. 2 
 
 
 LIBRAftY, 
 LUFORD'.
 
 LIBRARY 
 OF 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 CALIFORNIA 
 .OS ANGELES
 
 L O G I C K: 
 
 Or, The RIGHT USE of 
 
 REASON 
 
 IN THE 
 
 Enquiry after TRUTH. 
 
 WITH 
 
 A Variety of RULES to guard againft Error} 
 
 in the Affairs of RELIGION and 
 
 HUMAN LIFE, as well as 
 
 in the SCIENCES. 
 
 By ISAAC WA<r<TS, D. D. 
 The SIXTH EDITION, Corre&ed. 
 
 L Q N D Q N : 
 
 f rimed for RICHARD FORD, at tbt Angel, and 
 
 HSTT, at tht Bible and Crown, bstb in tkt Poultr/. 
 MDCC XXXVI.
 
 C 
 T O 
 
 WS 
 
 Sir John Hartopp, Bar 1 . 
 
 1 
 
 SIR, 
 
 IT is fit the Publick fhould receive 
 thro' your Hands what was writ- 
 ten originally for the Affiftance 
 of your younger Studies, and was then 
 prefented to you. 
 
 It was by the repeated Importuni- 
 ties of our Learned Friend Mr. John, 
 Eames, that I was perfuaded to revife 
 thefe Rudiments of Logick ; and when 
 I had once fudered rnyfelf to begin 
 the Work, I was drawn flill onward 
 far beyond my firft Defign, even to 
 the Neglect, or too long Delay of other 
 preiling and important Demands that 
 were upon me. 
 
 It has been my Endeavour to form 
 
 every Part of this Treatife both for the 
 
 A a Inftruc* 
 
 1493588
 
 DEDICATION, 
 
 Inftru&ion of Students to open their 
 Way into the Sciences, and for the 
 more extenfive and general Service of 
 Mankind, that the Gentleman and the 
 Cbriftian might find their Account in 
 the Perufal as well as the Scholar, I 
 have therefore collected and propofed 
 the chief Principles and Rules of right 
 Judgment in Matters of common and 
 iacred Importance, and pointed out 
 our moft frequent Miftakes and Preju- 
 dices in the Concerns of Life and Re- 
 ligion, that we might better guard 
 againft the Springs of Error, Guilt arid 
 Sorrow, which furround us in every 
 Stage of Mortality. 
 
 You know, Sir, the great Defign of 
 this noble Science is to refcue our rea- 
 foning Powers from their unhappy Sla- 
 very and Darknefs ; and thus with all 
 due Subrniffion and Deference it offers 
 a humble Affiftance to divine Reve- 
 lation. Its chief Bufinefs is to relieve 
 the natural Weaknefles of the Mind by 
 fome better Efforts of Nature; it is tq 
 
 diffufe
 
 DEDICATION, 
 
 diffufea Light over the Underftanding 
 in our Enquiries after Truth, and not 
 to furnifh the Tongue with Debate and 
 Controversy. 7f ue Logick is not that 
 noify Thing that deals all in Difpute 
 and Wrangling, to which former Ages 
 had debafed and confined it ; yet its 
 Difciples muft acknowledge alfo, that 
 they are taught to vindicate and defend 
 the Truth, as well as to fearch it out* 
 True Logick doth not require a long 
 Detail of hard Words to amufe Man- 
 kind, and to puff up the Mind with 
 empty Sounds > and a Pride of falfe 
 Learning 5 yet fome Diftindions and 
 Terms of Art are neceflary to range 
 every Idea in its proper Clafs, and to 
 keep our Thoughts from Confufion. 
 The World is now grown fo wile as 
 not to fuffer this valuable Art to be 
 engroft by the Schools. In fo polite 
 and knowing an Age, every Man of 
 Reafon will covet fome Acquaintance 
 with Logick) fince it renders its daily 
 Service to Wifdom and Virtue^ and to 
 A 3 the
 
 DEDICATION. 
 
 the Affairs of common Life as well as 
 td the Sciences. 
 
 I will not prefume. Sir, that this 
 little Book is improved iince its firft 
 Compofure, in Proportion to the Im- 
 provements of your manly Age. But 
 when you fhall pleafe to review it in 
 your retired Hours, perhaps you may 
 refrefh your own Memory in fome of 
 the early Parts of Learning : And if 
 you find all the additional Remarks 
 and Rules made fo familiar to you al- 
 ready by your own Obfervation, that 
 there is nothing new among them, it 
 will be no unpleafing Reflection that 
 you have fo far anticipated the prefent 
 Zeal and Labour of, 
 
 SIR, 
 
 Your moft faithful and 
 
 obedient Servant ', 
 
 London, Aug. 24. 
 1724. 
 
 I. WATTS.
 
 L O G I C K: 
 
 O R, 
 
 The Right Ufe of R E A s o N . 
 
 The INT RODUCTION and general SCHEME. 
 
 LO G I C K is the Art ofufing Reafon * well 
 in our Enquiries after Truth, and the Conn- 
 muni cation of it to others. 
 
 Reafon * is the Glory of human Nature* 
 and one of the chief Eminencies whereby we arfc 
 raifed above our Fellow -Creatures the Brutes in this 
 lower World. 
 
 Reafon, as to the Power and Principle of it, i& 
 the common Gift of God to all Men , tho* all 
 are not favoured with it by Nature in an equal 
 Degree : But the acquired Improvements of it in 
 different Men, make a much greater Diftinclion 
 between them than Nature had made. I could 
 even venture to fay, that the Improvement of Rea- 
 fon hath raifed the Learned and the Prudent in thb 
 European World, almoft as much above the Hot- 
 tentots, and other Savages of Africa, as thofe Sa- 
 vages are by Nature fuperior to the Birds, the Beafts* 
 and the Fifties. 
 
 Now the Defign of Lcgick is to teach us the 
 right Ufe of our Reafon, or Intellectual Powers^ 
 and the Improvement of them in our lelves and 
 others ; this is not only neceflary in order to at- 
 
 * The Word Reafon in this Place is not confined to the mere Faculty of 
 reafoning or inferring one thing from another, but includes all the intellect 
 tual Powers of Man. 
 
 A 4 tain
 
 * L G I C K : Or; 
 
 tain any competent Knowledge in the Sciences, or 
 the Affairs of Learning, but to govern both the 
 greater and the meaner Aftions of Life. It is the 
 Cultivation of our Reafon by which we are better 
 enabled to diftinguifh Good from Evil, as well as 
 Truth from Faljhood : And both thefe are Matters 
 of the higheft Importance, whether we regard this 
 Life, or the Life to come. 
 
 The Purfuit and Acquifition of Truth is of infi- 
 nite Concernment to Mankind. Hereby we be- 
 come acquainted with the Nature of Thing* both 
 in Heaven and Earth, and their various Relations 
 to each other. It is by this means we difcover 
 our Duty to God and our Fellow-Creatures : By 
 this we arrive at the Knowledge of natural Reli- 
 gion^ and learn to confirm our Faith in divine Re- 
 velation, as well as to underftand what is revealed. 
 Our Wifdom, Prudence and Piety, our prefent 
 Conduct and our future Hope, are all influenced 
 by the Ufe of our rational Powers in the Search 
 after Truth. 
 
 There are feveral Things that make it very 
 necefiary that our Realbn mould have fome Af- 
 fiftance in the Exercife or Ufe of it. 
 
 The firft is, the Depth and Difficulty of many 
 Truths^ and the Weakness of our Reafon to fee far 
 into Things at once^ and penetrate to the Bottom of 
 them. It was a Saying among the Ancients, Ve- 
 ritas in Puteo^ Truth lies in a Well : and to carry 
 on this Metaphor we may very juftly fay, that 
 Logick does, as it were, fupply us with Steps 
 whereby we may go down to reach the Water -, 
 or it frames the Links of a Chain whereby we 
 may draw the Water up from the Bottom. Thus, 
 by the Means of many Reafonings well connect- 
 ed together, Philofophers in our Age have drawn 
 a thoufand Truths out of the Depths of Dark- 
 3 nefs,
 
 fte right Ufe ^Reafom 3 
 
 nefs, which our Fathers were utterly unacquaint- 
 ed with. 
 
 Another Thing that makes it neceflary for our 
 Reafbn to have fome Afliftance given it, is the 
 
 Difgmfe andfalfe Colours in which many things ap- 
 pear to us in this prefent imperfeR State : There are 
 a thoufand things which are not in reality what 
 they appear to be, and that both in the natural 
 and the moral World : So the Sun appears to be 
 flat as a Plate of Silver, and to be lefs than twelve 
 Inches in Diameter ; the Moon appears to be as 
 big as the Sun, and the Rainbow appears to be a 
 large fubftantial Arch in the Sky , all which are 
 in reality grofs Falfhoods. So Knavery puts on 
 the Face ofjuftice, Hypocrify and Superftitionvfezr 
 the Vizard of Piety, Deceit and Evil are often 
 clothed in the Shapes and Appearances of Truth 
 and Goodnefs. Now Logick helps us to ftrip oft" * 
 the outward Difguife of Things, and to behold 
 them and judge of them in their own Nature. 
 
 There is yet a further Proof that our intellectual 
 or rational Powers need fome Afliftance, and that 
 is becaufethey are fo frail and fallible in the pre- 
 fent State ; we are impofed upon at home as well as 
 abroad ; we are deceived by our Senfes, by our Ima- 
 ginations, by our PaJJions and Appetites ; by the Au- 
 /^onVyofMen, by Education and Cujlom, &c. and 
 we are led into frequent Errors, by judging accord- 
 ing to thefe falfe and flattering Principles, rather 
 than according to the Nature of Things. Some- 
 thing of this Frailty is owing to our very Confti- 
 tution, Man being compounded of Flefh and Spi- 
 rit : Something of it arifes from our Infant State* 
 and our growing up by flow Degrees to Manhood, 
 fo that we form a thoufand Judgments before our 
 Reafon is mature. But there is ftill more of it 
 owing to our original Defection from God, and 
 
 the
 
 4 L O G I C K>. O, 
 
 the fooliflv and evil Difpofitions that are found in 
 fallen Man : So that one great Part of the Defign 
 tf Logick is to guard us againft the delufive Influ- 
 ences of our meaner Powers, to cure the Miftakes 
 of immature Judgment, and to raife us in fome 
 meafure from the Ruins of our Fall. 
 
 It is evident enough from all thefe Things, that 
 our Reafon needs the Afiiftance of Art in our En- 
 quiries after Vrutb or Duty , and without fome 
 Skill and Diligence in forming our Judgments a- 
 right, we mail be led into frequent Miftakes, both 
 in Matters of Science, and in Matters of Practice, 
 and fome of thefe Miftakes may prove fatal too. 
 
 The Art of Logick, even as it affifts us to gain 
 the Knowledge of the Sciences, leads us on to- 
 ward Virtue and Happinefs , for all our fpecu- 
 lative Acquaintance with llyings mould be made fub- 
 fervient to our better Conduct in the civil and the 
 religious Life. This is infinitely more valuable 
 than all Speculations, and a wife Man will ufe 
 them chiefly for this better purpofe. 
 
 All the good Judgment and Prudence that any 
 Man exerts in his common Concerns of Life, 
 without the Advantages of Learning, is called 
 natural Logick : And it is but a higher Advance- 
 ment, and a farther Afiiftance of our rational 
 Powers that is defigned by and expected from this 
 artificial Logick. 
 
 In order to attain this, we muft enquire what 
 are the principal Operations of the Mind, which 
 are put forth in the Exercife of our reafon : And 
 we mall find them to be thefe four, (viz.) Per- 
 ception^ Judgment^ Argumentation, andDi/po/ition. 
 
 Now the Art of Logick is compos'd of thofe Ob- 
 fervations and Rules, which Men have made about 
 theie four Operations of the Mind, Perception, 
 'Judgment, Reasoning, and Difpofition, in order to 
 afiift and improve them. I. Per-
 
 <fhe 'tight Vfi of ReaforL 5 
 
 I* Perception, Conception, or Apprehenfion, is the 
 mere fimple Contemplation of Things offered to 
 our Minds, without affirming or denying any 
 Thing concerning them. So we conceive or 
 think of a Horfe, a Tree, High, Swift, Slow, Ani- 
 mal, 'Time, Motion, Matter, Mind, Life, Death, &c. 
 The Form under which thefe Things appear to the 
 Mind, or the Refult of our Conception or Appre- 
 henfion, is called an Idea. 
 
 II. Judgment is that Operation of the Mind, 
 whereby we join two or more Ideas together by 
 one Affirmation or Negation, that is, we either 
 affirm or deny this to be that. So This Tree is 
 high ; That Horfe is not Jwift ; The Mind of Man 
 is a thinking Being -, Mere Matter has no Thought 
 belonging to it ; God is juft ; Good Men are often 
 miferable in this World , A righteous Governor will 
 make a Difference betwixt the Evil and the Good , 
 which Sentences are the Effect of Judgment, and 
 are called Proportions. 
 
 III. Argumentation or Reafoning is that Opera- 
 tion of the Mind, whereby we infer one Thing, 
 i. e. one Proportion, from two or more Propofi- 
 tions premifed. Or it is the drawing a Conclufion, 
 which before was either unknown, or dark, or 
 doubtful, from fome Propofitions which are more 
 known and evident. So when we have judged that 
 Matter cannot think, and that the Mind of Man 
 doth think, we then infer and conclude, that there- 
 fore the Mind of Man is not Matter. 
 
 So we judge that A juft Governor will make a 
 Difference betwixt the Evil and the Good", we judge 
 alfo that God is a juft Governor v and from thence 
 we conclude, that God will make a Difference be- 
 twixt tb$ Evil and the Good, 
 
 This
 
 6 L G 1C K: Or, 
 
 This Argumentation may be carried on further, 
 thus, God will one Time or another make a Differ- 
 ence between the Good and the Evil : But there is 
 little or no Difference made in this World , 'Therefore 
 there muft be another World wherein this Difference 
 Jhall be made. 
 
 Thefe Inferences or Conclufions are the Effefts of 
 Reafoning, and the three Propofitions taken all to- 
 gether are called a Syllogifm* or Argument. 
 
 IV. Difpofition is that Operation of the Mind* 
 whereby we put the Ideas, Propofitions and Ar- 
 guments, which we have formed concerning one 
 Subject, into fuch an Order as is fitteft to gain 
 the cleareft Knowledge of it, to retain it longeft, 
 and to explain it to others in. the belt manner : 
 Or, in Ihort, it is the Ranging of our Thoughts 
 in fuch Order, as is beft for our own and others 
 Conception and Memory. The Effect of this 
 Operation is called Method. This very Defcrip- 
 tion of the four Operations of the Mind and their Ef- 
 feffs in this Order, is an Inftance or Example of 
 Method. 
 
 Now as the Art of Logick afiifts our Concep- 
 tion^ fo it gives us a large and comprebenftve View 
 of the Subjects we enquire into, as well as a clear 
 and diftinct Knowledge of them. As it regulates 
 our Judgment and our Reafoning^ fo it fecures us 
 from Miftakes, and gives us a true and certain 
 Knowledge of Things ; and as it furnifhes us with 
 Method, fo it makes our Knowledge of Things 
 both eafy and regular , and guards our Thoughts 
 from Confufion. 
 
 Logick is divided into four Parts, according to 
 thefe four Operations of the Mind, which it di- 
 rects, and therefore we fhall treat of it in this 
 Order. 
 
 THE
 
 right Vfe of Reafon; 
 
 THE 
 
 FIRST PART 
 
 O F 
 
 LOCI C K. 
 
 Of Perceptions and Ideas. 
 
 TH E firft Part of Logick contains Ob- 
 fervations and Precepts about the firft 
 Operation of the Mind, Perception or 
 Conception: And fmce all our Know- 
 ledge, how wide and large foever it grow, is 
 founded upon our Conceptions and Ideas, here we 
 fhall confider, 
 
 1. The general Nature of them. 
 
 2. fbe Objefts of our Conception, or the Archer 
 types or Patterns of thefe Ideas. 
 
 3. The feveral Divijions of them. 
 
 4. The W or d s an ft <Terms whereby our Ideas are 
 fxpreft. 
 
 5. General Direffions about our Ideas. 
 
 $. Special Rules to direft our Conceptions. 
 
 CHiAP.
 
 L O G 1C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Nature of Ideas. 
 
 FIRST, the Nature of Conception or Percep- 
 tion -j- Jhall juft be mentioned, tho* this may 
 feem "to belong to anocher Science rather than 
 Logick. 
 
 Perception is that Aft of the Mind (or as fome 
 Philofophers call it, rather a PaJJion or Imprejfiori) 
 whereby the Mind becomes confcious of any Thing, 
 as when I feel Hunger ; Thirjl, or Cold, or Heat ; 
 when I fee a Horfe, A Tree, or a Man ; when I 
 hear a human Voice, or thunder, I arn confcious of 
 thefe Things, and this is called Perception. If I 
 ftudy, meditate, wi/h, or fear, I am confcious of 
 thefe inward Acts alfo, and my Mind perceives its 
 own Thoughts, Wijhes, Fears, &V. 
 
 An Idea is generally defined a Reprefentation of 
 a Thing in the Mind ; it is a Reprefentation of 
 ibmething that we have feen, felt, heard, &c. or 
 been confcious of. That Notion or Form of a 
 Horfe, a Tree, or a Man, which is in the Mind, 
 is called the Idea of a Horfe, a Tree, or a Man. 
 That Notion of Hunger, Cold, Sound, Colour, 
 Thought, or Wifh, or Fear, which is. in the 
 Mind, is called the Idea of Hunger, Cold, Sound, 
 Wijh, &c. 
 
 It is not the outward Object, or Thing which is 
 perceived, (viz.) the Horfe, the Man, &c. nor 
 
 f- Ncte, The Words Conception and Perception are often ufed promifcuoufly, 
 as I have done here, becaufe I would not embarrafs a Learner with too 
 many Diftinflions ; but if I were to diftinguifli them, I would fay Percep- 
 tion is the Confcioufnefs of an Objeft when prefent : Conception js the fprm- 
 ing an Idea of the Objedt whether prefent or abfcnt. 
 
 3 W
 
 C. i, *fbe right Uje of Reafon. 9 
 
 is it the very Perception or Senfe, and Feeling , (viz.) 
 of Hunger, or Cold, &c. which is called the 
 Idea ; but it is the Thing as it exifts in the Mind 
 by Way of Conception or Reprefentation, that is pro- 
 perly called the Idea, whether the Objeft be prefent 
 or abfent. 
 
 As a Horfe, a Man, a Tree, are the outward 
 Objects of our Perception, and the outward Arche- 
 types or Patterns of our Ideas ; fo our own Senfa- 
 tions of Hunger, Cold, &c. are alfo inward Ar- 
 chetypes or Patterns of our Ideas : But the Notions 
 or Pictures of thefe Things, as they are confidered, 
 or conceived in the Mind, are precifely the Ideas 
 that we have to do with mLogick. To fee a Horfe * 
 or to feel Cold is one Thing ; to think of, and con- 
 verfe about a Man, a Horfe, Hunger, or Cold, is 
 another. 
 
 Among all thefe Ideas, fuch as reprefent Bodies, 
 are generally called Images, efpecially if the Idea 
 of the Shape be included. Thofe inward Repre- 
 fentations which we have of Spirit, Thought, Love, 
 Hatred, Caufe, Effeff, &c. are more pure and 
 mental Ideas, belonging more efpecially to the 
 Mind, and carry nothing of Shape or Senfe in 
 them. But I fhall have occafion to fpeak more 
 particularly of the Original and the Diftinftion of 
 Ideas in the third Chapter. I proceed therefore 
 now to confider the Objeffs of our Ideas. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 ?* LOGICK:Or, Part I, 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the Objects of Perception. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of Being in general. 
 
 TH E Objeff of Perception is that which is re- 
 prefented in the Idea, that which is the Ar- 
 chetype or Pattern, according to which the Idea 
 is formed ; and thus Judgment 'J, Proportions, Rea- 
 fens, arid long Difcourfes^ may all become the Ob- 
 jefts 'of Perception *, but in this Place we fpeak 
 chiefly of thefirft and more ftmple Objefts of it, be- 
 fore they are join'd and form'd into Propositions 
 or Difcourfes. 
 
 Every Objeff of our Idea is call'd a tfheme^ whe 
 ther it be a Being or Not Being ; for Not Being 
 may be propofed to our Thoughts, as well as 
 that which has a real Being. But let us firft treat 
 of Beings, and that in the largeft Extent of the 
 Word. 
 
 A Being is confider'd as pojfible, or as aftual. 
 
 "When it is confidered as poffible, it is faid to 
 have an EJJence or Nature , fuch were all 'Things 
 before their Creation : When it is confidered as ac- 
 tual, then it is faid to have Exiftence alfo ; fuch are 
 all Things which are created, and God himfelf the 
 Creator. 
 
 Effence therefore is but the very Nature of any 
 Being, whether it be actually exifting or no. A 
 Rofe in Winter has an Eflence, in Summer it has 
 pxiftence alfo.
 
 C.II. S.2. The right Ufe of Rezkn: rr 
 
 Note, There is but one Being which includes 
 Exiftence in the very Effence of it, and that is God, 
 who therefore actually exifts by natural and eternal 
 Necefllty : But the aftual Exiftence of every Crea- 
 ture is very diftin<5t from its Effence, for it may be 
 or may not be, as God pleafe. 
 
 Again, Every Being is confider'd either as fub- 
 fifting in and by its felf, and then it is called a 
 Subftance , or it fubfifts in and by another, and then 
 it is called a Mode or Manner of Being. Tho* few 
 Writers allow Mode to be call'd a Being in the fame 
 perfect Senfe as a Subftance is , and fome Modes 
 have evidently more of real Entity or Being than 
 others, as will appear when we come to treat of 
 them. Thefe Things will furnifh us with Matter 
 for larger Difcourfe in the following Sections. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 Of Subftances and their various Kinds. 
 
 A Subftance is a Being which can fubfift by ir- 
 felf, without Dependence upon any other 
 created Being. The Notion of fubfifting by itfelf 
 gives occafion to Logicians to call it a Subftance. So 
 a Horfe, a Houfe, Wood, Stone, Water, Fire, a Spirit, 
 a Body, an Angel are called Subftances, becaufe they 
 depend on nothing but God for their Exiftence. 
 
 It has been ufual alfo in the Defcription of Sub- 
 ftance to add, it is that which is the Subject of 
 Modes or Accidents -, a Body is the Subitance or 
 Subject, its Shape is the Mode. 
 
 But left we be led into Miftakes, let us here take 
 Notice, that when a Subftance is faid to fubfift with- 
 out Dependence upon another created Being, all that 
 we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utter- 
 ly deftroy'd and reduced to nothing, by any Power 
 inferior to that of our Creator ; tho* its prefent 
 B particular
 
 12 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 particular Form, Nature and Properties may be 
 alter'd and deftroy'd by many inferior Caufes : a 
 Hor/e may die and turn to Duft ; Wood may be 
 turned into Fire, Smoak and A/hes , a Houfe into 
 RuWiJh, and Water into Ice or Valour ; but the 
 Subftance or Matter of which they are made ftill 
 remains, tho* the Forms and Shapes of it are al- 
 tered. A Body may ceafe to be a Houfe or a Horfe, 
 but it is a Body ftill ; and in this Senfe it depends 
 only upon God for its Exiftence. 
 
 Among Sub/lances fome are thinking or confcious 
 Beings, or have a Power of Thought, fuch as the 
 Mind of Man, Gad, Angels. Some are extended 
 andfolid or impenetrable, that is, they have Di- 
 menfions of Length, Breadth, and Depth, and 
 have alfo a Power of Refiftance, or exclude 
 every thing of the fame kind from being in 
 the fame Place. This is the proper Character 
 of Matter or Body. 
 
 As for the Idea of Space* whether it be void or 
 full, i. e. a Vacuum or a Plenum, whether it be in- 
 terfpers'd among all Bodies, or may be fuppofed 
 to reach beyond the Bounds of the Creation, it is 
 an Argument too long and too hard to be difput- 
 ed in this Place what the Nature of it is : It has 
 been much debated whether it be a real Subftance, 
 or a mere Conception of the Mind, whether it be 
 the Immenfity of the Divine Nature, or the mere 
 Order of co-exiftent Beings, whether it be the man- 
 ner of our Conception of the Diftances of Bodies, 
 or a mere Nothing. Therefore I drop the Men- 
 tion of it here, and refer the Reader to the firft 
 Effay among the Philofopbical Effays by I. W. 
 publilhed 1733. 
 
 - Now if we ieclude Space out of our Confidera- 
 tion, there will remain but two Sorts of Subftances 
 ^ the World, i, e. Matter and Mind, or as we 
 
 other-
 
 C.II.S.2. ne right ifft o 
 
 other wife call them, Body and Spirit ; at leaft, we 
 have no Ideas of any other Subftance but thefe*. 
 
 Among Subftances, fome are called Simple^ 
 fome are Compound, whether the Words be taken 
 in a philofophical or a vulgar Senfe. 
 
 Simple Subftances in zphilofophical Senfe, are either 
 Spirits which have no manner of Compofition in 
 them, and in this Senfe God is called zfimple Being ; 
 or they are the firft Principles of Bodies* which 
 are ufually called Elements, of which all other 
 Bodies are compounded : Elements are fuch Sub- 
 ftances 
 
 * Becaufe Men have different Ideas and Notions of Subftance, I thought ic 
 potproperentirely to omit all Accounts of them, and therefore have thrown 
 them into the Margin. 
 
 Some Philofophers fuppofe that our Acquaintance with Matter or Mind 
 reaches no farther than the mere Properties of them- and that there is a 
 fort of unknown Being, which is the Subftance or theSubjeflby which thefe 
 Properties of foil d Extenjion and of Cogitation are fupported, and in which 
 thefe Properties inhere or exift. But perhaps this Notion arifes only from 
 our turning the mere abftra&ed or logical Notion of Subftance or Self- fubjift- 
 ing into the Notion of a A'A'in&phyJical or natural Being, without any Ne- 
 ceffity. Solid Extenjion feems to me to be the v^ry Subftance of Matter or 
 of all Bodies: and a Power of thinking, which is always in ail, feems to ba 
 the very Subftance of all Spirits ; for God himfelf is an intelligent, almighty 
 Power; nor 'is there any need tofeek for any other fecret and unknown Be- 
 ing, or abftrafied Subftance entirely diftind from thefe, in order to fupp;>rc 
 the feveral Modes or Properties of Matter or Mind, for thefe two Ideas are 
 fufficient forthatPurpofe ; therefore I rather think thefe are Snbftances. 
 
 It mull be confeltj when we fay, Spirit is a thinking Sttbffance, and Mat- 
 ter it an extended folid Stibftance, we are fometimes ready to imagine thac 
 Extenjion aud Solidity are but mere Modes and Properties of a certain un- 
 known Subjlanct or Subjeft which fupports them, and which we call "Body ; 
 and that a Ptwt* of thinking, is but a mere Mode and Property of fome 
 nnknnwn Snhftance r>T Subjefl which flipports it, and which we call Spirit: 
 But I rather take this :o be a mere Miftake, which we are led into by th? 
 grammatical Form and Ufe of Words j and perhaps our ln%!cal Way of 
 thinking by SubflanceiwA Modes, as we\\ AS aw grammatical Way of talking 
 by Snbflanti ves and Adietii-jrs, help to delude us into this Suppolition. 
 
 However, that I may not be wanting to ary of my Readers, I would let 
 them know Mr. Luke's Opinion, which has obtained much in the prefen: 
 Age, and it is this : " That our Idea of any particular Stibjiance, is on!? 
 " fuch a Combination of fimp'.e Ideas as represents that Thing as fubfu'ting by 
 " itfelf, in which rhefuppo&d orconfufed Idea of Sttbflance (fuch as it is) ;$ 
 ' always ready to offer itfelf. It is a Con junction of Ideas co-?xifting in 
 " fuch a Caufe of their Union , and makes the whole SubjeS ftibfift by itfelf, 
 " though the Caufe of their Union be unknown; and ourgentral Idea of 
 " Sttbfiance arifes from the Self-fubfiftence of this ColiecYion of Ideas." 
 
 Now if this Notion of Snbflan:e reft here, and be confider? d merely as an 
 
 ankno'.vn Ciufe of the Union of Properties, it is much more eafy to bead- 
 
 B a miu d -.
 
 114 L G 1C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 fiances as cannot be refolved, or reduced, into two 
 or more Subttances of different Kinds. . . 
 
 The various Seels of Philofophers have attri- 
 buted the Honour of this Name to various Things. 
 The Peripateticks, or Followers of Ariftotlc, made 
 Fire, Air, Earth and Water to be the four Ele- 
 ments, of which all earthly Things were com- 
 pounded ; and they fupppfed the Heavens to be a 
 Quinteffence, or fifth fort of Body diftincl: from 
 all thefe : But, fince experimental Philofophy and 
 Mathematics have been better underftood, this 
 Doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The Cby- 
 mifts make Spirit, Salt, Sulphur, Water and Earth 
 to be their five Elements, becaufe they can re- 
 duce all terreftrial Things to thefe five : This 
 feems to come nearer the Truth -, though they are 
 not all agreed in this Enumeration of Elements. 
 In fhort, our modern Philofophers generally fup- 
 pofe Matter or Body to be one fimple Princi- 
 ple, or folid Extenfion, which being diverfified by 
 its various Shapes, Quantities, Motions and Situa- 
 tions, makes all the Varieties that are found in the 
 Univerfe -, and therefore they make little Ufe of 
 the Word Element. 
 
 Compound Subftances are made up of two or 
 
 mitted : But if We proceed to fuppofe a fait of real, fubftantial, diftinft Being, 
 different iiom fMd Quantity or Exttnfion in Bodies, and different from a Power 
 of thinking in Spirits, in my Opinion it is the Introdu&ion oTa needlefs fcho- 
 laftieal Notion into the real Nature of Things, and then fancying it to have a 
 real Exiftence. 
 
 Mr. Locke in his Effay of Hum. Und. Book II. Ch. 2a. $ z. feems to ridi- 
 cule this common Idea of Sub/iance, which Men have generally fuppofed to 
 be a fort of Subjtratum dltinct from all Properties whatfoever, and to be 
 the Support of all Properties. Yet in Book IV. Ch. 3. .6. he feems to 
 fuppoie there may be force fiich unknown Subjlratum, which may be capable 
 of receiving the Properties both of Matter and of Mind, (viz.) Extension, So- 
 lidity, and Cogitation j for he fuppofes it pofliblc for God to add Cogitation to 
 that Subftancc which is ccrporeat, and thus to caufe Matter to think. If this 
 he true, then Spirits (fcr ought we know) may be corporeal Beings or thinking 
 Bodies, which is a Doctrine too favourable to the Mortality of the Soul. 
 But 1 leave thefe Debates to the Philofophers of the Age, and will not be 
 too pofitive in my Opinion of this abftrufe Subject. 
 
 See more of this Argument in Pbihfofbical EJfays before cited. Eff. zd- 
 
 more
 
 C. II. S. 2. The right Ufe ofReafon. 15 
 
 more fimple Subftances : So every Thing in this 
 whole material Creation, that can be reduced by 
 the Art of Man into two or more different Prin- 
 ciples or Subftances, is a compound Body in the 
 philofophical Senfe. 
 
 But if we take the Words Simple and Compound 
 in a vulgar Senfe, then all thofe are fimple Sub- 
 fiances which are generally efteemed uniform in 
 their Natures. So every Herb is called a Simple ; 
 and every Metal and Mineral -, tho' the Chymift 
 perhaps may find all his feveral Elements in each 
 of them. So a Needle -is a fimple Body, being 
 made only of Steel ; but a Sword or-, a Knife is a 
 Compound, becaufe its Haft or Handle is made of 
 Materials different from the Blade. So the Bark 
 of Peru, or the Juice of Sorrel is a fimple Medicine : 
 But when the Apothecaries Art has mingled feve- 
 ral Simples together, it becomes a Compound^ as 
 Diafcordium or Mitbridate* 
 
 The Terms of pure and #/#/, when applied to 
 Bodies, are much akin to fimple and compound. So 
 a Guinea \spure Gold, if it has nothing but Gold 
 in it, without any Alloy or bafer Metal : But if 
 any other Mineral or Metal be mingled with it, 
 it is called a mv/Subftance or Body. 
 
 Subftances are alfo divided into animate and in- 
 animate. Animated Subftances are either animal 
 or vegetable *. 
 
 Some of the animated Subftances have various 
 organ ical or inftru mental Parts, fitted for a Va- 
 riety of Motions from Place to Place, and a 
 Spring of Life within themfelves, as Beafts, Birds, 
 Fijhes, and Infefts j thefe are called Animals. Other 
 animated Subftances are called Vegetables, which 
 have within themfelves the Principles of another 
 
 * Note, Vegetables as well as Ar.lmxh have gotten the Name of animated 
 SiManc:s, becaufe fome of the Antients fuppofcd Herbs and T'.ar.n, Beafit 
 Wd Birds, & { . to have a fort of Souh diftinft from Matter or B-Jy. 
 
 B 3. fort
 
 16 LOG 1C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 fort of Life and Growth, and of various Pro- 
 ductions of Leaves, Flowers and Fruit , fuch as we, 
 fee in Plants, Herbs and Trees. 
 
 And there are other Subjlances, which are call'd 
 inanimate, becaufe they have no fort of Life in 
 them, as Earth, Stone, Air, Wafer, &c. 
 
 There is alfo one fort of Subftance, or Being, 
 which is compounded of Body and Mind, or a ra- 
 tional Spirit united to an Animal , fuch is Man- 
 kind. Angels, or any other Beings of the fpiritu- 
 al and invifible World, who have afifum'd vifible 
 Shapes for a Seafon, can hardly be reckon'd among 
 this order of compounded Beings -, becaufe they 
 drop their Bodies, and dived themfelves of thofe 
 vifible Shapes, when their particular Meffage is 
 perform'd, and thereby fhew that thefe Bodies 
 do not belong to their Natures. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of Modes and their various Kinds, and firft of ejjen- 
 tial and accidental Modes. 
 
 THE next fort of Objects which are repre- 
 fented in our Ideas, are called Modes, or 
 Manners of Being -f . 
 
 A Mode is that which cannot fubfift in and of 
 itfelf, but is always efteem'd as belonging to, and 
 fubfifting by, the help of fome Subftance, which 
 for that Reafon, is called its Subjetf. A Mode 
 jnuft depend on that Subftance for its very Exift- 
 ence and Being , and that not as a Being depends 
 on its Caufe, (for fo Subjlances themfelves depend 
 
 f" Ncte, The Term Mcde is by fome Authors applied chiefly totheJ?z- 
 tiont or relative Manners of Being. But in logical Treatifes it is often ufed 
 in a larger Senfe, and extends to all Attributes whatfoever, and includes the 
 inoft eflential and inward Properties, as well as outward Refpedh and Relati- 
 ons, and reaches to Affio-.i thernfdves as well as Mawrs of A,&ion- 
 
 on
 
 C.II.S. 3. TberigbtUfeofRezfon. ij 
 
 on God their Creator ; (but the 'very Being of a. 
 Mode depends on fome Subftance for its Subjetf, 
 in which it is, or to which it belongs ; fo Moti- 
 on, Shapes Quantity, Weight, are Modes of Body ; 
 Knowledge, Wit, Folly, Love, 'Doubting, Judging, 
 are Modes of the Mind ', for the one cannot fub- 
 fift without Body, and the other cannot fubfift 
 without Mind. 
 
 Modes have their feveral Divifions, as well as 
 Subftances. 
 
 I. Modes are either ejjential, or accidental. 
 
 An ejfential Mode or Attribute, is that which 
 belongs to the very Nature or Eflence of the Sub- 
 ject wherein it is ; arid the Subject can never have 
 the fame Nature without it ; fuch is Roundnefs in 
 a Bowl, Hardnefs in a Stone, Softnefs in Water, 
 vital Motion in an Animal, Solidity in Matter, 
 thinking in a Spirit ; for tho* that piece of Wood 
 which is now a Bowl may be mzdefquare, yet if 
 Roundnefs be taken away, it is no longer a Bowl : 
 So that very Flefh and Bones, which is now an 
 minimal, may be without Life or inward Motion ; 
 but if all Motion be entirely gone, it is no longer 
 an Animal, but a Carcafs : So if a Body or Mat- 
 ter, be divefted of Solidify, it is a mere void Space 
 or Nothing , and if Spirit be entirely without 
 Thinking, I have no Idea of any Thing that is 
 left in it ; therefore fo far as I am able to judge, 
 Confcioufnefs muft be its eflential Attribute*: 
 Thus all the Perfections of God are called his At- 
 tributes, for he cannot be without them, 
 
 * Note, When I call JcIiJ Extenjion an eflential Mode or Attribute of 
 Matter, and a Power of Tbinting an eflential Mode or Attribute of a Spirit, I 
 do it in compliance with common Forms of Speech : but perhaps in reality 
 <hefe are the very Efiences or Subftances themfelves, and the moft fubftan- 
 tial Ideas that we can frame of Body and Spirit, and have no need of dny 
 (ve know not what; Subftratuyt or unintelligible Subftaace to fupport them 
 in thsit Exifler.ce or Being. 
 
 B 4 An
 
 i8 LOGICK: Or Part I. 
 
 An effential Mode is either primary orfecondary. 
 
 A primary effential Mode is the firft, or chief 
 Thing, that conftitutes any Being in its particular 
 Effence or Nature, and makes it to be that which 
 it is, and diftinguifhes it from all other Beings : 
 This is called the Difference in the Definition of 
 Things, of which hereafter : So Roundnefs is the 
 primary effential Mode, or Difference of a Bowl -, 
 the meeting of two Lines is the primary efiential 
 Mode, or the Difference of an Angle ; the Perpen- 
 dicularity of thefe Lines to each other is the Differ- 
 ence of a right Angle : Solid Extenfwn is the Primary 
 Attribute, or Difference of Matter : Confcioufnefs, 
 or at leaft a Power of Thinking, is the Difference, 
 or primary Attribute of a Spirit * -, and to fear and 
 lave God is the primary Attribute of a pious Man. 
 
 Afecondary effential Mode is any other Attribute 
 of a Thing, which is not of primary Confidera- 
 tion : This is called a Property : Sometimes indeed 
 it goes toward making up the Effence, efpecially 
 of a complex Being, fo far as we are acquainted 
 with it , fometimes it dep?nds upon, and follows 
 from the Effence of it , fo Volubility, or Aptnefs 
 to roll, is the Property of a Bowl, and is derived 
 from its Roundnefs. Mobility, and Figure or Shape, 
 are Properties of Matter ; and it is the Property 
 of a pious Man to love bis Neighbour. 
 
 An accidental Mode, or an Accident, is fuch a 
 Mode, as is not neceffary to the Being of a Thing, 
 for the Subject may be without it, and yet re- 
 main of the fame Nature that it was before ; or 
 it is that Mode, which may be feparated or abo- 
 liflit from its Subject ; fo Smoothnsfs or Roughnefs, 
 filacknefs or Whitenefs, Motion? Reft, are the Ac- 
 cidents of a Bowl -, for thefe may be all chang'd, 
 and yet the Body remain a Bowl ftill : Learning, 
 
 * See the Note in the foregoing Pjge. 
 
 Juftict,
 
 C. II. S. 3. fbe Right Ufe o/"Reafon. 19 
 
 Juflice, Folly i Sicknefs, Health, are the Accidents 
 of a Man : Motion, Squarenefs, or any particular 
 Shape or Size, are the Accidents of Body : Yet 
 Shape and Size in general are efiential Modes of it ; 
 for a Body muft have fome Size and Shape, nor 
 can it he without them : So Hope, fear, Wifh- 
 ing, AJfenting, and Doubting, are Accidents of the 
 Mind, tho' Thinking in general feems to be eflen- 
 tial to it. 
 
 Here obferve, that the Name of Accident has 
 been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetic Phi- 
 lofophers to all Modes, whether eflential or acci- 
 dental ; but the Moderns confine this Word Ac- 
 cident to the Senfe in which I have defcribed it. 
 
 Here it fhould be noted alfo, that tho' the 
 Word Property be limited fometimes in logical 
 Treatifes to thefecondary effentml Mode, yet it is 
 ufed in common Language to fignify thefe four 
 forts of Modes , of which fome are efential, and 
 fome accidental. 
 
 (i.) Such as belong to every Subject of that 
 kind, but not only to thofe Subjects. So yellow 
 Colour and Duftility are Properties of Gold , they 
 belong to all Gold, but not only to Gold; for 
 Saffron is alfo yellow, and Lead is duftile. 
 
 (2.) Such as belong only to one kind of Subject 
 but not to every Subject of that kind. So Learn- 
 ing, Reading, and Writing, are Properties of hu- 
 man Nature ; they belong only to Man, but not 
 to all Men. 
 
 (3.) Such as belong to every Subject of one kind, 
 and only to them, but not always. So Speech or 
 Language is a Property of Man, for it belongs 
 to all Men, and to Men only , but Men are not 
 always fpeaking. 
 
 (4.) Such as belong to every Subject of one 
 kind, and to them only and always. So Shape and 
 
 Divifibility
 
 ao LO G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 Divifibility arc Properties of Body , fo Omnifcience 
 and Omnipotence are Properties ot the divine Na- 
 ture, for in this Senfe Properties and Attributes are 
 the fame, and except in logical Treatifes there is 
 fcarce any Distinction made between them. Thefe 
 are called Propria quarto Modo in the Schools, or 
 Properties of the fourth Sort. 
 
 Note, Where there is any one Property or effen- 
 tial Attribute fo fuperior to the reft, that it ap- 
 pears plainly that all the reft are derived from it, 
 and fuch as is fufficient to give a full Diftinction 
 of that Subject from all other Subjects, this At- 
 tribute, or Property, is called the effenllal Dif- 
 ference^ as is before declared , and we commonly 
 fay, the Effence of the Thing confifts in it , fo the 
 EJ/ence of Matter in general feems to confift in 
 Solidity , orfolid Extenfion. But for the moft part* 
 we are fo much at a Lofs in finding out the inti- 
 mate Efience of particular natural Bodies, that we 
 are forc'd to diftinguifh the effential Difference of 
 moft Things by a Combination of Properties. So 
 a Sparrow is a Bird, which has fuch colour'd 
 Feathers, and fuch a particular Size, Shape and 
 Motion. So Wormwood is an Herb which has fuch 
 a Leaf of fuch a Colour, and Shape, 'and Tafte, 
 and fuch a Root and Stalk. So beafts and Fifhes, 
 Minerals, Metals and Works of Art fometimes, 
 as well as of Nature, are diftinguifhed by fach 
 a Colleffion of Properties.' 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 The further Divifions of Mode. 
 
 II. *"T^ H E fecond Divifion of Modes is into ab* 
 
 1 folute and relative. An abfolute Mode is 
 
 *hat which belongs to its Subject, without Re- 
 
 fped
 
 C. II. S. 4. ?be right Ufe o/Reafon. 2 1 
 
 fpec"l to any other Beings whatfoever : But a re- 
 lative Mode is derived from the Regard that one 
 Being has to others. So Roundnefs and Smooth* 
 nefs are the abfolute Modes of a Bowl ; for if there 
 were nothing elfe exifting in the whole Creation, 
 a Bowl might be round and fmootb : But Greatnefs 
 and Smallnefs are relative Modes ; for the very 
 Ideas of them are derived merely from the Com- 
 parifon of one Being with others : A Bowl of four 
 Inches Diameter is very great, compared with one 
 of an Inch and a half , but it is very fmatt in 
 comparifon of another Bowl, whofe Diameter is 
 eighteen or twenty Inches. Motion is the abfolute 
 Mode of a Body, but Swiftnefs or Slownefs are 
 relative Ideas ; for the Motion of a Bowl on a 
 Bowling-Green is fwift, when compared with a 
 Snail ; and it is flow, when compared with a 
 Canon-Bullet. 
 
 Thefe relative Modes are largely treated of by 
 fome logical and metaphyfual Writers under the 
 Name of Relation: And thefe Relations them- 
 felves are farther fubdivided into fuch as arife from 
 the Nature of Things, and fuch as arife merely 
 from the Operation of our Minds , one fort are cal- 
 led real Relations, the other mental ; fo the Like- 
 nefs of one Egg to another is a real Relation, be- 
 caufe it arifes from the real Nature of Things ; 
 for whether there was any Man or Mind to con- 
 ceive it or no, one Egg would be like another : 
 But when we confider an Egg as a Noun Subftan- 
 tive in Grammar, or as fignified by the Letters 
 e,g, g, thefe are mere mental Relations, and derive 
 their very Nature from the Mind of Man. Thefe 
 fort of Relations are called by the. Schools Entia 
 Rationis, or fee end Notions, which have no real 
 Being, but by the Operation of the Mind. 
 
 a III. The
 
 22 LOGIC K: Or, Part L 
 
 III. The third Divifion of Modes fhews us, 
 they are either intrinfecal or extrinfical. Intrinfi- 
 cal Modes are conceived to be in the Subject or 
 Subftance, as when we fay a Globe is round) or 
 fwift) rolling^ or at reft : Or when we fay a Man 
 is /#//, or learned* thefe are intrinfic Modes : But 
 extrinfic Modes are fuch as arife from fomething 
 that is not in the Subject or Subftance it felf; 
 but it is a manner of Being which fome Sub- 
 ftances attain by Reafon of fomething that is ex- 
 ternal or foreign to the Subject; as, This Globe 
 lies within two Yards of the Wall , or this Man is 
 belov'd or hated. Note, Such fort of Modes, as 
 this laft Example, are called external Denomina- 
 tions. 
 
 IV. There is a fourth Divifion much akin to 
 this, whereby Modes are laid to be Inherent or 
 Adherent^ that is, Proper or Improper. Adherent 
 or improper Modes arife from the joining of fome 
 accidental Subftance to the chief Subject, which 
 yet may be feparated from it ; fo when a Bowl is 
 wet) or a Boy is cloth'd, thefe are adherent Modes ; 
 for the Water and the Cloaths are diftinct Sub- 
 ftances which adhere to the Bowl) or to the Boy : 
 But when we fay, the Bowl is fwift or round ; 
 when we fay, the Boy is ftrong or witty) thefe are 
 proper or inherent Modes , for they have a fort of 
 In-being in the Subftance it felf, and don't a- 
 rife from the Addition of any other Subftance 
 to it. 
 
 V. Aftion and Paffion are Modes or Manners 
 which belong to Subftances, and mould not en- 
 tirely be omitted here. When a Smith with a 
 Hammer, ftrikes a Piece of Iron) the Hammer and 
 the Smith are both Agents^ or Subjects of Ac- 
 
 '2 . lion i
 
 C.II.S.4- We right UfeofReafon. 23 
 
 tion , the one is the Prime or Supreme, the other 
 the Subordinate: The Iron is the Patient, or the 
 Subject of Paflion, in a philofophical Senfe, be- 
 caufe it receives the Operation of the Agent : 
 Tho' this Senfe of the Words Paffion ancT Pa- 
 tient differs much from the vulgar Meaning of 
 diem*. 
 
 VI. The fixtb Divifion of Modes may be into 
 Phyjical, i. e. Natural, Civil, Moral, and Super- 
 natural. So when we confider the Apoftle Paul, 
 who was a little Man, a Roman by the Privilege 
 of his Birth, a Man of Virtue or Honefty, and 
 an infpired Apoflle ; his low. Stature is a pbyfecal 
 Mode, his being a Roman is a civil Privilege, his 
 Honefty is a moral Confide rat ion, and his being 
 infpired \sfupernatural. 
 
 VII. Modes belong either to Body or to Spi- 
 rit, or to both. Modes of Body belong only to 
 Matter or to corporeal Beings ; and thefe are 
 Shape, Size, Situation, or Place*. &c-. -Modes of 
 Spirit belong only to Minds , fuch are Knowledge^.- 
 AJJent, Dijjent, Doubting, Reafoning, &V. Modes 
 which belong to both have been fometimes call'd 
 mixt Modes, or human Modes, for thefc are only 
 found in human Nature, which is compounded 
 both of Body and Spirit , fuch are Senfation, Ima- 
 gination, PaJJion, &c. in all which there is a Con- 
 currence of the Operations both of Mind and Bo- 
 dy, i. e. of animal and intellectual Nature. 
 
 But the Modes of Body may be yet farther dif- 
 tinguifh'd. Some of them are primary Modes or 
 
 * Note, Agent fignines the Doer, Patient the Sufferer, AElion is Doing, 
 Pa/ion is Suffering : Agent and A9im have retained their original and phir 
 lofophical Senfe, tho* Patient anJ Pajpan have acquired a very different 
 Meaning in common Language*
 
 *4 L O G 1C K: Or, Part I 
 
 Dualities, for they belong to Bodies confider'd in 
 themfelves, whether there were any Man to take 
 Notice of them or no ; fuch are thofe beforemen- 
 tion'd (viz.) Shape, Size, Situation, fcfr. Secon- 
 dary Dualities, or Modes, are fuch Ideas as we af- 
 cribe to bodies on account of the various Im- 
 preflions which are made on the Senfes of Men 
 by them ; and thefe are called fenfible Qualities, 
 which are very numerous , fuch are all Colours, as 
 Red, Green, Blue, &c. fuch are all Sounds, as 
 Sharp, Shrill, Loud, Hoarfe ; all I'aftes, as Sweet, 
 Bitter, Sour ; all S?nclls, whether 'Pleafant, Of- 
 fenfive, or Indifferent ; and all Tattile Qualities, 
 or fuch as affect the 'Touch or Feeling, (viz.) Heat, 
 Cold, &V. Thefe are properly called fecondary 
 Dualities, for tho' we are ready to conceive them 
 asexifting in the very Bodies themfelves which 
 affect our Senfes, yet true Philofophy has mofl un- 
 deniably proved that all thefe are really various 
 Ideas or Perceptions excited in human Nature, 
 by the different Impreflions that Bodies make up- 
 on our Senfes by their primary Modes, \. e. by 
 Means of the different Shape, Size, Motion and 
 Pofition of thofe little invifible Parts that com- 
 pofe them. Thence it follows that a fecondary 
 Quality confidered as in the Bodies themfelves, is 
 nothing elfe but a Power or Aptitude to produce 
 fuch Senfations in us : See Locke's Eflay of the 
 Underftanding, Book 2. Ch. 8. 
 
 VIII. I might add in the lad Place, that as 
 Modes belong to Subflances, fo there are fome alfo 
 that are but Modes of other Modes : For tho' they" 
 fubfift in and by the Sub/lance, as the original 
 Subject of them, yet they r.re properly and di- 
 rectly attributed to fome Moae of that Subftance. 
 Motion is the Mode of a Body 5 but the Swift- 
 
 vefs,
 
 C. II. S. 5. fa right Uje /Reafoa. 25 
 n(fs, or Slownefs of it, or its Direction to the North 
 or South^ are but Modes of Motion. Walking 
 is the Mode or Manner of Man, or of a Beaft; 
 but Walking gracefully implies a Manner or 
 Mode fuperadded to that Action. All compara- 
 tive and fuperlative Degrees of any Quality, are 
 the Modes of a Mode, as Swifter implies a greater 
 Meafure of Swiftnefs. 
 
 It would be too tedious here to run through all 
 the Modes, Occidents, and Relations at large that 
 belong to various Beings, and are copioufly treat- 
 ed of in general, in 'he Science calPd Metapby- 
 ficks, or more properly Ontology : They are alfo 
 treated of in particular in thofe Sciences which 
 have affumed them feverally as their proper Sub- 
 jects. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 Of the ten Categories. Of Subftance modify d. 
 
 WE have thus given an Account of the two 
 chief Objefts of our Ideas, (viz.) Sub/lances 
 and Modes, and their various Kinds : And in 
 thefe laft Sections we have briefly compriz'd the 
 greateft part of what is neceflary in the famous 
 ten Ranks of Being, called the ten Predicaments 
 or Categories QiAriflotle, on which there are end- 
 lefs Volumes of Difcourfes formed by feveral of 
 his Followers. But that the Reader may not ut- 
 terly be ignorant of them, let him know the 
 Names are thefe: Subftance, Quantity, Duality, 
 Relation, Attion, Paffion, Where, When, Situa- 
 tion and C loathing. It would be mere Lofs of 
 Time to mew how loofe, how injudicious, and 
 even ridiculous, is this ten-fold Divifion of Things : 
 And whatfoever farther relates to them, and which 
 
 may
 
 26 LOGICK: Or Parti. 
 
 may tend to improve ufeful Knowledge, mould 
 be fought in Ontology , and in other Sciences. 
 
 Beftdes Subftance and Mode, fome of the Mo- 
 derns would have us confider the Subftance modi- 
 fied, as a diftinft Object of our Ideas ; but I think 
 there is nothing more that need be faid on this Sub- 
 ject, than this, (viz.) There is fome Difference 
 between a Subftance when it is confidered with all 
 its Modes about it, or cloath'd in all its Manners 
 of Exiftence, and when it is diftinguifh'd from 
 them, and confider'd naked without them. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Of Not-Being. 
 
 li S Being is divided into Subftance and Mode, 
 J\^ fo we may confider Not-Being with Re- 
 gard to both thefe. 
 
 I. Not-Being is confidered as excluding all Sub- 
 ftance, and then all Modes are alfo neceffarily ex- 
 cluded, and this we call pure Nihility, or mere 
 Nothing. 
 
 This Nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a 
 pbilofopbical Senfe -, fo we fay there is nothing in the 
 Cup, in a vulgar Senfe, when we mean there is 
 no Liquor in it -, but we cannot fay there is nothing 
 in the Cup, in a ftrict philofophical Senfe, while 
 there is Air in it, and perhaps a Million of Rays 
 of Light are there. 
 
 II. Not-Being, as it has relation to Modes or 
 Manners of Being, may be confider'd either as a 
 mere Negation, or as a Privation. 
 
 A Negation is the Abfence of that which does 
 not naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeak- 
 ing of, or which has no Right, Obligation, or 
 Neceffity to be prefent with it , as when we fay 
 
 a Stone
 
 C. II. S. 5. <fbe right Ufe ^Reaibn^ 27 
 
 a Stone is Inanimate, or Blind, or Deaf, i. e. it 
 has no Life, nor Sight, or Hearing -, or when we 
 fay a Carpenter or a Fijhennan is unlearned ; thefe 
 are mere Negations. 
 
 But a Privation is the Abfence of what does 
 naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeaking of, 
 or which ought to be prefent with it, as when 
 a Man or a Horfe is deaf, or /*W, or dead, or 
 if a Pbyfidan or a Divine be unlearned, thefe are 
 called Privations : So the Sinfulnefs of any human 
 Action is faid to be a Privation , for &' is that 
 want of Conformity to the Law of God, which 
 ought to be found in every Action of Man. 
 
 Note, There are fome Writers who make all 
 fort of relative Modes or Relations, as well as all 
 external Denominations, to be mere Creatures of the 
 Mind, and Entia Rationis, and then they rank 
 them alfo under the general Head of Not-Beings ; 
 but it is my Opinion, that whatfoever may be 
 determined concerning mere mental Relations and 
 external Denominations, which feem to have Ibme- 
 thing lefs of Entity or Being in them, yet there 
 are many real Relations, which ought not to be 
 reduc'd to fo low a Clafs ; fuch are the Situation 
 of Bodies, their mutual Dijlances, their particu- 
 lar Proportions and Meafures, the Notions of Fa- 
 therhood, Brotherhood, Son/hip, &c. all which are 
 relative Ideas. The very Eflence of Virtue or 
 Holinefs confifts in the Conformity of our Ac- 
 tions to the Rule of Right Reafon, or the Law 
 of God : The Nature and Effence of Sincerity 
 is the Conformity of our Words and Actions to 
 our Thoughts, all which are but mere Relations ; 
 and I think we muft not reduce fuch pofitive Be- 
 ings as Piety, and Virtue, and 'Truth, to the Rank 
 of Non-Entities, which have nothing real in them, 
 tho' Sin Cor rather the Sinfulnefs of an Action) 
 C may
 
 28 L O G 1C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 may be properly call'd a Not-Being, for it is a want 
 of Piety and Virtue. This is the moft ufual and per- 
 haps the jufteft Way of reprefenting thefe Matters. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of the federal Sorts of Perceptions or Ideas. 
 
 IDEAS may be divided with Regard to their 
 Original, their Nature, their Objefls and their 
 Qualities. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 Offenfible, fyiritual and abftraRed Ideas. 
 
 *~T^ HERE has been a great Controverfy, 
 A about the Origin of Ideas, (viz.] whether any 
 of our Ideas are innate or no, i. e. born with us, 
 and naturally belonging to our Minds. Mr. Locke 
 utterly denies it ; others as pofitively affirm it. 
 Now, though this Controverfy may be compro- 
 mifed, by allowing that there is a Senfe, wherein 
 our firft Ideas of fome Things may be faid to be 
 innate, (as I have fhewn in fome Remarks on 
 Mr. Loke's Eflay, which have lain long by me) 
 yet it does not belong to this Place and Bufmefs 
 to have that Point debated at large, nor will it 
 hinder our Purfuit of the prefent Work to pafs it 
 over in Silence. 
 
 There is fufficient Ground to fay, that all our 
 Ideas, with Regard to their Original, may be di- 
 vided into three forts (viz.) fenjible, fpiritual, and 
 abftraffed Ideas. 
 
 I. Senfible or corporeal Ideas are deriv'd originally 
 from our Senfes, and from the Communication 
 
 which
 
 C.III. S. i. The right Ufe cfReafbn. 9 
 
 which the Soul has with the animal Body in this 
 prefent State -, fuch are the Notions we frame of 
 all Colours, Sounds, Taftes, Figures, or Shapes and 
 Motions, for our Senfes being converfant about 
 particular fenfible Objects become the Occafions 
 of feveral diftinct Perceptions in the Mind ; and 
 thus we come by the Ideas of Yellow, White, 
 Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all 
 thofe which we call fenfible Qualities. All the 
 Ideas which we have of Body, and the feveral 
 Modes and Properties that belong to it, feem to 
 be derived from Senfation. 
 
 And howfoever thefe may be treafured up in 
 the Memory, and by the Work of Fancy may be 
 increafed, diminiihed, compounded, divided, and 
 diverfified, (which we are ready to call our In- 
 vention] yet they all derive their firft Nature and 
 Being from fomething that has been let into our 
 Minds by one or other ot our Senfes. If I think 
 of a golden Mountain, or a Sea of liquid Fire, yet 
 the fmgle Ideas of Sea, Fire, Mountain and Gold 
 came into my Thoughts at firft by Senfation ; the 
 Mind has only compounded them. 
 
 II.* Spiritual or intellectual Ideas are thofe which 
 we gain by reflecting on the Nature and Actions 
 of our own Souls, and turning our Thoughts 
 within our felves, and obferving what is tranf- 
 adted in our own Minds. Such are the Ideas we 
 have of Thought, Affent, Diffent, Judging, Rea- 
 fon, Knowledge, Underjlanding, Will, Love, Fear t 
 Hope. 
 
 By Senfation the Soul contemplates Things (as 
 it were) out of itfelf, and gains corporeal Repre- 
 lentations or fenfible Ideas : By Reflection the Soul 
 contemplates itfelf, and Things within itfelf, and 
 
 * Here the Word Spiritual is ufed in a mere natural, and not in * 
 
 C a by
 
 30 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 by this Means it gus&Jpiritual Ideas, or Repre- 
 fentations of Things intellectual. 
 
 Here it may be noted, tho' the firft Ori- 
 ginal of thefe two forts of Ideas, (viz. ) Senjible 
 and Spiritual, may be entirely owing to thefe 
 two Principles, Senfation and Reflection, yet the 
 Recoiled ion and frefh Excitation of them may be 
 owing to a thoufand other Occafions and Occur- 
 rences of Life. We could never inform a Man 
 who was born Blind or Deaf, what we mean by 
 the Words Tellow, Blue, Red, or by the Words 
 Loud or Shrill, nor convey any juft Ideas of thefe 
 Things to his Mind, by all the Powers of Lan- 
 guage, unlefs he has experienced thole Seniations 
 of Sound and Colour , nor could we ever gain 
 the Ideas of Thought, Judgment, Reafon, Doubt- 
 ing, Hoping, &c. by all the Words that Man 
 could invent, without turning our Thoughts in- 
 ward upon the Actions of our own Souls. Yet 
 when once we have attained thefe Ideas by Senfa- 
 tion and Reflection, they may be excited afrefh by 
 the Ufe of Names, Words, Signs, or by any 
 Thing elfe that has been connected with them in 
 our Thoughts , for when two or more Ideas have 
 been aflbciated together, whether it be by Cuf- 
 tom, or Accident, or Defign, the one prefently 
 brings the other to Mind. 
 
 III. Befides thefe two which we have named, 
 there is a third fort of Ideas, which are commonly 
 called abftrafted Ideas, becaufe tho' the original 
 Ground or Occafion of them may be Senfation, or 
 Refiettioitt or both, yet thefe Ideas are framed by 
 another Aft of the Mind which we ufually call 
 Abftraftion. Now the Word Abftraftion fignifies 
 a withdrawing feme Parts of an Idea from other 
 Parts of it, by which Means fuch alftraffed Ideas 
 are formed, as neither reprefent any Thing corpo- 
 real
 
 C. III. S. I . The right Ufe of Reafon. 3 1 
 
 real orjpiritual, i. e. any thing peculiar or proper 
 to Mind or Body. Now thefe are of two kinds. 
 
 Some of thefe abftrafted Ideas are the moft ab- 
 folute, general and univerfal Conceptions of Things 
 confidered in themfelves, without Refpeft to 
 others, fuch as Entity or Being, and Not-being, 
 EJfence, Exigence, Aft, Power, Subflance, Mode, 
 Accident, &c. 
 
 The other fort of abftraffed Ideas is relative, as 
 when we compare feveral Things together, and 
 confider merely the Relations ot one Thing to 
 another, entirely dropping the Subjects of thole 
 Relations, whether they be corporeal or fpiritual ; 
 fuch are our Ideas of Caufe, Ejfeft, Likenefs, Un- 
 likenefs, Subject, ObjecJ, Identity, or Samene/s, and 
 Contrariety, Order, and other Things which are 
 treated of in Ontology. 
 
 Moft of the 'Terms of Art in feveral Sciences 
 may be ranked under this Head ofabftraffed Ideas, 
 as Noun, Pronoun, Verb, in Grammar, and the 
 feveral Particles of Speech, as wherefore, there- 
 fore, when, bow, althtf, bowfoever, &c. So Con- 
 nections, Tranptionsi Similitudes, Tropes and their 
 various Forms in Rhetorick. 
 
 Thefe abftrafled Ideas, whether abfolute or re- 
 Wtfat, cannot fo properly be faid to derive their 
 immediate, compleat and diftinct Original, either 
 from Senfation or Reflection, (i.) Becaufe the 
 Nature and the Ad ions both of Body and Spirit 
 give us Occafion to frame exadtly the fame Ideas 
 of Effence, Mode, Caufe, Effeft, Likenefs, Contra- 
 riety, &c. Therefore thefe cannot be called either 
 fenfible or fpiritual Ideas, for they are not ex- 
 act Reprefentations either of the peculiar Qualities or 
 jiftions of Spirit or Body, but feem to be a diftincl: 
 kind of Idea fram'd in the Mind, to reprefent 
 our mod general Conceptions of Things or their 
 C 3 Relations
 
 32 LOGICK: Or Part I. 
 
 Relations to one another, without any Regard to 
 their Natures, whether they be corporeal or fpi- 
 ritual. And (2) the fame general Ideas, of Caufe 
 and Effefl? Likenefs? &c. may be transferr'd to a 
 thoufand other kinds of Being, whether bodily 
 or fpiritual, befides thofe from whence we firft 
 derived them : Even thofe abftrafted Ideas? which 
 might be firft occafion'd by Bodies, may be as 
 properly afterward attributed to Spirits. 
 
 Now, though Mr. Locke fuppofes Senfation and 
 Reflection to be the two only Springs of all Ideas, 
 and that thefe two are fufficient to furnim our 
 Minds with all that rich Variety of Ideas which 
 we have , yet AbftraBion is certainly a different 
 Act of the Mind, whence thefe abftrafted Ideas 
 have their Original ; tho* perhaps Senfation or 
 Reflection may furnim us with all the firft Ob- 
 jects and Occafions whence thefe abftrafled Ideas 
 are excited and deriv'd. Nor in this Senfe and 
 View of Things can I think Mr. Locke himfelf 
 would deny my Reprefentation of the Original 
 of abjtrafted Ideas? nor forbid them to ftand for 
 a diftindt Species. 
 
 Note? Tho' we have divided Ideas in this Chap- 
 ter into three Sorts (w"z.) fenfiUe? fpiritual? and 
 abftra&ed, yet it may not be amifs juft to take 
 notice here, that as Man may be called a corn- 
 found Subftance? being made up of Body and 
 Mind, and the Modes which arife fron this Com- 
 pofition are called mixed Modes? fuch as Senfation? 
 PaJJion? Difcourfe? &c. So the Ideas of this Sub- 
 ftance or Being called Man? and of thefe mixed 
 Modes may be called mixf Ideas? for they are 
 not properly and fcri&ly fpirittoti? fenfiUe or ab- 
 f rafted. See a much larger Account of every 
 Part of this Chapter in the Philofophical E/ays 9 
 by/,^Eir, 3 ,4,^ t 
 
 SECT
 
 C.III. S. 2. Me right Ufe of Re&fon. 33 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of fimple and complex , compound and collective Ideas. 
 
 IDEAS confidered in their Nature, are either 
 fimple or complex. 
 
 K fimple Idea is one uniform Idea which can- 
 not be divided or diftinguifhed by the Mind of 
 Man into two or more Ideas; fuch are a Multi- 
 tude of our Senfations, as the Idea of Sweet, Bit- 
 ter, Cold, Heat, White, Red, Blue, Hard, Soft, 
 Motion, Reft, and perhaps Extenficn and Duration : 
 Such are alib many of our fpiritual Ideas ; fuch 
 as Thought, Will, Wijh, Knowledge, &V. 
 
 A complex Idea is made by joining two or more 
 fimple Ideas together , as a Square, a Triangle, a 
 Cube, a Pen, a Table, Reading, Writing, Truth, 
 Faljhood, a Body, a Man, a Horfe, an Angel, a . 
 heavy Body, a fwift Horfe, &c. Every Thing 
 that can be divided by the Mind into two or more 
 Ideas is called complex. 
 
 Complex Ideas are often confidered as [ingle and 
 diftintt Beings, tho' they may be made up of fe- 
 veral fimple Ideas ; fo a Body, a Spirit, a Houfe, 
 a Tree, a Flower. But when feveral of thefe 
 Ideas of a different Kind are join* d together, which 
 are wont to be confider'd as diftincl: fingle Beings, 
 this is called a compounded Idea, whether thefe 
 united Ideas be fimple or complex. So a Man is 
 compounded of Body and Spirit, fo Mithridate is 
 a compound Medicine, becaufe it is made of many 
 different Ingredients : This I have fhewn under 
 the Doctrine of Subftances. And Modes alfo may 
 be compounded Harmony is a compound Idea, 
 made up of different Sounds united ; fo feveral dif- 
 ferent Virtues muft be united to make up the 
 C 4 compounded
 
 34 LOGICK: Or Part I. 
 
 compounded Idea or Character, either of a Hero, 
 or a Saint. 
 
 But when many Ideas of the fame Kind are 
 joined together and united in one Name, or un- 
 der one View, it is called a collective Idea ; fo an 
 Army, or a Parliament, is a Collection of Men ; 
 a Dictionary or Nomenclalura is a Collection of 
 Words 5 a. Flock is a Collection of Sheep ", a F0- 
 ?<?/?, or Grove, a Collection of Trees ; a /&#/? is 
 a Collection of Sand, or Corn, or Duft, &c. a 
 CzYy is a Collection of Houfes ; a Nofegay is a 
 Collection of Flowers ; a Month, or a l><3r, is a 
 Collection of Days, and a Tboufand is a Collection 
 of Units. 
 
 1 he precife Difference between a compound and 
 ollec~live Idea is this, that a compound Idea unites 
 Things of a different Kind, but a collective Idea 
 Things of the fame Kind : tho' this DiftinCtion in 
 fome Cafes is not accurately obferv'd, and Cuftom 
 oftentimes ufes the Word compound for collective. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of univerfal and particular Ideas, real and ima~ 
 ginary. 
 
 IDEAS, according to their ObjeCtf, may firft 
 be divided into particular or univerfal. 
 A particular Idea is that which reprefents one 
 Thing only. 
 
 Sometimes the one Thing is reprefented in a 
 loofe and indeterminate manner, .as when we fay 
 fome Man, any Man, one Man, another Man; 
 fome Horfe, any Horfe -, one City, or another, which 
 is called by the Schools Individuum Vagum, 
 
 Sometimes the particular Idea reprefents one 
 Thing in a determinate Manner, and then it is 
 
 called
 
 C. III. S. 3. The Right Ufe ofReafon. 
 
 called a fmgular Idea ; fuch is Bucephalus or 
 ander's Horfe, Cicero the Orator, P<?/<?r the Apo- 
 ftle, the Palace of Verfailles, this Book, that River, 
 the new Forefl, or the City of London: That 
 Idea which reprefents one particular determinate 
 Thing to me is called a fmgular Idea, whether it 
 be fimple, or complex, or compound. 
 
 The Objefl of any particular Idea, as well as 
 the Idea itfelf, is fometimes called an Individual : 
 So Peter is an individual Man, London is an indi- 
 vidual City. So this Book, one Horfe, another Hor/e 9 
 are all Individuals ; tho' the Word Individual is 
 more ufually limited to one fmgular, certain, and 
 determined Object. 
 
 An univerfal Idea is that which reprefents a 
 common Nature agreeing to feveral particular 
 Things ; fo a Horfe, a Man, or a Book, are called 
 univerfal Ideas, becaufe they agree to all Horfes, 
 Men, or Books. 
 
 And I think it is not amifs to intimate, in this 
 Place, that thefe univerfal Ideas are formed by 
 that Act of the Mind which is called Alftraftwn. 
 \. e. a withdrawing fome part of an Idea from 
 other Parts of it: For when fmgular Ideas are 
 firft let into the Mind by Senfation or Reflection, 
 then, in order to make them univerfal, we leave 
 out, or drop, all thofe peculiar and determinate 
 Characters, Qualities, Modes, or Circumftances, 
 which belong merely to any particular individual 
 Being, and by which it differs from other Beings ; 
 and we only contemplate thofe Properties of it, 
 wherein it agrees with other Beings. 
 
 Tho' it muft be confefled, that the Name of 
 dbftraRed Ideas is fometimes attributed to univer- 
 fal Ideas, both fenfible or fpiritual, yet this Ab- 
 flrattion is not Ib great \ as when we drop out of 
 Our Idea every 'fenfible or ffiritual Reprefentation, 
 
 and
 
 36 LOG 1C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 and retain nothing but the moft general and ab- 
 folute Conceptions of Things, or their mere Re- 
 lations to one another, without any Regard to their 
 particular Natures, whether they befenfibleorjpiri- 
 tual. And it is to this kind of Conceptions we 
 more properly give the Name of abftrafted Ideas 
 as in the firft Section of this Chapter. 
 
 An univerfal Idea is either general or fpecial. 
 
 A general Idea is called by the Schools a Genus ; 
 and it is one common Nature agreeing to feveral 
 other common Natures. So Animal is a Genus ; 
 becaufe it agrees to Horfe, Lion, Whale, Butterfly, 
 which are alfo common Ideas ; fo Fijh is a Genus, 
 becaufe it agrees to Trout, Herring, Crab, which 
 are common Natures alfo. 
 
 K fpecial Idea is called by the Schools a Species ; 
 it is one common Nature that agrees to feveral 
 fingular individual Beings , fb Horfe is a fpecial 
 Idea, or a Species, becaufe it agrees to Bucephalus, 
 Trott and Snow-ball. City is a. fpecial Idea, for it 
 agrees to London, Paris, Briftol. 
 
 Note, I ft , Some of thefe Univerfals are Genus* s, 
 if compared with lefs common Natures ; and they 
 are Species's, if compared with Natures more com- 
 mon. So Bird is a Genus, if compared with Ea- 
 gle, Sparrow, Raven, which are alfo common Na- 
 tures : But it is a Species, if compared with the more 
 general Nature, Animal. The fame may be faid 
 oiFtJh, Beaft, &c. 
 
 This fort of univerfal Ideas, which may either 
 be confidered as a Genus, or a Species, is called 
 Subaltern : But the higheft Genus, which is never 
 a Species, is called the moft general ; and the low- 
 eft Species, which is never a Genus, is called the 
 moft fpecial. 
 
 It may be obferved here alfo, that that general 
 
 Nature or Property wherein one thing agrees with 
 
 4 moft
 
 C. III. S. 3. fbc Right U/6 fl/'Reafon. 3 7 
 
 moft other things is called its more remote Genus : 
 So Subftance is the remote Genus of Bird, or 5<?rf/?, 
 becaufe it agrees not only t6 all kinds of Animals, 
 but alfo to things inanimate, as Sun, Stars, Clouds, 
 Metals, Stones, Air, Water, &c. But Animal is 
 the proximate or neareft Genus of Bird, becaufe it 
 agrees to feweft other things. Thofe genera] Na- 
 tures which ftand between the near eft and moft re- 
 mote are called Intermediate. 
 
 Note, II d| y, In univerfal Ideas it is proper to 
 confider their Comprehenfwn and their Extenfeon *. 
 
 The Comprehenfion of an Idea regards all the 
 efiential Modes and Properties of it : So Body in its 
 Comprehenfion takes in Solidity, Figure, Quantity, 
 Mobility, &c. So a Bowl in its Comprehenfion in- 
 cludes Rouwdnefs, Volubility, &c. 
 
 The Extenfeon of an univerfal Idea regards all 
 the particular Kinds and fingle Beings that are con- 
 tained under it. So a Body in its Extenfeon in- 
 cludes Sun, Moon, Star, Wood, Iron, Plant, Ani- 
 mal, &c. which are feveral Species, or Individuals, 
 under the general Name of Body. So a Bowl, in 
 its Extenfeon, includes a wooden Bowl, a brafs Bowl, 
 a white and Black Bowl, a heavy Bowl, &c. and 
 all kinds of Bowls, together with all the particu- 
 lar individual Bowls in the World. 
 
 Note , The Comprehenfion of an Idea is fometimes 
 taken in fo large a Senfe, as not only to include 
 the eflential Attributes, but all the Properties, 
 Modes, and Relations whatfoever, that belong to 
 any Being, as will appear Chap. VI. 
 
 This Account of Genus and Species is part of 
 that famous Doctrine of Univerfals, which is taught 
 in the Schools, with divers other Formalities be- 
 longing to it , for it is in this Place that they jn- 
 
 Note, The Word Extstifi here :s taken in a mere logicalScnk, and 
 jjot in a ftyfiul and mathematical Senfci 
 
 troduce
 
 38 LOGICK:Or, Parti. 
 
 troduce Difference, which is the primary efiential 
 Mode, and Property, or the fecondary eflential 
 Mode, and Accident or the accidental Mode ; and 
 thefe they call the five Predicables, becaufe every 
 Thing that is affirm'd concerning any Being, muft 
 be either the Genus, the Species? the Difference, 
 fome Property, orfome Accident : But what farther 
 is necefiary to be fajd concerning thefe Things, 
 will be mentioned when we treat of Definition. 
 
 Having finimed the Doctrine ofuniverfal and 
 particular Ideas, I mould take notice of another 
 Divifion of them, which alfo hath Refpect to 
 their Objeffs i and that is, they are either real or 
 imaginary. 
 
 Real Ideas are fuch as have a juft Foundation 
 in Nature, and have real Objects, or Exemplars, 
 which did, or do, or may actually exift, accord- 
 ing to the prefent State and Nature of Things ; 
 fuch are all our Ideas of Long, Broad, Swift, Slow, 
 Wood, Iron, Men, Horfes, 'Thoughts, Spirits, a cruel 
 Mafter, a proud Beggar, a. Man feven Foot high. 
 
 Imaginary Ideas, which are alfo called fantaftical, 
 or chimerical, are fuch as are made by enlarging, 
 diminiming, uniting, dividing real Ideas in the 
 Mind, in fuch a manner, as no Objects, or Ex- 
 emplars, did or will ever exift, according to the 
 prefent Courfe of Nature, tho' the feveral Parts of 
 thefe Ideas are borrowed from real Objects i fuch 
 are the Conceptions we have of a Centaur, a Sa- 
 tyr, a golden Mountain, a flying Horfe, a Dog with- 
 out a Head, a Bull lefs than a Moufe, or a Moufe 
 as big as a Bull, and a Man twenty Foot high. 
 
 Some of thefe fantaftic Ideas are pojjllle, that 
 is, they are not utterly inconfiftent in the Nature 
 of Things ; and therefore it is within the reach 
 of Divine Power to make fuch Objects ; fuch are 
 moft of the Inftances already given : But ImpoJJibles 
 4 carry
 
 C. III. S. 4. Tfc right Ufe of Reafon." 39 
 
 carry an utter Inconfiftence in the Ideas which are 
 join'd ; fuch are felf-atfive Matter, and infinite or 
 eternal Men, a pious Man without Honefy, or Hea- 
 ven without Holinefs. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 < The Divifion of Ideas, with Regard to their Qualities- 
 
 IDEAS, with Regard to their Qualities, afford 
 us thefe feveral Divifions of them. i. They 
 are either clear and diftinft, or obfcure and confufed. 
 2. They are vulgar or learned. 3. They are per- 
 fect or imperfeff. 4. They are trueorfalfe. 
 
 I. Our Ideas are either dear and diftinft, or o#- 
 yf#?v and confufed. 
 
 Several Writers have diftinguifhed the dear 
 Ideas from thofe that are diftintt -, and the confufed 
 Ideas from thofe that are obfcure ; and it muft be 
 acknowledged, there may be fome Difference be- 
 tween them , for it is the Clearnefe of Ideas for 
 the moft part makes them diftinft -, and the Ob- 
 fcurity of Ideas is one Thing that will always bring 
 a fort of Cottfujion into them. Yet when thefe 
 Winers come to talk largely upon this Subject, 
 and to explain and adjuft their Meaning with 
 great Nicety, I have generally found that they 
 did not keep up the Diftin&ion they firft de- 
 fign'd, but they confound the one with the other. 
 I Ihall therefore treat of dear or diftinft Ideas, as 
 one and the fame fort, and obfcure or confufed 
 Ideas, as another. 
 
 A clear and diftinft Idea is that which reprefents 
 the Object of the Mind with full Evidence and 
 Strength, and plainly diftinguilhes it from all 
 other Objefts whatfoever. 
 
 An
 
 40 LOGICK: Or Part I. 
 
 An obfcure and confufed Idea reprefents the Ob- 
 ject, either fo faintly, fo imperfectly, or fo ming- 
 led with other Ideas, that the Object of it doth 
 not appear plain to the Mind, nor purely in its 
 own Nature, nor fufficiently diftinguifhed from 
 other Things. 
 
 When we fee the Sea and Sky nearer at Hand, 
 we have a clear and diftintt Idea of each ; but 
 when we look far toward the Horizon, efpecially 
 in a mifty Day, our Ideas of both are but obfcure 
 and confufed ; for we know not which is Sea and 
 which is Sky. So when we look at the Colours 
 of the Rainbow , we . have a clear Idea of the red* 
 the blue, the green in the Middle of their feveral 
 Arches, and a diftinSt Idea too, while the Eye 
 fixes there ; but when we confider the Border of 
 thofe Colours, they fo run into one another that 
 renders their Ideas confufed and obfcure. So the 
 Idea which we have of our Brother, or our Friend, 
 whom we fee daily, : is clear and diftinft -, but 
 when the Abfence of mainy : Years has injured the 
 Idea, it becomes obfcure and confufed. 
 
 Note, here, that fome of our Ideas may be very 
 clear and diftinff in one Refpect, and very obfcure 
 and confufed in another. , So when we fpeak of a 
 Chiliagonum, or a Figure of a thoufand Angles, we 
 may have a clear and diftinft rational Idea of the 
 Number one thoufand Angles ; for we can demon- 
 (trate various Properties concerning it by Reafon : 
 But the Image, or fenfible Idea, which we have of 
 the Figure, is but confufed and obfcure ; for we 
 cannot precifely diftinguifli it by Fancy from the 
 Image of a Figure that has nine hundred Angles, or 
 nine hundred and ninety. So when we fpeak of the 
 infinite Divifebility of Matter, we always keep in 
 our Minds a very clear and diftinct Idea of Divi- 
 fion and Drvifijrility : But after we have made a 
 
 little
 
 C.III.S.4- Jfe right Ufe of Reafon. 41 
 
 little Progrefs in dividing^ and come to Parts 
 that are far too fmall for the Reach of our Senfes, 
 then our Ideas, or fenftble Images of thefe little 
 Bodies, become obfcure, and indiftinft, and the 
 Idea of Infinite is very obfcure, imperfeft and con- 
 ftifed. 
 
 II. Ideas are either vulgar or learned. A vul- 
 gar Idea reprefents to us the moft obvious and 
 fenfible Appearances that are contained in the Ob- 
 ject of them : But a learned Idea penetrates farther 
 into the Nature, Properties, Reafons, Caufes and 
 Effects of Things. This is beft illuftrated by fomc 
 Examples. 
 
 It is a vulgar Idea that we have of a Rainbow 
 when we conceive a large Arch in the Clouds, 
 made up of various Colours parallel to each other ; 
 But it is a learned Idea which a Philofopher has 
 when he confiders it as the various Reflections and 
 Refractions of Sun-Beams, in Drops of falling 
 Rain. So it is a vulgar Idea which we have of 
 the Colours offolid Bodies, when we perceive them 
 to be, as it were, a red, or blue, or green Tincture 
 of the Surface of thofe Bodies : But it is a philo- 
 fophical Idea when we confider the various Colours 
 to be nothing elfe but different Senfations exci- 
 ted .in us by the varioufly refracted Rays of 
 Light, reflected on our Eyes in a different Man- 
 ner, according to the different Size, or Shape, 
 or Situation of the Particles of which the Sur- 
 faces of thofe Bodies are compofed. It is a vul- 
 gar Idea which we have of zWatch or Clock, 
 when we conceive of it as a pretty Inftrument' 
 made to fhew us the Hour of the Day : But it is 
 a learned Idea which the Watchmaker has of it, 
 who knows all the feveral Parts of it, the Spring 
 the Balance, the Chain, the Wheels, their Axles 
 &V. together with the various Connections and 
 
 Adjuftments
 
 42 LOGICK: Or Parti. 
 
 Adjuftments of each Part, whence the exact and 
 uniform Motion of the Index is derived, which 
 points to the Minute or the Hour. So when a 
 common Underftanding reads Pirgil's MneiA, he 
 has but a vulgar Idea of that Poem, yet his Mind 
 is naturally entertained with the Story, and his 
 Ears with the Verfe : But when a Critick or a 
 Man who has fkill in Poefy, reads it, he has a 
 learned Idea of its peculiar Beauties, he taftes and 
 relifhes a fuperior Pleafure \ he admires the Ro- 
 man Poet, and wifties he had known the Chriftian 
 theology ', which would have furnifh'd him with 
 nobler Materials and Machines than all the Hea- 
 then Idols* 
 
 It is with a vulgar Idea that the World beholds 
 the Cartoons of Raphael at Hampton-Court ', and 
 every one feels his Share of Pleafure and Entertain- 
 ment : But a Painter contemplates the Wonders of 
 that Italian Pencil, and fees a thoufand Beauties 
 in them which the vulgar Eye neglected : His 
 learned Ideas give him a tranfcendent Delight, and 
 yet, at the fame time difcover the Blemifhes which 
 the common Gazer never obferv'd. 
 
 III. Ideas are either perfeft or imperfeft, which 
 are otherwife called adequate or inadequate. 
 
 Thofe are adequate Ideas which perfectly repre- 
 fent their Archetypes or Objects. Inadequate 
 Ideas are but a partial, or incomplete Reprefen- 
 tation of thofe Archetypes to which they are re- 
 ferred. 
 
 All our fimple Ideas are in fome Senfe adequate 
 or perfeft, becaufe Jtmple Ideas, confider'd merely 
 as our firft Perceptions, have no Parts in them r 
 So we may be faid to have a perfect Idea of 
 'White, Black, Sweet, Sour, Length, Light, Mo- 
 tion, Reft, &c. We have alfo a perfect Idea of 
 various Figures, as a Triangle, a Square^ a Cylin- 
 der 9 

 
 C. Ill; S. 4. fbe right Ufe of Reafon. 43 
 
 der, a Cube, a Sphere, which are complex Ideas i 
 But our Idea or Image of a Figure of a thoufand 
 Sides, our Idea of the City of London, or the Pow* 
 ers of a Loadflone, are very imperfect, as well as 
 all our Ideas of infinite Length or Breadth, infinite 
 Power, Wifdom or Duration ; for the Idea of *- 
 finite is endlefs and ever growing, and can neyer 
 be compleated. 
 
 Note> i. When we have a perfect Idea of arty 
 thing in all its Parts, it is call'd a compleat Ideh \ 
 when in all its Properties, it is called comprehenfive. 
 But when we have but an inadequate and imperfect 
 Idea, we are only faid to apprehend it ; therefore 
 we ufe the Term Apprehenfion, when we fpeak of 
 our Knowledge of God, who can never be compre* 
 bended by his Creatures. 
 
 Note, 2. Tho* there are a Multitude of Ideas 
 which may be call'd perfect, or adequate in a vulgar 
 Senfe, yet there are fcaree any Ideas which are ade- 
 quate, comprehenfive and complete in a philosophical 
 Senfe -, for there is fcaree any thing in the World 
 that we know, as to all the Parts and Powers, and 
 Properties of it in Perfection, Even fo plain an 
 Idea as that of a Triangle, has perhaps, infinite 
 Properties belonging to it, of which we know but 
 a few. Who can tell what are the Shapes and Po- 
 fitions of thofe Particles, which caufe all the Va* 
 fiety of Colours that appear on the Surface of 
 Things ? Who knows what are the Figures of the 
 little Corpufcles that compofe and diftinguifh dif- 
 ferent Bodies ? The Ideas of Brafs, Iron, Gold, 
 Wood, Stone, Hyjjbp, and Rofemary have an infi- 
 nite Variety of hidden Myfteries contained in the 
 Shape, Size, Motion and Pofition of the little Par- 
 ticles, of which they are compofed , and, perhaps, 
 alfo infinite unknown Properties and Powers, that 
 may be deriv'd from them. And if we arife to 
 D the
 
 44 LOG 1C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 the Animal World, or the World of Spirits, our 
 Knowledge of them muft be amazingly imperfect, 
 when there is not the leaft Grain of Sand, or empty 
 Space, but has too many Queftions and Difficul- 
 ties belonging to it for the wifeft Philofopher upon 
 Earth to anfwer and refolve. 
 
 IV. Our Ideas are either true orfatfe , for an Idea 
 being the Reprefentation of a thing in the Mind, 
 it muft be either a true or a falfe Reprefentation of 
 it. If the Idea be conformable to the Object or Ar- 
 chetype of it, it is a true Idea ; if not, it is & falfe 
 one. Sometimes our Ideas are referr'd to things 
 really exifting without us as their Archetypes. If I 
 fee Bodies in their proper Colours I have a. true Idea: 
 But when a Man under the Jaundice fees all Bodies 
 yellow , he has & falfe Idea of them. So if we fee 
 the Sun or Moon, rifing or fetting, our Idea repre- 
 fents them bigger than when they are on the Meri- 
 dian : And in this Senfe it is a. falfe Idea, becaufe 
 thofe heavenly Bodies are all Day, and all Night 
 of the fame bignefs. Or when I fee zftrait Staff 
 appear crooked while it is half under the Water -, I 
 fay, the Water gives me v. falfe Idea of it. Some- 
 times our Ideas refer to the Ideas of other Men de- 
 noted by fuch a particular Word, as their Arche- 
 types : So when I hear a Protejlant ufe the Words 
 Church and Sacraments -, if I underftand by thefe 
 Words, a Congregation of faithful Men who prof efs 
 Cbriftianity, and the two Ordinances, Baptifm and 
 the Lord's Supper, I have a true Idea of thofe 
 Words in the common Senfe of Proteftants : But if 
 the Man who fpeaks of them be a Papift, he means 
 the Church of Rome and the feven Sacraments, and 
 then I have a miftaken Idea of thofe Words, as fpo- 
 ken by him, for he has a different Senfe and Mean- 
 ing : And in general whenfoever I miftake the Senfe 
 of any Speaker or Writer, I may be faid to have 
 a falfe Idea of it, Some
 
 C. IV. S. il The right Ufe ^Reafom 45 
 
 Some think that Truth or Faljkood properly be- 
 longs only to Propo/itions, which fhall be the Sub- 
 ject of Difcourfe in the fecond Part of "Logic ; for 
 if we confider Ideas as mere Imprefiions upon the 
 Mind, made by outward Objects, thofe Impref- 
 fions will ever be conformable to the Laws of Na- 
 ture in fuch a Cafe : The Water will make a Stick 
 appear crooked, and the horizontal Air will make 
 the Sun and Moon appear bigger. And generally 
 where there is Faljhood in Ideas, there feems to be 
 fomefecret or latent Proportion, whereby we judge 
 falfly of Things : This is more obvious where we 
 take up the Words of a Writer or Speaker in a mi* 
 ftaken Senfe, for we join his Words to our own I- 
 deas, which are different from his. But after all, 
 fmce Ideas are Pictures of Things, it can never be 
 very improper to pronounce them to be true or 
 falfe, according to their Conformity or Nonconformity 
 to their Exemplars. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of Words and their fever al Divifions, together 
 with the Advantage and Danger of them, 
 
 SECT. I. 
 Of Words in general, and their Ufe. 
 
 TH O* our Ideas are firft acquired by the Per- 
 ception of Objects, or by various Senfations 
 and Reflections, yet we convey them to each other 
 by the Means of certain Sounds, or written Marks, 
 which we call Words ; and a great Part of our 
 Knowledge is both obtained r.nd communicated by 
 thefe Means, which are call'cl Speech or Language. 
 D 2 But
 
 46 L G I C K : Or, Part I. 
 
 But as we are led into the Knowledge of Things 
 by Words, fo we are oftentimes led into Error, or 
 Miftake, by the Ufe or Abufeof JF0rdj alfo. And 
 in order to guard againft fuch Miftakes, as well 
 as to promote our Improvement in Knowldge* 
 it is neceffary to acquaint ourfelves a little with 
 Words and Terms. We lhall begin with thefe 
 Obfervations. 
 
 Obferv. i. Words whether they are fpoken or 
 written) have no natural Connection with the 
 Ideas they are defign'd to fignify, nor with the 
 'Things which are reprefented in thole Ideas. There 
 is no manner of Affinity between the Sounds 
 white in Englijh, or Uanc in French, and that Co- 
 lour which we call by that Name ; nor have the 
 Letters, of which thefe Words are compofed, 
 any natural Aptnefs to fignify that Colour rather 
 than red or green. Words and Names therefore 
 are mere arbitrary Signs invented by Men to 
 communicate their Thoughts, or Ideas, to one ano- 
 ther. 
 
 Obferu. 2. If one fmgle Word were appointed 
 to exprefs but one fimple Idea, and nothing elfe, 
 as White, Black, Sweet, Sour, Sharp, Bitter, Ex- 
 tenfion. Duration, there would be fcarce any Mif- 
 take about them. 
 
 But alas ! It is a common Unhappinefs in Lan- 
 guage, that different ym/j/tf Ideas are fometimes ex- 
 prefs'd by the fame Word ; fo the Words fweet and 
 Jharp, are applied both to the Objects of hearing 
 and tailing, as we mall fee hereafter , and this, per- 
 haps, may be one Caufe or Foundation of Obfcuri- 
 ty and Error arifing from Words. 
 
 Obferu. 3. In communicating our Complex 
 
 Ideas to one another, if we could join as many 
 
 peculiar and appropriated Words together in one 
 
 Sound, as we join fimple Ideas to make one com- 
 
 3
 
 CIV. S. i. *fbe right Ufe ofRezfon. 47 
 
 plex one, we Ihould feldom be in Danger of mif- 
 taking : When I exprefs the Tafte of an Apple, 
 which we call the Bitter-Sweet, none can miftake 
 what I mean. 
 
 Yet this fort of Compofition would make all Lan- 
 guage a molt tedious and unweildy thing, fince 
 moft of our Ideas are complex, and many of 
 them have eight or ten fimple Ideas in them ; 
 fo that the Remedy would be worfe than the 
 Difeafe ; for what is now exprefled in one fhort 
 Word, as Month, or Tear, would require two 
 Lines to exprefs it. It is necefiary, therefore, 
 that fingle Words be invented to exprefs complex 
 Ideas, in order to make Language fhort and ufe- 
 ful. 
 
 But here is our great Infelicity, that when 
 fingle Words fignify complex Ideas, one Word can 
 never diftinctly manifeft all the Parts of a com- 
 plex Idea i and thereby it will often happen, that 
 one Man includes more or lefs in his Idea, than 
 another does, while he affixes the fame Word to 
 it. In this Cafe there will be Danger of Mif- 
 take between them, for they do not mean the 
 fame Objetf, tho* they ufe the fame Name. So if 
 one Perfon, or Nation, by the Word Tear mean 
 twelve Months of thirty Days each, i. e. three 
 hundred and fixty Days, another intend a Solar 
 Tear of three hundred fixty five Days, and a 
 third mean a Lunar Tear, or twelve Lunar Months, 
 i. e. three hundred fifty four Days, there will be 
 a great Variation and Error in their Account of 
 Things, unlefs they are well appriz'd of each 
 other's Meaning beforehand. This is fuppos'd to 
 be the Reafon, why fome ancient Hi/lories, and 
 Prophecies, and Accounts of Chronology, are fo 
 hard to be adjufted. And this is the true Reafon 
 of fp furious and endlefs Debates on many Points 
 P 3 W
 
 48 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 in Divinity ; the Words Church, Worjhip, Idola- 
 try^ Repentance, Faith, Election^ Merit, Grace* 
 and many others which fignify very complex Ideas, 
 are not applied to include juft the fame fimple Ideas, 
 and the fame Number of them, by the various 
 contending Parties , thence arife Confufion and 
 Conteft. 
 
 Obferu. 4. Tho' a Jingle Name does not cer- 
 tainly manifeft to us all the Parts of a complex 
 Idea, yet it muft be acknowledg*d, that in many 
 of our complex Ideas, the fingle Name may Point 
 put to us fome chief Property which belongs to 
 the Thing that the Word fignifies ; efpecially 
 when the Word or Name is trac'd up to its 
 Original, thro' feveral Languages from whence it 
 is borrowed. So an Apoflle fignifies one who isfent 
 forth. 
 
 But this tracing of a Word to its Original, 
 (which is call'd Etymology) is fometimes a very 
 precarious and uncertain Thing : And after all, 
 we have made but little Progrefs towards the 
 Attainment of the full Meaning of a complex 
 Idea, by knowing fome one chief Property of it. 
 We know but a fmall Part of the Notion of 
 an Apojlle, by knowing barely that he is fent 
 forth. 
 
 Obferv. 5. Many (if not moft) of our Words 
 which are applied to moral and intellectual Ideas, 
 when traced up to their Original in the learned 
 Languages, will be found to fignify fenfible and 
 corporeal Things : Thus the Words Apprehenfwn^ 
 Underftanding, Abftraffion, Invention, Idea, In- 
 ference, Prudence, Religion, Church, Adoration, 
 fc?f. have all a corporeal Signification in their 
 Original. The Name Spirit itfelf fignifies Breath 
 or Air * in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew : Such is 
 the Poverty of all Languages, they are forc'd tq 
 
 ufe
 
 C. IV. S. I. 3k right Ufe of Reafon, 49 
 
 ufe thefe Names for incorporeal Ideas, which thing 
 has a tendency to Error and Confufion. 
 
 Obferv. 6. The laft thing I fhall mention that 
 leads us into many a Miftake, is, the Multitude of 
 Objects that one Name fometimes fignifies : There 
 is almoft an infinite Variety of Things and Ideas 
 both funple and complex, beyond all the Words 
 that are invented in any Language ; thence it be- 
 comes almoft necefiary that one Name ftiould fig- 
 nify feveral Things. Let us but confider the two 
 Colours of Tellow and Blue, if they are mingled to- 
 gether in any confiderable Proportion they make 
 a Green : Now there may be infinite Differences 
 of the Proportions in the Mixture of Tellow and 
 Blue -, and yet we have only thefe three Words, 
 Tellow, Blue, and Green, to fignify all of them, at 
 leaft by one fingle Term. 
 
 When I ufe the Word Shore, I may intend there- 
 by a Coaft of Land mar the Sea, or a Drain to 
 carry off Water, or a Prop to fupport a Building ; 
 and by the Sound of the Word Porter, who can 
 tell whether I mean a Man who bears Burthens, or 
 a Servant who waits at a Nobleman's Gate ? The 
 World is fruitful in >the Invention of Uten/ils of 
 Life, and new Characters and Offices of Men, yet 
 Names entirely new are feldom invented -, there- 
 fore old Names are almoft neceflarily us'd to figni- 
 fy new Things, which may occafion much Confu- 
 fion and Error in the receiving and communicating 
 of Knowledge. 
 
 Give me leave to propofe one fingle Inftance, 
 wherein all thefe Notes fhall be remarkably ex- 
 emplified. It is the Word Bi/hop, which in 
 French is called Eveque ; upon which I would make 
 thefe feveral Obfervations. (i.) That there is 
 no natural Connection between the facred Of- 
 fice hereby fignified, and the Letters or Sound 
 D 4 which
 
 Jo L G I C K : Or, Part I. 
 
 which fignify this Office ; for both thefe Words, 
 Eveque and Bijbop fignify the fame Office, tho* 
 there is not one Letter alike in them ; nor have 
 the Letters which compofe the Englijh or the 
 French Word any thing facred belonging to them, 
 more than the Letters that compofe the Words 
 King or Soldier. (2.) If the Meaning of a Word 
 could be learnt by its Derivation or Etymology, 
 yet the original Derivation of Words is often- 
 times very dark and unfearchable ; for who would 
 imagine that each of thefe Words are derived 
 from the Latin Epifcopus, or the Greek 'E*n{<rMir(&' ? 
 Yet in this Inftance we happen to know certainly 
 the true Derivation j the French being anciently 
 writ Evefque, is borrow'd from the firft Part of 
 the Latin Word ; and the old Englijh Bifcop from 
 the middle of it. (3.; The original Greek Word 
 fignifies an Overlooker, or one who ftands higher 
 than his Fellows and overlooks them : It is a 
 compound Word, that primarily fignifies fenfible 
 Ideas, tranflated to fignify or include feveral moral 
 or intellectual Ideas \ therefore all will grant, that 
 the Nature of the Office can never be known by the 
 mere Sound or Senfe of the Word Overlooker. (4.) 
 1 add farther, the Word Bijhop, or Epifcopus, even 
 when it is thus tranflated from a fenfible Idea, to 
 include feveral intellectual Ideas, may yet equally 
 fignify an Over Jeer of the Poor; an InJpeRor of 
 the Cuftoms ; a Surveyor of the Highways , a 
 Supervifor of the Excife, &c. but by the Confent 
 of Men, and the Language of Scripture, it is 
 appropriated to fignify & facred Office in the Church. 
 ^5.) This very Idea and Name, thus tranflated 
 from Things lenfible, to fignify a fpiritual and fa- 
 cred Thing, contains but one Property of it, 
 (viz.] onetkat has an Overfight, or Care over others : 
 But it does not tell us, whether it includes a 
 
 Cart.
 
 C. IV. S. 2. *fbe right Ufe ofReafon: 5 1 
 
 Care over one Church, or many , over the Laity , 
 or the Clergy. (6.) Thence it follows, that thofe 
 who in the complex Idea of the Word Bijhop in- 
 clude an Overfight over the Clergy, or over a whole 
 Diocefe of People, a Superiority to Prefhyters, a 
 diftinct Power of Ordination, &c. muft necefia- 
 rily difagree with thofe who include in it only the 
 Care of a fingle Congregation. Thus according 
 to the various Opinions of Men, this Word fig- 
 nifies a Pope, a Gallican Bijhop, a Lutheran Su- 
 perintendent, an Englijh Prelate, zPaftorof afmgle 
 Affembly, or a Prejbyter or Elder. Thus they 
 quarrel with each other perpetually , and it is well 
 if any of them all have hit precifely the Senfe of the 
 facred Writers, and included juft the fame Ideas 
 in it, and no others. 
 
 I might make all the fame Remarks on the Word 
 Church or Kirk, which is derived from KV/ aTx-, 
 or the Houfe of the Lord, contracted into Kyrioik, 
 which fome fuppofe to fignify an Affembly of Chri- 
 ftians, fome take it for all the World that profejjes 
 Chriftianity, and fome make it to mean only the 
 Clergy : and on thefe Accounts it has been the Oc- 
 cafion of as many and as furious Controverfies as 
 the Wori Bijbop which was mentioned before. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of negative and pofttive 'Terms. 
 
 FROM thefe and other Confiderations it will 
 follow, that if we would avoid Error in our 
 Purfuit of Knowledge, we muft take good heed 
 to the Ufe of Words and Terms, and be acquainted 
 with the various Kinds of them. 
 
 I. Terms are eidier pofitive or negative. 
 
 Negative
 
 r 
 
 52 L G 1C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 Negative Terms are fuch as have a little Word 
 or Syllable of denying join'd to them, according 
 to the various Idioms of every Language, as Un- 
 pleafant, Imprudent, Immortal, Irregular, Ignorant, 
 Infinite, Endlefs, Lifelefs, Deathlefs, Nonfenfe, 
 Abyfs, Anonymous, where the Prepofitions Un, Im> 
 In, Non, A, An, and the Termination lefs, fignify 
 a Negation, either in Englijh, Latin, or Greek. 
 
 Pofitive Terms are thofe which have no fuch ne- 
 gative Appendices belonging to them, as Life, 
 Death, End, Senfe, Mortal 
 
 But fo unhappily are our Words and Ideas link'd 
 together, that we can never know which are pofe- 
 tive Ideas, and which are negative, by the Word 
 that is ufed to exprefs them, and that for thefe 
 Reafons. 
 
 i ft , There are fome pofitive 'Terms which are 
 made to fignify a negative Idea ; as Dead is pro- 
 perly a Thing that is deprived of Life, Blind im- 
 plies a Negation or Privation of Sight ; Deaf a 
 Want of Hearing , Dumb a Denial of Speech. 
 
 2 d! y, There are alfo fome negative Terms, which 
 imply pofitive Ideas, fuch as immortal and death- 
 left, which fignify ever- living, or a Continuance 
 in Life : Infolent fignifies rude and haughty : In- 
 demnify to keep fafe ; and Infinite perhal(^ has a 
 ^pofitive Idea too, for it is an Idea ever growing ; 
 and when it is applied to God it fignifies his compleat 
 Perfection. 
 
 3 dl y, There are both pofitive and negative Term s, 
 invented to fignify the fame and contrary Ideas ; 
 as Unhappy and Miferable, Sinlefs and Holy, Pure 
 ^ and Undefiled, Impure and Filthy, Unkind and Cruel, 
 
 Irreligious and Profane, Unforgiving and Revenge- 
 ful, &c. and there is a great deal of Beauty and 
 Convenience deriv'd to any Language from this 
 Variety of Expreffion ; tho* fometimes it a little 
 
 confounds
 
 CIV. S. 2. Xbe Right Ufe of Reafon: 53 
 
 confounds our Conceptions of Being and Not-Being y 
 our pofitive and negative Ideas. 
 
 4 thl y, I may add alfo, that there are fome Words 
 which are negative in their original Language, but 
 feem pofitive to an Engli/hman, becaufe the Nega- 
 tion is unknown -, as Abyfs, a Place without a Bot- 
 tom -, Anodyne, an eafing Medicine ; Amnefty, an 
 Unremembrance or general Pardon ; Anarchy , a 
 State without Government ; Anonymous, i. e. name- 
 lefs ; Inept l , i. e. not fit ; Iniquity, i. e. Unright- 
 eoufhefs ; Infant, one that can't fpeak, (viz.) a 
 Child ; Injurious, not doing Juftice or Right. 
 
 The Way therefore to know whether any Idea 
 be negative or not, is, to confider whether it pri- 
 marily imply the Abfence of any pofitive Being, 
 or Mode of Being ; if it doth, then it is a Nega- 
 tion or negative Idea ; otherwife it is a pofitive one, 
 whether the Word that exprefies it be pofitive or 
 negative. Yet after all, in many Cafes this is 
 very hard to determine , as in Amnefty, Infinite, 
 Abyjs, which are originally negative Terms, but 
 they fignify Pardon, &c. which feem to be Pofi- 
 tives. So Darknefs, Madnefs, Clown, are pofitive 
 Terms, but they imply the Want of Light, the 
 Want of Reafon, and the Want of Manners -, and 
 perhaps thefe may be rank'd among the negative 
 Ideas. 
 
 Here note, that in the Englijh Tongue two ne- 
 gative Terms are equal to one pofitive, and figni- 
 fy the fame Thing, as not unhappy, fignifies hap- 
 py ', not immortal, fignifies mortal ; he is no im- 
 prudent Man, i. e. he is a Man of Prudence : But 
 the Senfe and Force of the Word in fuch a negative 
 Way of Expreffion, feems to be a little dimi- 
 nifhU 
 
 SECT.
 
 54 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 Of fimple and complex Terms. 
 
 RMS are divided into fimple or com- 
 flex. A fimple Term is one Word, a com- 
 plex Term is when more Words are ufed to fignify 
 one Thing. 
 
 Some Terms are complex in Words, but not in 
 Senfe, fuch is the fecond Emperor of Rome -, for it 
 excites in our Mind only the Idea of one Man (viz.) 
 Auguflus. 
 
 Some Terms are complex in Senfe, but not in 
 Words -, fo when I fay an Army, a Foreft, I mean 
 a Multitude of Men, or Trees ; and almoft all our 
 moral Ideas, as well as many of our natural ones, 
 are exprefs'd in this manner ; Religion, Piety, Loy- 
 alty, Knavery, Theft, include a Variety of Ideas 
 in each Term. 
 
 There are other Terms which are complex both 
 In Words and Senfe ; fo when I fay, a fierce Dog, 
 or a pious Man, it excites an Idea, not only of 
 thofe two Creatures, but of their peculiar Characters 
 alfo. 
 
 Among the Terms that are complex in Senfe, but 
 not in Words, we may reckon thofe fimple Terms 
 which contain a primary and a fecondary Idea in 
 them ; as when I hear my Neighbour fpeak that 
 which is not true, and I fay to him this is not 
 true, or this is falje, I only convey to him the 
 naked Idea of his Error , this is the primary Idea: 
 But if I fay it is a Lye, the Word Lye carries alfo 
 a fecondary Idea in it, for it implies both the Falf- 
 hood of the Speech, and my Reproach and Cen- 
 fure of the Speaker. On the other hand, if I fajr it 
 it a Miflake, this carries alfo a fecondary Idea with 
 
 its
 
 C IV, S. 3. Me Right Ufe of Reafon; 55 
 
 it , for 'it not only refers to the Falihood of his 
 Speech, but includes my Tendernefs and Civility 
 to him at the fame Time. Another Inftance may 
 be this k , when I ufe the Word Incefl, Adultery* 
 and Murder ', 1 convey to another not only the pri- 
 mary Idea of thofe Actions, but I include alfo the 
 fecondary Idea of their Unlawfulnefs, and my Ab- 
 horrence of them. 
 
 Note, i ft , Hence it comes to pafs, that among 
 Words which fignify the fame principal Ideas, 
 fome are clean and decent, others unclean ; fome 
 chafte, others obfeene ; fome are kind, others are 
 affronting and reproachful, becaufe of the fecondary 
 Idea which Cuftom has affix'd to them. And it 
 is the Part of a wife Man, when there is a Ne- 
 ceflity of exprefiing any evil ARiom, to do it ei- 
 ther by a Word that has a fecondary Idea of Kind- 
 nefs, or Softnefs -, or a Word that carries in it an 
 Ides, of Rebuke and Severity, according as the Cafe 
 requires: So when there is a Neceffity of expref- 
 fing Things unclean or obfeene, a wife Man will do 
 it in the moft decent Language, to excite as few 
 uncleanly Ideas as pofiible in the Minds of the 
 Hearers. 
 
 Note, 2 dl >', In Length of Time, and by the 
 Power of Cuftom, Words fometimes change their 
 -primary Ideas, as mail be declared, and fometimes 
 they have chang'd their fecondary Ideas, tho' the 
 primary Ideas may remain : So Words that were 
 once chafte, by frequent Ufe grow obfeene and un- 
 cleanly; and Words that were once honourable, 
 may in the next Generation grow mean and con- 
 temptible. So the Word Dame originally fignifi- 
 ed a Miftrefs of a Family, who was a Lady, and 
 it is ufed ftill in the Englijh Law to fignify a 
 Lady ; but in common ufe now-a-days it repre- 
 fents a Farmer's Wife, or a Miftrefs of a Family 
 
 f
 
 5 6 L G I C K : Or, Part I. 
 
 of the lower Rank in the Country. So thofe Words 
 ofRab/bakeb, Ifa. xxxvi. 12. in our Tranflation, 
 (Eat their own Dung, &c.) were doubtlefs decent 
 and clean Language, when our Tranflators wrote 
 them above a hundred Years ago. The Word 
 Dung has maintain'd its old fecondary Idea and in- 
 offenfive Senfe to this Day ; but the other Word in 
 that Sentence has by Cuftom acquired a more un- 
 cleanly Idea, and mould now rather be chang'd in- 
 to a more decent Term, and fo it mould be read 
 in publick, unlefs it mould be thought more pro- 
 per to omit the Sentence *. 
 
 For this Reafon it is, that the Jewijh Rabbins 
 have fupplied other chafte Words in the Margin 
 of the Hebrew Bible, where the Words of the 
 Text, thro* Time and Cuftom, are degenerated, 
 fo as to carry any bafe and unclean fecondary Idea 
 in them ; and they read the Word which is in the 
 Margin, which they call Keri , and not that 
 which was written in the Text, which they call 
 Chetib. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of Words common and Proper. 
 
 III. VT 7 O R D S and Names are either common or 
 \V -proper. Common Names are fuch as 
 Hand for univerfal Ideas, or a whole Rank of Be- 
 ings, whether general or fpecial. Thefe are call'd 
 Appellatives , fo Fi/h, Bird, Man, City, River , are 
 common Names , and fo are Trout, Eel, Lobfter, 
 for they all agree to many Individuals , and fome 
 of them to many Species : But Cicero, Virgil, Buce- 
 
 * So in fome Places of the facred Hiftorians, where it is written, Every 
 cat that fiffet againjl tbt Wall, we fliould read Every Male. 
 
 phalus.
 
 C. IV. S. 4. tte right Uje o/'Reafon; 57 
 pbalus, London, Rome, Mtna, the 'Thames, are 
 proper Names, for each of them agrees only to one 
 fingle Being. 
 
 Note here firft, that a proper Name may become 
 in fome Senfe common, when it hath been given to 
 feveral Beings of the fame Kind ; fo Cafar, which 
 was the proper Name of the firft Emperor Julius, 
 became alfo a common Name to all the following 
 Emperors. And Tea, which was the proper 
 Name of one fort of Indian Leaf, is now-a-days 
 become a common Name for many Infufions of 
 Herbs, or Plants, in Water ; as Sage-Tea, Alehoof 
 Tea, Limon-Tea, &c. So Peter, Thomas, John, 
 William, may be reckon'd common Names alfo, 
 becaufe they are given to many Perfons, unlefs 
 they are determined to fignify a fingle Perfon at any 
 particular Time or Place. 
 
 Note, in thefecond Place, that a common Name 
 may become proper by Cuftom, or by the Time, 
 or Place, or Perfons that ufe it ; as in Great Bri- 
 tain, when we fay the King, we mean our prefent 
 rightful Sovereign King George, who now reigns i 
 when we fpeak of the Prince, we intend his Roy- 
 al Highnefs George Prince of Wales : If we 
 mention the City when we are near London, we 
 generally mean the City of London ; when in a 
 Country Town, we fay the Parfon or the Efquire, 
 all the Parifh knows who are the fingle Perfons 
 intended by it ; fo when we are fpeaking of the 
 Hiftoiy of the New Teftament, and ufe the 
 Words Peter, Paul, John, we mean thofe three 
 Apoftles. 
 
 Note in the third Place, that any common Name 
 whatfoever is made proper, by Terms of Particu- 
 larity added to it, as the common Words Pope, 
 King, Horfe, Garden, Book, Knife, tic. are de- 
 fign'd to fignify a fmgular Idea, when we fay 
 3 the
 
 58 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 theprefent Pope ; the King of Great Britain ; the 
 Horfe that 'won the loft Plate at New-Market ; 
 the Royal Garden at Kenfmgton ; this Book ; that 
 Knife, &c, 
 
 S E C T. V. 
 
 Of concrete and abftraEl Terms. 
 
 IV. VT7 O R D S or Terms are divided into ab- 
 
 W ftraft and concrete. 
 
 Abftraft Terms fignify the Mode or Quality of a 
 Being, without any Regard to the Subject in which 
 it is , as Whitenefs, Roundnefs, Length, Breadth, 
 Wifdom, Mortality, Life, Death. 
 
 Concrete Terms, while they exprefs the Quali- 
 ty, do alfo either exprefs, or imply, or refer to 
 fome Subject to which it belongs ; as white, 
 round, long, broad, wife, mortal, living, dead. 
 But thefe are not always Noun Adjectives in a 
 grammatical Senfe ; for a Fool, a Knave, a Philo~ 
 fopher, and many other Concretes are Subftan- 
 tives, as well as Knavery, Folly, and Philofophy, 
 which are the abftrad: Terms that belong to 
 them. 
 
 SECT. VL 
 Of univocal and equivocal Words. 
 
 V. \T7 O RDS and Verms are either univocal or 
 VV equivocal. Univocal Words are fuch as 
 fignify but one Idea, or at leaft but one fort of 
 Thing , equivocal Words are fuch as fignify two 
 or more different Ideas, or different forts of Ob- 
 jects. The Words Book, Bible, Fijh, Houfe, Ele- 
 phant, may be called univocal Words } for I 
 
 know
 
 C. IV. S. 6. tte right Ufe of Rezfon: 59 
 
 know not that they fignify any thing elfe but 
 thofe Ideas to which they are generally affixt ; 
 but Head is an equivocal Word, for it fignifies 
 the Head of a Nail, or a Pin, as well as of an 
 Animal : Nail is an equivocal Word, it is ufed for 
 the Nail of the Hand or Foot, and for an iron 
 Nail to fatten any thing* Poft is equivocal, it 
 is a Piece of 'Timber ; or a fwift MeJJenger. A 
 Church is a religious AffemUy^ or the large fair 
 Building where they meet ; and fometimes the 
 fame Word means a Synod of Biftiops or of Pref- 
 byters, and in fome Places it is the Pope and a ge- 
 neral Council. 
 
 Here let it be noted, that when two or more 
 words fignify the fame Thing, as Wave and Bil*- 
 low, Mead and Meadow, they are ufiially called 
 Jynonymous Words: But it feems very ftrange, 
 that Words which are directly contrary to each 
 other, mould fometimes represent almoft the fame 
 Ideas -, yet thus it is in fome few Inftances ; a va- 
 luable, or an invaluable Blefflng ; a /baneful? or a 
 Jhamelefs Villain ; a thick Skull, or a thin Skull'd 
 Fellow, a mere Paper Skull-, a Man of a large 
 Confcience, little Confcience, or no Confcience ; a 
 famous Rafcal, or an infamous one : So uncertain a 
 Thing is human Language, whofe Foundation and 
 Support is Cuftom. 
 
 As Words fignifying the fame Thing are called 
 Jynonymous ; fo equivocal Words, or thofe which 
 fignify feveral Things, are called bomonymous> or 
 ambiguous ; and when Perfons ufe fuch ambiguous 
 Words, with a Defign to deceive, it is called 
 Equivocation. 
 
 Ourfimple Ideas, and efpecially the fenfible Qua - 
 lilies, furnim us with a great Variety of equivo- 
 cal or ambiguous Words ; for thefe being the firft, 
 and molt natural Ideas we have, we borrow fome 
 E of
 
 6o L O G I C Ki Or, Parti. 
 
 of their Names, to fignify many other Ideas, 
 both fimple and complex. The word Sweet ex- 
 prefles the pleafant Perceptions of almoft every 
 Senfe ; Sugar is fweet, but it hath not the fame 
 Sweetneis as Mufick -, nor hath Mufick the Sweet- 
 nefs of a Rofe ; and a fweet Profpeff differs from 
 them all : Nor yet have any of thefe the fame 
 Sweetnefs as Difewrfe, Council, or Meditation hath ; 
 yet the royal Pfalmift faith of a Man, We took 
 fweet Counfel together ; and of God, My Medita- 
 tion of him /hall be fweet. Bitter is alfo Juch an 
 equivocal Word ; there is bitter Wormwood, there 
 are bitter Words, there are bitter Enemies, and a 
 bitter cold Morning. So there is a Sharpnefs in 
 Vinegar, and there is a Sharpnefs in Pain, in Sor- 
 row, and in Reproach ; there is a fharp Eye, a 
 lharp Wit, and a fharp Sword : But there is not 
 one of thefe feven Sharpnejfes, the fame as ano- 
 ther of them, and a lharp Eaft Wind is different 
 from them all. 
 
 There are alfo Verbs, or Words of Action, 
 which are equivocal as well as Nouns or Names. 
 The words to bear, to take, to come, to get, are 
 fufficient Inftances of it ; as when we fay, to bear 
 a Burden, to bear Sorrow or Reproach, to bear a 
 Name, to bear a Grudge, to bear Fruit, or to bear 
 Children ; the Word bear is ufed in very different 
 Senfes. And fo is the word get, when we fay, 
 to get Money, to get in, to get off, to get ready ; 
 to get a Stomach, and to get a Cold, &c. 
 
 There is alfo a great deal of Ambiguity in 
 many of the EngUJh Particles, as, but, before, be- 
 fdf* with, ivithout, that, then, there, fsr, forth y 
 above, about, &c. of which Grammars and Dic- 
 tionaries will fufficiently inform us. 
 
 SECT.
 
 C. IV; S, 7. Me right Uje ^Rfcafon. 61 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 Various Kinds of equivocal Words* 
 
 IT would be endlefs to run through all the Va* 
 rieties of Words, and Terms, which have dif- 
 ferent Senfes applied to them , I mail only menti- 
 on therefore a few of the moft remarkable and 
 moft ufeful Diftinftiom among them. 
 
 i fc , The firft Divifton of equivocal Words 
 lets us know that fome are equivocal only in their 
 Sound or Pronunciation ; others are equivocal only 
 in Writing ; and others, both in Writing, and in 
 Sound. 
 
 Words equivocal in Sound only, are fuch ad 
 thefe ; the Rein of a Bridtej which hath the fame 
 Sound with the Reign of a King or a Shower of 
 Rain, but all three have different Letters, and 
 diftincl: Spelling, So Might, or Strength, is equi* 
 vocal in Sound, but differs in Writing from Mite^ 
 a little Animal, or a fmall piece of Money. And 
 the Verb to write, has the fame Sound with 
 Wright a Workman, Right or Equity, and Rite 
 or Ceremony , but it is fpelled very differently 
 from them all. 
 
 Words equivocal in Writing only, are fuch as 
 thefe -, to tear in Pieces, has the fame Spelling 
 with a Tear : To lead, or guide, has the fame 
 Letters as Lead the Metal : And a Bowl for Re* 
 creation is written the fame Way as a Bowl for 1 
 drinking, but the Pronunciation of all thefe is 
 different. 
 
 But thofe Words which are moft commonly 
 
 and juftly call'd equivocal, are fuch as are both 
 
 written and pronounced the fame way, and yec 
 
 have different Senfes or Ideas belonging to them j 
 
 E 2 fuch
 
 62 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 fuch are all the Inftances which were given in the 
 preceding Section. 
 
 Among the Words which are equivocal in 
 Sound only, and not in Writing, there is a large 
 Field for Perfons who delight in Jefts and Puns, 
 in Riddles and Quibbles, tofport themfelves. This 
 fort of Words is alfo ufed by wanton Perfons, to 
 convey lewd Ideas, under the Covert of Exprefflons 
 capable of a chafte Meaning, which are called 
 double Entendres-, or when Perfons fpeak Falf- 
 bood with a defign to deceive, under the Covert 
 of 'Truth. Tho' it muft be confeft, that all forts of 
 equivocal Words yield fufficient Matter for fuch 
 Purpofes. 
 
 There are many Cafes alfo, wherein an equivo- 
 cal Word is ufed for the fake of Decency to cover 
 a. foul Idea, : For the moft chafte and modeft, and 
 well-bred Perfons, having fometimes a Necefiity 
 to fpeak of the Things of Nature, convey their 
 Ideas in the moft inoffenfive Language by this 
 Means. And indeed, the mere Poverty of all 
 Languages makes it neceflkry to unequivocal Words 
 upon many Occafions, as the common Writings of 
 Men, and even the holy Book of God fufficiently 
 manifeft. 
 
 2 dl y, Equivocal Words are ufually diftinguifh- 
 ed, according to their Original, into fuch, whole 
 various Senfes arife from mere Chance or Accident, 
 and fuch as are made equivocal by Defign -, as the 
 Word Bear fignifies a Jhaggy Beafl, and it figni- 
 fies alfo to bear or carry a Burden , this feems to 
 be the mere Effect of Chance: But if I call my 
 Dog, Bear, becaufe he is fhaggy, or call one of 
 the Northern Conflellations by that Name, from a 
 fancied Situation of the Stars in the Shape of that 
 Animal, then it is by Defign that the Word is 
 made yet farther equivocal. 
 
 3 But
 
 CIV. 8.7. ?KrigfoVfiof&i&n: 63 
 
 But becaufe 1 think this common Account of 
 the Spring or Origin of equivocal Words is too 
 flight and imperfect, I mall referve this Subjeft 
 to be treated of by itfelf, and proceed to the third 
 Divifion. 
 
 3 dl y, Ambiguous or equivocal Words, are 
 fuch, as are fometimes taken in a large and general 
 Senfe, and fometimes in a Senfe more ftrift and 
 limited^ and have different Ideas affixed to them 
 accordingly. Religion or Virtue, taken in a large 
 Senfe, includes both our Duty to God and our 
 Neighbour ; but in a more ftridl, limited, and pro- 
 per Senfe, Virtue fignifies our Duty towards Men, 
 and Religion our Duty to God. Virtue may yet be 
 taken in the ftricteft Senfe, and then it fignifies 
 Power or Courage, which is the Senfe of it infome 
 Places of a new Teftament. So Grace, taken 
 in a large Senfe means the Favour of God, and all 
 the fpiritual Blefiings that proceed from it (which 
 is a frequent Senfe of it in the Bible) but in a 
 limited Senfe it fignifies the Habit of Holinefs 
 wrought in us by Divine Favour, or a complex 
 Idea of the Chriftian Virtues. It may be alfo ta- 
 ken in the ftricteft Senfe ; and thus it fignifies any 
 Jingle Chriftian Virtue, as in 2 Cor. viii. o, 7. where 
 it is ufed for Liberality. So a City, in a ftrict and 
 proper Senfe, means the Houfes inclofed within the 
 Walls -, in a larger Senfe it reaches to all the 
 Suburbs. 
 
 This larger and Jlritfer Senfe of a Word is ufed 
 in almoft all the Sciences, as well as in Theolo- 
 gy, and in common Life. The Word Geography, 
 taken in a ftriff Senfe, fignifies the Knowledge of 
 the Circles of the earthly Globe, and the Situati- 
 on of the various parts of the Earth -, when it is 
 taken in a little larger Senfe, it includes the Know- 
 ledge of the Seas alfo ; and in the largejt Senfe of 
 3 all
 
 $4 LOGICK: Or Part I. 
 
 all, it extends to the various Cuftoms, Habits, 
 and Governments of Nations. When an Aftro- 
 nomer ufes the Word Star in its proper and ftriffc 
 Senfe, it is applied only to the fixed Stars, but in 
 a large Senfe it includes the Planets alfo. 
 
 This equivocal Senfe of Words belongs alfo to 
 many proper Names : So Afia taken in the largeft 
 Senfe is one quarter of the World ; in a more li- 
 mited Senfe it fignifies Natalia, or the lefler /tfia ; 
 but in the ftricteft Senfe it means no more than 
 one little Province of Natalia, where ftood the Ci- 
 ties of Ephejus, Smyrna, Sardis, &c. and this 
 is the moft frequent Senfe of it in the New Tefta- 
 ment. Flanders and Holland, in a drift Senfe, 
 are but two fingle Provinces among the feventeen, 
 but in a large Senfe Holland includes feven of 
 $hem, and Flanders ten. 
 
 There are alfo fome very common and little 
 "Words in all Languages, that are us'd in a more 
 extenjive or more limited Senfe ; fuch as all, every, 
 whofoever, &c. When the Apoftle fays, all Men 
 Ipave finned, and all Men muft die, all is taken in 
 its moft univerfal and extenfive Senfe, including 
 ell Mankind, Rom. v. j2. When he appoints 
 Prayer to be made for all Men, it appears by the 
 following Verfes, that he reftrains the Word all 
 (o fignify chiefly all Ranks and Degrees of Men, 
 j Tim. ii. i. But when St. Paul fays, I pleafe all 
 Men in all things, i Cor. x. 33. the Word all is 
 exceedingly limited, for it reaches no farther than 
 that he plealed all thole Men whom be converfed 
 with, in all things that were lawful. 
 
 4 thl y, Equivocal Words are in the fourth Place 
 diftinguifti'd by their literal or Figurative Senfe. 
 Words are ufed in a proper or literal Senfe, when 
 they are defign'd to fignify thofe Ideas for which, 
 were originally made, or to which they are 
 
 primarily
 
 CIV. 8.7. TherightUfeofRztfQTi. 65 
 
 primarily and generally annexed ; but they are 
 ufed in a figurative or tropical Senfe, when they 
 are made to fignify fome things, which only 
 bear either a Reference or a Refemblancs to the pri- 
 mary Ideas of them. So when two Princes con- 
 tend by their Armies, we fay they are at War in 
 a proper Senfe , but when we fay there is a War 
 betwixt the Winds and the Waves in a Storm, 
 this is called Figurative, and the peculiar Figure 
 is a Metaphor. So when the Scripture fays, Riches 
 make themfelves Wings, and fly away as an Eagle 
 toward Heaven, the Wings and the Flight of the 
 Eagle are proper Exprefiions ; but when Flight 
 and Wings are applied to Riches, it is only by 
 Way of Figure and Metaphor. So when Man is 
 faid to repent, or laugh or grieve, it is literally 
 taken , but when God is faid to be grieved, to re- 
 pent, or laugh, &c. thefe are all figurative Ex- 
 preflions, borrowed from a Refemblance to Man- 
 kind. And when the Words Job or Efther are 
 ufed to fignify thofe very Perfons, it is the literal 
 Senfe of chem ; but when they fignify thole two 
 Books of Scripture, this is a figurative Senfe. 
 The Names of Horace, Juvenal, and Milton, are 
 ufed in the fame manner, either for Books or 
 Men. 
 
 When a Word, which originally fignifies any 
 particular Idea or Object, is attributed to feveral 
 other Objects, not fo much by way of Refem- 
 blance, but rather on the Account of fome evi- 
 dent Reference or Relation to the original Idea, 
 this is fometimes peculiarly called an analogical 
 Word , fo a found or healthy Pulfe ; a found DzV 
 geftion , found Sleep, are all fo called, with Reference 
 to a found and healthy Conftitution ; but if you 
 fpeak of found Doctrine, or found Speech, this 
 js by way of Refemblance to Health, and the 
 E 4 Word*
 
 66 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 Words are metaphorical: Yet many times Ana- 
 logy and Metaphor are ufed promifcuoufly in the 
 fame Senfe, and not diftinguifh'd. 
 
 Here note, That the Defign of metaphorical 
 Language and Figures of Speech is not merely to 
 reprefent our Ideas, but to reprefent them with 
 Vivacity, Spirit, Affeftion, and Power ; and 
 tho* they often make a deeper Impreflion on the 
 Mind of the Hearer, yet they do as often lead 
 him into a Miftake, if they are ufed at improper 
 Times and Places. Therefore, where the Defign 
 of the Speaker or Writer is merely to explain, to 
 inflrucJ, and to lead into the Knowledge of naked 
 Truth, he ought, for the mod part, to ufe plain 
 and proper Words, if the Language affords them, 
 and not to deal much in figurative Speech. But 
 this fort of Terms is ufed very profitably by Poets 
 and Orators, whofe Bufmefs is to move, and per- 
 fuade, and work on the Paffions, as well as on the 
 Underftanding. Figures are alfo happily employ- 
 ed in proverbial moral Sayings by the wifeft and 
 the beft of Men, to imprefs them deeper on the 
 Memory by fenfible Images -, and they are often 
 ufed for other valuable Purpofes in the facred 
 Writings. 
 
 5 ch 'y, I might adjoin another fort of equivocal' 
 Words -, as there are fome which have a different 
 Meaning in common Language, from what they 
 have in the Sciences , the Word PaJJion fignifies 
 the receiving any Aftion in a large philofophical 
 Senfe -, in a more limited philofophical Senfe, it 
 fignifies any of the Affeftions of human Nature, as. 
 Love, Fear, joy, Sorrow, sV. But the common 
 People confine it only to Anger. So the Word 
 Simple philofophically fignifies Single, but vulgar- 
 ly it is ufed for Foolift.
 
 C. IV. S. 8 . -The right Ufe of Reafon; 67 
 
 6 th1 /, Other equivocal Words are us'd fome- 
 times in an abfolute Senfe, as when God is called 
 perfett^ which allows of no Defect j and fome- 
 times in a comparative Senfe, as good Men are 
 oftentimes call'd, perfett in Scripture, in Compa- 
 rifon of thofe Who are much inferior to them in 
 Knowledge or Holinefs : But I have dwelt rather 
 too Jong upon this Subject already, therefore I 
 add no more, 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 The Origin or Caufes of equivocal Words. 
 
 NO W, that we may become more skilful in 
 guarding ourfelves I and others againft the 
 Dangers of Miftake which may arife from equivo- 
 cal Words, it may not be amifs to conclude this 
 Chapter with a fhort Account of the various 
 Ways or Means whereby a Word changes its Sig- 
 nification, or acquires any new Senfe, and thus 
 becomes equivocal, efpecially if it keeps its old 
 Senfe alfo. 
 
 1. Mere Chance fometimes gives the fame Word 
 different Senfes , as the Word Light fignifies a 
 Body that is not heavy \ and it alfb fignifies the 
 JLffcR ofSun-BeamSy or the Medium whereby we 
 fee Objefts : This is merely accidental, for there 
 feems to be no Connection between thefe two 
 Senfes, nor any Reafon for them. 
 
 2. Error and Miftake is another Occafion of 
 giving various Senfes to the fame Word ; as when 
 different Perfons read the Names of Prieft, Bi- 
 Jbop, Church, Eafter, &c. in the New Teftament, 
 they affix different Ideas to them, for want of 
 Acquaintance with the true Meaning of the fa- 
 cred Vfriter , tho' it muft be confefs'd, thefe va- 
 rious
 
 68 LOGICK:Or, Parti. 
 
 rious Scnfes, which might arife at firft from ho- 
 neft Miftake may be culpably fupported and pro- 
 pagated by Inter eft, Ambition , Prejudice, and a 
 Parly-Spirit on any Side 
 
 3. Time and Cuftom alters the Meaning of 
 Words. Knave heretofore fignified a diligent Ser- 
 vant (Gnavus ;) and a Gillian was a meaner 'Tenant 
 to the Lord of the Manor (Villicus , ) but now both 
 thefe Words carry an Idea of Wickednefs and 
 Reproach to them. A Ballad once fignified a fo- 
 lemn and facred Song, as well as one that is tri- 
 vial, when Solomon's Song was called the Ballad of 
 Ballads , but now it is applied to nothing but 
 trifling Verfe, or comical Subjects. 
 
 4. Words change their Senfe by Figures and 
 Metaphors, which are deriv'd from fome real A- 
 walogy or Refemblance between feveral things -, as 
 when Wings and Flight are applied to Riches, it 
 fignifies only, that the Owner may as eafily lofe 
 them, as he would lofe a Bird who flew away with 
 Wings. 
 
 And I think, under this Head, we may rank 
 thofe Words, which fignify different Ideas, by a 
 fort of an unaccountable far-fetcht Analogy p , or di- 
 ftant Refemblance, that Fancy has introduced be- 
 tween one thing and another , as when we fay, 
 the Meat is green when it is balf-roafted : We fpeak 
 of airing Linen by the Fire, when we mean drying 
 or warming it : We call for round Coals for the 
 Chimney, when we mean large fquare ones : And 
 we talk of the Wing of a Rabbit, when we mean 
 the Foreleg : The true Reafon of thefe Appella- 
 tions we leave to the Criticks. 
 
 5. Words alfo change their Senfe by the fpecial 
 Occafion of ufing them, the peculiar manner of 
 Pronunciation, the Sound of the Voice, the Motion 
 tf the Face, or Geflures of the Body j fo when an 
 
 angry
 
 C. IV. S. 8. ?bf Right UJe of Reafon. 69 
 
 angry Mafter fays to his Servant, it is bravely 
 done or you are a fine Gentleman , he means juft 
 the contrary ; namely, it is very ill done ; you are 
 aforry Fellow: It is one way of giving a fevere 
 Reproach, for the Words are fpoken by way of 
 Sarcafm or Irony. 
 
 6. Words are applied to various Senfes, by new 
 Ideas appearing or arifing fafter than new Words 
 are framed. So when Gun-Powder was found out, 
 the Word Powder, which before fignified only 
 "Duft, was made then to fignify that Mixture or 
 Compofition of Nitre, Charcoal, &c. and the Name 
 Canon, which before fignified a Law or a Rule, 
 is now alfo given to a great Gun, which gives 
 Laws to Nations. So Footboys, who had free- 
 quently the common Name of Jack given them, 
 were kept to turn the Spit, or to pull off their 
 Mailer's Boots ; but when Instruments were in- 
 vented for both thofe Services, they were both 
 call'd Jacks, tho* one was of Iron, the other of 
 Wood, and very different in their Form. 
 
 7. Words alter their Significations according to 
 the Ideas of the various Perfons, Seels, or Parties 
 who ufe them, as we have hinted before ; fb when 
 a Papifl ufes the Word Hereticks he generally means 
 the Protejlants *, when a Proteflant ufes the Word 
 he means any Perfons who were wilfully (and per- 
 haps contentioufly) obftinate in fundamental Errors. 
 When a Jew fpeaks of the true Religion, he means 
 the Institutions of Mofe-s , when a Turk mentions 
 it he intends the Doftrine of Mahomet -, but when 
 a Chriftian makes uie of it, he defigns to fignify 
 Chriflianity, or the Truths and Precepts of the 
 GofpeL 
 
 8. Words have different Significations accord- 
 ing to the Book, Writing, or Difcourje in which 
 they ftand. So in a Treatife of Anatomy, a Foot 
 
 fignifies
 
 ?o LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 fignifies that Member in the Body of Man: But in 
 a Book of Geometry or Menfuration it fignifies 
 twelve Inches. 
 
 If I had Room to exemplify moft of thefe Par- 
 ticulars in one fmgle Word, I know not where 
 to chufe a fitter than the Word Sound, which 
 feems (as it were) by Chance, to fignify three dif- 
 tinct Ideas, (viz.) Healthy, (from Sanus) as a 
 found Body ; Noife (from Sonus) as &/hrill Sound ; 
 and to found the Sea (perhaps from the French 
 Sonde, a Probe, or an Inftrument to find the Depth 
 of Water.) From thefe three, which I may call 
 original Senfes, various derivative Senfes arife , as 
 found Sleep, found Lungs, found Wind and Limb, 
 a found Heart, a found Mind, found Dottrinc, a 
 found Divine, found Reafon, a found Cask, Sound 
 Timber, a found Reproof, to beat one foundly, to 
 found one's Meaning or Inclination, and a found 
 or narrow Sea, turn thefe all into Latin, and the 
 Variety will appear plain. 
 
 I confefs, fome few of thefe which I have men- 
 tion'd as the different Springs of equivocal Words, 
 may be reduced in fome Cafes to the lame Origi- 
 nal : But it muft alfo be granted, that there may 
 be other Ways befides thefe whereby a Word 
 comes to extend its Signification, to include va- 
 rious Ideas, and become equivocal. And tho* it 
 is the Bufinefs of a Grammarian to purfue thefe 
 Remarks with more Variety and Particularity, 
 yet it is alfo the Work of a Logician to give No- 
 tice of thefe Things, left Darknefs, Confufion, 
 and Perplexity be brought into our Conceptions 
 by the Means of Words, and thence our Judg- 
 ments and Reafonings become erroneous. 
 
 CHAP,
 
 C. V. life right Ufe o/'Reafon. 7 1 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 General Directions relating to our Ideas. 
 
 yourfelves with a rich Variety 
 
 of our Ideas -, acquaint yourfelves with 
 things ancient and modern ; things natural, civil 
 and religious ; things domeftick and national ; 
 things of your native Land, and of foreign Coun- 
 tries ; things prefent, paft and future ; and above 
 all, be well acquainted with God and yourfelves ; 
 learn animal Nature, and the Workings of your 
 own Spirits. 
 
 Such a general Acquaintance with things will 
 be of very great Advantage. 
 
 The frft Benefit of it is this ; it will aflift the 
 Ufe of Reafon in all its following Operations ; it 
 will teach you to judge of things aright , to argue 
 juftly, and to methodife your Thoughts with Accu- 
 racy. When you mail find feveral things a-kin to 
 each other, and feveral different from each other, 
 agreeing in fome Part of their Idea, and difagree- 
 ing in other Parts, you will range your Ideas in 
 better order, you will be more eafily led into a 
 diftinct Knowledge of things, and will obtain a 
 rich Store of proper Thoughts and Arguments 
 upon all Occafions. 
 
 You will tell me perhaps that you defign the 
 Study of the Law or Divnity ; and what Good 
 can natural Philcfophy or Mathematicks do you, or 
 any other Science, not directly fubordinate to 
 your chief Defign? But let it be confider'd, that 
 all Sciences have a fort of mutual Connection ; and 
 Knowledge of all Kinds fits the Mind to reafon. 
 and judge better concerning any particular Sub- 
 
 ject.
 
 78 LOG ICK: Or Part I 
 
 ject. I have known a Judge upon the Bench be- 
 tray his Ignorance, and appear a little confufed in 
 his Sentiments about a Cafe of fufpected Murder 
 brought before him for want of fome Acquain- 
 tance with animal Nature and Philofophy. 
 
 Another Benefit of it is this ; fuch a large and 
 general Acquaintance with things will fecure you 
 itQm perpetual Admirations and Surprifes, and guard 
 you againft that Weaknefs of ignorant Perfons* 
 who have never feen any thing beyond the Con- 
 fines of their own Dwelling, and therefore they 
 wonder at almoft every thing they fee ; every 
 thing beyond the fmoke of their own Chimney, 
 and the Reach of their own Windows, is new and 
 ftrange to them. 
 
 A third Benefit of fuch an univerfal Acquaintance 
 with things, is this ; it will keep you from being 
 too pofitive and dogmatical, from an Excefs of 
 Credulity and Unbelief, i. e. a Readinefs to believe* 
 or to deny every thing at firft hearing ; when 
 you ihall have often feen, that ftrange and uncom- 
 mon things, which often feemed incredible, are 
 found to be true ; and things very commonly re- 
 ceiv'd have been found falfe. 
 
 The Way of attaining fuch an extenfive Treafure 
 of Ideas, is, with Diligence to apply yourfelf to 
 read the beft Books ; converfe with the moft 
 knowing and the wifeft of Men, and endeavour 
 to improve by every Perfon in whofe Company 
 you are , fufter no Hour to pafs away in a lazy 
 Idlenefs, an impertinent Chattering or ufelefs 
 Trifles : Vifit other Cities and Countries when 
 you have feen your own, under the Care of one 
 who can teach you to profit by .Travelling, and 
 to make wife Obfervations ; indulge a juft Curio- 
 fity in feeing the Wonders of Art and Nature ; 
 fearch into things yourfelves, as well as learn, 
 2 them
 
 0. V. Ike right Ufe of Reafon. 73 
 
 them from others ; be acquainted with Men as 
 well as Books ; learn all things as much as you 
 can at firft Hand , and let as many of your Ideas 
 as poflible be the Reprefentations of Things, and 
 not merely the Reprefentations of other Mens 
 Ideas: Thus your Soul, like fome noble Building, 
 (hall be richly furnifh'd with original Paintings, 
 and not with mere Copies. 
 
 Direct II. Ufe the moft proper Methods to retain 
 that Treafure of Ideas which you have acquired ; for 
 the Mind is ready to let many of them flip, unlefs 
 fome Pains and Labour be taken to fix them upon 
 the Memory. 
 
 And more efpecially let thofe Ideas be laid up 
 and preferv'd with the greateft Care, which are 
 moft directly fuited, either to your eternal Wel- 
 fare as a Chriftian, or to your particular Station 
 and Profe/ion in this Life; for tho* the former 
 Rule recommends an univerfal Acquaintance with 
 Things, yet it is but a more general and fuperfi- 
 cial Knowledge that is required or expected of 
 any Man, in Things which are utterly foreign to 
 his own Bufmefs ; but it is neceflary you mould 
 have a more particular and accurate Acquaintance 
 with thofe things that refer to your peculiar Pro- 
 vince and Duty in this Life, or your Happinels 
 in another. 
 
 There are fome Perfons who never arrive at any 
 deep, folid, or valuable Knowledge in any Sci- 
 ence or any Bufmefs of Life, becaufe they are 
 perpetually fluttering over the Surface of Things 
 in a curious and wandring Search of infinite Va- 
 riety i ever hearing, reading, or afking after 
 fomething new, but impatient of any Labour to 
 ky up and preferve the Ideas they have gained : 
 Their Souls may be compar'd to a Looking-Glafs, 
 
 that
 
 7 4 LOGICK: Or, Part 1 
 
 that wherefoever you turn it, it receives the Images 
 of all Objects, but retains none. 
 
 In order to preferve your Treafure of Ideas and 
 the Knowledge you have gain'd, purfue thefe Ad- 
 vices, efpecially in your younger Years. 
 
 1. Recolleff every Day the things you havefeen, 
 or heard, or read, which may have made any Ad- 
 dition to your Underftanding : Read the Writings 
 of God and Men with Diligence and perpetual 
 Reviews : Be not fond of haftning to a new Book, 
 or a new Chapter, till you have well fix'd and 
 eftablifh'd in your Minds what was ufeful in the 
 laft : Make ufe of your Memory in this manner, 
 and you will fenfibly experience a gradual Im- 
 provement of it, while you take Care not to load 
 it to excefs. 
 
 2. 'Talk over the things which you have feen, 
 heard or learnt with fome proper Acquaintance ; this 
 will make a frefh Impreffion upon your Memory , 
 and if you have no fellow Student at hand, none 
 of equal Rank with yourfelves, tell it over to any 
 of your Acquaintance, where you can do it with 
 Propriety and Decency ; and whether they learn 
 any thing by it or no, your own Repetition of 
 it will be an Improvement to yourfelf : And this 
 Practice alfo will furnim you with a Variety of 
 Words and copious Language, to exprefs your 
 Thoughts upon all Occafions. 
 
 3. Commit to writing fome of the moft con- 
 fiderable Improvements which you daily make, at 
 leaft fuch Hints as may recall them again to your 
 Mind, when perhaps they are vanifh'd and loft. 
 And here I think Mr. Locke's Method of Adver- 
 faria or common Places, which he defcribes in the 
 End of the firft Volume of his pojlhumous Works , 
 is the beft , ufmg no learned Method at all, fet- 
 ting down things as they occur, leaving a dif- 
 
 tinft
 
 C. V. The right Ufe o/'Reafon. 75 
 
 tinct Page for each Subject, and making an Index 
 to the Pages. 
 
 At the End of every Week, or Month, or 
 Year you may review your Remarks for thefe 
 Reafons : Firft, to judge of your own Improve- 
 ment, when you mall find that many of your 
 younger Collections are either weak and trifling ; 
 or if they are juft and propej, yet they are 
 grown now fo familiar to you, that you will 
 thereby fee your own Advancement in Know- 
 ledge. And in the next Place what Remarks 
 you find there worthy of your riper Obfervation, 
 you may note them with a marginal Star, inftead 
 of tranf bribing them, as being worthy of your 
 fecond Year's Review, when the others are ne- 
 glected 
 
 To fhorten fomething of this Labour, if the 
 Books which you read are your own, mark with 
 a Pen, or Pencil, the moft confiderable Things 
 in them which you defire to remember. Thus 
 you may read that Book the fecond Time over 
 with half the Trouble, by your Eye running 
 over the Paragraphs which your Pencil has 
 noted. It is but a very weak Objection againft 
 this Practice to fay, I Jhall fpoil my Book ; for I 
 perfuade myfelf that you did not buy it as a 
 Eookfeller to fell it again for Gain, but as a 
 Scholar to improve your Mind by it , and if the 
 Mind be improved, your Advantage is abundant, 
 though your Book yields lefs Money to your Exe- 
 cutors. 
 
 Ntte, This Advice tf Writing, Marking, and Renewing your Marks, re- 
 fers chiefly to thofe occajsonal Notions you meet with either in Readirgor 
 In Converfation : But when you are d'.rcftly and profe/edly purlumg any Sub- 
 ject of Knowledge in a good Syftena in your youi^er Years. The Sjjitm it 
 felf is your common Place-Book, and muft be entirely reviewed. The fame 
 may be faid concerning any Treatije which elofely^ fureiaclly and accurate 1 
 hahiks any paitkjular Theme. 
 
 F Direft
 
 76 L O G 1 C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 Direct. III. As you proceed both in Learning and 
 in Life, make a wife Obfervation what are the Ideas, 
 what the Difcourfes and the Parts of Knowledge that 
 have been more or lefs ufeful to yourfelf or others. 
 In our younger Years, while we are furnifhing 
 our Minds with a Treafure of Ideas, our Experi- 
 ence is but fmall, and our Judgment weak ; it is 
 therefore impoffible at that Age to determine aright 
 concerning the real Advantage and Ufefulnefs of 
 many things we learn. But when Age and Expe- 
 rience have matured your Judgment, then you will 
 gradually drop the more ufelefs fart of your 
 younger Furniture, and be more follicitous to re- 
 tain that which is moft necefTary for your Wel- 
 fare in this Life* or a better. Hereby you will 
 come to make the fame Complaint that almoft 
 every learned Man has done after long Experi- 
 ence in Study, and in the Affairs of human Life 
 and Religion -, Alas ! bow many Hours, and Days, 
 and Months, have I loft in purfuing feme Parts of 
 Learning, and in reading feme Authors, which have 
 turned to no other Account but to inform me, that 
 they were not worth my Labour and Purfuit ! Hap- 
 py the Man who has a wife Tutor to conduct him 
 through all the fciences in the firft Years of his 
 Study , and who has a prudent Friend always at 
 Hand to point out to him from Experience how 
 much of every Science is worth his Purfuit ! And 
 happy the Student that is fo wife as to follow fuch 
 Advice ! 
 
 Direct. IV. Learn to acquire a Government over 
 your Ideas and your Thoughts, that -.they may come 
 when they are called, and depart when they are bid- 
 den. There are fome Thoughts that rile and in- 
 trude upon us while we Ihun them j there are 
 
 others
 
 C. V. The right fye 0/Reafon. ^7 
 
 others that fly from us, when we would hold and 
 fix them. 
 
 If the Ideas which you would willingly make 
 the Matter of your prefent Meditation are ready 
 to fly from you, you muft be obftinate in the Pur- 
 fuit of them by an Habit of fixed Meditation ; 
 you muft keep your Soul to the Work, when it 
 is ready to ftart afide every Moment, unlefs you 
 will abandon yourfelf to be a Slave to every 
 wild Imagination. It is a common, but it is an 
 unhappy and a fhameful thing, that every Trifle 
 that comes acrofs the Senfes or Fancy fhould divert 
 us, that a buzzing Fly fhould teize our Spirits, and 
 fcatter our beft Ideas : But we muft learn to be 
 deaf and regardlefs of other things, befides 'ti^at 
 which we make the prefent Subject of our Me- 
 ditation : And in order to help a wandering and 
 fickle Humour, it is ufeful to have a Book or Pa- 
 per in our Hands, which has fome proper Hints 
 of the SubjecT: that we defign to purfue. We 
 muft be refolute and laborious, and fometimes 
 conflict with ourfelves if we would be wife and 
 learned. 
 
 Yet I would not be too fevere in this Rule : It 
 muft be confefled there are Seafons when the Mind, 
 or rather the Brain is overtir'd or jaded with Study 
 or Thinking ; or upon fome other Accounts ani- 
 mal Nature may be languid or cloudy ', and unfit to 
 aflift the Spirit in Meditation ; at fuch Seafons (pro- 
 vided that they return not too often) it is better 
 fometimes to yield to the prefent Indifpofition ; 
 for if Nature intirely refift, nothing can be done 
 to the Purpofe, at leaft in that Subject or Sci- 
 ence. Then you may think it proper to give 
 yourfelf up to fome Hours of Leifure and Recrea- 
 tion^ or ufeful Idlenefs ; or if not, then turn your 
 Thoughts to fome other alluring Subjects, and pore 
 F 2 no
 
 7? L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 no longer upon thefrjl, till fome brighter or more 
 favourable Moments arife. A Student fliall do 
 more in one Hour, when all things concur to in- 
 vite him to any fpecial Study, than in four Hours, 
 at a ^dull and improper Seafon. 
 
 I would alfb give the fame Advice, if fome vain, 
 or worthlefs, or foolijh Idea will crowd itfelf into 
 your Thoughts , and if you find that all your La- 
 bour and Wreftling cannot defend yourfelf from 
 it, then divert the Importunity of that which of- 
 fends you by turning your Thoughts to fome enter- 
 taining Subject, that may amufe a little and draw 
 you offfrom the troublefome and impofing Gueft ; 
 and many a Time alfo in fuch a Cafe, when the 
 impertinent and intruding Ideas would divert from 
 p**ient Duty, Devotion and Prayer have been very 
 fuccefsfuj tp overcome fuch obftinate Troublers of 
 the Peace and Profit of the Soul. 
 
 If the. natural Genius and Temper be too vola- 
 tile^ fickle and wattdring, fuch Perfons ought in a 
 moreefpecial manner to apply themfelves to mathe- 
 matical Learning^ and to begin their Studies with 
 Anthmetick and Geometry ; wherein new Truths, 
 continually arifing to the Mind out of the plaineft 
 and eafieft Principles, will allure the Thoughts 
 with incredible Pleafure in the Purfuit : This will 
 give the Student fuch a delightful Tafte of Reafon- 
 ing, as will fix his Attention to the fmgle Subject 
 which he purfues, and by Degrees will cure the 
 habitual Levity of his Spirit : But let him not in- 
 dulge and purfue thefe fo far, as to neglect the 
 prime Studies of his defign'd Profeflion. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 C.VI. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Special Rules to direft our Conceptions of Things. 
 
 A Great Part of what has been already writ- 
 ten is defign'd to lay a Foundation for 
 thofe Rules , which may guide and regulate our 
 Conceptions of things ; this is our main Bufinefs 
 and Defign in the fir/I part of Logick. Now if we 
 can but direct our Thoughts to a juft and happy 
 Manner in forming our Ideas of things, the other 
 Operations of the Mind will not fo eafily be per- 
 verted , becaufe moft of our Errors in Judgment* 
 and the Weaknefs, Fallacy and Miftake of our 
 Argumentation proceed from the Darknefs, Con- 
 fufion, Defect, or fome other Irregularity in our 
 Conceptions. 
 
 The Rules to afiift and direct our Conceptions 
 are thefe. 
 
 j. Conceive of things dearly and diftinftly in 
 
 their own Natures. 
 2. Conceive of things compkatly in all their 
 
 Paris. 
 3 . Conceive of things comprehenfwely in all their 
 
 Properties and Relations. 
 4. Conceive of things extenfively in all their 
 
 Kinds. 
 $. Conceive of things orderly, or in a proper 
 
 Method. 
 
 SECT.
 
 8a L G I C K: Or, Part I, 
 
 $*,* " ' * cr V" -...- 
 
 SECT. I. 
 O/" gaining clear and diftinfi Ideas. 
 
 TH E firft Rule is this, Seek after a clear and. 
 diftinffi Conception of things as they are in their 
 own Nature? and do not content your felves with ob- 
 fcure and confufed Ideas, where clearer are to be at- 
 tairfd. 
 
 There are fome things indeed whereof diftinft 
 Ideas are fcarce attainable, they feem to furpafs 
 the Capacity of the Underftanding in our pre- 
 fent State ; fuch are the Notion? of Eternal? Im- 
 menfe? Infinite? whether this Infinity be applied to 
 Number? as an infinite Multitude ; to Quantity? as 
 infinite Length, Breadth ; to Powers and Perfec- 
 tions? as Strength, Wifdom, or Goodnefs infi- 
 nite, &c. Tho' Mathematicians in their way 
 demonftrate ieveral things in the Doctrine of 
 Infinites? yet there are ftill fome infolvable Diffi- 
 culties that attend the Ideas of Infinity? when it 
 is applied to Mind or Body , and while it is in 
 Reality but an Idea ever growing? we cannot have 
 ib clear and diftincl a Conception of it as to fe- 
 cure us from Miftakes in fome of our Reafonings 
 about it. 
 
 There are many other things that belong to 
 the material World, wherein the fharpeft Philo- 
 fophers have never yet arrived at clear and diftincl: 
 Ideas, fuch as the particular Shape? Situation? 
 Contexture? Motion ofthcfmall Particles of Minerals? 
 Metals? Plants? &V. whereby their very Natures 
 and EfTences are diftinguifhed from each other. 
 Nor have we either Senfes or Inftruments fuf- 
 ficicntly nice and accurate to find them out. 
 There are other things in the World of Spirits 
 
 wherein
 
 C.VI. S. i. 
 
 wherein our Ideas are very dark and confufed, 
 fuch as their Union with animal Nature, the way 
 of their atting on material Beings, and their Cow- 
 verfe with each other. And tho* it is a laudable 
 Ambition to fearch what may be known of thefe 
 Matters, yet it is a vaft Hindrance to the Enrich- 
 ment of our Underftandings, if we fpend too 
 much of our Time and Pains among Infinites and 
 Unfearchables, and thofe things for the Invefti- 
 gation whereof we are not furnifhed with proper 
 Faculties in the prefent State. It is therefore of 
 great Service to the true Improvement of the 
 Mind to diftinguifh well between KnowaHes and 
 Unknowable;. 
 
 As far as things are knowable by us, it is of 
 excellent Ufe to accuftom our felves to clear and di- 
 ftintt Ideas. Now among many other Occafions 
 of the Darknefs and Miftakes of our Minds, there 
 are thefe two things which moft remarkably bring 
 Confufion into our Ideas. 
 
 1. That from our Infancy we have had the Ideas 
 of things fo far connected with the Ideas of Words, 
 that we often miftake Words for things, we min- 
 gle and confound one with the other. 
 
 2. From our youngeft Years we have been ever 
 ready to confider things not fo much in their own 
 Natures, as in their various Refpefls to ourfehes, 
 and chiefly to our Senfes ; and we have alfo join'd 
 and mingled the Ideas of fame things, with many 
 other Ideas, to which they are not akin in their 
 own Natures. 
 
 In order therefore to a clear and diftinft Know- 
 ledge of things, we muft uncloath them of all 
 thefe Relations and Mixtures, that we may con- 
 template them naked, and in their own Natures 5 
 and diftinguifh the Subject that we have in View 
 from all other Subjects whatfoever : Now to per- 
 F 4 form
 
 ga LOGICK: Or Part I. 
 
 form this well, we muft here confider the 'Defini- 
 tion of Words, and the Definition oftthigs. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 Of the Definition of Words or Names. 
 
 IF we could conceive of Things as Angels and 
 unbodied Spirits do, without involving them 
 in thofe Clouds which Words and Language throw 
 upon them, we fhould feldom be in Danger of 
 fuch Miftakes as are perpetually committed by us 
 in the prefent State ; and indeed it would be of 
 unknown Advantage to us to accuftom ourfelves 
 to form Ideas of 'Things iznthout Words , that we might 
 know them in their own proper Natures. But fince 
 we muft ufe Words, both to learn and to com- 
 municate moft of our Notions, we fhould do it 
 with juft Rules of Caution. I have already de- 
 clar'd in part, how often and by what Means our 
 Words become the Occafions of Errors in our 
 Conceptions of Things. To remedy fuch Incon- 
 veniencies, we muft get an exact Definition of the 
 Words we make ufe of, i. e. we muft determine 
 precifely the Senfe of our Words, which is call'd 
 the Definition of the Name. 
 
 Now a Definition of the Name being only a 
 Declaration in what Senfe the Word is ufed, or 
 what Idea or Object we mean by it, this may be 
 exprefs'd by any one or more of the Properties, 
 Effects or Circumftances of that Object which 
 do furficiently diftinguifh it from other Objects : 
 As if I were to tell what I mean by the Word 
 Air* 1 might fay it is that thin Matter which we 
 lpreatlo in and breath out continually ; or it is that 
 fluid Body in which the Birds fly a little above the 
 garth \ p.r it is that invifible Matter which fills all
 
 
 C. VI. S. 2. fbe Right UJe e/'Reafon. 83 
 
 Places near the Earth, or which immediately encom- 
 paffes the Globe of Earth and Water. So if I would 
 tell what I mean by Light, I would fay, it is that 
 Medium whereby we fee the Colours and Shapes of 
 Things \ or it is that which diftinguijhes the Day from 
 the Night. If I were ask'd what I mean by Reli- 
 gion^ I would anfwer, it is a Collection of all our 
 Duties to God) if taken in a drift and limited Senfe ; 
 but if taken in a large Senfe, it is a Collection of all 
 our Duties loth to God and Man. Thefe are call'd 
 the Definitions of the Name. 
 
 Note, In defining the Name there is no Neceflity 
 that we mould be acquainted with the intimate Ef- 
 fence or Nature of the Thing 5 for any manner of 
 Defcription that will but fufficiently acquaint an- 
 other Perfon what we mean by fuch a Word, is a 
 fufficient Definition for the Name. And on this Ac- 
 count, zfynonymous Word, or a mere Negation of 
 the contrary, a translation of the Wora into another 
 Tongue, or a grammatical Explication of it, is 
 fometimes fufficient for this Purpofe; as if one 
 would know what I mean by a Sphere, I tell him 
 it is a Globe , if he ask what is a triangle, it is 
 that which has three Angles ; or an Oval is that which 
 has the Shape of an Egg. Dark is that which has 
 no Light -, Afthma is a Difficulty of Breathing -, a 
 Diaphoretick Medicine, or a Sudorifick, is fome- 
 thing that will provoke Sweating ; and an Infolvent 
 is a Man that cannot pay his Debts. 
 
 Since it is the Defign of Logick, not only to af- 
 fift us in Learning but in 'Teaching alfo, it is necef- 
 fary that we mould be furnifh'd with fome parti- 
 cular Directions relating to the Definitions of Names, 
 both in Teaching and Learning.
 
 84 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Directions concerning the Definition of Names. 
 
 Direct. IT"T AVE a Care of making ufe of mere 
 JL JL Words, infteadof Ideas, i. e. fuch 
 Words as have no Meaning, no Definition be- 
 longing to them : Do not always imagine that 
 there are Ideas wberefoever there are Names -, for 
 tho* Mankind hath fo many Millions of Ideas 
 more than they have Names, yet fo foolifh and 
 lavifh are we, that too often we ufe fome Words 
 in mere Wafte, and have no Ideas for them ; or 
 at leaft, our Ideas are fo exceedingly mattered 
 and confufed, broken and blended, various and 
 uniettled, that they can fignify nothing toward 
 the Improvement of the Underftanding. You 
 will find a great deal of Reafon for this Remark, 
 if you read the Popijb School-men or the myflick 
 Divines. 
 
 Never reft fatisfied therefore with mere Words 
 which have no Ideas belonging to them, or at leaft 
 m fettled and determinate Ideas. Deal not in fuch 
 empty Ware, whether you are a Learner or a 
 Teacher -, for hereby fome Perfons have made 
 themfelves rkh in Words, and learned in their 
 own Efteem ; whereas in reality their Under- 
 ftandings have been poor and they knew m> 
 thing. 
 
 Let me give for inftance fome of thofe Wri- 
 ters or Talkers who deal much in the Words Na- 
 ture * Fate, Luck, Chance-, Perfection, Power, Life, 
 Fortune, Inftintf, &V. and that even in the moft 
 calm and inftrudive Parts of their Difcourfe ; 
 though neither they themfelves nor their Hearers 
 have any fettled Meaning under thofe Words ; 
 
 and
 
 CVI.S.3- TberightUfeofRetfon: 85 
 
 and thus they build up their Reafonings, and In- 
 fer what they pleafe, with an Ambition of the 
 Name of Learning or of fublime Elevations in 
 Religion , whereas in truth, they do but amufe 
 themfelves and their Admirers with fwelling 
 Words of Vanity, understanding neither what they 
 fay, nor whereof they affirm. But this fort of 
 Talk was reproved of old by the two chief 
 Apoftles St. Peter and St. Paul, i Tim. i. 7. and 
 2 Pet.\\. 1 8. 
 
 When Pretenders to Philofophy or good Senfe 
 grow fond of this fort of Learning, they dazzle 
 and confound their weaker Hearers, but fall under 
 the Neglect of the Wife. The Epicureans are 
 guilty of this Fault, when they afcribe the For- 
 mation of this World to Chance: The Arifto- 
 telians, when they fay, Nature abhors a Vacuum : 
 The Stoics when they talk of Fate, which is 
 fuperior to the Gods : And the Gamefters when 
 they curfe their Ill-Luck, or hope for the Favours 
 of Fortune. Whereas, if they would tell us, that 
 by the Word Nature they mean the Properties of 
 any Being, or the Order of things eftablijhed at the 
 Creation , that by the Word Fate they intend the 
 Decrees of God, or the necejjary Connexion and In- 
 fluence offecond Caufes and EffecJs ; if by the Word 
 Luck or Chance they fignify the absolute Negation 
 of any determinate Caufe, or only their Ignorance of 
 any fuch Caufe, we mould know how to converfe 
 with them, and to aflent to, or difient from 
 their Opinions. But while they flutter in the 
 dark, and make a Noife with Words which have 
 no fixt Ideas, they talk to the Wind, and can 
 never profit. 
 
 I would make this Matter a little plainer ftill 
 by Inftances borrowed from the Peripatetick Phi- 
 Jofophy, which was taught once in all the 
 
 Schools.
 
 86 LOGICK:Or; Part L 
 
 Schools. The Profeflbr fancies he has afiign'd the 
 true Reafon, why all heavy Bodies tend downward, 
 why Amber will draw Feathers or Straws? and the 
 Load/lone draw Iron? when he tells you, that this 
 is done by certain gravitating and attractive Qua- 
 lities, which proceed from the fubftantial Forms of 
 thole various Bodies. He imagines that he has 
 explained why the Load/tone's * North Pole? Jhatt 
 repel the North End of a magnetick Needle? and at- 
 tract the South? when he affirms, that this is done 
 by its Sympathy? with one End of it, and its An- 
 tipathy againft the other End. Whereas in truth, 
 all thefe Names of Sympathy? Antipathy? fubjtan- 
 tid Forms and Qualities? when they are put for the 
 Caufes of thefe Effe&s in Bodies, are but hard 
 "Words, which only exprefs a learned and pom- 
 pous Ignorance of the true Caufe of natural Ap- 
 pearances ; and in this Senfe they are mere Words 
 without Ideas. 
 
 This will evidently appear, if one ask me, why 
 e concave Mirrour or convex Glafs will burn Wood 
 in the Sun-Beams or why a Wedge will cleave 
 it? And I mould tell him, it is by an uftorious 
 Quality in the Mirrour or Glafs, and by a cleaving 
 Power in the Wedge, arifing from a certain un- 
 known fubftantial Form in them, whence they 
 derive thefe Qualities ; or if he mould ask me 
 why a Clock Jlrikes? and points to the Hour? and I 
 ihould fay, it is by an indicating Form zndfonorijic 
 S^uality ? whereas I ought to tell him how the 
 Sun-Beams are collected and united by a burning 
 Glafs ? whence the mechanical Force of a Wedge 
 is deriv'd , and what are the Wheels and Springy 
 
 * Noft, Some Writers call that the Ssutb-Pole of a Loadftone which at- 
 trafts the South-End of the Needle ; but I chufe to follow thofe who call, it 
 tfee Kwtb-Pole. 
 
 5 [the
 
 C. VI. S. 3. The rlgU Ufe of Reafon.' 87 
 
 the Pointer and Hammer, and Bell, whereby a 
 Clock gives notice of the Time, both to the Eye 
 and the Ear, But thefe uflorious and cleaving 
 Powers, fanorous and indicating Forms and Qualities^ 
 do either teach the Enquirer nothing at all but 
 what he knew before, or they are mere Words with- 
 out Ideas *. 
 
 And there is many a Man in the vulgar and 
 in the learned World, who imagines himfelf 
 deeply skilled in the Controverfies of Divinity^ 
 whereas he has only furnifhed himfelf with a 
 Parcel of fcholajtick or myftick Words, under fome 
 of which the Authors themfelves had no juft Ideas; 
 and the Learner when he hears, or pronounces 
 them, hath fcarce any Ideas at all. Such fort of 
 Words fometimes have become Matters of im- 
 mortal Contention, as though the Gofpel could 
 not ftand without them ; and yet the Zealot per- 
 haps knows little more of them than he does of 
 Shibboleth, or Higgaion, Selab. Judges xii. 6. Pfal. 
 ix. 1 6. 
 
 Yet here I would lay down this Caution, that 
 there are feveral Objefts of which we have not a 
 clear and diftinct Idea, much lefs an adequate or 
 comprehenfive one, and ,yet we cannot call the 
 Names of thefe things Words without Ideas ; 
 
 * It may be djeffal here, And what does the modern Pbilofopher, 
 " with all his detail of mathematical Numbers and Diagrams, do more 
 " than this toward the Solution of thefe Difficulties ? Does he not defcrifae 
 " Gravity by a certain unknown Force, tvbert&y Bodies tend downward to the 
 " Center ? Hath he found the certain and mechanical Reafons of Ait raflion, 
 tf Magnetifm, &c.? " I Anfwer, That the Moderns have found a thoufeni 
 things by applying Mathematicks to natural Philofophy, which the Anci- 
 ents were ignorant of; and when they ufe any Names of this Kind, -uix 
 Gravitation, Attraffion, &c. they ufe them only to fignify, that there are 
 fuch ErFedsand fuch Caufes, with a f equent Confeflion of their Ignorance 
 of the true Springs of them : They dj not pretend to make tbefe fftrds 
 ftand for the real Caufes of things, as tho' they thereby affign'd th true 
 philofophical Solution of thefe Difficulties ; 'for in this Senfe they will frill 
 fee Wordt<witlKKtUnt t whether in the Mouth of an old PhUofopher or a 
 
 fuch
 
 88 LOG I CK: Or, Parti. 
 
 fuch are the Infinity and Eternity of God himfelf, 
 the Union of our own Soul and Body, the Union of 
 the divine and human Natures in Jefus Chrift, the 
 Operation of the holy Spirit on the Mind of Man, 
 &V. Thefe ought not to be called Words with- 
 out Ideas, for there is fufficient Evidence for the 
 Reality and Certainty of the Exiftence of their 
 Objects, tho' there is fome Confufion in our clear- 
 eft Conceptions of them ; and our Ideas of them, 
 tho' imperfect, are yet fufficient to converfe about 
 them, fo far as we have Need, and to determine 
 fo much as is neceffary for our own Faith and 
 Practice. 
 
 Direct. II. Do not fuppofe that the Natures or 
 EJfences of things always differ from one another, 
 as much as their Names do. There are various 
 Purpofes in human Life, for which we put very 
 different Names on the fame thing, or on things, 
 whofe Natures are near akin , and thereby often- 
 times, by making a new nominal Species, we are 
 ready to deceive ourfelves with the Idea of another 
 real Species of Beings : And thofe whofe Under- 
 {landings are led away by the mere Sound of 
 Words, fancy the Nature of thofe things to be very 
 different whofe Names are fo, and judge of them 
 accordingly. 
 
 I may borrow a remarkable Inftance for my 
 Purpofe almoft out of every Garden, which con- 
 tains a Variety of Plants in it. Moft or all Plants 
 agree in this, that they have a Root, a Stalk, 
 Leaves, Buds, BloJJbms and Seeds : But the Gar- 
 diner ranges them under very different Names, as 
 tho' they were really different Kinds of Beings, 
 merely becaufe of the different Ufe and Service to 
 which they are applied by Men : As for Inftance, 
 
 thofe
 
 C.VI.S.3- 
 
 thofe Plants whofe Roots are eaten mall appro- 
 priate the Name of Roots to themfelves -, fuch are 
 Carrots, Turnips, Radi/hes, &V. If the Leaves are 
 of chief ufe to us, then we call them Herbs *, as 
 Sage, Mint, 'Thyme : If the Leaves are eaten raw 
 they are termed Sdlad ; as Lettuce, Pur/lain : If 
 boiled, they become Pot-herbs , as Spiwge, Cole- 
 worts -, and fome of thofe fame Plants, which are 
 Pot-herbs in one Family, are Sallad in another. 
 If the Buds are made our Food, they are called 
 Heads, or 'Tops ; fo Cabbage Heads, Heads of Af- 
 paragus and Artichoaks. If the BloJ/bm be of moft 
 Importance, we call it a Flower -, fuch are Dai- 
 fies, Tulips and Carnations, which are the mere 
 BlofToms of thofe Plants. If the Hu/k or Seeds 
 are eaten, they are call'd the Fruits of the Ground* 
 as Peafe, Beans, Strawberries, &c. If any Part 
 of the Plant be of known and common Ufe to us 
 in Medicine, we call it a phyfical Herb, as Carduus, 
 Scurvy-grafs -, but if we count no part ufeful, we 
 call it a Weed, and throw it out of the Garden ; 
 and yet perhaps our next Neighbour knows fome 
 valuable Property and ufe of it , he plants it in 
 his Garden, and gives it the Title of an Herb or 
 a Flvwer. You fee here how fmall is the real Di- 
 ftinction of thefe feveral Plants, confider'd in 
 their general Nature as the leffer Vegetables : yet 
 what very different Ideas we vulgarly form con- 
 cerning them, and make different Species of them, 
 chiefly becaufe of the different Names given 
 them. 
 
 Now when things are fet in this clear Light, 
 it appears how ridiculous it would be for two 
 Perfons to contend, whether Dandelion be a Herb, 
 or a Weed ; whether it be a Pot-herb or Sallad ; 
 when by the Cuftom or Fancy of different Fami- 
 lies, this one Plant obtains all thefe Names, ac- 
 3 cording
 
 90 LOGICK: Or, Parti. 
 
 cording^ to the feveral Ufes of it, and the Value 
 that is put upon it. 
 
 Note* here, that I find no manner of Fault with 
 the Variety of Names which are given to feveral 
 Plants, according to the various Ufes we make of 
 them. But I would not have our Judgments im- 
 pofed upon hereby, to think that thefe mere no- 
 minal Species, viz. Herbs, Sallad and Weeds be- 
 come three really different Species of Beings, on 
 this Account, that they have different Names and 
 Ufes. But I proceed to other Inftances. 
 
 It has been the Cuftom of Mankind, when 
 they have been angry with any thing, to add a 
 new ill Name to it, that they may convey there- 
 by a hateful Idea of it, tho* the Nature of the 
 thing ftill abides the fame v So the Papifts call the 
 Proteftants Hereticks : A prophane Perfon calls a 
 Man of Piety a Precifian : And in the Times 
 of the Civil War in the laft Century, the Royalifts 
 call'd the Parliamentarians, Fanaticks, Roundheads 
 and Sectaries: And they in requital call'd the 
 Royalifts, Malignant* : But the Partizans on each 
 fide were really neither better nor worfe for thefe 
 Names. 
 
 It has alfo been a frequent Practice on the 
 other Hand, to put new favourable Names upon ill 
 Ideas, on purpofe to take off the Odium of them. 
 But notwithftanding all thefe flattering Names 
 and Titles, a Man of profiife Generofity is but a 
 Spendthrift , a natural Son is a Baftard ftill ; a Gal- 
 lant is an Adulterer, and a Lady of Pleafure is a 
 Whore. 
 
 DirecT:. III. Take heed of believing the Nature 
 and EJfence of two or more things to be certainly the 
 fame, becaufe they may have the fame Name given 
 them. This has been an unhappy and fatal Occa- 
 
 fion
 
 C. VI. S. 3 . 7& right Ufe ^Reafon; <l 
 
 fion of a thoufand Miftakes in the natural, in the 
 civil, and in the religious Affairs of Life, both a- 
 mongfl the Vulgar and the Learned. I mall give 
 two or three Inftances, chiefly in the Matters of 
 Natural Philofophy, having hinted feveral Dangers 
 of this Kind, relating to theology in the foregoing 
 Difcourfe concerning Equivocal Words. 
 
 Our elder Philofophers have generally made ufe 
 of the Word SOUL to fignify that Principle where- 
 by a Plant grows, and they called it the vegetative 
 Soul : The Principle of the animal Motion of a 
 Brute has been likewife call'd a Soul, and we have 
 been taught to name it the fenfitive Soul : They 
 have alfo given the Name Soul, to that fuperior 
 Principle in Man, whereby he thinks, judges, rea- 
 fons, &ff . and tho' they diftinguifh'd this by the 
 honourable Title of the rational Soul, yet in com- 
 mon Difcourfe and Writing we leave out the Words 
 vegetative, fenfitive and rational ; and make the 
 Word Soul ferve for all thefe Principles : Thence 
 we are led early into this Imagination, that there is 
 a fort of fpiritual Being in Plants and in Brutes, 
 like that in Men. Whereas if we did but abftract 
 and feparate thefe Things from Words, and com- 
 pare the Caufe of Growth in a Plant, with the 
 Caufe of Reafoning in Man (without the Word 
 Soul) we mail never think that thefe two Princi- 
 ples were at all like one another ; nor mould we 
 perhaps fo eafily and peremptorily conclude, that 
 Brutes need an intelligent Mind to perform their 
 animal Actions. 
 
 Another Inftance may be the Word L i F E, 
 which being attributed to Plants, to Brutes, and 
 to Men, and in each of them afcribed to the Soul 9 
 has very eafily betrayed us from our Infancy into 
 this Miftake, that the Spirit, or Mind, or think- 
 ing Principle, in Man, is the Spring of vegetative 
 G and
 
 $2 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 an animal life to bis Body : Whereas it is evident, 
 that if the Spirit or thinking Principle of Man 
 gave Life to his animal Nature, the Way to 
 fave Men from dying would not be to ufe Medi- 
 cines, but to perfuade the Spirit to abide in the 
 Body. 
 
 I might derive a third Inftance from the Word 
 HEAT ; which is ufed to fignify the Senfation 
 we have when we are near the Fire, as well as the 
 Caufe of that Senfation which is in the Fire itfelf ; 
 and thence we conclude from our Infancy, that 
 there is a fort of Heat in the Fire refembling our own 
 Senfation, or the Heat which we feel : Whereas in 
 the Fire there is nothing but little Particles of 
 Matter, of fuch particular Shapes, Sizes, Situa- 
 tions and Motions as are fitted to imprefs fuch 
 Motions on our Flefh or Nerves as excite the 
 Senfe of Heat. Now if this Caufe of our Senfa- 
 tion in the Fire had been always called by a di- 
 ftinct Name, perhaps we had not been fo rooted 
 in this Miftake, that the Fire is hot with the fame 
 fort of Heat that we feel. This will appear with 
 more Evidence, when we confider that we are 
 fecure from the fame Miftake where there have 
 been two different Names allotted to our Senfation, 
 and to the Caufe of it ; as, we do not fay, Pain is 
 in the Fire that burns us, or in the Knife that cuts 
 and wounds us ; for we call it burning in the Ftre 9 
 cutting in the Knife, and Pain only, when it is in 
 cur fehes. 
 
 Numerous Inftances of this Kind might be de- 
 riv'd from the Words fweet, four, loud, Jhrill, and 
 almoft all the fenfible Qualities, whofe real Natures 
 we miftake from our very Infancy, and we arc 
 ready to fuppofe them to be the fame in us, and in 
 the Bodies that caufe them -, partly, becaufe the 
 Words which fignify our own Seniations, are ap- 
 plied
 
 C. VI. S. 3. <fbt right life /Reafon: 93 
 
 plied alfo to fignify thofe unknown Shapes and 
 Motions of the little Corpufcles which excite and 
 caufe thofe Senfations. 
 
 Direfb. IV. In Corner fation or Reading be dili^ 
 gent to find out the true Senfe, or diftinff Idea, 
 winch the Speaker or Writer affixes to his Words ; 
 and efpecially to thofe Words which are the chief 
 Subjeft of his Difcourfe. As far as poffible take 
 heed, left you put more or fewer Ideas into one 
 Word, than the Perfon did when he wrote or 
 fpoke , and endeavour that your Ideas of every 
 Word may be the fame as his were : Then you 
 will judge better of what he fpeaks or writes. 
 
 It is for want of this that Men quarrel in the 
 dark ; and that there are fo many Contentions in 
 the feveral Sciences, and efpecially in Divinity 
 Multitudes of them arife from a Miftake of the 
 true Senfe or compleat Meaning, in which Words 
 are ufed by the Writer or Speaker , and hereby 
 fometimes/^^w to agree ^ when they really differ 
 in their Sentiments i and fometimes theyfeem to dif* 
 fer when they really agree. Let me give an Inftance 
 of both* 
 
 When one Man by the Word Church, (hall 
 underftand all that believe in Chrift ; and another 
 by the Word Church means only the Church of 
 Rome , they may both aflent to this Propofiti- 
 on, There is no Salvation out of the Church, and 
 yet their inward Sentiments may be widely diffe- 
 rent. 
 
 Again, ' one Writer mall affirm that Virtue 
 added to faith is fufficient to make a Chriftian, and 
 another mail as zealoufly deny this Proportion, 
 they feem to differ widely in Words, and yet 
 perhaps they may both really agree ia Sentiment : 
 G a ff
 
 94 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 If by the Word Virtue, the Affirmer intends our 
 whole Duty to God and Man -, and the Denier by 
 the Word Virtue means only Courage, or at moft 
 our Duty toward our Neighbour, without includ- 
 ing in the Idea of it the Duty which we owe to 
 God. 
 
 Many fuch fort of Contentions as thefe are, if 
 traced to their Original, will be found to be mere 
 Logomachies, or Strifes and Quarrels about Names 
 and Words, and vain J anglings, as the Apoftle 
 calls them in his firft Letter of Advice to 77- 
 mothy. 
 
 In order therefore to attain clear and diftinff 
 Ideas of what we read or hear, we muft fearch 
 the Senfe of Words ; we muft confider what is 
 their Original and Derivation in our own or fo- 
 reign Languages , what is their common Senfe 
 amongft Mankind, or in other Authors, efpecial- 
 ly fuch as wrote in the fame Country, in the fame 
 Age, about the fame Time, and upon the fame 
 Subjects : We muft confider in what Senfe the 
 fame Author ufes any particular Word or Phrafe, 
 and that when he is difcourfing on the fame Mat- 
 ter, and efpecially about the fame Parts or Para- 
 graphs of his Writing : We muft confider whe- 
 ther the Word be ufed in a ftricl: and limited, or 
 -in a large and general Senfe , whether in a literal, 
 in a figurative, or in a prophetick Senfe , whe- 
 ther it has any fecondary Idea annext to it befides 
 the primary or chief Senfe. We muft enquire 
 farther, what is the Scope and Defign of the 
 Writer , and what is the Connection of that Sen- 
 tence with thofe that go before it, and thofe which 
 follow it. By thefe and other Methods we are to 
 fearch out the Definition of Names, \. e. the true 
 Senfe and Meaning in which any Author or Speaker 
 ufes any Word, which may be the chief Subject 
 3 ^
 
 C. VI. S. 3." <fbe right Ufe o/'Reafon; 95 
 of Difcourfe, ( or may carry any confiderable Im- 
 portance in it. 
 
 Direct. V. When we communicate our Notions to 
 others, merely with a Dsfign to inform and improve 
 their Knowledge ; let us in the Beginning of our Dif- 
 courfe take care to adjuft the Definition of Names 
 where foever there is need of it, that is, to determine 
 plainly what we mean by the chief Words which 
 are the Subject of our Difcourfe -, and be fure always 
 to keep the fame Ideas, whensoever we ufe the Jame 
 Words, unlefs we give due Notice of the Change. 
 This will have a very large and happy Influence, in 
 fecuring not only others but our felves too from 
 Confufion and Miftake ; for even Writers and 
 Speakers themfelves, for want of due Watchful- 
 nefs, are ready to affix different Ideas to their own- 
 Words, in different Parts of their Difcourfes, and 
 hereby bring Perplexity into their own Reafonings, 
 and confound their Hearers. 
 
 It is by an obfervation of this Rule, that Ma- 
 thematicians have fo happily fecured themfelves, 
 and the Sciences which they have profeft, from 
 Wrangling and Controverfy j becaufe whenfoever 
 in the Progrefs of their Treatifes they have Oc- 
 cafion to ufe a new and unknown Word, they al- 
 ways define it, and tell in what Senfe they mail 
 take it ; and in many of their Writings you find 
 a heap of Definitions at the very beginning. Now 
 if the Writers of Natural Philofophy and Morality 
 had ufed the fame Accuracy and Care, they had 
 effectually fecluded a Multitude of noify and fruit- 
 lefs Debates out of their feveral Provinces : Nor 
 had that facred Theme of Divinity been perplex- 
 ed with fo many intricate Difputes, nor the Church 
 o.f Cbrift been torn to pieces by fo many Sects 
 an4 padions, if the Words Grace* Faith, Right e- 
 G 3 wfafi,
 
 96 L G I C K : Or, Part I, 
 
 oufnefs, Repentance, Juftification, Worjhip, Church-, 
 Bijhop, Prejbyter, &c. had been well defined, and 
 their Significations adjufted, as near as poflible, by 
 the Ufe of thofe Words in the new Teftament , or 
 at leaft, if every Writer had told us at firft in 
 what Senfe he would ufe thofe Words. 
 
 Direct. VI. In your own Studies, as well as in 
 the Communication of your Thoughts to others, mere- 
 ly for their Information, avoid ambiguous and equi- 
 vocal Terms as much as poffible. Do not ufe fuch 
 Words as have two or three Definitions of the 
 Name belonging to them, i. e. fuch Words as 
 have two or three Senfes , where there is any 
 Danger of Miftake. Where your chief Bufmefs 
 is to inform the Judgment, and to explain a Mat- 
 ter, rather than to perfuade or affect, be not fond 
 of expreffing your felves in figurative Language, 
 when there are any proper Words that fignify the 
 fame Idea in their literal Senfe. It is the Ambi- 
 guity of Names, as we have often faid, that brings 
 almoft infinite Confufion into our Conceptions of 
 Things. 
 
 But where there is a neceffity of ufmg an ambigu- 
 ous Word, there let double Care be ufed in defining 
 that Word, and declaring in what Senfe you take 
 it. And be fure to fuffer no ambiguous Word ever 
 to come into your Definitions. 
 
 Direct. VII. In communicating your Notions, ufe 
 every Word as near as pojjible in the fame Senfe in 
 wbich Mankind commonly ufes it ; or wbicb Writers 
 that have gone before you have ufually ajfixt to it, 
 tip on Condition that it is free from [Ambiguity. Tho* 
 Names are in their Original merely arbitrary, yet 
 we fhould always keep to the eftablilh'd Meaning; 
 pf them, unlefs great Neceflity require the Al- 
 teration ,
 
 C VI. S, 3. 72* right Ufe gf Reafon. 97 
 
 teration ; for when any Word has been ufed to 
 fignify an Idea, that old Idea will recur in the 
 Mind when the Word is heard or read, rather 
 than any new Idea which we may fatten to it. 
 And this is one Reafon why the received Defini- 
 tion of Names fhould be changed as little as poffi- 
 ble. 
 
 But I add farther, that tho' a Word entirely 
 new, introduced into a Language, may be affixed 
 to what Idea you pleafe, yet an old Word ought 
 never to be fixt to an unaccuftomed Idea, without 
 juft and evident Neceflity, or without prefent or 
 previous Notice, left we introduce thereby a Li- 
 cenfe for all manner of pernicious Equivocations 
 and Pal/hoods ; as for Inftance, when an idle Boy 
 who has not feen his Book all the Morning fhall tell 
 his Mafter that he has learnt his Leffon^ he can ne- 
 ver excufe himfelf by faying, that by the Word 
 Leffon he meant his Ereakfaft^ and by the Word 
 learn he meant eating ; furely this would be con- 
 ftrued a downright Lye, and his fancied Wit would 
 hardly procure his Pardon. 
 
 In ufmg an ambiguous Word which has been 
 ufed in different Senfes, we may chufe what we 
 think the moft proper Senfe, as I have done -p. 86. 
 in naming the Poles of the Load/lone, North or 
 South. 
 
 And when a Word has been ufed in two or three 
 Senfes, and has made a great Inroad for Error up- 
 on that Account, it is of good Service to drop one 
 or two of thofe Senfes, and leave it only one re- 
 maining, and affix the other Senfes or Ideas to o- 
 ther Words. So the modern Philofophers, when 
 they treat of the human Soul, they call it the Mind 
 or Mens bumana, and leave the Word Anima or 
 Soul to fignify the Principle of Life and Motion in 
 mere animal Beings. 
 
 G 4 The
 
 98 L G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 The Poet Juvenal has long ago given us a hint 
 of this Accuracy and Diftindtion when he fays of 
 Brutes and Men, 
 
 Indulfit mundi communis Conditor illis 
 Tantum Animas ; nobis Animum quoque. 
 
 Sat. xvi. v. 134. 
 
 Exception. There is one Cafe wherein fome of 
 thefe laft Rules concerning the Definition of Words 
 may be in fome meafure difpenfed with ; and that 
 is, when ftrong and rooted Prejudice hath efta- 
 blifh'd fome favourite Word or Phrafe, and long 
 ufed it to exprefs fome miftaken Notion, or to 
 unite fome inconfiftent Ideas ; for then it is fome- 
 times much eafier to lead the World into Truth by 
 indulging their Fondnefs for a Phrafe, and by af- 
 figning and applying new Ideas and Notions to their 
 Favourite Word ; and this is much fafer alfo than 
 to awaken all their Pafllons by rejecting both their 
 old Words, and Phrafes, and Notions, and intro- 
 ducing all new at once : Therefore we continue to 
 lay, There is Heat in the Fire, there is Coldnefs in 
 Ice, rather ,than invent new Words to exprefs the 
 Powers which are in Fire or Ice, to excite the 
 Senfations of Heat or Cold in us. For the fame Reafon 
 fome Words and Phrafes which are lefs proper 
 may be continued in Theology, while People are led 
 into clearer Ideas with much more Eafe and Suc- 
 cefs, than if an Attempt were made to change all 
 their beloved Forms of Speech. 
 
 In other Cafes thefe logical Directions mould ge- 
 nerally be obferved, and different Names affixt to 
 different Ideas. 
 
 Here I cannot but take Occafion to remark, 
 that it is a considerable Advantage to any Lan- 
 guage to have a Variety of new Words introduced 
 
 into
 
 C. VI. S. 3 ~. *fhe ngU Ufe 0/"Reafon7 g 
 
 into it, that when in Courfe of Time new Objeffs 
 and new Ideas arife, there may be new Words and 
 Names affign'd to them : And alfo where one fin- 
 gle Name has fuftain'd two or three Ideas in Time 
 paft, thefe new Words may remove the Ambigu- 
 ity by being affixt to fome of thofe Ideas. This 
 Practice would by degrees take away part of the 
 Uncertainty of Language. And for this Reafon I 
 cannot but congratulate our Engli/h tongue, that it 
 has been abundantly enrich'd with the Tranflation 
 of Words from all our neighbour Nations, as well 
 as from antient Languages, and thefe Words have 
 been as it were enfranchifed amongft us ; for French* 
 Latin, Greek and German Names will fignify En- 
 glijh Ideas, as well as Words that are antiently and 
 intirely Englijh. 
 
 It may not be amifs to mention in this Place, 
 that as the Determination of the particular Senfe 
 in which any Word is ufed is called the Definition 
 of the Name, fo the Enumeration of the various 
 Senfes of any equivocal Word is fometimes calPd 
 the Divifion or Diftinftion of the Name ; and for 
 this Purpofe good Dictionaries are of excellent 
 Ufe. 
 
 This Diftinffion of the Name or Word is greatly 
 necefiary in Argumentation or Difpute ; when a 
 fallacious Argument is ufed, he that anfwers it di- 
 ftinguifhes the feveral Senfes of fome Word or 
 Phrafe in it, and mews in what Senfe it is true and 
 in what Senfe it is as evidently /#//. 
 
 SECT.
 
 100 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of the Definition of things. 
 
 AS there is much Confufion introduced into 
 our Ideas, by the Means of thofe Words 
 to which they are affixed ; fo the mingling our Ideas 
 with each other without Caution, is a farther Oc- 
 cafion whereby they become confufed. A Court 
 Lady, born and bred up amongft Pomp and Equi- 
 page, and the vain Notions of Birth and Quality, 
 conftantly joins and mixes all thefe with the Idea 
 of her felf, and fhe imagines thefe to be effential 
 to her Nature, and as it were necejjary to her Being ; 
 thence fhe is tempted to look upon menial Servants, 
 and the loweft Rank of Mankind, as another 
 Species of Beings quite diftincl: from her felf. A 
 Plough Boy that has never travelled beyond his 
 own Village, and has feen nothing but thatctfd 
 Houfes and his PariJh-Church, is naturally led to 
 imagine that 'Thatch belongs to the very Nature 
 of a Houfe, and that that muft be a Church which 
 is built of Stone, and efpecially if it has a Spire up- 
 on it. A Child whofe Uncle has been excefiive 
 fond, and his Schoolm after very fevere, 'eafily be- 
 lieves that Fondnefs always belongs to Uncles, and 
 that Severity is effential to Maflers or Inftruffors. 
 He has feen alfo Soldier* with red Coats, or Mi- 
 nifters with long Hack Gowns, and therefore he 
 perfuades himfelf that thefe Garbs are eflential to 
 the Characters, and that he is/ not a Minijlerwho 
 has not a long black Gown, nor can he be a Sol- 
 dier who is not drefled in red. It would be well 
 ifaU fuchMiftakes ended with Childhood. 
 
 It
 
 C. VI. S. 4. fbe right Ufe ofReafon. lot 
 
 It might be alfo fubjoined, that our complex 
 Ideas become confufed, not only by uniting orblen- 
 ding together more fimple or fingle Ideas than real- 
 ly belong to them, as in the Inftances juft men- 
 tion'd ; but Obfcurity and Confufion fometimes 
 come upon our Ideas alfo, for want of uniting a 
 fufficient Number of fingle Ideas to make the com- 
 plex one : So if I conceive of a Leopard only as a 
 fpotted Beaft, this does not diftinguifh it from a Ty^ 
 ger or a Lynx^ nor from many Dogs or Horfes* 
 which are fpotted too ; and therefore a Leopard 
 muft have fome more Ideas added to complete and 
 diftinguifh it. 
 
 I grant that it is a large and free Acquaintance 
 with the World, a watchful Obfervation and dili- 
 gent Search into the Nature of Things that muft 
 fully correct this kind of Errors: The Rules of Lo- 
 gick are not fufficient to do it : But yet the Rules of 
 Logick may inftruct us by what means to diftinguifh 
 one thing from another, and how to fearch and 
 mark out as far as may be the Contents and Limits 
 of the Nature of diftinct Beings, and thus may give 
 us great Affiftance towards the Remedy of thefe 
 Miftakes. 
 
 As the Definition of Names frees us from that 
 Confufion which Words introduce, fo the Defini- 
 tion of Things will in fome Meafure guard us a- 
 gainft that Confufion which mingled Ideas have 
 introduced : For as a Definition of the Name ex- 
 plains what any Word means, fo a Definition of 
 the Thing explains what is the Nature of that 
 thing. 
 
 In order to form a Definition of any thing 
 we muft put forth thefe three Acts of the 
 Mind. 
 
 i", Compare the thing to be defined with 
 things that are moftJike to itfelf, and fee 
 A wherein
 
 102 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 Wherein its Eflence or Nature agrees with them ; 
 and that is call'd the general Nature or Genus in a 
 Definition : So if you would define what Wine is, 
 firft compare it with other Things like itfelf, as 
 Cyder * Perry., fcfa. and you will find it agrees 
 effentially with them in this, that it is a. fort of 
 Juice. 
 
 2 dl y, Confider the moft remarkable and prima- 
 ry Attribute, Property, or Idea wherein this Thing 
 differs from thofe other Things that are moft like 
 it ; and that is its effential or fpecific Difference : 
 So Wine differs from Cyder and Perry , and all o- 
 ther Juices, in that it is prejfed from a Grape. This 
 may be called itsjpecial Nature, which diftinguifh- 
 es it from other Juices, 
 
 3 dl y, Join the general and fpecial Nature toge- 
 ther, or (which is all one) the Genus and the Diffe- 
 rence^ and thefe make up a Definition. So the Juice 
 of a Grape, or Juice pr eft from Grapes is theDeft- 
 nition of Wine. 
 
 So if I would define what Winter is, I confider 
 firft wherein it agrees with other Things which are 
 moft like it (viz.} Summer, Spring, Autumn, and 
 I find they are all Seafons of the Tear -, therefore a 
 Seafon of the Tear is the Genus. Then I obferve 
 wherein it differs from thefe, and that is in the 
 Jhortnefs of tie Days ; for it is this which does pri- 
 marily diftinguifh it from other Seafons ; therefore 
 this may be called its fpecial Nature or its Diffe- 
 rence. Then by joining thefe together I make a. 
 Definition. Winter is that Seafon of the Tear where- 
 in the Days are jhorteft. I confefs indeed this is 
 but a ruder Definition of it, for to define it as an ac- 
 curate Aftronomer I muft limit the Days, Hours 
 and Minutes. 
 
 After the fame manner if we would explain or 
 define what the Pifture of a Man is, we confider 
 
 firft
 
 C. VI. S. 4. he right Ufe /Reafon; 103 
 
 firft the Genus or general Nature of it, which is a 
 Reprefentation ; and herein it agrees with many o- 
 ther Things, as a Statue, a Shadow, a Print, a 
 verbal Defcription of a Man, &V. Then we con- 
 fider wherein it differs from thefe, and we find it 
 differs from a verbal Defcription in that it is a Re- 
 prefentation to the Eye and not to the Ear : It dif- 
 fers from a Statue in that it is a Reprefentation up- 
 on a flat Surface, and not in a folid Figure : It dif- 
 fers from a Shadow in that it is an abiding Repre- 
 fentation and not a fleeting one : It differs from a 
 Print or Draught, becaufe it reprefents the Colours 
 by Paint as well as the Shape of the Object by De- 
 lineation. Now fo many, or rather fofew of thefe 
 Ideas put together, as are juft fufficient to diftin- 
 guifh. a Picture from all other Representations* 
 make up its efiential Difference or its fpecial Na- 
 ture -, and all thefe are included in its being painted 
 on a plain Surface. Then join this to the Genus* 
 which is a Reprefentation -, and thus you have the 
 compleat Definition of the Picture of a Man, viz. 
 it is the Reprefentation of a Man in Paint upon a 
 Surface (or a Plane.) 
 
 Here it muft be obferved, that when we fpeak 
 of the Genus and Difference as compofing a De- 
 finition, it muft always be underftood that the near- 
 eft Genus and the fpecijick Difference are requi- 
 red. 
 
 The next general Nature or the neareft Genus 
 muft beufed in a Definition, becaufe it includes 
 all the reft ; as if I would define Wine, I muft 
 fay Wine is a Juice, which is the neareft Genus ; 
 and not fay, Wine is a Liquid, which is a re- 
 mote general Nature; or Wine is a Subftance, 
 which is yet more remote, for Juice includes 
 both Subfiance and Liquid. Befides, neither of 
 jthefe two remote general Natures would make 
 
 any
 
 *64 L O G 1C K: Or, Part t 
 
 any Diftin&ion betwixt Wine and a thoufand other 
 Sub/lances, or other Liquids, a remote Gems leaves 
 the thing too much undiftinguim'd. 
 
 Thefpecifick Difference is that primary Attribute 
 which diftinguifhes each Species from one another, 
 while they ftand ranked under the fame general Na- 
 ture or Genus. Tho' Wine differs from other Li- 
 quids in that it is the Juice of a certain Fruit, yet 
 this is but a general orgtnerick Difference, for it does 
 not diftinguifh Wine from Cyder or Perry j the Spe- 
 cifick Difference of Wine therefore is its Preffure 
 from the Grape, as Cyder is prefied from Apples, 
 and Perry from Pears t 
 
 In Definitions alfo we muft ufe the primary At- 
 tribute that diftinguifhes the Species or fpecial Na- 
 ture, and not attempt to define Wine by its parti- 
 cular Taftes, or EfFecls, or other Properties, 
 which are but fecondary or confequential, when its 
 Preffure from the Grape is the moft obvious and 
 primary Diftindtion of it from all other Juices. I 
 confefs in fome Cafes it is not fo eafily known 
 which is the primary Idea that diftinguifhes one 
 thing from another , and therefore fome would as 
 foon define Winter by the Coldnefs of the Seafon, as 
 by the Shortnefs of the Days ; though the Short- 
 nefs of the Days is doubtlefs the moft juft, primary 
 and philofophical Difference betwixt that and the 
 other Seafons of the Year, fmce Winter Days are 
 always Jhorteft, but not always the coldeft -, I add 
 alfo, that the Shortnefs of the Days is one Caufe of 
 the Coldnefs , but the Cold is no Caufe of their Short- 
 nefs. 
 
 SECT.
 
 C.VLS.5. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Rules of Definition of the thing. 
 
 TH E fpecial Rules of a good Definition are 
 thefe : 
 
 Rule I. A Definition muft be univerfal, or as fome 
 call it, adequate ; that is, it muft agree to all the 
 particular Species or Individuals that are included 
 under the fame Idea ; fo the Juice of a Grape a- 
 grees to all proper Wines, whether Red, White, 
 French, Spanijh, Florence, &c. 
 
 Rule II. It muft be proper and peculiar to the 
 Thing defined, and agree to that alone ; for it is the 
 very Defign of a Definition effe&ually to diftin- 
 guifh one thing from all others : So the Juice of a 
 Grape agrees to no other Subftance, to no other Li- 
 quid, to no other Being but Wine. 
 
 Thefe two Rules being obferved will always ren- 
 der a Definition reciprocal with the Thing defined ; 
 which is a fcholaftick Way of fpeaking, to fignify 
 that the Definition may be ufed in any Sentence in 
 the Place of the thing defined, or they may be 
 mutually affirmed concerning each other, or fub- 
 ftituted in the room of each other. The Juice of 
 the Grape is Wine, or Wine is the Juice of the 
 Grape, And wherefoever the Word Wine is ufed, 
 you may put the Juice of the Grape in Head of it, 
 except when you confider Wine rather as a Word 
 than a Thing, or when it is mentioned in fuch logi- 
 cal Rules. 
 
 Rule
 
 2ol ^ L G I C K: Or, Part I, 
 
 Rule III. A Definition ought to be clear and plain ; 
 For the Defign of it is to lead us into the Knowledge 
 of the Thing defined. 
 
 Hence it will follow that the Words ufed in a 
 Definition ought not to be doubtful, and equivocal, 
 and obfcure, but as plain and eafy as the Language 
 will afford : And indeed it is a general Rule con- 
 cerning the Definition both of Names and Things, 
 that no Word fhould be ufed in either of them 
 which has any Darknefs or Difficulty in it, unlefs 
 it has been before explain'd or defined. 
 
 Hence it will follow alfo, that there arc many 
 Things which cannot well be defined either as to 
 the Name or the Thing, unlefs it be by fynonymous 
 Words, or by a Negation of the contrary Idea, &c. 
 for learned Men know not how to make them 
 more evident or more intelligible than the Ideas 
 which every Man has gained by the vulgar Me- 
 thods of teaching. Such are the Ideas of Extenfion, 
 Duration, Thought, Confcloufnefs, and moft of our 
 fimple Ideas, and particularly fenfible Qualities, 
 as White, Blue, Red, Cold, Heat, Shrill, Bitter, 
 Sour, &c. 
 
 We can fay of Duration that it is a Continuance 
 in Being, or a not ceafmg to be ; we can fay of 
 Conjcioufnefs, that it is as It were a Feeling within 
 our felves ; we may fay Heat is that which is not 
 Cold -, or Sour is that which is like Vinegar ; or 
 we may point to the clear Sky, and fay that is 
 Blue. Thefe are the vulgar Methods of teaching 
 the Definitions of Names, or Meaning of Words. 
 But there are fome Philofophers whofe Attempt 
 to define thefe Things learnedly have wrapt up 
 their Ideas in greater Darknefs, and expofed them- 
 felves to Ridicule and Contempt ; as when they 
 define Heat they fay, it is ^ualltas congregans ho- 
 
 mogema
 
 C. VI.S. 5. The right life 0/*Reafott. 107 
 
 mogcnea & fegregans keterogenea, i. e. a Quality ga- 
 thering together Things of the fame Kind, and 
 feparating Things of a different Kind. So they 
 define White , a Colour arifmg from the Prevalence 
 of Brightnefs : But every Child knows Hot and 
 White better without thefe Definitions* 
 
 There are many other Definitions given by the 
 peripatetiek Philofophers, which are very faulty 
 by reafon of their Obfcurity ; as Motion is defin- 
 ed by them the Aft of a Being in Power fo far 
 forth as it is in Power. Time is the Meafure or 
 Number of Motion according to paft, prefent and 
 future. The Soul is the Aft of an organical natural 
 Body, having Life in Power ; and feveral others 
 of the fame Stamp. 
 
 Rule IV. It is alfo commonly prefcribed a- 
 mongft the Rules of Definition, that it Jhould be 
 Jkort, fo that it muft have no Tautology in it, nor 
 any Words Superfluous. I confefs Definitions ought 
 to be exprefled in as few Words as is confident 
 with a clear and juft Explication of the Nature 
 of the Thing defined, and a Diftinction of it from 
 all other Things befide : But it is of much more 
 Importance, and far better, that a Definition 
 fhould explain clearly the Subject we treat of, 
 tho* the Words be many, than to leave Obfcuri- 
 ties in the Sentence, by confining it within too 
 narrow Limits. So in the Definition which we 
 have given of Logick, that it is the Art of ufmg 
 Reafon well in the Search after Truth and the Com- 
 munication of it to others, it has indeed many Words 
 in it, but it could not well be fhorter. Art is the 
 Genus wherein it agrees with Rhetorick^ Poejy^ 
 Arithmetic^ Wreftling, Sailing, Building, &c. for 
 all thefe are Arts alfo : But the Difference or fpe- 
 cial Nature of it is drawn from its Object, Rea- 
 H fon |
 
 io8 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 fan -, from the Aft ufing it welt, and from its two 
 great Ends or Defigns, viz. thefearch of Truth, 
 and the Communication of it : Nor can it be juftly 
 defcribed and explained in fewer Ideas. 
 
 V. If we add a fifth Rule, it muft be that nei- 
 ther the thing defined, nor a mere fynonymous Name 
 Jhould make any fart of the Definition, for this 
 would be no Explication of the Nature of the 'Thing ; 
 and a fynonymous Word at beft could only be a 
 Definition of the Name. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Qbfervations concerning the Definition of things. 
 
 BEfore I part with this Subje6t I muft propofe 
 feveral Obferuations which relate to the Defi- 
 nition of Things. 
 
 i fc Obferve. There is no need that in Definitions 
 we fhould be confined to one fingle Attribute or 
 Property, in order to exprefs the Difference of the 
 Thing defined, or fometimes the eflential Dif- 
 ference confifts in two or three Ideas or Attributes. 
 So a Grocer is a Man who buys and fells Sugar and 
 Plumbs and Species for Gain. A Clock is an Engine 
 with Weights and Wheels, that Jhews the Hour of 
 the Day both by pointing and ftriking : And if I were 
 to define a Repeating Clock I muft add another 
 Property, viz. that it alfo repeats the Hour. So 
 that the true and primary eflential Difference of 
 fome complex Ideas confifting in feveral diftinct 
 Properties cannot be well exprefied without con- 
 junctive Particles of Speech. 
 
 2 A Obferv. There is no need that Definitions 
 fhould always be $oftwe t for fome things differ 
 
 from
 
 C VI. S. 6. fke right Ufe c/'Reafon. 109 
 
 from others merely by a Defect of what others have ; 
 as if a Chair be defined a Seat for a fingle Perfon 
 with a Back belonging to it, then a Stool is a Seat 
 for a Jingle Perfon without a Back ; and a Form is 
 a Seat for federal Perfons without a Back : Thefe 
 are negative Differences. So Sin is a want of Con- 
 formity to the Law of God , Blindnefs is a want of 
 Sight:. A Vagabond is a Perfon without a Home. 
 Some Ideas are negative, and their Definitions 
 ought to be fo too. 
 
 3 d Obferv. Some things may have two or more 
 Definitions, and each of them equally juft and good ; 
 as a Mile is the Length of eight Furlongs , or it is 
 the third part of a League. Eternal is that which 
 ever was and ever Jhall be , or it is that which had no 
 Beginning and foall have no End. * Man is ufually 
 defined a rational Animal : But it may be much 
 better to define him a Spirit united to an Animal 
 of fuch a Shape, or an Animal of fuch a peculiar 
 Shape united to a Spirit , or a Being compofed of fuch 
 an Animal or a Mind. 
 
 4 th Obferv. Where the EJfences of Things are 
 evident, and clearly diftinct from each other, there 
 we may be more exact and accurate in the Defi- 
 nitions of them : But where their EJfences approach 
 nearer to each other, the Definition is more diffi- 
 cult. A Bird may be defined a feathered Animal 
 with Wings, a Ship may be defined a large hollow 
 Building made to pafs over the Sea with Sails : But 
 if you afk me to define a Batt, which is between 
 a Bird and a Beaft, or to define a Barge and Hoy 9 
 
 * The common Definition of Man, vix. a rational Animal, is very faulty, 
 I. Bccaufethe Animal is not rational; the Rationality of Man arifes from 
 the Mind to which the Animal is united. 2. Becaufe if a Spirit fhould be 
 united to a Horfe and make it a rational Being, furely this would not be a 
 Man : It is evident therefore that the peculiar Shape muft enter into the De- 
 finition of a Man to render it juft and perfedt ; and for want of a fujl De- 
 fcription thereof all our Definitions are defective* 
 
 H 2 which
 
 no LOG 1C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 which are between a Boat and a Ship, it is much 
 harder to define them, or to adjuft the Bounds of 
 their Efience. This is very evident in all mon- 
 ftrous Births and irregular Productions of Nature, as 
 well as in many Works of Art , which partake fo 
 much of one Species and fo much of another , that 
 we cannot tell under which Species to rank them, 
 or how to determine their fpecifick Difference. 
 
 The feveral Species of Beings are feldom pre- 
 cifely limited in the Nature of Things by any 
 certain and unalterable Bounds : The Eflences of 
 many Things do not confift in indivifibili, or in 
 one evident indivifible Point, as fome have ima- 
 gined ; but by various Degrees they approach 
 nearer to, or differ more from others that are of a 
 Kindred Nature. So (as I have hinted before) in 
 the very middle of each of the Arches of a Rain- 
 bow the Colours of green, yellow, and red are fuf- 
 ficiently diftinguifhed ; but near the Borders of 
 the feveral Arches they run into one another, fo 
 that you hardly know how to limit the Colours, 
 nor whether to call it red or yellow, green, or 
 bluf. 
 
 5 th Obferv. As the bigbeft or chief Genus^s, viz. 
 Being and Not-Being can never be defined, becaufe 
 there is no Genus fuperior to them ; fo neither can 
 fingular Ideas or Individuals be well defined, be- 
 caufe either they have no effential Differences from 
 other Individuals, or their Differences are not 
 known *, and therefore Individuals are only to be 
 defcrib'd by their particular Circumftances : So 
 King George is diftinguifh'd from all other Men 
 and other Kings, by defcribing him as the firft 
 King of Great Britain of the Houfe of Brunfwick : 
 and Weliminfter-haU is defcribed by its Situation 
 and its Uie, &c. 
 
 . ' That
 
 C. VI. S. 6. ke right Ufe of Reafon. 1 1 r 
 
 That individual Bodies can hardly have any 
 eflential Difference, at leaft within the Reach of 
 our Knowledge, may be made thus to appear ; 
 Methufelah, when he was nine hundred and fixty 
 Years old, and perhaps worn out with Age and 
 Weaknefs, was the fame Perfon as when he was 
 in his full Vigour of Manhood, or when he was 
 an Infant, newly born ; but how far was his Body 
 the fame ? who can tell whether there was any 
 Fibre of his Flefh or his Bones that continued the 
 fame throughout his whole Life ? or who can de- 
 termine which were thofe Fibres ? The Ship in 
 which Sir Francis Drake failed round the World 
 might be new built and refitted fo often, that 
 few of the fame Timbers remained ; and who can 
 fay whether it muft be called the fame Ship or 
 no? and what is its eflential Difference? How 
 (hall we define Sir Francis Drake's Ship, or make 
 a Definition for Methufelah ? 
 
 To this Head belongs that moft difficult Que- 
 ftion, What is the Principle of Individuation ? or 
 what is it that makes any one Thing the fame as 
 it was fometime before ? This is too large and 
 laborious an Enquiry to dwell upon it in this Place : 
 Yet I cannot forbear to mention this Hint, viz. 
 Since our own Bodies muft rife at the laft Day 
 for us to receive Rewards or Punifhments in them, 
 there may be perhaps fome original Fibres of each 
 human Body, fome Stamina Vita, or primeval 
 Seed of Life , which may remain unchanged thro* 
 all the Stages of Life, Death and the Grave; 
 thefe may become the Springs and Principles of a 
 Refurreciion, and fufficient to denominate it the 
 fame Body. But if there be any fuch conftant 
 and vital Atoms which diftinguifli every human 
 ! Body, they are unknown to God only. 
 
 H 3 6th Obfn.
 
 112 L O G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 6 th Obferu. Where we cannot find out the Ef- 
 fence or effential Difference of any Species or Kind 
 of Beings that we would define, we muft content 
 our felves with a Collection of fuch chief Parts 
 or Properties of it as may beft explain it fa 
 far as it is known, and beft diftinguifh it from 
 other Things : So a Marigold is a Flower which hath 
 many long yellow Leaves round a little Knot of 
 Seeds in the midfl with fuch a -peculiar Stalky &c. 
 So if we would define Silver, we fay it is a white 
 and hard Metal, next in Weight to Gold : If we 
 would define an Elder-Tree, we might fay it is 
 one among the leffer Trees, whofe younger Branches 
 are foft and full of Pith, whofe Leaves are jagged 
 or indented, and of fuch a particular Shape, and it 
 bears large Clufters of fmall black Berries : So we 
 muft define Water, Earth, Stone, a Lyon, an Ea~ 
 gle, a Serpent, and the greateft part of natural 
 Beings, by a Collection of thofe Properties, which 
 according to our Obfervation diftinguifh them 
 from all other Things. This is what Mr. Locke 
 calls nominal Effences, and nominal Definitions. 
 And indeed fince the effential Differences of the va- 
 rious natural Beings or Bodies round about us arife 
 from a peculiar Shape, Size, Motion and Situation 
 of the fmall Particles of which they are compofed, 
 and fince we have no fufficient Method to inform 
 us what thefe are, we muft be contented with 
 fuch a fort of Definition of the Bodies they corn- 
 pofe. 
 
 Here note that this fort of Definition, which 
 is made up of a mere Collection of the moft re- 
 markable Parts or Properties, is called an imperfect 
 Definition or a Description , whereas the Defini- 
 tion is called -perfeff when it is compofed of the ef- 
 fential Difference added to the general Nature or. 
 Genus. 
 
 7*
 
 C. VI. S. 6. <fbe right Uje c/'Reafon. 1 1 3 
 
 7* Obferv. The perfett Definition of any Being 
 always includes the Definition of tbe Name where- 
 by it is called, for it informs us of the Senfe or 
 Meaning of that Word, and mews us what Idea 
 that Word is affixed to : But the Definition of the 
 Names does by no means include a perfett Defini- 
 tion of the 'Thing , for as we have faid before, a 
 mere fynonymous Word, a Negation of the con- 
 trary, or the Mention of any one or two diftin- 
 guiming Properties of the Thing may be a fuffi- 
 cient Definition of the Name. Yet in thofe Cafes 
 where the efiential Difference or Effence of a 
 Thing is unknown, there a Definition of the Name 
 by the chief Properties, and a Defcription of the 
 Thing are much the fame. 
 
 And here I think it necefiary to take Notice of 
 one general Sentiment that feems to run thro* 
 that excellent Performance, Mr. Locke's EJfay 
 of human Under/landing, and that is, " That 
 <* the Effences of Things are utterly unknown 
 to us, and therefore all our Pretences to diftin- 
 " guifh the Efiences of Things can reach no far- 
 ' ther than mere nominal Effences \ or a Collecli- 
 " on of fuch Properties as we know ; to fome of 
 " which we affix particular Names, and others 
 < c we bundle up, feveral together, under one 
 " Name : And that all our Attempts to rank B,e- 
 " ings into different Kinds of Species can reach 
 <' no farther than to make mere nominal Species ; 
 <e and therefore our Definitions of Things are but 
 " mere nominal Defcriptions or Definitions of the 
 " Name. 
 
 Now that we may do Juftice to this great Au- 
 thor^ we ought to confider that he confines this 
 Sort of Difcourfe only to the Effence of fimple 
 Ideas, and to the Effence of Subftances, as appears 
 evident in the fourth and fixth Chapters of his 
 H 4 Third
 
 LOGICK: Or Part I. 
 
 Third Book : for he allows the Names of mixed 
 Modes always to fignify the real" Effences of their 
 Species , Chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial 
 Things to have real diftincl Species ; and that in the 
 Diftinc~tion of their Efiences there u generally lefs 
 Conjujion and Uncertainty than in natural, Chap. VI. 
 Sec~t. 40, 41. tho* it mud be confefs'd that he fcarce 
 makes any Diftinclion between the Definition of 
 the Name and the Definition of the Thing, as Ch. 
 IV. and fometimes the Current of his Difcourfe 
 decries the Knowledge of EJfences in fuch gene- 
 ral Terms as may juftly give Occafion to mil- 
 take. 
 
 It muft be granted, that the Efience of mod 
 of our fimple Ideas and the greateft part of par- 
 ticular natural Subftances are much unknown to us ; 
 and therefore the efiential Difference of fenfible 
 Qualities and of the various Kinds of Bodies, fas 
 I have faid before) lye beyond the Reach of our 
 Underftandings : We know not what makes the 
 primary real inward Diftinctions between Red, 
 Green, Sweet, Sour, &c. between Wood, Iron, 
 Oil, Stone, Fire, Water, Flcjh, Clay, in their ge- 
 neral Natures, nor do we know what are the in- 
 ward and prime Diftinctions between all the par- 
 ticular Kinds or Species in the Vegetable, s'nimal, 
 Mineral, Metallick, or Liquid World 'of Things. 
 See Philofoph. E/ays. Eff. xi. Sec. i. 
 
 But ftill there is a very large Field for the Know- 
 ledge of the Efiences of Things, and for the Ufe 
 of perfeft Definitions amongft our complex Ideas, 
 the modal Appearances and Changes of Nature, the 
 Works oj Art, the Matters of Science, and all the 
 Affairs of the civil, the moral and the religious 
 Life : And indeed it is of much more Importance 
 to all Mankind to have a better Acquaintance with 
 the Works of Art for their own Livelihood and
 
 C. VI. S. 6. The Right U/e ofReafon. 1 15 
 
 daily Ufe, with the Affairs of Morality for their 
 Behaviour in this World, and with the Matters of 
 Religion, that they may be prepared for the World 
 to come, than to be able to give a perfect Defini- 
 tion of the Works of Nature. 
 
 If the particular Efiences of Natural Bodies are 
 unknown to us, we may yet be good Philofo- 
 phers, good Artifts, good Neighbours, good Sub- 
 jects and good Chriftians without that Knowledge, 
 and we have juft Reafon to be content. 
 
 Now that the Eflences of fome of the modal 
 Appearances and Changes in Nature, as well as 
 Wrings of Art, Science and Morality are fufficiently 
 known to us to make -perfect Definitions of them, 
 will appear by the Specimen of a few Definitions 
 of thefe Things. 
 
 Motion is a Change of Place. Swiftnefe is the 
 pafling over a long Space in a fhort Time. A 
 natural Day is the Time of one alternate Revoluti- 
 on of Light and Darknefs, or it is the Duration of 
 twenty four Hours. An Eclipfe of the Sun is a De- 
 fect in the Sun's Tranfmiflion of Light to us by the 
 Moon interpofing. * Snow is congealed Vapour. 
 * Hail is congeal'd Rain. An * I/land is a Piece of 
 Land rifing above thefurrounding Water. An * Hill 
 is an elevated Part of the Earth, and a * Grove is a 
 Piece of Ground thick fet with Trees. An Houfe 
 is a Building made to dwell in. A Cottage is a 
 mean Houfe in the Country. A Supper is that 
 Meal which we make in the Evening. A Tri- 
 angle is a Figure compofed of three Sides. A 
 Gallon is a Meafure containing eight Pints. A 
 Porter is a Man who carries Burdens for Hire. A 
 
 * Note, I/land, Hill, Grave, are not defigned here in their monremote antt 
 fubftantlal Natures, (if I may fo exprefs it) or as the Matter of them it 
 Earth i for in this Senfe we know not their Eflence, but only as confider'd 
 in their modal Appearance, whereby one fart cf Earth is diftinguUht from 
 another, The fame may be faid of Snow, Bail, &t. 
 
 King
 
 n6 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 King is the chief Ruler in a Kingdom. Veracity 
 is the Conformity of our Words to our Thoughts, 
 Covet oufnefs is an excefiive Love of Money, or 
 other PoiTefiions. Killing is the taking away the 
 Life of an Animal. Murder is the unlawful kil- 
 ling of a Man. Rhetorick is the Art of fpeaking 
 in a manner fit to perfuade. Natural Philofopby 
 is the Knowledge of the Properties of Bodies and 
 the various Effects of them, or it is the Know- 
 ledge of the various Appearances in Nature and 
 their Caufes ; and Logick is the Art of ufmg our 
 Reafon well, &V. 
 
 Thus you fee the efiential Differences of vari- 
 ous Beings may be known, and are borrowed from 
 their Qualities and Properties, their Caufes, EffeRs, 
 Qbjetts, Adjunct, Ends, &c. and indeed as infinite- 
 ly various as the EJJences of Things are, their De- 
 finitions muft needs have very various Forms. 
 
 After all it muft be confefTed, that many Logi- 
 cians and Philofophers in the former Ages have 
 made too great a Buttle about the Exactnefs of 
 their Definitions of Things, and entered into long 
 fruitlefs Controverfies and very ridiculous Debates 
 in the feveral Sciences about adjufting the Logical 
 Formalities of every Definition , whereas that fort 
 of Wrangling is now grown very juftly contemp- 
 tible, fmce it is agreed that true Learning and the 
 Knowledge of Things depends much more upon 
 a large Acquaintance with their various Proper- 
 ties, Caufes, Effects, Subjed, Object, Ends and 
 Defigns, than it does upon the formal and fcho- 
 laftick Niceties of Genus and Difference. 
 
 SECT.
 
 C.VI.S.7. 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 Of a corn-pleat Conception of Things. 
 
 HAVING dwelt fo long upon the firft Rule 
 to direct our Conceptions, and given an 
 Account of the Definition both of Names and Things 
 in order to gain dear and diftinft Ideas, we make 
 hafte now to \hzfecond Rule to guide our Concep- 
 tions and that is, Conceive of Things compleatly in 
 all their Parts. 
 
 All Parts have a Reference to fome Whole : 
 Now there is an old Diftinction which logical 
 Writers make of a Whole and its Parts into four 
 feveral Kinds, and it may be proper juft to men- 
 tion them here. 
 
 1. There is a metapfyfical Whole, when 'the 
 Effence of a Thing- is faid to confift of two Parts, 
 the Gems and the Difference, i. e. the general and 
 the fpecial Nature, which being joined together 
 make up a Definition. This has been the Subject 
 of the foregoing Sections. 
 
 2. There is a mathematical Whole which is bet- 
 ter called integral, when the feveral Parts, which 
 go to make up the Whole are really diftinct from 
 one another, and each of them may fubfift apart. 
 So the Head, the Limbs and the Trunk are the 
 integral Parts of an animal Body ; fo Unites art 
 the integral Parts of any large Number ; fo thefe 
 Difcourfes which I have written concerning Per- 
 ception, Judgment, Reafoning and Difpofition are 
 the four integral Parts of Logick. This fort of 
 Parts goes to make up the Compleatnefs of any 
 Subject, and this is the chief and moft direct Mat- 
 ter of our Difcourfe in this Section.
 
 Ii8 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 3. There is a fhyfical or effential Whole, which 
 is ufually made to fignify and include oi&ly the 
 two effential Parts of Man, Body and Soul: But I 
 think the Senfe of it may better be alter'd, or 
 at leaft enlarged, and fo include all the effential 
 Modes, Attributes or Properties which are con- 
 tained in the Comprehenfwn of any Idea. This 
 {hall be the Subject of Difcourfe under the third 
 Rule to direfl our Conceptions. 
 
 4. There is a logical whole, which is alfo called 
 an univerfal ; and the Parts of it are all the par- 
 ticular Ideas to which this univerfal Nature ex- 
 tends. So a Genus is a Whole in refpect of the fe- 
 veral Species which are its Parts. So the Species 
 is a Whole, and all the Individuals are the Pans 
 of it. This fhall be treated of in the fourth Rule 
 to guide our Conceptions. 
 
 At prefent we confider an Idea as an integral 
 Whole, and ourfecond Rule directs us to contem- 
 plate it in all its Parts : But this can only refer 
 to complex Ideas, for fimple Ideas have no Parts. 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 Of Diviftotiy and the Rules of it. 
 
 Since our Minds are narrow in their Capacity, 
 and cannot furvey the feveral Parts of any 
 complex Being with one fmgle View, as God fees 
 all Things at once ; therefore we muft as it were 
 take it to Pieces, and confider of the Parts fepar 
 rately that we may have a more compleat Concep- 
 tion of the Whole. So if I would learn the Na* 
 ture of a Watch, the Workman takes it to pieces 
 and {hews me the Spring, the Wheels, the Axles y 
 the Pinions, the Balance, the Dial-Plate : the Poin- 
 ter y the Cafe, &c . and defcribes each of thefe Things 
 
 to
 
 C. VI. S. 8. Tfe riglt Ufe of Reafon. 1 1 9 
 
 to me apart, together with their Figures and their 
 Ufes. If I would know what an Animal is, the 
 Anatomift confiders the Head, the Trunk, the 
 Limbs, the Bowels apart from each other, and 
 gives me diftind Lectures upon each of them. 
 So a Kingdom is divided into its feveral Provinces : 
 A Book into its feveral Chapters ; and any Science 
 is divided according to the feveral Subjefts of which 
 it treats. 
 
 This is what we properly call the Divifion of 
 an Idea, which is an Explication of the Whole by 
 its feveral Parts, or an Enumeration of the feveral 
 Parts, that go to compofe any Whole Idea, and to 
 render it compleat. And I think when Man is 
 divided into Body and Soul, it properly comes un- 
 der this part of the Dodlrine of integral Divifion* 
 as well as when the mere Body is divided into 
 Head, Trunk and Limbs : This Divifion is fome- 
 times called Partition. 
 
 When any of the Parts of any Idea are yet far- 
 ther divided in order to a clear Explication of 
 the Whole, this is called a Subdivifwn ; as when a 
 Tear is divided into Months, each Month into Days, 
 and each Day into Hours, which may alfo be far- 
 ther fubdivided into Minutes and Sounds. 
 
 It is neceffary in order to the full Explication 
 of any Being to confider each Part, and the Pro- 
 perties of it, diftincl: by it felf, as well as in its Re- 
 lation to the Whole : for there are many Properties 
 that belong to the feveral Parts of a Being which 
 cannot properly be afcribed to the Whole, tho' 
 thefe Properties may fit each Part for its proper 
 Station, and as it Hands in that Relation to the 
 whole complex Being : as in a Houfe, the Doors 
 &re moveable, the Rooms fquare, the Cielings white, 
 the Windows tranfparent, yet the Houfe is neither 
 moveable, nor fquare, nor white, nor tranfparent. 
 
 The
 
 120 LOGICK: Or, Part I. 
 
 Thefpecial Rules of a good Divifion are thefe. 
 
 1. Rule. Each Partfingly taken mufl contain lefs 
 than the whole, but all the Parts taken colleftively 
 (of together} mufl contain neither more nor lefs than 
 the whole. Therefore if in difcourfing of a Tree 
 you divide it into the Trunk and Leaves it is an 
 imperfect Divifion, becaufe the Root and the 
 Branches are needful to make up the Whole. So 
 Logick would be ill divided into Apprehenfwn, 
 Judgment and Reafoning ; for Method is a confider- 
 able Part of the Art which teaches us to ufe our 
 Reafon right, and fhould by no Means be 
 omitted. 
 
 Upon this Account, in every Divifion wherein 
 we defign a perfect Exactnefs, it is neceffary 
 to examine the whole Idea with Diligence, left wj 
 omit any Part of it thro* want of Care ; tho* in 
 fome Cafes it is not poflible, and in others it is 
 not neceflary that we mould deicend to the minu- 
 teft Parts. 
 
 2. Rule. In all Divifiom we Jbould firft confider 
 the larger and more immediate Parts of the Subjeff, 
 and not divide it at once into the more minute and 
 remote Parts. It would by no means be proper 
 to divide a Kingdom firft into Streets, and Lanes 
 and Fields, but it muft be firft divided into Pro- 
 vincies or Counties, then thofe Counties may be di- 
 vided into Towns, Villages, Fields, &c. and the 
 Towns into Streets and Lanes. 
 
 3. Rule. The fever al Parts of a Divifion ought 
 to be oppofite, i. e. one Part ought not to contain an- 
 other. It would be a ridiculous Divifion of an 
 Animal into Head, Limbs, Body and Brain^ for the 
 Brains are contained in the Head, 
 
 i Yet
 
 C.VI.S.8. nerJgbfUfeofRezfon. 121 
 
 Yet here it muft be noted, that fometimes the 
 Subjects of any Treatife, or the Objects of a par- 
 ticular Science may be properly and neceflarily fo 
 divided, that the fecond may include the firft, and 
 the third may include the firft and fecond, with- 
 out offending againft this Rule, becaufe in the fe- 
 cond or following Parts of the Science or Dif- 
 courfe, thefe Objects are not confidered in the fame 
 manner as in the firft ; as for Inftance, Geometry 
 divides its Objects into Lines, Surfaces and Solids : 
 Now tho* a Line be contained in a Surface or 
 a Solid, yet it is not confider*d in a Surface or 
 rate and alone, or as a mere Line, as it is in the 
 firft Part of Geometry which treats of Lines. So 
 Logick is rightly divided into Conception, Judg- 
 ment, Reafoning and Method ; for tho* Ideas or 
 Conceptions are contained in the following Parts of 
 Logick, yet they are not there treated of zsfepa- 
 rate Ideas, which are the proper Subject of the 
 firft Part. 
 
 4. Rule, Let not Subdiviftons be too numerous 
 without Neceflity : For it is better many Times to 
 diftinguim more Parts at once if the Subject will 
 bear it, than to mince the Difcourfe by excefllve 
 dividing and fubdividing. It is preferable there- 
 fore in a Treatife of Geography to fay that in a 
 City we will confider its Walls, its Gates, its Build-' 
 ings, its Streets, and Lanes, than to divide it for- 
 mally firft into the encompajjing and the encompaffed 
 Parts ; the eneompaffing Parts are the -Walls and 
 Gates ; the encompafied Part includes the Ways 
 and the Buildings -, the Ways are the Streets and 
 the Lanes ; Buildings confift of the Foundations 
 and the Suferftruflurc, &V. 
 
 Too
 
 122 LOGICK: Or, Parti. 
 
 Too great a Number of Subdivifions has been 
 affected by fome Perfons in Sermons, Treatifes, 
 Inftructions, &V. under pretence of greater Ac- 
 curacy: But this fort of Subtilties hath often given 
 great Confufion to the Underftanding, and fome* 
 times more Difficulty to the Memory. In thefe 
 Cafes it is only a good Judgment can determine 
 what Subdivifeons are needful. 
 
 5. Rule. Divide every Subjeft according to the 
 fpecial Defign you have in view. One and the fame 
 Idea or Subject may be divided in very different 
 Manners according to the different Purpofes we 
 have in difcourfing of it. So if a Printer were to 
 confider the feveral Parts of a Book, he muft di- 
 vide it into Sheets, the Sheets into Pages, the Pa- 
 ges into Lines, and the Lines into Letters. But a 
 Grammarian divides a Book into Periods, Sentences 
 and Words, or Parts of Speech, as Noun, Pronoun, 
 Verb, &c. A Logician confiders a Book as divid- 
 ed into Chapters, Sections, Arguments, Propofi- 
 tions, Ideas , and with the Help of Ontology, he di- 
 vides the Proportions into Subject, ObjecJ, Pro- 
 perty, Relation, Acli&n, PaJJion, Caufe, Effeft, &V* 
 But it would be very ridiculous for a Logician 
 to divide a Book into Sheets, Pages and Lines ; 
 or for a Printer to divide it into Nouns and Pro- 
 nouns, or into Propofitions, Ideas, Properties or 
 Caufes. 
 
 6. Rule. In all your Divifiom obferve with great - 
 eft Exaclnefs the Nature of Wings. And here I am 
 conftrain'd to make a Subdivifion of this Rule 
 into two very neceflary Particulars. 
 
 (i.) Let the Parts of your Divifion be fuch as 
 are properly diftinguijhed in Nature. Do not di- 
 vide afunder thofe Parts of the Idea which are in- 
 timately
 
 fc. VI.S. 8. fbe right Ufe cfReafon. 12 j 
 
 timately united in Nature, nor unite thofe Things 
 into one Part which Nature has evidently dif- 
 joined : Thus it would be very improper in treat- 
 ing of an Animal Body to divide it into thefupe- 
 rior and inferior Halves -, for it would be hard to 
 fay how much belongs by Nature to the inferior 
 Half, and how much to the fitperwr. Much more 
 improper would it be ftill to divide the. Animal 
 into the right Hand Parts and left Hand Parts, 
 which would bring greater Confulion. This 
 would be as unnatural as a Man who fhould 
 cleave a Hazel Nut in Halves thro 1 the Hufk, the 
 Shell and the Kernel at once, and fay a Nut is 
 divided into thefe two Parts ; whereas Nature leads 
 plainly to the threefold Diftinction of Hujk, Shell 
 and Kernel. 
 
 (2.) Do not affeft Duplicities nor Triplicities, nor 
 'any certain Number of Parts in your Divifion of 
 Things , for we know of no fuch certain Number 
 of Parts which God the Creator has obferved in 
 forming all the Varieties of his Creatures, nor is 
 there any uniform determined Number of Parts 
 in the various Subjects of human Art or Science ; 
 yet fome Perfons have difturbed the Order of Na- 
 ture, and abufed their Readers by an Affectation of 
 Dichotomies, trichotomies, Sevens, Twelves, 0V; 
 Let the Nature of the Subject, confidered together 
 with the Defign which you have in view, always 
 determine the Number of Parts into which you 
 divide it. 
 
 After all, it muft be confefs'd that an intimate 
 Knowledge of Things and a judicious Oblervati- 
 on will aflift in the Bufmefs of Divifion, as well 
 as of Definition, better than too nice and curious 
 an Attention to the mere Formalities of logi- 
 cal Writers, without a real Acquaintance with 
 Things. 
 
 1 SEC *,
 
 124 L G 1 C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 SE.CT. IX. 
 
 Of a comprehenftve Conception of Things, and of 
 
 Abftraftion. 
 
 THE third Rule to direct our Conception re- 
 quires us to conceive of Things comprehenfi'vely. 
 As we muft furvey an Object in all its Parts to 
 obtain a compleat Idea of it, fo we muft confider 
 it in all its Modes, Attributes, Properties and Re- 
 lations, in order to obtain a comprebenfive Con- 
 ception of it. 
 
 The Comprehenfion of an Idea, as it was ex- 
 plain' d under the Doctrine of Univerfals, includes 
 only the effential Modes or Attributes of that Idea \ 
 but in this Place the Word is taken in a larger 
 Senfe, and implies alfo the various occafional Pro- 
 perties, accidental Modes and Relations. 
 
 The Necefilty of this Rule is founded upon 
 the fame Reafon as the former, viz. That our 
 Minds are narrow and fcanty in their Capacities, 
 and as they are not able to confider all the Parts 
 of a complex Idea at once, Ib neither can they at 
 once contemplate all the different Attributes and 
 Circumftances of it: We muft therefore confider 
 Things fucccjfively and gradually in their various 
 Appearances and Circumftances : As our natural 
 Eye cannot at once behold the fix Sides of a Dye 
 or Cube, nor take Cognizance of all the Points 
 that are marked on them, and therefore we turn 
 lip the Sides fucceflively, and thus furvey and num- 
 ber the Points that are marked on each- Side, that 
 we may know the whole. 
 
 In
 
 C. VI. S. 9. The right life ^Rcafott; 
 
 In order to a comprehenfive View of" any Idea, we 
 muft firft confider whether the Obje& of it has 
 an Exigence as well as an EJJence ; whether it be 
 a fimple or a complex Idea ; whether it be a Sub" 
 fiance or a Mode ; if it be a Sub/lance, then we 
 muft enquire what are the effential Modes of it* 
 which are neceffary to its Naturej and what are 
 thofe Properties or Accidents of it, which belong 
 to it occifionally, or as it is placed in fome par- 
 ticular Circurnftances : We muft view it in its 
 internal and ab/olute Modes, and obferve it in thole 
 various external Relations in which it ftands to other 
 Beings : We muft confider it in its Powers and 
 Capacities either to do or fuffer : We muft trace 
 it up to its various Caufes, whether fupreme of 
 fubordinate. We muft defcend to the Variety 
 of its Effefls, and take notice of its feveral Ends 
 and Deftgns which are to be attained by it. We 
 muft conceive of it as it is either an Objeft or a 
 Subjett ; what are the Things that are akin to it, 
 and what are the Oppofites or Contraries of it ; for 
 many things are to be known both by their con- 
 trary and their kindred Ideas. 
 
 If the thing we difcourfe of be a mere Mode, we 
 muft enquire whether it belong to Spirits or Bodies ; 
 whether it be a pbyfical or moral Mode : If mo- 
 rali then we muft confider its Relation to God to 
 our [elves, to our Neighbours ; its Reference to this 
 Life, or the Life to come. If it be a Virtue, we: 
 muft feek what are the Principles of it, what 
 are the Rules of it, what are the Tendencies of 
 it, and what are the falfe Virtues that counterfeit 
 it, and what are the real Vices that oppofe it$ 
 what are the Evils which attend the Neglect of 
 it, what are the Rewards of the Pratlice of it 
 both here and hereafter* 
 
 I 2 If
 
 I 2 6 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 If the Subject be hiftorical or a Matter of Pact, 
 we may then enquire whether the Action was j 
 done at all, whether it was doneinfucba manner, 
 or by fuch Perfons as is reported ; at what Time 
 it was done , in what Place j by what Motive, and 
 for what Dejign ; what is the Evidence of the 
 Fad ; who are the Witnejjes ; what is their Cha- 
 racter and Credibility ; what Signs there are of 
 fuch a Fact ; what concurrent Circitmftances which 
 may either fupport the Truth of it, or render it 
 doubtful. 
 
 In order to make due Enquiries into all thefe 
 and many other Particulars which go towards the 
 complete and comprehenfive Idea of any Being, the 
 Science of Ontology is exceeding necefTary. This 
 is what was wont to be called thefrft Part of Me- 
 taphyficks in the Peripatetick Schools. It treats of 
 Being in its moft general Nature, and of all its 
 Affections and Relations. I confefs the old Popijh 
 Schoolmen have mingled a Number of ufelefs Sub- 
 tiltics with this Science , they have exhaufted their 
 own Spirits, and the Spirits of their Readers in 
 many laborious and intricate Trifles, and fome 
 of their Writings have been fruitful of Names 
 without Ideas, which hath done much Injury to 
 the facred Study of Divinity. Upon this Account 
 many of the Moderns have moft unjuftly aban- 
 doned the whole Science at once, and thrown 
 Abundance of Contempt and Raillery upon the 
 very Name of Metaphyfjcks ; but this Contempt 
 and Cenfure is very unreafonable, for this Science 
 feparated from fome Ariftotelian Fooleries and fcho- 
 laftick Subtilties is fo necefiary to a diftincl Con- 
 ception, folid Judgment, and juft reafoning on 
 many Subjeds, that fometimes it is introduced as 
 a Part of Logick, and not without Reafon. And 
 thofe who utterly defpife and ridicule it, either 
 
 betray
 
 C. VI. S. 9. The right Ufe 0f Reafon. i 27 
 
 betray their own Ignorance, or will be fuppoled 
 to make their Wit and Banter a Refuge and Ex- 
 cufe for their own Lazinefs. Yet thus much I 
 would ac]d, that the later Writers of Ontology are 
 generally the beft on this Account, becaufe they 
 have left out much of the ancient Jargon. See the 
 Brief Scheme of Ontology in the Pbilofopbick EJJays 
 by I. W. 
 
 Here let it be noted that it is neither ufeful, 
 neceffary, or poffible to run thro' all the Modes, 
 Circumftances and Relations of every Subject we 
 take in hand , but in Ontology we enumerate a 
 great Variety of them, that fo a judicious Mind 
 may choofe what are thole Circumftances^ Relati- 
 ons and Properties of any Subject, which are moft 
 neceflary to the prefent Defign of him that fpeaks 
 or writes, either to explain, to illuftrate, or to 
 prove the Point. 
 
 As we arrive at the compleat Knowledge of an 
 Idea in all its Parts, by that Act of the Mind 
 which is called Divifion, 16 we come to a compre- 
 .benfeve Conception of a Thing in its feveral Pro- 
 pertiesand Relations, by that Act of the Mind which 
 is called Abftraffion, i. e. we confider each fingle 
 Relation or Property of the Subject alone, and 
 thus we do as it were withdraw and feparate it in 
 our Minds both from the Subject it felf, as well as 
 from other Properties and Relations in order to 
 make a fuller Observation of it. 
 
 This Act of\d%ft&$ion is faid to be twofold, 
 either Prectfvue or Negative. 
 
 Precifive Abftraftion is when we eonfider thofe 
 Things apart which cannot really exift apart ; as 
 when we confider a Mode without confidering its 
 Subftance and Subjeff, or one effential Mode with- 
 out another. Negative AbftraRion is when we con- 
 fider one Thing feparate from another, which 
 I 3 may
 
 j 2 3 X G I C K: Or, Part I, 
 
 may alfo exift without it -, as when we conceive 
 of a S#fy># without conceiving of its accidental 
 Modes or Relations , or when we conceive of one 
 Accident without thinking of another. If I think 
 of reading or writing without the exprefs Idea of 
 fome Man, this is precifive AbftraRion , or if I 
 think of the Attraction of Iron^ without the ex- 
 prefs Idea of fome particular magnetick Body. But 
 when I think of a Needle without an Idea of its 
 Sharpnefs, this is negative Abftraftion ; and it is the 
 fame when I think of its Sharpnefs without confi- 
 flering its Length, 
 
 SECT. X. 
 
 Qf the extenfive Conception of Things, and ef 
 Diftribution. 
 
 AS the Compleatnefs of ^Jdea refers to the fe- 
 veral Ptrts that cornpofe it, and the Com-? 
 prehenfion of an Idea includes its various Proper- 
 ties, fo the Extenfion ojf an Idea denotes the vari- 
 ous Sorts or Kinds of Beings to which the fame Idea 
 belongs : And if we would be fully acquainted 
 with a Subject, we muft obferve 
 
 Rul&tQ ^direct, our Conceptions, viz. 
 Conceive of Things in all their Extenfion^ i. e. we 
 muft fearch out the various Species or Special Na- 
 tures which are contained under it as a Genus or 
 general Nature. If we would know the Nature of 
 an Animal perfectly, we muft take Cognizance of 
 Beajls, Birds, Ft/hes and Infefls, as well as Men* 
 all which are contained under the general Nature^ 
 
 As
 
 C. VI. S. 10. Tfc right UfeofRezfon. 129 
 
 As an integral Whole is diftinguifliM into its fe- 
 veral Parts by Divifion, fo the Word Diftribu- 
 tion is moft properly ufed when we diftinguifh an 
 univerfal Whole into its feveral Kinds of Species : 
 And perhaps it had been better if this Word had 
 been always confin'd to this Signification, tho* it 
 muft be confeft, that we frequently fpeak of the 
 Divifion of an Idea into its feveral Kinds, as well 
 as into feveral Parts. 
 
 The Rules of a good Diftribution are much the 
 fame with thofe which we have before applied 
 to Divifion, which may be juft repeated again in 
 the briefeft manner, in order to give Examples 
 to them. 
 
 I. Rule. Each Partjingfy taken muft contain lefs 
 than the Whole, but all the Parts taken colleftiv'ety 
 or together, muft contain neither more nor lefs 
 than the Whole ; or as Logicians fometimes exprefs 
 it, the Parts of the Divifion ought to exhauft the 
 whole Thing which is divided. So Medicine is juftly 
 diftributed into Propbylaftick, or the Art of pre- 
 ferving Health ; and Therafeutick, or the Art 
 of reftoring Health -, for there is no other fort 
 of Medicine befides thefe two. But Men are not 
 well diftributed into tall or Jhort, for there are 
 fome of a middle Stature. 
 
 II. Rule. In all Diflributions we mould firft 
 confider the larger and more immediate Kinds or 
 Species or Ranks of Being, and not divide a 
 Thing at once into the more minute and remote. 
 A Genus mould not at once be divided into Indi- 
 viduals, or even into the loweft Species, \f there 
 be a Species fuperior. Thus it would be very im- 
 proper to divide Animal into Trout, Lobfter, Eel, 
 
 Bear, Eagk, Dove, Worm and Butterfly, for 
 I 4 thefe
 
 ?3 o LOGIC K: Or Part I. 
 
 thefe are inferior Kinds , whereas Animal ought 
 ftrft to be diftributed into Man, ~Beaft, Bird, Fifh, 
 Infefl : And then Beaft fhould be diftributed into 
 J)og, Bear, &c. Bird into Eagle, Dave, &c. Fijh 
 into Trout, Eel, Lobjler, &c. 
 
 It is irregular alfo to join any inferior Species in 
 the fame Rank or Order with the Superior , as 
 if we would diftinguifh Animals into Birds, Bears 
 and Oyfters, &c. it would be a ridiculous Diftr;- 
 JDUtion. 
 
 III. Rule. The feveral Parts of a Diftribution 
 ought to be oppofite ; that is, one Species or Clafs 
 pf Beings in the fame Rank of Divifion ought not 
 to contain or include another , fo Men ought not 
 to be divided into the Rich, the Poor, the Learned 
 and the fall ; for poor Men may be both learned 
 and tall, and fo may the rich. 
 
 But it will be objected, are not animated Bodies 
 rightly diftributed into Vegetative and Animal, or 
 (as they are ufually called) Senfaive ? Now the Sen- 
 Jitive contains the Vegetative Nature in it, for Ani- 
 mals grow as well as Plants. I anfwer that in this 
 and all fuch Diftributions the Word Vegetatm* 
 Signifies merely Vegetative -, and in this Senie Vege* 
 tative will be fufficiently oppofite to Animal, for it 
 cannot be faid of an Animal that it contains mere 
 Vegetation in the Idea of it. 
 
 IV. Rule. Let not Subdivifions be too nume- 
 rous without Neceflity , therefore I think Quan- 
 tity is better diftinguifhed at once into a Line, a 
 Surface and a Solid, than to fay as Ramus does, 
 that Quantity is Cither a Line, or a Thing lined \ 
 and a Thing lined is either a Surface or a Solid. 
 
 V. Rule.
 
 C. VI. S. 10. The Right UJe o/'Reafon. 13 r 
 
 V. Rule. Diftribute every Subject according to 
 the fpecial Defign you have in View, fo far as is 
 necefiary or ufeful to your prefent Enquiry. Thus 
 a Politician diftributes Mankind according to their 
 civil Characters, into the Rulers and the Ruled -, 
 and a Phyftcian divides them into the Sick or the 
 Healthy ; but a Divine diftributes them into Turks, 
 Heathens, Jews, or Cbriftians. 
 
 Here Note, that it is a very ufelefs Thing to 
 diftribute any Idea into fuch Kinds or Members 
 as have no different Properties to be fpoken of; 
 as it is mere trifling to divide right Angles into 
 fuch whofe Legs are equal, and whofe Legs are un~ 
 equal, for as to the mere right Angle they have no 
 different Properties. 
 
 VI. Rule. In all your Diftributions obferve the 
 Nature of Things with great Exactnefs ; and 
 don't affect any particular Form of Diftribution, 
 as fome Perfons have done, by dividing every Ge- 
 nus into two Species, or into three Species , where- 
 as Nature is infinitely various, and human Affairs 
 and human Sciences have as great a Variety, nor 
 is there any one Form of Diftribution that will 
 exactly fuit with all Subjects. 
 
 Note, It is to this Doctrine of Diftribution of 
 a Genus into its federal Species, we muft alfo refer 
 the Diftribution of a Caufe according to its feve- 
 ral Efecls, as fome Medicines are heating, fome are 
 cooling ; or an Effeft when it is diftinguifh'd by 
 its Caufes, as Faith is either built upon divine Tef- 
 fimony or human. It i$ to this Head we refer par- 
 pcular artificial Bodies, when they are diftinguifh- 
 ed according to the Matter they are made of, as 
 a Statue is either of Brafs, of Marble, or Wood, 
 $3c, and any other Beings when they are diftin- 
 4 guifh'd
 
 I 3 2 LOGIC K: Or, Pare I 
 
 guifh'd according to their End and Defgn, as the 
 Furniture o Body or Mind is either for Ornament 
 -cr Ufe. To this Head alfo we refer Subjects when 
 they are divided according to their Modes or Ac- 
 cidents-, as Men are either merry, or grave, or fad; 
 and Modes when they are divided by their Subjects, 
 as Diftemptrs belong to the Fluids, or to the folid 
 Parts of the Animal. 
 
 It is alfo to this Place we reduce the Propofals 
 Of a Difficulty under its various Cafes, whether it 
 be in Speculation or Practice : As to (hew the 
 Reafon of Sun-beams burning Wood, whether 
 it be done by a convex Glafs or a concave ; or to 
 Ihew the ConftruRion and Menfuration of Trian- 
 gles, whether you have two Angles and a Side 
 given, or two Sides and an Angle, or only three 
 Sides. Here it is necefiary to diftribute or divide 
 a Difficulty into all its Cafes, in order to gain a per- 
 fect Knowledge of the Subject you contemplate. 
 
 It might be obferved here, that Logicians have 
 fometimes given a Mark or Sign to diftinguifh 
 when it is an integral Whole, that is divided into 
 its Parts or Members, or when it is a Genus, an 
 univerfal Whole, that is diftributed into its Species 
 and Individuals. The Rule they give is this: 
 Whenfoever the whole Idea can be directly and 
 properly affirmed of each Part, as a Bird is an 
 Animal, a Fijh is an Animal, Bucephalus is a Horfe, 
 Peter is a Man, then it is a Diftribution of a Ge- 
 nus into its Species or a Species into its Individu- 
 als : But when the whole cannot be thus direftly 
 affirmed concerning every Part, then it is a Divi- 
 fion of an integral into its feveral Species or Mem- 
 bers ; as we cannot fay the Head, the Breaft, the 
 Hand or the Foot is an Animal, but we fay the 
 Head is a Part of the Animal, and the Foot is an- 
 other Part. 
 
 This
 
 C VI. S. n . 7& right Ufe of Reafon; 133 
 
 This Rule may hold true generally in corporeal 
 Beings, or perhaps in all Subftances : But when 
 we fay the Fear of God is Wifdom, and fo is human 
 Civility: Criticifm is true Learning , and fo is Pbi- 
 lofophy : To execute a Murderer is Juflice, and to 
 fave and defend the Innocent is Juflice too : In thefe 
 Cafes it is not fo eafily determin'd, whether an 
 integral Whole be divided into its Parts, or an uni- 
 verlal into its Species : For the Fear of God may 
 be called either one Part, or one Kind of Wifdom: 
 Criticifm is one Part, or one Kind of Learning : 
 And the Execution of a Murderer may be called a 
 Species of Juflice as well as a Part of it. Nor in- 
 deed is it a Matter of great Importance to deter- 
 mine this Controverfy. 
 
 SECT. XI. 
 Of an orderly Conception of Things. 
 
 THE lafl Rule to direct our Conceptions, is 
 that ive Jhould rank and place them in a pro- 
 per Method and juft Order. This is of neceflary 
 Ufe to prevent Confufion ; for as a Trader who 
 never places his Goods in his Shop or Wharehoufe 
 in a regular Order, nor keeps the Accounts of his 
 buying and felling, paying and receiving in a juft 
 Method, is in utmoft Danger of plunging all his 
 Affairs into Confufion and Ruin ; fo a Student 
 who is in the Search of Truth, or an Author or 
 Teacher who communicates Knowledge to others, 
 will very much obftru6t his Defign, and confound 
 his own Mind or the Mind of his Hearers, unlefs 
 he range his Ideas in juft Order. 
 
 If we would therefore become fuccefsful Learn- 
 ers or Teachers, we muft not conceive of Things, 
 in a confufed Heap, but difpofe our Ideas in fome 
 Certain Method, which may be moft eafy and ufe- 
 4 fill
 
 1 34 LOGICK: Or, Part I. 
 
 Ful both For the Underftanding and Memory ; 
 and be Fure as much as may be To follow the Na- 
 ture of things, for which many Rules might be 
 given, viz. 
 
 1. Conceive as much as you can oF the Effen- 
 lials oF any Subject, beFore you conFider its Acci- 
 dentals. 
 
 2. Survey firft the general Paris and Properties 
 oFany Subject, beFore you extend your Thoughts 
 to diFcourfe oF the particular Kind or Species 
 oF it. 
 
 3. Contemplate Things firft in their own fimple 
 Natures, and afterward view them in Compofition 
 with other Things ; unlefs it be your prefent Pur- 
 poFe to take a compound Being to pieces, in order 
 to find out or to fhew the Nature of it by iearch- 
 jng and difcovering of what Simples it is com- 
 pofed. 
 
 4. ConFider the absolute Modes or Affections 
 of any Being as it is in itfelf, before you proceed 
 to confider it relatively, or to furvey the vari- 
 ous Relations in which it ftands to other Be- 
 ings, &c. 
 
 Note, TheFe Rules chiefly belong to the Me- 
 thod oFInftruction which the Learned call Syn- 
 thetick. 
 
 But in the Regulation of our Ideas there is 
 Feldom an abfolute Necefllty that we mould place 
 them in this or the other particular Method : It 
 is pofllble in fome CaFes that many Methods may 
 be equally good, that is, may equally afiift the 
 Underftanding and the Memory : To Frame a 
 Method exquifitely accurate, according to the 
 ftrict Nature oF Things, and to maintain this Ac- 
 curacy From the Beginning to the End oF a Trea- 
 tife, is a moft rare and difficult Thing, if not im- 
 poffible. But a larger Account of Method would 
 
 be
 
 C. VI. S. 12. The right Ufe gfReafoiL 13$ 
 be very improper in this Place, left we anticipate 
 what belongs to the fourth Part ofLogick. 
 
 SECT. XII. 
 
 Thefe five Rules of Conception exemplified. 
 
 IT may be ufeful here to give a Specimen of the 
 five facial Rules to dirett our Conceptions, which 
 have been the chief Subject of this long Chapter, 
 and reprefent them practically in one View. 
 
 Suppofe the Theme of our Difcourfe were the 
 Paffions of the Mind. 
 
 i ft , To gain a clear and diftintJ Idea of Paffion y 
 we muft define both the Name and the Thing. 
 
 To begin with the Definition of the Name ; we 
 are not here to underftand the Word Paffion in 
 ins vulgar and moft limited Senfe, as it fignifies 
 merely Anget or Fury -, nor do we take it in its 
 moft extenfive philofophical Senfe, for the fuf- 
 taining the Ablion of an Agent ; but in the more li- 
 mited philofophical Senfe, PaJJions fignify the va- 
 rious Affections of the Mind, fuch as Admiration, 
 Love, or Hatred ; this is the Definition of the Name. 
 
 We proceed to the Definition of the Thing. 
 Paffion is defined a Senfation offomefpecial Commotion 
 in animal Nature, occafeoned by the Mind's Perception 
 offome Objettfuited to excite that Commotion. * Here 
 the Genus or general Nature of Pajfion is a Sen- 
 
 Perception of fomt OkjeS, &c. I made this Alteration in the Description of 
 the Paffions in that Bock chiefly to include in a more explicit manner the 
 Paffions of Defire and Avtrfisn w,hkh re Adts of Volition rather than Sen- 
 jatiins. Yet fincefome Commotions of animal Nature attend all the P^flions, 
 and fi nee there is always Senfation of thefe Commotions, I fliall not change 
 the Definition I have written here : For this will agree- to all the Paffions 
 whether thtj include any At of Volition or not; Nor indeed is the Matter 
 of any great Importance. N<rv. 17. 17*8. 
 
 fation
 
 136 LOGICS Or, Part I. 
 
 fation ofjome facial Commotion in animal Nature 4 , 
 and herein it agrees with Hunger, Thirft, Pain* 
 &c. The effential Difference of it is, that this Com- 
 motion arises from a thought or Perception of the 
 Mind, and hereby it is diftinguifhed from Hunger, 
 Thirft, or Pain. 
 
 2 dl y, We muft conceive of it compleatly, er 
 flirvey the feveral Parts that compofe it. Thele 
 are (i.) 'The Mind*s Perception of fome Objeft. (2.) 
 The confequent Ruffle or fpecial Commotion of the 
 Nerves, and Blood, and animal Spirits. And (3.) 
 The Senfation of this inward Commotion. 
 
 3 dl r, We muft confider it comprehenfively in its 
 various Properties^ The moft effential Attributes 
 that make up its Nature have been already men- 
 tioned under the foregoing Heads. Some of the 
 moft considerable Properties that remain are thefe* 
 viz. That Pajjion belongs to all Mankind, in greater 
 or lefier Degrees : // is not conflantly prefent -with 
 us, but upon fome certain Occaftons : It is appointed 
 by our Creator for various ufeful Ends and Purpofes^ 
 viz. to give us Vigour in the Purfuit of what is 
 good and agreeable to us, or in the Avoidance of 
 what is hurtful : It is very proper for our State of 
 Trial in this World : It is not utterly to be rooted out 
 of our Nature, but to be moderated and governed ac^ 
 cording to Rules of Virtue and Religion, &c< 
 
 4'Wy, We muft take Cognizance of the various 
 Kinds of it, which is call'd an extenfeve Conception 
 of it. If the Object which the Mind perceives 
 be very uncommon, it excites the Paffion of Ad- 
 miration. If the Object appear agreeable it raifes 
 Love : If the agreeable Object be abfent and at- 
 tainable it is Defers : If likely to be obtain'd, it 
 excites Hope : If unattainable, Defpair : If it be 
 prefent and pojjeft, it is the Paflion of Joy : If loft, 
 i r t excites Sorrow. If the Object be difagreeable.
 
 C.VI.S. 13. Tbe right Ufi of Rezfon. 137 
 
 it caufes in general Hatred or Averfeon : If it be 
 abfent and yet we are in Danger of it, it raifes 
 our Fear : If it be prefent, it is Sorrow and Sad- 
 nefs, &c. 
 
 5*17, All thefe Things and many more which 
 go to compofe a Treatife on this Subject muft be 
 placed in their proper Order : A flight Specimen 
 of which is exhibited in this fhort Account of 
 Paflion, and which that admirable Author Def- 
 cartes has treated of at large ; tho* for want of 
 fufficient Experiments and Obfervations in natural 
 Philofophy, there are fome few Miftakes in his 
 Account of animal Nature. 
 
 SECT. XIII. 
 
 An niuftration of thefe five Rules by Similitudes. 
 
 THUS we have brought the firft Part of Lo- 
 gick to a Conclufion: And it may not be 
 improper here to reprefent its Excellencies (fo far 
 as we have gone) by general Hints of its chief De* 
 fign and Ufe, as well as by a various Comparifon of it 
 to thofe Inftruments which Mankind have invented 
 for their feveral Conveniencies and Improvements. 
 The Defign of Logick is not to furnifh us with 
 the perceiving Faculty, but only to direft and af- 
 fift us in the Ufe of it : It doth not give us the 
 Objects of our Ideas, but only cafts fuch a Light 
 on thofe Objects which Nature furnifhes us with, 
 that they may be the more clearly and diftinctly 
 known : It doth not add new Parts or Properties 
 to Things, but it difcovers the various Parts, Pro- 
 perties, Relations and Dependencies of one Thing 
 upon another, and by ranking all Things under ge- 
 neral and fpecial Heads, it renders the Nature, or 
 any of the Properties, Powers, andUfesofaThing 
 
 more
 
 * 3 8 L O G I C.K: Or, Parti. 
 
 rnore eafy to be found out, when we feek in what 
 Rank of Beings it lies, and wherein it agrees with, 
 and wherein it differs from others. * 
 
 If any Comparifons would illuftrate this, it may 
 be thus reprefented; 
 
 I. When Lbgick afiifh us to attain a clear and 
 diflinft Conception of the Nature of Things by 
 Definition, it is like thofe Glaffes whereby we be- 
 hold fuch Objects diftinctly, as by reafon of their 
 Smallnefs or their great Diftance appear in Con- 
 fiifion to the naked Eye : So the Telefcope difco- 
 vers to us diftant Wonders in the Heavens, and 
 fhews the milky Way, and the bright cloudy Spots 
 in a very dark Sky to be a Collection of little 
 Stars, which the Eye unaflifted beholds in mingled 
 Confufion. So when Bodies are too fmall for our 
 Sight to furvey them diftinctly, then the Micro- 
 fcope is at hand for our Affiftance, to fhew us all 
 the Limbs and Features of the moft minute Animals, 
 with great Clearnefs and Diftinction. 
 
 II. When we are taught by Logick to view a 
 Thing compleatly in all its Parts by the Help of 
 Divifion, it has the Ufe of an anatomical Knife, 
 which diflects an animal Body, and feparates the 
 Veins, Arteries, Nerves, Mufcles, Membranes, &c. 
 and fhews us the feveral Parts which go to the 
 Compofition of a compleat Animal. 
 
 III. When Logick inftructs us to furvey art 
 Object comprehenftvely in all the Modes, Properties, 
 Relations, Faces and Appearances of it, it is of 
 the fame Ufe as a terreflrial Globe, which turning 
 round on its Axis, reprefents to us all the Variety 
 of Lands and Seas, Kingdoms and Nations on the 
 Surface of the Earth in a very ihort Succeffion of 
 
 Tujie,
 
 C.VI.S. 13. 22* right life /Reafon. 139 
 
 Time fhews the Situation and various Relation of 
 them to each other, and gives a compreheniive 
 View of them fn Miniature. 
 
 IV. When this Art teaches us to diftriftute any 
 
 txtenfwe Idea into its different Kinds or Species, k 
 may be compared to the prifmatick Glafs, that re- 
 ceives the Sun-Beams or Rays of Light, which 
 leem to be uniform when falling upon it, but it 
 feparates and diftributes them into their different 
 Kinds and Colours, and ranks them in their proper 
 SuccefTion. 
 
 Or if we defcend to Subdivifions and fubordinate 
 Ranks of Being, then Diftribtttion may alfo be 
 faid to form the Refemblance of a natural Tree, 
 wherein the Genus or general Idea ftands for the 
 Root or Stock, and the feveral Kinds or Species, and 
 Individuals, are diftributed abroad, and represented 
 in their Dependence and Connection, like the fe- 
 veral Boughs, Branches, and lejjer Shoots. For In- 
 ftance, let Animal be the Root of" a logical Tree, 
 the Refemblance is Icen by mere Infpedion, tho* 
 the Root be not placed at the Bottom of the 
 Page.
 
 140 
 
 LOGICK:Or, Part I. 
 
 Pbilip 
 Man fames 
 Peter 
 
 Beaft . 
 
 &c. 
 
 Squirrel 
 
 MaftifF. 
 spaniel. 
 Greyhound. 
 
 Animal *! 
 
 Eagle 
 |Lark 
 )Duck- 
 Goofe, 
 
 CTrout 
 
 Fifli C Whale 
 COyfter, 
 
 Infeft, 
 
 CMneMt. 
 
 \MlfLy. 
 
 orm. 
 
 The fame Similitude will ferve alfo to illuftrate 
 the Divifion and Subdivifion of an integral Whde y 
 into its feveral Parts. 
 
 When Logick diredts us to place all our Ideas 
 in a proper Method, moft convenient both for In- 
 ftruction and Memory, it doth the fame Service 
 
 as
 
 C.VI.S.I3. Me Right Ufe of Rezfon: 141 
 
 as the Cafes of weU contrived Shelves in a large Li- 
 brary wherein Folio's, Quarto's, Oftavo's, and leffer 
 Volumes, are difpofed in fuch exact Order under 
 the particular Heads of Divinity, Hi/lory, Mathe- 
 maticks, ancient and mifcellaneous Learning, &V. 
 that the Student knows where to find every Book, 
 and has them all as it were within his Command 
 at once, becaufe of the exact Order wherein they 
 are placed. 
 
 The Man who has fuch Afiiftances as thefe at 
 Hand, in order to manage his Conceptions and re- 
 gulate his Ideas, is well prepared to improve his 
 Knowledge, and to join theje Ifaas together in a^ 
 regular manner by Judgment, which is the fecond 
 Operation of the Mind, and will be the Subject 
 of the fecond Part of Logick. 
 
 THE
 
 LOGICR:Or, Part II. 
 THE 
 
 SECOND PART . 
 
 O F 
 
 L O G I C K. 
 
 Of Judgment and Proportion. 
 
 "irc'TT- HEN the Mind has got Acquaintance 
 \\/ with Things by framing Ideas of them, 
 W it proceeds to the next Operation, and 
 that is, to compare thefe Ideas together, 
 and td join them by Affirmation^ or disjoin them by 
 Negation, according as we find them to agree or 
 diftgree. This Aft of the Mind is called Judg- 
 ment ; as when we have by Perception obtained the 
 Ideas of Plato, a Philofopher, Man, Innocent, we 
 form thefe Judgments ; Plato was a Philofopher 5 
 no Man is innocent. 
 
 Some Writers have aflerted, that Judgment con- 
 fifts in a mere Perception of the Agreement or Dif- 
 agreement of Ideas. But I rather think there is an Act 
 of the Will Cat leaft in moft Cafes ) neceffary to form 
 a Judgment ; for tho' we do perceive, or think we 
 perceive Ideas to agree or difagree, yet we rnay 
 ibmerimes refrain from judging or aflenting to the 
 Perception, for fear left the Perception fliould 
 
 not
 
 Vhe Right Ufe o/Rcafon; 14 J 
 
 not be fufficiently clear, and we ftiould be mifta- 
 ken : And I am well allured at other Times, that 
 there are Multitudes of Judgments formed, and a 
 firm Affent given to Ideas join'd or disjoined, be- 
 fore there is any clear Perception whether they 
 agree or difagree -, and this is the Reafori of fo 
 many falfe Judgments or Miftakes among Men. 
 Both thefe Practices are a Proof that Judgment has 
 fomething of the Will in it, and does not merely con- 
 fift in Perception, fince we fometimes judge (tho* 
 unhappily) without perceiving, and fometimes we 
 perceive without immediate judging. 
 
 As an Idea is the Refult of our Conception or Ap- 
 prehenfion* fo a Proportion is the Effect of Judg* 
 ment. The foregoing Sentences which are Exam* 
 pies of the Act of Judgment are properly called 
 Proportions, Plato is a Philofopher* &c. 
 
 Here let us confider, 
 
 1. The general Nature of a Propofition, andtfa 
 Parts of which it is compofed. 
 
 2. 'The various Diviftons Q? Kinds of Propofi- 
 tions. 
 
 3. The Springs of falfe Judgment, ortbeDoffrine 
 sf Prejudices. 
 
 4. General Directions to aj/ift us in judging aright ". 
 
 5. Special Rules to direft us in judging farticula* 
 tyjfftf. 
 
 QH A?:
 
 i44 LOGICK: Or, Part II. 
 
 CHAP. L 
 
 Of the Nature of a Proportion, and its 
 federal Parts. 
 
 A Propofition is a Sentence wherein two or 
 more Ideas or 'Terms are join'd or disjoin'd 
 by one Affirmation or Negation, as Plato was a 
 Philofopher : Every Angle is formed by two Lines 
 meeting : No Man living on Earth can be compleatly 
 happy. When there are never fo many Ideas or 
 Terms in the Sentence, yet if they are joined or 
 disjoined merely by one fingle Affirmation or Ne- 
 gation, they are properly called but one Propofiti- 
 on, tho' they may be refolved into feveral Propo- 
 fitions which are implied therein, as will appear 
 hereafter. 
 
 In defcribing a Proportion, I ufe the Word 
 Terms as well as Ideas, becaufe when mere Ideas 
 are joined in the Mind without Words, it is rather 
 called a Judgment ; but when clothed with Words, 
 it is called a Propofition, even tho' it be in the 
 Mind only, as well as when it is ejcpreft by fpeak- 
 ing or Writing. 
 
 There are three Things which go to the Nature 
 and Conftitution of a Propofition, (viz.) the Sub- 
 jeft, the Predicate and the Copula. 
 
 The Subject of a Propofition is that concerning 
 which any thing is affirmed or denied : So Plato, 
 Angle, Man living on Earth, are the Subjects of 
 the foregoing Propofitions. 
 
 The Predicate is that which is affirmed or deni- 
 ed of the Subject ; fo Philofopher is the Predicate 
 of the firft Propofiyorn formed by two Lines meet- 
 ing, is the Predicate of the fecond ; capable of be- 
 ing
 
 C I. <fhe right Ufe ofReafon; 145 
 ing compleatly happy, is the proper Predicate of the 
 third. 
 
 The Subjetf and Predicate of a Propofition taken 
 together are called the Matter of it ; for thefe are 
 the Materials of which it is made. 
 
 The Copula is the Form of a Propofition -, it re- 
 prefents the Ac"l of the Mind affirming or denying, 
 and it is expreft by the Words, am, art, is, are, 
 &c. or, am not, art not, is not, are not, &c. 
 
 It is not a Thing of Importance enough to 
 create a Difpute , whether the Words no, none, 
 not, never, &c. which disjoin the Ideas or Terms 
 in a negative Propofition, mail be called a Part of 
 the Subjeff of the Copula, or of the Predicate. 
 Sometimes perhaps they may feem moft naturally 
 to be included in one, and fometimes in another 
 of thefe, tho 1 a Propofition is ufually denomina- 
 ted affirmative or negative by its Copula, as here- 
 after. 
 
 Note i. Where each of thefe Parts of a Propo- 
 fition is not expreft diftinctly in fo many Words, 
 yet they are all underftood and implicitly contain- 
 ed therein ; as, Socrates difputed, is a compleat Pro- 
 pofition, for it fignifies, Socrates was difputing. So, 
 I die, fignifies I am dying. I can write, i. e. I am 
 able to write. In Latin and Greek one fmgle Word 
 is many Times a compleat Propofition. 
 
 Note 2. Thefe Words, am, art, is, &c. when 
 they are ufed alone without any other Predicate 
 fignify both the Aft of the Mind judging, which 
 includes the Copula, and fignify alfo attual Exift- 
 ence, which is the Predicate of that Propofition. 
 So Rome is, fignifies Rome is exiflent : 'There are 
 fomeftrange Monfters, that is, fome ftrange Mon- 
 gers are exiftent. Carthage is no more, i. e. Car- 
 thage has no Being.
 
 LOG fC K: Or, Part if 
 
 * Note 3. The Subject and Predicate of a Propo- 
 fition are not always to be known and diftinguilh'd 
 by the placing of the Words in the Sentence, but 
 by reflecting duly on the Senfe of the Words, and 
 on the Mind and Defign of the Speaker or Wri- 
 ter : As if I fay, in Africa there are many Liens, 
 I mean many Lions are exiftent in Africa : Many 
 Lions is the Subject, and exiftent in Africa is the 
 Predicate. // is proper for a Philofopher to under? 
 ft and Geometry , here the Word Proper is the Pre- 
 dicate, and all the reft is the Subject, except Is the 
 Copula. 
 
 Note 4. The Subject and Predicate of a Propo- 
 fition ought always to be two different Ideas, or 
 two different Terms , for where both the forms 
 and Ideas are the fame, it is called an identical Pro- 
 fofition, which is mere trifling, and cannot tend 
 to promote Knowledge, fuch as, a Rule is a Rule, 
 or a good Man is a good Man. 
 
 But there are fome Proportions, wherein the 
 Terms of the Subject and Predicate feem to be the 
 fame, yet the Ideas are not the fame ; nor can 
 thefe be call'd purely identical or trifling Propofiti- 
 ons ; fuch as Home is Home *, that is, Home is a 
 convenient or delightful Place -, Socrates is Socrates 
 fill ; that is, the Man Socrates is ftill a Philofo- 
 pher :' The Hero was not a Hero ; that is, the Hero 
 did not jhew bis Courage : What I have written, 1 
 have written : that is, what I wrote I jlill approve 
 'and will not alter it : What is done, is done ; that 
 is, it cannot be undone. It may be eafily obferved 
 in thefe Proportions the Term is equivocal, for in 
 the Predicate it has a different Idea from what it has 
 'in the Subjett. 
 
 There are alfo fome Proportions wherein the 
 3*<?mfofthe Subject and Predicate differ, but the 
 ideas are the fame , and thefe are not merely iden- 
 tical
 
 . II. S. i . <fbe right Ufe ^Reafon: 147 
 
 tied or trifling Propofitions ; as, impudent isjhamt- 
 lefs , a Billow is a Wave ; or Fluttm (in Latin) is 
 a Wave ; a Globe is a round Body. In thefe Pro- 
 pofitions either the Words are explained by a Defini- 
 tion of the Name, or the Ideas by a Definition of 
 the Thing, and therefore they are by no Means 
 tifelefs, when formed for this Purpofe. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the various Kinds of Proportions. 
 
 PRopofitions may be distributed into various 
 Kinds according to their Subjeft, their Copula, 
 their Predicate, their Nature or Compofition, their 
 Senfe, and their Evidence, which Diftributions will 
 be explained in the following Sections. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of univerfal, particular, indefinite) and fingula? 
 Proportions, 
 
 PRopofitions may be divided according to their 
 Subjeft into univerfal and particular ; this ia 
 ufually call'd a Divifion arifing from the Quantity* 
 
 An univerfal Proportion is when the Subject Js 
 taken according to the whole of its Extenfion ; 
 fo if the Subjed be a Genus or general Nature, 
 it includes all its Species or Kinds : If the SubjecT: 
 be a Species, it includes all its Individuals. This 
 Univerfality is ufually fignified by thefe Words, 
 Ally every, no, none, or the like 5 as, all Men mult
 
 I 4 S LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 die : No Man is Almighty : Every Creature had a 
 
 A -particular Proportion is when the Subject is 
 not taken according to its whole Extenfion ; that 
 is, when the Term is limited and reftrained to 
 fome one or more of thofe Species or Individuals^ 
 whofe general Nature it exprefies, but reaches 
 not to all ; and this is ufually denoted by the 
 Words, fome y many, a few, there are 'which. &c. 
 as fome \Eirds can fing well: Few Men are truly 
 wife : 'There are Parrots 'which will talk a hundred 
 Mings. 
 
 Under the general Name of univerfal Propofiti- 
 ens, we may juftly include thofe that wtfingu- 
 lar, and for the moft Part thofe that are indefinite 
 alfo. 
 
 AJingular Proportion is when the Subject is a 
 iingular or individual Term or Idea ; as Defcartes 
 was an ingenious Philofopher : Sir Ifaac Newton 
 tas far exceeded all his Predeceffors : Fhe Palace at 
 Hampton - Court is a pleafant Dwelling : This Day 
 is very cold. The Subject here mud be taken ac- 
 cording to the whole of its Extenfion, becaufe be- 
 ing an individual, it can extend only to one, and 
 it muft therefore be regulated by the Laws of uni- 
 vrfal Proportions. 
 
 An indefinite Propofition, is, when no Note, ei- 
 ther of Univerfality or Particularity, is prefixed to 
 a Subject, which is in its own Nature general ; 
 as a Planet is ever changing its Place : Angels are 
 noble Creatures. Now this fort of Propofition, 
 efpecially when it defcribes the Nature of Things, 
 is ufually counted univerfal alfo, and it fuppofes 
 the Subject to be taken in its whole Extenfion ; 
 for if there were any Planet which did not change 
 or any Angel that were not a noble 
 Creature*
 
 C. II. S. I . tibe right Vfe 'of Reafon. 149 
 Creature, thefe Propofitions would not be ftrictly 
 true. 
 
 Yet in order to fecure us againft Miftakes in 
 judging of univerfal i particular and indefinite Pro- 
 pofitions, it is neceffary to make thefe following 
 Remarks. 
 
 .."".' 
 
 I. Concerning univerfal Propofitions. 
 
 Note i. Univerfal Terms may either denote a 
 metaphyfical, a phyfical, or a moral Univeriality. 
 
 A metapbyfical, or mathematical Univerfality, is 
 when all the Particulars contained under any ge- 
 neral Idea have the fame Predicate belonging to 
 them without any Exception whatfoever ; or when 
 the Predicate is fo eflential to the univerlal Sub- 
 ject, that it deftroys the very Nature of the Sub- 
 ject to be without it ; as, all Circles have a Centre 
 and Circumference : All Spirits in their own Nature 
 are immortal. 
 
 A phyfical or natural Univerfality* is, when ac- 
 cording to the Order and common Courfe of Na- 
 ture, a Predicate agrees to all the Subjects of that 
 Kind, tho* there may be fome accidental and pre- 
 ternatural Exceptions , as, all Men ufe Words to 
 exprefs their Thoughts , yet dumb Perfons areexcept- 
 ed, for they cannot fpeak. AH Beafts have four 
 Feet* yet there may be fome Monfiers with five \ 
 or maim'd, who have but three. 
 
 A moral Univerfality^ is when the Predicate a- 
 grees to the greateft part of the Particulars which 
 are contained under the univerfal Subject ; as all 
 Negroes are ftupid Creatures : All Men are governed 
 by Affection rather than by Reafon : All the old Ro- 
 mans loved their Country : And the Scripture uies 
 this Language, when St. Paul tells us, Tbe Cretes 
 are always Liars. 
 
 "Now
 
 LOGIC K: Or, Part It 
 
 Now it is evident, that a fpecial orfingular Con- 
 clufion cannot be inferr'd from a moral Unvutrfo&y, 
 nor always and infallibly from a phyfecal one, tho* 
 it may be always inferred from a Univerfality 
 which is metaphyfical, without any Danger or Poffi- 
 bility of a Miftake. 
 
 Let it be obferved alfo, that ufually we make 
 little or no Distinction in common Language, be- 
 tween a Subject that is phyfically or metaphyjically 
 univerfal. 
 
 Note 2. An univerfal Term is fometimes taken 
 'eolleffively for all its particular Ideas united toge- 
 ther, and fometimes diftributively, meaning each 
 of them fingle and alone. 
 
 Inftances of a collective Univerfal are fuch as 
 thefe : All thefe Apples -will Jill a Bujhel : All ths 
 Hours of the Night are fufficient for Sleep : All the 
 Rules of Grammar overload the Memory. In thefe 
 Propofitions it is evident, that the Predicate be- 
 longs not to the Individuals feparately, but to the 
 whole collective Idea ; for we cannot affirm the 
 fame Predicate if we change the Word all into one, 
 or into every, we cannot fay one Apple or every Ap- 
 ple will fill a Bujhel, &c. Now fuch a collective 
 Idea when it becomes the Subject of a Propofition, 
 ought to be efteemed as one fingle Thing, and 
 this renders the Propofition fingular or indefinite, as 
 we (hall mew immediately. 
 
 A dijlributive Univerfal will allow the Word all 
 to be changed into every, or into one, and by this 
 Means is diftinguifh'd from a collective. 
 
 Inftances of a diftributive Univerfal, are the moft 
 common on every Occafion ; as, all Men are mor- 
 tal : Every Man is a Sinner, &c. But in this fort 
 of Univerfal there is a Distinction to be made, 
 which follows in the next Remark*
 
 C H. S. I. fbe right Ufe fl/'Reaforh f $f 
 
 Note 3. When an univerfal Term is taken dif- 
 tributively, fometimes it includes all the Individu- 
 als contained in its inferior Species : As when I 
 fay every Sicknefs has a Tendency to Death ; I mean 
 every Individual Sicknefs as well as every Kind* 
 But foinetimes it includes no more than merely 
 each Species or Kind ; as when the Evangelift fay$ 
 Cbrift healed every Difeafe, or every Difeafe was 
 healed by Chrift ; that is, every Kind of Difeafe. 
 The frft of thefe. Logicians call the Diftribution 
 of an Univerfal in fmgula generum ; the loft is a 
 Diftribution in genera fengulorum. But either of 
 them joined to the Subject render a Propofition uni- 
 verfal. 
 
 Note 4. The Univerfality of a Subject is often 
 reftrained by a Part of the Predicate ; as when we 
 fay all Men learn Wifdom by Experience : The uni- 
 verfal Subject, all Men, is limited to fignify only, 
 all tbofe Men who learn Wifdom. The Scripture 
 alfo ufes this fort of Language, when it fpeaks of 
 all Men being jujlified by the Righteoufnefs of one % 
 Rom. v. 1 8. that is all Men who are juftified ob- 
 tain it this way. 
 
 Obferve here, that not only a metaphyfical or na- 
 tural, but a moral Univerfality alfo is oftentimes 
 to be reftrained by a part of the Predicate ; as when 
 we fay, all the Dutch are good Seamen : All the Ita- 
 lians are fubtle Politicians ; that is, thofe among the 
 Dutch who are Seamen, are good Seamen ; and. 
 thofe among the Italians who are Politicians* 
 are fubtle Politicians, /. e. they are generally 
 ib. 
 
 Note 5. The Univerfality of a Term is many 
 times reftrained by the particular Time, Place, Cir- 
 tumftance, &c. or the Defign of the Speaker ; as 
 if we are in the City of London, and fay, all the 
 to preftnt their Petition , we meat* 
 
 only
 
 LOGIC K: Or, Part IL 
 
 only all the Weavers who dwell in the City. So 
 when it is faid in the Gofpel, all Men did marvel, 
 Mark v. 20. it reaches only to all thofe Men who 
 heard of the Miracles of our Saviour. 
 
 Here alfo it fhould be obferved, that a moral 
 Univerfality is reftrain'd by 'Time, Place, and o- 
 ther Circumftances as well as a natural ; fo that by 
 thefe Means the Word all fometimes does not ex- 
 tend to a tenth Part of thofe who at firft might 
 feem to be included in that Word. 
 
 One Occafion of thefe Difficulties and Ambigu- 
 ities, that belong to univerfal Proportions, is the 
 common Humour and Temper of Mankind, who 
 generally have an Inclination to magnify their I- 
 deas, and to talk roundly and univerfally concern- 
 ing any thing they Ipeak of ; which has introdu- 
 ced univerfal Terms of Speech into Cuftom and 
 Habit, in all Nations and all Languages, more 
 than Nature or Reafon would dictate , yet when 
 this Cuftom is introduced, it is not at all improper 
 to ufe this fort of Language in folemn and facred 
 Writings, as well as in familiar Difcourfe. 
 
 II. Remarks concerning indefinite Propofttions. 
 
 Note i. Propofitions Carrying in them univerfal 
 Forms of Expreffion, may fometimes drop the 
 Note of Univerfality, and become indefinite, and 
 yet retain the fame univerfal Senfe, whether meta- 
 fhyfecal, natural or moral, whether collelive or di- 
 jftributive. 
 
 We may give Inftances of each of thefe. 
 
 Metaphyfical ; as a Circle has a Center and Cir- 
 cumference. Natural ; as, Beafts have four Feet. 
 Moral , as, Negroes areftupid Creatures. Collec- 
 tive ; as, the Apples will fill a Bufhel. Diftribu- 
 tive ; as, Men are mortal. 
 
 Note 2t
 
 C. II. S. i . ?he right Ufe 0/*Reafon.' 1 53 
 
 Note 2. There are many Cafes wherein a collet 
 the Idea is expreft in a Propofition by an indefinite 
 Term, and that where it defcribes the Nature or 
 Quality of the Subject, as well as when it declares 
 fome fa/I Matters of Faff ; as Fir-trees fet in good 
 Order will give a charming Profpeff ; this muft 
 fignify a Collection of Fir-Trees, for one makes no 
 JProlpect. In Matters of Fact this is more evident 
 and frequent ; as the Romans overcame the Gauls : 
 *The Robbers furrounded the Coach : The wild Geefe 
 few ov.er the Thames in the Form of a Wedge. All 
 thefe are collective Subjects. 
 
 Note 3. In indefinite Proportions the Subject is 
 often restrained by the Predicate, or by the fpe- 
 cial Time, Place, or Circumftances, as well as in 
 Propofitions which are expreQy univerfal ; as, the 
 Chinefes are ingenious Silk-Weavers, i. e. thofe 
 Chinefrs, which are Silk-Weavers are ingenious at 
 their Work. The Stars appear to us when the Twi- . 
 light is gone. This can fignify no more than the 
 Stars which are above our Horizon. 
 
 Note 4. All thefe Reflections tend to reduce 
 fome indefinite Propofitions almoft into particular ', 
 as will appear under the next Remarks. 
 
 III. Remarks concerning particular Propofitions. 
 
 Note i . A particular Propofition may fometimes 
 be expreft indefinitely, without any Note of Parti- 
 cularity prefixt to the Subject ; as, in Times of Con 
 fufion Laws are not executed : Men of Virtue are dif- 
 graced, and Murtherers efcape^ i. e. fome Laws> 
 fome Men of Virtue, fome Murtherers : Unlefs we 
 mould call this Language a moral Univerfality^ tho* 
 I think it can hardly extend fo far. 
 
 Note 2. TheWordsfome,afew,&c. tho' they ge- 
 nerally denote a proper Particularity, yet fometimes 
 shey exprefs a colleftive Idea \ as, fome of the Ene- 
 mies
 
 154 L O G I C K: Or, Part IL 
 
 mics befet the General around. A few Greeks would 
 beat a thoufand Indians. 
 
 I conclude this Seffion with a few general Re- 
 marks on this Subject, (viz.) 
 
 Gen. Rent. I. Since univerfal, Indefinite and par- 
 ticular Terms in the plural Number may either be 
 taken in a collective or a diftributive Senfe, there is 
 one mort and eafy Way to find when they are collec- 
 tive and when diftributive, (viz.) If the Plural Num- 
 ber may be chang'd into the fingular, i. e. if the 
 Predicate will agree to one fingle Subject, it is a 
 diftribulive Idea ; if not, it is collective. 
 
 Gen. Rem. II. Univerfal and particular Terms-in 
 the plural Number, fuch as, all, fome, few, many, 
 &c. when they are taken in their diftributive Senle, 
 reprefent feveral fingle Ideas -, and when they are 
 thus affixed to the Subject of a Propofition, render 
 that Propofition univerfal or particular, according to 
 the univerfality or particularity of the Terms affixt. 
 
 Gen. Rem. III. Univerfal and particular Terms 
 in the plural Number, taken in their collective Senfe, 
 ireprefent generally one collective Idea. 
 
 If this one collective Idea be thus reprefented 
 (whether by univerfal or particular Termsj as the 
 Subject of a Propofition which defcribes the Na- 
 ture of a Thing, it properly makes either a fingu- 
 lar or an indefnite Propofition ; for the Words, all* 
 feme, a few, &c. do not then denote the Quanti- 
 fy of the Propofition, but are efteemed merely as 
 Terms which connect the Individuals together in 
 order to compofe one collective Idea. Obferve 
 thefe Inftances, all the Sycamores in the Garden 
 would make a large Grove ; i. e. this one Col- 
 lection of Sycamores, which is a fmgular Idea.
 
 GIL S. i. fbe right Ufe ^Reafori: 15 j 
 
 Some of the Sycamores in the Garden would make a 
 fine Grove. Sycamores would make a noble Grove : In 
 thefe laft the Subject is rather indefinite than fingu- 
 lar. But it is very evident, that in each of thefe 
 Propofitions the Predicate can only belong to a col- 
 lective Idea, and therefore the Subject muft be 
 efteemed a colleftiwe. 
 
 If this collective Idea (whether reprefented by u- 
 niverfal or particular Terms) be ufed in defcribing 
 pafl Matters of Faft, then it is generally to be 
 efteemed zfingular Idea, and renders the Propofi- 
 tion fingular* as, all the Soldiers of Alexander made 
 but a little Army : A few Macedonians vanquijhca 
 the large Army of Darius : Some Grenadiers in the 
 Camp plundered all the neighbouring Towns. 
 
 Now we have fhewn before, that if a Propo- 
 fition defcribing the Nature of Things has an indefi- 
 nite Subject, it is generally to be efteemed univerfal 
 in its propofitional Senfe : And if it has a fingular 
 Subjeft, in its propofitional Senfe it is always rankc 
 with Univerfals. 
 
 After all we rhuft be forced to confefs, that the 
 Language of Mankind, and the Idioms of Speech 
 are fo exceeding various, that it is hard to reduce 
 them to a few I^ules ; and if we would gain a juft 
 and precife Idea of every univerfai, particular 
 and indefinite Expreflion, we muft not only confi- 
 der the peculiar Idiom of the Language, but the 
 Time, the Place, the Occafion, the Circumftan- 
 ces of the Matter fpoken of, and thus penetrate 
 as far as pofTible into the Defign of the Speaker of 
 Writer, 
 
 Sfccf,
 
 156 L G I C K: Or, Part II 
 
 SECT. II. 
 Of affirmative and negative Proportions. 
 
 WH E N a Propofition is confidered with Re- 
 gard to its Copula, it may he divided into 
 affirmative and negative ; for it is the Copula joins 
 or disjoins the two Ideas. Others call this a Divifi- 
 on of Propofitions according to their Quality. 
 
 An affirmative Propofition. is when the Idea of 
 the Predicate is fuppofed to agree to the Idea of 
 ths Subjecl, and is joined to it by the Word is 9 
 or are, which is the Copula , as all Men are Sin- 
 ners. But when the Predicate is not fuppofed to 
 agree with the Subject, and is disjoined from it by 
 the Particles is not, are not, &c. the Propofition is 
 negative -, as, Man is not innocent -, or, no Man is 
 innocent. In an affirmative Propofition we aflert 
 one Thing to belong to another, and, as it were, 
 unite them in Thought and Word : In negative 
 Proportions we feparate one Thing from another, 
 and deny their Agreement. 
 
 It may feem fomething odd, that two Ideas or 
 Terms are faid to be disjoined as well as joined by a 
 Copula : But if we can but fuppofe the negative 
 Particles do really belong to the Copula of negative 
 Propofitions, it takes away the Harfhnefs of the 
 Expreflion : and to make it yet fofter, we may 
 confider that the Predicate and Subjecl: may be 
 properly faid to be joined in a Form of Words as a 
 Propofition, by connexive Particles in Grammar or 
 Logick, tho* they are disjoined in their Senfe and 
 Signification. Every Youth, who has learnt his 
 Grammar, knows there are fuch Words as disjunc- 
 tive Conjunffiws, 
 
 Several
 
 C 4 VI. S. 13. *fhe right Ufe gfReafon: 157 
 
 Several Things are worthy our Notice on this 
 Subjeft. 
 
 i ft Note. As there are fome 'Terms^ or Words * 
 and Ideas (as I have fhewn before) concerning 
 which it is hard to determine whether they are ne- 
 gative or pofitive, fo there are feme Proportions 
 concerning which it may be difficult to fay, whe- 
 ther they affirm or deny : as, when we fay, Plata 
 was no Fool : Cicero was no un/kilful O rater : Q&^ 
 far made no Expedition to Mufcovy : An Oyfter has 
 no part like an Eel : It is not neceffary for a Pbyfi- 
 cian io /peak French, and for a Phyfician to fpeak 
 French' is needlefs. The Senfe of thefe Propofi- 
 tions is very plain and eafy, tho* Logicians might 
 fquabble perhaps a whole Day, whether they 
 Jhould rank them under the Names of negative or 
 affirmative. 
 
 2 d Note. In Latin and Engli/h two Negatives 
 joined in one Sentence make an Affirmative ; as 
 when we declare no Man is not mortal, it is the 
 fame as tho' we faid, Man is mortal. But in Greek 
 and oftentimes in French two Negatives make but 
 a ftronger Denial. 
 
 3 d Note. If the mere negative Term, Not, be ad- 
 ded to the Copula of an univerfal affirmative Pro^ 
 pofition, it reduces it to a particular Negative ; as* 
 all Men are not wife, fignifies the fame as, fome 
 Men are not wife. 
 
 4 th Note* In all affirmative Propofitions, the 
 Predicate is taken in its whole Comprehenfion ; 
 that is, every efiential Part and Attribute of it is 
 affirmed concerning the Subject ; as when I fay, 
 a true Chriftian is an honefl Man, every Thing 
 that belongs to Honefty is affirmed cpncerning a 
 true Chriftian. 
 
 JL a
 
 158 LOGlCK:Or y Part IL 
 
 5 th Note. In all negative Proportions the Predi- 
 cate is taken in its whole Extenfion ; that is, eve- 
 ry Species and Individual that is contained in the 
 general Idea of the Predicate, is utterly denied con- 
 cerning the Subject: So in this Proportion, a Spi- 
 rit is not an Animal^ we exclude all forts and kinds, 
 and particular Animals whatfoever from the Idea of 
 a Spirit. 
 
 From thefe two laft Remarks we may derive 
 this Inference, that we ought to attend to the entire 
 Comprehenfeon of our Ideas, and to the univerfal 
 Extenfion of them, as far as we have proper Capa- 
 city for it, before we grow too confident in our 
 affirming or denying any Thing, which may have 
 the leaft Darknefs, Doubt or Difficulty attending 
 it : It is the want of this Attention that betrays us 
 into many Miftakes. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of the Oppofition and Converfwn of Proportions. 
 
 AN Y two Ideas being joined or disjoined in 
 various Forms will afford us feveral Propo- 
 fitions : All thefe may be diftinguimed according to 
 their Quantity and their Quality * into four, which 
 are markt or denoted by the Letters A, E, I, O, 
 thus: 
 
 Q Univerfal Affirmative. 
 
 i jUniverfal Negative. 
 
 denotes a jp articular Af f rmative . 
 
 (Particular Negative. 
 according to thefe old Latin Rhymes - 
 
 * The Reader fliould remember here, that a Propofition according to its 
 Slvantity is called univtrfal or poLrtitttUr, and according to its Quality, it if 
 Either aj/Srmativt *r ntgative< 
 
 Afferit
 
 C. II. S. 3 . 22f right Ufe of Reafon.' 1 59 
 
 Afferit A.) NegatfL, verum generaliter Ainba. 
 Afferit I, Negat O, fed particulariter Ambo. 
 
 This may be exemplified by thefe two Ideas, a 
 Vine and a Tree. 
 
 A Every Vine is a Tree. 
 E No Vine is a Tree. 
 I Some Vine is a Tree. 
 O Some Vine is not a Tree. 
 
 The Logicians of the Schools have written 
 many large Trifles concerning the Oppofition and 
 Converfwn of Propofitions. It will be fufficient 
 here to give a few brief Hints of thefe Things, 
 that the Learner may not be utterly ignorant of 
 them. 
 
 Propofitions which are made of the fame Sub- 
 ject and Predicate are faid to be oppofite, when that 
 which is denied in one is affirmed in the other, ei- 
 ther in whole or in part, without any Confideration 
 whether the Propofitions be true or no. 
 
 If they differ both in Quantity and Quality they 
 are called Contradictory, as, 
 A Every Vine is aJ Tbg& ^ never be both ^ 
 
 O Some Fine is no^ both falfe at the fame 
 
 a Tree. 3 
 
 If two Univerfals differ in Quality they arc 
 Contraries, as, 
 A Every Vine is a (< , can ncyer ^ bo(h ^ 
 
 Tree. 
 
 If two particular Propofidons differ in Quality 
 they are Subcontraries, as, 
 
 L 3 I $9Blt
 
 160 L O G I C K : Or, Part II. 
 
 I Some Vine is ^ Thefc may be both tme tQge _ 
 
 -v ree \7- - b- ther, but they can never 
 
 os**n*isMT be othfalfe . 
 
 a free. j 
 
 Both particular and univerfal Propofitions which 
 agree in Quality but not in Quantity are called Sub- 
 altern, tho' thefe are not properly oppofite, as, 
 A Every Vine is a Tree. 
 I Some Vine is a Tree. 
 
 Or thus, 
 
 E No Vine is a Tree. 
 
 O Some Vine is not a Tree. 
 
 The Canons of fubalternate Propofitions are ufu- 
 ally reckoned thefe three (viz.} (i.) If an univer- 
 fal Propofition be true, the particular will be true 
 alfo, but not on the contrary. And (2.) If a par- 
 ticular Propofition be falfe, the univerfal muft be 
 falfe too, but not on the contrary. (3.) Subaltern 
 Propofitions , whether universal or particular, 
 may fometimes be both true and fometimes both 
 falfe. 
 
 The Converjion of Propofitions is when the Sub- 
 ject and Predicate change their Places with Pre- 
 fervation of the Truth. This may be done with 
 conftant Certainty in all univerfal Negatives and 
 particular Affirmatives ; as no Spirit is an Animal, 
 may be converted, no Animal is a Spirit ; andfome 
 Tree is a Vine, may be converted, fome Vine is a 
 Tree. But there is more formal Trifling in this 
 fort of Difcourfe than there is of folid Improvement, 
 becaufe this fort of Converfion arifes merely from 
 the Form of Words, as connected in a Propofition, 
 rather than from the Matter. 
 
 Yet it may be ufeful to obferve, that there are 
 
 fome Propofitions, which by Reafon of the Ideas 
 
 pr Matter of which they are compofed may be 
 
 converted with conftant Truth : Such are thofe 
 
 4 Propofitions
 
 C.II.S.4. *[%<> right Ufe of Reafon. 161 
 Proportions whofe Predicate is a. nominal or real 
 Definition of the Subject, or the Difference of it, 
 or a Property of the fourth Kind, or a fuperlative 
 Degree of any Property or Quality whatfoever, or 
 in fhort, wherefoever the Predicate and the Sub- 
 ject have exactly the fame Extenfion or the fame 
 Comprehenfion ; as, every Vine is a 'Tree bearing 
 Grapes ; and every 'Tree bearing Grapes is a Vine : 
 Religion is the trueftWiflom , and the true& Wlf- 
 dom is Religion : Julius Caefar was the frsJ Em- 
 peror of Rome ; and the frsJ Emperor of Rome 
 was Julius Csefar. Thefe are the Propofitions 
 which are properly convertible, and they are called 
 reciprocal Propofitions. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 Of pure and modal Propofitions, 
 
 ANother Divifion of Propofitions among the 
 fcholaftick Writers is into pure and modal. 
 This may be called (for Diftinction fake) a Divifi- 
 on according to the Predicate. 
 
 When a Propofition merely exprefles that the 
 Predicate is connected with the Subject, it is calPd 
 a pure Propofition ; as, every true Chriftian is an 
 bone ft Man. But when it includes a lib the Way 
 and Manner wherein the Predicate is connected 
 with the Subject, it is call'd a modal Propofition^ 
 as, when I fay, it is necejfary that a true Chriftian 
 Jhould be an hcneft Man. 
 
 Logical Writers generally make the Modality 
 of this Propofition to belong to the Copula, be- 
 caufe it fhews the Manner of the Connection be- 
 tween Subject and Predicate. But if the Form 
 of the Sentence as a logical Propofition be duly 
 coniider'd, the Mode itfelf is the very Predicate 
 L 4 <>f
 
 i6a L O G I K : Or, Part E. 
 
 of the Propofition, and it muft run thus : Mat a 
 if rue Chriflian Jhould be an honesJ Man is a necejjary 
 Thing, and then the whole primary Propofition is 
 included in the Subject of the modal Propofition. 
 
 There are four Modes pf connecting the Predi- 
 cate with the Subject, which are ufually reckoned 
 up on this Occafion, (viz.) NeceJJity and Contin- 
 gency which are two Oppofites, Pofjibility and Im- 
 fojjibility which are alfo Oppofites ; as, it is ne- 
 ceffary that a Globe Jhould lye round : That a Globe 
 le made of Wood or Glafs is an unneceffary or con- 
 tingent Thing : It is impqffible that a Globe Jhould 
 bfffquare : It is pojjible that a Globe may be made of 
 Water. 
 
 With Regard to thefe modal Proportions which 
 the Schools have introduced, I would make thefe 
 two Remarks. 
 
 Remark i. Thefe Propofitions in Englifh are 
 formed by the Refolution of the Words, muSt be, 
 might not be, can be, and cannot be, into thofe more 
 explicate Forms of a logical Copula and Predi- 
 cate, is neceffary, is contingent, is pojjible, is impof- 
 ftble : For it is neceffary that a Globe Jhould be round, 
 fignifies no more than that a Globe musJ be 
 
 Remark 2. Let it be noted that this quadru- 
 ple Modality is only an Enumeration of the na- 
 'tural Modes or Manners wherein the Predicate is 
 connected with the Subject : We might alfo de- 
 fcribe feveral moral and civil Modes of connecting 
 two Ideas together (viz.) Lawfulness and Unlaw- 
 fulnefs, Conveniency and Inconveniency, &c. whence 
 we may form fuch modal Propofitions as thefe. It 
 is unlawful for any Perfon to kill an innocent Man : 
 ft is lawful for Cbriftians to eat Flejh in Lent : To 
 
 tell
 
 C. II. S. 5. fbc right Ufe ofRcdon. 163 
 
 tell all that we think is inexpedient : For a Man to 
 be affable to his Neighbour is 'very convenient, &c. 
 
 There are feveral other Modes of fpeaking where- 
 by a Predicate is connected with a Subject : fuch 
 as, it is certain, it is doubtful, it is -probable, it is 
 improbable, it is agreed, it is granted, it is faulty 
 the Ancients, it is written, &c. all which will form 
 other kinds of modal Propofitions. 
 
 But whether the Modality be natural, moral, &c. 
 yet in all thefe Propofitions it is the Mode is the 
 proper Predicate, and all the reft of the Propofition, 
 except the Copula (or Word is] belongs to the Sub- 
 jef ; and thus they become pure Propofitions of a 
 complex Nature, of which we mall treat in the 
 next Section, fo that there is no great Need of ma- 
 king Modals a diftinct Sort. 
 
 There are many little Subtilties which the Schools 
 acquaint us with concerning the Converfwn and Op- 
 pofition, and Equipollence of thefe modal Propo- 
 fitions, fuited to the Latin or Greek Tongues, ra- 
 ther than the Englijh, and fit to pafs away the 
 Idle Time of a Stu4ent, rather than to enrich his 
 Underftanding, 
 
 S E c T. V. 
 Of fingle Propofitions, whether fimple or complex. 
 
 WH E N we confider the Nature of Propofiti- 
 ons, together with the Formation of them, 
 and the Materials whereof they are made, we di- 
 vide them into fingle and compound* 
 
 A fingle Propofition is that which has but one 
 Subject and one Predicate ; but if it has more Sub- 
 jects or more Predicates, it is called a compound Pro- 
 pofition, and indeed it contains two or more Prp-r 
 ppfitions in it.
 
 164 L G I C K : Or, Part II. 
 
 A Jingle Propofition (which is alfo called cate- 
 gorical] may be divide4 again mtofimple and corn- 
 flex*. 
 
 A purely fimple Propofition is that whofe Subject 
 and Predicate are made up of fingle Terms ; as, 
 Virtue is deferable : Every Penitent is pardon* d : No 
 Man is innocent. 
 
 When the Subject, or Predicate, or both, are 
 made up of complex Terms, it is called a complex 
 Propofition ; as every fmcere Penitent is pardon' d ; 
 Virtue is defirable for its own Sake : No Man alive 
 is perfectly innocent. 
 
 If the Term which is added to the Subject of a 
 complex Propofition be either effential or any Way 
 neceflary to it, then it is called explicative, for it 
 only explains the Subject : as every Mortal Man 
 is a Son of-Adzm. But if the Term added to make 
 up the complex Subject does not necefiarily or 
 conftantly belong to it, then it is determinative, 
 and limits the Subject to- a particular part of its 
 Extenfion ; as, every pious Man Jhall be bappy. 
 In the firft Propofition the Word mortal is mere- 
 ly explicative : in the fccond Propofition the Word 
 pious is determinative. 
 
 Here note, that whatfoever may be affirmed or 
 denied concerning any Subject with an explicative 
 Addition, may be alfo affirmed or denied of that 
 Subject without it ; as we may boldly fay, every 
 Man is a Son of Adam, as well as, every mortal 
 Man : But it is not fo, where the Addition is de- 
 terminative, for we cannot fay, every Manjball be 
 happy, tho' every pious Man mall be fo. 
 
 * As fimple Ideas are oppofed to complex, an&fingh Ideas to compound, fo 
 Propofitions are diftinguiflied in the fame Manner : The Englijh Tongue in 
 thisRefpeft having fome Advantage above the learned Languages, which 
 have noufuai Word to diftinguifli/g/e fromftmfie. 
 
 In
 
 C. II. S, 6. *fbe right Uje c/Reafon; 
 
 In a complex Proportion the Predicate or Sub- 
 ject is fometimes made convex by the Pronouns, 
 who, which, whofe, to whom, &c. which make 
 another Propofition , as every Man who is pious, 
 Jhall be faved : Julius, whofe Sirname was Ctsfar^ 
 overcame Pompey : Bodies which are tranfparent, 
 have many Pores. Here the whole Propofition is 
 called the primary or chief, and the additional Pro- 
 pofition is called an incident Propofition. But it is 
 {till to be efteem'd in this Cafe merely as a part of 
 the complex Term , and the Truth or Falfhood 
 of the whole complex Propofition is not to be judged 
 by the Truth or Falfhood of the incident Propofi- 
 tion, but by the Connection of the whole Subject: 
 with the Predicate. For the incident Propopofi- 
 tion may be falfe, and abfurd, or impoflible, and 
 yet the whole complex Propofition may be true, 
 as, a Horfe which has Wings, might fly over the 
 Thames. 
 
 Befide this Complexion which belongs to the Sub- 
 jett or Predicate, logical Writers ufe to fay, there 
 is a Complexion which may fall upon the Copula 
 alfo : But this I have accounted for in the SeEliou 
 concerning modal Proportions ; and indeed it is 
 not of much Importance whether it were placed 
 there or here. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 Of compound Proportions. 
 
 A Compound Propofition is made up of two or 
 more Subjects or Predicates, or both ; and 
 it contains in it two or more Propofitions, which 
 are either plainly expreft, or concealed and implfd. 
 
 The
 
 i66 L G I C K : Or, Part II. 
 
 The frjt fort of compound Proportions are thofe 
 wherein the Competition is expreft and evident , and 
 they are diftinguifh'd into thefe fix Kinds, (viz.) 
 Copulative, Disjunctive, Conditional, Caufal, Re- 
 lative and Difcretive. 
 
 I. Copulative Proportions are thofe which have 
 more Subjects or Predicates connected by affirma- 
 tive or negative Conjunctions -, as Riches and Ho- 
 nours are Temptations to Pride : Casfar conquered the 
 Gauls and the Britons : Neither Gold nor Jewels 
 will purchafe Immortality. Thefe Propofitions are 
 evidently compounded, for each of them may be 
 refolved into two Propofitions, (viz.) Riches are 
 Temptations to Pride , and Honour is a Temptation 
 to Pride -, and fo the reft. 
 
 The Truth of copulative Propofitions depends 
 upon the Truth of all. the Parts of them -, for if 
 C&far had conquered the Gauls, and not the Bri- 
 tons, or the Britons and not the Gauls, the fecond 
 copulative Propofition had not been true. 
 
 Here note, thofe Propofitions, which cannot be 
 refolved into two or more fimple Propofitions, are 
 not properly copulative, tho* two or more Ideas 
 be connected and coupled by fuch Conjunctions, 
 either in the Subject or Predicate ; as, two 'and 
 three make five : Majefty and Meeknefs don't often 
 meet : The Sun, Moon, and Stars are not all to be 
 feen at once. Such Propofitions are to be efteem'd 
 merely complex, becaufe the Predicate cannot be af- 
 firmed of each fmglc Subject, but only of all of 
 them together as a collective Subject. 
 
 II. Disjunctive Propofitions are when the Parts, 
 are disjoined or oppofed to one another by diSr . 
 junctive Particles ; as, it is either Day or 
 
 4
 
 C.II.S.6. rteRtgfcUfeofR&ifon: 167 
 
 *The Weather is either Jhining or rainy : Quantity is 
 either Length, Breadth, or Depth. 
 
 The Truth of Disjunctives depends on the ne- 
 ceflary and immediate Oppofition of the Parts ; 
 therefore only the laft of thefe Examples is true ; 
 but the two firft are not ftrictly true, becaufe Twi- 
 light is a Medium between Day and Night ; and 
 dry, cloudy Weather is a Medium between Jhining 
 and raining. 
 
 III. Conditional or hypothetical Propofitions are 
 thofe whofe Parts are united by the conditional 
 Particle */; as, If the Sun be fixt, the Earth muft 
 move : If there be no Fire, there will be no Smoke. 
 
 Note, The firft Part of thefe Propofitions, or 
 that wherein the Condition is contained, is called 
 the antecedent, the other is called the confequent. 
 
 The Truth of thefe Propofitions depends not at 
 all on the Truth and Falfhood of their two Parts, 
 but on the Truth of the Connexion of them ; for 
 each part of them may be falfe, and yet the whole 
 Propofition true ; as, if there be no Providence, 
 .thert will be no future Punijhment. 
 
 IV. Caufal Propofitions are where two Propofi- 
 tions are joined by caufal Particles -, as, Houfes were 
 not built that they might be deftroyed : Rehoboam 
 was unhappy becaufe he followed evil Counfel. 
 
 The Truth of a caufal Propofition arifes not 
 from the Truth of the Parts, but from the caufal 
 Influence that the one Part of it has upon die 
 other ; for both Parts may be true, yet the Propo- 
 fition falfe, if one Part be not the Caufe of the 
 other. 
 
 Some Logicians refer reduplicative Propofitions 
 to this Place, as Men, confidered as Men, are ra- 
 tional Creatures, i. e. becaufe they are Men. 
 
 V. Rf-
 
 168 L G I C K: Or, Part It 
 
 V. Relative Propofitions have their Parts joined 
 by fueh Particles* as exprefs a Relation or Compa- 
 rifon of one Thing to another ; as, when you are 
 filent I will fpeak : As much as you are worth, fo 
 much you Jhall be ejleemed : As is the Father ; fo is 
 the Son : Where there is no Tale-Rearer, Contention 
 will ceafe. 
 
 Thefe are very much a-kin to conditional Pro- 
 pofitions, and the Truth of them depends upon the 
 Juftnefs of their Connexion. 
 
 VI. Difcretive Propofitions are fuch wherein va- 
 rious and feemingly oppofite Judgments are made 
 whofe Variety or Diftinction is noted by the Parti- 
 cles, but, tho', yet, &c. as Travellers may change 
 their Climate but not their Temper : Job was Pati- 
 ent, tho' bis Grief was great < 
 
 The Truth and Goodnefs of a difcretive Propo- 
 fition depends on the Truth of both Parts, and 
 their Contradiftinction to one another , for tho* 
 both Parts mould be true, yet if there be no 
 feeming Oppofition between them, it is an ufe- 
 lefs Afiertion, tho' we cannot call it a falfe one ; 
 as, Defcartes was a Philofopher, yet he was a 
 Frenchman : The Romans were valiant, but they 
 fpoke Latin , both which Propofitions are ridicu- 
 lous, for want of a feeming Oppofition between 
 the Parts. 
 
 Since we have declared wherein the Truth and 
 Fat/hood of thefe compound Propofitions confift, it is 
 proper alfo to give fome Intimations how any of 
 thefe Propofitions when they are falfe may be oppo- 
 fed or contradicted. 
 
 All compound Propofitions, except Copulatives 
 and Difcretives, are properly denied or contradict- 
 ed when the Negation affects their conjunctive 
 Particles j as, if the disjunctive Propofition af- 
 
 ferts,
 
 C. II. [S. 6. 2fc right Ufe ^Reafon; 
 
 ferts, it is either Day or Night. The Opponent 
 fays, It is not either Day or Night, or it is not ne- 
 ce/arythat it Jhould be either Day or Night, fo the 
 hypothetical Propofition is denied by faying, it does, 
 not follow that the Earth muft move if the Sun be fix' 'd. 
 
 A disjunctive Propofition may be contradicted 
 alfo by denying all the Parts, as, it is neither Day 
 nor Night. 
 
 And a caufal Propofition may be denied or op- 
 pofed iadirt&y and improperly, when either part of 
 the Propofition is denied , and it muft be falfe if 
 either Part be falfe : But the Defign of the Propo- 
 fition being to fhew the caufal Connexion of the 
 two Parts, each Part is fuppofed to be true, and 
 it is not properly contradicted as a caufal Proportion, 
 un lefs one Part of it be denied to be the Caufe of 
 the other. 
 
 As for Copulatives and Difcretives, becaufe their 
 Truth depends more on the Truth of their Parts, 
 therefore thefe may be oppofed or denied as many 
 Ways, as the Parts of which they are compos'd 
 may be denied -, fo this copulative Propofition, 
 Riches and Honour are 'Temptations to Pride, may 
 be denied by faying, Riches are not Temptations, 
 tbo* Honour may be : or, Honour is not a Temptation, 
 thd* Riches may be : or, neither Riches nor Honour 
 are Temptations, &c. 
 
 So this difcretive Propofition, Job was patient, 
 tho* his Grief was great, is denied by faying, Job 
 was not patient, tho* his Grief was great : or, Job 
 was patient, but hisGrief was not great : or, Job 
 was not patient, nor was his Grief great. 
 
 We proceed now to the fecondfort of compound 
 Propofitions, (viz.) fuch whofe Compofition is not 
 exprejfed, but latent or concealed, yet a fmall At- 
 tention will find two Propofitions included in them. 
 Such are thefe that follow 5 
 
 i Exclufive? 5
 
 i 7 6 L O ti I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 1. Exclufives ; as, The pious Man alone is hap- 
 py. It is only Sir Ifaac Newton could find out true 
 Philofophy. 
 
 2. Exceptives ; as, None of the Ancients but 
 Plato well defended the Soul's Immortality. 'The Pro- 
 teftants worjhip none but Ocd. 
 
 3. Comparatives-, as, Pain is the greatest Af- 
 fliction. No Turk was fiercer than the Spaniards 
 at Mexico. 
 
 Here note, that the comparative Degree does 
 not always imply the Pofitive ; as if I fay, A Fool 
 is better than a Knave ; this does not affirm that 
 Folly is Good, but that it is a lefs Evil than Kna- 
 very. 
 
 4. Ineeptives and Defitives, which relate to the 
 beginning or ending of any thing , as, the Latin 
 'Tongue is not yet forgotten. No Man before Orpheus 
 wr0/*'"Greek Verfe-, Peter Czar ofMufcovy began 
 to civilize his Nation. 
 
 To thefe may be added Continuatives ; as Rome 
 remains to this Day, which includes at leaft two 
 Propofitions, (viz.) Rome was, and Rome is. 
 
 Here let other Authors fpend Time and Pains 
 in giving the precife Definitions of all thefe forts 
 of Propofitions, which may be as well underftood 
 by their Names and Examples : Here let them tell 
 what their Truth depends upon, and how they 
 are to be oppofed or contradicted ; but a mode- 
 rate Share of common Senfe, with a Review of 
 what is faid on the former Compounds, will fuffice 
 for all thefe Purpofes without the Formality of 
 Rules. 
 
 SECT.
 
 GILS. 7. TkerigbtUfiofRe&fon. 171 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 Of true and falfe Proportions. 
 
 PRopofitions are next to be confidered accorcU 
 ing to their Senfe or Signification^ and thus 
 they are diftributed into true and falfe. A true 
 Propofttion reprefents Things as they are in them- 
 felves , but if Things are reprefented otherwife, 
 than they are in themfelves, the Propofition is 
 Me. 
 
 Or we may defcribe them more particularly 
 thus , a true Propofition joins thofe Ideas and Terms 
 together whofe Objects are joined and agree, or 
 it disjoins thofe Ideas and Terms, whofe Objects 
 difagree or are disjoined ; as every Bird has Wings* 
 a Brute is not immortal. 
 
 A falfe Propofition joins thofe Ideas or Terms 
 whofe Objects difagree, or it disjoins thofe whofe 
 Objects agree \ as Birds have no Wings, Brute's are 
 immortal. 
 
 Note, It is impofiibfe that the fame Propofition 
 fhould be both true and falfe at the fame Time, 
 in the fame Senfe and in the fame Refpect ; be-* 
 caufe a Propofition is but the Representation of 
 the Agreement or Difagreement of Things : Now 
 it is impojfible that the jame Thing /houd be and net 
 be, or that the fame Things Jhould agree and not 
 agree at the fame 'Time and in the fame Rejpeff. This 
 is a firft Principle of human Knowledge. 
 
 Yet fome Propofitions may feem to contradict 
 one another, tho' they may be both true, but in 
 different Senfes or Refpecls or Times: as, Man 
 was immortal in Paradife, and Man was mortal in 
 Paradife. But thefe two Propofitions muft be 
 refer'd to different Times ; as, Man before his Fall 
 was immortal, but at the Fall be became mortal, 
 M So
 
 172 LOGICK: Or Part II. 
 
 So we may fay now, Man is Mortal, or Man is 
 immortal, if we take thefe Propositions in diffe- 
 rent Refpects ; as, Man is an immortal Creature 
 as to his Soul, but mortal as to his Body. A great 
 Variety of Difficulties and feeming Contradictions, 
 both in holy Scripture and other Writings, may 
 be folved and explained in this manner. 
 
 The mod important Queftion on this Subject 
 is this, What is the Criterion or dijlinguifhing Mark 
 of Truth ? How fhall we know when a Propofi- 
 tion is really true or falfe ? There are fo many Dif- 
 guifes of Truth in the World, fo many falfe Ap- 
 pearances of Truth, that fome Sects have decla- 
 red there is no Poffibility of diftinguifhing Truth 
 from Faljhood ; and therefore they have abandoned 
 all Pretences to Knowledge, and maintain'd ftre- 
 nuoufly that nothing is to be known. 
 
 The firft Men of this Humour made themfelves 
 famous in Greece by the Name of Sceptics ; that 
 is, Seekers: They were alfo called Acadcmicks, 
 borrowing their Name from Academia, their 
 School or Place of Study. They taught that all 
 Things are uncertain, tho' they allow'd that fome 
 are more probable than others. After thefe arole 
 the Sect of Pyrrhonicks, named from Pyrrho their 
 Matter, who would not allow one Propofition to 
 be more probable than another ; but profefs'd that 
 all Things were equally uncertain. Now all thefe 
 Men (as an ingenious Author expreffes it) were 
 rather to be called a Sett of Liars than Philofo- 
 phers, and that Cenfure is juft for two Reafons : 
 (i.j Becaufe they determined concerning every 
 Propofition that it was uncertain, and believed 
 that as a certain Truth, while they profeffed there 
 was nothing certain, and that nothing could be 
 determined concerning Truth or Falfhood ; and 
 thus their very Doctrine gave itfelf the Lie. (2.) 
 
 Becaufe
 
 C.II.S.y. fberigbtlifeofRttCofi. 173 
 
 Becaufe they judged and acted as other Men did 
 in the common Affairs of Life , they would nei- 
 ther run into Fire nor Water, tho' they profeffed 
 Ignorance and Uncertainty j whether the one 
 would burn, or the other drown them. 
 
 There have been fome in all Ages who have 
 too much affected this Humour, who difpute 
 againft every thing, under Pretence that 'Truth has 
 no certain Mark to difliJiguiJh it. Let us therefore 
 enquire, what is the general Criterion of 'Truth ? 
 And in order to this, it is proper to confider what 
 is the Reafon why we affent to thofe Propofitions, 
 which contain the moft certain and indubitable 
 Truths, fuch as thefe, the Whole is greater than a 
 Part \ two and thr&e make five. 
 
 The only Reafon why we believe thefe Propo- 
 fitions to be true, is becaufe the Ideas of the Sub- 
 jects and Predicates appear with fo much Clear- 
 nefs and Strength of Evidence to agree to each 
 other, that the Mind cannot help difcerning the 
 Agreement, and cannot really doubt of the Truth 
 of them, but is conftrained to judge them true. 
 So when we compare the Ideas of a Circle and a 
 Triangle, or the Ideas of an Oyfler and a Butterfly , 
 we fee fuch an evident Difagreement between 
 them, that we are fure that a Butterfly is not an 
 Oyfler ; nor is a Triangle a Circle. There is no- 
 thing but the Evidence of the Agreement or Dif- 
 agreement between two Ideas, that makes us af- 
 firm or deny the one or the other. 
 
 Now it will follow from hence that a clear and 
 diflintt Perception or full Evidence of the Agreement 
 and Difagreement of our Ideas to one another, cr to 
 things, is a certain Criterion of Truth : For fince 
 our Minds are of fuch a Make, that where the Evi- 
 dence is exceeding plain and ftrong, we cannot 
 withold our Affent ; we mould then be necefia- 
 M 2 rily
 
 174 L G 1 C K: Or, Parr . 
 
 rily expofed to believe Fallhood, if compleat Evi- 
 dence mould be found in any Propofitions that 
 are not true. But furely the God of perfect Wif- 
 dom, Truth and Goodnefs would never oblige 
 his Creatures to be thus deceived ; and therefore 
 he would never have conftituted us of fuch a 
 Frame, as would render it naturally impofllble to 
 guard againft Error. . 
 
 Another Confequence is naturally derived from 
 the former , and that is, that the only Reafon 
 why we fall into a Miftake is becaufe we are im- 
 patient to form a Judgment of Things before we 
 have a clear and evident Perception of their Agree- 
 ment or Difagreement ', and if we will make hafte 
 to judge while our Ideas are obfcure and confus'd, 
 or before we fee whether they agree or difagree, 
 we mail plunge our felves into perpetual Errors. 
 See more on this Subject in an Effay on the Free- 
 dom of Will in God and Man: Publifh'd 1732 
 Sect, i. p. 13. Sold by J. Roberts in Warwick 
 Lane, and R. Hett in the Poultry. 
 
 Note, What is here afferted concerning the Ne- 
 ceflity of clear and diftincl Ideas refers chiefly to 
 Propofitions, which we form our felves by our own 
 Powers : As for Propofitions which we derive from 
 the Teftimonyof others, they will be accounted for 
 in Chap. IV. 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 Of certain and dubious Proportions, of Knowledge 
 and Opinion. 
 
 Since we have found that Evidence is the great 
 Criterion and the fure Mark of Truth ; this 
 leads us directly to confider Propofitions according 
 to their Evidence ; and here we muft take Notice 
 both of the differ&nt Degrees of Evidence, and the 
 di/erent Kinds of it. Pro-
 
 C.II. S.8. tte right Ufe of RR&&H. 175 
 
 Propofitions according to their different Degrees 
 ef Evidence are diftingui fried into certain and du- 
 bious *. 
 
 Where the Evidence of the Agreement or Dif- 
 agreement of the Ideas is fo ftrong and plain, that 
 we cannot forbid nor delay our Afient ; the Pro- 
 pofition is called certain, as, every Circle hath a 
 Centre ; the World did. not create it felf. An Affent 
 to fuch Propofitions is honcur'd with the Name of 
 Knowledge. 
 
 But when there is any Obfcurity upon the 
 Agreement or Difagreement of the Ideas, fo that 
 the Mind does not clearly perceive it, and is not 
 compell'd to afient or diffent, then the Propofi- 
 tion, in a proper and Philofophical Senfe, is called 
 doubtful or uncertain ; as, the Planets are inhabited ; 
 the Svuls of Brutes are mere Matter ; the World will 
 not (land a. thoufand Tears longer ; Dido built the 
 City of Carthage, &c. Such uncertain Propofitions 
 are called Opinions. 
 
 When we confider our felves as Pbilofopbers or 
 Searchers of Truth^ it would be well if we always 
 fufpended a full Judgment or Determination about 
 any thing v and made farther Inquiries, where this 
 plain and perfect Evidence is wanting \ but we 
 are fo prone of our felves to judge without full 
 Evidence, and in fome Cafes the Necefilty of 
 Action in the Affairs of Life conftrains us to judge 
 and determine upon a tolerable Degree of Evi- 
 dence, that we vulgarly call thofe Propofitions 
 
 * It may be ohjefted, that Ms Certainty and Uncertainty being only in the 
 Mind, the Divifion belongs to Propofitions rather accjrding to the Degrees 
 of our AfftM, then the Degrees of E-vidttxe. But it may well beanfwerfd, 
 that the Evidtnce here intended is that which appears fo to tie Mind, and 
 not the rpere Evidence in tht Nature of Things: Bifidis (as we /hall (hew 
 immediately) the Degree cf Affent ought to be exaftly proportionable to the 
 Degree of Evidence: and therefore the D.flfirence is pot^reat, whether Prc T 
 pofitions be called certain or uncertain, according to the AJtafvire of E-viJtace^ 
 
 M 3 certain
 
 176 LOGIC K: Or, Part II, 
 
 certain, where we have but very little Room or 
 Reafon to doubt of them, tho' the Evidence be 
 not com pleat and refiftlefs. 
 
 Certainty., according to the Schools, is diftin- 
 guifhed into Objective and Subjective. Objective 
 Certainty is when the Propofition is certainly true 
 in it felf; and Subjective, when we are certain of 
 the Truth of it. The one is in Things, the other 
 js in our Minds. 
 
 But let it be obferved here, that every Propofi- 
 tion in it felf is certainly true or certainly falfe. For 
 tho' Doubtfulnefs or Uncertainty feems to be a Me- 
 dium between certain Truth and certain Falfhood 
 in our Minds, yet there is no fuch Medium in 
 Things themfelves , no, not even in future Events : 
 for now at this time it is certain in it felf, that 
 Midfummer-Day feven Tears hence will be ferene, 
 or it is certain it will be cloudy, tho' we are uncer- 
 tain and utterly ignorant what fort of Day it will 
 be: This Certainty of diftant Futurities is known 
 to God only. 
 
 Uncertain or dubious Propofetions, i. e. Opinions, 
 are diftinguim'd into probable or improbable. 
 
 When the Evidence of any Propofition is great- 
 er than the Evidence of the contrary, then it is a 
 frobable Opinion : Where the Evidence and Argu- 
 ments are ftronger on the contrary Side, we call 
 it improbable. But while the Arguments on ei- 
 ther Side feem to be equally ftrong, and the Evi- 
 dence for and againft any Propofition appears 
 equal to the Mind, then in common Language we 
 call it a doubtful Matter. We alfo call it a dubi- 
 ous or doubtful Propofition when there are no Ar- 
 guments on either Side, as next Chriftmas Day 
 will be a very Jharp Froft. And in general all thefe 
 Proj>ofitions are doubtful, wherein we can per- 
 ceive no fufficient Marks or Evidences of Truth 
 
 or
 
 C. II. S. 9. The right life ^Reafon. 177 
 
 or Faljkood. In fuch a Cafe the Mind which is 
 fearching for Truth ought to remain in a State of 
 Doubt and Sufpence, until fuperior Evidence on 
 one Side or the other incline the Balance of the 
 Judgment, and determine the Probability or Cer- 
 tainty to the one Side. 
 
 A great many Propofitions which we generally 
 believe or difbelieve in human Affairs, or in the 
 Sciences, have very various Degrees of Evidence, 
 which yet arife not to compkat Certainty, either 
 of Truth or Faifhood. Thus it comes to pafs 
 that there are fuch various and almoft infinite De- 
 grees of Probability and Improbability. To a weak 
 Probability we mould give a weak Affcnt ; and a 
 ftronger Affent is due where the Evidence is greater, 
 and the Matter more probable. If we proportion 
 our AJJent in all things to the Degrees of Evidence, 
 we do the utmoft that human Nature is capable of 
 in a rational Way to fecure itlelf from Error. 
 
 SECT. IX. 
 
 Of Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reafon, Faith 
 and Infpiration. 
 
 AFTER we have confidered the Evidence of 
 Propofitions in the various Degrees of it, 
 we come to furvey the federal Kinds of Evidence, 
 or the different Ways whereby Trutli is let into 
 the Mind, and which produce accordingly feveraJ 
 kinds of Knowledge. We fhall diftribute them 
 into thefe fix (viz.) Sevfe, Confcioufnefs,' Intelli- 
 gence, Reafon, Faith, and Infpiration, and then 
 diftinguifti the Propofitions which are derived from 
 them, 
 
 M 4 I. The
 
 I 7 S L G I C K: Or, Part H. 
 
 I. The Evidence of Senfe is when we frame a 
 Propofition according to the Diflate of any or 
 our Senfes ; fo we judge that Grafs is green , that 
 a Trumpet gives a pleafant Sound -, the Fire burns 
 Wood , Water is foft, and Iron is hard ; for we 
 have feen, heard or felt all thefe. It is upon this 
 Evidence of Senfe that we know and believe the 
 daily Occurrences in human Life , and almoft all 
 the Hiftories of Mankind that are written by 
 Eye or Ear-WitnefTes are built upon this Prin- 
 ciple. 
 
 Under the Evidence of Senfe we don't only in- 
 clude that Knowledge which is derived to us by 
 our outward Senfes of Hearing, Seeing, Feeling, 
 Rafting and Smelling, but that alfo which is de- 
 rived from the inward Senfations and Appetites 
 of Hunger, Thirft, Eafe, Pleafure, Pain, Weari- 
 ?iefs, Reft, &c, and all thofe Things which belong 
 to the Body ; as Hunger is a painful Appetite, Light 
 is pleafant : Reft isfweet to the weary Limbs. 
 
 Propofitions which are built on this Evidence 
 may be named fenfiUe Propofitions, or the Dicfates 
 of Senfe. 
 
 II. As we learn what belongs to the Body by 
 the Evidence of Senfe, fo we learn what belongs 
 to the Soul by an inward Confcioufnefs, which 
 may be called a fort of internal Feeling, or fpi* 
 ritual Senfation of whatpaffes the in the Mind ; as, 
 I think before I fpeak ; I defire large Knowledge, 1 
 Jufpeff my own Practice, I fludied hard to Day ; 
 my Conference bears Wttnefs of my Sincerity ; my 
 Soul hates vain Thoughts ; Fear is an uneafy PaJJicn 5 
 \ong Meditation on one thing is tirefome. 
 
 Thus
 
 GILS. p. TherightUfeofRetfon; 179 
 
 Thus it appears that we obtain the Knowledge 
 of a Multitude of Propofitions, as well as of Jingle 
 Ideas by thofe two Principles which Mr. Locke calls 
 Senfation and Reflection : One of them is a fort of 
 Confcioufnefs of what aflfedts the Body, and the other 
 is a Confcioufnefs of what pafies in the Mind. 
 
 Propofitions which are built on this infernal Con- 
 fcioufnefs, have yet no particular or diftinguifhing 
 Name affigned to them, 
 
 III. Intelligence relates chiefly to thofe abftracted 
 Propofitions which carry their own Evidence 
 with them, and admit no Doubt about them. 
 Our Perception of this Self -Evidence in any Pro- 
 pofition is called Intelligence. It is our Knowledge 
 of thofe firft Principles of Truth which are (as it 
 were) wrought into the very Nature and Make 
 of our Minds : They are fo evident in them- 
 felves to every Man who .attends to them, that 
 they need no Proof. It is the Prerogative and 
 peculiar Excellence of thefe Propofitions, that 
 they can fcarce ever be proved or denied : They 
 cannot eafily be proved, becaufe there is nothing 
 fuppofed to be more clear or certain, from whicli 
 an Argument may be drawn to prove them. 
 They cannot well be denied, becaufe their own 
 Evidence is fo bright and convincing, that as 
 foon as the Terms are underftood the Mind ne- 
 ceflarily aflentsj fuch are thefe, Wkatfoever afteth 
 bath a Being ; Nothing has no Properties ; a Part 
 is lefs than the Whole* nothing can be the Caufe 
 ojitfelf. 
 
 Thefe Propofitions are called Axioms, or Max- 
 ims, or firft Principles -, thefe are the very Founda- 
 tions of all improved Knowledge and Reafonings, 
 and on this Account thefe have been thought to 
 be innate Propofitions, or Truths born with us. 
 
 Some
 
 i8o LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Some fuppofe that a great part of the Know- 
 ledge of Angels and human Souls in the feparate 
 State is obtained in this manner, (viz.) by fuch an 
 immediate View of Things in their own Nature, 
 which is called Intuition, 
 
 IV. Reafoning is the next fort of Evidence, and 
 that is when one Truth is inferr'd or drawn from 
 others by natural and juft Methods of Argu- 
 ment -, as, if there be much Light at Midnight, I 
 infer, it proceeds from the Moon, becaufe the Sun is 
 under the Earth. * If I fee a Cottage in a Forreft, I 
 conclude, Some Man has been there and built it. 
 Or when I furvey the Heavens and Earth, this 
 gives Evidence to my Reafon, that there is a God, 
 'who made them. 
 
 The Propofitions which I believe upon this 
 kind of Evidence, are called Conclufions, or rational 
 Truths, and the Knowledge that we gain this Way 
 is properly call'd Science. 
 
 Yet let it be noted, that the Word Science is 
 ufually applied to a whole Body of regular or me- 
 thodical Obfervations or Propofitions which learn- 
 ed Men have formed concerning any Subject of 
 Speculation, deriving one Truth from another by 
 a Train of Arguments. If this Knowledge chief- 
 ly directs our Pr a ft ice, it is ufually called an Art : 
 And this is the moil remarkable Diftinclion be- 
 tween an Art and a Science, (viz.) the one refers 
 chiefly to Practice, the other to Speculation,. Na- 
 tural Philofophy or Phyfick, and Ontology are Sci- 
 ences v Logick and Rhetorick are called Arts ; but 
 Mathematicks include both Art and Science ; for 
 they have much of Speculation, and much of Prac- 
 tice in them. 
 
 * Note, Sired this Book was written we have feen fo many Appearances of 
 the Airyrn B^silis as reduces this inference only to a Probability. 
 
 4 Qbfav*
 
 C. 11.8.9, *&* right Ufe o/*Reafon. 18 1 
 
 Obferve here, that when the Evidence of a 
 3? repetition derived from Senfe, Confcioufnefs, In- 
 telligence^ or Reafon is firm and indubitable, it pro- 
 duces fuch A (Tent as we call a natural Cer- 
 tainty, 
 
 V. When we derive the Evidente of any Pro- 
 pofition from the Teftimony of others, it is calkd 
 the Evidence of Faith ; and this is a large Part of 
 our Knowledge, Ten thoufand Things there are 
 which we believe merely upon the Authority or 
 Credit of thofe who have fpoken or written of 
 them. It is by this Evidence that we know there 
 is fuch a Country as China, and there was fuch a 
 Man as Cicero who dwelt in Rome. It is by this 
 that moft of the Tranfactions in human Life are 
 managed : We know our Parents and our Kin- 
 dred by this Means, we know the Perfons and 
 Laws of our prefent Governours, as well as Things 
 that are at a vaft Diftance from us in foreign Na- 
 tions, or in ancient Ages. 
 
 According as the Perfons that inform us of any 
 thing are many or few, or more or lels wife, and 
 faithful, and credible, fo our Faith is more or lefs 
 firm or wavering, and the Proportion believed is 
 either certain or doubtful , but in Matters of Faith, 
 an exceeding great Probability is called a moral 
 Certainty. 
 
 Faith is generally diftinguimed into Divine and 
 Human, not with Regard to the Proportions that 
 are believed, but with Regard to the Teflimony 
 upon which we believe them. When God re- 
 veals any thing to us, this gives us the Evidence 
 of Diving Faith ; but what Man only acquaints 
 us with produces a human Faith in us ; the one, 
 being built upon the Word of Man, arifes but to 
 moral Certainty -, but the other being founded ou 
 
 the
 
 i$2 LOGIC K: Or, Part 11 
 
 the Word of God arifes to an abfolute and infal- 
 lible Affurwce, fo far as we underftand the Mean- 
 ing of this Word, tf his is called fupernatural 
 Certainty. 
 
 Propofitions which we believe upon the EvU 
 dence of human fyftimony are called Narratives, 
 Relations, Reports* Hiftorical Obfervations, &c. 
 but fuch a$ are built on Divine Teftimony are term- 
 ed Matters of 'Revelation ; and if they are of great 
 Importance in Religion, they are called Articles of 
 Faith. 
 
 There are fome Propofitions or Parts of Know- 
 ledge, which are faid to be derived from Obferva- 
 tion and Experience, that is, Experience in our- 
 felves, and the Observations we have made on 
 other Perfons or Things , but thefe are made up 
 of fome of the former Springs of Knowledge join- 
 ed together, (viz.) Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Reafon, 
 Faith, &c. and therefore are not reckon*d a dif- 
 tinft kind of Evidence. 
 
 VI. Infpiration is a fort of Evidence diftin<5c 
 from all the former, and that is, when fuch an 
 overpowering Impreflion of any Propofition is .made 
 upon the Mind by God himfelf, that gives a con- 
 vincing and indubitable Evidence of the Truth 
 and Divinity of it : So were the Prophets and the 
 Apojlles infpired *. 
 
 Sometimes God may have been plea fed to make 
 ufe of the outward Senfes, or the inward Work- 
 ings of the Imagination, of Dreams, Apparitions, 
 Vifions and Voices, or Reafoning, or perhaps hu- 
 man Narration, to convey divine Truths to the 
 Mind of the Prophet , but none of thefe would 
 be fufficient to deferve the Name, of Infpiration, 
 
 * Note h?r, I /peak chiefly of the b'jheft Kind wifllpiration. 
 
 4
 
 C.II.S.9- nerigbtUfeofRezfon." 183 
 
 without a fuperior or Divine Light and Power at* 
 tending them. 
 
 This fort of Evidence is alfo very diftinft from 
 what we ufually call Divine Faith ; for every com- 
 mon Chriftian exercifes Divine Faith when he be- 
 lieves any Propofition which God has revealed in 
 the Bible upon this Account, becaufe God basfaid 
 zY, tho' it was by a Train of Reafonings that he 
 was led to believe that this is the Word of God : 
 Whereas in the Cafe of Infpiration^ the Prophet 
 not only exercifes Divine Faith, in believing what 
 God reveals, but he is under a fuperior heavenly 
 Imprefiion, Light and Evidence, whereby he is 
 allured that God reveals it. This is the moft emi- 
 nent kind of fupernatural Certainty. 
 
 Tho* Perfons might be allured of their own 
 Infpiration by fome peculiar and inexprejfible Con- 
 fcioufnefs of this divine Infpiration and Evidence 
 in their own Spirits, yet it is hard to make out 
 this Infpiration to others, and to convince them 
 of it, except by fome antecedent or confequent 
 Prophecies or Miracles, or fome publick Appear- 
 ances more than human. 
 
 The Propofitions which are attain'd by this fort 
 of Evidence are called infpired Truths. This is 
 Divine Revelation at firft hand, and the Dictates 
 of God in an immediate manner, of which Theo- 
 logical Writers difcourfe at large ; but fince it 
 belongs only to a few Favourites of Heaven to 
 be infpired, and not the Bulk of Mankind, it is 
 not necefiary to fpeak more of it in a Treadle of 
 Logick, which is defign'd for the general Im- 
 provement of human Reafon. 
 
 The various Kinds of Evidence, upon which we 
 believe any Propofition, afford us thefe three Re- 
 marks. 
 
 I, Remark
 
 184 LO-GICK:Or, Part It 
 
 jft Remark. The famePropofition may be known 
 to us by different kinds of Evidence : That the 
 whole is bigger than a fart is known by our Senfes, 
 and it is known by the Self-Evidence of the Thing 
 to our Mind,- That God created the Heavens and 
 the Earth is known to us by Reafon, and is known 
 alfo by Divine Teftimony or Faitbt 
 
 11 A Remark. Among thefe various Kinds of 
 Evidence, fome are generally ftronger than others 
 in their own Nature, and give a better Ground 
 for Certainty,; Inward Confcioufnefi and Intelli- 
 gence^ as well as Divine Faith and Infpiration, ufu- 
 ally carry much more Force with them than Senfe 
 or human Faith, which are often fallible ; tho' 
 there are Inftances wherein human Faith, Senfe 
 and Reafoning lay a Foundation alfo for compleat 
 Aflurance, and leave no room for Doubt. 
 
 Reajon in its own Nature would always lead us 
 into the Truth in Matters within its Compafs, if 
 it were ufed aright, or it would require us to fuf- 
 pend our Judgment where there is want of Evi- 
 dence. But it is our Sloth, Precipitancy, Senfe, 
 PaJJion, and many other Things that lead our 
 Reafon aftray in this degenerate and imperfect 
 Eftate : Hence it comes to pafs that we are guilty 
 of fo many Errors in Reafoning, efpecially about 
 divine Things, becaufe our Reafon either is bufy 
 to enquire, and refolved to determine about Mat- 
 ters that are above our prefent Reach ; or becaufe 
 we mingle many Prejudices and fecret Influences 
 of Senfe, Fancy, PaJJion, Inclination, &c. with 
 our Exercifes of Reafon, and judge and determine 
 according to thefe irregular Influences. 
 
 Divine
 
 C. II. S. 9. fbc Right UJe 0/*Reafon. j 85 
 
 Divine Faith would never admit of any Con- 
 troverfies or Doubtings, if we were but afiur'd 
 that God had fpoken, and that we rightly under- 
 ftood his Meaning. 
 
 III d Remark. The greateft Evidence and Cer- 
 tainty of any, Propofition does not depend upon 
 the Variety of the Ways or Kinds of Evidence, 
 whereby it is known, but rather upon the 
 Strength and Degree of Evidence, and the 
 Clearnefs of that Light in or by which it appears 
 to the Mind. For a Propofition that is known 
 only one Way may be much more certain, and 
 have ftronger Evidence than another that is fup- 
 pofed to be known many Ways. Therefore thefe 
 Propofitions, Nothing has no Properties, Nothing 
 can make itfelf, which are known only by Intelli- 
 gence, are much furer and truer than this Propo- 
 fition, The Rainbow has real and inherent Colours in 
 it, or than this, the Sun rolls round the Earth ; tho* 
 we feem to know both thefe laft by our Senfes, 
 and by the common c Teflimony of our Neighbours. 
 So any Propofition that is clearly evident to our 
 own Confcioufnefs or Divine Faith, is much more 
 certain to us than a thoufand others that have only 
 the Evidence of feeble and obfcure Senfations, of 
 mere -probable Reafonings and doubtful Arguments, 
 or the JFitnefs of fallible Men, or even tho' all 
 thefe mould join together. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 186 LOG I CK: Or, Part IL 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 The Springs oj falfe Judgment, or the Doc- 
 trine of Prejudices. 
 
 INTRODUCT ION. 
 
 IN the End of the foregoing Chapter, we 
 have furvey'd the feveral Sorts of Evidence, 
 on which we build our Aflent to Proportions. 
 Thefe are indeed the general Grounds upon 
 which we form our Judgments concerning Things. 
 "What remains in this fccond Part of Logick is 
 to point out the feveral Springs and Caufes of our 
 Miftakes in judging, and to lay down fome Rules 
 by which we mould conduct ourfelves in palling 
 a Judgment of every Thing that is propofed 
 to us. 
 
 I confefs many Things which will be mention- 
 ed in thefe following Chapters might be as well 
 referr'd to the third Part of Logick, where we 
 fhall treat of Reasoning and Argument ; for moft 
 of our falfe Judgments feem to include a fecret bad 
 Reafoning in them ; and while we mew the Springs 
 of Error, and the Rules of true Judgment, we do 
 at the fame time difcover which Arguments are 
 fallacious, which Reafonings are weak, and which 
 are juft and ftrong. Yet fince this is ufually cal- 
 led a. judging ill, or judging well, I think we may 
 without any Impropriety treat of it here; and 
 this will lay a furer Foundation for all forts of Ra- 
 tiocination and Argument. 
 
 Ram Judgments are called Prejudices, and fo 
 are the Springs of them. This Word in com- 
 mon Life fignifies an ill Opinion which we have
 
 CX III. S. i. fherightUfeQfRstfQK. 187 
 
 conceive of fame other Perfon, or fome Injury done 
 to him. But when we ufe the Word in Matters 
 of Science, it fignifies a Judgment that is formed 
 concerning any Per/on or thing before fufficient Exa- 
 mination ; and generally we fuppofe it to mean a 
 falfe Judgment or Miftake : At leaft, it is an Opi- 
 nion taken up without folid Reafon for it, or an 
 Affent given to a Propofition before we have juft 
 Evidence of the Truth of it, tho* the thing itfelf 
 may happen to be true. 
 
 Sometimes thefe ram judgments are called Prc- 
 fojfeffions whereby is meant, that fome particular 
 Opinion has pofieffed the Mind, and engaged the 
 Afient without fufficient Search or Evidence of 
 the Truth of it. 
 
 There is a vaft Variety of thefe Prejudices and 
 PrepoJJeffions which attend Mankind in every Age 
 and Condition of Life ; they lay the Foundations 
 of many an Error, and many an unhappy Practice, 
 both in the Affairs of Religion, and in our civil 
 Concernments, as well as in Matters of Learning. 
 It is neceflary for a Man who purfues Truth to 
 enquire into thefe Springs of Error, that as far as 
 poflible he may rid himfelf of old Prejudices and 
 watch hourly againft new ones. 
 
 The Number of them is fb gfeat, and they are 
 fo interwoven with each other, as well as with 
 the Powers of human Nature, that it is fometimes, 
 hard to diftinguifh them apart; yet for Method 
 Sake we mail reduce them to thefe four general 
 Heads, ' (viz.) Prejudices arifing from Things, or 
 from Words, iromourfehes, or from other Perfons ; 
 and after the Defcription of each Prejudice, we 
 fhall propofe one or more Ways of curing it. 
 
 N SEC*.
 
 188 LOGIC K: Or, Part II 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Prejudices arifingfrom 'Things. 
 
 THE fir/I fort of Prejudices are thofe which 
 arife from the Things tbemfefoes about which 
 we judge. But here let it be obferved that there 
 is nothing in the Nature of Things that will necef- 
 farily lead us into Error, if we do but ufe our 
 Reafbn aright, and with-hold our Judgment till 
 there appear fufficient Evidence of Truth. But 
 fmce we are fo unhappily prone to take Advan- 
 tage of every doubtful Appearance and Circum- 
 ftance of Things to form a wrong Judgment, and 
 plunge ourfelves into Miftake, therefore it is pro- 
 per to confider what there is in the Things them- 
 felves that may occafion our Errors. 
 
 I. The Obfcurity offome Truths, and the Diffi- 
 culty of fe arching them out, is one Occafion of rafh 
 and miftaken Judgment. 
 
 Some Truths are difficult becaufe they lye re- 
 mote from the firft Principles of Knowledge, and 
 want a long Chain of Argument to come at them : 
 Such are many of the deep Things of Algebra and 
 Geometry, and fome of the Theorems and Pro- 
 blems of molt Parts of the Mathematicks. Many 
 Things alfo in natural Philofophy are dark and in- 
 tricate upon this Account, becaufe we cannot 
 come at any certain Knowledge of them without 
 the Labour of many and difficult, as well as charge- 
 able Experiments.. 
 
 There are other Truths which have great Dark- 
 fiefs upon them, becaufe we have no proper Means 
 or Mediums to come at the Knowledge of them. 
 .Tho' in our Age we have found out many of the 
 
 deep
 
 C. III. S. i. The right Ufe ^ReafonJ 1 89 
 
 deep Things of Nature by the Affiftance of Glaf- 
 fes and other Inftruments ; yet we are not hither- 
 to arrived at any fufficient Methods to difcover 
 the Shape of thole little Particles of Matter which 
 diftinguifh the various Sapours, Odours and Colours 
 of Bodies , nor to find what fort of Atoms com- 
 pofe Liquids or Solids, and diftinguifh Wood, Mi- 
 nerals, Metals^ daft) Stone, &c. There is a 
 Darknefs alfo lies upon the Actions of the intellec- 
 tual or angelical World ; their Manners of Subfift- 
 ence and Agency, the Power of Spirits to move 
 Bodies, and the Union of our Souls with this ani- 
 mal Body of ours are much unknown to us on 
 this Account* 
 
 Now in many of thefe Cafes a great part of 
 Mankind is not content to be entirely ignorant ; 
 but they rather choofe to form ram and hafty 
 Judgments, to guefs at Things without juft Evi- 
 dence, to believe fomething concerning them be- 
 fore they can know them, and thereby they fall 
 into Error. 
 
 This fort of Prejudice^ as well as moft others, 
 is cured by Patience and Diligence in Inquiry and 
 Reafoning, and a Sufpenfion of Judgment till we 
 have attain'd fome proper Mediums of Know- 
 ledge, and till we fee fufficient Evidence of the 
 Truth. 
 
 II. The Appearance of Things in a Difguife is 
 another Spring of Prejudice or ram Judgment. 
 The outfide of Things which firft ftrikes us is 
 oftentimes different from their inward Nature, 
 and we are tempted to judge fuddenly according 
 to outward Appearances. If a Picture is daub'd 
 with many bright and glaring Colours, the vul- 
 gar Eye admires it as an excellent Piece ; whereas 
 the fame Perfon judges very contemptuoUfly of
 
 I 9 o LOGICR: Or Part IL 
 
 fome admirable Defign {ketch 5 d out only with a 
 black Pencil on a coarfe Paper, tho* by the Hand 
 of Raphael. So the Scholar fpies the Name of a 
 new Book in a publick News-Paper, he is charm- 
 ed with the Title, he purchafes, he reads with huge 
 Expectations, and finds it all Trafh and Im- 
 pertinence : This is a Prejudice derived from the 
 Appearance ; we are too ready to judge that Vo- 
 lume valuable which had fo good a Frontifpiece. 
 The large Heap of Encomiums and fwelling Words 
 of Affurance that are beftowed on >uack Medi- 
 cines in publick Advertifements tempt many a 
 Reader to judge them infallible, and to ufe the 
 Pills or the Plaifter with vaft Hope and frequent 
 Difappointment. 
 
 We are tempted to form our Judgment of Per- 
 fens as well as Things by thefe outward Appearances. 
 Where there is Wealth, Equipage and Splendor we 
 are ready to call that Man happy, but we fee not 
 the vexing Difquietudes of his Soul : And when we 
 fpy a Perfon in ragged Garments, we form a def- 
 picable Opinion of him too fuddenly ; we can 
 hardly think him either happy or wife, our Judg- 
 ment is fo ftrangely biafled by outward and fenfible 
 Things. It was thro* the Power of this Prejudice 
 that the Jews rejected our blefled Saviour ; they 
 could not fuffer themfelves to believe that the Man 
 who appeared as the Son of a Carpenter was alfo 
 the Son of God. And becaufe St. Paul was of a 
 little Stature, a mean Preience, and his Voice con- 
 temptible, fome of the Corinthians were tempted 
 to doubt whether he were infpired or no. 
 
 This Prejudice is cured by a longer Acquain- 
 tance with the World* and a juft Observation that 
 Things are fometimes better and fometimes ivorfe than 
 they appear to be. We ought therefore to re- 
 ftrain our excefllve Forwardnefs to form our Opi- 
 nion
 
 C. III. S, i . fbe right Ufe c/'Reafon. 191 
 
 nion of Perfons or Things before we have Op- 
 portunity to fearch into them more perfectly. Re- 
 member that a grey Beard does not make a Philofo- 
 pher ; all is not Gold that glijlers ; and a rough 
 Diamond may be worth an immenfe Sum. 
 
 III. A Mixture of different Qualities in the fame 
 thing is another Temptation to judge amifs. "We 
 are ready to be carried away by that Quality which 
 ftrikes the firft or the flrongeft Imprejffions upon us, 
 and we judge of the whole Object according to 
 that Quality, regardlefs of all the reft ; or fome- 
 times we colour over all the other Qualities with 
 that one Tincture, whether it be bad or good. 
 
 When we have juft reafon to admire a Man for 
 his Virtues, we are fbmetimes inclined not only to 
 neglect his Weakneffes, but even to put a good 
 Colour upon them, and to think them amiable. 
 When we read a Book that has many excellent 
 Truths in it and Divine Sentiments, we are 
 tempted to approve not only that whole Book, 
 but even all the Writings of that Author. When 
 a Poet, an Orator or a Painter has performed ad^ 
 mirably in feveral illuftrious Places, we fometimes 
 alfo admire his very Errors, we miftake his Blun- 
 ders for Beauties, and are fo ignorantly fond as to 
 copy after them, 
 
 It is this Prejudice that has rendered fo many 
 great Scholars perfect Bigots, and inclined them 
 to defend Homer or Horace, Liyy or Cicero, in all 
 their Miftakes, and vindicate all the Follies of 
 .their favourite Author. It is this that tempts fome 
 great Writers to fupport the Sayings of almoft all 
 the antient Fathers of the Church^ and admire them 
 even in their very Reveries. 
 
 N 3 0"
 
 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 On the other Hand, if an Author has profefs'd 
 heretical Sentiments in Religion, we throw our 
 Scorn upon every thing he writes, we defpife even 
 his critical or mathematical Learning, and will hard- 
 ly allow him common Senfe. If a Poem has 
 fotne Blemifties in it, there is a Set of falfe Cri- 
 ticks who decry it univerfally, and will allow no 
 Beauties there. 
 
 This fort of Prejudice is relieved by learning to 
 diftinguilh Things well, and not to judge in the 
 Lump. There is fcarce any Thing in the World 
 of Nature or Art, in the World of Morality or 
 Religion, that is perfectly uniform. There is a 
 Mixture of Wifdom and folly, Vice and Virtue, 
 Good and Kvil, both in Men and Things. We 
 Ihould remember that fome Perfons have great Wit 
 and little Judgment \ others are judicious, but not 
 witty. Some are good humour d without Compli- 
 ment ; others have all the Formalities of Complai- 
 fance, but no good Humour. We ought to know 
 that one Man may be 'vicious and learned, while 
 another has Virtue without Learning : That many 
 a Man thinks admirably well who has a poor ut- 
 terance ; while others have a charming manner 
 of Speech, but their Thoughts are trifling and 
 impertinent. Some are good Neighbours, and cour- 
 teous and charitable toward Men who have no 
 Piety toward God , others are truly religious, but 
 of morofe natural Tempers. Some excellent Say- 
 ings are found in very felly Books, and fome filly 
 Thoughts appear in Books of Value. We Ihould 
 neither praife nor difpraife by Wholefale^ but fepa- 
 rate the Good from the Evil, and judge of them 
 apart : The Accuracy of a good J udgment conr 
 flits much in making fuch Diftinftiorjs,
 
 C. III. S. i. fte right UfeofRezCon: 193 
 
 Yet let it be noted too, that in common Dif- 
 courfe we ufually denominate Perfons and Things 
 according to the major Part of their Character. 
 He is to be called a wife Man who has but few 
 Follies : He is a good Phikfopher who knows much 
 of Nature, and for the molt Part reafons well in 
 Matters of human Science : And that Book Jhould 
 be efteemed well written, which has much more 
 of good Senfe in it than it has of Impertinence. 
 
 IV. Tho' a Thing be uniform in its own Na- 
 ture, yet the different Lights in which it may be 
 placed, and the different Views in which it appears 
 to us, will be ready to excite in us miltaken Judg- 
 ments concerning it. Let an erect Cane be placed 
 in a horizontal Plane, at a great Diftance from 
 the Eye, and it appears a plain Triangle -, but we 
 ftiall judge that very Cone to be nothing but a flat 
 Circle, if its Bafe be obverted towards us. Set a 
 common round Plate a little obliquely before our 
 Eyes afar off, and we (hall think it an oval Figure ; 
 but if the very Edge of it be turned towards us, 
 we fliall take it for a ftrait Line. So when we- 
 view the feveral Folds of a changeable Silk, we pro- 
 nounce this Part red, and that yellow, becaufe of 
 its different Pofition to the Light, tho' the Silk 
 laid fmooth in one Light appears all of one Co- 
 lour. 
 
 When we furvey the Miferies of Mankind, and 
 think of the Sorrows of Millions, both on Earth 
 and jn Hell, the Divine Government has a terrible 
 Afpeff, and -we may be tempted to think hardly 
 even 7 of God himfelf : But if we view the Profu- 
 fion of his Bounty and Grace amongft his Crea- 
 tures on Earth, or the happy Spirits in Heaven, 
 we mall have fo exalted an Idea of his Qccdnefs as 
 to forget his Vengeance. Some Men dwell en- 
 N 4 tirely
 
 794 LOGICK:Or, Patt II, 
 
 tirely upon the Promifes of his Gofpel, and think 
 him all Mercy : Others under a melancholy Frame, 
 dwell upon his Terrors and his Threatnings, and 
 are overwhelmed with the Thought of his Seve- 
 rity and Vengeance, as tho' there were no Mercy 
 in him. 
 
 The true Method of delivering our felves from 
 this Prejudice is to view a thing on all fides, to 
 compare all the various Appearances of the fame 
 thing with one another, and let each of them have 
 its full Weight in the Balance of our Judgment, 
 before we fully determine our Opinion. It was by 
 this Means that the modern Aftronomers came to 
 find out that the Planet Saturn hath a flat broad 
 Circle round its Globe, which is called its Ring, by 
 obferving the different Appearances as a narrow 
 or a broader Oval, or as it fometimes leems to be a 
 flrait Line, in the different Parts of its twenty 
 nine Years Revolution thro* the Ecliptic. And if 
 we take the fame juft and religious Survey of the 
 great and Ueffecl God in all the Difcoveries of his 
 Vengeance and his Mercy, we fhall at laft con- 
 clude him to be both juft and good. 
 
 V. The cajual Affociatwn of many of our Ideas 
 becomes the Spring of another Prejudice or rafh 
 Judgment, to which we are fometimes expofed, 
 If in our younger Years we have taken Medicines 
 that have been naufeous, when any Medicine what- 
 foever is afterward propofed to us under Sicknefs, 
 we immediately judge it naufeous : Qur Fancy has 
 To clofely join'd thefe Ideas together, that we 
 know not how to feparate them : Then the Sto- 
 mach feels the Difguft, and perhaps refufes the 
 only Drug that can preferve Life. So a Child 
 who has been let Blood joins the Ideas of Pain 
 #nd the Surgeon together, and he hates the Sight 
 
 of
 
 C. III. S. 2, Tfc right Ufe 0/*Reafon: 
 
 of the Surgeon, becaufe he thinks of his Pain .- 
 Or if he has drunk a bitter Potion, he conceives 
 a bitter Idea of jhe Cup which held it, and will 
 drink nothing out of that Cup, 
 
 It is for the fame Reafon that the Bulk of the 
 common People are fo fuperftirioufly fond of the 
 Pfalms tranflated by Hopkins and Sternhold, and 
 think them facred and divine, becaufe they have 
 been now for more than an hundred Years bound 
 up in the fame Covers with our Bibles. 
 
 The beft Relief againft this Prejudice of AJJb- 
 ciation is to confider, whether there be any natu- 
 ral and neceflary Connection between thofe Ideas 
 which Fancy, Cuftom, or Chance hath thus joined 
 together : And if Nature has not joined them, let 
 our Judgment correct the Folly of our Imagina- 
 tion, and feparate thefe Ideas again. ., 
 
 SECT. II. 
 Prejudices anfingfrom Words. 
 
 OU R Ideas and Words are fo linkt together, 
 that while we judge of Things according to 
 Words, we are led into feveral Miftakes. Thefe 
 may be distributed under two general Heads, 
 (viz.) Such as arife fromfingle Words or Phrafes, 
 or fuch as arife from Words joined in Speech, and 
 compofmg a Difcourfe. 
 
 I. The moft eminent and remarkable Errors of 
 the firft Kind, are thefe three, (i.) When our 
 Words are infignificant, and have no Ideas j as 
 when the myftical Divines talk of the Prayer of 
 Sftence, the fupernatural and pa/Jive Night of the 
 Soul, the Vacuity of Powers, the Sufpenfion of all 
 ts: Or (2.) When our Words are equivo- 
 cal,
 
 ,96 LOGIC K: Or, Pare II. 
 
 cal, and fignify two or more Ideas, as the Words 
 Law, Light, Flejh, Spirit, Right eoufnefs, and many 
 other Terms in Scripture: Or (3.) When two 
 or three Words are Jynonymous, and fignify one 
 Idea, as Regeneration and new Creation in the new 
 Teftament , both which mean only a Change of 
 the Heart from Sin to Holinefs ; or as the Elector of 
 Cologn and the Bijhop of Cologn are two Titles of 
 the fame Man. 
 
 Thefe kinds of Phrafes are the Occafions of 
 various Miftakes ; but none fo unhappy as thofe 
 in Theology: For both Words without Ideas, as 
 well as Jynonymous and equivocal Words, have been 
 ufed and abufed by the Humours, Paffions, Inte- 
 refts, or by the real Ignorance and Weakneis of 
 Men to beget terrible Contefts among Chri- 
 ftians. 
 
 But to relieve us under all thofe Dangers, and 
 to remove thefe Jorts of Prejudices which arife 
 from fingle Words or Phrafes, I muft remit the 
 Reader to Part I. Chap. 4. where I have treated 
 about Words, and to thofe Directions which I have 
 given concerning the Defnition of Names, Part I. 
 Chap. 6. Sett. 3. 
 
 II. There is another fort of falfe Judgments or 
 Miftakes which we are expofed to by Words ; and 
 that is, when they are joined in Speech, and com- 
 pofe a Difeourfe ; and here we are in Danger two 
 Ways. 
 
 The one is, when a Man writes good Senfe, or 
 fpeaks much to the Purppfe, but he has not a 
 happy and engaging manner of Exprcflion. Per- 
 haps he ufes coarfe and vulgar Words, or old, ob- 
 folete, and unfafliionable Language, or Terms 
 and Phrafes that are foreign, latinized, fcholaftick, 
 very uncommon and hard to be understood : And 
 4. ihis
 
 CIII.S.2. fherlghtUfeofK.ztfQK. 197 
 
 this is ftill worfe, if his Sentences are long and 
 intricate, or the Sound of them harfh and grat- 
 ing to the Ear. All thefe indeed are "Defers in 
 Style, and lead fome nice and unthinking Hearers 
 or Readers into an ill Opinion of all that fuch a 
 Perfon fpeaks or writes. Many an excellent Dif- 
 courfe of our Forefathers has had abundance of 
 Contempt caft upon it by our modern Pretenders 
 to Senfe, for want of their diftinguifhing between 
 the Language and the Ideas. 
 
 On the other hand, when a Man of Eloquence 
 fpeaks or writes upon any Subject, we are too 
 ready to run into his Sentiments, being fweetly 
 and infennbly drawn by the Smoothnefs of his 
 Harangue, and the pathetic Power of his Lan- 
 guage. Rhetorick will varnifti every Error fo that 
 it mall appear in the Drefs of 'Truth, and put fuch 
 Ornaments upon Vice as to make it look like 
 Virtue : It is an Art of wondrous and extent! ve In- 
 fluence , it often conceals, obfcures or overwhelms 
 the Truth, and places fometimes a grofs Falmood 
 in a moil alluring Light. The Decency of Action, 
 the Mufick of the Voice, the Harmony of the 
 Periods, the Beauty of the Style, and all the en- 
 gaging Airs of the Speaker have often charm'd 
 the Hearers into Error, and perfuaded them to 
 approve whatfoever is propofed to fo agreeable a 
 manner. A large Ailembly ftands expofed at once 
 to the Power of thefe Prejudices, and imbibes 
 them all. So Cicero and Demofthenes made the 
 Romans and the Athenians believe almcft whatfo- 
 ever they pleafed. 
 
 The beft Defence againft both thefe Dangers 
 is to learn the Skill (as much as poflible) offepa- 
 r citing our thoughts and Ideas from Words and Pbra- 
 fesy to judge of the Things in their own Natures, 
 'j*n,d in their natural or juft Relation to one ano- 
 ther,
 
 L G 1C K? Or, Part II. 
 
 ther abftracted from the Ufe of Language, and 
 to maintain a fteady and obftinate Refolution to 
 hearken to nothing but Truth, in whatfoever 
 Stile or Drefs it appears. 
 
 Then we mail hear a Sermon of pious and juft 
 Sentiments with Efteem and Reverence, tho* the 
 Preacher has but an unpolifhed Stile, and many 
 Defects in the manner of his Delivery. Then 
 we mail neglect and Difregard all the flattering 
 Infinuations whereby the Orator would make Way 
 for his own Sentiments to take Poffeflion of our 
 Souls, if he has not folid and inftructive Senfe 
 equal to his Language. Oratory is a happy Ta- 
 lent when it is rightly employ'd to excite the Paf- 
 fion to the Practice of Virtue and Piety ; but to 
 fpeak properly, this Art has nothing to do in the 
 Search after Truth. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Prejudices arifingfrom ourfelyes. 
 
 N Either Words nor Things would fo often lead 
 us aftray from Truth, if we had not with- 
 in our felves fuch Springs of Error as thefe that 
 follow. 
 
 I. Many Errors are derived from our Weaknefs 
 of Reafon, and Incapacity to judge of Things in our 
 Infant State. Thefe are called the Prejudices of 
 Infancy. We frame early Miftakes about the 
 common Objects which furround us, and the com- 
 mon Affairs of Life : We fancy the Nurfe is our 
 left Friend^ becaufe Children receive from their 
 Nurfes their Food and other Conveniencies of 
 Life. We judge that Books are very unpleafant 
 Things, becaufe perhaps we have been driven to 
 
 them
 
 199 
 
 them by the Scourge. We J ud e al * that the 
 Sky touches the diftant Hitts, becaufe we cannot 
 inform our felves better in Childhood. We be- 
 lieve the Stars are not rifen till the Sun isfet, be- 
 caufe we never fee them by Day. But fome of 
 thefe Errors may feem to be derived from the next 
 Spring. 
 
 The Way to cure the Prejudices of Infancy is 
 to diftinguifh, as far as we can, which are thofe 
 Opinions which we fram'd in perfect Childhooc], 
 to remember that at that Time our Reafon w^is 
 incapable of forming a right Judgment, and to 
 bring thefe Propofitions again to be examined at 
 the Bar of mature Reafon, 
 
 II. Our Senfes give us many^ a falfe Informati- 
 on of Things, and tempt us to judge amifs. This 
 is called the Prejudice of Senfe, as when we fup- 
 pofe the Sun and Moon to be flat Bodies, and to 
 be but a few Inches broad, becaufe they appear fo 
 to the Eye. Senfe inclines us to judge that jtir 
 has no Weight, becaufe we don't feel it prefs heavy 
 upon us ; and we judge alfo by our Senfes that 
 Cold and Heat, Sweet and Sour, Red and Blue, &c. 
 are fuch real Properties in the Obje&s themfelves, 
 and exactly like thofe Senfations which they excite 
 in us. 
 
 Note, Thofe Miftakes of this fort which all 
 Mankind drop and lofe in their advancing Age are 
 called mere Prejudices of Infancy, but thofe which 
 abide with the vulgar Part of the World, and 
 generally with all Men, till Learning and Philo- 
 fophy cure them, more properly attain the Name 
 of Prejudices of Senfe. 
 
 Thefe Prejudices are to be rcmov'd feveral Ways. 
 
 (i.) By the Afliftance of one Senfe we cure the 
 
 Miftakes of another, as when a Stick thrujl into 
 
 4 tie
 
 ' trSGtCK: Or, Part It 
 
 the Water feems 'crooked, we are prevented from 
 judging it to be really fo in it felf, for when we 
 take it out of the Water, both our Sight and our 
 Feeling agree and determine it to be flrait. (2.) 
 The Exercife of our Reafon, and an Application 
 to mathematical and philofophical Studies, cures 
 many other Prejudices of Senfe both with relation 
 to the heavenly and earthly Bodies. (3.) We 
 fhould remember that our Senfes have often de- 
 ceived us in various Inftances, that they give but 
 a confus'd and imperfect Reprefentation of Things 
 in many Cafes, that they often reprefent falfly 
 thofe very Objecls to which they feem to be fuit- 
 ed, fuch as the Shape, Motion, Size and Situation 
 of grofs Bodies, if they are but placed at a Dif- 
 ftance from us ; and as for the minute Particles of 
 which Bodies are compofed, our Senfes cannot 
 diftinguim them. (4.) We fhould remember alfo 
 that one prime and original Defign of our Senfes is 
 to inform us what various Relations the Bodies 
 that are round about us bear to our own animal 
 Body, and to give us notice what is pleafant and 
 ufeful, or what is painful and injurious to us; but 
 they are not fufficient of themfelves to lead us in- 
 to a philofophical Acquaintance with the inward 
 Nature of Things. It muft be confefs'd it is by 
 the Afliftance of the Eye and the Ear elpecially 
 (which are called the Senfes o/ Difcipline) that our 
 Minds are furnim'd with various Parts of Know- 
 ledge, by reading, hearing, and obferving Things 
 divine and human ; yet Reafon ought always to 
 accompany /{he Exercife of our Senfes whenever 
 we would form a juft Judgment of Things pro- 
 pofed to our Enquiry. 
 
 Here it is proper to obferve alfo, that as the 
 Weaknefs of Reafon in our Infancy, and the Dic- 
 tates of our Senfes fometimes in advancing Tears, 
 
 lead
 
 C.III.S.3^ tte right Ufe of 'Reafon; 201 
 
 lead the wifer part of Mankind aftray from Truth ; 
 fo the meaner Parts of our Species, Perfons whofe 
 Genius is very low, whofe Judgment is always 
 weak, who are ever indulging the Diclates of 
 Senfe and Humour, are but Children of a larger 
 Size, they ftand expofed to everlafting Miftakes in 
 Life, and live and die in the midft of Prejudices. 
 
 III. Imagination is another fruitful Spring of 
 falfe Judgments. Our Imagination is nothing elfe 
 but the various Appearances of our fenfible Ideas 
 in the Brain, where the Soul frequently works in 
 uniting, disjoining, multiplying, magnifying, di- 
 minifhing and altering the feveral Shapes, Colours, 
 Sounds, Motions, Words and Things that have 
 been communicated to us by the outward Organs 
 of Senfe. It is no wonder therefore if Fancy 
 leads us into many Miftakes, for it is but Senfe 
 at Second-hand. Whatever is ftrongly impreft upon 
 the Imagination fome Perfons believe to be true. 
 Some will choofe a particular Number in a Lot- 
 tery >, or lay a large Wager on a Jingle chance of a 
 Dye, and doubt not of Succefs, becaufe their 
 Fancy feels fo powerful an Impreffion, and affures 
 them it will be profperous. A thoufand pretended 
 Propheftes and Infpirations, and all the Freaks of 
 Enthufiafm have been derived from this Spring. 
 Dreams are nothing elfe but the Deceptions of 
 Fancy : A Delirium is but a ftiort Wildnefs of the 
 Imagination ; and a fettled Irregularity of Fancy 
 is Diffraction and Madnefs. 
 
 One Way to gain a Victory over this unruly 
 Faculty, is to fet a Watch upon it perpetually, 
 and to briddle it in all its Extravagances ; never to 
 believe any thing merely becaufe Fancy dictates it, 
 any more than I would believe a Midnight Dream y 
 
 nor to truft Fancy any farther than it is attended 
 
 with
 
 LOGICK:Or> Part It 
 
 vrith fevers Reafon. It is a very ufeful and enter- 
 taining Power of human Nature in Matters of II- 
 luftration, Perfuafwti, Oratory, Poefy, Wit^ Cou- 
 verfation, &c. but in the calm Enquiry after Truth 
 and final Judgment of Things Fancy mould re- 
 tire, and ftand afide, unlefs it be called in to ex- 
 plain or illuftrate a difficult Point by a Simi- 
 litude. 
 
 Another Method of Deliverance from thefe Pre- 
 judices of Fancy ) is to compare the Ideas that arife 
 in our Imaginations with the real Nature of Things , 
 as often as we have occafion to judge concerning 
 them ; and let calm and fed ate Reafon govern and 
 determine our Opinions, tho* Fancy mould mew 
 never fo great a Reluctance. Fancy is the inferior 
 Faculty, and it ought to obey* 
 
 IV. tfbe various Pajfions or dfeftions of the 
 Mind are numerous and endlefs Springs of Pre- 
 judice. They difguife every Object they converfe 
 with, and put their own Colours upon it, and 
 thus lead the Judgment aftray from Truth. It is 
 Love that makes the Mother think her own Child 
 the faireft, and will fometimes perfuade us that a 
 Blemi/h is a Beauty. Hope and Defire make an 
 Hour of Delay feem as long as two or three 
 Hours ; Hope inclines us to think there is nothing 
 too difficult to be attempted ; Defpair tells us that 
 a brave Attempt is mere Rafhnefs, and that every 
 Difficulty is unfurmountable. Fear makes us 
 imagine that a Bufh fhaken with the Wind has 
 fome favage Bead in it, and multiplies the Dan- 
 gers that attend our Path : But ftill there is a 
 more unhappy Effect of Fear when it keeps Mil- 
 lions of Souls in Slavery to the Errors of an efta- 
 blimed Religion : What could perfuade the wife 
 Men and Philofophers of a Popt/b Country to be- 
 
 lievs
 
 C. III. S. 3 . The right life 0f Reafori. 
 
 lieve the grofs Abfurdities of the Roman Church* 
 but the Pear of Torture or Death, the Galleys or* 
 the Inquifition ? Sorrow and Melancholy tempt us 
 to think our Circumftanees much more difmal 
 than they are, that we may have fotne Excufe for 
 Mourning : And Envy reprefents the Condition of 
 our Neighbour better than it is* that there might 
 be fome Pretence for her own Vexation and Un- 
 eafmefs. Anger and Wrath and Revenge, and all 
 thofe hateful Pafllons excite in us far worfe Ideas 
 of Men than they deferve, and perfuade us to be- 
 lieve all that is ill of them. A detail of the Evil 
 Influence of the Affettions of the Mind upon our* 
 Judgment would make a large Volume. 
 
 The Cure of thefe Prejudices is attained by a 
 conftant Jealoufy of oiirfelves, and Watchfulnefe 
 over our PaJJions, that they may never interpofe 
 when we are called to pafs a Judgment of any 
 thing : And when our Affections are warmly en- 
 gaged, let us abftain from judging. It would be 
 alfo of great Ufe to us to form our deliberate Judg- 
 ments of Perfons and Things in the calmeft and 
 fereneft Hours of Life, when the PaJJions of Na- 
 ture are all Client, and the Mind enjoys its moft 
 perfect Compofure: And thefe Judgments fo form'd 
 mould be treafured up in the Mind j that we might 
 have Recourfe to them in Hours of Need. See 
 many more Sentiments and Directions relating to 
 this Subject in my Doftrine of the Pajfions. 2 d Editi- 
 on enlarged. 
 
 V The Fondnefs we have for SELF, and the 
 Relation which other Perfons and things have to 
 our felves, furnifh us with another long Rank 
 of Prejudices. This indeed might be . reduced 
 to the PaJJion of Self-Love, but it is fo copious 
 an Head that I chofe to name it as a diftinft 
 O Spring
 
 204 L G 1 C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Spring of falfe Judgments. We are generally 
 ready to fancy every thing of our own has fome- 
 thing peculiarly valuable in it, when indeed there 
 is no other Reafon, but becaufe it is our own. 
 Were we born amongft. the Gardens of Italy, the 
 Rocks of Switzerland, or the Ice and Snows of 
 Ruffia and Sweden, ftill we fhould imagine pecu- 
 liar Excellencies in our native Land. We con- 
 ceive a good Idea of the Town and Pillage where 
 we firft breathed, and think the better of a Man 
 For being born near us. We entertain the beft 
 Opinion of the Perfons of our own Party, and ea- 
 fily believe evil Reports of Perfons of a different 
 SebJ or Faction. Our own Sex, or Kindred, our 
 Houfes, and our very Names, feem to have fome- 
 thing good and defirable in them. We are ready 
 to mingle all thefe with our fehes, and cannot 
 bear tx> have others think meanly of them. 
 
 So good an Opinion have we of our own Senti- 
 ments and Practices, that it is very difficult to be- 
 lieve what a Reprover fays of our Conduct ; and 
 we are as ready to aflent to all the Language of 
 Flattery. We fet up our own Opinions in Religi- 
 on and Philofophy as the Tefts of Orthodoxy and 
 fruth ; and we are prone to judge every Practice 
 of other Men either a Duty or a Crime which we 
 think would be a Crime or a Duty to us, tho* their 
 Circumftances are vaftly different from our own. 
 This Humour prevails fometimes to fuch a Degree, 
 that we would make our own Tafte and Inclination 
 the Standard by which to judge of every Dim of 
 Meat that is fet upon the Table, every Book in a 
 Library, every Employment, Study and Bufmeis 
 Of Life, as well as every Recreation. 
 
 It is from this evil Principle oi fitting up felf 
 for a Model what other Men ought to be, that the 
 jflntichriflian Spirit of Imfof.tion and Perfection 
 
 had
 
 C.III.S.3. "The right Ufe of 'Reafori. 
 
 had its Original : tho* there is no more Reafon 
 for it than there was for the Practice of that Ty- 
 rant, who, having a Bed fit for his own Size, was 
 reported to ftretch Men of low Stature upon the 
 Rack, till they were drawn out to the Length of 
 his Bed ; and fome add alfo that he cut off the 
 Legs of any whom he found too long for it. 
 
 It is alfo from a Principle near akin to this that 
 we pervert and ftrain the Writings of any vene- 
 rable Authors, and efpecially the facred Books of 
 Scripture to make them fpeak our own Senfet 
 Thro* the Influence which our own Schemes or 
 Hypothecs have upon the Mind* we fometimes 
 become fo fharp-fighted a*s to find thefe Schemes 
 in thofe Places of Scripture where the holy Wri- 
 ters never thought of them, nor the holy Spirit 
 intended them. At other Times this Prejudice 
 brings fuch a Dimnefs upon the Sight, that we can- 
 not read any thing that oppofes our own Scheme* 
 tho* it be Written as with Sun-beamsj and in the 
 plaineft Language -, and perhaps we are in Danger 
 in fuch a Cafe of winking a little againft the Light. 
 
 We ought to bring our Minds free* unbiafs'd 
 and teachable to learn our Religion from the 
 Word of God , but we have generally formed all 
 the leffer as well as the greater Points of our Re- 
 ligion beforehand, and then we read the Prophets 
 and Apoftles only to perfuade them to confirm 
 our own Opinions; Were it not for this Influ- 
 ence of Self, and a Bigotry to our own Tenets* 
 we could hardly imagine that fo many ftrange, 
 abfurdj inconfiftent, wicked, mifchievous, and 
 bloody Principles mould pretend to fupport and 
 defend themfelves by the Go/pel of Chrift. 
 
 Every learned Critick has his own Hypothefis j 
 
 and if the common Tiext be not favourable to his 
 
 Opinion, a various Leflion fhall be made aurhen- 
 
 O a tick
 
 2o6 LOGfCK: Or Part II. 
 
 tick. The Text muft be fuppofed to be defeftwe 
 or redundant^ and the Senfe of it fhall be literal, 
 or metaphorical^ according as it beft fupports his 
 own Scheme. Whole Chapters or Books fhall 
 be added or left out of the facred Canon, or be 
 turned into Parables by this Influence. Luther 
 "knew not well how to reconcile the Epiftle of St. 
 James to the Doctrine of Juftification by Faith 
 alone, and fo he could not allow it to be Divine. 
 The Papifls bring all the Apocrypha into their 
 Bible, and ftamp Divinity upon it ; for they can 
 fancy Purgatory is there, and they find Prayers for 
 the Dead. But they leave out the fecond Com- 
 mandment becaufe it forbids the Worjhip of Images. 
 Others fuppofe the Mofaick Hi/lory of the Creation 
 and the Fall of Man to be oriental Ornaments, or 
 a mere Allegory, becaufe the literal Senfe of thofe 
 three Chapters of Genefis don't agree with their 
 Theories. Even an honeft plain-hearted and un- 
 learned Chrijlian is ready to find fomething in 
 every Chapter of the Bible, to countenance his 
 own private Sentiments , but he loves thofe Chap- 
 ters beft which fpeak his own Opinions plaineft : 
 This is a Prejudice that flicks very clofe to our 
 Natures ; the Scholar is infefted with it daily, and 
 the Mechanick is not free. 
 
 Self has yet a farther and a pernicious Influence 
 upon our Underftandings, and is an unhappy 
 Guide in the Search after Truth. When our own 
 'Inclination or our Eafe, our Honour or our Profit 
 tempts us to the Practice of any thing of fufpect- 
 ed Lawfulnefs, how do we flrain our Thoughts 
 to find Arguments for it, and perfuade our felves 
 it is lawful ? We colour over Iniquity and fmful 
 Compliance with the Names of Virtue and Inno- 
 cence, or at leaft of Conjlraint and Necejfity. All 
 the different and oppofite Sentiments and Practi- 
 ces
 
 C. IN. S. 3. The right life ^Reafon. 207 
 
 ces of Mankind are too much influenced by this 
 mean Bribery, and give toojuft Occafion for fa - 
 tyrical Writers to fay that Self -Inter eft governs all 
 Mankind. 
 
 When the Judge had awarded due Damages to 
 a Perfon into whofe Field a Neighbour's Oxen 
 had broke, it is reported that he reverfed his own 
 Sentence, when he heard that the Oxen which had 
 done this Mifchief were bis own. Whether this be 
 a Hiftory or a Parable, it is ftill a juft Reprefenta- 
 tion of the wretched Influence of Self to corrupt the 
 Judgment. 
 
 One Way to amend this prejudice is to thruft 
 Self fo far out of the Queftion that it may have 
 no manner of Influence whenfoever we are called 
 to judge and confider the naked, Nature, Truth 
 and Juftice of things. In Matters of Equity be- 
 tween Man and Man, our Saviour has taught us 
 an effectual Means of guarding againft this Preju- 
 judice, and that is to put my Neighbour in the place 
 of myfelfi and my felf in the Place of my Neigh- 
 bour^ rather than be brib'd by this corrupt Prin- 
 ciple of Self-Love to do Injury to our Neighbpurs. 
 Thence arifes that Golden Rule of dealing with others 
 as we would have others deal with us. 
 
 In the Judgment of 'Truth .and Falfhood^ Right 
 and Wrong, Good and Evil, we ought to confider 
 that every Man has a SELF as well as we -, and 
 that the Taftes, PafTions, Inclinations and Inte- 
 refts of different Men are very different, and often 
 contrary, and that they dictate contrary Things : 
 Unlefs therefore all manner -of different and con- 
 trary Proportions could be true at once, Self can 
 never be a juft Teft or Standard of 'Truth and 
 pal/hood. Good and Evil. 
 
 03 yi.
 
 2o8 L G I C K: Or, Part II 
 
 VI. The tempers, Humours, and peculiar Turns 
 cf the Mind, whether they be natural or acquired, 
 have a great Influence upon our Judgment, and 
 become the Occafion of many Mi/lakes. Let us 
 furvey a few of them. 
 
 (i.J Some Perfons are of an eafy and credulous 
 Temper, while others are perpetually difcovering a 
 Spirit of Contradiction. 
 
 The credulous Man is ready to receive everything 
 for a Truth, that has but a Shadow of Evidence ; 
 every new Book that he reads, and every ingeni- 
 ous Man with whom he converfes, has Power 
 enough to draw him into the Sentiments of the 
 Speaker or Writer. He has fo much Complai- 
 fance in him, or Weaknefs of Soul, that he is 
 ready to refign his own Opinion to the firft Ob- 
 jection which he hears, and to receive any Senti- 
 ments of another that are aflerted with a pofitive 
 Air and much A durance. Thus he is under a 
 kind of Necefiity thro* the Indulgence of this 
 credulous Humour, either to be often changing 
 his Opinions, or to believe Inconfiftencies. 
 
 The Man of Contradiction is of a contrary Hu- 
 mour, for he ftands ready to oppofe every thing 
 that is faid : he gives a flight Attention to the 
 Reafons of other Men, from an inward fcornful 
 Prefumption that they have no Strength in them. 
 When he reads or hears a Difcourfe different from 
 his own Sentiments, he does not give himfelf leave 
 to confider whether that Difcourfe may be true -, 
 but employs all his Powers immediately to con- 
 fute it. Your great Difputers and your Men of 
 Coniraverfy are in continual Danger of this fort of 
 Prejudice : they contend often for Victory, and 
 will maintain whatfoever they have afierted, while 
 T? rvith is loft in the Noife and Tumult of reci- 
 procal
 
 C. III. S. 3. The right CT^^Reafon. 209 
 
 procal Contradictions -, and it frequently happens 
 that a Debate about Opinions is turned into a mu- 
 tual Reproach of Perfons. 
 
 The Prejudice of Credulity may in fome Mea- 
 fure be cured by learning to fet a high Value on 
 Truth, and by taking more Pains to attain it ; re- 
 membring that Truth oftentimes lies dark and 
 deep, and requires us to dig for it as hid Trca- 
 fure ; and that Falfhood often puts on a fair Dif- 
 guife, and therefore we mould not yield up our 
 Judgment to every plaufible Appearance. It is 
 no part of Civility or good Breeding to part with 
 Truth, but to maintain it with Decency and 
 Candor. 
 
 A Spirit of Contradiction is fo pedantick and 
 hateful that a Man mould take much Pains with 
 himfelf to watch againft every Inftance of it : He 
 mould learn fo much good Humour at leaft as 
 never to oppofe any thing without juft and folid 
 Reafon for it : He mould abate fome Degrees of 
 Pride and Morofenefs, which are never failing In- 
 gredients in this fort of Temper, and mould feek 
 after fo much Honefty and Conference as never to 
 contend for Conqueft or Triumph j but to re- 
 view his own Reafons, and to read the Arguments 
 of his Opponents (if poffible) with an equal In- 
 differency, and be glad to fpy Truth, and to fub- 
 mit to it, tho* it appear on the oppofite Side. 
 
 (2.) There is another Pair of Prejudices deriv'd 
 from two Tempers of Mind, near akin to thofe I 
 have juft mention'd ; and thefe are the dogmatical 
 and the fcepiical Humour^ i. e. always pofitive, or 
 always doubting. 
 
 By what means foever the Dogmatift came by 
 
 his Opinions, whether by his Senfes, or by his 
 
 Fancy, his Education, or his own Reading, yet 
 
 he believes them all with the fame AiTurance that 
 
 04 be
 
 L O G I C K: Or, Part II, 
 
 he does a mathematical Truth ; he has fcarce any 
 mere Probabilities that belong to him -, every thing 
 with him is certain and infallible ; every Pun&ilio 
 in Religion is an Article of his Faith, and he an- 
 fwers all manner of Objections by a fovereign 
 Contempt. 
 
 Perfons of this Temper are feidom to be con- 
 vinced of any Miftake : A full Affurance of their 
 pwn Notions makes all the Difficulties of their 
 own Side vanifh fo intirely, that they think every 
 Point of their Belief is written as with Sun-beams, 
 and wonder any one mould find a Difficulty in it. 
 They are amazed that learned Men mould make a 
 Controverfy of what is to them fo perfpicuous and 
 indubitable. The loweft Rank of People both 
 in learned and in vulgar Life is very fubject to this 
 Obftinacy. 
 
 Sceptifm is a contrary Prejudice. The Dogma- 
 tift is fure of every Thing, and the Sceptick believes 
 nothing. Perhaps he has found himfelf often mif- 
 taken in Matters of which he thought himfelf well 
 aflured in his younger Days, and therefore he is 
 afraid to give afient to any thing again. He fees 
 fo much Shew of Reafon for every Opinion, and 
 fo many Objections alfo arifing againft every 
 Doctrine, that he is ready to throw off the Belief 
 of every Thing : He renounces at once the Purfuit 
 of Truth, and contents himfelf to fay, There is 
 nothing certain. It is well if thro* the Influence of 
 fuch a Temper he does not caft away his Religion 
 as well as his Philofophy, and abandon himfelf to 
 a profane Courfe of Life, regardlefs of Hell and 
 Heaven. 
 
 Both thefe Prejudices laft mentioned, tho* they 
 are fo oppofite to each other, yet they arife from 
 the fame Spring, and that is, Impatience of Study 
 and Want ef. diligent Attention in the Search af 
 
 Truth,
 
 C. III. S. 3, The right Ufe ofReafon. 21 1 
 
 &utb. The Dogmatijl^ is in hafte to believe fome- 
 thing he can't keep himfclf long enough in Suf- 
 pence till fome bright and convincing Evidence 
 appear on one Side , but throws himfelf cafually 
 into the Sentiments of one Party or another, and 
 then he will hear no Argument to the contrary. 
 The Sceptick will not take Pains to fearch Things 
 to the Bottom, but when he fees Difficulties on 
 both Sides refolves to believe neither of them. 
 Humility of Soul, Patience in Study, Diligence in 
 Enquiry ', with an honeft Zeal for 'Truth, would go 
 a great way towards the Cure of both thefe Fol- 
 lies. 
 
 (3.) Another fort of temper that is very injuri- 
 ous to a right Judgment of things is an wconftant, 
 fickle, changeable Spirit, and a very uneven Temper 
 of Mind. When fuch Perfons are in one Hu- 
 mour, they pafs a Judgment of Things agreeable 
 to it; when their Humour changes, 'they revcrfe 
 their firft Judgment, and embrace a new Opinion. 
 They have no Steadinefs of Soul ; they want Firm- 
 nefs of Mind fufficient to eftablifli themfelves in 
 any Truth, and are ready to change it for the 
 next alluring Falfhood that is agreeable to their 
 Change of Humour. This Ficklenefi is fometimes 
 fo mingled with their very Conftitution by Na- 
 ture or by Diftemper of Body, that a cloudy Day 
 and a lowring Sky mall ftrongly incline them to 
 form an Opinion, both of themfelves and of Per- 
 fons and Things round about them, quite different 
 from what they believe when the Sun Jhines and 
 the Heavens areferene. 
 
 This fort of People ought to judge of Things 
 and Perfons in their moft fedate, peaceful and 
 compofed Hours of Life, and referve thefe Judg- 
 ments for their Conduct at mpre unhappy Sea- 
 fons. 
 
 (4.) Some
 
 L a G / C tf; Or, Part II. 
 
 (4.) Some Perfonshave 2. violent and turgid Man- 
 ner both of fatting and Thinking , whatfoever they 
 judge of, it is always with a Tincture of this Va- 
 nity. They are always in Extremes, and 'pro- 
 nounce concerning every thing in the Superlative. 
 If they think a Man to be learned, be is the chief 
 Scholar of the Age : If another has low Parts, he 
 is the greatefl Blockhead in Nature : If they ap- 
 prove any Book on divine Subjects, it h the left 
 Book in the World next to the Bible : If they fpeak 
 of a Storm of Rain or Hail, it is the moft terrible 
 Storm that fell fince the Creation ; and a cold Win- 
 ter Day is the coldeft that ever was known. 
 
 But the Men of this fwelling Language ought 
 to remember that Nature has ten thoufand mode- 
 rate Things in it, and does not always deal in Ex- 
 tremes as they do, 
 
 (5.) I think it may be called another fort of 
 Prejudices derived from Humour ; when fome Men 
 believe a Dottrine merely becaufe it is ancient and 
 has been long believ'd , others are fo fond of No- 
 velty, that nothing prevails upon their Afifent fo 
 much as new Thoughts and new Notions. Again 
 there are fome who fet a high Efteem upon every 
 thing that is foreign^ and far-fetched; therefore 
 China Pictures are admired, how aukward foever : 
 Others value Things the more for being of our 
 own native Growth >, Invention, or Manufacture^ 
 and thefe as much defpife/0ra Things. 
 
 Some Men of Letters and theology will not be- 
 lieve a Propofition even concerning a fublime Sub- 
 ject, till every thing myfterious, deep and diffi- 
 cult is cut off from it, tho* the Scripture aflerts 
 it never fo plainly -, others are fo fond of a My- 
 ftery and things incomprehenfeble , that they would 
 fcarce believe the Dodtrine of the Trinity if it 
 pould be explained ; they incline to that foolifh 
 4 Rant
 
 C.III.S. 3- We right UfeofRezfon. 213 
 
 Rant of one of the Antients, Credo quia impofli- 
 bile eft ; I believe it becaufe it is impoffible. 
 
 To cure thefe Miftakes remember that neither 
 antique or novel, foreign or native, myflerlous pr 
 plain, are certain Characters either of Truth or 
 Falfhood. 
 
 I might mention various other Humours of Men 
 that excite in them various Prejudices, and lead 
 them into ram and miftaken Judgments ; but thefe 
 are fufficient for a Specimen. 
 
 VII. There are feveral other Weakneffes which 
 
 belong to human Nature, whereby we are led in- 
 
 to Mi/takes, and indeed are render'd almoft unca- 
 
 pable of pafiing a folid Judgment in Matters of 
 
 great Depth and Difficulty. Some have a native 
 
 Obfcurity of Perception, (or mail I call it a want 
 
 of natural Sagacity?) whereby they are hinder'd 
 
 from attaining clear and diftinct Ideas. Their 
 
 Thoughts always feem to have fbmething con- 
 
 futed and cloudy in them, and therefore they judge 
 
 in the dark. Some have a Defeft in Memory, and 
 
 then they are not capable of comparing their pre- 
 
 fent Ideas with a great Variety of other, in or- 
 
 der to fecure themfelves from Inconfiftency in 
 
 Judgment. Others may have a Memory large 
 
 enough, yet they are fubject to the fame Errors 
 
 from a Narrownefs of Soul, and fuch a Fixation and 
 
 Confinement of 'Thought to a few Objects, that they 
 
 fcarce ever take a furvey of Things wide enough 
 
 to judge wifely and well, and to fecure themfelves 
 
 from all Inconfiftencies. 
 
 Tho* thefe are natural Defefts and Weakneffes, 
 yet they may in fome meafure be relieved by La- 
 bour, Diligence and a due Attention to proper 
 
 But
 
 214 LOGICK:Or, Part II. 
 
 But among all the Caufcs of falfe Judgment 
 which are within ourfelves, I ought by no means 
 to leave out that univerfal and original Spring of 
 Error y which we are informed of by the Word 
 of God, and that is the Sin and Defection of our 
 firft Parents, whereby all our bed natural Powers 
 both of Mind and Body are impair'd, and ren- 
 der'd very much inferior to what they were in 
 a State of Innocence. Our Underftanding is 
 darken'd, our Memory contracted, our corrupt 
 Humours and Paflions are grown predominant, 
 our Reafon jnfeebled, and various Diforders attend 
 our Conftitution and animal Nature, whereby the 
 Mind is ftrangely impofed upon in its Judgment 
 of Things. Nor is there any perfect Relief to 
 be expected on Earth. There is no hope of ever 
 recovering from thefe Maladies, but by a fincer.e 
 Return to God in the Ways of his own Appoint- 
 ment, whereby we mail be kept fafe from all dan- 
 gerous and pernicious Errors in the Matters of 
 Religion , and tho* Imperfections and Mftakes will 
 hang about us in the prefent Life as the Effects 
 of our original Apoftacy from God, yet we hope 
 for a full Deliverance from them when we arrive 
 at Heaven. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Prejudices arifingfrom other Perfom. 
 
 WE R E it not for the Springs of Prejudice, 
 that are lurking in ourfehes 9 we mould not 
 be fubject to fo many Miftakes from the Influence 
 of others : But fince our Nature is fo fufceptive 
 of Errors on all Sides, it is fit we mould have 
 Hints and Notices given us, how far other Per~ 
 Jons may have Power over us, and become the 
 4
 
 C.III.S.4. The Right UJe of Re&fon. 21$ 
 
 Caufesof our falfe Judgments. This might all 
 be caft into one Heap, for they are all near akin, 
 and mingle with each other : but for Diftindtion 
 fake let them be called the Prejudices of Education, of 
 Cuftom, of Authority-) and fuch as arife from the 
 manner of Propofal. 
 
 I. Thofe with whom our Education is entruft- 
 ed may lay the firft Foundation of many Miftakes 
 in our younger Years. How many Fooleries and 
 Errors are inftilled into us by our Nurfes, our 
 Fellow-Children, by Servants or unfkilful Teach- 
 ers, which are not only maintained through the fol- 
 lowing Parts of Life, but fometimes have a very 
 unhappy Influence upon us ! We are taught that 
 'There are Goblings and Bugbears in the Dark ; our 
 young Minds are crowded with the Terrible Ideas 
 of Ghofls appearing upon every Occafion, or with the 
 pleafanter Tales of Fairies dancing at Midnight. 
 We learn to prophefy betimes, to foretel Futurities 
 by good or evil Omens^ and to prefage approaching 
 Death in a Family by Ravens and little Worms^ 
 which we therefore call a Death-watch. We are 
 taught to know beforehand, for a Twelvemonth 
 together, which Days of the Week will be fair or 
 foul) which will be lucky or unlucky ; nor is there 
 any thing fo filly, but may be impofed upon our 
 Underftandings in that early part of Life ; and 
 thefe ridiculous Stories abide with us too long, 
 and too far influence the weaker Part of Man- 
 kind. 
 
 We chufe our particular Sett and Party in the 
 civil) the religious and the learned Life, by the In- 
 fluence of Education. In the Colleges of Learn- 
 ing, fome are for the Nominal*, and fome for the 
 Realifls in the Science 6f Metaphyficks, becaufe 
 their Tutors were devoted to thefe Parties, The 
 
 old
 
 LOGIC K: Or, Part It 
 
 eld Philofophy and the new have gained thoufands 
 of Partizans the fame way : And every Religion 
 has its Infant Votaries, who are born, live and die 
 in the fame Faith without Examination of any 
 Article. The 'Turks are taught early to believe in 
 Mahomet , the Jews in Mofes ; the Heathens wor- 
 ihip a multitude of Gods under the Force of their 
 Education, And it would be well if there were 
 not Millions of Chrifiians^ who have little more 
 to fay for their Religion, than that they were 
 born and bred up in it. The greateft part of the 
 Cbriftian World can hardly give any Reafon why 
 they believe the Bible to be the Word of God, but 
 becaufe they have always believed it, and they 
 were taught fo from their Infancy. As Jews and 
 <?urks, and American Heathens believe the moft 
 rnonftrous and incredible Stories, becaufe they 
 have been train'd up amongft them, as Articles of 
 Faith ; fo the Papifls believe their Tranjubjlanti- 
 ation, and make no Difficulty of aflenting to Im- 
 jx>ffibilitiesi fmce it is the current Doftrine of 
 their Catechifms. By the fame Means the feveral 
 Sedls and Parties in Chriflianity believe all the 
 ftrained Interpretations of Scripture by which they 
 have been taught to fupport their own Tenets : 
 They find nothing difficult in all the abfurd Glof- 
 fes and far-fetched Senfes that are fometimesput up- 
 on the Words of the facred Writers, becaufe their 
 Ears have been always accuftom'd to thefe Glofles ; 
 and therefore they fit fo fmooth and eafy upon 
 their Underftandings, that they know not how" 
 to admit the moft natural and eafy Interpretation 
 in Oppofition to them, 
 
 In the fame manner we are nurft up in many 
 filly and grofs Miflakes about domeflick Affairs as 
 well as in Matters of political Concernment. It 
 is upon the fame Ground that Children are train'd 
 
 up
 
 C.III.S.4. TberigbtUfeofRetfon. 217 
 
 up to be Wings and fortes betimes ; and every one 
 learns the diftlnguifhing Terms of his own Party, 
 as the Papifts learn to fay their Prayers in Latin* 
 without any Meaning, Reafon, or Devotion. 
 
 This fort of Prejudice muft be cured by calling 
 all the Principles Of our young Years to the Bar 
 of more mature Reafon, that we may judge of 
 the Things of Nature and political Affairs by juft- 
 er Rules of Philofophy and Obfervation : And 
 even the Matters of Religion muft "be firft inquired 
 into by Reafon and Conference, and when thefe have 
 led us to believe Scripture to be the Word of God, 
 then that becomes our fovereign Guide, and Rea- 
 fon and Confcience muft fubmit to receive its 
 Dictates. 
 
 II. The next Prejudice which I mail mention 
 is, that which arifes from the Cuftom or Fajhion of 
 thofe amongft whom we live. Suppofe we have 
 freed our felves from the younger Prejudices of our 
 Education, yet we are in Danger of having our 
 Mind turned afide from Truth by the Influence of 
 general Cuftom. 
 
 Our Opinion of Meats and Drinks, of Gar- 
 ments and Forms of Salutation are influenced much 
 more by Cuftom than by the Eye, the Ear, or the 
 Tafte. Cuftom prevails even over Senfe itfelf, and 
 therefore no Wonder if it prevail over Reafon too. 
 What is but Cuftom that renders many of the 
 Mixtures of Food and Sauces elegant in Britain, 
 which would be aukward and naufeous to the. In- 
 habitants of China, and indeed were naufeous to 
 us when we firft tailed them ? What but Cuftom 
 could make thofe Salutations polite in Mufcovy, 
 which are ridiculous in France or England ? We 
 call our felves indeed the politer Nations, but it is 
 we who judge thus of ourfelves ; and that fan- 
 cied
 
 2 18 -LOGIC K: Of] Part It 
 
 cied Politeness is oftentimes more owing to Cuftom 
 than Reafon. Why are the Forms of our prefent 
 Garments counted beautiful, and thofe Fafhions of 
 our Anceftors the Matter of Scoff and Contempt* 
 which in their Day were all decent and genteel ? 
 It is Cuftom that forms our Opinion of Drefs, and 
 reconciles us by Degrees to thofe Habits which 
 at firft feemed very odd and monftrous. It muft 
 be granted there are fome Garments and Habits 
 which have a natural Congruity or Incongruity, 
 Modefty or Immodefty, Decency or Indecency., 
 Gaudery or Gravity , tho* for the moft part there 
 is but little of Reafon in thefe Affairs : But what 
 little there is of Reafon of' natural Decency , Cuftom 
 triumphs over it all. It is almoft impofiible to 
 perfuade a gay Lady that any thing can be de- 
 tent which is out of Fajkion : And it were well if 
 Fajhion ftretch'd its Powers no farther than the 
 Bufmefs of Drapery and the fair Sex. 
 
 The Methods of our Education are governed 
 by Cuftom. It is Cuftom and not Reafon that fends 
 every Boy to learn the Roman Poets, and begin a 
 little Acquaintance with Greek, before he is bound 
 an Apprentice to a Soapboiler or Leatherfeller. 
 It is Cuftom alone that teaches us Latin by the 
 Rules of a Latin Grammar , a tedious and abfurd 
 Method ! And what is it but Cuftom that has for 
 paft Centuries confined the brighteft Genius's even 
 of the high Rank in the Female World to the only 
 Bufmefs of the Needle, and fecluded them moft 
 unmercifully from the Pleafures of Knowledge, 
 and the divine Improvements of Reafon ? But we 
 begin to break all thefe Chains, and Reafon begins 
 to dictate the Education of Youth. May the 
 growing Age be learned and wife ! 
 
 It
 
 C. III. . 4. fbe right Ufe o/*Reafon. 
 
 It is by the Prejudice arifing from our own Cuf- 
 toms, that we judge of all other civil and religious 
 Forms and Practices. The Rites and Ceremonies 
 of War and Peace in other Nations, the Forms 
 of Weddings and Funerals, the feveral Ranks of 
 Magijlracy, the Trades and Employments of both 
 Sexes, the publick and the domeftick Affairs of Life* 
 and almoft every thing of foreign Cufloms is judg'd 
 irregular. It is all imagined to be unreasonable or 
 unnatural^ by thofe who have no other Rule to 
 judge of Nature and Reafon, but the Cuftoms of 
 their own Country, or the little Town where they 
 dwell. Cuftom is called a fecond Nature, but we 
 often miftake it for Nature itfelf. 
 
 Befides all this, there is a Fafhion in Opinions* 
 there is a Fafhion in Writing and Printing, in 
 Stile and Language. In our Day it is the Vogue 
 of the Nation, that Parliaments may fettle the 
 Succeffion of the Crown, and that a People can make 
 a King , in the laft Age this was a Doctrine akin 
 to Treafon. Citations from the Latin Poets were 
 an Embellifhment of Stile in the laft Century j 
 and whole Pages in that Day were covered with 
 them j it is now forbidden by Cuftom, and ex- 
 pofed by the Name of Pedantry, whereas in 
 Truth both thefe are Extremes. Sometimes our 
 printed Books mall abound in Capitals, and fome- 
 times reject them all* Now we deal much in Ef- 
 fays , and moft unreafonably defpife fyftematic 
 Learning, whereas our Fathers had a juft Value 
 for Regularity and Syjlems ; then Folio's and 
 Quarto's were the fafliionable Sizes, as Volumes 
 in Oft aw are now. We are ever ready to run in- 
 to Extremes, and yet Cuftom ftill perfuades us that 
 Reafon and Nature are on our Side.
 
 220 L O G TC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 This Bufmefs of the Fajkwn has a moft power- 
 ful Influence on our Judgments -, for it employs 
 thofe two ftrong Engines of Fear and Shame to 
 operate upon our Underftandings with unhappy 
 Succefs. We are afhamed to believe or profefs an 
 unfafhionable Opinion in Philofophy, and a cow- 
 ardly Soul dares not fo much as indulge a Thought 
 contrary to the eftablijhcd o\' fajhionable Faith^ nor 
 act in Oppofition to Cuftom, tho' it be according 
 to the Dictates of Reafon. 
 
 I confefs, there is a Refpect due to Mankind 
 which fhould incline even the wifeft of Men to 
 follow the innocent Cuftoms of their Country in 
 outward Practices of the Civil Life, and in ibme 
 Meafure to fubmit to Fafhion in all indifferent Af- 
 fairs, where Reafon and Scripture make no Re- 
 rnonftrances againft it. But the Judgments of the 
 Mind ought to be for ever free, and not biafied 
 by the Cuftoms and Fajhions of any Age or Nation 
 whatfoever. 
 
 To deliver our Underftandings from this Dan- 
 
 fr and Slavery, we fhould confider thefe three 
 hings. 
 
 1 . That the greateft Part of the Civil Cuftoms 
 of any particular Nation or Age fpring from 
 Humour rather than Reafon. Sometimes the Hu- 
 mour of the Prince prevails, and fometimes the 
 Humour of the People. It is either the Great or 
 the Many who dictate the Fafhion, and thefe have 
 not always the higheft Reafon on their Side. 
 
 2. Confider alfo, that the Cuftoms of the fame 
 Nation in different Ages, the Cuftoms of different 
 Nations in the fame Age, and the Cuftoms of dif- 
 ferent Towns and Villages in the fame Nation, are 
 very various and contrary to each other. The 
 fa/monabk Learning, Language, Sentiments and 
 
 Rules of Politenefs differ greatly in different Coun- 
 i tries
 
 C. III. S. 4. tte right UReafon; 22 r 
 
 tries and Ages of Mankind j but 'Truth and Reafon 
 are of a more uniform and fteady Nature, and 
 don't change with the Fafhion. Upon this Ac- 
 count, to cure the PrepoJJeffions which arife from 
 Cujlom, it is of excellent Ufe to travel, and fee the 
 Cuftoms of various Countries, and to read the 
 Travels of other Men, and the Hiftory of paft 
 Ages, that every thing may not feem ftrange and 
 uncouth which is not praclifed within the Limits 
 of our own Parim, or in the narrow Space of our 
 own Life-time. 
 
 3. Confider yet again, how often we our felves 
 have changed our own Opinions concerning the 
 Decency, Propriety, or Congruity of feveral 
 Modes or Pr attics s in the World, efpecially if we 
 have lived to the Age of thirty or forty. Cuftotn 
 or Fajhion, even in all its Changes, has beeri 
 ready to have fome Degree of Afcendency over our 
 Underftanding, and what at one time feemed de- 
 cent, appears obfolete and difagreeable afterward, 
 when the Fafhion changes. Let us learn there- 
 fore to abftract as much as pofiible from Cuftont 
 and Fa/hion, when we would pafs a Judgment 
 concerning the real Value and intrinfic Nature of 
 Things. 
 
 III. The Authority of Men if the Spring of another 
 Rank of Prejudices. 
 
 Among thefe the Authority of our Forefathers 
 and ancient Authors is moft remarkable. We pa'y 
 Deference to the Opinions of others, merely be- 
 caufe they lived a thoufand Years before us ; and 
 even the Trifles and Impertinencies that have a 
 Mark of Antiquity upon them are reverenced for 
 this Reafon, becaufe they came from the Anci- 
 ents. It is granted, that the Ancients had many, 
 wife and great Men among them, and fome of 
 P i their
 
 222 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 their Writings, which Time hath delivered down 
 to us, as truly valuable : But thofe Writers lived 
 rather in the Infant-State of the World ; and the 
 Philofophers, as well as the polite Authors of our 
 Age, are properly the Elders, who have feen die 
 Miftakes of the younger Ages of Mankind, and 
 corrected them by Oblervation and Experience. 
 
 Some borrow all their Religion from the Fa- 
 thers of the Chrijlian Church, or from their Sy- 
 nods or Councils ; but he that will read Monfieur 
 Daille on the Ufe of the Fathers will find many 
 Reafons why they are by no means fit to dictate 
 our Faith, fince we have the Gofpel of Chrift^ 
 and the Writings of the Apoftles and Prophets in 
 our own Hands. 
 
 . Some Perfons believe every thing that their 
 Kindred, their Parents, and their Tutors believe. 
 The Veneration and the I..ove which they have 
 for their Ancejlors incline them to fwallow down 
 all their Opinions at once, without examining 
 what Truth or Falfhood there is in them. Men 
 take up their Principles by Inheritance, and de- 
 fend them as they would their Eftates, becaufe 
 they are born Heirs to them. I freely grant, that 
 Parents are appointed by God and Nature to teach 
 us all the Sentiments and Practices of our younger 
 Years , and happy are thofe whofe Parents lead 
 them into the Paths of Wifdom and Truth ! 1 
 ,grant farther, that when Perfons come to Years 
 of Difcretion, and judge for themfelves, they 
 ought to examine the Opinions of their Parents 
 with the greateft Modefty, and with a humble 
 Deference to their fuperior Character ; they ought 
 in Matters perfectly dubious to give the Prefer- 
 ence to their Parents Advice, and always to pay 
 them the firft Refpect, nor ever depart from their 
 Opinions and Practice, till Reafon and Confcience 
 
 make
 
 C. III. S. 4. TherightUfeof^vifoK. 223 
 
 make it neceffary. But after all, it is poflible that 
 Parents may be niiftaken, and therefore Rcafon 
 and .Scripture ought to be our final Rules of Deter- 
 mination in Matters that relate to this World, and 
 that which is to come. 
 
 Sometimes a favourite Author, or a Writer of 
 great Name, drags a thoufand Followers after him 
 into his own Miftakes, merely by the Authority 
 of his Name and Character. The Sentiments of 
 Ariftotle were imbibed and maintained by all the 
 Schools in Europe for feveral Centuries , and a 
 Citation from his Writings was thought a fuffi- 
 cient Proof of any Propofition. The great )ef- 
 cartes had alib too many implicit Believers in the 
 laft Age, tho' he himfelf, in his Philofophy, dif- 
 claims all fuch Influence over the Minds of his 
 Readers. Calvin and Luther, in the Days of Re* 
 formation from Popery, were learned and pious 
 Men, and there have been a Succefllon of their 
 Difciples even to this Day, who pay too much 
 Reverence to the Words of their Mafters. There 
 are others who renounce their Authority, but give 
 themfelves up in too fervile a manner to the Opi- 
 nion and Authority of other Mafters, and follow 
 as bad or worfe Guides in Religion. 
 
 If only learned, and wife, and good Men had 
 Influence on the Sentiments of others, it would 
 be at leaft a more excufable fort of Prejudice, and 
 there would be fome Colour and Shadow of Rea- 
 fon for it : But that Riches, Honours, and outward 
 Splendour mould fet up Perfons for Dictators to all 
 the reft of Mankind ; this is a moft fhameful In- 
 vafion of the Right of our Underftandings on the 
 one hand, and as fhameful a Slavery of the Soul 
 on the other. The poor Man or the Labourer too 
 often believes fuch a Principle in Politicks, or in 
 Morality, and judges concerning the Rights of the 
 P 3 King
 
 324 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 King and the People, juft as his 'wealthy Neighbour 
 does. Half the Parifh follows the Opinion of 
 the Efquire, and the 'Tenants of a Manor fall into 
 the Sentiments of their Lord., efpecially if he lives 
 amongft them. How unreafonable and yet how 
 common is this ? 
 
 As for Principles of Religion, we frequently 
 find how they are taken up and forfaken, changed 
 and refumed by the Influence of Princes. In all 
 Nations the Priefts have much Power alfo in dic- 
 tating the Religion of the People, but the Princes 
 dictate to them : And where there is a great Pomp 
 and Grandeur attending the Priefthood in any 
 Religion whatfoever, with fo much the more Re- 
 verence and ftronger Faith do the People believe 
 whatever they teach them : Yet it is too often 
 evident that Riches, and Dominions, and high 
 Titles in Church or State have no Manner of Pre- 
 tence to Truth and Certainty, Wifdom and Good- 
 nefs above the reft of Mortals, becaufe thefe Su- 
 periorities in this World are not always conferred 
 according to Merit. 
 
 I confefs, where a Man of Wifdom and Tears, 
 of Obfervation and Experience, gives us his Opi- 
 nion and Advice in Matters of the civil or the 
 yioral Life, Reafon tells us we mould pay a great 
 Attention to him, it is probable he may be in the 
 Right. Where a Man of long Exercife in Piety 
 fpeaks of practical Religion, there is a due Defe- 
 rence to be paid to his Sentiments : And the fame 
 we may fay concerning an ingenious Man long verf- 
 ed in any Art or Science, he may juftly expecl due 
 Regard when he fpeaks of his own Affairs and 
 proper Bufinefs. But in other Things each of thefe 
 may be ignorant enough, notwithftanding all their 
 Piety and Years, and particular Skill : Nor even 
 in their own proper Province are they to be believed
 
 C. III. S. 4, The right Ufe */Reafon. 225 
 
 in every thing without Referve, and without Exa- 
 mination. 
 
 To free our felves from thefe Prejudices, it is 
 fufficient to remember that there is no Rank nor 
 Character among Mankind, which has any juft 
 Pretence to fway the Judgments of other Men 
 by their Authority : For there have been Perfons 
 of the fame Rank and Character who have main- 
 tained different and contrary Sentiments -, but all 
 thefe can never be true, and therefore the mere 
 Name or Reputation that any of them poffefies, is 
 not a fufficient Evidence of Truth. 
 
 Shall we believe the Ancients in Philofcphy ? But 
 fome of the Ancients were Stoicks, fome Peripa- 
 teticks, fome Platonicks, and fome Epicureans, fome 
 Cynics, and fome Sceptics. Shall we judge of Mat- 
 ters of the Chriftian Faith by the Fathers or Pri- 
 mitive Writers for three or four hundred Years 
 after Cbrift ? But they often contradicted one an- 
 other, and themfelves too , and what is worfe, 
 they fometimes contradicted the Scripture itfelf. 
 Now among all thefe different and contrary Sen- 
 timents in Pbilofophy and Religion, which of the 
 Ancients muft we believe, for we cannot believe 
 them all? 
 
 Again, To believe in all Things as our Prede- 
 ceffors did, is the ready way to keep Mankind in 
 an everlafting State of Infancy, and to lay an 
 eternal Bar againft all the Improvements of our 
 Reafon and our Happinefs. Had the prefent Age 
 of Philofophers fatisfied to themfelves with thefub- 
 (tantial Forms, and occult Qualities of Anflotle, 
 with the folid Spheres, Excentricks and Epicycles of 
 Ptolomy, and the ancient Aftronomers , then, the 
 great Lord Bacon, Copernicus, and Defcartes, with 
 the greater Sir Ifaac Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr. 
 Boyle, had rifen in our World in vain. We muft 
 P 4 have
 
 226 LOGIC K: Or Part II. 
 
 have blundered on ftill in fuccefiive Generations 
 amongft Abfurdities and thick Darknefs, and g. 
 hundred ufeful Inventions for the Happinefs of 
 human Life had never been known. 
 
 Thus it is in Matters of Philofophy and Science. 
 But) you will fay, Jhall not our own Ancejlors de- 
 termine our Judgment in Matters of civil or religi- 
 ous Concernment ? If they muft, then the Child 
 of a Heathen muft believe that Heathenifm is 
 Truth ; the Son of a Papift muft aflent to all the 
 Abfurdities of Popery ; the Pofterity of the Jews 
 and Socinians muft for ever be Socinians and Jews ; 
 and a Man, whofe Father was of Republican Prin- 
 ciples, muft make a Succefiion of Republicans in 
 his Family to the End of the World. If we 
 ought always to believe whatfoever our Parent^ 
 or our Priefts, or our Princes believe, the Inhabi- 
 tants of China ought to worfhip their own Idols, 
 and the Savages of Africa ought to believe all the 
 Nonfenfe, and praclife the Idolatry of their Negro. 
 Fathers and Kings. The Britifh Nation, when it 
 was Heathen^ could never have become Cbrijtian ; 
 and when it was a Slave to. R.ome^ it could never 
 have been reformed. 
 
 Befides, let us confider that the great God, our 
 common Maker, has never given one Man's Un- 
 flerftanding a legal and rightful Sovereignty to de- 
 fermine Truth for others, at leaft after they are paft 
 the State of Childhood or Minority. No fingle 
 Perfon, how learned and wife, and great foever, oy 
 whatfoever natural^ or civil, or ecclefiaftical Rela- 
 tion he may have to. us, can claim this Dominion 
 over our Faith. St. Paul the Appftle, in his pri- 
 vate Capacity would not do it ; nor hath an in- 
 fpired Man any fuch Authority, until he makes his 
 divine Commiflion appear. Our Saviour himfelf 
 Sells the Jews, that if be had not done fuch won- 
 drous
 
 C.III. S. 4. The Right Uje o/"Reafon. 227 
 
 drous Works among them, they had not finned in 
 disbelieving his Doctrines, and refilling him for 
 the MeJJlab. No Biftiop or Prefbyter, no Synod 
 or Council, no Church or Afiembly of Men, (fince 
 the Days of Infpiration) hath Power derived to 
 them from God to make Creeds or Articles of 
 Faith for us, and impofe them upon our Under- 
 ftandings. We muft all aft according to the beft 
 of our own Light, and the Judgment of our own 
 Confciences, ufmg the beft Advantages which 
 Providence hath given us, with an honeft and im^ 
 partial Diligence to enquire and fearch out the 
 Truth : For every one of us muft give an Account of 
 himfelf to God. To believe as the Church , or the 
 Court believes, is but a forry and a dangerous 
 Faith : This Principle would make more Heathens 
 than Chriftians, and more Papifts than Proteftants ; 
 and perhaps lead more Souls to Hell than to Hea- 
 ven ; for our Saviour himfelf has plainly told us, 
 that if the Blind will be led by the Blind, they muft 
 both fall in the Ditch. 
 
 Tho 1 there be fo much Danger of Error arifmg 
 from the three Prejudices laft mentioned, yet be- 
 fore I difmifs this Head, I think it proper to take 
 Notice, that as Education^ Cuftom and Authority 
 are no fure Evidences of Tn//&, fo neither are they 
 certain Marks of Faljhood ; for Reafon and Scrip- 
 ture may join to dictate the fame Things which 
 our Parents, our Nurfes, our Tutors, our Friends, 
 and our Country believe and profefs. Yet there 
 appears fometimes in our Age a Pride and Petu- 
 lancy in Youth, zealous to caft off the Sentiments 
 of their Fathers and Teachers on Purpofe to mew 
 that they carry none of the Prejudices of Educa- 
 tion and Authority about them. They indulge all 
 rnanner of licentious Opinions and Practices, from 
 a vain Pretence. of afferting their Liberty. But 
 
 alas!
 
 228 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 alas ! This is but changing one Prejudice for an- 
 other ; and fometimes it happens by this means, 
 that they make a Sacrifice both of Truth and 
 Virtue to the vile Prejudices of their Pride and 
 Senfuality. 
 
 IV. There is another Tribe of Prejudices which 
 are near akin to thofe of Authority , and that is 
 when we receive a Doctrine becaufe of the Man- 
 ner in which it is propofed to us by others. I have 
 already mentioned the powerful Influence that Ora- 
 tory and fine Words have to infmuate a falfe Opi- 
 nion, and fometimes Truth is refufed, and fuf- 
 fers Contempt in the Lips of a wife Man, for 
 want of the Charms of Language : But there are 
 feveral other Manners of Propo/al whereby mif- 
 taken Sentiments are powerfully conveyed into the 
 Mind. 
 
 Some Perfons are eafily perfuaded to believe 
 what another dictates with a pofitive Air and a 
 great Degree of Affurance : They feel the over- 
 bearing Force of a confident Dictator, efpecially 
 if he be of fuperior Rank or Character to them- 
 felves. 
 
 Some are quickly convinced of the Truth of 
 any Doctrine, when he that propofes it puts on 
 all the Airs of Piety, and makes folemn Appeals to 
 Heaven, and Proieflations of the 'Truth of it : The 
 pious Mind of a weaker Chriftian is ready to re- 
 ceive any thing that is pronounced with fuch an 
 awful Solemnity. 
 
 It is a Prejudice near akin to this, when a hum- 
 ble Soul is frighted into any particular Sentiments 
 of Religion, becaufe a Man of great Name or 
 Character pronounces Herefy upon the contrary 
 Sentiments, cafts the Difbeliever out of the Church, 
 and forbids him the Gates of Heaven. 
 
 Others
 
 C.III.S.4. TberigbtUfeofRetfon. 229 
 
 Others are allured into particular Opinions by 
 gentler Practices on the Underftanding : Not on- 
 ly the fofter Tempers of Mankind, but even har- 
 dy and rugged Souls are fometimes led away Cap- 
 tives to Error by the foft Airs of Addrefs, and the 
 fweet and engaging Methods of Perfuafion and Kind-* 
 nefs. 
 
 I grant, where natural or reveal'd Religion 
 plainly dictate to us the infinite and everlafting 
 Importance of any facred Doctrine, it cannot be 
 improper to ufe any of thefe Methods to perfuade 
 Men to receive and obey the Truth, after we have 
 given fufficient Reafon and Argument to convince 
 their Underftandings. Yet all thefe Methods con- 
 fidered in themfelves, have been often ufed to con- 
 vey Falfhood into the Soul as well as Truth ; and 
 if we build our Faith merely upon thefe Founda- 
 tions, without Regard to the Evidence of Truth 
 and the Strength of Argument, our Belief is but 
 the Effeft of Prejudice : For neither the pofitive, 
 the awful or folemn, the terrible or the gentle Me- 
 thods of Addrefs carry any certain Evidence with 
 them that Truth lies on that Side. 
 
 There is another Manner of -proofing our own 
 Opinion, or rather oppofing the Opinions of others, 
 which demands a mention here, and that is when 
 Perfons make a Jefl ferve inftead of an Argument , 
 when they refute what they call Error by a Turn 
 of Wit y and anfwer every Objection againft their 
 own Sentiments, by cafting a Sneer upon the Ob- 
 jector. Thefe Scoffers practife with Succefs upon 
 weak and cowardly Spirits : Such as have not been 
 well eftablifhed in Religion or Morality, have 
 been laughed out of the beft Principles by a con- 
 fident Buffoon , they have yielded up their Opi- 
 nions to a witty Banter, aad fold their Faith and 
 Religion for a Jejl. 
 
 There
 
 230 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 There is no Way to cure thefe Evils in fuch a 
 degenerate World as we live in, but by learning 
 to diftinguifh well between the Subftance of any 
 DoRrine, and the manner of Addrefs either in pro- 
 pofing, attacking, or defending it ; and then by 
 fetting a juft and fevere Guard of Reafon and 
 Confcience over all the Exercifes of our Judg- 
 ment refolving to yield to nothing but the con- 
 vincing Evidence of Truth, religioufly obeying 
 the Light of Reafon in Matters of pure Reafon, 
 and the Dictates of Revelation in Things that re- 
 late to our Faith. 
 
 Thus we have taken a brief Survey of fome of 
 the infinite Varieties of Prejudice that attend Man- 
 kind on every fide in the prefent State, and the 
 Dangers of Error or of rafh Judgment^ we are 
 perpetually expofed to in this Life : This Chapter 
 fhall conclude with one Remark, and one Piece of 
 Advice. 
 
 The Remark is this. This fame Opinion, whe- 
 ther falfe or true, may be dictated by many Pre- 
 judices at the fame time , for as I hinted before, 
 Prejudice may happen to dictate Truth fometimes 
 as well as Error. But where two or more Prejudices 
 oppofe one another, as it often happens, the ftrong- 
 er prevails and gains the AfTent : Yet how feldotn 
 does Reafon interpofe with fufficient Power to get 
 the Afcendant of them all as it ought to do! 
 
 The Advice follows, (viz.} Since we find fuch 
 a fwarm of Prejudices attending us both within 
 and without ; fince we feel the Weaknefs of our 
 Reafon, the Frailty of our Natures, and our In- 
 fufficiency to guard our felves from Error upon 
 this Account, it is not at all unbecoming the Cha- 
 racter of a Logician or a Philofopher (together with 
 the Advice already given) to direct every Perfon 
 in his Search after Truth to mak;e his daily Ad- 
 
 dreffes
 
 C. IV. The right Ufe ofReafoa: 23 1 
 
 drcfies to Heaven, and implore the G0d of Truth 
 to lead him into all Truth, and to ajk Wifdom of 
 him who giveth liberally to them that afk it, and 
 uplyraideth us not with our own Follies. 
 
 Such a devout Practice will be an excellent Pre- 
 parative for the beft Improvement of all the Di- 
 reftiom and Rules propofed in the two following 
 Chapters. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 General Direffiom to ajjift us in judging 
 aright. 
 
 THE chief Defign of the Art of Logick is to 
 afiift us in forming a true Judgment of 
 Things , a few proper Obfervations for this End 
 have been dropt occafionally in fome of the fore- 
 going Chapters: Yet it is necefiary to mention 
 them again in this Place, that we may have a 
 more compleat and fimultaneous View of the ge- 
 neral Directions, which are necefiary in order to 
 judge aright. A Multitude of Advices may be 
 framed for this Purpofe ; the chief of them may, 
 for Order fake, be reduced to the following 
 Heads. 
 
 I. Direft. When we confider our felves as Pin- 
 iofopbers, or Searchers after Truth, we mould ex- 
 amine all our old Opinions afrejh, and enquire what 
 was the Ground of them, and whether our Affent 
 were built on jufl Evidence \ and then we /hould caft 
 off all thofe Judgments which were formed hereto- 
 fore without due Examination. A Man in purfuit 
 of Knowledge fhould throw off all thofe Preju- 
 i dices
 
 2 $2 LOGIC K: Or, Part If. 
 
 dices which he had imbibed in Times paft, and 
 guard againft all the Springs of Error mentioned 
 in the preceding Chapter, with utmoft Watchful- 
 nefs for Time to come. 
 
 Obferve here, that this Rule of cafting away all 
 our former prejudicate Opinions and Sentiments, is 
 not propofed to any of us to be practifed at once, 
 confidered as Men ofBufinefs, or Religion, as Friends 
 or Neighbours, as Fathers or Sons, as Magiftrates, 
 Subjects or Chriftians -, but merely as Philofophers 
 and Searchers after Truth : And though it may be 
 well prefumed that many of our Judgments, both 
 true and falfe, together with the Practices built 
 thereon in the natural, the civil and the religious 
 Life were formed without fufficient Evidence ; 
 yet an univerfal Rejection of all thefe might deftroy 
 at once our prefent Senfe and Practice of Duty 
 with Regard to God, our Selves, and our Fellow- 
 Creatures, Mankind would be hereby thrown in- 
 to fuch a State of Doubting and Indifference, thai- 
 it would be too long e're they recovered any 
 Principles of Virtue or Religion by a Train of 
 Realbnings. 
 
 Befides, the common Affairs of human Life of- 
 ten demand a much fpeedier Determination, and 
 we muft many times act upon prefent Probabili- 
 ties : The Bulk of Mankind have not Time and 
 Leifure, and Advantages fufficient to begin all 
 their Knowledge anew, and to build up every 
 fingle Opinion and Practice afreili upon the jufteft 
 Grounds of Evidence. 
 
 Yet let it be obferved alfo, that fo far as any 
 Perfon is capable of forming and correcting his 
 Notions and his Rules of Conduct in the natural, 
 civil and religious Life by the ftrict Rules of Lo- 
 guk -, and fo far as he hath Time and Capacity to 
 review his old Opinions, to re-examine all thofe 
 
 which
 
 CIV.S.4. fyerightUfeof&ttfon. 233 
 
 which are any Way doubtful, and to determine 
 nothing without juft Evidence, he is likely to be- 
 come fo much the wifer, and the happier Man. 
 and (if Divine Grace aflift him) fo much the better 
 Chriftian. And tho* this cannot be done all at 
 once, yet it may be done by prudent Steps and 
 >f " 
 
 Degrees, till our whole Set of Opinions and Prin- 
 ciples be in time corrected and reformed, or at 
 leaft eftablifhed upon jufter Foundations. 
 
 II. Direft. Endeavour that all your Ideas ofthofe 
 Objefts concerning which you fafs any Judgment , be 
 clear and diftintf, compleat, comprehenfive, extenfive 
 and orderly, as far as you have Occafion to judge 
 concerning them. This is the Subftance of the laft 
 Chapter of the firft Part of Logick. The Rules 
 which direft our Conceptions, muft be reviewed, if 
 we would form our Judgments aright. But if 
 we will make hafte to judge at all Adventures, 
 while our Ideas are dark and confufed and very 
 imperfe5l, we mall be in Danger of running into 
 many Miftakes. This is like a Perfon who would 
 pretend to give the Sum total of a large Account 
 in Arithmetick, without furveying all the Particu- 
 lars , or as a Painter who profefles to draw a fair 
 and diftinft Landfkip in the Twilight, when he 
 can hardly diftinguilh a Houfe from a Tree. 
 
 Obferve here, that this Direction does not re- 
 quire us to gain clear, diftincl:, compleat Ideas of 
 Things in all their Parts, Powers, and Qualities 
 in an abfolute Senfe, for this belongs to God alone, 
 and is impoflible for us to attain : But it is expreft 
 in a relative or limited Senfe -, that is, our Ideas 
 mould be clear, diftincl: and comprehenfive, &c. 
 at leaft fo far as we have Occafion at that time to 
 judge concerning them. We may form many true 
 and certain Judgments concerning God, Angels, 
 
 Animals,
 
 234 L G I C K: Or, Part II, 
 
 Animals, Men, Heaven, Hell, &V. by thofe partial 
 and very imperfect Conceptions of them to which 
 we have attained, if we judge no farther concern- 
 ing them than our Conceptions reach. 
 
 We may have a clear and diftinct Idea of the 
 Exiftence of many Things in Nature, and affirm 
 that they do exift, tho' our Ideas of their Intimate 
 Effences and Caufes, their Relations and Manners of 
 Attion are very confufed and obfcure. We may 
 judge well concerning federal Properties of any 
 Being, tho* other Properties are unknown, for per- 
 haps we know not all the Properties of any Being 
 whatfoever. 
 
 Sometimes we have clear Ideas of the abfoluts 
 Properties of an Object -, and we may judge of 
 them with Certainty, while the relative Proper- 
 ties are very obfcure and unknown to us. So we 
 may have a clear and juft Idea of the Area of a 
 Parallelogram without knowing what Relation it 
 bears to the Area of a triangle or a Polygon. I may 
 know the length of the Diameter of a Circle, with- 
 out knowing what Proportion it has to the Cir- 
 cumference. 
 
 There are other Things whofe external Relative 
 Properties with refpect to each other, or whofe 
 Relations to us, we know better than their own 
 inward and dbfolute Properties, or their eflential 
 diftinguifhing Attributes. We perceive clearly, 
 that Fire will warm or burn us, and will evaporate 
 Water -, and that Water will allay our Thirft, or 
 quench the Fire, tho' we know not the inward dif- 
 tinguifhing Particles or prime effential Properties 
 of Fire or Water. We may know the King, and 
 Lord Chancellor, and affirm many Things of them 
 in their legal Characters, tho' we can have but a 
 confufed Idea of their Perfons or natural Features^ 
 if we have never feen their Faces. So the Scrip- 
 ture
 
 C. IV. fbe right Ufe of Reafon; 235 
 
 ture has revealed God himfelf to us, as our Cre- 
 ator, Preferver, Redeemer, and Sanftifier, and as 
 the Objeft of our Worftjip in clearer Ideas than it 
 has revealed many other abftrufe Queftions which 
 may be raifed about his own Divine Effence or 
 Subftancs, his Immenfity or Omniprefence. 
 
 This therefore is the general Obfervation in or- 
 der to guide our Judgments, that we Jhould not al- 
 low our [elves to form a "Judgment concerning 'Things 
 farther than our clear and diftincJ Ideas reach, and 
 then we are not in danger of Error. 
 
 But there is one confiderable Objection againft this 
 Rule which is necefiary to be anfwered -, and there 
 is one juft and reafonable Exception, which is as 
 needful to be mentioned. 
 
 The Objection is this : May we not judge fafely 
 concerning fome total or compleat Ideas, when we 
 have a clear Perception only of fome Parts or 
 Properties of them? May we not affirm, that All 
 that is in God is eternal, or that all his unknown 
 Attributes are infinite, tho* we have fo very imper- 
 fect an Idea of God, Eternity, and Infinity ? Again, 
 May we not fafely judge of particular Objects 
 whofe Idea is obfcure by a clear Idea of the Ge- 
 neral? May I not affirm, that <?wry unknown Spe- 
 cies of Animals has inward Springs of Motion, be- 
 caufe I have a clear Idea that thefe inward Springs 
 belong to an Animal in general ? 
 
 Anfwer. All thofe fuppofed unknown Parts, Pro- 
 perties or Species are clearly and diftinflly perceiv- 
 ed to be connected with, or contained in the 
 known Parts, Properties or general Ideas, which 
 we fuppofe to be clear and diftincl: as far as we 
 judge of them: And as we have no particular 
 Idea of thofe unknown divine Attributes, or unknown 
 Species of Animals -, fo there is nothing particular 
 affirmed concerning them beyond what belongs to
 
 236 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 the general Idea of Divine Attributes or Animals , 
 with which I clearly and diftinctly perceive them 
 to be connected. 
 
 It may be illuftrated in this manner. Suppofe 
 a long Chain lies before me, whofe neareft Links I 
 fee are Iron Rings, and I fee them faften'd to a Poft 
 near me, but the moft difiant Links lie beyond the 
 reach of my Sight, fo that I know not whether 
 they are oval or round, Brafs or Iron : Now I 
 may boldly affirm the whole Length of this Chain 
 isfajtened to the Poff, for I have a clear Idea that 
 the neareft Links are thus faften'd, and a clear 
 Idea that the diftant Links are connected with the 
 neareft, if I can draw the whole Chain by one 
 Link. 
 
 Or thus ; If two known Ideas, A and B are 
 evidently join'd, or agree, and if C unknown be 
 included in A, and alfo D unknown be included 
 in B, then 1 may affirm that C and D are join'd 
 and agree ; for I have, a clear Perception of the 
 Union of the two known Ideas A and B ; and 
 alfo a clear Perception of the Connexion of the 
 unknown Ideas with the known. So that dear 
 and diftinff Ideas muft ftill abide as a general ne- 
 ceffary Qualification in order to form right Judg- 
 ments ; and indeed, it , is upon this Foot that all 
 Ratiocination is built, and the Conclufwns are thus 
 formed, which deduce Things unknown from 
 Things known. 
 
 Yet it feems to me that there is one juft Li- 
 mitation or Exception to this general Rule of Judg- 
 wevt, as built on clear and diftinct Ideas, and it 
 is this ; 
 
 Exception. In Matters of mere Teftimony, whether 
 human or divine, there is always a Necejfity of clear 
 and diftinR Ideas of the 'Things which are believed. 
 the Evidence of Propofitions, which are en- 
 tirely
 
 C. IV. <tt>e right Ufe of Reafon; 
 
 tirely formed by ourfelves, depends on the Clearnefs 
 and Diftinctnefs of thofe Ideas of which they are 
 compofed, and on our own clear Perception of 
 their Agreement or Difagreement, yet we may 
 juftly aflent to Propofitions fofm'd by others, when 
 we have neither a very clear Conception in our 
 felves of the two Ideas contained in the Words, 
 nor how they agree or difagree ; provided always 
 that we have a clear and fufficient Evidence of the 
 Credibility of the Perfons who inform us. 
 
 Thus when we read in Scripture the great Doc- 
 trines of the Deity of Cbrift, of the Union of the di- 
 vine and human Natures in him, of the divine Agen- 
 cy of the bleffed Spirit , that the Son is the Brightnefs 
 of his Father's Glory, that all 'Things were created 
 by him, and for him, that the Son Jhall give up his 
 Kingdom to the Father, and that God Jhall be all 
 in all, we may fafely believe them : For tho* our 
 Ideas of thefe Objects them felves are not fufficient- 
 ly clear, diftinct, and perfect, for our own Minds 
 to form thefe Judgments or Propofitions concern- 
 ing them, yet we have a clear and diftinct Per- 
 ception of God's revealing them, or that they 
 are contain'd in Scripture , and this is fufficient 
 Evidence to determine our Aflent. 
 
 The fame Thing holds true in fome meafure, 
 where credible human Teftimony allures us of fome 
 Propofitions, while we have no fufficient Ideas of 
 the Subject and Predicate of them to determine 
 our Aflent. So when an honeft and learned Ma- 
 thematician aflures a Plowman that the three An- 
 gles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles, or 
 that the Square of the Hypotenufe oj a right-angled 
 Triangle is equal to the Sum of the Squares of the 
 two Sides ; the Plowman, who has but confus'd 
 Ideas of thefe Things, may firmly and fafely be- 
 lieve thefe Propofitions upon the fame Ground, 
 2 becaufe
 
 238 L G I C K: Or, PartIL 
 
 becaufe he has Evidence of the Skill and Faith- 
 fulnefs of his Informer *. 
 
 III. Direction. When you have obtained as 
 clear and comprehenfive Ideas as is needful, both 
 of the Subject and Predicate of a Propofition, 
 then compare thofe Ideas of the Subjeft and Predi- 
 cate 
 
 * Perhaps fome may object againft this Reprefentation of Things, and 
 fay, that " We cannot properly be faid to believe a Propofition any farther 
 *' than we ourfelves have Ideas under the Terms : Therefore if we have no 
 Ideas under the Terms, we believe nothing but the Connexion of Words 
 or Sounds ; and if we have but obfcure and inadequate Ideas under the 
 Terms, then we partly believe a Connexion of Things, and partly a 
 Connection of SounHs : but that we cannot properly be faid to believe the 
 Propofitkn, for our Faith can never go beyond our Ideas. 
 Now to fet this Matter in a clear Light, I fuppofe that every Prcpofidon 
 which is propofed to my Affent, is a Sentence made up of Terms which 
 have fome Ideas under them, known or unknown to me. I confels, if I 
 believe there are no ideas at all under the Terms, and there is nothing 
 meant by them, then indeed (with regard to me) it is the mere joining of 
 Sounds: But if (for inftance) a Plowman has credible Information from an 
 honeft and fldlful Mathematician, that an Ellipfis is made by the Se&ion of 
 a Cone, he believes the Propofition, cr he believes the Sentence is true, as it 
 is made up of Terms which his Informant underftands, tho' the Ideas be 
 usknown to him ; that is, he believes there are fome Ideas which his In- 
 formant has under thefe Words which are really connected. And, I think 
 this may juftly be called, believing the Propofilion, for it is a Belief of fome- 
 thing more than the mere joining of Sounds; it is a belief of the real Con- 
 nection of fome unknown Ideas belonging to thofe Sounds : and in this 
 Senfe a Man may be faid to believe the Truth of a Propofition, which he 
 doth not under/land at all. 
 
 With more Reafon flill may we be faid to believ e a Proportion upon cre- 
 dible Teftimony, if we have fame fort of Ideas under the Terms, tho' they 
 are but partial or inadequate, and obfcure ; fuch as Divine Anfioers were 
 given by Urim and Ttummim : For fince it is purely upon Teftimony we be- 
 lieve the known Parts of the Ideas fignified by thofe Words to be connected, 
 upon the fame Teftimony we may alfo believe all the unknown Parts of th* 
 Ideas Signified by thole Words to be connected, (*WB.) becaufe our Informant 
 !s knowing and faithful. And in this Senfe we may juftly be faid to be- 
 lieve a Propofition of Scripture entirely, which we underftand but very imper- 
 Jefily, becaufe God who reveals it is knowing and faithful in Perfection. 
 
 And indeed, unlefs this Reprefentation of the Matter be allowed, there ar 
 but very few Proportions in the World, even in human Things, to which 
 we can give an entire Afient, or which we may be faid either to know, or 
 to believe, becaufe there is fcarce any thing on Earth of which we have an 
 adequate, and moft perfect Idea. And it Is evident that in Divine Tbingt 
 there is fcarce any thing which we could either know or believe without 
 this Allowance : For tho' Reafon and Revelation join to inform me, that 
 Gd is holy, how exceeding inadequate are my Ideas of God, and of his Ho- 
 linefs f yet I may boldly and entirely aflent to this whole Propofition, fince 
 I am lure that every known and unknown Idea fignified by the Term God
 
 G. IV. Me right Ufe 0/Reafon: 
 
 cate together with utmofl Attention, and obferve how 
 far they agree, and wherein they differ : Whether 
 the Propofition may be affirmed Abjolutely or Re- 
 latively, whether in Whole or in Part, whether 
 Univerfatty or Particularly, and then under what 
 particular Limitations. Turn thefe Ideas about in 
 your Mind, and take a View of them on all Sides, 
 juft as a Mafon would do to fee whether two hewn 
 Stones exadtly fuit each other in every Part, and 
 
 is connected with the Ideas of the Term Holinefs, becaufe Reafon partly 
 informs me, but efpecially becaufe the Divine Teftimony which has connect- 
 ed them, is certainly credible. 
 
 I might argue upon this Head perhaps more forcibly from the Doctrine 
 of God's Incomprebevfibleneff. If we could believe nothing but what we have 
 Ideas of, it would be impoffible for us to believe that God is Incompreben- 
 fible : For this implies in it a Belief, that there are fome unknown Ideas 
 belonging to the Nature of God. Therefore we do both believe and profefs 
 that fomething concerning unknown Ideas, when we believe and profefs 
 that God is iKcompreherfiblc* 
 
 I perfuade myfelfthat moft of thofe very Perfons who object againft my 
 Reprefentation of Things, will yet readily confefs, they believe all the Pro- 
 pofitions in Scripture, rather than declare They do not believe fe-veral of them\ 
 tho' they muft acknowledge that feveral of them are far above their Under- 
 ftanding, or that they have fcarce any Ideas of the true Senfe of them. 
 And therefore where Proportions derived from credible Teftimony are made 
 up of dark or inadequate Ideas, I think it is much more proper to fay, 
 We believe them, than that We do not believe them, left we cut off a Multi- 
 tude of the Propofitions of the Bibie from our Aflent of Faith. 
 
 Yet let it be obferved here, that when we believe a Propofition on mere 
 Teftimony, of which we have no Ideas at all, we can only be faid to give a 
 genera! implicit Affent to tie Truth of that Propofition, without any particular 
 Knowledge of, or explicit Affent to the fptcial Truth contained in that Propoji- 
 titm : And this our implicit Afftnt is of very little Ufe, unlefs it be to teftify 
 our Belief of the Knowledge and Veracity of him that informs us. 
 
 As our Ideas of a Propofition are more or lefs clear and adequate, as well 
 as juft and proper, fo we do explicitly affent more or lefs to the particular 
 Truth contained in that Propofition. And our Affent hereby becomes more 
 or lefe ufeful for the Encreafe of our Knowledge or the Direction of our 
 Practice. 
 
 When Divine Teftimony plainly propofes to our Faith fuch a Propofition 
 whereof we have but obfcure, doubtful aad inadequate Ideas, we are bound 
 implicitly to believe the Truth of it, as expreft in thofe Terms, in order to 
 fliew our Submifiion to God who revealed it, as a God of perfect Know- 
 ledge and Veracity : But it is our Duty to ufe all proper Methods to obtain 
 a farther and explicit Knowledfe of the particular Truth contained in the 
 Propofition, if we would improve by it either in Knowledge or Virtue. AH 
 neceffary Rules of Grammar and Criticifm ihould be employed to find out 
 the very Ideas that belong to thofe Words, and which were defigned by the 
 Divirje Speaker or Writer. Tho' we may believe the Truth of a Propofition 
 which we do not underftand, yet we ihould endeavour to underftand every 
 Propofition which we believe to be true.
 
 340 L G I C K : Or, Part II. 
 
 are fit to be joined in erecting a carved or fluted 
 Pillar. 
 
 Compare the whole Subject with the whole Pre- 
 dicate in their feveral Parts : Take heed in this 
 Matter that you neither add to, or diminifh the 
 Ideas contained in the Subject or in the Predicate ; 
 for fuch an Inadvertence or Miftake will expofe 
 you to great Error in Judgment. 
 
 IV. Direft. Search for Evidence of Truth with 
 Diligence and Honefly^ and be heartily ready to re- 
 ceive Evidence, whether for the Agreement or Dif- 
 agreement of Ideas. 
 
 Search with Diligence j fpare no Labour in fearch- 
 ing for the Truth in due Proportion to the Im- 
 portance of the Proportion . Read the beft Au- 
 thors who have writ on that Subject ; confult 
 your wife and learned Friends in Converfation ; 
 and be not unwilling to borrow Hints toward 
 your Improvement, from the meaneft Perfon, nor 
 to receive any Glimpfe of Light from the moft 
 unlearned. Diligence and Humility is the Way 
 to thrive in the Riches of the Underftanding, as 
 well as in Gold or Silver. Search carefully for the 
 Evidence of Truth, and dig for Wifdom as for hid 
 freafure. 
 
 Search with a fteady Honesty of Soul, and a fin- 
 cere Impartiality to find the Truth. Watch 
 againft every Temptation that might bribe your 
 Judgment, or warp it afide from Truth. Do not 
 indulge yourfelf to wijh any unexamined Propofi- 
 t.ion were true or falfe, A Wifh often perverts the 
 Judgment, and tempts the Mind ftrangely to be- 
 lieve upon flight Evidence whatfoever we wifh to 
 befalfc. 
 
 V.
 
 C. IV. 7&> right Ufe o/'Reafon. 241 
 
 V. Direft. Since the Evidence of the Agree- 
 ment or Difagreement of two Ideas is the Ground 
 of our Aflent to any Propofition, or the great Cri- 
 terion of Truth ; therefore we Jhould fufpend our 
 Judgment^ and neither affirm or deny till thi's Evi- 
 dence appear. 
 
 This Direction is different from thefecond , for 
 tho' the Evidence of the Agreement or Difagreement 
 of two Ideas moft times depend on the Clearnefs 
 and Diftinftnefs of the Ideas themfelves, yet it does 
 not always arife thence. Teflimony may be a fuf- 
 ficient Evidence of the Agreement or Difagree- 
 ment of two obfcure Ideas, as we have feen juft 
 before in the Exception under the fecond Direction. 
 Therefore, tho* we are not univerfally and in all 
 Cafes bound to fufpend our Judgment till our Ideas 
 of the Objefts themfelves are clear and diftinft, yet 
 we muft always fufpend our Judgment, and with- 
 hold our Afient to, or Denial of any Propofition, 
 till fome juft Evidence appear of its 'Truth or Faljhood. 
 It is an Impatience of Doubt and Sufpence, a Rafli- 
 nefs and Precipitance of Judgment, and Haftinefs 
 to believe fomething on one Side or the other, that 
 plunges us into many Errors. 
 
 This Direction to delay and fufpend our Affent, 
 is more particularly neceffary to be obferved when 
 fuch Propofitions offer themfelves to us as are 
 fupported by Education, Authority, Cuflom, Incli- 
 nation, Intereft, or other powerful Prejudices ; for 
 our Judgment is Jed away infenfibly to believe all 
 that they dictate ; and where Prejudices and Dan- 
 gers of Error are multiplied, we mould fet the 
 ftricler Guard upon our Aflent. 
 
 Yet remember the Caution or Limitation here 
 which I gave under the firft Direction, (viz.} that 
 this is not to be too ftrictly applied to Matters of 
 daily Praftice y either in human Life or Religion ; 
 
 but
 
 242 L G I C K : Or, Part II. 
 
 but when we confider our felves as Philofopbers o* 
 Searchers after 'Truth, we fhould always with-hold 
 our AfTent where there is not juft Evidence : 
 And as far and as faft as we can in a due Confif- 
 tence with our daily neceflary Duties we fhould 
 alfo reform and adjuft all our Principles and Prac- 
 tices both in Religion and the civil Life by thefe 
 Rules. 
 
 VI. Direft. We muft judge of every Proportion 
 by tbofe proper and peculiar Mediums or Means 
 thereby the Evidence of it is to be obtained, whe- 
 ther it be Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Rea- 
 fon, or Teftimony. All our Faculties and Powers 
 are to be employed in judging of their proper 
 Objects. 
 
 If we judge of Sounds, Colours, Odours, Sapors, 
 the Smootbnefs, Rougbnefs, Softnefs, or Hardnefs of 
 Bodies, it muft be done by the Ufe of our Senfes : 
 But then we muft take heed that our Senfes are 
 well difpofed as fhall be fhewn afterward. 
 
 And fince our Senfes in their various Exercifes 
 are in fome Cafes liable to be deceived, and more 
 efpecially when by our Eyes or Ears we judge of 
 the Figure, Quantity, Diftance and Pofition of Ob- 
 jects that are afar off, we ought to call our Reafon 
 into the Afiiftance of our Senfes, and correct the 
 Errors of one Senfe by the help of another. 
 
 It is by the Powers of Senfe and Reafon joined 
 together that we muft judge philofophically of 
 the inward Nature, the fecret Properties and Pow- 
 ers, the Caufes and Effeffs, the Relations and Pro- 
 portions of a thoufand corporeal Objects which 
 furround us on Earth, or are placed at a diftance 
 in the Heavens. If a Man on the one hand con- 
 fines himfelf only to fenfibie Experiments, and does 
 pot exercife Reafon upon them, he may furprife 
 2 himfelf
 
 C. IV. 72tf ri$t Ufe of Reafon; 243 
 
 himfelf and others with ftrange Appearances, and 
 learn to entertain the World with Sights and 
 Shews, but will never become a Philofopher : And 
 on the other hand, if a Man imprifon himfelf in 
 his Clofet, and employ the moft exquifite Powers 
 of Reafon to find out the Nature of Things in 
 the corporeal World , without the Ufe of his 
 Senfes, and the Practice of Experiments, he will 
 frame to himfelf a Scheme of Chimeras inftead of 
 true Philofophy. Hence came the Invention of 
 fubftantial Forms and Qualities, of Materia Prima 
 and Privation, with all the infignificant Names 
 ufed by the Peripatetick Writers ; and it was for 
 want of more Experiments that the Great Def- 
 cartes failed in feveral Parts of his philofophical 
 Writings. 
 
 In the abftrafted and fpeculative Parts of the 
 Matbcmatick^ which treat of Quantity and Num- 
 ber, the Faculty of Reafon muft be chiefly em- 
 ployed to perceive the Relation of various Quan- 
 tities, and draw certain and ufeful Condufwns -, but 
 it wants the Afliftance of Senfe alfo to be acquaint- 
 ed with Lines, Angles and Figures. And in practical 
 Matbematicks our Senfes have ftill greater Employ- 
 ment. 
 
 If we would judge of the pure Properties, and 
 Aftions of the Mind, of the Nature of Spirits, 
 their various Perceptions and Powers, we muft not 
 enquire of our Eyes and our Ears, nor the Images 
 or Shapes laid up in the Brain, but we muft have 
 recourfe to our own Confcioufnefs of what pafles 
 within our own Mind. 
 
 If we are to pafs a Judgment upon any thing that 
 relates to Spirits in a State of Union with Animal Na- 
 ture, and the mixt Properties ofSenfation, Fancy, Ap- 
 petite, PaJJion, Pleafure and Pain, which arife thence, 
 we muft confult pur own Senfations and the other 
 
 Powers
 
 244 L O G 1C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Powers which we find in ourfelves confider'd as Men 
 or Creatures made up of a Mind and an Animal , and 
 by juft Reafonings deduce proper Confequences, 
 and improve our Knowledge in thefe Subjects. 
 
 If we have Occafion to judge concerning Matters 
 done in paft Ages, or in diftant Countries, and where 
 we ourfelves cannot be prefent, the Powers ofSenfi 
 and Reafon (for the moft part) are not fufficient to 
 inform us, and we muft therefore have recourfe to 
 the I'eftimony of others : and this is either divine or 
 human. 
 
 In Matters of mere human Prudence we fhall 
 find the greateft Advantage by making wife Obfer- 
 vatiom on our own Condutt, and the Conduct of 
 others, and a Survey <?/ the Events attending fuch 
 Conduct. Experience in this Cafe is equal to a 
 natural Sagacity, or rather fuperior. A Treafure 
 of Obfervations and Experiences collected by wife 
 Men, is of admirable Service here. And perhaps 
 there is nothing in the World of this kind equal 
 to the facred Book of Proverbs, even if we look on 
 it as a mere human Writing. 
 
 In Queftions of Natural Religion we muft exer- 
 cife the Faculty of Reafon which God has given 
 us i and fince he has been plea fed to afford us bis 
 Word, we fliould confirm and improve or correct 
 our Reafonings on this Subject by the Divine Af- 
 fiftance of the Bible. 
 
 In Matters of reveal* d Religion, that is, Chri- 
 jtianity, Judaifm, &c. which we could never have 
 known by the Light of Nature, the Word of 
 God is our only Foundation and chief Light ; tho* 
 here our Reafon muft be ufed both to find out the 
 true Meaning of God in his Word, and to derive 
 juft Inferences from what God has written, as well 
 as to judge of the Credentials whereby Divine fefti" 
 mony is diftinguifhed from mere human feftimonyy 
 or from Impofture, As
 
 C. IV. *fbe ri$t Ufe ofReafon. 245 
 
 As Divine Revelation can never contradict right 
 Reafon, (for they are two great Lights given us 
 by our Creator for our Conduct) fo Reafon ought 
 by no Means to affume to itfelf a Power to contra- 
 di# Divine Revelation. 
 
 Tho* Revelation be not contrary to Reafon, yet 
 there are/0#r Clajfes wherein Matters of Revela- 
 tion may be faid to rife above, or go beyond our 
 Reafon. 
 
 1 . When Revelation afferts two Wings of which 
 we have clear Ideas, to be join' d, whofe Connection or 
 Agreement is not difcoverable by Reafon ; as when 
 Scripture informs us that The Deadjhall rife, that 
 The Earth Jhall be burnt up, and the Man Chrift 
 Jefus Jhall return from Heaven, none of thcfe 
 Things could ever be found out or proved by 
 Reafon. 
 
 2. When Revelation affirms any Proportion, 
 while Reafon has no clear and diftinft Ideas of the 
 Subjeff, or of the Predicate ; as God created all 
 Things by Jefus Chrift : By the Urim and Thum- 
 mim God gave forth Divine Oracles. The Predi- 
 cate of each of thefe Propofitions is to us an ob- 
 fcure Idea, for we know not what was the peculiar 
 Agency of Jefus Chrift when God the Father created 
 the World by him ; nor have we any clear and 
 certain Conception what the Urim and Thummim 
 were, nor how God gave Anfwers to his People by 
 them. 
 
 3. When Revelation, in plain and exprefs Lan- 
 guage, declares fame Dotlrine which our Reafon at 
 prefent knows not with evidence and certainty how or 
 in what Senfe to reconcile to fome of its own Princi- 
 ples ; as, that the Child Jefus is the mighty God, Efa. 
 ix. 6. which Propofition carries a feeming Oppo- 
 fition to the Unity and Spirituality of the Godhead, 
 whid} are Principles of Reafon, 
 
 4. When
 
 246 L O G I C K : Or, Part II. 
 
 4. When two Propofitions or Doftrines are plainly 
 afferted by divine Revelation, which our Reafon at 
 prefent knows not how or in what Senfe with Evidence 
 and Certainty to reconcile with one another ; as, The 
 Father is the only true God, John xvii. 3. and yet 
 Chrift is over all, God blejfedfor ever, Rom. ix. 5. 
 
 Now divine Revelation having declared all thefe 
 Propofitions, Reafon is bound to receive them, be- 
 caufe it cannot prove them to be utterly inconfif- 
 tent or impoffible, tho' the Ideas of them may be 
 obfcure, tho' we ourfelves fee not the rational Con- 
 nection of them, and tho' we know not certainly 
 how to reconcile them. In thefe Cafes Reafon muft 
 fubmit to Faith ; that is, we are bound to believe 
 what God afferts, and wait till he {hall clear up 
 that which feems dark and difficult, and till the 
 Myjleries of Faith fhall be farther explained to us 
 either in this World or in the World to come *, 
 and Reafon itfelf dictates this Submiflion. 
 
 VII th Direction. It is very ufeful to have fome ge- 
 neral Principles of Truth fettled in the Mind, whofe 
 Evidence is great and obvious, that they may be al- 
 ways ready at hand to ajfift us in judging of the 
 great Variety of Things which occur. Thefe may 
 be called firft Notions, or fundamental Principles ; 
 for tho' many of them are deduced from each 
 other, yet moft or all pf them may be called Prin- 
 ciples when compared with a thoufand other Judg- 
 ments which we form under the Regulation and 
 Influence of thefe primary Propofitions. 
 ^ Every Art and Science, as well as the Affairs of 
 civil Life and Religion, have peculiar Principles 
 of this kind belonging to them. There are Me- 
 taphyfical, Phyjical, Mathematical, Political, Oeco- 
 nomical, Medicinal, Theological, Moral and Pru- 
 
 * See fomethiflg more on this Subjeft, Diretf, ILfrued, and Cbap. V. Seff.6. 
 
 dential
 
 C. IV. flbe Right Ufe c/*Reafon. 247 
 
 dential Principles of Judgment. It would be too 
 tedious to give a Specimen of them all in this 
 Place. Thofe which are of the moft univerfal Ufe 
 to us both as Men and as Cbriftians, may be found 
 in the following Chapter among the Rules (f Judg- 
 ment about particular Objefts. 
 
 VIII th Direction. Let the Degrees of your AJJent 
 to every Propofition bear an exaft Proportion to the 
 different Degrees of Evidence. Remember this is 
 one of the greateft Principles of Wifdom that Mart 
 can arrive at in this World, and the beft human 
 Security againft dangerous Miftakes in Speculation 
 or Practice. 
 
 In the Nature of Things of which our Know- 
 ledge is made up there is infinite Variety in their 
 Degrees of Evidence. And as God hath given 
 our Minds a Power to fufpend their Aflent till 
 the Evidence be plain, fo we have a Power to re- 
 ceive Things which are propofed to us with a 
 ftronger or weaker Belief in infinite Variety of 
 Degrees proportionable to their Evidence. I be- 
 lieve that the Planets are inhabited, and I believe 
 that the Earth rolls among them yearly round the 
 Sun -, but I don't believe both thefe Propofitions 
 with an equal Firmnefs of Afient, becaufe the Ar- 
 guments for the latter are drawn from mathematical 
 Obferuations ; but the Arguments for the former are 
 but probable Conjectures and moral Reafonings. Yet 
 neither do I believe either of thefe Propofitions fo 
 firmly, as I do that the Earth is about twenty four 
 tboufand Miles round, becaufe the mathematical 
 Proof of this is much eafier, plainer and ftronger. 
 And yet farther, when I fay that the Earth was 
 created by the Power of God, I have ftill a more in- 
 fallible Affurance of this than of all the reft, becaufe 
 Reafon and Scripture join to afiiire me of it. 
 
 Di-
 
 348 LOGIC K: Or Part II. 
 
 IX th Direction. Keep your Mind always open to 
 receive 'Truth, and never fet Limits to your own Im- 
 provements. Be ready always to hear what may be 
 objected even againft your favourite Opinions, and 
 thofe which have had longeft PofTeflion of your 
 Afient. And if there fhould be any new and un- 
 controulable Evidence brought againft thefe old or 
 beloved Sentiments, don't wink your Eyes faft 
 againft the Light, but part with any thing for the 
 fake of Truth : Remember when you overcome 
 an Error you gain Truth ; the Victory is on your 
 Side, and the Advantage is all your own. 
 
 I confefs thofe grand Principles of Belief and 
 Practice which univerfally influence our Conduct 
 both with Regard to this Life and the Life to 
 come, fhould be fuppofed to be well fettled in the 
 firft Years of our Studies, fuch as, the Exiftence 
 and Providence of God, the 'Truth of Chriftianity, 
 the Authority of Scripture, the great Rules of Mo- 
 rality, &c. We fhould avoid a light fluttering 
 Genius, ever ready to change our Foundations, 
 and to be carried about with every Wind of DoElrine. 
 To guard againft which Inconvenience, we fhould 
 labour with earned Diligence and fervent Prayer, 
 that our moft fundamental and important Points of 
 Belief and Practice may be eftablifhed upon juft 
 Grounds of Reafon and Scripture when we come 
 to Years of Difcretion, and fit to judge for our- 
 felves in fuch important Points. Yet fince it is 
 poflible that the Folly or Prejudices of younger 
 Years may have eftablifhed Perfons in fome 
 miftaken Sentiments, even in very important Mat- 
 ters, we fhould always hold ourfelves ready to re- 
 ceive any new Advantage toward the Correction or 
 Improvement even of our eftaUiJffd Principles, as 
 well as Opinions of lefier Moment, 
 
 *.: . ^fj$ jl|9i! 4 3. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 C. V. S. i . tte Right Ufe ^Reafon. 49 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Special Rules to direft us in judging of parti- 
 cular Objetts. 
 
 IT would be endlefs to run thro' all thofe par- 
 ticular Objects concerning which we have Oc- 
 calion to pafs a Judgment at one time or an- 
 other. Things of the moft frequent Occurrence, 
 of the wideft Extent, and of the greateft Im- 
 portance, are the Objects and Exercifes of Senfe* 
 of Reafon, and Speculation, the Matters of Mora- 
 lity, Religion and Prudence^ of human and divine 
 Teftimony, together with the Effays of Reafoning 
 upon Things paft and future. Special Rules relating 
 to all thefe will be the Subject of the following 
 Sedions. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment concerning the 
 Objefts of Senfe. 
 
 THO* our Senfes are fomedmes liable to be 
 deceived, yet when they are rightly difpofed, 
 and fitly exercifed about their proper Objefts, with 
 the juft Afiiftance of Reafon, they give us fufficient 
 Evidence of Truth. 
 
 This may be proved by an Argument drawn 
 from the Wifdom y Goodnefi, and Faithfulnefs of 
 God our Creator. It was he gave us our Sexfes, 
 and he would not make us of fudi a Conftitution 
 as to be liable to perpetual Deception and una- 
 voidable Error in ufmg thefe Faculties of Senfe in 
 the beft manner we are capable of, about thefe 
 2
 
 250 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 very Things which are the proper Objects of 
 them. 
 
 This may be proved alfo by the ill Conferences 
 that would follow from the Suppofetion of the con- 
 trary. If we could have no Certainty of the 
 Dictates of our Senfes, we could never be fure of 
 any of the common Affairs and Occurrences of 
 Life. Men could not tranfact any of their civil 
 or moral Concerns with any Certainty or Juftice ; 
 nor indeed could we eat or drink, walk or move 
 with Safety. Our Senfes direct us in all thefe. 
 
 Again, the Matters of Religion depend in fome 
 Meafure upon the Certainty of the Dictates of 
 Senfe ; for Faith comes by Hearing ; and it is to 
 our Senfes that God appeals in working Miracles 
 to prove his own Revelation. Now if when our 
 Eyes and Ears, and other Organs of Senfe are 
 rightly difpofed and exercifed about their proper 
 Objects, they were always liable to be deceived, 
 there could be no Knowledge of the Gofpel, no 
 Proof of divine Revelation by Vifions, Voices, or 
 Miracles. 
 
 Our Senfes will difcover Things near us and 
 round about us, which are neceflary for our pre- 
 fent State with fufficient Exactnefs, and Things 
 diftant alfo, fo far as they relate to our neceflary 
 Ufe of them. 
 
 Nor is there need of any more accurate Rules 
 For the Ufe of our Senfes in the Judgment of all 
 the common Affairs of Life, or even of miraculous 
 and divine Operations, than the vulgar Part of 
 Mankind are fufficiently acquainted with by Na- 
 ture, and by their own daily Obfervations. 
 
 But if we would exprefs thefe Rules in a more 
 .exact manner, how to judge by the Dictates of our 
 Senfes^ they fhould be reprefented thus, 
 
 . We
 
 C. V. S. r . The right Ufe of Reafon; 
 
 1. We muft take care that the Organs of our 
 Senfe be rightly difpofed, and not under the Power* 
 of any Diftemper or confiderable Decay ; as for 
 Inftance, that our Eyes are not tinctured with the 
 Jaundice , when we would judge of Colours, left 
 we pronounce them all yellow : That our Hands 
 are not burning in a Fever, nor benumm'd with 
 Froft or the Palfy, when we would judge of the-, 
 Heat or Coldnefs of any Object : That our Palate 
 be not vitiated by any Difeafe* or by fome other 
 improper Tafte, when we would judge of the true 
 Tafte of .any Solid or Liquid. This Direction re- 
 lates to all our Senfes, but the following Rules 
 chiefly refer to our Sight. 
 
 2. We muft obferve whether the Qbjett be at 
 a -proper Diftance, for if it be too near or too far 
 off, our Eyes will not fufHciently diftinguifti ma- 
 ny Things which are properly the Objects of 
 Sight ; and therefore (if poflible) we muft make 
 nearer Approaches to the Object, or remove far- 
 ther from it, till we have obtained that due Dif- 
 tance which gives us the cleared Perception. 
 
 3. We muft not employ our Sight to take a 
 full Survey at once of Objeffs that are too large for 
 it, but we muft view them by Parts, and- then 
 judge of the Whole : Nor muft our Senfes judge 
 of Objects too fmall, for fome Things which ap- 
 pear thro' Glafies to be really and diftinctly exi> 
 tent, are either utterly invifible, or greatly con- 
 fufed when we would judge of them by the naked 
 Eye. 
 
 4. We muft place curfelves. in fuch a Pofition 
 toward the Qbjett, or place the Objefi in fuch a 
 Pofltion toward our Eye, as may give us the clear* 
 eft Reprefentation of ic ; for a different Pofition 
 greatly alters the Appearance of the Shape of Bo- 
 dies. And fox this Reaibn we mould change the 
 
 R Pofition
 
 L G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Pofetion both of the Eye and the Objeft in fome 
 Cafes, that by viewing the Objeft in feveral Ap- 
 pearances we may pafs a more compleat and cer- 
 tain Judgment concerning it. 
 
 5. We muft confider what the Medium is by 
 which Objebts art reprefented to our Senfes ; whe- 
 ther it be thinner or thicker -, whether it be Air, 
 or Vapour, or Water, or Glafs, &c. whether it 
 be duly enlightened or dufky ; whether it reflect, 
 or refract, or only tranfmit the Appearance of the 
 Object ; and whether it be tinctured with any 
 particular Colour; whether it be moving or at 
 Reft. 
 
 6. We muft fometimes ufe other Helps to aflift 
 our Senfes , and if we make ufe of Glaffes, we 
 muft make all juft Allowances for the Thicknefs 
 or Thinnefs of them, for the Clearnefs or Dul- 
 nefs, for the Smoothnefs or Roughnefs, for the 
 Plainnefs, the Convexity or Concavity of them, 
 and for the Diftance at which thefe Glafies are 
 placed from the Eye, or from the Object, (or 
 from one another, if there be two or more Glaf- 
 fes ufed) and all this according to the Rules of 
 Art. The fame fort of Caution mould be ufed 
 alfo in Mediums which aflift the Hearing, fuch as 
 Speaking-Crumpets, Hearing-Trumpets, &c. 
 
 7. If the Object may be propofed to more Senfes 
 than one, let us call in the Afliftance of fome 
 other Senfes to examine it, and this will increafe 
 the Evidence of what one Senfe dictates. Ex. gr. 
 Our Ear may aflift our Eye in judging of the Di- 
 ftance of Bodies, which are both vifible and fo- 
 norous, as an exploded Canon, or a Cloud charged 
 with Thunder. Our Feeling may aflift our Sight in 
 judging of the Kind, the Shape, Situation or Di- 
 ftance of Bodies that are near at Hand, as whe- 
 ther a Garment be Silk OK Stuff, &JV. So if I both 
 
 fee,
 
 C. V. S. 2. The right # of Reafon: 
 
 fee, hear, and embrace my Friend, I am fure he is 
 prefent. 
 
 8. We fhould alfo makefeveral Trials, at fome 
 diftant Times, and in different Circumftances, 
 comparing former Experiments with later, and 
 our own Obfervations with thofe of other Per* 
 fons. 
 
 It is by fuch Methods as thefe that modern Phi* 
 lofopby has been fo greatly improved by the ufe of 
 fenjible Experiments. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters t>f 
 Reafon and Speculation. 
 
 IT is by Reafon we judge both in Matters of 
 Speculation and Practice ; there are peculiar 
 Rules which relate to Things practical^ whether: 
 they be Matters of Religion, Morality, or Prudence^ 
 yet many Things in this Section may be applied 
 to practical Enquiries and Matters of Faith, tho* 
 it chiefly relates to Knowledge or Speculations of 
 Reafon. 
 
 1. Whatfoever clear Ideas we can join together 
 without Inconfiftency, are to be counted Pcffible^ 
 becaufe Almighty Power can make whatfoever 
 we can conceive* 
 
 2. From the mere Pojfibility of a Thing we Can- 
 not infer its aflual Exigence ; nor frcm the Non- 
 Exiftence of it can we infer its Impojfjibility. 
 
 Note, The Idea of God feems to claim an Ex- 
 emption from this general Rule ; for if he be pof- 
 fible, he certainly exifts, becaufe the very Idea 
 includes Eternity, and he cannot begin to be : If 
 he exift not, he is impofiible, for th very fame 
 Reafon, 
 
 R 2 3. Wha;-
 
 254 LOGICK: Or, Part IL 
 
 3. Whatfoever is evidently contained in the Idea 
 of any thing, may be affirmed of that thing with 
 Certainty. Reafon is contained in the Idea of a 
 Man 5 and Exiftence is contained in the Idea of 
 God , and therefore we may affirm God exifts, and 
 Man is reasonable. 
 
 4. It is impofiible that the fame Thing mould 
 be, and not be at the fame Time, and in the fame 
 Refpedt. Thence it follows, that two contradic- 
 tory Ideas cannot be joined in the fame Part of the 
 fame Subject * at the fame Time, and in the fame 
 Refpefls : Or, that two contradictory Proportions can 
 never be both true. 
 
 5. The more we.converfe with any Subjeft in 
 its various Properties, the better Knowledge of it 
 we are likely to attain , and by frequent and re- 
 peated Enquiries and Experiments, Reafonings 
 and Conventions about it, we confirm our true 
 Judgments of that Thing, and correct our former 
 Miftakes. 
 
 6. Yet after our utmoft Enquiries, we can never 
 be allured by Reafon, that we know all the Powers 
 and Properties of any Jinite Being. 
 
 7. If finite Beings are not adequately known by 
 us, much lefs are Things infinite : For it is of the 
 Nature of a finite Mind not to be able to compre- 
 hend what is infinite. 
 
 8. We may judge and argue very juftly and 
 certainly concerning Infinites, in fome Parts of 
 them, or fo far as our Ideas reach, tho* the Infi- 
 nity of them hath fomething incomprehenfible in 
 it. And this is built on the general Rule follow- 
 ing, '(wz.) 
 
 9. Whatfoever is fufficiently clear and evident 
 ought not to be denied, tho j there are other things 
 belonging to the fame Subject which cannot be 
 comprehended.' I may affirm many Things with 
 
 Certainty
 
 C. V. S. 2 . The right Ufe ^Reafon. 255 
 
 Certainty concerning human Souls, their Union with 
 Bodies, concerning the Divifibility of Matter, and 
 the Attributes of God, tho' many other Things re- 
 lating to them are all Darknefs to us. 
 
 10. If any Opinion propofed has either no Argu- 
 ments, or equal Arguments for and againft it, we 
 muft remain in perfect Sufpence about it, till con- 
 vincing Evidence appear on one Side. 
 
 11. Where prefent Neceffity of Action does 
 not conftrain us to determine, we mould not im- 
 mediately yield up our Affent to mere probable 
 Arguments, without a due Referve, if we have any 
 reafonable Hope of attaining greater Light and 
 Evidence on one Side or the other : For when the 
 Balance of the Judgment once refigns its Equili- 
 brium or 'Neutrality to a mere probable Argument, 
 it is too ready to fettle itfelf on that Side, fo that 
 the Mind will not eafily change that Judgment, 
 tho' bright and ftrong Evidence appear afterwards 
 on the other Side. 
 
 12. Of two Opinions if one has tinanfweraU't 
 Difficulties attending it, we muft not reject it im- 
 mediately, till we examine whether the contrary 
 Opinion has not Difficulties as unanswerable. 
 
 13. If each Opinion has Objections againft it 
 which we cannot anfwer, or reconcile, we mould 
 rather embrace that which has the leaft Difficul- 
 ties in it, and which has the beft Arguments to fup- 
 port it : And let our Affent bear Proportion to the 
 fuperior Evidence. 
 
 14. If any Doctrine hath very ftrong and fuf- 
 ficient Light and Evidence to command our Affent, 
 we fhould not reject it becaufe there is an Objec- 
 tion or two againft it which we are not able to 
 anfwer ; for upon this Foot a common Chriftian 
 would be baffled out of every Article of his Faith, 
 and muft renounce even the Diftales of bis
 
 256 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 fon and bis Senfes -, and the moft learned Man per- 
 haps would hold but very few of them faft , for 
 fome Objections which attend the facred Doc- 
 trine of the Eternity and the Omniprejence of God^ 
 and the philofophical Doctrines of Light, Atoms, 
 Space, Motion, &c. are hardly folvable to this 
 Day. 
 
 15. Where two Extremes are propofed, either 
 in Matters of Speculation or Practice, and neither 
 of them has certain and convincing Evidence, it is 
 generally fafeft to take the middle Way. Modera- 
 tion is more likely to come near the Truth than 
 doubtful Extremes. This is an excellent Rule to 
 judge of the Characters and Value of the greateft 
 Part of Perfons and Things , for Nature feldom 
 deals in Superlatives. It is a good Rule alfo by 
 which to form our Judgment in many Speculative 
 Controverfies ', a reconciling Medium in fuch Cafes 
 does often beft fecure Truth as well as Peace. 
 
 1 6. When two different Proportions have each 
 a veryjlrong and cogent Evidence, and do not plain- 
 ly appear inconfiftent, we may believe both of 
 them, tho' we cannot at prefent fee the Way to 
 reconcile them. Reafon, as well as our own Con- 
 fcioufnefs, a fibres us that the Will of Man is free, 
 and that Multitudes of human Aftions are in that 
 Rejpeft contingent ; and yet Reafon and Scripture 
 afiure us that God foreknows them all, and this im- 
 plies a certain Futurity. Noyv tho' learned Men 
 have not to this Day hit on any fo clear and hap- 
 py Method as is defired to reconcile thefe Propo- 
 fitions, yet fince we do not fee a plain Inconfiftency 
 }n them, we juftly believe them both, becaufe their 
 Evidence is great. 
 
 17. Let us not therefore too fuddenly determine 
 jn difficult Matters that two Things are utterly in- 
 confident ; For there are many Propofmons which 
 
 may
 
 C. V. S. 2. c Tbe right Ufe o/Heafon. 257 
 
 may appear inconfiflent at firft, and yet afterwards 
 we find their Conjiftency, and the Way of recon- 
 ciling them may be made plain and eafy : As alfo, 
 there are other Proportions which may appear 
 confiftent at firft, but after due Examination we find 
 their Inconfiftency. 
 
 1 8. For the fame Reafon we mould not call 
 thofe Difficulties utterly infolvable, or thofe Ob- 
 jections unanfwerable, which we are not prefently 
 able to anfwer : Time and Diligence may give far- 
 ther Light. 
 
 19. In fliort, if we will fecure ourfelves from 
 Error, we fhpuld not be too frequent or hafty in 
 aflerting the certain Confiftency or Inconfiftency, the 
 abfolute Univerfality, Necejflity, or ImpoJJibility of 
 Things, where there is not the brighteft Evidence. 
 He is but a young and raw Philofopher, who, 
 when he fees two particular Ideas evidently agree, 
 immediately aflerts them to agree universally, to 
 agree necejjarily y and that it is impojjible it Jhould be 
 otherwife : Or when he fees evidently that two par- 
 ticular Ideas happen to difagree, he prefently aflerts 
 their conftant and natural Inconfiftency, their utter 
 ImpoJJibilhy of Agreement, and calls every thing 
 contrary to his Opinion Abfurdity and Nonfenfe. A 
 true Philofopher will affirm or deny with much 
 Caution or Modefty, unlefs he has thoroughly ex- 
 amined and found the Evidence of every Part of 
 his Afiertion exceeding plain. 
 
 20. Let us have a Care of building our Aflu- 
 rance of any important Point of Doctrine upon one 
 fingle Argument, if there are more to be obtained. 
 We mould not flight and reject all other Argu- 
 ments which fupport the fame Doctrine, left if 
 our favourite Argument fhould be refuted, and fail 
 us, we fhould be tempted to abandon that impor- 
 tant Principle of Truth. I think this was a very 
 
 R 4 culpable
 
 . 
 
 158 6 ft 7 C K: 0V, Part II. 
 
 culpable Practice in Defcartes, and fome of his 
 Followers, who when he had found out the Ar- 
 gument for the Exiftence of God, derived from the 
 Idea of a moft ferfeft and felf-exiftent Being, he 
 feemed to defpife and abandon all other Arguments 
 againft Atheifm. 
 
 21. If we happen to have our chief Arguments 
 for any Opinion refuted, we fhould not immedi- 
 ately give up the Opinion itfelf ; for perhaps it 
 may be a Truth ftillj and we may find it to be 
 
 j uftly fupported by other Arguments, which we 
 might once think weaker, or perhaps by new Ar- 
 guments 'which we knew not before; 
 
 22. We ought to efteem that to be fufficient E- 
 vidence of a Proportion, where both the Kind and 
 the Force of the Arguments or Proofs are as great 
 as the Nature of the Thing admits, and as the 
 Neceffity or Exigence of the Cafe requires. So if 
 we have a credible and certain Teftimony that Chrift 
 
 ' rofe from the Dead, it is enough ; we are not to 
 expect mathematical or ocular Demonjlration for it, 
 -at lead in our Day. 
 
 23. Tho* we mould feek what Proofs may be 
 attained of any PropoTuionj and we mould receive 
 any Number of Arguments which are juft and 
 evident for the Confirmation of the fame Truth, 
 yet we muft not judge of the Truth of any Pro- 
 pofition by the Number of Arguments which are 
 brought to fupport it, but by the Strength and 
 Weight of them : A Building will ftand firmer and 
 
 'longer on four large Pillars of Marble, than on 
 ten of Sand, or Earth, or Timber. 
 
 24. Yer where certain Evidence is not to be 
 found or expected, a confiderable Number of pro- 
 bable Arguments carry great Weight with them 
 
 even -in Matters of Speculation. That is a proba- 
 ble Hypothecs in Pbihfophy or in Theology, which 
 
 goes
 
 C. V. S. 3. fbe right Ufe ofReafon. 
 goes fartheft toward the Solution of many diffi- 
 cult Queftions arifmg on any Subject, 
 
 - v ^* 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 Morality and Religion. 
 
 HERE it may be proper in the firft Place 
 to mention a few Definitions of Words or 
 Terms. 
 
 By Matters of Morality and Religion, I mean 
 thofe Things which relate to our Duty to God, 
 our Selves, or our Fellow-Creatures. 
 
 Moral Good, or Virtue, or Holinefs, in an Ac- 
 tion or Temper conformable to the Rule of our 
 Duty. Moral Evil, or Vice, or Sin, is an Action 
 or Temper unconformable to the Rule of our 
 Duty, or a Neglect to fulfil it. 
 
 Note, The Words Vice or Virtue, chiefly imply 
 the Relation of our Actions to Men and this 
 World : Sin and Holinefs rather imply their Re- 
 lation to God and the other World. 
 
 Natural Good is that which gives us Pleafure or 
 Satisfaction. Natural Evil is that which gives us 
 Pain or Grief. 
 
 Happinefs confifts in the Attainment of the 
 higheft and moft lafting natural Good. Mfery 
 confifts in fuffering the higheft and moft lafting 
 natural Evil ; that is, in mort, Heaven or Hell. 
 
 Tho' this be a juft Account of perfeft Happinefs 
 and perfect Mifery, yet wherefoever Pain overba- 
 lances Pleafure, there is a Degree of Mifery ; and 
 wherefoever Pleafure overbalances Pain, there is a 
 'Degree of Happinefs. 
 
 I proceed
 
 LOGICK: Of, Part II. 
 
 I proceed now to lay down fomc Principles and 
 Rules cf Judgment in Matters of Morality and Re- 
 ligion. 
 
 1. The Will of our Maker, whether difcover- 
 ed byReafon or Revelation, carries the higheft 
 Authority with it, and is therefore the birheft Rule 
 of Duty to intelligent Creatures; a Conformity or 
 Non-conformity to it determines their Actions to 
 t>e morally good or evil. 
 
 2. Whatfoever is really an immediate Duty to- 
 ward ourfelves, or toward our Fellow-Creatures, 
 js more remotely a Duty to God ; and therefore in 
 the Practice of it we mould have an Eye to the 
 Will of God as our Rule, and to his Glory as our 
 End. 
 
 3. Our wife and gracious Creator has clofely 
 united our Duty and our Happinefs together ; and 
 has connected Sin or Vice, and Punifkment ; that 
 is, he has ordained that the bigbeft natural Good 
 and Evil mould have a clofe Connection with mo- 
 ral Good and Evil, and that both in the Nature 
 of Things, and by his own pofitive Appoint- 
 ment. 
 
 4. Confcience mould feek all due Information 
 in order to determine what is Duty, and what 
 is Sin, becaufe Happinefs and Mifery depend up- 
 on it. 
 
 5. On this Account our Inclination to prefent 
 temporal Good, and our Averfion to prefent tempo- 
 ral Evil, muft be wifely overbalanced by the Con- 
 fideration of future and tternal Good or Evil, that 
 is, Happinefs or Mfery. And for this Reafon we 
 fhould not omit a Duty or commit a Sin, to 
 gain any temporal Good, or to avoid any temporal 
 Evil.- 
 
 6. Tho"
 
 C.V.S.3- fberightUfeofR&fon; 261 
 
 6. Tho' our natural Reafon in a State of Inno- 
 cence might be fufficient to find out thofe Duties 
 which were neceffary for an innocent Creature, in 
 order to abide in the Favour of his Maker, yet in 
 a fallen State our natural Reafon is by no means 
 fufficient to find out all that is neceflary to rejlort 
 a finful Creature to the divine Favour. 
 
 7. Therefore God hath condefcended in vari- 
 ous Ages of Mankind to reveal to finful Men what 
 he requires of them in order to their Reftoration> 
 and has appointed in his Word fome peculiar Mat- 
 ters of Faith and Practice, in order to their Sal- 
 vation. This is called revealed Religion, as the 
 Things knowable concerning God, and our Du- 
 ty by the Light of Nature are called natural Reli- 
 gion. 
 
 There are alfo many Parts of Morality, and 
 natural Religion, or many natural Duties relating 
 to God, to our felves, and to our Neighbours, 
 which would be exceeding difficult and tedious 
 for the Bulk of Mankind to find out and deter- 
 mine by natural Reafon -, therefore it has pleafed 
 God in this facred Book of Divine Revelation to 
 exprefs the moft neceflary Duties of this kind in 
 a very plain and eafy manner, and made them in- 
 telligible to Souls of the loweft Capacity , or they 
 may be very eafily derived thence by the Ufe of 
 Reafon. 
 
 9. As there are fome Duties much more necef- 
 fary, and more important than others are, fo every 
 Duty requires our Application to underftand and 
 pradife it in Proportion to its Necejfjity and Impor- 
 tance. 
 
 10. Where two Duties feem to ftand in Op- 
 pofition to each other, and we cannot praclife 
 both, the lefs muft give Way to the greater, and 
 the Omiflion of the lefs is not finful. So ceremo- 
 nial
 
 262 L G 1C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 vial Laws give Way to moral : God will have Mercy 
 and not Sacrifice. 
 
 1 1.. In Duties of natural Religion, we may 
 judge of the different Degrees of their Neceffity 
 and Importance by Reafon, according to their 
 greater or more apparent Tendency to the Ho- 
 nour of God and the Good of Men : But in Mat- 
 ters of 'revealed Religion^ it is only divine Revela- 
 tion can certainly inform, us what is moft ne- 
 ceflary and moft important ; yet we may be 
 afiifted alfo in that Search by the Exercifes of 
 Reafon. 
 
 12. In Actions wlierein there may be fome fern- 
 fie about the Duty or Lawfulnefs of them, we 
 fhould choofe always the fafeft Side* and abftain 
 as far as we can from the Practice of Things whofe 
 Lawfulnefs we fufpect. 
 
 13. Points of the great eft Importance in human 
 Life, or in Religion, are generally the moft evi- 
 dent^ both in the Nature of Things and in the 
 Word of God ; and where Points of Faith or 
 Practice 'are exceeding difficult to find out, they 
 cannot be exceeding important. This Proposition 
 may be proved by the Goodnefs and Faithfulnefs 
 of God, as well as by Experience and Obferva- 
 tion. 
 
 14. In fome of the outward Practices and 
 Forms of Religion, as well as human Affairs, 
 there is frequently a prefent Necejfity of fpeedy Ac- 
 tion one Way or another : In fuch a Cafe, hav- 
 ing furveyed Arguments on both Sides, as far as 
 our Time and Circumftances admit, we mult 
 guide our Practice by tbofe Reafom which appear 
 m^ft probable, and feem at that Time to overbalance 
 the reft ; yet always referving room to admit far- 
 ther Light and Evidence, when fuch Occurrences 
 return again. It is zPreponderation of drcumftaiitial 
 
 Argument^
 
 C. V*-S. 4. The Rtghf'Ufe 0/"Reafon. 263 
 
 Arguments that muft determine our Actions in a 
 thoufand Occurrences. 
 
 15. We may alfo determine upon probable Ar- 
 guments where the matter is of fenall Confequence 
 and would not anfwer the Trouble of feeking af- 
 ter Certainty. Life and Time are more precious 
 than to have a large Share of them laid out in. 
 fcrupulous Enquiries, whether fmoaking Tobacco, or 
 wearing a Periwig be lawful or no. 
 
 1 6. In Affairs of greater Importance, and which 
 may have a long and lading, and extenfive Influ- 
 ence on our future Conduct or Happinefs, we 
 fhould not take up with Probabilities, if Certain- 
 ty may be attained. Where there is any Doubt 
 on the Mind, in fuch Cafes we mould call in the 
 Affiftance of all manner of Circumftances, Rea- 
 fons, Motives, Confequences on all Sides : We 
 muft wait longer and with earned Requeft feek 
 human and divine Advice before we fully deter- 
 mine our Judgment and our Practice, according 
 to the old Roman Sentence, Quod ftatuendum eft 
 femel, deliberandum eft diu. We fhould be Jong 
 in confidering what we muft determine once 
 for all. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of hu- 
 man Prudence. 
 
 THE great Defign of Prudence, as diftinct 
 from Morality and Religion, is to determine 
 and manage every Affair with Decency, and to 
 the beft Advantage. 
 
 This is decent, which is agreeable to our State, 
 Condition, or Circumftances, whether it be in 
 Behaviour, Difcourfe, or Action. 
 
 3 That
 
 264 L O G 1C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 That is advantageous which attains the moft and 
 beft Purpofes, and avoids the moft and greateft In- 
 con veniencies. 
 
 As there is infinite Variety in the Circumflances 
 of Perfons, Things, Aftions, Times and Places, fo 
 we muft be furniftied with fuch general Rules aa 
 are accommodable to all this Variety by a wife 
 Judgment and Difcretion : For what is an A6b of 
 confummate Prudence in fome Times, Places and 
 Circumftances, would be confummate Folly in others. 
 Now thefe Rules may be ranged in the following 
 manner. 
 
 1. Our Regard to Perfons or Things mould be 
 governed by the Degrees of Concernment we have 
 with them, the Relation we have to them, or the 
 Expectation we have from them. Thefe mould 
 be the Meafures by which we mould proportion 
 our Diligence and Application in any thing that re- 
 lates to them. 
 
 2. We mould always confider whether the 
 Thing we purfue be attainable ; whether it be 
 worthy our Purfuit ; whether it be worthy the 
 Degree of Purfuit ; whether it be worthy of the 
 Means ufed in order to attain it. This Rule is ne- 
 ceflary both in Matters of Knowledge, and Matters 
 of Practice. 
 
 3. When the Advantages and Difadv ant ages, 
 Conveniencies and Inconveniencies of any Action are 
 balanced together, we muft finally determine on 
 that Side which has the fuperior Weight ; and 
 the fooner in things which are neceffarily and 
 fpeedily to be done or determined. 
 
 4. If Advantages and Difadvantages in their 
 own Nature are equal, then thofe which are moft 
 certain or likely as to the Event mould turn the 
 Scale of our Judgment, and determine our Prac- 
 tice. 
 
 5. Where
 
 C.V.S.4; The rightUfc of &&{<&: 26$ 
 
 5. Where the Improbabilities of Succefs of Ad- 
 vantage are greater than the Probabilities, it fc 
 not Prudence to act or venture. It is proper to 
 enquire whether this be not the Cafe in almoft all 
 Lotteries , for they that hold Stakes will certainly 
 fecure Part to themfelves ; and only the Remainder 
 being divided into Prizes muft render the Improba- 
 bility of Gain to each Adventurer greater than the 
 Probability. 
 
 6. We fhould not defpife or neglect any real 
 Advantage, and abandon the Purfuit of it, tho' 
 we cannot attain all the Advantages that we de- 
 fire. This would be to act like Children, who 
 are fond of fomething which ftrikes their Fancy 
 moft, and fullen and regardlefs of every thing elfe, 
 if they are not humoured in that Fancy. 
 
 7. Tho' a general Knowledge of Things be ufe- 
 ful in Science and in human Life, yet we fhould 
 content our felves with a more fuperficial Know^ 
 ledge of thofe things which have the leaft Rela- 
 tion to our chief End and Defign. 
 
 8. This Rule holds good alfo in Matters of Bu- 
 finefs and Praftice, as well as in Matters of Know- 
 ledge -, and therefore we Jhould not grafp at every 
 thing, left in tbe end we attain nothing. Perfons 
 that either by an Inconftancy of Temper, or by a 
 vain Ambition, will purfue every fort of Art and 
 Science, Study and Bufinefs, feldom grow excellent 
 in any one of them : And Projectors who form 
 twenty Schemes feldom ufe fufficient Application 
 to finifh one of them, or make it turn to good 
 Account. 
 
 9. Take heed of delaying and trifling amongft 
 the Means inftead of reaching at the End. Take 
 heed of wafting a Life in mere fpeculative Studies, 
 which is called to Attwn and Employment : Dwell 
 oot too long in pbilofopbicai, mathematical, of 
 3
 
 Z 66 LOGIC K: Or, . Part II. 
 
 grammatical Parts of Learning, when' your chief 
 Defign is Law, Phyfick^ or Divinity. Do not 
 fpend the Day in gathering Flowers by the Way 
 Side, left Night come upon you before you ar- 
 rive at your Journey's End, and then you will not 
 reach it. 
 
 10. Where the Cafe and Cir cum flames of wife 
 and good Men refemble our own Cafe and Circum- 
 ftances, we may borrow a great deal of Inftruction 
 toward our prudent Conduct from their Example, 
 as well as in all Cafes we may learn much from 
 their Comjerfation and Advice. 
 
 1 1 , After all other Rules remember this, that 
 mere Speculation in Matters of human Prudence can 
 never be a perfect Director without Experience and 
 Obfervation. We may be content therefore in 
 our younger Years to commit fome unavoidable 
 Miftakes in Point of Prudence, and we fhall fee 
 Miftakes enough in the Conduct of others, both 
 which ought to be treafured up amongft our ufe- 
 ful Obferv,ations, in order to teach us better Judg- 
 ment for Time to come. Sometimes the Mif- 
 takes, Imprudences and Follies, which our felves or 
 others have been guilty of, give us brighter and 
 more effectual LefTons of Prudence, than the wifeft 
 Councils, and the faireft Examples could ever have 
 done. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 V 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 human Teftimony. 
 
 TH E Evidence of human Teftimony is not fo 
 proper to lead us into the Knowledge of 
 the EJfence and inward Nature of Things, as to 
 acquaint us witfr the Exiftence, of Things, and to 
 
 inform
 
 267 
 
 inform us of Matters of Faff both paft and pre- 
 fcnt. And tho* there be a great deal of Fallibility 
 in the Teftimony of Men, yet there ,are fome 
 Things we may be almoft as certain of, as that 
 the Sun Jh'mes, or that jive 'Twenties make a Hun- 
 dred. Who is there at London that knows any 
 thing of the World, but believes there is fuch a 
 City as Parts in France ; that the Pope dwells at 
 Rome ; that Julius Casfar was an Emperor, or thac 
 Luther bad a great hand in the Reformation $ 
 
 If we obferve the following Rules, we may ar- 
 rive at fuch a Certainty in many Things of human 
 Teftimony, as that it is morally impofiible we 
 mould be deceived, i. e. we may obtain a moral 
 Certainty. 
 
 1. Let us confider whether the Thing reported 
 be in itfelf pojjlble ; if not, it can never be credi- 
 ble, whofoever relates it. 
 
 2. Confider farther whether it be probable, whe- 
 ther there are any concurring Circumftances to prove 
 it, befide the mere Teftimony of the Perfon that 
 relates it. I confefs if thefe laft Conditions are 
 wanting the thing may be true, but then it 
 ought to have the ftronger Teftimony to fup- 
 port it. , 
 
 3. Confider whether the Perfon who relates it 
 be capable of knowing the 'Truth : Whether he be 
 zftilful Judge in fuch Matters, if it be a Bufinefs 
 of Artj or a nice Appearance in Nature, or fome 
 curious Experiment in Philofophy. But if it be 
 a mere Occurrence in Life, a plain, fenfible Mat- 
 ter of Fad, k is enough to enquire whether he 
 who relates it were an Eye or Ear-Witnefs, or 
 whether he himfelf had it only by Hearfay, of can 
 trace it up to the Original. 
 
 S
 
 268 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 4. Confider whether the Narrator be honeft and 
 faithful* as well as fkilful: Whether he hath no 
 Biafs upon his Mind, no peculiar Gain or Profit 
 by believing or reporting it, no Inter -eft or Prin- 
 ciple which might warp his own Belief afide from 
 Truth, or which might tempt him to prevaricate,. 
 to fpeak falfly, or to give a Reprefentation a lit- 
 tle different from the naked Truth of Things. In 
 fhort, whether there be no Occafton of Sufpicion 
 concerning his Repoit. 
 
 5. Confider whether federal Perfom agree toge- 
 ther in the Report of this Matter ; and if fo, then 
 whether thefe Perfons who joined together in their 
 Teftimony might not be fuppofed to combine to- 
 gether in a Fal/hood. Whether they are Perfons 
 of Jufficient Skill > Probity and Credit. It might be 
 alfo enquired, whether they are of different Na- 
 tions, Seels, Parties, Opinions, orlnterefts. For 
 the more divided they are in all thefe, the more 
 likely is their Report to be true, if they agree to- 
 gether in their Account of the fame Thing ; and 
 efpecially if they perfift in it without waver- 
 ing. 
 
 6. Confider farther, whether the Report were 
 capable of being eaftly refuted at firft if it had not 
 been true , if fo, this confirms the Teftimony. 
 
 7. Enquire yet again, whether there has been 
 a conftant, uniform 'Tradition and Belief of this Mat- 
 ter from the very firft Age or Time when the 
 Thing was tranfacted, without any reafonable 
 Doubts or Contradictions. Or, 
 
 8. If any Part of it hath been doubted by any 
 confiderable Perfons, whether it has been fearched 
 wtt and afterwards confirmed, by having all the 
 Scruples and Doubts removed. In either of thefe 
 Cafes ihe Teftimony becomes more firm and cre- 
 dible. 
 
 9. En-
 
 C.V.S. . TherightUfeof&s&n. 269 
 
 9. Enquire on the other Hand, whether there 
 are any confiderable Objections remaining againft the 
 Belief of that Proportion fo attefted. Whether 
 there be any thing very improbable in the thing it 
 felf. Whether any concurrent Circumflances feem 
 to opfofe it. Whether any Perlbn or Perfons give 
 a pojitive and plain Tejlimony againft it. Whether 
 they are equally Jkilful, and equally faithful as thofe 
 who aflert it. Whether they he as many or more 
 in Number, and whether they might have any 
 fecret Biafs or Influence on them to contradict 
 it. 
 
 10. Sometimes the entire Silence of a Thing may 
 have fomething of Weight toward the Decifion 
 of a doubtful Point of Hiftory, or a Matter of 
 human Faith, (viz.] where the Fa6t is pretended 
 to be publick, if the Perfons who are filent about 
 it were fkilful to obferve, and could not but know 
 fuch an Occurrence ; if they were engaged by 
 Principle or by Intereft to have declared it ; if 
 they had fair Opportunity to fpeak of it : And 
 thefe Things may tend to make a Matter fufpi- 
 cious, if it be not very well attefted by pofitive 
 Proof. 
 
 IT. Remember that in fome Reports there are 
 more Marks of Faljhood than of Truth^ and in 
 others there are more Marks of Truth than of Fal/e- 
 hood. By a Comparifon of all thefe things toge- 
 ther, and putting every Argument on one Side 
 and the other into the Balance, we muft form as 
 good a Judgment as we can which Side prepon- 
 derates *, and give a ftrong or a feeble Afient or 
 Diflent, or with-hold our Judgment entirely, ac- 
 cording to greater or lejjer Evidence, according to 
 more jdain or dubious Marks of Truth or Falje- 
 Ipovd. 
 
 S Z 12. Ob-
 
 2;o LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 12. Obferve that in Matters of human Tefti- 
 mony, there is oftentimes a great Mixture of Truth 
 and Faljhood in the Report itfelf : Some Parts of 
 the Story may be perfectly true, and fome utterly 
 falfe ; and fome may have fuch a blended Con- 
 fufion of Circumftances which are a little warpt 
 afide from the Truth, and mifreprefented, that 
 there is need of good Skill and Accuracy to form 
 a Judgment concerning them, and determine 
 which Part is true, and which is falfe. The whole 
 Report is not to be believed, becaufe fome Parts 
 are indubitably true, nor the whole to be rejected, 
 becaufe fome Parts are as evident Faljhoods. 
 
 We may draw two remarkable Obferuations from 
 this Seftion. 
 
 Obferv. I. How certain is the Truth of the 
 Chriftian Religion, and particularly of the Refur- 
 reRion of Chrifl, which is a Matter of Fact on 
 which Chriftianity is built ! We have almoft all 
 the concurrent Evidences that can be derived from 
 human 'Teftimony joining to confirm this glorious 
 Truth. The Fact is not impofiible ; concurrent 
 Circumftances caft a favourable Afpect on it ; it 
 was foretold by one who wrought Miracles, and 
 therefore not unlikely, nor unexpected : The A- 
 poftles and firft Difciples were Eye and Ear-Wit- 
 nefies, for they converfed with their rifen Lord ; 
 they were the moft plain, honed Men in them- 
 felves , the Temptations of worldly Interefts did 
 rather difcouragc their Belief and Report of it : 
 They all agree in this Matter, tho* they were 
 Men of different Characters ; Pharifees and Fijher- 
 men, and Publicans, Men of Judaa and Galilee^ 
 and perhaps fome Heathens ^ who were early con- 
 verted: The Thing might eafily have been dif- 
 proved if it were falfe , it hath been conveyed by 
 5 conftant
 
 C. V. S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. 27 1 
 
 conftant Tradition and Writing down to our 
 Times , thofe who at firft doubted were afterwards 
 convinced by certain Proofs ; nor have any pre- 
 tended to give any Proof of the contrary, but 
 merely denied the Fact with Impudence in Oppo- 
 fition to all thefe Evidences. 
 
 Obferv. II. How weak is the Faith which is due 
 to a Multitude of things in ancient human Hifto- 
 ry ! For tho* many of thefe Criteria, or Marks of 
 Credibility are found plainly in the more general 
 and publick Fafts, yet as to a Multitude of particu- 
 lar Faffs and Circumftances, how deficient are they 
 in iuch Evidence as mould demand our Afient ! 
 Perhaps there is nothing that ever was done in all 
 paft Ages, and which was not a publick Fact, fo 
 well attefted as the Refurrection of Chrift. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 divine Teftimony. 
 
 AS human fajlimony acquaints us with Matters 
 of Fatt, both paft and prefent, which lye 
 beyond the Reach of our own perfonal Notice ; 
 fo divine Tejlimony is fuited to inform us both of 
 the Nature of Things, as well as Matters of Faff, 
 and of Things future, as well as prefent or paft. 
 
 Whatfoever is dictated to us by God himfelf, 
 or by Men who are divinely infpired, muft be be- 
 lieved with full AfTurance. Reafon demands us to 
 believe whatfoever divine Revelation dictates : For 
 God is perfectly wife, and cannot be deceived ; he 
 is faithful and good, and will not deceive his Crea- 
 tures : And when Reafon has found out the cer- 
 tain Marks or Credentials of divine Feftimony to 
 S 3 belong
 
 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 belong to any Propofition, there remains then no 
 farther Enquiry to be made, but only to find out 
 the true Senfe and Meaning of that which God 
 has revealed, for Reafon itfelf demands the Belief 
 of it. 
 
 Now divine I'ejlimony or Revelation requires thefe 
 following Credentials. 
 
 i. That the Propositions or Doctrines reveal- 
 ed be not inconfiftent with Reafon , for intelligent 
 Creatures can never be bound to believe real In- 
 confiftencies. Therefore we are fure the Popifh 
 Doctrine of tfranfubftantiation is not a Matter of 
 divine Revelation, becaufe it is contrary to all our 
 Senfes and our Reafon, even in their proper Ex- 
 ercifes. 
 
 God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of 
 himfelf, and agreeable to his own Nature and 
 divine Perfections. Now many of thefe Per- 
 fections are difcoverable by the Light of Reafon, 
 and whatfoever is inconfiftent with thefe Perfections, 
 cannot be a divine Revelation. 
 
 But let it be noted that in Matters of Practice- 
 toward our Fellow Creatures, God may command 
 us to act in a Manner contrary to what Reafon 
 would direct antecedent to that Command. So 
 Abraham was commanded to offer up his Son a 
 Sacrifice : The Ifraelites were ordered to borrow 
 of the Egyptians without paying them, and to 
 plunder and flay the Inhabitants of Canaan : Be- 
 caufe God has a fovereign Right to all Things, 
 and can with Equity difpofiefs his Creatures of 
 Life, and every Thing which he has given them, 
 and efpecially fuch finful Creatures as Mankind i 
 and he can appoint whom he pleafes to be the In- 
 ftruments of this juft Difpoffefiion or Depriva- 
 tion. So that thefe divine Commands are not 
 really inconfiftent with right Reafon \ for whatfoever
 
 C. V. S. 6. The right Ufe ofReafon: 273 
 
 is fo cannot be believed where that Inconfeftency 
 appears. 
 
 2. Upon the fame Account the whole Dofirinc 
 cf Revelation muft be confident with itfelf \ every 
 Part of it muft be confiftent with each other : 
 And tho' in Points of PracJice latter Revelation, 
 may repeal or cancel former divine Laws, yet in 
 Matters of Belief no latter Revelation can be 
 inconfiftent with what has been heretofore re- 
 vealed. 
 
 3. Divine Revelation muft be confirmed by 
 fome divine and fupernatural Appearances, fome 
 extraordinary Signs or tokens, Vifions^ Voices^ or 
 Miracles wrought, or Prophecies fulfilled. There 
 muft be fome Demonftrations of the Prefence and 
 Power of God, fuperior to all the Powers of 
 Nature, or the fettled Connection which God as 
 Creator has eftabliihed among his Creatures in 
 this vifible World, 
 
 4. If there are any fuch extraordinary and won- 
 <krful Appearances and Operations brought to 
 .conteft with, or to oppofe divine Revelation^ there 
 muft and always will be fuch a Superiority on the 
 Side of that Revelation which is truly divine, as 
 to manifeft that God is there. This was the 
 Cafe when the Egyptian Sorcerers contended with 
 Mofes. But the Wonders which Mo/es wrought 
 -did fo far tranfcend the Power of the Magicians* 
 as made them confefs, // was the Finger oj God. 
 
 5. Thefe divine Appearances or Atteftations to 
 Revelation muft be either known to ourfdves, by 
 our own perfonal Obfervation of them, or they 
 rnuft be fujficiently attefted by other s^ according to 
 the Principles and Rules by which Matters of 
 buman Faith are to be judged in the foregoing 
 Section, 
 
 S 4 Some
 
 274 LOGICK:Or, Part II. 
 
 Some of thofe who lived in the Nations and 
 Ages where Miracles were wrought, were Eye and 
 Ear-WitnefTes of the Truth and Divinity of the 
 Revelation ; but we who live in thefe diftant Ages, 
 muft have them derived down to us by juft and in- 
 conteftable Hiftory and Tradition. We alfo even 
 in thefe diftant Times may fee the Accomplifh- 
 ments of fome antient Predictions, and thereby ob- 
 tain that Advantage toward the Confirmation of 
 our Faith in divine Revelation beyond what thofe 
 Perfons enjoyed who lived when the Prediflions 
 were pronounced. 
 
 6. There is another very confiderable Confir- 
 mation of divine 'Tejlimony , and that is, when the 
 Doctrines themfelves either on the Publication or 
 the Belief of them produce fupernatural EfFecls, 
 ^Such were the miraculous Powers which were, com- 
 municated to Believers in the firft Ages of Chri- 
 ftianity, the Converfion of Jews or Gentiles, the 
 amazing Succefs of the Gofpel of Chrift without 
 human Aid, and in Opposition to a thoufand Im- 
 pediments, its Power in changing the Hearts and 
 Lives of ignorant and vicious Heathens, and wicked 
 and profane Creatures in all Nations, and filling 
 them with a Spirit of Virtue, Piety and Goodnefs. 
 "Wherefoever Perfons have found this Effect in their 
 pwn Hearts, wrought by a Belief of the Gofpel 
 of Chrift, they have a Witnefs in themfelves of the 
 Truth of it, and abundant Reafon to believe it 
 divine. 
 
 Of the Difference between Reafon and Revela- 
 tion, and in what Senfe the latter is fuperior, fee 
 more in Chop. II. Seff. 9, and Chap. IV, Direfl. 6. 
 
 SICT,
 
 jG, V. S. 7. fbe right Ufe ofRezfon. 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 Principles and Rules of judging, .concerning 
 
 paft, prefent, and to come, by the mere Ufe of 
 'Reafon. 
 
 T Hough we attain the greateft Aflurance of 
 Things paft and future by divine Faith, and 
 learn many Matters of Fa6t, both paft and prefent y 
 by human Faith, yet Reafon alfo may in a good 
 Pegree aflift us to judge of Matters of Fact both 
 paft, prefent, and to come^ by the following Prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 1. There is a Syftem of Beings round about us, 
 of which we ourfehes are a Part, which we call 
 the World ; and in this World there is a Courfe of 
 Nature, or a fettled Order of Caufes, Effects, Ante- 
 cedents, Concomitants, Conferences, &c. from which 
 the Author of Nature doth not vary but upon 
 very important Occafions. 
 
 2. Where Antecedents, Concomitants and Confe- 
 quents, Caufes and Effefts, Signs and ^Things figm- 
 fied, Subjects and Adjuntts are necefiarily conneded 
 with each other, we may infer the Caufes from, 
 the Effects, and Effects from Caufes, the Antecer- 
 dents from the Confequents, as well as Confequents 
 from Antecedents, &c. and thereby be pretty cer- 
 tain of many Things both paft, prefent, and to 
 come. It is by this Principle that Aftronomers can 
 tell what Day and Hour the Sun and Moon were 
 eclipfed jive hundred Tears ago, and predid all fu- 
 ture Eclipjes as long as the World fhall ftand. They 
 can tell prccifely at what Minute the Sun rifes or 
 fets this J)ay at Pequin in China, or what Alti- 
 tude the Dog-ftar had at Midnight or Midnoon in, 
 Rome, on the Day when Julius Cae&r was Jlain. 
 
 Gardiners
 
 276 LOGIC K: O, Part II. 
 
 Gardiners upon the fame Principle can foretel the 
 Months when every Plant will be in Bloom, and the 
 Plowman knows the Weeks of Harveft : We are 
 fure if there be a Chicken, there was an Egg : If 
 there be a Rainbow, we are certain it rains not far 
 off: If we behold a Tree growing on the Earth, we 
 know it has naturally a Root under Ground. 
 
 3. Where there is fuch a neceffary Connexion 
 between Catifes and Effefts, Antecedents and Confe- 
 quents, Signs and Things fignifed, we know alfo 
 that like Caufes will have like Effects, and pro- 
 portionable Caufes will have proportionable Effects, 
 contrary Caufes will have contrary Effects -, and ob- 
 ferving Men may form many Judgments by the 
 Rules of Similitude and Proportion, where the 
 Caufes, Effefts, &c. are not entirely the fame. 
 
 4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain 
 Connection between Antecedents, Concomitants and 
 Confequents, we can give but a Conjecture, or a -pro- 
 bable Determination. If the Clouds gather, or the 
 Weather-glafs finks, we fuppofe it will rain : If a 
 Man fpit Blood frequently with coughing, we fuppofe 
 Jiis Lungs are huft : If very dangerous Symptoms 
 appear,! we expect his Death. 
 
 5. Where Caufes operate freely with a Liberty 
 of Indifference to this or the contrary, there we can- 
 not certainly know what the Effects will be : For 
 it feems to be contingent, and the certain Know- 
 ledge of it belongs only to God. This is the Cafe 
 in the greateft Part of human Actions. 
 
 6. Yet wife Men by a juft Obfervation of hu- 
 ftian Nature will give very probable Conjectures 
 in this Matter alfo concerning Things paft, or 
 Things future, becaufe human Nature in all Ages 
 and Nations has fuch a Conformity to itfelf. By 
 a Knowledge of the Tempers of Men and their 
 prefent Circurfiftances, we may be able to give a 
 
 happy
 
 CV.S.y. ^r^&Uy^/Reafon. 277 
 
 happy Guefs what their Conduct will be, and what 
 will be the Event, by an Obfervation erf" the like 
 Cafes in former Times. This made the Emperor 
 Marcus Antoninus to fay, " By looking back itit* 
 * Hiftory, and confidering the Fate and Revolutions 
 " ef Governments, you will be able to form a Guefs , 
 " and almoft prophefy upon the future. For Things 
 " paji, prefent, and to come, are ftrangely uniform^ 
 11 and of a Colour ; and are commonly caft in the 
 " fame Mould. So that upon the Matter, forty 
 * Tears of human Life may ferue for a Sample of 
 ten thoufand." Collier's Antoninus, Book VII. 
 Sect. 50. 
 
 7. There are alfo fome other Principles of judg- 
 ing concerning the paft Actions of Men in former 
 Ages, befides Books, Hiftories, and Traditions, which 
 are the Mediums of conveying human Teftimony \ 
 as we may infer the Skill and Magnificence of the 
 Antients by fome Fragments of their Statues, and 
 Ruins of their Buildings. We know what Roman 
 Legions came into Great Britain by Numbers of 
 Bricks dug out of the Earth in fome Parts of the 
 Ifland, with the Marks of fome particular Legion 
 upon them, which muft have been employed there 
 in Brick-making. We rectify fome Miftakes in 
 Hiftory by Statues, Coins, old Altars, Utenfils of 
 War, &c. We confirm or difprove fome pre- 
 tended Traditions and hiftorical Writings, by Me- 
 dals, Images, Piftures, Urns, &c. 
 
 Thus I have gone thro* all thofe particular Ob- 
 jetts of our Judgment which I firft propofed, and 
 have laid down Principles and Rules by which we 
 may fafely conduct ourfelves therein. There is a 
 Variety of other Objects concerning which we 
 are occafionally called to pals a Judgment, (viz.) 
 The Characters of Perfons, the Value and Worth 
 
 f
 
 278 L O G I C K: Or, &c. Part II. 
 
 of ttings, the Senfe and Meaning of particular 
 Writers^ Matters of 'Wit , Oratory^ Poefy* Matters 
 of Equity in judicial Court 's, Matters of^raffick and 
 Commerce betwixt Man and Man, which would be 
 cndlefs to enumerate. But if the general and (pe- 
 ial Rules of Judgment which have been mentioned 
 in thefe two laft Chapters are treafured up in the 
 Mind, and wrought into the very Temper of our 
 Souls in our younger Years, they will lay a Foun- 
 dation for juft and regular Judgment concerning a 
 thoufand fpcdd Occurrences in the religious^ civil 
 and learned Life. 
 
 THE-
 
 279 
 
 THE 
 
 THIRD PART 
 
 -s'-.LY ' } 
 O F 
 
 L O G I C K. 
 
 Of Reqfoning and Sylkgifm. 
 
 AS the firft Work of the Mind is Perception* 
 whereby our Ideas are framed, and the fe- 
 cond is Judgment, which joins or disjoins 
 our Ideas, and forms a Proportion, fo the third 
 Operation of the Mind is Reafoning, which joins 
 feveral Propofitions together, aod makes a Syttogifm 9 
 that is, an Argument whereby we are wont to infer 
 fomething that is lefs known, from Truths which are 
 more evident. 
 
 In treating of this Subject, let us confider more 
 particularly, 
 
 1 . The Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Parts of 
 which it is compofed. 
 
 2. The feveral kinds of Syllcgifms, faith parti- 
 cular Rules relating to them.
 
 *8o LOG 1C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 3. ^he Dotfrine of Sophifms, or /^ Reasoning, 
 together with the Means of avoiding them, and the 
 Manner of folding or anfwering them. 
 
 4. Some general Rules to direft our Reafoning. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Parts 
 of which it is comfofed. 
 
 IF the mere Perception and Comparifon of two 
 Ideas would always fhew us whether they agree 
 or disagree j. then all rational Propofitions would 
 be Matters of Intelligence, or firft Principles, and 
 there would be no Ule of Reafaning, or drawing 
 any Confequences. It is the Narrownefs of the 
 human Mind which introduces the Neceflity of 
 Reafoning. When we are unable to judge of the 
 Truth or Falmood of a Propofition in an imme- 
 diate Manner, by the mere Contemplation of its 
 Subject and Predicate, we are then conftrained to 
 ttfe a Medium, and to compare each of them with 
 fome third Idea, that by feeing how far they agree 
 or difagree with it, we may be able to judge how 
 far they agree or difagree among themfelves : As, 
 if there are two Lines A and 5, and I know not 
 whether they are equal or no, I take a third Line 
 , or an Inch, and apply it to each of them j if it 
 agree with them both, then I infer that A and B 
 are equal ; but if it agree with one and not with 
 the other, then I conclude A and B are unequal : 
 If it agree with neither of them, there can be no 
 Comparifon. 
 
 So
 
 C.I. TkrfgbtUfeofR&fon. 281 
 
 So if the Queftion be whether God muft be wor- 
 Jhipped, we feek a third Idea, fuppofe the Idea of 
 a Creator, and fay, 
 
 Our Creator muft be worjhipped. 
 God is our Creator. 
 Therefore God muft be worjhipped, 
 The Companion of this third Idea, with the 
 two diftinct Parts of the Queftion, ufually requires 
 two Propofitions which are called the Premtffes: 
 The third Proportion which is drawn from them 
 is the Condufeon, wherein the ^uejlion itfelf is an- 
 fwcred, and the Subject and Predicate joined either 
 in the Negative or the Affirmative. 
 
 The Foundation of all Affirmative Conclufiom is 
 laid in this general Truth, that fo far as two pro- 
 pofed Ideas agree to any third Idea, they agree al- 
 fo among themfelves. The Character of Creator 
 agrees to God, and Worjhip agrees to a Creator ', 
 therefore Worjhty agrees to God. 
 
 The Foundations, of all negative Conclufwns is 
 this, that where one of the two propofed Ideas 
 agrees with the third Idea, and the other difagrees 
 with it, they muft needs difagree fo far alfo with 
 one another , as, if no Sinners are happy, and if 
 Angels are happy, then Angels are not Sinners. 
 
 Thus it appears what is the ftricl: and juft No- 
 tion of a SyUogifm : It is a Sentence or Argument 
 made up of three Propofitions fo difpofed, as that 
 the laft is necefiarily inferred from thofe which go 
 before, as in the Inftances which have been juft 
 mentioned, 
 
 In the Conftitution of a Syllogifm two Things 
 may be confidered, (viz. ) the Matter and the Form 
 of it. 
 
 The Matter of which a Syllogifm is made up, 
 
 is three Propofitions ; and thefe three Propofitions 
 
 are made up of three Ideas or Terms varioufly join- 
 
 5 cd.
 
 282 LOGIC K: Or, Part IIL 
 
 ed. The three Terms are called the remote Matter 
 of a Syllogifm ; and the three Proportions the 
 froxime or immediate Matter of it. 
 
 The three Terms are named the Major > the 
 Minor, and the Middle. 
 
 The Predicate of the Conclufion is called the 
 major farm, becaufe it is generally of larger Ex- 
 tenfion than the minor Term, or the Subject. The 
 major and minor 'Terms are called the Extremes. 
 
 The middle Term is the third Idea invented and 
 difpofed in two Proportions in fuch a manner as 
 to fhew the Connection between the major and 
 minor Term in .the Conclufion ; for which Reafon 
 the middle Term itfelf is fometimes called the Ar- 
 gument. 
 
 That Propofition which contains the Predicate 
 of the Conclufion, connected with the middle Term, 
 is ufually called the major Propofition, whereas the 
 minor Propofition connects the middle Term with 
 the Subject of the Conclufion, and is fometimes 
 called the Affumpt'wn. 
 
 Note, This exact Diftinction of the feveral Parts 
 of a Syllogifm, and of the major and minor Terms 
 connected with the middle Term,, in the major and 
 minor Propofidons, does chiefly belong to femple 
 or categorical Syllogifm s, of which we mail fpeak 
 in the next Chapter, tho' all Syllogifms whatfoever 
 have fomething analogical to it. 
 
 Note farther, that the major Propofition is ge- 
 nerally placed firft, and the minor, fecond, and the 
 Conclufion in the laft Place, where the Syllogifm 
 is regularly compofed and reprefented. 
 
 . The Form of a Syttogijm is the framing and dif- 
 pofing of the Premifies according to Art, or juft 
 Principles of Reafoning, and the regular Infe* 
 rence of the Conclufion from them, 
 
 %.. 
 
 Th S
 
 C.II.S.I. tfk^gvfc^/Reafon. 2% 
 
 The Aft of Reafoning or inferring one thing 
 from another, is generally expreft and known by 
 the Particle Therefore? when the Argument is 
 formed according to the Rules of Art ; though in 
 common Difcourfe or Writing, fuch eatifal Par- 
 ticles as For, Becaufe, rrianifeft the Aft of Reafon- 
 ing as well as the illative Particles 'Then and There- 
 fore : And wherefoever any of thefe Words are 
 ufed, there is a perfect Syllogifm expreft or im- 
 plyed, tho' perhaps the three Propofitions do not 
 appear, or are not placed in regular Form. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 w. , ^v ;.*:.<': A 4 -3 TO 
 
 Of the various Kinds of Sylkgifms, 'with par- 
 ticular Rules relating to them. 
 
 SYllogifins are divided into various Kinds, either' 
 according to the Queflion which is proved by 
 them, according to the Nature and Competition of 
 them, or according to the middle 'Term) which is 
 ufed to prove the Queftion. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of univerfal and particular Syllogifms, both negative 
 and affirmative. 
 
 ACcording to the Quejlion which is to be 
 proved, fo Syllogifms are divided into i- 
 verfal Affirmative, univerfal Negative, particular* 
 Affirmative, and particular Negative. This is often 
 called a Divifion of Syllogifms drawn from the 
 Condufton j for fo many Sorts of Condulions. there 
 T may
 
 284 LOGIC K: Or, Pan III. 
 
 may be which are marked with the Letters A, E, 
 
 1,0. 
 
 In an univerfal affirmative Syllogif?n, one Idea is 
 proved univerfally to agree with another, and may 
 be univerfally affirmed of it, as every Sin deferves 
 Death^ every unlawful Wijk is a Sin ; therefore every 
 unlawful Wijh deferves Death. 
 
 In an univerfal negative Sylkgifm, one Idea is 
 proved to difagree with another Idea univerfally, 
 and may be thus denied of it, as, no Injujlice can 
 le pleafing to God ; all Persecution for the Sake of 
 Confcience is Injujlice ; therefore no Perfection for 
 Conference Sake can be pleafing to God. 
 
 Particular affirmative, and -particular negative 
 Syllogifms may be eafily underftood by what is laid 
 of Univerfah, and there will be fufficient Exam- 
 ples given of all thefe in the next Section. 
 
 The general Principle upon which thefe univer- 
 fal and particular Syllogifms are founded is this 5 
 whatfoever is affirmed or denied univerfally of any 
 Idea, may be affirmed or denied of all the parti- 
 cular Kinds or Beings, which are contained in the 
 Extenfion of that univerfal Idea. So the Defert 
 of Death is affirmed univerfally of Sin, and an un- 
 lawful Wifo is one particular Kind of Sin, which 
 is contained in the univerfal Idea of Sin, therefore 
 the Defert of Death may be affirmed concerning 
 an unlawful Wljh. And fo of the reft. 
 
 Note, In the Doctrine of Syllogifms, a fingular 
 and an indefinite Propofition are ranked among 
 Univerfah, as was before obferved in the Doctrine 
 qf Pi opofitions. 
 
 SECT,
 
 C.II. S.2. The rightUfe 0/Heafon. 285 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of plain, femple Syllogifms, and their Rules. 
 
 THE next Divifion of Syllogifms is into fingle 
 and compound. This is drawn from the Na- 
 ture and Compofetion of them. 
 
 Single Syllogifms are made up of three Propofi- 
 tions : Compound Syllogifms contain more than 
 three Propositions, and may be formed into two or 
 more Syllogifms. 
 
 Single Syllogifms, for Diftin&ion's Sake, may 
 be divided into * Simple, Complex and Conjunc- 
 tive. 
 
 Thofe are properly called fimple or categorical 
 Syllogifms, which are made up of three plain, Jin- 
 gle, or categorical Proportions, wherein the middle 
 Term is evidently and regularly joined with one 
 Part of the Queftion in the major Proportion, 
 and with the other in the minor, whence there 
 follows a plain fingle Conclufion ; as, every hu- 
 man Virtue is to be fought with Diligence ; Prudence 
 is a human Virtue ; therefore Prudence is to be fought 
 diligently. 
 
 Note, Tho* the Terms of Propofitions may be 
 complex -, yet where the Compofition of ftie whole 
 Argument is thus plain, fimple and regular, it is 
 properly called a fimple Syllogifm, fmce the Com- 
 pletion does not belong to the fyllogiftic Form 
 of it. 
 
 * As Ideas and Propofitions are divided into Jingli and compound, and 
 fingle are fubdivided into fimple and complex fo there are the fame Divifions 
 and Subdivifions applied to Syllogifms. 
 
 T .2
 
 286 LOGICK: Or, Part III. 
 
 Simple Syllogifms have feveral Rides belonging 
 to them, which being obferved, will generally fe- 
 cure us from falfe Inferences : But thefe Rules be- 
 ing founded on four general Axioms, it is neceflary 
 to mention thefe Axioms beforehand, for the Ufe 
 of thofe who will enter into the ipeculative Reafon 
 of all thefe Rules. 
 
 Axiom i. Particular Proportions are contained 
 in Univerfals, and may be inferred from them \ but 
 Univerfals are not contained in Particulars, nor 
 can be inferred from them. 
 
 Axiom 2. In all univerfal Proportions, the Sub- 
 ject is univerfal : In all particular Proportions, the 
 Subject is particular. 
 
 Axiom 3. In all affirmative Propofitions, the 
 Predicate has no greater Extenfion than the Sub- 
 iect ; for its Extenfion is reftrained by the Sub- 
 ject, and therefore it is always to be eiteemed as a 
 particular Idea. It is by mere Accident, if it 
 ever be taken univerfally, and cannot happen but 
 in fuch univerfal or fingular Propofitions as are 
 reciprocal. 
 
 Axiom 4. The Predicate of a negative Propo- 
 fition is always taken univerfally, for in its whole 
 Extenfion it is denied of the Subject. If we fay 
 no Stone is vegetable^ we deny all forts of Vegeta- 
 tion concerning Stones. 
 
 The Rules of Jimpk, regular Syllogifms are 
 thefe. 
 
 Rule I. The middle Term muft not be taken twice 
 particularly ', but once at leaft univerfally. For if 
 the middle Term be taken for two different Parts 
 or Kinds of the fame univerfal Idea, then the Sub- 
 ject of the Conclufipn is compared with one of 
 
 thefe
 
 C. II. S. 2. The right Ufe o/'Reafon. 287 
 
 thefe Parts, and the Predicate with another Part, 
 and this will never fhew whether that Subject and 
 Predicate agree or diiagree : There will then be 
 four dijtinft Terms in the Syllogifm, and the two 
 Parts of the Queftion will not be compared with 
 the fame third Idea ; as if I fay, fome Men are pious, 
 and fome Men are Robber 's, I can never infer that 
 fome Robbers are pious, for the middle Term Men 
 being taken twice particularly, it is not the Jams 
 Men who are fpoken of in the major and minor 
 Propofitions. 
 
 Rule II. The forms in the Condufion muft never 
 be taken more univer folly than they are in the Pre- 
 mijfes. The Reafon is derived from the firft: 
 Axiom, that Generals can never be inferred from 
 Particulars. 
 
 Rule III. A negative Condufion cannot be proved 
 by two affirmative PremiJJ'es. For when the two 
 Terms of the Conciufion are united or agree to 
 the middle Term, it does not follow by any Means 
 that they dilagree with one another. 
 
 Rule IV. If one of the PremiJJ'es be negative, the 
 Condufion muft be negative. For if the middle 
 Term be denied of either Part of the Condu- 
 fion, it may mew that the Terms of the Conciu- 
 fion dilagree, but it can never fhew that they 
 agree. 
 
 Rule V. If either of the PremiJJ'es be particular, the 
 Condufion ntujl be particular. This may be proved 
 for the moft part from the firft Axiom. 
 
 Thefe two laft Rules are fometimes united in 
 
 this fingle Sentence, 'The Condufion always follows 
 
 the weaker Part of the Premijfes. Now Negatives 
 
 T and
 
 2 88 O G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 and Particulars are counted inferior to Affirmatives 
 and Univerfals. 
 
 Rule VI. From two negative Premijjes nothing 
 can be concluded. For they feparate the middle 
 Term both from the Subject and Predicate of the 
 Conclufion, and when two Ideas difagree to a 
 third, we cannot infer that they either agree or dif- 
 agree with each other. 
 
 Yet where the Negation is a Part of the middle 
 Term, the two Premifles may look like Negatives 
 according to the Words, but one of them is af- 
 firmative in Senfe ; as, What has no Thought can- 
 not reafon ; but a Worm has no Thought ; therefore 
 a Worm cannot reafon. The minor Propofition does 
 really affirm the middle Term concerning the Sub- 
 ject, (viz.) a Worm is what has no Thought ', and 
 thus it is properly in this Syllogifm an affirmative 
 Propofition. 
 
 Rule VII. From two particular Premiffes, no- 
 thing can be concluded. This Rule depends chiefly 
 pn the firft Axiom. 
 
 A more laborious and accurate Proof of thefe 
 Rules, and the Derivation of every Part of them 
 in all poffible Cafes, from the foregoing Axioms, 
 require fo much Time, and are of fo little Im- 
 portance to affift the right Ufe of Reafon, that it 
 is needlefs to infift longer upon them here. See 
 all this done ingenioufly in the Logick called, the 
 Art of Thinking, Part iii. Chap. iii. &c. 
 
 SECT,
 
 C.II. S. 3. tterigBtU/eofUctfon. 289 
 
 SECT. III. 
 Of the Moods and Figures of fimple Syllogifms. 
 
 Simple Syllogifms are adorned and furrounded in 
 the common Books of Logick with a Varie- 
 ty of Inventions about Moods and Figures^ where- 
 in by the artificial Contexture of the Letters A^ 
 E, /, and 0, Men have endeavoured to transform 
 Logick, or the Art of Reafoning, into a fort of 
 Mecbamjm* and to teach Boys to fyllogize, or 
 frame Arguments and refute them, without any 
 real inward Knowledge of the Queftion. This is 
 almoft in the fame Manner as School-boys have 
 been taught perhaps in their trifling Years to com- 
 pofe Latin Verfes ; *. e. by certain Tables and 
 Squares, with a Variety of Letters in them, where- 
 in by counting every fixth, feventh, or eighth Let- 
 ter, certain Latin Words mould be framed in the 
 Form of Hexameters or Pentameters ; and this may 
 be done by thofe who know nothing of Latin or 
 of Verfes. 
 
 I confefs fome of thefe logical Subtilties have 
 much more Ufe than thofe verfifying Tables, and 
 there is much Ingenuity difcovered in determining 
 the precife Number of Syllogifms that may be 
 formed in every Figure^ and giving the Reafons of 
 them i yet the Light of Nature, a good Judg- 
 ment, and due Confideration of Things tend more 
 to true Reafoning than all the Trappings of Moods 
 and Figures. 
 
 But left this Book be charged with too great 
 Defects and Imperfections, it may be proper to 
 give fhort Hints of that which fome Logicians 
 have fpent fo much Time and Paper upon. 
 
 T 4 All
 
 $90 L O G I C K: Or, Part III, 
 
 All the pofiible Combinations of three of the 
 Letters A* E-> /> O, to make three Propofitions 
 amount to fixty four , but fifty four of them are 
 excluded from forming true Syllogifms by the fe- 
 ven Rules in the foregoing Section : The remaining 
 Ten are varioufly diverfified by Figures and Moods 
 into fourteen Syllogifms. 
 
 The Figure of a Syllogifm is the proper Difpo- 
 fition of the middle Term with the Parts of the 
 Queftion. 
 
 A Mood is the regular Determination of Pro- 
 pofitions according to their Quantity and Quality, 
 i. e. their univerfal or particular Affirmation or 
 Negation , which are fignified by certain artifi- 
 cial Words wherein the Confonants are neglected, 
 and thefe four Vowels A^ E, /, O, are only re- 
 garded. 
 
 There are generally counted three Figures. 
 
 In the firft of them the middle Term is the 
 Subject of the major Propofition, and the Predi- 
 cate of the minor. This contains four Moods 
 (viz.} Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio. And it 
 is the Excellency of this Figure that all Sorts of 
 Queftions or Conclufions may be proved by it, 
 whether A, E, /, or 0, /. e. Univerfal or parti- 
 cular, affirmative or negative, as, 
 
 Par- Every wicked Man is truly miferable. 
 ba- All Tyrants are wicked Men , 
 ra, Therefore al} Tyrants are truly miferable, 
 
 Ce* He that's always in Fear is not happy ; 
 la- Covetous Men are always in Fear ; 
 Witt, Therefore covetous Men are not happy.
 
 C. II. S. 3. The right Ufe ofReafon. 29 1 
 
 Da- Whatfoever furthers our Salvation is good 
 
 for us ; 
 
 ri- Some Afflictions further our Salvation ; 
 /. Therefore fome Afflictions are good for us. 
 
 Fe- Nothing that muft be repented of is truly 
 
 defirable -, 
 
 ri- Some Pleafures muft be repented of; 
 o. Therefore there are fome Pleafures which arc 
 not truly defirable. 
 
 In the fecond Figure the middle Term is the 
 Predicate of both the Premifles , this contains 
 four Moods, (viz.) Cefare, Cameftres^ Feftino^ Ba- 
 roco, and it admits only of negative Conclufions ; 
 as, 
 
 Ce- No Liar is fit to be believed ; 
 
 fa- Every good Chriftian is fit to be believed ; 
 
 re. Therefore no good Chriftian is a Liar. 
 
 The Reader may eafily form Examples of the 
 reft, 
 
 The tbird Figure requires that the middle Term 
 be the Subject of both the Premifles. It has fix 
 Moods, (viz.) Daraptz, Felapton, Difamis^ Datifi^ 
 Bocardo, Ferifon : And it admits only of particu- 
 lar Conclufions ; as, 
 
 Whofoever loves God mall be faved ; 
 rap- All the Lovers of God have their Imper- 
 
 fections ; 
 
 ti. Therefore fome who have Imperfections lhall 
 be faved. 
 
 I leave the Reader to form Examples of the
 
 292 LOGIC K: Or, Part IIL 
 
 The Moods of thefe three Figures are comprized 
 in four Latin Verfes. 
 
 Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio quoque primse. 
 Cefare, Cameflres, Feftino, Baroco, fecundas. 
 Tertia Darapti fibi vindicat, atque Felapton^ 
 Adjungens Difamis, Datift> Bocardo, Ferifon. 
 
 The fpenal Rules of the three Figures are thefe. 
 
 In the Jirft Figure the major Propofition muft 
 always be univerfal, and the minor affirmative. 
 
 In the fecond Figure alfb the major muft be uni- 
 verfal, and one of the Premifles, together with 
 the Conclufion, muft be negative. 
 
 In the third Figure the minor muft be affirma- 
 tive, and the Conclufion always particular. 
 
 There is alfo a fourth Figure wherein the middle 
 Term is predicated in the major Propofition, and 
 fubjected in the minor : But this is a very indirect 
 and oblique manner of concluding, and is never 
 ufed in the Sciences, nor in human Life, and 
 
 therefore I call it ufelefs. Some Logicians will 
 
 allow it to be nothing elfe but a mere Inverfion 
 of the firft Figure ; the Moods of it, (viz.) Ba- 
 ralipton, or Barbari, Calentes, Dibatis, Fefyamo^ 
 Frefifom^ are not worthy to be explained by one 
 Example. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of Complex Syttogifms* 
 
 IT is not the mere Ufe of complex forms in a 
 Syllogifm that gives it this Name, tho* one 
 of the Terms is ufually complex ; but thofe are 
 properly called complex Syllogifms, in which the 
 middle Term is not connected with the whole 
 
 Subject,
 
 C.II.S.4. fberigbtUfeofRttfon. 29$ 
 Subject, or the whole Predicate in two diftinct 
 Propofitions, but is intermingled and compared 
 with them by Parts, or in a more confufed man- 
 ner, in different Forms of Speech ; as, 
 
 The Sun is a fenfelefs Being ; 
 
 The Perfians wor/^ipped the Sun ; 
 
 Therefore the Perfians war/hipped a fenfelefs Be- 
 ing. 
 
 Here the Predicate of the Conclufion is wor- 
 fljipped a fenfelefs Being, part of which is joined 
 with the middle Term Sun in the major Propofi- 
 tion, and the other Part in the minor. 
 
 Tho* this fort of Argument is confefied to be 
 entangled, or confufed, and irregular, if examined 
 by the Rules of fimple Syllogifms ; yet there is a 
 great Variety of Arguments ufed in Books of 
 Learning* and in common Life, whole Confe- 
 quence is ftrong and evident, and which muft be 
 ranked under this Head ; as, 
 
 I. Exclufive Propofitions will form a complex 
 Argument ; as, pious Men are the only Favourites 
 of Heaven ; true Chriflians are Favourites of Hea- 
 ven '> therefore true Chriflians are pious Men. Or 
 thus, Hypocrites are not pious Men ; therefore Hy- 
 pocrites are no Favourites of Heaven. 
 
 II. Exceptive Propofitions will make fuch com- 
 plex Syllogifms ; as, None but Phyfecians came to 
 the Confultation , the Nurfe is no Phyfician ; there- 
 fore the Nurfe came not to the Confultation. 
 
 III. Or, Comparative Propofitions ; as, Know- 
 ledge is better than Riches ; Virtue is better than 
 Knowledge ; therefore Virtue is better than Riches. 
 Or thus, a J)ove will fly a Mile in a Minute -, a 
 
 Swallow
 
 294 LO G I C K: Or y Part III. 
 
 Swallow flies fwijter than a Dove ; therefore a 
 Swallow will fly more than a Mile in a Minute. 
 
 IV. Or Inceptive and Defttive Propofitions ; as, 
 the Fogs vanijh As the Sun rifes > but the Fogs 
 have not yet begun to vanijh ; therefore the Sun is 
 not yet rifen. 
 
 V. Or Modal Propofitions ; as, It is neceffary 
 that a General underftand the Art of War , but 
 Caius does not under ft and the Art of War ; there- 
 fore it is neceffary Caius /hould not be a General. 
 Or thus, A total Eclipfe of the Sun would caufe 
 Darknefs at Noon ; it is poffible that the Moon at 
 that 'Time may totally eclipfe the Sun ; therefore it 
 is pojjible that the Moon may caufe Darknefs at 
 Noon. 
 
 Befide all thefe, there is a great Number of 
 complex Syllogifms which can hardly be reduced 
 under any particular Titles, becaufe the Forms of 
 human Language are fo exceeding various , as, 
 
 Chriftianity requires us to believe what the Apojlles 
 wrote ; St. Paul is an Apojlle ; therefore Chriftianity 
 requires us to believe what St. Paul wrote. 
 
 No human Artift can make an Animal \ a Fly or 
 a Worm is an Animal ; therefore no human Artift 
 can make a Fly or a Worm. 
 
 The Father always lived in I^ndon , the Son al- 
 ways lived with the Father -, therefore the Son always 
 lived in London. 
 
 The Eloffom foon follows the full Bud j tbis Pear- 
 Tree hath many full Buds ; therefore it will Jhortly 
 have many Bloffoms. 
 
 One Hailftone never falls alone ; but a Hailftone 
 fettjuft now, therefore others fell with it. 
 
 Thunder
 
 C. II. S. 4. Vhe Right UJe fRcafon. 295 
 
 'Thunder feldom comes without Lightning ; but if 
 thundered Tefterday ; therefore probably it lightened 
 alfo. 
 
 Mofes wrote before the Trojan War ; the firft 
 Greek Hiftorians wrote after the Trojan War ; 
 therefore the firft Greek Hiftorians wrote after 
 Mofes*. 
 
 Now the Force of all thefe Arguments is fo 
 evident and conclufive, that tho* the Form of the 
 Syllogifm be never fo irregular, yet we are fure 
 the Inferences are juft and true ; for the Premiffes, 
 according to the Reafon of Things, do really con- 
 tain the Conclufeon that is deduced from them 9 which 
 is a never failing Teft of true Syllogifm, as fhall 
 be fhewn hereafter. 
 
 The Truth of moft of thefe complex Syllogifms 
 may alfo be made to appear (if needful) by redu- 
 cing them either to regular, Jimple Syllogifms, or 
 to fome of the conjunctive Syllogifms, which are 
 defcribed in the next Section . I will give an In- 
 ftance only in the firft, and leave the reft to exer- 
 cife the Ingenuity of the Reader. 
 
 The firft Argument may be reduced to a Syllo- 
 gifm in Barbara thus, 
 
 tte Sun is a fenfekfi Being ; 
 
 What the Perfians worjhipped is the Sun ; 
 
 Therefore what the Perfians worjhipped is a 
 fenfelefs Being. Tho* the conclufive Force of this 
 Argument is evident without this Reduction. 
 
 * Perhaps fome of thefe Syllogifms may be reduced to thofe which I 
 call Ctnnexi-ve ifterward ; but it is of little Moment to what Sftciei they 
 belong ; for it is not any formal Sett of Rules fo much as the Evidence 
 and Force of Reafon that auft determine the Truth or Falihood of all fuch 
 Syllogifms, 
 
 SECT.
 
 296 LOG 1C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 S E C T. V. 
 
 Of conjunctive Syllogifms. 
 
 THofe are called conjunctive Syllogifms, wherein 
 one of the Premiffes, namely the major, has 
 diftinct Parts, which are joined by a Conjunction, 
 or fome fuch Particle of Speech. Moft Times 
 the major or minor, or both, are explicitly corn- 
 found Proportions : And generally the major Pro- 
 pofition is made up of two diftinct Parts or Pro- 
 pofitions in fuch a manner, as that by the Afier- 
 tion of one in the minor, the other is either af- 
 lerted or denied in the Conclufion: Or by the De- 
 nial of one in the minor ~, the other is either aflerted 
 or denied in the Conclufwn. It is hardly poffible 
 indeed to fit any (hort Definition to include all 
 the Kinds of them ; but the chief amongft them 
 are the conditional Syllogifm, the disjunctive, the 
 relative, and the connective. 
 
 I. The conditional or hypothetical Syllogifm is 
 whofe major or minor, or both, are conditional 
 Propofitions ; as, If there be a God, the World is 
 governed by Providence \ but there is a God ; there- 
 fore the World is governed by Providence. 
 
 Thefe Syllogifms admit two forts of true Argu- 
 mentation, where the major is conditional. 
 
 1. When the Antecedent is afierted in the mi- 
 nor, that the Confequent may be aflerted in the 
 Conclufion , fuch is the preceding Example. This 
 is called arguing from the Pofuion of the Antecedent 
 to the Pofition of the Confequent. 
 
 2. When the Confequent is contradicted in 
 the minor Propofition, that the Antecedent may 
 be contradicted in the ConclufiQn ; as, If Atheifts 
 
 4 are
 
 C. II. S. 5. fbe right Ufe ofReafon. 297 
 
 are in the right, then the World exijis without a 
 Caufe -, bur. the World does not exift without a 
 Caufe , therefore Atheifts are not in the tight. This 
 is called arguing from the removing of the Confe- 
 quent to the removing of the Antecedent. 
 
 To remove the Antecedent or Confequent here 
 does not merely fignify the Denial of it, but the 
 Contradiction of it , for the mere Denial of it by 
 a contrary Propofition will not make a true Syllo- 
 gifm, as appears thus : If every Creature be rea- 
 fonable, every Brute is reafonable: but no Brute is 
 reafonable \ therefore no Creature is reafonable. 
 Whereas if you fay in the minor, but every Brute 
 is not reafonable, then it would follow truly in the 
 Conclufion, therefore every Creature is not reafon- 
 able. 
 
 When the Antecedent or Confequent are nega- 
 tive Propofitions, they are removed by an Affir- 
 mative , as, If there be no God, then the World 
 does not difcover creating Wifdom ; but the World 
 does difcover creating Wifdom ; therefore there is a 
 God. In this Inftance the Confequent is removed 
 or contradi&ed in the minor, that the Antecedent 
 may be contradicted in the Conclufion. So in this 
 Argument of St. Paul, i Cor. xv. If the Dead rife 
 not, Chrift died in vain ; but Chrift did not die in 
 vain ', therefore the Dead Jhall rife. 
 
 There are alfo two forts of falfe Arguing, (viz.} 
 (i.) From the removing of the Antecedent to the re- 
 moving of the Conjequent ; or (2.) From the Pofi- 
 tion of the Confequent to the Pofttion of the Antece-* 
 dent. Examples of thefe are eafily framed ; as, 
 
 (i.) If a Minifter were a Prince he muft be ho- 
 noured ; But a Minifter is not a Prince -, 
 Therefore he mujl not be honoured.
 
 LOGICK:Or, Part lit 
 
 (2.) If a Minifter were a Prince, be tnuft be ho- 
 noured , But a Mimfter muft be honoured 5 
 
 therefore he is a Prince. 
 
 Who fees not the ridiculous Falfhood of both 
 thefe Syllogifms ? 
 
 Obferv. I. If the Subject of the Antecedent and 
 the Confequent be the fame, then the hypothetical 
 Syllogifm may be turned into a categorical One ; 
 as, If Csefar be a King he muft be honoured ; but 
 Casfar is a King , therefore, \3c. This may be 
 changed thus, Every King muft be honoured ; but 
 Casfar is a King ; therefore, &c. 
 
 ObfefV. 11. If the major Propofition only be 
 conditional^ the Conclufion is categorical: But if 
 the minor or both be conditional, the Conclufion is 
 alfo conditional -, as, The Worjhippers of Images are 
 Idolaters , If the Papifts worjhip a Crucifix, they 
 are Worjhippers of an Image ; therefore If the Pa- 
 pifts worjhip a Crucifix, they are Idolaters. But 
 this fort of Syllogifms mould be avoided as much 
 as poffible in Difputation, becaufe they greatly erri- 
 barrafs a Caufe : The Syllogifms, whofe major on- 
 ly is hypothetical, are very frequent, and ufed with 
 great Advantage. 
 
 II. A disjunctive Syllogifm is when the major 
 Propofition is disjunctive ; as, The Earth moves in 
 a Circle or an Ellipfts ; but it does not move in a 
 Circle ; therefore it moves in an Ellipfis. 
 
 A disjunctive Syllogifm may have many Members 
 or Parts thus ; it is either Spring, Summer, Au- 
 tumn, or Winter -, but it is not Spring, Autumn, or 
 Winter ; therefore // is Summer. 
 
 The true Method of arguing here is from the 
 
 AJfirtion of one, to the Denial of the reft, or from 
 
 4 tbt
 
 C. II. S. 5. The right Ufe ^Reafon. 299 
 
 the Denial of one or more, to the Affertion of what 
 remains : but the major mould be fo framed, that 
 the feveral Parts of it can't be true together, tho' 
 one of them is evidently true. 
 
 III. A relative Syllogifm requires the major Pro- 
 pofition to be relative ; as Where Chrift is there 
 Jhall his Servants be , but Chrift is in Heaven , 
 therefore his Servants ft all be there alfo. Or, As is 
 the Captain, fo are his Soldiers -, but the Captain is a 
 Coward ; therefore his Soldiers are fo too. 
 
 Arguments that relate to the Doctrine of Pro- 
 portion muft be referred to this Head ; as, As 
 two are to four, Jo are three to fix ; but two make 
 the half of four j therefore three make the half cf 
 fix. 
 
 Befides thefe, there is another fort of Syllogifm 
 which is very natural and common, and yet Au- 
 thors take very little Notice of it, call it by an 
 improper Name, and defcribe it very defectively, 
 and that is, 
 
 IV. A connexhe Syllogifm. This fome have 
 called copulative; but it does by no means require 
 the major to be a copulative nor a compound Pro- 
 pofition (according to the Definition given of it, 
 Part II. Chap. II. Seft. 6.) but it requires that 
 two or more Ideas be fo connected either in the 
 complex Subject or Predicate of the major, that 
 if one of them be affirmed or denied in the minor, 
 common Senfe will naturally mew us what will 
 be the Confequence. It would be very tedious 
 and ufelefs to frame particular Rules about them, 
 as will appear by the following Examples, which 
 are very various, and yet may be farther multi- 
 plied. 
 
 U i
 
 L O G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 (i.) Meeknefs and Humility always go together; 
 Mofes was a 'Man of Meeknefs , therefore Mofcs 
 was alfo humble. Or we may form this minor, 
 Pharaoh was no bumble Man , therefore be was not 
 meek. 
 
 (2.) No Man canferve God and Mammon *, the 
 covetous Man ferves Mammon ; therefore he can- 
 not ferue God. Or the minor may run thus, the 
 true Chriflian Jerves God j therefore be does notferve 
 Mammon. 
 
 (3.^ Genius mufl join with Study to make a great 
 Man ; Florino has Genius but be cannot flu dy ; there- 
 fore Florino will never be a great Man. Or thus, 
 Quintus fludics hard but has no Genius ; therefore 
 Quintus will never be a great Man. 
 
 (4.) Gulo can't make a Dinner without Flejh and 
 Fijh , there was no Fi/h to be gotten to Day ; there- 
 fore Gulo this Day cannot make a Dinner. 
 
 (5. ) London and Paris are in different Latitudes ; 
 the Latitude of London is 51 Deg. therefore this 
 cannot be the Latitude of Paris. 
 
 (6.) Jofeph and Benjamin bad one Mother ; 
 Rachel was the Mother of Jofeph ; therefore Jhe 
 was Benjamin'.? Mother too. 
 
 (7.) The Father and the Son are of equal Stature ; 
 The Father is fix Foot high , therefore the Son is fix 
 Foot high alfo. 
 
 (8.) Pride is inconfiftent with Innocence ; Angels 
 have Innocence ; therefore they have no Pride. Or 
 thus ; Devils have Pride ; therefore they have not 
 Innocence. 
 
 I might multiply other Inftances of thefe con- 
 nex'we Syllogijms y by bringing in all forts of ex- 
 ceptive^ exdufive, comparative, and modal Propo- 
 fitions into the Compofition of them ; for all 
 thefe may be wrought into conjunctive, as well as 
 le Syllogifras, and thereby we may render 
 
 them
 
 C.II. S.6. rkerightUfeofRetfon. 301 
 
 them complex. But it would wafte Time and Pa- 
 per without equal Profit. 
 
 Concerning thefe various Kinds of conjunctive 
 Syllogifms, take thefe two Obfervations. 
 
 Obferv. I. Moft of them may be transformed 
 into categorical Syllogifms by thofe who have a 
 mind to prove the Truth of them that Way ; or 
 they may be eafily converted into each other by 
 changing the Forms of Speech. 
 
 Obferv. II. Thefe conjunctive Syllogifms are fel- 
 dom deficient or faulty in the Form of them j for 
 fuch a Deficience would be difcovered at firft 
 Glance generally by common Reafon, without 
 a~ny artificial Rules of Logick : The chief Care 
 therefore is to fee that the major Propofition be true, 
 upon which the whole Force of the Argument ufu- 
 ally depends. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 Of compound Syllogifms. 
 
 TT 7 E properly call thofe compound Syllogifms which 
 W are made up of two or more fingle Syllogifms , 
 and may be refolved into them. The chief Kinds 
 are thefe, Epicfrirema, Dilemma, Profyllogifmus, 
 and Sorites. 
 
 I. Epichirema is a Syllogifm which contains the 
 Proof of the major or minor, or both, before it 
 draws the Conclufion. This is often ufed in Writ- 
 ing, in publick Speeches, and in common Con- 
 verfation, that fo each Part of the Difcourfe may 
 be confirmed and put out of Doubt, as it moves 
 U 2
 
 302 L G I C K: Or, Part III, 
 
 on toward the Conclufion, which was chiefly de- 
 figned. Take thislnftance-, 
 
 Sicknefs may be good for us , for it weans us from 
 the Pleafures of Life, and makes us think of dy- 
 ing ; 
 
 But we are uneafy under Stcknefs, which ap- 
 pears by our Impatience, Complaints, Groanings, 
 &c. 
 
 Therefore we are uneafy fometimes under that 
 which is good for us. 
 
 Another Inftance you may fee in Cicero's Oration 
 in Defence of Milo, who had (lain Clodius. His 
 major Propofition is, that it is lawful for one Man 
 to kill another who lies in wait to kill him ; which 
 he proves from the Cuftom of Nations, from natural 
 Equity, Examples, &c. his minor is, that Clodius 
 laid wait for Milo , which he proves by his Arms, 
 Guards, &c. and then infers the Conclufion, that 
 it was- lawful for Milo to kill Clodius. 
 
 II. A Dilemma is an Argument which divides 
 the whole into all irs Parts OP Members by a dif- 
 junttive Propofition, and then infers fomething 
 concerning each Part which is finally inferred con- 
 cerning the whole. Inftances of this are frequent ; 
 as, /;/ this Life we muft either obey eur vicious In- 
 clinations or refift them : To obey them will bring Sin 
 and Sorrow, to refift them is laborious and painful ; 
 Therefore we cannot be perfectly free from Sorrow or 
 'Pain in this Life. 
 
 A Dilemma becomes faulty or ineffectual three 
 Ways : Fir/I, When the Members of the Divifion 
 are not well oppofed, or not fully enumerated , for 
 then the major is falfe* Secondly, When what is 
 afferted concerning each part is not juft ; for then 
 the minor is not true. 1'hirdly, When it may be 
 
 retorted
 
 C.II.S. 6. tterigbtVfeofKe&fon. 303 
 
 retorted with equal Force upon him who utters 
 it. 
 
 There was a famous ancient\ Inftance of this 
 Cafe wherein a Dilemma was retorted. Euathlus 
 promifed Protagoras a Reward when he had taught 
 him the Art of Pleading, and it was to be paid the 
 firft Day that he gained any Caufe in the Court. 
 After a confiderable time Protagoras goes to Law 
 with Euathlus for the Reward, and uies this Di- 
 lemma -, Either the Caufe will go on my Side or on 
 yours : If the Caufe goes on my Side, you muft pay 
 me according to the Sentence of the Judge : If the 
 Caufe goes on your Side, you muft pay me according 
 to your Bargain : Therefore whether the Caufe goes 
 for me or againft me you muft pay me th; Reward. 
 But Euathlus retorted this Dilemma thus : Either I 
 /hall gain the Caufe or lofe it : If I gain the Caufe, 
 then nothing will be due to you according to the Sen~ 
 fence of the Judge : But if I lofe the Caufe, nothing 
 will be due to you according to my Bargain : There- 
 fore whether I lofe or gain the Caufe I will not pay 
 you, for nothing will be due to you. 
 
 Note i. A Dilemma is ufually defcribed as tho* 
 it always proved the Abfurdity, Inconvenience, or 
 Unreafonablenefs of fome Opinion or Practice -, 
 and this is the mod common Defign of it ; but it 
 is plain, that it may alfo be ufed to prove the Truth 
 or Advantage of any thing propofed ; as, /// Hea- 
 ven we fhall either have Defires or not : If we have 
 no Defires, then we have full Satisfaction ; if we 
 have Defires, they Jhall be fatisfed as fcift as they 
 arife -, therefore in Heaven we Jhall be completely 
 fatisjied. 
 
 Note 2. This fort of Argument may be com- 
 pofed of three or more Members, and may be 
 called a Trilemma. 
 
 U a III. A
 
 3 o4 L G I C K: Or, Part III, 
 
 III. A Profyllogifm is when two or more Syllo- 
 gifms are fo connected together, that the Con- 
 clufion of the former is the major or the minor of 
 the following , as, Blood can't think ; but the Soul 
 of Man thinks ; therefore the Soul of Man is not 
 Blood -, but the Soul of a Brute is his Blood accord- 
 ing to the Scripture j therefore the Soul of Man is 
 different from the Soul of a Brute. See another In- 
 ftance in the Intfoduftion to this Treatife, p. 5. 
 
 IV. A Sorites is when feveral middle Terms are 
 chofen to connect one another fucceffively in feve- 
 ral Propofitions, till the laft Propofition connects 
 its Predicate with the firft Subject. Thus, All 
 Men of Revenge have their Souls often uneafy un- 
 eafy Souls are a Plague to themfehes ; now to be 
 ones own Plague is Folly in the Extreme j therefore 
 all Men of Revenge are extreme Fools. 
 
 The Apoftle, Rom. viii. 29. gives us an Inftance 
 of this fort of Argument if it were reduced to ex- 
 act Form : Whom he foreknew thofe he predejlinated j 
 whcm he predejlinated he called; whom he called he 
 juftified ; whom he juftified he glorified ; therefore 
 whom he foreknew he glorified. 
 
 To thefe Syllogifms it may not be improper to 
 add Induction, which is, when from feveral parti- 
 cular Propofitions we infer one general ; as, The 
 Doctrine of the Socinians cannot be proved from the 
 Gofpels, it cannot be proved from the Afts of the 
 Apoftles, it cannot be proved from the Epiftles, nor 
 the Book of Revelations , therefore it cannot be proved 
 from the New fa/lament. 
 
 Note, This fort of Argument is often defective, 
 becaufe there is not due Care taken to enumerate 
 all the Particulars on which the Conchifion mould 
 depend, 
 
 All
 
 C.II. 8.7. ttf right UfeofHttfon. 305 
 
 All thefe four Kinds of Syllogifms in this Section 
 may be called redundant, becaufe they have more 
 than three Proportions . But there is one fort of 
 Syllogifm which is defective, and is called an En- 
 tbymem, becaufe only the Conclufion with one of 
 the Premiffes is expreft, while the other is fuppofed 
 and referved in the Mind : Thus, There is no true 
 Religion without good Morals ; therefore a Knave 
 cannot be truly religious : Or thus, // is our Duty to 
 love our Neighbours as our Jelves ; therefore there 
 are but few who perform their Duty. 
 
 Note, This is the moft common fort of Argu- 
 ment amongft Mankind both in Writing and in 
 Speaking , for it would take up too much Time, 
 and too much retard the Difcourfe to draw out all 
 our Arguments in Mood and Figure. Befides, Man- 
 kind loves to have fo much Compliment paid to 
 their Underftandings as to fuppofe that they know 
 the Major or Minor, which is fupprefled and im- 
 plied, when you pronounce the other Premifs and 
 the Conclufion. 
 
 If there be any Debate about this Argument, 
 the Syllogifm mutt be compleated in order to try 
 its Force and Goodnefs by adding the abfent Pro- 
 pofition. 
 
 SECT. VJI. 
 
 Of the middk Terms, of common Places or Topics, 
 and Invention of Arguments. 
 
 THE nextDivifion of Syllogifms is according 
 to the middle Term, which is made ufe of in 
 the Proof of any Proportion. Now the middle 
 Term (as we have hinted before) is often called 
 Argument, becaufe the Force of the Syljogifm de- 
 pends upon it ; We muft make a little Delay here 
 U 4 to
 
 306 LOGICK: Or, Part III. 
 
 to treat briefly of the Doctrine of Topics or Places 
 whence middle "Terms or Arguments are drawn. 
 
 All Arts and Sciences have fome general Sub- 
 jects which belong to them, which are called To- 
 pics, or common Places ; becaufe middle Terms are 
 borrowed, arid Arguments derived from them for 
 the Proof of their various Propofitions which we " 
 have occafion to difcourfe of. The Topics of 
 Grammar are Etymology , Noun, Verb, ConjlruRi- 
 on, Signification, &c. The Topicks of "Logic are 
 Genus, Species, Difference, Property, Definition, 
 Divifwn, &c. The Topics of Ontology or Meta- 
 pbyfecs are Caufe, Effetl, Attion, Pajjion, Identi- 
 ty, Oppofition, Subjett, Adjuncl, Sign, &c. The 
 Topics of Morality or Ethics are Law, Sin, Du- 
 ty 9 Authority, Freedom of Will, Command, Threat- 
 ning, Reward, Punijhment, &c. The Topics of 
 Theology are God, Chrift, Faith, Hope, Worjhip, 
 Salvation, &c. 
 
 To thefe feveral Topics there belong particular 
 Obfervations, Axioms, Canons or Rules *, which 
 are laid down in their proper Sciences ; as, 
 
 Grammar hath fuch Canons, (viz.) Words in a 
 different Conftruffion obtain a different Senfe. Words 
 derived from the fame Primitive may probably hktve 
 ferns Affinity in their original Meaning, &c. 
 
 Canons in Logic are fuch as thefe, Every Part 
 of a Divifion fingly taken muft contain lefs than 
 th? Whale, A Definition mujt be peculiar and prs- 
 f>f\" to the Thing defined. Whatever is affirmed or 
 denied of the Genus, may be affirmed or denied of the 
 Species, &c. 
 
 Metaphyfical Canons are fuch as thefe ; final 
 Caufes belong only to intelligent Agents. If a natural 
 and neceffary Caufe operate, the Effefl will follow, 
 
 * A Cancn is a Proportion declaring fome Property of the Subjeft, which 
 it not expreft in the {jfc/initiin or Divifim of it>
 
 C. II. S. 7. fbe Right life of Rcafon. 3 07 
 
 &c. and there are large Catalogues of many more 
 in each diftinct Science. 
 
 Now it has been the Cuftom of thofe who 
 teach Logick or Rhetorick to direct their Difciples, 
 when they want an Argument, to confult the Ic- 
 veral Topics which are fuited to their Subject of 
 Difcourfe, and to rummage over the Definitions, 
 Divifwns and Canons that belong to each Topic. 
 This is called the Invention of an Argument ; and 
 it is taught with much Solemnity in fome Schools. 
 
 I grant there may be good Ufe of this Practice 
 for Perfons of a lower Genius, when they are to 
 compofe any Difcourfe for the Publick , or for 
 thofe of fuperior Parts to refrefh their Memory, 
 and revive their Acquaintance with a Subject 
 which has been long abfent from their Thoughts ; 
 or when their natural Spirits labour under Indifpo- 
 fition and Languor , but when a Man of moderate 
 Sagacity has made himfelf Matter of his Theme 
 by juft Diligence and Enquiry, he has feldom need 
 to run knocking at the Doors of all the Topics that 
 he may furnifh himfelf with Argument or Matter 
 of fpeaking : And indeed it is only a Man of Senfe 
 and Judgment that can ufe common Places or To- 
 pics well ; for amongft this Variety he only knows 
 what is fit to be left out, as well as what is fit to 
 be fpoken. 
 
 By fome logical Writers this Bufmefs of Topics, 
 and Invention is treated of in fuch a manner with 
 mathematical Figures and Diagrams, filled with 
 the barbarous technical Words, Napcas^ Niseis, 
 Ropcos, Nofrop-> &c . as tho* an ignorant Lad were 
 to be led mechanically in certain artificial Harnef- 
 fes and Trammels to find out Arguments to prove 
 or refute any Propofition whatfoever, without any 
 rational Knowledge of the Ideas. Now there is 
 no Need to throw Words of Contempt on fuch 
 
 a Practice ;
 
 308 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 a Pra&ice ; the very Defcription of it carries Re- 
 proof and Ridicule in Abundance. 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 Of feveral Kinds of Arguments and Demonjlrations. 
 
 WE proceed now to the Divifion of Syllo- 
 gifms according to the middle 'Term ; and 
 in this Part of our Treatife the Syllogifms them- 
 felves are properly called Arguments, and are thus 
 diftributed. 
 
 I. Arguments are called Grammatical, Logical, 
 Metaphyfical, Phyfical, Moral, Mechanical, theo- 
 logical, &c. according to the Art, Science, or Sub- 
 ject whence the middle Term or Topick is bor- 
 rowed. Thus if we prove that no Man Jhould Jieal 
 from his Neighbour becaufe the Scripture forbids it, 
 this is a theological Argument : If we prove it from 
 the Laws of the Land, it is political -, but if we prove 
 it from the Principles of Reafon and Equity the 
 Argument is moral. 
 
 II. Arguments are either certain and evident, or 
 doubtful and merely probable. 
 
 Probable Arguments are thofe whofe Conclufi- 
 fions are proved by fome probable Medium , as, 
 Fbis Hill was once a Church-Tard, or a Field of 
 Battle, becaufe there are many human Bones found 
 here. This is not a certain Argument, for human 
 Bones might have been conveyed there fome other 
 Way. 
 
 Evident and certain Arguments are called De- 
 wonjlrations *, for they prove their Conclufions by 
 clear Mediums and undoubted Principles , and they 
 are generally divided into thefe two Sorts. 
 
 i. Demon-
 
 GILS. 8. TherightUfeofRc&fon: 309 
 
 1. Demonftrations a Priori, which prove the 
 Effect by its necefiary Caufe ; as, I prove the 
 Scripture is infallibly true, becaufe it is the Word 
 of God, who cannot lye. 
 
 2. Demonftrations a Poftenori, which infer the 
 Caufe from its neceflary Effect -, as, I infer there 
 hath been the Hand of fome Artificer here-, becaufe 
 I find a curious Engine. Or, I infer there is a God, 
 from the Works of his Wifdom in the viftble World. 
 
 The laft of thefe is called Demonftratio ?S on, 
 becaufe it proves only the Exiftence of a Thing ; 
 the firft is named Demonftratio ?S <Mm, becaufe it 
 fliews alfo the Caufe of its Exiftence. 
 
 But Note, That tho' thefe two forts of Argu- 
 ments are moft peculiarly called Demonftrations, 
 yet generally any ftrong and convincing Argument 
 obtains that Name , and it is the Cuftom of Ma- 
 thematicians to call all their Arguments Demon- 
 ftrations, from what Medium foever they derive 
 them. 
 
 III. Arguments are divided into artificial and 
 inartificial. 
 
 An artificial Argument is taken from the Na- 
 ture and Circumftances of the Things ; and if the 
 Argument be ftrong it produces a natural Certain- 
 ty ; as I'he World was firft created by God, becaufe 
 nothing can create itfelf. 
 
 An inartificial Argument is theTeftimony of an- 
 pther, and this is called original, when our Infor- 
 mation proceeds immediately from the Perfons 
 concerned, or from Eye or Ear-Witnefiesof a Fact : 
 it is called tradition when it is delivered by the 
 Report of others. 
 
 We have taken Notice before, that Teftimony 
 is either divine or human. If the human Tefti- 
 mony be ftrong, it produces a moral Certainty, 
 
 but
 
 3 io LOGICK: Or, Part III. 
 
 but divine Teftimony produces a fupernatural Cer- 
 tainty which is far fuperior. 
 
 Note, Arguments taken from human 'Teftimony 
 as well as from Laws and Rules of Equity, are cal- 
 led moral ; and indeed the fame Name is alfo ap- 
 plied to every fort of Argument which is drawn 
 from the free Attiom of God, or the contingent Ac- 
 tions of Men, wherein we cannot arife to a natural 
 Certainty, but content ourfelves with an high De- 
 gree of Probability, which in many Cafes is fcarce 
 inferior to natural Certainty. 
 
 IV. Arguments are either dirett or indirect. It 
 is a dirett Argument where the middle Term is 
 fuch as proves the Queftion itfelf, and infers that 
 very Propofition which was the Matter of En- 
 quiry. An indirect or oblique Argument proves or 
 refutes fome other Propofition, and thereby makes 
 the Thing enquired appear to be true by plain 
 Confequence. 
 
 Several Arguments are called indireff ; as, (i.) 
 When fome contradictory Propofition is proved 
 to be falfe, improbable or impoflible : Or when 
 upon Suppofition of the Falfhood or Denial of 
 the original Propofition, fome Abfurdity is infer- 
 red. This is called a Proof per impojfibile, or a 
 Reduftio ad abfurdum. (2.) When fome other 
 Propofition is proved to be true which is lefs pro- 
 bable, and thence it follows that the original Pro- 
 pofition is true, becaufe it is more probable. This 
 is an Argument ex magis probabili ad minus. (3.) 
 When any other Propofition is proved upon which 
 it was before agreed to yield the original Queftion. 
 This is an Argument ex ConceJJo. 
 
 V. There is yet another Rank of Arguments 
 which have Latin Names > their true Diftinftion 
 
 is
 
 C. II. S. 8. fbe right Ufe of Reafon. 3 1 1 
 
 is derived from the Topics or middle Terms which 
 are ufed in them, tho* they are called an Addrefs 
 to our Judgment? our Faith, our Ignorance^ our 
 ProfeJJion, our Modefty, and our PaJJions. 
 
 1 . If an Argument be taken from the Nature 
 or Exiftence of Things, and addrefied to the 
 Reafon of Mankind, it is called Argumentum ad Ju- 
 didum. 
 
 2. When it is borrowed from fome convincing 
 Teftimony, it is Argumentum ad Fidem, an Addrefe 
 to our Faith. 
 
 3. When it is drawn from any inefficient Me- 
 dium whatfoever, and yet the Oppofer has not Skill 
 to refute or anfwer it, this is Argumentum ad Igno- 
 rantiam, an Addrefs to our Ignorance. 
 
 4. When it is built upon the profeft Principles 
 or Opinions of the Perfon with whom we argue, 
 whether thefe Opinions be true or falfe, it is named 
 Argumentum ad Hominem, an Addrefs to our pro- 
 feft Principles. St. Paul often ufes this Argument 
 when he reafons with the Jews, and when he lays, 
 / fpeak as a Man. 
 
 5. When the Argument is fetched from the 
 Sentiments of fome wife, great, or good Men, 
 whofe Authority we reverence and hardly dare 
 oppofe, it is called Argumentum ad Verecundiam, an 
 Addrefs to our Modefty. 
 
 6. I add finally, when an Argument is borrow- 
 ed from any Topics which are fuited to engage 
 the Inclinations and Pafiions of the Hearers on 
 the Side of the Speaker, rather than to convince 
 the Judgment, this is Argumentum ad Pajfiones, 
 an Addrefs to the Pa/iom ; or if it be made pub- 
 Jickly, it is called ad Pofulum, or an Appeal to the 
 People. 
 
 After
 
 LOG I CK: Of, Part III. 
 
 After all thefe Divifions of Syllogifm or Argu- 
 ment arifing from the middle 'Term, there is one 
 Diftinction proper to be mentioned which arifes 
 from the Premiffes. An Argument is called uni- 
 form when both the Premifies are derived from the 
 fame Springs of Knowledge, whether it be Senfe, 
 Reafon, Confcioufnefs, human Faith, or divine Faith .* 
 But when the two Premifles are derived from dif- 
 ferent Springs of Knowledge, it is called a mixt 
 Argument, 
 
 Whether the Conclufion muft be called Human 
 or Divine, When one or both Premifles are Mat- 
 ters of Divine Faith but the Conclufion is drawn by 
 human Reafon, I leave to be difputed and deter- 
 mined in the Schools of Theology. 
 
 Thus the fecond Chapter is finifhed, and a par- 
 ticular Account given of all the chief Kinds or Syl- 
 logifms or Arguments which are made ufe of among 
 Men, or treated of in Logick, together \vithjpecial 
 Rules for the Formation of them, as far as is ne- 
 ceflary. 
 
 If a Syllogifm agree with the Rules which are 
 given for the Conftruclion and Regulation of it, 
 it is called a true Argument : If it difagree with 
 thefe Rules, it is a Paralogifm^ or falfe Argument : 
 But when a falfe Argument puts on the Face and 
 Appearance of a true one, then it is properly cal- 
 led a Sophifm or Fallacy which mall be the Subject 
 of the next Chapter. 
 
 CHAP,
 
 C. III. S. i . The right Vfe ^Rcafon. 3 1 $ 
 
 CHAP. ID. 
 
 The Doftrine ofSophifms. 
 
 FROM Truth nothing can really follow but 
 what is true : Whenfoever therefore we find 
 a falfe Condufion drawn from Premifies which feem 
 to be true, there muft be fome Fault in the De- 
 duction or Inference ; or clfe one of the Premifles 
 is not true in the Senfe in which it is ufed in that 
 Argument. 
 
 When an Argument carries the Face of Truth 
 with it, and yet leads us into Miftake, it is a 
 Sophifm ; and there is fome Need of a particular 
 Defcription of thefe fallacious Arguments, that we 
 may with more Eafe and Readinefs detect and 
 folve them. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of feveral Kinds of Sopbifms, and their Solution. 
 
 AS the Rules of right Judgment and of good 
 Ratiocination often coincide with each 
 other, fo the Doctrine of Prejudices, which was 
 treated of in the fecond Part of Logick y has anti- 
 cipated a great deal of what might be laid on the 
 SubjeEt of Sopbifms ; yet I (hall mention the moft 
 remarkable Springs of falfe Argumentation^ which 
 are reduced by Logicians to fome of the following 
 Heads. 
 
 I. The
 
 314 L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 I. The firft fort of Sophifm is called Ignoratio 
 Elenchi, or a Ml/lake of the ^uejlion , that is, 
 when fomething elfe is proved which has neither 
 any neceffary Connection or Inconfiftency with 
 the Thing enquired, and confequently gives no 
 Determination to the Enquiry, tho* it may feem 
 at firft Sight to determine the Queftion , as, if 
 any mould conclude that St. Paul was nor a na- 
 tive Jew, by proving that he was born a Roman ; 
 or if they mould pretend^ to determine that be was 
 neither Roman, nor Jew, by proving that he was 
 born at Tarfus in Cilicia : Thefe Sophifms are re- 
 futed by mewing that all thefe three may be true ; 
 for he was born of Jewijh Parents in the City of 
 tfarfus, and by fome peculiar Privilege granted to 
 his Parents, or his native City, he was born a 
 Denizen of Rome. Thus there is neither of thefe 
 three Characters of the Apoftle inconfiftent with 
 each other, and therefore the proving one of them 
 true does not refute the others. 
 
 Or if the Queftion be propofed, Whether ' Excefs 
 cf Wtne can be hurtful to him that drinks it, and the 
 Sophifter mould prove that it revives his Spirits, 
 it exhilarates his Soul, it gives a Man Courage, and 
 makes him ftrong and aRive, and then he takes it 
 for granted that he has proved his Point. - 
 
 But the Refpondent may eafily mew that tho* 
 Wine may do all this, yet it may be finally hurtful 
 loth to the Soul and Body of him that drinks it to 
 excefs. 
 
 Difputers when they grow warm are ready to 
 run into this Fallacy : They drefs up the Opinion 
 of their Adverfary as they pleafe, and afcribe Sen- 
 timents to him which he doth not acknowledge ; 
 and when they have with a great deal of Pomp 
 attacked and confounded thefe Images of Straw 
 4- of
 
 C. III.' S. i . -The right Ufe o/'Reafon. 3 1^ 
 
 of their own making, they triumph over their 
 Adverfary as tho' they had utterly confuted his 
 Opinion. 
 
 It is a Fallacy of the fdme kind which a Difpu- 
 tant is guilty of when he finds that his Adversary 
 is too hard for him, and that he cannot fairly 
 prove the Queftion firft propofed ; he then with 
 Slynefs and Subtilty turns the Difcourfe afide to 
 fome other kindred Point which he can prove, 
 and exults in that new Argument wherein his Op- 
 ponent never contradicted him. 
 
 The Way to prevent this Fallacy is by keeping 
 the Eye fixt on the precife Point of Difpute, and 
 neither wandring from it ourfelves, nor fufifering 
 our Antagonift to wander from it, or fubftitute any 
 thing elfe in its Room. 
 
 II. The next Sophifm is called Petitio Principni> 
 or a Suppofition of what is not granted ; that is, wheri 
 any Propofition is proved by the fame Propofitiort 
 in other Words, or by fomething that is equally 
 uncertain and difputed : As if any one undertake 
 to prove that the human Soul is extended thro* all 
 the Parts of the Body, becaufe it refides in every 
 Member, which is but the fame Thing in other 
 Words. Or ]f a. Paptft fhoukU pretend to prove 
 that bis Religion is the only Catholick Religion, and 
 is derived from Chrift and his Apoftles, becaufe it 
 agrees with the Doftrine of all the Fathers of tbt 
 Church, all the holy Martyrs, and all the Chriftian 
 World throughout all Ages : Whereas this is a great 
 Point in Conteft, whether their Religion does agree 
 with that of all the Antients and the primitive 
 Chriftians, or no* 
 
 III. That Sort of Fallacy which is called a 
 Circle is very near akin to the Petitio Principii ; as, 
 
 X
 
 5 i6 LOGlCK:Or, Part III. 
 
 when one of the PremifTes in a Syllogifm is quef- 
 tioned and oppofed, and we intend to prove it 
 by the Conclufion : Or, when in a Train of Syl- 
 logifms we prove the laft by recurring to what 
 was the Conclufion of the firft. The Paptfts are 
 famous at this Sort of Fallacy, when they prove 
 the Scripture to be the Word, of God by the Authority 
 or infallible tfeftimony of their Church , and when 
 they are called to mew the infallible Authority of 
 their, Church, they pretend to prove it by the 
 Scripture. 
 
 jiniaMJ: V 
 
 i,n.IY.:The next kind of Sophifm is called non 
 'Ctf#ffapro Causa, or the AJjignation of a falfe Caufe. 
 TFhis.^he Peripatetic Philosophers were guiJey of 
 continually, when they told us that certain Beings, 
 which they called jubjlantial Forms, were the 
 Springs of Colour, Motion, Vegetation, and the 
 various Operations, of natural Beings in the ani- 
 anate and inanimate World , when they informed 
 us that .Nature was -terribly afraid of Vacuum, and 
 that th s was the Caufe why the Water would not 
 fa 1 ou of a long Tube if it was turned upfide 
 down : The Moderns, us well as the Antients fall 
 often into his' Fallacy when they pofitively aflign 
 the Reafons of natural Appearances, without fuf- 
 ficient Experiments to prove them, 
 
 Aftrologers are over-run with this Sort of Falla- 
 cies, and they cheat the People groily by pretend- 
 ing to tell Fortunes, and to deduce the Caufe of 
 the various Occurrences in the Lives of Men, 
 from the various P options of the Stars and Planets, 
 \yhich they call Afpefts. 
 
 When Comets and EcUpfes of the Sun and Moon 
 are conftrued to fignify the Fate of Princes, the 
 Revolution of States, Famine, Wars and Calami- 
 ties 
 / adv/ 5
 
 C, III. S. i . Tfa right Ufe 0/Reafbn. 3 j 7 
 
 ties of all Kinds, it is a Fallacy that belongs to 
 this Rank ofSopbifms. 
 
 There is fcarce any thing more common in hu- 
 man Life than this Sort of deceitful Argument-. 
 If any two accidental Events happen to concur, 
 one is prefently made the Caufe of the other. If 
 Thius wronged his Neighbour of a Guinea, and in 
 fix Months after he fell down and broke his Leg, 
 weak Men will impute it .to the divine Vengeance 
 on Titius for his former Injuftice. This Sophifrn 
 was found alfo in the early Days of the World : 
 For when holy Job was furrounded with uncomrpow 
 Miferies, his own Friends inferred, that be was a 
 inoft heinous Criminal^ and charged him with ag- 
 gravated Guilt as the Caufe of his Calamities ; tho* 
 God himfclf by a Voice from Heaven folved this 
 uncharitable Sophifm, and cleared his Servant Job 
 of that Charge. 
 
 How frequent is it among Men to impute 
 Crimes to wrong Perlbns ? We too Often charge 
 that upon the wicked Contrivance and premedi- 
 tated Malice of a Neighbour, which arofe merely 
 from Ignorance, or from unguarded Temper. 
 And on the other hand, when we have a Mind to 
 excufe ourfelves, we praclife the fame Sophifm, 
 and charge that upon our Inadvertence or our Ig- 
 norance, which perhaps was defigned Wickednefs. 
 What is really done by a Neceflity of Circumftan- 
 ces, we fometimes impute to Choice : And again i 
 we charge that upon Neceflity, which was really 
 defired and chofen. 
 
 Sometimes a Perfon acts out of Judgment in 
 Oppofition to his Inclination ; another Perfori 
 perhaps acts the fame Thing out of Inclination, 
 and againft his Judgment. It is hard for us to 
 determine with Affurance what are the inward 
 X 2 Springs
 
 3x8 L O G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 Springs and fecret Caufes of every Man's Con- 
 duit -, and therefore we fhould be cautious and 
 flow in pafling a Judgment, where the Cafe is 
 not exceeding evident : And if we fhould miftake, 
 let it rather be on the charitable than on the cenfo- 
 rious Side. 
 
 'Tis the fame Sophifm that charges mathemati- 
 cal Learning with leading the Minds of Men to 
 Scepticifm and Infidelity, and as unjuftly accufes 
 the new Philofophy of paving the Way to Herefy 
 and Schifm. Thus the Reformation from Popery 
 has been charged with the Murder and Blood of 
 Millions^ which in Truth is to be imputed to the 
 'Tyranny of the Princes and the Priefts, who would 
 not fuffer the People to reform their Sentiments 
 and their Practices according to the Word of 
 God. Thus Chriflianity in the primitive Ages 
 was charged by the Heathens with all the Cala- 
 mities which befel the Roman Empire, becauie 
 the Chriftians renounced the Heathen Gods and 
 Idols. 
 
 The Way to relieve ourfelves from thefe So- 
 phifms, and to fecure ourfelves from the Danger 
 of falling into them, is an honeft and diligent 
 Enquiry into the real Nature and Caufes of Things, 
 with a conftant Watchfulnefs againfl all thofe Pre- 
 judices that might warp the Judgment afide from 
 Truth in that Enquiry. 
 
 V. The next is called fallacia Accidentis, or a 
 Sophifm wherein we pronounce concerning the 
 Nature and effential Properties of any Subject ac- 
 cording to fomething which is merely accidental 
 to it. This is akin to the former, and is alfo very 
 frequent in human Life. So if Opium or the 
 Peruvian Bark has been ufed imprudently or un- 
 
 fuccefsfully, 
 5
 
 C.III.S. i. nerigfoUfeofRezfon. 319 
 fuccefsfully, whereby the Patient has received In- 
 jury, fome weaker People abfolutely pronounce 
 againft the Ufe of the Bark or Opium upon all 
 Occafions whatfoever, and are ready to call them 
 Poifon. So Wine has been the accidental Occa- 
 fion of Drunkennefs and Quarrels ; Learning and 
 Printing may have been the accidental Caufe of 
 Sedition in a State ; the Reading of the Bible by 
 Accident hath been abufed to promote Hereftes or 
 dcftruRive Errors , and lor thefe Reafons they have 
 been all pronounced evil things. Mahomet forbad 
 his Followers the Ufe of Wme ; the Turks dif- 
 courage Learning in their Dominions ; and the 
 Papijls forbid the Scripture to be read by the Laity. 
 But how very unreafonable are thefe Inferen- 
 ces, and thefe Prohibitions which are built upon 
 them! 
 
 VI. The next Sophifm borders upon the former ; 
 and that is, when we argue from that which is true 
 in particular Circumflances to prove the fame 
 thing true abfolutely^ fimply, and abjlrafied from 
 all Circumjlances ; this is called in the Schools a 
 Sophifm a ditto fecundum quid ad ditJum fimpliciter ; 
 as, 'That -which is bought in the Shambles is eaten for 
 Dinner ; raw Meat is bought in the Shambles ; there- 
 fore raw Meat is eaten for Dinner. Or thus, Livy 
 writes Fables and Improbabilities when he defcribes 
 Prodigies and Omens ; therefore Livfs Roman Hif- 
 tory is never to be believed in any thing. Or thus, 
 'There may be fome Miflake of Transcribers in Jome 
 Part of Scripture ; therefore Scripture alone is not a 
 fafe Guide for our Faith. 
 
 This Sort of Sophifm has its Reverfe alfo ; as, 
 
 when we argue from that which is true fimply and 
 
 abfolutely to prove the fame thing true in all parti- 
 
 X 3 cular
 
 $20 L O I C K: Or, PartIII f 
 
 cular Circumftances- whatfoever * ; as if a Traytor 
 fhould argue from the fixth Commandment, 'Thou 
 Jhall'nct kill a Man, to pfdve that ? -bimfelf ought 
 not to be hanged : Of if a Madman fhould tell me, 
 I ought not to withheld bis Sword from him, be- 
 caufe no Man ought to withhold the Property of an- 
 other. 
 
 Thefe two laft Species of Sophifms are eafily folved 
 by fhewing the Difference betwixt Things in their 
 abfolute Nature, and the fame Things furrounded 
 with peculiar Circumftances, and considered in Re- 
 gard to fpecial Times, Places, Perfons and Oc- 
 cafions , or by fhewing the Difference between 
 a moral and a metaphy/ical Univerfality, and that the 
 Propofuion will hold good in one Cafe, but not 
 in the other. 
 
 VII. The Sophifms of Compofition and Divt/icn 
 come next to be mentioned. 
 
 The Sophijm of Compofaion is when we infer 
 any thing concerning Ideas in a compounded Senfe, 
 which is only true in a divided Senfe. And when it 
 is faid in the Gofpel that Chrift made the Blind to 
 fee, and the Deaf to hear, and the Lame to walk, 
 we ought not to infer hence that Chrift performed 
 Contradictions ; but thole who were blind before 
 were made to fee, and thofe who were deaf before 
 were made to hear, We. So when the Scripture 
 affures us the worft of Sinners may be failed, it fig- 
 nifies only that they who have been the worft of 
 Sinners may repent and be faved, not that they 
 lhall be faved in their Sins. Or if any one mould 
 argue thus, fwo and three are even and odd ; Jive 
 
 * This is arguing from a mtral Ur.herfality which admits of feme Ex- 
 tcptioos, in the fame manner as may be argue4 from metoflyfical or a na- 
 tural Unherfality, which admits of no Exceptions* 
 
 arc
 
 C.III. S.i. ttertg&tiyeofRe&lon. 321 
 are two and three ; therefore five are even and odd- 
 Here that is very falfely inferred concerning two- 
 or three in Union^ which is only true of them di- 
 vided. 
 
 The Sophifm of Divifwn is when we infer the 
 fame Thing concerning Ideas in a divided Senfe, 
 which is only true in a compounded Senfe j as, if 
 we mould pretend to prove that every Soldier in the 
 Grecian Army put an hundred thoufand Perfians to 
 Flight, becaufe the Grecian Soldiers did fo. Or if 
 a Man mould argue thus ; five is one Number ; 
 two and three are five ; therefore tvjo and three are- 
 one Number. 
 
 This fort of Sophifms is committed when the 
 Word All is taken in a collective and a dijlributive 
 Senfe, without a due Distinction ; as, if any one 
 fnould reafon thus , Ail the mufical Inflruments of the 
 Jewifli 'Temple made a noble Concert, The Harp was a 
 mufical Inftrument of the Jewim Temple -, therefore 
 the Harp made a noble Concert. Here the Word All 
 in the Major is collective, whereas fuch a Conclu- 
 fion requires that the Word All mould be diftri- 
 butive. 
 
 It is the fame Fallacy when the univerfal Word 
 All or No refers to Species in one Propoficion, and 
 to Individuals in another , as, All Animals were in 
 Noah'j Ark ; therefore no Animals perijhed in the 
 Flood : Whereas in the Premifs all Animals fignifies 
 every kind of Animals , which does not exclude or 
 deny the drowning of a thoufand Individuals. 
 
 VIII. The laft fort of Sophifms arifes from our 
 Abufe of the Ambiguity of Words., which is the larg- 
 eft and moft extenfive kind of Fallacy ; and in- 
 deed feveral of the former Fallacies might be re- 
 duced to this Head. 
 
 D ."'.'..ttjivV 
 
 X 4 Vf hea
 
 322 LOGICK: Or, Part III, 
 
 When the Words or Phrafes are plainly equivocal, 
 they are called Sopbifms of Equivocation ; as, if we 
 fhould argue thus, He that Jends forth a Book into the 
 Light, defires it to be read ; He that throws a Book 
 into the Fire, fends it into the Light , therefore, be 
 that throws a Book into the Fire defires it to be read. 
 
 This Sophifai, as well as the foregoing, and all 
 of the like Nature are folved by fhewing the 
 different Senfes of the Words, Terms or Phrafes. 
 Here Light in the major Proportion fignifies the 
 fublick View of the World , in the minor it figni- 
 fies the Brightness of Flame and Fire, and therefore 
 the Syllogifm has tour Terms, or rather it has no 
 middle Terms, and proves nothing. 
 
 But where fuch grofs Equivocations and Ambi- 
 guities appear in Arguments, there is little Danger 
 of impofing upon ourfelves or others. The great- 
 eft Danger, and which we are perpetually expofed 
 to in Reafoning, is, where the two Senfes or Sig- 
 nifications of one Term are near akin, and not 
 plainly diftinguifhed, and yet they are really fuf- 
 iiciently different in their Senfe to lead us into 
 great Miftakes, if we are not watchful. And in- 
 deed the greatefl Part of Gontroverfies in the fa- 
 cred or civil Life arife from the different Senfes 
 that are put upon Words, and the different Ideas 
 which are included in them , as has been fhewn at 
 large in the firft Part of Logick, Chap. IV. which 
 treats of Words and Terms. 
 
 There is after all thefe, another Sort of So- 
 phiftn which is wont to be called an imperfett Enu- 
 meration, or a falfe Induction, when from a few Ex- 
 periments or Observations Men infer general Theo- 
 rems and univerial Propofitions. But this is fuffi- 
 chntly noticed in the foregoing Chapter, where we 
 treated of that fort of Syllogifm which is called 
 . 
 
 SECT,
 
 C. III. S. 2. tfbe Right Ufe ^Reafon. 323 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Two general Tefts of true Syllogifms, and Methods 
 of folding all Sophifms. 
 
 BEfides the fpecial Defcription of true Syllogifms 
 and Sophijms already given, and the Rules by 
 which the one are framed, and the other refuted, 
 there are thefe two general Methods of reducing 
 all SyHogifms whatfoever to a I'eft of their Truth 
 or Falfhood. 
 
 I. The firft is, that the Premises muft (at leaft 
 implicitly) contain the Condufion ; or thus, One 
 of the Premijfes muft contain the Condufion, and 
 the other muft ftjew that the Condufion is contained 
 in it. The Reafon of this Rule is this ; When 
 any Propofition is offered to be proved, it is ne- 
 cefTary to find another Propofition which con- 
 firms it, which may be called the containing Pro- 
 pofition j but becaufe the fecond muft not contain 
 the firft in an exprefs manner, and in the fame 
 Words *, therefore it is neceflary that a third or 
 oftenfive Propofition be found out to fhew that 
 the fecond Propofition contains the firft which 
 was to be proved. Let us make an Experiment 
 of this Syllogifm. WToofoever is a Slave to bis 
 natural Inclinations is miferable ; the wicked Man 
 is a Slave to his natural Inclinations ; therefore the 
 wicked Man is miferable. Here it is evident that 
 the major Propofition contains the Condufion ; 
 
 * It is confefied that conditimal and Jisjuitffive major Proportions do 
 exprefly contain all that is in the Condufion ; but then it is not in a certain 
 'and conclujive Manner, but only in a dubious Form of Speech, and mingled 
 with other Terms, and therefore it is not tixfame exfreft Pnfo/ition. 
 
 for
 
 324 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 for under the general Character of a Slave to na- 
 tural Inclinations, a wicked Man is contained or 
 included ; and the minor Propofition declares it ; 
 whence the Conclufion is evidently deduced that 
 tbe wicked Man is miferable. 
 
 In many affirmative Syllogifms we may fuppofe 
 either the major or the minor to contain the 
 Conclufion, and the other to mew it ; for there 
 is no great Difference. But in negative Syllo- 
 gifms it is the negative Propofition that contains 
 the Conclufion, and the affirmative Propofition 
 fhews it , as, every wife Man maflers his PaJJions -, 
 no angry Man majlers his PaJJions ; therefore no 
 angry Man is wife. Here it is more natural to 
 fuppofe the minor to be the containing Propofi- 
 tion , it is the minor implicitly denies Wifdom 
 concerning an angry Man, becaufe maflering the 
 PaJJions is included in Wifdom, and the major 
 fhews it. 
 
 Note, This Rule may be applied to complex and 
 conjunctive, as well as fimple Syllogifms, and is 
 adapted to mew the Truth or Falfhood of any of 
 them. 
 
 II. The fecond is this ; As the Verms in every 
 Syllogifm are ufuatty repeated twice, fo they mufl be 
 taken precifely in the fame Senfe in both Places: 
 For the greateft Part of Miftakes, that arife in 
 forming Syllogifms, is derived from fome little 
 Difference in the Senfe of one of the Terms in 
 the two Parts of the Syllogifm wherein it is ufed. 
 Let us confider the following Sophifms. 
 
 i. // is a Sin to kill a Man ; a Murderer is a 
 Man -, therefore it is a Sin to kill a Murderer. 
 Here the Word Kill in the firft Propofition fig- 
 nifies to kill unjujtly, or without a Law , in the 
 Conclufion it is taken abfolutely for putting a 
 
 Man
 
 C1II.S.2. TbertgbtUfeofRerfon: 325 
 
 Man to Death in general^ and therefore the Inference 
 is not good. 
 
 2. What I am, you are not , but 1 am a Man ; 
 therefore you are not a Man. This is a relative 
 Syllogifm : But if it be reduced to a regular cate- 
 gorical Form, it will appear there is Ambiguity in 
 the Terms, thus ; What I am, is a Man ; you are 
 not what I am -, therefore you are not a Man. Here 
 'what I am, in the major Propofition, is taken fpe- 
 cifi catty for my Nature ; but in the minor Propo- 
 fition the fame Words are taken individually for my 
 Perfon -, therefore the Inference muft be falfe, for 
 the Syllogifm doth not take the Term what I am 
 both Times in the fame Senfe. 
 
 3. He that fays you are an Animal , fays true ; but 
 be that fays you are a Goofe, fays you are an Animal \ 
 therefore he that fays you are a Goofe, fays true. In 
 the major Propofition the Word Animal is the 
 Predicate of an incidental Propofition ; which in- 
 cidental Propofition being affirmative renders the 
 Predicate of it particular, according to Cbap. II. 
 Seff. 2. Axiom. 3. and confequently the Word 
 Animal there fignifies only human Animality. In 
 the minor Propofition, the Word Animal^ for the 
 fame Reafon, fignifies the Animality of a Goofe ; 
 thereby it becomes an ambiguous Term, and unfit 
 to build the Conclufion upon. Or if you fay, the 
 Word Animal in the Minor is taken for human 
 Animality^ then the Minor is evidently falfe. 
 
 It is from this hH general I'eft of Syllogifmsthat 
 we derive the Cuftom of the Refpondent in an- 
 fwering the Arguments of the Opponent, which is 
 to diftinguim upon the major or minor Propofiti- 
 on, and declare which Term is ufed in two Senfes, 
 and in what Senfe the Propofition may be true, 
 and in what Senfe it is falfe. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 3 26 LOGICS: Or, Part III. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Some general Rules to direffi our Reafoning. 
 
 MO S T of the general and fpecial Directions 
 given to form our Judgments aright in the 
 preceding Part of Logick might be rehearlL-J here ; 
 for the "Judgments which we pafs upon Things are 
 generally built on fome fecret ReaforAng or Argu- 
 gument by which the Propofition is iuppoied to be 
 proved. But there may be yet fotnc farther Af- 
 iiftances given to our reafoning Powers in their 
 Search after Truth, and an Obfervation of the fol- 
 lowing Rules will be of great Importance for that 
 End. 
 
 I. RULE, dccuftom yourfclyes to clear and diftinft 
 Ideas, to evident Propofitions, to jtrong and convin- 
 cing Arguments. Converfe much with thofe Friends, 
 and thofe Books, and thofe Parts of Learning 
 where you meet with the greateft Clearnefs of 
 Thought and Force of Reafoning. The mathe- 
 matical Sciences, and particularly Arithmetic^ 
 Geometry^ and Mechanicks abound with thefe Ad- 
 vantages : And if there were nothing valuable in 
 them for the Ufes of human Life, yet the very 
 fpeculative Parts of this fort of Learning are well 
 worth our Study ; for by perpetual Examples 
 they teach us to conceive with Clearnefs, to con- 
 ne& our Ideas and Propofitions in a Train of De- 
 pendence, to reafon with Strength and Demon- 
 ftration, and to diftinguifh between Truth and 
 Falmood. Something of thefe Sciences mould be 
 fludied by every Man who pretends to Learning, 
 and that (as Mr. Lode expreffes it) not fo much to 
 
 make
 
 C. IV. The righf Ufe 0/*Reafbn: 327 
 
 make us Mathematicians, as to make us reafonable 
 Creatures. 
 
 We fhould gain fuch a Familiarity with Evi- 
 dence of Perception and Force of Reasoning, and 
 get fuch a Habit of difcerning clear Truths, that 
 the Mind may be foon offended with Obfcurity 
 and Confufion : Then we mail (as it were) natu- 
 rally and with Eafe reftrain our Minds from rafh 
 Judgment, before we attain juft Evidence of the 
 Propofition which is offered to us ; and we fhall 
 with the fame Eafe, and (as it werej naturally feize 
 and embrace every Truth that is propofed with juft 
 Evidence. 
 
 This Habit of conceiving clearly, of judging 
 juftty, and of reafoning well, is not to be attained 
 merely by the Happinefs of Conftitution, the 
 Brighcnefe of Genius, the bed natural Parts, or 
 the beft Collection' of logical Precepts. It is 
 Cuftom and Practice that muft form and eftablifh 
 this Habit. We muft apply ourfelves to it till 
 we perform all this readily, and without reflect- 
 ing on Rules. A coherent thinker, and a firiff 
 Reafoner is not to be made at once by a Set of 
 Rules, any more than a good Painter or Muftcian 
 may be formed extempore by an excellent Lecture 
 on Mufick or Painting. It is of infinite Impor- 
 tance therefore in our younger Years to be taught 
 both the Value and the PracJice of conceiving 
 clearly and reafoning right: For when we are 
 grown up to the middle of Life, or pad it, it is 
 no Wonder that we mould not learn gocd Rea- 
 foning, any more than that an Ignorant Clown 
 fhould not be able to learn fine Language, Danc- 
 ing, or a courtly Behaviour, when his n flic Airs 
 have grown up with him till the Age of Forty. 
 
 For
 
 3 28 G / & Or, Part fli 
 
 For want of < this Care yow^ Perfons of .Rtf;z& and 
 Education dwell all their Days among obfcure 
 Ideas j they conceive and judge always in Confufi- 
 on, they take weak Arguments for Demonstration ? 
 they are Ie4 away with the Difguifes and Shadows 
 of Truth. , Now if fuch Perfons happen to have 
 a bright Imagination, a Volubility of Speech, and 
 a Copioufnefs of Language, they not only impofe 
 many Errors upon their own Underftandings, but 
 they ftamp the Image of their own Miftakes up- 
 on their Neighbours alfo, and fpread their Errors 
 abroad. 
 
 It is a Matter of juft Lamentation and Pity to 
 confider the Weaknefs of the common Multitude 
 of Mankind in this Refpec~t, how they receive any 
 thing into their Aflent upon the moft trifling 
 Grounds. True Reafoning hath very little Share 
 in forming their Opinions. They refift the moft 
 convincing Arguments by an obftinate Adherence 
 to their Prejudices, and believe the moft impro- 
 bable Things with the greateft A durance. They 
 talk of the abftrufeft Myfteries, and determine 
 upon them with the utmoft Confidence, and with- 
 out juft Evidence either from Reafon or Revela- 
 tion. A confufed Heap of dark and inconfiftent 
 Ideas make up a good Part of their Knowledge in 
 Matters of Philofophy as well as Religion, having 
 never been taught the Ufe and Value of clear and 
 juft Reafoning. 
 
 Yet it muft be ftiSl confeft that there are fome 
 Myfteries in Religion, both natural and revealed, as 
 well as fome abjlrufe Points in Philofophy, where- 
 in the Wife as well as the Unwife muft be con- 
 tent with obfcure Ideas. There are feveral Things, 
 efpecially relating to the invifible World, which 
 are unfearchable in our prefent State, and there- 
 fore we muft believe what Revelation plainly dic-
 
 CIV. XfortghfUfeofRezCon. 329 
 
 tates, tho 1 the Ideas may be obfcure. Reafon it 
 felf demands this of us ; but we mould feek for 
 the brighteft Evidence both of Ideas, and of the 
 Connexion of them, wherefoever it is attainable. 
 
 II. RULE. Enlarge your general Acquaintance 
 'with Things daily, in order to attain a rich Furniture 
 of Topicks, or middle Terms, whereby thofe Propoft- 
 tions which occur may be either proved or di/proved; 
 but efpecially meditate and enquire with great Dili- 
 gence and Exaftnefs into the Nature, Properties, Cir- 
 cumftances and Relations of the particular Subject about 
 which you judge or argue. Confider its Caufes, Ef- 
 fects, Confequences, Adjuncts, Oppofites, Signs, 
 Gff. fo far as is needful to your prefent Purpofe. 
 You mould furvey a Queftion round about, and 
 on all Sides, and extend your Views as far as pof- 
 fible, to every Thing that has a Connexion with it. 
 This Practice has many Advantages in it j as, 
 
 2. It will be a Means to fugged to your Minds 
 proper Topicks for Argument about any Propofi- 
 tion that relates to the fame Subject. 
 
 2. It will enable you with greater Readinefs and 
 Juftnefs of Thought to give an Anfwer to any 
 fudden Queftion upon that Subject, whether it 
 arifes in your own Mind, or to be propofed by 
 others. 
 
 3. This will inftruct you to give a plainer and 
 fpeedier Solution of any Difficulties that may at- 
 tend the Theme of your Difcourfe, and to refute 
 the Objections of thofe who have efpoufed a con- 
 trary Opinion. 
 
 4. By fuch a large Survey of the whole Sub- 
 ject in all its Properties and Relations, you will be 
 better fecured from Inconfiftencies, /. e. from af- 
 ferting or denying any thing in one Place, which 
 contradicts what you have alTerted or denied in an- 
 other :
 
 330 LOGIC K: Or, Part lit 
 
 other : And to attain thefe Ends, an Extenfivenefs 
 of Underftanding and a large Memory are of un- 
 fpeakable Service. 
 
 One would be ready to wonder fometimes how 
 eafily great and wife, and learned Men are led in- 
 to Aflertions in fome Parts of the fame Treatife, 
 which are found to be fcarce confident with what 
 they have afierted in other Places : But the true 
 Reafon is the Narrownefs of the Mind of Man, 
 that it cannot take in all the innumerable Proper- 
 ties and Relations of one Subject with a fingle 
 View ; and therefore whilft they are intent on one 
 particular Part of their Theme, they bend all their 
 Force of Thought to prove or difprove fome Pro- 
 pofition that relates to that Part, without a fuffi- 
 cient Attention to the Confequences which may 
 flow from it, and which may unhappily affect an- 
 other Part of the fame Subject, and by this Means 
 they are fometimes led to fay things which are in- 
 confiitent. In fuch a Cafe the great Dealers in Dif- 
 pute and Controverfy take Pleafure to caft Non- 
 fenfe and Self - Contradiction on their Antagonist 
 with huge and hateful Reproaches. For my part, 
 I rather chufe to pity human Nature, whofe ne- 
 ceffary Narrownefs of Underftanding expofes us 
 all to fome Degrees of this Frailty. But the moft 
 cxtenfive Survey poflible of our whole Subject is 
 the beft Remedy againft it. It is our judging 
 and arguing upon a partial View of Things* 
 that expofes us to Miftakes, and pufhes us into 
 Abfurdities, or at leaft to the very Borders of 
 them. 
 
 III. RULE. In parching the Knowledge of Things, 
 always keep the frecife Point of the prefent >uef- 
 tion in your Eye. Take heed that you add nothing to 
 it while you are arguing^ nor omit any Part of it* 
 
 Watch
 
 C. IV. The right Ufe o/'Reafon. 3 3 1 
 
 Watch carefully left any new Ideas Hide in to 
 mingle themfelves either with the Subject or the 
 Predicate. See that the Queftion be not altered 
 by the Ambiguity of any Word taken in different 
 Senfes , nor let any fccret Prejudices of your own, 
 or the fophiftical Arts of others, cheat your Un- 
 derftanding by changing the Queftion, or ihuf- 
 fling in any thing elie in its room. 
 
 And for this End it is ufeful to keep the precife 
 Matter of Enquiry as fimple as may be, and difen- 
 gaged from a Complication of Ideas, which do not 
 neceffarily belong to it. By admitting a Complica- 
 tion of Ideas, and taking too many Things at once 
 into one Queftion, the Mind is fometimes dazzled 
 and bewildered ; and the Truth is loft in fuch a 
 Variety and Confufion of Ideas -, whereas by li- 
 miting and narrowing the Queftion, you take a 
 fuller Survey of the whole of it. 
 
 By keeping the fingle Point of Enquiry in our 
 conftant View, we mall be fecured from fudden, 
 ram, and impertinent Refponfes and Determina- 
 tions, which fome have obtruded inftead of So- 
 lutions and folid Anfwers, before they perfectly 
 know the Queftions. 
 
 IV. RULE. When you have exaftly confidered 
 the precife Point of Enquiry , or what is unknown in 
 the Queftion, then confider what, and how much you 
 know already of this Queftion, or of the Ideas and 
 Terms of which it is competed. It is by a Compari- 
 fbn of the known and unknown Parts of the Quef- 
 tion together, that you find what Reference the 
 Part known hath unto, or what Connection it hath 
 with the Thing that is fought : Thofe Ideas where- 
 by the known and unknown Parts of the Queftion 
 are connected, will furnifh you with middle Terms 
 Y or
 
 332 L O G 1 C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 or Arguments whereby the Thing propofed may 
 be proved or difproved. 
 
 In this Part of your Work, (viz.) Comparing 
 Ideas together, take due time, and be not too hafty 
 to come to a Determination, efpecially in Points 
 of Importance. Some Men when they fee a little 
 Agreement or Difagreement between Ideas, they 
 prefume a great deal, and fo jump into the Con- 
 clufion : This is a fhort Way to Fancy, Opinion 
 and Conceit, but a mod unfafe and uncertain Way 
 to true Knowledge and Wifdom. 
 
 V. RULE. In chufing your middle 'Terms er Ar- 
 guments to prove any Queftion, always take fuch To - 
 pics as arejureft, and lea ft fallible, and which carry 
 the grcaleft Evidence and Strength with them. Be 
 pot fo follicitous about the Number, as the Weight 
 of your Arguments, efpecially in proving any Pro- 
 poiition which admits of natural Certainty, or of 
 compleat Demonjlration. Many times we do In- 
 jury to a Caufe by dwelling upon trifling Argu- 
 ments. We amufe our Hearers with Uncertain- 
 ties by multiplying the Number of feeble Reafon- 
 ings, before we mention thofe which are more 
 fubftantial, conclufive and convincing. And too 
 often we yield up our own AfTent to mere pro- 
 bable Arguments, where certain Proofs may be ob- 
 tained. 
 
 Yet it muft be confefled there are many Cafes 
 wherein the growing Number of probable Arguments 
 increafes the Degree of Probability, and gives a 
 great and fufficient 'Confirmation to the Truth 
 which is fought -, as, 
 
 (i.) When we are enquiring the true Senfe of 
 any Word or Phrafe, we are more confirmed in 
 the Signification of it by finding the fame Ex- 
 
 preffion
 
 C. IV. The right Ufe 0/Reafon. 333 
 
 preffion fo ufed in feveral Authors, or in feveral 
 Places of the fame Author. 
 
 (2.) When we are feaching out the true Mean- 
 ing or Opinion of any Writer* or enquiring into 
 any facred Doctrine of Scripture, we come to a. 
 furer Determination of the Truth by feveral di^ 
 ftinct Places wherein the fame Thing is expreffed 
 or plainly implied , becaufe it is not fo probable 
 that an honeft fkilful Reader fhould miftake the 
 Meaning of the Writer in many Places, as he may 
 in one or two. 
 
 (3.) When we would prove the Importance of 
 any fcriptural Doctrine or Duty, the Multitude 
 of Texts, wherein it is repeated and inculcated upon 
 the Reader, feems naturally to inftruct us that it is 
 a Matter of greater Importance, than other Things 
 which are but (lightly or fingly mentioned in the 
 Bible. 
 
 (4.) In fearching out Matters of Fact in Times 
 paft or in diftant Places (in which Cafe moral Evi- 
 dence is fufficient, and moral Certainty is the ut- 
 moft which can be attained) here we derive a 
 greater Afiurance of the Truth of it by a Num- 
 ber of Perfons, or a Multitude of Circumftances 
 concurring to bear Witnefs to it. 
 
 (5.) From many Experiments in natural Philo- 
 fophy we more fafely infer a general Theorem, 
 than we can from one or two. 
 
 (6.) In Matters which require prefent Practice, 
 both facred and civil, we muft content ourfelves 
 oftentimes with a mere Preponderation of probable 
 Reafons or Arguments. Where there are feveral 
 Reafons on each Side, for and againft a Thing 
 that is to be done or omitted, a fmall Argument 
 added to the Heap may juftly turn the Balance ort 
 one Side, and determine the Judgment, as I have 
 noted in the Second Part of Logick, 
 
 Y 2 To
 
 334 LOG I CK: Or, Part III. 
 
 To conclude -, a growing Acquaintance with 
 Matters of Learning, and a daily Improvement of 
 our Underftandings in Affairs human and divine, 
 will beft teach us to judge and diftinguiih in what 
 Cafes the Number of Arguments adds to their 
 Weight and Force : It is only Experience can fully 
 inform us when we muft: be determined by probable 
 fopicks, and when we muft feek and expect De- 
 monftrations. 
 
 VI. RULE. Prove your Condufwn (as far as 
 bojjible'} by fome Propofitions that are in themfelves 
 more plain, evident , and certain than the Conclufion ; 
 or at leajl fucb as are more known, and more intelli- 
 gible to the Perfon whom you would convince. If we 
 neglect this Rule, we mail endeavour to enlighten 
 that which is obfcure by fomething equally or 
 more obfcure, and to confirm that which is doubt- 
 ful by fomething equally or more uncertain. Com- 
 mon Senfe dictates to all Men, that it is impoflible 
 to eftablifh any Truth, and to convince others 
 of it, but by fomething that is better known to 
 them than that Truth is. 
 
 VIL RULE. Labour in all your Arguings to en- 
 lighten the Under jlanding, as well as to conquer and 
 captivate the Judgment. Argue in fuch a manner 
 as may give a natural, diftinct, and folid Know- 
 ledge of Things to your Hearers, as well as to 
 force their Aflent by a mere Proof of the Que- 
 ftion. Now to attain this End, the chief Topick 
 or Medium of your Demonftration mould be fetched, 
 as much as pofiible, from the Nature of the Thing 
 to be proved, or from thofe Things which are moft 
 naturally connected with it. 
 
 Get me-
 
 CIV. TherightUfeofRezfon. 335 
 
 Geometricians fometimes break this Rule without 
 Neceffity, two Ways, (viz.) 
 
 1 . When they prove one Propofition only by 
 ihewing what Absurdities will follow if the con- 
 tradictory Propofition be fuppofcd or admitted ; 
 This is called Redublio ad abfurdum *, or Demon- 
 flratio per impojjibile ; as for Inftance, When they 
 prove all the Radii of a Circle to be equal,, by fup- 
 pofing one Radius to be longer or fhorter than 
 another, and then fhewing what abfurd Confe- 
 quences will follow. This, I confefs, forces the 
 A (Tent, but it does not enlighten the Mind by 
 ihewing the true Reafon and Caufe why all Radii are 
 equal, which is derived from the very Conftruc- 
 tion of a Circle : For fince a Circle is formed by 
 fixing one End of a ftrait Line in the Centre* 
 and moving the other End round (or, which is all 
 one, by Compafies kept open to a certain Extent; 
 it follows evidently that every Part of the Cir- 
 cumference being thus defcribed muft be equally 
 diftant from the Centre, and therefore the Radii 
 which are Lines from the Centre to the Circum- 
 ference, muft be all equal. 
 
 2. Geometricians forget this Rule when they 
 heap up many fir-fetched Lines, Figures and Pro- 
 portions to prove fome plain, fimple and obvi- 
 ous Propofition. This is called a Demonftration 
 per aliena & remota, or an Argument from unna- 
 tural and remote Mediums: As if in order to prove 
 the Radii of a Circle are all equal I mould make 
 feveral Triangles and Squares about the Circle, 
 
 * Note, This Rule chiefly refers to the Eflablijhmeiit of fome Truth, ra- 
 ther than to the Refutation of Error. It is a very common and ufeful Way 
 of arguing to refute a falfe Fr ipofition, by fhewing what evident Falffiord 
 cr Abfurdity will follow from it : For what Propofition foever is really ab- 
 furd and falfe, does eftedluaDy prove that Principle to be falfe from which 
 
 is der'v.d ; fo that this Wy of refuting an Error is not fo ufuajly called 
 ad abjurdum, 
 
 Y 3 ar,i
 
 . 
 
 336 LOGIC: K: Or, Partlll 
 
 and then form fome Properties and Propofitions 
 of Squares and Triangles prove that the Radii of 
 a Circle are equal. 
 
 Yet it muft be confefied, that fometimes fuch 
 Queftions happen, that it is hardly pofiible to 
 prove them by dirtft Arguments drawn from the 
 Nature of Things, &c. and then it may not only 
 be lawful, but necefiary to ufe indirect Proofs, and 
 Arguments drawn from remote Mediums^ or from 
 the Abfurdity of the contradictory Suppofnions. 
 
 Such indireft and remote Arguments may alfo be 
 fometimes ufed to confirm a Propofition which has 
 been before proved by Arguments more direct and 
 immediate. 
 
 VIII. RULE. Though Arguments mould give 
 Light to the Subject, as well as conftrain the Af- 
 fent, yet you muft learn to diftinguijh well between 
 an Explication and an Argument ; and neither im~ 
 fofe upon yottrfehts, nor fuffer yourfehes to be im- 
 fofed upon by others, by miftaking a mere Illuflration 
 for a convincing Reafon. 
 
 Axioms them (elves, or Self-evident Propofitions 
 may want an Explication or IHnJlration^ tho' they 
 are not to be proved by Reafoning. 
 
 Similitudes and Allufions have oftentimes a very 
 happy Influence to explain fome difficult Truth, 
 and to render the Idea of it familiar and eafy. 
 Where the Refemblance is juft and accurate, the 
 Influence of a Simile may proceed fo far as to 
 ihew the Pofllbility of the Thing in Queftion : 
 But Similitudes muft not be taken as a folid Proof 
 of the Truth or Exiftence of thofe Things to 
 which they have a Refemblance. A too great 
 Deference paid to Similitude^ or an utter Rejec- 
 tion of them feem to be two Extremes, and ought 
 . to be avoided. The late ingenious Mr. Locke, 
 
 even
 
 CIV. The right Ufe of Retfon. 337 
 
 even in his Enquiries after Truth* makes great 
 Ufe of Similes for frequent Illuftration, and is very 
 happy in the Invention of them, tho* he warns us 
 alfo left we miftake them for condufive Argu- 
 ments. 
 
 Yet let it be noted here, that a Parable or a Si- 
 militude ufed by any Author, may give a fufficient 
 Proof of the true Senfe and Meaning of that Au- 
 thor, provided that we draw not^this Similitude 
 beyond the Scope and Defign for which it was 
 brought ; as when our Saviour affirms, Rev. iii. 3. 
 I will come on tbee as a Thief-, this will plainly 
 prove that he defcribes the Unexpeffednefs of bis 
 Appearance^ tho' it will by no means be drawn to 
 fignify any Injuftice in bis Defign. 
 
 IX. RULE. In your whole Courfe of Reafoning 
 keep your Mind fmcerely intent in the Purfuit of 
 Truth -, and follow folid Argument wberefoever it 
 leads you. Let not a Party Spirit > or any Paf- 
 fion or Prejudice whatfoever, flop or avert the 
 Current of your Reafoning in Queft of true 
 Knowledge. 
 
 When you are enquiring therefore into any Sub- 
 ject, maintain a due Regard to the Arguments and 
 Objections on both Sides of a Queftion : Confi- 
 der, compare, and balance them well before you 
 determine for one Side. It is a frequent, but a 
 very faulty Practice to hunt after Arguments only 
 to make good one Side of a Queftion, and en- 
 tirely to neglect and refufe thofe which favour the 
 other Side. If we have not given a due Weight 
 to Arguments on both Sides, we do but wilfully 
 mifguide our Judgment, and abufe our Reafbn, 
 by forbidding its Search after Truth. When we 
 efponfe Opinions by a fecret Biafs on the Mind 
 thro' the Influences of Fear, Hope, Honour, Cn* 
 Y 4 d
 
 338 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 dit) fnterefti or any other Prejudice, and then feek 
 Arguments only to fupport thofe Opinions, we 
 have neither done our Duty to God or to our 
 felves ; and it is a Matter of mere Chance if we 
 Humble upon Truth in our Way to Eafe and Pre- 
 ferment. The Power of Reafoning was given us 
 by our Maker for this very End, to purfue frutb *, 
 and we abufe one of his richeft Gifts, if we bafely 
 yield it up to be led aftray by any of the mean- 
 er Powers of Nature, cr the perifhing Interefts 
 of this Life. Reafon itfelf, if honcftly obeyed, 
 will lead us to receive the divine Revelation of the 
 Gofpel, where it is duly propcied, and this will 
 fhew us the Path of Life everlafting. 
 
 THE
 
 <fhe Right UJe 0/"Reafon. 339 
 THE 
 
 FOURTH PART 
 
 O F 
 
 L O G I C K. 
 
 Of Difpofrtion and Method* 
 
 IT is not merely a clear and diftinft Idea, a 
 well-formed Proportion, or a juft Argument, 
 that is fufficient to fearch out and communi- 
 cate the Knowledge of a Subject. There muft 
 be a Variety and Series of them difpofed in a due 
 manner in order to attain this End: And there- 
 fore it is the Defign of the loft Part of Loguk to 
 teach us the Art of Method. It is that muft fecure 
 our Thoughts from that Confufion, Darkneis, and 
 Miftake which unavoidably attend the Meditations 
 and Difcourfes even of the brighteft Genius who 
 defpifes the Rules of it. 
 
 1. We mail here confider the Nature of Me- 
 thod, and the federal kinds of it. 
 
 2. Lay down the <?rtf/ Rules of Method, with 
 a few Particulars under them* 
 
 CHAP.
 
 340 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Nature of Method, and the federal 
 Kinds of it, (viz.) Natural and Arbitrary, 
 Synthetic and Analytic. 
 
 MEthod, taken in the largeft Senfe, implies 
 the placing of federal Things, or -performing 
 federal Operations in fuch an Order as is moft conve- 
 nient to attain fome End propofed : And in this Senfe 
 it is applied to all the Works of Nature and Art, 
 to all the divine Affairs of Creation and Provi- 
 dence , and to the Artifices, Schemes, Contrivances 
 and Practices of Mankind, whether in natural, 
 civil, or facred Affairs. 
 
 Now this orderly Difpofition of Things includes 
 the Ideas of Prior, Pofterior, and Simultaneous ; of 
 Superior, Inferior, and Equal , of 'Beginning, End, 
 and Middle, &c. which are defcribed more par- 
 ticularly among the general Affettions of Being in 
 Ontology. 
 
 But in Logick Method is ufually taken in a more 
 limited Senfe, and the Nature of it is thus de- 
 fcribed : Method is the Difpofition of a Variety of 
 thoughts on any Subjeff in fuch Order as may beft 
 ferve to find out unknown Truths, to explain and 
 confirm Truths that are known, or to fix them in the 
 Memory. 
 
 It is diftributed into two general Kinds, (viz.) 
 Natural and Arbitrary. 
 
 Natural Method is that which obferves the Or- 
 der of Nature, and proceeds in fuch a manner as 
 that the Knowledge of the Things which follow 
 depends in a great meafure on the Things which 
 go before, and this is twofold, (viz.} Synthetic 
 
 and
 
 C. I. <fte right Ufe of Reafon: 34 1 
 
 and Analytic, which are fometimes called Synthefes 
 and Analyfis *. 
 
 Syntbitick Method is that which begins with the 
 Parts f, and leads onward to the Knowledge of 
 the Whole ; it begins with the moft fimple Princi- 
 ples, and general Truths, and proceeds by degrees 
 to that which is drawn from them or compounded 
 of them : And therefore it is called the Method of 
 Compofition. 
 
 Analytic Method takes the whole Compound as 
 it finds it, whether it be a Species or an Individual, 
 and leads us into the Knowledge of it by refolv- 
 ing it into its firft Principles or Parts, its generic 
 Nature, and its fpecial Properties -, and therefore 
 it is called the Method of Refolution. 
 
 As fynthetic Method is generally ufed in teach- 
 ing the Sciences after they are invented , fo 
 
 The Word Analyfis has three or four Senfes, which it may not be im- 
 proper, to take Notice of here* 
 
 ' I. It fignifies the general and particular Heads of a Difcourfe, with their 
 mutual Connections, both co-oroiaate and fubordinate, drawn out by way of 
 Abftract into one or more Tables, which arc frequently placed like an Index 
 at the Beginning or End of a Book. 
 
 a. It fignifies the refolving of a Difcourfe into its various Subje&s and 
 Arguments, as when any Writing of the ancient Prophets is refolved into the 
 prophetical, biftorital, doEirinal, and fraffical Part* of it ; it it faid to be- 
 lyjed in general. When a Sentence is diltinguiiht into the Nouns, the Verbs, 
 Pronoum, Adverbs, and other Particlet of Speech which compofek, then it is 
 faid to be analysed grammatically. When the fame Sentence is diftinguifljed 
 into Sutyefi and Pridicate, Proportion, Argument, 43, OtjeS, Caufe, Effeft, 
 Adjunff, Offc/ite, &o then ic is analyftd logically and Kttapbyfically. This 
 laft is what is chiefly meant in the tbtohgical Schools, when they ("peak of 
 analyfing a ttxt of Scripture. 
 
 3. Analyfn fignifies particularly the Science of Algebra, wherein a Qne- 
 ftion being propofed, one or more Letters, as, *, y, a, or Vowels, as a, e, i. 
 &c. are made ufe of to fgn;fy the unknown Number, which being intermin- 
 gled with feveral known Numbers in the Queftion, is at laft by the Rules of 
 Art feparated or releafed from that Entanglement, and its particular Value is 
 found out by fliewing its Equation, or Equality to fome known Number. 
 
 4. It fignifies analytical Method, as here explained in Logick. 
 
 j JNcet, It is confeft that Syntfojis often begins with the Genus, and pro- 
 ceeds to the Species and Individuals. But the Genut or generic Nature is then 
 confidered only as a fbyfit al or effentiaf Part of the Species, tho' it be fome- 
 times called an univerjal or logical Whole. Thus fyntbetic Method maintains 
 its own Defcription ftill, for it begins with the P*rt* t and proceeds fo the 
 Whit which is compofed of them 
 
 analytic
 
 342 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 analytic is moft praftiled in finding out Things 
 unknown. Though it muft be confeft that both 
 Methods are fometimes employed both to find out 
 Truth and to communicate it. 
 
 If we know the Parts of any Subject eafier and 
 better than the Whole, we confider the Parts 
 diftinctly, and by putting them together we come 
 to the Knowledge of the Whole. So in Grammar 
 we learn firft to know Letters, we join them to 
 make Syllables, out of Syllables we compofe Words, 
 and out of Words we make Sentences and Difcourfes. 
 So the Phyfician or Apothecary knows the Nature 
 and Powers of his Simples, (viz.] his Drugs, his 
 Herbs, his Minerals, &c. and putting them toge- 
 ther, and confidering their feveral Virtues, he finds 
 what will be the Nature and Powers of the Bolus, 
 or any compound Medicine : This is the fyntbctic 
 Method. 
 
 But if we are better acquainted with the Whole 
 than we are with particular Parts, then we divide 
 or refolve the Whole into its Parts, and thereby 
 gain a diftinct Knowledge of them. So in vulgar 
 Life we learn in the Grofs what Plants or Minerals 
 are ; and then by Chemiftry we gain the Know- 
 ledge of Salt, Sulphur, Spirit, Water, Earth, 
 which are the Principles of them. So we are firft 
 acquainted with the whole Body of an Animal, and 
 then by Anatomy or Direction, we come to learn 
 all the inward and outward Parts of it. This is 
 analytic Method. 
 
 According to this moft general and obvious 
 Idea of lynthelic and analytic Method, they differ 
 from each other as the Way which leads up from 
 -a Valley to a Mountain differs from itfelf, confi- 
 dercd as it leads down from the Mountain to the 
 Valley ; or as St. Matthew and St. Luke prove 
 Cbrijt to be the Son of Abraham ; Luke finds it out 
 
 by
 
 C. I. tte right Vfe /Reafon: 343 
 
 by Analyfis^ rifing from Chrift to his Anceftors ; 
 Matthew teaches it in fyntbetic Method, begin- 
 ning from Abraham, and (hewing that Chrift is 
 found among his Pofterity. Therefore it is a 
 ufual Thing in the Sciences, when we have by 
 Analyfis found out a Truth, we ufe fynthetic Me- 
 thod to explain and deliver it, and prove it to be 
 true. 
 
 In this eafy View of Things, thefe two kinds of 
 Method may be preferved confpicuoufly, and en- 
 tirely diftinct : But the Subjects of Knowledge 
 being infinite, and the Ways whereby we arrive 
 at this Knowledge being almoft infinitely various, 
 it is very difficult, and almoft impofiible, always 
 to maintain the precife Diftinction between thefe 
 two Methods. 
 
 This will evidently appear in the following Ob- 
 feruations. 
 
 Obf. I. Analytick Method being ufed chiefly to 
 find out Things unknown, it is not limited or con- 
 fined merely to begin wifh fome whole Subject, and 
 proceed to the Knowledge of its Parts, but it 
 takes its Rife fometimes from any fingle Part or 
 Property, or from any thing whatfoever that be- 
 longs to a Subject which happens to be firft and 
 moft eafily known, and thereby enquires into the 
 more abftrufe and unknown Parts, Properties, 
 Caufes, Effects, and Modes of it, whether abfo- 
 lute or relative : as for inftance, 
 
 fi.j Analyfis finds out Caufes by their Effects. 
 So in the fpeculative Part of natural Philofophy^ 
 when we obferve Light ^ Colour 'j, Motioxsj Hard- 
 nefs, Softnefs^ and -other Properties and Powers of 
 Bodies, or any of the common or uncommon 
 Appearances of Things either on Earth, or in Hea- 
 ven, we fearch out the Caufes of them. So by 
 
 the
 
 344 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 the various Creatures we find out the Creator, and 
 learn his Wifdom, Power and Goodnefs. 
 
 (2.) It finds out Effects by their Caufes. So 
 the practical and mechanical Part of natural Phi- 
 lofo.phy confiders fuch Powers of Motion, as the 
 Wind, the Fire, and the Water, &c. and then 
 contrives what Ufes they may be applied to, and 
 what will be their Effecls in order to make Mills 
 and Engines of various Kinds. 
 
 (3.) It finds out the general and fpecial Nature 
 of a Thing by confidering the various Attributes 
 of the Individuals, and obferving what is com- 
 mon, and what is proper, what is accidental, and 
 what is eflentral. So by furveying the Colour, the 
 Shape, Motion, Reft, Place, Solidity, Extenfion of 
 Bodies, we come to find that the Nature of Body 
 in general is folid Extenfwn , becaufe all other Qua- 
 lities of Bodies are changeable, but this belongs 
 to all Bodies, and it endures through all Changes; 
 and becaufe this is proper to Body alone, and 
 agrees not to any thing elfe ; and it is the Foun- 
 dation of all other Properties. 
 
 (4.) It finds out the remaining Properties or 
 Parts of a Thing, by having fome Parts or Pro- 
 perties given. So the Area of a Triangle is found 
 by knowing the Height and the Safe. So by hav- 
 ing two Sides, and an Angle of a Triangle given, 
 we find the remaining Side and Angles. So when 
 we know Cogitation is the prime Attribute of a 
 Spirit, we infer its Immateriality, and thence its 
 Immortality. 
 
 (5.) Analyfis finds the Means necefiary to at- 
 tain a propoled End by having the End firft af- 
 figned. So in moral, political, (economical Affairs, 
 having propofed the Government of Self , a Family, 
 a Ssciety, or a Nation, in order to their beft Inte- 
 reft, we confider and fearch out what are the fro-
 
 G.I. egeoc&n. 34$ 
 
 per Laws, Rules and Means to effect it. So in 
 the Practices of Artificers* and the Manufactures 
 of various Kinds, the End being propofed, as, 
 making Cloth* Houfes* Ships* &c. we find out 
 Ways of compofmg thefe things for the feveral 
 Ufes of human Life. By the putting any of thefe 
 Means in Execution to attain the End, is fynthetic 
 Method. 
 
 Many other Particulars might be reprefented to 
 fhew the various Forms of analytic Method* where- 
 by Truth is found out, and fome of them come 
 very near to fyntbetic* fo as hardly to be diftin- 
 guifhed. 
 
 Obf. II. Not only the Inveftigation of Truth, 
 but the Communication of it alfo is often practifed 
 in fuch a Method, as neither agrees precifely to 
 fynthetic or analytic. Some Sciences, if you jcon- 
 fider the whole of them in general* are treated in 
 fynthetic Order ; fo Phyfics or natural Philofophy 
 begins ufually with an Account of the general 
 Nature and Properties of Matter or Bodies, and 
 by Degrees defcends to confider the particular 
 Species of Bodies, with their Powers and Proper- 
 ties * yet it is very evident that when Philofophers 
 come to particular Plants and Animals, then by 
 Chemiftry and Anatomy they analyfe or refolve thofe 
 Bodies into their feveral conftituent Parts. On 
 the other hand, Logic is begun in analytic Method* 
 the whole is divided into its integral Parts* accord- 
 ing to the four Operations of the Mind ; yet here 
 and there fynthetic Method is ufed in the particu- 
 lar Branches of it, for it treats of Ideas in general 
 firft, and then defcends to the feveral Species of 
 them ; it teaches us how Proportions are made up 
 of Ideas* and Syllogifms of Propofitiow* which is the 
 Order of Comfofition. 
 
 /; The
 
 346 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 The ancient fcholaftic Writers have taken a great 
 deal of Pains, and engaged in ufelefs Difputes 
 about thefe two Methods, and after all have not 
 been able to give fuch an Account of them as to 
 keep them entirely diftinct from each other, nei- 
 ther in the Theory nor in the Practice. Some of 
 the Moderns have avoided this Confulion in fome 
 Meafure by confining themfelves to defcribe almoft 
 nothing elfe but the jyntbetic and analytic Methods 
 of Geometricians and Algeloraijls, whereby they have 
 too much narrowed the Nature and Rules of Me- 
 thod, as tho' every thing were to be treated in 
 mathematical Forms. 
 
 Upon the whole I conclude, that neither of 
 thefe two Methods mould be too fcrupuloufly 
 and fuperftitioufly purfued, either in the Inven-i 
 tion or in the Communication of Knowledge. It 
 is enough if the Order of Nature be but obferved 
 in making the Knowledge of Things following 
 depend on the Knowledge of the Things which 
 go before. Oftentimes a mixed Method will be 
 found molt effectual for thefe Purpofes -, and in- 
 deed a wife and judicious Profpect of our main 
 End and Defign muft regulate all Method whatfo- 
 ever. 
 
 Here the Rules of natural Method ought to be 
 propofed, (whether it be analytic, or fyntbetic^ or 
 mixt :) but it is proper firft to give fome Account 
 of arbitrary Met 'hod , left it be thrult at too great a 
 Diftance from the firft Mention of it. 
 
 Arbitrary Method leaves the Order of Nature, 
 and accommodates itfelf to many Purpofes ; fuch 
 as, to treafure up Things, and retain them in 
 Memory , to harangue and perfuade Mankind to 
 any Practice in the religious or the civil Life ; or 
 to delight, amufe, or entertain the Mind. 
 
 As
 
 C.l. The right Ufe of Re&hn: 347 
 
 As- for the Affiftance of the Memory, in moft 
 Things a natural Order has an happy Influence ; 
 for Reafon itfeJf deducing one Thing from another, 
 greatly aflifts the Memory by the natural Con- 
 nection and mutual Dependence of Things. But 
 there are various other Methods which Mankind 
 have made ufe of for this Purpofe, and indeed 
 there are fome Subjects that can hardly be re- 
 duced to Analyfis or Synthefis. 
 
 In reading or writing Hiflory, fome follow the 
 Order of the Governors of a Nation, and difpofe 
 every Tranfaction under their, particular Reigns: 
 So the facred Books of Kings and Chronicles are 
 written. Some write in Annals and Journals , and 
 make a new Chapter of every Year. Some put 
 all thofe Tranfactions together which relate to 
 one Subject - y that is, all the Affairs of one War* 
 one League, one Confederacy, one Council, &c. tho" 
 it lafted many Years, and under many Rulers. 
 
 So in writing the Lives of Men, which is called 
 Biography, fome Authors follpw the Track of 
 their Tears, and place every thing in the precife 
 Order of Time when it occurr'd : Others throw 
 the 'Temper and Charafte? of the Perfons, their 
 private Life, their publick Stations, their -perfonal Oc- 
 currences^ their dome/lick Conduff, their Speeches, 
 their Books or Writings, their Sicknefs and Deatb % 
 into fo many diftinct Chapters. 
 
 In Chronology fome Writers make their Epochas 
 to begin all with one Letter : So in the Book 
 called Duftor Hiftoricus, the Periods all begin with 
 C ; as, Creation, Cataclyfm, or Deluge, Chaldean 
 Empire, Cyrus, Chrift, Conftantine, &c. Some 
 divide their Accounts of Time according to the 
 four great Monarchies; AJjyrian, Perftan, Gre- 
 cian and Roman. Others think it ferves the Me- 
 mory beft to divide all their Subjects into the re- 
 Z markabls
 
 j 4 8 LOGICK: Or, Part IV. 
 
 markable Number of Sevens , fo Prideaux has 
 written an Introduction to Hiflory. And there is a 
 Book of Divinity called Fafciculus Controverfiarum, 
 by an Author of the fame Name, written in the 
 fame Method, wherein every Controverfy has fe- 
 "jen Queftions belonging to it ; tho' the Order of 
 Nature feems to be too much neglected by a Con- 
 finement to this feptenary Number. 
 
 Thofe Writers and Speakers, whofe chief Bufi- 
 nefs is to amufe or delight, to allure, terrify, or 
 perfuade Mankind, do not confine themfelves to 
 any natural Order^ but in a crypt teal or bidden Me- 
 thod adapt every thing to their defigned Ends. 
 Sometimes they omit thofe Things which might 
 injure their Defign, or grow tedious to their 
 Hearers, tho' they feem to have a necefiary Re- 
 lation to the Point in hand : Sometimes they add 
 thofe Things which have no great Reference -to 
 the Subject, but are fuited to allure or refrem the 
 Mind and the Ear. They dilate fometimes, and 
 flourifh long upon little Incidents, and they fkip 
 over, and but lightly touch the drier Part of their 
 Theme. They place the firjl Things laft, and the 
 laft Things fir/I, with wondrous Art, and yet fa 
 manage it as to conceal their Artifice, and lead 
 the Senfes and Pafttons of their Hearers into a 
 pleafing and powerful Captivity. 
 
 It is chiefly Poejy and Oratory that require the 
 Practice of this kind of arbitrary Method : They 
 omit Things eflential which are not beautiful, 
 they infert little needlefs Circumftances, and beau- 
 tiful Digrefiions, they invert Times and Actions, 
 in order to place every Thing in the moft affect- 
 ing Light, and for this End in their Practice they 
 neglect all logical Forms ; yet a good Acquaintance 
 with the Forms of Logick and natural Method is of 
 admirable Ufe to thofe who would attain thefe 
 
 Arts
 
 C.II. tfte-rigbtUfeofRnfon. 349 
 
 Arts in Perfection. Hereby they will be able to 
 range their own Thoughts in fuch a Method and 
 Scheme, as to take a more large and comprehen- 
 five Survey of their Subject and Defign in all the 
 Parts of it ; and by this Means they will better 
 judge what to chufe and what to refufe ; and how- 
 to drefs and manage the whole Scene before them, 
 fo as to attain their own Ends with greater Glory 
 and Succefs. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 The Rules of Method, general And fpeciaL 
 
 THE General Requifit.es of true Method in 
 the Purfuit or Communication of Know^ 
 ledge, may be all comprifed under the following 
 Heads. It muft be (i.; Safe. (2). Plain and 
 Eafy. (3.) Dijlinft. (4.) Full or without De~ 
 feft. (5.) Short or without Superfluity. (6.) Pro* 
 per to the Subjeft and the Defign, (7*) Con- 
 netted. 
 
 I. RULE. Among all the Qualifications of 
 a good Method, there is none more neceffary 
 and important than that it fhould be fafe and, 
 fecure from Error ; and to this End thefe four 
 'particular or fpecial Directions mould be ob- 
 ferved. 
 
 i. Ufe great Care and CircumJpeRion in laying the 
 Foundations of your Difcourfe, or your Scheme of 
 Noughts upon any Subjsft. Thefe Propofitions 
 which are to ftand as firft Principles, and on 
 which the whole Argument depends, muft be 
 viewed on all Sides with utmoft Accuracy, left an 
 Z 2 Error
 
 350 L O G I C K: Or, PartlV. 
 
 Error being admitted there, fhould diffufe itfelf 
 thro* the whole Subject See therefore that your 
 general Definitions or Defcriptions are as accurate 
 as the Nature of the Thing will bear : See that 
 your general Divifiom and Diftributions-be juft and 
 exact, according to the Rules given in the firft 
 Part of Logick: See that your Axioms be fuffici- 
 ently evident, fo as to demand the Affent of thofe 
 that examine them with due Attention. See that 
 your firft and more immediate Confcqucnces from 
 thefe Principles be well drawn; and take the fame 
 Care of all other Proportions that have a powerful 
 and fpreading Influence thro* the feveral Parts of 
 your Difcourle. 
 
 For want of this Care, fometimes a large Trea- 
 tife has been written by a long Deduction of Con- 
 fequences from one or two doubtful Principles, 
 which Principles have been effectually refuted in 
 a few Lines, and thus the whole Treatife has been 
 deftroyed at once : So the largeft and faireft Build- 
 ing finks and tumbles to the Ground, if the Foun- 
 dations and Corner- Stones of it are feeble and in- 
 fufficient. 
 
 2. It is a very advifable Thing that your prima- 
 ry and fundamental Proportions be not only evident 
 and true, hit they jhould be made a little familiar 
 to the Mind by dwelling upon them before you proceed 
 farther. By this Means you will gain fo full an 
 Acquaintance with them, that you may draw 
 Confequences from them with much more Free- 
 dom, with greater Variety, brighter Evidence, 
 and with a firmer Certainty, than if you have but 
 a flight and fudden View of them. 
 
 3. As you proceed in the Connection of your 
 Arguments, fee that your Ground be made firm in 
 every Step. See that every Link of your Chain 
 of Reafoning be ftrong and good : For if but 
 
 one
 
 C II. The right Ufe 0/Reafon. 3 5 1 
 
 one Link be feeble and doubtful, the whole Chain 
 of Arguments feels the Weaknefs of it, and lie 
 cxpofed to every Objector, and the original Que- 
 4lion remains undetermined. 
 
 4. Draw up all your Propofitions and Arguments 
 withfo much Caution , and exprefs your Ideas with 
 fucb a jufl Limitation as may preclude or anticipate 
 any Objections. Yet remember this is only to be 
 done as far as it is poflible, without too much en- 
 tangling the Queftion, or introducing complicat- 
 ed Ideas, and obfcuring the Senfe. But if fuch a 
 cautious and limited Drefs of the Queftion mould 
 render the Ideas too much complicated, or the 
 Senfe obfcure, then it is better to keep the Argu- 
 ment more fimple, clear and eafy to be under- 
 ftood, and afterwards mention the Objections di- 
 ftinctly in their full Strength, and give a diftincr. 
 AnfwertQ them. 
 
 II a RULE. Let your Method be -pla'n and eajy y 
 fo that your Hearers or Readers, as well as your 
 felf may run thro* it without Embarrafiment, and 
 may take a clear and comprehenfive View of the 
 whole Scheme. To this End the following parti- 
 cular Directions will be ufeful. 
 
 i . Begin always with thofe 'Things which are beft 
 known, and moft obvious, whereby the Mind may 
 have no Difficulty or Fatigue, and proceed by regu- 
 lar and eafy Steps to Wings that are more difficult. 
 And as far as poflible, let not the Underftanding, 
 or the Proof of any of our Politions, depend on 
 the Pofitions that follow, but always on thofe 
 which go before. It is a Mattet of Wonder that 
 in lo knowing an Age as this, there mould be fo 
 many Perfons offering Violence daily to this Rule 
 by teaching the Latin Language by a Grammar writ^ 
 Un in Lat'in-t which Method feems to require 4 
 Z 3 perfeft
 
 352 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 perfect Knowledge of an unknown Tongue, in 
 order to learn the firft Rudiments of it. 
 
 2. Do not affeft excejjive Hafte in learning or 
 teaching any Science, nor hurry at once in the midft 
 of j/, left you be too foon involved in feveral new 
 and ftrange Ideas and Propofitions, which cannot 
 be well qnderftood without a longer and clofer 
 Attention to thofe which go before. Such fort of 
 Speed is but a wafte of Time, and will conftrain 
 you to take many Steps backward again, if you 
 would arrive at a regular and compleat Knowledge 
 of the Subject. 
 
 3. Be not fond of crowding too many Thoughts and 
 Reafonings into one Sentence or Paragraph^ beyond 
 the dpprehenfion or Capacity of your Readers or 
 Hearers.. There are fome Perfons of a good Ge- 
 nius, and a capacious Mind, who write and fpeak 
 very obfcurely upon this Account -, they affect a 
 long Train of Dependencies, before they come to 
 a Period , they imagine that they can never fill 
 their Page with too much Senfe ; but they little 
 think how they bury their own beft Ideas in thq 
 Croud, and render them in a manner invifible and 
 ufelefs to the . greateft Part of Mankind. Such 
 Men may be great Scholars, yet they are but poor 
 Teachers. 
 
 4. For the fame Reafon avoid too many Sub" 
 divifious. Contrive your Scheme of Thoughts in 
 fuih a manner as may finifh your whole Argu- 
 ment with as few inferior Branchings as Reafon 
 will admit ; and let them be fuch as are obvious 
 and open to the Underftanding, that they may 
 come within one fingle View of the Mind. This 
 will not only aflift the Underftanding to receive, 
 but it will aid the Memory alfo to retain Truth ; 
 whereas a Difcourfe cut out into a vaft Multitude 
 of gradual Subordinations, has many Inconveni- 
 
 encie^
 
 C. II. The right Ufe c/'Reafon. 353 
 
 encies in it ; it gives Pain to the Mind and Me- 
 mory, in furveying and retaining the Scheme of 
 Difcourfe, and expofes the unfkilful Hearers to 
 mingle the fuperior and inferior Particulars toge- 
 ther, it leads them into a thick Wood inftead of 
 open Day-light, and places them in a Labyrinth 
 inftead of a plain Path. 
 
 5. Give all Diligence in your younger Tears to ob- 
 tain a clear and eafy Way of txprejfing your Con- 
 ceptions, that your Words, as fait as you utter 
 them, may ftamp your own Ideas exaftly on the 
 Mind of the Hearer. This is a moft happy Ta- 
 lent for the Conveyance of Truth, and an excel- 
 lent Security againft Miftakes and needlefs Ccntro- 
 verfies. 
 
 III d RULE. Let your Method be diftinft, and 
 without the perplexing Mixture of Things that 
 ought to be kept feparate, and this will be eafily 
 pradifed by four Directions. 
 
 1 . Don't bring unneceffary heterogeneous * Mat- 
 ter in your Difcourfe on any Subjeff \ that is, don't 
 mingle an Argument on one Subject with Mat- 
 ters that relate entirely to another, but juft fo far 
 as is necefiary to give a clearer Knowledge of the 
 Subject in hand. Examples in Logick may be bor- 
 rowed from any of the Sciences to illuftrate the 
 Rules : But long Interpofitions of natural Philo- 
 
 fophy, of the Imagination and Pajpons, of Agency of 
 Spirits united to Bodies, &c. break the Thread of 
 Difcourfe, and perplex the Subject. 
 
 2. Let every complicated 'Theme or Idea be divided 
 into its diftinft fengle Parts, as far as the Nature ff 
 the Subject And your prefent Defign requires it. Tho* 
 
 * Things of one Kind are caBed lomtgauau, Things of different Kinds 
 ffs btrtrogcscsus, 
 
 Z4 you
 
 354 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 you muft not abound in needlefs Subdivifions, yet 
 fomething of this Work is very neceflary , and it 
 is a good Judgment alone can dictate how far to 
 proceed in it, and when to flop. 
 
 Compound Ideas muft be reduced to a fimple 
 Form in order to underftand them well. You 
 may eafily m after that Subject in all the Parts of 
 it by a regular Succeffion, which would confound 
 the Underftanding to furvey them at once. So 
 we come to the Knowledge of a very perplexed 
 Diagram in Geometry, or a complicated Machine in 
 Mechanics, by having is parcelled out to us into 
 its feveral Parts and Principles, according to this, 
 and the foregoing Rule of Method. 
 
 3. Call every Idea, Proportion and Argument to 
 its proper Clafs, and keep each Part of the Subject 
 in its own Place. Put thofe things all together 
 that belong to one Part or Property, one Confi- 
 deration or View of your Subject. This will 
 prevent needlefs Repetitions, and keep you from 
 intermixing Things which are different. We 
 muft maintain this Distinction of Things and 
 Places if we would be fafe from Error. It is Con- 
 fufion that leads us into endlefs Miftakes, which 
 raturally arife from a Variety of Ideas ill-joined, 
 forted, or ill-difpofed. It is one great ufe of Me- 
 thod, that a Multitude of Thoughts and Propo- 
 fitions may be fo diftindly ranged in their pro- 
 per Situations, that the Mind may not be over- 
 whelmed with a confufed Attention to them all at 
 once, nor be diftracted with their Variety, nor 
 be tempted to unite Things which ought to be 
 fepa rated, nor to disjoin Things which mould be 
 
 ^united. 
 
 4. In the Partition of your Difcourfe into dijtinft 
 Heads, take heed that ycur Particulars do not inter- 
 fere with the General, nor with each other. Think
 
 C.II. 7& right Ufe of 'Reafon. 355 
 
 it is not enough that you make ufe of diftinct Ex- 
 preflions in each Particular, but take care that the 
 Ideas be diftinct alfo. It is mere Foolery to mul- 
 tiply diftinct Particulars in treating of Things^ 
 where the Difference of your Particulars lies only 
 in Names and Words. 
 
 IV th RULE. The Method of treating a Sub- 
 ject mould be plenary or full, fo that nothing may 
 be wanting j nothing which is necefTary or proper 
 mould be omitted. 
 
 When you are called to explain a Subject, don't 
 pafs by, nor fkip over any thing in it which is 
 very difficult or obfcure. 
 
 When you enumerate the Parts or the Properties 
 of any Subject, do it in a complete and compre- 
 henfive manner. 
 
 When you are afferting or -proving any Truth, 
 fee that every doubtful or difputable Part of the 
 Argument be well fupported and confirmed. 
 
 If you are to illuftrate or argue a Point of Dif- 
 ficulty^ be not too fcanty of Words, but rather 
 become a little copious and diffufive in your Lan- 
 guage : Set the Truth before the Reader in feveral 
 Lights, turn the various Sides of it to view, in 
 order to give a full Idea and firm Evidence of the 
 Propofition. 
 
 When you are drawing up a Narrative of any 
 Matter of Fact, fee that no important Circum- 
 ftance be omitted. 
 
 When you propofe the Solution of any Difficul- 
 ty, confider all the various Cafes wherein it can 
 happen, and mew how they may be folved. 
 
 In fhort, let your Enumerations, your Divifions 
 and Diftributions of Things be fo accurate, that 
 no needful Part or Idea may be left put. 
 
 This
 
 356 L O G I C K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 This Fulnefs of Method does not require that 
 every thing mould be faid which can be faid upon 
 any Subject ; for this would make each fingle 
 Science endlefs : But you fhould fay every thing 
 which is neceflary to the Defign in View, and 
 which has a proper and direct Tendency to this 
 End ; always proportioning the Amplitude of your 
 Matter, and the Fulnefs of your Difcourfe to your 
 great Defign, to the Length of your Time, to the 
 Convenience, Delight and Profit of your Hearers. 
 
 V th RULE. As your Method muft be full with- 
 out Deficiency, fo it muft be Jhort, or without Su- 
 perfluity. The Fulnefs of a Difcourfe enlarges our 
 Knowledge, and the well-concerted Brevity faves 
 our Time. In order to obferve this Rule, it will 
 be enough to point out the chief of thofe Super- 
 fluities or Redundancies, which fome Perfons are 
 guilty of in their Difcourfes, with a due Caution 
 againft them. 
 
 1. Avoid all needlefs Repetitions of the fame 'Thing 
 in different Parts of your Difcourfe. It muft be 
 confeffed there are feveral Cafes wherein a Review 
 of the fame foregoing Propofmon is needful to 
 explain or prove feveral of the following Pofiti- 
 ons -, but let your Method be fo contrived, as far 
 as poffible, that it may occafion the feweft Re- 
 hearfals of the fame Thing ; for it is not grateful 
 to the Hearers without evident Neceflity. 
 
 2. Have a Care of a tedious Prolixity, or draw- 
 ing out any Part of your Difcourfe to an unnecejary 
 and tirefome Length. It is much more honourable 
 for an Inftruclor, an Orator, a Pleader, or a Preach- 
 er, that his Hearers mould fay, / was afraid he 
 would have done, than that they fhould be tempt- 
 ed to mew Signs of Uneaftnefs, and long for the 
 Conclufion. 
 
 Pefides,
 
 C. II. The right Ufe ofReafon: 357 
 
 Befides, there is another Inconvenience in it ; 
 when you affect to amplify on the former Branches 
 of a Difcourfe, you wUl often lay a Neceffity up- 
 on yourfelf of contracting the latter and moft 
 ufeful Parts of ft, and perhaps prevent yourlelf 
 in the moft important Part of your Defign. Many 
 a Preacher has been guilty of this fault in former 
 Days, nor is the prefent Age without fomelnftances 
 of this Weaknefs. 
 
 3. Do not multiply Explications where there is no 
 Difficulty, or Darknefs, or Danger of Miftake. Be 
 not fond of tracing every Word of your Theme 
 tbro' all the grammatical^ the logical and metaphy- 
 fical Characters and Relations of it, nor fhew your 
 critical Learning in fpreading abroad the various 
 Senfes of a Word, and the various Origin of thofe 
 Ssnfes, the Etymology of Terms, the fynonymous 
 and the paronymous or kindred Names, ($c. where 
 the chief Point of Difcourfe does not at all re- 
 quire it. You would laugh at a Pedant,, who 
 profefiing to explain the Athanafian Creed, fbould 
 acquaint you, that Athanafius is derived from a 
 Greek Word, which fignifies Immortality, and that 
 the fame Word 'Adavawi'* fignifies alfo the Herb 
 fanfie. 
 
 There are fome Perfons fo fond of their learned 
 Diftinctions, that they will fhew their Subtilty 
 by diftinguijhing where there is no Difference : And 
 the fame filly Affectation will introduce Diftintti- 
 ons upon every Occurrence, and bring three or 
 four Negatives upon every Subject of Difcourfe ; 
 firft to declare what it is not, and then what it is : 
 Whereas fuch Negatives ought never to be men- 
 tioned where there is no apparent Danger of Mif- 
 take. How ridiculous would that Writer be, 
 who, if he were fpeaking of the Nicene Creed, 
 Ihould declare negatively, i. That he did not 
 
 mean
 
 358 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 mean the Doftrine which the Inhabitants of Nice 
 believed, nor (2.) A Creed written by them, but 
 (3.) Pofitively a Creed compofed by fever al Chrif- 
 tian Ei/hops met together in the City of Nice ? The 
 Pofitive is fufficient here, and the two Negatives 
 are impertinent. 
 
 4. 5tf not fond of proving thofe things which need 
 fio Proof, fuch as felf-evident Proportions and 
 Truths univerfally confefled, or fuch as are intire- 
 Jy agreed to and granted by our Opponents. It is 
 this vain Affectation of proving every 'Thing that 
 has led Geometricians to form ufclefs and intricate 
 Demonftrations to fupport fome Theorems, which 
 are fafficiently evident to the Eye by Infpection, 
 or to the Mind by the firft mention of them ; and 
 it is the fame Humour that reigns fometimes in 
 the Pulpit, and fpends half the Sermon in proving 
 fome general Truth which is never difputed or 
 doubted, and thereby robs the Auditory of more 
 ufeful Entertainment. 
 
 5. As there are fome things fo evidently true, 
 that they want no Proof, fo there are others fo 
 evidently falfe that they want no Refutation. It is 
 mere trifling, and a wafte of our precious Mo- 
 ments, to invent and raife fuch Objections as no 
 Man would ever make in earneft, and that merely 
 for the fake of anfwering and folving them : This 
 breaks in nororioufly upon the due Brevity of Me- 
 thod. 
 
 6. Avoid in general all learned Forms, all Trap- 
 pings of Art, and Ceremonies of the Schools, where 
 there is no need of them. It is reported concern- 
 ing the late Czar of Mufcovy, that when he 
 firft acquainted himfelf with mathematical Learn- 
 ing he practifed all the Rules of Circumvallation 
 and Contravallalion, at the Siege of a Town in 
 
 Livonia ;
 
 C II. The right Ufe of Reafon; 359 
 
 Livonia ; and by the Length of thofe Formalities 
 he loft the Opportunity of taking the Town. 
 
 7. Don't fuffer every occafional and incidental 
 thought to carry you away into a long Parentbefis, 
 and thus to ftretch out your Difcourfe, and divert 
 you jrom the Point in Hand. In the Purfuit of 
 your Subject, if any ufeful Thought occur which 
 belongs to fome other Theme, note it down for 
 the fake of your Memory on fome other Paper, 
 and lay it by in referve for its proper Place and 
 Seafon : But let it not incorporate itfelf with 
 your prefent Theme, nor draw off your Mind 
 from your main Bufmefs, tho* it mould be never 
 fo inviting. A Man who walks directly but flow- 
 ly towards his Journey's End, will arrive thither 
 much fooner than his Neighbour, who runs into 
 every crooked Turning which he meets, and wan- 
 ders afide to gaze at every thing that flrikes his 
 Eyes by the Way, or to gather every gaudy Flower 
 that grows by the fide of the Road. 
 
 To fum up all ; There is an happy Medium to be 
 obferved in our Method? fo that the Brevity may not 
 render the Senfe obfcure, nor the Argument feeble* 
 nor our Knowledge merely fuperjicial : And on the 
 other Hand 9 that the Fulnefs and Copioufnefs of jour 
 Method may not wafte the Time, tire the Learner, or 
 fill the Mind with Trifles and Impertinendcs. 
 
 The copious and the contracted Way of writing 
 have each their peculiar Advantages. There is a 
 proper Ufe to be made of large Parapbrafes, and 
 full, particular, and diffufive Explications and Ar- 
 guments , thefe are fitteft for thofe who defign to 
 be acquainted thoroughly with every Part of the 
 Subject. There is alfo a Ufe of Jhorter Hints, 
 Abftrafts and Compendiums to inftruct thofe who 
 feek only a flight and general Knowledge, as well 
 as to refrelh the Memory of thofe who have learnt 
 
 the
 
 360 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 the Science already, and gone thro* a larger Scheme. 
 But it is a grofs Abufe of thefe various Methods 
 of Inftruction, when a Perfon has read a mere corn- 
 fend or Epitome of any Science, and he vainly ima- 
 gines that he underftands the whole Science. So 
 one Boy may become a Philofopher by reading 
 over the mere dry Definitions and Divifions of 
 Scbeibler*s Compendium of Peripateticifm : So an- 
 other may boaft that he underftands Anatomy, be- 
 caufe he has feen a Skeleton ; and a third profefs 
 himfelf a learned Divine, when he can repeat the 
 Apojlles Creed. 
 
 RULE. Take care that your Method be 
 proper to the Subjeff in Hand, proper to your pre~ 
 fent Defign, as well as proper to the Age and Place 
 wherein you dwell. 
 
 : i. Let your Method be proper to the Subjeff. All 
 Sciences muft not be learnt or taught in one Me- 
 thod. Morality and 'Theology, Metaphyfics and 
 Logick, will not be eafily and happily reduced to a 
 ftricl mathematical Method : Thofe who have tried 
 have found much Inconvenience therein. 
 
 Some things . have more need to be explained 
 than to be proved ; as Axioms or felf-evident Pro~ 
 fojitions , and indeed all the firft great Principles, 
 the chief and moft important Doctrines both of 
 natural and revealed Religion ; for when the Senfe 
 of them is clearly explained, they appear fo evi- 
 dent in the Light of Nature or Scripture, that 
 they want no other Proof. There are other Things 
 that Hand in need of Proof, as well as Explication, 
 as many mathematical Theorems, and feveral deep 
 Controverfees in Morality and Divinity. There are 
 yet other forts of Subjects which want rather to 
 be warmly impreft upon the Mind by fervent Ex~ 
 kortations, and ftand in more need of this than 
 
 they
 
 C. II. Me Right UJe ofReafon. 361 
 
 they do either of Proof or Explication -, fuch are 
 the moft general, plain and obvious Duties of 
 Piety towards God, and love toward M?#, with a 
 Government of all our Inclinations and Paffions. 
 Now thefe feveral Subjects ought to be treated in 
 a different Manner and Method. 
 
 Again, There are fome Subjects in the fame 
 Treatife which are more ttfsful and neceffary than 
 others, and fome Parts of a Subject which are 
 eminently and chiefly defegned by a Writer or Speak- 
 er : True Method will teach us to dwell longer 
 upon thefe Themes, and to lay out more Thought 
 and Language upon them ; whereas the fame Art 
 of Method will teach us to cut fhort thofe things 
 which are ufed only to introduce our main Subject, 
 and to ftand as a Scaffolding merely to aid the 
 Structure of our Difcourfe. It will teach us alfo 
 to content ourfelves with brief Hints of thofe 
 Matters which are merely occafional and inci- 
 dental. 
 
 2. Tour Method muft be adjufted by your Defign ; 
 for if you treat of the fame Subject with two dif- 
 ferent Views and Defigns, you will find it necef- 
 fary to ufe different Methods. Suppofe the Doc- 
 trine of the facred 'Trinity were your Theme, and 
 you were to read a Lecture to young Students on 
 that Subject, or if you defigned a Treatife for the 
 Conviction of learned Men, you would purfue a 
 very different Method from that which would be 
 proper to regulate a practical Difcourfe, or a Ser- 
 mon to inftruct vulgar Chriftians merely in the pi- 
 ous Improvement of this Doctrine, and awaken 
 them to their Duties which are derived thence. 
 
 In ftiort, we muft not firft lay down certain 
 and precife Rules of Method, and refolve to con- 
 fine the Matter we difcourfe of to that particular 
 Form and Order of Topicks ; but we muft well 
 
 confider
 
 362 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 confider and ftudy the Subjeft of our Difcourfe 
 throughly, and take a juft Survey of our prefent 
 De/ign, and thefe will give fufficient Hints of the 
 particular Form and Order in which we mould 
 handle it, provided that we are moderately skilled 
 in ^general Laws of Method and Order. 
 
 Yet let it be noted here, that neither the Sub- 
 jett or Matter of a Difcourfe, nor the particular 
 Defign of it, can fo precifely determine the Me- 
 thod, as to leave no room for Liberty and Va- 
 riety. The very fame Theme may be handled, and 
 that alfo with the fame Defign, in feveral different 
 Methods, among which it is hard to fay which is 
 the beft. In writing a Syftem of Divinity, fome 
 begin with the Scriptures, and thence deduce all 
 other Doctrines and Duties. Some begin with 
 the Being of God and his Attributes, fo far as he 
 is known by the Light of Nature, and then pro- 
 ceed to the Doctrines of Revelation. Some di- 
 ftinguifli the whole Subject into the Credenda and 
 Agenda, that is, Things to be believed, and Things 
 to be done. Some think it beft to explain the 
 whole Chriftian Religion by an hiflorical Detail 
 of all the Difcoveries which God has made of him- 
 felf to this lower World, beginning at the Creation 
 in the firft Chapter of Genefis, and fo proceeding 
 onward according to the Narrative of the Old and 
 New Teftament. And there are others that en- 
 deavour to include the whole of Religion under 
 thefe four Heads, (viz.) The Apojlles Creed, the 
 Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments, and the two 
 Sacraments ; tho* I cannot but think this is the 
 leaft accurate of any. The fame Variety may be 
 allowed in treating other Subjects ; this very Trea- 
 tife of Logick is an Inftance of it, whofe Method 
 differs very confiderably from any others which I 
 have feen, as they differ ajfo greatly from one an- 
 / other
 
 C.II. <The right Ufe of Reafon. 363 
 
 other tho* feveral of them are confefied to be well 
 written. 
 
 3. Tho' a juft View of our Subjefi and our Df- 
 fign may dictate proper Rules of natural Method, 
 yet there muft be fome little Deference at leaft paid 
 to the Cuftom of the Age wherein we dwell, and to 
 the Humour and Genius of our Readers or Hearers, 
 which if we utterly reject and difdain, our Per- 
 formances will fail of defired Succefs, even tho' 
 we may have followed the juft Rules of Method. 
 J will mention but this one Inftance : In the for- 
 mer Century it was frequent with learned Men to 
 divide their Theme or Subject into a great Mul- 
 titude of coordinate Members or Parts, they abound- 
 ed alfo in the Forms of Logick and Diftinttion, 
 and indulged numerous Ranks of Subordination. 
 Now tho' we ought not to abandon the Rules of 
 juft Method and Divifion, in order to comport with 
 the modim Writers in our Age who have renounc- 
 ed them, yet it is prudent to pay fo much Refpect 
 to the Cuftom of the Age, as to ufe thefe Forms 
 of Divifwn with due Moderation, and not affect 
 to multiply them in fuch a manner as to give an 
 early and needlefs Difguft to the generality of our 
 prefent Readers. The fame may be faid concern- 
 ing various other Methods of Conduct, in the Af- 
 fairs of Learning as well as the Affairs of Life, 
 wherein we muft indulge a little to Cuftom : And 
 yet we muft by no means fuffer ourfelves fo far to 
 be impofed upon and governed by it, as to neglect 
 thofe Rules of Method which are necefiary for the 
 fafe, eafy and compleat Enquiry into Truth, or 
 the ready and effectual Communication of it tq 
 qthers. 
 
 VII th RULE. The laft Requifite of Method is, 
 
 fhjtt the Partf of a DJfwurfe Jhould be well conmfted ; 
 
 A a M
 
 364 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 and thefe three fhort Directions will fuffice for this 
 Purpofe. 
 
 1 . Keep your main End and Defign ever in view, 
 and let all the Parts of your Difcourfe have a ten- 
 dency toward it, and, as far as poffible, make that 
 tendency vijible all the Way: Otherwife the Readers 
 or Hearers will have reafon to wonder tor what End 
 this or that Particular was introduced. 
 
 2. Let the mutual Relation and Dependence of 
 the federal Branches of your Difcourfe be fo jujl and 
 evident, ' that every Part may naturally lead onward 
 to the next, without any huge Chajms or Breaks 
 which interrupt and deform the Scheme. The Con- 
 nection of Truths fhould arife and appear in their 
 fucceflive Ranks r.rd Order, as the feyeral Parts 
 of a fine ProfpecY afcend juft behind each other, 
 in their natural and regular Elevations and Diftan- 
 ces, and invite the Eye to climb onward with con- 
 ftant Pleafure till it reach the Sky. Whatfoever 
 horrid Beauty a Precipice or a Cataract: may add 
 to the Profpect of a Country, yet fuch fort of hi- 
 deous and abrupt Appearances in a Scene of Rea- 
 foning are real Blemifhes and not Beauties. When 
 the Reader is pafling over fuch a Treatife, he often 
 finds a wide Vacancy, and makes an uneafy Stop, 
 and knows not how to tranfport his Thoughts over 
 to the nexft Particular, for want of fome Clue or 
 connecting Idea to lay hold of. 
 
 3. Acquaint yoiirfelf'witb all the proper and decent 
 Forms of 'Tranjition from one Part of a Difcourfe to 
 Another, andpraflife them as Occafion offers. Where 
 the Ideas, Propofitions and Arguments are hap- 
 pily difpofed, and well connected, the Truth in- 
 deed is fecure j but it renders the Difcourfe much 
 more agreeable, when proper and graceful Expref- 
 iion joins the Parts of it together in fo entertain-
 
 C. II. fbe right Ufe ofReafon. 365 
 
 ing a manner, that the Reader knows not how 
 to leave off till he hath arrived at the End. 
 
 Thefe are the general and moft important Rules 
 bf true Method ,' and though they belong chiefly to 
 the Communication of Knowledge, yet an early 
 and thorough Acquaintance with them will be of 
 confiderable Ule toward the Purfuit and Attain- 
 ment of it. 
 
 Thofe Perfons who have never any Occafion to 
 communicate Knowledge by Writing or by pub- 
 lick Difcourfes, may allb with great Advantage 
 perufe thefe Rules of Method ', that they may learn 
 to judge with Juftice and Accuracy concerning 
 the Performance of others. And befides,, a good 
 Acquaintance with Method^ will greatly affift every 
 t>ne in ranging, difpofing and managing all hu- 
 man. Affairs. 
 
 The particular Means or Methods for a farther 
 Improvement of the Underftanding are very va- 
 rious, fuch as, Meditation^ Reading, Conberfing, 
 foifputing by Speech or by Writing, Queftion and 
 Anfwer, &c. And in each of thefe Practices 
 fome fpecial Forms may be obferved, and fpecial 
 Rules may be given to facilitate and fecure our 
 Enquiries after Truth : But this would require 
 a little Volume by, itfelf, and a Treatife of Logick 
 has always been efteemed fufficiently compteat with- 
 out it. 
 
 FINIS'.
 
 The TABLE of the 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 i*T*HE Introduction or general Scheme , Page i. 
 
 The Firft Part (viz.) Of Perception and 
 Ideas. 
 
 CHAP. I. Of the Nature of Ideas, p. 8. 
 
 CHAP. II. Of the Ob] efts of Perception. Sett, i.' 
 Of Being in general ', p. 10. Sea. 2. Of Sub^ 
 fiances and their various Kinds , p. u. Sea. 3, 
 Of Modes and their various Kinds -, and Jirft of 
 ejfential and accidental Modes, p. 16. Seclr. 4, 
 Tfo further Divi/ions of Mode, p. 20. Sea. 5, 
 Qf /<? te# Categories. Of Sub/lance modified. 
 p. 25. Sea. 6. O/ JVb/ /(, p. 26. 
 
 CHAP. III. O/ the federal forts ef Perceptions or 
 Ideas. Sed. i. Of fenfible, fpiritual, and ab- 
 jlratted Ideas, p. 28. Sea. 2. Of fimple and 
 complex, compound and collcflive Ideas, p. 33, 
 Sea. 3. O/ univerfal and particular Ideas, real 
 and imaginary, p. 34. Sea. 4. %<? Divifion of 
 Ideas, with Regard to their Qualities, p. 39^ 
 
 CHAP. IV. O/ Words and their feveral Divifions* 
 together with the Advantage and danger of them. 
 Sea. i . Of Words in general and their Ufe, p. 45. 
 Sea. 2. Of negative and pofetive farms, p. 51. 
 Sea. 3. Of fimple and complex Terms, p. 54. 
 Sea. 4. O/ Words common and proper, p. 56. 
 Sea. 5. O/ concrete and abftraft Terms, p. 58. 
 
 Sea.
 
 Se&. 6. Of univocal and equivocal Words, ibid. 
 Se<5t. 7. Various Kinds of equivocal Words, p. 61 1 
 Set 8. The Origin or Caufes of equivocal Words y 
 
 p. 67. 
 
 CHAP. V. General Directions relating to our Ideas, 
 (viz.) i. Of acquiring a Treafure of Ideas, 2. Of 
 retaining Ideas in Memory. 3. Of feletting ufe+ 
 ful Ideas. 4. Of the Government of our Thoughts^ 
 
 p. 71. 
 
 CHAP. VI. Special Rules to direft our Conception of 
 Things , p. 79. Se&. i. Of gaining clear and di' 
 jiinft Ideas i p. 80. Sedt 2. O/ /^ Definition 
 of Words or Names , p. 82. Sedl. 3. Directions 
 concerning the Definition of Names, p. 84. Se<5h 
 4. Of the Definition of Things, p. 100. Seft. 5, 
 /?/ of Definition of the Thing, p. 105. Sed. 6. 
 Obfervations concerning the Definition of Things, 
 p. 108. Se<5t 7. O/ ^ compleat Conception of 
 Things, p. 117. Se<5t 8. O/ Divifion, and the 
 Rules of it, p. 1 1 8. Seft. 9. Of a comprehen- 
 five Conception of Things and of Abftrattion y p. 
 124. Se&. 10. (y the extenfive Conception of 
 Things, and of Diftribution, p. 128. Se6t.ii. 
 Of an orderly Conception of Things, p. 133. Seft. 
 12. 7Ztf/ jfatf ^/^ o/ Conception exemplified^ 
 p. 135. Seft. 13. An Illujlration of tbefe five 
 Rules by Similitudes, p. 137. 
 
 The Second Part, (viz.) of Judgment and 
 Proportion. 
 
 CHAP. I. Of the Nature of a Proportion and 
 its fever al Parts, p. 144
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 CHAP. II. Of the various Kinds of Proportions,, 
 Se6t. i. Ofuniverfal, particular, indefinite^ and 
 fmgular Proportions, p. 147. Sect. 2. Of af- 
 firmative and negative Proportions, p. 156. 
 Seft. 3. Of the Oppofition and Converfion of Pro- 
 fofitions* p. 158. Se<fl. 4. Of pure and modaf 
 Proportions, p. 161. Sed. 5. Of fingle Propo- 
 f^ions^whetherfimpleor complex^ p. 163. Secb6. 
 &f compound Propofitions, p. 165. Se6t. 7. O/ 
 /r#<? tffld yi//tf Proportions ; p. 171. Seft. 8. Q^, 
 certain and doubtful Proportions of Knowledge 
 and Opinion^ p. 1 74. Set. 9. Of Senfe y Con* 
 fcioufnefsy Intelligence^ Reafon^ Faiih^ and Infpi- 
 ration, p. 177. 
 
 CHAP. III. The Springs of falfe Judgment , or the 
 Doctrine of Prejudices , p. 186. Seft. i. Preju- 
 dices arifeng from Thing s> p. 188. Seft. a. Pre- 
 judices arifingfrom Words, p. 195. Sedt. 3. Pr<r- 
 ju dices arifmg from ourfelves^ p. 198. Se<5t. 4. 
 Prejudices arifmg from other Perfons^ p* 214. 
 
 CHAP. IV. General Directions to ajjift us in judging 
 aright* p. 231. 
 
 CHAP. V. Special Rules to direft us in judging of 
 particular Oljebh* Se6t. i . Principles and Rules 
 of Judgment concerning the Objects ofSenfe, p. 249. 
 Sedt. 2. Principles and Rules of Judgment in Mat- 
 ters of Reafon and Speculation, p. 253. Se<5t. 3. 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 Morality and Religion , p. 259. Se6t. 4. Principles' 
 and Rules of Judgment in Matters of human Pru- 
 dence, p. 263. 'Se<5t. 5. Principles and Rules of 
 Judgment in Matters of human 'Teftimony, pr. 266. 
 Sett. 6. Principles and Rules of Judgment in Ma^ 
 ten of diving Tejlimonyy p. 27 1 , Se6t. 7. Principles .
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 And Rules of Judging concerning Things pajf, prefenf 
 'and to come, 'by the mere Ufe of Red f on, p. 275. 
 
 The Third Part (viz.) Of Reafoning and 
 Syllogifm. 
 
 GHAP. I. Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and of 
 the Parts of which it is compofed, p. 280. 
 
 CHAP. II. Of the various Kinds of Syllogifms, with 
 "particular Rulei relating to them. Seft. i. Of 
 univerfal and particular Syllogifms, liotlp negative 
 and affirmative i p. 283. Sedl. 2. Of plain, finipte 
 Syllogifms, and their Rules, p. 285. Seft. 3. Of 
 the Moods and Figures offimple Syllogifms, p. 289. 
 Se6t. 4. Of complex Syllogifms, p. 292. Sect. 5. 
 Of conjunctive Syllogifms, p. 296. Sedl. 6. Of 
 compound Syllogifms, p. 301. Seft. 7. Of the 
 middle Terms of common Places or Topics, and 
 Invention of Arguments, p. 305. Seft. 8. Of fe- 
 ver al Kinds of Arguments and Demonjlrations, 
 
 P. 308. 
 
 CHAP. III. The Dofttine of Sophifms. Sett. i. Of 
 feveral Kinds of Saphifms, and their Solution y 
 p. 313. Seft. 2. Two general Tejis of true Syl- 
 logifms, and Methods of folving all Sophifms, 
 
 P- 3 2 3' 
 CH A p. IV. Some general Rules to direft our Reafon- 
 
 4 ing, '' p. 326. 
 
 The Fourth Part, (viz.) Of Method. 
 
 CHAP. I. The Nature and Kinds of Method, 
 p. 340. 
 
 CHAP. II. General ancl Jpecial Rules of Method, 
 
 P- 349-
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 Lately puUiJhed : 
 
 PHilofophical EJJays on 'various Subjects, (viz.) 
 Space, Subftance, Body, Spirit, the Opera 
 tions of the Soul in Union with the Body, Innate 
 Ideas, perpetual Confcioufnefs, Place and Mo- 
 tion of Spirits, the departing Soul, the Refur- 
 redlion of the Body, the Production and Opera- 
 tions of Plants and Animals, with fome Remarks 
 on Mr. Locke's EJJay of the Human Under/landing , 
 to which is fubjoined A brief Scheme of Ontology* 
 or the Science of Being in general with its Affections, 
 By 1. Watts. D. D. The Second Edition. 
 
 The Doctrine of the Pafiions explained and im- 
 proved, or A brief and comprehenfive Scheme of 
 the natural Affections of Mankind attempted in a 
 plain and eafy Method ; with an Account of their 
 Names, Nature, Appearances, Effects, and diffe- 
 rent Ufes in Human Life : To which are fubjoined 
 Moral and Divine Rules f or the Regulation or Go- 
 vernment of them. By /. WATTS, D. D. The 
 fecond Edition corrected and enlarged. He ttyt 
 has no Rule over his own Spirit , is like a City that 
 is broken down and without Walls. London : Print- 
 ed for Richard Ford, at the Angel, and Richard 
 Hett, at the Bible and Crown, both in the Pouj-* 
 trey. 1732.
 
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