I8S"I DR. TATHAM'S BAMPTON LECTURES MDCCLXXXIX THE CHART AND SCALE OF TRUTH IN TWO VOLUMES VOL I I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any authority, in the ensuing discourse : truth has been my only aim ; and wherever that has appeared to Jead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding, whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or not. Not that I want a due respect to other men's opinions ; but, after all, the greatest reverence is due to truth. — Locke, Hum. Und. book i. chap. 4, § 23. TQ AAHeEI nANTA 2YNAAEI.— Aristot. Eth. Nicom. lib. i. cap. 8. THE CHART AND SCALE OF TRUTH BY WHICH TO FIND THE CAUSE OF ERROR LECTURES READ BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD AT THE LECTURE FOUNDED BY THE REV. JOHN BAMPTON M.A. BY EDWARD TATHAM D. D. LATE RECTOR OF LINCOLN COLLEGE OXFORD A NEW EDITION REVISED CORRECTED AND ENLARGED FROM THE AUTHOr's MANUSCRIPTS WITH A MEMOIR PREFACE AND NOTES BY E. W. GRINFIELD M.A. LATE OF LINCOLN COLLEGE ALDI LONDON WILLIAM PICKERING 1840 printed ev c. whittingham, chiswick. TO THE HEADS OF COLLEGES. RIGHT REVEREND AND REVEREND SIRS,*' T APOLOGIZE, as I ought to do, for the delay in printing these Lectures, by saying, that, vrhen I had the honour to be appointed by you, my particular en gagements, beside my ordinary employ ments, were so many, that I could not take my subject till January, 1789; that some of these engagements continued upon my hands, all the ensuing spring ; and that, after I had finished at St. Mary's, some important concerns called me away the whole summer, to a distant part of the king dom. On account of the haste in which they were composed, I wished to revise them, and found the subject increasing upon me, in every page. VI DEDICATION. Such as they are, I now beg leave to present them to you, in a form, which, I judge, will give my extensive subject the best advantage, accompanied with a hearty wish for your health and prosperity in all things ; that you may see the arts and sciences, virtue, religion, and all good learning flourish under your auspice ; that, as your University improves in splendour, it may advance in reputation ; and that, as it is the first in ornament, it may be the first in discipline. I am, Gentlemen, your most obliged, and obedient Servant, THE AUTHOR. Ling. Coll. July 10, 1790. Extract from the last Will and Testament of the late Reverend John Bampton, Canon of Salisbury. " I direct and appoint, that the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons shall be preached upon either of the following subjects — to confirm and establish the Christian faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics — upon the Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures," &c. PREFACE. A NEW edition of " The Chart and -*- ¦- Scale of Truth" was long and ear nestly demanded, during the life of its learned author, but, through what he con fesses " his native indolence," he never submitted to the labour of carrying it through the press ; yet he appears to have constantly kept this object in view, for he has left a copy of his work, so much enlarged and altered, as in some measure to give it the character of a new publi cation. It is from this enlarged and corrected copy the present edition has been taken ; but the Editor has felt it his duty to exercise his discretion in the choice of the materials. The notes and observations appear to have been written at different intervals, during many years ; several are PREFACE. duplicates, with more or less variations, others are unfinished, and nearly all are left for future consideration and improve ment. Under these circumstances, the editor was intrusted with a discretionary power to omit or admit whatever he might deem expedient; and he has endeavoured to exercise this discretion, according to the best of his judgment. The author, as it would appear from his manuscripts, was desirous that, in any re publication of the " Chart and Scale," it should assume the aspect of a distinct logical treatise, and resign all appear ance of Bampton Lectures. But this design was not sufficiently matured to war rant the Editor, in bringing out tl;ie work, in this independent form. He. 'has> there fore still allowed it to retail? its original character ; but to render its 'arrangement, as a treatise of logic, somewhat more com plete, it has been found necessary to ar range several of the earlier lectures, as a general introduction ; and to throw the two last chapters of the first volume, into the form of an appendix. PREFACE. Xl The principal new matter consists of the chapters on metaphysics, which have been retrieved from the author's manuscripts, but there is scarcely a page, in which, some additions or alterations may not be dis covered. Many of these respect merely the style, which, it must be admitted, is somewhat harsh and obscure, whilst others are enlargements or illustrations of the argument. There are also considerable omissions, relating to temporary topics, long since passed away. For some of these, the Editor has the authority of Dr. Tatham ; for others, he is himself respon sible, unwilling to perpetuate forgotten controversy, or to reiterate charges, which can no longer be sustained. The copious table of contents and general index will be found of unquestionable utility to the scientific student. CONTENTS. Memoir and General Introduction . page xxi Appendix to Memoir xxxvii INTRODUCTION. Sect. I. — Truth in general. Truth, its various acceptations ; has respect to the Intel lect, Will, and Imagination; Truth and Wisdom coin cident in Christianity ; incomprehensible in its whole nature, therefore indefinable ; an attribute of the Divine Mind; thence derived into the human; uniform in God; diversified in man; the one absolute and infal lible, the other partial, progressive, and subject to error 1 — 15 Sect. II. — Mind. The subject of Truth ; to be investigated by conscious ness and reflection; Nature begins with causes, Man with effects ; hence Physics precede Metaphysics in the order of study; Lord Bacon's partition of the Sciences ; Locke's : Aristotle's preferred and followed ; — The Theoretic, Practic, and Poetic Mind, as relative to the Intellect, the Will, and the Imagination 16 — 22 Sect. III. — Principles. Truth derived from Principles ; Aristotle's account of Axioms or First Principles ; Intuitive Principles divided into primary and secondary ; Beattie's account of; the evidence of external Sense ; of internal Sense; XIV CONTENTS. of Memory. Reason, its office and limits; consists in Perception, operating by comparison . 2# — 29 Sect. IV. — Reasoning. Truth deduced from Principles, by reasoning; Reason, its limits ; not the cause or standard of Truth ; consists of Perception and Judgment . . . 29 — 32 Sect. V. — Induction. Ascends from particulars to generals ; rises to Axioms or universals, which form the primary principles of Truth ; the Key to the interpretation of Nature. The inductive Logic belongs to Bacon ; Definition the last act of Rea son, in the search of Truth . . . 33 — 40 Sect. VI. — Syllogism. Secondary Principles, derived from Axioms, the basis of Syllogistic Reasoning; consists in deducing Truths un known, and from those known ; to predicate a genus of a species, or an accident of a subject; opposed to In duction ; descends from generals to particulars ; com pares by the middle term ; unsafe^j^ if not fortified by Induction ; the Syllogistic Method more applicable to demonstrative, than to probable Truth . 41 — 51 Sect. VII. — Analogy. Based on the uniformity of Nature ; expects similar effects from similar causes ; divided into metaphoric and real ; is conversant with probabilities ; of wide extent ; its first principles different from Induction or Syllogism, and deduces its conclusions differently ; rational Logic consists of these three methods of reasoning, as appli cable to the different kinds of Truth ; its usefulness and superiority over the Logic of the Schools p. 52 — 62 Sect. VIII.— r/w Kinds of Truth. Truth threefold, as relative to the Intellect, the Will,' and the Imagination ; its principles primary and secondary ; has respect either to Induction, or Syllogism, or Ana- CONTENTS. XV logy; Truth, like the prismatic rays of light, affected by 1 the human faculties through which it passes ; the general Rule for embracing Truth .... 62 70 General Plan. To delineate the nature and kinds of Truth, in their rela tion to the human faculties, for the purpose of illus trating their connexion with Theologic Truth ; to point out, as by a Chart, the various dependencies of Truths on each other, by producing parallels of their Logic, their Principles, and their several kinds of Reasoning ; and then to illustrate their general Harmony and Agree ment ; to measure, as by a Scale, the relative force of each ; and to arrange them in their relation to the powers of Intellect, Will, and Imagination . . 71—86 CHAP. I.— MATHEMATICS. Sect. I. — The Logic of Mathematics. All Science relative to Mind or Matter; is Physical or Me taphysical; the intermediate is Mathematical; divided into Geometry and Arithmetic, as relating to quantity continuous or quantity discrete . . p. 87 — 90 Sect. II. — Mathematical Principles. Relative to the abstract and universal forms of Matter, Units, Points, Lines, Angles, Circles, Superficies, Solids, Equality, and Inequality ; the precision of Diagrams and Figures ; depend on Definitions ; their simplicity and certainty ; Axioms self-evident, though not intui tive ; Reason judges of them, without the help of a middle term ; Mathematical Principles founded on Definition, and not applicable to any subject, but Quan tity 91—106 Sect. III. — Mathematical Reasoning. Reducible to Syllogisms of the first figure; its process from generals to particulars ; from Axioms to Demon strations ; self-evident in every stage in demonstration, not only the middle term, but all others are general ; XVI CONTENTS. Syllogistic in its force, but not applicable to moral reasoning ; distinction between the ancients and mo derns in their respective use of categorical and rela tive propositions . . . . . 106 — 115 Sect. IV. — Mathematical Truth. The general ideas of Mathematics, syllogistically com pared, terminate in absolute and irresistible conviction ; tested by axioms which are universal and self-evident ; Mathematics belong strictly to the Intellect or theoretic mind 116—117 CHAP. II.— PHYSICS. Sect. I. — The Logic of Physics. Founded on the properties inherent in matter; referred by Aristotle, to the Theoretic Mind, as deriving its prin ciples from external subjects . . 118 — 120 Sect. II. — Physical Principles. Built on evidence of the external Senses ; proceed from causes to effects ; the errors of the Senses corrected by experiments . . , . . . . 121 — 126 Sect. III. — Physical Reasoning. Ascends from secondary to the primary Cause ; through the laws of nature to the God of nature; rejects Hypothesis and trusts only to Experiment; proceeds by Induction, extended by Analogy ; affords small scope for Syllogistic Reasoning ; uniting with Mathematics, it extends to the universe, by means of Analogy; Mathe matics to be used instrumentally, not as demonstrating Physical Causes 127 175 Sect. IV. — Physical Truth. Acquired by induction of particulars, ranged under general laws ; certain, but not demonstrative ; best, when aided by Mathematics ..... 175 180 CONTENTS. XVII CHAP. III.— METAPHYSICS. Sect. I. — The Logic of Metaphysics. The Science of Universals ; inductive, from particulars to generals; consists in the study of the human mind, by consciousness ..... 180 — 182 Sect. II. — Metaphysical Principles Based on the study of our faculties ; the mind its own reviewer ; strengthens all the mental powers by abstrac tion 182—185 Sect. III. — Metaphysical Reasoning. Its method analytical; the phenomena to be 'tested by consciousness ; should, if possible, have a specific terminology 186 — 190 Sect. IV. — Metaphysical Truth Consists in a faithful delineation of the human faculties ; in reporting their just relations, and forming a due estimate of their condition . . . 191 — 192 CHAP. IV.— FACTS. Sect. I. — The Logic of Facts Belongs to the theoretic mind ; it is built on the testimony of our senses, to things present; is the most plain and palpable of all evidence .... 193 — 194 Sect. II. — The Principles of Facts Arise from experiments on objects presented to the senses ; relate to time, place, person, &c. ; and depend on the •witness of the external senses ; a practical illustration 195—197 Sect. IIL— The Reasoning on Facts Depends neither on induction nor syllogism ; but results immediately from the senses of the spectator; reason should inquire into the evidence and circumstances attending them, and detect the occasional errors of the senses 198—201 Sect. IV.— r^e Truth of Facts Is intuitive and self-evident ; fact and truth synonymous ; b XVIII CONTENTS. the most easy, obvious, and familiar of any kind of truth; selected by Providence, as the basis of Christian evidence 202,203 CHAP, v.— HISTORY. Sect. I. — The Logic of History Depends on the testimony of others, and on our natural willingness to give credit to trustworthy witnesses ; the value of History 204—205 Sect. II. — The Historical Principle Depends on the testimony and authority of others, duly supported by evidence ; testimony the general principle of all historic fact; a practical illustration . 206 — 208 Sect. III. — Historic Reasoning Depends on particular facts recorded by the memory and testimony of credible witnesses ; its great and compre hensive importance .... 208 — 217 Sect. IV. — Historic Truth Depends on testimony; probable in its nature; commands assent on reasonable evidence ; is competent for all its purposes ..... 217 — 219 CHAP. VI.— ETHICS. Sect. I. — The Logic of Ethics Pertains to the will ; forms a part of contingent truth ; founded on a knowledge of good and evil ; its end happiness ; is compounded of right reason and well directed desire . .... 220 227 Sect. II. — The Principle of Ethics. The moral sense, or conscience ; lays the foundation of moral obligation; depends on free will, regulated by hope of reward, and fear of punishment . 228 237 Sect. III. — The Reasoning of Ethics. Based on the distinction between good and evil, as CONTENTS. XIX respects reward or punishment; in our various rela tions towards God and our neighbour ; syllogistic logic of small use in it, induction of far greater 238 — 251 Sect. LV.— Ethical Truth. Not capable of strict demonstration ; difference of morals and mathematics ; modes of quantity and modes of quality; their reasoning inverse — the one, from gene rals to particulars, the other, from particulars to gene rals ; Locke, his errors in representing Ethical Truth as demonstrative 252—263 Sect. V. — The Perfection of Morals Consists in our knowledge of the Divine Will ; could only belong to a Divine revelation ; the Gospel the only perfect moral system ; Christ the perfect pattern of man 263—272 CHAP. VII.— POETRY. Sect. I. — The Province of Imagination or Poetic Mind. The object of poetry (including the elegant arts) is pleasure connected with instruction, — Prodesse delec- tando ; forms new images, which have resemblance to the old, but no external existence; is imitative of nature, and desires to embellish her . 273 — 278 Sect. II. — The Poetic Principle Consists in sensibility tp natural beauty, corrected by good taste and reason; genius creative of new associations 279—281 Sect. III. — Poetical Reasoning Consists in producing a true effect, by imitation from nature, and collects results by induction, from the best models; poetry founded on the highest abstractions of the imagination,, acting on the will and memory, cor rected by reason and judgment . . 281 — 303 xx CONTENTS. Sect. IV.— Poetic Truth. Though fictitious, produces a uniform effect; it is mind imitating Divine energies ; the high dignity of poetry 304—309 CHAP. VIIL— MUSIC. Compound of art and science ; allied to geometry and astronomy ; terminates in effect ; consists in the union of motion and sound ; resembles poetry ; its truth, or expression, to be estimated by its power of exciting mental emotion ..... 310 — 315 RECAPITULATION 316—318 APPENDIX. I. — ^The Aristotelian Logic. Formed probably by the analysis of mathematical prin ciples ; Aristotle's account of syllogism ; . origin of his axioms and categories ; book of sophisms and topics ; neglect of induction ; Bacon and Sir Isaac Newton overturned his logic; evils of his philosophy 321—344 II. — The Author's Apology. The love of truth his motive and object ; the ethical errors of Aristotle shewn from his rule of contraries — Love your friends, hate your enemies; general failure of his philosophy in its most useful objects, as regards conversation or the prosecution of science ; successful chiefly in promoting disputation ; its ill effects during the middle ages, and on our present studies 345—368 MEMOIR AND GENERAL INTRODUCTION. /^F Edward Tatham, the learned and ^^ acute author of the present work, we have few biographical materials. He was a native of Yorkshire, as appears from the register of his baptism in the parochial chapelry of Dent, in the parish of Sedbergh, dated October 1, 1749, and the son of James Tatham, gentleman, to whom he affectionately inscribed his volume of Dis courses, introductory tb the Study of Divinity, published in 1780. It was no ordinary gratification to an aged parent to receive such a token of filial gratitude and intellectual ability. He was educated at Sedbergh Grammar School, under the care ofthe Rev. Dr. Bate- man, who appears to have been a teacher of uncommon worth. Dr. Tatham, in his XXII MEMOIR AND affectionate manner, always termed him, in his Yorkshire accent, " Oidd Bateman," and Dr. Haygarth of Bath, who was also one of Dr. Bateman's pupils, appears to have retained the same grateful recollec tions of his early instructor. To all, who can enter into the feeHngs of grateful pupils desiring to record the merits of their old schoolmaster, it will give pleasure to read the letters, many years afterwards written by Dr. Haygarth to Dr. Tatham, which are placed in the appendix to this short memoir \ He was admitted of Queens College, 1769, and took deacon s orders in 1776, and priest's in 1778. On his first taking orders, he undertook the curacy of Banbury, where he published the sermons already mentioned. Whilst resident at Queen's, the fire, in 1779, which consumed a considerable part of the college, destroyed his books and some of his manuscripts. The materials on which the Chart and Scale of Truth is founded ' Dr. King, the late Bishop of Rochester, was also edu cated at Sedbergh, and was the contemporary with Dr. Tatham. — See Appendix, No. 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXUI are yet in existence ; but no place or date is mentioned, by which it can be ascer tained, where or when they were put together. In 1781, he was elected fellow of Lincoln College, and became the acting tutor. It was during this period he preach ed the Bampton Lectures, the first volume of which was published in 1790, and the second in 1792. In March, 1792, he was elected Rector of Lincoln College, on the decease of Dr. Horner. His powerful mind was not confined to theological inquiries ; he took an active interest in the political questions of that critical period. In 1790, he published a remonstrative Letter to the Revolution Society, and in the year following, a Letter addressed to Mr. Burke. But it is unne cessary to particularize his various minor publications, as a list of their titles is sub joined to this brief memorial. On the election of Dr. Tatham to the rectorship, he became possessed of a hand some income, which he very liberally ex pended in improvements on the rectorial houses at Combe and Twyford. At a xxiv MEMOIR AND later period, he was a munificent contributor to the improvements in the college, where he was enabled to display his architectural attainments. In 1801, he married Elizabeth, daugh ter of John Cook, Esq., of Cheltenham, by whom he had no issue. She still sur vives, to revere his memory, and lament her loss. He retained his health and vigour of mind and body to an advanced age, but when infirmities came upon him, he re mained, for the most part, in the rectorial house at Coombe ; where, by the statutes of the College, he had a right of resi dence. The new front of this house was built by Dr. Tatham with much skill, in the Gothic style, at a considerable expense ; Coombe being indeed his favourite resi dence, and he died there, April 24, 1834, in the eighty-fifth year of his age. Some of his last expressions testified his firm reliance on the merits of his Redeemer. His re mains were, at his own request, deposited in the collegiate church of All Saints, Oxon, and an expressive, though not flattering GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXV likeness has been put up in the hall of Lin coln College. In the general character of his mind, as well as in the style of his writings. Dr. Ta tham perhaps approached to the genius of Warburton, more than to that of any other writer. Throughout the Chart and Scale of Truth may be discovered many of the " disjecta membra" of that original, but eccentric author. There is much of the same rough unpolished strength in his language, and his kindred attachment to Warburton, may be discovered also in his frequent reference to the Legation of Moses^ ^ In his exterior manners and address. Dr. Tatham had many of those peculiarities, so often incidental to men of genius, which result from living in a kind of intellectual world of their own. He was rather negligent of those official forms which are the ceremonials of a university. It can scarcely bp wondered, therefore, that he never served the office of vice-chancellor. But it may be confidently stated, that he was far above any feelings of envy or malignity, however the pungency of his language might occasionally offend. Two anecdotes, strongly characteristic, it may not be amiss to introduce : — At the great entertainment given to the allied sovereigns, at the peace, in the Oxford Theatre, the first toast proposed by the Prince Regent was " the King." — Dr. Tatham immediately arose, and begged to remind his royal highness they always drank in that university — " Church XXVI MEMOIR AND Having given this short account of a great and good man, we now propose to furnish the reader with a brief introduc tion to the work, by which Dr. Tatham will be hereafter chiefly remembered, and this is the more necessary, on account of a certain want of arrangement, which may and King." The prince, with his well known politeness, acknowledged his error, and the toast was given accordingly. — The other is of a higher order. On one of those college festals, called gaudies, a number of the undergraduates had kept their ovations to a late hour, and becoming somewhat noisy in their mirth, the rector sent his old servant to desire them to separate. Not obeying the mandate, he sent a more peremptory order ; this so exasperated two of the party, who were the most excited, that they rushed out of the room, and following the servant into the lodge, commenced a violent assault on the rector's person. Such an outrage they in ferred would lead to their summary expulsion; accordingly they rose early and cancelled their names on the college buttery book, and were about to take their departure. Dr. Tatham, knowing their fortunes in after life would be seriously injured, sent for them, and after a suitable repri mand, thus addressed them: — " Gentlemen, your names can only remain on the books, on these conditions : you are lo be strictly confined to the college during the next vacation. As to you, Mr. who are intended for the law, I require that you furnish me with a comprehensive analysis of Blackstone's Commentaries, and you, Mr. whoare forthechurch,must furnish a similar analysis of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity." It is needless to say, they both gratefully acquiesced in these terms. — This anecdote may well stand in the stead of any laboured eulogium on Dr. Tatham's character. GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXVII be accounted for, in some degree, from the unfitness of the materials, as subjects of pulpit address. " The Chart and Scale of Truth," as Dr. Reid has justly remarked in his letter^'' to Dr. Tatham, is essentially a system of logic, formed on the principles of Lord Bacon's writings, and may be considered as a practical commentary on the " Novum Organum." Not that he has followed Bacon in a servile and undeviating man ner—for he has adopted his general divi sions of mind from Aristotle — but that, in the general texture and composition of the work, it is based on that principle of in duction, as opposed to syllogism, which constitutes the main distinction between ancient and modern science. The primary and pervading principle of the entire work is this — that truth, though essentially the same and uniform in the Divine Mind, becomes varied and modified, as it passes through the human faculties — just as light receives a hue and ' See Appendix, No. II. XXVlll MEMOIR AND colour from the medium through which it passes— and that, in this manner, truth may be considered as passing through the intel lect, the will, and the imagination, and branching out into the various departments of mathematics, physics, metaphysics, mo rals, history, and poetry, demanding specific modes of reasoning and evidence, yet retain ing a common resemblance, so that they may all and each be brought to bear upon the " summum genus" of knowledge, — the knowledge of revealed theology. This is the fundamental principle, which pervades the work, and if the reader keeps this in mind, he will find little difficulty, in master ing its details. In working out this comprehensive pro blem, the author is first led to consider the principles of mathematical reasoning, which are strictly demonstrative, and which bear no relation to the principles of induction. He then remarks, that it was by a profound analysis of this mathematical reasoning, Aristotle discovered the method of syllo gism, and that all syllogisms are reducible GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXIX to those of the first figure (barhara). Syl logism is properly and strictly only appli cable to matters of pure demonstration ; that is, to the subject of pure mathematics. Hence he infers its comparative unfitness and incompetency to deal with subjects of probable and contingent truth. Such is the master key to this new system of logic, and when properly examined, it will be found to explain all the controver sies which have arisen between the advo cates of the Aristotelian and Baconian systems. In matters of geometry and arithmetic no induction is required ; the truth is self evident and indubitable, it rests on definitions which can allow of no dis pute or variation, and upon axioms which carry their own evidence, and postulates which are admitted the moment they are enunciated. To subjects of this purely theoretic kind, the syllogistic method of reasoning (into which all mathematical reasoning may be resolved) is strictly applicable ; but it is applicable only, under very great restrictions, to any other ; be- XXX MEMOIR AND cause all other kinds of truth refer to dif ferent states of mind, than that of pure intellect. And hence it is, that logic, as Dr. Whate- ly himself acknowledges, as an art, has nothing to do with the truth of the major proposition. This it always takes for granted, assuming its truth, like that of mathematics. But though the geometer may always safely assume his major pre mise, it is not so with the reasoner on other subjects. And hence it is, that syllogism becomes so totally inefficacious as the in strument of moral or theological reasoning. The evil of the syllogistic logic consists, therefore, in attempting to apply the art of demonstrative reasoning, to subjects which do not admit of demonstration; and the consequence is, that all moral truths, which are screwed down by syllogism, are nothing else than so many identical propositions ; the conclusion being nothing less than a repetition of the major proposition (which is always universal), under a specific form. But, though not an instrument for the discovery of probable truth, it is contended GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXxi by many, that syllogism is an admirable instrument for the detection of error. It would indeed be invaluable, if such were the fact; but a few considerations may point out its very narrow limits even in this respect. That we may convict opponents of pa ralogisms, or false syllogisms, by a proper use of syllogistic reasoning, there can be no question ; but it is only an error of form that we can possibly detect. If we ascend to principles or premises, we must first de scend to the method of induction ; we can only examine universals, by an investigation ofthe particulars contained under them ; but all major propositions may be considered as universals : consequently, all major pro positions require to be examined by the inductive process. The errors, therefore, which can be detected by syllogism, are exclusively those which may arise in the use of syllogism. They respect not the truth of things, but the truth of words, the proprieties of language ; thus far and no farther, the range of the syllogistic logic may extend. " The greater logic," says XXXII MEMOIR AND Sir John Herschel, " may be termed rational ; whilst to the inferior department, which is conversant with words alone, the epithet verbal, may for distinction be ap plied*." And hence it is the application of syllo gism can find little or no scope, in the pro gress of modern science, and that amidst all the brilliant discoveries of physics, chemistry, or geology, the inductive pro cess is constantly brought into action, whilst that of syllogism is scarcely ever alluded to. But, what still further demon strates its narrow limits is this — that the purely geometrical process, which can be reduced to syllogism, has itself been found somewhat too cumbrous for the compli cated calculations of modern science. Had Newton or La Place C(f ^^^^d therit5?elves to the process of the a^icient geometry, they could never have succeeded in their sublime discoveries. It is well known, that the celebrated Matthew Stewart did not succeed in employing the ancient geometri- ' Prelim. Discourse to Nat. Philos. p. 19. GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXXIII cal process to the interpretation ofthe Prin- cipia. — How deplorable then would be the attempt to demonstrate Newton, by the in tervention of syllogism ^. But it may be thought, that it affords, at least, a useful discipline and exercise for the youthful faculties, and that, as such, even though its immediate benefits are tri- ° To perceive the utter inutility of syllogism, whether on subjects of demonstrative or probable truth, it is only neces sary to state, that, to demonstrate the first proposition of Euclid syllogistically, no less than eight syllogisms are re quired. Of these, the first four are conditional, which are to be reduced to barbara by four others, to convert the problem into a theorem. — See Whateley's Logic, book iii. chap. iv. sect. 6. This stultus labor ineptiarmn may, however, serve to con vince the student, that Dr. Tatham was not mistaken in his conjecture, that the invention of syllogism may be traced to the logical analysis of such geometrical problems. It may also convince him, how unprofitable it must be to apply this cumbrous machinery to the investigation even of the simplest mathematical process. — But let us suppose, that, instead of the A and B of geometers, or instead of a problem, demanding only one self-evident postulate and one equally self-evident definition, these eight syllogisms were con structed of propositions of probable or contingent truth : not only would the process be greatly protracted, but, at every step, some new objection might be taken, which would give birth to a new brood of syllogisms, and these might be mul tiplied almost ad infinitum. Such was the prolific study of the schoolmen, whose understandings were perpetually ob scured with syllogistic fog, and whose tongues were kept for ages, by such a logic, in unceasing rotatory motion. XXXlV MEMOIR AND vial, it ought to be retained, for its ten dency to expand or invigorate the intellect. To this, it would seem sufficient to reply, that the syllogistic logic produced no such beneficial result on the minds of those, who formerly cultivated it to the greatest extent; and that the experience of the middle ages will for ever demonstrate its futility, as an element of rational and intellectual educa tion. But it may be questioned, whether, in the present state of science and literature, it is capable of improving the mental facul ties, even to the limited extent, which it may be supposed to have attained, in ano ther and very different stage of moral, lite rary, and philosophic intercourse. It has been acutely remarked by Dr. Reid, that the ancients, in their logical researches, attended only to categorical propositions, which have one subject, and one predicate, and of these, to such only, as have a general term for their subject ; whereas the moderns have attended chiefly to relative proposi tions, which express a relation between two subjects, and these subjects always general ideas^. ^ See Chart and Scale, vol. i. p. 113, 114. GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXXV Now, it deserves consideration, whether, by this transfer of categoric to relative pro positions, the entire value and propriety of the syllogistic logic has not been set aside on all topics of probable and contingent reasoning. The " dictum de omni et de nullo," on which this whole logic is based, does not apply to the agreement or dis agreement of ideas. It can serve only to elucidate propositions which are strictly categorical, which have one subject, one predicate, and which have for their subject, a general term. It cannot be brought to apply to propositions when compared with others, whose subjects are general and corre lative ideas. Of such propositions, as Wallis has remarked, the test should consist in another axiom ^ — " Quae conveniunt in eodem tertio, conveniunt inter se." And this difference may serve to explain the extreme puerility of all the questions which can now be examined by the scho lastic logic. It can be applied only to the most simple and categorical reasoning — to reasoning which carries with it its own evidence, and which approaches the simplicity of Euclid. As soon as any ques- XXXVI MEMOIR AND tion becomes complex or obscure, demand ing the scrutiny and comparison of our thoughts, its utility, as a test, is destroyed ; it can only add to our difficulties, by con tracting our attention to the terms, instead of expanding it over the whole compass of the reasoning. It is, in fact, incapable of measuring such modern inquiries ; and hence it was, that Locke, though he imper fectly understood the rationale of the an cient logic, perceived enough of its defi ciency, to enable him to reject its claims, as an instrument for enlarging, regulating, or improving the human understanding. — But why should we invoke the spirit of the dead, or insult the corpse of that mighty monster, who once bestrode the world, "like a Colossus?" The scholastic logic has long since lost its sway. It now serves only " to point a moral or adorn a tale." It has sweetened the pleasantries of Gold smith, and heightened the satire of Swift. In offering these observations, it is not my object to make any formal or preconcerted attack on that system of logic, which is still taught at Oxford ; but merely to justify the GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXXvli principles of the work, which I have been requested to revise. It has long been my firm conviction, that the principles of this work are built on a basis, which can never be shaken ; and that, when ancient preju dices have passed away, its merits will be felt and acknowledged, even by the Alma Mater of its author. Be this as it may, the work now comes before the public, in an enlarged and im proved form, as a practical comment on the inductive logic. In this respect, its merits were widely acknowledged on its first appearance. It is well remembered, that Mr. Burke called on Dr. Tatham, soon after its publication, and expressed himself in the highest terms of approbation. The letters of Dr. Reid and Dr. Doig'' will speak for themselves. The Editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in the article " Logic," thus announcetheir obligation, and their opinion of its merits : — " This chapter is almost wholly taken from Dr. Tatham's ' Chart and Scale of Truth,' a work, which, ' See Appendix. XXXVIU MEMOIR AND notwithstanding the ruggedness of its style, has so much real merit, as a system of logic, that it cannot be too diligently studied by the inquirer, who would travel by the straight road to the temple of science." These observations, which are principally applicable to the first volume, (in which the various kinds of truth relating to human science are explained) may also be partially transferred to the second, which relates exclusively to theology. — Theologic truth, according to Dr. Tatham, rests originally on our belief in the Divine vera city. Faith is the basis of its logic, but its external and internal evidences form the proper subjects of human reasoning and inquiry. He views it with Bacon — " tanquam pqrtus et sabbatum humana- rum contemplationum omnium." Whilst he allows it is more distinct and separate in the nature of its truth, than any of the human arts or sciences are from each other, and confesses the informality of its logical arrangements ; he appropriately represents Theology, as their queen and potentate, to whom they all respectively subserve and GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXXIX minister—-" The virgins that be her fellows do bear her company." Considered in its general character and design, " The Chart and Scale of Truth" may be viewed, therefore, as a practical and continuous comment on the Novum Orga num of Bacon. It is its leading object to establish the value of the inductive prin ciple, as opposed to the syllogistic. The one proceeds on the analytic, the other on the synthetic method. It is almost needless to observe, that whilst synthesis prevails in the works of nature, analysis should prevail in the studies of nature. All the works of nature and of art to be investigated with precision, require to be analyzed with pre cision, before they can be understood. It is proper however to remark, that, in some of the strictures on Bishop Lowth, on the rules of biblical translation, and on the comparative value of the Hebrew and the Septuagint, many readers may be found to differ from the author. These are topics open to freedom of discussion, and, on which, some of the best and most learned men have entertained different opinions. xi MEMOIR AND GENERAL INTRODUCTION. But, whatever be the agreement or disagree ment of the reader on these secondary topics, the Editor feels no uncertainty, as to the general decision, on the high and original value of the entire work, — that it is one of those permanent productions, which will always retain its rank and sta tion, in the library of the learned theolo gian. For himself, he deems it only an act of justice to acknowledge, that he owes much of the formation of those analogical studies, which have been his chief occupa tion through life, to the early study of this original treatise, in conjunction with the kindred works of Butler, Brown, Reid, and Stewart. APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR. I.— LIST OF THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE AUTHOR. 1778. Essay on Journal Poetry, 8vo. 1780. Twelve Discourses, introductory to the Study of Divinity. 1789. The Bampton Lectures. The first vol. appeared in 1790, the second in 1792. 1790. A Remonstrance to the Revolution Society. 1791. Letters to Edmund Burke, 8vo. 1792. A Sermon before the University on Nov. 5. 1793. A Sermon suitable to the Times. 1798. Letter to Mr. Pitt on the National Debt. 1802. Plan of the Income Tax. 1807. Address to the Members of Convocation on the Statute for Public Examinations. 1811. Address to Lord Grenville on Abuses in the University. 1813. Oxonia Purgata. 18 — . Oxonia lUustrata, treating of the Architectural Improvements of Oxford. 1816. Observations on the Scarcity of Money, and its Effects. dii APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR. II.— DR. REID'S LETTER TO DR. TATHAM. REV. SIE, Oct. 1791. Some time ago, Dr. Doig of Stirling sent me your " Chart and Scale of Truth," as a present from the author. My best acknowledgments are due for so unexpected a testimony of your regard, and for the honour you have done to the short account of Aristotle's Logic. As I wished to read your book before I re turned my thanks for the present, I have now also to thank you most cordially for the pleasure and instruction I have had by it. You call it very justly a new logic, and I think it is- a sound logic; tracing distinctly the different regions of human knowledge, and pointing out the first principles, the kind of evidence and method of reasoning proper to each. I shall recommend it to our Professor of Logic, who, I doubt not, has the candour and the good sense to discern its merit, and will have the opportunity of making it known to many. Such a work might be expected from so able a disciple and admirer of Lord Bacon. I hope it will teach philoso phers to give more attention to the instructions of that great reformer in philosophy, than they have done. Newton understood his merit, and traced with success the path he had pointed out ; you will lead many others to do the same. That you may not understand this, as an unmeaning compliment, will you forgive me, Rev. Sir, mentioning one thing, wherein I do not perfectly go along with you ? After giving just and liberal praise to the great man last mentioned, you seem to find fault with the forces he has introduced to account for the planetary motions, as things, which, without his inten tion, have given a handle to materialists, and which he APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR. xllli should have held forth only, as an hypothesis, for the benefit of calculation, and not as really existing in nature. I am humbly of the opinion, that, of all the followers of Bacon, Newton has most closely followed his rules, without deviating to the right hand or to the left. The two first books of the " Prineipia," are properly called "Mathematical principles of natural philosophy." The propositions are mathematically demonstrated, and nothing but mathematical principles are assumed, except the three laws of motion, which, as physical principles he took to be sufficiently confirmed hy induc tion, hy those who went before him. The third book is the application of those mathematical principles to physical astronomy. The rules of philosophizing laid down in the beginning of the third book, are, I think, as good a compound, as can be given, in so few words, of the Novum Organum. The phenomena are facts, and the propositions are deduced from those facts, by reasoning according to the rules laid down. The sum of this physical astronomy is, that by reasoning from facts, according to his rule of philosophizing, he extends to the heavenly bodies two laws of nature, or forces, which were before allowed to obtain universally in earthly bodies. These are the vis inerticB and the vis gravitatis. As to the handle given by these forces to materialism, is it not equally strong, when they are imputed to earthly bodies as when to the heavenly ? If this be so, Galileo, Torricelli, Wren, Wallis, Huygens, &c. are the persons chargeable with giving this handle, and Newton only left it as he found it. But, to consider the forces them selves ; — the vis inertia. Newton indeed thinks to be in herent in matter ; but it means no more but passiveness, that matter perseveres in any state, in which, it is put, tni by some impressed force it be made to change it. This seems to me, to be so far from giving a handle to materialists, that it is subversive of their whole system. A consistent materialist must hold, that every animal xliv APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR. on the face of the earth, and perhaps every vegetable, contradicts this law. Yet if it be not true, Newton's system is a rope of sand. — Perhaps it is the vis gravi tatis that gives the handle. This Newton holds, not to be inherent in matter, but an impressed force ; and he must necessarily do so, to be consistent ; for if it were inherent, it would be evidently contradictory to the vis inertia. Matter continues to be inert, even when its state is constantly changed by the force of gravity; being passive, it yields to every impression. As all action implies an agent, an impressed force implies some being that impresses it, either body or mind. If the impression be made by a body, that body must also have had its force impressed, and the chain of bodies impressed and impressing must end in some being, which has an inherent power of impressing motion upon matter, and, consequently, which is not matter. This, I think, is the fair conclusion from Newton's doctrine of gi-avity, the conclusion which he saw and intended; and it ap pears to be as unlucky a handle for the materialist as even the vis inertia ; indeed, these are so connected, that, though the inertia of matter does not imply its gravity, the impressed force of gravity implies its inertia. Nor can I help thinking, that Newton had reason to hold forth his system, as the true physical principles of astronomy, and not barely as an hypothesis, by which the phenomena might be solved, and calculation assisted. He had learned from Bacon, to disdain as the fictions of men, hypotheses whose truth is not legitimately proved by induction from fact. This appears from his second law of philosophizing. If the heavenly bodies be inert and inactive, every change of their state from rectilineal motion, necessarily implies an impressed force, and an uninterrupted change implies a force uninterruptedly impressed. That such a force really exists in nature, and is not an arbitrary hypothesis, appears to be a APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR. xlv necessary conclusion, from these two premises ; to wit, that matter is inert, and that the heavenly bodies move in curve lines. It is impossible to evade this conclu sion, unless there be in nature a power of giving motion to matter, which is neither iii the matter itself, nor external to it. There seem to me to be two ways, in which, Newton's system may be fairly, I do not say successfully, assaulted : one way is, by showing that his rules of philosophizing are not, in the present state of human nature, the only foundation, on which, a true system of physical astronomy can be raised. For this, Bacon, as well as Newton, is answerable, as the rules are the same in both. The other way is, by showing that his conclusions are not justly deduced from the phenomena of the heavens, according to those rules. For this, Newton alone is answerable. — He seems like wise to me, to have just stopped, where a natural philoso pher ought to stop. Having traced the chain of natural and dependant causes, as far as he was able, and shown, that the highest link he was able to reach, still implied a higher, which must be either a natural and dependant cause, or the finger of God. But your opinion of Newton's system does not affect your " Chart and Scale of Truth," nor does it affect the great regard and esteem, with which, I have the honour to be. Rev. Sir, Your very much obliged humble servant, THOMAS REID. Xlvi APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR. III.— DR. HAYGARTH'S LETTERS TO DR. TATHAM. REVEREND DOCTOR, Bath, June 22, 1807. The just praise, with which, you have honoured the character of the Rev. Dr. Bateman in a late publication, could not fail to afford high gratification, to all his scholars. It has revived a wish, which I have often en tertained, that his Latin and Greek phrase books might be published. They were composed, you know, of notes upon classical authors, to explain difficult and illustrate beautiful passages. Being the work of many years, hy a man of uncommon learning, might not a monument be thus erected, which would be highly honourable to the memory of so excellent a school master ? Would not such a publication promote clas sical erudition, and afford very useful assistance to the upper boys of large schools ? I left Sedbergh school in 1759, and, soon after that period, my time and study have been chiefly employed on other, particularly, on medical subjects, so that I should be very ill qualified to publish such a work. Besides, mine are much less perfect, than future copies, as you may remember, that Dr. Bateman was constantly adding new annotations to his phrase-books. Your departure from Sedbergh was probably at least ten years later. Are you in possession of good copies of them, or can you find any, among your friends at Oxford ? If you approve this proposal, you wUl undoubtedly require, that the business should be executed, in a proper manner. For this purpose, may it not be necessary to engage a man of learning; first, to correct all the APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR. xlvii numerous schoolboy errata, which the very best copies may probably contain, by a careful reference to all the original passages which are quoted ? second, to make an index of all the authors, referring to all the passages explained in the order of their works, so that each phrase may be found, by the classical reader, without difficulty ? I prevailed upon a young friend of mine to form such an index to my Latin phrase-book. Should not these phrase-books, with such corrections and indexes, be published in a small and cheap form, so as in both senses to fit a schoolboy's pocket ? Can you recollect any Sedbergh scholar, who would be able and willing to undertake the task of editor ? No attempt will be made to accomplish this proposal, without the approbation of at least one of Dr. Bate man's sons. I have already desired my friend, John Dawson, to communicate this plan to the Rev. S. Bateman, with whom you may probably be better acquainted than I am. With Col. Bateman I had become more intimate at Bath, but he is returned to India. This address from an utter stranger might require many apologies. But my hope that you will pardon the liberty I have taken, is in the desire we mutually feel to advance the honour of our highly respectable schoolmaster, and to promote useful knowledge. I have the honour to be, Your very respectful and faithful servant, JOHN HAYGARTH. XlVllI APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR. IV. SIR, Oxford, Aug. 13, 1807. On my visit to this place, it would have given me great pleasure to obtain a personal conference with you, on the business explained in the letter, which, though a stranger, I took the liberty to address you. Your full approbation of my proposal gave me great satisfaction. I have not yet received any answer to the request sent through Mr. Dawson to the Rev. S. Bateman. As he has the honour to be your friend, your recommendation may probably have much influence. I cannot think, that he can have any objection, to the publication of the Latin and Greek phrase books of his very learned and respectable father, if executed in a proper manner. As I understand that you sometimes visit Bath, it would give me much satisfaction to have the honour of seeing you there, when we might more fully discuss this business. I have the honour to be, with great respect, Your obliged and faithful J. HAYGARTH. v.— DR. DOIG'S LETTER TO DR. TATHAM. REV. SIR, Stilling, Aug. 16, 1794. As Mr. Ireland, a native of this country and an apo thecary in your city, is returning directly to Oxford, I could not deny myself the pleasure of writing you a few lines by that conveyance. Perhaps you may recollect to have seen in Oxford, towards the end of June, 1791, APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR. xlix two Caledonians of a very different aspect ; the one, a country squire, with rather a larger stock of erudition, than usually falls to the share of that species of beings on your side the Tweed ; the other, a smatterer in Greek and Latin, and some other ancient languages. The former was a Mr. Ramsey, and the latter a Dr. Doig. The remembrance of your attention and civilities to my fellow-traveller and myself upon that occasion has brought this trouble upon you, which is, I beg leave to assure you, a tribute of the most sincere gra titude. Why this tribute was not paid sooner is another question. The reason was, the want of a commodious channel of conveyance, and, perhaps, because I could not think of troubling you with a letter, by the ordinary course, without having something to communicate of more importance than a mere compliment. I spent an evening about a fortnight ago with your correspondent, Dr. Reid, of Glasgow, who still speaks in very high terms of your Bampton system of logic, and heartily wishes to see it generally adopted. He is a very old man, much bowed down and very deaf, but stiU enjoys a great share of health and vigour ; and, as far as I can pretend to judge, the same strength of mind he did forty years ago. You may probably have forgot, that when I had the honour of being with you at Oxford, you prescribed me, by way of task, to read Aristotle's Pohtics. This task I have performed most faithfully, and have, I think, reaped both pleasure and profit from the opera tion. That treatise is little known here. I fear the Egyptian priest's stricture upon the Greeks, recorded by Plato, will be too long appUcable to my coun trymen. About two years ago (8vo. 1793), there was pub- hshed a trifle of mine, under the title of " Two Letters on the Savage State, addressed to the late Lord Kaims." They were patronised by the late Dr. Home, Lord d i APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR. Bishop of Norwich, who died, however, before it was pubhshed. Lord Kaims and the other demi-christians here maintain, that once upon a time aU mankind were in a state of savagism. I endeavour to controvert this article. If you will give me leave, I shall transmit you a copy of it the very first opportunity. I have like wise written a dissertation on the origin of the tribe of the Greeks called Hellenes, which was read before the members of the Royal Society, Edinburgh, and is pub lished in the third volume of their Transactions. A copy of it shall accompany " Beatus Fannius, ultro Delatis capsis et imagine."* Mr. Ramsey is in tolerable good health and spirits. I believe he wrote to you by the same conveyance. He has not yet lost all hopes of seeing the Head of Lincoln College at his sweet villa, and regaling him with his various and delicious fruits, the produce of the neatest and most diversified garden in this country. In this case, I too should flatter myself with the hopes of an en passant. Your goodness wUl excuse this enormously long scrawl, which shall end where it should have begun, that is, with congratulating you on your preferment, and sincerely wishing you long life, good health, and high spirits to enjoy it, and begging you will rest assured, that I am. Rev. Sir, with the greatest respect. Your most obedient humble servant, DAVID DOIG. * This alludes to a poem published (4to. 1796) by the Doctor, entitled, " Extract from a Poem on the Prospect of Stirling Castle." — Editor. APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR. VI.— DR. GEDDES' LETTER TO DR. TATHAM. [The following short letter from Dr. Geddes, is too characteristic of the writer to be omitted. — Editor.] REV SIR, London, Jan. 21, 1794. I HAVE just now received your very polite letter of the 18th of last December, with the acceptable present of your " Lectures." I was not before a stranger to them, although my scanty purse had not been able to purchase them. I have read that part which you point out with much pleasure. We differ on some points : but I trust we shall always differ, as Uberal and honest men ought to differ. To delineate the " Chart of Truth" is an arduous task, which few have accomplished so well as yourself; but still, I fear, Pilate's query will occur, Tl Eqi\) «Av)fi£/«. Relative truth is, I hope, not uncommon, but absolute truth is, perhaps, unattainable in this vale of tears. Be that as it will, your labours are extremely laudable, and must class you among the first scholars of the present age. Your name in the list of my sub scribers is a great acquisition, especially at a time when bigotry, and something worse than bigotry, is trying to injure me. If Cooke have no copy let me know, that one may be sent hence. I have ordered my two last pubUcations to be presented to you, and am, with very great regard. Rev. Sir, Your obhged humble servant, A. GEDDES. THE CHART AND SCALE OF TRUTH, BY WHICH TO FIND THE CAUSE OF ERROR. GENERAL INTRODUCTION. Sect. I. Of Truth in general. ISDOM is a term which has a more w limited and a more extended signifi cation. Some of the ancient philosophers used it to express only a superior skill or proficiency in the arts' ; others raised it to the comprehension of the speculative sci ences, whilst they excluded from its meaning all practical virtue, which, in their mistaken ' Trjv Se aoijiiav iv rat? rixvaiq, rote dgpijie^dTOig rat: rivvai diroSlSofxev, olov '^eiSiav, Xidepyov 6v, Kal TIo\vk\£itov, dvBpiavTOTOidv' ivravOa /j.iv ovv uOiv aXXo tTrifiaipovrci Trjv ao^iav, rj ilri dpirrj reyvrfg izlv. — ^Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 7. B ^ THE CHART AND SCALE estimate of the value of things, was to confer upon it, as they thought, the highest honour . But others, anticipating the superior dignity to which it was in future to be exalted, gave it a construction more enlarged and liberal ; allowing it to embrace every virtue both of the heart and understanding, and making it to comprehend all moral as well as intel lectual good'. In this more comprehensive and exalted sense, wisdom was applied by the most illus trious of her children, who in his animated and almost enthusiastic descriptions, has adorned this queen of virtues with a splen- ° Efj'aj Se Tivai: trocjtht old/ueda oXwt" a Kara fiipoi, oSe aWd Tl ^ iTO(j>ovs, ijairep "OfirjpOi ijujaiv iv rj) MapyeiTTj, Tdv S' UT dp aKairrrjpa deoi diaav, St dpoTrjpa, OuV dWat Tl 6v. a'se SrjXov on ij dxpifii'^drr) dv rav iirt^fjMav e'i-q rj aofia. Sii apa Tov dv firj fiovov rd ek tiHv dpySv ilSevai, dXXd Kat irepl rat dpy^di dXtfdeuHv. wV ut) dv -q ao^ia vac cai iiri'^rifjir], xai uavtp KC(j)aXrjv e'^eaa eiri'^ijfitj rwv TifiiuTaTuiv. droirov ydp, si nc rrjv ewirrjfir)v iroXtTtiojv, 17 ri^v ihpdvtjaiv mrhSaioTaTrjv ourai aivai, ei fit} rd dpirov rav iv ra Koaua avdpuTfk iriv Aristot. Ethiti. Nicorn. lib. vi. cap. 7. ' Ilaffa iiri'rrjfiri yapiZofiivri SiaiKorTvvtK Kal Tiji aXXti^ dperiji: iravupyla, aXX a ero^t'a, g fiovoyivfii irapd irarpdi;, 'irXr]prj<: ¦ydpiroe Kal dXrjQeiag. — John, i. 14. 'H \dpig Kal li dXl/dcta Bid 'Ii/ira X^ocra iyivero. — John, i. 17. 'Ev Tura yviorrovrai irdvrti on ifiol /ladtirai eTt, idv dydirtfv evrjra iv dXXrjXon, — John, xiii. 35. Xct^tf has a more extensive sense than dydirri, and in cludes its meaning — Gratia, beneficiiim, sed in ea significa tione qua ponitur pro amicitia seu benevolentia fratrum geminorum. See Steph. Thes. Ling. Gr. THE CHART AND SCALE supereminent distinctions by which man be comes the subject of a religion which will make him wise unto salvation. There is no expression by which our Lord presents himself and his holy gospel to our apprehension with a more intense devotion, or which he enforces with a stronger em phasis, than that of truth. " Sanctify them through thy truth. Thy word is truth'." He joins it with life, as connected by a close and necessary tie, and as constituting the way which leads immediately to the end of his religion. " I am the way, and the truth, and the life ; no man cometh to the Father, but by me . Descended from a celestial parent, and allied to a sister of such purity and perfec tion, this branch of wisdom is a subject at all times most deserving our cultivation and regard, for its own sake, and more especially for the sake of Him who had all truth, who, " from his good-will to men," hath given us ^ John, xvii. 17. ^ John, xiv. 6, OF TRUTH. those sublime and supernatural portions of it, which are most accommodated to our neces sities, and who, " knowing what is in man," hath conveyed them to us in a manner by which we can receive and improve them to our best advantage. She is the brightest object and ornament of the understanding, as her sister Charity is of the heart. To open this vast and important argument of truth in general, by a formal, and what is called a logical definition, would betray both ignorance and presumption, and promise little success in the conclusion. Aristotle indeed is said to have reproached Democri- tus as a teacher and philosopher, because he dealt in similitudes and analogies, and did not define and dispute in form': and, under the sanction of his authority, the method of defin ing has been attempted by some philosophers, perhaps with more confidence than success'". Truth is ofthe nature and essence of God, like him incomprehensible in the whole, and ' Bacon. De Augm. Sclent, lib. vi. cap. 2. '" How imperfect and illogical is that of WoUaston I Def. 2. Sect. 1. THE CHART AND SCALE ineffable in its sublimer parts. It is more than the other attributes, it embraces and comprehends them all. For these and other reasons it cannot admit of an adequate defini tion. And who in the beginning of his re searches, would presume to define that, which, after all his longest and best-conducted la bours, he can only hope partially, and often imperfectly to comprehend ; and of which an essential part can neither be directly ex pressed, nor directly understood " ? We may indeed esteem ourselves highly favoured by the Author and Finisher of all truth, if at the end of our researches, we shall be able any way to understand, in order to apply a few " See Bp. Browne's " Divine Analogy," p. 84, who cites these remarkable words from Aquinas : " Intellectus noster, eo modo apprehendit eas (perfectiones), secundum quod sunt in creaturis, et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per nomina." " What faculties other species of creatures may have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things, we know not. This we know, aud certainly find, that we want other views of them besides those we have, to make discoveries of them more perfect. The intellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike, that the parts which we see of either of them hold no proportion to that we see not ; and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes, or our thoughts of either of them, is but a point in comparison of the rest." — Locke, Hum. Und. book iii. chap. 3. OF TRUTH. particular portions and detachments of it, and to guard them from error and corruption. When, upon a solemn occasion, the question was put to our Lord by a Roman governor, " What is truth ?" though it was what he fully and perfectly knew, and what he came purposely and professedly to teach '^ he did not define it. He knew that definition was never the best method of instruction, and that, in its common use and application, it was seldom the friend of truth. Philosophi cally viewed, words do not constitute truth. They are only the vocal instruments by which it is communicated, or the written signs by which it is recorded. The latter are the daughters of earth, the former the sons of heaven. By an inquirer therefore things are to be examined, rather than words defined. By a teacher, things are to be con veyed by words in some form or other, which are doubtless to be explained to the under standing, if not sufficiently understood before. But explanation is one thing, and definition '^ Kal ek raro iXijXvda elt tov Koufjiov, 'iva fiaprvprfaa rfi dXrjQuq. Hue d Sv Ik rrjg dXtjQda';, dKaci fiu Trjg tjnovrji-. — John, xviii. 37. 8 THE CHART AND SCALE is another. Explanation is the first office of a teacher; definition, if it be good, is the last of the inquirer, after the truth be found ; and is then the most advantageously employed by the teacher, when his previous instructions have prepared him for its possession. But let us mark the conduct of the teacher professedly sent from God. Himself the fountain and conductor of truth, he is repre sented in the sacred oracles as the sun", the fountain of light, and as the day-spring from on high'% the harbinger of light : and of these apt similitudes, familiar to all even without an explanation, which had been em ployed by Solomon in some of his sublime portraits of wisdom. He often availed him self, expressing truth by the significant em blem of " light and the light of life." Whatever opinion therefore we may enter tain of the doctrines and tenets of these two ancient philosophers, from the example of One who was wiser and " greater" than they, we may venture, in the present in stance, to prefer the native of Abdera to the " Psa. Ixxxiv. 11. Mai. iv. 2. » Luke, i. 78. OF TRUTH. 9 master of the Lycaeum : and, instead of in stituting the present investigation, by vainly attempting to define, it may be safer to fol low the example of Him, who, in manner as well as in matter, was infinitely above the Stagyrite, and to avail ourselves of this simi litude, as a fit illustration of truth in general. God is supremely a Mind, and truth is consequently an attribute of mind. To the sun " declaring at his rising a mar vellous instrument '°," He, " by whom all tilings were made"," hath delegated the power of enlightening the material system ; whilst he hath reserved to Himself the office, which is more suitable to his nature, of giving light and knowledge by his eternal truth to the mind of man. But, whether he act through the instrumentality of his crea tures, or more immediately from himself, he is uniform and consistent in his operations, so that one part of his divine economy is always illustrative of another. As the sun sheds his light over the material creation to >' Eccles. xliii. 2. " John, i. 3. 10 THE CHART AND SCALE be apprehended by the eye, truth is the light shed down from heaven to be appre hended by the intellect, given to illumine every subject natural and moral, corporeal and spiritual, so far as they are qualified by their different natures to convey it to the human mind ; or rather, perhaps, so far as the human mind is qualified to receive it from them. For the difficulty of truth does not exist so much in the subjects, as in our selves ; and truths, which are the strongest in themselves, may sometimes shine upon our minds with the weakest force ''. " "IffMc Si Kal TTJg i^aXfTTODyroc etrt/c Kara Svo roTrae, b'k iv Toit irpdyfj-aiTiv, dXX iv ij/iiv ro a'inov avrrjt. uaircp ydp Kal rd Tuv vvKreptSav ofifiara irpot to (j)Eyyot £i^£t rd /j.ed' rjfiipav, aVw Kal Trjt ijfteripag \pv)^ri<; d vovg irpbg rd rrj ipiiaei tpavcpuTOTa TrdvTo>v. — Aristot. Metaph. lib. ii. cap. 1. De causa diflBcultatis in veritatis cognitione discrepantes sunt sententiae : alii enim res ipsas hujus diflficultatis causam esse, alii nos ipsos esse censent. Heraclitus et Academic! omnes res fluxas et cad u eas nullamque omnino stabilem et immutabilem esse putarunt, et in rebus ipsis difficultatem possuerunt.^ Alii, omnem veritatis difficultatem in imbecil- litate nostri intellectus habuerunt, hisce nisi argumentis: " Siqua res esset cognitu difficilis, ea esset talis respectu cujuscunque intellectus; sed ratione divini Intellectus nulla res sit cognitu difficilis." Et " Quicquid per se tale est, id ea re non est difficile tale." Sed intermedia sentenlia reci- pienda est. Quod difficultas cognoscendas veritatis partim ad nos, partim ad res ipsas referenda sit. — Joan. Ludov. Haven- reuterus Com. in Aristot. Metaph. lib. ii. cap. I. 8vo. Francf. 1604, OF TRUTH. 1 I Thus from the Divine mind, truth becomes an attribute of the human, and must be in proportion to the mind in which it is ; and, from a comparative view of these different minds, so far as we can judge of them, how ever imperfectly that may be, assisted by this scriptural similitude of light, we may hope to arrive at a general conception of truth) as it relates to man. In the Divine mind, which pervades and comprehends all things, truth is universal (allowing for the inadequate comprehension of our ideas and words when applied to the Deity) ; in the human, which, though it be capable of enlargement from the body, and can reach to distant times and places, is not of all times and places, it is partial ; as the light of the sun, by the rotation of the earth, is to the human eye. For, whereas our minds are only in particular places at par ticular times, it is the sole prerogative of the Divine to be present in all places and at all times. In the Divine mind, which is sepa rate and distinct from body, it is immediate and intuitive ; in the human, which is joined 12 THE CHART AND SCALE by a mysterious union with the body, it is mediate and progressive, advancing from the information of the senses through the opera tions of the intellect, like the gradual dawn of light. In the Divine mind, which is simple and uncompounded, it is of equal force ; in the human, which is composed of different faculties adapted to different sub jects, it is of different degrees and kinds, according to the difference of its faculties and the subjects presented to them ; as the light is varied into many degrees of shade and colour, according to the different media through which it passes. In the Divine mind, which is pure, it is unerring and infal lible ; in the human, which is corrupt, it is subject to error, as the pure light of the sun is darkened and obscured by the grosser exhalations of the earth. But as the Divine mind is incapable of change, so also hath he formed the human the same in all men and nations, in reference to general truths and faculties ; so that whatever be the imperfec tions or shades of any truth as relative to men, it is essentially immutable, that is, absolute and opposite to falsehood, as " dark ness to light, and light to darkness." OF TRUTH. 13 Thus of truth, which, in its omniscient fountain, is universal, immediate, equal, and infallible, from the infirmity and inferiority of their nature, men are only blessed with a partial, progressive, various, though immuta ble ray, which is obstructed by passions, prejudices, habits and vices, the causes of error, as clouds and vapours obscure the sun. Yet partial and imperfect as it is, truth is the greatest gift which God could bestow, or man receive — but it is not bestowed on us, even thus partially and imperfectly, on un conditional terms. It is hidden in darkness, and involved in difficulties, intended like all the other gifts of heaven, to be sought and cultivated by all the different powers and exertions of human reason. The love of truth is accordingly one of the strongest passions of the mind, a stimulus" which prompts it incessantly to its sublimest exercise ; and the investigation of its various " "Opc^ig SiavorjTiKrj, ^ero eS Kal KUKat, rj aXtjOai; Kal ^cvSot. — Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. lib. v. cap. 2. aOiv dvOpairp Xajiaiv fiH^ov, rf j^api^etrdai &Em (refivorapov aXtjddat. — Plutarch. 14 THE CHART AND SCALE kinds, whether they rest in contemplation , are applied to action^", or operate in effect^', is the most honourable employment of human life. This honour, to which all who have leisure and opportunity should ambitiously aspire, is enhanced three ways ; by the utility of the truth in question, by the assiduity and ability employed to overcome the difficulty of the search, and by the willingness with which, when found, it is received and adopted; forming together an exalted union of intel lectual and moral virtue. One, who was the most highly honoured of earthly poten tates, could withdraw from the splendour of his riches and the glories of his crown, as a candidate for the higher honour of culti vating this wisdom, and of ministering in all her provinces. " The glory of God," says Solomon, " is to conceal a thing ; and the honour of the king to search it out^." Conscious however of the fallibility which attends the best exertions of human reason. 'Kiri'^rj/J.r]. ^ Tlpa^ig. Jloirjais. — Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 3, 4. Proverbs, xxv. 2. OF TRUTH. 15 sensible of the darkness under which the Author of all truth hath left some of its most interesting and important parts, and convinced withal, that as the search of it is the duty, so the invention will be the happi ness of man, the honest and ingenuous in-' quirer will enter upon the task with humility, with diligence, with desire, and all the best affections of heart and understanding, with hope, not unmixed with fear. There is but one path to truth, whereas error is open to a thousand ways, and is prepared, as an enemy in ambush, on all occasions, to turn him aside from the direct and successful road. 16 THE CHART AND SCALE Sect. II. Of Mind in general. THE mind of which truth is an attribute, is not easily made the object of its own view and contemplation. By our conscious ness, which is the first ground of judgment, incapable of being resisted or evinced by reason, aided by reflection, we are partially informed of the motions, capacities, and ope rations of that invisible agent ; which, though removed from external sense and abstracted from common apprehension, has been ana lyzed and arranged in its faculties both by ancient and modern philosophers. Taken in its largest comprehension, as the knowledge of abstract and separate sub stances, Aristotle raises the philosophy of mind above all other parts of learning. He assigns to it the investigation ofthe principles and causes' of things in general, and ranks ' Ae? yap TavTi}v ruv irparav dp'^uv Kal airiuv civai dcaipt]- TiKrjv. — ^Aiistot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2. OF TRUTH. 17 it not only as superior, but also as prior, in the order of nature, to the whole tribe of arts and sciences. But " what is first to nature is not first to man." Nature begins with causes which produce effects. Man begins with effects and by them ascends to causes. Thus all human study and investigation proceed of necessity in the reverse of the natural order of things, from sensible to intelligible ; from body, the effect ; to mind, which is both the first and final cause. Now physic, being the name given by the Peripatetic to the phi losophy of body, from this necessary course of human studies, some of his interpreters ^ called that of mind metaphysic *, implying also, by the term, that its subject, being more sublime and difficult than any other as relating to universals *, the study of it would ' Alexander and Philoponus. ' Twv /ierd rd fviriKa. Cujus inscriptionis haec ratio est, quod in hoc opere ea tractentur quorum theorea posterior est doctrinae natural! saltern quoad nos, qui a corporum cognitione rerumque caducarum, in substantiarum immate- rialium atque immortalium contemplationem provehimur. — Du Val. Synops. Doctr. Peripat. * 1,\£Sdv Si Kal "^aXewuiTaTa yvapi^siv toU dvOpairoic etJ C 18 THE CHART AND SCALE come most properly and successfully after that of physics. Taking it however in its natural order, as furnishing the general principles ° of all other parts of learning, which descend from thence to the cultivation of particular subjects ^ Aristotle himself called this the First philoso phy ; but, as its subject is universal being ^, particularly mind which is the highest and most universal, he gave it also the appella tion of the Universal Science, common to all the rest* : and, lastly, to finish his enco mium of this First and universal philosophy, rd fidXi^a KadoXu' TTOppoiTaToi ydp tu)V aladrjatov i'siv. — Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2. ' 'YiroXafj,pdvo/j.cy Stj, Tparov fiiv iTrhanBai fj.dXi'^a iravra TOV dv di ivSij^erai, fifj Kaff tKa^ov e^ojra iirirrjfiriv avrav. — Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2. ^ Aristot. Metaph. lib. ii. cap. 1, 2. ' "EoTty iiriaTrifiri rif , ^ Osiopei to ov j; ov. — AristOt. Metaph. lib. !v. cap. 1. * 'H Trpwrr; (j>iXorTO(j>ia KaSroXti Traauiv Koivrj. — Aristot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1. Ut physica tractat res natu rales et corporeas qua; materia constant et forma ; sic metaphysica res incorporeas et mate- riae expertes, quas divinae dicuntur. — Agit, primo, de ente generatim ejusque principiis, essentia scilicet et existentia et partibus, sive de summis generibus entis et categoriis, ut res sint sive partes entis; deinde, de substantia spiritual! sive spiritu, et, ultimatim, de Deo.~Est scientiarum universalis- sima. Disserit generatim per supremas causas et univer- sales, primaque prineipia ; unde nominata Sapientia et Prima Philosophia. — Du Val. Synops. Doct. Peripat. OF TRUTH. 19 he honoured it with the exclusive name of Wisdom ^ And though in his celebrated partition of the sciences, Lord Bacon has made the distribution of metaphysics somewhat differ ently from that of the old philosophers, he treats this First philosophy with the greatest respect and attention, calling it the general root or stem out of which the other parts of learning shoot into separate branches, view ing it in hopeful prospect, when more philo sophically cultivated, as supplying a collec tion of axioms and universal propositions appropriated to no particular science, but of more general application, considering it as the parent of them all, declaring it tran scendent, and calling it with Plato, the science of things divine and human". ' Primus philosophus res speculatur quatenus abstractse sunt, ab omnique nexu liberae. Philosophia autem prima ea est quae etiam sapientia dicitur, cujus ambitu omnes disciplinae cinguntur. v iroXvvuvriToe iroipia, fjv Kal avrrjv airXSe iiri'sfinriv KXrjriov, Kai [j.dXi'^a kiri'Trifiriv , ut inquit The- mist. in 1 Poster. Ipsa enim tenet et speculatur primarias rerum causas. — Budae! Comment, in Ling. Gr. 'H aoi^la Ttpl rivag airiag Kal apx^Q i'^iv iin'^rifn). — Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. I. '" De Augm. Scient. lib. iii. cap. 1. See Plato in Thaeet. and Cic. 2, Tusc. Quaest. 20 THE CHART AND SCALE Mr. Locke has taken the most useful part of this fruitful field of ancient erudition, which forms the most difficult as well as the sublimest subject of investigation, and has descended, with peculiar genius and ability and a native strength of mind, to the analysis of the Human Understanding. And if this great philosopher had followed the example of the learned Cud worth in his Intellectual System, and built his work upon the founda tion of the ancient metaphysicians, he would have added much to its merit and perfection, and have greatly enhanced that fame which it has already made immortal. The study of this universal science or philosophy of mind, the seat of all learning and the storehouse of all truth, is both the first in dignity and the largest in compre hension. It is a study both deep and diffi cult ; a study which has been too much conducted on false principles founded only in imagination, too long perverted and ob scured by the subtleties of logic, and too often terminating in something more injuri ous to truth than mere refinement and spe culation. When founded however on just OF TRUTH. 21 observation and sound reflection, and con ducted by rational investigation, it is a study which paves the way to a more scientific and successful cultivation of all the other parts of knowledge". Waving for the present the further pur suit of this fundamental science, this first philosophy, in its use or in its abuse, through the volumes of ancient and modern meta physicians, and without descending to a more minute investigation of the human mind, that imperfect emanation of the Divine, it will be sufficient for the purpose of these Lectures that its general functions have been distributed into three different provinces : — the theoretic, the practic, and the poetic mind'^ which I shall otherwise express by the intellect, the will, and the imagination. " To uiv Ttavra eTri^atrSrai r^ p.dXi'^a 'f)(ovn rf/v ku^oXh i-!ri^rifir]v dvayKoiov vTrdpj(iLV. ovtoq ydp olSi irw? TraVTa rd vTTOKeifieva. — Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2. " Odo-a Sidvoia, rj TrpaKTiKrj, ^ TroiriTiKr), rj BetoprinKfi. — ^See Aristot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1, for the philosophical distinc tion between them. Philosophia theoretica est cujus finis est veritatis nuda solaque contemplatio. 22 THE CHART AND SCALE To each of these faculties, in their opera tion upon their respective objects external or Philosophia practica cujus finis est praxis, id est actio interna, libera, ex electione profecta, et ad bonum directa. Philosophia poetica cujus finis est poesis, id est effectio, seu actio externa. — Du Val. Synops. Doctr. Peripat. Plato divided the mind into four faculties or affections, v6r](HQ, liavoia, ¦Kiang, ziKaaia : intelligentia, cogitatio, fides, simulatio — correspondent to the different degrees of truth. NoTjirtc £?r( Tw avtoTario, Sidvoia kirl r^ StVTtpio, tS rpira tti^iq, Kal Tf riXcv-drt) eiKaaia. — De Repub. sub fine. This distribution is not however so well calculated to distinguish the several kinds, as ttiutis has a common relation to all the kinds. Lord Bacon makes his general partition of learning as it relates to the memory, the imagination, and reason. " Par- titio doctrinae humanse ea est verissima quae sumitur ex triplici facultate animi rationalis quae doctrinae sedes est. Historia ad memoriam refertur, poesis ad phantasiam, philo sophia ad rationem. — Neque alia censemus ad theologica partitione opus esse." — De Augm. Scient. lib. ii. c. 1. And in the seventh book he refers morality to the will under the conduct of reason. This distribution of our great philosopher and reformer of learning seems also to be imperfect; for reason is the general instrument of the mind common to all its faculties (and his words are " ex triplici facultate animi rationalis"), and common alike to all the kinds of truth or learning. I have therefore preferred the distribution of the Peripa tetic to those both of the Academic and English philosopher, as being more proper and distinct, and equally comprehen sive; for under his division Zidvoia ^EioprjnKrj, he classes all those parts of learning which do not belong to the other two. TpciQ (j)iXoa-0(j)iai Stwpijriicaf, fia^rjuaTiKi), (jivtriKr), SfoXoyucij. — Aristot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1. And for the same reasons I deem it much more just and philosophical than Locke's Division of the Sciences in the conclusion of his Essay. OF TRUTH. 23 internal, truth in general divides into special relations, or correspondencies ; and the dis tribution of its several parts, forming the whole circle of learning divine and human, will be most naturally and philosophically made, according as they range under one or other of these general provinces of human intellect. The universal science or philosophy of mind is the true foundation of the universal art or philosophy of logic, the organ or instru ment, by which truth is to be found and cul tivated in all different relations and corres pondencies to the different parts or faculties of the mind, of which it is an attribute. And the general office of this logic or universal art is, first, to find and establish right princi ples ; secondly, to institute a right method of reasoning correspondent to the principles ; and, thirdly, to estimate the kind and value of the truth when found, whether it belong to the intellect, the will, or imagination. 24 THE unAKT AND SCALE Sect. III. Of Principles in general. THAT all truth of which the mind is capable, to whatever faculty it may relate, is derived from certain principles' or first and fundamental truths, which are the causes why other things are true, is a maxim older than the days of Aristotle, and in which all sound philosophers have necessarily con curred ; since, by the contrary supposition, there could be no such thing as truth at all*: ' nSffa SiZaaKaXia Kal irdaa fin^rjaig SiavorjTiKij, CK wpovirap- •)^t>(jri^ yiverai yvoDi7£v Sid reVa rS rpoTTH Trapay ivovTai, Kal rwv &XXii)v e/ca^ij Ti-)Qiit)v. — Aristot. Analyt. Post. lib. i. cap. 1. OvK "KTj.ifv Si TO aXriBis avtv rfje ahlai;. E/caTOV Si fjiaXf^a avTO riav aXXii)v, KaS o Kal to'iq ixXXoiq virdp'^^ti to avvi)vvp.ov, olov TO TTvp ^Epfxorarov. Kal ydp role aXXoie to a'lTiov tSto rfje ^epjiOTTiTOQ. (i)^£ Kal dXrjBi'^aTOV to roic V'^ipoig a'tnov ra a.Xr)^i(Tiv elvat. Sio rde Tdv del ovriiiv dp)^ac, dvayKoiov del civai aX?)&fjxaTa etiV. — Aristot. Metaph. lib. iii. cap. 2. OF TRUTH. 27 such as have the seed absolutely in them selves, that is, such as are derived from no others of any kind whatever by any act or process of reason ; such as, in the words of a late writer, " are intuitively certain, or intui tively probable, and are known by a power of the mind which perceives truth not by progressive argumentation, but by an instan taneous and instinctive impulse ; derived nefther from education nor from habit, but from nature ; acting independently upon our will, whenever the object is presented, accord ing to an established law, and therefore not improperly called sense, and acting in the same manner upon all mankind, and there fore properly called common sense, the ulti mate judge of truth'?" Or, are they the result of the laborious investigations, reason ings, and deductions of a few philosophers ? If the latter part of this alternative be true (and the Categories from which Aristotle formed his axioms, whether philosophically or not is here no question, as well as the Prineipia of Newton, have immortalized the ' Beattie on Truth, p. 36 and 42. 28 THE CHART AND SCALE fame of their inventors as splendid monu ments of human reason ;) there must be other grounds or evidences productive of intuitive certainty or intuitive probability, obvious, instantaneous, and incapable of be ing deduced by reason, which constitute the first principles from which these secondary ones are, by a process of reason, formed. These primary principles (and they have surely the first title to the name of princi ples) are mentioned by the same author to be — the evidence of external sense ; the evi dence of internal sense or consciousness ; the evidence of memory, and some others'. This general division of principles into primary and secondary, original and derived, evidences and axioms, let the distinction be made in what terms you will, however novel it may sound, is, I hope, philosophically made" : and, if so, it will be found of great » Beattie on Truth, p. 43. ' These original evidences are acknowledged by Aristotle in book ii. cap. 19 of the Post. Analyt. as the genuine foundation from which all axioms are derived : and though he chooses to reserve an equal honour to the latter, he OF TRUTH. 29 importance in the search of truth in general, as it will divide our reasoning, which should always be governed by the principles, into two direct kinds or methods. Sect. IV. Of Reasoning in general. A LL truth, to whatever province or de- ¦^ ^ partment of mind it bears a reference, is deduced from principles by an act or reason, the organ which is common to them all, and the distinguishing prerogative of human nature. It is observed by the excellent Lord Bacon in his Advancement of Learning, that sound ness of direction in the application of the means takes away error and confusion, and forms the principal of those general expedients allows the former to be necessary to their existence. 'AvayKi; apa E^Etv fiiv Tiva Sivajxiv, fifj TOiavTrjv S' 'ix^iv, rj in tutiov Ti/xiwTipa KaT aKpityEiav — Svvdfiiv trviiipvTOV KpiTiKviv, ^v KaXSaiv a'iv6riav£pbv Si Kal, on, e'j ng a'la&tiaig EKXiXoiirev, avayKH) Kal iiri'^fifirjv nvd eKXEXonrivai, fjv aSvvarov XdSelv — Eiraj^Sjjvoi Se ^rj 'i^ovTag dia^-qaiv, dSevarov. t&v ydp KaSi' eKa^ov i] dia^r)- aig. — Aristot. Analyt. Post. lib. i. D 34 THE CHART AND SCALE By such acts of observation and judgment, diligently practised and frequently repeated, exercised on many particular or individual subjects of the same class and of a similar nature, noting their agreements and marking the differences however minute, and rejecting all instances which, however similar in ap pearance, are not in effect the same, reason with much labour and attention extracts some general laws* respecting the powers, properties, qualities, actions, passions, vir tues, and relations of things, which are the causes of discovering truth. This is no hasty, premature, notional ab straction of the mind, by which images and ideas are formed that in nature have no ex istence. Nor is it a careless and partial enu meration and induction of a number of par ticulars negligently examined and carelessly applied, by which general propositions can be formed with any philosophical solidity. It is a rational, operative, experimental pro-^ cess', instituted and executed upon the real * ArjXov S^ on fi/juv rd irpwra eiraywyrj yviopll^eiv avayKoiov' Kal ydp Kal ^ a'i(T^ri(ng Stio ro KaSdXa ifiiroiel. — Aristot. Analyt. Post. lib. ii. cap. 19. See lib. !i. cap. 13. ' Manus hominis nuda, quantumvis robusta et constans, ad opera pauca et facile sequentia sufficit: eadem ope in- OF TRUTH. 35 nature and constitution of things. By this process, reason advances from particulars to generals, from less general to more general ; till by a series of slow progression and by regular degrees, she arrives at the most general ideas, called forms or formal causes*. And by affirming or denying a genus of a spe cies, or an accident of a substance, or of a class of substances through all the stages of the gradation, we form conclusions, which if logically drawn are axioms*, or gene- strumentorum multa et reluctantia vincit. Similis est et mentis ratio. — Bacon. Nov. Org. * Qui formas novit, is, quae adhuc non facta sunt, qualia nee naturae vicissitudines, nee experimentales industriae un- quam in actum produxissent, nee cogitationem humanam subiturae fuissent, detegit et educit. — Ibid. ° Axioms are the result of the most laborious and recon dite learning, and that they should be firmly established, is an object of the first importance to the success of every branch of science. Lord Bacon therefore strenuously con tends that they should never be taken upon conjecture, or even upon the authority of the learned ; but that, as they are the general principles and grounds of all learning, they are to be canvassed and examined with the most scrupulous attention, "ut axiomatum corrigatur iniquitas, quae ple- rumque in exemplis vulgatis fundamentum habent." — De Augm. Scient. lib. ii. cap. 2. " Atque ilia ipsa putativa prineipia ad rationes reddendas compellere decrevimus, quousque plane constent." — Distrib. Operis. That all axioms are intuitive and self-evident truths, is a fundamental mistake, into which Mr. Locke (Essay, book iv. chap. 7, sect. 1) and others (see Ancient Metaphysics, vol. !. 36^ THE CHART AND SCALE ral propositions ranged one above another, book V. chap. iii. p. 389, and vol. ii. p. 335) have been betrayed to the great injury of science. This error has, I apprehend, been engrafted upon another equally prevalent, That mathe matics is a system, or, at least, a specimen of universal rear soning; and, as mathematical axioms are presumed to be intuitive, they hastily presumed that all others were intuitive. Mr. Locke was gifted with a strong mind, though not cul tivated with much learning. In many parts of his Essay, he has shown himself an able metaphysician in the riiost useful part of that difficult science. He has however no where shown himself an able logician. He judged of the school- logic from its weak and useless effect in promoting the real interests of learning, and from its tendency to nothing but endless dispute and fruitless jargon. But though from a view of the end, he justly condemned the means, he did not understand them. Surely he had neither read Aristotle nor Bacon, or he would not have discovered such a want of logical philo sophy as this chapter of Maxims betrays ; at the same time, that in the midst of so much darkness, like the sun from a cloud, his native strength of mind breaks out with this luminous sentence : — " In particulars, our knowledge begins, and so spreads itself by degrees to generals ; though afterwards the mind takes the quite contrary course, and having drawn its knowledge into as general propositions as it can, makes those familiar to its thoughts, and accustoms itself to have recourse to them, as to the standards of truth and falsehood." Book iv. chap. 7, sect. 11. He totally mistook the maxim of the schools. That all reasoning is ex praecognitis et praeconcessis (Essay, book !v. chap. 2, sect. 8, and chap. 7). He seems indeed to have been unacquainted with the true philosophy of reasoning, and not to have understood the nature of those intermediate ideas to which he attributes the advancement of all know ledge, nor the true mode of their application ; and he ap pears to have been mistaken in the nature of that agreement OF TRUTH. 37 till they terminate in those which are uni versal *. Axioms thus investigated and established, are applicable to all parts of learning, and are the indispensable', and the truly admi rable expedients by which reason pushes on her inquiries in the particular pursuit of truth, in every branch of knowledge. The method of reasoning by which they are and disagreement of ideas, of which he has said so much as the sole criteria of truth. In the twelfth chapter of this book indeed he exposes the absurdity of taking axioms upon credit ; but shows how little he understood of their use. His conception of the improve ment of learning was very imperfect ; for though he might understand the nature of physics, he was unacquainted with the philosophy of ethics and mathematics. * Duae viae sunt atque esse possunt ad inquirendam veri- tatem. Altera a sensu et particularibus advolat ad axiomata maxime generalia, atque ex his principiis eorumque immota veritate judical et invenit axiomata media: atque haec via in usu est. Altera a sensu et particularibus excitat axiomata ascendendo continenter et gradatim, ut ultimo loco perve- niatur ad maxime generalia ; quse via vera est et intentata. — Bacon. Nov. Org. lib. i. aph. 19. See also lib. i. aph. 102—107. ' T&v dp^uv Si at jxiv kwayiayy deiopSvTai, al Si alaOriaei, at Si eOiaixi^ tivI, koX dXXai Si dXXag. M.en£vai Si rreipaTtov emTOC >J ireipvKaari., arzuSa'^iov Si diriag opirrdwaL KaXUg. MEyaXTjr yap EXBirt potr^v trpbg rd lirdfieva. t^oKe'i iv irXelov rj to tjixiitv to iravrbg eivai fi apx^, Kai TroXXa kfiiliavfj yiveaQai Si avTtjg tUv l^rirtnUviav. — ^Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. lib. i. cap. 7. 38 THE CHART AND SCALE formed is that of true and legitimate in duction ^ which is therefore called by the best and soundest of logicians, the key of interpretation . If instead of taking his axioms out of the great families of the categories by an imme diate and indolent extraction, and erecting them by his own sophistical invention into the principles upon which his disputation was to be employed '", the analytical genius of Aristotle had presented us with the laws of the true inductive logic by which axioms are philosophically formed, and given us an example of it with his usual sagacity ^. Inductionem censemus earn esse demonstrandi formam quae sensum tuetur et naturam premit, et operibus imminet ac fere immiscetur. — Bacon. Distrib. Operis. ' Ibid. Nov. Org. lib. ii. aph. 10. ¦" Ex experientia arripiunt varia et vulgaria, eaque neque certo comperta, nee diligenter examinata et pensitata ; re- liqua in meditatione atque ingenii agitatione ponunt. — Hujus generis exemplum in Aristotele maxime conspicuum est, qui philosophiam dialectica sua corrupit, quum mundum ex categoriis effecerit, et innumera pro arbitrio suo naturae rerum imposuerit, magis ubique sollicitus quomodo quis respondendo se explicet, et aliquid reddatur in verbis posi- tivum, quam de interna rerum veritate. — Ille enim prius decreverat; neque experientiam ad constituenda axiomata rite consuluit; sed, postquam pro arbitrio suo decrevisset, experientiam ad sua placita tortam circumducit et captivam. — Ibid, lib. i. aph. 62, 63. OF TRUTH. 39 in a single branch of science " ; he would have brought an offering more valuable and acceptable to the temple of truth, than he effected by the aggregate of all his logical and philosophical productions. It is after the inductive process has been industriously pursued and successfully per- " Though in different parts of his works he gives a general idea of induction {'Onoloig Si /cal irepl rovg Xoyag, di re Sid avKKoyiaji&v, kol 01 Si kirayu>y^g' dfit^orepoi ydp Sid rrpoyiviixj- KOfievMV iroiavrai rrjv SiSaaKaXiav" 01 jxiv, Xafi^dvovreg oig irapa ^vviivTtov' 01 Si, SeiKvvvreg to /caSoXa, Sid re SfjXov eJvai rb Ka^eKaTOv. — Analyt. Post. lib. i. cap. i. 'Ek TrpoyiviooKOfxiviov Si irdaa SiSatrKaXla. 'H fiev Si kirayioyrjg, fj Si avXXoyiafii^. 'H fiev Srj eirayoiyrj dp-jfi} eti koi t5 /caSoXa. 'O Si v d^Xo^eriiv eirl rb irepag, rj dvdiraXiv. 'ApKriov fiev ydp airb tZv yvupijxuv. Tavra Si Sittuq, Id fiiv ydp fi/jilv, rd Se dirXSig. "lauig iv fip'iv ye apKTeov avo t&v iifiiv yvaplfioiv. — apxJJ yap ro orf Kal el tuto ihaivoiTO apKUvnvg, aSiv irpoaSefiirei rS Sion. — Ethic. Nicom. lib. i. cap. 4.) that he never put it in practice in the formation of his axioms and principles, which he chose rather to assume gratuitously, or to fabricate by his own invention. See Analyt. Post. lib. i. cap. 24. 40 THE CHART AND SCALE formed, that definition" so pompously but prematurely, so formally but gratuitously affected by the old logicians and their dis ciples of the schools, may be logically and usefully introduced, by beginning with the genus, passing through all the graduate and subordinate stages, and marking the specific difference as it descends, till it arrive at the individual which is the subject of the ques tion. By adding an affirmation or nega tion of the attribute of the genus, to the species or individual, or that of a general accident, to the particular substance so de fined, and thus making the definition a pro position, the truth of the question will be logically solved, without any farther pro cess". So that instead of being the first, as employed by the logic in common use, definition should form the last act of reason in the search of all truth, except that which is strictly mathematical. But we are now anticipating the subject of the following section. '* AeT yap eJ liv 6 bpnTfibg, irpoeiSevai Kal eivai yvuipiua. — Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 7. " Aristot. Analyt. Post. lib. i. cap. 10. OF TRUTH. 41 Sect. VI. Of Reasoning by Syllogism. nr^HESE axioms or general propositions -¦- thus inductively established, become another species of principles which may be properly called secondary, and which lay the foundation of another and different method of reasoning. When these are formed, and not before, we may safely admit the maxim with which the old logicians set out in the exercise of their art, as the great hinge on which their reasoning and disputation turn, — from truths that are already known', to derive others which are not known. Or to state it more comprehensively, so as to apply to probable, as well as to demonstrative reasoning — from truths which are better known ^ to derive others which are less known. * 'E^ aXrfS^iov /cat irpuinov Kal dfieaiav Kal yviapifiorepiav Kal irporepiav /cat aln&v ra minirepaafiaToe. — ^Aristot. Analyt. Post. lib. i. ' Ex praecognitis et praeconcessis. 42 THE CHART AND SCALE These known or better-known truths constitute those axioms or general proposi tions, the existence of which this other method of reasoning, not only requires, but of which it also demands a subordination and gradation. On these as principles, all its operations are founded, and on the truth and soundness of these its success must ulti mately depend. Philosophically speaking, this reasoning consists in reducing under general propo sitions others which are less general, or which are particular', where the proof arises out of higher and more general propositions ; since the inferior are only known to be true, as we trace their connection with the superior. For what is true of any whole class, must be true of all in that class ; but the class itself must be pure and without any thing extraneous, and the particular truth which is to be proved must belong to that class, or the conclusion will be false. Logi cally speaking, it is to predicate a genus ' Manifestum est artem judicandi per syllogismum nihil aliud esse, quam reductionem propositionum ad prineipia. — Bacon. De Augm. Scient. lib. v. cap. 4. OF TRUTH. 43 of a species, or individual contained and comprehended under it*, or an accident of the substance in which it is inherent' : for whatever, as a whole or genus, contains another, as a part or species, it communi cates to it its nature and properties ; and whatever common accident is actually in herent in a class of substances, it commu nicates itself in a logical sense, to every particular of the class. Therefore, when a question arises upon any subject, the inquiry is, What is true of the genus or family under which it classes ? for that will be always true of it, whether a species or a particular and vice versd, upon the great logical maxim, that what is true of the whole is true of all its parts*. Thus it is the business of syllo- * Ka6' viroKeifievov — T&v ovruiv, rd fiev Ka^ viroKei/ievft Tivbg Xeyerai, kv viroKeifiiva Si aSevl kriv. olov, 6 av&poiirog, KaSr' viroKeifievo /Jiiv Xeyerai th nvog av^pinra, kv viroKeifiev^ Si aSevl knv. Aristot. Categ. cap. 2. ' Ev viroKeifievii) — ra Si, kv viroKeifieva fiev k'n, Ka&' viroKei- fxeva Se oSevbg Xeyerai' {ev inroKeifieva Se XEyw, o kv Tivi firj oic fiipog virdp-)(ov, aSvvarov x<^P'C elvai to kv tj etiv) oTov j/ ng ypafifiariKri, kv viroKeifiivip fiev tTi rj ^'^XV' '^"'^' viroKeifieva Si aSevbg Xeyerai' /cat rari rb XevKOV, iv viroKeifievt^ fiev eti rj» adifian, {airav ydp xp&fia, kv trifian,) KaSr' viroKeifievu Si eSevbg Xeyerai' — Ibid. ' Quod verum est de toto verum est de omni. This is generally expressed by dictum de omni, a logical 44 THE CHART AND SCALE gism to form under general propositions others which are less and less general, till we descend to the particular which is the object of our research. And here we arrive at the true foundation of that agree ment and disagreement, which logically speaking constitute affirmative and negative truth. This method of reasoning has obtained the name of Syllogism or Collection, which has been analysed by Aristotle in a minute and laborious process, with a wonderful de gree of subtlety and acumen. He has ex hibited it to view in every possible shape, enacted the laws by which it is to be governed, and invented all the modes and figures into which it may be cast. Such was the study which exercised the wits of all the schoolmen for nearly a thousand years. axiom, that what is affirmed of the genus or whole, may be affirmed of all the species and individuals under it. And the opposite axiom is dictum de nullo, that what is denied of the genus or whole may be denied of its species or indi viduals. By these axioms all the modes of the first figure are governed, to which all the legitimate modes of the other figures are reducible. OF TRUTH. 45 Thus induction and syllogism are the two methods of direct reasoning corresponding to the two kinds of principles, primary and secondary, on which they are founded, and by which they are respectively conducted ^ In both methods indeed reason proceeds by judging and comparing, but the process is different throughout. In the exercise of induction, the first thing is to perceive and to judge of particulars, from their respective evidence by single apprehension, as the senses do of objects. The next is to com^ pare these judgments together by single and simple acts, and that immediately^ from the agreement of a number of which col- ' 'OfioiioQ Si Kal ircpl rag Xoyug, o'l re Sia avKXoyidfi&v, /cal 01 Si kirayiiiyrjg' afxipdrepoi ydp Sid irpoyivoxTKOfieviav iroiavrai rfiv SiSaaKaXiav' oi /liv Xafi€dvovTeg log irapd ^vvievnaV oi Si, SeiKvvvreg rb /caS'oXa, Sid tu S^Xov elvai rb Ka^eKw^ov. — Aristot. Analyt. Post. lib. i. cap. 1. ' "E^-t Si 0 ToiSrog avXXoyi(Tfibs rfjg irpwrrig Kal dfietru irpord- iTiiog. — Aristot. Analyt. Prior, cap. 23. In arte judicandi, aut per inductionem aut per syllogis mum concluditur. At, quatenus ad judicium quod fit per inductionem, uno eodemque mentis opere illud quod quaeritur et invenitur et judicatur. Neque enim per medium aliquod res transigitur, sed immediate, eodemque fere modo quo fit in sensu : quippe sensus in objectis suis primariis simul et object! speciem arripit et. ejus veritate consent!!. Bacon. De Augm. Scient. lib. v. cap. 4. 46 THE CHART AND SCALE lateral judgments, general ideas and proposi tions are derived. In the exercise of syllogism, the first thing is to compare by double and complex comparisons, through the help of a third or middle term severally applied to the two original terms of the question', making two propositions called the premises. The second thing is to judge of these premises in order to collect a third proposition or con clusion, different from them both'". As therefore these methods of reasoning proceed on different principles, so are they not only different, but the reverse of each other " ; and, though it may have the sanction of Aristotle, an inductive syllogism'* is a sole cism. Till general truths are ascertained by in duction, these third or middle terms by which " ^Clv fiiv ydp k'^i fieaov, Sid ra fietra 6 avXXoyurfidg' (Sv Si fir) kn, Si iirayioyrjg. — Analyt. Prior, cap. 23. Aliter fit in syllogismo, cujus probatio immediata non est, sed per medium perficitur. De Augm. Scient. lib. v. cap. 4. '" SuXXoytir/ioc Si eti Xtiyoc, kv y, Tedevnav riv&v, erepdv n T&v Keifieviov k^ arayicj/c irvfi€alvei ra ravra elvai. — AristOt. Analyt. Prior, lib. i. cap. 1. " Kal rpoTTOv nvd avrlxeirai i) iirayotyrj rji miXXoyurfiS, are the words of Aristotle himself. Analyt. Prior, cap. xxiii. " Analyt. Prior, lib. ii. cap. 23. OF TRUTH. 47 syllogisms are made, are no where safely to be found ; for it is only by the middle terms and propositions taken from general truths, that less general or particular truths can be evinced '¦\ " The invention of the middle term or argument by induction, is therefore the one and first thing, and the judgment of the consequence, from the argument by syllogism, is the other and second'*." So that another position of the Peripatetic, " that syllogism is naturally prior in order to induction '%" is equally unfounded; for induction does not only naturally but neces sarily precede syllogism, and is in every respect indispensable to its existence ; since till generals are established, there can neither be definition, proposition, middle term, or axiom, and consequently no syllogism. " Let the truth in question be whether A contain C, and the general truth that A contains B. B the subject of the general proposition is the middle term, by which a middle proposition is formed, that C contains B, from which the truth in question is deduced. Aristot. Prior. Analyt. on the invention of middle terms. " Itaque alia res est inventio medii, alia judicium de consequentia argument!. De Augm. Scient. lib. v. cap. 4. " aipe(T£0)g Xeyofieva E^at St' iirayiayijs yvutpifia, KOLv ng /3e'X7)rat yvupifia iroieTv on virapxei l/caTW yE'vEt EVia) — oiirE yap £/c T&v KoBdXa avev iirayuyijg, SrE Sid rfjg iirayioyijg dvev rrjg aia^niremg. — Analyt. Post. lib. i. But the kitayiay^ of Aristotle is a very vague and imperfect repre sentation of sound and legitimate induction, which he never studied or cultivated with the pains and analytical acumen he bestowed on the syllogism. OF TRUTH. 49 mately on the truth of axioms, and the truth of axioms on the soundness of induc tions. — Thus induction is not only different from, but prior and essential to syllogism, and likewise superior in value '*. But though induction be more useful in the first invention of truth, syllogism it is said is more useful in teaching it when found. Truth is more easily conveyed than found. Induction is not only the sole method of invention, but of initiation also, taken in its enlarged and classical meaning, for all parts of human learning, except the mathematics, owe to it both their origin and advance ment. Being however more difficult and laborious, and less ostentatious than the other, it has been too much neglected, and almost quite abandoned, to the .great loss of truth in general. Syllogism affects indeed " " In matters to which the theory of syllogism extends, a man of good sense, who can distinguish things that diflTer, can avoid the snares of ambiguous words, and is moderately practised in such matters, sees at once all that can be inferred from the premises; or finds that there is but a very short step to the conclusion." Dr. Reid, in Appendix to vol. iii. of Lord Kaims's Sketches. 50 THE CHART AND SCALE to be the method of science, and the method of instruction ; though perhaps when duly estimated, with less title to those distinctions than the former. It is indeed the method of mathematics, which have unfortunately been mistaken by logicians for the rule of universal reasoning " : and, as the word signi fies teaching, or that by which men are taught, from another mistake of its meaning '"', they thought syllogism was, of course, the me thod both of science and instruction. In all other parts of science however, whether we wish to add to their truths by farther inventions, or, really to exemplify, illus trate, or teach what is already known, the only method of science, and the best method of instruction is that of invention and initia tion by induction *'. " Duncan, p. 1 18, and almost every other book of logic. Mr. Harris somewhere calls it the praxis of universal logic : and Mr. Locke was perhaps as much misled by this mis taken notion as any other philosopher. °° The true and original meaning of fiadfifiara was, to teach men to ascend from material to immaterial subjects, that is, from physics to metaphysics. " ScieUtia, quae aliis tanquam tela pertexenda traditur, eadem methodo (si fieri potest) animo alterius est insinu- OF TRUTH. 51 Thus I have taken a general and compre hensive, but compendious view (and they who know how many volumes have been employed upon syllogism alone cannot think that I have been prolix) of the whole exercise of reason, as it advances in the direct investi gation of truth, which is ascending and descending ; ascending by induction from less to greater, from particulars to generals ; and descending by syllogism from greater to less, from general to less general, and to particulars. anda, qua primitus inventa. De Augm. Scient. lib. vi. cap. 2. On the general subject of this chapter, consult Reid's Analysis of Aristotle's Logic ; Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind, vol. ii. ; Herschell's Introduction to Natural Philo sophy ; Barrow's Lectiones Mathematicae, Lect. vi. ; the article Logic in the Encyclopaedia Britannica ; Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. i. chap. 5, &c. — Editor. 52 THE CHART AND SCALE Sect. VII. Of Reasoning by Analogy '. ^ I "^0 these two kinds of reasoning which -¦- are direct, we add another of great im portance and extent which is indirect and collateral. The principle, in which this branch of logic has its foundation, is a native bent and propensity of the mind, strengthened by ex perience and confirmed by habit, by which we are involuntarily led to expect that nature and truth are uniform and analogous through out the universe — that similar causes of whatever kind will, in similar circumstances, at all times produce simi^7**^ects : or, if the causes cannot be kno^vvn that' similar effects'' will explain, illustr^t'^, and account for similar effects. ' On the general subject of this chapter, consult Butler's Analogy; Reid's Essays, vol. i. chap, iv.; Stewart's Ele ments, vol. ii. chap. 4, sect. 2, § 3. ° If the liberty of arguing from a similarity of eflfects be OF TRUTH. 53 This principle then resolves itself into similitude, and reason acts upon it, as in all other cases, by comparing and judging. Thus we argue from truths which have been proved by direct reasoning, or which are obvious to simple apprehension, to others which are similar in cause or in effect ; and if, upon comparing and judging, the principle will bear us out, we conclude the latter to be also true ; a conclusion which will supply us with a kind and degree of truth sufficient for most of the uses and purposes of human life. This method of reasoning is Analogy, which according to Quintilian, is " to refer a thing that is doubtful, to something similar and different, that uncertainties may derive their proof from certainties '." This kind of reasoning has a more per manent and certain foundation than perhaps may appear to some upon a superficial esti- once denied us, all experimental philosophy will be in a manner useless. Jones's Philosophy, p. 119. ' Analogiae haec vis est, ut id, quod dubium est, ad aliquod simile, de quo non quaeritur, referat, ut incerta certis probetur. Quintilian. Inst. Orat. lib. i. cap. 6. 54 THE CHART AND SCALE mate of that similitude on which it rests. " This is not," says the excellent Bishop Browne, " an appearing and metaphorical similitude ; it is the substituting the idea or conception of one thing to stand for and represent another, on account of a true re semblance and correspondent reality in the very nature of the things compared. It is defined by Aristotle, an equality or parity of reasoning* ; though, in strictness of speaking, the parity of reasoning is rather built on the similitude and analogy, and consequent to them, than the same with them^" The result of this reasoning is however not properly conviction ; it is only strong presumption at best ; and, from the view of the truths we know, arises an opinion con cerning those we do not know, which opinion will of course vary in the degrees of its force almost from the point of absolute cer tainty through the whole scale of proba bilities, down to the confines of doubt and conjecture — according to the nature of the * 'H avaXoyia Iffdr/jc e'tI Xtiya. Ethic. Nicom. lib. v. cap. 3. ' Bp. Browne's Divine Analogy, p. 2. OF TRUTH. OO truths from which we reason — according to their greater or less extent and — according as the cases and instances compared are more or less similar. Analogy is a species of logic on which the Stagyrite has been as frugal of his philo sophy*, as he was upon induction. It is however a method of reasoning of most useful and important application and almost of universal extent in life. It is the business of the first logic to convey truth and information to the mind, easy in its application and obvious in its conclusion. And besides this advantage, resulting from its plainness and familiarity (an advantage which the ablest philosophers and the di- vinest teachers have been careful to improve), it has other privileges. Many truths, divine and human, of the last importance to men are incapable both of direct proof and direct « The irapdSeiyjia, of which he speaks in the twenty-fifth chapter of the second book ofthe Prior Analytics in a very cursory way, is indeed something like analogy, rsra Si irlrig £K T&v Ofioiwv — (pavepbv av on rb irapdStiyfid i'7iv, 'are uig oXov irpbg fiepog, are lig fiepog irpbg dXov, aXX' wg fiepog irpbg fiipog, orav dfiipu) fiiv Jl vrrb rb avTO, yvwpifior Si Bdrapov. 56 THE CHART AND SCALE communication*, and can only be evinced and conveyed to the understanding, by this indirect and collateral channel. Many which can be directly proved and directly conveyed, it illustrates with clearer and fuller light, and sets them in a point of view easier to be seen and apprehended by us. But analogy has also a scientific use which is conspicuously displayed, when it acts as a necessary supplement and auxiliary to induc tive reasoning, without which, this useful part of logic would remain very defective and confined. When the philosopher has founded a general truth or proposition upon a certain number of particular comparisons, it is by the help of analogy that he gives it an extent over all similar instances through out the universe, till it may happen to be contradicted by one, in which it is found to fail. So that by analogy the whole province of truth is facilitated, illustrated and en larged, and widened beyond the strict and proper limits both of inductive and syllo gistic reasoning. ' Bishop Browne's Divine Analogy. OF TRUTH. 57 Thus we see this method of reasoning is totally different from those preceding. Whilst they alike agree in two general points — that they argue from truths known before' either particular or general, and — that they reason by comparing and judging; yet is it from different first truths or principles, and in a different way. And whilst the student or philosopher is deriving advantage from each, let him take care to keep them separate and distinct, and in their proper sphere ; or, by a promiscuous application, he will be in danger of employing them where they will not usefully apply, and instead of leading him to truth, where they will betray him into error. These three different methods constitute the proper, and, I think, the whole, business of logic, that useful and universal art, which for two thousand years has been twisted and ' 'E/c i&v irpoyivo