IvIBRA.RY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 University of California. 
 
 Class 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2007 with funding from 
 
 IVIicrosoft Corporation 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cultureofjusticeOOduborich 
 
THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
THE CULTURE OF 
 
 JUSTICE 
 
 yi f/lode of Moral Education 
 and of Social Reform 
 
 By PATTERSON Du BOIS 
 
 Author of "The Point of Contact in Teaching," 
 
 "Beckonings from Little Hands," **The 
 
 Natural Way in Moral Training," etc. 
 
 Render unto Ccesar the things 
 that are Ccesar^s. — ^esus. 
 
 True yustice between man and man, 
 Zzekiel 18:8, 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 Dodd, Mead and Company 
 
 1907 
 

 6£N£HAL 
 
 Copyright, 1907, 
 By DoDD, Mead and Company 
 
 Published April, 1907 
 
PUBLISHER'S PREFACE 
 
 This book is the natural sequence and 
 consummation of its three predeces- 
 sors — **Beckonings from Little Hands," 
 **The Point of Contact in Teaching," 
 and **Fireside Child Study." In all these 
 works we see the same motif, but it 
 remains for the present volume to make 
 clear the meaning and importance of 
 Justice itself as the bottom moral and 
 social principle. The book is thus edu- 
 cational and sociological. It concerns 
 the social reformer and the jurist as well 
 as the parent, teacher, minister, and busi- 
 ness man. Its reach is from the cradle 
 to the market or to the school, bar, and 
 pulpit — alike professional and popular. 
 
 1.74092 
 
^ OF THE "^ 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 This little book Is the amplification of an 
 address delivered under the auspices of 
 the Union Theological Seminary at the 
 opening of the Extension Courses for 
 Lay Students In the autumn of 1906. 
 
 Prior to this I had presented one phase 
 and another of the subject as lectures or 
 talks before pedagogical, clerical, and 
 women's clubs, or special audiences, 
 under such titles as **The Appeal of 
 Justice'' and **The Place of Justice In 
 Education." 
 
 The great moral awakening In civic 
 and In business life, the contagious zeal 
 for social reform, the growing conscious- 
 ness of definite educational Ideals, the 
 movement toward child emancipation, 
 the criticism of court procedure, the as- 
 cendancy of arbitration and peace prin- 
 ciples — these on the one hand; on the 
 
vm PREFACE 
 
 Other hand, the menace to the integrity 
 of the home and the family, the pas- 
 sionate greed, the gambling habit, the 
 lawless vengeance, and the sluggishness 
 of the Church to lead In moral-social re- 
 form — all these things Indicate that the 
 time Is ripe for an effort toward the end 
 which this discussion has In view. 
 
 That most of our social misery Is at 
 bottom rooted In human Injustice has 
 long been my Intensifying conviction. 
 That the Improvement of moral condi- 
 tions rests upon a fuller and more 
 definite conception of Justice as the basal 
 and the virile virtue Is to me equally 
 clear. 
 
 Such Is the real purport of the work, 
 however Inadequate or faulty Its presen- 
 tation. The first part Is devoted more 
 specifically to principles or theory, the 
 second part to practice or application; 
 the latter Includes diverse Illustration 
 and three very Important topics. In which 
 Justice or Equity Is the common factor. 
 
 That some issues In the argument will 
 
PREFACE IX 
 
 seem unconventional and extreme to not 
 a few readers is to be expected. The 
 main thing is that the true idea of Jus- 
 tice shall become our controlling moral 
 habit of mind and regulate our complex 
 human relations — our rights and duties. 
 Patterson Du Bois. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 THEORY 
 
 I 
 A Right Start j 
 
 II 
 Our Duty to Our Powers 28 
 
 III 
 Genesis of the Sense of Justice and 
 
 OF Morality 36 
 
 IV 
 Meaning and Significance of Justice 53 
 
 V 
 
 Universality and Persistence of the Sense 
 
 OF Justice 90 
 
 VI 
 
 Extension and Further Elucidation of 
 
 THE Principle 120 
 
 APPLICATION 
 
 VII 
 Specimen Applications 159 
 
 VIII 
 Loyalty vs. Obedience 198 
 
 IX 
 
 Failure and Immorality of Corporal Pun- 
 ishment 209 
 X 
 Money as a Means of Moral Training 228 
 
 Index 273 
 
PART FIRST 
 
 M 
 
 THEORY 
 
OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 A RIGHT START 
 
 A CHILD of ten, returning from school 
 one day, naively submitted to the court 
 of the home circle this case of class-room 
 ethics: "The teacher makes the girls 
 pick up all the papers from the floor 
 about their own desks; and sometimes 
 the children say, *Those are not my 
 papers ;' but she says they must pick them 
 up just the same." Then with a child's 
 instinctive directness she added, **I 
 should think it would be better not to 
 let the papers get on the floor." 
 
 This plea of the children, that the 
 papers were not theirs, was the appeal 
 to Justice — the earliest born and the 
 most persistent form of the moral sense. 
 The little maid simply shifted the prob- 
 lem back from cure to prevention. 
 
/* 
 
 4 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 What she saw in a twinkling, the brain 
 of science and the heart of philanthropy 
 have been gradually coming to see 
 through the centuries. The world is a 
 school-room littered with disorder and 
 misery. Shall we spend ourselves merely 
 trying to relieve it? or shall we work 
 to prevent it? This is the problem. Can 
 rOve alone solve it? ^ 
 
 Love is the great dynamic of the soul. ^ 
 But human love has little or no essential 
 wisdom, no selective self-control. It is 
 unengineered steam, the electric potential 
 of the air. It may caress a child into 
 saintship or it may nag and punish him 
 Into criminal estrangement. It may lift 
 the poor Into self-respect and cheerful 
 comfort, or It may pauperise them into 
 degradation and despair. Love needs a 
 regulator. It needs the judgment of 
 Justice. 
 As we shall see later, Justice Is the full- 
 est expression of the right relation of 
 man to man. No other virtue Is thus 
 complete. It gives to all other virtues 
 
A RIGHT START 5 
 
 their highest efficiency. To Love, it is 
 the balance-wheel, the pendulum, the 
 regulator, the governor, the rudder, the 
 far-sighted lookout, the premier. 
 
 Without a sense of justice there is no 
 sound moral sense. Exactly what justice 
 means and why it is the essence of moral 
 living we shall see later. That the 
 Christian or the Jew needs all the moral- 
 ity that he can get is not debatable. 
 That the culture of justice is the shortest 
 and indeed the only sure road to it is 
 the present proposition. 
 
 All through the ages and now on all 
 sides of us we find religious men failing 
 in morals. They do not appear to ap- 
 preciate the infinite obligation of render- 
 ing to every man his own or of enabling 
 each to contribute his fullest strength to 
 the common good. They have not 
 brought conscience under the law of jus- 
 tice. The result is, social conditions as 
 we see them among all sorts and condi- 
 tions of men. 
 
 Some Christians are afraid to be moral 
 
6 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 lest they be **merely" moral. On this 
 point also more later. But just this word 
 now: When the Master Teacher told 
 men that they must render unto Caesar 
 the things that are Caesar's and unto 
 God the things that are God's, he gave 
 them to understand that there is a moral 
 obligation of man to man as well as a 
 religious obligation of man to God. 
 These two things are at bottom one, but 
 the finite mind will do well to think of 
 them, must so do indeed, as practically 
 two. Christianity includes morality, 
 sure enough, but human relations are so 
 complex that it is worth while — neces- 
 sary, in fact — to think of morals as 
 morals, however strongly we hold that 
 being a Christian includes all. 
 
 That ethical philosophising alone will 
 not produce moral living is patent and 
 proved. But that a man is as He **think- 
 eth in his heart" is a fact* as old as 
 Sacred Writ. Social life, in. our day at 
 least, is too intricate a thing to be 
 morally lived without a clear, control- 
 
A RIGHT START 7 
 
 ling principle of which the conscience is 
 always conscious. If such a principle 
 exist as a named virtue, the mind ought 
 to be able to define it in words which, if 
 not mathematical, should at least give a 
 specific set to one's thinking, feeling, and 
 willing. The "heart" means all this: 
 to think in one's heart is to think things 
 through to action. 
 
 Is there such a guiding principle, senti- 
 ment, or ideal virtue ? It is the function 
 of this book to show in some measure 
 that there is, and that it is Justice. 
 Every one has a feeling for justice as the 
 moral-social specific. But with very few 
 has it become the controlling ethical 
 duty in their lives. It has never been de- 
 fined as a centre of the thinking in the 
 heart. We feel for Justice as the 
 heathen gropes for God — knowing him 
 only from afar and in the twilight mist. 
 
 The popular mind, largely affected by 
 juridical phrase, has come to associate 
 the idea of justice with the idea of retri- 
 bution or punishment, or at least with 
 
8 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 legal victory. The average man sup- 
 poses that he can get justice without 
 equity, or worse still, that if he is legal 
 he is just! He never thinks of justice as 
 the great formative agency for the de- 
 velopment of the individual. He does 
 not see it as a co-operative and reciprocal 
 rendering, each to each, of that which 
 is his own and in the interest of the high- 
 est common good. But of this matter of 
 definition more later. 
 
 No one idea more dominates the atti- 
 tude of loving and conscientious parents 
 than that of correction and especially 
 punishment; and still further, that the 
 effectiveness of punishment depends 
 chiefly upon its severity. The same is 
 true of the school and the state. Under 
 the strictly just habit of mind we should 
 so study to render unto every one his 
 own that punishment is hardly to be 
 thought of, or thought of only as a con- 
 sequence of our own dereliction. 
 
 Perhaps the measure of punishment 
 necessary to the common good is the 
 
A RIGHT START 9 
 
 measure of our ignorance and unwisdom 
 in dealing first with children and later 
 with men. In setting a penal pace for 
 ourselves as guardians of children, how- 
 ever, let us cease to quote the dealings of 
 God with the race, for only in the most 
 limited sense can we compare ourselves 
 with God. And so of justice; it is here 
 discussed purely as a matter of morals 
 or human relations. It demands that we 
 begin right rather than wait for wrongs 
 to need correcting. 
 
 Possibly the trouble lies just here: we 
 pity our neighbour enough to pull him 
 out of the mire, but we do not love him 
 enough to think justice for him. There- 
 fore we make no effort to prevent his 
 falling into the pit in the first place, 
 which is what a truly just habit of mind 
 would order. In fact, so long as we al- 
 low the pitfall to remain we cannot hope 
 for his safety. If it remain, it does so 
 because we have not yet acquired the just 
 habit of loving our neighbour as we 
 ought to love ourselves, as contributors 
 
lo THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 to and sharers In the common good. We 
 do not see the whole relation in which 
 we stand in an infinite reciprocity. We 
 need the eye of justice looking back- 
 ward as well as forward. 
 
 As that great modern prophet, Victor 
 Hugo, has put it:^ 
 
 *'This soul is full of darkness and sin 
 is committed ; but the guilty person is not 
 the man who commits the sin, but he who 
 produces the darkness." Let us say who 
 permits the darkness. 
 
 A child of six saw these truths no less 
 directly. She had been telling her father 
 and mother about an untrained school- 
 mate from a Christian, well-to-do home. 
 **How would you like to have a child like 
 that?" she said; **you would teach her, 
 wouldn't you?" This showed that with 
 all her disapprobation of such an ob- 
 jectionable classmate she still looked fuir. 
 ther back to causes and threw J^lame on 
 the girl's parents. This was the Spartan 
 law. 
 
 * "Les Miserables." 
 
A RIGHT START il 
 
 Another child, a vigorous-minded girl 
 of ten, commenting on the conduct of 
 certain companions, said it made her 
 mad — **mad not at the children, but at 
 their mothers." The average parent 
 might think that those mothers had not 
 punished enough; but the just mind 
 might as fairly think that they had 
 punished too much — or relied too 
 greatly on treatment after instead of be- 
 fore the deed. 
 
 Let us start right We have had a 
 hand in producing the darkness that has 
 permitted and produced misery in all 
 sorts and conditions of men — and only 
 too often in the very name of love. Us- 
 ually we can look for the first causes in 
 an unjust home life. The effects are evi- 
 dent in the larger social life. 
 The quickest way to atone for all this 
 nd to make a new start is to train the 
 hildren into the unfailing method of 
 Love's justice by practising it ourselves. 
 It is their natural method, as we have 
 seen in a few cited instances. But they 
 
12 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 need us to steady them in it. We shall 
 see the full meaning of this as we pro- 
 ceed. 
 
 As a feeling, Love is the greatest of all 
 impelling powers. But love is not a 
 prescribed method or a plan. Lacking 
 wisdom, it may do unlovely, because un- 
 just, things, without seeing their unlove- 
 liness. The mother punishes her child 
 in love, she says. But if she has not 
 heard the child's case and has igno- 
 rantly hurt the innocent, she has done an 
 unjust and therefore an unlovely thing. 
 And yet no one dare say she does not love 
 her child. 
 
 Not so when Love takes Justice for her 
 wisdom and makes it her unfailing way. 
 This enlists the nobler faculties of mind 
 — calls out the imagination as inter- 
 preter, demands the suspended and de- 
 liberating judgment, holds self-interest 
 and personal irritation in check, and 
 opens the vision to the universal good. 
 Justice is impossible to mental indolence. 
 It develops that courage which is neces- 
 
A RIGHT START 13 
 
 sary to face facts and that self-control 
 which is essential to their valuation. It 
 is the only safe administrator of the per- 
 fect law of individual liberty, and the 
 guarantor of peace, unity, and brother- 
 hood. 
 
 As a habit of thought, justice begins 
 and must show itself as a moral funda- 
 ment in the family. Many an able jurist 
 finds it easier to be just on the bench than 
 at the family fireside — even though he 
 has not realised it. If, as we shall see 
 later, the sense of justice develops in 
 early childhood, it is in the home that it 
 is either weakened or strengthened with 
 the days. 
 
 In a true family life, uncorrupted, in- 
 corruptible, solidified by the loyalty of a 
 just confidence, mutual aid and affec- 
 tionate devotion — in this lies the hope of 
 the nation and of the individual. Here 
 virtue begins to be loved, vice to be ab- 
 horred. Here God first reveals himself 
 to the upreaching souL 
 
 I cannot forbear quoting a few apt sen- 
 
14 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 tences from Dr. Washington Gladden. 
 **A11 the economic operations of the com- 
 munity are an evolution from the life of 
 the pioneer family. All the movements 
 which tend to socialise the community — 
 the education, the moral and religious 
 training — originate in the family. These 
 functions are now largely handed over 
 to other agencies. But the family is not 
 released from responsibility for them. 
 The family must still remain the vitalis- 
 ing, energising force, in them and be- 
 hind them all. All this work of protec- 
 tion, production, education must find its 
 spring and its impulse in the home. The 
 capital defect of our modern society is 
 in the tendency of the family to shirk 
 these primary social functions and pass 
 them over to other agencies." 
 
 For society's sake, for the individual's 
 sake, let us maintain the integrity of the 
 family. The signs of family and home 
 degeneracy are more serious than those 
 of physical degeneracy and crime. It is 
 in the home that Love needs the highest 
 
A RIGHT START 15 
 
 Wisdom — the wisdom of true justice. It 
 is in the home that we handle first causes. 
 Here justice should begin to be preven- 
 tive, formative, and constructive rather 
 than wait for the later public justice of 
 correction, retribution, and repression. 
 
II 
 
 OUR DUTY TO OUR POWERS 
 
 Too long have theology and the Church 
 permitted the world to ask why *'con- 
 version'' or the profession of Christian- 
 ity has not produced a finer moral dis- 
 cernment as well as a higher moral cour- 
 age in the average Christian. 
 
 The reason is not far to seek. We are 
 endowed with capabilities or personal 
 powers which have to be trained into a 
 harmonious adjustment with a complex 
 humanly organised society. 
 
 This is a matter of morals, however 
 essentially Christian morals be rooted in 
 religion. And it is with moral rela- 
 tions — social human relations only — 
 that we are now concerned. More spe- 
 cifically, it is with justice as the modal 
 base of human relations that we are en- 
 
OUR DUTY TO OUR POWERS 17 
 
 deavouring to cultivate a better working 
 acquaintance. 
 
 Granted that the ultimate Christian 
 motive is religious, we must have a more 
 humanly near working purpose than the 
 doing right in order to please God. Few 
 men can carry so remote an abstraction 
 into human adjustments unless the 
 human adjustments are thought of as an 
 end in themselves. To please God by 
 being right with men is a true ideal, but 
 it does not show us what being right with 
 men consists in nor does it train the fac- 
 ulties and capabilities into specific habits 
 of action. 
 
 Too often the Christian falls back into 
 the lap of something that he calls **spirit- 
 uality," and so evades the real issue — the 
 near duty of discernment and coopera- 
 tion. Or he rests in his orthodoxy and 
 his literalism, or on certain pet rigours. 
 
 The famous defaulter. Hippie, made a 
 point of condemning the use of tobacco, 
 liquor, and the Sunday newspaper. A 
 preacher said of him, "This man Hippie 
 
iZ THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 had been fattening on sermons about 
 love and heaven. . . . He was one of 
 your strict churchmen, who did not con- 
 sider that the minister preached gospel 
 when he insisted upon honesty in busi- 
 ness life. Hippie's conception of relig- 
 ion was to be exact in your formularies, 
 but it never occurred to him that it was 
 the Christian's duty to be true and hon- 
 est and brave and pure." 
 
 This may or may not be literally true of 
 this particular man. But it is essentially 
 true of a type of supposedly religious 
 persons who, whether hypocritical in 
 purpose or not, are strict about their 
 theology, their forms, their church atten- 
 tions, and even some ethical matters, but 
 who have no really moral habit of mind. 
 It was also said with reason that such a 
 character is largely the product of 
 ^legalism." 
 
 There was a time, within easy memory, 
 too, when orthodoxy would scarcely tol- 
 erate any particular stress upon morals 
 or ethics. It fairly trembled lest man, 
 
OUR DUTY TO OUR POWERS 19 
 
 becoming Impressed with his human rela- 
 tions, should forget his relations to God. 
 In order to place ethics under a ban it 
 unjustly coined the term **mere moral- 
 ity," and pointed the finger of theologi- 
 cal condemnation at him who enter- 
 tained that **mere morality" too gener- 
 ously, (No word in the language can 
 be used with more insidious unfairness 
 than the word **mere." It is one of the 
 main mischief-makers of discussion.) 
 
 Referring to this absurd, to say noth- 
 ing of unscriptural, coldness toward our 
 moral duties considered as duties. Pro- 
 fessor Coe^ notes that "less than fifty 
 years ago a writer on ^natural goodness' 
 asserted that *moral men as a class, and 
 in view of their morality, inflict the sever- 
 est injury on the cause of religion.' . . . 
 The more perfect the moralist, the more 
 fatal the influence !" This was that old 
 misconception which, as Coe adds, "as- 
 sumes that if only we have faith we do 
 
 * "Religion of a Mature Mind," p. 147. 
 
 OP THE ^ 
 ' ■ f- r^ *►* I -IT- 
 
20 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 not need to lay very much stress upon 
 being good.'' 
 
 God wants us to be good. From Gene- 
 sis to Revelation the Bible is big with 
 this homely fact. He wants us to be like 
 himself; but the only way that we can 
 realise what the goodness of God means 
 is to begin by being good to man in a 
 small way ourselves. But we do not know 
 how. Our powers are untrained. We 
 have grown up without definite aims 
 and conceptions. We need a method, a 
 conscious mode of thinking, to guide our 
 doing. 
 
 Look over the Christian world. There 
 are millions professing love to God and 
 love to man and yet in perpetual con- 
 flict of criticism one of another. They 
 would not disagree on the point that 
 Judaism and Christianity, unlike the pa- 
 gan religions, demand moral excellence 
 in conduct and character. They would 
 not deny that they themselves were 
 faulty or sinful, but they would resent 
 particular charges against their particular 
 
OUR DUTY TO OUR POWERS %i 
 
 faults, going in most cases to the extent 
 of excusing or of positively justifying 
 their misdeeds in the concrete. 
 
 Yet these people mean to be good by 
 the Gospel standards, and they are not 
 fairly to be charged with hypocrisy. 
 Most of them are not competent to act 
 the purposeful hypocrite, if they would. 
 They mean to love their fellow-men, but 
 love in the best sense is not whim. It 
 needs enlightenment and training. Its 
 first obligation is to become learned and 
 expert. 
 
 Parents suppose that because they love 
 their children they cannot go astray in 
 doing as they please with them. The 
 amount of injustice and even downright 
 cruelty committed in the name of love is 
 prodigious. 
 
 So with the sympathies and the benevo- 
 lent virtues generally. The fact that 
 they are intentionally benevolent does 
 not render them harmless. Neither does 
 being a humble-minded, earnest Chris- 
 tian guarantee wisdom in the mode of 
 
X2 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 supposed well-doing. One man, for 
 love's sake, throws alms to the pauper; 
 another from the same motive cautions 
 him against doing it. Both "love the 
 brethren," but they disagree about love's 
 method of striving to be a doer of the 
 Word. 
 
 Parents differ in the motives for being 
 good which they present to their chil- 
 dren. With some, it is to please the pa- 
 rent, with others to please God; or it is 
 fear of punishment, or it is utilitarian — 
 a matter of final rewards. Until there is 
 more uniformity of moral thinking we 
 cannot have sound moral conditions. 
 
 Christians are conscientiously busy criti- 
 cising one another's moral standards. 
 What is a peccadillo to one is to another 
 a heinous sin or crime; what one has 
 never stopped to consider as a point in 
 Christian morals, has to another been a 
 glaring menace or a positive stumbling 
 block. Why these differences? Arc 
 they not all Christians *4n good stand- 
 ing" — and properly reckoned so by the 
 
OUR DUTY TO OUR POWERS 23 
 
 Church? Why, then, have they not 
 reached some uniformity of moral judg- 
 ment? 
 
 To become a Christian is not at once to 
 attain the power of moral discernment 
 or even the will to live up to such discern- 
 ment as is already attained. But to be- 
 come Christ's is to gain through Him the 
 love of better things, to seek the more 
 excellent way, to go on toward perfec- 
 tion. The question is how to do it. 
 
 Now in a social world, in the corporate 
 life, what does this mean but the exercise 
 of human powers? To consecrate these 
 powers, however concretely, as in Miss 
 HavergaFs hymn, "Take my life and let 
 it be,'* is to be incessantly vigilant that 
 our powers neither become atrophied 
 through disuse nor crippled through mis- 
 use. I cannot understand how taking 
 Christ into my life or the knowing of it 
 through my love to the brethren relieves 
 me from the responsibility of expertly us- 
 ing these God-given faculties. No one 
 so much as the Christian is under obliga- 
 
24 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 tion to be wise, discreet, discerning, 
 healthy, strong, energetic, efficient. 
 
 In Swedenborg's phrase, the ** Kingdom 
 of God is a kingdom of uses." Chris- 
 tianity and uselessness are incompatible 
 ideas, for Christianity is essentially so- 
 cial. To be immoral is to be anti-social ; 
 it is to disrupt the social bond. Likewise 
 to be useless in society is to be anti-social 
 and is virtually immoral. 
 
 But love to God and faith in Christ 
 do not appear to teach a Christian how 
 to be useful, even though he grow into 
 the desire. We have hosts of obstructive 
 — because unwise — Christians about us 
 as witnesses. Why is this so ? Do we not 
 also see the wicked, and even the un- 
 learned wicked, turning to Christ and 
 showing a fine discrimination in their 
 moral reformation? We see both, and 
 why ? Some have a more acute and a bet- 
 ter discernment than others. This is a 
 matter apart from faith or '^conversion.'' 
 
 All this points to the fact that when we 
 begin to talk about religion and **spirit- 
 
OUR DUTY TO OUR POWERS 25 
 
 uality" and faith and love and salvation 
 we are prone to lose sight of the truth 
 that a right spirit or a consecrated mind, 
 or heart, does not Insure skill In mental 
 or moral discernment any more than It 
 guarantees muscular development. It 
 does not adjust religious faith or belief 
 to forms of environment. It may beget 
 the desire, but It does not direct the facul- 
 ties specifically. 
 
 The egregious mistake of Christians — 
 not of Christianity — appears to me to be 
 this comparative neglect of our God- 
 given outfit for social life. There is a 
 tendency to think that with the Book In 
 hand we have all that is necessary to the 
 following of Its lead. Can we not be as 
 irreverent toward our powers as toward 
 the Book? 
 
 Society called Christian is a tangle of 
 diverse ethical aims and judgments 
 largely because it has no unit, no definite 
 centre of ethical thinking, no track for Its 
 train of pity, kindness, and benevolent 
 generosity, no ethical habit of mind. 
 
26 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Jesus IS admittedly the ideal man and 
 love to God the confessed animating 
 purpose. But the truth is, God has set 
 us in a concrete, tangible world, and 
 while we are as nothing without the 
 Spirit, our human construction demands 
 a lower ideal than the divine — something 
 nearer to us, more tangible, more work- 
 able for immediate use. The question, 
 What would Jesus do ? is interesting for 
 discussion without general agreement; 
 but the question. What must I do? re- 
 quires me to take into consideration my 
 powers in their relation to my fellows in 
 a social world. 
 
 This means an ordered habit of 
 thought, stable, yet adjustable to an ever- 
 developing order of things. Otherwise 
 we may prove ourselves piously irrever- 
 ent by dissipating our powers in caprice. 
 
 To live without an organising, directing 
 idea is to be chaotic, anarchic, futile, and 
 foolish. If there is an impiety of '*mere 
 morality," there is an immorality of mere 
 piety. Let us be good if we would be 
 
OUR DUTY TO OUR POWERS 27 
 
 God's. If we would do His will let us 
 be moral. If we would love our brothers 
 let us learn how to think about them to 
 the end that we may grow skilful in the 
 exercise of our social relations — our 
 morals. Let us not think ourselves con- 
 secrated with our mind — our intellectual 
 discrimination left out. 
 
 The culture of morals — personal and 
 social — is a different thing from the *'re- 
 ligion of culture" or of science or of 
 ethics. Culture as culture is indeed life- 
 less. It has been shrewdly said that 
 civilisation never civilises. 
 
 The Christ is the renewing, vitalising 
 agency, but his Gospel demands the cul- 
 ture of morals. It does not permit the 
 ignoring of powers; it expects the useful- 
 ness to society that can grow only by 
 study and by practice. We are the trus- 
 tees not alone of our property, but of 
 our powers. Faith and Love are not 
 enough to enable us to administer that 
 trust wisely, 
 
 A practised moral discrimination and a 
 
28 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 courage to act on it are essential to that 
 social soundness which is moral. This is 
 both more and less than being an ethi- 
 cal philosopher as such. Moralists are 
 not necessarily moral. The moral dis- 
 crimination must carry a God-conscious- 
 ness with it, even though this God-con- 
 sciousness is not morality. Mrs. Hough- 
 ton calls attention to the French pessi- 
 mism resulting from godless text books 
 on morals.^ Undoubtedly she is right, 
 but while God is the ultimate sanction we 
 must have a more distinctly human and 
 social sanction. This we shall find to be 
 the Sanction of Justice. 
 
 The truth is, the Church, if it would 
 grow in efficiency as evangeliser and civil- 
 Iser, must avail itself of the findings of 
 sociological investigation. Science is the 
 natural ally of the Church, which the 
 Church is too slow to recognise. 
 
 That learned expert in foreign mission 
 methods, Dr. Sidney L. Gulick, has told 
 
 * "Telling Bible Stories," p. 9. 
 
OUR DUTY TO OUR POWERS 29 
 
 US that the foreign mission will gain Its 
 highest efficiency when it assumes the 
 character of a social settlement, when 
 the missionary will not only proclaim the 
 true religion in the abstract, but will la- 
 bour to transform the entire social life of 
 the people. 
 
 This means to clean the place with 
 bucket and brush as well as to cleanse the 
 heart with the **blood of Christ''; it 
 means to take measures against insecurity 
 of property and life, against ignorance, 
 carnality, and disease; it means to teach 
 help to the less favoured, public spirit 
 and community solidarity, and mutuality 
 of interests, reciprocity of rights and of 
 duties — the essence of which Is the 
 Charity of Justice. 
 
 This sociological education Indeed Is 
 necessary not only to the propagation of 
 Christianity abroad, but In our own 
 homes. ^'Unless a child," says President 
 Nicholas Murray Butler,^ ^^understands 
 
 '<*The Meaning of Education/* p. 27. 
 
30 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 that though he is an individual he is also 
 a member of the body politic, of an insti- 
 tutional life in which he must give and 
 take, defer and obey, adjust and corre- 
 late, and that with all this there can be no 
 civilisation and no progress, we are 
 thrown back into the condition of 
 anarchy — the anarchy of Rousseau — or 
 the collectivism and stagnation of China, 
 India, and Egypt." 
 
 The Church is beginning to realise that 
 it must recognise this matter of the body 
 politic as a moral question or fail of its 
 mission. Already we find the Church 
 moving toward an active interest in or- 
 ganised labour, child emancipation, im- 
 migration, industrialism, and socialism. 
 In all these questions justice-charity is 
 the keynote and the intellectual directive. 
 Love of man — Christian brotherhood — 
 is the propelling force, justice lays the 
 track. God the Father was the divine in- 
 spirational force, Jesus was the way. 
 Jesus was incarnate justice, as he was 
 incarnate charity. The two became one 
 
OUR DUTY TO OUR POWERS 31 
 
 in him. Never did he utter a more far- 
 reaching, all-comprehending moral prin- 
 ciple than when he said, **Render unto 
 Csesar the things that are Caesar's and 
 unto God the things that are God's." 
 This is all that justice asks, all that love 
 asks, all that charity asks. 
 
 Nor are we to regard the body politic 
 or the institutional life as bounded by our 
 national confines or the shadow of our 
 flag. It means man. It was Phillips 
 Brooks who said that "No man has come 
 to true greatness who has not felt in 
 some degree that his life belongs to his 
 race and that what God gives him, he 
 gives him for mankind.'' 
 
 The relation between man and man is 
 moral, however truly it be rooted in 
 religion. The very idea of the Kingdom 
 of God is a corporate idea. It is a thing 
 of modes, methods, manners. The move- 
 ment against child labour is moral ; 
 politeness in the home, courtesy at court, 
 are at bottom moral. Morality, as al- 
 ready said, necessitates training in dis- 
 
34 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 crimination. It demands that the spirit- 
 ual eye be trained to a far horizon, to a 
 long look back for causes, forward 
 for effects. It calls loudly for the Imagi- 
 nation. The Golden Rule does not tell 
 me how to wish that others should do to 
 me. I must love my neighbour as my- 
 self, but how ought I to love myself? 
 
 For the want of a directed Imagination 
 and a trained mode of social thought I 
 may violate these divine orders In my 
 veriest zeal to carry them out. Well- 
 meaning men vote against their own 
 individual and social interests not neces- 
 sarily because they are selfish or timid, 
 but because they are short-sighted and 
 prosaic. **Good" people encourage some 
 forms of amusement because they are 
 satisfied with an Immediate pleasure and 
 cannot see the tendencies of such courses 
 in the distance. The teleologlcal faculty, 
 the telescopic vision, is undeveloped. 
 Moral thinking is undirected. It wan- 
 ders without a surveyed road ahead. 
 
 Such people are satisfied with the miti- 
 
OUR DUTY TO OUR POWERS 33 
 
 gation of pain by deeds of pity instead 
 of preventing pain to the next generation 
 by the culture, let us say, of justice, or 
 of some other all-embracing moral ideal 
 — if there be one. They would rather 
 cure the man disabled by football than 
 prevent the coaching that orders to *4ay 
 a man out" if necessary to winning. 
 
 They would rather raise money for a 
 church by the vice of gambling, so that 
 the church could fight vice, than prevent 
 the very vice that the church ought to 
 fight. They would rather be taxed for 
 reformatories, prisons, almshouses, and 
 hospitals than prevent a large need of 
 supporting such institutions by pursuing 
 a preventive policy with children. 
 
 When I say **they," I mean people who 
 are Christians in **good standing." They 
 want to be in good standing not for busi- 
 ness reasons nor with any conscious hypo- 
 critical intent, but sincerely. They believe 
 in God and advocate love and charity 
 to all men, but they lack the vision o^- 
 consequences and of causes. They can 
 
34 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 imagine enough to pity, to sympathise, 
 and in a degree to be kind ; but they can- 
 not see far enough to reach the heart of 
 equity, of reciprocity, of equalisation, of 
 the whole duty toward the Caesar of 
 brotherhood. 
 
 Here, then, is a matter of the use and 
 cultivation of powers toward an ideal, 
 social morality. Here is the constructive 
 demand for the kingdom of uses. This 
 means an ordered thinking of far-off 
 cause and effect, a refined and apt dis- 
 crimination, a sensitive courage. 
 
 It is not enough to say love, love, love. 
 It is not enough to be sorry for sin and 
 to aspire to heaven, or to accept a **plan 
 of salvation," unless that plan includes 
 the divine truth that our powers are not 
 to be ignored or minimised simply be- 
 cause we profess a religion of love and 
 faith. Just as great as that duty of love 
 to God and faith in Christ is the duty of 
 using what he has given us. Prayer and 
 praise are no substitute for thinking and 
 feeling and doing. We are in a moral 
 
OUR DUTY TO OUR POWERS 35 
 
 world — that is, a world of human and 
 social relations, and we are bound to 
 study the way to be moral or right in all 
 our relations. "There is no true man- 
 hood without morality, for manhood 
 rests in the social conscience, and God 
 wants the best of manhood for His ser- 
 vice, because the best of manhood can 
 hold most of God." 
 
 Now, if the moral thinking of Chris- 
 tians is as chaotic as we have just indi- 
 cated and if the discrimination is as un- 
 certain and as inexact, it is evident that 
 there must be found a norm of educa- 
 tion for the training of the moral dis- 
 cernment. This norm must become the 
 axis or germinal centre of all our moral 
 thinking. We must measure by it, direct 
 by it, control by it. It must fix our goals 
 and set the pace for running and light the 
 way and clear the track. Love is the en- 
 ergising power, but love is not a trusty 
 directive. Love needs wisdom. Where 
 is it? 
 
Ill 
 
 GENESIS OF THE SENSE OF JUSTICE AND 
 OF MORALITY 
 
 If we watch the signs of feeling in young 
 children under certain circumstances, we 
 shall see how early and with what vigour 
 the property sense develops. 
 
 A certain little girl in the home was 
 spilling her kindergarten beads when her 
 father rose to take them from her. With 
 muscles tense in determination she 
 clasped her little hands over her treas- 
 ures and exclaimed, ''No! those are 
 mineF^ The father with quick Insight 
 recognising her feeling, withdrew his 
 hand. On this display of concession to 
 the child's sense of property rights, she 
 arose and said graciously, *Tapa can take 
 Rachel's beads now." The child had no 
 wish to combat her father, nor even to 
 
SENSE OF JUSTICE AND OF MORALITY 37 
 
 deprive him of the beads, but she wanted 
 her property rights recognised. 
 
 Here was a sense of personal relations 
 to persons and to things. It asserted 
 property rights, forbade trespass, carried 
 a question of give and take, distinguished 
 offence and defence — in short, insisted 
 on the recognition of meum and tuum 
 and foreshadowed acknowledgment of 
 personal accountability. 
 
 If we tie together the hands of a much 
 younger child, he will struggle to free 
 them. This is not necessarily because he 
 wishes to employ his hands for some spe- 
 cific purpose at the moment, but because 
 we violate his instinct of power. Very 
 early indeed does the child declare by his 
 actions a proprietary right In his facul- 
 ties or powers. In truth, this is but an 
 aspect of the law of self-preservation. 
 
 This proprietary sense is but an earlier, 
 more subtle, more intimate, more funda- 
 mental form of the property sense, which 
 term is better reserved for material pos- 
 sessions of things outside of us. 
 
3? THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Froebers aim was thoroughly funda- 
 mental, for it was to put the child in pos- 
 session of his own powers. 
 
 It was to develop the resources of the 
 individual to the utmost benefit of soci- 
 ety. Hence the basal conception of the 
 kindergarten is that of community life, 
 developing the two essentials of individ- 
 uality and mutuality — rights and duties, 
 meum and tuum. The child is a member 
 of a larger whole. 
 
 Now out of the proprietary sense, in 
 connection with the recognition of hu- 
 man relations, springs the sentiment of 
 rights. But it is impossible for the child 
 or man to live in these human relations 
 without his imagination opening to him 
 an exchange of places with his neigh- 
 bour. He cannot help but put himself in 
 his neighbour's place under stress, and, 
 in turn, demanding that his neighbour 
 do the same for him. Thus the idea of 
 duty and of reciprocity is begotten, and 
 he becomes moral. 
 
 The regulation and control of these so- 
 
SENSE OF JUSTICE AND OF MORALITY 39 
 
 cial relations, the securing of these 
 rights, the implication that such security 
 must be guaranteed to all or to none, de- 
 velops a notion of a moral social order 
 of which the controlling principle or mas- 
 ter mode is that which we call fairness, 
 equity, or justice. Fair play, the ^'square 
 deal," is the first morality. The recogni- 
 tion of meum and tuurriy working both 
 ways as rights and as duties, is the bed 
 rock of the moral life and the call of 
 justice. 
 
 Morality and justice are at bottom one. 
 They arise out of the very necessity of 
 personal, individual, and social self- 
 preservation. The first struggle of the 
 child to free himself of bondage or to de- 
 fend his property from trespass is not In 
 the nature of kindness, generosity, or 
 benevolence, but of establishing a stable 
 and equitable social order, a reciprocity 
 of rights and of duties, which in the total 
 is the ideal of justice or the highest com- 
 mon good. '*If ye have not been faith- 
 ful in that which is another's, who will 
 
40 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 give you that which is your own?" To 
 be unfaithful to society is to suffer per- 
 sonal loss also/ 
 
 As the sentiment of justice is the earliest 
 definite motive to develop in the individ- 
 ual, so does it appear to be the earliest 
 in the history of the race. Very sugges- 
 tive is George Matheson's interpretation 
 of the story of Eden. His deduction is 
 that the earliest moral appeal was the 
 appeal to human justice. 
 
 Adam had experienced the sense of pro- 
 prietorship. He "stretched his hand 
 toward the trees of the Garden and said, 
 *They are mine.' Through the cool air 
 a voice comes, *They are not all yours ; it 
 is a divided ownership.' With that voice 
 came the first possibility of actual trans- 
 gression — of stepping into another's 
 field. That other was here the Creator ; 
 there was no rival child to say, *This part 
 belongs to me;' therefore the Almighty 
 said it. The first thing prohibited was 
 
 ' Luke 1 6 : I2, 
 
SENSE OF JUSTICE AND OF MORALITY 41 
 
 trespassing on the divine field — for the 
 simple reason that there was no rival 
 human field. The earliest moral appeal 
 was an appeal to human justice. ... It 
 is not a demand for reverence, a demand 
 for homage, a demand for sacrifice ; it is 
 a demand for bare justice. 'We parted 
 this field between us, you and I, let us 
 keep to our contract. I gave you one side 
 of the garden, I retained the other.' . . . 
 The common view is that it is a case of 
 mere disobedience. I do not think that 
 is the deepest idea of the picture. I hold 
 that the primitive narration has attached 
 itself not to the portrayal of obedience, 
 but to the portrayal of justice. It is not 
 a question of resistance to divine author- 
 ity, it is a question of interference with 
 divine possession. . . . The law which 
 Adam seeks to violate is not a law of 
 authority, it is a law of justice, of equity, 
 of the relation of meum and tutim, . . . 
 It is not the dependant forgetting the 
 respect to his master, it Is the partner 
 ignoring his contract, the associate break- 
 
42 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 ing his bond, the sharer of dual rights 
 attempting to encroach upon the rights of 
 the other. . . . Obedience is not the be- 
 ginning of a child's morality. The dif- 
 ference between his and yours is the first 
 thing which your child should know."^ 
 Here morality begins. 
 
 It makes no difference whether we wish 
 to take the story of Eden narrowly as 
 literal history or broadly as universal 
 truth given by allegory. There is always 
 this lesson in it which Matheson has so 
 forcefully pointed out. 
 
 Similarly, the story of Cain and Abel 
 may be taken either way, but it will al- 
 ways open the larger truth of modern 
 sociology that each one is measurably 
 responsible for the condition of all. In 
 so far as we permit or even foster social 
 degradation we are the successors of 
 Cain. Referring to tenement conditions, 
 Jacob Riis has said that it is as bad to 
 kill a man with a house as with an axe. 
 
 * See Chapter VIII for a fuller discussion 
 of this. 
 
SENSE OF JUSTICE AND OF MORALITY 43 
 
 It is a little less direct, but in the end it is 
 only a form of the implement of Cain. 
 Modern manslaughter is a fine art. 
 
 Now note how this primitive aspect of 
 trespass — primitive in the race and in the 
 child — fits the finding of modern crimi- 
 nology. The first anti-social impulse 
 which collides with the criminal law is 
 the vagrant tendency. Vagrancy is a 
 habitual trespass, an ignoring of bounds. 
 The next anti-social impulse is against 
 property ; and the last is against the per- 
 son. A vagrant loses interest in meum 
 and tuum; this leads to the destruction 
 against property, and finally to personal 
 violence. 
 
 The sin against justice is the moral de- 
 fection in all. The father who attempted 
 to put his hands on his child's beads was 
 an ignorer of limits, of bounds ; his hands 
 were vagrant. They forgot the right of 
 property, and in some cases the father 
 might have resorted to brutal violence to 
 carry out his purpose. 
 
 Now while love is the greatest thing in 
 
44 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 the world, the vital social binding force, 
 the royal power, common experience 
 shows that love can be unlovely (as al- 
 ready pointed out), because unwise, and 
 because unwise, unfair. The throne, 
 therefore, needs a trained counsellor, a 
 premier to give It direction and to guide 
 with steadied skill, the nice adjustment of 
 human relations. And these relations 
 grow more and more intricate. 
 
 Where, then, in the catalogue of human 
 attributes — call them virtues. Instincts, 
 sentiments, or what you will — where, I 
 say, will you find this premier? Which 
 begins early and persists throughout life? 
 Which is surest, most nearly universal, 
 most capable of exerting a consistent con- 
 trol? Which combines in superior 
 degree a deliberating intelligence with 
 strong feeling? Which is the most ra- 
 tional equaliser, the most democratic, the 
 most far-sighted, the exactest regulator? 
 Which Is Incapable of being overdone, 
 overestimated, or In practice driven too 
 far? Which Is the most elemental, the 
 
SENSE OF JUSTICE AND OF MORALITY 45 
 
 most inclusive of all that makes for social 
 equality, solidarity, stability, and moral 
 efficiency ? 
 
 There can be but one answer : It is this 
 something that we call JUSTICE, or 
 equity, or fairness. It dawns, as has 
 just been shown, in early childhood and 
 is never extinguished. It is larger than 
 kindness, more economic than generosity, 
 less emotional than pity, farther sighted 
 than benevolence, for it carries and regu- 
 lates them all. 
 
 Kindness without justice is only half 
 kind; justice without kindness is on the 
 road to being kind. Was it not Kant 
 who expressed his surprise that there was 
 so much kindness and so little justice 
 among men? Ruskin, too, sees that if 
 you do justice to your brother you will 
 come to love him; but if you do him in- 
 justice because you don't love him you 
 will come to hate him. The one divine 
 work, the one ordered sacrifice, he in- 
 sists, is to do justice ; and **it is the last we 
 are ever inclined to do." And Royce ob- 
 
 ^-i-^kit^ 
 
 RolTY 
 
46 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 serves that **mere kindliness and plastic- 
 ity accomplish nothing." 
 
 The kindly or benevolent motives have 
 been well named the ^^duties of imperfect 
 obligation." Necessary as they are, as 
 accessories in social morals, they are In 
 themselves flabby, Inconstant, unstable, 
 indefinite, sporadic, deflecting, unor- 
 dered, chaotic, anarchic, sometimes 
 suicidal. Under the master hand of jus- 
 tice, however, they become the queen's 
 ministers. 
 
 Scarce an article as justice seems to be 
 in human relations. It is the one thing for 
 which human nature Is always feeling 
 and In which It rests as a right. Listen 
 to the people's talk, look at your news- 
 papers, magazines, books, your peace 
 conferences, wherever there Is discussion 
 of clash and difference you will always 
 find that the bottom word Is ^'justice" or 
 **fairness." An examination of the let- 
 ters from the people to a leading news- 
 paper, mainly on matters of public con- 
 cern, shows that the word * justice" re- 
 
SENSE OF JUSTICE AND OF MORALITY 47 
 
 curs as a signature, incomparably oftener 
 than any other — unless it be something 
 like ^'Constant Reader/' which signifies 
 nothing. It seems as though moral ap- 
 peal could no farther go. It is the verbal 
 ultimatum. Until the foot touches this 
 rock the wrestle is all in the air. Con- 
 versely, no offence stings so deeply and 
 smarts so long as the offence against 
 justice. Injustice to childhood rankles 
 through manhood. 
 
 You wish to pay a merited compliment 
 to a man who brings you his picture, you 
 say it does not do him justice. You do not 
 say it is unkind or unbenevolent or un- 
 generous, for that would imply that he 
 needed something not quite his own; and 
 you want to imply that he has a fair 
 claim on something in his countenance 
 which has been held back — filched, as it 
 were, by a chemical immorality. It is his 
 proprietary right. 
 
 What wonder that Webster called jus- 
 tice '*the greatest interest of man on 
 earth ... the ligament which holds 
 
48 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 civilised beings and civilised nations to- 
 gether/' adding that wherever it is duly 
 honoured, ** there is a foundation for so- 
 cial security.'' Demosthenes saw that 
 **It is not possible to found a lasting 
 power upon injustice." Harking back 
 to the day of Abraham, we find the di- 
 vine recipe for ^'keeping the way of the 
 Lord" to be the doing of "justice and 
 judgment." The Psalmist who begins 
 his song (89) in the strain of singing of 
 the mercies of the Lord forever pro- 
 claims the foundation of God's throne to 
 be justice (or righteousness) and judg- 
 ment. 
 
 Undoubtedly we all believe In some- 
 thing that we call justice, but we are not 
 all ready to allow the subordination to 
 justice of kindness, pity, and the benevo- 
 lent or gentler virtues of **indefinlte obli- 
 gation." Much less are we all willing 
 to admit that exacting justice Is the 
 pivotal morality, the tap root of our con- 
 ception of duties, as well as of rights, and 
 in fact the historical and psychological 
 
SENSE OF JUSTICE AND OF MORALITY 49 
 
 base of moral control and of moral char- 
 acter, and of the social bond. 
 
 Anything but that I some will say. For 
 instance, I chance upon a sermonette on 
 **HumIlity, the Foundation Virtue." 
 How can humility have any discriminat- 
 ing, directing power in the adjustment 
 of social relations? **The very essence 
 of humility is service and love," says the 
 writer. **One stoops not for the sake of 
 stooping — there is no virtue in that — ^but 
 to help some one else." Quite true; this 
 IS the divine attitude of love. But moral- 
 ity is a matter of adjustment of our rela- 
 tions one with another. How shall we 
 **help some one else" ? It is easy for love 
 to harm him in the effort and so to be im- 
 moral. To the rule of justice we must 
 turn for a basis of action and a mode of 
 realising the moral relation. Humility 
 is an attitude growing out of our concep- 
 tions of that which is above us. Justice 
 is a mode of action for the common 
 good, which is morality. 
 
 It has also been urged that we make 
 
50 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 honour the basis of ethical instruction. 
 But honour is a very indefinite obliga- 
 tion. There is no honour without justice, 
 and just dealing is always honourable. 
 
 Have we not freshly before us the les- 
 son of one of the greatest and most 
 dramatic moral victories in history, turn- 
 ing entirely upon the question and the 
 claim of justice? In the vindication of 
 Alfred Dreyfus France was saved from 
 probable disruption and no one knows 
 what horrors, to law, order, and a truer 
 stability. This was accomplished in the 
 name of justice by the courageous, un- 
 prejudiced examination of facts. Ar- 
 rayed against this single moral principle 
 were powerful and long triumphant 
 cliques and hordes of conspirators, pas- 
 sionately dominated by military and 
 racial or religious antagonisms. For 
 years this vile power seemed invincible. 
 But the instinct of justice was stronger, 
 and after twelve years prevailed. 
 
 What prospect of victory could have 
 been possible had the conflict against this 
 
SENSE OF JUSTICE AND OF MORALITY 51 
 
 intrigue, this strong military arm, been 
 waged in the name of humility, or even 
 of kindness to Dreyfus ? Perhaps benev- 
 olence or kindness or pity obtained his 
 pardon. But Zola said, **It is revolting 
 to obtain pardon when one asks for jus- 
 tice." No ! justice and justice alone had 
 in it the virility, the investigating pene- 
 tration, the energy, the courage, the 
 moral vision to see the national threat 
 and to avert and conquer it. No duty of 
 **indefinite obligation" could have stood 
 for a moment before the phalanx of in- 
 trenched infamy. Justice alone could 
 see that the social structure of a free 
 people was imperilled and justice alone 
 was competent to redeem and establish 
 it upon a firmer foundation than ever be- 
 fore in the history of the republic. 
 
 Thus we are prepared to examine more 
 closely into the real meaning of justice 
 through this discovery of it as the primi- 
 tive moral sensibility. We have seen 
 that it arises psychologically out of the 
 very law of life itself and that it appears 
 
51 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 to be the basal principle of the law of 
 social as well as of individual self-pres- 
 ervation. Being the earliest social in- 
 stinct, it is the natural point of departure 
 for the moral-social education. Justice 
 is in the nature of the case the efficient 
 moral appeal and the axial centre of 
 moral training. 
 
 But before we accept the proposition 
 that the moral health of the world rests 
 in the prescription of justice as a mode of 
 education, we must look more closely into 
 its true meaning in life, its universality as 
 a virtue, and its place as premier in the 
 ethical cabinet of which Love is the 
 queen. 
 
IV 
 
 MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 
 
 The word *^justice" has baffled many an 
 effort at exact definition. But, like some 
 other terms over which philosophers 
 puzzle, it carries a felt meaning in the 
 breast of the people — that primordial 
 sense of proprietorship in one^s own char- 
 acter and possibilities, that elementary 
 sense of the balancing of owed and 
 owing, of the reciprocity of rights and 
 duties, the fair chance or the **square 
 deal," and, most vital of all, the uni- 
 versal or common good. 
 
 But so long as justice has but a felt 
 meaning it is liable to the errancy of 
 other more benevolent emotions — love, 
 pity, gratitude, generosity. It is in its 
 proper development the intellectual emo- 
 tion par excellence. Rather let us say it 
 
54 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 is intellection warmed by emotion. In 
 the highest degree it demands the exer- 
 cise of the imagination, for its efficiency 
 rests upon vision — long-distance vision, 
 undistorted by fear, favour, or prejudice. 
 
 While justice is the primitive, the basal 
 moral sentiment, it is the most educable 
 because the most intellectual. More than 
 any other is it ready to be trained into 
 becoming a controlling and energetic 
 habit of mind and a clear ground-plan 
 of social morals. It is the thorough 
 virtue because it sees throughly. 
 
 A blind man came cautiously feeling his 
 way down the street one day when the 
 sidewalks were newly covered with snow. 
 As I approached him from an opposite 
 direction a group of boys suddenly 
 ceased their snow-ball fight in response 
 to the appeal from one of the boys, who 
 happened to see the sightless wayfarer 
 moving toward them. 
 
 **Hold on, fellows," I heard the boy 
 say in a subdued, almost reverential tone, 
 "hold on until this blind man gets by." 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 55 
 
 The response was Immediate. In the 
 midst of the group the poor unfortunate 
 and I passed each other free not only of 
 molestation, but even of obstruction. 
 
 The usual explanation of such a pro- 
 ceeding would be that the boys were 
 moved by pity or sympathy or kindness. 
 And so they were. 
 
 But if we track the psychic history of 
 this **pity" — call it that — we shall see 
 that the boys were conscious that here 
 was a man whom nature had placed at a 
 disadvantage. He had lost one of his 
 powers quite essential to a running of 
 their gauntlet. As between him and 
 them the conditions were uneven, they 
 were not level, the deal would be any- 
 thing but square. 
 
 The taking advantage of one who has 
 thus been deprived of his powers is in a 
 measure an act accessory to this depriva- 
 tion. The imagination demands that we 
 put ourselves in the unfortunate's place. 
 For the moment we suffer the realisation 
 of blindness and we arise to protect the 
 
56 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 real sufferer as we would ourselves. We 
 may call this the pity of sympathy, and so 
 it is; but deeper down it is the pity of jus- 
 tice. We may call it kindness, and so it 
 is; but it is the kindness of justice. We 
 may call it charity, and so it is ; but it is 
 the charity of justice. 
 
 It is interesting here to note that in the 
 Old Testament the Hebrew word 
 Zedakah means both justice and charity. 
 The Jewish charity box to-day is in strict 
 Hebrew tradition and linguistic signifi- 
 cance a *^justice box.'* 
 
 The Hebraic idea of charity carried 
 with it a sense of responsibility and obli- 
 gation. Sharing was a positive duty. 
 The helpless had a right to claim the 
 assistance of the more fortunate. This 
 reciprocity and equity was the very 
 essence of righteousness. It is the ideal 
 of Justice. The word **judgment,'* so 
 often coupled with **justice'' in the Old 
 Testament, means (according to Moul- 
 ton, the triumph of right over wrong. 
 
 Modern philanthropy is arriving at this 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 57 
 
 very coalescence of interpretation. It in- 
 sists that charity should be something 
 more than a blind response to the feel- 
 ings. It must see where actions lead to 
 and it must look for causes. Ruskin, 
 satirically criticising popular charity, 
 says, **As much charity as you choose, 
 but no justice." But this is the charity 
 of mere emotion rather than the charity 
 of justice. Jacob Riis, with his larger 
 vision, sums it all when he says, **Charity 
 in our day no longer means alms, but jus- 
 tice." Here we are by a process of evolu- 
 tion back at the ancient Hebrew standard 
 — marvellously displayed throughout the 
 nineteenth chapter of Leviticus, as well 
 as elsewhere in Scripture.^ 
 
 And yet we have arrived at no such 
 clear definition as social education de- 
 mands. The felt significance of the idea 
 of one's right of self-proprietorship is 
 
 * See, for instance, Deut. 24 : 13; Isa. 32 : 16, 
 17; Psa. 106:3; Prov. 14:34; Deut. 15; 
 Ex, 23:11; Deut. 16:11-14; 10-18; Isa. 
 58 : 7, 8 ; Ezek. 18:5-9; etc. 
 
58 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 not enough. We are prone to use our 
 powers unjustly to others, and therefore, 
 by virtue of the social tie, in the long run 
 unjustly to ourselves. Our Ideas of 
 justice become warped and limited. 
 Worse than that, they become profes- 
 sional and technical and even penal. The 
 very essence of justice drops out of sight, 
 supplanted by a form of procedure. 
 With many persons It stands for little else 
 than retribution or punishment, or con- 
 versely. It stands for acquittal from an 
 indictment for crime. 
 
 The felt significance of the term **jus- 
 tlce" Is not so much wrong per se as It Is 
 Inadequate. This Inadequacy results In 
 wrong. The native sense, previously de- 
 lineated, acquires a warp, a cant, and 
 must be educated back to the primal 
 feeling and out again toward a true Intel- 
 lectual conception of rights and duties 
 which are the essence of the social organ- 
 ism. 
 
 A journal commenting editorially on 
 the acquittal of a famous criminal, thus 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 59 
 
 quotes: ** *Human justice often errs/ 
 said the moralist. *True,' said the judge, 
 *but it's the only kind weVe got.' " 
 
 If **the moralist" said this, he, too, was 
 in need of a definition. Efforts at human 
 justice err; but justice never. Errancy 
 and justice are a contradiction. If this 
 were not so we should have no moral 
 anchorage, no fixity. Too well we know 
 that pity may harden, that gener- 
 osity may pauperise. But justice is the 
 formative and the corrective, the sure 
 point of departure in social safety. 
 
 And still we are looking for a concrete 
 definition. Great thinkers, writers, and 
 speakers in all ages have said many fine 
 and true things about justice. But the 
 working definition, the clear formula for 
 a definite habit of mind, calls for search. 
 
 Justice Field called justice **the great 
 end of civil society." It is no less the 
 great means to its own end. Nothing be- 
 gets justice like justice; Theodore Parker 
 dignified it as **the keynote of the 
 world;" Emerson claims that it '^satisfies 
 
6o THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 everybody;" Carlyle classes it as **sanity 
 and order," and **the everlasting central 
 law of this universe;" Disraeli makes it 
 **truth in action;" Wendell Phillips de- 
 clares that **utter and exact justice" is 
 **the one clew to success." We have al- 
 ready seen that Webster called justice 
 the ligament which holds civilised beings 
 and civilised nations together, and that 
 Demosthenes saw that it is not possible 
 to found a lasting power upon injustice. 
 With Plato, justice is **the greatest 
 good;" to Aristotle it includes all virtue. 
 
 If now we gather up these terse and 
 radical declarations we shall find some 
 elements common to many or to all. 
 Like a composite photograph, these 
 common points will be very much accen- 
 tuated by correspondences in the pictures. 
 We find, then, that it is the essential, all- 
 satisfying, bond or moral ligament of 
 ordered society; it makes for unity, is 
 stable, immutable, exacting, impartial, 
 virile ; the root virtue ; the moral base. 
 
 All this agrees with our view of the 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 6i 
 
 genesis of justice and of the synonymous 
 character of justice and morals as devel- 
 oped in the previous chapter. And it 
 agrees with the law of justice-charity in 
 the Old Testament and with the ethics of 
 Jesus as comprehended in the Golden 
 Rule, the **Render unto Caesar," the par- 
 ables of pounds and talents, the declara- 
 tion of the unity of God and man, and 
 other aspects of our Lord's teachings. 
 
 And yet as a habit of mind, a working 
 principle, we have hardly reached a ver- 
 bal formula or definition. We might 
 still work for cure rather than for pre- 
 vention, we might mistake the nature of 
 the social bond, we might hope for the 
 greatest good of all without knowing 
 good when we see it, we might pray for 
 universal virtue and truth without look- 
 ing for the origin of vice and misery — 
 much less recognising ourselves as its ac- 
 countable abettor or producer. 
 
 We have only to go back to our analy- 
 sis of the genesis again. We find there 
 something else — the proprietary sense. 
 
6% THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Now Ruskin's insight touches us more 
 closely. He says, ** Justice consists 
 mainly in the granting to every human 
 being due aid in the development of such 
 faculties as it possesses for action and en- 
 joyment." 
 
 Sure enough, we find here the recogni- 
 tion of the proprietary right of the indi- 
 vidual in his natural and spiritual possi- 
 bilities, which are the fundaments of 
 character. We obstruct justice when we 
 interfere with the development of those 
 possibilities or powers. This individual 
 right of every one implies a correlative 
 individual duty of every one. This is the 
 moral sense that emerges in early child- 
 hood on the perception of personal 
 powers and of human relations. 
 
 But for brevity and simplicity few defi- 
 nitions excel that of Justinian: '^Justice 
 is the constant and unswerving desire to 
 render unto every man his own." 
 
 Necessarily this means that every one 
 must give way to and work for the good 
 of society. Ideally, therefore, justice to 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 63 
 
 one includes the idea of the good of all. 
 Individualism or atomism is forbidden. 
 It is the fundamental moral motive be- 
 cause its reach is unlimited. In the words 
 of Dr. W. T. Harris, **it consolidates all 
 intelligent will power into one power, so 
 that the action of each assists the action 
 of all. . . . The immoral man is perpetu- 
 ally annulling his own action." Make 
 this also read. The unjust man is per- 
 petually annulling his own action, and 
 we have the root criticism. Conversely, 
 the just man is perpetually abetting and 
 reinforcing his own action. This brings 
 us to Kant's great law: So act that thy 
 deed will not contradict itself if it is made 
 the universal act of all intelligent beings. 
 Another philosophy defines justice as 
 that which respects the freedom of a 
 moral being by holding him absolutely 
 accountable for his deeds, and therefore 
 returning upon him the exact equivalent. 
 But however interesting and even true 
 this may be as an abstraction, I find in it 
 nothing to induce a habit of mind which 
 
64 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Will make a man just to his neighbour. 
 It ignores the causes by which a man has 
 been brought to the committal of the 
 deed, and is a hard, unbrotherly, anti- 
 social rule, however logical within itself. 
 
 Indeed, its advocates admit that in prac- 
 tice the argument is modified by the fact 
 that no being in the universe except a 
 Perfect Being is amenable to justice. 
 The divine attitude toward a growing 
 universe, they say, is one of grace ^ which 
 is that quality which sustains the imper- 
 fect so that it may develop. But the im- 
 perfect itself in proportion to its develop- 
 ment craves responsibility for its deed, 
 and so more and more as it approximates 
 perfection it demands and rejoices in jus- 
 tice, because justice is the recognition of 
 its attained freedom. 
 
 Briefly in this philosophy grace repre- 
 sents God's attitude towards a growing 
 cosmos; we are not yet worthy of jus- 
 tice. And justice itself briefly is the rec- 
 ognition of freedom and maturity. Dr. 
 Harris puts it that "Grace subserves and 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 65 
 
 also limits justice. . . . The new penol- 
 ogy has therefore by degrees moved for- 
 ward to a platform higher than that of 
 abstract justice, which sought merely to 
 return his deed on the doer." ^ 
 
 Cosmically, in the divine relationship 
 this is doubtless the final view. But as a 
 working plan, a habit of mind for social 
 man in his relations to man only, it is 
 to my mind impracticable and unwork- 
 able. In truth, I am unable to see how we 
 can talk about the justice of God. It is 
 better to avoid these terms of human 
 social relations so far as possible in speak- 
 ing of God. The question was once asked 
 by a good Presbyterian elder, **How can 
 God be just in justifying the sinner?" 
 God is love. That we can understand 
 and live by. But he asks us to show our 
 love to him and to our fellows by being 
 just to our fellows. He wants the kind 
 of love between man and man that is 
 
 * ^'Penological Papers N.P.A." 1890. Quoted 
 by Henderson in his "Introducdon to Dependent, 
 Defective, and Delinquent Classes.** 
 
66 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 guided, directed, and made efficient by 
 justice. 
 
 Now, as already said, because man 
 never gets a full hearing, man never gets 
 perfect justice from his fellows. The 
 information demanded by absolute jus- 
 tice is impossible to obtain. Here, then, 
 is where mercy comes in. // one could 
 he absolutely just, mercy would be need- 
 less. As it is, mercy is necessary to fill 
 the gap. It is but the acknowledgment 
 of our ignorance or our indifference in 
 dealing with our fellows. It is a sort of 
 blind effort at supplemental justice. The 
 largest part of our debt we pay in the 
 gold of positive knowledge. The re- 
 mainder we pay in a due bill of mercy, to 
 be honoured in gold coin as divulged 
 facts warrant. Justice is the active prin- 
 ciple and mercy is residual and supple- 
 mental. **Too much mercy is want of 
 mercy," says Tennyson. And Young, 
 **A God all mercy is a God unjust." 
 
 Justice is orderly, systematic, intel- 
 lectual, constant, and would know all; 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 67 
 
 mercy is sporadic, subservient, apologetic, 
 occasional and knows nothing. In our 
 fallible and ignorant state our necessary 
 mercy will sometimes be unjust, but full 
 ideal justice, were it humanly possible, 
 would have no need for mercy. 
 
 Full justice, then, is humanly impossible 
 and mercy is humanly necessary. But 
 the first duty lies with the former. It is 
 our business to know. It has been 
 shrewdly said, if we knew all we could 
 pardon all. In Hugo's **Les Misera- 
 bles," the Bishop is thus described: **He 
 never condemned anything hastily or 
 without taking the circumstances into cal- 
 culation. He would say, *Let us look at 
 the road by which the fault has come.' " 
 
 **He was indulgent to the women and 
 the poor on whom the weight of human 
 society presses. He would say, *The 
 faults of women, children, servants, the 
 weak, the indigent, and the ignorant are 
 the fault of husbands, fathers, masters, 
 the strong, the rich, and the learned. . . . 
 This soul is full of darkness and sin is 
 
68 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 committed, but the guilty person is not 
 the man who commits the sin, but he who 
 produces the darkness. . . . Let us pray 
 not for ourselves, but that our brother 
 may not fall into error on our account.' " 
 Again, **An ugly appearance, a deformity 
 of mind, did not trouble him or render 
 him indignant; he was moved, almost 
 softened, by them. It seemed as if he 
 thoughtfully sought beyond apparent 
 life for the cause, the explanation, or the 
 excuse. He examined without anger, 
 and with the eye of a linguist deciphering 
 a palimpsest the amount of chaos which 
 still exists in nature." 
 
 The culprit must be regarded as a vic- 
 tim of crime as well as a criminal. **A11 
 attempts at dealing with criminal prob- 
 lems which take no account of the condi- 
 tions which tend to produce the criminal 
 population are predestined to failure.^ " 
 
 This is true not alone of the criminal, 
 but of the offender in the school and in 
 
 * Morrison, ''Juvenile Offenders," P« 41* 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 69 
 
 the home. Parents are prone to punish 
 without seeing that what they punish is 
 largely the legitimate fruit of their own 
 home administration. They are punish- 
 ing the imitations of and even a loyalty 
 or obedience to themselves. 
 
 The inefficiency of our penal laws is 
 largely due to the fact that they have 
 ignored the individual and social condi- 
 tions on which the movement of crime de- 
 pends. "The criminal character of an 
 offender is not always to be estimated by 
 the nature of the offence.'' And yet how 
 prone we are to punish more rigorously 
 for breaking a fifty-dollar bit of Venetian 
 glass than a five-cent flower pot! We 
 spend too much time and money in re- 
 pressive agencies and too little in righting 
 the conditions which produce the crimi- 
 nal. This is true of home discipline also. 
 
 Parents have much to learn from crim- 
 inology. They are in a majority of cases 
 the contributory delinquents. The fox 
 hunter's reason, as Jeremy Bentham gives 
 it, is that it is right that the criminal 
 
70 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 or fox should have a little start. This 
 instinctive recognition is only a form of 
 admission that we do not know all and 
 may, therefore, be unjust if we are not 
 merciful. The conditions which have 
 created him a fox instead of a huntsman 
 must be taken into account and allowed 
 for. Out of a long life on the bench 
 Justice Brewer declares, **It is certain 
 that absolute justice cannot be adminis- 
 tered by finite man." Injustice is a com- 
 mon heritage. It is because of this sure- 
 ness of injustice that Secretary Hay 
 wrote to his pastor that one ought to get 
 more than he deserves. 
 
 It is worth while to quote here a few 
 sentences from Justice Brewer of the 
 United States Supreme Court :^ 
 
 "Justice, absolute justice, requires that 
 judgment be measured not alone by 
 the concrete acts, but should take 
 into account the differences caused by 
 heredity and environment, for which 
 the individuals are not responsible. In 
 
 * From The Outlook, June 24, 1905. 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 71 
 
 short, it Is certain that absolute justice 
 cannot be administered by finite man. 
 We can never determine how much the 
 character is affected by forces and influ- 
 ences over which the alleged criminal 
 himself has had no control, and therefore 
 we can never establish an accurate rela- 
 tion between his acts and the conse- 
 quences thereof. 
 
 **More and more does the judge appre- 
 ciate the presence of those forces and 
 influences which in the truest sense de- 
 termine the quantity of guilt, and yet 
 because they are beyond the reach of 
 human knowledge are ignored, and must 
 be ignored, in the daily administration 
 of the law. More and more does he 
 realise that while the scientific student 
 may have the possibility of certainty as 
 the result of his study, he as a judge must 
 ever act with a consciousness that there 
 is a domain into which he can never 
 enter, and yet a domain filled with con- 
 siderations which affect in the highest 
 sense the matter of perfect justice. . . . 
 Can it be that that Infinite One makes 
 manifest absolute truth in all the domain 
 of the material world, but leaves the 
 realm of the spiritual forever a chaos of 
 
72 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 uncertainty, resulting In perpetual In- 
 justice to his highest and noblest work? 
 
 '^One and only one alternative Is pre- 
 sented. In some other time and place 
 the failures of justice on earth will be 
 rectified. Infinite wisdom will there 
 search the past of every life, measure 
 with exactness the Influences of heredity 
 and environment, and out of the fulness 
 of that knowledge correct the errors 
 which we are powerless to prevent. The 
 Inevitable failure of justice In this life Is 
 an assurance of a life to come. Outside 
 of the declarations of revelation, and 
 putting the thought I have presented 
 one side, immortality Is but a possibility. 
 *Over the river they beckon to me,' is 
 only the voice of hope. To that hope 
 and that possibility comes the strong 
 testimony from the Inevitable failure of 
 human justice as contrasted with the full 
 knowledge of the laws governing the 
 material world, for It Is abhorrent to our 
 conceptions of an Infinite being that He 
 should endow us with the latter while 
 Investing the highest product of creative 
 intelligence, the human soul, with a mys- 
 terious environment which no man can 
 ever fathom and which to the end of its 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 73 
 
 existence will prevent that soul from 
 receiving the exact reward which is essen- 
 tial to absolute justice. . . . 
 
 **Forty years of judicial life, as varied 
 as that which falls to the lot of any, 
 have given to me an answer to Cato's 
 question. I have looked into the faces 
 of persons on trial before me for alleged 
 crimes, or litigant in civil cases, have 
 searched every item of testimony which 
 the laws of evidence allow to be intro- 
 duced, in the hope of gathering there- 
 from some knowledge of the influences 
 which the past of heredity and environ- 
 ment have cast, and finding but little to 
 guide or instruct, have yielded to the 
 necessity of determining rights on the 
 basis of only the concrete and visible 
 facts. I have been over and over again 
 oppressed with the limitations of finite 
 nature, and longed to know something 
 of those unseen and unknown influences 
 which have brought the individual to his 
 place before me. Conscious of these 
 ever-present limitations, I have asked 
 whether this is the best that God has 
 done for man? And the answer which 
 has come out of my long experience on 
 the bench is that somewhere and some 
 
74 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 time all the failures of human justice 
 will be made good. Through the light 
 of the judicial glass I have seen the 
 splendid vision of immortality. Rising 
 above the confused, conflicting voices 
 of the court-room I have heard the ma- 
 jestic and prophetic words of the great 
 apostle: *For this corruptible must put 
 on incorruption, and this mortal must 
 put on immortality.' 
 
 **But the fact of immortality is one 
 thing, its lesson another. Is it freighted 
 with joy or burdened with despair? 
 Does it mean merely the making certain 
 the result of our wrong-doings? Is It 
 nothing but an appeal to a higher court, 
 in which a more just sentence will be 
 pronounced, a change, as It were, from 
 Jeffreys to Sir Matthew Hale ? Will the 
 exact pound of flesh be taken? On the 
 even scales of the blind goddess will 
 there be only the remorseless weighing 
 out of just punishment? 
 
 ** *Is there no place 
 
 Left for repentance, none for pardon 
 left?' 
 
 **Must we look forward to Immortality 
 with the sure and only expectation that 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 75 
 
 the wrongs we have here concealed will 
 be made known, and the doom we have 
 evaded be cast upon us? I know 
 that in human courts mercy is a futile 
 plea. . . . 
 
 **Only in an appeal to the executive is 
 there place for mercy. Pardon is not a 
 judicial function. But in the great 
 tribunal of eternity the same Being is 
 both judge and chief executive." 
 
 And yet in human relations we must 
 make a distinction between mercy and 
 pardon, if pardon is to be reserved as an 
 executive function. There must be 
 mercy in the law under which the judge 
 acts as well as in the equity without stat- 
 ute. Kames says a court of equity boldly 
 undertakes **to correct or mitigate the 
 rigour and what in a proper sense may be 
 termed the injustice of the common law.'' 
 That mercy, as has already been said, is 
 the taking into account the probable 
 causes and influences which are either 
 invisible or beyond our ken. In the juve- 
 nile courts — and notably in the work of 
 Judge Lindsey of Denver — we find freer 
 
76 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 administration of **justice/' completer 
 and most effective as an educational force 
 in the community. 
 
 Undoubtedly it is exceedingly difficult 
 for the average lawyer to grasp the real 
 significance of justice. With a case to 
 gain and a reputation for success in view, 
 and indeed as a victim of almost inevi- 
 table professionalism, justice comes to 
 have for him a meaning little beyond that 
 of process. 
 
 Judge Taft and others have spoken with 
 no uncertain sound to show how the ends 
 of justice are defeated by trivial, inconse- 
 quential, interminable, technical appeals. 
 Our judges are perforce too often but 
 **mild moderators of the game of chican- 
 ery in the court-room." 
 
 Judge Charles F. Amidon, of the 
 United States District Court of North 
 Dakota/ finds the fundamental defect of 
 our legal administration to be the doc- 
 trine that *'where error is found preju- 
 
 ' The Outlook, July 14, 1906. 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 77 
 
 dice will be presumed/' This, he con- 
 tends, removes the cause at once from the 
 region of reality and fact into the thin 
 air of presumption and metaphysics. 
 The real question is whether error in pro- 
 cedure has produced wrong judgment. 
 Otherwise, we put technical error in proc- 
 ess above moral justice, regarding prac- 
 tice above substance. So numerous and 
 so obstructive are appeals growing in this 
 country that Judge Ami don declares our 
 administration of the criminal law to be 
 an unworkable machine. The result has 
 been not only that criminals, especially 
 rich criminals, go unpunished, but that 
 the sense of justice has been impaired, the 
 meaning of justice perverted, and the 
 tone of social morals lowered to the level 
 of personal greed and ignored infamy. 
 It is when the average attorney 
 changes the terminology of his thought to 
 what he calls equity that he approaches 
 more nearly to the real meaning of jus- 
 tice. But this is professional and techni- 
 cal rather than basal and moral. It has 
 
78 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 been held by some, especially the earlier 
 English writers on jurisprudence, that 
 equity mitigates the hardships of the law 
 where the law errs through being framed 
 in universals. Would it not be fundamen- 
 tally — that is, morally — truer to say that 
 this is a function of mercy? 
 
 Justice Story admits^ this professional 
 limitation of ideas through technicality. 
 Equity applied to jurisprudence, he says, 
 is not as comprehensive as natural or 
 moral equity. ^'Courts of equity afford 
 relief in regard to those rights recognised 
 by the jurisprudence of the state where 
 the remedy of the law is doubtful, inade- 
 quate, or incomplete.'' They are courts 
 of mercy or a more liberal and far- 
 sighted effort at moral justice. 
 
 The definition of justice or natural law 
 as already given by Justinian answers, 
 says Story, to the general sense of equity 
 as that which is founded in natural jus- 
 tice, in honesty, and in right. Equity 
 
 * ''Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence." 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 79 
 
 does not embrace (we are told by the 
 same authority) a jurisdiction so wide 
 and extensive as that which arises from 
 these principles of natural justice. Even 
 Roman law left many matters of natural 
 justice wholly unprovided for, from diffi- 
 culty of framing rules to meet them and 
 from the doubtful nature of the policy of 
 giving legal sanction to **duties of im- 
 perfect obligation, such as charity, grati- 
 tude, and kindness." Again, Aristotle 
 defines equity as a better sort of justice, 
 which corrects legal justice where the lat- 
 ter errs through being expressed in a uni- 
 versal form and in not taking account of 
 particular cases. 
 
 That the legal mind has been suffering 
 through its technique in this matter, I 
 say, is evident. There ought not to be 
 such terms as **natural justice" or "natu- 
 ral law," much less ought we to speak of 
 a **better sort of justice" as over against 
 **legal justice." The truth is there is but 
 one justice, and that is simply the duty 
 of the individual as a member of society 
 
8o THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 to seek the highest good of all other 
 members of society. To this end he must, 
 negatively, do nothing to obstruct the full 
 development and right employment of 
 personal powers and capacities for action 
 and enjoyment. And, positively, he must 
 render all positive aid to the same end. 
 Anything less than this is a prostitution 
 of the term which ought to be held sacred 
 to the idea and the ideal. 
 
 Yet if we look back through the cen- 
 turies, we find this lowered ideal through 
 the technique of the bench and bar. In 
 the codes of Henry I., of England, for 
 instance, the differing grades of office 
 bearers had different jurisdictions. The 
 power of life and death, belonging to the 
 greater lords of franchises, exercised ^ 
 haute justice, while the lords of less dig- 
 nity exercised a lower justice.^ The dis- 
 tinction is intelligible but derogatory. 
 
 The classification of crimes and the dif- 
 ference of jurisdiction is right, of course, 
 
 * Stubbs, ''Lectures on Early English History," 
 edited by Hassall. 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 8i 
 
 but the emasculating of the word jus- 
 tice by using it simply as a name for a 
 form of legal action has, without doubt, 
 confused the public mind and lowered the 
 standard of this fundament of public and 
 even of private morals. 
 
 One has only to read the daily papers 
 to see how the word ^^justice" has been 
 stripped of its vitality and controlling 
 significance. A man goes to a **court of 
 justice" to get the better of his neigh- 
 bour often through mere legal trickery or 
 technicality, and imagines that he is seek- 
 ing justice. Legal conditions may abso- 
 lutely forbid justice to either party to the 
 dispute. The law may be fulfilled, while 
 justice is travestied. 
 
 The same association of the word "jus- 
 tice" with legal procedure has also be- 
 gotten the idea that justice is a matter 
 of punishment or reward. This obliter- 
 ates that larger sense of the word, which 
 demands of each one a rigorous interest 
 in his neighbour's welfare, as a part of 
 the common weal of society, without ref- 
 
82 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 erence to legislative enactments or court 
 orders. 
 
 As an instance, take a reporter's account 
 of the apprehension and trial of a Phila- 
 delphia kidnapping case. After stating 
 that the case was **railroaded^' with great 
 celerity, the news column says, **Nothing 
 was allowed to interfere with the inflict- 
 ing of justice upon the man who had de- 
 liberately brought days and nights of 
 anguish to the parents of a little child." 
 Here we find the too prevailing bias that 
 justice is vindictive and retributive. So 
 It may be ; but the term is lowered when 
 It Is used as a synonym for punishment, 
 or for anything but equity or fairness. 
 
 The distinctions between justice, natural 
 and legal, and equity as made by the 
 courts is wholly technical. But the words 
 are In the root meaning the same, and are 
 the equivalent of our English word 
 **falr." Luther Is wrong when he says 
 **the strictest justice may be the greatest 
 Injustice; there must be not law, but 
 equity." 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 83 
 
 If we go back to origins, we find that 
 the root of ^'justice" is yu, to bind; of 
 **equity," eka, one; of ^'fairness," pak, 
 to bind (whence also pact, compact, and 
 peace). The basal idea in these three 
 words is that of a binding together in 
 unity. Here again we see that justice, 
 equity, or fairness is the essential liga- 
 ture of society, the bond of surety, and 
 the morality of peace. Luther meant 
 right. But we must not admit that it is 
 possible to be just to one if that requires 
 injustice elsewhere. 
 
 These terms, one or all, are the social 
 keynote, the essence of Christianity, as 
 we find it especially in the Gospel of 
 John — the Gospel preeminently also of 
 love. Justice is methodised love. 
 
 It has been said that jurisprudence or 
 legal science can no longer be called the 
 science of rights but the science of human 
 relations. This comes back to the propo- 
 sition of infancy. When human rela- 
 tions are realised by the child, rights and 
 duties become the two aspects of a con- 
 
84 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 trolling sentiment. This develops as 
 fairness or justice. 
 
 The world has never seen a more impor- 
 tant movement toward the substitution of 
 the principle of justice for a formal rule 
 of procedure than in the establishment of 
 the juvenile court as an institution of 
 government.^ 
 
 The editor of the Berlin Lokal 
 Jnzeiger, Herr von Kupfer, when on a 
 visit to the United States in 1904, said 
 that the most interesting phase of New 
 York life was the care bestowed on the 
 wayward or unfortunate children and 
 youth. **The idea of a children's court," 
 he says, **strikes one as novel, new to me, 
 at least." Its educative value is preemi- 
 nent, because it has an eye single to ideal 
 justice as the basis of social life, and it 
 exemplifies the principle in visible, con- 
 crete acts. 
 
 Students of sociology, criminology, 
 education, and social reform have for 
 
 * The juvenile court is more fully presented 
 in Chapter VII. 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 85 
 
 years been working in the direction of 
 prevention rather than of mere suppres- 
 sion of evil. It has become apparent that 
 as mothers and fathers are a principal 
 cause of unruly children, that as teachers 
 and school management are a fruitful 
 cause of backwardness, as well as of posi- 
 tive arrested development, so, courts and 
 penal institutions are producers of crimi- 
 nals. 
 
 Against these vicious tendencies of sup- 
 posed disciplinary agencies have come 
 the children's aid and protective societies, 
 the anti-child-labour movement, and the 
 juvenile courts. Along with this has 
 grown the conception of the contribu- 
 tory delinquency of parents as a cause of 
 youthful delinquency recognised by 
 statute. 
 
 Judge Lindsey, of Denver, the unique 
 hero of justice, looks, as did Hugo's 
 Bishop, at the road by which the deed 
 came. He takes into account the influ- 
 ences out of which the crime was begot- 
 ten. His aim, in short, is the ideal of 
 
86 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 justice, because it mercifully takes into 
 account everything that is humanly pos- 
 sible to consider as causative and con- 
 structive. The result is, Judge Lindsey 
 finds little real criminality among chil- 
 dren, even though he finds much law- 
 breaking. The distinction is vital, and 
 when people have learned to think jus- 
 tice, when they have, through this single 
 moral Ideal, become discriminate, we 
 shall sight the oncoming era of peace and 
 virtue. 
 
 In the retrospect : justice is the basis of 
 the social life. As between man and 
 man it is the universal, the unerring 
 moral guide. It is formulated charity; 
 love in economic action. It is the essence 
 of social unity, the ground plan of 
 brotherhood. It preserves to society the 
 full value of each individual, and to each 
 individual the full value of his member- 
 ship in society. Every act that limits the 
 action of another without adding to the 
 general good is an act of injustice. 
 
 Justice is teleological, large visioned, 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 87 
 
 seeing all of life in each act of life. It is 
 a view-of-the-world. It thinks things 
 through. It considers how the present 
 came to be what it is and what will be. 
 Justice in the best sense is preventive, for- 
 mative, and constructive ; while secondar- 
 ily it is repressive, corrective, retributive, 
 re-formative. 
 
 No man knows enough to be perfectly 
 just, but he will grow in knowledge under 
 the rule of the ideal of justice as a work- 
 ing theory. He will find it a perpetual 
 spur and challenge to his thoroughness 
 and his courage. Mercy is love's apol- 
 ogy for the injustice that grows out of 
 our ignorance. The moment we say 
 mercy is anything but love's apology for 
 its limitations and unwisdom, we are 
 loosing our hold on justice as the fixed 
 basis of social life. We are putting jus- 
 tice into the Umbo of the duties of imper- 
 fect obligation. It is because we have 
 done this that justice has been so traves- 
 tied. 
 
 We properly resort to mercy because on 
 
88 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 the one hand we are so ignorant of the 
 causes and conditions of any one act, and 
 on the other hand, because we know so 
 well that every individual is so largely 
 indebted to or is the victim of social and 
 natal heredity as well as to his immediate 
 environment. Mercy is therefore a kind 
 of supplemental justice — love's struggle 
 to be fair. 
 
 Justice as a duty is the guaranteeing to 
 every one the right to the development of 
 his capacities and his powers for action 
 and enjoyment so far as they contribute 
 to the social efficiency. Justice is preemi- 
 nently the virtue of the will. It de- 
 mands absolute self-control, for it re- 
 quires the suspended judgment, incessant 
 revision, and right of choice. It is the 
 agent of freedom. It has been said that 
 the whole possible scope of human ambi- 
 tion is the satisfaction of being heard. 
 Justice grants a universal hearing. 
 
 Justice, equity, and fairness are to all 
 intents and purpose one. They stand for 
 human mutuality, unity, and the highest 
 
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE 89 
 
 efficiency before God. They stand ready 
 to invest sympathy, pity, kindness, benev- 
 olence, charity, and love with that clear- 
 eyed wisdom, intellectual industry, and 
 brave energy which give them their full 
 value in the cabinet of virtues. And they 
 stand for the subordination of the indi- 
 vidual to the social order. 
 
 Justice is a mode of morals actuated by 
 a constant and unswerving desire to ren- 
 der unto every one his own in the 
 larger interest of the common good. 
 
UNIVERSALITY AND PERSISTENCE OF 
 THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 
 
 More than a century ago, that dynamic 
 genius of the French Revolution, Dan- 
 ton, said of his king, Louis XVI, '*We 
 have no right to be his judges, it is true; 
 well, we will kill him." This declaration 
 of the man who had been the Minister of 
 Justice appears to me to epitomise the 
 whole moral problem of man. 
 
 First, here is the natural obeisance to 
 right and the irrepressible desire to be 
 thought right, and next, there is the sur- 
 render to the antagonistic impulse or 
 passion of the time. In one degree or 
 another this is the history of every one 
 of us — oscillation, vacillation, lack of 
 focus, unstable anchorage, neglected 
 orientation. Not that we are all alike, 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 91 
 
 for With some the perception of what is 
 right toward others in any concrete situa- 
 tion is clearer and the habit of tenacity 
 stronger ; while with others the surrender 
 is easier. 
 
 There can be no question about the nat- 
 ural universal desire to be thought right. 
 Men differ very much as to what right 
 is, and as to the ways of being or doing 
 right. But it is always the theoretical 
 fixed point in their thinking. They meas- 
 ure themselves as near to it or far from 
 it. They often prefer the wrong, but 
 they try to make themselves and others 
 think the wrong is the right. This is 
 true of the pirate, the bandit, the Sultan, 
 and the persecuting churchman. The 
 vision is defective. Much that passes for 
 sin in theological codes is simple igno- 
 rance, unconscious imitation, short or 
 blurred moral vision, lack of imagina- 
 tion, supposed heredity, or real social in- 
 heritance. Otherwise theology itself 
 must be sinful, for it cannot all be right 
 — to say nothing of our strained, 
 
92 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 warped, self-interested, unimaginative, 
 prosaic interpretations of Scripture. 
 This is not to excuse error or guilt, but 
 rather to give it its proper location in 
 order that we may not only correct and 
 reform aright, but construct and direct 
 new life aright. 
 
 The moral discernment of right, when 
 it takes the form of justice, in the child is 
 the least obstructed and the clearest. 
 We may well doubt whether it is ever 
 really extinguished, however befogged it 
 may become by convention and the selfish 
 struggle of life. 
 
 It is the purpose of this chapter to show 
 by illustrative examples how variously 
 the sense of justice manifests itself from 
 early childhood upward, and also how 
 and why this primal virtue is at once uni- 
 versally sensed and rarely practised. We 
 have cited Danton as the type — the clear 
 vision befogged for the moment and the 
 surrender to the immediate passion. 
 
 I have already referred to the case of 
 the little girl with the kindergarten beads 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 93 
 
 — her clear conception both of her own 
 right and of her duty to her father. Add 
 to that now the case of a little boy of 
 five years passing a comment on a tourna- 
 ment or series of contests between the 
 guests of two rival, yet very friendly, 
 summer hotels. The first match was in 
 bowling, the second in tennis. The house 
 of which the youngster was a guest 
 gained the bowling contest. Amid the 
 loyal huzzahs the little fellow philoso- 
 phised: *^I think it was nice for us to 
 beat at bowling and I think it would be 
 nice for the others to beat at tennis — for 
 that would be polite.'* 
 
 The child was groping among the ele- 
 ments of social ethics. What he called 
 politeness was his budding sense of equity 
 both as a right and as a duty — the two 
 cannot be separated as motif In social 
 morals, and at bottom there Is no other. 
 This youngster was fast coming Into that 
 perception of human relations with 
 which, as we have seen, the moral sense 
 emerges. 
 
94 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 A certain mother, offended by her boy's 
 conduct, gave him the alternative either 
 to do as she wished or to leave the room. 
 After a moment's reflection the boy re- 
 plied, 'That's fair!" President Eliot, 
 noting this household incident, said, **I 
 would give more for that judicial com- 
 ment — for its effect on the boy's later life 
 than for any amount of accurate figur- 
 ing." This boy was older, farther along 
 in his moral development, than the child 
 previously quoted. Fairness had become 
 more fundamental as a working princi- 
 ple than mere obedience. His duty to 
 act, even against his inclination, was con- 
 ditioned upon the recognition of his free 
 will and right of choice. That he was 
 willing to act when the situation was 
 just, was of more consequence to him 
 than the conquest of arithmetic. Jus- 
 tice was the one voice that he would obey. 
 
 This boy was not an ethical philoso- 
 pher, not precocious, not unusual. Youth 
 is exacting in the domain of the univer- 
 sal. The learned man in Kant puzzled 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 95 
 
 over justice in relation to kindness; the 
 child in Kant visioned the law: So act 
 that thy deed will not contradict itself if 
 it is made the universal act of all intelli- 
 gent beings. 
 
 Miss Rye of the Howard Association, 
 London, tells of a little girl, child of 
 burglars, who, on being received into an 
 institution, began to steal, and was 
 threatened with a whipping. Bursting 
 into tears the child wailed, **Where I 
 corned from they whipped me if I didn't 
 steal ; and now you are going to whip me 
 because I do." The wrong of stealing 
 had not occurred to her, but there was an 
 unfairness somewhere toward her, which 
 was at once self-evident and cruel. 
 
 There is deep significance here for us 
 all. Children in the best of homes and 
 in the best of schools are not yet fully 
 conventionalised or socialised beings. 
 But they have become so in spots. 
 Hence, they do not know the reason for 
 much of the privation, suppression, and 
 punishment which they suffer. But they 
 
96 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 do know that it is wickedly unfair to treat 
 them as though they had the experience 
 and the formed habits of an adult. They 
 do not reason this out, but they feel it 
 out. All this, however, works toward 
 the injury of that original sense of jus- 
 tice which ought to be preserved to them 
 for society's sake if for no other reason. 
 Some years ago Professor John Dewey 
 in order to get concretely at the theory of 
 ends and motives which actually control 
 thinking upon moral subjects, asked one 
 hundred students to state some typical 
 early moral experience of his own, relat- 
 ing, say, to obedience, honesty, and 
 truthfulness; and the impression left by 
 the outcome upon each upon his own 
 mind, especially the impression as to the 
 reason for the virtue in question. With- 
 out following the results in detail, let us 
 note this one item: **A sense of justice 
 / seems to have been the first distinctly 
 moral feeling aroused in many. This, 
 not on account of the wrong which the 
 child did others, but of wrong suffered 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 97 
 
 in being punished for something which 
 seemed perfectly innocent to the child. 
 One of the distinct painful impressions 
 left on my own mind by the papers is 
 the comparative frequency with which 
 parents assume that an act is consciously 
 wrong and punish it as such, when in the 
 child's mind the act is simply psychologi- 
 cal — based, I mean, upon ideas and emo- 
 tions which, under the circumstances, are 
 natural." 
 
 One of the students remembered being 
 driven from a field where he was picking 
 berries, and so led to question the right of 
 others to be so exclusive. But he remarks 
 that the effectual appeal always lay in his 
 being led to put himself in the place of 
 others. This, together with what Dr. 
 Dewey says of the feeling of injustice, 
 tallies with what is claimed in the third 
 chapter to be the genesis of the sense of 
 justice in young children. It is a com- 
 bined sentiment of rights and duties aris- 
 ing out of the proprietary sense by aid 
 of the imagination as affected by rela- 
 
9S THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 tions to the human world. Morality lies 
 not in things but in relations. 
 
 Who is there that does not carry in 
 vivid recollection some act of injustice 
 toward him in his childhood by some one 
 in authority over him? Whatever else 
 IS forgotten, that at least rankles on. I 
 well remember being marked for a yell 
 in a school-room. Our teacher was a man 
 of distinction in science, a member of the 
 Society of Friends, and not otherwise un- 
 friendly. The deed was done by a boy 
 directly back of me, who had not the jus- 
 tice to offer himself as the real delin- 
 quent. I protested, but was given no 
 hearing. My protest extended to my 
 father, who reinforced my contention of 
 innocence, but without avail. Many 
 years after, when a lecturer myself, I was 
 startled to see my old professor in the 
 front row of my audience. The oppor- 
 tunity was irresistible. Immediately on 
 closing I made myself agreeable to him 
 by rehearsing the long bygone affair of 
 injustice. 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 99 
 
 Of course he did not remember it. But 
 I had at last got as **even" as it was pos- 
 sible to get, for he had been in the 
 benches and I in the chair on this night, 
 and the reprimand was left to work it- 
 self out in his own soul by simple refer- 
 ence to it — all good natured as it was. 
 Justice was satisfied with its "hearing." 
 
 I think I have never told this story to 
 any one without my getting the reply, **I 
 have an experience very similar in my 
 own life." So common is this persistent 
 memory of childhood's suffering from a 
 denied hearing of its case, or an unjust 
 suspicion or punishment, that it seems 
 scarcely worth while to record any fur- 
 ther instances. 
 
 Many persons remember how strongly 
 tempted they were to run away from 
 home in childhood, and often because of 
 some unfair attitude or action against 
 them. The sense of being misunderstood 
 is most common, and this is but the result 
 of the gag of injustice that denies the 
 right to a hearing. 
 
loo THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Here is a typical case from the London 
 Spectator: 
 
 Perhaps my experience on this subject 
 may interest some of your readers. When 
 I was a little girl of about five, I was, to- 
 gether with my sisters, being brought up 
 by a Puritan lady of very strict, austere 
 views. One day there was a great row 
 in the house. A peach which was ripen- 
 ing on the garden wall, and which we 
 had been forbidden to touch, was found 
 to have been pinched and somebody's 
 thumb-nail dug into it. Suspicion fell on 
 me, and was confirmed by my nail appear- 
 ing to fit the mark. I had had nothing 
 to do with it, but I was shaken, whipped, 
 and locked up with nothing to eat except 
 some bread and water and a cold rice- 
 pudding, until such time as I confessed 
 my fault. 
 
 How well I remember all my misery and 
 the long weary hours, until the brilliant 
 idea occurred to me to confess the act, 
 innocent as I was, and get liberated. I 
 rushed to the door, kicked it, and 
 screamed out my penitence with sobs and 
 tears, that were as much rage and hunger 
 as anything else. But I had not looked 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE loi 
 
 far enough. "I was certain she had done 
 
 it," exclaimed Mrs. F triumphantly, 
 
 "and to think of the way she denied it 
 with the most innocent face! Go back 
 in there, you wicked little girl, and think 
 of what happens to such children as you." 
 The key was again turned in the lock, and 
 I was left with the rice-pudding, now fast 
 growing slimy and mouldy-looking. By 
 this time my sufferings had touched the 
 conscience of the real delinquent, the 
 kitchen-maid, who at this point confessed 
 it was she who had pinched the forbidden 
 fruit. 
 
 You would have thought that at least 
 some reparation would have been made 
 to me for all I had so unjustly suffered. 
 
 Not at all. Mrs. F said I must be 
 
 an artful limb of the devil. I was 
 whipped again, worse than before, and 
 when finally I was admitted back to the 
 family circle it was with a large placard 
 with '*Liar" written on it fastened to my 
 back. I have often wondered whether 
 
 Mrs. F had the faintest idea of the 
 
 chaos of fury and bewilderment that 
 filled my soul. I do not think so. I be- 
 lieve she honestly thought she was train- 
 ing us right, and I remember that when in 
 
loz THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 after years I met her again she expressed 
 herself as having been always so very 
 fond of me, and described the pleasure 
 it had given her to guide my infant steps 
 into the path they should go. 
 
 Here is a bit of personal reminiscence 
 from the pen of Edward Bok : 
 
 During my early boyhood my father 
 was led into some gold-mining invest- 
 ment, and at the dinner-table he discussed 
 the fact with my mother. Of course I 
 was at once alert. Boylike, I caught 
 nothing of the conversation except the 
 single fact of the gold mine. Naturally, 
 I felt that my father could do nothing by 
 halves, and so, to my mind, my father 
 had bought an entire gold mine. Next 
 day I duly conveyed this precious piece of 
 information to my playmates. To their 
 credit, I must say, they received it at first 
 with some incredulity, but finally my elo- 
 quence won the day and they were con- 
 vinced I All but one boy ; he pooh-poohed 
 the whole idea. He was older than I, 
 but that made no difference. He must 
 be convinced. My father's capacity to 
 buy a gold mine, or a whole city of gold 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 103 
 
 mines if he wanted them, must be estab- 
 lished in that boy's mind. And so I set 
 to work. Diligently I argued every 
 phase of the question with that boy, but 
 somehow or other he wouldn't have it. 
 However, I was not discouraged. See- 
 ing that I could not argue it into him, 
 I proceeded to literally pound it into him. 
 My father's reputation, I felt, must be 
 established, no matter what the cost. I 
 was engaged in this exhilarating form of 
 argument when the owner of the gold 
 mine himself appeared on the scene, and — 
 evidently seeing that I was getting much 
 the worse of the argument — seizing my 
 ear, disentangled me from the embrace of 
 my opponent, and delivering one or two 
 **love-pats" upon me himself, marched 
 me home 1 I do not think I blamed my 
 father so much for extricating me from 
 the warm embrace of my unconvincible 
 opponent as I did for his failure to ask 
 me, after we had reached home, the 
 reason of his finding me in such close 
 quarters 1 Instead of instituting inquiry 
 he simply constituted himself a court of 
 action. 
 
 The child's sense of moral evenness, or 
 
I04 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 equity is well illustrated in the follow- 
 ing:' 
 
 A boy of seven, told not to carry his 
 basin of sand to a preempted corner of 
 the porch, did so a second time. He was 
 warned that the next time would be under 
 penalty. A week later (a week during 
 which his mind had been distracted by a 
 household calamity) , he was found in the 
 same spot with his sand. His mother's 
 reproving eyes brought him to his feet. 
 Without a word of self-justification he 
 walked beside her into the house. After 
 a trying interview, he slipped one sandy 
 hand into hers, saying, **Truly, mamma, 
 I forgot, but I thought you ought to 
 whip me, as you promised ; that was only 
 fair.'' 
 
 A little girl, less than three years old, 
 childishly fond of unripe apples, was 
 warned and guarded, but not always suc- 
 cessfully. Finally the threat of punishment 
 was uttered, together with a prophecy of 
 illness. The next day she came and laid 
 an apple-core in her mother's lap. **I ate 
 an apple, mamma. You may punish me 
 
 * Reported by Rebecca Smylie in The Sunday 
 School Times. 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 105 
 
 now, but I know God won't let me get 
 sick. He knows a spanking is enough for 
 one little apple." 
 
 A child told that a specific punishment 
 will follow a certain course of action feels 
 that he is free to choose between the two. 
 Frequently he is intercepted in his de- 
 signs, but gets the punishment as if he 
 had attained the forbidden delight. 
 This, to the child mind, is manifestly un- 
 fair. **You didn't say you'd whip me if 
 I tried to go swimming," protested a de- 
 tected runaway. **I was willing to take 
 a whipping if I got a swim." 
 
 A former headmaster of Rugby (later, 
 the Archbishop of Canterbury) is spoken 
 of in a Rugby boy's letter as being "a 
 beast, but a just beast." ^ This was com- 
 plimentary. 
 
 After the **pardon" of Dreyfus, his 
 heroic defender, Zola (already referred 
 to), thus wrote to Madame Dreyfus: 
 
 "It is revolting to obtain pity when one 
 asks for justice, and all seems to have 
 been preconcerted in order to bring about 
 ^ Reported by Prmcipal Philips, of West Chester, Pa 
 
lo6 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 this last iniquity. The judges, wishing 
 to strike the innocent in order to save the 
 guilty, seek refuge in an act of horrible 
 hypocrisy, which they call mercy." 
 
 George Fox, in prison for conscience' 
 sake, refused to leave his disgusting in- 
 carceration by the proffered king's par- 
 don because he had done no wrong. He 
 would not accept pardon for justice. 
 
 This unextinguished sense of fairness or 
 equity, this earliest born sense of justice, 
 has not been lost even in the criminal 
 classes, but it has become limited and per- 
 verted. Indeed, these classes are chiefly 
 the product of the world's lack of justice. 
 
 Note a few cases reported by Mac- 
 Donald. A thief at Milan said, **I do 
 not steal, I only take from the rich that 
 which they have too much of; and do the 
 merchants do otherwise? Why, then, 
 should I be accused and they left undis- 
 turbed?" Another said, **I steal, it is 
 true, but never less than 2000 francs ; to 
 attack so large an amount seems to me 
 less a theft than a speculation.'* A third 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 107 
 
 said, **If I had not stolen I could not have 
 enjoyed myself; I could not even have 
 lived; we are necessarily in the world; 
 without us what need would there be of 
 judges, lawyers, gaolers? It is we who 
 give them a living." A fourth said, "We 
 are necessary. God put us in the world 
 to punish the stingy and bad rich ; we are 
 a species of plague from God. And be- 
 sides, without us what would the judges 
 do?'' A fifth, justifying the use of vio- 
 lence in robbery, said, "We bound them 
 for our own safety, as the gaoler does 
 when he puts the handcuffs on us ; it was 
 their turn — to each his turn." 
 
 Dr. MacDonald cites these cases^ to 
 show that the moral sense of criminals 
 IS "radically defective" or that moral 
 sense is "incomprehensible to them." I 
 am citing them to show that while the 
 moral sense of the criminal is decidedly 
 defective, moral sense is by no means 
 wanting in, or incomprehensible to him. 
 
 * "Criminology," p. 159 ff. 
 
io8 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Every one of these men has a sense of 
 justice. Every one wants to be thought 
 right; each one wants to think himself 
 right. To this end he employs a sophis- 
 try and a process of self-deception really 
 no more absurd than do thousands of our 
 ''respectable neighbours'' who go to their 
 daily tasks and walk the streets with 
 heads up in fearless confidence. 
 
 Observe also the note of reciprocity, of 
 equity, as much as to say that even if 
 they are wrong, they are little different 
 from their legal accusers. Some indeed 
 claim that they are discharging a duty to 
 society, and to judges and lawyers in par- 
 ticular. Some moral sense, however er- 
 ratic, is writ large in the confessions of 
 these men, who are but types. 
 
 The English criminologist, W. Douglas 
 Morrison, speaking of the homes of the 
 children of the Liverpool Industrial 
 School, says, ''I have been greatly aston- 
 ished, when talking to the children, to 
 find what a vast amount of vice and in- 
 decency they had listened to without be- 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 109 
 
 ing aware that there was anything wrong 
 in it." 
 
 I think it is safe to say that every one of 
 them carries in his untutored breast a 
 sense of fairness, however inoperative it 
 may be ; and here is the point of contact 
 for the basis of moral appeal. 
 
 **It is the feeling of injustice," says Car- 
 lyle, **that is insupportable to all men." 
 It is man's injustice to man that makes 
 so many malefactors with such blunted 
 moral sensibilities, and with so much sat- 
 isfaction in their own sophistry and self- 
 deception. 
 
 The man who cheerfully confessed to 
 having stolen gold bars from the mint 
 maintained to the end of his incarcera- 
 tion that the government had been unjust 
 to him and morally owed him thousands 
 of dollars of back pay. The claim was 
 absurd, but it was made in the name of 
 common fairness for all that, unfair as 
 he himself was in committing the theft. 
 
 It is from the study of the extremes that 
 we arrive most quickly at basal facts. 
 
no THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Criminals may be taken as the type of 
 extreme mental states, and we may there- 
 fore look a little further at the finding 
 of criminologists. 
 
 As we pursue this interesting study two 
 facts will become more and more evi- 
 dent : first, that the original sense of jus- 
 tice is seldom or never wholly obliter- 
 ated ; secondly, that it has become weak- 
 ened, warped, and tortured out of its own 
 countenance. We have seen this already 
 in the cases cited. 
 
 The wish to be thought right and to 
 offer excuses which are supposed to jus- 
 tify are pretty sure to crop out even in 
 the most blatant criminals. They appear 
 to feel, even though ever so weakly, that 
 there must be a stable norm of right 
 somewhere. They may glory in their 
 departure from it, but this is only a form 
 of confession of its claims. An extreme 
 case of this kind was reported in the 
 daily press not very long ago.^ 
 
 * The Press, (Philadelphia) despatch dated 
 July 12, 1906. 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE in 
 
 The case was that of a professional man 
 who was arrested for forgery. In the 
 police station he is reported to have said : 
 **My one great regret in life is that I 
 have fallen a slave to the morphine habit, 
 and to resist its use have failed in my 
 ambition to become the greatest criminal 
 of the age. I glory in crime and am a 
 criminal because it is impossible for me 
 to be anything else J' 
 
 This man claimed that he had criminal 
 instincts by heredity and that this was 
 beyond remedy. But observe that he 
 had sufficient sense of right and sufficient 
 desire to be thought right to offer as an 
 excuse for his wrong his belief that he 
 could not help it. The germ of right 
 was still in this ambitious criminal. 
 
 Lombroso, the distinguished criminol- 
 ogist and advocate of this much strained 
 and, I believe, untenable heredity theory, 
 cites the case of a man who, after twenty 
 years' imprisonment, was visited by a 
 spectre or vision of the Virgin while in 
 his cell. She appointed him to a mission 
 
112 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 in her name, and the man became, so it is 
 reported, a philanthropist. This could 
 not have been but for the reawakening of 
 the original sentiment or sense of justice, 
 or absolute right to all men. 
 
 Again, a horse thief admitted having 
 taken a horse because the leader of a 
 band could not be expected to go on foot; 
 but he denied that the act was theft. 
 
 MacDonald^ notes that thieves consider 
 a bankrupt worse than themselves. But 
 his immunity inflames their sense of fair- 
 ness and reacts through their revenge on 
 society. One thief shared his booty 
 with the poor out of a confessed sense of 
 what he called natural justice. But for 
 the artificial justice or prescriptions of 
 law courts he cared nothing. 
 
 MacDonald concludes that the criminal 
 is more likely to think right than to feel 
 right. For the lack of the proper feel- 
 ing the criminal lacks the will power to 
 follow his idea. Hence, the doctrine of 
 
 * *< Criminology," p. 164 IF. 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 113 
 
 **honesty among thieves," which Is prac- 
 tically the sense of justice with the emo- 
 tional side obliterated, or, at least, mis- 
 directed. Of course this is not the true, 
 efficient sentiment of justice, but its 
 degradation to merely an economic idea. 
 When we come, then, to think of justice 
 as a mode of education we must not omit 
 the training of the feelings^ as an essen- 
 tial to this aspect of social reform. The 
 feelings are racial, social ; hence their im- 
 portant function even in the highly intel- 
 lectual sentiment of justice. An idea acts 
 only according as it is felt. 
 
 In Flynt and Walton's *Towers that 
 Prey," two criminals are discussing the 
 conviction of an innocent friend, for mur- 
 der. Says one, **Seems like a gun can't 
 do nothin' any more 'thout bein' pinched 
 for somethin' else." The other replies, 
 "I'd sooner be pinched for what I didn't 
 do 'n what I done ; it riles a bloke's sense 
 
 * See ''The Natural Way in Moral Training/' 
 chapter on Nurture by Atmosphere, by Patterson 
 DuBois. 
 
114 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 o' justice to be accused false and helps 
 him put up a front.'' The innocent con- 
 vict himself says, "I ain't turnin' soft and 
 kickin' 'bout goin' to the chair — not me I 
 It's up to me to sit in it, that's straight. 
 An' I've done enough to deserve croakin' 
 ten times over; but, Jackson, it ain't up 
 to me to stand for the killin' of 
 Hooper. ... I don't mind croakin' for 
 anything I done, but I hate like hell to 
 croak for somethin' I didn't." 
 
 Very clearly does the sense of fairness 
 come out in this incident. The murderer 
 has no objections to his capital punish- 
 ment, provided the punishment is for a 
 deed which he has committed. The 
 equity would be all right had he done the 
 act, and although he has escaped punish- 
 ment for many other crimes, he is riled 
 for this one miscarriage of judgment. 
 
 A criminal telling of his release from 
 the Auburn penitentiary after a five 
 years' term says :^ 
 
 * **Thc Autobiography of a Thief," recorded by 
 Hutchins Hapgood, p. 197. 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 115 
 
 I knew that there was nothing in a life 
 of crime. I had tested that well enough. 
 But there were times during the last 
 months I spent in my cell when, in spite 
 of my good resolutions, I hated the out- 
 side world, which had forced me into a 
 place that took away from me my man- 
 hood and strength. I knew I had sinned 
 against my fellow-men, but I knew, too, 
 that there had been something good in 
 me. I was half Irish, and about that 
 race there is naturally something roguish ; 
 and that was part of my wickedness. 
 When I left stir I knew I was not 
 capable, after five years and some months 
 of unnatural routine, of what I should 
 have been by nature. 
 
 It would appear, then, that, as claimed 
 at the outset, justice is the earliest moral 
 feeling to develop and the surest to per- 
 sist through life. Despite Judge Taft's 
 decision that the motive of justice is natu- 
 urally in the Anglo-Saxon breast, but ab- 
 sent in the Porto Rican and the Filipino, 
 and despite the contention in some quar- 
 ters that it is much stronger in men than 
 
 
 '^ERSITY 
 
Il6 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 in women, I believe it to be more nearly 
 universal, can be counted on more surely 
 as a moral appeal, than any other virtu- 
 ous sentiment or instinct. There are 
 good reasons why it might seem weaker, 
 or at least might be less obvious and 
 operative in women than in men. But 
 that does not vitiate the main contention 
 of universality. 
 
 It is impossible for me to see how there 
 can be any difference caused by sex in the 
 spontaneous generation of the sense of 
 proprietary rights and the relation which 
 these rights bear to others. The rights 
 and duties of humanity develop just as 
 surely in one sex as in the other. But it is 
 not impossible that the training and the 
 sort of relation which men and women 
 bear to the community may cause a diver- 
 gence in the mode of display of the origi- 
 nal sentiment, and even result in a greater 
 or less degree of its inoperation. 
 
 Meredith Townsend in his book on 
 Asia testifies that, *The idea of justice is 
 almost as instinctive as the idea of differ- 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 117 
 
 ence between right and wrong, and an 
 Asiatic submits more humbly to a just 
 sentence than a European." 
 
 So sacred was the idea of justice in the 
 Middle Ages, that, as Hallam writes, 
 **the courts of a feudal barony or manor 
 required neither the knowledge of posi- 
 tive law nor the dictates of natural sagac- 
 ity. In all doubtful cases, and especially 
 where a crime not capable of notorious 
 proof was charged, the combat was 
 awarded, and God, as they deemed, was 
 the judge." 
 
 That the sense of justice or right and 
 the consequent respect for virtue are 
 never wholly obliterated from the degen- 
 erate mind is the theme of a striking pas- 
 sage in that lofty yet almost forgotten 
 epic, PoUok's **Course of Time" : 
 
 Virtue, like God, whose excellent majesty, 
 Whose glory virtue Is, is omnipresent. 
 No being, once created rational. 
 Accountable, endowed with moral sense, 
 .With sapience of right and wrong en- 
 dowed, 
 
n« THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 And charged, however fallen, debased, 
 
 destroyed ; 
 However lost, forlorn, miserable; 
 In guilt's dark shrouding wrapt, however 
 
 thick; 
 However drunk, delirious, and mad. 
 With sin's full cup; and with whatever 
 
 damned 
 Unnatural diligence it work and toil, 
 Can banish virtue from its sight, or once 
 Forget that she is fair. 
 
 The question now arises why, if the 
 race has such an instinctive sense of jus- 
 tice, such a desire indeed to be thought 
 right, why is there so much injustice in 
 the world? 
 
 The answer was given at the start. In 
 a degree we are all like Danton. Our 
 sense of fairness has been too little prac- 
 tised. Other virtues, imperfect and un- 
 certain, have been too easily substituted 
 and magnified for the cardinal moral reg- 
 ulator. The result is just what we see 
 to-day in our civilisation. Our vision is 
 too contracted and too astigmatic. We 
 do not take to heart the truth that unless 
 
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 119 
 
 one understands that as a member of the 
 body politic, or institutional life, if he 
 fails to give and take, defer and obey, 
 adjust and correlate, he is unjust, anti- 
 social, and immoral. 
 
 Not that benevolence, generosity, pity, 
 kindness, patience, humility, gratitude, 
 forgiveness, etc., can have no place in 
 social ethics — life would be intolerable 
 without them; but rather that they get 
 their full value under the vise signature 
 of the master moral insight of Justice — 
 which can be neither misplaced nor par- 
 tial nor overdone when it is real. 
 
 What Christians need is a more exact 
 and courageous moral discrimination and 
 feeling ; less sophistry ; a confirmed habit 
 of thinking things through to the ultimate 
 moral issue and result. In this school 
 Justice is the headmaster; in this empire 
 of universal brotherhood Justice is the 
 premier as Love is the throne. 
 
VI 
 
 EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 
 OF THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 Justice is more than a basis of ethical 
 training. It is essential to the full effi- 
 ciency of all forms of right influences of 
 man upon man. It underlies all true edu- 
 cation as means and as end. 
 
 Something that looks like social reform 
 or moral improvement or a closer 
 brotherhood or a truer unity or a higher 
 freedom or a firmer peace can be accom- 
 plished through the indefinite motives 
 that we call philanthropy and benevo- 
 lence. 
 
 But if such reform has been wrought 
 at the expense of a true equity, it must 
 in the end prove a delusion. Unless phil- 
 anthropy has confided its cause to the 
 exacter thought and the even, steady 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 121 
 
 hand of justice it has failed of its divine 
 mission. Upon this distinction moral 
 education must focus. 
 
 In view of what has been said in the 
 foregoing chapters — the testimony of 
 Scripture, of great minds, of the child's 
 instincts, of the criminal's complaint, of 
 the trend toward brotherhood and peace, 
 and of the social-moral obligation — this 
 would seem to be a truth, simple and ob- 
 vious enough to need no restatement. 
 
 Yet there are good men and thoughtful 
 men who, rightly preaching the gospel 
 of love, too easily overlook the fact that 
 love can be unlovely (as Christianity 
 may be un-Christian) , but that love's jus- 
 tice or justice-love can be neither unjust 
 nor unlovely — nor un-Christian. Such 
 men have restricted their outlook to the 
 salvation of the individual, ignoring the 
 fact that the Gospel of Christ is a social 
 Gospel, the Lord's Prayer a social prayer 
 and the kingdom of Heaven a corporate 
 idea. 
 
 Take, for instance, this declaration 
 
122 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 from an influential religious journal: 
 **No man lives who can afford to be just, 
 for no man could live if he received jus- 
 tice/' Rather let us contend that no 
 man fully lives until he receives justice 
 and gives justice. Humanly speaking, 
 there is no complete moral life but in 
 equity. In this rights and duties coincide 
 and become one. We have seen that 
 although no one man can be entirely just, 
 every man can take social justice as the 
 norm of his moral life. 
 
 But to continue the quotation: **We get 
 more blessings than we deserve, better 
 treatment from God and men than we 
 are entitled to, every day of our lives." 
 How? Is not every man by the law of 
 justice entitled to the very best that can 
 be done for him to make him an efficient 
 member of society? Does any little 
 child get better — better — at the hands of 
 society than he is entitled to ? 
 
 One man may receive in some respect 
 more than his share, but this is because he 
 is unjust to society and society is, so far. 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 123 
 
 unjust to him. The sooner he becomes a 
 just man, the sooner will he receive jus- 
 tice — which is his desert. To say that no 
 man can live if he receive justice from 
 his fellow-men is to imply that social life 
 is possible only through injustice. This 
 is moral anarchy. To say that the social 
 order rests upon injustice is practically a 
 contradiction in terms. Justice is san- 
 ity and order. 
 
 The truth is, that no man can afford to 
 be wwjust, because by any other plan of 
 life he is perpetually annulling his own ac- 
 tion, as has already been shown. This is 
 what every member of society is suffer- 
 ing from. Society is having a head-on 
 collision with itself because of the lack of 
 a unified ideal and plan of justice. The 
 man who contributes to an election fund 
 to be expended in depriving him of the 
 full value of his vote Is in collisioi;i with 
 himself. 
 
 To promote hollow and bogus concerns 
 IS to weaken that public confidence which 
 even the promoter needs. To break the 
 
124 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 law regulating road speed is to reduce 
 the protection which one gets from all 
 law. He who thinks to save himself 
 trouble by half-washing a milk bottle 
 may bring back trouble in an epidemic. 
 The man who gambles with the captain 
 endangers the vessel on which he is a 
 passenger. The editor who incites to 
 crime by exciting headlines may suffer 
 at the hand of criminals whom he has 
 helped to cultivate. And the social edict 
 that throws the man of forty-five out of 
 employment to make room for younger 
 men returns with a blow upon the head 
 of society by increasing the number of its 
 dependants. 
 
 All such courses are anti-social — ignor- 
 ing the equitable interdependence of 
 men, and are therefore personally im- 
 moral. 
 
 To be unjust to one is, by ever so little, 
 perhaps, to unbalance the social order — > 
 which is worse than the direct damage 
 to the individual. To him as a member 
 of society a larger, though indirect, dam* 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 125 
 
 age returns. The sooner we educate to 
 this the better. 
 
 No man has ever received his due at the. 
 hands of man. No criminal but carries a 
 score against his sometime environment, 
 whichever score society may reckon 
 against him. To no one has society guar- 
 anteed full righteous development of his 
 powers even for society's own sake. 
 Society has suffered a partial paralysis by 
 its drug habit of injustice. 
 
 But justice under the name of preven- 
 tive philanthropy is moving in multitudi- 
 nous ways. For the handicapped child 
 surgery has been substituted for scolding 
 and castigation. For the messenger boys 
 liable to ruin by night calls at houses of 
 vice, for very little children toiling 
 through a long night in cotton mills, for 
 children in the glass factories and for 
 boys in the coal breakers, the voice of 
 justice is rising to preserve and restore to 
 them the filched property of their possi- 
 bilities. To the city child of the dark 
 tenement and the narrow alley are open- 
 
126 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 ing the opportunities of parks, play- 
 grounds, gymnasiums, baths, vacation 
 schools, reading clubs, libraries, healthful 
 social centres, and, let us say, juvenile 
 courts — even though Judge Lindsey re- 
 minds us that *^if the juvenile court is 
 designed to keep children out of prisons 
 and gaols, we ought to have something 
 to keep them out of the juvenile court." 
 
 If it were always possible, the best thing 
 we could have would be a justly ordered 
 home and family life. Indeed one may 
 wonder whether the well-to-do home is 
 not in danger of being neglected in the 
 partial struggle for prevention. Our 
 homes have their peculiar liabilities to 
 unjust discrimination and inequality. In 
 the zeal to be just outside a mother or 
 father may forget the bench at the fire- 
 side.^ This is to be unjust to society at 
 the most vital place. 
 
 It ought now to be evident that man can 
 never be just to man by starting with 
 
 ' See "Fireside Child Study. '' Also ''Reckonings 
 from Little Hands. " Both by the present author. 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 127 
 
 men. It may be confidently asserted that 
 no one arrives at maturity properly ma- 
 tured. Every one has been more or less 
 despoiled of his possibilities In childhood 
 and youth. The losses of the past cannot 
 be wholly regained, even though Mother 
 Nature is wonderfully forgiving and re- 
 storing. 
 
 This spoliation of youth, reduced to its 
 lowest ethical denominator, Is Injustice; 
 and it Is the chief cause of much of the 
 subsequent misery, delinquency, disorder, 
 and crime to which society Is such an easy 
 prey. And much of this must be laid at 
 the door of the well-to-do, enlightened, 
 Christian home. Misery does not pri- 
 marily root in the slums. 
 
 How slow we have been to see that we 
 never can put the adult world where it 
 ought to be by beginning with the adult 
 world! Repression, punishment, relief 
 for body and mind, purification and adult 
 correction and support, are good as far as 
 they go, but they do not Insure against 
 the same role for the next generation. 
 
128 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 They clear the school-room floor, but do 
 not prevent its disorder again. Jesus 
 went about doing good to all ages and 
 stages of life, but he made It very em- 
 phatic that the beginning of life Is the 
 place to begin with Ideal life. 
 
 We are coming to see that this divine 
 attitude Is not one of sentimentality but of 
 common sense. But we still cherish the 
 almshouse, the reformatory, and the 
 prison. Do we help to make men de- 
 pendent and delinquent so that we can 
 exercise charity In rehevlng and correct- 
 ing them? It Is Indeed a wonderful 
 irony, this so-called civilisation of ours. 
 
 But the juvenile court, the anti-child-la- 
 bour movement, the children's aid soci- 
 eties, and the kindergarten are pushing 
 on. Let the homes of the well-to-do es- 
 tablish their fireside court,^ where the 
 **suspended judgment'' is the rule, where 
 physical defect or disorder is not rated 
 as moral delinquency, and where chlld- 
 
 " See ''Fireside Child Study." 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 129 
 
 ish feelings, ambitious, and energies are 
 not suppressed under selfish parental 
 threats. And so of the school. And the 
 Church ? When will It throw a right em- 
 phasis on the child, not thinking itself 
 dutiful by torturing the child Into the 
 mould of a dwarfed man? And when 
 win the Church lead In social reform? 
 
 The educator of to-day regards the de- 
 veloping personality of the pupil as the 
 centre of his activity. So did Jesus. To 
 this developing personality the manifold 
 of Interests must be referred back at all 
 times. This Is the plea of proprietary 
 simultaneous rights and duties — the 
 moral plea of justice. 
 
 This right to one's own developing 
 personality Is the spiritual right of char- 
 acter. But Its realisation Is possible only 
 to him who recognises It as making for 
 the general good and subject to adjust- 
 ment of the rights of others. All rights 
 beget moral duties ; all moral duties pre- 
 serve rights. Rights and duties are a 
 single motif of brotherhood. 
 
I30 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Even In material things the sense of 
 rights of possession must be carefully 
 guarded and trained. **How and in 
 what spirit is it my duty to use my power 
 or prerogative? What law can I lay 
 down for myself so that my powers shall 
 not be a source of evil to me and to 
 others?'' asks President Woolsey. **In 
 our partial view, justice may sometimes 
 seem to demand that we waive our rights 
 and it may be our duty to do so. But, all 
 the same, it is our duty also to respect 
 our rights of possession, since these lie 
 at the root of all our charity and gener- 
 osity/' 
 
 Manifestly we cannot bring up a child 
 to be kind, generous, and charitable un- 
 less that child is conceded a possession of 
 powers and property^ in withholding 
 which he could be unkind and ungener- 
 ous. The sense of rights as a social sense 
 comes, there fore, to be at one with a sense 
 of duties. 
 
 And so we find the moral sanction grav- 
 itating every time to the principle of jus- 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 131 
 
 tice as the primal substructure of ordered 
 society. **He that is unjust in the least 
 is unjust also in much,'' because justice is 
 cooperative and interdependent. **If ye 
 have not been faithful in that which is 
 another's, who shall give you that which 
 is your own?"^ Your injustice to an- 
 other so disturbs the social relation that it 
 returns upon you. 
 
 Sure enough. This is not spite, but the 
 insight that one cannot rob his neighbour 
 without, morally at least, robbing him- 
 self. 
 
 Justice is the universal touch, the all- 
 sided connectedness, the cosmic respon- 
 sibility. The '^duties of imperfect obli- 
 gation" turn at last to justice as their only 
 safe regulator — lest in their blind sym- 
 pathy they undo their own well-doing. 
 
 Can one break any of the last six items 
 of the decalogue without offending ideal 
 justice? Can one lie without robbing 
 another of his own? Is not adultery a 
 
 ' Parable of the Unjust Steward. 
 
132 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 blow at the Integrity of the social rela- 
 tion and organised efficiency? Is not 
 calumny killing, and Is killing not rob- 
 bery of powers? Can one Injure him- 
 self without Injuring society, and so re- 
 turning the Injury upon himself again? 
 
 What a beautiful equity we find In the 
 model, or Lord's, prayer: **On earth as 
 in heaven"; **ForgIve us our trespasses 
 as we forgive those who trespass against 
 us." The prayer assumes social Interde- 
 pendence. 
 
 Trespass ? Have we not seen that this 
 was the root sin of Eden? that the first 
 moral principle on record was the prin- 
 ciple of justice — the Inviolate proprietor- 
 ship, the guarantee against trespass? 
 Young childhood feels this, and the 
 growing child must be educated to live by 
 the discernment of It. 
 
 Justice has no place for Inertia and Irre- 
 sponsibility. It not only forbids our 
 causing another to stumble, but It de- 
 mands that we exert ourselves to prevent 
 his stumbling. This principle Is finely 11- 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 133 
 
 lustrated, so far as it goes, In the laws of 
 the Norman kings of England. Under 
 Henry I., for instance, says Stubbs^; **If 
 any one kills a Frenchman and the men 
 of the neighbourhood do not within a 
 week take the slayer and bring him be- 
 fore the justices to show why he did it, 
 they — that is, the men of the hundred — 
 are to pay for the murder, 46 marks. 
 Here you see the neglect to help the 
 carrying into effect of the law is made 
 punishable." 
 
 Justice as a sentiment is the constant 
 and unswerving desire to render, let us 
 say to guarantee, to every one his own. 
 This means not only that we avoid ob- 
 structing any one's proper development, 
 but that we give him his share of our di- 
 rect aid. We shall not only punish the 
 miscreant, but we shall remove the causes 
 that have made an evil doer of him ; we 
 shall not only help the unfortunate out of 
 poverty, but we shall abate the condi- 
 
 * "Lectures on Early English History," p. 52. 
 
134 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 tions which make his misfortune possible. 
 A journal asks this searching question: 
 "More than a hundred thousand persons 
 united in seeking to secure the release of 
 a convicted murderer. How many of 
 that hundred thousand will work to- 
 gether to help the young man who has 
 not been convicted of any crime, but who 
 is working hard to get an honest living 
 and educate his children?" 
 
 Justice thus becomes the guide to and 
 the guarantee of freedom. From its 
 origin in the proprietary sense of right 
 in one's own powers it compasses the 
 whole moral obligation to secure a simi- 
 lar proprietorship to every one in the 
 social organism. What is now popularly 
 known as the sense of human brother- 
 hood is little else than a revived sentiment 
 of justice come by the utilitarian or socio- 
 logical road. It is the voice of freedom 
 — the struggle for which is the history 
 of the race. 
 
 Justice, liberty, peace. These three 
 terms are but variants of the thought of 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 135 
 
 the perfect social structure or organism. 
 The word peace itself is in its root idea 
 the pact or union, as are the words jus- 
 tice^ equity and fairness} 
 
 On the walls of the War and Peace 
 Museum at Lucerne there is inscribed 
 this paragraph from Elihu Burritt: 
 
 People may laugh at the plan of arbi- 
 tration, but in my opinion the warlike 
 plan is infinitely more ludicrous. The 
 inequality of horses, a disparity in the 
 power of wielding the sword, or the pos- 
 session of high powers of strategy in a 
 general are circumstances which the 
 merest child can understand and have no 
 connection either with justice or national 
 honour. 
 
 This was uttered years ago. Why is 
 Burritt so sure? Because those things 
 which condition success or defeat in war 
 have no essential root in justice. There 
 is the pivotal point in Burritt's argument. 
 He knew that social control, that stable 
 conditions of order, were impossible ex- 
 ' See Chapter III. 
 
136 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 cept they be grounded In Ideas of justice. 
 This Is the moral rock on which Is writ- 
 ten the law of liberty and the pact of 
 peace. Perhaps universal peace Is to 
 come through the feeling of the masses 
 for justice and In a universal revival of 
 the sentiment that *'a man's a man for a' 
 that/' 
 
 Note how Phillips Brooks's definition 
 of liberty^ coincides with our view of jus- 
 tice : Liberty is the fullest opportunity for 
 man to be and to do the very best that is 
 possible for him. It Is justice that se- 
 cures to him this opportunity. And this 
 Is possible only under conditions of peace* 
 
 This principle Is as true In the home 
 as It Is In the counsels of the nations. 
 Parental triumphs not rooted In fairness 
 or justice, but which rest on the accident 
 of superior physique or other weight of 
 power, mean moral war In the household 
 — however quiet the regime seems — and 
 disaffection and possible delinquency later 
 
 * Addresses based on John 8 : 31-36, p. 105. 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 137 
 
 in life. And this leads to social rupture 
 on a larger scale. 
 
 It has been said that earthly injustice 
 argues for immortality. Let It also be 
 that justice safeguards the dead. The 
 leader of a Sunday-school class was once 
 drawing the customary moral from the 
 text "Gallio cared for none of these 
 things" ^ — the lesson against Indifference 
 to the claims of Christ on us. **Is it a 
 true parallel?" asked a hesitating 
 teacher. **Well, it is a lesson for us," 
 said the leader. *'But Is it fair to 
 Gallio?" persisted the teacher somewhat 
 deferentially. There Is a deal of unfair 
 reflection on the characters of the past 
 for the sake of making a point. Does It 
 hurt them? It hurts their influence, to 
 which they have still a right. It hurts us 
 when we misconstrue. 
 
 Take the case of the Philipplan gaoler, 
 asking, **What must I do to be saved?" ^ 
 A Sunday-school ''lesson help" says, ''Evi- 
 
 *Acts 18 : 17. 
 *Acts 16 : 30. 
 
13? THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 dently he was convicted of sin." I say 
 not '^evidently/' But the theologian's 
 wish Is father to the cocksure Interpre- 
 tation. It may be so, but fairness to the 
 gaoler demands that his meaning rest on 
 something else than our exegetlcal or 
 homlletlcal convenience. 
 
 Justice feels; It embraces the soul of 
 sympathy, pity, forgiveness, kindness. 
 Justice thinks; It weighs conditions, 
 searches for causes and effects, calculates 
 the equity of opportunity, the reciproc- 
 ity of rights and duties and discriminates 
 and fixes moral values. Justice Imagines, 
 visualises, sees the whole, penetrates, 
 puts the self In the place of others, grasps 
 the unlversals. Justice wills, acts ; It Is a 
 doer. Education for justice Is therefore 
 preeminently an education by doing. 
 
 Shall we forget to be merely kind, pity- 
 ingly benevolent, simlllngly forgiving, 
 heartily generous? These duties of Im- 
 perfect obligation are duties still, but the 
 more they place themselves under the 
 guidance of the virile and heroic sense 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 139 
 
 of justice, the more true to themselves 
 they will be. We shall then cease to 
 **kill with kindness," to impoverish with 
 benevolence, to weaken with over-assist- 
 ance, to invite crime with too easy pardon, 
 to create offenders in the effort to correct 
 them. 
 
 Is it, then, that we cannot err in the 
 name of justice as we are liable to do in 
 the name of love, kindness, or charity? 
 Of course the finite mind is not inerrant 
 and absolute justice is a thing of the In- 
 finite Mind. 
 
 But justice more than any other of 
 love's ministers has a definite plan of 
 thought. It is conscious of its principle. 
 If the vision and reach of the human 
 mind are not infinite, they mean to be exact 
 as far as they go and to go farther. The 
 just mind, although limited, is neither 
 slow nor hasty; it sees no more reason 
 for **railroading" one criminal because of 
 popular indignation than deferring the 
 sentence of another because of his sup- 
 posed respectability or his obscurity. 
 
I40 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 The just mind, conscious of its limita- 
 tions, is not debarred by them from learn- 
 ing all that can be learned in any case. 
 It is not satisfied to judge a child's actions 
 by similar actions in the adult. It is im- 
 possible fully to understand a child, but 
 human justice, partial and imperfect as 
 it may be, consists in the admission of the 
 difficulty instead of assuming to know it 
 all. Its prime effort is to locate the real 
 evil or the real peril. 
 
 Hence, finite as man is, justice is con- 
 scious of a certain finality in its plan and 
 purpose as simple benevolence cannot be. 
 It is economic and quantitative. It is a 
 habitual process of thought, a prescribed 
 mode of morals. It abhors bias, is all- 
 sided. It is kindness set in the infinite 
 form. It is altogether and always hu- 
 mane. 
 
 The newspaper told us not long ago of 
 a young man who robbed his employer 
 because he wanted to marry, and bought 
 a little house for a prospective home. 
 His sweetheart, in tears at the magis- 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 141 
 
 trate's court, said, **Whatever he has 
 done has been for my sake, and TU never 
 give him up. He did all this because he 
 loved me. FU stay by him to the end." 
 
 Justice did not require that she give him 
 up, but neither did it permit her to con- 
 done his guilt because it was for her sake. 
 Love might err here where justice could 
 not. And yet the magistrate might 
 justly consider the motive. The road by 
 which the man came to his fall is to be 
 taken into account. Justice to her would 
 likewise condone in her, to an extent, the 
 closing of her eyes to everything but a 
 certain loyalty. Justice to society would 
 demand both that the culprit suffer and 
 that society suffer for not having edu- 
 cated him to the prevention of his becom- 
 ing a thief. And so forth : the process of 
 cause against cause, effect against effect, 
 is really an infinite one, but it is untiringly 
 intelligent, planful, cooperative, actuated 
 alike by sympathy and reason, in the in- 
 terest of the larger social good. 
 
 Even an old criminal may not be the 
 
f4» THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 same man at the time of his sentence as 
 he was at the time of his crime. Canon 
 Mozley/ writing on the reversal of hu- 
 man judgment, says, **Some one who did 
 not promise much comes out at the mo- 
 ment of trial strikingly and favour- 
 ably. . . . The act of the thief on the 
 cross is a surprise. Up to the time he 
 was judged he was a thief, and from a 
 thief he became a saint. For even in the 
 dark labyrinth of evil there are unex- 
 pected outlets. Sin is established by 
 habit in the man, but the good principle 
 which is in him also, but kept down and 
 suppressed, may be secretly growing 
 toor 
 
 Yet quite unjustly we continue to think 
 of him as the same old thief and are sur- 
 prised when told that he is ready to enter 
 paradise. By the same sort of unreversed 
 judgment we make children naughty, 
 criminals more criminal at heart, and 
 hinder their reform — for children and 
 
 •••University Sermons," 6th ed., p. 92. 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 143 
 
 men build themselves largely out of our 
 judgments of them. 
 
 An ex-policeman pleading guilty to six- 
 teen robberies, when about to receive his 
 sentence, asked and was given permission 
 to address the court: 
 
 *Tour Honour," he said, **I have com- 
 mitted many crimes, and the law says that 
 crime must be punished. I bow to the 
 mandates of the law. In many cases it 
 is, however, impossible to punish the 
 guilty without making the innocent suffer 
 also. In my case this is particularly true, 
 because the imposition of a heavy sen- 
 tence will be a blow to my aged mother, 
 whom I love better than my life. 
 
 **Having had time for reflection in 
 prison, I cannot think what possessed me to 
 do the things that I have done. It could 
 not have been love of gain, because the 
 results of my crimes have been vastly ex- 
 aggerated. I took for the most part only 
 hats and umbrellas. I committed no vio- 
 lence, and never carried a gun in my life. 
 Since my arrest I have made a full con- 
 fession, and have made every effort to 
 make ifull restitution, and I ask your 
 
144 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Honour to temper justice with mercy, so 
 that when I come out of prison I may 
 find my poor old mother still alive, and 
 can redeem myself in the eyes of my 
 fellow-men, and be a comfort to my 
 mother's declining years, and be with her 
 when she dies. That is all I have to say. 
 I thank you for your attention." 
 
 "Your appeal is a strong one," said the 
 Judge in reply. '*I feel that if your love 
 for your mother is as sincere as you say 
 it is, and I have no reason to question it, 
 It is a very commendable feeling on your 
 part, but it is a great misfortune that 
 you were not controlled by it before you 
 committed these crimes. However, it is 
 not for the Court to regard the sentimen- 
 tal aspect of each particular case, but the 
 bearing it has on the general public. Re- 
 flecting on your case, however, I have 
 concluded that a lighter sentence than 
 was suggested at the time you pleaded 
 guilty will fulfil the ends of justice." 
 
 This is not sentimentality. It is taking 
 all circumstances into account. It is rec- 
 ognising that the good principle in a 
 crime-ridden man, kept down and sup- 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 145 
 
 pressed, had been growing, nevertheless. 
 The first motive of the State is not to 
 punish, but to make good citizens. And 
 parents should be under the same rule. 
 
 Formative and constructive justice, as 
 has been said, must begin in the family. 
 The child must be understood ; he, or his 
 nature at least, must have a hearing; his 
 errors must be located ; his good impulses 
 recognised and fostered. He must be 
 conceded an individuality with a right of 
 choice, subject to the general good — 
 which general good also limits and di- 
 rects the choices of his parents no less 
 than his own. Thus, justice to the child 
 becomes a mode of his education to a 
 just mind. 
 
 The home attitude must be that of a 
 desire to be fair in all things. It must 
 show itself in common conversation. 
 The equitable note must be sounded even 
 though the subject be far out of the 
 child's understanding and interest. Jus- 
 tice must hold itself a standing home 
 critic on gossip, exaggeration, suspicion. 
 
146 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 and personal feelings. Injustice must be 
 held as the bane of the reporter's over- 
 statement and over-publicity; of legal 
 garnishments, detective **sweating" proc- 
 esses, rebates, bosses, child slavery, 
 cruelty to animals, corporal punishment, 
 church heresy trials, capital oppression, 
 trade, clerical, medical, and legal imposi- 
 tion, food adulteration and so forth. 
 
 Justice asks one to rinse out a pub- 
 lic drinking cup after using it as surely 
 as before; it keeps lead pencils out of the 
 mouth of the pencil borrower; warns the 
 woman in the sealskin coat not to fan her 
 delicate neighbour in the front pew; 
 points the newcomer to the foot of the 
 line at the ticket office ; keeps dirty boots 
 off of car seats; considers the passenger 
 back of the open window; orders punc- 
 tuality as a social virtue; never demands 
 that a cook shall be infallible with a 
 worn-out stove or without good utensils ; 
 issues no conflicting orders to employees 
 without apology and self-reform; ab- 
 stains from marking public library 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 147 
 
 books; refuses to spit on floors; recog- 
 nises that the success of a church may de- 
 pend as much on the fidelity of a sexton 
 or janitor as upon the pastor or the 
 treasurer; forbids that an audience scat- 
 ter itself in rear seats, expecting the 
 speaker to exert himself to be heard 
 when the front seats are empty; sees that 
 the labourer's mind, or that of the house 
 servant, needs the relief of change and 
 variety as does that of his master; be- 
 lieves that a public officer may be honest 
 and able and yet make a mistake ; denies 
 to the chauffeur the murderous right of 
 way simply because of his willingness to 
 pay a fine; refuses to stigmatise every law 
 breaker as a criminal or always to em- 
 phasise the fact that it is a negro and 
 never that it is a white man, or to put 
 the released criminal under a perpetual 
 ban. 
 
 Justice first took the shackles from the 
 insane and provided schools for the blind, 
 the deaf, and the imbecile — giving them 
 the greatest possible opportunity for the 
 
T48 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 development of their powers and the giv- 
 ing to them a place in the organised social 
 energy. Justice must go farther and pre- 
 vent insanity, imbecility, and other afflic- 
 tions. The employer must relieve the 
 monotony of his treadmill and the mind 
 of the least must have a varied outlook. 
 The justice of cure must be put out of 
 business by the justice of prevention. 
 This idea at least must dominate the 
 moral regimen. In a thousand such ways 
 the youthful sense of justice must be con- 
 served and strengthened by suggestion 
 and practice. 
 
 There is no subject, no occasion, involv- 
 ing the relation between man and man 
 which is not under the regulative moral 
 eye and hand of justice. A few of the 
 more familiar types have just been enu- 
 merated — familiar, yet not so commonly 
 thought of as matters of justice. The 
 home has there a large educational field. 
 
 There are other types. Take the physi- 
 cian who makes an egregious error of 
 diagnosis, which involves the patient in 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 149 
 
 large expense for a course of treatment 
 subsequently admitted to have been en- 
 tirely erroneous; or the physician who 
 visits too often because his own funds are 
 low; or the patient who is slow to pay 
 his bill because it comes so long after 
 his recovery; or the extortion of a spe- 
 cialist without regard to a certain claim 
 upon his skill by the social inheritance 
 which has made it possible; or the 
 lawyer who unduly postpones and 
 appeals on errors which do not affect the 
 justice of the judgment; or the editor 
 who orders an expert article and then re- 
 fuses to take it — costing the author days 
 of research, perhaps, and literary la- 
 bour;^ or the editor who, more moved by 
 fairness, pays for an article and sup- 
 
 ^ I am aware that an editor is supposed to know- 
 unerringly what is good for his paper and what his 
 constituents want, and also that the paper is his, 
 and that no one need write for it if he does not 
 wish to. The plea is plausible, but I, for one, 
 have never believed in editorial infallibility. In 
 fact, being an editor may be the best reason for not 
 knowing always what the public wants or ought to 
 
15© THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 presses it without giving the author the 
 opportunity of using it elsewhere ; or the 
 church court that tries a minister for 
 heresy by a vast assembly necessarily 
 prejudiced, inexperienced, heated, and 
 without calm personal deliberation on 
 proper evidence. 
 
 Right here, also, let us pause to consider 
 the matter of church statistical reports. 
 In some of the larger denominations — 
 and I speak with surer knowledge of my 
 own — essential comparisons of the local 
 churches are impossible to a fair mind. 
 Certain totals are absolutely deceptive or 
 meaningless. Lack of uniformity in 
 method results in misconstruing and in 
 the over- or under-estimating of relative 
 strength, zeal, or efficiency. The out- 
 have. Professionalism is a bar to progress. I say 
 this as an editor. Great reforms and great discov- 
 eries have often been unprofessional. A contributor 
 may be a better judge, sometimes, than an editor. 
 In any case, an author from whom an article is or- 
 dered has a certain claim to recognition. I say this 
 not without knowing that the subject is complex and 
 difficult and the lines of cleavage indefinite. 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 151 
 
 come is an unjust rating of ministers or 
 of organisations. Many ministers ap- 
 pear under these statistics as successes, 
 others as failures in one way or another, 
 while the truth is the comparisons are 
 farcical, and some are unduly exalted 
 while others are unduly lamented or 
 blamed. This is bad suggestion for the 
 young folk of the church. 
 
 This unsystematic system of the 
 churches is more or less evidenced also in 
 some of the philanthropic institutions un- 
 der the Church's care. In a semi-volun- 
 tary organisation some looseness and in- 
 definiteness Is perhaps to be expected. 
 But the truth is the Church has made 
 so little of social equity or justice, 
 as the foundation method of love — that 
 she has no ethical spine. She has been so 
 afraid that somebody might substitute 
 morality for religion that she has lost the 
 sense of Christian proportion. 
 
 Of course there are glorious exceptions 
 among church officers and workers. Our 
 great philanthropies, in which love is 
 
152 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 working out as justice, are largely 
 manned by professing Christians. It Is 
 the Church as an Institution that Is suffer- 
 ing from suppressed equity and that 
 needs nothing more than to teach and 
 practise the morality of justice. 
 
 The Injustice of ecclesiastical formalism 
 reaches the absurd In the following, 
 which Is clipped from The Literary Di- 
 gest: 
 
 The scandal caused by the protest of the 
 Rev. S. D. Brownjohn against the con- 
 firmation of Bishop Temple as Arch- 
 bishop of Canterbury was not so much 
 the scandal of his Interruption of the 
 ceremony as It was the scandal and sac- 
 rilege of the refusal to hear his protest. 
 After full public notice * 'given to all and 
 singular opposers" of the election of 
 Dr. Temple as Archbishop to come to 
 St. Mary-le-Bow Church on Decem- 
 ber 2 2d to make their objections, Mr. 
 Brownjohn appeared. The royal man- 
 date was read In the presence of eight 
 bishops commissioned by the Crown to 
 confirm the election, citing all opposers, 
 if any, to appear, Mr. Brownjohn arose 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 153 
 
 and said that he desired to protest against 
 the confirmation of Dr. Temple's election 
 because of his belief in doctrines which 
 the protester believed to be absolutely 
 **incompatible with fidelity to the teach- 
 ing of the Book of Common Prayer." 
 Thereupon he was told he could not be 
 heard and that it had long ago been de- 
 cided that the Court had no power to 
 entertain such objection. The Arch- 
 bishop of York concurred, and the 
 opposer was silenced. The ceremony 
 went on, and the august company was 
 told that the new Primate was a prudent 
 and discreet man, eminent for his knowl- 
 edge of the Scriptures and in every way 
 suitable to the position. Then the Ap- 
 paritor-General proceeded slowly down 
 the aisle crying: 
 
 *'Oyez ! Oyez ! All ye and sundry who 
 have any objection to the confirmation 
 of the Rt. Rev. Frederick Temple as 
 Archbishop of Canterbury, come for- 
 ward and ye shall he heardJ' 
 
 Thereupon Mr. Brownjohn arose, and 
 again tried to make his protest; but was 
 again silenced, and told by the Arch- 
 bishop of York that he could not be 
 heard. Then to cap the absurdity of it 
 
154 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 all, the Vicar-General denounced as con- 
 tumacious those who had failed to pre- 
 sent their objections: 
 
 *^I accuse the contumacy of all and sin- 
 gular the persons as aforesaid cited, in- 
 timated, publicly called and not appear- 
 ing, and I pray them to be pronounced 
 contumacious." 
 
 But, after all, we come back to child- 
 hood and youth — sensitive, discerning, 
 imitative — as the time of life when injus- 
 tice does the most mischief, and the home 
 and the school as the places where it 
 counts for most. The boy may forget 
 the unfairness of his playmate, but he 
 is likely to remember that of his precep- 
 tor. Just one more illustration from a 
 school journal: ^^A boy in a New York 
 public school was accused by his teacher 
 of breaking a pane of glass in a window. 
 He denied the charge and explained that 
 he was some distance from the place ; but 
 he saw that the teacher did not believe 
 him. This occurred almost fifty years 
 ago, when there was much severity em- 
 
EXTENSION AND FURTHER ELUCIDATION 155 
 
 ployed in the treatment of schoolboys. 
 The attitude of the teacher was so threat- 
 ening that the boy stayed away from 
 school. A relative going to California 
 consented, at his earnest request, to take 
 him West. After thirty years he re- 
 turned and sought his old teacher, whose 
 first words were, 'Horace, I found out 
 that it was not you who broke the glass.' 
 Until then Horace had kept his griev- 
 ance." 
 
 That the sense of justice is probably 
 never wholly obliterated from any hu- 
 man breast is strongly indicated in previ- 
 ous chapters. But that it may become 
 too weak to prevent an unjust motive in 
 the same human breast is also true. 
 
 One of the first ways to weaken the 
 moral development of the child is to vio- 
 late his instinct of justice by dealing un- 
 justly with him or with any one within 
 his view — being inconsiderate of the pro- 
 prietary rights and the personality of will 
 in others. 
 
 Our own self-regimen will consist pri- 
 
156 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 marily in thinking justice until it becomes 
 a settled habit of mind, manifesting itself 
 outwardly in action. 
 
 The training of others will consist 
 largely in this personal attitude by sug- 
 gestion. Our thought habit will show 
 itself less in philosophising or didactics 
 than in an obvious intention to hear all 
 sides, to avoid snap judgments; in a 
 calm mental control, a readiness to apolo- 
 gise and to forgive, a remembrance of 
 past good record in the face of a present 
 aberration or failure, a right valuation of 
 intentions, an allowance for difficulties of 
 overcoming, and an inflexibility of pur- 
 pose to be fair. In other words, justice 
 must be taught chiefly by justice. 
 
 Love is power ; it tells us we must love 
 our neighbour. Justice directs; It tells 
 us we must love him as we love ourselves. 
 This is the justice-love of Scripture. In 
 It rights and duties merge as the one com- 
 mon social-moral obligation. Brother- 
 hood is real, for righteousness and peace 
 kiss each other. 
 
PART SECOND 
 
 M 
 
 APPLICATION 
 
VII 
 
 SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 
 
 To discuss the ethical value of justice is 
 one thing and to practise it as the funda- 
 mental moral duty is another. 
 
 The average mind — and too often the 
 mind far above average — finds it diffi- 
 cult to apply abstract principles to the 
 concrete situations as they emerge in life. 
 We may go a little farther and say that 
 many such minds are not troubled with 
 this difficulty, for they simply do not 
 think of there being any relation between 
 the principles and the immediate condi- 
 tions. 
 
 It is not uncommon to see the child- 
 study psychologist fail utterly to adjust 
 himself by his own recipes to children in 
 the real. The laws of child nature he 
 has never discerned as duties to children. 
 
i6o THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Similarly, we may philosophise on the 
 origin, nature, and function of justice; we 
 may accord to it its basal importance in 
 the scale of social virtues; we may 
 even plead a public cause in the name 
 of all that is equitable and right or 
 don the judicial robe on occasion — 
 and yet when it comes to being 
 simply fair, or just, in the kaleidoscopic 
 commonplaces of life we ignomini- 
 ously fail. We not only deny the right 
 of a hearing to cases, but we do not 
 even discern cases. We toss off judg- 
 ments without a thought of their remote 
 but probable consequences. 
 
 It has already been said that the basal 
 rule of practice is to think justice — to do 
 this as an acquired habit of mind. In a 
 degree this will involve a consciousness 
 of all that the term stands for in the 
 unity of a true human brotherhood. It 
 will quicken our sense of the duty to ren- 
 der unto every one his own and to aid 
 every one to develop his highest efficiency 
 toward the general good. 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS i6l 
 
 Thinking justice will require our tak- 
 ing all contributory circumstances into 
 account. We shall have to take per- 
 sons — children or adults — exactly where 
 we find them, no matter by what road 
 they came, yet considering that road as 
 a criminating or excusing factor in their 
 present position. 
 
 As justice is the earliest moral interest, 
 we shall have to appeal to our fellows 
 with their natural interests and instincts 
 in mind, since these indicate the direc- 
 tions which nature has pointed out for the 
 development of their possibilities and the 
 realisation of their powers. This realisa- 
 tion is their primal right and its recog- 
 nition is our primal moral duty. 
 
 Now let us step into the common walks 
 of life and see how we should go about 
 applying the principle or adopting the 
 method of justice in practice. Mani- 
 festly the first thing in any criticism or 
 judgment of our fellows is to give them 
 a hearing. This, in the hurly burly of 
 social life, cannot mean that every one 
 
l62 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 must be formally questioned and cross- 
 questioned. But it does mean that we are 
 to take contributory causes and circum- 
 stances — including obstacles and motives 
 into account so far as possible/ It pro- 
 hibits the snap and demands the sus- 
 pended judgment. **He that answereth 
 a matter before he heareth it, it is folly 
 and shame unto him.'' ^ 
 
 Mr. Plumbline lived in a large city at 
 the corner of two broad streets. He 
 had been annoyed at times by the pound- 
 ing of a hard ball against his back board 
 fence. The two objections were that it 
 was unpleasant to hear, and that it 
 threatened to damage the fence. One 
 day just as Mr. Plumbline was about to 
 go out the shouts of the boys and the ir- 
 regular rhythm of the pounding began. 
 As he crossed the street at the front end 
 
 *See ''Fireside Child Study," by the present 
 author, for a more particular exposition. Also 
 "Beckonings from little Hands." (Dodd, Mead 
 & Co.) 
 
 ' Proverbs i8 : 13. 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 163 
 
 of the property his first impulse was to 
 call to the boys to stop their game or go 
 elsewhere. 
 
 He halted and said to himself, **If I do, 
 I shall incur the enmity of the boys and 
 probably accomplish no good. Why 
 might I thus incur their enmity? Be- 
 cause by such a course I do not recognise 
 certain instincts and interests of theirs 
 perfectly proper and in fact necessary to 
 their development. Enmity does not 
 make for the integrity of the social bond 
 or presage peace. At the same time, to 
 maintain my property rights will in a 
 degree abridge their personal freedom. 
 These boys want, and ought to have, free 
 exercise. They have no place to go to 
 get it between school sessions. We all 
 have to yield something." 
 
 One group of boys stood on Mr. 
 Plumbline's sidewalk, another stood on 
 the opposite side of the street. They 
 were throwing the ball across from one 
 side to the other. When the boys on Mr. 
 Plumbline's walk missed catch, the ball 
 
i64 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 hit the fence just behind them with the 
 menacing thud. 
 
 **Now/' mused Mr. Plumbllne, ''I 
 will permit a certain amount of this nuis- 
 ance in the interest of the boys' enjoy- 
 ment and need of exercising their muscles 
 in a favourite pastime. Next to the 
 necessary outlet of youthful spirit and 
 energy (which the world needs) , the basal 
 motif of this play is skill in throwing 
 and catching. Youth has a good sense 
 of fairness, so my property rights fairly 
 brought to their notice will appeal to 
 them provided also I recognise that they 
 have proprietary rights^ in the develop- 
 ment of their powers and the acquirement 
 of cheerful character. 
 
 So Mr. Plumbline walked down the 
 street, avoiding any appearance of vin- 
 dictiveness as he approached the group 
 on his sidewalk. **Boys," he said, '*that 
 ball is rather hard on my fence, you know. 
 It's all right for you to play here, of 
 
 ' See Chapter III, 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 165 
 
 course, but you'll have to try to do better 
 catching, and then that will save the 
 fence. Try your skill a little better, won't 
 you?" **A11 right, sir, we will," said the 
 boys as Mr. Plumbline walked away. 
 The nuisance was abated, no enmity was 
 visible. Very pretty story — in theory, 
 do you say? It is a real case. That 
 such a course will always be possible or 
 will always succeed is by no means here 
 claimed. One cannot always make it his 
 business to educate the boys in the street. 
 But the principle is the one demanding 
 first consideration. 
 
 Take another case. When school is out 
 the boys and girls, whose release is a sig- 
 nal for physical demonstration, are often 
 a source of annoyance to the neighbour- 
 hood. They want fun in exchange for 
 the compulsory earnestness of the class- 
 room. They are not necessarily bad, but 
 the removal of organised restraint re- 
 sults in trespass or depredation on abut- 
 ting properties. 
 
 Mr. Fairbrother's back gate was usu- 
 
l66 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 ally left unlocked, and complaints had 
 come from the kitchen that the boys were 
 bad. Happening to look out of an up- 
 per window one day, he saw a youthful 
 invasion of his back yard. In a few mo- 
 ments he dashed from the kitchen door 
 into the midst of the astonished group 
 and closed the gate, thus Imprisoning a 
 few of the trespassers. Immediately 
 they all scaled the fence except one, 
 whom Mr. Falrbrother held fast. 
 
 "Don't you know that this Is my prop- 
 erty?" asked the owner, with perfect 
 calmness. 
 
 "Yes, sir," replied the boy; "but the 
 other fellows push me In here, and I can't 
 help It." 
 
 There was no just reason for disputing 
 this statement, but neither was there any 
 reason why Mr. Falrbrother should not 
 give the boy a ground of appeal to his 
 fellows. If his excuse were true, or make 
 an appeal to himself. If It were not true. 
 
 "Do you think It fair to come In here in 
 this way, without permission?" 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 167 
 
 **No, sir." 
 
 **If you had a private property, would 
 you think it fair in me to do as I pleased 
 with it?" 
 
 **No, sir; but I couldn't help it." 
 
 "Well, ril believe you, but you tell the 
 fellows that it isn't a fair thing, will 
 you?" 
 
 **A11 right, sir." 
 
 The boy was discharged without repri- 
 mand or threat or ill will. His own in- 
 stinct of justice had been appealed to, he 
 had been trusted, he had not even been 
 scolded. The youthful irruptions were 
 heard of no more. This is another real 
 case. Such a course might not have 
 ended successfully with other boys. Nor 
 can one always employ such means in 
 cases of malicious mischief. But it de- 
 mands first consideration. 
 
 Now it is true that that boy's father 
 might have been a "grafter" politician, 
 thus committing far worse, although in- 
 visible, depredations on Mr. Fair- 
 brother's property. He may have been 
 
1 68 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 a well-to-do merchant or manufacturer — 
 adulterating Mr. Fairbrother's daily 
 food or selling to him commodities of 
 sustenance with false weights. In a 
 dozen other ways he may have invaded 
 Mr. Fairbrother's personal rights in one 
 way or another, if not directly, at least 
 indirectly, by business methods afflicting 
 the body politic; for, as has been sagely 
 said by a noted preacher, the immorali- 
 ties and persecutions of the Middle Ages 
 were not further behind Christ's example 
 than are the predatory corporations, the 
 ill-gotten fortunes and some of the busi- 
 ness standards of our own time. 
 
 These business standards and methods 
 create the atmosphere in which youthful 
 depredation flourishes, and so long as we 
 tolerate and even contribute, perhaps, to 
 that atmosphere ourselves we cannot 
 justly lay all blame on the young energy 
 that fattens on it. There is any amount 
 of lawlessness among the sober and **re- 
 spectable'' members of society, and this 
 filters down to the children. The fathers 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 169 
 
 are beyond our common reach. The 
 main thing is to train the rising genera- 
 tion into a keener sense of social obliga- 
 tions by treating them with all the con- 
 siderations demanded by the equitable 
 and cooperative spirit principle. 
 
 An instance in which the provocation 
 was similar to the preceding, but the 
 treatment was different, comes from the 
 columns of a contemporary:^ 
 
 A gentleman who had purchased a 
 house found upon occupying it that a 
 corner of his yard was made a passage- 
 way by boys from two families which 
 dwelt on opposite sides of his house. 
 They climbed over his fence, broke down 
 bushes in their ruthless haste and were 
 regardless of all appeals to desist. They 
 had no respect for the maid who called 
 to them, and laughed at his wife who 
 chided them. What could he do? He 
 might have notified the police or have 
 sent word to the parents, but he would 
 thereby have antagonised the boys, and 
 provoked them to mean retaliations, re- 
 
 ' The Watchman, 
 
I70 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 garding him as a mean old curmudgeon, 
 and he would have created ill feeling on 
 the part of the parents. He came to a 
 quick decision to take down the fence at 
 one point, lay a board walk so that the 
 boys would take that route and do no 
 harm to the shrubs. 
 
 The writer of this note then comments : 
 "Was not this the best solution ? He has 
 no further real cause of annoyance, the 
 parents are not antagonised, and possibly 
 the boys are touched by more generous 
 treatment." 
 
 Much would depend upon the way in 
 which this was done. The boys may 
 have regarded themselves as victors and 
 chuckled over their conquest, in which 
 all the advantage was theirs without 
 there being any reciprocity or recognition 
 of the man's property right. A judicious 
 conversation with the boys, making a 
 point of their natural desire to shorten 
 their path, would have given some educa- 
 tional value to the affair; but a basis of 
 reciprocity, such as that of the first case 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 171 
 
 above cited, would have gone to the bot- 
 tom and helped the boys more surely 
 toward good cooperative citizenship. 
 Barring the fact that the man did what 
 he did for sheer self-protection, with no 
 educative intent beyond that, his action 
 might be called kind or generous or for- 
 giving, but hardly equitable. Kindness 
 is immediate and circumscribed. Justice 
 is social and far reaching. 
 The late Dr. H. Clay Trumbull used to 
 tell a story of his own youth, which is of 
 interest. His biographer thus records 
 it:' 
 
 Henry had been assigned to the engi- 
 neering and pay department, in which 
 he later became paymaster of construc- 
 tion. The young clerks in the office had 
 fallen into the habit of borrowing from 
 the chief engineer's desk, in his absence, 
 an inkstand containing a special ink. 
 Henry accepted this habit as one of the 
 office practices, and one day was using 
 the inkstand when his chief, Mr. Samuel 
 
 ' From ''The Life Story of Henry Clay Trum- 
 bull," by Philip E. Howard. 
 
172 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Ashburner, needed it at once. Sending 
 into the room where the clerks were work- 
 ing, Mr. Ashburner had the young scribe 
 and the borrowed inkstand brought be- 
 fore him. 
 
 **Henry," he said, with kindly empha- 
 sis, **I want that inkstand to remain on 
 my desk at all times. You must never 
 take it away." 
 
 **ril bear that in mind, sir," answered 
 the young man, and went back to his 
 work. 
 
 A few days later the ink was missing 
 when Mr. Ashburner had occasion 
 to use it. Stepping to the door of 
 the clerks' room, he called sharply, 
 "Henry !" Young Trumbull quickly fol- 
 lowed him into the next room. [Trum- 
 bull was nothing if not alert.] 
 
 **Henry," he exclaimed, **what did I 
 tell you about that inkstand?" 
 
 **You told me not to take it away 
 again." 
 
 *Tes, and I meant it. Now bring it to 
 me at once!" 
 
 Henry passed into the clerks' room, 
 lifted the missing inkstand from the desk 
 of another, and carried it to his chief. 
 As he placed it in its proper place and 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 173 
 
 Started to leave the room, Mr. Ash- 
 burner looked severely at him. 
 
 "Henry," he said, emphatically, **never 
 let this happen again." 
 
 *'ril bear in mind what you say, sir," 
 was the quiet answer. 
 
 Later in the day the clerk who had been 
 at fault manfully explained the whole 
 matter to his superior. Henry was at 
 once summoned. With an earnest and 
 troubled look Mr. Ashburner received 
 him. ^ **Why didn't you tell me this 
 morning that you hadn't taken that ink- 
 stand?" 
 
 "You didn't ask me, sir," replied 
 Henry. 
 
 The chief was somewhat nonplussed. 
 He had found men ready enough to lay 
 blame upon others, but not so ready to 
 keep still when even a word of denial 
 might clear them. Henry Trumbull's 
 refinement of moral vision was a revela- 
 tion to him. The interview was closed 
 with an apology from the chief, and 
 Henry went back to his desk. He was 
 building character while helping to build 
 railroads. 
 
 A very interesting ethical question 
 
174 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 arises here. What was Henry's motive 
 for taking blame until he was asked 
 whether he committed the deed ? What 
 was his habit of mind in such a case? 
 That he had "a contemptuous disregard 
 of consequences when doing the right," 
 as his biographer claims, is unquestioned. 
 That the occasion was taken by Trum- 
 bull as an opportunity for self-conquest 
 must also be placed to the credit of his 
 discernment and resolute self-mastery. 
 But the question remains whether these 
 virtues might not have been equally ex- 
 ercised without permitting the employer 
 (or chief) to act as a false accuser. It 
 remains true, also, that the employer was 
 unjust in passing judgment upon Henry 
 without interrogating him. Henry 
 taught his chief a lesson in justice without 
 an insolent word. Certainly this was 
 masterful. And still the question 
 presses : Did duty require Henry to suffer 
 a false charge of disobedience? Did 
 duty demand that the chief must be left 
 to discover his own error, or that some 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 175 
 
 one else should reveal it to him? The 
 question must be settled upon a basis of 
 equity or justice. It cannot be settled 
 on a basis of benevolence or unguided 
 love. 
 A twelve-year-old boy was locked up 
 for thirty days in his father's attic until 
 released by official action. When detec- 
 tives visited the house — so the report 
 reads — the mother conducted them to 
 the boy's place of confinement. 
 
 The boy appeared to be a remarkably 
 bright little fellow, but he was evidently 
 losing interest in life, owing to his soli- 
 tude. The room was almost devoid of 
 furnishings and was poorly ventilated, a 
 stool or small table being all that the 
 prisoner had to sit upon and all the fresh 
 air that he could get came in through a 
 space about four inches wide in the west 
 window, which was raised that distance 
 and securely nailed. The front window 
 was found to be tightly nailed down and 
 darkened by a heavy curtain which was 
 tightly secured. The detectives say that 
 the boy when thirsty was compelled to 
 lower a bottle to the ground by means 
 
176 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 of a String, and if any one happened to 
 notice it they would fill it, when he would 
 hoist it up and drain it through the small 
 opening in the window. 
 
 When the detectives inquired why the 
 lad was so severely punished, his mother, 
 who is an intelligent-appearing woman, 
 said he was first locked up for a few 
 days for staying out late at night. A few 
 days afterward the next-door neighbour 
 missed $5 in cash and a watch. It was 
 found that the lad had gotten out of a 
 window into the neighbour's house, and 
 had taken the articles. The watch he 
 took apart while trying to find some 
 amusement in his solitary confinement. 
 
 For this offence his father sentenced 
 him to a month in jail, four weeks of 
 which he had served. He was sentenced 
 to solitary confinement, and the window 
 of his prison-room was fastened to pre- 
 vent his escape. 
 
 This father is the type of a very large 
 class of persons who mean well. Instead 
 of cultivating formative justice as their 
 habit of mind, however, they cultivate 
 retribution or punishment as their habit 
 of mind, and hence contribute to the 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 177 
 
 world those elements which make for dis- 
 content and disruption instead of the 
 brotherhood or moral unity of society. 
 
 We see the boy committing theft not 
 for plunder but as an outlet for his pent- 
 up interests and energies. We have no 
 record of the parents' life and treatment 
 of the boy prior to this occurrence. If 
 we had, we might find them directly 
 guilty of that '^contributory delinquency" 
 which Judge Lindsey of Denver so ex- 
 posed as a cause of juvenile error. 
 
 My own doctrine has long been that 
 every parent is at least indirectly his 
 erring child's contributory delinquent. 
 Many parents apprehending this truth in 
 a degree, think to save themselves by 
 avoiding something which they call 'in- 
 dulgence" and by making repression, re- 
 striction, interference, and castigation 
 their habit of mind. Did they but know 
 it, they more easily become contributory 
 delinquents through this habit than 
 through that of ''justice" — ^which con- 
 cedes to the child his right to self-devel- 
 
178 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 opment under a suggestive environment. 
 
 Judge Lindsey was the first judge to 
 send a father to jail for lack of proper 
 companionship with his son. He has 
 saved many a boy and girl by going back 
 of their deeds to the parents and punish- 
 ing them. When street waifs of either 
 sex discover that the judge means to 
 give them **a square deal," he virtually 
 has them in complete control. So great 
 is the power of just dealing that this in- 
 spired judge can send accused boys to the 
 industrial school or place of detention 
 without an officer. The culprits take 
 their own commitment papers and the 
 money, and go alone. 
 
 Of children who have been found guilty 
 of crimes which in other days or in other 
 places would send them to a reformatory 
 or prison Judge Lindsey says, "It is not 
 right to brand these children with the 
 name of criminals when they are for the 
 most part enterprising youths who have 
 not been taught an ideal right doing." 
 
 Commitment is a last resort and is often 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 179 
 
 at the request of the culprits themselves. 
 But the Judge makes It plain that he Is 
 not angry, but wants to keep them from 
 growing up **bums" and outcasts. He 
 wants them to live on their honour. 
 Sometimes he takes the boys to his own 
 home and sends for the mothers too. 
 His good mother says, **He Is harder on 
 the mothers who go to parties and clubs 
 and neglect their children than he Is on 
 the ones who get drunk even." ^ 
 
 It is some years since Judge Lindsey 
 became inspired with the truth that a 
 large proportion of the criminals who 
 are an expense and a menace to society 
 Is but a natural boomerang — a return 
 upon society of Its own unjust treat- 
 ment of children and youth. Berenger, 
 the author of the famous French 
 Berenger law, arrived at the conclusion 
 that the laws and the penal Institu- 
 tions were largely responsible for the 
 increase in the number of criminals. His 
 
 ' Reported in The World To-Day. 
 
i8o THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 law is very easy on the new offender. In 
 more than ten years of its operation the 
 number of second offences has been 
 greatly reduced. 
 
 Victims of an unwholesome and evilly 
 suggestive environment, victims of unjust 
 judgment, whose cases are never truly 
 heard — here, is the condition to be met, 
 rather than anything self-determinedly 
 bad. In such a case youth needs a friend 
 — and needs to see that he is truly 
 friendly. Crime is not to be made light 
 of or justified, but into the judgment of 
 it enters the way which has made crime 
 easy to pliant youth. 
 
 The old and the new methods have been 
 so well put that I quote at length :^ 
 
 Heretofore the state has been concerned 
 with the reclamation of stolen property 
 and the punishing of criminals, without 
 any due regard to the salvation of the 
 little offenders. As a result children have 
 been arrested, disgraced, imprisoned and 
 allowed to mingle with hardened crim- 
 
 ' Editorial in The Arena ^ April, 1906. 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS i8i 
 
 inals; and often the slight offender has 
 through this cruel and unjust process be- 
 come a confirmed law-breaker, a menace 
 to society, a constant expense to the state, 
 and a curse to his family and to himself. 
 
 All this, so far as Denver is concerned, 
 is past, and the results that have followed 
 have more than justified the most san- 
 guine expectations of Judge Lindsey and 
 his co-workers. Hundreds upon hun- 
 dreds of children have been saved to the 
 state without the humiliation and degra- 
 dation attending the old methods. Hun- 
 dreds of children are to-day among the 
 brightest and most promising of Denver's 
 young citizens who under the old system 
 would have been in reform-schools or 
 prisons, or Ishmaelites of civilisation, 
 embittered by the deep conviction that 
 the state was their enemy and with the 
 feeling that they had little or no chance 
 of a fair show in life. 
 
 Often children innocent of some offence 
 charged against them, but with a ques- 
 tionable record, are haled before the 
 court. Under the old system they were 
 quickly examined, judged, and punished, 
 with the result that the child was dis- 
 graced for a crime he did not commit. 
 
1 82 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 He thus hated the state because the state 
 had been unjust to him. He went forth 
 from the reform-school ruined. Hence- 
 forth society had an Ishmael to deal with, 
 while under just and loving treatment he 
 might have become a high-minded and 
 useful citizen. Let us illustrate with a 
 typical case : 
 
 One day a boy was brought to court by 
 a judge and a physician who lodged the 
 complaint. The judge insisted that the 
 prisoner had thrown a stone through 
 the car window as the car passed the 
 school-yard. The judge's face was badly 
 cut, and both he and the physician in- 
 sisted that they saw the boy who had 
 been arrested commit the offence. Judge 
 Lindsey examined the boy in private. 
 The lad freely confessed to many misde- 
 meanours, but stoutly affirmed that he 
 was not the one who threw the stone. As 
 a result of a thorough questioning Judge 
 Lindsey became convinced that the boy 
 was telling the truth. He returned to 
 the accusers and amazed them by telling 
 them that he was morally certain that the 
 boy was innocent. They immediately 
 demanded that he find the guilty one. 
 He set out for the school which was the 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 183 
 
 scene of the offence. Here he explained 
 to the boys that he was in trouble; that 
 he was not willing to have an innocent 
 boy judged guilty of an offence that he 
 believed the prisoner did not commit; 
 and he appealed to the youths present to 
 help him out of his trouble. He asked 
 the one who really cast the stone to con- 
 fess. After this heart-to-heart talk one 
 little fellow rose and said: **J^dge, I 
 heaved the stone." 
 
 Scores of other cases could be cited 
 showing that under the old method the 
 innocent child would have been judged 
 guilty, all because of the criminal indif- 
 ference of judges and of society to the 
 tremendous importance of punishing only 
 the guilty and of saving the young to the 
 state instead of making them enemies of 
 the state and a curse and an expense to 
 society. 
 
 In the case of the misjudgment by a 
 teacher of the present author when a 
 schoolboy, suppose the erring professor 
 had taken the pains that Judge Lindsey 
 took in this case, how different the result ! 
 
 That children in unfavourable environ- 
 ments are longing for help to do better 
 
1 84 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 is evidenced by the fact that Judge Llnd- 
 sey has them coming to him by the hun- 
 dred seeking aid and protection. And 
 that boys can be trusted when they see 
 that they are trusted and justly regarded, 
 is shown from the following incident, 
 which I quote also from the editor of 
 The Arena: 
 
 Six years ago many of the boys in the 
 state industrial school were seen in the 
 yards with balls and chains attached to 
 prevent them from running away. Un- 
 der the new order all this has been 
 changed. When the Grand Army en- 
 camped at Denver the boys in the 
 reform-school naturally longed to be 
 present to see the soldiers, to hear the 
 music and to behold the city in gala dress. 
 Judge Lindsey proposed to give them the 
 opportunity to spend the day in Denver 
 under no surveillance and with no pledge 
 other than their own word given to him 
 that they would return voluntarily to the 
 school at a certain hour. The believers 
 in the old order were horrified at the 
 proposition. They deemed it reckless. 
 They did not understand the new spirit 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 185 
 
 that had come with the inauguration of a 
 system of divine justice or justice illu- 
 mined by love. The judge went to the 
 boys and said: **Boys, how many of you 
 would like to go to Denver and spend 
 the day?'' Of course the whole school 
 was eager for the great holiday. Then 
 the judge told them that he believed in 
 them; he believed that no boy in the 
 school would give him a pledge and then 
 break it ; and believing that, he had given 
 his pledge that every boy would be back 
 in his place at a certain hour if they were 
 allowed to go. All the boys promised 
 and the school of over two hundred went 
 to Denver, and every boy returned at the 
 appointed time. 
 
 On the other hand, a boy sent alone to 
 the reform-school at Utah discovered a 
 court officer shadowing him. The boy 
 had given his word that if trusted and 
 sent unattended he would go to the re- 
 formatory. He went and bought his 
 ticket and was waiting for the train when 
 he sighted an officer watching him from 
 a distance. The natural, let us say, per- 
 haps, the just, result was that he threw 
 
1 86 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 away his ticket and fled. When caught, 
 he declared that he had no intention of 
 escaping until he saw that the state was 
 breaking faith with him by distrustfully 
 watching him. 
 
 I cite Lindsey's methods as illustrations 
 easily at hand to show what can be done. 
 And if such results can be accomplished 
 by a judge of the court, what may not 
 parents upon similarly just principles ac- 
 complish at home? The juvenile court 
 might almost go out of business if every 
 father would follow his methods of win- 
 ning and of deserving confidence through 
 love's sympathetic arm of justice. 
 
 In young children — say under ten years 
 of age — we often see the sense of justice 
 acting as critic, not belligerently, but sim- 
 ply in wonderment at the absence of 
 equity and fairness: 
 
 A little girl of ten on handing her 
 monthly school report to her parents re- 
 marked, "Our reports are awfully funny. 
 If you stay away you get a better mark 
 than if you are there." 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 187 
 
 A child of nine told her father that her 
 Sunday-school teacher had marked two 
 children in the class **good'' when they 
 were bad. **Last Sunday," she said, 
 she marked them good because they 
 didn't know they were doing what they 
 oughtn't and so she wouldn't count it 
 against them, but next Sunday she would 
 mark them bad if they acted the same 
 way. And now she marked them good 
 when they were just as bad." The child 
 evidently approved the equity of the 
 first marking, but not the equity of the 
 second. The child was absolutely free 
 from jealousy. 
 
 A teacher in a class of older girls than 
 the foregoing made it a point that every 
 girl had a right to know how she stood and 
 why. She was notoriously uneven in her 
 marking, and when she was asked to ex- 
 plain the record she charged the girls with 
 insulting her by doubting her fairness. 
 
 These are all typical cases and are in- 
 troduced here not for novelty, but as 
 warnings to teachers against even the 
 
i88 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 appearance of injustice in matters that 
 look possibly transient and slight. 
 
 It is the business of justice to interro- 
 gate the case, and this is not always easy. 
 Not only is suspended judgment essen- 
 tial on the main question, but one must 
 be careful to be fair in the very language 
 in which he addresses himself to the sub- 
 ject under examination. This applies to 
 critics of all kinds — for a critic's office is 
 judicial. It applies equally to the chief 
 justice on the bench, to the mother in 
 the nursery, to the book reviewer, and to 
 the hearer of a public speaker. 
 
 It has been wisely said^ that we should 
 attempt no paraphrase of an opponent's 
 views, and that in characterising an- 
 other's doctrine we should never affix 
 such adjectives as **mere," "bare," 
 '*dead," '^abstract," etc., which bias the 
 case before it is fairly heard. To be just 
 in discussion is exceedingly difficult, and 
 
 * ** Article on Belligerent Discussion and Truth 
 Seeking," International yournal of Ethics ^ by 
 Richard C. Cabot. 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 189 
 
 IS to be accomplished only through what 
 Mr. Cabot calls **the inclusive attitude" 
 — that is, the enlargement of our ideas 
 so as to include our opponent's doctrine, 
 to the extent that we feel a strong ten- 
 dency to accept it. Otherwise, we ex- 
 clude ourselves from legitimate and fair 
 discussion, by putting our opponent's 
 plea out of the range of our own vision. 
 
 In our judgments of children we are 
 habitually guilty of this self-exclusion. 
 Whatever the young child does, there 
 is at least a partly legitimate reason for 
 his doing, and this we should see and as- 
 sent to in order to acquire the inclusive 
 attitude. Moreover, the catalogue of 
 adjectives by which we prejudice the 
 child's case in our own view of it is large 
 and luring. All such terms as **disobedi- 
 ent," *Vilful," ^'stupid," **cruel," 
 "naughty," *4ndolent," "incorrigible," 
 etc., are snares to unjust judgments and 
 unwise dealing.^ 
 
 * This is more fully treated in the ** Fireside 
 Child Study." 
 
190 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Surely enough has now been said by 
 way of illustration and exemplification to 
 show how theory may be translated into 
 practice by thinking justice as a habit of 
 mind acquired with a definite view to the 
 common good. 
 
 It is worth while, however, to add a few 
 words on a more didactic teaching of jus- 
 tice than that of being merely just to the 
 children themselves. This is, of course, 
 to be done through appeals to their sense 
 of fairness, through story, and through 
 their attitude toward the brutes. 
 
 Queen Victoria is quoted as saying that 
 **No civilisation is complete which does 
 not include the dumb and defenceless of 
 God's creatures within the sphere of 
 charity and mercy." We have already 
 seen that in the Scriptural and in the 
 modern sociological sense charity is jus- 
 tice. And it has been argued in this book 
 that mercy is justice in the making — just 
 in motive, but with a conscious ignorance 
 of conditions. We may, therefore, sub- 
 stitute the word **justice" for **charity 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 191 
 
 and mercy" in the good queen's declara- 
 tion. 
 As an illustration of practice in discern- 
 ment of the equity of a brute's case an ex- 
 cellent little story appeared some years 
 ago,^ the essential points of which were 
 about thus : A little girl, Jennie, had been 
 switching her kitty for catching and eat- 
 ing a bird. When Lena took Jennie to 
 task for her treatment of the cat, Jennie 
 took Lena to task for not loving the inno- 
 cent little birds. Lena contended that 
 she did love the birds, but that she would 
 never think of blaming a cat for catching 
 them. Jennie's cat was trying to provide 
 for six little kittens, and it was her mother 
 instinct that led her to get all the food 
 she could. On the other hand, Lena 
 could not bear to see girls' hats orna- 
 mented with birds, while Jennie con- 
 fessed her weakness for the beauty of 
 that kind of millinery. Lena took the 
 '^inclusive attitude." She saw from 
 
 * **The Rights of Pussy," in The Sunday School 
 Times, January 14, 1899, by Mary S. Potter. 
 
I9» THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Jennie's and the cat's points of view — 
 and was fair. 
 
 Homely as the story is, it indicates a 
 line of training toward just discrimina- 
 tion, a suspended judgment and the all- 
 round sympathy that true equity and the 
 universal good demands. 
 
 Thus we may train the young into a 
 more virile morality, and a better citizen- 
 ship, both by practising the art of just 
 discrimination, as well as by being just 
 in our own judgments of others. 
 
 Indeed, the further we go into the inves- 
 tigation of animal life, the more ex- 
 tended do we find the truth that all na- 
 ture seeks its own conservation and prog- 
 ress by the maintenance of peace and co- 
 operative relations between individuals. 
 Strife is not the natural law even of wild 
 life.^ 
 
 Animals of the same species at least 
 tend toward the maintenance of mutual 
 and cooperative social relations. Ants, 
 
 ' ♦* Government not Founded in Force," by 
 Leander Chamberlain. 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 193 
 
 bees, birds, and many mammals furnish 
 evidence of this. Animal life suffers 
 from the inanimate powers of nature, but 
 Mr. Chamberlain ventures that even 
 among mammals not one in fifty perishes 
 by the attack of predacious enemies. 
 Man is the predatory and destructive 
 animal. Man is at once capable of reach- 
 ing the highest degree of social union 
 or brotherly cooperation, and of sink- 
 ing to the lowest level of a selfish, anti- 
 social, unbrotherly and destructive spirit. 
 Within his own species, the beast is 
 moral; within his, man is perpetually 
 falling into immorality — despite his op- 
 portunities. 
 
 It would be interesting, if it were pos- 
 sible, to count how many points toward 
 deterioration from a just habit of mind 
 result from the passion for unfair kill- 
 ing-sports, that is, where mere sport is 
 the sole motive. War, as we have seen, 
 certainly tends to obliterate the power 
 of rendering just judgments. Perhaps 
 this may be reckoned as one of the chief 
 
194 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 residual moral evils of offensive wars, or 
 conflicts for conquest — if not for all 
 wars. It is often said that the demoralis- 
 ing effects of war remain long after the 
 conclusion of peace. But the benumbing 
 and the warping of the sense of justice is 
 not usually thought of as a chief of moral 
 evils. 
 
 Now in general, and in the retrospect: 
 
 The first immorality is trespass on the 
 rights of another — appropriating his 
 property or interfering with his powers. 
 This is the allegory of Eden. In this 
 view we have seen that the violation of 
 any of the last six commandments, any 
 or all, is a violation of justice. 
 
 Therefore, we must be watchful against 
 loose and easy-going moral interpreta- 
 tions — the blurring of boundary lines — 
 trespass in any wise. 
 
 We must respect the child's sense of 
 possession, since out of it grows his 
 sense of duty to the possession of others. 
 He must not be too strenuously per- 
 suaded to give up a favourite toy even 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 195 
 
 for charity's sake. How can you teach 
 the duty of giving to any one who has 
 nothing to give? He can give his 
 powers even though he has no property 
 to bestow. But how can he appro- 
 priate powers when, by superior force, 
 you take virtual possession of them 
 under the name of authority? Instant, 
 mechanical, unconditional obedience, 
 what sense of possession does it permit? 
 The sense of justice is offended and rebel- 
 lion follows. Then offended justice 
 looses its hold on social order, becomes 
 itself unjust — as Sophomores haze be- 
 cause they were hazed, and fathers whip 
 because they were whipped. 
 
 No one thing is so patently a type of 
 possession as money. Train the mind 
 to talk honourably about other people's 
 money. Train the hands to handle other 
 people's money. On this point more 
 hereafter. 
 
 Create contempt for the spirit of get- 
 ting something for nothing — do it in- 
 directly. Evidence your respect for the 
 
196 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 rule of suspended judgment by refusing 
 to condemn others until the case has been 
 heard beyond mere rumour. Be careful 
 that ethics is not set against itself — de- 
 fending the wrong by ingenious appeals 
 to, and the misapplication of the names 
 of virtues. 
 
 Then practise the finer shadings, the 
 nicer discriminations. The sense of per- 
 sonal rights must suffer modification. 
 Justice-culture, through proprietorship, 
 must concede the truth that nothing is 
 altogether one's own, for we have an in- 
 heritance from the past which is the com- 
 mon property of the ages. The very 
 language in which we think and express 
 ourselves is a common property, and 
 nothing is exclusively one's own. Jus- 
 tice must take the larger view. Rights 
 and duties appear simply as different as- 
 pects of the human bond and the human 
 obligation. 
 
 **The deeper and larger sense of social 
 duty," as Charlotte Perkins Oilman says 
 — **not the personal balancing of rights, 
 
SPECIMEN APPLICATIONS 197 
 
 which IS easy to even the youngest mind, 
 but the devotion to the service of all, the 
 recognition that the greater includes the 
 less — this must be shown by personal ex- 
 ample long before it can be imitated."^ 
 
 * ** Concerning Children," p. 112. 
 
VIII 
 
 LOYALTY VS. OBEDIENCE 
 
 A MOTHER having an errand to go, just 
 before dark, told her little girl to see that 
 all the chickens were housed before she 
 went indoors. The father, not knowing 
 of the mother's order, as darkness ap- 
 proached appeared at the door and told 
 the child to come in. There was one 
 stubborn fowl yet uncaged, and the child 
 replied that she would come in a min- 
 ute. The bird gave her some trouble, 
 and when again the father appeared it 
 was with an imperative order and a repri- 
 mand for disobedience. When the 
 mother returned, she found the daughter 
 searching the Scriptures in order to see 
 whether there was any prescription there 
 for honouring both parents when their 
 orders conflicted. She had turned to the 
 
LOYALTY vs. OBEDIENCE 199 
 
 book of Ephesians, and when discovered 
 was puzzling over Paul's recommenda- 
 tion, **Children, obey your parents, in the 
 Lord, for this is right." 
 
 Manifestly, obedience to both was im- 
 possible. She was looking for the key to 
 a deadlock. There must be such a thing 
 as a just and proper disobedience and an 
 unjust and improper obedience. She had 
 no ground to stand on. That she felt 
 the injustice of the situation, however in- 
 nocent of such intent the parents were, 
 there can be no doubt. Mere obedience, 
 in view of the possibility of such a 
 dilemma, cannot be a virtue per se. 
 
 Shocking as this is to most good per- 
 sons, who can solve that conscientious 
 child's problem? How could she obey 
 two conflicting orders? Were not both 
 parents of equal authority? 
 
 Many will contend that parents muist 
 see to it that they are not in conflict. 
 But that is another subject. The simple 
 point is that if obedience per se were a 
 duty, then the child had a duty of do- 
 
200 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 ing two contrary things at once, which is 
 the injustice of absurdity. 
 
 Human fallibility, then, is a factor to 
 be considered. There can be no ques- 
 tion but that obedience to God is per se a 
 duty, for God is always right. Yet so 
 important was it that man should learn 
 the art of living equitably with men, that 
 the story of Eden really turns upon this 
 moral art, however true it may be that 
 Adam was disobedient.^ Regard that 
 story as literal or allegorical as you 
 please, its pivotal point is ethical, even 
 though God was one of the parties to the 
 transaction. It rests on the basal social 
 virtue — that of rendering to every one 
 his own. Obedience is incidental to it. 
 Otherwise, the transaction seems to have 
 been unnecessary. 
 
 If the world was to be peopled and 
 men were to live harmoniously and co- 
 operatively with men, it was important 
 that they should understand the very 
 
 ^ Sec Matheson's exposition Chapter. III. 
 
LOYALTY vs. OBEDIENCE aoi 
 
 fundament of this social-moral life at the 
 start. This was the childhood of the 
 race. 
 
 Very aptly does Dr. Matheson pursue 
 his exposition thus: *'You cannot teach 
 your child morality by teaching it obedi- 
 ence. . . . Obedience is not the begin- 
 ning of a child's morality. What is the 
 beginning of a child's morality? I say 
 it is justice, the inculcation of fair play. 
 Whether in the garden or in the play- 
 ground, it is the primary moral lesson of 
 youth. The dtference between his and 
 yours is the first thing which your child 
 should know. Let him see the limits of 
 his own Eden. . . . Never prohibit for 
 the sake of prohibition. . . . Prohibi- 
 tion in itself is not helpful . . . but jus- 
 tice is helpful. Justice sanctifies prohibi- 
 tion. . . . The temptation of young 
 Adam is the temptation to his justice; 
 the fall of young Adam is his fall from 
 the height of justice." 
 
 In this view, the first sin is the sin of 
 violated human rights — or immorality. 
 
2oa THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 The child's first conscious relations are 
 human relations. From these he works 
 out to a clearer sense of his relations to 
 God. This is why the lesson of Eden 
 was primarily social-moral. 
 
 It is true, then, as Matheson insists, 
 that obedience, per se, is not the begin- 
 ning of a child's morality. A child may 
 obey a very immoral command to the let- 
 ter. Is the act then moral? If not, it 
 must be true that '*you cannot teach your 
 child morality by teaching it obedience" 
 to fallible humanity. You must rest 
 your moral education on something else, 
 and the story of Eden shows that we 
 must rest it on justice — or the rule of 
 mine and yours. 
 
 "Those who trespass against us" are 
 the immoral ones, and our morality be- 
 gins by obeying this moral law of 
 boundary. In this we become coopera- 
 tive, interdependent, brotherly. We 
 render unto every one his own in the in- 
 terest of the common good. 
 
 Now absolute, instant, unqualified obe- 
 
LOYALTY vs. OBEDIENCE aoj 
 
 dience we must often exact from children 
 and from men; that is one thing. But 
 this does not make obedience to fallible 
 man the fundament of morals; that is 
 another thing. Authority we must have ; 
 that is one thing. But human authority 
 may be exerted immorally; that is an- 
 other thing. Our relations to an infalli- 
 ble God as obedient children we are not 
 now considering. 
 
 The great mistake that parents make is 
 in supposing that when a child executes 
 an order immediately and to the letter he 
 is thereby obedient in soul as well as in 
 body ; and that he is, therefore, develop- 
 ing a moral discipline. It is possible to 
 be obedient and rebellious at the same 
 moment. Here emerges the important 
 distinction between the obedience that is 
 only mechanical response and the obedi- 
 ence that is heart loyalty. 
 
 It is this loyalty that love's justice really 
 wants. The child cited at the opening 
 of this chapter was loyal to both parents ; 
 obedient to both she could not be. Her 
 
204 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Spiritual loyalty was fine. There lay the 
 test of love's morality. She studied to 
 please and to serve both, but without full 
 obedience to either. Set your heart on 
 this result, O parent, without fretting 
 yourself about the literal response, loyal 
 or disloyal. 
 
 This Is no plea for the abandonment of 
 parental or any other form of govern- 
 mental authority. Nor Is It to encourage 
 children to be the '^arbiters of their own 
 conduct" or to steer their canoes by a 
 pocket compass of their own construction 
 — as Dr. Parkhurst vividly puts It. This 
 Is not written for children. 
 
 But It Is to controvert the same able 
 critic when he says that **the best and 
 most fundamental lesson a child ever 
 learns Is to obey." If the argument of 
 this book, with the authorities It quotes, 
 is worth anything, the most fundamental 
 moral lesson Is that of fair play, of jus- 
 tice, of mine and yours^ of a reciprocal 
 brotherly unity. 
 
 The loyalty of soul to this immutable 
 
LOYALTY vs. OBEDIENCE 205 
 
 law of justice, the rendering unto every- 
 one his own in the larger interest of the 
 universal good, is better than a blind, 
 servile, and unfeeling obedience to hu- 
 man caprice, whim or notion, necessary 
 as that servility, in our imperfect social 
 conditions, may even be. 
 
 The short road to securing this spiritual 
 obedience of loyalty is the loving heart 
 enlightened by the wisdom of justice. 
 The parent or teacher whose course 
 grows out of the just habit of mind will 
 not need to worry much about the secur- 
 ing of obedience. The child is quick to 
 resent injustice, and this resentment 
 means a weakening of the spirit of 
 loyalty. No less quick is the child to re- 
 spond to a manifest desire of the parent 
 or teacher to be fair; which means 
 a strengthening of the loyal spirit or true 
 heart obedience. This is the very essence 
 of freedom under law, or liberty, which 
 Dr. Parkhurst finely says is "a genius for 
 obeying, and consists not in our success- 
 ful escape from ordinance, but in the 
 
2o6 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 graceful facility with which we are able 
 to execute it." That is, the spirit of jus- 
 tice recognises the social will as above 
 that of the individual and the common 
 good as returning to bring the highest 
 good to the individual. 
 
 Obedience, in the common sense of 
 literal response to orders, is sometimes 
 right and sometimes wrong and some- 
 times impossible. It may be necessary 
 and may be unnecessary or positively in- 
 advisable. The Japanese success against 
 Russia was in part due to a certain 
 amount of initiative allowed to the under 
 ranks. As a whole the army was a solid 
 mechanism, but without making mere 
 obeying machines of the individuals 
 when the use of their own judgment 
 could increase their efficiency and respon- 
 sibility. 
 
 But young children have no developed 
 judgment. Very true. That throws a 
 larger responsibility on their overseers to 
 be absolutely just and in all respects to 
 stand for sanity and social order. This 
 
LOYALTY vs. OBEDIENCE 107 
 
 begets the loyalty that should be. We 
 have a weakness for commanding, for 
 being obeyed. To see a child or a dog 
 do exactly as we say flatters our sense of 
 power and self-importance. The result 
 is, we command too easily and therefore 
 issue many commands which were far 
 better not obeyed. But as the children 
 cannot be the arbiters in such cases, we 
 must cultivate the habit of thinking and 
 executing justice before we indulge the 
 slippery habit of command. We must 
 study to give no command the obedience 
 to which would not be in the highest de- 
 gree righteous. 
 
 We must not study our own ease in 
 governing, but the child's growth toward 
 self-government. This will come back 
 to us in ease to ourselves as well as in 
 development to the child. 
 
 Our relation to the child must be the 
 same as our relation to society — recipro- 
 cal and cooperative. We must work with 
 him instead of against him. When he 
 sees that we are in community of inter- 
 
2o8 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 ests, he will show a loyal deference to our 
 larger experience. Obedience must be 
 mutual. We have no right to command 
 except we first obey the laws of God and 
 of man and the laws of the child's devel- 
 oping nature. When we become thus 
 obedient, we may expect that higher 
 obedience which is heart loyalty from the 
 child toward his justice-loving superiors. 
 Child nature, like all nature, is com- 
 manded by obeying it. Obedience to 
 Heaven's fundamental law? Yes! 
 Obedience to whimsical, self-important, 
 fallible, unjust men? Sometimes. 
 
IX 
 
 FAILURE AND IMMORALITY OF CORPORAL 
 PUNISHMENT 
 
 The question of corporal punishment is 
 one on which pretty much everybody 
 holds a ready-to-Tiand opinion. That 
 punishment of any sort should be such a 
 familiar subject to all sorts and condi- 
 tions of men is to be lamented. If it were 
 a rare and exceptional thought among 
 parents there would be less need of it, 
 and if there were less need of it in the 
 home, the same would be true of the 
 state. 
 
 The pity is that the more conscientious 
 and consecrated an inexperienced young 
 parent, the more likely is he to think of 
 himself as a commissioned punisher. 
 That punishment is necessary in this fal- 
 lible and unjust world is true enough. 
 
aio THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 But it Is no less true that much of its 
 necessity grows out of the universal ten- 
 dency and temptation to rely on it as the 
 great moral specific. Punishment must 
 be regarded as a drug whose usefulness 
 on occasion may beget its own incurable 
 habit. 
 
 This book stands for prevention. If 
 children were treated justly from the 
 start — if parental love would consent to 
 be enlightened, guided, or advised by the 
 principle of constructive justice, the need 
 of punishment would be immensely re- 
 duced and two or three generations 
 would find society a very different moral 
 proposition from what it is to-day. 
 
 The matter of punishment in general is 
 too large for treatment here. Suffice It 
 that we consider briefly the vexed ques- 
 tion of corporal punishment. 
 
 It would seem to be self-evident that no 
 parent ought to punish without a distinct 
 purpose in view. Shall this purpose be 
 personal revenge, or shall it be to pro- 
 tect society by preventing a repetition of 
 
FAILURE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 211 
 
 the offence, or is the moral improvement 
 of the child to be the conscious intent? 
 Punishment may be merely deterrent, to 
 prevent annoyance to the parent or 
 others without any real motive of moral 
 formation or reformation. 
 
 Most parents suppose that they punish 
 to make their children better, although 
 such is not really the case. They do it 
 largely to save themselves vexation and 
 trouble, if indeed there is not present an 
 element of personal retribution and ven- 
 geance. But all conscientious parents 
 would agree that whatever their purpose 
 or whatever their method, they should 
 do nothing that would be likely to hinder 
 reformation. Their immediate impulse 
 might be to make the child less objection- 
 able, but they would admit that in doing 
 this they ought not in the long run to 
 make him more so. 
 
 This brings us to the real issue. I be- 
 lieve that in a vast majority of cases cor- 
 poral punishment does hinder reforma- 
 tion. It may cure a child of slamming 
 
ail THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 the door, of invading the jam pantry, of 
 soiling his rubbers, of mutilating his 
 books, of pinching his baby sister, or of 
 any other misdirected energy. It may 
 save annoyance and vexation of spirit to 
 the adult house in the immediate present. 
 But it has not raised the child's moral 
 standard, nor purified his intentions, nor 
 opened his vision to a working ideal. 
 How can a thrashing help the discrimi- 
 nation of right from wrong? 
 
 On the contrary, it has set a seal of ap- 
 proval on the method of the brute ; it has 
 driven the victim to think more of his 
 body and less of his soul. This is 
 the tendency of corporal punishment, 
 whether administered in school or in the 
 family or by the courts of the State ; and 
 whether it be in the form of old-fash- 
 ioned tortures or simple flogging. 
 
 Just for a moment let us look at the 
 other side. It has been popularly pre- 
 sented over and over again, but take a 
 few sentences from a public teacher, 
 whose searching insight, lofty motives, 
 
FAILURE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 213 
 
 public spirit, and incisive pen entitle 
 whatever he says to consideration/ 
 Listen: 
 
 There is evident just at the present time 
 a growing belief in the efficiency of the 
 whipping-post as a punishment for crim- 
 inals. If children were chastised more, 
 they would stand less in need of it after 
 they become adults. At one end of life 
 or the other we all need to be whipped, 
 and by one kind of lash or another are 
 likely to be ; and one stroke while we are 
 still tender is worth a dozen applied after 
 we have become tough. 
 
 This tone of suggestion is not motived 
 by any sanguinary desire to have the poor 
 little things set aching; but a considerable 
 percentage of the elements composing our 
 nature is as definitely brutal as anything 
 that appears in the dog or the ox, and 
 settled brutality can be matched only by 
 more of the same. A school-teacher who 
 is forbidden to resort to corporal punish- 
 ment is already beaten on her own 
 ground. It may not be safe to allow her 
 
 * Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst in The Munseyy 
 for April, 1906. 
 
214 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 that prerogative, but she is herself de- 
 feated if it is not allowed to her, for she 
 is almost certain to have pupils into 
 whom respect for authority can only be 
 wrought by the discipline of physical 
 pain. I would not myself teach in the 
 average run of common school where a 
 ferrule is not recognised as an essential 
 piece of school-room furniture. If it is 
 there, it may not be needed; if it is not 
 there, it will almost certainly be needed. 
 
 This is dogmatic enough certainly, 
 and scarcely less plausible. But observe, 
 it has no word of constructive justice. It 
 apparently never supposes that the child 
 may be so guided as to preclude the 
 necessity of retribution. It is absolutely 
 sweeping. The whole emphasis is on our 
 duty after the offence is committed, in- 
 stead of on our duty to prevent the child 
 from becoming an offender in the first 
 instance. 
 
 True, it might be urged that corporal 
 punishment was the particular subject. 
 But it is not safe to address the public on 
 the subject of punishment at all without 
 
FAILURE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 215 
 
 showing the dangers of moral damage 
 through Its unjust administration. The 
 fact is that very few parents or teachers 
 can be trusted with a ferrule. Very little 
 punishment of any sort is strictly fair, 
 for reasons apparent in the first part of 
 this book. And, for reasons to appear 
 presently, corporal punishment is almost 
 sure to be unfair, to say nothing of de- 
 moralising by brutalising. 
 
 If children were chastised more, would 
 adults need less of it? Were our crim- 
 inal classes never whipped? Whipped 
 children curse the world. Is it true that 
 the brute in us must be matched by the 
 brutal ? or ought we to be helped to rise 
 above our bruteship? If the school- 
 teacher who is forbidden to whip is al- 
 ready beaten on her own ground, isn't 
 her ground wrong? Is there no such 
 thing as the development of respect for 
 authority without the agency of physical 
 pain? Corporal punishment may deter 
 from committing the same particular 
 offence, but will it deter from other of- 
 
21 6 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 fences ? Will it reform the moral ideal ? 
 Will it help the discrimination ? Will it 
 strengthen atrophied moral sense ? 
 Let us quote again : 
 
 When the matter of putting the rod 
 back in the New York public schools 
 was up for discussion, in 1904, a minor- 
 ity report favouring such step urged — in 
 the language used conjointly by the 
 Male Principals' Association of Man- 
 hattan and the Bronx and the Princi- 
 pals' Association of the city of New 
 York — that **every child has the right 
 to demand of us that we train him to a 
 wholesome respect for the law." Also 
 that **physical pain is nature's mode of 
 punishment, and it is unfair to state that 
 it is an insult to the child whose only 
 avenue of sensibility is through his in- 
 tegument." It is sentimentality rather 
 than sentiment that antagonises the re- 
 introduction of corporal punishment into 
 the schools — a condition of mind not 
 likely to infect the judgment of teachers 
 themselves, who come face to face with 
 the situation; and the report just quoted 
 concludes by saying that **out of two hun- 
 dred and sixty-nine principals, corporal 
 
FAILURE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 217 
 
 punishment is favoured by two hundred 
 and twenty-three" — that is, by more than 
 eighty-two per cent. 
 
 The fact that so large a percentage of 
 principals favoured corporal punishment 
 is significant — of something. But of 
 what? Are they not more concerned 
 with the child's immediate submission to 
 authority than with his development into 
 a morally self-governing being? The 
 difference is wide. Undoubtedly the 
 teachers face a difficult and trying situa- 
 tion, and the temptation to coercion by the 
 short cut way is very great. The brutal- 
 ising way is often the royal road to imme- 
 diate results, no doubt. But justice 
 demands moral development, rather than 
 isolated enforced deeds. Mechanical 
 obedience, we have seen in the previous 
 chapter, is not loyalty. The child has a 
 right to demand that we **train him to a 
 wholesome respect for the law." But 
 brute means engender no such educative 
 respect, even though they terrorise into 
 
siS THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 abject submission and secure certain im- 
 mediate results. 
 
 So much for the argument for defence 
 of corporal punishment. The principal 
 reason given by the father for having 
 whipped his child is that the offence was 
 never committed again — or at least not 
 soon again. But this view is too limited. 
 It gives no indication of the real attitude 
 of the victim's mind and heart. It does 
 not show that the terrorised soul has be- 
 come a loyal soul. And the inference is 
 that it has become hardened and brutal- 
 ised rather than loyal and trustful. 
 
 We must, then, take a larger view. We 
 must look for effects upon both pun- 
 isher and punished — that is, for results 
 far beyond the present situation of par- 
 ticular cases. 
 
 As a general proposition: Corporal 
 punishment as a mode of moral education 
 is a failure. 
 
 I. As a method, it is usually irrational, 
 since it bears no correlative or sequential 
 relation to the offence. It does not, 
 
FAILURE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 219 
 
 therefore, educate the mind either of 
 the offender or of the punisher or 
 of the spectator. Having no thought 
 of making the retribution fit the deed, 
 it becomes a sort of universal pre- 
 scription, degrading because undiscrim- 
 inating. 
 
 2. No form of punishment is so easy to 
 administer suddenly, excitedly, without 
 opportunity for fair judgment of the 
 case. This results in over-punishing 
 and the moral damage wrought by has- 
 tily assuming too much. It begets the 
 animus that might (instead of justice) 
 makes right and induces the strong to 
 take unfair advantage of the weak. The 
 punisher imagines himself doing right 
 because the passionate demonstration re- 
 lieves his own irritation and gives an out- 
 let to his sense of vengeance. This self- 
 indulgence is gratifying to his animal 
 nature, and the gratification seems to him 
 like the approval of a conscience sensi- 
 tive to duty. 
 
 3. Fostering the idea that **might 
 
220 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 makes right,** corporal punishment be- 
 comes a self-perpetuating institution, 
 just as men who were hazed become 
 hazers. The result is that the pug- 
 nacious spirit is contagious. Corporal 
 punishment is a species of battle; and 
 boys fight because their parents sanction 
 fighting by fighting them. This stays the 
 progress of brotherhood and peace 
 among men. 
 
 4. Mere bodily power or gladiatorial 
 skill becomes a substitute for justice and 
 hence a menace to the integrity of the 
 whole social structure. 
 
 5. There are physiological and patho- 
 logical reasons against corporal punish- 
 ment. Children are often injured for 
 life by injudicious penal strokes. Apart 
 from this, a better result is to be ex- 
 pected by those gentle measures^ which 
 tend to exert a calming, quieting, and 
 soothing influence on the mind as a means 
 of repressing wrong and encouraging 
 right action, than measures which tend to 
 
 ^ ** Gentle Measures," by Jacob Abbott. 
 
FAILURE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 121 
 
 agitate and irritate the mind. Violent 
 methods tend to excite angry resentment 
 and this does not make for loyalty and 
 trustful devotion. The very principle of 
 self-preservation arouses antagonism and 
 casts suspicion on the claim that the lash 
 is intended for the victim's betterment. 
 There is at least this moral peril to the 
 developing mind if there be, indeed, no 
 physical injury. 
 
 6. No argument against corporal pun- 
 ishment rests upon a broader base and 
 means more to an open mind perhaps 
 than the historical. It is not my purpose 
 to elaborate this here. Suffice it to indi- 
 cate the significant truth of the trend of 
 the world's movement. 
 
 Thus, we find a rapidly growing ab- 
 horrence of war and of the apotheosis of 
 might. Justice is pushing its claim as 
 the only arbiter among nations. War is 
 declining as a corrective and directive. 
 We have peace conferences and con- 
 gresses and arbitration treaties. Men 
 are addressing themselves less to the 
 
22a THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 sword and the bullet than to the law of 
 unity and universal brotherhood. 
 
 See how many classes of offences in 
 England were formerly subject to capi- 
 tal punishment. Note the decline of bod- 
 ily torture as a means of making men 
 faithful and loyal. It is little more than 
 ten years since flogging was abolished in 
 the British army. Fifty years ago every 
 parish in England had its stocks in use. 
 
 Is corporal punishment so insisted upon 
 because of its severity, or its convenience, 
 or its intelligible appeal ? I have already 
 shown that its convenience is responsible 
 for much hasty and unjust administra- 
 tion. As to severity, it is said that crim- 
 inals do not return to the state where the 
 whipping post is their dread. Well, 
 then, are they reformed, or do they sim- 
 ply cross the border and pursue the crim- 
 inal life elsewhere? That is the ques- 
 tion. 
 
 Nor is severity a guarantee of reforma- 
 tion. Speaking of the advantage of the 
 '^indeterminate sentence/' an expert edi- 
 
FAILURE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 223 
 
 tor^ thus shows up the popular fallacy of 
 the educating power of mere severity in 
 corporal punishment : 
 
 It is not easy always to measure the de- 
 terrent force of laws; we can tell some- 
 thing about it by their effect. The his- 
 tory of penology shows very positively 
 that variations in the force of penalties 
 do not have proportionate effect as de- 
 terrents. If that were so then we should 
 expect that the severest penalty would be 
 the best deterrent. The history of cen- 
 turies refutes the supposition. The 
 application of the most terrible physical 
 punishments, such as mutilation and 
 death, did not prevent petit larceny. In 
 the thirty-seven years of the reign of 
 Henry VIII. it is reported that 37,000 
 were executed. Even as late as 18 18 
 two women were hung in England for 
 passing forged one-pound notes. But 
 this did not stop forgery or larceny. 
 These punishments were discarded not 
 only because they were Inhuman, but be- 
 cause they were Ineffectual. 
 
 ' Charities and the Commons^ December 29, 
 1906. 
 
224 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Charles Dickens drove a vast deal of 
 corporal punishment from the schools of 
 England. It had been little less than 
 barbaric in its forms and in its frequency. 
 He saw also the relation between a 
 child's food and his conduct — that a 
 poorly nourished child was liable to pun- 
 ishment arising from his anemia and 
 that nourishment was often a better cure 
 for delinquency than punishment could 
 be. "No other writer," says Inspector 
 James L. Hughes,^ '*has attacked so 
 many phases of wrong training, unjust 
 treatment, and ill usage of childhood.'' 
 His books describe no less than twenty- 
 eight schools. He abated not only actual 
 corporal cruelty, but also the terrorising 
 of children. 
 
 Dickens was the prophet of a reform, 
 noting which, our former Commissioner 
 of Education, Dr. William T. Harris, 
 says: **The habit of finding in the good 
 tendencies of the child the levers with 
 
 ' **Dickens as an Educator," by James L. Hughes. 
 
FAILURE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 225 
 
 which to move him to the repression of 
 his bad impulses has placed in the hands 
 of the professional teacher the means of 
 governing the child without appeal to 
 force except in the rarest cases." 
 
 Of the work which the juvenile court 
 and its accessory, the probation officer, 
 are doing toward the abolition of irra- 
 tional and undeserved punishment — 
 even of lawbreakers I have already 
 spoken. But this mighty reform is all in 
 the world trend which makes for a truer 
 human brotherhood. 
 
 Once more, the insane are no longer 
 outcasts or criminals, but sufferers from 
 disease. Houses of incarceration and 
 detention have become hospitals ; guards 
 have become attendants and nurses. 
 Irons and straight jackets, once among 
 the corporal inflictions, have been put 
 into the museum to be studied historically 
 or gazed on with horror. All this is in- 
 dicative of the way the world is moving 
 — toward more rational, more fitting, 
 more adjustable, more efficacious, more 
 
226 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 educative, more humane ways of punish- 
 ment and reform. 
 
 7. Further. The trend is toward pre- 
 vention as better than cure. The more a 
 parent thinks about punishment of any 
 kind, the more he will punish — and 
 punish unfittingly and unjustly. And the 
 more he punishes, the more is he likely to 
 resort to the corporal method. It makes 
 him feel that he is doing something, 
 gives him a sense of his own prowess, 
 swells his head and contracts his heart. 
 The only person I can think of as pos- 
 sibly deserving a flogging is the flogging 
 parent or caretaker. The flogger brutal- 
 ises himself as well as the child he flogs, 
 and this results in brutalising, and so 
 lowering, the moral tone of society, and 
 perpetuating the practice to coming gen- 
 erations. 
 
 Justice waits not until the evil deed is 
 done, so that punishment may be in- 
 flicted, but so fairly deals with the indi- 
 vidual that he shall not be tempted to 
 become an evil doer. Justice labours to 
 
FAILURE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 227 
 
 enable each individual to realise his full- 
 est capacity for contributing to the uni- 
 versal good. This is morality. Toward 
 such an end corporal punishment is a 
 failure and Its tendency is therefore im- 
 moral. 
 
X 
 
 MONEY AS A MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 
 
 As a means of training the mind and the 
 . hands to moral uses, no other agency is 
 SO resourceful as money. It is the com- 
 monest and most familiar representative 
 of value all through life, and as such it 
 IS a symbol of the property sense — in 
 which the sentiment of justice origi- 
 nates. 
 
 The fact that the love of money for its 
 own sake is the root of all, or of much, 
 evil, coupled with the fact that we can- 
 not get along without it, gives it a high 
 practice value in moral training. But 
 this also suggests another fact — that it 
 IS easy to misuse it in seeking this very 
 end. 
 
 There are many persons whose minds 
 are more honest than their hands. Small 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 229 
 
 peculations frequently arise from the 
 fact that the hands have not been trained 
 to hold other people's money. Of course 
 a thoroughly established just habit of 
 mind will control the hands, but not many 
 persons have attained to such a fixed 
 habit of mind. So they peculate, or are 
 at least loose and careless in handling 
 other people's money without classing 
 themselves as dishonest or criminal. This 
 has been demonstrated by experiment 
 with groups of men of equal morality, 
 but who have and have not been trained 
 to handle other people's property. 
 
 On the other hand, many a one is trusty 
 with funds who really has no higher gen- 
 eral religious and moral standards, yet 
 whose money handling is honest largely 
 because of long training in it. The feel 
 of trust money awakens no personal 
 cupidity or begets no carelessness. Scru- 
 pulosity has become a habit. 
 
 It is apparent, then, that any thought 
 of money as a training instrument must 
 take cognisance of two aspects of the sub- 
 
ago THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 ject — our own money and other people's 
 money. 
 
 Children, especially as they approach or 
 are entering adolescence, should be en- 
 trusted with small funds not their own. 
 It is evident that this has a larger train- 
 ing value than that of simple honesty. It 
 begets not only moral trustworthiness, 
 but general executive or administrative 
 reliability; it demands thoughtful care, 
 self-inspection, self-control, order, cour- 
 age, exactness and even, as a side result, 
 punctuality. 
 
 There are various ways of thus entrust- 
 ing children with money, such as errands, 
 treasurerships, the payment of bills, and 
 the temporary custody of small sums for 
 apparent purposes. It will be seen that 
 the critical faculty, the judgment, as well 
 as the emotions and the will, can all be 
 brought into healthy exercise in this mat- 
 ter. Trustworthiness is begotten by be- 
 ing trusted, and the moral backbone of 
 many a child is stiffened by seeing that 
 he is trusted. Similarly, rogues are not 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 231 
 
 infrequently the creatures of our distrust, 
 for children and men are likely to grow 
 to what we repute them to be. Money is 
 an easy and effective agency in this fea- 
 ture of character-building. 
 
 Much more might be said about the just 
 handling of other people's money, but 
 this chapter means to be little more than 
 suggestive of principles, and much that 
 is involved in stewardship or trusteeship 
 is essential also to the discussion of the 
 children's money as their own. 
 
 The subject divides naturally under 
 four heads: (i) Earning; (2) Saving; 
 (3) Spending; (4) Giving. Or we may 
 use the four little verbs, get, keep, use, 
 give. While lending and borrowing are 
 a very important part of the world's busi- 
 ness life, great care is necessary in guid- 
 ing children in this class of transactions. 
 Many schoolboys and girls fall only too 
 easily into the habit of borrowing. In al- 
 most any class one is pretty sure to see 
 the borrowing pupil, who, to avoid the 
 trouble of carrying his own books or 
 
23* THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Other school utensils, depends upon the 
 easy lender to help him through. Here 
 is a violation of the law of common fair- 
 ness in a very contemptible form when 
 it becomes a fixed habit. 
 
 The parent must use a fine discrimina- 
 tion here. The child should be cautioned 
 against dependence on borrowing, even 
 though in emergency it is the right thing 
 to do. On the other hand, he should be 
 trained to discriminate between that 
 habitual lending which encourages habit- 
 ual borrowing and that occasional lend- 
 ing which is right and proper. Justice is 
 the arbiter just here. The ultimate aim 
 is a true cooperative spirit, a unified pur- 
 pose, a community of interests. The boy 
 who relies on borrowing, expecting his 
 good-natured mate to do his carrying, is 
 anti-social, unjust, and immoral. So, 
 too, is the boy who makes it a rule never 
 either to lend or to borrow. As children 
 grow in their **teens," they will gradually 
 come to see the use and abuse of borrow- 
 ing in business life. As a general rule 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 233 
 
 the hand-to-mouth borrower is to be 
 shunned for his own sake as well as for 
 that of the might-be-lender. 
 
 I. As to earning. It has been a much 
 discussed point as to whether children 
 should be encouraged to earn their own 
 money or whether they should have an 
 allowance, or both. The question cannot 
 be answered by an unvarying rule. But 
 this IS sure ; when parents pay their chil- 
 dren for service, it should be the kind of 
 service which is not strictly a child's 
 home duty simply as the child of his 
 parents. Many little services must be 
 rendered for love's sake, lest a sordid 
 spirit arise. 
 
 I knew of a father who had a "den" or 
 shop, where he recreated himself with 
 carpentry or other mechanical work. He 
 paid his little children three cents a week 
 to keep the shop in order. As they grew 
 older, he raised the wage to five, then to 
 ten, then twenty-five cents, and ulti- 
 mately a dollar. But the shop cleaning 
 in time fell into irregularity and neglect, 
 
234 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 even though the reward grew as an in- 
 creasing allowance. 
 
 When children are paid for service, the 
 service should be strictly rendered. There 
 should also be conditions in the contract, 
 if possible, as an educative feature. 
 
 One of the best educative plans for aid- 
 ing a child to earn money intelligently 
 and at the same time begetting a method- 
 ical business habit was one devised by a 
 father for a girl of thirteen. The child 
 was to be given certain kinds of bills 
 to pay, and to receive a commission 
 therefor. One advantage of this plan 
 was that it taught her to handle other 
 people's money, even to carrying it about 
 the city, and at the same time gave her 
 a chance to earn her own income. 
 
 The arrangement was that **downtown" 
 bills — that is, bills to be paid at business 
 houses in the centre of the city, say two 
 miles distant from home — ^were to be 
 graded thus : Bills up to five dollars, five 
 per cent, commission; bills of five to ten 
 dollars, two per cent. ; ten to twenty-five, 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 235 
 
 one per cent. ; over twenty-five, one-half 
 per cent. Bills In the home district up 
 to twenty dollars, one per cent. Ser- 
 vants' wages, one-half per cent. If the 
 latter were neglected until over two days 
 overdue, there was no commission. An 
 error In calculating the percentage In any 
 case reduced the commission one-half. 
 When the child Increased in years the 
 rate of commission was increased. The 
 girl kept her account, which was settled 
 monthly, she signing the book at the 
 foot of each page. 
 
 It will be seen that this arrangement 
 naturally led to inquiry: "Why Is my 
 percentage less as the amount of the bill 
 increases?" Because it takes just as 
 much time and costs as much walking or 
 carfare to pay five dollars as ten. A com- 
 mission of five per cent, on fifty dollars 
 would be a little heavy on the father. 
 For a bill of this size one-quarter per 
 cent, might be enough on the foregoing 
 basis, but when It is considered that the 
 child's responsibility in carrying so much 
 
236 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 money was so much greater, It was fair 
 to remunerate her In a measure for the 
 care necessary to Its safety. 
 
 The principles Involved In the foregoing 
 scheme are ( i ) easy quantitative 
 measurements; (2) grading to teach 
 relative conditions of valuation; (3) pen- 
 alty of neglect or error; (4) as the child 
 grows Into conventional ways and ap- 
 preciation, the scale of commissions 
 changes. Or, to put It more succinctly, 
 the percentage Is adjusted by the amount, 
 distance, responsibility, punctuality, sac- 
 rifice and accuracy. Here Is a large edu- 
 cational value. 
 
 If children aid their father In his busi- 
 ness, they should usually be paid for It. 
 If they address or deliver circulars, do 
 boxing, labelling, copying, bookkeeping, 
 dusting, or anything that Is commercial, 
 It should be regarded commercially. Es- 
 pecially Is this true If the service Is reg- 
 ular and by agreement rather than the 
 mere lending of hand to help a father 
 because he Is a father. 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 237 
 
 I take the liberty now of quoting at 
 some length from a valuable article on 
 **Child-training by Bookkeeping," by 
 Mrs. Jane Marsh Parker.^ It is very 
 complete in its way and is worthy of 
 study, although I should prefer to see it 
 modified when applied to a boy only six 
 years of age. Mrs. Parker says: 
 
 I found the other day in a collection 
 of old papers the account-book opened 
 with my eldest son when, upon his sixth 
 birthday, an allowance of twenty-five 
 cents a week was given him. Out of 
 that he was to give to the Sunday-school 
 five cents weekly. He was to use his 
 own judgment in spending his money; 
 but he was to give an account for every 
 penny on Saturday night, when his father 
 went over the account with him, and 
 settled it for the week. A schedule of 
 charges for misdemeanors was fixed upon 
 at the outset; the child decided what 
 they should be, and signed a contract to 
 pay the same cheerfully when required. 
 He was to be paid extra for doing certain 
 things, like shovelling snow, weeding the 
 
 * The Outlook. August II, 1906. 
 
23^ THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 garden, etc. Added to this, an account 
 was kept of gifts of money; making all in 
 all quite a bit of bookkeeping, demanding 
 regularity and accuracy of entries. That 
 account-book, with pencil attached, was 
 kept within easy reach. Alas that It was 
 often the source of tears! Here are a 
 few items on the debit side : 
 
 Losing my hat 03 
 
 Spilling ink on baby 05 
 
 Skipping bath 05 
 
 Saucy to cook 03 
 
 Muddy shoes in house. . .03 
 
 His [father's] bookkeeping system for 
 children permitted advance loans — ad^ 
 vised them when needed — but a debt was 
 to be paid as soon as possible. Pleasur- 
 ing and goodies were not to be invested 
 in with a debt on one's shoulders. There 
 was always honest work for boys to do 
 whose allowance was not equal to pay- 
 ing debts. 
 
 At one time it looked not a little as if 
 we were cultivating what might turn out 
 to be stinginess in the boy, so severely 
 frugal did he wax under pressure of in- 
 solvency. That was the chance for 
 teaching discretion in giving — for mak- 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 239 
 
 Ing lasting impression of what avarice 
 can do in transforming character — as 
 there happened to be one or two striking 
 demonstrations available for illustration, 
 and the most was made of them. 
 
 A wholesale dread of bankruptcy, of 
 having to draw on his bank account 
 rather than add to it another five dollars, 
 is the best kind of a curb-bit on an im- 
 pulsive, wide-awake boy. ... A spend- 
 thrift child is not easily taught frugality, 
 and if strict accounting for an allowance 
 will not do it, his is a hopeless case in- 
 deed. . . . The weekly balancing of that 
 account by parent and child becomes an 
 important feature of the family life, pro- 
 moting that community of interests with- 
 out which disintegration of the home is 
 sure to follow. 
 
 The spirit of this method is very fine. 
 In some particulars, however, I should 
 doubt the expediency, especially in the 
 average household. Here are evidently 
 exceptional parents in more ways than 
 one. For a child of double their child's 
 age, and more, the plan would seem to 
 me in all details more applicable. Mrs, 
 
24© THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 Theodore Birney also advocates strict 
 accountancy and balances. But we may 
 be too exact with children of six or 
 eight A certain amount of unaccount- 
 ability goes with young childhood. The 
 kindergarten age is not the age for 
 mathematical precision. Balances are too 
 intellectual. But the ideal of promoting 
 community of interests is a kindergarten 
 Ideal, and the spirit of this arrangement 
 Is true and good. 
 
 It is possible, too, to attempt to fix 
 money values to childish acts with too 
 much precision. Money may become too 
 prevailing and too exacting a thought in 
 the child's life. The danger of stinginess 
 referred to by the writer was met by 
 wholesome teaching, but not every parent 
 Is so discerning as this. 
 
 Once more, it were better that so young 
 a child should not sign a contract. He 
 must be made trusty by trusting him Im- 
 plicitly. Contracts are for men In the 
 complex relations of business life. Better 
 begin life with an emphasis on the simple 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 241 
 
 Strength of yea, yea; nay, nay. By all 
 means omit the written contract with so 
 young a child unless merely as a mem- 
 orandum. 
 
 The climax of cleverness in this matter 
 of training young children is reached in 
 Carl Ewald's masterly sketch, *'My 
 Little Boy.''^ The child was given a 
 penny a week, with the privilege of dis- 
 posing of it as he pleased. The arrange- 
 ment was to last until the summer holi- 
 days, a period of fifteen weeks. 
 
 Accordingly, his father divided a 
 drawer into fifteen compartments, and in 
 each compartment he put a penny. This 
 gave the child a survey, at any moment, 
 of his resources. The spectacle of fifteen 
 shining coins fills him with mad delight, 
 and he begins the week with the pur- 
 chase of a stick of chocolate, which dis- 
 appears in five minutes. 
 
 The father tells him about a top that 
 he might have bought. After much 
 
 * The Strand Magazine ^ June, 1 906. 
 
*4a THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 tribulation the top is bought the follow- 
 ing week, and in three days is lost. Then 
 a skipping rope is wanted, but it costs 
 fourpence. The paternal advice is to buy 
 nothing the next three weeks, and then 
 on the fourth there will be the fourpence 
 in hand. 
 
 The boy, however, has had youthful 
 counsel, and he proposes that his father 
 lend him the fourpence, for which he will 
 give twenty pennies back. The father 
 refuses, showing the child that he has 
 only thirteen pennies at best. 
 
 They go and study the aspect of the 
 drawer — the boy in dismay. The father 
 next proposes that he take the boy's 
 penny and advance him four, noting that 
 the three succeeding weeks the pennies 
 in the drawer will come due to the father. 
 This is accepted and the debt liquidated 
 in instalments each week. 
 
 On the second week the boy wants a 
 stick of chocolate, but is told that he must 
 wait until the debt is paid. The boy sees 
 that what's gone is gone. The novelty 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 243 
 
 of the rope has worn off. The boy pro- 
 poses to draw on a compartment beyond 
 the appropriated funds, and takes the 
 penny farthest off — just before the holi- 
 days. Thus begins a species of pecula- 
 tion, which is continued until all is gone 
 and there are five empty compartments 
 between him and the summer holidays. 
 This is poverty, and father and child sit 
 every day contemplating the empty 
 drawer. The experience is painful, but it 
 Is hoped will prove profitable when the 
 new set of pennies is started after the 
 holidays. 
 
 Nothing could exceed this as a practical 
 training in the morals of finance. The 
 whole philosophy is visible at any time 
 in hard pan. It looks, too, as though 
 it were better that the boy had not 
 earned the money, since under the 
 arrangement the expenditure could be 
 prescribed. 
 
 Of course this scheme has no direct 
 thought of saving or giving, and is there- 
 fore limited. But as a discipline its reach 
 
244 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 is farther than might at first appear. It 
 exposed the child to a temptation the in- 
 sidious nature of which he could soon see 
 for himself. To an extent, it indirectly 
 suggested the need of saving by not ap- 
 propriating money better kept in hand 
 for future need. As the plan exposed the 
 boy to temptation, so it gave him oppor- 
 tunity to study relative values, prospec- 
 tive needs, and methods of adjustment. 
 The child and the father together could 
 ponder and devise and enjoy and suffer. 
 In that drawer a lifetime was compressed 
 and illustrated with simplicity and sug- 
 gestiveness. 
 
 Under this general head of earning or 
 getting we must not neglect a side thrust 
 at the most insidious cause of moral de- 
 generacy to which we are liable. I mean 
 the growing vice of gambling — the aim 
 to get something for nothing. Money 
 won by betting, by lottery, or by any 
 other form of chancing is not earned. 
 No return is made for it. The gambler 
 is not a producer, not a factor in legiti- 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 245 
 
 mate trade, not a giver of value for 
 value. 
 
 Very early should the child be taught 
 the dangers of the hope to get something 
 for nothing. Not only ethical principle 
 but the civil law condemns under the class 
 name of gambling this chief among social 
 vices. 
 
 All my life I have been an abstainer 
 and I yield to none in the wish to see 
 King Alcohol dethroned forever. But 
 his extinction will not remove his coad- 
 jutor, the gambling spirit, from power. 
 The two often cooperate, but not neces- 
 sarily always. The motive of something- 
 for-nothing begins long before liquor is 
 tasted and in places where alcohol is un- 
 known. 
 
 Of the two I believe It to be the more 
 insidious and surreptitious. To the com- 
 mon eye it is much more evident where 
 the first glass may lead to than where 
 the first "chance" or **bet" may lead to. 
 The first drunk Is an alarming warning; 
 the first stake, either lost or won, is an 
 
246 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 invitation to continue, with no red signal 
 of the tightening grip of habit. 
 
 In England, justices, magistrates, and 
 moralists are growing alarmed at the 
 mad spreading of the betting and gaming 
 habit. The temperance cause is gaining 
 ground, but the gambling spirit is ram- 
 pant — **bridge" being among the leading 
 incitements, although by no means the 
 only one. 
 
 That betting or gambling has become 
 as prevalent here as in England may be 
 a question, but that it is rapidly sapping 
 the moral sense in all grades of society 
 is beyond doubt. If it has not yet reached 
 the point of a national evil here, now is 
 the time to prevent it. And home teach- 
 ing is the first teaching. A gambling 
 home is far worse than a gambling 
 saloon, since the home is the first place of 
 sanction or of condemnation in the moral 
 life. 
 
 Briefly, gambling is defined as "the de- 
 termination of the ownership of property 
 by appeal to chance."^ By chance we 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 247 
 
 mean those natural forces or conditions 
 or mutations that cannot be controlled. 
 All gain by gambling is unjust, but not 
 all unjust gain is gambling. 
 
 Many persons are brought up to abhor 
 this seductive vice of gambling, yet they 
 lack just that ethical discrimination for 
 the culture of which this volume pleads, 
 and so they do not perceive wherein the 
 evil really lies. The result is that they 
 sometimes condemn the legitimate and 
 sometimes condone immoral proceedings, 
 and are unable in either case to account 
 to inquiring children for their judgments. 
 
 In a succinct way, then, let us see what 
 the sin of gambling consists in — viewing 
 its tendencies and the demoralisation that 
 follows in its train.^ 
 
 It involves the denial of system and of 
 rational control and social order in the 
 apportionment of property. It is an or- 
 ganised rejection alike of reason and of 
 
 * John A. Hobson in **Betting and Gambling a 
 National Evil," edited by B. Seebohm Rowntree. 
 (Macmillan). 
 
24S THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 industry. It plunges the mind into a 
 world of anarchy, where things come and 
 go without human regulation or control. 
 It thus inflicts a graver damage on the 
 intellect than theft, for, rejecting reason, 
 it puts its devotees in an atmosphere of 
 chance and generates an emotional excite- 
 ment that tends to inhibit those checks 
 which reason puts upon emotional ex- 
 travagance. Rational control is a neces- 
 sary factor of civilisation. It means plan 
 in life, order in society, progress in hu- 
 manity. To all this gambling is a blow, 
 which sends the human mind reeling to 
 a less human plane of living. It is easy 
 to become a gambler, especially in some 
 stations of life void of variety and recre- 
 ation. 
 
 Monotony begets the gambling spirit. 
 There is fascination in the unexpected 
 and in the hazardous, and men will seek 
 it as a relief from monotony and the 
 humdrum of existence. 
 
 All this means a "descent to a lower 
 plane of thought and feeling.'' "Per- 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 249 
 
 haps no other human interest,'' says Mr. 
 John A. Hobson, "not based on purely 
 physical craving, arouses so absorbing a 
 passion ; alcoholism itself scarcely asserts 
 a stronger dominion over its devotees." 
 The uncertainty, the hazard, the possi- 
 bility, the feverish awaiting, all lay a 
 deadly grip on the moral sense. Sym- 
 pathies for others in their losses are ex- 
 tinguished. Misfortune is rated a part 
 of the game of life. The opium habit is 
 hardly more insidious and irresistible. 
 Says Mr. W. D. Mackenzie, "In the 
 making of a bet, a man resolves to re- 
 press the use of his reason, his will, his 
 conscience, his affections; only one part 
 of his nature is allowed free play and 
 that is his emotions." He lives in 
 an unnatural strain, a stranger to pru- 
 dence and industry. 
 
 Lying, fraud, theft, personal antago- 
 nisms, and self-destruction follow in the 
 wake of gambling. Many embezzle- 
 ments are the result of It. The family 
 as well as the individual is wrecked by 
 
%So THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 it. It becomes an infectious social dis- 
 ease with all attendant evils. Slow and 
 legitimate accumulation is not suffered, 
 healthy activity is paralysed and govern- 
 ment itself is threatened with a rotten de- 
 terioration. 
 
 Is it possible that such a horrid picture 
 comes back in any sense to our Christian 
 homes? To a large extent, yes. The 
 principle of *4east effort,'' indolence, 
 or laziness; the excitement and fascina- 
 tion of hazard and irresponsible chance, 
 these make the way easy for the motive 
 of something-for-nothing. This motive 
 itself is invited and stimulated in many 
 ways and through various agencies. 
 Most of these may not be wrong or evil 
 in themselves, but they conspire to the in- 
 trusion of the gambling spirit. 
 
 First among these conspirators is lan- 
 guage itself. The free use of such words 
 as **luck'' and *'bet" tends to level the 
 thought to the thing signified in the 
 speech. Then comes the passion for 
 special privilege, and the **parasitic feel- 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 251 
 
 ing." Next the more specific induce- 
 ments to get something for nothing in the 
 shape of a **prize with every package," 
 free gifts with no visible string to them, 
 prizes for game winning, a free piano, 
 prize guessing, etc. It is not contended 
 that these are gambling, but only that 
 they conspire to inflame the motive of 
 something-for-nothing, of which gam- 
 bling is the ultimate evil. Three times 
 in a few months have I had very tempt- 
 ing offers of free gifts from publishers. 
 The first two I accepted, with the result 
 that I was afterward pestered to sub- 
 scribe to books. The third I resolutely 
 ignored, on the principle that something 
 for nothing never pays. 
 
 Again come the more directly evil in- 
 ducements to bet, often in fun, more of- 
 ten in earnest. The popular '^bridge" is 
 begetting hosts of ^^respectable" betting 
 people, and money passes freely in homes 
 and In clubs. To this must be added 
 the raffle and the organised lottery. 
 Travellers abroad fall into gambling 
 
252 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 snares **just to try it." A lady told me 
 that she always charged her gaming 
 losses at Monte Carlo to travelling ex- 
 penses. She said she knew it was gam- 
 bling and would not dare to do it at 
 home. 
 
 The home attitude toward all these con- 
 spiring agencies influences the children. 
 An atmosphere free from these taints 
 makes them repugnant when they are 
 met with outside. A pronounced an- 
 athema against the shiftless greed that is 
 always looking for something without 
 giving return will prove a wholesale 
 preventive. When our common law 
 declares certain things to be immoral and 
 destructive, the weak-kneed Christian 
 may invoke it as his reason for refusing 
 to participate in bets, raffles, lotteries, 
 or other forms of gaming mechanism 
 no matter where or in what interest they 
 are held. 
 
 If this attitude toward this in'dolent and 
 unfair something-for-nothing spirit can 
 be made pronouncedly antagonistic in the 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 253 
 
 home, the whole moral life of the chil- 
 dren will be better insured than if there 
 is simply a limp, goody-goody talk, punc- 
 tuated with **luck," prize packages, 
 special privileges, **bridge" ball-game 
 and election bets, and raffles — all of 
 which are unequitable and anti-social. 
 
 Bishop Brent of the Philippine Islands 
 in an article in the Manila Times thus 
 reiterates the substance of a sermon of 
 his which created a hostile sensation -} 
 
 My assertion is that moderate gam- 
 bling is a vice, and it is as respectable to 
 be a moderate liar, a moderate adulterer, 
 a moderate thief, as to be a moderate 
 gambler. The effect on the character, if 
 not equal, is at any rate similar. . . . 
 I reassert that gambling is contemptible 
 in any one who pretends to self-respect, 
 and reprehensible to God and His Son 
 Jesus Christ. I maintain that the differ- 
 ence between poker and cock-fighting, 
 between bridge whist played for money 
 and pangingue, is a matter of white- 
 wash. . . . Poker I think is a contempt- 
 
 * Quoted from The Outlook^ Sept. 8, 1906. 
 
254 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 ible game; if it were not for the money 
 risked, poker would drop out of exist- 
 ence. Whist is entirely different; it is a 
 good game, a game of the intellect and 
 a game of skill, and I commend it; but 
 I maintain that when bridge whist is 
 played for money or for expensive prizes 
 as distinguished from a trophy held, but 
 never owned, by a winner, as it is in 
 Manila, it isn't a bit different from the 
 cock-pit or from the roulette-table at 
 Monte Carlo. The only distinction is 
 that the thing called ^society' has dipped 
 its brush in whitewash and has white- 
 washed bridge whist played for money. 
 
 2. As to Saving. Justice is essentially 
 economic. It means that every one shall 
 have his due. Therefore, a child or 
 youth who has had no training in the 
 economics of life is likely to be robbed 
 of his best resources sooner or later. He 
 will be his own robber. Economy is not 
 limited to finance, but is the bottom factor 
 in effort and a condition of efficiency. 
 
 The idea of saving must not press too 
 hard upon very young children, as they 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 255 
 
 cannot yet appreciate the relations of 
 persons and things. The practice of true 
 economy must grow with the youth's 
 years. It is no use to preach the necessi- 
 ties of a far-off future to young children. 
 Their experience is too narrow to make 
 such admonition effectual. Indeed, a 
 young child has no conscious business 
 with his possible adulthood. 
 
 The nicer point is to beget a saving 
 habit without inducing stinginess and 
 penuriousness — which is anti-social and 
 inequitable. The method of Ewald, 
 already cited, probably demonstrates the 
 motive of saving as well as any method 
 can. The bottom idea is that money is 
 only good for what it can bring in ex- 
 change and is valueless in itself. Mere 
 hoarding, therefore, violates the law of 
 justice, since it deprives society of a use- 
 ful Instrument. 
 
 A contributor to the Kindergarten Mag- 
 azine some years ago gave his experience 
 in training the economic sense in children. 
 After noting that he believes in allow- 
 
%S6 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 ances and in saving for the sake of accu- 
 mulating, as well as for some definite pur- 
 chase, and that he does not believe in 
 paying children for ordinary domestic 
 services, he says : 
 
 "Five years ago we were boarding, and 
 my children were aged nine (boy) and 
 eleven (girl) years. They had no idea 
 of the money value of anything except 
 candy, nuts, cakes, etc. I thought it 
 would be well to give them a practical 
 education in this line, and one day told 
 them that I would in the future pay them 
 regular wages of $6 per week; from this 
 they should pay their table board, $4.50 
 per week, and with the balance they 
 would have to pay for all their clothes, 
 etc. We started at Christmas, and each 
 put down in a little book under the head- 
 ings **Money received" and **Money 
 spent'' the details of the accounts. Oc- 
 casionally I would borrow from them a 
 dollar or two for a week, giving my note 
 and paying the exorbitant interest of 
 5 per cent, a week for it. Receipts were 
 given by the children and demanded by 
 them for money paid out, unless there 
 was a sales ticket to file. An extra stock 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 257 
 
 of clothes made it necessary for them 
 to borrow at times, and then they gave 
 their notes, as I had done. My boy when 
 less than ten years old came to me one 
 night with Tapa, how much money do 
 you think IVe spent this year?' (He had 
 just bought a suit and overcoat and had 
 little left.) I answered, *I don't know; 
 how much?' *I've had $190, and it's all 
 gone but $2.23 — it costs money, papa, 
 to live, don't it?' His sister — a quiet 
 child — learned the same lesson. We 
 would often discuss their expenditures, 
 and they learned the value of clothes, 
 etc., better than they could have done in 
 any other way. Their mamma, of 
 course, 'shopped' for them, but they were 
 always consulted or advised. 
 
 **I simply told them that a certain per- 
 centage of the money spent for the fam- 
 ily was theirs, paid it to them as wages. 
 Often, however, I gave them an oppor- 
 tunity to do work for me, such as writing 
 out an article I wanted copied or going 
 on an unusually long errand, for which 
 I paid carfare, which they would save 
 by walking. The work done for me was 
 planned so it would have to be done dur- 
 ing their usual play hours, and so they 
 
25« THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 would learn the difference between work 
 and play. 
 
 '^Neither of the children are stingy, but 
 both know how to spend money to get the 
 most good out of it, and both have 
 money loaned at interest. They will 
 walk and give the carfare to a needy per- 
 son or give up some longed-for pleasure 
 to aid one in distress.'' 
 
 2' ^s to Spending, Spending is as 
 much an economic matter as saving. 
 Proper spending is proper saving. As 
 soon as a youth understands how it may 
 be more economical to spend $2 than 
 to spend $1, he has a grip on a great 
 principle. 
 
 Parents are liable to go to one of two 
 extremes: They either dictate how 
 the child's money shall be spent or they 
 take no part at all in directing him. 
 Many girls grow up to be young ladies 
 without having had a voice in selecting 
 their own clothes or in otherwise exer- 
 cising a choice in the purchase of their 
 necessities. It is better that they should 
 make some mistakes than that their 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 259 
 
 spending should always be under absolute 
 dictation. 
 
 This freedom, within limits, should be 
 accorded to young children also. They 
 can be led almost without knowing it. 
 Their tastes, their wills, their judgments, 
 are thus trained into discriminating 
 energy. 
 
 A word about the economy of the 
 Church. How frequently do we see 
 looseness here ! Even good business men 
 fall into a happy-go-lucky way when the 
 business is that of Church finances. If 
 the Church should not be a model of 
 strict accounting and cutting the coat ac- 
 cording to the cloth, what should ? 
 
 The Church ought to be an example to 
 its youth in all matters of exactness, 
 promptness, regularity, economic coordi- 
 nation of agencies, and general manage- 
 ment. It is often said that it is no part 
 of a pastor's work to collect or appeal 
 for money — the pastor's business being 
 spiritual. But is loose business manage- 
 ment compatible with spirituality? Is 
 
26o THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 uneconomic administration of other 
 people's money a thing apart from 
 morality or spirituality? 
 
 Children carefully trained at home are 
 sometimes put in moral jeopardy when 
 they see their church so loose-jointed and 
 irresponsible in its ways and means of 
 livelihood. 
 
 4. As to Giving. To touch even lightly 
 on all phases of this important subject 
 would not be possible or even desirable 
 here. 
 
 In their laudable zeal to prevent their 
 children from becoming selfish and to 
 incite them to kindness and generosity, 
 parents often do damage to certain valu- 
 able instincts and propensities. 
 
 It is not uncommon to so work on a 
 child's feelings that he will part with 
 some things which it were better for him 
 to have kept for his own. Children be- 
 come attached to certain playthings, for 
 instance, which attachment is a form of 
 sentiment upon which much of our higher 
 culture depends. We see that at Christ- 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING a6i 
 
 mas time. Many a parent knows that a 
 new set of toys may make a momentary 
 excitement, after which the child will 
 gravitate to an old, half-broken hobby. 
 
 Then there is the matter of giving away 
 discarded things. Nice discernment is 
 needed here, for the children themselves 
 are discerning. A little boy on being 
 advised to give away some broken toys 
 to a children's charity Institution re- 
 plied, "But how can they use them if I 
 can't?" On the other hand, a little girl 
 being advised not to do just that thing, 
 replied, '*But the boys have tool boxes, 
 and they like these broken things so that 
 they can mend them." Enough to show 
 that many things must be taken into ac- 
 count In directing a child's giving. 
 
 But we are more particularly concerned 
 with money. How far Is It advisable to 
 attempt the formation of the giving habit 
 in young children who have no money of 
 their own to give? Would the child 
 gain or lose, spiritually, by waiting for 
 a certain period before being permitted 
 
a62 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 to contribute to the Sunday-school mis- 
 sionary box? 
 
 The real pedagogy of this "giving" 
 habit has not pressed its way to the front. 
 Yet at no point should the home and the 
 school be more closely in accord. 
 
 The dominant idea appears to be that 
 the sooner a "penny"can be shaken from 
 a child's hand into the offertory plate, 
 the surer will be his training in the finan- 
 cial support of the Lord's cause. 
 
 Here, for instance, is the annual report 
 of a flourishing primary school. It has 
 contributed so many dollars for mission- 
 ary or benevolent purposes, and of this 
 total the **cradle-roir' babies have given 
 a generous share — "out of their own 
 pockets," a waggish church officer re- 
 marks. 
 
 The intention is excellent. It is to form 
 and fix good habits early. The general 
 proposition is good : Begin soon and stick 
 to it. 
 
 But this is not all. A man will not be a 
 more liberal contributor for having first 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 263 
 
 dropped a penny into a box at three or at 
 SIX months of age than for having first 
 done the same thing at three or at six 
 years. The reply may be that while the 
 child is not really giving his own, or him- 
 self, or giving (in form) with any real- 
 isation of the meaning of the act, he is at 
 least forming the habit. 
 
 I doubt it. He is not forming the habit 
 of giving in the same sense that he is 
 forming the habit of walking. His feet 
 are his own and he is learning to use 
 them for all time. But the money is not 
 his own, and the habit of giving his 
 father's money is not the habit of giving 
 his own, or for all time. 
 
 But, waiving this distinction, it remains 
 true that an act which ought to be 
 thoughtful may begin too early to grow 
 into the desired habit. The quasi-habit 
 of missionary benevolence may wear out 
 before the child has arrived at the real 
 stage of development when it should be- 
 gin. Later than the cradle age true giv- 
 ing of one^s own may begin with the 
 
264 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 effectual self-initiative and so Inaugurate 
 a genuine spiritual habit. Giving is cor- 
 relative to having. 
 
 If it be argued that the primary child 
 (to say nothing of the cradle-roll babe) 
 has some appreciation of joint mission- 
 ary support, then, logically, he must be 
 conscious that he is contributing some one 
 else's property and not his own. Is this 
 good education? 
 
 But not to push the argument too far, 
 let us strain a point favourably to the 
 common practice, and admit that the 
 *'penny'' is called the child's before he 
 gives it. The first idea I wish to press is 
 that in the very nature of the case the 
 practice must be purely nominal and 
 formal, if the money has been given to 
 the child simply to transmit it, and would 
 not have been given him had not the 
 offertory been prescribed as Its only ad- 
 missible end. 
 
 It Is questionable whether such an act 
 can be the real inception of a truly benev- 
 olent attitude and habit. I am quite 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 265 
 
 aware that a habit of action will beget a 
 habit of feeling. Forcing ourselves to 
 smile will help to make us cheerful and 
 doing good deeds will make us kindly. 
 But how far this is true of the child who 
 takes no initiative is at least worthy of 
 inquiry. 
 
 The second idea which I wish to press is 
 more directly constructive. Suppose the 
 children were taught that giving is a 
 privilege as well as a duty, and that they 
 can come into that privilege just as soon 
 as they have something representing 
 their own selves — their personal energies 
 or their peculiar possessions — to volun- 
 teer. Would not the offertory gain in 
 sanctity and meaning? Do we have 
 them come to the communion before they 
 **discern"? Is not that a privilege? 
 This means, of course, the translation of 
 energies or sacrifices into money values 
 and this part of the pedagogic will pri- 
 marily fall upon the parent and the 
 home. So the school must oversee the 
 home in this respect. 
 
a66 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 I am not prepared to advise the shut- 
 ting off of the primary offertory entirely. 
 But I do want to force into prominence 
 the fact of its too nominal and mechani- 
 cal nature, the possibility of a richer 
 spiritual culture in this field by looking 
 forward to a day of privilege — a day 
 when the child may enter the guild of 
 those who truly give themselves in giv- 
 ing of their little substance. The ques- 
 tion of the mere swelling of funds is an- 
 other story. 
 
 A writer in The Outlook^ giving an ac- 
 count of the Rev. Thomas K. Beecher, 
 says that one of his three rules for the 
 Sunday-school was that every pupil 
 should put something into the collection. 
 
 **Upon the latter point he elaborated at 
 some length. He said it was not the 
 money he was most after, but the habit 
 of responsibility and of bearing one's 
 fair share in all cooperative enterprises. 
 Therefore, he ordained that the contri- 
 
 ' March lo, 1906. 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 267 
 
 bution should be at least one cent. He 
 preferred the children to earn this cent by 
 some little errand rather than to ask their 
 father or mother for it at the last minute. 
 And when, through poverty or ill for- 
 tune, a cent was not obtainable, the pupil 
 should cut out a little piece of paper, 
 round like a cent., write *'one cent" on 
 one side and sign his name on the other. 
 This perfected his status concerning the 
 contribution, for he knew that no one 
 would avail himself of this unless it was 
 necessary." 
 
 Much of the exhortation and the rea- 
 soning in this matter appears to me to 
 need thoughtful scrutiny. Here, for in- 
 stance, is an extract from an article by a 
 clergyman in a current religious journal : 
 
 '* Cheerful, joyful as well as direct giv- 
 ing IS so lofty a grace that it has to be 
 learned. Cheerful giving is a real Chris- 
 tian grace, so classified, so named one of 
 the seven fundamental means of grace. 
 (2 Cor. 8:7.) This grace must be de- 
 veloped, therefore, as any other grace 
 
a68 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 must — viz., by the power of the Holy 
 Spirit operating upon the heart and in the 
 heart through Christian culture. This 
 culture should be commenced in youth. 
 Children should be taught as clearly and 
 conscientiously to give unto the Lord as 
 to pray unto Him. Parents should teach 
 this, Sunday-schools should teach it, cate- 
 chists should teach it. It is the truth ; it 
 is Scriptural truth; it is St. Paul's doc- 
 trine; it is the will of the Master. It is 
 a law that applies to all. If this grace 
 is taught in youth, it will never be lost 
 sight of as children grow older. They 
 grow up to be Christian *givers.' 
 (Prov. 22:6.) As the twig is bent so 
 will the tree grow." 
 
 Now note. There are other ways of 
 giving to the Lord than by simply trans- 
 mitting some one else's money. But 
 suppose money were the only acceptable 
 gift to the Lord. Is praying to be put on 
 the same basis as money to a moneyless 
 child? Note again. *Tf this grace is 
 taught in youth, it will never be lost sight 
 of." This is not questioned or contro- 
 verted. The point is as to when the 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 269 
 
 privilege of money-giving **in youth'' is 
 to begin. The article just quoted makes 
 no distinction between a child of three 
 and a youth of thirteen. It is upon just 
 this distinction that I am asking for care- 
 ful thought from an educational, not a 
 mere money-gathering, point of view. 
 
 Much depends on where we put the 
 main emphasis. If our moving desire is 
 to get as much money as possible, then 
 we need give no further heed to what I 
 have just argued. 
 
 If our prime interest is the education of 
 the child, then the question becomes a 
 psychological and a pedagogical one. 
 
 If the giving habit were better installed 
 at ten years of age than at five, would we 
 be willing to lose the money by the aboli- 
 tion of a mechanical offertory? Of 
 course if the giving habit is more surely 
 rooted at three than at nine, by all means 
 begin it at three, provided this advan- 
 tage is not offset by a false conception on 
 the part of the child — that he is giving 
 his own when he owns nothing to give, 
 
270 THE CULTURE OF JUSTICE 
 
 but is transmitting another's. We can- 
 not do better than hold the question at 
 least as an open one, on both sides of 
 which there is much to be said, and one 
 involving very important moral prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 That giving can be taught and wrought 
 into habit is beyond question. But the 
 essential thing in the training is to make 
 the habit discriminating and in a meas- 
 ure systematic. Yet it must not be so 
 systematic as to become mechanical and 
 irresponsive to the appeal of the sym- 
 pathies. In any case it is essential that 
 we recognise and cultivate the sense of 
 possession or proprietary right, for, as 
 we have seen, this lies at the root of all 
 our charity and generosity. When it is 
 trained to see beyond self to the pro- 
 prietary rights of others, and the com- 
 mon good is the dominant motive, rights 
 and duties are at one and the conception 
 of justice has become the rule of life. 
 
 Love moves, justice directs. When 
 love and justice, like rights and duties, 
 
MONEY AS MEANS OF MORAL TRAINING 271 
 
 move together as one, guaranteeing to 
 every life its own In the interest of the 
 social whole, then shall we realise the 
 meaning of both the Fatherhood of God 
 and the Brotherhood of Man. We shall 
 not be less than kin, but we shall be more 
 than kind. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abraham, 48 
 
 Accounts, children's, 256 
 
 Adjectives prejudice child's 
 case, 189 
 
 Adolescents entrusted with 
 money not their 
 own, 230 
 
 Almshouse cherished, 128 
 
 Amidon, Judge, on funda- 
 mental defect in 
 legal administration, 
 76f 
 
 Anarchy of Rousseau, 30 
 
 Anglo-Saxon sense of jus- 
 tice, 115 
 
 Annulment of own action 
 by injustice, 123 
 
 Appeal to human justice 
 earliest moral appeal, 
 40 
 
 Aristotle on equity, 79 
 on justice, 60 
 
 Attic, prisoner in, 175 
 
 Authority, and orders, con- 
 flict of, 198 
 may be immoral, 203 
 
 Beast, a just, 105 
 Beecher, Thomas K., on 
 
 Sunday-school giving, 
 
 266 
 
 Beginning of child's moral- 
 ity, 42 
 
 Benevolent virtues ndt 
 harmless, 21 
 
 Bentham, Jeremy, on fox- 
 hunter's reason, 70 
 
 Berenger law, 179 
 
 Birney, Mrs., advocates ac- 
 countancy, 240 
 
 Blessings, do not get more 
 than we deserve, 122 
 
 Blind man, instance of, 54 
 
 Bodily power a substitute 
 for justice, 220 
 
 Bok, Edward, quoted, 102 
 
 Borrowing, 231 
 
 Boy's comment on tourna- 
 ment, 93 
 
 Boy imprisoned in attic, 175 
 
 Brent, Bishop, on gambling, 
 253 
 
 Brewer, Justice, on justice, 
 7off 
 
 Bridge whist, 251 
 
 Brooks, Phillips, on liberty, 
 136 
 on greatness, 31 
 
 Brotherhood, ground plan 
 of, 86 
 rights and duties, mo- 
 tifs of, 129 
 
a74 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Brown, John, case of, iS2ff 
 Brute's case, equity of, 191 
 Bucket and brush methods, 
 
 29 
 Burritt, Elihu, on injustice 
 
 of war, 135 
 Butler, Nicholas Murray, 
 
 quoted, 29 
 
 Cain and Abel, sociology 
 
 of, 42 
 Carlyle, on injustice, 109 
 
 on justice, 60 
 Cases not even discerned, 
 
 160 
 
 Cato's question. Justice 
 
 Brewer's answer to, 
 
 73 
 
 Cause and effect, remote, 34 
 
 Charity and justice, 29, 56, 
 
 57 
 Charity, Hebraic idea of, 56 
 rights of possession at 
 root of, 130 
 Chamberlain, quoted, 193 
 Child a member of larger 
 whole, 38 
 giving father's money, 
 
 263 
 nature commanded by 
 
 obeying It, 208 
 under conflicting or- 
 ders, 198 
 Children's accounts, 256 
 
 appeal, 3 
 Children not arbiters of 
 own conduct, 204 
 without money of their 
 own to give, 261 
 China, stagnation of, 30 
 
 Christians' needs, 119 
 
 morality, sf 
 Church does not lead in 
 social reform, 129 
 should be a model of 
 
 accounting, 259 
 statistical reports, 150 
 torturing the child, 129 
 Civilization, irony of, 128 
 Cleansing, 29 
 Coe, on morality, 19 
 Combat an effort for jus- 
 tice, 117 
 Common injustice, types of, 
 
 I48f 
 Conflict among Christians, 
 
 20 
 Conflict of orders, 198 
 
 of self, 32 
 Contract, child should not 
 sign a, 240 
 of Eden, 41 
 Consecration not discern- 
 ment, 25 
 Corporal punishment almost 
 sure to be unfair, 215 
 a failure, 218 
 as a method, 218 
 does not educate, 219 
 easy to administer sud- 
 denly and excitedly, 
 219 
 hinders reformation, 211 
 historical argument 
 
 against, 221 
 self-perpetuating insti- 
 tution, 219 
 tendency of, 212 
 what it will and will 
 not do, 21$ 
 
INDEX 
 
 175 
 
 Court incident, i4of 
 
 Courts producers of crimi- 
 nals, 85 
 
 Criminals score against 
 environment, 125 
 sense of Justice never 
 obliterated, no 
 
 Criticism among Christians, 
 20, 22 
 
 Culture of justice, 5 
 
 Danger of stinginess, 240 
 Dangers of hope to get 
 something for noth- 
 ing, 24s 
 Danton, 90, 92, 118 
 Dead, the, justice to, 137 
 Decalogue, last six items of, 
 
 131 
 Decline of bodily torture, 
 
 222 
 Definition of justice in 
 
 lowest terms, 89 
 Definitions of justice, 59ff 
 Delinquency, contributory, 
 
 177 
 Demosthenes, 48, 60 
 
 on justice, 60 
 Depredation, incident of, 169 
 Desire to be thought right, 
 
 universal, 9 1 
 Dewey's experiment, 96 
 Dickens against corporal 
 
 punishment, 224 
 Direct aid, 133 
 Disobedience, Eden not a 
 
 case of, 41 
 Disraeli on justice, 60 
 Divine possession, interfer- 
 ence with, 41 
 
 Dreyfus saved through jus- 
 tice, 5of 
 
 Duties of imperfect obliga- 
 tion, 46 
 
 Duty to man and God, 6 
 
 Earning money, 233 
 
 Ecclesiastical formalism, 
 
 case of, 152 
 
 Economic action, love in, 86 
 
 Economy of church, 259 
 
 Eden, not a case of mere 
 disobedience, 41 
 trespass the root sin of, 
 132 
 
 Editors not infallible, 149 
 
 Eliot's comment on boys, 
 94 
 
 Equity, 77ff 
 
 Errancy and justice, 59 
 
 Ethical habit of mind, lack 
 of, 25 
 philosophising not pro- 
 ductive of moral liv- 
 ing, 6 
 spine wanting in 
 
 church, 151 
 
 Every parent a contribu- 
 tory delinquent, 177 
 
 Ewald, method of, 255 
 plan of, 241 
 
 Executions under Henry 
 VIII, 223 
 
 Fairbrother, Mr., case of, 
 
 165 
 Fairness, sense of, among 
 
 criminals, 114 
 Fair play the first morality, 
 
 39 
 
*76 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Faith and love, insuf- 
 ficiency of, 2^ 
 
 Family an energising force, 
 14 
 
 Formative justice begins in, 
 145 
 Gladden on, 14 
 
 Field, Justice, on justice, 
 59 
 
 Filipino sense of justice, 
 115 
 
 Finite nature, limitations 
 of, 73 
 
 First motive of good citi- 
 zens, 145 
 
 Flynt and Walton's story 
 of two criminals, 113 
 
 Foreign mission as social 
 settlement, 29 
 
 Forgery, criminal, 1 1 1 
 
 Formative agency for de- 
 velopment of indi- 
 vidual, 8 
 justice must begin in 
 family, 145 
 
 Fox, George, refused to ac- 
 cept pardon for jus- 
 tice, 106 
 
 Freedom, child struggles 
 for, 37 
 voice of, 134 
 
 French pessimism, 28 
 
 Froebel's aim, 38 
 
 Gambler not a producer, 244 
 Gambling defined, 246 
 
 spirit in England, 246 
 Generosity dependent on 
 
 possession, 130 
 Giving, 260 
 
 Gladden, on responsibility 
 
 of family, 14 
 Golden Rule does not tell 
 
 how, 32 
 Goodness of God, 20 
 Gospel of Christ, social, 
 
 121 
 of John, 83 
 Grace the divine attitude 
 
 toward universe, 64 
 Guilty person he who pro- 
 duces the darkness, 
 
 10 
 Gulick on foreign mission 
 
 as social settlement, 
 
 28f 
 
 Habit of mind, 25, 160 
 lack of ethical, 25 
 Hallam, on justice of com- 
 bat in middle ages, 
 117 
 Hands of child tied, 37 
 Harris, W. T., on justice, 63 
 
 quoted, 63, 224 
 Havergal's hymn, 23 
 Hay, Secretary, quoted, 70 
 Heaven, kingdom of, a cor- 
 porate idea, 121 
 Henry I, 80, 133 
 codes of, 80 
 Heresy trials unjust, 150 
 Hippie's conception of re- 
 ligion, 18 
 Hobson, John, quoted, 249 
 Home attitude must be fair, 
 
 145 
 Homely acts of justice, 146 
 Honor, basis of ethical in- 
 struction, so 
 
INDEX 
 
 277 
 
 Human brotherhood a re- 
 vived sentiment, 134 
 justice, 40; errs, 59 
 relations and moral 
 
 sense, 93 
 terms inadequate when 
 applied to God, 65 
 Humility not the founda- 
 tion virtue, 49 
 Hugo, Victor, Bishop's jus- 
 tice in **Les Misera- 
 bles,** 67 
 on guilt, 10 
 Hypocrisy, 21 
 
 Idea acts as it is felt, 113 
 
 Immorality of mere piety, 
 
 26 
 
 of uselessness, 24 
 
 Immortality, Justice Brewer 
 
 on, 74 
 Imperfect obligation, duties 
 
 of, 46, 51 
 Inclusive attitude, 189 
 Indeterminate sentence, 
 
 222 
 Injustice annuls our own 
 action, 123 
 gag of, 99 
 
 to childhood rankles 
 through manhood, 47 
 weakens loyalty, 205 
 why so much in the 
 world, 118 
 Insane, treatment of, 225 
 Insufficiency of faith and 
 
 love, 27 
 Interference with divine 
 possession, 41 
 
 Japanese success in war, 
 
 206 
 Jennie and her cat, 191 
 Jewish charity box, 56 
 Judgment and justice, 48 
 
 Moulton on, 56 
 
 Judgments, thoughtless, 160 
 
 Justice, absolute, a thing of 
 
 infinite mind, 7oflF, 139 
 
 and judgment, 48, 56 
 
 and injustice, Carlyle 
 
 on, 109 
 as a signature, 46f 
 as habit of thought, 13 
 as a guarantee, 88 
 a thorough virtue, 54 
 a view of the world, 87 
 by combat, 117 
 charity of, 29 
 criticised, 122 
 defined in lowest terms, 
 
 89 
 earliest moral appeal, 
 
 40, 115 
 equity, fairness, as syn- 
 onyms, 88 
 essentially economic, 254 
 essential to full effi- 
 ciency, 120 
 etymology of, 83 
 false views of, 122 
 felt meaning of, 53 
 impossible to mental 
 
 indolence, 12 
 inadequacy of felt sig- 
 nificance of, 58 
 in the family, 13 
 is teleological, 86 
 Justinian on, 62 
 liberty, peace, one, 134 
 
278 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Justice locates real evil, 140 
 
 love, 121 
 
 matter of human rela- 
 tions, 9 
 
 moral-social specific, 7 
 
 must be taught by jus- 
 tice, 156 
 
 never extinguished, 45, 
 92 
 
 not mere legality or 
 court procedure, 81 
 
 Sanction of, 28 
 
 seems weaker in wom- 
 en, 116 
 
 to child a mode of edu- 
 cation, 145 
 
 to the dead, 137 
 
 synonyms of, 83 
 
 the earliest moral feel- 
 ing to develop, 40, 115 
 
 what it does, 138 
 Justinian on justice, 62 
 
 Karnes, on injustice of 
 common law, 75 
 
 Kant, 45, 63, 95 
 
 Killing with a house, 42 
 
 Kindergarten child spilling 
 beads, 36 
 
 Kindness, an imperfect ob- 
 ligation, 46 
 
 Kindness without justice, 45 
 
 Kingdom of God a cor- 
 porate idea, 31 
 
 Kupfer, on juvenile court, 
 84 
 
 Legal procedure con- 
 founded with justice, 
 81 
 
 Liberty defined by Bishop 
 
 Brooks, 136 
 Life, beginning of, place to 
 
 begin ideal life, 138 
 Lindsey, Judge, The Arena 
 on, 184 
 first to send a father to 
 
 jail, 178 
 finds little criminiality 
 
 among children, 85 
 justice in his juvenile 
 
 court, 75f 
 takes boys to his own 
 
 hdme, 179 
 way of, 75, 85, 178, 
 179, 180, 184 
 London Spectator, case 
 
 from, 100 
 Love and faith, insuffi- 
 ciency of, 27 
 Love needs enlightenment 
 and training, 21, 35 
 needs wisdom, 21, 35 
 not a method, 12 
 to God and usefulness, 
 
 24 
 unlovely, 4, 44 
 Love*s obligation to become 
 learned and expert, 
 21, 35 
 regulator, 4, 45 
 Lord's Prayer a social 
 
 prayer, 121, 132 
 Loyalty better than blind 
 
 obedience, 204 
 Lucerne, museum at, 135 
 Luther, quoted, 82 
 
 MacDonald, cases reported 
 by, 106 
 
INDEX 
 
 279 
 
 MacDonald says criminal 
 thinks right rather 
 than feels right, 112 
 on thieves and bank- 
 rupts, 112 
 
 Mackenzie, on betting, 249 
 
 Man the predatory animal, 
 197 
 
 Matheson, on obedience, 
 
 40, 201 
 interpretation of story 
 
 of Eden, 40, 201 
 Matured, no one properly, 
 
 127 
 Meaning of Jewish word 
 
 Zedakah, 56 
 Mechanical obedience per- 
 mits no sense of pos- 
 session, 195 
 Mental activities of justice, 
 
 12 
 Mercy contrasted with jus- 
 tice, 66f 
 function of, 78 
 Tennyson on, 66 
 what it is, 87 
 Young on, 66 
 Method for child for earn- 
 ing money, 234 
 need of, 20 
 Meum and tuum, 37, 39, 
 
 41, 202 
 
 Middle Ages, combat in, 
 
 117 
 standards those of our 
 
 time, 168 
 Mine and yours, rule of, 
 
 37f 39. 41, 202 
 Mint thief, 109 
 Misconception of justice, 7 
 
 Misery not rooted in slums, 
 127 
 
 Modern philanthropy, s6f 
 
 Money as means of train- 
 ing to moral uses, 228 
 won by chancing, 244 
 
 Moral discrimination, need 
 of more exact, 5, 6, 
 19, T19 
 
 Moral living not produced 
 by ethical philos- 
 ophising, 6, 28 
 
 Moral-social specific, 7 
 
 Moralists not necessarily 
 moral, 6, 28 
 
 Morality and justice, one- 
 ness of, 39 
 
 Morality, beginning of 
 child's, 42 
 of Christians, 15 
 mere, 19, 119 
 not in things but in re- 
 lations, 98 
 
 Morrison, 108 
 
 on criminals, 68 
 
 Moulton on judgment, 56 
 
 Motive of boys helping 
 blind man, 55 
 
 Mozley, Canon, act of thief 
 on cross a surprise, 142 
 
 Need of punishment re- 
 duced, 210 
 
 Neglect of outfit for social 
 life, 25 
 
 Obedience not a virtue per 
 se, 199 
 not beginning of 
 child's morality, 42 
 
a8o 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Obedience to God is per se 
 a duty, 200 
 
 Obedient and rebellious at 
 same moment, 203 
 
 Obligation, duties of in- 
 definite or imperfect, 
 46, 51 
 to man and God, 6 
 
 Offences in England for- 
 merly subject to cap- 
 ital punishment, 222 
 
 Opinions of children, lof 
 
 Orthodoxy intolerant of 
 morality, 18 
 
 Parents paying children for 
 service, 233 
 why they punish, 211 
 
 Parker, Jane Marsh, on 
 child training by 
 bookkeeping, 228 
 
 Parker, Theodore, on jus- 
 tice, 59 
 
 Parkhurst controverted, 204 
 on corporal punish- 
 ment, 213 
 
 Paraphrase of opponent's 
 views, 188 
 
 Passion for special privi- 
 lege, 250 
 
 Peculations arise from 
 hands untrained, 229 
 
 Penal institutions produc- 
 ers of criminals, 85 
 
 Penal laws, inefficiency of, 
 69 
 
 Personality developing the 
 center of activity, 
 129 
 
 Pessimism, French, 28 
 
 Philippian gaoler, case of, 
 136 
 
 Philanthropies manned by 
 professing Christians, 
 152 
 
 Philanthropy preventive as 
 justice, 125 
 
 Phillips, Wendell, on jus- 
 tice, 60 
 
 Picture, justice of, 47 
 
 Piety, immorality of mere, 
 26 
 
 Pivotal morality and tap 
 root of justice, 48 
 
 Plato on justice, 60 
 
 Plumbline, case of, 162 
 
 Policeman in court, 143 
 
 Pollok's course of time, 117 
 
 Porto Rican sense of jus- 
 tice, 115 
 
 Possession, rights of, lie at 
 root of charity and 
 generosity, 130 
 
 Powers not ignored, 34 
 trustees of, 27 
 
 Premier, where to find this, 
 44 
 
 Principals* Association of 
 New York, 215 
 
 Prison cherished, 128 
 
 Prizes, 251 
 
 Professionalism, a bar to 
 progress, 150 
 
 Property rights of child, 
 36, 62 
 
 Property, trustees not 
 alone of, 2y 
 
 Proprietary right of indi- 
 vidual, 62 , 
 sense, 37, 61 
 
INDEX 
 
 2^1 
 
 Psalmist, 48 
 
 Punish, why parents, 211 
 
 Punishment, corporal, 211, 
 215, 218, 219, 221 
 
 Punishment done in love, 12 
 justice used as syno- 
 nym for, 82 
 not a gfeat moral 
 
 specific, 210 
 purpose in, 210 
 
 Qualification of justice as 
 premier, 44 
 
 Racial and social feelings, 
 113 
 
 Reform, delusive, 120 
 
 Reporter's account, 82 
 
 Right a universal standard, 
 91, 117 
 
 Rights and duties simul- 
 taneous; motif of 
 brotherhood, 129 
 
 Rights spring from pro- 
 prietary sense, 38 
 
 Riis, Jacob, on charity and 
 justice, 57 
 on killing with a house, 
 42 
 
 Roman law, 79 
 
 Rousseau, anarchy of, 30 
 
 Royce quoted, 45 
 
 Rugby boy's letter, 105 
 
 Ruskin, 45, 57, 62 
 
 on charity and justice, 
 57» 62 
 
 Rye, Miss, on child of 
 burglars, 95 
 
 Safeguarding the dead, 137 
 
 Sanction of justice, 28 
 
 Saving, 254 
 
 Schoolroom incident, i54f 
 injustice, 98 
 
 Searching question, 134 
 
 Self-collision, instances of, 
 32, 123 
 
 Self-preservation, 37, 39 
 
 Severity, not a guarantee of 
 reformation, 222 
 
 Severest penalty not best 
 deterrent, 223 
 
 Sex, no difference caused 
 by, 116 
 
 Significance of word "jus- 
 tice," 81 
 
 Sin, so-called, not sin, 91 
 
 Snap judgments, 156 
 
 Social life, outfit for, 25 
 order cannot rest on 
 
 injustice, 123 
 reform, Church does 
 
 not lead in, 129 
 self-preservation, 39 
 settlement idea in for- 
 eign missions, 29 
 
 Society, collision of, 32, 
 123 
 
 Sophistry of Christians, 
 129 
 
 Spending, 258 
 
 Square deal, first morality, 
 39 
 
 Stagnation of China, 30 
 
 Story, Justice, quoted, 78 
 
 Struggle of child to free 
 tied hands, 37 
 
 Stubbs, quoted, 133 
 
 Student's testimony, 96 
 
 Swedenborg, quoted, 24 
 
282 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Taft, Judge, decision of, 
 115 
 on justice, ^6 
 Technique of bench and 
 
 bar, Tj, 79, 80 
 Tendency of corporal pun- 
 ishment, 212 
 Tennyson, on mercy, 66 
 Testimony, various, 121 
 Thief on cross a surprise, 
 
 142 
 Thinking justice, 86, 155 
 Torture, decline of, 222 
 Townsend, Meredith, on 
 
 justice in Asia, 116 
 Trespass in modern crimi- 
 nology, 43, 132 
 the root sin of Eden, 
 132 
 Trumbull, case of, 171 
 Trustees of property and 
 powers, 2^ 
 
 Unjust man annuls own 
 
 action, 63 
 Use of "luck" and "bet," 
 
 250 
 Uselessness immoral, 24 
 
 Vagrancy, 43 
 Vagrant hands, 43 
 
 Vice, children unaware of, 
 
 108 
 Vices, 1 08, 249 
 Victoria quoted, 190 
 Violation of instinct of 
 
 justice, 155 
 
 War, abhorrence of, 221 
 
 War and peace museum at 
 Lucerne, 135 
 
 Webster's, Daniel, defini- 
 tion of justice, 47, 60 
 
 Wisdom, need of love, for, 
 35 
 not guaranteed by be- 
 ing a Christian, 21 
 
 Women, sense of justice in, 
 116 
 
 Woolsey, President, on 
 basis of generosity, 
 130 
 on surrender of rights, 
 130 
 
 Young, on mercy, 66 
 Youth, spoliation of, 127 
 
 Zedakah, justice-charity, 56 
 Zola quoted, 51 
 
 letter to Madame 
 Dreyfus, losf 
 
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