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ESSAYS 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH, 
 
 PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF ALL EVIDENCE 
 AND EXPECTATION. 
 
 4, -r~^~^7> 
 
 " &ifr-»Tii£ AUTHOR OF 
 
 Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA— R. W. POMEROY. 
 
 1831. <*;< 
 

 
 v 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Few words will be necessary in introducing the 
 present volume to the public. 
 
 Some of those who did the author the honour of 
 testifying a favourable estimate of a former Essay 
 of his on the Formation of Opinions, expressed at 
 the same time a regret that he had passed too 
 lightly over one very important part of the subject; 
 namely, the conduct of men in the application of 
 their means and faculties to the investigation of 
 truth. While he had explained more or less to 
 their satisfaction in what manner the mind is af- 
 fected by the circumstances in which it is placed, 
 and the inevitable determination of its views by 
 the evidence presented to it, they thought that he 
 had indicated in too cursory a way the duties of 
 mankind in the collection and examination of that 
 evidence, the effect of which, when once brought 
 before the understanding, is so completely uncon- 
 trollable by the will. 
 
Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 In consequence of these suggestions he applied 
 himself to the subject, and produced the treatise 
 on the Pursuit of Truth, which stands first in the 
 volume, and which he presents to those who took 
 an interest in his former Essay, in the hope that it 
 may prove a not unacceptable companion to it. 
 
 In respect to the second Essay, he has only to 
 offer a remark on its external appearance. It is, 
 as the reader will observe, in Dialogue, a form not 
 very frequently used by modern writers in the ex- 
 position of philosophical views, and adopted on the 
 present occasion rather by way of experiment than 
 from any opinion of its preferableness. After con- 
 sidering what has been said by Hurd and others on 
 the employment of real or fictitious, ancient or 
 modern names, he has preferred designating his 
 speakers by simple letters, as being less repulsive 
 to the taste than any other expedient, except that 
 of using the names of eminent characters of past 
 days, which he was precluded from adopting, be- 
 cause the opinions expressed in these conversations 
 have reference to the actual times in which we 
 live. This is a point after all of little importance 
 in philosophical discussions, since the parts of the 
 dialogue assigned to the different speakers are in- 
 
PREFACE. IX 
 
 tended to exhibit opinions rather than character, 
 and may be considered as only embodying in lan- 
 guage the various views which successively present 
 themselves to the same mind in reflecting on the 
 subject selected. 
 
 The third Essay embraces topics which the 
 author can scarcely hope will attract attention, ex- 
 cept from that small number of intellectual men 
 who have turned their thoughts to the considera- 
 tion of the foundations of human knowledge, a sub- 
 ject included along with many others of vital, 
 although unappreciated importance to society, un- 
 der the repulsive appellation of metaphysics. By 
 these few, however, he ventures to hope that the 
 treatise will be found of some interest, if not from 
 the absolute originality of its views, (on which it is 
 not for him to pronounce,) yet from the novelty 
 and regularity of the order in which they are ex- 
 hibited. 
 
 With regard to the whole of the Essays, he may 
 venture to offer them to the public, and particu- 
 larly to the friends who have expressed so indul- 
 gent an opinion of his former volumes, as the result 
 of long continued, if not always successful reflec- 
 tion. The greater part of the volume indeed was 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 written out for the press four or five years ago, 
 since which it has had the benefit of repeated 
 scrutiny and revision. He mentions these circum- 
 stances, not to disarm criticism or to preclude 
 animadversion, but as establishing a title to a care- 
 ful and candid examination from his readers, espe- 
 cially from those who may see reason to differ from 
 the conclusions at which he has arrived. 
 
 March, 1829. 
 
CONTENTS, 
 
 ESSAY I. 
 
 ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH, AND ON THE DUTY OF INQUIRY. 
 
 Page 
 Chapter I. Introduction. Importance of the Subject, 15 
 II. On the States of Mind favourable and un- 
 favourable to the Pursuit of Truth, 22 
 
 III. In what circumstances Inquiry is a Duty, 30 
 
 IV. Examination of certain Prejudices adverse 
 
 to Inquiry, ----- 38 
 V. On the Duties incumbent on Mankind in 
 the Pursuit of Truth, or in the Process 
 of Inquiry, ----- 50 
 
 VI. On the Influence of the Institutions and 
 
 Practices of Society on the Pursuit of 
 Truth, - - * - - - 71 
 
 VII. On the Spirit in which we ought to com- 
 
 municate and receive the Results of 
 Inquiry, 80 
 
 ESSAY II. 
 
 ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Part I. ------- 95 
 
 II. -«-..._ 109 
 
 in. .--.-._.-. m 
 
Xll CONTENTS. 
 
 ESSAY III. 
 
 ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF ALL EVIDENCE AND EXPEC- 
 TATION. 
 
 Page 
 Chapter I. On the Assumption implied in all our Ex- 
 pectations, that like Causes will pro- 
 duce like Effects, or of the Future 
 Uniformity of Causation, - - 153 
 
 II. The Uniformity of Causation is assumed 
 with regard to the Past as well as to 
 the Future, 159 
 
 III. The Uniformity of Causation cannot be 
 
 established by Experience and Testi- 
 mony, --.--. 168 
 
 IV. The Uniformity of Causation is assumed 
 
 in all our conclusions respecting Men- 
 tal as well as Physical Phenomena, 173 
 V. Our Certainty and Uncertainty in relation 
 to Moral, are of the same nature as in 
 relation to Physical Events, - 179 
 
 VI. Illustrations of the Truth unfolded in the 
 
 last Chapter, .... 188 
 
 VII. On the Uniformity of Causation as the 
 
 Fundamental Principle of Physical and 
 
 Moral Evidence, ... - 195 
 VIII. On Possibility, Probability, and their Op- 
 
 posites, ... - 210 
 
 IX. On Necessity, - - - 217 
 
 X. Conclusion, ... - 230 
 
ESSAY 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 
 
 AND ON THE 
 
 DUTY OF INQUIRY. 
 
ESSAY I. 
 
 ON 
 
 THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT. 
 
 In the progress of society remarkable changes 
 inevitably take place in moral sentiment. Actions 
 formerly regarded as of trivial moment, grow into 
 importance ; qualities at one time extolled sink into 
 dubious virtues, or even positive vices ; new duties 
 are evolved from the novel situations in which men 
 are placed ; and the code of morality is amplified 
 with rules which would have been unintelligible at 
 a previous period, because the circumstances to 
 which they are applicable had not then arisen. 
 
 Such are all rules relating to the conduct of men 
 in the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge. So 
 long as science had no existence, as mankind were 
 
16 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 solely occupied with providing for their physical 
 wants, or were continually engaged in the rougher 
 work of mutual depredation and hostility, the pur- 
 suit of knowledge as a distinct object could not 
 have place, and consequently the virtues and vices 
 connected with it were unknown. 
 
 In our days a different posture of affairs presents 
 itself. The acquisition of knowledge has become 
 an object of immense interest and importance. The 
 welfare of society in a thousand ways is deeply im- 
 plicated in the rectification of error and the disco- 
 very of truth. Hence new relations arise ; new 
 obligations are constituted, a career is opened in 
 which men may display numerous virtues and vices, 
 in which there are various things to shun and to 
 perform, and in which therefore we are called to 
 discriminate and select. 
 
 It happens in this as in many other matters, that 
 the moral sentiments of mankind are tenacious of 
 their accustomed course, and reluctant to take a 
 new direction. When men have been long habitu- 
 ated to look on any quality with approbation, they 
 can scarcely divest themselves of the feeling, even 
 though they discover the object no longer to deserve 
 it; and they are slow in bestowing the same senti- 
 ment on qualities and actions by which it has not 
 been familiarly excited. Thus the glare which has 
 so long dazzled the human race with regard to 
 warlike qualities and military achievements, still 
 
INTRODUCTION. 17 
 
 continues to bewilder them into an admiration of 
 actions incalculably destructive to human happiness. 
 Mankind have yet attained to no sound moral feel- 
 ing on the subject, and it will require the reiterated 
 efforts of philosophers to work into their minds the 
 proper sentiments, with which the conqueror of 
 nations should be regarded. 
 
 A similar remark may be made in reference to 
 the pursuit of truth. Men at present lamentably 
 err in apportioning their moral approbation and 
 disapprobation to the actions of those who are en- 
 gaged in intellectual efforts. They frequently smile 
 on conduct which is fundamentally vicious, and 
 pour their indignation on such as ought to warm 
 them into admiration and applause. Nor are such 
 mistakes to be wondered at. The morality of the 
 subject, besides being comparatively new, involves 
 some nice distinctions, which cannot fail to be gene- 
 rally overlooked or confounded, till they have been 
 clearly discriminated, and rendered plain and fami- 
 liar by repeated expositions. In the following pages 
 an attempt is made to ascertain and enforce the 
 duties of man, in a matter so closely interwoven 
 with his welfare, as well as to point out the erro- 
 neous principles which have sometimes been sub- 
 stituted in their place. 
 
 It is hoped that an honest and fearless endeavour 
 to trace what our duty is in relation to inquiry, will 
 not in the present day be ill received. There is a 
 
 2* 
 
18 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 growing disposition in the world, amongst the intel- 
 ligent part of it at least, to prize truth and veracity, 
 to look with disdain on all artifice, disingenuity, and 
 disguise ; to regard the business of life no longer as 
 an affair which demands unremitted intrigue and 
 perpetual deceit ; to consider the great interests of 
 humanity as not requiring to be supported by igno- 
 rance and superstition ; to believe that suppression 
 and concealment can be of no service, except to the 
 few at the expense of the many ; and that every im- 
 portant question should be freely and boldly ex- 
 amined. In this state of feeling on the part of men 
 of cultivated minds, a discussion of the conduct 
 which we ought to observe in relation to the pursuit 
 of truth seems to be peculiarly appropriate, and 
 even if it fail of yielding entire satisfaction, may 
 serve as a groundwork for more successful efforts. 
 
 As when an object is of little value we are not 
 greatly concerned in what manner we pursue it, the 
 importance of this discussion evidently depends on 
 the value of truth itself, on which, in the present 
 day, it is scarcely necessary to insist. That it inti- 
 mately concerns mankind, that not only the pro- 
 perties of external nature, but the consequences of 
 human actions, the effects of different agencies on 
 our sensibility, the results of the various combina- 
 tions of society on individual happiness, the relations 
 of man to other beings, should be precisely ascer- 
 tained and accurately understood, is a proposition 
 
INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 so undeniable when clearly expressed, as barely to 
 escape the character of a truism. The overwhelm- 
 ing importance of this knowledge, is attested by the 
 sad tale of error and suffering, which every page of 
 history presents to our observation. What possible 
 problem can mankind have to solve but one, how 
 to make themselves conjointly as happy, and for 
 that purpose as noble-minded and virtuous as they 
 can during the short term of their mortal existence ? 
 And how have they hitherto solved this problem ? 
 In what numerous ways have they proved them- 
 selves totally blind to their real interests, perverted 
 their resources, exasperated the unavoidable evils 
 of their condition, and inflicted gratuitous and un- 
 profitable misery on each other and on themselves ? 
 It is clear that men can have no interest in suffer- 
 ing, no preference for unhappiness in itself, and 
 wherever they are found in headlong career after 
 it, it must be under an impression that they are in 
 pursuit of a different object. It is error therefore ; 
 it is illusion ; it is an incapacity on their part to see 
 the real consequences of actions, the real issues of 
 events, that gives rise to all those evils which deso- 
 late the world, except such as can be traced to the 
 physical circumstances of man's nature and condi- 
 tion.*' 
 
 * " Error is the universal cause of the misery of mankind," 
 are the first words of Malebranche in his Treatise on the Search 
 after Truth. 
 
20 IMPORTANCE OF 
 
 The prevalence of misery, as the consequence of 
 ignorance, shows at once the paramount importance 
 of the pursuit of accurate knowledge. To discover 
 truth, is in fact to do good on a grand scale. The 
 detection of an error; the establishment of a fact; 
 the determination of a doubtful principle, may 
 spread its benefits over large portions of the human 
 race, and be the means of lessening the misery or 
 increasing the happiness of myriads of unborn ge- 
 nerations. The great interests of mankind then 
 demand, that the way of discovery should be open, 
 that there should be no obstructions to inquiry, that 
 every facility and encouragement should be given 
 to efforts which are directed to the detection of their 
 errors ; and yet one of the greatest discouragements 
 which at present exists, is the state of their own 
 moral sentiments. Although he who has achieved 
 the discovery of truth in a matter of importance, 
 has the satisfaction of reflecting that he has con- 
 ferred a benefit on his fellow men, to which time 
 itself can prescribe no limits, the probability is, that 
 instead of attracting sympathy and gratitude, he will 
 meet with a considerable share of odium and per- 
 secution as the consequence of his perspicacity. 
 
 A state of things in which the real interests and 
 moral sentiments of the community are placed in 
 strong opposition, cannot fail to be fruitful in evil, 
 and he would perform no slight service who could 
 hasten its termination. The likeliest means of doing 
 
THE SUBJECT. 21 
 
 this, is to show in a clear light what our duties in rela- 
 tion to inquiry really are ; or, in other words, by what 
 conduct, in reference to the investigation of truth, the 
 general interests are best promoted. Tardy as man- 
 - kind show themselves in all changes of moral sen- 
 timent, they cannot permanently continue to bestow 
 their approbation on qualities clearly proved to be 
 pernicious, nor withhold it from actions, which are 
 shown to be undeniably calculated for their welfare. 
 The subject has never yet, as far as the author 
 knows, been systematically treated in the point of 
 view here described. Locke, indeed, in his Conduct 
 of the Understanding, has thrown out excellent re- 
 marks on some of the topics which it embraces ; 
 and his treatise, which cannot be too warmly re- 
 commended, breathes an admirable spirit of right 
 feeling and sound judgment, in relation to the pur- 
 suit of truth. Malebranche, too, in his celebrated 
 work, De la Recherche de la Verite, abounds with 
 instructive observations, encumbered nevertheless 
 with antiquated matter and exploded doctrines, 
 through which few in the present day will venture 
 to toil. Neither of these distinguished writers, 
 however, looked at the subject in the particular 
 light in which it is the object of the following pages 
 to place it; and even if they had, the lapse of a 
 century and a half may be presumed to have brought 
 us into a more favourable position for viewing it in 
 its most important relations. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 ON THE STATES OF MIND FAVOURABLE AND UNFAVOUR- 
 ABLE TO THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 
 
 As the. principle object of the present treatise is 
 to ascertain the duties of man in relation to inquiry, 
 or the search after truth, it is necessary to begin by 
 examining what states of mind are favourable and 
 unfavourable to success in that important pursuit. 
 Unless we clearly understand these mental pheno- 
 mena, we can fully comprehend neither how far 
 they are within our control, to what extent they 
 are matters of duty, nor in what manner they are 
 affected by the circumstances in which we are 
 placed. These states of mind may be classed for 
 convenience under the heads of moral and intel- 
 lectual ; the former comprehending our desires and 
 emotions, the latter our opinions or modes of think- 
 ing. 
 
 In entering on any inquiry, we may have desires 
 and affections connected with the subject, or with 
 the issue of the examination, and preconceived opi- 
 nions, which will have a material influence on the 
 result. We may feel, for instance, a lively affection 
 
OX THE STATES OF MIND, &C. 23 
 
 for a doctrine, an irresistible desire to find it con- 
 firmed by investigation, and a conviction of its truth 
 not the less strong for having no dependence on 
 any process of reasoning; or, on the other hand, 
 we may feel an entire indifference, and have no 
 opinion at all on the subject. 
 
 Amidst the varied conditions in which the mind 
 may be, our business at present is to determine in 
 what state, moral and intellectual, a man would be 
 most likely to succeed in attaining truth on any 
 question which he was called on to examine. 
 
 This is a problem not very difficult to solve. 
 Every one must at once see, that a simple and sin- 
 cere desire to arrive at the truth, without any pre- 
 dilection in favour of any opinion whatever, and 
 without any other disturbing feeling of affection or 
 dislike, or hope or fear, is the moral state of mind 
 most favourable to the success of inquiry. If a 
 man is possessed with a desire to find a given opi- 
 nion true, or to confirm himself in a doctrine which 
 he already entertains, he will in all probability pay 
 a partial attention to the arguments and evidence 
 in its favour, to the neglect of opposite considera- 
 tions ; but if he is free from all wishes of this kind, 
 if he has no predilection to gratify, if his desires are 
 directed solely to the attainment of correct views, 
 he will naturally search for information wherever 
 it is likely to present itself; he will be without 
 
24 ON THE STATES OF MIND 
 
 motive for partiality, and susceptible of the full 
 force of evidence. 
 
 However unaccountable it may at first sight ap- 
 pear, it is a fact, that few human beings, in their 
 moral, religious, and political inquiries, are pos- 
 sessed with this simple wish of attaining truth : 
 their strongest wishes are directed to the discovery 
 of new grounds for adhering to opinions already 
 formed ; and they are as deaf to arguments on the 
 opposite side as they are alive to evidence in favour 
 of their own views. The pure wish to arrive at 
 truth is indeed as rare as the integrity which strictly 
 observes the golden rule to act towards others as 
 we would wish others to act towards us. For this 
 several reasons may be assigned. A principal one 
 is, that men's interests are often indissolubly con- 
 nected with the prevalence of certain opinions ; 
 they are therefore naturally anxious to find out 
 every possible ground why these opinions should 
 be held : their personal consequence too is often 
 implicated in their support; they are pledged by 
 their rank or office, or previous declarations, to the 
 maintenance of a determinate line of argument, and 
 they feel that it would be a disparagement to their 
 intellectual powers and to their reputation, were it 
 proved to be unsound. 
 
 Another reason is, that such opinions are some- 
 times really objects of affection, and things of habit. 
 
IN THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 25 
 
 We are accustomed to regard them as true, and it 
 is troublesome to look at them in a different light ; 
 or perhaps we love them as the rallying points of 
 pleasant ideas and cherished feelings. 
 . In addition to all this, men are glad to find in 
 their opinions some excuse for their practices. 
 They naturally, therefore, wish to meet with a 
 confirmation of those doctrines which are condu- 
 cive to their self-complacency. 
 
 These, and other similar circumstances, create 
 in the mind a desire to find some given opinion 
 true; and of course, as far as their influence ex- 
 tends, extinguish the desire to find the truth. 
 
 Even when any one entertains a sincere desire 
 to form correct opinions on any subject, the feel- 
 ings or emotions with which it may be associated 
 in his own mind may interfere to disturb his intel- 
 lectual views. It is perhaps possible to conceive a 
 man possessed with a genuine wish to arrive at the 
 truth, notwithstanding a feeling of affection or com- 
 placency for some particular doctrine ; and endued 
 with such self-control as not to allow a feeling of 
 that kind to influence his mode of conducting the 
 investigation ; but it will inevitably influence his 
 thoughts. All the favourable considerations will 
 spontaneously rise to his view with more frequency 
 and vividness than those of an opposite character. 
 
 The same effect will frequently take place from 
 an apparently contrary cause. A man may feel a 
 3 
 
26 ON THE STATES OF MIND 
 
 dislike for a certain conclusion ; he may dread to 
 find it true ; and this very sentiment may so fix his 
 view upon it as to assist in bringing about the con- 
 viction which he wishes to shun. There are cer- 
 tain fixed habitual feelings on some subjects, which 
 have a remarkable effect in thus circumscribing the 
 intellectual vision. One of the most striking of 
 these is the sentiment of awe. If a man is habitu- 
 ally labouring under this feeling in regard to the 
 general subject, or to the issue of the investigation, 
 it is astonishing how limited will be the range of 
 his thoughts, how few and how monotonous the 
 conceptions to which the subject will give rise. 
 
 It may be questioned, whether this kind of awe 
 can exist in any intensity in a mind which is occu- 
 pied with a genuine desire after truth ; fear of the 
 result of investigation at least can hardly exist 
 there ; but if even a fainter tone of the feeling pre- 
 dominate, it will prevent that quickness of concep- 
 tion, comparison, inference, which would otherwise 
 be brought to bear on the inquiry. The fact is, 
 however, that this state of mind is generally found 
 attended by a desire to receive confirmation in our 
 habitual opinions. Men are alarmed when, in de- 
 partments of knowledge over which the solemnity 
 of fear has diffused itself, they alight on any new 
 ground, or in other words, on any doctrines at vari- 
 ance with received principles ; and their w r ishes are 
 usually pointed to a corroboration of the views with 
 
IN THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 27 
 
 which they are already familiar, and which neither 
 startle their timidity nor task their understand- 
 ings. 
 
 From this brief review it appears that these emo- 
 tions produce two effects: they create desires for 
 some result other than the simple attainment of truth; 
 and even when they create no desires of this kind, 
 they suggest ideas which would not have otherwise 
 entered the mind ; or what is equally effectual, they 
 prevent ideas from entering which would have 
 otherwise been suggested. 
 
 Having considered the favourable and unfavourable 
 moral states of mind connected with our subject, we 
 proceed to the intellectual. In any given mind, the 
 intellectual state most favourable for the attainment 
 of truth is obviously freedom from preconceived er- 
 rors. The preoccupation of the understanding by 
 erroneous opinions is one of the greatest impedi- 
 ments which offer themselves in the pursuit of 
 accurate knowledge. The mere preoccupancy 
 itself is an obstacle scarcely to be overcome ; but 
 as the opinions thus lodged are generally the ob- 
 jects of awe and veneration, the task of removing 
 them becomes almost hopeless. No language can 
 describe with sufficient force the tenacity with 
 which early received notions are retained : they 
 seem to enter into the very essence of the soul, to 
 weave themselves into the tissue of the understand- 
 ing, till it transcends the power of conception to 
 
28 ON THE STATES OF MIND 
 
 imagine them erroneous. Of those notions in par- 
 ticular, which are coeval with our earliest recollec- 
 tions, and the origin of which we cannot trace, we 
 seem incapable of suspecting the falsity. 
 
 When such notions are combined with that kind 
 of fear and awe which we have already described, 
 there is no degree of absurdity to which they may 
 not rise. A modern writer,* in his travels through 
 Mesopotamia, relates that at Orfah (the ancient Ur 
 of the Chaldees) the river and the fish in it are re- 
 garded as sacred to Abraham, and the inhabitants 
 firmly believe, that if any of the fish were caught, 
 no process of cooking could make any impression 
 on their bodies. Here is a notion which any one 
 might at once put to the test by direct trial ; a fact 
 which they have only to stretch out their hands to 
 verify or disprove ; yet so thoroughly preoccupied 
 are the minds of the people by the prejudice instilled 
 in early infancy, such awe do they feel in relation 
 to it, that they have not the slightest suspicion of 
 its absurdity, and would think it profane to at- 
 tempt to submit it to the ordeal of actual experi- 
 ment. 
 
 Combining the states which we have attempted 
 to describe, we have a union of qualifications which 
 every lover of knowledge, every inquirer should 
 aim at attaining; a simple desire to arrive at the 
 
 * Mr. Buckingham. 
 
IN THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 29 
 
 truth, a freedom from disturbing passion, and a 
 freedom from preconceived erroneous opinions. 
 
 Of these qualifications, the genuine desire for 
 truth may be considered the most valuable. If it 
 is not the mark, it is at least the indispensable at- 
 tribute of a great mind. United with a large and 
 comprehensive understanding, it places a man 
 amongst the benefactors of his species. 
 
 Were men in general possessed with this desire 
 in any great degree of purity and intenseness, many 
 errors might undoubtedly still prevail in the world 
 from the limited powers of the human intellect ; but 
 it is easy to see how much the progress of know- 
 lede would be accelerated, and how soon the traces 
 of illiberality and intolerance would be swept from 
 social intercourse. 
 
 Men in fact are usually in the state here descri- 
 bed when they enter on the study of physical and 
 mathematical science : their sole object is to know 
 all that is to be known, they seldom have any 
 passions connected with the truths before them, and 
 in general they are perfectly aware of their own 
 ignorance. 
 
 In this chapter we have aimed simply at describ- 
 ing the moral and intellectual states favourable and 
 unfavourable to the grand object of inquiry. How 
 far they are subject to our control is a curious and 
 interesting question, which will fall under our cog- 
 nizance in a subsequent part of the present essay. 
 
 3* 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES INQUIRY IS A DUTY. 
 
 It is our purpose in a subsequent chapter to in- 
 quire what are our duties in the pursuit of truth ; 
 but it seems necessary in the first place to ascertain 
 in what circumstances the duty of investigation is 
 incumbent, and to examine some objections which 
 may be alleged against it. 
 
 A great majority of mankind may well be excused 
 from devoting much attention to the investigation 
 of any truths but such as directly relate to their 
 immediate condition, or are offered spontaneously 
 to their notice. Doomed to incessant labour, they 
 are rather to be commended when they evince an 
 anxiety for extraneous knowledge than blamed for 
 betraying indifference. On those, who are elevated 
 above this constant attention to the mere preserva- 
 tion of life, the duty of inquiry presses with varying 
 force, according to their station and opportunities. 
 Without pretending to a complete enumeration, we 
 think we may state, that this duty is incumbent on 
 all who can be brought under the following classes : 
 
DUTY OF INQUIRY. 31 
 
 1. Those whose professed office it is to teach 
 others. 
 
 2. Those who voluntarily undertake to instruct 
 others. 
 
 3. All those who have the means and opportunity 
 of inquiry on subjects which have an important 
 bearing on their moral actions or conduct in society. 
 
 It assuredly will not require many words to prove, 
 that those who are called upon by their office to 
 instruct others should diligently investigate the sub- 
 jects they have to explain. The labour of inquiry 
 is equally demanded of any one who voluntarily 
 undertakes the same task. In both these cases, 
 inquiry is the only means which the parties have of 
 satisfying themselves, that they are disseminating 
 truth and not falsehood. Nothing can be more ab- 
 solutely imperative. If 1 undertake to instruct 
 others, I am under the strongest obligation to do 
 all in my power to render myself competent to the 
 function, and to take the utmost care not to delude 
 or mislead. Instruction can have no legitimate 
 object but to teach what is true ; and it is a sort of 
 practical contradiction to undertake it, without 
 having bestowed the trouble of ascertaining what 
 the truth is. 
 
 It is equally imperative on every one to undergo 
 the labour of inquiry according to his means and 
 opportunities, in regard to all subjects which have 
 an important bearing on his conduct; which in 
 
32 IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
 other words furnish grounds for determining what 
 that conduct shall be. Not to inquire in these 
 cases, would be to take steps involving the happi- 
 ness of ourselves and our fellow-creatures, without 
 knowing or doing all in our power to learn the 
 consequences of those steps : it would be staking, 
 in fact, our welfare and that of others on the mere 
 chance of our being ignorantly in the right. 
 
 When the circumstances here described are com- 
 bined, when it is a man's office to instruct others, 
 and instruct them on subjects having an important 
 bearing on the common welfare, the duty of inquiry 
 is raised to its highest pitch. 
 
 On all persons, who come under these three 
 classes, it may be stated to be incumbent to pursue 
 their inquiries till they can clearly trace satisfactory 
 conclusions from undeniable premises. No one 
 ought to be satisfied with his opinions on any subject 
 of importance, much less ought he to inculcate them 
 on others, unless he can trace their connection with 
 self-evident principles. 
 
 It is not easy to imagine how this plain statement 
 can be controverted or denied ; yet there are fre- 
 quent cases in actual life, where the duty of inquiry, 
 if not positively rejected, is really evaded. There 
 are several pretexts employed on these occasions : 
 inquiry might lead to doubt or perplexity ; to be- 
 come acquainted with opposite arguments might 
 shake the settled convictions of the understanding: 
 
INQUIRY IS A DUTY. 33 
 
 to read the writings of adversaries might conta- 
 minate the mind with false views. 
 
 Every one who alleges such pretexts as these for 
 declining inquiry, must obviously begin by assuming 
 that his own opinions are unerringly in the right. 
 Nothing could justify any man for declining the 
 investigation of a subject which it is his duty to 
 teach, or on which his opinions necessarily deter- 
 mine his social conduct, but the possession of an 
 understanding free from liability to error. Not 
 gifted with infallibility, in what way except by 
 diligent inquiry can he obtain any assurance that he 
 is not in the one case disseminating erroneous opi- 
 nions, or in the other pursuing a course of injurious 
 action ? If he holds any opinion, he must have 
 acquired it, either by examination, or by instillation, 
 rote, or some process which he cannot recollect. 
 On the supposition that he has acquired it by proper 
 examination, the duty on which we are now insisting 
 has been discharged, and the matter is at an end. 
 If he has acquired it in the other manner, if it is fast 
 fixed in his understanding without any consciousness 
 on his own part how it came there, the mere plea that 
 his mind might become unsettled, can be.no argument 
 against the duty of investigation. For any thing he 
 can allege to the contrary his present opinions are 
 wrong; and in that case the disturbance of his 
 blind conviction, instead of being an evil, is an 
 essential step towards arriving at the truth. 
 
34 IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
 There is no foreseeing how far the subtlety of 
 interest and indolence may go, and it may be pos- 
 sibly assigned as a further reason for his declining 
 inquiry, that he may come to some fallacy which 
 he cannot surmount, although convinced of its 
 character. If he is convinced of its character, he 
 must either have grounds for that conviction or not. 
 If he has grounds, let him examine them, draw them 
 out, try if they are valid, and then the fallacy will 
 stand exposed. If he has no grounds for suspect- 
 ing a fallacy, what an irrational conclusion he con- 
 fesses himself to have arrived at ! But he may re- 
 ply — he may be unable to solve the difficulty, he 
 may be perplexed, and the issue may he, that it 
 would have been much better had he remained in 
 his former strong though unenlightened conviction. 
 Why better? If he is in perplexity, let him read, 
 think, consult the learned and the wise, and the re- 
 sult will probably be, a definite opinion on one side 
 or the other. But if he still remain in doubt, where 
 is the harm, or rather why is it not to be considered 
 a good ? The subject is evidently one which admits 
 strong probabilities on opposite sides. Doubt, there- 
 fore, is the proper sentiment with which to regard 
 it: it is the result of the best exercise of the facul- 
 ties ; and either positively to believe, or positively 
 to disbelieve, would imply an erroneous apprecia- 
 tion of evidence. 
 
 In the minds of some people, a strong prejudice 
 
INQUIRY IS A DUTY. 35 
 
 appears to exist against that state of the under- 
 standing which is termed doubt. A little reflection, 
 however, will convince any one, that on certain 
 subjects doubt is as appropriate a state of mind as 
 belief or disbelief on others. There are doctrines, 
 propositions, facts, supported and opposed by every 
 degree of evidence, and many amongst them by 
 that degree of evidence of which the proper effect 
 is to leave the mind in an equipoise between two 
 conclusions. In these cases, either to believe or 
 disbelieve would imply that the understanding was 
 improperly affected. Doubt is the appropriate re- 
 sult, which there can be no reason to shrink from 
 or lament. 
 
 But it is further urged, that inquiry might con- 
 taminate the mind with false views ; and therefore 
 it is wise and laudable to abstain from it. 
 
 We can understand what is meant by contamina- 
 ting a man's habits, or disposition, or even imagina- 
 tion. If a man read impure books, or works of 
 extravagant fiction and false taste, his imagination 
 will inevitably be coloured by the ideas presented, 
 and the conceptions which subsequently rise up in 
 his mind will partake of the impurity and extrava- 
 gance with which he has been conversant. But 
 there is no analogy on this point between the 
 understanding and the imagination. There is con- 
 tamination in preposterous and obscene images 
 crowding before the intellectual vision, notwith- 
 
36 IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
 standing a full and distinct perception of their 
 character; but there is no contamination, no evil 
 in a thousand false arguments coming before the 
 mind, if their quality is clearly discerned. The 
 only possible evil in this case is mistaking false for 
 true ; but the man who shrinks from investigation, 
 lest he should mistake false for true, can have no 
 reason for supposing himself free from that delusion 
 in his actual opinions. That he should be more 
 likely to escape from error without than with in- 
 vestigation, is a species of absurdity which requires 
 no exposure. 
 
 On no plea, therefore, can investigation be de- 
 clined. That it should unsettle a man's established 
 convictions, or that it should lead to ultimate doubt, 
 may be a good : the one is the necessary prelimi- 
 nary to passing from error to truth ; the other, if 
 ultimately produced, is most likely to be the proper 
 state of mind in relation to the particular subject 
 examined. That inquiry should contaminate his 
 mind is also a vain allegation. The only meaning 
 which can be attached to the phrase, implies a 
 misconception of falsehood for truth, a delusion, 
 which inquiry is not only the direct means of pre- 
 venting, but of dissipating if he is already involved 
 in it. 
 
 Whoever fears to examine the foundation of his 
 opinions, and enter on the consideration of any 
 train of counter-argument, may rest assured, that 
 
INQUIRY IS A DUTY. 37 
 
 he has some latent apprehension of their unsound- 
 ness and incapacity of standing investigation. And 
 as a fear of this sort is totally at variance with that 
 spirit of candour and fairness which we have 
 already seen to be the proper disposition for the 
 attainment of truth, no man should suffer it to pre- 
 vent him from boldly engaging in the requisite ex- 
 amination. A great deal of invective has been 
 levelled at free-thinking. The only distinction 
 worth attending to on this point is that between 
 accurate and inaccurate, true and false. Thinking 
 can never be too free, provided it is just. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN PREJUDICES ADVERSE TO 
 INQUIRY. 
 
 Besides the objections to inquiry examined in the 
 last chapter, there are some other prejudices of a 
 similar character, which as long as they prevail 
 must form serious impediments to the attainment of 
 truth. 
 
 One of these is a fear that we may search too 
 far, and be guilty of presumption in prying into 
 things we ought not to know : another prejudice is, 
 that we may contract guilt should we arrive at erro- 
 neous conclusions, or conclusions at variance with 
 such as are established ; and another, that it is a sort 
 of praiseworthy humility to acquiese in received 
 opinions, on the authority of others, and refrain from 
 thinking for ourselves. 
 
 A brief space will not be ill bestowed in setting 
 these prejudices in their true light. 
 
 As to the first, a few words will suffice to prove 
 that nothing can be more irrational and unfounded. 
 We have shown in another place* that truth is con- 
 
 * Essay on the Publication of Opinions. 
 
EXAMINATION, &C. 39 
 
 ducive to human happiness; the attainment of it, 
 one of the highest objects of human enterprise ; and 
 the free exercise of our faculties on all subjects, the 
 means of securing this invaluable blessing. If this 
 is a correct representation, investigation is a pursuit 
 in which there is every thing to hope and nothing 
 to fear, and to which there are no limits but such 
 as the nature of our own faculties prescribes. 
 
 It is not easy to conceive with exactness what 
 can possibly be apprehended frc-m inquiry ; what is 
 the precise danger or difficulty it is expected to in- 
 volve us in ; what is implied in the fear that we may 
 search too far. Some indeed appear to have ima- 
 gined that inquiry might conduct us to forbidden 
 truths. 
 
 As there are secret transactions amongst our su- 
 periors in society, or even our associates, which we 
 should be culpable in prying into ; sealed documents 
 circulating in the world, sacred to those whose 
 names they bear, and not to be scrutinized with 
 honour by any of the intermediate agents through 
 whose hands they pass ; records of private affairs, 
 kept solely for the use of the individuals concerned 
 in them, and which we are not to come upon by 
 stealth, and rifle of their information : and as to in- 
 fringe the privacy of these matters would be stig- 
 matized as indelicate, meddling, presumptuous ; so 
 it seems to be supposed that there are closed docu- 
 ments in nature into which we are forbidden to 
 
40 OF CERTAIN PREJUDICES 
 
 look, private processes going on into which we 
 have no right to intrude, truths existing which are 
 not to be profaned by our scrutiny, and to attempt 
 to make ourselves acquainted with these is unjusti- 
 fiable audacity and presumption. If this prejudice 
 does not often assume the definite form here as- 
 cribed to it, it may frequently be found exerting an 
 influence without a distinct consciousness in the 
 mind over which it prevails. 
 
 A more striking instance of a completely false 
 analogy could not be adduced. There is not a 
 single point of resemblance throughout the whole 
 field of knowledge to these little secrets, the off- 
 spring of human weakness, or the indispensable 
 resources of human imperfection. There is no 
 secret in the natural or the moral world, sacred 
 from the investigation of man. Here there can be 
 no presumption, no undue boldness, no counterpart 
 at all to the audaciousness of one man intruding 
 upon the privacy of another. All that man has to 
 guard against, and that simply for his own sake, is 
 error ; his vigilance is required, only to ensure that 
 his facts are properly ascertained, and his inferen- 
 ces correctly deduced. The presumption he has to 
 repress, is not any presumption in relation to other 
 beings in possession of secrets, which he is trying 
 clandestinely to wrest from them, but merely the 
 presumption of drawing positive and ample conclu- 
 sions from doubtful and slender premises, of sup- 
 
ADVERSE TO INQUIRY. 41 
 
 posing that he has discovered what he has not, that 
 he has succeeded where he has only failed, that he 
 has done what still remains to be accomplished ; in 
 a word, the presumption of overrating his own 
 ■ achievements. Here indeed a man may err in self- 
 confidence, but an evil cannot obviously arise from 
 searching too far, which is best remedied by 
 searching farther, by closer reasoning and more 
 rigorous investigation. 
 
 The strangest absurdities indeed would be in- 
 volved in the supposition that we could possibly 
 reach to knowledge which we ought not to attain. 
 We are placed in this world by the Creator of the 
 universe, surrounded with certain objects and en- 
 dowed with certain faculties. From these objects, 
 with these faculties, it is implied by the hypothesis 
 under consideration, we may extort secrets which 
 he never designed to be known, extract information 
 which Omnipotence wished to withhold ! 
 
 The second prejudice above enumerated, that 
 we may contract guilt if in the course of inquiry 
 we miss the right conclusion, is still more prevalent 
 and influential. On a former occasion* we have 
 shown, that nothing can be more at variance with 
 reason, than an apprehension of this nature. As 
 our opinions on any subject are not voluntary acts 
 but involuntary effects, in whatever conclusions 
 
 * Essay on the Formation of Opinions. 
 4* 
 
42 OF CERTAIN PREJUDICES 
 
 our researches terminate, they can involve us in no 
 culpability. All that we have to take care of, as 
 we shall more largely show hereafter, is to bestow 
 on every subject an adequate and impartial atten- 
 tion. Having done this we have discharged our 
 duty, and it would be irrational and unmanly to 
 entertain any apprehension for the result. 
 
 In fact, there is the grossest inconsistency in the 
 prejudice now under consideration. If we may 
 contract guilt by inquiry, we may contract guilt 
 by remaining in our present state. The only valid 
 reason which can be assigned, why we may com- 
 mit an offence by embarking in any inquiry is, that 
 we may miss the right conclusion ; but it is obvious 
 that we may equally miss it by remaining in our 
 actual opinions. It is then incumbent on us to 
 know, whether we are committing an offence by 
 remaining in our present opinions ; in other words, 
 it is necessary to inquire whether those opinions 
 are true ; thus the reason assigned for not inquir- 
 ing, leads itself to the conclusion that it is necessary 
 to inquire. 
 
 We may also remark, that this prejudice is ob- 
 viously at variance with the obligations of morality, 
 which we have stated in the last chapter, and that 
 so far from its being wrong, it is our actual duty to 
 inquire where inquiry is of importance, a duty 
 constituted by the consequences with which our 
 conduct in this respect is attended. 
 
 
ADVERSE TO INQUIRY. 43 
 
 A man, indeed, after the best and most dispas- 
 sionate investigation of an important subject, may 
 naturally feel a degree of anxiety lest he should 
 after all have missed the truth ; but in this anxiety 
 there is not, or ought not to be, the slightest admix- 
 ture of moral uneasiness. It is an anxiety, lest his 
 conclusions, when they come to form the grounds 
 of his actions or of his instructions to others, should 
 lead to consequences which he did not anticipate. 
 His conclusions may be wrong, and the conse- 
 quences disastrous ; but if he has a proper view of 
 the matter, there will be none of the stings of re- 
 morse, not the faintest accusation of conscience. 
 Having inquired to the best of his power, he has 
 done all that depended on himself, and would ex- 
 hibit little wisdom were he to torment himself with 
 reproaches for an unfortunate issue. 
 
 The third prejudice we have to consider is, that 
 acquiescence in received opinions, or forbearing, 
 according to the common phrase, to think for our- 
 selves, evinces a degree of humility highly proper 
 and commendable. 
 
 If we examine the matter closely, nevertheless, 
 we shall find that it usually evinces nothing but a 
 great degree of indolent presumption or intellectual 
 cowardice. There is often, in truth, as great a 
 measure of presumption in this species of acquies- 
 cence as in the boldest hypothesis which the human 
 invention can start. That received or established 
 
44 OF CERTAIN PREJUDICES 
 
 opinions arc true, is one of those sweeping conclu- 
 sions, which would require very strong reasons and 
 often elaborate research to justify it. On what 
 grounds are they considered to be true by one who 
 declines investigation ? Because (on the most fa- 
 vourable supposition) they have been handed down 
 to us by our predecessors, and have been regarded 
 with conviction by a multitude of illustrious men. 
 But what comprehensive reasons are these ! What 
 investigation it would require to show they were 
 valid ! As the whole history of mankind teems with 
 instances of the transmission of the grossest errors 
 from one generation to another, and of their having 
 been countenanced by the concurrence of the most 
 eminent of the race; what a large acquaintance 
 with the peculiarities of the generations prccedingus, 
 and the circumstances of the great men to whom we 
 appeal, it would require to show that this particu- 
 lar instance was an exemption from the general lot ! 
 
 It is then no humility to refrain from inquiry ; on 
 the contrary, it is the proper kind of humility ; or if 
 it is not humility, it is the proper feeling for the 
 occasion, to be determined to do all in our power 
 to make ourselves acquainted with every subject 
 on which it is necessary for us to pronounce or 
 profess an opinion. 
 
 From the necessity of using our own judgment, 
 or in other words of forming a conclusion for our- 
 selves, we cannot be absolved. We must form our 
 
ADVERSE TO INQUIRY. 45 
 
 opinion either of the doctrine itself, or of the com- 
 parative degrees of confidence to which those men 
 who have studied the subject are entitled ; and it is 
 evident that in the case of disputed doctrines, the 
 latter is as difficult, and demands as much investi- 
 gation, as much knowledge and acuteness of judg- 
 ment, as to come to a decision on the original 
 question. 
 
 Let no one then deceive himself by supposing, 
 that he is exercising the virtue of humility, or mo- 
 desty, or diffidence, when he is in fact resting in a 
 conclusion which, to reach legitimately, would re- 
 quire so much knowledge and ability. Far from 
 being a virtue, indeed, this kind of acquiescence is 
 in most cases a positive vice, tending to stop all 
 inquiry and all advancement. In certain circum- 
 stances, as we have already shown, it is an impera- 
 tive duty to enter upon a rigorous examination of 
 all the evidence within our reach. 
 
 From the preceding review, it appears that all 
 these prejudices are equally unfounded ; that there 
 are no forbidden truths, to which inquiry may con- 
 duct us ; that the result of inquiry, whatever it may 
 be, can involve us in no criminality ; and lastly, that 
 it is no true humility to refrain from investigation 
 in deference to the authority of others. 
 
 Let the inquirer then enter on his task with full 
 confidence that he is embarking in no criminal, or 
 forbidden, or presumptuous undertaking. Let him 
 
4G OF CERTAIN PREJUDICES 
 
 be as circumspect as he pleases in collecting his 
 facts and deducing his conclusions, cautious in the 
 process, but fearless in the result. Let him be fully 
 aware of his liability to error; of the thousand 
 sources of illusion ; of the limited powers of the 
 individual ; of the paramount importance of truth ; 
 but let him dismiss all conscientious apprehensions 
 of the issue of an investigation, conducted with due 
 application of mind and rectitude of purpose. 
 
 As there are some prejudices which are hostile to 
 inquiry, so there are some principles of an opposite 
 character, the full and adequate conviction of which 
 essentially conduces to promote it. Amongst these 
 is the truth that knowledge is progressive, and that 
 in this progress every age is placed in a more ad- 
 vantageous position for the comprehension of any 
 subject of science than the last. Every inquirer, 
 therefore, finds himself on higher ground than his 
 predecessors ; he can avail himself of their latest 
 acquisitions without the labour of original discov- 
 ery, and thus with unbroken spirits, and unsub- 
 dued vigour, he can commence his career at the 
 ultimate boundary of theirs. Hence, without any 
 presumption in the superiority of his faculties, he 
 may hope to attain views more comprehensive and 
 correct, than were enjoyed by men who immeasu- 
 rably transcended him in capacity. All the advan- 
 tage, nevertheless, which he has over his precur- 
 sors, his successors will have over him. All his 
 
ADVERSE TO INQUIRY. 47 
 
 exertions will tend to place them above him ; and 
 the very truths which he discovers, should he be 
 fortunate enough to discover any, will give them 
 the power of detecting the errors, with which all 
 truths on their first manifestation in any mind are 
 inevitably conjoined. 
 
 In such considerations as these there might be 
 something to deter a man of narrow views and sel- 
 fish feelings. That his opinions should be thus 
 scrutinized and examined, and their imperfections 
 detected ; that in process of time he should lose 
 his rank as an oracle on the subject of his exer- 
 tions, and be superseded by after-sages, might have 
 any other effect than that of stimulating him to 
 exertion. To a man of real genius, however, a 
 man of large and liberal understanding, and as 
 large liberal feelings, these considerations are at 
 once replete with satisfaction and encouragement, 
 and destructive of undue self-importance and com- 
 placency. 
 
 When he looks back on his predecessors, he ap- 
 preciates the advantages of his position, and can 
 thus, without undue self-estimation, indulge a fair 
 hope, that by strenuous exertions his own works 
 may form one of the steps in the intellectual pro- 
 gress of the race, and constitute him the author of 
 benefits to be indefinitely perpetuated. When he 
 looks forward, while he exerts in the coming glo- 
 ries of progressive knowledge, and anticipates with 
 
48 OF CERTAIN PREJUDICES 
 
 delight the developement of truths which he is 
 never to know ; he feels a perfect confidence that 
 any real service which he may render to literature 
 or science will be duly appreciated, and rejoices 
 that any errors into which he may unconsciously 
 wander will do little injury, because they will be 
 speedily corrected. 
 
 Knowing that were he even the Newton of his 
 age, he must be eventually outstripped, he consi- 
 ders such an incident as no wise derogatory to his 
 talents or reputation : agitated by none of the 
 jealousy which is too common a disgrace to men 
 who ought to rise superior to the weakness of such 
 a passion, he even feels a desire that he may be 
 outstripped in his own life-time, a curiosity to 
 know by what modifications his own doctrines will 
 be corrected ; he is on the watch for new discove- 
 ries, because he knows that there are minds which 
 having mastered preceding knowledge are in a con- 
 dition to make them. 
 
 It has been frequently stigmatized as presumptu- 
 ous and overweening vanity in a man of the present 
 day to fancy himself superior to men of past times ; 
 but the view of the subject here exhibited annihilates 
 all such imputations. It takes away all colour of 
 disrespect from the closest scrutiny of the efforts of 
 his predecessors. He is conscious that in the most 
 successful controversy, if controversy it may be 
 called, which he may institute with them, the 
 
ADVERSE TO INQUIRY. 49 
 
 greatest success cannot be considered as any per- 
 sonal superiority on his part over the object of his 
 remarks ; he knows that it is the superiority of the 
 station to which his own times have carried him ; 
 and thus the profoundest respect is compatible 
 with the freest examination. What does he ad- 
 mire in the great philosophers of past ages ? Not 
 surely their errors, perhaps not one of their un- 
 qualified opinions ; but he admires the reach of 
 thought, which, from the then level of knowledge, 
 could touch on truths, the full and perfect mastery 
 of which was to be the work of future ages, the 
 slow result of the successive efforts of persevering 
 and vigorous minds. 
 
 Such a view of the progressive character of hu- 
 man knowledge as this would wonderfully facilitate 
 the pursuit of truth. No single principle with 
 which we are acquainted would have so salutary 
 an influence in promoting candour, liberality, 
 openness to conviction, self-knowledge, proper 
 caution, and proper fearlessness. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 ON THE DUTIES INCUMBENT ON MANKIND IN THE 
 PURSUIT OF TRUTH, OR IN THE PROCESS OF IN- 
 QUIRY. 
 
 It is almost an identical proposition, that on 
 every subject it is important for man to understand 
 clearly what his duty requires of him. While this 
 is universally acknowledged, it is sometimes over- 
 looked, that it is equally important for him to know 
 also what it does not require. It may be questioned, 
 indeed, whether more evil has not arisen in the 
 world from his regarding useless actions, pernicious 
 actions, and actions not within his power, as required 
 of him by moral obligation, than from his leaving out 
 of the code of duty such as are of a contrary cha- 
 racter. As to pernicious actions, a syllable would 
 be superfluous to show, that it must be fraught 
 with mischief to consider them as duties, and con- 
 sequently both to encourage and commit them. 
 And with regard to useless actions ; to erect them 
 into so many imperative obligations, besides creat- 
 ing confusion in our moral sentiments, where perfect 
 distinctness and precision are of the highest value, 
 and inflicting injury, (as the prevalence of error 
 cannot fail to do,) on our reasoning powers, brings 
 
THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 51 
 
 upon mankind all the evils of needless restraint and 
 profitless compunction. 
 
 It is equally if not more pernicious to regard our- 
 selves and others as responsible for actions or 
 events, over which we have no control, which we 
 can neither produce nor prevent. The unhappi- 
 ness reciprocally sustained and inflicted in conse- 
 quence of the omission of imaginary duties not in 
 any body's power, the needless constraint, the 
 doubts and fears and misgivings, the disputes and 
 dissensions proceeding from such erroneous feelings 
 of moral obligation, are attested by the melancholy 
 history of human superstitions. 
 
 Men are peculiarly liable to erroneous sentiments 
 of this kind, when the scene of the events in ques- 
 tion is partly or wholly in the mind ; when they are 
 events of a sensitive or intellectual nature, or ex- 
 ternal actions so mixed up with mental processes 
 as to baffle the efforts of ordinary discrimination to 
 separate them. 
 
 These remarks will be found strikingly applicable 
 to the subject before us. In regard to the pursuit 
 of truth, there are certain things which are wholly 
 in our power, while on the other hand there are 
 intellectual processes and states of mind not within 
 our control; and these ought to be clearly and 
 accurately discriminated, that w T e may satisfactorily 
 ascertain what in this important matter it is incum- 
 bent on us to do. 
 
52 DUTIES OF MANKIND IN 
 
 It has been frequently enjoined on the enquirer, 
 that he should dismiss all predilection from his 
 mind, all prejudices, all fear and hope, and affection, 
 and hatred, and other passions, and approach the 
 consideration of a subject with that perfect indif- 
 ference which would be the most effectual security 
 for the ultimate attainment of truth. That this is 
 the proper state of mind for the occasion, we have 
 already shown. We have seen that the appropriate 
 qualifications for an inquirer are a desire to arrive 
 at truth, a freedom from disturbing passion, and 
 from preconceived errors. And, undoubtedly, were 
 it practicable to generate in ourselves the state of 
 mind here described, we should be bound to do 
 so by the clearest obligations of morality ; but we 
 must all know, from our own experience, how im- 
 possible it is to divest ourselves of these feelings 
 and preconceptions by a mere effort of the will. 
 A man who has been brought up in ardent admira- 
 tion of certain doctrines, a strong affection for them, 
 and an unquestioned conviction of their truth, has no 
 power to lay down these feelings at pleasure. They 
 have been the slow result of years, the growing 
 product of innumerable circumstances ; and we 
 might as well ask him to divest himself of the recol- 
 lections of his youth as of these affections for what 
 he was taught in it. As it is injurious to require or 
 to aim at more than can be possibly accomplished, 
 it is necessary to ascertain what in this respect is 
 
THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 53 
 
 practicable. All that can be expected from a man 
 in the circumstances here described, (and the task 
 is arduous enough for the strongest powers and 
 greatest integrity of purpose,) appears to be to 
 make himself perfectly acquainted with the state of 
 his own mind. If he becomes fully aware, that he 
 has by education, or other circumstances, not only 
 a strong conviction of a doctrine, but an ardent love 
 for it, without ever having scrutinized its foundation, 
 and ascertained the propriety of his sentiments, 
 this thorough insight into the state of his under- 
 standing and affections is the best security which 
 the nature of the case will allow against the influence 
 of such prepossessions. The more closely he ex- 
 amines himself, the freer he will be from the danger 
 of improper bias. 
 
 The same remarks will apply in the case of hos- 
 tility entertained against any doctrine ; and in general 
 in all cases, where a passion or affection from any 
 cause precedes the inquiry which we institute. 
 
 It is plain that such an examination will especially 
 tend to loosen the power of all preconceived no- 
 tions. To be fully aware that the opinions we 
 have hitherto held exist in our understandings simply 
 because they have been placed there by others, and 
 not as the result of any process of reasoning on our 
 own parts, is almost tantamount to the power of 
 extirpating them from our minds before we com- 
 mence the proposed investigation. 
 
 5* 
 
54 DUTIES OF MANKIND IN 
 
 However difficult it may be for a man to bring 
 himself into the most favourable state of mind for 
 the attainment of truth, the next step is entirely in 
 his power, and that is to conduct the examination 
 of any subject with diligence and impartiality. If it 
 is proved in regard to any subject, that it is a man's 
 duty to investigate it, it is equally proved that it is 
 his duty to pursue the inquiry in a manner calculated 
 to attain the end in view. The same reasons which 
 require him to examine, demand that the examina- 
 tion should be complete and impartial. As without 
 examination he can have no security that he is 
 teaching truth or acting on just principles, so he can 
 have no security on these points, unless the exa- 
 mination be conducted in the likeliest manner to 
 attain a correct result. 
 
 His investigation must be made in the first place 
 with care and diligence. A difficult subject (and 
 most disputed subjects are either naturally or fac- 
 titiously difficult) is not to be mastered with a 
 cursory attention. It has been well remarked, that 
 no complex or very important truth can be trans- 
 planted in full maturity from one mind to another ; 
 it must be sown, strike root, and go through the 
 whole process of vegetation, before it can have a 
 living connection with the new soil, and flourish in 
 complete vigour and development.* 
 
 * The ^exact words of the passage here referred to are as 
 follows : " No complex or very important truth was ever yet 
 
THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 55 
 
 We are apt to be deceived in this respect on sub- 
 jects relating to morals. The terms employed are 
 such as are daily used in the common intercourse 
 of life, and we imagine we at once comprehend any 
 doctrines which they are the medium of express- 
 ing. In physical science, where at every step we 
 are encountered by the difficulties of a technical 
 phraseology, as well as of practical observations 
 and experiments, we immediately feel the necessity 
 of a regular application and progression, of master- 
 ing one principle before we proceed to the next, of 
 carrying our object by detail, working our way by 
 vigorous and reiteraied efforts. In morals, on the 
 contrary, we are too apt to be content with mere cur- 
 sory reading: no difficulties are presented by the 
 language, no unusual terms arrest our progress, no 
 particular experiments demand a pause to verify 
 them, and we glide smoothly along the pages of the 
 profoundest treatise, with an apparently clear ap- 
 prehension of the various propositions we meet 
 with, but in reality with a vague conception of their 
 full drift and precise meaning. Hence, people are 
 often deluded into fancying themselves competent 
 to pronounce a decision on questions requiring 
 
 transferred in full development from one mind to another: 
 truth of that kind is not a piece of furniture to be shifted; it is 
 a seed which must be sown and pass through the several stages 
 of growth." — Letters to a Young Man whose Education had been 
 neglected. 
 
56 DUTIES OF MANKIND IN , 
 
 severe study, great nicety of discrimination, and 
 close logical deduction. These results are partly 
 occasioned also by love of ease, and reluctance to 
 intellectual exertion. On difficult subjects, inquiry, 
 it is not to be concealed, is laborious : and the na- 
 tural indolence of most men induces them to stop 
 short of that vigorous application which difficulties 
 require for their solution. 
 
 Impartiality of examination is if possible of still 
 higher value than care and diligence. It is of little 
 importance what industry we exert on any subject, 
 if we make all our exertions in one direction, if we 
 sedulously close our minds against all considera- 
 tions which we dislike, and seek with eagerness for 
 any evidence or argument which will confirm our 
 established or favourite views. What duty and 
 common sense require of us is, that our attention 
 be equally given to both sides of every question, 
 that we make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with 
 all the conflicting arguments, that we be severely 
 impartial in weighing the evidence for each, and 
 suffer no bias to seduce us into supine omission on 
 the one hand, or inordinate rapacity for proof on 
 the other. 
 
 This too is any thing but a light and easy task. 
 It can be performed to a certain extent by every 
 honest and sincere inquirer ; but perhaps to accom- 
 plish it in perfection, would require a mind at once 
 enlarged, acute, candid, disinterested, and upright. 
 
THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 57 
 
 A man who perfectly accomplishes it, however, 
 cannot fail to command the esteem of his fellow 
 men by the worth and dignity of his conduct. It is 
 painful to think that such an example is rare ; that 
 instead of it we usually find the mere partisan, one 
 evidently engaged not in the pursuit of truth, but in 
 searching for every possible argument to support 
 and confirm a conclusion, predetermined by his in- 
 terest, his prejudices, or his position in society. 
 
 What a contrast do these two present : one can- 
 did, upright, fearless of the issue of the investigation 
 because solely intent on truth, searching on all 
 sides, refusing no evidence, anxious only that every 
 circumstance should be brought out in its true co- 
 lours and dimensions, and free from anger against 
 opposition ; the other directing all his acuteness to 
 one side, prying into those sources of information 
 alone where he imagines he shall find what is agree- 
 able to his wishes, stating every thing both to him- 
 self and others with the art and exaggeration of a 
 hired pleader, sounding forth the immaculate merits 
 of his cause, and filled with rancour against all who 
 do not range themselves under the same banners. 
 
 From the lenient manner in which the faults of 
 negligent and unfair investigation are generally 
 treated, it might seem that they are of small conse- 
 quence and light turpitude. To pronounce them 
 so, however, under the circumstances described in 
 a former chapter, would be little better than an ex- 
 
58 DUTIES OF MANKIND IN 
 
 press contradiction. When any one has to discharge 
 the office of instructing others on the subject of 
 inquiry, or when that subject has an important 
 relation to his social conduct, the vices of partial 
 and inadequate examination must, by the force of 
 the terms, be of serious moment. Besides, consi- 
 dered in a more comprehensive view, as to their 
 effects on the human race at large, far from being 
 of trivial consequence, they are sources of great 
 evil. They are nothing less in fact than impedi- 
 ments to the natural progress of mankind in becom- 
 ing acquainted with what is for their real happiness, 
 and consequently they are impediments to that 
 happiness itself. 
 
 The only improvement in the condition of man- 
 kind, that can be rationally expected, is from their 
 gradually emancipating themselves from the various 
 errors and multiform ignorance in which they are 
 involved. Society commences in barbarism, it be- 
 comes very slowly enlightened : every step of the 
 progress implies the discovery of new truths, or a 
 departure from errors to which it has been accus- 
 tomed, from notions established, and practices 
 consecrated by years. To accomplish this, to dis- 
 cover truth and to detect error, investigation is the 
 direct means: the more diligent and impartial the 
 inquiry, the surer the progress, and the faster the 
 improvement. 
 
 It follows, that to deny the importance of 
 
THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 59 
 
 investigation, and the importance of conducting 
 it with diligence and fairness, is to deny the 
 value of the means of improvement, and of using 
 those means in the best manner. If then we are 
 under any obligation to consult the general welfare, 
 diligence and fairness in our inquiries are not only 
 • recommendable qualities, which it would be well 
 for us to exercise, but they are positive duties, 
 which we cannot neglect without actual culpability. 
 
 And further it is of great importance to our 
 moral principles in general, that we should culti- 
 vate the spirit of fairness in research and contro- 
 versy. While there is so much laxity and want of 
 discrimination in regard to candour and upright- 
 ness in the prosecution of our inquiries, while re- 
 search on the most momentous subjects may be 
 neglected or perverted with impunity, we cannot 
 expect to find the spirit of integrity carried to its 
 highest perfection in the commerce of life. From 
 one who exhibits a want of proper diligence and 
 scrupulous impartiality in his treatment of evidence 
 in literature or science, it would be vain to look 
 for uncompromising integrity when he is called to 
 adjust the contending claims of his fellow-men, or 
 to decide between his own rights and those of 
 others. In both cases the same qualities are de- 
 manded, and if they are neglected in the one, they 
 will be weakened in the other. 
 
 Not only however is it rare to see these qualities 
 
60 DUTIES OF MANKIND IN 
 
 exemplified in the most important questions, but 
 nothing is commoner than virtual if not direct re- 
 commendations to act in contradiction to them. 
 What is the conduct of many of those who take 
 upon themselves the office of public instruction? 
 Do they recommend that on any important ques- 
 tion you should pay equal attention to both sides of 
 the controversy ? that you should read the books 
 which have been written against their own opini- 
 ons as well as such as have been produced in their 
 favour ? that you should endeavour to be strictly 
 impartial, and scrutinize their arguments with as 
 much severity as you employ on those of their op- 
 ponents T Is their language "read, examine for 
 yourselves, draw your own inferences, impartially 
 investigate; we present you with our conclusions 
 and the reasons on which they are founded ; we 
 believe them to be strong, but put them to the test ; 
 assist us by pointing out any fallacies you may 
 descry; let us be coadjutors in the grand cause of 
 truth?" Is it not then on the contrary, " the doc- 
 trine we announce is the only one which can be 
 free from error ; avoid all those writings which are 
 opposed to it as you would avoid the contamina- 
 tion of the plague ; do every thing in your power 
 to banish any opposite suggestions from your own 
 minds ; shun the moral turpitude of doubting what 
 we teach ; fear and confide ?" 
 
 If, however, the positions we have laid down are 
 
THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 61 
 
 true, if it is a man's duty to examine, and to exa- 
 mine with diligence and impartiality, it is also his 
 duty to recommend the same course to others. If 
 it would be morally wrong in himself to abstain 
 from the investigation of both sides of a question, 
 to bestow all his attention on arguments of one 
 tendency, to banish as far as he could all opposite 
 suggestions instead of giving them a fair and candid 
 examination, then he must stand convicted of a 
 moral offence for urging upon others the same con- 
 duct. On this point there can be no compromise. 
 It is either right or wrong to be partial in our in- 
 vestigations. If it is wrong to be partial, it is 
 wrong to recommend and enforce partiality; it is 
 a departure from the distinct line of duty, a devia- 
 tion from candid, upright, and honourable conduct. 
 This representation, it will be observed, by no 
 means implies that a man should refrain from urg- 
 ing his opinions with all the arguments in his 
 power ; but the moment he begins to teach the 
 necessity of thinking as he does, to set forth the 
 guilt of dissenting from his doctrine, and to insist 
 on the avoidance of all opposite considerations, that 
 moment he commits an offence against the moral 
 law r of truth. 
 
 The preceding remarks, if they are at all valid, 
 
 show that the whole of our duty in relation to the 
 
 pursuit of truth or to inquiry, is comprehended in 
 
 adequate and impartial examination ; examination 
 
 6 
 
62 DUTIES OF MANKIND IN 
 
 in the first place of the state of our own minds in 
 reference to the subject of inquiry ; and secondly, 
 examination of the subject itself and of the evidence 
 appertaining to it. 
 
 It is not possible, we apprehend, to state any 
 duty connected with the matter, which may not be 
 resolved into one of these. 
 
 To this conclusion, there is a prevalent notion 
 opposed ; that it is a man's duty to believe certain 
 prescribed doctrines. What these doctrines are 
 indeed is not by any means settled, but that there 
 are some which it is a duty to believe almost all 
 unite in pronouncing. 
 
 The simple consideration, that belief is not a 
 voluntary act, is sufficient of itself to dispose of 
 this proposition ; but a few words will not be wast- 
 ed in trying to exhibit the inconsistency of a notion 
 which is at the bottom of much human misery. 
 
 If there is any correctness in the preceding con- 
 clusions of this treatise, when in certain cases doc- 
 trines or propositions are presented to our minds, it 
 is our duty to inquire into their truth. Whether 
 these are new propositions, or propositions which we 
 have held without investigation from the first dawn 
 of consciousness, is not material. Circumstances 
 present them to our minds as demanding inquiry 
 into their truth, and our duty is to examine. It is 
 obvious that in this stage of the business at all 
 events, it is not our duty to believe them. To exa- 
 
THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 63 
 
 mine them is to investigate whether they have a 
 title to belief or not ; and if it is our duty to ascer- 
 tain whether they have claims on our credence, it 
 would be absurd to argue that it is incumbent on 
 us to begin the investigation by admitting the claims 
 into the validity of which we are inquiring. If 
 there is any duty of the kind incumbent on us, it 
 must be at a subsequent stage. We proceed, we 
 will suppose, in the examination with adequate 
 diligence and strict impartiality, tn this process 
 there is evidently still no duty of belief to perform. 
 All that we have to do is to be fair, candid, and 
 diligent. We finally close the investigation, and 
 the state of our understandings in relation to the 
 subject examined (on the supposition that the pro- 
 cess has been conducted in the manner described) 
 is obviously the unavoidable and involuntary result : 
 that is, it is the necessary result of an investigation 
 entered into because it was our duty to enter into 
 it, and conducted throughout in the manner our 
 duty prescribed. That this result should be a 
 given, a pre-ordained result, cannot therefore be a 
 duty. 
 
 It would be an extraordinary thing indeed for 
 any one to say to us, " it is your duty to inquire 
 into this doctrine and to conduct the examination 
 with strict fairness and integrity ; but although you 
 do all this, unless your examination terminate in a 
 belief of the doctrine, you will be morally culpable. " 
 
64 DUTIES OF MANKIND IN 
 
 It will probably be objected, "your culpability 
 arises from this, that you did not do all in your 
 power to believe the doctrine." Do all in our 
 power to believe? Why should we? On what 
 grounds of duty ? Previous to examination the doc- 
 trine is not to us a truth, it is merely a proposition 
 offered to our scrutiny : why then should we wish 
 to believe it, or do all in our power to believe it? 
 The proper wish on such an occasion, as we have 
 seen, is not to find any proposition true, but to find 
 the truth ; and in regard to doing all in our power 
 to believe, if this implies, as it obviously does, pay- 
 ing more attention to the considerations on one side 
 of the question than those on the other, it would be 
 a positive violation of duty, an infraction of that 
 rigid impartiality which has already been estab- 
 lished as an imperative obligation. 
 
 But the objector replies, "you have suffered 
 your passions to interfere, it is perversity of heart 
 and malignity of disposition, which have rendered 
 propositions incredible to you that have been ad- 
 mitted by others." If this accusation is meant to 
 apply to the manner in which we have designedly 
 treated the evidence, then as by the supposition we 
 have conducted the examination with fairness and 
 diligence, it is manifestly out of place. But if the 
 intention of it is to charge us with being possessed 
 by passions, which have involuntarily on our parts 
 exaggerated some portions of the evidence and 
 
THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 65 
 
 weakened others, and thus led to erroneous con- 
 clusions, we reply: 1. This is a mere gratuitous 
 assumption. 2. It is at all events an involuntary 
 error which is charged upon us. 3. Since by the 
 supposition we have conducted the examination 
 with perfect fairness, notwithstanding our suffering 
 under these passions, the greater is our merit. 4. 
 The circumstance of having conducted it fairly 
 ought to be received in the absence of all other 
 evidence, as conclusive proof that no such passions 
 have prevailed. 5. As we have just the same 
 grounds for throwing such an imputation on our 
 opponent, we may with equal fairness suppose, that 
 in forming an opinion different from ours, he has 
 been influenced by some of these reprehensible 
 passions. 
 
 At this point the objector will probably say, 
 " you have made suppositions which I cannot al- 
 low ; you have supposed that an investigation may 
 be conducted with fulness, fairness, and impar- 
 tiality, and not end in the preordained result, in 
 the prescribed opinion : now this I deny. If the 
 investigation had been diligently and fairly prose- 
 cuted, there is only one opinion in which it could 
 have ended. That it has terminated differently is 
 a full proof of some vice in the process. 1 " 
 
 This we believe is a correct representation of 
 what passes in the minds of those who condemn 
 others as morally culpable for their opinions. Ta- 
 6* 
 
66 DUTIES OF MANKIND IN 
 
 citly assuming themselves to be unerringly in the 
 right, they conclude that others could not have dif- 
 fered from them had they fairly examined. 
 
 To an objector of this class it is easy to answer: 
 11 we might with equal fairness and propriety charge 
 the same vice upon you. What reason can you 
 have for maintaining that all fair and diligent ex- 
 amination must end in the belief of your opinion, 
 which we may not have for asserting the same thing 
 in favour of our own ?" 
 
 He may possibly reply, " The reasons for my 
 opinion are superlatively strong. I cannot con- 
 ceive it possible that any one who candidly ex- 
 amines can resist them; they have convinced the 
 best and greatest minds ; they have never been 
 refuted." 
 
 We answer, " all these phrases are only expressions 
 of the strength of your own conviction. As to the 
 reasons for your opinion, we have examined them, 
 and they appear to us outweighed by opposite con- 
 siderations. Your conviction of their force is not 
 greater than that which we entertain of the strength 
 of the arguments on our side of the question. Our 
 opinion, too, has been held by men of powerful 
 minds ; and if it had not, there is nothing in the 
 circumstance of powerful minds having held an 
 opinion which can possibly strengthen the direct 
 evidence in its favour to one who examines it. To 
 one w r ho does not examine, authority may be a 
 
THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 67 
 
 valid argument ; to one who does, authority in op- 
 position to his own views is nothing but an in- 
 ducement to examine more closely, to suspect 
 unperceived fallacies, to seek for additional evi- 
 dence, to review all his own inferences, and try 
 every part of the chain which connects them with 
 acknowledged premises. You will perceive there- 
 fore that we have as great a right to adopt the lan- 
 guage of infallibility as you have." 
 
 The proceeding of such an objector as we have 
 here supposed is nothing more or less than making 
 the coincidence or discrepancy of the opinion of 
 any inquirer with his own opinion, the criterion 
 whether the inquiry has been properly conducted. 
 
 This it is obvious can never be admissible. In 
 all arguments the disputants are to be placed on 
 equal terms ; nothing must be granted to one that 
 is not to another. If this sort of procedure were 
 conceded to any, it must be conceded to all, and it 
 is easy to see that all argument would be at an end. 
 But the good sense of mankind, with a happy in- 
 consistency, often saves them from the legitimate 
 consequences of their own principles. While every 
 one might arrogate such a privilege to himself, he 
 would see the folly of a claim to it on the part of 
 another. 
 
 Were we asked what criterion then we would 
 propose of fairness and unfairness in the process of 
 investigation, we answer that there are two sets of 
 
68 DUTIES OF MANKIND IN 
 
 circumstances by which we may guide our judg- 
 ment on that point. First, we may form a general 
 presumption from a man's known personal qualities 
 and habits. We may, for example, fairly presume, 
 that by a man of strict integrity in other matters, no 
 wilful partiality has been exercised in the examina- 
 tion of any question which he has been called to 
 investigate. In the absence of express evidence 
 to the contrary, this would be the only just infer- 
 ence. A man's personal qualities and habits, how- 
 ever, are known only to a few, and even when 
 known they cannot be considered as specific evi- 
 dence of particular facts. We have much more 
 exact grounds for deciding on the fairness or un- 
 fairness of his investigations in the second set of 
 circumstances referred to, namely, the qualities 
 which he actually exhibits in producing his opin- 
 nions to the world. Diligence, candour, upright- 
 ness, impartiality on the one hand, and indolence, 
 disingenuousness, unfairness on the other, are quali- 
 ties which belong as well to the mode of stating to 
 others the evidence and arguments on any subject, 
 as to the mode of conducting inquiry, and reveal 
 the character of those efforts which have been 
 made in the secresy and silence of the closet. 
 From the opinion of any one barely expressed, we 
 can learn nothing of the process by which it has 
 been formed ; but let him produce his arguments, 
 his authorities, his moral sentiments, and he fur- 
 
THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 69 
 
 rushes us with sufficient data to decide on his fair- 
 ness and integrity : at least we have no concern 
 with the course of application in which his opinion 
 has originated, except so far as these data betray it. 
 
 The qualities we have enumerated are often as 
 distinctly displayed in a man's compositions or con- 
 versation, as they are in any part of his conduct. 
 Who can mistake the language of sincerity and sin- 
 gleness of purpose, for that of interestedness and 
 duplicity ? who the colourings and exaggerations of 
 party pleading for the honest exposition of the in- 
 quirer after truth ? 
 
 Some one has sarcastically said, that language 
 was given to man to conceal his thoughts. In vain, 
 however, would he employ it to conceal his moral 
 qualities. 
 
 In any long tissue of sentiment and reasoning, the 
 real properties of the mind will manifest themselves. 
 It is as impossible for the mean, hypocritical, servile 
 spirit to assume through any long investigation the 
 moral carriage of the liberal, the candid, the upright, 
 the noble, as to produce in itself the feelings by 
 which they are animated. The greatest art will not 
 suffice to suppress certain infallible symptoms of 
 what lurks beneath the surface, while it will be 
 totally incapable of producing, because utterly un- 
 conscious of many other indications, universally 
 attending the qualities which command our esteem 
 and admiration. He who takes up his pen for the 
 
70 DUTIES OF MANKIND, &C. 
 
 gratification of an unworthy passion, spleen, hatred, 
 revenge, or whatever it may be, may rest assured 
 that the chances are ten thousand to one against a 
 successful concealment of his actuating principle. 
 
 Of all the faults which authors and teachers 
 commit in their controversies, perhaps none de- 
 serves exposure more than the practice of pro- 
 nouncing on a man's fairness, good feeling, and integ- 
 rity, not from the usual indications of those qualities, 
 but from the nature of the conclusions at which he 
 has arrived. Neglecting all the various causes which 
 inevitably generate differences of opinion, and which 
 fully and satisfactorily account for the widest dis- 
 crepancies that exist, they can find nothing to which 
 they can ascribe a deviation from their own tenets, 
 but perversity of heart or malignity of purpose, and 
 the sole evidence they look for of these criminal 
 dispositions is that difference of opinion itself. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE INSTITUTIONS AND PRAC- 
 TICES OF SOCIETY ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 
 
 Having examined the states of mind favourable 
 and unfavourable to the success of inquiry, and in- 
 vestigated the conduct which it becomes the inquirer 
 to pursue, we may now proceed to the examination 
 of such practices and institutions in society as have 
 a tendency to beget those states of mind, and to in- 
 fluence that conduct. 
 
 Were we to imagine a system the most favoura- 
 ble to the pursuit of truth, it w r ould of course be 
 one by which no partialities or antipathies were 
 created, and no inducements held out to an inade- 
 quate or unfair examination ; a system, in short, 
 which left conclusions or doctrines unnoticed, and 
 if it interfered at all, extended its encouragement to 
 enterprise in undertaking, and diligence and fairness 
 in conducting investigation. If a simple wish to 
 arrive at correct conclusions is the proper state of 
 mind in which to enter upon any subject, and a 
 strictly impartial attention to the conflicting evi- 
 dence the proper conduct to be pursued during the 
 
72 INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
 examination, every practice or institution in society 
 which creates other wishes, and offers inducements 
 to pursue a different conduct, must be pronounced 
 inimical to the attainment of truth. 
 
 Amongst these we must rank institutions bestow- 
 ing emolument on individuals, with the stipulation 
 that they teach certain doctrines definitively pre- 
 scribed. It must be acknowledged, that institutions 
 of this character are likely to have great influence 
 over the moral and intellectual condition and con- 
 duct of those who come within their sphere. He who 
 enters into them has no choice as to what he shall 
 teach. He must either conform to the prescribed 
 doctrines, or quit his station and give up the emolu- 
 ment. At the outset he either believes or disbelieves 
 the doctrines. If he believes them, he has cogent 
 motives for abstaining from all examination of their 
 validity ; at least from any fair and candid examina- 
 tion of the objections brought against them. The 
 indolence of mind engendered by the perfect coin- 
 cidence of his opinions and his interest disposes him 
 to shun an intellectual effort, which could not have 
 a happier result than the conclusion in which he is 
 already at his ease ; and the apprehension of the 
 bare possibility of a different result operates equally 
 to deter him fromt he enterprise. Every consider- 
 ation presented by the circumstances in which he 
 is placed suggests, that his exertions should be 
 restricted to an inquiry after more striking and 
 
ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 73 
 
 ingenious arguments in support of the opinions 
 which he is at present fortunate enough to hold. 
 
 If on the other hand he does not believe the doc- 
 trines which he has undertaken to profess and ex- 
 pound, he will have equally strong reasons to keep 
 him from a full and impartial inquiry into their 
 truth. To escape the degradation of inculcating 
 on others doctrines which he disbelieves himself, he 
 will apply all his attention to the evidence in their 
 favour: all his diligence, his talent, his ingenuity, 
 will be exerted to magnify the arguments that he 
 wishes to find conclusive ; all his care will be em- 
 ployed to keep his mind from the operation of 
 antagonist considerations. 
 
 A man in either of the situations described, can 
 hardly be expected to be possessed with a wish to 
 arrive at the truth, whatever it may be. It is the 
 natural tendency of his position to destroy this wish 
 in the most candid and impartial mind, and to sub- 
 stitute in its place the desire to attain or strengthen 
 a conviction of the prescribed doctrines. The con- 
 sequences of arriving at results inconsistent with 
 them are too fearful for him to contemplate, and he 
 will therefore venture on no course of which he 
 does not see a probable termination in their fa- 
 vour. 
 
 If there is any regularity in the motives which 
 operate on the human mind, we may safely pro- 
 nounce that this will be found the tendency of such 
 7 
 
74 INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
 institutions. There may be other reasons why they 
 should be supported ; they may be fraught in other 
 ways with advantages so ample and decided as to 
 overbalance the evil now ascribed to them ; they 
 may be essential to the preservation of religion, of 
 the state, of morals, of decorum, of civilization : 
 into these imputed benefits we do not inquire ; we 
 regard the institutions singly in the point of view 
 relating to our subject ; and it cannot be denied, 
 that how great soever may be their other advan- 
 tages, they have this particular tendency to beget a 
 state of mind and a course of conduct, different 
 from those which the tenor of the preceding part 
 of this treatise has shown to be required by the in- 
 terests of mankind and the obligations of morality. 
 Truth itself demands that this tendency should be 
 fully stated and understood. 
 
 The annexation of any advantage whatever, 
 whether by positive institution or by the habits of 
 the community, to any particular opinions, has the 
 same effects as that of pecuniary emolument. Eli- 
 gibility to. honours, the esteem of friends, reputation 
 in society, and other benefits accruing from the pro- 
 fession of certain opinions, operate in the same way 
 as inducements to negligent and impartial treatment 
 of evidence. The case we have taken may be 
 considered as the representative of all, and re- 
 lieves us from the necessity of entering on further 
 detail. 
 
ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 75" 
 
 But these institutions have also a further effect, 
 besides their direct influence over the minds of the 
 parties as already described. Men seeing the ad- 
 vantages of holding these doctrines, and some of 
 them feeling perhaps the evils of disbelieving them, 
 are particularly careful to instil them into the minds 
 of their children, that their descendants may fully 
 possess the firm conviction which removes so many 
 obstacles from the career of fame and fortune. 
 
 This remark brings us to the consideration of a 
 practice described by Locke under the appellation 
 of principling the minds of children; the practice 
 of instilling certain doctrines into their minds with- 
 out teaching them the duty of examination ; and 
 even of connecting the idea of guilt with any doubt 
 or departure from the opinions prescribed. 
 
 " There is, 11 says Locke, " I know, a great fault 
 among all sorts of people of principling their child- 
 ren and scholars ; which at last, when looked into, 
 amounts to no more, but making them imbibe their 
 teacher's notions and tenets by an implicit faith, 
 and firmly to adhere to them whether true or false. 
 What colours may be given to this, or of what use 
 it may be when practised upon the vulgar destined 
 to labour, and given up to the service of their bel- 
 lies, I will not here inquire. But as to the inge- 
 nuous part of mankind, whose condition allows 
 them leisure, and letters, and inquiry after truth, 1 
 can see no other right way of principling them, but 
 
-76 INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
 to take heed, as much as may be, that in their ten- 
 der years, ideas, that have no natural cohesion, 
 come not to be united in their heads, and that this 
 rule be often inculcated to them to be their guide 
 in the whole course of their lives and studies, viz. 
 that they never suffer any ideas to be joined in their 
 understandings, in any other or stronger combina- 
 tion than what their own nature and correspondence 
 give them ; and that they often examine those that 
 they find linked together in their, minds ; whether 
 this association of ideas be from the visible agree- 
 ment that is in the ideas themselves, or from the 
 habitual and prevailing custom of the mind joining 
 them thus together in thinking."* 
 
 In treating of this topic we shall also confine our- 
 selves to the point of view immediately relating to 
 our subject. Our purpose is to show the effects of 
 th6 institutions and practices of society on the de- 
 sire after truth and the mode of investigation ; and 
 no one will surely deny, that if the minds of child- 
 ren are strongly imbued with particular doctrines, 
 if they are taught to believe that to doubt such doc- 
 trines is a crime, if they are commanded to receive 
 them as positive and incontrovertible truths of 
 which no question is to be entertained, if they grow 
 up therefore unaccustomed to examination, the ef- 
 fect must be a state of mind as remote as possible 
 
 * Conduct of the Understanding, sec. 41. 
 
ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 77 
 
 from a fearless and ardent desire after truth, and a 
 conduct in regard to investigation in which we shall 
 vainly look for diligence and impartiality. 
 
 It may be urged, indeed, that instilling doctrines 
 into the minds of children is unavoidable ; that they 
 must necessarily learn many things the reasons of 
 which they cannot understand, and take many things 
 on trust because incapable of appreciating the evi- 
 dence on which they rest. All this is readily al- 
 lowed. Many things must be taught them for which 
 they can for a while have no other authority than 
 the teacher ; but if we really wish to produce in 
 them a love of truth, a desire after knowledge, a 
 spirit of candour, and that integrity of mind which 
 will best preserve them from error, nothing must 
 be taught them as a doctrine which it is their duty 
 to believe, and of which it is a crime to doubt. All 
 the instruction given them should be accompanied 
 with inducements to exert their own faculties, to 
 seek for reasons of what is asserted. They should 
 be rescued from the mere passive adoption of what 
 is proposed to them by authority, and trained to 
 the habit of drawing their own inferences. All the 
 reverence which they are commonly educated to 
 feel for particular doctrines and authorities, they 
 should be taught to feel for truth itself, and for 
 honesty of investigation. It is under such a disci- 
 pline that we should expect to see minds of integrity 
 arise which would be blessings to the world. 
 7* 
 
78 INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
 One other practice in society remains to be 
 noticed, which must necessarily have an evil effect 
 on the spirit and conduct of investigation ; namely, 
 the practice of persecution for opinions, that eternal 
 blot on the reputation of humanity. It might be 
 expected, perhaps, that as rewards encourage a 
 partial attention to evidence in favour of those 
 doctrines for the profession of which they are be- 
 stowed, the opposite treatment, persecution, would 
 have the effect of inducing mankind to shun the 
 persecuted doctrines and the arguments in their 
 favour. And it no doubt happens, that the lovers 
 of peace and quietness, who do not greatly concern 
 themselves about any opinions so long as their 
 ordinary course of life is suffered to run smoothly, 
 may be deterred by a fear of painful consequences 
 from any attention to doctrines which can bring 
 only danger and discredit on their votaries. But in 
 general the effect is the reverse, and especially on 
 the party who actually suffers in his own person. 
 His passions are roused against his oppressors, and 
 instead of seeking for what is true, his whole soul 
 is bent on detecting the errors of his antagonists, 
 and providing himself with every possible argument 
 on his own side. He grasps not at truth, but at the 
 means, whatever they may be, of self defence, and 
 at the power of annoyance. Thus punishment in 
 fact, like rewards, although in a different way, brings 
 
ON THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. 79 
 
 the mind into a state far from being favourable to 
 impartiality of investigation. 
 
 This is true even of that minor species of per- 
 secution, which consists in debarring dissentients 
 from certain rights and privileges, or exacting de- 
 clarations of faith. Many find themselves from 
 rank, or birth, or station, in this vexatious position 
 in society ; and the irritation which it produces, 
 the sense of injustice which they feel, has a ten- 
 dency to sharpen their perspicacity to all the 
 arguments of their own party, and to the weak 
 points of the system which degrades itself by an- 
 noying them with needless disabilities and injurious 
 exactions. 
 
 In whatever light persecution is considered, it 
 shows itself a compound of folly and wickedness. 
 Besides the direct misery which it inflicts on society, 
 we see from this representation that it has the effect 
 of putting the mind into an unfavourable state for 
 the perception of truth; and even defeats its own 
 object, inasmuch as it strengthens the conviction of 
 those opinions against which it is directed. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ON THE SPIRIT IN WHICH WE OUGHT TO COMMUNICATE 
 AND RECEIVE THE RESULTS OF INQUIRY. 
 
 We have now considered the importance of 
 searching for truth, the states of mind favourable 
 and unfavourable to the success of inquiry, the 
 prejudices opposed to it, on whom the duty of 
 investigation devolves, what is the conduct incum- 
 bent on them during the process, and lastly the 
 influence of the institutions and practices of society 
 on this momentous pursuit. 
 
 The subject however is not yet exhausted. There 
 are other duties involved in the pursuit of truth, 
 which are equally worth our attention. 
 
 When we have exerted our utmost vigour of in- 
 tellect, examined all sides of a question with impar- 
 tiality, and attained a satisfactory conclusion clearly 
 deduced from undeniable premises ; in a word, 
 when we have fully discharged the duties incum- 
 bent on us during the process of inquiry, there are 
 still important offices which we may be called on 
 to perform : we may be required to communicate 
 the results of our investigation to others, and we 
 
THE RESULTS OF INQUIRY. 81 
 
 may also have to receive from others the results of 
 investigations in which they have been engaged. It 
 is worth while to examine what is the proper spirit, 
 in which to do both the one and the other. 
 
 One who has taken due pains to master a subject, 
 who feels persuaded that he can present it in a new 
 light, and who is not destitute of the obvious qua- 
 lifications for the task, is under an obligation to 
 communicate his views to his fellow-creatures. 
 Not to do it, if the matter were of importance, 
 would be reprehensible selfishness; it could be 
 only to avoid trouble, or shrink from responsibility, 
 or maintain a solitary superiority over the rest of 
 the world. 
 
 It is true, he may be deceived in his estimate of 
 his own achievements ; an exaggerated opinion of 
 the value of what we ourselves accomplish, is 
 perhaps inseparable from human nature ; but if he 
 has taken due pains, and is actuated by a proper 
 spirit, his conduct is entitled to approbation. By 
 communicating the result of his inquiries, he may 
 possibly too be instrumental in promulgating error; 
 his views may wander widely from the truth, and 
 he may lead many astray by the same illusive rea- 
 soning which has deceived his own mind. These 
 are things, which, according to the constitution of 
 man and the present state of society, cannot be 
 avoided. Even in this case, nevertheless, he is 
 doing good. His errors are such as have, with 
 
82 COMMUNICATING AND RECEIVING 
 
 more or less distinctness, presented themselves to 
 other minds as truths. To bring them openly for- 
 ward, with the premises from which they are de- 
 duced, and the train of reasoning by which they 
 have established themselves as truths in his own 
 understanding, is giving them the best chance of 
 being refuted, and refuted in so full and luminous a 
 manner, that their real character will be conspicu- 
 ous to every future inquirer. 
 
 Had they been kept back, had they and the 
 arguments in their support not been openly pro- 
 duced, they would have continued to haunt other 
 minds, to delude other understandings, and create 
 those casual and vague disputes, which are perpe- 
 tually arising when a question has not been tho- 
 roughly canvassed. 
 
 While therefore he deserves the execration of 
 mankind who knowingly promulgates falsehood, 
 and of course has the purpose of deceiving ; an 
 opposite sentiment is due to the man, who, w T ith 
 upright intentions, and after adequate examination, 
 is unfortunate enough to be the unconscious instru- 
 ment of disseminating error. To such a misfortune 
 all men are liable, and this liability imposes on them 
 the duty of communicating their opinions in a spirit 
 of candour and liberality. In danger, with the ut- 
 most circumspection, of falling into mistakes, it 
 becomes them to evince ^n entire openness to cor- 
 rection, a willingness to listen to opposite sugges- 
 
THE RESULTS OF INQUIRY. 83 
 
 tions, a readiness to review their most cautious 
 conclusions, and a perpetual sense of their own fal- 
 libility. They should endeavour, too, to separate 
 the consideration of their own reputation from the 
 cause of truth. 
 
 A man who communicates his views to the world, 
 . is, or ought to be, an inquirer after truth, and it is 
 of little importance to him in that character, when 
 a mistake has been committed and detected, which 
 part of the process is his. That an error has been 
 cleared up, that a truth has been discovered, should 
 occasion too much pleasure to his mind to permit 
 it to dwell long on the personal consideration of 
 the agency through which it has been accomplished. 
 
 This openness to conviction nevertheless is per- 
 fectly consistent with a severe examination of all 
 opposite allegations, and a free exposure of antago- 
 nist sophistry. Let him reply, retort, return the 
 scrutiny of his opponents, and especially expose any 
 unfairness or malevolence which may characterise 
 their opposition ; but let him at the same time 
 cheerfully acknowledge any error of which he may 
 be convicted; let him pay the most scrutinizing 
 attention to hostile criticism, not to find out merely 
 how to reply to it, but how far it is fairly applicable. 
 
 Were we to imagine a being, who, while he was 
 free from the moral weaknesses of human nature, 
 was still subject to its intellectual fallibility ; the 
 following is the kind of language we should expect 
 
84 COMMUNICATING AND RECEIVING 
 
 to hear from him, on his giving to the public the 
 result of any investigations in which he had been 
 employed. 
 
 " In communicating these speculations to the 
 world, I do it under a full sense of my liability to 
 error, and of the chances that I have fallen into 
 many mistakes, notwithstanding the patient thought 
 which 1 have bestowed on the subject, and the va- 
 rious means I have employed to ensure correctness. 
 Future philosophers, I am aware, will see in a much 
 clearer light the truths here developed, and will 
 present them in a much more lucid and convincing 
 order; divested too of the inaccuracies which sur- 
 round them in my pages. These inaccuracies I 
 have not the slightest wish to see spared. So far 
 from desiring any one to forbear pointing out errors 
 in my reasoning, 1 shall feel greatly indebted to him 
 for the correction of a fallacy. One of the ends 
 which I seek to accomplish by laying these specu- 
 lations before the public, is to avail myself of the 
 instruction arising out of the different views which 
 different minds take of the same subject. And not 
 only will any one confer a real benefit on me by 
 dissipating my errors, but he will prevent my specu- 
 lations from spreading erroneous opinions among 
 mankind, and counteracting any advantages which 
 might result from such of them as are well-founded. 
 Nothing can be more abhorrent to the feelings of a 
 man of upright mind, than that errors should be 
 
THE RESULTS OF INQUIRY. 85 
 
 perpetuated merely to preserve his reputation for 
 correctness, and save his vanity from mortification : 
 nothing therefore ought to be received with more 
 gratitude than an indication where those errors lie. 
 It at once enlightens his own mind, and saves him 
 from being the instrument of injury to his fellow 
 creatures, when he thought of doing them a service. 
 
 " On this point I have only one request to make, 
 that the existence of an error may be shown, not 
 merely asserted ; and that any fallacy in reasoning 
 may be directly pointed out, rather than met by 
 counter arguments drawn from different premises. 
 When any train of reasoning is fairly laid down 
 before us, if it involves an error, the fallacy may be 
 detected and exposed. For any such detection then 
 I shall be grateful. I am willing to review, to dis- 
 cuss, to analyze again any principle which I have 
 maintained, and should rejoice to emancipate my- 
 self from any illusion. 
 
 " Should any one intermix his exposure of my 
 errors with opprobrious language, it will be to his 
 own detriment and disgrace ; but it shall not prevent 
 me from taking advantage of his perspicacity to 
 clear my understanding from inaccurate concep- 
 tions. While I shall do my best to seize the truth 
 of his arguments, I shall also in the same spirit of 
 fairness endeavour to appreciate and exhibit in its 
 true colours, that unfortunate junction of malignancy 
 8 
 
86 COMMUNICATING AND RECEIVING 
 
 of disposition with intellectual power, of which he 
 has afforded the melancholy spectacle. 
 
 "If, on the other hand, the objections brought 
 against any of my doctrines appear to me, after the 
 fullest and fairest examination, to be unsound, I 
 shall not hesitate on my part to expose their cha- 
 racter. To this task I shall devote the utmost 
 acuteness of which I am master, and undertake as 
 close and severe an examination of their pretensions 
 as 1 should desire might be bestowed on my own. 
 
 " In a word r as truth is my object, I shall endea- 
 vour to find it by every means in my power, and 
 shall freely join in the exposure of error, whether 
 found in preceding writings, in my own productions, 
 or in those of my antagonists.'" 
 
 So much for the spirit with which a man should 
 communicate his views to the public ; and from 
 this representation may also be gathered the spirit 
 in which he ought to receive the communications 
 of others. 
 
 In the first place, it follows from the preceding 
 remarks, that some degree of good will and appro- 
 bation is due to every communication, which is 
 made after the requisite preparation and with up- 
 right intentions. 
 
 This sentiment of kindness, nevertheless, is not 
 to prevent a strict appreciation of merits and de- 
 fects. A man who presents his views to the world 
 
THE RESULTS OF INQUIRY. 87 
 
 is attempting to influence the minds of myriads of 
 human beings, and it becomes of importance that 
 these views should be put to the severest test which 
 human ingenuity can devise. It is for the benefit 
 of all that truth should prevail ; and that the merits 
 and defects, the strength and the weakness of a 
 work, whatever they really are, should be rendered 
 distinctly manifest As no upright man would wish 
 error to exist for his own private advantage in op- 
 position to the general good, so he ought not to 
 refrain from the exposure of it in the writings of 
 others, merely from a principle of humanity. If 
 the error is important, the duty of the occasion is 
 to point it out. True benevolence here consists in 
 counteracting a general evil, although at the ex- 
 pense of impairing individual happiness. 
 
 The whole duty on the subject indeed, may be 
 comprised in one word — -justice. This is what 
 every critic ought to give, and more than this a 
 man ought not to wish to receive. The general 
 presumption in favour of an author's intentions, in 
 the absence of all evidence to the contrary, should 
 obtain for him the courtesy due to a laudable at- 
 tempt, and secure him from all imputations of 
 bad motives, but not shield his speculations from 
 scrutiny. There is nothing incompatible between 
 thorough esteem for the moral and even intellec- 
 tual qualities of his mind, and a full conviction of 
 the inaccuracy of his views and the unsoundness of 
 
88 COMMUNICATING AND RECEIVING 
 
 his arguments ; — nothing inconsistent between re- 
 spect for the one and a free exposure of the other. 
 
 It will frequently happen, that not only errors 
 will be committed, which it will be requisite to ex- 
 pose, but various mental qualities will be exhibited 
 in the communication of opinions; — vanity, conceit, 
 affectation, prejudice, presumption, and other of- 
 fensive and ludicrous characteristics. There is no 
 good reason why these should not be set in their 
 true light. That every thing should appear to 
 every one what it really is, must ever be the inte- 
 rest of the majority of mankind. At the same time 
 it deserves to be remembered, that some errors 
 carry along with them their own refutation, and 
 some weaknesses furnish their own exposure, so 
 that neglect may be a not less efficacious although 
 a less painful remedy than censure. 
 
 The same justice which requires these errors 
 and weaknesses to be shown in their true charac- 
 ter, imposes on us the pleasanter duty of pointing 
 out excellences whenever they occur. To com- 
 mend just reasoning, felicitous illustration, candour, 
 fairness, modesty, and magnanimity, is equally de- 
 manded of us, as to expose and condemn qualities 
 of an opposite nature. Men do not always feel 
 that it is not sufficient to pass over these merito- 
 rious qualities in silence, — to intermit their vitu- 
 peration when they meet with them : something 
 more than this is required by the general good ; 
 
THE RESULTS OF INQUIRY. 89 
 
 just commendation is as useful as just censure, and 
 to withhold it is a fraud at once on the individual 
 and the public. 
 
 This is the more necessary to be insisted on, as 
 we frequently meet with men, rigid in the applica- 
 tion of principles, professing to bring every thing to 
 the standard of utility, and severe in their condem- 
 nation of all deviations from this rule, who appear 
 to think they have done every thing required of 
 them, when they have performed the task of repre- 
 hension. With a strong sense of vice and error, 
 they have no ardour for excellence ; prone to cen- 
 sure, they are without inclination to praise; alive 
 to deformity, they are insensible to beauty and ele- 
 gance. If they attempt to commend, it seems an 
 effort against their nature, resulting in imperfect 
 accents of abortive eulogy. 
 
 Conduct of this kind is reprehensible on their 
 own principles, it is equally important that excel- 
 lences should be duly appreciated, as that defects 
 should be placed in a true light. In this as in other 
 cases, we can have no better guide than the law of 
 truth. Let every thing be regarded and represented 
 exactly as it is : let vices be seen as vices, and let 
 virtues appear in their true character. If men see 
 clearly they can scarcely fail to feel correctly. 
 
 We contend for the commendation of merit, but 
 it requires no exaggerated praise. The simplest 
 statement of what has been accomplished is all to 
 
90 COMMUNICATING AND RECEIVING 
 
 which it needs to aspire, although it is not all which 
 a generous spirit is impatient to bestow. Noble- 
 ness of mind springs forward with ardour to meet 
 every indication of a similar nature wherever it 
 appears. There is no surer mark of the absence of 
 the highest moral and intellectual qualities, than a 
 cold reception of excellence. 
 
 Further, it will not escape the candid*mind, that 
 being ourselves liable to mistake, we may err both 
 in censure and applause. Were we infallible, we 
 might with equal fearlessness commit ourselves to a 
 description of both the merits and the defects of 
 any production offered to our scrutiny ; but prone 
 to err, we should recollect that errors of censure 
 are more certainly destructive of happiness than 
 errors of praise, and we therefore ought to be es- 
 pecially vigilant in investigating the grounds of our 
 decision before we pronounce an unfavourable sen- 
 tence. 
 
 Were these principles acted upon, every man 
 would have the proper inducement to keep back or 
 to bring forward the fruits of his researches. 
 
 Knowing that if he produced what was immature, 
 ridiculous, unsound, or fallacious, he must undergo 
 the ordeal of ridicule and refutation, he would be 
 cautious of obtruding what would do him no honour : 
 confident, on the other hand, that his merits would 
 be fairly appreciated, he would feel all that alert- 
 ness in his labours which naturally arises from the 
 
THE RESULTS OF INQUIRY. 91 
 
 conviction that we are making advances to a deter- 
 minate point : and lastly, assured that the decision 
 of his judges would be right, he would acquiesce in 
 it, even if unfavourable, without irritation and with- 
 out complaint, and with the satisfaction at least, 
 that he had made some progress in a knowledge of 
 his own capabilities. 
 
ESSAY 
 
 PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
ESSAY II 
 
 oy 
 
 THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 A. I am glad that we have disengaged ourselves 
 from the company, as 1 am not altogether satisfied 
 with the opinions you have been expressing on the 
 character and condition of mankind. They are too 
 disheartening. 
 
 N. Are they true? That is the only inquiry 
 worthy of a rational being. 
 
 A. When I say they are too disheartening, I 
 mean that they go beyond the truth in the low esti- 
 mate which they exhibit of human nature, in the 
 present day, I should hardly contest any opinions on 
 any other ground. 
 
 N. After all, what have 1 said ? I have said, and 
 I repeat, that when we look back into the history 
 of the human race, we can scarcely help feeling 
 ashamed that we belong to it. Man is an animal 
 in a very slight degree rational by nature. It seems 
 
96 ON THE JPROGRESS 
 
 to require ages upon ages to bring the race to any 
 thing like a state of reason — a state where preju- 
 dice and passion are subordinate to the understand- 
 ing, where man controls the blind impulse of the 
 present by a view of the future, and distinctly per- 
 ceives his relative position in the universe. It is 
 certain that mankind have hitherto never reached 
 such a state. Let any one look around him, and 
 what does he observe? A few minds perhaps 
 capable of raising themselves into the pure atmo- 
 sphere of truth, of emancipating themselves from 
 the domination of mere instinct, of expatiating 
 through the moral and material world with full 
 liberty of intellect, and of appreciating the exact 
 relation in which they stand to the existences 
 around them ; but the majority — nine hundred and 
 ninety-nine in a thousand — the slaves of prejudice 
 and the dupes of passion, inflicting misery upon 
 themselves and others from gross ignorance of the 
 real tendencies of action and the rational object of 
 existence ; shrinking from truth as from a spectre ; 
 frightened by imaginary terrors ; incapable of 
 pursuing more than one step of argument, yet 
 pertinacious in their own infallibility ; humbling 
 themselves in the dust as unworthy to approach 
 the God whom they tremble to think of, while they 
 confess his unbounded benevolence, yet assuming 
 their actions to be of such immense importance to 
 him as to require the discipline of eternity at his 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 97 
 
 hands. The meanness of men's reasoning powers 
 in general is almost incredible. Locke, if I mis- 
 take not, terms a man who can advance two steps 
 in reasoning a man of two syllogisms. There are 
 few such to be found. The majority of mankind 
 are men of one syllogism, or of less. The faculty of 
 taking two steps in reasoning without assistance — 
 leading strings — is rare: that of taking three be- 
 longs to one in an age. It stamps a man as the 
 wonder of his day. 
 
 A. Yet with these mean understandings, these 
 limited faculties, how much has the human race 
 accomplished? You must admit, that men in the 
 present day are superior, wonderfully superior, 
 in knowledge and wisdom to their progenitors 
 three thousand or even three hundred years ago ; 
 that they have discarded some methods of render- 
 ing themselves miserable, and opened anew fresh 
 springs of happiness. In a word, there has been 
 an advance in the discrimination of good and evil. 
 You will not contend that men are incapable of 
 progressive improvement, chained for ever like the 
 brutes to the circle of individual attainment, doom- 
 ed generation after generation to commence at one 
 point and to tread the same round. No ! human 
 improvement, thank God, admits of successive ad- 
 vances ; each generation starts from the ground at 
 which the last had expended its strength in arriv- 
 ing ; and I will venture to say, that this single cir- 
 
 9 
 
98 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 cumstance is sufficient to carry the race to a degree 
 of knowledge which it is impossible for us to con- 
 ceive. Oh ! that 1 could live to see the results of 
 another century of progression ! 
 
 N, The principle of the progressive improve- 
 ment of mankind, and the consequences resulting 
 from it, I acknowledge as well as yourself. It was 
 implied indeed in my assertion, that it required 
 ages upon ages to bring the race to any thing like 
 a state of rationality ; an assertion, which, while it 
 admits the tendency to improvement, certainly en- 
 courages no very sanguine expectations of the 
 rapidity of the progress. In our anticipations on 
 this point we differ. When I look back on the 
 past, or around me on the present, I cannot help 
 feeling convinced, that if men are to advance, as I 
 think they inevitably must, it will be by a very 
 slow march. There are a thousand obstacles in 
 the way. It is but a poor eulogy on human capa- 
 bilities, that mankind have been four or five thou- 
 sand years in attaining to their present partial and 
 imperfect civilization, which, extolled as it gene- 
 rally has been, is scarcely entitled to the appella- 
 tion of semi-barbarism. If we are to be guided by 
 experience, if we are to expect hereafter only what 
 we have found in the past, our anticipations of the 
 rapidity of future improvement will not be very 
 extravagant, 
 
 A. Consider the wars and disorders which have 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 99 
 
 heretofore constantly checked the career of civiliza- 
 tion. But for the madness of ambition, how far it 
 would have already advanced ! 
 
 N. These wars and disorders were the necessary 
 consequences of those narrow faculties, that inca- 
 pacity of reasoning, that blindness to their real in- 
 terests, which I charge on the human race. To 
 say in defence of human nature, that it would have 
 improved faster had not these things happened, is 
 only to affirm, that if it had been endowed with 
 superior sense, it would not have exhibited so much 
 folly. 
 
 A. There is one thing, however, which you must 
 allow to be much in favour of those anticipations 
 which look for a more rapid advance in future than 
 has hitherto been experienced — the invention of 
 printing. 
 
 N. That indeed is the noblest acquisition of 
 science : it is the impregnable fortress of civiliza- 
 tion ; no political changes, no physical vicissitudes, 
 no mutation short of the complete extinction of 
 mankind, can henceforth ever restore the empire 
 of the world to ignorance. But admitting all the 
 benefits of this invention, it is not in the nature of 
 the human mind to advance with rapidity. The 
 onward strides of improvement may be sure, but 
 they will be slow. Genius may burst away from 
 the steady march of the race, and penetrate into 
 regions which it will be the work of future gene- 
 
100 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 rations completely to explore ; but all its energy 
 will not suffice to drag on the main body faster 
 than the regular pace to which the nature of its 
 powers inevitably confine it. 
 
 A. You appear to forget, that as by the press the 
 cultivation of knowledge extends itself over greater 
 numbers, a greater portion of talent will be brought 
 out; prejudices will give way in a shorter time, 
 and improvements be adopted with less reluctance. 
 Consider how rapid has been the progress of 
 science within the last fifty years, compared with 
 an equal term during the middle ages. 
 
 N. Of physical science it is true. It labours 
 under a part only of those obstructions which im- 
 pede the science of human nature. Yet even here 
 we may mark several of those impediments which 
 doom the species to a tardy progression ; the dul- 
 ness and inertness of the faculties to discover truth, 
 the interests arrayed against its reception, the diffi- 
 culty of sundering the established bonds of mental 
 association. Besides, there is a puny sort of self- 
 love in every department of knowledge, which 
 desires the prevalence and stability of opinions be- 
 cause they are its opinions. It cannot find in its 
 heart to fancy itself at all in error. Instead of 
 wishing for the progress and spread of truth, how- 
 ever subversive of established doctrines, and that 
 mankind should be continually detecting their errors 
 and adding to their acquirements, instead of exult- 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 101 
 
 ing at the prospect which the future presents of 
 receding darkness and advancing light, this con- 
 temptible selfishness would have the world to stand 
 still for ever at the point which itself has attained, 
 and poises its own gratification against the compre- 
 hensive interests of mankind, its own shallow pre- 
 tensions against the growing science of the age, and 
 the intellect of myriads of unborn generations. It 
 would bind down all the great spirits which are yet 
 to advance the happiness and elevate the dignity of 
 man to its own blind dogmas and narrow sphere of 
 vision, and permit no other intellectual movement 
 in the world than an approximation to those opi- 
 nions which itself has chanced to adopt. 
 
 N. You are severe. 
 
 N. Severe ! Would it not exhaust the patience 
 of the meekest philosopher — a designation to which 
 1 have no pretensions — to see men who have pos- 
 sessed themselves of the established quantum of 
 information, constantly parading it as the ne plus 
 ultra of knowledge, and stifling or attempting to 
 stifle every symptom of improvement, lest their own 
 personal consequence should be scratched ? 
 
 A. I am perfectly aware of the extensive 
 prevalence of the feelings you describe, which 
 joined to the disinclination, perhaps disability, that 
 every man has to enter into trains of ideas totally 
 at variance with his habitual modes of thinking, 
 protract the reign of error even where interest is 
 
 9* 
 
102 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 not engaged in its support. The conduct of the 
 medical men in relation to Harvey's discovery is a 
 notorious instance in point. But these obstacles 
 give way. 
 
 N. True. Men die off; and they are succeeded 
 by others, whose minds are imbued with truer 
 principles, and who do not feel their reputation 
 pledged against improvement. This, however, is a 
 slow process. By your own showing, a prejudice 
 exposed as false can perish only with the generation 
 to which it adheres. A rapid advance truly, when 
 every step of improvement requires at least an age! 
 
 A. We have instances, nevertheless, in which 
 discoveries have met with a pretty general recep- 
 tion in their own times. Those of modern chemistry 
 for instance. 
 
 N. Yet Priestley could not part with the doctrine 
 of phlogiston. As he was a man who held his 
 opinions with less than common pertinacity, an 
 enquirer open to conviction to the day of his death — 
 not one of those who early in life packed up their 
 miserable stock of knowledge and label it complete — 
 his is a striking instance how tenaciously a theory 
 once received adheres to the understanding. 1 
 grant, however, that physical science advances more 
 rapidly, and disseminates its improvements with 
 more ease, than moral and political knowledge. It 
 would seem, that just in proportion as knowledge is 
 unimportant it meets with a readier reception. 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 103 
 
 A. Do you really intend to insinuate that che- 
 mistry, and the other physical sciences, are unim- 
 portant ? Call to mind the power which they have 
 given to man over nature — how well they have 
 answered to Lord Bacon's description of the rational 
 end of knowledge. 
 
 N. I do not call these pursuits unimportant, ex- 
 cept comparatively; but I maintain that they are 
 incalculably inferior in their effects upon human 
 happiness to those sciences which explore the 
 nature of man and the tendencies of action, and 
 which in the present day, notwithstanding the 
 circumstances which force them in some de- 
 gree on general reflection, are disgracefully ne- 
 glected. 
 
 A. Not at all. The science of political economy 
 has surely received its due share of attention. 
 Some of the first intellects of modern times have 
 fixed their grasp upon it. 
 
 N. True. This is an exception, a glorious ex- 
 ception ; and if any thing could render me more 
 sanguine in my anticipations of political melioration, 
 it would be the progress of this science, the irresis- 
 tible manner in which it has insinuated itself into 
 our councils and moulded our policy. Twenty or 
 thirty years ago the doctrines of Adam Smith were 
 apparently a dead letter; his book was considered 
 by that sapient race, the practical men, as full of 
 Utopian dreams. Pitt did not fully comprehend it, 
 
104 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 and Fox declared it past understanding.* A first- 
 rate statesman in the present day would be scouted 
 for equal ignorance. The prevalence of this sci- 
 ence will do good. Its severe logic, its rigorous 
 requisitions to keep in view the meaning of terms, 
 the beautiful dependence of its long series of pro- 
 positions, will accustom men to think with more 
 accuracy and precision, while they render it even a 
 delightful exercise for a masculine understanding. 
 It is a lever which will move the world. 
 
 A. We have here then an instance in which a 
 science, and that not a physical science, has ad- 
 vanced with considerable rapidity. 
 
 N. Pardon me. Political economy is itself a 
 proof that the dissemination of new truths is restrict- 
 ed by the nature of the human mind to what I may 
 venture to term a very moderate rate. It was neces- 
 sary that the contemporaries of Adam Smith should 
 be succeeded by another generation before his doc- 
 trines could prevail. 
 
 A. What will you say, however, to the improve- 
 ments of Malthus, Say, Ricardo, and others ? These 
 have been generally, if not universally, admitted by 
 their contemporaries. 
 
 N. Where is your proof? Not to enter into the 
 
 * Mr. Butler in his Reminiscences tells us, that Mr. Fox 
 confessed he had never read the Wealth of Nations, adding, 
 u there is something in all these subjects which passes my 
 comprehension ; something so wide, that I could never embrace 
 them myself, or find any one who did."— Vol. i. p. 187. 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 105 
 
 question, whether the writings of these authors con- 
 tain any valuable discoveries, I will venture to as- 
 sert, that the number of people, who fully understand 
 the true nature of any improvements which have 
 been introduced into the science since the days of 
 Adam Smith, scarcely amounts to a few hundreds. 
 No ! we must all die before these things can be 
 generally understood. To comprehend them be- 
 longs not to our age. 
 
 A. It is my turn to ask for proof. 
 
 N. I refer you to the Reviews. How few of the 
 reviewers of Mr. Malthus, M. Say, or Mr. Ricardo 
 have ventured to grapple with their doctrines ! To 
 enter into reasonings of this kind is a tasking of the 
 intellect to which few writers can submit, and which 
 would scarcely promote the popularity of a periodi- 
 cal work. I refer you to the house of commons. 
 Of the number of those who are nightly employed 
 in the discussion of economical topics, how many 
 are there fully in possession of even the acknow- 
 ledged principles of the subject ? 
 
 A. Neither the Reviews, nor the house of com- 
 mons, can be reasonably expected to be in the very 
 van of a difficult science, although doubtless splen- 
 did exceptions might be named. But to return to 
 your assertion respecting the slow advance of the 
 science of man, I am disposed to think it more 
 rapid than you are willing to allow, and that the 
 contrary opinion on your part arises from the few 
 
106 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 changes which have appeared in our civil and po- 
 litical institutions. Now it is very possible that 
 knowledge on a particular subject may have been 
 making a great progress for years, and yet not have 
 manifested itself in the modification of existing in- 
 stitutions. Nay, this seems absolutely necessary : 
 for, before any effects can appear in practice, it is 
 requisite, in the first place, that the discoveries 
 should have been made ; and, secondly, that they 
 should have been familiarized by dissemination. 
 Hence it is not fair to measure the progress of a 
 science at any given period by its practical results. 
 
 N. I concede some weight to your remarks. But 
 what examples would you select of improvements 
 in moral and political science apart from practice? 
 
 A. After political economy, which we have al- 
 ready considered, I should adduce legislation, mo- 
 ral and intellectual philosophy generally, and the 
 philosophy of physical inquiry in particular, and 
 also the theory of language. 
 
 N. 1 see whom you are aiming at. You doubt- 
 less have in your eye Bentham, Dr. Thomas Brown, 
 Home Tooke, and a few others. 
 
 A. You might have guessed more widely of the 
 truth. I hesitate not to express my conviction, 
 that these writers have made important advances 
 in their several pursuits. I know the reluctance with 
 which their claims are admitted, but 1 suspect that 
 few have taken the trouble to understand their w r orks. 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 107 
 
 N. So! You are coming round I perceive to my 
 opinion ; for you must acknowledge, that if few 
 have taken the trouble to understand writers of this 
 class and character, the rate at which their dis- 
 coveries are propagated must be very tardy. Be- 
 lieve me, my dear sir, these men belong to the next 
 age. The truths, which they have promulgated, 
 must be familiarized in elementary treatises, taught 
 in the schools, wrought into our lighter literature, 
 and instilled into the minds of another 'generation 
 before they can be generally received. It is a com- 
 mon error to consider the achievements of a few 
 great minds as indicative of the state of civilization 
 to which the community at large has attained. 
 Men of genius leave their contemporaries a cen- 
 tury behind. There is an eloquent passage in a 
 writer of some celebrity so much to the point, that 
 1 must beg to quote it in illustration of my views. 
 " We cannot help remarking," says he, " what a 
 deception we suffer to pass on us from history. It 
 celebrates some period in a nation's career as pre- 
 eminently illustrious for magnanimity, lofty enter- 
 prise, literature, and original genius. There was 
 perhaps a learned and vigorous monarch, and there 
 were Cecils and Walsinghams, and Shakespeares 
 and Spensers, and Sidneys and Raleighs, with many 
 other powerful thinkers and actors, to render it the 
 proudest age of our national glory. And we thought- 
 lessly admit on our imagination this splendid exhi- 
 
108 PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 bition as representing, in some indistinct manner, 
 the collective state of the people in that age. The 
 ethereal summits of a tract of the moral world are 
 conspicuous and fair in the lustre of heaven, and 
 we take no thought of the immensely greater pro- 
 portion of it which is sunk in gloom and covered 
 with fogs. The general mass of the population, 
 whose physical vigour, indeed, and courage, and 
 fidelity to the interests of the country, were of such 
 admirable avail to the purposes, and under the direc- 
 tion of the mighty spirits that wielded their rough 
 agency; this great mass was sunk in such mental bar- 
 barism, as to be placed at about the same distance 
 from their illustrious intellectual chiefs, as the hordes 
 of Scythia from the most elevated minds of Athens. n * 
 
 A. A noble passage, eloquent in language and 
 felicitous in illustration : but you surely do not 
 regard it as applicable to modern times? 
 
 N. I look upon it as a pretty faithful picture of 
 the state of things in the present day. He who, 
 not content with imposing reports and statistical 
 results, comes into actual contact with the real 
 body of the people, will find an immeasurable differ- 
 ence between the average of their intelligence and 
 the luminous and comprehensive views which fill the 
 eye of a Bentham or a Brown, or any other man of 
 genius whose name may be employed to mark the 
 farthest point of intellectual progression. 
 
 * Essay on Popular Ignorance, by John Foster, p. 71. 
 
ON 
 
 THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 N. Jt appears to me, that in our last conversation 
 on the progressive improvement of mankind, we 
 differed only in regard to its rapidity, you contend- 
 ing for a much quicker progress than I am disposed 
 to anticipate. The difference between us, how- 
 ever, scarcely affects any of the important conse- 
 quences flowing from the general principle. 
 
 A. Your arguments, although forcibly urged, by 
 no means shook the previous conviction of my 
 mind ; but what are the consequences to which you 
 particularly allude ? 
 
 N. The most cursory glance at the subject is suf- 
 ficient to suggest a thousand valuable inferences, 
 some of them widely at variance with prevalent 
 opinions. For instance, if all kinds of knowledge 
 necessarily improve, it is vain to look for the sound- 
 est principles, the deepest insight into nature, in 
 our older writers. 
 
 A. That is a conclusion which is certainly little 
 10 
 
110 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 accordant with the theories of the day. Even I, 
 sanguine as I am of the future, should hesitate to 
 accede to it. 
 
 N. The ground of this prepossession in favour of 
 old writers is evidently a false analogy, which Lord 
 Bacon has well exposed. In every subject which 
 admits of an accession of knowledge, the best wri- 
 ters must be in time superseded. To a later age 
 they must often appear tedious, wasting their pow- 
 ers on trifles, attempting formally to establish what 
 is obviously absurd or what no one disputes, or task- 
 ing their strength in the prolix exposure of fallacies, 
 the true character of which may now be shown in 
 a few sentences. Such works after a certain period 
 are consulted only on account of their reputation, 
 for their style, or for the pleasure of tracking the 
 steps of a great mind. The works of Bacon and 
 Locke are already becoming instances in point. 
 They are more talked of than read ; and if you will 
 pardon a homely expression, oftener dipped into 
 than waded through. 
 
 A. We have works, nevertheless, and those not 
 works of art, but what in contra-distinction may be 
 called works of knowledge, which will not be rea- 
 dily superseded. 
 
 N. It would be difficult to name them. I will 
 not deny, however, the possibility of a doctrine 
 being so concisely and clearly established, that the 
 demonstration may sever be displaced by a better. 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 1 11 
 
 Even in such cases, the doctrine in process of time 
 appears so intuitive as not to require proof. 
 
 A. It seems to be an unavoidable inference from 
 your remarks, that the study of old authors is a 
 waste of labour. 
 
 N. Much of it is an exhaustion of the strength to 
 no purpose. This obsolete learning is well enough 
 for minds of a secondary cast, but it only serves to 
 hamper the man of original genius. It is unwise 
 in such a one to enter very minutely into the his- 
 tory of the science to which he devotes himself, — 
 more especially at the outset. Let him perfectly 
 master the present state of the science, and he will 
 be prepared to push it farther while the vigour of 
 his intellect remains unbroken ; but if he previously 
 attempt to embrace all that has been written on the 
 subject, to make himself acquainted with all its ex- 
 ploded theories and obsolete doctrines, his mind 
 will probably be too much entangled in their intri- 
 cacies to make any original efforts ; too wearied 
 with tracing past achievements to carry the science 
 to a farther degree of excellence. When a man has 
 to take a leap he is materially assisted by stepping 
 backward a few paces, and giving his body an im- 
 pulse by a short run to the starting place ; but if 
 his precursory range is too extensive, he exhausts 
 his force before he comes to the principal effort. 
 
 A. The general voice is against your doctrine. 
 Old authors are universally considered as treasures 
 
1 12 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 of deep thought, mines of wisdom, from which the 
 young aspirant after distinction is recommended to 
 extract the ore, which he is to beat out and embel- 
 lish for the public use. I think you underrate them. 
 
 N. Do not mistake me. I reverence as much as 
 any man the great intellects which have been em- 
 ployed in raising the structure of science. It is no 
 disparagement to the illustrious men of past times, 
 that their errors are pointed out, and that shorter 
 and easier methods are found of accomplishing that 
 which it required all their efforts to effect. With 
 intellects far greater perhaps than any subsequent 
 labourers in the same cause, they may be surpassed 
 in extent and accuracy of knowledge at a later 
 period by men of the most limited capacity. Such 
 is the necessary condition of human improvement. 
 All that an individual can effect is comparatively tri- 
 vial. His powers of original inference are bounded 
 to a few steps. The works of one must be elevated 
 on those of another. Meanwhile beauty of style, 
 elegance of illustration, perspicuity of arrangement, 
 and ingenuity of inference, — all that constitutes a 
 book a work of art, — may be imperishable. 
 
 A. Your view of the subject seems to militate 
 against all claims to originality. If one man is to 
 build on the discoveries of another, his best works 
 can only be like stones in the edifice, — while it is 
 surely the ambition of every man of genius to erect 
 a structure of his own. 
 
Or KNOWLEDGE* 113 
 
 N. This notion, that a man should produce some- 
 thing exclusively his own, unconnected with any 
 thing previously accomplished, in order to entitle 
 him to the praise of originality, has given rise to a 
 good deal of vain contention about the claims of 
 individuals to particular discoveries and inventions. 
 A casual expression, a barren assertion, an imper- 
 fect and unsteady approximation to an important 
 truth, has been singled out to invalidate the just 
 pretensions of the man of original genius, who has 
 planted a firm foot on ground of which it is possible 
 indeed that a glimpse had been previously caught, 
 but which had never been actually reached ; and 
 who has opened to our delighted minds a vista of 
 consequences which seems more like a creation 
 than a discovery. Thus the originality of Newton 
 in his doctrine of gravitation has been disputed on 
 the ground of some approaches to this principle by 
 Hook; that of Hume, in his views of the relation 
 of cause and effect, on the strength of expressions 
 in sundry writers ; that of Malthus, in his princi- 
 ples of population, on account of some passages in 
 Wallace, Stuart, and Smith ; and that of Dalton, 
 in his chemical theory of definite proportions, in 
 consequence of an imperfect anticipation of it by 
 Higgins. The truth is, that the originality de- 
 manded by such critics is an originality which can- 
 not exist ; it is purely chimerical, and the ambition 
 of attaining it can lead only to extravagant para- 
 10* 
 
114 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 doxes and baseless theories. Whoever wishes to 
 be original in the only practicable way, must rise 
 from the improvements of others. A living writer 
 has well characterised this originality in the case 
 of the doctrine of population, when he remarks 
 that Mr. Malthus took an obvious and familiar 
 truth, which till his time had been a barren truism, 
 and showed that it teemed with consequences. 
 
 A. I acknowledge that he who can do this may 
 well be content with himself. 
 
 N. Yet the critics will quote the familiar truth 
 to prove that the consequences were not original. 
 But this is absurd on any theory but that which re- 
 quires in every invention or discovery a perfect in- 
 sulation from preceding achievements, before it is 
 entitled to that praise. The slightest connection 
 with what has been previously accomplished seems 
 in the eyes of these dreamers to divest it of this 
 character. To trace the way in which it was ef- 
 fected, or the steps of the process, is with them the 
 same thing as destroying its claims to admiration. 
 In contradiction to all this, I will venture to affirm 
 that it is invariably owing to the state of a science 
 at the time when a man takes it up, that he is able 
 to make his peculiar discoveries. Hence those fu- 
 gitive glimpses, those scattered lights, those casual 
 touches in writings of the same date. The minds 
 of a number of individuals seem to be contempo- 
 raneously labouring with obscure intimations of the 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 115 
 
 same truth, till in the most vigorous amongst them 
 it struggles from its obscurity and bursts into day. 
 " The greatest inventor in science, " says an emi- 
 nent philosopher, " was never able to do more than 
 to accelerate the progress of discovery."* 
 
 A. But surely your representation of the matter 
 has a tendency to lessen the merit of invention, or 
 at least our admiration of it. 
 
 N. On the contrary, it shows us where admira- 
 tion is due, and what are the grounds on which we 
 should grant it, as well as explodes the flimsy pre- 
 tences on which it is sometimes professed to be 
 withheld. What is still better, it exhibits the real 
 process of invention and discovery, and proves 
 that they must necessarily go on, however slowly, 
 so long as there is any thing to invent or dis- 
 cover. 
 
 A. In this point we perfectly agree. Hence the 
 folly of shutting the mind to further improvement, — 
 of conceiving, as many people are apt to do, that 
 they have mastered the sciences once and for 
 ever. 
 
 N. Mastered the sciences ! A man in the present 
 day with regard to the sciences is something like 
 Virgil's boatman, si brachia forte remisit, he loses 
 his place— he is in effect carried backward. There 
 is a perpetual necessity for exertion if he would 
 
 * Playfair's Works, vol. ii. p. 52. 
 
116 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 maintain his relative position in the world of intel- 
 lect ; and from this necessity arises much of that 
 hostility to improvement which characterises the 
 dull and the indolent. Thus what should yield de- 
 light proves a source of mortification ; for what in 
 reality can be more exhilarating than the thought, 
 that thousands of minds are constantly at work 
 upon new improvements and discoveries, that every 
 year may bring some correction to our errors and 
 solve some of our difficulties, and that as long as 
 we live, new lights will pour upon our understand- 
 ings? A right view T of the subject would show us, 
 that every man of genius, of enterprise, and of re- 
 search, is labouring for our gratification, smoothing 
 the path for our steps, and illuminating objects to 
 delight our vision. When the warm glow of youth- 
 ful feeling has passed away, I know of nothing so 
 worthy to replace it ; nothing so well calculated to 
 relieve the insipidity of middle life, as the prospect 
 of continual advances in knowledge, inspiring hopes 
 which are perpetually gratified and perpetually 
 renewed. An adequate view — a deep impression 
 of the progressive character of science is utterly in- 
 consistent with that overweening confidence which 
 causes a man to place his own opinions as the limit 
 of improvement. 
 
 A. If this is preposterous in an individual, it is 
 surely equally so in a body of men. What then 
 shall we say of a set of immutable propositions on 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 1 1 7 
 
 any subject whatever 1 — a series of doctrines laid 
 down as absolute truths never to be altered ? 
 
 N. 1 should certainly pronounce it a grand mis- 
 take in the science of the human mind. There is 
 not a single subject which exercises the faculties of 
 man that may not be improved, — nay that will not 
 !>e improved, — by the efforts of successive genera- 
 tions. It would be an unpardonable degree of 
 arrogance in an assemblage of the wisest men that 
 ever lived, supposing that they could be brought 
 together, to circumscribe any subject whatever 
 within the narrow boundaries of their own opinions. 
 It would betray a total misconception of the relations 
 of the human mind to the objects around it. I 
 have contended, that men in the present day are 
 superior in knowledge to their predecessors, — but 
 on the same grounds those who come after us will 
 be superior to the existing generation. It is highly 
 probable indeed, how mortifying soever the reflec- 
 tion may be to our personal consequence, that we 
 in this age are mere barbarians compared with the 
 race who shall hereafter fill the earth ; and surely 
 for us to erect a standard of opinion for beings so like- 
 ly to be infinitely superior to ourselves is too absurd 
 to need exposure, and can scarcely fail to provoke 
 many a compassionate smile in the future ages of 
 the world. 
 
 A. Absurd enough in all conscience. We are 
 too apt, I confess, to consider our own age as en- 
 
118 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 lightened almost to the utmost extent of human 
 capacity. When we reflect upon the wonderful 
 discoveries of modern astronomy; on the brilliant 
 operations of chemical analysis ; on the new lights 
 darted into the gloom of past ages by geology ; on 
 the comprehensive truths of political economy, — 
 when we survey our ships and our commerce, our 
 steam-engines and our gas-lights and balloons, our 
 canals, and piers, and bridges, — in the exultation of 
 having taken a giant-stride, we fancy ourselves 
 already arrived at the goal. The truth is, however, 
 that all these considerations are but so many argu- 
 ments for modesty and diffidence. If the present 
 age has excelled those which have preceded it, this 
 result is owing to circumstances still in full activity, 
 and which will inevitably carry the next generation 
 far beyond us. It is often said that we are presump- 
 tuous in thinking ourselves more knowing than our 
 ancestors, but we forget the presumption of arrogat- 
 ing a superiority over our successors. 
 
 JN. It is curious to speculate on the consequences 
 of this inevitable progression. The multiplication 
 of books, for instance, will give rise to some singular 
 phenomena. What a vast accumulation of lite- 
 rature, should the world continue a thousand or 
 twenty thousand years longer without a geological 
 submersion ! What a weight of materials every 
 year is adding to the stock of the historian ! Fn 
 process of time it will require the whole life of a 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 119 
 
 man to become acquainted with the transactions of 
 former ages, and the longest life will be insufficient 
 to master the literature of a single country. 
 
 A. It will be the reign of retrospective reviews. 
 A thousand years hence the literature of our own 
 age may possibly furnish half a dozen nibbles to 
 these fishers in the waters of oblivion. The splen- 
 dour of intellect which envelopes us will have dwin- 
 dled into a mere luminous point, scarcely making 
 its way athwart the intervening space, — a star 
 faintly visible in the night of ages. How mortifying 
 to the personal vanity which makes itself the very 
 sun of a system ! But if we indulge in speculations 
 of this nature, we shall inevitably draw on our our- 
 selves the imputation of being visionary advocates 
 of the perfectibility of man. 
 
 N. Such an imputation will scarcely be fixed on 
 me, after what 1 have said in a former conversation 
 on the slow progress of the human race. That there 
 will be a progress, however, and an incessant one, 
 is so far from being a visionary speculation, that I 
 scarcely know a proposition which rests on a firmer 
 basis. And the particular speculation on the future 
 phenomena of literature is equally well founded. It 
 is obvious that the art of printing has produced a 
 complete revolution in the world of letters during 
 the few centuries which have elapsed since its in- 
 vention : the movement will continue — will be ac- 
 celerated; the causes are still in activity, and 
 
120 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 acquiring new force. We have merely to represent 
 to ourselves therefore a repetition of what has 
 already happened, only on a larger scale and with 
 a somewhat more rapid career. Our conclusions 
 on this subject must be drawn, not from the history 
 of antiquity, but from that of modern times. Had 
 Greece possessed the art of printing, the story of 
 the human race would havje been different beyond 
 all conception from what it is. 
 
 A. If it had saved the world only from those ages 
 of disputation, in which the human mind seemed to 
 spin round a circle, without a single step of ad- 
 vancement, the benefit would have been invaluable. 
 It is useless, however, to imagine what might have 
 happened, a more interesting inquiry is what will 
 the future bring? Literature, science, political 
 institutions, religion, — all must pass through va- 
 rious changes, if there is any correctness in the 
 principle of progressive improvement. 
 
 N. Literature and science we have already ad- 
 verted to. A progress in these must be accompanied 
 by progressive changes in our social and political 
 institutions. That they have not arrived at per- 
 fection, the slightest glance at the misery around 
 us is all that is requisite to prove. The supposition 
 that they will not be subject to changes would imply, 
 either that while other kinds of knowledge were 
 daily advancing, the science of social happiness was 
 as complete as the nature of the subject allowed, 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 121 
 
 and therefore susceptible of no improvement; or 
 that the happiness of communities admitted of no 
 addition, their misery of no diminution, from the 
 most thorough insight into the various causes which 
 produced them. The history of every country 
 proves that a knowledge of these causes is one of 
 the most difficult of acquisitions ; that on no subject 
 is a man more easily deluded, less capable of ex- 
 tensive views, guilty of grosser mistakes, and yet 
 more inveterately pertinacious in thinking himself 
 infallible. Nor is there any subject on which the 
 correction of an apparently small error has teemed 
 with such important benefits to the world. 
 
 A. From all which it most indubitably follows, 
 that political knowledge and political institutions are 
 predestined to improvement. What a source of sad 
 anticipation to a multitude of politicians ! 
 
 N. Already great changes have taken place, as 
 any one w r ill own who is at all conversant with 
 the history of the past. Greater are in embryo. 
 The blind veneration for rank, the feudal feeling, is 
 obviously on the decline, and it is probable that it 
 will be nearly extirpated in the course of ages. 
 The tendency of political change is now evidently 
 to republicanism ; and it is not unlikely that the 
 existing governments of Europe will gradually 
 approximate to the form adopted in the United 
 States of America. That form is at present un- 
 suitable to the feelings and habits of Europeans, 
 
 11 
 
122 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 which still retain a strong tinge of the spirit of the 
 middle ages. There are certain principles, however, 
 which are making daily advances, and which in 
 proportion as they subvert the ancient spirit of 
 hereditary attachment, will render it unnecessary 
 and substitute a better in its place. Such are the 
 principles — that government is for the benefit of the 
 whole community ; that to ensure the attainment 
 of this end, the will of the majority ought to prevail ; 
 that to secure the benefits of government, the people 
 must strictly conform to the regulations which they 
 themselves have imposed ; and the corollaries flow- 
 ing from these propositions. Changes of this kind 
 must not be expected too soon. We may alter on a 
 sudden the forms of polity, but we cannot suddenly 
 transform the spirits of men. This is the effect of 
 time, or what is meant by that phrase, of innume- 
 rable successive circumstances, and it cannot be 
 either much accelerated or much retarded. The 
 slow progress of mankind is here more apparent 
 than any where. 
 
 A. From your opinion respecting the tendency 
 of political change to republicanism I must dissent; 
 in no instance have we seen this form of govern- 
 ment productive of greater advantages than the 
 mixed; and I am strongly inclined to question 
 whether any happier expedient can be devised than 
 the hereditary descent of power. 
 
 N. 1 am not anxious at present to discuss the 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 123 
 
 merits of any forms of government. All that I mean 
 to contend for is, that whichever is really the best 
 must in the natural course of improvement establish 
 its claims to preference. Men learn these things 
 slowly, but experience must ultimately force them 
 upon their understandings. The change in men's 
 religious views will also probably be great. As 
 mankind learn to reason more justly, they will see 
 the absurditv of many of their tenets. Thev will 
 discover more and more clearly, that instead of the 
 wise and benevolent Author of the universe, they 
 have been worshipping an image in their own 
 minds, endowed with similar imperfect faculties 
 and passions to their own, nay, even invested with 
 principles of action drawn from human nature in 
 its rudest state. Men's conception of the Deity 
 can never go beyond although it frequently falls 
 short of their moral opinions. He who has a nar- 
 row, confused^ and indistinct view of what is really 
 w T ise and admirable in human qualities, cannot have 
 a clear and comprehensive idea of God. Hence 
 as moral knowledge advances, as mankind come 
 more and more to fix their approbation on actions 
 according to their actual desert, their conception 
 of the Deity will become more refined, more ele- 
 vated, and more worthy of its object. The proper 
 way to exalt man's veneration of God is to teach 
 him what is really just, benevolent, and magnani- 
 mous in his own race. It is melancholy to reflect 
 
124 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 on ibe sort of attributes and actions which are daily 
 ascribed to the Supreme Being. 
 
 A. I have frequently been struck with the fact 
 to which you have alluded, that men's conception 
 of the Deity generally falls short of their moral 
 opinions; but 1 have never been able to account 
 satisfactorily for so remarkable a phenomenon. 
 How is it, that even in the present day theological 
 systems continue to invest the Deity, as you have 
 expressed it, with principles of action drawn from 
 human nature in its rudest state, and long since 
 practically exploded in every civilized country? 
 
 N. The awfulness of the subject combines with 
 the interests of men to produce a tardy application 
 of their improved knowledge to their conception of 
 the Author of the universe. It is as if they enter- 
 tained an obscure and undefined apprehension, that 
 any alteration in their ideas regarding him would 
 not simply be a change in their own minds, but 
 would involve a modification of the nature and hap- 
 piness of the Supreme Being himself. The venera- 
 tion which they feel towards their Creator diffuses 
 itself over their own dogmas. But your question 
 has diverted me from the natural course of my re- 
 marks. 1 was going to observe, that mankind will 
 not only necessarily perceive the absurdity of many 
 of their tenets, but they will especially become 
 sensible of the folly and wickedness of intolerance, 
 that never-dying worm which preys on the vitals of 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 125 
 
 human felicity. I am never so inclined to feel con- 
 tempt for my own species as when I look into the 
 history of religious persecution. It presents to us 
 a combination of all that is weak with all that is 
 wicked in our nature, — the senseless activity of an 
 idiot destroying his own happiness, with the malig- 
 nity of a demon blasting that of others. 
 
 A. Language is too feeble to express the deep 
 execration which is its just due. But I own I am 
 more struck with the extreme folly, the childish 
 weakness, the incapacity of just reasoning, involv- 
 ed in the slightest act of intolerance, than with any 
 other of its features. In point of mere logic, such 
 an act is absolutely disgraceful to the intellectual 
 character of any one capable of drawing a single 
 inference. Were it not for the sufferings of the 
 victim, it would be altogether ludicrous. The 
 puny, pitiful attempts at intolerance in our own 
 day, are miserably post-dated, — absurd from their 
 pretensions and contemptible from their impotence. 
 
 N. With my whole soul 1 agree with you as to 
 the sentiments which these attempts ought to in- 
 spire ; but 1 am of opinion that they are not so ill- 
 timed nor so impotent as you imagine : in other 
 words, I consider that there yet exists a more ex- 
 tensive spirit of intolerance than you are aware of; 
 subdued indeed from its original savageness, but 
 deeply rooted and tenacious. There are also to be 
 found more important cases of intolerance than 
 11* 
 
126 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 your language implies. From all that I have my- 
 self observed of the spirit of society, I am decidedly 
 of opinion that the sympathies of the majority of 
 the nation are in almost every case against, and not 
 in favour of the victim. 
 
 A. I should be pained to believe it. 
 
 N. I am convinced you will find it so ; and this 
 brings us again to the point before discussed, the 
 over-estimation of the attainments and real civiliza- 
 tion of the present age. The spirit of society on 
 this subject may be looked upon as the thermometer 
 of civilization, — at least a high degree of what we 
 include in that term cannot possibly exist where 
 intolerance prevails. The two things are mutually 
 destructive. The same remark may be applied to 
 a still more enormous evil, or one at least that pre- 
 sents itself in greater and more distinct masses, — 
 war. The existence of war at all is a tremendous 
 proof that mankind are not civilized. Again then 
 we must conclude that w 7 e over-estimate our pro- 
 gress ; that we are really but a little way removed 
 from barbarism, in comparison with the possible 
 point at which the race may arrive. And this 
 would be a most salutary conviction ; for while it 
 would add to our alacrity by teaching us how 
 much there was yet to discover, it would abate our 
 presumption in the perfection of our present attain- 
 ments. If I do not deceive myself, I foresee the 
 time (far distant, alas !) when mankind shall awake 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 127 
 
 to a full sense at once of their actual imperfections 
 and of their capacity for illimitable improvement ; 
 when they shall cease to create their own misery, 
 and to lavish their admiration on qualities that 
 thrive on their ruin: "when almost all the great 
 political wonders, the idols of history, stripped one 
 after another of the vain splendour thrown around 
 them, will appear nothing more than the frivolous 
 and often fatal sports of the infancy of the human 
 
 * Rapporls du Physique et du Moral de l'Homrae, par J. G. 
 Cabanis, tome i, page 340. 
 
ON 
 
 THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 A. In our previous conversations we have touch- 
 ed on the present state of society, but only in a ge- 
 neral way ; and we were chiefly occupied with the 
 progress of the human race, and the principles on 
 which such a progress might be looked for. I should 
 like to hear your sentiments on some other features 
 in the intellectual condition of our own times. My 
 friend B here, who differs in his general views from 
 both of us, will assist me in the task of contesting 
 any questionable propositions. 
 
 N. The field is wide : we have already endea- 
 voured to estimate the point reached in the scale of 
 civilization ; what other part of the subject have 
 you particularly in view ? 
 
 A. My views have reference chiefly to the state 
 of moral and political intelligence and feeling. I 
 think, for my own part, that society is in a curious 
 condition in these respects. It seems to be la- 
 
PROGRESS OP KNOWLEDGE. 129 
 
 bouring with a thousand incongruous principles and 
 opinions. 
 
 N. I perfectly agree with you. When we ex- 
 amine the actual condition of society, we find 
 amazing discrepancies in moral and political senti- 
 ment. We find even great contrariety in the same 
 individual. He will be found perhaps, without 
 being aware of it, maintaining two opinions, mu- 
 tually repugnant and contradictory ; one opinion 
 probably the result of instillation by his preceptors ; 
 the other his own acquisition from reading or con- 
 versation. Now, not being in the habit of deduc- 
 ing a series of inferences, not being able to follow 
 out any doctrine to its consequences, he is insensi- 
 ble to the contrariety existing between them, and 
 perhaps would regard you with something like hor- 
 ror if you were to attempt to point it out. This is 
 all very well, and cannot be avoided where, without 
 much precision of ideas, there is any thing like a 
 determination of the general intellect to moral and 
 political inquiries ; where men's knowledge begins 
 to outstrip their prejudices, and yet is not disen- 
 tangled from them. The same causes however give 
 rise to other moral phenomena, not quite so free 
 from culpability. 
 
 A. To what do yau allude ? 
 
 N. 1 allude to the concealment of opinions and 
 feelings, to the insincerity, to the conventional simu- 
 lation, which abound in the present day. Every 
 
130 ON THE TROGRESS 
 
 one must be struck with the discordance of tone 
 between the sentiments of our literature, of our 
 public debates, of our formal documents on the 
 other hand, and those heard in private society, and 
 exhibited in the common habits of life on the other. 
 The same individual who has been speaking to the 
 popular prejudices of. the day in public, will often 
 let you see by a sneer or a jest, or at all events by 
 the principles which regulate his daily conduct, 
 that he has in reality been playing the actor, and 
 duping his audience. Hence our literature does 
 not present us with the actual sentiments entertain- 
 ed. There is nothing like general sincerity in the 
 profession of opinions. The intellect of the age is 
 cowed. 
 
 B. A great part of what appears to be insincerity 
 may perhaps be ascribed to a want of the power to 
 perceive logical inconsistencies, and some part to 
 the habit of thoughtlessly expressing in private so- 
 ciety opinions not seriously entertained. It has been 
 remarked by an able writer, that were we to know 
 what was said of us in our absence we could seldom 
 gather the real opinions of the speakers : " there 
 are so many things said from the mere wantonness 
 of the moment, or from a desire to comply with 
 the tone of the company; so many from the im- 
 pulse of passion, or the ambition to be brilliant ; so 
 many idle exaggerations, which the heart in a mo- 
 ment of sobriety would disavow ; that frequently the 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 131 
 
 person concerned would learn any thing sooner 
 than the opinions entertained of him, and torment 
 himself, as injuries of the deepest dye, with things 
 injudicious perhaps and censurable, but which 
 were the mere sallies of thoughtless levity."* A 
 similar observation may be made with regard to 
 moral and political opinions. Things are said in 
 the social or the listless hour, when the mind 
 relaxes from the tension of steady thought, which 
 would be disowned when the intellect had collect- 
 ed all its forces, and was calmly and solemnly look- 
 ing at the whole bearings of the subject. Besides, 
 if it were not so, I think you judge the matter too 
 rigidly. Actual simulation of opinions I will not 
 defend ; but surely there is a species of dissimula- 
 tion, or (not to use a word with which unfavoura- 
 ble associations are connected) of suppression, 
 which far from being culpable may be prudent and 
 even meritorious, nay, absolutely necessary. I think 
 I once heard you assert, that if any man were now 
 to promulgate the moral and political opinions 
 (could they be known) which will generally pre- 
 vail at the end of two hundred years from this time, 
 he would be hooted from society. In this senti- 
 ment 1 do not participate, as 1 see no room for so 
 immense a change as it supposes, but on your own 
 grounds a prudent reserve is commendable. 
 
 * Godwin's Inquirer, p. 312, ed. 1823. 
 
132 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 N. The sentiment was expressed perhaps too 
 broadly, but without pretending to form a conjec- 
 ture as to what such future opinions may be, I think 
 it substantially correct. [ will grant you, therefore, 
 that it is prudent in a man to suppress any opinions 
 flagrantly hostile to popular prejudice ; but it is not, 
 you will allow, high-minded ; if it escape our con- 
 tempt, it is not a species of conduct to raise the 
 glow of enthusiastic admiration, to " dilate our 
 strong conception with kindling majesty," and to 
 elevate us for a time at least above the dead level 
 of our nature. The poet says — 
 
 "Give me the line that ploughs its stately course 
 Like the proud swan, conquering the stream by force."* 
 
 And I confess my admiration will always follow him 
 who boldly breasts the current of popular prejudice, 
 forcing his way by his native energy. Nor can I 
 help thinking that such a man, if he combined un- 
 deviating coolness, moderation, integrity, and sim- 
 plicity of mind, with great intellectual powers, 
 would in the end extort the forbearance at least of 
 the host of enemies who would rush to the encoun- 
 ter from the instinct of fear. 
 
 A. Such conduct would undoubtedly excite the 
 admiration of a few, but it would be the destruc- 
 tion of the happiness of the individual unless he 
 
 * Cowper. 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 133 
 
 were singularly constituted. It is a fearful thing 
 for any man to encounter the execration, or even 
 the tacit condemnation, of the society in which he 
 lives. And moreover it is questionable whether, 
 supposing even his sentiments to be true, he would 
 promote the cause by such a bold and reckless 
 course. For any system of thoughts to be received 
 with effect, the minds of the community must be in 
 a state of preparation for it. If promulgated too 
 early it is cast back into obscurity by the offended 
 prejudices of society, or becomes a prominent ob- 
 ject against which they are perpetually exasperating 
 themselves. It is a light-house amidst the breakers. 
 The genius of a Smeaton in philosophy would be 
 required to erect an intellectual structure of this 
 kind, capable at once of giving intense light, and 
 withstanding the moral turbulence by which it 
 would be assailed. A premature disclosure of any 
 doctrine, you may rest assured, retards its ultimate 
 reception. In fact, a forbearance to utter all that 
 a man thinks is a species of continence necessary 
 throughout the whole progress of civilization ; at 
 every step the commanding minds of the age being 
 in one state, and the feelings and opinions of the 
 majority in another directly hostile to it. 
 
 B. 1 cannot exactly see the necessity of a discre- 
 pancy of this nature ; but admitting that the com- 
 manding intellects of the age must thus differ in their 
 views on many points from the bulk of mankind, it 
 
 12 
 
134 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 by no means follows that all who thus differ are to 
 be ranked in that class. On the contrary, I should 
 be inclined to say, that to be widely at variance 
 with our own age is in most cases a mark of un- 
 sound understanding; and this seems more espe- 
 cially to follow (turning to N.) from your principles ; 
 for if the human mind is exceedingly slow at the 
 work of invention and discovery, as I have often 
 heard you represent it to be, it is an obvious infer- 
 ence, that we are not to look for many of those gi- 
 gantic strides which place the man of genius far in 
 advance of his contemporaries. The chances are, 
 therefore, that singular views are erroneous views. 
 Hence a proper diffidence in himself, a sense of 
 that liability to error which no one ought to feel 
 more deeply than the philosopher, should make him 
 hesitate when he finds his opinions peculiar to his 
 own mind. 
 
 N. True, it should make him review them, probe 
 them to the quick, try them by every possible test ; 
 but having done this, it would be absolutely cul- 
 pable to suppress them merely from the considera- 
 tion that they were singular, and therefore likely 
 enough to be tainted with error. The latter indeed 
 is a condition under which every man must pro- 
 mulgate his opinions. 
 
 A. But to return to the numerous diversities of 
 opinion in society : my remark on that head was 
 intended to apply not to the discrepancies in the 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 135 
 
 opinions of the same mind, but to the differences 
 subsisting between individuals and classes. It is 
 astonishing, that with access apparently to the same 
 sources of knowledge, under the same civil and 
 political institutions, with almost perfect freedom of 
 intercommunication, operated upon daily by the 
 same current of periodical intelligence from one 
 end of the land to the other, pursuing similar 
 occupations and similar amusements, the people 
 should be divided into so great a variety of sects 
 and parties, many of them of the most dissimilar 
 and opposite modes of thinking. The fact is strik- 
 ingly shown by the publications, and particularly 
 the periodical publications, of the day. Thus, not 
 to mention that there is one set of journals for the 
 ministerial party in politics, another for the oppo- 
 sition, another for the reformers, with advocates 
 for a thousand intermediate shades of opinion, we 
 have journals for the evangelical, the orthodox, the 
 unitarians, the methodists, the deists, the phrenolo- 
 gists, the co-operatives, and others which might be 
 specified ; and these advocating, each of them, doc- 
 trines essentially repugnant and contradictory to 
 those of all the rest. Is it not strange, that under 
 the influence of all the common circumstances 
 which 1 have just enumerated, such very opposite 
 views should prevail, and be advocated not only 
 with considerable knowledge and skill, but with 
 the most thorough conviction of their truth ? Does 
 
136 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 it not prove, either that truth is unattainable in 
 moral, religious, and political inquiries, or that men 
 have rushed into the midst of these subjects without 
 stopping to ascertain the first principles on which 
 they all must agree, and thus have involved them- 
 selves in a chaos of contradictions ? 
 
 N. You recollect, I dare say, the remark of 
 Locke, that although we cannot affirm that there 
 are fewer opinions prevalent in the world than there 
 are, yet fewer persons entertain them than we are 
 apt to suppose ; most people not having any clear 
 ideas on those questions about which so much con- 
 troversy is raised, and on which they themselves 
 loudly assert their positive judgment. 
 
 A. But still you must allow, that the leading 
 minds of each party do really hold them, especially 
 in cases where interest is out of the question, which 
 is sufficient for my purpose, it being in fact still 
 more extraordinary, that minds of this description, 
 minds consequently of considerable powers and 
 superior information, with the same sources open 
 to them, should exhibit such contradictory appear- 
 ances ; or, in other words, entertain such opposite 
 views. 
 
 N. Such discrepancies show that the individual 
 circumstances which shape our opinions predomi- 
 nate over the general causes to which we are all 
 subjected. They can exist only in a very imperfect 
 state of knowledge, such as I have contended ours 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 137 
 
 to be, where men's modes of thinking have resulted 
 from chances of a thousand kinds, and have not 
 originated in a systematic deduction from undenia- 
 ble premises. You, 1 think, have well described 
 the general course of even thoughtful men, rushing 
 into the midst of subjects, without an examination 
 ' of first principles, and a regular progress from them ; 
 or rather they find themselves, from circumstances, 
 in the midst of the subjects, and never think of 
 remounting to any primary truths, or stepping out 
 of the magic circle described around them by the 
 age, and country, and rank, in which they came into 
 existence. Engrossed with the established ideas of 
 their system, they exercise their ingenuity in disco- 
 vering the relations of its parts ; and in the pleasure 
 of the occupation, they never think of setting them- 
 selves at a distance from it, viewing its external 
 aspect, marking its position in the world of intellect, 
 surveying its relations as a whole to truth and to 
 nature. This is frequently exemplified in the la- 
 borious trifling of antiquaries and commentators, 
 who will often display wonderful skill and acuteness 
 in the adjustment of some worthless point, which 
 their own exertions alone have invested with some- 
 thing like importance. The weakest theory, or the 
 most fallacious system of philosophy, will, in like 
 manner, hold in bondage the strongest minds, who 
 are often so intently occupied with its intrinsic 
 relations, as to forget its extrinsic absurdity. In 
 
 12* 
 
138 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 the limits by which they are thus circumscribed, 
 they sometimes exert the highest powers of in- 
 tellect, and leave nothing for us to bewail but 
 the barriers with which birth, and education, and 
 other circumstances have surrounded their under- 
 standings. A mind thus hemmed in, is in a si- 
 tuation somewhat similar to that of a man who 
 has been shut up in a strong castle from his birth, 
 and has therefore had no means of viewing the 
 outward appearance and relative position of the 
 building. His conception too of external objects, 
 as it has been acquired merely by glimpses through 
 the window, is narrow and imperfect ; and his com- 
 parative estimate of such external objects, and those 
 within his reach, must be disproportionate to their 
 real difference. Let him once escape from the 
 castle, and his ideas undergo a complete revolution. 
 He gets into the pure breezes of heaven ; the open 
 daylight, and the free exercise of vision. A similar 
 happy transition is experienced by the mind which 
 has once disengaged itself from the prejudices 
 of any system in which it has been cooped up. 
 With regard to the diversities of views and doc- 
 trines which have led to these remarks, I rejoice to 
 see them. I am glad to see the co-operative erecting 
 his parallelograms, and the phrenologist mapping 
 out the skull. 1 cannot comprehend that delicate 
 sensitiveness, which is alarmed at novel and extra- 
 ordinary opinions, as if the structure of society 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 139 
 
 would be demolished, and the globe itself shattered 
 by their promulgation, 
 
 B. How then are we to deal with doctrines 
 which appear to be dangerous ? Are we to stand 
 idle and allow them free course? 
 
 N. Examine them: look them in the face: if 
 they are false, they will vanish before the gaze of 
 scrutiny : if they are true, I dare any man to say 
 that they ought to vanish. 
 
 B. Your reply is what I expected, but I have 
 another question to ask in which you may find 
 more difficulty. Truth is one, error is pernicious ; 
 how then can you rejoice in the existence of diver- 
 sities by which the uniformity of truth is excluded. 
 
 N. When I say I rejoice, I speak of course in 
 reference not to what is absolutely good, but to 
 our actual state. The world is full of ignorance and 
 error, and I am glad to see a zealous pursuit of 
 even singular and eccentric views, as the means of 
 ultimately lessening the evil. Tentative processes 
 of this kind are indeed indispensable steps. The 
 grand experiment which Mr. Owen is making in 
 America, even if it miscarry, is sure to throw light 
 on the principles of human nature. Even the 
 modern phrenology, should it prove utterly un- 
 founded, will be of use. The prosecution of its 
 inquiries will furnish a body of curious facts to the 
 philosophical speculator ; and if ultimately ex- 
 ploded, it will be to the philosophy of mind what 
 
140 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 alchymy was to chemistry. The same benefit 1 
 own does not spring from a diversity of religious 
 sects, because theology is considered as a matter 
 not open to progressive improvement. Each sect 
 has its fixed doctrines, and the object is not to dis- 
 cover new truths, but to prevent any lapse from 
 the principles prescribed. All inquiry with them 
 is after new arguments to support old opinions. 
 Yet here, although intellectual enterprise is dis- 
 countenanced, contention and collision are brought 
 into play ; the contention of rival sects and the col- 
 lision of hostile opinions, forcing an examination of 
 points which men would fain shield from inquiry, 
 extorting concessions which can no longer be de- 
 cently withheld ; and thus producing some of the 
 good effects of that spirit of research and discovery 
 which in less important sciences meets with such 
 lavish encouragement. Although each sect may 
 consider its own system as perfect, it has charity 
 enough to assist in stripping other systems of their 
 errors. 
 
 B. Then you regard all these diversities of think- 
 ing with great complacency ? 
 
 N. They are really exhilarating in an enlarged 
 view of the subject. At any given point of the 
 progress, in any given state of knowledge or of ig- 
 norance, it is much better that the ignorance and 
 the error should be of a multiform than a uniform 
 character. With my views, therefore, it is some- 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 141 
 
 what ludicrous to see the anger, the vexation, the 
 resentment, with which the generality of men re- 
 gard those who differ from them in opinion. Such 
 difference seems to be felt as a sort of personal 
 offence, as an intolerable grievance which must be 
 repressed. Wounded self-love looks around it, 
 and can find nothing short of an act of parliament 
 or a judicial sentence adequate to the task of 
 avenging its wrongs. What is the simple light, 
 however, in which philosophy and common sense 
 would see these differences 1 They would see, first, 
 that the subject in question required examination ; 
 and, secondly, that it was likely to obtain the ex- 
 amination which it required. The permanent ex- 
 istence of any differences of opinion on any subject 
 shows of itself, either that truth has not been fully 
 attained by any of the dissentient parties, or that 
 it has not been deduced in the most perspicuous 
 method ; and, therefore, that there is still a neces- 
 sity for animadversion and discussion. 
 
 B. It is implied then in your view of the subject, 
 that truth in these matters is attainable ; that there 
 are certain determinate principles which may be 
 discovered, and from which indisputable deductions 
 might be made. 
 
 N. Certainly. 1 see no reason to doubt it, and 
 our friend A, who is so sanguine as to the progress 
 of knowledge, must inevitably accord with me. 
 
142 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 A. True : but others may ask, how are such 
 principles to be ascertained ? 
 
 N. By a very slow but a tolerably sure process ; 
 by generation after generation thinking, and speak- 
 ing, and writing ; by proposing doubts and hypo- 
 theses ; by criticism, by argument, by ridicule ; by 
 all the play and contention of wit and folly, scep- 
 ticism and pertinacity, sophistry and good sense. 
 From these discordant elements, let loose on every 
 possible subject of inquiry, we may ultimately ex- 
 pect that enlightened and lasting unanimity which 
 always attends the clear and simple exhibition of 
 truth. 
 
 B. But still you will allow, that there are some 
 subjects which will probably ever remain dubious, 
 difficult, and obscure ; and which as long as the 
 world lasts must inevitably engender differences of 
 opinion. 
 
 N. I will not undertake to say that there is no 
 subject which is doomed to be encumbered with 
 eternal difficulties ; but this I will venture to affirm, 
 that of whatever kind they are they will be accu- 
 rately estimated and set in their proper light. The 
 nature and the degree of the evidence on each 
 point will be appreciated; the valid inferences, 
 few or many, which the subject affords will be 
 clearly shown : the absurd conclusions previously 
 drawn from it will be exploded ; what it will and 
 what it will not furnish will be rendered equally 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 143 
 
 manifest ; and although the obstacles to a perfect 
 comprehension of it may never be surmounted, there 
 may be complete unanimity as to the character of 
 the difficulties which it presents. No reason can 
 be assigned why all this should not be accomplish- 
 ed, and this is in fact for us, for human beings, the 
 attainment of truth. 
 
 B. Although I am not for my own part very san- 
 guine as to any great progress in the human race, 
 1 would not deny that there might be a considera- 
 ble one amongst a few superior minds, who are to 
 be found in every age, and who, forming an un- 
 broken series, might carry on indefinitely the work 
 of perfecting the sciences : but I much doubt the 
 possibility of any corresponding or rather any com- 
 mensurate progress in the multitude. It is one 
 thing for the sciences to go on improving, and 
 another for the mass of mankind to become pro- 
 gressively partakers of such improvements. 
 
 N. The progress will be slow ; nor will I under- 
 take to maintain that it will be altogether commen- 
 surate with the advances of those superior minds 
 to whom you refer ; but nothing I think can pre- 
 vent it. The same principles of human nature 
 which render a science progressive among learned 
 and studious men, will make knowledge progres- 
 sive in every class. There is a certain measure of 
 intelligence, or rather there is a certain set of no- 
 tions, which every one inevitably imbibes, even 
 
144 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 the lowest of society ; a certain atmosphere of 
 knowledge breathed in common by all ; and these 
 notions depend upon the state of knowledge 
 amongst those whose particular business it is to 
 apply themselves to its cultivation. Now the cor- 
 rectness or incorrectness of the notions thus imbib- 
 ed, makes no difference in the ease with which 
 they are acquired. The mind of a child receives 
 with as little difficulty the enlightened opinions 
 prevalent in the best English society as the ruder 
 notions of the Hindoo or Hottentot. Unless, there- 
 fore, the communication between the high and the 
 low, the learned and the unlearned, is cut off, the 
 latter cannot help partaking of the progress of their 
 superiors. But it requires no evidence to show 
 that the tendency of modern improvement, far from 
 threatening to interrupt or embarrass this commu- 
 nication, is decidedly to render it easy and com- 
 plete. In fact, the sources of intelligence are open 
 to all ranks indiscriminately. External obstacles 
 to the general spread of sound knowledge are fast 
 giving way. It is in the nature of the human mind 
 itself, that we shall detect the most formidable im- 
 pediment. We shall find it generally true, that 
 discoveries are both slowly made, and slowly re- 
 ceived and adopted. After a man has arrived at 
 maturity, trained in certain fixed principles, pre- 
 judices, and habits, it is impossible to change them 
 essentially ; and, even if his opinions could be 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 145 
 
 changed, his associations and feelings would prove 
 rebels to his intellect. Hence, as I have before 
 observed, it is the } T oung on whom any improve- 
 ment is to be impressed ; and hence it is an age at 
 least which must be granted for its perfect esta- 
 blishment. Thus the wisdom of the pre-eminent 
 few of one generation cannot become the common 
 property, the familiar instrument of the crowd, till 
 the next or a still later age ; and it appears to me 
 that this process is one which comparatively little 
 can be done to hasten, but which much may be 
 done to perfect and extend. 
 
 A. Here again we come to our old point of disa- 
 greement. After all you have urged, I see no reason 
 for departing from the opinion which I before main- 
 tained, that the wider and wider diffusion of know- 
 ledge amongst mankind must inevitably accelerate 
 the progress of the race. The scope of your doc- 
 trine, which appears to me to involve a striking 
 inconsistency, is to show, that a greater number of 
 mankind may be made to partake of the progress, 
 but that the rate of the progress cannot be quicken- 
 ed. You maintain in effect, that the general dis- 
 semination of knowledge has little or no tendency 
 to render mankind readier to part with their preju- 
 dices ; that what each man learns in his youth he 
 must retain with a pertinacity equal and unaltera- 
 ble ; and that even the most enlightened individual 
 of the present day, after he has reached a certain 
 
 13 
 
146 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 age, is as callous to further improvement, as firmly 
 indurated in his notions, as inaccessible to new 
 ideas, as the rude barbarian of the American wild 
 or the benighted chieftain of the middle ages : or if 
 you do not go quite so far as this, if you would re- 
 ject this application of the doctrine to the philoso- 
 pher, you must at least maintain that the nature of 
 the opinions which an ordinary man imbibes in that 
 atmosphere of intelligence described by you as sur- 
 rounding his infancy, can make no difference as to 
 the tenacity with which they subsequently cling 
 to him. In all this there appears to me to be an 
 inconsistency for which I can account only by sup- 
 posing that it has been concealed from your view by 
 a strong prejudice as to the slow progress of the 
 race, resulting from a disappointment of your san- 
 guine visions on this subject in early life. What ! 
 supposing a man's mind to be imbued in youth with 
 liberal and enlightened sentiments, supposing him to 
 gather without any direct effort on his own part, 
 but from the actions and conversation of those 
 around him, " that the human mind is necessarily 
 fallible, that therefore it should never close itself 
 against new light, that it should be constantly ac- 
 cessible to fresh ideas, and ever on the watch to 
 correct its errors ; that truth and not its own im- 
 portance should be its sacred object in all inquiries 
 and on all subjects, " — supposing a man, 1 say, to 
 be imbued with these views, are we to conclude 
 
 \ 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 147 
 
 that notwithstanding their influence he would be as 
 inveterate, as stubborn in his prejudices, as unsus- 
 ceptible of melioration, as the most benighted of his 
 species ; as the deluded victim, for example, who 
 casts himself under the chariot wheels of an idol, 
 the superstitious devotee who heroically lashes 
 himself as he conceives into the favour of God, or 
 the furious bigot who exterminates heresy by the 
 rack and the scaffold ? 
 
 When the matter is put in this light, I think you 
 must allow, that in proportion to the real intelli- 
 gence of men will be their openness to conviction, 
 their disposition to receive new ideas, their readi- 
 ness to review their cherished opinions ; and that a 
 step of improvement may come in time to require 
 something less than an age. 
 
 B. But you have forgotten another part of our 
 friend's remark, in which 1 am fully disposed to 
 join him, the necessary slowness with which the 
 human mind makes any improvements, any inven- 
 tions or discoveries. 
 
 A. To this part of his remarks an equally 
 conclusive answer may be given. A great part of 
 the slowness with which discoveries have suc- 
 ceeded each other, may be ascribed to the tardy 
 and limited diffusion of knowledge. N himself 
 has made the remark, that one discovery must 
 spring from another; that a man of inventive 
 genius must rise from the height to which the la- 
 bours of his predecessor have carried him. Now 
 
148 ON THE PROGRESS 
 
 for a series of improvements and discoveries of this 
 kind, I see no necessity for the intervention of 
 long periods of time. If a man of original talent 
 has the power of rising from the discoveries of his 
 predecessor, he may do it, or begin to do, it from 
 the moment they are known to him; and thus one 
 man taking up the achievements of another, there 
 may be a series of them even amongst contempo- 
 raneous inquirers. The only requisite condition 
 seems to be a ready and immediate promulgation 
 of all that is accomplished. Formerly indeed what 
 any one man discovered made its way slowly and 
 laboriously to others engaged in the same pursuit. 
 Perhaps he would pass from the scene before his 
 labours were understood and appreciated, and in 
 such a state of imperfect inter-communication a 
 barren interval must undoubtedly elapse between 
 almost every successive discovery in the same 
 science. This lapse of time, however, was re- 
 quired solely to propagate the intelligence amongst 
 those who were likely to make use of it. At 
 present, when the diffusion may be effected with 
 the instantaneousness of lightning, when the world 
 has become an immense whispering gallery, and 
 the faintest accent of science is heard throughout 
 every civilized country as soon as uttered, the 
 requisite conditions are changed. Long intervals 
 are no longer necessary, and the career of improve- 
 ment may be indefinitely accelerated. Besides, 
 not only are discoveries more rapidly communicat- 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 149 
 
 ed to discovering minds, and the intervals of the 
 series reduced almost to nothing, but with the gene- 
 ral diffusion of knowledge more of these original 
 intellects start forth, and thus another cause is 
 brought into operation to swell the train and hasten 
 the triumph of science. 
 
 N. Your observations are ingenious and to a cer- 
 tain extent perfectly just, nor do I know that they 
 are at all inconsistent with my own views, except 
 inasmuch as they lead to expectations of too san- 
 guine a character. The process of improvement, 
 and the circumstances which tend to accelerate 
 what has been significantly and sometimes sneer- 
 ingly termed the march of mind, you have ac- 
 curately described. The only real difference 
 between us is as to the rapidity of the progress ; 
 and I still think, that if you were to examine the 
 condition of society with a severe scrutiny, if you 
 were to make yourself practically acquainted with 
 the intellectual state of the mass, if you were to see, 
 as I have seen, that the glare of modern civiliza- 
 tion is owing to the superficial illumination which 
 the intelligence of a comparatively few has cast 
 over the many, — in thus perceiving how little had 
 actually been done, you would be inclined to grant 
 more time for the evolution of those great and 
 glorious results, which we unite in hailing as the 
 ultimate destiny of the human race. 
 
 13* 
 
ESSAY 
 
 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION, 
 
 EXPLAINING 
 
 THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF ALL EVIDENCE AND 
 EXPECTATION. 
 
ESSAY III. 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF ALL EVI- 
 DENCE AND EXPECTATION. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 ON THE ASSUMPTION IMPLIED IN ALL OUR EXPECTA- 
 TIONS, THAT LIKE CAUSES WILL PRODUCE LIKE 
 EFFECTS, OR OF THE FUTURE UNIFORMITY OF CAU- 
 SATION. 
 
 It is now generally admitted by philosophers, that 
 there are a number of truths which necessarily 
 arise in the mind in certain circumstances, and 
 which are not the result of any logical deduction. 
 Such are the existence of the external world and 
 the identity of our own minds. The belief of these 
 truths without any process of inference or argumen- 
 tation, is a fact in the philosophy of mind which it 
 is impossible to deny. It is justly remarked by Dr. 
 Brown, that without some principles of immediate 
 belief, we could have no belief whatever ; " for," 
 
154 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 he continues, " we believe one proposition because 
 we discover its relation to some other proposition, 
 which is itself perhaps related in like manner to 
 some other proposition formerly admitted, but which 
 carried back as far as it may be, through the longest 
 series of ratiocination, must ultimately come to 
 some primary proposition, which we admit from the 
 evidence contained in itself, or to speak more accu- 
 rately, which we believe from the mere impossibility 
 of disbelieving it. All reasoning, then, the most scep- 
 tical, be it remarked, as well as the most dogmatical, 
 must proceed on some principles which are taken 
 for granted, not because we infer them by logical 
 deduction, for this very inference must then itself 
 be founded on some other principle assumed with- 
 out proof, but because the admission of these first 
 principles is a necessary part of our intellectual 
 constitution. "* " In ascending," says Buffier, "from 
 one proof to another, propositions must at length be 
 found that require none, otherwise life would be 
 consumed in accumulating proofs, without proving 
 any thing decisively."! 
 
 * Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, by Dr. 
 Thos. Brown, vol. i. p. 283. 
 
 f First Truths, by Pere Burner, p. 5, (English Translation 
 1780.) Aristotle has some passages to the same effect, which 
 Dr. Beattie has adduced in his Essay on Truth, p. 40, fifth 
 edition. 
 
IN THE FUTURE. 155 
 
 Amongst the primary truths which are necessarily 
 assumed or taken for granted in this manner, one 
 of the most important is the uniformity of causation. 
 In all our anticipations of events, in all cases of 
 applying to the future our experience of the past, 
 we unavoidably assume the fundamental principle 
 that every cause will continue to produce the effect 
 by which we have hitherto found it attended. A 
 very short explanation will be sufficient to make 
 this perfectly clear. 
 
 When I throw a piece of paper into the fire, it 
 is obvious that I do it under the expectation that 
 the paper will be consumed. But why do I form 
 this expectation ? Because I have found by expe- 
 rience that fire has the property of consuming 
 paper. This is a reason which would be perfectly 
 satisfactory to every mind in actual life ; the meta- 
 physician, however, although perfectly satisfied 
 with the validity of the answer, still asks why, be- 
 cause you have found in your past experience that 
 fire has consumed paper, do you conclude that it 
 will now exhibit the same destructive quality ? By 
 what logical process do you infer that the same 
 cause will continue to produce the same effect? 
 Show me the steps of your reasoning. 
 
 All the reply which can be given to this demand 
 is what philosophers have already given. It is, that 
 I assume or expect that fire will destroy paper as 
 it has hitherto done, without any process of reason- 
 
156 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 ing, any deduction from any other principle, L na- 
 turally and irresistibly take it for granted. You 
 yourself continually act on a similar assumption ; for 
 in putting your questions to me or any other per- 
 son, you take for granted, you assume without think- 
 ing of it, that your words will reach the ears of him 
 for whom they were intended, and excite ideas in 
 his mind, as you have found them to do in time 
 past. In placing your foot on the ground, in taking 
 up your pen, or in eating your breakfast, you still 
 expect that the objects around you, the subjects of 
 your operations, will retain their usual properties ; 
 that the earth will not open a gulf beneath your 
 feet, that the pen will not melt in your grasp, and 
 that the food which has hitherto nourished you, 
 will not turn to poison on your stomach. In a word, 
 from the same causes you and every other human 
 being necessarily anticipate the same effects. This 
 uniformity is the essential principle of all expec- 
 tation. 
 
 This subject has been so ably treated by former 
 writers, that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it 
 here. The short explanation which I have intro- 
 duced is intended merely to serve as a basis for 
 subsequent reasonings ; and to one who wishes to 
 enter deeply into an important metaphysical ques- 
 tion, it can by no means supersede the necessity of 
 of a reference to the works of Hume, Reid, Stewart, 
 and Brown. 
 
IN THE FUTURE. 157 
 
 Mr. Hume was the first who distinctly showed 
 that the uniformity of causation was not an inference 
 from any other truth; that it was not a logical con- 
 sequence of any principle or proposition previously 
 admitted ; that in applying the past to the future 
 there was a step taken by the mind which required 
 explanation. The errors into which this great 
 metaphysician fell in attempting to account for our 
 expectation of similar effects from similar causes, 
 (an expectation which he resolved into the sole 
 influence of custom,) have been subsequently cor- 
 rected by the three other eminent writers above 
 mentioned, the last of whom has explained and il- 
 lustrated the subject with so much acuteness and 
 precision, that the doctrine may be regarded as 
 perfectly established and defined, although still ca- 
 pable of affording inferences and views, which even 
 he with all his perspicacity failed to observe, or 
 neglected to unfold in that regular order in which 
 they may be exhibited. 
 
 Before proceeding to point out some of these 
 latent consequences, it may be useful to call the 
 attention of the reader to a distinction which is apt 
 to be overlooked, — the distinction between the phy- 
 sical truth, that the same causes produce the same 
 effects, and the mental fact, that we assume or take 
 for granted this uniformity in the operation of 
 causes. In speaking of the former I shall employ the 
 phrases, uniformity of nature, uniformity of the laws 
 14 
 
158 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION, &C. 
 
 of nature, or uniformity of causation ; in speaking 
 of the latter, or the mental fact, I shall term it an 
 assumption of the uniformity of causation, or I shall 
 speak of it as a principle or law of mind by which 
 we take for granted that like causes have like effects. 
 In regard to any primary principles unavoidably 
 assumed by the constitution of our nature, or neces- 
 sarily involved in the very process of thought, it is 
 obvious that every proposition inconsistent with 
 them, and every argument directed against them, 
 must imply an absurdity. The disputant would in 
 fact be contending against a principle which he 
 himself was under the perpetual necessity of taking 
 for granted. In the case of the truth which is the 
 subject of the present essay, this would be pecu- 
 liarly manifest. The acts of speaking and writing 
 always presuppose an expectation that objects will 
 retain their properties, or in other words, that the 
 same causes will produce the same effects ; and 
 consequently he who enunciates a proposition in- 
 consistent with the uniformity of causation, is ex- 
 pressly denying what in the denial itself he implicitly 
 assumes. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION IS ASSUMED WITH RE- 
 GARD TO THE PAST AS WELL AS TO THE FUTURE. 
 
 From the representation in the preceding chap- 
 ter it appears to be an unquestionable matter of 
 fact, that we in all cases expect like effects from 
 like causes ; or in other words, assume the future 
 uniformity of causation. 
 
 This expectation of the future, as it is the most 
 remarkable circumstance connected with the pre- 
 sent subject, has so much engaged the attention of 
 philosophers, that they seem to have overlooked or 
 only slightly noticed another fact equally obvious 
 when stated, and pregnant if possible with more 
 important consequences. Or, to express myself 
 differently, they appear to have attended to only 
 one half of the truth. They have clearly discerned 
 in what manner we unavoidably expect the future 
 to resemble the past; how we always assume that 
 the same causes will continue to produce the same 
 effects ; but they have bestowed little regard on 
 the equally clear fact, that in all our reasonings 
 
160 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 about the past we as necessarily assume that like 
 causes always have produced like effects. 
 
 This assumption of the past uniformity of causa- 
 tion will be apparent on the slightest reflection. 
 To have recourse again to our instance of throw- 
 ing paper into the fire : it is obvious that I not only 
 expect the paper to be burnt, but I assume that fire 
 has always possessed the property of consuming 
 that substance. As a proof that this assumption is 
 involved in my thoughts, it is only necessary to 
 trace the process of my mind in rejecting a narra- 
 tion at variance with my own experience. Should 
 any one assert, that at a former period of his life 
 he had thrown paper into the fire, suffered it to re- 
 main for five minutes in the flames, and then taken 
 it out unscorched and unconsumed, I should in- 
 stantly regard the relation as false, and should think 
 it a sufficient refutation to throw a piece of paper 
 into the fire, and thus prove to the narrator the im- 
 possibility of what he had asserted. But why could 
 not paper have remained in the flames for five mi- 
 nutes unconsumed ? Because Uie experiment before 
 us proves that fire has the property of destroying it. 
 Should any one push his inquiries further, and ask 
 why, because you find that fire has at present this 
 property, do you infer that it has always possessed 
 it ? I can only reply, that it is an assumption which 
 I necessarily make. I cannot even think of the 
 past without taking for granted that the same causes 
 
IN THE PAST. 161 
 
 have produced the same effects in every age and 
 every country. 
 
 It has been observed by Mr. Stewart, in speak- 
 ing of that law of belief {to use his own words) 
 which leads us to expect the continuance in future 
 of the established order of physical phenomena, 
 that " a very striking illustration of this presents it- 
 self in the computations of the astronomer; on the 
 faith of which he predicts, with the most perfect 
 assurance, many centuries before they happen, the 
 appearances which the heavenly bodies are to ex- 
 hibit."* 
 
 Now it is certainly a no less striking illustration 
 of our belief in the past uniformity of causation 
 which is presented to us by modern astronomical 
 computations of the celestial phenomena of former 
 ages. The astronomer, in the absence of all testi- 
 mony on the subject, without the slightest direct 
 evidence of any single event, unhesitatingly pro- 
 ceeds in his calculations on the established order 
 of the solar system, and particularizes the eclipses 
 which have taken place thousands of years before 
 the date of authentic history, with quite as much 
 confidence as he predicts the appearances of the 
 heavenly bodies in ages yet to come. That this 
 uniformity of causation is assumed and not inferred 
 with regard to the past, just as it is with regard to 
 
 * Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, chap. ii. 
 sect. 4, of vol. ii. 
 
 14* 
 
162 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 the future, is abundantly manifest. The same il- 
 lustration may be used in both cases. Take for 
 instance the usual method of showing, that the fu- 
 ture uniformity of the laws of nature is not a legiti- 
 mate inference from our antecedent observations. 
 In the words of Dr. Beattie : u The sea has ebbed 
 and flowed twice every day in time past, therefore 
 the sea will continue to ebb and flow twice every 
 day in time to come, is by no means a logical de- 
 duction of a conclusion from premises. "* With 
 equal force may the reasoning, " The sea now ebbs 
 and flows twice every day, therefore the sea has 
 always ebbed and flowed twice a day in times 
 past," also be denied to be a legitimate inference. 
 
 Or let us take the words of Dr. Brown : " A 
 stone tends to the earth — a stone will always tend 
 to the earth, are not the same propositions ; nor can 
 the first be said to involve the second. "t Precisely 
 the same remark is applicable to the two proposi- 
 tions, "a stone tends to the earth — a stone has 
 always tended to the earth." These are equally 
 remote from identity and from being reciprocally 
 involved. 
 
 The truth is, that the expectation we instinctively 
 entertain of the future uniformity, and the convic- 
 tion as instinctively present in our own minds of 
 
 * Essay on Truth, second edition, p. 126. 
 t Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i. p. 
 122. 
 
IN THE PAST. 163 
 
 the past uniformity of the laws of nature, may be 
 resolved into one general principle of belief, which 
 is identified with all our thoughts and actions, that 
 the same antecedents have been, are, and will be 
 followed by the same consequences. 
 
 In observing that philosophers in general have 
 overlooked the truth ; that in reasoning on events 
 which have taken place, we necessarily assume the 
 past uniformity of causation, as in calculating on 
 those which are to take place, we necessarily as- 
 sume the future uniformity of causation, it is not 
 intended to maintain that the fact has not been 
 incidentally noticed or even expressly asserted. As 
 far as I have examined, however, their notice of it 
 has been casual, and they appear in no instance to 
 have been aware of the consequences to which it 
 ultimately leads. The only exception to any part 
 of this remark is Dr. Thomas Brown. Hume has 
 several passages in which the fact is recognised. 
 Dr. Reid less explicitly asserts it.* Dugald Stewart 
 perhaps less explicitly than either. All of them, 
 however, seem too entirely occupied with the ex- 
 
 * There is one passage, however, in Dr. Reid's Essays on the 
 Intellectual Powers, which states it with clearness and precision : 
 44 What conclusions," he asks, u does the philosopher draw from 
 the facts he has collected ? They are, that like events have 
 happened in former times in like circumstances, and will happen 
 in time to come." Essay vii. chap. iii. The only fault in this 
 passage is, that what are in truth unavoidable assumptions are 
 represented as conclusions drawn from facts. 
 
164 UNIFORMITY OP CAUSATION 
 
 pectation regarding the future, to feel the import- 
 ance of the retrospective application of the same 
 identical principle. When the latter writer speaks 
 of this elemental law of thought, as he terms it, it 
 is under the character of "an expectation of the 
 continued uniformity of the laws of nature ;" or, " a 
 principle of the mind by which we are led to apply 
 to future events the results of our past experience."* 
 In the same style Dr. Reid speaks of it as u an 
 original principle, by which we believe and expect 
 the continuance of the course of nature, and the 
 continuance of those connections which we have 
 observed in time past."t In another place he de- 
 signates it as "an instinctive prescience of the 
 operations of nature," " a prescience that things 
 which have been found conjoined in time past, will 
 be found conjoined in time to come.^J 
 
 Hume has been less engrossed than either of the 
 two philosophers last mentioned with the prospec- 
 tive character of this principle. In the beginning 
 of his sceptical doubts, several of his positions 
 imply, that this assumption of the uniformity of the 
 laws of nature is involved in all our reasonings 
 concerning the past : his assertion, for instance, 
 " that it is by means of the relation of cause and 
 
 * Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii. 
 chap. ii. sect. 4. 
 t Inquiry into the Human Mind, chap. vi. sect. 24. 
 t Ibid. 
 
IN THE PAST. 165 
 
 effect alone, that we can go beyond the evidence of 
 our memory and senses." The same truth is also 
 implied in a passage, where he maintains that past 
 experience can be allowed to give direct and certain 
 information of those precise objects only, and that 
 precise period of time which falls under its cogni- 
 sance. In another place he asks why experience 
 should be extended to future times and other ofc- 
 jects y but if these passages show that he had a 
 glimpse of the truth, they show also that it was 
 partial and fugitive. Like the other writers, he 
 slides into the consideration almost exclusively of 
 the application of the past to the future. " All our 
 experimental conclusions proceed upon the suppo- 
 sition that the future will be conformable to the 
 past." And another passage plainly indicates that 
 this view of the subject almost wholly engaged his 
 attention. " Let the course of things," says he, u be 
 allowed hitherto ever so regular, that alone, without 
 some new argument or inference, proves not that 
 for the future it will continue so." 
 
 Dr. Thomas Brown, who has treated this sub- 
 ject with more precision and accuracy than any 
 other writer, seems to have been fully aware of 
 the fact, that we assume the uniform operation of 
 causes in our speculations on the past as well as 
 on the future. " The change," he says, u which 
 we know in the actual circumstances observed, we 
 believe to have taken place as often as the circurn- 
 
16G UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 stances before were similar ; and we believe also, 
 that it will continue to take place as often as future 
 circumstances shall in this respect have an exact 
 resemblance to the present." And again, "the 
 utmost perfection of our mere senses could show 
 us only what is, at the moment of perception, not 
 what has been, nor what will be ; and there is no- 
 thing in any qualities of bodies perceived by us, 
 which, without experience, could enable us to pre- 
 dict the changes that are to occur in them. The 
 foundation of all inquiry with respect to pheno- 
 mena as successive, is that most important law or 
 original tendency of our nature, in consequence of 
 which, we not merely perceive the changes ex- 
 hibited to us at one particular moment, but, from 
 this perception, are led irresistibly to believe, that 
 similar changes have constantly taken place in all 
 similar circumstances, and will constantly take 
 place as often as the future circumstances shall 
 be exactly similar to the present.*" 
 
 Although this eminent philosopher has thus most 
 clearly expressed the truth which I am now en- 
 deavouring to illustrate, he appears not to have 
 methodically considered it in its most important 
 applications, and to have been with the rest dispro- 
 portionately engrossed with what he terms " the 
 conversion of the past into the future." It is one 
 
 * Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind, vol. i. p. 184. 
 
IN THE PAST. 167 
 
 thing to have an incidental perception of a truth, 
 or to touch it causally in the circuit of our specula- 
 tions, and another to see it in a clear light, to make 
 it the direct object of our attention, to ascertain 
 its full value, and to pursue it into all its conse- 
 quences. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION CANNOT BE ESTA- 
 BLISHED BY EXPERIENCE AND TESTIMONY. 
 
 To the representation of the subject in the. pre- 
 ceding chapter, it will probably be urged as an ob- 
 jection, that we by no means assume that causes 
 and effects have always been uniform in their 
 sequence; but on the contrary are indebted for 
 the knowledge of this fact to experience and to 
 history. How should we know, it may be said, 
 that human beings formerly lived on this earth ; 
 that fire has always consumed wood, corn afforded 
 nutriment, and water quenched thirst ; how should 
 we know all these things but from the voice of his- 
 tory, the testimony of our fellow-men ? From 
 what other source could we derive the knowledge, 
 that there has been a regular succession of day and 
 night, of summer and winter, that the sun has dis- 
 dispensed light and heat for thousands of years, 
 that the moon for an equal period has passed 
 through her incessant circle of changes, and that 
 over the heads of countless generations the stars 
 have ceaselessly glittered in the sky, making night 
 
UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION, &C 169 
 
 beautiful, and exciting the awe and admiration of 
 mankind? 
 
 In considering this objection, it is necessary to 
 call to mind in the first place the distinction which 
 we are constantly apt to overlook between the 
 general principle, that like causes have like effects, 
 and particular instances of causation. The prin- 
 ciple itself must be assumed before we can draw 
 any inference from the present to the past or to the 
 future; but what particular effects result from par- 
 ticular causes must be collected from observation. 
 After we have found that a certain cause produces 
 a certain effect, we unconsciously take for granted, 
 that whenever that particular cause has been in 
 operation that particular effect has followed. The 
 sequence itself is gathered from observation or ex- 
 perience, but the uniformity of the sequence is ir- 
 resistibly and unavoidably assumed. 
 
 We know, for example, that human beings 
 formerly lived on this earth as at present from the 
 traces which they have left ; that is, from the 
 effects which they produced while in existence, or 
 the remains of their bodies. What effects human 
 beings produce we learn from experience; but un- 
 less we take for granted that causes and effects 
 have a uniform connection, we cannot infer from 
 any existing appearances what agents were con- 
 cerned in their production ; discard this principle, 
 and the traces which we now regard as left by 
 15 
 
170 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 men similar to ourselves may have been occasioned 
 in a thousand modes which it is impossible to 
 imagine. 
 
 The two sources which supply us with informa- 
 tion regarding past events, and to which the ob- 
 jection under notice attributes our knowledge of the 
 uniformity of causation, are personal experience 
 and testimony ; and in order to ascertain how far 
 these could enable us to arrive at this principle, it 
 will be necessary to examine them separately. 
 
 All that a man's personal experience reaches to 
 manifestly is, that he has observed certain succes- 
 sions in the phenomena of the world, material and 
 mental. He may have observed, for example, that 
 lead has invariably sunk in w r ater. The instances 
 of this which he has actually witnessed may have 
 been a hundred ; and the simple amount of his ex- 
 perience consequently is, that lead has sunk in 
 water a hundred times. As far as these instances 
 go, he may be said to have gathered the uniformity 
 of causation from personal experience : but his ex- 
 perience can tell him no more than that this uni- 
 formity has taken place in a hundred trials: and 
 the moment he extends the same uniformity to 
 other instances, he leaves the confined circle of per- 
 sonal observation, and proceeds on the irresistible 
 assumption of which we have so often spoken. 
 
 It may be remarked too, that his conviction that 
 lead will sink and has always sunk in water is as 
 
NOT ESTABLISHED BY EXPERIENCE. 171 
 
 thorough after one trial as after a hundred. If we 
 at any time repeat an experiment, it is not because 
 we doubt whether the same causes always produce 
 the same effects, but it is lest any of the causes 
 or effects should have escaped our observation. 
 
 In the next place, we have to examine whether 
 this uniformity of causation can be gathered from 
 testimony. 
 
 And first we may remark, that the testimony of 
 another can vouch only for what he himself has 
 witnessed. If my neighbour has observed lead to 
 sink in water a hundred times, and I have done 
 the same, our conjoint experience amounts only to 
 this, that lead has sunk in water two hundred 
 times, while the conviction we have or the assump- 
 tion we make is universally comprehensive. 
 
 In the second place it is important to remark, as 
 will be more fully shown hereafter, that our reli- 
 ance upon testimony itself proceeds on the assump- 
 tion of that very uniformity of causation, which 
 testimony by the objection under notice is supposed 
 to prove. When I am told by my neighbours that 
 they have observed the same particular succession 
 of events which I myself have witnessed, 1 believe 
 them, because I have found them individually men 
 of veracity, or because I have found men in gene- 
 ral adhere to truth in circumstances similar to those 
 in which their testimony is given. What is the 
 ground of my reliance in this case ? Not simple ex- 
 
172 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION, &C. 
 
 perience, because that could tell me only that in a 
 certain number of instances men had acted in a 
 certain manner ; it could not inform me that they 
 still continue to act in the same manner, and yet I 
 believe they do in the instance in question, on the 
 inevitable assumption of the uniformity of causation. 
 Thus testimony cannot prove this uniformity, be- 
 cause we must take the principle itself for granted 
 in bringing testimony to prove it. 
 
 From these considerations it clearly appears, that 
 our own personal experience can prove the unifor- 
 mity of causation only in those individual instances 
 where we have witnessed it ; that the testimony of 
 others in like manner can prove this uniformity only 
 in the number of cases which have fallen under 
 their observation ; and that testimony itself, or rather 
 our belief in it, involves the assumption of that uni- 
 formity which some people would adduce it to 
 prove. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION IS ASSUMED IN ALL 
 OUR CONCLUSIONS RESPECTING MENTAL AS WELL AS 
 PHYSICAL PHENOMENA. 
 
 The preceding chapters have sufficiently es- 
 tablished and illustrated the fact, that in all our 
 thoughts and reasonings concerning events, we un- 
 avoidably proceed on the assumption that similar 
 effects have always arisen and will always arise 
 from similar causes. 
 
 So far I have restricted my observations almost 
 exclusively to physical changes, because 1 wished 
 to keep out of view the consideration of mental 
 events, till the precise nature of that law of thought 
 which forms the subject of the present essay had 
 been elucidated. But we should have a very im- 
 perfect view of the subject if we rested here. It is 
 evident that we must proceed on this or some simi- 
 lar principle in our moral reasonings ; and I shall 
 endeavour to show, that the same assumption of 
 the uniformity of causes and effects is involved in 
 all our conclusions respecting moral and intellectual 
 phenomena. 
 
 15* 
 
174 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 It has been already remarked, that when we 
 throw a piece of paper into the fire, we do it under 
 the expectation that the paper will be consumed. 
 In like manner, when I write a letter to a friend, I 
 do it under the impression that his intellectual quali- 
 ties will continue the same as I have hitherto found 
 them; and that the associations established in his 
 mind between certain words and certain ideas will 
 be the same as heretofore. I take for granted that 
 the black marks in my letter will continue to intro- 
 duce into his mind the thoughts which 1 design to 
 convey, just as I take for granted that lead will sink 
 in water, or snow melt in the sun : and in ad- 
 dressing my arguments to his understanding, I pro- 
 ceed on the assumption of its retaining all its usual 
 powers. This holds in respect not only to indivi- 
 duals, but to mankind at large. The predictions of 
 the astronomer, to which I have already alluded, 
 proceed on the assumption, not only that the hea- 
 venly bodies will continue to be governed by the 
 same laws, but that mankind in after ages will re- 
 tain the same faculties as they now possess. 
 
 With regard to the operations of the understand- 
 ing the fact will be at once admitted. If there is 
 any difficulty in the matter, it must attach to the 
 question whether the same uniformity of causation 
 is assumed in the case of affections, passions, and 
 volitions. But we shall discern no difference in 
 this respect amongst all these classes of mental 
 
IN MENTAL EVENTS. 175 
 
 phenomena. With regard to all we unavoidably 
 proceed on the same assumption. When I an- 
 nounce to my friend the accomplishment of some 
 wish long cherished in his heart, I confidently anti- 
 cipate the joy which my communication will excite; 
 exactly on the same principle which leads me to 
 expect that the stone which I throw into the air 
 will fall to the ground. When 1 enter a bookseller's 
 shop to purchase a book, I as fully calculate on his 
 parting with the volume for the customary price, as 
 I presume on the combustion of paper when thrown 
 into the fire. If I attempt to persuade a fellow 
 creature to refrain from a meditated crime, my ad- 
 vice proceeds on the same assumption, that similar 
 moral effects will follow the moral causes with 
 which they have been hitherto found conjoined. I 
 point out perhaps the consequences of the action 
 in rousing the indignation of mankind, and leading 
 them to inflict punishment on the perpetrator ; or 
 I endeavour to show the remorse by which it will 
 be pursued in his own breast. And if he were to 
 ask me how I could tell that these effects would 
 follow, 1 should answer, that they had been found 
 to do so in similar cases. Should he proceed still 
 farther in his inquiries, should he request to know 
 how I could tell that the same effects would again 
 attend the same causes, I could merely answer, that 
 the assumption of this uniformity of sequence was a 
 necessary condition of thought which neither he 
 
176 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 nor myself could avoid ; and that his own questions 
 afforded an instance of it, since they proceeded up- 
 on the expectation, not only that his words would 
 reach my ears as in times past, but that certain 
 ideas and volitions would be excited in my mind as 
 heretofore, the result of which would be an answer 
 to his inquiries. 
 
 It may be objected, however, that our confidence 
 in these cases is not so great as it is in regard to 
 physical events ; that there is always more or less 
 of uncertainty in our anticipations ; that my cor- 
 respondent may not be able to read my letter, since 
 he may have lost his memory ; that my other friend 
 may have changed his views, and may feel no joy 
 at the accomplishment of his wishes ; that the book- 
 seller may refuse to part w T ith his volumes; and 
 that in the last hypothetical case adduced, mankind 
 may no longer feel incensed at those actions which 
 formerly roused their indignation. 
 
 The reply to this objection is not difficult. In 
 all these cases there is no want of faith in the uni- 
 formity of causation : our uncertainty by no means 
 relates to the principle itself, but to the point whe- 
 ther all the same causes, and no other, are in ope- 
 ration : and if the event at any time turn out con- 
 trary to our expectations, we feel well assured of 
 the presence of some extraordinary cause — an as- 
 surance evidently proceeding on the assumption, 
 that if the causes had been the same the effects 
 
IN MENTAL EVENTS. 177 
 
 must also have been similar. Thus if my corres- 
 pondent is unable to read my letter, if he no longer 
 connects any meaning with the written words, 1 
 am convinced that some extraordinary calamity 
 has befallen him. If the bookseller refuse to sell 
 me his volumes, I feel no hesitation in ascribing his 
 conduct to some particular motive not usually at 
 work in his mind : all proving, not that there is a 
 want of uniformity in the sequence of causes and 
 effects, but that there is a different assemblage of 
 causes ; that some essential circumstance has been 
 left out, or some unusual one has crept into the ac- 
 customed combination. 
 
 As this part of the subject leads to some interest- 
 ing conclusions, I shall endeavour to show in the 
 next chapter, that whatever certainty or uncertain- 
 ty we feel in regard to moral events, particularly 
 voluntary actions, is precisely the same as that 
 which we entertain in the case of physical changes, 
 and that in this respect the two classes of pheno- 
 mena are exactly on an equality. 
 
 After so amply proving that we necessarily as- 
 sume the uniformity of causation in moral events 
 with reference to the future, it will scarcely be 
 needful to show that we equally assume it with re- 
 gard to the past. All that I have said in a former 
 chapter on the retrospective application of this 
 principle, will be found applicable mutatis mutan- 
 dis to the subject before us. The powers and pas- 
 
178 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION, &C. 
 
 sions which we now discern in the human mind, we 
 assume to have always existed, and to have operated 
 in a similar manner; and that we do not derive 
 our conviction of this uniformity from testimony is 
 still more apparent in the present case than the 
 other, since testimony itself is a moral event, a 
 voluntary action, and therefore cannot prove that 
 itself is invariably connected with certain causes. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 OUR CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY IN RELATION TO 
 MORAL ARE OF THE SAME NATURE AS IN RELATION 
 TO PHYSICAL EVENTS. 
 
 It is proposed to show in the present chapter, that 
 whatever certain or uncertainty we feel with regard 
 to voluntary actions, is precisely of the same charac- 
 ter, and arises from the same causes as that which 
 we feel with regard to physical changes : and that 
 in many cases our certainty is not less in respect to 
 the former than to the latter. 
 
 For the sake of perspicuity and comparison we 
 may divide physical events into several classes, and 
 examine our feelings of this nature in regard to 
 each. 
 
 1. There are some events observed to be so in- 
 variably connected with others, that when one takes 
 place we feel perfectly sure that the other will fol- 
 low. Thus it is impossible to doubt that when a 
 piece of lead is thrown into water it will sink ; that 
 when flame is applied to gunpowder an explosion 
 will ensue ; that when an elastic ball is thrown 
 upon a hard floor it will rebound ; and that when 
 
180 CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
 we press the keys of a harpsichord we shall pro- 
 duce certain musical sounds. 
 
 2. The preceding events depend on something 
 antecedent, which may or may not take place. 
 The sinking of a piece of lead depends on its be- 
 ing placed in the water, and all that we can pre- 
 dict is, that if such an event come to pass, such a 
 result will follow ; or that in given circumstances 
 a certain event will happen. But there is another 
 class of events placed beyond accident or control, 
 which may be the objects of absolute prediction, 
 which depend on no previous supposition, and 
 which we calculate upon with perfect assurance ; 
 such as the eclipses of the sun and moon, and the 
 motions of the heavenly bodies in general. 
 
 3. There is another and very large class of phe- 
 nomena which are placed beyond the reach of 
 human foresight, which to us are uncertain : the 
 state, for instance, of the wind and weather, the 
 appearance of meteors, the occurrence of earth- 
 quakes, and a thousand others which will rise to the 
 recollection of every one. 
 
 Analogous in point of uncertainty to these are 
 many events connected with those concerning which 
 we feel completely certain : such as the direction in 
 which a ball thrown upon a hard floor may rebound, 
 or the place where it may ultimately rest ; the par- 
 ticular effects of an explosion of gunpowder, and 
 the like. An example will explain my meaning. If 
 
RESPECTING MORAL EVENTS. 181 
 
 I throw an elastic ball against a stone floor, 1 can 
 predict that it will rebound, but not the precise 
 course which it will describe, nor in what part of 
 the floor its motion will finally cease, nor what time 
 will elapse in the process. To me, therefore, the 
 one event, the rebounding of the ball is certain ; the 
 other event, the direction it will pursue, is uncer- 
 tain. 
 
 4. Perhaps as a fourth class I may instance events 
 which we can predict in the gross, but not in the 
 detail ; such as the regular return of the seasons. 
 
 Now what is the real difference amongst these 
 four classes of events ? What is it that enables us 
 to predict some with perfect certainty, while we 
 can scarcely form a conjecture as to others ? 
 
 In the first place, it is obvious that the uncer- 
 tainty entertained with regard to the latter arises 
 from no mistrust of the uniformity of causation. To 
 refer to our third class of physical events, we be- 
 lieve that the direction of a ball rebounding from 
 the floor is as necessary a consequence of certain 
 causes as the rebound itself; and we make no doubt 
 that if we could throw the ball with equal force 
 from the same point to the same place on the floor, 
 and secure the similarity of all the other influential 
 circumstances, we should obtain the same result. 
 This is exemplified in circumstances a little varied 
 by the expert billiard player. What in the hands 
 of a novice is uncertainty and confusion, becomes 
 
 16 
 
182 CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
 in his all the certainly of foreknowledge. The 
 precise course of the ball, and its ultimate resting 
 place, are all foreseen by the prophetic eye of skill. 
 Since our uncertainty therefore arises not from 
 any irregularity in the sequence of causes and 
 effects, it can arise only from our ignorance of the 
 whole of the causes in operation. These two ex- 
 haust the possible suppositions on the subject. To 
 know a cause as such is to foresee the effect which 
 it will produce ; and if we know all the causes con- 
 cerned in a phenomenon, we can foretell all the 
 effects. That some events present steadier objects 
 of prediction than others, merely attests that w 7 ith 
 regard to the former we have attained superior 
 knowledge. We have a striking exemplification of 
 this in the instance of astronomy. Before that 
 science was at all cultivated, the eclipses of the sun 
 and moon, and the positions of the heavenly bodies, 
 were matters of uncertainty ; they appeared lawless 
 and irregular phenomena. But if with regard to 
 events, which mankind at one time looked upon as 
 unfixed and anomalous, they now feel undoubting 
 confidence, this has obviously proceeded from no 
 change in the character of the events, but from a 
 revolution in human knowledge. We hence obtain 
 a full confirmation of the important conclusion, 
 which, simple as it may appear to be, is perpetually 
 overlooked, that uncertainty is a state or feeling of 
 the mind, not an attribute of events. When we 
 
RESPECTING MORAL EVENTS. 183 
 
 assert that any event is uncertain, we merely de- 
 clare the state of our minds ; it is our knowledge, 
 and not the event, which possesses the character of 
 uncertainty. 
 
 Having thus ascertained what is the real meaning 
 of uncertainty as applied to physical events, 1 pro- 
 ceed to show that whatever uncertainty we feel 
 with regard to voluntary actions is precisely of the 
 same character. 
 
 For this purpose let us consider voluntary actions 
 under different classes, corresponding to those un- 
 der which we arranged physical phenomena. 
 
 1. There are a great number of voluntary actions 
 which we observe to follow certain causes with so 
 much regularity, that we feel a perfect confidence 
 in the result whenever those causes are in opera- 
 tion. With as little doubt as we expect lead to 
 sink in water or gunpowder in contact with flame 
 to explode, we calculate upon a thousand actions 
 depending on the volitions of the human mind ; we 
 expect that when food is set before a hungry man 
 he will eat, that when a man's house is on fire he 
 will attempt to escape, that when we direct our 
 servants to do certain offices they will perform 
 them, and that by the offer of certain sums of mo- 
 ney we can procure the various commodities which 
 are daily exposed to sale. If any one alleges that 
 these consequences are by no means certain, be- 
 cause for example it is possible the hungry man 
 
184 CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
 may refuse food, I reply, that this refusal must arise 
 from some motive not necessarily connected with 
 his state of hunger. It is possible in the same way 
 that lead may not sink in water, (a lump of cork 
 for instance may buoy it up,) but this must be oc- 
 casioned by some adventitious circumstance. 
 
 In this first class, therefore, physical events and 
 voluntary actions appear to engender in the mind 
 the same kind of certainty and to be exactly cor- 
 respondent. 
 
 2. We may also find amongst voluntary actions, 
 some which are capable of absolute prediction, — 
 depending on no previous supposition. We can 
 foretell, for instance, that the tradesmen in an Eng- 
 lish town will shut up their shops on a Sunday, that 
 a number of travellers during the present year will 
 leave England for foreign countries, that speeches 
 will be made in parliament, and that criminals will 
 be condemned by the judges. 
 
 All these events are evidently voluntary actions 
 or their results, and may be predicted with as much 
 confidence as the rising of the sun or an eclipse of 
 the moon. The circumstance of the motions of 
 the heavenly bodies enabling us to measure time, 
 makes no difference as to the point of view in 
 which we are considering them. 
 
 3. To the third class of physical events we shall 
 find abundance of corresponding moral phenomena. 
 I may cite indeed the chief part of the actions 
 
RESPECTING MORAL EVENTS. 185 
 
 of mankind at large. As in the material universe 
 there are numberless circumstances constantly 
 taking place, of which some may be predicted with 
 tolerable exactness and others baffle all conjecture, 
 so in the affairs of men we have all degrees of un- 
 certainty : some actions we may confidently antici- 
 pate, while concerning others we are altogether in 
 perplexity. It perhaps will not be contested with 
 regard to this third class, that physical and moral 
 phenomena closely correspond. 
 
 4. With regard to the fourth class, which is per- 
 haps a superfluous division, and might be resolved 
 by a slight analysis into one or other of the preced- 
 ing classes, it is obvious that there is the same mix- 
 ture of certainty and uncertainty in the return of 
 the seasons, and in men's actions consequent on 
 that return. With as much confidence as we an- 
 ticipate the coming of spring, we may look for a 
 voluntary application of the labour necessary for 
 the cultivation of the soil at that season, although 
 we are unable to predict the exact time and the 
 particular occurrences in either case. There are 
 other events among mankind analogous to these, in 
 respect to uniformity in the aggregate and variety 
 in the details. Thus mankind regularly retire to 
 rest every evening and rise every morning, regu- 
 larly eat and drink, and pursue their several occu- 
 pations. 
 
 In regard to these four classes then, as in regard 
 16* 
 
186 CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
 to the classes of physical events, we feel certainty 
 and uncertainty ; certainty in those cases where 
 our knowledge is complete, and uncertainty in 
 those cases where we are not acquainted with all 
 the influential circumstances. This uncertainty is 
 evidently the feeling of the mind speculating upon 
 the future, nor can we apply the term uncertain to 
 any conceivable event, physical or mental, with 
 any other meaning. 
 
 It is indeed singular enough that any events 
 whatever should ever have been considered as in 
 themselves possessing the character of uncertainty. 
 If any meaning can be attached to this term so 
 used, it must imply that the same causes do not 
 always produce the same effects ; for if the same 
 causes always produce the same effects, uncertain- 
 ty can be nothing but a feeling in the mind of him 
 who speculates concerning them. 
 
 It appears to be the numerous instances of this 
 feeling with regard to voluntary actions, which 
 have led to the notion that there must be some 
 greater uncertainty or instability in them than in 
 material events. But if there is this quality in the 
 actions themselves, it must arise from the same 
 causes producing one kind of effect at one time 
 and another kind of effect at another time. It has 
 been shown, how r ever, that we do necessarily 
 and unavoidably assume that the same causes 
 always produce the same effects ; and as this as- 
 
RESPECTING MORAL EVENTS. 187 
 
 sumption is a necessary law or condition of thought, 
 the contrary must be absurd. This consideration 
 alone is sufficient to determine the vague question 
 which has been agitated respecting the so called 
 freedom of the will, a question which has been spun 
 out into such a length of controversy, chiefly from 
 the simple circumstance of many of the disputants 
 having formed no clear conception of the poir>t in 
 dispute. If in our anticipations of voluntary actions 
 we assume the uniform attendance of certain 
 effects on certain causes, either there must be this 
 uniformity, or by the constitution of our nature we 
 assume what is false, — an alternative which ap- 
 pears to settle the question. 
 
 This subject however is too important to be dis- 
 missed with a single remark, and it will be resumed 
 in a subsequent chapter. 
 
CHAPTER. VI. 
 
 ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE TRUTH UNFOLDED IN THE 
 LAST CHAPTER. 
 
 We have seen in the last chapter, that the cir- 
 cumstance of some events presenting steadier 
 objects of prediction than others, does not arise 
 from any greater uniformity of causation in the 
 former; and that the uncertainty of our anticipa- 
 tions with regard to both moral and physical events 
 is of the same character and has the same source : 
 it is simply a feeling of the mind, and arises solely 
 from the imperfection of our knowledge. 
 
 It was also attempted to show, that men's actions 
 and speculations as constantly proceed upon the ex- 
 pectation that certain voluntary acts will result 
 from certain motives, as that physical substances 
 will produce their usual effects. It is surprising 
 indeed that this connection between motives and 
 actions should have ever been theoretically ques- 
 tioned, when every human being every day of his 
 existence is practically depending upon its truth ; 
 when men are perpetually staking pleasure, and 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRECEDING CHAPTER. 189 
 
 fortune, and reputation, and even life itself, on the 
 very principle that they speculatively reject. It is 
 in truth intermingled in all our schemes, projects, 
 and achievements. In the address of the orator, 
 in the treatise of the author, in the enactments of 
 the legislator, in the manoeuvres of the warrior, in 
 the edicts of the monarch, it is equally implied. 
 Examine any one of these. Take for example the 
 operations of a campaign. A general in the exer- 
 cise of his authority over the army which he com- 
 mands, cannot move a step without taking for 
 granted that the minds of his soldiers will be de- 
 termined by the motives presented to them. When 
 he directs his aid-de-camp to bear a message to an 
 officer in another part of the field, he calculates 
 upon his obedience with as little mistrust as he 
 reckons upon the stability of the ground on which 
 he stands, or on the magnifying power of the tele- 
 scope in his hand. When he orders his soldiers to 
 wheel, to deploy, to form a square, to fire a battery, 
 is he less confident of the result than he is when he 
 performs some physical operation — when he pulls 
 a trigger, or seals a despatch ? It is obvious that 
 throughout all his operations, in marches and en- 
 campments, and sieges and battles, he calculates as 
 fully on the volitions of his men as on the strength 
 of his fortifications or the powers of his batteries. 
 
 It were easy to multiply illustrations. When a 
 man establishes a manufactory, he reckons with 
 
190 ILLUSTRATIONS OF 
 
 perfect assurance on the power of the motives 
 which he presents to the minds of his workmen. 
 There is a periodical result arising from their voli- 
 tions in which he unhesitatingly confides, just as he 
 confides in the power of the steam engine which 
 shares their labours. 
 
 In commercial transactions of all sorts there is the 
 same reliance. Jn the simple circumstance of a 
 merchant's draft on his banker, we have it striking- 
 ly exemplified. We can scarcely conceive an 
 instance of more perfect reliance on the determina- 
 tion of the will by the motives presented to it, than 
 this common occurrence. The merchant dismisses 
 his draft into the commercial world without the 
 least doubt, that however circuitous the course, it 
 w T ill at last find some individual to present it for 
 payment, and that his banker will finally pay it. 
 Here we have in fact a series of volitions, the re- 
 sult of which is looked for with unhesitating confi- 
 dence, with a confidence quite equal and similar to 
 that with which the material of the draft is expected 
 to retain the hand-writing upon it. 
 
 The principal illustration, however, w 7 hich I have 
 to adduce on this subject is the science of political 
 economy, especially as it will afford at the same 
 time an opportunity of exhibiting the real basis of 
 this science, which has not perhaps been fully un- 
 derstood, even by some of those who have been suc- 
 cessful in the discovery and elucidation of its truths. 
 
THE PRECEDING CHAPTER. 191 
 
 The principle which is at the bottom of all the 
 reasonings of potitical economy, is in fact the uni- 
 formity with which visible or assignable circum- 
 stances operate on the human will. It is for example 
 laid down in books on this subject, that if a com- 
 munity can purchase any commodity on lower terms 
 .at one market than another, they will resort to the 
 cheaper market; and on this proposition an econo- 
 mist builds a large superstructure of argument, with- 
 out the least doubt as to the foundation on which 
 it rests, and confidently predicts what will be the 
 conduct of this or that nation to whom such a 
 choice of markets is offered. The result thus pre- 
 dicted is made up of the actions of individuals, all 
 of whose minds are determined by this assignable 
 circumstance. 
 
 Another principle of political economy is, that 
 where competition is left open, there is a certain 
 equality takes place in the profits of the various 
 branches of commerce. If any one branch becomes 
 much more lucrative than the rest, a flow of capi- 
 tal to that department soon restores the equilibrium. 
 This principle is explained by Adam Smith, in the 
 case of the builder, as follows : 
 
 " The building rent," says he, " is the interest or 
 profit of the capital expended in building the house. 
 In order to put the trade of a builder upon a level 
 with other trades, it is necessary that this rent 
 should be sufficient, first, to pay him the same in- 
 
192 ILLUSTRATION OF 
 
 terest which he would have got for his capital if he 
 had lent it on good security ; and, secondly, to keep 
 the house in constant repair, or what comes to the 
 same thing, to replace within a certain term of 
 years the capital which had been employed in build- 
 ing it. The building rent, or the ordinary profit of 
 building, is therefore everywhere regulated by the 
 ordinary interest of money. Where the market 
 rate of interest is four per cent., the rent of a house, 
 which over and above paying the ground rent, af- 
 fords six or six and a half per cent, upon the whole 
 expense of building, may perhaps afford a sufficient 
 profit to the builder. When the market rate of in- 
 terest is five per cent., it may perhaps require se- 
 ven or seven and a half per cent. If in proportion 
 to the interest of money the trade of a builder af- 
 fords at any time a much greater profit than this, it 
 will soon draw so much capital from other trades 
 as will reduce the profit to its proper level. If it 
 affords at any time much less than this, other trades 
 will soon draw so much capital from it as will 
 again raise that profit.* 
 
 Now, when Dr. Smith asserts, that the trade of 
 a builder under the circumstances supposed will 
 draw capital from other trades, he is not stating a 
 physical fact which will take place in consequence 
 of some material attraction, but he is laying down 
 
 * Wealth of Nations, book v. chap. 2. 
 
THE PRECEDING CHAPTER. 193 
 
 a result which will ensue from the known princi- 
 ples of the human mind, or in other words, from 
 motives acting on society with certainty and pre- 
 cision. The secession of capital from other trades 
 is not a mechanical effect, like the motion of water 
 to its level, but the consequence of a number of 
 voluntary actions. It is an event which is produced 
 through the medium of the wills of human beings, 
 although we reason upon it with as much certainty 
 as on the tendency of water to an equilibrium. 
 
 In employing such figurative expressions as these, 
 ill exalting trade and capital into spontaneous agents, 
 and investing them with certain qualities and ten- 
 dencies, we are apt to be deceived by our own lan- 
 guage; to imagine that we have stated the whole 
 of the truth, and to lose sight of all those mental 
 operations concerned in the result which we so 
 concisely express. Let us reflect for a moment on 
 all the intellectual and moral processes which lie 
 hid under the metaphorical description of the trade 
 of a builder drawing capital from other trades. To 
 produce this result, the fact must transpire that the 
 trade is more than ordinarily lucrative ; this cir- 
 cumstance must excite the cupidity or emulation 
 of a number of individuals ; these individuals must 
 deliberate on the prudence or propriety of embark- 
 ing in it; they must resolve upon their measures ; 
 they must take steps for borrowing money, or with- 
 draw capital before appropriated to other purposes 
 17 
 
194 ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 and apply it to this ; in doing which, they will pro- 
 bably have to enter into bargains, make sales, draw 
 bills, and perform a hundred other voluntary ac- 
 tions ; the result of all which operations will be the 
 employment of a greater portion of the labour of 
 the community in building than formerly, and a 
 smaller portion in other pursuits ; and all these with 
 a number of other occurrences are masked under 
 the phrase of one trade drawing capital from an- 
 other. 
 
 It is the same throughout the whole science of 
 political economy. The rise and fall of prices, the 
 fluctuations in exchange, the vicissitudes of supply 
 and demand, the return of excessive issues of paper 
 on the bankers, the disappearance of specie, the 
 depreciation of the currency, and various other 
 events, are to be traced to certain determinate 
 causes acting with regularity on the wills of bodies 
 of men : all these phrases are in fact expressions of 
 the results of voluntary actions. Such circumstances 
 furnish as striking instances of perfect vaticination 
 with regard to the determinations of the will as any 
 that can be produced from physical science. Poli- 
 tical economy is in a great measure an inquiry into 
 the operation of motives, and proceeds on the prin- 
 ciple that the volitions of mankind are under the 
 influence of precise and ascertainable causes. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ON THE UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION AS THE FUNDA- 
 MENTAL PRINCIPLE OF PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVI- 
 DENCE. 
 
 It is manifest from the foregoing representations, 
 that it is solely by assuming the uniformity of causa- 
 tion that we can penetrate into the future. Without 
 this assumption we could not predict the commonest 
 occurrence, nor calculate on any property of mind 
 or of matter. Every prediction and every calcula- 
 tion on the future is in fact an inference from causes 
 to effects, and implies two things : first, a knowledge 
 of the past sequences of causes and effects ; and, 
 secondly, an assumption that the same sequences 
 will take place hereafter. This is the only kind of 
 vaticination or foresight which we can conceive. 
 
 It is the same assumption of the uniformity of 
 causation which enables us to penetrate into the 
 past. But in doing this we evidently reverse the 
 proceeding. Instead of inferring effects from their 
 causes, we in the first instance at least infer causes 
 from their effects — a process which implies the 
 same knowledge of the sequences of events, and 
 
196 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 also an assumption that those sequences have al- 
 ways been the same. We can ascertain past events 
 which we have not ourselves witnessed, only by 
 tracing their connection with present circumstances ; 
 nor can we proceed a step in this without assuming 
 that like effects have had like causes. 
 
 In w r hat may be called physical evidence the 
 process is very clear and simple. Suppose, for in- 
 stance, that travelling through a newly discovered 
 country I come to a deserted and dilapidated build- 
 ing. I infer with all the unconsciousness and in- 
 stantaneousness of instinct that it was built by 
 human beings. I enter: 1 perceive a chimney 
 blackened by smoke, and I find long rank grass 
 growing in the roofless apartments; from which 
 circumstances 1 conclude that the tenants of the 
 building w 7 ere in the habit of using fire, and that it 
 has not been recently occupied. In all this it is 
 obvious that I assume at every step the uniformity 
 of causation in the past. How can I tell that the 
 structure has been the work of men? Plainly, be- 
 cause I have seem men, and men only, construct 
 similar edifices, and a similar effect must have had 
 a similar cause. Deprive me of this latter principle, 
 let similar effects be supposed to proceed from 
 dissimilar causes, and I cannot make a single in- 
 ference : the structure may have been the work of 
 birds, it may have sprung like a mushroom from 
 the earth, or fallen like a shower from the sky. 
 
THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE. 197 
 
 In all other cases of physical evidence, the pro- 
 cedure of the mind is, in the first instance,* a sim- 
 ple inference from present appearances to the 
 causes which produced them. One of the most 
 striking examples of this kind of evidence is fur- 
 nished by the science of geology, in which, from 
 the phenomena presented by the ante-diluvial strata 
 of the earth, the philosopher infers the past occur- 
 rence of events concerning which the voice of his- 
 tory is totally silent. Here, where not a whisper 
 of human testimony is heard, we perceive the na- 
 ture of physical evidence in its naked and undis- 
 guised form ; and we cannot fail to discern, that 
 every step of our reasonings from it is an ascent 
 from present phenomena to their causes, involving 
 the principle of uniform causation. 
 
 But it is only a small part of our knowledge of 
 
 * I say in the first instance, because, after having inferred a 
 past cause from any present phenomenon, we may descend 
 from that cause to other effects of which we have no direct 
 evidence. Thus in the science of geology, we infer from the 
 appearance of certain strata that they were deposited by water ; 
 and when we have thus established the agency of water, we 
 may proceed to deduce many other necessary effects which 
 must have resulted from it. In this way we reason from effect 
 to cause and from cause to effect ; but in every case which re- 
 fers to past events, our inferences commence by the former, 
 namely, by reasoning from present phenomenon to their causes ; 
 and whichever we do, the same assumption is involved in the 
 process. 
 
 17* 
 
193 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 past events which we gather from physical evidence. 
 By far the most important source of information 
 to such events is the testimony of human beings ; 
 and it is a curious, interesting, and momentous in- 
 quiry, whether we proceed on the same principle 
 when we avail ourselves of this moral evidence to 
 penetrate into the past, as when we make use of 
 that which is of a purely physical character. 
 
 Testimony must be either oral or written, As 
 far as the mere physical circumstances are concern- 
 ed, we evidently commence our use of it by rea- 
 soning from effects to causes. We infer, for example, 
 that the writing before us has been the work of 
 some human being, in doing which we of course 
 assume the uniformity of causation. If from the cir- 
 cumstances attending the testimony we infer that it 
 is entitled to be received as veracious ; if, for in- 
 stance, we find that it has proceeded from a man of 
 tried integrity, and who acted under the influence 
 of motives which render it unlikely that he should 
 deceive, our inference still proceeds on the assump- 
 tion of the same principle. I may have in other 
 cases found these circumstances to have been the 
 precursors or causes of true testimony ; but how 
 can I or any one tell that they have operated in 
 the same way in the instance before me ? The re- 
 ply must evidently be, that it is impossible to avoid 
 assuming that the same causes have invariably the 
 same effects. 
 
THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE. 199 
 
 In fact, if we examine any of the rules which 
 have been laid down for the reception of testimony, 
 or any of those marks which have been pointed out 
 as enabling us to judge of its credibility, we shall 
 find them all involving the uniformity of causation, 
 It is allowed on all hands, that the concurrence of 
 a number of witnesses in the same assertion, their 
 reputation for veracity, the fact of the testimony 
 being against their own interest,the probability of de- 
 tection in any false statements, are all circumstances 
 enhancing the credibility of what they affirm. These 
 are considered as general principles on the subject 
 gathered from experience, and w 7 e apply them in- 
 stinctively to any new case which may be present- 
 ed to us, either in the course of our own observation, 
 or as having taken place at some former period. 
 But it is obvious from what has just been said, that 
 unless we assume a uniformity in the succession of 
 causes and effects, we cannot transfer our experi- 
 ence from any one case to another. That cer- 
 tain circumstances have produced true testimony 
 in one or a hundred instances, can be no reason 
 why they should produce it in a different instance, 
 unless we assume that the same causes have neces- 
 sarily the same effects. 
 
 It is clearly shown by this reasoning, that in the 
 reception of testimony and the use of physical evi- 
 dence we proceed on the same principle. But in 
 the case of testimony there is a peculiarity not be- 
 
200 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 longing to physical evidence. In the former we 
 not only have certain effects from which it is our 
 task to infer the causes, or certain causes from 
 which to infer the effects ; as when we judge the 
 writing before us to have been the work of some 
 human being, or the testimony to be true on ac- 
 count of the circumstances under which it was 
 given ; but the testimony itself consists of the as- 
 sertion of facts, and the nature of the facts asserted 
 often forms part of the grounds on which the vera- 
 city of the testimony is determined : it frequently 
 happens, that while external circumstances tend to 
 confirm the testimony, the nature and circumstan- 
 ces of the facts attested render it highly improbable 
 that any such facts should have taken place, and 
 these two sets of circumstances may be so exactly 
 equivalent as to leave the mind in irremediable 
 doubt. In the consideration of both, however, the 
 same assumption is involved. We think the facts 
 improbable, because we have found them rarely 
 occurring under the circumstances stated ; we think 
 the testimony likely to be true, because we have 
 generally found true testimony to proceed from 
 witnesses acting under the influence of similar 
 motives, and what w T e have found to happen in other 
 cases we are irresistibly led to conclude must also 
 happen in the case before us. 
 
 The opposition of the circumstances of the evi- 
 dence and the nature of the facts may be carried 
 
THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE. 201 
 
 still further. Assertions are frequently made which 
 in themselves imply a breach of the uniformity of 
 causation. From such cases the conclusions al- 
 ready established remove all difficulty. To weigh 
 probabilities, to determine what credit is due to 
 two sets of conflicting circumstances, neither of 
 which as far as our knowledge extends is irrecon- 
 cilable to the usual course of nature, is often a nice 
 and arduous task ; but if the principles of this essay 
 are correct, it is easy to see what reception ought 
 to be given to assertions professedly implying .a de- 
 viation from the uniform succession of causes and 
 effects. 
 
 Suppose, for instance, any person to affirm that 
 he had exposed a cubic inch of ice to a tempera- 
 ture of 200 degrees of Fahrenheit, and that at the 
 expiration of an hour it had retained its solidity. 
 Here is a sequence of events asserted which is 
 entirely at variance with the admitted course of 
 nature ; and the slightest reflection is sufficient to 
 show that to believe the assertion would involve a 
 logical absurdity. The intrinsic discrepancy of the 
 facts could never be overcome by any possible 
 proofs of the truth of the testimony. 
 
 For let us put the strongest case imaginable ; let 
 us suppose that the circumstance of the ice remain- 
 ing unmelted, rests on the concurrent testimony of 
 a great number of people, people too of reputation, 
 science, and perspicacity, who had no motive for 
 
202 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 falsehood, who had discernment to perceive and 
 honesty to tell the real truth, and whose interests 
 would essentially suffer from any departuie from 
 veracity. Under such circumstances false testi- 
 mony it may be alleged is impossible. 
 
 Now mark the principle on which this repre- 
 sentation proceeds. Let us concede the positions, 
 that what is attested by a great number of wit- 
 nesses must inevitably be true, — that people of 
 reputation and intelligence without any apparent 
 motive for falsehood are invariably accurate in 
 their testimony, — and that they are above all inca- 
 pable of violating truth, when a want of veracity 
 would be ruinous to their interests. Granting all 
 this, I ask the objector, how he knows that these 
 things are so ; that men of this character and in 
 these circumstances speak truth? He will reply 
 that he has invariably found them to act in this 
 manner : but why, because you have found them 
 to act in this manner in a few or even in many 
 cases, within your own experience or in the ex- 
 perience of ages, do you conclude that they have 
 acted so in all cases and in the case before us ? 
 The only answer is, thpt it is impossible not to 
 take for granted, that in precisely similar circum- 
 stances Similar results will ensue, or that like causes 
 hare always like effects. 
 
 Thus on the ground of the uniformity of causa- 
 tion, he would be maintaining the competency of 
 
THE BASTS OF EVIDENCE. 203 
 
 testimony to prove a fact which implies a deviation 
 from that uniformity. 
 
 It is true that the one case relates to a physical 
 and the other to a moral event; and it is barely 
 possible that some one may contend that the uni- 
 formity of causation in material is inferior to that 
 in mental changes. 
 
 To refute such an objection, I should have to re- 
 verse the train of argument by which 1 endeavour- 
 ed to show in a former chapter that the uniformity 
 of causation is the same in both. I had there to 
 prove that the greater uncertainty which is suppos- 
 ed to characterise mental phenomena, is merely 
 the uncertainty of our own knowledge ; but in re- 
 futing the objection at present under notice, I 
 should have to prove that there is no greater uni- 
 formity of causation in voluntary actions than in 
 physical events, which is surely a superfluous un- 
 dertaking. 
 
 It is indeed curious enough, that if any one should 
 choose to exalt the evidence of testimony above 
 physical evidence, he would have the difficult task 
 of proving that this uniformity is superior in volun- 
 tary actions. For testimony is in all cases a volun- 
 tary act or the result of volition, implying the 
 previous operation of motives. If a person as- 
 serts that he has witnessed a particular event, he 
 must be actuated by some motive or other to make 
 the assertion. Suppose this motive invariably to 
 
J04 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 be a desire to disclose the truth, accompanied by 
 the requisite knowledge ; we should then confident- 
 ly rely upon hearing the truth whenever any hu- 
 man being opened his lips. But it is evident that 
 our confidence would be in no respect greater than 
 that which we should feel with regard to the melt- 
 ing of ice when placed in the fire, or the sinking of 
 lead when thrown into the sea. If testimony were 
 uniformly true, its truth could not rank higher in 
 point of certainty than any other ascertained fact 
 in nature ; or in other words, there could be no rea- 
 son why it should produce a greater degree of 
 certainty in our understandings. 
 I These considerations appear to establish the 
 important rule, that no testimony can prove any 
 deviation from the known sequences of cause and 
 effect, or that at any time similar effects have 
 not had similar causes or similar causes, similar 
 effects. 
 
 In the strongest conceivable case, the argument 
 of an advocate for the power of testimony to prove 
 such deviations would be this : " It is impossible 
 that human testimony should not be true in these 
 circumstances, because its falsity would be contrary 
 to the principles of human nature ; that is, it would 
 imply a deviation from that sequence of motives 
 and voluntary actions which has invariably been 
 observed." 
 
 But on precisely the same ground he ought to 
 
THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE. 206 
 
 maintain that the circumstances attested could not 
 take place, because they are contrary to the laws of 
 the material world, unless it can be shown, as I 
 have before remarked, that the certainty or uni- 
 formity of causation in voluntary actions is greater 
 than in physical events. 
 
 The rule now laid down, is in fact that bv 
 which mankind are universally though perhaps not 
 consciously nor uniformly glided. Let us take 
 another 'case as an illustration. If a number of 
 men were to swear that they had seen the mercury 
 of a barometer remain at the height of 30 inches 
 when placed in the exhausted receiver of an air- 
 pump, their testimony would be instantly rejected. 
 The universal conclusion would be that such an 
 event was impossible. To justify the rejection of 
 the evidence, it would not be necessary to account 
 for the origin of so extraordinary a statement, or 
 to trace the concatenation of motives in the minds 
 of those who asserted its truth. The motives of 
 the witnesses might be quite inconceivable, there 
 might be no apparent advantage to any of them in 
 hazarding a falsehood : on the contrary, their rank 
 in life, their reputation, their habits of integrity, 
 the disgraceful consequences of detection, might 
 appear irresistible dissuasives from a course of de- 
 ceit. But although these circumstances might con- 
 cur in rendering their veracity probable, no man 
 of science would listen to their evidence. People 
 18 
 
206 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 might be perplexed to account for their conduct, 
 but all would agree as to the credit due to their 
 statements. 
 
 It may be asked, why reject the testimony 
 rather than admit the fact, when the former equally 
 implies a deviation from the uniform sequence of 
 causes and effects? If the circumstances of the 
 witnesses are such as always give rise to true testi- 
 mony, then to consider their evidence as false is to 
 admit, that the same causes do not always produce 
 the same effects. 
 
 The answer to this objection is not difficult. If 
 the rejection and the admission of the testimony 
 equally implied a deviation from the uniform se- 
 quence of causes and effects, there could be no 
 reason for either rejecting or admitting it; for 
 every reason which can be assigned why any past 
 event should be regarded as having taken place in- 
 volves the uniformity of causation. But the rejec- 
 tion of the testimony is not in this predicament. 
 The causes of testimony, or in other words those 
 considerations which operate upon the mind of the 
 witness, cannot always be ascertained ; and as we 
 are uncertain as to the causes in operation we 
 cannot be certain of the effects ; we cannot be 
 sure that the circumstances of the witness are such 
 as have before given rise to true testimony, and 
 consequently we cannot be sure that the testimony 
 is true. To reject testimony, therefore, in any case 
 
THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE. 207 
 
 where it is brought to establish a professed devia- 
 tion from the uniform sequence of causes and 
 effects, can never imply a departure from that uni- 
 formity, white to admit it would by the supposition 
 necessarily involve one. It may be remarked 
 further, that many of the sequences of cause and 
 effect in the material world are so simple, that we 
 may at any time verify them by experiment, which 
 can seldom be done with regard to moral events, 
 such as testimony, the result of complex causes. 
 Whether ice will melt in the fire, or whether mer- 
 cury will remain at a height of 30 inches in the 
 exhausted receiver of an air-pump, I can try at 
 pleasure ; but I cannot place a witness under the 
 influence of any assigned combination of circum- 
 stances, for the purpose of trying whether they will 
 cause him to speak truth. The sequence which is 
 thus perfectly ascertained can never be invalidated 
 by one which is doubtful. 
 
 A still closer argument may be employed. 
 Should any man affirm himself to have been an 
 eye-witness of any event contrary to the usual suc- 
 cession of causes and effects, such as those above 
 adduced, I might consistently reply to him in the 
 following terms : " I have no grounds whatever for 
 believing what you say. You assert that an event 
 has taken place quite at variance with the observed 
 course of nature; but if I once give up the unifor- 
 mity of causation or of the laws of nature, 1 may 
 
208 UNIFORMITY OF CAUSATION 
 
 account for what I hear by supposing that your 
 senses have deceived you, or that your tongue utters 
 words which you do not intend, or that my ears 
 have acquired the property of changing the sounds 
 transmitted to them ;■' or any other mutation which 
 it is possible to conceive. Without this principle 
 I should be abandoned to the utmost license of 
 conjecture and scepticism, nor could I possibly 
 have any reason for supposing one of these events 
 to have taken place rather than another, be- 
 cause every reason that could be assigned would 
 necessarily imply the principle which 1 had dis- 
 carded. 
 
 In a former chapter I endeavoured to prove, that 
 the uniformity of causation could not be established 
 by testimony, because testimony reaches only a 
 limited number of events ; and our reception of it, 
 as the present chapter has more largely shown, 
 proceeds on the assumption of that uniformity 
 which it was supposed capable of proving. But it 
 is obvious to remark, that if testimony on this ac- 
 count is not capable of proving the uniformity of 
 causation, it cannot prove the contrary ; if we ne- 
 cessarily assume this principle antecedent to all 
 testimony and in the reception of testimony itself, 
 we cannot subsequently discard it on the strength 
 of the same species of evidence. The illustration 
 of this remark, however, would only lead to a re- 
 petition of what has been already advanced. 
 
THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE. 209 
 
 In saying that by far the most important kind of 
 evidence is the testimony of human beings, I ought 
 to have qualified the observation by stating, that the 
 proofs of the being of a God all belong to that class 
 of evidence which I have termed physical. It is 
 not human testimony but physical evidence, which 
 points to the existence of a Supreme Intelligence ; 
 and it is worthy of particular remark, that every 
 argument adduced from the appearances of design 
 in the works of nature, from the exquisite contri- 
 vances which overpower us with admiration, is an 
 obvious instance of the unavoidable assumption that 
 like effects must have had like causes. Renounce 
 this principle, and how would it be possible to infer 
 from the most admirable appearances of design, 
 that they have been the production of an intelligent 
 cause ? 
 
 In vain would the philosopher point out in any 
 organized body the admirable correspondence of 
 means to ends, the nice adaptation of one expedi- 
 ent to meet an inconvenience and another to secure 
 an advantage, the happy disposition of parts, and the 
 harmonious operation of the whole, unless we could 
 be sure of the truth, that similar effects must have 
 had similar causes, and that consequently successful 
 contrivances to produce happiness and obviate 
 misery, could proceed from no other source than a 
 wise and benevolent Author. 
 18* 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 ON POSSIBILITY, PROBABILITY, AND THEIR OPPOSITES. 
 
 The term uncertainty has already been explained 
 in another chapter in, which I endeavoured to show- 
 that it designated a state of the mind, not an attri- 
 bute of events. A similar observation may be made 
 with regard to the words probability, possibility, 
 and their opposites ; important terms which 1 have 
 hitherto employed without explanation, because I 
 considered that their real signification would be 
 necessarily brought out by the preceding discus- 
 sions. 
 
 It is worthy of particular notice, that we apply 
 these terms in common to the past and the future. 
 We speak of the probability of a circumstance re- 
 lated of Miltiades or Julius Caesar, as well as of the 
 probability of an event which is looked for to-mor- 
 row. As to the past, it requires no argument to 
 prove that a certain succession or train of events 
 has taken place, which from the nature of the case 
 cannot be altered, and which may be said to form 
 an immutable object of knowledge. It follows con- 
 
ON POSSIBILITY. 211 
 
 sequently, that if with regard to the past we make 
 use of any terms implying dubiousness or uncer- 
 tainty, such terms have no relation to the events 
 themselves, but to our acquaintance with them. 
 When we speak of past circumstances as possible 
 or impossible, probable or improbable, we are only 
 expressing the degree of our knowledge. 
 
 The term possible, evidently implies a defect of 
 knowledge on our part. It implies in fact that we 
 are not acquainted with all the antecedents of that 
 event to which we apply the epithet. We are told, 
 for instance, that a man B fell from his horse yes- 
 terday morning at eight o'clock, and we pronounce 
 such an accident possible, because we are not ac- 
 quainted with any circumstances irreconcilable with 
 it, nor is any such circumstance assigned by the 
 narrator. But the report is false ; the event has not 
 taken place, and had we known the whole preced- 
 ing circumstances relating to B up to the hour 
 specified, we should have pronounced the accident 
 impossible : we should have found, perhaps, that B 
 had indeed mounted his horse, but also that his 
 body was all the time in a position utterly incom- 
 patible with his falling, so that his keeping his seat 
 was the necessary consequence of the causes in 
 operation. 
 
 That event therefore to us is possible which 
 contradicts not our experience, in as far as we are 
 acquainted with the circumstances attending it, or 
 
212 ON POSSIBILITY, PROBABILITY, 
 
 in other words, which does not imply any deviation 
 from the uniform sequence of causes and effects. 
 
 This brings us to the signification of impossible, 
 when that term is used in reference to the succes- 
 sion of events. An event is impossible which con- 
 tradicts our experience, or which implies that the 
 same causes have produced different effects, or the 
 same effects been preceded by different causes. 
 While the term possibility implies a defect of know- 
 ledge on our part, impossibility implies no defect, 
 but on the contrary complete knowledge of the 
 succession of causes and effects. Thus when we 
 pronounce that it was impossible for a piece of ice 
 to remain in the midst of burning coals without 
 being dissolved, our conclusion involves a complete 
 knowledge of this particular effect of fire on ice, as 
 well as the assumption that what has taken place in 
 our own experience must always have occurred 
 under precisely the same circumstances. 
 
 Jf I am not greatly deceived, the acutest rea- 
 soner, the closest thinker, the most subtile analyser 
 of words will find himself unable to produce any 
 other meaning of the term impossible than that 
 which is here assigned to it.* 
 
 * There is another use of the word impossible in the sense 
 of self-contradictory. For instance, it is said to be impossible 
 to make a true circle whose radii shall be unequal. Such im- 
 possibilities would, as several philosophers have remarked, be 
 more properly styled self-contradictions. Analysis carried 
 
AND THEIR OPPOSITES. 213 
 
 When any event is rumoured to have happened, 
 and we pronounce the rumour to be untrue and the 
 event impossible ; or when any circumstance is well 
 attested, and we pronounce it impossible that the 
 evidence should be false, what is the real amount 
 of our words ? In what consists the impossibility? 
 On what principle does our judgment proceed? 
 
 If the impossibility does not consist in the event 
 involving a deviation from the uniformity of causa- 
 tion, if our judgment proceeds on any other princi- 
 ple than this, let the essence of the impossibility, let 
 the real principle of our judgment be exhibited. 
 Let us see what other explanation of this important 
 term can be given. 
 
 In the mean time, when we are referring to the 
 succession of events, we may consider impossible 
 and involving a deviation from the uniform succes- 
 sion of causes and effects, as convertible terms or 
 synonymous expressions. " It is impossible for ice 
 to remain in the fire unmelted," is just the same 
 proposition as " the continuance of ice in the fire 
 unmelted involves a violation of the uniformity of 
 causation. " How many perplexing difficulties 
 w 7 ould be solved and controversies determined by 
 the simple substitution of one of these phrases for 
 the other ! 
 
 farther than I have at present occasion to push it, might proba- 
 bly show that all impossibility, and amongst the rest that here 
 treated of, involves a contradiction of ideas. 
 
214 ON POSSIBILITY, PROBABILITY, 
 
 The term probability will not detain us long. It 
 necessarily implies a deficiency of knowledge, since, 
 if we knew all the circumstances connected with 
 an event alleged to have taken place, we should 
 know w T hether or not it had happened, and we 
 should not regard it with any uncertainty. The 
 circumstances connected with an event may be 
 either such as precede or such as follow it, or in 
 other words they may be either causes or effects. 
 If we knew the whole of the causes in operation at 
 the time the event is alleged to have taken place, 
 we could with certainty infer the effect, or whe- 
 ther the event took place or did not : or if we 
 knew the whole of the circumstances succeeding 
 that time we could also determine the matter. 
 Probability therefore can only have place when but 
 part of these preceding and succeeding circum- 
 stances are known, and will be greater or less ac- 
 cording to the number of them with which we are 
 acquainted. 
 
 According to this explanation, an event is proba- 
 ble when we are acquainted with a number of cir- 
 cumstances preceding and succeeding, which must 
 have happened had the event taken place; and it is 
 improbable when we are acquainted with a number 
 of such circumstances, which must have happened 
 had the alleged event not taken place ; or perhaps 
 probability may be said to consist in the prepon- 
 derance of the former kind of circumstances over 
 
AND THEIR 0PP0S1TES. 215 
 
 the latter, and improbability of the preponderance 
 of the latter over the former. 
 
 Probability could not evidently be attributed to 
 any events unless they proceeded from regular 
 causes and produced regular effects. To us they 
 are probable because we know some but not all 
 the circumstances connected with them ; but as al- 
 though we knew all the circumstances we could not 
 be sure of the events without assuming the unifor- 
 mity of causation, so if we know only a part of the 
 circumstances we cannot regard the events as pro- 
 bable without the same assumption. Thus whether 
 the preceding definition of probability is sufficiently 
 comprehensive and accurate or not, it is plain, that 
 whenever we employ the term we necessarily as- 
 sume the principle of uniformity. The argument 
 may be put in a somewhat different shape. An 
 event is asserted to be probable. Why ? Because 
 certain circumstances have happened which always 
 accompany such an event. But why should those 
 circumstances be considered as rendering the event 
 probable in the instance in question ? They have, 
 it is true, in other cases been found to constitute 
 grounds of probability, but why should they con- 
 tinue to do so in the present instance ? JSo answer 
 can be given, but that we unavoidably assume the 
 occurrence of similar results in similar cases. 
 
 We have hitherto considered these terms as ap- 
 plied to the past, and it requires little illustration 
 
216 ON POSSIBILITY, PROBABILITY, &C. 
 
 to show that they have the same meaning when 
 applied to the future. 
 
 In speculating on the future, we consider that to 
 be possible which is not at variance with the known 
 sequences of events ; that to be impossible which 
 implies a deviation from them. No prediction 
 would be listened to a moment which involved an 
 incompatibility with that assumption of the unifor- 
 mity of nature, which is identified with all our 
 mental operations, and without which foresight and 
 prediction could not have place. Probability and 
 improbability, when applied to the future, have also 
 the same signification as when applied to the past, 
 and imply an acquaintance with part only of those 
 circumstances, a knowledge of the whole of which 
 would give us the power of unerring and positive 
 prediction. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ON NECESSITY. 
 
 In a former chapter we have remarked, that the 
 fact of our assuming the uniformity of causation in 
 mental as well as physical events, appears to settle 
 the question respecting the necessity of human ac- 
 tions. 
 
 The regular sequence of causes and effects seems 
 to be all that is implied in the word necessary. 
 From the disputes nevertheless, which have arisen 
 with regard to the necessity of human actions, it is 
 evident that the term has been used in a vague or 
 ambiguous manner. On a close investigation, I 
 think it will be found that this word has been em- 
 ployed in three different senses unconsciously and 
 without discrimination: 
 
 1. In the sense already explained to denote the 
 uniform connection of cause and effect. 
 
 2 e As the opposite of the word voluntary, or in 
 other words, either in the negative sense of being 
 independent of the will, or in the positive sense of 
 being against or in opposition to the will. 
 
 3. To denote the circumstance of our being able 
 19 
 
218 ON NECESSITY. 
 
 to trace an effect to its causes. That which we can 
 refer to its causes we frequently term necessary, 
 while that which we are not able to trace to its 
 causes we call contingent. 
 
 1. In the first of these senses, no one can deny 
 the necessity of human actions without inconsisten- 
 cy. That there is a uniformity of causation in 
 mental as well as physical events, in the determina- 
 tions of the will as well as in the operations of the 
 intellect ; that we unavoidably assume this unifor- 
 mity and perpetually act on the assumption ; are 
 facts which have already been established in the 
 preceding chapters. If then this is the meaning of 
 those who assert the necessity of human actions ; 
 if they simply intend to express that voluntary ac- 
 tions follow their causes with the same regularity 
 which prevails in the changes of the material world, 
 no one can refuse to admit the proposition without 
 contradicting a principle of his own mental consti- 
 tution. 
 
 2. With regard to the second meaning of the 
 term, it is scarcely requisite to make a remark. If 
 by necessary we mean the opposite of voluntary, 
 then to call voluntary actions necessary would be 
 absurd. This is an absurdity perhaps never com- 
 mitted by the advocates of the doctrine of neces- 
 sity, but it is one often virtually imputed to them by 
 their opponents. 
 
 3. If by the term necessary we mean to denote 
 
ON NECESSITY. 219 
 
 those events which can be clearly traced to their 
 causes, and thus become the objects of unerring 
 prediction, and if by contingent we mean to de- 
 note those events, the causes of which lie hid from 
 our scrutiny, then voluntary actions like physical 
 events are of both kinds, some are necessary and 
 some contingent, and in the progress of knowledge 
 many of the latter are gradually passing into the 
 former. 
 
 In this sense the term necessary coincides with 
 the term certain, explained in a preceding chapter, 
 and has relation merely to the state of our know- 
 ledge, not to any quality in the events themselves. 
 Our incapability of assigning the causes of any 
 effect, or predicting the effects of any cause, can in 
 no way alter the connection between them. 
 
 It appears from this examination as if there could 
 be no dispute at all in reference to any propositions 
 depending on the term necessary, so long as it was 
 exclusively employed in any one of the three ac- 
 ceptations here pointed out; and of any other 
 meaning than these three it seems difficult to form 
 a conception. It is to be suspected therefore, that 
 the differences on this subject have arisen from 
 sometimes attaching one and sometimes another of 
 these meanings to the word, and to other equivalent 
 expressions, and also from a similar vacillation in 
 the use of the antagonist phrases. 
 
 There is one prevalent fallacy which could never 
 
220 ON NECESSITY. 
 
 have been supported a moment had there been 
 strict precision in the employment of terms. It 
 consists in asserting that voluntary actions are not 
 necessary, because in every case the agent might 
 have acted differently. This is in fact at the bottom 
 using necessary as the opposite of voluntary, and 
 then asserting the consequent truism, that what 
 depends on the will is not necessary. But the fal- 
 lacy deserves a more detailed exposure. Suppose 
 then some one to assert that his voluntary actions 
 are not necessary, because in every conceivable 
 case he might have acted otherwise. We must in 
 the first place ascertain the meaning of the expres- 
 sion " might," and a little consideration will show 
 it to imply an alteration in the conditions of the 
 action. The full meaning is that he might have 
 acted otherwise had he pleased, which is only as- 
 serting that had antecedent circumstances been 
 different a different effect would have followed. It 
 is in truth an assertion of the necessity of the same 
 result in the same circumstances ; for in order to 
 conceive a different result he is obliged to suppose 
 an alteration in the cause. His being pleased to do 
 the action was the necessary condition to its being 
 done. Had he pleased to do some other action, that 
 other action w r ould have followed. 
 
 Should it be still alleged that his being pleased 
 was his own doing, it may be replied that it was 
 certainly an event which took place in his own 
 
ON NECESSITY. 221 
 
 mind, if that is what it is intended to say: but in 
 genera], when we speak of any thing being our own 
 doing, we mean that it was our voluntary act. Now 
 in no sense can his being pleased to do a thing be 
 said to be his voluntary act, for if we trace what 
 passes in the case of every voluntary action we 
 shall find three things : 
 
 1. Certain ideas are presented to the mind. 
 
 2. The mind is brought into the state of willing 
 or being pleased to do something; which is gene- 
 rally if not always in the first instance a movement 
 of the muscles. 
 
 3. The movement follows, or the thing is done, 
 and this third event is that which we term a volun- 
 tary action. 
 
 If this is a correct account of the successive steps 
 essential to a voluntary action, then to say that 
 being pleased to do a thing is itself a voluntary 
 action, is to say that an effect is its own cause. We 
 call an action voluntary because it follows that state 
 of mind which we designate by the expression being 
 pleased to do the action, and consequently to apply 
 the same epithet to the state of mind itself would 
 be to assert that being pleased was the consequen ce 
 of being pleased. It will be seen from all this, that 
 when any one maintains voluntary actions not to 
 be necessary because he might have acted other- 
 wise had he pleased, his proposition merely asserts 
 that a different result would have happened under 
 
 19* 
 
222 ON NECESSITY. 
 
 different circumstances ; and proves in fact the im- 
 possibility of conceiving any event to have been 
 otherwise than what it was, except on the supposi- 
 tion of a change in the causes. The assertion is a 
 proof that voluntary actions are. necessary in the 
 only sense affixed to it by any one who understands 
 the subject, namely in the sense of depending on 
 regular causes; for he is compelled to suppose a 
 change of causes in order to suppose a change of 
 effect, — a procedure evidently implying that while 
 the causes are the same the same effect cannot be 
 different. 
 
 It is obvious that in such fallacies as this there is 
 an inveterate supposition, that by the term neces- 
 sity is meant something acting in opposition to the 
 will, and obliging us to perform actions at variance 
 with it; and it is not surprising that under this sup- 
 position the doctrine of necessity should have ap- 
 peared inconsistent with our own consciousness. 
 But when the term necessity is kept strictly to one 
 meaning, when it is used to denote simply the con- 
 nectionof causes and effects, and all that the doc- 
 trine asserts is shown to be that the state of mind 
 termed willing, or being pleased to do a thing, is 
 an effect of regular causes, every semblance of in- 
 consistency with personal consciousness vanishes. 
 All that we can in any case be conscious of is, in 
 the first place, the occurrence of a smaller or greater 
 number of views or considerations, some perhaps 
 
ON NECESSITY. 223 
 
 inclining us to act one way and some another, and in 
 the second place the power of doing as we please. 
 In this there is nothing in the slightest degree in- 
 compatible with the doctrine of causation. The 
 occurrence of certain views of considerations to 
 the mind is one link in the chain of moral causation, 
 which the advocate of philosophical necessity can- 
 not be supposed to deny, — nor does he refuse to 
 admit, nay he insists in its fullest sense on the con- 
 sciousness of the power of doing as we please. 
 We always are conscious of the power, and always 
 exercise the power of doing as we please in things 
 depending on the will; but why are we pleased to 
 do one thing rather than another ? This is an effect 
 which by the constitution of our nature we pro- 
 nounce must have a cause ; and all that the philoso- 
 pher asserts is that there is a cause or combination 
 of causes, which in every case brings the mind into 
 the state of being pleased. This cause or combi- 
 nation of causes cannot always be assigned, but 
 there are thousands of instances in which the con- 
 nection of the cause and the state of mind is so 
 completely ascertained, that we do not hesitate to 
 infer one from the other. 
 
 In judging of human nature we are obviously 
 guided partly by our own consciousness and partly 
 by our experience of mankind. Both are often 
 necessary for the establishment of a general truth , 
 and they admirably unite in support of the doctrine 
 
224 ON NECESSITY, 
 
 of philosophical necessity. We not only find from 
 an examination of our own minds that it states no- 
 thing at variance with what is passing there, but 
 we see when we look abroad that the phenomena 
 of human life are crowded with illustrations of its 
 truth.* 
 
 * It is no wonder that misconceptions of the doctrines of phi- 
 losophical necessity are so prevalent, when such a writer as 
 Dr. Coplestone has given the following' representation of it. 
 
 "Let us now attend to the graver question, whether because 
 God made the world and all things in it, therefore every thing 
 that happens, human conduct as well as the rest, must be re- 
 garded as proceeding from him, and determined beforehand by 
 his direction, in all its detail. Whatever has been, is, or will 
 be, could not, as some say, be otherwise. We, vain and insig- 
 nificant creatures, full of our own importance, imagine that we 
 act from ourselves, that we can deliberate, choose, reject, com- 
 mand, forbid, contrive, hasten or hinder a thousand things, 
 when in fact this is all delusion — all the creation of our own 
 fancy. We are but members of the machine, like the rest ; and 
 though we may please ourselves with thinking that we act an 
 independent part, the real truth is, we have no voice, no power, 
 no control in what is going on — all would take its course just 
 the same, whether for good or for ill, were we to give ourselves 
 no anxiety or concern whatever in the matter. Such, I believe, 
 is a fair statement of the doctrine of philosophical necessity, or 
 predestination, confined to this life." Inquiry into the Doctrines 
 of Necessity and Predestination, p. 7. 
 
 The author of the present treatise will not assert that Dr. 
 Coplestone may not find some authorities for this representation 
 in the multitude of writings on the subject of necessity ; but he 
 will venture to say that there is scarcely a proposition in the 
 whole passage, except perhaps the two first sentences, with 
 
ON NECESSITY. 225 
 
 Self-introspection is in all cases an indispensable 
 process for arriving at correct conclusions regard- 
 ing the powers and principles of the human mind, 
 but the facts which it presents are just as easily- 
 connected with false inferences as any others. Of 
 this the present subject yields an illustration, which 
 is also a striking instance of a moral phenomenon 
 more prevalent in the world than we are apt to 
 suspect, the existence in the same understanding of 
 two opinions mutually destructive, without any 
 consciousness of their incompatibility. We frequent- 
 ly find the same person denying the doctrine of the 
 necessary determination of the will by the motives 
 presented to it, and yet contending for the neces- 
 
 which any necessarian who understands the question would 
 agree. So far indeed from holding the opinions here imputed 
 to him, he would maintain the reverse; he would maintain that 
 we can and do deliberate, chouse, reject, command, forbid, con- 
 trive, hasten or hinder a thousand things; that this is not de- 
 lusion ; that deliberation, choice, rejection, are as real events 
 as freezing, thawing, raining; that we have a voice, a power, a 
 control in what is going on ; that instead of all pursuing its 
 course just the same, were we to give ourselves no anxiety or 
 concern whatever in the matter, this anxiety or concern is a 
 necessary link in the chain, without which a totally different 
 series of events must ensue ; that, in other words, if we did no* 
 give ourselves any trouble about things, if we did not exercise 
 a power and control over them, they could not possibly follow 
 the same course as if we did, our being anxious or taking a con- 
 cern or exercising a control in them being a condition, the ab- 
 sence of which would necessarily modify the result. 
 
226 ON NECESSITY. 
 
 sary truth of testimony in certain assignable circum- 
 stances. 
 
 It scarcely requires a word to show the incon- 
 sistency of these two intellectual acts. Testimony, 
 as we have before remarked, is the result of voli- 
 tion; and to maintain that certain circumstances 
 necessarily give rise to that sort of testimony which 
 is true, is to maintain that the motives presented 
 necessarily determine the witness to speak the 
 truth. 
 
 The origin of this inconsistency will, I think, be 
 found in the appeal which men are apt to make in 
 these cases to their own feelings. With regard to 
 the first case, namely, the determination of the will 
 by the motives presented to it, they are conscious 
 that when any action is proposed to them they can 
 decide as they please, and they therefore reject the 
 idea of any necessity in their determinations. With 
 regard to the second case, namely, the necessary 
 truth of testimony in certain assignable circumstan- 
 ces, their conclusion seems in the same way the 
 result of an appeal to consciousness. They repre- 
 sent to themselves all the strong motives constituted 
 by those circumstances, and they feel that in such 
 a situation they could not have uttered a syllable 
 of falsehood. 
 
 Hence it appears that the same appeal to con- 
 sciousness results in two conclusions incompatible 
 with each other ; the validity of the conclusion in 
 
ON NECESSITY. 227 
 
 favour of the truth of testimony in certain assigna- 
 ble circumstances, depends on the invalidity of the 
 other conclusion, that there is no necessary deter- 
 mination of the will. It is not, however, that men 
 are in this case deceived in the facts. The incom- 
 patibility of the results is owing to the fallacy of the 
 inference, that because we are conscious of being 
 able to do as we please, there is no necessity in our 
 determinations, a fallacy itself proceeding on an 
 erroneous interpretation of the principal term. 
 
 There is also another intellectual phenomenon 
 connected with the subject before us, which may 
 perhaps be also referred to the habit of appealing 
 to our own consciousness. Notwithstanding the 
 universal and unavoidable assumption of the uni- 
 formity of nature, there seems to be on some occa- 
 sions in the minds of the ignorant, a more lively 
 sense or deeper impression of the uniformity of cau- 
 sation in motives and actions than in physical events, 
 when these two are placed in opposition. 
 
 For instance, a narrative relating events contra- 
 ry to the laws of nature is received on the authority 
 of men, whose interest, as far as we can discover, 
 would naturally lead them to suppress it. Obloquy 
 and threats and violence perhaps are in vain em- 
 ployed to make them depart from their statement ; 
 and although their story implies as palpable a vio- 
 lation of the properties of matter, as that which in 
 the extremest case the falsehood of their testimony 
 
228 ON NECESSITY. 
 
 could possibly involve of the principles of humna 
 nature, there is often a strong propensity to believe 
 it. Men can scarcely imagine that any one should 
 persevere in a false statement, in opposition to all 
 the motives which urged him to abandon it. Less 
 difficulty is found in conceiving an equal anomaly 
 in physical events. It is probable that this partial 
 leaning to the necessary operation of motives in 
 such circumstances is to be accounted for, by the 
 different kinds of mental reference employed in re- 
 gard to the two classes of facts. In regard to moral 
 facts we appeal to our own consciousness, whether 
 such motives would not have had such effects, 
 whether we ourselves could have persevered if the 
 statement had not been true, and we feel intensely 
 sensible of the impossibility of continued imposture. 
 In regard to physical facts, on the other hand, we 
 appeal to a less vivid principle, to our recollection. 
 In the former case we appear to make an actual 
 trial, we put the matter to the proof of our own 
 sensibility ; in the latter we go through the cooler 
 process of referring to knowledge previously ac- 
 quired. 
 
 Although this may explain why men have some- 
 times a greater tendency to believe in the unifor- 
 mity of moral than of physical events, it evidently 
 furnishes no logical ground of preference, and the 
 tendency itself manifests an obvious inconsistency. 
 It is only too in particular circumstances, as for 
 
ON NECESSITY. 229 
 
 instance when the evidence is vividly exhibited, or 
 the mind is under the impresssion of deep preju- 
 dices and feelings, that the phenomenon is observ- 
 able. At other times the instinctive belief of the 
 uniform sequence of physical causes and effects, is 
 the source of that undefined and latent, but irrepres- 
 sible scepticism, with which men in general regard 
 every narrative asserting a deviation from the regu- 
 lar course of nature. It is a remarkable fact, how- 
 ever, in the history of the human mind, that while 
 men speculatively reject the principle of uniformity 
 in moral events, they should in some cases practi- 
 cally ascribe greater force to it than to the unifor- 
 mity of physical causation. 
 
 20 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Man, it has been remarked, is placed on the nar- 
 row isthmus of the present time, between the two 
 oceans of the past and the future ; and I have en- 
 deavoured to show the principle by the aid of which 
 he sends his glances over both. 
 
 All, in fact, that a man strictly speaking experi- 
 ences relating to external things, are certain affec- 
 tions of his bodily organs, and the rest of his know- 
 ledge consists of inferences from these. Even in 
 the instance of testimony oral or written, what he 
 directly knows is in the one case a few sounds, and 
 in the other certain affections of the organ of vision ; 
 every thing beside may be said to be conclusions, 
 however rapid, or habitual, or instantaneous, de- 
 duced from these simple sensations ; and he can- 
 not arrive at one of these conclusions without 
 assuming the grand principle of the uniformity of 
 causations. 
 
 The assumption of this principle 1 have endea- 
 voured to illustrate. 1 have shown that it enters 
 
CONCLUSION. 231 
 
 into our reasonings on the past as well as into our 
 speculations on the future ; that the truth assumed 
 is not the result of personal experience, nor to be 
 gathered from the testimony of others ; and that 
 the assumption of it is involved in all our conclu- 
 sions respecting moral and intellectual as well as 
 physical phenomena. 
 
 I have further endeavoured to show that uncer- 
 tainty is a state of the mind, not an attribute of 
 events ; and that whatever uncertainty we feel in 
 regard to voluntary actions, is of the same kind and 
 has the same origin as that which we feel in regard 
 to physical occurrences ; and moreover that men's 
 actions and speculations as constantly proceed on 
 the expectation that certain acts will result from 
 certain motives, as that certain effects will be pro- 
 duced by physical causes. 
 
 I have also entered expressly into the considera- 
 tion of this assumption as involved in our reason- 
 ings upon the past or our use of evidence, and 
 shown, that as the whole of our inferences from 
 the present to the past rest upon it, or in other 
 words the whole of our knowledge of the past, we 
 cannot discard it in any case without a logical ab- 
 surdity. I have particularly applied this truth to 
 the case of testimony; and in conclusion I have 
 attempted to prove that the term impossible, when 
 employed in reference to the succession of events, 
 
 20* 
 
232 CONCLUSION. 
 
 :an imply nothing but a deviation from the uni- 
 formity of causes and effects, and that the term 
 lecessary is merely expressive of that uniformity. 
 
 Many of these are either striking truths in them- 
 selves, or truths from which important conse- 
 quences naturally flow. They seem to myself to 
 3e principles which may be decisively applied to 
 ;he elucidation of doctrines hitherto obscurely un- 
 lerstood, and to the determination of controversies 
 ong vainly agitated. 
 
 Amongst the important questions, the solution of 
 which they comprehend, two deserve to be parti- 
 :ularly distinguished. The first is the controversy 
 3n the subject of philosophical necessity. The 
 fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters will I apprehend 
 be found to determine all that can be meant by 
 this term, and its antagonist freedom of the will^ 
 almost without any mention of either of those 
 phrases ; and the chapter which is devoted ex- 
 pressly to the subject will render this still more 
 apparent. 
 
 The other important question that may be cited 
 as embraced by the doctrines in this Essay, regards 
 the legitimate bounds of testimony. If the princi- 
 ples laid down on this subject are correct, they 
 release the mind at once from an overwhelming 
 load of difficulty, and plainly define one of the true 
 limits of that important species of evidence. If 
 
CONCLUSION. 233 
 
 they are not correct, the plainness with which they 
 are laid down will render their refutation an easy 
 task, and facilitate the object w 7 hich this imperfect 
 but maturely considered essay has had in view, — 
 the establishment of truth in a momentous and 
 difficult sphere of inquiry. 
 
 THE END. 
 
By the same Author. 
 
 1. ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION AND 
 PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS. 
 
 2. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION IN LI- 
 TERARY SOCIETIES, on Political Economy, 
 Politics, Morals, Metaphysics, Polite Literature, 
 and other branches of Knowledge, with Remarks 
 under each Question, original and selected. 
 
 3. A CRITICAL DISSERTATION on the Na- 
 ture, Measures, and Causes of VALUE; chiefly in 
 reference to Mr. Ricardo and his Followers. 
 
 4. A LETTER TO A POLITICAL ECO- 
 NOMIST, occasioned by an article in the West- 
 minster Review on the subject of Value. 
 
fc'340 2 
 

 
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