PBJyCETON, N. J. ^ 
 
 Young, John, 1805-1881. 
 The province of reason 
 
UNIFORM WITH THIS VOLUME. 
 
 THE CHRIST OF HISTORY: 
 
 AN ARGUMENT GROUNDED ON THE PACTS 
 OF HIS LIFE ON EARTH. 
 
 By JOHN YOUNG LL.D 
 
 Price TS cents. 
 
 " It is an argument in favor of the Di\inity of Christ, founded on the facts 
 of his earthly life. It takes the lowest ground with the skeptic — excluding all 
 miracles, and simply claiming the authenticity of those recorded facts which 
 are free from question and all appearance ofexaggeration or delusion. From 
 these admitted facts, he constructs an arguuient to prove that Christ could not 
 have been merely human, but must hav^'been divine. "What we admire in 
 the argument is the candor and fairness with which it is conducted. The 
 evangelic narratives are subjected to a rigid induction ; nothing is relied on 
 that is not unquestionable, and no conclusion drawn but such as is irresistible 
 to every honest, logical mind. We have never seen this branch of Christian 
 evidence so luminously and fairly treated. The writer is a severe and accu- 
 rate thinker, and is evidently intent, throughout his whole argument, only 
 upon obtaining the truth. For skeptical minds it must prove a most powerful 
 and impressive work ; while to all minds it will bring the great features of the 
 Eedeemer's life and character with so mj^h. freshness and force, that a deep 
 impression can hardly be escaped. We reaard it as an extraordinarily able and 
 profitable volume." — EvangeliHt. ^ 
 
 ROBERT CiiRTER-'& BROTHERS, 
 
THE 
 
 PROVINCE OF REASON: 
 
 A CRITICISM OP 
 
 THE BAMPTON LECTURE 
 
 ON 
 
 ^'THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT. 
 
 » 
 
 B T 
 
 JOHN YOUNG, LL.D., Edin., 
 
 ATTTHOR OF "THE CHRIST OP HI3TOR T," B T O , 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS, 
 
 No. 530 BEOADWAY. 
 1860. 
 
T O 
 
 M. P. FOE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, AND FIRST VICE-CHANCELLOR 01* 
 THE tTNIVERSITT OF EDINBURGH, 
 
 THIS -V O IL, TJ IMi JSl , 
 
 WHICH ATTEMPTS TO EXAMINE THE PHILOSOPHIES 
 
 OF OXFORD AND EDINBURGH, 
 
 AND TO TEST THEIR LEGIITMATE RESULTS, 
 
 IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, 
 
 BY HIS OBEDIENT HUMBLE SERVANT. 
 
 JOHN YOUNG. 
 London, Uh April, 1860. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 There are some things so true and so great, 
 as to be independent of tlie obscurity or the 
 fame of those who assert or deny them. The 
 humblest individual, gras2)ing them with his 
 poor hand, possesses an advantage in their un- 
 aided grandeur and force, which no superior 
 abilities, acquirements, and culture can com- 
 mand. 
 
 To me, if the principles of the Bampton 
 Lecture on the Limits of Beligious Thought 
 be conceded, the chief attribute of humanity, 
 as constituted by the Great Father, is laid in 
 the dust, the sacred Scrij^tures are an elabor- 
 ate and meaningless pretence, the possibility of 
 worship and of trust in the Supreme is de- 
 stroyed, and, above all, the authority of con- 
 science, and the immutable foundations of 
 morality are undermined. These, I think, are 
 reasons sufficiently jtowerful for attempting, 
 even with inadequate means, to counteract the 
 
vill PREFACE. 
 
 influence of a work which has found a much 
 wider acceptance than metaphysical writings, 
 generally, meet w^ith in this country. 
 
 An independent, exhaustive, and formal dis- 
 cussion is not to he looked for here, of the 
 great suhject which is placed as the title of 
 this volume. But I am altogether at fault, 
 if hy the criticisms and arguments wdiich fol- 
 low, the rightful Province of Keason be not 
 made out, with some distinctness. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTIOX FIRST. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 EEACTION. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Its inherent Yice — History of Speculation — Oscillation from 
 Extreme to Extreme — Impartial Investigations — Extreme 
 Views of Brampton Lecture — Possible Medium 17 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 RATIONALISM. 
 
 Fairly and Unfairly Defined — Right Reason harmonious with 
 all Truth — Desire to find Harmony — Based in our Nature — 
 Law of our Intelligence — Lower Reason, the Understand- 
 ing — Higher Reason — Evil Name, Rationalism — Partly 
 Merited 23 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 
 
 Kant — ^Hamilton's Relation to him — Kantian System — Two 
 Chief Evils — Fichte — His Relation to Kant — Idealism — Re- 
 lation to Spinoza — Pantheism, Fatalism — Deep Influence on 
 Germany — Schelling — Personally, no Pantheist — InteUec- 
 lectual Intuition — Mysticism — Hegel, the Philosopher — 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 "The Absolute"=l8t, Being; 2d, Xon-being; 3d, The Be- 
 coming=" The Idea" — Basis, mere assumption — Carried 
 into Sphere of Religion — German Rationalism — Where ? 
 A Rationalism, Rererent, "Wise 30 
 
 SECTION SECOXD. 
 COXCERXIXG APPLICATIOXS OF LOGIC. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRELIillNARY CRITICISMS. 
 
 Method of Bampton Lecture — Laid down, but Abandoned — 
 Over-Confidence — Difficulties of Investigation — Virtually 
 Hamilton's Arguments — " Infinite " distinguished from 
 "Absolute" — Groundless — Two, essentially the same 59 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 "the infinite," "the absolute," etc. 
 
 Infinity of Attributes — Contradiction — All, Actual and Possi- 
 ble in Absolute— " The One," "The All"— Shifting and 
 Substitution of Terms — Contradictory Reasoning — Illustra- 
 tions — Potential and Actual — Confusion — Materialistic Ten- 
 dency 68 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CAUSATION, etc. 
 
 Hamilton's very Argument — Here, no Force — Hamilton's Idea 
 of Cause — Of "Absolute" — Lecturer's, opposite — Hamilton's 
 formally Abandoned — Here, Adopted — Grave, Logical 
 Blunder — Contradictory Reasonings — Unsupported Asser- 
 tion — Idea of Creation — Incomprehensible — Commence- 
 ment of Finite Phenomena, not — And not Contradictory. . . 82 
 
CONTENTS. XI 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 IXCONCEIV ABILITY OF "THE INFINITE." 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Admit Fact, Refuse Arguments — Nature of Consciousness — 
 Equivocal " Limitation" — Infinite, Finite — Distinction Just 
 and Real — Confusion — Inconsequent Reasonings — Con- 
 sciousness of Infinite Contradictory ? — Virtual Skepticism — 
 Natural Theism Impossible? — Not Consistent with Facts — 
 Impeachment of the Almighty 95 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS REASONINGS. 
 
 "Infinite," "Absolute," held Equivalent to God — Conclusions 
 as to these applied to this — Investigation of Principles held 
 wrong — Can never reach Principles — Content with Regula- 
 tions — Truth and Falsehood — Properties of our Concep- 
 tions — Hume and Berkeley — " Mind Cramped by own 
 Laws," etc. — Unmitigated Skepticism — Inconsistency of 
 Reasoning — Suicidal 108 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 CONCERNING A PHILOSOPHY OF "THE UN- 
 CONDITIONED " ETC. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 RELATION OF THE SCOTTISH AND OXONIAN PHILOSOPHIES. 
 
 Hamilton and Mr. Maurice — Scottish System — Chief Fault — 
 Excellences — Entire Separation from Bampton Lecture — 
 "The Unconditioned," etc. — Assumptions of Rationalism — 
 Cousin — Realism of Hamilton — Wrote in Interest of Phi- 
 losophy, and of Logic — Lecturer, of Theology — Hamilton's 
 Conclusions, and his, opposite 12"? 
 
XU CONTENTS, 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 MEANING OF "THE UNCONDITIONED," ETC. 
 
 FAGS 
 
 No Unconditioned, no Absolute — Never, to Created Spirit — 
 "Infinite," Incomprehensible — 0/, concerning In&nite — No 
 Idea, then Nothing — Word Infinite, Understood — How ? — 
 Infinite, not Wliole Sphere of Divine — Eternal — This In- 
 finity proper — All possible Attributes — Power, Knowl- 
 edge — He, who Infinite, not all Inconceivable — Human 
 Spirit and Highest— Human Personality and Divine — 
 Human Intelligence and Divine — Moral Attributes and 
 Divine — Man, true Microcosm 146 
 
 SECTIOJ( FOURTH. 
 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 NECESSARY CONDITIONS. 
 
 Must believe G-od is — That Intelligent — Free Intelligence- 
 Truthful, Benignant — Independently, these Conclusions — 
 If not, no Revelation to Man 113 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EVIDENCES OF REVELATION. 
 
 External Evidence — TVhat? — Impossible to Multitudes — In 
 Fulness, to any — Book, Divine in Origin — Contents un- 
 known — Faith to seek — Internal Evidence — What ? — Self- 
 attestation — Its Power 183 
 
CONTENTS. xm 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 REVELATION AND GOD. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Is Grod Revealed ? — As He is, as is not ? — Presented, repre- 
 sented ? — Representation — Revelation — True or False ? — 
 Types, Images — Their Meaning and Use — Fearful, if Very 
 God, not Revealed. 200 
 
 SECTION FIFTH. 
 CONCERNING MORALITY AND MORAL SENSE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE RELATIVE AND THE REAL. 
 
 Relation to Faculties of Knower — Phenomena — Also Nou- 
 mena — Ground to believe this — Consciousness not falla- 
 cious — Knowing Faculty not fallacious — Minds generically 
 same — Limited, not therefore unreal 225 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 MODIFICATIONS OP MORALITY 
 
 Kant — Practical and Pure Reason — Logically wrong, morally 
 right — Thought-Forms — Time, Space, Personality — No new 
 Limitations — Moral Ideas not modified by Laws of Thought 
 — Mind reflects truly — ^Not cramped by its own Forms. ... 236 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WRONG. 
 
 Incapable of judging of Divine ? — Infinite Morality ? — Abso- 
 lute Morality ? — Contradictory — Bolingbroke — Practical 
 Rules — Eternal Principles — No Modification — Varied Ap- 
 plications — Conscience — Supreme Authority 248 
 
Xiv CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTION SIXTH. 
 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Faith, as Act of Understanding — Knowledge, Basis, and Meas- 
 ure of — Its Distinctions — Consciousness — Intuitions of 
 Sense — Of Reason — Sphere of Responsibility — Character 
 of Faith — Determined by its Grounds — Fact of Conscious- 
 ness, enough — Its own Ground — Mere Act of Faith, noth- 
 ing — Primary Beliefs— Mansel's Statements — Hamilton's — 
 Ground of Faith — Always understanding, Higher Reason, 
 or both — Revelation — God trustworthy — Understanding, 
 Reason, and Conscience proclaim — Harmony of these pow- 
 ers — No Discord — Spirit of Fault — Piercing Eye — The 
 Perfect Light 2*73 
 
SECTION FIRST. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 I. — Reaction. 
 II. — Rationalism. 
 III. — Geeman Philosophical Rationalism. 
 
PROVINCE OF REASON. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 REACTION. 
 
 Its inherent Vice — History of Speculaton — Oscillation from Ex- 
 treme to Extreme — Impartial Investigation — Extreme Views 
 of Bampton Lecture — Possible Medium. 
 
 The old truism renews itself, with each age, in 
 each struggle of opinions, bearing not partially on 
 one side of a debated question, but honestly and 
 equally on both. " Reaction rarely can be tem- 
 perately wise or even simply just/' The vice is 
 inherent, ineradicable. The excess which provokes 
 reaction, by a law as constant as any power in 
 material nature, never fails to beget its counter- 
 part, in a compensating excess, in the opposite 
 direction. In the moment of keen, perhaps pas- 
 sionate debate, truth is never, only and altogether^ 
 with either of two antagonist sections, but partly 
 with both, and often in marvellously equal propor- 
 tion. A silent verity lies underneath every position, 
 which has the force to attract around it resolute 
 
18 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 and honest adherents. There is, also, always lurk- 
 ing error in the selectest combination, let the party 
 symhol embody ever so large an amount of truth. 
 In the middle space between opposite extremes, 
 verging now in the direction of the one, and again 
 in the direction of the other, will be found that, 
 which is far above all parties — the imperishable, 
 the immutable, the divine. 
 
 The history of speculation reveals an incessant 
 action and reaction of the mind of the ages, on the 
 highest subjects of human thought. Instead of 
 normal and j^rogressive intellectual efforts, spring- 
 ing from mthin, from a wdsely-balanced organism, 
 obedient to its governing laws, men have been pro- 
 voked or betrayed into opinions, have been hurried 
 by prejudices, have been blindly enamored of some 
 peculiar theory, perhaps their own, have been in- 
 flamed by a passion for victory, instead of a love 
 for truth, and have acted in a spirit of partizanship 
 and of rivalry ; or they have obeyed the secret force 
 of mental idiosvncracies, the existence of which in 
 themselves they did not suspect. The result has 
 been, successive oscillations, from extreme to ex- 
 treme, always both right and both wrong, though 
 in unequal degrees. The periods of dispassionate, 
 catholic and steadily advancin2; invcstio:ation have 
 been often remote from one another, nidelv broken 
 up by exaggerations and extravagances in one direc- 
 tion, which again have given birth to exaggerations 
 
REACTION. 19 
 
 and extravagances, as great or greater in the oppo- 
 site direction. 
 
 In this country, and at this moment, we seem 
 to be in the presence of a strong reaction, as well 
 in the department of mental philosophy, as in a 
 higher and more sacred sphere still. Opposite 
 schools are in collision ; no one, as yet, being ac- 
 knoAvledged to have made good a j)ermanent, ex- 
 clusive occupation of the vantage ground. Such a 
 state of things may have its unquestionable bene- 
 fits, but there is also no small peril to the interests 
 of the highest truth, which may be sacrificed to 
 unfounded prejudices, or to the violence of un- 
 worthy passions. Perhaps only one thing is quite 
 certain, neither extreme of the opposing sections 
 will be wholly right, neither will be wholly wrong. 
 To discover that, in each, which is true, is the brave 
 and great work imposed on us by our age, and it 
 demands an impartial, searching, fearless, candid, 
 broad spirit of investigation. 
 
 No injustice is done to the celebrated work of 
 which we are about to venture a criticism, in saying 
 that it is the birth of a reaction, and is formally 
 designed to crush what is deemed an excessive and 
 dangerous rationalism. The lecturer states as much 
 in plain terms, and perhaps his deservedly admired 
 production bears upon it, sufficiently strongly 
 marked, the peculiar taint of a reactionary efi'ort. 
 It is extreme — and here, without reasoning at all, 
 
20 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 I may be allowed to cluster together in as few sen- 
 tences as possible the first strong impressions pro- 
 duced on my own mind, which may also have been 
 awakened in other minds, by this book. "It is 
 extreme. It goes too far, to be quite within the 
 law of equity and wisdom. It is too exterminating, 
 too mercilessly destructive to be wholly merited. 
 The efiect also is utterly depressing and prostrat- 
 ing. Limited as human powers confessedly are, 
 we shudder at abject intellectual denudation. It 
 is one thing to admire heartily the extended and 
 varied learning of an accomplished writer, the 
 vigorous, sometimes eloquent periods that flow 
 from his joractised pen, his dialectic power, his 
 logical subtilty, facility and courage, and to bow 
 unfeignedly to the purity of his motives ; but it is 
 quite another thing to consent to the justice of his 
 conclusions. No. The impression abides and deep- 
 ens — it is too much : it can not be true ; these 
 principles are not in harmony with the deep con- 
 victions lodged in our nature, or with our most 
 cherished hopes. Man must be able to know more 
 of the Great Being than this writer will allow, must 
 be able to reach some essentially true thoughts, 
 respecting him. Nor is it doubtful, as he asserts 
 it is, whether what constitutes virtue, moral excel- 
 lence on earth among men, does also constitute 
 virtue, moral excellence, among all orders of ra- 
 tional creatures. Conscience is not a temporary 
 
REACTION. 21 
 
 guide for this world only, is not the proclaimer of 
 arbitrary distinctions and of mere human modifica- 
 tions of morality, but a divine voice in the soul, 
 announcing what is eternally, immutably, univer- 
 sally right — right in itself, right for men, right for 
 all rational beings, and light for ever and ever ! 
 
 '' Here is a high and extended argument — an 
 elaborate book ! On what ? The Infinite, the 
 Unconditioned, the Absolute. This author boldly 
 goes into the region of inconceivable, a prioi^i 
 truths, the region of pure abstraction, the region 
 of mere subjective logic. But the principle which 
 he seeks to establish, is that the human mind is 
 incapable of reasoning respecting the Infinite, in- 
 caj^able of conceiving the Infinite at all. Either 
 his course is legitimate, and then his principle is 
 demolished ; or his course is illegitimate and nug- 
 atory, and then his principle is yet undefended, 
 unestablished. In any case, the false impression 
 is created that human reason must be an irrecon- 
 cilable foe to Christians and to <i;)hristianity for 
 nothing, it seems, will content them but to forbid 
 imperatively every efi'ort of reason to approach 
 and adore the Great Being. And then, the evil 
 is a grave and terrible one, that j^hilosophy and 
 religion alike are left surrounded with insoluble 
 contradictions and impenetrable uncertainties. Is 
 not the inference inevitable, that in this case, it is 
 the part of wisdom to have as little as possible to 
 
22 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 do with either ? So far as this book is concerned, 
 many will fairly judge, that men have two and 
 only two things before them. Either, they must 
 blindly accept as divine a revolution, whose exter- 
 nal evidences — and with these the author main- 
 tains, and these only, reason has anything to do — 
 it is literally impossible for myriads of them to 
 examine, flattering themselves that this is faith ; 
 or they must hopelessly suiTender to a universal 
 scepticism, calling this the light of reason." 
 
 Such, I believe, will be the first involuntary im- 
 pressions of at least one class of minds, after the 
 perusal of these Lectures. The question is, Can 
 our first impressions bear second thoughts ? Have 
 they solid ground to rest upon ? This remarkable 
 book, professedly a defence of Kevelation and a 
 determination of the legitimate province of human 
 reason, which has been welcomed cordially by a 
 large ]3ortion of the public — dare we venture to 
 suspect that it may, after all, be unsound in its 
 fundamental principles, injurious to our most sa- 
 cred interests, and dishonoring to one of the no- 
 blest endowments with which man has been gifted 
 by his Maker. Let us examine and judge. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 RATIONALISM. 
 
 Fairly and unfairly defined — Right Reason harmonious with all 
 Trutli — Desire to find Harmony — Based in our Nature — Law of 
 our Intelligence — Lower Reason, Understanding — Higher Rea- 
 son — Evil Xame, Rationalism — Partly merited. 
 
 Among the minor, but decisive proofs of the 
 reactionary character, which pervades the work 
 before us, we mark the language, and especially 
 the tone in which rationalism so called, is de- 
 scribed. The word, not without just occasion, has 
 come to be of bad odor ; but in its etymological 
 sense, it is a faultless and excellent word. The 
 idea which it conveys is in entire harmony with 
 the nature of rational beings, is indeed the proper 
 and necessary demand of that nature. 
 
 Rationalism, rightly so called, is not a sectional, 
 but a universal faith. He who accepts cordially a 
 doctrine laid down in what he holds to be the 
 Book of Inspiration, does not hesitate to ask, and 
 expects to find, and does actually find, in most 
 cases, that, besides its external authoritative sanc- 
 tion, it is commended to his mind as true in itself, 
 and in harmony with other truths, and with those 
 
24 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 general principles of belief, which belong to the 
 constitution of our rational nature. Without ex- 
 ceptiouj all who are capable of any mental effort, 
 are conscious of a profound desire to discover a 
 consistency between the dictates of their intelli- 
 gence, and the articles of their faith, be that faith 
 what it may. Very many things they may be un- 
 able perfectly to harmonize, and are satisfied to 
 leave unsolved. But the effort in other directions 
 is continued, notwithstanding. The desire is not 
 extinguished. It is hrepressible. It belongs to 
 our nature, to search and strive after inward har- 
 mony, after the reconciliation of things, which 
 must be really one, whether we be able to discover 
 their unity or not. So universal, so irrepressible, 
 is this tendency, that it can only be looked upon 
 as a law of our intelligence. And how vain to 
 force back the rushing spirit of investigation, which 
 obeys a power as mighty as that which governs 
 the ocean in its ebb and flow ! How vain to deter 
 men from that to which the structure of their minds 
 prompts them ! How worse than vain, to stigma- 
 tize as crime an act of obedience to a constitu- 
 tional principle ! 
 
 The fact is, that the desire to reconcile our rea- 
 son (using the word in its current popular sense, 
 as synonymous with general human intelligence,) 
 and our creed, be that creed what it may, Jewish, 
 Christian, Mohammedan, or Pagan, rests on a 
 
RATIONALISM. 25 
 
 foundation as deep as any which our nature knows. 
 Let it be ovanted on the one hand that there is an 
 outward -syritten revelation. But it is as surely 
 believed, on the other hand, that there is, also, an 
 inward unwritten revelation in our intelligent na- 
 ture. Both have the same origin — they must be 
 perfectly harmonious. The voice of truth from 
 without must be essentially at one with the voice 
 of truth from within. That is the secret convic- 
 tion of every mind, and it is indestructible. If 
 consciousness — as Sir William Hamilton, and we 
 presume Mr. Manseil, holds — be a revelation of the 
 facts of our inward being, it admits of no doubt 
 at all, that not the least authoritive portion of the 
 revelation must be that w^hich embodies the data 
 of our higher reason. Our native cognitions, be 
 they many or few, the necessary truths lying in 
 the depths of our minds, our rational, and most of 
 all our moral intuitions, are to us the voice of the 
 Being who created us. And nothing can be more 
 certain than that He cannot contradict himself. 
 The outward, written revelation may contain trea- 
 sures unknown to the inward revelation, and un- 
 utterably more precious. But so far as they go 
 the two must he in perfect, absolute harmony, 
 whether we be able to make it out, or not. 
 
 Even our lower reason — reason in the common 
 meaning of the word, the fair and sound conclusions , 
 of the understanding proper, the comparing and 
 
26 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 judging faculty — must be essentially at one with all 
 truth. Imperfect and fallible as the humnn under- 
 standing is, it is the highest, it is the only instru- 
 ment of judging, which our Maker has granted to 
 us. Within its own sphere, wisely and rightly em- 
 ployed, it must be trustworthy ; at all events, we 
 have nothing else, as rational beings, by which to 
 compare, discriminate and affirm, or deny, in any 
 case. But be the confidence which we repose in 
 our mere understanding ever so limited, we are 
 compelled to put unlimited trust in our higher 
 reason, in the primitive data of our rational and 
 moral nature. These must be altogether divine. 
 The mysterious intuitions that result from no ex- 
 perience of ours, but come forth from that locus 
 principioruniy to whose contents we have contrib- 
 uted nothino- and can never contribute anvthino;, 
 are a true and proper revelation from our Creator, 
 and can only be in perfect harmony with every 
 other communication from the same great source. 
 We may mistake the inward message, as we may 
 mistake the outward. There may be interpolations 
 and various readings in the one, as there are also 
 in the other. And different commentators and 
 critics, American, Asiatic, African, European, Ger- 
 man, French, British, according to their mental 
 structure or their training, or their taste, may be 
 prompted and may find it possible, to bring out 
 different meanings from the one, as they have also 
 
RATIONALISM. 27 
 
 from the other. But the essential harmony of the 
 two is indubitable. 
 
 This is the foundation, the deep ground of that 
 tendency, which is strictly universal, though often 
 unavowed, perhaps, even, often unperceived. And 
 shall ifc be denounced as wicked ? Is the desire an 
 impious one, to perceive the essential harmony be- 
 tween the nature with which our Creator has en- 
 dowed us and what claims to be His written reve- 
 lation ? Is the mental effort to search till we 
 discover, and as far as it is possible for us to 
 discover this harmony, of such a nature, that a 
 philosopher must frown upon it and forbid it 
 peremptorily ? On the contrary, is it not in 
 every way becoming, and right, and imperative, 
 forced on us by a clamorous want within, and de- 
 manded, as a sacred duty, springing out of venera- 
 tion of the Great Being ? 
 
 It is not denied that there are evils, possible and 
 real evils, connected with the free exercise of the 
 understanding within the domain of religion. In- 
 stead of humility, and reverence, and faith, a hard- 
 ened, j)resumptuous, impious spirit shall create 
 most revolting confusion between the respective 
 claims of man and his Creator. But every good 
 thing on this earth must be accepted, if accepted 
 at all, with grievous deductions. Liberty always 
 and everywhere, is in danger of degenerating into 
 licentiousness, yet with all its chances of abuse it 
 
28 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 may not be exchanged, one instant, for the Upas 
 shade of despotism. Truth in like manner may 
 be pushed to extreme, and may pass into extrava- 
 gance and absurdity, but it must be left perfectly 
 free nevertheless, exposed to all manner of perver- 
 sions, and is only endangered by pretended safe- 
 guards, material or spiritual. And that desire, 
 deeply based in our nature, the desire not to bring 
 the dictates of our intelligence to revelation or 
 revelation to them, for either would be dishonest, 
 but to make out, ever in greater extent, the real 
 and perfect harmony between the two ; this desire 
 is not to be crushed, to whatever possible evils it 
 may give rise. It cannot be crushed. Desire or 
 do what we may, it will not be crushed ; and the 
 attempt to crush it is ignoble as it is futile. Vir- 
 tually, it is the old struggle revived, ever in vain, 
 between might and right, between authority and 
 intelligence, between blind superstition and enlight- 
 ened faith. What the faggot and the fire of other 
 times failed to accomplish is not likely to be ac- 
 complished by a ponderous and rigorous dialectic, a 
 hard, cold, and passionless logic. Divine Kevela- 
 tion and right reason have one source ; it is a 
 very sacred thing to strive to see, it would be 
 very wrong not to strive to see that they utter one 
 voice. 
 
 But Rationalism, so called, has a general evil 
 reputation. Deservedly it has an evil reputation, 
 
RATIONALISM. 29 
 
 owing to misapplications and abuses sanctioned 
 by some of its nominal disciples, perhaps amongst 
 uSj certainly, in other quarters. The power of the 
 understanding has been exaggerated and a much 
 wider province has been claimed for the human 
 faculties, than belongs to them rightfully. The 
 most sacred authority has been invaded and the 
 proper liberty of scientific criticism has passed, in 
 some instances, to licentiousness. This is the ex- 
 treme on one side, and it is worthy of just condem- 
 nation. But it is not just to represent, as the 
 Bampton lecturer has done, the extreme as the 
 thing itself — the extreme, too, in its very worst 
 form, a form unknown to this country, limited, at 
 all events, to a few solitary individuals who reject 
 Chistianity altogether, and are, certainly, not wor- 
 thy of prominent consideration, or entitled to the 
 rank of leaders of public opinion. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 GEEMAN PHILOSOPHICAL EATIONALISM. 
 
 Kant— Hamilton's Relation to him— Kantian System— Two Chief 
 Evils — Fichte — His Relation to Kant — Ideahsm — Relation to 
 Spiaoza — Pantheism, Fatalism — Deep Influence on Germany — 
 Schelling — Personally, no Pantheist — Intellectual Intuition — 
 Mysticism— Hegel, the Philosopher — " The Absolute"= 1st. 
 Being; 2d. Non-Being; 3d. the Becoming=" The Idea— Basis, 
 mere Assumption — Carried into Sphere of Religion — German 
 Rationahsm — Where ? — A Rationalism, Reverent, Wise. 
 
 GrERMANY IS the imagined birtli-j)lace and home 
 of rationalism proper, which, as currently under- 
 stood, simply means the wildest infidelity. The 
 philosophy and theology of that country are asso- 
 ciated in the minds of many with all that is law- 
 less, absurd, and impious. And certainly, in no 
 other region, shall we find any thing answering to 
 the modes of thought which are exposed in the 
 Bampton Lecture. Those who are unacquainted 
 with Gi-ermany can scarcely be capable of doing 
 justice, either to the errors which the lecturer 
 assails, or to his method of combatting them. 
 There was needed for most of his readers, I appre- 
 hend, in order to intelligent appreciation, some 
 account — ^if touching only the leading, uppermost 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 31 
 
 points — of the speculations of Kant, Fichte, Schel- 
 ling, and Hegel, to whom chiefly allusion is made. 
 I find myself obliged, for my own sake, and that 
 my future statements and reasonings may be un- 
 derstood, to attempt something of this kind, though 
 it can only be very imperfect and very general. 
 The difficulty is unusually great, of putting into 
 small compass, an account at all intelligible and 
 satisfactory. 
 
 My statement can have little value save that, as 
 the mode in which a common mind has striven to 
 bring a hard subject within its conception, it may 
 be the more easily apprehensible by ordinary men. 
 
 Emanuel Kant is esteemed the arch-heretic of 
 Germany, the father of a rationalism, which for 
 more than half a century flooded the Continent, 
 almost unchecked, and well-nigh swept away the 
 most sacred mental heritage of the nation. Were 
 this true, or anything like truth, that grave and 
 2;ood man must have thorouo;hly misunderstood 
 his own office and actual w^ork. His conscious and 
 determined aim was directly the reverse. At a 
 time when the idealism of Hume had found dis- 
 ciples all over Europe, and when the materialism 
 and atheism of Voltaire, D'Holbach, and the En- 
 cyclopaedists had infected Germany to its very core, 
 and were spreading fast and far, Kant stood for- 
 ward a philosophic, I might say, a religious re- 
 former. He, at least, honestly intended to build 
 
32 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 up an impregnable defence for philosophy and for 
 religion against the worst assaults of scepticism. 
 If the actual effect was widely different from the 
 original intention — if, as has been said with some 
 bitterness, but also with a little truth, he has only 
 laid a more thoroughly logical basis for infidelity — 
 at least his sincerity is unquestionable. And his 
 philosophy, now better understood and more fairly 
 applied, forms a grand landmark in the progress of 
 European enlightenment. Many who vehemently 
 cry out against the transcendental nonsense of 
 Kant, the same persons who eagerly take refuge in 
 the system of Sir William Hamilton, as the bul- 
 wark of religion, are little aware of the actual rela- 
 tion which these two philosophical chiefs bear to 
 one another. 
 
 There are seveml and very important points of 
 difference between the Scottish and the Kantian 
 philosophies. But, passing over the terminology, 
 which, in the one case, is simple, and in the other, 
 is barbarous and nearly unintelligible, none wdia 
 are acquainted with both, and without prejudice 
 against either, will dispute that the philosophy of 
 Sir William Hamilton is virtually and essentially 
 the philosophy of Kant. The points of resemblance 
 are leading and striking. Consciousness, the au- 
 thoritative witness of all mental phenomena, is the 
 basis of both. The two mental forms of time and 
 space, which mold the acts of consciousness, are 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 33 
 
 common to both. So also are the fact of pure a 
 priori truths made known by consciousness, and 
 the two principles of universality and necessity by 
 which such truths are tested. So also is the grand, 
 general disti'ibution of all the phenomena of con- 
 sciousness into those of knowledge, and feeling, and 
 conation, or desire and will. And on wdiat may 
 be called Sir William Hamilton's great principle, 
 of a philosophy of the conditioned being alone pos- 
 sible, has anything more explicit been uttered than 
 these words of Kant ? " This refusal of our reason 
 to afford a satisfactory ausw^er to speculative ques- 
 tions, extending beyond this life, is a hint from it, 
 to divert our self-cognition from fruitless transcend- 
 ant specidation to fruitful practical use ; w^iich, 
 although it is always directed only to objects of 
 experience, still takes up its principle at a higher 
 point, and thus determines its procedure, as if our 
 destiny extended infinitely far beyond experience, 
 and consequently out beyond this life."'-'' 
 
 But notwithstanding the close relation of the 
 two philosophies, it is not difficult to account for 
 the aversion — to use no harsher term — with w^hich 
 Kant has been and is regarded among us, and for 
 the actual, evil results to which his system gave 
 occasion in his own country. That all our knowl- 
 edge can be only relative, not absolute, that it is 
 of phenomena only and not of things in se, is not 
 
 * Kritik derreiner Vernun/t, Seite 421. Frankfort, 1791. 
 
 2* 
 
34 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 peculiar to him, but is equally maintained by Sir 
 William Hamilton. The chief vulnerable points 
 in the Kantian system, the sources of that fatal 
 direction which it gave to speculation, appear to 
 me to be the two following : 
 
 I. The false valuation of the subjective and the 
 objective resj)ectively. The non-ego ^ with Kant, is 
 next to nothing ; the ego is all but everything. 
 The reality of the non-ego is not denied. He finds 
 it in consciousness. He finds it also a pure under- 
 standing-cognition, under the category of substance. 
 But it is reduced to the smallest possible minimum. 
 There is an unknown substratum of phenomena ; 
 but the phenomena, excepting this inherence in an 
 unknown substratum, are wholly dependent on the 
 ego, a result arising from the laws of our sensibility 
 and the forms of the understanding. The non-ego 
 is all but phenomenal, far more subjective than ob- 
 jective. Even the ego itself is, in a wide sense, 
 phenomenal ; that is to say, the ego of conscious- 
 ness is only the manifested, the phenomenized ego. 
 The I, thinking, feeling, or willing, is a phenome- 
 non of consciousness. But there is something else, 
 and far more, which never comes up as phenome- 
 non. The real ego is behind, underneath — an un- 
 known substratum, substance. It is impossible 
 not to see the tendency of this to lead either to 
 scepticism, on the one hand, or to pure subjective 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 35 
 
 idealism, on the other — a tendency which was too 
 speedily developed in both directions. 
 
 II. A more fatal portion still of the Kantian 
 system is that, wherein what are held to be the 
 necessary contradictions of the pure reason, are set 
 forth. This is the portion, it must be noted, which 
 in its spirit, and, to some extent, in its very form, 
 has been reproduced in the Bampton Lecture ; to 
 be followed, there is reason to fear, unless some 
 sufficient corrective and repellant be forthcoming, 
 by not less lamentable consequences. The doctrine 
 of creation, that of identity and immortality, that 
 of liberty and necessity, and that of the neces- 
 sary existence of the Deity, are those wherein 
 Kant concludes, there exists for the pure reason 
 inevitable contradiction. The sphere to which these 
 doctrines belong, according to Kant, is that of the 
 unconditioned, and it is this sphere, from which it 
 is the great purpose of the Bampton lecturer to 
 show, there can arise nothing but contradiction to 
 the human mind. Only in ignorance can it be 
 imagined, that while Kant propounds antinomies in 
 one region, the English philosopher discovers them 
 in another. The sphere is the same to both, and, 
 virtually, the work of both is the same. But there 
 is this marked difference : Kant, applying a severe 
 logic to the criticism of the pure reason, having 
 discovered what he deemed natural and necessary 
 contradictions, was obliged in stern honesty to ex- 
 
36 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 pose them. But he labors, though unsuccessfully, 
 to show how they arise, so as to save, as far as may 
 be, the authority of reason. The English philo- 
 sopher seems to go to his work with good will, 
 and with the distinct aim, not to make the best of 
 what may be confessedly bad, but to make the bad 
 worse, and still worse, if possible. He seems to 
 exhibit satisfaction, not sorrow, in humbling and 
 maiming human reason, and fixing on it the charge 
 of weakness and error. Be this as it may, at least 
 Kant knew full well the inherent tendency of that 
 portion of his system to which we have referred. 
 " Reason,'' he says ^' is hereby led into the tempta- 
 tion, either of abandoning itself to a sceptical hope- 
 lessness, or of assuming a dogmatical pride, and 
 cariying its head stiffly as to certain assertions, 
 without granting a hearing or justice to the argu- 
 ments for the contrary. Both ways are the death 
 of a sound philosophy, although the first (scepti- 
 cism) may be called the euthanasia of pure reason.''* 
 
 Fichte was at first the disciple, and always the 
 reverent and loving admirer, of the Konigsberg 
 sage. But his genius was too real and too kingly 
 to be controlled. Unhappily imbibing the latent 
 eiTors of the Kantian system, he developed with 
 fatal success the sj)ecial evil which inhered in 
 them. 
 
 I. On the one hand, the exaggeration of the 
 
 * Kritik, s. 434. 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 37 
 
 subjective, carried so high by Kant, was carried 
 still higher by Fichte. If the ego were really of 
 such moment as the master had shown it was, it 
 must be of yet greater moment still, the disciple 
 argued. The non-ego, reduced to the smallest 
 possible minimum by the one, was reduced to nil 
 by the other. The ego and its manifestations in- 
 cluded everything. Knowledge can only be of the 
 acts of consciousness ; consciousness cannot trans- 
 cend itself What is within, it can bear witness 
 to, w^hat is without, if there be existence without, 
 we can never know. Our inward sensations, 
 thoughts, acts, and changes of whatever kind, 
 belong to the sphere of our knowdedge ; nothing 
 else does. External phenomena are wholly the 
 creation of the ego, wholly the result of subjective 
 changes and laws. An external substratum or sub- 
 stans, even if such a thing existed, we have no 
 possible means of reaching. We can know only 
 what is within the ego, its modes and its acts. 
 Still further, as Kant had shown that the ego 
 of consciousness was only phenomenal, and that 
 the real ego " in se" was unrevealed, Fichte ex- 
 tended the principle yet farther. With him the 
 ego became not so much individual in this or that 
 person, as absolute and universal in humanity. 
 And how near this was to a pure, subjective 
 pantheism, it is not hard to perceive. 
 
 May we here venture a humble, yet sincere word 
 
38 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 on behalf of the man, one of the brightest and 
 noblest sons of the German fatherland, without 
 faltering in condemnation of the system ? Pre- 
 sently, I shall have occasion to produce the words 
 of Schelling, when he vehemently resisted the 
 charge of pantheism which was brought against 
 him, with gi'eater force of evidence, than against 
 any of his philosophical comperes. But as vehem- 
 ently and as sincerely did Fichte resent the same 
 charge, and that of atheism also, of which he was 
 accused. I do not profess to explain how it was ; 
 I do not understand it. But it seems, as if the 
 personal faith of none of the German philosophers 
 could be righteously measured, by the sytems which 
 they founded. These systems, without exception, 
 starting from a mere assumption, w^ere severely 
 w^rought out by them, on the principles of what 
 they deemed the soundest logic, were held by them 
 as sacred, hard-gotten possessions, and in the re- 
 gion of abstract thought, ruled over them with ab- 
 solute sway. But it would seem that all the while 
 their real, personal life, their moral convictions, 
 and their religious faith, were quite apart, as if in 
 a totally different sphere. In my humble judg- 
 ment, the metaphysical speculations of Fichte, 
 beginning with a mere ijetitio principii, are as 
 baseless and as wild as they are calculated to be 
 deeply injurious and dishonoring to the Great 
 Being. But the religious and moral region of his 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 39 
 
 soul, in some unaccountable way, must have been 
 preserved notwithstanding. Scarcely anything loft- 
 ier, purer, more touching, and more inspiring in 
 moral sentiment, is to be found anywhere, than 
 Fichte has indited. The lustre which encircles his 
 memory, to my mind, is more spiritual, more genial, 
 more human, than that which gathers around al- 
 most any other of the great names of Germany. 
 His life was a noble one. His death approached 
 the heroic ; and his character was one of rare ele- 
 vation and purity. Enough of this. There was a 
 second direction, in which the latent evil of the 
 Kantian system was developed by Fichte. 
 
 II. The weakness and untrustworthiness of pure 
 reason, as shown by Kant, created an intense recoil 
 in the mind of one who, though a skilled logician, 
 had more of sentiment, and soul, and daring genius 
 in his constitution, than of the dialectic spirit. He 
 rushed to the opposite extreme. The authority of 
 reason must be paramount. He would accept no 
 other guide. But this issue again was powerfully 
 helped from another and very different quarter 
 than the Kantian philosophy. The short, suffer- 
 ing, self-denying course of Benedict Spinoza had 
 been extensively productive, too productive, for its 
 effects were in a fearfully evil direction. Perhaps 
 no single man, not excepting even Leibnitz himself, 
 ever exerted so deep an influence on all the leading 
 souls of Germany as did the persecuted Jew. Leib- 
 
40 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 nitz may have touclied the national mind at many 
 more points, but his influence in the one direction 
 in which Spinoza especially wrought, was nothing 
 like so profound or enduring. It has seemed to 
 me that the wild, reckless, almost insane spirit, so 
 constantly flashing out both in the philosophy and 
 the theology of Germany, is to be ascribed, in very 
 great part, to the sway which the writings of Spi- 
 noza had secured. And Fichte's was a soul to be 
 struck more than most by their unflinching bold- 
 ness and their tremendous sweep. Having, besides, 
 altogether renounced the reality of the objective, it 
 became a necessity for him to maintain so much 
 the more determinedly, the reality and validity of 
 the subjective. If the conclusions of reason were 
 hopelessly contradictory, as Kant's antinomies 
 seemed to show, there was nothing for him ever- 
 more to trust to. But, in Spinoza, he found at 
 once a high assertion and a noble testimony to the 
 supremacy of reason. Here was a mighty efi'ort 
 of the subjective faculty, a system professedly 
 founded on, and entirely wrought out by, pure 
 reason. He took his own course, he did not accept 
 the details, but he was hereby fortified and se- 
 cured in the principle. 
 
 There is wonderful fascination in the system of 
 Spinoza as a piece of mere abstraction, a pure 
 creation of the intellect. It is simple, clear, appa- 
 rently exhaustive and unanswerable. Suhstans and 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 41 
 
 modes, subject and attributes, apparently mivst in- 
 clude all being. Can there be any higher generali- 
 zation than this ? Except for the one omission of 
 the idea of causality, fatal to the metaphysical, but 
 still more to the moral side of the sj)eculation, the 
 answer must have been. No ; there can be no 
 higher generahzation. But this fundamental omis- 
 sion produces, on the one hand, a pure objective 
 Pantheism ; and, on the other hand, a universal 
 and terrific fatalism. 
 
 Did not the mind of Germany recoil at once, 
 and for ever, from such a system ? Formally, 
 it did ; that is to say, Spinoza found few professed 
 disciples. But his influence was deep and far ex- 
 tended, notwithstanding. A tone was given to 
 speculation, and a cast of thought was inspired 
 and diffused, which live to this dav. The intellec- 
 tual vigor and daring of the man, his wonderful 
 logical faculty, his lofty generalization, and his 
 profound j^ower of abstraction, were captivating. 
 But, above all, his memory was loved, for his 
 sufferings, his moral integrity and intrepidity, 
 and, if the testimony of Schleiermacher is to be 
 accepted, for his piety. Unaccountably, the Ber- 
 lin theologian deliberately honors him as '' the 
 holy, though rejected Spinoza." And many of 
 the philosophers and theologians of Germany 
 shared, perhajDS to this day share, his enthusiasm. 
 These are the words in which Schleiermacher ex- 
 
42 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 alts him : ^' the high world-spirit penetrated him, 
 the illimitable was his beginning and his end, the 
 universe his only and eternal love. In holy inno- 
 cence and deep humility, he saw himself mirrored 
 in the eternal world : and perceived, at the same 
 time, how he, likewise, was the world's mirror. 
 Full of religion was he, and full of the Holy 
 Ghost ; and, therefore, stands he alone and unap- 
 proachable, a master in his art, but lifted high 
 above profane association, without disciples, and 
 without citizenship."'*' 
 
 The influence of Spinoza on the tone, if not the 
 substance of Fichte's sjDeculations, is most mani- 
 fest. On those of Hegel, we shall find it is yet 
 more manifest still. But it is most of all palpable 
 and pervading in the philosophy of Schelling. That 
 is virtually and truly, though not formally, Spino- 
 zism, another name for Pantheism ; and hence, the 
 charge was broadly preferred against Schelling, and 
 with the very strongest apjmrent ground. How 
 indignantly and utterly he cast it from him, these 
 words of his will show : ^' Grod is that which is in 
 itself, and only from itself can be conceived ; but 
 the finite is necessarily in another, and only from 
 this can be conceived. Clearly, in consequence of 
 this distinction, things are sejmrated from God ; 
 not merely, as might appear from the doctrine of 
 modifications superficially considered, in degree and 
 
 * Werke, 1st Band, s. 100. Berlin, 1843. 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 43 
 
 through their limitations, but toto genere. What- 
 ever their relation to God may be, they are abso- 
 lutely divided from Him by this, that they can 
 exist only in and through another (namely Him), 
 so that the conception of them is a dependent one, 
 which, without the concejotion of God, would be in 
 no way possible. He, on the contrary, is alone the 
 self-sufficient, original, self-affirming Existence, and 
 everything else can be essentially related to Him, 
 only as affirmed by Him, and dependent on Him. 
 Only on this hypothesis are the attributes of things 
 (their eternity, for example) valid. God is eternal 
 in his own nature ; things are eternal only depend- 
 ently on Him, and as consequences of his existence. 
 Just owing to this difference, all individual things 
 taken together cannot, as is often asserted, consti- 
 tute God. By no kind of combination can that, 
 which in its own nature is derived, pass into that 
 which in its own nature is underived.''* 
 
 Can w^ords be more clear, more exact, more 
 strong, than these ? The man who uttered them, 
 surely, could be no real pantheist in his soul ; but 
 he certainly was in his philosophical system. It is 
 a striking instance of what I have ventured to sup- 
 pose, though I am altogether unable to explain it, 
 the entire separation, as if into two totally different 
 and widely apart regions — the entire separation, in 
 
 * Schriften, 1st Band, a. 404. Landschut, 1809. 
 
44 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 the German metaphysicians, of the speculative in- 
 tellect from the moral convictions and life. 
 
 The absolute assumed by Schelling — (always the 
 outset is pure assumption) — is virtually the uni- 
 versal suhstans of Spinoza, and the ego and non- 
 ego of Schelling are virtually the two modes of 
 Substance, thought and extension, as evolved by 
 Spinoza. But, further, Schelling seeks to show 
 that the ego and non-ego^ though separate, are also 
 one ; that subject and object, though apart, are 
 also identical. There are two poles of Being, like 
 the negative and positive extremes of the magnet, 
 the center being the indifference-point, in which the 
 two meet and are one. The Absolute is an infinite 
 subject-object, evolving itself in two forms, as mind 
 and as matter. There is a process of evolution, 
 from the Absolute, into intelligence on the one 
 hand, and into external nature on the other hand. 
 There is also a process of resumption in which 
 mind and matter are restored to identity in the 
 Absolute, are absorbed in the essential unity of the 
 Great Whole. 
 
 It is curious and startling to find, that the 
 knowledge, by us, of the Absolute is also reached 
 through a process of absorption and identification. 
 The organ of this highest knowledge, which is pos- 
 sessed only by a gifted few of the human race, 
 Schelling calls intellectual intuition. The soul in 
 its upward stretch towards the Absolute, rises be- 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 45 
 
 jond the sphere of consciousness, passes away as 
 out of itself, loses itself for the time, in identity 
 with pure Being, in absorption into pure Being. 
 Thus identified and absorbed, and only thus, it 
 comes to know the Absolute. 
 
 From what absurdity and what contradictions 
 this intellectual-intuition theory is obviously inse- 
 23arable, need not here be shown. But it is impos- 
 sible not to connect it at once with Jacob Boehme, 
 with Tauler, with Eckart, and with the whole 
 mystic school from the earliest period. Schelling 
 is no more the metaphysician, but the undisguised 
 mystic, whatever that may involve. There was 
 needed a mind far more philosophic and more sys- 
 tematic than his, if anything enduring were to 
 come out from the materials which he had alien- 
 ated from their true sphere. 
 
 Hegel is pre-eminently the philosopher of Ger- 
 many — always excepting Kant, who in his origin- 
 ality, in the depth and sweep of his views, and in 
 his logical facility and power, is unsurpassed. 
 Hegel had less of poetry and of spiritual insight 
 than Schelling, and far less of genius and of soul 
 than Fichte, but he had more of the legislative and 
 methodizing faculty than either, had more entire 
 mastery of logic, was more inured to extended ab- 
 straction, and altogether was gifted with a more 
 subtle, more comprehensive and more indomitable 
 intellect. 
 
46 INTRODUCTOKY. 
 
 The Absolute is the starting-point of the Hege- 
 lian philosophy. In the farthest, utmost regress 
 of though tj we reach the Absolute, a bare idea, a 
 pure abstraction, the purest and most abstract of 
 all abstractions, a something infinite, unconditioned 
 — for with Hegel, the Absolute, the Infinite, the 
 Unconditioned are the same and applied to one 
 idea — the ultima tliule of thought, the last, dim, 
 naked point in the backward stretch of the reason. 
 Beyond this we cannot pass, but this we reach, 
 and with this, therefore, j)hilosoj)hy must begin 
 " das absolute," the boundless, aloof from all lim- 
 itation, relation, condition or dependence, nothing 
 substantial, actual, as we speak, far less material, 
 I had almost said physical, but only pure, mere 
 idea, which to him was alone entity." The Abso- 
 lute" was the unbeginning, eternal Idea, and phe- 
 nomena were the decomposition and reconstruction, 
 the egress and regress of the Idea. The analysis 
 of the Absolute, therefore, would be a true re- 
 thinking of the stupendous, aboriginal, abysmal 
 thought : it would be the key of the universe, for 
 the universe is only the evolution of the Idea. 
 The higher we can ascend in the analytic move- 
 ment, the nearer we must come to very reality. 
 Hence the process of thought, as thought, of all 
 thought, must reveal the true unfolding of the 
 " Absolute Idea." A thought as such, is never a 
 unity. Something is distinguished from some 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM, 47 
 
 other thing, and the two combined and unified 
 form the thought. 
 
 What then are the elements into which the Ab- 
 solute Idea may be resolved ? What is the result 
 of this last and highest analysis ? I. Das Absolute 
 ist das Seyn. The boundless, the unconditioned, 
 the absolute is, first of all, Being. It is — but that 
 is all — it is mere, bare Being. '^ Es ist dies, die 
 (im Gredanken) schlechthin anfangliche, abstract- 
 este, und diirftigste,"'^'-' — " the barest, nakedest, 
 most impoverished idea, possible to be formed" — 
 mere Being, mere existing, wide, boundless, undis- 
 tinguished, undetermined by anything, in any way 
 — no attributes, no consciousness. II. Das Abso- 
 lute ist das Nichts — is nothinsr, non-beino;. " Das 
 reine Seyn,'' says Hegel, " ist nun die reine Ab- 
 straction, damit das absolut-negative, welches, 
 gleichfalls unmittelbar genommen, das Nichts ist. 
 Es folgte hieraus, die zweite Definition des Abso- 
 luten, dasz es das Nichts ist/'f " Pure being is 
 pure abstraction, and consequently the absolute- 
 negative, which in like manner, directly taken, is 
 nothing. There follows from this the second defi- 
 nition of the Absolute, that it ' is nothing,' — non- 
 being.'' I must yet again employ Hegel's own 
 words — ^' Nur in-und um-dieser Unbestimmtheit- 
 willen, ist es Nichts ; ein unsagbares, sein Unter- 
 
 * Encydopddie Die Lehre vom Seyn, s. 99. Heidelberg 1827. 
 f Seite 100. 
 
48 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 sobied von dem Nichts ist eine blosse Meinung." 
 — " Only through and on account of this undefin- 
 edness (unconditionedness) is Being=:non-being — 
 a thing incapable of being expressed, its difference 
 from non-being is a bare notion." Being, in the 
 sense intended by Hegel, mere being, without at- 
 tributes and without consciousness, is absolutely 
 unconditioned, has nothing to mark it, to define 
 it, to make it a thing. And non-being, in like 
 manner, is absolutely unconditioned, has nothing, 
 and can have nothing, to mark or define it ; for it 
 is nothing. Here, therefore, in this resj^ect, das 
 Seyn ist das Nichts, Being is non-Being. 
 
 Beinof and non-beinjr are the same, amount to 
 the same. Both are alike absolutely uncon- 
 ditioned, and both, on the same ground, are alike 
 included, and nothing else is included, in the Ab- 
 solute. These, then, are the two elements, which 
 enter alike into the Absolute Idea, and are con- 
 tradistinguished. In the seeming unity of eYery 
 idea, there needs a '^ widerspruch,'' some one thing 
 to be set against another, a positive and a nega- 
 tive : and only through their union is the forma- 
 tion of a distinct idea possible. Das Seyn, mere 
 unconscious being, would for ever have remained 
 unconscious:=non-being. There was needed, ein 
 Anders-seyn — other being. Only by meeting some- 
 thing else, could das Seyn, distinguish itself, be- 
 come conscious of itself But the original, Anders- 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 49 
 
 seyn, must be ^^ das Nichts/' — non-being ; nothing 
 else was possible according to the conception. And 
 hence this, namely, non-being, was the medium 
 through which, alone, self-distinction and self-con- 
 sciousness were reached by the Seyn. So that the 
 formula was logically true. " Das Nichts ist das 
 Seyn," — non-being is being; it became as being to 
 the Seyn, it was the Anders-seyn — other being, an 
 actual thing. Alone, they were each as nothing, but 
 together they groio to something ; they result in 
 ^^ das werden," — the becoming : there is an evolu- 
 tion from them into consciousness ; there is the 
 formation of a distinct idea, a passing into reality. 
 Thus we have the Absolute Idea resolved into its 
 elements, '' das Seyn, das Nichts (das Anders- 
 seyn), das Werden." This is the Eternal, Unbe- 
 ginning process. The universe is no other than 
 this evolution of " The Idea," an everlasting be- 
 coming, a ceaseless growing up into reality, that is, 
 ideal reality ; for with Hegel there is no other. 
 Ideas are things, and there are no real things, but 
 ideas ! 
 
 Only a mere fragment of the Hegelian Schema, 
 have I attempted to open. Let it suffice. The 
 fatal, mortal vice is palpable as sunlight. The 
 basis of the speculation is pure, mere assumption. 
 There never was, never could be, such an absolute 
 as is su2}posed, or such an evolution of unconscious 
 
 into conscious being, save in the brain of the 
 
 3 
 
50 INTIIODUCTOUY. 
 
 dreamer. But we are coin])('lled to admin; tlie 
 man^ however we judge of the systein. IHh pro- 
 digious Hubtlety, and his giant grasp of the severest 
 al)straetions ereate unniix(Ml amazement. And 
 Tnany grand, pun;, nohle thoughts has he left be- 
 hind, wliich must live, and kindle life, wherever 
 they are received. But it is almost past belief, that 
 a sane and honest mind should have surrendcii'ed 
 itself to such utter and jjorfect wildness of si)e(;ula- 
 tion as we have exposed ; and still more j)ast be- 
 lief that multitudes of sane and honest men should 
 have caught the infection, and with almost the en- 
 thusiasm of l)iety, have carried the madness of 
 logic to a more outrageous height still, liut it is 
 true. 
 
 No complaint could be made against the Bamp- 
 ton lecturer, for any strong and severe language he 
 may have used, had it a])]jlied ordy to the wild ex- 
 tremes of (lerman speculation ; especially since, in 
 Hegel's own Vhllosopliy of ilvJiijion^ and in the 
 writings of Feuerbach, Bauer, Strauss, and many 
 besides, it has been shown to what ruinous lengths 
 it may be carried, when brought to bear on the 
 most sacred of all subjects. But the lecturer, 
 throughout his celebrated volume, and, as it aj)- 
 pears to me, without guard or reserve, has identi- 
 fied this country, its 2)hilos()phers and theologians, 
 not only witli (;r(!rman sjM'culation, but with its 
 very extreme and worst forms. The following qu j- 
 
GERMAN PIIILOSOI'UICAL RATIONALISM. 51 
 
 tations, a few out of many, I may be allowed to put 
 forward in evidence of this : 
 
 " The rationalist . . . assigns to some su- 
 perior tribunal the right of determining what (in 
 revelation) is essential to religion and what is not ; 
 he claims the privilege of accepting or rejecting any 
 given revelation, wholly or in part, acc(jrding as it 
 does or does not satisfy the conditions of some 
 higher-criterion, to be supplied by tiie hunjan con- 
 sciousness." (pp. 4, .0.) Kationalisni proceeds — 
 " by paring down supposed excrescences. Com- 
 mencing with a preconceived theory of the puiposc 
 of a revelation, and of the form which it ouglit to 
 assume, it proceeds to remove or reduce all that 
 will not harmonize with this leading idea." (p. G.) 
 " Kationalisni tends to destroy revealed reUgion 
 altogether, by obliterating the whole distinction 
 between the human and the divine. If it retain 
 any portion of revealed truth, as such, it does so, 
 not in consequence, but in defiance, of its funda- 
 mental principle." (p. IG.) "The fundamental 
 position of rationalism is, tliat man by his own r<;a- 
 son can attain to a right conception of God." (p. 
 37.) In a way certainly not characterized by dig- 
 nity, rationalists are thus addressed : " FooJs, to 
 dream that man can escape from himself, tliat hu- 
 man reason can draw aught but a human jjortiait 
 of God ! They do but substitute a marred and 
 mutilated humanity for one exalted and entire, 
 
52 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 they add nothing to their conception of God as he 
 is, but only take away a part of their conception 
 of man ; . . . and what is the caput mortuum 
 which remains, but only the sterner features of hu- 
 manity, exhibited in repulsive nakedness." (p. 18.) 
 " Our rational j)hilosopher strips off from humanity 
 just so much as suits his purpose, and ^ the residue 
 thereof he maketh a god,' — less pious in his idola- 
 try than the carver of the graven image, in that he 
 does not fall down unto it and pray unto it, but is 
 content to stand afar off and reason concerning \i" 
 (p. 19.) '' Surely downright idolatry is better than 
 this rational worship of a fragment of humanity. 
 . . . Unmixed idolatry is more religious than 
 this. . . . Undisguised atheism is more logi- 
 cal." (p. 20.) 
 
 As descriptive of rationalism, Mr. Mansell pro- 
 duces the following quotations from the darkest 
 portions of Hegel's logic, nearly unintelligible, one 
 may surmise, to English readers : — '' The logical 
 conception is the absolute divine conception itself, 
 and the logical process is the immediate exhibition 
 of God's self-determination to Being." (p. 30.) 
 '' Eeligion is the divine spirit's knowledge of hini- 
 self, through the mediation of the finite sj^irit." 
 (p. 31.) " The kingdom of philosophy is truth, ab- 
 solute and unveiled. It contains in itself the ex- 
 hibition of God as he is in his eternal essence, be- 
 fore the creation of a finite world." (p. 31.) 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 53 
 
 In connection with these, are quotations less 
 dark, but not less revolting, from Strauss, from 
 Fichte, from Schelling, from Feuerbach, from Mar- 
 heincke, and from August Comte. After a refer- 
 ence to the philosophical Christ of Hegel and the 
 mythical Christ of Strauss, the lecturer cries out 
 with passionate indignation : "These be thy gods, 
 philosophy ! these be the metai^hysics of salva- 
 tion !" (p. 161.) 
 
 I venture to think that one and all of these pas- 
 sages, and especially the whole taken together, are 
 not called for either in spirit or in direct expres- 
 sion. I venture to think that they are net true 
 and not just, that scarcely a single one of them is 
 true or just, as applied to any philosophical or 
 theological school in this country, or even almost 
 to any solitary individuals. As for Fichte, Schel- 
 ling, Feuerbach, and Strauss, they belong very 
 much to the past, even in Germany. It cannot be 
 denied that the spirit which they, and especially 
 the first and brightest of them, Fichte, awoke and 
 diffused, still breathes in many a page of modern 
 German literature. But it deserves remark that 
 no one of them has founded a school called after 
 his name, or can number of actual disciples be- 
 yond a few scattered units. Strauss has formally 
 receded from his earlier course, without abjuring 
 it, and has entered on the field of sober historical 
 science, far away from the mythic region. Hegel 
 
54 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 alone can be said to survive as the founder of a 
 system, and he is the parent of several separate 
 schools. In the thirty years that have passed since 
 his death, they have arisen, each differing, on some 
 points, from the master, but all standing by his 
 method and deeply imbued with the spirit of his 
 philosophy. But where in this country shall we 
 look for the faintest image of the Hegelian ration- 
 alism .? It does not exist. Since the days of 
 Locke, if we except the school of English Platon- 
 ists, and the irregular and incomplete efforts of Mr. 
 Coleridge, it must be confessed with sorrow, that 
 the philosophy of England has been only descend- 
 ental. Our transcendentalism is the merest nom- 
 inis umhra. We have, it is true, as we always 
 have had, and certainly not in greater number or 
 of more formidable character, now than in other 
 times, individual writers, avowedly opposed to 
 divine revelation on various grounds. It is true, 
 also, that translations of Strauss' Life of Jesus 
 are circulated to some noticable extent, and that 
 ■the atheism of Comte has been epitomised and put 
 into an English dress. Nor is it denied, that here 
 '^^ "^ and there may be found stray sentiments and an 
 occasional cast and method of thought which can 
 be distinctly traced to a Hegelian source. But 
 among our philosophical writers, and especially 
 among our theologians, of whatever class, in this 
 country — and it is theologians especially that are 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM. 55 
 
 foriiially addressed in the Bamjiton Lecture — where 
 is there anything answering, or even in the most 
 distant way approaching to that rationalism which, 
 in such dark lines, is marked off in the passages 
 which have been quoted ? There is not any such 
 thing. 
 
 It is scarcely just or worthy of philosophy or of 
 religion, to exhibit a picture which finds its coun- 
 terpart only in the growth of a foreign country, as 
 if it truly represented some rationalistic school in 
 this country. By all means, if there be individ- 
 uals, clerical or lay, who have seemed to attach 
 higher authority to human reason than is meet, 
 and to treat great and sacred questions in too free 
 and rash a sj^irit, let their sentiments be met on 
 their own proper ground and exposed and corrected. 
 But it is a very different procedure — one essentially 
 faulty — to identify a number of persons not for- 
 merly indicted, but perfectly well known, with a 
 system which, as a whole, they would utterly re- 
 pudiate, to identify them with the veiy worst de- 
 tails of that system. The effect of this — I do not 
 believe the conscious design, but the actual effect 
 of this — must be to create against earnest and able 
 and upright men a prejudice, of which they are 
 wholly undeserving. 
 
 There is a rationalism — it must be held all the 
 more firmly, because the too indiscriminate and 
 too strong language of the Bampton Lecture would 
 
5f) INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 blind us to the fact ; there is a rationalism, not 
 German — if so invidious and offensive a use of an 
 honored national name may be pardoned — not Ger- 
 man and not infidel, and not presumptuous, and 
 not godless — a rationalism reverent, humble, pious, 
 which, unless we be false to the constitution of our 
 minds, false to what is higher than our minds, 
 eternal truth, and false to the Great Being, the 
 Father of our minds and the Fountain of truth, 
 we dare not, must not, never must forego. 
 
SECTION SECOND. 
 
 CONCEML\G APPLICATlOxNS OF LOGIC. 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I. — Prelimixary Criticisms. 
 II. — " The Ixfinite," " The Absolute," etc. 
 III. — Causatiox, etc. 
 
 lY. IXCOXCEIYABILITY OP ".ThE IxFIXITE." 
 
 V. — Miscellaneous Reasoxixgs. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRELIMINAEY CEITICISMS. 
 
 Method of Bampton Lecture — Laid down, Abandoned — Over- 
 confidence — Difficulties of Investigation — •Virtuallj, Hamilton's 
 Arguments — -"Infinite" distinguished from "Absolute" — 
 Groundless — Essentially same. 
 
 The method of discussion, proposed in the 
 Bampton Lecture, has all the advantage of being 
 faultlessly logical. It is perfectly fair to say, as 
 the writer does, that " the primary and proper 
 object of criticism is not religion, natural or re- 
 vealed, but the human mind in its relation to reli- 
 gion." (p. 24.) It is added, " rightly or wrongly, 
 men will think of these things (the truths of reli- 
 gion), and a knowledge of the laws under which 
 they think, is the only security for their thinking 
 soundly.'' (p. 32.) " A philosophy of religion," he 
 says with great distinctness, " may be attempted 
 from two opposite points of view — either as a phi- 
 losophy of the object of religion, that is to say, as 
 a scientific exposition of the nature of God, or as 
 a philosophy of the subject of religion, that is to 
 say, as a scientific inquiry into the constitution of 
 the human mind, so far as it receives and deals 
 
60 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 with religious ideas", (p. 34.) Of the second 
 method, which the lecturer is to adopt, it is said, 
 " its primary concern is with the operations and 
 laws of the human mind, and its special purpose is 
 to ascertain the nature, the origin, and the limits 
 of the religious element in man." (p. 35.) Before 
 dealing w^ith the object of religion, God, '' we need 
 a preliminary examination of the conditions of 
 human thought." (p. 37.) In this way, we reach 
 " the limits of our own powers and the consequent 
 distinction between w^hat w^e may and what we 
 may not seek to comprehend." (p. 36.) "We 
 must begin with that wliich is within us, not with 
 that which is above us, with the philosophy of 
 man, not w^ith that of God." (p. 65.) 
 
 Such is the order of discussion. But, curiously 
 enough, it is not sooner announced than aban- 
 doned. Instead of commencing with an examina- 
 tion of the human mind, in order to ascertain the 
 conditions and limits of human thought, the lec- 
 turer turns aside to expose the contradictions and 
 confusions of German rationalism. For the time, 
 he follow^s a method exactly the opposite of that 
 on which he had determined, the method which 
 begins not with the subject of theology, man, but 
 with the object of theology, God. The temptation 
 must have been powerful, which thus hurried him 
 in the face of the order which he himself had im- 
 posed on the discussion, that he might reduce to 
 
PRELIMINARY CRITICISMS. 61 
 
 absurdity the attempts of German rationalists, to 
 philosophize respecting the Infinite. " We can 
 not/' says he, " legitimately approach the object 
 of theology, God, until a previous inquiiy has de- 
 termined for us the limits of our powers of thought, 
 and what we may, and what we may not seek to 
 comprehend/' But straightway, we are led down 
 to the deepest of the reasonings, about the most 
 incomprehensible aspects of that which the lecturer 
 pronounces to be all incomprehensible together. 
 Without attaching immoderate importance to this 
 violation of order, it is nevertheless very significant 
 in a professed and disciplined logician. 
 
 The opening sentence, with which the lecturer 
 introduces the strictly argumentative part of his 
 work, deserves a little notice from us here. " There 
 are three teruis, fayniliar as household ivords in 
 the vocabulary of philosophy, which must be taken 
 into account in every system of metaphysical the- 
 ology. To conceive the Deity as he is, we must 
 conceive Him as first cause, as absolute and as infi- 
 nite." (p. 44.) The sj^irit of this announcement, 
 it seems to me, is not assuring ; not assuring espe- 
 cially, to those who feel that the discussion about 
 to be entered upon touches a question of life and 
 death to them, touches the one, most momentous 
 point in the whole range of philosophy and the- 
 ology. Withal I question whether it be actually 
 true that these three terms are familiar as house- 
 
62 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 hold words, in the vocabulary of philosophy. On 
 the contrary, are they not among its highest and 
 rarest symbols, and do they not belong to a pro- 
 found, even inaccessible region ? At all events, 
 they certainly are meant to embody ideas which 
 the lecturer holds to be altogether inconceivable. 
 Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in Germany, and 
 Jouffroy and Cousin in France, have freely made 
 use of the terms in question. But with the excep- 
 tion of Coleridge, they were all but entirely foreign 
 to this country, till the appearance of Sir William 
 Hamilton's celebrated review of Cousin's Flii- 
 losopliy of the Infinite, now thirty years ago. Even 
 now, it seems scarcely becoming in any writer to 
 boast of a household familiarity with words, which, 
 though they have come into more general use, have 
 not ceased to represent the highest and hardest 
 abstractions of metaphysics. 
 
 It is no fault of the lecturer, but it is of some 
 importance to bear in mind, that the argument 
 which is forthwith constructed, in the second and 
 third discourses, the portion of the work which is 
 devoted to continuous reasoning, the other por- 
 tions being more popular than argumentative, is 
 substantially and virtually that of Hamilton's cele- 
 brated review. It is altered in some, even essen- 
 tial, respects, and it is greatly extended in parts, 
 and many special additional details are intro- 
 duced, but all the strongest points are contained, 
 

 
 PRELIMINARY CRITICISMS. 63 
 
 either expressly or implicity, in the earlier criti- 
 cism. 
 
 One other thing must not be omitted in these 
 preliminary notices ; the lecturer accepts, without 
 a word of yindicatioUj the distinction between the 
 Infinite and the Absolute, which can rest only on 
 the authority of Hamilton. Neither Kant, nor 
 Fichte, nor Schelling, nor Hegel mark any notice- 
 able difference in the meaning of these words. Ety- 
 mologically they amount to much the same thing, 
 and at least by the German metaphysicians they 
 are used indifferently. Hamilton takes a course 
 peculiar to himself, and constitutes the Uncondi- 
 tioned a genus, of which the Infinite and the Ab- 
 solute are the species. Perhaps the exigencies of 
 his system, and especially his favorite theory of 
 causality, needed this distinction. At all events, 
 for himself he selects the pair of contraries — an 
 absolute whole, and an absolute part, a whole all 
 inclusive, such that it cannot be conceived as part 
 of a larger whole, a part so small that it cannot be 
 conceived as a whole, capable of being again divided 
 into parts — and gives to them the name of the 
 Absolute, completed, finished, perfect, whole, tJie 
 unconditionally limited. What is meant by the 
 whole and the part, thus described, may be intelli- 
 gible. But I am not ashamed to confess that, when 
 this is called the imconditionally limited, I do not 
 understand the words nor do I believe that they 
 
64 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIO. 
 
 are capable of being understood by any person. To 
 me, tliey are not sense, as little so, as would be the 
 expression, solidly liquid, or coldly hot. Uncondi- 
 tionally limited ! The first term is directly con- 
 tradictory of the second. At all events, it was not 
 justifiable, even in Sir William Hamilton, that a 
 formula, at least apparently contradictory, should 
 be noted by him as the Absolute ; that is to say, 
 should usurp for its own use a term already occu- 
 ]Died, quite in a different sense — namely, as synony- 
 mous with the Infinite. But yet less justifiable is 
 it in the Bampton lecturer to take up the supposed 
 distinction between the Infinite and the Absolute, 
 as if it were universally admitted, especially since, 
 as we shall presently find, he had not even Hamil- 
 ton's ground for making any distinction at all. 
 And he does all this, with Mr. Calderwood's very 
 noticeable book, to which he expressly refers, before 
 him, containing, as it does, an ingenious and robust 
 exposure of Hamilton's use of the terms in ques- 
 tion.''' The lecturer, it seems to me, was scarcely 
 entitled in these circumstances to pass on in simple 
 silence : and until the opposing reasonings be set 
 aside — and I believe they cannot be set aside — we 
 must regard the unconditionally Ujiiited, that is, 
 the Absolute, as distinguished from the Infinite, 
 as a palpable blunder. 
 
 * Tlie Philosophy of the Infinite, by Henry Calderwood — a very 
 rare example of early power and promise, which would have dono 
 honor to a. ripe and practised metaphysician. 
 
PRELIMINAEY CRITICISMS. 65 
 
 But the extraordinary fact is, that while the 
 lecturer resolves to distinguish the Infinite from 
 the Absolute, he does not use the latter term in 
 Hamilton's sense at all, though this 1^ the only 
 sense, which makes it, however, strangely and con- 
 tradictorily, distinguishable from the Infinite. In 
 a note on his second lecture, he tells us, " the other 
 sense in which the Absolute is contradictory of the 
 Infinite, is irrelevant to the present argument/' 
 (p. 301.) But Hamilton says, "in this accepta- 
 tion,'' — he means, as contradictory of the Infinite 
 — "for myself, I exclusively use it," — the term 
 Absolute (p. 13.) The meaning which the lecturer 
 attaches to the Absolute is the very one which it 
 never bears in Hamilton's use of the word ; namely, 
 " aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, con- 
 dition, dependence," etc., and it is thus, says Ham- 
 ilton, tantamount .to rh dnoXvrov of the lower 
 Greeks. In this meaning," he adds, i. e., the mean- 
 ing selected by the Bampton lecturer — " the Ab- 
 solute is not opposed to the Infinite."* It is not 
 indeed, it is not even distinguishable from it. For 
 how better could we define the Infinite, than in the 
 very words here employed to define the absolute, 
 " aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, con- 
 dition, dependence," etc. Absolute, i. e., absolved, 
 loosed, freed from — what ? connections, relations, 
 boundaries, limits, without limits, infinite. The 
 
 * Discussions, p. 13. 
 
66 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 two words are virtually identical, and only an 
 imagined imperious necessity, which in this case is 
 certainly not shown, can account for the abortive 
 attempt to distinguish between them. It is possi- 
 ble to detect the merest shade of difference, when 
 the lecturer says, " by the Absolute is meant that 
 which exists in, and by itself, having no necessary 
 relation to any other being. By the Infinite is 
 meant that which is free from all possible limita- 
 tion, that than which a greater is inconceivable.^' 
 (p. 45.) But we can perceive in a moment that 
 the definitions might be reversed with perfect just- 
 ice. Quite as truly it might be asserted that the 
 Infinite, like the Absolute, is that which exists in, 
 and by itself, and which can have no necessary rela- 
 tion to any other being. On the other hand, quite 
 as truly, so far as yet aj)23ears, it might be asserted 
 that the Absolute, like the Infinite, is that, than 
 w^hich a greater is inconceivable, and which is free 
 from all possible limitation. "Aloof from limita- 
 tion,'' etc., is Sir William Hamilton's very j^lirase. 
 The Absolute, at all events in the lecturer's sense 
 of the word, and the Infinite, are identical, and yet 
 he distinguishes them, as if they were perfectly 
 different, and as if the difference were universally 
 understood and admitted. Hamilton had a reason 
 in the exigencies of his system for distinguishing 
 between the two terms, and he constructed a de- 
 fence of the distinction, however insufficient, and 
 
PRELIMINARY CRITICISMS. 67 
 
 even contradictory. The lecturer does not give any 
 reason, and does not make any defence. I am un- 
 able to conjecture why he employed two hard, un- 
 couth, and, as he believes, unintelligible words, 
 when one might have sufficed ; why, especially, he 
 imposed two separate definitions which were both 
 distinctly contained in either of the two terms. 
 But I am obliged to own that in the circumstances 
 an anticipative distrust of his accuracy, and of the 
 soundness of his reasoning is created in my mind. 
 
CHAPTEK II. 
 
 THE INFINITE, THE ABSOLUTE, ETC. 
 
 Infinity of Attributes — Contradiction — All actual and possible in 
 " Absolute"— " The One"— " The All"— Shifting and Substitu- 
 tion of Terms — Contradictory Reasonings — Illustrations — ^Poten- 
 tial and Actual — Confusion — Materialistic Tendency. 
 
 Up to a certain pointy there can be little differ- 
 ence one would imagine ; there is in fact, little dif- 
 ference, amongst moderate men, of however oppo- 
 site schools, as to the at least apparent contradic- 
 tions in which reason is involved, when it attempts 
 to construct a ]yhilosopliy of the Infinite or Abso- 
 lute. Most would agree — do in fact agree — though 
 this is very far from the imj^ression suggested in 
 the Bampton Lecture — that there is so much of in- 
 scrutable mystery in the region of the Divine, so 
 much that is necessarily incomj^rehensible, that 
 anything approaching to a system, a fully compre- 
 hended and explained philosophy, with the ground 
 princiijles on which it rests, is never to be reached. 
 The grand error — but not of extreme rationalists, 
 at least, not of them only — of theologians, is, that 
 they have philosophized too much, and not well ; 
 that they do philosophize, philosoj^hize falsely, and 
 
THE INFINITE, THE ABSOLUTE, ETC. 69 
 
 profess to give forth a round whole of religious 
 truth, a coropleted scheme which leaves compara- 
 tively little unexplained. It cannot be. Hints to- 
 wards such an issue, more or less inspiring and 
 precious, may be possible ; occasional gleams in 
 one direction and another, openings into the deep 
 unknown, the recovery here of one patch of sur- 
 face hitherto dark, and there of another, and bring- 
 ing them within the range of the light, may be 
 possible. But anything approaching to a complete 
 philosophy of the Infinite, or a philosophy of re- 
 ligious truth, natural or revealed, few will hesitate 
 to pronounce a mere imposibility. But many who 
 would readily make this admission, shrink back 
 from such conclusions as those of the Bampton 
 lecturer, and especially from his (as I judge) not 
 satisfactory method of supporting them. 
 
 The second lecture in the series which is before 
 us, is distinguished by high and hard abstractions, 
 and by uncouth words, with the use of which few 
 could boast a household familiarity. Our first 
 business must be to pierce, as far as we are able, 
 through the encrusting terms and forms, and to 
 reach a meaning apprehensible by the common un- 
 derstanding. Scientific formula are unavoidable 
 in marking scientific distinctions. But we deal 
 here with spiritual truth ; and whatever value there 
 may be in the use of abstract terms, they are 
 never, if they be really worth anything, incapable 
 
70 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 of being translated, it may be circuitously and 
 cumbrously, into the ordinary language of thought. 
 If they are untranslatable, it is because there is 
 nothing to translate. 
 
 I have only further to submit, that with " the 
 Absolute'' of Schelling or Hegel, with the Uncon- 
 ditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite of German, or 
 French philosophy I am not here to deal at all ; 
 but only with these terms, as defined, explained, 
 and reasoned upon in the Bampton Lecture ; and 
 any argument of mine must be held to be valid, 
 so long as it is soundly based only on these defini- 
 tions, explanations, and reasoning. 
 
 The lecturer's first distinct position, as I gather, 
 amounts to this, that the Infinite must be en- 
 dowed with infinite attributes, and that their num- 
 ber must be infinite. Passing by the contradiction 
 involved in the idea of an infinite number, it must 
 be borne in mind that we have nothing to do with 
 the relevancy, as respects the general argument, of 
 this or of any of the other positions maintained. 
 Taking them as they stand, I am only concerned 
 to show, by one or two examples, the inexact na- 
 ture of the reasoning. " The Infinite," I quote 
 from lecture second, " cannot be regarded as con- 
 sisting of a limited number of attributes, each un- 
 limited in its kind. It cannot be conceived, for 
 example, after the analogy of a line infinite in 
 length but not in breadth, or of a surface infinite 
 
THE INFINITE, THE ABSOLUTE, ETC. 71 
 
 in two dimensions of space but bounded in the 
 third, or of an intelligent being possessing some 
 one or more modes of consciousness in an infinite 
 degree, but devoid of others." (p. 45.) The con- 
 clusion is, — or if not, what is it ? — that the In- 
 finite must possess infinite attributes and an in- 
 finite number of them. What then, one might 
 ask 7 The use to be made of such a conclusion, 
 supposing it reached, and its precise effect on the 
 general argument, it would be hard indeed to 
 determine. 
 
 We shall meet with other examples of the evil 
 and danger of such illustrations, borrowed from 
 material nature, as occur in the passage just 
 quoted, by which the highest spiritual truth is 
 entangled and darkened. Here, however, even the 
 illustration might have served to correct the state- 
 ment, and ought to have suggested that what 
 might seem limitation in the number of attributes 
 may be only a mere necessary fact, an addition be- 
 ing simjDly impossible, in the nature of things. 
 Suppose a body infinite not in two dimensions 
 only, but in all three alike ; it could then be infi- 
 nite in no other, for no other is possible. Length, 
 breadth, and thickness comprise the dimensions 
 possible to extended body. Any other, according 
 to our modes of judging, is impossible in the na- 
 ture of things. 
 
 It must be noticed emphatically, that there is a 
 
72 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 vast distinction, which is thoroughly overlooked by 
 the lecturer not in this place merely, but through- 
 out the entire discussion, and the overlooking: of 
 wliich necessarily creates confused and fallacious 
 reasoning. It is the distinction, between a supposed 
 quantitative Infinite, and the qualitative Infinite. 
 Let the notion be attempted, however vain, of 
 ^^The Infinite Whole" — a quantity, an amount, 
 including everything, to which nothing by possi- 
 bility can be added, and from which nothing by 
 possibility be subtracted. This Infinite — if a fic- 
 tion so baseless may be suffered to keep itself, for 
 a moment, before our imagination — is strictly one, 
 and there can be nothing besides. This is the Infi- 
 nite (if you will), and there can be nothing but 
 this Infinite. It can admit of no parts. Partition 
 is at once destructive of the conception, or rather 
 the fiction. Distinct, separate personality is im- 
 possible ; distinct, separate qualities or attributes 
 are impossible. But the qualitative Infinite in- 
 volves no such necessary results. An Infinite, as 
 to duration, does not render a finite, as to dura- 
 tion — which is another and separate thing — impos- 
 sible to our thought. Without contradiction, the 
 two may co-exist. So also distinct and separate 
 personality is not here swallowed up and lost, as 
 in the One Infinite. An Infinite Being — quite 
 remote from the notion of a quantity, an amount, 
 to which nothing can be added without destroying 
 
THE INFINITE, THE ABSOLUTE, ETC. 73 
 
 it — does not render the existence of a finite being 
 or of finite beings impossible to our thought. 
 Witliout contradiction, they may co-exist. Even 
 beyond this, an Infinite attribute does not render 
 another distinct and different Infinite attribute, or 
 many distinct and different Infinite attributes, im- 
 possible to our thoughts. 
 
 The fancied, quantitative Infinite is One, and 
 there can be nothing besides. All parts, all per- 
 sonalities, all separate qualities are necessarily 
 merged and lost in it. But with the notion of 
 the qualitative Infinite, there may co-exist, with- 
 out contradiction, as many Infinites as there are at- 
 tributes. Knowledge and Power belong to spheres 
 which interfere not in any possible way, the one 
 with the other. They cannot come into collision. 
 Without contradiction, Power may be unlimited 
 and Knowledge may also be unlimited. Veracity, 
 Rectitude, Love, and a thousand Infinites besides, 
 co-existing at the same time, are not impossible to 
 our thouf^ht. 
 
 To come more closely to the point from which 
 we started, the difference is hardly to be estimated, 
 when we pass from quantity to quaKty, from gross 
 amount to attributes. Thus, it is no limitation of 
 Unlimited Power that it is not Knowledge, and 
 no limitation of Unlimited Knowledge that it is 
 not Power. It is not in the nature of things, that 
 these qualities should be interpenetrable or con- 
 
74 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 vertible^ and that the separate independent exist- 
 ence of the one should be incompatible with that 
 of the other. In like manner, in a lower sphere, 
 the sphere of the finite, it is no limitation to 
 mind, that it cannot walk, and no limitation to 
 truth or love, that you cannot measure them by a 
 scale of inches. These things are simply impossi- 
 ble. If then we say that the Infinite, as defined, 
 is necessarily endowed wdth all possible attributes 
 — this is the very utmost which the definition al- 
 low^s to be said. That all possible attributes make 
 up, and must make up an infinity ; this, true or 
 false, is at all events not shown. Take the writ- 
 er's own illustration of " an intelligent being pos- 
 sessing certain modes of consciousness in an infi- 
 nite degi'ee," and say that in place of certain 
 modes the being possesses all the modes of con- 
 sciousness possible to an intelligence ; can it be 
 maintained, besides, that these amount, and must 
 amount to infinity ? No man is entitled to ad- 
 vance such a position. Jt is utterly incapable of 
 proof. On the contrary, it is clear, if we suppose, 
 as the lecturer himself supposes, a purely spiritual 
 nature, there is at least one class of attributes, 
 those included in extension, which could have no 
 possible application to it. We come to this : the 
 attributes of a pure intelligence, each infinite in 
 kind, nevertheless could include — and this, with- 
 out the slightest limitation of the Being — only so 
 
THE INFINITE^ THE ABSOLUTE, ETC. 75 
 
 much as was possible, in the nature of things : and 
 whether this might or might not amount to in- 
 finity is a point unsettled. 
 
 Again : it is maintained that the Absolute must 
 include in itself all being and all modes of being, 
 actual and possible, not even excepting evil. There 
 are two distinct applications of which these terms, 
 the Infinite, the Absolute, are, or at least in this 
 work are held to be, susceptible : — 1st, to the one 
 Absolute Being, God (the words are not mine ; I 
 shall by and by try to show that they are false and 
 contradictory). 2d, to the Whole, the all-inclusive 
 Whole, without distinction of Divine or human, 
 Infinite or finite, the All, the to ndv of the early 
 Greeks. 
 
 It is perplexing that the lecturer takes advantage 
 of both of these senses, and passes them inexplica- 
 bly from one hand to the other, of course unde- 
 signedly, but never keeps fixedly to either. You 
 have references that can apply only to ^' The One," 
 and again, others that can apply only to '^ The 
 All ;" but you have no security that the same ap- 
 plication shall be retained in two successive illus- 
 trations. He turns from the one to the other with- 
 out notice. 
 
 In the case immediately before us it is manifestly 
 intended to convey that " The One," the Infinite, 
 living Being, must include all existence, not even 
 excepting evil. But it is overlooked that an an- 
 
76 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 tagonist lias still the alternative of ^^ The All/' the 
 all-inclusive Whole. This he might argue is the 
 Absolute, and this contains in itself all actual 
 modes of being and all possibility of being. But 
 what then ? what is gained by the admission, the 
 admission of a fact which nobody denies, however 
 they may deal with it ? "What is gained by it ? 
 Nothing ; at least by the lecturer, in the present 
 stage of his reasoning, literally nothing. 
 
 But it is argued farther, not only that the Infi- 
 nite or Absolute must contain in itself all actual 
 being, but that all actual being must contain the 
 realization of every possible mode of being. " The 
 entire distinction," he says, " between the possible 
 and the actual can have no existence as regards the 
 absolutely Infinite, for an unrealized possibility is 
 necessarily a relation and a limit." (p. 46.) The 
 Infinite, as here conceived and represented, has 
 reached its last development — has had its utmost 
 possibility actualized, and has become one vast, 
 boundless monotony, over which no breath of 
 change can ever pass ; a gross, gorged, dead com- 
 plement of being, to which movement of any sort, 
 even from within, is for ever denied. This surely 
 is limitation, iron necessity, for ever bounding and 
 crushing all existence, not only not involved in the 
 idea of the Infinite, or rather, of an infinite, but 
 opposed to it : this is, if any thing can be, the un- 
 conditionally limited^ entirely contradictory of the 
 
THE INFINITE, THE ABSOLUTE, ETC. 77 
 
 Infinite, which sense, however, the lecturer has 
 formally abjured. But here it is. The rationalist 
 is justified in pronouncing all this a flat denial of 
 the patent facts of nature. The Great Whole, he 
 could maintain, is the residence of forces that are 
 ceaselessly in action ; of laws that ceaselessly reign 
 in the harmony and order of the universe. A pause 
 in the action of these forces, in the reign of these 
 laws, would be a limit to '' The AlF' in the most 
 direct, possible form. Endless development and 
 production resulting from power in harmony with 
 law — in other words, the never-ceasinoj conversion 
 of the possible into the actual — this, he might as- 
 sert, constitutes the true and grand idea of the In- 
 finite, The All. 
 
 But, as has akeady been noticed, the intended 
 reference, in the passage we are examining, must 
 certainly be not to '' The Whole," the rb nav, though 
 it is perfectly legitimate for an antagonist to resort 
 to this alternative, but to The One ; for in con- 
 firmation or illustration of what had been ad- 
 vanced, a sentiment is introduced which can apply 
 only to the One. '^ The scholastic saying, ^ Deus 
 est actus lourus,' ridiculed as it has been by modern 
 critics, is, in truth, but the expression in technical 
 language of the almost unanimous voice of philoso- 
 phy, both in earlier and later times.'' (p. 47.) The 
 saying in question, like many other aphoristic sym- 
 bols of the schoolmen, contains a profound truth. 
 
78 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 From all sides it cannot be accepted, but on some 
 sides it is both true and grand. God is nobly con- 
 ceived as everywhere, and ever, in act, a ceaseless, 
 infinite energy. The duration of God the school- 
 men represented as the "" punctum starts,'' in which 
 there could be no past, no future, no succession — 
 an everlasting now. His nature, in certain essen- 
 tial aspects, they described when they said, ^' Deus 
 est actus purus" — God is pure, mere, simple act ; 
 the one all-pervading, living power of the universe ; 
 unlabored, spontaneous, untiring, eternal, universal 
 energy. But what has this to do with the neces- 
 sity, which the lecturer seeks to make out, that all 
 possible modes of being must also be actual, exist- 
 ing modes of being ? Nothing. So far from it, 
 the adduced confirmation or illustration is the 
 clearest possible refutation of his position. The 
 idea of ceaseless action suggests that of ceaseless 
 production, not the completed actualization of all 
 possibilities, but never-ending conversion — an irre- 
 pressible, inner life, coming forth in ever new de- 
 velopments. 
 
 Meanwhile, it is certain that the lecturer, in the 
 statement wliich he would confirm or illustrate by 
 the quotation from Thomas Aquinas, had in his 
 mind, not the All, but the One, the Infinite Being. 
 In so many words, this is distinctly conveyed sub- 
 sequently : "A mental attribute, to be conceived 
 as infinite, must be in actual exercise on every pos- 
 
THE INFINITE, THE ABSOLUTE, ETC. 79 
 
 sible object ; otherwise, it is potential only with 
 regard to those on which it is not exercised ; and 
 an unrealized potentiality is a limitation/' (p. 51.) 
 Were a mental attribute simply brute force, these 
 ' statements would be, at least, partially admissible. 
 Brute force, left to itself, is not only necessarily 
 in action, but necessarily in its utmost possible 
 action, and on all objects on which it can bear. A 
 steam power, whatever be its amount, goes forth 
 to the limit of that amount, and on all objects be- 
 longing to its sphere, and within that sphere. In- 
 troduce the additional idea of mind, of reason, of 
 w^ill, of choice, and you have no longer an irresisti- 
 ble, brut« necessity of action, but power com- 
 manded and regulated by its possessor, now let 
 forth, or again held back. Is that a limit which 
 substitutes choice for necessity .^ Is that a limit 
 which elevates and extends power, and glorifies its 
 possessor .? But what can be meant when it is as- 
 serted, "if a mental attribute be not in actual ex- 
 ercise on every possible object, it is potential only 
 with regard to those on -which it is not exercised.'* 
 This may not be, but it looks wonderfully like a 
 contradiction. The only intelligible meaning wdiich 
 it can have is this, where an attribute has been ac- 
 tually exercised to its utmost limit, it is no longer 
 potential, it is expended, exhausted. But where 
 it has not been 'put forth, yet might be, it is still 
 potential, it waits to he exercised. A potentiality 
 
80 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 realized is done with ; there is an end of it. That, 
 surely, is a limit. But if so, what shall we say of 
 its opposite ? Is it also a limit ? " An unrealized 
 potentiality is a limit/' says the lecturer. But 
 power which is truly infinite, must he for ever un- • 
 realizable in its utmost extent, and just because it 
 is infinite. Let the manifestations of it he ever so 
 overwhelming, there must be a reserve of jDoten- 
 tiality within and beyond, which can never be ex- 
 hausted. If power in the Infinite is not put forth 
 in eveiy possible mode, so as to convert all possi- 
 bility into actuality— in other words, if there is 
 such a thing with the Great Being as unrealized 
 potentiality ; this, so far from imposing a limit on 
 his nature, so far from making it finite, is the very 
 thing which we mean to convey when we say it is 
 infinite. 
 
 Mr. Mansell proceeds — "hence," and yet, for 
 one, I am quite unable to discover anything like a 
 necessary, or even probable sequence — *• hence, 
 every infinite mode of consciousness must be re- 
 garded as extending over the field of every other, 
 and their common action involves perpetual anta- 
 gonism.'" (p. 51.) If we suppose a literal field, 
 completely filled up by different bodies of solid, 
 material actors, who have, at the same time, in the 
 same space, different and conflicting sets of opera- 
 tions to carry forward, Mr. ManselFs difficulty 
 would be realized. But spiritual powers do not 
 
THE INFINITE, THE ABSOLUTE, ETC. 81 
 
 occupy space, do not fill up space, so as to impede 
 and obstruct action. Kectitude, and wisdom, and 
 love, and truth, have perfectly different spheres be- 
 longing to them, though in the same mind, and 
 cannot, by any ]3ossibility, come into material col- 
 lision with one another. These perfections may 
 be misused, either by not being sufficiently in ex- 
 ercise, or by being put forth wrongly. But spirit- 
 ual attributes, extending over each other's fields, 
 so as to imjDcde each other's action, what can it 
 mean ? I am unable to tell. It seems gross in 
 idea, and not consistent with a belief in the essen- 
 tial distinction between matter and mind. But 
 very noticeable is it, that this unhappy statement 
 is scarcely sooner made, than the lecturer escapes 
 from it — and to what ? to human sin, moral free- 
 dom, and the mysteries of providence, matters spe- 
 cially theological, even scriptural, far away from 
 the high abstractions amidst which we have been 
 soaring. Into this devious region we must not at 
 present venture. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 CAUSATION, ETC. 
 
 Hamilton's very argument — Here, no Force — Hamilton's Idea of 
 Cause — Of Absolute — Lecturer's, opposite — Hamilton's formally 
 Abandoned — Here Adopted — Grave, logical Blunder — Contra- 
 dictory Reasonings — Unsupported Assertion — Idea of Creation — 
 Incomprehensible — Commencement, not — And not Contradictory. 
 
 The lecturer maintains (pp. 47-53) that the idea 
 of cause is contradictory of the idea either of The 
 Infinite or " The Absolute." 
 
 Dealing as he professes to do with the modern 
 forms of rationalism, he might have been expected 
 to notice that causation is entirely abandoned in 
 certain quarters, and that in its place we have the 
 forces and laws of the universe, and resulting from 
 them an eternal, infinite series of developments. It 
 might have been a well-timed and valuable service, 
 had he set himself to expose this subtle and spread- 
 ing form of infidelity. Far better this, than to 
 expend time and power in laboriously and learn- 
 edly plucking to pieces what I humbly conceive no 
 party or school here is found to uphold ! Far bet- 
 ter this, than, as I have striven to show and hope 
 still farther to show, to argue inconclusively against 
 
CAUSATION, ETC. 83 
 
 a system which has next to no standing in this 
 country, and is never in the least likely, judging by 
 present appearances, to have a standing amongst 
 us. 
 
 That there are profound mysteries surrounding 
 the idea of creation, of creation in time, for that is 
 the point, in the common form, in which it is put, 
 and more, that the notion of the Infinite beginning 
 to cause and giving being to a finite universe, is 
 incapable of being grasped by the human mind, is 
 most fully admitted. But, I must deny that the 
 lecturer has touched the real difficulty. He has 
 shown that the whole subject may be involved in 
 the thickest darkness, and he has multiplied the 
 contradictions and confusions to which, by^ one 
 method of reasoning, it may lead ; but I must deny 
 that even the extremest rationalists are without 
 the means of replying successfully, at least, to 
 much that he has advanced. Some of his reason- 
 ings, in my humble judgment, are very far from 
 being conclusive. 
 
 " A cause," he says, " cannot as such, be abso- 
 lute ; the absolute cannot, as such, be a cause." 
 (p. 47 ) Is one allowed to ask why ? The thing 
 is far from being self-evident. I maintain that his 
 distinctly laid dowai definition of the Absolute con- 
 tains nothing, at least palpably, inconsistent with 
 the idea of cause. '^ That which exists in and by 
 itself, and has no necessary relation to any other 
 
84 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 being" — for so the Absolute is defined — may, re- 
 taining all its self-sufficiency and absoluteness, 
 have a voluntary, a self-imposed relation to other 
 being. At least I am unable to perceive how this 
 can be denied. It is freely granted, that very new 
 and totally different ground is broken open, when 
 it is added to the w^ords already quoted : " on the 
 other hand, the conception of the absolute implies 
 a possible existence out of all relation." I simply 
 call special attention to this short clause — it will 
 be examined presently. 
 
 Meantime, the argument founded on it is, in so 
 many words, Sir William Hamilton's, perhaps the 
 very strongest which even he was able to produce. 
 But I apprehend that its strength is his alone, and 
 cannot serve his disciple in the slightest degree. 
 1st. Hamilton was contending against Cousin's 
 theory, not of the Absolute, as cause, but of an 
 absolute cause, a necessary, eternal cause, a cause 
 which must pass into act. The precise words of 
 Cousin are these — " The distinguishing character- 
 istic (of God) being an absolute creative force, 
 which cannot but pass into activity, it follows not 
 that the creation is possible, but that it is neces- 
 sary." The cause in Hamilton's reasoning is not 
 the cause in Mr. Mansel's reasoning, but totally 
 different ; and the argument, w^hich is appropriate 
 and powerful, if not invincible as applied to the 
 one, loses all its point and force as applied to the 
 
CAUSATION, ETC. 85 
 
 other. 2d. The Absolute to which Hamilton refers 
 is not the Absolute to which Mr. Mansell refers, 
 but totally cliiferent, indeed diametrically opposite. 
 '" As contradictory of the Infinite/' and in no other 
 acceptation, Sir WilHam Hamilton declares he in- 
 variably uses the term Absolute. But this sense 
 the lecturer finds "irrelevant to his argument," 
 and he has avowedly and formally adopted quite 
 another ; a sense in which the word " is not opposed 
 to the Infinite,'' in w^hich I have tried to show it is 
 not even distinguishable from the Infinite, but is 
 virtually and essentially the same. Bearing this in 
 mind, how shall we interpret that short clause to 
 which, a few moments ago, special attention was 
 called ? How shall we understand the words, " the 
 conception of the Absolute implies a possible exist- 
 ence out of all relation ?" No ; "the Absolute," as 
 deliberately and formally defined by the lecturer, 
 implies no such thing, and he is guilty of uncom- 
 mon carelessness in asserting that it does. The pal- 
 pable logical blunder is so great and so serious in its 
 consequences that it is scarcely pardonable. " The 
 Absolute," in Sir WilHam Hamilton's sense, does 
 imply " a possible existence out of all relation ;" 
 but the lecturer distinctly abandons this sense, and 
 as distinctly accepts another definition, which is 
 purposely antagonistic to that of Hamilton. In- 
 deed, as has been already noticed, Mr. Calderwood 
 makes out the terms, Infinite and Absolute, to be 
 
86 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 virtually synonymous, though, by a nice phrase- 
 ology, it be possible to exhibit a slight shade of 
 difference in their signification. '^ By the Abso- 
 lute,'' says Mr. Mansell, following Calderwood, 
 " is meant that which exists in and by itself, hav- 
 ing no necessary relation to any other being." (p. 
 45.) But, in the place of this, we find here the 
 important substitution, " the conception of the 
 Absolute implies a possible existence out of all 
 relation." It is glaringly in the face of his own 
 definition! '^ Out of all relation T' No, by no 
 means ; for the Absolute, as defined, is that which 
 has not no relation, but no necessary relation ; 
 and even more than this, no necessary relation to 
 any other being. Two things are manifestly im- 
 plied — 1st. That external relation, and not inter- 
 nal, is contradictory of the Absolute, as he under- 
 stands it. 2d. That even external relation is 
 contradictory, only if it be supposed to be also 
 necessary ; necessary, that is, to the very idea of 
 the being of the Absolute, so that it could not be 
 conceived apart from it. Relation within itself is 
 admissible ; relation to other being is admissible, 
 provided always it be not necessary, not essential. 
 Temporary, incidental relation, voluntary self-im- 
 posed relation to other being is not contradictory 
 of the Absolute. And yet we read, '^ the concep- 
 tion of the Absolute implies a j^ossible existence 
 out of all relation." It is not necessary to insist 
 
CAUSATION, ETC. 87 
 
 further on tliis grave mistake ; but the lecturer 
 must pardon his readers, if, after this, they greatly 
 distrust his logical accuracy and precision. 
 
 The act of causation, it is further argued, must 
 be voluntary ; volition is possible only in a con- 
 scious being, and consciousness supposes relation, 
 at all events, between subject and object, the being 
 choosing and the choice formed. With unneces- 
 sary amplification, it is said, " there must be a 
 conscious subject and an object of which he is con- 
 scious. The subject is a subject to the object, and 
 the object is an object to the subject, and neither 
 can exist by itself as the Absolute.'' (p. 48.) But 
 why not ? I am entitled to suppose by the Abso- 
 lute what Mr. Mansell designates The Absolute 
 God, and so much the more, indeed necessarily, 
 because the argument respects the act of causation. 
 An ^ct supposes an actor. Now the relation be- 
 tween the Divine Mind and its conscious thought 
 is purely internal, and internal relation was implied 
 in the definition with which the argument set out. 
 Are we again to find a logician not supplementing, 
 but subverting his own definition and arguing 
 against it ? We are. The lecturer does this, but 
 without the least intimation that he is changing 
 his ground. "The alternative (^. e., of internal 
 relation), he says, is, in ultimate analysis,«no less 
 self-destructive than the other. For the object of 
 consciousness, whether a mode of the subject's 
 
88 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 existence or not, is either created in and by the act 
 of consciousness, or it has an existence independent 
 of it. In the former case, the object depends on 
 the subject, and the subject alone is the true Abso- 
 lute." (p. 49.) Of course it is, an antagonist might 
 reply, and stop him just at this point ; the subject 
 is the true Absolute — and what then ? We need 
 not go further. The other alternative proposed, 
 or any possible alternative besides, is not required. 
 This is enough. Of course the conscious subject 
 is the Absolute, if there be an absolute, and his 
 conscious choice is a mode of his existence. Sub- 
 stance and mode are not contradictory, but essen- 
 tial the one to the other. And yet this is all, by 
 which the lecturer seeks to subvert his own defini- 
 tion, and feels himself entitled to assert, " Not 
 only is the Absolute, as conceived, incapable of a 
 necessary relation to anything else, but it is ^also 
 incapable of containing, by the constitution of its 
 own nature, an essential relation within itself 
 Stop, an antagonist might say ; prove it ; the con- 
 trary is distinctly conceded in your own defini- 
 tions — " as a whole, for instance, composed of 
 parts, or as a substance, consisting of attributes, 
 or as a conscious subject in antithesis to an object.'' 
 (p. 49.) I can only offer a dkect negative to this 
 affirmal^on. It is not only not proved, I hold it 
 to be not true, to be the very contrary of the truth — 
 always taking the lecturer's own formal definition 
 
CAUSATION, ETC. 89 
 
 of the Absolute as the legitimate one. Being 
 without attributes is a contradiction, an absurdity; 
 and no relation can be more indubitable, direct and 
 close, than that between being and its attributes. 
 It is essential, it is inevitable. It does not limit, 
 it constitutes being. Consciousness in like manner 
 is the condition of intelligence. Self-conscious in- 
 telligence is alone intelligence. I know that I 
 know, else I do not know at all. Intelligence 
 without self-consciousness is a nonentity, a purely 
 baseless idea. 
 
 The lecturer returns to the notion of Cause and 
 its incompatibility with that of either the Infinite, 
 or the Absolute. Much is made of the familiar 
 common-places, about creation involving a change 
 to the Creator, either from worse to better, or from 
 better to worse, from a lower to a higher, or from 
 a higher to a lower mode of being, or from one 
 state to another, the change being purely indiffer- 
 ent. On all which, for my part, I do not feel 
 called upon to say one w^ord — ^inasmuch as the 
 same things advanced by infidels of different 
 schools, have been met, so far as they can be met, 
 many times over. This newer scepticism — for such 
 essentially I hold it to be, of course without the 
 remotest suspicion of the lecturer's personal faith 
 — contains only the old poison not even changed 
 in form. But how, it is asked, can the Absolute 
 give origin to the relative^ the Infinite to finite ? 
 
90 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 We cannot tell, an extreme rationalist shall reply, 
 and as little can you tell, and yet you believe it. 
 It is incomprehensible to us, as it is to you, and 
 not more. The alternative is before us — either 
 matter is eternal or the one Infinite Intelligence 
 caused the universe of matter and mind. We 
 cannot comprehend this, and you cannot com- 
 prehend it. We cannot interpret either the fact 
 or the mode or the time of creation, and you 
 cannot interpret these. But jve believe in the 
 creation, and you having no other evidence than 
 is open to us, believe in it. Believing in it, we 
 defy any one to prove that it is contradictory. 
 To the power of the Infinite Being, we like you, 
 can affix no limits. New developments of that 
 power are ever to be expected. They can neither 
 create nor exhibit change in Him, but are only 
 fresh forms of expressing what He is, what He im- 
 mutably, eternally is. 
 
 " But how," asks the lecturer, " can the relative 
 be conceived, as coming into being .? If it is a 
 distinct reality from the Absolute, it must be con- 
 ceived as passing from non-existence into exist- 
 ence." " To think of an object in the act of be- 
 coming, in the progress from not being into being, 
 is to think that which in the very thought annihi- 
 lates itself." (p. 53.) It is enough to reply, that 
 there can be no such progress, and it is not ima- 
 gined that there can be, as the lecturer describes, 
 
CAUSATION, ETC. 91 
 
 '7 
 
 no such, act of becoming, no such passing from 
 non-existence into existence, no such coming into 
 being. What is really supposed or imagined is 
 this : One instant, the Infinite Being is alone; be- 
 sides Him, there is absolutely nothing. The next 
 instant, something else is, the creation is. It is, 
 that is all we can say. It has not come, as from 
 one place to another. It is. It has not passed, 
 as from one state to another. It was not. It is. 
 It has not become anything, having been something 
 else before. It simply is. It has not made pro- 
 gress by a single step. It never was anything, 
 anywhere. It is. That is all we can say. How 
 it is, or why, or why not earlier, or later, we can- 
 not comprehend or explain. The lecturer asserts, 
 but he has failed to prove, does not even attempt 
 to prove, " the impossibility of conceiving the co- 
 existence of the Infinite and the finite."' On the 
 contrary, it is the Being of a God, of an Infinite, 
 which make the patent, admitted fact of the exist- 
 ence of the finite — at least to many minds — either 
 intelligible or credible. 
 
 Just as little can we acknowledge " the cognate 
 impossibility of which he speaks, of conceiving a 
 first commencement of phenomena or the absolute 
 giving birth to the relative." (p. 54.) We have 
 here the one fatal error in Sir William Hamilton's 
 system, as some of its devoutest disciples confess 
 with sorrow, the true origin of whatever else is ob- 
 
92 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 jectionable in it. With sometliing like infatua- 
 tion that great man, betrayed by fondness for his 
 own theory of causation, clung to the idea of '' the 
 impossibility of conceiving an absolute commence- 
 ment or an absolute termination." The question 
 of the conceivability of the idea of the Infinite is 
 here quite apart, the question of the comprehensi- 
 bility of the fact or the mode of creation is also 
 quite apart. All that is at issue, is simj)ly this : 
 When the statement is made, " this instant God is 
 alone, besides Him there is absolutely nothing, the 
 next instant something else is, creation is,'' does 
 consciousness declare or does it not declare this ab- 
 solute commencement of the finite to be incon- 
 ceiveable, because contradictory .^ Mr. Mansell, 
 following Hamilton, maintains that it does. Many 
 even of Hamilton's disciples, amongst whom I 
 humbly claim to number myself, maintain that it 
 does not. Authority, of course, goes for nothing 
 in such a case. Calmly, profoundly, continuously 
 meditating, divesting ourselves, in all honesty, of 
 every prejudice and every prepossession, each must 
 determine this question for himself. No authority, 
 however justly venerated, can be suffered to sug- 
 gest or supply what can have no value, unless it 
 be the clear testimony of our own minds. For my 
 part, I am as thoroughly satisfied as I can be of 
 anything, that I can and do think, represent to 
 myself, in thought, this first commencement of 
 
CAUSATION, ETC. 93 
 
 relative phenomena, and without the slightest 
 sense of contradiction. The power which caused 
 it is incomprehensible. The mode in which this 
 power operated is also incomprehensible. But the 
 effect of creative power, in the absolute com- 
 raencement of new existence, I can and do think, 
 I can and do represent it to my mind, without the 
 slightest sense of contradiction. The idea of cre- 
 ation — and this, be it noted, is a much wider 
 thing, and even perfectly different from the crea- 
 tion, the actual new existence, first beginning to 
 be — is not contradictory. It has never been shown 
 — we maintain it cannot be shown — to be contra- 
 dictory. The lecturer asserts that it is, .but he has 
 not proved his assertion. 
 
 Those who have concurred in the principles 
 which I have sought to establish, in opposition to 
 his reasoning, will agree with me, that it is not 
 here only he has failed, but also in several of the 
 conclusions which he sums up, towards the close of 
 his second lecture. To one and another of these 
 conclusions, be they true or false in themselves, I 
 have to offer, so far as his arguments are concerned, 
 a direct negative, on the ground of evidence abeady 
 advanced. "The conception," says the lecturer, 
 professing to sum up his reasonings thus far, but 
 in reality not doing so, " of the Absolute and the 
 Infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears 
 encompassed with contradictions. There is a con- 
 
94 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 tradiction in supposing such an object to exist, 
 whether alone or in conjunction with others, and 
 there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. 
 There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one, 
 and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as 
 many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as 
 personal, and there is a contradiction in conceiving 
 it as impersonal. It cannot, without contradiction, 
 be represented as active, nor, without equal contra- 
 diction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be 
 conceived as the sum of all existence, nor yet can 
 it be conceived as a part only of that sum." (p. 59.) 
 This peroration is unusually imposing, and is 
 very admirably put. But it appears to me to have 
 one fundamental and fatal fault, as we may dis- 
 cover, I humbly conceive, on casting our thoughts 
 back on the course of the argumentation. It puts 
 forward, in strong relief, propositions strikingly 
 antithetical and telling in their sequence, but it 
 does not contain the actual findings, and only the 
 actual findings which appear in the body of the 
 lecture itself By no means ; and hence it is desti- 
 tute of all value, save that of very fine writing, out 
 of place. Against several clauses of this eloquent 
 and ingenious summary, I have tried to make good 
 my right to put — " not proven." True or false, at 
 least " not proven." 
 
CHAPTER lY. 
 
 INCONCEIVABILITY OF INFINITE, 
 
 Admit Facts, refuse Arguments — Nature of Consciousness — 
 Equivocal Limitation — Infinite, Finite — Distinction, just and 
 real — Confusion — Inconsequent Reasonings — Consciousness of 
 Infinite Contradictory ? — Virtual Scepticism — Natural Theism 
 Impossible ? — This Inconsistent with Facts— ^Impeachment of 
 the Almighty. 
 
 Happily, it will not be necessary much longer to 
 employ the kind of reasoning to which it has hith- 
 erto been unavoidable to have recourse. There are 
 very vital, home-coming questions awaiting discus- 
 sion, and it is a trial of patience and spirit to be 
 detained from these by what, did it not lie in the 
 way of something far higher, one might be provoked 
 to regard as mere logical sleight-of-hand. I must 
 also own to a feeling of pain, that in a case where 
 the Great Being, and the spirit of man, and the 
 destiny of the universe were concerned, it should 
 have been necessary to resort to the coldest and 
 hardest forms of logic, the most impalpable of 
 metaphysical abstractions, and the veriest subtleties 
 and illusions of dialectics. The sense of duty must 
 have been overwhelmingly imperative, to compel 
 an earnest and true soul to endure the substitution 
 
96 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 of shadow for substance, of verbal mechanism for 
 living energy, and of mere dialectic for stern reality. 
 There are high and noble uses of metaphysics, I 
 believe ; there is an absolute necessity for the rigid 
 philosophical treatment of subjects which belong to 
 the true sphere of philosophy. But we must not 
 forget that extensive acquaintance with the history 
 and the materials of speculation, perfect facility in 
 the use of logical forms, and familiarity, even house- 
 hold familiarity, with the nomenclature of abstrac- 
 tion are not identical either with a true philosophic 
 spirit or with sound reasoning, or with the main- 
 tenance of great and just principles. I have already 
 tried to show, and I am about to produce still far- 
 ther proofs, that the Bamj)ton Lecture, justly cele- 
 brated on many accounts, is not a safe guide, either 
 in philosophy or in theology, is not accurate in its 
 reasonings, and not philosophical in its conclusions 
 and its spirit. 
 
 Only very briefly will it now be necessary to do 
 this ; and so much the more, as in the special point, 
 which is laboriously argued in the third lecture, I 
 shall have, by and by, to express at least a quali- 
 fied concurrence. But even where the conclusion 
 may be limitedly true, I wish to show that the ar- 
 gumentation is, to some extent, vicious and invalid. 
 
 The point to be made out in the third lecture is, 
 that the Infinite is inconceivable by the human 
 mind, and the proof is derived from the nature of 
 
IXCONCEIY ABILITY OF INFINITE. 97 
 
 human consciousness. ^^ ith the issue, its actual 
 truth or falsehood, I am not now concerned. But 
 the proof is, in my humble judgment, unsatisfac- 
 tory in many respects, and is acx^ompanied with 
 statements not only not supported, but untenable. 
 ^^ To be conscious, we must be conscious of some- 
 thing, and that something can only be known as 
 that which it is, by being distinguished from that 
 which it is not. But distinction is necessarily limi- 
 tation/' (p. 70.) Why so ? Do I limit some- 
 tiling^ when I say it is not nothing ? In the sense 
 of distinguishing, defining, determining^ I do limit ; 
 but in the sense of circumscribing, narrowing, mak- 
 ing less or other than it is, I do not necessarily 
 limit. All knowledge is essentially discrimination, 
 distinction, the separation and differentiation of 
 things. Do I necessarily impose a limit — except 
 in an equivocal sense — on everything, hy simply 
 knoioing it ? If this were true, it must apply 
 much beyond the human consciousness, it must 
 reach to the divine. The Infinite God is a con- 
 scious being. Consciousness is the condition of 
 all knowledge, exist w^here it may. ^' I know that 
 I know, else I do not know at all," is true univer- 
 sally, without any possible exception. Divine, like 
 human consciousness, implies distinction of one 
 thing from another — differentiation — for that is 
 equivalent to knowledge. But beyond this, and 
 perhaps still more clearly decisive, the Infinite 
 
98 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 Being is self-conscious, knows himself ; and does 
 He, must He, by this knowledge limit his own na- 
 ture ? Even from this alone, we are entitled to 
 assert, with confidence, that to discriminate, to 
 distinguish, to know, to be conscious, is not neces- 
 sarily equivalent to limitation, except in an equivo- 
 cal sense. 
 
 Again : " the infinite cannot be distinguished, 
 as such, from the finite, by the absence of any 
 quality which the finite possesses, for such absence 
 would be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distin- 
 guished by the presence of an attribute which the 
 finite has not ; for, as no finite part can be a con- 
 stituent of an infinite whole, this differential char- 
 acteristic must itself be infinite, and must, at the 
 same time, have nothing in common with the 
 finite." (pp. 70, 71.) I understand by the Infinite, 
 and have a right to understand, the one living God. 
 The lecturer himself, again and again, so under- 
 stands it ; and he cannot be sufiered, because it 
 may be necessary for his special purpose, to enforce 
 — the rationalist may legitimately refuse him the 
 right of enforcing — in this instance, another sense, 
 and of taking refuge in the Infinite, the All — a 
 mere ideal abstraction. He admits, as his own 
 personal belief, and those with whom he is con- 
 tending, are entitled to keep him to the admission 
 of One Infinite Being, the Creator of the finite 
 universe. It is a patent fact that we can, and do, 
 
INCONCEIVABILITY OF INFINITE. 99 
 
 distinguish this Infinite Being from finite beings. 
 Whether we be able fully to conceive and compre- 
 hend the Infinite is not the question. But, as a 
 matter of fact, thus far, at least, we can, and do 
 go ; every intelligent man does distinguish the In- 
 finite Being from finite beings and things, and in 
 the very way which is j)i'onounced in this passage 
 to be impossible. What is more, we are perfectly 
 certain that the distinction so made is thoroughly 
 well-founded and real. We distinguish the In- 
 finite, I. by the absence of a quality which the 
 finite possesses — finity, limitation. But in sober 
 earnest, the lecturer asserts, that thus discrimina- 
 ting, difierentiating the Infinite, hy the absence of 
 limitation^ we do limit Him. II. by the presence 
 of an attribute which the finite has not — infinitv, 
 non-limitation. But, it is said, the difierential 
 characteristic must itself be infinite, and so can 
 have nothing in common with the finite. Of 
 course, so. It does not need to have anything in 
 common ; just because, in this point, the two have 
 nothing in common, the distinction between them 
 is complete. 
 
 Among other inconsequent passages, as I deem 
 them, the following may be selected — " a thing, an 
 object, an attribute, a person, or any other term, 
 signifying one out of many possible objects of con- 
 sciousness, is, by that very relation, necessarily de- 
 clared to be finite" (is the one Infinite Being, 
 
100 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 because there is a finite creation, and distinsruished 
 from it, necessarily declared to be finite ? does the 
 writer deliberately mean so ?) '^ An infinite thing, 
 or object, or attribute, or person, is, therefore, in 
 the same moment declared to be both finite and 
 infinite/' (p. 90.) Were there only the Infinite, 
 in the pure pantheistic sense, the Quantitative In- 
 finite, if we so speak, the One Whole, the to ndv 
 (a very difierent thing from the Qualitative Infi- 
 nite), and nothing but the Infinite ; all j^henomena, 
 and all finity, being mere illusion, the passage we 
 have quoted might stand. But rationalists, in 
 common with the lecturer, are not restricted from 
 supposing One Infinite Being, and, besides Him, 
 finite beings and things. The co-existence of the 
 One and the many they do not profess to explain, 
 nor does he, but it is a fact, and they accept the 
 fact, as he also does ; the natural reason accepts 
 it ; and they defy him, or any one, to prove that 
 it is contradictory. Inexplicable they will allow it 
 to be, but not contradictorv — at all events, ac- 
 cepted on both sides. Now will the lecturer main- 
 tain that, when it is asserted that, besides limited 
 beings and things there is one Being who is not 
 limited, '^ who is free from all possible (that is, as 
 I understand, necessary) limitation, and than 
 whom a greater is inconceivable '' — for such is his 
 own definition — this is limiting that Being ? The 
 thing is surely preposterous. Will he, aside from 
 
INCONCEIVABILITY OF INFINITE. 101 
 
 the Schellingian and Hegelian abstractions, with 
 which we have nothing to do, maintain that by 
 predicating attributes of that Being, in other words, 
 by conceiving Him to be being, and not nothing — 
 for, being without attributes is a contradiction — 
 we limit Him ? The fact is, that in these lec- 
 tures not only is One Infinite Being admitted, but 
 it is distinctly argued that his attributes, like his 
 nature, must be infinite. Let us then take forth 
 a single attribute — power ! What do I limit, 
 when I say that this power is unlimited ; or, if 
 you will, infinite ? True, power is not everything, 
 it is '^ the All," it is not the Infinite. And if the 
 lecturer is only showing the impossibility of the 
 Infinite, the '^ rb ndv/' with whom is he contend- 
 ing, for where is the rationalist, in this country, 
 who maintains it ? And, surely, a logician will 
 not imagine that he has gained a victory over those 
 wdio stand by his side and are glad to see him, 
 contending against a position to which they are as 
 thoroughly opposed as he can be. Human reason 
 finds no contradiction, though it does find profound 
 mystery in the unlimited power, unlimited wisdom, 
 unlimited spiritual excellence of the Being whose 
 nature is all unlimited. 
 
 The same Schellingian, Hegelian, or Spinozistic 
 Infinite, is assailed in another passage. '' The In- 
 finite, if it is to be conceived at all, must be con- 
 ceived as potentially everything, and actually no- 
 
102 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 thing ; for, if there is anything in general which it 
 cannot become, it is thereby limited ; and if there 
 is anything in particular which it actually is, it is 
 thereby excluded from being any other thing. But, 
 again, it must also be conceived as actually every- 
 thing, and potentially nothing ; for an unrealized 
 potentiality is a limitation/' (p. 71.) All this is 
 literally assailing nothing. The Infinite, in this 
 sense, the to irdv^ the universal substans, who 
 adopts the idea ? And yet even here, the veriest 
 pantheist, I am presumptuous enough to think, 
 might silence the Bampton lecturer on his own 
 ground, and might say. Yes, the Infinite is poten- 
 tially everything, and actually everything. There 
 is no unrealized 2:)0tentiality. Everything possible 
 is ; and there is nothing which the Infinite cannot 
 become, for no actual thing more is possible. And 
 what then ? the jDantheist might ask. 
 
 It is v^earisome, lowering, and almost corrupt- 
 ing, this mere vaporing of words and forms of 
 attack and of fence, which means nothing and 
 can end in nothing, save that it must have a mis- 
 chievous moral efiect, alike on the writer and his 
 readers. 
 
 I shall only notice, further, the form in which 
 the lecturer puts the conclusion, when he thinks he 
 has established '^ a consciousness of the Infinite, as 
 such, thus necessarily involves a self-contradiction.'* 
 (p. 71.) And yet a consciousness of the Infinite 
 
INCONCEIVABILITY OF INFINITE. 103 
 
 God, a consciousness that the Infinite God exists, 
 is vehemently maintained by Sir William Hamil- 
 ton, and is again and again admitted in the Bamp- 
 ton Lecture. The incongruity is owing entirely to 
 that illogical and (in effect) immoral shifting and 
 shuffling of the Infinite and an Infinite, to which I 
 have before had to refer. Here, " a consciousness 
 of the Infinite is self-contradictory." But the writer 
 can, when necessary, find Infinity in one living 
 Being. ^'^ We are compelled," he says, " by the 
 constitution of our minds, to believe in the exist- 
 ence of an Infinite and Absolute Beins; — a belief 
 which appears forced on us, as the complement of 
 our consciousness of the relative and the finite. 
 But the instant we attempt to analyze the ideas 
 thus suggested to us, in the hope of attaining to 
 an intelligible conception of them, we are, on every 
 side, involved in inextricable confusion and contra- 
 diction." (p. QS.) No, we are not, it might be re- 
 plied ; it is not true ; unless, indeed, instead of 
 keeping by the idea of One Infinite God, Ave shift 
 it, ever and a2;ain, and substitute for it. the Infinite 
 — a mere abstraction, a perfectly wild and unmean- 
 ing abstraction, against which it is utterly worth- 
 less labor for this accomplished v/riter to argue ; 
 for where is it held, where is anything approaching 
 it held .? " So long as human consciousness,'' — 
 these also are the words of the Bampton Lecture ; 
 with what consistency they are introduced any one 
 
104 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 may judge — " contains the idea of a God" — and 
 He is the Infinite — '"and the instincts of worship, 
 so long mental philosophy will walk on common 
 ground with religious belief/' (p. 32.) 
 
 I think I may appeal to every reader of the 
 work, whether, not the tendency, but one great 
 and avowed purpose of it be not to separate mental 
 philosophy from religious faith, to show that they 
 are irreconcileable, and that faith has no security, 
 save in a universal protest against the authority of 
 the understandinoj. Ao;ain, '' It is bv consciousness 
 alone, that we know that God" (and He is the 
 Only Infinite) " exists, or that we are able to offer 
 Him any service.'' (p. 86.) And yet the same 
 writer maintains " that a consciousness of the In- 
 finite (who is God) is self-contradictory," and, 
 therefore, I should presume to argue, impossible. 
 
 Minute criticism of these two Lectures need not 
 be pursued further. Looking back, especially to 
 the second, and to the long array of contradictories,, 
 which is there slowly and formally drawn out, it is 
 hardly possible to avoid thinking that, throughout, 
 there is, at least, seeming satisfaction, in darkening 
 and blasting what many regard as the natural be- 
 liefs and hopes of men. The irrepressible feeling in 
 my mind — of course without for an instant im- 
 peaching the personal convictions of the writer, and 
 referring solely to the reasonings and conclusions 
 of his book — is, that I have been dealing; with a 
 
INCONCEIVABILITY OF INFINITE. 105 
 
 virtual scepticism ; with a scepticism, moreover, 
 which seems to gloat over its own blindness, and 
 impotence, and degradation, and almost to exult in 
 putting out its own eyes, and covering itself with 
 shame and rags ! 
 
 Theism, on the mere ground of our rational 
 nature, and in the absence of written revelation, is 
 imjDOSsible ! That is the conclusion which the Lec- 
 turer announces. The co-existence of the Infinite 
 and the finite involves endless contradictions. 
 Either we must abandon the finite and hold bv the 
 Infinite, adopting the scheme of Pantheism, or we 
 must abandon the Infinite and hold by the finite, 
 adoptiug the scheme of Atheism. But both alter- 
 natives alike land us in contradictions as great or 
 greater than those from which we seek to escape. 
 Theism, Pantheism, Atheism are impossible, nearly 
 equally impossible ! Man cannot even read the 
 alphabet out of which a rational Theism must be 
 framed. Paragraphs, sentences of profound mean- 
 ing, are impossible ! Even single words, the sym- 
 bols of living ideas, precious as suggestive of undy- 
 ing truth, are impossible. Man is ignorant of the 
 very letters of the alphabet, cannot join them to- 
 gether, cannot pronounce them, and cannot form 
 even a solitarv term. 
 
 It is a terrible conclusion, if it be true. But is 
 it true ? Is it true that in the absence of written 
 revelation, natural Theism is impossible ? Is it 
 
 5* 
 
106 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 consistent with facts ? Is there no Theist, has 
 there never been a natural Theist, save among Jews 
 or Christians ? What of Mohammedans ? Has 
 no single soul, over all the ages, and in all the pa- 
 gan world, amidst many darknesses, and inconsis- 
 tences, and false beliefs, yet adhering to it, — has 
 no single soul ever struggled up through the crowd 
 of inferior divinities, to the idea and the faith of 
 one Supreme Being ? Has there been no Pytha- 
 goras, no Xenophanes, no Parmenides, no Socrates, 
 no Plato, no Zeno, noEpictetus ? Andhave there 
 been no obscure and unprivileged souls, of whose 
 ruder faith these higher spirits may suggest the ex- 
 istence ? 
 
 When we return — as on the lecturer's principles 
 we should be compelled to return — a decisive nega- 
 tive to these questions, it must surely be forgotten 
 that for thousands of years from the creation, man- 
 kind did not receive the boon of a written revela- 
 tion, as we understand it ; that with the exception 
 of one small tribe of men, all the nations of the 
 world were destitute of this boon till the coming 
 of Christ ; that in the 1800 years that have elapsed 
 since, only the few, compared with the vast masses 
 of the earth's population, have seen the light of the 
 Christian Scriptures ; that at this moment, four- 
 fifths of our race are in the midst of pagan or other 
 darkness ; that under shelter of the name Chris- 
 tian, there are untold myriads who know nothing 
 
INCONCEIVABILITY OF INFINITE. 107 
 
 of these Scriptures — myriads who are even opposed 
 to them. In consequence of their birth and educa- 
 tion, over which they have had no control, owing to 
 prejudiced and false notions which have been poured 
 into them, not sought by them, they are ignorant 
 of the New Testament and opposed to it. Is there 
 no God to them ? have they absolutely no means 
 through the powers and tendencies of their own 
 minds of reaching even to faith in God ? Is there 
 no God to all the outlying millions of our race ? 
 For 6,000 years or more, over all the world, has 
 there never been a Supreme Being in the thought, 
 in the heart of man, save among the few who have 
 received a written revelation ? 
 
 I hope I am profoundly thankful for the light of 
 Christian truth, and do fervently long for its diffu- 
 sion over the whole world. But among the teach- 
 ings of the New and of the Old Testament I regard 
 this as not the least divine, that the Great Father 
 since the beginning of the world has been veiy near 
 to the minds He has made, though they were 
 neither Jews nor Christians ; has ever had a wit- 
 ness for Himself within them ; and, above all, has 
 never ceased, by his Spirit, to strive with their 
 evil, in order to subdue and cast it out, that they 
 might be restored to Him, and might know and 
 trust Him for ever. 
 
CHAPTEK V. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS REASONINGS. 
 
 "Infinite," " Absolute," held equivalent to God — Conclusions as 
 to these applied to this — Investigation of Principles declared 
 wrong — Cannot reach Principles — Content with Regulations — 
 Truth and Falsehood — Properties of our Conceptions — Hume 
 and Berkeley — " Mind cramped by own Laws " — Unmitigated 
 Scepticism — Inconsistency of Reasoning — Suicidal. 
 
 In the first of tlie Banipton Lectures a singular 
 quotation from Clemens Alexandrinus is intro- 
 duced with, at least qualified approbation. "It 
 has been actually said/' writes the lecturer, " that 
 even if philosophy is useless, it is still useful as the 
 means of proving its own uselessness/' Wherein 
 the acuteness of this saying lies it might be diffi- 
 cult to discover ; but certainly the Greek father 
 who uttered it must have lost all Ms faith in phi- 
 losophy before he could think of exalting it to the 
 honor of proving its own uselessness. And the 
 modern lecturer, who appreciates the sharpness of 
 the Alexandrian salt, can hardly himself be a very 
 serious or determined believer. This little sen- 
 tence at the outset is startling — almost suspicious. 
 What is to be expected from one who, about to 
 discuss, on the ground of philosophy, a high, and 
 
MISCELLANEOUS REASONINGS. 109 
 
 sacred, and most momentous subject, betrays that 
 he has little or no confidence in the instrument he 
 is to employ ? Nor has there been anything to 
 quiet this early suspicion, so far as we have yet 
 gone. Kather otherwise. Had the lecturer under- 
 taken to show, he could have adopted no more 
 effectual method than he has done of showing the 
 utter uselessness and mischievousness of philoso- 
 phy. The never-varying tendency of his work, I 
 humbly conceive, is to destroy all respect for phi- 
 losophy and for the efforts of human intelligence. 
 So many things, it has been j)roved or attempted 
 to be proved, philoso23hy cannot do, the human 
 mind cannot do, that one is fain to inquire at this 
 stage, is there anything which they can do ? 
 Where is this process of nullifying and annihi- 
 lating to stop ? Limits of religious thought ! 
 Doubtless, religious thought has its limits, and it 
 must be important to discover them. But it must 
 also have its sphere ; and where is this ? Here we 
 have all limits together, on this side, on that side 
 — nothing but limits everywhere. Difficulty is 
 added to difficulty ; the circumscribing cord is 
 drawn tighter and tighter, narrower and narrower, 
 until literally no atom of free space is left. 
 
 One who has been well nigh overwhelmed by 
 the contradictions and confusions that are here so 
 laboriously piled up, and who at first sees no es- 
 cape from them, may be imagined to stop the lee- 
 
110 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 turer and to ask tremblingly, before yielding him- 
 self without reserve — '' But what more ? where is 
 this to end, or has it an end ? You tell me the 
 Infinite is inconceivable, and that a consciousness 
 of it is self-contradictory, and that the human, 
 mind can do nothing towards solving the problem 
 of the universe — cannot w^ork out for itself even a 
 single first principle — but what then ? Whither 
 is this j)hilosophical nihilism to conduct me ? 
 What more am I to be required to abandon ? I 
 v;ould see the end ?" 
 
 These questions are fair, and the answer which 
 they must receive is unmistakeable. The lecturer 
 goes so far, and is so ingenuous, so explicit, that 
 doubt is impossible. Hitherto the argument has 
 been restricted to tJie Infinite or x\bsolute, whether 
 One living Being, or a vast indefinite whole, or 
 both, is not determined, but, in any case, an idea 
 wdiich it is possible to reach (if at all) only by 
 the highest effort of abstraction. Throughout the 
 later lectures, however, the abstraction is dis- 
 missed, and by the Infinite or Absolute, the Di- 
 vine Being is unmistakeably intended ; and what 
 had been proved, or supposed to be proved, in re- 
 ference to the philosophical abstraction, is applied 
 to the only true God. The lecturer began with 
 the position, that it is impossible to know the Li- 
 jinite; he ends with the position, that it is impos- 
 sible to know God — a somewhat different thing, 
 
MISCELLANEOUS REASONINGS. Ill 
 
 one might judge, and therefore a questionable con- 
 clusion, unless he has clearly shown that the Infi- 
 nite or Absolute are convertible with God, and 
 this he certainly has not done or professed to do. 
 Meantime, it is again and again broadly asserted, 
 that man does not and cannot know Grod; at all 
 events, does not and cannot know that he knows 
 God. The utmost, even with the aid of revela- 
 tion, that we can reach is, ^^ such a knowledge as is 
 best adaj^ted to our wants and training. But how 
 far that represents God as He is, (I understand 
 this to mean, how far it represents the true, the 
 real God) we know not, and have no need to 
 know." (p. 146.) It is explicitly declared, that 
 ^Hhe Infinite (he means God, and can mean 
 nothing else) — God — is not an object of human 
 thought at all." (p. 218.) It is not yet the time, 
 for showing all that must grow out of this conclu- 
 sion, but it ought to be distinctly understood that 
 on the principles of the Bampton Lecture it is not 
 God, not very God, not the true God, but some- 
 thing essentially difierent from Him, and how far 
 difierent we cannot ascertain, that we can ever 
 know ; not God, not very God, not the true God, 
 but something essentially difierent from Him, that 
 we can ever worship. 
 
 Be it so — and what then ? It comes to this, at 
 least, that only in some sphere, lower than the 
 Divine — if at all — there can be scope for the efforts 
 
112 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 of the human mind. But even this hope is vain. 
 The lectm'er distinctly aims to make out that, 
 within the entire range of speculative thought, 
 there is nothing for us — at all events ultimately — 
 but contradiction, confusion, and darkness. He 
 states that the very first law of all thought and of 
 all consciousness, the very first principle of action 
 and feeling, and the very perception of our senses 
 create for us only inscrutable mysteries. The un- 
 derstanding can do nothing, but blindly accept the 
 conditions with which it is environed, or else stum- 
 ble at the very first step into insoluble contradic- 
 tions. Moral liberty, personality, individuality, 
 and the commerce between mind and matter, stare 
 us in the face, w^hen we look out on the region of 
 speculative thought, and vainly demand from us 
 an interpretation. It cannot be given. The mere 
 facts (of liberty, personality, etc.), the lecturer 
 admits, are not inconceivable and not contradic- 
 tory. So far from this, " they embody," he says, 
 " the veiy laws of conception itself, and are expe- 
 rienced every moment as true." (p. 140.) But we 
 must not speculate on them — it is impossible to 
 gain the least satisfaction res]^)ecting them — all in- 
 quiry is not only useless, but wrong in its very 
 principle. On every subject and on every side, the 
 lecturer seems to be able only to heap up difficul- 
 ties. The very things which are universally ac- 
 cepted and understood, he is at pains to show, are 
 
MISCELLANEOUS REASONINGS. 113 
 
 connected with others which are not understood at 
 all, which cannot even be discovered. Any inquiry 
 into these higher facts is peremptorily forbidden, 
 as lying beyond the legitimate sphere of thought. 
 At all events, " to such inquiry/' he pronounces, 
 " no satisfactory answer can be given." (p. 141.) 
 But surely, we may at the least try to advance, if 
 but a step ; we may patiently speculate, and 
 pierce, and wait for light ? No. At this jDoint, 
 without an effort to inquire, he would have us 
 rest I But why ? For a reason which is even 
 more startling than the statement, for which it is 
 supposed to account. " The highest principles of 
 thought and action to which we can attain," he 
 says, " are regulative, not speculative ; they do 
 not serve to satisfy the reason, but to guide the 
 conduct." (p. 141.) The counter-assertion is 
 enough ; the highest principles do satisfy the rea- 
 son, and they then best guide the conduct, when 
 they have first satisfied the reason. 
 
 I cannot and will not argue such a point as this. 
 But I may be suffered to ask, is this philosophy ? 
 — is this the spirit of philosophy ? — has this been 
 inspired by the writings of Sir William Hamilton ? 
 With a deeper feeling than I care to clothe in 
 words, I answer — no, it has not ; it is as wide as 
 the poles asunder, from either the tone or the let- 
 ter of the teaching of that great man. And I hope 
 to furnish abundant proof of this, ere long. No : 
 
114 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 the natural and true association of such ideas as 
 those just referred to is not with a high philoso- 
 phy, hut with a darkening scepticism. Hence it is 
 no wonder to me, that the lecturer should find in 
 Hume — who, though perhaps personally not a 
 sceptic, made it the business of his life to show 
 that all philosophy and all speculative inquiry ter- 
 minated only in scepticism — I do not wonder that 
 the English logician should find, in the Scottish 
 sceptic, a statement, which in its letter and in its 
 aim, he can accept and commend. " No priestly 
 dogmas," says Hume — I quote from the Bampton 
 Lecture, p. 138 — '^ ever shocked common sense 
 more than the infinite divisibility of extension, 
 vvith its consequences. He should have added, 
 that the antagonist assumption of a finite divisibil- 
 ity is equally incomprehensible.'' Be it borne in 
 mind, that the substance of this statement is not the 
 question, resjDecting which men of the most oppo- 
 site sentiments may concur ; I refer to the sym- 
 pathy of spirit between the sceptic and the logician, 
 at all events, to the oneness of tendency and effect 
 in their labors, to shock common sense, to put 
 down reason, and to beget scepticism. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, we are hardly prepared 
 for the assertion, in its stern dogmatic force, that 
 '' truth itself is nothing more than a relation. 
 Truth and falsehood are not properties of things 
 in themselves, but of our conceptions .... 
 
MISCELLANEOUS REASONINGS. 115 
 
 trutli, in relation to no intelligence^ is a contradic- 
 tion in terms." (p. 149.) It is quite admitted that 
 om' conceptions of things may be true or false ; 
 truth and ftilsehood are qualities of our concep- 
 tions. But are they only qualities of our concep- 
 tions ? that is the question. A statement, a rep- 
 resentation, a fact so-called, a principle, may be 
 true or false in itself Our idea of it is one thing, 
 but its own actual, j)ositive truth or falsehood is 
 quite another thing. I am not ignorant how such 
 positions as the lecturer's may be defended, in 
 ■what logical forms they may be put and held to 
 be invincible. But I know also that they are the 
 very foundation of the idealism of Berkeley, of 
 which, the idealism of Hume was the necessary 
 and native consequence, and I hold them to be as 
 ruinous as they are unsound. 
 
 Perhaps it ought not to be matter of surprise 
 that the writer, who has evidently lost faith in the 
 human mind, and certainly aims to destroy its 
 authority, and can be satisfied with nothing short 
 of its utter humiliation, should also be doubtful 
 respecting truth itself, should question its indepen- 
 dent reality, and should reduce it to a mere modi- 
 fication of the conscious subject, a mere quality of 
 our conceptions. Happily, there is an untaught 
 dialectic, in this case, a native, instinctive logic 
 which is more than a match for all the subtlety of 
 the schools. The common sense, I mean communis 
 
116 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 sensuSy in the old, high signification, the common 
 reason of men rebels against this idealistic theory, 
 and will have none of it. There is such a thing as 
 truth ; there are such things as truths, independent 
 realities, apart from our conceptions altogether, be 
 they right or wrong. Immortality, responsibility, 
 are real properties of beings, not mere subjective 
 affections. Wisdom, rectitude, purity, benevolence, 
 are real properties of beings in themselves, indepen- 
 dent,- immutable entities attaching to substance, 
 and not essentially affected by any conceptions that 
 may be formed in any mind concerning them. 
 These conceptions may be true, and tbey may be 
 false, they may vary endlessly ; but truth and 
 truths are immutably, eternally the same. 
 
 In connection with the principles that have now 
 been instanced, the Bampton lecturer seems to nar- 
 row the compass, and to enfeeble the intellectual 
 power of man, to an extent, and with an undis- 
 guisedness, which are somewhat confounding. He 
 seems desirous of encompassing this part of our 
 nature with difficulties which it cannot remove, 
 and with darkness which it cannot penetrate, and 
 of showing that it has, and can have no other in- 
 heritance than this. " Such problems'' — he means 
 problems insoluble — " arise inevitably, whenever 
 we attempt to pass from the sensible to the intelli- 
 gible world, from the sphere of action to that of 
 thought, from that which appears to us, to that 
 
MISCELLANEOUS REASONINGS. 117 
 
 which is, in itself." (p. 135.) Where then, any one 
 may now ask, is the sphere of human intelligence ? 
 We can only answer, nowhere ; for the intelligible 
 world, the world of thought, the world of reality, 
 in distinction from that of j^henomena, is shut 
 against us. Where is the sphere of human intelli- 
 gence, as an essential part of our mental constitu- 
 tion ? nowhere. It has no sphere, unless we accept 
 from the lecturer the world of sense, of action, and 
 of outward phenomena, the same over which the 
 bodily senses and the animal instincts, and the 
 mere calculating, prudential faculty, preside. It 
 is impossible that anything can be more unquali- 
 fied, undisguised, and free, than the language in 
 Avhich our destiny is pronounced. ^' In religion, in 
 morals, in our daily business, in the care of our 
 lives, in the exercise of our senses, the rules which 
 guide our practice cannot be reduced to principles 
 which satisfy our reason." (p. 135.) 
 
 Emphatically and utterly I protest against this 
 view of human experience. It is not consistent 
 with fact. It is wholly at variance with fact. 
 Were it meant, that we cannot reach principles, 
 which leave no unanswered question behind, this 
 would be quite admissible, and since the range of 
 truth is unlimited, this must also apply to intel- 
 lects higher far than the human. Even they can- 
 not advance to the utmost boundary of truth and 
 of knowledge, beyond which no question can arise. 
 
118 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 But apply where it may, this is not what is stated, 
 but something essentially different. And if what 
 is stated be really meant, that we cannot reach 
 principles, which, whatever questions they leave 
 behind, are nevertheless satisfactory to the reason, 
 I answer, this is contradictoiy to all fact. The 
 distinction is acknowledged every day, and is patent 
 to all, between those who merely follow practical 
 rules, and those w^ho search into the principles on 
 which the rules are based. The one form the class 
 of prudent, correct, successful persons. The latter 
 are distinctively called wise. In religion and 
 morals, the mere servants of custom and of pre- 
 cepts are, at the best, decent, harmless, innocent. 
 They, on the other hand, who inquire, and inves- 
 tigate, and search for the grounds of religious be- 
 lief, and of moral law, until they are able to satisfy 
 their rational and then- moral nature, only they are 
 really virtuous and pious. In the actual experience 
 of life, persons in whom the trust of their fellow- 
 creatures is reposed are such as are believed to have 
 thought for themselves, and made their deliberate 
 election of principles, and come to a fixed purpose 
 to stand by them, at all hazards. For the indivi- 
 dual self, there is no inward rest, and no real 
 strength to suffer or to do, save from deep, satisfy- 
 ing, immovable convictions. " Men of princij^le" 
 — in distinction from mere practice — is not a flour- 
 ish of words, a poor deception which we put upon 
 
MISCELLANEOUS REASONINGS. 119 
 
 ourselves, in order to conceal an unwelcome fact 
 There is a reality answering to it ! There is such 
 a thing as examiDing, discovering, and laying 
 hold of deep and sure principles, which in their 
 measure, satisfy the reason, and are felt to be inde- 
 structible. 
 
 Were the representations, from the Bampton 
 Lecture, which have been produced, true, then for 
 once, we might altogether agi'ee with the lecturer 
 in the method by which he accounts for them. 
 They would verily suggest — he distinctly says, and 
 believes they do suggest, and he puts it as the ac- 
 tual fact of the whole case — " they suggest, as 
 their obvious explanation, the hypothesis of a mind 
 cramped by its own laws, and bewildered by the 
 contemplation of its own forms.'' (p. 142.) These 
 are his very actual words, and to me, this conclu- 
 sion — of course, referring solely to the book, and 
 not questioning for a moment, the actual personal 
 convictions of the writer — seems the climax of an 
 unmitigated scepticism ! In my humble judg- 
 ment, it is blasphemy against human reason ! 
 blasphemy against the Being who formed the 
 mind of man ! Aye ! its Father ! God is the 
 Creator of all things, but he is the Father of 
 minds, only of minds, hut of minds. And what 
 of his child — the mind of man ? Here is the an- 
 swer of the lecturer, '' a cramped, bewildered thing, 
 cramped by its own laws, bewildered in its own 
 
120 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS OF LOGIC. 
 
 forms !" It can avail liim nothing, to take refuge 
 in the doctrine of the fall, or of original sin. He 
 blasphemes the very primitive constitution of the 
 mind, the original laws, the essential thought- 
 forms, established by The Maker, and he declares 
 that they can terminate — are designed to termin- 
 atCy save within the sphere of the senses — though 
 even here, one cannot forget that he has said that 
 the very perception of our senses creates for us in- 
 soluble mysteries — in nothing but contradiction, 
 confusion, and darkness. One of the grossest para- 
 doxes of Germany has been outdone here in Eng- 
 land. For what end were eyes given ? To limit 
 vision, was the reply of the German sage,. But 
 here, — for what end was mind given ? to limit 
 knowledge, to prevent us from knowing, to cramp 
 and bewilder the being endowed with it. 
 
 In the presence of such, or anything approach- 
 ing such an announcement, I think of ingenuous, 
 open, youthful souls ! By all means let them be 
 warned against the danger of presumptuous and 
 rash philosophizing. But can we not also quicken 
 and kindle them ? Can we not touch their spirit- 
 ual nature, w^ith a wise and gentle hand, so as to 
 awaken a tremulous response ? They need to 
 have the upward path of inquiry opened to them, 
 hopefully, to be invited and stimulated to the 
 search after truth ! Can we do nothing to kindle 
 the glow of generous enthusiasm in their breasts — 
 
MISCELLANEOUS KEASONIXGS. 121 
 
 the fire of an inextinguishable love of truth ? It 
 is not nohle, in a professed philosopher to frown on 
 the spirit of inquiry, and to check and chill the effort 
 of speculative thought. It is not noble, to humble 
 and degrade the human mind, to exhibit its power- 
 iessness, and to convict it of doing always and 
 only mischief. But in these Divinity lecture ser- 
 mons, whatever be the subject, the heavy blow 
 comes down on man's intellectual powers. What- 
 ever be the illustration, the lesson never varies — 
 how worthless, fallacious, and injurious are all 
 speculative efforts ! It is poor and pitiable work, 
 so to represent truth on the one hand, and the 
 mind of man on the other, as to leave no refuge 
 for a generous and high pulsing soul, absolutely 
 no refuge, but scepticism or despair. 
 
 I only add, on this section of the subject, that 
 there is a glaring inconsistency between the lec- 
 turer's views of the human mind in general, and 
 his ow^n particular use of the instrument, when as- 
 sailing rationalism. Beginning, from the outset, 
 with the position that the Infinite or Absolute is 
 wholly and only inconceivable, is not, in fact, an 
 object of human thought at all, he nevertheless 
 reasons on the subject with confidence, and with 
 an apparent total absence of effort. We are com- 
 pelled to think, that at least lie knows thoroughly 
 well. It is no diflficultv, no labor to him. Like 
 
 an accomplished chess-player, he is so familiar 
 
 6 
 
122 CONCERNING APPLICATIONS Of LOGIC. 
 
 with the pieces caDcl places, that he could make the 
 moves blindfoldj and check at every turn. The 
 subject is not above him, but he is manifestly 
 above it, and can handle it with perfect ease. The 
 most impalpable distinctions he can pursue, the 
 darkest processes of abstraction he can penetrate, 
 and all the windings and ramifications of the 
 highest ideas he can trace out. In this respect, the 
 Bampton lecturer must not be confounded with 
 Sir William Hamilton. Cousin, — after Helgel, 
 and striving to bring the German schema some- 
 what within the range of the common understand- 
 ing, and to make it, instead of a pure ideal fig- 
 ment, at least a little more consistent with the 
 reality of things — had put forth, in brilliant capti- 
 vating form, his Philosophy of the Infinite. This 
 was a legitimate object of criticism. Hamilton 
 simply criticizes it, takes the reasonings and posi- 
 tions as given, brings them to the test of what he 
 deems established principles, and concludes that the 
 Infinite does not come within the legitimate sphere 
 of philosophy, and is incogitable by the human 
 mind. The Bampton lecturer, on the other hand, 
 argues independently, constructs and spreads out 
 his own processes of reasoning, as on a subject 
 with which he was familiar, asserts confidently, 
 and concludes decisively. Nevertheless, after all, 
 he confesses, " I know actually nothing about the 
 Infinite or Absolute, I can attach no idea to the 
 
MISCELLANEOUS REASONINGS. 123 
 
 words, they are perfectly, wholly, only inconceiva- 
 ble by my mind." 
 
 It is hardly a question, whether this does not 
 vitiate the entire argumentation, to the very core, 
 and from beginning to end. An impartial umpire 
 might surely say, you reason as if you thoroughly 
 understood your subject ; and yet you assure me 
 that you do not, that you cannot even conceive the 
 ideas which you put into words. Which am I to 
 believe, your course of reasoning, which is one thing, 
 or your assurance, which is quite another thing ? 
 If you do not know, and cannot even conceive this 
 Infinite or Absolute of which you speak, am I to 
 think that you are nevertheless able to reason ac- 
 curately concerning it ; and am I to trust your 
 reasonings, and to accept your conclusions ? The 
 reductio ad ahsurdum is a perfectly legitimate 
 method, and quite satisfactory when fitly em- 
 ployed. But who ever heard of reducing to ab- 
 surdity, a thing of which he was utterly ignorant, 
 of which he could not even form the least concej)- 
 tion ? Are we not obliged to think that there 
 must be some egregious fallacy, utterly fatal to the 
 entire reasoning of this book on " the Limits of 
 Beligious Thought ?" 
 
SECTION THIRD. 
 
 CONCERNING A PHILOSOPHY OF "THE 
 UNCONDITIONED," ETC. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 I. — Relation of the Scottish axd Oxonian 
 
 Philosophies. 
 II. — Meaning of "The Unconditioned." etc. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 PwELATION OF THE SCOTTISH AND OXONIAN PHILOSOPHIES. 
 
 Hamilton and Mr. Maurice — Scottish System — Chief Fault — Ex- 
 cellences — Entire Separation from Bampton Lecture — " The 
 Unconditioned," etc. — Assumptions of Rationalism — Cousin — 
 Realism of Hamilton — Wrote in Interest of Philosophy, and of 
 Logic — Lecturer of Theology — Hamilton's Conclusions and his 
 opposite. 
 
 This, perhaps, is the fitting place for attempting, 
 presumptuous though it must seem, a brief vindi- 
 cation of the illustrious Scottish philosopher, with 
 whom, and whose philosophy, the Bampton Lec- 
 ture and its respected author, have been completely 
 identified. First of all, for a moment or two, I 
 may notice what, though in my humble judgment 
 it be an entire mistake, is, I am sure, the farthest 
 thing possible from a misrepresentation, on the 
 part of Mr. Maurice, whose fervent, eloquent, and 
 noble protest against the recently promulgated 
 views of revelation, must deepen the already pro- 
 found respect and love with which he is regarded. 
 " Sir William Hamilton," says Mr. Maurice, " a 
 loi^ician in the most thorou2:h and exclusive sense, 
 was too consistent, and too honest, not to avow his 
 
128 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 abhoiTcnce of mathematics." (p. 156.) -^ "A brave 
 man doubtless, reckless of popularity, ready to 
 overthrow the discoveries of the generations past, 
 or the prospects of generations to come, rather than 
 sacrifice his consistency. One cannot but honor 
 him for his sincere, cordial, unconditioned hatred 
 of that which had no meaning for him." (p. 156.) 
 No meaning for him ! I am not aware of the 
 ground on which this idea of Hamilton's utter 
 ignorance is based. It seems to need something 
 like proof, and proof, I am convinced, would not 
 be easy to find. But for his cordial and uncondi- 
 tioned hatred of mathematics, I must look upon 
 this, as an entire mistake. He does indeed say 
 that the study of mathematics is not improving, in 
 the sense and in the degree in which its admirers 
 maintain that it is. But he admits that as a 
 mental discipline, in which view, and in which 
 view alone, he speaks of it, "it is beneficial in the 
 correction of a certain vice, and in the formation 
 of a certain virtue. The vice is the habit of mental 
 distraction ; the virtue is the habit of continued 
 attention." (p. 304.)t He, at the same time, quotes 
 with approval the words of no mean authority^ 
 who asserts that the chief benefit of the study lay 
 " in strengthening the power of steady and conca- 
 tenated thought." (p. 305.) Hamilton does say, 
 that the study is capable of leading to credulity on 
 
 * ""What is Revelatiou,'" etc. \ '•' DiscussioiiSj" etc. 
 
SCOTTISH AND OXONIAN PHILOSOPHIES. 129 
 
 the one hand, and to scepticism on the other hand. 
 But the name which awakens so much reverence, 
 Bacon, he brings forward as countenancing the 
 same idea. 
 
 It ouo;ht not to be for^jotten, that Sir W. Ham- 
 ilton explains himself and his purpose, when he 
 says, " we are far from meaning to disparage the 
 mathematical genius, which invents new methods 
 and formulas or new and felicitous appUcations of 
 the old." (p. 285.) '^ Our objections and those of 
 our authorities are directed against the excessive 
 study of the mathematical sciences in general." (p. 
 321.) The case was simply this, as stated by him- 
 self — '' the university of Cambridge, unless it can 
 demonstrate that mathematical study is the one 
 be^f, if not the exclusive, mean of a general evolu- 
 tion of our faculties, must be held to have estab- 
 lished and maintained a scheme of discipline, more 
 partial and inadequate than any other, which the 
 history of education records/' (p. 259.) " Some 
 intelligent mathematicians," he adds, " admit all 
 that has been urged against their science as a prin- 
 cipal discipline of the mind, and only contend, 
 that it ought not to be extruded from all place in 
 a scheme of liberal education. With these we have 
 no controversy." (p. 261) " The question," he says, 
 " does not regard the value of mathematical science, 
 considered in itself, or in its objective results, but 
 
 the utility of mathematical study, that is, in its 
 
 6* 
 
130 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 subjective effect, as an exercise of the mind. The 
 expediency is not disputed of leaving mathematics, 
 as a co-ordinate, to find their level, among the 
 other branches of academical instruction. It is 
 only contended, that they ought not to be made 
 the principal, far less the exclusive object of acade- 
 mical encouragement." (p. 260.) 
 
 On the whole, perhaps it may be allowed, that 
 this was, and still is, an open question, on which 
 men may take the side taken by Hamilton, with- 
 out either entire ignorance or cordial hatred of ma- 
 thematical science, or its professors. 
 
 Whether I be right or wrong, in imagining any 
 connection between this mistake and the supposed 
 identification of Sir W. Hamilton with Mr. Man- 
 sell, so comj)lete has the identification been, that 
 in many quarters what praise or blame has been 
 measured out to the one, has been supposed to be 
 equally deserved by the other. In some cases, a 
 prepossession in favor of the Scottish philosopher, 
 in others a strong prejudice against him has been 
 created ; both, I hope to show, alike unmerited. 
 It is not forgotten by me, how much is justly due 
 to the accomplished and learned author of the 
 Bampton Lecture. I have not the power to injure 
 his high reputation — I hope also, it is the farthest 
 thing possible from my desire. Nevertheless, it will 
 be maintained that he has misconstrued, and has 
 totally misapplied and perverted Hamilton's doc- 
 
SCOTTISH AND OXONIAN PHILOSOPHIES. 131 
 
 trines. Altogether, the design is to show, that the 
 fundamental principles of the Bampton Lecture are 
 very far aj^art indeed, from the j)rinciples, but espe- 
 cially from the genius and the spirit of the modern 
 Scottish philosophy. 
 
 Sir W. Hamilton needs no eulogium from any 
 one. His labors and his writings are his monu- 
 ments. He belongs to Europe, and Europe, for 
 ages to come, ^vill cherish his memory and his work 
 as among her rarest treasures. Praise, from such 
 as I am, would be simply presumptuous, with 
 whatever genuine reverence and admiration I may 
 look upon him. But, it would be folly to claim for 
 Hamilton's, or any other philosophical system, 
 either faultlessness or perfection. One flagrant 
 error in it has often been singled out, it may be 
 called, the one flagrant error, which more or less 
 taints the whole. It is the theory of causation, to 
 which its author clung with intense, passionate 
 fondness to the last, the impossibility of conceiving 
 an absolute commencement (or an absolute termi- 
 nation) of finite phenomena. But in spite of this 
 great vice, the excellences of the system are many 
 and grand. 
 
 1st. The doctrine of external perception ; simple, 
 jirofound, exhaustive, affording an impregnable 
 philosophical basis for natural realism. 2d. The 
 doctrine of consciousness. Kant had first com- 
 pletely revealed and interpreted this authoritative 
 
132 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 basis of philosophical induction. Cousin, also, had 
 penetrated into its "arcana/' with his subtle genius, 
 and had irradiated them with the warm light of his 
 fervid imagination. But to Hamilton we are in- 
 debted for the full analysis of the facts of conscious- 
 ness, and for the rigid and logical exposition of its 
 laws. 3d. The analysis and synthesis of the men- 
 tal powers ; exact, complete, comprehensive ; are 
 a lasting monument to Hamilton's fame. Even 
 the mere nomenclature is an inheritance ; beautiful, 
 suggestive, severely fitting. I. The acquisitive 
 faculty — perception external and internal. II. The 
 conservative faculty, memory proper. III. The re- 
 productive faculty, recollection proper, under the 
 laws of association. IV. The representative fac- 
 ulty, imagination. V. The elaborate faculty, the 
 understanding. VI. The regulative or legislative 
 faculty, reason. 
 
 I have said nothing of Hamilton's achievements 
 in the sphere of logic, though competent judges de- 
 clare them to constitute his highest triumph. But 
 my information is too limited to authorize me to 
 speak, and perhaps my power of appreciation is yet 
 more limited still. 
 
 In comparing the modern English, and the mod- 
 ern Scottish philosophies, there is one feature of re- 
 semblance which it is impossible to deny. It is, liere, 
 acknowledged with great sorrow. The relativity 
 of all our knowledge is maintained by Hamilton. 
 
SCOTTISH AND OXONIAN PHILOSOPHIES 133 
 
 Entire and universal relativity is maintained, in 
 the face, as we shall by-and-by strive to show, of 
 considerations founded on experience, which go at 
 least to modify the position. " Our whole knowl- 
 edge of mind and matter is only relative, of exist- 
 ence absolutely and in itself we know nothing." 
 (Lee. i. 138.) '^ All we know, is known only un- 
 der the special condition of our faculties.'' (Lee. i. 
 140.) " However infinite and various may be the 
 universe and its contents, these are known to us, 
 not as they exist, but as our mind is capable of 
 knowing them. Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad 
 modum recipientis." (Lee. i. 61.) ^^ God only 
 exists for us, as we have faculties of apprehending 
 his existence." (Lee. i. 63.) Even so — thus far, 
 the two appear to be in harmony. Perhaps it may 
 come out eventually, that the harmony is more ap- 
 parent than real, special rather than general. But 
 to the points of contrast : — 
 
 I. The unvarying tone of the Bampton Lecture, 
 we have seen, is repressive, humiliating and con- 
 demnatory of the efforts of the speculative under- 
 standing. But it is a fact, which hundreds at this 
 moment would be eager to attest, that the living 
 teaching of Hamilton w^as stimulative and quick- 
 ening in the highest possible degree. If anything 
 be certain it is this, that he inspired his students 
 with an enthusiasm for speculative inquiry, a pas- 
 sion for investigation. And in this respect his writ- 
 
134 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 ings are at one with liis oral instructions. " Spec- 
 ulation/' he says, ^^ is not a negation of thought 
 but the highest energy of the intellect." (Lect. i. 
 114.) The Bampton Lecture constantly exalts 
 faithj in opposition to intelligence. Hamilton en- 
 dorses the sentiment, that doubt is the first step to 
 philosophy, and that the sceptical, searching, spec- 
 ulative spirit is indispensable in its disciples. 
 Philosophy is the art of doubting well. (Lect. i. 
 90-93.) Again, supposing materialism to gain the 
 ascendancy, he says, ^* Philosophy would then be 
 subverted in the subversion of its three gi'eat ob- 
 jects, God, free-will and immortality" — the very 
 three, from w^hich especially and peremptorily, the 
 Bampton Lecture would for ever shut us out ; 
 " true wisdom," he adds, " would then consist, not 
 in speculation, but in repressing thought, during 
 our brief transit from nothingness to nothingness." 
 (Lect. i. 37.) We know where the repression of 
 thought and the prohibition of speculation are de- 
 manded, with abundant plainness. 
 
 XL The entire separation of philosophy from 
 theology, inasmuch as the latter belongs to the 
 region of faith, is distinctive of the Bampton Lec- 
 ture. Let us hear Hamilton's idea of philosophy, 
 " It comprehends all the sublimest objects of our 
 theoretical and moral interest : every (natural) 
 conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present 
 wo"rth and future destiny of man is exclusively de- 
 
SCOTTISH AND OXONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 135 
 
 ducted from the philosophy of mind." (Lect. i. 
 13.) '' Mind rises to its highest dignity, when 
 viewed as the ohject, through which and through 
 which alone our unassisted reason can ascend to 
 the knowledge of God." (Lect. i. 35.) Need I say, 
 where we are taught that reason never can ascend 
 to this knowledge ? Again, ^^ the importance of 
 mental ^^hilosphy to theology has not become su- 
 perfluous in Christianity. Anterior to revelation, 
 religion rises out of psychology as a result, subse- 
 quently to revelation, it supposes a genuine phi- 
 losophy of mind, as the condition of its truth." 
 (Lect. i. 42.) Again, after arguing on philosophi- 
 cal gi'ounds for the priority of free intelligence in 
 the universe, he adds, ^^ such is the manifest de- 
 pendence of our theology on our psychology, in 
 reference to the Jirst condition of a Deity — the ab- 
 solute priority of free intelligence. But this is, per- 
 haps, even more conspicuous, in relation to the 
 second, that the universe is governed not merely 
 by physical, but by moral laws, for God is only 
 God, insomuch as he is the moral governor of a 
 moral world." (Lect. i. 32.) '^ Thus it is shown," 
 he says, " that theology is wholly dependent on 
 psychology, for with the proof of the moral nature 
 of man, stands or falls the proof of the existence 
 of a Deity." (Lect. i. 33.) If these passages fail 
 to mark a severance wide and fundamental I con- 
 
136 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 fess myself unable to understand what like and un- 
 like mean. 
 
 III, The last quotation suggests a characteris- 
 tic of the Bampton Lecture, namely, the ethical 
 principles maintained in it, which will fall to be 
 examined at length in its proper place, and has 
 not yet come before us. Here, it is taken forth 
 only for a moment, and for the one purpose of con- 
 trast. No more unambiguous illustration of the 
 contrast, perhaps, will be found, than is furnished 
 by the perfectly opposite views taken of a passage in 
 Kant's Kritik of the Practical Reason.^ It is that 
 well-known, magnificent passage, beginning some- 
 what thus: — " Two things, alike incomprehensible, 
 lie clear before me, the starry heaven above and 
 the moral law within ;'' there follows a glorious 
 and noble exposition of essential and immutable 
 morality and of conscience as the revelation of it. 
 Hamilton quotes it at length, with enthusiastic 
 admh'ation as well of the soundness of the doctrine 
 as of the stern sublimity of the expression. The 
 Bampton lecturer simply ignores such a revelation 
 of morality, and such authority in conscience. Is 
 there no difierence between the two ? 
 
 IV. Were everything else set aside, or satisfac- 
 torily exjDlained, there remains one grand funda- 
 mental doctrine, which places the two distin- 
 guished men, of whom we speak, immeasurably far 
 
 * Kritik der Pradischer Vernunft, s. 238. Riga, 1788. 
 
SCOTTISH AND OXONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 137 
 
 apart from one another. It is the doctrine of the 
 higher reason in man. Without the least hesita- 
 tion, so far as concerns the work, on The Limits of 
 Religious Thought, it can he asserted, that its au- 
 thor beheves in no intellectual endowment, above 
 the faculty of judgment, the understanding proper, 
 the comparing and reasoning power. There may 
 be occasional sentiments and phrases, that seem as 
 if they pointed elsewhere, but throughout the dis- 
 tinct evidence is unvarying, abundant and decisive, 
 that the highest of the mental powers is the mere 
 understanding. But Hamilton places last and 
 highest in his synthesis of intellectual endow- 
 ments, reason, the lociis princijoiorum, the place 
 of native intuitions, of necessary, universal truths. 
 He calls this, " the power which the mind has of 
 being the native source of certain a priori cogni- 
 tions.'' It is the regulative faculty, but not in the 
 feeble sense of the Bampton Lecture, where regu- 
 lative is used as equivalent to promling rules for 
 practice and life. It is regulative, in the sense of 
 regnant, legislative, insomuch as it gives forth 
 laws of thought, creates mental forms, arising out 
 of its own proper nature, according to which, 
 knowledge and thought are moulded. It is not 
 reasoning, and has nothing to do with reasoning, 
 which, on the contrary, belongs wholly to the un- 
 derstanding, the lower reason. This reason does 
 not reason, never can reason. Its only office is to 
 
138 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 see what is written within, and to announce ac- 
 cordingly. It is the true m-tel-Iectio7i, though a 
 lower faculty commonly usurps this name. " The 
 human mind," says Leibnitz, " is not only capable 
 of knowing universal, necessary truths, but of dis- 
 covering them in itself. There is a disposition, an 
 aptitude, a pre-formation, which determines our 
 mind to elicit these truths, and causes that they 
 can be elicited." So wrote the great Grerman ; 
 and Hamilton, after reciting his words, adds, ^^ I 
 have quoted these passages for their own great im- 
 portance, as the first full and explict announce- 
 ment, and certainly not the least able illustrations 
 of one of the most momentous principles in philo- 
 sopliif — (Lect. ii. p. 359.) This principle, how- 
 ever, is entirely ignored in the Bampton Lecture. 
 It is not possible to exaggerate the extent and the 
 depth, the entirenss and absoluteness of the dif- 
 ference, arising out of the reception or rejection of 
 the doctrine of the higher reason, as the organ of 
 a priori truths. 
 
 I have done with the contrast ; and can now, 
 only in a single sentence, cluster together the points 
 which have been selected. 1st, in a spirit repres- 
 sive of speculation and of philosophical inquiry, 
 and one stimulative and quickening in the highest 
 degree ; 2nd, in totally opposite views of the pro- 
 per objects of philosophy and of the relation of 
 philosophy to theology ; 3rd, in no less opposite 
 
SCOTTISH AND OXONIAN PHILOSOPHIES. 139 
 
 views of conscience and of immutable morality ; 
 and 4th, in a mere discursive understanding on the 
 one hand and a higher reason on the other hand, 
 the author of the Bampton Lecture is thoroughly 
 and essentially separated from Sir William Hamil- 
 ton. I am prepared to maintain, that wherever 
 the philosophy of the able work, on the Limits of 
 Religious Thought, may find its source, it is not 
 and cannot be, in the system of Hamilton, the 
 fundamental principles of which are utterly irre- 
 concilable with its structure, its conclusions, and 
 its entire tendency and spirit. 
 
 But the doctrine of " the Unconditioned, the 
 Absolute, the Infinite"' remains, and here, at all 
 events, it may be conceived, it will be impossible 
 to deny that the conclusions of these two distin- 
 guished men are entirely identical. I am very far, 
 indeed, from being satisfied that this is at all the 
 case. 
 
 We must look back to the account which was 
 given in an earlier part of this criticism of Ger- 
 man philosophical speculation ; of that account 
 the use is, now, to be made, for which, chiefly, it 
 was introduced. Be it then remembered, that 
 Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were not only meta- 
 physicians and philosophers, but the acknowledged 
 and admired leaders of metaphysical philosophy. 
 Hegel, especially, was a profound logician and the 
 master mind of his age. Nevertheless, we have 
 
140 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 seen, that the course of his speculation was, in 
 many respects, consistent only with a thorough 
 logical monomania. The same was nearly equally 
 true of the others. Yery frequently, the logical 
 processes which they constructed might be rigidly 
 sound. But one and all began in pure assumj)tion, 
 and throughout, necessitated, now and again, re- 
 course to assumption. The Absolute of Schelling 
 and Hegel and the absolute-e^o of Fichte, at all 
 events, the absolute of the two former was not only 
 a mere petitio principii, but a mere abstraction. 
 Being, Absolute being, in the naked, impoverished, 
 most abstract sense of Hegel, was only the wildest 
 figment of the logical intellect, and had no possible 
 reality answering to it. And w^e have seen, in 
 part, what conclusions, revolting to common sense, 
 were built up out of this figment. Nevertheless, 
 the mere dialectic freak of a pow^erful but, in this 
 respect, uncontrolled understanding, was the theory 
 of the universe, the one philosophy, at last dis- 
 covered, the science of sciences. And it was hailed 
 as such, over Germany, by the ablest and best 
 men. 
 
 It was impossible that a man so intensely realis- 
 tic as Hamilton, a believer in a real, external uni- 
 verse, a real individual soul of man, and a real 
 Grod — all, with him, first principles of philosophy, 
 immediate data of consciousness — could do any- 
 thing but vehemently protest against this mania 
 
SCOTTISH AND OXOXIAX PHILOSOPHIES. 141 
 
 which, withal, had so much to captivate and allure 
 a certain order of minds. Besides, himself as pro- 
 found and . accomplished a logician as Hegel, how 
 could he but indignantly spurn mere assumption 
 and be shocked by daring, outrageous, even impious 
 and, withal, baseless syllogisms ? The German 
 school of which we speak must by no means be 
 confounded ^vith the early sages of Greece and of 
 Egypt. There is a profound and warm sympathy, 
 which it is hardly possible to repress, when we lis- 
 ten to the wild rhapsodists of Elea, crying, as they 
 did, amidst darkness and perplexity ; or when we 
 gaze on the ecstacies of Plotinus. Jamblichus, and 
 Proclus : for they were men possessed and ab- 
 sorbed, surrendered disinterestedly, unreservedly, 
 and wholly to what thev passionately beHeved in. 
 But we come in contact with quite another phase 
 of experience, in the German school. I am far 
 from denying the attribute of earnestness to Hegel, 
 yet farther still from denying it to Schelling, and 
 farthest of all from denvino: it to Fichte. But 
 with Hegel, at all events, earnestness was a quality 
 far more of the head than of the heart — it was in- 
 tellectual, much more than either spiritual or 
 moral. He had enthusiasm, an absorbing and 
 overmastering enthusiasm, but it was the enthu- 
 siasm, not of religion, not even of philosophy, but 
 almost purely of logic. He had a passion for 
 subtletv, for svstem, and. whetted bv success, it 
 
142 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 became a passion for victory, for scholastic supre- 
 macy. It seems to me impossible to resist the 
 conclusion, that Hegel became, as it was quite na- 
 tural he should, a bewitched and intoxicated lover 
 of his own system — the system, as he and his dis- 
 ciples currently called it. All other realities were 
 little to him in comparison with the system, the 
 method. He souglit to make them consistent with 
 it, but he cared far more for it than for them. In- 
 vincible logic, all-conquering syllogism, were every- 
 thing to him. That a whole nation, nearly, so far 
 as its educated men were concerned, had caught 
 this frenzy, had taken up, as the grandest reality, 
 what rested on a mere assumption and worse, a 
 mere abstraction, an idea, nothing real, not even 
 possible, not even cogitable, was enough to vex and 
 rouse a nature more phlegmatic than Hamilton's. 
 But when, besides, it was attempted by Cousin to 
 introduce the system to Europe, through a French 
 medium, to modify, and soften, and rationalize it, 
 suiTounded with all the brilliance of a noble ima- 
 gination and all the corruscations of a highly-cul- 
 tivated genius, he could be silent no longer. 
 
 But — and attention is specially called to this 
 fact — he A\Tote in the interest of philosophy. In 
 the first instance, he Avrote chiefly, if not solely, in 
 the interest of philosophy, in the interest of the 
 science of logic, whose legitimate sphere, he judged, 
 had been wantonly abandoned. Logical formulae 
 
SCOTTISH AJJD OXONIAN PHILOSOPHEKS. 143 
 
 and logical processes had been applied to certain 
 abstractions — ^^ The Unconditionedj the Absolute, 
 the Infinite/' For philosoj)hy's sake, he sought to 
 demonstrate that a system of the universe, on such 
 a basis, was impossible and absurd. For logic's 
 sake, he sought to demonstrate that these wild ab- 
 stractions were not amenable to logical laws, w^ere 
 not compressible within logical forms, and were 
 totally incognizable and incogitable. 
 
 The Bampton Lecture, quite on the other hand, 
 is nominally, formally, altogether a theological 
 treatise. It is written in the interest of Christian- 
 ity, and consists of '' Divinity Lecture Sermons," 
 according to the wording of the original founda- 
 tion. Its title is, The Limits of Beligious Tliought 
 Examined. The lecturer had nothing to do with 
 philosophy, except indirectly ; nothing to do with 
 the rationalism of Hegel ; nothing to do with these 
 abstractions — The Unconditioned, the Absolute, 
 the Infinite — unless they were to be held synony- 
 mous with the name of God, which neither Hegel, 
 Cousin, nor Hamilton profess to maintain. The 
 distinction is fundamental. Hamilton, in the first 
 instance, at least, was discussing a question of pure 
 metaphysics and of logic. 
 
 The lecturer was determining a religious doc- 
 trine. But there is a second distinction. It is 
 not denied that Hamilton applied his philo- 
 sophical conclusions to the more sacred sphere 
 
144 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 of theolog}'', but such applications were partial 
 and comparatively few. He holds and asserts, in 
 the strongest terms, that the Unconditioned, the 
 Infinite, the Absolute — these abstractions — are 
 wholly and only inconceivable. But he never 
 asserts, in the same way, that Grod is wholly in- 
 conceivable. I think we shall find that he asserts 
 something veiy different, and totally opposite. As 
 Infinite, he holds that God, in his infinity, is in- 
 conceivable, cannot be taken into thought. But 
 this is all. Here are his very words : ''The Divin- 
 ity in a certain sense is revealed ;" could he have 
 said the Infinite is, in a certain sense, revealed ? 
 No : the Infinite, that ideal abstraction, that Pan- 
 theistic substance, is wholly inconceivable ; but 
 with him the Infinite was not equivalent to Grod, 
 but very much otherwise, for he says — " The Di- 
 vinity is, in a certain sense, revealed ; in a certain 
 sense, is concealed. He is at once known and un- 
 known." Who can desire more than this ? 
 
 But the Bampton lecturer does not only not 
 say this, but he says the very opposite. All the 
 findings of Hamilton and his own, in reference to 
 the Unconditioned, Absolute, or Infinite, he ap- 
 plies, without reserve or qualification, to the living 
 God, as if they were the same. God, the true 
 God, according to him, is wholly and only incon- 
 ceivable by the human mind, " is not an object of 
 human thought at all." Something is conceived ; 
 
SCOTTISH AND OXONIAN PHILOSOPHERS. 145 
 
 but it is not God, not God as He is, not very God ; 
 something is known, but it is not God. God, very 
 God, is only and wholly unconceived and unknown. 
 There are separate terms, occasional phrases, in the 
 BamjDton Lecture which seem to point to more 
 than this. But taking, with the utmost stretch 
 of candor, its deliberate reasonings, its express and 
 repeated language, and its unvarying tendency and 
 spirit, I think no impartial reader will deny that 
 this is what it maintains. 
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED, ETC. 
 
 " No Unconditioned," " No Absolute" — Never, to created Spirit — 
 " Infinite" Incomprehensible — Of^ concerning, " Infinite" — No 
 Idea, then Nothing — Word Infinite understood — How ?- — Infi- 
 nite not whole Sphere of Divine — Eternal — This Infinity proper — 
 All possible Attributes — Power, Knowledge — He, who Infinite, 
 not All-incomprehensible — Human Spirit and Highest — Human 
 Personality and Divine — Human IntelUgence and Divine — floral 
 Attributes and Divine — Man, true Microcosm. 
 
 These disastrous terms, the Unconditioned, tlie 
 Absolute, the Infinite ! How have they been im- 
 ported into theology, or even into philosophy ? 
 Above all, what authority is there for making 
 them convertible with the sacred word, Grod, the 
 name of the Only Living One, whom we have 
 been taught to call our Father, surely, not all un- 
 known ? 
 
 Hamilton will tell us that '^ from Xenophanes 
 to Liebnitz, the infinite, the absolute, the uncon- 
 ditioned, formed the highest jDrinciple of specula- 
 tion." This sentence, separated as it sometimes 
 has been by those who have quoted it, from what 
 immediately follows, not only may lose part of its 
 meaning, but may convey a totally different sense 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 147 
 
 from what is intended. Hamilton adds, "but 
 from the dawn of philosophy in the school of Elea, 
 until the rise of the Kantian philosophy, no seri- 
 ous attempt was made to investigate the nature 
 and origin of the notion (or notions) as a psycho- 
 logical phenomenon." {Discussions, p. 18.) A cer- 
 tain ultimate point in speculation had been early 
 reached, been thereafter assumed and pondered, 
 but never deliberately and philosophically investi- 
 gated, either during the Platonic, or the Alexan- 
 drian, or the scholastic periods, till the time of 
 Kant and his iDimediate followers. Alexandrian 
 philosophy, plunged in the mysteries of the 
 " Logos," and rapt in ecstatic visions — the vision 
 of pure being, a widely different thing from calm, 
 patient investigation, had all but entirely passed 
 this by. The marvellous dialectic subtlety of the 
 schoolmen, save in a single instance or two, in the 
 period of its highest excitement and energy, amidst 
 the war of universal s, and of sensible and intelligi- 
 ble species, dared not throw its weblike entangle- 
 ment around their ultimate idea, dared not touch 
 it. The silence and inaction of a thousand years 
 are significant. Better, some will say, they had 
 never been broken by the might and the mastery 
 of Hegelianism. No, by no means. This highest 
 principle, assumed so long, but never psychologi- 
 cally examined, lying dim and vague in the depths 
 of certain philosophic minds, as a terrible secret 
 
148 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 which they must not question — this, philosophized 
 and systematized, may reveal itself, as it never 
 could have done, otherwise. Let us search to see. 
 Thought, it is said, in its farthest regress, its 
 utmost effort to ascend to the ultimate, the hijrh- 
 est, reaches a limit which it cannot transcend — 
 ahsoluteness, unconditionedness. There must be 
 something primitive, original, antecedent to all 
 else, independent of all else. Be what it may, it 
 must be absolute, unconditioned, infinite. Specu- 
 lation asserts this, as its first principle, ponders it, 
 goes forth after it, did so thousands of years ago. 
 In the depths of eternity past, before the existence 
 of a finite universe, there must have been absolute- 
 ness, unconditionedness, infinity, something abso- 
 lute, unconditioned, infinite. That is the conclu- 
 sion, or rather, the postulate. And it may here 
 be allowed, that it is not unlawful to sufier 
 thought to wander back, even though it can only 
 weary itself in spasmodic efforts to transcend the 
 limits of creation, and to conceive the Uncreated, 
 alone, in immensity. Nor may this be wholly un- 
 connected with an exalted, a rare veneration. But 
 it is impossible not to feel, that this region cannot 
 belong to us, save in a very exceptional sense. We 
 may make the effort to pass into it, for a moment, 
 but it can be but for a moment. Our moment's 
 stay may awaken in our minds unusual sentiments 
 of reverence and awe. We may meditate, and wait^ 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 149 
 
 and gaze, and be stronger and better for the effort 
 But the region, certainly, is not ours. We can 
 KNOW nothing of it, however much we may con- 
 jecture : still less, can we reason confidently re- 
 specting it. It is the place, if place at all, not for 
 reasoning, but for wonder and for abandonment to 
 profound, uncontrolled emotion. When, therefore, 
 it is reiterated from several quarters, the Absolute, 
 the Unconditioned, the Infinite, is, must he, we can 
 onlv ask, what do the words mean ? Absoluteness, 
 in the most wide and abstract sense, Uncondition- 
 edness. Infinity — certain qualities, attributes — but 
 attaching to what, inhering in what ? that is the 
 question — a question to which we can obtain no 
 answer. Is it something or nothing, or both, a 
 being or a thing, living or dead, mind or matter .^ 
 The absolute ; it is a mere ideal figment, a thing 
 of fancy, a pure self-imposition. There never was, 
 or could be, a reality answering to such an abstrac- 
 tion. 
 
 It may be possible to imagine the non-existence 
 of the finite universe, to conceive the Great Being, 
 alone, in immensity ; possible to conceive life, then, 
 intelligencCj then, one living intelligence. But 
 when this is called tlie absolute, that is, absolute- 
 ness, in the abstract, who can attach a sense to the 
 word ? Absolute truth is quite intelligible. We 
 understand by it, truth without mixture ; veiy 
 truth, and nothing but truth. And the Absolute 
 
150 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 God would be intelligible ; meaning, very God, the 
 real God, altogether divine, and alone divine. But 
 this is not what is meant, but something perfectly 
 different. It is the absolved God, God loosed from 
 all relation, external and internal, the uncondi- 
 tioned, brought under no condition of relation or 
 connection of any kind. One might answer, even 
 so — let it be granted thus far, at least. The Great 
 Being, before creation, alone, in immensity, must 
 have been unconditioned, ah extra ; necessarily so, 
 for there was nothing to condition Him. But what 
 is gained ? This is only saying, that He was alone, 
 in immensity, saying it in another form, without 
 the slightest advantage. The statement may be 
 true, at all events it cannot be denied. God was 
 then, and must be conceived, as the unconditioned. 
 But with that period and that state, save in mere 
 abstracted contemplation, we have nothing to do ; 
 and it is impossible, speculate as we may, that we 
 can ever know, certainly know, anything respect- 
 ing it. 
 
 The era of creation, whenever, howsoever start- 
 ing forth, the era of creation, alone, belongs to us ; 
 and, in connection with this, I maintain that these 
 terms — the unconditioned, the absolute (in the 
 sense of absolved), not only have no meaning, 
 but are thoroughly and utterly false. There is no 
 being, or thing, in the universe to whom, or which 
 they can apply. There is, there can be, no uncon- 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 151 
 
 ditioned God to us. The Grod of consciousness is 
 not unconditioned. Consciousness never revealed, 
 never could reveal, an unconditioned God. The 
 mere fact of the existence of a conscious creature 
 excludes the possibility of unconditionedness in 
 the creator. The Great Being has voluntarily 
 conditioned himself — that is, what we most cer- 
 tainly know — has voluntarily placed himself in re- 
 lation with created beings and thinsrs. There is no 
 such thing, evermore, as the unconditioned, the 
 absolute ; if, indeed, there ever was such a thing. 
 And how then shall we designate a philosophy, 
 which, of its own proper motion, without cause 
 given, brings up before us, and would perpetuate, 
 these meaningless barbarities, which can only be- 
 wilder and darken ? How shall we designate the 
 theology, which, through these monstrous fictions, 
 raises an impassable barrier between the Almighty 
 and his creatures, and, by the same means, strikes 
 down the divinest thing in their nature, the rea- 
 son He hath given them ? 
 
 The Bampton lecturer freely and constantly 
 uses the phrase " the Absolute," as a name for the 
 Deity, and the Absolute God, God in his absolute 
 essence, absolute being. There is no absolute God, 
 or essence, or being, in the sense of absolved, loosed 
 from relation ; and if the word is employed, ac- 
 cording to popular usage, to mean no more than 
 true, real, very God, then the fault is not a small 
 
152 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 one, of departing, in a philosophical work, from 
 the philosophical sense, and creating ambiguity 
 and error by a double meaning. Some, who are 
 far removed from the lecturer's standpoint, be- 
 cause the terms in question have come into such 
 prominence, not perceiving how injurious and how 
 false they are, have adopted them quite unhesitat- 
 ingly, as if they were true. The unconditioned, 
 the absolute, as phrases, occur very frequently, 
 without evil design, in our current literature and 
 theology. Perhaps, sufficiently valid reasons have 
 been produced to justify the demand, made in all 
 humility, but on ground which is deemed unassail- 
 able, that these barbarous, and most false words, 
 be banished from use for ever. They are meaning- 
 less, at the best ; there is no reality corresponding 
 to them. A true philosophy disowns them. A 
 true theology, still more. 
 
 But ^^the Infinite" remains, and, even in the 
 absence of the two cognate phrases, all the real 
 difficulty may yet abide unmitigated and entire, 
 compressed into the remaining term. Some ob- 
 jection might be taken to the form in which the 
 idea is put — the Infinite, that is Infinity, in the 
 abstract — where is it ? what is it ? I know of no 
 infinity but one. There is one Infinite Being. 
 Where else is infinity ? But Grod is Infinite ; 
 and the question rises up, as inevitably as if we 
 had still to deal with the terms, unconditioned 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 153 
 
 and absolute, is the Infinite conceivabie or incon- 
 ceivable, cognizable or incognizable, by the human 
 mind ? 
 
 On this point, I have to avow myself a humble 
 disciple of Sir W. Hamilton, and so much the 
 more, because I hold this to be perfectly consis- 
 tent ; indeed, alone consistent with a thorough se- 
 paration from the philosophy and the theology of 
 the Bampton Lecture. To me, the reasoning of 
 Hamilton is altogether invincible and invulnerable. 
 It amounts to this, put in the simplest form — To 
 think, is to condition, to limit, to bring within the 
 conditions, the limits of our thinking power. That 
 which has no limits, above, below, on this side or 
 on that, cannot be placed within limits ; in other 
 words, it cannot be thought. The Infinite is 
 strictlv unthinkable, because it is not limitable — 
 limitable not in any exceptional sense, but in 
 the true, literal sense of narrowing and circum- 
 scribing. 
 
 To think or the Infinite, concerning the Infinite, 
 to form ideas, notions respecting it, is quite possi- 
 ble ; but to think it, that is, to comprehend it in 
 thought, is strictly impossible. To think a thing 
 in the strict, philosophical sense, that is, to bring 
 it within thought, and to con-ceive it, or com-pre- 
 hend it, amount virtually to the same thing. Con- 
 cipiOj co7n-prehendo, suggest an original, literal 
 identity of meaning. To conceive, to form a con- 
 
 7* 
 
154 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 ccpt of a thing exactly answering to the reality, to 
 tlirow our thought around it and take it together, 
 or again, to lay hold of it together, to close upon 
 it with our grasp, are different forms of one sub- 
 stantial meaning, and that, again, is conveyed by 
 the single word, think. To think a thing, is to 
 grasp it within our thought. The Infinite cannot 
 be grasped within our thought, nor within any 
 limits, for, on all sides, it has no limits. To know 
 God, in his Infinity, is impossible ; but to know, and 
 know much respecting the God, who is infinite, is 
 quite another thing, and may be grandly possible. 
 Meantime, I venture to suggest that the conclusion 
 at which a sober philosophy arrives, is no other than 
 that which men have already universally adopted, 
 who know nothing of speculation or of metaphysi- 
 cal controversies. What they intend to convey, in 
 saying that God is infinite, is, that they have 
 thought and thought again and again, but have ever 
 found the reality towering upward, piercing down- 
 ward, stretching out on all sides immeasurably be- 
 yond their loftiest, farthest thoughts. Is it not so ? 
 At the same time, there are some exj)lanations 
 to be put on this general conclusion, and some 
 necessary reservations which have been often over- 
 looked, and have thus occasioned great inaccuracy 
 and even injustice, on the one side and the other. 
 When, for example, it is broadly asserted that we 
 can have no idea of, that is, concerning, the In- 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 155 
 
 finite, the statement is at variance with facts, and 
 with individual experience. Every one feels it, at 
 once. That concerning which I have no idea at all, 
 is to me nothing, in every sense, nothing. I may, 
 and do believe in that which I cannot fully com- 
 pre-hend in thought, which I cannot place clearly 
 within my thought. But I must at least, be able 
 to form some idea, some notion, as to what that is, 
 which I cannot fully comprehend. I must so far 
 have an idea concerning it, that I can distinguish 
 it, from what it is not. To believe in that, respect- 
 ing which I can form no notion, is to believe in 
 nothing, it is not to believe at all. The nature 
 which compels me to believe in the Infinite, must 
 supply me somehow with a substratum, a substance 
 of which my belief can take hold. Again, when it 
 is broadly asserted that we can attach no meaning 
 to the word infinite, this statement, also, is felt to 
 be at variance with fact. We do attach a most 
 distinct meaning to the word. Every one does, 
 else how comes the word to be used. Historically, 
 it stands simply thus : we have a certain notion or 
 notions in our minds, and, in order to express them, 
 we select, we create the word infinite, without 
 limits, and are satisfied that this word is a proper 
 and fitting medium for expressing what we mean. 
 The word infinite, we understand perfectly : it 
 means without limits ; but the thing which is infi- 
 nite, we cannot com-pre-hend, con-ceive, think, 
 
156 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED, 
 
 biing into thought, and we simply mean to say that 
 we cannot comprehend it, when we call it infinite. 
 There is the word contradictory. We have a dis- 
 tinct and positive idea as to what we mean, when 
 we say that a thing is contradictory ; but the thing 
 which is contradictory, we cannot think, cannot 
 take into thought, cannot conceive. Two and two 
 are nine, it is a contradiction ; a piece of wood is 
 two feet long and fifteen long, at the same time, it 
 is a contradiction : it is impossible to thought. 
 There is the word unintelligible. We know what 
 it means ; but the thing which is unintelligible, we 
 cannot think, cannot conceive, cannot comprehend. 
 It is not to he understood. The very notion we 
 have formed and expressed in the word, would be 
 destroyed, if it were understood. 
 
 In the same way, we have quite a clear notion 
 resjDecting what is meant by the word infinite, with- 
 out limits. This is not difficult to our mind. We 
 can reason respecting it ; we can apply it, and can 
 judge when it is rightly ap23lied, and when wrongly. 
 But that tuhich is infinite, we cannot con-ceive, 
 and we mean to assert its inconceivabilitv, w^hen 
 we say it is infinite. It is beyond thought, impos- 
 sible to thought. Infinity, attach to what it may, 
 where it may, is beyond thought, impossible to 
 thought. Rightly, Hamilton suggests, that the 
 word stands in human language as a symbol, not 
 of the power, but of the powerlessness of the human 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 157 
 
 mind ; not of knowledge^ but of ignorance. And 
 yet, is there not power as well as powerlessness ; is 
 there not knowledge as well as ignorance betokened ; 
 high, and stupendous knowledge. To know that 
 Infinity belongs to the Great Being ; that in cer- 
 tain respects he is unknowable, lifted above the in- 
 telligence of his highest creatures : this is power, 
 not weakness, this affects and elevates beyond mea- 
 sure our whole conception of Him. It is even this, 
 "which renders worship possible. But for this, there 
 had been no God to us. A God all-known and 
 comprehended, is no God. That which I fully 
 know and understand is below, not above me, for I 
 have mastered it. I have not to worship it, it must 
 bow down to me. That which towers immeasur- 
 ably above me, which I cannot scale and cannot 
 fathom, before which I am as nothing, less than 
 nothing, that, that alone, I fall down to and adore, 
 Not ignorance, but knowledge, is the mother of 
 devotion. Nevertheless, the sense of ignorance in 
 the created mind, of immeasurable ignorance and 
 inferiority, is preliminary and essential to all true 
 adoration. " Who can by searching find out God, 
 who can find out the Almighty to perfection ? It 
 is as high as heaven, what canst thou know ? 
 deeper than hades, Avhat canst thou do ? the mea- 
 sure thereof is longer than the earth, and it is 
 broader than the sea !" 
 
 But how do we come to predicate of any being 
 
158 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 or thing this stupendous, incomprehensible attri- 
 butCj Infinity, and in what sense is it predicable of 
 the one Great Being, and of Him alone ? There 
 are sacred associations here not to be despised, 
 which do not surround either of the two mere 
 philosophical terms to which we before referred. 
 This word is hallowed to piety, because it is sup- 
 posed to be sanctioned by the Holy Scriptures. 
 For the sake of those who might otherwise fail to 
 perceive how thoroughly oj)en the whole question 
 is, I shall quote the only passages in Holy Scrip- 
 ture in which the term translated by our word in- 
 finite is found. They are four in number. ^' Ethio- 
 pia and Egypt were her strength, and it was in- 
 finite." " Take the spoil of their infinite store." 
 " Are not thine iniquities infinite ?" Only in one 
 instance is the word connected with the Almighty, 
 and that with reference to one of His attributes. 
 ^' Great is the Lord, His understanding is infinite." 
 Here, and m the other three examples, the word 
 simply means, without number, without search. 
 Not once, have we infinite, in the modern, philoso- 
 phical and defined sense. 
 
 The Bampton lecturer, with Sir William Hamil- 
 ton, maintains that the Infinite is given in con- 
 sciousness, and given as the complement of our 
 consciousness of the finite. Correlatives imply 
 one another. It is not possible to think the one 
 without, in the same mental act, being necessitated 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 159 
 
 to think the other. Fully admitting the soundness 
 of this logical law, there is, nevertheless, not much 
 gained by it in the case before us. Logic and re- 
 ality are by no means necessarily separated, but 
 they are by no means necessarily connected. An 
 idea shall suggest its correlate. In thought, both, 
 shall be equally true, yet the one may have a posi- 
 tive reality answering to it, the other no reality at 
 all. Something implies its correlate, not some- 
 thing, nothing. Being implies its correlate, non- 
 being, Finite implies its correlate not finite, infi- 
 nite. The one is a reality before me, the other, in 
 two of the cases out of the three, is no reality at 
 all, and whether, in the third it be a reality, can- 
 not, at least only by such a method as this, be as- 
 certained. Indeed, I am far from being satisfied 
 that it is in this way at all, that we reach the no- 
 tion of the Infinite. 
 
 That there is in the human soul a native, intui- 
 tive, original sense of God, of a Supreme Being, 
 is one thing. But when Hamilton asserts that 
 " the Infinite'' is a datum of consciousness — as- 
 serts a universal conviction that the Infinite is — 
 some hesitation is, perhaps, pardonable, for this is 
 quite another thing. Two of the laws by which 
 we test the data of consciousness are before me : — 
 1st, the law of parcimony, namely, that no fact be 
 assumed, except it be simple and ultimate ; 2nd, 
 the law of harmony, namely, that nothing but the 
 
160 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNTCONDITIONED. 
 
 simple, ultimate fact be taken, without inference 
 or addition. It appears to me that both of these 
 laws are violated, when it is held that the Infinite 
 is given in consciousness. In the educated, culti- 
 vated mind — the mind of a philosopher, a scholar 
 — the datum may so gi'ow into this form, that it 
 shall not be judged susceptible of further analysis. 
 But is there not an earlier, simpler form of the 
 consciousness, truly the ultimate form, to which 
 this makes an unjustifiable addition ? That there 
 is a God is one of those a priori truths, those 
 primitive cognitions, that lie in the depths of our 
 higher reason, to which, in the words of Leibnitz, 
 there is a disposition, an aptitude, a preformation, 
 and which, though they may lie dormant, are ever 
 capable of being elicited. There is a God, a 
 Supreme, a highest Being, over all. But the 
 datum is given in this grand, undefined form. 
 That this Being is Infinite, I hold to be a conclu- 
 sion of the understanding — a conclusion in certain 
 cases so direct, immediate, and so strongly forced 
 in upon us, as to be with difiiculty distinguished 
 from the original consciousness. Nevertheless, the 
 two are perfectly distinct, and can be, and in strict 
 truth ought to be, kept apart. The sense of God 
 is universal, and native to the soul of man. But 
 only this is universal. The conviction that the 
 Supreme must be infinite is later, logically and 
 chronologically, and is reached, however directly 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 161 
 
 and rapidlyj only through the understanding. But 
 it is reached. There is no question here that the 
 Great Being is infinite, truly and properly infinite 
 is the Infinite One, the one only being of whom 
 this attribute is predicable. Yet it is a question, 
 a profound, even perilous question, one which de- 
 mands investigation, and may also lead to great 
 diversity of judgment — '^ In what sense and to 
 what extent does Infinity belong to the Great 
 Being ?" 
 
 The fallacy which pervades and vitiates the 
 Bampton Lecture is, that this one attribute con- 
 stitutes God, and since that which is Infinite is 
 inconceivable, therefore He is only and wholly in- 
 conceivable, unknowable. No proof is attempted, 
 but it is throughout constantly assumed that in all 
 respects, and in every view, God is only the Infinite, 
 and, therefore, the inconceivable. 
 
 There is one sphere in which, by consent of all, 
 this stupendous attribute must be predicated. The 
 duration of the Great Being is strictly infinite — 
 unbeginning, unending, underived, uncaused, abso- 
 lutely indej)endent, unassailable, unchangeable, 
 from everlasting to everlasting. How this convic- 
 tion is reached, whether a direct datum of the 
 higher reason, or a direct and irresistible inference 
 from a datum of the reason, it is not here needful 
 to inquire. There is no question to the pliiloso- 
 phical theist, any more than to the Christian theo- 
 
162 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 logian. But the con-cep-tion, the com-prchension, 
 to all is simply impossible. Take the image of a 
 perfect circle — without beginning, without end ; or 
 fancy a '■^ punctum stans ;" or repeat the words 
 "an everlasting now" — no past, no future, no suc- 
 cession, no change, a perpetual present. But after 
 all these, or any such helps, we should count the 
 man bereft of reason who should profess that he 
 could in the most distant or feeble way approach 
 to the conception, the com-prehension, of eternal 
 duration. Here is Infinity strictly incognizable, 
 incogitable, in the sense in which those words have 
 been explained. But it is believed, and that sup- 
 poses that we have formed some notion respecting 
 it, that we understand the words, and can see 
 clearly enough what that is which it is impossible 
 for us to com-pre-hend. It is believed. The lec- 
 turer holds it to be an immediate datum of con- 
 sciousness. I may conceive it to be an inference 
 of the understanding from an original datum. But 
 in either case it is believed. That is the fact. And 
 is it nothing.? What creature on earth, except 
 man, is capable of reaching this truth at all — is 
 endowed with the faculty of believing it, of know- 
 ing that it is true ? This is no badge of weakness, 
 but much more a symbol of the greatness of our 
 nature ; that we can and do believe in One who is 
 unbeginning, unending, with whom is no succes- 
 sion, no change, but an everlasting present. A 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 163 
 
 majesty, a grandeur, an awfulness, are thrown 
 around the Most High, which at the same time 
 react on us. We are elevated, whilst we are over- 
 awed. Our worship is not therefore ignorant, but 
 only so much the more enlightened, because it is 
 directed to One of whom we know that that is true, 
 which is inconceivably above our highest thoughts. 
 The being or essence of the Supreme, inasmuch 
 as it is unbeginning, unending, strictly eternal, 
 must be infinite. The same is equally true of the 
 attributes of the Supreme nature. As eternal ^ they 
 are, each and all, strictly infinite. But explana- 
 tion, elimination is attempted. The being of God 
 is his proper nature, that whereby He is what He 
 is, the suhstanSj essence in which attributes inhere. 
 When it is added, this essence is infinite in itself 
 (and not merely in virtue of its eternal duration), 
 I, for one, am unable either to affirm or deny. I 
 can attach no sense whatever to the words. It may 
 be gi'eat ignorance, great obtuseness, gi'eat incapa- 
 city. But I can form no sort of notion, what that 
 is which is maintained. It may be true, or it may 
 be false, but I am quite incapable of understanding 
 the one or the other. Logic would make short and 
 decisive work of this difficulty, if it be a difficulty. 
 The Divine essence, we should be told, must be 
 either finite or infinite ; if it be not finite, then it 
 must be infinite. Yet this also admits of an an- 
 swer, short, if not decisive. Who shall determine 
 
164 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 for US that these words, finite and infinite, are at 
 all apphcahle in this case ? I think they are not. 
 Heat is neither long nor short. Light is neither 
 round nor square. These qualities have no relation 
 to the substances named. Were it asserted that the 
 Divine essence is limited, finite, the ready questions 
 would start up, how, where, in what sense ? It is 
 impossible. There is, there can be nothing to limit 
 it. This is the one essence in the universe, the being 
 of beings, the primitive nature, the one fountain of 
 all other natures. Whence could a limit arise ? 
 It is contradictor}^ — would be destructive. 
 
 But, infinite in itself! I can attach no meaning 
 whatever, to the language. In my humble judg- 
 ment, to be incapable of limit and to be infinite are 
 not the same, but totally difierent. When the 
 duration of the Great Being is declared to be un- 
 beginning, unending, there is certainly a positive 
 idea conveyed, though we be unable to grasp it in 
 our thought. It is more, much more, than being 
 incapable of being limited, it is something positive 
 and actual in itself And it is this which I, for 
 one, am unable to attach any meaning to, in con- 
 nection with the Highest essence, the Highest na- 
 ture. Incapable of being limited is one thing, posi- 
 tive Infinity, as in the case of duration, is quite 
 another thing. Loosely, expletively, rhetorically, 
 we speak of the Infinite Life, the Infinite Essence, 
 without harm, possibly even so as to awaken rev- 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 165 
 
 er^nt feeling^. But, beyond tliis, if with the view 
 of exaltiDsr the Almio-htv, men have attributed 
 positive infinity to his nature, in itself, they have 
 done so, on their own authority. Men have origin- 
 ated this application of a sacred word ; a man may- 
 question its propriety and its truth. 
 
 Pursuing still this special course of thought it 
 is farther maintained that, when it is said that the 
 Supreme Being is enriched with all possible attri- 
 butes to which not one in any direction can be 
 added, this is the utmost that can be said. To 
 talk of an infinity of attributes is to utter not only 
 what has no meaning, but what is contradictory, 
 landing us in the absurdity of an infinite number. 
 And, in like manner^ the application of the term 
 infinite to the separate excellences (except in virtue 
 of their eternity) of the Most High, may be shown 
 to be not only unmeaning but false. For illustra- 
 tion, I select two Divine properties, which seem to 
 afibrd the most appreciable example of what I seek 
 to convey — ^power and knowledge. Shall we say, 
 Infinite power. Infinite knowledge ? With genu- 
 ine desire to honor their Maker, men have uttered 
 these expressions ; but they rest solely on human 
 authority. What do we really mean when we so 
 speak ? The infinite God, He who is strictly, 
 properly infinite, knows all the knowable and can 
 effect all the powerable. Is not this what we 
 mean, and all that we mean ? But that all the 
 
166 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 powerable and all the knowable amount, each, to 
 infinity who can determine ? None can. There is 
 no limit to the power of the Highest ; all that be- 
 longs to the sphere of power is His. There is no 
 limit to the knowledge of the Highest ; all that 
 belongs to the sphere of knowledge is His. 
 
 It comes to this. The God revealed in con- 
 sciousness is the Highest Being, beyond whona 
 nothing is possible. The understanding infers 
 that his duration must be unbegiuning, unend- 
 ing, strictly infinite; infers besides, that every pos- 
 sible attribute, physical, intellectual, and moral, 
 in the highest possible degree, must inhere in his 
 nature. On every side, in relation to every qua- 
 lity, the Supreme must tower immeasurably be- 
 yond the highest conceptions of his highest crea- 
 tures. The understanding concludes that he does, 
 and adores Him, Him alone, as Grod. There is a 
 sense in which the Highest is thus for ever un- 
 known and unknowable. But this conclusion of 
 the understanding, in its very nature and in the 
 very mode in which it is reached, involves that 
 there is also a sense, in which He is truly known 
 and for ever to be more and more known. Infin- 
 ity is all-incomprehensible, but infinity does not 
 extend, — cannot^ in the nature of things — extend 
 over the whole sphere of the Divine. The Being 
 who is truly infinite, is not a?/-incomprehensible. 
 Wherein and how far is he comprehensible ? 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 167 
 
 That is the question to which we now address 
 ourselves. 
 
 Sir William Hamilton, whom the Bampton lec- 
 turer professes to follow, shall here be our guide, 
 and shall show us the pathway to this highest 
 knowledge. " Though man/' he says, " be not 
 identical with the Deity, still he is created in the 
 image of God. It is, indeed, only through an 
 analogy of the human with the Divine nature, that 
 we are percipient and recipent of the Divinity." 
 {Discussions, p. 19.) And in these memorable 
 words : " Mind is the object, the only object, 
 through which our unassisted reason can ascend to 
 the knowledge of God/' From mind, from the 
 spiritual nature within us, according to Hamilton, 
 we rise, legitimately rise, to the spiritual nature 
 above us and over all. Merely, as essence^ as suh- 
 stans, we are utterly ignorant of our own minds. 
 But the man would be unworthy to be reasoned 
 with, who should, therefore, deny that we had any 
 real true knowledge of them. A mental image of 
 spirit, as distinguished from matter, we certainly 
 have not, for to that all materials are wanting. 
 But we have a clear, fixed idea of a spirit dwelling 
 within us, the residence of spiritual attributes and 
 the source of spiritual life and energies. From 
 our own, we rise, legitimately rise, to the uncreated, 
 all-creating Spirit, and can and do conceive — never 
 adequately, never with full comprehension, but in 
 
168 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 a way which satisfies, while it overawes reason and 
 awakens the profoundest veneration — can and do 
 form a conception of Him who is the fountain of 
 all spiritual being and excellence. This is the first 
 step in that mystic ladder, whereby, according to 
 Hamilton, our unassisted reason can ascend to God. 
 The second is no less direct. 
 
 From our own personality and individuality, 
 we rise to the conception of One Supreme Being. 
 The logical enigma of the One and the Many, the 
 One and the All, of which Mr. Mansell makes so 
 much, creates little perplexity in actual experience, 
 save in rare instances. I do not, dare not, make 
 light of it. Too well I know, how it has crushed 
 and tortured many an earnest soul, from the day 
 when the burdened singer of Elea sent up his wail, 
 till now. But as a matter of fact, men have 
 learned, save in rare instances, to argue very 
 simply, but very soundly. We are one, yet have 
 many powers. How our unity is not destroyed by 
 this plurality we cannot explain, but we certainly 
 know the fact that it is not destroyed. How the 
 I, that thinks, and feels, and acts, is not a bundle 
 of thoughts, and emotions, and acts, but separate, 
 independent, beneath and above them all, we can- 
 not explain ; but we certainly know the fact, and 
 accept it, and act m^^om it every hour, and find it 
 perfectly intelligible. The logical dilemma is not, 
 save in rare instances, either an intellectual or a 
 
MEANING OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 169 
 
 moral difficulty. Our separate unity and individu- 
 ality, and our entire identity at all stages of our 
 being, are, according to Hamilton, and, we pre- 
 sume, Mansell also, original data of consciousness. 
 And the unity and individuality of the Great Su- 
 preme present no difficulties which have not been 
 met and j^i'^'ictically surmounted in the case of our 
 own personality. So we plant our foot firmly on 
 the second step of the ladder which connects legiti- 
 mately, truly connects the human with the Divine. 
 A third and a fourth step are close at hand. 
 From intelligence within we rise to intelligence 
 above us ; from moral attributes within we rise to 
 supreme moral excellence above us. In these two 
 last respects, the principles of the Bampton Lec- 
 ture, as to the inconceivability of the idea of God, 
 are in directest contradiction to the ordinary con- 
 victions of men. We certainly know what an in- 
 telligent, what a moral nature means. The intelli- 
 gence and moral perfection of the Supreme may be 
 immeasurably beyond our highest concej)tions. 
 But knowledge and rectitude, and purity, and love 
 are real qualities, independent of quantity. Wis- 
 dom is wisdom, rectitude is rectitude, love is love, 
 whatever be the sphere over which they extend. 
 Wisdom on which no limit can be put, I cannot 
 co7?zprehend in my thought. But what wisdom is, 
 I clearly understand, and am able to form a higher 
 
 and still higher idea of its extent ; and if still far 
 
 8 
 
170 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONDITIONED. 
 
 above my highest idea, it stretches out, it is all the 
 while distinctly in my thought, though to its full 
 sweep I cannot reach. Infinity is for ever beyond 
 the grasp of my conceptive faculty, but wisdom is 
 not, moral attributes are not ; and a spiritual na- 
 ture, in which wisdom and moral attributes dwell, 
 is not. Even to say that the attributes, intellectual 
 or moral, are of an extent which I can never fully 
 comprehend, makes only a new and grand addition 
 to my idea of the nature in which they dwell ; in- 
 stead of destroying my conce]3tion, this makes it 
 only more real and more lofty. 
 
 Man is thus the true microcosm. His material 
 frame allies him with the visible universe ; his ra- 
 tional nature allies him with the invisible Creator 
 of the Universe. It is not faith, but scepticism, 
 which proclaims it impossible for reason to ascend 
 to the conception of God ; a scepticism, which is 
 in the face of our deepest convictions and of the 
 facts of experience ; a scepticism, we shall find, 
 which, having first laid the chief attribute of hu- 
 manity in the dust, proceeds to strip revelation of 
 all its glory, and to make it not an unveiling, but 
 a concealing of the Most High — an elaborate and 
 distressing disappointment. 
 
SECTION FOURTH. 
 
 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 I. — Necessary Conditions. 
 II. — Evidences of Revelation. 
 III. — Revelation and God. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 NECESSARY CONDITIONS. 
 
 Must believe God is — That Intelligent — Free Intelligence — Benig- 
 nant, Truthful — These Conclusions Indispensable — If not reach, 
 no Revelation to Man. 
 
 It was not to be demanded that the Bampton 
 lecturer should enter into any formal proof of the 
 divine authority of the Old and New Testaments. 
 He has not done so. It was by no means necessary 
 in relation to his special subject. We shall grant, 
 that supposing a revelation at all, he was entitled 
 to assume the actual revelation in the Holy Scri]3- 
 tures. But what of the preliminary question of a 
 revelation at all ? This had a connection, a very 
 close and startling connection with his subject. So 
 much so, that at this moment it is to me unac- 
 countable, almost incredible, that he could have 
 overlooked it. Without reasoning at all, let me 
 put the case as it may be su23posed to strike any 
 ordinary understanding. " Here is a revelation 
 from Grod." '' From God ? one asks, who has 
 yielded to the previous reasonings of the book. 
 From whom, did you say ? — God ? Who is He ? 
 where is He ? what is He ? You have proved to 
 
174 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 me that my understanding is incapable of guiding 
 me to know anything about God, and that I can 
 never, through my understanding, know anything 
 certainly about him. You have proved to me, that 
 I can never come to a fixed conclusion for myself, 
 that there is a God. You have proved to me that, 
 in the absence of written revelation, a rational 
 Theism is absolutely impossible ; that all thought, 
 and all speculative reasoning on the subject, can 
 only land me in insoluble contradictions and ab- 
 surdities. Do not mock me ; do not add insult to 
 injury. A revelation from God ? I must first of 
 all know that there is a God, and you have told me 
 that this I cannot know. I must first of all know 
 something about God ; aye much, very much, about 
 him ; much that is important and essential, before 
 I can even look at what calls itself a revelation from 
 Him." 
 
 Perhaps it would have been more exact, to say 
 that the lecturer has, in effect overlooked the facts 
 which I have expressed in this imaginary rej^ly. 
 In ivords^ he has acknowledged them ; but the 
 words are few and loose. The acknowledgment is 
 made as if little or nothing depended on it, and as 
 if the facts were of little or no importance, and pre- 
 sented no difficulty in relation to the general argu- 
 ment. The entire passage runs thus : — " But be- 
 fore applying this method to the j)eculiar doctrines 
 of the Christian revelation, it will be desirable to 
 
NECESSARY CONDITIONS. 175 
 
 say a few words on the preliminary condition, on 
 which our belief in the possibility of any revelation 
 at all is dependent. We must justify, in the first 
 instance, the limitations which have been assigned 
 to human reason in relation to the great foundation 
 of all religious belief whatsoever ; we must show 
 how far the same method warrants the assertion 
 which has already been made on other grounds, 
 namely, that we may and ought to believe in the 
 existence of a God, whose nature we are unable to 
 comprehend, that we are bound to believe that God 
 exists, and to acknowledge him as our Sustainer 
 and our Moral Governor, though we are wholly 
 unable to declare what he is in his absolute es- 
 sence." (pp. 170, 171.) 
 
 In this quotation, the phrase, Moral Governor, 
 occurs, though where the writer finds it, it is hard 
 to see. He does not tell us, nor what sort of con- 
 nection he supposes it to have with the acceptance 
 of revelation. The idea is not taken up at all, 
 either here or elsewhere. Even the phrase is not 
 introduced again. All that is in any way looked at 
 by the lecturer, in the passage now quoted, is that 
 we must believe that God exists, though He be 
 wholly and only inconceivable by our minds. This 
 belief in God, which lies at the foundation of the- 
 ology, he then, at some length, places by the side 
 of the belief in causality, which lies at the founda- 
 tion of philosophy. Theology, it is made out, is 
 
176 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 not worse than philosophy. The one rests on what 
 it cannot conceive, so does the other. That is 
 enough. Were it at all of importance, it might be 
 possible, with great ease, to resist this parallel. 
 Philosophy asserts that for every event, there must 
 be cause. But do we not distinctly know what we 
 mean, by the word cause ? We certainly do. How 
 the notion of cause originates, whether d priori or 
 d posteriori, or partly both, is a question which 
 has long been agitated, and may yet be unsettled. 
 It is even keenly discussed, whether there be such 
 a thing as causality at all, and whether all pheno- 
 mena may not be resolved into mere succession in 
 time, or place, or both. But what is meant, when 
 we speak of that which is properly cause, is no 
 question, never has been a question. Power ex- 
 presses the causal nexus, with abundant distinct- 
 ness and is perfectly conceivable. Why power 
 should be necessary, why for every event v/e should 
 be compelled to believe a cause we know not, and 
 can assim no reason. But that is all. On the 
 theological side, on the contrary, why there should 
 be a God, why we are necessitated to believe in a 
 God, is not the point which troubles any mind. 
 The lecturer does not say it is, but something per- 
 fectly different. He maintains that the very idea 
 of God, at all, we cannot conceive, and that we 
 know and understand nothing about him ; except 
 that He is. Even so. 
 
NECESSARY CONDITIONS. 177 
 
 But this is literally all tliat is advanced, on 
 what is admitted to be a '' preliminary condition 
 on which our belief in the possibility of any reve- 
 lation at all is dependent/' " We are bound to 
 believe that God exists/' says the Lecturer. And 
 what, then, of the contradictions, theistic, pan- 
 theistic, atheistic, into which we are inevitably 
 plunged, so soon as we dare to think ? Are they 
 to be all forgotten ? Must we not first of all get 
 rid of them ? But how ? Who, luliat shall ex- 
 tricate us from them ? Unless from within, ex- 
 trication is impossible. But let this pass. Grod is 
 given in consciousness, the lecturer will say. Let 
 it be granted. But through what power of our 
 nature do we take hold of this ultimate fact ? 
 Consciousness is a general term, which applies 
 equally to all our acts of knowledge, all our feel- 
 ings, and all our convictions. Somehow or other, 
 that which we distinguish as reason in man, the 
 higher reason, our unassisted reason, must be able 
 to ascend to God, in spite of all the alleged con- 
 tradictions. There must be no talk of building up 
 a consciousness, of constructing a notion. This is 
 original and universal, or it is not. If it be not, 
 then away with that necessity of belief, which the 
 lecturer admits and enforces. If it be, let us 
 neither add to it, nor take from it. This is an 
 intuition of our nature — the lecturer admits it, 
 
 Hamilton contends for it — a primitive, native, d 
 
 8* 
 
178 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 jyrtori cognition ; and its place can only be, the 
 higher reason. 
 
 There is an organ — it appears — a special power 
 in our mental constitution, through which we as- 
 cend to the highest. From that inner sanctuary 
 of our being, there comes forth the voice, " There 
 is a God, a Supreme over all." "We must be- 
 lieve in Grod/' But in what ? something or noth- 
 ins: ? To sav that we believe in God and yet that 
 we have no idea of Him, is neither more nor less 
 than a dhect contradiction. 
 
 The pathway by which unassisted reason can 
 ascend upward, I have already, under the guid- 
 ance of Hamilton, sought to describe. From our- 
 selves, we rise to the Highest. Infinity it is im- 
 possible ever to compass in thought, but He who 
 is truly Infinite, we can and do conceive of, and in 
 our measure, know. Every son of man in whom is 
 the sense of the Great Being, has also, by the same 
 token, formed his idea of that Being, more or less 
 imperfect, but also more or less true and real. Here, 
 then, is the first necessary preliminary condition 
 of belief in any revelation. On some independent 
 ground, through some power of our nature, we 
 must beforehand have reached the conviction that 
 there is a God. 
 
 2d. Not less essential is the condition, that we 
 be satisfied tliat this God is endowed with intelli- 
 gence. A -message from Him ! Are we satisfied 
 
NECESSARY CONDITIONS. 179 
 
 that He can instruct us, that He can have any- 
 thing great and worthy to communicate ? Unless 
 we be, it is impossible for us even to admit the 
 idea of a message from Him at all. 
 
 3d. A Grod under the law of universal necessity, 
 subject to a force over which he has no control, is 
 not one who could communicate with his creatures. 
 He must be governed by his own free choice, and 
 have the power of adopting measures, arising out 
 of the condition of those in whom He is interested, 
 and out of the purposes of his own intelligence. 
 Only a free being can be conceived to reveal him- 
 self 
 
 4th. The conviction is indispensable of the per- 
 fect truthfulness of the Supreme. I might have 
 added, his good will ; for who could oj)en the mes- 
 sage of a possibly malignant Deity. But at least 
 perfect truthfulness is absolutely essential. The 
 lurking idea of falsehood, the faintest suspicion of 
 decej^tion, would be utterly fatal to any communi- 
 cation between the Creator and his creatures. 
 
 Thus, then, it stands. That reason, which Mr. 
 Mansell represents as so feeble and so false, miLst 
 have real power and of no inconsiderable amount. 
 If he cannot trust it, at least the G-reat Being puts 
 confidence in it, and commits to it some high and 
 hard questions and some most momentous inter- 
 ests. If he can find nothing but darkness in its 
 path, nothing but contradictions and absurdities 
 
180 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION, 
 
 as its results and no destiny for it for ever, but 
 hopeless Avandering amidst the dreary mazes of 
 Pantheism and Atheism, the Great Being must 
 have far difierent thoughts, for He entrusts it, it 
 alone, with the determination of preliminaries, all 
 but infinitely important. Somehow or other, be- 
 fore even looking into what professes to be a reve- 
 lation, our minds, for themselves, must have been 
 able to reach the conviction, not only that there is 
 a God, but that He is an intelligent, a voluntary, 
 a moral — at least in the sense of truthful — beino;. 
 We cannot go to the revelation for proof of one of 
 these things. Unless they are all sure beforehand, 
 we cannot, as rational beings, must not, dare not 
 open it at all. 
 
 Imagine the Bampton lecturer, requiring only 
 belief in a God of whom we can form no concep- 
 tion, presenting the volume of revelation, strong 
 in the outward tokens of its origin, to the ration- 
 ahst with whom he has been reasoning. With 
 what bitterness, what desolation of heart, would 
 he answer : " You have jrat out my eyes, and do 
 you call on me to behold the daylight ; you have 
 destroyed my organ of hearing, and do you tell me 
 there are words of melody to which I should lis- 
 ten. Your external proofs are excellent, no doubt, 
 and satisfactory to those who can understand them. 
 But you have assured me that ^ my mind is a per- 
 fect blank/ in reference to the essential nature of 
 
NECESSARY CONDITIONS. 181 
 
 God, and that I have no means of knowing, in any 
 one direction, ivhat He truly is. Perhaps he is 
 destitute of intelligence, and this book could only 
 lead me into error and folly. Perhaps it is the 
 work of an invincible necessity, and I have not 
 even the satisfaction of knowing that it is what 
 lie wishes to communicate. Perhaps He hates 
 me, at all events has no regard to truth, and this 
 book may be a tissue of malignant untruths." 
 
 There is no answer but one to all this — the fun- 
 damental principles of the Bampton Lecture must 
 be unsound. Were they true, revelation would be 
 impossible. We could never come in contact with 
 it. We should want the indispensable preliminary 
 means for coming into contact with it. I deliber- 
 ately maintain, that were the principles of the 
 Bampton Lecture true, not a single son of man 
 could reach those conclusions, which are indispen- 
 sable, before he could rationally open the pages of 
 a professed revelation. But they are not true. 
 Every enlightened believer in revelation is a wit- 
 ness against them. Our minds are not perfectly 
 blank, as the lecturer asserts they are, in reference 
 to the essential nature of the Great Being. They 
 can and do reach, they are constituted to reach the 
 conception of a Supreme, Intelligent, Voluntary, 
 Moral Nature. Formed by the Almighty, it is 
 not strange that they should, it would be passing 
 strange if they could not. ^' Mind is the object, 
 
182 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 the only object" — I do not promise that this shall 
 be the last time I shall fortify myself in this critic- 
 ism by referring to these compendious and memor- 
 able words of Hamilton — " through which our un- 
 assisted reason can ascend to the knowledge of 
 God." 
 
OHAPTEE II. 
 
 EVIDENCES OF EEVELATION. 
 
 Eztemal Evidence — ^What? — Impossible to Multitudes — In Full- 
 ness to Any — Book, Divine in Origin — Contents Unknown — 
 Faith to Seek — Internal Evidence — "What? — Self-attestation — 
 Its Power. 
 
 There are obviously two methods, one or other, 
 or both of whicli might be adopted in dealing with 
 what claims to be a message from heaven. Either 
 it might be asked, if its contents be such, so true, 
 so pure, so great, so new, and otherwise unknown, 
 so consistent with all that had before been reached 
 respecting the character of the Great Being, as to 
 show beyond doubt whence it comes. Or it might 
 be asked, if the outward tokens and seals of its 
 origin be such, as not only to put down all sus- 
 picion, but to create entire conviction. The Bamp- 
 ton lecturer allows, in some sense, the propriety of 
 both of these methods, but he expresses very clearly 
 his distrust, almost dislike of the first, and his 
 strong preference of the second. " The reasonable 
 believer must abstain from pronouncing judgment 
 on tlie nature of the message, until he has fairly 
 examined the credentials of the messenger." (p. 
 
184 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 169.) '' If there is sufficient evidence on other 
 groundSj to show that the scripture in which this 
 doctrine'' — one that is perplexing and dark — '' is 
 contained, is a revelation from God, the doctrine 
 itself must be iinconcl{tio7ially received, not as rea- 
 sonable nor as unreasonable, but as scriptural. If 
 there is not such evidence, the doctrine itself will 
 lack its proper support, but the reason which re- 
 jects it is utterly incompetent to substitute any 
 other representation in its place." (p. 180.) '' We 
 are thus compelled to seek another field for the 
 right use of reason, in religious questions" — i. e., 
 than by examining doctrines and judging of their 
 consistency and truth — ''and what that field is, it 
 will not be difficult to determine .... in 
 other words, the legitimate object of a rational 
 criticism of revealed religion is 7iot to be found in 
 the contents of that religion, but in its evidences." 
 (p. 234.) '' The crying evil of the present day in 
 religious controversy is the neglect or contempt of 
 the external evidences of Christianity : the first 
 step towards the establishment of a sound religious 
 philosophy, must consist in the restoration of those 
 evidences to their true place in the theological sys- 
 tem." (p. 238.) '' Wc do not certainly knoiv the 
 exact nature and operation of the moral attributes 
 of God. We can but infer and conjecture from 
 what we know of the moral attributes of man, and 
 the analogy between the finite and the infinite can 
 
EVIDENCES OF REVELATION, 185 
 
 never be so perfect, as to preclude all possibility of 
 error in the process/' (p. 240.) ^' The evidence 
 derived from the internal character of a religion, 
 whatever may be its value within its proper limits, 
 is, as regards the divine origin of the religion, 
 purely negative. It may prove in certain cases 
 (though even here the argument requires much 
 caution in its employment) that a religion has not 
 come from God, but it is in no case sufficient to 
 prove that it has come from Him." (p. 238.) 
 " Even the negative argument, which concludes 
 from the character of the contents of a religion, 
 that it cannot have come from God, however legiti- 
 mate within its proper limits, is one which requires 
 considerable caution in the application/' (p. 239.) 
 
 On the whole, it is quite indisputable, that the 
 Bampton lecturer looks to the external evidences 
 of revelation, as alone positive and reliable. The 
 internal evidence is at best nesrative, and alwavs 
 doubtful. In these circumstances, it is of no small 
 importance to ascertain what are those external 
 evidences, on which almost everytlxing, indeed, in 
 effect everythmg depends, in order to a rational 
 faith, in divine revelation. We again quote the 
 lecturer's own words : — '' Here then is the issue 
 which the wavering disciple is bound seriously to 
 consider. Taking into account the various ques- 
 tions, whose answers on the one side and the other, 
 form the sum total of evidences for or against the 
 
186 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 claims of the Christian faith ; the genuineness and 
 authenticity of the documents, the judgment and 
 good faith of the writers ; the testimony to the 
 actual occurrence of prophecies and miracles, and 
 their relation to the religious teaching with which 
 they are connected ; the character of the Teacher 
 himself, that one portrait, which in its perfect 
 purity and holiness, and beauty, stands alone and 
 unajDproached in human history, or human fiction ; 
 those rites and cermonies of the elder law, so sig- 
 nificant as typical of Christ, so strange and mean- 
 ingless without Him ; those predictions of the pro- 
 mised Messiah, whose obvious meaning is rendered 
 still more manifest, by the futile ingenuity which 
 strives to pervert them ; the history of the rise 
 and progress of Christianity, and its comparison 
 with that of other religions : the ability or inabil- 
 ity of human means to bring about the results, 
 which it actually accomj)lished ; its antagonism to 
 the cm-rent ideas of the ao;e and countrv of its ori- 
 gin ; its effects as a system on the moral and social 
 condition of subsequent generations of mankind ; 
 its fitness to satisfy the wants, and console the suf- 
 ferings of human nature ; the character of those 
 by whom it was first promulgated and received ; 
 the sufferings which attested the sincerity of their 
 convictions ; the comparative trustworthiness of 
 ancient testimony and modern conjecture ; the mu- 
 tual contradictions of conflictino^ theories of unbe- 
 
EVIDENCES OF REVELATION. 187 
 
 lief and the inadequacy of all of them, to explain 
 the facts, for which they are bound to account ; — 
 taking all these, and similar questions into full 
 consideration, are you prepared to affirm, as the 
 result of the whole inquiry, that Jesus of Naza- 
 reth was an impostor, or an enthusiast, or a mythi- 
 cal figment, and his disciples crafty and designing, 
 or well-meaning, but deluded men ? For, he as- 
 sured, that nothing short of this, is the conclusion 
 which you must maintain, if you reject one jot or 
 one title of the whole doctrine of Christ/' (pp. 
 248-9.) 
 
 This is the course, and by no means the wliole 
 course, through which men immersed in the busi- 
 ness of daily life, unused to continuous study, in- 
 capable of it, through which the unlearned, un- 
 privileged, ignorant multitudes must pass before 
 they can get to a rational, satisfactory faith in 
 Christianity ! Credat Judceus I There must be 
 some grand mistake here ! 
 
 The closing sentence in the quotation just made, 
 does not much lie in our way, but it is too singu- 
 lar to be passed without notice. Surely this is not 
 dignified ; it sounds like an argument ad terro- 
 rem, which most ingenuous and honorable minds 
 would be tempted to resent. Be assured, nothing 
 short of this is the conclusion, which you must 
 maintain, if you reject one jot or one tittle of the 
 whole doctrine of Christ." Either the Bible, as it 
 
]88 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 is received at this day, entire, or inevitable scepti- 
 cism. If this be not the meaning, what else can it 
 mean ? But is it true ? Is the warning, the in- 
 timidation, well grounded ? Is the alternative 
 actually what is here stated to be ? Some good 
 Christians are often jDcrplexed by the conflicting 
 genealogies in Matthew and Luke, and especially 
 because both alike refer not to Mary, but to Jo- 
 se23h. Others are troubled respecting the autho- 
 rity of the Gospel, which bears Matthew's name. 
 It is well known, that Luther rejected the epistle 
 of James from the canon. Many do not accept 
 the epistle to the Hebrews, and still more are in 
 doubt respecting the Book of Revelation. I am 
 not called upon to say yea or nay to these and 
 other such subjects of dispute. But I accept the 
 fact. They are points in dispute among fliithful 
 Christians, and surely they are not beyond the 
 sphere of legitimate criticism. The Bampton lec- 
 turer has too summary a method of dealing with 
 them all, as if he were ready to put in j^ractice a 
 universal ostracism. " Be assured there is no al- 
 ternative, if you reject one jot or one tittle of the 
 whole doctrine of Christ." There is something 
 not pleasing in this sjjirit, wiiich more than once 
 betravs itself in the book on the limits of relioious 
 thought. It would be wrong to assert that this 
 was the conscious design of the author ; but ever 
 and again the words of the book seem framed to 
 
EVIDENCES OF REVELATION. 189 
 
 bewilder, and terrify, and drive per force into 
 faith. 
 
 After the long array of external evidences in the 
 passage just quoted, it is added : — " taking all 
 these and similar questions into full considera- 
 tion, &c/' Ample as the enumerations had been, 
 it is quite true, that there are similar questions, an 
 almost endless number of similar questions, which 
 demand an answer, quite as imperatively as those 
 that are speciiied, before a result satisfactory to 
 the understanding can be obtained. I can jot 
 down but a few headings — Ancient Documents, 
 their age, transmission, purity, authority ; An- 
 cient History, Egyptian, Arabian, Persian, Chal- 
 dean, Hebrew^, Grrecian, Eoman ; Chronology, Gre- 
 ography, Natural History, Astronomy, Geology — 
 then, Philology, Criticism, Principles of interpre- 
 tation ; Inspiration, its meaning, its evidences, its 
 degrees, how claimed by the writers, how far al- 
 lowed by antiquity ; the Canon, by whom deter- 
 mined. When, by What authority. 
 
 The field is almost illimitable, and be it remem- 
 bered, if the demands of the understanding are to 
 be satisfied, it must be all overtaken. Not one 
 thing, in such a case, can rationally be assumed on 
 authority. If one thing may, another may, all 
 may be assumed, and the whole ground is shifted 
 and destroyed. If the basis of faith is to be an ex- 
 amination of external evidences a process of calcu- 
 
190 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 lation and computation, a work of the logical un- 
 derstanding, then it must be complete and exhaus- 
 tive if it is to be rationally available. A single de- 
 cided flaw, a palpable gross blunder in history, 
 chronology, or science, in a quarter which we had 
 not looked into, would be sufficient to overturn any 
 structure we had previously reared. The mind 
 could have no rest, so long as a single region of 
 evidence had not been thoroughly explored. 
 
 Far, very far, am I from denying that it is wise 
 and dutiful, not only for professional, but for non- 
 l^rofessional ^^ersons, to investigate, as they have 
 opportunity, one or other, or more of the branches 
 that are included in the external evidences of reve- 
 lation. The result of such investigation, rightly 
 conducted, will be to confirm faith, and to create 
 profound wonder at the minuteness, the nice ad- 
 justments, the continuity and the strength of the 
 proofs. The result will be to awaken the feeling 
 that further study, in other and new directions, 
 could only end in the same confirmation of faith, 
 and the same strengthening wonder. But no in- 
 telligent man could fail to perceive, that when only 
 a small portion of a field almost unlimited had been 
 visited, and when a single fact, in any one of the 
 unvisited regions of that field, might be sufficient 
 to change the whole face of things, he could have — 
 were this the kind of basis on which his faith must 
 
EVIDENCES OF REVELATION. 191 
 
 rest — no rational peace till every spot and corner 
 had been thoroughly explored. 
 
 Far, very far, am I from imdervalning the 
 learned, impartial, indefatigable workers in the 
 manifold departments of the external evidences. 
 Revelation has everything to hope for from them. 
 The world, the church lies under an amount of ob- 
 ligation to them, not easily estimated. The anti- 
 quarian, the scientific, the hermeneutical, especially 
 the historical, the philological, and the critical 
 branches of sacred learning, are of incalculable 
 value, and have amply repaid the talent, the re- 
 search, and the time that have been devoted to 
 them. They must not be forsaken, they cannot be 
 spared, and, happily, there is little token that labor 
 in this direction is likely to flag. Far otherwise. 
 But I speak to the nature of things. If no single 
 lifetime, devoted only to this, could overtake all, 
 or nearly all, that is included in the external evi- 
 dences of revelation, and if unless all be overtaken, / 
 there can be no legitimate rest to the under- 
 standing, in this species of proof, is it conceivable, 
 is it possible, that the Most High should send a 
 message to his creatures, which could be satisfac- 
 torily authenticated in no other way than this ? 
 It is impossible. It is contrary to all reason, to all 
 probabiUty. One might venture to affirm, without 
 exaggeration, that if rational faith be of the nature 
 supposed, there is not a rational believer in revela- 
 
192 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 tion, in existence, at this moment. There never 
 has been a rational believer in revelation, not one 
 individual, in anv age, who has so thorouo-hlv, so 
 exhaustively gone over the whole of the external 
 proofs, as to be able to say with truth, " There is 
 not a corner, which I have not explored, not a spot, 
 in which some seemingly decisive fact against the 
 authority of Scripture might lie, which I have not 
 narrowly scanned. The thing is literally, physi- 
 cally impossible. 
 
 It is no calumny against professional men, to say 
 that few of them cither have, or can have exhaus- 
 tivelv searched into more than one or two of the 
 leadincc and better-known branches of external evi- 
 dence. Many, very many, have not, cannot have 
 done even this. AVhat, then, of non-professional 
 persons, of the vast laity, especially the vast com- 
 monalty of Christianity ? Talk of Hebrew, Greek, 
 Chaldaic, Syriac, and other languages of ancient 
 codices, ancient versions, of historical, scientific, 
 philological, critical, hermeneutical researches and 
 studies, of prophecies and miracles and inspiration, 
 and the kinds of investigation belonging to them ! 
 What do, what can, the myriads of good Christian 
 people know about any of these things ? Nothing, 
 absolutely nothing. And have they, then, no posi- 
 tive, reliable evidence, on which their faith rests ? 
 Has the Great Being left them without the possi- 
 hility of any positive, reliable evidence ? For in 
 
EVIDENCES OF REVELATION, 193 
 
 their case, such faith, as Mr. Mansell desiderates, 
 is literally, absolutely impossible. With patent, 
 outcrvinijj, innumerable facts around us, we cannot 
 hesitate to judge that the Bampton lecturer must 
 be wrong, altogether wrong, in this conclusion. 
 The evidence which alone he counts positive and 
 reliable is that which untold myriads cannot reach 
 by any possibility. The evidence which he counts 
 merely negative, is that on which their faith rests, 
 on which it must rest, for they have no other. 
 The question gives its own reply — a triumphant 
 reply. Must not this evidence, and 7iot the other j 
 be the highest, the soundest, the strongest ? It 
 would be an impeachment of the Almighty to think 
 anything else, it would betray, on his part, a mani- 
 fest disregard of the pressing wants and the ■clearest 
 interests of his creatures. 
 
 There is more. On the face of it, external evi- 
 dence can bring only to this conclusion, that a cer- 
 tain book comes from God, and is invested with 
 his authority ; but it does not suppose either 
 knowledge of its contents or adoption of them. 
 The rational believer, when he has rationally be- 
 lieved, has, after all, a real faith to seek, a faith 
 that shall be good for anything, here or hereafter. 
 
 Let us now turn to the other side, and imagine 
 a man who is no rational believer, but has only a 
 dim idea that the Bible may be divine ; or even a 
 fixed conviction that it is not divine, but merely 
 
194 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 human. He opens and reads^ and as he reads, he 
 is brought to a sudden pause, and is iiTesistibly 
 impelled to think— " God is here and I knew it 
 not/' (I speak that which I do know, I simply 
 record that of which I have the highest j^roof.) It 
 is, as if the Invisible whispered in the deepest depth 
 of his natm-e, " I have found thee, and thou mayst 
 no more escape/' A preternatural touch goes to 
 the quick of his soul, and it trembles. Reason within 
 him, and conscience, wake up to life and say, " It 
 is true, read again ; it is there, it is true, it is 
 divine/' A voice from within answers to the voice 
 without, and the conviction is instant, irresistible — 
 " this is God, be sure of it ; this is God." The 
 Bible meets, w^akes up, answers to the divine intui- 
 tions of the soul, the deep longings, wants, suffer- 
 ings, sins, fears and hopes of man ! Answers to 
 them, and exceeds them all, reveals wants unfelt 
 before, creates longings that never stirred before, 
 sheds light, higher, purer, brighter, more ravishing, 
 than the eye ever caught a glimpse of before, finds 
 and draws forth intuitions in the silence of the 
 reason and conscience which had lain dormant ever 
 before, and shows other and higher points of vision, 
 glorious peaks, hidden from the unaided eye, glan- 
 cing in the blended radiance of wisdom, purity, 
 truth, power, and love. This is the majesty and 
 might of self-attestation, this is evidence, whose 
 force falls on the educated and uneducated, on him 
 
EVIDENCES OF REVELATION. 195 
 
 who has searched into the external proofs, and on 
 him who knows nothing of them ; this is evidence 
 which it is pitiful and poor to call positive ; it is 
 more than positive, it is invincible, it is almighty, 
 and carries the conviction triumphantly to our 
 heart of hearts ; " This is from above, only and 
 wholly, and for ever divine." 
 
 There are some grave difficulties which will be 
 instantly suggested in great force, to certain minds, 
 by statements like these. What need of revela- 
 tion, they will eagerly ask, if reason ah'eady con- 
 tains within itself all that is supposed to be re- 
 vealed ? But reason does not contain all that is 
 supposed to be revealed. This is not asserted. 
 Quite the reverse. But reason contains truth akin 
 to that which is revealed ; it is the jj^lace, of such 
 truth, of ultimate, native intuitions, it is the power 
 through which we recognize and take hold of the 
 divine, which revelation makes known. There is 
 then, it may be urged, no supreme authority, no 
 infallible judge such as we have been in the habit 
 of supposing the inspired Scriptures to be. Rea- 
 son would seem to be exalted above revelation, at 
 all events placed on a level with it. Every man 
 becomes on these principles, his own highest au- 
 thority, and accepts or rejects what he pleases, 
 according to the dictates of his reason, and con- 
 science, and that, 'practically ^ must amount to his 
 
 / 
 
196 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 own whim and caprice, at different times, and in 
 different states of mind. 
 
 There is danger, always, and in everything how- 
 ever apparently safe. The soundest principles, the 
 surest truths, are not secure against danger. There 
 is great danger from the pride of reason, from the 
 vanitv, the stiff doormatism, the stubborn selfhood 
 of men, from fanaticism, from superstition, and 
 from the tendency to a false mysticism in superior 
 minds. Let the danger be guarded against, with 
 the most jealous and untiring care. But it is not 
 inevitable. Surely, there may be a cautious, a 
 wise, a humble, a self-distrusting, a reverent, a 
 godly use of the powers, with which, for the no- 
 blest ends, our Maker has endowed us. 
 
 As it is, we must not overlook, either the exist- 
 ing fact of a diversity of Christian opinions, al- 
 most endless, or the humiliating lessons which it 
 teaches. The immense number of Protestant and 
 of Romish sects, reveal what must ever be the in- 
 evitable result, so long as the sphere is open tp dif- 
 ferent minds. Nothing can be more decisive than 
 the motto of all the evangelical churches, " the 
 scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, the 
 only infallible rule of faith and manners.'' But 
 free-will and necessity, resistible and irresistible 
 grace, election and non-election, universal atone- 
 ment and limited atonement, salvation of infants 
 and perdition, eternity and non-eternity of evil — 
 
EVIDENCES OF REVELATION. 197 
 
 not to name points far more widely apart stiU — 
 are all based on the one infallible authority. 
 
 The question is quite apart, how does revelation, 
 viewed differently, as it inevitably must be, by 
 different minds, best authenticate its origin ? I 
 have sought to answer the question on the ground 
 of facts, patent, outcrying, innumerable facts, 
 which seem to admit of no interpretation but 
 one. The entire mass of the Christian laity, es- 
 pecially the Christian commonalty, know, and can 
 know next to nothing of external proofs, they have 
 and can have nothing, but the internal, self-attest- 
 ing evidence. I maintain that this is enough ; 
 tliey have found it abundantly enough, rationally 
 indestructible. And every real accepter of revela- 
 tion, though he have first inquired into the exter- 
 nal seals of its divine origin, must come to thiSj 
 also, at last, and can rest only here. 
 
 We say, and rightly say, that so much letter- 
 press within two boards, contains the message from 
 heaven. But practically, and in effect, each man's 
 bible is so much as he has found and put within 
 him, and no more. He may find, he ought to 
 find, ever more and more, but that only which he 
 has found, is the revelation to him. The rest is 
 a bible only in name. A mine is opened before 
 us ; it is filled with treasure, and is inexhaustible. 
 But my wealth consists only of so much genuine 
 metal as I find and make my own and carry with 
 
198 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 me, and put to use. Others find what I do not, 
 and I may find what thev have missed. It is open 
 to all, it belongs to all alike, but each is rich only 
 in that which he gets possession of. The best test 
 of a gold mine is the actual finding of gold in it. 
 Geologists, mineralogists, and practical workmen 
 may survey a district and may predict that gold 
 must be found there. But to dig and find gold, to 
 dig still, and find more gold, settles all questions, 
 and makes doubt impossible. Finding the Divine 
 puts the stoutest unbelief to flight, and the Divine 
 which we find is our Bible, no more. The self- 
 attestinor divinitv of revelation, its inherent life 
 and force, form its best evidence. Valuable, indis- 
 pensable as the external proof is, in its own place, 
 this is it which has made Christianity omnipotent, 
 has secured its noblest triumphs, and spread its 
 sweeping conquests. It is power. It touches the 
 soul, comes home to the deepest thoughts and feel- 
 ings, and far transcends them and inspires the con- 
 viction of its own assured divinitv. 
 
 And shall we then suspect and distrust reason 
 and conscience ; that higher nature within us, 
 throucrh which, throuo^h which alone, we have 
 come near to the Invisible indwelling spirit of Re- 
 velation, and which is even specially constituted to 
 recognize this Holy Presence ? Shall we suspect 
 and distrust it, as if it were the foe and not the 
 ally of scripture ? If ice do, the Great Being 
 
ETIDEyCES OF REVELATION. 199 
 
 does not. Are we wiser, more thouorlitfal, more 
 
 ' 7 
 
 prudent than he / Low and feeble, as our nature, 
 confessedly is, and often fallacious, He has trusted 
 it, most maixellouslv. Throuorli this and only 
 this, it has been shown already, anterior to re- 
 velation. He summons us, to rise to the idea of 
 Himself ; through this and only this, He has left 
 us to reach the conception of His intelligent, free, 
 moral beino^. Bv the aid of this, and onlv this, 
 we are first of all in a condition to look into what 
 claims to be a revelation from him, and when the 
 revelation is in our hands, it is this chiefly, though 
 not alone, which the revelation addresses. As for 
 the claim of divinitv. made bv revelation, we have 
 no means — the world, with the exception of a few 
 among the privileged, educated classes — has no 
 possible means of testing it, save through this and 
 only this. It is this, this alone which linds the 
 Invisible in the message, and summons us to adore 
 and believe. 
 
 We MIGHT afford to dispense with aU the exter- 
 nal evidences, on which Mr. Mansell relies so much. 
 But the internal, self-attestins: divinitv, we could 
 not afford to lose. Were this to cro, all would s:o. 
 There would then be no God to us ; we could not 
 recognize him, could not answer to his voice, his 
 touch. There would then remain to us. onlv dark- 
 ness and death — death to aU that is most real 
 within us and above us ! 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 REVELATION AND GOD. 
 
 Is Grod Eevealed ? — As He is ? — ^As He is not ? — Presented, Re- 
 presented ? — Representation, Revelation ? — True or False ? — 
 Types, Images? — Their Meaning and Use — Fearful, if very G-od 
 not revealed. 
 
 I THINK, I am not wrong in asserting, that the 
 Bampton Lecture is the first and only book, in any 
 language, which maintaining the doctrine of a reve- 
 lation from Heaven, at the same time^ denies that 
 the revelation reveals God. That it actually does 
 sOj it will be possible to make exceedingly plain. 
 I am not conscious of anything, but an act of 
 pei'fect fairness and justice, when the lecturer is 
 represented as maintaining, that something is re- 
 vealed in the scriptures^ but it is not God, not 
 God as He is, and when it is concluded that if so, 
 we are shut up to the alternative that it is God as 
 He is not ; for God, somehow, it certainly is. The 
 thing of all things, which is unrevealed and incap- 
 able of being revealed, is God, that is, very God. 
 Whatever be the purpose of the Old and New Testa- 
 ments, to reveal Grod, the true, very God, to bring 
 him forth to his creatures^ as He really is and as 
 
EEVELATIOX AND GOD. 201 
 
 he alone can be truly conceived, is not included in 
 ttiat purpose. Perhaps his meaning is nowhere ex- 
 pressed so shortly, nakedly and unequivocally, as 
 in a note in his second lecture (p. 305), where he 
 refers to ^^ the admission, which is ultimately forced 
 on us, that our human conception of the Infinite is 
 NOT the TRUE one.'' The Infinite is God, or it is 
 nothing. The Infinite, with the lecturer, is God, 
 and God is the Infinite. What is true of the one, 
 he holds to be true of the other — rightly or wrongly 
 is not the question. The Infinite is simply and 
 only a synonym for God, and the sentence quoted 
 is virtually this, ^' our human conception of God is 
 not the true one.'' 
 
 Altogether, a preliminary remark is needed in 
 reference to such phrases as Infinite, Absolute na- 
 ture, the Absolute God, God in his absolute es- 
 sence, and so forth. Already notice has been taken 
 of this phraseology. But the notice must be re- 
 peated. " The Absolute God," most persons would 
 conceive to mean the true God, very God, and so 
 understood, its use would be quite harmless. But 
 the philosophical sense is perfectly different ; it is 
 the absolved God, God loosed from all relation, 
 The Unconditioned. It has been shown, that there 
 is no unconditioned, Absolute God, no absolute 
 essence, and there never was to any rational crea- 
 ture. The God of consciousness, the true God, is 
 a voluntarily conditioned being, standing in direct 
 
202 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 relation to his creatures. The Absolute, therefore, 
 applied to God, is not simply unmeaning, it is pos- 
 itively false. The entire phraseology, borrowed 
 from a philosophy, which is wholly idealistic, is to 
 be utterly condemned and discarded. In like man- 
 ner, it has been shown, that the term Infinite, ap- 
 plies strictly to the eternal duration of God. That 
 is Infinite. But beyond this, men have no right to 
 apply terms of their own coining to the Great Be- 
 ing. In all aspects of his nature. He is incapable 
 of limit, past finding out, above the highest con- 
 ceptions of his highest creatures. But this is the 
 utmost that any are entitled to assert. The Bamp- 
 ton lecturer, however, maintains a perfectly oppo- 
 site view. To him God is the Absolute, the Infinite, 
 His essence is the absolute essence. Kightly or 
 wrongly is not the question here. But this is the 
 fact — he applies these phrases to God, he uses 
 them as synonymous with God, and what he asserts 
 in reference to them, he is to be understood as as- 
 sertino; in reference to God, the livinsj God — other- 
 wise his whole reasoning is purposeless. I under- 
 stand this, and shall act entirely on this under- 
 standing. No one can legitimately understand 
 anything else. 
 
 In order that the amplest justice may be done and 
 a perfectly faithful impression made, in reference 
 to the jDoint before us, I shall first of all quote en 
 masse, the whole of the passages, of which after- 
 
REVELATION AND GOD. 203 
 
 \^ards I shall have to make separate use. He 
 siDcaks of ^' the morbid horror of anthropomor- 
 phism, which poisons the speculations of so many 
 modern philosophers, when they attempt to be 
 wise above what is written, and seek for a meta- 
 physical exposition of God's nature and attributes. 
 They may ^oi, forsooth, think of the unchangeable 
 God, as if He were their felloio-man, influenced by 
 human motives and moved hj human supplications. 
 They want a truer, juster idea of the Deity as He 
 is, than that under which He has been pleased to 
 reveal Himself, and they call on their reason to 
 furnish it. Fools, to dream that man can escape 
 from himself, that human reason can draw aught 
 but a human portrait of God . . . . do we 
 ascribe to Him a fixed 23urpose ? Our conception 
 of a purpose is human. Do we speak of Him as 
 continuing unchanged ? Our conception of con- 
 tinuance is human. Do we conceive Him as know- 
 ing and determining ? What are knowledge and 
 determination but modes of human conscious- 
 ness V (pp. 17-18.) " Revelation can make known 
 the Infinite Being, only in one of two ways, by 
 presenting Him as He is, or by rep)rese7iting Him 
 under symbols more or less adequate.'' (p. 27.) 
 " Revelation represents the Infinite God, under 
 finite symbols, in condescension to the finite capac- 
 ity of man .... rationalism claims to be- 
 hold God as He is nom; it finds a common object 
 
204 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 for religion and philosojDhy, in the explanation of 
 God." (p. 31.) '' We feel that though God is in- 
 deedy in his incomprehensible essence, absolute and 
 infinite : it is not as the absolute and infinite, that 
 He appeals to the love^ and the fear, and the rev- 
 erence of his creatures. We feel that the life of 
 religion lies in the human relations in which God 
 reveals Himself to man, not in the divijie perfec- 
 tions, which those relations veil and modify, 
 though without wholly concealing. We feel that 
 the God to whom we pray and in whom we trust, 
 is not so much the God eternal and infinite, with- 
 out body, parts, or passions (though we acknowl- 
 edge He is all these), as the God who is gracious 
 and merciful, etc.'' (pp. 64-65.) '' To have suf- 
 ficient grounds for believing in God is a very dif- 
 ferent thing from having sufficient grounds for 
 reasoning about Him ; .... the natural 
 senses, it may be, are diverted and colored by the 
 medium through which they pass, to reach the in- 
 tellect, and present to us, not things in themselves, 
 but things as they appear to us. And this is 
 manifestly the case with the 7^eligious conscious- 
 ness, which can only represent the Infinite God, 
 through finite forms. But we are compelled to 
 believe, on the evidence of our senses, that a mate- 
 rial world exists, even while we listen to the argu- 
 ments of the idealist, who reduces it to an idea or 
 a nonentity, and we are comjpelled by our religious 
 
REVELATION AND GOD. 205 
 
 consciousness to believe in the existence of a per- 
 sonal God, though the reasonings of the rationalist 
 logically followed out, may i^educe us to Fantheism 
 or Atheism/' (p. 122.) '' The first mode aims at a 
 speculative knowledge of God as He is ; . . . . 
 the second, abandoning the speculative knowledge 
 of the Infinite, .... is content with tliose 
 regulative ideas of the Deity, which are sufficient 
 to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intel- 
 lect, which tell us not tvJiat God is Himself, but 
 how He wills that we should think of Him. 
 . . . . He knows that human worship is not 
 incompatible with infinite wisdom and goodness, 
 though it is not as the Infinite that God reveals 
 Himself in his moral government, nor is it as 
 the Infinite that He promises to answer prayer." 
 (p]3. 126-8.) '■'■ In this manifestation of God to 
 man, alike in consciousness as in Scripture, under 
 Unite forms io finite minds, as a person to a person, 
 we see the root and foundation of that religious 
 service, without which belief is a speculation and 
 worship a delusion.'' (p. 128.) '' It is, then, 
 strictly in analogy with the method of God's pro- 
 vidence, if we believe He has given us truths, in- 
 tended not to satisfy our reason, but to guide our 
 practice ; 7iot to tell us what God is in his absolute 
 nature, but hoiu He luills that ive shoidd think of 
 Him in our present state." (p. 143.) '^ It is to 
 be expected that our knowledge of God, though 
 
206 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 revealed by Himself, is revealed m relation to hu- 
 man faculties, and subject to the limitations and 
 2?7zperfectionSj inseparable from the constitution of 
 the human mind." (p. 144.) ^' We may believe 
 and ought to believe that the conceptions which 
 we are comjpelled to adopt as the guides of our 
 thoughts and actions now, may, indeed, in the 
 sight of a higher intelligence, be but partial truth, 
 but cannot be total falsehood." (p. 145.) '' We 
 must remain content with the belief, that we have 
 that knoioledge of God which is best adapted to 
 our wants and training. How far that knowledge 
 represents God, as He is, we know not and have 
 no need to know." (p. 146.) " TAe ti^ue concep- 
 tio7i of the Divine nature, so far as loe are able to 
 receive it, is to be found in those regulative repre- 
 sentations which exhibit God under limitations, 
 accommodated to the constitution of man, not in 
 the unmeaning abstractions, which, aiming at a 
 higher knowledge, distort rather than exhibit the 
 Absolute and the Infinite." (p. 150.) ^' W^e can- 
 not help observing, how the Almighty, in com- 
 municating with his people, condescends to place 
 Himself on what, humanly speaking, may be 
 called a loiuer level than that on which the natural 
 reason of man would be inclined to exhibit Him." 
 (p. 152.) ^' The Father has revealed Himself to 
 mankind, under human types and images, that He 
 may appeal more earnestly and effectually to man's 
 
REVELATION AND GOD. 207 
 
 consciousness of the human spirit within him, 
 Tue Son has done more than this. He became, 
 for our sakeSj very man ; . . . . being both 
 God and man. Herein is our justification, if we 
 refuse to aspire beyond those limits of human 
 thought in which He phiced us. Here is our an- 
 swer, if any man would spoil us through philoso- 
 phy and vain deceit. Is it rational to contemplate 
 God, under symbols drawn from the human con- 
 sciousness .^ Christ is our pattern, for in Him 
 dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." 
 (p. 154.) 
 
 It would be difficult to find an instance of any- 
 thing more fatuitous in reasoning than is supplied 
 by the last of these quotations. The very words, 
 ^' in him dwelt all the fulness of the godhead 
 bodilv," contain the instant answer to the fallacious 
 inferences of the lecturer. Who ever thought, or 
 said, that it was '^ irrational to contemplate God 
 under symbols drawn from the human conscious- 
 ness ?" Whence, else, could they be drawn ? But 
 the question is, whether symbols drawn from the 
 human consciousness, or elsewhere, do truly, or 
 only fallaciously, represent God, whether they 
 bring us down to themselves, or prompt us, and 
 help us to rise above themselves. The Redeemer 
 of men was man ; are we therefore, taught to 
 think of the Almighty as man, are we not, on the 
 contrary, impelled, from man, through man, by 
 
208 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 the aid of man, to rise to God. The Kedeemer of 
 men was man ; but his humanity suggested, ut- 
 tered, imaged more than the human, because it 
 included more than the human, because it was 
 the temple of the indwelling Deity. Had the 
 purpose been to keep us down to the human, a 
 common humanity had sufficed. But a common 
 humanity did not suffice. A superhuman hu- 
 manity was set before the world ; a divine hu- 
 manity, one in which dwelt the fulness of Godhead 
 — -just that we might be saved from abiding with 
 the notion of mere human attributes and modes, and 
 might be compelled, in thought, to ascend to divine 
 excellences. Jesus spake as man never spake, acted 
 as man never acted, lived as man never lived, and 
 died as man never died. A mysterious sovereignty, 
 not human, rested upon him, a purity, a wisdom, 
 a forgivingness, a gentleness, a power of endurance 
 and of self-sacrifice, a patience, a meekness, and a 
 love, which were not only symbols of the divine, 
 but were themselves verily divine. Anthropomor- 
 phism is harmless when it guides the human to 
 transcend itself, when it lifts it up to the idea of a 
 su]3erhuman perfection. It is dangerous and blas- 
 phemous when it seeks to bring down God to the 
 level of his creatures, and conceives their weak- 
 nesses and limitations as also His. 
 
 This levelling of the Divine, in my humble judg- 
 ment, is the intent and drift of the Bampton lee- 
 
REVELATION AND GOD. 209 
 
 ture ; it distinctly aims to justify anthropomor- 
 phism, on philosophical grounds. How else, shall 
 we account for the bitter contempt with which, in 
 one of the passages already quoted, the lecturer 
 speaks of " the morbid horror of anthropomorphism" 
 — as if it were not at all a thing to be afraid of — 
 " which poisons the speculations of so many modern 
 philosophers when they attempt to be wise above 
 what is written, and seek for a metaphysical expo- 
 sition of the nature and attributes of God." By 
 the way, only by the way, it is possible to seek a 
 knowledge of God's nature and attributes, without 
 desiring that it be metaphysical, far less that it 
 shall consist of what, in another passage, the lec- 
 turer calls, " unmeaning abstractions, which distort 
 rather than exhibit God." The two things are 
 quite apart, and not without great injustice are 
 they here conjoined. A knowledge, a true, not a 
 fallacious, knowledge of God is what we seek. The 
 lecturer continues, "■ they" — those who have a hor- 
 ror of anthropomorphism — " may not, forsooth , 
 think of the unchangeable God, as if he were their 
 fellow man, influenced b}^ human motives, and 
 moved by human supplications." This piece of 
 not well-timed irony can only mean that what thes© 
 men think they may not do, the lecturer thinks 
 they may and ought to do — ^it is their fault that 
 they do not. It must mean, that we ought to con- 
 ceive of God^ as if he were om' fellow man, influ- 
 
210 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 enced and moved as human beings are influenced 
 and moved. He continues—^' Fools, to dream that 
 man can escape from himself, that human reason 
 can draw aught but a human portrait of God." 
 
 What man does, or thinks, is human, must be 
 human, never can be anything but human. But 
 whether a man's thought can carry a man above 
 man's self, is not touched. Man is always man ; 
 what he does is man's doing, what he thinks is 
 man's thinking, is human. In this sense he can 
 never transcend himself Is this what the lecturer 
 means ? If so, there is some room for an honest 
 indignation against what is surely not fit treat- 
 ment of a solemn and great subject. Has any one, 
 in his right mind, thought or said that man could 
 be not man ? I must call this worse than trifling. 
 The lecturer continues — '^do we ascribe to God a 
 fixed purpose, our conception of a purpose is hu- 
 man — do we speak of Him as continuing unchanged, 
 our conception of continuance is human — do we 
 conceive him as knowing and determining, what 
 are knowledge and determination but modes of hu- 
 man conscii.usness." 
 
 I am quite unable to make anything else of these 
 questions and answers than this, that they are a 
 very philosophical, very learned mode of stating a 
 very plain fact, namely, that man is always man, 
 that when he speaks about God, or anything else, 
 he uses human words, because he has none other to 
 
REVELATION AND GOD. 211 
 
 use ; and when he conceives anything, his concep- 
 tion is a human conception, simply because he is a 
 man, and not an angel ; and when he thinks, his 
 thouo-ht is a human thousrht, that is to say, it is 
 
 O O 7 V 7 
 
 formed by a human mind, and according to those 
 laws that guide and govern human thinking. But 
 the question is not touched at all, whether the human 
 thought may be a correct thought or no, whether 
 it may answer truly, to that with which it is occu- 
 pied. Schelling alone, in the philosophic circle, 
 with whom the mystics of earlier and of later times 
 are substantially at one, asserts the possibility of 
 transcending consciousness. But were he silenced, 
 as on this point he easily can be, the question w^ould 
 be as far as ever from being determined, whether 
 within the limits of consciousness, and according to 
 the formal laws of thought, it be possible for the 
 human mind to rise to that which is superhuman, 
 to think of it, and to think accurately and truly. 
 This question, the only one at issue, is not touched 
 by the lecturer. I maintain that the laws of 
 thought and of consciousness, the spiritual consti- 
 tution of man, established by the Great Maker, are 
 such, as to show a divine intention that man should 
 be able to escape from himself, that human reason 
 should be able to draw more than a human portrait, 
 aye, many a portrait of siqjerliuman excellence and 
 greatness, and that the human mind should be able 
 to rise to that which is far above itself. I maintain 
 
212 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 it, on the ground of experience and of fact. The 
 lecturer may taunt those whom he calls dreaming 
 fools, and may lash them with his bitterest irony. 
 But, perhaps, they have no cause to be much 
 moved. It is more than an adequate compensation 
 to them, that they are able, and know and feel that 
 they are able, to conceive power, and wisdom, and 
 rectitude, and perfection, which it would be con- 
 tradictory to attach to any mere humanity. It is 
 no question with them. They are conscious of 
 power to conceive a superhuman spiritual nature, 
 in which superhuman attributes and excellences 
 reside. Man can escape from himself, can trans- 
 cend himself, he is constituted to transcend him- 
 self, far and farther and yet farther still, to rise 
 above himself, and nearer and nearer to the Great 
 Being. 
 
 We meet in the Bampton Lecturer, constant 
 reference to " the finite forms, finite symbols, and 
 human types and images of Holy Scripture, and to 
 the condescension to finite capacities, and the ac- 
 commodation to the limitations and imperfections, 
 inseparable from the constitution of the human 
 mind.'' One is tempted to ask, Who ever heard 
 or dreamt of infinite forms, or infinite symbols, or 
 types, or images, who ever heard of infinite words, 
 who ever dreamt of such ? The constant repetition 
 is startling. Without any such intention, on the 
 part of the writer, it goes to create an impression, 
 
REVELATION AND GOD. 213 
 
 quite apart from argument. Mani-s a finite being, 
 in the midst of finite beings and things. But the 
 constant and utterly useless repetition and reitera- 
 tion of the word finite is apt, in certain minds, to . 
 nourish a prejudice, a pre-judgment, of the ques- 
 tion, '^ Whether, through the finite, man can as- 
 cend to that which is far above the finite, to the 
 conception of the living God, of whom infinity is 
 one of the distino-uishino^ attiibutes.'' Of course, 
 in speaking of this Great Being, revelation employs, 
 the only materials which are possible, finite words, 
 forms, types, and images, and at last a finite human 
 nature, the man Christ Jesus, who was God as well 
 as man. But the use of all these is, not that we 
 should rest in them, but that we should conceive 
 that whicli is immeasurably above them, that which 
 they are intended to suggest and strike out. 
 
 On the whole, there seems to be an entire mis- 
 apprehension, pervading this portion of the Bamp- 
 ton Lecture, with respect to the proper meaning 
 and use of an image or symbol. For illustration, let 
 us take a very frequent phrase — ^' mental growth." 
 The words are figurative, typical. The question 
 is, is it intended that I am to bind my thought 
 down to the actual symbol, or am I to use it as 
 a ladder for ascending to what is above it ? 
 Here, in the literal image, we have first ; ground 
 properly prepared and manured, then a seed de- 
 deposited in it, the seed is saturated with mois- 
 
214 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 ture and warmed by the sun^ it softens, fer- 
 ments, decays, perishes, a green sprout gradually 
 breaks out, it elongates, thickens, strikes up and 
 up, grows stronger and stronger. Have I to keep 
 my thought down to these and such things ? Or, 
 on the contrary, forgetting them all, in themselves, 
 have I only to use them, as helps for suggesting 
 something totally different in Mnd^ where there is no 
 soil, no manure, no rain, no moisture, no sun, no fer- 
 mentation, no sprouting. I must rise, if I would 
 understand and make intelligent use of the figure, 
 1 must rise to a purely spiritual nature, the idea of 
 the gradual increase of knowledge, the gradual fill- 
 ing and furnishing the mind, the gradual awakening 
 and exercising, and invigoration of the powers, the 
 implantation and strengthening and progress of in- 
 ward principles. The types and images of scrip- 
 ture are only degraded (any types and images 
 would be only degraded and perverted) if we bind 
 our thought down to the actual form. The entire 
 end of the most sacred symbols is destroyed, if we 
 put tliera in the place of that, which they are to 
 signify and suggest. True, they are human, finite, 
 in condescension to our capacity, in accommoda- 
 tion to our limited nature. True, most true, as 
 the lecturer says, " The Father has revealed him- 
 self to mankind under human types and images, 
 that he may appeal more earnestly and effectually, 
 to man's consciousness of the human spirit within 
 
REVELATION AND GOD. 215 
 
 him/' Is there any other than a human spirit 
 within him, to which an appeal could be made ; 
 why have we this labored, repetitious, pleonastic 
 ringing out of the terms, human, finite, as if we 
 were in danger of forgetting that man is man. 
 The Merciful Father does indeed seek to touch, in 
 the nearest, closest, tenderest possible way, the 
 consciousness of his creatures, by means of images 
 which thev can at once understand and feel. But 
 is it, that they should only keep to these images, 
 is it not, rather, that they should rise above them? 
 That is the question. The human type has a su- 
 perhuman reality, to which it answers, which it is 
 meant to suggest to us. It is used, not for its own 
 sake. We abuse, we pervert, we destroy it, if we 
 put it in the place of the higher reality. Its whole 
 intention is to lift us up to what is above it. An 
 image is an image of something, and the some- 
 thing above it which it images and not itself, is 
 the end of its use. 
 
 " We cannot help observing,'' says the lecturer, 
 ^^how the Almighty in communicating with his 
 creatures, condescends to place himself in what 
 humanly speaking, may be called a lower level, 
 than that on which the natural reason of man 
 would be inclined to exhibit him." In the name 
 of the natural reason and its almighty inspirer, 
 this is utterly denied. The words are denied, but 
 much more the spirit they breathe. If there be 
 
216 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 any one thing in the bible, more than another, to 
 which the natural reason of man clings, it is its 
 simple, human, touching imagery. And why ? 
 Because, of all things, the soul finds this to be 
 mightily helj^ful, in inspiring the truest, loftiest, 
 divinest thoughts of the Great Being. Were we 
 to rest in the imagery itself, instead of allowing it 
 to lift us, as it is intended it should lift us, to what 
 is far above it, then, indeed, the Almighty would 
 he placed, on a lower level. And this, it has been 
 shown, this is what the lecturer does and counsels 
 all to do. 
 
 Respecting the nature of revelation, the views 
 expressed by Mr. Mansell are strangely unfixed, 
 apparently unpremeditated. ^' Revelation, it is 
 said, can make known the Infinite Being, only in 
 one of two ways, by 'presenting Him as He is, or 
 by representing him under symbols more or less 
 adequate." This sounds acute and elegant, but it 
 is without foundation. Present God ? Present, 
 in distinction from repi^esent ? We present a liv- 
 ing being, in person and in no other way that I 
 know of. We represent him in words or by signs 
 of one kind or other. Revelation cannot p>resent 
 God at all, the idea is preposterous and absurd ; 
 and I am by no means sure, that this is the only 
 instance in which sense has been sacrificed to sound. 
 Revelation can do nothing but represent God. The 
 representation is thought to be, it calls itself, a re- 
 
REVELATION AND GOD. 217 
 
 velation, an unveiling. At all events, it is a repre- 
 sentation of God, in words and by images and 
 types. Is the representation truej or false ? That 
 is a great question ! The verdict of the lecturer 
 upon it is hardly doubtful. He does, indeed, seem 
 to say — in fact, he does say — that God reveals him- 
 self, but he verily means conceals, not reveals — 
 " The life of religion lies in the human relations in 
 which God reveals himself to man, not in the di- 
 vine perfections, w^hich those relations veil and 
 modify, though without wholly concealing.'' How 
 God reveals — /. e., 2<?iveils — Himself, in relations 
 which veil His divine perfections, few could pre- 
 tend to understand. To the same effect is the pas- 
 sage relating to the evidence of the senses : — " The 
 natural senses, it may be, are diverted and colored 
 by the medium through which they pass to reach 
 the intellect and present to us not things in them- 
 selves, but things as they appear to us. And this 
 is manifestly the case with the religious conscious- 
 ness," &c. If this does not mean that our exter- 
 nal senses are partly fallacious and deceptive, and 
 that, like them, our religious consciousness is also 
 ■^dixilj fallacious and deceptive, what can it mean ? 
 Kevelation represents God to mankind, and there 
 are manifestly only two senses in which it can do 
 so — either truly or untruly. Truly or untruly ? 
 — that is the great question. The Bampton lec- 
 turer, not once, but times without number, vehe- 
 
218 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 mently resists the idea that God is or can be re- 
 presented as He is. Can there be an alternative but 
 this, that He must then be represented as He is 
 not ? Quite in consistency with this alternative, we 
 read of " those regulative ideas of the Deity, which 
 are sufficient to guide our practice, but not to 
 satisfy our intellect ; of truths intended not to 
 satisfy our reason, but to guide our practice/' The 
 scriptures "tell us, not what God ism Himself, 
 but lioio He ivills that we should think of Him ; 
 they are intended to tell us not what God is in his 
 absolute nature, but lioiv He luills that we should 
 think of Him in our present state." On the whole, 
 it is as i^lain as very intelligible words can make it, 
 that for oursakes God is represented not as He is, 
 but as He is not. The knowledge communicated to 
 us is not the true knowledge, but only " that which 
 is best adapted to our wants and our training." 
 The deliberate judgTuent of the lecturer is expressed 
 in the following decisive sentences : — " How far 
 that knowledge (given in the scriptures) represents 
 God as He is — in other words, t^^uly represents 
 God — we knoiv not.'' "Our conceptions of God, 
 the conceptions we are compelled to adopt, may, 
 indeed, be but partial truth, but they cannot be 
 total falsehood.'' " Our human conception of the 
 Infinite," of God who alone is the Infinite, " is 
 not the true one." This is the verdict on the awful 
 question— " Not True," yet "Not Total False- 
 
REVELATION AND GOD. 219 
 
 liood ;" How far true^ or How far false, " we 
 know not." I end as I began ; something is re- 
 vealed, but it is 7iot God. The thing of all things, 
 which is unrevealed and incapable of being re- 
 vealed, is God. 
 
 It is a lamentable result ! The worship of all 
 Christian churches and congregations, the prayers 
 of all good Christian people, are offered up to the 
 unknown Being. We cannot trust our religious 
 consciousness, for, like our bodily senses, it is a 
 coloring, if not distorting medium, through which 
 objects cannot be presented as they are in them- 
 selves. We cannot trust divine revelation, for its 
 representations are intentionally not true, though 
 not total falsehood ; they teach us, indeed, the 
 mode in which God wills that ive should think of 
 Him, but we know that that mode is not true, 
 though how far it is from the truth we know not. 
 The deep moan of a troubled human heart is 
 wafted across the dark expanse of three thousand 
 years — " that I knew where I might find Him, 
 that I might come even to His seat \" And in the 
 long interval many and many a spirit in like trouble 
 has lifted up the same burdened cry. There is no 
 answer to it, on the principles with which we have 
 been contending ; no answer, save one, which it 
 were merciful to withhold. "You cannot find 
 Him; you cannot know Him. Something you 
 
220 CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION. 
 
 may know, something you may find, but 7iof, never, 
 the true, the real God." 
 
 But there is an answer to the question, of a very 
 different character, and from a very different quar- 
 ter. " We know that the Son of God has come 
 and hath given us an understanding to know Him 
 that is true." "This is life eternal, that they 
 might hioiv thee, the only true God and Jesus 
 Christ, whom thou hast sent." " Every one that 
 loveth is born of God and hioiveth God. He that 
 loveth not knoweth not God, for God is love." 
 
 An ideal counteiyai^t, in us, compressing Infinity 
 within the limits of our minds, is impossible. It 
 is admitted in the fullest extent. But has the 
 Great Being no godlike ways, thoughts, utterances 
 that proclaim him at once, that bring him truly 
 before our thoughts, far more truly than if we had 
 a visible representation before our eyes ? It is dis- 
 tressing, profoundly distressing, in my humble 
 judgment, if our experience compels us, for our- 
 selves, to answer, No. Yet more distressing, if to 
 others, in reply to their eager questioning, we are 
 compelled to answer. No. 
 
 There was one who could, and did, proclaim, 
 " He that hath seen me hath seen the Father" — 
 the invisible through the visible. Many a time, 
 the Divinity broke through his humanity ; as 
 when he spoke to the guilty woman — " Daughter, 
 doth no man condemn thee ? neither do I condemn 
 
REVELATION AND GOD. 221 
 
 thee ; go, and sin no more ;" or, when on the cross 
 he prayed, " Forgive them, for they know not 
 what they do ;" or, when on the mountain side, he 
 taught the multitudes, " Blessed are the poor in 
 spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven ;'' 
 " blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see 
 God." Never man spake so. God was in such 
 words, and breathes out of them, at this moment, 
 on the world, with the glow of unutterable wis- 
 dom and love. "I thank thee, oh Father, that 
 hast revealed to babes the things hidden from the 
 wise and prudent." 
 
SECTION FIFTH. 
 
 CONCERNING MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE, 
 
 Chaptee 
 
 I. — The Relative and the Real. 
 II. — Human Modifications of Mokality. 
 III. — I:^imutable Right and Wrong. 
 
CHAPTEE I. 
 
 THE EELATIYE A2TD THE EEAL. 
 
 Relation to Faculties of Knower — Phenomena — Also Noumena — 
 Ground to Believe this — Consciousness not Fallacious — Knowing 
 Faculty not Fallacious — Minds generically the same — Limited, 
 not therefore Unreal. 
 
 The question as to the relativity or reality of all 
 our knowledge, lies very near to that which touches 
 specially our connection with the Great Being. 
 There are strong peculiarities attaching to the lat- 
 ter, which render it, in some degree, independent 
 of otlier questions. But the scepticism — I can call 
 it by no other name — which denies that we can 
 know Grod as he is, belongs to that wider scepticism 
 which denies that we can know anything as it is. 
 Sorrowfully it must be confessed, that Jiere, not 
 only Kant but Hamilton is at one with the Bamp- 
 ton lecturer. And the position which they in com- 
 mon maintain, it must be granted, seems to be 
 logically unassailable. Yet I hope to be able to 
 make out that, in effect and in fact, it is not sound, 
 and that all which is ascertainable by logic is not 
 all which is ascertainable by other means. 
 
 Here are some of the modes in which formal 
 
226 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 science puts its unwelcome result : — " We can 
 know only as we have faculties for knowing/' 
 " Not that which is, can we reach, but only that 
 which is in some way relative, analogous to our 
 powers, and only so far as it is relative to our 
 powers/' " Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad mo- 
 dum recipientis." " Things as they appear to us, 
 but not things as they are in themselves — pheno- 
 mena, not noumena, are for us/' " Of existence 
 absolutely and in itself we know nothing/' 
 
 Perhaps it is not much to say, that all this is 
 strongly opposed to the ordinary convictions of 
 mankind. Most men would be disposed to assert 
 with confidence. We must, we do, we certamly do 
 know, at least, some things in themselves ; we 
 know them really, not simply as they appear to us, 
 but as they m^ust aj)pear to all intelligent beings, 
 and that is, as they really are in themselves. There 
 may not be much in this fact, but in the event of 
 independent presumptive reasons being discovered, 
 tending in the same direction, it is something to 
 have this strong background of general conviction 
 on which to lean. 
 
 One thing is quite certain, we can know only so 
 much and so far as we have faculties for knowing. 
 Were our faculties strengthened, were they more 
 numerous, as we can well imagine them to be, the 
 sphere of our knowledge would be indefinitely en- 
 larged. That is to say, our knowledge, at present^ 
 
THE RELATIVE AND THE REAL. 227 
 
 is certainly limited. But who denies that it is ? 
 It is undeniable. Of any subject, in any direction, 
 we know only so much. With no great stretch of 
 fancy we can imagine our knowledge, in every 
 direction, to be immensely increased. But limited 
 knowledge, so far as it goes, need not be therefore 
 untrustworthy, it may be perfectly reliable and 
 real. We can know only what appears to us, and 
 what is relative to our faculties. But because a 
 thing appears to us and is related to our faculties, 
 is it just therefore not real and actual, in itself ? 
 Who has demonstrated this ? It has never been, 
 it cannot be demonstrated. Here, it would ap- 
 pear, lies the fallacy, at all events the defect, in 
 the theory which maintains the relativity, not in 
 distinction from, but as opposed to the reality, of 
 all our knowledge. It takes for gi'anted that phe- 
 nomena, just because they are phenomena, are 
 therefore not noumena. But this is not proved, 
 cannot be proved. Phenomena may not be, also, 
 noumena ; the two are quite apart. Granted. But 
 there is nothing to hinder that they he, also, nou- 
 mena. This has never been disproved, cannot be 
 disproved. When it is asserted, " W^e can know 
 07ily phenomena," even logically, the position is not 
 strictly defensible. We do know phenomena — 
 what we know are phenomena — that is certain ; 
 logic is entitled to affirm it. But logic cannot le- 
 gitimately add a single word. That we know only 
 
228 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 phenomena^ in other words, that the phenomena 
 are only phenomena, is a gratuitous assumption. 
 Certain things, in reference to matter, and in refer- 
 ence to mind, appear, of which we can and do take 
 hold. But may not the things which aj^pear he 
 the things themselves. I maintain that there is no 
 reason to think anything else, and very strong pre- 
 sumptive reasons to lead us to think this. Knowl- 
 edge, though limited, may, so far as it goes, be 
 perfectly reliable. It is of phenomena, but it need 
 not therefore be of mere phenomena, in distinction 
 from realities. The actual things themselves may 
 ajDpear to us — why not ? and thus be both pheno- 
 mena and noumena. 
 
 Let us turn for illustration to the power of con- 
 sciousness. This is the one essential condition of 
 all intellectual activity. I know, only as I know 
 that I know ; I feel, only as I know that I feel ; I 
 desire and will, only as I know that I desire and 
 will. This is the light of all our seeing, the light, 
 in which all our mental states and acts are visible 
 to the eye of the soul. With what is my thought 
 occupied at this moment ? what emotion is 23assing 
 through me ? what desire, or volition, is forming ? 
 This, and this, and this : I know it, I am conscious 
 of it, it admits of no doubt. We cannot go higher. 
 The testimony of consciousness is accejDted, as in- 
 dubitable. It is the ultimate autlioritv, from which 
 there is no appeal. Kant, Hamilton, and Mansell, 
 
THE RELATIVE AND THE REAL. 229 
 
 bow to it. It is the one, only, foundation of phil- 
 osophy. The testimony of consciousness, as a rev- 
 elation of the facts of our inward being, must be 
 accepted, unconditionally, else philosophy is no 
 longer possible. It is accepted. But why, on what 
 ground ? Simply because we cannot believe, and 
 have no ground to believe, quite otherwise, that 
 our nature is a lie. But this is to fall back, not so 
 much on ourselves, as on our Creator. In consti- 
 tuting and constructing our nature, he cannot have 
 meant us to believe a falsehood, cannot have erected 
 within us a lying witness. 
 
 We are entitled, I think, to apply the same mode 
 of reasoning in other special cases. Here, for exam- 
 ple, my faculty of knowing belongs to the structure 
 of my nature, quite as much as my consciousness 
 does. If I accept the latter as no deception, no false- 
 hood palmed uj)on me, why should I any more dis- 
 trust the former. True, I know only what appears 
 to my faculty of knowing, what it is formed to take 
 hold of. If it did not appear , and were wholly 
 unrelated to my mind, it would be to me nothing. 
 But because it aj)]Dears, does it, therefore, become 
 notlimg, and is it to be counted by me for no re- 
 ality ? I think the highest reason is at one with 
 the strong natural convictions of mankind gener- 
 ally, in the conclusion that our knowledge is real, 
 though it be relative ; real, though it be phenome- 
 
230 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 nal ; not merely phenomenal, but also noumenal — 
 the two being perfectly consistent. 
 
 Logic is a stern authority, and logic asserts, 
 " what you know are phenomena," and logic can- 
 not make out that phenomena, in any case, are also 
 realities. But there may be strong ground, never- 
 theless, to believe it, and to believe it confidently. 
 Here is a book before me — I perceive it, I am con- 
 scious of perceiving, of knowing it. It aj^pears to 
 me ; .if it did not, I could know nothing about it. 
 It ^'s a phenomenon, but I know that it is more, 
 my knowing faculty declares it to be a real, sub- 
 stantial existence, a fact in God's universe. It is 
 not mere j)henomenon. It is a veritable something, 
 and I know it to be a veritable something, that is, 
 if I give credit to my power of knowing. I do 
 know it as it is, not ]3erfectly, not all comprehen- 
 sively. But what I do know is actually true of it. 
 If I had ten senses, instead of five, or a hundred 
 instead of ten, I should discover properties that are 
 now hidden ; but those which I had already dis- 
 covered, would not thereby be falsified, else my 
 whole nature would be falsified along with them, 
 my mental constitution would then be an organ- 
 ized deception. 
 
 We must know things, really, as they are in 
 themselves, must know them as other intelligent 
 beings know them. They may know far more, 
 and other properties, than we do ; but what we 
 
THE RELATIVE AND THE REAL. 231 
 
 know must abide true also, and enter into the con- 
 ception of the reality. I do know myself, my real, 
 very self. I do know myself truly, so far as my 
 knowledge goes. Self is a phenomenon of con- 
 sciousness, but it is a reality beyond it, at the same 
 time, which I certainly know. What I am to my 
 own consciousness, that, also, I must be to other 
 intelligences who look upon me. They may know 
 more, but they cannot know contrary to what I do. 
 Perfect, universal knowledge of self, or of anything 
 else, I have not, but a knowledge real, positive, 
 and reliable, I have. I do, I must know my ac- 
 tual thoughts, my principles, my tendencies, my 
 motives, my aims, my character, that which makes 
 me what I am, and distinguishes me from others. 
 In the same way, there must be a knowledge real, 
 though limited, of other living beings, as well as 
 of self — a knowledge of their actual character, of 
 their place in the scale of intellectual and moral 
 worth. Beyond this, a real external universe is 
 before us, real mountains, seas, forests, and skies, 
 not projected from within, not created by our 
 minds, or by any laws that guide our perception 
 and our thinkings, but out from them, actual sub- 
 stantial facts — phenomenal, it is true, appearing 
 to us, else we could know nothing of them, rela- 
 tive to our faculties, but not the less real in them- 
 selves. Beyond this still there is real truth for 
 the inward eye, as well as a real universe for the 
 
232 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 outward eye. There are real truths, standing quite 
 out from our faculties, independent of them, ap- 
 2:)earing to us, indeed, but themselves solid veri- 
 ties. There is a real living God, over all. 
 
 Mr. Mansell interposes a difficulty in the way of 
 real knowledge, as distinguished from relative, for 
 which not many are likely to be prepared. When 
 we speak of knowing things in themselves, know- 
 ing them as they are, we mean that our knowledge 
 of them is not owing merely to the instrument 
 with which we think, but much more to what is 
 in them, themselves, to what is outward and ac- 
 tual in them, of which we, with our minds, take 
 hold. In other words, we mean, that we know 
 them, in some degree, as any other mind, any- 
 where, must know^ them. An outer, independent 
 reality must be virtually the same to all intelligen- 
 ces. But the Bamj^ton lecturer finds and asserts 
 that " I can imagine other minds, only by first as- 
 suming their likeness to my own.'' (p. 203.) This 
 assumption, it is contended, I have no right to make. 
 As a matter of jDure reason, we know nothing of 
 any created minds, save human minds. We may 
 conjecture, may imagine, on various presumptive 
 grounds, such other existence, but we cannot 
 know it, as a fact. Eevelation makes known finite 
 intelligences, not human, vast in number, perhaps 
 of different, separate orders, and higher in the scale 
 of creation than mankind. We accept the fact. 
 
THE RELATIVE AND THE REAL. 233 
 
 but why, the lecturer will ask, should "human 
 intelligence be made the representative of all in- 
 telligence ?" Perhaps this is a case in which 
 one question may best be answered by another, 
 and we ask in reply, why not ? If it be legiti- 
 mate to rise from our own spiritual nature, to 
 the Supreme, the Divine spiritual nature — and 
 our Maker has left us no means but this of reach- 
 ing the conception of Himself — it can scarcely 
 be derogatory to other creatures, if we conceive 
 of them through ourselves. It seems not unphil- 
 osophical, but on the contrary most congenial 
 and congruous, to conceive of all created minds, 
 as brothers, elder born and younger born, perhaps ; 
 endowed with varying powers, but generically i\Q 
 same. It is impossible for us to conceive of Mind, 
 anywhere, of any order or grade, except as a power 
 of knowing, feeling, and desiring, or willing. Dif- 
 ferences in degree may be endless, but generic dif- 
 ference is inconceivable, without a destruction of 
 our whole notion of mind. Can we imagine any 
 created intelligence, thinking that two and two are 
 six, that the sun moves round the earth, that the 
 monarchy of Britain is a republic, that a man is 
 not essentially the same identical person at fifty as 
 he was at thirty, that responsibility does not mean 
 that we are answerable to a superior authority ? 
 We cannot. These are things not only true to us, 
 but true in themselves, which all minds must look 
 
234 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 upon, essentially, in the same light. A higher in- 
 telligence might have a deeper insight into the 
 science of numbers, the laws of the material uni- 
 verse, the theory of government, the doctrine of 
 personal identity, and into the relation subsisting 
 between man and his Creator than we have, but 
 that which we know are true, could not be false to 
 him ; it would be true to him also. Much more 
 might be true, but this at least would abide true. 
 Our knowledge is not complete, not perfect, but it 
 is of actual, positive verities, without us, and in- 
 dependent of us, and of all ; it is of things as 
 they are, and are seen by all intelligences. The 
 phenomena of consciousness are not fallacies, our 
 powers are not meant to deceive us, but to guide 
 us in their measure to truth and reality. Things 
 a][>]^eaT to us, but if they were merely appearances 
 they would be implicit untruths. We are invol- 
 untarily bound by certain laws, in obedience to 
 which thoughts are formed. But our nature be- 
 comes a falsehood, and our Maker a deceiver, if 
 these laws be not intended, not to keep us back 
 from reality, but to help us more surely to reach 
 it. Had we higher faculties, we might know more, 
 but this ought not rationally to create the slightest 
 suspicion that the acquaintance with things which 
 we do possess is not valid. Our knowledge is re- 
 lative, it must be relative to our faculties — all 
 knowledge is necessarily relative to the faculties of 
 
THE RELATIVE AND THE REAL. 235 
 
 the being who possesses it — but it is not, therefore, 
 nDt real. -It is phenomenal, but phenomena are 
 phenomena of something actual behind them, 
 which they phenomenize, and thereby reveal. It 
 is limited — so is all created knowledge, the knowl- 
 edge of the highest created intelligence that exists, 
 or can be conceived to exist — but so far as it goes, 
 it is reliable and genuine. 
 
CHAPTEE II. 
 
 HUMAN MODIFICATIONS OF MORALITY. 
 
 Kant — Practical and pure Reason — Logically wrong, morally right 
 — Thought-Forms — Time, Space, Personahty — No new Limita- 
 tions — Moral Ideas— Xot Modified by Laws of Thought— Mind 
 Reflects Truly — Xot Cramped hy its own Forms. 
 
 From wliat has been advanced, it is sufficiently 
 apparent — the fact, indeed, is admitted on all 
 sides — that logic is not an instrument for the 
 discovery of new truth. Its proper and only 
 office is to eliminate what is and what is not 
 involved in certain assumed data. Existing truth, 
 truth already contained in the premises, it can 
 detect and expose. But with this its function 
 ceases. If the premises be true, the strictly logi- 
 cal inferences and deductions from them cannot be 
 assailed. But even when the premises are strictly 
 true, that may be also true which goes far beyond 
 them. For example, in the brief discussion with 
 which we were last occupied, the phenomena of con- 
 sciousness constitute the entire sphere of our knowl- 
 edge, and logic, therefore justly concludes that all 
 our knowledge is phenomenal ; or, again, on the 
 ground that we can know only so far as we have 
 
HUMAN MODIFICATIONS OF MORALITY. 237 
 
 faculties for knowing, logic justly concludes that 
 all our knowledge is relative to our faculties. This 
 is clearly involved, and it is all that is involved in 
 the premises. But logic does not and cannot assert 
 that, because tliis is true, it is also the whole truth 
 that can be ascertained on the subject. So far from 
 this we have found that what are truly the ])lieno- 
 mena of consciousness are also more than pheno- 
 mena, are the things themselves, which, indeed, 
 appear to us, since, unless they did, they would be 
 to us nothing. We have found, besides, that that 
 which is truly relative to our faculties, is so not 
 because of some special peculiarity in our mental 
 structure which gives its own form to all that 
 reaches it, but because of generic characteristics 
 which must be common to all intelligent beings. 
 Our knowledge is phenomenal, and it is relative ; 
 but, on other grounds, we are able to conclude that 
 it is perfectly reliable at the same time, so far as it 
 goes. 
 
 There is one region, above all others, where the 
 nature of our knowledge is a matter of supreme 
 imjjortance. It is the region of moral truth. If 
 our ideas of right and wrong be not, in their meas- 
 ure, real ; if they be owing to a molding and shaj)- 
 ing power in us, and not to the things themselves ; 
 if they do not answer truly, in their measure, to 
 very realities, there is nothing stable for us ever- 
 more. In my humble judgment, had that portion 
 
238 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 of the Bampton Lecture relating to conscience and 
 to the nature of morality, stood alone, and had all 
 the other portions been faultless, tliis would have 
 rendered the work dangerous, in a degree hardly to 
 be estimated ; and all the more, as it comes from 
 a professed and sincere advocate of Christian- 
 ity, whose sentiments, therefore, are likely to be 
 adopted, without suspicion and without examina- 
 tion, by great multitudes. These sentiments, as I 
 humbly judge, tend to saj) the foundations of the 
 highest truth and of all rational faith. 
 
 It would be vain to think of a full discussion 
 here, of the nature of virtue and of the theory of 
 our moral sentiments. Yet both of these high 
 questions are intimately related to the subject which 
 is to occupy us. Is there such a thing as right and 
 wrong, a distinct quality of our mental and of our 
 outward acts, separate from wisdom, from utility, 
 from beauty, from aesthetic fitness, not opposite to 
 these properties, even congenial with them all, but 
 perfectly distinct from them, above them, suj)er- 
 added to them ? And is there a part or power of 
 our nature which takes hold of this distinct quality, 
 perceives it, makes us at once conscious of it — a 
 power, besides, which asserts a supreme authority 
 from which there is no appeal, and imjjeratively 
 commands and forbids ? To these questions I find 
 both an affirmative and a negative answer in the 
 Bampton Lecture — aflirmative, inasmuch as it 
 
HUMAN MODIFICATIONS OF MORALITY. 239 
 
 seems to consent to the conclusions of Bntler ; neg- 
 ative, inasmuch as the whole of the reasonings are 
 in the face of these conclusions. The lecturer will 
 be found to deny what Butler distinctly held : 
 firstj immutable right and wrong, apprehensible by 
 man ; and, secondly, conscience as the inward wit- 
 ness and revealer of immutable right and wrong. 
 The opening reference to Kant, in the beginning of 
 the seventh lecture, is almost decisive of this point. 
 Not many could have dealt with his magnificent 
 thoughts as the lecturer has done. I quote the 
 passage entire, as translated by Hamilton (Lect. i. 
 39), with only a few unimportant changes. It is 
 from the concluding portion of the treatise on the 
 practical reason. 
 
 "Two things there are which the oftener and the 
 more steadfastly we contemplate, fill the mind with 
 an ever new and ever rising admiration and rever- 
 ence — the staiTy heaven above me, the moral law 
 within me. After neither, as if it were hidden in 
 darkness or in the immensity beyond the sphere of 
 my vision, do I need to search and merely conjec- 
 ture. Both I contemplate lying clear before me, and 
 both I connect immediately with my consciousness 
 of existence. The one departs from the place I 
 occupy in the outer world of sense, expands beyond 
 the bonds of imagination this connection of my 
 body with worlds rising beyond worlds, and sys- 
 tems blending into systems, and protends it also 
 
240 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 into the illimitable times of their periodic move- 
 ments, to its commencement and perpetuity. The 
 other departs from my invisible self, from my per- 
 sonality, and represents me in a world truly infinite 
 indeed, but whose infinity can be tracked out only 
 by the intellect, with which also my connection, 
 unlike the fortuitous relation I stand in to all worlds 
 of sense, I am compelled to recognize as universal 
 and necessary. In the former, the first view of a 
 countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it 
 were, my imj^ortance as an animal product, which, 
 after a brief — and that incomjDrehensible — endow- 
 ment with the powers of life, is compelled to re- 
 fund its constituent matter to the planet on which 
 it grew, itself an atom in the universe. The other, 
 on the contrary, elevates my worth as an intelli- 
 gence, even without limit, and this through my 
 personality, in which the moral law reveals a faculty 
 of life, independent of my animal nature — nay, of 
 the whole material world ; at least, if it be per- 
 mitted to infer as much from the regulation of my 
 being which a conformity with that law exacts ; 
 proposing, as it does, my moral worth for the abso- 
 lute end of my activity, conceding no compromise 
 of its imperative to the necessitation of nature, and 
 spurning, in its infinity, the conditions and boun- 
 daries of my j)resent transitory life." 
 
 Sir William Hamilton is all admh'ing, genial 
 sympathy with the German sage. He quotes the 
 
HUMAN MODIFICATIONS OF MORALITY. 241 
 
 foregoing passage " for the soundness of its doctrine 
 and for the natural and unsouglit-for sublimity of 
 the expression." He, with Kant, was a believer in 
 conscience and in immutable morality. But the 
 Bampton lecturer only objects and censures, only 
 wonders at the inconsistency, which first proves all 
 our knowledge to be relative, and then a portion of 
 it to be real. The inconsistency is palpable, and 
 has been marked by a thousand eyes. The practi- 
 cal is separated from the pure reason by an essential 
 distinction, apparently without sufficient ground 
 and in defiance of logic. But it is a glorious in- 
 consistency, it is a noble blunder — perhaps no blun- 
 der, but a magnificent truth, only reached not soon 
 enough. True, majestically true, is the grand dis- 
 covery, where he finds it : but it is true, also, where 
 he found it not. In the pure reason, as well as in 
 the practical reason, lie divine intuitions, eternal, 
 necessary truths. But as to the latter, at all events, 
 the practical reason, conscience, as we should say, 
 Kant, yielding to the force of his own conscious- 
 ness, upheld the indwelling in man of immovable 
 moral convictions and of a supreme moral authority. 
 But the Bampton lectm^er only pertinaciously 
 stands by the fact of Kant's logical inconsistency. 
 And it is quite true, as he asserts, that " the result 
 of the critical philosophy (in the hands of Kant) as 
 applied to the speculative side of human reason, 
 was to jorove the existence of certain necessary forms 
 
242 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE, 
 
 and laws of intuition and of thought, which impart 
 a corres20O7iding character to all the objects of 
 which consciousness, intuitive or reflective, can 
 take cognizance/' (p. 200.) But according to the 
 same philosophy, certain moral ideas, he insists, 
 are not merely " facts of human consciousness, con- 
 ceived under the laivs of human thought, but abso- 
 lute, transcendent 7'eal {ties, implied in the concep- 
 tion of all reasonable beings, as such, and therefore 
 independent of the law of time, and binding not on 
 man as man, but on all possible intelligent beings, 
 created and uncreated. The moral reason is thus 
 a source of absolute and unchangeable recdities, 
 while the speculative reason is concerned only with 
 phenomena, or things modified by the constitution 
 of the human mind/' (p. 201.) 
 
 It is not my business to defend Kant. Let it 
 be granted, that so far as he is concerned the criti- 
 cisms now quoted are just. But these criticisms 
 throw additional light on the jDrinciples, undoubt- 
 edly maintained by the lecturer. The distinction 
 which is here made, is broad and impassable, be- 
 tween realities and phenomena, or, as he varies the 
 expression, things modified by our minds, between 
 realities and facts of human consciousness, reali- 
 ties and things conceived under the laws of human 
 thought, between truth and right for man and 
 truth and right for other intellige7it beings. He 
 insists that the forms and laws of thought impose 
 
HUMAN MODIFICATIONS OF MORALITY. 243 
 
 a character of their oicn on whatever is the object 
 of consciousness, quite other than the thing itself. 
 It brings back repulsively the hard image of " a 
 mind cramped by its own laws and bewildered in 
 the contemplation of its own forms/' The fixed 
 idea seems to be, that the laws of thought are so 
 many rigid moulds, so many contracted grooves, 
 into which thought, like fused metal, is run, and 
 from which it receives a peculiar form, unlike 
 everything else ; at least whether like or unlike 
 anything else, or how far like and how far unlike, 
 we can never know. Perhaps it would be more 
 philosophical, more generous, certainly more hon- 
 orable to the Creator, to conceive of the forms of 
 thought, as mirrors, so constructed and so set that 
 by their mould and their position, they may, in 
 their measure, reflect on us a truthful image of the 
 realities that fall on their surface. On the lectur- 
 er's supposition, our minds must for ever present 
 to us self-originated illusions, necessarily more or 
 less artificial, must actually, largely create for us, 
 what we imagine to be realities beyond them and 
 independent of them. On the supposition, which I 
 have ventured to suggest, our minds are, within 
 the limits of their capacity, faithful and truthful 
 media, through which is honestly conveyed to us 
 what is presented to them. 
 
 Perhaps the question ought to have been sooner 
 distinctly put and answered, '^ What are these 
 
244 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 mysterious, essential thought-forms, these neces- 
 sary mental laws, which are supposed not to re- 
 port to us what is communicated to them, but ac- 
 tually to modify all our knowledge and to make it 
 specially liuman^ quite different from knowledge, 
 possessed by other intelligent beings, at all events, 
 whether different or the same, or how far different 
 and how far the same, we can never know. What 
 are they.^ Chiefly these three — Time, Space, Per- 
 sonality. 
 
 I. The first, the law of Time, is tlie univeral, 
 the only strict universal thought-form, necessarily 
 affecting all the acts of consciousness, without ex- 
 ception. In thinking of anything, we think of it, 
 must think of it, as, in time, occuj)ying a definite 
 period, preceded by something, followed by some- 
 thing else. Duration and succesl^ion are the two 
 necessary ideas. We are not taught by experience, 
 thus to think : it is not owing to a purpose or 
 choice of ours. It is involuntary, inevitable, uni- 
 versal, wholly a priori. But is there anything 
 here, any new thing, not already involved in our 
 nature, to cramp, to fetter, to narrow, to modify, 
 to alter our ideas, to make them other, than, in 
 an}^ case, they must have been ? I maintain 
 there is not. The bearing of this thought-form, 
 on the doctrine of the Infinite, is manifest, and 
 the lecturer has made legitimate use of it in this re- 
 lation. Within time we cannot condense eternitv. 
 
HUMAN MODIFICATIONS OF MORALITY. 245 
 
 Within limits, we cannot compress that which has 
 no limits. Under the mental law of time, Infinity 
 is in-con-ceivable, in-com-prehensible. But I ask 
 is this, any neio thing, any additional chain, forged 
 for us, by this peculiar thought-form ? It is sim- 
 ply to say, that we are created and not uncreated, 
 that we are finite, not infinite. It is no new thing, 
 but neither more nor less, than simply identical 
 with the earlier fact involved in our creation. The 
 finite cannot contain, com-prehend the Infinite. 
 The a priori law of time is not a new, cramping, 
 naiTowing, modifying influence. It is simply the 
 necessary concomitant of our created nature, and 
 no addition to it. Above all, it is no peculiar lim- 
 itation, belonging only to man, making his thoughts 
 and his knowledge peculiarly human, but belonging 
 necessarily to all created minds, be their order what 
 it may. 
 
 II. In like manner, of the thought-form of per- 
 sonality. We think of mental attributes, must 
 think of them, can only think of them, as in an 
 individual mind. It is possible to abstract the 
 general quality, say, of wisdom, and to reason re- 
 specting it, and to set it before our minds, as a 
 separate idea. But in the same moment, in the 
 same mental act, we necessarily localize it in a wise 
 being. The law of personality conditions our 
 thinking, in this sphere. Supreme intelligence, 
 moral attributes, volitions, we are compelled to 
 
246 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 attach to a Supreme Personality. But do we not, 
 at the same time, most surely believe that this is 
 the very actual fact .? Why, and on what invinci- 
 ble ground, shall any one assert that it is not ? 
 Our own personality is the image and the proph- 
 ecy, if not the proof of the Supreme personahty. 
 Unless our nature be an elaborate deception, we 
 are compelled to accept this as the very truth, in- 
 volving no inconsistency, though profound mys- 
 tery, which we may never be able to solve. At 
 all events, this can be no peculiarly human limita- 
 tion. Kising, necessarily, out of the very fact of 
 personality, it must bear alike on all created 
 minds, human and superhuman. 
 
 III. The law of Space need not be noticed. It 
 belongs only to one sphere, that of extended matter 
 and of our external perceptions, and in no import- 
 ant sense can it be conceived to create any new 
 limit for our knowledge. 
 
 The entire idea of our being cramped and fet- 
 tered, by the necessary laws of thought, is un- 
 founded and untrue. We are creatures, finite, 
 limited bein^^s, and all our knowledo'e and our 
 powers are limited. But our Creator has not 
 aggravated this necessary limitation, by new 
 chains, under the name of essential thouoiit-forms. 
 The conception is both more natural and more 
 philosophical, that these, belonging to us, not 
 peculiarly as human, but in common with all finite 
 
HUMAN MODIFICATIONS OF MORALITY. 247 
 
 beings, are designed to help us in reaching, to the 
 utmost extent of which our nature is capable, the 
 very reality of things. It is not true that the laws 
 of thought ^^ impart a corresponding character to 
 all the objects of consciousness," that is, impose on 
 them an additional limitation of their own. It is 
 not true that the " facts of human consciousness" 
 are not also faithful representatives of facts in 
 themselves. It is not true that '^ what is conceived 
 under the laws of human thought" is not also ac- 
 tual reality. It is not true that right and wrong 
 for man is not also right and wrong for all other 
 intelligent beings. 
 
CHAPTEK III. 
 
 IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WKONG. 
 
 iQcapable of Judging of Divine ? — Infinite Morality ? — Absolute 
 Morality ? — Contradictory — Bolingbroke — Regulations — Eternal 
 Principles — No Modification — "Varied AppJieations — Conscience 
 — Supreme Authority. 
 
 The work we are examining^ deals with the hu- 
 man, only with the human ; and the human, it 
 professes to show, is something quite by itself, 
 peculiarly constructed and conditioned, under pe- 
 culiar restrictive laws, which make all human 
 knowledge and all human experience totally differ- 
 ent from knowledge and experience, among other 
 intelligent beings. Above all,, it aims to separate 
 these utterly and for ever, from all relation to the 
 Divine Mind. 
 
 " As a corollary to this theory" (that of Kant, 
 already referred to), " it follows that the law of 
 human morality must be regarded as the measure 
 and adequate representation of the moral nature 
 of God ; in fact, that our knowledge of the Divine 
 Being is identical with that of our own moral 
 duties." (p. 202.) The lecturer speaks of Kant's 
 theory as virtually maintaining " that man may 
 
IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WRONG. 249 
 
 becomo the measure of the Absolute nature of 
 God/' (p. 208.) Again, with reference to the 
 Moral Eeason, he says, ^' We must refuse to exalt 
 it to the measure and standard of the Absolute 
 and Infinite goodness of God." (p. 229.) 
 
 Perhaps it might be asked, where, even in Kant, 
 there is just ground for this sort of inference. 
 But, at all events, it is surely possible to maintain 
 the authority of conscience, and the validity and 
 reality of our moral intuitions, without exalting 
 man to the level of his Creator, and, above all, with- 
 out constituting him the measure and standard of 
 his Creator's attributes. There are some things 
 which even the lecturer must allow to be common 
 to man, with the Highest Intelligence. A whole 
 is greater than its part, parallel lines, cannot meet ; 
 in another region the principle of gravitation reigns 
 in the material universe, and in another region 
 still, wisdom is better than folly. We might even 
 venture so far as to make these, and such facts or 
 principles, tests of any communication professing 
 to come from above. If thev were contradicted or 
 denied, we might venture to conclude that the 
 communication could not be divine. But should 
 we, therefore, be chargeable with exalting our 
 knowledge to the level of the Divine, above all, 
 with constituting our knowledge the measure and 
 standard of the Divine. The idea is preposterous, 
 and as a charge, is scarcely candid or fair. But 
 
250 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 the whole drift of the lecturer is to show that hu- 
 man morality is one thing, divine morality (though 
 I intensely dislike the j)hrase) quite another thing. 
 " Human morality, even in its highest elevation, is 
 not identical with, nor adequate to measm'e the 
 absolute morality of Grod.'' (p. 206.) 
 
 Taking the word absolute, in its strict philoso- 
 phical meaning, the meaning belonging to it, in the 
 earlier discussions relating to the Absolute and In- 
 finite, that phrase, absolute morality is simply not 
 sense, indeed, is a pure contradiction. Absolute, 
 absolved, loosed from relation, connection, depend- 
 ence, etc. Morality is a single quality, out of 
 many, related necessarily to other qualities, sup- 
 posing their existence, essentially dependent on 
 them ; on intelligence, for example, on perception, 
 on volition. If it be said it is absolute, inasmuch 
 as it is " in and bv itself," this arises from a mis- 
 conception. The Being in whom it resides is in 
 and of Himself — that is. He is underived, self-sus- 
 tained, and everlastingly self-sustaining. But His 
 attributes are in Him, not in and of themselves. 
 If the word be employed po23ularly, to mean pure, 
 unmixed, genuine, very morality, in its highest 
 possible form, the sense is most true ; but the w^ord, 
 already preoccupied, is none the less objectionable. 
 At all events, let us not be terrified by the grand- 
 eur of the word absolute, for here the only thing it 
 can mean is pure, real, very. 
 
IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WRONG. 251 
 
 It may be" convenient, at the same time, to notice 
 a cognate phrase, which is also repeatedly em- 
 ployed, infinite morality. I do not know what it 
 means, or by what authority it is used. I can 
 attach no idea to the word infinite, in this connec- 
 tion. Kectitude, purity, veracity, benevolence, in- 
 capable of limit, in the uncreated nature ; moral 
 excellence, the highest that can possibly exist, be- 
 yond which nothing is conceivable ! To any other 
 or more than this, I am unable to attach any idea, 
 any meaning whatever. Infinite, in the strict phi- 
 losophical sense, does convey more than this, 
 something positive and a2:)prehensible, though not 
 comprehensible. The Being in whom spiritual ex- 
 cellence resides is strictlv Infinite, because He is 
 Eternal, unbeginning, unending, underived, un- 
 changeable. All his perfections, physical, and 
 moral, are in this sense strictly infinite, that they 
 ever have been and ever shall be. But in them- 
 selves, to call them infinite, may be true, or it may 
 be false ; but to me it is wholly unintelligible. One 
 thing is quite clear, moral attributes in the Great 
 Being may be in exercise, or they may not be in 
 exercise ; they may be put forth in varying forms 
 and in varying degrees. To my mind it is contra- 
 dictory to predicate infinity of that, which admits 
 of degrees. On the whole, these awful words Abso- 
 lute morality. Infinite morality, must not be suf- 
 fered to impose on us. Both are at the best 
 
252 MORALITY AND A MOEAL SEN'S!:, 
 
 unmeaDingy and, at least, one is a pure contra- 
 diction. 
 
 I am not quite sure, that even the design, un- 
 consciously, of the use of the terms we have criti- 
 cized, was not to deter us from attempting to think 
 of the moral attributes of the Creator, and to 
 make us feel that the subject does not belong to 
 us at all. The undoubted aim of the lecturer 
 throughout, is to prove that moral excellence in the 
 highest nature is altogether beyond our knowledge. 
 Thus he says — ^' He from whom all holy desires^ 
 all good counsels, and all just works do proceed, 
 must himself be more holy, more just, more good, 
 than these. But when we try to realize in thought, 
 this sure conviction of our faith, we find that here, 
 as everywhere, the finite cannot fathom the infinite, 
 that while in our hearts we believe, yet our thoughts 
 are at times sore troubled.'' (p. 230.) " That 
 there is an absolute morality, based upon, or rather 
 identical with the eternal nature of God is indeed 
 a conviction, forced upon us by the same evidence, 
 as that on which we believe that God exists at all. 
 But what that absolute morality is, we are as un- 
 able to fix in any human conception, as we are to 
 define the other attributes of the same divine na- 
 ture.'' (p. 206.) '' We do not certainly know the 
 exact nature and operation of the moral attributes 
 of God : we can but infer and conjecture from 
 'what we know of the moral attributes of man, and 
 
IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WRONG. 253 
 
 the analogy between the finite and the infinite, can 
 never be so perfect, as to prechide all possibility 
 of error in the process/' (p. 240.) 
 
 There is one writer of the last century, Lord 
 Bolingbroke, who expresses sentiments precisely 
 identical with those now quoted. In him they 
 were consistent enough ; for he employed them in 
 order to overthrow the argument for a future state. 
 '•^ The Divine attributes,'' says Bolingbroke, '^ are 
 exercised in such innumerable relations, absolutely 
 unknown to us, that though we are sure the ex- 
 ercise of them, in the immensity of the universe, 
 is always directed by the all-perfect Being, to that 
 which is fittest on the whole ; yet, the notions of 
 created beings like us, who see them in one rela- 
 tion alone, cannot be ajDplied to them, with any 
 propriety nor with any certainty sufiicient to make 
 them objects of ■ our imitation." (Bol. Works, 
 Lon. 1754, iii. 412.) Again, '•'• as little can we rise 
 from our moral obligations to God's supposed 
 moral attributes. I call them supposed, because 
 after all that has been said, to prove a necessary 
 connection between his physical, and his moral at- 
 tributes, the latter may all be absorbed in his wis- 
 dom." (iv. 18.) " God is in their (theologians') 
 notion of him, nothing more than an Infinite man. 
 He knows as we know, is wdse as we are wise, and 
 moral as we are moral." (iv. 296.) " Clarke's 
 whole chain of reasoning, from the moral attri- 
 
254 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 butes downwards, is nothing more than one con- 
 tinued application of human moral ideas to the 
 design and conduct of God." (v. 5.) " It re- 
 quired no such metaphysical apparatus, as he (Sam. 
 Clarke) employed, somewhat tediously, to prove 
 that all perfections, physical and moral, must be 
 attributes of the self-existent, all-perfect author 
 of all being ; but he does not prove what he as- 
 serts, and on the proof of wdiich his whole argu- 
 ment turns, that these attributes are the same in 
 God, as they are in our ideas." (iv. 249.) 
 
 These sound to me like extracts from the Bamp- 
 ton Lecture ; they contain the very ideas put forth 
 in it ; but they are the words of Lord Bolingbroke. 
 None could be more earnest than he was, in his 
 day, to prove that the moral attributes of the 
 Great Being are unknown, and unknow^able by 
 man. 
 
 There is one distinction between the Divine and 
 the human, in which a source of difficulty is found, 
 wdiich it is not easy to appreciate. "To human 
 conception, it seems impossible that absolute mo- 
 rality should be manifested in the form of a law 
 of obligation, for such a law implies relation and 
 subjection to the authority of a lawgiver. All 
 human morality is manifested in this form." (p. 
 206.) I humbly conceive, that all the difficulty 
 here represented, vanishes with a simple statement 
 of the accepted facts. There is a law within the 
 
IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WRONG. 255 
 
 human mind, commandmg right, forbidding wrong. 
 There is also an inward sense of obligation to obey 
 that law. It is in this way that human morality 
 is manifested. On the other hand, the Supreme 
 always is and does that which is immutably right. 
 It is his essential nature, to be and do that which 
 is immutably right. He would not be God, He 
 would cease to be, were it otherwise. There are 
 no lawgiver and no law to Him, no obedience, no 
 sense of obligation ; but only the silent evolution 
 of an eternal fact, the serene energy of a changeless 
 nature. What is law to us, is life to the Supreme ; 
 what is obligation to us, is mere being to Him. 
 And what then ? Where is the difficulty ? 
 
 The real question at issue is not touched at all — 
 " Is there, or is there not, that which is immutably 
 right, that which is immutably wrong — the same 
 to all created minds, and to the uncreated ? Have 
 we, or have we not, the power of distinguishing 
 that which is immutably right and that which is 
 immutably wrong ? Is rectitude rectitude, up- 
 rightness uprightness, dishonesty dishonesty, gen- 
 erosity generosity, malignity malignity, deceit de- 
 ceit, to us and to all beings, and to the Great 
 God ?" The question is intelligible, direct, sim- 
 ple. I put it in the shortest form, Is a lie a lie, 
 all the universe over, in all places and at all times, 
 and amongst all rational and moral beings ? There 
 may be doubt whether a thing be true or false, or 
 
256 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE, 
 
 how far it is the one or the other. There may be 
 doubt whether the utterer or the doer of it were 
 aware of its falsity, or how far he was aware of it. 
 But suppose the thing to be a palpable, naked 
 falsehood, is it, or is it not, a falsehood all the uni- 
 verse over ; is it, or is it not, eternally, immutably 
 wrong, a thing to be only scouted, scorned, hated, 
 reprobated ? Can we conceive a single sane mind, 
 of God's creating, of any order, in any part of 
 space, thinking it other than eternally, immutably 
 wrong ? Phenomenon of consciousness ? It is 
 phenomenon. But there is reality behind it, and 
 it is this, of which we take hold, and know that 
 we take hold. It is such a phenomenon, so actual, 
 so real, that it scorches, and scars, and damns the 
 mind in which it is begotten. It is, and we know 
 that it iSj an actual, execrable, burning abomina- 
 tion, in Grod's universe. We do, in our measure, 
 know some things, this among others, in them- 
 selves, as they really are, and as they are judged by 
 all creatures, and by the Creator ! 
 
 Our impressions of evil, as of everything else, 
 depend on our mental capacity, and on the amount 
 of our intelligence. A powerful, instructed, disci- 
 plined mind, will see falsehood as another cannot. 
 But to both, with stronger or feebler impressions, 
 it is essentially the same — a thing, only and immu- 
 tably wrong. 
 
 The Bampton lecturer, if I rightly understand 
 
IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WRONG. 257 
 
 him, would have us abandon all investigation into 
 fixed moral principles, and would substitute for 
 them certain ascertained rules of life. As in the 
 intellectual, so here also in the moral region, his 
 conviction seems to be that the moment we pass 
 from the world of the senses to the world of 
 thought, from practical to speculative truth, we 
 insm'e nothing but perplexity. Take, as an exam- 
 ple, the following on the subject of principles — 
 " To maintain the immutability of moral princi- 
 ples in the abstract, is a very different thing from 
 maintaining the immutability of the particular acts 
 by which those principles are manifested in prac- 
 tice. That duty ought, in all cases, to be fol- 
 lowed, in preference to inclination, is as certain a 
 truth as that two straight lines cannot inclose a 
 space. In their concrete application, both princi- 
 ples are equally liable to error It is 
 
 in their concrete form that moral principles are 
 adopted as guides of conduct and canons of judg- 
 ment, and in this form they admit of various de- 
 grees of uncertainty or of positive error." (p. 207.) 
 Poor guides they must be 1 useless canons 1 one 
 would think, if this be true. There are cases of 
 casuistry, Protestant as well as Roman Catholic, 
 which fill many goodly volumes. And if the great 
 principles of morality depended, as the lecturer 
 seems to think thev do, on the solution of such 
 cases, we may as well, at once, throw ourselves at 
 
258 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 the feet of di vines, of either school, or both ; for 
 no training of ordinary men could possibly fit 
 them for such a task. But what shall we think 
 of the elevation to the dignity of a moral princi- 
 ple, of the statement, ^^ that duty ought always to 
 be followed in preference to inclination.^' Moral 
 principle ? it is no moral principle. It is a sound 
 maxim, a judgment which most men have arrived 
 at. But moral principles are given in a shorter, 
 simpler, terser, sterner form. Be just, be truth- 
 ful, be upright and sincere, be loving and gener- 
 ous ! Duty ! the word is short enough, but it is 
 made, in experience, endlessly complex and com- 
 plicated. There are many real and many more 
 unreal difficulties, connected with the determina- 
 tion of what in modern phrases is called duty. It 
 touches a thousand things, more or less related or 
 conflicting, which are made to encumber the sim- 
 ple moral imperative, the ought and ought not. 
 We think of interests, immediately persona! or 
 relative, of social obligations and influences, of ac- 
 tual surrounding conditions, of results and effects, 
 of public opinion, of 23leasure or pain, to others of 
 inclination or bias, for or against. But the question 
 is far shorter, easier, simpler, " shall I utter or act 
 a falsehood ? shall I be guilty of clear injustice ? 
 shall I practise a deception ? shall I perpetrate a 
 cruelty .?" These are questions which in 999 cases 
 
IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WRONG. 259 
 
 out of every 1,000, even a child knows to answer, 
 in a moment. 
 
 The lecturer keeps far away from the great, im- 
 mutable principles of right or wrong. Apparently, 
 human morality is to him something doubtful, fluc- 
 tuating, and changeable. He, in fact, speaks of 
 " moral obligation, conceived as a law binding on 
 man, to be regarded as immutable, so long as magi's 
 nature remains unchanged." (p. 204.) Again, of 
 "morality in its human character, depending on 
 conditions not co-eternal with God.'^ (p. 210.) It 
 would not be equitable, were I to omit to say, that 
 in these, and such cases, he has reference to what 
 are called positive commands of God touching 
 things indifferent in themselves, but binding, be- 
 cause they are commanded. As most forcibly illus- 
 trating the principle involved, I take the fact that 
 the Jews, by command of God, gave a tenth of 
 their property to their religion, that a particular 
 tribe were priests by birth, wore certain robes, and 
 performed certain ceremonies at certain times, and 
 in a prescribed mode. These things were neither 
 ridit nor wrons^ in themselves, human conscience 
 had nothing to do with them, save in one point ; 
 they were to the Jews express commands of their 
 God. And reason and conscience witness to this 
 as a first principle, " God is to be obeyed unreserv- 
 edly." We may be right or we may be wrong in 
 construing his voice, but that voice recognized, obe- 
 
260 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 dience is imperative. Here is tlie one moral prin- 
 ci2:)le, in all that can be regarded as circumstantial 
 and positive, in human duty — implicit obedience 
 to God. But this has nothing circumstantial, 
 local, temporary, fluctuating in it ; it is eternal, 
 immutable, universal, a law not to man only, but 
 to all created natures. This stands on the same 
 basis with eternal justice, veracity, sincerity, and 
 benevolence. 
 
 But the aim of the lecturer is not to identify 
 human morality with everlasting principles, but to 
 reduce it to what is merely positive and locally or 
 temporarily regulative. He speaks of the great 
 principles of all that is holy and righteous existing 
 in God, before they assumed theii^ finite form in 
 the heart of man.'' (p. 210.) What is the finite in 
 distinction from any other form of rectitude, vera- 
 city, U23rightness and benevolence ? I do not 
 know. Again, " God did not create absolute mo- 
 rality, it is co-eternal with himself, and it were 
 blasphemy to say that there ever was a time when 
 God was and Goodness was not. But God did 
 create the human manifestation of morality," (p. 
 208), that is to say, he did create a human mani- 
 festation of that which was in Himself and was 
 uncreated. We must understand this, as the un- 
 doubted import of the structure of the sentence. 
 The eternal principles of right and wrong are un- 
 created, but a human manifestation of them loas 
 
IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WRONG. 261 
 
 created. That must mean, I imagine, a human 
 medium for manifesting tliem was created. The 
 lecturer adds, God did create this manifestation, 
 " when he created the moral constitution of man/' 
 Of course he did. The moral constitution of man 
 was the new medium, through which eternal moral 
 principles were manifested. No, by no means, this 
 is not what the lecturer would say, for he adds, 
 Grod did create the human manifestation of moral- 
 ity, " when he placed man in those circumstances, 
 by which the eternal principles of right and wrong 
 are modified in relation to this present life." This 
 is not manifestation, it is not the mere application 
 of principles to certain new circumstances, but 
 modification. 
 
 To modify, is to alter, so as to suit circum- 
 stances. We modify a statement, when we find, 
 either that it contained too much or did not con- 
 tain enough, to be strictly true. We modify a 
 scheme, when, finding either that it will not work, 
 or not so efficiently as we anticipated, we correct 
 its provisions, or introduce new ones. We modify 
 a principle, when experience has taught us that in 
 one direction and another, it is not really sound, or 
 is defective. To modify is to alter. And the 
 eternal principles of right and wrong are not 
 merely applied to this present life, but altered.^ 
 how far we know not, but they are so far altered 
 that from human morality, we cannot judge lohat 
 
262 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 real, essential morality is, or may be. If this be 
 not to shake the everlasting foundations of the 
 moral universe, what can be ? No wonder then 
 the lecturer should say, " while in our hearts 
 we believe, yet our thoughts at times are sore 
 troubled."' No wonder then he should find 
 " many things, impossible to understand and diffi- 
 cult to believe." And his hitherto strong refuge, 
 Butler, whose chief glory, it appears to me, no 
 one has labored more effectually — though without 
 such an intention — than he, to cast in the dust ; 
 his chosen refuge cannot avail him here. True 
 enough, ^' the very philosopher whose writings 
 have most contributed to establish the supreme 
 authority of conscience in man, is also the one, 
 who has pointed out most clearly the existence of 
 analogous moral difficulties in nature and in re- 
 ligion, and the true answer to both, namely the ad- 
 mission, that Grod's government, natural as well as 
 spiritual, is a scheme, impeyfectly comprehended." 
 (p. 229.) 
 
 All or nearly all will admit that God's govern- 
 ment is imperfectly comprehended. But what of 
 the modification, the alteration of the eternal prin- 
 ciples of right and wrong, in relation to this lyres- 
 ent life ? What of human morality as a different 
 thing from real, genuine, essential morality ? 
 This is no imperfect comprehension of Grod's 
 government, it is comprehending, only too clearly, 
 
IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WRONG. 263 
 
 the unstable and flexible character of moral law. 
 Butler maintains nothing like this, he does not, in 
 the most indirect way, hint at such a thing. The 
 very contrary. Butler upholds the doctrine of 
 conscience as a power in the soul, percipient of 
 immutable right and wrong, an authority com- 
 manding the one, forbidding the other. Referring 
 to disputed commands in the Old Testament, he 
 says, ^' none of these precepts,'' (in the very pas- 
 sage quoted by Mr. Mansell, p. 243,) "are contrary 
 to immutable morality." Immutable morality ! 
 He holds that we can know it and judge what is 
 and what is not contrary to it. The Bampton 
 lecturer could not have employed the phrase, for 
 he distinctly maintains that we cannot know it. — 
 There is, he might have said, an immutable mo- 
 rality, but what it is, we are wholly unable to fix 
 in any human conception. Not so, Butler. So 
 clear, and sure, and fixed is our conception of it, 
 in his opinion, that he puts it against a conceived, 
 not actual, statement in the scriptures, and asserts 
 its supremacy. '^i/*it were commanded," he says, 
 " to cultivate the principles and to act in the 
 spirit of treachery, ingi'atitude, cruelty, the com- 
 mand,'' — in the bible he means — even a command 
 in the bible — '' would not alter the nature of the 
 case or of the action, in any of these instances. 
 But it is quite otherwise in precepts which require 
 only the doing an external action." (p. 243.) 
 
264 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 There can be no interpretation, but one, of this 
 passage. Conscience, in the sphere of the highest 
 moral principles, is the ultimate authorit}^, from 
 which there is no appeal. Everywhere, for all 
 beings, and for ever and ever, these principles are 
 immoveable. The law of the inward judge is 
 paramount. Nothing can compete with it. But- 
 ler shall tell us, that not even a command in the 
 \)i\)[Q — were such a thing possible — not even a com- 
 mand in the bible, however seemingly express and 
 plain, could alter the case. There is nothing here, 
 of the modification of eternal right and wrong ; 
 nothing here of distinguishing human morality, 
 from eternal, essential morality. 
 
 To those who, with myself, bow to the authority 
 of the holy scriptures, there may be a nobler and 
 fuller revelation of moral life, than can be reached, 
 in the absence of such divine aid, and a clearer 
 and more extended interpretation of moral law. 
 But where there are no scriptures, thank God ! 
 there is a conscience, a voice from above, within 
 man, testifying to the highest and grandest truth. 
 Take this away ! as in effect and in fact, the 
 Bampton lecturer does, and the divinest light that 
 yet lingers in the human soul is put out. Reduce 
 morals to a calculation of probabilities, a science 
 of ecclesiastical casuistry, let virtue depend on a 
 w-eighing and balancing of advantages, personal 
 and relative, on a measuring of effects, near and 
 
IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WRONG. 265 
 
 remote, on each man's sagacity and honesty and 
 temper in judging, let there be no innate sense ol 
 right and wrong, no ultimate authoritative judge, let 
 eternal justice, veracity and ujDrightness, witnessed 
 bv conscience, be banished from lano;ua2:e, as ami- 
 able but imbecile mistakes, and the very founda- 
 tions of the moral universe are upturned and the 
 reign of a hopeless, eternal, moral anarchy is in- 
 augurated. 
 
 The imperfections and even perversions of nat- 
 ural conscience are undeniable. Like the bodily 
 senses and the powers of the mind, this, also ad- 
 mits of behig improved and impaired. But it re- 
 mains notwithstanding, as they also do ; it remains 
 an imperishable part of our constitution, precious 
 above all others, as the source of immutable, moral 
 intuitions. '^ It is not,'' says Dr. Chalmers, meet- 
 ing the case of contradictory, ethical conclusions in 
 different countries and ages, ^^ it is not that Justice, 
 Humanitv, and Gratitude are not the canonized 
 virtues of every region, or that Falsehood, Cruelty, 
 and Fraud would not, in their abstract and unas- 
 sociated nakedness, be viewed as the objects of 
 moral antipathy and rebuke. ... In spite of 
 all the topical moralities, to which various causes 
 have given birth, there is an unquestioned univer- 
 sal morality notwithstanding. And in every case, 
 where the moral sense is unfettered by these asso- 
 ciations and the judgment is uncramped either by 
 
 12 
 
266 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 the partialities of interest or by the inveteracy of 
 national customSj which habit and antiquity have 
 rendered sacred, . . . conscience is found to 
 sjDcak the same language ; nor to the remotest ends 
 of the worldj is there a country or an island where 
 the same uniform and consistent voice is not heard 
 from her." — Moral and Intellectual Constitution 
 of Man, I. 89-91. 
 
 If the conclusions which have been successively 
 arrived at, in the progi'ess of this criticism, be valid, 
 the following is something like the result : — The 
 BamjDton lecturer has dethroned human reason, 
 has reduced all truth to a mode of our conceptions, 
 has put out the lamp of revelation, denying that 
 the true God, as He is, is to be found there, and 
 has thus left the outer temple void and dark. But 
 in his reasonings on our moral nature, he has done 
 something yet more to be lamented. He has put 
 forth his hand to the very altar of the innermost 
 sanctuary of our being, has extinguished the sacred 
 fire on that altar, and has written on the whole 
 structure — Ichabod, the glory is departed ! I ven- 
 ture to lift a humble, feeble voice against this sac- 
 rilege. For one, I must stand, at all hazards, by 
 what I regard as among the clearest and surest ut- 
 terances of consciousness, the existence of a moral 
 sense ! For one, I must abide, as on the very es- 
 sential ground of the moral universe, by immutable 
 morality, revealed by conscience and common to all 
 
IMMUTABLE RIGHT AND WRONG. 267 
 
 intelligent beings. So much the more absolutely 
 must I cling to these, because, on the principles of 
 the Bampton lecturer, I can see nothing for man 
 but darkness — darkness above, below, around, 
 everywhere ; darkness in this world, darkness here- 
 after, darkness for ever and ever ; dreary, hopeless, 
 overwhelming darkness ; an eternal, intolerable 
 agony of darkness ! 
 
 Only in a passing sentence or two, shall I notice 
 the peculiar method in which the lecturer defends 
 the mysteries of Christianity, the doctrines of the 
 Triniiy, the Incarnation, the Atonement. It is 
 well known that objectors against these doctrines 
 have been wont to assert that they are not only 
 incomprehensible, but directly contradictory. The 
 answer of the lecturer amounts to a free ad- 
 mission of all the alleged contradictions. It is 
 even so, he would say, but the objection has no 
 validity as a2)plied to the Christian revelation, 
 for it is only common to it, with all philos- 
 , ophy and with all the efforts of reason, when 
 directed to the nature of God, or to his pro- 
 cedure with his creatures, or to his purposes and 
 methods. We cannot reason upon them without 
 being plunged into contradictions without end. 
 We have no right to reason upon them all. They 
 belong to the region of faith — they are to be 
 accepted unconditionally. The Infinite and all 
 
268 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE, 
 
 that relates to the Infinite is not an object of 
 human thought. We have no business to think, 
 we are utterly incapable of conceiving anything at 
 all on the subject. 
 
 It occurs to me, that there are others besides 
 Christians who might make very admirable use of 
 this mode of silencing objections. There is a doc- 
 trine, very venerable by antiquity, and as having 
 been devoutly held, as being held at this moment 
 by myriads of the human race — the doctrine of 
 The All — no individual, personal God, but The 
 All — one immanent life, for ever and ever develop- 
 ing itself and absorbing back into itself what it 
 gives forth, an everlasting egress and regress, out- 
 coming and resumption. All alleged contradic- 
 tions, its adherents might maintain, have no valid- 
 ity. The subject does not belong to the sphere of 
 human thought at all. It is inconceivable, and 
 therefore the moment reason approaches it, it can 
 find in it nothing but contradictions. This high, 
 transcendental method of dismissing objections 
 would lead, logically, to some curious results. No 
 Protestant, for example, could utter a word against 
 such a dogma as transubstantiation, to name no 
 other. The ultra Calvinists, also, to whom the 
 lecturer seems to bear little love, and their doctrine 
 of eternal justification and eternal reprobation, 
 would be perfectly safe. They have only to utter 
 
IMMUTABLE P.IGHT AND WRONG. 269 
 
 the magical words — " The Infinite is not an object 
 of human thought at all — this belongs to the region 
 of the unconditioned, into which vou have no nojht 
 to enter/' With these words, all difficulty van- 
 ishes and victory is complete. 
 
 It is little likely, that accomplished and earnest 
 theologians, in our own or any other country, will 
 be found wilHng to accept of this kind of shelter 
 for doctrines, which they hold dear. Time was, 
 when the battle of the faith was fought on other 
 and far nobler ground, and erudite and able men 
 contended, triumphantly contended, that that 
 which they admitted to be altogether incompre- 
 hensible, could not be shown to be contradictory. 
 Tliat time, one may piously hope, is not yet past. 
 Meanwhile, so far as the Bampton lecturer is con- 
 cerned, those who have separated themselves from 
 Christianity, are completely triumphant, and have 
 had conceded to them all that they ever contended 
 for. They have always alleged, they do now allege, 
 that Chiistianity has no foundation in reason, can- 
 not stand on the ground of reason. The lecturer 
 simply acknowledges the fact. In his view, Chris- 
 tianity is as full of as insoluble contradictions, as 
 he imagines philosophy to be. But it does not 
 seem to occur to him, that in such a case, wisdom 
 would teach us, not to adopt the one, because it is 
 no v>'orse than the other, but to reject both, for the 
 same reason. 
 
270 MORALITY AND A MORAL SENSE. 
 
 I see an alternative, one, only one — either to 
 yield unconditionally to authority and throw our- 
 selves into the arms of an infallible church, or in 
 blank despair, to enshroud and entomb ourselves 
 amidst all the horrors of a universal scepticism. 
 
SECTION SIXTH. 
 
 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
COXCERM^G REASON AXD FAITH. 
 
 Faith, as Act of the Understanding — Knowledge, Basis and Mea- 
 sure of — Its Distinctions — Consciousness — Intuitions of Sense ; 
 of Reason — Spliere of Responsibility — Character of Faith deter- 
 mined by its G-rounds — Fact of Consciousness enough — Its own 
 Ground — Mere Act of Faith Nothing — Primary Beliefs — Man- 
 sell's Statements — Hamilton's — Ground of Faith Always Under- 
 standing, Higher Reason, or both — Revelation — God Trustworthy 
 — Understanding, Reason, Conscience, Proclaim it — Harmony 
 of these Powers — Xo Discord — Spirit of Faith — The Piercmg 
 Eye — Perfect Light. 
 
 There are two wordsj Eeason and Faith, occur- 
 ring, especially the first of the two, I know not 
 how often, in the Bampton Lecture. Neither of 
 them is once defined, or, in any precise manner, 
 explained. I have attempted to show that the 
 lecturer, in his use of the term, reason, means sim- 
 ply the understanding, the faculty of judgment, 
 the power which discriminates, reasons, infers, de- 
 duces and judges. The doctrine of Leibnitz, Kant, 
 thouo-h as announced bv him, there is much confu- 
 fusion and inaccuracy. Cousin, Coleridge, Hamil- 
 ton, and the modern philosophy of Europe, with 
 the exception of one or two eminent English 
 names, is that there exists a higher reason in man 
 — intellect proper, the source of intuitive a priori 
 
274 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 truths. Farther still, there is a moral sense, what 
 Kant desigates, the j^i'^'^ctical reason — the source 
 of moral intuitions. Our English name is con- 
 science, a power percipient of right and wrong, an 
 authority commanding the one, forbidding the 
 other. These three — omitting the popular use 
 of the word as S3monymous with general, human 
 intelligence — the understanding, the intellect, the 
 conscience, include all the strictly legitimate ap- 
 plications of the term, reason. 
 
 Faith, so far as it belongs to philosophy, has two 
 distinct, but closely rela^ted senses, into one or 
 other of which all its applications may be resolved. 
 First of all, it is simply equivalent to belief, hold- 
 ino- for true and real. Secondlv, it is used to mean 
 confidence, trust in a statement, a principle, a per- 
 son, in anything. The second of these senses, neces- 
 sarily, includes the first, but the first may exist 
 without the second. We may firmly believe a 
 thing to be true, in which there may be no need, 
 not even a possibility, for the exercise of trust or 
 confidence. But that in which we confide, we 
 must, first of all, necessarily, hold to be true. 
 Confidence is often only belief intensified, the 
 same thing but in a more emphatic form. At 
 the same time, there is a real, generic difference 
 between the two. Simple belief is purely intellec- 
 tual, confidence is always partly moral, an act not 
 of the understanding merely, but still more of the 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 275 
 
 heart, perhaps also of the conscience. The inward 
 nature takes hold of that which it believeSj com- 
 mits itself to itj as true, and rests in it. 
 
 But whether in the sense of trust, or in that of 
 simple belief, the question is, what is the exact 
 relation between faith and reason — the lower, the 
 hio-her or the moral reason .^ Within certain lim- 
 its, the answer to this question can create no diffi- 
 culty. Belief, in the usual meaning of the word, 
 belief grounded in the conclusions of the under- 
 standing, is perfectly intelligible and explicable. 
 Through the ordinary mental processes, we in- 
 quire, examine and make ourselves acquainted 
 with the subject, thoroughly understand it, and 
 admit and adopt what commends itself to our 
 minds, as true. In the same way, we receive from 
 others a statement of facts, the testimony appears 
 to us sufiS-cient, and satisfactory, and we credit it. 
 In all this we act clearly and solely on the ground 
 of the understanding — the measure of our knowl- 
 edo-e is the measure of our faith. 
 
 It is quite true, that so soon as a thing com- 
 mends itself to our minds, so soon as we thoroughly 
 understand it and find its evidence sufficient, we 
 must believe it. It may be distasteful. We may 
 loisli not to believe it, we may assert that we do 
 not believe it, but we must, nevertheless ; we do, 
 in point of fact. Seeing a thing to be true, and 
 believing it are identical. But it is sufficiently 
 
276 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 palpable, that the apparent necessity in this case is 
 owing, in great part, to ourselves, is self-created. 
 It is wtj who according to our inclination, look or 
 refuse to look at truth, loe who examine or refuse 
 to examine evidence, ive who suffer prejudice, in 
 one direction or another, to sway our minds or who 
 resist the force of prejudice. At last, belief is our 
 deliberate act^ grounded in the perceptions and con- 
 clusions of our understanding. Knowledge is the 
 basis and the measure of the act. We believe, be- 
 cause we understand, and so far as we understand 
 and no farther. 
 
 All the difficulty in determining the exact rela- 
 tion between reason and faith, lies in quite another 
 region. Before touching this, however, I must 
 notice some distinctions, often overlooked, but 
 which have a very essential bearing on the subject. 
 
 The act of consciousness is altogether involun- 
 tary and necessary. I cannot avoid being con- 
 scious of what is passing in my mind. It does not 
 dej)end on my will. I arn conscious, whether I 
 will or no. For this reason, consciousness is its 
 own ground, and needs and can have no other. I 
 hnow, that I know, that I feel, that I will, that 
 this thought is in my mind at this moment. I 
 knoiv it. You cannot go beyond this. You can 
 get no proof whatever of the fact from any other 
 quarter, nothing, except this immediate necessary 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 277 
 
 knowledge. Consciousness wants no proof, it has 
 no gi'ound beyond itself. It is its own ground. 
 
 External perception also is necessary and invol- 
 untaiy. With, my eyes open, I cannot avoid per- 
 ceiving, whether I will or no. I see that tree, that 
 hook, that flower. It cannot be proved by any 
 other evidence. I see it, that is all, I know that I 
 see it. You cannot go farther, it is its own ground. 
 The intuitions of the higher reason and of the con- 
 science, belong to the same category. " The soul, 
 God, immortality, immutable right and wrong — 
 these and other such are data of reason and con- 
 science. The understanding may consent to them 
 as true, may be able to find strong confirmations 
 of their truth. But they are not discovered by the 
 understanding, they are not arrived at by reason- 
 ing, and they may not be capable of being logically 
 demonstrated. They are first of all given in con- 
 sciousness, they are utterances of the soul from 
 within to itself, internal readings, intellections, an- 
 nouncements by the reason and conscience, and in 
 common with the intuitions of sense, and with all 
 the acts of consciousness, they are simply their own 
 ground. 
 
 Faith, whether in the sense of belief, or in that 
 of confidence, belongs to quite another order of 
 powers. It is essentially secondary, that is, it sup- 
 poses something prior to itself, on which it rests. 
 Unlike consciousness, perception, and reason, it is 
 
278 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 Dot necessary but dependent, generally all but uni- 
 versally dependent, on our will. It does not arise 
 out of our mental constitution, whether we will or 
 no, but is a capacity, which we may or may not 
 exercise, according to our inclination or our pur- 
 pose. Hence it is essentially connected with re- 
 sponsibility — it is a virtue, and its opposite may be 
 a crime. Consciousness, perception, and the intui- 
 tions of reason, are neither right nor wrong, on our 
 part, neither wise nor unwise. To be conscious, is 
 no merit and no fault, neither to be praised nor to 
 be blamed. It is the mere necessary act of our 
 nature, with which we have nothing to do, except 
 to acknowledge it. But is faith, thus indifferent, 
 either intellectually or morally ? On the contrary, 
 it cannot be doubted for a moment, that faith may 
 be, must be, always, either right or wrong, wise or 
 unwise. Its character is determined by the grounds 
 on which it is based. 
 
 One additional distinction remains, belief or faith 
 is in no respect creative, not even percejDtive, but 
 only and wholly re-ceptive. It is not an organ for 
 discovering truth, or even for ^9er-ceiving truth that 
 had otherwise been unseen. It supposes something 
 presented to it, something already discovered and 
 perceived by another organ, and its entire office is 
 to hold it for true, and to admit and adopt it. It 
 does not suj^ply its own materials, but simply acts 
 on materials presented to it. We believe. The 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 279 
 
 first question is, in what ? — something presented 
 to uSj through another medium. The second ques- 
 tion is, on what grounds ? and are the grounds 
 valid or invalid ? These questions — questions be- 
 lono'ins: altoG;'ether to the understandino- — can be 
 determined in no other way than every other act of 
 our rational nature is determined. The mere fact 
 of consciousness, without asking a single question, 
 is sufficient, we are entitled to take our stand uj)on 
 it, itself alone. If I am conscious of a certain 
 thought, feeling, state of mind, at this moment, it 
 cannot be gainsaid. Nothing can be surer. But 
 the mere act of faith is of no value at all. It de- 
 pends entirely on the grounds on which it is based 
 — whether they be wise and valid, or the contrary. 
 It would be pure fanaticism, utter irrationality, 
 capable of every sort of abuse, to say, " I believe 
 this or that, I can give no ground for it, but I firmly 
 believe it.'' In no respect, can the mere act of faith 
 be either its own evidence or its own ground. In- 
 variably, the question must abide — a question, al- 
 together, of the understanding — believe in what ? 
 on what grounds ? 
 
 The great difficulty — real or imagined — is in the 
 application of the principles now laid down to what 
 are called " primary beliefs," the reality of which I, 
 for one, most fully and cordially recognize. There 
 are, it is maintained, beliefs or trusts, native to the 
 soul, immediate, irresistible, ultimate facts, beyond 
 
280 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 wliicli we cannot go. In loose, current phrase 
 there are intuitions of sense and intuitions of rea- 
 son, including both our j^urely intellectual and our 
 moral intuitions. I am fully prepared to gi'ant, in 
 opposition to the idealist, that we do put faith, and 
 are justified in putting faith, in our sense-percep- 
 tions ; and in opjDOsition to a mere sensational, ma- 
 terialistic^ positive philosophy, that we do put faith, 
 and are justified in putting faith, in the intuitions 
 of reason and conscience and in consciousness, in 
 which alone, both the higher and the lower intu- 
 itions are given. I hold that we are so constituted, 
 as to entertain these primary beliefs, and that in spite 
 of seeming excej)tions, they are immediate, and all 
 but irresistible. But I deny altogether, that either 
 the character or the law of faith is herebj^, in any 
 respect, altered. It is still secondary, dependent and 
 purely receptive. Instead of being its own gi'ound, 
 it is grounded — as the mere statement of the psycho- 
 logical facts shows — in perception, or in reason, or in 
 conscience, and throughout in consciousness. In- 
 stead of being arbitrary and unaccountable, instead 
 of being opj^osed to the higher reason, instead of 
 being even independent of it, faith, as it respects 
 our j^rimary beliefs, is consciously sanctioned, nay 
 demanded by the reason, as a necessary act of obe- 
 dience. Faith, in the cases alluded to, true faith, 
 is itself the highest reason, is simply obedience to 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 2S1 
 
 the highest reason — the consummation and the 
 crowu of our intellectual activity. 
 
 There is even more. Our primary beliefsj in the 
 farthest analysis, are capable of being resolved into 
 an indestructible conclusion of the understanding. 
 The deep, inward ultimate ground, understood and 
 felt by multitudes who cannot express it, in defi- 
 nite words, is no other than this — our perceptions, 
 our intuitions, our consciousnesses must be true, he- 
 cause otherwise our nature is a falsehood and our 
 Creator a deceiver. This is the last stronoc refu2:e 
 of faith in these primary convictions. AYe could 
 believe nothing, if they were not to be believed. 
 All within us and all around us, everywhere, would 
 be only delusion and mockery. And thus the 
 highest faith is resolved into a simple judgement, 
 an act of the calm, sober understandino-. 
 
 But some of the truths of intuition are alto- 
 gether incomprehensible, and, at least, this seems 
 not consistent with the law of faith as already 
 expounded. The Unbeginning, Unending, Un- 
 changing One is incomprehensible. Infinite dura- 
 tion is incomprehensible, utterly incomprehensible. 
 But, it must be remembered that all these are data 
 of the higher reason, or rather, as I venture to 
 think, inferences of the understanding from data 
 of the reason. Faith has thus not onlv reason to 
 sustain it, but a double ground in the understand- 
 ing: and the reason, and. therefore, legitimately 
 
282 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 takes hold of, aj^preliends that which nevertheless 
 cannot be com-prehended in thought. Even the 
 Bampton lecturerj in luorcls, sustains this issue. 
 ^' Keason itself/' he says, " rightly interpreted, 
 teaches the existence of truths that are above rea- 
 son" — that is, which are imcomprehensible. And 
 again, "It is a duty enjoined by reason itself to 
 believe in that which we are unable to compre- 
 hend." Quite so : ,and, therefore, faith is mani- 
 festly based on reason. We may judge wdth what 
 consistency, and in connection with the words now 
 quoted, the lecturer can assert, " We thus learn 
 that the provinces of reason and faith are not co- 
 extensive." (p. 96.) But if, as he had just main- 
 tained, reason enjoins what faith obeys, and as in 
 the first quotation, if reason teaches what faith 
 adopts, it is showm, so far at least, that their pro- 
 vinces are co-extensive. 
 
 I turn to the language of Sir William Hamilton 
 on this point, beautifully exact and true to the 
 letter. '^ We are thus taught," he says, '' the salu- 
 tary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to 
 be constituted into the measure of existencCy and 
 are warned from recognizing the domain of our 
 knowledge (that is our com-prehension) as neces- 
 sarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith." 
 He never opposes reason to faith, never opposes 
 even knowledge to faith ; but only maintains that 
 the one extends beyond the other. The Bampton 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 283 
 
 lecturer, on the contrary, speaks of '' The conflict- 
 ing claims of reason and faith." 
 
 After describing the contradictions that arise out 
 of the idea of the Infinite or Absolute, he adds, 
 " This tells with equal force against all belief and 
 all unbelief, and therefore, necessitates the conclu- 
 sion that belief cannot be determined solely by 
 reason/' (p. 59.) Belief is not always determined 
 by reasoning, not always by Icnoioledge i. e. com- 
 pre-hen-sion ; sometimes it has its ground in in- 
 tuition. But I have tried to show that in all cases 
 it must be determined, either by the higher or by 
 the lower reason, or by both. By what else can it 
 be determined ? There is no single power within 
 us and no combination of powers apart from the 
 understanding and the intellect, through which 
 belief can be produced. Again, '' In this impotence 
 of reason, we are compelled to take refuge in faith, 
 and to believe that an Infinite Being exists, though 
 we know not how." (p. 120.) 
 
 It is reason which impels or compels us to be- 
 lieve that an Infinite Being exists. Instead of 
 fleeing from the one to take refuge in the other, it 
 is reason which in this case teaches what faith 
 adopts — reason which enjoins what faith obeys. 
 Instead of being uncongenial and irreconcilable, 
 the two are in perfect harmony, faith all the while 
 leaning on reason for support. One other passage 
 will sufiice. " In thus believing we desert the evi- 
 
284 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 dence of reason to rest on that of faith and of the 
 pnnci2)les on which reason itself depends, it is 
 obviously impossible to have any other guaran- 
 tee." — (p. 146.) We may, in many instances, have- 
 to transcend the evidence furnished by the under- 
 standing merely. That may be insufficient. But 
 to desert even this for the evidence of faith, is to 
 abandon that which is something, however inade- 
 quate, for that which is literally nothing. By no 
 possibility can our mere faith in anything furnish 
 the least evidence that the thing is true and real ; 
 and as for being a guarantee, and the only guaran- 
 tee^ of the principles on which reason itself de- 
 pends, if there be force in what has been already 
 advanced, this must at once be seen to be the very 
 / opposite of the truth. 
 
 Graphically and beautifully, faith is said by an 
 inspired penman, to substantiate things hoped for ; 
 that is, by its all-absorbing force, to give them, to 
 our sensibilities, the solidity of a real presence. 
 Graphically and beautifully, it is said, to e-vidence 
 things not seen, — that is, to bring them out into 
 clear light, and to present them before our eyes. 
 But evidence, meaning ^^roo/* of its objects, in any 
 possible, intelligible sense, it can furnish none. 
 The mere act of believing or confiding in anything, 
 in itself, is of no value at all. All the value that 
 can belong to it depends entirely on the grounds 
 on which it is based. Faith merely takes hold of 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 285 
 
 that which has been seen to be true, which, pre- 
 viously and on other grounds has been seen to be 
 true. It is supposed that, first of all, we find a 
 thing to be true and trustworthy ; whether it be 
 so or not, actually, is still a question, but the evi- 
 dence, at least, has satisfied us, and on the ground 
 of this we put faith in it. Indisputably, the faith 
 cannot be the proof of its truth. 
 
 It must be acknowledged that Hamilton, in his 
 notes on Reid, employs language which goes far, 
 too far, to support that of the Bampton Lecture. 
 Two things, however, are to be noted : first, that 
 he does not refer to faith in its usual and general 
 meaning, but only to a certain limited class of 
 beliefs, those called primary, native, intuitive ; 
 secondly, even these primary beliefs he does not 
 place in opposition to reason, but only holds that 
 their ground, and the ground of reason itself, lie in 
 something which he conceives to be beyond reason. 
 
 '^ Reason itself," says he, '^ must rest at last 
 upon authority, for the original data of reason do 
 not rest on reason; but are necessarily accepted by 
 reason, on the authority of what is beyond itself."' 
 — {Hamilton's Beid, p. 760.) What authority, we 
 may ask, esj^ecially ask Hamilton, is there or can 
 there be lulthin us, superior to the higher reason ? 
 None. There is no power in our nature superior 
 or even equal to this. And if the authority re- 
 ferred to be an authority, ah extra, that, first, can 
 
286 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 only be reached by us ; secondly, can only reach, 
 us through our reason, intellectual or moral — as a 
 datum of this highest power ; so that reason, even 
 in such a case, is and must be the ultimate ground 
 on which faith rests. And, besides, who is enti- 
 tled to assert that the data of reason cannot rest 
 on reason ? Do not the data of consciousness rest 
 on consciousness, on consciousness alone ? I am 
 conscious of this or that thought in my mind. 
 Where is the proof ? I know it. I can have no 
 other j)roof ; I want no other. I know it as a fact 
 within me ; it is enough. So, also, I am distinctly 
 aware of this or that intuition. I see it, I read it, 
 as written and laid up in the locus 2^Ti7icipia7^u7n ; 
 my hio'her reason announces it as true. If it be 
 suggested, as it may legitimately be suggested, 
 that in both of these instances we can, in addition 
 to their own proper ground, and do fall back on 
 our nature and on the great Being who created it. 
 It is granted. The authority of our Creator is 
 paramount. He is to be implicitly believed and 
 trusted. But there is a reason for this. It is be- 
 cause even the understanding teaches that we 
 could believe nothing, unless we believed this. In 
 other words, we come back to the very ground of 
 rationality. The principle which we adopt in this 
 case is one which the understanding and the intel- 
 lect not only sanction but demand. This faith is 
 faith altogether grounded in reason. 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 287 
 
 " In the last resort/' Hamilton adds, " we must, 
 perforce, philosophically admit that belief is the 
 primary condition of reason, not reason the ulti- 
 mate gTound of belief" (p. 760.) By no means ; 
 for, when we accept the data of reason, it is be- 
 cause we have ground in our nature and in Him 
 who created it for believing that these data are 
 true, because we are satisfied that the reason which 
 furnishes these data legitimately deserves our faith. 
 Again, Hamilton adds : " We are compelled to 
 surrender the proud intellige ut credas of Abelard, 
 to content ourselves with the humble crede ut in- 
 telligas of Anselm." (p. 760.) But why may not 
 both maxims be profoundly and equally true ? I 
 hold that they are. We should err egregiously by 
 adopting the first alone, but not less egregiously 
 should we err by adopting the second alone. Both 
 togiether must be taken in order to reach the whole 
 truth. Examine, search j)atiently, get to under- 
 stand and know, in order that you may enlighten- 
 edly adopt. On the other hand, accept what the 
 higher reason announces, in order that you may pon- 
 der it, penetrate it, and understand it as far as it 
 can be understood. It is even j)ossible to put An- 
 selm's maxim in a higher and more modest form 
 still, than he gave it, crede, etiamsi non intelligas — 
 etiamsi mmquam intellecturus sis. Some of the 
 data of reason are incomprehensible by the under- 
 standing. But they are true ; the ground of the 
 
288 CONCEKNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 reason whereon they stand is sufficient basis for 
 theui to rest upon, though to their full and grand 
 compass of meaning we shall never be able to 
 reach. 
 
 The general results at which we have arrived are 
 these. First of all, we put faith in the conclusions 
 of the understanding ; and these, of course, may 
 be right or they may be wrong. But we believe 
 that which we think we understand and because 
 we understand it, and only so far as we understand 
 it, our knowledge being both the basis and the 
 measure of our faith. Secondly, we put faith in 
 the intuitions, first, of sense, and second of reason, 
 intellectual and moral. And lastly, we put faith 
 in consciousness, the witness alike of our intui- 
 tions and of all our acts of knowledge. Throuo;h- 
 out, in all cases, the ground of faith is either the 
 understanding, or the higher reason, or both. Our 
 mere faith itself determines nothing, j)roves noth- 
 ing. Its worth or w^orthlessness depends entirely 
 on the character of its grounds. Universally, the 
 question must be put, Are these grounds wise, 
 right, sufficient .^ in one word, are they rational. 
 
 There remains one possible source, wdiich the 
 Bampton lecturer seems to have had chiefly in his 
 thought, whence the materials of belief or faith 
 may be de-riv-ed. That source is written revela- 
 tion. With many of the questions here arising, 
 most of which belong exclusively to the under- 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 289 
 
 standing, the logical understanding, the faculty of 
 judgment, we have nothing to do. For example, 
 by what external marks, seals and proofs, that 
 w^hich claims to be from heaven, evinces itself in- 
 dis2)utably to be so, is not a question for us. So 
 also, by v>'hat canons of criticism, what principles 
 and modes of interpretation, w^e are to be guided 
 in dealing with what is written, so as most surely 
 to reach its true meaning and to determine the sense 
 of disputed texts, are not questions for us. By the 
 way, only by the way, there is one canon, to which, 
 inasmuch as it is perfectly general and has a pe- 
 culiar recommendation, I may give prominence. 
 If we attach weight to the authority of Butler, 
 we shall ponder his deliberately expressed verdict, 
 already quoted : ''None of these precepts'' — dis- 
 puted precepts in the Old Testament — " are con- 
 traiy to immutable morality. If it were com- 
 manded to cultivate the principles and act in 
 the sp)irit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty, the 
 command would not alter the nature of the 
 case or of the action, in any of these instances.'' 
 I say, we shall ponder his words and shall learn 
 from him to lay it dow^n as one of the fixed laws 
 of interpretation, that that cannot be divine, which 
 is in the face of the immutable principles of reason 
 and conscience. Should any sacred text seem to 
 contradict these principles, we may doubt our in- 
 terpretation of the text, we may, we must dismiss 
 
290 CO^'CERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 that interpretation as certainly false, but we may 
 not, must not for a moment suffer the faintest sus- 
 picion of these principles to darken our minds. 
 Revelation may make known that which neither 
 unaided reason nor conscience has ever uttered. 
 Revelation may announce that which is far beyond 
 and above all intimations from within, may an- 
 nounce even that which transcends the comprehen- 
 sion of the finite mind. But w^hat is in manifest 
 contradiction to the immutable princijDles of moral- 
 ity, revelation never can promulgate, for this would 
 be to make the Great Being contradict himself 
 All this, by the way. Such matters do not fall 
 within our proper sphere. 
 
 What we have to suppose is this, the conviction 
 lodged in a human mind that certain words express 
 a real message from the Almighty, and that the 
 message conveys such or such a distinct meaning ; 
 the result is a firm belief in this meaning, as the 
 very thought of the Supreme. What is the nature 
 of this belief or faith and on what is it grounded ? 
 In reference to the preliminary stages which lead 
 to this final result, there is no room for difference 
 of opinion. For example, manifestly, it may be 
 true or it may be false, that there is a divine voice 
 in certain words. We may have come to a right 
 or to a wrong conclusion on this point. It is cer- 
 tainly one which can be ascertained only through 
 the processes of the understanding, or through the 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 291 
 
 intuitions of reason, or through both. In like 
 manner it may be true or it may be false, that the 
 meaning which tue have attached to the Divine 
 voice is the correct one. We may have come to a 
 right or to a wrong conclusion on this point. It 
 is certainly one which can be ascertained only in 
 the exercise of the common faculty of judgment. 
 Thus far the act of our minds is manifestly 
 grounded in reason. But does the faith which we 
 repose in the ideas which we have thus reached, 
 demand quite a new exposition. It is faith no 
 longer in man, no longer in ourselves, no longer in 
 reason, but in the immediate word of the Supreme. 
 Be it so. Certainly, the mental act does terminate 
 in the G-reat Being, as its object, and there reposes 
 with confidence. But why ? Unaccountably ? 
 arbitrarily ? in a way of which no explanation can 
 be given ? No. But because, simply and only 
 because the understanding, the intellect and the 
 conscience unite in announcing it as their impera- 
 tive demand, that, of all things. He is to be be- 
 lieved. Here and everywhere, true faith is 
 grounded in reason. It can be grounded in 
 nothing else. 
 
 It is possible, legitimately to extend the idea of 
 supernatural communication, beyond the limits of 
 the sacred text. Philosophy at least has nothino- 
 to object against this extension. The daemon of 
 Socrates contains the germ of an imperishable 
 
292 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 truth. There is a widely extended belief in the 
 direct intercourse — altogether mysterious and in- 
 comprehensible as it is — of the Infinite with the 
 finite mind. The idea is inexpressibly healing and 
 strengthening, that the great speaker, unheard by 
 the outward ear ; and the great worker, unseen by 
 the outward eye — the speaker to minds, the worker 
 in minds — ceaseless, universal, impartial in his in- 
 fluence, is the Creator and Father of men. Where 
 a human mind is found, His secret voice is never 
 silent. His invisible energy is never at rest. It 
 ajDpears to be in harmony with the soundest phi- 
 losophy to believe that the unspoken word of the 
 Eternal is heard — might be heard far oftener than 
 it is — within the individual soul. 
 
 But does not this give scope to unlimited delu- 
 sion ? Certainly, in some aspects it seems to do 
 so. Our own mere notions, our morbid, super- 
 stitious feelings, the wild dreams of our imagina- 
 tions, may be taken for intimations from heaven. 
 But I may venture to suggest that the evil is by 
 no means peculiar. It is only precisely of the same 
 kind, with that which befalls the outward written 
 revelation. Men put their own fanciful capricious, 
 prejudiced interpretations on it ; and difierent in- 
 dividuals in difierent conditions of mind, bring out 
 the most o^^posite senses from it. In either case, 
 whether from without, or from within, it is only 
 by the reverent, the reflecting, the modest soul, 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 293 
 
 that the Divine voice is rightly interpreted. Be it 
 ever remembered that, whether there be a Divine 
 voice at all, and what its true meaning is, are ques- 
 tions to be determined only by the judgment, ques- 
 tions, therefore, to which in all cases we may give 
 a right or a wrong reply. But supposing them an- 
 swered satisfactorily, faith terminates in this case 
 as in the former, in the Great Being himself, as its 
 object, and there reposes with confidence. But 
 w4iy ? Not unaccountably, not arbitrarily. No ! 
 but because, sim23ly and only because, the under- 
 standing, the intellect and the conscience unite in 
 announcing it to us as their imperative demand, 
 that of all things, He is to be believed. Here and 
 everywhere, true faith is grounded in reason. It 
 can be grounded in nothing else.* 
 
 * I am glad to be able to confirm the general issue at which we 
 have arrived, by the authority of a recent work which forms a most 
 valuable contribution to sound philosophy, Dr. McCosh's Intuiiions 
 of the Mind. " All allowable faith has thus ever the sanction of 
 reason, and in some cases, it is the issue of a consequential reason- 
 ing. Faith is thus liable to be tested, even as reason Ls ; nor are 
 we at liberty to lay reason aside on the pretence of following a faith 
 which will not allow itself to be examined." (p. 422.) "We should 
 not place ourselves for one hour, under the guidance of a faith 
 which has no evidence to furnish. There cannot be a more peril- 
 ous advice than that which has been given by certain parties to 
 the doubting and inquiring, when they exhort them to force them- 
 selves to believe, though as yet they feel that they have no con- 
 vincing evidence, or to profess a creed, in order to get one, as they 
 fall in with evidence in advancing. It will be seen at once, where- 
 in this case differs from the other previously put. In the one, we 
 walk with reason, from the beginning, though we do not know 
 
294 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 It is a disastrous blunder to cast suspicion and dis- 
 honor on any of the powers with which our nature 
 is endowed, and to set them one against the other, as 
 natural enemies. It amounts to an indirect impeach- 
 ment of the Creator. True, there are foolish and 
 proud worshippers of human intelligence, as if it 
 were almost independent of the Being who inspired 
 it ; conceited, petulant, shallow and empty praters, 
 who will own no authority higher than their own 
 judgment, and who, in effect, make their knowl- 
 edge the measure of everything visible and invisi- 
 ble, human and Divine. All the greatest thinkers 
 of the world exclaim with one voice against such 
 rationalism as this, and denounce it, as of all things 
 the most irrational. Sir William Hamilton pro- 
 duces a marvellous host of confessors, not to knowl- 
 edge, but to ignorance, to their own ignorance and 
 the ignorance of their race ; confessors selected from 
 all ages, countries, and schools. Our highest 
 knowledge only deepens the conviction that we 
 know nothing jyerfecthj^ nothing in all its ramifi- 
 cations and relatio7is. But we do know neverthe- 
 less, and this is the fact which is injuriously, fatally 
 overlooked on the other side. We do know, and 
 are sure that we are able to know, and shall know 
 
 whither it may lead us ; in the other, we are without reason, from 
 the beginning and cannot expect reason to aid us in our difficulties. 
 In the one, we set out with light and wait for more ; in the other, 
 we set out without light, and necessarily at random, and if we fall 
 in with light, it must be by the purest accident." (p. 425.) 
 
OOXCERNIXG REASON AND FAITH. 295 
 
 raore and yet morej ever and ever more ; and our 
 knowledge, though always limited, is real and reli- 
 able, so far as it reaches. 
 
 It is neither right nor wise, to decry the under- 
 standing on all occasions, and by all possible means. 
 The habit grows by indulgence, and degenerates at 
 last into a most offensive species of cant, the cant 
 of reverence and humilitv. " The human mind is 
 feeble and erring, never to be relied upon, always 
 and only to be distrusted." Such is the kind of 
 language which many are wont to use. What piety 
 there may be in this mood of mind, I shall not 
 take it upon me to judge ; but unquestionably the 
 quality of wisdom is greatly lacking in it. That 
 very conclusion which, with such solemnity and 
 sadness, is affirmed by those who take a pleasure in 
 defaming themselves, is nothing more than the 
 verdict of theii' understanding. It appears that 
 even they can place some confidence in this power 
 after all. Distrusting it in all other cases, they 
 entirely trust it in this case, when it judges that it 
 is not to be trusted. 
 
 Our nature is limited, all our faculties are lim- 
 ited, just as certainly as they are created. The one 
 condition is only the other, in a different phrase. 
 On all sides, in relation to every subject of thought, 
 that which we know, stretches onward to that 
 which we cannot know, wdiich is illimitable and 
 incomprehensible. Our powder of judgment is finite 
 
296 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 and demands constant caution in its exercise, lest 
 we adopt that which is eiToneous. But true rever- 
 ence and true humility would teach us to connect 
 this fact, with a high and sacred responsibility. Be 
 it as it may, the undei'^tanding is our Creator's gift 
 to us. It is the instrument with "which he has 
 furnished us, the only instrument wdth w^hich he 
 has furnished us for forming a judgment at all, and 
 for reaching a conclusion wdth respect to anything. 
 By all means let its exercise be guarded by perpet- 
 ual caution, and by a modest diffidence ; but let 
 the power itself be reverenced and trusted for its 
 Great Author's sake, and from a faith in his benig- 
 nant and wise design. 
 
 The great fault, the vice of our age, it appears 
 to me does not lie on the side of over- valuing the 
 2)0wers of the human mind, though that has its 
 dangers, formidable both in character and in num- 
 ber. It lies, I venture to judge, in exactly the op- 
 posite direction ; it consists in the wdde neglect of 
 the free exercise of the understanding, especially in 
 the most sacred sphere of thought. This power is 
 often described, as if it were only or chiefly a temp- 
 tation and a snare. Manifold evils are traced back 
 to it as their dark fountain, and the most dispar- 
 aging epithets are used to destroy all reverence for 
 it. In utter contempt, but very ignorantly, it is 
 taunted as the logical understanding and the mean- 
 ing is, that it is useless-at the best, save for split- 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 297 
 
 ting of hairs, subtle, finical, hard, and cold. Faith, \ 
 on the other hand, is exalted as a lofty virtue, inde- 
 pendent of the understanding, and even opposed to 
 it. It is hardly an exaggeration to affiim, that if 
 men were to think of the organ of outward vision, 
 as many certainly do think of their mental faculty 
 of perception, we should meet them with their eyes 
 fast closed or protected by some opaque covering to 
 save them from the danger of seeing. 
 
 Multitudes of intelligent persons reach their re- 
 ligious creed, scarcely at all, through inquiring and 
 judging. They have been born to it ; or, in a 
 period of inward disturbance and fear, they have 
 rushed to it for shelter. And all, or nearly all, 
 with whom they mingle, have accepted the same 
 formulae. They themselves, besides, have read on 
 the subject, and are not destitute of considerable 
 information respecting it. That is virtually the 
 whole matter. Nothing more. And what they, in 
 this manner, reach, they continue to keep, through 
 the same means. Some conflicting thoughts, some 
 unpleasant misgivings, they are occasionally con- 
 scious of, but these are never fairly met and im- 
 partially dealt with. They are simply set aside. 
 The fear is, that by another course, their adopted 
 creed would be endangered. But, wherefore, should 
 it ? After the closest examination, impartially 
 conducted, a true faith must remain essentially 
 unchanged. But with or without change in the 
 
 13 
 
298 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 articles of a creed, this noble effect would follow — 
 we should be stronger and freer by honest investi- 
 gation, and should be impelled to illimitable pro- 
 gress in the path of reverent obedience to the laws 
 of our nature, and to Him who established them. 
 Is this effect rare ? It is so, simply because the 
 only method of reaching it is so widely neglected. 
 Free, independent inquiry, a disposition to look 
 impartially on all sides, and a resolute purpose to 
 adopt only that which in all honesty we judge to be 
 true, vast multitudes, undeniably, know nothing of 
 this, and never have known it. In the sphere of 
 religion, as well as in other spheres, perhaps more 
 than in any other sphere, men think in masses, 
 think with their party. That simply means that 
 they do not think at all. It is an affair of imita- 
 tion, of social influence, of outward circumstances. 
 The old saying has gTown out of use, and would 
 hardly be endorsed in these days, ^' He who hath 
 never doubted, hath never truly believed." Free 
 thinking has become synonymous with infidelity, 
 as if thinking, which was not perfectly free, could 
 justly be of the smallest value in the sight of man 
 or God. 
 
 The wav in which truth reaches the mind is 
 hardly less im^^ortant than the truth itself which 
 is accepted. The very process of honestly exerting 
 the powers of our rational nature, of inquiring and 
 judging impartially, the very process is vitalizing, 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 299 
 
 invigorating and healing. That which is true, 
 greatly true, may settle on the surface of the 
 mind as a foreign deposit, successive depositions 
 may gather above the first stratum, and the whole 
 may form a mere inert accretion, never piercing 
 down at all into the spiritual nature, to arouse and 
 quicken it, and to work within it, as a vital force. 
 We are afraid of error, and with just cause. But 
 there is something else of which we have quite as 
 just cause to be afraid. The design of our mental 
 structure is unmistakable. We are constituted to 
 inquire, to examine, and to search out truth for 
 ourselves. In our very structure, our Maker an- 
 nounces his will, that we should faithfully exercise 
 the power of judgment with which he has endowed 
 us, on everything which appeals to us, and that 
 without fear or favor, shaking off all thought of 
 consequence, and every influence that might either 
 deter or ensnare, we should determine for ourselves, 
 according to our best ability, what is true, and 
 how far it is true. But, independent thinking, in 
 the sphere of religion, at all events, the habit of 
 independent thinking is little known, so little, that 
 where, in any instance, it rises into prominence, it 
 is viewed with suspicion and fear, as a thing which 
 can conduct only to evil. Error may be, it often 
 is, crime. But there is one thing which always, 
 and certainly is, crime, to pour habitual contempt 
 on our Maker, by refusing to put forth the powers 
 
300 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 with which he has endowed us, on the highest and 
 grandest subjects, which can occupy them. 
 
 It is altogether a mistake, to imagine that we 
 endanger faith by doing simple justice to the un- 
 derstanding. The marvellous, almost mysterious 
 power ever maintains its lofty place in our spirit- 
 ual being. As an inscrutable, internal force — a 
 force for action and for suffering — it has enkin- 
 dled, when depicted by a genial soul, more than 
 human eloquence, it has breathed a deeper glow 
 into the fire of insj^iration itself. Verily, faith 
 hath removed mountains. It hath sublimated, 
 glorified, almost deified humanity. Men have 
 done and endured things nearly incredible through 
 this wondrous power. But the startling fact must 
 not be overlooked, that these incredible things 
 have often been irrespective of the rightness or the 
 wrongness of the principles which were held and 
 trusted in, by the doers of them. A false as well as 
 D. true creed has had its conquering heroes and its 
 self-sacrificing martyrs. Truth and error are not 
 ascertained by succcessful daring and by heroic 
 suffering. The grounds of faith are ever perfectly 
 distinct from its effects in this relation, and its 
 grounds alone determine its cliaracter, as wise or 
 unwise, right or wrong. But faith itself, grounded 
 in whatsoever it may, the principle is strength. 
 It is not an eye to see ; it may be bhnd, or the 
 light it follows may be a false light. But it is a 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 301 
 
 a hand to grasp. And even if the grasp inclose 
 nothing or a lie, the grctsp is mighty. It may be 
 such tremendous tension and fixture of the whole 
 frame, such vice-like, prodigious compression, such 
 superhuman excitement and concentration of all 
 the physical and all the mental energies, that it 
 shall do the work of a minor Omnipotence. 
 
 The spirit of faith, however, we may estimate 
 the relative worth of the faculty ; the disposition 
 to believe and trust is always a beautiful sign of 
 moral health. The unsuspicious, ingenuous, gener- 
 ous, open soul is in the normal state of nature. 
 We are formed to believe and confide. The first 
 years of rational life on earth are marked by un- 
 limited dependence on the one hand, and unlimited 
 trust on the other hand. We believe and confide 
 in our own powers, in other living beings with 
 whom we come in contact, and in the great, mute 
 symbols of nature around us. It belongs to our 
 structure. We are so made and constituted. The 
 chief and most beautiful characteristic of childhood 
 is immense, almost unreserved receptivity and 
 trustfulness. Suspicion in a child is an unnatural 
 vice. But what would be vice in this period be- 
 comes a virtue in one more mature, becomes a ne- 
 cessity. There are powers within us, slowly devel- 
 oped, whose very office it is to guard, to direct, and 
 to govern faith, to forbid or to command its exer- 
 cise. That which was at first a mere tendency, 
 
302 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 a spontaneouSj almost involuntary disposition, is 
 meant to become a regulated principle, filling its 
 own place in the liarmony and order of our inward 
 beins:, in obedience to the laws which have been 
 established to guide its action. As we advance to- 
 wards maturity of intelligence and of moral worth, 
 every exercise of faith becomes more consciously 
 dependent on the higher, controlling powers of the 
 soul. But it is just, therefore, only the stronger, 
 the more secure, and often the more rapturous. 
 
 There is no discord between the understanding 
 and even the loftiest movements of a legitimate 
 faith. The mere judging faculty sanctions, even 
 enjoins consent to that which itself could never 
 have reached, and can never comprehend. It recog- 
 nizes the trustworthiness of the Supreme, and com- 
 mands unqualified reception of whatever issues from 
 his authority. It recognizes, besides, even in man, 
 a power far above itself, whose data it must simply 
 accept and dare not question. Between a true 
 faith and the higher reason^ intellectual and moral, 
 the harmony is entire. Whatever in written in- 
 spiration, whatever in external nature, whatever in 
 spiritual providence, whatever in the depths of the 
 soul itself is distinctively from above, appeals, of 
 right, to the reason and the conscience, and appeals 
 not in vain. This is it, in our nature, which is 
 constituted to take hold of the Divine, which is the 
 special organ of the Divine, through which we as- 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 303 
 
 cend to the Great Being, and his thoughts and the 
 sense of his presence descend to enter us. To con- 
 temn the understanding, and neglect its free exer- 
 cise, is crime ; but to dishonor the higher reason, 
 the Divine faculty, the only organ through which 
 our Maker can speak with us, and we can reach our 
 Maker, is crime, more flagrant still. 
 
 " Read — within V is the audible command of 
 his own mind, to every human being — " Read — 
 ivithin !'' Go down to the deep place of intuitions, 
 which own no earthly fountain ! Search, Look, 
 Gaze, Try to detect and decipher the mysterious 
 writing on the primitive tablets of the soul, Avhich 
 no created hand has traced ! Listen, also ! in that 
 profoundest, sacredest adytum — away from all 
 outer sounds, which derange and dull the organ of 
 hearing, wait for the faintest whisperings of the 
 holy oracle ? Look and Listen, Wait and Gaze, 
 long, patiently, painfully ! The oracle luill utter 
 itself, the hidden, holy writing loill shine out, and 
 some divine letters, words, sentences will become 
 legible to the eye ! Nor can this do other than 
 prompt and help the study, not less, but more 
 eager, and humble, and reverent, of the pages of 
 the outward inspiration. That, like another mys- 
 tic Shekinah, will illumine the deep adytum and 
 suftuse it with a diviner glory. But whether in 
 the first, more dim, mysterious light, or in the 
 later, brighter efi'ulgence, Reason is the eye of the 
 
304 CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 
 
 .soul, wliich Faith BiibTiiiKsivcly .'ind joyously fol- 
 lowH. What the one deHcrics, the other accepts. 
 The two arc one ; at least a harmony, if not a 
 unity. 
 
 Calm, eager, piercing is ihv. gaze of llcason. Jt 
 is the eye of profound, abstracted contem])lation, 
 now turned downward to tlu^ dee})est depths of tlio 
 being and again lii'ted up to the S])here of the Eter- 
 nal, that it may Jiiid what is writt(ui in the one, 
 inter[)reted juid coniirmed by the other. There are 
 select moments in the mental history, sacred to the 
 higher reason, when it is not so much exerted by us, 
 as visited, indepeiKh^ntly of eifort on our ])art, with 
 wondrous illumination. It is not an ehiborative, but 
 a luiicly receptive, at the most, a contemplative 
 faculty. 'J'here are select moments, when its receji- 
 tivc ])()wer and the positive impartations made to it 
 and the openings into the unknown, through which 
 it may gaze, all are extraordinary. It may be with 
 the volume of inspiration before us and its holy 
 teachings lifting up our minds — it may be, in the 
 secret cluunber, wlicn avc are upon our knees, be- 
 fore tlu^ ''All-seeing" — it may boon the lone moun- 
 tain or ill the deep forest wild — it ma,y be, in th(^ 
 silence and outspread darkness of midnight — ak)ne, 
 iar from human lellowshii) ! The eye of Iveason 
 sweei)S the horizon all around, and the whole ex- 
 ])anse of ih(' concave, overhead. Like as some 
 absorbcnl worshi})per of science, in his solitary 
 
CONCERNING REASON AND FAITH. 305 
 
 tower of obsorvation, while all the world is asleep, 
 directs his telescope, now to one qnarter of the 
 heavens and a<;ain to another ; the eye of the 
 s])iritual seer, the spiritual seeker, gazes forth and 
 upward. Thus it may have gazed, often and long, 
 but in vain. At lenirtli, the inoniont comes when 
 a single, brilliant, glittering, spark-point, like a 
 precious star, a solitary jewel on the brow of night, 
 is described. Perhaps another glints out and per- 
 haps even another still. It is rapture, worth all 
 the gazing, and w\aiting, and watching, and dis- 
 appointment, and frequent sickness of heart ! 
 
 Wait on ! Brave soul — seeker after imperish- 
 able eternal truth ! Light is worth waiting for. 
 It shall spring up. More and yet more shall break 
 forth, to the upward, eager eye. But the realm 
 of the darkness is vast, the points of light are few. 
 We anticipate, we long for another state of being. 
 (Shall there ever be to us an atmosphere without 
 clouds, a day to which there is no light ? ^' In 
 T/nj Light— 'Thou Eternal Fount'— we shall see 
 Light !" 
 
 THE END.