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Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mdthode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART (ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2) 1.0 I.I 1.25 ||M li" IIM 2.2 u 1^ It y£ 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.6 ^ /APPLIED IMAGE Inc 1553 East Main Slreel Rochester, New York U609 (716) <82 - 0300 - Phone (716) 268 - 5989 - Fa« / AN ESSAY ON D JL- V^ RE ETHICS, WITH A THEORY OF THE MOTIVE. BY W DOUW LIGHTHALL, B.A., B.C.L. ^ontrtal ; ' WITNESS" PRINTING HOUSE, BONAVENTURE STREET. 1882. (U-^ i^rmmmm ^'f/ ^^^. AN ESSAY o <. '■- I,' i: -\ ON D >^_y RE ETHICS WITH A THKORV UK THE M()TI\E. BY W. DOUW LIGHTHALL, B.A., B.C.L. I I iHontrtal : 'WITNESS" RINTINU HOUSE, HONAVENTURE STREET. 1882. imvnidtii i «*itT, 1 I a n PREPACK. This E„say has arisen o„. of con,irme,l .lissa.isfaci™ with .he us o.a,v „ea.™e„, .f ,he science wl.h which i, <,ea,s, a lon,.ha„„.i„, co„vic.i„„ u,a. b, fa, .he ,,ea.es. .i^cu unab ? "" " '°"*''°"= "■"=" "^ - "« only been 1 nl r? "" """'""«"• "'■ '''"'' "f "•= ■"»" powerful With the sole hope that it may be of use. ETH ICS, WITH A THEORY OF THE MOTIVE. IIV W. DOUW LIGH THALr., D.A., II C.L. Christian theology-the science behind, and distinct from, the rel.gion-must assume a certain chain of positions before it can be in final dear concord with modern discover" It has made its passage from those long ages which demanded but tests of experience to an epoch which, correct or not. is only quieted with the demonstrations and the probabilities of science The great questions of Good and Bad. of Right and Wrong- that IS to say. great ethical questions-are of such near import- ance to religion that it is imperative in such an epoch that Christ's doctrine of uncalculating self-devotion should be proven accordant with proper inductive and analytical studies of them. Ethics has been pursued ''rom two opposite quarters. One group of schools has sought in many forms to define Good and Right from ideas in the fully developed conscience, and thence to arrive at the nature of conscience itself. Ti,c other group examines simple instances of good and thence attempts to show in what manner the developed ideas are built up. The former directly examine a complex fact; the latter proceed to its cxplana- tion from elementary components. Those usually hold in some form that a special faculty of the mind is at work, frequently termed -the moral faculty." whose opc-ations cannot be resolved into other mental elements; these be!i.v« the disputed ideas to be products of common reasonings and experiences of pleasure and pain. But both parties in any case admit that the Virtuous man does, if sufficiently alive to the circumstances, at once perceive the Good and Right. Those who begin by contem- plating the notion as it emerges from his mind in full heautv re consequently apt to be correct in tkeir a^r.J^ \ Tl^ and that act right or wrong. Often this delicate perception s. for obvious reasons, lost by the student of the othe m thod ugh h,s .W,.„,as far as it may go, is usually more lei; should never be missed from sir^ht th-,t /,./;. • ■ ana,.. .,„.„ aue„.„„ ., ^^Ill ^^ ^'"""' '"' A few word, „o«- „„ ,he general sround-work "of ,he science Co danJ r,gh,a,c only ,„amie»of ,.,i„g» ,„d deeds, a, d „ . t ae.nal sense can onl, be so understood. When we nred ca a ^.".S as „o„d we,l.ink of i, as a source of benef,.. ' V e w Fed.cateadeedasgood we „,a,. „se .he word in one of , „ » .on, or ,n what snrronndings done, in which meaning we simnl • P ace . ,n .he category of good things ; or that it is go'od e Z^- ml iC"?: °' ''= ""»'• ""» ''- " «"^ a henet a, motive. Hence the terms "absolutely" and "rel-uivpiv" and Absolute and Relative Ethics. - ^bt mea ^ -t L unt; the circumstances," but has likewise a double meaning corre ponding to that of " good." mtaning corres- If a good thing is thought so because a source of benefit we b^^e tt "luT'br T " ''-'''''' ''-''' consideringthat : 2 J '^"^^'^"^ '^^ ^^^'0 g'-o^Ps divide their path, one side declaring that " benefit" merely returns to an original fac" ty fo the perception of good ; and the other proceeding to ex mine th various grades of benefit and seek their common quality. A hi . they find can be of benefit only in relation to some end or use wh.ch end is further discovered to be the benefit o consc o s' u mate happiness which the thing can effect towards thrm- d I icate but ";'f"°"^ ""• ''"' '' ' ^'^'''^"- - ^ «'"-ture of aeiicate but satisfying pleasures i^^ .ndon,. ,, ,ad if ntadetn ord'er:otih?t,rdr:r.: l:: »..h moral mer.t one n.„s. s,.* to act well. Now, to seek any X ject some motive or moving force is necessary, and this the analvzmg party say is, in every case, desire of pleasure On two points, consequently, the appreciators and the analvzcrs take ,ssue. Are perceptions of good to he referred to a sepkrate >.•«//,. or to our sensibilities to pleasure? And is the monre of good anything other than desire of pleasure ? The Appreciators object prmcpally: (,) That pleasure is far too low an element t„ be ,n any form identical with good ; (a) that pleasurable desire is selfish m essence, whereas right motive is not ; and (3) that such theories overlook the binding force or obligation which attaches to laws of duty. They feel compelled to turn elsewhere for explanation. The Analyzers urge that pleasure can somehow be discerned at the bottom of every sample of good, and that acts and their n^otives may be mged in a series of grades, from the lowest desire up to even righteousness itself And. besides, that no other tenable motive-force than theirs can be shown ; which allegation they sometimes illustrate by a criticism of the ethical doctrine worked out by the profoundest of Appreciators, Kant. If these positions are sound if good and the motive of right action can be reduced to known elements in such manner as not to belie the appreciation referred to above, the theory of analysis which results o will have for support the great logical Law of Parcimonv. which forbids the entertainment of a more complex theorv when a simpler one will suffice. , 1 a My essay has nothing to do with the illustrations, experiments, indue ive steps and other methods by which the latter party trace out their connection between pleasure and good, desire and nghteous motive. Suffice that they have of late years been fast enlarging of their ranks. Christianity, resting its ethical system principallv on the developed consciousness in practice, has no prejudice against suentific names and methods unless in practice, where alone it assumes a knowledge, their outcome is bad. But if the charges made by the Appreciators are correct, there is a drawn battle be- ween Christianity and the pleasure-theory, which must be decided by the life or death question, " Which is true .=- Let us therefore \\ ^]^rtWiw%***»* 8 examine the charges. If incorrect, that danger is clone away, and Christian churches may harmlessly even form alliance as bodie. with the tenet acquitted. thJ^^ P'r^^f ^^^y '^^'' '^° ^hief shapes. Egoism claims that the standard of good and motive of right for me is my own personal pleasure, or a structure of pleasures composing my happiness. Utilitarianism sets up the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In its former shape the theory being admittedly selfish has, at least, the second of those defects before-mentioned which are charged by the hostile party. The aimed-at end i* rejected by the practical conscience, and the motive does not explain true moral action. in the second shape the end aimed at IS good, but it seems impossible for a man who acknowledges only desire as a motive to really seek the pleasure of others by any other means than pursuing his own ; and thus we are again brought up at selfishness. Commonly made to both shapes is the objection that pleasure can be ,n no manner essentially connected with good, because it has a gross, as opposed to a lofty, character. The proposition that Pleasure is Good is rejected entire. We demur to levelling our noblest actions to so grovelling a field, being certain thai moral feeling is sublimer than gratification. .K .?."' '^l ^^^'''''°" '' "°' '° °''''°"''>' ^^"^ ^^hen it is advanced hat though Pleasure is not Good, it is yet the lower form out of which the latter has been evolved, refined, constructed ; just as man has been evo ved, with his pity, his love, his worship, with his thoughts among the stars, and his aspirations into eternity, from the petti- ness of an amoeba-state. Like " man " and " amoeba " therefore Ike ..sight- and '.sensation," like all names of the lower and the higher in grades of evolution, so .'pleasure" and .'good" must as terms be kept distinct. There is recognised even an intermediate form, the Beautiful, between the pleasant and the good. The first two have their field, and end in self. The con- fusion of their names is but one fruit of two productive fallacies • of the loose transference, to a genus of allied feelings, of the word pleasure, which language had long, though likewise loosely appropriated to a species; and secondly, of a great characteristic fallacy of the nmetoenth century to the effect that having com- P ehended the elements or origin of a thin,, the thing tf e f o 11 the rest of its relations, are comprehended. In tn th it Z ':tare ^int '"'T'''''' " '' ^^^"- ^'^ -^ -" w ch a statue will be made IS not the statue- nor is thp nr«i- • statue ,-the I)er./op„e.u, which above all makes it what it is bemg om.tted. 7'^. ././.. ,, ,,,, co.pr.k..fe, /ro. Use,) A "d so are man's moral perceptions. Those Hebrews o ofd wh! .nvesfgateci them from this standpoint, defined thLcha.ers tcs and knew their .ntricacies much more deeply than the thIT L?' ?::^" T'"" ''' '''"^ '' ''-' -^ '^"^« - " Trl ; /' ^°°'^ ■■"""'"' '^" ^°°^: : pleasure retains its eIat,on. Even the term "happiness" is not synonymous with (object.ve) .. good." as the idea impi.ed is less noble, and b sid a more e..tens.ve notion attaches to the latter, which ho h perhaps ,t co.ncides in the human sphere with the notion of ha ' ness .ncludes benefits of any other kind possible in ad ffet" ex.tence. or to a different race. (Still, we recognize it on^ as We seek then the Good, a form higher, in the same scale, than happ.ness and gloriously beyond pleasure. But now we come to the second objection, that desire is essentially selfish, while right a^m. and by the des.re of it 1 am moved to moral action '' Hence the Lgo.st .s ruled out of the race, acknowledging a con- scious selfishness which we feel to be no e.xplanation of he w, " Vt' ^'"' ''' ''' ^'^'""^^ ^« ''^^^ '" his sympathie V th mankind may in some particular individual be as actfve nd as far reachmg ,n effect as the Utilitarian's who sets up the happi. ness of others. But how i. it possible for the Utili arian to s t up others' happiness ? I„ aiming at it is he not swayed by the happmess refiected in his own mind, and only bv that .^ Fo the pleasure of another as such can never be his pleasure. What then. ,s the moving force in his heart ? It is the sukonsdous happiness reflected in him from their's 10 and made his. unknown to himself, by his automatic power of sympathy. He does not seek it-he spurns it if he can. 7Z not h.s end-,t is only the psychical machinery by which his end IS attamed. He seeks to keep nothing in mind but the object he has .ntended. It is only when he turns his introspective thought to an analys.s of his motives that he finds himself apparently swaye by his own delight. The truth is that by representation' -our power of .magining things not present-we can both call up our own past and future pleasures, and also those past, future and presen, o< other persons. And in calling up those of two or o( ten. we expenence greater pleasure than of one from the psv- ^hologjcal pr.ncip]e that pleasures are superior in qualitv propo'r- t-onately to the number of their sources. So that when 'we recall however mdistinctly, the happiness of all society, w.th whom 'the conscenfous man grows to connect every deed performed for others, we experience a feeling of vastly finer quality than when we turn our thoughts upon self. Imagination in this' aspect may be l.kened to a mirror whose face we can direct towards the world or our own minds-receiving in the one case the small image of a vast a,.! beaufful landscape, but in the other a larger imL of one contracted spot. Now the point is that we are practically oblivious to this process. Our conscious object is solely to do the good. The elaborate arrangements of pleasure and pain and their desire and aversion within us are only a subconscious mechanism A true man. as has been frequently said, would perish for his race's good, even though he believed his own possibilities of happiness were doomed to everlasting extinction. His nature has become a correct and sensitive meter of the value of actions as they affect hiniself and that human ,race into whose being his own is ex- tended and he lays down his life with, brimming over every per- sonal despair, the half-conscious joy of a universe. But. though it moves him, he does not think of it as in himself. He din°lv notices us influence there only as the power sufficient for an ob- ject outs.de. The mighty sophism-destroying judgment of Christ : He that saveth h.s life shall lose it, but he that loseth his iife for my sake shall save it" is an expression of this; and 11 Bacon writes: •' We read that some of the elect and holv n^cn " of thell ? "^ " •" " ""'"•^- "' '^'"''>' -^' '"H-^-"^ ^-i- o th r 1^ rTr'"""' ^'*'" ''''''''' '^^'^ — '>'°tted out salvltL ° "' "^ ''^" '^^' ''-'' '^-"-" ^^-^^ -- of hp„., • .. - . , ' ""'" ""- predominant and crucial -har ter,st,c o, r.ghtness i, thought, not feeling; and it is proper to call u an intelUduat fact. The scale of LoH.. ■ , , Fthirc 1,1. , °' 8^"""S 1" ahsolute le t a V 7\ " undoubtedly conditioned by the laws of intei- lectual knowledge. Mo.st advocates of Utilitarianism, while constructing each his Th s°o ; : ' ."'^^'"'^ °^ "^^'^^ ^^^'^' -' -^--^ ne s pass by the need of a critical view of the motive, such as has been above attempted. But Schopenhauer in his " Ground- nc and lack of moral appreciation, yet full of keen logical analysis, exposes the secret as follows :-.< C'est quand la raison dermdre d'une action ou omission reside dans /..,.« ., ,. Z d un autre etre ' interess. 4 titre de patienf : alors I'agent dans 1 resolution ou son abstention na rien d'autre en vue que la p s du bien et du mal de cet autre. * * * ' C t morat '.''' '! n"' '"' ''"'' ""''' '" '"^"'"''^^ "" caractere de b^on^i morale. Or. pour que mon action soit faite uniquement eu vue d un autre, U faut ,ue le bien de cet autre sort pour ,noi et drrectenunt un motif au meme titre ou mon bun a moi lest d'ordinaire " * * C est e phenomene quotidien de la pUrir (Tr. A. Burdeau.) By M.ll ,t does not seem to have been noted. But it is so by Bain, though under the simple head of Sympathy, in his "Emo- .ons and the Will." (C.vi..§...) Grote has-a nearly equiva- S: ieT T'""' "y"^' '" ''^ °^^" ''^'' (^-^--'^ -Ethical Subject . Cap. on Nature of the Ethical Sentiment.) Schopen- hauer afterwards spoils his discovery by metaphysically referril sympathy to some mysterious pantheistic consciousness of an TotT'beinr^" ''^ '^^^'""''' "^'^'^ '"''^■''"^' ^"^ '^^' «^' IS consIls'l'T"'"""'" *" "■'"'"'" "'■""' "»»"-™» «d sub. conscious ract,„s „ ,„ „mo.c .he kernel cliincnl.v of Ethics It not, ce^amly. ha„l to fal, i„,o other errors, such asover ookinl that men d.lTer personally in their perception, of „l,n,„re "5 pa.n; or that all practical systems are emWrical, a .,'*:, i, I pox.„,d,ve„encies„f standard; but to ove look the r a.'o ,' a^.ove.n,ent,o„ed is ,„ abandon the only talisman which pres r e ^ m the centremos, magic chamber and can alone save fro^Ka "s ata ,ll„„cal„y respecting the motive, from the reproach of sc^fi r::.airof L":::^:„'" "-- -- -- •'« '^^- auerna:::. It is essential, further, for the pressing ^ood of minkin ( .u . --nsts Should .ake that relation pron;i^nt: :^r ; t: Schopenhauer has been conscious enough of its importance to do The. are all aggravuingl, inexplicit, and blind whL passin; net' But to proceed to another matter. By misconception much has been ma e. m our science, of the government, the behests the Law. of Reason. The matter stands about as follows th 1 ve recogn^e pleasures and pains intuitively, and that bv compari n we awa e to further intuitions of quantity and qualitvTeL are the purely mtuuioncal elements : the Reasoning Facultv the^ performs us ordinarv function of extending our genial kn 1 d^ of objects ; and from each of these, either by direct contact or by a socat.on wuh previous known objects, we derive special pleasures or .ains. Intelligence thus operates merel as air' l.ght on the path of life, a more extended view, n pe " Tf .greater stores of motive-producers. We are swaved no exclu.vely than before by our foelings (for thfLZ^ I ^ e^ as of ,tsel, no motives), but our motives are more lar^dy „ from things distant, future and great ^ arenro?,''"' "''' P-sonal happiness as their consriot,s aim are properly not nght or good, but .esthetic, actions if thev hav^ any mtellectual element at all. and mav only be cal ed good if performed on a higher principle as parts of the'other tern To as. da. category should belong actions performed to w,n ll applause or avoid the censure of men, though considerable ethic. 13 theories have been founded on this class alon •, nor do habit or heredity explain anything essentia! to ethical acts. They should take no place in pure Ethics. If the first and second objections have been successfullv thus removed, and Utilitarianism cut plainly l„ose from its dangerous drift towards Egoism, Christianity may view serenely the discus- sions which constantly proceed upon the third. The suggestion can here be contributed that moral obligation may iuve i"ts root in subconscious pain of disobedience, acting as machinery for the reference of an objective force to moral rule by the fully conscious stratum of mind when contemplating the rule. The man who complains at being urable to do right withou. such sub-conscious powers, is no more reasonable than he who grumbles that he cannot see without eyes, protesting that he is chained k>, x\o\. provided ivith, the eyes. The high type of feeling allied to pleasure with which we are provided is moral feeling, and is only so allied through being con- structed of delicate pleasures in certain relations, as a cathedral is constructed of rocks, hewn, carved and bui't together. Its elements rise from every object we can associate witn sensation, that is to say, practically every object we can know. In the perfectly educated imagination it is the one supreme wnd universally-drawn delight, and is directed to a harmony bef.veen all conscious powers and the universe; a harmonious development and exercise of them, which is the system or intellectual vision called The Good. Harmony of any kind only exists in relation to ourselves. It IS that related state of objects in which we exert our powers upon them in natural proportions of exercise and rest, and con- sequently with ease. Natural exercise of a power is its condition, normally, of greatest pleasure. The whole of our sensibilities thus form an apparatus which practically amounts to a distinct moral sense oi conscience ; so that Christian, Buddhist, Confucian, and Greek are furnished by nature with a delicate criterion or quasi-intuition of the Good, and have only to argue clearly to agree. The Good is definite, measurable and practically knowable to men. The moral sense (its action subconscious) is the one arbiter of 14 Relative Fthics Th pleasure, intelligence onVrs'thV?',."'!.""'"' '^^^ '' ^°"«--- Absolute Ethics '"^'^ '"'^ ^''P°""^« ^^e scheme of -n^ind was the aLcL.W I'^-^.T'. '^^^^"'^ ^" ^^-^'^^P-^' pleasure with the beneficial Tho r . 7' '"^"'■*""^' ^"^ ^^ or the universally ben t " ''' '"''^"^^'"^' ■^^•^'- can be brought to ^^ <- ™«&-nation of it then, if we -•t--on Of I' ;, rThrhi^he'^;"'' ''''''' '^ ^^^^ -^^ --- constitution within ";. en the P ' """' """' '-^' ^'^ •^^'- ^y some .n.thod o f^tue H " ' P''^'"'"'' ^^'^''^h -erring,, don: J th I h tr; 7 T ^"^" ^^^^ '° '^'^^' -'h its fun measures o relilion H V '" "' ^''■'^" '''^ '^^"'PP^'^ "«ht~we shall not e a 'ohH H °"'^'''-"°' "^^''^'^ -^ swayed suL'imelv and afc.sorbinl. ' "^ '"^^^^^'' ^^^'^ -"d "ature be developed in som ' f Tr '^ '"""'■' = '''' ^ '^^-^'^ present, as seems p ob bl'nV/'" ' °" ' "^''^^^ ^'"^^ ^° 'he finally attain to the loveln ""'""' '"^ ' ""''>'• ''^«" «" '"usl pressure which, rr^ib' rt" "' '"'"' ^'^^'^ ^"^ 'he ^vhich strikes him t t ^re andm"' ''' '"" ^f every event in intelligence, is quietlv 17 P''''''°" ^^ ^' ^^^^"^es h- the physical SsfpTr^'^r^';^'"^"-"'^'^-^^^ t'on. is it not the answer to n ' of imaginable perfec our morarrX'tirMf k°1 """^^ "'"=" "^ '•« -"e — an co„.,o5. z* :r;;:rvelT ^ wH?r °"' "=■ conscloas powers and what i. .k ."'• ^hat then are air ""d .he sensitive animal V wh^'T ' " " """ """ind A-a on,, in the iire Th^ ^n. o^ eaTrT" ^'"*°^'' ' relafons bejond, around and after !h" k Or are there other ■iKtiny of beings aale to •■ l^.l, f J 'Pl-^'e. with which the also ha™oni.e? Is i true I, rT" """ ''^"'™<'" "'°"'<' »» possess b« a mon, n 7n al'd 'r™"'"^"" "'^^ "^ "»' - .0 ever, Possibili./'f ' ^^^ ^ ."o" "j' "T'' "■'""''' Penods a„,id scattered Forces'^ "'e „ if!:/"' '"''"°"-' we wake and rise without 16 n.m he truth, the sacrifice, the cl.gnity. the moral plar,s, of this = •n th>s ternble. boundless prison, without the knowledge, super- vision or guidance, or something to us their equivalent, of Another rn-ghty to saveP Man's thoughts, after he is evolved into ma turn naturally to investigate the great questions of God and im- mortahty. and the relations of our being, and hence of our conduct to and m v.ew of these, which he observes are of infinitely superior .mportance to the business of the day. And if God Himself be per ectly good and wise, shall he not know the Good and will it and has F e not made it and is it not His command ? MoraUi'y ^^h.ch decides these questions, and to the Christian it comes to .mply the will of Our Father, and the lives and acts we owe Him