BD ill Certttube A STUDY IN PHILOSOPHY BY REV. ALOYSIUS ROTHER, S.J. PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY ST. LOUIS, MO., i 9 ii Published by B. Herder 17 South Broadway freiburg (baden) i london, w. c. Germany 68, Great Russell Street ^1 NIHIL OBSTAT Sti. Ludovici, die i. Oct. 1910 R. J. Meyer, SJ. Praep. Prov. Missour. NIHIL OBSTAT Sti. Ludovici, die 25. Nov. 1910 F. G. Holweck, Censor Librorum. IMPRIMATUR Sti. Ludovici, die 25. Nov. 1910 *i* Joannes J. Glennon, A?-chiepiscofius Sti. Ludovici. Copyright, 191 1, by Joseph Gummersbach Becktold Printing: and Book Mfe. Co.. St. Louis. Mo. £,C!.A2S0f>5? CONTENTS CHAPTER i. \ PAGE INTRODUCTORY NOTIONS— Ignorance, Com- plete and Partial, Privative and Negative — X Doubt, Negative and Positive — Opinion — Sus- picion — Certitude — Certitude merely Subjective, and Certitude at once Subjective and Objective — Certitude, Metaphysical, Physical and Moral — Certitude, Absolute and Hypothetical — Certi- tude, Natural and Philosophical I CHAPTER 2. REQUISITES FOR CERTITUDE. Article i. First Requisite for Certitude: As- sent to Truth 20 Article 2. Second Requisite for Certitude: Infallible Motives 26 Article 3. Third Requisite for Certitude: Evidence of the Infallibility of the Motives 29 CHAPTER 3. PROPERTIES OF CERTITUDE. Article 1. Metaphysical Certitude Absolute Certitude 35 CONTENTS. PAGE Article 2. Metaphysical Certitude the only Ab- solute Certitude 37 Article 3. Physical and Moral Certitude, though Hypothetical, still True Certitude. . 40 Article 4. Essential Grades of Certitude 70 Section 1. Metaphysical Certitude Greater than Physical and Moral, and Physical Greater than Moral 70 Section 2. The Three Orders of Certitude not Species Properly so Called 73 Article 5. Accidental Degrees of Certitude. ... 81 Alphabetical Index 93 PREFACE The following pages present an exposition of Certitude accord- ing to the teaching of the Scholastics, and their purpose is to secure a greater esteem and love for the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. CERTITUDE CHAPTER FIRST Introductory Notions Summary: States of mind falling short of certitude- Ignorance, complete and partial, privative and negative — Doubt, negative and posi- tive — Opinion — Suspicion — Certitude — Cer- titude merely subjective and certitude both subjective and objective — Certitude, meta- physical, physical and moral — Moral certi- tude in a wider sense — Certitude, absolute and hypothetical— Certitude, natural and philosophical. i. The inquiry into any new branch of knowl- edge should, according to Cicero's advice (de Officiis, 1. i. c. 2.), start out with a definition of the subject to be investigated, in order that we may clearly know what we are about to discuss. 2. Definition of certitude. What then is certitude? It is ordinarily described as the firm* assent of the mind to a statement without any] fear of error. 3. States of mind falling short of certitude. Before scrutinizing the above definition a little I 2 Certitude more thoroughly, let us first note the various states of mind falling short of genuine certitude. 4. Ignorance. When man comes into the world, his mind may be compared to a virgin page, or— as philosophers put it — to a "tabula rasa," that is, a smooth wax tablet upon which no inscription has as yet been made. This total absence of knowledge is ignorance. Little by little, impressions are made upon this tablet of the mind, becoming deeper and broader till fre- quently the knowledge acquired by the mind grows most varied and seemingly unlimited. However, finite intelligences, no matter how com- prehensive in their breadth of thought, will al- ways remain in ignorance of incomparably more than they know; for knowledge is infinite, and none but the Infinite can hold it all. Hence, ignorance may either be complete or partial. Again, ignorance is either a mere absence of knowledge, or it is the absence of such knowledge as a person, under given circumstances, is ex- pected to have. The former is technically known as negative and the latter as privative ignorance. Thus if the physician is not acquainted with farming, we have an instance simply of ig- norance: there is a mere negation — negative ignorance. But if he is not acquainted with matters the knowledge of which is called for by his profession, his ignorance is privative: there Introductory Notions 3 is a privation of some knowledge that is due — privative ignorance. 5. The mind's activity in the pursuit of its object, truth, may be compared to a journey, of which ignorance is the starting point, and cer- tainty the destination. 6. State of doubt. The first stage in the route of travel is the state of doubt. When we say this, we do not mean to assert that the mind always passes first from a condition of ignorance to that of doubt. No, very often it takes a straight leap from ignorance to certain knowl- edge. Frequently, however, it is compelled to reach its destination by this roundabout way of doubt. Doubt is a state of intellectual suspense be- tween some statement and its opposite due to lack of evidence. In this state of doubt, the in- tellect views two or more ideas and compares them, but discovers no signs of their mutual relation or merely such slight ones as justify no positive judgment. Hence it remains undecided. Suppose a boy were to ask you whether the number of fish in the Mississippi River is odd or even, you would perhaps say to him, if you took him seriously at all, that as you had no reasons whatsoever for asserting either the one or the other, you could not tell. This kind of doubt, where there is a total absence of grounds for either side, is called negative. It is really 4 Certitude not doubt at all, but rather ignorance in regard to the relation between two terms. For to doubt means to refuse assent on account of the insuffi- ciency of the motives advanced for a proposition and its opposite ; now in negative doubt, no mo- tives whatever are discernible. If the reasons for both of the opposite state- ments are very weak, doubt is likewise regarded as negative. It is termed positive, when there are, indeed, grounds for both alternatives worthy of some consideration, but none weighty enough to in- duce a man of ordinary prudence to give or re- fuse his assent. 7. Opinion. If, on the other hand, sufficient reasons present themselves to justify the mind in embracing one of the two opposite statements, without, however, precluding the possibility of error on its part, then, should it venture on a judgment, it is said to form an opinion. This is the second stage on the road to certitude. Hence, opinion may be defined as an assent of the mind to one of two opposite views on grounds not altogether incompatible with error. It is wavering assent, synonymous with belief in one of its meanings. Thus Webster says, "Belief is used for persuasion or opinion, when evidence is not so clear as to leave no doubt." The grounds which give rise to an opinion, are Introductory Notions 5 called its probability. For an opinion to be ra- tional, the reasons in its favor must be such as to move a prudent man to yield assent. It is not necessary that the grounds for the side embraced should preponderate. It is sufficient for them to be solid and sound, not light and delusive. 8. Suspicion. There is still another condi- tion of mind on this side of certitude which might be regarded as a sort of bridge or tran- sition between doubt and opinion, namely suspi- cion. Suspicion, as here understood, is not the same as a rash judgment formed on flimsy grounds ; but as entering into philosophic investi- gation, it is regarded as a leaning or inclination of the mind to pronounce judgment for reasons insufficient in themselves, but which seem to point in the direction in which the truth lies. Suspicion, as thus taken, is really nothing else than a certain scenting or divining of the truth. It is but the struggling of the "ingenium curi- osum" in man, and an evidence of its restlessness and eagerness to soar aloft on the wings of thought. It gives rise to all manner of guesses, conjectures, hypotheses and theories, and thus often proves the fruitful mother of startling in- ventions. Hence in the purely intellectual re- gion, such surmises are laudable and to be encouraged, provided, of course, they do not run counter to any well established principle or 6 Certitude fact. But in the practical concerns of life, sus- picions must be controlled by the dictates of a correct conscience. 9. Certitude. We have now arrived at the destination of our journey, namely certitude. We described it, at the opening of the treatise, as the firm assent of the mind to some statement, without any fear of error. This definition of certitude does not necessarily import that assent is given to truth. As a matter of fact, it is pos- sible for the mind to adhere, without fear of error, not only to what is true but, even at times, to what is false. This seems puzzling and calls for an explanation ; it will be better, however, to defer this question to another place (No. 34) where we shall treat of the requisites for genuine certitude. The above definition of certitude then, is gen- eral, and applies to firm assent given to one of two contraries, whether the side adhered to, be true or false. 10. First division of certitude. This leads us at once to the division of certitude into that which is merely subjective, and that which is both subjective and objective. Certitude regarded in itself, is, of course, sub- jective; for it is a state of mind. But this subjective state may have been caused by ob- jective truth, or it may be wholly due to the action of the intellect, unduly influenced by the Introductory Notions J will and deluded by the mere appearance of truth. If the origin of certitude is traceable to the former, i. e. to objective truth, certitude is called formal: if solely to the latter, i. e. to the subjective operation of the mind, it is styled purely subjective. This purely subjective certitude may be defined as unyielding assent to a proposition on grounds which do not make it evident that the possibility of the opposite is excluded; whilst formal certi- tude, on the other hand, is described as firm as- sent to truth on grounds which show its opposite to be plainly absurd. Formal certitude might not unsuitably be called genuine certitude, all the more so, as the ordinary meaning of our word "formal" suggests something quite different from the above techni- cal signification. We shall show further on, why this last kind of assent alone deserves to be dignified with the name of certitude properly so called. Purely subjective and genuine certitude, it will be noticed, agree in this, that both are qualities of the thinking mind, but they differ from each other in that the former has its source in the mind exclusively, whilst the latter is the result of the mind determined by objective truth. Objective certitude. Since we are allowed by metonomy to name the cause of a thing after the effect it produces, objective truth as giving 8 Certitude rise to subjective certitude, has been termed ob- jective certitude. This so called objective certitude may be de- fined as objective truth manifesting itself to the mind in such a way as to compel assent. In this connection, let it be remarked that ob- jective truth as productive of firm assent should, if we wish to be exact in expression, be simply called "certainty," whilst the word "certitude" ought to be reserved for the subjective condition of the mind. Cardinal Newman in his "Gram- mar of Assent," p. 331, says: "Certitude is a mental state, certainty is a quality of a proposi- tion." Thus, we often hear people say, that such or such a thing is a certainty ; or that they accept some fact as an inevitable certainty. But we say, "Skeptics will admit no certitude," or, "We have no certitude of the hour of our death." However, this distinction is by no means al- ways observed. Let us illustrate the above definitions by a few examples. " t was the belief of men for ages that the earth was flat. This conviction of theirs was purely subjective certitude, as the reason for it, namely the mere sensible appearance of the earth, was not of a nature to exclude the possibility of the opposite, namely that the earth was not flat, but round. The form of the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies must have often created doubt Introductory Notions 9 in the minds of the beholders, and should have set them to reconsider their hasty inference. And now let us take an instance of genuine certitude. We are firmly convinced that there is a Provi- dence, lovingly caring for us and directing and controlling all that exists. Our belief in this divine guidance is unshakable and moreover rests on grounds, namely the wisdom, goodness and love of God, which are incompatible with the contrary statement that there is no Providence. Here we have a clear exemplification of the firm assent resting on objective truth, that is, of genu- ine certitude. 11. Second division of certitude. There is still another division of certitude, which by rea- son of its great importance claims our special attention. We defined (objective) certitude as truth manifesting itself to the mind in such a way as to compel assent. Now this manifesta- tion of the truth takes place through certain ob- jective grounds or reasons, which, however, are not all of the same general character; for there are essential differences amongst them. Accord- ing to these differences both certainty and certi- tude are divided into three classes, namely, tneta^ physical, physical and moral. 12. Metaphysical certainty. A statement regarding some objective truth is said to be meta- physically certain, when it rests on grounds io Certitude drawn from the very essence of that truth and involved in its very idea; and since what is es- sential to a thing is altogether inseparable from it, it follows that the metaphysically certain im- plies absolute unchangeableness, such as is with- drawn from Almighty power itself. Thus, it is metaphysically certain that two and two are four, and not even God can bring about that they should not be four. The adherence of the mind to such truths con- stitutes metaphysical (subjective) certitude. It may be defined as assent to a statement on grounds with which its opposite is absolutely in- compatible. When we say that a statement is absolutely incompatible with certain motives, we mean that the truth of this statement together with the ex- istence of those motives would imply a contra- diction, that is to say, an affirmation and negation of the same thing. 13. Physical certainty. Let us now pass on to physical certainty. A statement is said to be physically certain when its unchangeableness or permanent charac- ter, rests on the physical laws of nature. These laws, however, are subject to the controlling action of the Almighty power of God, as v. g. the law that a stone thrown into the air, if un- supported, will fall again to the ground. Hence it follows that physical certainty is hypothetical, Introductory Notions n being conditioned by the proviso, "if God does not interfere with the ordinary course of na- ture." The adherence of the mind to a physical fact consequent upon the perception of nature's uni- form mode of action is physical (subjective) certitude. It is defined as assent to a statement, on grounds with which its opposite is physically incompatible: that is to say, a statement made in opposition to nature's laws cannot become true, as long as these laws, which form the ground of assent, remain in force and are not suspended by the God of nature. These laws of nature, as will have been gath- ered from the foregoing, are forces residing in nature, in virtue of which physical agents — that is, agents not endowed with freedom — always and of necessity produce the same effect. It is to these forces that the uniformity and constancy of nature are due. Now let us throw a little more light on this subject by a few examples. It is contrary to the laws of nature, as known to us through legiti- mate induction, for a dead person to come back to life. These same inexorable laws make it impossible for a man to walk on the billows of the ocean without sinking, or to be shut up in a fiery furnace without being consumed. Hence any report that a dead man left the grave, or that some one walked on the water without being 2 12 Certitude submerged, or dwelt in the midst of flames un- touched, must be refused credence, unless it ap- pears clearly that it pleased God to suspend the laws of nature in some particular case for wise reasons of his own. 14. Moral certainty. We now come to our last division of certainty, namely, moral cer- tainty. A statement is said to be morally certain, when the so called "moral laws" form the basis of its fixedness and unchangeableness. 15. Meaning of moral laws. But before we go any further, we *must first explain what is meant by moral laws. Moral laws, as here understood, are certain, tendencies or propensities of free beings which prompt them always to act in a certain definite manner. True, they do not deprive the agent of his freedom : they leave it in his power to act counter to them. Yet, as these laws are not only most helpful but even indispensable to the well-being of the individual and the race, they are in such com- plete harmony with reason that no one can set them aside except by an extreme abuse of his free will and by doing violence to his rational self. They possess then a certain necessitating or compelling force, yet so that they can, abso- lutely speaking, be overruled by the will of man. But more about this further on. Introductory Notions 13 They are called moral laws because they are impulses, guiding agents capable of moral ac- tions, and strengthening them in the performance of good. The name "law" as referred to these prompt- ings of man's rational nature is somewhat mis- leading. For by a law in the domain of morality, we generally understand a precept or command- ment. But the moral laws as the basis of moral certainty are not precepts as such; they are rather, as explained before, moral forces, tend- encies, proclivities, planted by God in man's na- ture, to help him to perform certain very impor- tant operations more readily and securely. In fact, they are called laws only, as bearing an analogy to physical laws. But as the phrase "moral laws" in the signifi- cation just given is very rare, and moreover not sanctioned by our standard dictionaries, we shall avoid it, and employ instead expressions in cur- rent usage having the same meaning, as "moral or human instincts," "natural bias," "tendency or inclination of free agents," and the like. From the above explanation we infer, that, like physical certainty, moral certainty is hypo- thetical, being dependent on the condition, that the free agent will not go counter to his rational instincts. We may then define moral (subjective) certi- tude as assent given to a statement, the opposite 14 Certitude of which is incompatible with man's moral in- stincts. Let us, as before, illustrate our abstract defini- tions by a few concrete examples. The love of life, as long as life is a source of enjoyment, is one of these moral instincts. No one who is in good health and held in honor, will take his own life, though he can do so. Again, our correct natural inclinations urge us with irresistible power, not to maim or disfigure ourselves. Could you imagine a young man who is, moreover, rather vain of his appearance to slash himself with a razor? Yet, no one will deny that it is possible for him to do so. This love of keeping our bodies whole and intact, is another moral instinct, such as we described above. "Nemo gratis mendax," that is, no one lies just for the sake of lying, is also an instinct of this sort, governing the rational activity of man. People do tell many lies, no doubt; so many in fact, as to make the Psalmist say in his excess, "Every man is a liar." But they do not lie un- less some advantage accrues to them from this perversion of the truth. That the above dictum really embodies a human instinct, is also proven by the fact that every one considers it a great insult to be called a liar, and some resent it so much as to have recourse to violence. Yet there are found rare exceptions of moral depravity Introductory Notions 15 who set at naught this sacred bias of human na- ture, by lying just for the sake of lying. "Parents love their children," is also accounted- an instinct of the moral order. The love of parents for their offspring is planted in their hearts by the Almighty himself. Taking our stand upon this instinct, we consider ourselves justified in forecasting the actions of parents in regard to their children. True, there are un- natural parents ; the very fact, however, that men call them unnatural, proves that they regard their conduct as opposed to nature. Thus the cor- rectness of our assertion stands confirmed by common opinion. 16. It might be added here that not all the human tendencies are common to the entire race ; but some of them are restricted to certain condi- tions and stages of man's life. We can hardly make our meaning clearer than by citing a pas- sage from both Horace and Shakespeare, in which these great poets delineate the propensities and traits peculiar to certain states of human existence. Not all the characteristics set down by them as marking different periods of man's career, are moral instincts in the strict sense of the word; yet they bear at least a very striking resemblance to them, and thus serve as apt illus- trations of the matter under discussion. Thus Horace shows himself the keen observer and searching reader of the human heart that he 1 6 Certitude is, by the portrait which he gives in "Ars Po etica" of the tendencies, likings and habits of the beardless youth. He says : "Imberbis juvenis, tandem custode remoto, Gaudet equis canibusque, et aprici gramine campi ; Cereus in vitium flecti, monitoribus asper, Utilium tardus provisor, prodigus aeris, Sublimis, cupidusque, et amata relinquere pernix." Shakespeare sets forth the traits of the School- boy, the Soldier and the Justice very tellingly in the following lines : "And then the whining School-boy, with his satchel, And shining morning face, creeping like snail Unwillingly to school Then a Soldier, Full of strange oaths, and bearded like a pard, Jealous in honor, sudden and quick in quarrel, Seeking the bubble reputation Even in the cannon's mouth. And then the Justice, In fair round belly with good capon lined, With eyes severe, and beard of formal cut, Full of wise saws and modern instances." It will have been seen from the examples above given, that to know the human instincts, (whether properly so called or in a looser sense) is to know human nature. A thorough acquaint- ance with them makes the good ruler who is to guide men, and the good poet and novelist who describe their manners. To guard against misapprehension, let it be Introductory Notions ij remarked that by human instincts in the looser sense, we understand mere whims or humors common to certain classes of persons, national traits developed by local conditions and the like. Bear also in mind that at present we are simply endeavoring to clear up our notions ; later on, we shall examine whether physical and moral certi- tude are genuine certitude. 17. Moral certitude in the wider sense. The expression "moral certitude" is sometimes used in a somewhat different sense which we must notice, in order to avoid confusion. It often stands for what is highly probable, and may be denned, as assent to a proposition or. statement on grounds which render its truth highly probable without excluding the possibility of the contrary. Thus, if you send a letter or a parcel through the mail in a civilized country, you feel morally certain that it will reach its destination. You are also morally convinced that in a book of fair proportions, some printing mistakes will be found. This quasi-certitude is called "moral," because actions performed with such mental assurance as it can give us, are justifiable before the tribunal of conscience. Certainty of this kind might not unsuitably be called "prudential," since any measure taken in pursuance of it, must be regarded as prudent, that is to say, befitting a prudent man. 1 8 Certitude 1 8. Third division of certitude into absolute and hypothetical. There is still a further divi- sion of certitude to be noted, which is funda- mental in the study of philosophy, and especially in this question of certainty, namely, into abso- lute and hypothetical. Absolute certitude. A statement is said to be absolutely certain, when its truth is independent of any condition whatsoever. Certainty of this description is possessed by such propositions as the following: "God exists"; "Twice three are six"; "All the points of the circumference of a circle are equally distant from a point within called the centre." When we postulate independence "of any con- dition whatsoever," we, of course, mean condi- tions which are possible and conceivable ; for an impossible or inconceivable proposition must be regarded as non-existent. It might not be out of place to show by some examples how absolute propositions look, when yoked to an unthink- able condition. Here are two of them : "Three and three make six, provided three times three are not twelve;" or, "God is eternal, provided he did not begin to exist." It is plain that such senseless additions must be altogether set aside. Hypothetical certitude. A statement is hypo- thetically certain when its truth depends upon the fulfilment of some condition. Under this head fall all statements which are grounded on Introductory Notions 19 the physical laws and the moral instincts, as, "A stone dropped into the water will sink to the bottom," or "This witness, well known for his uprightness will tell the truth, when cited to testify in court." For the first example is con- ditioned upon God not suspending the ordinary course of nature, and the second, upon man making a proper use of his free will. 19. Fourth division of certitude into natu- ral and philosophical. Another division of cer- titude is that into natural and philosophical. Natural certitude is the mental assurance which every one of sound mind has in regard to many things, even without full advertence to the reasons why he is sure. The natural light of reason, even when unimproved by study and reflection, guides us safely in many things ; if not interfered with from without, it never leads us astray within its own sphere. Philosophical certitude is natural certitude per- fected by an accurate scrutiny of the grounds of assent. These two kinds of certitude do not differ es- sentially from one another. They are the same mental state in different stages of development; or, to express their dissimilarity in technical language, we might say that in natural certitude, the mind perceives the reasons for its firm con- viction indirectly or by implication, whereas when in possession of philosophical certitude, it knows the same reasons directly and explicitly. CHAPTER SECOND REQUISITES FOR CERTITUDE ARTICLE i First Requisite for Certitude, Assent to Truth Summary: Thesis: first requisite for certitude, assent to truth — An objection met — Proof of thesis — Truth the proper object of the intellect — Close connection between skepticism and the denial that assent to truth is required for certitude. 20. After describing certitude and enumer- ating its divisions, we must now prove what certitude is; and this we shall do by showing that the definition of genuine certitude is not arbitrarily formed, but possessed of objective validity, or, in other words, that it is in agree- ment with reality. 21. An objection met. An apparently seri- ous difficulty, however, confronts us at the out- set of our philosophical investigations. For, according to the statement just made, we intend to prove what certitude is ; but how is this possi- ble without begging the question? For we beg 20 Requisites for Certitude 21 the question whenever we assume in the premises the very thing to be proved. Now the premises to be of any service in reasoning must be recog- nized as certain: hence to prove what certitude is, you must already know that it exists and what it is. We can meet this objection in two ways. In the first place, we can reply that we do not in- tend to give a proof or demonstration in the strict sense of the word, that it is our purpose^ merely to analyze certitude, and that in doing so, we adopt the external garb of the syllogism simply for the sake of clearness and convenience. But we have another answer in reserve: it is our aim here to give a philosophical definition of certitude, and we deduce this from what com- mon sense tells us about certitude. In other words, we base our scientific and philosophical knowledge of certitude upon natural certitude, and thus we can demonstrate our definition to be correct without laying ourselves open to the charge especially odious to philosophers, of beg- ging the question. 22. Let us now restate the definition of certi- tude and point out that the elements involved in it, are based upon accurate observation and cor- rect analysis of the mental processes. True or genuine certitude is unflinching as- sent to truth from motives which show its oppo- site to be evidently absurd. 22 Certitude A glance at this definition reveals at once that for certitude strictly so called three conditions must be fulfilled, namely, first, the mind's assent must be given to a statement which is true in itself ; secondly, this statement must be accepted by the mind on grounds with which its opposite is incompatible ; and thirdly, these grounds must manifest themselves to the intellect as evidently infallible. For the sake of clearness, let us em- body each of these requirements in a separate thesis. THESIS i In order to have certitude in the strict and highest sense of the word, the mind's assent must, in the first place, be given to a statement which is true in itself. 23. Note that we speak here of certitude in the "strict" and "highest" sense of the word, where, by the former, we mean "genuine" certi- tude and, by the latter, "metaphysical." For, as we shall see further on, there can be certitude strictly so called, (viz. physical and moral), which, however, is not certitude in the highest sense of the term. 24. We can derive the necessity of this essen- tial condition for perfect intellectual assurance from the fact admitted on all hands, that e'erti- Requisites for Certitude 23 tude constitutes the perfection of the human in- tellect. It is the culmination, the acme of human cognition. It is the full repose of the mind in the possession of truth. This, in fact, might be called the definition of certitude as given by com- mon sense. For, a man of average intelligence will tell you, that he is certain when he has full assurance of something, and feels perfectly easy in mind in regard to its truth. Now it is im- possible that the intellect should experience such complete repose in giving assent to what is in itself false. For, it would then be at rest with- out being in possession of its own peculiar object, truth; and to say that any faculty can rest alto- gether satisfied when exercising its activity on an object not its own, is a contradiction in terms. The reason is this : Every faculty tends, of its very nature, towards its own object; as the will towards the good, the appetite towards food; for the object of a faculty is that to which its activity is directed. Now if it were possible for a faculty to find perfect satisfaction in an object not its own, it would thereby show itself indifferent and un- concerned in regard to its own object, since by the very fact of being attracted and engrossed by an object not its own, it ceases to tend to- wards its own. Hence a faculty of this sort would at once tend towards its own object — for otherwise it 24 Certitude would not be a faculty at all — and it would not tend towards it ; for we assume it to be indiffer- ent towards its own object, because we suppose it capable of finding full repose in something besides its own peculiar object; and this would imply a patent contradiction. Let us corroborate this argument by a few well known facts of every-day experience, which go to show that the cravings of a faculty can never be appeased by an object not its own. The will — one of the faculties of the soul — is ill at ease so long as it clings to what is evil ; it never finds perfect satisfaction except in the good. For evil is not the proper object of the will. Grating sounds and false notes offend the trained ear, because they are out of keeping with it. Dreary surroundings, bleak fields, bare trees act depressingly on a person of fervid imagina- tion: for the fancy has not the object on which it loves to feed. Thus it is also with the intellect, since it, too, is one of man's faculties. It cannot feel at rest unless it possesses truth: for truth is its proper object. Whence it follows that assent to what is false cannot be certain: for certitude is the full re- pose, the full assurance of the mind. 25. A query answered. But some one might Requisites for Certitude 25 ask, perhaps, how do you know that the true is the proper object of the intellect, and the false is not? The answer to this question is given by self -consciousness, which takes notice of all the internal phenomena of our intellectual life. For our consciousness tells us, that we all love truth, that our reason devotes its energies to discovering it : whilst this same inner witness attests that we abhor falsity as an evil, that we fly from it, that we feel ashamed when caught blundering. Now this love of truth on the one hand, and detestation of falsity on the other, clearly show that the one is, and the other is not the object of the intellect. Moreover, it is evident a priori, that the false, which is a privation of a perfection, and hence an evil, cannot be the object of a faculty. 26. Close connection between universal skepticism and denial that assent to truth is required for perfect certitude. To strengthen our thesis still more, we invite attention to the great importance of allowing no assent to be certain, unless given to what is true; for were we to yield this point, we should place skepti- cism on a dangerous vantage ground in its at- tack on the existence of certain knowledge, and thus play into the hands of our enemies. For if we could ever be truly certain of what is really a mistake, then certain and uncertain 26 Certitude assent would not differ from one another, as far as objective truth is concerned, since both the one and the other could stand with falsity. Hence, certain assent would in reality be as uncertain as uncertain assent; and if so, how could we ever be sure of the truth ? We should have to admit that we could not ; we should have to surrender to the skeptics. If then we do not hold steadfastly to this point, that what is certain is likewise true, the \ fabric of knowledge is built on sand, and cannot endure. ARTICLE 2 Second Requisite for Certitude, Infallible Motives Summary: Thesis: infallible motives required for cer- titude — Twofold character of grounds of assent — Proof of thesis. 27. We cannot then be certain, unless our assent is given to truth. However, this is not enough for certitude. For it often happens that what we mentally acquiesce in, is true as a mat- ter of fact, yet we are not for that reason alone certain. Hence a further condition for the re- moval of all doubt is needed. Let us state this explicitly in the next thesis. Requisites for Certitude 27 THESIS 2 For the intellect to be certain in the strict and highest sense of the word, it is not enough that the statement ad- hered to, be true; it must moreover be accepted on grounds with which its opposite is incompatible. A few expressions in this thesis need clearing up, before we can pass on to the proof. The grounds of a statement are, of course, the reasons that can be brought forward to show its * truth. These reasons may be of a twofold char- acter. They may either merely indicate that a statement is so without, however, excluding the- possibility of the opposite; or, they may, in ad- dition, make it appear that this possibility is excluded. It is reasons of the latter kind which we require for genuine certitude ; those of the first description only give rise to assent more or less probable. Let us illustrate our meaning by an example. Suppose you see a rabbit stretched out in the grass ; you raise it up : it neither breathes nor stirs ; you pass your hand over its body : it feels cold to the touch. You say, it is dead. But are you justified in pronouncing this judg- ment? Are your grounds for your assertion such as to exclude its contradictory? I answer that they are not. For it is possible for an ani- 3 28 Certitude mal which neither breathes nor stirs, and feels cold to the touch, to be still alive. Perhaps it is merely stunned. But suppose you notice, that the rabbit has been shot through the head or the heart, or that it is beginning to decay, then the grounds for your judgment that the rabbit is dead would be incompatible with its contradict- ory, namely, that the animal is not dead. In order to have genuine certitude, the reasons for assent must be of this kind. Let us now pass to the proof of the thesis, namely, that a statement in order to be certain, must be accepted by the mind on grounds with which its opposite is incompatible. In other words, the reasons for certain assent to a propo- sition must exclude the possibility of error. 28. This second condition for certain assent is an immediate inference from the first requisite for perfect certitude, namely, that nothing short of truth can fully satisfy the mind. Now it is only a statement resting on motives incompatible with its contradictory that is necessarily true. Hence no other reasons except such as invalidate the opposite of the proposition for which they are advanced, can fully satisfy the intellect and thus produce certainty. Thus when the view that the earth moved, was first advanced by Copernicus, the reasons given by him were not such as to exclude the opposite opinion, namely, that the earth was at Requisites for Certitude 29 rest. It was a theory then ; and it was by reason of the weakness of the arguments brought for- ward in its support that it was not generally ac- cepted as at present, when we are furnished with several proofs which shut out altogether the old belief as embodied in the Ptolemaic system. 29. The argument just given may also be very briefly presented in a somewhat different guise thus : In order that I may be certain in any particular case, my assent must be infallible. For to say that an affirmation is certain and to say that it is infallible, comes to the same thing. Now, in- fallibility is denned as entire exemption from liability to error; hence, assent that is infallible, must be traceable to reasons, which cannot under any circumstances co-exist with error. ARTICLE 3 Third Requisite for Certitude The Infallibility of the Motives for As- sent must be Evident Summary: Thesis: the infallibility of the motives of assent must be evident — Brief explanation of the notion of evidence — Proof of the thesis — In what sense the mind can be said to adhere to what is false without fear of error. 30. But there is still a third condition re- quired for perfect certitude. 30 Certitude THESIS 3 • In order to possess certitude in the strict and highest sense of the word, it is not enough for the intellect to assent to a statement true in itself and based on infallible grounds; these grounds must, moreover, manifest themselves to the mind as evidently infallible, that is, as necessarily con- nected with the truth. We assert then in this third thesis, that the reasons on account of which the mind yields certain assent must be evident to it. Although the discussion of the subject of evidence con- stitutes a special treatise of its own, the require- ments of our thesis call for a brief exposition of the meaning of evidence as used here. Evidence, in general, is anything that renders* truth apparent to the intellect. It is either ob- jective or subjective. Objective evidence, which is evidence properly so called, is nothing else than objective truth revealing itself to the mind so clearly as to compel assent. As we shall see later, whenever an object with the light of evi- dence shining upon it, is placed before the think- ing agent, the mind must yield to this clear manifestation of the truth ; whereas when such evidence is wanting, the surrender of the intel- Requisites for Certitude 31 lect by pronouncing judgment on insufficient grounds, is due, in part, to the power of the will exercising its sway over the cognitive facul- ties. This objective evidence is figuratively called the light through which truth discloses itself to the mind. Subjective evidence is the effect produced by objective evidence. It may be described as the perception of a statement with such clearness and distinctness, that all wavering of the intel- lect in regard to its certainty vanishes. To have perfect certitude, then, the exclusion of the opposite of a statement must be evident. This in plain English means, that we cannot be sure of a statement, unless we clearly see the force of the reasons given in proof. 31. Our assertion may be established in the following manner. Certain assent is the perfec- tion of the cognitive or knowing faculty. Now unshaken adherence of mind to a truth without the evident or clear perception of the infalli- bility of the grounds in its favor, is assent which cannot render to itself an account of its firm- ness ; it is firm assent, the firmness of which does not proceed from knowledge. For if I do not know that the grounds for my unwavering adherence to a truth are infallible, that is, neces- sarily connected with the truth, I cannot know that I am not mistaken. Hence, such assent, in so far as it is fixed and unyielding, would not 3 2 Certitude be rational ; it would resemble the blind instinct, by which the irrational animals are guided and pushed on. Now, it is plain that blind and un- founded acquiescence in a statement cannot pos- sibly constitute the perfection of a seeing or knowing faculty, such as the intellect is. Suppose some one brings forward the most incontestable arguments to prove to me the geo- metrical proposition that the square described upon the hypothenuse is equivalent to the sum of the squares described upon the other two sides. As long as I do not see their force, that is, as long as I do not clearly perceive the neces- sary connection between the arguments advanced and the truth of the proposition in question, I cannot give that firm assent, which rests on in- sight and is rational. 32. The same argument might also be pro- posed in a slightly different form thus: In order that the infallible grounds, which accord- ing to our second thesis are required for certi- tude, may produce fixity of assent, they must, of course, act upon the mind. But to this end, they must manifest themselves as infallible. For it is only through the knowledge of their infallibility, that these grounds appeal to the mind and become capable of influencing it in such a manner as to compel assent. Let us add another argument in proof of our thesis. Requisites for Certitude 33 33. An intellectual being by its very nature must know its own thoughts by reflection, and, hence, in attaining to certitude must become con- scious of this certitude. To become conscious of this certitude, however, it must clearly see that the reasons for admitting the truth exclude all error. 34. A difficulty answered. This seems to be the most appropriate occasion to redeem our promise (Xo. 9) of showing how it is possible for the mind to adhere, without fear of error, not only to what is true, but sometimes also to what is false. How can this be? Is not this an admission that certitude is, as the skeptics say, impossible of attainment? For if false and genuine certitude resemble each other so closely, how can I tell one from the other? How can I know that what seems most solid, may not after all be only a soap bubble? In unriddling this apparent paradox, we must distinguish between absence of fear in the will and quiet of mind. For although in assent both to what is true and to what is false, the will may experience no fear that the intellect is mistaken, yet the quiet of mind which is the characteristic mark of genuine certitude, is never complete when one adheres stanchly to an er- roneous statement. For quiet of mind (which, unlike the absence of the fear of error, resides entirely in the intellect), is consequent upon the 34 Certitude presence of evidence, as explained before; and it is impossible for the false to be evident; for evidence is truth clearly manifesting itself to, and forcing its acceptance upon, the mind. Now the false — that which is not — cannot mani- fest itself clearly as real and true. Such manifestation is reserved to reality — to that which IS — to the true. Hence we maintain that false assent, no matter how persistent and firm according to all appearances, is always ac- companied by a certain lack of evidence, by a certain haziness, by a certain want of lucidity or clearness, which warns the mind to halt and re-examine its grounds for assent. CHAPTER THIRD PROPERTIES OF CERTITUDE ARTICLE i Metaphysical Certitude Absolute Certitude Summary: Thesis : metaphysical certitude absolute cer- titude — Difference between metaphysical, physical and moral certitude on the one hand, and absolute and hypothetical on the other — Proof of thesis. 35. After thus analyzing the notion of certi- tude, let us now pass on to the consideration of some of its properties, a disquisition which will often stand us in good stead in our battle against false philosophy. At the outset of this treatise, we divided certi- tude into three orders, namely metaphysical, physical and moral, and gave their respective definitions. The question now arises, whether the name certitude is rightly applied to each of these three divisions, or whether it is attributed to one alone in the strict sense of the word, and to the others in a wider sense. We answer that the three assents, namely, metaphysical, physical and moral, have all of 35 36 Certitude them a just title to be called certitude, although they differ essentially in the degree of perfec- tion, in which they share the common predicate, the metaphysical being absolute, and the physical and moral being conditional. We shall en- deavor to solve the problems involved in this statement in the next four theses. THESIS 4 Metaphysical certitude is rightly named absolute. Before we prove this assertion, take notice of an important difference between metaphysical, physical and moral certitude on the one hand, and absolute and hypothetical on the other. Metaphysical, physical and moral certitude have regard to the grounds of assent, (v. g. the es- sences of things or the laws of nature) as con- sidered in themselves; whereas absolute and hypothetical certitude view these same grounds as unconditioned or conditioned from without. 36. With these remarks premised, we prove the thesis thus: Metaphysical certitude is grounded on reasons drawn from the inward nature of things, and hence involved in the very idea of the truth affirmed. Thus, when I say, "The whole is greater than any of its parts," the essence of whole and of part, or the ideas representing them, afford me all the data for Properties of Certitude 37 my firm assent to the statement. Now (as will be shown in Ontology), the essences of things are unchangeable and indestructible : whatever goes to constitute them, belongs to them with absolute necessity, and hence independently of any condition possible or thinkable. For, es- sence in the strict sense of the word, is that without which a thing can neither exist nor be conceived; consequently, it is inseparably bound up with the object of which it is the essence. Since then mental adherence to truth is propor- tionate to the grounds which determine it, and upon which it rests for its stability, it follows that metaphysical assent, as being the result of motives which are absolute and unconditioned in their nature, is itself absolute and uncondi- tioned. ARTICLE 2 [Metaphysical Certitude the Only Absolute Certitude Summary: Thesis: metaphysical certitude the only ab- solute certitude — Ambiguous meaning of the expression "absolute and conditional assent" — Proof of the thesis. 37. It still remains for us to show that meta- physical certitude is the only absolute certitude; and this we shall do in the next thesis. 38 Certitude THESIS 5 No other assent except that which is given to a statement on metaphysical grounds possesses absolute firmness. For the better understanding of this thesis, it might be well to direct attention to another way of phrasing the above assertion. We are some- times told that assent resting on a metaphysical basis is "absolute"; whereas mental adherence for physical and moral considerations is condi- tional (hypothetical). This manner of stating the case is somewhat ambiguous. For when we say that our assent is absolute or conditional, our meaning may either be that it is absolutely or conditionally given, or that its firmness and un- changeableness is absolute or conditional. We do not intend to convey the former idea. For, assent is always absolutely given, since assent conditionally yielded would be assent withheld until the fulfilment of some condition is realized, and therefore would not be actual assent at all. Hence the words "absolute" and "conditional" have reference to the "firmness" of the mental concurrence in the truth affirmed. Let us explain this by an analogous instance. It would not seem inappropriate to call matri- mony an absolute, and betrothal a conditioned engagement; not in the sense that in the one Properties of Certitude 39 case consent is positively given, and in the other, it is not; — for both matrimony and betrothal suppose an actual, present agreement; — but in this sense that the one contract is absolutely un- alterable, whereas the other is annullable under certain conditions. 38. Our thesis is really nothing else than an extension of the foregoing one. For, as we said there, assent possessing absolute firmness calls for motives of the same character, that is, motives subject to no implied condition; since assent and its motives stand to each other in the relation of effect and cause, and the effect cannot surpass the cause in perfection — in the present case, in firmness. Now there are no other motives which are altogether unconditional except those styled metaphysical. For the physical laws and the moral instincts are both dependent on certain contingencies, the former on possible Divine interference, and the latter, on the arbitrary use of man's free will. Hence, it follows that physical and moral certitude — if certitude at all, a question to be settled soon — are at best conditional; and consequently, meta- physical certitude alone is absolute. 39. We might note here in passing, what we shall explain explicitly further on in proving the genuineness of physical and moral certitude, that assent based on metaphysical grounds is certi- tude by excellence. For there can be nothing 40 Certitude more excellent than the absolute and the uncon- ditioned ; and metaphysical certitude is such in its own sphere. In fact, metaphysical truths are the centre, round which all our cognition revolves, they are the fulcrum, on which all our knowledge rests, they are the light within the mind, without which all would be darkness and chaos. ARTICLE 3 Physical and Moral Certitude, though Hypothetical, still True Certitude Summary: Thesis: physical and moral certitude, though hypothetical, still true certitude — The force of hypothetical propositions — First argument of the thesis — Answer to the objection that no propositions can be certain unless the fear of error and the danger of a mistake is absolutely excluded — Second argument of the thesis — Answer to the objection that unless the possibility of a miracle is altogether excluded, assent is merely probable — How physical and moral certitude can become absolute — Chief objection to our doctrine unsound even from standpoint of Dialectics — Con- firmation of our view by the verdict of common sense — Meaning of common sense here — Signs by which to recognize judg- ments of common sense— An objection an- swered. 40. We now leave the region of metaphysi- cal certitude with these few remarks, and pass Properties of Certitude 41 on to a subject which is not so plain and has given rise to different views even amongst men who sincerely seek the truth and embrace it, as soon as it clearly manifests itself. It regards the nature of physical and moral certitude. Let us express our doctrine on this controverted point thus : THESIS 6 Intellectual assent, based on the physical laws and the moral instincts of men, is truly and genuinely cer- tain,, although, being conditioned, it is imperfect as compared with meta- physical. 41. This then, in brief, is the debated ques- tion which we are about to discuss ; and as it would seem that much of the difficulty experi- enced in understanding the views of either side, is due to a loose use of certain terms, let us first of all clearly and distinctly mark out the bound- aries of those most liable to breed confusion. One of the chief sources of vagueness in this matter arises from the peculiar kind of certainty possessed by hypothetical (conditional) propo- sitions. To settle this question with precision, we must bear in mind that a hypothetical proposition consists of two parts, namely the antecedent or 42 Certitude condition, and the consequent or conditioned proposition. What we properly assert in a hypothetical proposition, is the relation between the antecedent and the consequent. Thus, when I say, "If there is a breeze, the leaves of the trees rustle," I do not assert either that there is a breeze, or that the leaves rustle; all I want to point out, is the relation between the two parts of the hypothetical sentence. This con- nection may be, and often is absolutely certain. But it not unfrequently happens, that the con- sequent of a conditional sentence has a certain measure of certainty of its own, to which I may direct my attention. Certainty, in this case, is necessarily conditioned, that is, dependent on a certain contingency; yet it is certainty for all that, as we shall see hereafter. Let us illus- trate our meaning by an example. Suppose a young man should say to you: "I shall win the prize in the contest I am about to enter, if the judges are not biased by prejudice." In this proposition, we may regard the relation between the antecedent and the consequent; or, we can, if we so choose, restrict ourselves to the consideration of the consequent, taken by itself, viz., "I shall win the prize in the contest," together with the grounds in its support, and see what degree of certainty, if any, it possesses. Perhaps the contestant judges so, because he knows his own powers and the weakness of his Properties of Certitude 43 opponent ; and because he has come off victori- ous under less favorable circumstances. By reason of this double character of a hypo- thetical proposition then, we likewise meet with a twofold assent, one relating to the connection between the antecedent and the consequent, and the other regarding the conditioned consequent on its own merits. We must not lose sight of the above distinction in our later researches ; for the proper understanding of our thesis hinges to a large extent upon it. When we say then, that assent based on physical and moral grounds is conditioned and imperfect, yet none the less certain — we speak of the conditioned proposi- tion taken by itself and valued at its own worth, and not of the relation between antecedent and consequent. We might perhaps make this still plainer by choosing two concrete cases, the one founded on a physical law, and the other, on one of the moral instincts. When the king in Schiller's ballad, "The Diver," said to the knights and squires standing about him : "Is amongst ye a knight or squire so bold, As to plunge into this abyss? I cast in the vortex a goblet of gold, The dark waves already surge around it and hiss;" he knew, of course, that the goblet of gold would surely sink. It is the certitude in regard to this 4 44 Certitude statement, 'The goblet of gold will surely sink/' conditioned by the possibility of Divine inter- ference, with which we are concerned now. But we have nothing to do here, at least directly, with the connection which exists between the two propositions, "The goblet of gold will sink" and "God will not interfere with the laws of nature in this case." Now let us add an example drawn from the moral order. Recall the return of the prodigal son to the home of his childhood, how kindly his old fa- ther received the young scapegrace in spite of his ungrateful behavior; how he fell upon the neck of his boy and kissed him, and then for joy ordered the fatted calf to be killed, even at the risk of wounding the feelings of his other son who had never wavered in his fidelity. Any one witnessing that scene would have cried out: "How that father loves his son I" Now it is this assertion as regarded in itself, which is the ob- ject of intellectual adherence. We might add this condition, "unless he acts a part and shamefully plays the hypocrite." But we are not now investigating the relation between, "This father loves his son," and "He is not act- ing a part." We must make still another remark, in order to show exactly, just how much we affirm in this thesis. It is this — the conditioned member Properties of Certitude 45 of a hypothetical sentence may be absolutely affirmed, provided the condition to which it is conceived to be subject, has been verified. In this case, the consequent of the conditional proposition may become the conclusion of a sort of hypothetical syllogism, somewhat in this man- ner: "The goblet of gold flung into the sea, will sink unless God works a miracle. Now, I know that he will not work a miracle in this instance. Therefore I am absolutely certain, that the goblet of gold will sink." Whatever may be said of the propriety of calling this method of setting forth the premises and drawing the conclusion, a legitimate syllogism (of which more elsewhere), let it be borne in mind, that we do not at present suppose the condition to have been realized; yet we nevertheless main- tain, that assent given on physical and moral grounds is truly certain. 42. We take this attitude in opposition to some philosophers who hold that unless the con- dition is known to be fulfilled, the mental ad- herence can never rise above the level of mere probability. We beg to differ from them in this particular, and, as we think, for good reasons. Let the proofs we are about to give speak for themselves. 43. First argument based on the nature of certitude. It has been stated before (thesis 1) that certain assent is assent necessarily linked 46 Certitude to truth. We also showed there that assent is such whenever the statement adhered to, rests on grounds which exclude the possibility of the opposite, or, in other words, are necessarily con- nected with the truth. Now the physical laws and the moral instincts are necessarily connected with the truth of the statements made on account of them, because these laws and instincts are themselves neces- sary, i. e. necessarily productive of their re- spective effects. No doubt, this necessity is conditioned, yet it is necessity none the less, as we shall show presently. Hence, assent resting on the laws and instincts in question, must like- wise be necessary, that is, necessarily connected with the truth, and so far forth certain. The radical reason implied in the above argu- mentation is, that the physical laws and moral instincts render the assertion which they motive, evident; and evidence always begets certitude. It now remains to show that the physical laws and the inborn propensities grafted by the Cre- ator on our rational constitution are forces which coerce and necessitate in a true sense of the word. And first, that such is the case, is acknowl- edged by the voice of mankind. For men often speak of the laws of nature as "inexorable," "relentless," and the like, thus implicitly avow- ing their constraining power, as in the following Properties of Certitude 47 proverb; "Death is deaf and hears no denial." When a certain poet says : "Consumption has no pity For blue eyes and golden hair," he expresses the same truth after his own ideal fashion. The well-known adage, "The mills of the gods grind slow, but grind exceeding fine," is but another way of stating that Nature ob- tains certain ends unfailingly through her laws. Many of our old sayings, which are in the mouth of everybody and are often nothing else than the concrete embodiment of certain moral instincts, frequently take a categorical and ab- solute form ; and this shows that they are re- garded by men as resting on necessary and unchangeable principles, as, "Deserve success, and you shall have it" ; "Evil communications corrupt good manners"; "Pride shall have a fall" ; and a host of others. The philosophical reason for this necessity is given in the Treatise on "Induction," where it is shown that both the physical laws and the moral instincts have their ultimate root in the inner nature of the agents from which they proceed. 44. It will be seen from the above that for a statement to be really certain, the possibility of the opposite need not be excluded absolutely; all that is required is, that the motives of assent possess some sort of real necessity. In fact, 48 Certitude were it otherwise, almost all the statements founded upon the regularity of the physical forces (to say nothing of those based on moral grounds), would thereby sink to the level of mere probabilities ; since it is very difficult to tell whether there is not some hidden reason locked up in the bosom of God whose "judg- ments are incomprehensible and whose ways are unsearchable," why it should please him to change the established order of things in any particular case. 45. An objection raised. But some one might ask, is not this assertion (namely, that a proposition may be certain, and yet not exclude the contradictory absolutely) opposed to the very definition of certitude, which requires that all fear of error be barred out and that all danger of going astray be removed? We answer to this, that our doctrine is not at variance with the definition of certitude ; for when we assert that certitude shuts out all doubt and obviates all danger of a mistake, we have reference to well-founded, prudent, rational doubts, and to the danger of error truly such; and not to unfounded, foolish, irrational mis- givings, and merely fantastic, imaginary perils. These latter are to be scouted and disregarded, and hence cannot destroy our firm adherence to truth. As regards the danger of error in particular, Properties of Certitude 49 which may need some further explanation, re- member that danger signifies exposure to immi- nent or threatening evil; and I think, it will be conceded by all that no risk is run, no chances are taken, if in reliance on the physical laws and moral instincts, I rest assured, for instance, that the solid oaken boards of my room, on which I am standing, will not be suddenly turned into thin air, but will continue to support me ; or that a gay young student, who whilst boating with some of his friends has fallen overboard, will not refuse to grasp the oar held out to him. 46. Second argument based on the distinc- tion between certain and probable assent. Assent of whatever kind, is either certain or probable. For the other mental states besides certitude and opinion (or probable assent) are ignorance, suspicion and doubt, none of which can lay claim to the name of intel- lectual assent. Hence, if we can prove that the mental adherence given on the strength of the physical laws and the moral instincts is not probable, it follows that it is certain; and this we can do. For assent which is merely prob- able is not necessarily true, since it is yielded on debatable and undecisive grounds, on grounds which imply a "may," but not a "must," and which therefore involve no necessity of any sort. Suppose that you see your friend reclining very composedly on his couch with his eyes closed, 50 Certitude and that you form the judgment, "He is asleep": your reasons for arriving at this inference, as is obvious, carry no necessity with them; for they are of such a character, that the statement, "He is not asleep," is quite compatible with them; that is to say, they are merely probable. But quite the contrary happens, when there is question of an enunciation based on the physical laws and the moral instincts of men. Then we are confronted not with a mere "may," but with a "must." We have no longer to do with vari- able and shifting grounds, but with grounds of an entirely fixed and peremptory description. If I see a quarter of mutton suspended on a spit over a blazing fire, I know that the meat will become roasted. My assent is unhesitating and unwavering. Since then the motives of mental adherence drawn from the physical laws and the moral instincts, are of an essentially different nature from those brought forward for a mere proba- bility, we infer that assent on account of these laws and instincts cannot be probable, and hence must be certain ; for, as we stated above, there is no middle state between certain and probable assent. 47. A difficulty met. But here we are con- fronted with a difficulty. We said in our last proof, that the motive of assent for a physical fact differs essentially from a mere probability. Properties of Certitude 51 Such, however, our opponents argue, does not seem to be the case. For where the possibility of a miracle is not absolutely excluded — as we hold, it is not in mere physical certitude — the law of nature is thereby brought down to the level of a mere probable ground of assent, as happened, for instance, when our Blessed Lord had arrived at Bethania to summon Lazarus from the tomb. (N. B. We confine ourselves to the consideration of the physical laws for the sake of simplicity; but what holds true of them, applies mutatis mutandis to the moral instincts as well.) We answer, in the first place, that the above objection rests on a false assumption. For it is taken for granted that the motive of assent for physical certitude is twofold, namely the law as well as the assurance that there will be no exception to its due operation. Now, this is a mistake. The motive for physical certitude is one, namely the necessity of the law. This al- ways remains the same, even though there be some likelihood of nature swerving from its ordinary course in a particular instance. True, in order to have genuine physical certitude, we must be sure that no positive reasons of any sort exist for conjecturing a departure from the customary workings of the natural forces; in other words, that no indication whatever of probable Divine intervention appears. But such 52 Certitude knowledge is required, not as a motive of assent, but merely as an indispensable condition for us to perceive that the law — the true motive of as- sent — is applicable in a given case. The ab- sence of every sign that God will exercise his right as Sovereign Lord of nature, does not move the mind to affirm the statement under consideration; it merely renders it possible for the physical laws duly to influence the intellect. In a similar manner, it is the flame of the match which lights the wick; yet, in order that it may do so, I must apply it: the immediate contact between the flame and the wick is merely re- quired as a condition for the ignition to take place. Bear in mind, however, we must suppose that the conditions for the effectiveness of the physical laws and the moral instincts — namely Divine non-interference and the due concurrence of the will of man — will be realized unless some reason to the contrary can be shown. For, as regards the physical laws, an infinitely wise Be- ing, such as God is, never suspends the estab- lished order of things except for considerations of a most weighty character, and therefore ex- tremely seldom. Hence, the fulfilment of the conditions in this case is guaranteed by Infinite Wisdom itself. And as to those propensities, which are called "leges morales" in Latin philo- sophical works, it must be remembered that they Properties of Certitude 53 have been implanted in man's breast by a loving Providence for the essential welfare of the noblest portion of visible creation, namely, ra- tional beings. They are the safeguards of per- sonal happiness and the secure defence of the stability of one of God's grandest works, human society. Consequently, they too possess such stability and fixity, that unless there are positive grounds for suspecting unnatural conduct, they must be regarded as sure to produce their in- tended effect. But we readily admit, as a legiti- mate inference from the principles laid down by us, that in the case of physical and moral certitude a mistake is absolutely possible; for were it not so, then both the one and the other would thereby become metaphysical certitude. But we refuse to grant, that the mere absolute possibility of a statement being erroneous pre- vents its being certain. To avoid misapprehension, let us add that when we say, we may be mistaken in matters physical and moral, the word mistaken must be understood in a somewhat modified sense. For in order to be mistaken according to the full import of the word, the opposite of what we judged would take place must, in no way, be foreseen and allowed. This, however, cannot be claimed here; since we foresee and hence, after a fashion, allow the possibility of an ex- ception to the physical laws and moral instincts. 54 Certitude Consequently, no mistake properly so called can be laid to our charge, if an assertion of ours, made on the strength of the physical laws and moral instincts, turns out false, since it was conditioned and not absolute. It would perhaps be more appropriate to say that the unexpected happened or the exception to the rule came true for once: just as a man who belongs to a party which he thought would win in a political cam- paign, will tell you that he was on the wrong side rather than that he was mistaken; for he, too, recognized and therefore admitted the pos- sibility, and (in this case) also the probability of losing in the contest. This is sometimes ex- pressed technically by saying, that such error is merely material and not formal. 48. How physical and moral certitude can become absolute. We hold then that condi- tional assent, as above described, is truly cer- tain; yet, on the other hand, we readily admit that both physical and moral certitude can be- come absolute. For though intellectual adher- ence to a proposition may not be absolutely firm in itself, it may be rendered so by linking it to a metaphysical principle ; and this is what is called reducing physical and moral certitude to meta- physical. Thus, I am metaphysically (or abso- lutely) certain that the course of nature will be very rarely interfered with by the Almighty. True, God, considering his absolute power alone, Properties of Certitude 55 can change it at any moment; yet knowing that he is both wise and holy, I have perfect assur- ance that he will not do so except for very mo- mentous reasons, and therefore very seldom. I am also metaphysically certain that my friend, with whom I have associated for years on fa- miliar terms exists and has the general appear- ance, I think he has. For it is utterly ridiculous to suppose that God would all this time conjure up a phantom before me and permit me to take it for a reality. I am likewise absolutely cer- tain, that Christ the Lord has graced this earth of ours with his presence, that Pius X is now (1910) Sovereign Pontiff and William Taft President of the United States, that Rome ex- ists, that Julius Caesar was a famous Roman general and statesman, etc. For if these and similar statements are false, we would have to admit that there could be an effect without a proportionate cause. 49. Chief objection against our view, un- sound even from the standpoint of Dialectics. It might not be out of place here, to give the chief objection of our opponents in another form, under which it is sometimes proposed, and show that even from a purely dialectical standpoint, it is faulty ; and this all the more so, as we have alluded to this manner of argumenta- tion before (No. 41) and cast doubt on its legiti- macy. 56 Certitude Let us for the sake of clearness present their counter-proof under the guise of a definite syllo- gism thus: This old man will die soon unless God sus- pends the usual course of nature. Now God will not do so. Therefore he will die soon. But, say our antagonists, the minor of this; syllogism, being, as a rule, only probable, the conclusion likewise will possess no more than probability, since, as one of the rules of the syllogism has it, the conclusion always follows the character of the weaker premise. Hence it would seem that physical assent is never certain, unless I am absolutely sure that God will not change the regular course of events. In answer we reply, in the first place, that our objectors suppose the minor of the above argu- mentation, viz. "God will not suspend the usual course of nature," to be one of the grounds of assent to the conclusion, "This old man will die soon"; which is erroneous. As we have, how- ever, developed this point thoroughly before, we shall waive any further discussion of the diffi- culty regarded from this view-point. But this is not the only weakness of the fore- going captious fallacy. There is a flaw in the very structure of the syllogism, since for a syllo- gism to be such in the true sense of the word, the minor must set forth something, not already Properties of* Certitude 57 expressed in the major. This, however, is not so in the present case. To perceive this the more clearly, let us re- state the major and the minor more fully with all that they imply, and our contention, I think, will then be readily granted. Our major read thus : "This old man will die soon, unless God suspends the usual course of nature." The subject, "This old man," must, of course, be taken in the concrete, such as it actu- ally is. Suppose then, that our invalid is a nonagenarian, worn out with disease and old age, altogether helpless and useless, weary of life and very anxious to be dissolved. Hence our syllogism fully drawn out will run thus: This old man, over ninety years of age, wasted by disease and enfeebled by the weight of years, a burden to himself and others, and longing to depart this life, will die in the near future, un- less God suspends one or more of the laws of nature. Now God will not do so, just because the old man is so wasted and useless, in a word, because his course is run. Therefore he will die soon. A mere inspection of the premises thus spread out, shows that the minor is already fully ex- pressed in the major. The above argumentation has no more claim to the name of a syllogism in the strict sense of the word than the follow- 58 Certitude ing: "Every pigeon is an animal. Every ani- mal is a living being. Therefore, every pigeon is a living being." 50. We have then demonstrated to convic- tion that intellectual assent based on the physical laws and the moral instincts, constitutes true certitude. In our thesis we added a qualifying clause to this statement, namely that physical and moral certitude are conditioned, and hence im- perfect as compared with metaphysical. This follows so evidently from what goes before, and is again involved in what is about to follow, that there is no need of saying any more about this phase of our subject. 51. Let us now still further strengthen our position by an appeal to common sense. If the proof of the following thesis should not be alto- gether satisfactory, it will at least confirm our contention and put its reasonableness in a clearer light. THESIS 7 The verdict of common sense con- firms the conclusion arrived at, that assent based on physical and moral motives is truly and genuinely cer- tain. But before proceeding to our argument, let us make a few general remarks on the force of Properties of Certitude 59 a demonstration which rests upon the testimony of "Common Sense." 52. Meaning of "Common Sense." What is here meant by common sense? In ordinary parlance, common sense is the same as sound practical judgment. But in philosophy, we may define it with Webster as "that power of the mind which by a kind of instinct or short proc- ess of reasoning perceives truth, the relation of things, cause and effect, etc." Common sense, then, in this connection is a certain ease or readi- ness wrought into the very fabric of our minds to judge correctly regarding matters closely con- nected with man's intellectual, moral and social welfare. The name sense is given to this super- sensible faculty by analogy, because, like the senses in general, it perceives its object immedi- ately (at least in very many cases), and like sight in particular, it acts (for the most part) by intuition. Common sense is a kind of intel- lectual insight. Here are a few pronouncements which have their source in this common sense of mankind: "Our mental faculties are given us for the at- tainment of truth"; "What is evident is cer- tain" ; "To doubt about everything, is impossible and absurd" ; "The external universe is not a mere illusion, but exists independently of our thoughts"; "An occurrence testified to by every- body, or at least by very many — for example, 60 Certitude the invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte- has certainly taken place." As will be seen, we have restricted ourselves in the choice of examples to such, as have some immediate bearing on Logic. Nor is it difficult to account for the existence of this natural endowment, called "Common Sense." For it stands to reason that the Author of nature should have laid such tendencies in man's intellectual make-up, as would enable him to recognize, as it were, spontaneously, unbidden and without effort, those things, the knowledge of which is essentially bound up with his happi- ness. For, "natura non deficit in necessariis," nature never fails in what is necessary. Hence God has given us, what might be called an intellectual instinct, inclining and urging our minds to accept certain truths with readiness and full assurance. But it must not be imagined that these truths are thus received through a "blind" instinct. No, they are each and all of them illumined by their own evidence, since the reasons for their admission, though not perhaps understood scien- tifically, yet present themselves to the mind with sufficient clearness for rational assent. If then a judgment is prompted by this com- mon sense, we are sure that it is true. The only hindrance which obstructs our path in this mat- ter at times, is the difficulty of knowing whether Properties of Certitude 61 any given conviction is really a dictate of com- mon sense. However, there are certain signs, which will serve us as safe guides to discern the genuine from the spurious in testing those be- liefs of ours which seem to spring from this source of common sense. If a judgment really proceeds from an inborn tendency of the human mind, it must be acknowl- edged as certain by practically everybody; there may be exceptions to this universality; for it is possible to stifle even the voice of nature. Further, enunciations which are, so to speak, the birth-right of mankind, must have been re- ceived as true at all times. There can have been no epoch in the history of the race when their compelling and binding force was not recog- nized. True — as in the previous case — the clearness of some of these truths has been dimmed at cer- tain periods by the unaccountable and eccentric twists of thought on the part of a few singu- larly constituted intellects ; yet always with the result, that these convictions have not only emerged victorious from the clash of opinions, but have taken still firmer hold on all rational minds, thus gaining strength even through oppo- sition. Besides these marks of common sense truths, namely their universality and continuity, which regard the entire race, there are others of a more 62 Certitude personal character, all of them deducible from the fact that these beliefs are supposed to spring from nature, and therefore to be natural to men. Now what is natural to us (that is, what pro- ceeds spontaneously from our common nature), is born with us, and puts forth its activity, as soon as it is sufficiently developed. Hence these truths of common sense must have been in our possession, ever since we can remember ; they must be so familiar to us, that we cannot even recall how we acquired them. Again, what is natural to us, is an object of our special affection and devotion ; we cling to it most tenaciously. If then a conviction rests on an inborn tendency of our nature, we must hold it so dear that we will not surrender it at any cost. Further, what is truly natural to a person, cannot be set aside or disregarded by him with- out a sense of shame and guilt. Hence one would expect that even a doubt about a truth of common sense seriously entertained, would be regarded by men as tantamount to a denial of reason and a stultification of the intellect. Lastly, what is natural to us, bears the closest scrutiny : the more critically it is looked into, the more highly it will commend itself. If then there are persuasions which are the offspring of na- ture, it would seem, that the more accurately and Properties of Certitude 63 quietly they are examined, the more their force and reasonableness should appear. These are some of the signs characteristic of the truths of Common Sense. Where they and similar ones are found, there, we may be sure, we have to deal with convictions that have their source in an inbred tendency of our intellect. True, many objections have been urged against the existence of this criterion of Common Sense ; as the once all but universal belief in the influ- ence of the stars on the birth of men; or the widely diffused opinion that the earth was flat, that the sun moved, and that men could not live at the antipodes. But it might be shown easily enough, that these and similar erroneous no- tions, though once almost unanimously accepted, do not bear all the requisite hall-marks of judg- ments originating in an innate impulse of nature. As, however, we are not now explaining this subject of "Common Sense" professedly, we shall postpone its fuller treatment to another place. Let us now apply the above general remarks to the case in hand. We say then that common sense confirms what we have endeavored to prove, namely that assent on physical and moral grounds is true and genuine certitude. 53. For, in the first place, who will dare to question that the physical laws and moral instincts have from time immemorial been thought to pos- sess a certain degree of real necessity; and that 64 Certitude not by a few persons, but by everybody. The very names lazv and instinct bear witness to this. Finally, if we turn to ourselves, we find that we accept, without hesitation, any assertion resting on the necessity inherent in these laws and in- stincts. We know that we have done so ever since we can remember, and that we do so now with even greater energy and force of intellect. Nor can it be said that we assent inconsiderately and rashly. For we are aware of the irresistible force of these truths, even when thinking most calmly and dispassionately : nay, we often feel constrained to give in to them against our very inclinations. So true is this, that terms and phrases have been borrowed from the realm of physical certitude to express the strength of metaphysical conclusions. Thus, when we say that some statement of ours is palpable or tangi- ble, our meaning is, that it is as evident and certain as the existence of things which can be touched with the hands. We speak of ocular proof in the same sense; we say that something is as clear as day-light. In fact, the word evi- dence itself is derived from the Latin videre, to see. We regard an appeal to the senses as the strongest weapon of silencing a headstrong op- ponent. We think that we can put a stop to a quarrel at once by telling a disputant : "Why, I have seen it with my own eyes ; I have heard it with these ears; I have touched it with my own Properties of Certitude 65 hands." It was thus that Christ overcame the incredulity of his disciple Thomas, when he said to him: "Put in thy finger hither, and see my hands ; and bring hither thy hand, and put it into my side ; and be not faithless, but believing." This striking readiness and proneness of the human mind, peculiar to all men and dating back to the very cradle of rational existence, to yield assent to judgments resting on physical and moral grounds, shows conclusively that the Au- thor of nature has, so to speak, attuned our in- tellects to accept them without the least hesita- tion, and that therefore they must be true. For the God of Truth himself is the voucher for tnem. There is hardly any need of illustrating our teaching as far as the physical laws are con- cerned. The case is too plain. You feel per- fectly sure that if you take up a red-hot coal, it will burn you, or that if a heavy shower pours down on the parched fields in summer, they will absorb the moisture and become drenched with rain. Who doubts it? But it may be useful to add an instance or two to show the firmness and strength of convictions founded^ on the moral instincts (the "leges morales" of the Scholastics). Take the case of a father and mother who are well known for the deep interest which they have always taken in the welfare of their children. 66 Certitude Suppose that one of their sons becomes seriously ill. Is not everybody acquainted with them per- fectly sure that they will at once call in a physi- cian and do all in their power to save their child ? And why ? because we are all well aware that the love of father and mother for their off- spring is a sacred instinct implanted in nature. Now follow the father to the physician and hear him plead in a voice choked with emotion : "Dear Sir, please, do come at once to my house ; my son is very sick." Could you deem it possi- ble for the physician to entertain the slightest doubt as to the truthfulness of the afflicted fa- ther and to say to himself: "That man is lying." No! For both the love of truth and love of honor, two other heaven-born instincts of human nature, tell him that there is no decep- tion here ; that it would be an insult to that good man to harbor so much as a breath of suspicion. To confirm this by a concrete example, recall the submissive request made by the woman of Canaan to Christ to heal her poor daughter, who was grievously troubled by the devil, and her insistence and importunity even after the humili- ating and seemingly stinging rebuff of the great Wonder-worker. What more natural than such a request! For, love for her child, no matter how wretched that child may be, stirs in every mother's heart. But are there not parents who grossly neglect Properties of Certitude 67 their children, expose them to danger and prove the cause of their ruin? Alas, it is but too true. This, however, argues nothing against our posi- tion. For we do not deny that the tendencies and promptings of our rational nature are some- times deadened and even uprooted by the un- natural lives of certain individuals. But when- ever this happens, there are always indications showing that in these rare cases the moral in- stincts of nature have been so blunted as to be unreliable. For just as, in order to be certain in matters physical, there must not be apparent any reason pointing to divine interference, so also, to have moral certitude, there should be no reasonable misgivings that the natural propensities prompt- ing conduct have been impaired or crushed out in any particular case, and therefore cannot as- sert themselves. Take another example: Here are two men who have loved each other ever since they were boys together. They have always respected and esteemed one another; for their friendship is based on mutual appreciation both of heart and mind. They rejoiced with one another when fortune smiled, and they sorrowed with each other in times of trial. Their conduct attests all this. Suppose now that one of them is cast into prison on a false charge and that he can be rescued by his friend clearing him in court. 68 Certitude Who would hesitate even for a moment as to what his friend's course of action will be? For the love of friends is an instinct planted deep in man's nature, and can be relied upon even in times of dire need. But what about St. Peter? Did he not deny his Master whom he loved so much? Judging of this apparent counter-proof of our doctrine on merely natural grounds and with all the rev- erence due to the Prince of the Apostles, we would say that his denial does not refute our view in this matter of certitude. For, in the first place, moral certitude is not absolute, and hence there may be rare excep- tions to the rule. Again, in order to have true moral certitude, there must be no indications sug- gesting that the natural promptings upon which we rely in a particular case will be obstructed or repressed. Were there none such in the present case? Christ, of course, foresaw Peter's fall; for he was the omniscient God, and hence his foreknowledge belongs to another, a higher or- der. But could not others, familiar with the im- pulsiveness of Peter, well-meaning and honest though he was, have surmised the probability of his defection under very trying circumstances? It would seem that they could. Let us consider yet another of these tendencies inborn in man, and in this instance affecting more directly his intellectual life, namely the Properties of Certitude 69 desire to learn and find out the unknown. This eagerness for knowledge is generally called curi- osity or inquisitiveness. Seneca describes this tendency in man very tersely when he says: "Natura curiosum nobis ingenium dedit." We are all perfectly sure that men will be swayed by this propensity, at least, whenever there is question of something which interests them very much, and is of great importance to them. Thus, who entertains the least doubt but that the farmer will go out frequently into his orchard and fields to ascertain with his own eyes what the prospects for a fruitful year are? Or who ever knew a merchant that did not keep himself informed in regard to the state of the market ? It is related that Francis Borgia, the Duke of Gandia, was very fond of hawking, yet he would often close his eyes, just when the falcon was about to pounce upon its prey. Here our theory in regard to the compelling force of the human instincts does not seem to hold. Yet, it does. For what Francis denied himself, was not a mat- ter of any importance to himself or to others. Moreover, any one who knew the sterling, rug- ged virtue of the man, would not be surprised at this proof of self-control. 54. An objection answered. But, it is urged, you concede there are philosophers who will not allow statements enunciating facts of yo Certitude the physical and moral order to be genuinely cer- tain, as long as the possibility of an exception is not absolutely excluded ; consequently, you have no right to invoke the testimony of common sense in your favor. To this we answer that our argument is not based on what some philosophers may have elab- orated as philosophers, but on the plain utter- ance of the voice of nature. As regards this latter, these philosophers are at one with us ; and as for their speculative opinion, they seem to be mistaken. For their attitude in this question arises from an arbitrary definition of certitude, as a condition of mind excluding absolutely the opposite of the judgment assented to. This is precisely what we challenge: they will find it hard to establish their definition without assum- ing the very point to be proved. ARTICLE 4 Essential Grades of Certitude Section i Metaphysical Certitude Greater than Physical or Moral ; and Physical Greater than Moral Summary: Thesis and its proof. 55. There is still another question to be set- tled, which is very closely connected with the Properties of Certitude Ji previous discussion and may, in fact, be re- garded as a corollary from it; namely the ques- tion touching the specific distinction of the three kinds of certitude. Are metaphysical, physical and moral certitude three different species of in- tellectual assent or not? We speak here of subjective certitude primarily, since it alone has given rise to divergencies of opinion amongst philosophers. Objective certainty shall, how- ever, be considered indirectly as the basis, upon which the solution of this controverted point chiefly depends. Let us cast our teaching on this subject into the form of a thesis. THESIS 8 Metaphysical, physical and moral cer- titude differ essentially from one an- other, and form a descending scale of intellectual assents. Our thesis implies two things ; first, that meta- physical, physical and moral certitude differ in some essential element ; and secondly, that one surpasses another in perfection. In the proof it will be found convenient to take the two parts together. The proposition is shown thus : Certitude takes its character from its grounds of assent. For it is determined by them, and therefore depends upon them for, its 72 Certitude firmness, just as the solidity of a bridge depends on the strength of the piers on which it rests. Such then will be the assent, as are the motives on which it is yielded. Hence if these motives are of three kinds, each differing from the other in something essential, the intellectual adherence produced by them will likewise differ essentially. That the motives of assent are essentially dis- similar, will be readily granted on a mere in- spection of them : for metaphysical motives are drawn from the very nature or idea of the truth affirmed. Hence they are of an altogether ab- solute character and utterly unchangeable. The physical motives, on the other hand, are consti- tuted by the laws of nature, and the moral, by certain tendencies governing free agents. Hence both are conditioned, and therefore essentially weaker than those of the metaphysical order. But there also exists an essential difference be- tween the physical laws and the moral instincts, in so far as the former are controllable only by a power of infinite wisdom and goodness, whereas the latter are subject to the free will of finite beings. Consequently, as the will of God and that of man differ essentially, so do likewise the two kinds of certitude referred to these wills as conditions. Properties of Certitude 73 Section 2 The Three Orders of Certitude not Species Properly so Called Summary: Thesis: certitude is an analogous, not a univocal term, the analogy being that of "intrinsic attribution" — Meaning of uni- vocal, equivocal and analogous terms — Analogy of attribution and proportion — Proof of thesis — Argument of opponents that metaphysical, physical and moral cer- titude are true species and our comment. 56. There is then an essential difference be- tween metaphysical, physical and moral certitude in such wise, that metaphysical certitude excels the other two, and physical takes precedence of moral. Whence it follows that these three kinds of assent may be called essentially different or- ders or grades of certitude ; whether they may also be termed species in the strict sense of the word, we shall endeavor to settle in the next thesis. THESIS 9 The name certitude is applied to as- sent given on metaphysical, physical and moral grounds, not univocally but analogically, the analogy in this case being that known as analogy of 74 Certitude follows that the three orders of certi- tude are not species in the technical sense of the word. 57. UnivocaJ, equivocal and analogous terms defined. Before we prove our thesis, a regard for clearness obliges us to explain briefly, what is meant by univocal, equivocal and analo- gous terms, as well as to assign the various divi- sions of analogy. A univocal term is one which signifies some- thing common to several objects and predicable of all of them in exactly the same way. Thus "animal" is such a term in reference to men and brute beasts. Equivocal terms, on the other hand, are those which are affirmed of various subjects in en- tirely different meanings. Such a term is the word "mass," as referred to a quantity of matter and to a religious service. Analogous terms hold a middle place between the univocal and the equivocal; they are those which when predicated of divers subjects, ex- press notions that are partly the same and partly different. The adjective "gloomy," as applied to a man's look and to the weather, is of this sort. This capacity possessed by certain terms, of being ascribed to two or more objects with a meaning which is partly the same and partly different, is called analogy. Properties of Certitude 75 Analogy is divided into analogy of attribution and of proportion, according as the ground for attributing the same name to divers things is either a simple relation, or else a resemblance of relations. But as this latter kind of analogy does not concern us here, we shall restrict our- selves to the explanation of the former. Analogy is said to be of attribution, when what is signified by the analogous term, is found in one of the subjects of predication (the principal) primarily and in its fulness, whilst in the others (the secondary) it is found only in so far as they bear some relation to the principal. This kind of analogy we find exemplified in the term "healthy," as applied to animals and food. For "healthy" is predicated primarily of animal or- ganisms ; it is attributed to food only secondarily, because it produces health in animals. Analogy of attribution is again subdivided into extrinsic and intrinsic. It is extrinsic, when what is expressed by the analogous term, is in- trinsic to the principal subject of predication only, but extrinsic to the others, to which it is ascribed on account of some relation to the prin- cipal. The adjective "healthy," as related to animals and food, will likewise serve to illustrate this definition. Analogy is said to be of intrinsic attribution, when what is signified by the common term is, indeed, intrinsic to all the subjects of predica- y6 Certitude tion, but when the manner in which it exists in each of them is essentially different. Thus both God and creatures are truly "being"; but "be- ing" as found in God, is independent, uncondi- tioned and infinitely perfect, whereas, in creatures, it is dependent, conditioned and imperfect. With these remarks premised, let us now pro- ceed to the first of the three parts of our thesis, in which we state that the name certitude is ap- plied to assent given on metaphysical, physical and moral grounds not univocally, but anal- ogously. 580 The argument we give in proof of this part, is based on the nature of univocal and analogous concepts. It proceeds thus : In order that a concept may be univocal in the strict sense of the word, it must be applied to the objects of which predication is made, in entirely the same meaning. Such, however, is not the case in the matter under discussion. For although, what is objectively certain or true, always im- plies some sort of necessity, yet this necessity is by no means the same in every proposition; for metaphysical necessity is absolute, whereas physical and moral are conditioned, the condition in each case being essentially different. Hence necessity and certainty are not affirmed in alto- gether the same sense, of propositions enunci- ating metaphysical, physical and moral truths and therefore one of the elements of genuine Properties of Certitude JJ univocation is wanting. Thus, when I say, "It is certain that two and two are four" — "It is certain that this spark will burn me" and, "It is certain that this man will not tell a lie," the word "certain" varies in signification in each sentence. And since (objective) certainty and (subjective) certitude are correlatives, the latter being determined by the former, it follows that (subjective) certitude is referred to the various orders of intellectual assent, not univocally, but analogically, that is, in a sense partly the same and partly different. 59. We now come to the proof of the second part of the thesis, namely, that the analogy spoken of above, is analogy of "intrinsic attribu- tion." For this kind of analogy, as just stated, we require first, that the analogous term express a concept, intrinsically constitutive of the two (or more) subjects to which it is attributed; and secondly, that the reality represented by this concept as found in one of the subjects, be essen- tially dependent on the same reality as realized in the other. It is only this second requisite for intrinsic analogy of attribution which calls for a little further explanation here. To see how it applies in the present matter, call to mind that meta- physical certitude, within its own sphere of certi- tude, is absolute and independent, being alto- gether unconditioned; whereas physical and f& Certitude moral certitude depend on metaphysical in more than one way. For, in the first place, as fully explained elsewhere, no certain judgment can be formed without the implicit assertion of the three so called fundamental truths, viz., the primary principle of all knowledge or the prin- ciple of contradiction, the first fact in all cog- nition or the existence of the thinking subject, and the primary condition of all knowledge or the capacity of the mind for knowing the truth, all of which belong to the metaphysical order. Again, physical and moral certitude would lose all their meaning without the absolutely certain knowledge of the dependence of the physical and moral order upon a Creator, infinitely wise and holy, whose kind Providence extends even from end to end. Hence it follows that physical and moral certi- tude, resting essentially upon metaphysical for their firmness, are certitude only by what is known as "analogy of intrinsic attribution," that is to say, in entire subordination to perfect or metaphysical certitude. 60. From what has been said hitherto, the third part of our thesis, viz., that the three or- ders of certitude cannot be termed species prop- erly so called, follows as an immediate inference. For species properly so called suppose a genus properly so called. Now* a genus in the strict sense is understood to be a univocal concept, Properties of Certitude 79 that is to say, a concept which is applicable to the things of which it is predicated, without any variation of meaning. But the concept certitude falls short of this requirement. Hence it is that we should speak of three orders or grades of certitude rather than of three species without any qualification. There would, however, be no objection to calling certitude a quasi-genus and the three orders included under it gwa^'-species. For this reason we do not mean to quarrel with those who call the three kinds of certitude, species, all the more so, as they seem to use the term chiefly to indicate that there is an essential difference between metaphysical, physical and moral certitude, as against certain philosophers who discard any diversity in certain assents. 61. A difficulty met. It might not be out of place here, just to touch upon the chief argu- ment given for three species of certitude, espe- cially as we have made use of nearly the same process of reasoning for establishing our own position. But before doing so, we must briefly explain an expression, which we often hear used in this connection, and which suggests nothing very definite in English, namely the expression "for- mal object of a faculty and its act." By this formal object, as here understood, is meant the object to which a faculty and its act are directed and which determines them, thus giving them 80 Certitude their peculiar character and form. It is, as it were, the form-giving object. Thus the formal object of sight is color; of hearing, sound; and of the intellect, the essences of things. Hence the formal object of certitude will be that to which certain assent is directed, and which de- termines it, namely the motives or grounds of intellectual adherence. Let us now pass to the argument of those who uphold three species of certitude. They tell us, that just as an instrument, say a saw or a hatchet, takes the peculiar form or shape it may happen to have, from the use to which it is to be put ; so, in a similar manner, the faculties and their acts receive their own peculiar and specific form or character, from the formal object for which they are destined. For the faculties and their acts are, so to speak, instruments for apprehend- ing or seizing the object to which they relate. Since, then, the formal objects or grounds of certitude according to these philosophers are of three kinds and differ specifically from each other, it follows that there must be three species of certitude. We admit this argument, with the exceptior that in our opinion, there seems to be an essential difference in the generic element of certitude it- self which the other side either overlooks, or does not consider of sufficient importance to empha- size. Properties of Certitude 81 ARTICLE 5 Accidental Degrees of Certitude Summary: Thesis: certitude does not admit degrees as regards its negative element, but ad- mits degrees as regards the positive ele- ment — Proof of thesis — The exclusion of error admits degrees in its causes — The firmness of the exclusion of error admits of degrees in itself — A difficulty answered — Summing up. 62. The question now arises; are there any differences or variations of intellectual assent within the boundaries of each of the three orders of certitude? If there are, they will, of course, be merely accidental, just as the differences be- tween two animals of the same kind, say, between two horses, are only accidental. We ask then — to take a definite example — is it pos- sible for the same metaphysical truth, v. g. "Every effect must have a cause," to be more certain to one mind than to another. We an- swer that it is. Let us first state our doctrine concisely in a thesis. THESIS 10 Certain assent, if viewed negatively, that is, as excluding the fear of error, admits no accidental degrees; but if 82 Certitude regarded on its positive side, namely as the firm adherence to truth, it is subject to variations in each of the three orders of certitude. The wording of this thesis supposes that cer- tain assent can be considered from a twofold standpoint, a negative and a positive. To be convinced of this, it is enough, merely to glance at the definition of certitude as the firm adher- ence to one of two contradictory statements without any fear of the other being true. The thesis then embraces two parts, in the first of which we shall prove that certitude consid- ered negatively admits of no degrees or varia- tions ; and in the second, that if taken positively, it does. Proof of the first part, that certitude in re- spect to its negative element admits of no de- grees. The negative element of certitude consists in this, that all doubt, hesitancy and dread of being mistaken has been banished. Certitude then, viewed on its negative side, is a negation pure and simple, a total absence of whatever is at variance with the firmness of mental adherence required by the order of certitude of which there is question. Now a negation which is total, and hence the complete and not the merely partial absence of something, does not admit of degrees. Properties of Certitude 83 Thus complete darkness implies the removal of even the slightest trace of light; a perfect vacuum supposes every, even the last, particle of air, to have been exhausted. Complete dark- ness or a perfect vacuum may be destroyed, but neither can be intensified. The same holds true as regards the exclusion of doubt in true and genuine certitude. It may cease altogether by the mind losing hold on the grounds shutting out doubt ; but it cannot be increased. The negative element of certitude is sometimes likened to an indivisible mathematical point : for such a point cannot be diminished or brought to greater perfection: any attempt to do so even in thought, would involve us in a contradiction. In the Schoolmen's dialect, this idea is often con- veyed by saying, "Certitudo stat in (puncto) in- divisibili," that is to say, "Certitude is like a mathematical point without extension." Let us now take up the second part of our thesis, in which we inquire into the positive ele- ment of certitude, namely the firm adherence to truth. We wish to know then, whether this admits of degrees in each of the three orders of certitude, or whether it, too, like the negative element is comparable to an indivisible math- ematical point. Is Shakespeare's dictum, "To make assurance doubly sure," to be taken meta- phorically or literally? Is it possible for the certain assent of one man to some truth to be 84 Certitude more intense and firm than that of another to the same truth ? or, can the same person be more certain of a statement at one time than at an- other, just as he can be more obliging, virtuous, accomplished at one period of his life than at another ? We answer that certitude viewed on its posi- tive side can be intensified in each of its three essential grades. We show it thus : Certitude on its positive side will admit of accidental degrees, if on the one hand, adherence to truth is capable of being intensified, and if on the other, there are causes at work in the acqui- sition of certitude, which can bring about varia- tions in the intensity of intellectual assent. Now that mental adherence can be intensified or perfected, cannot be doubted, since, on the one hand, it is something positive in its nature, and on the other, its perfectibility does not im- ply any contradiction in its concept, as does that of other positive notions, which have in them- selves a superlative meaning, for instance, right, chief, extreme, universal, equal and the like. For where is there anything impossible in the idea of one thing adhering more or less closely to another? There are, furthermore, causes to produce a variation in the intensity of the intellectual as- sent : namely the motives of assent and the pres- sure of the will, brought to bear upon the think- Properties of Certitude 85 ing agent. For both these motives and the will- pressure admit of more and less; hence also the effect, to which they give rise, namely the assent of the mind; since the effect varies as the cause whenever it is capable of gradations. Thus, the greater the conflagration is, the more intense will be the heat which it generates. As to the motives of assent, it can be readily seen, that they may be both increased in number, and intensified from within by being rendered clearer and more distinct. For the same truth can be shown by one, two, three or still more solid and unexceptional proofs. Thus, I can become assured v. g. that my friend has a high fever by what he tells me, or by what I see myself, or from the testimony of the physician, or perhaps in other ways. Again, there may be many gradations and shades in the clearness and definiteness of the ideas which go to constitute the same certain judgment. Thus, my ideas may be clearer to- day than they were yesterday, because I am more attentive or less fatigued to-day, or because I have looked more closely into the matter since yesterday. I was certain yesterday as I am to- day; but to-day I cling more vigorously to the truth than I did yesterday. A youthful student may be perfectly certain of all the propositions in Euclid; but it is highly probable that in ma- turer life, when he is a professor of mathematics, 86 Certitude his knowledge of these same propositions will not only have been broadened, but also clarified. Again, the clearness and precision of our ideas depends upon each one's intellectual caliber. One man may be a genius, another a person of mediocre talent. The latter understands the arguments advanced for some assertion suffi- ciently to be truly certain; but the other, the eagle-eyed, has a much more lucid and discrimi- nating insight into them, and hence he holds to the truth with a much tighter grasp. As regards the stress of the will brought to bear upon intellectual assent, it is plain that it too can vary not only in different individuals in respect to the same statement; but one and the same person may be differently influenced by the same truth to-day and to-morrow according to the changing affections of the will. That the will can act upon the intellect, there can be no doubt ; it is a fact clearly attested by consciousness. True, the will cannot elicit intel- lectual assent; for it is a volitional, and hence a non-intellectual faculty. Yet, it can urge on the intellect to a more accurate scrutiny of the mo- tives of assent, as it is likely to do, whenever a statement proposed for approval or rejection, is of great importance or very pleasing to the think- ing subject. If the contrary happens, that is, if there is question of an unpalatable truth, the will is liable at times to weaken the intellectual Properties of Certitude 87 assent by inducing the mind to look away from the distasteful facts or arguments and close its eyes to their evidence. Thus suppose that your country is at war with another nation and that well authenticated dispatches announce a victory. You are sure ; but because the news pleases you, you give yourself up to this delightful certainty with much greater intensity of assent, than you would have done, if the report resting on similar grounds had told of defeat. All we have hitherto said, proves that certain assent admits of accidental degrees. Let us now add a few remarks by way of corollaries in further elucidation of the previous thesis. 63. The exclusion of error admits of de- grees in its causes. Since the same causes which determine the positive adherence of the mind, likewise exclude the fear of error, it fol- lows, that the foundation to which the exclusion of error is due, is variable; and this is some- times expressed by saying that the exclusion of error allows of more or less, if not in itself (formally), at least in its causes or funda- mentally. Let us illustrate this by a comparison. A bul- let may be driven out of the barrel of a gun by a greater or less charge of powder. In either case, the negative result produced by the charge is the same, namely the absence of the bullet 88 Certitude from the barrel; but the cause of this removal, namely the larger or smaller quantity of the ex- plosive, varies. The same example incidentally also shows, that the positive effects obtained in the case, as, the intensity of the report and the velocity of the projected ball, are in exact pro- portion to the propelling cause. 64. The firmness of the exclusion of doubt admits degrees in itself. If, however, we re- gard, not precisely the exclusion of doubt as such, but the firmness of this exclusion, then, we may rightly say, that this latter allows of more or less in itself (formally), and not merely in its causes. For, on the one hand, the firm- ness of the exclusion of doubt is perfectible, being something positive, and on the other, it owes its origin to varying causes, the same that produce the positive assent. Suppose that the firmness of the exclusion of doubt rests in some particular case on three grounds, such that each of them proves the statement in question to evi- dence. I may forget one of them altogether, and another may become hazy and uncertain; yet as I have still one motive left, my certitude in regard to that statement endures ; whereas with the two reasons on which my mind has now lost its hold, I should again lapse into a state of doubt respecting the truth of which I possessed genuine certitude before. Thus we can see that the firmness of the exclusion of doubt is itself Properties of Certitude 89 capable of degrees ; since an unsettled state of mind is more decidedly excluded by three mo- tives of assent than by two or one. 65. A difficulty cleared up. In conclusion, let us answer an objection which is often brought up against this second part of the thesis. It is claimed that the firmness of assent with which one holds to some statement cannot admit of any degrees, because it is determined by the perceived impossibility of the opposite of the statement under consideration. Now impossi- bility being negative in its nature, and hence not susceptible of variations, it follows (say our op- ponents), that the firmness of the assent corre- sponding to it, does not admit of more or less, and is consequently like an indivisible math- ematical point. We reply to this exception taken to our doctrine that the impossibility of the opposite itself rests on the necessity of the perceived connection between the subject and the predicate. For it is only through this latter that the impossibility of the opposite becomes in- telligible. Now this necessity, in its turn, is brought home to the mind through one or more grounds or motives of assent. Whence we in- fer that the firmness of the intellectual adherence to truth is based directly and immediately upon the motives of assent as showing forth the neces- sary connection between subject and predicate, and only secondarily and indirectly upon the im- 90 Certitude possibility of the opposite. Since then these motives for the mind's acceptance of a proposi- tion admit of more or less, it follows that the positive assent, directly depending on them, does so in like manner. It will be seen from the above that the im- possibility of the opposite is not so much a mo- tive of certain assent as a test of the genuineness of the necessity involved in every certain judg- ment, and an aid in grasping this necessity. Let us illustrate by a similitude what we have just said, viz., that assent can vary, although the necessity of the truth and the impossibility of its opposite are one and indivisible, and hence incapable of degrees. All creation proclaims the Wisdom of God, a Divine attribute which in itself is simple and indivisible. The more of God's wonderful works we study, the more we admire his Wis- dom, because, although entirely simple and in- divisible in itself, yet this perfection manifests itself to us through various channels. In a simi- lar manner, the necessity of a proposition and the impossibility of its contradictory, .though likewise one and indivisible, yet can be mani- fested from various view-points and thus impress themselves more or less upon the mind. But there is another flaw in the above dif- ficulty, namely the unwarranted assumption, that the impossibility of the opposite is insusceptible Properties of Certitude 91 of variations under any aspect. True, reference to this additional weak spot is not needed for the solution of the difficulty just proposed: yet, it is good to call attention to it, on account of the close connection of the principle involved with other kindred questions. As regards this assumption we say, in the first place, that it comes with a very bad grace from our opponents who admit that the objective necessity of the truth is threefold; viz., meta- physical, physical and moral. For if so, the im- possibility of the opposite is likewise threefold, since necessity and impossibility, as here under- stood, are correlatives, and hence imply one another. But, say our antagonists, is not the impossi- bility of the contrary a negation? How then can it have degrees? To this rejoinder we answer that, when we say a negation allows of no degrees, we mean a negation which is total and complete. If it is not thus entire, it is susceptible of more or less, just as a vacuum — if taken to be space from which the air has been exhausted to a very high degree — can be more or less perfect. Now, the impossibility of the contrary may be considered in a twofold relationship. It may be either referred to each of the orders of cer- tainty in particular, and then it can have no variations ; for the possibility of the opposite 7 92 Certitude corresponding to each of these orders is excluded totally: or it may relate to certainty in general viewed generically ; then, I say, it does not de- note complete and absolute negation or ex- clusion ; but it prescinds from the circumstance whether the possibility excluded be metaphysical, physical or moral, (i. e., absolute or conditional) ; and hence, like certainty itself, it can be sub- divided into three essential orders. 66. Summing up. To conclude, the process by which certitude is engendered in the mind, seems to be the following : The mind holds two concepts (subject and predicate) before its in- tellectual gaze, in order to ascertain their agree- ment or disagreement, and then casts about for reasons to establish the relation between the two. It finds, let us suppose, one or more appropriate grounds showing forth the necessity or evidence of the looked for connection as well as the im- possibility of the opposite. The evidence per- ceived impels the intellect to yield assent by ad- hering firmly to the truth, and at the same time expels all doubt or fear of error : thus the think- ing being comes finally to rest satisfied in the full enjoyment of truth, and this is to possess perfect certitude. THE END ALPHABETICAL INDEX. NUMBERS REFER TO THE PAGES. Analogous terms defined, 74. Analogy of attribution and proportion, 75; extrinsic and intrinsic analogy of attribution, 75. Certitude defined, 1, 6; how it differs from certainty, 8; certitude purely subjective, and certitude at once subjective and objective, 6; objective cer- titude, 7; metaphysical certitude, 9; physical certitude, 10; moral certitude, 12; moral certi- tude in the wider sense, 17; absolute certitude, 18; hypothetical certitude, 18; natural and phil- osophical certitude, 19; requisites for certitude; first requisite, assent to truth, 20; second requisite, infallible motives, 26; third requi- site, evidence of infallible motives, 29; prop- erties of certitude: metaphysical certitude ab- solute certitude, 35; metaphysical certitude the only absolute certitute, 37; physical and moral certitude though hypothetical, still true certi- tude, 40; confirmation from common sense, 58; essential grades of certitude, 70; meta- physical, physical and moral certitude essen- tially different orders of certitude, one sur- passing the other, 70; they are certitude not univocally, but analogously, jy, they are not species properly so called, 73; accidental de- grees of certitude, 81; certitude viewed nega- tively does not admit of degrees, 82; certitude viewed positively admits of degrees, 83; ex- clusion of doubt admits of degrees in its causes, 87; the firmness of the exclusion of doubt admits of degrees in itself. 88. 93 94 Alphabetical Index Common Sense, meaning of, 59; signs of judgments of common sense, 61. Doubt, definition of, 3; negative and positive doubt, 3. Evidence, notion of, 30; objective and subjective, 30. Equivocal terms defined, 74. Formal object of act and faculty; meaning of, 79. Grounds of a statement twofold, 27. Genus, meaning of, 78. Hypothetical propositions, their force, 41. Ignorance, definition of, 2; complete and partial, 2. Laws, physical, 11; moral, 12; in what sense neces- sary, 46. Metaphysical certitude, 9. Moral certitude, 12; moral certitude in the wider sense, 17; moral laws, 15; their necessity, 46. Object; formal object of a faculty and its act, 79. Opinion defined, 7. Physical certitude, 10; physical laws, 11; their neces- sity, 46. Propositions hypothetical, their force, 41. Sense, common, meaning of, 59; signs of judgments of common sense, 61. Skepticism the result of denying that certitude is assent to truth, 25. Stare in indivisibili, meaning of phrase, 83. Suspicion described, 5. Univocal terms defined, 74.