space and time of the intuitions of the senses. (The same transcendental unity of appercep- [p. 108] tion constitutes, in all possible phenomena which may come together in our experience, a connection of all these 'representations according to laws. ~ For that unity of con- sciousness would be impossible, if the mind, in the know- ledge of the manifold, could not become conscious of the ' identity of function, by which it unites the manifold syn- , thetically in one knowledge. Therefore the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary umty of the synthesis of all phenornena according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which render them not only necessarily reproducible, but assign also to their intuition an object, that is, a concept of something in which they are necessarily united. The mind could never conceive the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its representa- tions (and this a priori) if it did not clearly perceive the identity of its action, by which it subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and thus renders its regular coherence a priori pos- sible. , When we have clearly perceived this, we shall be able to determine more accurately our concept of an ob- ject in general. ) All representations have, as representa- tions, their object, and can themselves in turn become objects of other representations. The only objects which go Transcendental Analytic can be given to us immediately are phenomena, and what- ever in them refers immediately to the object is [p. 109] called intuition. These phenomena, however, are not things in themselves, but representations only which have their object, but an object that can no longer be seen by us, and may therefore be called the not-empirical, that is, the transcendental object, = ,r. The pure concept of such a transcendental object (which in reality in all our knowledge is always the same = x) is that which alone can give to all our empirical con- cepts a relation to an object or objective reality. That concept cannot contain any definite intuition, and can therefore refer to that unity only, which must be found in the manifold of our knowledge, so far as it stands in re- lation to an object. That relation is nothing else but a ne£essary unity of consciousness, and therefore also of the synthesis of the manifold, by a common function of the mind, which unites it in one representation. As that unity must be considered as a priori necessary (because, without it, our knowledge would be without an object), we may conclude that the relation to a transcendental object, that is, the objective reality of our empirical knowledge, rests on a transcendental law, that all phenomena, if they are to give us objects, must be subject to rules [p. no] a priori of a synthetical unity of these objects, by which rules alone their mutual relation in an empirical intuition becomes possible : that is, they must be subject, in experi- ence, to the conditions of the necessary unity of apper- ception quite as much as, in mere intuition, to the formal conditions of space and time. Without this no knowledge is possible. Transcendental Analytic gi IV Preliminary Explatiation of the Possibility of the Categories as Knowledge 3. priori There is but one experience in which all perceptions are represented as in permanent and regular connection, as there is but orie space and on_e time in which all forms of phenomena and all relations of being or not being take place. If we speak of different experiences, we only mean different perceptions so far as they belong to one and the same general experience. It is the permanent and synthetical unity of perceptions that constitutes the form of experience, and experience is nothing but the syn- thetical unity of phenomena according to concepts. Unity of synthesis, according to empirical concepts, would be purely accidental, nay, unless these [p. 1 1 1 J were founded on a transcendental ground of umty, a whole crowd of phenomena might rush into our soul, without ever forming real experience. All relation between our knowledge and its objects would be lost at the same time, because that knowledge would no longer be held together by general and necessary laws ; it would therefore become thoughtless intuition, never knowledge, and would be to us the same as nothing. The conditions a priori of any possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of any objects of our experience. /Now I maintain that the categories of which we are speaking are nothing but the conditions of thought which make experience possible, as much as space and tirne contain the conditions of that intuition which forms experience.' These categories there- 92 Transcendental Analytic fore are also fundamental concepts by which we think objects in general for the phenomena, and have therefore a priori objective validity. This is exactly what we wish to prove. The possibility, nay the necessity of these categories rests on the relation between our whole sensibility, and therefore all possible phenomena, :ind that original apper- ception in which everything must be necessarily subject to the conditions of the permanent unity of self-conscious- ness, that is, must submit to the general functions [p. 1 12] of that synthesis which we call synthesis according to concepts, by which alone our apperception can prove its permanent and necessary identity a prion. ^ Thus the con- cept of cause is nothing but a synthesis of that which follows in temporal succession, with other phenomena, but a synthesis according to concepts : and without such a unity which rests on a rule a priori, and subjects all phe- nomena to itself, no permanent and general, and therefore necessary unity of consciousness would be formed in the manifold of our perceptions. Such perceptions would then belong to no experience at all, they would be without an object, a blind play of representations, — less even than a dream. All attempts therefore at deriving those pure concepts of the understanding from experience, and ascribing to them a purely empirical origin, are perfectly vain and useless. I shall not dwell here on the fact that a concept of caiise, for instance, contains an element of necessity, which no experience can ever supply, because experience, though it teaches us that after one phenomenon something else follows habitually, can never teach us that it follows necessarily, nor that we could a priori, and without any j Transcendental Analytic 03 limitation, derive from it, as a condition, any conclusion as to what must follow. And thus I ask with reference to that empirical rule of association, which must always be admitted if we say that everything in the succession of events is so entirely subject to rules that nothing [p. 113] ever happens without something preceding it on which it always follows, — What does it rest on, if it is a law of nature, nay, how is that very association possible ? You call the ground for the possibility of the association of the manifold, so far as it is contained in the objects them- selves, the affinity of the manifold. I ask, therefore, ho_w do you make that permanent affinity by which phenomena stand, nay, must stand, under permanent laws, conceivable to yourselves .■' According to my principles it is easily conceivable. All possible phenomena belong, as representations, to the whole of our possible self-consciousness. From this, as a transcendental representation, numerical identity is insep- arable and a priori certain, because nothing can become knowledge except by means of that original apperception. As this identity must necessarily enter into the synthesis of the whole of the manifold of phenomena, if that syn- thesis is to become empirical knowledge, it follows that the phenomena are subject to conditions a priori to which their synthesis (in apprehension) must always conform. The representation of a general condition according to which something manifold can be arranged (with uni- formity) is called a rule, if it must be so arranged, a law. All phenomena therefore stand in a permanent connection according to necessary laws, and thus possess [p. 1 14J that transcendental aifinity of which the empirical is a mere consequence. 94 Transcendental Analytic It sounds no doubt very strange and absurd that nature should have to conform to our subjective ground of apper- ception, nay, be dependent on it, with respect to her laws. But if we consider that what we call nature is nothing but a whole of phenomena, not a thing by itself, but a number of representations in our soul, we shall no longer be sur- prised that we only see her through the fundamental faculty of all our knowledge, namely, the transcendental apperception, and in that unity without which it could not be called the object (or the whole) of all possible experience, that is, nature. We shall thus also understand why we can recognise this unity a priori, and therefore as nec- essary, which would be perfectly impossible if it were given by itself and independent of the first sources of our own thinking. In that case I could not tell whence we should take the synthetical propositions of such general unity of nature. They would have to be taken from the objects of nature themselves, and as this could be done empirically only, we could derive from it none but an accidental unity, which is very different from that neces- sary connection which we mean when speaking of nature. DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING [p. 115] Section III Of the Relation of the Undei'standing to Objects in General, and the Possibility of Knozving Them a priori What in the preceding section we have discussed singly and separately we shall now try to treat in con- nection with each other and as a whole. , We saw that there are three subjective sources of knowledge on Transcendental Analytic 05 which the possibility of all experience and of the knowledge of its objects depends, namely, sense, imagi- nation, and apperception. ) Each of them may be con- sidered as empirical in its application to given phenom- ena; all, however, are also elements or grounds a priori which render their empirical application possible. Sense represents phenomena empirically in perception, imagina- tion in association (and reproduction), apperception in the empirical consciousness of the identity of these reproduc- tive representations with the phenomena by which they were given ; therefore in recognition. The whole of our perception rests a priori on pure in- tuition (if the perception is regarded as representation, then on time, as the form of our internal intuition), the association of it (the whole) on the pure syn- [p. 116] thesis of imagination, and our empirical consciousness of it on pure apperception, that is, on the permanent identity of oneself in the midst of all possible repre- sentations. ' If we wish to follow up the internal ground of this connection of representations to that point towards which they must all converge, and where they receive for the first time that unity of knowledge which is requisite for every possible experience, we must begin with pure apperception. Intuitions are nothing to us, and do not concern us in the least, if they cannot be received into our consciousness, into which they may enter either directly or indirectly. Knowledge is im- possible in any other way. We are conscious a priori of our own permanent identity with regard to all repre- sentations that can ever belong to our knowledge, as forming a necessary condition of the possibility of all 96 Transcendental Analytic representations (because these could not represent any- thing in me, unless they belonged with everything else to one consciousness and could at least be connected within it). This principle stands firm a priori, and may be called the transcendental principle of the unity of all the manifold of our representations (therefore also of intuition). This unity of the manifold in one subject is synthetical; the pure apperception therefore supplies us with a principle of the synthetical unity of [p. 117] the manifold in all possible intuitions.^ This synthetical umty, however, presupposes [p. 118] or involves a synthesis, and if that unity is necessary a priori, the synthesis also must be a priori. The tran- scendental unity of apperception therefore refgrs to_the pure synthesis of imagination as a condition a priori of ^ This point is of great importance and should be carefully considered. All representations have a necessary relation to some possible empirical con- sciousness, for if they did not possess that relation, and if it were entirely im- possible to become conscious of them, this would be the same as if they did not exist. All empirical consciousness has a necessary relation to a transcen- dental consciousness, which precedes all single experiences, namely, the con- sciousness of my own self as the original apperception. It is absolutely necessary therefore that in my knowledge all consciousness should belong to one consciousness of my own self. Here we have a synthetical unity of the manifold (consciousness) which can be known a priori, and which may thus supply a foundation for synthetical propositions a priori concerning pure thinking in the same way as space and time supply a foundation for syn- thetical propositions which concern the form of mere intuition. The synthetical proposition that the different kinds of empirical conscious- ness must be connected in one self-consciousness, is the very first and syn- thetical foundation of all our thinking. It should be remembered that the mere representation of the Ego in reference to all other representations (the collective unity of which would be impossible without it) constitutes our transcendental consciousness. It does not matter whether that representation is clear (empirical consciousness) or confused, not even whether it is real; but the possibility of the logical form of all knowdedge rests necessarily on the relation to this apperception as a faculty. Transcendental Analytic ay the_possibility of the manifold being united in one knowledge. Now there can take place a priori the pro- ductive synthesis of imagination only, because the re- produ_ctive rests on conditions of experience.y'^The principle therefore of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, before all apg;er- ception^ constitutes the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, nay, of all experience. N The synthesis of the manifold in imagination is called transcendental, if, without reference to the difference of intuitions, it affects only the a piiori conjunction of the manifold ; and the unity of that synthesis is called tran- scendental if, with reference to the original unity of ap- perception, it is represented as a priori necessary. ^As the possibility of all knowledge depends on the unity of that apperception, it follows that the transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination is the pure form of all possible knowledge through which therefore all objects of possible experience must be represented a priori./ This unity of apperception with reference to [p. 119] the synthesis of imagination is the understandijig, and the same unity with reference to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the pure understanding. It must be admitted therefore that there exist in the understajiding pure forms of knowledge a priori, which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in reference to all possible phenomena. ;' These are the categories, that is, the pure concepts of the understanding. The empirical faculty of know- ledge of man contains therefore by necessity an under- standing which refers to all objects of the senses, though by intuition only, and by its synthesis through 98 Transcendental Ajialytic imagination, and all phenomena, as data of a possible experience, must conform to that understanding. As this relation of phenomena to a possible experience is likewise necessary, (because, without it, we should receive no knowledge through them, and they would not in the I least concern us), it follows that the pure understanding constitutes by the means of the categories a formal and synthetical principle of all experience, and that phenomena have thus a necessary relation to the understanding. We shall now try to place the necessary connection of the understanding with the phenomena by means of the categories more clearly before the reader, by beginning with the beginning, namely, with the empirical. The first that is given us is the phenomenon, [p. 120] which, if connected with consciousness, is called peixeption. (Without its relation to an at least possible consciousness, the phenomenon could never become to us an object of knowledge. It would therefore be nothing to us ; and because it has no objective reality in itself, but exists only in being known, it would be nothing altogether.) As every phenomenon contains a manifold, and different percep- tions are found in the mind singly and scattered, a co^n- nection of them is necessary, such as they cannot have in the senses by themselves. There exists therefore in us an active power for the synthesis of the manifold which we call imagination, and the function of which, as applied to perceptions, I call apprehension} This imagination 1 It has hardly struck any psychologist that this imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception. This was partly owing to their confining this faculty to reproduction, partly to our belief that the senses do not only give us im- pressions, but compound them also for us, thus producing pictures of objects. This, however, beyond our receptivity of impressions, requires something more, namely, a function for their synthesis. Transcendental Analytic gg is meant to change the manifold of intuition into an im- age, it must therefore first receive the impressions into its activity, which I call to appreJiend. It must be clear, however, that even this appre- [p. 121] hension of the manifold could not alone produce a cohe- rence of impressions or an image, without some subjective power of calling one perception from which the mind has gone over to another back to that which follows, and thus forming whole series of perceptions. This is the repro- ductive faculty of imagination which is and can be em- pirical only. If representations, as they happen to meet with one another, could reproduce each other at haphazard, they would have no definite coherence, but would form irregu- lar agglomerations only, and never produce knowledge. ( It is necessary therefore that their reproduction should be subject to a rule by which one representation connects itself in imagination with a second and not with a third. ] It is this subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules, which is called the association of repre- sentations. If this unity of association did not possess an objective foundation also, which makes it impossible that phenomena should be apprehended by imagination in any other way but under the condition of a possible synthetical unity of that apprehension, it would be a mere accident that phe- nomena lend themselves to a certain connection in human knowledge. Though we might have the power of asso- ciating perceptions, it would still be a matter of [p. 122] uncertainty and chance whether they themselves are asso- ciable ; and, in case they should not be so, a number of perceptions, nay, the whole of our sensibility, might possi- lOO Transcendental Analytic bly contain a great deal of empirical consciousness, but in a separate state, nay, without belonging to the one con- sciousness of myself, which, however, is impossible. Only by ascribing all perceptions to one" consciousness (the origi- nal apperception) can I say of all of them that I am con- scious of them. It must be therefore an objective ground, that is, one that can be understood as existing a priori, and before all empirical laws of imagiriation, on which alone the possibility, nay, even the necessity of a law can rest, which pervades all phenomena, and which makes us look upon them all, without exception, as data of the senses, associable by themselves, and subject to general rules of a permanent connection in their reproduction.^ This objective ground of all association of phenomenal call their affinity, and this can nowhere be found except in the principle of the unity of apperception applied to all knowledge which is to belong to me. According to it all phenomena, without exception, must so enter into the mind or be apprehended as to agree with the unity of apperception. This, without a synthetical unity in their connection, which is therefore necessary objectively also, would be impossible. We have thus seen that the objective unity [p. 123] of all (empirical) consciousness in one consciousness (that of th(; original apperception) is the necessary condition even of all possible perception, while the affinity of all phenomena (near or remote) is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in imagination which is a priori founded on rules. Imagination is therefore likewise the power of a synthe- sis a priori which is the reason why we called it produc- tive imagination, and so far as this aims at nothing lut Transcendental Analytic lOl the necessary unity in the synthesis of all the manifold in! phenomena, it may be called the transcendental function of imaginatiori. However strange therefore it may appear at first, it must nevertheless have become clear by this time that the affinity of phenomena and with it their asso- ciation, and through that, lastly, their reproduction also according to laws, that is, the whole of our experience, becomes possijole only by means of that transcendental j function of imagination, without which no concepts of ' objects, could ever come together in one experience. It is the permanent and unchanging Ego (or pure ap- , perception) which forms the correlative of all our repre- i^entations, if we are to become conscious of them, and all ? consciousness belongs quite as much to such an all-em- ^bracing pure apperception as all sensuous intuitions be- J longs, as a representation, to a pure internal [p. 124] intuition, namely, time. This apperception it is which must be added to pure imagination, in order to render its function intellectual. For by itself, the synthesis of imagination, though carried out a priori, is always sensu- ous, and only connects the manifold as it appears in intui- tion, for instance, the shape of a triangle". But when the manifold is brought into relation with the unity of apper- ception, concepts which belong to the understanding be- come possible, but only as related to sensuous intuition through imagination. We have therefore a pure irnagination as one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul, on which all knowledge a priori depends. Through it we bring the manifold of intuition on one side in connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other. These two extreme ends, sense and under- I02 Transcendental Analytic standing, must be brought into contact with each other by means of the transcendental function of imagination, because, without it, the senses might give us phenomena, ^ but no objects of empirical knowledge, therefore no expe- rience. Real experience, which is made up of apprehen- sion, association (reproduction), and lastly recognition of phenomena, contains in this last and highest [p. 125] (among the purely empirical elements of experience) con- cepts, which render possible the formal unity of experi- ence, and with it, all objective validity (truth) of ernpirical knowledge. These grounds for the recognition of the manifold, so far as they concern the form only of expe- rience in general, are our categories. On them is founded the whole formal unity in the synthesis of imagination and, through it, of^ the whole empirical use of them (in recognition, reproduction, association, and apprehension) down to the very phenomena, because it is only by means of those elements of knowledge that the phenomena can belong to our consciousness and therefore to ourselves. It is we therefore who carry into the phenomena which we call nature, order and regularity, nay, we should never find them in nature, if we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, had not originally placed them there. For the unity of nature is meant to be a necessary and a priori certain unity in the connection of all phenomena. And how should we a priori have arrived at such a synthetical unity, if the subjective grounds of such unity were not contained a priori in the original sources of our know- ledge, and if those subjective conditions did not at the same time possess objective validity, as being the grounds 1 Of may be omitted, if we read alter empirischcr Gebra uch. Transcendental Analytic 103 on which alone an object becomes possible in [p. 126] our experience ? We have before given various definitjons of the under- \ standing, by calling it the spontaneity of knowledge (as opposed to the receptivity of the senses), or the faculty of thinking, or the faculty of concepts or of judgments ; all of these explanations, if more closely examined, coming to the same. (^We may now characterise it as the faculty of rules!) This characteristic is more significant, and ap- proaches nearer to the essence of the understanding. The senses give us forms (of intuition), the understanding rules, being always busy to examine phenomena, in order ^to disgjver in them some kind of rule. Rules, so far as they are objecdye (therefore necessarily inherent in our knowledge of an object), are called laws. Although expe- rience teaches us many laws, yet these are only particular determinations ' of higher laws, the highest of them, to which all others are subject, springing a priori from the understanding ; not being derived from experience, but, on the contrary, imparting to the phenomena their regu- larity, and thus making experience possible. The under- standing therefore is not only a power of making rules by a comparison of phenomena,'it is itself the lawgiver of nature, and without the understanding nature, that is, a synthetical unity of the manifold of phenomena, [p. 127] according to rules, would be nowhere to be found, because phenomena, as such, cannot exist without us, but exist in our sensibility only. This sensibility, as an object of our knowledge in any experience, with everything it may con- tain, is possible only in the unity of apperception, which unity of apperception is transcendental ground of the necessary order of all phenomena in an experience. The I04 Transcendental Analytic same unity of apperception with reference to the mani- fold of representations (so as to determine it out of one)! forms what we call the rule, and the faculty of these rules I call the understanding. As possible experience there- fore, all phenomena depend in the same way a priori on the understanding, and receive their formal possibility from it as, when looked upon as mere intuitions, they depend on sensibility, and become possible through it, so far as their form is concerned. However exaggerated therefore and absurd it may sound, that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and of its formal unity, such a statement is nevertheless correct and in accordance with experience. It is quite true, no doubt, that empirical laws, as such, cannot derive their origin from the pure understanding, as little as the infinite manifoldness of phenomena could be sufficiently comprehended through the pure form of sensuous intuition. \ But all empirical laws are only par- ticular determinations of the pure laws of the [p. 128] understanding, under which and according to which the former become possible, and phenomena assume a regular form, quite as much as all phenomena, in spite of the variety of their empirical form, must always submit to the conditions of the pure form of sensibility. The pure understanding is therefore in the categories the law of the synthetical unity of all phenomena, and thus makes experience, so far as its form is concerned, for the first time possible. This, and no more than this, we were called upon to prove in the transcendental deduction of the categories, namely, to make the relation of the 1 That is, out of one, or out of the unity of apperception. Transcendental Analytic 105 understanding to our sensibility, and through it to all objects of experience, that is the objective validity of the pure concepts a priori of the understanding, conceivable, and thus to establish their origin and their truth. SUMMARY REPRESENTATION OF THE CORRECTNESS AND OF THE ONLY POSSIBILITY OF THIS DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDER- STANDING If the objects with which our knowledge has to deal were things by themselves, we could have no concepts a priori of them. For where should we take them 1 If we took them from the object (without asking even the ques- tion, how that object could be known to us) our [p. 129] concepts would be empirical only, not concepts a priori. If we took them from within ourselves, then that which is within us only, could not determine the nature of an object different from our representations, that is, supply a ground why there should be a thing to which something like what we have in our thoughts really belongs, and why all this representation should not rather be altogether empty. But if, on the contrary, we have to deal with p^henomena only, then it becomes not only possible, but necessary, that certain concepts a priori should precede our empirical knowledge of objects. For being phenom- ena, they form an object that is within us only, because a mere modification of our sensibility can never exist outside us. The very idea that all these phenomena, and there- fore all objects with which we have to deal, are altogether within me, or determinations of my own identical self. io6 Transcendental Analytic implies by itself the necessity of a permanent unity of them in one and the same apperception. In that unity of a possible consciousness consists also the form of all knowledge of objects, by which the manifold is thought as belonging to one object. The manner therefore in which the manifold of sensuous representation (intuition) belongs to our consciousness, precedes all knowledge of an object, as its intellectual form, and constitutes a kind of formal a priori knowledge of all objects in general, if they are to be thought (categories). Their syn- [p. 130] thesis by means of pure imagination, and the unity of all representations with reference to the original appercep- [ tign, precede all empirical knowledge. "■ Pure concepts of the understanding are therefore a pi'ioi'i possible, nay, with regard to experience, necessary, for this simple rea- son, because our knowledge has to deal with nothing but phenomena, the possibility of which depends on ourselves, and the connection and unity of which (in the repre- sentation of an object) can be found in ourselves only, as antecedent to all experience, nay, as first rendering all experience possible, so far as its form is concerned. On this ground, as the only possible one, our deduction of the categories has been carried out.] TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC BOOK II ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES General logic is built up on a plan that coincides accu- rately with the division of the higher faculties of know- ledge. These are, Understanding, 'Judgment, and Reason. Logic therefore treats in its analytical portion of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms corresponding with the func- tions and the order of the above-named faculties [p. 131 1 of the mind, which are generally comprehended under the vague name of the understanding. As form^ logic takes no account of the contents of our knowledge (pure or empirical), but treats of the form of thought only (discursive knowledge), it may well contain in its analytical portion the canon of reason also, reason being, according to its form, subject to definite rules which, without reference to the particular nature of the knowledge to which they are applied, can be found out a priori by a mere analysis of the acts of reasoning into their component parts. Transcendental logic, being limited to a certain content, namely, to pure knowledge a priori, cannot follow general logic in this division ; for it is clear that the transcendental use of reason cannot be objectively valid, and cannot there- fore belong to the logic of truth, that is, to Analytic, but must be allowed to form a separate part of our scholastic 107 io8 Transcendental Analytic system, as a logic of illusion, under the name of transcen- dental Dialectic. Understanding and judgrnent have therefore a canon of their objectively vaHd, and therefore true use in tr%n- scend_ental logic, and belong to its analytical portion. But reason, in its attempts to determine anything a priori with reference to objects, and to extend knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience, is altogether dialectical, and its illusory assertions have no place in a canon [p. 132] such as Analytic demands. Our Analytic of principles therefore will be merely a canon of the faculty of judgrnent, teaching it how to apply to phenomena the concepts of the understanding, which contain the condition of rules a priori. For this reason, and in order to indicate my purpose more clearly, I shall use the name of doctrine of the faculty of Judgment, while treating of the real principles of the understanding. INTRODUCTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL FACULTY OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL If the understanding is explained as the faculty of rules, the faculty of judgment consists in performing the subsumption under these rules, that is, in determining whether anything falls under a given rule {casus dates legis) or not. .Genejial logic contains no^precepts for the faculty of judgment and cannot contain them. For as it takes no account of the contents of our knowledge, it has only to explain analytically the mere form of knowledge in concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, and thus [p. 133] to estabHsh formal rules for the proper employment of the Transcendental Analytic lOg understanding. \ If it were to attempt to show in general how anything should be arranged under these rules, and how we should determine whether something falls under them or not, this could only take place by means of a new rule. ) This, because it is a new rule, requires a new pre- cept for the faculty of judgment, and we thus learn that, though the understajiding is capable of being improved and instructed by means of rules, the faculty of judgment' is a special talent which cannot be taught, but must be practised. ^ This is what constitutes our so-called mother- wit, the absence of which cannot be remedied by any schooHng.'^ For although the teacher may offer, and as it were graft into a narrow understanding, plenty of rules borrowed from the experience of others, the faculty of using them rightly must belong to the pupil himself, and without that talent no precept that may be given is safe from abuse. ^ A physician, therefore, a judge, or [p. 134J a politician, may carry in his head many beautiful patho- logical, juridical, or political rules, nay, he may even be- come an accurate teacher of them, and he may yet in the application of these rules commit many a blunder, either because he is deficient in judgment, though not in under- standing, knowing the general in the abstract, but unable to determine whether a concrete case falls under it ; or, it may be, because his judgment has not been sufficiently trained by examples and practical experience. It is the ^ Deficiency in the faculty of judgment is really what we call stupidity, and there is no remedy for that. An obtuse and narrow mind, deficient in nothing but a proper degree of understanding and correct concepts, may be improved by study, so far as to become even learned. But as even then there is often a deficiency of judgment {secunda Petri) we often meet with very learned men, who in handling their learning betray that original deficiency which can never be mended. no Transcendental Analytic one great advantage of examples that they sharpen the faculty of judgment, but they are apt to impair the accu- racy and precision of the understanding, because they fulfil but rarely the conditions of the rule quite adequately (as casus in terminis^. Nay, they often weaken the effort of the understanding in comprehending rules according to their general adequacy, and independent of the special circumstances of experience, and accustom us to use those rules in the end as formulas rather than as principles. Examples may thus be called the go-cart of the judgment, which those who are deficient in that natural talent ^ can never do without. But although general logic can give no pre- [p. 135] cepts to the faculty of judgment, the case is quite differ- ent with transcen_dental logic, so that it even seems as if it were the proper business of the latter to correct and to establish by definite rules the faculty of the judgment in the use of the pure understanding. For as a doctrine and a means of enlarging the field of pure knowledge a priori for the benefit of the understanding, philosophy does not seem necessary, but rather hurtful, because, in spite of all attempts that have been hitherto made, hardly a single inch of ground has been gained by it. For criti- cal purposes, however, and in order to guard the faculty of judgment against mistakes {lapsus jndicii) in its use of the few pure concepts of the understanding which we pos- sess, philosophy (though its benefits may be negative only) has to employ all the acuteness and penetration at its command. 1 Desselben has been charged into derselben in later editions. Desselben, however, may be meant to refer to Urlheil, as contained in Urtheihkraft. The second edition has desselben. Tra7iscendcntal Analytic 1 1 1 What distinguishes transcenclental philosophy is, that besides giving the rules (or rather the general condition of rules) which are contained in the pure concept of the understanding, it can at the same time indicate a prion the case to which each rule may be applied. The superi- ority which it enjoys in this respect over all other sciences, except mathematics, is due to this, that it treats of con- cepts which are meant to refer to their objects a priori, so that their objective validity cannot be proved [p. 136] a posteriori, because this would not affect their own peculiar dignity. It must show, on the contrary, by means of general but sufficient marks, the conditions under which objects can be given corresponding to those concepts ; otherwise these would be without any contents, mere logical forms, and not pure concepts of the under- standing. Our transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment will consist of two chapters. The first will treat of the sensuous condidon under which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be used. This is what I call the schematism of the pure understanding. The second will treat of the synthetical judgments, which can be derived a priori under these conditions from pure concepts of the understanding, and on which all knowledge a priori de- pends. It will treat, therefore, of the principles of the pure understanding. THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE [p- 137] FACULTY OF JUDGMENT OR ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES tt ■ ■ '' ^' CHAPTER I OF THE SCHEMATISM OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING In comprehending any object under a concept, the representation of the former must be homogeneous with the latter, ^ that is, the concept must contain that which is represented in the object to be comprehended under it, for this is the only meaning of the expression that an object is comprehended under a concept. (Thus, for instance, the empirical concept of a plajte is homo- geneous with the pure geometrical concept of a circle, the roundness which is conceived in the first forming an object of intuition in the latter.) Now it is clear that pure concepts of the understanding as compared with empirical or sensuous impressions in general, are entirely heterogeneous, and can never be met 1 . 1 Read dem leizieren, as corrected by Rosenkranz, for der lehteren. 112 Transcendental Analytic 113 with in any intuition. How then can the latter be com- prehended under the former, or how can the categories be applied to phenomena, as no^ one is likely to say that causaUty, for instance, could be seen through the senses, and was contained in the phenomenon? It is [p. 138] really this very natural and important question which renders a transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judg- ment necessary, in order to show how it is possible that any of the pure concepts of the understanding can be applied to phenomena. In all other sciences in which the concepts by which the object is thought in general are not so heterogeneous or different from those which represent it in concrete, and as it is given, there is no necessity to enter into any discussions as to the applicability of the former to the latter. ) In our case there must be some third thing horap- geneous on the on_e side with the category, and on the other with the phenomenon, to render the application of the former to the latter possible. This intermediate repre- sentation must be pure (free from all that is empirical) and yet intelligible on the one side, and sensuous on the other. Su'ch a representation is the transcendental schema. (The concept of the understanding contains pure syn- thetical unity of the manifold in general." Tim^e, as the formal condition of the manifold in the internal sense, consequently of the conjunction of all representations, contains a manifold a priori in pure intuition. A tran- scendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with the category (which constitutes its unity) that it is g enera l and founded on a rule a priori ; and it is oji the oth^r hand so far homogeneous with the phe- [p. 139] nomenon, that time must be contained in every empirical 114 Transcendental Analytic representation of the manifold. The applicadon of the category to phenomena becomes possible therefore by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as a schema of the concepts of the understanding, allows the phenomena to be comprehended under the category. After what has been said in the deduction of the cate- gories, we hope that nobody will hesitate in answering the question whether these pure concepts of the understand- ing allow only of an empirjcal or also of a transcendental application, that is, whether, as conditions of a possible experience, they refer a priori to phenomena only, or whether, as conditions of the possibility of things in gen- eral, they may be extended to obje£ts by themselves (with- out restriction to our sensibility). For there we saw that concepts are quite impossible, and cannot have any mean- ing unless there be an object given either to them or, at least, to some of the elements of which they consist, and that they can never refer to things by themselves (without regard as to whether and how things may be given to us). We likewise saw that the only way in which objects can be given to us, consists in a modification of our sensibility, and lastly, that pure concepts a priori must contain, besides the function of the understanding in the category itself, formal conditions a priori of sensibility (particu- [p. 140] larly of the internal sense) which form the general condi- tion under which alone the category may be applied to any object. We shall call this formal and pure condition of sensibility, to which the concept of the understanding is restricted in its application, its schema ; and the function of the understanding in these schemata, the schematism of the pjire understanding. The schema by itself is no doubt a product of the hnagi- Transcendental Analytic 1 1 5 natwn only, but as the synthesis of the imagination does noLaim at a single intuition, but at some kind of unity alone in the determination of sensibility, the schema ought to be distinguished from the image. ' Thus, if I place five points, one after the other this is an image of the number five. If, on the contrary, I think of a number in general, whether it be five or a hundred, this thinking is rather t^ie representation of a method of representing in one_image a certain quantity__ (for instance a thousand) according to a certain concept, than the image itself, which, in the case of a thousand, I could hardly take in and com- pare with the concept. This representation of a general procedure of the imagination by which a concept receives its image, I call the schema of such concept. The fact is that our pure sensuous concepts do not depend on images of objects, but on schemata. |[p. 141] No image of a triangle in general could ever be adequate to its concept. It would never attain to that generality of the concept, which makes it applicable to all triangles, whether right-angled, or acute-angled, or anything else, but would always be restricted to one portion only of the sphere of the concept. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere but in thought, and is in fact a rule for the synthesis of imagination with respect to pure forms in space. Still less does an object of experience or its image ever cover the empirical concept, which always refers directly to the schema of imagination as a rule for the determination of our intuitions, according to a certain general concept. The concept of dog means a rule ac- cording to which my imagination can always draw a general outline of the figure of a four-footed animal, without being restricted to any particular figure supplied Ii6 1 ranscetidental Analytic by experience or to any possible image which I may draw in the concrete.< This schem_atism of our understanding apphed to phenomena and their mere form is an^ art hid- den in the depth of the human soul, the true secrets of which we shall hardly ever be able to guess and reveal.^ i So much only we can say, that the image is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination, while the schema of sensuous concepts (such as of figures in space) is a product and so to say a monogram of [p. 142] the pure imagination a priori, through which and accord- ing to which images themselves become possible, though they are never fully adequate to the concept, and can be connected with it by means of their schema only. The' schema of a pure concept of the understanding, on the contrary, is something which can never be made into an image ; for it is nothing but the pure synthesis determined by a rule of unity, according to concepts, a synthesis as expressed by the category, and represents a transcendental product of the imagination, a product which concerns the determination of the internal sense in general, under the conditions of its form (time), with reference to all repre- sentations, so far as these are meant to be joined a priori in one concept, according to the unity of apperception. Without dwelling any longer on a dry and tedious determination of all that is required for the transcen- dental schemata of the pure concepts of the understand- ing in general, we shall proceed at once to represent them according to the order of the categories, and in connection with them. The pure image of all quantities {(juanta) before the external sense, is space ; that of all objects of the senses in general, time. The pure schema of quantity {qtian- 'i.^::-it:r:. t^ /, . '-Transcendental Analytic 117 titas), however, as a concept of the understanding, is number, a representation which comprehends the succes- sive addition of one to one (homogeneous). Number therefore is nothing but the unity of the syn- [p. 143] thesis of the manifold (repetition) of a homogeneous intuition in general, I myself producing the time in the apprehension of the intuition. { ReaUty is, in the pure concept of the understanding, that which corresponds to a sensation in general : that, therefore, the concept of which indicates by itself being (in time), while negation is that the concept of which rep- resents not-being (in time). ' The opposition of the two takes place therefore by a distinction of one and the same time, as either filled or empty. As time is only the form of intuition, that is, of objects as phenomena, that which in the phenomena corresponds to sensation, constitutes the transcendental matter of all objects, as things by themselves (reality, Sachheit). Every sensa- tion, however, has a degrge of quantity by which it can fill the same time (that is, the internal sense, with refer- ence to the same representation of an object), more or less, till it vanishes into nothing (equal to nought or negation). There exists, therefore, a relation and connection, or rather a transition from reality to negation, which makes every reality representable as a quantum ; and the schema of a reality, as the quantity of something which fil^ time, is this very continuous and uniform production of reality in time ; while we either descend from the sensation which has a certain degree, to its vanishing in time, or ascend from the negation of sensation to some quantity of it. The scheina of substance is the permanence [p. 144] pfjhe real in time, that is, the representation of it as a Ii8 Transcendental Analytic substratum for the empirical determination of time in general, which therefore remains while everything else changes. (It is not time that passes, but the existence of the changeable passes in time. What corresponds there- fore in the phenomena to time, which in itself is unchange- able and permanent, is the jjnchangeable_in existence, that is, substance ; and it is only in it that the succession and the coexistence of phenomena can be determined according to time.) The schema of cause and of the causality of a thing in general is the real which, when once supposed to exist, is always followed by something else. -. It consists therefore in the succession of the manifold, in so far as that succes- sion is subject to a rule. The schema of community (reciprocal action) or of the reciprocal causality of substances, in respect to their acci- dents, is the coexistence, according to a general rule, of the determinations of the one with those of the other. The schema of possibility is the agreement of the syn- thesis of different representations with the conditions of time in general, as, for instance, when opposites cannot exist at the same time in the same thing, but only one after the other. It is therefore the determination of the representation of a thing at any time whatsoever. The schema of reality is existence at a given time. [p. 145] The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all times. It is clear, therefore, if we examine all the categories, that the schema of quantity contains and represents the production (synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object ; the schema of quality, the synthesis of sensation (perception) with the representation Transce)idcntal Analytic 119 of time or the filling-up of time ; the schema of relation, ' the relation of perceptions to each other at all times (that is, according to a rule which determines time) ; lastly, the schema of modality and its categories, time itself as the correlative of the determination of an object as to whether and how it belongs to time. The schemata therefore are ' nothing but determinations of time a prion according to rules, and these, as applied to all possible objects, refer in the order of the categories to the series of tinu\ the contents of time, the order of time, and lastly, the comprehension of time. We have thus seen that the schematism of the under- standing, by means of a transcendental synthesis of imagination, amounts to nothing else but to the unity of the manifold in the intuition of the internal sense, and therefore indirectly to the unity of apperception, as an active function corresponding to the internal sense (as re- ceptive). These schejnata therefore of the pure concepts of the understanding are the true and only con- [p. 146] ditions by which these concepts can gain a relation to objects, that is, a significance, and the categories are thus in the end of no other but a possible empirical use, serv- ing only, on account of an a priori necessary unity (the necessary connection of all consciousness in one original apperception) to subject all phenomena to general rules of synthesis, and thus to render them capable of a general connection in experience. All our knowledge is contained within this whole of possible experience, and transcendental truth, which pre- cedes all empirical truth and renders it possible, consists in general relation of it to that experience. But although the schemata of sensibility serve thus to realise the categories, it must strike everybody that they I20 Transcendental Analytic at the same time restrict them, that is, limit them by con- ditions foreign to the understanding and belonging to sen- sibility. Hence the schema is really the phenomenon, or the sensuous concept of an object in agreement with the category (numerus est quantitas pliaenovienon, sensatio realitas phaenomenon, constans et perdurabile rerum sub- stantia pJiaenomenon — aeternitas neccssitas phaenomenon, etc.). If we omit a restrictive condition, it would seem that we amplify a formerly limited concept, and that therefore the categories in their pure meaning, [p. 147] free from all conditions of sensibility, should be valid of things in general, as they are, while their schemata rep- resent them only as they appear, so that these categories might claim a far more extended power, independent of all schemata. And in truth we must allow to these pure concepts of the understanding, apart from all sensuous conditions, a certain significance, though a logical one only, with regard to the mere unity of representations produced by them, although these representations have no object and therefore no meaning that could give us a concept of an object. Thus substance, if we leave out the sensuous condition of permanence, would mean noth- ing but a something that may be conceived as a subject, vi^ithout being the predicate of anything else. Of such a representation we can make nothing, because it does not teach us how that thing is determined which is thus to be considered as the first subject. Categories, there- fore, without schemata are functions only of the under- standing necessary for concepts, but do not' themselves represent any object. This character is given to them by sensibility only, which realises the understanding by, at the same time, restricting it. THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE [p. 148] OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES CHAPTER n SYSTEM OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING We have in the preceding chapter considered the tran- scendental faculty of judgni_ent with reference to those general condijions only under which it is justified in using the pure concepts of the understanding for syn- thetical judgments. It now becomes our duty to repre- sent systematically those judgments which, under that critical provision, the understanding, can really produce a priori. Cpor this purpose our table of categories will be without doubt our natural and best guide. 1 For it is the relation of the categories to all possible experience which must constitute all pure a priori knowledge of the understanding ; and their relation to sensibility in general will therefore exhibit completely and systematically all 122 Transcendental Analytic the transcendental principles of the use of the under- standing.^ Principles a priori are so called, not only because they contain the grounds for other judgments, but also because they themselves are not founded on higher and more gen- eral kinds of knowledge. This peculiarity, however, does not enable them to dispense with every kind of proof ; for although this could not be given objectively, as [p. 149] all knowledge of any object really rests on it, this does not prevent us from attempting to produce a proof drawn from the subjective sources of the possibility of a know- ledge of the object in general ; nay, it may be necessary to do so, because, without it, our assertion might be sus- pected of being purely gratuitous. We shall treat, however, of those principles only which relate to the categories. We shall have nothing to do with the principles of transcendental aesthetic, according to which space and time are the conditions of the pos- sibility of all things as phenomena, nor with the limita- tion of those principles, prohibiting their application to things by themselves. Mathematical principles also do jnot belong to this part of our discussion, because they I are derived from intuition, and not from the pure con- cept of the understanding. As they are, however, syn- thetical judgments a priori, their possibility will have to be discussed, not in order to prove their correctness and apodictic certainty, which would be unnecessary, but in order to make the possibility of such self-evident know- ledge a priori conceivable and intelligible. We shall also have to speak of the principle of analyti- 1 The insertion of man, as suggested loy Rosenkranz, is impossible. Transcendental Analytic 123 cal as opposed to synthetical judgments, the [p. 150] latter being the proper subject of our enquiries, because this very opposition frees the theory of the latter from all misunderstandings, and places them clearly before us in their own peculiar character. SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING Section I Of the Highest Principle of all Analytical Judgments Whatever the object of our knowledge may be, and whatever the relation between our knowledge and its object, it must always submit to that general, though only negative condition of all our judgments, that they do not contradict themselves ; otherwise these judgments, without any reference to their object, are in themselves nothing. But although there may be no contradiction in our judg- ment, it may nevertheless connect concepts in a manner not warranted by the object, or without there being any ground, whether a priori or a posteriori, to confirm such a judgment. A judgment may therefore be false or ground- less, though in itself it is free from all contradiction. The proposition that no subject can have a [p- 151J predicate which contradicts it, is called the principle of contradiction. It is a general though only negative crite- rion of all truth, and belongs to logic only, because it applies to knowledge as knowledge only, without reference to its object, and simply declares that such contradiction would entirely destroy and annihilate it. Nevertheless, a positive use also may be made of that 124 Transcendental Analytic principle, not only in order to banish falsehood and error, so far as they arise from contradiction, but also in order to discover truth. For in an analytical judgment, whether negative or affirmative, its truth can always be sufficiently tested by the principle of contradiction, because the oppo- site of that which exists and is thought as a concept in our knowledge of an object, is always rightly negatived, while the concept itself is necessarily affirmed of it, for the simple reason that its opposite would be in contradiction with the object. It must therefore be admitted that the principle of con- tradiction is the general and altogether sufficient principle of all analytical knowledge, though beyond this its au- thority and utility, as a sufficient criterion of truth, must not be allowed to extend. For the fact that no knowledge can run counter to that principle, without destroying itself, makes it no doubt a conditio sine qua nan, [p. 152] but never the determining reason of the truth of our knowledge. Now, as in our present enquiry we are chiefly concerned with the synthetical part of our know- ledge, we must no doubt take great care never to offend against that inviolable principle, but we ought never to expect from it any help with regard to the truth of this kind of knowledge. 'There is, however, a formula of this famous principle — a principle merely formal and void of all contents — which contains a synthesis that has been mixed up with it from mere carelessness and without any real necessity.'; This formula is : It is impossible that anything should be and at the same time not be. f Here, first of all, the apodictic cer- tainty expressed by the word impossible is added unnec- essarily, because it is understood by itself from the nature Transcendental Analytic 125 of the proposition ;j secondly, the proposition is affected by the condition of time, and says, as it were, something = A, which is something = B, cannot be at the same time not-B, but it can very well be both (B and not-B) in succession. For instance, a man who is young cannot be at the same time old, but the same man may very well be young at one time and not young, that is, old, at another. The principle of contradiction, however, as a purely logical principle, must not be limited in its appli- cation by time; and the before-mentioned for- [p. 153] raula runs therefore counter to its very nature. The mis- understanding arises from our first separating one predi- cate of an object from its concept, and by our afterwards joining its opposite with that predicate, which gives us a contradiction, not with the subject, but with its predicate only which was synthetically connected with it, and this again only on condition that the first and second predicate have both been applied at the same time. If I want to say that a man who is unlearned is not learned, I must add the condition ' at the same time,' for a man who is unlearned at one time may very well be learned at an- other. But if I say no unlearned man is learned, then the proposition is analytical, because the characteristic (unlearnedness) forms part now of the concept of the subject, so that the negative proposition becomes evident directly from the principle of contradiction, and without the necessity of adding the condition, "at the same time.' This is the reason why I have so altered the wording of that formula that it displays at once the nature of an analytical proposition. 126 Transcendental Analytic SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE [p. 154] UNDERSTANDING Section II Of the Highest Principle of all Synthetical yndgments The explanation of the possibility of synthetical judg- ments is a subject of which general logic knows nothin-g, not even its name, while in a transcendental logic it is the most important task of all, nay, even the only one, when we have to consider the possibility of synthetical judg- ments a priori, their conditions, and the extent of their validity. For when that task is accomplished, the object of transcendental logic, namely, to determine the extent and limits of the pure understanding, will have been fully attained. In forming an analytical judgment I remain within a given concept, while predicating something of it. If what I predicate is affirmative, I only predicate of that concept what is already contained in it ; if it is negative, I only exclude from it the opposite of it. In forming synthet- ical judgments, on the contrary, I have to go beyond a given concept, in order to bring something together with it, which is totally different from what is contained in it. Here we have neither the relation of identity [p. 155] nor of contradiction, and nothing in the judgment itself by which we can discover its truth or its falsehood. Granted, therefore, that we must go beyond a given concept in order to compare it synthetically with another, something else is necessary in which, as in a third, the synthesis of two concepts becomes possible. What, then, Transcendental Analytic 127 is that third ? What is the medium of all synthetical judgments? v It can only be that in which all our concepts are contained, namely, the internal sense and its a priori form, time. "• The synthesis of representations depends on imagination, but their synthetical unity, which is neces- sary for forming a judgment, depends on the unity of apperception. It is here therefore that the possibility of synthetical judgments, and (as all the three contain the sources of representations a priori') the possibility of pure synthetical judgments also, will have to be discovered ; nay, they will on these grounds be necessary, if any knowledge of objects is to be obtained that rests entirely on a synthesis of representations. If knowledge is to have any objective reality, that is to say, if it is to refer to an object, and receive by means of it any sense and meaning, the object must necessarily be given in some way or other. Without that all concepts are empty. We have thought in them, but we have not, by thus thinking, arrived at any knowledge. We have only played with representations. To give an object, if this is not meant again as mediate only, but if [p. 1 56] it means to represent something immediately in intuition, is nothing else but to refer the representation of the object to experience (real or possible). Even space and time, however pure these concepts may be of all that is empirical, and however certain it is that they are repre- sented in the mind entirely a priori, would lack neverthe- less all objective validity, all sense and meaning, if we could not show the necessity of their use with reference to all objects of experience. Nay, their representation is is a pure schema, always referring to that reproductive imagination which calls up the objects of experience, 128 Transcendental Analytic without which objects would be meaningless. The same applies to all concepts without any distinction. It is therefore the possibility of experience which alone gives objective reality to all our knowledge a priori. Experience, however, depends on the synthetical unity of phenomena, that is, on a synthesis according to con- cepts of the object of phenomena in general. Without it, it would not even be knowledge, but only a rhapsody of perceptions, which would never grow into a connected text according to the rules of an altogether coherent (possible) consciousness, nor into a transcendental and 'necessary unity of apperception. Experience depends i therefore on a priori principles of its form, that is, on general rules of unity in the synthesis of phe- [p. 157] nomena, and the objective reality of these (rules) can always be shown by their being the necessary conditions in all experience ; nay, even in the possibility of all experience. Without such a relation synthetical proposi- tions a priori would be quite impossible, because they have no third medium, that is, no object in which the synthetical unity of their concepts could prove their objective reality. Although we know therefore a great deal a priori in synthetical judgments with reference to space in general, or to the figures which productive imagination traces in it, without requiring for it any experience, this our know- ledge would nevertheless be nothing but a playing with the cobwebs of our brain, if space were not to be con- sidered as the condition of phenomena which supply the material for external experience. Those pure synthetical judgments therefore refer always, though mediately only, to possible experience, or rather to the possibility of Transcendental Analytic I2g experience, on which alone the objective validity of their synthesis is founded. As therefore experience, being an empirical synthesis, is in its possibility the only kind of knowledge that im- parts reality to every other synthesis, this other synthesis, as knowledge a priori, possesses truth (agreement with its object) on this condition only, that it contains nothing beyond what is necessary for the synthetical [p. 158] unity of experience in general. The highest principle of all synthetical judgments is therefore this, that every object is subject to the necessary conditions of a synthetical unity of the manifold of intui- tion in a possible experience. Thus synthetical judgments a priori are possible, if we refer the formal conditions of intuition a priori, the syn- thesis of imagination, and the necessary unity of it in a transcendental apperception, to a possible knowledge in general, given in experience, and if we say that the con- ditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience themselves, and thus possess objective valid- ity in a synthetical judgment a priori. SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING Section III Systematical Representation of all Synthetical Principles of the Understanding That there should be principles at all is entirely due to ] the pure understanding, which is not only the faculty of rules in regard to all that happens, but itself the source I30 Transcendental Analytic of principles, according to which everything LP- I59] (that can become an object to us) is necessarily subject to rules, because, without such, phenomena would never become objects corresponding to knowledge. Even laws of nature, if they are considered as principles of the empirical use of the understanding, carry with them a character of necessity, and thus lead to the supposition that they rest on grounds which are valid a priori and before all experience. Nay, all laws of nature without distinction are subject to higher principles of the under- standing, which they apply to particular cases of experi- ence.^ They alone therefore supply the concept which contains the condition, and, as it were, the exponent of a rule in general, while experience furnishes each case to which the general rule applies. There can hardly be any danger of our mistaking purely empirical principles for principles of the pure understanding or vice versa, for the character, of nec_es- sity which distinguishes the concepts of the pure under- standing, and the absence of which can easily be perceived in every empirical proposition, however general it may seem, will always prevent their confusion. There are, however, pure principles a prion which I should not like to ascribe to the pure understanding, because they are derived, not from pure concepts, but from pure intuitions] (although by means of the understanding); the [p. i6o] understanding being the faculty of the concepts. We find such principles in mathematics, but their application to experience, and therefore their objective validity, nay, even the possibility of such synthetical knowledge a priori (the deduction thereof) rests always on the pure understanding. Transcendental Analytic 131 Hence my principles will not include the principles of mathematics, but they will include those on which the possibility and objective validity a priori of those mathe- matical principles are founded, and which consequently are to be looked upon as the source of those principles, proceeding from concepts to intuitions, and not from intuitions to concepts. When the pure concepts of the understanding are applied to every possible experience, their synthesis is either mathematical or dynamical, for it is directed partly to the intuition of a phenomenon only, partly to its exist- ence. The conditions a priori of intuition are absolutely necessary with regard to every possible experience, while the conditions of the existence of the object of a possible empirical intuition are in themselves accidental only. The principles of the mathematical use of the categories will therefore be absolutely necessary, that is apodictic, while those of their dynarnical use, though likewise pos- sessing the character of necessity a priori, can possess such a character subject only to the condition of empirical thought in experience, that is mediately and indirectly, and cannot therefore claim that immediate evidence which belongs to the former, although their certainty with re- gard to experience in general remains unaffected by this. Of this we shall be better quahfied to judge at [p. 161 ] the conclusion of this system of principles. Our table of categories gives us naturally the best in- structions for drawing up a table of principles, because these are nothing but rules for the objective use of the former. 132 TransccndeJital Analytic All principles ■e, of the pure understanding are there- I Axioms of Intuition. II Ill Anticipations of Analogies of Perception. IV Postulates of Empirical Tlioueht in General. Experience. I have chosen these names not unadvisedly, so that the difference with regard to the evidence and the application .of those principles should not be overlooked. We shall soon see that, both with regard to the evidence and the a priori determination of phenomena according to the cat- egories of quantity and quality (if we attend to the form of them only) their principles differ considerably from those of the other two classes, inasmuch as the [p. 162] former are capable of an intuitive, the latter of a merely discursive, though both of a complete certainty. I shall therefore call the former mathematical, the latter dynami- cal principles.! j(- should be observed, however, that I do not speak here either of the principles of mathematics, or of those of general physical dynamics, but only of the principles of the pure understanding in relation to the internal sense (without any regard to the actual represen- tations given in it). It is these through which the former become possible, and I have given them their name, more on account of their application than of their contents. I shall now proceed to consider them in the same order in which they stand in the table. 1 Here follows in the Second Edition, Supplement XV. Transcendental Analytic 133 I [OF THE AXIOMS OF INTUITION ^ Principle of the Pjire Understanding 'All Phenomena are, with reference to their intuition, extensive quantities '] I call an extensive quantity that in which the represen- tation of the whole is rendered possible by the representa- tion of its parts, and therefore necessarily preceded by it. I cannot represent to myself any line, however small it may be, without drawing it in thought, that is, without producing all its parts one after the other, start- [p. 163] ing from a given point, and thus, first of all, drawing its intuition. The same applies to every, even the smallest portion of time. I can only think in it the successive prog- ress from one moment to another, thus producing in the end, by all portions of time and their addition, a definite quantity of time. As in all phenomena pure intuition is either space or tim^, every phenomenon, as an intuition, must be an exten_sive quantity, because it can be known in apprehension by a successive synthesis only (of part with part). All phenomena therefore, when perceived in intuition, are aggregates (collections) of previously given parts, which is not the case with every kind of quantities, but with those only which are represented to us and apprehended as extensive. On this successive synthesis of productive imagiiiation in elaborating figures are founded the mathematics of ex- tension with their axioms (geometry), containing the con- 1 Here follows, in the later Editions, Supplement XVI. ■ -' • ' 134 Transcendental Analytic ditions of sensuous intuition a priori, under which alone the schema of a pure concept of an external phenomenal appearance can be produced ; for instance, between two points one straight line only is possible, or two straight lines cannot enclose a space, etc. These are the axioms which properly relate only to quantities (^quanta) as such. But with regard to quantity {qitantitas), that is, with regard to the answer to the question, how large something may be, there are no axioms, in the proper [p. 164] sense of the word, though several of the proposition^ referring to it possess synthetical and immediate certainty {indemonstrabilia\ The propositions that if equals be added to equals the wholes are equal, and if equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal, are really analytical, because I am conscious immediately of the identity of my producing the one quantity with my pro- ducing the other ; axioms on the contrary must be synthet- ical propositions a priori. The self-evident propositions on numerical relation again are no doubt synthetical, but they are not general, like those of geometry, and there- fore cannot be called axioms, but numerical formulas only.^ That 7 + 5 = 12 is not an analytical proposition. For neither in the representation of 7, nor in that of 5, nor in that of the combination of both, do I think the number 12. (That I am meant to think it in the addition of the two, is not the question here, for in every analytical proposition all depends on this, whether the predicate is really thought in the representation of the subject.) Although the proposition is synthetical, it is a singular ~ proposition only. If in this case we consider only the synthesis of the homogeneous unities, then the synthesis can here take place in one way only, although afterwards Transcendental Analytic 135 the use of these numbers becomes general. If I say, a triangle can be constructed with three lines, two of which together are greater than the third, I have before me the mere function of productive imagination, which may draw the lines greater or smaller, and bring them together at various angles. The number 7, on the contrary, [p. 165] is possible in one way only, and so likewise the number 12, which is produced by the synthesis of the former with 5. Such propositions therefore must not be called axioms ' , (for their number would be endless) but numerical for- mulas. This transcendental principle of phenomenal mathemat- ics adds considerably to our knowledge a priori. Through it alone it becomes possible to make pure mathematics in their full precision applicable to objects of experience, which without that principle would by no means be self- evident, nay, has actually provoked much contradiction. Phenomena are not things in themselves. Empirical intuition is possible only through pure intuition (of space and time), and whatever geometry says of the latter is valid without contradiction of the former. All evasions, as if objects of the senses should not conform to the rules of construction in space (for instance, to the rule of the infinite divisibility of lines or angles) must cease, for one would thus deny all objective validity to space and with it to .all mathematics, and would no longer know why and how far mathematics can be applied to phenomena. The synthesis of spaces and times, as the synthesis of the essential form of all intuition, is that which renders possible at the same time the apprehen- sion of phenomena, that is, every external [p. i66] experience, and therefore also all knowledge of its ob- 136 Transcendental Analytic jects, and whatever mathematics, in their pure use prove of that synthesis is valid necessarily also of this knowledge. All objections to this are only the chicaneries of a falsely guided reason, which wrongly imagines that it can sepa- rate the objects of the senses from the formal conditions of our sensibility, and represents them, though they are phenomena only, as objects by themselves, given to the understanding. In this case, however, nothing could be known of them a priori, nothing could be known syn- thetically through pure concepts of space, and the sci- ence which determines those concepts, namely, geometry, would itself become impossible. II \_Anticipations of Perception The principle which anticipates all perceptions as such, is this : In all phenomena sensation, and the Real which corresponds to it in the object {realitas phaenomenon), has an intensive quantity, that is, a degree ^ ] All knowledge by means of which I may know and determine a priori whatever belongs to empirical know- ledge, may be called an anticipation, and it is no doubt in this sense that Epicurus used the expression [p. 167] • 7r/3dA,7;i|rt9. But as there is always in phenomena some- thing which can never be known a priori, and constitutes the real difference between empirical and a priori know- ledge, namely, sensation (as matter of perception), it fol- lows that this can never be anticipated. The pure determinations, on the contrary, in space and time, as 1 Here follows in the Second Edition, Supplement XVI b. Transcendental Analytic 137 regards both figure and quantity, may be called antici- pations of phenomena, because they represent a priori, whatever may be given a posteriori in experience. If, however, there should be something in every sensation that could be known a priori as sensation in general, even if no particular sensation be given, this would, in a very special sense, deserve to be called anticipation, because it seems extraordinary that we should anticipate experience in that which concerns the matter of experi- ence and can be derived from experience only. Yet such is really the case. Apprehension, by means of sensation oi;ly, fills no more than one moment (if we do not take into account the suc- cession of many sensations). Sensation, therefore, being that in the phenomenon the apprehension of which does not form a successive synthesis progressing from parts to a complete representation, is without any extensive quan- tity, and the absence of sensation in one and the same mo- ment would represent it as empty, therefore = 0.- [p. 168] What corresponds in every empirical intuition to sensa- tion is reality {realitas phaenomenoii), what corresponds to its absence is negation = 0. C Every sensation, however, is capable of diminution, so that it may decrease, and grad- ually vanish. There is therefore a continuous connection between reality in phenomena and negation, by means of many possible intermediate sensations, the difference be- tween which is always smaller than the difference between the given sensation and zero or complete negation. It thus follows that the real in each phenomenon has always a quantity, though it is not perceived in apprehension, be- cause apprehension takes place by a momentary sensation, not by a successive synthesis of many sensations ; it does 138 Transcendental Analytic ' not advance from the parts to the whole, and though it has a quantity, it has not an extensive quantity. That quantity which can be apprehended as unjty onjy, and in which plurality can be represented by approxima- tion only to negation = 0, I call intensive qnantity. Every reality therefore in a phenomenon has intensive quantity, that is, a degree. If this reality is considered as a cause (whether of sensation, or of any other reality in the phe- nomenon, for instance, of change) the degree of that reality as a cause we call a momentum, for instance, the momentum of gravity : and this because the degree indi- cates that quantity only, the apprehension of [p. 169] which is not successive, but momentary. This I men- tion here in passing, because we have not yet come to consider causality. Every sensation, therefore, and every reaUty in ph_e- nomena, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive quantity which can always be diminished, and there is between reality and negation a continuous connection of possible realities, and of possible smaller perceptions. Every colour, red, for instance, has a degree, which, however small, is never the smallest; and the same applies to heat, the momentum of gravity, etc. This peculiar property of quantities that no part of them is the smallest possible part (no part indi- visible) is called continuity. Time and space are quanta continua, because there is no part of them that is not enclosed between limits (points and moments), no part that is not itself again a space or a time. Space con- sists of spaces only, time of times. Points and moments are only limits, mere places of limitation, and as places Transcendental Analytic 139 presupposing always those intuitions which they are meant to limit or to determine. Mere places or parts that might be given before space or time, could [p. 170] never be compounded into space or time. Such quanti- ties can also be called flowing, because the synthesis of the productive imagination which creates them is a progression in time, the continuity of which we are wont to express by the name of flowing, or passing away. j^l phenomena are therefore continuous quantities, whether according to their intuition as extensh'e, oj according to mere perc_eption (sensation and therefore reality) as intensive quantities. When there is a break in the synthesis of the manifold of phenomena, we get only an aggregate of many phenomena, not a phenom- enon, as a real quantum ; for aggregate is called that what is produced, not by the mere continuation of pro- ductive synthesis of a certain kind, but by the repeti- tion of a synthesis (beginning and) ending at every moment. If I call thirteen thalers a quantum of money, I am right, provided I understand by it the value of a mark of fine silver. This is a continuous quantity in which no part is the smallest, but every part may constitute a coin which contains material for still smaller coins. But if I understand by it thirteen round thalers, that is, so many coins (whatever their value in silver may be), then I should be wrong in speaking of a quantum of thalers, but should call it an aggregate, that is a number of coins. As every number must be founded on some unity, every [p. 171] phenomenon, as a unity, is a quantum, and, as such, a continuum. If then all phenomena, whether considered as exten- 140 Transcendental Analytic sive or intensive, are continuous quantities, it might seem easy to prove witli mathematical evidence that all change also (transition of a thing from one state into another) must I be continuous, if the causality of the change did not lie quite outside the limits of transcendental philosophy, and presupposed empirical principles. For the understand- ing a pi-iori tells us nothing of the possibility of a cause which changes the state of things, that is, determines them to the opposite of a given state, and this not only because it does not perceive the possibility of it (for such a perception is denied to us in several kinds of knowledge a priori), but because the changeability relates to certain determinations of phenomena to be taught by experience only, while their cause must lie in that which is unchangeable. But as the only ma- terials which we may use at present are the pure fundamental concepts of every possible experience, from which all that is empirical is excluded, we cannot here, without injuring the unity of our system, antici- pate general physical science which is based upon certain fundamental experiences. [p. 172] Nevertheless, there is no lack of evidence of the great influence which our fundamental principle exer- cises in anticipating perceptions, nay, even in making up for their deficiency, in so far as it (that principle) stops any false conclusions that might be drawn from this deficiency. If therefore all reality in perception has a certain degree, between which and negation there is an in- finite succession of ever smaller degrees, and if every sense must have a definite degree of receptivity of sen- sations, it follows that no perception, and therefore no Transcende7ital Analytic 141 experience, is possible, that could prove, directly or indirectly, by any roundabout syllogisms, a complete absence of all reality in a phenomenon. We see there- fore that experience can nevgr supply a proof of enrpty space or empty time,'^ because the total absence of reahty in a sensuous intuition can itself never be perceived, neither can it be deduced from any phenomenon what- soever and from the difference of degree in its reality ; nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation of it. For although the total intuition of a certain space or time is real all through, no part of it being empty, yet as every reality has its degree which, while the exten- sive quality of the phenomenon remains un- [p. 173] changed, may diminish by infinite degrees down to the nothing or void, there must be infinitely differing degrees in which space and time are filled, and the intensive quantity in phenomena may be smaller or greater, although the extensive quantity as given in intuition remains the same. We shall give an example. Almost all natural philos- ophers, perceiving partly by means of the momentum of gravity or weight, partly by means of the momentum of resistance against other matter in motion, that there is a great difference in the quantity of various kinds of matjter though their volume is the same, conclude unanimously that this volume (the extensive quantity of phenomena) must in all of them, though in differ- ent degrees, contain a certain amount of empty space. Who could have thought that these mathematical and mechanical philosophers should have based such a conclusion on a purely metaphysical hypothesis, which they always profess to avoid, by assuming that the real 142 Transcendental Analytic in space (I do not wish here to call it impenetrability or weight, because these are empirical concepts) must always be the same, and can differ only by its extensive quantity, that is, by the number of parts. I meet this hypothesis, for which they could find no ground in experience, and which therefore is purely metaphysical, by a transcendental demonstration, which, though it is not intended to explain the difference in the [p. 174J filling of spaces, will nevertheless entirely remove the imagined necessity of their hypothesis which tries to explain that difference by the admission of empty spaces, and which thus restores, at least to the under- standing, its liberty to explain to itself that difference in a different way, if any such hypothesis be wanted in natural philosophy. We can easily perceive that although the same spaces are perfectly filled by two different kinds of matter, so that there is no point in either of them where matter is not present, yet the real in either, the quality being the same, has its own degrees (of resistance or weight) which, without any diminution of its extensive quantity, may grow smaller and smaller in infinitum, before it reaches the void and vanishes. Thus a certain expansion which fills a space, for instance, heat, and every other kind of phe- nomenal reality, may, without leaving the smallest part of space empty, diminish by degrees in infinitum, and never- theless fill space with its smaller, quite as much as another phenomenon with greater degrees. I do not mean to say that this is really the case with different kinds of matter according to their specific of gravity. I only want to show by a fundamental principle of the pure [p. 175] understanding, that the nature of our perceptions renders Transcendental Analytic 143 such an explanation possible, and that it is wrong to look upon the real in phenomena as equal in degree, and differ- ing only in aggregation and its extensive quantity, nay to maintain this on the pretended authority of an a priori principle of the understanding. Nevertheless, this anticipation of perception is apt to startle ^ an enquirer accustomed to and rendered cautious by transcendental disquisitions, and we may naturally won- der that the understanding should be able to anticipate ^ a synthetical proposition with regard to the degree of all that is real in phenomena, and, therefore, with regard to the possibility of an internal difference of sensation itself, apart from its empirical quality ; and it seems therefore a question well worthy of a solution, how the understanding can pronounce synthetically and a priori about phenomena, nay, anticipate them with regard to what, properly speak- ing, is empirical, namely, sensation. The quality of sensation, colour, taste, etc., is always em- pirical, and cannot be conceived a priori. But the real that corresponds to sensations in general, as opposed to nega- tion = 0, does only represent something the concept of which implies being, and means nothing but the synthesis in any empirical consciousness. In the internal sense that empirical consciousness can be raised from O to [p. 176] any higher degree, so that an extensive quantity of intui- tion (for instance, an illuminated plain) excites the same 1 Kant wrote, etwas — etwas Attffallencies, the second elzvas being the adverb. Rosenkranz has left out one etiuas, \\>ithout necessity. It seems necessary, however, to add Uberlegung after transcendentalen, as done by Erd- mann. 2 Anticipiren kdnne must certainly be added, as suggested by Schopen- hauer. 144 Transcendental Analytic amount of sensation, as an aggregate of many other less illuminated plains. It is quite possible, therefore, to take no account of the extensive quantity of a phenomenon, and yet to represent to oneself in the mere sensation in any single moment a synthesis of a uniform progression from o to any given empirical consciousness. All sensa- tions, as such, are therefore given a posteriori'^ only, but their quality, in so far as they must possess a degree, can be known a priori. It is remarkable that of quantities in general we can know one quality only a priori, namely, their contiriuity, while with regard to quaUty (the real of phenomena) nothing is known to us a priori, but their in- tensive quantity, that is, that they must have a degree. Everything else is left to experience. Ill \The Analogies of Experience The general principle of them is : All phenomena, as far as their ex- istence is concerned, are subject a priori to rules, determining their mutual relation in one and the same time 2] [p. 177] The three modi of time 3.1& pen7ianence, succession, and coexistence. There will therefore be three rules of all relations of phenomena in time, by which the existence of every phenomenon with regard to the unity of time is determined, and these rules will precede all experience, nay, render experience possible. The general principle of the three analogies depends on the necessary unity of apperception with reference to 1 The first and later editions have a priori. The correction is first made in the Seventh Edition, 1828. ^ See Supplement XVII. Transce?tdental Analytic 145 every possible empirical consciousness (perception) at every time, and, consequently, as that unity forms an a priori ground, on the synthetical unity of all phenomena, according to their relation in time. For the original ap- perception refers to the internal sense (comprehending all representations), and it does so a priori to its form, that is, to the relation of the manifold of the empirical conscious- ness in time. The original apperception is intended to combine all this manifold according to its relations in time, for this is what is meant by its transcendental unity a priori, to which all is subject which is to belong to my own and my uniform knowledge, and thus to become an object for me. This synthetical unity in the time relations of all perceptions, which is determined a priori, is exposed therefore in the law, that all empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of the general [p. 178] determination of time ; and the analogies of experience, of which we are now going to treat, are exactly rules of this kind. These principles have this peculiarity, that they do not refer to phenomena and the synthesis of their empirical intuition, but only to the existence of phenomena and their mutual relation with regard to their existence. The man- ner in which something is apprehended as a phenomenon may be so determined a priori that the rule of its synthesis may give at the same time this intuition a priori in any empirical case, nay, may really render it possible. But the existence of phenomena can never be known a priori, and though we might be led in this way to infer some kind of existence, we should never be able to know it definitely, or to anticipate that by which the empirical intuition of one differs from that of others. 146 Transcendental Analytic The principles which we considered before and which, as they enable us to apply mathematics to phenomena, I called mathematical, refer to phenomena so far only as they are possible, and showed how, with regard both to their intuition and to the real in their perception, they can be produced according to the rules of a mathematical syn- thesis, so that, in the one as well as in the other, we may use numerical quantities, and with them a determination of all phenomena as quantities. Thus I might, [p. 179] for example, compound the degree of sensations of the sunlight out of, say, 200,000 illuminations by the moon, and thus determine it a priori or construct it. Those former principles might therefore be called constitutive. The case is totally different with those principles which are meant to bring the existence of phenomena under rules a priori, for as existence cannot be constructed, they can only refer to the relations of existence and become merely regulative principles. Here therefore we could not think of either axioms or anticipations, and whenever a perception is given us as related in time to some others (although undetermined), we could not say a priori what other perception or how great a perception is necessarily connected with it, but only how, if existing, it is neces- sarily connected with the other in a certain mode of time. In philosophy analogy means something very different to what it does in mathematics. In the latter they are for- mulas which state the equality of two quantitative relations, and they are always constitutive so that when three' terms of a proposition are given, the fourth also is given by it, that is, can be constructed out of it. In philosophy, 1 The First and Second Editions read ' Wlien two terms of a proposition are given, the third also.' Transcendc7ital Analytic ia.7 on the contrary, analogy does not consist in the equality of two quantitative, but of two qualitative relations, so that when three terms are given I may learn from them a priori the relation to a fourth only, but not that [p. i8o] fourth term itself. All I can thus gain is a rule according to which I may look in experience for the fourth term, or a characteristic mark by which I may find it. An analogy of experience can therefore be no more than a rule accord- ing to which a certain unity of experience may arise from perceptions (but not how perception itself, as an empirical intuition, may arise); it may serve as a principle for ob- jects (as phenomena 1) not in a constitutive, but only in a regulative capacity. Exactly the same applies to the postulates of empirical thought in general, which relate to the synthesis of mere intuition (the form of phenomena), the synthesis of per- ception (the matter of them), and the synthesis of experi- ence (the relation of these perceptions). They too are regulative principles only, and differ from the mathemati- cal, which are constitutive, not in their certainty, which is estabhshed in both a priori, but in the character of their evidence, that is, in that which is intuitive in it, and there- fore in their demonstration also. What has been remarked of all synthetical principles and must be enjoined here more particularly is this, that these analogies have their meaning and validity, not as principles of the transcendent, but only as princi- [p. i8i ] pies of the empirical use of the understanding. They can be established in this character only, nor can phenomena ever be comprehended under the categories directly, but 1 Read den Erscheinungen, 148 Transcendental Analytic only under their schemata. If the objects to which these principles refer were things by themselves, it would be perfectly impossible to know anything of them a priori and synthetically. But they are nothing but phenomena, and our whole knowledge of them, to which, after all, all principles a priori must relate, is only our possible experi- ence of them. Those principles therefore can aim at nothing but the conditions of the unity of empirical know- ledge in the synthesis of phenomena, which synthesis is represented only in the schema of the pure concepts of the understanding, while the category contains the func- tion, restricted by no sensuous condition, of the unity of this synthesis as synthesis in general. Those principles will therefore authorise us only to connect phenomena, according to analogy, with the logical and universal unity of concepts, so that, though in using the principle we use the category, yet in practice (in the application to phe- nomena) we put the schema of the category, as a practical key, in its^ place, or rather put it by the side of the category as a restrictive condition, or, as what may be called, a formula of the category. ' I read dej-en, and afterwards der ersteren, though even then the whole passage is very involved. Professor Noire thinks that dessen may be referred to Gebrauch, and des ersteren to Grundsatz. Ti-anscendental Aiialytic 149 A [p. 182J \_First Analogy Principle of Permanence^ All phenomena contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the changeable as its determination only, that is, as a mode in which the object exists Proof of the First Analogy All phenomena take place in time. Time can deter- mine in two ways the relation in the existence of phe- nomena, so far as they are either successive or coexistent. In the iirst case time is considered as a series, in the second as a whole.] Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is ' always successive, and therefore always changing. By it alone therefore we can never determine whether the man- ifold, as an object of experience, is coexistent or succes- sive, unless there is something in it which exists always, that is, something constant and permanent, while change and succession are nothing but so many kinds {modi) of time in which the permanent exists. Relations of time are therefore possible in the permanent only (coexistence and succession being the only relations of time) [p. 183] so that the permanent is the substratum of the empirical representation of time itself, and in it alone all determi- nation of time is possible. Permanence expresses time as the constant correlative of all existence of phenomena, of all change and concomitancy. For change does not affect time itself, but only phenomena in time (nor is ^ See Supplement XVIII. 150 Transcendental Analytic coexistence a mode of time itself, because in it no parts /can be coexistent, but successive only). If we were to ascribe a succession to time itself, it would be necessary to admit another time in which such succession should be possible. Only through the permanent does existence in different parts of a series of time assume a quantity which we call duration. For in mere succession existence always comes and goes, and never assumes the slightest quantity. Without something permanent therefore no relation of time is possible. > Time by itself, however, cannot be per- ceived, and it is therefore the permanent in phenomena that forms the substratum for all determination of time, and at the same time the condition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that is, of experience; while with regard to that permanent all existence and all change in time can only be taken as a mode of existence of what is permanent. '^ In all phenomena therefore the permanent is the object itself, that is, the substance (phe- nomenon), while all that changes or can change [p. 184] belongs only to the mode in which substance or substances exist, therefore to their determinations. I find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but also the man of common understanding has admitted this permanence as a substratum of all change of phenomena. It will be the same in future, only that a philosopher generally expresses himself somewhat more definitely by saying that in all changes in the world the substance remains, and only the accidents change. But I nowhere find even the attempt at a proof of this very synthetical proposition, and it occupies but seldom that place which it ought to occupy at the head of the pure and entirely a priori existing laws of nature. In fact the proposition Transcendental Analytic 1 1 \ that substance is permanent is tautological, because that permanence is the only ground why we apply the category of substance to a phenomenon, and it ought first to have been proved that there is in all phenomena something permanent, while the changeable is only a determination of its existence. But as such a proof can never be given dogmatically and as deduced from concepts, because it refers to a synthetical proposition a priori, and as no one ever thought that such propositions could be valid only in reference to possible experience, and could therefore be proved only by a deduction of the possibiHty of [p. 185] experience, we need not wonder that, though it served as the foundation of all experience (being felt to be indis- pensable for every kind of empirical knowledge), it has never been established by proof. A philosopher was asked, What is the weight of smoke? He replied, Deduct from the weight of the wood burnt the weight of the remaining ashes, and you have the weight of the smoke. He was therefore convinced that even in fire matter (substance) does not perish, but that its form only suffers a change. ;The proposition also, from nothing comes nothing, was only another conclusion from the same principle of permanence, or rather of the con- stant presence of the real subject in phenomena.) For if that which people call substance in a phenomenon is to be the true substratum for all determination in time, then all existence in the past as well as the future must be deter- mined in it, and in it only. Thus we can only give to a I phenomenon the name of substance because we admit its existence at all times, which is not even fully expressed by the word permanence, because it refers rather to future time only. The internal necessity however of permanence 152 Transcendental Analytic is inseparably connected with the necessity to have been always, and the expression may therefore stand, [p. 186] Gigni de niliilo nihil, in nihiluni nil posse reverti, were two propositions which the ancients never separated, but which at present are sometimes parted, because people imagine that they refer to things by themselves, and that the former might contradict the dependence of the world on a Supreme Cause (even with regard to its substance), an apprehension entirely needless, as we are only speak- ing here of phenomena in the sphere of experience, the unity of which would never be possible, if we allowed that new things (new in substance) could ever arise. For in that case we should lose that which alone can represent the unity of time, namely, the identity of the substratum, in which alone all change retains complete unity. This permanence, however, is nothing but the manner in which we represent the existence of things (as phenomenal). The different determinations of a substance, which are nothing but particular modes in which it exists, are called accidents. They are always real, because they concern the existence of a substance (negations are nothing but determinations which express the non-existence of some- thing in the substance). If we want to ascribe a particular kind of existence to these real determinations of the sub- stance, as, for instance, to motion, as an accident of mat- ter, we call it inlierence, in order to distinguish it from the existence of substance, which ^ we call subsistence. This, however, has given rise to many misunderstand- [p. 187] ings, and we shall express ourselves "better and more cor- rectly, if we define the accident through the manner only 1 Read das man. Transcendental Analytic 153 in which the existence of a substance is positively deter- mined. It is inevitable, however, according to the condi- 1 tions of the logical use of our understanding, to separate, as it were, whatever can change in the existence of a substance, while the substance itself remains unchanged, and to consider it in its relation to that which is radical and truly permanent. Hence a place has been assigned to this category under the title of relations, not so much because it contains itself a relation, as because it contains their condition. On this permanence depends also the right understand- ing of the concept of change. To arise and to perish are not changes 9f that which arises or perishes. Change is a mode of existence, which follows another mode of existence of the same object. Hence whatever changes is permanent, and its condition only changes. As this alteration refers only to determinations which may have an end or a beginning, we may use an expression that seems somewhat paradoxical and say : the permanent only (substance) is changed, the changing itself suffers no change, but only an alteration, certain determinations ceasing to exist, while others begin. It is therefore in substances only that change [p. 188] can be perceived. Arising or perishing absolutely, and not referring merely to a determination of the permanent can never become a possible perception, because it is the permanent only which renders the representations of a transition from one state to another, from not being to being, possible, which (changes) consequently can only be known empirically, as alternating determinations of what is permanent. If you suppose that something has an absolute beginning, you must have a moment of time in 154 Transcendental Analytic which it was not. But with what can you connect that moment, if not with that which already exists ? An empty antecedent time cannot be an object of perception. But if you connect this beginning with things which existed already and continue to exist till the beginning of some- thing new, then the latter is only a determination of the former, as of the permanent. The same holds good with regard to perishing, for this would presuppose the empiri- cal representation of a time in which a phenomenon exists no longer. Substances therefore (as phenomena) are the true sub- strata of all determinations of time. If some substances could arise and others perish, the only condition of the empirical unity of time would be removed, and phenomena would then be referred to two different times, in which existence would pass side by side, which is absurd. For there is but one time in which all different times [p. 189] must be placed, not as simultaneous, but as successive. Permanence, therefore, is a necessary condition under which alone phenomena, as things or objects, can be determined in a possible experience. What the empirical criterion of this necessary permanence, or of the substan- tiality of phenomena may be, we shall have to explain in the sequel. Transcendental Analytic \ct B \Second Analogy Principle of Production i Everything that happens (begins to be), presupposes something on which it follows according to a rule] Proof The apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always successive. The representations of the parts fol- low one upon another. Whether they also follow one upon the other in the object is a second point for reflec- tion, not contained in the former. We may indeed call everything, even every representation, so far as we are conscious of it, an object ; but it requires a more profound investigation to discover what this word may [p. 190] mean with regard to phenomena, not in so far as they (as representations) are objects, but in so far as they only signify an object. So far as they, as representations only, are at the same time objects of consciousness, they cannot be distinguished from our apprehension, that is from their being received in the synthesis of our imagination, and we must therefore say, that the manifold of phenomena is always produced in the mind successively. If phenomena were things by themselves, the succession of the represen- tations of their manifold would never enable us to judge how that manifold is connected in the object. We have always to deal with our representations only ; how things may be by themselves (without reference to the represen- tations by which they affect us) is completely beyond the 1 See Supplement XIX. 156 Transcendental Analytic sphere of our knowledge. Since, therefore, phenomena are not things by themselves, and are yet the only thing that can be given to us to know, I am asked to say what kind of connection in time belongs to the manifold of the phenomena itself, when the representation of it in our apprehension is always successive. Thus, for instance, the apprehension of the manifold in the phenomenal appearance of a house that stands before me, is succes- sive. The question then arises, whether the manifold of the house itself be successive by itself, which of course no one would admit. Whenever I ask for the transcen- dental meaning of my concepts of an object, I find that a house is not a thing by itself, but a phenomenon [p. 191] only, that is, a representation the transcendental object of which is unknown. What then can be the meaning of the question, how the manifold in the phenomenon itself (which is not a thing by itself) may be connected t Here that which is contained in our successive apprehension is considered as representation, and the given phenomenon, though it is nothing but the whole of those representa- tions, as their object, with which my concept, drawn from the representations of my apprehension, is to accord. As the accord between knowledge and its object is truth, it is easily seen, that we can ask here only for the formal con- ditions of empirical truth, and that the phenomenon, in contradistinction to the representations of our apprehen- sion, can only be represented as the object different from them, if it is subject to a rule distinguishing it from every other apprehension, and necessitating a certain kind of conjunction of the manifold. That which in the phe- nomenon contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is tlie object. Transcendental Analytic 157 Let us now proceed to our task. That something takes place, that is, that something, or some state, which did not exist before, begins to exist, cannot be perceived em- pirically, unless there exists antecedently a phenomenon which does not contain that state ; for a reality, following on empty time, that is a beginning of existence, [p. 192] preceded by no state of things, can be apprehended as little as empty time itself. Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception following on another per- ception. But as this applies to all synthesis of apprehen- sion, as I showed before in the phenomenal appearance of a house, that apprehension would not thereby be different from any other. But I observe at the same time, that if in a phenomenon which contains an event I call the ante- cedent state of perception A, and the subsequent B, B can only follow A in my apprehension, while the perception A can never follow B, but can only precede it. I see, for instance, a ship gliding down a stream. My perception of its place below follows my perception of its place higher up in the course of the stream, and it is impossible in the apprehension of this phenomenon that the ship should be perceived iirst below and then higher up. We see there- fore that the order in the succession of perceptions in our apprehension is here determined, and our apprehension regulated by that order. In the former example of a house ray perceptions could begin in the apprehension at the roof and end in the basement, or begin below and end above: they could apprehend the manifold of the empirical intuition from right to left or from left to right. There was therefore no determined order in the succession of these perceptions, determining the point where [p. 193] I had to begin in apprehension, in order to connect the 158 Transcendental Andlytic manifold empirically ; while in the apprehension of an event there is always a rule, which makes the order of the successive perceptions (in the apprehension of this phe- nomenon) necessary. In our case, therefore, we shall have to derive the sub- jective succession in our apprehension from the objective succession of the phenomena, because otherwise the for- mer would be entirely undetermined, and unable to dis- ' tinguish one phenomenon from another. The former alone proves nothing as to the connection of the manifold in the object, because it is quite arbitrary. The latter must therefore consist in the order of the manifold in a phenomenon, according to which the apprehension of what is happening follows upon the apprehension of what has happened, in conformity with a rule. Thus only can I be justified in saying, not only of my apprehension, but of the phenomenon itself, that there exists in it a succession, which is the same as to say that I cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in that very succession. In conformity with this, there must exist in that which always precedes an event the condition of a rule, by which this event follows at all times, and necessarily ; [p. 194J but I cannot go back from the event and determine by apprehension that which precedes. For no phenomenon goes back from the succeeding to the preceding point of time, though it is related to some preceding point of time, while the progress from a given time to a determined fol- I lowing time is necessary. Therefore, as there certainly is something that follows, I must necessarily refer it to some- thing else which precedes, and upon which it follows by rule, that is, by necessity. So that the event, as being Transcendental Analytic 159 conditional, affords a safe indication of some Icind of con- dition, while that condition itself determines the event. If we supposed that nothing precedes an event upon which such event must follow according to rule, all succes- sion of perception would then exist in apprehension only, that is, subjectively ; but it would not thereby be deter- mined objectively, what ought properly to be the antece- dent and what the subsequent in perception. We should thus have a mere play of representations unconnected with any object, that is, no phenomenon would, by our perception, be distinguished in time from any other phe- nomenon, because the succession in apprehension would always be uniform, and there would be nothing in the phenomena to determine the succession, so as to render a certain sequence objectively necessary. I could not say therefore that two states follow each other in a phenome- non, but only that one apprehension follows [p. 195] another, which is purely subjective, and does not deter- mine any object, and cannot be considered therefore as knowledge of anything (even of something purely phe- nomenal). If therefore experience teaches us that something hap- pens, we always presuppose that something precedes on which it follows by rule. Otherwise I could not say of the object that it followed, because its following in my apprehension only, without being determined by rule in reference to what precedes, would not justify us in admit- ting an objective following.'' It is therefore always with reference to a rule by which phenomena as they follow, that is as they happen, are determined by an antecedent 1 'Rta.A.anzunehmen berechtigt. i6o Transcendental Analytic state, that I can give an objective character to my sub- jective synthesis (of apprehension); nay, it is under this supposition only that an experience of anything that hap- pens becomes possible. It might seem indeed as if this were in contradiction to all that has always been said on the progress of the human understanding, it having been supposed that only by a perception and comparison of many events, following in the same manner on preceding phenomena, we were led to the discovery of a rule according to which certain events always follow on certain phenomena, and that thus only we were enabled to form to ourselves the concept of a cause. If this were so, that concept would be [p. 196] empirical only, and the rule which it supplies, that every- thing which happens must have a cause, would be as acci- dental as experience itself. The universality and necessity of that rule would then be fictitious only, and devoid of any true and general validity, because not being a priori, but founded on induction only. The case is the same as with other pure representations a priori (for instance space and time), which we are only able to draw out as pure concepts from experience, because we have put them first into experience, nay, have rendered experience possible only by them. It is true, no doubt, that the logical clear- ness of this representation of a rule, determining the suc- cession of events, as a concept of cause, becomes possible only when we have used it in experience, but, as the con- dition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, it was nevertheless the foundation of all experience, and . consequently preceded it a priori. It is necessary therefore to show by examples that we never, even in experience, ascribe the sequence or conse- Transcendental Analytic i6i quence (of an event or something happening that did not exist before) to the object, and distinguish it from the sub- jective sequence of our apprehension, except when there is a rule which forces us to observe a certain order of per- ceptions, and no other; nay, that it is this force which from the first renders the representation of a [p. 197] succession in the object possible. We have representations within us, and can become conscious of them ; but however far that consciousness may extend, and however accurate and minute it may be, yet the representations are always representations only, that is, internal determinations of our mind in this or that relation of time. What right have we then to add to these representations an object, or to ascribe to these modifications, beyond their subjective reality, another ob- jective one.? Their objective character cannot consist in their relation to another representation (of that which one wished to predicate of the object), for thus the question would only arise again, how that representation could again go beyond itself, and receive an objective character in addition to the subjective one, which belongs to it, as a determination of our mind. If we try to find out what new quality or dignity is imparted to our representations by their relation to an object, we find that it consists in nothing but the rendering necessary the connection of representations in a certain way, and subjecting them to a rule; and that on the other hand they receive their objective character only because a certain order is neces- sary in the time relations of our representations. In the synthesis of phenomena the manifold [p. 198] of our representations is always successive. No object can thus be represented, because through the succession 1 62 Trmiscendental Analytic which is common to all apprehensions, nothing can be distinguished from anything else. But as soon as I per- ceive or anticipate that there is in this succession a rela- tion to an antecedent state from which the representation follows by rule, then something is represented as an event, or as something that happens : that is to say, I know an object to which I must assign a certain position in time, which, after the preceding state, cannot be different from what it is. If therefore I perceive that something hap- pens, this representation involves that something preceded, because the phenomenon receives its position in time with reference to what preceded, that is, it exists after a time in which it did not exist. Its definite position in time can only be assigned to it, if in the antecedent state something is presupposed on which it always follows by rule. It thus follows that, first of all, I cannot invert the order, and place that which happens before that on which it follows ; secondly, that whenever the antecedent state is there, the other event must follow inevitably and neces- sarily. Thus it happens that there arises an order among our representations, in which the present state [p. 199] (as having come to be), points to an antecedent state, as. a correlative of the event that is given ; a correlative which, though as yet indefinite, refers as determining to the event, as its result, and connects that event with itself by necessity, in the succession of time. If then it is a necessary law of our sensibility, and therefore a formal condition of all perception, that a pre- ceding necessarily determines a succeeding time (because I cannot arrive at the succeeding time except through the preceding), it is also an indispensable law of the empirical representation of the series of time that the phenomena of Transcendental Analytic 163 past time determine every existence in succeeding times, nay, that these, as events, cannot take place except so far as the former determine their existence in time, that is, determine it by rule. For it is of course in phenomena only that we cart know empirically this continuity in the cohe- rence of times. What is required for all experience and renders it pes- ' sible is the understanding, and the first that is added by it is not that it renders the representation of objects clear, but that it really renders the representation of any object for the first time possible. This takes place by the understanding transferring the order of time to the phe- nomena and their existence, and by assigning to each of them as to a consequence a certain a priori determined place in time, with reference to antecedent phenomena, without which place phenomena would not be in [p. 200] accord with time, which determines a priori their places to all its parts. This determination of place cannot be derived from the relation in which phenomena stand to absolute time (for that can never be an object of percep- tion); but, on the contrary, phenomena must themselves determine to each other their places in time, and render them necessary in the series of time. In other words, what happens or follows must follow according to a general rule on that which was contained in a previous state. We thus get a series of phenomena which, by means of the under- standing, produces and makes necessary in the series of possible perceptions the same order and continuous cohe- rence which exists a priori in the form of internal intui- tion (time), in which all perceptions must have their place. That something happens is therefore a perception which belongs to a possible experience, and this experi- 164 Transcendental Analytic ence becomes real when I consider the phenomenon as determined with regard to its place in time, that is to say, as an object which can always be found, according to a rule, in the connection of perceptions. This rule, by which we determine everything according to the succes- sion of time, is this : the condition under which an event follows at all times (necessarily) is to be found in what precedes. All possible experience therefore, that is, all objective knowledge of phenomena with regard to their relation in the succession of time, depends on [p. 201] 'the principle of sufficient reason.' The proof of this principle rests entirely on the fol- lowing considerations. All empirical knowledge requires synthesis of the manifold by imagination, which is always successive, one representation following upon the other. That succession, however, in the imagination is not at all determined with regard to the order in which something precedes and something follows, and the series of succes- sive representations may be taken as retrogressive as well as progressive. If that synthesis, however, is a synthesis of apperception (of the manifold in a given phenomenon), then the order is determined in the object, or, to speak more accurately, there is then in it an order of successive synthesis which determines the object, and according to which something must necessarily precede, and, when it is once there, something else must necessarily follow. If therefore my perception is to contain the knowledge of an event, or something that really happens, it must consist of an empirical judgment, by which the succession is sup- posed to be determined, so that the event presupposes another phenomenon in time on which it follows neces- sarily and according to a rule. If it were different, if the Transcendental Analytic 165 antecedent phenomenon were there, and the event did not follow on it necessarily, it would become to me a mere play of my subjective imaginations, or if I thought it to be objective, I should call it a dream. It is therefore the relation of phenomena (as possible perceptions) [p. 202] according to which the existence of the subsequent (what happens) is determined in time by something antecedent necessarily and by rule, or, in other words, the relation of cause and effect, which forms the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments with regard to the series of perceptions, and therefore also the condi- tion of the empirical truth of them, and of experience. The principle of the causal relation in the succession of phenomena is valid therefore for all objects of experience, also (under the conditions of succession), because that principle is itself the ground of the possibility of such experience. Here, however, we meet with a difficulty that must first be removed. The principle of the causal connection of phenomena is restricted in our formula to their succession, while in practice we find that it applies also to their coexist- ence, because cause and effect may exist at the same time. There may be, for instance, inside a room heat which is not found in the open air. If I look for its cause, I find a heated stove. But that stove, as cause, exists at the same time with its effect, the heat of the room, and there is therefore no succession in time between cause and effect, but they are coexistent, and yet the law applies. The fact is, that the greater portion of the active [p. 203J causes 1 in nature is coexistent with its effects, and the' 1 The reading of the First Edition is Ursache; Ursachen is a conjecture made by Rosenkranz; and approved by others. 1 66 Ti-anscendental Analytic succession of these effects in time is due only to this, that a cause cannot produce its whole effect in one moment. But at the moment in which an effect first arises it is always coexistent with the causality of its cause, because if that had ceased one moment before, the effect would 'never have happened. Here we must well consider that what is thought of is the order, not the lapse of time, and that the relation remains, even if no time had lapsed. The time between the causality of the cause and its im- mediate effect can be vanishing (they may be simultane- ous), but the relation of the one to the other remains for all that determinable in time. If I look upon a ball that rests on a soft cushion, and makes a depression in it, as a cause, it is simultaneous with its effect. But I neverthe- less distinguish the two through the temporal relation of ' dynamical connection. For if I place the ball on a cush- ion, its smooth surface is followed by a depression, while, if there is a depression in the cushion (I know not whence), a leaden ball does by no means follow from it. The succession in time is therefore the only empirical criterion of an effect with regard to the causality of the cause which precedes it. The glass is the cause of the rising of the water above its horizontal surface, [p. 204] although both phenomena are simultaneous. For as soon as I draw water in a glass from a larger vessel, something follows, namely, the change of the horizontal state which it had before into a concave state which it assumes in the glass. This causality leads to the concept of action, that to the concept of force, and lastly, to the concept of sub- stance. As I do not mean to burden my critical task, which only concerns the sources of synthetical knowledge Transcendeittal Analytic 167 a priori, with analytical processes which aim at the ex- planation, and not at the expansion of our concepts, I leave a fuller treatment of these to a future system of pure reason ; nay, I may refer to many well-known man- uals in which such an analysis may be found. I cannot pass, however, over the empirical criterion of a substance, so far as it seems to manifest itself, not so much through the permanence of the phenomenon as through action. Wherever there is action, therefore activity and force, there must be substance, and in this alone the seat of that fertile source of phenomena can be sought. This sounds very well, but if people are asked to explain what they mean by substance, they find it by no means easy to answer without reasoning in a circle. How can [p. 205] we conclude immediately from the action to the penna- nence of the agent, which nevertheless is an essential and peculiar characteristic of substance {phaenomenon)} After what we have explained before, however, the an- swer to this question is not so difficult, though it would be impossible, according to the ordinary way of proceed- ing analytically only with our concepts. Action itself implies the relation of the subject of the causality to the effect. As all effect consists in that which happens, that is, in the changeable, indicating time in succession, the last subject of it is the permanent, as the substratum of all that changes, that is substance. For, according to the principle of causality, actions are always the first ground of all change of phenomena, and cannot exist therefore in a subject that itself changes, because in that case other actions and another subject would be required to deter- mine that change. Action, therefore, is a sufficient em- pirical criterion to prove substantiality, nor is it necessary 1 68 Transcendental Analytic that I should first establish its permanency by means of compared perceptions, which indeed would hardly be pos- sible in this way, at least with that completeness which is required by the magnitude and strict universality of the concept. That the first subject of the causality of all aris- ing and perishing cannot itself (in the field of phenomena) arise and perish, is a safe -conclusion, pointing in [p. 206] the end to empirical necessity and permanency in exist- ence, that is, the concept of a substance as a phenomenon. If anything happens, the mere fact of something aris- ing, without any reference to what it is, is in itself a mat- ter for enquiry. The transition from the not-being of a state into that state, even though it contained no quality whatever as a phenomenon, must itself be investigated. This arising, as we have shown in No. A, does not con- cern the substance (because a substance never arises), but its state only. It is therefore mere change, and not an arising out of nothing. When such an arising is looked upon as the effect of a foreign cause, it is called creation. This can never be admitted as an event among phenom- ena, because its very possibility would destroy the unity of experience. If, however, we consider all things, not as phenomena, but as things by themselves and objects of the understanding only, then, though they are substances, they may be considered as dependent in their existence on a foreign cause. Our words would then assume quite a different meaning, and no longer be applicable to phe- nomena, as possible objects of experience. How anything can be changed at all, how it is possible that one state in a given time is followed by an- [p. 207] other at another time, of that we have not the slightest conception a priori. We want for that a knowledge of Transcendental Analytic 169 real powers, which can be given empirically only : for instance, a knowledge of motive powers, or what is the same, a knowledge of certain successive phenomena (as movements) which indicate the presence of such forces. What can be considered a priori, according to the law of causality and the conditions of time, are the form of every change, the condition under which alone, as an arising of another state, it can take place (its contents, that is, the state, which is changed, being what it may), and therefore the succession itself of the states (that which has hap- pened).^ When a substance passes from one state a into another b, the moment of the latter is different from the moment of the former state, and follows it. Again, that second state, as a reality (in phenomena), differs from the first in which that reality did not exist, as b from zero ; that is, even if the state b differed from the state a in quantity only, that change is an arising of b — a, which in the former state was non-existent, and in relation to [p. 208] which that state is = o. The question therefore arises how a thing can pass from ! a state =« to another ^b} Between two moments there is always a certain time, and between two states in these two moments there is always a difference which must have a certain quantity, because all parts of phenomena are always themselves quantities. Every transition there- fore from one state into another takes place in a certain time between two moments, the first of which determines ' It should be remarked that I am not speaking here of the change o-f certain relations, but of the change of a state. Therefore when a body moves in a uniform way, it does not change its state of movement, but it does so when its motion increases or decreases. 170 Transcendental Analytic the state from which a thing arises, the second that at which it arrives. Both therefore are the temporal limits of a change or of an intermediate state between two states, and belong as such to the whole of the change. Every change, however, has a cause which proves its causality during the whole of the time in which the change takes place. The cause therefore does not pro- duce the change suddenly (in one moment), but during a certain time ; so that, as the time grows from the initiatory moment a to its completion in /;, the quantity of reality also ip — a) is produced through all the smaller degrees between the first and the last. All change therefore is possible only through a continuous action of causality which, so far as it is uniform, is called a mo- [p. 209] mentum. A change does not consist of such momenta, but is produced by them as their effect. This is the law of continuity in all change, founded on this, that neither time nor a phenomenon in time consists of parts which are the smallest possible, and that never- theless the state of a thing which is being changed passes through all these parts, as elements, to its new state. No difference of the real in phenomena and no difference in the quantity of times is ever the smallest ; and thus the new state of reality grows from the first state in which that reality did not exist through all the infinite degrees thereof, the differences of which from one another are smaller than that between zero and a. It does not concern us at present of what utility this principle may be in physical science. But how such a principle, which seems to enlarge our knowledge of nature so much, can be possible a priori, that requires a careful investigation, although we can see that it is real and true, Transcettdental Analytic \'/\ and might thus imagine that the question how it was pos- sible is unnecessary. For there are so many unfounded pretensions to enlarge our knowledge by pure reason that we must accept it as a general principle, to be always dis- trustful, and never to believe or accept any- [p. 210] thing of this kind without documents capable of a thor- ough deduction, however clear the dogmatical proof of it may appear. All addition to our empirical knowledge and every ad-| vance in perception is nothing but an enlargement of the determinations of our internal sense, that is, a progression in time, whatever the objects may be, whether phenomena or pure intuitions. This progression in time determines everything, and is itself determined by nothing else, that is, the parts of that progression are only given in time, and through the synthesis of time, but not time before this synthesis. For this reason every transition in our perception to something that follows in time is really a determination of time through the production of that per- ception, and as time is always and in all its parts a quantity, the production of a perception as a quantity, through all degrees (none of them being the smallest), from zero up to its determined degree. This shows how it is possible to know a priori a law of changes, as far as their form is concerned. We are only anticipating our own apprehen- sion, the formal condition of which, as it dwells in us before all given phenomena, may well be known a prion. In the same manner therefore in which time contains the sensuous condition a priori of the possi- [p. 211 J bility of a continuous progression of that which exists to that which follows, the understanding, by means of the unity of apperception, is a condition a priori of the possi- 172 Transcendental Analytic bility of a continuous determination of the position of all phenomena in that time, and this through a series of causes and effects, the former producing inevitably the existence of the latter, and thus rendering the empirical knowledge of the relations of time valid for all times (universally) and therefore objectively valid. C [ Third Analogy Principle of Comnmnity All substances, in so far as they are coexistent, stand in complete community, that is, reciprocity one to another i] Proof Things are coexistent in so far as they exist at one and the same time. But how can we know that they exist at one and the same time ? Only if the order in the syn- thesis of apprehension of the manifold is indifferent, that is, if I may advance from A through B, C, D, to E, or contrariwise from E to A. For, if the synthesis were successive in time (in the order beginning with A and ending with E), it would be impossible to begin the appre- hension with the perception of E and to go backwards to A, because A belongs to past time, and can no longer be an object of apprehension. [p. 212] If we supposed it possible that in a number of sub- ' stances, aj phenornena, each were perfectly isolated, so that none influenced another or received influences from 1 See Supplement XX. Transcendental Analytic 173 another, then the coexistence of them could never become an object of possible perception, nor could the existence of the one through any process of empirical synthesis lead us on to the existence of another. For if we imagined that they were separated by a perfectly empty space, a percep- tion, proceeding from the one in time to the other might no doubt determine the existence of it by means of a sub- sequent perception, but would never be able to determine whether that phenomenon followed objectively on the other or was coexistent with it. There must therefore be something besides their mere '■ existence by which A determines its place in time for B, and B for A, because thus only can these two substances be represented empirically as coexistent. Nothing, how- ever, can determine the place of anything else in time, except that which is its cause or the cause of its deter- minations. Therefore every substance (since it can be effect with regard to its determinations only) must contain in itself the causality of certain determinations in another substance, and, at the same time, the effects of the causal- ity of that other substance, that is, substances must stand in dynamical communion, immediately or medi- [p. 213] ately, with each other, if their coexistence is to be known in any possible experience. Now, everything without which the experience of any objects would be impossible, may be said to be necessary with reference to such objects of experience ; from which it follows that it is necessary for all substances, so far as they are coexistent as phe- nomena, to stand in a complete communion of reciprocity with each other. The word communion (Gemeinschaft) may be used in two senses, meaning either communio or commercium. 174 Transcendental Analytic We use it here in the latter sense : as a dynamical com- munion without which even the local communio spatii could never be known empirically. '' We can easily per- ceive in our experience, that continuous influences only can lead our senses in all parts of space from one object to another ;^ that the light which plays between our eyes and celestial bodies produces a mediate communion be- tween us and them, and proves the coexistence of the latter ; that we cannot change any place empirically (per- ceive such a change) unless matter itself renders the per- ception of our own place possible to us, and that by means of its reciprocal influence only matter can evince its simul- taneous existence, and thus (though mediately only) its coexistence, even to the most distant objects. Without this communion every perception (of any phe- [p. 214] nomenon in space) is separated from the others, and the chain of empirical representations, that is, experience itself, would have to begin de novo with every new object, without the former experience being in the least connected with it, or standing to it in any temporal relation. I do not want to say anything here against empty space. Empty space may exist where perception cannot reach, and where therefore no empirical knowledge of coexist- ence takes place, but, in that case, it is no object for any possible experience. The following remarks may elucidate this. It is neces- sary that in our mind all phenomena, as being contained in a possible experience, must share a communion of ap- perception, and if the objects are to be represented as connected in coexistence, they must reciprocally determine their place in time, and thus constitute a whole. If this subjective communion is to rest on an objective ground, or Transcendental Analytic 175 is to refer to phenomena as substances, then the percep- tion of the one as cause must render possible the per- ception of the other, and vice versa: so that the succession which always exists in perceptions, as apprehensions, may not be attributed to the objects, but that the objects should be represented as existing simultaneously. This is a recip- rocal influence, that is a real comvierciimt of substances, without which the empirical relation of co-exist- [p. 215 j ence would be impossible in our experience. Through this commercium, phenomena as being apart from each other and yet connected, constitute a compound {composi- tum reale), and such compounds become possible in many ways. The three dynamical relations, therefore, from which all others are derived, are inJierence, consequence, and composition. ******** These are the three analogies of experience. They are nothing but principles for determining the existence of phenomena in time, according to its three modes. First, the relation of time itself, as to a quantity (quantity of existence, that is duration). Secondly, the relation in time, as in a series (successively). And thirdly, likewise in time, as the whole of all existence (simultaneously). This unity in the determination of time is dynamical only, that is, time is not looked upon as that in which experience assigns immediately its place to every existence, for this would be impossible ; because absolute time is no object of perception by which phenomena could be held together ; but the rule of the understanding through which alone the existence of phenomena can receive synthetical unity in time determines the place of each of them in time, there- fore a priori and as valid for all time. 176 Transcendental Analytic ! By nature (in the empirical sense of the word) [p. 216] we mean the coherence of phenomena in their existence, according to necessary rules, that is, laws. There are therefore certain laws, and they exist a priori, which them- selves make nature possible, while the empirical laws exist and are discovered through experience, but in accordance with those original laws which first render experience pos- 1 sible. Our analogies therefore represent the unity of nature in the coherence of all phenomena, under certain exponents, which express the relation of time (as compre- hending all existence) to the unity of apperception, which apperception can only take place in the synthesis accord- ing to rules. The three analogies, therefore, simply say, that all phenomena exist in one nature, and must so exist because, without such unity a priori no unity of experi- ence, and therefore no determination of objects in experi- ence, would be possible. With regard to the mode of proof, by which we have arrived at these transcendental laws of nature and its peculiar character, a remark must be made which will become important as a rule for any other attempt to prove intelligible, and at the same time synthetical propositions a prior i. If we had attempted to prove these analogies dogmatically, that is from con- cepts, showing that all which exists is found only in that which is permanent, that every event [p. 217] presupposes something in a previous state on which it follows by rule, and lastly, that in the manifold which is coexistent, states coexist in relation to each other by rule, all our labour would have been in vain. For we may analyse as much as we like, we shall never arrive from one object and its existence at the existence Transcendental Analytic 177 of another, or at its mode of existence by means of the concepts of these things only. What else then remained ? There remained the possibility of expe- rience, as that knowledge in which all objects must in the end be capable of being given to us, if their representation is to have any objective reality for us. In this, namely in the synthetical unity of appercep- 1 tion of all phenomena, we discovered the conditions a priori of an absolute and necessary determination in time of all phenomenal existence. Without this even the empirical determinations in time would be impossible, and we thus .established the rules of the synthetical unity a priori, by which we might antici- pate experience. It was because people were ignorant of this method, and imagined that they could prove dogmatically synthetical propositions which the empir- ical use of the understanding follows as its principles, that so many and always unsuccessful attempts have been made to prove the proposition of the ' sufficient reason.' The other two analogies have not even been thought of, though everybody followed them uncon- sciously.i because the method of the categories [p. 218] was wanting, by which alone every gap in the under- 1 The unity of the universe, in which all phenomena are supposed to be connected, is evidently a mere deduction of the quietly adopted principle of the communion of all substances as coexistent; for if they were isolated, they would not form parts of a whole, and if their connection (the reciprocity of the manifold) were not necessary for the sake of their coexistence, it would be impossible to use the latter, which is a purely ideal relation, as a proof of the former, 'which is real. We have shown, however, that communion is really the ground of the possibility of an empirical knowledge of coexistence, and that really we can only conclude from this the existence of the former, as its condition. 178 Transcendental Analytic standing, both with regard to concepts and principles, can be discovered and pointed out. IV The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General 1. What agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in intuition and in concepts) is possible 2. What is connected with the material conditions of experience (sensa- tion) is real 3. That which, in its connection with the real, is determined by uni^ versal conditions of experience, is (exists as) necessary Explanation [p. 219] The categories of modality have this peculiar character that, as determining an object, they do not enlarge in the least the concept to which they are attached as predicates, but express only a relation to our faculty of knowledge. ' Even when the concept of a thing is quite complete, I can still ask with reference to that object, whether it is pos- sible only, or real also, and, if the latter, whether it is necessary .■" ) No new determinations of the object are thereby conceived, but it is only asked in what relation it (with all its determinations) stands to the understanding and its empirical employment, to the empirical faculty of judgment, and to reason, in its application to experience.' The principles of modality are therefore nothing but explanations of the concepts of possibility, reality, and necessity, in their empirical employment, confining all categories to an empirical employment only, and prohibit- ing their transcendental^ use. For if these categories are 1 Here the same as transcendent. Transcendental Analytic 179 not to have a purely logical character, expressing the forms of thought analytically, but are to refer to things, their possibility, reality, or necessity, they must have reference to possible experience and its synthetical unity, in which alone objects of knowledge can be given. The postulate of the possibility of things [p. 220] ' demands that the concept of these should agree with the formal conditions of experience in general. This, the ob- jective form of experience in general, contains all synthesis which is required for a knowledge of objects. A concept is to be considered as empty, and as referring to no object, if the synthesis which it contains does not belong to experience, whether as borrowed from it (in which case it is called an empirical concept), or as a synthesis on which, as a condition a priori, all experience (in its form) depends, in which case it is a pure concept, but yet belonging to experience, because its object can only be found in it. For whence could the character of the possibility of an object, which can be conceived by a synthetical concept a priori, be derived, except from the synthesis which con- stitutes the form of all empirical knowledge of objects > It is no doubt a necessary logical condition, that such a concept must contain nothing contradictory, but this is by no means sufficient to establish the objective reality of a concept, that is, the possibility of such an object, as is con- ceived by a concept. Thus in the concept of a figure to be enclosed between two straight lines, there is nothing contradictory, because the concepts of two straight lines and their meeting contain no negation of a fig- [p. 221] ure. The impossibility depends, not on the concept itself, but on its construction in space, that is, the conditions of space and its determinations, and it is these that have ob- i8o Transcendental Analytic jective reality, or apply to possible things, because they contain a priori in themselves the form of experience in general. ' And now we shall try to explain the manifold usefulness and influence of this postulate of possibility. If I repre- sent to myself a thing that is permanent, while everything which changes belongs merely to its state, I can never know from such a concept by itself that a thing of that kind is possible. Or, if I represent to myself something so constituted that, when it is given, something else must at all times and inevitably follow upon it, this may no doubt be conceived without contradiction, but we have as yet no means of judging whether such a quality, viz. causality, is to be met with in any possible object. Lastly, I can very well represent to myself different things (sub- stances) so constituted, that the state of the one produces an effect on the state of the other, and this reciprocally; but whether such a relation can belong to any things can- not be learned from these concepts which contain a purely arbitrary synthesis. The objective reality of these con- cepts is only known when we see that they [p. 222] express a priori the relations of perceptions in every kind of experience; and this objective reality, that is, their transcendental truth, though independent of all experi- ence, is nevertheless not independent of all relation to the form of experience in general, and to that synthetical unity in which alone objects can be known empirically. ' But if we should think of framing new concepts of sub- stances, forces, and reciprocal actions out of the material supplied to us by our perceptions, without borrowing from I experience the instance of their connection, we should en- tangle ourselves in mere cobwebs of our brain, the possi- Transcendental Analytic i^i bility of which could not be tested by any criteria, because in forming them we were not guided by experience, nor had borrowed these concepts from it. Such purely imag- inary concepts cannot receive the character of possibility, like the categories a priori, as conditions on which all experience depends, but only a posteriori, as concepts that must be given by experience, so that their possibility can either not be known at all, or a posteriori, and empirically only. Thus, for instance, a substance supposed to be present as permanent in space, and yet not filling it (like that something between matter and the thinking subject, which some have tried to introduce), or a peculiar faculty of our mind, by which we can see (not only infer) the future, or lastly, another faculty, by which we can enter [ into a community of thought with other men (however dis- tant they may be), all these are concepts the [p. 223] possibility of which has nothing to rest on, because it is not founded on experience and its known laws. Without these they are and can only be arbitrary combinations of thought which, though they contain nothing contradictory in themselves, have no claim to objective reality, or to the possibility of such an object as is to be conceived by them. With regard to reality, it stands to reason that we cannot conceive it in the concrete without the aid of experience ; for reality concerns sensation orily, as the material of ex- perience, and not the form of relations, which might to a certain extent allow us to indulge in mere fancies. I here pass by everything the possibility of which can only be learned from its reality in experience, and I only mean to consider the possibility of things through con- cepts a priori. Of these (concepts) I persist in maintain- ing that they can never exist as such concepts by them- i82 Transcendental Analytic selves alone, but only as formal and objective conditions of experience in general. ^ It might seem indeed as if the possibihty of a triangle could be known from its concept by itself (being inde- pendent of all experience), for we can give to it an object entirely a priori, that is, we can construct it. But as this is only the form of an object, it would always remain a product of the imagination only. The possibil- [p. 224] ity of its object would remain doubtful, because more is wanted to establish it, namely, that such a figure should really be conceived under all those conditions on which all objects of experience depend. That which alone connects with this concept the representation of the possibility of such a thing, is the fact that space is a formal condition a priori of all external experiences, and that the same for- mative synthesis, by which we construct a triangle in im- agination, should be identical with that which we exercise in the apprehension of a phenomenon, in order to make an empirical concept of it. And thus the possibility of continuous quantities, nay, of all quantities, the concepts of which are always synthetical, can never be deduced from the concepts themselves, but only from them, as formal conditions of the determination of objects in all experience. And where indeed should we look for ob- jects, corresponding to our concepts, except in experience, by which alone objects are given us .? If we are able to know and determine the possibility of things without any previous experience, this is only with reference to those formal conditions under which anything may become 1 I have adopted Erdmann's conjecture, ak solche Begriffe instead of aus solchen Begriffen, Transcendental Analytic 183 an object in experience. This takes place entirely a priori, but nevertheless in constant reference to experi- ence, and within its limits. The postulate concerning our knowledge of [p.' 225] the reality of things, requires perception, therefore sensa- tion and consciousness of it, not indeed immediately of the object itself, the existence of which is to be known, but yet of a connection between it and some real percep- tion, according to the analogies of experience which deter- mine in general all real combinations in experience. In the mere concept of a thing no sign of its existence can be discovered. For though the concept be ever so perfect, so that nothing should be wanting in it to enable us to conceive the thing with all its own determinations, existence has nothing to do with all this. It depends only on the question whether such a thing be given us, so that its perception may even precede its concept. ^ A con- cept preceding experience implies its possibility only, while perception, which supplies the material of a con- cept, is the only characteristic of reality.^ It is possible, ' however, even before the perception of a thing, and there- fore, in a certain sense, a priori, to know its existence, provided it hang_ together with some other perceptions, according to the principles of their empirical connection (analogies). For in that case the existence of a thing hangs together at least with our perceptions in a possible experience, and guided by our analogies we [p. 226] can, starting from our real experience, arrive at some other thing in the series of possible perceptions. Thus we know the existence of some magnetic matter pervading all bodies from the perception of the attracted iron filings, though our organs are so constituted as to render an im- 184 Transcendental Analytic mediate perception of that matter impossible. According to the laws of sensibility and the texture of our percep- tions, we ought in our experience to arrive at an immedi- I ate empirical intuition of that magnetic matter, if only our senses were more acute, for their actual obtuseness does ; not concern the form of possible experience. Wherever, therefore, perception and its train can reach, according to empirical laws, there our knowledge also of the existence of things can reach. But if we do not begin with experi- ence, or do not proceed according to the laws of the em- pirical connection of phenomena, we are only making a vain display, as if we could guess and discover the exist- ence of anything. 1 With reference to the thijd postulate we find that it refers to the material necessity in existence, and not to the merely formal and logical necessity in the connection of concepts. As it is impossible that the existence of the objects of the senses should ever be known entirely a priori, though it may be known to a certain extent a priori, namely, with reference to another already given existence, and as even in that case we can only [p. 227] arrive at such an existence as must somewhere be con- tained in the whole of the experience of which the given perception forms a part, it follows that the necessity of existence can never be known from concepts, but always from the connection only with what is actually perceived, according to general rules of experience.^ Now, there is no existence that can be known as necessary under the condition of other given phenomena, except the existence 1 See Supplement XXI. '^M) iL{..!^l ^ ^\C. i^ C, ,„. 2 Insert man before gleichwohl, and leave out k'onnen at the end of the sentence. Transcendental Analytic 185 of effects from given causes, according to tlie laws of causality. It is not therefore the existence of things (substances), but the existence of their state, of which alone we can know the necessity, and this from other states only, which are given in perception, and according to the empirical laws of causality. Hence it follows that the criterium of necessity can only be found in the law of possible experience, viz. that everything that happens is determined a priori by its cause in phenomena.^ ~ We therefore know in nature the necessity of those effects only of which the causes are given, and the character of necessity in existence never goes beyond the field of possible experience, and even there it does not apply to the existence of things, as substances, because such sub- stances can never be looked upon as empirical effects or as something that happens and arises. Necessity, there- fore, affects only the relations of phenomena [p. 228] according to the dynamical law of causality, and the pos- sibility, dependent upon it, of concluding a firio7'i irom a given existence (of a cause) to another existence (that of an effect). Thus the principle that everything which hap- pens is hypothetically necessary, subjects all the changes in the world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary existence, without which there would not even be such a thing as nature. Hence the proposition that nothing happens by blind chance {in mundo non datiir casus) is an a priori law of nature, and so is likewise the other, that no necessity in nature is a blind, but always a conditional and there- fore an intelligible, necessity {non datur fattnn). Both these are laws by which the mere play of changes is ren- 1 Read seine Ursache instead of ihre. 1 86 Transcendental Analytic dered subject to a nature of things (as phenomena), or, what is the same, to that unity of the understanding in which alone they can belong to experience, as the synthet- ical unity of phenomena. Both are dynamical principles. The former is in reality a consequence of the principle of causality (the second of the analogies of experience). The latter is one of the principles of modality, which to the determination of causality adds the concept of neces- sity, which itself is subject to a rule of the understanding. The principle of continuity rendered every break in the series of phenomena (changes) impossible {in iniindo non datiir salttis), and likewise any gap between two [p. 229] phenomena in the whole of our empirical intuitions in space {non datiir hiatus). For so we may express the proposition that nothing can enter into experience to prove a vacuum, or even to admit it as a possible part of empirical synthesis. For the vacuum, which one may conceive as outside the |ield of possible experience (the world), can never come before the tribunal of the under- standing which has to decide on such questions only as concern the use to be made of given phenomena for em- pirical knowledge. It is in reality a problem of that ideal reason which goes beyond the sphere of a possible experi- ence, and wants to form an opinion of that which sur- rounds and limits experience, and will therefore have to be considered in our transcendental Dialectic. With regard to the four propositions {in mundo non datur hiatics, non datus saltus, non datur cas?is, non datur fatuvi), it would be easy to represent each of them, as well as all principles of a transcendental origin, according to the order of the cate- gories, and thus to assign its proper place to every one of them. But, after what has been said before, the versed Transcendental Analytic 187 and expert reader will find it easy to do this himself, and to discover the proper method for it. They all simply agree in this, that they admit nothing in our empirical synthesis that would in any way run counter to the understanding, and to the continuous cohesion of all phenomena, that is, to the unity of its concepts. For it is the understand- [p. 230] ing alone through which the unity of experience, in which all perceptions must have their place, becomes possible. i Whether the field of possibility be larger than the field which contains everything which is real, and whether this again be larger than the field of what is necessary, are curious questions and admitting of a synthetical solution, which questions however are to be brought before the tribunal of reason only. They really come to this, whether all things, as phenomena, belong to the sphere of one experience, of which every given perception forms a part, that could not be connected with any other phenomena, or whether my perceptions can ever belong to more than one possible experience (in its general connection). The understanding in reality does nothing but give to experi- ence a rule a priori, according to the subjective and formal conditions of sensibility and apperception, which alone render experience possible. Other forms of intuition (different from space and time), and other forms of the understanding (different from the discursive forms of thought or conceptual knowledge), even if they were pos- sible, we could in no wise render conceivable or intelli- gible to ourselves ; and even if we could, they would never belong to experience, the only field of knowledge in which objects are given to us. Whether there be [p. 231] therefore other perceptions but those that belong to our whole possible experience, whether there be in fact a 1 88 Tj'anscendental Analytic completely new field of matter, can never be determined by the understanding, which is only concerned with the synthesis of what is given. The poverty of the usual arguments by which we con- struct a large empire of possibility of which all that is real (the objects of experience) forms but a small segment, is but too apparent. When we say that all that is real is possible, we arrive, according to the logical rules of inver- sion, at the merely particular proposition that some possible is real, and thus seem to imply that much is possible that is not real. Nay, it seems as if we might extend the num- ber of things possible beyond that of things real, simply on the ground that something must be added to the pos- sible to make it real. But this addition to the possible I cannot recognise, because what would thus be added to the possible, would be really the impossible. It is only to my understanding that anything can be added concern- ing the agreement with the formal conditions of experi- ence, and what can be added is the connection with some perception ; and whatever is connected with such a per- ception, according to empirical laws, is real, though it may not be perceived immediately. But that, in constant con- nection with what is given us in experience, [p. 232] there should be another series of phenomena, and there- fore more than one all-embracing experience, cannot pos- sibly be concluded from what is given us, and still less, if nothing is given us, because nothing can be thought without some kind of material. What is possible only under conditions which themselves are possible only, is not possible in the full sense of the word, not therefore in the sense in which we ask whether the possibility of things can extend beyond the limits of experience. Transcendental Analytic 189 I have only touched on these questions in order to leave no gap in what are commonly supposed to be the concepts of the understanding. But absolute possibility (which has no regard for the formal conditions of experience) is really no concept of the understanding, and can never be used empirically, but belongs to reason alone, which goes beyond all possible empirical use of the under- standing. We have therefore made these few critical remarks only, leaving the subject itself unexplained for the present. And here, when I am on the point of concluding this fourth number and at the same time the system of all principles of the pure understanding, I think I ought to explain why I call the principles of modality postulates. I do not take this term in the sense which has [p. 233] been given to it by some modern philosophical writers, and which is opposed to the sense in which mathematicians take it, viz. that to postulate should mean to represent a proposition as certain without proof or justification ; for if we were to admit with regard to synthetical propositions, however evident they may appear, that they should meet with unreserved applause, without any deduction, and on their own authority only, all criticism of the understanding would be at an end. And as there is no lack of bold assertions, which public opinion does not decline to accept, (this acceptance being, however, no credential), our under- standing would be open to every fancy, and could not refuse its sanction to claims which demand admission as real axioms in the same confident tone, though without any substantial reasons. If therefore a condition a prion is to be synthetically joined to the concept of a thing, it will be indispensable that, if not a proof, at least a deduc- I go Transcendental Analytic tion of the legitimacy of such an assertion, should be forthcoming. The principles of modality, however, are not objectively synthetical, because the predicates of possibility, reality, and necessity do not in the least increase the concept of which they are predicated, by adding anything to its rep- resentation. But as nevertheless they are synthetical, , they are so subjectively only, i.e. they add to the [p. 234] concept of a (real) thing, without predicating anything new, the peculiar faculty of knowledge from which it springs and on which it depends, so that, if in the understanding the concept is only connected with the formal conditions of experience, its object is called possible ; if it is con- nected with perception (sensation as the material of the senses), and through it determined by the understanding, its object is called real ; while, if it is determined through the connection of perceptions, according to concepts, its object is called necessary. The principles of modality therefore predicate nothing of a concept except the act of the faculty of knowledge by which it is produced. In mathematics a postulate means a practical proposi- tion, containing nothing but a synthesis by which we first give an object to ourselves and produce its concept, as if, for instance, we draw a circle with a given line from a given point in the plane. Such a proposition cannot be proved, because the process required for it is the very process by which we first produce the concept of such a figure. We may therefore with the same right postulate the principles of modality, because they never increase ^ the concept of a thing, but indicate the manner 1 No doubt by reality I assert more than by possibility, but not in the thing itself, which can never contain more in its reality than what is contained in Transcendental Analytic 191 only in which the concept was joined with our faculty of knowledge.^ [p. 235] its complete possibility. While possibility is only the positing of n thing in reference to the understanding (in its empirical use), reality is, at the same time, a connection of it with perception. 1 See Supplement XXII. THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT OR ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES CHAPTER HI ON THE GROUND OF DISTINCTION OF ALL SUBJECTS .INTO PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA We have now not only traversed the whole domain of the pure understanding, and carefully examined each part of it, but we have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its proper place. This domain, how- ever, is an island and enclosed by nature itself within limits that can never be changed. It is the country of truth (a very attractive name), but surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the true home of illusion, where many a fog bank and ice that soon melts away tempt us to be- lieve in new lands, while constantly deceiving the advent- urous mariner with vain hopes, and involving [p. 236] him in adventures which he can never leave, and yet can ' never bring to an end. Before we venture ourselves on this sea, in order to explore it on every side, and to find out whether anything is to be hoped for there, it will be 192 Transcendental Analytic 193 useful to glance once more at the map of that country 1 which we are about to leave, and to ask ourselves, first, 1 whether we might not be content with what it contains, nay, whether we must not be content with it, supposing that there is no solid ground anywhere else on which we could settle ; secondly, by what title we possess even that domain, and may consider ourselves safe against all hos- tile claims. Although we have sufficiently answered these questions in the course of the anajytic, a summary reca- pitulation of their solutions may help to strengthen our conviction, by uniting all arguments in one point. We have seen that the understanding possesses every- thing which it draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, for no other purpose but for experience. The principles of the pure understanding, whether constitutive a priori (as the mathematical) or simply relative (as the dynamical), contain nothing but, as it were, the pure schema of possible experience; for that experi- [p. 237] ence derives its unity from that synthetical unity alone which the understanding originally and spontaneously imparts to the synthesis of imagination, with reference to apperception, and to which all phenomena, as data of a possible knowledge, must conform a priori. But although these rules of the understanding are not only true a priori, but the very source of all truth, that is, of the agreement of our knowledge with objects, because containing the conditions of the possibility of experi- ence, as the complete sphere of all knowledge in which objects can be given to us, nevertheless we do not seem to be content with hearing only what is true, but want to know a great deal more. If therefore this critical investi- gation does not teach us any more than what, even with- 194 Transcendental Analytic out such subtle researches, we should have practised ourselves in the purely empirical use of the understand- ing, it would seem as if the advantages derived from it were hardly worth the labour. One might reply that nothing would be more prejudicial to the enlargement of our knowledge than that curiosity which, before enter- ing upon any researches, wishes to know beforehand the advantages likely to accrue from them, though quite un- able as yet to form the least conception of such advan- tages, even though they were placed before our eyes. There is, however, one advantage in this transcendental investigation which can be rendered intelligible, [p. 238] nay, even attractive to the most troublesome and reluctant apprentice, namely this, that the understanding confined to its empirical use only and unconcerned with regard to the sources of its own knowledge, may no doubt fare very well in other respects, but can never determine for itself the limits of its own use and know what is inside or out- side its own sphere. It is for that purpose that such profound investigations are required as we have just insti- tuted. If the understanding cannot decide whether cer- tain questions lie within its own horizon or not, it can never feel certain with regard to its claims and posses- sions, but must be prepared for many humiliating correc- tions, when constantly transgressing, as it certainly will, the limits of its own domain, and losing itself in follies and fancies. That the understanding cannot make any but an empir- ical, and never a transcendental, use of all its principles a priori, nay, of all its concepts, is a proposition which, if thoroughly understood, leads indeed to most important consequences. What we call the transcendental use of a Transcendental Analytic 105 concept in any proposition is its being referred to things in general and to things by themselves, while its empirical use refers to phenomena only, that is, to objects of a pos- sible experience. That the latter use alone is admissible will be clear from the following considerations, [p. 239] What is required for every concept is, first, the logical form of a concept (of thought) in general ; and, secondly, the possibility of an object to which it refers. Without the latter, it has no sense, and is entirely empty, though it may still contain the logical function by which a concept can be formed out of any data. The only way in which an object can be given to a concept is in intuition, and though a pure intuition is possible a priori and before the object, yet even that pure intuition can receive its object, and with it its objective validity, by an empirical intuition only, of which it is itself nothing but the form. All con- cepts, therefore, and with them all principles, though they may be possible a priori, refer nevertheless to empirical intuitions, that is, to data of a possible experience. With- out this, they can claim no objective validity, but are a mere play, whether of the imagination or of the under- standing with their respective, representations. Let us take the concepts of mathematics as an example, and, first, with regard to pure intuitions. Although such principles as 'space has three dimensions,' 'between two points there can be only one straight line,' as well as the representation of the object with which that science is oc- cupied, may be produced in the mind a priori, they would have no meaning, if we were not able at all times [p. 240] to show their meaning as applied to phenomena (empirical objects). It is for this reason that an abstract concept is required to be made sensuous, that is, that its correspond- ig6 Transcendental Analytic ing object is required to be shown in intuition, because, without this, the concept (as people say) is without setise, that is, without meaning. Mathematics fulfil this require- ment by the construction of the figure, which is a phe- nomenon present to the senses (although constructed a priori). In the same science the concept of quantity finds its support and sense in number ; and this in turn in the fingers, the beads of the abacus, or in strokes and points which can be presented to the eyes. The concept itself was produced a priori, together with all the synthetical principles or formulas which can be derived from such concepts; but their use and their relation to objects can nowhere be found except in experience, of which those concepts contain a priori the (formal) possibility only. That this is the case with all categories and with all the principles drawn from them, becomes evident from the fact that we could not define any one of them (really, that is, make conceivable the possibility of their object),^ without at once having recourse to the conditions of sen- sibility or the form of phenomena, to which, as their only possible objects, these categories must necessarily be restricted, it being impossible, if we take away [p. 241] these conditions, to assign to them any meaning, that is, any relation to an object, or to make it intelligible to ourselves by an example what kind of thing could be intended by such concepts. [When representing the table of the categories, we dis- pensed with the definition of every one of them, because at that time it seemed unnecessary for our purpose, which concerned their synthetical use only, and because entail- ^ Additions of tlie Second Edition. Transcendental Analytic 197 ing responsibilities which we were not bound to incur. This was not a mere excuse, but a very important pru- dential rule, viz. not to rush into definitions, and to attempt or pretend completeness or precision in the definition of a concept, when one or other of its characteristic marks is sufficient without a complete enumeratioti of all that constitute the whole concept. Now, however, we can perceive that this caution had even a deeper ground, namely, that we could not have defined them, even if we had wished ; ^ for, if we remove all conditions of [p. 242] sensibility, which distinguish them as the concepts of a possible empirical use, and treat them as concepts of things in general (therefore as of transcendental use), nothing remains but to regard the logical function in judgments as the condition of the possibility of the things themselves, without the slightest indication as to where they could have their application and their object, or how they could have any meaning or objective validity in the pure understanding, apart from sensibility.] ^ No one can explain the concept of quantity in general, except, it may be, by saying that it is the determination of an object, by which we may know how many times the one is supposed to exist in it. But this 'how many times ' is based on successive repetition, that is on time, and on the synthesis in it of the homogeneous. 1 I am treating here of the real definition, which not only puts in place of the name of a thing other and more intelligible words, but that which contains a clear mark by which the object {definilum) can at all times be safely recog- nised, and by which the defined concept becomes fit for practical use. A real definition {Realarkldrung) must therefore render clear the concept itself, and its objective reality also. Of this kind are the mathematical explanations which represent an object in intuition, according to its concept. 2 Read nimmt instead of nehmen, and konnen instead of konne. igS Transcendental Analytic Reality, again, can only be explained in opposition to a negation, if we think of time (as containing all being) being either filled or empty. Were I to leave out permanence (which means ex- istence at all times), nothing would remain of my con- cept of substance but the logical representation of a subject which I think I can realise by imagining something which is a subject only, without [p. 243] being a predicate of anything. But in this case we should not only be ignorant of all conditions under which this logical distinction could belong to any- thing, but we should be unable to make any use of it or draw any conclusions from it, because no object is thus determined for the use of this concept, and no one can tell whether such a concept has any meaning at all. 1 Of the concept of cause also (if I leave out time, in which something follows on something else by rule) I should find no more in the pure category than that it is something which enables us to conclude the existence of something else, so that it would not only be impossible to distinguish cause and effect i from each other, but the concept of cause would possess no indication as to how it can be applied to any object, because, in order to form any such conclusion, certain conditions require to be known of which the concept itself tells us nothing. The so-called principle that everything contingent has a cause, comes no doubt before us with great solemnity and self-assumed dignity. But, if I ask what you understand by contingent and you answer, something of which the non-existence is possible, I should be Transcendental Analytic igq glad to know how you can recognise this possibility of non-existence, if you do not represent to yourselves, in the series of phenomena, some kind of succession, and in it an existence that follows upon non-existence (or vice versa), and consequently a change ? To say that the non-existence of a thing is not self- [p. 244] contradictory is but a lame appeal to a logical condi- tion which, though it is necessary for the concept, yet is by no means sufficient for its real possibility. I can perfectly well remove in thought every existing substance, without contradicting myself, but I can by no means conclude from this as to its objective con- tingency in its existence, that is, the possibility of its non-existence in itself. As regards the concept of community, it is easy to see that, as the pure categories of substance and causality admit of no explanation that would deter- mine their object, neither could such an explanation apply to the reciprocal causality in the relation of substances to each other {commercium). As to possibility, existence, and necessity, no one has yet been able to explain them, except by a man- ifest- tautology, so long as their definition is to be exclusively drawn from the pure understanding. To substitute the transcendental possibility of things (when an object corresponds to a concept) by the logical possibility of the concept (when the concept does not contradict itself) is a quibble such as could deceive and satisfy the inexperienced only. [It seems to be something strange and even illogical ^ ^The passage from 'It seems to be' to 'objective concepts' is left out in the Second Edition, and replaced by a short note, see Supplement XXIII. 200 Transcendental Analytic that there should be a concept which must have a meaning, and yet is incapable of any explanation. But the case of these categ9ries is peculiar, because it is only by means of the general sensuous condition that they can acquire a definite meaning, and a refer- ence to any objects. That condition being [p. 245] left out in the pure category, it follows that it can contain nothing but the logical function by which the manifold is brought into a concept. By means of this function, that is, the pure form of the concept, nothing can be known or distinguished as to the object belong- ing to it, because the sensuous condition, under which alone objects can belong to it, has been removed. Thus we see that the categories require, besides the pure concept of the understanding, certain determinations of their application to sensibility in general (schemata). Without them, they would not be concepts by which an object can be known and distinguished from other objects, but only so many ways of thinking an object for possible intuitions, and giving to it,- according to one of the functions of the understanding, its meaning (certain requisite conditions being given). They are needed to define an object, and cannot therefore be de- fined themselves. The logical functions of judgments in general, namely, unity and plurality, assertion and negation, subject and predicate, cannot be defined with- out arguing in a circle, because the definition would itself be a judgment and contain these very functions. The pure categories are nothing but representations of things in general, so far as the manifold in intuition must be thought by one or the other of these func- tions. Thus, magnitude is the determination which can Transcendental Analytic 201 [only be thought by a judgment possessing [p. 246] quantity (Judicium commune'); reality, the determination which can only be thought by an affirmative judgment; . while substance is that which, in regard to intuition, must be the last subject of all other determinations. With all this it remains perfectly undetermined, what kind of things they may be with regard to which we have to use one rather than another of these func- tions, so that, without the condition of sensuous intui- tion, for which they supply the synthesis, the categories have no relation to any definite object, cannot define any object, and consequently have not in themselves the validity of objective concepts.] From this it follows incontestably, that the pure concepts of the understanding never admit of a tran- scendental, but only of an empirical use, and that the principles of the pure understanding can only be re- ferred, as general conditions of a possible experience, to objects of the senses, never to things by themselves (without regard to the manner in which we have to look at them). Transcendental Analytic has therefore yielded us this important result, that the understanding a priori can never do more than anticipate the form of a possible experience ; and as nothing can be an object of experience except the phenomenon, it follows that the understanding can never go beyond the limits of sensibility, within which alone ob- jects are given to us. Its principles are prin- [p. 247] ciples for the exhibition of phenomena only ; and the proud name of Ontology, which presumes to supply in a systematic form different kinds of synthetical knowledge a priori of things by themselves (for instance the principle 202 Transcendental Analytic of causality), must be replaced by the more modest name of a mere Analytic of the pure understanding. Thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. If the mode of such intuition is not given, the ■ object is called transcendental, and the concept of the understanding admits then of a transcendental use only, in producing a unity in the thought of the manifold in gen- eral. A pure category therefore, in which every condition of sensuous intuition, the only one that is possible for us, is left out, cannot determine an object, but only the thought of an object in general, according to different modes. Now, if we want to use a concept, we require in addition some function of the faculty of judgment, by which an object is subsumed under a concept, consequently the at least formal condition under which something can be given in intuition. If this condition of the faculty of judgment (schema) is wanting, all subsumption is impossible, because nothing is given that could be subsumed under the con- cept. The purely transcendental use of categories there- fore is in reality of no use at all, and has no definite or even, with regard to its form only, definable object. Hence it follows that a pure category is not fit for any [p. 248] synthetical a priori principle, and that the principles of the pure understanding admit of empirical only, never of transcendental application, nay, that no synthetical prin- ciples a priori are possible beyond the field of possible experience. It might therefore be advisable to express ourselves in the following way : the pure categories, without the formal conditions of sensibility, have a transcendental character only, but do not admit of any transcendental use, because such use in itself is impossible, as the categories are Transcendental Analytic 203 deprived of all the conditions of being used in judgments, that is, of the formal conditions of the subsumption of any possible object under these concepts. As therefore (as pure categories) they are not meant to be used empiri- cally, and cannot be used transcendentally, they admit, if separated from sensibility, of no use at all ; that is, they cannot be applied to any possible object, and are nothing but the pure form of the use of the understanding with reference to objects in general, and of thought, without ever enabling us to think or determine any object by their means alone. [Appearances, 1 so far as they are thought as objects under the unity of the categories, are called pJtenoinena. But if I admit things which are objects of the [p. 249] understanding only, and nevertheless can be given as objects of an intuition, though not of sensuous intuition (as coram intuitu intellectnali), such things would be called Noumena (intelligibilid). One might feel inclined to think that the concept of Phenomena, as limited by the transcendental sesthetic, suggested by itself the objective reality of the Noumena, and justified a division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and consequently of the world into a sensible and intelligible world {mundus sensibilis et intelligibilis~) ; and this in such a way that the distinction between the two should not refer to the logical form only of a more or less clear knowledge of one and the same object, but to a difference in their original presentation to our knowledge, which makes them to differ in themselves from each other in kind. For if the senses only represent to us something 1 The passage from ' Appearances ' to ' given to me in intuition ' is left out in the Second Edition, and replaced by Supplement XXIV. 204 Transcendental Analytic as it appears, that something must by itself also be a thing, and an object of a non-sensuous intuition, i.e. of the understanding. That is, there must be a kind of know- ledge in which there is no sensibility, and which alone possesses absolute objective reality, representing objects as they are, while through the empirical use of our under- standing we know things only as they appear. Hence it would seem to follow that, beside the empirical [p. 250] use of the categories (limited by sensuous conditions), there was another one, pure and yet objectively valid, and that we could not say, as we have hitherto done, that our knowledge of the pure understanding contained nothing but principles for the exhibition of phenomena, which, even a priori, could not apply to anything but the formal possibility of experience. Here, in fact, quite a new field would seem to be open, a world, as it were, realised in thought (nay, according to some, even in intuition), which would be a more, and not a less, worthy object for the pure understanding. All our representations are no doubt referred by the understanding to some sort of object, and as phenomena are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a something, as the object of our sensuous intui- tion, this something being however the transcendental ob- ject only. This means a something equal to x, of which we do not, nay, with the present constitution of our under- standing, cannot know anything, but which ^ can only serve, as a correlatum of the unity of apperception, for the unity of the manifold in sensuous intuition, by means of which the understanding unites the manifold into the 1 Read welches instead of welcher. Transcendental Analytic 205 concept of an object. This transcendental object cannot be separated from the sensuous data, because in that case nothing would remain by which it could be [p. 251] thought. It is not therefore an object of knowledge in itself, but only the representation of phenomena, under the concept of an object in general, which can be defined by the, manifold of sensuous intuition. For this very reason the categories do not represent a peculiar object, given to the understanding only, but serve only to define the transcendental object (the concept of something in general) by that which is given us through the senses, in order thus to know empirically phenomena under the concepts of objects. What then is the cause why people, not satisfied with the substratum of sensibility, have added to the phe- nomena the noumena, which the understanding only is supposed to be able to realise .'' It is this, that sensibility and its sphere, that is the sphere of phenomena, is so lim- ited by the understanding itself that it should not refer to things by themselves, but only to the mode in which things appear to us, in accordance with our own sub- jective qualification. This was the result of the whole transcendental aesthetic, and it really follows quite nat- urally from the concept of a phenomenon in general, that something must correspond to it, which in itself is not a phenomenon, because a phenomenon cannot be anything by itself, apart from our mode of representation, [p. 252] Unless therefore we are to move in a constant circle, we must admit that the very word phenomenon indicates a relation to something the immediate representation of which is no doubt sensuous, but which nevertheless, even without this qualification of our sensibility (on which the 2o6 Transcendental Analytic form of our intuition is founded) must be something by itself, that is an object independent of our sensibihty. Hence arises the concept of a noumenon, which how- ever is not positive, nor a definite knowledge of anything, but which implies only the thinking of something, without taking any account of the form of sensuous intuition. But in order that a noumenon may signify a real object that can be distinguished from all phenomena, it is hot enough that I should free my thought of all conditions of sensuous intuition, but I must besides have some reason for admitting another kind of intuition besides the sen- suous, in which such an object can be given; otherwise my thought would be empty, however free it may be from contradictions. It is true that we were not able to prove that the sensuous is the only possible intuition, though it is so for us : but neither could we prove that another kind of intuition was possible; and although our thought may take no account of any sensibility, the question always remains whether, after that, it is not a mere [p. 253] form of a concept, and whether any real object would thus be left. I The object to which I refer the phenomenon in general lis the transcendental object, that is, the entirely indefinite thought of something in general. This cannot be called, the noumenon, for I know nothing of what it is by itself, and have no conception of it, except as the object of sen- suous intuition in general, which is therefore the same for lall phenomena. I cannot lay hold of it by any of the categories, for these are valid for empirical intuitions only, in order to bring them under the concept of an object in general. A pure use of the categories is no doubt pos- sible, that is, not self-contradictory, but it has no kind of Transcendental Analytic 207 objective validity, because it refers to no intuition to which it is meant to impart the unity of an object. The cate- gories remain for ever mere functions of thought by which no object can be given to me, but by which I can only think whatever may be given to me in intuition. J If all thought (by means of categories) is taken away from empirical knowledge, no knowledge of any object remains, because nothing can be thought by mere intui- tion, and the mere fact that there is within me an affection of my sensibility, establishes in no way any relation of such a representation to any object. If, on the contrary, all intuition is taken away, there always remains [p. 254] the form of thought, that is, the mode of determining an object for the manifold of a possible intuition. In this sense the categories may be said to extend further than sensuous intuition, because they can think objects in general without any regard to the special mode of sensi- bility in which they may be given ; but they do not thus prove a larger sphere of objects, because we cannot admit that such objects can be given, without admitting the possibility of some other but sensuous intuition, for which we have no right whatever. I call a concept problematic, if it is not self-contra- dictory, and if, as limiting other concepts, it is connected with other kinds of knowledge, while its objective reality cannot be known in any way. Now the concept of a noumenon, that is of a thing which can never be thought as an object of the senses, but only as a thing by itself (by the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, because we cannot maintain that sensibility is the only form of intuition. That concept is also necessary, to prevent sensuous intuition from extending to things by 2o8 Transcendental Analytic themselves ; that is, in order to limit the objective validity of sensuous knowledge (for all the rest to which sensuous intuition does not extend is called noumenon, for [p. 255] the very purpose of showing that sensuous knowledge can- not extend its domain over everything that can be thought by the understanding). But, after all, we cannot under- stand the possibility of such noumena, and whatever lies beyond the sphere of phenomena is (to us) empty ; that is, we have an understanding which problematically extends beyond that sphere, but no intuition, nay not even the con- ception of a possible intuition, by which, outside the field of sensibility, objects could be given to us, and our under- standing could extend beyond that sensibility in its asser- tory use. The concept of a noumenon is therefore merely limitative, and intended to keep the claims of sensibility within proper bounds, therefore of negative use only. But it is not a mere arbitrary fiction, but closely con- nected with the limitation of sensibility, though incapable of adding anything positive to the sphere of the senses. A real division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a sensible and intelligible world (in a positive sense), ^ is therefore quite inadmissible, although concepts may very well be divided into sensuous and intel- lectual. For no objects can be assigned to the intellectual concepts, nor can they be represented as objectively valid. If we drop the senses, how are we to make it [p. 256] conceivable that our categories (which would be the only remaining concepts for noumena) have any meaning at all, considering that, in order to refer them to any object, something more must be given than the mere unity of 1 Addition of the Second Edition. Transcendental Analytic 20Q thought, namely, a possible intuition, to which the cate- gories could be applied? With all this the concept of a noumenon, if taken as problematical only, remains not only admissible, but, as a concept to limit the sphere of sensibility, indispensable. In this case, however, it is not a particular intelligible object for otir understanding, but an understanding to which it could belong is itself a prob- lem, if we ask how it could know an object, not discursively by means of categories, but intuitively, and yet in a non- sensuous intuition, — a process of which we could not understand even the bare possibility. Our understanding thus acquires a kind of negative extension, that is, it does not become itself limited by sensibility, but, on the contrary, limits it, by calling things by themselves (not considered as phenomena) noumena. In doing this, it im- mediately proceeds to prescribe limits to itself, by admit- ting that it cannot know these noumena by means of the categories, but can only think of them under the name of something unknown. In the writings of modern philosophers, however, I meet with a totally different use of the terms of mtmdus sensi- bilis and intelligibilis} totally different from the mean- ing assigned to these terms by the ancients, [p. 257] Here all difficulty seems to disappear. But the fact is, that there remains nothing but mere word-mongery. In accordance with this, some people have been pleased to call the whole of phenomena, so far as they are seen, the world of sense ; but so far as their connection, according to general laws of the understanding, is taken into account, the world of the understanding. Theoretical astronomy, ' An additional note in the Second Edition is given in Supplement XXV. P 2IO Transcendental Analytic which only teaches the actual observation of the starry heavens, would represent the former; contemplative as- tronomy, on the contrary (taught according to the Coperni- can system, or, it may be, according to Newton's laws of gravitation), the latter, namely, a purely intelligible world. But this twisting of words is a mere sophistical excuse, in order to avoid a troublesome question, by changing its meaning according to one's own convenience. Under- standing and reason may be applied to phenomena, but it is very questionable whether they can be applied at all to an object which is not a phenomenon, but a nou- menon ; and it is this, when the object is represented as purely intelligible, that is, as given to the understanding only, and not to the senses. The question therefore is whether, besides the empirical use of the understanding (even in the Newtonian view of the world), a transcen- dental use is possible, referring to the noumenon, as its object; and that question we have answered decidedly in the negative. When we therefore say that the senses rep- [p. 258] resent objects to us as they appear, and the understand- ing as they are, the latter is not to be taken in a transcen- dental, but in a purely empirical meaning, namely, as to how they, as objects of experience, must be represented, according to the regular connection of phenomena, and not according to what they may be, as objects of the pure understanding, apart from their relation to possible experi- ence, and therefore to our senses. This will always remain unknown to us ; nay, we shall never know whether such a transcendental and exceptional knowledge is possible at all, at least as comprehended under our ordinary cate- gories. With us understanding and sensibility cannot Transcendental Analytic 211 determine objects, unless they are joined together. If we separate them, we have intuitions without concepts, or concepts without intuitions, in both cases representations which we cannot refer to any definite object. If, after all these arguments, anybody should still hesi- tate to abandon the purely transcendental use of the cate- gories, let him try an experiment with them for framing any synthetical proposition. An analytical proposition does not in the least advance the understanding, which, as in such a proposition it is only concerned with what is already thought in the concept, does not ask whether the concept in itself has any reference to objects, or ex- presses only the unity of thought in general [p. 259] (this completely ignoring the manner in which an object may be given). The understanding in fact is satisfied if it knows what it contained in the concept of an object ; it is indifferent as to the object to which the concept may refer. But let him try the experiment with any syntheti- cal and so-called transcendental proposition, as for in- stance, ' Everything that exists, exists as a substance, or as a determination inherent in it,' or ' Everything con- tingent exists as an effect of some other thing, namely, its cause,' etc. Now I ask, whence can the understand- ing take these synthetical propositions, as the concepts are to apply, not to some possible experience, but to things by themselves (noumena) .' Where is that third term to be found which is always required for a syn- thetical proposition, in order thus to join concepts which have no logical (analytical) relation with each other.'' It will be impossible to prove such a proposition, nay even to justify the possibility of any such pure assertion, with- out appealing to the empirical use of the understanding. 212 Tratisccndcntal Analytic and thus renouncing entirely the so-called pure and non- sensuous judgment. There are no principles therefore according to which the concepts of pure and merely in- telligible objects could ever be applied, because we cannot imagine any way in which they could be given, and the problematic thought, which leaves a place open to them, serves only, like empty space, to limit the sphere of em- pirical principles, without containing or indicat- [p. 260] ing any other object of knowledge, lying beyond that sphere. APPENDIX Of the Amphiboly of Reflective Concepts, owing to THE Confusion of the Empirical with the Tran- scendental Use of the Understanding Reflection (i-eflexid) is not concerned with objects them- selves, in order to obtain directly concepts of them, but is a state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we may arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to the various sources of our knowledge by which alone their mutual relation can be rightly de- termined. Before saying any more of our representa- tions, the first question is, to which faculty of knowledge they may all belong ; whether it is the understanding or the senses by which they are connected and compared. Many a judgment is accepted from mere habit, or made from inclination, and as no reflection precedes or even follows it critically, the judgment is supposed [p. 261] to have had its origin in the understanding. It is not all judgments that require an investigation, that is, a Transcendental Analytic 213 careful attention with regard to the grounds of their truth; for if they are immediately certain, as for in- stance, that between two points there can be only one straight line, no more immediately certain marks of their truth than that which they themselves convey could be discovered. - But aU judgments, nay, all com- parisons, require reflection, that is, a discrimination of the respective faculty of knowledge to which any given concepts belong. The act by which I place in general the comparison of representations by the side of the faculty of knowledge to which that comparison be- longs, and by which I determine whether these repre- sentations are compared with each other as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, I call transcende?ital reflection. The relation in which the two concepts may stand to each other in one state of the mind is that of identity and difference, of agreement and opposition, of the internal and external, and finally of the determinable and the determination (matter and form). The right determination of that relation depends on the question in which faculty of knowledge they subjectively belong to each other, whether in sensibility or in the understanding. For the proper distinction of the latter is of great importance with regard to the manner in which the former must be considered. [p. 262] Before proceeding to form any objective judgments, we have to compare the concepts with regard to the identity (of many representations under one concept) as the founda- tion of general judgments, or with regard to their differ- ence as the foundation of particular judgments, or with regard to their agreement and opposition serving as the foundations of affirmative and negative judgments, etc. 214 Transcendental Analytic For this reason it might seem that we ought to call these concepts concepts of comparison {conceptus com- parationis). But as, when the contents of concepts and not their logical form must be considered, that is, whether the things themselves are identical or different, in agree- ment or in opposition, etc., all things may have a two- fold relation to our faculty of knowledge, namely, either to sensibility or to the understanding, and as the manner in which they belong to one another depends on the place to which they belong, it follows that the transcendental reflection, that is the power of determining the relation of given representations to one or the other class of knowledge, can alone determine their mutual relation. Whether the things are identical or different, in agree- ment or opposition, etc., cannot be established at once by the concepts themselves by means of a mere com- parison (comparatio), but first of all by a proper discrimi- nation of that class of knowledge to which they belong, that is, by transcendental reflection. It might therefore be said, that logical reflection is a mere comparison, because it takes no account of the faculty of knowledge to which any given representations belong, and treats [p. 263] them, so far as they are all found in the mind, as homogeneous, while transcendental reflection (which re- fers to the objects themselves) supplies the possibility of an objective comparison of representations among themselves, and is therefore very different from the other, the faculty of knowledge to which they belong not being the same. This transcendental reflection is a duty from which no one can escape who wishes to form judgments a prion. We shall now take it in hand, and may hope thus to throw not a little light on the real business of the understanding. Transcendental Analytic 215 I. Identity and Difference When an object is presented to us several times, but each time with the same internal determinations {qualitas et quantitas), it is, so long as it is considered as an object of the pure understanding, always one and the same, one thing, not many {numerica identitas). But if it is a phe- nomenon, a comparison of the concepts is of no conse- quence, and though everything may be identical with regard to the concepts, yet the difference of the place of this phenomenon at the same time is a sufficient ground for admitting the 7inmerical difference of the object (of the senses). , Thus, though there maybe no internal difference whatever (either in quality or quantity) between two drops of water, yet the fact that they may be seen [p. 264] at the same time in different places is sufficient to establish their numerical difference. Leibniz took phe- nomena to be things by themselves, intelligibilia, that is, objects of the pure understanding (though, on account of the confused nature of their representations, he assigned to them the name of phenomena), and from that point of view his principle of their indiscernibility (principiuTtt identitas indiscernibiliuni) could not be contested. As, however, they are objects of sensibility, and the use of the understanding with regard to them is not pure, but only empirical, their plurality and numerical diversity are indicated by space itself, as the condition of external phenomena. For one part of space, though it may be perfectly similar and equal to another, is still outside it, and for this very reason a part of space different from the first which, added to it, makes a larger space : and this applies to all things which exist at the same time in 2i6 Transcendental Analytic different parts of space, however similar or equal they may be in other respects. II. Agreement and Oppositiott When reality is represented by the pure understanding only {realitas nomnenon), no opposition can be conceived between realities, that is, no such relation that, if connected in one subject, they should annihilate the effects one of the other, as for instance 3 — 3=0. The real in [p. 265] the phenomena, on the contrary {realitas phenomenon), may very well be in mutual opposition, and if connected in one subject, one may annihilate completely or in part the effect of the other, as in the case of two forces moving in the same straight line, either drawing or impelling a point in opposite directions, or in the case of pleasure, counterbalancing a certain amount of pain. III. The hiternal and the External In an object of the pure understanding that only is internal which has no relation whatever (as regards its existence) to anything different from itself. The inner relations, on the contrary, of a substantia phenomenon in space are nothing but relations, and the substance itself a complex of mere relations. We only know substances in space through the forces which are active in a certain space, by either drawing others near to it (attraction) or by preventing others from penetrating into it (repulsion and impenetrability). Other properties constituting the concept of a substance appearing in space, and which we call matter, are unknown to us. ~ As an object of the pure understanding, on the contrary, every substance must have Transcendental Analytic 217 internal determinations and forces bearing on the internal reality. But what other internal accidents can I think, except those which my own internal sense pre- [p. 266] sents to me, namely, something which is either itself thought, or something analogous to it? Hence Leibniz represented all substances (as he conceived them as nou- mena), even the component parts of matter (after having in thought removed from them everything implying exter- nal relation, and therefore composition also), as simple subjects endowed with powers of representation, in one word, as monads. IV. Matter and Form These are two concepts which are treated as the foun- dation of all other reflection, so inseparably are they con- nected with every act of the understanding. The former denotes the determinable in general, the latter its deter- mination (both in a purely transcendental meaning, all differences in that which is given and the mode in which it is determined being left out of consideration). Logi- cians formerly called the universal, matter ; the specific dif- ference, form. In every judgment the given concepts may be called the logical matter (for a judgment) ; their relation, by means of the copula, the form of a judgment. In every being its component parts {essentialia) are the matter ; the mode in which they are connected in it, the essential form. With respect to things in general, unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility, and the limitation thereof (negation) as that form by which one [p. 267] thing is distinguished from another, according to transcen- dental concepts. The understanding demands first that something should be given (at least in concept) in order to 2i8 Transcendental Analytic be able afterwards to determine it in a certain manner. In the concept of the pure understanding therefore, matter comes before form, and Leibniz in consequence first as- sumed things (monads), and within them an internal power of representation, in order afterwards to found thereon their external relation, and the community of their states, that is, of their representations. In this way space and time were possible only, the former through the relation of sub- stances, the latter through the connection of their deter- minations among themselves, as causes and effects. And so it would be indeed, if the pure understanding could be applied immediately to objects, and if space and time were determinations of things by themselves. But if they are sensuous intuitions only, in which we determine all objects merely as phenomena', then it follows that the form of intuition (as a subjective quality of sensibility) comes before all matter (sensations), that space and time there- fore come before all phenomena, and before all data of experience, and render in fact all experience possible. As an intellectual philosopher Leibniz could not endure that this form should come before things and determine their possibility : a criticism quite just when he assumed that we see things as they are (though in a confused representa- tion). But as sensuous intuition is a peculiar [p. 268] subjective condition on which all perception a priori de- pends, and the form of which is original and independent, the form must be given by itself, and so far from matter (or the things themselves which appear) forming the true foundation (as we might think, if we judged according to mere concepts), the very possibility of matter presupposes a formal intuition (space and time) as given. Transcendental Analytic 219 NOTE ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF REFLECTIVE CONCEPTS I beg to be allowed to call the place which we assign to a concept, either in sensibility or in the pure understand- ing, its transcendental place. If so, then the determination oj^this position which belongs to every concept, according to the difference of its use, and the directions for deter- mining according to rules that place for all concepts, would be called ii'anscendental topic; a doctrine which would thoroughly protect us against the subreptitious claims of the pure understanding and the errors arising from it, by always distinguishing to what faculty of knowledge each concept truly belongs. Every concept, or every title to which many kinds of knowledge belong, may be called a logical place. Upon this is based the logical topic of Aris- totle, of which orators and schoolmasters avail themselves in order to find under certain titles of thought [p. 269] what would best suit the matter they have in hand, and thus to be able, with a certain appearance of thoroughness, to argue and wrangle to any extent. Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains no more than the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison and distinction, which differ from the categories because they do not serve to represent the object according to what con- stitutes its concept (quantity, reality, etc.), but only the comparison of representations, in all its variety, which pre- cedes the concept of things. This comparison, however, requires first a reflection, that is, a determination of the place to which the representations of things which are to be compared belong, namely, whether they are thought by the pure understanding or given as phenomena by sensibility. 220 Transcendental Analytic Concepts may be logically compared without our asking any questions as to what place their objects belong, whether as noumena to the understanding, or to sensi- bility as phenomena. But if with these concepts we wish to proceed to the objects themselves, a transcendental reflection is necessary first of all, in order to determine whether they are meant to be objects for the pure under- standing or for sensibility. Without this reflection our use of these concepts would be very uncertain, and [p. 270] synthetical propositions would spring up which critical reason cannot acknowledge, and which are simply founded on transcendental amphiboly, that is, on our confounding an object of the pure understanding with a phenomenon. For want of such a transcendental topic, and deceived by the amphiboly of reflective concepts, the celebrated Leibniz erected an intellectual sjston of the world, or believed at least that he knew the internal nature of things by comparing all objects with the understanding only and with the abstract formal concepts of his thought, v Our table of reflective concepts gives us the unexpected ad- vantage of being able to exhibit clearly the distinctive features of his system in all its parts, and at the same time the leading principle of this peculiar view which rested on a simple misunderstanding. He compared all things with each other by means of concepts only, and naturally found no other differences but those by which the understanding distinguishes its pure concepts from each other. The conditions of sensuous intuition, which carry their own differences, are not considered by him as original and independent; for sensibility was with him a confused mode of representation only, and not a separate source of representations. According to him a phenomenon was Transcendental Analytic 221 the representation of a thing by itself, though different, in its logical form, from knowledge by means of the [p. 271] understanding, because the phenomenon, in the ordinary absence of analysis, brings a certain admixture of collat- eral representations into the concept of a thing which the understanding is able to separate. In one word, Leibniz intellectualised phenomena, just as Locke, according to his system of Noogony (if I may use such an expression), sensnalised all concepts of the understanding, that is, represented them as nothing but empirical, though ab- stract, reflective concepts. Instead of regarding the understanding and sensibility as two totally distinct sources of representations, which however can supply objectively valid judgments of things only in conjunction with each other, each of these great men recognised but one of them, which in their opinion applied immediately to things by themselves, while the other did nothing but to produce either disorder or order in the representations of the former. , Leibniz accordingly compared the objects of the senses with each other as things in general and in the under- standing only. He did this. First, so far as they are judged by the understanding to be either identical or different. As he considers their concepts only and not their place in intuition, in which alone objects can be given, and takes no account of the transcendental place of these concepts (whether the object is to be counted among phenomena or among things by themselves), it could not happen otherwise than [p. 272] that he should extend his principle of indiscernibility, which is valid with regard to concepts of things in gen- eral only, to objects of the senses also {mimdits phaenom- 222 T^'anscendental Analytic ejiojt), and imagine that he thus added no inconsiderable extension to our knowledge of nature. No doubt, if I know a drop of water as a thing by itself in all its internal determinations, I cannot allow that one is different from the other, when their whole concepts are identical. But if the drop of water is a phenomenon in space, it has its place not only in the understanding (among concepts), but in the sensuous external intuition (in space), and in this case the physical place is quite indifferent with regard to the inner determinations of things, so that a place B can receive a thing which is perfectly similar or identical with another in place A, quite as well as if it were totally different from it in its internal determinations. Difference of place by itself and without any further conditions ren- ders the plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena not only possible, but also necessary. That so-called law of Leibniz therefore is no law of nature, but only an analytical rule, or a comparison of things by means of concepts only. Secondly. The principle that realities (as mere asser- tions) never logically contradict each other, is perfectly true with regard to the relation of concepts, but [p. 273] has no meaning whatever either as regards nature or as regards anything by itself (of which we can have no con- cept whatever).! The real opposition, as when A — B=o, takes place everywhere wherever one reality is united with another in the same subject and one annihilates the effect of the other. This is constantly brought before our eyes in nature by all impediments and reactions which, as depending on forces, must be called realitates phaenomena. 1 ' Whatever ' is omitted in the Second Edition. Transcendental Analytic 223 General mechanics can even give us the empirical condi- tion of that opposition in an a priori rule, by attending to the opposition of directions ; a condition of which the tran- scendental concept of reality knows nothing. Although Leibniz himself did not announce this proposition with all the pomp of a new principle, he yet made use of it for new assertions, and his followers expressly inserted it in their system of the Leibniz-Wolfian philosophy. According to this principle all evils, for example, are nothing but the consequences of the limitations of created beings, that is, they are negations, because these can be the only opposites of reality (which is perfectly true in the mere concept of the thing in general, but not in things as phenomena). In like manner the followers of Leibniz consider it not only possible, but even natural, to unite all reality, without fearing any opposition, in one being ; because the only opposition they know is that [p. 274] of contradiction (by which the concept of a thing itself is annihilated), while they ignore that of reciprocal action and reaction, when one real cause destroys the effect of another, a process which we can only represent to our- selves when the conditions are given in sensibility. Thirdly. The Leibnizian monadology has really no other foundation than that Leibniz represented the difference of the internal and the external in relation to the understand- ing only. Substances must have something internal, which is free from all external relations, and therefore from com- position also. The simple, therefore, or uncompounded, is the foundation of the internal of things by themselves. This internal in the state of substances cannot consist in space, form, contact, or motion (all these determinations being external relations), and we cannot therefore ascribe 224 Transcendental Analytic to substances any other internal state but that which belongs to our own internal sense, namely, the state of representations. This is the history of the monads, which were to form the elements of the whole universe, and the energy of which consists in representations only, so that properly they can be active within themselves only. For this reason, his principle of a possible community of substances could only be a pre-established harmony, and not a physical influence. For, as every- [p. 275] thing is actively occupied internally only, that is, with its own representations, the state of representations in one substance could not be in active connection with that of another ; but it became necessary to admit a third cause, exercising its influence on all substances, and making their states to correspond with each other, not indeed by oc- casional assistance rendered in each particular case {sys- tema assistentiae), but through the unity of the idea of a cause valid for all, and in which all together must receive their existence and permanence, and therefore also their reciprocal correspondence according to universal laws. FourtJily. Leibniz's celebrated doctrine of space and time, in which he intellectualised these forms of sensi- bility, arose entirely from the same delusion of transcen- dental reflection. If by means of the pure understanding alone I want to represent the external relations of things, I can do this only by means of the concept of their reciprocal action ; and if I want to connect one state with another state of the same thing, this is possible only in the order of cause and effect. Thus it happened that Leibniz conceived space as a certain order in the com- munity of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their states. That which space and time seem to pes- Transcendental Analytic 225 sess as proper to themselves and independent [p. 276] of things, he ascribed to the confusion of these concepts, which made us mistake what is a mere form of dynamical relations for a peculiar and independent intuition, ante- cedent to things themselves. Thus space and time became with him the intelligible form of the connection of things (substances and their states) by themselves, and things were intelligible substances {siibstantiae noumend). Never- theless he tried to make these concepts valid for phe- nomena, because he would not concede to sensibility any independent kind of intuition, but ascribed all, even the empirical representation of objects, to the understanding, leaving to the senses nothing but the contemptible work of confusing and mutilating the representations of the understanding. But, even if we could predicate anything synthetically by means of the pure understanding of things by them- selves (which however is simply impossible), this could never be referred to phenomena, because these do not represent things by themselves. We should therefore in such a case have to compare our concepts in a transcen- dental reflection under the conditions of sensibility only, and thus space and time would never be determinations of things by themselves, but of phenomena. What things may be by themselves we know not, nor need [p. 277] we care to know, because, after all, a thing can never come before me otherwise than as a phenomenon. The remaining reflective conceptions have to be treated in the same manner. Matter is substantia phenomenon. What may belong to it internally, I seek for in all parts of space occupied by it, and in all effects produced by it, all of which, however, can be phenomena of the external Q 226 Transcendental Analytic senses only. I have therefore nothing that is absolutely, but only what is relatively internal, and this consists itself of external relations. Nay, what according to the pure understanding should be the absolutely internal of matter is a mere phantom, for matter is never an object of the pure understanding, while the transcendental object which may be the ground of the phenomenon which we call matter, is a mere something of which we could not even understand what it is, though somebody should tell us. We cannot understand anything except what carries with it in intuition something corresponding to our words. If the complaint ' that we do not understand the internal of things,' means that we do not comprehend by means of the pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be of themselves, it seems totally unjust and unreasonable ; for it means that without senses we should be able to know and therefore to see things, that is, that we should possess a faculty of knowledge totally different from the human, not only in degree, but in kind [p. 278] and in intuition, in fact, that we should not be men, but beings of whom we ourselves could not say whether they are even possible, much less what they would be like. Observation and analysis of phenomena enter into the internal of nature, and no one can say how far this may go in time. Those transcendental questions, however, which go beyond nature, would nevertheless remain un- answerable, even if the whole of nature were revealed to us, for it is not given to us to observe even our own mind with any intuition but that of our internal sense. In it lies the mystery of the origin of our sensibility. Its relation to an object, and the transcendental ground of that unity, are no doubt far too deeply hidden for us, who can know Transcendental Analytic 227 even ourselves by means of the internal sense only, that is, as phenomena, and we shall never be able to use the same imperfect instrument of investigation in order to find any- thing but again and again phenomena, the non-sensuous, and non-phenomenal cause of which we are seeking in vain. What renders this criticism of the conclusions by means of the acts of mere reflection extremely useful is, that it shows clearly the nulHty of all conclusions with regard to objects compared with each other in the understanding only, and that it confirms at the same time what [p. 279] we have so strongly insisted on, namely, that phenomena, though they cannot be comprehended as things by them- selves among the objects of the pure understanding, are nevertheless the only objects in which our knowledge can possess objective reality, i.e. where intuition corresponds to concepts. When we reflect logically only, we only compare in our understanding concepts among themselves, trying to find out whether both have exactly the same contents, whether they contradict themselves or not, whether something belongs to a concept, or is added to it, and which of the two may be given, while the other may be a mode only of thinking the given concept. But if I refer these concepts to an object in general (in a transcendental sense), with- out determining whether it be an object of sensuous or intellectual intuition, certain limitations appear at once, warning us not to go beyond the concept, and upsetting all empirical use of it, thus proving that a representation of an object, as of a thing in general, is not only insufifi- cient, but, if without sensuous determination, and indepen- dent of empirical conditions, self-contradictory. It is necessary therefore either to take no account at all of the 228 Transcendental Analytic object (as we do in logjc) or, if not, then to think it under the conditions of sensuous intuition, because the intelligi- ble would require a quite peculiar intuition which we do not possess, and, without it, would be nothing to us, while on the other side phenomena also could never [p. 280] be things by themselves. For if I represent to myself things in general only, the difference of external relations cannot, it is true, constitute a difference of the things themselves, but rather presupposes it ; and, if the concept of one thing does not differ at all internally from that of another, I only have one and the same thing placed in different relations. Furthermore, by adding a mere affir- mation (reality) to another, the positive in it is indeed augmented, and nothing is taken away or removed, so that we see that the real in things can never be in contra- diction with itself, etc. ******** A certain misunderstanding of these reflective concepts has, as we showed, exercised so great an influence on the use of the understanding, as to mislead even one of the most acute philosophers to the adoption of a so-called system of intellectual knowledge, which undertakes to determine objects without the intervention of the senses. For this reason the exposition of the cause of the misunder- standing, which lies in the amphiboly of these concepts, as the origin of false principles, is of great utility in deter- mining and securing the true limits of the understanding. It is no doubt true, that what can be affirmed or denied of a concept in general, can also be affirmed or denied of any part of it {dictum de onini et milld) ; but it [p. 281] would be wrong so to change this logical proposition as to make it say that whatever is not contained in a general Transcendental Analytic 229 concept, is not contained either in the particular con- cepts comprehended under it; for these are particular concepts for the very reason that they contain more than is conceived in the general concept. Nevertheless the whole intellectual system of Leibniz is built up on this fallacy, and with it falls necessarily to the ground, to- gether with all equivocation in the use of the understand- ing, that had its origin in it. Leibniz's principle of discernibility is really based on the supposition that, if a certain distinction is not to be found in the general concept of a thing, it could not be met with either in the things themselves, and that there- fore all things were perfectly the same {niimero eadem), which are not distinguished from each other in their con- cept also, as to quality or quantity. And because in the mere concept of a thing, no account has been taken of many a necessary condition of its intuition, it has rashly been concluded that that which, in forming an abstraction, has been intentionally left out of account, did really not exist anywhere, and nothing has been allowed to a thing except what is contained in its concept. [p. 282] The concept of a cubic foot of space, wherever and how many times soever I may think it, is in itself perfectly the same. But two cubic feet are nevertheless distinguished in space, by their places alone {nuniero diversa), and these places are conditions of the intuition in which the object of our concept is given, and which, though they do not belong to the concept, belong nevertheless to the whole of sensibility. In a similar manner there is no contra- diction in the concept of a thing, unless something nega- tive has been connected with something affirmative ; and simply affirmative concepts, if joined together, cannot 230 Transcendental Analytic neutralise each other. But in sensuous intuition, where we have to deal with reality (for instance motion), there exist conditions (opposite directions) of which in the concept of motion in general no account was taken, and which render possible an opposition (not however a logical one), and from mere positives produce zero = 0, so that it would be wrong to say that all reahty must be in per- fect agreement, if there is no opposition between its con- cepts.^ If we keep to concepts only, that which we call internal is the substratum of all relations or [p. 283] external determinations. If therefore I take no account of any of the conditions of intuition, and confine myself solely to the concept of a thing, then I may drop no doubt all external relations, and yet there must remain the con- cept of something which implies no relation, but internal determinations only. From this it might seem to follow that there exists in everything something (substance) which is absolutely internal, preceding all external determinations, nay, rendering them possible. It might likewise seem to follow that this substratum, as no longer containing any external relations, must be shnple (for corporeal things are always relations only, at least of their parts existing side by side) ; and as we know of no entirely internal deter- minations beyond those of our own internal sense, that substratum might be taken, not only as simple, but like- 1 If one wished to use here the usual subterfuge that realiiates noumena, at least, cannot oppose each other, it would be necessary to produce an example of such pure and non-sensuous reality, to enable us to see whether it was something or nothing. No example, however, can be produced, except from experience, which never offers us anything but phenomena; so that this proposition means really nothing but that a concept, which contains affirma- tives only, contains no negative, a proposition which we at least have never doubted. Transcendental Analytic 231 wise (according to the analogy of our own internal sense) as determined by representations, so that all things would be really monads, or simple beings endowed with repre- sentations. All this would be perfectly true, unless some- thing more than the concept of a thing in gen- [p. 284J eral were required in order to give us objects of external intuition, although the pure concept need take no account of it. But we see, on the contrary, that a permanent phenomenon in space (impenetrable extension) may con- tain mere relations without anything that is absolutely internal, and yet be the first substratum of all external perception. It is true that if we think by concepts only, we cannot think something external without something internal, because conceptions of relations presuppose things given, and are impossible without them. But as in intuition something is contained which does not exist at all in the mere concept of a thing, and as it is this which supplies the substratum that could never be known by mere concepts, namely, a space which, with all that is contained in it, consists of purely formal, or real rela- tions also, I am not allowed to say, that, because nothing can be represented by mere concepts without something absolutely internal, there could not be in the real things themselves, comprehended under those concepts, and in their intuition, anything external, without a foundation of something absolutely internal. For, if we take no account of all conditions of intuition, then no doubt nothing re- mains in the mere concept but the internal in general, with its mutual relations, through which alone the exter- nal is possible. This necessity, however, which depends on abstraction alone, does not apply to things, if [p. 285] they are given in intuition with determinations expressive 232 Transcendental Analytic of mere relations, and without having for their foundation anything internal, for the simple reason that they are phenomena only, and not things in themselves. What- ever we may know of matter are nothing but relations (what we call internal determinations are but relatively internal); but there are among these relations some which are independent and permanent, and by which a certain object is given us. That I, when abstraction is made of these relations, have nothing more to think, does not do away with the concept of a thing, as a phenomenon, nor with the concept of an object in abstracto. It only shows the impossibility of such an object as could be determined by mere concepts, that is of a noumenon. It is no doubt startling to hear, that a thing should consist entirely of relations, but such a thing as we speak of is merely a phenomenon, and can never be thought by means of the categories only ; nay, it consists itself of the mere relation of something in general to our senses. In the same man- ner, it is impossible for us to represent the relations of things in abstracto as long as we deal with concepts only, in any other way than that one should be the cause of determinations in the other, this being the very concept of our understanding, with regard to relations. But as in this case we make abstraction of all intuition, a whole class of determinations, by which the manifold determines its place to each of its component parts, that is, the form of sensibility (space), disappears, though in truth [p. 286] it precedes all empirical casuality. If by purely intelligible objects we understand things which, without all schemata of sensibility, are thought by mere categories, such objects are simply impossible. It is our sensuous intuition by which objects are given to us that Transcendental Analytic 233 forms the condition of the objective application of all the concepts of our understanding, and without that intuition the categories have no relation whatever to any object. Nay, even if we admitted a kind of intuition different from the sensuous, our functions of thought would have no meaning with regard to it. If we only mean objects of a non-sensuous intuition, to which our categories do not apply, and of which we can have no knowledge whatever (either intuitional or conceptual), there is no reason why noumena, in this merely negative meaning, should not be admitted, because in this case we mean no more than this, that our intuition does not embrace all things, but objects of our senses only ; that, consequently, its objective validity is limited, and space left for some other kind of intuition, and consequently for things as objects of it. But in that sense the concept of a noumenon is problematical, that is, the representation of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible or that it is impossible, because we have no conception of any kind of intuition but that of our senses, or of any kind of concepts but of our categories, [p. 287] neither of them being applicable to any extra-sensuous object. We cannot therefore extend in a positive sense the field of the objects of our thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, or admit, besides phenomena, objects of pure thought, that is, noumena, simply because they do not possess any positive meaning that could be pointed out. For it must be admitted that the categories by themselves are not sufficient for a knowledge of things, and that, with- out the data of sensibility, they would be nothing but subjective forms of unity of the understanding, and without an object. We do not say that thought is a mere product of the senses, and therefore limited by them, but it does 234 Transcendental Analytic not follow that therefore thought, without sensibility, has its own pure use, because it would really be without an object. Nor would it be right to call the noumenon such an object of the pure understanding, for the noumenon means the problematical concept of an object, intended for an intuition and understanding totally different from our own, and therefore themselves mere problems. The con- cept of the noumenon is not therefore the concept of an object, but only a problem, inseparable from the limitation of our sensibility, whether there may not be objects inde- pendent of its intuition. This is a question that [p. 288] can only be answered in an uncertain way, by saying that as sensuous intuition does not embrace all things without exception, there remains a place for other objects, that can- not therefore be absolutely denied, but cannot be asserted either as objects of our understanding, because there is no definite concept for them (our categories being unfit for that purpose). The understanding therefore limits the sensibility with- out enlarging thereby its own field, and by warning the latter that it can never apply to things by themselves, but to phenomena only, it forms the thought of an object by itself, but as transcendental only, which is the cause of phenomena, and therefore never itself a phenomenon: which cannot be thought as quantity, nor as reality, nor as substance (because these concepts require sensuous forms in which to determine an object), and of which therefore it must always remain unknown, whether it is to be found within us only, or also without us ; and whether, if sensi- bility were removed, it would vanish or remain. If we like to call this object noumenon, because the representation of it is not sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. But as we Transcendental Analytic 235 cannot apply to it any of the concepts of our understand- ing, such a representation remains to us empty, serving no purpose but that of indicating the limits of our sensuous knowledge, and leaving at the same time an [p. 289] empty space which we cannot fill either by possible expe- rience, or by the pure understanding. The critique of the pure understanding does not there- fore allow us to create a new sphere of objects beyond those which can come before it as phenomena, or to stray into intelligible worlds, or even into the concept of such. The mistake which leads to this in the most plausible manner, and which, though excusable, can never be justi- fied, consists in making the use of the understanding, con- trary to its very intention, transcendental, so that objects, that is, possible intuitions, are made to conform to con- cepts, not concepts to possible intuitions, on which alone their objective validity can rest. The cause of this is again, that apperception, and with it thought, precedes every possible determinate arrangement of represen- tations. We are thinking something in general, and determine it on one side sensuously, but distinguish at the same time the general object, represented in abstrac- tion, from this particular mode of sensuous intuition. Thus there remains to us a mode of determining the object by thought only, which, though it is a mere logical form without any contents, seems to us nevertheless a mode in which the object by itself exists (noumenon), with- out regard to the intuition which is restricted to our senses. [p- 290] ******** Before leaving this transcendental Analytic, we have to add something which, though in itself of no particular 236 Transceitdental Analytic importance, may yet seem to be requisite for the complete- ness of the system. The highest concept of which all transcendental philosophy generally begins, is the division into the possible and the impossible. But, as all division presupposes a divisible concept, a higher concept is re- quired, and this is the concept of an object in general, taken as problematical, it being left uncertain whether it be something or nothing. As the categories are the only concepts which apply to objects in general, the distinction whether an object is something or nothing must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories. I. Opposed to the concepts of all, many, and one, is the concept which annihilates everything, that 'is, none; and thus the object of a concept, to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is = o, that is, a concept with- out an object, like the noumena, which cannot be counted as possibilities, though not as impossibilities either {ens nationis) , or like certain fundamental forces, [p. 291] which have been newly invented, and have been con- ceived without contradiction, but at the same time with- out any example from experience, and must not therefore be counted among possibilities. II. Reality is sometliing, negation is nothing ; that is, it is the concept of the absence of an object, as shadow or cold {nihil privativHiit). III. The mere form of intuition (without substance) is in itself no object, but the merely foi'mal condition of it (as a phenomenon), as pure space and pure time {ens iniaginarinm), which, though they are something, as forms of intuition, are not themselves objects of intuition. IV. The object of a concept which contradicts itself, is nothing, because the concept is nothing ; it is simply Transcendental Analytic 237 the impossible, as a figure composed of two straight lines {nihil negativum). A table showing this division of the concept of nothing (the corresponding division of the concept of something follows by itself) would have to be arranged as follows. Nothing, [p. 292] as I. Empty concept without an object. Ens rat'onis. II. Empty object of a III. Empty intuition without concept. an object. Nil privativutn. Ens imaginarium IV. Empty object without a concept. Nihil negativum. We see that the ens rationis (No. i) differs from the ens negativum (No. 4), because the former cannot be counted among the possibilities, being the result of fancy, though not self-contradictory, while the latter is opposed to possibility, the concept annihilating itself. Both, however, are empty concepts. The nihil privati- vutn (No. 2) and the ens imagitiaritun (No. 3) are, on the contrary, empty data for concepts. It would be impossible to represent to ourselves darkness, unless light had been given to the senses, or space, unless extended beings had been perceived. The negation, as well as the pure form of intuition are, without something real, no objects. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC [p. 293] Second Division Transcendental Dialectic INTRODUCTION I. Of Transcendental Appearance (Illusion) We call "Dialectic in general a logic of illusion (eine Logik des Scheins). This does not mean that it is a doctrine of probability (Wahrscheinlichkeit), for proba- bility is a kind of truth, known through insufficient causes, the knowledge of which is therefore deficient, but not deceitful, and cannot properly be separated from the analytical part of logic. Still less can phenomenon (Erscheinung) and illusion (Schein) be taken as identical. For truth or illusion is not to be found in the objects of intuition, but in the judgments upon them, so far as they are thought. It is therefore quite right to say, that the senses never err, not because they always judge rightly, but because they do not judge at all. Truth therefore and error, and consequently illusory appearance also, as the cause of error, exist in our judgments only, that is, in the relation of an object to our understanding. No error exists in our knowledge, if it completely agrees with the laws of our understanding, nor can there be [p. 294] an error in a representation of the senses, because they 238 Transcendental Dialectic 239 involve no judgment, and no power of nature can, of its own accord, deviate from its own laws. Therefore neither the understanding by itself (without the influence of another cause), nor the senses by themselves could ever err. The understanding could not err, because as long as it acts according to its own laws, the effect (the judg- ment) must necessarily agree with those laws, and the formal test of all truth consists in this agreement with the laws of the understanding. The senses cannot err, because there is in them no judgment at all, whether true or false. Now as we have no other sources of know- ledge but these two, it follows that error can only arise through the unperceived influence of the sensibility on the understanding, whereby it happens that subjective grounds of judgment are mixed up with the objective, and cause them to deviate from their destination ; ^ just as a body in motion would, if left to itself, always follow a straight line in the same direction, which is changed however into a curvilinear motion, as soon as another force influences it at the same time in a different direc- tion. In order to distinguish the proper action [p. 295] of the understanding from that other force which is mixed up with it, it will be necessary to look on an erroneous judgment as the diagonal between two forces, which de- termine the judgment in two different directions, forming as it were an angle, and to dissolve that composite effect into the simple ones of the understanding and of the sen- sibility, which must be effected in pure judgments a priori 1 Sensibility, if subjected to the understanding as the object on which it exercises its function, is the source of real knowledge, but sensibility, if it in- fluences the action of the understanding itself and leads it on to a judgment, is the cause of error. 240 Transcendental Dialectic by transcendental reflection, whereby, as we tried to show, the right place is assigned to each representation in the faculty of knowledge corresponding to it, and the influence of either faculty upon such representation is determined. It is not at present our business to treat of empirical, for instance, optical appearance or illusion, which occurs in the empirical use of the otherwise correct rules of the understanding, and by which, owing to the influence of imagination, the faculty of judgment is misled. We have to deal here with nothing but the transcendental illusion, which touches principles never even intended to be applied to experience, which might give us a test of their correctness, — ■ an illusion which, in spite of all the warnings of criticism, tempts us far beyond the em- pirical use of the categories, and deludes us with the mere dream of an extension of the pure understanding. All principles the application of which is entirely confined within the limits of possible experience, we [p. 296] shall call immaneiit ; those, on the contrary, which tend to transgress those limits, transcendent. I do not mean by this the transcendental use or abuse of the categories, which is a mere fault of the faculty of the judgment, not being as yet sufficiently subdued by criticism nor sufficiently attentive to the limits of the sphere within which alone the pure understanding has full play, but real principles which call upon us to break down all those barriers, and to claim a perfectly new territory, which nowhere recognises any demarcation at all. Here transcendental and transcendent do not mean the same thing. The principles of the pure understanding, which we explained before, are meant to be only of empirical, and not of transcendental application, that is, they cannot Transcendental Dialectic 241 transcend the limits of experience. A principle, on the contrary, which removes these landmarks, nay, insists on our transcending them, is called transcendent. If our critique succeeds in laying bare the illusion of those pre- tended principles, the other principles of a purely em- pirical use may, in opposition to the former, be called immanent. Logical illusion' which consists in a mere imitation of the forms of reason (the illusion of sophistic syllo- gisms), arises entirely from want of attention to logical rules. It disappears at once, when our attention [p. 297] is roused. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not disappear, although it has been shown up, and its worthlessness rendered clear by means of transcendental criticism, as, for instance, the illusion inherent in the proposition that the world must have a beginning in time. The cause of this is that there exists in our reason (considered subjectively as a faculty of human knowledge) principles and maxims of its use, which have the appearance of objective principles, and lead us to mistake the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our concepts in favour of the understanding for an objective necessity in the determination of things by themselves. This illusion is as impossible to avoid as it is to prevent the sea from appearing to us higher at a distance than on the shore, because we see it by higher rays of light ; or to prevent the moon from ap- pearing, even to an astronomer, larger at its rising, although he is not deceived by that illusion. Transcendental Dialectic must, therefore, be content to lay bare the illusion of transcendental judgments and guarding against its deceptions — but it will never suc- R 242 Transcendental Dialectic ceed in removing the transcendental illusion (like the logical), and putting an end to it altogether, [p. 298] For we have here to deal with a natural and inevitable illusion, which itself rests on subjective principles, repre- senting them to us as objective, while logical Dialectic, in removing sophisms, has to deal merely with a mis- take in applying the principles, or with an artificial illu- sion produced by an imitation of them. There exists, therefore, a natural and inevitable Dialectic of pure rea- son, not one in which a mere bungler might get entangled from want of knowledge, or which a sophist might arti- ficially devise to confuse rational people, but one that is inherent in, and inseparable from human reason, and which, even after its illusion has been exposed, will never cease to fascinate our reason, and to precipitate it into momentary errors, such as require to be removed again and again. z. Of Pure Reason, as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion A. Of Reason in General All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds thence to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason, for working up the material of intuition, and comprehending it under the highest unity of thought. As it here becomes [p. 299] necessary to give a definition of that highest faculty of knowledge, I begin to feel considerable misgivings. There is of reason, as there is of the understanding, a purely formal, that is logical use, in which no account is taken of the contents of knowledge ; but there is also a real use, in so far as reason itself contains the origin of cer- Transcendental Dialectic 243 tain concepts and principles, which it has not borrowed either from the senses or from the understanding. The former faculty has been long defined by logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusions, in contradistinction to im- mediate ones {conscqiicntiae inwicdiatae) ; but this does not help us to understand the latter, which itself produces concepts. As this brings us face to face with the division of reason into a logical and a transcendental faculty, we must look for a higher concept for this source of know- ledge, to comprehend both concepts : though, according to the analogy of the concepts of the understanding, we may expect that the logical concept will give us the key to the transcendental, and that the table of the functions of the former will give us the genealogical outline of the con- cepts of reason. In the first part of our transcendental logic we defined the understanding as the faculty of rules, and we now distinguish reason from it, by calling it the faculty of principles. [p. 300] The term principle is ambiguous, and signifies com- monly some kind of knowledge only that may be used as a principle, though in itself, and according to its origin, it is no principle at all. Every general proposition, even though it may have been derived from experience (by induction), may serve as a major in a syllogism of reason ; but it is not on that account a principle. Mathematical axioms, as, for instance, that between two points there can be only one straight line, constitute even general know- ledge a priori, and may therefore, with reference to the cases which can be brought under them, rightly be called principles. Nevertheless it would be wrong to say, that this property of a straight line, in general and by itself. 244 Transcendental Dialectic is known to us from principles, for it is known from pure intuition only. I shall therefore call it knowledge from principles, whenever we know the particular in the general, by means of concepts. Thus every syllogism of reason is a form of deducing some kind of knowledge from a prin- ciple, because the major always contains a concept which enables us to know, according to a principle, everything that can be comprehended under the conditions of that concept. As every general knowledge may serve as a major in such a syllogism, and as the understanding supplies such general propositions a priori, these no doubt may, with reference to their possible use, be called principles. [p. 301] But, if we consider these principles of the pure under- standing in themselves, and according to their origin, we find that they are anything rather than knowledge from concepts. They would not even be possible a priori, unless we relied on pure intuition (in mathematics) or on conditions of a possible experience in general. That everything which happens has a cause, can by no means be concluded from the concept of that which happens ; on the contrary, that very principle shows in what man- ner alone we can form a definite empirical concept of that which happens. It is impossible therefore for the understanding to sup- ply us with synthetical knowledge from concepts, and it is really that kind of knowledge which I call principles abso- lutely ; while all general propositions may be called prin- ciples relatively. It is an old desideratum, which at some time, however distant, may be realised, that, instead of the endless Transcendental Dialectic 241; variety of civil laws, their principles might be discovered, for thus alone the secret might be found of what is called simplifying legislation. Such laws, however, are only limitations of our freedom under conditions by which it always agrees with itself ; they refer to something which is entirely our own work, and of which we ourselves can be the cause, by means of these concepts. But that objects in themselves, as for instance material nature, should be subject to principles, and be determined accord- [p. 302] ing to mere concepts, is something, if not impossible, at all events extremely contradictory. But be that as it may (for on this point we have still all investigations before us), so much at least is clear, that knowledge from princi- ples (by itself) is something totally different from mere knowledge of the understanding, which, in the form of a principle, may no doubt precede other knowledge, but which by itself (in so far as it is synthetical) is not based on mere thought, nor contains anything general, according to concepts. If the understanding is a faculty for producing unity among phenomena, according to rules, reason is the faculty for producing unity among the rules of the understanding, according to principles. Reason therefore never looks directly to experience, or to any object, but to the under- standing, in order to impart a priori through concepts to its manifold kinds of knowledge a unity that may be called the unity of reason, and is very different from the unity which can be produced by the understanding. This is a general definition of the faculty of reason, so far as it was possible to make it intelligible without the help of illustrations, which are to be given hereafter. 246 Transcendental Dialectic B. Of the Logical Use of Reason [p. 303] A distinction is commonly made between what is im- mediately known and what is only inferred. That in a figure bounded by three straight lines there are three angles, is known immediately, but that these angles to- gether are equal to two right angles, is only inferred. As we are constantly obliged to infer, we grow so accustomed to it, that in the end we no longer perceive this difference, and as in the case of the so-called deceptions of the senses, often mistake what we have only inferred for something perceived immediately. In every syllogism there is first a fundamental proposition ; secondly, another deduced from it ; and lastly, the conclusion (consequence), according to which the truth of the latter is indissolubly connected with the truth of the former. If the judgment or the conclusion is so clearly contained in the first that it can be inferred from it without the mediation or intervention of a third representation, the conclusion is called immediate (conse- quentia immediata) : though I should prefer to call it a conclusion of the understanding. But if, besides the fun- damental knowledge, another judgment is required to bring out the consequence, then the conclusion is called a conclusion of reason. In the proposition 'all men are mortal,' the following propositions are contained : some men are mortal ; or some mortals are men ; or nothing that is immortal is a man. These are therefore im- [p. 304] mediate inferences from the first. The proposition, on the contrary, all the learned are mortal, is not contained in the fundamental judgment, because the concept of learned does not occur in it, and can only be deduced from it by means of an intervening judgment. Transcendental Dialectic 247 In every syllogism I first think a rule (the major) by means of the understanding. I then bring some special knowledge under the condition of the rule (the minor) by means of the faculty of judgment, and I finally determine my knowledge through the predicate of the rule {con- clusio), that is, a priori, by means of reason. It is there- fore the relation represented by the major proposition, as the rule, between knowledge and its condition, that con- stitutes the different kinds of syllogism. Syllogisms are therefore threefold, like all judgments, differing from each other in the manner in which they express the relation of knowledge in the understanding, namely, categorical, hy- pothetical, and disjunctive. If, as often happens, the conclusion is put forward as a judgment, in order to see whether it does not follow from other judgments by which a perfectly different object is conceived, I try to find in the understanding the assertion of that conclusion, in order to see whetker it does not ex- ist in it, under certain conditions, accohling to a general rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object of the conclusion can be brought under the given [p. 305] condition, then that conclusion follows from the rule which is valid for other objects of knowledge also. Thus we see that reason, in forming conclusions, tries to reduce the great variety of the knowledge of the understanding to the smallest number of principles (general conditions), and thereby to produce in it the highest unity. C. Of the Pure Use of Reason The question to which we have at present to give an answer, though a preliminary one only, is this, whether reason can be isolated and thus constitute by itself an 248 Transce7idental Dialectic independent source of concepts and judgments, which spring from it alone, and through which it has reference to objects, or whether it is only a subordinate faculty for imparting a certain form to any given knowledge, namely, a logical form, a faculty whereby the cognitions of the understanding are arranged among themselves only, and lower rules placed under higher ones (the condition of the latter comprehending in its sphere the condition of the former) so far as all this can be done by their comparison. Variety of rules with unity of principles is a requirement of reason for the purpose of bringing the understanding into perfect agreement with itself, just as the understand- ing brings the variety of intuition under concepts, and thus imparts to intuition a connected form. Such a prin- ciple however prescribes no law to the objects [p. 306] themselves, nor does it contain the ground on which the possibility of knowing and determining objects depends. It is merely a subjective law of economy, applied to the stores of our understanding ; having for its purpose, by means of a comparison of concepts, to reduce the general use of them to the smallest possible number, but without giving us a right to demand of the objects themselves such a uniformity as might conduce to the comfort and the extension of our understanding, or to ascribe to that maxim any objective validity. In one word, the question is, whether reason in itself, that is pure reason, contains synthetical principles and rules a priori, and what those principles are .'' The merely formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives us sufficient hints as to the ground on which the transcendental principle of synthetical know- ledge, by means of pure reason, is likely to rest. Transcendental Dialectic 249 First, a syllogism, as a function of reason, does not refer to intuitions in order to bring them under rules (as the understanding does with its categories), but to con- cepts and judgments. Although pure reason refers in the end to objects, it has no immediate relation to them and their intuition, but only to the understanding and its judg- ments, these having a direct relation to the [p. 307] senses and their intuition, and determining their objects. Unity of reason is therefore never the unity of a possible experience, but essentially different from it, as the unity of the understanding. That everything which happens has a cause, is not a principle discovered or prescribed by reason, it only makes the unity of experience possible, and borrows nothing from reason, which without this relation to possible experience could never, from mere concepts, have prescribed such a synthetical unity. Secondly. Reason, in its logical employment, looks for the general condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and the syllogism produced by reason is itself nothing but a judgment by means of bringing its condition under a gen- eral rule (the major). But as this rule is again liable to the same experiment, reason having to seek, as long as possible, the condition of a condition (by means of a pro- syllogism), it is easy to see that it is the peculiar principle of reason (in its logical use) to find for every condi- tioned knowledge of the understanding the unconditioned, whereby the unity of that knowledge may be completed. This logical maxim, however, cannot become a principle of pitre reason, unless we admit that, whenever the condi- tion is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another, a series, which consequently is [p. 308] itself unconditioned, is likewise given (that is, is contained in the object and its connection). 250 Transcendental Dialectic Such a principle of pure reason, however, is evidently synthetical; for analytically the conditioned refers no doubt to some condition, but not to the unconditioned. From this principle several other synthetical propositions also must arise of which the pure understanding knows nothing; because it has to deal with objects of a possible experience only, the knowledge and synthesis of which are always conditioned. The unconditioned, if it is really to be admitted, has to be especially considered with regard to all the determinations which distinguish it from whatever is conditioned, and will thus supply material for many a synthetical proposition a priori. The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason will however be transce}tdent, with regard to all phenomena ; that is to say, it will be impossible ever to make any adequate empirical use of such a principle. It will thus be completely different from all principles of the understanding, the use of which is entirely immanent and directed to the possibility of experience only. The task that is now before us in the transcendental Dialectic which has to be developed from sources deeply hidden in the human reason, is this : to discover the correctness or otherwise the falsehood of the principle that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of phenomena, or of objective thought in general) extends to the unconditioned, and what consequences result therefrom with regard to the empirical use of the understanding: — to find [p. 309] out whether there is really such an objectively valid prin- ciple of reason, and not only, in place of it, a logical rule which requires us, by ascending to ever higher conditions, to approach their completeness, and thus to bring the highest unity of reason, which is possible to us, into our Transcendental Dialectic 251 knowledge : to find out, I say, whether, by some miscon- ception, a mere tendency of reason has not been mistaken for a transcendental principle of pure reason, postulating, without sufficient reflection, absolute completeness in the series of conditions in the objects themselves, and what kind of misconceptions and illusions may in that case have crept into the syllogisms of reason, the major proposition of which has been taken over from pure reason (being perhaps a petitio rather than a postnlatum), and which ascend from experience to its conditions. We shall divide it into two parts, of which the first will treat of the tran- scendent concepts of pure reason, the second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC [p. 310] BOOK I OF THE CONCEPTS OF PURE REASON Whatever may be thought of the possibility of con- cepts of pure reason, it is certain that they are not simply obtained by reflection, but by inference. Concepts of the understanding exist a priori, before experience, and for the sake of it, but they contain nothing but the unity of reflec- tion applied to phenomena, so far as they are necessarily intended for a possible empirical consciousness. It is through them alone that knowledge and determination of an object become possible. They are the first to give material for conclusions, and they are not preceded by any concepts a priori of objects from which they could them- selves be deduced. Their objective reality however de- pends on this, that because they constitute the intellectual form of all experience, it is necessary that their application should always admit of being exhibited in experience. The very name, however, of a concept of reason gives a kind of intimation that it is not intended to be limited to experience, because it refers to a kind of knowledge of which every empirical knowledge is a part only (it may be, 252 Transcendental Dialectic 253 the whole of possible experience or of its empir- [p. 311 J ical synthesis) : and to which all real experience belongs, though it can never fully attain to it. Concepts of reason serve for conceiving or comprehending ; concepts of the understanding for understanding (perceptions). If they contain the unconditioned, they refer to something to which all experience may belong, but which itself can never become an object of experience; — something to which reason in its conclusions from experience leads up, and by which it estimates and measures the degree of its own empirical use, but which never forms part of empirical synthesis. If such concepts possess, notwithstanding, objective validity, they may be called conceptus ratiocinati (concepts legitimately formed) ; if they have only been surreptitiously obtained, by a kind of illusory conclusion, they may be called conceptus ratiocinantes (sophistical concepts). But as this subject can only be fully treated in the chapter on the dialectical conclusions of pure rea- son, we shall say no more of it now, but shall only, as we gave the name of categories to the pure concepts of the understanding, give a new name to the concepts of pure reason, and call them transcendental ideas, a name that has now to be explained and justified. [p- 312] 2 54 Transcendental Dialectic TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC BOOK I First Section Of Ideas in General In spite of the great wealth of our languages, a thought- ful mind is often at a loss for an expression that should square exactly with its concept ; and for want of which he cannot make himself altogether intelligible, either to others or to himself. To coin new words is to arrogate to oneself legislative power in matters of language, a proceed- ing which seldom succeeds, so that, before taking so des- perate a step, it is always advisable to look about, in dead and learned languages, whether they do not contain such a concept and its adequate expression. Even if it should happen that the original meaning of the word had become somewhat uncertain, through carelessness on the part of its authors, it is better nevertheless to determine and fix the meaning which principally belonged to it (even if it- should remain doubtful whether it was originally used exactly in that meaning), than to spoil our labour by becoming unintelligible. Whenever therefore there exists one single word only for a certain concept, which, in its received meaning, exactly covers that concept, and when it is of [p. 313] great consequence to keep that concept distinct from other related concepts, we ought not to be lavish in usino- it nor Transcendental Dialectic 255 employ it, for the sake of variety only, as a synonyme in the place of others, but carefully preserve its own pecul- iar meaning, as otherwise it may easily happen that the expression ceases to attract special attention, and loses itself in a crowd of other words of very different import, so that the thought, which that expression alone could have preserved, is lost with it. From the way in which Plato uses the term idea, it is easy to see that he meant by it something which not only was never borrowed from the senses, but which even far transcends the concepts of the understanding, with which Aristotle occupied himself, there being nothing in experi- ence corresponding to the ideas. With him the ideas are archetypes of things themselves, not only, like the cate- gories, keys to possible experiences. According to his opinion they flowed out from the highest reason, which however exists no longer in its original state, but has to recall, with difficulty, the old but now very obscure ideas, which it does by means of reminiscence, commonly called philosophy. I shall not enter here on any literary discus- sions in order to determine the exact meaning which the sublime philosopher himself connected with that expres- sion. I shall only remark, that it is by no [p. 314J means unusual, in ordinary conversations, as well as in written works, that by carefully comparing the thoughts uttered by an author on his own subject, we succeed in understanding him better than he understood himself, because he did not sufficiently define his concept, and thus not only spoke, but sometimes even thought, in opposition to his own intentions. Plato knew very well that our faculty of knowledge was filled with a much higher craving than merely to 256 Transcendental Dialectic spell out phenomena according to a synthetical unity, and thus to read and understand them as experience. He knew that our reason, if left to itself, tries to soar up to knowledge to which no object that experience may give can ever correspond ; but which nevertheless is real, and by no means a mere cobweb of the brain. Plato discovered his ideas principally in what is prac- tical,^ that is, in what depends on freedom, which again belongs to a class of knowledge which is a [p. 315] peculiar product of reason. He who would derive the concept of virtue from experience, and would change what at best could only serve as an example or an im- perfect illustration, into a type and a source of know- ledge (as many have really done), would indeed transform virtue into an equivocal phantom, changing according to times and circumstances, and utterly useless to serve as a rule. Everybody can surely perceive that, when a person is held up to us as a model of virtue, we have always in our own mind the true original with which we compare this so-called model, and estimate it accord- ingly. The true original is the idea of virtue, in regard to which all possible objects of experience may serve as examples (proofs of the practicability, in a certain degree, of that which is required by the concept of reason), but never as archetypes. That no man can ever act up to ' It is true, however, that he extended his concept of ideas to speculative knowledge also, if only it was pure, and given entirely a priori. He extended it even to mathematics, although they can have their object nowhere but in possible experience. In this I cannot follow him, nor in the mystical deduc- tion of his ideas, and in the exaggerations which led him, as it were, to hypos- tasise them, although the high-flown language which he used, when treating of this subject, may well admit of a milder interpretation, and one more in accordance with the nature of things. Transcendental Dialectic 257 the pure idea of virtue does not in the least prove the chimerical nature of that concept ; for every judgment as to the moral worth or unworth of actions is possi- ble by means of that idea only, which forms, therefore, the necessary foundation for every approach to moral perfection, however far the impediments inherent in human nature, to the extent of which it is difficult to determine, may keep us removed from it. The Platonic Republic has been supposed to [p. 316] be a striking example of purely imaginary perfection. It has become a byword, as something that could exist in the brain of an idle thinker only, and Brucker thinks it ridiculous that Plato could have said that no prince could ever govern well, unless he participated in the ideas. We should do better, however, to follow up this thought and endeavour (where that excellent philosopher leaves us without his guidance) to place it in a clearer light by our own efforts, rather than to throw it aside as useless, under the miserable and very dangerous pretext of its impracticability. A constitution founded on the greatest possible human freedom, according to laws which enable the freedom of each individual to exist by the side of the freedom of others (without any regard to the highest possible human happiness, because that must necessarily follow by itself), is, to say the least, a necessary idea, on which not only the first plan of a constitution or a state, but all laws must be based, it being by no means necessary to take account from the beginning of existing impediments, which may owe their origin not so much to human nature itself as to the actual neglect of true ideas in legislation. For nothmg can be more mischievous and more unworthy a philoso- 258 Tratiscendental Dialectic pher than the vulgar appeal to what is called adverse experience, which possibly might never have existed, if at the proper time institutions had been framed accord- ing to those ideas, and not according to crude [p. 317] concepts, which, because they were derived from ex- perience only, have marred all good intentions. The more legislation and government are in harmony with that idea, the rarer, no doubt, punishments would become; and it is therefore quite rational to say (as Plato did), that in a perfect state no punishments would be neces- sary. And though this can never be realised, yet the idea is quite correct which sets up this maximum as an archetype, in order thus to bring our legislative constitu- tions nearer and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. Which may be the highest degree where human nature must stop, and how wide the chasm may be between the idea and its realisation, no one can or ought to deter- mine, because it is this very freedom that may be able to transcend any limits hitherto assigned to it. It is not only, however, where human reason asserts its free causality and ideas become operative agents (with regard to actions and their objects), that is to say, in the sphere of ethics, but also in nature itself, that Plato rightly discovered clear proofs of its origin from ideas. A plant, an animal, the regular plan of the cosmos (most likely therefore the whole order of nature), show clearly that they are possible according to ideas only; [p. 318] and that though no single creature, under the singular conditions of its existence, can fully correspond with the idea of what is most perfect of its kind (as little as any individual man with the idea of humanity, which, for all that, he carries in his mind as the archetype of all his Transcendental Dialectic 259 actions), those ideas are nevertheless determined through- out in the highest understanding each by itself as un- changeable, and are in fact the original causes of things, although it can only be said of the whole of them, con- nected together in the universe, that it is perfectly adequate to the idea. If we make allowance for the exaggerated expression, the effort of the philosopher to ascend from the mere observing and copying of the physical side of nature to an architectonic system of it, teleologically, that is according to ideas, deserves re- spect and imitation, while with regard to the principles of morality, legislation, and religion, where it is the ideas themselves that make experience of the good possible, though they can never be fully realised in experience, such efforts are of very eminent merit, which those only fail to recognise who attempt to judge it accord- ing to empirical rules, the very validity of which, as principles, was meant to be denied by Plato. With re- gard to nature, it is experience no doubt which supplies us with rules, and is the foundation of all truth : with regard to moral laws, on the contrary, experience is, alas ! but the source of illusion ; and it is altogether reprehen- sible to derive or limit the laws of what we [p. 319] ought to do according to our experience of what has been done. Instead of considering these subjects, the full develop- ment of which constitutes in reality the peculiar character and dignity of philosophy, we have to occupy ourselves at present with a task less brilliant, though not less use- ful, of building and strengthening the foundation of. that majestic edifice of morality, which at present is under- mined by all sorts of mole-tracks, the work of our reason, 26o Transcendental Dialectic which thus vainly, but always with the same confidence, is searching for buried treasures. It is our duty at pres- ent to acquire an accurate knowledge of the transcenden- tal use of^ the pure reason, its principles and ideas, in order to be able to determine and estimate correctly their influence and value. But before I leave this preliminary introduction, I beg those who really care for philosophy (which means more than is commonly supposed), if they are convinced by what I have said and shall still have to say, to take the term idea, in its original meaning, under their special protection, so that it should no longer be lost among other expressions, by which all sorts of representa- tions are loosely designated, to the great detriment of philosophy. There is no lack of names adequate to express every kind of representation, without our having to encroach on the property of others. I shall [p. 320] give a graduated list of them. The whole class may be called representation {irpraesentatio). Under it stands con- scious representation, perception {perceptio). A perception referring to the subject only, as a modification of his state, is seiisation {sensatio), while an objective sensation is called knowledge, cognition {cognitio). Cognition is either intuition or concept (intuitns vel conceptus). The former refers immediately to an object and is singular, the latter refers to it mediately, that is, by means of a characteristic mark that can be shared by several things in common. A concept is either empirical or pure, and the pure concept, so far as it has its origin in the understanding only (not in the pure image of sensibility) is called notion {notio). A concept formed of notions and transcending all possible experience is an idea, or a concept of reason. To any one who has once accustomed himself to these distinctions, it Transcendental Dialectic 261 must be extremely irksome to hear the representation of red colour called an idea, though it could not even be rightly called a notion (a concept of the understanding). TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC [p- 321] BOOK I Second Section Of Transcendental Ideas We had an instance in our transcendental Analytic, how the mere logical form of our knowledge could con- tain the origin of pure concepts a priori, which represent objects antecedently to all experience, or rather indicate a synthetical unity by which alone an empirical knowledge of objects becomes possible. The form of judgments (changed into a concept of the synthesis of intuitions) gave us the categories that guide and determine the use of the understanding in every experience. We may ex- pect, therefore, that the form of the syllogisms, if referred to the synthetical unity of intuitions, according to the manner of the categories, will contain the origin of cer- tain concepts a priori, to be called concepts of pure reason, or transcendental ideas, which ought to determine the use of the understanding within the whole realm of experience, according to principles. The function of reason in its syllogisms consists in the universality of cognition, according to concepts, and the syllogism itself is in reality a judgment, deter- [p. 322] mmtA. a priori in the whole extent of its condition. The 262 Transcende7ital Dialectic proposition ' Caius is mortal,' might be taken from experi- ence, by means of the understanding only. But what we want is a concept, containing the condition under which the predicate (assertion in general) of that judgment is given (here the concept of man), and after I have arranged it under this condition, taken in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I proceed to determine accordingly the know- ledge of my object (Caius is mortal). What we are doing therefore in the conclusion of a syl- logism is to restrict the predicate to a certain object, after we have used it first in the major, in its whole extent, under a certain condition. This completeness of its ex- tent, in reference to such a condition, is called universality [universalitas) ; and to this corresponds, in the synthesis of intuitions, the totality (universitas) of conditions. The transcendental concept of reason is, therefore, nothing but the concept of the totality of the conditions of any- thing given as conditioned. As therefore the uncondi- tioned alone renders a totality of conditions possible, and as conversely the totality of conditions must always be unconditioned, it follows that a pure concept of reason in general may be explained as a concept of the uncondi- tioned, so far as it contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned. As many kinds of relations as there are, which [p. 323] the understanding represents to itself by means of the categories, so many pure concepts of the reason we shall find, that is, first, the unconditioned of the categorical syn- thesis in a subject ; secondly, the unconditiotied of the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series ; thirdly, the unconditiojied of the disjunctive synthesis of the parts of a system. Transcendental Dialectic 263 There are exactly as many kinds of syllogisms, each of which tries to advance by means of pro-syllogisms to the unconditioned : the first to the subject, which itself is no longer a predicate ; the second to the presupposition, which presupposes nothing else ; and the third to an aggregate of the members of a division, which requires nothing else, in order to render the division of the concept complete. Hence the pure concepts of reason implying totality in the synthesis of the conditions are necessary, at least as problems, in order to carry the unity of the understanding to the unconditioned, if that is possible, and they are founded in the nature of human reason, even though these transcendental concepts may be without any proper application iii coticreto, and thus have no utility beyond bringing the understanding into a direction where its application, being extended as far as possible, is brought throughout in harmony with itself. Whilst speaking here of the totality of condi- [p. 324] tions, and of the unconditioned, as the common title of all the concepts of reason, we again meet with a term which we cannot do without, but which, by long abuse, has become so equivocal that we cannot employ it with safety. The term absolute is one of those few words which, in their original meaning, were fitted to a concept, which afterwards could not be exactly fitted with any other word of the same language, and the loss of which, or what is the same, the loose employment of which, entails the loss of the concept itself, and that of a concept with which reason is constantly occupied, and cannot dis- pense with without real damage to all transcendental in- vestigations. At present the term absolute is frequently used simply in order to indicate that something applies 264 Transcendental Dialectic to an object, considered in itself, and thus as it were inter- nally. In this way absolutely possible would mean that something is possible in itself (interne), which in reality is the least that could be said of it. It is sometimes used also to indicate that something is valid in all respects (without limitation), as people speak of absolute sovereignty. In this way absolutely possible would mean that which is possible in all respects, and this is again the utmost that could be said of the possibility of a thing. It is true that these two significations [p. 325] sometimes coincide, because something that is internally impossible is impossible also in every respect, and there- fore absolutely impossible. But in most cases they are far apart, and I am by no means justified in concluding that, because something is possible in itself, it is possible also in every respect, that is, absolutely possible. Nay, with regard to absolute necessity, I shall be able to show hereafter that it by no means always depends on internal necessity, and that the two cannot therefore be considered synonymous. No doubt, if the opposite of a thing is in- trinsically impossible, that opposite is also impossible in every respect, and the thing itself therefore absolutely necessary. But I cannot conclude conversely, that the opposite of what is absolutely necessary is internally impossible, or that the absolute necessity of things is the same as an internal necessity. For in certain cases that internal necessity is an entirely empty expression, with which we cannot connect the least concept, while that of the necessity of a thing in every respect (with regard to all that is possible) implies very peculiar deter- minations. As therefore the loss of a concept which has acted a great part in speculative philosophy can never Tra7tscendental Dialectic 265 be indifferent to philosophers, I hope they will also take some interest in the definition and careful preservation of the term with which that concept is connected. I shall therefore use the term absolute in this [p. 326] enlarged meaning only, in opposition to that which is valid relatively and in particular respects only, the latter being restricted to conditions, the former free from any restrictions whatsoever. It is then the absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions at which the transcendental concept of reason aims, nor does it rest satisfied till it has reached that which is unconditioned absolutely and in every respect. Pure reason leaves everything to the understanding, which has primarily to do with the objects of intuition, or rather their synthesis in imagination. It is only the absolute totality in the use of the concepts of the understanding, which reason reserves for itself, while trying to carry the synthetical unity, which is realised in the category, to the absolutely unconditioned. We might therefore call the latter the unity of the phenomena in reason, the former, which is expressed by the category, the unity in the understanding. Hence reason is only con- cerned with the use of the understanding, not so far as it contains the basis of possible experience (for the abso- lute totality of conditions is not a concept that can be used in experience, because no experience is uncondi- tioned), but in order to impart to it a direction towards a certain unity of which the understanding knows nothing, and which is meant to comprehend all acts of the under- standing, with regard to any object, into an [p. 327] absolute whole. On this account the objective use of the pure concepts of reason miust always be transcendent: 266 Transcendental Dialectic while that of the pure concepts of the understanding must always be imniaiient, being by its very nature restricted to possible experience. By idea I understand the necessary concept of reason, to which the senses can supply no corresponding object. The concepts of reason, therefore, of which we have been speaking, are transcendental ideas. They are concepts of pure reason, so far as they regard all empirical knowledge as determined by an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fancies, but supplied to us by the very nature of reason, and referring by necessity to the whole use of the understanding. They are, lastly, transcendent, as overstepping the limits of all experience which can never supply an object adequate to the transcendental idea. If we speak of an idea, we say a great deal with respect to the object (as the object of the pure understanding) but very little with respect to the subject, that is, with respect to its reality under empirical conditions, because an idea, being the concept of a maximum, can never be adequately given in concreto. As the latter is really the whole aim in the merely speculative use of reason, and as [p. 328] the mere approaching a concept, which in reality can never be reached, is the same as if the concept were missed altogether, people, when speaking of such a con- cept, are wont to say, it is an idea only. Thus one might say, that the absolute whole of all phenomena is an idea only, for as we can never form a representation of such a whole, it remains a problem without a solution. In the practical use of the understanding, on the contrary, where we are only concerned with practice, according to rules, the idea of practical reason can always be realised in con- creto, although partially only ; nay, it is the indispensable Transcendental Dialectic 267 condition of all practical use of reason. The practical realisation of the idea is here always limited and deficient, but these limits cannot be defined, and it always remains under the influence of a concept, implying absolute com- pleteness and perfection. The practical idea is therefore in this case truly fruitful, and, with regard to practical conduct, indispensable and necessary. In it pure reason becomes a cause and active power, capable of realising what is contained in its concept. Hence we cannot say of wisdom, as if contemptuously, that it is an idea only, but for the very reason that it contains the idea of the necessary unity of all possible aims, it must determine all practical acts, as an original and, at least, limitative condition. Although we must say that all transcendental [p. 329] concepts of reason are ideas only, they are not therefore to be considered as superfluous and useless. For although we cannot by them determine any object, they may never- theless, even unobserved, supply the understanding with a canon or rule of its extended and consistent use, by which, though no object can be better known than it is accord- ing to its concepts, yet the understanding may be better guided onwards in its knowledge, not to mention that they may possibly render practicable a transition from physical to practical concepts, and thus impart to moral ideas a certain strength and connection with the specu- lative knowledge of reason. On all this more light will be thrown in the sequel. For our present purposes we are obliged to set aside a consideration of these practical ideas, and to treat of reason in its speculative, or rather, in a still more limited sense, its purely transcendental use. Here we must fol- 268 Transcendental Dialectic low the same road which we took before in the deduction of the categories ; that is, we must consider the logical form of all knowledge of reason, and see whether, per- haps, by this logical form, reason may become a source of concepts also, which enable us to regard objects in themselves, as determined synthetically a priori in rela- tion to one or other of the functions of reason. Reason, if considered as a faculty of a certain [p. 330] logical form of knowledge, is the faculty of concluding, that is, of judging mediately, by bringing the condition of a possible under the condition of a given judgment. The given judgment is the general rule {major). Bring- ing the condition of another possible judgment under the condition of the rule, which may be called subsumption, is the minor, and the actual judgment, which contains the assertion of the rule in the subsumed case, is the conclu- sion. We know that the rule asserts something as gen- eral under a certain condition. The condition of the rule is then found to exist in a given case. Then that which, under that condition, was asserted as generally valid, has to be considered as valid in that given case also, which complies with that condition. It is easy to see therefore that reason arrives at knowledge by acts of the under- standing, which constitute a series of conditions. If I arrive at the proposition that all bodies are changeable, only by starting from a more remote knowledge (which does not yet contain the concept of body, but a condition of such a concept only), namely, that all which is com- posite is changeable ; and then proceed to something less remotely known, and depending on the former, namely, that bodies are composite ; and, lastly, only advance to a third proposition, connecting the more remote knowledge Transcendental Dialectic 269 (changeable) with the given case, and conclude that bodies therefore are changeable, we see that we have [p. 331] passed through a series of conditions (premisses) before we arrived at knowledge (conclusion). Every series, the exponent of which (whether of a categorical or hypothet- ical judgment) is given, can be continued, so that this procedure of reason leads to ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, a series of conclusions which, either on the side of the conditions {per prosyllogismos) or of the conditioned {per episyllogismos), may be continued indefinitely. It is soon perceived, however, that the chain or series of prosyllogisms, that is, of knowledge deduced on the side of reasons or conditions of a given knowledge, in other words, the ascending series of syllogisms, must stand in a very different relation to the faculty of reason from that of the descending series, that is, of the progress of reason on the side of the conditioned, by means of episyl- logisms. For, as in the former case the knowledge em- bodied in the conclusion is given as conditioned only, it is impossible to arrive at it by means of reason in any other way except under the supposition at least that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series of premisses), because it is under that supposition only that the contemplated judg- ment a /rwr? is possible; while on the side of the condi- tioned, or of the inferences, we can only think [p. 332] of a growing series, not of one presupposed as complete or given, that is, of a potential progression only. Hence, when our knowledge is considered as conditioned, reason is constrained to look upon the series of conditions in the • ascending line as complete, and given in their totality. But if the same knowledge is looked upon at the same 270 Transcendental Dialectic time as a condition of other kinds of knowledge, which constitute among themselves a series of inferences in a descending line, it is indifferent to reason how far that progression may go a parte posteriori, or whether a total- ity of the series is possible at all, because such a series is not required for the conclusion in hand, which is suffi- ciently determined and secured on grounds a parte priori. Whether the series of premisses on the side of the con- ditions have a something that stands first as the highest condition, or whether it be without limits a parte priori, it must at all events contain a totality of conditions, even though we should never succeed in comprehending it ; and the whole series must be unconditionally true, if the conditioned, which is considered as a consequence result- ing from it, is to be accepted as true. This is a demand of reason which pronounces its knowledge as determined a priori and as necessary, either in itself, and in that case it requires no reasons, or, if derivative, as a member of a series of reasons, which itself is unconditionally true. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC [p- 333] BOOK I Third Section System of Transcendental Ideas We are not at present concerned with logical Dialectic, which takes no account of the contents of knowledge, and has only to lay bare the illusions in the form of syllogisms, Transcendental Dialectic 271 but with transcendental Dialectic, which is supposed to contain entirely a priori the origin of certain kinds of knowledge, arising from pure reason, and of certain de- duced concepts, the object of which can never be given empirically, and which therefore lie entirely outside the domain of the pure understanding. We gathered from the natural relation which must exist between the tran- scendental and the logical use of our knowledge, in syllogisms as well as in judgments, that there must be three kinds of dialectic syllogisms, and no more, corre- sponding to the three kinds of conclusion by which reason may from principles arrive at knowledge, and that in allof these it is the object of reason to ascend from the condi- tioned synthesis, to which the understanding is always restricted, to an unconditioned synthesis, which the under- standing can never reach. The relations which all our representations share in common are, 1st, relation to the subject; 2ndly, the rela- tion to objects, either as phenomena, or as ob- [p. 334] jects of thought in general. If we connect this subdivi- sion with the former division, we see that the relation of the representations of which we can form a concept or an idea can only be threefold : ist, the relation to the sub- ject ; 2ndly, the relation to the manifold of the phenom- enal object ; 3rdly, the relation to all things in general. All pure concepts in general aim at a synthetical unity of representations, while concepts of pure reason (tran- scendental ideas) aim at unconditioned synthetical unity of all conditions. All transcendental ideas therefore can be arranged in three classes : the first containing the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject ; the second the absolute unity of the series of conditions of 2/2 Transcendental Dialectic phenomena ; the third the absokite imity of the condition of all objects of thought ?'« general. The thinking subject is the object-matter of psychology, the system of all phenomena (the world) the object-matter of cosmology, and the being which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the Being of all beings), the object-matter of theology. Thus it is pure reason which supplies the idea of a transcen- dental science of the soul {psychologia raiionalis), of a tran- scendental science of the world (cosmologia ratio7ialis) , and, lastly, of a transcendental science of God {theologia iranscendentalis). Even the mere plan of any [p. 335] one of these three sciences does not corns from the under- standing, even if connected with the highest logical use of reason, that is, with all possible conclusions, leading from one of its objects (phenomenon) to all others, and on to the most remote parts of any possible empirical synthesis, — but is altogether a pure and genuine product or rather problem of pure reason. What kinds of pure concepts of reason are comprehended under these three titles of all transcendental ideas will be fully explained in the following chapter. They follow the thread of the categories, for pure reason never refers direct to objects, but to the concepts of objects framed by the understanding. Nor can it be rendered clear, except hereafter in a detailed explanation, how first, reason simply by the synthetical use of the same function which it employs for categorical syllogisms is necessarily led on to the concept of the absolute unity of the thinking sub- ject ; secondly, how the logical procedure in hypothetical syllogisms leads to the idea of something absolutely uncon- ditioned, in a series of given conditions, and how, thirjily, Transcendental Dialectic 273 the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism produces necessarily the highest concept of reason, that of a Being of all beings ; a thought which, at first sight, seems extremely paradoxical. [p. 336] No objective deduction, like that given of the categories, is possible with regard to these transcendental ideas ; they are ideas only, and for that very reason they have no relation to any object corresponding to them in experi- ence. What we could undertake to give was a subjective deduction 1 of them from the nature of reason, and this has been given in the present chapter. We can easily perceive that pure reason has no other aim but the absolute totality of synthesis on the side of conditions (whether of inherence, dependence, or concur- rence), and that it has nothing to do with the absolute completeness on the part of the conditioned. It is the former only which is required for presupposing the whole series of conditions, and thus presenting it a priori to the understanding. If once we have a given condition, com- plete and unconditioned itself, no concept of reason is required to continue the series, because the understanding takes by itself every step downward from the condition to the conditioned. The transcendental ideas therefore serve only for ascending in the series of conditions till they reach the unconditioned, that is, the principles. With regard to descending X.o the conditioned, there is no doubt a widely extended logical use which our reason [p. 337] may make of the rules of the understanding, but no tran- scendental one ; and if we form an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis (by progresstis), as, for 1 Instead of Anleitung read Ableitung. 274 Transcendental Dialectic instance, of the whole series of all future changes in the world, this is only a thought (ens rationis) that may be thought if we like, but is not presupposed as necessary by reason. For the possibility of the conditioned, the totality of its conditions only, but not of its consequences, is pre- supposed. Such a concept therefore is not one of the transcendental ideas, with which alone we have to deal. Finally, we can perceive, that there is among the tran- scendental ideas themselves a certain connection and unity by which pure reason brings all its knowledge into one system. There is in the progression from our know- ledge of ourselves (the soul) to a knowledge of the world, and through it to a knowledge of the Supreme Being, something so natural that it looks like the logical progres- sion of reason from premisses to a conclusion. ^ Whether there exists here a real though hidden relationship, such as we saw before between the logical and transcendental use of reason, is also one of the questions the answer to which can only be given in the progress of these investi- gations. For the present we have achieved what we wished to achieve, by removing the transcen- [p. 338] dental concepts of reason, which in the systems of other philosophers are generally mixed up with other concepts, without being distinguished even from the concepts of the understanding, out of so equivocal a position ; by being able to determine their origin and thereby at the same time their number, which can never be exceeded, and by thus bringing them into a systematic connection, marking out and enclosing thereby a separate field for pure reason. 1 See Supplement XXVI. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC BOOK II OF THE DIALECTICAL CONCLUSIONS OF PURE REASON One may say that the object of a purely transcendental idea is something of which we have no concept, although the idea is produced with necessity according to the origi- nal laws of reason. Nor is it possible indeed to form of an object that should be adequate to the demands of reason, a concept of the understanding, that is, a concept which could be shown in any possible experience, and. rendered intuitive. It would be better, however, and less [p. 339] liable to misunderstandings, to say that we can have no knowledge of an .object corresponding to an idea, but a problematic concept only. The transcendental (subjective) reality, at least of pure concepts of reason, depends on our being led to such ideas by a necessary syllogism of reason. There will be syllo- gisms therefore which have no empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no concept, and to which, constrained by an inevitable illusion, we never- theless attribute objective reality. As regards their result, 27s 276 Transcendental Dialectic such syllogisms are rather to be called sophistical than rational, although, as regards their origin, they may claim the latter name, because they are not purely fictitious or accidental, but products of the very nature of reason. They are sophistications, not of men, but of pure reason itself, from which even the wisest of men cannot escape. All he can do is, with great effort, to guard against error, though never able to rid himself completely of an illusion which constantly torments and mocks him. Of these dialectical syllogisms of reason there are there- fore three classes only, that is as many as the ideas to which their conclusions lead. In the syllogism [p. 340] of the Jirst class, I conclude from the transcendental con- cept of the subject, which contains nothing manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which however I have no concept in this regard. This dialectical syllogism I shall call the transcendental /^rrt/c^/j/w. The second class of the so-called sophistical syllogisms aims at the transcendental concept of an absolute totality in the series of conditions to any given phenomenon ; and I conclude from the fact that my concept of the uncon- ditioned synthetical unity of the series is always self- contradictory on one side, the correctness of the opposite unity, of which nevertheless I have no concept either. The state of reason in this class of dialectical syllogisms, I shall call the antinoyny of pure reason. Lastly, according to the thi)d class of sophistical syl- logisms, I conclude from the totality of conditions, under which objects in general, so far as they can be given to me, must be thought, the absolute synthetical unity of all con- ditions of the possibility of things in general ; that is to say, I conclude from things which I do not know accord- Transcendental Dialectic 277 ing to their mere transcendental ^ concept, a Being of all beings, which I know still less through a transcendental concept, and of the unconditioned necessity of which I can form no concept whatever. This dialectical syllogism of reason I shall call the ideal of pure reason. 1 Transcendent is a misprint. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC [p- 341] BOOK II CHAPTER I OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON The logical paralogism consists in the formal faulti- ness of a conclusion, without any reference to its con- tents. But a transcendental paralogism arises from a transcendental cause, which drives us to a formally false conclusion. Such a paralogism, therefore, depends most likely on the very nature of human reason, and produces an illusion which is inevitable, though not insoluble. We now come to a concept which was not inserted in our general list of transcendental concepts, and yet must be reckoned with them, without however changing that table in the least, or proving it to be deficient. This is the concept, or, if the term is preferred, the judgment, T think. It is easily seen, however, that this concept is the vehicle of all concepts in general, therefore of transcen- dental concepts also, being always comprehended among them, and being itself transcendental also, though with- out any claim to a special title, inasmuch as it serves only to introduce all thought, as belonging to conscious- 278 Transcendental Dialectic 279 ness. However free that concept may be from all that is empirical (impressions of the senses), it serves [p. 342] nevertheless to distinguish two objects within the nature of our faculty of representation. /, as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called body. The term /, as a thinking being, signifies the object of psychology, which may be called the rational science of the soul, supposing that we want to know nothing about the soul except what, independent of all experience (which determines the I more especially and in concretd), can be deduced from the concept of I, so far as it is present in every act of thought. Now the rational science of the soul is really such an undertaking ; for if the smallest empirical element of my thought or any particular perception of my internal state were mixed up with the sources from which that science derives its materials, it would be an empirical, and no longer a purely rational science of the soul. There is therefore a pretended science, founded on the single propo- sition of T think, and the soundness or unsoundness of which may well be examined in this place, according to the principles of transcendental philosophy. It should not be objected that even in that proposition, which ex- presses the perception of oneself, I have an internal experience, and that therefore the rational science of the soul, which is founded on it, can never be quite [p. 343] pure, but rests, to a certain extent, on an empirical prin- ciple. For this inner perception is nothing more than the mere apperception, T think, without which even all transcendental concepts would be impossible, in which we really say, I think the substance, I think the cause, 28o Transcendental Dialectic etc. This internal experience in general and its pos- sibility, or perception in general and its relation to other perceptions, there being no special distinction or em- pirical determination of it, cannot be regarded as em- pirical knowledge, but must be regarded as knowledge of the empirical in general, and falls therefore under the investigation of the possibility of all experience, which investigation is certainly transcendental. The smallest object of perception (even pleasure and pain), if added to the general representation of self-consciousness, would at once change rational into empirical psychology. I think IS, therefore, the only text of rational psychology, out of which it must evolve all its wisdom. It is easily seen that this thought, if it is to be applied to any object (my self), cannot contain any but transcendental predi- cates, because the smallest empirical predicate would spoil the rational purity of the science, and its indepen- dence of all experience. We shall therefore follow the thread of the [p. 344] categories, with this difference, however, that as here the first thing which is given is a thing, the I, a thinking being, we must begin with the category of substance, by which a thing in itself is represented, and then proceed backwards, though without changing the respective order of the categories, as given before in our table. The topic of the rational science of the soul, from which has to be derived whatever else that science may contain, is therefore the following. Transcendental Dialectic 281 I The Soul is substance. II III As regards its quality, simple. As regards the different times in which it exists, numerically identical, that is unity (not plurality). IV It is in relation to possible objects in space.' All concepts of pure psychology arise from [p. 345] these elements, simply by way of combination, and with- out the admixture of any other principle. This sub- stance, taken simply as the object of the internal sense, gives us the concept of immateriality , and as simple substance, that of incorruptibility ; its identity, as that of an intellectual substance, gives us personality ; and all these three together, spirituality ; its relation to objects in space gives us the concept of commercium. (intercourse) with bodies ; the pure psychology thus rep- resenting the thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as soul (anima), and as the ground of animality ; which again, as restricted by spirituality, gives us the concept of immortality. To these concepts refer four paralogisms of a transcen- 1 The reader, who may not guess at once the psychological purport of these transcendental and abstract terms, or understand why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will find their full explanation and justification in the sequel. Moreover, I have to apologise for the many Latin expressions which, contrary to good taste, have crept in instead of their native equivalents, not only here, but throughout the whole of the work. My only excuse is, that I thought it better to sacrifice something of the elegance of language, rather than to throw any impediments in the way of real students, by the use of inaccurate and obscure expressions. 282 Transcendental Dialectic dental psychology, which is falsely supposed to be a science of pure reason, concerning the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, use as the foundation of such a science nothing but the single, and in itself per- fectly empty, representation of the /, of which [p. 346] we cannot even say that it is a concept, but merely a consciousness that accompanies all concepts. By this /, or he, or it (the thing), which thinks, nothing is repre- sented beyond a transcendental subject of thoughts = .y, which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from them, we can never have the slightest concept, so that we are really turning round it in a perpetual circle, having already to use its representation, before we can form any judgment about it. And this inconvenience is really inevitable, because con- sciousness in itself is not so much a representation, dis- tinguishing a particular object, but really a form of repre- sentation in general, in so far as it is to be called knowledge, of which alone I can say that I think some- thing by it. It must seem strange, however, from the very begin- ning, that the condition under which I think, and which therefore is a property of my own subject only, should be valid at the same time for everything which thinks, and that, depending on a proposition which seems to be em- pirical, we should venture to found the apodictical and general judgment, namely, that everything which thinks is such as the voice of my own consciousness declares it to be within me. The reason of it is, that we are con- strained to attribute a priori to things all the qualities which form the conditions, under which alone [p. 347] we are able to think them. Now it is impossible for me Transcendental Dialectic 283 to form the smallest representation of a thinking being by any external experience, but I can do it through self-con- sciousness only. Such objects therefore are nothing but a transference of my own consciousness to other things, which thus, and thus only, can be represented as thinking beings. The proposition f tJiink is used in this case, how- ever, as problematical only ; not so far as it may contain the perception of an existence (the Cartesian, cogito, ergo sum), but with regard to its mere possibility, in order to see what properties may be deduced from such a simple proposition with regard to its subject, whether such sub- ject exists or not. If our knowledge of thinking beings in general, so far as it is derived from pure reason, were founded on more than the cogito, and if we made use at the same time of observations on the play of our thoughts and the natural laws of the thinking self, derived from them, we should have before us an empirical psychology, which would form a kind of physiology of the internal sense, and perhaps ex- plain its manifestations, but would never help us to under- stand such properties as do not fall under any possible experience (as, for instance, simplicity), or to teach apodic- tically anything touching the nature of thinking beings in general. It would not therefore be a rational psychology. As the proposition I think (taken problemati- [p. 348] cally) contains the form of every possible judgment of the understanding, and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it must be clear that the conclusions to be drawn from it can only contain a transcendental use of the understanding, which declines all admixture of experience, and of the achievements of which, after what has been said before, we cannot form any very favourable anticipations. 284 Transcendental Dialectic We shall therefore follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments of pure psychology.^ \_The First Paralogism of Substantiality That the representation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments, and cannot be used therefore as the determination of any other thing, is the substance. I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself can never be used as the predicate of any other thing. Therefore I, as a thinking being (Soul), am Substance. Criticism of the First Paralogism of Pure ^ Psychology We showed in the analytical portion of transcendental logic, that pure categories, and among them that of sub- stance, have in themselves no objective meaning, unless they rest on some intuition, and are applied to [p. 349] the manifold of such intuitions as functions of synthetical unity. Without this they are merely functions of a judg- ment without contents. I may say of everything, that it is a substance, so far as I distinguish it from what are mere predicates and determinations. Now in all our think- ing the I is the subject, in which thoughts are inherent as determinations only ; nor can that I ever be used as a determination of any other thing. Thus everybody is con- strained to look upon himself as the substance, and on thinking as the accidents only of his being, and determi- nations of his state. 1 All that follows from here to the beginning of the second chapter, is left out in the Second Edition, and replaced by Supplement XXVII. ^ Afterwards transcendental instead of pure. Transcendental Dialectic 285 But what use are we to make of such a concept of a substance ? That I, as a thinking being, continue for my- self, and naturally neither arise nov perish, is no legitimate deduction from it ; and yet this conclusion would be the only advantage that could be gained from the concept of the substantiality of my own thinking subject, and, but for that, I could do very well without it. So far from being able to deduce these properties from the pure category of substance, we have on the contrary to observe the permanency of an object in our experience and then lay hold of this permanency, if we wish to apply to it the empirically useful concept of substance. In this case, however, we had no experience to lay hold of, but have only formed a deduction from the concept [p. 350] of the relation which all thinking has to the I, as the com- mon subject to which it belongs. Nor should we, what- ever we did, succeed by any certain observation in proving such permanency. For though the I exists in all thoughts, not the slightest intuition is connected with that repre- sentation, by which it might be distinguished from other objects of intuition. We may very well perceive there- fore that this representation appears again and again in every act of thought, but not that it is a constant and per- manent intuition, in which thoughts, as being changeable, come and go. Hence it follows that in the first syllogism of transcen- dental psychology reason imposes upon us an apparent knowledge only, by representing the constant logical sub- ject of thought as the knowledge of the real subject in which that knowledge inheres. Of that subject, however, we have not and cannot have the slightest knowledge, because consciousness is that which alone changes repre- 286 Transcendental Dialectic sentations into thoughts, and in which therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found. Beside this logical meaning of the I, we have no know- ledge of the subject in itself, which forms the substratum and foundation of it and of all our thoughts. In spite of this, the proposition that the soul is a substance may well be allowed to stand, if only we see that this concept can- not help us on in the least or teach us any of the ordinary conclusions of rationalising psychology, as, for [p. 351] instance, the everlasting continuance of the soul amid all changes and even in death, and that it therefore signifies a substance in idea only, and not in reality. Tlie Second Paralogism of Simplicity Everything, the action of which can never be consid- ered as the concurrence of several acting things, is simple. Now the Soul, or the thinking I, is such a thing : — Therefore, etc. Ci'iticism of tlie Second Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology This is the strong (yet not invulnerable) syllogism among all dialectical syllogisms of pure psychology, not a mere sophism contrived by a dogmatist in order to impart a certain plausibility to his assertions, but a syllogism which seems able to stand the sharpest examination and the gravest doubts of the philosopher. It is this : — Every composite substance is an aggregate of many substances, and the action of something composite, or that which is inherent in it as such, is an aggregate of many actions or accidents distributed among many sub- Transcende7ital Dialectic 287 stances. An effect due to the concurrence of many acting- substances is no doubt possible, if that effect is [p. 352] external only (as, for instance, the motion of a body is the combined motion of all its parts). The case is different however with thoughts, if considered as accidents belong- ing to a thinking being within. For suppose it is the composite which thinks, then every part of it would contain a part of the thought, and all together only the whole of it. This however is self-contradictory. For as representations, distributed among different beings (like the single words of a verse), never make a whole thought (a verse), it is impossible that a thought should be inher- ent in something composite, as such. Thought therefore is possible only in a substance which is not an aggregate of many, and therefore absolutely simple.^ What is called the nerviis probandi in this argument lies in the proposition that, in order to constitute a thought, the many representations must be comprehended under the absolute unity of the thinking subject. Nobody how- ever can prove this proposition from concepts. For how would he undertake to do it.' The proposition [p. 353] that a thought can only be the effect of the absolute unity of a thinking being, cannot be considered as analytical. For the unity of thought, consisting of many representa- tions, is collective, and may, so far as mere concepts are concerned, refer to the collective unity of all co-operating substances (as the movement of a body is the compound movement of all its parts) quite as well as to the absolute unity of the subject. According to the rule of identity 1 It would be very easy to give to this argument the ordinary scholastic dress. But for my purposes it is sufficient to have clearly exhibited, even in a popular form, the ground on which it rests. 288 Transcendental Dialectic it would be impossible therefore to establish the necessity of the presupposition of a simple substance, the thought being composite. That, on the other hand, such a propo- sition might be established synthetically and entirely a priori from mere concepts, no one will venture to afifirm who has once understood the grounds on which the possi- bility of synthetical propositions a priori rests, as explained by us before. It is likewise impossible, however, to derive this neces- sary unity of the subject, as the condition of the possi- bility of the unity of every thought, from experience. For experience never supplies any necessity of thought, much less the concept of absolute unity. Whence then do we take that proposition on which the whole psycho- logical syllogism of reason rests } It is manifest that if we wish to represent to ourselves a thinking being, we must put ourselves in its place, and supplant as it were the object which has to be considered by our own subject (which never happens in any [p. 354] other kind of investigation). The reason why we postu- late for every thought absolute unity of the subject is because otherwise we could not say of it, I think (the manifold in one representation). For although the whole of a thought may be divided and distributed under many subjects, the subjective I can never thus be divided and distributed, and it is this I which we presuppose in every thought. As in the former paralogism therefore, so here also, the formal proposition of apperception, I think, remains the sole ground on which rational psychology ventures to undertake the extension of its knowledge. That proposi- tion, however, is no experience, but only the form of Transcendental Dialectic 289 apperception inherent in, and antecedent to, every expe- rience, that is a purely subjective condition, having refer- ence to a possible experience only, but by no means the condition of the possibility of the knowledge of objects, and by no means necessary to the concept of a thinking being in general ; although it must be admitted that we cannot represent to ourselves another intelligent being without putting ourselves in its place with that formula of our consciousness. Nor is it true that the simplicity of my self (as a soul) is really deduced from the proposition, I think, for it is already involved in every thought itself. The proposition / am simple must be considered as the imme- [p. 355] diate expression of apperception, and the so-called syllo- gism of Cartesius, cogito, ergo sum, is in reality tautological, because cogito {sum cogitans) predicates reality immediately. [ am simple vat?i.vis no more than that this representation of I does not contain the smallest trace of manifoldness, but is absolute (although merely logical) unity. Thus we see that the famous psychological argument is founded merely on the indivisible unity of a representa- tion, which only determines the verb with reference to a person; and it is clear that the subject of inherence is designated transcendentally only by the I, which accom- panies the thought, without our perceiving the smallest quality of it, in fact, without our knowing anything about it. It signifies a something in general (a transcendental subject) the representation of which must no doubt be simple, because nothing is determined in it, and nothing can be represented more simple than by the concept of a mere something. The simplicity however of the repre- sentation of a subject is not therefore a knowledge of the u 290 Transcendental Dialectic simplicity of the subject, because no account whatever is taken of its quahties when it is designated by the entirely empty expression I, an expression that can be applied to every thinking subject. So much is certain therefore that though I [p. 356] always represent by the I an absolute, but only logical, unity of the subject (simplicity), I never know thereby the real simplicity of my subject. We saw that the propo- sition, I am a substance, signified nothing but the mere category of which I must not make any use (empirically) in concreto. In the same manner, I may well say, I am a simple substance, that is, a substance the representation of which contains no synthesis of the manifold ; but that concept, or that proposition also, teaches us nothing at all with reference to myself, as an object of experience, because the concept of substance itself is used as a func- tion of synthesis only, without any intuition to rest on, and therefore without any object, valid with reference to the condition of our knowledge only, but not with refer- ence to any object of it. We shall test the usefulness of this proposition by an experiment. Everybody must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul can only be of any value in so far as it enables me to distinguish the soul from all matter, and thus to except it from that decay to which matter is at all times subject. It is for that use that our proposition is really intended, and it is therefore often expressed by, the soul is not corporeal. If then I can show that, [p. 357] although we allow to this cardinal proposition of rational psychology (as a mere judgment of reason from pure categories) all objective validity (everything that thinks is simple substance), we cannot make the least use of it, Transcendental Dialectic 291 in order to establish the homogeneousness or non-homo- geneousness of soul and matter, this will be the same as if I had relegated this supposed psychological truth to the field of mere ideas, without any real or objective use. We have irrefutably proved in the transcendental ^Es- thetic that bodies are mere phenomena of our external sense, not things by themselves. We are justified there- fore in saying that our thinking subject is not a body, i.e. that, because it is represented by us as an object of the internal sense, it is, so far as it thinks, no object of our external senses, and no phenomenon in space. This means the same as that among external phenomena we can never have thinking beings as such, or ever see their thoughts, their consciousness, their desires, etc., exter- nally. All this belongs to the internal sense. This argu- ment seems indeed so natural and popular that even the commonest understanding has always been led [p. 358] to it, the distinction between souls and bodies being of very early date. But although extension, impermeability, cohesion, and motion, in fact everything that the external senses can give us, cannot be thoughts, feeling, inclination, and de- termination, or contain anything like them, being never objects of external intuition, it might be possible, never- theless, that that something which forms the foundation of external phenomena, and which so affects our sense as to produce in it the representations of space, matter, form, etc., if considered as a noumenon (or better as a transcendental object) might be, at the same time, the subject of thinking, although by the manner in which it affects our external sense it produces in us no intui- tions of representations, will, etc., but only of space and 292 Transcendental Dialectic its determinations. This something, however, is not ex- tended, not impermeable, not composite, because such predicates concern sensibility only and its intuition, when- ever we are affected by these (to us otherwise unknown) objects. These expressions, however, do not give us any information what kind of object it is, but only that, if considered by itself, without reference to the external senses, it has no right to these predicates, peculiar to external appearance. The predicates of the internal sense, on the contrary, such as representation, think- [p. 359] ing, etc., are by no means contradictory to it, so that really, even if we admit the simplicity of its nature, the human soul is by no means sufficiently distinguished from rriatter, so far as its substratum is concerned, if (as it ought to be) matter is considered as a phenomenon only. If matter were a thing by itself, it would, as a com- posite being, be totally different from the soul, as a simple being. But what we call matter is an external phenome- non only, the substratum of which cannot possibly be known by any possible predicates. I can therefore very well suppose that that substratum is simple, although in the manner in which it affects our senses it produces in us the intuition of something extended, and therefore composite, so that the substance which, with reference to our external sense, possesses extension, might very well by itself possess thoughts which can be represented consciously by its own internal sense. In such wise the same thing which in one respect is called corporeal, would in another respect be at the same time a thinking being, of which though we cannot see its thoughts, we can yet see the signs of them phenomenally. Thus the expres- sion that souls only (as a particular class of substances) Transcendental Dialectic 293 think, would have to be dropt, and we should return to the common expression that men think, that is, [p. 360] that the same thing which, as an external phenomenon, is extended, is internally, by itself, a subject, not composite, but simple and intelligent. But without indulging in such hypotheses, we may make this general remark, that if I understand by soul a being by itself, the very question would be absurd, whether the soul be homogeneous or not with matter which is not a thing by itself, but only a class of repre- sentations within us ; for so much at all events must be clear, that a thing by itself is of a different nature from the determinations which constitute its state only. If, on the contrary, we compare the thinking I, not with matter, but with that object of the intellect that forms the foundation of the external phenomena which we call mat- ter, then it follows, as we know nothing whatever of the matter, that we have no right to say that the soul by itself is different from it in any respect. The simple consciousness is not therefore a knowledge of the simple nature of our subject, so that we might thus distinguish the soul from matter, as a composite being. If therefore, in the only case where that concept might be useful, namely, in comparing myself with objects of external experience, it is impossible to determine the peculiar and distinguishing characteristics of its nature, what is the use, if we pretend to know that fhe [p. 361] thinking I, or the soul (a name for the transcendental object of the internal sense), is simple .? Such a propo- sition admits of no application to any real object, and can- not therefore enlarge our knowledge in the least. Thus collapses the whole of rational psychology, with 294 Transcendental Dialectic its fundamental support, and neither here nor elsewhere can we hope by means of mere concepts (still less through the mere subjective form of all our concepts, that is, through our consciousness) and without referring these concepts to a possible experience, to extend our know- ledge, particularly as even the fundamental concept of a simple nature is such that it can never be met with in experience, so that no chance remains of arriving at it as a concept of objective validity. Tlie Third Paralogism of Personality Whatever is conscious of the numerical identity of its own self at different times, is in so far a person. Now the Soul, etc. Therefore the Soul is a person. Criticism of the Third Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology Whenever I want to know by experience the numerical identity of an external object, I shall have to [p. 362] attend to what is permanent in that phenomenon to which, as the subject, everything else refers as determination, and observe the identity of the former during the time that the latter is changing. I myself, however, am an object of the internal sense, and all time is but the form of the internal sense. I therefore refer each and all of my suc- cessive determinations to the numerically identical self; and this in all time, that is, in the form of the inner intui- tion of myself. From this point of view, the personality of the soul should not even be considered as inferred, but Transcendental Dialectic 295 as an entirely identical proposition of self-consciousness in time, and that is indeed the reason why it is valid a priori. For it really says no more than this : that dur- ing the whole time, while I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of that time as belonging to the unity of my- self ; and it comes to the same thing whether I say that this whole time is within me as an individual unity, or that I with numerical identity am present in all that time. In my own consciousness, therefore, the identity of person is inevitably present. But if I consider myself from the point of view of another person (as an object of his external intuition), then that external observer con- siders me, first of all, in time, for in the apperception time is really represented in me only. Though he admits, therefore, the I, which at all times accompanies all rep- resentations in my consciousness, and with [p. 363] entire identity, he will not yet infer from it the objective permanence of myself. For as in that case the time in which the observer places me is not the time of my own, but of his sensibility, it follows that the identity which is connected with my consciousness is not therefore con- nected with his, .that is, with the external intuition of my subject. The identity of my consciousness at different times is therefore a formal condition only of my thoughts and their coherence, and proves in no way the numerical identity of my subject, in which, in spite of the logical identity of the I, such a change may have passed as to make it impossible to retain its identity, though we may still attribute to it the same name of I, which in every other state, and even in the change of the subject, might yet retain the thought 296 Transcendental Dialectic of the preceding and hand it over to the subsequent subject.^ Although the teaching of some old schools [p. 364] that everything is in a flux, and nothing in the world permanent, cannot be admitted, if we admit substances, yet it must not be supposed that it can be refuted by the unity of self-consciousness. For we ourselves cannot judge from our own consciousness whether, as souls, we are perma- nent or not, because we reckon as belonging to our own identical self that only of which we are conscious, and therefore are constrained to admit that, during the whole time of which we are conscious, we are one and the same. From the point of view of a stranger, however, such a judgment would not be valid, because, perceiving in the soul no permanent phenomena, except the representation of the I, which accompanies and connects them all, we cannot determine whether that I (being a mere thought) be not in the same state of flux as the other thoughts which are chained together by the I. [p. 365] It is curious, however, that the personality and what is presupposed by it, namely, the permanence and sub- stantiality of the soul, has now to be proved first. For 1 An elastic ball, which impinges on another in a straight line, communi- cates to it its whole motion, and therefore (if we only consider the places in space) its whole state. If then, in analogy with such bodies, we admit sub- stances of which the one communicates to the other representations with consciousness, we could imagine a whole series of them, in which the first communicates its state and its consciousness to the second, the second its own state with that of the first substance to a third, and this again all the states of the former, together with its own, and a consciousness of them, to another. That last substance would be conscious of all the states of the previously changed substances, as of its own, because all of them had been transferred to it with the consciousness of them; but for all that it would not have been the same person in all those states. Transcendental Dialectic 297 if we could presuppose these, there would follow, if not the permanence of consciousness, yet the possibility of a permanent consciousness in one and the same subject, and this is sufficient to establish personality which does not cease at once, because its effect is interrupted at the time. This permanence, however, is by no means given us before the numerical identity of ourself, which we infer from identical apperception, but is itself inferred from it, so that, according to rule, the concept of substance, which alone is empirically useful, would have to follow first upon it. But as the identity of person follows by no means from the identity of the I, in the consciousness of all time in which I perceive myself, it follows that we could not have founded upon it the substantiality of the soul. Like the concept of substance and of the simple, how- ever, the concept of personality also may remain, so long as it is used as transcendental only, that is, as a concept of the unity of the subject which is otherwise unknown to us, but in the determinations of which there is an uninter- rupted connection by apperception. In this sense such a concept is necessary for practical purposes and sufficient, but we can never pride ourselves on it as helping to ex- pand our knowledge of our self by means of [p. 366] pure reason, which only deceives us if we imagine that we can concluse an uninterrupted continuance of the subject from the mere concept of the identical self. That concept is only constantly turning round itself in a circle, and does not help us as with respect to any question which aims at synthetical knowledge. What matter may be as a thing by itself (a transcendental object) is entirely unknown to us ; though we may observe its permanence as a phenome- non, since it is represented as something external. When 298 Transcendental Dialectic however I wish to observe the mere I during the change of all representations, I have no other correlative for my comparisons but again the I itself, with the general condi- tions of my consciousness. I cannot therefore give any but tautological answers to all questions, because I put my concept and its unity in the place of the qualities that belong to me as an object, and thus really take for granted what was wished to be known. The Fourth Paralogism of Ideality {with Regard to Exter- nal Relations) That, the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause of given perceptions, has a doubtful existence only:— [p. 367 J All external phenomena are such that their existence cannot be perceived immediately, but that we can only infer them as the cause of given perceptions : — Therefore the existence of all objects of the external senses is doubtful. This uncertainty I call the ideality of external phenomena, and the doctrine of that ideality is called idealism ; in comparison with which the other doc- trine, which maintains a possible certainty of the objects of the external senses, is called dualis7n. Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendejital Psychology We shall first have to examine the premisses. We are perfectly justified in maintaining that that only which is within ourselves can be perceived immediately, and that my own existence only can be the object of a mere percep- tion. The existence of a real object therefore outside me Transcendental Dialectic 299 (taking this word in its intellectual meaning) can never be given directly in perception, but can only be added in thought to the perception, which is a modification of the internal sense, and thus inferred as its external cause. Hence Cartesius was quite right in limiting all perception, in the narrowest sense, to the proposition, I (as a thinking being) am. For it must be clear that, as what [p. 368] is without is not within me, I cannot find it in my apper- ception ; nor hence in any perception which is in reality a determination of apperception only. In the true sense of the word, therefore, I can never perceive external things, but only from my own internal perception infer their existence, taking the perception as an effect of which something external must be the proxi- mate cause. An inference, however, from a given effect to a definite cause is always uncertain, because the effect may be due to more than one cause. Therefore in refer- ring a perception to its cause, it always remains doubtful whether that cause be internal or external ; whether in fact all so-called external perceptions are not a mere play of our external sense, or point to real external objects as their cause. At all events the existence of the latter is infer- ential only, and liable to all the dangers of inferences, while the object of the internal sense (I myself with all my representations) is perceived immediately, and its existence cannot be questioned. It must not be supposed, therefore, that an idealist is he who denies the existence of external objects of the senses ; all he does is to deny that it is known by immedi- ate perception, and to infer that we can never [p. 369] become perfectly certain of their reality by any experience whatsoever. 300 Transcendental Dialectic Before I expose the deceptive illusion of our paralogism, let me remark that we must necessarily distinguish two kinds of idealism, the transcendental and the empirical. Transcendental idealism teaches that all phenomena are representations only, not things by themselves, and that space and time therefore are only sensuous forms of our intuition, not determinations given independently by them- selves or conditions of objects, as things by themselves. Opposed to this transcendental idealism, is a transcendental realism, which considers space and time as something in itself (independent of our sensibility). Thus the tran- scendental realist represents all external phenomena (admitting their reality) as things by themselves, existing independently of us and our sensibility, and therefore existing outside us also, if regarded according to pure con- j cepts of the understanding. It is this transcendental ! realist who afterwards acts the empirical idealist, and who, after wrongly supposing that the objects of the senses, if they are to be external, must have an existence by them- selves, and without our senses, yet from this point of view considers all our sensuous representations insufficient to render certain the reality of their objects. The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, [p. 370] may well be an empirical realist, or, as he is called, a dualist ; that is, he may admit the existence of matter, without taking a step beyond mere self-consciousness, or admitting more than the certainty of representations within me, that is the cogito, ergo snm. For as he con- siders matter, and even its internal possibility, as a phe- nomenon only, which, if separated from our sensibility, is nothing, matter with him is only a class of representa- tions (intuition) which are called external, not as if they Transcendental Dialectic 301 referred to objects external by themselves, but because they refer perceptions to space, in which everything is outside everything else, while space itself is inside us. We have declared ourselves from the very beginning in favour of this transcendental idealism. In our system, therefore, we need not hesitate to admit the existence of matter on the testimony of mere self-consciousness, and to consider it as established by it (sc. the testimony), in the same manner as the existence of myself, as a thinking being. I am conscious of my representations, and hence they exist as well as I myself, who has these representa- tions. External objects, however (bodies), are phenomena only, therefore nothing but a class of my representations, the objects of which are something by means of these repre- sentations only, and apart from them nothing, [p. 371] External things, therefore, exist by the same right as I ' myself, both on the immediate testimony of my self-con- sciousness, with this difference only, that the representa- tion of myself, as a thinking subject, is referred to the internal sense only, while the representations which in- dicate extended beings are referred to the external sense also. With reference to the reality of external objects, I need as little trust to inference, as with reference to the reality of the object of my internal sense (my thoughts), both being nothing but representations, the immediate perception (consciousness) of which is at the same time a sufficient proof of their reality. The transcendental idealist is, therefore, an empirical realist, and allows to matter, as a phenomenon, a reality which need not be inferred, but may be immediately per- ceived. The transcendental realism, on the contrary, is necessarily left in doubt, and obliged to give way to 302 Tra7iscendental Dialectic empirical idealism, because it considers the objects of the external senses as something different from the senses themselves, taking mere phenomena as independent beings, existing outside us. And while with the very best consciousness of our representation of these things, it is far from certain that, if a representation exists, its corresponding object must exist also, it is clear that in our system external things, that is, matter in all its shapes and changes, are nothing but mere phenomena, [p. 372] that is, representations within us, of the reality of which we are immediately conscious. As, so far as I know, all psychologists who believe in empirical idealism are transcendental realists, they have acted no doubt quite consistently, in ascribing great im- portance to empirical idealism, as one of the problems from which human reason could hardly extricate itself. For indeed, if we consider external phenomena as repre- sentations produced inside us by their objects, as existing as things by themselves outside us, it is difficult to see how their existence could be known otherwise but through a syllogism from effect to cause, where it must always remain doubtful, whether the cause be within or without us. , Now we may well admit that something which, taken transcendentally, is outside us, may be the cause of our external intuitions, but this can never be the object which we mean by the representations of matter and material things ; for these are phenomena only, that is, certain kinds of representations existing always within us, and the reality of which depends on our immediate conscious- ness, quite as much as the consciousness of my own thoughts. The transcendental object is unknown equally in regard to internal and external intuition. Transcendental Dialectic 303 Of this, however, we are not speaking at [p. 373] present, but only of the empirical object, which is called external, if represented in space, and internal, when repre- sented in temporal relations only, both space and time being to be met with nowhere except in ourselves. The expression, outside us, involves however an inevita- ble ambiguity, because it may signify either, something which, as a thing by itself, exists apart from us, or what belongs to outward appearance only. In order, therefore, to remove all uncertainty from that concept, taken in the latter meaning (which alone affects the psychological question as to the reality of our external intuition) we shall distinguish empirically exter7ial objects from those that may be called so in a transcendental sense, by calling the former simply things occurring in space. Space and time are no doubt representations a priori, which dwell in us as forms of our sensuous intuition, before any real object has determined our senses by means of sensation, enabling them to represent the ob- ject under those sensuous conditions. But this some- thing, material or real, that is to be seen in space, presupposes necessarily perception, and cannot be fancied or produced by means of imagination without that per- ception, which indicates the reality of something in space. It is sensation, therefore, that indicates reality [p. 374] in space and time, according as it is related to the one or the other mode of sensuous intuition. If sensation is once given (which, if referring to an object in general, and not specialising it, is called perception), many an object may be put together in imagination from the manifold materials of perception, which has no empirical place in space or time, but in imagination only. This admits of no doubt, 204 Transcendental Dialectic whether we take the sensations of pain and pleasure, or the external ones of colour, heat, etc. ; it is always per- ception by which the material for thinking of any objects of external intuition must be first supplied. This per- ception, therefore (to speak at present of external in- tuitions only), represents something real in space. For, first, perception is the representation of a reality, while space is the representation of a mere possibility of co- existence. Secondly, this reality is represented before the external sense, that is, in space. Thirdly, space itself is nothing but mere representation, so that nothing in it can be taken as real, except what is represented in it ; ^ or, vice versa, whatever is given in it, that is, what- [p. 375] ever is represented in it by perception, is also real in it, because, if it were not real in it, that is, given immediately by empirical intuition, it could not be created by fancy, the real of intuition being unimaginable a priori. Thus we see that all external perception proves imme- diately something real in space, or rather is that real it- self. Empirical realism is therefore perfectly true, that is, something real in space always corresponds to our external intuitions. Space itself, it is true, with all its phenomena, as representations, exists within me only, but the real or the material of all objects of intuition is never- theless given in that space, independent of all fancy or 1 We must well master this paradoxical, but quite correct proposition, that nothing can be in space, except what is represented in it. For space itself is nothing but representation, and whatever is in it must therefore be contained in that representation. There is nothing whatever in space, except so far as it is really represented in it. That a thing can exist only in the representation of it, may no doubt sound strange; but will lose its strangeness if we consider that the things with which we have to deal, are not things by themselves, but phenomena only, that is, representations. Transcendental Dialectic 305 imagination ; nay, it is impossible that in that space any- thing outside us (in a transcendental sense) could be given, because space itself is nothing outside our sensi- bility. The strictest idealist, therefore, can never require that we should prove that the object without us [p. 376] (in its true meaning) corresponds to our perception. For granted there are such objects, they could never be repre- sented and seen, as outside us, because this presupposes space, and the reality in space, as a mere representation, is nothing but the perception itself. It thus follows, that what is real in external phenomena, is real in perception only, and cannot be given in any other way. From such perceptions, whether by mere play of fancy or by experience, knowledge of objects can be produced, and here no doubt deceptive representations may arise, without truly corresponding objects, the deception being due, either to illusions of imagination (in dreams), or to a fault of judgment (the so-called deceptions of the senses). In order to escape from these false appearances, one has to follow the rule that, whatever is connected according to empirical laws with a perception, is real. This kind of illusion, however, and its prevention, concerns idealism as well as dualism, since it affects the form of experience only. In order to refute empirical idealism and its un- founded misgivings as to the objective reality of our exter- nal perceptions, it is sufficient to consider that exter- nal perception proves immediately a reality in space, which space, though in itself a mere form of [p. 377] representations, possesses nevertheless objective reality with respect to all external phenomena (which themselves are mere representations only) ; that without perception, even the creations of fancy and dreams would not be pos- 3o6 Transcendental Dialectic sible, so that our external senses, with reference to the data from which experience can spring, must have real objects corresponding to them in space. There are two kinds of idealists, the dogmatic, who denies the existence of matter, and the sceptical, who doubts it, because he thinks it impossible to prove it. At present we have nothing to do with the former, who is an idealist, because he imagines he finds contradictions in the possibility of matter in general. This is a difficulty which we shall have to deal with in the following section on dialectical syllogisms, treating of reason in its internal struggle with reference to the concepts of the possibihty of all that belongs to the connection of experience. The sceptical idealist, on the contrary, who attacks only the ground of our assertion, and declares our conviction of the existence of matter, which we founded on immediate per- ception, as insufficient, is in reality a benefactor of human reason, because he obliges us, even in the smallest matter of common experience, to keep our eyes well [p. 378] open, and not to consider as a well-earned possession what may have come to us by mistake only. We now shall learn to understand the great advantage of these idealistic objections. They drive us by main force, unless we mean to contradict ourselves in our most ordinary propositions, to consider all perceptions, whether we call them internal or external, as a consciousness only of what affects our sensibility, and to look on the external objects of them, not as things by themselves, but only as representations of which, as of every other representation, we can become immediately conscious, and which are called external, because they depend on what we call the external sense with its intuition of space, space being itself nothing but Transcendental Dialectic 307 an internal kind of representation in which certain per- ceptions become associated. If we were to admit external objects to be things by themselves, it would be simply impossible to understand how we can arrive at a knowledge of their reality outside us, considering that we always depend on representations which are inside us. It is surely impossible that we should feel outside us, and not inside us, and the whole of our self-consciousness cannot give us anything but our own determinations. Thus sceptical idealism forces us to take refuge in the only place that is left to us, namely, in the ideality of all phenomena : the very ideality which, though as yet unprepared for its consequences, we estab- lished in our own transcendental .(Esthetic. If [p. 379] then. we ask whether, consequently, dualism only must be admitted in psychology, we answer, certainly, but only in its empirical acceptation. In the connection of experi- ' ence matter, as the substance of phenomena, is really given to the external sense in the same manner as the thinking I, likewise as the substance of phenomena, is given to the internal sense ; and it is according to the rules which this category introduces into the empirical connection of our external as well as internal perceptions, that phenomena on both sides must be connected among themselves. If, on the contrary, as often happens, we were to extend the concept of dualism and take it in its transcendental acceptation, then neither it, nor on one side the pncumatism, or on the other side the materialism, which are opposed to dualism, would have the smallest foundation ; we should have missed the determination of our concepts, and have mistaken the difference in our mode of representing objects, which, with regard to what 3o8 Transcende7ital Dialectic they are in themselves, remain always unknown to us, for a difference of the things themselves. No doubt I, as represented by the internal sense in time, and objects in space outside me, are two specifically different phenomena, but they are not therefore conceived as different things. ! The transcendental object, which forms the foundation of external phenomena, and the other, which forms the foundation of our internal intuition, is therefore [p. 380] neither matter, nor a thinking being by itself, but simply an unknown cause of phenomena which supply to us the empirical concept of both. If therefore, as evidently forced to do by this very criticism, we remain faithful to the old rule, never to push questions beyond where possible experience can supply us with an object, we shall never dream of going beyond the objects of our senses and asking what they may be by themselves, that is, without any reference to our senses. But if the psychologist likes to take phe- nomena for things by themselves, then, whether he admit into his system, as a materialist, matter only, or, as a spiritualist, thinking beings only (according to the form of our own internal sense), or, as a dualist, both, as things existing in themselves, he will always be driven by his mistake to invent theories as to how that which is not a thing by itself, but a phenomenon only, could exist by itself CONSIDERATION [p. 381] on the Whole of Pure Psychology, as affected by these Paralogisms If we compare the science of the soul, as the physi- ology of the internal sense, with the science of the body, as a physiology of the objects of external senses, we find, Transcendental Dialectic 309 besides many things which in both must be known empiri- cally, this important difference, that in the latter many things can be known a priori from the mere concept of an extended and impermeable being, while in the former nothing can be known a priori and synthetically from the concept of a thinking being. The cause is this. Though both are phenomena, yet the phenomena of the external sens» have something permanent, which sug- gests a substratum of varying determinations, and conse- quently a synthetical concept, namely, that of space, and of a phenomenon in space ; while time, the only form of our internal intuition, has nothing permanent, and makes us to know the change of determinations only, hut not the determinable object. For in what we call soul there is a continuous flux, and nothing permanent, except it may be (if people will so have it) the simple /, so simple because this representation has no contents, consequently nothing manifold, so that it seems to repre- sent, or more accurately to indicate, a simple [p. 382] object. This I or Ego would have to be an intuition, which, being presupposed in all thought (before all experi- ence), might as an intuition a priori supply synthetical propositions, if it should be possible to get any know- ledge by pure reason of the nature of a thinking being in general. But this I is neither an intuition nor a concept of any object, but the mere form of conscious- ness which can accompany both classes of representa- tions, and impart to them the character of knowledge, provided something else be given in intuition which supplies matter for a representation of an object. Thus we see that the whole of rational psychology is impossi- ble as transcending the powers of human reason, and 3IO Transcendental Dialectic nothing remains to us but to study our soul under the guidance of experience, and to keep ourselves within the limits of questions which do not go beyond the line where the material can be supplied by possible internal experience. But although rational psychology is of no use in ex- tending our knowledge, but as such is made up of paral- ogisms only, we cannot deny to it an important negative utility, if it does not pretend to be more than a critical investigation of our dialectical syllogisms, as framed by our common and natural reason. What purpose can be served by psychology [p. 383] founded on pure principles of reason } Its chief pur- pose is meant to be to guard our thinking self against the danger of materialism. This purpose however is answered, as we have shown, by the concept which rea- son gives of our thinking self. For, so far from there being any fear lest, if matter be taken away, all thought, and even the existence of thinking beings might vanish, it has been on the contrary clearly shown that, if we take away the thinking subject, the whole material world would vanish, because it is nothing but a phenomenon in the sensibility of our own subject, and a certain class of its representations. It is true that I do not know thus this thinking self any better acc6rding to its qualities, nor can I perceive its permanence, or even the independence of its exist- ence from the problematical transcendental substratum of external phenomena, both being necessarily unknown to us. But as it is nevertheless possible that I may find reason, from other than purely speculative causes, to hope for an independent, and, during every possible Transcendental Dialectic 3 1 1 change of my states, permanently abiding existence of my thinking nature, much is gained if, though I freely confess my own ignorance, I can nevertheless repel the dogmatical attacks of a speculative opponent, [p. 384] showing to him that he can never know more of the nat- ure of the subject, in order to deny the possibility of my expectations, than I can know, in order to cling to them. Three dialectical questions, which form the real object of all rational psychology, are founded on this transcen- dental illusion of our psychological concepts, and cannot be answered except by means of the considerations in which we have just been engaged, namely, (i) the ques- tion of the possibility of the association of the soul with an organic body, that is, of animality and the state of the soul in the life of man ; (2) the question of the be- ginning of that association of the soul at the time and before the time of our birth ; (3) the question of the end of that association of the soul at and after the time of death (immortality). What I maintain is, that all the difficulties which we imagine to exist in these questions, and with which, as dogmatical objections, people wish to give themselves an air of deeper insight into the nature of things than the common understanding can ever claim, rest on a mere illusion, which leads us to hypostasise what exists in thought only, and to accept it in the same quality in which it is thought as a real object, outside the "think- ing subject, taking in fact extension, which is phenomenal only, for a quality of external things, existing [p. 385] without our sensibility also, and movement as their effect, taking place by itself also, and independently of our 312 Transcendental Dialectic senses. For matter, the association of which with the soul causes so much misgiving, is nothing but a mere orm, or a certain mode of representing an unknown object by that intuition which we call the external sense. There may, therefore, well be something outside us to which the phenomenon which we call matter cor- responds ; though in its quality of phenomenon it cannot be outside us, but merely as a thought within us, although that thought represents it through the external sense as existing outside us. Matter, therefore, does not signify a class of substances totally heterogeneous and different from the object of the internal sense (the soul), but only the different nature of the phenomenal appearance of objects (in themselves unknown to us), the representations of which we call external, as compared with those which we assign to the internal sense, although, like other thoughts, those external representations also belong to the thinking subject only. They possess however this illusioH that, as they represent objects in space, they seem to separate themselves from the soul and to move out- side it, although even the space, in which they are seen, is nothing but a representation of which no homogeneous original can ever be found outside the soul. The question therefore is no longer as to the possibility of an associa- tion of the soul with other known and foreign [p. 386] substances outside us, but only as to the connection of the representations of the internal sense with the modi- fications of our external sensibility, and how these can be connected with each other according to constant laws, and acquire cohesion in experience. So long as we connect internal and external phenomena with each other as mere representations in our experience. Transcendental Dialectic 313 there is nothing irrational, nor anything to malce the asso- ciation of both senses to appear strange. As soon how- ever as we hypostatise the external phenomena, looking upon them no longer as representations, but as tilings existing by tJurnsclves and outside tis, zvith the same qual- ity i}i which they exist inside us, and referring to our own thinking subject their acts which they, as phenomena, show in their mutual relation, the effective causes outside us assume a character which will not harmonise with their effects within us, because that character refers to the ex- ternal senses only, but the effects to the internal sense, both being entirely unhomogeneous, though united in the same subject. We then have no other external effects but changes of place, and no forces but tendencies, which have for their effects relations in space only. Within us, on the contrary, those effects are mere thoughts, without any relations of space, movement, shape, or local [p. 387] determination between them ; and we entirely lose the thread of the causes in the effects which ought to show themselves in the internal sense. We ought to consider therefore that bodies are not objects by themselves which are present to us, but a mere appearance of we do not know what unknown object, and that movement likewise is not the effect of that unknown cause, but only the appearance of its influence on our senses. Both are not something outside us, but only representation within us, and consequently it is not the movement of matter which produces representations within us, but that motion itself (and matter also, which makes itself known through it) is representation only. Our whole self-created difficulty turns on this, how and why the representations of our sensibility are so connected with each other that those 314 Transcendental Dialectic which we call external intuitions can, according to em- pirical laws, be represented as objects outside us ; a ques- tion which is entirely free from the imagined difficulty of explaining the origin of our representations from totally heterogeneous efficient causes, existing outside us, the confusion arising from our mistaking the phenomenal ap- pearance of an unknown cause for the very cause outside us. In judgments in which there is a misapprehension confirmed by long habit, it is impossible to bring its cor- rection at once to that clearness which can be [p. 388] produced in other cases, where no inevitable illusion con- fuses our concept. Our attempt therefore at freeing rea- son from these sophistical theories can hardly claim as yet that perspicuity which would render it perfectly satisfac- tory. I hope however to arrive at greater lucidity in the following manner. All objections may be divided into dogmatical, critical, and sceptical. The dogmatical attacks the proposition, the critical the proof of a proposition. The former presup- poses an insight into the peculiar nature of the object in order to be able to assert the contrary of what the proposition asserts. It is therefore itself dogmatical, and pretends to know the peculiar nature of the object in question better than the opponent. The critical objec- tion, as it says nothing about the worth or worthlessness of the proposition, and attacks the proof only, need not know the object itself better, or claim a better knowledge of it. All it wants to show is, that a proposition is not well grounded, not that it is false. The sceptical objec- tion, lastly, places assertion and denial side by side, as of equal value, taking one or the other now as dogma, and now as denial ; and being thus in appearance dof^- Transcendental Dialectic 315 matical on both sides, it renders every judgment [p. 389] on the object impossible. Both the dogmatical and scep- tical objections must pretend to so much knowledge of their object as is necessary in order to assert or deny anything about it. The critical objection, on the con- trary, wishes only to show that something purely futile and fanciful has been used in support of a proposition, and thus upsets a theory by depriving it of its pretended foundation, without wishing to establish itself anything else about the nature of the object. According to the ordinary concepts of our reason with regard to the association between our thinking subject and the things outside us, we are dogmatical, and look upon them as real objects, existing independently of our- selves, in accordance with a certain transcendental dualism which does not reckon external phenomena as representa- tions belonging to the subject, but places them, as they are given us in sensuous intuition, as objects outside us and entirely separated from the thinking subject. This mere Assumption is the foundation of all theories on the association between soul and body. It is never asked whether this objective reality of phenomena is absolutely true, but it is taken for granted, and the only question seems to be, how it is to be explained and understood. The three systems which are commonly sug- [p.39o] gested, and which in fact are alone possible, are those, 1st, of physical itifliience, 2nd, of pre-established harmony, and 3rd, of supernatural assistance. The second and third explanations of the association between soul and matter arise from objections to the first, which is that of the ordinary understanding, the objection being, that what appears as matter cannot by its imme- 3i6 Transcefidental Dialectic diate influence be the cause of representations, these being a totally heterogeneous class of effects. Those who start this objection cannot understand by the objects of the external senses matter, conceived as phenomenon only, and therefore itself a mere representation produced by whatever external objects. For in that case they would really say that the representations of external objects (phenomena) cannot be the external causes of the repre- sentations in our mind, which would be a meaningless objection, because nobody would think of taking for an external cause what he knows to be a mere representation. According to our principles the object of their theory can only be, that that which is the true (transcendental) object of our external senses cannot be the cause of those repre- sentations (phenomena) which we mean by the name of matter. As no one has any right to say that he [p. 391] knows anything of the transcendental cause of the repre- sentations of our external senses, their assertion is entirely groundless. And if the pretended reformers of the doc- trine of physical influence represent, according to the ordinary views of transcendental dualism, matter, as such, as a thing by itself (not simply as a mere phenomenal appearance of an unknown thing), and then proceed in their objections to show that such an external object, which shows no causality but that of movements, can never be the efficient cause of representations, but that a third being must intervene in order to produce, if not reciprocal action, at least correspondence and harmony between the two, they would really begin their refutation by admitting in their dualism the irprnTov -\^evho<; of a physical influence, and thus refute by their objection, not so much the physical influence as their own duahstic Transcendental Dialectic 317 premisses. For all the difficulties with regard to a possi- ble connection between a thinking nature and matter arise, without exception, from that too readily admitted dualistic representation, namely, that matter, as such, is not phenomenal, that is, a mere representation of the mind to which an unknown object corresponds, but the object itself, such as it exists outside us, and independent of all sensibility. [p. 302] It is impossible, therefore, to start a dogmatical objec- tion against the commonly received theory of a physical influence. For if the opponent were to say that matter and its movements are purely phenomenal and therefore mere representations, the only difficulty remaining to him would be that the unknown object of our senses could not be the cause of our representations, and this he has no right to say, because no one is able to determine what an unknown object may or may not be able to effect; and, according to our former arguments, he must necessarily admit this transcendental idealism, unless he wishes to hypostasise mere representations and place them outside himself as real things. What is quite possible, however, is to raise a well- founded critical objection to the commonly received opinion of a physical influence. For the pretended association between two kinds of substances, the one thinking, the other extended, rests on a coarse dualism, and changes the latter, though they are nothing but representations of the thinking subject, into things existing by themselves. Thus the misunderstood physical influence may be entirely upset by showing that the proof which was to establish it, was surreptitiously obtained, and therefore, valueless. . The notorious problem, therefore, as to a possible asso- 3i8 Transcendental Dialectic ciation between the thinking and the extended, would, when all that is purely imaginative is deducted, [p. 393] come to this, hoiv external intuition, namely, that of space (or what fills space, namely, form and movement), is pos- sible in any thinking subject f To this question, however, no human being can return an answer, and instead of attempting to fill this gap in our knowledge, all we can do is to indicate it by ascribing external phenomena to a transcendental object as the cause of this class of repre- sentations, but which we shall never know, nor be able to form any concept of. In all practical questions we treat phenomena as objects by themselves, without troubling ourselves about the first cause of their possibility (as phenomena). But as soon as we go beyond, the concept of a transcendental object becomes inevitable. The decision of all the discussions on the state of a thinking being, before this association with matter (life) or after the ceasing of such association (death), depends on the remarks which we have just made on the associa- tion between the thinking and the extended. The opinion that the thinking subject was able to think before any association with bodies, would assume the following form, that before the beginning of that kind of sensi- [p. 394] bility through which something appears to us in space, the same transcendental objects, which in our present state appear as bodies, could have been seen in a totally differ- ent way. The other opinion that, after the cessation of its association with the material world, the soul could continue to think, would be expressed as follows : that, if that kind of sensibility through which transcendental and, for the present, entirely unknown objects appear to us as a material world, should cease, it would -not follow that Transcendental Dialectic 319 thereby all intuition of them would be removed : it being quite possible that the same unknown objects should con- tinue to be known by the thinking subject, although no longer in the quality of bodies. Now it is quite true that no one can produce from spec- ulative principles the smallest ground for such an asser- tion, or do more than presuppose its possibility, but neither can any valid dogmatical objection be raised against it. For whoever would attempt to do so, would know neither more nor less than I myself, or anybody else, about the absolute and internal cause of external and material phenomena. As he cannot pretend to know on what the reality of external phenomena in our present state (in life) really rests, neither can he know that the condition of all external intuition, or the thinking subject itself, will cease after this state (in death). [p. 395] We thus see that all the wrangling about the nature of a thinking being, and its association with the material world, arises simply from our filling the gap, due to our ignorance, with paralogisms of reason, and by changing thoughts into things and hypostasising them. On this an imaginary science is built up, both by those who assert and by those who deny, some pretending to know about objects of which no human being has any conception, while others make their own representations to be objects, all turning round in a constant circle of ambiguities and contradictions. Nothing but a sober, strict, and just criticism can free us of this dogmatical illusion, which, through theories and systems, deceives so many by an imaginary happiness. Jt alone can limit our speculative pretensions to the sphere of possible experience, and this not by a shallow scoffing at repeated failures or by 320 Transcendental Dialectic pious sighs over the limits of our reason, but by a demar- cation made according to well-established principles, writ- ing the nihil ulterius with perfect assurance on those Herculean columns which Nature herself has erected, in order that the voyage of our reason should be continued so far only as the continuous shores of experience extend — shores which we can never forsake without [p. 396] being driven upon a boundless ocean, which, after deceiv- ing us again and again, makes us in the end cease all our laborious and tedious endeavours as perfectly hopeless. We have yet to give a general and clear investigation of the transcendental, and yet natural illusion, produced by the paralogisms of pure reason, and the justification of our systematical arrangement of them, which ran parallel with the table of the categories. We could not have done this at the beginning of this section, without running the risk of becoming obscure, or inconveniently anticipating our arguments. We shall now try to fulfil our duty. All illusion may be explained as mistaking the subjec- tive condition of thought for the knowledge of the object. In the introduction to the transcendental Dialectic, we showed that pure reason is occupied exclusively with the totality of the synthesis of conditions belonging to any- thing conditioned. Now as the dialectical illusion of pure reason cannot be an empirical illusion, such as occurs in cer- tain empirical kinds of knowledge, it can refer only to the conditions of thought in general, so that there can [p. 397] only be three cases of the dialectical use of pure reason : — 1. The synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general. 2. The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thought. Transcendmtal Dialectic 321 3. The synthesis of the conditions of pure thought. In every one of these three cases pure reason is occu- pied only with the absolute totality of that synthesis, that is, with that condition, which is itself unconditioned. It is on this division also that the threefold transcendental illusion is founded which leads to three subdivisions of the Dialectic, and to as many pretended sciences flowing from pure reason, namely, transcendental psychology, cosmol- ogy, and theology. We are at present concerned with the first only. As, in thinking in general, we take no account of the relation of our thoughts to any object (whether of the senses or of the pure understanding), what is called (i) the synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general, is not objective at all, but only a synthesis of thought with the subject, which synthesis is wrongly taken for the synthetical representation of an object. It follows from this that the dialectical conclusion as to the condition of all thought in general, which condition itself is unconditioned, does not involve a fault in its con- tents (for it ignores all contents or objects), but only a fault in form, and must therefore be called a [p. 398] paralogism. As, moreover, the only condition which accompanies all thought is the /, in the general proposition / think, reason has really to deal with this condition, so far as that condi- tion is itself unconditioned. It is however a formal con- dition only, namely, the logical unity of every thought, no account being taken of any object ; but it is represented nevertheless as an object which I think, namely, as the I itself and its unconditioned unity. If I were asked what is the nature of a thing which 322 Transcendental Dialectic thinks, I could not give any answer a priori, for the answer ought to be synthetical, as an analytical answer might explain perhaps the meaning of the term "thought," but could never add any real knowledge of that on which the possibility of thought depends. For a synthetical solution, however, we should require intuition, and this has been entirely left out of account in the general form given to our problem. It is equally impossible to answer the general question, what is the nature of a thing which is moveable, because in that case the impermeable exten- sion (matter) is not given. But although I have no answer to return to that question in general, it might seem that I could answer it in a special case, namely, in the proposition which expresses the self-consciousness, I think. For this I is the first subject, i.e. sub- [p. 399] stance, it is simple, etc. These, however, ought then to be propositions of experience, which nevertheless, without a general rule containing the conditions of the possibility of thought in general and a priori, could not contain such predicates (which are not empirical). This consideration makes our knowledge of the nature of a thinking being derived from pure concepts, which seemed at first so plausible, extremely suspicious, though we have not yet discovered the place where the fault really lies. A further investigation, however, of the origin of the attributes which I predicate of myself as a thinking being in general, may help us to discover the fault. They are no more than pure categories by which I can never think a definite object, but only the unity of the representations which is requisite in order to determine an object. With- out a previous intuition, no category by itself can give me a concept of an object, for by intuition alone the object is Transcendental Dialectic 323 given, which afterwards is thought in accordance with a category. In order to declare a thing to be a substance in phenomenal appearance, predicates of its intuition must first be given to me, in which I may distinguish the per- manent from the changeable, and the substratum (the thing in itself) from that which is merely inher- [p. 400] ent in it. If I call a thing simple as a phenomenon, what I mean is that its intuition is a part of phenomenal appearance, but cannot itself be divided into parts, etc. But if I know something to be simple by a concept only, and not by phenomenal appearance, I have really no knowledge whatever of the object, but only of my concept which I make to myself of something in general, that is incapable of any real intuition. I only say that I think something as perfectly simple, because I have really noth- ing to say of it except that it is something. Now the mere apperception (the I) is substance in concept, simple in concept, etc., and so far all the psycho- logical propositions of which we spoke before are incon- testably true. Nevertheless what we really wish to know of the soul, becomes by no means known to us in that way, because all those predicates are with regard to intui- tion non-valid, entailing no consequences with regard to objects of experience, and therefore entirely empty. For that concept of substance does not teach me that the soul continues by itself, or that it is a part of external intui- tions, which itself cannot be resolved into parts, and can- not therefore arise or perish by any changes of nature. These are qualities which would make the soul known to us in its connection with experience, and might give us an insight into its origin and future state. But [p. 401] if I say, by means of the category only, that the soul is 324 Transcendetttal Dialectic a simple substance, it is clear that the bare rational con- cept of substance contains nothing beyond the thought that a thing should be represented as a subject in itself, without becoming in turn a predicate of anything else. Nothing can be deduced from this, with regard to the permanence (of the I), nor can the attribute of simplicity add that of permanence, nor can we thus learn anything whatsoever as to the fate of the soul in the revolutions of the world. If anybody could tell us that the soul is a simple part of matter, we might, with the help of experi- ence, deduce from this the permanence and, on account of its simple nature, the indestructibility of the soul. But of all this, the concept of the I, in the psychological proposition of / think, tells us nothing. The reason why that being which thinks within us imagines that it knows itself by means of pure categories, and especially by that which expresses absolute unity under each head, is this. The apperception itself is the ground of the possibility of the categories, and these represent nothing but the synthesis of the manifold in intuition, so far as it has unity in apperception. Self-con- sciousness therefore is the representation of that which forms the condition of all unity, and is itself uncondi- tioned. One may therefore say of the thinking [p. 402] I (the soul), which represents itself as substance, simple, numerically identical in all time, and as the correlative of all existence, from which in fact all other existence must be concluded, that it does not know itself through the cate- gories, but knows the categories only, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, that is, through itself. It may seem no doubt self-evident that I cannot know as an object that which is presupposed in Transcendental Dialectic 325 order to enable me to know an object, and that the deter- mining self (thought) differs from the self that is to be determined (the thinking subject), like knowledge from its object. Nevertheless nothing is more natural or at least more tempting than the illusion which makes us look upon the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a perceived unity in the subject of thoughts. One might call it the surrep- titious admission of an hypostasised consciousness (apper- ceptionis substantiatae). If we want to have a logical term for the paralogism in the dialectical syllogisms of rational psychology, based on perfectly correct premisses, it might be called a sophisina figurae dictionis. In the major we use the category, with reference to its condition, transcendentally only ; in the minor and in the conclusion, we use the same category, with reference to the soul which is to be compre- [p. 403] bended under that condition, empirically. Thus, in the paralogism of substantiality,^ the concept of substance is a purely intellectual concept which, without the conditions of sensuous intuition, admits of a transcendental use only, that is, of no use at all. In the minor, however, we refer the same concept to the object of all internal experience, though without having previously estabUshed the condi- tion of its application in coucreto, namely, its permanence. We thus are making an empirical, and therefore entirely inadmissible use of it. Lastly, in order to show the systematical connection of , all these dialectical propositions of a rationalising psy- chology, according to their connection in pure reason, and thus to establish their completenes.s, it should be 1 Simplicitat was a misprint for substantialitat. 326 Transcendental Dialectic remarked that the apperception is carried through all the classes of the categories, but only with reference to those concepts of the understanding, which in each of them formed a foundation of unity for the others in a possible perception, namely subsistence, reality, unity (not plu- rality), and existence, all of which are here represented by reason, as conditions (themselves unconditioned) of the possibility of a thinking being. Thus the soul knows in itself: — I [p. 404] The unconditioned unity of tlie relation, that is, itself, not as inherent, but as subsisting. II III The unconditioned unity The unconditioned unity of quality, in the manifoldness of time, that is, that is, not as a real whole, not as at different times but as numerically different, simple.i but as one and the same subject. IV The unconditioned unity of existence in space, that is, not as the consciousness of many things outside it, but as the consciousness of the existence of itself only, and of other things, merely as its representations. 1 How the simple can again covrespond to the category of reality cannot yet be explained here ; but will be shown in the following chapter, when another use has to be discussed which reason makes of the sa,m<; concept. Transcendental Dialectic 327 Reason is the faculty of principles. The state- [p. 405] ments of pure psychology do not contain empirical predi- cates of the soul, but such as, if they exist, are meant to determine the object by itself, independent of all experi- ence, and therefore by a pure reason only. They ought therefore to rest on principles and on general concepts of thinking beings. Instead of this we find that a single representation, 1,^ governs them all, a representation which, for the very reason that it expresses the pure formula of all my experience (indefinitely), claims to be a general proposition, applicable to all thinking beings, and, though single in all respects, has the appearance of an absolute unity of the conditions of thought in general, thus stretching far beyond the limits of possible experience.] ^ Ich bin was a mistake, it can only be meant for Ich denke. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC BOOK II CHAPTER II THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON In the Introduction to this part of our work we showed that all the transcendental illusion of pure reason depended on three dialectical syllogisms, the outline of which is sup- plied to us by logic in the three formal kinds of the ordi- nary syllogism, in about the same way in which the logical outline of the categories was derived from the [p. 406] four functions of all judgments. The first class of these rationalising syllogisms aimed at the unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all representations (of the subject or the soul) as corresponding to the categorical syl- logisms of reason, the major of which, as the principle, asserts the relation of a predicate to a subject. The second class of the dialectical arguments will, therefore, in analogy with the hypothetical syllogisms, take for its object the unconditioned unity of the objective condi- tions in phenomenal appearance, while the third class, which has to be treated in the following chapter, will be concerned with the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility of objects in general. 328 Transcendental Dialectic 329 It is strange, however, that a transcendental paralogism caused a one-sided illusion only, with regard to our idea of the subject of our thought ; and that it is impossible to find in mere concepts of reason the slightest excuse for maintaining the contrary. All the advantage is on the side of pneumatism, although it cannot hide the heredi- tary taint by which it evaporates into nought, when sub- jected to the ordeal of our critique. The case is totally different when we apply reason to the objective synthesis of phenomena ; here reason tries at first, with great plausibility, to establish its prin- [p. 407] ciple of unconditioned unity, but becomes soon entangled in so many contradictions, that it must give up its pre- tensions with regard to cosmology also. For here we are met by a new phenomenon in human reason, namely, a perfectly natural Antithetic, which is not produced by any artificial efforts, but into which reason falls by itself, and inevitably. Reason is no doubt preserved thereby from the slumber of an imaginary con- viction, which is often produced by a purely one-sided illusion ; but it is tempted at the same time, either to abandon itself to sceptical despair, or to assume a dog- matical obstinacy, taking its stand on certain assertions, without granting a hearing and doing justice to the argu- ments of the opponent. In both cases, a death-blow is dealt to sound philosophy, although in the former we might speak of the Euthanasia of pure reason. Before showing the scenes of discord and confusion produced by the conflict of the laws (antinomy) of pure reason, we shall have to make a few remarks in order to explain and justify the method which we mean to follow in the treatment of this subject. I shall call all transcen- 330 Transcendetital Dialectic dental ideas, so far as they relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena, cosmical concepts, [p. 408] partly, because of even this unconditioned totality on which the concept of the cosmical universe also rests (which is itself an idea only), partly, because they refer to the synthesis of phenomena only, which is empirical, while the absolute totality in the synthesis of the con- ditions of all possible things must produce an ideal of pure reason, totally different from the cosmical concept, although in a certain sense related to it. As therefore the paralogisms of pure reason formed the foundation for a dialectical psychology, the antinomy of pure reason will place before our eyes the transcendental principles of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology, not in order to show that it is valid and can be accepted, but, as may be guessed from the very name of the antinomy of reason, in order to expose it as an idea surrounded by deceptive and false appearances, and utterly irreconcileable with phenomena. THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON Section I System of Cosmological Ideas Before we are able to enumerate these ideas according to a principle and with systematic precision, we must bear in mind, 1st, That pure and transcendental concepts arise from the understanding only, and that reason does not [p. 409] in reality produce any concept, but onVj frees, it may be, the concept of the understandi7ig of the inevitable limita- Transcendental Dialectic 33 1 tion of a possible experience, and thus tries to .enlarge it, beyond the limits of experience, yet in connection with it. Reason does this by demanding for something that is given as conditioned, absolute totality on the side of the conditions (under which the understanding subjects all phenomena to the synthetical' unity). It thus changes the category into a transcendental idea, in order to give absolute completeness to the empirical synthesis, by con- tinuing it up to the unconditioned (which can never be met with in experience, but in the idea only). In doing this, reason follows the principle that, if tlie conditioned is given, the whole sum of conditions, and tlierefore the abso- lutely unconditioned mnst be given likewise, the former being impossible without the latter. Hence the transcendental ideas are in reality nothing but categories, enlarged till they reach the unconditioned, and those ideas must admit of being arranged in a table, according to the titles of the categories. 2ndly, Not all categories will lend themselves to this, but those only in which the synthesis constitutes a series, and a series of subordinated (not of co-ordinated) condi- tions. Absolute totality is demanded by reason, [p. 410] with regard to an ascending series of conditions only, not therefore when we have to deal with a descending line of consequences, or with an aggregate of co-ordinated condi- tions. For, with reference to something given as condi- tioned, conditions are presupposed and considered as given with it, while, on the other hand, as consequences do not render their conditions possible, but rather presuppose them, we need not, in proceeding to the consequences (or in descending from any given condition to the condi- tioned), trouble ourselves whether the series comes to an 332 Transcendental Dialectic end or not, the question as to their totality being in fact no presupposition of reason whatever. Thus we necessarily conceive time past up to a given moment, as given, even if not determinable by us. But with regard to time future, which is not a condition of arriving at time present, it is entirely indifferent, if we want to conceive the latter, what we may think about the former, whether we take it, as coming to an end some- where, or as going on to infinity. Let us take the series, VI, n, o, where n is given as conditioned by m, and at the same time as a condition of o. Let that series ascend from the conditioned n to its condition m (I, k, i, etc.), and descend from the condition n to the conditioned o (/) ^1 ft etc.). I must then presuppose the former series, in order to take « as given, and according to reason (the total- ity of conditions) 71 is possible only by means of that series, while its possibility depends in no way on the [p. 411] subsequent series, o,p, g, r, which therefore cannot be con- sidered as given, but only as dabilis, capable of being given. I shall call the synthesis of a series on the side of the conditions, beginning with the one nearest to a given phe- nomenon, and advancing to the more remote conditions, regressive; the other, which on the side of the con- ditioned advances from the nearest effect to the more remote ones, progressive. The former proceeds in ante- cedentia, the second in conscqnentia. Cosmological ideas therefore, being occupied with the totality of regressive synthesis, proceed in anteccdentia, not in conscqnentia. If the latter should take place, it would he a gratuitous, not a necessary problem of pure reason, because for a com- plete comprehension of what is given us in experience we want to know the causes, but not the effects. Transcendental Dialectic 333 In order to arrange a table of ideas in accordance with the table of the categories, we must take, first, the two original quanta of all our intuition, time and space. Time is in itself a series (and the formal condition of all series), and in it, therefore, with reference to any given present, we have to distinguish a priori the antecedciitia as conditions (the past) from the conscquentia (the future). Hence the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of [p. 412] the series of conditions of anything conditioned refers to time past only. The whole of time past is looked upon, according to the idea of reason, as a necessary condition of the given moment. With regard to space there is in it no difference between progressus and reg7'essus, because all its parts exist together and form an aggregate, but no series. We can look upon the present moment, with reference to time past, as conditioned only, but never as condition, because this moment arises only through time past (or rather through the passing of antecedent time). But as the parts of space are not subordinate to one another, but co-ordinate, no part of it is in the condition of the possibility of another, nor does it, like time, con- stitute a series in itself. Nevertheless the synthesis by which we apprehend the many parts of space is successive, takes place in time, and contains a series. And as in that series of aggregated spaces (as, for instance, of feet in a rood) the spaces added to a given space are always the condition of the limit of the preceding spaces, we ought to consider the measuring of a space also as a synthesis of a series of conditions of something given as conditioned, with this difference only, that the side of the [p. 41 3 J conditions is by itself not different from the other side which comprehends the conditioned, so that regressus and 334 Transcendental Dialectic progressus seem to be the same in space. As however every part of space is Hmited only, and not given by another, we must look upon every limited space as con- ditioned also, so far as it presupposes another space as the condition of its limit, and so on. With reference to limita- tion therefore progressus in space is also regressus, and the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in the series of conditions applies to space also. I may ask then for the absolute totality of phenomena in space, quite as well as in time past, though we must wait to see whether an answer is ever possible. Secondly, reality in space, that is, matter, is something conditioned, the parts of which are its internal conditions, and the parts of its parts, its remoter conditions. We have therefore here a regressive synthesis the absolute totality of which is demanded by reason, but which can- not take place except by a complete division, whereby the reality of matter dwindles away into nothing, or into that at least which is no longer matter, namely, the simple ; consequently we have here also a series of conditions, and a progress to the unconditioned. Thirdly, when we come to the categories of the real relation between phenomena, we find that the [p. 414] category of substance with its accidents does not lend itself to a transcendental idea ; that is, reason has here no inducement to proceed regressively to conditions. We know that accidents, so far as they inhere in one and the same substance, are co-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series ; and with reference to the sub- stance, they are not properly subordinate to it, but are the mode of existence of the substance itself. The concept of the substantial might seem to be here an idea of tran- Transcendental Dialectic 335 cendental reason. This, however, signifies nothing but the concept of the object in general, which subsists, so far as we think in it the transcendental subject only, without any predicates ; and, as we are here speaking only of the unconditioned in the series of phenomena, it is clear that the substantial cannot be a part of it. The same applies to substances in community, which are aggregates only, without having an exponent of a series, since they are not subordinate to each other, as conditions of their possibil- ity, in the same way as spaces were, the limits of which can never be determined by itself, but always through another space. There remains therefore only the cate- gory of causality, which offers a series of causes to a given effect, enabling us to ascend from the latter, as the condi- tioned, to the former as the conditions, and thus to answer the question of reason. [p, 415] Fourthly, the concepts of the possible, the real, and the necessary do not lead to any series, except so far as the accidental in existence must always be considered as con- ditioned, and point, according to a rule of the understand- ing, to a condition which makes it necessary to ascend to a higher condition, till reason finds at last, only, in the totality of that series, the unconditioned necessity which it requires. If therefore we select those categories which necessa- rily imply a series in the synthesis of the manifold, we shall have no more than four cosmological ideas, accord- to the four titles of the categories. Absolute completeness of the composition of the given whole of all phenomena. 336 Transcendental Dialectic III II Absolute completeness Absolute completeness of the division of the origination of a given whole of a phenomenon in phenomenal appearance. in general. IV Absolute completeness of the dependence of the existence of the changeable in phenomenal appearance. [p. 416] It should be remarked, first, that the idea of absolute totality refers to nothing else but the exhibition of phe- nomena, and not therefore to the pure concept, formed by the understanding, of a totality of things in general. Phe- nomena, therefore, are considered here as given, and rea- son postulates the absolute completeness of the conditions of their possibility, so far as these conditions constitute a series, that is, an absolutely (in every respect) complete synthesis, whereby phenomena could be exhibited accord- ing to the laws of the understanding. Secondly, it is in reality the unconditioned alone which reason is looking for in the synthesis of conditions, con- tinued regressively and serially, as it were a completeness in the series of premisses, which taken together require no further premisses. This unconditioned is always con- tained in tJie absolute totality of a scries, as represented in imagination. But this absolutely complete synthesis is again an idea only, for it is impossible to know beforehand, whether such a synthesis be possible in phenomena. If we represent everything by means of pure concepts of the understanding only, and without the conditions of sensu- ous intuition, we might really say that of everything given as conditioned the whole series also of conditions, sub- Transcendental Dialectic 337 ordinated to each other, is given, for the conditioned is given through the conditions only. When we come to phenomena, however, we find a particular limitation of the mode in which conditions are given, namely, [p. 417] through the successive synthesis of the manifold of intui- tion which should become complete by the regresses. Whether this completeness, however, is possible, with regard to sensuous phenomena, is still a question. But the idea of that completeness is no doubt contained in reason, without reference to the possibility or impossibil- ity of connecting with it adequate empirical concepts. As therefore in the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of the manifold in intuition (according to the categories which represent that totality as a series of conditions of something given as conditioned) the uncon- ditioned is necessarily contained without attempting to determine whether and how such a totality be possible, reason here takes the road to start from the idea of totality, though her final aim is the unconditioned, whether of the whole series or of a part thereof. This unconditioned may be either conceived as existing in the whole series only, in which all members without exception are conditioned and the whole of them only absolutely unconditioned — and in this case the regressiis is called infinite — or the absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series, the other members being subordinate to it, while it is itself conditioned by nothing else.^ In the 1 The absolute total of a series of conditions of anything given as con- ditioned, is itself always unconditioned; because there are no conditions beyond on which it could depend. Such an absolute total of a series is, how- ever, an idea only, or rather a problematical concept, the possibihty of which has to be investigated with reference to the mode in which the unconditioned, Z 338 Transcendental Dialectic former case the series is without Hmits a parte [p. 418] priori (without a beginning), that is infinite ; given how- ever as a whole in which the regressus is never complete, and can therefore be called infinite potentially only. In the latter case there is something that stands first in the series, which, with reference to time past, is called the begiitning of the world ; with reference to space, the limit of the world; with reference to the parts of a lim- ited given whole, the simple ; with reference to causes, absolute spontaneity (liberty) ; with reference to the exist- ence of changeable things, the absolute necessity of nature. We have two expressions, woiid and nature, which fre- quently run into each other. The first denotes the math- ematical total of all phenomena and the totality of their synthesis of large and small in its progress whether by composition or division. That world, however, is called nature 1 if we look upon it as a dynamical [p. 419] whole, and consider not the aggregation in space and time, in order to produce a quantity, but the unity in the existence of phenomena. In this case the condition of that which happens is called caiLse, the unconditioned causality of the cause as phenomenal, liberty, while the conditioned causality, in its narrower meaning, is called natural cause. That of which the existence is conditioned that is, in reality, the transcendental idea with which we are concerned, may be contained in it. 1 Nature, if taken adjective {formaliter), is meant to express the whole complex of the determinations of a thing, according to an inner principle of causality; while, if taken substantive {materialiter), it denotes the totality of phenomena, so far as they are all held together by an internal principle of causality. In the former meaning we speak of the nature of liquid matter, of fire, etc., using the word adjective; while, if we speak of the objects of nature, or of natural objects, we have in our mind the idea of a subsisting whole. Transcendental Dialectic 330 is called contingent, that of which it is unconditioned, jiec- essary. The unconditioned necessity of phenomena may be called natural necessity. I have called the ideas, which we are at present dis- cussing, cosmological, partly because we understand by world the totality of all phenomena, our ideas being directed to that only which is unconditioned among the phenomena; partly, because world, in its transcendental meaning, denotes the totality of all existing things, and we are concerned only with the completeness of the synthesis (although properly only in the regressus to the [p. 420] conditions). Considering, therefore, that all these ideas are transcendent because, though not transcending in kind their object, namely, phenomena, but restricted to the world of sense (and excluded from all noumena) they nevertheless carry synthesis to a degree which transcends all possible experience, they may, according to my opinion, very properly be called cosjnical concepts. With reference to the distinction, however, between the mathematically or the dynamically unconditioned at which the regressus aims, I might call the two former, in a narrower sense, cosmi- cal concepts (macrocosmically or microcosmically) and the remaining two transcendent concepts of nature. This dis- tinction, though for the present of no great consequence, may become important hereafter. THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON Section II Antithetic of Pure Reason If every collection of dogmatical doctrines is called The tic, I may denote by Antithetic, not indeed dogmatical 340 T7-anscendeiital Dialectic assertions of the opposite, but the conflict between dif- ferent kinds of apparently dogmatical knowledge {thesis cui?t antithesi), to none of which we can ascribe [p. 421] a superior claim to our assent. This antithetic, therefore, has nothing to do with one-sided assertions, but considers general knowledge of reason with reference to the con- flict only that goes on in it, and its causes. The tran- scendental antithetic is in fact an investigation of the antinomy of pure reason, its causes and its results. If we apply our reason, not only to objects of experience, in order to make use of the principles of the understanding, but venture to extend it beyond the limit of experience, there arise rationalising or sophistical propositions, which can neither hope for confirmation nor need fear refutation from experience. Every one of tTiem is not only in itself free from contradiction, but can point to conditions of its necessity in the nature of reason itself, only that, unfortu- nately, its opposite can produce equally valid and nec- essary grounds for its support. The questions which naturally arise in such a Dialectic of pure reason are the following, i. In what propositions is pure reason inevitably subject to an antinomy.' 2. On what causes does this antinomy depend .' 3. Whether, and in what way, reason may, in spite of this contradiction, find a way to certainty .? A dialectical proposition of pure reason must have this characteristic to distinguish it from all purely sophistical propositions, first, that it does not refer to a [p. 422] gratuitous question, but to one which human reason in its natural progress must necessarily encounter, and, secondly, that it, as well as its opposite, carries with itself not a merely artificial illusion, which when once seen through Transcendental Dialectic 341 disappears, but a natural and inevitable illusion, which, even when it deceives us no longer, always remains, and though rendered harmless, cannot be annihilated. This dialectical doctrine will not refer to the unity of the understanding in concepts of experience, but to the unity of reason in mere ideas, the condition of which, as it is meant to agree, as a synthesis according to rules, with the understanding, and yet at the same time, as the absolute unity of that synthesis, with rea- son, must either, if it is adequate to the unity of reason, be too great for the understanding, or, if ade- quate to the understanding, too small for reason. Hence a conflict must arise, which cannot be avoided, do what we will. These apparently rational, but really sophistical asser- tions open a dialectical battle-field, where that side always obtains the victory which is allowed to make the attack, and where those must certainly succumb who [p. 423] are obliged to keep on the defensive. Hence doughty knights, whether fighting for the good or the bad cause, are sure to win their laurels, if only they take care that they have the right to make the last attack, and are not obHged to stand a new onslaught of the enemy. We can easily imagine that this arena has often been entered, and many victories have been won on both sides, the last decisive victory being always guarded by the defender of the good cause maintaining his place, his opponent being forbidden ever to carry arms again. As impartial judges we must take no account of whether it be the good or the bad cause which the two champions defend. It is best to let them fight it out between themselves in the hope that, after they have rather tired out than injured each 342 Transcetidental Dialectic other, they may themselves perceive the uselessness of their quarrel, and part as good friends. This method of watching or even provoking such a conflict of assertions, not in order to decide in favour of one or the other side, but in order to find out whether the object of the struggle be not a mere illusion, which every- body tries to grasp in vain, and which never can be of any use to any one, even if no resistance were [p. 424] made to him, this method, I say, may be called the sceptical method. It is totally different from scepticism, or that artificial and scientific agnosticism which under- mines the foundations of all knowledge, in order if pos- sible to leave nothing trustworthy and certain anywhere. The sceptical method, on the contrary, aims at certainty, because, while watching a contest which on both sides is carried on honestly and intelligently, it tries to discover the point where the misunderstanding arises, in order to do what is done by wise legislators, namely, to derive from the embarrassments of judges in law-suits information as to what is imperfectly, or not quite accurately, determined in their laws. The antinomy which shows itself in the application of laws, is, considering our limited wisdom, the best criterion of the original legislation (nomothetic), and helps to attract the attention of reason, which in abstract speculations does not easily become aware of its errors, to the important points in the determination of its principles. This sceptical method is essential in transcendental philosophy only, while it may be dispensed with in other fields of investigation. It would be absurd in mathematics, for no false assertions can there be hidden or rendered invisible, because the demonstra- [p. 425] Transcendeiital Dialectic 343 tions must always be guided by pure intuition, and pro- ceed by evident synthesis. In experimental philosophy a doubt, which causes delay, may be useful, but at least no misunderstanding is possible that could not be easily removed, and the final means for deciding a question, whether found sooner or later, must always be supplied by experience. Moral philosophy too can always pro- duce its principles and their practical consequences in the concrete also, or at least in possible experience, and thus avoid the misunderstandings inherent in abstraction. Transcendental assertions, on the contrary, pretending to knowledge far beyond the field of possible experience, can never produce their abstract synthesis _in any intui- tion a priori, nor can their flaws be discovered by means of any experience. Transcendental reason, therefore, admits of no other criterion but an attempt to combine its conflicting assertions, and therefore, previous to this, unrestrained conflict between them. This is what we shall now attempt to do.^ 1 The antinomies follow each other, according to the order of the tran- scendental ideas mentioned before [p. 335 = p. 415]- 344 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis [p. 426] THE ANTINOMY FIRST CONFLICT OF THE • Thesis The world has a beginning in time, and is limited also with regard to space. Proof For, if we assumed that the world had no beginning in time, then an eternity must have elapsed up to every given point of time, and therefore an infinite series of succes- sive states of things must have passed in the world. The infinity of a series, however, consists in this, that it never can be completed by means of a successive synthesis. Hence an infinite past series of worlds is impossible, and the beginning of the world a necessary condition of its existence. This was what had to be proved first. With regard to the second, let us assume again the opposite. In that case the world would be given as an infinite whole of co-existing things. Now we cannot conceive in any way the extension of a quantum, which is not given within certain limits to every intuition,^ ex- cept through the synthesis of its parts, nor [p. 428] the totality of such a quantum in any way, except through 1 We may perceive an indefinite quantum as a whole, if it is included in Umits, without having to build up its totality by means of measuring, that is, by the successive synthesis of its parts. The Umits themselves determine its completeness, by cutting off everything beyond. Transcendental Dialectic 345 Antithesis OF PURE REASON [p- 427] TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS Antithesis The world has no beginning and no limits in space, but is infinite, in respect both to time and space. Proof For let us assume that it has a beginning. Then, as beginning is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing is not, it would follow that antecedently there was a time in which the world was not, that is, an empty time. In an empty time, however, it is impossible that anything should take its beginning, because of such a time no part possesses any condition as to existence rather than non-existence, which condition could distin- guish that part from any other (whether produced by itself or through another cause). Hence, though many a series of things may take its beginning in the world, the world itself can have no beginning, and in reference to time past is infinite. With regard to the second, let us assume again the oppo- site, namely, that the world is finite and limited in space. In that case the world would exist in an empty space with- out limits. We should therefore have not only a relation of things in space, but also of things to space. As how- ever the world is an absolute whole, outside of [p. 429] which no object of intuition, and therefore no correlate of the world can be found, the relation of the world to empty 246 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis a completed synthesis, or by the repeated addition of unity to itself.^ In order therefore to conceive the world, which fills all space, as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world would have to be looked upon as completed; that is, an infinite time would have to be looked upon as elapsed, during the enumeration of all co-existing things. This is impossible. Hence an infinite aggregate of real things cannot be regarded as a given whole, nor, therefore, as given at the same time. Hence it follows that the world is not infinite, as regards extension in space, but enclosed in limits. This was the second that had to be proved. [p. 430] OBSERVATIONS ON THE I On the Thesis In exhibiting these conflicting arguments I have not tried to avail myself of mere sophisms for the sake of what is called special pleading, which takes advantage of the want of caution of the opponent, and gladly allows his appeal to a misunderstood law, in order to establish his own illegitimate claims on its refutation. Every one of our proofs has been deduced from the nature of the case, and no advantage has been taken of the wrong conclu- sions of dogmatists on either side. ^ The concept of totality is in this case nothing but the representation of the completed synthesis of its parts, because, as we cannot deduce the concept from the intuition of the whole (this being in this case impossible) , we can conceive it only through the synthesis of its parts, up to the completion of the infinite, at least in the idea. Transcendental Dialectic 347 Antithesis space would be a relation to no object. Such a relation, .and with it the limitation of the world by empty space, is nothing, and therefore the world is not limited with regard to space, that is, it is infinite in extension. 1 FIRST ANTINOMY [p- 431J II On the Antithesis The proof of the infinity of the given series of world, and of the totality of the world, rests on this, that in the ^ Space is merely the form of external intuition (formal intuition) and not a real object that can be perceived by external intuition. Space, as prior to all things which determine it (fill or limit it), or rather which give an empiri- cal intuition determined by its form, is, under the name of absolute space, nothing but a mere possibility of external phenomena, so far as they either exist already, or can be added to given phenomena. Empirical intuition, therefore, is not a compound of phenomena and of space (perception and empty intuition). The one is not a correlate of the other in a synthesis, but the two are only connected as matter and form in one and the same empirical intuition. If we try to separate one from the other, and to place space outside all phenomena, we arrive at a number of empty determinations of external intuition, which, however, can never be possible perceptions; for instance, motion or rest of the world in an infinite empty space, i.e. determination of the mutual relation of the two, which can never be perceived, and is therefore nothing but the predicate of a mere idea. 348 Tmnscendental Dialectic Thesis I might have apparently proved my thesis too by put- ting forward, as is the habit of dogmatists, a wrong, definition of the infinity of a given quantity. I might have said that the quantity is infinite, if no greater quan- tity (that is, greater than the number of given units con- tained in it) is possible. As no number is the greatest, because one or more units can always be added to it, I might have argued that an infinite given quantity, and therefore also an infinite world (infinite as regards both the past series of time and extension in space) is impos- sible, and therefore the world limited in space and time. I might have done this, but, in that case, rny definition would not have agreed with the true concept of an infinite whole. We do not represent by it how large it is, and the concept of it is not therefore the concept of a maxi- mum, but we conceive Jjy it its relation only [p. 432] to any possible unit, in regard to which it is greater than any number. According as this unit is either greater or smaller, the infinite would be greater or smaller, while infinity, consisting in the relation only to this given unit, would always remain the same, although the absolute quantity of the whole would not be known by it. This, however, does not concern us at present. The true transcendental concept of infinity is, that the successive synthesis of units in measuring a quantum, can never be completed.^ Hence it follows with perfect cer- tainty, that an eternity of real and successive states cannot have elapsed up to any given (the present) moment, and that the world therefore must have a beginning. 1 This quantum contains therefore a multitude (of given units) which is greater than any number ; this is the mathematical concept of the infinite. Transcendental Dialectic 349 Antithesis opposite case an empty time, and likewise an empty space, would form the limits of the world. Now I am quite aware that people have tried to escape from this conclusion by saying that a limit of the world, both in time and space, is quite possible, without our having to admit an absolute time before the beginning of the world or an absolute space outside the real world, which is impossible. I have nothing to say against the latter part of this opinion, held by the philosophers of the school of Leibniz. Space is only the form of external intuition, and not a real object that could be perceived externally, nor is it a correlate of phenomena, but the form of phenomena themselves. Space, therefore, cannot exist absolutely (by itself) as some- thing determining the existence of things, because it is no object, but only the form of possible objects. Things, therefore, as phenomenal, may indeed determine space, that is, impart reality to one or other of its predicates (quantity and relation); but space, on the other side, as something existing by itself, cannot determine the reality of things in regard to quantity or form, because it is noth- ing real in itself. Space therefore (whether full or empty i) may be limited by phenomena, but phenomena cannot be limited by empty space outside them. The same [p. 433] applies to time. But, granting all this, it cannot be denied that we should be driven to admit these two monsters, empty space outside, and empty time before the world, if we assumed the limit of the world, whether in space or time. 1 It is easily seen that what we wish to say is that empty ^ace, so far as limited by phenomena, that is, space within the world, does not at least con- tradict transcendental principles, and may be atlmitted, therefore, so far as, they are concerned, though by this its possibility is not asserted. 350 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis With regard to the second part of the thesis, the diffi- culty of an endless and yet past series does not exist ; for the manifold of a world, infinite in extension, is given at 07ie and the same time. But, in order to conceive the totality of such a multitude of things, as we cannot appeal to those limits which in intuition produce that totality by themselves, we must render an account of our concept, which in our case cannot proceed from the whole to the determined multitude of the parts, but has to demonstrate the possibility of a whole by the successive synthesis of the parts. As such a synthesis would constitute a series that would never be completed, it is impossible to con- ceive a tota.lity either before it, or through it. For the concept of totality itself is in this case the representation of a completed synthesis of parts, and such a completion, and therefore its concept also, is impossible. Transcendental Dialectic 351 Antithesis For as to the plea by which people try to escape from the conclusion, that if the world has limits in time or space, the infinite void would determine the existence of real things, so far as their dimensions are concerned, it is really no more than a covered attempt at putting some unknown intelligible world in the place of our sensiiotis world, and an existence in general, which presupposes no other condition in the world, in the place of a first beginning (an existence preceded by a time of non-existence), and boundaries of the universe in place of the limits of extension, — thus getting rid of time and space. But we have to deal here with the mundus phaenontenon and its quantity, and we could not ignore the conditions of sensibility, without destroying its very essence. The world of sense, if it is limited, lies necessarily within the infinite void. If we ignore this, and with it, space in general, as an a priori condition of the possibility of phenomena, the whole world of sense van- ishes, which alone forms the object of our enquiry. The mundus ■intelligibilis is nothing but the general concept of any world, which takes no account of any of the conditions of intuition, and which therefore admits of no synthetical proposition, whether affirmative or negative. ■1C2 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis [p. 434] THE ANTINOMY SECOND CONFLICT OF THE Thesis Every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing exists anywhere but the simple, or what is composed of it. Proof For let us assume that compound substances did not consist of simple parts, then, if all composition is removed in thought, there would be no compound part, and (as no simple parts are admitted) no simple part either, that is, there would remain nothing, and there would therefore be no substance at all. Either, therefore, it is impossible to remove all composition in thought, or, after its removal, there must remain something that exists without composi- tion, that is the simple. In the former case the com- pound could not itself consist of substances (because with them composition is only an accidental relation of sub- stances, which substances, as permanent beings, must subsist without it). As this contradicts the [p. 436] supposition, there remains only the second view, namely, that the substantial compounds in the world consist of simple parts. It follows as an immediate consequence that all the things in the world are simple beings, that their composi- Transcendental Dialectic 353 Antithesis OF PURE REASON [p- 435] TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS Antithesis No compound thing in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nowhere in the world anything simple. Proof Assume that a compound thing, a substance, consists of simple parts. Then as all external relation, and therefore all composition of substances also, is possible in space only, it follows that space must consist of as many parts as the parts of the compound that occupies the space. Space, however, does not consist of simple parts, but of spaces. Every part of a compound, therefore, must occupy a space. Now the absolutely primary parts of every compound are simple. It follows therefore that the simple occupies a space. But as everything real, which occupies a space, contains a manifold, the parts of which are by the side of each other, and which therefore is com- pounded, and, as a real compound, compounded not of accidents (for these could not exist by the side of each other, without a substance), but of substances, it would follow that the simple is a substantial compound, which is self -contradictory. The second proposition of the antithesis, that there 354 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis tion is only an external condition, and that, though we are unable to remove these elementary substances from their state of composition and isolate them, reason must con- ceive them as the first subjects of all composition, and therefore, antecedently to it, as simple beings. Transcendental Dialectic 355 Antithesis exists nowhere in the world anything simple, is not intended to mean more than that the existence [p. 437] of the absolutely simple cannot be proved from any ex- perience or perception, whether external or internal, and that the absolutely simple is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can never be shown in any possible expe- rience, so that in the explanation of phenomena it is with- out any application or object. For, if we assumed that an object of this transcendental idea might be found in expe- rience, the empirical intuition of some one object would have to be such as to contain absolutely nothing manifold by the side of each other, and combined to a unity. But as, from our not being conscious of such a manifold, we cannot form any valid conclusion as to the entire impossi- bility of it in any objective intuition, and as without this no absolute simplicity can be established, it follows that such simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatsoever. As, therefore, an absolutely simple object can never be given in any possible experience, while the world of sense must be looked upon as the sum total of all possible experience, it follows that nothing simple exists in it. This second part of the antithesis goes far beyond the first, which only banished the simple from the intuition of the composite, while the second drives it out of the whole of nature. Hence we could not attempt to prove it out of the concept of any given object of external intuition (of the compound), but from its relation to a possible experi- ence in general. 356 Transcendetital Dialectic Thesis [p. 438] OBSERVATIONS ON THE I On the Thesis If I speak of a whole as necessarily consisting of sepa- rate parts, I understand by it a substantial whole only, as a real compound, that is, that contingent unity of the manifold, which, given as separate (at least in thought), is brought into a mutual connection, and thus constitutes one whole. We ought not to call space a compositum, but a totum, because in it its parts are possible only in the whole, and not the whole by its parts. It might therefore be called a compositum ideale, but not realc. But this is an unnecessary distinction. As space is no compound of substances, not even of real accidents, nothing remains of it, if I remove all composition in it, not even the point, for a point is possible only as the limit of a space, and there- fore of a compound. Space and time do not [p. 440] therefore consist of simple parts. What belongs only to the condition of a substance, even though it possesses quantity (as, for instance, change), does not consist of the simple ; that is to say, a certain degree of change does not arise through the accumulation of many simple changes. We can infer the simple from the compound in self-sub- sisting objects only. Accidents of a state, however, are not self-subsisting. The proof of the necessity of the simple, as the component parts of all that is substantially composite, can therefore easily be injured, if it is extended Transcendental Dialectic 357 Antithesis SECOND ANTINOMY [p- 439] II On the Antithesis Against the theory of the infinite divisibility of matter, the proof of which is mathematical only, objections have been raised by the Motiadists, which become suspicious by their declining to admit the clearest mathematical proofs as founded on a true insight into the quality of space, so far as space is indeed the formal condition of the possi- bility of all matter, but treating them only as conclusions derived from abstract but arbitrary concepts, which ought not to be applied to real things. But how is it possible to conceive a different kind of intuition from that given in the original intuition of space, and how can its determina- tions a priori not apply to everything, since it becomes possible only by its filling that space ? If we were to listen to them, we should have to admit, beside the mathematical point, which is simple, but no part, but only the limit of a space, other physical points, simple like- wise, but possessing this privilege that, as parts of space, they are able, by mere aggregation, to fill space. Without repeating here the many clear refutations of this absurd- ity, it being quite futile to attempt to reason away by purely discursive concepts the evidence of mathematics, I only remark, that if philosophy in this case seems to play tricks with mathematics, it does so because it [p. 441] forgets that in this discussion we are concerned with phe- 358 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis too far, and applied to all compounds without distinction, as has often been the case. I am, however, speaking here of the simple only so far as it is necessarily given in the composite, which can be dissolved into the former, as its component parts. The true meaning of the word Monas (as used by [p. 442] Leibniz) should refer to that simple only, which is given immediately as simple substance (for example in self-con- sciousness), and not as an element of the composite, in which case it is better called an Atonins} As I wish to prove the existence of simple substances, as the elements of the composite only, I might call the thesis^ of the second antinomy transcendental Atomistic. But as this word has long been used as the name of a particular explanation of material phenomena (inoleculae) and pre- supposes, therefore, empirical concepts, it will be better to call it the dialectic principle of monadology. 1 Rosenkranz thinks that atoimis is here used intentionally by Kant as a masculine, to distinguish it from the atomon, translated by scholastic philos- ophers as inseparable, indiscernible, simplex, etc., while with the Greek philos- ophers atomus is feminine. Erdman, however, has shown that Kant has used atomus elsewhere also as masculine. 2 Antithesis is a misprint. Transcendental Dialectic 359 Antithesis no7nena only, and their conditions. Here, however, it is not enough to find for the pure concept, produced by the understanding, of the composite the concept of the simple, but we must find for the intuition of the composite (matter) the intuition of the simple ; and this, according to the laws of sensibility, and therefore with reference to the objects of the senses, is totally impossible. Though it may be true, therefore, with regard to a whole, consisting of sub- stances, which is conceived by the pure understanding only, that before its composition there must be the simple, this does not apply to the totiim sitbstajitialc pJiaenomcnon which, as an empirical intuition in space, carries with it the necessary condition that no part of it is simple, because no part of space is simple. The monadists, however, have been clever enough to try to escape from this difficulty, by not admitting space as a condition of the possibility of the objects of external intuition (bodies), but by presupposing these and the dynamical relation of substances in general as the condition of the possibility of space. But we have no concept of bodies, except as phenomena, and, as such, they presuppose space as the necessary condition of the possibility of all external phenomena. The argument of the monadists, therefore, is futile, and has been sufficiently answered in the transcendental Esthetic. If the bodies were things by themselves, then, and then only, the argu- ment of the monadists would be valid. The second dialectical assertion possesses this [p. 443] peculiarity, that it is opposed by dogmatical assertion which, among all sophistical assertions, is the only one which undertakes to prove palpably in an object of ex- perience the reality of that which we counted before as 26o Transcendental Dialectic Thesis Transcendental Dialectic 361 Antithesis belonging only to transcendental ideas, namely, the abso- lute simplicity of a substance, — I mean the assertion that the object of the internal sense, or the thinking I, is an absolutely simple substance. Without entering upon this question (as it has been fully discussed before), I only remark, that if something is conceived as an object only, without adding any synthetical determination of its intuition (and this is the case in the bare representation of the I), it would no doubt be impossible that anything manifold or composite could be perceived in such a rep- resentation. Besides, as the predicates through which I conceive this object are only intuitions of the internal sense, nothing can occur in them to prove a manifold (one by the side of another), and therefore a real com- position. It follows, therefore, from the nature of self- consciousness that, as the thinking subject is at the same time its own object, it cannot divide itself (though it might divide its inherent determinations) ; for in regard to itself every object is absolute unity. Nevertheless, when this subject is looked upon externally, as an object of intuition, it would most likely exhibit some kind of composition as a phenomenon, and it must always be looked upon in this light, if we wish to know whether its manifold constituent elements are by the side of each other or not. 362 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis [p. 444] THE ANTINOMY THIRD CONFLICT OF THE Thesis Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality from which all the phenomena of the world can be deduced. In order to account for these phenomena it is necessary also to admit another causality, that of freedom. Proof Let us assume that there is no other causality but that according to the laws of nature. In that case everything that takes place, presupposes an anterior state, on which it follows inevitably according to a rule. But that ante- rior state must itself be something which has taken place (which has come to be in time, and did not exist before), because, if it had always existed, its effect too would not have only just arisen, but have existed always. The causality, therefore, of a cause, through which something takes place, is itself an event, which again, according to the law of nature, presupposes an anterior state and its causality, and this again an anterior state, and so on. If, therefore, everything takes place according to mere laws of nature, there will always be a second- [p. 446] ary only, but never a primary beginning, and therefore no completeness of the series, on the side of successive causes. But the law of nature consists in this, that nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently deter- Transcendental Dialectic 363 Antithesis OF PURE REASON [p- 445] TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS Antithesis There is no freedom, but everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of nature. Proof If we admit that there is freedom, in the transcendental sense, as a particular kind of causality, according to which the events in the world could take place, that is a faculty of absolutely originating a state, and with it a series of consequences, it would follow that not only a series would have its absolute beginning through this spontaneity, but the determination of that spontaneity itself to produce the series, that is, the causality, would have an absolute begin- ning, nothing preceding it by which this act is determined according to permanent laws. Every beginning of an act, however, presupposes a state in which the cause is not yet active, and a dynamically primary beginning of an act presupposes a state which has no causal connection with the preceding state of that cause, that is, in no wise follows from it. Transcendental freedom is therefore opposed to the law of causality, and represents such a [p. 447] connection of successive states of effective causes, that no unity of experience is possible with it. It is therefore an empty fiction of the mind, and not to be met with in any experience. 364 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis mined a priori. Therefore the proposition, that all cau- sality is possible according to the laws of nature only, contradicts itself, if taken in unlimited generality, and it is impossible, therefore, to admit that causality as the only one. We must therefore admit another causality, through which something takes place, without its cause being further determined according to necessary laws by a pre- ceding cause, that is, an absolute spontaneity of causes, by which a series of phenomena, proceeding according to natural laws, begins by itself ; we must consequently admit transcendental freedom, without which, even in the course of nature, the series of phenomena on the side of causes, can never be perfect. [p. 448] OBSERVATIONS ON THE I On the Thesis The transcendental idea of freedom is far from forming the whole content of. the psychological concept of that name, which is chiefly empirical, but only that of the absolute spontaneity of action, as the real ground of Tratiscendental Dialectic 365 Antithesis We have, therefore, nothing but naturCy in which we must try to find the connection and order of cosmical events. Freedom (independence) from the laws of nature is no doubt a deliverance from restraint, but also from the guidance of all rules. For we cannot say that,, instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom may enter into the causality of the course of the world, because, if determined by laws, it would not be freedom, but nothing else but nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental freedom differ from each other like legality and lawlessness. The former, no doubt, imposes upon the understanding the difficult task of looking higher and higher for the origin of events in the series of causes, because their causality is always conditioned. In return for this, however, it promises a complete and well-ordered unity of experience ; while, on the other side, the fiction of freedom promises, no doubt, to the enquiring mind, rest in the chain of causes, leading him up to an unconditioned causality, which begins to act by itself, but which, as it is blind itself, tears the thread of rules by which alone a complete and coherent experience is possible. THIRD ANTINOMY [p. 449] II On the Antithesis He who stands up for the omnipotence of nature (tran- scendental physiocracy), in opposition to the doctrine of freedom, would defend his position against the sophistical conclusions of that doctrine in the following manner. If 366 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis imputability ; it is, however, the real stone of offence in the eyes of philosophy, which finds its unsurmountable difficulties in admitting this kind of unconditioned causal- ity. That element in the question of the freedom of the will, which has always so much embarrassed speculative reason, is therefore in reality transcendental only, and refers merely to the question whether we must admit a faculty of spontaneously originating a series of successive things or states. How such a faculty is possible need not be answered, because, with regard to the causality, accord- ing to the laws of nature also, we must be satisfied to know a priori that such a causality has to be admitted, though we can in no wise understand the possibility how, through one existence, the existence of another is given, but must for that purpose appeal to experience alone. The neces- sity of a first beginning of a series of phenomena from freedom has been proved so far only as it is necessary in order to comprehend an origin of the world, while all suc- cessive states may be regarded as a result in succession according to mere laws of nature. But as thus [p. 450] the faculty of originating a series in time by itself has been proved, though by no means understood, it is now permitted also to admit, within the course of the world, different series, beginning by themselves, with regard to . their causality, and to attribute to their substances a fac- ulty of acting with freedom. But we must not allow our- selves to be troubled by a misapprehension, namely that, as every successive series in the world can have only a relatively primary beginning, some other state of things always preceding in the world, therefore no absolutely primary beginning of different series is possible in the Transcendental Dialectic -i^J Antithesis you do not admit something mathematically the first in the world with reference to time, tliere is no necessity zuhy you should look for something dynamically the first with refer- ence to causality. Who has told you to invent an abso- lutely first state of the world, and with it an absolute beginning of the gradually progressing series of phenom- ena, and to set limits to unlimited nature in order to give to your imagination something to rest on ? As substances have always existed in the world, or as the unity of expe- rience renders at least such a supposition necessary, there is no difficulty in assuming that a change of their states, that is, a series of their changes, has always existed also, so that there is no necessity for looking for a first begin- ning either mathematically or dynamically. It is true we cannot render the possibility of such an infinite descent comprehensible without the first member to which every- thing else is subsequent. But, if for this reason you reject this riddle of nature, you will feel yourselves constrained to reject many synthetical fundamental properties (natural forces), which you cannot comprehend any more, nay, the very possibility of change in general would be [p. 451] full of difficulties. For if you did not know from expe- rience that change exists, you would never be able to con- ceive a priori how such a constant succession of being and not being is possible. And, even if the transcendental faculty of freedom might somehow be conceded to start the changes of the world, such faculty would at all events have to be outside the world (though it would always remain a bold assump- tion to admit, outside the sum total of all possible intui- tions, an object that cannot be given in any possible 368 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis course of the world. For we are speaking here of the absolutely first beginning, not according to time, but according to causality. If, for instance, at this moment I rise from my chair with perfect freedom, without the necessary determining influence of natural causes, a new series has its absolute beginning in this event, with all its natural consequences ad infinitum, although, with regard to time, this event is only the continuation of a preceding series. For this determination and this act do not belong to the succession of merely natural effects, nor are they a mere continuation of them, but the determining natural causes completely stop before it, so far as this event is concerned, which no doubt follows them, and does not result from them, and may therefore be called an abso- lutely first beginning in a series of phenomena, not with reference to time, but with reference to causality. This requirement of reason to appeal in the series of natural causes to a first and free beginning is fully con- firmed if we see that, with the exception of the Epicu- rean school, all philosophers of antiquity have felt themselves obliged to admit, for the sake of explaining all cosmical movements, a prime mover, that is, a freely acting cause which, first and by itself, started this series of states. They did not attempt to make a first be- ginning comprehensible by an appeal to nature only. Transcendental Dialectic 369 Antithesis experience). But to attribute in the world itself a faculty to substances can never be allowed, because in that case the connection of phenomena determining each other by necessity and according to general laws, which we call nature, and with it the test of empirical truth, which dis- tinguishes experience from dreams, would almost entirely disappear. For by the side of such a lawless faculty of freedom, nature could hardly be conceived any longer, because the laws of the latter would be constantly changed through the influence of the former, and the play of phenomena which, according to nature, is regular and uniform, would become confused and incoherent. 370 Transcendefttal Dialectic Thesis [p. 452] THE ANTINOMY FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE Thesis There exists an absolutely necessary Being belonging to the world, either as a part or as a cause of it. Proof The world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a series of changes without which even the representation of a series of time, which forms the con- dition of the possibility of the world of sense, would not be given us.^ But every change has its condition which precedes it in time, and renders it necessary. Now, everything that is given as conditional presup- poses, with regard to its existence, a complete series of conditions, leading up to that which is entirely uncon- ditioned, and alone absolutely necessary. Something absolutely necessary therefore must exist, if there exists a change as its consequence. And this absolutely necessary belongs itself to the world of sense. For if we sup- posed that it existed outside that world, then the series of changes in the world would derive its origin from it, while the necessary cause itself would not be- [p. 454] long to the world of sense. But this is impossible. For ^ As formal condition of the possibility of changes, time is no doubt objec- tively prior to them (read dissen instead of disser') ; subjectively, however, and in the reality of our consciousness the representation of time, like every other, is occasioned solely by perceptions. Transcendental Dialectic 371 Antithesis OF PURE REASON [p- 4S3j TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS Antithesis There nowhere exists an absolutely necessary Being, either within or without the world, as the cause of it. Proof If we supposed that the world itself is a necessary being, or that a necessary being exists in it, there would then be in the series of changes either a beginning, un- conditionally necessary, and therefore without a cause, which contradicts the dynamical law of the determina- tion of all phenomena in time ; or the series itself would be without any beginning, and though contingent and con- ditioned in all its parts, yet entirely necessary and uncon- ditioned as a whole. This would be self-contradictory, because the existence of a multitude cannot be necessary, if no single part of it possesses necessary existence. If we supposed, on the contrary, that there exists an absolutely necessary cause of the world, outside the world, then that cause, as the highest member [p. 455] in the series of causes of cosmical changes, would begin the existence of the latter and their series.^ In that case, however, that cause would have to begin to act, and 1 The word to begin is used in two senses. The first is active when the cause begins, or starts (infit), a. series of states as its effect. The second is passive (or neuter) when the causality begins in the cause itself (fit). I reason here from the former to the latter meaning. 372 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis as the beginning of a temporal series can be determined only by that which precedes it in time, it follows that the highest condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the time when that series was not yet (be- cause the beginning is an existence, preceded by a time in which the thing which begins was not yet). Hence the causality of the necessary cause of changes and that cause itself belong to time and therefore to phenomena (in which alone time, as their form, is possible), and it cannot therefore be conceived as separated from the world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena. It follows, therefore, that something absolutely necessary is contained in the world, whether it be the whole cosmical series itself, or only a part of it. [p. 456] OBSERVATIONS ON THE I On the Thesis In order to prove the existence of a necessary Being, I ought not, in this place, to use any but the cosmological argument, which ascends from what is conditioned in the phenomena to what is unconditioned in concept, that being considered as the necessary condition of the abso- lute totality of the series. To undertake that proof from the mere idea of a Supreme Being belongs to another principle of reason, and will have to be treated separately. The pure cosmological proof cannot establish the ex- istence of a necessary Being, without leaving it open, Transcendental Dialectic 373 Antithesis its causality would belong to time, and therefore to the sum total of phenomena. It would belong to the world, and would therefore not be outside the world, which is contrary to our supposition. Therefore, neither in the world, nor outside the world (yet in causal connection with it), does there exist anywhere an absolutely necessary Being. FOURTH ANTINOMY [p- 4S7] II On the Antithesis If, in ascending the series of phenomena, we imagine we meet with difficulties militating against the existence of an absolutely necessary supreme cause, such difficulties ought not to be derived from mere concepts of the neces- sary existence of a thing in general. They ought not to be ontological, but ought to arise from the causal connec- tion with a series of phenomena for which a condition is required which is itself unconditioned, that is, they ought to be cosmological, and dependent on empirical laws. It must be shown that our ascending in the series of causes 374 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis whether that Being be the world itself, or a Being distinct from it. In order to settle this question, principles are required which are no longer cosmological, and do not proceed in the series of phenomena. We should have to introduce concepts of contingent beings in general (so far as they are considered as objects of the under- standing only), and also a principle according to which we might connect them, by means of concepts only, with a necessary Being. All this belongs to a tran- [p. 458] scendent philosophy, for which this is not yet the place. If, however, we once begin our proof cosmologically, taking for our foundation the series of phenomena, and the regressus in it, according to the empirical laws of causality, we cannot afterwards suddenly leave this line of argument and pass over to something which does not belong as a member to this series. For the condition must be taken in the same meaning in which the rela- tion of the condition to that condition was taken in the series which, by continuous progress, was to lead to that highest condition. If therefore that relation is sensuous and intended for a possible empirical use of the under- standing, the highest condition or cause can close the regressus according to the laws of sensibility only, and therefore as belonging to that temporal series itself. The necessary Being must therefore be regarded as the highest member of the cosmical series. Nevertheless, certain philosophers have taken the liberty of making such a salto (/ttera/Sacrt? et? aX\o 7eVo9). From the changes in the world they concluded their empirical contingency, that is, their dependence on empirically de- termining causes, and they thus arrived at an ascend- Transcendental Dialectic 375 Antithesis (in the world of sense) can never end with a condition empirically unconditioned, and that the cosmological argu- ment, based on the contingency of cosmical states, as proved by their changes, ends in a verdict against the admission of a first cause, absolutely originating the whole series A curious contrast however meets us in this [p. 459] antinomy. From the same ground on which, in the thesis, the existence of an original Being was proved, its non- existence is proved in the antithesis with equal stringency. We were first told, that a necessary Being exists, because the whole of time past comprehends the series of all con- ditions, and with it also the unconditioned (the necessary). We are now told tliere is no necessary Being, for the very reason that the whole of past time comprehends the series of all conditions (which therefore altogether are them- selves conditioned). The explanation is this. The first argument regards only the absolute totality of the series of conditions determining each other in time, and thus arrives at something unconditioned and necessary. The second, on the contrary, regards the contingency of all that is determined in the temporal series (everything being pre- ceded by a time in which the condition itself must again be determined as conditioned), in which case everything unconditioned, and every absolute necessity, [p.. 461] must absolutely vanish. In both, the manner of conclud- ing is quite in conformity with ordinary human reason, which frequently comes into conflict with itself, from con- sidering its object from two different points of view. Herr von Mairan considered the controversy between two famous astronomers, which arose from a similar difficulty. 376 Transcendental Dialectic Thesis ing series of empirical conditions. This was quite right. As, however, in this way they could not find a first be- ginning, or any highest member, they suddenly left the empirical concept of contingency, and took to the pure category. This led to a purely intelligible series, the completeness of which depended on the existence of an absolutely necessary cause, which cause, as no longer subject to any sensuous conditions, was freed also from the temporal condition of itself beginning its causality. Such a proceeding is entirely illegitimate, as may be" seen from what follows. In the pure sense of the category we call contingent that the contradictory opposite of which is possible. Now we cannot conclude that intelHgible contingency from empirical contingency. Of what is being [p. 460] changed we may say that the opposite (of its state) is real, and therefore possible also at another time. But this is not the contradictory opposite of the preceding state. In order to establish that, it is necessary that, at the same time, when the previous state existed, its oppo- site could have existed in its place, and this can never be concluded from change. A body, for instance, which, when in motion, was A, comes to be, when at rest, = non A. From the fact that the state opposite to the state A follows upon it, we can in no wise conclude that the con- tradictory opposite of A is possible, and therefore A con- tingent only. In order to establish this, it would be necessary to prove that, at the same time when there was motion, there might have been, instead of it, rest. But we know no more than that, at a subsequent time, such rest was real, and therefore possible also. Motion at one Transcendental Dialectic 377 Antithesis as to the choice of the true standpoint, as something sufficiently important to write a separate treatise on it. The one reasoned thus, the moon revolves on its own axis, because it always turns the same side towards the earth. The other concluded, the moon does not revolve on its oivn axis, because it always turns the same side towards the earth. Both conclusions were correct, according to the point of view from which one chose to consider the motion of the moon. lyS Transcendental Dialectic Thesis time, and rest at another, are not contradictory opposites. Therefore the succession of opposite determinations, that is, change, in no way proves contingency, according to the concepts of the pure understanding, and can there- fore never lead us on to the existence of a necessary Being, according to the pure concepts of the under- standing. Change proves empirical contingency only; it proves that the new state could not have taken place according to the law of causality by itself, and without a cause belonging to a previous time. This cause, even if it is considered as absolutely necessary, must, as we see, exist in time, and belong to the series of phenomena. Transcendental Dialectic 370 THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON [p. 462] Section III Of the Interest of Reason in these Conflicts We have thus watched the whole dialectical play of the cosmological ideas, and have seen that they do not even admit of any adequate object being supplied to them in any possible experience, nay, not even of reason treat- ing them in accordance with the general laws of experi- ence. Nevertheless these ideas are not arbitrary fictions, but reason in the continuous progress of empirical syn- thesis is necessarily led on to them, whenever it wants to free what, according to the rules of experience, can be determined as conditioned only, from all conditions, and comprehend it in its unconditioned totality. These rationalising or dialectical assertions are so many attempts at solving four perfectly natural and inevitable problems of reason. There cannot be either more or less of them, because there are neither more nor less series of synthet- ical hypotheses, which limit empirical synthesis a priori. We have represented the brilliant pretensions of reason, extending its domain beyond all the limits of experience, in dry formulas only, containing nothing but the grounds of its claims ; and, as it befits transcendental [p. 463] philosophy, divested them of everything empirical, al- though it is only in connection with this that the whole splendour of the assertions of reason can be fully seen. In their application, and in the progressive extension of the employment of reason, beginning from the field of experience, and gradually soaring up to those sublime 380 Transcendental Dialectic ideas, philosophy displays a grandeur which, if it could only establish its pretensions, would leave all other kinds of human knowledge far behind, promising to us a safe foundation for our highest expectations and hopes for the attainment of the highest aims, towards which all the exertions of reason must finally converge. The ques- tions, whether the world has a beginning and any hmit of its extension in space ; whether there is anywhere, and it may be in my own thinking self, an indivisible and indestructible unity, or whether there exists nothing but what is divisible and perishable ; whether in my acts I am free, or, like other beings, led by the hand of nature and of fate ; whether, finally, there exists a supreme cause of the world, or whether the objects of nature and their order form the last object which we can reach in all our speculations, — these are questions for the solution of which the mathematician would gladly sacri- fice the whole of his science, which cannot give him any satisfaction with regard to the highest and dearest as- pirations of mankind. Even the true dignity and worth of mathematics, that pride of human reason, rest [p. 464] on this, that they teach reason how to understand nature in what is great and what is small in her, in her order and regularity, and likewise in the admirable unity of her moving powers, far above all expectations of a philos- ophy restricted to common experience, and thus encour- age reason to extend its use far beyond experience, nay, supply philosophy with the best materials intended to support its investigations, so far as their nature admits of it, by adequate intuitions. Unfortunately for mere speculation (but fortunately perhaps for the practical destinies of men), reason, in the Transcendental Dialectic 381 very midst of her highest expectations, finds herself so hemmed in by a press of reasons and counter reasons, that, as neither her honour nor her safety admit of her retreating and becoming an indifferent spectator of what might be called a mere passage of arms, still less of her commanding peace in a strife in which she is herself deeply interested, nothing remains to her but to reflect on the origin of this conflict, in order to find out whether it may not have arisen from a mere misunderstanding. After such an enquiry proud claims would no [p. 465] doubt have to be surrendered on both sides, but a per- manent and tranquil rule of reason over the understand- ing and the senses might then be inaugurated. For the present we shall defer this thorough enquiry, in order to consider which side we should like to take, if it should become necessary to take sides at all. As in this case we do not consult the logical test of truth, but only our own interest, such an enquiry, though settling nothing as to the contested rights of both parties, will have this advantage, that it makes us understand why those who take part in this contest embrace one rather than the other side, without being guided by any special insight into the subject. It may also explain some other things, as, for instance, the zelotic heat of the one and the calm assurance of the other party, and why the world greets one party with rapturous applause, and entertains towards the other an irreconcileable prejudice. There is something which in this preliminary enquiry determines the right point of view, from which alone it can be carried on with proper completeness, and this is the comparison of the principles from which both parties start. If we look at the propositions of the antithesis, 382 Transcendental Dialectic we shall find in it a perfect uniformity in the mode of thought and a complete unity of principle, [p. 466] namely, the principle of pure empiricism, not only in the explanation of the phenomena of the world, but also in the solution of the transcendental ideas of the cosmical universe itself. The propositions of the thesis, on the contrary, rest not only on the empirical explanation within the series of phenomena, but likewise on intelli- gible beginnings, and its maxim is therefore not simple. With regard to its essential and distinguishing character- istic, I shall call it the dogmatism of pure reason. On the side of dogmatism we find in the determination of the cosmological ideas, or in the Thesis : — First, A certain practical interest, which every right- thinking man, if he knows his true interests, will heartily share. That the world has a beginning ; that my think- ing self is of a simple and therefore indestructible nature ; that the same self is free in all his voluntary actions, and raised above the compulsion of nature ; that, finally, the whole order of things, or the world, derives its origin from an original Being, whence everything receives both unity and purposeful connection — these are so many foundation stones on which morals and religion are built up. The antithesis robs us, or seems to rob us, of all these sup- ports. Secondly, Reason has a certain speculative interest on the same side. For, if we take and employ the tran- scendental ideas as they are in the thesis, one may quite «/;w;7' grasp the whole chain of conditions and [p. 467] comprehend the derivation of the conditioned by begin- ning with the unconditioned. This cannot be done by the antithesis, which presents itself in a very unfavourable Transcendental Dialectic 383 light, because it cannot return to tlie question as to the conditions of its synthesis any answer which does not lead to constantly new questions. According to it one has always to ascend from a given beginning to a higher one, every part leads always to -a still smaller part, every event has always before it another event as its cause, and the conditions of existence in general always rest on others, without ever receiving unconditioned strength and support from a self-subsisting thing, as the original Being. Thirdly, This side has also the advantage of popularity, which is by no means its smallest recommendation. The common understanding does not see the smallest difficulty in the idea of the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis, being accustomed rather to descend to consequences, than to ascend to causes. It finds comfort in the ideas of the absolutely first (the possibility of which does not trouble it), and at the same time a firm point to which the leading strings of its life may be attached, while there is no pleas- ure in a restless ascent from condition to condition, and keeping one foot always in the air. On the side of empiricism, so far as it deter- [p. 468] mines the cosmological ideas, or the antithesis, there is : — First, No such practical interest, arising from the pure principles of reason, as morality and religion possess. On the contrary, empiricism seems to deprive both of their power and influence. If there is no original Being, different from the world ; if the world is without a be- ginning, and therefore without a Creator ; if our will is not free, and our soul shares the same divisibility and perishableness with matter, moral ideas also and principles 384 Transcendental Dialectic lose all validity, and fall with the transcendental ideas, which formed their theoretic support. But, on the other side, empiricism offers advantages to the speculative interests of reason, which are very- tempting, and far exceed, those which the dogmatical teacher can promise. With the empiricist the under- standing is always on its own proper ground, namely, the field of all possible experience, the laws of which may be investigated and serve to enlarge certain and intelligible knowledge without end. Here every object can and ought to be represented to intuition, both in itself and in its relations, or at least in concepts, the images of which can be clearly and distinctly represented in given similar intuitions. Not only is there no necessity for leaving the chain of the order of nature in order to lay hold of ideas, the objects of which are not known, [p. 469] because, as mere products of thought, they can never be given, but the understanding is not even allowed to leave its proper business and, under pretence of its being finished, to cross into the domain of idealising reason and transcen- dental concepts, where it need no longer observe and in- vestigate according to the laws of nature, but only tliink and dream, without any risk of being contradicted by the facts of nature, not being bound by their evidence, but justified in passing them by, or in even subordinating them to a higher authority, namely, that of pure reason. Hence the empiricist will never allow that any epoch of nature should be considered as the absolutely first, or any limit of his vision into the extent of nature should be con- sidered as the last. He will not approve of a transition from the objects of nature, which he can analyse by observation and mathematics and determine synthetically Transcendental Dialectic 385 in intuition (the extended), to those which neither sense nor imagination can ever represent in concreto (the sim- ple) ; nor will he concede that a faculty be presupposed, even in nature, to act independent of the laws of nature (freedom), thus narrowing the operations of the under- standing in investigating, according to the necessary rules, the origin of phenomena. Lastly, he will never tolerate that the cause of anything should be [p. 470] looked for anywhere outside of nature (in the original Being), because we know nothing but nature, which alone can offer us objects and instruct us as to their laws. If the empirical philosopher had no other purpose with his antithesis but to put down the rashness and presump- tion of reason in mistaking her true purpose, while boasting of insight and knowledge, where insight and knowledge come to an end, nay, while representing, what might have been allowed to pass on account of practical interests, as a real advancement of speculative enquiry, in order, when it is so disposed, either to tear the thread of physical enquiry, or to fasten it, under the pretence of enlarging our knowledge, to those transcendental ideas, which really teach us only that we know nothing ; if, I say, the em- piricist were satisfied with this, then his principle would only serve to teach moderation in claims, modesty in assertions, and encourage the greatest possible enlarge- ment of our understanding through the true teacher given to us, namely, experience. For in such a case we should not be deprived of our own intellectual presump- tions or of our faith in their influence on our practical interests. They would only have lost the pompous titles of science and rational insight, because true [p. 471] speculative kttoivledge can never have any other object 2C 386 Transcendental Dialectic but experience ; and, if we transcend its limits, our syn- thesis, which attempts new kinds of knowledge indepen- dent of experience, lacks that substratum of intuition to which alone it could be applied. As it is, empiricism becomes often itself dogmatical with regard to ideas, and boldly denies what goes beyond the sphere of its intuitive knowledge, and thus becomes guilty itself of a want of modesty, which here is all the more reprehensible, because an irreparable injury is thereby inflicted on the practical interests of reason. This constitutes the opposition of Epicureanism ^ to Platonis-m. Either party says more than it knows ; but, [p. 472] while the former encourages and advances knowledge, although at the expense of practical interests, the latter supplies excellent practical principles, but with regard to everything of which speculative knowledge is open to us, it allows reason to indulge in ideal explanations of natural phenomena and to neglect physical investigation. With regard to the third point which has to be con- ^ It is, however, doubtful whether Epicurus did ever teach these principles as objective assertions. If he meant them to be no more than maxims for the speculative use of reason, he would have shown thereby a truer philosophical spirit than any of the philosophers on antiquity. The principles that in ex- plaining phenomena we must proceed as if the field of investigation were enclosed by no limit or beginning of the world; that the material of the world should be accepted as it must be, if we want to learn anything about it from experience ; that there is no origination of events except as determined by invariable laws of nature; and, lastly, that we must not appeal to a cause distinct from the world, all these are still perfectly true, though seldom ob- served in enlarging the field of speculative philosophy, or in discovering the principles of moraUty, independently of foreign aid. It is not permissible that those who wish only to ignore those dogmatical propositions, while still engaged in mere speculation, should be accused of wishing to deny them. Transcendental Dialectic 387 sidered in a preliminary choice between the two opposite parties, it is very strange that empiricism should be so unpopular, though it might be supposed that the common understanding would readily accept a theory which prom- ises to satisfy it by experimental knowledge and its ra- tional connection, while transcendental dogmatism forces it to ascend to concepts which far surpass the insight and rational faculties of the most practised thinkers. But here is the real motive; — the man of ordinary [p. 473] understanding is so placed thereby that even the most learned can claim no advantage over him. If he knows little or nothing, no one can boast of knowing much more, and though he may not be able to employ such scholastic terms as others, he can argue and subtilise infinitely more, because he moves about among mere ideas, about which it is easy to be eloquent, because no one knows anything about them. The same person would have to be entirely silent, or would have to confess his ignorance with regard to sci- entific enquiries into nature. Indolence, therefore, and vanity are strongly in favour of those principles. Besides, although a true philosopher finds it extrernely hard to accept the principle of which he can give no reasonable account, still more to introduce concepts the objective reality of which cannot be established, nothing comes more natural to the common understanding that wants something with which it can operate securely. The difficulty of comprehending such a supposition does not disquiet a person of common understanding, because not knowing what comprehending really means, it never enters into his mind, and he takes everything for known that has become familiar to him by frequent use. At last all specu- lative interest disappears before the practical, and he 388 Transcendental Dialectic imagines that he understands and knows what his fears and hopes impel him to accept or to believe. Thus the empiricism of a transcendentally idealising reason [p. 474] loses all popularity and, however prejudicial it may be to the highest practical principles, there is no reason to fear that it will ever pass the limits of the school and obtain in the commonwealth any considerable authority, or any favour with the multitude. Human reason is by its nature architectonic, and looks upon all knowledge as belonging to a possible system. It therefore allows such principles only which do not render existing knowledge incapable of being associated with other knowledge in some kind of system. The propositions of the antithesis, however, are of such a character that they render the completion of any system of knowledge quite impossible. According to them there is always beyond every state of the world, an older state ; in every part, other and again divisible parts ; before every event, another event which again is produced from else- where, and everything in existence is conditioned, without an unconditioned and first existence anywhere. As there- fore the antithesis allows of nothing that is first, and of no beginning which could serve as the foundation of an edifice, such an edifice of knowledge is entirely impossible with such premisses. Hence the architectonic interest of reason (which demands not empirical, but pure [p. 475] rational unity a priori) serves as a natural recommendation of the propositions of the thesis. But if men could free themselves from all such interests, and consider the assertions of reason, unconcerned about their consequences, according to the value of their argu- ments only, they would find themselves, if they knew of Transcendental Dialectic 389 no escape from the press except adhesion to one or the other of the opposite doctrines, in a state of constant oscillation. To-day they would be convinced that the human will is free ; to-morrow, when considering the indissoluble chain of nature, they would think that free- dom is nothing but self-deception, and nature all in all. When afterwards they come to act, this play of purely speculative reason would vanish like the shadows of a dream, and they would choose their principles according to practical interests only.' But, as it well befits a reflect- ing and enquiring being to devote a certain time entirely to the examination of his own reason, divesting himself of all partiality, and then to publish his observations for the judgment of others, no one ought to be blamed, still less be prevented, if he wishes to produce the thesis [p. 476] as well as the antithesis, so that they may defend them- selves, terrified by no menace, before a jury of his peers, that is, before a jury of weak mortals. THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON Section IV Of the Transcendental Problems of Pure Reason, and the Absolute Necessity of their Solution To attempt to solve all problems, and answer all ques- tions, would be impudent boasting, and so extravagant a self-conceit, that it would forfeit all confidence. Never- theless there are sciences the very nature of which requires that every question which can occur in them should be answerable at once from what is known, because the answer must arise from the same sources from which the 390 Transcendental Dialectic question springs. Here it is not allowed to plead inevita- ble ignorance, but a solution can be demanded. We must be able, for instance, to know, according to a rule, what in every possible case is riglit or wrong, because this touches our obligation, and we cannot have any obligation to that which we cannot know. In the explanation, [p. 477] however, of the phenomena of nature, many things must remain uncertain, and many a question insoluble, because what we know of nature is by no means sufficient, in all cases, to explain what has to be explained. It has now to be considered, whether there exists in transcendental phi- losophy any question relating to any object of reason which, by that pure reason, is unanswerable, and whether we have a right to decline its decisive answer by treating the object as absolutely uncertain (from all that we are able to know), and as belonging to that class of objects of which we may form a sufficient conception for starting a question, without having the power or means of ever answering it. Now I maintain that transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity among all speculative knowledge, that no ques- tion, referring to an object of pure reason, can be insoluble for the same human reason ; and that no excuse of inevita- ble ignorance on our side, or of unfathomable depth on the side of the problem, can release us from the obligation to answer it thoroughly and completely ; because the same concept, which enables us to ask the question, must qualify us to answer it, considering that, as in the case of right and wrong, the object itself does not exist, except in the concept. There are, however, in transcendental philoso- [p. 478] I phy no other questions but the cosmological, with regard Transcendental Dialectic 391 to which we have a right to demand a satisfactory answer, touching the quality of the object ; nor is the philosopher allowed here to decline an answer by pleading impenetra- ble obscurity. (^ These questions can refer to cosmological ideas only, because the object must be given empirically, and the question only refers to the adequateness of it to an idea. 'j If the object is transcendental and therefore itself unknown, as, for instance, whether that something the phenomenal appearance of which (within ourselves) is the thinking (soul), be in itself a simple being, whether there be an absolutely necessary cause of all things, etc., we are asked to find an object for our idea of which we may well confess that it is unknown to us, though not therefore impossible.^ The cosmological ideas alone pos- sess this peculiarity that they may presuppose [p. 479] their object, and the empirical synthesis required for the object, as given, and the question which they suggest refers only to the progress of that synthesis, so far as it is to contain absolute totality, such absolute totality being no longer empirical, because it cannot be given in any experience. As we are here concerned solely with a thing, as an object of possible experience, not as a thing ^ Though we cannot answer the question, what kind of quality a transcen- dental object may possess, or what it is, we are well able to answer that the question itself is nothing, because it is without an object. All questions, there- fore, of transcendental psychology are answerable, and have been answered, for they refer to the transcendental subject of all internal phenomena, which itself is not phenomenal, and noi given as an object, and possesses none of the conditions which make any of the categories (and it is to them that the ques- tion really refers) applicable to it. We have, therefore, here a case where the common saying applies, that no answer is as good as an answer, that is, that the question regarding the quality of something which cannot be conceived by any definite predicates, being completely beyond the sphere of objects, is entirely null and void. 392 Transcendental Dialectic by itself, it is impossible that the answer of the transcen- dent cosmological question can be anywhere but in the idea, because it refers to no object by itself; and in respect to possible experience we do not ask for that which can be given in concreto in any experience, but for that which lies in the idea, to which the empirical synthe- sis can no more than approach. Hence that question can be solved from the idea only, and being a mere creation of reason, reason cannot decline her responsibility and put it on the unknown object. It is in reality not so strange as it may seem [p. 480] at first, that a science should demand and expect definite answers to all the questions belonging to it {qiiaestiones domesticae), although at present these answers have not yet been discovered. There are, in addition to transcen- dental philosophy, two other sciences of pure reason, the one speculative, the other practical, pure mathematics, and pure ethics. Has it ever been alleged that, it may be on account of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, it must remain uncertain what exact relation the diameter bears to a circle, in rational or irrational numbers.? As by the former the 'relation cannot be expressed ade- quately, and by the latter has not yet been discovered, it was judged rightly that the impossibility at least of the solution of such a problem can be known with cer- tainty, and Lambert gave even a demonstration of this. In the general principles of morality there can be noth- ing uncertain, because its maxims are either entirely null and void, or derived from our own rational concepts only. In natural science, on the contrary, we have an infinity of conjectures with regard to which certainty can never be expected, because natural phenomena are objects criven Transcendental Dialectic 393 to us independent of our concepts, and the key to them cannot be found within our own mind, but in the world outside us. For that reason it cannot in many cases be found at all, and a satisfactory answer must not be expected. The questions of the transcendental [p. 481 J Analytic, referring to the deduction of our pure know- ledge, do not belong to this class, because we are treating at present of the certainty of judgments with reference to their objects only, and not with reference to the origin of our concepts themselves. We shall not, therefore, be justified in evading the obli- gation of a critical solution, at least of the questions of reason, by complaints on the narrow limits of our reason, and by confessing, under the veil of humble self-know- ledge, that it goes beyond the powers of our reason to determine whether the world has existed from eternity, or has had a beginning ; whether cosmical space is filled with beings ad infinitum, or enclosed within certain limits ; whether anything in the world is simple, or everything can be infinitely divided ; lastly, whether there is a Being entirely unconditioned and necessary in itself, or whether the existence of everything is conditioned, and therefore externally dependent, and in itself contin- gent. For all these questions refer to an object which can be found nowhere except in our own thoughts, namely, the absolutely unconditioned totality of the syn- thesis of phenomena. If we are not able to say and establish anything certain about this from our own con- cepts, we must not throw the blame on the [p. 482] object itself as obscure, because such an object (being nowhere to be found, except in our ideas) can never be given to us ; but we must look for the real cause of 394 Transcendental Dialectic obscurity in our idea itself, which is a problem admit- ting of no solution, though we insist obstinately that a real object must correspond to it. A clear explanation of the dialectic within our own concept, would soon show us, with perfect certainty, how we ought to judge with reference to such a question. If people put forward a pretext of being unable to arrive at certainty with regard to these problems, the first question which we ought to address to them, and which they ought to answer clearly, is this. Whence do you get those ideas, the solution of which involves you j in such difficulty .? Are they phenomena, of which you require an explanation, and of which you have only to find, in accordance with those ideas, the principles, or the rule of their explanation .'' Suppose the whole of nature were spread out before you, and nothing were hid to your senses and to the consciousness of all that is presented to your intuition, yet you would never be able to know by one single experience the object of your ideas in concrete (because, in addition to that complete intuition, what is required is a completed synthesis, and the consciousness of its absolute totality, which [p. 483] is impossible by any empirical knowledge). Hence your question can never be provoked for the sake of explain- ing any given phenomenon, and as it were suggested by the object itself. Such an object can never come before you, because it can never be given by any possible expe- rience. In all possible perceptions you always remain under the sway of conditions, whether in space or in time ; you never come face to face with anything uncon- ditioned, in order thus to determine whether the uncon- ditioned exists in an absolute beginning of the synthesis, Transcendental Dialectic 395 or in an absolute totality of the series without any begin- ning. The whole, in its empirical meaning, is always relative only. The absolute whole of quantity (the uni- verse), of division, of origination, and of the condition of existence in general, with all the attendant questions as to whether it can be realised by a finite synthesis or by a synthesis to be carried on ad infinitum, has nothing to do with any possible experience. You would, for instance, never be able to explain the phenomena of a body in the least better, or even differently, whether you assume that it consists of simple or throughout of composite parts : for neither a simple phenomenon, nor an infinite composition can ever meet your senses. Phe- nomena require to be explained so far only as the condi- tions of their explanation are given in perception ; but whatever may exist in them, if comprehended [p. 484] as an absolute whole, can^ never be a perception. Yet it is this very whole the explanation of which is required in the transcendental problems of reason. As therefore the solution of these problems can never be supplied by experience, you cannot say that it is un- certain what ought to be predicated of the object. For your object is in your brain only, and cannot possibly exist outside it ; so that you have only to take care to be at one with yourselves, and to avoid the amphiboly, which changes your idea into a pretended representation of an object empirically given, and therefore to be known according to the laws of experience. The dogmatical solution is therefore not only uncertain, but impossible ; while the critical solution, which may become perfectly 1 Read keine in original, not eine. 396 Transcendental Dialectic certain, does not consider the question objectively, but only with reference to the foundation of the knowledge on which it is based. THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON [p. 485] Section V Sceptical Representation of the Cosmological Questions in the Four Transcendental Ideas We should no doubt gladly desist from wishing to have our questions answered dogmatically, if we understood beforehand that, whatever the answer might be, it would only increase our ignorance, and throw us from one incom- prehensibility into another, from one obscurity into a still greater obscurity, or it may be even into contradictions. If our question can only be answered by yes or no, it would seem to be prudent to take no account at first of the probable grounds of the answer, but to consider before, what we should gain, if the answer was yes, and what, if the answer was no. If we should find that in either case nothing comes of it but mere nonsense, we are surely called upon to examine our question critically, and to see whether it does not rest on a groundless sup- position, playing only with an idea which betrays its fal- sity in its application and its consequences better than when represented by itself. This is the great advantage of the sceptical treatment of questions which [p. 486] pure reason puts to pure reason. We get rid by it, with a little effort, of a great amount of dogmatical rubbish, in order to put in its place sober criticism which, as a true cathartic, removes successfully all illusion with its train of omniscience. Transcendental Dialectic 397 If, therefore, I could know beforehand that a cosmo- logical idea, in whatever way it might try to realise the unconditioned of the regressive synthesis of phenomena (whether in the manner of the thesis or in that of tie antithesis), that, I say, the cosmological idea would always be either too large or too small for any concept of the under- standing, I should understand that, as that cosmological idea refers only to an object of experience which is to correspond to a possible concept of the understanding, it must be empty and without meaning, because the object does not fit into it, whatever I may do to adapt it. And this must really be the case with all cosmical concepts, which on that very account involve reason, so long as it remains attached to them, in inevitable antinomy. For suppose : — First, That the world has no beginning, and you will find that it is too large for your concept, which, as it consists in a successive regressus, can never reach the whole of past eternity. Or, suppose, that the world has a beginning, then it is again too small for the concept of your understanding engaged in the necessary empiri- cal regressus. For as a beginning always pre- [p. 487] supposes a time preceding, it is not yet unconditioned ; and the law of the empirical use of the understanding obliges you to look for a higher condition of time, so that, with reference to such a law, the world (as limited in time) is clearly too small. The same applies to the twofold answer to the question regarding the extent of the world in space. For if it is infinite and unlimited, it is too large for every possible empirical concept. If it is finite and limited, you have a perfect right to ask what determines that limit. Empty 398 Transcendental Dialectic space is not an independent correlate of things, and can- not be a final condition, still less an empirical condition forming a part of a possible experience ; — for how can tl^re be experience of what is absolutely void ? But, in order to produce an absolute totality in an empirical syn- thesis, it is always requisite that the unconditioned should be an empirical concept. Thus it follows that a limited world would be too small for your concept. Secondly, If every phenomenon in space (matter) con- sists of an infinite number of parts, the regressus of a division will always be too large for your concept, while if the division of space is to stop at any member (the simple), it would be too small for the idea of the uncondi- tioned, because that member always admits of a regres- sus to more parts contained in it. [p. 488] Thirdly, If you suppose that everything that happens in the world is nothing but the restilt of the laws of nature, the causality of the cause will always be some- thing that happens, and that necessitates a regressus to a still higher cause, and therefore a continuation of the series of conditions a parte prioiH without end. Mere active nature, therefore, is too large for any concept in the synthesis of cosmical events. If you admit, on the contrary, spontaneously produced events, therefore generation from freedom, you have still, according to an inevitable law of nature, to ask why, and you are forced by the empirical law of causality beyond that point, so that you find that any such totality of con- nection is too small for your necessary empirical concept. Fourthly, If you admit an absolutely necessary Being (whether it be the world itself or something in the world, or the cause of the world), you place it at a time infinitely Transcendental Dialectic 399 remote from any given point of time, because otherwise it would be dependent on another and antecedent exist- ence. In that case, however, such an existence would be unapproachable by your empirical concept, and too large even to be reached by any continued regressus. But if, according to your opinion, everything [p. 489] which belongs to the world (whether as conditioned or as condition) is contingent, then every given existence is too small for your concept, because compelling you to look still for another existence, on which it depends. We have said that in all these cases, the cosinical idea is either too large or too small for the empirical regressus, and therefore for every possible concept of the under- standing. But why did we not take the opposite view and say that in the former case the empirical concept is always too small for the idea, and in the latter too large, so that blame should attach to the empirical regressus, and not to the cosmological idea, which we accused of deviating from its object, namely, possible experience, either by its too-much or its too-little .' The reason was this. It is possible experience alone that can impart reality to our concepts ; without this, a concept is only an idea without truth, and without any reference to an object. Hence the possible empirical concept was the standard by which to judge the idea, whether it be an idea and fiction only, or whether it has an object in the world. For we then only say that anything is relatively to something else either too large or too small, if it is required for the sake of the other and ought to be adapted to it. One of the playthings of the old dia- lectical school was the question, whether we [p. 490] should say that the ball is too large or the hole too small. 400 Transcendental Dialectic if a ball cannot pass through a hole. In this case it is indifferent what expression we use, because we do not know which of the two exists for the sake of the other. But you would never say that the man is too large for his coat, but that the coat is too small for the man. We have thus been led at least to a well-founded suspicion that the cosmological ideas, and with them all the conflicting sophistical assertions, may rest on an empty and merely imaginary conception of the manner in which the object of those ideas can be given, and this suspicion may lead us on the right track to discover the illusion which has so long led us astray. THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON Section VI Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of Cosmological Dialectic It has been sufficiently proved in the transcendental .(Esthetic that everything which is perceived in space and time, therefore all objects of an experience possible to us, are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere representations which, such as they are represented, namely, as [p. 491 J extended beings, or series of changes, have no inde- pendent existence outside our thoughts. This system I call Transcefidental Idealism} Transcendental realism changes these modifications of our sensibility into self- subsistent things, that is, it changes m.ere representations into things by themselves. 1 See Supplement XXVIII. Transcendental Dialectic 40 1 It would be unfair to ask us to adopt that long-decried empirical idealism which, while it admits the independent reality of space, denies the existence of extended beings in it, or at all events considers it as doubtful and does not admit that there is in this respect a sufficiently established difference between dream and reality. It sees no difficulty with regard to the phenomena of the internal sense in time, being real things ; nay, it even maintains that this internal experience alone sufficiently proves the real existence of its object (by itself), with all the deter- minations in time. Our own transcendental idealism, on the contrary, allows that the objects of external intuition may be real, as they are perceived in space, and likewise all changes in time, as they are represented by the internal sense. For as space itself is a form of that intuition which we call ex- ternal, and as there would be no empirical repre- [p. 492] sentation at all, unless there were objects in space, we can and must admit the extended beings in it as real ; and the same applies to time. Space itself, however, as well as time, and with them all phenomena, are not tilings by themselves, but representations, and cannot exist outside our mind ; and even the internal sensuous intuition of our mind (as an object of consciousness) which is represented as determined by the succession of different states in time, is not a real self, as it exists by itself, or what is called the transcendental subject, but a phenomenon only, given to the sensibility of this to us unknown being. It cannot be admitted that this internal phenomenon exists as a thing by itself, because it is under the condition of time, which can never be the determination of anything by itself. In space and time, however, the empirical truth of phenomena 2D 402 Transcendental Dialectic is sufficiently established, and kept quite distinct from a dream, if both are properly and completely connected to- gether in experience, according to empirical laws. The objects of experience are therefore never given by themselves, but in our experience only, and do not exist outside it. That there may be inhabitants in [p. 493] the moon, though no man has ever seen them, must be admitted ; but it means no more than that, in the possible progress of our experience, we may meet with them ; for everything is real that hangs together with a perception, according to the laws of empirical progress. They are therefore real, if they are empirically connected with any real consciousness, although they are not therefore real by themselves, that is, apart from that progress of experience. Nothing is really given to us but perception, and the empirical progress from this to other possible perceptions. For by themselves phenomena, as mere representations, are real in perception only, which itself is nothing but the reality of an empirical representation, that is, phenomenal appearance. To call a phenomenon a real thing, before it is perceived, means either, that in the progress of ex- perience we must meet with such a perception, or it means nothing. For that it existed by itself, without any reference to our senses and possible experience, might no doubt be said when we speak of a thing by itself. We here are speaking, however, of a phenomenon only in space and time, which are not determinations of things by themselves, but only of our sensibility. Hence that which exists in them (phenomena) is not something by itself, but consists in representations only, [p. 494] which, unless they are given in us (in perception), exist nowhere. Transcendental Dialectic 403 The faculty of sensuous intuition is really some kind of receptivity only, according to which we are affected in a certain way by representations the mutual relation of which is a pure intuition of space and time (mere forms of our sensibility), and which, if they are connected and determined in that relation of space and time, according to the laws of the unity of experience, are called objects. The non-sensuous cause of these representations is entirely unknown to us, and we can never perceive it as an object, for such a cause would have to be represented neither in space nor in time, which are conditions of sensuous rep- resentations only, and without which we cannot conceive any intuition. We may, however, call that purely in- telligible cause of phenomena in general, the tran- scendental object, in order that we may have something which corresponds to sensibility as a kind of receptivity. We may ascribe to that transcendental object the whole extent and connection of all our possible perceptions, and we may say that it is given by itself antecedently to all experience. Phenomena, however, are given accordingly, not by themselves, but in experience only, because they are mere representations which as perceptions [p. 495] only, signify a real object, provided that the perception is connected with all others, according to the rules of unity in experience. Thus we may say that the real things of time past are given in the transcendental object of experience, but they only are objects to me, and real in time past, on the supposition that I conceive that a regressive series of possible perceptions (whether by the light of history, or by the vestiges of causes and effects), in one word, the course of the world, leads, according to empirical laws, to a past series of time, as a- condition of 404 Transcendental Dialectic the present time. It is therefore represented as real, not by itself, but in connection with a possible experience, so that all past events from time immemorial and before my own existence mean after all nothing but the possi- bility of an extension of the chain of experience, begin- ning with present perception and leading upwards to the conditions which determine it in time. If, therefore, I represent to myself all existing objects of the senses, at all times and in all spaces, I do not place them before experience into space and time, but the whole representation is nothing but the idea of a possible experi- ence, in its absolute completeness. In that alone those objects (which are nothing but mere representations) are given ; and if we say that they exist before [p. 496] my whole experience, this only means that they exist in that part of experience to which, starting from perception, I have first to advance. The cause of empirical conditions of that progress, and consequently with what members, or how far I may meet with certain members in that re- gressus, is transcendental, and therefore entirely unknown to me. But that cause does not concern us, but only the rule of the progress of experience, in which objects, namely phenomena, are given to me. In the end it is just the same whether I say, that in the empirical progress in space I may meet with stars a hundred times more dis- tant than the most distant which I see, or whether I say that such stars are perhaps to be met with in space, though no human being did ever or will ever see them. P'or though, as things by themselves, they might be given without any relation to possible experience, they are nothing to me, and therefore no objects, unless they can be comprehended in the series of the empirical regressus. Transcendental Dialectic 405 Only in another relation, when namely these phenomena are meant to be used for the cosmological idea of an abso- lute whole, and when we have to deal with a question that goes beyond the limits of possible experience, the distinction of the mode in which the reality of those objects of the senses is taken becomes of importance, in order [p. 497] to guard against a deceptive error that would inevitably arise from a misinterpretation of our own empirical concepts. THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON Section VII Critical Decision of the Cosmological Conflict of Reason with itself The whole antinomy of pure reason rests on the dialec- tical argument that, if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions also is given. As therefore the objects of the senses are given us as conditioned, it follows, etc. Through this argument, the major of which seems so natural and self-evident, cosmological ideas have been introduced corresponding in number to the difference of conditions (in the synthesis of phenomena) which consti- tute a series. These cosmological ideas postulate the absolute totaUty of those series, and thus place reason in inevitable contradiction with itself. Before, however, we show what is deceptive in this sophistical argument, we must prepare ourselves for it by correcting and defining certain concepts occurring in it. First, the following proposition is clear and admits of no doubt, that if the conditioned is given, it imposes on us the regressus in the series of all conditions of [p. 498] it ; for it follows from the very concept of the conditioned 4o6 Transcendental Dialectic that through it something is referred to a condition, and, if that condition is again conditioned, to a more distant condition, and so on through all the members of the series. This proposition is really analytical, and need not fear any transcendental criticism. It is a logical postulate of reason to follow up through the understanding, as far as possible, that connection of a concept with its conditions, which is inherent in the concept itself. Ftirther, if the conditioned as well as its conditions are things by themselves, then, if the former be given, the regressus to the latter is not only required, but is really given; and as this applies to all the members of the series, the complete series of conditions and with it the unconditioned also is given, or rather it is presupposed that the conditioned, which was possible through that series only, is given. Here the synthesis of the condi- tioned with its condition is a synthesis of the understand- ing only, which represents things as they are, without asking whether and how we can arrive at the knowledge of them. But if I have to deal with phenomena, which, as mere representations, are not given at all, unless I attain to a knowledge of them (that is, to the [p. 499] phenomena themselves, for they are nothing but empirical knowledge), then I cannot say in the same sense that, if the conditioned is given, all its conditions (as phenomena) are also given, and can therefore by no means conclude the absolute totality of the series. For phenomena in their apprehension are themselves nothing but an empirical syn- thesis (in space and time), and are given therefore in that synthesis only. Now it follows by no means that, if the conditioned (as phenomenal) is given, the synthesis also that constitutes its empirical condition should thereby be Transcendental Dialectic 407 given at the same time and presupposed ; for this takes place in the regressus only, and never without it. What we may say in such a case is this, that a regressus to the con- ditions, that is, a continued empirical synthesis in that direction is required, and that conditions cannot be want- ing that are given through that regressus. Hence we see that the major of the cosmological argu- ment takes the conditioned in the transcendental sense of a pure category, while the minor takes it in the empirical sense of a concept of the understanding, referring to mere phenomena, so that it contains that dialectical deceit which \5 called. Sopkisma fignrac diciiojiis. That deceit, [p. 500] however, is not artificial, but a perfectly natural illusion of our common reason. It is owing to it that, in the major, we presuppose the conditions and their series as it were on trust, if anything is given as conditioned, because this is no more than the logical postulate to assume complete premisses for any given conclusion. Nor does there exist in the connection of the conditioned with its condition any order of time, but they are presupposed in themselves as given together. It is equally natural also in the minor to look on phenomena as things by themselves, and as objects given to the understanding only in the same manner as in the major, as no account was taken of all the conditions of intuition under which alone objects can be given. But there is an important distinction between these concepts, which has been overlooked. The synthesis of the condi- tioned with its condition, and the whole series of condi- tions in the major, was in no way limited by time, and was free from any concept of succession. The empirical syn- thesis, on the contrary, and the series of conditions in phenomena, which was subsumed in the minor, is neces- 4o8 Transcendental Dialectic sarily successive and given as such in time only. There- fore I had no right to assume the absolute totality of the synthesis and of the series represented by it in this case as well as in the former. For in the former all the mem- bers of the series are given by themselves (without deter- mination in time), while here they are possible through the successive regressus only, which cannot exist [p. 501] unless it is actually carried out. After convicting them of such a mistake in the argu- ment adopted by both parties as the foundation of their cosmological assertions, both might justly be dismissed as not being able to produce any good title in support of their claims. But even thus their quarrel is not yet ended, as if it had been proved that both parties, or one of them, were wrong in the matter contended for (in the con- clusion), though they had failed to support it by valid proof. Nothing seems clearer than that, if one maintains that the world has a beginning, and the other that it has no begin- ning, but exists from all eternity, one or the other must be right. But if this were so, as the arguments on both sides are equally clear, it would still remain impossible ever to find out on which side the truth lies, and the suit continues, although both parties have been ordered to keep the peace before the tribunal of reason. Nothing remains therefore in order to settle the quarrel once for all, and to the satis- faction of both parties, but to convince them that, though they can refute each other so eloquently, they are really quarrelling about nothing, and that a certain transcendental illusion has mocked them with a reality where no [p. 502] reality exists. We shall now enter upon this way of ad- justing a dispute, which cannot be adjudicated. Transcendental Dialectic 409 The Eleatic philosopher Zeno, a subtle dialectician, was severely reprimanded by Plato as a heedless Sophist who, in order to display his skill, would prove a proposition by plausible arguments and subvert the same immediately afterwards by arguments equally strong. He maintained, for instance, that God (which to him was probably nothing more than the universe) is neither finite nor infinite, neither in motion nor at rest, neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing. It seemed to his critics as if he had intended to deny completely both of the two self-contra- dictory proposition which would be absurd. But I do not think that he can be rightly charged with this. We shall presently consider the first of these propositions more carefully. With regard to the others, if by the word God he meant the universe, he could not but say that it is neither permanently present in its place (at rest) nor that it changes it (in motion), because all places exist in the universe only, while the universe exists in no place. If the universe comprehends in itself everything that exists, it follows that it cannot be similar or dissimilar to any other thing, because there is no other thing besides it with which it could be compared. If two oppo- [p. 503] site judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition, they both, in spite of their contradiction (which, however, is no real contradiction), fall to the ground, because the condi- tion fails under which alone either of the propositions was meant to be valid. If somebody were to say that everybody has either a good or a bad smell, a third case is possible, namely, that it has no smell at all, in which case both contradictory propositions would be false. If I say that it is either good smelling or not good smelling {vel suaveolens vel non 410 Transcendental Dialectic suaveolens), in that case the two judgments are contradic- tory, and the former only is wrong, while its contradictory opposite, namely, that some bodies are not good smelling, comprehends those bodies also which have no smell at all. In the former opposition {per disparata) the contingent condition of the concept of a body (smell) still remained in the contradictory judgment and was not eliminated by it, so that the latter could not be called the contradictory opposite of the former. If I say therefore that the world is either infinite in space or is not infinite {non est injinitus), then, if the for- mer proposition is wrong, its contradictory opposite, that the world is not infinite, must be true. I should thus only eliminate an infinite world without affirming another, namely, the finite. But if I had said the world [p. 504] is either infinite or finite (not-infinite), both statements may be false. For I then look upon the world, as by itself, determined in regard to its extent, and I do not only elimi- nate in the opposite statement the infinity, and with it, it may be, its whole independent e.fistence, but I add a deter- mination to the world as a thing existing by itself, which may be false, because the world may not be a thing by itself, and therefore, with regard to extension, neither infinite nor finite. This kind of opposition I may be allowed to call dialectical, that the real contradiction, the analytical opposition. Thus then of two judgments opposed to each other dialectically both may be false, because the one does not only contradict the other, but says something more than is requisite for a contradic- tion. If we regard the two statements that the world is in- finite in extension, and that the world is finite in exten- Transcendental Dialectic 411 sion, as contradictory opposites, we assume that the world (the whole series of phenomena) is a thing by itself ; for it remains, whether I remove the infinite or the finite regressus in the series of its phenomena. But if we remove this supposition, or this transcendental illusion, and deny that it is a thing by itself, then the contradic- tory opposition of the two statements becomes [p. 505] purely dialectical, and as the world does not exist by itself (independently of the regressive series of my rep- resentations), it exists neither as a whole by itself infinite, nor as a whole by itself finite. It exists only in the em- pirical regressus in the series of phenomena, and nowhere by itself. Hence, if that series is always conditioned, it can never exist as complete, and the world is therefore not an inconditioned whole, and does not exist as such, either with infinite or finite extension. What has here been said of the first cosmological idea, namely, that of the absolute totality of extension in phe- nomena, applies to the others also. The series of condi- tions is to be found only in the regressive synthesis, never by itself, as complete, in phenomenon as an independent thing, existing prior to every regressus. Hence I shall have to say that the number of parts in any given phe- nomenon is by itself neither finite nor infinite, because a phenomenon does not exist by itself, and its parts are only found through the regressus of the decomposing syn- thesis through and in the regressus, and that regressus can never be given as absolutely complete, whether as finite or as infinite. The same applies to the series of causes, one being prior to the other, and to the series leading from conditioned to unconditioned necessary exist- ence, which can never be regarded either by [p. 506] 412 Transcendental Dialectic itself finite in its totality or infinite, because, as a series of subordinated representations, it forms a dynamical re- gressus only, and cannot exist prior to it, by itself, as a self-subsistent series of things. The antinomy of pure reason with regard to its cosmo- logical ideas is therefore removed by showing that it is dialectical only, and a conflict of an illusion produced by our applying the idea of absolute totality, which exists only as a condition of things by themselves, to phe- nomena, which exist in our representation only, and if they form a series, in the successive regressus, but nowhere else. We may, however, on the other side, derive from that antinomy a true, if not dogmatical, at least critical and doctrinal advantage, namely, by prov- ing through it indirectly the transcendental ideality of phenomena, in case anybody should not have been satis- fied by the direct proof given in the transcendental Esthetic. The proof would consist in the following dilemma. If the world is a whole existing by itself, it is either finite or infinite. Now the former as well as the latter proposition is false, as has been shown by the proofs given in the antithesis on one and in the thesis on the other side. It is false, therefore, that the world (the sum total of all phenomena) is a whole existing [p. 507] by itself. Hence it follows that phenomena in general are nothing outside our representations, which was what we meant by their transcendental ideality. This remark is of some importance, because it shows that our proofs of the fourfold antinomy were not mere sophistry, but honest and correct, always under the (wrong) supposition that phenomena, or a world of sense which comprehends them all, are things by themselves. Transceiidental Dialectic 413 The conflict of the conclusions drawn from this shows, however, that there is a flaw in the supposition, and thus leads us to the discovery of the true nature of things, as objects of the senses. This transcendental Dialectic therefore does not favour scepticism, but only the scep- tical method, which can point to it as an example of its great utility, if we allow the arguments of reason to fight against each other with perfect freedom, from which some- thing useful and serviceable for the correction of our judg- ments will always result, though it may not be always that which we were looking for. THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON [p. 508] Section VIII The Regulative Principle of Pure Reason with Regard to the Cosniological Ideas As through the cosmological principle of totality no real maximum is givefi of the series of conditions in the world of sense, as a thing by itself, but can only be required in the regressus of that series, that principle of pure reason, if thus amended, still retains its validity, not indeed as an axiom, requiring us to think the totality in the object as real, but as 2. problem for the understanding, and therefore for the subject, encouraging us to undertake and to con- tinue, according to the completeness in the idea, the re- gressus in the series of conditions of anything given as conditioned. In our sensibility, that is, in space and time, every condition which we can reach in examining given phenomena is again conditioned, because these phenom- ena are not objects by themselves, in which something 414 Transcendental Dialectic absolutely unconditioned might possibly exist, but empiri- cal representations only, which always must have their condition in intuition, whereby they are determined in space and time. The principle of reason is therefore properly a rule only, which in the series of con- [p. 509] ditions of given phenomena postulates a regressus which is never allowed to stop at anything absolutely uncondi- tioned. It is therefore no principle of the possibility of experience and of the empirical knowledge of the objects of the senses, and not therefore a principle of the under- standing, because every experience is (according to a given intuition) within its limits ; nor is it a constitutive principle of reason, enabling us to extend the concept of the world of sense beyond all possible experience, but it is merely a principle of the greatest possible continuation and extension of our experience, allowing no empirical limit to be taken as an absolute limit. It is therefore a principle of reason, which, as a rule, postulates what we ought to do in the regressus, but does not anticipate what may be given in the object, before such regressus. I therefore call it a regulative principle of reason, while, on the contrary, the principle of the absolute totality of the series of conditions, as given in the object (the phenom- ena) by itself, would be a constitutive cosmological prin- ciple, the hollowness of which I- have tried to indicate by this very distinction, thus preventing what otherwise would have inevitably happened (through a transcenden- tal surreptitious proceeding), namely, an idea, which is to serve as a rule only, being invested with objective reality. In order properly to determine the meaning of this rule of pure reason it should be remarked, first of all, that it cannot tell us what the object is, but only how [p. 510] Transcendental Dialectic 415 the empirical regressus is to be carried out, in order to arrive at the complete concept of the object. If we attempted the first, it would become a constitutive prin- ciple, such as pure reason can never supply. It cannot therefore be our intention to say through this principle, that a series of conditions of something, given as condi- tioned, is by itself either finite or infinite ; for in that case a mere idea of absolute totality, produced in itself only, would represent in thought an object such as can never be given in experience, and an objective reality, indepen- dent of empirical synthesis, would have been attributed to a series of phenomena. This idea of reason can there- fore do no more than prescribe a rule to the regressive synthesis in the series of conditions, according to which that synthesis is to advance from the conditioned, through all subordinate conditions, towards the unconditioned, though it can never reach it, for the absolutely uncon- ditioned can never be met with in experience. To this end it is necessary, first of all, to define accu- rately the synthesis of a series, so far as it never is com- plete. People are in the habit of using for this purpose two expressions which are meant to establish a difference, though they are unable clearly to define the ground of the distinction. Mathematicians speak only of a progressus in infinitum. Those who enquire into concepts (philoso- phers) will admit instead the expression of a [p. S'l] progressus in indefinitiini only. Without losing any time in the examination of the reasons which may have sug- gested such a distinction, and of its useful or useless application, I shall at once endeavour to define these concepts accurately for my own purpose. Of a straight line it can be said correctly that it may be 41 6 Transcendental Dialectic produced to infinity ; and here the distinction between an infinite and an indefinite progress {progressiis in indefini- tum) would be mere subtilty. No doubt, if we are told to carry on a line, it would be more correct to add in indefi- nitii^n, than in infinitum, because the former means no more than, produce it as far as yon wish, but the second, you shall never cease producing it (which can never be intended). Nevertheless, if we speak only of what is possible, the former expression is quite correct, because we can always make it longer, if we like, without end. The same applies in all cases where w'e speak only of the progressus, that is, of our proceeding from the con- dition to the conditioned, for such progress proceeds in the series of phenomena without end. From a given pair of parents we may, in the descending line of generation, proceed without end, and conceive quite well that that line should so continue in the world. For here reason never requires an absolute totality of the series, [p. 512] because it is not presupposed as a condition, and as it were given {datum), but only as something conditioned, that is, capable only of being given (dabile), and can be added to without end. The case is totally different with the problem, how far the regressus from something given as conditioned may ascend in a series to its conditions ; whether I may call it a regressus into the infinite, or only into the indefinite (in indefinitimi ; and whether I may ascend, for instance, from the men now living, through the series of their ancestors, in infinitum ; or whether I may only say that, so far as I have gone back, I have never met with an empirical ground for considering the series limited any- where, so that I feel justified, and at the same time obliged Transcendental Dialectic 417 to search for an ancestor of every one of these ancestors, though not to presuppose them. I say, therefore, that where the whole is given in empirical intuition, the regressus in the series of its in- ternal conditions proceeds in infinitum, while if a mem- ber only of a series is given, from which the regressus to the absolute totality has first to be carried out, the regressus is only in indcfinituni. Thus we must [p. 513] say that the division of matter, as given between its limits (a body), goes on in infinitum, because that matter is complete and therefore, with all its possible parts, given in empirical intuition. As the condition of that whole con- sists in its part, and the condition of that part in the part of that part, and so on, and as in this regressus of decom- position we never meet with an unconditioned (indivisible) member of that series of conditions, there is nowhere an empirical ground for stopping the division ; nay, the fur- ther members of that continued division are themselves empirically given before the continuation of the division, and therefore the division goes on in infinitum. The series of ancestors, on the contrary, of any given man, exists nowhere in its absolute totality, in any possible experience, while the regressus goes on from every link in the gener- ation to a higher one, so that no empirical limit can be found which should represent a link as absolutely uncon- ditioned. As, however, the links too, which might supply the condition, do not exist in the empirical intuition of the whole, prior to the regressus, that regressus does not pro- ceed in infinitum (by a division of what is given), but to an indefinite distance, in its search for more links in addition to those which are given, and which themselves are again always conditioned only. 41 8 Transcendental Dialectic In neither case — the regressns in infinitum [p. 514] nor the regressus in indefinitimi — is the series of conditions to be considered as given as infinite in the object. They are not things by themselves, but phenomena only, which, as conditions of each other, are given only in the regressus itself. Therefore the question is no longer how great this series of conditions may be by itself, whether finite or infinite, for it is nothing by itself, but only how we are to carry out the empirical regressus, and how far we may continue it. And here we see a very important difference with regard to the rule of that progress. If the whole is given empirically, it is possible to go back in the series of its conditions in infinitum. But if the whole is not given, but has first to be given through an empirical regressus, I can only say that it is possible to proceed to still higher conditions of the series. In the former case I could say that more members exist and are empirically given than I can reach through the regressus (of decomposition); in the latter I can only say that I may advance still further in the regressus, because no member is empirically given as abso- lutely unconditioned, and a higher member therefore always possible, and therefore the enquiry for it necessary. In the former case it was necessary io find more members of the series, in the latter it is necessary to enquire for more, be- cause no experience is absolutely limiting. For [p. 515] either you have no perception which absolutely limits your empirical regressus, and in that case you cannot consider that regressus as complete, or you have a perception which limits your series, and in that case it cannot be a part of your finished series (because what limits must be different from that which is limited by it), and you must therefore continue your regressus to that condition also, and so on for ever. Transcendental Dialectic 419 The following section, by showing their application, will place these observations in their proper light. THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON Section IX Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason with Regard to all Cosviological Ideas No transcendental use, as we have shown on several occasions, can be made of the concepts either of the understanding or of reason ; and the absolute totality of the series of conditions in the world of sense is due entirely to a transcendental use of reason, which demands this unconditioned completeness from what presupposes as a thing by itself. As no such thing is contained in the world of sense, we can never speak again [p. 516] of the absolute quantity of different series in it, whether they be limited or in themselves unlimited ; but the ques- tion can only be, how far, in the empirical regressus, we may go back in tracing experience to its conditions, in order to stop, according to the rule of reason, at no other answer of its questions but such as is in accordance with the object. What therefore remains to us is only the validity of the principle of reason, as a rule for the continuation and for the extent of a possible experience, after its invalidity, as a constitutive principle of things by themselves, has been sufficiently established. If we have clearly established that invalidity, the conflict of reason with itself will be entirely finished, because not only has the illusion which led to that conflict been removed through critical analysis, but in its place the sense in which reason agrees with 420 Transcendental Dialectic itself, and the misapprehension of which was the only cause of conflict, has been clearly exhibited, and a prin- ciple formerly dialectical changed into a doctrinal one. In fact, if that principle, according to its subjective meaning, can be proved fit to determine the greatest possible use of the understanding in experience, as adequate to its objects, this would be the same as if it determined, as an ax- iom (which is impossible from pure reason), the [p. 517] objects themselves a priori : for this also could not, with reference to the objects of experience, exercise a greater influence on the extension and correction of our know- ledge, than proving itself efficient in the most extensive use of our understanding, as applied to experience. I Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in an Universe Here, as well as in the other cosmological problems, the regulative principle of reason is founded on the proposition that, in the empirical regressus, no experience of an absolute limit, that is, of any condition as such, which empirically is absolutely unconditioned, can exist. The ground of this is that such an experience would contain a limitation of phenomena by nothing or by the void, on which the continued regressus by means of experience must abut ; and this is impossible. This proposition, which says that in an empirical regressus I can only arrive at the condition which itself must be considered empirically conditioned, [p. 518] contains the rule in tcrminis, that however far I may Transcendental Dialectic 421 have reached in the ascending series, I must always en- quire for a still higher member of that series, whether it be known to me by experience or not. For the solution, therefore, of the first cosmological problem, nothing more is wanted than to determine whether, in the regressus to the unconditioned extension of the universe (in time and in space), this nowhere limited ascent is to be called a regressus in infinitum, or a regres- sus in indefinitiim. The mere general representation of the series of all past states of the world, and of the things which exist together in space, is itself nothing but a possible empirical regressus, which I represent to myself, though as yet as in- definite, and through w^hich alone the concept of such a series of conditions of the perception given to me can arise.i Now the universe exists for me as a concept only, and never (as a whole) as an intuition. Hence [p. 519] I cannot from its quantity conclude the quantity of the regressus, and determine the one by the other; but I must first frame to myself a concept of the quantity of the world through the quantity of the empirical regressus. Of this, however, I never know anything more than that, em- pirically, I must go on from every given member of the series of conditions to a higher and more distant member. Hence the quantity of the whole of phenomena is not ab- solutely determined, and we cannot say therefore that it is 1 This cosmical series can therefore be neither greater nor smaller than the possible empirical regressus on which alone its concept rests. And as this can give neither a definite infinite, nor a definite finite (absolutely limited), it becomes clear that we cannot accept the quantity of the world, either as finite or as infinite, because the regressus (by which it is represented) admits of neither the one nor the other. 423 Transcendental Dialectic a regressus in infinitum, because this would anticipate the members which the regressus has not yet reached, and represent its number as so large that no empirical synthe- sis could ever reach it. It would therefore (though nega- tively only) determine the quantity of the world prior to the regressus, which is impossible, because it is not given to me by any intuition (in its totality), so that its quantity cannot be given prior to the regressus. Hence we cannot say anything of the quantity or extension of the world by itself, not even that there is in it a regressus in infinitum, but we must look for the concept of its quantity according to the rule that determines the empirical regressus in it. This rule, however, says no more than that, however far we may have got in the series of empirical conditions, we ought never to assume an absolute limit, but subordinate every phenomenon, as conditioned, to another, [p. 520] as its condition, and that we must proceed further to that condition. This is the regressus in indefinitum, which, as it fixes no quantity in the object, can clearly enough be distinguished from the regressus in infinitum. I cannot say therefore that, as to time past or as to space, the world is infinite. For such a concept of quan- tity, as a given infinity, is empirical, and therefore, with reference to the world as an object of the senses, abso- lutely impossible. Nor shall I say that the regressus, beginning with a given perception, and going on to every- thing that limits it in a series, both in space and in time past, goes on in infinitum, because this would presuppose an infinite quantity of the world. Nor can I say again that it is finite, for the absolute limit is likewise empiri- cally impossible. Hence it follows that I shall not be able to say anything of the whole object of experience (the Transcendental Dialectic 423 world of sense), but only of the rule, according to which experience can take place and be continued in accordance with its object. To the cosmological question, therefore, respecting the quantity of the world, the first and negative answer is, that the world has no first beginning in time, and no extreme limit in space. For, in the contrary case, the world would be limited by empty time and empty space. As however, [p. 521J as a phenomenon, it cannot, by itself, be either, — a phe- nomenon not being a thing by itself, — we should have to admit the perception of a limitation by means of absolute empty time or empty space, by which these limits of the world could be given in a possible experience. Such an experience, however, would be perfectly void of contents, and therefore impossible. Consequently an absolute limit of the world is impossible empirically, and therefore ab- solutely also.^ From this follows at the same time the affirmative answer, that the regressus in the series of the phenomena of the world, intended as a determination of the quantity of the world, goes on in indefinitnm, which is the same as if we say that the world of sense has no absolute quantity, but that the empirical regressus (through which alone it can be given on the side of its conditions) has its own rule, ■^ It will have been observed that the argument has here been carried on in a very different way from the dogmatical argument, which was presented before, in the antithesis of the first antinomy. There we took the world of sense, according to the common and dogmatical view, as a thing given by itself, in its totality, before any regressus : and we had denied to it, if it did not occupy all time and all space, any place at all in both. Hence the con- clusion also was different from what it is here, for it went to the real infinity of the world. 424 Trmiscendental Dialectic namely, to advance from every member of the series, as conditioned, to a more distant member, whether by our own experience, or by the guidance of history, [p. 522] or through the chain of causes and their effects ; and never to dispense with the extension of the possible empirical use of the understanding, this being the proper and really only task of reason and its principles. We do not prescribe by this a definite empirical regres- sus advancing without end in a certain class of phe- nomena ; as, for instance, that from a living person one ought always to ascend in a series of ancestors, without ever expecting a first pair ; or, in the series of cosmical bodies, without admitting in the end an extremest sun. All that is demanded is a progressus from phenomena to phenomena, even if they should not furnish us with a real perception (if it is too weak in degree to become experi- ence in our consciousness), because even thus they belong to a possible experience. Every beginning is in time, and every limit of extension in space. Space and time, however, exist in the world of sense only. Hence phenomena only are limited in the world conditionally ; the world itself, however, is limited neither conditionally nor unconditionally. For the same reason, and because the world can never be given complete, and even the series of conditions of something given as conditioned cannot, as a cosmical series, be given as complete, the concept of the quantity of the world can be given through the regressus only, and not before it in any collective intuition, [p. 523] That regressus, however, consists only in the determin- ing of the quantity, and does not give, therefore any definite concept, nor the concept of any quantity which, Transcendental Dialectic 425 with regard to a certain measure, could be called infinite. It does not therefore proceed to the infinite (as if given), but only into an indefinite distance, in order to give a quantity (of experience) which has first to be realised by that very regressus. II Solution of the Costnological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a Whole given in Intuition If I divide a whole, given in intuition, I proceed from the conditioned to the conditions of its possibility. The division of the parts {siibdivisio or deco-mpositio) is a regressus in the series of those conditions. The absolute totality of this series could only be given, if the regressus could reach the simple parts. But if all parts in a continu- ously progressing decomposition are always divisible again, then the division, that is, the regressus from the condi- tioned to its conditions, goes on in infinitum ; because the conditions (the parts) are contained in the conditioned itself, and as that is given as complete in an [p. 524] intuition enclosed within limits, are all given with it. The regressus must therefore not be called a regressus in indefinitum, such as was alone allowed by the former cosmological idea, where from the conditioned we had to proceed to conditions outside it, and therefore not given at the same time through it, but first to be added in the empirical regressus. It is not allowed, however, even in the case of a whole that is divisible in infinitum, to say, that it consists of infinitely -many parts. For although all parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, yet the whole division is not contained in it, because it consists 426 Transcendental Dialectic in the continuous decomposition, or in tlie regressus itself, which first makes that series real. As this regressus is infinite, all members (parts) at which it arrives are con- tained, no doubt, in the given whole as aggregates ; but not so the -wJwle series of the division, which is successively- infinite and never complete, and cannot, therefore, repre- sent an infinite number, or any comprehension of it as a whole. It is easy to apply this remark to space. Every space, perceived within its limits, is such a whole the parts of which, in spite of all decomposition, are always spaces again, and therefore divisible in in- finitum, [p. 525] From this follows, quite naturally, the second applica- tion to an external phenomenon, enclosed within its limits (body). The divisibility of this is founded on the divisi- bility of space, which constitutes the possibility of the body, as an extended whole. This is therefore divisible i}i infinitum, without consisting, however, of an infinite number of parts. It might seem indeed, as a body must be represented as a substance in space, that, with regard to the law of the divisibility of space, it might differ from it, for we might possibly concede, that in the latter case decomposition could never do away with all composition, because in that case all space, which besides has nothing independent of its own, would cease to be (which is impossible), while, even if all composition of matter should be done away with in thought, it would not seem com- patible with the concept of a substance that nothing should remain of it, because substance is meant to be the subject of all composition, and ought to remain in its Transcendental Dialectic 427 elements, although their connection in space, by which they become a body, should have been removed. But, what applies to a thing by itself, represented by a pure concept of the understanding, does not apply to what is called substance, as a phenomenon. This is not an absolute subject, but only a permanent image of sensibility, nothing in fact but intuition, [p. 526] in which nothing" unconditioned can ever be met with. But although this rule of the progress in infinitum applies without any doubt to the subdivision of a phe- nomenon, as a mere occupant of space, it does not apply to the number of the parts, separated already in a cer- tain way in a given whole, which thus constitute a quantum discretiim. To suppose that in every organised whole every part is again organised, and that by thus dissecting the parts in infinitum we should meet again and again with new organised parts, in fact that the whole is organised in ififinitwn, is a thought difficult to think, though it is possible to think that the parts of matter decomposed in infi7iitum might become organised. For the infinity of the division of a given phenomenon in space is founded simply on this, that by it divisibility only, that is, an entirely indefinite number of parts, is given, while the parts themselves can only be given and determined through the subdivision, in short, that the whole is not itself already divided. Thus the division can determine a number in it, which goes so far as we like to go, in the regressus of a division. In an or- ganic body, on the contrary, organised in infinitum the whole is by that very concept represented as [p. 527] divided, and a number of parts, definite in itself, and yet infinite, is found in it, before every regressus of division. 428 Transcendental Dialectic This would be self-contradictory, because we should have to consider this infinite convolute as a never-to-be-com- pleted series (infinite), and yet as complete in its (or- ganised) comprehension. Infinite division takes the phe- nomenon only as a quantum contitiiaim, and is insepa- rable from the occupation of space, because in this very occupation lies the ground of endless divisibility. But as soon as anything is taken as a qtiantum discrettivi, the number of units in it is determined, and therefore at all times equal to a certain number. How far the organi- sation in an organised body may go, experience alone can show us ; but though it never arrived with certainty at any unorganised part, they would still have to be admitted as lying within possible experience. It is different with the transcendental division of a phenomenon. How far that may extend is not a matter of experience, but a principle of reason, which never allows us to consider the empirical regressus in the decomposition of extended bodies, according to the nature of these phenomena, as at any time absolutely completed. Concluding Remarks on the Solution of the [p. 528] Transcendental -7nathe7natical Ideas, and Preliminary Remark for the Solution of the Transcendental-dynami- cal Ideas When exhibiting in a tabular form the antinomy of pure reason, through all the transcendental ideas, and indicating the ground of the conflict and the only means of removing it, by declaring both contradictory statements as false, we always represented the conditions as belong- ing to that which they conditioned, according to relations Transcendental Dialectic 429 of space and time, this being the ordinary supposition of the common understanding, and in fact the source from which that conflict arose. In that respect all dialec- tical representations of the totality in a series of condi- tions of something given as conditioned were always of the same character. It was always a series in which the condition was connected with the conditioned, as mem- bers of the same series, both being thus lioviogeneous. In such a series the regressus was never conceived as com- pleted, or, if that had to be done, one of the members, being in itself conditioned, had wrongly to be accepted as the first, and therefore as unconditioned. If not always the object, that is, the conditioned, yet the series of its conditions was always considered according [p. 529] to quantity only, and then the difficulty arose (which could not be removed by any compromise, but only by cutting the knot), that reason made it either too long or too short for the understanding, which could in neither case come up to the idea. But in this we have overlooked an essential distinction between the objects, that is, the concepts of the under- standing, which reason tries to raise into ideas. Two of them, according to the above table of the categories, imply a mathematical, the remaining two a dynamical synthesis of phenomena. Hitherto this overlooking was of no great importance, because, in the general representation of all transcendental ideas, we always remained under phenome- nal conditions, and with regard to the two transcenden- tal-mathematical ideas also, we had to do with no object but the phenomenal only. Now, however, as we have come to consider the dynamical concepts of the understanding, so far as they should be rendered adequate to the idea of 430 Transcendental Dialectic reason, that distinction becomes important, and opens to us an entirely new insiglit into the character of the suit in which reason is implicated. That suit had before been dis- missed, as resting on both sides on wrong presuppositions. Now, however, as there seems to be in the dy- [p. 530] namical antinomy such a presupposition as may be com- patible with the pretensions of reason, and as the judge himself supplies perhaps the deficiency of legal grounds, which had been misunderstood on both sides, the suit may possibly be adjusted, from this point of view, to the satis- faction of both parties, which was impossible in the con- flict of the mathematical antinomy. If we merely look to the extension of the series of con- ditions, and whether they are adequate to the idea, or whether the idea is too large or too small for them, the series are no doubt all homogeneous. But t^e concept of the understanding on which these ideas are founded contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous only (which is presupposed in the composition as well as the decom- position of every quantity), or of the heterogcneotts also, which must at least be admitted as possible in the dy- namical synthesis, both in a causal connection, and in the connection of the necessary with the contingent. Thus it happens that none but sensuous conditions can enter into the mathematical connection of the series of phenomena, that is, conditions which themselves are part of the series ; while the dynamical series of sensuous con- ditions admits also of a heterogeneous condition, which is not a part of the series, but, as merely intelligible, outside it ; so that a certain satisfaction is given to reason [p. 531] by the unconditioned being placed before the phenomena, without disturbing the series of the phenomena, which Transcendc7ital Dialectic 431 must always be conditioned, or breaking it off, contrary to the principles of the understanding. y Owing to the dynamical ideas admitting of a condition of the phenomena outside their series, that is, a condition which itself is not a phenomenon, something arises which is totally different from the result of the mathematical ^ antinomy. The result of that antinomy was, that both the contradictory dialectical statements had to be declared false. The throughout conditioned character, however, of the dynamical series, which is inseparable from them as phenomena, if connected with the empirically uncon- ditioned, but at the same time not sensuous condition, may give satisfaction to the understanding on one, and the reason on the other side,^ because the dialectical argu- ments which, in some way or other, required unconditioned totahty in mere phenomena, vanish; while the [p. 532] propositions of reason, if thus amended, may botli be triLe. This cannot be the case with the cosmological ideas, which refer only to a mathematically unconditioned unity, be- cause with them no condition can be found in the series of phenomena which is not itself a phenomenon, and as such constitutes one of the links of the series. 1 Mathematical, omitted in the First and Second Editions. 2 The understanding admits of no condition among phenomena, which should itseli'' be empirically unconditioned. But if we might conceive an intelligible condition, that is to say, a condition, not belonging itself as a link to the series of phenomena, of something conditioned (as a phenomenon) without in the least interrupting the series of empirical conditions, such a con- dition might be admitted as empirically unconditioned, without interfering with the empirical continuous regressus. 432 Transcendental Dialectic III Solution of the Cosmological Ideas with Regard to the Totality of the Derivation of Cosmical Eve fits from their Causes We can conceive two kinds of causality only with reference to events, causality either of jiature or of free- dom. The former is the connection of one state in the world of sense with a preceding state, on which it follows according to a rule. As the causality of phenomena de- pends on conditions of time, and as the preceding state, if it had always existed, could not have produced an effect, which first takes place in time, it follows that the causality of the cause of that which happens or arises must, accord- ing to the principle of the understanding, have itself arisen and require a cause. By freedom, on the contrary, in its cosmo- [p. 533] logical meaning, I understand the faculty of beginning a state spontaiieously. Its causality, therefore, does not depend, according to the law of nature, on another cause, by which it is determined in time. In this sense freedom is a purely transcendental idea, which, first, contains noth- ing derived from expei^ience, and, secondly, the object of which cannot be determined in any experience ; because it is a general rule, even of the possibility of all experience, that everything which happens has a cause, and that there- fore the causality also of the cause, which itself lias hap- pened or arisen, must again have a cause. In this manner the whole field of experience, however far it may extend, has been changed into one great whole of nature. As however, it is impossible in this way to arrive at an ab- Trattscetidental Dialectic 433 solute totality of the conditions in causal relations, reason creates for itself the idea of spontaneity, or the power of beginning by itself, without an antecedent cause determin- ing it to action, according to the law of causal connec- tion. It is extremely remarkable, that the practical concept of freedom is founded on the transcetidcntal idea of freedom, which constitutes indeed the real difficulty which at all times has surrounded the question of the possibility of freedom. Freedom, in its practical sense, is the [p. 534] independence of our (arbitrary) will from the coercion through sensuous impulses. Our (arbitrary) will is sensu- ous, so far as it is affected pathologically (by sensuous impulses) ; it is called animal {arbitrium briitinn), if neces- sitated pathologically. The human will is certainly sensu- ous, an arbitrium sensitivmn, but not briUum, but liberum, because sensuous impulses do not necessitate its action, but there is in man a faculty of determination, indepen- dent of the necessitation through sensuous impulses. It can easily be seen that, if all causality in the world of sense belonged to nature, every event would be deter- mined in time through another, according to necessary laws. As therefore the phenomena, in determining the will, would render every act necessary as their natural effect, the annihilation of transcendental freedom would at the same time destroy all practical freedom. Practical freedom presupposes that, although something has not happened, it ought to have happened, and that its cause therefore had not that determining force among phenom- ena, which could prevent the causality of our will from producing, independently of those natural causes, and even contrary to their force and influence, something de- 2F 434 Transcende7ital Dialectic termined in the order of time, according to empirical laws, and from originating entirely by itself 2, series of events. What happens here is what happens generally [p. 535] in the conflict of reason venturing beyond the limits of possible experience, namely, that the problem is no^ physi- ological, but transcendental. Hence the question of the possibility of freedom concerns no doubt psychology; but its solution, as it depends on dialectical arguments of pure reason, belongs entirely to transcendental philosophy. In order to enable that philosophy to give a satisfactory an- swer, which it cannot decline to do, I must first try to de- termine more accurately its proper procedure in this task. If phenomena were things by themselves, and therefore space and time forms of the existence of things by them- selves, the conditions together with the conditioned would always belong, as members, to one and the same series, and thus in our case also, the antinomy which is common to all transcendental ideas would arise, namely, that that series is inevitably too large or too small for the under- standing. The dynamical concepts of reason, however, which we have to discuss in this and the following section, have this peculiarity that, as they are not concerned with an object, considered as a quantity, but only with its ex- istence, we need take no account of the quantity of the series of conditions. All depends here only on [p. 536] the dynamical relation of conditions to the conditioned, so that in the question on nature and freedom we at once meet with the difficulty, whether freedom is indeed possi- ble, and whether, if it is possible, it can exist together with the universality of the natural law of causality. The ques- tion in fact arises, whether it is a proper disjunctive prop- osition to say, that every effect in the world must arise, Transcendental Dialectic 435 either ixom. nature, or from freedom, or whether both can- not coexist in the same event in different relations. The correctness of the principle of the unbroken connection of all events in the world of sense, according to unchange- able natural laws, is firmly established by the transcen- dental Analytic, and admits of no limitation. The question, therefore, can only be whether, in spite of it, freedom also can be found in the same effect which is determined by nature; or whether freedom is entirely excluded by that inviolable rule ? Here the common but fallacious suppo- sition of the absolute reality of phenomena shows at once its pernicious influence in embarrassing reason. For if phenomena are things by themselves, freedom cannot be saved. Nature in that case is the complete and sufficient cause determining every event, and its condition is always contained in that series of phenomena only which, together with their effect, are necessary under the law of nature. If, on the contrary, phenomena are taken for [p. 537] nothing except what they are in reality, namely, not things by themselves, but representations only, which are con- nected with each other according to empirical laws, they must themselves have causes, which are not phenomenal. Such an intelligible cause, however, is not determined with reference to its causality by phenomena, although its effects become phenomenal, and can thus be determined by other phenomena. That intelligible cause, therefore, with its causality, is outside the series, though its effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions. The effect therefore can, with reference to its intelligible cause, be considered as free, and yet at the same time, with ref- erence to phenomena, as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature ; a distinction which, if thus repre- 436 Transcendental Dialectic sented, in a general and entirely abstract form, may seem extremely subtle and obscure, but will become clear in its practical application. Here I only wished to remark that, as the unbroken connection of all phenomena in the con- text (woof) of nature, is an unalterable law, it would necessarily destroy all freedom, if we were to defend obsti- nately the reality of phenomena. Those, therefore, who follow the common opinion on this subject, have never been able to reconcile nature and freedom. ' Possibility of a Causality through Freedom, in [p. 538] Hannojiy zvith the Universal Law of Natural Necessity Whatever in an object of the senses is not itself phe- nomenal, I call intelligible. If, therefore, what in the world of sense must be considered as phenomenal, pos- sesses in itself a faculty which is not the object of sensuous intuition, but through which it can become the cause of phenomena, the causality of that being may be considered from tivo sides, as intelligible in its action, as the causality of a thing by itself, and as sensible in the effects of the action, as the causality of a phenomenon in the world of sense. Of the faculty of such a being we should have to form both an empirical and an ititellectiial concept of its causality, both of which consist together in one and the same effect. This twofold way of conceiving the faculty of an object of the senses does not contradict any of the concepts which we have to form of phenomena and of a possible experience. For as all phenomena, not being things by themselves, must have for their foundation a transcendental object, determining them as mere repre- sentations, there is nothing to prevent us from attribut- Transcendental Dialectic 437 ing to that transcendental object, besides the [p. 539] quaUty through which it becomes phenomenal, a causality also which is not phenomenal, although its ejfect appears in the phenomenon. Every efficient cause, however, must have a character, that is, a rule according to which it manifests its causality, and without which it would not be a cause. According to this we should have in every subject of the world of sense, first, an empirical character, through which its acts, as phenomena, stand with other phenomena in an unbroken connection, according to per- manent laws of nature, and could be derived from them as their conditions, and in connection with them form the links of one and the same series in the order of nature. Secondly, we should have to allow to it an intelligible character also, by which, it is true, it becomes the cause of the same acts as phenomena, but which itself is not subject to any conditions of sensibility, and never phe- nomenal. We might call the former the character of such a thing as a phenomenon, in the latter the character of the thing by itself. According to its intelligible character, this active sub- i ject would not depend on conditions of time, for time is only the condition of phenomena, and not of things by themselves. In it no act would arise or perish, [p. 540] neither would it be subject therefore to the law of determi- nation in time and of all that is changeable, namely, that everything which happens must have its cause in the phe- nomena (of the previous state). In one word its causality, so far as it is intelligible, would not have a place in the series of empirical conditions by which the event is ren- dered necessary in the world of sense. It is true that that intelligible character could never be known imme- 438 Transcendental Dialectic diately, because we cannot perceive anything, except so far as it appears, but it would nevertheless have to be conceived, according to the empirical character, as we ' must always admit in thought a transcendental object, as the foundation of phenomena, though we know nothing of what it is by itself. / In its empirical character, therefore, that subject, as a phenomenon, would submit, according to all determining laws, to a causal nexus, and in that respect it would be nothing but a part of the world of sense, the effects of which, like every other phenomenon, would arise from nature without fail. As soon as external phenomena be- gan to influence it, and as soon as its empirical character, that is the law of its causality, had been known through experience, all its actions ought to admit of explanation, according to the laws of nature, and all that is requisite for its complete and necessary determination would be found in a possible experience. In its intelligible character, however (though [p. 541] we could only have a general concept of it), the same subject would have to be considered free from all influ- ence of sensibility, and from all determination through phenomena : and as in it, so far as it is a nonmenon, nothing happens, and no change which requires dynamical determination of time, and therefore no connection with phenomena as causes, can exist, that active being would so far be quite independent and free in its acts from all natural necessity, which can exist in the world of sense only. One might say of it with perfect truth that it origi- nates its effects in the world of sense by itself, though the act does not begin in itself.^ And this would be perfectly true, though the effects in the world of sense need not Transcendental Dialectic 430 therefore originate by themselves, because in it they are always determined previously through empirical conditions in the previous time, though only by means of the empiri- cal character (which is the phenomenal appearance of the intelligible character), and therefore impossible, except as a continuation of the series of natural causes. In this way freedom and nature, each in its complete signification, might exist together and without any conflict in the same action, according as we refer it to its intelligible or to its sensible cause. Explanation of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom [p. 542] in Connection ivith the General Necessity of Nature I thought it best to give first this sketch of the solution of our transcendental problem, so that the course which reason has to adopt in its solution might be more clearly surveyed. We shall now proceed to explain more fully the points on which the decision properly rests, and exam- ine each by itself. The law of nature, that everything which happens has a cause, — that the causality of that cause, that is, its activity (as it is anterior in time, and, with regard to an effect which has arisen, cannot itself have always existed, but must have happened at some time), must have its cause among the phenomena by which it is determined, and that therefore all events in the order of nature are empirically determined, this law, I say, through which alone phenom- ena become nature and objects of experience, is a law of the understanding, which can on no account be surrendered, and from which no single phenomenon can be exempted ; because in doing this we should place it outside all possible experience, separate from all objects of possible [p. 543J 440 Transcendental Dialectic experience, and change it into a mere fiction of the mind or a cobweb of the brain. But although this looks merely like a chain of causes, which in the regressus to its conditions admits of no absolute totality, this difficulty does not detain us in the least, be- cause it has already been removed in the general criticism of the antinomy of reason when, starting from the series of phenomena, it aims at the unconditioned. Were we to yield to the illusion of transcendental realism, we should have neither nature nor freedom. The question therefore is, whether, if we recognise in the whole series of events nothing but natural necessit}', we may yet regard the same event which on one side is an effect of nature only, on the other side, as an effect of freedom ; or whether there is a direct contradiction between these two kinds of causality ? There can certainly be nothing among phenomenal causes that could originate a series absolutely and by itself. Every action, as a phenomenon, so far as it pro- duces an event, is itself an event, presupposing another state, in which its cause can be discovered ; and thus everything that happens is only a continuation of the series, and no beginning, happening by itself, is possible in it. Actions of natural causes in the succession of time are therefore themselves effects, which likewise [p. 544] presuppose causes in the series of time. A spontaneous and original action by which something takes place, which did not exist before, cannot be expected from the causal nexus of phenomena. But is it really necessary that, if effects are phenomena, the causality of their cause, which cause itself is phenom- enal, could be nothing but empirical ; or is it not possible, although for every phenomenal effect a connection with its Transce7idental Dialectic 441 cause, according to the laws of empirical causality, is cer- tainly required, that empirical causality itself could never- theless, without breaking in the least its connection with the natural causes, represent an effect of a non-empirical and intelligible causality, that is, of a caused action, orig- inal in respect to phenomena, and in so far not phenom- enal ; but, with respect to this faculty, intelligible, although, as a link in the chain of nature, to be regarded as entirely belonging to the world of sense ? We require the principle of the causality of phenomena among themselves, in order to be able to look for and to produce natural conditions, that is, phenomenal causes of natural events. If this is admitted and not weakened by any exceptions, the understanding, which in its empirical employment recognises in all events nothing but nature, and is quite justified in doing so, has really all [p. 545] that it can demand, and the explanations of physical phe- nomena may proceed without let or hindrance. The under- standing would not be wronged in the least, if we assumed, though it be a mere fiction, that some among the natural causes have a faculty which is intelligible only, and whose determination to activity does not rest on empirical condi- tions, but on mere grounds of the intellect, if only the ///£?- nomenal activity of that cause is in accordance with all the laws of empirical causality. For in this way the active subject, as causa phaenomenon, would be joined with nature through the indissoluble dependence of all its actions, and the noumenon ^ only of that subject (with all its phenomenal causality) would contain certain conditions which, if we want to ascend from the empirical to the transcendental ^ It seems better to read noumenon instead of phenomenon. 442 Transcendental Dialectic object, would have to be considered as intelligible only. For, if only we follow the rule of nature in that which may be the cause among phenomena, it is indifferent to us what kind of ground of those phenomena, and of their con- nection, may be conceived to exist in the transcendental subject, which is empirically unknown to us. This intel- ligible ground does not touch the empirical questions, but concerns only, as it would seem, the thought in the pure understanding ; and although the effects of that thought and action of the pure understanding may be dis- [p. 546] covered in the phenomena, these have nevertheless to he completely explained from their phenomenal cause, accord- ing to the laws of nature, by taking their empirical char- acter as the highest ground of explanation, and passing by the intelligible character, which is the transcendental cause of the other, as entirely unknown, except so far as it is indicated by the empirical, as its sensuous sign. Let us apply this to experience. Man is one among the phe- nomena of the world of sense, and in so far one of the natural causes the causality of which must be subject to empirical laws. As such he must therefore have an em- pirical character, like all other objects of nature. We perceive it through the forces and faculties which he shows in his actions and effects. In the lifeless or merely animal nature we see no ground for admitting any faculty, except as sensuously conditioned. Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature through his senses only, knows himself through mere apperception also, and this in actions and internal determinations, which he cannot ascribe to the impressions of the senses. Man is thus to himself partly a phenomenon, partly, however, namely with reference to certain faculties, a purely intelligible Transcendental Dialectic 443 object, because the actions of these faculties cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility. We [p. 547] call these faculties understanding and reason. It is the latter, in particular, which is entirely distinguished from all empirically conditioned forces or faculties, because it weighs its objects according to ideas, and determines the understanding accordingly, which then makes an empirical use of its (by themselves, however pure) concepts. That our reason possesses causality, or that we at least represent to ourselves such a causality in it, is clear from the imperatives which, in all practical matters, we impose as rules on our executive powers. The ought expresses a kind of necessity and connection with cauSes, which we do not find elsewhere in the whole of nature. The understanding can know in nature only what is present, past, or future. It is impossible that anything in it ought to be different from what it is in reality, in all these rela- tions of time. Nay, if we only look at the course of nature, the ought has no meaning whatever. We cannot ask, what ought to be in nature, as little as we can ask, what qualities a circle ought to possess. We can only ask what happens in it, and what qualities that which happens has. This ought expresses a possible action, the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept ; while in every merely natural action the ground must [p. 548] always be a phenomenon. Now it is quite true that the action to which the ought applies must be possible under natural conditions, but these natural conditions do not affect the determination of the will itself, but only its effects and results among phenomena. There may be ever so many natural grounds which impel me to will and 444 Transcendental Dialectic ever so many sensuous temptations, but they can never produce the ought, but only a willing which is always con- ditioned, but by no means necessary, and to which the ought, pronounced by reason, opposes measure, ay, pro- hibition and authority. Whether it be an object of the senses merely (pleasure), or of pure reason (the good), reason does not yield to the impulse that is given em- pirically, and does not follow the order of things, as they present themselves as phenomena, but frames for itself, with perfect spontaneity, a new order according to ideas to which it adapts the empirical conditions, and according to which it declares actions to be necessary, even though they have* not taken place, and, maybe, never will take place. Yet it is presupposed that reason may have causality with respect to them, for otherwise no effects in experience could be expected to result from these ideas. Now let us take our stand here and admit it at least as possible, that reason really possesses causality [p. 549] with reference to phenomena. In that case, reason though it be, it must show nevertheless an empirical character, because every cause presupposes a rule according to which certain phenomena follow as effects, and every rule requires in the effects a homogeneousness, on which the concept of cause (as a faculty) is founded. This, so far as it is derived from mere phenomena, may be called the empirical char- acter, which is permanent, while the effects, according to a diversity of concomitant, and in part, restraining con- ditions, appear in changeable forms. Every man therefore has an empirical character of his (arbitrary) will, which is nothing but a certain causality of his reason, exhibiting in its phenomenal actions and effects a rule, according to which one may infer the motives of Transcendental Dialectic 445 reason and its actions, both in kind and in degree, and judge of the subjective principles of his will. As that empirical character itself must be derived from phenomena, as an effect, and from their rule which is supplied by experience, all the acts of a man, so far as they are phe- nomena, are determined from his empirical character and from the other concomitant causes, according to the order of nature ; and if we could investigate all the manifesta- tions of his will to the very bottom, there would be not a single human action which we could not predict [p. 550] with certainty and recognise from its preceding conditions as necessary. There is no freedom therefore with refer- ence to this empirical character, and yet it is only with reference to it that we can consider man, when we are merely observing, and, as is the case in anthropology, try- ing to investigate the motive causes of his actions physio- logically. If, however, we consider the same actions with refer- ence to reason, not with reference to speculative reason, in order to explain their origin, but solely so far as reason is the cause ^\ac\\ produces them ; in one word, if we com- pare actions with reason, with reference to practical pur- poses, we find a rule and order, totally different from the order of nature. For, from this point of view, everything, it may be, ought not to have happened, which according to the course of nature has happened, and according to its empirical grounds, was inevitable. And sometimes we find, or believe at least that we find, that the ideas of reason have really proved their causality with reference to human actions as phenomena, and that these actions have taken place, not because they were determined by empirical causes, but by the causes of reason. 446 Transcendental Dialectic Now supposing one could say that reason [p. 551] possesses causality in reference to phenomena, could the action of reason be called free in that case, as it is accu- rately determined by the empirical character (the disposi- tion) and rendered necessary by it ? That character again is determined in the intelligible character (way of think- ing). The latter, however, we do not know, but signify only through phenomena, which in reality give us imme- diately a knowledge of the disposition (empirical charac- ter) only.^ An action, so far as it is to be attributed to the way of thinking as its cause, does nevertheless not result from it according to empirical laws, that is, it is not preceded by the conditions of pure reason, but only by its effects in the phenomenal form of the internal sense. Pure reason, as a simple intelligible faculty, is not sub- ject to the form of time, or to the conditions of the suc- cession of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character does not arise or begin at a certain time in order to produce an effect ; for in that case it would be subject to the natural law of phenomena, which deter- [p. 552] mines all causal series in time, and its causality would then be nature and not freedom. What, therefore, we can say is, that if reason can possess causality with reference to phenomena, it is a faculty through ivhich the sensuous condition of an empirical series of effects first begins. For the condition that lies in reason is not sensuous, and 1 The true morality of actions (merit or guilt), even that of our own con- duct, remains therefore entirely hidden. Our imputations can refer to the empirical character only. How much of that may be the pure effect of free- dom, how much should be ascribed to nature only, and to the faults of tem- perament, for which man is not responsible, or its happy constitution (merilo fortunae), no one can discover, and no one can judge with perfect justice. Transcendental Dialectic 447 therefore does itself not begin. Thus we get what we missed in all empirical series, namely, that the condition of a successive series of events should itself be empirically unconditioned. For here the condition is really outside the series of phenomena (in the intelligible), and there- fore not subject to any sensuous condition, nor to any temporal determination through preceding causes. Nevertheless the same cause belongs also, in another respect, to the series of phenomena. Man himself is a phenomenon. His will has an empirical character, which is the (empirical) cause of all his actions. There is no condition, determining man according to this character, that is not contained in the series of natural effects and subject to their law, according to which there can be no empirically unconditioned causality of anything that happens in time. No given action therefore (as it can be perceived as a phenomenon only) can begin absolutely by itself. Of pure reason, however, we cannot [p. 553] say that the state in which it determines the will is pre- ceded by another in which that state itself is determined. For as reason itself is not a phenomenon, and not subject to any of the conditions of sensibility, there exists in it, even in reference to its causality, no succession of time, and the dynamical law of nature, which determines the succession of time according to rules, cannot be applied to it. Reason is therefore the constant condition of all free actions by which man takes his place in the phenomenal world. Every one of them is determined beforehand in his empirical character, before it becomes actual. With regard to the intelligible character, however, of which the empirical is only the sensuous schema, there is neither 448 Transcendental Dialectic before nor after ; and every action, without regard to the temporal relation which connects it with other phe- nomena, is the immediate effect of the intelligible char- acter of pure reason. That reason therefore acts freely, without being determined dynamically, in the chain of natural causes, by external or internal conditions, anterior in time. That freedom must then not only be regarded negatively, as independence of empirical conditions (for in that case the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of phenomena), but should be determined positively also, as the faculty of beginning spontaneously a series of events. Hence nothing begins in reason itself, [p. 554] and being itself the unconditioned condition of every free action, reason admits of no condition antecedent in time above itself, while nevertheless its effect takes its begin- ning in the series of phenomena, though it can never constitute in that series an absolutely first beginning. In order to illustrate the regulative principle of reason by an example of its empirical application, not in order to confirm it (for such arguments are useless for transcen- dental propositions), let us take a voluntary action, for example, a malicious lie, by which a man has produced a certain confusion in society, and of which we first try to find out the motives, and afterwards try to determine how far it and its consequences may be imputed to the offender. With regard to the first point, one has first to follow up his empirical character to its very sources, which are to be found in wrong education, bad society, in part also in the viciousness of a natural disposition, and a nature insensible to shame, or ascribed to frivolity and heedlessness, not omitting the occasioning causes at the time. In all this the procedure is exactly the same as Transcendental Dialectic 440 in the investigation of a series of determining causes of a given natural effect. But although one believes that the act was thus determined, one neverthe- [p. 555 ] less blames the offender, and not on account of his un- happy natural disposition, not on account of influencing circumstances, not even on account of his former course of life, because one supposes one might leave entirely out of account what that course of life may have been, and consider the past series of conditions as having never existed, and the act itself as totally unconditioned by previous states, as if the offender had begun with it a new series of effects, quite by himself. This blame is founded on a law of reason, reason being considered as a cause which, independent of all the before-mentioned empirical conditions, would and should have determined the behaviour of the man otherwise. Nay, we do not regard the causality of reason as a concurrent agency only, but as complete in itself, even though the sensuous motives did not favour, but even oppose it. The action is imputed to a man's intelligible character. At the moment when he tells the lie, the guilt is entirely his ; that is, we regard reason, in spite of all empirical condi- tions of the act, as completely free, and the act has to be imputed entirely to a fault of reason. Such an imputation clearly shows that we imagine that reason is not affected at all by the influences of the senses, and that it does not change (although its manifestations, that is the mode in which it shows itself by its [p. 556] effects, do change) : that in it no state precedes as deter- mining a following state, in fact, that reason does net belong to the series of sensuous conditions which render phenomena necessary, according to laws of nature. Rea- 2G 450 Transcendental Dialectic son, it is supposed, is present in all the actions of man, in all circumstances of time, and always the same ; but it is itself never in time, never in a newr state in which it was not before ; it is determining, never determined. We cannot ask, therefore, why reason has not determined itself differently, but only why it has not differently deter- mined the fhenomena by its causality. And here no answer is really possible. For a different intelligible character would have given a different empirical character, and if we say that, in spite of the whole of his previous course of life, the offender could have avoided the lie, this only means that it was in the power of reason, and that reason, in its causality, is subject to no phenomenal and temporal conditions, and lastly, that the difference of time, though it makes a great difference in phenomena and their rela- tion to each other, can, as these are neither things nor causes by themselves, produce no difference of action in reference to reason. We thus see that, in judging of voluntary [p. 557] actions, we can, so far as their causality is concerned, get only so far as the intelligible cause, but not beyond. We can see that that cause is free, that it determines as inde- pendent of sensibility, and therefore is capable of being the sensuously unconditioned condition of phenomena. To explain why that intelligible character should, under present circumstances, give these phenomena and this empirical character, and no other, transcends all the powers of our reason, nay, all its rights of questioning, as if we were to ask why the transcendental object of our external sensuous intuition gives us intuition in space only and no other. But the problem which we have to solve does not require us to ask or to answer such questions. Our Transcendental Dialectic 451 problem was, whether freedom is contradictory to natural necessity in one and the same action : and this we have sufficiently answered by showing that freedom may have relation to a very different kind of conditions from those of nature, so that the law of the latter does not affect the former, and both may exist independent of, and undisturbed by, each other. ******** It should be clearly understood that, in what we have said, we had no intention of establishing the reality of freedom, as one of the faculties which contain [p. 558] the cause of the phenomenal appearances in our world of sense. For not only would this have been ho transcen- dental considei"ation at all, which is concerned with con- cepts only, but it could never have succeeded, because from experience we can never infer anything but what must be represented in thought according to the laws of experience. It was not even our intention to prove l\iQ pos- sibility of freedom, for in this also we should not have suc- ceeded, because from mere concepts a priori we can never know the possibility of any real ground or any causality. We have here treated freedom as a transcendental idea only, which makes reason imagine that it can absolutely begin the series of phenomenal conditions through what is sensuously unconditioned, but by which reason becomes involved in an antinomy with its own laws, which it had prescribed to the empirical use of the understanding. That this antinomy rests on a mere illusion, and that nature does not contradict the causality of freedom, that was the only thing which we could prove, and cared to prove. 452 Transcendental Dialectic IV [p. 559] Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the De- pendence of Phenomena, with Regard to their Existence in General In the preceding article we considered the changes in the world of sense in their dynamical succession, every one being subordinate to another as its cause. Now, however, the succession of states is to serve only as our guide in order to arrive at an existence that might be the highest condition of all that is subject to change, namely, the necessary Being. We are concerned here, not with the unconditioned causality, but with the unconditioned exist- ence of the substance itself. Therefore the succession which we have before us is properly one of concepts and not of intuitions, so far as the one is the condition of the other. It is easy to see, however, that as everything compre- hended under phenomena is changeable, and therefore conditioned in its existence, there cannot be, in the whole series of dependent existence, any unconditioned link the existence of which might be considered as absolutely necessary, and that therefore, if phenomena were things by themselves, and their condition accordingly belonged with the conditioned always to one and the same series of intuitions, a necessary being, as the condition of [p. 560] the existence of the phenomena of the world of sense, could never exist. The dynamical regressus has this peculiar distinction as compared with the mathematical, that, as the latter is only concerned with the composition of parts in forming a whole or the division of a whole into its parts, the conditions of Transcendental Dialectic 453 that series must always be considered as parts of it, and therefore as homogeneous and as phenomena, while in the dynamical regressus, where we are concerned, not with the possibility of an unconditioned whole, consisting of a num- ber of given parts, or of an unconditioned part belonging to a given whole, but with the derivation of a state from its cause, or of the contingent existence of the substance itself from the necessary substance, it is not required that the condition should form one and the same empirical series with the conditioned. There remains therefore to us another escape from this apparent antinomy : because both conflicting propositions might, under different aspects, be true at the same time. That is, all things of the world of sense might be entirely contingent, and have therefore an empirically conditioned existence only, though there might nevertheless be a non- empirical condition of the whole series, that is, an uncon- ditionally necessary being. For this, as an intelligible condition, would not belong to the series, as a link of it (not even as the highest link), nor would it render any link of that series empirically unconditioned, [p. 561] but would leave the whole world of sense, in all its mem- bers, in its empirically conditioned existence. This man- ner of admitting an unconditioned existence as the ground of phenomena would differ from the empirically uncondi- tioned causality (freedom), treated of in the preceding article, because, with respect to freedom, the thing itself, as cause (substantia phaenomcnon), belonged to the series of conditions, and its causality only was represented as intelligible, while here, on the contrary, the necessary be- ing has to be conceived as lying outside the series of the world of sense (as ens extramundamnn), and as purely 454 Transcendental Dialectic intelligible, by which alone it could be guarded against itself becoming subject to the law of contingency and dependence applying to all phenomena. The regulative principle of reason, with regard to our present problem, is therefore this, that everything in the world of sense has an empirically conditioned existence, and that in it there is never any unconditioned necessity with reference to any quality ; that there is no member in the series of conditions of which one ought not to expect, and as far as possible to seek, the empirical con- dition in some possible experience ; and that we are never justified in deriving any existence from a condition outside the empirical series, or in considering it as inde- pendent and self-subsistent in the series itself ; without however denying in the least that the whole [p. 562] series may depend on some intelligible being, which is free therefore from all empirical conditions, and itself contains rather the ground of the possibility of all those phenomena.. By this we by no means intend to prove the uncondi- tionally necessary existence of such a being, or even to demonstrate the possibility of a purely intelligible condi- tion of the existence of the phenomena of the world of sense. But as on the one side we limit reason, lest it should lose the thread of the empirical condition and lose itself in transcendent explanations incapable of being repre- sented in concreto, thus, on the other side, we want to limit the law of the purely empirical use of the under- standing, lest it should venture to decide on the possibil- ity of things in general, and declare the intelligible to be impossible, because it has been shown to be useless for the explanation of phenomena. What is shown by this Transcendental Dialectic 455 is simply this, that the complete contingency of all things in nature and of all their (empirical) conditions, may well coexist with the arbitrary presupposition of a necessary, though purely intelligible condition, and that, as there is no real contradiction between these two views, they may well both be true. Granted even that such an absolutely necessary being, as postulated by the under- [p. 563] standing, is impossible in itself, we still maintain that this cannot be concluded from the general contingency and dependence of all that belongs to the world of sense, nor from the principle that we ought not to stop at any single member so far as it is contingent, and appeal to a cause outside the world. Reason follows its own course in its empirical, and again a peculiar course in its transcen- dental use. The world of sense contains nothing but phenomena, and these are mere representations which are always sen- suously conditioned. As our objects are never things by themselves, we need not be surprised that we are never justified in making a jump from any member of the sev- eral empirical series, beyond the connection of sensibility, as if they were things by themselves, existing apart from their transcendental ground, and which we might leave behind in order to seek for the cause of their existence outside them. This, no doubt, would have to be done in the end with contingent things, but not with mere repre- sentations of things, the contingency of which is itself a phenomenon, and cannot lead to any other regressus but that which determines the phenomena, that is, which is empirical. To conceive, however, an intelligible ground of phenomena, that is, of the world of sense, and to con- ceive it as freed from the contingency of the latter, does 456 Transcendental Dialectic not run counter either to the unlimited empirical regressus in the series of phenomena, nor to their general contin- gency. And this is really the only thing which [p. 564] we had to do in order to remove this apparent antinomy, and which could be done in this wise only. For if every condition of everything conditioned (according to its exist- ence) is sensuous, and therefore belongs to the series, that series is again conditioned (as shown in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy). Either therefore there would re- main a conflict with reason, which postulates the uncondi- tioned, or this would have to be placed outside the series, i.e. in the intelligible, the necessity of which neither re- quires nor admits of any empirical condition, and is there- fore, as regards phenomena, unconditionally necessary. The empirical use of reason (with regard to the condi- tions of existence in the world of sense) is not affected by the admission of a purely intelligible being, but ascends, according to the principle of a general contingency, from empirical conditions to higher ones, which again are empirical. This regulative principle, however, does not exclude the admission of an intelligible cause not compre- hended in the series, when we come to the pure use of reason (with reference to ends or aims). For in this case, an intelligible cause only means the transcendental, and, to us, unknown ground of the possibility of the sen- suous series in general, and the existence of this, inde- pendent of all conditions of the sensuous series, and, in reference to it, unconditionally, necessary, is by [p. 565] no means opposed to the unlimited contingency of the former, nor to the never-ending regressus in the series of empirical conditions. Transcendental Dialectic 457 Concluding Remark on the Whole Antinomy of Pure Reason So long as it is only the totality of the conditions in the world of sense and the interest it can have to reason, that form the object of the concepts of our reason, our ideas are no doubt transcendental, but yet cosmological. If, however, we place the unconditioned (with which we are chiefly concerned) in that which is entirely outside the world of sense, therefore beyond all possible experience, our ideas become transcendent : for they serve not only for the completion of the empirical use of the understanding (which always remains an idea that must be obeyed, though it can never be fully carried out), but they separate them- selves entirely from it, and create to themselves objects the material of which is not taken from experience, and the objective reality of which does not rest on the comple- tion of the empirical series, but on pure concepts a priori. Such transcendent ideas have a merely intelligible object, which may indeed be admitted as a transcendental object, of which, for the rest, we know nothing, but for which, if we wish to conceive it as a thing determined by its inter- nal distinguishing predicates, we have neither [p. 566] grounds of possibility (as independent of all concepts of experience) nor the slightest justification on our side in admitting it as an object, and which, therefore, is a mere creation of our thoughts. Nevertheless that cosmological idea, which owes its origin to the fourth antinomy, urges us on to take that step. For the conditioned existence of all phenomena, not being founded in itself, requires us to look out for something different from all phenomena, that is, for an intelligible object in which there should be no 458 Transcendental Dialectic more contingency. As, however, if we have once allowed ourselves to admit, outside the field of the whole of sensibil- ity, a reality existing by itself, phenomena can only be con- sidered as contingent modes of representing intelligible objects on the part of beings which themselves are intel- ligences,^ nothing remains to us, in order to form some kind of concept of intelligible things, of which in them- selves we have not the slightest knowledge, but analogy, applied to the concepts of experience. As we know the contingent by experience only, but have here to deal with things which are not meant to be objects of experience, we shall have to derive our knowledge of them from what is necessary in itself, that is, from pure concepts of things in general. Thus the first step which we take [p. 567] outside the world of sense, obliges us to begin our new knowledge with the investigation of the absolutely neces- sary Being, and to derive from its concepts the concepts of all things, so far as they are intelligible only ; and this we shall attempt to do in the next chapter. 1 After anzusehen, sind may be added for the sake of clearness, but it is often omitted in Kant's style. THE SECOND BOOK OF TRANSCEN- DENTAL DIALECTIC CHAPTER III THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON Section I Of the Ideal in General We have seen that without the conditions of sensibility, it is impossible to represent objects by means of the pure concepts of the understanditig, because the conditions of their objective reality are absent, and they contain the mere form of thought only. If, however, we apply these concepts to phenomena, they can be represented in con- creto, because in the phenomena they have the material for forming concepts of experience, which are nothing but concepts of the understanding ift concreto. Ideas, however, are still further removed from objective reality than the categories, because they can meet with no phenomenon in which they could be represented in concreto. They con- tain a certain completeness unattainable by any [p. 568] possible empirical knowledge, and reason aims in them at a systematical unity only, to which the empirically possible unity is to approximate, without ever fully reaching it. Still further removed from objective reality than the Idea, would seem to be what I call the Ideal, by which I mean the idea, not only iti concreto, but in individuo, that 459 460 Tratiscendental Dialectic is, an individual thing determinable or even determined by the idea alone. Humanity (as an idea), in its complete perfection, im- plies not only all essential qualities belonging to human nature, which constitute our concept of it, enlarged to a degree of complete agreement with the highest aims that would represent our idea of perfect humanity, but every- thing also which, beside this concept, is required for the complete determination of the idea. For of all contra- dictory predicates one only can agree with the idea of the most perfect man. What to us is an ideal, was in Plato's language an Idea of a divine mind, an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenom- enal copies. Without soaring so high, we have to admit [p. 569] that human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals also, which though they have not, like those of Plato, creative, yet have certainly practical power (as regulative prin- ciples), and form the basis of the possible perfection of certain acts. Moral concepts are not entirely pure con- cepts of reason, because they rest on something empirical, pleasure or pain. Nevertheless, with regard to the prin- ciple by which reason imposes limits on freedom, which in itself is without laws, these moral concepts (with regard to their form at least) may well serve as examples of pure concepts of reason. Virtue and human wisdom in its per- fect purity are ideas, while the wise man (of the Stoics) is an ideal, that is, a man existing in thought only, but in complete agreement with the idea of wisdom. While the idea gives rides, the ideal serves as the arclietype for the permanent determination of the copy ; and we have no Transcendental Dialectic 461 other rule of our actions but the conduct of that divine man within us, with which we compare ourselves, and by which we judge and better ourselves, though we can never reach it. These ideals, though they cannot claim objective reality (existence), are not therefore to be considered as mere chimeras, but supply reason with an indispensable standard, because it requires the concept of that which is perfect of its kind, in order to estimate and [p. 570] measure by it the degree and the number of the defects in the imperfect. To attempt to realise the ideal in an example, that is, as a real phenomenon, as we might represent a perfectly wise man in a novel, is impossible, nay, absurd, and but little encouraging, because the natural limits, which are constantly interfering with the perfection in the idea, make all illusion in such an experi- ment impossible, and thus render the good itself in the idea suspicious and unreal. This is the case with the ideal of reason, which must always rest on definite concepts, and serve as rule and model, whether for imitation or for criticism. The case is totally different with those creations of our imagina- tion of which it is impossible to give an intelligible concept, or say anything, — which are in fact a kind of monogram, consisting of single lines without any apparent rule, a vague outline rather of different experiences than a definite image, such as painters and physiognomists pretend to carry in their heads, and of which they speak as a kind of vague shadow only of their creations and criticisms that can never be communicated to others. They may be termed, though improperly, ideals of sen- sibility, because they are meant to be the never-attain- able model of possible empirical intuitions, and yet fur- 462 Transcendental Dialectic nish no rule capable of being explained or ex- [p. 571] amined. In its ideal, on the contrary, reason aims at a perfect determination, according to rules a priori, and it conceives an object throughout determinable according to principles, though without the sufficient conditions of experience, so that the concept itself is transcendent. THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON Section II Of the Transcendental Ideal {Prototypon Transcendentale) Every concept is, with regard to that which is not contained in it, undetermined and subject to the prin- ciple of determinability, according to which of every two contradictprily opposite predicates, one only can belong to it. This rests on the principle of contradiction, and is therefore a purely logical principle, taking no account of any of the contents of our knowledge, and looking only to its logical form. Besides this everything is subject, in its possibility, to the principle of complete determination, according to which one of all the possible predicates of things, as com- pared with their opposites, must be applicable [p. 572] to it. This does not rest only on the principle of contra- diction, for it regards everything, not only in relation to two contradictory predicates, but in relation to the whole possibility, that is, to the whole of all predicates of things, and, presupposing these as a condition a priori, it repre- sents everything as deriving its own possibility from the Transcendental Dialectic 463 share which it possesses in that whole possibility,^ This principle of complete determination relates therefore to the content, and not only to the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates which are meant to form the complete concept of a thing, and not the principle of analytical representation only, by means of one of two contradictory predicates ; and it contains a transcendental presupposition, namely, that of the material for all possibility which is supposed to contain [p. 573] a priori the data for the particular possibility of everything. The proposition, that everything which exists is com- pletely determined, does not signify only that one of every pair of given contradictory predicates, but that one of all possible predicates must always belong to a thing, so that by this proposition predicates are not only compared with each other logically, but the thing itself is compared tran- scendentally with the sum total of all possible predicates. The proposition really means that, in order to know a thing completely, we must know everything that is pos- sible, and thereby determine it either affirmatively or negatively. This complete determination is therefore a concept which in concreto can never be represented in its totality, and is founded therefore on an idea which belongs to reason only, reason prescribing to the under- standing the rule of its complete application. ' According to this principle, therefore, everything is referred to a common correlate, that is, the whole possibility, which, if it (that is, the matter for all possible predicates) could be found in the idea of any single thing, would prove an affinity of all possible things, through the identity of the ground of their complete determination. The determinability of any concept is subordi- nate to the universality {universalitas) of the principle of the excluded middle, while the determination of a thing is subordinate to the totality (universitas), or the sum total of all possible predicates. 464 Transcendental Dialectic Now although this idea of the sum total of all possibility, so far as it forms the condition of the complete determina- tion of everything, is itself still undetermined with regard to its predicates, and is conceived by us merely as a sum total of all possible predicates, we find nevertheless on closer examination that this idea, as a fundamental con- cept, excludes a number of predicates which, being deriva- tive, are given by others, or cannot stand one [p. 574] by the side of the other, and that it is raised to a com- pletely a priori determined concept, thus becoming the concept of an individual object which is completely deter- mined by the mere idea, and must therefore be called an ideal of pure reason. If we consider all possible predicates not only logically, but transcendentally, that is, according to their content, which may be thought in them a priori, we find that through some we represent being, through others a mere not-being. The logical negation, which is merely indicated through the small word not, does in reality never apply to a concept, but only to its relation to another in a judg- ment, and is very far therefore from being sufficient to determine a concept with regard to its content. The ex- pression, not-mortal, can in no wise indicate that mere not- being if thereby represented in an object, but leaves the content entirely untouched. A transcendental negation, on the contrary, signifies not-being by itself, and is opposed to transcendental affirmation, or a something the concept of which in itself expresses being. It is called, therefore, reality (from res, a thing), because through it alone, and so far only as it reaches, are objects something, while the opposite negation indicates a mere want, and, if [p. 575] it stands by itself, represents the absence of everything. Transcendental Dialectic 465 No one can definitely think a negation, unless he founds it on the opposite affirmation. A man born blind cannot frame the smallest conception of darkness, because he has none of light. The savage knows nothing of poverty, be- cause he does not know ease, and the ignorant has no conception of his ignorance,^ because he has none of know- ledge, etc. All negative concepts are therefore derivative, and it is the realities which contain the data and, so to speak, the material, or the transcendental content, by which a complete determination of all things becomes possible. If, therefore, our reason postulates a transcendental 1 substratum for all determinations, a substratum which contains, as it were, the whole store of material whence all possible predicates of things may be taken, we shall find that such a substratum is nothing but the idea of the : sum total of reality (pmnitudo realitatis). In [p. 576] that case all true negations are nothing but limitations which they could not be unless there were the substratum of the unlimited (the All). By this complete possession of all reality we represent 1 the concept of a thing by itself 2.% completely determined, ! and the concept of an ens realissinium is the concept of individual being, because of all possible opposite predicates one, namely, that which absolutely belongs to being, is found in its determination. It is therefore a transcen- dental ideal which forms the foundations of the complete 1 The observations and calculations of astronomers have taught us much that is wonderful; but the most important is, that they have revealed to us the abyss of our ignorance, which otherwise human reason could never have conceived so great. To meditate on this must produce a great change in the determination of the aims of our reason. 466 Transcendental Dialectic determination which is necessary for all that exists, and which constitutes at the same time the highest and complete condition of its possibility, to which all thought of objects, with regard to their content, must be traced back. It is at the same time the only true ideal of which human reason is capable, because it is in this case alone that a concept of a thing, which in itself is general, is completely determined by itself, and recognised as the representation of an in- dividual. The logical determination of a concept by reason is based upon a disjunctive syllogism in which the major contains a logical division (the division of the sphere of a general concept), while the minor limits that sphere to a certain part, and the conclusion determines the concept by that part. The general concept of a reality [p. 577] in general cannot be divided a priori, because without ex- perience we know no definite kinds of reality contained under that genus. Hence the transcendental major of the complete determination of all things is nothing but a rep- resentation of the sum total of all reality, and not only a concept which comprehends all predicates, according to their transcendental content, under itself, but within itself; and the complete determination of everything depends on the limitation of this total of reality, of which some part is ascribed to the thing, while the rest is excluded from it, a procedure which agrees with the aut aut of a disjunctive major, and with the determination of the object through one of the members of that division in the minor. Thus the procedure of reason by which the transcendental ideal becomes the basis of the determination of all possible things, is analogous to that which reason follows in dis- junctive syllogisms, a proposition on which I tried before Transcendental Dialectic 467 to base the systematical division of all transcendental ideas, and according to which they are produced, as corresponding to the three kinds of the syllogisms of reason. It is self-evident that for that purpose, namely, in order simply to represent the necessary and complete deter- mination of things, reason does not presuppose [p. 578] the existence of a being that should correspond to the ideal, but its idea only, in order to derive from an uncon- ditioned totality of complete determination the condi- tioned one, that is the totality of something limited. Reason therefore sees in the ideal the prototypon of all things which, as imperfect copies {ectypd), derive the material of their possibility from it, approaching more or less nearly to it, yet remaining always far from reach- ing it. Thus all the possibility of things (or of the synthesis of the manifold according to their content) is considered as derivative, and the possibility of that only which in- cludes in itself all reality as original. For all negations (which really are the only predicates by which every- thing else is distinguished from the truly real being) are limitations only of a greater and, in the last instance, of the highest reality, presupposing it, and, according to their content, derived from it. All the manifoldness of things consist only of so many modes of limiting the concept of the highest reality that forms their common substratum, in the same way as all figures are only differ- ent modes of limiting endless space. Hence the object of its ideal which exists in reason only is called the orig- inal Being (ens originarium), and so far as it has nothing above it, the highest Being {ens summum), and so far 468 Transcendental Dialectic as everything as conditioned is subject to it, the Being of all beings {ens entiimi). All this however does not mean the objective relation of any real thing to other [p. 579] things, but of the idea to concepts, and leaves us in perfect ignorance as to the existence of a being of such super- ' lative excellence. Again, as we cannot say that an original being consists of so many derivative beings, because these in reality pre- suppose the former, and cannot therefore constitute it, ' it follows that the ideal of the original being must be conceived as simple. I The derivation of all other possibility from that original being cannot therefore, if we speak accurately, be consid- ered as a limitation of its highest reality, and, as it were, a division of it — for in that case the original being would become to us a mere aggregate of derivative beings, which, according to what we have just explained, is impos- sible, though we represented it so in our first rough i sketch. ( On the contrary, the highest reality would form the basis of the possibility of all things as a cause, and not as a sum total.) The manifoldness of things would not depend on the limitation of the original being, but on its complete effect, and to this also would belong all our sensibility, together with all reality in phenomenal appearance, which could not, as an ingredient, belong to the idea of a supreme being. If we follow up this idea of ours and hyjpos- [p. 580] I ta|i.se it, we shall be able to determine the original being by means of the concept of the highest reality as one, simple, all sufficient, eternal, etc., in one word, determine it in its unconditioned completeness through all predica- ments. The concept of such a being is the concept of Transcendental Dialectic 469 God in its transcendental sense, and thus, as I indicated above, the ideal of pure reason is the object of a tran- scendental theology. By such an employment of the transcendental idea, however, we should be overstepping the Hmits of its purpose and admissibility. Reason used it only, as being the concept of all reality, for a foundation of the complete determination of things in general, without requiring that all this reality should be given objectively and constitute itself a thing. This is a mere fiction by which we com- prehend and realise the manifold of our idea in one ideal, as a particular being. We have no right to do this, not even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis ; nor do all the consequences which flow from such an ideal concern the complete determination of things in general, for the sake of which alone the idea was necessary, or influence it in the least. It is not enough to describe the procedure [p. 581 J of our reason and its dialectic, we must try also to dis- cover its sources, in order to be able to explain that illu- sion itself as a phenomenon of the understanding. The ideal of which we are speaking is founded on a natural, not on a purely arbitrary idea. I ask, therefore, how does it happen that reason considers all the possibility of things as derived from one fundamental possibility, namely, that of the highest reality, and then presupposes it as contained in a particular original being } The answer is easily found in the discussions of the transcendental Analytic. The possibility of the objects of our senses is their relation to our thought, by which something (namely, the empirical form) can be thought a priori, while what constitutes the matter, the reality 470 Transcendental Dialectic in the phenomena (all that corresponds to sensation) must be given, because without it it could not even be thought, nor its possibility be represented. An object of the senses can be completely determined only when it is compared with all phenomenal predicates, and represented by them either affirmatively or negatively. As, however, that which constitutes the thing itself (as a phenomenon), namely, the real, must be given, and as without this the thing could not be conceived at all, and as that in which the real of all phenomena is given is what we [p. 582] call the one and all comprehending experience, it is nec- essary that the material for the possibility of all objects of our senses should be presupposed as given in one whole, on the limitation of which alone the possibility of all empirical objects, their difference from each other, and their complete determination can be founded. And since no other objects can be given us but those of the senses, and nowhere but in the context of a possible experience, nothing can be an object to us, if it does not presuppose that whole of all empirical reality, as the con- dition of its possibility. Owing to a natural illusion, we are led to consider a principle which applies only to the objects of onr senses, as a principle valid for all things, and thus to take the empirical principle of our concepts of the possibility of things as phenomena, by omitting this limitation, as a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general. If afterwards we hypostasise this idea of the whole of all reality, this is owing to our changing dialectically the distributive unity of the empirical use of our understand- ing into the collective unity of an empirical whole, and then represent to ourselves this whole of phenomena as Transcendental Dialectic ^yi an individual thing, containing in itself all empirical reality. Afterwards, by means of the aforementioned tran- [p. 583] scendental subreption, this is taken for the concept of a thing standing at the head of the possibility of all things, and supplying the real conditions for their complete de- termination. 1 THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON Section III Of the Arguments of Speculative Reason in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being Notwithstanding this urgent want of reason to presup- pose something, as a foundation for the complete deter- mination of the concepts of the understanding, reason nevertheless becomes too soon aware of the purely ideal and factitious character of such a supposition to allow itself to be persuaded by it alone to admit a [p. 584] mere creation of thought as a real being, unless it were forced by something else to seek for some rest in its regressus from the conditioned, which is given, to the unconditioned which, though in itself and according to its mere concept not given as real, can alone complete the series of conditions followed up to their causes. This is ' This ideal of the most real of all things, although merely a representation, is first realised, that is, changed into an object, then hypostasisid, and lastly, by the natural progress of reason towards unity, as we shall presently show, personified; because the regulative unity of experience does not rest on the phenomena themselves (sensibility alone), but on the connection of the mani- fold, through the understanding (in an apperception), so that the unity of the highest reality, and the complete determinability (possibility) of all things, seem to reside in a supreme understanding, and therefore in an inteUigence. 472 Transcendental Dialectic the natural course, taken by the reason of every, even the most ordinary, human being, although not every one can hold out in it. It does not begin with concepts, but with common experience, and thus has something really exist- ing for its foundation. That foundation however sinks, unless it rests upon the immoveable rock of that which is absolutely necessary ; and this itself hangs without a sup- port, if without and beneath it there be empty space, and everything be not filled by it, so that no room be left for a wliy, — in fact, if it be not infinite in reality. If we admit the existence of something, whatever it may be, we must also admit that something exists by necessity. For the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause, and from this the same con- clusion leads us on till we reach a cause which is not con- tingent, and therefore unconditionally necessary. This is the argument on which reason founds its progress towards an original being. Now reason looks out for the concept of a [p. 585] being worthy of such a distinction as the unconditioned necessity of its existence, not in order to conclude a priori its existence from its concept (for if it ventured to do this, it might confine itself altogether to mere concepts, without looking for a given existence as their foundation), but only in order to find among all concepts of possible things one which has nothing incompatible with absolute necessity. For that something absolutely necessary must exist, is regarded as certain after the first conclusion. And after discarding everything else, as incompatible with that necessity, reason takes the one being that remains for the absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity can be comprehended, that is, derived from its concept alone, or Transcendental Dialectic 473 not. Now the being the concept of which contains a therefore for every wherefore, which is in no point and no respect defective, and is sufficient as a condition every- where, seems, on that account, to be most compatible with absolute necessity, because, being in possession of all con- ditions of all that is possible, it does not require, nay, is not capable of any condition, and satisfies at least in this one respect the concept of unconditioned necessity more than any other concept which, because it is deficient and in need of completion, does not exhibit any such [p. 586] characteristic of independence from all further conditions. It is true that we ought not to conclude that what does not contain the highest and in every respect complete condition, must therefore be conditioned even in its existence ; yet it does not exhibit the only characteristic of unconditioned existence, by which reason is able to know any being as unconditioned by means of a concept a priori. The concept of a being of the highest reality (ens rea- lissimum) would therefore seem of all concepts of all pos- sible things to be the most compatible with the concept of an unconditionally necessary Being, and though it may not satisfy that concept altogether, yet no choice is left to us, and we are forced to keep to it, because we must not risk the existence of a necessary Being, and, if we admit it, can, in the whole field of possibility, find nothing that could produce better founded claims on such a distinction in existence. This therefore is the natural course of human reason. It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary Being. In this being it recognises unconditioned existence. It then seeks for the concept of that which is 474 Transcendental Dialectic independent of all condition, and finds it in that [p. 587] which is itself the sufficient condition of all other things, that is, in that which contains all reality. Now as the unlimited all is absolute unity, and implies the concept of a being, one and supreme, reason concludes that the Supreme Being, as the original cause of all things, must exist by absolute necessity. We cannot deny that this argument possesses a certain foundation, when we must come to a decision, that is, when, after having once admitted the existence of some one necessary Being, we agree that we must decide where to place it ; for in that case we could not make a better choice, or we have really no choice, but are forced to vote for the absolute unity of complete reality, as the source of all possibility. If, however, we are not forced to come to a decision, but prefer to leave the question open till our con- sent has been forced by the full weight of arguments, that is, if we only have to form a judgment of what we really do know, and what we only seem to know, then our for- mer conclusion does by no means appear in so favourable a light, and must appeal to favour in order to make up for the defects of its legal claims. For, if we accept everything as here stated, namely, _^n'/, that we may infer rightly from any given exist- [p. 588] ence (perhaps even my own only) the existence of an un- conditionally necessary Being, secondly, that I must con- sider a being which contains all reality and therefore also all condition, as absolutely unconditioned, and that there- fore the concept of the thing which is compatible with absolute necessity has thus been found, it follows by no means from this, that a concept of a limited being, which does not possess the highest reality, is therefore contra- Transcendefital Dialectic 475 dictory to absolute necessity. For, though I do not find in its concept the unconditioned which carries the whole of conditions with it, this does not prove that, for the same reason, its existence must be conditioned ; for I cannot say in a hypothetical argument, that if a certain condition is absent (here the completeness according to concepts), the conditioned also is absent. On the contrary, it will be open to us to consider all the rest of limited beings as equally unconditioned, although we cannot from the gen- eral concept which we have of them deduce their neces- sity. Thus this argument would not have given us the least concept of the qualities of a necessary Being, in fact it would not have helped us in the least. Nevertheless this argument retains a certain importance and authority, of which it cannot be at once deprived on account of this objective insufficiency. For sup- [p. 589] pose that there existed certain obligations, quite correct in the idea of reason, but without any reality in their applica- tion to ourselves, that is without any motives, unless we admitted a Supreme Being to give effect to practical laws, we should then be bound to follow the concepts which, though not objectively sufficient, are yet, according to the standard of our reason, preponderant, and more convincing than any others. The duty of deciding would here turn the balance against the hesitation of speculation by an additional practical weight; nay, reason would not be justi- fied, even before the most indulgent judge, if, under such urgent pleas, though with deficient insight, it had not fol- lowed its judgment, of which we can say at least, that we know no better. This argument, though it is no doubt transcendental, as based on the internal insufficiency of the contingent, is 476 Transcendental Dialectic nevertheless so simple and natural, that the commonest understanding accepts it, if once led up to it. We see things change, arise and perish, and these, or at least their state, must therefore have a cause. Of [p. S90] every cause, however, that is given in experience, the same question must be asked. Where, therefore, could we more fairly place the last causality, except where there exists also the supreme causality, that is in that Being, which originally contains in itself the sufficient cause for every possible effect, and the concept of which can easily be realised by the one trait of an all-comprehending per- fection .'' That supreme cause we afterwards consider as absolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely neces- sary to ascend to it, while there is no ground for going beyond it. Thus among all nations, even when still in a state of blind polytheism, we always see some sparks of monotheism, to which they have been led, not by medita- tion and profound speculation, but by the natural bent of the common understanding, which they gradually fol- lowed and comprehended. There are only three kinds of proofs of the existence of God from speculative reason. All the paths that can be followed to this end begin either from definite experience and the peculiar nature of the world of sense, known to us through experience, and ascend from it, according to the laws of causality, to the highest cause, existing outside the world ; or they rest on indefinite experience only, that is, on any exist- ence which is empirically given ; or lastly, they leave all experience out of account, and conclude, entirely a priori from mere concepts, the existence of a supreme [p. 591] cause. The first proof is the physico-tkcological, the second Transcendental Dialectic 477 the cosmological, the third the ontological proof. There are no more, and there can be no more. I shall show that neither on the one path, the empirical, nor on the other, the transcendental, can reason achieve anything, and that it stretches its wings in vain, if it tries to soar beyond the world of sense by the mere power of speculation. With regard to the order in which these three arguments should be examined, it will be the oppo- site of that, followed by reason in its gradual development, in which we placed them also at first ourselves. For we shall be able to show that, although experience gives the first impulse, it is the transcendental concept only which guides reason in its endeavours, and fixes the last goal which reason wishes to retain. I shall therefore begin with the examination of the transcendental proof, and see afterwards how far it may be strengthened by the addition of empirical elements. THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON [p. 592] Section IV Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God It is easily perceived, from what has been said before, that the concept of an absolutely necessary Being is a con- cept of pure reason, that is, a mere idea, the objective reality of which is by no means proved by the fact that reason requires it. That idea does no more than point to a certain but unattainable completeness, and serves rather to limit the understanding, than to extend its sphere. It seems strange and absurd, however, that a conclusion of 4/8 Transcendental Dialectic an absolutely necessary existence from a given existence in general should seem urgent and correct, and that yet all the conditions under which the understanding can form a concept of such a necessity should be entirely against us. People have at all times been talking of an absolutely necessary Being, but they have tried, not so much to under- stand whether and how a thing of that kind could even be conceived, as rather to prove its existence. No doubt a verbal definition of that concept is quite easy, if we say that it is something the non-existence of which is impos- sible. This, however, does not make us much [p. 593] wiser with reference to the conditions that make it neces- sary ^ to consider the non-existence of a thing as absolutely inconceivable. It is these conditions which we want to know, and whether by that concept we are thinking any- thing or not. For to use the word unconditioned, in order to get rid of all the conditions which the understanding always requires, when wishing to conceive something as necessary, does not render it clear to us in the least whether, after that, we are still thinking anything or per- haps nothing, by the concept of the unconditionally necessary. Nay, more than this, people have imagined that by a number of examples they had explained this concept, at first risked at haphazard, and afterwards become quite familiar, and that therefore all further inquiry regarding its intelligibility were unnecessary. It was said that every proposition of geometry, such as, for instance, that a triangle has three angles, is absolutely necessary, and ' Read nothwendig instead of unmoglich. Noire. Transcendental Dialectic 479 people began to talk of an object entirely outside the sphere of our understanding, as if they understood per- fectly well what, by that concept, they wished to predicate of it. But all these pretended examples are taken without ex- ception from judgments only, not from things, and their existence. Now the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the same thing as an absolute necessity of things. The absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the predicate in the [p. 594] judgment. The above proposition did not say that three angles were absolutely necessary, but that under the con- dition of the existence of a triangle, three angles are given (in it) by necessity. Nevertheless, this pure logical neces- sity has exerted so powerful an illusion, that, after hav- ing formed of a thing a concept a priori so constituted that it seemed to include existence in its sphere, people thought they could conclude with certainty that, because existence necessarily belongs to the object of that concept, provided always that I accept the thing as given (existing), its existence also must necessarily be accepted (according to the rule of identity), and that the Being therefore must itself be absolutely necessary, because its existence is implied in a concept, which is accepted voluntarily only, and always under the condition that I accept the object of it as given. If in an identical judgment I reject the predicate and retain the subject, there arises a contradiction, and hence, I say, that the former belongs to the latter necessarily. But if I reject the subject as well as the predicate, there is no contradiction, because there is nothing left that can be contradicted. To accept a triangle and yet to reject 480 Transcendental Dialectic its three angles is contradictory, but there is no contradic- tion at all in admitting the non-existence of the triangle and of its three angles. The same applies to the concept of an absolutely necessary Being. Remove its [p. 595] existence, and you remove the thing itself, with all its predicates, so that a contradiction becomes impossible. There is nothing external to which the contradiction could apply, because the thing is not meant to be externally necessary ; nor is there anything internal that could be contradicted, for in removing the thing out of existence, you have removed at the same time all its internal quali- ties. If you say, God is almighty, that is a necessary judgment, because almightiness cannot be removed, if you accept a deity, that is, an infinite Being, with the concept of which that other concept is identical. But if you say, God is not, then neither his almightiness, nor any other of his predicates is given ; they are all, together with the subject, removed out of existence, and therefore there is not the slightest contradiction in that sentence. We have seen therefore that, if I remove the predicate of a judgment together with its subject, there can never be an internal contradiction, whatever the predicate may be. The only way of evading this conclusion would be to say that there are subjects which cannot be removed out of existence, but must always remain. But this would be the same as to say that there exist absolutely necessary subjects, an assumption the correctness of which I have called in question, and the possibility of which you had undertaken to prove. For I cannot form to myself the smallest concept of a thing which, if it had been removed together with all its predicates, should leave be- [p. 596] hind a contradiction ; and except contradiction, I have Transcendental Dialectic 481 no other test of impossibility by pure concepts a priori. Against all these general arguments (which no one can object to) you challenge me with a case, which you repre- sent as a proof by a fact, namely, that there is one, and this one concept only, in which the non-existence or the removal of its object would be self-contradictory, namely, the concept of the most real Being (ens realissimum). You say that it possesses all reality, and you are no doubt justified in accepting such a Being as possible. This for the present I may admit, though the absence of self-con- tradictoriness in a concept is far from proving the possi- bility of its object.^ Now reality comprehends existence, and therefore existence is contained in the concept of a thing possible. If that thing is removed, the [p. 597] internal possibility of the thing would be removed, and this is self-contradictory. I answer: — Even in introducing into the concept of a thing, which you wish to think in its possibility only, the concept of its existence, under whatever disguise it may be, you have been guilty of a contradiction. If you were allowed to do this, you would apparently have carried your point ; but in reality you have achieved nothing, but have only committed a tautology. I simply ask you, whether the proposition, that this or that thing (which, ^ A concept is always possible, if it is not self-contradictory. This is the logical characteristic of possibility, and by it the object of the concept is dis- tinguished from the nihil negativum. But it may nevertheless be an empty concept, unless the objective reality of the synthesis, by which the concept is generated, has been distinctly shown. This, however, as shown above, must always rest on principles of possible experience, and not on the principle of analysis (the principle of contradiction). This is a warning against inferring at once from the possibility of concepts (logical) the possibility of things (real). 482 Transcendental Dialectic whatever it may be, I grant you as possible) exists, is an analytical or a synthetical proposition ? If the former, then by its existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing ; but in that case, either the thought within you would be the thing itself, or you have presupposed existence, as belonging to possibility, and have according to your own showing deduced existence from internal possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The mere word reality, which in the concept of a thing sounds different from existence in the concept of the pred- icate, can make no difference. For if you call all accept- ing or positing (without determining what it is) reality, you have placed a thing, with all its predicates, within the con- cept of the subject, and accepted it as real, and you do nothing but repeat it in the predicate. If, on the [p. 598] contrary, you admit, as every sensible man must do, that every proposition involving existence is synthetical, how can you say that the predicate of existence does not admit of removal without contradiction, a distinguishing property which is peculiar to analytical propositions only, the very character of which depends on it } I might have hoped to put an end to this subtle argu- mentation, without many words, and simply by an accurate definition of the concept of existence, if I had not seen that the illusion, in mistaking a logical predicate for a real one (that is the predicate which determines a thing), resists all correction. Everything can become a logical predicate, even the subject itself may be predicated of itself, because logic takes no account of any contents of concepts. Deter- mination, however, is a predicate, added to the concept of the subject, and enlarging it, and it must not therefore be contained in it. Transcendental Dialectic 483 Being is evidently not a real predicate, or a concept of something that can be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the admission of a thing, and of certain deter- minations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, God is almighty, contains two concepts, each having its object, namely, God and almightiness. The small word is, is not an addi- [p. 599] tional predicate, but only serves to put the predicate in relatio7t to the subject. If, then, I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (including that of almightiness), and say, God is, or there is a God, I do not put a new predicate to the concept of God, but I only put the subject by itself, with all its predicates, in relation to my concept, as its object. Both must contain exactly the same kind of thing, and nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses possibility only, by my thinking its object as simply given and saying, it is. And thus the real does not contain more than the possible. A hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred possi- ble dollars. For as the latter signify the concept, the for- mer the object and its position by itself, it is clear that, in case the former contained more than the latter, my con- cept would not express the whole object, and would not therefore be its adequate concept. In my financial posi- tion no doubt there exists more by one hundred real dol- lars, than by their concept only (that is their possibility), because in reality the object is not only contained analyti- cally in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state), synthetically ; but the con- ceived hundred dollars are not in the least increased through the existence which is outside my concept. By whatever and by however many predicates [p. 600] 484 Transcendental DiaLctic I may think a thing (even in completely determining it), nothing is really added to it, if I add that the thing exists. Otherwise, it would not be the same that exists, but some- thing more than was contained in the concept, and I could not say that the exact object of my concept existed. Nay, even if I were to think in a thing all reality, except one, that one missing reality would not be supplied by my say- ing that so .defective a thing exists, but it would exist with the same defect with which I thought it ; or what exists would be different from what I thought. If, then, I try to conceive a being, as the highest reality (without any defect), the question still remains, whether it exists or not. For though in my concept there may be wanting nothing of the possible real content of a thing in general, some- thing is wanting in its relation to my whole state of think- ing, namely, that the knowledge of that object should be possible a postei-iori also. And here we perceive the cause of our difficulty. If we were concerned with an object of our senses, I could not mistake the existence of a thing for the mere concept of it ; for by the concept the object is thought as only in harmony with the general conditions of a possible empirical knowledge, while by its existence it is thought as contained in the whole content of experience. Through this connection with the content of the whole experience, the concept of an object [p. 601] is not in the least increased ; our thought has only received through it one more possible perception. If, however, we are thinking existence through the pure category alone, we need not wonder that we cannot find any characteristic to distinguish it from mere possibility. Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may con- tain, we must always step outside it, in order to attribute Transcendental Dialectic 48 5 to it existence. With objects of the senses, this takes place through their connection with any one of my per- ceptions, according to empirical laws; with objects of pure thought, however, there is no means of knowing their ex- istence, because it would have to be known entirely a pri- ori, while our consciousness of every kind of existence, whether immediately by perception, or by conclusions which connect something with perception, belongs entirely to the unity of experience, and any existence outside that field, though it cannot be declared to be absolutely impos- sible, is a presupposition that cannot be justified by any- thing. The concept of a Supreme Being is, in many respects, a very useful idea, but, being an idea only, it is quite in- capable of increasing, by itself alone, our know- [p. 602] ledge with regard to what exists. It cannot even do so much as to inform us any further as to its possibility. The analytical characteristic of possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in mere positions (reali- ties), cannot be denied to it ; but the connection of all real properties in one and the same thing is a synthesis the possibility of which we cannot judge a priori because these realities are not given to us as such, and because, even if this were so, no judgment whatever takes place, it being necessary to look for the characteristic of the pos- sibility of synthetical knowledge in experience only, to whicTi the object of an idea can never belong. Thus we see that the celebrated Leibniz is far from having achieved what he thought he had, namely, to understand a priori the possibility of so sublime an ideal Being. Time and labour therefore are lost on the famous onto- logical (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a Supreme 486 Transcendental Dialectic Being from mere concepts ; and a man might as well im- agine that he could become richer in knowledge by mere ideas, as a merchant in capital, if, in order to improve his position, he were to add a few noughts to his cash account. THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON [p. 603] Section V Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Ex- istence of God It was something quite unnatural, and a mere innovation of scholastic wisdom, to attempt to pick out of an entirely arbitrary idea the existence of the object corresponding to it. Such an attempt would never have been made, if there had not existed beforehand a need of our reason of admitting for existence in general something necessary, to which we may ascend and in which we may rest ; and if, as that necessity must be unconditioned and a priori certain, reason had not been forced to seek a concept which, if possible, should satisfy such a demand and give us a knowledge of an existence entirely a priori. Such a concept was supposed to exist in the idea of an ens realis- simmn, and that idea was therefore used for a more defi- nite knowledge of that, the existence of which one had admitted or been persuaded of independently, namely, of the necessary Being. This very natural procedure of reason was carefully concealed, and instead of ending with that concept, an attempt was made to begin with it, and thus to derive from it the necessity of existence, which it was only meant to supplement. Hence arose [p. 604] that unfortunate ontological proof, which satisfies neither Transcendental Dialectic 487 the demands of our natural and healthy understanding, nor the requirements of the schools. The cosmological proof , which we have now to examine, retains the connection of absolute necessity with the high- est reality, but instead of concluding, like the former, from the highest reality necessity in existence, it concludes from the given unconditioned necessity of any being, its un- limited reality. It thus brings everything at least into the groove of a natural, though I know not whether of a really or only apparently rational syllogism, which carries the greatest conviction, not only for the common, but also for the speculative understanding, and has evidently drawn the first outline of all proofs of natural theology, which have been followed at all times, and will be followed in future also, however much they may be hidden and dis- guised. We shall now proceed to exhibit and to examine this cosmological proof which Leibniz calls also the proof a contingentia niiindi. It runs as follows : If there exists anything, there must exist an absolutely necessary Being also. Now I, at least, exist ; therefore there exists an absolutely necessary Being. The minor contains an experience, the major the conclusion from experience in general to the existence of [p. 605] the necessary.! This proof therefore begins with expedi- ence, and is not entirely a priori, or ontological ; and, as the object of all possible experience is called the world, this proof is called the cosmological proof. As it takes 1 This conclusion is too well known to require detailed exposition. It rests on the apparently transcendental law of causality in nature, that everything contingent has its cause, which, if contingent again, must lil