Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924074416979 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 924 074 416 979 In compliance witJi current copyright law, Cornell University Library produced this replacement volume on paper that meets the ANSI Standard Z39.48-1984 to replace the irreparably deteriorated original. 1994 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS EDITED IN ENGLISH DR. PAUL CARUS WITH AN ESSAY ON KANT'S PHILOSOPHY, AND OTHER SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR THE STUDY OF KANT CHICAGO THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY LONDON Kegah Paul, Trehch, Trubnbr & Co., Ltd. igoz TRANSLATION COPYRIGHTED BY The Open Court Publishing Co. igo2. PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. T7' ANT'S /V-o&^ome«a,' although a small book, is indubitably the most important of his writings. It furnishes us with a key to his main work, The Critique of Pure Reason ; in fact, it is an extract containing all the salient ideas of Kant's system. It approaches the subject in the simplest and most direct way, and is therefore best adapted as an introdnction into his philosophy. For this reason. The Open Court Publishing Company has deemed it advisable to bring out a new edition of the work, keeping in view its broader use as a preliminary survey and explanation of Kant's philosophy in general. In order to make the book useful for this broader purpose, the editor has not only stated his own views concerning the problem underlying the Prolegomena (see page 167 et seq.), but has also collected the most important ma- terials which have reference to Kant's philosophy, or to the recep- tion which was accorded to it in various quarters (see page 241 et seq.). The selections have not been made from a partisan stand- point, but have been chosen with a view to characterising the atti- tude of different minds, and iCo directing the student to the best literature on the subject. It is not without good reasons that the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason is regarded as the beginning of a new era in the history of philosophy ; and so it seems that a compre- hension of Kant's position, whether we accept or reject it, is indis- pensable to the student of philosophy. It is not his solution which 1 Prolegomena means literally prefatory or introductory remarks. It is the neuter plural of the present passive participle of irpoAeyeti^, to speakbefare, i.e., to make introductory remarks before beginning one's regular discourse. IV PREFACE. makes the sage of Kdnigsberg the initiator of modem thought, but his formulation of the problem. The present translation is practically new, but it goes without saying that the editor utilised the labors of his predecessors, among whom Prof. John P. Mahaffy and John H. Bernard deserve special credit. Richardson's translation of 1818 may be regarded as super- seded and has not been consulted, but occasional reference has been made to that of Prof. Ernest Belfort Bax. Considering the difficulties under which even these translators labored we must recognise the fact that they did their work well, with painstaking diligence, great love of the subject, and good judgment. The editor of the present translation has the advantage of being to the manor bom ; moreover, he is pretty well versed in Kant's style ; and wherever he differs from his predecessors in the interpretation of a construction, he has deviated from them not without good rea- sons. Nevertheless there are some passages which will still re- main doubtful, though happily they are of little consequence. As a curiosum in Richardson's translation Professor Maha&y mentions that the words -widersinnig geivuvdene Schnecken, which simply means "symmetric helices,"' are rendered by ' ' snails rolled up contrary to all sense " — a wording that is itself contrary to all sense and makes the whole paragraph unintelli- gible. We may add an instance of another mistake that misses the mark. Kant employs in the Appendix a word that is no longer used in German. He speaks of the Cento der Metafhysik as having neue Lap^en and einen ver&nderten ZuschniU. Mr. Bax trans- lates Cento by "body," Laf;pen by "outgrowths," and ZuschniU by "figure." His mistake is perhaps not less excusable than Richardson's ; it is certainly not less comical, and it also destroys the sense, which in the present case is a very striking simile. 1 Mahaffy not incorrectly translates "spirals winding opposite ways," and Mr. Bax follows him verbatim even to the repetition of the footnote. PREFACE. V Cento is a Latin word' derived from the Greek Kevrpav,^ meaning "a garment of many patches sewed together," or, as we might now say, "a crazy quilt." * « « In the hope that this book will prove useful. The Open Court Publishing Company offers it as a help to the student of philosophy. p. c. iThe French centon is still in use. S.xei^pwi', (x) one that bears the marks of the KcrTpoi/, goad ; a rogue, (2) a patched cloth; {3) any kind of patchwork, especially verses made up of scraps from other authors. TABLE OF CONTENTS. PAGE Kant's Prolegomena 1-163 Essay on Kant's Philosophy by Dr. Paul Cams. (With Por- traits of Kant and Garve) 167-240 Supplementary Materials for the Study of Kant's Life and Philosophy : Introductory Note 243 Kant's Life and Writings. (After Windelband) 245 The Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment. (After Weber) 250 Kant's Views on Religion. (After Schwegler) 258 Kant and Materialism. (After Lange) 261 Kant and Deism. (After Heinrich Heine.) With Fac- simile of the Title-page of the Critique of Pure Reason 264 The Kantian Philosophy. (After Arthur Schopenhauer) 279 Hostile. Estimate of Kant by a Swedenborgian. (After Theodore F. Wright) 283 Facsimile and Translation of a Letter of Kant to His Brother 285 Chronology of Kant's Life and Publications. (After Paulsen) 287 Index to Kant's Prolegomena 293 Index to the Article on Kant's Philosophy 299 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA. INTRODUCTION. THESE Prolegomena are destined for the use, not of pupils, but of future teachers, and even the latter should not expect that they will be serviceable for the systematic exposition of a ready-made science, but merely for the discovery of the science itself. There are scholarly men, to whom the history of philosophy (both ancient and modern) is philosophy itself; for these the present Prolegomena are not written. They must wait till those who endeavor to draw from the fountain of reason itself have com- pleted their work ; it will then be the historian's turn to inform the world of what has been done. Unfor- tunately, nothing can be said, which in their opinion has not been said before, and truly the same proph- ecy applies to all future time ; for since the human reason has for many centuries speculated upon innu- merable objects in various ways, it is hardly to be ex- pected that we should not be able to discover anal- ogies for every new idea among the old sayings of past ages. My object is to persuade all those who think Meta- physics worth studying, that it is absolutely necessary to pause a moment, and, neglecting all that has been done, to propose first the preliminary question, 'Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all pos- sible?' 2 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA. If it be a science, how comes it that it cannot, like other sciences, obtain universal and permanent recognition ? If not, how can it maintain its preten- sions, and keep the human mind in suspense with hopes, never ceasing, yet never fulfilled? Whether then we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance in this field, we must come once for all to a definite conclusion respecting the nature of this so-called sci- ence, which cannot possibly remain on its present footing. It seems almost ridiculous, while every other science is continually advancing, that in this, which pretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose oracle every one inquires, we should constantly move round the same spot, without gaining a single step. And so its followers having melted away, we do not find men confident of their ability to shine in other sciences venturing their reputation here, where everybody, how- ever ignorant in other matters, may deliver a final verdict, as in this domain there is as yet no standard weight and measure to distinguish sound knowledge from shallow talk. After all it is nothing extraordinary in the elabora- tion of a science, when men begin to wonder how far it has advanced, that the question should at last occur, whether and how such a science is possible? Human reason so delights in constructions, that it has several times built up a tower, and then razed it to examine the nature of the foundation. It is never too late to become wise ; but if the change comes late, there is always more difficulty in starting a reform. The question whether a science be possible, pre- supposes a doubt as to its actuality. But such a doubt offends the men whose whole possessions consist of this supposed jewel ; hence he who raises the doubt INTRODUCTION. 3 must expect opposition from all sides. Some, in the proud consciousness of their possessions, which are ancient, and therefore considered legitimate, will take their metaphysical compendia in their hands, and look down on him with contempt ; others, who never see anything except it be identical with what they have seen before, will not understand him, and everything will remain for a time, as if nothing had happened to excite the concern, or the hope, for an impending change. Nevertheless, I venture to predict that the inde- pendent reader of these Prolegomena will not only doubt his previous science, but ultimately be fully persuaded, that it cannot exist unless the demands here stated on which its possibility depends, be satis- fied ; and, as this has never been done, that there is, as yet, no such thing as Metaphysics. But as it can never cease to be in demand,^ — since the interests of common sense are intimately interwoven with it, he must confess that a radical reform, or rather a new birth of the science after an original plan, are un- avoidable, however men may struggle against it for a while. Since the Essays of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather since the origin of metaphysics so far as we know its history, nothing has ever happened which was more decisive to its fate than the attack made upon it by David Hume. He threw no light on this species of knowledge, but he certainly struck a spark from 1 Says Horace ; " RusticQS expectat, dum defluat amnis, at ille Labitur et labetur id omne volubilis aevam; " ' ' A TDStic fellow waiteth on the shore For the river to flow away, But the river flows, and flows on as before, And it flows forever and aye." ' 4 kant's prolegomena. which light might have been obtained, had it caught some inflammable substance and had its smouldering fire been carefully nursed and developed. Hume started from a single but important concept in Metaphysics, viz., that of Cause and Effect (in- cluding its derivatives force and action, etc.). He challenges reason, which pretends to have given birth to this idea from herself, to answer him by what right she thinks anything to be so constituted, that if that thing be posited, something else also must necessarily be posited ; for this is the meaning of the concept of cause. He demonstrated irrefutably that it was per- fectly impossible for reason to think a priori and by means of concepts a combination involving necessity. We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the ex- istence of one thing, another must necessarily exist, or how the concept of such a combination can arise a priori. Hence he inferred, that reason was alto- gether deluded with reference to this concept, which she erroneously considered as one of her children, whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of im- agination, impregnated by experience, which sub- sumed certain representations under the Law of Asso- ciation, and mistook the subjective necessity of habit - for an objective necessity arising from insight. Hence he inferred that reason had no power to think such combinations, even generally, because her concepts would then be purely fictitious, and all her pretended a priori cognitions nothing but common experiences marked with a false stamp. In plain language there is not, and cannot be, any such thing as metaphysics ataU.» 1 Nevertheless Hume called this very destructive science metaphysics and attached to it great value. Metaphysics and morals [he declares in the INTRODUCTION. 5 However hasty and mistaken Hume's conclusion may appear, it was at least founded upon investiga- tion, and this investigation deserved the concentrated attention of the brighter spirits of his day as well as determined efforts on their part to discover, if pos- sible, a happier solution of the problem in the sense proposed by him, all of which would have speedily resulted in a complete reform of the science. But Hume suffered the usual misfortune of meta- physicians, of not being understood. It is positively painful to see how utterly his opponents, Reid, Os- wald, Beattie, and lastly Priestley, missed the point of the problem ; for while they were ever taking for granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that which he never thought of doubting, they so misconstrued his valuable suggestion that everything remained in its old condition, as if nothing had happened. The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had never doubted ; but whether that concept could be thought by reason a priori, and consequently whether it pos- sessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, implying a wider application than merely to the ob- jects of experience. This was Hume's problem. It was a question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need of the concept. Were the former fourth part of his Essays] are the most important branches of science ; math- ematics and physics are not nearly so important. But the acute man merely regarded the negative use arising from the moderation of extravagant claims of speculative reason, and the complete settlement of the many endless and troublesome controversies that mislead mankind. He overlooked the posi- tive injury which results, if reason be deprived of its most important pro- spects, which can alone supply to the will the highest aim for all its en- deavor. 6 kant's prolegomena. decided, the conditions of the use and the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a matter of course. But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponents of the great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of reason, so far as it is concerned with pure thinking, — a task which did not suit them. They found a more convenient method of being defiant without any insight, viz. , the appeal to common sense. It is indeed a great gift of God, to pos- sess right, or (as they now call it) plain common sense. But this common sense must be shown prac- tically, by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by appealing to it as an oracle, when no rational justification can be advanced. To appeal to common sense, when insight and science fail, and no sooner — this is one of the subtile discoveries of modern times, by means of which the most superficial ranter can safely enter the lists with the most thorough thinker, and hold his own. But as long as a particle of insight remains, no one would think of having re- course to this subterfuge. For what is it but an ap- peal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose ap- plause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and confides in it ? I should think that Hume might fairly have laid as much claim to common sense as Beattie, and in addition to a critical reason (such as the latter did not possess), which keeps common sense in check and prevents it from speculating, or, if speculations are under discussion, restrains the desire to decide because it cannot satisfy itself concerning its own arguments. By this means alone can common sense remain sound. Chisels and hammers may suffice to work a piece of wood, but for INTRODUCTION. 7 Steel-engraving we require an engraver's needle. Thus common sense and speculative understanding are each serviceable in their own way, the former in judg- ments which apply immediately to experience, the latter when we judge universally from mere concepts, as in metaphysics, where sound common sense, so called in spite of the inapplicability of the word, has no right to judge at all. I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, which many years ago first inter- ) rupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investiga- ^ tions in the field of speculative philosophy quite a J new direction. I was far from following him in the ) conclusions at which he arrived by regarding, not the \ whole of his problem, but a part, which by itself can give us no information. If we start from a well- i founded, but undeveloped, thought, which another has bequeathed to us, we may well hope by continued reflection to advance farther than the acute man, to whom we owe the first spark of light. I therefore first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connexion of cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the under- standing thinks the connexion of things a priori, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such connexions. I sought to ascertain their number, and when I had satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts, which I was now certain were not deduced from experience, as Hume had apprehended, but sprang from the pure understanding. This de- duction (which seemed impossible to my acute prede- cessor, which had never even occurred to any one 8 kant's prolegomena. else, though no one had hesitated to use the concepts without investigating the basis of their objective val- idity) was the most difficult task ever undertaken in the service of metaphysics ; and the worst was that meta- physics, such as it then existed, could not assist me in the least, because this deduction alone can render metaphysics possible. But as soon as I had succeeded in solving Hume's problem not merely in a particular case, but with respect to the whole faculty of pure reason, I could proceed safely, though slowly, to de- termine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles, in its circumference as well as in its contents. This was required for meta- physics in order to construct its system according to a reliable method. But I fear that the execution of Hume's problem in its widest extent (viz. , my Critique of the Pure Rea- son) will fare as the problem itself fared, when first proposed. It will be misjudged because it is mis- understood, and misunderstood because men choose to skim through the book, and not to think through it — a disagreeable task, because the work is dry, ob- scure, opposed to all ordinary notions, and moreover long-winded. I confess, however, I did not expect to hear from philosophers complaints of want of popu- larity, entertainment, and facility, when the existence of a highly prized and indispensable cognition is at stake, which cannot be established otherwise than by the strictest rules of methodic precision. Popularity may follow, but is inadmissible at the beginning. Yet as regards a certain obscurity, arising partly from the diffuseness of the plan, owing to which the principal points of the investigation are easily lost sight of, the INTRODUCTION. 9 « complaint is just, and I intend to remove it by the present Prolegomena. The first-mentioned work, which discusses the pure faculty of reason in its whole compass and bounds, will remain the foundation, to which the Prolegomena, as a preliminary exercise, refer ; for our critique must first be established as a complete and perfected sci- ence, before we can think of letting Metaphysics ap- pear on the scene, or even have the most distant hope of attaining it. We have been long accustomed to seeing anti- quated knowledge produced as new by taking it out of its former context, and reducing it to system in a new suit of any fancy pattern under new titles. Most readers will set out by expecting nothing else from the Critique; but these Prolegomena may persuade him that- it is a perfectly new science, of which no one has ever even thought, the very idea of which was unknown, and for which nothing hitherto accom- plished can be of the smallest use, except it be the suggestion of Hume's doubts. Yet even he did not suspect such a formal science, but ran his ship ashore, for safety's sake, landing on scepticism, there to let it lie and rot ; whereas my object is rather to give it a pilot, who, by means of safe astronomical principles drawn from a knowledge of the globe, and provided with a complete chart and compass, may steer the ship safely, whither he listeth. If in a new science, which is wholly isolated and unique in its kind, we started with the prejudice that we can judge of things by means of our previously acquired knowledge, which is precisely what has first to be called in question,, we should only fancy we saw ever3rwhere what we had already known, the expres- lO KANT'S PROLEGOMENA. « sions, having a similar sound, only that all would ap- pear utterly metamorphosed, senseless and unintelli- gible, because we should have as a foundation our own notions, made by long habit a second nature, in- stead of the author's. But the longwindedness of the work, so far as it depends on the subject, and not the exposition, its consequent unavoidable dryness and its scholastic precision are qualities which can only benefit the science, though they may discredit the book. Few writers are gifted with the subtilty, and at the same time with the grace, of David Hume, or with the depth, as well as the elegance, of Moses Mendels- sohn. Yet I flatter myself I might have made -my own exposition popular, had my object been merely to sketch out a plan and leave its completion to others, ' instead of having my heart in the welfare of the sci- ence, to which I had devoted myself so long ; in truth, it required no little constancy, and even self-denial, to postpone the sweets of an immediate success to the prospect of a slower, but more lasting, reputation. Making plans is often the occupation of an opu- lent and boastful mind, which thus obtains the repu- tation of a creative genius, by demanding what it cannot itself supply; by censuring, what it cannot improve ; and by proposing, what it knows not where to find. And yet something more should belong to a sound plan of a general critique of pure reason than mere conjectures, if this plan is to be other than the usual declamations of pious aspirations. But pure reason is a sphere so separate and self-contained, that we cannot touch a part without afiecting all the rest. We can therefore do nothing without first determin- ing the position of each part, and its relation to the INTRODUCTION. 1 1 rest; for, as our judgment cannot be corrected by anything without, the validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in which it stands to all the rest within the domain of reason. So in the structure of an organized body, the end of each member can only be deduced from the full conception of the whole. It may, then, be said of such a critique that it is never trustworthy except it be perfectly complete, down to the smallest elements of pure reason. In the sphere of this faculty you can determine either everything or nothing. But although a mere sketch, preceding the Critique of Pure Reason, would be unintelligible, unreliable, and useless, it is all the more useful as a sequel. For so we are able to grasp the whole, to examine in de-~ tail the chief points of importance in the science, and to improve in many respects our exposition, as com- pared with the first execution of the work. After the completion of the work I offer here such a plan which is sketched out after an analytical method, while the work itself had to be executed in the synthetical style, in order that the science may present all its articulations, as the structure of a pe- culiar cognitive faculty, in their natural combination. But should any reader find this plan, which I publish as the Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics, still obscure, let him consider that not every one is bound to study Metaphysics, that many minds will succeed very well, in the exact and even in deep sciences, more closely allied to practical experience,^ while they IThe term Anschauung here nsed means sense-perception. It is that which is given to the senses and apprehended immediately* as an object is seen by merely looking at it. Tfye translation intuition, though etymolog- ically correct, is misleading. In the present passage the term is not nsed in its technical significance but means " practical experience." — Ed. 12 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA. cannot succeed in investigations dealing exclusively with abstract concepts. In such cases men should apply their talents to other subjects. But he who undertakes to judge, or still more, to construct, a sys- tem of Metaphysics, must satisfy the demands here made, either by adopting my solution, or by thor- oughly refuting it, and substituting another. To evade it is impossible. In conclusion, let it be remembered that this much-abused obscurity (frequently serving as a mere pretext under which people hide their own indolence or dullness) has its uses, since all who in other sci- ences observe a judicious silence, speak authorita- tively in metaphysics and make bold decisions, be- cause their ignorance is not here contrasted with the knowledge of others. Yet it does contrast with sound critical principles, which we may therefore commend in the words of Virgil : "Ignavum, fucos, pecus a prsesepibus arcent." •Bees are defending their hives against drones, those indolent creatures. " PROLEGOMENA. PREAMBLE ON THE PECULIARITIES OF ALL META- PHYSICAL COGNITION. §1. Of the Sources of Metaphysics. IF it becomes desirable to formulate any cognition as science, it will be necessary first to determine accurately those peculiar features which no other sci- ence has in common with it, constituting its charac- teristics ; -Otherwise the boundaries of all sciences become confused, and none of them can be treated thoroughly according to its nature. The characteristics of a science may consist of a simple difierence of object, or of the sources of cogni- tion, or of the kind of cognition, or perhaps of all three conjointly. Oii this, therefore, depends the idea of a possible science and its territory. First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but meta- physical knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical 14 kant's prolegomena. psychology. It is therefore a priort knowledge, com- ing from pure Understanding and pure Reason. But so far Metaphysics would not be distinguish- able from pure Mathematics ; it must therefore be called pure philosophical cognition; and for the meaning of this term I refer to the Critique of the Pure Reason (II. "Method of Transcendentalism," Chap. I., Sec. i), where the distinction between these two employments of the reason is sufficiently ex- plained. So far concerning the sources of metaphysi- cal cognition. § -2. Concerning the Kind of Cognition which can alone be called Metaphysical. a. Of the Distinction between Analytical and Syn- thetical Judgments in general. — The peculiarity of its sources demands that metaphysical cognition must consist of nothing but a priori judgments. But what- ever be their origin, or their logical form, there is a distinction in judgments, as to their content, accord- ing to which they are either merely explicative, add- ing nothing to the content of the cognition, or expan- sive, increasing the given cognition : the former may be called analytical, the latter synthetical, judgments. Analytical judgments express nothing in the predi- cate but what has been already actually thought in the concept of the subject, though not so distinctly or with the same (full) consciousness. When I say : All bodies are extended, I have not amplified in the least my concept of body, but have only analysed it, as ex- tension was really thought to belong to that concept before the judgment was made, though it was not ex- pressed; this judgment is therefore analytical. On the contrary, this judgment, All bodies have weight, METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 1 5 contains in its predicate something not actually thought in the general concept of the body ; it ampli- fies my knowledge by adding something to my con- cept, and must therefore be called S57nthetical. b. The Common Princifle of all Analytical Judgments is the Law of Contradiction. — All analytical judgme.nts depend wholly on the law of Contradiction, and are in their nature a priori cognitions, whether the con- cepts that supply them with matter be empirical or not. For the predicate of an affirmative analytical judgment is already contained in the concept of the subject, of which it cannot be denied without contra- diction. In the same way its opposite is necessarily denied of the subject in an analytical, but negative, judgment, by the same law of contradiction. Such is the nature of the judgments : all bodies are extended, and no bodies are unextended (i. e., simple). For this very reason all analytical judgments are a priori even when the concepts are empirical, as, for example, Gold is a yellow metal ; for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold as a yellow metal: it is, in fact, the very concept, and I need only analyse it, without looking beyond it else- where. c. Synthetical Judgments require a different Principle from the Law of Contradiction. — There are synthetical a posteriori judgments of empirical origin; but there are also others which are proved to be certain a priori, and which spring from pure Understanding and Rea- son. Yet they both agree in this, that they cannot possibly spring from the principle of analysis, viz., the law of contradiction, alone ; they require a quite different principle, though, from whatever they may be deduced, they must be subject to the law of con- l6 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA. tradiction, which must never be violated, even though everything cannot be deduced from it. I shall first classify synthetical judgments. 1. Empiricai/udgmenis ate always synthetical. For it would be absurd to base an analytical judgment on experience, as our concept suffices for the purpose without requiring any testimony from experience. That body is extended, is a judgment established a priori, and not an empirical judgment. For before appealing to experience, we already have all the con- ditions of the judgment in the concept, from which we have but to elicit the predicate according to the law of contradiction, and thereby to become conscious of the necessity of the judgment, which experience could not even teach us. 2. Mathematical Judgments are all synthetical. This fact seems hitherto to have altogether escaped the observation of those who have analysed human rea- son ; it even seems directly opposed to all their con- jectures, though incontestably certain, and most im- portant in its consequences. For as it was found that the conclusions of mathematicians all proceed accord- ing to the law of contradiction (as is demanded by all apodeictic certainty), men persuaded themselves that the fundamental principles were known from the same law. This was a great mistake, for a synthetical prop- osition can indeed be comprehended according to the law of contradiction, but only by presupposing another synthetical proposition from which it follows, but never in itself. First of all, we must observe that all proper math- ematical judgments are a priori, and not empirical, because they carry with them necessity, which cannot be obtained from experience. But if this be not con- METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 1 7 ceded to me, very good ; I shall confine my assertion to pure Mathematics, the very notion of which implies that it contains pure a priori and not empirical cogni- tions. It might at first be thought that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a mere analytical judgment, following from the concept of the sum of seven and five, accord- ing to the law of contradiction. But on closer exam- ination it appears that the concept of the sum of 7-I-5 contains merely their union in a single number, with- out its being at all thought what the particular num- ber is that unites them. The concept of twelve is by no means thought by merely thinking of the combina- tion of seven and five ; and analyse this possible sum as we may, we shall not discover twelve in the con- cept. We must go beyond these concepts, by calling to our aid some concrete image {Anschauung), i.e., either our five fingers, or five points (as Segner has it in his Arithmetic), and we must add successively the units of the five, given in some concrete image (^Anschau- ung), to the concept of seven. Hence our concept is really amplified by the proposition 7-1-5^12, and we add to the first a second, not thought in it. Arith- metical judgments are therefore synthetical, and the more plainly according as we take larger numbers; for in such cases it is clear that, however closely we analyse our concepts without calling visual images {Anschauung) to our aid, we can never find the sum by such mere dissection. All principles of geometry are no less analytical. That a straight line is the shortest path between two points, is a synthetical proposition. For my concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality. The attribute of shortness is therefore alto- 1 8 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA. gether additional, and cannot be obtained by any analysis of the concept. Here, too, visualisation (AnscAauung') must come to aid us. It alone makes the synthesis possible. Some other principles, assumed by geometers, are indeed actually analytical, and depend on the law of contradiction ; but they only serve, as identical prop- ositions, as a method of concatenation, and not as principles, e. g., a^a, the whole is equal to itself, or a-\-6'>a, the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these, though they are recognised as valid from mere concepts, are only admitted in mathematics, be- cause they can be represented in some visual form {Anschauung). "What usually makes us believe that the predicate of such apodeictic^ judgments is already contained in our concept, and that the judgment is therefore analytical, is the duplicity of the expression, requesting us to think a certain predicate as of neces- sity implied in the thought of a given concept, which necessity attaches to the concept. But the question is not what we are requested to join in thought io the given concept, but what we actually think together with and in it, though obscurely ; and so it appears that the predicate belongs to these concepts necessa- rily indeed, yet not directly but indirectly by an added visualisation {Anschauung'). § 3. A Remark on the General Division of Judgments into Analytical and Synthetical. This division is indispensable, as concerns the Critique of human understanding, and therefore de- 1 The term apodeictic is borrowed by Kant from Aristotle who uses it in the sense of '^certain beyond dispute." The word is derived from airofieuci^fit {;=/fA<7w}and is contrasted to dialectic propositions, i. e,, such statements as admit of controversy. — Ed, METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 1 9 serves to be called classical, though otherwise it is of little use, but this is the reason why dogmatic philos- ophers, who always seek the sources of metaphysical judgments in Metaphysics itself, and not apart from it, in the pure laws of reason generally, altogether neglected this apparently obvious distinction. Thus the celebrated Wolf, and his acute follower Baum- garten, came to seek the proof of the principle of Sufficient Reason, which is clearly synthetical, in the principle of Contradiction. In Locke's Essay, how- ever, I find an indication of my division. For in the fourth book (chap. iii. § 9, seq.), having discussed the various connexions of representations in judg- ments, and their sources, one of which he makes "identity and contradiction" (analytical judgments), and another the coexistence of representations in a subject, he confesses (§ 10) that our a priori knowl- edge of the latter is very narrow, and almost nothing. But in his remarks on this species of cognition, there is so little of what is definite, and reduced to rules, that we cannot wonder if no one, not even Hume, was led to make investigations concerning this sort of judgments. For such general and yet definite prin- ciples are not easily learned from other men, who have had them obscurely in their minds. We must hit on them first by our own reflexion, then we find them elsewhere, where we could not possibly have found them at first, because the authors themselves did not know that such an idea lay at the basis of their observations. Men who never think indepen- dently have nevertheless the acuteness to discover ever3^hing, after it has been once shown them, in what was said long since, though no one ever saw it there before. 20 kant's prolegomena. § 4. The General Question of the Prolegomena. — /r Metaphysics at all Possible ? Were a metaphysics, which could maintain its place as a science, really in existence ; could we say, here is metaphysics, learn it, and it will convince you irresistibly and irrevocably of its truth : this question would be useless, and there would only remain that other question (which would rather be a test of our acuteness, than a proof of the existence of the thing itself), "How is the science possible, and how does reason come to attain it?" But human reason has not been so fortunate in this case. There is no single book to which you can point as you do to Euclid, and say: This is Metaphysics; here you may find the noblest objects of this science, the knowledge of a highest Being, and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure reason. We can be shown indeed many judgments, demonstrably certain, and never questioned ; but these are all analytical, and rather concern the materials and the scaffolding for Meta- physics, than the extension of knowledge, which is our proper object in studying it (§ 2). Even suppo- sing you produce synthetical judgments (such as the law of SuflScient Reason, which you have never proved, as you ought to, from pure reason a priori, though we gladly concede its truth), you lapse when they come to be employed for your principal object, into such doubtful assertions, that in all ages one Metaphysics has contradicted another, either in its assertions, or their proofs, and thus has itself des- troyed its own claim to lasting assent. Nay, the very attempts to set up such a science are the main cause METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 21 of the early appearance of scepticism, a mental atti- tude in which reason treats itself with such violence that it could never have arisen save from complete despair of ever satisfying our most important aspira- tions. For long before men began to inquire into na- ture methodically, they consulted abstract reason, which had to some extent been exercised by means of ordinary experience ; for reason is ever present, while laws of nature must usually be discovered with labor. So Metaphysics floated to tjie surface, like foam, which dissolved the moment it was scooped off. But imme- diately there appeared a new supply on the surface, to be ever eagerly gathered up by some, while others, instead of seeking in the depths the cause of the phe- nomenon, thought they showed their wisdom by ridi- culing the idle labor of their neighbors. The essential and distinguishing feature of pure mathematical cognition among all other a priori cog- nitions is, that it cannot at all proceed from concepts, but only by means of the construction of concepts (see Critique II., Method of Transcendentalism, chap. I., sect. i). As therefore in its judgments it must proceed beyond the concept to that which its corresponding visualisation {Anschawung") contains, these judgments neither can, nor ought to, arise ana- lytically, by dissecting the concept, but are all syn- thetical. I cannot refrain from pointing out the disadvan- tage resulting to philosophy from the neglect of this easy and apparently insignificant observation. Hume being prompted (a task worthy of a philosopher) to cast his eye over the whole field of a /r/<7r/ cognitions in which human understanding claims such mighty possessions, heedlessly severed from it a whole, and 22 KANT'S PROLEGOMEITA. indeed its most valuable, province, viz., pure mathe- matics ; fojr he thought its nature, or, so to speak, the state-constitution of this empire, depended on totally different principles, namely, on the law of contradiction alone; and although he did not divide judgments in this manner formally and universally as I have done here, what he said was equivalent to this: that mathematics contains only analytical, but meta- physics synthetical, a priori judgments. In this, how- ever, he was greatly mistaken, and the mistake had a decidedly injurious effect upon his whole conception. But for this, he would have extended his question concerning the origin of our synthetical judgments far beyond the metaphysical concept of Causality, and included in it the possibility of mathematics a priori also, for this latter he must have assumed to be equally synthetical. And then he could not have based his metaphysical judgments on mere experience without subjecting the axioms of mathematics equally to experience, a thing which he was far too acute to do. The good company into which metaphysics would thus have been brought, would have saved it from the danger of a contemptuous ill-treatment, for the thrust intended for it must have reached mathematics, which was not and could not have been Hume's in- tention. Thus that acute man would have been led into considerations which must needs be similar to those that now occupy us, but which would have gained inestimably by his inimitably elegant style. Metaphysical judgments, properly so called, are all synthetical. We must distinguish judgments pertain- ing to metaphysics from metaphysical judgments properly so called. Many of the former are analytical, but they only afford the means for metaphysical judg- METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 23 ments, which are the whole end of the science, and which are always synthetical. For if there be con- cepts pertaining to metaphysics (as, for example, that of substance), the judgments springing from simple analysis of them also pertain to metaphysics, as, for example, substance is that which only exists as sub- ject; and by means of several such analytical judg- ments, we seek to approach the definition of the con- cept. But as the analysis of a pure concept of the understanding pertaining to metaphysics, does not proceed in any different manner from the dissection of any other, even empirical, concepts, not pertaining to metaphysics (such as : air is an elastic fluid, the elasticity of which is not destroyed by any known de- gree of cold), it follows that the concept indeed, but not the analytical judgment, is properly metaphysical. This science has something peculiar in the production of its a priori cognitions, which must therefore be dis- tinguished from the features it has in common with other rational knowledge. Thus the judgment, that all the substance in things is permanent, is a synthet- ical and properly metaphysical judgment. If the a priori principles, which constitute the ma- terials of metaphysics, have first been collected ac- cording to fixed principles, then their analysis will be of great value ; it might be taught as a particular part (as a fhilosophia definitivd), containing nothing but analytical judgments pertaining to metaphysics, and could be treated separately from the synthetical which constitute metaphysics proper. For indeed these analyses are not elsewhere of much value, except in metaphysics, i. e., as regards the synthetical judg- ments, which are to be generated by these previously analysed concepts. 24 KANT S PROLEGOMENA. The conclusion drawn in this section then is, that metaphysics is properly concerned with synthetical propositions a priori, and these alone constitute its end, for which it indeed requires various dissections of its concepts, viz., of its analytical judgments," but "^Tier«irifKe~pTe'cgdure is not different from that in every'bther"'kind of knowledge, in which we merely seek_.to^render our concepts distinct by analysis. But the generation of a priori cognition by concrete im- ages as well as by concepts, in fine of synthetical propositions a priori in philosophical cognition, con- stitutes the essential subject of Metaphysics. Weary therefore as well of dogmatism, which teaches us nothing, as of scepticism, which does not even promise us anything, not even the quiet state of a contented ignorance ; disquieted by the importance of knowledge so much needed ; and lastly, rendered suspicious by long experience of all knowledge which we believe we possess, or which offers itself, under the title of pure reason: there remains but one critical question on the answer to which our future procedure depends, viz. , Is Metaphysics at all possible? But this question must be answered not by sceptical objections to the asseverations of some actual system of meta- physics (for we do not as yet admit such a thing to exist), but from the conception, as yet only proble- matical, of a science of this sort. In the Critique of Pure Reason I have treated this question synthetically, by making inquiries into pure reason itself, and endeavoring in this source to deter- mine the elements as well as the laws of its pure use according to principles. The task is difficult, and requires a resolute reader to penetrate by degrees into a system, based on no data except reason itself, and METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 25 which therefore seeks, without resting upon any fact, to unfold knowledge from its original germs. Prole- gomena, however, are designed for preparatory exer- cises ; they are intended rather to point out what we have to do in order if possible to actualise a science, than to propound it. They must therefore rest upon something already known as trustworthy, from which we can set out with confidence, and ascend to sources as yet unknown, the discovery of which will not only explain to us what we knew, but exhibit a sphere of many cognitions which all spring from the same sources. The method of Prolegomena, especially of those designed as a preparation for future metaphys- ics, is consequently analytical. But it happens fortunately, that though we cannot assume metaphysics to be an actual science, we can say with confidence that certain pure a priori synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are actual and given ; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly recognised as apodeictically certain, partly by mere reason, partly by general consent aris- ing from experience, and yet as independent of expe- rience. We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetical knowledge a priori, and need not ask whether it be possible, for it is actual, but how it is possible, in order that we may deduce from the prin- ciple which makes the given cognitions possible the possibility of all the rest. TTie General Problem: How is Cognition from Pure Reason Possible? § 5. We have above learned the significant dis- tinction between analytical and synthetical judgments. The possibility of analytical propositions was easily 26 rant's prolegomena. comprehended, being entirely founded on the law of Contradiction. The possibility of synthetical a pos- teriori judgments, of those which are gathered from experience, also requires no particular explanation ; for experience is nothing but a continual S5rnthesis of perceptions. There remain therefore only synthetical propositions a priori, of which the possibility must be sought or investigated, because they must depend upon other principles than the law of contradiction. But here we need not first establish the possibility of such propositions so as to ask whether they are possible. For there are enough of them which indeed are of undoubted certainty, and as our present method is analytical, we shall start from the fact, that such synthetical but purely rational cognition actually ex- ists ; but we must now inquire into the reason of this possibility, and ask, how such cognition is possible, in order that we may from the principles of its possi- bility be enabled to determine the conditions of its use, its sphere and its limits. The proper problem upon which all depends, when expressed with scho- lastic precision, is therefore : How are Synthetic Propositions a priori possible? For the sake of popularity I have above expressed this problem somewhat differently, as an inquiry into purely rational cognition, which I could do for once without detriment to the desired comprehension, be- cause, as we have only to do here with metaphysics and its sources, the reader will, I hope, after the fore- going remarks, keep in mind that when we speak of purely rational cognition, we do not mean analytical, but synthetical cognition.' 1 It is unavoidable that as knowledge advances, certain expressions which have become classical, after having been used since the infancy of science, METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 27 Metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this problem: its very existence depends upon it. Let any one make metaphysical assertions with ever so much plausibility, let him overwhelm us with con- clusions, if he has not previously proved able to an- swer this question satisfactorily, I have a right to say: this is all vain baseless philosophy and false wisdom. You speak through pure reason, and claim, as it were to create cognitions a priori by not only dissecting given concepts, but also by asserting connexions which do not rest upon the law of contradiction, and which you believe you conceive quite independently of all ex- perience; how do you arrive at this, and how will you justify your pretensions? An appeal to the con- sent of the common sense of mankind cannot be allowed; for that is a witness whose authority de- pends merely upon rumor. Says Horace : "Qaodcunqne ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi." ' ' To all that which thou provest me thus, I refuse to give credence." The answer to this question, though indispensable, is difficult; and though the principal reason that it was not made long ago is, that the possibility of the question never occurred to anybody, there is yet an- other reason, which is this that a satisfactory answer will be found inadequate and unsuitable, and a newer and more appropriate application of the terms will give rise to confusion. [This is the case with the term *! analytical."] The analytical method, so far as It is opposed to the synthetical, is very different from that which constitutes the essence of ana lytical propositions : it signifies only that we start from what is sought, as it were given, and ascend to the only conditions under which it is possible In this method we often use nothing but synthetical propositions, as in math ematical analysis, and it were better to term it the regressive method, ta contradistinction to the synthetic or progressive. A principal part of Logic too is distinguished by the name of Analytics, which here signifies the logic of truth in contrast to Dialectics, without considering whether the cognitions belonging to it are analytical or synthetical. 28 rant's prolegomena. to this one question requires a much more persistent, profound, and painstaking reflexion, than the most diffuse work on Metaphysics, which on its first ap- pearance promised immortality to its author. And every intelligent reader, when he carefully reflects what this problem requires, must at first be struck with its difficulty, and would regard it as insoluble and even impossible, did there not actually exist pure syn- thetical cognitions a priori. This actually happened to David Hume, though he did not conceive the ques- tion in its entire universality as is done here, and as must be done, should the answer be decisive for all Metaphysics. For how is it possible, says that acute man, that when a concept is given me, I can go be- yond it and connect with it another, which is not con- tained in it, in such a manner as if the latter necessa- rily belonged to the former? Nothing but experience can furnish us with such connexions (thus he con- cluded from the difficulty which he took to be an im- possibility), and all that vaunted necessity, or, what is the same thing, all cognition assumed to be a priori, is nothing but a long habit of accepting something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective necessity for objective. Should my reader complain of the difficulty and the trouble which I occasion him in the solution of this problem, he is at liberty to solve it himself in an easier way. Perhaps he will then feel under obligation to the person who has undertaken for him a labor of so profound research, and will rather be surprised at the facility with which, considering the nature of the sub- ject, the solution has been attained. Yet it has cost years of work to solve the problem in its whole uni- versality (using the term in the mathematical sense, METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 2g viz., for that which is sufficient for all cases), and finally to exhibit it in the analytical form, as the reader finds it here. All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory manner the question, "How are synthetic cognitions a priori ^os- sible?" For the answer contains the only credentials which they must show when they have anything to oSer in the name of pure reason. But if they do not possess these credentials, they can expect- nothing else of reasonable people, who have been deceived so often, than to be dismissed without further ado. If they on the other hand desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome oratory suited to the common sense of man, they can- not in justice be prevented. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief, they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical purposes only) the existence of something that is possible and even indispensable for the guid- ance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians ; for the latter profess to be specula- tive philosophers, and since, when judgments a prion are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be ad- mitted (for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby announced as necessary), such men cannot be permitted to play with conjectures, but their assertions must be either science, or are worth nothing at all. 30 kant's prolegomena. It may be said, that the entire transcendental phi- losophy, which necessarily precedes all metaphy-sics, is nothing but the complete solution of the problem here propounded, in systematical order and complete- ness, and hitherto we have never had any transcen- dental philosophy; for what goes by its name is prop- erly a part of metaphysics, whereas the former science is intended first to constitute the possibility of the latter, and must therefore precede all metaphysics. And it is not surprising that when a whole science, deprived. of all help from other sciences, and conse- quently in itself quite new, is required to answer a single question satisfactorily, we should find the an- swer troublesome and difficult, nay even shrouded in obscurity. As we aow proceed to this solution according to the analytical method, in which we assume that such cognitions from pure reasons actually exist, we can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition (which alone is under consideration here), pure math- ematics and pure natural science (physics). For these alone can exhibit to us objects in a definite and actual- isable form (Jn der Anschauung'), and consequently (if there should occur in them a cognition a priori') can show the truth or conformity of the cognition to the object in concreto, that is, its actuality, from whith we could proceed to the reason of its possibility by the analytic method. This facilitates our work greatly for here universal considerations are not only applied to facts, but even start from them, while in a synthe- tic procedure they must strictly be derived in abstracto from concepts. But, in order to rise from these actual and at the same time well-grounded pure cognitions a priori to METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 3I such a possible cognition of the same as we are seek- ing, viz., to metaphysics as a science, we must com- prehend that which occasions it, I mean the mere natural, though in spite of its truth not unsuspected, cognition a priori which lies at the bottom of that sci- ence, the elaboration of which without any critical in- vestigation of its possibility is commonly called meta- physics. In a word, we must comprehend the natural conditions of such a science as a part of our inquiry, and thus the transcendental problem will be gradually answered by a division into four questions : 1. How is pure mathematics possible? 2. How is pure natural science possible} 3. How is metaphysics in general possible} 4. How is metaphysics as a science possible? It may be seen that the solution of these problems, though chiefly designed to exhibit the essential matter of the Critique, has yet something peculiar, which for itself alone deserves attention. This is the search for the sources of given sciences in reason itself, so that its faculty of knowing something a priori may by its own deeds be investigated and measured.- By this procedure these sciences gain, if not with regard to their contents, yet as to their proper use, and while they throw light on the higher question concerning their common origin, they give, at the same time, an occasion better to explain their own nature. FIRST PART OF THE TRANSCEN- DENTAL PROBLEM. HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? §6. HERE is a great and established branch of knowl- edge, encompassing even now a wonderfully large domain and promising an unlimited extension in . the future. Yet it carries with it thoroughly -aipodeicti- cal certainty, i. e., absolute necessity, which therefore rests upon no empirical grounds. Consequently it is a pure product of reason, and moreover is thoroughly synthetical. [Here the question arises :] " How then is it possible for human reason to pro- duce a cognition of this nature entirely a priori?" Does not this faculty [which produces mathemat- ics] , as it neither is nor can be based upon experi- ence, presuppose some ground of cognition a /«*«, which lies deeply hidden, but which might reveal it- self by these its effects, if their first beginnings were but diligently ferreted out? § 7. But we find that all mathematical cognition has this peculiarity : it must first exhibit its concept in a visual form (^Ansckauung) and indeed a priori, ! therefore in a visual form which is not empirical, but pure. Without this mathematics cannot take a single step; hence its judgments are always visual, viz.. HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 33 "intuitive"; whereas philosophy must be satisfied with discursive judgments from mere concepts, and though it may illustrate its doctrines through a visual figure, can never derive them from it. This obser- vation on the nature of mathematics gives us a clue to the first and highest condition of its possibility, which is, that some non-sensuous visualisation (called pure intuition, or reine Anschauung') must form its basis, in which all its concepts can be exhibited or constructed, in concreto and yet a priori. If we can find out this pure intuition and its possibility, we may thence easily explain how synthetical propositions a priori are possible in pure mathematics, and conse- quently how this science itself is possible. Empirical intuition [viz., sense-perception] enables us without difficulty to enlarge the concept which we frame of an object of intuition [or sense-perception], by new pred- icates, which intuition [i. e., sense- perception] itself presents synthetically in experience. Pure intuition [viz., the visualisation of forms in our imagination, from which every thing sensual, i. e., every thought of material qualities, is excluded] does so likewise, only with this difference, that in the latter case the synthetical judgment is a priori certain and apodeic- tical, in the former, only a posteriori and empirically certain ; because this latter contains only that which occurs in contingent empirical intuition, but the for- mer, that which must necessarily be discovered in pure intuition. Here intuition, being an intuition a priori, is before all experience, viz., before any percep- tion of particular objects, inseparably conjoined with its concept. § 8. But with this step our perplexity seems rather to increase than to lessen. For the question now 34 kant's prolegomena. is, "How is it possible to intuite [in a visual form] anything a priori?" An. intuition [viz., a visual sense- perception] is such a representation as immediately deg^ds_upon the_pjresence of the object. Hence it seems impossible to intuite from the outset a priori, be- cause intuition would in that event take place without either a former or a present object to refer to, and by consequence could not be intuition. Concepts indeed are such, that we can easily form some of them a priori, viz., such as contain nothing but the thought of an object in general ; and we need not- find our- selves in an immediate relation to the object. Take, for instance, the concepts of Quantity, of Cause, etc. But even these require, in order to make them under- stood, a certain concrete use — that is, an application to some sense-experience {Anschauung), by which an object of them is given us. But how can the intui- tion of the object [its visualisation] precede the ob- ject itself? § g. If our intuition [i. e., our sense-experience] were perforce of such a nature as to represent things as they are in themselves, there would not be any in- tuition a priori, but intuition would be always empir- ical. For I can only know what is contained in the ob- ject in itself when it is present and given to me. It is indeed even then incomprehensible how the visualis- ing (^Anschauung) of a present thing should make me know this thing as it is in itself, as its properties can- not migrate into my faculty. of representation. But even granting this possibility, a visualising of that sort would not take place a priori, that is, before the object were presented to me ; for without this latter fact no reason of a relation between my representa- HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 35 tion and the object can be imagined, unless it depend upon a direct inspiration. Therefore in one way only can my intuition {Anschauung') anticipate the actuality of the ob- i ject, and be a cognition a priori, viz. : if my intui- ( tion contains nothing but the form of sensibility, ^ antedating in my subjectivity all the actual im- ' pressions through which I am affected by objects. For that objects of sense ca n only ;_bgjnt uited ac - _cording to tfiis7orm ot sensib ility I can know a priori. Hence it follows : that propositions, which concern this form of sensuous intuition only, are possible and valid for objects of the senses ; as also, conversely, that intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any other things than objects of our senses.^ § 10. Accordingly, it .is only the form of sensuous intuition by which we can intuite things a priori, but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they are in themselves ; and this assumption is absolutely necessary if synthetical propositions a /r?(?r/ be granted as possible, or if, in case they actually occur, their possibility is to be comprehended and determined beforehand. Now, the intuitions which pure mathematics lays at the foundation of all its cognitions and judgments which appear at once apodeictic and necessary are Space and Time. For mathematics must first have all its concepts in intuition, and pure mathematics in pure intuition, that is, it must construct them. If it proceeded in any other way, it would be impossible -to make any headway, for mathematics proceeds, not 1 This whole paragraph (i 9) will be better understood when compared with Remark I., following this section, appearing in the present edition on page 40. — Ed. 36 rant's prolegomena. analytically by dissection of concepts, but synthetic- ally, and if pure intuition be wanting, there is nothing in which the matter for synthetical judgments a priori can be given. Geometry is based upon the pure in- tuition of space. Arithmetic accomplishes its concept of number by the successive addition of units in time ; and pure mechanics especially cannot attain its con- cepts of motion without employing the representation of time. Both representations, however, are only in- tuitions ; for if we omit from^the empirical intuitions of bodies and their alterations (motiony'everything enipirical,'Or belonging to sensation, space andl time still"remain7'whrch are therefore pure intuitions that lie a priori at the basis of the empirical. Heasejhey can never be omitted,' but at the same time7'by_their being pure intuitions ayrtoft^^CB^ prove that they are niSreT^ns^oT oursSHSiBilitypwhich^'m^^ t 'p irecede" all empirical intuition, or perception of actual oBjects, and conformably to wKich~objects "can' Eeknown a priori, but only as they appear to us. §^T. TEe' problem of the present section is there- fore solved. Pure mathematics, as synthetical cogni- tion a priori, is only possible by referring to no other objects than those of the senses. At the basis of their empirical intuition lies a pure intuition (of space and of time) which is a prion. This is possible, because I the latter intuition is nothing but the mere form' of i sensibility, which precedes the actual appearance of I the objects, in that it, in fact, makes them possible. Yet this faculty of intuiting a priori affects not the matter of the phenomenon (that is, the sense-element in it, for this constitutes that which is empirical), but its form, viz., space and time. Should any man ven- ture to doubt that these are determinations adhering HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 37 not to things in themselves, but to their relation to our sensibility, I should be glad to know how it can be possible to know the constitution of things a priori, viz., before we have any acquaintance with them and before they are presented to us. Such, however, is the case with space and time. But this is quite com- prehensible as soon as both count for nothing more than formal conditions of our sensibility, while the objects count merely as phenomena ; for then the form of the phenomenon, i. e., pure intuition, can by all means be represented as proceeding from ourselves, that is, a priori. § 12. In order to add something by way of illus- tration and confirmation, we need only watch the ordinary and necessary procedure of geometers. All proofs of the complete congruence of two given fig- ures (where the one can in every respect be substi- tuted for the other) come ultimately to this that they may be made to coincide ; which is evidently noth- ing else than a synthetical proposition resting upon immediate intuition, and this intuition must be pure, or given a priori, otherwise the proposition could not rank as apodeictically certain, but would have em- pirical certainty only. ' In that case, it could only be said that it is always found to be so, and holds good only as far as our perception reaches. That every- where space (which [in its entirety] is itself no longer the boundary of another space) has three dimensions, and that space cannot in any way have more, is based on the proposition that not more than three lines can intersect at right angles in one point; but this prop- osition cannot by any means be shown from concepts, but rests immediately on intuition, and indeed on pure and «/rw« intuition, because it is apodeictically cer- 38 rant's prolegomena. tain. That we can require a line to be drawn to in- finity (Jn indefinitutri), or that a series of changes (for example, spaces traversed by motion) shall be infi- nitely continued, presupposes a representation of space and time, which can only attach to intuition, namely, so far as it in itself is bounded by nothing, for from concepts it could never be inferred. Conse- quently, the basis of mathematics actually are pure intuitions, which make its synthetical and apodeic- tically valid propositions possible. Hence our tran- scendental deduction of the notions of space and of time explains at the same time the possibility of pure mathematics. Without some such deduction its truth may be granted, but its existence could by no means be understood, and we must assume "that everything which can be given to our senses (to the external senses in space, to the internal one in time) is intuited by us as it appears to us, not as it is in itself." § 13. Those who cannot yet rid themselves of the notion that space and time are actual qualities inher- ing in things in themselves, may exercise their acumen on the following paradox. When they have in vain attempted its solution, and are free from prejudices at least for a few moments, they will suspect that the degradation of space and of time to mere forms of our sensuous intuition may perhaps be well founded. If two things are quite equal in all respects as much as can be ascertained by all means possible, quantitatively and qualitatively, it must follow, that the one can in all cases and under all circumstances replace the other, and this substitution would not oc- casion the least perceptible difference. This in fact is true of plane figures in geometry; but some spher- ical figures exhibit, notwithstanding a complete in- HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 39 ternal agreement, such a contrast in their external relatipn, that the one figure cannot possibly be put in the place of the other. For instance, two spherical triangles on opposite hemispheres, which have an arc of the equator as their common base, may be quite equal, both as regards sides and angles, so that noth- ing is to be found in either, if it be described for itself alone and completed, that would not equally be ap- plicable to both ; and yet the one cannot be put in the place of the other (being situated upon the opposite hemisphere). Here then is an internal difference be- tween the two triangles, which difference our under- standing cannot describe as internal, and which only manifests itself by external relations in space. But I shall adduce examples, taken from common life, that are more obvious still. What can be more similar in every respect and in every part more alike to my hand and to my ear, than their images in a mirror? And yet I cannot put such a hand as is seen in the glass in the place of its arche- type; for if this is a right hand, that in the glass is a left one, and the image or reflexion of the right ear is a left one which never can serve as a substitute for the other. There are in this case no internal differ- ences which our understanding could determine by thinking alone. Yet the differences are internal as the senses teach, for, notwithstanding their complete equality and similarity, the left hand cannot be en- closed in the same bounds as the right one (they are not congruent) ; the glove of one hand cannot be used for the other. What is the solution? These objects are not representations of things as they are in them- selves, and as the pure understanding would cognise them, but sensuous intuitions, that is, appearances, 40 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA. the possibility of which rests upon the relation of cer- tain things unknown in themselves to something else, viz. , to our sensibility. Space is the form of the ex- ternal intuition of this sensibility, and the internal determination of every space is only possible by the determination of its external relation to the whole space, of which it is a part (in other words, by its re- lation to the external sense). That is to say, the part is only possible through the whole, which is never the case with things in themselves, as objects of the mere understanding, but with appearances only. Hence the difference between similar and equal things, which are yet not congruent (for instance, two symmetric helices), cannot be made intelligible by any concept, but only by the relation to the right and the left hands which immediately refers to intuition. Remark I. I Pure Mathematics, and especially pure geometry, can only have objective reality on condition that they refer to gbjects of- sense. But in regard to the latter the principle holds good, that our sense representa- tion is not a representation of things in- themselves, but of the way in which they appear to us. Hence it follows, that the propositions of geometry are not the results of a mere creation of our poetic imagination, and that therefore they cannot be referred with assu- rance to actual objects ; but rather that they are nec- essarily valid of space, and consequently of all that may be found in space, because space is nothing else than the form of all external appearances, and it is this form alone in which objects of sense can be given. Sensibility, the form of which is the basis of geom- etry, is that upon which the possibility of external HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 41 appearance depends. Therefore these appearances can never contain anything but what geometry pre- scribes to them. It would be quite otherwise if the senses were so constituted as to represent objects as they are in themselves. For then it would not by any means fol- low from the conception of space, which with all its properties serves to the geometer as an a priori foun- dation, together with what is thence inferred, must be so in nature. The space of the geometer would be considered a mere fiction, and it would not be credited with objective validity, because we cannot see how things must of necessity agree with an image of them, which we make spontaneously and previous to our acquaintance with them. But if this image, or rather this formal intuition, is the essential property of our sensibility, by means of which alone objects are given to us, and if this sensibility represents not things in themselves, but their appearances : we shall easily comprehend, and at the same time indisputably prove, that all external objects of our world of sense must necessarily coincide in the most rigorous way with the propositions of geometry ; because sensibil- ity by means of its form of external intuition, viz. , by space, the same with which the geometer is occupied, makes those objects at all possible as mere appear-' ances. It will always remain a remarkable phenomenon in the history of philosophy, that there was a time, when even mathematicians, who at the same time were philosophers, began to doubt, not of the accuracy of their geometrical propositions so far as they con- cerned space, but of their objective validity and the applicability of this concept ijtself, and of all its corol 42 kamt's prolegomena. laries, to nature. They showed much concern whether a hne in nature might not consist of physical points, and consequently that true space in the object might consist of simple [discrete] parts, while the space which the geometer has in his mind [being continu- ous] cannot be such. They didnot recegBJse that this mental space renders possible the physical space, i. e.,. the extension of matter; that thisjmrejpace is not at all a quality of things in themselves, but a form of our sensuous faculty of representation; and that all objects in space are mere appearances, i. e., not things in themselves but representations of our sensu- ous intuition. But such is the_.case, for the space of the geometer is exactly the form of sensuous intuition which we find a priori in us, and contains tEe~ground of the possibility of all externsd appearances (accord- ing to their form), and the latter mustliecessarily'and most rigidly agree with the propositions of the geOJh- eter, which he draws not from any fictitious concept, but from the subjective basis of all external phenom- ena, which is sensibility itself. In this and no other way can geometry be made secure as to the undoubted objective reality of its propositions against all the in- trigues of a shallow Metaphysics, which is surprised at them [the geometrical propositions], because it has not traced them to the sources of their concepts. Remark II. \VTiateyer is given us as object, must be given us injofciyjtio^n, i^n'our'mfmfionTiow^ taies place by means of the senses only; the understanding infuites notfun^^bS^^^^^fle^s. And aFweliave^UBtshown that the senses never and in no manner enable us to know things in themselves, but only their appear- HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 43 ances, which are mere representations of the sensi- bility, we conclude th at ' all bodies, together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughtsT You will^sayTls nor^ffiriinanifest idealism ? Idealism consists in the assertion, that there are none but thinking beings, all other things, which we think are perceived in intuition, being nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them corresponds in fact. Whereas. I ,,say, that things as obj ects of our senses existing^ outside us ar e given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their ag- p earances, i. e., the representations which they cau^ in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means triatlhere'are"t%3ies^ithout us^'thatis. t hings which, though quite unknow n to us a.g~to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the represen- tations which their influence on our sensibility pro- cures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknowii to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be termed idealism ? It is the very contrary. Long before Locke's time, but assuredly since him, it has been generally assumed and granted with- out detriment to the actual existence of external things, that many of their predicates may be said to belong not to the things in themselves, but to their appearances, and to have no proper existence outside our representation. Heat, color, and taste, for in- stance, are of this kind. Now, if I go farther, and for weighty reasons rank as mere appearances the re- maining qualities of bodies also, which are called pri- 44 KANT S PROLEGOMENA. mary, such as extension, place, and in general space, with all that which belongs to it (impenetrability or materiality, space, etc.) — no one in the least can ad- duce the reason of its being inadmissible. As little as the man who admits colors not to be properties of the object in itself, but only as modifications of the sense of sight, should on that account be called an idealist, so little can my system be named idealistic, merely because I find that more, nay, All the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong merely to its appearance. The existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, as in genuine idealism, but it is only shown, that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself. I should be glad to know what my assertions must be in order to avoid all idealism. Undoubtedly, I should say, that the representation of space is not only perfectly conformable to the relation which our sensibility has to objects — that I have said — but that it is quite similar to the object, — an assertion in which I can find as little meaning as if I said that the sensa- tion of red has a similarity to the property of vermil- ion, which in me excites this sensation. Remark III. Hence we may at once dismiss an easily foreseen but futile objection, "that by admitting the ideality of space and of time the whole sensible world would be turned into mere sham. " At first all philosophical insight into the nature of sensuous cognition was spoiled, by making the sensibility merely a confused mode of representation, according to which we still know things as they are, but without being able to re- HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 45 duce everything in this our representation to a clear consciousness ; whereas proof is offered by us that sensibility consists, not in this logical distinction of clearness and obscurity, but in the genetical one of the origin of cognition itself. For sensuous percep- tion represents things not at all as they are, but only the mode in which they affect our senses, and conse- quently by sensuous perception appearances only and not things themselves are given to the understanding for reflexion. After this necessary corrective, an ob- • jection rises from an unpardonable and almost inten- tional misconception, as if my doctrine turned all the things of the world of sense into mere illusion. When an appearance is given us, we are still quite free as to how we should judge the matter. The ap- pearance depends upon the senses, but the judgment upon the understanding, and the only question is, whether in the determination of the object there is truth or not. But the difference b etween ti?ath and dr eaming is riot ascertained by tne n'atuf ^ '161 thfi fep - te^i^imS,JlfiMLJiX&J£Sierred to objectsOor they are the same in bothi ^^ ac corSmg to those rules, which dete rmine the coher- ence of the representatlohs in the concept oi an ob- ject^and by ascertainmg whether they can subsisito- gether in experien^or^t " Ah^ it isniSt^he'Ta of the appearances if our cognition takes illusion for truth, i. e., if the intuition, by which an object is given us, is considered a concept of the thing or of its exist- ence also, which the understanding can only think. The senses represent to us the paths of the planets as now progressive, now retrogressive, and herein is neither falsehood nor truth, because as long as we hold this path to be nothing but appearance, we do 46 kant's prolegomena. not judge of the objective nature of their motion. But as a false judgment may easily arise when the under- standing is not on its guard against this subjective mode of representation being considered objective, we saj' they appear to move backward ; it is not the senses however which must be charged with the illu- sion, but the understanding, whose province alone it is to give an objective judgment on appearances. Thus, even if we did not at all reflect on the origin of our representations, whenever we connect our in- tuitions of sense (whatever they may contain), in space and in time, according to the rules of the coher- ence of all cognition in experience, illusion or truth will arise according as we are negligent or careful. It is merely a question of the use of sensuous represen- tations in the understanding, and not of their origin. In the same way, if I consider aU the representations of the senses, together with their form, space and time, to be nothing but appearances, and space and time to be a mere form of the sensibility, which is not to be met with in objects out of it, and if I make use of these representations in reference to possible ex- perience only, there is nothing in my regarding them as appearances that can lead astray or cause illusion. For all that they can cbrrectly cohere according to rules of truth in experience. Thus all the proposi- tions of geometry hold good of space as well as of all the objects of the senses, consequently of all possible experience, whether I consider space as a mere form of the sensibility, or as something cleaving to the things themselves. In the former case however I com- prehend how I can know a priori these propositions concerning all the objects of external intuition. Other- wise, everything else as regards all possible experience HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 47 remains just as if I had not departed from the vulgar view. But if I venture to go beyond all possible experi- ence with my notions of space and time, which I can- not refrain from doing if I proclaim them qualities inherent in things in themselves (for what should pre- vent me from letting them hold good of the same things, even though my senses might be different, and unsuited to them?), then a grave error may arise due to illusion, for thus I would proclaim to be universally valid what is merely a subjective condition of the in- tuition of things and sure only for all objects of sense, viz., for all possible experience; I would refer this condition to things in themselves, and do not limit it to the conditions of experience. My doctrine of the ideality of space and of time, therefore, far from reducing the whole sensible world to mere illusion, is the only means of securing the ap- plication of one of the most important cognitions (that which mathematics propounds a priori) to actual ob- jects, and of preventing its being regarded as mere illusion. For without this observation it would be quite impossible to make out whether the intuitions of space and time, which we borrow from no experi- ence, and which yet lie in our representation a priori, are not mere phantasms of our brain, to which objects do not correspond, at least not adequately, and con- sequently, whether we have been able to show its un- questionable validity with regard to all the objects of the sensible world just because they are mere appear- ances. Secondly, though these my principles make ap- pearances of the representations of the senses, they are so far from turning the truth of experience into 48 kant's prolegomena. mere illusion, that they are rather the only means of preventing the transcendental illusion, by which meta- physics has hitherto been deceived, leading to the childish endeavor of catching at bubbles, because ap- pearances, which are mere representations, were taken for things in themselves. Here originated the remark- able event, of the antimony of Reason which I shall mention by and by, and which is destroyed by the single observation, that appearance, as long as it is employed in experience, produces truth, but the mo- ment it transgresses the bounds of experience, and consequently becomes transcendent, produces nothing but illusion. Inasmuch, therefore, as I leave to things as we obtain them by the senses their actuality, and only limit our sensuous intuition of these things to this, that they represent in no respect, not even in the pure intuitions of space and of time, anything more than mere appearance of those things, but never their constitution in themselves, this is not a sweeping illu- sion invented for nature by me. My protestation too against all charges of idealism is so valid and clear as even to seem superfluous, were there not incompe- tent judges, who, while they would have an old name for every deviation from their perverse though com- mon opinion, and never judge of the spirit of philo- sophic nomenclature, but cling to the letter only, are ready to put their own conceits in the place of well- defined notions, and thereby deform and distort them. I have myself given this my theory the name of tran- scendental idealism, but that cannot authorise any one to confound it either with the empirical idealism of Descartes, (indeed, his was only an insoluble prob- lem, owing to which he thought every one at liberty HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 49 to deny the existence of the corporeal world, because it could never be proved satisfactorily"), or with the mystical and visionary idealism of Berkeley, against which and other similar phantasms our Critique con- tains the proper antidote. My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, how- _eyer, coiiistitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), since _jt never canie into my head to doubt it, but it con- cerns thesensuqus representation of things, to which gpjLce_and__ time especially belong. Of these [viz. , space and time] , consequently of all appearances in general, I have only shown, that they are neither things (but mere modes of representation), nor deter- minations belonging to things in themselves. 'But the word "transcendental," which with me means a reference of our cognition, i. e., not to things, but only to the cognitive faculty, was meant to obviate this misconception. Yet rather than give further oc- casion to it by this word, I now retract it, and desire this idealism of mine to be called critical. But if it be really an objectionable idealism to convert actual thi' ngs~(iiot appearances') into mere representation s. .. by what name shall we call him who conversely^ j£5SH£^~SH£-.^P^?i^isirP5S. tojhingsj' It may, I think, be called "dreaming idealism," in contradis- tinction to the former, which may be called "vision- ary," both of which are to be refuted by my transcen- dental, or, better, critical idealism. SECOND PART OF THE TRANSCEN- DENTAL PROBLEM. HOW IS THE'^SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? §14- NATUR E is the existence of things, so far as it is dete rmined according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of things in themselves, ■we_could never cognise it either a priori or a posteriori. Not a priori, for how can we know~wEat belongsto things in themselves, since this never can be done by the dissection of our concepts (in anal}rtical judg- ments) ? We do not want to know what is contained in our concept of a thing (for the [concept describes what] belongs to its logical being), but what is in the actuality of the thing superadded to our concept, and by what the thing itself is determined in its existence outside the concept. Our understanding, and the con- ditipns^ on which alone it can connect the determiBa^ tions of things in their existence, do not prescribe any rule to things themselves; these do not conform to^ our understanding, but it must conform itself to them ; they must therefore be first jgiven us in order to gather these determinations from them, whereftffe they would not be cognised a priori. j^cognition of the "nafure~o1~things in themselves a posteriori would be equally impossible. For, if ex- HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 5 1 perience is to teach us laws, to which the existence of things is subject, these laws, if they regard things in themselves, must belong to them of necessity even outside our experience. But experience teaches us what exists and how it exists, but never that it must necessarily exist so and not otherwise. Experience therefore can never teach us the nature of things in themselves. § 15. We nevertheless actually possess a pure sci- ence of nature in which are propounded, a priori and with all the necessity requisite to apodeictical propo- sitions, laws to which nature is subject. I need onlj ' call to witness that propaedeutic of natural science -; which, under The tlHeljf ~tEe liniversal Science of Na- ture, _precedes all Physics (which is founded _upon ^m rj^[r.'lLriL"r'r'''^)' ^" ^^ wp yiayg ^atVipmatir.g gp plied to apggarancej_and also mer el y Hisr.n rQivp r"'"-| ciples (or those derived from conc ppt-g); ■mhirli rnni stitute the philosoBhicaj,^ait_of._the-P.ute-cngnition-o£ nature. But there are^several Jhingsjnjt, which^are not quite pure and independent j^i. empirical source such as the concept of motipnj^^zX^oiJpipeiiftrabiUty. (upon which the empirical concept„of-_matteii-rests),. that of inertia, and many,. others, .wJiiii;b™pr.eYen.t_its being cjLlJed_a perfectly pure. sciencejoi-natuxe- Be- sides, it only refers to objects of the external sense, and therefore does not give an example of a universal science of nature, in the strict sense, for such a sci- ence must reduce nature in general, whether it regards the object of the external or that of the internal sense (the object of Physics as well as Psychology), to uni- versal laws. But among the principles of this uni- versal physics there are a few which actually have the required universality j for instance, the proposi- 52 rant's prolegomena. tions that "substance is permanent," and that "every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws," etc. These are actually universal la\ys of na- ture, which subsist completely a priori. There is_then. in_ f act „a,., pure .science of nature, and the question arises, How is iij^ssible ? § 1 6. The word "nature" assumes yet another meaning, which determines the object, whereas in the former sense it only denotes the conformity to law \Gesetzmdssigkeit'\ of the determinations of the exist- ence of things generally. Jf wecoiisider it materialHer (i.._e.., in the matter. that forms its objects) ",nature-is the. ..complex of all the objects of _exgerience.-"— And with this only are we now concerned, for besides, things which can never be objects of experience, if they must be cognised as to their nature, would oblige us to have recourse to concepts whose meaning could never be given in concreto (by any example of possible experience). Consequently we must form for ourselves a list of concepts of their nature, the reality whereof (i. e., whether they actually refer to objects, or are mere creations of thought) could never be determined. The cognition of what cannot be an object of experi- efiCe^ould Tie tiyperpKysical, ana with things hyper- pKysical we arehere not concerned, but o^y^with itej;ogoitiQn_p.f. .n.aJtu.re,._th.e_.jL<>tuMilXSLwh^^^ be confirmed by experience, though it J[the cognition of nature] is possible a priori and precedes all experi- ence. § 17. The formal [aspect] of nature in this nar- rower sense is therefore the conformitj' to law of all the objects of experience, and so far as it is cognised a priori, their necessary conformity. But it has just been shown that the laws of nature can never be cog- HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 53 nised a priori in objects so far as they are considered not in reference to possible experience, but as things in themselves. And our inquiry here extends not to things in themselves (the properties of which we pass by), but to things as objects of possible experience, and the complex of these is what we properly desig- nate as nature. And now I ask, when the possibility of a cognition of nature a priori is in question, whether it is better to arra:nge the problem thus : H ow can we cognise a priori that thing^?is„Qbjects-^of-experi- ence necessarily coiiform toJ^awP^pj^hus.:^ .H possible to cog nise a priori the-.n£&easary-r.nnfnrmity to law of experience itsel f as regards -all-itS-XibjectS- g enerally ? Closely considered, the solution of the problem, represented in either way, amounts, with regard to the pure cognition of nature (which is the point of the question at issue), entirely to the same thing. For the subjective laws, under which alone an empirical cognition of things is possible, hold good of these things, as objects of possible experience (not as things in themselves, which are not considered here). Either of the following statements means quite the same : A judgment of observation can never rank as ex- perience, without the law, that "whenever an event is observed, it is always referred to some antecedent, which it follows according to a universal rule." "Everything, of which experience teaches that it happens, must have a cause. " It is, however, more commendable to choose the first formula. For we can a priori and previous to all given objects have a cognition of those conditions, on which alone experience is possible, but never of the laws to which things may in themselves be subject. 54 rant's prolegomena. without reference to possible experience. We cannot therefore study the nature of things a priori otherwise than by investigating the conditions and the universal (though subjective) laws, under which alone such a cognition as experience (as to mere form) is possible, and we determine accordingly the possibility of things, as objects of experience. For if I should choose the second formula, and seek the conditions a priori, on which nature as an object of experience is possible, I might easily fall into error, and fancy that I was speak- ing of nature as a thing in itself, and then move round in endless circles, in a vain search for laws concern- ing things of which nothing is given me. Accordingly we shall here be concerned with ex- perience only, and the universal conditions of its pos- sibility which are given a priori. Thence we shall determine nature as the whole object of all possible experience. I think it wiU be understood that I here do not mean the rules of the observation of a nature that is already given, for these already presuppose experience. I do not mea n how (through ex perience) wej£an-5itedjLthe,Ja_ws of nature ; fo r these would not th en be laws a priori, and would yield us no pure„§gi-__ ence of nature ; but [I mean to ask] how th e condi- tions a priori of the possibility of experience are at the same time the sources trom which alF the 'uni- versal laws of nature~mu¥rBe derived. § 18. Iirtlfe~firiir"prace we" rnust state that, while all judgments of experience {Erfahrungsurtheile) are empirical (i. e., have their ground in immediate sense- perception), vice versa, all empirical judgments {em- pirische UrtheiW) are not judgments of experience, but, besides the empirical, and in general besides what is given to the sensuous intuition, particular HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 55 concepts must yet be superadded — concepts which have their origin quite a priori in the pure under- standing, and under which every perception must be first of all subsumed and then by their means changed into experience.^ Empir ical judgments, so_far,. as_they have objec- ti ve validity, are judgments of experience ; b ut those wh_ich_aj:e_mjJ.X.su±(jectively valid , I nam e mere judg- ments of pe rception. TlieTbtter re quirel nopufe'con- cept of the understanding, but only the logicarcon- nexion ot perSeptioirTnraTH'inEing subjeetT-^-But'the for mer alway s re q uireT 'Besides^TieTep'fggientati&n of t he sensuous intuition, partrcul?r con ce$ls~oftginally begotten in the understandifig, yjlyich p roduce theobjec- ti ve validity of the judgtnen t of experience. All our judgments are at first merely~]udgments of perception; they hold good only for us (i. e., for our subject), and we do not till afterwards give them a new reference (to an object), and desire that they shall always hold good for us and in the same way for everybody else ; for when a judgment agrees with an object, all judgments concerning the same object must likewise agree among themselves, and thus\the objective validity of the ju dgment of experience sig- iilHes nothmg else than its necessary universality of a pplication. And conversely when we~Eave reason to consider a judgment necessarily univer sal .(which • iiey erTiepe'tf€'sFBpoff^pCT6ep!ionri3^irt upon the pure c0trce'pt"Bf"the'Tirn3ers?anHIng, under which the per- cepfion^is^ilbsumed), we must consider it objective 1 Empirical judgments \empirischt UrtJuile) are either mere statements of fact, viz., records of a perception, or statements of a natural law, implying a causal connexion between two facts. The former Kant calls "judgments of perception" {Wahrfuhmungsurikeiie), the latter ** judgments of experi- ence • * {Er/ahrungsurtheile). — Ed. 1/ 56 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA. also, that is, that it expresses not merely a reference ^ij9Hr^JPl^iE5Si!l9l^I15SSF*i"^yJ 3- qu^ity or tSe _object. For there would be no reason for the judg- ments of other men necessarily agreeing v/ith mine, if it were not the unity of the object to which they all refer, and with which they accord ; hence they must all agree with one another. § ig. Therefore objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody') are equivalen t terms, an(l though we do not know the object in itself, yet when JKe,.caasidjer.a„judgmerit,as., universal, and also ne ces- sary, we understand it to have objective validity. By this judgment we cognise the object (though it remains unknown as it is in itself) by the universal and neces- sary connexion of the given perceptions. As this is the case with all objects of sense, judgments of expe- rience take their objective validity not from the im- mediate cognition of the object (which is impossible), but from the condition of universal validity in empiri- cal judgments, which, as already said, never rests upon empirical, or, in short, sensuous conditions, but upon a pure concept of the understanding. Thfi_ab- ii?^5t_always^remains un^^ .itse]fi_ but_when^y ithe concept of the understanding the connexion of the ;representations of the object, which are given to our~ iiensIKiny,'li'aetCTmirred as univSs^^ i]|Ii[10?isssiiDi2Ll3y;jRi!O3raHQni.'J^ j udg- iment that is objective. ' To illustrate the matter : When we say, "the room is warm, sugar sweet, and wormwood bitter,"* — we 1 1 freely grant that these examples do not represent such judgments of perception as ever could become judgments of experience, even though a concept of the understanding were superadded, because' they refer merely to feeling, which everybody knows to be merely subjective, and which of course can never be attributed to the object, and consequently never become HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 57 have only subjectively valid judgments. I do not atv all expect that I or any other person shall always find) it as I now do; each of these sentences only expresses N a relation of two sensations to the same subject, to \ myself, and that only in my present state of percep- Jj tion ; consequently they are not valid of the objecty Such are judgments of perception. Judgments of ex-J perience are of quite a different nature. What gxpe,- rience teaches me under certain circumstances, it must always teach me_and__ever3i[body^j_jijd_its_jj^^ not lim ited to th e sub j ect nor to its state at a particu - JLar._.tiine. Hence I pronounce all such judgments as being objectively valid. For instance, when I say the air is elastic, this judgment is as yet a judgment of perception only — I do nothing but refer two of my sensations to one another. But, if I would have it ) called a judgment of experience, I require this con- S nexion to stand under a condition, which makes it •< universally valid. I desire therefore that I and every- j body else should always connect necessarily the same perceptions under the. same circumstances. § 20. We must consequently analyse experience in order to see what is contained in this product of * the senses and of the understanding, and how the ' judgment of experience itself is possible. The foun- dation is the intuition of which I become conscious, J. e., perception (^percepiio), which pertains merely to the senses. But in the next place, there are acts of judging (which belong only to the understanding). I But this judging may be twofold — first, I may merely ' objective. I only wished to give here an example of a judgment that is merely subjectively valid, containing no ground for universal validity, and thereby for a relation to the object. An example of the judgments of per- ception, which become judgments of experience by saperadded concepts of the understanding, will be given in the next note. 58 kant's prolegomena compare perceptions and connect them in a particular state of ray consciousness ; or, secondly, I may con- nect them in consciousness generally. The former judgment is merely a judgment of perception, and of subjective validity only : it is merely a connexion of perceptions in my mental state, without reference to the object.- Hence it is not, as is commonly imagined, enough for experience to compare perceptions and to connect them in consciousness through judgment; there arises no universality and necessity, for which alone judgments can become objectively valid and be called experience. / Quite another judgment therefore is required be- fore perception can become experience. The,given_ ! intuition must be subs umed u nder a concept, which determiines the form of judging in general relatively toThe intuition, connects its empirical consciousness" I in" consciousness generally, and thereby procures uni- ) vers^l~vafll3ity^o^&mpincal Tudgrnentsl^rA'Tonce^^^ ^ fins~na?ure "is a pure a priori concept of the Under- standing, which does nothing but determine for an intuition the general way in which it can be used for judgments. Let the concept be that of cause, then it determines the intuition which is subsumed under it, e. g., that of air, relative to judgments in general, viz., the concept of air serves with regard to its ex- pansion in the relation of antecedent to consequent in a hypothetical judgment. The concept of^ausej(c=~^ c ordingly is a pure concept"~of~tEe " ~understand ing, __and^only^^eryes_jtodete the representationsub- ^^^^underitrreiativeiy~to judgmentsjii general, ■pia sotolxralc e'iruniVCTsally valid judgment possible .! Before, therefore, a judgment of perception can J ' HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 59 become a judgment of experience, it is requisite that the perception should be subsumed under some such a concept of the understanding; for instance, air ranks under the concept of causes, which determines our judgment about it in regard to its expansion as hypothetical.^ Thereby the expansion of the air is represented not as merely belonging to the perception of the air in my present state or in several states of mine, or in the state of perception of others, but as belonging to it necessarily. The judgment, "the air is elastic, " becomes universally valid, and a judgment of experience, only by certain judgments preceding it, which subsume the intuition of air under the con- cept of cause and effect : and they thereby determine the perceptions not merely as regards one another in me, but relatively to the form of judging in general, which is here hypothetical, and in this way they ren- der the empirical judgment universally valid. If all our sy nthetical judgments are analysed_so far as they are objectively valid, it will be found that the'Y'ire"ver"consist~oT~mere inturtions"^nnect ed on ly (as'is^'commonlyTielieved") by comparison into a judg- ment-;-but--that--tb?fy'would"be IfripossiSie^were not a pur e coucepnafthgtyfaderstanaing supera dded to th e lioncepTs^'b'sfHcieHnffonrTiituition, under which con- t:ept--tfae5e~hrtt'gr~afe subsunied, and in this manne r on^ combined into an objectively valid judgment. 1 As an easier example, we may take the following : " When the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm." This judgment, however often 1 and others may have perceived it, is a mere judgment of perception, and contains no necessity ; perceptions are only usually conjoined in this manner. But if I say, "The.sun warms the stone," I add to the perception a concept of the understanding, viz., that of cause, which connects with the concept of sun- shine that of heat as a necessary consequence, and the synthetical judgment becomes of necessity universally valid, viz., objective, and is converted from a perception into experience. 6o KANT'S PROLEGOMENA. Even the judgments of pure mathematics in their sim- plest axioms are not exempt from this condition. The principle, "a straight line is the shortest between two points," presupposes that the line is subsumed under the concept of quantity, which certainly is no mere intuition, but has its seat in the understanding alone, and serves to determine the intuition (of the line) with regard to the judgments which may be made about it, relatively to their quantity, that is, to plu- rality (siS judicia plura/iva).'^ For under them it is understood that in a given intuition there is contained a plurality of homogenous parts. § 21. To prove, then, the possibility of experience so far as it rests upon pure concepts of the understand- ing a priori, we must first represent what belongs to judgments in general and the various functions of the understanding, in a complete table. For the pure con- cepts of the understanding must run parallel to these functions, as such concepts are nothing more than con- cepts of intuitions in general, so far as these are deter- mined by one or other of these functions of judging, in themselves, that is, necessarily and universally. Hereby also the a priori principles of the possibility of all experience, as of an objectively valid empirical cognition, will be precisely determined. For they are nothing but propositions by which all perception is (under certain universal conditions of intuition) sub- sumed under those pure concepts of the understanding. IThis name seems preferable to the term parttctUarza, which is used for these judgments in logic. For the latter implies the idea that they are not universal. But when I start from unity (in single judgments) and so proceed to universality, I must not [even indirectly and negatively] imply any refer- ence to universality. I think plurality merely without universality, and not the exception from universality. This is necessary, if logical considerations shall form the basis of the pure concepts of the understanding. However, tb^re is po need of making changes in logic. HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 6l Logical Table of Judgments. As to Quantity. Universal. Particular. Singular. 3- As to Relation. Categorical. Hypothetical. Disjunctive. As to Quality. Affirmative. Negative. Infinite. As to Modality. Problematical. Assertorical. Apodeictical. Transcendental Table of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding. I. 2. As to Quantity. As to Quality. Unity (the Measure). Reality. Plurality (the Quantity). Negation. Totality (the Whole). Limitation. As to Relation. Substance. Cause. Community. As to Modality. Possibility. Existence. Necessity. Pure Physiological Table of the Universal Principles of the Science of Nature. I. Axioms of Intuition. Anticipations of Perception. Analogies of Experience. Postulates of Empirical Thinking generally. 62 kant's prolegomena. % 2ia. In order to comprise the whole matter in one idea, it is first necessary to remind the reader that we are discussing not the origin of experience, but of that which lies in experience. The former per- tains to empirical psychology, and would even then never be adequately explained without the latter, which belongs to the Critique of cognition, and par- ticularly of the understanding. Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to tlt gt J H im ib i l it y r a Hd^tif-ttrdgmfents, which are en tirel y a*^ work of the unde rstanding. "But tfie~uf3gmen ts , which the understanding forms alone from sensuous intuitions, are far from being judgrdents of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in the sensuous intui- tion, while in the other the judgments must express what experience in general, and not what the mere perception (which possesses only subjective validity) contains. The judgment of experience must therefore add to the sensuous intuition and its logical connex- ion in a judgment (after it has been rendered univer- sal by comparison) something that determines the synthetical judgment as necessary and therefore as universally valid. This can be nothing else than that concept which represents the intuition as determined in itself with regard to one form of judgment rather than another, viz., a concept of that synthetical unity of intuitions which can only be represented by a given logical function of judgments. § 22. The sum of the matter is this : the business j of the senses is to inluite — that of the understanding is to think. But-tbinkin g" is uniting _ jepr^sentatigns ^ji. , -one. . CQjnaGioustlf.S^.-. This union originates either merely relative to the subject, and is accidental and HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 63 subjective, or is absolute, and is necessary or objec- tive. The union of representations in one conscious- , jiess Jsjudghientrj." TKnEing^ judging, or refe2^gj;ep£Menta^ions to judgments in _geiaeraL- Hence judgment§_are. either. m,erely„subjec- tive, when representati^nswej^eferred to jl cggQS,c.ip,us- ness in one subject o nly^ an d united i n it, or pbjec- tive, when they are jinited m a cqnsciousness_gen^5^ ally, that is, jiecessarily. The logical functions of all judgments are but various modes of uniting represen- tations in consciousness. But if they serve for con- cepts, they are concepts of their necessary union in a consciousness, and so principles of objectively valid judgments. This union in a consciousness is either analytical, by identity, or synthetical, by the combi- nation and addition of various representations one to another. Experience cons ists in the synthetical con- nexion of phenomena (perce ptions) in consciousness, so far as this connexion is necessary. Hence the pure concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must be subsumed ere they can serve for judgments of experience, in which the synthetical unity of the perceptions is represented as necessary and universally valid. ^ 1 But how does this proposition, "that jadgments of experience contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions," agree with my statement so often before inculcated, that "experience as cognition a posteriori can afford con- tingent judgments only ?" When I say that experience teaches me some- thing, I mean only the perception that lies in experience, — for example, that heat always follows the shining of the sun on a stone; consequently the proposition of experience is always so far accidental. That this heat neces- sarily follows the shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of experience (by means of the concept of cause), yet is a fact not learned by experience; for conversely, experience is first of all generated by this addi- tion of the concept of the understanding (of cause) to perception. How per- ception attains this addition may be seen by referring in the Critique itself to the section on the Transcendental faculty of Judgment [viz., in the first edition, Von dem. Schematismus der reimn Vrrstandsbegriff'e'\, 64 rant's prolegomena. § 23. Judgments, when considered merely as the condition of the union of given representations in a consciousness, are rules. These rules, so far as they represent the union as necessary, are rules a priori, and so far as they cannot be deduced from higher rules, are fundamental principles. But in regard to the possibility of all experience, merely in relation to the form of thinking in it, no conditions of judgments of experience are higher than those which bring the phenomena, according to the various form of their intuition, under pure concepts of the understanding, and render the empirical judgment objectively valid. These concepts are therefore the a priori principles of possible experience. The principles of possible experience are then at fiEe"sg!ine 'tim e^ jmiversal 'law's^of ' natur^'wKicir cafi''BS" iggnisedjf^/wj;'- ^'^^ ^\i& the problem in our sec- ond question, "How is the pure Science of Nature possible?" is solved. For the system which is re- quired for the form of a science is to be met with in perfection here, because, beyond the above-mentioned formal conditions of all judgments in general offered in logic, no others are possible, and these constitute a logical system. The concepts grounded thereupon, which contain the a priori conditions of all synthetical and necessary judgments, accordingly constitute a transcendental system. Finally the principles, by means of which all phenomena are subsumed under these concepts, constitute a physical * system, that is, a system of nature, which precedes all empirical cog- nition of nature, makes it even possible, and hence l[Kant uses the term physiological in its etymological meaning as "per- taining to the science of physics," i. e., nature in general, not as we use the term now as " pertaining to the functions of the living body,*' Accordingly it has been translated "physical." — Ed.'\ HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 65 may in strictness be denominated the universal and pure science of nature. § 24. The first one^ of the physiological principles subsumes all phenomena, as intuitions in space and time, under the concept of Quantity, and is so far a principle of the application of Mathematics to experi- ence. The second one subsumes the empirical ele- ment, viz., sensation, which denotes the real in intui- tions, not indeed directly under the concept of quan- tity, because sensation is not an intuition that contains either space or time, though it places the respective object into both. But still there is between reality (sense-representation) and the zero, or total void of intuition in time, a difference which has a quantity. For between every given degree of light and of dark- ness, between every degree of heat and of absolute cold, between every degree of weight and of absolute lightness, between every degree of occupied space and of totally void space, diminishing degrees can be conceived, in the same manner as between conscious- ness and total unconsciousness (the darkness of a psychological blank) ever diminishing degrees obtain. Hence there is no perception that can prove an abso- lute absence of it ; for instance, no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as a kind of con- sciousness, which is only outbalanced by a stronger consciousness. This occurs in all cases of sensation, and so the understanding can anticipate even sensa- tions, which constitute the peculiar quality of empiri- cal representations (appearances), by means of the principle: "that 'they all have (consequently that IThe three following paragraphs will hardly be understood unless refer- ence be made to what the Critique itself says on the subject of the Principles; they will, however, be of service in giving a general view of the Principles, and in fixing the attention on the main points. 66 rant's PROLEGOMtNA. what is real in all phenomena has) a degree. " Here is the second application of mathematics (maihesis in- tensoruni) to the science of nature. § 25. Anent the relation of appearances merely with a view to their existence, the determination is not mathematical but dynamical, and can never be objectively valid, consequently never fit for experi- ence, if it does not come under a priori principles by which the cognition of experience relative to appear- ances becomes even possible. Hence appearances must be subsumed under the concept of Substance, which is the foundation of all determination of exist- ence, as a concept of the thing itself; or secondly — so far as a succession is found among phenomena, that is, an event — under the concept of an Effect with reference to Cause ; or lastly — so far as coexist- ence is to be known objectively, that is, by a judg- ment of experience — under the concept of Commun- ity (action and reaction).^ Thus a priori principles form the basis of objectively valid, though empirical judgments, that is, of the possibility of experience so far as it must connect objects as existing in nature. These principles are the proper laws of nature, which may be termed dynamical. Finally the cognition of the agreement and con- nexion not only of appearances among themselves in experience, but of their relation to experience in gen- eral, belongs to the judgments of experience. This relation contains either their agreement with the for- mal conditions, which the understanding cognises, or their coherence with the materials of the senses and of perception, or combines both into one concept. Consequently it contains Possibility, Actuality, and 1 LKant uses here the equivocal term Wechselwzrkuitff^-^Efl,'\ HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 67 Necessity according to universal laws of nature ; and this constitutes the physical doctrine of method, or the distinction of truth and of hypotheses, and the bounds of the certainty of the latter. § 26. The third table of Principles drawn from the nature of the understanding itself after the critical method, shows an inherent perfection, which raises it far above every other table which has hitherto though in vain been tried or may yet be tried by analysing the objects themselves dogmatically. It exhibits all synthetical a priori principles completely and accord- ing to one principle, viz., the faculty of judging in general, constituting the essence of experience as re- gards the understanding, so that we can be certain that there are no more such principles, which affords a satisfaction such as can never be attained by the dogmatical method. Yet is this not all: there is a still greater merit in it. We must carefully bear in mind the proof which shows the possibility of this cognition a priori, and at the same time limits all such principles to a condition which must never be lost sight of, if we desire it not to be misunderstood, and extended in use beyond the original sense which the understanding attaches to it. This limit is that they contain nothing but the condi- tions of possible experience in general so far as it is subjected to laws a priori. Consequently I do not say, that things in themselves possess a quantity, that their actuality possesses a degree, their existence a connexion of accidents in a substance, etc. ~ This no- body can prove, because such a synthetical connexion from mere concepts, without any reference to sensu- ous intuition on the one side, or connexion of it in a possible experience on the other, is absolutely impos- 68 kant's prolegomena. sible. The essential limitation of the concepts in these principles then is : That all things stand neces- sarily a priori under the afore-mentioned conditions, as objects of experience only. Hence there follows secondly a specifically pecu- liar mode of proof of these principles : they are not directly referred to appearances and to their relations, but to the possibility of experience, of which appear- ances constitute the matter only, not the form. Thus they are referred to objectively and universally valid synthetical propositions, in which we distinguish judgments of experience from those of perception. This takes place because appearances, as mere intui- tions, occupying a part of space and time, come un- der the concept of Quantity, which unites their multi- plicity a priori according to rules synthetically. Again, so far as the perception contains, besides intuition, sensibilitj', and between the latter and nothing (i. e., the total disappearance of sensibility), there is an ever-decreasing transition, it is apparent that that which is in appearances must have a degree, so far as it (viz., the perception) does not itself occupy any part of space or of time.^ Still the transition to actuality from empty time or empty space is only possible in time ; consequently though sensibility, as IHeat and light are in a small space just as large as to degree as in a large one ; in like manner the internal representations, pain, consciousness in general, whether they last a short or a long time, need not vary as to the degree. Hence the quantity is here in a point and in a moment just as great as in any space or time however great. Degrees are therefore capable of in- crease, but not in intuition, rather in mere sensation (or the quantity of the degree of an intuition). Hence they can only be estimated quantitatively by the relation of i to o, viz., by their capability of decreasing by infinite inter- mediate degrees to disappearance, or of increasing from naught through in- finite gradations to a determinate sensation in a certain time. Quanttias qualitatis est gradus [i. e., the degrees of quality must be measured by equality]. HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 69 the quality of empirical intuition, can never be cog- nised a priori, by its specific diiference from other sensibilities, yet it can, in a possible experience in general, as a quantity of perception be intensely dis- tinguished from every other similar perception. Hence the application of mathematics to nature, as regards the sensuous intuition by which nature is given to us, becomes possible and is thus determined. Above all, the reader must pay attention to the mode of proof of the principles which occur under the title of Analogies of experience. For these do not refer to the genesis of intuitions, as do the prin- ciples of applied mathematics, but to the connexion of their existence in experience; and this can be nothing but the determination of their existence in time according to necessary laws, under which alone the connexion is objectively valid, and thus becomes experience. The proof therefore does not turn on the synthetical unity in the connexion of things in themselves, but merely of perceptions, and of these not in regard to their matter, but to the determination of time and of the relation of their existence in it, ac- cording to universal laws. If the empirical determi- nation in relative time is indeed objectively valid (i. e., experience), these universal laws contain the neces- sary determination of existence in time generally (viz., according to a rule of the understanding a priori^. In these Prolegomena I cannot further descant on the subject, but my reader (who has probably been long accustomed to consider experience a mere em- pirieal synthesis of perceptions, and hence not con- sidered that it goes much beyond them, as it imparts to empirical judgments universal validity, and for that purpose requires a pure and a priori unity of the 70 rant's prolegomena. understanding) is recommeKded to pay special atten- tion to thSs distinction of experience from a mere ag- gregate of perceptions, and to judge the mode of proof from this point of view. § 27. Now we are prepared to remove Hume's doubt. He justly maintains, that we cannot compre- hend by reason the possibility of Causality, that is, of the reference of the existence of one thing to the ex- istence of another, which is necessitated by the for- mer. I add, that we comprehend just as little the concept of Subsistence, that is, the necessity that at the foundation of the existence of things there lies a subject which cannot itself be a predicate of any other thing ; nay, we cannot even form a notion of the pos- sibility of such a thing (though we can point out ex- amples of its use in experience). The very same in- comprehensibility affects the Community of things, as we cannot comprehend how- from the state of one thing an inference to the state of quite another thing beyond it, and vice versa, can be drawn, and how sub- stances which have each their own separate existence should depend upon one another necessarily. But I am very far from holding these concepts to be derived merely from experience, and the necessity represented in them, to be imaginary and a mere illusion produced in us by long habit. On the contrary, I have amply shown, that they and the theorems derived from them are firmly established a priori, or before all experience, and have their undoubted objective value, though only with regard to experience. § 28. Though I have no notion of such a connex- ion of things in themselves, that they can either exist as substances, or act as causes, or stand in commun- ity with others (as parts of a real whole), and I can HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? Jl just as little conceive such properties in appearances as such (because those- concepts contain nothing that lies in the appearances, but only what the under- standing alone must think) : we have yet a notion of such a connexion of representations in our under- standing, and in judgments generally; consisting in this that representations appear in one sort of judg- ments as subject in relation to predicates, in another as reason in relation to consequences, and in a third as parts, which constitute together a total possible cognition. Besides we cognise a priori that without considering the representation of an object as deter- mined in some of these respects, we can have no valid cognition of the object, and, if we should occupy our- selves about the object in itself, there is no possible attribute, by which I could know that it is determined under any of these aspects, that is, under the concept either of substance, or of cause, or (in relation to other substances) of community, for I have no notion of the possibility of such a connexion of existence. But the question is not how things in themselves, but how the empirical cognition of things is determined, as regards the above aspects of judgments in general, that is, how things, as objects of experience, can and shall be subsumed under these concepts of the under- standing. And then it is clear, that I completely com- prehend not only the possibility, but also the neces- sity of subsuming all phenomena under these concepts, that is, of "using them for principles of the possibility of experience. § 29. When making an experiment with Hume's problematical concept (his crux metaphysicoruni) , the concept of cause, we have, in the first place, given a priori, by means of logic, the form of a conditional 72 kant's prolegomena. judgment in general, i. e., we have one given cogni- tion as antecedent and another as consequence. But it is possible, that in perception we may meet with a rule of relation, which runs thus : that a certain phe- nomenon is constantly followed by another (though not conversely), and this is a case for me to use the hypothetical judgment, and, for instance, to say, if' the sun shines long enough upon a body, it grows warm. Here there is indeed as yet no necessity of connexion, or concept of cause. But I proceed and say, that if this proposition, which is merely a subjec- tive connexion of perceptions, is to be a judgment of experience, it must be considered as necessary and universally valid. Such a proposition would be, "the sun is by its light the cause of heat." The empirical rule is now considered as a law, and as valid not merely of appearances but valid of them for the pur- poses of a possible experience which requires univer- sal and therefore necessarily valid rules. I therefore easily comprehend the concept of cause, as a concept necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience, and its possibility as a synthetical union of percep- tions in consciousness generally ; but I do not at all comprehend the possibility of a thing generafly as a cause, because the concept of cause denotes a condi- tion not at all belonging to things, but to experience. It is nothing in fact but an objectively valid cbgiiition of appearances and of their succession, so far as the antecedent can be conjoined with the consequent ac- cording to the rule of hypothetical judgments. § 30. Hence if the puTeMjoSceptS^bf *the under- standing do not refer to objects of experience but to things in themselves (jioumena), they have no signifi- cation whatever. They serve, as it were, only to de- HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 73 cipher appearances, that we may be able to read them as experience. The principles which arise from their reference to the sensible world, only serve our under- standing for empirical use. Beyond this they are arbitrary combinations, without objective reality, and we can neither cognise their possibility a priori, nor verify their reference to objects, let alone make it in- telligible by any example ; because examples can only be borrowed from some