^'^K ^ - ■ - ■ — i?7g than Difpating^ that the more good Na- tur'^d and better Bred fart of the World are grown dU mofi Sick of them and Prejudiced againjl them^ not being able to [ee Men Cut and SUflj and draiv Blood from one another after fuch an inhuman manner only to vent their own Spleen^ and make diver (ion for the favage and brutalized Rabble^ ivithout Jbme trouble^ fom R efentments of Pity and DifpUcency, And truly ^tis hard for a Man to read fome certain things of this Character without being difiurPd, and growing out of humour upo'/Pty and being even out of Conceit with Mankind^ fuch an Idea, do they raife of the Malignity of Human Nature^ and fo do they ruffle and cha- grine the Mind of the Reader : From which Impreffi^ ons he will hardly recover himfelf till he meets with fome Book or other of a contrary Spirit {whereof the Bifbop of London-Derry'/ Excellent DifcourjVof the Inventions of Men in the VVorfhip of God w a ve- ry eminent InJlanceJ which may ferve to recompofe the One^ and give him a better Opinion of the Other, J have endeavour"* din the Management of the prefent Argument to ufefuch Chrtpan Temper and Moderati^ en d6 becomes the Search of Truth ^ and may at que a Mind Concerned only for the finding it. For "of all the ill fort ed things m Nature^ 1 think it the mofi im* proper and difagreeable, to reafon in a Pajfion, efpeci^ ally when ^tis m Defence of that Religion which neither needs it nor allows it. And therefore laying afide all J^/ger and dijaffecfion (which even for the advantage The P R. E F A C £• cf m/I reafonwg ought to he Uid ajidtfj I have fet my felf to ohferve the Laws of Decencj as well as tbofe of good Difcourfe, to confider things a^ thej rea/Ijf are in thetrorxn Natures^ to re prefect them as 1 fnd them with allCalmnefs and Sedattmfs^ to regard nothing hut the pure Merits of the Caufe, and to treat that Party cf Men I write again fi with that Candour and Refpe^ as may the better dijpofe them to lend Attention to my Arguments^ Confidering it as one of the principal Rules of the Art of Perfuafion to gain upon the Ajfecli^ ens of Men in order to the Conviclion of their Judg" ments. And I do not know that 1 am guilty of any Incivtlity towards the Men 1 deal with^unlefs it be that £?/ Contradifling them. Wherein as they are even with me^ fo I hope they will not he lefs fo in the other fart^ but willtreit me with tht like return of Civility and good Temper ^ in cafe they fl) all think fit to make any, 1 he Occafion of this Undertaking was a certain late BookcalPdy ChrinianityNotMylterious, one of the moll bold^ daring and irreverent Pieces of Defiance to the Myfleries of ths Chrijlian Religion that even this Licentious Age has produced, and which has heenfuppo- fed to have donegreatBattery and Execution upon them^ and to he indeed a very fhrewd and notable Perform^ ance^ even by People of competent Sef^fe and Learnings not excluding the Author himfelf, who to (Jjetv hi4 good Opinion both of his Caufe and of his Management of tt^ h,ts fince publtfb^d a fecond Ediiion of his Book with Inlargements, and with his Name. To which I thought once to have returned a direci and Formal An- fwer by way of Solution of his Objections^ till upon fur- ther Conf deration Ijttdg'd it better to give an Abfolute Account of the Pofittve Side of the QueJiion\ and After having laid fuch Grounds in it as mtght be made ufe of The P R E F A C E^^ for the Confutcttion of his Book^ to make a fly or t Jppli- cation of them in a few Striciures ufon it at the End of Mine, But after 1 had laid thofe Grounds in the Ah • folute part J I found the application of them was fo ea(i^ to the Juthor'^s Obj'HionSy that thty might as mUbe made by my Reader^ who might with fuch readinefs out of the Principles here efiabltf/d form an Anfwer to all that dtferves one in that Book, that I thought there was no need of inlarging the Bulk of mine upon that Ac- count, Which accordingly tho^ I do not call by the Name of an Anfwer to Chriftianity Not Myfterious, / cannot but reckon to have all the Sub fiance {th^ not the Formality) of a R eplf to that Treattfe, it being much the fame thing in effect either to unlock a Door for i> Man, or to put into his hands a Key that will, 1 write neither for Favour nor for Preferment^ but only toferve the Caufe of Chriftianity (for fo I call that of its My fterics) and the Inter efl of that Church which is fo great a Friend to it and Matntainer of it according to its pur efl and mofi primitive State of Apojlolical and Evangelick Perfection, Of whofe Communion "^tis my Happinefs to be a Member^ my Glory to be a Priefl^ and that I had better Abilities to do her Service^ my higheft Ambition, However fuch as they are I humbij/ devote and imp toy them to that Purpofe^ as I do this and all other my Labours. I hope what I have written may do feme Service to the Caufe whofe Defence it un^ dertakeSy and if it does, I fljall not much regard the Refentments of any Defigning, or not fo well affeltei P.erfons^ Great or Little, who/e Difpleafure itmaypro* 'voke, tho^I have taken all due Care not to give any body any reafonable Offence, And fo I commit the following Papers to the attentive Perufalofthe Candid and Con^- fiderate Reader, and to the Blefflng of God. THE THE CONTENTS. Chapter I./^F Reafon, Page i ^. Chap. III. The Dtjlinciiorf of things Contrary to Reafon^ and Above Reajbn, conflder^d, 70 Chap. IV. That Human Reafon ts mt the Meafure of Truth » 95 Chap. V. That therefore a things being Incor^fre* henfible bj Reafon^ is of it felf no Concluding Argument of its not being True. i 58 Chap. VI. ThAt if the Incomfrehenfibilitj of a thing were an Argument of tts not being True^ Human Reafon would then be the Meafure of Truth. 167 Chap. VII. That therefore the Incomprehe'rjfibility of a thing is no jufl Obje^wn agair/jl the Belief of it. With an Account of the Cartefian Maxim ^ That we are to Affent only to what is Clear and Evident, 172 Chap. VIII. Wherein is fjewn what is the true Vfe of Reafon in Believing. 195 Chap. IX. An Application of the foregoing Confi- derations to the Mjfleries of Chnflianitj, ^01 Chap. X. The Conclufwn of the Whole^ with an Addrefs to the Socinians. J 10 Vofl'Jcript. 3 3 2 The The Introdudion. i. A Mong the various Ccnjeclures Men /\ of a Prophetic Spirit have fall'n in- 1%. to Concerning the laft events, we •^ -^ have had '^ this Opinion not long fince advancM for one, that as God formerly by rejecting the ^ews made vt'ay for the Gentiks^ fo in the latter days he will in like manner by rejefl:ing the Gentiles make way for the "Jews to enter into the Chriflian Church. That the ftate of Chriilianity being become intirely Cor- rupt, and all over Anti-chrijiianiz^d^ the Firft of thofe Viols of the Divine Wrath that are to exterminate the Wicked, and uflier in the Ter- rors of the Great Day, fliall fall upon the Chri- ftian World, that Chrijiendom fhall be utterly diifolv'd, broken in pieces, and deftroy'd, and that the^fiyj fhall be replaced and re-e(tabhf}i*d upon its Ruins. And, to render it Worthy of foSore a Calamity, that the generality of its Profeffors fhall not only greatly depart from the Primitive Power of the Evangelic Spirit, by Apoftatizing from the Purity and Perfeftion of both Chriftian Faith and Life (which we have already feen come to pafs) but fhall even lay down their Holy Profeflion, renounce their very Faith and Religion, and turn Infidels, Upon the latter part of which Opinion thofe B Words * Set Mrs.^OMUgnon s IVorks at Urge , p.vticuUrlyV ol/] . Part l. pag. 193. y^i aJfg Mr. Poircc'/ OemiomU Di^inefV q\> 5. p. 3 3S. •5 Jin Account of Words of our Saviour feem to caft a very fuf- piclous Afpefl, When the Son of Mm cometh^ jhall he f/jd Faith upon the Earths Luke i8. 8. As upon the Former do alfo thofe words of St. Pau/^ Thou wilt fay then^ The Branches were broken ojf^ that 1 might be g^^^jf^d in. Well ; hecaufe of unbelief they were broken off^ and thou fiarjdefi by Faith, Be not high-minded^ but fear. For if God fpared not the Natural Branches^ take heed lefl he alfo /pare not thee. Behold therefore the Goodnefs and Severity of God : On them which felly Severity ; hut towards thee^ Goodnefs y if thou con^ tinue in his Goodnefs. Otherwife thou alfo JJjalt be cut off: Rom. II. 19, 20,21, 22- that is, as a dead, withered and urifruitful Branch, as wei e the fews for the fame Reafon before, and as our Saviour tells us every unfruitful Branch Ihall be, Joh. 1 5. 2. 2. And truly if one were to judge of thefe Mens Opinion by the prefect face and ftate of things, one would be inclined to think it true, and that they had the right l{ey of Prophecy in their Hands. For fure by all Signs and Ap- pearances, the Courfe of the World feems to drive this way ; and if there be fuch a Fatal Revolution to come, no doubt but that we are with large fteps haftening to it. For how are the Vitals of Religion continually ftruck at, the Foundations of it unfettled and undermined, its venerable Articles difputed and ridiculed, and by what a (lender thread does Chriftianity hang ! The great Complaint for a long while has been of the Decay of Chriftian Reafon and Faith, ? Chrlftian Piety, and the Univerfal Corruption of Manners. But now our Religion is cor- rupted as well as our Manners, and we e- very day make ihipwrack of our Faith as well as of a good Confcience, So that we have now fill'd our meafure, and are every way ripe for Deftruflion. Some deny all ReveaiM Religion, and confequently the Chriliian ; others allowing the Divinity of the Religion, deny that of its Author, .together with the DoQrines of the '1 rinity, Incarnation and Sa- tisfaftion ; others again owning his Divinity, deny the necefiTity of Believing it ; others a- gain granting that, and the other Points, deny the neceffity of his SatisTaftion, which is noc only refolvM into mere Frudential Reafons (as formerly) inftead of being grounded upon the EffentUt Order and ^ufiite of God, but is brought down fo low of late as to be made an Ac- commodation and Condefcenfion to, and a gracious Compliance with the common VVeak- neffes and Prejudices of Mankind. 1 hus is the Chriftian Religion fo mangled and dif» memberM by fome, and foodly and infidiouily reorefented by others, that between them botli the general t'aith of the thing is indangei'd, and a ready way prepared to Sceftictjm and hfdelity, ^. Not that I think it ought to be any jufl matter of Scandal to any confidering Chri- ftians, or Prejudice to their Holy Religion to fee fo many Corruptions of it, and Apoftacies and Revoltings from it, fmce this is no more B 2 than 4- ji^n Account of than what the Holy Spirit of God has often forewarn'd us fhall come to pafs in tlie latter days; wherein we are exprefly told, that pe- rillous times fhall come, and that Men fhall refift the Truth, be proud and high-minded, of corrupt minds, and reprobate concerning the Faith, 2 Tim. j. And moreover, that they fhall privily bring in damnable Herefies, even denying the Lord that bought them, 2 Fet, 2. This therefore 1 fay ought in reafon to be no matter of fcandal to any Chriftians. And fo neither ought the poor, humble, fuffering con- dition of Jefus Chrid to have been any to the Jem, fince this alfo was plainly foretold of the Meflias, and made a notable part of his Charafter. And yet we find that the Crofs of Chrift was a ftumbling-block to the "Jews^ and fo no doubt are the prefent fufferings, I may fay Crucijixiorj^ of his Religion to many Chri- ftians ; the generality of which meafurc the certainty of their Faith by the firmnefs and conftancy of its ProfelTors, and are apt more to ftaggcr and take oftence at the untoward appearance of any Event, than to be confirm'd in their belief from its agreement with An- tient Prophecies. 4. In the mean time what do thofe mthout think of us ! Particularly the Heatheny, ainong whom no doubt there are fome that neitl.cr want Intelligence nor Curiofity to acquaint themfelves with the prefent ftate of Chrifien- dam. What a confirmation muft it be to thefc Men in their Infidelity, to fee Chriftians grow weary Reafon and Fhith. 5 weary of their own Religion, and willing to part with thofe great and weighty Articles of it for whicli the holy Martyrs (hed their Blood, and which could not be extorted from them by all the might and power of their cruel Emperors. Can it be expefted that thefe Mea fhould embrace a Rehgion which they fee thus continually deferted by its own Difciples 1 Or rather inftead of converting themfelves to Chriftianity will they not look every day when the Chriftians (hall come over to them ! For truly this feems to be the ftate of the Chriftian World at this time. We are port- ing as faft as we can into Heathenifm, and ftand even upon the brink of Infidelity. The great Articles of our Religion are giving up every day, and when Men have parted with thefe, we are very much beholden to them if they retain any of the reft, there being no- thing in Chriftianityconfiderable enough, when the great Myfteries of the Trinity, Incarnati- on, &c. are taken away, to make it appear an Inftitution worthy of God, or to challenge the AfTent of any thinking and confidering Man. But why do 1 talk of running into Heathenifm ? I am afraid we are tending further. For as from a Socinim 'tis eafie to commence a Deijl \ fo he that is once a Ueijl is in a hopeful way to be an Atheijl whenever he pleafe. 5. I do not fpeak thefe things out of a Spi- rit of Peevifhnefs and DiiTatisfaftion, as fome who being full of a Querulous Splcnetick Hu- mour, and knowing not how better todifpofe B I of 6 yin j4ccottnt of of it to tlieir eafe, give it vent upon tbe 7/Wx, of which they are always complaining right or wrong. No, the deplorable and dangerous fiateof Chriitianity, and the too vifible growth of Sociniamfm and Deijm among us extort thefe Refleflrions from me, and have given me many a troublefom and uneafie Thought in my pri- vate Retirements. For my Satisfaftion under* which, my beft Sdvo has been to confider that God governs the World, and that Jefus Clirift, who is the Head of his Church, will preferve it from all the Powers of Earth, and even from the Gates of Hell. And that tho' now he feems to be afleep in this Sacred VelTei while the Tempeft rages, and the Waves beat againft it, and almoft cover it, yet 'tis to be hoped he will awake, and rebuke the Winds and the Sea, and make all calm and quiet a« gain. However in the mean time 'tis fit the Mariners fhould work, and neglect the ufe of no means that are neceffary to the fafety of their Ship ; fome by Writing, others by private Difcourfe, and all by Prayers and a good Life. 6. But now whereas all Rational Method of Cure is founded upon the knowledge of the Caufe of the Diflemper, he that would contribute any thing to the flopping this Contagion of Religious Scepicifm^ that now reigns among us, ought in the firft place to confider the Reafon of it, what it is that makes JMen fo difpofed to waver in their Religion, and fo ready to part with the great Articles and Myfteries of it. Now to tiiis purpofe I call Reafon and Faith, 7 call to mind a very confiderable Obfervation of ^ Defcartes concQvmng Arheifm, which I take to be equally applicable to Infidelity, particu- larly to this of the Myfteries of the Chrirtian Faith : The Obfervation is this, ' That thofe * things which are commonly alledged by A- * theills to impugne the EKJftence of God, do ' all turn upon this, that either we attribute * fome Human Affeftion to God, or elfe ar- * rogate fo great force and penetration to our * own minds as to go about to comprehend and ^ determine what God can, and ought to do. * So that if we would but carry about us this * Thought, that our Minds are to be confi- ^ der'd as Finite, but God as Incomprehenfi- * ble and Infinite, there would be no further * difficulty in any of their Objeflions. Thus that very Acute and Judicious Perfon con- cerning the Grounds of Atheifm. And in like manner I think it may be laid of Infide- lity as to the Myfteries of Chriliianity, That the great Reafon why fo many that call them- felves Chriftians do foobftinately cavil at them and difpute them, is, that either they think too meanly of God, or too highly of them- felves • that either they afcnbe fomething Hu- man to his Nature, or fomething Divine to their orv^ ; that either they fet too narrow limits to the Divine Power and Greatnefs, or carry out too far thofe of their own underllandings ; in one word; that either they Humanize God, B 4 or * In the Preface to hit Metaphyfical Medications. 8 j!^n jlccomt of or Deify themfelves and their own Rational Abilities. 7. And they confefs in eflpcfl as much them- felves For the Reafon that thefe Men com- monly give out and pretend for their not al- lowing the Myderies of the Chriftian Religion any room in their Creed, is, that they are a- hove the reach of their Underftandings. They cannot comprehend them, or conceive how they can be, and therefore vi^ill not believe them ; having fixed it as a Law in the general to believe nothing but what they can compre- hend. But now where does the Ground of this Confequence reft at lall, or upon what Princi- ple does it ultimately depend ? How comes the Incomprehenfibility of a Point of Faith to be a prefumptionagainft it; why is its being above their Reafon an Argument that it is not true? Why I fay, but only becaufe in the firft place they attribute fo much to their Reafon (at leaft by a Confufe Sentiment) as to prefume it to be the Meafure and Standard of all Truth, and that nothing that is True can really be above it. Herel fay theftrefsof the matter will reft at lart. For fhould the Argument of thefe iVIen be reduced to a Syllogiftical Form, it muft necefTarily proceed thus, Whatever is above our Reafon is not to he he* liev/d as true ; . But the Reputed Myjleries oj Chriflianity are above our Reafon : There- Reafon and Faith. 9 Therefore the Refuted Myfleries of Chri[iiAnit) are not to be believ'^d as true. Now the only conteftable Propofition in this Syllogifcn is the Major, which can be provM by no other Principle than this, That our Reafon Is the Meafure of all Truth, and whofe Proof nauft be in this Form. Whatever is above the Meafure of all Truth is not to be believed a^s true ; ^ut our Reafon is the Meafure of dH Truth : Therefore whatever is above our Reafon is /jot to be believed as true. By this Analyfis of their Argument into its Principle, it is plain, that this their Reafon of disbelieving the Myfleries of the Chriftian Religion, viz. Becaufe they are above their Reaforty does at lafl: refolve into this, That their Reafon is the Meafure of all Truth ^ and that they can comprehend all things. For otherwife how fliould their not being able to comprehend a thing, be an Argument that it is not true? This I prefume is a Principle our Adverfaries would be loth to own, and indeed with good Reafon, it being the mofl extravagantly abfurd and felf-arrogating one that can pofTibly enter the Thought, or proceed from the Mouth of a Man. And accordingly I do not know any Socinian that had the immodedy in terms openly to affert it. But this is what they muft come to if they will fpeak out, and what in the mean time lo j^n Account of time thej^ do virtually and implicitly fay. So then their procedure in fhort fecms to be this, They firft {tt their Reafon above all things, and then will believe nothing that is above their Kcafon- And if this he not in an unreafona- ble meafure to exalt that Faculty, to carry it beyond its due bounds, nay to fet it no bounds at all, but ftriflly to make it Infinite, and fo to afcribe to it no lefs than a Divine Perfeftion, ! niuft profefsmy defpairever to know what IS. 8. To be the adequate Meafuve of all Truth, fo as to have no one Truth above the Compre- henfion of it, is as much as can be faid of the Reafon and Underftandingof God himfelf. His Infinite Underftanding is indeed truly and ne- ceffarily fo, and whatever is above his Reafon is for that very reafon moft certainly not true. Becaufe he effentially comprehending all that truly is, it muft necelTarily follow that what- ever he does not comprehend mull: htnothirjg. But to fay the fame of the Reafon of a Man, or of the Intelligence of the moft illuminated -Angel, would be to confound all diftinftion be- tween Finite and Infinite, God and Creature; and to advance the moft abfurd, and withal the moft impious and blafphemous Propofition imaginable. And yet this is the general Prin- ciple upon which the Body of Socirnanijm turns, and by which it would be moft direftly and moft compendioufly confuted. 9. I fhall therefore take hold of it by this handle : And fince that which is a Principle one way, Reafon and Faith, 1 1 way, as we argue forwards from the Caufe to theEffcft, may beconfidcr'd as a Confequence another way, as we argue backwards from the Eftefl to the Caufe; and fince there are thcfe two general ways of Reafoning, I fhall there- fore proceed both thefe Vv^ays in the manage- ment of the prefent Argument, which accord- ingly fliall turn chiefly upon this double Hinge, Firfi, I fhall overturn their Principle (I call it theirs, becaufe 'tis what they mufl: at lad necef- farily come to) by fliewing that Human Reafon is not the meafure of Truth, or that there may be fome things True which are above the com- prehenfion of Human Reafon, and that there- fore a thing's being above Reafon is no conclu- ding Argument of its not being True. Second- ly, 1 fliall argue ab Abfardo^ by fhewing that if \ thing's being above Reafon were an Argu* mentof itsnot being True, then it will follow that Human Reafon is the Meafure of all Truth, which if I bring them to, I fhall think them reduc'd to a fufficient Abfurdity. Thefe I intend as the two great Pillars of this Work, wiiich like the fides of an Arch will ftrengthen and bear up one another, that which is liable to exception m the former part being made out in the latter, and that which is liable to excep- tion in the latter being made out in the former. For if it be quedion'd in the Firft Part whether this be indeed their Principle, That Human Rea- fon is the Meafure of ail Truth, that will appear in the Second, wherein it will be fhewn to follow from their fuppofition. And if it be queftion'd I 2 An jt^ccoimt of queflionM in the Second Parr, whether this their Principle be abfurd, and fo whether they are reduced to an Abfurdity, that will appear intheFirft, wherein this Principle is fliewn to be Falfe. lo. And when by this Method I havefhewn in general both a Prion and d Pojleriori^ that a thing's being above Human Reafon is of it felf no fufficient Argun^ent of its not being true, I fhali then make application of all to the Myfte- riesof theChriftianReligion,which I fhall fliew may betruenotwithftanding their being above Hun^an Reafon, and fo that their being above it is no juft ground to conclude them Falfe, and that therefore they ought to be i^/i^ i/.^^ notwith- ftanding their being above our Reafon, which ^ in this cafe ought to be no prejudice to our Faith^ ' fuppofing them otherwife fufBciently reveal'd. Which whether they are or no 1 fliall not difcufs, my defign at prefent not being to enter into the derail of the Controverfie, to prove the parti- cular Myfleriesof the Chriftian Faith, fuch as theTrinity, Incarnation, or the like- but only to lay a general ground and foundation for the belief of thofe Articles, and to deliroy that upon which the Body o{ Soci//ta?7tfm ftands. The Great and General Principle of which I take to be, That nothing is to be believ'd as reveaPd by God, that is above the comprehenfion of Human Reafon ; or, That a IVIan is to believe nothing but what he can comprehend. Which Principle i hope by the help of God, with the utmott Evidence and Demonlfration to over- throw. Reafon and Faith. i^ throw. And becaufe in order to this I muft firft givea dire£l and ipvokk'* d Account ot Re a fo/t Sind taith, befides what will be faid Incident!/ and Occafionally of them in the Courfe of the Treatife, whofe main defign is fo to adjuft and accommodate the Natures and Properties of thefe two things together, as to fhew the Rea- fonablenefs of beUeving the Myfteries of the Chriftian Rehgion ; thereupon it is that I intitle the whole, Jn Account of Reafon md Faithy i» relation to the Myfteries of Chriflianity, This is the Grofs of vyhat I defign, the Particulars of which will be more diftinttly laid down and ac- counted for in the following Chapters. CHAP. L 0/ Reafon. I. A Mbigulty of Words being one great oc- XX cafion of Confufion of Thoughts ; who- ever will Difcourfe clearly and diftinftly of any Subjeft, muft in the firfl: place fix and fettle the fignification of his Terms, in cafe they are Ambiguous; that is, if one and the fame lerm be applyM to different Ideas. In this cafe, De- finition of the Name is to go before the Definiti- on of the Thing ; between which two I con- ceive the difference to be this, That in a Nomi^ nal Definition the word is only dctermin'd to fuch 14 ^ri Account of fuch a certain Idea, whereas in a Real one, theldeaicfelf isopenM and explalnM by fome other Ideas that are fupposM to be contained and involved in it. Upon which account it is that A^(??z?/W Definitions are Arbitrary, and therefore inconteliable, and therefore may be ufed as Prin^ ciples in Difcourfe, as they are in Geometry ; whereas Red Definitions are not Arbitrary, but muftbeconformM to the Nature of things, and fo are not to be taken for Principles, whofe Truth is to be fuppofed^ but for difputable Pro- pofitions, whofe Truth is to be proved. 2. Reafon therefore being an ambiguous word, and of various acceptations, before I proceed to give an account of the Nature of the thing,it will be neceffary that I define the Name ; which will alfo be the better defined^ if it be firft diftinguijlj^d. Now all Diftinftion being a fort of Divifion^ in which, according to the Rules of L(?g/V^, theDi- ftribution ought to be into the mofi: general, and moft immediate Members, I fhall accordingly diftinguidi of the feveral meanings of this word, Reafon., by the fame meafure as I would divide any whole into its parts. ?. I confider therefore that the moft general diftribution of Reafon is into that of the Objed and that of the Subjeft ; or, to word it more Intelligibly, tho' perhaps not altogether fo Scho- laftically, into that of the Thing, and that of the Underftanding. Reafon ohje^ive, or of the Thing, is again very various : Sometimes it is taken for Truth^ and that both for Truth of the Thing, namely the ElTential relations that are between Reafon andVahh^ 15 between Ideas; and for Truth of the Propofition^ which is its conformity to thofe Ideal Relations. Thus it is taken the firft way for the Ideal Rela- tions themfelves, when we inquire whether the Reafonsol Good and Evil are 4^ Eterno^ meaning by Renfons theEffential Relations or Differences. Thus again it is taken the fecond way, for the agreement or conformity of a Propofition with thofe Eflential Relations ; as when we fay, This is Senje a^^d Reafon ; meaning that the f ropofition is true, and conformable to the Nature of things. Sometimes again it is taken for the Medium, Argument, or Principle whereby a Truth is pro- ved ; as when we fay, Do you prove this by Reafon or by Authority f Sometimes again for the Rules and Meafures of Reafoning ; as fuppofe 1 fhould fay, Ihat Renjbn is the fitejl Study for a Rational Creature^ I fliould be fuppofed to mean thofe Rules and Meafures whereby we ought to rea- fon, and fo to intend a commendation o^Logick. Sometimes again it is taken for Moderation ; as when we fay, I here is Reafon in all things. Some- times for Right, Equity or Juftice ; the Obfer- vation of which is commonly call'd. Doing a, Man Reafon* It is alfo taken for the End or Mo- tive of an Aftion; as when v/e fay, For rvhut Reafon do you this or that ) in which fenfe it is ufed by the Poet ; -flat fro Rations voluntas. 4, Com.e we now to the Confideratlon of Reafon, as 'cis taken fubjeclively^ the other gc- neral 1 6 j4n Account of neral part of its diftinftlon, in which alfo there isfome variety of Acceptation. For it isfome- times taken for the A£l, fometimes for the Ha- bit, and fometimes for the Natural Power or Faculty of Reafoning. For the Aft ; as when we fay of a Man afleep, that he is defriv*d of his Reafon. For the Habit ; as when we fay of a Man, th^i he has lofl his Reajo^, when his Intel- leftuals are mightily diforder'd and impairM fay a Difeaie. For the Natural Power or Fa- culty of Reafoning ; as when we fay. That Man is a Creature indued with Reafoa. Which being a Propofition of Univerfal Truth, and that pro- ceeds of Man as Man, muft necelTarily be veri- fied of every Man, and confequently muft not be meant of the Aft or Habit of Reafon, (for thefe are not at all times in every Man) but of the Natural Power or Faculty of it, which is not liable to be fufpended as the Aft, nor loft as the Habit, but is Effential to the Nature ot Man, that which conftitutes him what he is, and diftinguifhes him from other Creatures, and confequently is infeparable from him, whe- ther afleep or awake, whether fick or well. 5. Reafon thus confider'd as it ftands for a Power or Faculty in Human Nature, may be taken again either largely or ftriftly. Large- ly, for the Power of Thinking or Perception in general, v^hereby a Man is capable of knowing or underftanding any Truth, let it be by what means, or in what order or method foever. Striftly, for the fame Power proceeding after a certain Ipecial manner, and according to a peculiar Reafon and Faith. i j peculiar order and metliod, namely, from the knowledge of one thing to that of another, or to the knowledge of what is, as yet, obfcure and unknown, by the knowledge of what is more clear and better known ; concerning which a fuller account by and by. 6. After having thus diftinguifh'd, with what exaflnefs of order I could, the feveral Ac- ceptations of the ^'ord'Reafo^j, 1 fliall in the next place define in which of thcfe Senfes I now ufe it. By Reafon then in this place, I intend not Rea- fon of the Objed, but that of the Subjefl: ; and that not as to the A£l or Habit, but as to tlie Natural Power or Faculty of Reaf6ning And that again not as it is taken flriftly, as it ufes a certain particular procefs in its operation, but as it is taken more at large for the power of per- ceiving or knowing in general. According to which Senfe Reafon is here the fame with Vnder-. ftandir^g. And fo it is often ufed ; as when we fay, The Reafon of a Man Teaches him this or th.it ; meaning his Underftanding at large, or the ge- neral Power whereby he underftands. For if Science, which ftriflly taken is that particular kind of Knowledge which is acquired by De- monftration, be yet often ufed more largely for Knowledge in general, why may not Reafcw^ the great Principle and Faculty of Scter^ce^which ftritlly taken fignifits a Power of Knowing by fuch a certain way and in luch a certain man- ner of proceeding, be taken as well in a greater latitude, for the Power of Knowing or Undei- ftanding in general? xS An Account of 7. And theNature of the Subjefl: and QuefHon now under Confideration requires that it fliould be thus ufed here. For when 'tis inquired whe- ther there be any thing in Religion above Rea- fon, the meaning certainly can be no other than whether there beany thing which furpaffes the Tower and Capacity of a Man's Underftanding to comprehend or account for? And he that fays there is nothing in Religion above Reafon, is fuppofed to mean, that there is nothing in it beyond the comprehenfion of a Man's Natural Underftanding, nothing but what he can pro- found and fathom. And fo alfo he that fays, that there are Myfteries in Chriftianity, or things above our Reafon, muft be prefum'd to mean, that there are ReveaPd Truths that fo far exceed the meafure of our Intelleflual Facul- ties, and are of a fize fo difproportionate to our Minds, that WMth all the force and penetration of Spirit, and the utmoft application of Thought, we cannot poffibly comprehend them, be our method of proceeding what it will. I do not intend by this to ftate the Que- ftion (which fhall be done more fully in its due place) but only to give an account of one of its Terms, and to fhew that by Reafon I both do and fliould here mean, A Man's Natural Power of Knowing or Underftanding in general. In which ufe of the word, 'tis no fmall Authority to me that the Excellent and moft Accurate Au- thor of UArt^de Fe/^fer, defines Logick to be an Art of well conducting ones Reafon in the knowledge of things : Where by Reafo» 'tis plain he muft mean the fame as Vnderjtmding. 8. Reajon and Faith. 19 8. What this Power or Principle of Under- ftanding is in its felf, or in its own Nature and EfTence, I do not pretend to know, as not having any clear Idea ot my own Soul, and indeed as not knowing my felf at all by Idea^ but only by a confufe Sentiment of internal Con- fcioufnefs. And therefore I fliall not go about to examin what it is. For the fame reafon alio I fhall not fet my felf to confider whether the Underftanding be any Power or Faculty really diftinftfrom the Soul, or. only the Soul it felf aft- ixig after a certain manner, this being almofl: as obfcure as the other ; and I care not to employ either my own Thoughts, or my Reader's, up- on things whereof I have not any clear Concep- tion. All that I fhall therefore further treat of concerning the Underftanding (for fo I now call our Reafon) fliall be with refpeft to its Operatic ons, by which the Nature of it is beft known, and whereof we are not only Confcious by way of Sentiment^ but have alfo, or at leaft by felf* refleftion may have, fome Notion and Con- ception by way of Idea, 9. Now thefe are ordinarily fuppofed to be three, Apfrehenfwn, Jr^dgmer/t ^nd Dijcourfe : By Jiffreherjfiotf, meaning the fimple view or per- ception of a thing ; by "^udgm^nt, the joining or feparating ot Ideas by Affirmation or Negation \ by Difcoufjiy the collefting of one thing from another. And upon this threefold ground our Syftems of Logick have for a great while pro- ceeded with great Agreement. But as Au- thentick as Time and Confent have made this Divifion, I cannot think it right, when 1 com- C 2 pare ao An Account of pare it with wliat by fclf-rcfleflion 1 find to pafs within my own Mind. For fuppofing it were true as to the matter of it ; that is, I mean, that Judgment and Difcourfe did really belong to the Underftanding (which yet the Philofo- phers of the Cartejhn way will by no means al- low) yet the Form of it muft needs be very un- artificial and inaccurate. For Truth being the general Objeft of the Underftanding, and there being nothing in Truth but Ideas and the Re- lation that is between them, 'tis impofTibie there fbould be any more operations of the Un- derhand ing than Perception and "judgment ; Per- ception as to the Ideas themfelves, and Judg- ment as to their Relation. Which Judgment 'tis true may be either Immediate or Mediate; Immediate when the Relations of Ideas are judgM of by the very Ideas themfelves, or Me- diate when they are judg'd of by the help and means of fome other Idea, but then all this is but Judgment ftill, tho' in two different ways, the difference between them being the fame as between judging of a thing under the Formality of a Fropofition, and judging of the fame thing under the Formality of a Conclufion. Thefe indeed are different ways of judging, but ftill they are both but Judgments, and one as much as the other. So that in reality that which thefe Men call Difcourfe is but a foecies of "judgment ; and if for that rcafon they will confider it as diftincl from Judgment and make it a third Operation, they might as well have put in the ox\\QX f}eciesxoo (Judgment Immediate) andfo made Reafon and Faith. ii made a fourth. But then this is againfl: the great Fundamental Law of Divifion, which re- quires that one of the Members ought not to be fo included in the o&her, as that the other may be affirm'd of it. Which is plainly the Cafe here, thi's being fuch a kind of Divifion, as if one fhould divide a Living Creature into a Plant, an Animal and a Man, and that b^'caufc Dilcourfe is as much a Species of Judgment as Man is of Animal. And herein (tho' the mat- ter be fo clear that I need it not) yet i ha^Dpea to have the Authority of a confiderable Fhilofo- pher on my fide, Monfieur Dtrodon, who in thefe few words expreifes his Senfe full and home to this purpofe; ^ i he third Operation of the Mind^ fays he, i:^ commonly cdPd Dtfcourje^ hut is properly the judgment of the Corjf'ecjuent^ as trjftrr'^d from the Judgment of the Antecedent. lo. By this it is evident, that fuppofing the matter of this Divifion never fo true, that is, that Judgment and Difcourfe do appertain to the Underllanding, yet the Form of it is wrong ; Difcourfe, which is here made a third member of the Divifion, being contained under Judg- ment, which is the fecond, as the Species of ir. But neither is the matter of it true. For Judg* ment and Difcourfe, or to fpeak more accurate- ly? J^^g^^ent, whether immediate or mediate, does indeed not belong to the Underflanding, but (as Will by and by appear) to the Will. There is but one general Operation that belongs C J to >■ • ! Philofg. Contraft. p. 242. ^^ \An Account of to tlie Underftanding, and that is Perception. For as I laid before, Truth being the general Objefl of the Underftanding, and there being nothincr in Truth but Ideas and their Relations, all that the Underfl:anding can here have to do will be only to perceive thefe Ideas, and the leveral Relations that are between them. For when this is done, then is a thing fujfficiently underftood, to underftand a thing being no more than to perceive its Ideas, and how they ftand related to one another. Here is the whole compafs and full extent of the Under- ftand ing, and all that we can pofTibly conceive by it ; and he that perceives Ideas and their Relations, underflands as much of them as is to be underftood. Whereby it is evident, that Perception is the only operation of the Under- ftanding, and that it can have no other. 'Tis true indeed there is variety in this Perception, it being either Simple or Complex; Simple of the Ideas themfelves, and Complex of their Relations ; which latter again is either Immedi- ate or Mediate, (as was faid before of J^^g- TTient) but ftill 'tis all but Perception, tho' diffe- rently modified ; which therefore I conclude to be the only Operation that properly belongs to the Underftanding. 1 1. But now if all that of right belongs to the Underftanding be Perception, then 'tis moft certain that Judgment cannot belong to the Underftanding, and that becaufe Judgment is not Perception. For we are faid to judge as ive perceive, and fome are fo much in hafte that Reafon and Faith. a:^ that they will judge ^c/^r^ they perceive, which plainly fliews them to be two different things. And that they are fo this one -Argument well confiderM is a Demonftration, that Judgment i3 a fallible thing, that may be true or falfe as it happens ; whereas Perception is always true, it being a Contradiflion that it fliould be otherwife : For what a Man does not truly perceive he does not perceive at all. I con- clude therefore that Judgment is not Perception; and fince Perception is (ashasbeenfhewn) the only operation of- the Underftanding, I con- clude again that Judgment does not belong to the Underftanding. It muft therefore belong to the Will, which is the proper feat both of Judgment and of Error too. And it is nothing elfe but the Will's confenting to and acquiefcing in the Reprefentations that are made by the Underftanding. Which agrees well with thofe weighty and very fruitful Max- ims, ' That the Will is the Subjeft and Princi- ' pie of all Error as well as Sin (which indeed * ought to be voluntary to make it culpable). ^ That 'tis in our Power to avoid Error by fuf- * pending our Judgment till the Evidence be ' clear, tho' 'tis not in our Power to avoid * Ignorance or Non-Perception of many things ' by reafon of the limitednefs of our Faculties. ' That the fault of thofe that err is, that their ' Wills run before their Underftandings, that * they judge and pronounce before they per- ' ceive, or of things whereof they have really ^ no Perception, which indeed is a great faulty C 4 * and 5 4- -^^^^ Account; of * and the caufe of all our diforders. That wc ^ are accountable for our Judgments as well as * for any of our other Aftions. And ladly, * That God is not the Caufe of any of our Hr- ' rors, which with rcfpefl: to him are only Afe- ^ gations, occafioned only by his not having gi- ^ ven us larger Capacities ; but with refpeft to ' our felvesare Pr/i/4//<5/?j, proceeding from the * ill ufe we make of thofe Natural Capacities ^ he has indued us with.' All which great and momentous Truths are grounded upon the very Principle now laid down, (which by this may appear to be fomething more than a Curi- oficy) 1 hat Judgment however commonly af- cribed to the Underftanding, does yet really be- long to the Will, and not to the Underftanding, whofe operations are all terminated within the limits of Perception. So well do thefe things cohere together, and fo aptly does one Truth lang and depend upon another. 12. But as right as I think this Account of the matter to be, yet confidering what an inno- vation it is from the Scholaftic Meafures, and how like a Paradox it looks, I think a little Countenance from Authority may do well to counterpoife the Prejudice of Singularity. And becaufe this is a greater Innovation than the precedent one, I fhall back it with an Authority proportionably greater than what was ufed up- on the other occafion. ^ // may be well concluded jKom what has been [aid (fays a Modern Writer, and 'Ktclicichc //V/^r^ri;?. Liv. i. p. i©. Reafon and Faith. 55 and whom I think I may venture to call a Philofophcr) that the Vnderjtanding never judgeSy (ince it only perceives^ or fince "[judgments and even Reajonings^ with reflect to the Vnderjianding^ are only pure Perceptions. That ^tis the Will alone which truly judges in acquiefcing in that which the Under Jlandirjg reprefents to />, and in voluntarily reposing it felf therein. And that alfo "'tis that a- lone which leads m into Error, i\galn ; I fay then that there is no other difference on the part of the Under [landing between a Jimple Perception, "Judg- ment and D^fcourfe^ but that the Ursderflanding perceives a Jimple thing without any relation to any thing whatjotver, by a jimple Perception, That tt perceives the Relations between two or more things in Judgment. And that in fne^ it perceives the Relations that are between the Relations of things in Dijcourfe. 80 that all the Operations oj the Un- der [landing are no other than pure Perceptions, All which he further explains and confirms by an Illuftration takerffrom Nu:nbers, with fome other very confiderable Reflexions upon it ; which for brevity's fake I leave the curious Reader to confult in order to his better Satis- faftion. 1 J. To this Account of this mofl excellent Perfon I fully agree as to the fubftance and matter of it, only would by his leave make fome little Alteration in the Form of it ; con- cerning which he had no occafion to be lollici- tous, as not defigning a formal and exaft di- vifion of the Operations of the Underflanding; but only to Iliew that they were all no other than iG ^ An j:4ccount of than pure Perceptions, And fo far his reprefenration of the A/Jatter is right, and fo, 1 fuppofe, will the Form of it be too if it run thus. The only operation of the Underftand- ing is Perception : Which Perception is either Simple or Complex. Simple of the Ideas themfelves, and Complex of their Relations. Which Complex Perception is again twofold. Immediate or Mediate. Immediate when the Relations of Ideas are perceivM by the perception and collation of the very Ideas them- felves whofe Relations they are ; Mediate when thofe Relations are perceived by the help or mediation of fome third Idea, made ufe of as a common meafure of comparing thofe I- deas which could not be fo collated together as to have their Relations perceived by them- felves. Andinthis^ I think, we have a riglit ifVccount of the Operations of the Underftand- ing, both as to Matter and Jorm •, the know- ledge of which, confidering how much Sfirit is above Bodj, though it were only a piece of Speculation and Curiofity, I (hould think of greater worth and confideration than that of the Properties of Lines and Figures, or any of the Phenomena'' s of Nature. 14, This Complex Perception, or the Per- ception of the Relations that are between I- deas, I take to be the fame with what we commonly call Kjjowledge: Which is ufually defined by an evident Ajfent, but I think not rightly. For an evident Affent is the fame as an Affent upon Evidence \ that is, an Af- fent' Reafon and Faith. 2 J fent to an evident thing, or to a thing where- of we have an evident Perception. But nov^ Perception and AiTent are two things, (the former being the ground of the latter) and 'tis in xhc Perception^ notinxhtAjfent^ that Know- ledge properly confifts. For Knowledge is molt certainly an Aft of the Underftanding; and it was Ihewn before, that the only Ope- ration of that is Perception. As for Aflent, that will be found to belong to another Prin- ciple For AfTent is no other than an Affirm^i- five 'judgment ; (for then a Man is faid to af- fent to a thing when he judges it to be fo or fo, and then to diffent when he judges it not to be fo) ; and Judgment, as was fhewn be- fore, belongs to the Will. Nor is it any thing to the contrary that we neceffarily alTent to whatfoever we clearly perceive. This nei- ther proves Aflent and Perception to be one and the fame, nor that Aflent does not belong to the Will, but only that the Will neccflari- ly follows, and cannot poflibly refifl: the clear Light of the Underllanding; which is a great Truth, but no Objeftion. Aflent therefore is always voluntary^ tho' not always free ; and whether voluntary or free is a plain Aft of the Will imbracing and acquiefcing in what is reprefented to it by the Underftanding. And therefore though we do always aifent to what we evidently perceive, yet Know- ledge does not confifl in the Aflent, but in the Perception^ which is the ground of that Aflent. 15. For^ ":% An Account of 15. For, to pufli the matter a little further, tliOUgh Affent neceffarily follows upon clear rercepticn, and cannot be feparated from it, yet fure we may ufe Ahflraciion here, and con- lider Perception witliout confidering AiTenr, the Idea of the one not including the Idea of the other. But now I would fain know whe- ther he that clearly perceives the Relations of things one to another, may not be truly faid 10 underftand or know thofe things ? Or whe- ther there be any thing further requifite to the iinderftanding or knowledge of a thing after a full and clear perception of it ? If not, (as I think no Man that confiders what he fpeaks will fay that there is) then Knowledge is fup- pofed to be in its compleat and perteft aft of being by Perception alone, and that before any AlTent be given ^ w^iich Affent therefore cannot go to the making up of its Nature, fince it was fuppofed to be compleat without it. To which I add. That let our Affent be join'd with never fo much Evidence, ftill we are faid to affent becaufe we know, and to what we know. So that our Knowledge is here prefuppofed to our Affent, and confe- quently is in order of Nature at leaft before it, and therefore cannot confiit in it. 1 con- clude therefore that Knowledge is not evident Jffefit^ but Ferception, particularly that Per- ception which I call Complex, the perception of the Relations that are between Ideas, whe- ther as to Agreement or Difagreement. Which, • Reafon and Faith. a a I think, till we can meet with a better, may ferve for a tolerable Definition of Knowledge. 1 6. But now whereas this Complex Per- ception (as was noted above) is either Imme- diate or Mediate; hence it is that our Know- ledge alio admits of the fame divlfion, being either Immediate or Mediate, or if ycu pleafe, 1/jtuitive or Demofjflrattve, Jktween which two the difference ufually made is, that in In- tuitive Knowledge we have an intire and fimultaneous view of things, and fee all at once ; whereas in Demonftrative Knowledge our profpeii: opens by degrees, and we proceed itep by flep, advancing from the knowledge of one thing to that of another. Tliis account indeed is true, but not explicit enough to make it clear: For 'tis Charaderizing from the el- fefl: only, and does not explain how our view in Intuitive Knowledge comes to be fo incite, and in Dem.onllrative lb gradual and pro- grefTive. This therefore mult be deduced iiigher, and explained by a more diftinO: Trin- ciple. And 1 think we fhall diftinguidi them more clearly and exaftly by faying, That In- tuitive Knowledge is when we perceive the a- greement or dilagreement of one Idea with another immediately and by themfelves, with- out the mediation or intervention of any other Idea. Demonjlrativey when this agreement or difagreement is perceiv'd not immediately, by comparing the Ideas with themfelves,' but mediately, by comparing them with a third ; that is, when we perceive them to agree or dif- agree q6 j4n Account of agree with themfelves, as we find them to do fo with feme third Idea, which we are often- times forced to make ufe of as a common mea- fure, becaufe we cannot always, by reafon of thenarrownefsof our Faculties, fo collate and confront our other Ideas together, as to fee whether they agree or no by their mere com- parifon. 1 7. This Demonftrative Knowledge Is what in the Schools is call'd Science^ concerning which great ftir is made, and variety of De- finitions given, but which by the meafures already laid down, appears to be nothing elfe but a Mediate Perception, or the perception of the Relations of Ideas by the mediation of fome other Idea. This other Idea is what wc ufually call a Medium or Proof, becaufe it is the common meafure whereby our Ideas are compared, and the Relations between them perceived. And 'tis the form and procefs of the Underftanding ufing this middle Idea as a mea- fure whereby to perceive the agreement or dif- agreement of the others, according as they a- gree or difagree with this, that I would call Reafonwg, which is not the very fame with Science, but the way and method to it. For we are faid to reafon in order to know, and Science is the effeft of Demonftration, accord- ing to that known faying in Logic, DemonfirA- tio eft Syllogifmus fcientium far lens, 18. If this Account of ReafoninghQ not clear enough to make it intelligible in it felf, or to diftinguifh it from Science, I would further ex- plain ■ Reafon and Faiths 5 2 plain It thus, by faying that Reafoning (as I here confider it with refpeft to the Under- (landing) is nothing elfe but the luccefTiyc Per- ception of each of the extream Ideas with the middle one, in order to perceive the union that is between them by the union that they have with the middle Idea. As for Example: I am to perceive that Space is Body ; and not being able to perceive this by the immediate infpeftion of thefe two Ideas, I call in a third to my afliftance, and proceed to the percepti- on of it thus: Whatever is extended is Body ; Space is extended, therefore Space is Body. Here^is plain that I perceive the union of the two extream Uc^s Space ^qdBodjy by the fuc-^ ccffive Perception of the union that each of them have with the middle Idea, extended. Now the very Perception it felf of the union of the two extream Ideas, Space and Body, by the mediation of the third and middle one, is what I would call 6aV»^e : For 'tis in the For- mality of this Mediate Perception that I am faid to k^wjv that Space is Body. But the fuc- ceffive Perception that I have of the union of each of thefe two extream Ideas with the mid- dle Idea in order to perceive the union they have among themfelves, is what I would call Reafomng, Which certainly cannot be the very Perception of the conclufion it felf (for that would confound it with Science) andyetmufi: be Perception too, (or elfe it would not belong to the Underflanding) and therefore can be no other than this fucceffive Perception that I fpcak 5 a j4n j^cmint of fpeak of. Whereby it may appear that the Reafoning here fpecified is not only diftinft from Science, but alfo from tliat Reafoning which confifts in illative Affirmations and Negations, and fo is a Species of Judgment, and accordingly belongs to the Will, not to the Underftanding, as was both remarked and accounted for before. 19. Thofe things which are known or per- ceivM by Intuitive Knowledge we call Primt^ -ples^ and thofe things which are perceivM by Demonftrative Knowledge we call Conclusions t Which though equally certain (becaufe the Ob- jefts of Knowledge) are yet not fo clear as Principles, which ferve indeed to the demon- ftration of other things, but need none them* felves, as being vifible by their own Light, and fometimes are fo evident that they are not fomuch as capable of any, but are ftriftly in* demonflrable, there being nothing more clear than themfelves whereby they may receive further Evidence. We fay of fuch Propofiti- ons, Th.%t they are a^ clear as the Light \ and there is more aptnefs in the comparifon than all that ufe it, I believe, are aware of. For Light is feen immediately and by it felf, and not by the mediation of any thing elfe ; where- as all other things are feen by Light. The Light that is thus feen by it felf anfwers to Principles^ and thofe other things which are feen by Light anfwer to Conclufwns. And the refemblance holds as well on the part of the A6t as of the Objeft; For the firft of thefe ways Keafon and Faith. ^ 3 Ways offeeinganfvvers to Intuition, and the lad to Demonftration. So fiirprifing is the agree- ment between Vifion and Knowledge, and lb ftrange and wonderful the proportion in this as well as in fome other things between the Sen- fible and the Intelleflual World. 20. Intuition is by far the mofl: perfect and excellent way of Knowledge, as being more clear, more fimple, and more intire. More cleAT^ for here we have all Light without any mixture of Darknefs, whereas in the other there is one dark fide. More fimple^ for here the Mind perceives the Truth by one fingle View, whereas in the other it is fain to multiply its Per- ception. More intire^ for here again we have the profpeft lying altogether before us in its full and whole extent, whereas in the other it opens gradually and fuccedively, t!ie Light ftealing in upon us more and more as we go farther and further, as it docs upon Men that travel toward the £.t/?. To which may be fur- ther added, that Intuitive Knowledge fuppofes and proceeds from perfection of the Underftand- ing, whofe Perceptive Faculty is hereby argued to be very bright and clear. For it muft be a very clear Perception to perceive the Relations of Ideas by the very Ideas themfelves. Where- as Demonftrative Knowledge, and the neceflity of Reafoning in order to it, is founded upon the narrownefs of our Intelleflual Capacities, which not being able to perceive the Truth or Falfhood of a Propofition by the fingle collation of the two Ideas that compote it, are fain to D make g^ An Account of make ufe of a third as a common meafure be- tween them ; and fo from theconfideration of fomething more clear and better known, to proceed in the fearch of what is more obfcure and lefs known. Accordingly we attribute the way of Intuition to the moil Ferfeft Beings, God and Angels. Though as to Angels, I make no great doubt but that in the Confidera- tion of very compounded Queftions, and fuch as include a multiplicity of Relations, they are fain to ufe Reafoning as well as we (as in the more fimple ones we ufe Intuition as well as they) though perhaps after a much more perfe£t manner, and by fuch compendious and facilita- ting Rules as we know nothing of. And as they may be fuppofed when they do reafon, to reafon better and more expeditely than we, fo with equal probability it may be prefum'd, con- fidering the great difproportion of Natures and States between us, that they ufe Intuition in very many things wherein we are forcM to have recourfe to Reafoning. 2 1. Hereafter indeed when, as the Scrip- ture tells us, all that is imperfed about us fhall be done away, and we ftjall be IcmiyyiKoi, not only like but equal to the Angels, we fhall be able to fee ('tis to be hoped) by Intuition too ; and that many things which we here not only were ignorant of, but thought impoffible ; things that were not only above our Reafon, but, as we thought, contrary to it. We fhall not only be able to reafon better than we do now, but fhall in moil: things not ftand in need of Reafon ami Faith. ^^ of any Reafoning at all, but fliall with one fim- ple View glance over and through the Relations of Ideas, and fo have an intire profpedt of the fair Field ofTruth. But at prefent we muft travel it over, and that with many a weary fiep, there being but very few things that we know by Intuition, no more than juft togiveusa tafte of the great Privilege of Heaven, and to in- courage both our Uefires and our Hofes of tliat perfeft State, when we fhall be fo far from needing any Logick to direft us in our reafon- ing, that we fhall have (in comparifon) but little need or ufe even of Reafon it felf. But ia this prefent State of our Non-age and Infirmity our Neceflity of it is very great. For our Intuiti- on is fo fhort-fighted, and reaches fo very little away, that, as, if we knew no more than what we can by this means attain to, the Compafs of our Knowledge would be fo very fcanty, that we fhould not have near light enough to direct us in our journey thro' the World; So if we would know more, and fee to a further diftance from us, we muft aflTift our feeble Eye by the Advantage of a Glafs. Now Reafon is this Glafs, Naturally indeed a very good Prcfpeftive, but which Logic, and efpecially Algebra^ has improved into a Telefcope. But yet ftill 'tis but an Artificialway of feeing, and all Art fuppofes and argues a Defeft in Nature. And tho' it he a great help, yet we know 'tis no very great Commendation to a Man's Eye fight to fee with Spefiacles. D ^ 22. 5 6 An Account of 22. And why then are we Proud ? And why proud of that which fhould rather dejefl: us, and make us Humble, of our Imperfeftions and our Defefls ? Our Natural Reafort is a Mark of our Limitation as Creatures, and our Artificial one of our Infirmity as Men, and both together give us but little Light, and help us to fee but a very little way off, and that after the moft im- perfeft and defeftive Manner, fuch as upbraids our Ignorance at the very fame time that it in- creafes our Knowledge, our Reafon not fo much inlightening, as betraying the Darknefs of our Under ftandings. Some few things indeed we Know as Angels do, by Intuition (or elfe we could not fo much as reafon like Men) but ftill the main Fund of our Knowledge lies in the Ra- tional and Demonflrative kind, and we are fain to ufe Clues and Chains to conduft our Thoughts through the infinite Mazes and Labyrinths of Truth, to proceed in a Train from one thing to another, to walk ftepby ftep, and feel out our way with warinefs and Caution like Men that go in the Dark. And fuch indeed is our ftate in this Body and in this World. Tis now a kind of Night with us, as having for the rnoft part only the Lelfer Light, Reajon^ for our Di- reftion. As for the Greater, Intuition^ vi^e have little more of that than of the refraded Beams of the Sun a little before its rifing, and after its fetting, enough to make a Twilight, a Mixture of Liglit and Darknefs, but fuch a Mixture as is very unequal, Darknefs making the far greater part of the Compofition. And is not this Con- fideration Reafon and Faith. ^j fideration fufficient (if there were nothing elfe) to take down our Pride, and infpireus witha Sentiment of the profoundeft HumiHty and Self- dejeftion. If not, let us Confider that evea this Lefler Light that is to govern our prefent Night and Darknefs, does oftentimes fail us, and fuffer an FxUpfe. Let us Confider that we have a darker fide yet, and are fubjefl: to a much lower Difpenfation. There being many things, and thofe of the highefl: Nature, and greateft importance, wherein our Reafon is utterly at a lofs, and cannot help us out, and with refpe6t to which being deftitute oi Sight^ we muft be Content to walk altogether by Faiih, Gon* cerning which in the following Chapter. D J CHAP. 5 8 jfin j4ccount of CHAP. II. 0/ Faith. J. TT^Aith is a Term of great Ambiguity as jj well as Reafon, but not to infill: upon the leveral Acceptations of it as it is ufed either in Divine or in Human Writings, I fl^all only define in what Senfe I here take it, and then proceed to fuch Confiderations upon it as may ferve to lay open its Nature fo far as is requifite to the prefent Defign. 2. 1 do not take Faith here for the Objeft of Faith, but for the Aft or Habit of faith, and that not Ethically confider'd, as it denotes the Moral Vertues of Veracity, Fidelity, Honefty and the like, but Logically^ as it fignihes a certain AfTenr, Judgment or Perfuafion of the Mind, particularly that which is founded upon Tefti- mony or Authority. So that the Generical and Common Fart of Faith is ^Jfe^f^^ wherein it agrees with fomeother Afts of the Mind, and the more fpecial and peculiar part that limits and Contrafts the General, and whereby the whole is differenc'd and diftinguiflVd, is the Motive and Ground of this AiTent. ^Tis it feems an AiTent grounded not upon the internal Reafon and Evidence of the thing, but upon the bare Tedimony and Authority of the Speaker. J. For Reafon and Faith. 59 J. For I confider that there are two general grounds of A (Tent, Reajbf^ and Authority, That is, we affent to a thing either becaufe we have fome Perception or Knowledge of it our felves, or becaufe its Truth is declared to us by another upon wliofe Knowledge and Veracity we think we may fafely depend. If the Reafon or Evi- dence of the thing be imperfeft and incomplete, that is, if we perceive only in part, then we yield a partial and imperfeft Affent, mixM with fome Fear or Sufpicion of the Contrary, which is what we call Opinion, B^it if the Evi- dence be full and perfetl, then we yield a firm and mofl: affured ^^ffent, which is generally diftinguifh'd from the other by the Name of Kjiowledge^ which according to the common Notion and Definition of it is an Evident jjftnt. But it was fhewn before that Knowledge does not Formally Confift in the Affent, but in the Perception which is the Ground of the Affent. And indeed how is itpoffible it fliould confill in any thing elle ? For (to give yet a further Confirmation to what has been already offer'd upon this Occafion) let Affent be never fo evi- dent, the evidence lies in the Perception, not in the Affent, which of it felf is a blind dark Act of the Mind, and can be faid no otherwife to be Evident, than as 'tis an Affent to an evident thing, that is, to what we perceive. But now Perception and Affent are not only two things, but fuch as belong alio to two different and di- ftinct Faculties, and therefore can never join to- gether to make up lQ7orvled^e^ which is an Act D 4 only 40 j^n jiccount of only of one. And indeed to fpeak the truths Evidtnt A^ent (as ^tis here appHed) (eems to me a mere jumble of Words confufely uniting together in one Idea, Operations that belong to diifinct Faculties, one belonging to the Will and the other to the Underftanding. And how the refuk of this heterogeneous Compofition iliould be Kjiowledge^ I muft confefs to be indeed a M)Jtery above my Comprehenfion. And be- fides, after all, an Evident Afient when refolv'd into more words will amount to the fame as an Aflent to what we know, and would it not be a Notable Definition of Knowledge, to fay, that it is an Ajfent to what we know f 4. If then Knowledge be nor an Evident Af- fentj and indeed as to the Formality of it has no- thing of Alfent in it, as confiding purely and wholly in Perception, 'tis plain that this Aflent to an evident thing ought not to becali'd Kjsow- ledge. For 'tis neceffary that the feveral Species of AlTent fl]Ould all have the general Nature of Affent in them, and confequently this being a certain Species of AfTent mufl: partake of the nature of Affent in general, which it cannot do if it be Isjwwledgey for that were to pafs over into another Kind, Knowledge not being AfTent, but Perception. 'lis therefore moft clear and evident that our Common Sy ftems have here al- io gone upon a wrong ground, and tha^ Know- ledge ought not to be put into the Number of the Three Affents (which are ufijally reckoned 10 be haitb, Opinion and Science') fmce the AlTent whofe ground is full Evidence, and which is the only Reafo7i and Faith. 41 only one that may pretend and is commonly prefumed to be IQjoivkdge, is mod: apparently not fo, as differing from it no lefs than in the whole Kind. 5. If then it be demanded by what Name I would diftinguidi this Second Affcnt to a thing when the Evidence is full and complete from the former wherein the Evidence is fup- pofed not to be fo perfeft, I anfwer that indeed (fo little have thefe things been ConfiderM as they ought) there is no proper Name, that I know of, for it. When we affent to a thing of incomplete Evidence we call it Opinion^ and when we affent to a thing whofe Evidence is complete this has been ufually callM Knowledge^ but certainly with the utmoft impropriety, knowledge, as appears, being quite another thing. But by what name to call it, or how to didinguifli it, I profefs I know not. Not for want of real difference and diitinftion in the thing (for my Thought of it is very diftincl) but merely becaufc we want a word for it. i\s we do in like manner for Affent upon Rea* fon in general to diftinguifli it from AiTpnt upon Authority in general. For as Affent upon Au- thority in general Abftradingfrom Human or Divine is callM Faith, fo alfo Affent upon Ilea- fon in general abfl:ra£ling from complete or incomplete fhould be call'd fomewhat, if one could tell what, as every generical Idea ought to be diftinguifh'd by a generical Name. Bui fince our Language affords not any one word that will lerve to either of thefe purpofes we myft 4-1 j4n j^c count of muft be content with the Definitio infleadof the Difinitum^ and exprcfs things at large, by fay- ing Affcnt upon Reafon or Evidence, and Af- lent upon fuch Evidence as is full and complete, ivhich isfufficient to diflinguifh it from Aflent upon evidence incomplete, though we have no one proper word for this as we have for theo- i;her, which is fitly callM Opinion^ whereby we denote the imperfeftion both of the Evi- dence and of the Alfent. 6. Bat now if the Aflent be mt grounded upon any internal Reafon or Evidence of the thing at all, but only upon Teftimony or Au- thority, then we Gall it Faith. Which appears to be an Aflent of a quite diff^erent Nature from the other two. For they both agree in the general Nature of AlTent upon Evidence, and differ only as the Evidence differs, and that is gradually, as complete diff"ers from incom- plete. But Faith differs from them both in the whole Kind, as having no Evidence at all, but only Authority for its Ground. And thus we have here a Threefold Aflfent, (though not fuch as is taught us in the Schools) the Account of which in fliort proceeds thus. All Aflent in ge- neral is eisher upon Reafon or Authority, if the Reafon be incomplete then '^usO^inion, If complete, then 'tis another kind of Aflent for which as yet there wants a Name, as alfo there does for Aflfent upon Reafon in General. But if the Aflent be upon Authority only, then 'tis F^ith. 7. Now ReafoVi ^on and Faith. ij.^ 7. Now this Authority may be cither of God or of Man. If the Authority whereupon our Aflenc is grounded be of Man, then the Affent that is fo grounded is Human Faith. If of God, then 'tis Divine Faith. Between which two there is this in Common, that they both proceed not upon the internal Light and Evi- dence of the thing but upon Authority, and fo agree in the general Nature of Faith, only as the Authority differs fo the Faith alfo varies, and Human Authority differing from Divine jufl: as much as Falhble differs from InfaHible, the fame in proportion will alfo be the Difference between Human and Divine Faith. That is, the former will alwaysbea Faluble, and the latter an Infalhble Affent. 8. Human jP^/>/; (though fometimes as aftuaU ly undeceiv'd as Divinej is yet always liable to Error and Deception, and fo doubtful, hazar- dous and uncertain even when actually true, like a Conclufion drawn from uncertain Premif- fes ; in which refpect it refembIesO/>//?/{?^;, and that fo much that fome have confounded it with it, though I think illogically enough, fince though there be a like uncertainty ia both Affents, yet they differ extremely in their Formal Motives, one being grounded upon Reafon, and the other upon Authority. And the Dillinction of thefe Affents is not taken from the degree of Certainty wherein they a- gree, but trom the Quality of the Motive wherein they differ. However tho'this makei; a great difference in Notion, it makes None in ths 4}. 4 -^^^ Accoimt of the Affairs of Civil Life, and the Faith of him that beheves the Teftimony of a Man will as to all real intents and purpofes go for no more than his Opimon, And that becaufe though dif- ferent AlTents as to the Formality of their Mo- tives, they are yet Much at one rate for Certain- ty, being both Fallible in their Grounds, and ib lubject to Error and Deception. 9. But the Cafe is quite otherwife as to J)ivifie Faith whofe Foundation ftands too fure not only to be overturned, but even fo much as fiiaken. This Faith is ftrictly and Abfolute- ]y infallible, not fubjcct to the {eaft Error, or Poflibility of Erring, as having the very Ground and Pillar of Truth it felf, the Omnifcience and Veracity of God for its Security, than which there neither Needs, nor Can be Greater, Tis Moil: Certain that God is both Actively and Paffively Infallible, his Omnifcience will not fufferhim to be deceiv'd himfelf, and his infi- nite Veracity and Truth will not fuffer him to-- deceive us. And therefore he that builds his Faith upon his Authority, goes upon the Moft fure Grounds, and cannot poffibly Err in his Affent. And as he is fecure from Error, fo he is alfo from all juft reafon of Scruple or Fear, and leaning upon a firm and indefectible Sup- port, may ftay and repofe himfelf upon it "with full Acquiefcence. So that there is all the Certainty that can be in this Faith, both Objective and Subjective, that of the Thing, a^nd that of the Perfon. The thing affented to is moft undoubtedly true in it felt, and he that Reafon and Faith. /j.5 that aflTents to it may be moft firmly aflured and perfuaded of the Truth of it in his own Mind, and among all Temptations to Doubt and Diftrud may with great Triumph and Confidence fay with the Apofile, 1 know whom 1 have heliev^dy 2 Tim. i. 12. 10. It was obferv'd a little before of //^r??.t« Faith that it refembles Opnion^ in as mucli as they are both dubious and uncertain AlTents, as proceeding upon grounds of like uncertain- ty, though otherwife of different Natures. Now as this Faith refembles Oftnion, fo in like manner it may be obferv'd of Divine Faith that it refembles Sclerjcey or rather that Second Affcnt (for fo I am forc'd to call it for want of a better Name) which we lately difcours'd of, and plac'd between Opinion and Faith. The Comparifon h.ere bears the fame proportion as to Certainty, as it did in the other Cafe as to uncertainty. Divine Faith has all the Certain- ty that is poffible, and therefore to be fure as much as Science or that Second Aifent can have. There is as much Certainty in the thing aifented to, and there may be as much Af- furance and firmnefs of Fcrluafion in the At* fenc it felf, or in other words what a man be- lieves upon the Aurhority of God is in it felf as certain as what he knows, and he may alfo be as Certain of it. For he thatalfcnts to a thing upon full evidence can but alfcnc tully and per- feftly without iufpenfe or hehtation, and fo alfo can he that aifcnts to a thmg upon Divine Authority only. His Ground is every whit as Fir 01 2^.6 \An Account of Firm and Sure as the others, and why then fliould the Meafure of his AfTurance be lefs ? It cannot poflibly be if he Knows and Confi- ders upon what Ground he ftands. So that thus far, both in regard of the Certainty of the Objefl", and the Firmnefs of the Perfuafion, Divine Faith may be juftly placed upon a level with the Moll: Evident Affent whatever. II. Nor I fuppofe will this be thought an undue Elevation of Divine Faith. Un the Contrary I expefl: to be Complain'd of for fct- ting the Dignity of it at too low a Fitch by thofe who fay that Divine Faith is Firmer than Science. But 'tis for want of the Latter that thefe Men (o exceffively extol the Former. I call it exceffively, becaufe 'tis what fl:ri£J:ly and cxaflly (peaking cannot be. For what I Perceive or Know is even by that very fuppofition unquef- tionably true,(or elfe I cannot be faid to Know it) and what I believe upon the higheft Authority can be no more. To fay therefore that Faith is Firmer thanScience,is like fay ing that one ftreight Line is ftreighter than another. But perhaps their Meaning only is, that 'tisfafer relying up- on the Authority of God than upon our own Rational Faculties, which indeed is right, and I heartily wifh all Men were convinced of it. For though what I do aftually and really Know be to the full as true and certain as what 1 Be- lieve, and I can no more be out in one than in the other, yet it is More Certain in the ge- neral that God cannot deceive me, than that my Reafon cannot be deceiv'd. Not that what I Reajon and Faith, 47 I alTent to by Divine Faith can have a greater Objeftive Certainty than what I clearly and diftinftly Perceive or Know, but only thac there is a PofTibility, not to fay Danger, of my taking that for a clear and diftinft Perception which indeed is Not fo, and fo though I can- not be deceived in what I do truly know, yet I may be deceiv'd in thinking that I know when I do not. So that Divine Faith though not more Certain than Knowledge it felf, is yet of greater Certainty than our Kjiopjing F/t- cuUies^ and generally fpeaking the Believer goes upon furer grounds than the Man of Reafoii and Demonftration. Becaufe his Reafon may pofTibly lead him into Error, whereas the O- ther^s Authority cannot. And when they are both in the right, yet Itill there will be this dif- ference between them, that his Reafon is only not Deceiv'^d^ whereas the Othei's Faith is hjaU 12. And thus far we have taken a view of the more bright and per feft fide of Divine Faith, I mean that of its Ftrmrjefs and Certaint^^ in refpeft of which it ftands upon a juft level with Science. But it has alfo a more dark fide, in which refpefl: it comes fliort of it, and mud give it the Precedency. And I think it may be very properly call'd a Dark fide, becaufe it con- fifts in Darknefs and Obfcurity, and which is ftill fo much the darker, becaufe 'tisfo peculiar to Faith, and makes fo great a part of its Character, being the Main Difference thac diftinguiflies it from Science^ or that Second AlTcnt 48 j^n Account of Aflent before fpoken of. For as to Firmnefs and Certainty, therein they agree. For Faith may be firm, becaufe he that believes in God may be fuppofed not in the leaft to hefitate or doubt of the truth of what he reveals. And 'tis alfo certain, becaufe it relies upon the moffc certain Foundation, the Teftimony of God, who is Infallible himfelf, and cannot deceive. And hitherto they run parallel one to the other. But here begins both the difference and the dif- proportion, that there is Clearnefs and Evidence on the fide of Science, and that Second AfTent, whereas there is none on the fide of Faith, which walks indeed upon firm Ground, but altogether in the dark. For he that Believes does not give his AfTent becaufe either by Senfe or Reafon he perceives the Object of his Faith to be thus or thus, but merely becaufe he has the Word and Authority of God for it. Which tho' it be fuiB- cient to found a firm and certain, is yet however not enough to beget a clear and evident AfTent. So that the great and diftinguifhing Character of Science and the fecond AfTent, is Light and Evidence, and that of Faith Inevidence and Ob- fcurity, which accordingly is commonly faid to be an inevident A^ent, But how and in what fenfe it is {^ feems not commonly to be fo well underftood, and for the Confequence of what depends upon the right ftating of it, deferves to be explained with all pofTible exactnefs. 1 J. In order to which we are carefully to diflinguifh between the thing believ'd, and the Reafon or Motive that induces us, to beheve it ; even Reafon and Faith. 49 even as In Knowledge we diflinguifli betweea the thing Known, and the Argument or Medi- um by which it is Known, the Scitufn and the Forma/Is ratio Sciendi. 1 he thing BehevM I would call the Matter or the Objeft of Faith, and the Motive that induces me to believe it I would call the Formal Reafon of Faith. '^JquU nxi I know calls them both Objefls, and then after diftinguifhes them by calling the former the Material Objeft, and the latter the formal Objeft of Faith. Accordingly he fays that the FormAlObje^ of Fdith is the t'trji truth, meaning (as he afterward explains himfelf) that Faith relies upon the Truth of God as its Medium, or Argument. Which Medium I chufe rather to call (and I think more intelligibly) the for- mal Reafon, than the formal Objeft of Faith. Since the Term (Obje£l) feems more properly to defign the Matter of Faith, or the thing Be- lieved, and is hardly applicable to the Motive or Reafon of Believing. However fince we both mean one and the fame thing, there need be no debate upon the different manner of ex- prefling it, efpecially fince if any one think his Term more intelligible and expreffive of the Notion intended by it, or has any reverence for it upon any other Confideration, he is at liberty to fubftitute it in the room of the other. 14. This neceffary Diftinftion being premi- fed, 'tis in the firft place to be well heeded that E when * 22,<. Q. I. Arc I. to An Account of when Faith is faid to be an obfcure and inevi- dent AlTent, thisObfcurity or Inevidence is not to be appHed to the formal Reafon or Motive of Faith, but only to the Matter or Objefl: of it. 1 fay not to the formal Reafon of it. For as there may be in general a clear Reafon why a Man fhould believe an Obfcure thing, fo 'tis mod certain that the formal Reafon for which we aiTent to the things of Faith is very clear. For this formal Reafon is no other than the Au- thority of God, Or rather, fince this includes the Truth of the Revealer as well as the Reve- lation it felf (for otherwile of what Authority would be the Revelation) : I would chufe to fay that the TV ///A and Revelation of God do jointly make up the formal Reafon of Divine Faith, which accordingly proceeds upon this double Principle, i. That whatever God reveals is true. 2. That this or that thing in particular is reveal'd by God. For Faith has its Reafons as well as Science (tho' of another Nature) and its Reafons are thefe two, as will more diftinct- ly appear by difpofing the Procefs of Faith into a Syllogiftical Form, which will be this, Whatever u reveaPd by God is true. This ii reveaPd hj God^ Therefore this is true. The Conclufion of this Syllogifm contains . both the Matter and the Act of Faith, as it is an Affent to fuch a thing upon fuch a ground, which is implied by the illative Particle^ There- fore Reafon and Fnith. 51 fore. The two otlws Propofuions contain the Ground it felf or die formal Reafon of Faith, which you fee coiififts of the double Principle be- fore-mention\1. Now 'tis moft apparent that thefetwo Principles are both of them fufficient- ]y clear, or at leaft oiay be io. 'Tis clear in the firll place that whatever is reveaPd by God is true. This is either felf-evident, or may be proved from the Idea of God, and fo has either the Light of a Principle, or of a Conclufion, ei- ther an immediate or a mediate Evidence. And it may be alfo clear (and to be fure is fo when- ever our Faith is well-grounded) that fuch a thing in particular is reveal'd by God. And in both thefe refpects it is true (what is commonly faid) that Faith is the Higheji Reafon. For you fee it is perfectly reafonable in its Fund and Prin- ciple, and does at lall refolve, as much as any mathematical Conclufion, into a rational ground of unqueftionable Light and Evidence. With this only difference that a Conclufion in Geome- try is founded upon a Ground taken from nnthtn^ from the intrinfic Nature of the thing, whereas our Conclufion of Faith proceeds upon a ground taken from without^ viz. from the Authority of God, but fuch as however in Light and Evi- dence is no way inferior to the other. 1 5. This by the way may ferve to fhew the vanity and impertinence of thofe who when they are to prove that there is nothing in Chri- ftianity above Reafon, run out into a popular Vein of Harangue about the Reafonablenefs of the Chriftian Religion and its great Accommo- E 2 datica 5 5 j^n Account of elation to Human Nature, crying out with re- peated importunity that Man is a Reafonable Creature, Chriftianity a reafonable Service, and Faith a Rational Aft, nay even the Higheft Reafon^ and the Hke. As if we were for a Bhnd and unaccountable Faith, and denied the ufe of Reafon in Rehgion, or that Faith was found* ed upon Reafon. Or as if becaufe there is a Reafon from without iov Beheving, therefore the thing BeUevM might not from within^ and as to the inward Matter of it be above Reafon, fo as not to be comprehended or accounted for by it. But this will crofs my way again in another place, (Chaf. 7. Art, 9.; and therefore I fhall not anticipate here what further Confiderations I may have occafion to beftow upon it there. 16. To return therefore, I fay that thisOb- fcurity and inevidence that is in Faith, and up- on whofe account it is commonly faid to be an inevident Aflent, does not belong to its formal Reafon (which you fee may be clear enough, as clear as any Principle of Natural Science) but only to the Matter or Objeft of it. That is, in other words the inevidence does not lie in the Reafon of Believing, but in the Nature of the thing Believ'd. Not that the matter of Faith again is wholly and all over without Evidence (for then there would be no reafon to believe it) but only that it has no evidence from within, and from the Nature of the thing it felf, as was remark'd before. Not that this again is foto beunderftood neither as if the Propofition to be believM were not fo much as fimply intelli- gible Keafon and Faith. 5 g gibleas to the very litteral fenle and dire£l fig- nification of its Terms. No, we are no more to believe we Know not what^ than to beHeve we Know not why^ and whatever Darknefs there mav be in Faith, it is ftill fo much a luminous AlTent, and an A£tof Reafon, astoreguirethac we underftand the fimple Meaning of the Pro- pofuion we are to believe, as well as the Grounds of Credibility upon which it Challenges our AfTent. For the general Obieft of Faith is Truth, and Truth is the relation of Connexion between Ideas, I fay Ideas, for Truth does not lie in Sounds or Words, but in Things. There- fore to believe fuch a thing to be True is the fame as to beHeve that there is a Connexion be- tween fuch Ideas. But then a Man muft know what thofe Ideas are, or elfe how can he believe they are connected. Therefore he mud under- ftand fomething more than the Terms them- felves, he mult alfo have the Ideas of thofe Terms, which is the fame as to underftand the Meaning and Signification of them. And indeed he that has no Idea or Conception of what he believes, believes he knows not what, and he that believes he knows not what cannot be properly faid to believe any thing. In all Faith therefore the Propofition muft be fimply intelligible, and though the Truth of it be to be Believ'd^ yet the Meaning of it muft be undtr^ flood. 1 7. For we are again Carefully to diftinguifh between the Meaning of a Propofition, and the Truth of a Propofition. The meaning of a E 3 Propofition 54- -^^ j4ccount of Propofition is only tlie Determination of the Heas that are fignified by iuch Terms ; the Truth of it is the Union or Connexion that is between thofe Ideas. Now tho' a Man does not fee the Connexion tliat is between the Jdeas of that Fropofition he is faid to Believe, yet he mnd in fome meafure perceive the Ideas themfclves, becaufe in believing the Propofition he is fuppofed to believe that fuch Ideas are fo related and Connected together. When there- fore 'tis faid that the matter of Faith is inevi* dent as to the intrinfic Nature of the thing, the inevidence mud not be thought to lie in the Ideas whereof the Propofition to be Believed Gonfifts, but in the Connexion of thofe Ideas, that is, not in the Meaning of the Propofition, but in the Truth of it, which is properly the Objeft of Faith, as the Ideas themfelves are of Perception. Which again by the way may ferve to difcover another Inftance of Impertinency in the Reafoning of thofe, who when they are Maintaining that there can be no A rticle of Faith above Reafon, divert into pompous Flourifhes* and Declamations about the Intelligibility of the Objects oS; Faith, and the utter impoflTibility of Believing what is not intelligible. As if we denied the fimple Intelligibility of the Fropofi- tion, or would have Men believe they know not what (which certainly would he a ftrange De- gree of Implicit Faith, and more Nonfenfical than that of t!ie CoRi^r) ; or, as if that Propofiti- on which is clear enough as to its fimpl© Meaning flight not beinevidenr, and fo above Reafon, as Reafon and Faith. 55 as to Its Truth, or in other words, as If Clear- nefs of Ideas might not coniift with Obfcurity of their Connexion. iS. But then it muft be obferv'd again, that when we fay that the Inevidencc that is in the Matter of Faith refpefts the Tr/ah of the Pro- pofition not the Memwg of it, or the Connexion of the Ideas and not the very Ideas themfelves, this is not fo to be underftood neither as if the Matter of Faith even thus confider'd, were ab- folutely, and in its felf neceflarily inevident, and fuch as could not poflibly be known with- out altering its Nature, and ceafing to be any longer the Objeft of Faith. I know the con- trary Suppofition has prevailM in fome Schools, where it paffes almoft for Principle and Maxim that Knowledge and Faith are mutually Exclu- five of each other, that the fame thing cannot be at once the Objeft of both, and that therefore if a thing be believM it cannot be known, and if known that it cannot be believM. St. Jujlin was of this Opinion, and has in many places de- clared his mind to this purpofe, particularly in hisXLTreatife^of hisExpofition upon St.Jofw^s Gofpel. And his Authoriy has recommended it (as it did moft other things) to feveral of the Schoolmen, particularly /^g'/^//?^^, whence it has been tranfmitted down among many Modern Writers of the Syltematical way, bothPhilofo- phers and Divines. But we muft follow Rea- fon before Authority, and whoever can be pre- E 4 ^ vail'd * Tom. 9. p. 107. 56 jc^n Account of vailM with to lay the latter quite afide, and to ule theotiierasheought, wil] I believe clearly perceive that nothing hinders but that the fame Fropofition may be at once the Objcfl: of both Faith and Science, or that the fame thinj^ may be at the fame time both Kjiomi and Believ*d^ provided it be by different Mediums, according to the diverfity of the refpeftive Afts. 19. For not to enter into the wrangle and Duft of the Schools upon this Occafion, it may be fufficient to confider that there is no manner of Oppofition between Faith and Knowledge, or the moft evident Affent as to the Effence of the Propofition (that being not fuppofcd to be denied in the one which is AffirmM in the other, or the contrary) but only as to the Medium of the Aft. And that 'tis not the abfolute Nature of the thing Believ'd, but the Quality of tlie Motive that fpecifies Faith, and diitinguiflies it from other Affents. So that 'tis no matter what the abfolute Nature of the thing be in it felf, whether it be evident or not evident, Knowable or not Knowable, provided it be affented to up» on the proper Medium and Motive of Faith, that is upon Authority, without any refpeft had to the Natural evidence of the thing, tho' otherwife never fo evident in its own Abfolute Nature, fo as to be the Object of Science (tho' upon a different Medium) at the fame time. For as I faid before, 'tis not the Nature of the thing, but the Quality of the Medium that fpe- cifies Faith, and tho' the fame thing cannot have f wo Natures, ur be in it felf at once evident and ^lot Reafon and Faith. 57 not evident, yet why may it not fuflain two different Relations, or be confiderM in two different Mediums, fo as to be laid to be known when perceiv'd by its Evidence, and to be be- lievM when alTcnted to upon Authority ? Which certainly may be done as fully, and with as lit- tle regard to its evidence, as if there were no evidence in the thing at all So that the Evi- dence of the thing does not hinder the Belief of it, fuppofing the Belief not to proceed upon that Evidence,but upon its own proper Medium, Authority. 20. But to ufe a way of Arguing lefs Ab- ftraft though it may be with fome more pref- fing and convincing. Suppofe God fhould re- veal to me a Geome:ricalTvuth, as that two Tri- angles having the fame Bafe, and being within the fame Parallels, are equal, and I who at firft receivM it upon his bare Authority fhould come afterwards to be able to demonftrate it my felf upon the known Principles of Art, who that well confiders the Natures of thefe things would fay that my Science evacuated my Faith, and that I ceafed to be a Believer aiToon as I became a AUthematki^xnf For though 1 am now fuppo- fed to Kjioiv what before 1 only Believ'd^ yet why Ihould this Knowledge deftroy my Faith, fince I may ftill have as much regard for the Authority of God, and as little to the Evidence of the thing as I had befor-i the Demonftration, and would ftill be ready toaffent to it though there were no Evidence to be produced for it, only upon t!.e Grour^d of Divine Authority. And -58 An Account of And, to ufe another Senfible though not fo Ar- tificial way of arguing, I would fain know whether any one of thofe who are of the Con- trary Sentiment would refufe a Demonftrative isocount of a RevealM Truth, fuppofe the Cre- ation of the World, merely for fear of injuring or deftroying his Faith, which yet he were bound in Confcience to do, if Knowledge and Faith were fo exclufive of each other, and in- evidence and Obfcurity were fo abfolutely of the Effence of Faith as fome pretend. For then it would not be lawful to acquire the Natural Knowledge of any reveal'd lYuth, becaufe'tis unlawful to deftroy one's Faith, and every }3e- liever would have jufl; reafon to fear all further Light and Information about what he believes, which yet 1 think would be acknowledged by all an extravagant Scruple, fuch as can hardly enter, much kfs flay long in any Confidering Head ; And is withal Contrary to a plain Hx- hortation of the ApofHe, who bids us add to our VMht^noivledge^ 2 Pet, , and fo be feen by its own Light. But let the Light fhine never fo bright upon the Objeft from other fides, Faith lets in none, nor has any regard to that which fhe finds there, but con- nives at it, and walks Cas I may fay) with her eyes fhut, contenting her felf with the certain- ty of Revelation, and leaving to Science (if there be any) the Evidence of the thiing. So that the Objeft is always dark to her, how clear and bright foever it may be in it feli', or ap- pear, when abfolutely confider'd, to a Philofo- phic 6o j4n j^c count of phic Eye. In which refpeQ it falls very {hort of the Perfeflion of Science, though in refpeO: of Firmnefs and Certainty it be equal to it, as was faid before. All which is briefly couch'd in that excellent Account of Faith given by the Author to the Hebrews, when he fays, that it is the Suhflance of things hoped for^ and the Argument of things not fen, Heb. 1 1. i. Where by Subjiance and Argument he equals it with Science in regard of the Firmnefs and Certain- ty of the Affent, but by faying that 'tis of things not fee n he makes it vail and ftoopto it in point of Evidence, in which refpeft indeed Faith, as Firm and as Certain as it is, is as much inferior to Science, as Darknefs is to Light. 22. To gather up then what has been here difcours'd at large concerning the inevidence of Faith into one view. When we fay that Faith inan inevident Aflentweare not to underftand this inevidence of the formal Reaf)n of Faith, but of the Matter of it. And when we fay that the Matter of it is inevident, we fhould not intend by it that it is wholly and all over without Evidence, but only that it has none iromwithtnov from the intrinfic Nature of the thing. And when we fay that the Matter of Faith is inevident from within, this again is not to be intended of the fimple Meaning of the Propofition, but of the Truth of it. And when we fay that the Truth of it is inevident, this again laltly is not to be underftood, as if in were ahvays and neceflarily fo in its own Ab*. folute Nature, but only fo far forth as it is Be- lieved, Reafon and Faith. 6 1 llev'd) or as 'tis confiderM under the forma- lity of an Objeft of Faith. Or in other words, the inevidence of the Matter of Faith in re- fpefl; of the Truth of the Article is not an ^A- folute but a Relative inevidence. Not that the Matter of Faith is Never Abfolutely and in the Nature of the thing inevident (for it may be fo too as will be feen afterwards) but only that it is not neceffArily fo, there being no reafon from the Nature of Faith that requires it fhould, which may confift with Evidence, though it proceeds not upon it, and has no regard to it as a Motive. So then the formal Reafon of Faith is always Clear, the Matter of it Abfo- lutely confiderM may be clear or not clear, as it happens, according as the Nature of the thing is, but as Be/kv^d.^ or as Confider'd under the formality of being the Objeft of Faith, fo it is always inevident and Obfcure, as being not fuppofed to be aifented to for the fake of its Evidence (even when it has any) but who!!/ upon another Account, already fuiBciently re- prefented. 2j. And thus having ftruck fome Light into the Darknefs of Faith, by flating and explaining with what exaftnels 1 could in what Senfe it is an wevide?2t j^jfent^ I cannot forbear obferving by the way (tho' a little of the fooneft) of what Service this Account may be towards the grand Queftion of Believing things above Reafon. For if Faith be an inevident AiTent fo far at lead as not to refpefl the Evidence of its Objeft> why may not a thing be believM tho' it be above Reafon ? ^4 \An Account of Reafon ? For what tho' it be above Reafon, is it therefore above Faith ? Has Faith any regard to Evidence ? Or is it determined by any Ra- tional Motive, I mean that is taken from the Nature of the Objeft ? Even when a thing is evident, Faith is not fuppofed to Affent to it becaufe of its Evidence, and why then may not a thing be believ'd tho' it be not evident ? Some contend that Faith and Evidence cannot poflibly confift together, and according to them, not only what is inevident may be believ'd, but whatever is believM mu(t be inevident. But this I look upon, and have already fliewn to be a Miftakc. And 'tis a Miliake in the Extremi- ty too. For I take it to be every whit as much an Extream to fay that the Objefl of Faith is always inevident, as to fay that it is always evi- dent. However, it is always inevident yc> /^r as Believed, which is the middle Point between the two extremes. The Nature of Faith re- quires at leaft this Relative inevidence of the Ubje£t, whatever it be in its own Nature, and we need no more. For if the Objeft of Faith be always inevident fo far as Believ'd, then will it not follow that it May be believ'd tho' inevi- dent ? For my part I fee nothing that fliould hinder this Confequence, if the Principle it proceeds upon be right. The Principle is (and a very moderate one fure, the generality of Wri- ters (training the Matter a great deal higher) that the Objeft of Faith is inevident as tar as Believ'd. The Confequence is, that therefore a thing may be believ'd, tho' inevide,pt. 'Tis true Reafon and Faith 6} true indeed one of thefe is an Abfolute, and the other only a Relative inevidence. jBut this fig- nifies nothing to the Argument. For why may not a thing really and in it felf incvident be be- liev'd, when even that which is Evident is Con- fiderM by Faith as inevident? Why, then 'tis all one (as to Faith) as if it were fo indeed ; For what does the Evidence fignify, or what real alteration does it make, if Faith has no re- gard to it, nor Confideration of it? And whac ftould hinder then but that a thing really inevi- dent may be believ'd, efpecially if revealM by God himfelf, and concencing himfelf- The Ihort is, Faith as Faith has no r^g^r^ to Evidence (I mean that of the thing) and Faith as Divi/?e has no ^^eed of it, and therefore why an inevi- dent thing may not be believM is what I do not underrtand, and would be glad to learn. 24. But to return (for I look upon this as too much a digrefTion from the prefent, and too much a Prevention of what is to follow to be fur- ther purfued) after having thus difcoursM of the Nature of Faith in general, and the double Di- ftribution of it into Human and Divine, with proper Confiderations upon each of them, it remains that it be now further confiderM that each of thefe may be either Explicit or Implicit. Then we are faid to believe Eocflicitlj^ whea we believe determinately fuch or fuch a thing ia particular, diftinftly knowing what that parti- cular thing is. And then Imi>Udtly, when we beUeve indeterminately and at large whatever is jpropofed to us by fuch an Authority, not know- ing 64- ^^ Account of ing what in particular is propofed, or what it i§ we Believe. Which tho^ it feems to carry the Appearance of an Aflenc too bUnd and hood- winkt to be the aft of a Reafonable Creature, may yet in its proper place become him as much as the other, and indeed is every whit as rational an Affent in its Ground and Principle. For all Explicit Faith is founded upon Implicit, and has Implicit Faith in it. 25. To underftand both this and the Nature of Implicit Faith the better we are to confider (what has been already intimated) that Faith proceeds upon Fremiffes, as well as Science^ and is the Conciufion of a Sy llogifm. And I further Note (what perhaps may not be unworthy the Obfervation of the Curious) that the Major Fro- pofition in Faith Explicit is the Conciufion in Faith Implicit, as may be feen in the Syllogifia before fee down. Whatever is reveaPd hj God is true^ This is Revealed by God, Therefore this is true. The Major Propofitlon here (whatever is reveal- ed by God is true) is the Conciufion of Implicit Faith, whofe a£l is as much to believe to be true whatever God reveals, as the ad of Expli- cit Faith is to believe that this or that in particu- lar is fo. So that Explicit Faith proceeds upon Implicit, borrows from it its Conciufion for its Principle, and begins where the other leaves off. Juft as in the Subdtermtion of Sciences, that which Reafon and Faith. 65 v;Iiich isaConclufion in one is a Principle in the other, fo'tis here in theSubalternation of thefe two Faiths, whereof that which is Explicit may be faid tobeSubalcernated to that which islm- phcir. Let not any therefore vihfy or difparage Implicit Faith as a bhnd and irrational Alfenr, fince it lays a ground for Explicit, which ferves it felf of it, uiing its Conclufion as a Principle, even as what is a Conclufion in Geometry is a Principle in Perfpecfi^e, And as Geometry is therefore accounted the Superior Science, fo ought implicit Faith to be reckoned as the Supe- rior Faith, upon whofe Conclufion the other proceeds, and which it felf proceeds thus, Whatever ii reveaPi by him that u Infallible is true J God, is Infallible^ Therefore whatever is revealed by God is true. Here befides that 'tis plain to be feen that the Conclufion of this lall: Syllogifm is the Principle of the precedent One, and that Explicit Faith juffofes what is -proved in Implicit, it may be further noted that Implicit Faith (as being the higheft degree of Faith) is due only to the higheit, that is, to an Infallible Authority, the reafon why whatever is revealM by God is here Concluded to be true, being, becaufe he is in- fallible. Infallibility then is the proper ground of Implicit Faith, and accordingly the Church of Rome alTuming to herfelf the CharaQer of Infallible, does upon that Suppofition rightly re- F quire 66 \An Accouytt of quire It. I fay upon that Suppofitlon, for fhe is right enough in her Confequence, fuppofing her Principle to be true. But the Truth of it is, that is Moft Extravagant, and fuch as carries in it fuch matchlefs Arrogance and Prefumption as befits only him who as God fttteth in thel'emp/e of Gody jhewing himfelf that he ii God, 2 Thef, 2. 4, For God only is Infallible, and therefore he only has right to require Implicit Faith. And to him indeed it is due from every one of his Creatures in the higheft Meafure imaginable, as is alfo Implicit Obeditr/ce upon the fame Ground. Of both which we have a fignal Example in Abraham^ Htb, 1 1. 8. who when he was call'd ^ by God to go out into a place which he fliould after receive for an Inheritance, is faid by Faith to have Vbe/fd^ and to have gone outy not knowing whither he went. 26. But now what can be more dark and in- evident than this Implicit Faith ? Its Formal Keafon indeed is fufficiently clear, and it re- folves at laft into a Ground highly Rational, and fo may be faid in that refpeft to be the high- eft Reafon. For certainly nothing can be more Reafonable than to believe whatever God (who is Infallible) reveals. There is therefore no Darknefs on this Side. Nay even the Light it felf does not fhine more Clear. But as for the Matter of it (if I may call it fo where no» thing diftindly is believ'd) that is fure as dark and obfcure as can well be conceiv'd, fo dark as even to be Invifible. For a Man to believe at large without any rcftri^lion or limitation what- ever Reafon and Faith. (.j ever God fliall propofe to him, let it be what ic will, not Knowing what that is (like AbrahanPs going, not knowing whither he went) is fuch a dark and obfcure a6l of Faith as has nothing clear in it but the Humility and Devotion ot' him who fo believes. This is a Faith Worthy of God, as well as pecuUar to him, and 'tis the great inevidence and obfcurity of it that makes it fo. For fo far is the Matter of it from having any Evidence in it, that it is not fo much as Evident what the Matter of it is. Here then is the very Blacknefsof Darknefs, and he that has this infolded Faith (as every true Believer has) and can thus truft God in the Dark, where he fees nothing but only the general Reafon of his fo doing, is not likely in any of the more expli- cit inflances of it to plead the inevidence of the Article toexcufe his Infidelity, or to deny his Faith to an otherwife fufficiently clear Revelati- on, merely becaufe it is above his fhallow Rea- fon. 27. Upon what has been hitherto difcours'd it will not be difficult to give in few words a Satisfaftory Refolution of a Celebrated Q^jefti- on which among the Schoolmen has made a gvQ^tmanyy and that is, whether Faith belor|j|^ to the Vnderpanding or to the iVi/i : It is plain by the Mealures already laid down that it be- longs to the Latter. For Faith (as all acknow- ledge) is an Affent, and AlTent is a Species of Judgment, and Judgment (as has been fbewn already) is an aft of the Will, not of the Under- (landing, whofe only Operation is Perception, F 2 and 68 jin Account of and confequently Faith is an afl of the Will con- fentingto, imbracing, acquiefcing and repofing it fdf in what the Underftanding reprefents as propoled and revealM by God. And indeed unlefs Judgment and confequently Faith did belong to the Will as their proper and immedi- ate Principle, 'tis impoflible to Conceive how a Man fhould be blame-worthy for any of his Opinions, or how he fhould rtand accountable either for Error on the one hand, or for Infide- lity and Herefy on the other. For if Faith be an aft of the Underftanding then fince the on- ly Operation of theUnderftanding is Perception, the greateft Fault of an Infidel or a Heretic will be Non-Perception, which indeed is not Error hutlgmrame, whereas Infidelity and Herefy are always fuppofed to include Error, and to be alfo the worfl of Errors. And this Non-per- ception is only a Negation, and fuch as refolves into want of Parts, which is not a Moral but a Natural defeft, whereas Infidelity and Here- fy (as indeed all that is Faulty) are underftood to be Privations and Defeftsof a Moral Nature. But then to make them fo they muft be volun- tary (nothing being faulty but what is fo) that is again they muft be H^/-^«/, that is, theymuftbe aftsof the Will, and Confequently Faith which is the Habit whereof thofe Sins are Privations, muftalfo belong to the fame Principle, orelfe in fliort there would be neither Vertue in having it, nor Vice in being without it. And accord- ingly our Saviour m upbraiding the "Jews with Infidelity does all along not only by Confe- quencc, Reafon and Faith. 6 9 quence, but direflly and exprefly, Charge it upon their Wills : Te will not come to me^ that je may have Life^ Joh. 5. 40. 28. And thus I have gone thorough what I intended, and what indeed is of greatefl: Confi- deration, upon this Subjeft of Faith. In the account of which if I differ from any Authors of the better Charafler that have either profeffedly oroccafionally written upon it, particularly Ba- roniu^ and Dr. Pearfon^ 'tis not that I love to lay afide great Authorities, or affecl to be by my felf, but becaufe I follow the bed: Light of my Underftanding, write with Freedom and Ingenuity what 1 think, and endeavour to re- prefent things as they are, without having re- gard to Authority any further than I think it join'd with Truth and Reafon. Which fhall alfo be my Rule in what remains of this Treatilc. In the mean time what has been hitherto dif- coursM concerning Reafon and Faith may ferve as a good Preparation in order to an Account of the Great QueRicn Concerning the Belief of things above Reafon. But before we enter upon any thing of that Nature, 'tis fit the DifUnftion of Above Reafon, and Contrary to Reafon be Confider'd and rightly ftated, which is the task allotted for the next Chapter. F J CHAP. rjo An Account of C H A P. III. The T)iJl'mclion oj things Contrary to^Rea- Jon^ and Alcove Reajon^ Conjidcrd. I. ' I ^Here are fome Diftinclions in the J^ World that are without a Difference, though Difference be the Ground of all Diftincti- on, and this by fome is pretended to be of that Number, who will have the Parts of it to be Coincident, and that Contrary to Reafon and above Reafon fignifie in reality alike, and are but different Expreflions for one and the fame thing. And though they may be reafonably fufpected to do this to ferve the intereft of a Caufe for whofe advantage it would be to have this Diflinflion taken away, yet they have the Confidence to Charge the fame upon thofe that hold it, pre- tending that it is only a dextrous Shift and Eva- fion invented by Subtile Men as an Expedient to relieve the Diftrefs of a defperate Argument, when there is nothing elfe to be faid for it. 2, Which of thefe is the Evafion, either the denying or the allowing this Diftinftion, will beft appear by the Examination of it, which, befides its Serviceablenefs to our Clearer pro- ceeding in what we are now upon, I am the rather induced to undertake, becaufe ( as Mr. Boyle Obferves in a little Treatife upon this Subjea) Rcafon and faith. 71 Subjefl) there are divers that employ this Difi Incite on^ few that have attempted to exflain it, and none that h^ taken care to ]ujii^e it. Indeed he him- felt is tlie only Perfon that 1 know of that has written profeffedly about it (and I cannot but wonder that a thing of fuch Guriofity and Im- portance fhould be fo little Confider'd) tho' I think he has not gone to the Bottom of the Sub- jeft, nor is fuiBciently clear even as far as he goes.. However becaufe he has fome Confider- able Obfervations upon it ( as indeed his Thoughts are generally very good) and there is no realbn why we fliould refute any additional Light in fo dark and untrodden a way, I fljill for the further advantage and illuflration of the Matter firft draw up into a fliort view what that Excellent Perfon has Meditated concerning it, with fuch Occafional Remarks as I ILall think neceffary, and then proceed to ftate the thing according to my own Conceptions, ho- ping that between us both it will be fufficiently clear'd, and that nothing of any Confequence will be overlooked that belongs to the Confide- ration of this fo little confider'd, and almoft Virgin Subjeft. ^ . 1 o give you then in the firft place the Sum of Mr. BojW^ Account, He propofes in general two things. I. To declare in what fenfe the Diftinftion is to be underftood- 2. To prove that it is not an Arbitrary or illufory Diftinction, but grounded upon the Nature of things. As to the firft he tells you that by things Above Rea- Jon he Conceives fuch Notions and Propofitions F 4 as n2 An Account of as Mere Reafon, that is, unaffifted by Revela- tion would never have difcoverM to us, whe- ther thofe things be to our Finite Capacities cl'^arly comprehenfible or not. And that by things Contrary to Reafon he underftands luch Conceptions and Propofitions as are not only undifcoverable by mere Reafon, but fuch as when we do underftand them do evidently ap- pear repugnant to fome Principle, or to fome Conclufion of right Reafon. 4. Now before I go any further I would here by this great Man's leave, and with due de- ference to his high Charafter, remarque, that though things undifcoverable by mere Reafon without Revelation may in a Certain fenfe be faid to be above Reafon^ in as much as they fur- pafs the Natural ability of the Underftanding to make the firft Difcovery of them, yet this is not what Divines mean by Jbove Reafon as they ufe the Phrafe in this Dirtinftion, oppofing it to Contrary to Reafon, For this Diftinftion was intended againft the Soclnhns^ who generally rejeft the Myfteries of Faith as contrary to Senfe and Reafon, to which we reply that they are not Contrary to Reafon but only Above ic. They cry out that this is no Diftinftion, but a mere bhift and Evafion, pretending that the Parts of it fall in together, and that what is a- bove Reafon is alfo contrary to it, and there- fore not to be believed. Now 'tis mod: plain that both they that ufe this Dillinftion, and they againft whom it is ufed do not Mean by things Above Reafon fuch as are beyond the firlt invention Reafon and Faith. 75 invention or Difcovery of it. For befides that to mean that our Myfteries are only urjclifcoverA- h/e when we fay they are above Reafon, would be too Httle a thing to oppofe to Contrary to Red^ forj^ it is alfo too Uttle a thing to intend by jMyftery, fince though the undifcoverablenefs of them by Reafon might be a fufFicient ground of their being focallM before their Revelation, it can be none now after they are reveal'd. And therefore if we fay ofthefe Myfteries now that they are above Reafon, we cannot be pre- fumed to intend it in refpect of their undtfco* ^'erablenefs. And 'tis as plain that our Adver- faries do not fo underfland us. For they deny that things above Reafon are to be behev'd, and that becaufe (according to them) above Reafon and contrary to Reafon are all one. But now no Socman that underftands his own Principle would deny the Credibility of things above Reafon, as that fignifies only fdndifiovera- ble by Reafon alone, much lefs would he fay that what is above Reafon (in that Senfe") is alfo contrary to it. No, without doubt they will in this fenfe both allow us the Diftinftion, and the Myfteries (if they may be fo calVd) that are built upon it. But then this plainly (hews that they do not underftand it in this Senfe, any more than we. 5. Jnftead therefore of faying undifcoverAble^ he fhould have faid incomfrehenjihie by Reafon. Into which he flips unawares in the account of the other part of theDiftinftion, things Contrary to Reafon^ by faying that they are liich as when wc 74 ^^ Account of we do undeidand them do appear repugnant, ^c, which plainly implies that the tprmer things that were laid to be above Reafon are fuch as we do not underftand, even when dif- coverM, and not fuch as we are not able only to Difcover, fince otherwife there will be no Antithefis in the Second part, in which there is nothiiig ami(s except thofc words as are not onlj undifcovtrable^ which in my judgment ought to be expungM as the Produftion of the firii Miliake. 6, Mr. Boyle proceeds to illuftrate his Ex- planation of this Diftinftion by a Comparifon drawn from Sight. He fuppofes a Man to be askt by a Diver what he could fee in a deep Sea. To which the Man is fuppofed to reply that he could fee into a Sea green Liquor to the depth of fome yards and no further. So that if lurther ask'c if he could fee what lies at the Bottom of the Sea, his Anfwer no doubt would be in the Negative. But then if the Diver fhould let himfelf down to the Bottom and bring up thence and fhew him Oyftersor Muf- cles with Pearls in them, he would eafily ac- knowledge both that they lay beyond the reach of his Sight, and that the Pearls were Genuin and Good. But if the Diver fliould further pretend that each of thele Pearls was bigger than the Shells they were containM in, this would bethought notonlyundifcernableby the Eyes, but contrary to their Informations, and to admit this would argue the Sight not only to be imperfcft, but falfe and delufory, and ac- cordingly Reafon and Faith 75 cordingly 'tis prefumM that th/s he would not admit. 7. Now I not only allow this Comparifon, but even admire it for the fingular Aptncfs and Pertinency of it to illuftrate, even to the Senfe, the difference between tlungs above and things contrary to Reafon, only I think it feems to proceed upon the fuppofition that by things above Reafon are meant fuch only as are tncomfrehenfible by it, which certainly would make the Comparifon much more Ap- pofite and Exa^l. Whereof he himfelf appears fenfible at the end of it, where offering to con- fider the Matter more diflin6lly, he tells you that the things above Reafon are not all of one fort, but may be diftinguifhM into two kinds fufficiently differing from each other. Which he makes to be thefe, that there are fome things that Reafon by its own Light cannot Difcover. And others, that, when propofed it cannot Comprehend. This indeed is true, but then he fliould have faid fo fooner, and have told us withal that by things above Reafon (as the Phrafe is ufed in thisDiftinflion) he meant the Latter Sort only, the Former not being to the Purpofe. 8. However he proceeds upon that part FirlT-, that is, to fliew that there are divers Truths in theChriftian Religion that Reafon left to itfelf would never have been able to find out. Of which he gives feveral Liftances, which as not being to the Point, I pafs over, and come to his other Confideration of things above Rea- fon, 76 ^n Account of fon, meaning fuch as when propofed do furpafs our Comprehenfion, and that (as he well ob- ierves) upon one or other of thefe three Ac- counts, either as not clearly Comeivable by our underftanding, fuch as the Infinitenefs of the Divine Nature, or 'dsi^e:cp/kabiehy us fuch as the Manner how God can Create a Rational Soul, orhowthisbeingan Immaterial Subilance can aft upon a Human Body, or be afted up- on by it, &c Or elfe laftly as Jfywmetrical or unfociable, that is, fuch, as we fee not how to reconcile with other things evidently and con- fefledly true, whereof he gives an inftance in the Cafe of Frefcience and Contingency. 9. He further obferves (and I think rightly) that there may be difference of degree in things above Reafon, as to their Abflrufenefs. That fome things appear to furpafs our underftand ings immediately, even before attentively lookt into. And other things only when a narrow infpecti- on is made into them, being intelligible enough in the Grof% and asimploy'd in common Dif- courfe. Whereof he gives inftapces in PUce^ Ttrne^ and Motion. And he makes ufe of this Obfervation to folve a Difficulty wherein ic is pretended that we cannot profefs to believe things which we acknowledge to be above our Reafon, without difcovering that we do not well confider what we fay, and that we then talk like Parrots. To which the fubftance of his Anfvveris, that we may talk of thofe things according to that Notion of them which is more Obvious Rfafon and Faith. yj Obvious and Superficial, though not according to that which is Philofophical and Accurate. lo. After this Explanationof what is meant by Above Rcafon and contrary to Reafon he comes in the Second place to juftify the Dinllin- ction by (hewing that it is grounded upon the Nature of things. And that he does by fliew- ingthat there is no Neceffity that things above Reafon Chould be alfo Contrary to Reafon. This he fhews firfl: of things above Reafon in the firll Senfe, *uiz. thofe that are undifcoverable by Reafon alone, but this being not the fenfe ot Above Realon as it is ufed in this Diftinction, and fince things according to this fenfe above Reafon are not affirm^ by our Adverfaries to be contrary to it, J pafs over all that he fays upon this part, and ftrike in with him again where he fhews the fame of things above Reafon in the Second fenfe. I cannot meet with any thing di- rectly under that Head, but only a few Paf- fages here and there fcatter'd up and down. As when he fays of Galileo^ that when he firfl: made his Difcoveries with the fekfcope and faid that there were Planets that mov'd a-bout "Jupiter^ He fdid fomething that other Aftronomers could not difcern to be true, but nothing that they could prove to be falfe. And again when he fays that for a thing to be above Keafon is Ex- trinfical and Accidental to its being true or falfe. Becaufe to be above our Reafon is not an Ab folute thing, but a Kefpeftive One, importing a Relation to the Meafure of Knowledge that belongs to Human Underllanding. And theie- fore 7 8 j4n j^c count of fore it may not be above Reafon in reference to a more inlightned Intelleft, &c, which indeed is rightly and very judicioufly remarqu'd in it felf, and no lefs pertinently to the preient bufi- nefs. And again when he fays that there arc fome things true which yet arc Hable to Ob- jeftions not direftly anfwerable, and fo above Reafon. He inftances in the Controverfy of the DivifibiUty of Quantity, where each fide of the Contradiftion is prefs'd with unanfwer- able Objeflions, and yet as parts of a Contra- di£lion, one of them mult necelTarily be true. i\nd yet take which you will you run into in« vincible Difficulties. Which indeed well con- cludes that a thing that is above Reafon may yet be true, and if true then not contrary to Reafon, it being impoffible that what is fo fhould be true. Which one Confideration is indeed enough to juftifie the Diftinftion beyond all exception. 1 1. Mr. Boyle has yet a further Obfervation concerning this Diftindion too Confiderable to be pafs'd over, and that is, that he looks upon it to be of Importance not only to the defence of fome Myfteries of the Chriftian Religion, but even of fome important Articles of Natural Theology, in which (as he fhews by feveral Inftances) there are many Doflrins which mufl be acknowledged to be true, and yet whofe Modi^ is not explainaWc. 12. After this he Confiders an Objedion wherein it is pretended that the granting this Diftindion would be of bad Conlequence, as affording Reafon and Faith. 79 affording flielter to any unintelligible duff that a bold Enthufiaft may obtrude under the venera- ble Thkoi 3. Mjfierjfy that is above Reafon. To which he anfwers very judicioufly, that he does not deny but that tlie Diftinclion is liable to be ill imploy'd, but that this is no other than whac is common to it with divers other Diftinftions, Which are without Scruple Admitted becaufe ufeful, and not rejefled becaule they have not the Privilege that they can never be Mifapplied. And that therefore both in reference to thofe other Dirtinctions, and that he had been treat- ing of, it becomes Men to (iand upon their Guard, and ftrictly examine how far the Do- ctrine propofcd as a Myftery^ is intitled to the benefit of this Diftinction. Which ifitfliould beempIoyMto juftifieany thing, that, though Itil'd a Myftery, is but a pretended one, the Error (as he well obferves in the Clofe of all) will lie, Not in the Groundlefnefs of the Diflin- ction, but in the Erroneoufnefs of the Applica- tion. 1 ^. Tn this you have the Sum and Subftance, as briefly and as clearly as I could reprefent it, of Mr. Bojile'*s Thoughts concerning things a- bove Reafon and contrary to Reafon, which, like all his, are great and ftrong, and (allow- ing only for thofe inaccuracies taken Notice of) juit and true. And now though what this Ex- cellent Perfon has ofl-crM may ferve to let in a great deal of Light into the Diilinction, yet fince a thing of fuch Confequence if true, and fo much Contefted whether true or no, can never 8o \An Account of never be made too Clear, and fonietlmesa dif- ferent, though not better, Reprefentation of a thing may contribute to its further Illuftration, every Reader having his particular Point of View, fo as that the very fame Notion or Truth that does not Meet with him in one Pofture, may fhine full in his Face and ftrike him with fuccefs in another, I fhall therefore under the Shelter of Mr. Boole's Authority, and by the advantage of his Light, venture to fet down my own Thoughts concerning this weighty Point, applying my felf chiefly to that part of it, wherein I think the other Account xMoft defective. 14. And firfi: though it fhould be true that to be above Reafon is to be Incomprehenfible, and to be Contrary to Reafon is to appear re- pugnant to (ome Principle or Conclufion of Right Reafon, yet I do not think this of it felf fufficient either to Clear or to Juftifie the Di- ftinction, fince it may be both again demanded what it is to be incomprehenfible, and what re- pugnant, and again difputed whether incompre- henfible and repugnant be not the fame, as well as whether that which is above Reafon be not alfo Contrary to it. And then weaie but where we were before. This Account of the Matter is then too Grofs and General to be refted in, and we muft be therefore more minute and par- ticular in our Explanation of it, if we would be more Clear. 1 5. However fince Generals are to go before, and do alfo prepare the way for Particulars, I fhall Re. I [on and Faith. 8i fhall firdpropole the general Idea of things a- bove Reafon and contrary to Reafon, and then particularize upon that Idea, by opening and unfolding more diftinftly and expHcitly what is containM in it, and by fo comparing and collating together the two parts of the Notion as to fhew the real Difference that is between them. So that I fliall make but one work of the Explanatory and "Jtdjtificatory parts, fuppofing that there needs no more to the Juftification of the Diftinftion, than only to have the Mem- bers of it well explained. For if the Idea of Above Realon be diftin£l from the Idea of Contrary to Reafon (as the Explanation of them will fhew that it is) then the DifHnftion proceeds upon a real Difference, is grounded upon the Nature oF things, and has all that is neceflary tea true and good Dillindion. 1 6. By things above Reafon then (as the Expreffion is ufcd in this Diftinflion) I con- ceive to be Meant, Not fuch as Reafon of it felf cannot Difcover, but fuch as when pro- pofed it cannot Comprehend. And by things Contrary to Reafon i conceive fuch as it can and does ailually comprehend, and that to be abfolutely Impoffible. Or in other words, a thing is then above Reafon when we do not comprehend how it can be, and then Contra- ry to Reafon when we do pofitively compre- hend that it cannot be. Thus in the General. 17. But to be a little more Particular, we are to Confider upon the firit Parr, that when we fpeak of things above Reafon, the word G • Reafon, Si jln j4c count of Reafon here (as was fhewn in the firfl Chap- ter) fignifies the fame as V^derjlandt/jg, and there being but one only Operation of that, namely Perception, by Comprehend here muft be meant the fame as by Perceive. So that when we fay of things above Reafon that they are fuch as Reafon cannot Comprehend, 'tis the fame as to fay they are fuch as the Un- derftanding cannot Perceive. But then when we fay, Canmt Perceive^ 'tis to be carefully noted that this is not to be underftood of the literal and Grammatical 7W^4;?/>^ of the Propo- fition, as if the thing faid to be Above Reafon were perfeftly unintelligible, but only of the Truth of it, as was obfervM before concerning Faith. And then again when we fay that A- bove Reafon is when we do not Comprehend or Perceive the Truth of a thing, this muft not be meant of not Comprehending the Truth in its whole Latitude and Extent, fo that as many Truths fliould be faid to be above Reafon as we cannot thus thorougly comprehend and purfue througliout all their Confequences and Relations to other Truths (for then almoft e- very thing would be Above Reafon) but only of not comprehending the Union or Connexion of thofe immediate Ideas of which the Propo- fition fuppofed to be above Reafon confifts. And which is therefore faid to be above Reafon not becaufe the fimple and dire£t Meaning of its Terms is unintelligible, or becaufe the Truth of it is not comprehenfible in its remoteft and utmoft Extent, but purely becaufe the Con- nexion Reafon and Faith. 8^ nexion of its Ideas, or the manner of it, is not difcernible, and that partly for want of fufficicnt clearnefsof the Ideas thcmfelvesfo as to be able to perceive their Union Intuitively^ and partly for want of a due and proper Me- dium whereby to compare them, fo as to dif- cern their Union in the way of Scimce and De- monflration, 1 8. 'Tis alfo to be Obferv'd upon the Second part of the Explanation, that I chuferatherto fay that things contrary to Reafon are fuch as we Perceive to be ImpffibU^ than fuch as affeur contrary to fome Principle ^ or fome Conclufion of Right Reafon, This being the more General and Abfolute Idea, whereof the two other are but Inftancesand Specifications. For then is a thiug faid to be Impoffible when its Ideas cannot ftand together or be united. Which may be either becaufe of the immediate Oppofition and Inconfiftency of the Ideas themfelves with them- felves fo as Mutually to Exclude each other (as in a Contradiflion) or becaufe of their inccn- fiflency with fome other Truth, with which it cannot Comport. Or in other words, either becaufe one of the Ideas cannot confiil with the other, by reafon of the immediate oppofition that is between them, or becaufe the Union of both is inconfiftent with fome Truth or other, which therefore will notfufFer them to be Uni- ted. Which Truth will be indeed either a Principle or a Conciufion of right Reafon. And then we are faid to Perceive a thing to be Im- poffible when we perceive that its ideas cannot G 2 iland 84. An Account of ftand together, and that either immediately by the very inconfillency of the Ideas themfclves, or mediately by the Repugnance that they car- ry to fome other Truth, whether Principle or Conclufion. Which Repugnance I take to con- fifl; in this, that the fuppofed Principle or Con- clufion cannot ftand with the Union of fuch J- deas, and that therefore if fuch a Principle or fuch a Conclufion be true (as is fuppofed) then fuch Ideas are not United, and indeed are as uncapable of Union, that is as mpojjible^ as if there were an immediate inconfiftency between the Ideas themfelves. So that tor a thing to be Contrary to Reafon, is, in fhort, for the Un- derftanding to perceive the Abfolute impoflibi- lity of it, or that its Ideas cannot ftand toge- ther, which it does either Immediately b)fc per- ceiving the direft inconfiftency of thofe Ideas, or Mediately by perceiving their inconfiftency with fome evident and inconteftable Truth or other, whether Principle or Conclufion. For the way and method is the fame in knowing a thing to be Falfeor impoffibleas in knowing it to be True, and accordingly as theProcefs of theUnderftanding is either Immediate or Me- diate in the latter, fo is it alfo in the former. But though there are thefe different ways of perceiving the impoffibility of a thing, 'tis in the General Perception of its Impoffibility and not in the leveral ways of it that its contrariety to Reafon muft be made Formally to confift ; Even as it was fhewn before of Knowledge, w^hich is made to confift in the Perception of the Reafon and Faith, 8 5 the Relation of Ideas, and not in this or that determinate manner of perceiving it, which in* deed lerve afterwards to diftinguifh Know- ledge into its kinds (as fuppofe hituitive and Demonftrative) but do not enter into its Firll and General Idea. For which Confideration J think the Perception of a thing's impoflibihty does better exprefs its Contrariety to Reafoa than the Repugnance it appears to have to fome Principle or Conclufion of it, that being only (as I faid before) an inftance and fpecifi- cation (and but one fingle one too) of its Im- pollibility. 19. So Now we are arrived to a Clear and Diftinfl: Conception of things Above Keafon and things Contrary to Reafon. A thing is then above Reafon when we do not Perceive or Comprehend how it can be. And then Con- trary to Reafon when we do Perceive that it Cannot be, or is Impoffible. As to give a plain and fenfible Inltance of each of thefe. That the fides of an Hyperbola fhould be always approaching to each other and yet never meet, though continued to infinity; is a Propofition of unqucftion'd Certainty in Geometry, and yet fuch as paffts the Reafon of a Man to Com- prehend how it can be, and therefore may pro- perly be faid to be one of thofc things that are above Reafon. But now that a Triangle fliould have Parallel Sides, is not only above Reafon, but directly Contrary to it. For here the Un- derftanding is not only at a lofs to Comprehend how it may be, but does pofitively and evident- G i Jy 86 -^^^ Account of ly perceive that it cannot be, it being utterly impoilible that a Figure of Three Lines fliould have its firles Parallel to each other. 20 Now though by this Explanation of things above Reafon and contrary to Reafon the Difference betu^een them is already obvious even 10 the eye, and ftares a Man in the very Face, like things of great Inequality vi^hofeDifpropor- tion appears at View, without Meafuring them, yet for further Satisfaflion's fake, and to make the matter as plain as any thing in Nature, to all but thofe who either have not, or will not ufe their Underftandings, let us a little Compare thefe Ideas together, thereby the better to illuftrate their Difference. 21. It is molt Evident that the Idea of things above Reafon and the Idea of things contrary to Reafon are two really diftinft Ideas, and that One is Not the Other. This immediate- ly appears from the very direfl: View of the Ideas themfelves. For what can be More plain than that Not to Comprehend how a thing may be, and to Comprehend that it can- not be, are two different things? And what better way have we to know the Diftinclion of things, but only that the Idea of one is not the Idea of another ? But then befides, the Ideas of thefe things are not only Formally different from each other, but have alfo dif- ferent Properties and Charaders belonging to them, and luch too as are exclufive o\ each o- ther, and which therefore do maniieftly fhew the Ideas to which they belong to be diftinft. For, Reafon and faith, 87 For, for a thing to be above Reafon implies only a Neguiorj, the Not Comprehending how a thing can be, but for a thing to be Contrary to Reafon implies the Pofttionoi an Intelledual aft, the Comprehending that it cannot be. >^gain, in things above Reafon the Propofition is fuppofed not to be underftood, v^hereas in things Contrary to Reafon, it is fuppofed to be well underftood, and that to be falfe and impoffible. Again, in things above Reafon the Mind determines nothing concerning the O^jVS propofed, whether it be true or whether it be falfe, whether it be Poflible, or whether it be Impoffible. All that fhe determines is concerning her own Jcf^ that flie does not Comfrebend how it can be. But whether it be or nor, that flie does not affirm, but holds herfelf in a perfefl: Sufpence. But now in things Contrary to Reafon the Mind is every whit as pofitive and decifive, and does determine as boldly and freely as in thofe things that are moll: according to it. Whereby it plainly appears that to be Contrary to Reafon is fomething more than to be above it, and that the Mind proceeds a great deal further in the former than in the latter, the Language of the Soul in things aboveReafon being only, How cm thefe things be ! But in things Contrary to Reafon fhe is Poiltive and Dogmatical, roundly pronouncing, This cannot be. So that unlefs there be no difference between a Negation and a Pofitive Aft, be- tween the Ignorance or Non-Perception of a thing, and the knowing it to be Falfe, be- G 4 tween 88 An Account of tween Sufpenfion and a peremptory Determina- nation, between a greater and a lefs, 'tis mod undeniably evident that the Parts of this Di- ftinftion are not only really but widely diffe- rent, and that to be above Reafon is one thing, and to be contrary to Reafon is another. 2 2. If it be pretended (as fonrie perhaps may be likely to Object) that to be Contrary to Reafon implies a Negation, as well as to be above Reafon, becaufe it is tliere fuppofed to be Comprehended that the thing is Falle and cannot be, and that therefore they agree in one of the Main inftances of their Difference, to this the Anfwer is Clear and Full. I grant there is a Negation in one as well as the other, but then I diftinguifli of Negation. There is a Nega- tion of the Aci^ and a Negation of thtObjtcK Contrary to Reafon does indeed imply a Ne- gation of the ObjeCi:, that is, it implies a Sepa- ration and dif union of certain Ideas, as incon* liftent and incompatible one with another. But it does not imply a Negation of the A£b, but the quite Contrary, becaufe the underffanding is here fuppofed pofitively to comprehend t!ie thing, and withal the Impoffibility of it, which is not done in things Above Reafon, wherein the Negation is that of the Aft. So that this firfl and great difference between ihem ftands firm and good. 2^}. And now having thus far inftified the reality of thisdiftinftion of things Above Rea- fon and Contrary to Reafon both by the Ex- flaNatJon^inA CclUtiofioi the Parts of it, which thereby Reafon and Faith. 89 thereby appear to confift of Ideas as different as can well be conceived, I might further pro- ceed to do the fame by producing fome Inftan- ces of things confeffedly Above Reafon that arc alfo notwithflanding as confeffedly True. For if any one thing that is Above Reafon be yet found to be true, this plainly demonftrates the thing in Qiieltion (if there can be yet any Que- ftion about it) mod evidently fliewing that what is Above Reafon is not as fuch Contrary to Reafon, it being impoflible that what is Con- trary to Reafon fliould be true, whatever is Contrary to Reafon being alfo as Contrary to Truth. 1 might alfo further alledge that to be Above Reafon does equally abftrafit from True and Falfe (which Contrary to Reafon does not) and that not only bscaufe, as I ob- fervM before, it determines nothing con- cerning its Objecl, but alfo becaule 'tis a thing not of an Abfoluce, but of a Rela- tive Importance, as being an extrinfical Deno- mination taken not from the Nature of the Ob- ject as it Is in it felf, but only as it is to us, and in relation to our not only Finite, but very Li- mited Capacities. For to be Above Reafon is not to be Above Realon in general or all Reafon^ fo as to be abfolutely incomprehenfible, but only Human Reafon. But then that which is Above the Reafon of a Man may not be Above the Reafon of an Angel (as indeed what is Above the Reafon of one Man may not tranfcend tha: of another) and what is Above the Reafon o; ail 90 j4n j4ccotmt of an Angel may yet be perfeftly comprehended by God, the Supream and Sovereign Reafon. So that to be Abovx Reafon here is of a refpeftive fignification, fuch as does not exprefs the quahty of the Objefl: as it is in its own Nature, but only as it is in reference to fuch a particular Facul- ty, whereas to be Contrary to Reafon is not a Relative but an Abfolute thing, and whatever is Contrary to Reafon, is Contrary to all Reafon, and fo confequently to Truth. I fay I might further infift on thefe and fome other Confi- derations, but being partly prevented here by Mr. Bojle (whofe Account I would have ufed to fupply the defefts of Mine, as Mine is intended to fupply fome of his) and having fo abundantly clear'd the difference of thefe things already, I fhall not fo far diftruft either the Strength of the Argument, or that of my Reader's Underftand- ing, as to profecute this Matter any further than only to fhape an Anfwer out of what has been laid down, to an Obje£lion which I meet with in a Modern Writer againft Monfieur Jurieu^ and which, to do it the utmofl Juftice, I will fet down in his own words. 24. 1 have Con(ider'*d (fays he^) the DifiiK^ion which they ufe between being Contrar) to Reafon, and being above Reafon. ^fis agreed that ^tis not foffible to believe what is Contrary to Reafon. But ^ti6 fid that we can well believe what is above Reafon, This DiflinBion feems to me of no ufe^ or elfe I do ?iOt comprehend it. For if b) being above Reafon it he * Anjk Surle Tableau du Socinimiifmt, Traite i. pag. 14. Reafon and Faiths 91 be meant that tve do not comprehend a Truth in its whole Extent^ though what we conceive of it he clear and certain^ I own that in this fenfe one ought to he^ It eve what is above Reafon, But ij by being above Reafon be meant a DoElrine^ wherein we fee nothing Clear ^ a Doctrine which our Reafon lofes the fight oj on all its fiaes^ I mean that all the Proportions which maj bt extracted from it appear incomprehenftble^ fuch a. one as this for example^ that the three Divine Perfons make but one God^ &c. It feems that to be above Reafon in this fenfe, is the fame as to be intirelj inaccefjible to R eafon^ which differs nothings but in words ^ from being Contrary to fieafon. 25. I fuppofe whoever has duely confiderM and well comprehended the Tenour of the fore- going Difcourfe, can neither be infenfible of the Deficiency of this Allegation, nor be long at a lofs what Anfwer to return to it. But to fpare my Reader this Trouble, My Reply is, that this Author's Argument proceeds upon a wrong Suppofition. He fuppofes here that to be Jbove Reafon muft be either the Not Comprehending a thing in its whole Latitude and extent, or the Comprehending Nothing at all of it. Where- as I have fhe vvn before that 'tis neither of them ; That we do not mean by Above Reafon what is all over unintelligible, even as to the very Mean- ing of the Prcpofition, nor what is not to be Comprehended in its utmoft extent, but only what is incomprehenfible to us as to the Truth of the thing, or the Manner of it. 'Tis true indeed if the Prcpofition were perfeftly unintel- ligible, fo that (as he fays) we could fee nothing clear 92 j4n j4ccount of clear in !t^ even as to the very Senfc and Mean- ing of it, we could no more believe ic than what is Contrary to Reafon, tho'even then it would not (as this Author confufely enough pretends ) be the fan:ie with it, becaufe what is Contrary to Reafon is fuppofed to be well underftood. But *tis much orhcrwife if it be incomprehenfible only as to the Truth or Manner of the thing. This as I fliall fhew hereafter may very well be Believ'd, though what is Contrary to Reafon cannot, and what is utterly unintelligible cannot. AnA 1 have fufficiently fhewn already that what is thi^ only inaccejpMe to Reafon differs, a little more than in words, from being contrary to it. 26. And now if Human Nature were not a very unaccountable thing, I fliould ftand great- ly amazed at either the Natural or wilful Blind- nefs of thofe who are for confounding things fo vaftiy different as the parts of this Diftinftion, of things above Reafon and contrary to it, mofb apparently are. There are indeed fome things which we are ordinarily taught to diftinguifh, and yet when ftriclly examined and compared, will be found to have no real ground of Diftin- ftion in them. And 'tis every whit as great (and almoftas Common) a Fault todiftinguifh things that do not differ, as to confound thofe that do. And there are alfj other things of fuch near Reftmblance and Cognation to each other that there needs a great deal of Art, Subtilty and nicelnfpeftion todifcern their Difference. So Fine and Minute and almoft imperceptible are the Lines that terminate their Natures, Reafon and Faith. 9^ Natures, and divide them from one another. But the Ideas of tbefe things are as different as thofe of a Man and a Tree, a Triangle and a Square, fo that a iMan vnuil wink Iiard not to perceive ir, or be very infincere not to acknow- ledge it. And I cannot imagine why thofe efpe- cially who are known toferve themfelvesupoa occafion of Diftinflions which have no other Foundation than the mere Will and Fleafure (unlefsyou will fay Interefl) of thofe that ufc them, fhould yet rejefl fuch a folid and well- grounded, as well as well Authorized, one as this, but only becaufe it is not for their turn, and, if admitted, would like a Bomb thrown into their Garrifon, blow up and lay waft their Main Strength, and force them to defert and give up a Caufe which they are (now efpecially) moftzealoufly fond of, and feem refolv'd even againfl Reafon to Maintain. 27. For I mufl: further remark (and 'tis an. Obfervation not lightly to be pafs'd over) that if this One Diftinflion of things above Reafon. and things contrary to Reafon be once admitted, or fhewiitobereal, folid and well-grounded, the main part of the Sociman Controverfy is imme- diately, or at leaft in the very next Confequence, at an end. For the Reafon why they will not believe things above Reafon is becaufe (as they pretend) Above Reafon differs nothing in re- ality from Contrary to Reafon, and io thofe things that are above Reafon are alfo as much contrary to it as above it, and what is Con- trary to Reafon is on both fides acknowledgM impoffible 94- --^^ j^^c count of impoflible to be believM. Well, but then if it be made appear (as I think by this time is fufficiently done) that thefe'two are quite dif- ferent things, and that to be above Reafon is not the fame as to be contrary to it, then even by their own Confeffion there can be no pre- tence why what is above Reafon may not be BelievM. Which I take to be the true induce- ment that makes thefe Men ftand out fo fiercely and obftinately againft this Diftinftion (for they are aware what mifchief it will do 'em) as it is alfo the reafon why I have beftowM fo much care and pains to clear and juftifie it. 28. And thus having given an Account of thefe great and Fundamental things, what Rea- fon is, what Faith is, and what it is to be Above, and what Contrary to Reafon, we have now prepared the way to the more full and direct Confideration of the Belief of things above Reafon, the true ftate of which Queftion by what has been hitherto difcours'd appears to be this, Whether we may not Aflent upon the Au- thority of Divine Revelation to fuch things as our Underftanding or Reafon cannot perceive or Comprehend as to the Truth or Manner of them. Or, whether our not being able thus to Comprehend them, be a fufficient Reafon why we fliould not believe them. For the Refolu- tion of which we have already laid the Grounds, and fhall now proceed more direflly to build upon them in the following Chapter. CHAP. Reafon and Faith. 95 CHAP. IV. That Human Reafon u not the Meafure of Truth. I . T T T E have gained a mod wonderful Point VV in the foregoing Chapter, by pro- ving the Dinftinftion between things Above and things Contrary to Reafon, and fuch as of it felt alone is fufficient Not only immedi- ately to decide, but even for ever to Silence the Controverfy between us and our Socima,a Adverfaries concerning the Belief of things above Reafon. For the only Objeftlon that is or can poflibly be pretended againft the Belief of things above Reafon being the fuppofed Contra- riety of the fame things to Reafon, if it be fhewa that to be above Reafon involves no fuch Con- trariety, then the Objeftion againft the belief of fuch things is fairly and wholly removed, and confequentlv there remains no Reafon why they may not be Btliev'd. So that I cannot but look upon the Subftance of my Work as moft efFeftu- ally done already, and thofe of our Adverfaries that have any reafonable Meafure of Penetra- tion and Sincerity mull needs be fenfible of it. And I dare appeal even to their own Confcien- ces whether they are not. However confider- ing 96 j4n Account of ing the Importunity of thofe I have to deal with^ as well as the weight of the Caufe it felf, I fliall endeavour the further ellablifhment of it upon fome other Confiderations, whereby I (hall alio give further Confirmation, and fo repay what 1 am indebted to the Point contended for in the preceding Chapter, lince we may as well ar- gue backwards from the Believablenefs of things above Reafon to their not Contrariety, as for- wards from their not Contrariety to their Be- lievablenefs, the Confequence being full as good, thus, Above Reafon Believ^ble^ therefore 7iOt Con- trary^ as thus. Above Reafon not Contrary^ there- fore Believable Now in order to the fuller Conviftion and Demonftration of the Believa- blenefs of things above Reafon 1 fet out upon this Ground, that Human Reafon is not the Mea* fare of Truth. 2. ' J'is agreed among the Maflers of Reafon that as all Proof ought to be only of fuch things as need it, fo there are Propofitlons fo Clear and Evident of themfelves that they have no need of being demonftrated, and that there are fome again that are not capable of Demonftration, the Fulnefs and Immediatenefs of their Evi- dence rendring them ftriftly indemonftrable. And it has been charged by one ^ of the moft Confiderable of them as a Fault in the Method of i\\t Geometricians that they fet themfelves to prove things that have no need of Proof, where- of he gives an Inftance in Euclid^ who goes for- mally L'AftdcPenfer. p. 432' Reafon and Faith. 97 mally to work to prove that two fides of a Tri- angle taken together are greater than one, aU though this be moft Evident even from the No- tion only of a Right Line, which Is the fhortefl that can poflibly be between two Points, and the Natural iMeafure of Diftance from one Point to another, which it could not be if it v/ere not alfo the fhortefl: of all Lines that can be drawn from Point to Point. ^. Now tho' I cannot fay that the Propofitioa of this Chapter is fo Evident of it felf as not to be capable of Demonltration, yet I muft Con- fefs I cannot but think it of the Number of thofc that do not need any, that is I mean, to thofe who will but take the Pains toconfider it with Attention, and are withal fo fincere as to fay ingenuoudy what they inwardly think. For to Unattentive or Captious Perfons nothing is plain (fince there is nothing but what fome will ccn- tradid, and there are thofe who profefs to doubt of every thing) and even the Sun it felf can't make a Man fee, if either he want Eyes, or will fhut them. I cannot therefore fay that to fuch men either this or any other Propofitioa is plain, but I would venture to be tried by any competent and indifferent Confiderer whe- ther this be not indeed a very plain and certain Propoficion, as plain as moit of thofe which pafs for Principles and Maxims in Difcourfe, that Hamaa Reafon is not the AJeafr/re of Truth, And accordingly I fhould juftly fear incurring the fame Cenfure that is charged upon the Geume- tricians, of going to prove what is evident, were H - there ^S An Account of there not fomething peculiar in the prefent Cafe that makes it very different from theirs. For they dealing in Matters of an Abftraft and in- different Nature, and fuch wherein the Lufts and Paflions of Men are altogether unintereffed, have no real need to prove evident things, be- caufe for that very reafon their Evidence is never Contefted ; vv^hereas the Point I have novi^ in hand being of a Moral Concernment and fuch as incounters tjie Partialities and falfe Biaffes of Human Nature, particularly that great and go- verning one of Self-Love, though it fliould be of equal evidence with fome of their Maxims, will yet not be equally fecure from Oppofition, and pafs ahke uncontefled. And fo .there may be need of proving it, if not to do any neceffary Service to the Propofition it felf, yet to fatisfie the importunity of the Men I argue with. Which indeed is the prefent Cafe, fince (as was intimated in the Beginning) the Sentiment of thefe Men concerning the disbelief of things above Reafon refolves at laft into this Principle, that Human Reafon is the Meafure of Truth. Which therefore both for their Satisfadion and Refutation muft be fhewn to be Falfe. 4. Now when 1 fay that Human Reafon is not the Meafure of Truth, my meaning is, thac it is not that Common Standard whereby Truth in the General is to be Meafured, fo that of eve- ry thing it may be fafely Concluded that it is either true or not true according as it accords with this Meafure, as 'tis comprehenfible or not comprehenfible by Human Reafon. 'Tis true Reafon and Faith. ^cf true indeed there is a certain Scnfe in wliicli Human Reafon fometimes is, and may be truely faid to be the Meafure of Truth, in as much as whatever the Underftanding does clearly and diftinftly Perceive may be concluded as molt certainly true, it being impoflible that a thing fliould be otherwife than as wc clearly perceive it to be, without fuppofing our Per- ceptive Faculties to be in themfelves naturally Falfe, and without fuppofing it alfo neceffary that we fliould fall into Error even in the right life of thefe Faculties (it being impoflible to conceive a More right ufe of them than to Aifent only to what we clearly Perceive) which are not only in themfelves manifeft Abfurdities, but fuch alfo as would neceffarily infer the Au- thor of our Natures to be alfo the Author of our Errors and Deceptions. It muii therefore be admitted by all what the Philofophers of the CarteJiaf7W2iY fo earneftly ftand and Contend for, that Clearnefs of Perception is the great Rule and Criterion of Truth, fo far that whatever we do clearly and diftindly perceive to be true is really in it felf True. But then this is only to be a Partial and Inadequate Rule, and in fome certain limited refpeft only, notabfolutely and in general. For though I grant that whatever we clearly perceive is true, yet I deny that it follows likewife Backwards, that whatever is true we do alfo clearly Perceive, and fo confe- quently that whatever we do not clearly per?, ceive is therefore not True. By which it is plain that this Cartefixn Maxim muft be very H 2 much 100 An Account of much abufed to prove that Human Reafon Is the Common and General Meafure of Truth, and I dare fay the great Authors of it never in- tended it to that purpofc. 5. Reafon or Underftanding in general mav be fafely faid, and mufi: necelTarily be allowM to be the Meafure of Truth. For Truth in ge- neral carries a necelTary Relation to Under- ftanding in general, as fully adequate and com- menfurate to it. So that all Truth is fimply and abfolutcly intelligible, the greateft and fub- limcft Truths as much as the leaft and meaneft, thofe which the Angels ftudy and defire to look into, as much as thofe which employ the nar- row Thoughts of the pooreft Ruftlc. The For- mer are in themfelves as intelligible as the latter, and if not aftually fo well underflood 'tis not becaufeot any incapacity in theObjefts, but by reafon of the Difproportion of the Faculties that are Converfant about them. But this Difpro- portion muft not be Univerfal, nor extend throughout the whole Order of Being. For what is intelligible mufl: be fo to fome Qnder- ftanding(fince what noUnderflanding can com- prehend is the fame as not to be intelligible) and confequently there muft bean Underltand- ing that Comprehends all that is truly intelli» gible, that is, all Truth. And accordingly it may be truly faid of this All-Comprehenfive Underftanding, that it is the iMeafure of Truth, fo that whatever this perfefl Underftanding docs not underftand is not intelligible, and if not intelligible, then alfo not True. Befides that Reafon and Faith. i o i that it might be further ConfiderM (were thi^ a proper place for fo AbftraO: and Metaphyfi- cal a Speculation) that Truth it Self, as to the real Nature and Ellence of it, is one and the fame with the Divine Ideas as they are related to one another, and does therefore exift Origi- nally and intirely in the Mind of God, who is Subftantial Truth, and accordingly does Com- prehend all Truth, and fo confequently is the Meafure of it. And becaufe this All-compre- henfive Underftanding is contained within the Extent of Reafon or Underllanding in General, therefore it may be truly faid alfo of Reafon or Underftanding in General that it is the xMeafurc of Truth, it being moft certain that what is above all Reafon, or what no Reafon whatfo- ever can Comprehend is as much above Truth too, and cannot poffibly be true. 6. But though it be thus necefTary to allow this of Realon in General, the fame cannot be allow'd of Human Reafon. For whatever is the Meafure of 1>uth muft be fully adequate and Commenfurate to Truth. That's Certain. And therefore if Human Reafon be the Meafure of Truth it muft have the famecompafs and ex- tent with Truth, and poffefs it whole and in- tire, if not Effentially and Subftantially as God does, yet at lea ft Noetically and by way of Theory, foasto be able thoroughly to Perceive and Comprehend all Truth. But now that this Qualification cannot poffibly agree to Human Reafon (though it be fomewhat unreafonable that I fhould be put to prove fuch a Propofitioii H I as loi An Accoimt of as this) I b.ope fully to demonftratc upon a Dou- ble Confideration, one taken from the Nature of Human Reafon, and the other from the Na- ture of Truth. 7. And firftto begin with Truth. This, as the Moft thinking and Metaphyfical Perfons Cgnceive of it, is fuppofed toconfill: in the Re- lations of equality or inequality, or Agreement or Difagreement. Now we are to Confider that thefe Relations may be of Three Sorts, either fuch as are between Created Beings, or fuch as are between Intelligible Ideas, or fuch as are between Created Beings and their Ideas. And we are alfo to Confider that there are two General Sorts of Truths extremely different one from another, and therefore carefully to be di- diftinguifhM. Thofe that regard only the Ab- flraft Natures of things, and their immutable EiTences, independently on their aftual Exift- ence. And others again that do regard things that do aftually Exift. The former of thefe Conftitutethat Order of Truths which we call Necejfarj^ the latter that which we call Contm* gent. And this double Order of Truths refults from that threefold Relation before-mention'd. Erom the firfl: and third Relations arife Contin- gent Truths, which are nothing elfe but the Relations of Agreement or Difagreement that are either between Created Beings themfelves, or between Created Beings and their Ideas. And thefe I call Contingent Truths in oppofition to thofe that are Neceffary and Eternal, partly becaufe thefe Relations could not begin to exiir before Reafon and taith. 105 before thofe Beings were producM (it being im- poffible that there fliould be Relations betweea things that are not) and partly becaufe thefe Relations nnight not have exifled, becaufe thofe Beings might not have been produced. And as Contingent Truths arife from the firft and third, fo from the fecond and middle Relations refult thofe Truths which are Neceffary, Eter- nal, and Immutable, and which I underftand to be nothing elfe but the Relations o( Agree- ment or Difagreement that are between Ideas. 8. 1 go here upon the common and allow'd Diftinclion between Neceffary and Contingent Truths, and upon the as much allow'd Suppo- fition that there is fuch an Order of Truths as are Neceffary and Eternal, which therefore I take for granted as a Principle, not to decline the trouble of proving it, but becaufe it is a ConfefsM as well as Evident thing, and I care not for proving any more evident things than I needs muft. And that thefe Neceffary and Eter- nal Truths are in this precifely diitinguifh'd from thofe that are Contingent, thdt they are the ReUtions that are between Ideas^ I think is plain from the very Notion and Nature of them, be- caufe they are fuppofed to be fuch Truths as re- gard the Abftraft Natures and Effences of things as they are in Idea, and not as they have an actual Exiflence in rerum Natura^ fince then they would not be neceffary, but Contingent Truths, which would be contrary to the Sup- pofition. And becaufe thefe Neceffary Truths are the moll confiderable and principal fort of H 4 Truths^ 104- -^^ Account of Truths, as being the Ground and Foundation of all Science, and the true and proper Objefts of our Theory and Contemplation, andbecauie for the fame Reafon whenever we fpeak of Truth Abfolutely and in General we are prefu- med to mean neceffary and immutable Truth, hence it is that Truth is commonly faid by Me- taphyfical Writers to confilt in the Relations that are between Ideas, though indeed this be ftriftly uue only oi NeceffoiryTmxh. B'jt it is fufficient to the prefent purpofe that it is true of this. And fo much I fuppofe will readily be granted me at leaft, that the general Nature and Reafon of NeceiTary and Eternal Truths confifts in the Relations that are between Ideas. 9. I further add that thefe Idea's muft be the fame with the Divine Ideas. 'Tis true indeed that exaflly fpeaking all Ideas are Divine Ideas, even thofe which we ufc to call our own, it being moft Certain (as might eafily and with the greateft Evidence be fhewn) that the imme- diate Objects of our Underftandings are no other than the Ideas of the Divine Intelleft, in which we fee and contemplate all things. But not to enter into this fublime Speculation at prefent, it will be fufficient to confider that unlefs the h d-as whofe Relations Conftitute thofe Truths which are Neceffary and Eternal be the Divine Ideas, it will be impoffible that Neceffary and Eternal Truths fhould be what we fuppofe they are,. that is Neceffary and Eternal. For Neceffary and Eternal Truths mull be N^eceffa- ry and Eternal Relations, and it being impoffi- ble Reafon and Faith. 105 blethat Relations fbouldbe more NecefTary or Eternal than the Subjects from which they re- fult, unlefs thefe Ideas the Subjefls of thefe Re- lations be Neceflary and Eternal, how can their Relations be fo? *Tis plain therefore that thefe Ideas mud: be Neceflary and Eternal. But now I pray what Ideas are fo but the Divine ? What is there in the whole Compafs of Being that is Neceflary, Eternal and Immutable but God and his Divine Perfe£lion§? As therefore we fay that thefe Neceflary and Eternal Truths are Relations between Idea^s^ and not fuch as are be- tween either Created Entities themfelves, or between them and their Ideas, becaufe then they would be of the Order of Contingent, not of Neceflary Truths, For the fame reafon we muft fay that they are the Relations that are between the Divim Idea^s^ thofe only being fuf- ficiently iieddy and Permanent Subjefts to fuftain fuch Stable and Immutable Relations. And indeed were it not for thofe Reprefenta- tive Perfe£lions of the Divine Nature which we call Ideas, there would be no Neceflary and Eternal ElTences to (upport thefe Neceflary and Eternal Relations, and then there could be no fuch Relations, and if no fuch Relations, then there could be no Neceflary Truths, and if no Neceflary Truths then no Science. Which by the way would mofl: Convincingly prove to any Capable and Attentive Underltanding the abfolute Neceflity and Certainty of a God, as the moft inmoll Ground and Central Support of the whole Intelleflual World. 10. Well io6 jAn Account of 10. Well then it c;^n no longer be doubted but that thefe Neceffary and Eternal Truths are the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas. But now as thefe Ideas are Infinite as being the Effcntial Perfeflions of God, and really identify'd with his Divine Nature and Subftance, fo it mufl: necefTarily follow that the Relations that refult from them, and fubfift between them mufl: alfo be Infinite. And then lince thefe Truths do ed^ntially Confifl: in, and in their Reafon and Formahty are no other than thefe Ideal Relations, it no lefs evident- ly foh^o ws that Truth alfo muft be Infinite too. 11. Which alfo will be necelTary to Con- clude upon another Account. For I confider again that fince Relations do not in reality dif- fer as diftinft Entities from their Subje6ls and Terms (as the Relations of two Circles fup- pofed to be equal to each other do not really dif- fer from the Circles themfelves fo related) thefe Ideal Relations mufl: in the reality of the thing be one and the fame with the Divine I- deas themlelves, and confequently with the Divine Nature with which thefe Ideas are i- dentified. And accordingly Truth which is the fame with thefe Ideal Relations mufl: alfo as to the real Eflence and Subftance of it be one and the fame with the Divine Nature. 12. And thcit indeed it is To may be further, and fomewhat more direftly, demonftrated tlius. lliat God is the Caufe of whatever is bcfides himfelf, or, that whatever is, is either God or the Efteft of God is a clear and acknow- ledged Reafon andFaith, 107 ledgM Principle. Neceflary Truth then is ei- ther God or the Effeft of God. But it is not the Effeft of God, and therefore it can be no other than God himfelf. Now that it is not the Effeft of God, the many grofs Abfurdlties which that fuppofition draws after it I think will oblige him that Confiders them to acknow- ledge. For Fjrft, if Neceflary Truth be the eflPed of God either it would not be neceffary, which is againft th^ Suppofition ; or if it be, then as being a neceflary Effefl it muft have a neceflary Caufe, that is a Caufe neceflfarily determined to aft, and fo God would h^ 2L mceffary Agent, even ad extra. He would alio be an waintelligent Agent. The Confequence is not to be avoided. For if Truth be the effeft of God then antecedently to the efletling of it, there was no Truth, and confequently no Knowledge, becaufe there could be nothing known ; and fo God in the produftion of Truth (if indeed he did produce it) muft be fuppofed to a8: altogether in the dark, and without any Intelligence. Again, if Truth be the Eftefl: of God, then the Perfeftion of the Divine Under- iianding muft be fuppofed to depend upoa fomething that is not God, nay upon fome- thing created by God, whereas God is the true perfective Object of all his Creatures, and is himfelf completely Happy in the fole Contem- plation of himfelf Twill follow again that God hasconftituted an Order of Realities which lie has not Power to abolifli ; that he has made fome things which he cannot unmake again. And ToS Jin Acconnt of A\^A laflly to add no more, If Truth be the Effect cf God then it cannot be God, (becaufe God cannot produce what is Himfelf ) and if it be not God, then bv the ^iippoiition there will be fomertiing NeccfTary, Immutable, Eternal and Independent, O'c, that is not God. Which lall Confequence as it contradicts the Common and Natural Sentiment of iVlankind,fo it ftruck io bard againft a certain very Thoughtful and Metaphyiical Head^, tBat he could not forbear urging this as One Argument againft the very Being of Neceffary Truth ; becaufe then (as he pretends; there would befomething Neceffary befides God, not confidering that this NecelTary Truth is really one and the fame with the Di- vine Subftance. Which one Confideration puts fay the whole force of his Argument againft the Eehg of Neceffary Truth, though however it be fufficiently conclufive of the Point we now contend for, that this Truth is not the Effecioi God. For if it were then his Allegation would take place; that is, there would indeed be lome- thing Neceffary befides God, which though it does not follow from the Suppofition of the Being of Neceffary Truth, is yet plainly infe- parable from the other Suppofition, that of its being the Eftecl of God. For then the very next Confequence is, that there would be fome- thing Neceffary befides God, which no Religi- ous, nor indeed Rational Ear can bear. Mis plain therefore that Truth is not the Effeft of God: Cogit. RationaL Hs Deo, p. 295. Reafon and Faith. 109 God ; and fince it is not, it remains by vertue of the premifed Disjunftion than it can be no other than the verj^ Subftance and Effence of the Deity. ij. And to this purpofe I further confider. That the whole Perfedion ot the Mind does confift inks union with God, who is her only true Good. This feems to me a Propolltion of a very fliining Evidence. For the good of the Mind muli of neceflity be fomething Spiritual, otherwife it would be of a Nature inferior to herfelf, and fo not capable of being her Per- feftion. But neither is that enough. What» ever is the good of the Mind muft not be only of a like Nature with the Mind, that is, of a Spiritual, but of sijuperwr Nature too. It mud be fomething above the Mind that can be its PerfecHon, and that can aft upon it, and in- lighten it, and affect it with plealing Senfations, otherwife how can it be able to add any thing to Its better Being or Perfeftion ? And in order to all this it mull alfo be intimately prefent to it, and united with it, otherwife how can it fo acluponit? But now God is the only Spiritual Being whom we can poffibly conceive thus qualified to be the good or perfeftive Object of our Minds. Whence it follows that he only is fo, and that we cannot become either more Perfect or more Happy in any Kind or Degree but by our Union with, and Poffeflion of God. And hence it further follows, that Truth could not be any Perfection of our Underftandings if it were not the fame with the Divine EiLnce (fince 1 1 o An Account of (fince that is our only perfective and beatifying Object) and that therefore fince it really is per- fective of our Underftand^gs, and that in the very highcll: meafure (the Underftanding being then moft Perfect vi^hen it has the cleareft and the largeft view of Truth) it can be no other than the very Effcnce of that Infinite Mind who is the only true Good and Objective Perfection of all Spirits. 14. 'Tis true indeed Des Cartes makes all Truth, even that which is Eternal to have been pofitively inftituted and eftablifh'd by God, to depend upon him as the Summm Legiflator^ to be the effect of his Will and Plcafure, and by Con- iequence to he Abfolutely and Originally Ar- bitrary and Contingent. So that according to liim 2 and 2 might not have been 4, or j An- gles of a Triangle might not have been equal to 2 Right ones if God had plcas'd fo to Order it. But this Notion of this Great Man does fo rude- ly Shock the Natural Senfe of Mankind that it cannot find Admiffion even wherethe reft of his Philofophy does, but is generally exploded not- withftandingthc eminency of its Author, and that evenby oneofhisgreateft Admirers^ and (as I think) by far the Moft Confiderable of his Difciples. And truly I think this Opinion is treated no worfe than it deferves, fince bclides the Abfurdities already Mention d, it fliakes the Foundations of Science, yea and of Morality, too, by fuppofing the Natures not only of Me- taphyfical Mr. Malebranche* Reafon and Faith. ' ill taphyfical and Mathertiatfcal Trutff, bat even of Moral Good and Evil to be ot'a Pofitiveand Arbitrary, and Confequently of a Contingent Ordination. It is ttierefore defervedly as well as generally rejected, but then let thofe that re« )ect it have a Care that they fall not into a worfe Abfurdity. As they would not fuppofe Trurii to be of a Pofitive and Alterable Nature and that the Relations of ideas might have been o- therwife than they are, fo let them have a Care how they make any thing NeceiTary and Im* mutable that is Not God. Let them be Con- fiftent with themfelves, and as they juftly re- ject the Opinion that makes Truth the Effect of God's Free and Arbltrarious Conftitution, and confequently of a Mutable and Variable Nature, fo let them own and Confefs (as thev' are Obliged to do) that it is no other than Goii himfelf. For there is no other way of avoiding Des Cartes^ Abfurdity. For if Truth be not God then 'tis the Effect of God, and if the Effefl: of God then fince the Conftitutions of God are Free and Arbitrary, the Natures and Relations of things might have been quite otherwife than they are, the whole Science of Geometry might be tranfpofed, a Circle might have the Properties of a Square, and a Square the Properties of a Circle, 2 and 2 might not have been 4, or what elfe you will inftance in. And fb in Morality too (which is of far worfe Confequence) there might have been the like tranfpohtion, what is Vertue might have been Vice, and what is Vice might have been Ill An Account of been Vertue, Thefe are the Natural Confe- quences oF Truth's being the EfFect of Divine Conrtitution, and they are intolerable ones too, and therefore the Principle from which they flow is by the general Current of Writers well denied. But then unlefs they proceed, and ac- knowledge Truth to be one with the Divine Effence they cannot help relapfing into the fame or worfe Abfurdities. For whoever fays that Truth is not God mufl: fay that it is the EfFect of God, and whoever fays that, mufl: either fay that 'tis Arbitrary and Contingent, or if he fays it is NecelTary and Immutable, he mufl: allow of fomething NecelTary and Immutable that is not God. But now it being mofl: Evident that there is nothing NecelTary that is not God, if Truth be not God then 'tis plain that it cannot be NecelTary (which prefently runs us into the Cartefim Abfurdityof the Arbitrary Pofition of Truth) or if it be NeceCfary then 'tis as plain that it mufl: be God. The fhort is, Truth s either God or the Effect of God. If it be not God, then 'tis the Effefl: of God as Des Cartes fays. But if not the Effeft of God (as the Con- fequent Abfurdities from that Principle demon- flrate, and as is generally granted) then 'tis God himlelf as we fay. It muft be one or the other, there is no iMedium. To lay that Truth is God, or to fay that 'tis the Effeft ot God are each of them Conliflent Propofitions, though from the grofs Abfurdities of the Latter the Former only appears to be the right, but to deny that 'lis the'effeft of God and yet not to fay that it Reafon arid Faith. i r 5 it is God, that is to affirm that 'tis neither the Etfect of God nor yet God, is all over unmain- tainable and inconfilknt. If it be not tlie Efte-fl of God (as is both generally and juftly acknow- ledge) then it mu(t of Neceflity be God, fince whatever is, is either God or the Eftcft of God IS- ^'^^rid indeed if Truth be not God how comes it to be Cloath'd with the Glorious En- figns of his Majefty, to wear the Characters ot his Divinity, and to havefo many of his pe- culiar and incommunicable Attributes ? Hov\'" comes it to be NeceiTary, Immutable, Eter- nal, Self-exirtent, Increated, Immcnfe, Omni- prefent and Independent, and that not only upon the Conceptions of any Minds whether Human or Angelical, but even all things what- foever, which might never have been made, or might now be annihilated without any Pre- judice to the being of I'ruth, which does not refpecl the natural and aflual Exigencies but . only the abftraft EiTences of things. Eor were there no fuch thing as any real Circle or Tri- angle in Nature it would (till be nevertlielefs true that their Abftraft EiTences would be de- terminate and invariable, and that fuch and fuch (lilVmft Properties would belong to tliem. Which by the way plainly Convinces that Truth is none of the Efteds, Works, or Crea- tures of God, fince it did exiit before them, does not now depend on rhem, and would re^ main the felf-fame Immutable thing without them. But then I demand whence has it thiS I Self. 1 1 4. j4n Account of Self-Subfiftence and Independency of Being ? Whence again has it its fixM and unalterable Nature, fuch as we can neither add any thing to, nor diminifli ought from ? How is it that it is Prefent in all Places, and to all Minds, fo as to be Contemplated by them all at the fame time, and after the fame Manner? How comes it to pafsthat we cannot fo much as difimagtm it, or by way of Fiction and Suppofition re- move it out of Being ; but it dill returns upon us with a ftrong and invincible ^pying^ fince even the very Suppofition that there is no Truth carries a Formal Propofition in it whofe Ideas have a certain Habitude to each other, and fo Contradifts it felf. Befides how comes it to be a Pcrfcftion of the Divine Underflanding ? Is any thing a Perfedion to God but himfelf ? How comes it alfo to be the Rule and Meafure of his Will, which can be determined by no- thing but what is Juft, Rcafonable and True ? Can any thing be a Rule to God that is not him- felf ? Does he Confult or follow any thing but what is One with his own Divine Nature and EfTence ? And yet God confults and follows Truth, and cannot aft but according to its Immutable Laws and Meafures. It is not therefore really diflinguifh'd from him, but Co- eternal and Confubftantial with him, and fo in Confulting Truth he Confults his own EfTence"^^, even fcritai ijnmortalis (/?, 'Veritas incommiUahilis /. 123, Reafon and Faith. 1 1 5 even the Divine ao>©-^ the Eternal and Increa- ted Wifdom, the true intelligible Light, in whom arc all the Ideas and ElTences ot things, the Fulnefs of Being and Truth, u^ho in the Beginning was with God, and was God, who is Eternally. Contemplated by him with Infinite Joy and Complacency, and who laid of himfelf Incarnate, !. a7ntbeWaj^ theTruth^ and the Life. I would fain know how all thefe incommuni- cable Attributes of God fhould agree to Truth if it be any thing lefs than a Divine Nature. Particularly I demand, whence has it that un- fliakable Firmnefs and Stability, that invinci- ble Permanency and Stedfaftnefs, that Neceffi- ty of Exiftence, that utter Repugnance to Not Being, but only becaufe it is really Coeffential and Confubllantial with him whofe Name is Jehovah^ and who is Being it felf, to whom it is Eflential to Exift, or rather, whofe very Ef- fence is Exigence. 16. But now from this Coeffentiality and Confubftantiality of Truth with the Divine Nature (a Noble and Sublime Theory, but which I do but lightly touch over, having not room here to purfue it at large) it evidently and neceiTarily follows again that Truth is hpiite. There cannot be a more immediate, nor a more neceffary, nor a more infeparable Connexion between any two things than between this Con- fequence and that Principle. And indeed if Truth were not Infinite how can the Know- ledge of God be fo ? Not lure as Concretely and Qbieftively Confider'd, for that manifeflly I 2 implies 1 1 6 An Account of implies the Infinity of its Object. And what is the Objeft of the Divine, or ofanyotherUnder- llanding, but Truth? And (liould Knowledge here be taken for the Power or Faculty of Know- ing, to what purpofe is an Infinite Fower of Knowing unkfs there be an Infinite to be Known ? And would not fuch a Power be un- eafie and affliflive, as well as ufelefs, to him that had it, unlefs the Objefl be fuppofed to carry a due proportion to it : For if it be fo un- eafie a Refleftion to Yorne of us to have fuch fliort and narrow Faculties when the Compafs of Truth has fo large and fpacious an Extent, to be able to know fo little when there is fo much to be known, how much more troublefom and painful would it be to the Supream Intelligence to have an Infinite Underftanding when all that is intelligible is but Finite ? Would not that In- finity of his Capacity ferve to vex and difquiet him more than the Narrownefs of ours does us, the difference being as much as between having a great Stomach and but little Meat, and a little Stomach when there is a great deal of Meat, whereof which isthegreateft Punifhment isob- vious to imagine. And we may judge of this in fome mealure by our felves. We have in us a Capacity boundlefs and unlimited. For tho* our Underftandings be Finite, our Wills know no Meafure, and are in a manner Infinite, As God has made us capable of enjoying an Infinite Good, fo Nothing lefs than that can fatisfie our Defires. For we defire Good as Good, and con- fequently all pofTibie Good. Now we find this to Reafon and Faith, i i j to be a great Pain to us at prefent to defire an Infinite Good when all that we can enjoy here is Finite. The greated: part of the Uneafiners, the Melancholy, the Difconfolatenefs, the Ari- dity that accompanies Human Life will be found, if trac'd to the Original, to proceed from hence, viz. from the little proportioa that is between our Capacities and our Gratifi- cations, between what is defir'd and what is enjoy'd. And this Defire of an Infinite Good will be a far greater Punifliment to us Hereafter when the Adivity of our Faculties fliall be more invigorated and inlarg'd, if we have not then an Infinite Good to enjoy, 'Twill be at lead the worft ingredient ot Hell and Damnati- on, if not all that is to be underftood by it. And yet we are ftill to Confider that our Will is Infinite only Ex parte Objecii^ becaufe it de- fires an Infinite Good, and not Ex parte A^us becaufe it defires it infinitely or with an unlimi- ted Force and Adivity. For 'tis impoflible that a Finite Nature fliould have any Power or Force in it that is firiftly infinite, or that any fuch Aft or Operation fliould proceed from it. But then what would the Affliction be if the Ad: were Infinite as well as the Object, and we were to afpire after an Infinite Good with an Infinite Defire ! What Conception can Frame a jufl: Idea of the Mifery ot llich a State ! And can it be much lefs for an In- finite Intelligence to have only a Finite In- telligible for its Objeft? But there is nothing Painful or Afflidive in the Condition of the Su- . premely and Compleatly BklTed. And there- I J lore 1 1 g j^n Account of fore we muft Conclude that as the Infinite Will of God lias a Good fully Commenrurate and i\dcquatcto its unlimited Activity, wlKreon it may center and repofc its Weight, {o the Infi- nite Underftanding of God hasalfo an Infinite 1/itelligible for its Objeft. And fince tlie Formal Ohieft of Underftanding in General, and Confe- quently of the Divine, is 7>uth (as that of the Will is Good) hence it follows again that Truth muft: needs be of an Infinite Natrue. 1 7. And do we not find it fo when we Con- vert our felves to it by Study and Meditation ? When we apply our Minds to the Contempla- tion of Truth, and fet our felves to mufe and think, do we not find that we launch forth into a vaft intelligible Sea, that has neither Bottom nor Shore? And the more we think and the more we Meditate are we not ftill more and more convinced of this, and do we notdifcover the further we go in our Intelledlual Frogrefs, that there ftill lies more and more beyond us, fo that the more we advance in the Knowledge of Truth the more we inlarge Our Idea of it, as the greateft Travellers think mod magnificent- ly of the World ? Do we not find as in a Spacious Campaigne, io in the immenfe Field of Truth, thaiour Eye wearies, and our Sight lofes it felf in the Boundlefs Profpeft, and that befidesthe clear view which we have of a few things at a little diftance from us, there lie all round us vaft Trafts unmeafurably diffufed, whereof we have only Confufe and indiltind Images, like .the Faint Blue of the far diltant Hills? Are not the Reafon and Vaith. l T 9 the Relations and Combinations of things with one another Infinite, and iliould but one Unk in this Endlefs Chain be alter'd would not innu- merable Alterations cnfue upon It? Should but One Propofition that is Falfe be fuppofed True^ or One that is True be fuppofed Falfe, what Un- derftanding but the Divine could go on with the Train of New Confequences that would re- fult from fuch a Suppofition ? I fay New Confe- quences, for we arc to confiderthat befides the .Abjblute Syjfemoi Truth which contains the Re- lations of Ideas with their fettled Coherencies and Dependencies one upon another according as they really fiand in their Natural Order, there is a Secondary Syftem of Truth which I may call Hypothetical^ that refults from any fup« pofed Change mad.e in the Abfolute Syiiem, whence will (lill arife new and new Confequen- ces even to Infinity. But not to confider Hypo- thetical 7>uth, can the Bounds oF that which is Abfolute be ever fix'd, or its Stock ever exhaufl- ed ? Does it not after all the Study that has been employed about it, and the numberlefs Number of Volumes that have been v/ritten upon it fur- nifh perpetual matter for our Contemplation, and is it not a Subjefl: for everlafting Thoughts and Confiderations ? Has it not been the great Refearchof the Thoughtful and Inquifitive for many Ages, and yet does not every Age refine upon its Predeceffor, and produce New Difco- veries? Are not the Sciences continually impro- ved, and yet are there not Hill Depths in every Science which no Line of Thought can ever I 4 fathom ? 1 10 j^n Account of fathom? WhatavaftFecuniHty isthcre in lome plain fimplc PropolUions, nay who can number the Conclufions that may be drawn from any one Principle! Take tlic moft fimple Figuie in Geometry, and where is the Mathematician who after a Thouland Years Study can reckon up all the Properties that may be affirmed of it, botha.-; Abfolutely Confkler'd, and as it Ilands in relation to other Figures ? And what then flnll we think of the whole Science in all its Branches and Dependencies, Particularly of Jlgeb^a^ the Main Ocean of this Bottomlefs Sea? And what fhall we fay of Metaphyficks, ano- ther unmeafurable Abyfs, and what of the end- lefs Circle of Truth, if not the fame which one of Job's Friends fays of God, Job ii. 7. Car/ft thou by Jhrchwg fad out Truth, C^njl thou find her cut unto Perje^tion ? It is us high a^sHaaver?^ ivhut ca/:/t thou do ? deeper than Htlly irhat canfl thou know ? The Meafure thereof is Umger than the Earthy and broader than the Sea. And that be* caufe they after all are Finite, whereas this is truly and flriftly Infinite. Which by the way fufficlently proves a God, and that this God is Truth, whofe Eternal and Glorious Majefty be Blcifed for Ever. iS. But then letusConfider, if Truth bein- deed (as you fee) or an Infinite Nature, then to prove that Human Reafon is not fully ade- quate to it, does not intirely poifefs it, nor all over and wholly comprehend it, and confequent- ly cannot be the Meafure of ir, there will be no need of laying open the great Weaknefs and De- ficiency Rcajon and Faith. HI nciency of ourUnderftanding: I need not re- prefent the Imperfcflion of its Light, nor the Shortnefs of its Views, nor the Siendernels of its Attainments, nor the very Narrow Extent of its Knowledge, nor the very little Progrefs it is able to make in the Contemplation and Comprehenfion of Truth ; That there are a great many things whereof we have no Ideas (for which we need go no furtlier for an In« fiance than our own Souls) and that even where we have Ideas of things we cannot always dif- cern the Relations and Connexions that are be- tween them, and that either for want of fuffi- cicntClearnefs in the Ideas them.felves to have their Relations perceived immediately without comparing them with other mediate Ideas, or elfe for want of fuch due and proper Mediums wherewith to compare them, and that there- fore the extent of our Knowledge is not only vaftly exceeded by the Natures of things, but alfo very Confiderably even by our own Ideas, there being many things whereof we have Ideas, and fometimes very clear ones too, and yet which we know no more how to reafon upon or difcourfe of intelligibly, or with any Cer- tainty, than we do of thofe things whereof we have no Ideas at all, being, for Example, no more able to tell what proportion fuch a Circle bears to fuch a Square though we have clear I- deas of both, than wc are to tell what proporti- on there is between Angels and our own iiouls, things whereof we have no Ideas. A very re- markable Inftance of ^he Shortnefs and Con- traccedne^ 122 \An Account of tradednefs of our Underftandings, which It feemsare not only deftitute of the Ideas of ma- ny things, andConfequently of the knowledge of them (it being impoflible that the extent of our knowledge fhouid exceed that of our Ideas') but are alib Blind to thofc very Ideas which they have, and cannot fee even when they have the advantage of the Light. But I lay, I need not prefent my Reader with a Night-piece of Human Reafon, defcribe its great Blindnefs and grofs Darknefs, how ignorant fhe is when flic does not adventure to judge, and how Er- roneous when flie does, Rumbling and falling (as is ufual in the dark) cut of one miftake into another, out of one Error into another, either by imbracing falle Principles, or by drawing wrong Conclufions from true ones, fo that Ig- norance feems her fafetl: Retreat, and to fufpend her beft Wifdom ,- Thefe I fay and fuch other qf our intelleftual Infirmities I need not infift upon or make any advantage of, it being fuffi- cient to conclude the Point in hand that Hu- man Reafon in its largeft Capacity and Extent and with all the advantages of both Nature and Artificial improvement is after all but a Fi^^ite thing (and that to be furethemoft Zealous of its Votaries and Advocates muft contefs that it is) fince 'tis impoiTible that what has Bounds fbouldbe able totally and adequately to Com- prehend what has None, or that F/;?//^ fhould be the Meafure of Infinite. 19. I know but of one thing that can with any Pertinency be replied to this Argument, and Reafon and Faiths 1:^5 and that is, that though Human Reafon (as Finite) be not able to comprehend all Truth (as being Infinite) yet however there may perhaps benoonel'ruth in Particular but what, when prefented to it, may be comprehended by it, and fo Human Reafon may be rightly faid to be Adequate and Commenfurate to Truth as Diflributtvel), though not as Co/leciivelj confi- der'd. But to this I have feveral things to re- turn. Firft of all I fay that fuch is the recipro- cal dependence and concatenation of Truth that the want of a thorough and intire Comprehen- fion of all Truth in its wideft and moft diffufed Extent muft needs very much Eclipfethe view and darken the Perception of any one Solitary Truth in particular, fo that however we may have fome tolerable Perception of it, and fuch as we may call Clear in Comparifon of fome other Truths which we do not fee fo clearly, yet it cannot be near fo Clear and Diftinft a Perception, as that Infinite Being has of it who fees not only the Truth it felf, but alfo the Manifold Relation, Connexion, and Combi- nation that it has with all other Truths. The difference between thefe two ways of Percepti- on being of a like Nature with that which is be- tween feeing a Propofition as it ftandsfingly by it felf, and feeing the fame Propofition with all its Relations and Dependencies, and inconjun- ftion with the whole Context and Coherence of the Difcourfe whereof it is a Part. I fay a- gain Secondly, that though we may have a competent Perception of fome plain and fimple Truths 11 1 j4n Account of Truths without purfuing them tliorough all the Relationsand Dependencies that tliey have with other Truths (fince othcru'ife, as I have hinted already, vve fliould be able to underftand no- thing, and every thing would be above Reafon) yet however we do not know but that there may be fome Truths of luch a Nature as not to be underdood without the adequate Compre- hcnfion of thole Relations and Dependencies ; which fince we have not, we do not, nor can ever know but that there may be fome Truths that are fo above us as to be out of our Reach, and to lie beyond all poffibility of Comprehen- fion, and confequently that Human Reafon is not adequate and commenfurate to Truth even Difiributtvel) confiderM. I fay we do not know, and 'tis impoflible we fhould ever know but that thus it may be. For how fhould we be able to know it, or upon what fliall we ground this our Knowledge ? It muft be either upon the Natural Force and Penetration of our Un- derlhndings, or upon our Adual Views and Perceptions, or upon the Nature of Truth it ielf. As for the Capacity of our Underdand- ings though we do not know the precife and cxaft Bounds and Limits of it, yet we know in the general that it is Finite, and has its fixM and determinate Meafure, which it would Itrive in vain to exceed. As for the Nature of Truth, that we both experiment, and from the foregoing Confiderations mull of neceffity con- clude to be Infinite. And what Ground of Af- iurancecan we have from either or both of thefe, which Reafon ayid taiih. 125 which arc apt rather to lay a Foundation of Dif- fdence and Didiuft ? And then as Tor our aQual Vicwsand Perceptions, though we fhould fuppofe them to have been hitherto never lb clear and diftinfl, never fo numerous and ex- tenfive, and never fo fortunate and fucceis- ful, fo that our Viftorious Underilandings never yet met with a Baffle, nor founded a retreat from a too difficult and imprcgnabla Theory, fuppofe in one word, that we never yet applied our minds to the confideration of a- ny one Truth but what wc fully comprehend- ed and were perfefl: Mafters of (which yet he mult be a very Prefumptuous, or a very little experienced Thinker that Dial] affirm of himfelf) how notwithfl:anding do we know, confidcr- ing the Finitenefs of our Intelleft, and the In- finitenefs of Truth, but that there may be O- ther Truths of a Nature fo far above us, andfo difproportionate to us, as not poffibly to be Comprehended 'by us. For we cannot argue here from the paft Succefles and Atchievements of our UnderiiandiDgs to the Future, or be- caufe there has been nothing hitherto propofed to us but what we Comprehended, that there- fore there can be nothing propofed but what we can Comprehend, if we conclude thus, we forget the vafl difproportion between Truth and Human Reafon, that the one is Finite and the other Infinite, the due and attentive Con- fideration of which would convince us that tho' we have thought never fo much, and ne- ver fo well, and comprehended never fo many Truths, yet for ought we know there may be Ii6 j^n Account of be Truths which our intelleftual Sight though aided with all the advantages of Art, that may help the Mind as much as a Te/efeope does the Eye, can yet never penetrate, and which (by the way) it may be Worthy of God to reveal to us if 'twere only toCheck and Controle the dar- ing Progrefs of our Underrtanding, to make us underftand our Meafure and remember that we are but Men, to be fenfible of the de- fers of that part upon which we moft value our felves and defpife others, and that even the Light that is in us is but Darknefs. Whether there be any fuch Truths I do not now fay, but only that upon the Suppofition ot the Infinity of Truth 'tis impofliblefor us to be fure but that there may be fuch, which is enough to hinder Our Reafon from being (at leaft as to us) the Meafure of Truth, fince if it be fo 'tis more than we know, or can poffibly be affured of, which makes it all one (jo^sj as if it were not. For we cannot make ufe of it as a M*eaiure, or draw any Confequence from ittotheFalfehood, Im- poffibility, or Incredibility of things Licompre- henfible, fince for ought we know or can know to the Contrary, there may be Truths which we cannot Comprehend. 20. But then I fay further Thirdly, that the Infinite Nature of Truth will Oblige us to ac- knowledge that there aftually are and muft be fuch. For if Truth be Infinite then 'tis plain that we cannot Comprehend it in its full and intire Extent, and fo much the very Objeftion fuppofes. But then I fay that as the want of a perfect Reafon ayid Faith. 177 perfefl: Comprehenfion of all Truth does very much fhade and darken the perception of any one fingle Truth in particular, and that becaufe of the mutual connexion and dependence of things one upon another (as was before obferv'd) fo it mull needs quite Eclipfe and totally Ab- fcond fome Truths from our N^iew. For there are fome Truths fo very Complex and Abftrufe, and that lie fo deep, and, as I may fay, fo far within the Bowels of the Intelleclual Syflem, that include fuch a Multitude of Relations, de- pend upon fo many Suppofitions, are the Con- clufionsot fo many Premiffes, pre-fuppole and require the knowledge of fo many things (of fome of which it may be we have not fo much as the fimple Ideas) have (iich a Train of Prin- ciples Planted and IntrenchM as a Guard be- fore 'em, and draw fuch an immenfe Retinue of Confequences after them, and are every way fo mingled^ involv'd and combined with 0- ther Truths that they cannot pofTibly be un- derftood without an intire and all-comprehen- five view of the whole Rational Syftem. In- ilances of fuch Truths abound in every Science. But there is nothing that may furnifli us with fo fenfible and palpable an Illuftrationof this Mat- ter as the Order and Meafur.e of Divine Provi^ dence. We are all fully alfured from the very Notion and Idea of God as involving all poffi* ble Excellency and Perfection in it, that he is a Being infinitely Wife, Good, ]ult and Holy, and Ccnfequently that his whole ConduQ in the Government of the World mufi: neceilarily carry 11 S An Account of carry the Charafter of all thefe Attributes, and that he cannot pofTibly do any thing contrary or repugnant to any of them any more than he cay der^y himfelf, or depart irom the Effential Perfeflions of his Infinite Nature. And upon this Confideraticn is founded the bett Argu- ment wc have fflr Submiflion and Refignation to the Will of God, and Acquiefcence in his Providential Difpenfations. Thus far then u'e are all fatisfied and agreed. And yet it cannot be denied wlien we come to Particulars, but that there are FhemmenA in the Moral as well as in the Natural World which are utterly infolvi- ble, and that a great many of thefe Difpenfati>- ons of Providence are accompanied with defpe- rate and invincible Difficulties, fuchas have at once exercifed and puzzled the thoughts of the moft inquifitive in all Ages, and flill remain Obflinate and Unmovable Objeftions not only to the Atheifti and Libertines^ but even to the moftfober and intelligent of both Philofophers and Divines, Men of the greateft Light and Piety, thofe who beft underlland, anddomoft reverence and adore the ways of God. And a- dore them after all they mufl, for fo intricate and intangling are the Difficulties, or (by the leave of fome) 1 would fay Myfleries of Provi- dence, efpecially in thofe dark Scenes of it that relate to the Divine Concourfeand Co-opera- tion with the Will of Man, the Ordination of his Final State, the Order and Diflribution of Grace, the Permiflion, Direction and Nice Conduct of Sin, d'c. that the Capacity of our Underiianding Keafon and Faith. 129 Underfianding willnotferve us to give a clear and unobnoxious account of them. Indeed the diligent and curious Wit of Man has gone a great way in this as well as in Other Matters, and feveral Syftems and Hypothefes have been invented about thefe things by Contemplative Spirits, among whom the two very particular Authors of the Treati/e o{ Nature and Grace, and of UOecorjomie Dtvirje have I think gone the furtheft of any. But though fome of thefe Accounts bid fairer for reception than others, by ftriking fome glimmering Light into thefe Abftrufities, yet (till they all agree in this, that they leave a great deal more in the Dark, and labour with Difficulties even where they do Explain : So that after all they difcover nothing fo much as their own Shortnefs and Deficiency. In the mean while we know and are mofi: certairi in the General, that all is right and as it fhould be in the Condu£l of God towards his Crea- tures, and that he cannot make one falfe Step in the Government of the World. So much we underftand without Syftems, and truly not much more with them. For as for the Parti- cular Scenes of Providence we know not what to make of them ; and when we have confi- der'd the Difpenfations of God as much as we can or dare, we find our fclves after all obliged to confefs, that though Rightcoufnep and^judg- ment are the Habitation of his Seat^ yet Clouds And Darkness are round about him. Pfal. 97. 2. 2 1 . But now how comes it to be fo Dark and Cloudy ? How come we to be fo little K ' abk l^o jiin Account of able to fee the particular Wifdom, Goodnefs, Juftice and Holinefs of thofe ways of God, which in the general we are convinced to be fo Wif% Good, Jufl: and Holy? Why carf wc not enter into the Detail of Providence? Why even becaufe wedonot fee it throughout, and have not a Comprehenfion of its Univerfal Syftem. For the PalTages of Providence are of fuch a Relative and Complicated Nature, there is fuch a kind of 7r=e/;^V'^'^ ^^ mutual in-be- ing or in-drnJling in them, (if I may transfer an Expreflion hither, commonly applyed to a higher Myftery) they are fo interwoven with, and have fo common a dependance upon one another, that without a Comprehenfive View of the whole DramHy we can hardly make any thing of any one Particular Scene. Indeed if we could have fuch a View as that, a View that went round and through, and grafp'd the whole Arenoi that immenfe Circle, we fhould quickly fee the Regularity ot the moft uneven and odd-figured Parts, and how wonderfully they confpired (like the Flats and Sharps of Mufick) to the Order and Harmony of that excellent and furprizing Beauty that refults from them. But being not able to reach this, we are not competent Judges of the reft, (which by the way fbould reprefs our forwardnefs to fit in Judgment upon things fo far above the Cognizance of our Court); and though we know the Meafures of God to be all Wife, Good, Juft and Holy, yet this is only an implicit Knowledge, founded upon an External Evi- . dencc Reafon and Faith. i^j dencc only (much after the fame manner as it is in Faith) even the general Conception we have of the Divine Perfcflion, without ajy clear ^nd immediate difcernment of the Internal Connexion that is between the things them- felves. We believe 'tis all well and right be- caufe the Infinitely Wife God fits at the Helm ; but then again, becaufe he is fo Infinitely Wife wecannotlound the Depths of his Wifdom (as indeed it would be very itrangeif an Infinitely Wife Agent fliould not be able to do things Wifely, and yet beyond our Underftanding; nor reconcile all his particular proceedings to the Laws of Reafon and Equity ; but the more we fludy about thefe things the more we are at a lofs, the further we wade into this Sea the deeper we find it, till at lall: we find cur felves obliged to cry out with the moft infpired A- poftle, the Depth of th Riches both of the WiJ- dom and Kj^owledge of God, how unje^tchable are his 'Judgments^ and his Ways pdji findirjg out ! Rom. II. J J. And all for want of an Intirs andComprehcnfive View of them. For if the Knowledge of fome very Compounded Truths be importible without the Clear Perception of the Simple Principles upon which they depend ; and a Man would to no purpofe beat his Brains about the Confideratlon of Cqnicd Secfio^s, till he has firft well poiTeiTed himfelf of Ordmary Geometry ; how much lefs then (may we con- clude) are the Intricate and very Complicated Events of Divine Providence to be unravel'd without a Collected and Simultaneous Idea of K 2 the: 1 3 1 -^^ Account of the Univerfal Syftem whereof they are parts, to which they relate, and from their Concen^ tricity with which they receive all their Order and Beauty, but which is in a manner loft to us for want of Compafs enough in our Profpeft. By which fingle Inftance it appears (among many others that might have been given) how the Incapacity of Comprehending Truth in its whole Extent may difable us from Compre- hending many Particular Truths ; and confe- quently, that the fame Infinity of Truth which hinders us from Comprehending it according to that Extent, muft alfo hinder us as much from being able to comprehend every Particular Truth. So then there will be Particular Truths which are Incomprehenfible by us, and confe- quently Human Reafon is not Commenfurate to all Truth, not only as Colleftively, but even as Diftributively ConfiderM. And therefore not as Dijlrihutiveljj becaufe not as CollecHvely. 2 2. But then to raife our Speculation a ht- tle higher, I confider yet further, that the In- finity of Truth is not only an Infinity of Ex^ tent^ but alfo an Infinity of Nature, that is, that the Compafs of Truth is not only Bound- lefs and illimited, and that it has in it an in- exhauftible Spring, which like the Source of Light, is never to be drawn dry by the moft thirfty draught ofthe whole IntelleQual World, but alfo that there are Particular Truths of a Nature truely infinite, and by confequence in- comprehenfible to any Underftanding that is not fo. For we arc here to recolJeft, what has Reafon and Faith. i :^ :^ has been already fhewn, that Truth is Confub- ilantial and Co effential with God and with the Divine Ideas. Now though thefe Ideas are all equally of the Eflence and Nature of God, and fo far equally Divine (it being impolTible that there fliould be any thing in God that is not God^ yet there is this general and very remark- able Difference between them, that fome of thefe Divine Ideas are Abfolute, and fome Re- lative. That is, fome are of the EfTence of God Simply and Abfolutely as He is in Him- felf, without any Relation to any thing out of Himfelf. And others again are of the HfTence of God confider'd purely in Relation to things without Him either in A£t or in PoiTibility, and only fo far forth as the Divine Eflence is reprefentatiye of Creatures. Or if you will, thus : We may confider a twofold Being in Ideas, EJfe Reale, and EJfe Ideale or Repr^fe/g* tativum. Some Ideas are Divine, not only ac- cording to their Effe Reale (for fo they are all) but alfo according to their Ejje Refr£fentativum^ as reprefenting God to the Mind that Contem- plates them. Others again are Divine only according to their Ejfe Rea/e^ being indeed of the Subltance of God, but not reprefenting him, but his Creatures, and fo are Divine in the lame fenfe as the Idea of a Body is Spiritual, v:z.Ejfef2tiaIIy only y not Re pre fent at ively. Which Diverlicy indeed refolves into the former, be- caufe they are of the Eflence of God, not as it is abfolutely in it fclf, but only as it is repre- fentative of Creatures, according to fuch a cer- K J tain 124. -^^^ Account of tain Modality and Limitation of Perfeftion. i\nd accordingly though they are ixu\y Divine laeassis well as the other, yet they are not faid to he Jdt^rs of God, as not reprefenting him, but Ms Creatures. The fhort is, The Effence of God may be confider'd either as it is abfolutely in It felf according to its Infinite Simplicity, or as it is in relation to, and reprefentative of things without, either of an Adual, or of a Poffible Hxiflence And fo the Ideas of Ef- fential Perfections of God are of two forts: Ei- ther fueh as are of the Eirence of God confider'd in the firfc fenfe, as it is in it felf, or elfe fuch as are of the fame Divine Effence only in the fecond fenfe, as far forth as that Effence is re- prefentative of things out of it felf ; upon which by the way, I fuppofe, muft be grounded (if we will refolve things into their lall Principle) the common diftinftion of the Attributes of God into Communicable and Incommunicable. The Incommunicable Attributes of God being thofe Perfeftions that are of the Divine Fiffencc Sim- ply and Abfolutely confider'd as it is in it felf; and the Comwunicahle thofe that belong to the Divine Effence Relatively confider'd, and as reprefentative of Creatures, to whom accord- ingly they are in their Meafure truly applica- ble ; whereas the former are nor, but are pecu- liar to God alone; which fufficiently (liews the difference between this double order of Di- vine Ideas. But to make it yet more intelligi- ble by an Inliance. The Idea of the Divine Imme?f(ity, or that Perieciw?} m God which we call Reafon ami Faith, i 5 5 call his Immenfity, is of the EHence of God according to the firfl: fenfe, as it is fimply and abfolutely in it felf; being no other than tlie Subftance of God as it is univerftlly diffufed, intirely prefent in, and filling all places with- out being circumfcribed by any, yet without any Local Extenfion. But now the Idea of Extenfion^ or that Perfeflion in God which ver- tually, eminently, and modo melligibiU^ an- fwers to Extenfion (and is therefore frequently called by Mr. MMranch^ U et endue intdligu hie) is of the Subftance of God, not as it is in it felf fimply and abfolutelv, but only as far forth as it is reprefentative of Matter, or Body, and imitable or participate by it, according to thofe Limitations and Imperfeftions which belong to that kind of Being, and which are reprelented by this its Idea. I know not whe- ther I exprefs my felt to the Conception of e- very Reader, but I am fufficiently Clear and Intelligible to my felf; and whoever is not much wanting either in Metaj)hyficSy or in At^ tention^ cannot I think well mifsmy Meaning. 23. Now the ufe that I make oi this Specu- lation to the prefent purpofe is this: Thofe I- deas which are of the ElTence of God only as that Divine ElTence, according to fome certain Limitations and inadequate Confidcrations of it, is reprefentative of Creatures, muft be con- fider'd by us as of a Finite Nature. Becaufe however truly Divine and of the Eflence of God, yet not as it is abfolutely and fimply in it lelf, but only as it is in relation to Creatures ; K 4 that 1^6 Aa Acmmt of that is, as partially and inadequately confider'd, according to certain Abftraftions and Limita- tions of Lintity and Perteftion, fuch as the things whereof they are Ideas do require. And ac- cord insly fuch Ideas are ordinarily faid, not to be the^ldeas of God who is Infinite (for they do not reprefent hm^ though Effential to him) but to be the Ideas of Creatures, who are Finite. They are indeed Divine Ideas ^ becaufc Effential to God ; but they are not Ideas of God, becaufe they are of the Divine Effence only as it relates to Creatures, and is reprefentative of them. Of Creatures therefore they are the Ideas, and God in feeing them is not properly faid to feehimfelf, (thoughthey areof himfelf) butto fee Creatures ; becaufe though they are of his Divine Effence, yet 'tis only according to fuch Precifions, Limitations and Inadequations of it as to be expreffive and reprefentative of their Finite Perteftions. As therefore the Realities which thefe Ideas reprefent are Finite, fo thefe Ideas muft be conceivM by us as Finite too ; it being impoffible that Infinite confider'd as Infi- nite, fhould be reprefentative of what is Finite. And as thefe Ideas are Finite, lo are they alfo by Confequence fo Proportionate, and of a Meafure fo adjufled to Finite Underftandings, as to be Intelligible by them, and within the Foffibility of their Comprehenfion ; which mult alfo in like manner be concluded of all thoic Truths which are Confubllantial to them. And accordingly the Experiment anfwers the Theory. We find that not only contingent Truths Reafon and Faith. jij Truths that regard only the Actualities and Exi- flencies of Things, fuch as matters of Fact, Hu- man Events, &c. but even a great many of thofe which are Ideal and Neceflary, and con- cern only the Abftract Reafons and Effences of Things independently on their Actual Exiftence, are Comprehenfible by us, as in Metafhyfus and Geometry^ in the Contemplation of which Sci- ences we meet with a great many things which we well underftand, and whereof we have Clear Ideas and Conceptions. 24. But now it is not thus with the Ideas of the firft Order, nor with their Trtfths. tho' thofe Divine Ideas which appertain to the Ef- fence of God only as reprefentative of Creatures, be both Finite and Comprehenfible by limited Underftand ings, ( which indeed otherwife would not be capable of any Science) yet thefe Abfolute Ideas which I now fpeak of, are nei- ther Finite nor Comprehenfible. For thefe Ideas are ot the very Effence and Subftanceof God as it is in it felf purely and feparately confi- der'd according to its fimple and abfolute Na- ture, and not as it is in relation to Creatures, or as reprefentative of any Reality out of it felf. And accordingly God in contemplating thefe Ideas of his may be truly and ftriftly faid to contemplate himfelf ; and we alio in the Con- templation of them do as really contemplate God, and that becaufe they are of his Divine Effence fimply and abfblutely confiderM as it is in it felf, and not as it is in reference co any thing befides, or our of it felf. Thele Ideas therefore 1:5 s ^n jAccoiint of therefore are ftriflly Infinite (becaufe the Di- vine EiTence, as it is in it fell fimply and abfo» lutcly confiderM is fo) and confequently Incom- prehenfible by any Finite, and confequently by Human Underllanding. God only can com- prchend thefe Ideas, and that becaufe he only can Comprehend himfelf. Human Reafon in- deed has Light enough to difcover that there are fuch Ideas and Perfections in God, and is withal able to difcern enough of them to raife her greatcfl: Vv^onder and Devotion, and to make her defplfe all other Intelligible Objefts in comparifon of thefe h/fi/iite Grandeurs ; and the Angelic Spirits that wait about the Throne of his Majefty, and liand in a better Light, are able to fee yet more of them ; but neither the one nor the other can Comprehend them fully any more than they can God himfelf, and that becaufe they are God. So that tho' the other Ideas are Finite and Comprehenfible, thefe are truly Infinite and Incomprehenfible, And of this we have {ufficient Fividence in the Inftan- ces above propofed of each. The Idea of £jc- tenfion is very Clear and Intelligible to our Minds, as Finite and as Narrowly bounded as they are. We have a very distinct View of it, we Perceive it, we Comprehend it. Among all Intelligible Objefts there is none that is more clear, nor whereof we have a more adequate and exaft Notion. And upon this is founded all that peculiar Clearnefs, Evidence and Cer- tainty that is in the Geometric Sciences, which alone have the happinefs to be free from Di- fputcs Reafon and Falth» 159 fputes, and without Contcftatlon to find that Truth which the others fcek after, and that for no other Reafon but becaufc wc have fo clear and diftinft a Notion of its General Subjeft, Exter?fion. But now as to the '^ Divine Immen- fity^ fo far are we froni having a Clear Concep- tion of that, that no fooncr do we fet our felves to contemplate this vaft Idea, but we enter into Clouds and Darknefs, or rather into fuch an over-fliining and infupportable Light as dazzles and blinds our Eyes, yea hurts and pains them, till they can no longer endure to gaze, but are forc'd to refrefli themfelves either by letting down their wearied Lids (fufpenfe of Thought) or by turning their view upon lefs glorious Ob- jedls. In the iMeditation of the other Idea we are like Men that wade in a River where we both fee and feel the Bottom, and go on for a pretty way together fmoothly and without much difficulty, only now and then meeting with an intangling Weed that lets and incum- bers our Progrefs. But in the Contemplation of the Infinite Idea of the Divine Immenfity we are like Men that commit themfelves to the Main Sea, at the very firfl: Plunge out of our Depth, andready tobeoverwhelm'd, fwallow- ed up and loil: in an Abyfs that knows no Bot- tom. 25. i * / the rather Injfatice in the Divine Immenfity, haaufe the De- njout Pfalmiji docs herein particularize his Ignorance, making it the Suhje^ of hit .^Jionijlment rather than his Curiofitj. Such Know- ledge is too wonderful for mc, it is high, I cannot iCCain unto ir, pfa\. 139. 140 j4n Account of 25. lufea little Figure and Imagery here tlic better to imprefs this upon the l.magin.ition ot thole who are not fo well habituated to the Con- ception of things by ?ure Int.lle^ion^ but the thing it felf needs none of the advantages of the Metaphorical way, being ftriQly and feverely true. And by thefe two Inftances it may ap- pear what a va(l difference there is between thefe two forts of the Divine Ideas, the A-bfo- lute and the Relative, thofe that are of the Ef- fence of God as in himfelf, and thofe that are of the fame Divine Elfence as it is in relation to Creatures. The Firft, Infinite and Inconi- prehenfible ; the Second, Finite and Compre- henfible. For you fee here the Idea of Extenfi- on is clear and diftinft, and fuch as we can fully and adequately Conceive, but the Idea of the Divine Immenfity, has nothing clear and di- ftind in it, but is all over Darknefs and Obfcu- rity, and fuch as quite afloniflies and confounds us with a Thoufand Difficulties upon the firft application of our Thoughts to it, as indeed do all the Ahfolute Attributes and Perfedions of God, which are all equally Infinite, and equally incomprehenfible to Finite Spirits, however they may be able to Comprehend that which in the Effence of God is refrefentattve of, and car- ries a ReUtton to thofe Realities wiiich either aftually do, or pofTibly may exifi out of it. And in this I fay no more (fetting afide only the Rationale of the thing) than thofe who tell us t\\2iiXht Incommumcable Attributes of God are In- finite and Imcomprehenfible. They are fo. But Reafon and Faith. i^t But wIiAt is it that makes them Infinite and In- comprehenlible? Even the fame that makes them Incommunicable^ viz,, their being of the Eflence of God as it is in it felf according to its Abfolute Simplicity, and not as it is in Relati- on to Creatures. For 'tis moft evident that the ElTence ot God as it is fimply and Abfolutely in it felt is every way Infinite and Incompre- henfible, and therefore all thofe Ideas and Fer- feftions of his which are in this Abiolute Senfe ElTential to him muft be alfoof an alike Infi- nite and Incomprehenfible Nature. Which by the way may ferve to Silence the prefumptuous Cavils of thofe who draw Objedlions againfl the Exiftenceof God from the imcomprehenfi- bility of his Attributes, fince if there be a God he muft have Incomprehenfible Attributes, which unlefs we afcribe to him we do not think either rightly or worthily of him. 26. But to refume our Point, we fee then here what a large Field is now open'd to our Profpeft of Infinite and Incomprehenfible Truths, even of a Compafs as large as the Ab- folute Ideas and Perfeftions of the Divine Ef- fence. For though all Created things are of a Finite Nature, and tho' even the Divine Ideas that reprefcnt them, as far as reprefentative of them, mufl: fall under the fame limited Confi- deration, yet thofe Abfolute Ideas and Perfedi- onsof God that have no fuch external Reference, but are of the Divine HfTence as it is in its pure, fimple, abftraded Self, m.uftnecelTarily partake of the Divine Infinity, and be as unbounded as God himfelf. And iince Truth (as was before obferv"*d) 1^7 An Account of obferv'd) Is Coeflfentlal and Confubftantlal with the Divine Ideas, I further Conclude, thattho^ thofe Truths which regard the ActuaUties and Exiftencies of Things, or if you pleafe, things that do aftually exill, be Finite, becaufe the things themfelves are fo, and tho' even thofe that regard the Divine Ideas themfelves are alfo Finite fuppofing the Ideas to be of the inferiour Order, fuch as are of the Divine ElTence only as it is reprefentative of, and in relation to Creatures, yet thofe Truths which refpefl: thofe Divine Ideas of the Superiour Order, that are of the Abfolute EfTence of God as it is in it felf purely and fimply Confider^d, and fo are not only E[fer/tsally^ but even Reprefentatively Divine, astrufy reprefentingGod, and being in a ftrifl: and proper fenfe his Ideas, I fay the Truths of this Order and Character muft neceflarily be of a Nature far exalted above all Creatures, yea above all other Ideal Truths, even as far as what is of the Simple and Abfolute ElTence of God tranfcends that which in the fame EfTence is only Relative to things without, and can therefore be no lefs than Infinite. We have here then an Order of Infinite Truths, even all thofe which regard the Abfolute Ideas and Per- fections of God. Thefe Divine Ideas and Fer- feftions are as Infinite, as that Glorious EfTence whofe Ideas they are and whom they reprefent, and fo alfo are the Sublime Truths which refulc from them. They are of a Nature flriftly Infi- nite, and if Infinite then by confequence Incom'^ -prehenfible^ I mean to all under/landings that are not fo. For as Nothing Finite has Reality enough Reafon and Faith. i^:^ enough to reprefent Infinite, fo neither can any thing Finite have Capacity enough to Compre- hend it. For as the aftual knowledge of any intelligent Being can never exceed its intelleftu* al Power, fo neither can its Power exceed the meafure of its EiTence. A Finite Being there- fore muft have a Finite Underftanding, and a Finite Underftanding muft have a Finite Per- ception. Since then our Underftandings are Finite, 'tis plain that our Perception of Infinite muft alfo be Finite. 'Tis true indeed that 0^- jeciive Reality which we contemplate when we think upon Infinite has no Limits, and fo we may be faid in fome refpect to have an hjinite Thought^ as far as the Operation of the Mind may be denominated from the quality of the Object, but yet ftill we think according to the iMeafure of our Nature, and our Perceftwn of Infinite can be no more at the moft than Finite. But now a Finite Perception bears no proportion to ani Infinite Intelligible, befides that to perceive fucii an Object after a Finite manner is not to perceive it as it is, but only Partially and inadequately. But now a Partial and inadequate Perception of a thing can never be faid to be a Comprehenfioa of thatching, even though the thing be Finite, much lefs then when it is Infinite. VVHiercby it plainly appears that if there be an Order of hjfimte 'i^ruths the fame will alio be Incomprehen* fible Ones, and fince again as I have fliewn there is an Order of fuch Truths, even all thofe thac regard the Abfolute Ideas and Perfections of the Divine EiTence, it clearly follows that there is an 144 -^^ j^aount of an Order of Incomprclienfible Truths, and Confequently that Human Reafon is not the •JMeafure of Truth, even Dtjinbutively confider- ed, fince there are Particular Truths which it cannot Comprehend ; which was the thing to be proved. 27. And of all this we may have a plain and vifible illuftration in the forementionM Inftance of the Divine Immenfity. This is an Idea or Perfection of God that is truely Infinite, as be- ing of his Divine ElTence as it is Abfolutely in it felf, and not as in Order to, or reprefentative of Creatures ; And as Infinite 'tis alfo Incompre- henfible by any but God himfelf. Accordingly the Complex Truth that regards this Abfolute Idea of God is alfo Infinite, and as fuch Incom- prehenfible. As appears in this Propofition, Godu Immenfe^ which is an Infinite and Incom- prehenfible Truth. We find it is fo a Pofleriori by cafting the view of our Underftandingsupon it. And we find it muft be fo ^ Priori by rea- loning upon the Principles already laid down and eftablifhM. And to prevent all vain cavil- ling in this matter I further add, that though we could fuppofe the Truths that refult from Infi- nite Ideas not to be Infinite (which yet we can- not by reafon of their real Identity and Coeflen- tiality with thofe Ideas) yet however they muft upon another account be incomprehenfible, even upon the Incomprehenfibility of thofe ideas. For if the ideas whereof a Truth confifts be In- comprehenfible, as they mufl: be if they are Infi- nite, that alone would be. enough to hinder us from Keafon and Faith. 1 4 5 fi'om being able to Comprehend fuch a Truth* icbeingimpolTiblewe fhould thoroughly.under- ftand the Relations or Habitudes between thofe Ideas whofe Simple iMatures (the Foundation of thofe Habitudes) we do not Comprehend. For if in Finite things the not having a clear and adequate Idea of a thing makes us unable to mdgc of the Truth or Fallliood of many Propo- iitions concerning that thing (whereof there are a multitude of Inftances in Mordity^ efpecially in Queiiions relating to the Sotdoi Man, which rnuft for ever lie undeterminM merely ior wane of our having a clear Idea of that Noble Effence) much more then in things Infinite will the noc having a ComprehenTion of the ideas incapaci* tate us from Comprehending the Truths than Refuft from them, which will therefore be as incomprehenlible as if they were (what indeed they are) in themfelves Infinite. 28. 1 have hitherto fnewn the Incomprehen- fibility of Truth by Human Reaion, andconfc- quently that Human Reafon is not the Meafure of Truth, from the joint Confideracion of each. Only with this difference. 1 have coni-derM and reprefented Truth Abfolutely as it is in it ielf, according to its own Inhnice and unmeafu- rable Nature. But as for Human Reafon I have coniiderM that only asf//?//f, asfuppoHng than fuiBcient tomyprefent Furpofc, and that there was no need of placing it in any othe: Light. For after it hath been fhewn that Truth is Infi- nite, to prove that Human Realbn cannot be the Meafur^: of it, it is certainly enough to con* L fider 14-6 ^n Account of fider it as a bounded Po\yer, without repreient- ing how very ftrait and narrow its Bounds are, fince wliatever is Finite can never meafure Infi* nite. But then if fo, what if we add the other Confideration to it ? if the bare Finitenefs of Human Underftanding (a defeft common to it with all Created Intelligencies) renders it unca- pable of Comprehending Truth, and Confe- quently of being the Meafure of it, how much more then does the littlenefs and narrownefs of its Bounds contribute to heighten that incapaci- ty ? if the having any Limits does fo unqualifie it for the adequate Comprehenfion of Truth, how then does the having fo very fhort and ftrait ones? Strait indeed by Natural and Original Conftitution, but much more yet retrenched by Sin, and by all thofe Faflions, Prejudices, de* ordinate Affeftions and Evil Cuftoms which are the Effects and Confequences of Sin, and which have now fo darkened our Mind?, and drawn fuch a grofs Film over our Intelleftual Sight that we can hardly diftinguifl] Day from Night, Clearnefs from Obfcurity, Truth from Falfliood, and are able to fee but lb very little a way into the Works of God (much lefs into the Nature of God himfelf) that we need nothing elfe to de- prefs and humble our Pride and Vanity than that very Knowledge of ours which puffs us up. So very narrow in its Compafs and Extent, fo veryShallow and Superficial in itsDepth, fo very Confufe and Obfcure in its Light, fo very un- certain and conjectural in its Ground, and fo every way defective and imperfect is it. But how Reafon and Faith. 14.^ Iiow then can we found t!ie Deptli of Truth with fo fliorc a Line? A Bottom lels Depth with (I will not (ay a Finite, but) fo very fcanty a Meafure? And what an extravagant Folly and Weaknefs, not to fay Pride and Vanity, is it to fancy that we can ? It would be a vain Pre- fumption in an Angel, but furethe very Mad- nefs and Diftraftion of Impudence in Man, who may with lefs defiance to Senfe and Rea- fon think to grafp the Ocean within the hollow of his liand, than to Comprehend and Mea* fure Truth, Infinite Boundlefs Truth, not only with Finite, but fo very limited Capacities. 29. But fuppofe Truth were not (what we have fhewn it to be) lr?fimte^ but had Bounds as well as our Reafon, yet unlefs it had the 6W/^, our Reafon cannot be Commenlurate to it, or the Meafure of it. But does the fuppofi- tion of its having Limits infer that it has the fame? No, For tho' Finite, its Bounds may poffibly be extended further than thofe of our Underftandings, and how can we be fure that they are not ? We cannot then even upon this Suppofitibn be fure that our Reafon is the Mea* fure of Truth, and therefore it is all one as to tjs (as I faid before) as if it were not fo, foraf- inuchas we cannot ufe it as a Meafure by draw- ing ahy Confequences from it concerning the Falfhoodor Impoffihility of things upon the account of our inability to Comprehend tliem, fince for ought we know the Limits of Truth though we fhould fuppofe it Finite, may yet exceed, and that very greatly too, thofe of our L 2 Rational 148 jin Account of Rational Faculties. And Confidcring both the Natural and the Superacceflbry defefltsof them it is very reafonable to think that they do. ^o. Some Effences perhaps there may be (though even this again is more than we know) that fit fo high in the Intelledltial Form as to be able to Comprehend all that is Finite, lb that the only reafon why they have not an adequate Comprehenfion of Truth at large is becaufe it is indeed Infinite. But there isno Neceffity, nor fo much as Probability that Human Reafon fhould be of fo raisM an Order that nothing but h^finity fliould tranfcend its Comprehenfion. And it muft be a Itrange Compofition of Pride and Self- Love that can make us fancy that it is ; fomething like that, only much more extrava- gant, which polTeffes the difturbM Heads of fome in Bed/am, and makes them Conceit them- felves Kings and Emperors in the midft of their lro»s, Rags and Straw. What though Truth were Finite, and fome Underftandings too that are fo were able to meafure it, why mufl: this needs be concluded of Human Under- ftanding ? If a Finite Being were able to Com- prehend Truth, why muft Man be that Being? The Scripture tells us he is made lower than the Angels, and how many Orders and De- grees there may be among them we know nor, nor indeed how many Ranks of Spiritual Beings there may be in the Univerfe whofe Underftand- ings go beyound ours. For who can define the Out-tiowings of the Divine Fecundity, or Num- ber the Rounds of the Intdkaual Scale ? In the mean Reafon and Faith. \^() mean while though Man knows not how many ^ Orders ot Intelligent Creatures there are above him, yet 'tis with great Reafon and Confenc prefum'd that tliere are none below him/fo that he is plac'd even by his own Confeilion in the lowed Form of the Intelleflual Order. And why then may not his Underftanding (as much as he values himfelf upon it) be of fo Shallow a Depth, and fo low a Size that even Finite Ob- jefts may be difproportionate to him? Efpecially fince we find him fo often puzzled and gravelled in Natural things, as alfo in thofe Ideal Truths that have relation to the Natural and Eftypal World, fuch as Philofophical and Mathemati- cal Problems. Or if the Reafon of any Crea- ture could be the Meafure of Truth, why fiiould he be that Creature, who is feared in the very Confines of the Material and Immate- rial World, and is as it were the Common-Point where Matter ends and Spirit begins, who brings up the rear of the Intelleflual kind, and is both the youngeft and the leaf} hdoiv^d among the Sons of God. ]\. Thefe Confideraticns fufficiently fhew that there is no Neceffitv, nor fo much as Pro- bability, that Human Reafon fliould be the Meafure of Truth even upon the Suppofition of its being Finite. Which indeed is enough of it felf to carry the Point Contended for as far as the Defign of the prefent Argument is Con- cerned. For if it be not neceiTary that Human Reafon fhould be the Meafure of Truth, then ^t is Poffible that it may not be, and if it is Po/Ti- L 3 ble l^o An Accotmt of ble that it may not, then we can be nev^er Sure that it is, and if we cannot be Sure that it is, then we cannot Ufe it as a xMeafurc, v/hich (as I'hfive remarked already and lor the Mo- ment of it do here reincuicate) makes it the. fame to all intents and purpofes as if it were not fuch at all. But yet to carry our Plea a lit- tie higher I further Contend that as the forego- ing Confiderations luffice to fhew that Human Reafon m^j not, fo there is One behind that very 'pofitively Demonftrates that it Cnnmt be the jMeafureot Truth, even though we fhould al- low it to be of a Finite and bounded Nature as well as our own Underffandings. 32. As there are many things whereof our Ideas are very Confufe and Obfcure, fo 'fis moft Certain that there are feme things where- of we have no ideas at all, it having not pieasM the Eternal and infinite Intelligence to Exhibit that in Himfelf which is Reprefentative of thofe things to our Underftandings. But now be- ildes the Difficulties and Difadvantages we fliall always lie under in the Comprehenfion of things Kom the Confufenefs and Obfciiricy of our Ideas, which of it Self will many times render thofe things, and alfo whatever nearly relates to thofe things incomprehenfible by us, and befides that our not having any ideas of Certain things, is an invincible 4iar to all Knowledge and Com- prehenfion of thofe things (unlcfs we could be fuppofcd to be able to fee whithout l^ight) 'tis alfo further Confidcrablc that pofTibly the Knowledge of thai 'J'ruth which we fet our Selves Reafo7t and Vahh. l 5 i Selves to Comprehend, and whereof we have the Ideas, may depend upon the truth of ano- ther thing whereof we have no Idea. If it fhould be fo tho' Truth in general be never fo Finite, or the Particular Truth we would Con- template be never fo Finite, 'tis plain we fliall be no more able to Comprehend it than if it were Infinite, Now I fay that 'tis not Only Poflible that this may be the Cafe (which yet of it Self as I have again and again Noted is fuf- ficient to debar us from ufing Air Reafon as the Meafure of Truth) but there are alfo fome In- ftances wherein it appears aflually to be fo. We know well enough what we mean by Li- herty and Contingency, and are withal well af* fur'd that we are free Agents. We have alfo a Sufficient Notion of Prefcieme, and are alfo no lefs affurM of the Reality of it. And becaufe both thefe are true, and there can be no real repugnance between one Truth and another we are alfo by Confequence aifur'd that there is a good Harmony and Agreement between thtm, and that they are Confiftent with each other. But now how to adjuft their apparent Oppofiti- on, or reconcile thofe Inftances of feeming Con- trad ift ion and inconfiftency wherewith they prefs us, this we neither Know nor are able with all our Meditation to Comprehend, and that be- caufe we have not an Idea of the Human Soul, without which there is no poffibility of Com- prehending how its free Workings may be the Objefts of Prefcience, tho' our Ideas of Prelci- cnce and Liberty were never fo Clear. Or if L 4 thi^ 151 An Account of thislnftance fhall not be thought fo proper be- caufethe Men with whom our prefenc Concern lies are pleasM to difjwn the Doflrine of Prc- fcience, let me defire them to confider whether there be not many other Difficulties concerning Human Liberty, befides that taken from Pn- fcience^ which they are no more able to get over than they are that. And that for the very fame Reafon, even becaufe they have not an Idea of the Soul, upon the Knowledge of which the So- lution of thof^, «s well as fome other Difficulties in Morality, does Neceffarily depend. Or if they pleafe let them take an Inflance of a Fhy- lical Nature. We know well enough what it IS to be in a Place, and we know alfo as well what It is to be Coextended to a Place But now how being in a Place may be without Co- extenfion to a Place, this is what we cannot Comprehend (tho' as to the thing it Self, upon other Confiderations conllrain'd to grant it) and that becaufe we are ignorant of the general .Nature of ^fint^ upon the clear Conception of which the Comprehenfion of the other does (o depend that it cannot be had without It. And indeed we may conchide in general that when •rver we have clear Ideas of things, and yet arc not able to Comprehend the Truth of them, Vis becaufe the Knowledge of thofe things de- pends upon the Truth of fomething elfe whereof %ve h.ive either no Idea, or not fuch as is fuffici- cntiy Clear. Which muft be the true Reafon t'i the hitherto prefum'd impoflibility of find- ing out the exad Proportion between a Circle and Reafon and Faith. \ c ^ and a Square. Why, Circle and Square are very Intelligible things, and how come we then not to be able to determinthe prccifeand juft Proportion that is between them; It cannot be from any Obfcurity in the things themfeives, much leis from our want of having Ideas of them, for we have as clear and exaft Ideas of thefe Fi- gures as we can have of any thing in the World. It mufi be therefore becaufe the Knowledge of their Proportion depends upon the Knowledge of fome other thing whereof the Idea fails us, which till we are poffefs'd of we fhall in vain endeavour co difcoverthe other. Whereby it plainly appears that we are not only uncapable of Comprehending thofe Truths that relate to things whereof we (lave no Ideas, but that even where we have Ideas, and thofe very Clear ones too we may be as far from Comprehending a Truth as if we had none merely upon the ac« count of the Dependence which that Truth has upon fome other thing whereof we have not, at leaft a ju{f, Idea. Which fingle Coniideratioa is enough for ever to fpoil Human Rsdfon for letting up for the Meajure otTruth^ even upon the Suppofition of its being Finite. So very falfe is that arrogant /^iTertion of a Modern ^ Philofopher , Quxcunqwf extfiunt humnns MtntifervejiigAhilta^fr.itnauain bAnitum,^ hat- ever is may be thoroughly Comprehended by the Mind of Man> excep: Iniinite. And again * Gerardi dtVries PrefeJJ'oris Ultra-etiini, fd^citntiQrjtt mti^nitUs dt Deo. Divinifq\ Perft^ionibut, Pag. ;^.8 I 5 \ Jln Account of Unum dantixnt eft quod om'nem mentis noftr^ vim longiijimt excedu^ ^Ph^f^ f^^^ Natara^ ut in je eji^ ah eACognofci. nec^uit^ Infinitum /?/^^^. There is but one only thing that far exceeds theForce and reachof our Mind, and that cannot oi its own very Nature be known by it as it is in it felf, namely Infinite, Wliat but One thing excepted from the A^erge, and placed beyond the reach of Human Knowledge? 'Tis well that One thing is a pretty large one, but fure the Author was ignorant of fomethingelfe, that is Himjelj\ or clfe he could never have advanced fuch a Crude and ill-confider'd a Propofition. J J. And thus I have fhewn at large in a ra- tional way by arguing a priori^ and from the Nature of things, that HiAnan Reafon is not the Meafure of Truth, and that even upon the iiioft Liberal Suppofition of its being Finite; And if it be not fo fuppofing Truth to be Fi- nite, much lefs is it (uppofing it (what it has been prov'd to be) of an Infinite Nature. If upon the Former Suppofition it exceeds the Proportion of our Reafon, certainly upon the latter there will be no Proportion between them. But whether our Reafon bears no Proportion to Truth, or whether it be only Difproporti' onateto it, either way it follows that it cannot be the Meafure of it, which I cannot but now ]ook upon as a Propofition fulTicicntly demon- il rated. And in all this I contend for no more ilian what is implied in that Common and uni- verfally approved Maxim even among thofe of the Rational rv^y^ that we ought not to deny what Reafon and Faith, 155 what is Evident for the fake of what is Obfcure, or depart from a Truth which \vc fee a Neceffi- ty to admit becaufeof fome Difficulties attend- ing it which we cannot lolve; which they fay is an Argument only of our Ignorance, and not of the Falfliood of the thing. This indeed is a true Rule, and fuch as mud be allowM to hold good in all our Reafonings, let the Mat- ter of them be what it will. Only I wifh that the Implication of the Rule were as much mind- cd, as the Rule it fclf is generally received. For it plainly implies that there are fome things which though plain and certain as to their Exr- Jh/7ce, are yet incomprehenfible and inexplica^ ble as to tlieir Manner, But then as the In« comprehenfibility of the Manner fxiould not make us rejeft the Truth of the thing when o- therwife Evident, fo neither fhould the Evi- dence we have of the Truth of the thing make usdifown the Incompfehenfibility of the Man- ner, fmce it is fo far from being againil: the Na* ture of Truth that it fliould be incomprehenfi- ble, that you fee we have difcovcrM even from the Contemplation of its Nature that there are incomprehenfible Truths. Of which I might now fubjoyn fome particular Examples, but that I fliould fail vei-y deep into a Common PUce^ being herein prevented by many other Wri- ters, particularly by the admirable one of L' Art de Per/ftr^ to the Firit Chapter of whofc Fourth Book i refer my Reader ; where he fhews by feverai, and fome of them uncommon Inftances that there are thii7^s which the Mind 156 An Account of of Man IS not capable of Compreliending. Af- ter which he Concludes with a very grave and ufeful Reflection, which for the great advan- tage and Pertinency of it to the prefent AfFair, though I refer my Reader to the reft of theChap- ter, 1 fliall here fet down. The Profit (fays he) that one may draw from theje Speculatio/JS ts not b.irelj to acquire the knowledge of them^ ivbich of it felf is hxrren enough^ hut tt is to Lam to know the Bounds of oar wnder flan ding, and to force it to confefs that there are things which it cannot Compre- hend. And therefore it is good to fatigue the mini with theje kind, of SubtiltieSy the bttta to tame its Prefumft ion jO-nd abate its confidence and daringnefs in ^ppofing its teeble Lights againfl the Mjfieries of Religion^ under the Pretence that it cannot compre- hend them. For fince all the Force of Human Under Jlandtng is ccnftrain'^d to yield to the leafl jttom of Matter J and to awn that it fees Clearly that it is infinitely divifihle without bting able to Comprehend how this way be. Is it not apparently to tranjgrefs again ft Reajonto rejufe to believe the wonder jul effeds of the Divine Omnipotence^ Mere- I) for this iKeafm^ that our Under (I an ding cannot Comprehend them? Yes without doubt it is, as Will better appear in thefequel of this Difcourfe. In the mean while before 1 take leave of the Subjeft of this Chapter, I have a double Re- marque to make upon it. 54. The Firltis, that fince Truth in its full extent is Incomprehendble, we fhould not vain- ly go about to Comprehend it, but be contented to be ignorant in many things. And iince there are Reajon and Faith. 157 are fome fpecial Truths in particular that are incomprehenlible we fliould not apply pur Thoughts to the Comprehenlion of all things at a Venture, as fome who are for underiland* ing every thing, but lit down firfi: and Conuder whether they are proportionate to our Capa- cities or No, and, as far as we can learn to dirtinguilli what Truths may, and what may not be Comprehended by us, that To we may not lofe that Time and Pains in the Contem- plation of them, which might be profitably imploy'd in the Confideration of other things, better iuted to our Capacity. As a great many do, who bufic themfelves all their Lives long about fuch things which if they fliould ftudy to Eternity they would not Comprehend, and that indeed becaufe they require an Infinite Ca- pacity to Comprehend them. Whereas the lliortell Compendium of Study, and the befl way to abridge the Sciences is to itudy only what we can iMafler, and what is within the Sphere ot our Faculties, and never fo much as to apply our lelves to what we can never Com- prehend. 3S- The other Remarque is that the Con- clufion prov'd in this Chapter does very much Fortifie and Confirm that which was under- taken to be made out in the laft Concerning the Diliinftion of Things Above, and Things Con- trary to Reafon. For if there are Truths which we cannot Comprehend, then it feems what is above our Comprehenlion may yet be True, and if True then to be fure not Contrary to 158 An Account of to Reafon, fince whatever is Contrary to Rea- fon is no lefs Contrary to Truth, which though fometimes above Reafon is yet never Contrary to it. CHAP. V. That therefore a thing s being IncoynpreA henfible by Reafon is of it f elf no Concluding Argument of. ii{<^^]^9t\\p^'^^ True. :''■-' ': .^-^■ I. AS there is nothing /V? Man thatdefen/ei XjL his Confideration fo Much] and Fe\^ things without him that deferve it More than that part of him wherein he refembles his Maker, f6 there is Nothing more worthy of his Confidera^ tion in that part, or that is at leaft more necerf- fary to be Confider'd by him, than x\\Q.Defeif\ of it, without a due regard to which it wonli not be very fafe for him to dwell much ubqn the Confideration of the other, as being apt 't^ feduce him into Pride and Vanity, to blow him up with Self-Conceir, and fo by an imaginarj^ Greatnefs to fpoil and corrupt that which fe Genuine and Natural. -^ 2. Now the Defefls of our Intelleflual part ConfiderM in their general Heads are Ifuppofe Sifjy Jgnorame^ and Error, And though Sin in i€ Reafon and Faith. i 59 itfelf muft be allowM to be of a worfe Nature and Confequence than either Ignorance or Er* for (however fonne may fancy it a greater Re- proach to 'em to have their Intelleftualsquefti- on'd than their Morals) and fo upon that fcore may require more of our Confideration, yet upon another account the Defefts of the Un- derrtandine^feem to need it more than thofeof the Will, fince we are not only apt to be more proud of our Intelleftuals than of our Morals, but alfo to Conceit our felves more Free and Se- cure from Error than vvearelrom Sin, though Sin in the very Nature and Principle of it implies and fuppofes Error. ^. Pride the prelumed Sin of the Angels is alfo the molt Natural and Hereditary one of Man, his dominant and mod cleavhig Cor- ruption, the Vice as I may call it of his Planet and Complexion. And that which we are moft apt to be proud of is our Vnderjl.indings^ the on- ly Faculty in us whofe limits we forget. la other things we are Senfiblenot only ot the ge- neral Bounds of our Nature, but alfo of the particular narrownefs of them, and according- ly do not attempt any thing very much beyond our Meafure, but contain our Selves pretty reafonably within Our Line, at leafl: are not fuch Fools as to apply our Strength to Move the Earth out of its place, or to fet our Mouths to drink up the Sea, or to try with our Eyes to look into the Regions beyond the Stars. But there is hardly any Dillance but to which we fancy our Intellectual Sight will reach, fcarce any i6o j!4h Account of any Objefl too bright, too large, or too far removM for it. Strange that when we Confi* der that in us which makes us Men, wefhould forget that we are fo. And yet thus it is ; when we look upon our Underftandings 'tis with fuch a Magnifying Glafs that it appears in a manner boundlefsand unhmited to us, and we are dazzled with our own Light. 4. Not that it is ro be prefumed that there are any who upon a dehberate Confideration of the Matter have this Formed and exprefs Thought that their Underftandings are Infmte. Human Nature feems hardly capable of luch Excefs. But only as the Plalmift fays in ano- ther Cafe of fome Worldly Men, that their In- tvard Thought ii that their houfes jh^ll continue, for ever^ Pfal 49. Not meaning that any could befo groffely abfurd as pofitively and explicitly to Conceive that their Houfes any more than their own Bodies, fhould laft always, and never decay, but only that they had fuch a kind of a wandring and Confufe Imagination fecretly lurking in their Minds, and loofely hovering about them ; fo in like manner there are a fort of People who are Parturient and teeming with a kind of Confufe and unformM Imagination tho' perhaps they never bring it to an exprefs and diftinft Thought, that their Underftand- ings have no bounds or limits belonging to them, tho' they cannot deny but that they have, if direQly put to the Quellion. 5. Accordingly you fhall find thofe whofe Conduft betrays this imvard Sentiment, who venture Reafon and Faith. 1 6 1 venture at all in their Studies, ftick at nothing* but will undertake to give a Reafon for every thing, and pofitively decide whatever Comes in their way without Sufpenfe or Referve, ima- gining (confufely at lead) they have a Com- prehenfion of all things, and that there is no- thing too hard or knotty for them, nothing but what they either adually do, or are capable of Comprehending, if they once fet themfelves to it. And from hence they roundly Conclude that whatever they are not able to Comprehend is not true, and accordingly deny their Belief to whatever tranfcends their Comprehenfion. 6. Now I confefs there is no fault to be found with the Confequence of thefe Men, nor with their Praftice as it relates to that Confequence, which are both (as far as I can fee) exceeding right if their Principle be once admitted: For if infleed it be really fo that Human Reafon is adequate and Commenfurate to Truth, fo that there is no Truth but what it is able to Comprehend, then it will certainly follow that whatever it cannot Comprehend is noc True, and there will need no other, nor bet- ter Argument of the falfhood of any thing than the Incomprehenfibility of it. For their Rea- foning refolves into this Form. Whatever is true we cnn Comprehend, This \Pe do not Comprehend^ Therefore (his is not true. M Or 1 62 j4n Account of Or thus^ Jf whatever is true xve can Comprehend^ then what we cannot Comprehend U not true. But whatever u true we can Comprehend^ Ergo, &c. Where 'tis plain that if the Major of the Firflj or the Minor of the Second Syllogifm (wherein the Principle of thefe Men is ContainM ) be al- lowed, there will be no avoiding the Conclufi- ons of them. So that if we admit that Human Reafon is Comprehenfive of all Truth we are not Confident with our Selves if we do not alfo grant that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is a juft Warrant to Conclude it not True. 7, But then on the other fide if this Mighty Principle upon which fuch a Weight is laiB, and fuch great things built be falfe, if Human Rea- fon be not the Meafure of Truth (as I think is with great Evidence Demonftrated in the laft. Chapter) then is not the Confequence as good this way, that therefore a thing's being Incom- prehenfible by Reafon is no Concluding Argu- ment of its not being True? For how are we inconfiftent with our Selves, if granting Human Reafon to be Commenfurate to Truth we deny that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing argues it not to be True, but only becaufe in denying that we Contradifl: our Principle; or, which is all one, Suppofe the Contradiftory Propofition to it to be true, viz, that Human Reafon 'v^not Commenfurate Reafon and Faith. i6^ Commenfurate to Truth. But now if in faying that the IncomprehenfibiHty of a thing does not argue it not to be true we in the Confe* quence oi what we affirm Suppofe that Human Keafon is not the Meafure of Truth, then 'tis as plain that the Suppofition of Reafon's not be- ing the Meafure ot Truth will alfo oblige us to fay that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is no Argument of its not being True. Where- by it is plain that the Confequence is every whit as good thus, Human Reajon is not the Meajure ofTrath^ therefore the Imomprehe/ifibiU^ ty of A thing is no Argument thxt it is not True ; its thus, Human Reafon is the Meafure of Truth ^ there- fore the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is an Argument that it is not True, The onlv Reafon why he that denies this latter Confequence upon the Suppofition or Conceffion of this latter Princi- ple is inconfiftent withhimfelf, being this, be- caufe in denying the latter Confequence he Sup- pofes the Former Principle, which Principle therefore mud as much infer the Confequence thatSuppofed it, viz,. That a thing's being fn- comprehenfible by Reafon is no Warrant to Conclude that it is not true. 8. And becaufe this Principle that Human Reafon is nor the Meafure of Truth has beea already proved at large, I look upon the grounds of this Confequence as already laid, and there- fore to fliew the Connexion that is between the one and the other (befides what I have even now faid to that purpofe) need only add this further Remarque. That fince Human Rea- M 2 foa 164- An Account of fon is not the Meafure of Truth, or fince there are Incomprehenfible Truths, then it feemsthe Incomprehenfibility of a thing and the Truth of a thing may Confift together ; or in other words, the fame thing may be at once True and Incomfrehenftble, But now there cannot be in the whole Compafs of Reafoning a more certain, or more evident Maxim than this, That that which is when a thing is, or would be fuppo- fing it were, is no Argument that it is not. As for Inftance, Suppofe it fhould be Objefted a- gzindtht Coper mca?f Hypothefis of the Motion of the Earth that it is repugnant to Senfe, fmce . we fee the Sun and the Stars Rife and Set, and Move round about us. It is thought a fufficient Anfwer to this to fay, That fuppofmg the Earth and not the Sun did really Move thefe Appear- ances would yet be the fame as they are now, fince Sailing, as we do, between the Sun and the Stars (as a late Writer"^ expreffes it) not the Ship in which we are, but the Bodies which furround us would feem to Move. And 'tis moft Certain that if fuppofmg the Earth did really Move the Motion would yet feem to be in the Sun and Stars ; then the feeming Motion of thofe Bodies is no Argument that the Earth does not Move. 9. Why juftfoitisintheprefentCafe, when 'tis Objefted againft the Truth of a thing that 'tis Incomprehenfible by Human Reafon, 'tis a fufficient Anfwer to fay that this argues nothing, fince * UQUiksPhjJfcr. Pag. 14^ Reafon and Faith. 1 6 5 fince if the thing were true it might yet be Incomprehenfible. And ^tis moft certain that if fuppofing a thing to be True it might yet be Incomprehenfible, then thelncomprehenfibihty of a thing is no good Objeftion againfl: the Truth of it. And therefore fmce we have proved that there are Incomprehenfible Truths, and Confequently that the Truth of a thing and the Incomprehenfibihty of the fame thing may Confift together, we may now with all Rational aflqrance Conclude that the Incom-^ prehenfibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True, any more than thefeeming Mo- tion of the Sun is an Argument againft tfie real one of the Earth, fince the Former would be even Suppofing the Truth of the Latter. And both by Vertue of this moft Evident and incon- teftable Principle, That what may Co^fift with the Truth of any thing, can be no good Argument that it is not True. 10. And indeed when it (hall be Confider'd how many things furpafs our Conception when we are Children which yet we are able well to Comprehend when we are Men, how many things again are beyond the Ken of Ignorant and Illiterate Men which yet are very Intelli- gible and Shine forth with full Light to the M?n of Art and Learning, and how many things again even aniong the Learned are now difco- verM and well underftood by the h^\^o'i Algebra which were Myfieries to former Ages, and are ftill beyond even the Imagination of thole who have not that Noble and Wonderful Kjj of M J Kj>ow^ i66 -^?^ Account of Kjtowlecige. When again it fhall be further ConliderM how many of thofe things which we cannot even with the Afliftance of that Com- manding Key unlock in this ftate of Mortality, we may yet have a clear view of in that of Se- paration, when deliver'd from the Burthen of our Fleflv and that many of thofe things which are too high for us then may yet be of a level with the Underftanding of Angels, and that what is above their Capacity may yet be moffc clearly and diftinftly perceiv'd by the Infinitely penetrating and All-Comprehenfive Intelleftof God, I fay he that {hall but ferioufly enter into thisfingle Refleftion muft needs difcover him.- felf much wanting in that Stock of Senfe and Reafon he pretends to, if he ftill continue to Meafure the Poflibilities of things by their Pro- portionablenefs to his Underftanding, or Con- clude any thing Falfe or Impoffible, when he has no better Reafon for it but only becaufe he cannot Comprehend it. CHAP. Reajon and Faith. i6j CHAP. VI. That if the IncomprehenJilfiUty of a thing "Were an Argument of its not being \ true^ Human Reafon would then he I the Meafure of 1 ruth, I. A S there is Nothing more Common than j[\^ for people to hold Certain Principles that have an infeparable Connexion with very- bad Confequences,and yet not profelTedly to hold thofe Confequences, becaufe either they do not attend to them, or are not fenfible that they do indeed follow from, fuch Principles, whereof we have two very pregnant Inftances in the Maintainersof the Predejlimrian and Solifdun Syftems, fo on the other hand, and for the fame Reafon there are thofe who take up, and with great Fixednefs adhere to certain Confequences, without ProfelTedly holding thofe Principles from which they truly flow, and to which (if traced to the Head) they will infallibly lead them. 2. Of this we have a very particular In- fiance (where I confefs one would not expefl: to find it) in thofe of the Soc'tnUn Perfuafion. The Reafon thefe Men of Reafon give why they will not believe the Myfteries of the Chri- M 4 ftian. 1 68 \An Account af ftian Faith, is becaufe they are above their Reafon, they cannot Comprehend them. Whereby they plainly imply, that they will believing Nothing bun what they can Compre- hend, or thit Nothing is to be believ'd that is Incomprehenfible, which is alfo a common Maxim among them, who accordingly m.ake Above Reafon and Contrary to Reafon to be one and the fame thing. And whereas 'tis only the untruth of a thing that can make it unfit to be the Objeft of Faith, in faying they will not believe what they cannot Comprehend, they do as good as fay that what they cannot Com- prehend is not True, and fo that the Incom- prehenfibility of a thing is a juft warrant to conclude it Falfe. And all this they own and exprefly declare, if not in thefe very terms, yet at leait in fuch as are equivalent to them as is too Notorious and well known to need any Ci- tations for the proof of it. But now though they do thus profeffedly own that the Incom- prehenfibility of a thing by Reafon is an Argu- ment of its not being true, yet that Human Reafon is the Meafure of Truth, or that all Truth is Comprehenfible by it, are (as I take it) Propofuions which they do not openly and profeffedly avow. For as I noted in the Intro* duftion "'tis fuch an Odious and Arrogant Afler- tion that they cannot with any Face of Modelly or common Decency make a plain and direO: ProfcfTion of it, though at the fame time 'tis moft Certain, that this is the true Principle of that Confequence which they do profeffedly hold. Reafon and Faith. i6g hold, viz, that the Incomprehenftbility of a, thing argues it not to be true^ and that this Confequence does as neceffarily lead back to that Principle. J. For as if Human Reafon be the Meafure of Truth it follows in the defcending line as a diredConfequence that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing argues it not to be true, fo it follows as well Backwards & per viam afienfusy that if the Incomprehenfibility of a thing argues it not to be True, then Human Reafon is the Mealure of Truth. Since if it were not, the Incomprehenfibility of a thing (as is fhewn in the Preceding Chapter) would then not argue it not to be True. If therefore it does, 'tis plain that Human Reafon is the Meafure of Truth. Which Principle whoever difowns ought alfo to renounce the other Propofition, viz. That the hcomprehenfibility of a thing is an Argument of its untruth^ which if yet he will imbrace notwith- ftanding, 'tis plain he holds the Confequence without its Principle, and has indeed no Rea- fon for what he Affirms. 4. For as he who granting Human Reafon to be the Meafure of Truth, denies yet that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is an Argument of its not being true is therefore inconfiftent with himfelf, becaufe in fo doing he fuppofes theContradiftory to what he had before grant- ed, "viz,, that Human Reafon is not the Meafure of Truth. So he that Affirms that the Incom- prehenfibility of a thing a an Argument of its not being 1 rue, and yet denies that Human Reafon is the Meafure of Truth, \% alfo as in- confiftent 17^ ^^ Account of confiftent with himfelf, becaufe in fo doing he fuppofss the Contradictory to his own AiTertion, and does in efteft fay that the Incomprehenfibi- lity of a thing is not an Argument of its not be« ing True, as moft certainly it would not be in cafe Human Reafon be not theMeafure of Truth, as the foregoing Chapter has fufficiently fhewn. Thefhort is, if the Not being of A proves that C is not, then the being of C proves that A is, fince if it were not, according to the firft Sup- pontion C could not be. And fo here if Rea- fon's not being the Meafure of Truth proves that the Incompreheniibility of a thing is not an Ar- gua)entofits not being True, then if the Incom- prehenfibility of a thing be an Argument of its not being true 'tis plain that Reafon is the Mea- fure of Truth, fmce if it were not then accord- ing to the firft Suppofition the Incomprehenfibi- lity of a thing would not be an Argument of its not being True. 5. For how I pray comes the Incomprehen- fibility of a thing to conclude the untruth of it? I cannot comprehend fuch a thing, therefore it is not True, where's the Confequence ? ^y whatLogick does this latter Fropoiition follow from the form.er ? Why we have here the Minor Propofition and the Conclufion, and to make a Compleat Argument of it we muft add another^ thus ; If it were true I fhould Comprehend it, but 1 do not Comprhend it, therefore it is not true. Whereby it appears to the eye that my not being able to Comprehend a thing is no otherwife an Argument of the untruth of it, than I Reafon and Faiths 17 1 than as it is firfl: pre-fuppofed that if it were true I fhould be able to Comprehend it. Which again refolving into this Abfolute Propofition, that I am able to Comprehend all Truth, ic plainly follows that if my Inability to Compre- hend a thing be an Argument that it is not true, then I am able to Comprehend all Truth, and that my Reafon is the Meafure and Final Stan- dard ot it. 6. I Conclude therefore that if the Incom- prehenfibility of a thing were an Argument of it's not being true then Human Reafon will be the Meafure of Truth, and that they that hold the former ought alfo if they will be confiftent with themfelves to admit the latter. But be- caufe this is a falfe Principle, that Human Rea- fon is the Meafure of Truth, therefore, 1 Con* elude again that the Confequence that Refolves into this Principle is alfo falfe, fince we may as well conclude a Confequence to be falfe becaufe it leads back to a falfe Principle, as a Principle to be falfe becaufe it is produftive of a bad Con- fequence. Which ftill further Confirms and Eftablifhes the Conclufion of the laft Chapter, 1/iz. That the Incomfrehenfibiltty of a thmg is na Argument of its untruth^ which you fee is now proved both Backwards and Forwards, and fo made impregnable on all fides. We have pro- ved it Forwards by fhewing the Falfenefs of that Principle that Human Reafon is the Meafure o[ Truth, and by thence arguing the faidConclu^ fion ; and we have alfo proved it Backwards by ftiewing that the contrary Suppofition Refolves int® l']l An Account of into that Falfe and already Confuted Principle. And I do not fee how any Conclufion can be j better proved. CHAP. VII. That therefore the Incomprehenjiiility of a thing is no jufi ObjeSlion agatnji the Belief of it. JVith an Account of the Cartefian Ma^iim^ that we are to Affent only to what is Clear and Evi^ dent. J, "TpIS a Wonderful thing to confider the J^ Caprice of Hunnan Nature, by what unaccountable Springs its Movements are or- dered, and how odly and unfteddily Men aft and manage themfelves even in the fame Cir- cumftances, and in Relation to the fame Objeds. Sometimes the Obfcurity and Myfterioufnefs of a thing fhall be a Motive of Credibility, and recommend it the rather to their Belief. Thus you fhall have a great many reje£l that Philofo- phy as idle and chymerical which undertakes to explain the Effefts of Nature by infenfible Par- ticles, their different Bignefs, Figure, Contex- 'ture, Local Motion, Red, &c. Merely becaufe this is a Plain, Simple and Intelligible Account, fuch as they can eafily and well Conceive. 'J he very Reafon and Faith. 175 very eafinefs and clearnefs wherewith they con- ceive thefe Principles is made an Objcftion againft them (though indeed it be a good Pre- fumption tor them) and for that very Reafon they will not believe them to be the true Princi* pies of Nature, whofe Effefts they fancy mufl be Refolved into Caufes more hidden and ab- ftrufe. And accordingly they find in them- felves a greater inclination to lend attention to thofe that (hall undertake the Solution of them by the real Chymera's of Subftantial Forms, Qualities, Sympathies, Antipathies, &c. or that fhall go to account for them by the yen more Obfcure Principles of the Chymifts, ftri- kingand filling their Ears with thofe great but empty Sounds, Arcbens^ Semind Sfirity Aftrd Bewgs, G^^, Blas^ &c. which they receive w^icli great Satisfaction, not for their Scientific Light (for they are dark as may be, mere Philofophic Cant) but only becaufe they are My fterious and Abftrufe, and therefore they fancy there muft be fomewhat more than Ordinary in them, tho' they know not, nor, it may be, never Con- fider'd, what. And herein, as in fome other Inftances, Men love D^rkmfs better than Light, 2. But then at another time you fhall have them inquiring after Truth as Diogenes did after an Honelt Man, with a Candle in their Hands, and not caring to go a ftep any further than .they can fee their way. Now upon a fudden . they are all for clear and diftinft Ideas, full and adequate Perceptions, Demonftrative Proofs and Arguments, and nothing will ferve or content 174- -^^ Account of content them but Light and Evidence* and they will believe nothing but what they can Compre- hend. Strange diverfity of Conduft ! Who would think two fuch vaftly diftant extream.s fliould meet together, I will not fay in the fame Man, but in the fame Human Nature, and that the very fame Creature (and fuch a One as Stiles it Self Rational too) fhould proceed by fuch uncertain Meafures, and aft fo inconfi- ftently with it Self ; fometimes embracing a thing for the fake of its Obfcurity, and fome- times again in another Fit making that alone an Invincible Objeftion againft the Belief of it. 5. But it is plain by the foregoing Meafures that it is not. For fince Truth is the general Objefl of Faith, 'tis evident that nothing can argue a thing to be abfolutely incredible, or not reafonable to be believM, but that which at the fame time argues it not to be true. For if true, then 'tis ftill within the Compafs of the genervul Objeft of Faith. But now we have fliewn already that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is no Argument of its not being true, whence it clearly and clofely follows that 'tis no Argument neither againft its Credibility. And if fo, then we may believe it notwithftanding its Incomprehenfibility, becaufe we may be- lieve whatever is not Abfolutely incredible. So that there is no NecefTity that wx fhould dif- card every thing we cannot Conceive as un- worthy of a Rational Belief, or that what is Above Reafon and Faith. 175 Above our Reafon jfhouid be tlierefore above our Faith too. 4. It is true indeed that the Incomprehenfi- blHry of a thing is in it Self no proper and di- reft Argument why it (liould be believ'd, and he would be thought to give but an ordinary account of his Faith, who being askM why he believ'dfuchan Incomprehenfible thing, fhould anfwer becaufe it is Imornlfreherjftble, Which at bell could pafs only for a Rehgious Flourifh, much fuch another as, Credo quiA imfoffii?ile. And that becaufe the Incomprehenfibhty of a thing is not direflly diXxA fer fe a Criterion of Truth (wliether it may be per Accidem^ may be confiderM afterwards) whofe Natural and genuin Charafter is not Obfcurity, but Light and Evidence. Not that nothing is True but what has this Charafler (for we have ah'eady fhewn the Contrary in proving Incomprehenfi- ble Truths) but that as whatever we clearly perceive is True, fo our Clear perceiving of a thing is the only fign from the Intrinfic Nature of the thing it Sell of the Truth of it. Incom- prehenfibihty therefore is none, but as fuch abftrafts from true and not true, and is equally Common to both. But now that which may Confift with a thing fuppofing it falfe, can no more prove it True, than that which may Confift with a thing fuppofing it True, can prove it falfe, according to the Tenour of the fifth Chapter. The Incomprehenfibihty therc« fore of a thing is no proper Argument of the Truth of it, and Confequently no Reafon of it Self 176 \An jAccount of Self, why it fhould be believM, and that becaufe it abft rafts as fuch from True and Falfe, and is too common to Both to prove either. 5. And becaufe it is fo, it is alfo further granted that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is not only in it Self no proper Reafon why \i fbould be believed, but has alfo fo far the Na- ture of a Dijftvaftve from believing, as to be a Caution againft a too hafty Belief, till there ap- pear fome other Motive from without either from Reafon or Authority that fhall determine the Affent. In the mean while it advifes to Stdf- fend. For the Incomprehenfibility of a thing being as fuch No Reafon why a Man fhould be- lieve it, 'tis plain that if he did believe it confi- der'd only as in that State he would believe it without Reafon. That therefore is a Reafon why he fhould fufpend, a Negation of Reafon being enough to with-hold ones Aflent, tho' to give it one had need have a pofitive Reafon, When therefore a thing appears Incomprehenfi- ble, that indeed is fufficient Reafon to fufpend our Belief, till fome prevailing Confideration from without fhall over-rule that Sufpcnfion, by requiring our Affent. But when it does fo, then the Incomprehenfibility ought to be no Argument to the Contrary, and it would be every whit as abfurd to rejefl: a thing now be- caufe of its Incomprehenfibility, as to believe it before for that Reafon. And that becaufe as the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is no reafon for Believing it, fo it is no Ablolute Reafon againft it. 6. If Reafon and Faith. 177 6. If It were fo it would be in NdturA^ tilings, the Objefts of Human and Philofo- phic Science, fuch as belong properly and im- mediately to the Province and Jurildiflion of Reafon. Here, if any where, the incompre- henfibility of a thing would forbid all Aflenc to it. And fo it is fuppofcd to do by fome who though far from denying the Belief of In*. coraprehemible things in Rdigiorf^ will yet tell you that in Phjftcd Contemplations, Clearnefs and Evidence is to lead the way, and we are to proceed with our Light before us, altenting to nothing but what we well Comprehend, la Matters of Faith indeed they will allow that Reafon is to be fubmitted to Revelation, and that we are to believe many things which pals our Comprehenfion ; but in Matters of pure Reafon they will have us go no farther than Reafon can carry us. Which indeed is righc enough if their Meaning be that we are to Aifent to Nothing but what upon the whole Matter all things Coniider'd from with- out as well as from within, we have reafon to believe true, and that we are never to pro- ceed to judge or determin without fome Evi- dence or other, but then this will equally hold in Matters of Faith too, wjiich is too rational an AiTent to be given at a Venture, and we know not why, and whofe Formal Reafon (as has been already difcoursM) is always Clear. But if their Meaning be that in Matters of Reafon we muft Aflent to nothing but what has an internal Evidence, and what in irs felf;. N and 178 An Account of and by its own Light is Comprehenfibic by us (as they feem to mean, or elfe their diflinftion of the Cafe of Reafon and the Cafe of Revela-^ tion is here impertinent) then I conceive that they fet too narrow Limits to our Affent in A^atters of Reafon when they allow it to be gi- ven only to things which in this Senfe are evi- dent to us. For 'tis plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True, and muftbeTrue, and fo not only may, but cannot help Aflenting to them, though at the fame time we are not able to Comprehend how they are, or can poffibly be. 7. Not that our AlTenr is then Blind and wholly without Evidence, (for then we might as well Affent to the contrary as to what we do, and would do better not to AfTent at all) but only that it has none from mthin^ and from the in* trinfic Nature of the Objeft, but only from iome External Confideration, much after the fame manner as it is in Fdth. In both which there may be a Clear Reafon, why we fiiould AfTent to an Obfcure thing. But then as the in- ternal Obfcurity does not deftroy the External Evidence, fo neither does the External Evidence ftrike any Light into the Internal Obfcurity ; or in other words,, as the Reafon for aflenting is neverthelefs Clear becaufethe Matter aflented to is Obfcure, fo neither is the Matter aflented ever the lefs Obfcure becaufe the Reafon for af- fenting to it is Clear. And yet notwithfland- ing this Internal Obfcurity of the Matter weaf- ient to it becaufe of the prevailing Light of the External Reafon and Faith. 179 External Evidence. And thi^ we do, not only in Matters of Faith (according to the Reftrifti- on oi lome) but in the things of Nature and Reafon too, where we are Oftentimes forc'd by the prefTing urgency of certain External and Collateral Confiderations to affent to things in- ternally obfcure, and whofe very pofiTibility we cannot Comprehend, as is plain in the great Qiiertion of the Divtfibiltty of Qunntity^ and other Inltances, whereof everyThmking Man's Obfervation cannot but have already furniflVd him with variety. The Incomprehenfibility then of a thing is no juft Objeflion againfl: our AtTentto it, even in Matters of a Rdttond Na- ture, much lefs then is it in Matters of Faith. For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reafon, and where file fits as judge, then much kfs in things that are not of her proper Jurifdiftion, and if notwitbftanding the inter- nal inevidence of an Objefl we think fie to affent to ic upon K.t//(?«4/ Confiderations, much more may we, and ought we upon the Author itj of the Infallible God. 8. Indeed if whatfoever is Above our Reafon were alfo (asfome pretend) as Contrary to it, and there were nothing true but what was alfo Comprehenfible, and lb the Incomprehenfibili- ty of a thing were an Argument of its not being true, then 1 confefs we could not as Rational Creatures affent to an incomprehenfible Propofi- tion upon any Confideration whatfoever, No not even that of Divine Authority. 'Tis true indeed there could then be no fu(;h Authority for N 2 Incom- i8o ^n Account oj" ^ Incomprehenfible things. But if there were, 'tis impoffible we fhould regard it, becaufe we could not have greater AfTurance either of the Exiftence or of the^Truth of it, than we have ah-eady (upon this Suppofition) that the tilings reveaPd are not true. But now if this Suppo- fition be no more than a Suppofition, if to be above Reafon does not involve any Contrariety to it, if there are incomprehenfible Truths, and confequently the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is no Argument of its not being true (all which has been already proved ) then 'tis plain that what is an Incomprehenfible may yet be a Be- lievable Objef^ (becaufe within the Poffibility of Truth) and then to render it aftually believM there needs only fome External Evidence either from Reafon or Authority. For what fliould hinder our Affent to an Incomprehenfible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it, and its own internal Obfcurity is no Argu- ment againft it ! 'Tis plain therefore that we ought to give our Aflent. And fince we do fo oftentimes upon a Ground of Reafon, much more ought we upon that more Firm and Im- moveable ground of Revelation. The fhort is, whatever is no Objeftion againft the Truth of a thing is none againft the Credibility of it, fince Truth is the General Obje£l of Faith (un- lefs you will fay that a thing is unfit to be be- liev'd upon any other account befides want of Truth) ; and therefore fince we have already fhewn that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is no Argument againft the Truth of it, it vi- fibly Reafon and Faith. i 8 1 fibly follows that it is no Argument againfl the Belief of it neither. Therefore an Incompre- henfible thing may be believ'd, and accordingly he that refufes to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reafon for it than becaufe it is Incomjfreherjftble. 9. Jf it be faid that this is reafon enough, becaufe Faith is a Rational Aft, and therefore what is above the ComprehenHon of Reafon is as much above a Rational Belief, to this, befides what I have already remarked upon this Occali- on in the Chapter of Faith*, I here further re- ply, tliat it is true indeed and^ on both fides agreed that Faith is a Rational Acl, but in what Senfeis theQaeftion. There are two very dif- ferent Senfes according to which it may be faid to be fo either in regard of the Clearnefs of its formal Reafon, or in regard of the Clearnefs of its Objeft. Either becaufe it is founded upon an External Evidence, or Argument for belie- ving, or becaufe it proceeds upon an Internal Evidence, that appears in the very Nature of the thing Believ'd. If Faith be faid to be a Ra- tional Aft in the latter Senfe, the Affertion is then falfe, for fo (that is in refpeft of the Object) we have fhewn it to be an inevident Affent. But if it be faid to be a Rational Act in the for- mer Senfe, then indeed it is true, but nothing to the purpofe, lince nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well confifl: with an N I In- * Art. 15, i8i j4n /Ic count of Internal Inevidence, or in other words, that the Clearneisof the Reafon for Believing may iland with the Obfcurity ot* the Object 13ehe- ved. Aid therefore though Faith be a Ra- tional Aft yet it does not hence follow that what is Above Reafon is alfo above Faith and cannot rationally be believM, becaufethe Acl of Faith is faid to be Rational, Not in refpeft of the Evidence of theObjeft, but only that of its Formal Realon or Motive. And therefore though there be no Evidence in the Objeft, yet it is "not thereby rendered uncapable of being the Matter of Faith, becaufe the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Aft fuppofes, is wholly of another kind. There feems indeed a kind of oppcfition as to the Sound between Faith's being an Aft of Reafon, and the belie- ving what is Above Reafon. And this it may be is that which impofes upon the Minds, or the Ears fliail I fay, of them that urge it as an Objection. I cannot imagin what elfe fliould, lor I'm lure there is no Contradiction m the Senfe. 'i'is true indeed Evidence in the Act and not Evidence in the Act are Contradicto- ries, becaufe ad Idem, and fo are Not Evidence in the Object and Evidence in the Object, for the fame reafon. But there is no Contradic- tion between Evidence in the Act and No Evi- dence in the Object, and therefore thefe may Itand together, though the other cannot. lo. But to lay open the Fallacy of this great and very popular Objection yet a httle more to the Eye (though it muft be a very bhnd one that Reafon and Faith. i^^ that does not fee it already) I will put it into Form, and give it a formal Anfwer. Jf Faith be a Rdtional AB^ then what /V Jhve Reafon cannot rationally be Believed, But Fatth is a Rational Act^ Ergo. For anfwer to this I diftinguifb. If by Ratio- nal Aft be meant an Aft founded upon Internal Evidence, or the Evidence of the Object, thea I deny the Minor, Faith is not To a Rational Act. But if by Rational Act be meant an Act founded upon External Evidence or the Evi- dence of its formal Reafon or Motive, then in- deed I grant the Minor, but deny the Confe* quence, which is none at all, for it does not at all follow becaufe Faith-is a Rational Act, mean- ing by it that it proceeds upon External Evi- dence, and that there is a clear Reafon for Belie- ving, that therefore the thing Believ'd may not from within and in its own Nature be altoge- ther inevidentandfo above theComprehenfion of Reafon. For though Evidence be Contra- dictory to Not Evidence in the fame, yet Evi- dence in the Act is no way Contradictory toln- evidence in the Object, and confequently does not at all exclude it. ^They may therefore both ftand together, andConfequently what is above Reafon may be behevM for any thing that this Celebrated Objection from Faith's being a Ra- tional Act makes to the Contrary ; which truly isfogrofsand palpable a Sophifm, that I cannot but wonder how it could ever impofe upon fo N 4 many 184 An Account of many Learned Men as it has done, and fomeof tliem very acute and nice Confiderers of things. But I hope the tallacioufnefs of it is by this lb plainly and tully detected, that I fhall not think thofe Heads worth much informing that fliall be further impofed on by it. 1 1. But what then fhali we fay to that great and fundamental Maxim fo preffingly inculcated by Des Cartes and his followers, and not difal- low'd of by others, that we are to affent to nothing but wbxt is Clear and, Evident ? If to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, how then to what is Obfcure and Inevident ? Or if to what is Ob- fcure and Inevident, how then to nothing bL^r: what is Clear and Evident? Do not thelefeem flat Contradictions one to the other, and how then fhall we adjufl the Matter bet vA,een rhem ? It muft be either by denying that Cartejian Max« irn to be true, or by fliewing that though ic be irue it does not Contradict the AfferLion !)ere niaintain'd, but is Confiftent with it. Tr.e fii ft way I fliaii not take. I allow the Maxim to be irue, and not only fo, but to be withal of the greateft Importance of any that can be given for the direction of the Mind of Man in order to the avoiding of Error* The only Remedy and Caution againft which is never to let our Judg- ments prevent our Conceptions, or roAffentto any thing that we have only a Confufe Notion of and %vhere we fee only by halves and with an imperfect Light, or perhaps do not fee at all, but ro have 2 Clear Underttanding of the mat- ler before we adventure to judge of it, and to Maintain Rca[on and Faith. 185 Maintain an Evidence in all our Reafonings. Which accordingly is made by Mr. Mdebranche the Firft of thole Rules which in his Treatife of Method he lays down to be obfervM in the inquiry after Truth. And indeed to do other- wife is to make a wrong life of our Intelleftual Powers, particularly of that Liberty we have to fufpend Judgment till the fulnefs of Evidence requires it, and the want of Obferving this Rule is alfo the Occafion of mofl of our Errors and Wrong AiTents, as the fame Excellent "^Per- fon fliews it to have been m particular to the Authors of the SchoU(iic Philofophy. 12. J (hall not therefore go about to falvemy ownAlT:rtionbydenyingDfiC/«rrfi^sMaxim,but rather by fhewing that according to the true Senfc and intendment of ir, it does not Contra- AiQ. it. But firft we muft fee what the trueSenfe of It is, or rather in what Senfe it is true, though this may be without much difficulty Collected by any attentive Reader from what hasbeen already faid in feveral places of this Chapter, wlierein I have in great Meafure prevented this Objefti- on. But toConiider it moredireftly ; To ve« rifie this Maxim that we are to AfTent to no- thing but what is Clear and Evident, theufual Way has been to dillinguifh between A/^/r^ri of J'aitb^ and Matters of Lieafon, In Matters of Faith, fay they, we are to believe many things which wecannot Comprehend And here thea it feem-j this Rule muft be laid a(ide. But in Matters ^ ?.i(h(T:hi di U yiTiic. Tom i. p. iC'y. lS6 \An Account of Matters of Reafon we muft Affentto nothing but what is Clear and Evident. And here then it feems it holds. Accordingly when 'tis Ob- jected againft certain Articles of Faith that they are not to be comprehended by Reafon, 'tis ufual to reply that thefe things do not belong to Reafon, 6^c, implying that if they did, then indeed the Objeflion would be good, and the incomprehenhbility of fuch things would be an Argument againft alTenting to them, which im- plies again that in Matters of Reafon we muft not Affent to anything but what is Clear and Evident, though in Matters of Faith we may. But we have remarqu'd already that^even in Mattery of Pure Reafon we are forc'd to AiTent to many things which we cannot comprehend, and that even in Matters of Faith we do in a Certain Senfe Affent upon Clear Evidence. This Diftinclion therefore will not do. 1^. In ftead therefore of diftinguifliing be- tween Matters of Faith and Matters of Rea- fon, I think it wil] be better to diilinguilh of Evidence. We are to Affent to Nothing fave what is Clear and Evident, fays our Maxim. Very Good. Now if by Evidence here be meant internal Evidence, and the Senfe be that we are to affent to nothing but what initsovvn Nature, and by a Light intrinficto it, is Evi- dent, then the Maxim is Falfe ; and that not only in Matters of Faith, but alfo in Matters of Reafon too, wherein we find our felves often Conftrain'd to affent to things that have not this internal Evidence, but are (as to what re- , fpefts Reafon and faith. 1S7 fpefts the Nature of the things themfelvcs) al- together Obfcure and Incomprehenfible. Buc if by Evidence l>ere be Meant Evidence at large, abftrafting from Internal or External, and the Senfe be that we are to alTent to nothing but what has fome Evidence or other, either In- ternal or External, or what is fome way or o- ther evident to us, and what we fee plainly to be true by a Light fliining from within or from without, in fliorr, what we have one way or other fufficient ground or Reafon to afTept to, then the Maxim is undoubtedly true, and will hold Univerlally, not only in Matters of Rea- fon, butalfoinMattersof Faith too, which (as was fhewrt in the Chapter of Faith) is the Con- clufion of a Syllogifm, and fo a Rational Aft, and proceeds upon as Much^ though not the Same kind of Evidence, as any other Conciu- fion does, And that even in the Belief of In- comprehenfible things, which it would be ab- furd, nay impoffible to believe, if there were no Reafon to believe things above Realon. Ac* cording to a faying, as I take it of St. Auftirf^ in one of his Letters to this purpofe. That we could not bri?7g oar felves to believe rr/jat is Above our Reafon^ tj' Reajon it felf did not perfuade us that there are things which rve fljordd do well to be^ lieve^ although we are not capable 0} Comprehending them. So then in (hort, if this Maxim that we are to affent to nothing but what is Evident, be underftood of Internal Evidence, then 'ti$ Falfe, not only in Matters of Faith butalfo in Matters of Rcalon. wherein things intrinfically inevident i88 • An Account of inevident are affented to. But if it be underftood of Evidence at large then 'cis true, not only in Matters of Reafon, butalfo in Matters of Faith, which (as has been often noted) is reafonable in its Fund and Principle,and whofeEvidencemuft be Clear, though its Objefl: may be Obfcure. 14. In this large therefore and indefinite Senfe of the Word Evidence the Maxim is to be underftood. We are to alTent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, that is, we ought to make ufe of our liberty of Sufpenfion fo far as not to give our AtTent to any thing but what all things Confider'd and upon the whole ap- pears Evident to us, what by fome Light or other we fee and plainly perceive to be true, and what in one word we find fufficient Rea- fon either from within or from without to Af- fent to. According to that well known Sen- tence wherewith Des Cartes Concludes his won- derful Syftem, Nihl/q; ab ulh Credi velim^ nt^l quod if ft Eviderjs & invito, ratio ferfuadebit, I would have nothing believM by any one but what by evident and irrefiflible reafon he fhall be Convinced of. And certainly he would be very unreafonable that fbould defire more. For to affent without Evidence of one fort or other that the thing affented to is true, is to aflent without a rvhj or rvhtrtfore^ and to affent fo is to affent without Reafon, which again is to affent not as a Rational Creature ; and as Man ought not, fo to be fure God cannot require fucb an Affent. To affent therefore to nothing but what upon fome Confideration or other is Clear and Reafo7t and Faith. 189 and Evident to us, and what we have good rea- fon to embrace, as true, is certainly a Maximi of unqueflionable Truth, and of univerfal Ex- tent, that holds in all Matters whatfoever, whether of Reafon or of Faith, in the tornner of which an Aflent without Evidence would be the Jcf^ and in the latter the Sacrifice of a Fool. 15. And that this is the true Senfe wherein Des Cartes intended his Maxim, as well as the true Senfe of the Maxim it felf, is plain from the Occafion of it which as all know who are not utter Strangers to, or very Negligent Rea- ders of his Books, was the bringing in and obtruding fo many things in the Vulgar Philo- fophy whereof the Introducers of them had fuch Confufe Notions, and of whofe reality* and Exiftence they had no Firm and Solid Reafons to affure them, fuch as Subftantiai Forms, really inhering Accidents and Qualities and the like, which ferved rather to darken than clear up the Science of Nature, and were the Occafions of a thoufand Errors in the Super- ttruflures that were rais'^d upon thofe Imagi- nary and Chymerical Principles. In Oppofi- tion to, and as a Remedy for which, he lays down this Fundamental Maxim, to be Care- fully obfervM by all the Difciples of Truth in their whole Intelle£lual Progrefs, never to affent to any thing but what is Clear and Evi- dent, that is, to nothing but of whofe Truth and Reality they are fully affured, and have fufficient Reafon to affent to. This is the true Senfe 190 An Account of Senfe of the Maxim, this is the Senfe of its Au- thor, and in this Senfe it is undeniably true. And that without any prejudice to our prefent Conclufion, with which (as thus explain'd) it is very Confiftent. For 'tis now very eafie to difcern that we may believe an Incomprehenfi- ble thing, and yet at the fame time according to this tartefun Maxim affent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, becaufe the Evi- dence of Eaith is External, and that there may be an External Evidence to affent to a thing Internally Inevident is no Contradiftion. 16. Which by the way may ferve to difcover as well the Injuftice as the Impertinence, i . Of thofe who make ufe of this Maxim as an Ob- jeftion againft the Belief of things above Rca- fon. 2. Ofthofe who take occafion from hence to traduce the C^rtefian Philofophy as favoura- ble to, and looking with a very propitious Af- peft upon Socinimtfm^ and indeed as little bet- ter than an Introduflion to it, only becaufe it talks fo much of clear and dillinft Ideas and Conceptions, and of affenting to nothing but what is Clear and Evident. But Mod of all ^dly. Of thofe who proceed even to traduce the Author himfelf ss a fecret Friend to the Caufe, and no better than a Socman in Difguife. It would have been indeed a Confiderable'Glo- ry and Advantage to that, (or any other In- tereft) to have had io great a Mafter of Rea- fon a Friend to it. But he Certainly was not, if with his Words he has tranfmitted to us his real Thoughts, which would be great unchari- Reafon and Fahh. 1 9 f ty to queflion, and, with a wicnefs, to /^ptt to what is not Evident. 17. He was indeed a great Maflcr in the Rational way, but no Magnifier or Exalcer of Human Reafon. So far from that, that he feems to have had the mod: inward and feeHng Senfe of its Infirmities and Defefts, and the beft to have underllood what a poor little thing 'tis to be a Man, of any one in the World. As may be abundantly Collefted from feveral pai^ fages in his Writings (befides that the whole vein of them runs that way) particularly thofe two final Sentences wherewith he fliuts up his Pri'ficiples and his Aletaphyfics^ At Nihilomintis memor me a ten ait at is ^ nihil Afjirmo^ &c. and, Nature nojlr^ inpnnitas ejl agnofcenda. Which plainly fhew what a low debafing Senfe he had both of Himfelf and of Human Nature in ge- neral, as 'tis Natural for every man to have more and more,* the wifer he grows, and the further he advances in Knowledge^ which when airs done (provided you take a good Dofeofit) is the belt Cure of Pride and Vanity* 18. And as he had thus {lender an Opinion both of Human Reafon and his Own, {o he ap- pears to have had alfo at the fame fuch an high- raifed and elevated Senfe of theimmenfeGran* deur of God, and of the Magnificence of his Works, and how infcrutable the Profundities of both are'to fuch Finite and Contrafted Minds as ours, as can fcarce any where be parallePd. Two Characters certainly of Spirit, that are none of the apteft to difpofe a Man to SocintA'- nijm. ^9^ -^^ j^ccount of nipn. But not to dwell any longer upon Ra- tional PreCumptions, there isa certain plain and deciding place in the Writings of this Great Man (which one would think had efcaped the Eyes of fome) that is enough for ever tofilence the Calumny of his being even in thelcaft So- ciniamz?d^ and to fhame thofe that have fo lit- tle Confcience or Judgment as to ftain his' Me- mory with it. For who can fufpeft him in the lead infefted with that Head-feizing Difeafe, which is now become fo Popular and Epidemic, when he fliall hear him ftill Purging and Apo- logizing for himfelf in thefe Vindicatory words, ^Credenda. effe QmnU qu£ a Deo r eve lata funt^ quamvis Caprum Noftrum Excedant, And again. It a ft forte Tfobis Dem de feiffoj vel aliis aliquid r eve let, quod N&turales ingenii Noflri vires exce* dat^ qualiaJAmfunt MjflerU Imarnationis & Tri- nitatiSy non rccufabirnm ilU Credere^ quimvis von Clare intelligamus. Nee ullo modo mirabima r mult a effe, turn in immenfa ejfis Natura^ turn etiam in rebm ab eo Creatts^ qua Captum Noflrum excedant. Now how glad fhould I be to fee all the Soci^ ni^ns in Chriflendom Subfcribe to this Form of Words, and is it not ftrange then that he whofe Originally chey are (hould be fufpefted of Soci^ manifm^ and that his Philofophy too fhould be thought to lead to it. But the Truth is, the Cartefian Philofophy leads juft as much to Socini' anijm, as Philofophy in general does to Athetf'm^ and I will venture to fay, and be bound to make Reafon and Faith. 1 9 5 make It good, that as no good Philofopher can be an Jtheifty fo no good Cartefim can be a SoctntAn, CHAP. VIIL TVIjerein is Jhewn isohat /i the true life of Reafon in Believing. i.T^ E A S O N being the great Charafler J\^ and Principle of Man, that makes him like to the Angels above him, and diftinguifhes him from the Beads that are below him, and which therefore only are below him for wane of the Rational Power (being many of them in regard of their Bodily Endowments upon a level with him, and feme beyond him) 'tis but juft and natural it fliould appear in all that he does, and prefide and govern in all his Ac- tions. For as the Conduct of the Infinitely wife and All-knowing God does always carry in ittheCharaflersot hisEflentialand Confub* ftantial Reafon, even of him who is the Wi& dom of theFathtr, the true intelligible Lights fo fhould alfo the Condufit of iVlan exprefs in Proportion the Signatures of his Reafon, and though he cannot aft by fuch exafi: and uner- ring Meafures as his Glorious Maker, nor yeC With all that Perfedion of Wifdom' that even fome Created Intelligences exprefi, yet at leaft O h« 194- -^^ Account of he {hould aft Iil another World, are too little and inconfidera- ble for us to fuppofe that our Reafon was given us for the Management of tb^m. Religion only O % bears 196 An Account of bears proportion to fo Noble a Faculty, Is moft worthy of its Application, and can alfo beft re- ward the due Exercife and Ufe of it, and ac- cordingly 'tis upon Religion that it will be beft beftow'd, 4. Nor is there any thing in Religion that may juftly fear to be brought before the Bar of Human Reafon, or to undergo the Teft of its feverert Difcuflion. The Heathen Religion in- deed Might, for which Caufe thofe that drew its Piflure caft a Shade upon a great part of it, and would not Venture to expofe it to Com- mon View. And the too much Heathenized Religion of fome Chrifiians may alfo very de- fervedly retire behind the Curtain, and decline coming to the Light, for fear the Abfurdities and Monftrous Inconfiftencies of it fhould be laid open. But certainly there is not any thing, neither Docfrine nor Precept in that true Religi- on that is reveal'd by God, in Evangelical Chriftianity, that need fly the Light of Reafon,, or refufe to be tried by it. Chriitian Religion is all over a Reafonable Service^ and the Author of it is too reafonable a Mafter to impofe any other, or to require (whatever his Vicar may Ao) that Men fhould follow him blindfold, and pull out their eyes to become his Difciples. No, he that Miraculoufly gave Sight to fo many has no need of, nor pleafure in the Bltndy nor has his Divine Religion any occafion for fuch Judges or Profeffors. For it is the Religion of the Eternal and uncreated Wifdom, the Divine Wcrd^ the true Light of the World, and the Univerfal Keafon and Faith. 1 9 7 Univerfal Reafon of all Spirits, and 'tis impof- fibie that he jfhould reveal any tiling that Con- tradids the Meafures of found Difcourfe, or the immutable Laws of Truth, as indeed it is that any Divine Revelation fhould be truly Oppofite to Right Reafon (however it may fometimes be Jboveit) or that anything fhould hcTheo/ogi^ ca/If true, which is Philofophically Falfe, as fome with great profoundnefs are pleas'd to diftin- guifh. For the Light of Reafon is as truly from God as the Light of Revelation is, and therefore though the latter of thefe Lights may exceed and out-fhine the former, it can never by Con- trary to it. God as the Sovereign Truth cannot reveal any thing againft Reafon, and as the So- vereign Goodnefs he cannot require us to believe any fuch thing. Nay to defcend fome degrees below this, he cannot require us to believe, not only what is againfi Reafon, but even what is rvithout it. For to believe any thing without Reafon is an unreafonabls Aft, and 'tis impolli- ble that God fhould ever require an unreafona- ble aft, efpecially from a Reafonable Creature. 5. We therefore not only acknowledge the ufe of Reafon in Religion, but alfo that 'tis in Religion that 'tis chiefly to be ufed, fo far are we from denying the Ufe of it there. And it is a little unfairly done ol our Adverfaries fo much to infinuate the Contrary as ihey do. For I cannot take it for I'efs than fuch an Infinuation, when they are arguing with us againft the Be- lief of the Chriftian Myfteries to run out as they ufuallydointoHaranguesandFlourifhes(where- O } of. 198 jln Account of of, by the way, I know none more guilty than the Author of Chriftianity not Myjitrious) about the Reafonablenefs of the Chriftian ReUgion, and the Rational Nature of Faith, what a Rea- fonable Aft the One is, and what a Reafonable Service the Other is, &c* as if we wereagainft the Ufe of Reafon in Religion, or were for a Blind, Groundlefs, and Unaccountable Faith, or as if becaufe we hold the Belief of things a- hove Reafon, therefore we are for having no Reafon for our Belief. This 1 fay is an unfair Infinuation, and fuch as argues fome want ei- ther of Judgment or Sincerity (I don't know \vhich) in thofe that fuggeft it. For they feem plainly by running fo much upon this Vein to imply as if it were part of the Queftion between us, whether there be any Ufe of Reafon in Re- ligion, or whether Faith is to be Founded upon Keafon or No. But Now this is no part of tlie Controverfie that lies between us, we acknow- ledge the Ufe of Reafon in Religion as well as they, and are as little for a Senfelefs and Irrati- onal Faith as they can be. This therefore be- ing Common to us both is no part of the Que- ft ion, and they do ill to infinuate that it is by fo many Popular Declamatory Strains upon the Reafonablenefs of Religion, and in particular of Faith, whereas they do, or fhould know, that the thing in Queftion between us is not whether there be any Ufe of Reafon to be made in Believing, but only what it is, or wherein the true Ufe of it does Confifl:. 6. Now Reafon and Tatih. 199 6. Now this we may determine in a few words, having aheady laid the grounds of it. For fince the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument againft the Truth of it, nor Confequently againd the Behef of it (as is fhewn in the three forgoing Chapters) it is plain that the proper Office and Bufinefs of a Believer's Reafon is to Examin and Inquire, Not whether the thing propofed be Compre- Iienfible or not, but only whether it be Re- vealM by God or No, fince if it be, the Incom- prehenfiblenefs of it will be no Objeftion againil it. That therefore ought to be no part of its Queftion or Deliberation, becaufe indeed it is not to the purpofe to Confider whether fuch a thing be, when if it were it would be no jufl: Objeflion. The only Coafiderable thing then here is whether fuch a Fropofition be indeed from God, and has him for its Author or no. And here Reafon is to clear her Eyes, put the Matter in thebeft Light, call in all the Aflift- ance that may be had both from the Heart and the Head, and determine of the thing with all the Judgment, and all the Sincerity that fl:ie can. But as to the Comprehenfibility or In- comprehenfibility of the Article, this is quite be- fides the Queftion, and ought therefore to be no part of her fcruitiny or debate, fince if it were never fo much above her Comprehenfion it would be never the lefs proper Objeft for her Belief. 7. The Sum is, the Incomprehenfibility oi a thing is no Argument againft the Belief of it, O 4 there- 5^0 An Account of therefore in the believing of a thing, the pro- per work of my Reafon is not to Confider whe- ther it be incomprehenfible. But when a thing is propofed to me as from God, all that my Rea- fon has to do in this cafe is Serioufly, Soberly, Diligently, Impartially, and (I add) Humbly^ to Examine whether it comes with the true Credentials of his Authority, and has him for its real Author or no. This is all that Realon has to do in this matter, and when fhe has done this, fhe is to rife from the Seat of Judg- ment, and refign it to Faith, which either gives or refufes her Aflenr, Not as the thing propo- fed is Comfrehenfible or not Comfrehenftble^ but as 'tis either ReveaPd or not R^veaPd, CHAP. Reajon and Faith. 50 1 CHAP. IX. ^n u^jjplicatmt of the foregoing Conjide* rations to the Myflertes of Chrijiianity. i>TTA VI N G thus raifed the Shell of our iTl Building to its due pitch, we have now only to Roof it by making a fhort Appli- cation of the Principles laid down and fettled in the former Chapters to the Myfteries of the Chriftian Rejigion^ againft the Truth and Be- lief of which it plainly appears from the prece- ding Coniiderations that there lies now no Reafonable Objeftion. For if Human Reafon be not the Meafure of Truth, and if therefore the Incomprehenfibility of a thing to Human Reafon be no Argument of its not being True, nor confcquently againft its being Believ'd, and if the only Ufe and Imployment of Reafon in Believing be to Confider, not the Internal E- vidence of the thing, whether the Article be Comprehenfible or no, but whether it be truly reveal'd by God, I fay if thefe things are fo, as we have abundantly prov'd them to be, then from thefe Premifes the clear and undeniable Confequence is that the Incomprehenfibility of the Chriftian Myfteries is no juft Reafon why they Ihould not be Believed, and fo that we may Believe them though we Ihould fuppofe them :502 An Account of them (vvliat yet fome deny) to be Incompre- henfible. 2. Nay fo far is the ImcomprehenfibleSubli- inity of thefe Myfteries from being a fufficient ObjeQion againftthe Belief of them, that acci- dentally and indireftly it may be improved into a confiderable Argument for them, and fuch as may ferve to recommend them to our Faith, in- afmuch as it is a very ftrong Prefumption that they are of no Human Origin, but have God for their Author, it being reafonable to fuppofe that ^'hat does fo very much tranfcend the Ca- pacity of Man to Comprehend, does no lefs exceed his Ability to invent. And accordingly the Incomprehenfibility of our Myfteries for which fome will have them to be falfe, is made life of by a very rational Author as an Argument of their Truth. And it may be worth while to Jet the Reader fee how he manages it in relation to One of the Moft Sublime of them. ^ The more Obfeare are our Mj/leries. Strange Paradox ! the more Credible they ?wrv appear to me, Tes, I fnd even in the Obfcurity of our -Myfteries^ received as they are by fo many differ eUt Nation'^ an invinci" hie Proof of their Truth, Hoiv^~ for tnfiance^ fh^ll fve dcccord the 'Vnity with the Trinity^ the Society of three different Perfons in the ferfeci Simplicity of the Dtvine Nature ? This without doubt is Inaomfre" henfible^ hut not Incredible, It is indeed above mj hut let m confider a little and we jh^H believe itj at ieaji if TFe mil be of the fume Religion mth the ApO" files* £ntyetitn}fur U Meta^hyf* & fur la Relig. p. $6\* Reafon and Faith ^05 Jlles. For fuppofing they had not kmrvn this tmffahle AJyfhrji^ or that they had not taught it to their Sue- cejfors^ 1 maintain th.it it is not i'offible that a Sen^^ ttment fo extraordinary (fjould find tn the Minds of M-n fuch an Vniverfal Belief as is given to it in the whole Churchy and among fo many different Nations. The More this Adorable Myjlery appears Monfirous (fujfer the Expreffion of the Enemies of our Faith) the More it shocks Human Reafon^ the More the Imagination Mutinies agawft it, the more Obfcure^ Incomprehenfible and Impenetrable it isy the lejs Cre* dible is it that it fljould Naturally inft/iuate it felf into the Minds and Hearts of all Chriflians of fo ma» ny and fo diflant Countries, Never do the fame Errors fpread univerfally, efpecially fuch fort of Er- rors which fo fir ar^gely offend the Imagination y which have nothingfenfible in them^ and which feern to Con* tradiEi the moji Simple and Common Notions, If Jeftu Chrift did not watch over hi^ Churchy the Number of the Unitarians would quickly exceed that of the Orthodox Chriflians, For there is nothing if the Sentiment of thefe Heretics that does not enter Naturally into the Mind, And '*tis very Conceiva* hie that Opinions that are proportioned to our Vnder^ jlandings may eflablfjh themfelves in time. But that a i ruth fo Sublime^ f^f^^ removed from Senfe^ fo Crofs to Human Reafony fo Contrary in fhort to all Nature as is this great M^jlery of our Faithy that a Truth 1 fay of this Char-uier fhould fpread it felf Vniverfally^ and Triumph over all Nations where the /ipofiles had Preach'* d the Gofpel, fuppojing that thefe frjt Preachers of our Faith had neither knowrt any tbir/g^ njv faid any, thing of this Myjiery^ this Certainlfy :^04 ^'^ Account of Certainly is what cannot be Conceived by any one that hits never fo little knowledge of Human Nature. That there jhould be Heretics that jbould oppofe a Docirme jo Sublime is nothing Jlrange^ nor am I fur prized at it. On the Contrary I fhould be very much if mver any Body hadoppofed it. This Truth wanted but lit- tle of beir.g quite opprefs^d. Tis very poffible. For ^ twill be always reckoned a Commendable "Undertaking to attack that which feems to CUjh with Reafon. But that at length the Myflery of the Trinity (bould pre- frevail^ andjhould ejiablijjj it fe If V raver f ally where- ever the Religion of feftis Chrifi was receiv d., with* cut its being known and taught by the /^pojlles, with- t,ut 0n Authority and a Force Divine, there needs methinks but an Ordinary Meafure of good Senfe to ac- knowledge that nothing in the World is lefs Probable. For it is not in the leajl likely that a. Doctrine fo Dt* vifie^ fo above Reafon^ fo remov'*d from whatever way fir ike the Imagination and the Senfe s^ fljouid Naturally Come into the 1 hought of Man, ^ You fee here how this excellent Perfon ftrikes Light out of Darknefs, by improving even the Incomprehenfibility of the Chridian JMyfteries into an Argument for the 1 ruth and Credibility of ihem, and fo turning the Artillery of our Adverfaries againft themfclves. This indeed is a bold Atchievement, and as Fortu- nate a one too, for I think there is a great deal of Force and Weight in his Reafoning But I need notpufh the Matter fo far, nor follow fo home into the Enemy's Camp, as to plant their own Cannon againft them. 'Tis fuiBcient to the defign of the prefenc Undertaking, and as much Reafon and Faith. ^o^ much as I am led to by the Principles before E- ftabnnrd, to conclude that the Incomprehen* fibility of the Chriilian Myfterics is no Argu- ment againft them. This therefore I iniift upon, and (if my Reafon mightily deceive me not) dare ingage finally to Itand to. For if (as it lias been fhewn)theIncomprehenfibility of a thing in general be no Conclufive Argument againft either the Truth or the Credibility of it, then fince negative Propofitions do feparatc the Attribute from theSubjeft according to all the Extent which theSubjeft has in the Propo- fition, what Confequence can be more Clear than that the Incomprehenfibility of our My- fteries is no Argument againft the Belief of them ? I conclude therefore that it is None, and that they ought never the lefs to be be- JievM for their being Incomprehenlible, fuppo- fing them otherwife fufRciently ReveaPd. 4. Whether they are lo or no is befides my Undertaking at prefent to examin, nor need f engage my Pen in this Queftion, fince the Af- firmative fide of it is fo Obvious to every Eye that can but read the Bible, and has been withal fo abundantly and convincingly made good by thofe abler hands which have gone into the De- tail of the Controverfy, and undertaken the particular Defence of the Chriftian Myfteries, This part of the Argument therefore being fo well difchargM ah'eady, J fhall Concern my feif no further with it than only in Confeqiience and Purfuance of the former Principles to beftow upon it this one fingle necelfary Remark, viz. That 506 An Account of That ds the Incomprehenfibility of the Chrlftl- an Myfteries is no juft Objeflion againfl: the Be- lief of them fuppofing them otherwife fuiBcient- ly ReveaPd, fo neither is it a juft Objection againft their being fo Reveal'd, fuppofing the plain, obvious and Hteral Conflrudion of the Words does naturally and direftly lead to fuch a Senfe. And that it does fo is not i think of- fered to be denied, and the thing it felf is plain enough to extort an acknowledgment, but then ^tis pretended that there is a Neceflity of having recourfe to a different Conftruflion, and to un- derftand the Words in another Senfe, becaufe of the unconceivablenefs and incomprehenfible- nefsof that which their proper and Grammati- cal Scheme does Exhibit. But by the Tenoup of this whole Difcourfe it evidently appears that there is no fuch Neceflity, fince to admit an incomprehenfible Senfe has nothing abfurd or inconvenient in it, and that becaufe the Incom- prehenfibility of a thing is no Argument of the Untruth of it. From whence it plainly follows that 'tis no more an Objeftion againft its being Reveal'd than 'tis an Objedlion againft the Be- lief of it fuppofing it were Reveal'd, there bting nothing but the untruth of a thing that can be a reafonable Obftruftion againft either. 5. We are therefore to take the Words of Scripture according to their proper and moft natural Senfe, and not feek out forforc'd and ftrain'd Interpretations upon the account of the Incomprehenfibility of that which is apparent- ly Genuin and Natural And if theRevelation b^ Reafon and Faith. I^O'J be otberwife plain, and fuch as we would ac- cept of in another cafe, and about matters which we can well Comprehend, we ought not to think it the lefs fo, becaufe the Senfe of it fo un- derftood is Cuch as we cannot reconcile to our Apprehenfions and Conceptions of things. For notwithftanding that it may be true, fince by this time we may be fuiBcicntly fatisfied that there are many incomprehenfible Truths. The Incomprehenfibility of a thing is therefore no Argument againft its being ReveaTd, any more than 'tis againft the Belief of it fuppoling it were* Which opens an Immediate Entrance to the ChriftianMyfteries, which I doubt not would be thought fuiBciently Reveal'd were it not for the incomprehenfibility of them, the only Ob- jedion that can be pretended againft their Reve- lation. 6. I have hitherto arguM upon the Suppofiti- on that the Myftertes of Chriftianity'(thofe Do- ftrines I mean that are fo call'd) are above Rea- fon, and fuch as do tranfcend our Comprehenfi- on, and have fliewn that even upon that Sup- pofition there is no reafonableObjedion againft the Belief of them, that they are never the lefs Believable for their being Incomprehenfible. But what if I fhould recall this Conceffion, and put our Adverfaries to the proof that they are in- deed above Human Reafon and Comprehenlion. They cannot be ignorant that there are thofe that Contend they are not, and with grei^t fhew of reafon offer to prove it, by endeavoufing to render a Conceivable and Intelligible Account oi" go8 An Account of of them. If thefe Men fbould be in the vVght (which I do not think neceflary at prelent to in- quire into) it would be a further Advantage to our Caufe, and fuch as though 1 do not now in- fift upon it, I need not lofe the Benefit of. But if it fhould prove that they are not in the righr^ the Caufe of our Chriftian My fteries is not much ConcernM in the Lofs of that Pillar, but can fupport it felf well enough without it, as ha- ving another that is fufficient to bear its weight, fince though we fhould fuppofe thefe Sacred Do- flrines to be never fo Incomprehenfible to our Reafojjy it does by no Confequence follow (as from the Argument of this whole Difcourfe is apparent) that therefore they may not be due Objects of our Faith. 7. Should anyone now be fo fond of Objec- tion as to draw one againfi: the Myfteries of Chriftianity from the ufeof tl^e Word Myitery in Scripture, which knows no other Myfteries but fuch as before the Revelation of them were undifcover'd, not Confidering whether they were in themfelves Conceivable or no, I mult tell him that 1 do not ftnow that ever I met in any Controverfy with a lefs pertinent Objection, as much as it is made of by a late Bold Writer ^, who heaps together a great many Texts to fhew the Signification of the Word Mylkry in the New 'I eftament, that it Signifies not things in themfelves inconceivable, but only fuch as were not known before they were reveaPd. Well;, be * Chrijiianity mf Myjiirms, p 9»- Reafon and Faith. 509 be It ib as this Gentleman pretends (though I believe upon Examination it would appear otherwife) yet what is this to the purpofe ? For do we difpute about Names or Thi?7gs ? The Queftion is not whether the Scripture ex- preffes inconceivable things by the Name of Myfteries, but whether there be not things ia Scripture above our Conception (call them by what Name you will) and if there be, whether their being fo above our Conception be an Ar- gument why they fhould not be BeiievM. Now to thefe inconceivable things it has been the Common Ufe of Church-Wrtters to apply the JslsLtnQoiMj/ienes, which, ifthe thing be grant- ed, he muft be a great Lover of Cavil and Wrangle that will contend about it. But the LearnedBi(hopofPt^(?r^f/?^r^has already prevent- ed me in the Confideration of this Objeftion, for which reafon,, together with the Frivolouf- nefs of it, I fhall purfue it no further. • Serm. of the MjftcrUsofthe Chrijiian Faitb* CHAP. ^lo j4n Account of CHAP. X. The Conclujion of the "whole^ "with an Ad- drejs to the Socinians. I. A ND thus I have led my Reader thro' XX ^ 'o"g Courfe of Various Reafoning, and perhaps as far as he is willing to follow me, though I hope his Journey has not been without fome F/eafure that may deceive, and fome Profit that may in part reward the Labour of it. I have fhewn him what Reafo^ is, and what Fauh is, that fo he may fee from the Abfolute Natures of each what Habitude and Relation they have to one another, and how theDarknefsandObfcu- riry ofthe Latter may confift with the Light and Evidence of the Former. I have alfo coniider'd the Diftinction of things Above Reafon and things Contrary to Reafon, and fliewn it to be real and well-grounded, and to have all that is requifite to a good Diftinction. And for the fur- ther Confirmation of it, I have alfo fhewn that Human Reafon is not the Meafure of Truth. From which Great Principle (which I was the more willing to difcourfe at large and thorough- ly to fettle and eftablifh becaufe of its Moment and Confequence to the Concern in hand) I have deduced that weighty Inference, that therefore the Incbpprclienfibility of a thing is no Conclu- ding Reafon and Faith. q r i ding Argument of its not being true, which Confequence for the greater Security of it, be- caufe it is fo Confiderable in the prefent Con- troverfy, I have alfo proved Backwards^ by fhewing that if the IncomprehenfibiUty of a thing were an Argument of its not being true, then Human Reafon (contrary to what was be- fore demonftrated) would be the Meafure of Truth. Whence I infer again ex Abfurdo, that therefore the IncomprehenfibiUty of a thing is no Argument of its not being true. From this laft Confequence I infer another of no lefsMo- ment and Confideration, viz,. That therefore the Incomprehenfibihty of a thing is no Argu- ment againd the Belief of it neither, where alfo I Confider that feemingiy Oppofite Maxim of Des Cartes^ that we are to AlTent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, and reconcile it to the other Pofition. Whence my next Step was to ftate the true ufe of Reafon in Believing, which I fhewM to Confiit not in examining the Credibility of the Objecl, but in taking account of the Certainty of the Revelation, which when once refolv'd of we are no longer to Difpute, but Believe. In fine, I have madean Applica- tion of thefe Confiderations to the Myfteriesof the Chriftian Faith, by fhewing that they are never the lefs to be BelievM for being My fleries, fuppofing them otheryife fufficientiy Reveal'd, againft which alio I have fhewn their Incom- prehenfibility to be no Objeftion. So that every way the Great Argument againft the Myfteries of the Chriftian Faith taken from the incom- P 2 prehen- ^ I ^ An Account of prehenfibllity of them vanifhes and finks into nothing. In all which I think I have effedual- ly overthrown the General and Fundamental Ground oiSocimamfm, and truejy in great Mea- fure that of Deifm too, whofe beft Argument againrt RevealM Religion in general, is, be- caufethe Chriftian^ upon all Accounts the moft preferable of thofe that pretend to be Revcal'd, Contains fo many things in it which tranfcend the Comprehenfion of Human Underftanding. But whether this Beft Argument be really a good one or no, the whole procedure of this Difcourfe may fuiBciently fbew, and whoever knows how to diftinguifh Sophiftry from good Reafoning, may eafily judge. 2. And now yowGentlemen for whofe fakes I have been at the pains to write this Treatife, give me leave in a few words to Addrefs my felf a little more particularly to you, and to Expo- ftulate with you. Whether it be the good Opi- nion you have of your Caufe, or the prefent Opportunity you have to appear in the behalf of it that invites you fo freely to Come abroad as you have done of late, you have certainly (to give your Courage its due) taken a very ratio- nal and Polite Age for it, and I hope the Wife Conduft of Providence may turn this junfture to the Advantage of the Truth, and that the Light to which you have adventurM to expofe your Novel Opinions may ferve to make you fee their Abfurdities, if you do not too Obftinately fhut your Eyes againft it. Some of you are Confiderable Matters of Reafon (otherwifetru- Keafon and Faith. 3 r 51 ly I fhould not think it worth while to argue with you) and you all protels g^td^iDevotionlo it (I wifti you do not make it an Idvl) and to be very Zealous and Affeftionate Dilciples of it. Reafon is the great Meafure by which you pre- tend to go, and the Judge to whom in all things you appeal. Now I accept of your Mealure, and do not refufe to be tried in the Court of your own Chufing. Accordingly you fee I have dealt with you all along upon the Ground of Logic, and in a Rational way, being very con« fident that Reafon alone will difcover to you your undue Elevations of it, and the Errors you have been mifled into by that Occafion, if you do but Confulteven this Oracle o{ yours as you ought, and make a right ufe of its Sacred Light. 5. But I am afraid you do not. Inftead of imploying your Reafon in the firft place to ex- amin the Certainty of the Revelation^ whether fuch a thing be truly Reveal'd, and if fo, to believe it notwithftanding its being incompre- henfible, your Method is to begin with the Qui- lit) of the Ohjecti to Conlider whether it be Comprehenfibleorno, and accordingly to pro- ceed in your Belief or Disbelief of its being Re- veaPd. 'Tis true indeed you are not fo grofs as to argue thus, this is Comprehenfible, there- fore 'tis Reveal'd. But you cannot deny but that you argue thus, this is Incomprehenfible, therefore 'tis not Reveal'd, proceeding upon this general Principle that though whatever is Comprehenfible is not therefore prefently Re- p J veal'd ^ ! 4- j4n Account of veal'd, yet whatever is Reveal'd muftbeCom- Prehenfible. But now judge you whether this be not to make your Reafon the Rule and Mea- iure of Divine Revelation, that is, that God can reveal nothing to you but what you can Comprehend, or, that you are able to Compre- hend all that God can poffibly Reveal ISov otherwife how is your not being able to Com- prehend any thing an Argument of its not being keveard) I fay confider whether this be not to fet up your Reafon as the Rule of Revelation, and confider again whether this does not rcfolve either into a very low Opinion you have of God and his Infinite PerfeSions, or an extravagantly high one you have of your fclves and your own Rational Indowments. . 4. And yet as if this were not Prefumption enough, do you notalfo make your Reafon the Rule of Vaith^ as well as of ReveUtwn^ To be the Rule of Faith is a very great thing, and yet fo ftr 'tis plain that you make your Reafon the Rule of Faith that you will allow nothing to be believM but whole Bottom you can found by that Line, this being an avowM Principle with you that you are to believe nothing but what you can Comprehen4. But hold a little, be- fore your Reafon can be the Meafure of Faith^ muft it not be the Meafure oi Truth f And I pray confider ferioufly, and tell me truly, do you veriiy think in your Confciences that your Reafon is the Meafure of Truth ? Do you think your rational Faculties proportionM to every in- telligible Objeft, and that you are able to com- prehend Reafon and Taith, 515 preliend all the things that are, and tliat there is nothing in the whole extent of Science too high, too difficult, or too abftrufe for you, no one part of this vaft Intelleftual Sea but what you can wadq through ? If you fay yes, befuks the Blafphemous Prefumption and Luciferim Arrogance of the Aflertion, and how little it falls on this fiiie of Similis ero Alttffimo^ which baniiliM the vain-glorious Angel from the Court of Heaven, becaufe nothing lefs would content his Afpiring Ambition than to be as God there (though by the way there is more Senfe and Congruity of Reafon in pretending to be a God in Heaven than to be a God upon Earth) I fay befides this, I would put it to your more fober thought to confider whether it be not every whit as great an Extremity in the way of ratio- nal Speculation to Dogmatize fo far as to pre- i tend to Comprehend every thing, as to fay with the Sceptics and Pyrrhonians that we know I nothing : The latter of which however in re- I gard of its Moral Confequences may be more in- ' nocently and iafely aiErm'd than the former, fince in that we only humbly degrade our felves, and are content to fink down into the Level of Brutes, whereas in this we afpire to what is infi^ nitely above us, and advance our felves into the Seat of God. And you know an Excefs of Self- Dejedion is of the two the more tolerable Ex- treme. But if you fay that your Reafon is not the Meafure of Truth (as upon this, and the other Confiderations there lies a Neceflity upon yoq to Confefs) how then I pray comes it to be P 4 the 5 1 6 An Account of the Meafure of your Faith, and how come you to lay down this tor a Maxim that you will be- lieve nothing but what you can comprehend? Why, if your Reafon be not the Meafure of Truth (and you your felves care not, and I be- lieve are alhamM in terms to fay that it is) then do you not evidently difcern that there is no Confequence from the Incomprehenfibiiity of a thing to the Incredibility of it, and that you have no reafon to deny your Belief to a thing as true merely upon the account of its incompre- henfibiiity. And do you not then plainly fee that your great Maxim falls to the ground, that you are to believe nothing but what you can Comprehend? But if yet notwithflanding this you will ftill adhere to your beloved Maxim, and refolve to believe Nothing but what you can adjuft and clear up to your Reafon, then I pray confider whether this will not neceffarily lead you back to that Abfurd, and withal Odious and Invidious Principle, and which therefore you your felves care not to own, viz. That your Rea. fon is the Meafure of Truth. 5. But why do you not care to own it ? Do you not fee at the firft caft of your Eye that you are unavoidably driven upon it by your profefs'd Maxim ? Or if you do not think fit to own it (as indeed it is a good handfom Morfel to fwal- low) why do you not then renounce that Ma^ xim of yours which is the immediate Confe- quence of it, and neceffarily refolves into it ? Why will you whofe Pretenfions are fo high to Reafon a6t fo dircftly againft the Laws of it, as Reafon and Faith. 5 1 j as to own that implicitly and by Confequence which neither your Head nor your Heart will fervc you to acknowledge in broad and exprefs Terms ? Be a little more Confiftent with your own Sentiments at leaft, if not with Truth, and be not your felves a Myjlery^ while you pretend not to believe any. If you do not care to own the Principle, then deny the Confequence, or if you will not let go the Confequence, then ftand by and own the Principle. Either fpeak out boldly and roundly that your Reafon is the Meafure of Truth, or if you think that too grofs a defiance to Senfe, Experience, Religion and Reafon too to be profefledly maintained, then be fo ingenuous to us, and fo Confiftent with your felves as to renounce your Maxim of Believing Nothing but what you can Compre- hend, fince you cannot hold it but with that Abfurd Principle ; And which is therefore a Certain Argument that you ought not to hold it. 6. And are you fure that you always do, I mean fo as to aft by it, that you hold it in Hypo- thtfi as well as in Thefi? Do you never aflent to any thing but what you can Comprehend ? Are there not many things in the Sciences which you find a preffing Neceffity to Subfcribe to, though at the fame time you cannot conceive their Alodf^s^ or account for their Poffibility ? But you'lfay perhaps thefe are things of a Phyfical and Philofophical Confideration, and fuch as have no relation to Religion. True, they arc fo ; but then befidcs that this vifibly betrays the weakneis; :5»8 yin Account of weaknefs of your ground, fince if theincom- prehenfibility of a thing were a good Argument againft aiTentmg to the Truth'^f ir, it would be fo throughout, in the things of Nature, as well as in the things of Religion, I would here further demand of you why you are fo particu- larly fhy of admitting incornprehenfible things in Rehgion, why is it there only that you feem fo ftiffly and zealoufly to adhere to your Maxim of Believing nothing but what you can Com- prehend? Since there are fo many inconceiva- ble things, or if you pleafe, Myfterks^ in the Works of Nature and of Providence, why not in Religion? Nay where fliould oneexpe out any reproach to your Underftandings,which were indeed intended for the ContempUtion^ but not for the Comfrehenfton of an Infinite Obje£t. You need not therefore here be back- ward - — ^ — . , , — ^ * Liftofchrip, p. 184, 5^4 An Account of ward to own that you meet with what yOu cannot Comprehend (it would indeed be a Mi^ ftery if you fhould not) nor think it any dif- grace to have your Eyes dazzl'd with that Light at the infupportable Glory of which even the Seraphm Veil and Cover theirs. 1 1. You may perceive by this that your De- nial of the Doftrine of the Trinity becaufe of thelncomprehenfibility of it proceeds upon no good Confequence, but you are alfo further de- fired to Confider the very Bad one that it Na» rurally leads to. You refufe to receive this Ar» tide becaufe you cannot Comprehend it, but befides that your Reafon for this your refufal is not good unlefs you could be fuppofed to Comprehend every thing, even the Deep things of God. Pray Confider what the Confequence will be if you purfue your Principle to the ut- moft, and Conduft your felves intirely by its Meafures. Will it not inevitably lead you to the denial of all Religion? This perhaps may ftartle you, but think again. Will not this ne- ceffarily lead you to the denial of God the Foundation of all Religion ? For if you will not believe the Trinal Diftinftionof Perfons in the Divine Effence becaufe you cannot conceive howfucha thing can be, then may you not for the fame reafon refufe as well to believe the Divine Effence it felf, fome of whofe incom- municable Attributes, fuch as his SelfExi* fieme^ Eternity^ Immenfitj^ &c. are as Incom- prehenfible as any thing in the Notion of the Trinity can be. So that if you will but follow your Reafon and Faith. ^ic your Meafure from the denial of Three you may be quickly brought to deny even O^ie, So direflly does your Principle of Believing no- thing but what you can Comprehend lead to Atheifm^ and that with (uch fwift and wide firidcs, that were it not for the aflidance of the fame expedient, your Friends the Dajh would hardly be able to follow you. 12. And now Sirs what do you think of your Principle? Is it not a goodly one, and richly worth all the Paflion and Zeal you have exprefsM for it ? You know very well that M. Madfe in his Excellent Treatife of the Divinity of Chrilt has fhewn you that upon one of your grounds Quiz., the denial of that Article) the Mubumetan Rehgion is preferable to theChriftian, and indeed that you are Obliged by it to renounce Chriftianicy and turn Mahu^ wetans. This truly was a home-thruft. But yet you fee the Confequence of your general Principle reaches further, as leading you not only out of Chrirtianity, but out of all Reli- gion whether Natural or ReveaPd, even be- yond Deifm, even into Atheifm it felf.'^ It it does not adually lead you thither the fault is not in the Principle, wliofe Connexion with that Confequence is /latural enough, but 'tis be** caufe you are not fo Confilient with your felves as to follow it* And indeed 'tis a great Happi- nefs that you do not, ((ince if you were here better Logicians you would be worfe Men) though it would be a much greater, if for the Q. dangt^r oa6 An Accouyit of danger of being more Confident with it you would be perfuaded to lay it down. I ^. And that you may be fo be pleafed fur- ther toConfider, that though this Principle of yours does not eventually carry you as far as Mheijm^ becauie perhaps the Horridnefs of the Conclufion may be a Counterweight a- gainft the Force of the Premifes ^though you fee it naturally tends that way) yet there is ve- ry great danger of its leading you Effeclually into Deifm^ that not being accounted now-a- days fuch a very frightful thing. For as long as you hold that what is above Human Reafon is not to be Believ'd, and upon that Account rejeft the Chriftian Myfteries, becaufe they are above Reafon, you lie at the Mercy of that Argument that fhall prove to you that thefe Myrteries are indeed ReveaPd, and that the Genuin and Natural Senfe of the Sacred Text declares for them. For if you once come to be convinced of that, you will then be Obliged in Confequence of your Principle to renounce that Religion which reveals fuch incredible thing's, that is the ChriftUn^ which will be a flirewM (indeed an invincible) Temptation to you to throw up all Reveal'd Religion, and fo to turn perfeft Deifts. And^I pray God it may not have that EfFeft upon you. 14. But as to the parting with Chriftianity that you will be further tempted to do upon another account- For when you have by your Principle ftript it, or I may fay rather un- bomlPd it of its great and adorable Myfteries, it will Reafon and faith. 517 win appear fuch a poor, lank, flender tiling to you that you will hardly think it Confiderable enough to be revealM as a New and morepcr- feft Inftitution by God, or to be receivM as fuch by thinking and Confidering Men. For wh.it will fuch find lb confiderable in ChriiVianity (efpecially asanew InlVitution) vvhatfovifibly peculiar and affuredly diltinguifliing, what that may infallibly fet it above an Human Infti- tution, if it be once robb'd of its Myiteries? They may indeed think it a good plain piece of Morals, and fuch as exceeds any other of a known Human Compofure, but how are they fare but'that the Invention of Man may be able to rife fo high, as to Compofe fuch a Syftem as this, it you fet afide its Myfteries? Which therefore I cannot but look upon of all the things that are intrinfic to it (for I do not here ConMt^ Miracles) as thegreatefl: Charac- ters of its Divinity. And fome perhaps would be ape to think them fuch as without which ic would hardly bethought worthy of reception ^efpecially asa New Inltitution) even with tlie help of Miracles, which Men are always ready, and not without reafon, to lufpeft, wlicn the Matters for whofe faketliey are v^rought bear not fufficient Proportion to them. Which they would alfo perhaps be inclined to think to be the prefent Cafe. For what (would they fay) is there in the Chridian Religion that defcrves fo .great ado, what that [hould ing^ge an Om* nipotent Arm to introduce it into che World, by fuch mighty Signs and Wonders, if there 0,2 be ^ "i 8 jdn Account ' of • be indeed nothing Wonderful it it, that is, if you rake away its Myfteries? What cannot a good Syficm of MoraHty (efpecially if only a Second, and a Httle more Correct Edition of a Former) be Communicated to the World without Alarming Heaven and Earth, and giving difturbanee to the Courfe of Nature? /\nd if Cbriiiianity be no More, what Propor- tion (fay they) will it bear to its Miraculous Introduflion? And what \v\\\ it be found to have fo very Confiderable as either to deferve or judifie fuch an Apparatus ? It muft indeed be allowed by all to be a good vvholfom loltitution for the Direction of Manners, but wh5t is there fo very Great and Admirable in it, what that either deierves or anfwers to fo many Types and Figures and Prophetical Prediftions, what that fo Copioufly fets forth the xManifold Wifdom ot God, and the Glory of his Attributes, and the Nothingnefs of the Creature, and where are thofe Deep things of God^ that Eye hath not feen nor Ear heard, nor have entered into the Heart of Man, i Cor. 2. 9, 10, (a place which the Apoftle applies out of the Prophet Ifdiah to the Revelations of the Gofpel) where 1 fay are thofe profound things which the Spirit of God only that Searches all things could reveal, and \vhich even now they are ReveaPd the dngels dcfire to look into, i Pet. 1.12. You'l hardly find any thing of fo rais'd a Chara£ler in Chriftianity if you deveft it of its Myfterjes, which therefore may juftly be reckoned as the Main Pillars of it^ without which it will have much Reafon and Faith. 519 tnuch ado to fupport it felf. So that in fhort Chrijlianity Not Mjjlerious (how fond foever a Certain Author is of fuch a ReHglon) will make but a very little Figure in Proportion to its Pomp and External Splendor, and indeed will almoft dwindle down into Nothing. 15. It may indeed even without the Myfl:e- ries make a fi:ift to fubfift as a mere Syftem of Precepts, and Rule of Life, though even thus ConfiderM it will be greatly impairM and fuffer much difadvantage (as wanting thofe Convin- cing Demonftrations of God's hatred of Sir?, and of his Love towards Mankind, and withal ' thofe indearing and perfuafive Arguments for their returns of Love, Gratitude and Obedience towards Jiim, which can only he derived from the Redemption of the World by the Death andSatisfaftionof its Divine Undertaker) but as a Covenant of Grace edablifli'd betwixt God and his Offending and Eftranged Crea- ture it cannot poflibly ftand, but muft fall to the ground. So that though the Moral or Legal p2ivt (as I may call it) of ChrilHanity may at a bard rate Continue after the downfal o-f its Mylteries, yet its Federal part, and all that is properly GoJ^el in it muft needs be involved in the Ruin and Fall with them, that being all built upon the Sattsfaciion of Chrift, as that again upon his Divwuj^ which is therefore the very Foundation of the Cbrhiian Re- ligion, as M. Abbadt^ has by Variety of Demonftration proved it to be. If then yoia would have that Divine Inftit;urion ftand, and if g^o ^n Account of if you would ftand faft in it (both which I am willing to fuppofe) have a care how you remove its Myfteries^ Confidering how Fun- damental they are to the Building, and how great a fhare of its Sacred Weight refts upon them. But endeavour rather to remove your own Prejudices, to Mortifieyour Underftand- ings, to ftudy Humility, and to reftrain the too free Sallies of your too curious and over venturous Reafon by ftilland filent Reflexions upon God's Infinite Grearnefs, and your own almoft as great Infirmities, by which one Thought wellpurfued you will (,by the Grace * of God) come to a better Underftanding of your felves than to rejeft any of his plain Re- velations merely becaufe you cannot Conceive them, and fo leaving Light and Vifion to the other Life, will be Content with other good Chrittians humbly to Believe and Adore m this. 1 6. Gentlemen, I befeech you ferioufly to Confider what with Chriftian Charity and all dueCivilRefpeftl have here laid before you^and if upon Confideration of it you find any weight in it, to let it have its full Force and Effeft upon you. Which if you do I hope it may ferve by theBleffingof God (to whom for that end I humbly devote this Labour) to Convince you, or at lealT: to put you upon iuch better Confi- derations of your own as May. For I pretend not here to have faid all, but to have left many things to the inlargement and improvement of youi own Meditation, Confidering the impro- priety of doing otherwife to ferfbns of your tarts Reafon and Faith. 5^1 Parts and Learning, which I pray God to San- Qifieand Increafecoyou. Whereby you may perceive that I am not againrt your making ufc of your Reafon. No, 1 would only have you reafon rightly, and that you may do fo would have you by all Human Methods to improve and Cultivate your Reafon as much as you can, being well perfuaded that as a half-view of things makes Men Opiniative, Difputatious and Dogmatial, fo a Clear and thorough Light makes them Humble and diftruftful of them- felves, and that the more Cultivated and Im- proved any Man^s Natural Reafon is, theeafier it will be for him to Captivate it to the O^e* dieme of Faith. POST' 555 Ayi Account of POST-SCRIPT. Since the Committing of thefe Papers to the Prefs I have had the pleafure to perufe Mr. Whifionh 'New I'heory of the Earth, for which extraordinary and truly great Perform- ance I return him all due Thanks, and am very glad to lee fo great a Mafter of Reafon and Philofophy exprefs fo awful and reverential a regard to Religion in general, and in particular to the Sacred Mjfieries of it, againft which both Human Reafon and Natural Philofophy have been of late fo abufively and prophanely imploy- ed. How far this Ingenious and Learned Au- thor makes good his great Undertaking, or whether this or the Former Theorijl be moft likely to be in the right, I fhall not take upon me to examin. I only make this Obfervatioa from both their wonderful Attempts, thacwhe- ther they are in the right or no, as to their refpeflive Accounts of things, yet they have at leaft gone fo far and offerM fo fairly towards a true Explanation of them, as to convince any Competent and indifferent Reader that the Mofmk Records concerning the greater Pheno-^ lleafon and- Faith. ^:^^ mem of Creation and Providence are not really of fo defperate a Nature as they were once pre- fum'd to be, but are in themfelves Capable ofj and may perhaps in time aftually have (if they have not already) a true natural Solution. As for Inftance, a Univerfal Flood without a Mi- racle, or that the World fliould be wholly Drown'd in a Natural way, or according to the Laws of Motion already fettled, and by a Train of Caufes already laid in Nature, has been hi- therto thought an Incomprehenfible, and ac- cordingly an Impoflible thing. But now if thefe two Mighty Genms^s who have undertaken to give a Natural Account of this flupendous Re- volution have neither of them pitchM upon the very precilc way and manner whereby it was brought to pafs, yet I think it cannot be denied but that they have faid enough between them to convince that the thing was naturally Poffible, and that a true Natural Account may be given of it, though they fhould be fuppofed not to have hit direftly upon that which is fo. That is, I mean, they have reprefented it at leaft as a Conceivable thing, wiiether they themfelves have had the good fortune to Conceive of it ex- a£lly as it was or no. Upon which it is very Natural and no lefs pertinent to the Concern in hand to make this furth^ Refle£\ion, that we fliould not be Overhafty to pronounce any thing (even of a Phjfical, much lefs of a Rel/gm^s Na- ture) to be Impoffible, only becaufe it appears to us to be Incomprehenfible. For befides that the Incomprehenfibility of a thing is (as this R whole 55.4- ^^^ Account of whole Difcourfe fhews) no certain Argument of its ImpoflTibility, and that what appears in- compreheniible to our Underftjandings may at the fame time be well Comprehended by thofe of Angels, not to fay of wifer Men, perhaps that which appears to us at prefent to be above all Comprehenfion may in procefs of time and upon furtherReflexion and Experience fo bright- en and clear up to our Minds, as to be Com- prehended, or at lea ft to be thought of a Com- prehenfible arid Poilible Nature even by our more improved felves. For the Incomprehen- fibility ot a thing as fuch being no Abfolute Affe- ftion or Intrinlic Denomination of the thing it ftlf from its own Nature, but only fuch as affects it from without and in relation to the prefent Capacity of our Underftandings, there needs no alteration in the Nature of the thing to make that Comprehenfible which was before Incom- prehenfible, a Change in our Underftandings is fufficient, upon whofe greater improvement alone an Incompreheniible may become a Com- prehenfible Objeft. So that befides the Nulli- ty of the Confequence from the Incomprehen(i. bility of a thing to its Impoffibility, even the Principle it feU from which that Confequence is pretended to be drawn may be removed by the prefent Comprehgnfion of w^hat pafsM be- fore with us for an incomprehenfibleProporition. Upon both which Confiderations we are admo- nifh'd to be very Cautious how we conclude any thing in Nature, much more in Scripture, to be impoffible, becaufe to us Incomprehenfible. And Rea[on and taith. 555 And 'tis the very ufe Mr. Whifton himfelf makes of the latter of them in the Conclufion of his excellent Work, from which I think it worth while to tranfcribe a Paffage both for the Ad- vantage of the prefent Argument, and the great- er Convidion of the Reader, to whom, as well as to my felf, it muft be no little Satisfaftioii to fee the Sentiments of fo great an Author con- cur with mine. The Meafure of our prefent knowledge (fays he, p. ^79.) ought not to be efleenPd the apm^to^ or Te/i of Truth (the very Propofition almoft in Terms of my Fourth Chapter) or to be oppofed to the Accounts received from prophane Antiquity^ much lefs to the infpir'^d writings. For notwith* Jianding that fever d particulars relating to the elde/i Condition of the World and its great Cataftrophe*s^ examined and compar'*d rvtth fo much Phtlofophy as was till lately known, were plainly unaccountable^ and, naturally fpeaking^ impofjible ; yet we fee now Nature is more full)^ more certainly^ and more fub- (tantially under/lood, that the fame things approve them/elves to be plain^ eafie^ and rational. ^Tis therefore Folly in the higheji degree to reject the Truth or Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures becaufe we cannot give our Minds particular fatij- faction as to the Manner^ nay or tvtn poffibility of fome things therein afferted. Since we have feen fo many of thofe things^ which feerrfd the moll incredi^ ble m the whole Bible ^ and gave the greateft Scruple and Scandal to Philofophic Minds ^ jo fully and par^ ticularlj attefled, and next to demonftrated from Certain Principles of Ajlronomy and natural IQiow^ ledge*. 596 An Account of kdge , 'r^ bat reafondle to exfeH in due time a like Solution of the other Dif}icutties» ^Tu hut jujl Jure to defend, uPon the Veracity of thofe Holy Wri^ ters in other A^erttons^ rvhofe Fidelity is fo intirely ejlabliflfd in thefe hitherto equally unaccountable ones. The obvious, plain, or literal Senfe of the Sacred Scriptures ought not without great reafon to be eluded or laid aftde : Several of thofe very places which feenfd very much to require the fame hitherto, appearing now to the Minute^ Circumfiances^ true and rational, according to the flriciefl and mo[l li- teral Interpretation of them. We may be under an Obligation to believe fuch things on the Authority of the Holy Scriptures (vs are properly Myfleries ; that U, though not really Contradict or y, yet plainly un^ accountable to our (prefent degree of) Kjtowledge and Reafon. Thu4 the Sacred fliflories of the Original Conflitution, and great Cataflrophe'*s of the World have been in thepafi Ages the Ob jells of the Faith of Jews and ChriJlianSy though the Divine Providence had not afforded fo much light as that they could other- wife Sat is fie themfelves in the Credibility of them, till the new improvements in Philofophy. And this is butjufl and Reafonable, For fure the Ignorance or Incapacity of the Creature does by no means afford juf^ ficient ground for Incredulity, or jufltfy Men in their rejelfing Divine Revelation, and impeaching the Veracity or Providence of the Creator, With which weighty, and to the prefent purpofe very perti- nent Words of this wortliy Author I Seal up my own, and leave them both to the Confideration of the Reader. FINIS.