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^e Nature and Obligation of Virtue i 
 
 SERMON 
 
 PREACHED IN THE 
 
 I'arifli - Church of aS'^^. Cbad, Salop^ 
 
 AT THE 
 
 PRIMARY VISITATION 
 
 or THE 
 
 Lord Bilhop of L i c hf i e l d. 
 
 And publifhed at his Lordfhip's Requeft. 
 
 w I T H A N 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 N O T E S on the fame Subjea. 
 By WILLIAM ADAMS, M. A. 
 
 Vicar of St. Chad's, Salop ; 
 Chaplain to the Lord Biftiop of Landaff'; 
 And late Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford. 
 - 
 
 L O 1^ D O N, 
 Printed by E. S A Y, in Ave -Mary-Lane : 
 
 And Sold by A. M I L L A B, in the Strand; 
 
 J. Whiston and B. W h i t e, in Fleet-Street ; 
 
 And Meflrs. D o d s i e y, in Pall-Mall. 
 
 ]V1,DCC,LIV. 
 
THE 
 
 NATURE 
 
 AND 
 
 OBLIGATION 
 
 OF 
 
 VIRTUE. 
 
 [Price One Shilling.] 
 
Juji publijhed, by the fame Author, 
 
 Printed in the fame Size with Mr. Hume'j Eflays, 
 
 The Second Edition, with Additions, 
 
 AN ESSAY in Anfwcr to Mr. HUMEs 
 ESSAYS on MIRACLES. Price 
 One Shilling. 
 
 Perseverance in Well-doing: 
 A Sermon preached at the Parifli-Church of 
 St. Chad^ Salop, before the Truftees of the 
 Salop Infirmary, and publiflied at their Re- 
 queft. Price Six Pence. 
 
 Sold, for the Benefit of the Charity, by 
 Mr. Longman, in Pater-noJler-Row, London j 
 Mr. Durjlon, Mr. Cotton, and Mr. Eddowes, 
 in Shrew/bury j and Mr. Pie/ley, in Oxford, 
 
To the Jl I G H T Reverend 
 
 FREDERICK, 
 
 LQRD BISHOP Ot / 
 L ICHFIEL D and CO VE NTR r, 
 
 M Y L O R D, 
 
 YOUR Lordflilp's approbation of 
 the following difcourfe does great 
 honour to its author. tHe is not how- 
 ever fo vain, ag to promife himfelf that it 
 will, upon a ftridter fcrutiny, appear in 
 every point approved even to your Lord- 
 fhip's candour. In a long train of rea- 
 foning upon a fubjeft.as difficult and ab- 
 ffrufe' as any other, many things niay 
 appear, upon a tranfient hearing, to the 
 quickeil difcernment fair anji plaufible, 
 which will not bear a plofer examination. 
 Your Lordfhip's judgment will not there- 
 fore, it is hopedj be queftipned, if fome 
 particulars* in it,' which the author him- 
 felf is far from not fufpeding, may be 
 thought liable to doubt or exception. It 
 Vfas enough to recommend it to your 
 J^ § l^prdfhip's 
 
iv. DEDICATION. 
 
 Lardfhip's good opinion, if any new light 
 aj^eared to be brought into a fiibjed^ 
 which has fo much employed and di- 
 vided the learned and in(^uifitive, or if 
 only a fair attempt was made towards it. 
 As llich only he prdfurties to offer it td 
 your Lordfhip and the publick, glad of 
 the opportunity of profeffing to the world 
 his fincere efteem and honour for your 
 Lordfhip's amiable charaddr. 
 
 / am, my Lord, 
 
 Tour LoRDSH IP's 
 
 Dutiful and obedient Servant. 
 
 W. Adams^. 
 
1 **,f t#*t******************* 
 
 l^^O^^f''^^'^ w. '-wi^i:^'^' -« * 
 
 ^s^)^^?'' "' ■^^-' ''' ^^* 
 
 
 Romans ii. 14, 15. 
 
 TBe/ej having not the law, are a law unto 
 themfehes ; which Jhew the work of the 
 law written in their hearts, their con- 
 Jcience alfo bearing witnefs, and their 
 thoughts the mean while acctifing, or elfe 
 excufing one another. 
 
 THE Apoftle here affirms of" the 
 Gentiles, that, though they were 
 ftrangers to the written or revealed 
 will of God, they had yet a law to con- 
 dud themfelves by, a law written in their 
 hearts ; their confcience with the right of 
 a legiflator didlating their duty, and their" 
 re^fon as a judge acquitting or condemn- 
 ing them. 
 
 It is a general truth implied in this, 
 
 that all intelligent beings are a law to 
 
 themfelves J that reafon implies duty and 
 
 obligation j and that v»*hoever by this light 
 
 B can 
 
[ 4 r 
 
 paring the abftraded ideas of the mind, 
 and contemplating the actions and cha- 
 radters . of men, thefe are the province 
 and peculiar of reafonj which lie open 
 in feme degree to the loweft of rational 
 beings, but are far above the level of 
 inftindt, fenfe, or paffion. Of thefe we 
 may fafely aflert, that they are as fixed 
 and unchangeable as reafon itfelf. While 
 reafon continues what it is, truth and 
 virtue will appear to it the fame. The 
 conflancy and immutability of the former 
 is plainly acknowledged and proved in 
 the whole intercourf& of men with each 
 other : why elfe do we demand the aflent 
 of men to the moft evident and demon- 
 ftrated truths, if we were not certain that 
 truth muft appear the fame, as far as it 
 is underftood, to all intelligent beings? 
 Objeds themfelves may be changed or 
 deftroyed : but our reafonings concerning 
 them will be equally true, whether they 
 have any real, or only a poffible exiftence. 
 The faculty of perceiving truth may be 
 deftroyed, or reafon may be taken from 
 us: but, while this remains, truth will 
 appear always the fame. We may with- 
 Qut arrogance affirm, that it is not in the 
 
 power 
 
[ 5 ] 
 power of the fupreme Being to alter Its 
 nature : it is immutable and neceflary, the 
 fame yejierday^ to-day, and for ever. 
 
 In like manner, in contemplating aftionfi 
 and charafters, right and wrong appear to 
 the mind as certainly and as neceffarily 
 diftindt from each other, as fixed and in- 
 variable in their nature. We are as cer- 
 tain that they muft appear the fame to all 
 beings that have reafon and underftanding 
 to receive the ideas, — that they are the 
 fame in all climates, in all ages, in all 
 worlds. As every true propofition is uni- 
 verfally true, fo every right adion, the 
 fame circumftances fuppofed, is univer- 
 fally right. It is not 'in the power of 
 omnipotence itfelf to alter or invert its 
 nature, to tranfmute the charafter of right 
 into wrong, or to make treachery, falfe- 
 hood, and ingratitude appear in the fame 
 light with honeftyi fidelity, and gratitude. 
 
 If it be afked, what it is that confti- 
 t«tes right, by what rule or ftandard it is 
 to be meafured and tried; the fame may 
 be equally queftioned concerning truth. 
 And, in anfwer to both, we may as well 
 
 afk, 
 
aflf, fejr what crkerixDn does the eye (iiftin- 
 gilifl^' colouiS!? The objea is prefaitddi> 
 and its properties and qualities appear witB 
 it: the ideas of colour, fhape, and pro- 
 portion, that belong to it, necelferily aiife 
 ifv t^€ mindi Adions arc as plainly an 
 ^bJ€<9: to the underftandJng ; and, wheii 
 {iirveyed or contemplated, their characters) 
 app«aj- with; them. We neceffiirily kff 
 ^emi under the charader of right, in- 
 different, or wrong. This right in a£kionS 
 Is not ordinarily difcovercd by any procefe 
 of reafon, but by fimpie perception r the 
 underftafiding fees it: and We may as 
 well afk of the moft obvious quantitieSFy 
 why fome are greater than other, why 
 the fquare,; for inftanee, is greater thaa 
 the root, as why fome aftions are better 
 dian otlier. 
 
 , In inveftigating truth*, we fet out with 
 fuch as are known and acknowledged, 
 and from thence infer others that are 
 nearly, and then more remotely, con- 
 nefted with them. In proving the truth 
 9f any doubted propofitjon, we appeal to 
 thofe that are more known ^ tili we arrive 
 at fuch as are fecn ojr felf-evHeot. Bast'm. 
 
 xnorals 
 
11^1 
 
 -with this firft felf-evidcnce : it is imme- 
 4'ialely feen and felt, and wants not -by the 
 -&W deduction's qf reafoji to be proved, s 
 
 : J' Tksfe are -indeed cafes where diffepeiit 
 |iigh|fe or dtttiis iriterfere, in whidh ifc 
 H0cill of thq cafuift or civilian is wanting 
 -to weigh the moments of each, and -fo 
 judge upon the whole which claim pre- 
 ponderates. But even here the feveral 
 rights that ^re <hus involved are dlftindt- 
 -ly feeri by their own evidence j and thb 
 ^fficulty iifaally lies in aligning to each 
 ^ -due, - The right and wrong in moiffc 
 ^ions ftands '©ut prominent and coftipi- 
 "fcuous -eV^en to a careflefs 'obiferver. Ouir 
 duty appears by its own light, and is ii^ot 
 ieft 'to be retfoned out or proved by 4n- 
 fferrkig one -trdth from another. 
 \, ■- . -' 1.1. , • , .1 J I 
 
 - However thus be, whether right he, as 
 i Aink, in ail €mple and Ufjmixed cafes 
 immediately feen, or '^fe&er it 'be hy 'a. 
 ■jhdrt process 'of '&e' mind ihlerred, at «fs, 5 
 *hink, 'too tfvident to ^bc'doahted that the 
 c-haradters of a<Sions, as rigTit or wrong, 
 &|^ear tq ^id^reafoBiflg feculty with % 
 
[ 8 J 
 light and evidence that cannot be refifted. 
 Moral difcernment is as natural and ef- 
 /ential to reafon, as logical. To fuppofe 
 a man without the faculty of diftinguifh- 
 ing truth from falfliood, is to fuppofe him 
 WDid of reafon, and the powers of thought : 
 to fuppofe him incapable of difcerning 
 right from wrong, is in like manner to 
 diveft him of underftanding, and to de- 
 grade him to the; level of brutes. 
 
 Reafon then implies in it a knowledge 
 of good and evil, and points out the 
 former with authority under the idea of 
 right; faying. This is the nvayj walk ye 
 in it. Rational beings have a rule of 
 action within them; and this rule is one 
 and the fame to all intelligent beings thro' 
 the univerfe. We may fay, with reve- 
 rence, that God, who has no law, no 
 fuperior to controul his will, is a law 
 unto himfelf } his unerring reafon direft- 
 ing, and his unbiafled will invariably pur- 
 fuing, what is right. And the fame rea- 
 fon, as far as he has imparted it in dif- 
 ferent degrees to his creatures, is their 
 law, a law written in their minds ; their 
 confcience witneffing to it, and, as they 
 
 obey 
 
[ 9 1 
 obey or negl^6l it, aceufing or elfeex- 
 cufing them. To do always ^hat.is right 
 is the privilege and eharader of infinite 
 wifdom and goodnefs; Beings of a limit- 
 ed capacity are liable in all degrees to 
 feilure and imperfeftion, — to deviate in 
 their judgment from truth, in their adtions 
 from righti Man in particular has many 
 principles of action which in their influ- 
 ence run counter to reafon, many impor- 
 tunate appetites and headftrong paffions 
 ready' to, difpute her authority, and to 
 ufurp the fovereignty over him. ,To 
 keep thefe within proper bounds, to di- 
 re^ them to their true objedrs, and to 
 fubdue them to the governance of rea- 
 fon, this is virtue ; . which may be defined 
 the conformity ofimperfecSfe beings to the 
 did;ates of reafon, or to right. 
 
 L , We fay not of the divine Being, that 
 he is virtuous : ke is righteous and, holy 
 in all his ways and works. But virtue 
 is a degrading charadter, when applied 
 to the Deity. , The reafon is, that it im- 
 plies trial and Gonflid:. Virtue in every 
 a^ion is meafured by the difficulty that 
 attends it, and bears exa^ proportion to 
 ni C the 
 
[ ,c] 
 the effort that is made to furmount diis 
 difficulty. There would be no virtue in 
 temperance, if there were no allurements 
 to excefs. Could we fuppofe man free 
 from temptation) diveft him of his ap- 
 petites and paffions, he might be then 
 more perfed:, becaufe more eafily fwayed 
 and governed by reafon : but his beft 
 a(^bns would no longer carry any proof 
 of virtue, in them. In like manner, as 
 God has implanted many paffions and 
 good affeftions in the mind to excite us 
 to duty, whatever good we do from thefe 
 principles, and not from reafon, fo far 
 is loft of the ' merit and virtue of the 
 aftion. In proportion as the mbtives to 
 duty are ftrongcr, a ftrwfter confbrmily 
 to right will be neceffary to give a proof 
 of equal virtue in the agent : where more 
 is given, more will be required : and the 
 offering of a mite in fome circumftances 
 will outweigh a talent in others. 
 
 And, as this is of the cffence and 
 charafter of virtue, fo, -prc^rly- ^jeak- 
 ing, ^his is the only virtue. Temperance, 
 juftice, and the reft, are duties diftini^ 
 in their nurture and ot^ed : but viirtae is 
 
 in 
 
{ II 1 
 
 in all thefe the fame. If we are tetn^ 
 perate from natural inclination pr com^ 
 plexion, if we give all our goods to feed 
 the poor from any other confideration 
 than that of conforming to our duty, 
 there is fo far no virtue in it. Adibns 
 thcmfelves have no charadter, are no far- 
 ther virtuous, than as they indicate virtue 
 in the agent. But the only virtue there 
 is conformity to reafon, or a fteady and 
 refolved adherence to what is right. 
 
 , The next queftion^, then will, be, what 
 it is that makes this conformity a duty, 
 or in what does the obligation to virtue 
 and right adtion cqnfift ? To this I an- 
 fwer, that right implies duty in its ides^. 
 To perceive that an aftion is right, is to 
 fee a reafon for doing it in the a(Stion it- 
 Mfi abftra(fted from all other confidersir 
 tions whatfoever- Now, this perception, 
 this acknowledged Tieiaitude in the a<9iQn, 
 is the very effence of obligation j that 
 which commands the approbation jind 
 choice," ^d binds ^e ci^nfeiepcf,: of every 
 y^tioBal' being. External confiderationiS 
 or naotives may make it our intereft or 
 prudence to a£t } but this ^ilone ^m mske 
 C 2 or 
 
[ 12 1 
 
 or conftitutc duty. Right, indifferent, and 
 wrong are fpecificalty oppbfed. to each 
 other. A right aftion' cannot therefore 
 by the terms be ' indifferent : the bare 
 omiffion of it, and not only the contrary 
 adtion, is" wrong, and carries felf-c!on- 
 demnatibn " along with it. The perception 
 therefore of right implies duty. And this 
 is the only obligation purely moral, the- 
 only obligation that there is any merit or 
 virtue in complying with. 
 
 I am not here fpeaking of the force 
 and efficacy of this principle, but of its 
 authority and pre-eminence. In the pre- 
 fent -corrupt and frail ftate of mankind 
 (here are, it is certain, many other prin* 
 cipks more prevailing, — lujls^ofthejlejh, 
 'which war 'hgainji the fpirit, and bring us 
 into captivity to the law of Jin. But it is 
 as certain, that, without thefe temptations 
 to the contrary, reafon would always gO'- 
 vern j that, where it is unhappily over- 
 ruled by luft or paffion, it ftill maintains 
 fts /pight : and we 'are, even when we 
 defert her fervice,- obliged, in fpight of 
 ourfelves, to acknowledge her authority 
 as a law written in our hearts, and to 
 
 fubmit 
 
[ 13 J 
 
 fubmit to her reproaches, while our own 
 thoughts accufe and condemn us. - To 
 aft from reafon, is to aft with 9ur own 
 judgment, and, confequently, to be felf- 
 approved. To deviate^ from right, is tb 
 aft contrary to our own ferife of things^ 
 to aft againft the confent of our minds, 
 and therefore is to be felf-condemntd. 
 
 ' But, if virtue be thus founded wholly 
 on the reafonablenefs of aftion, may ther^ 
 not- often appear reafons on. the other 
 fide, that will cancel and overrule this 
 obligation ? Will not prudence and duty 
 be often found to interfere', 'and the famt 
 reafon, which pronounces an aftion right 
 to be done, at the fame time declare it 
 imprudence and folly to do it ? Every 
 man has a private end to purfue, and is 
 made invincibly to kve and defire his 
 own happinefs. If virtue then imply trial, 
 difficulty, and felf-denial, what fhall ob- 
 lige him to forego the pleafiires that court 
 his choice, for the fake of that virtuei 
 which not only forbids them, but perhaps 
 may expofe him to real pain and trouble ? 
 Js hp not rather in thefe circumftances 
 
 obliged 
 
C H ] 
 
 obliged to confult his happinefs, and to 
 fly from pain and mifery ? 
 
 To this I anfwer, firft, that nothing 
 can bring us under an obligation to do 
 what appears to our moral difcernment 
 wrong. It may be fuppofed our intereil 
 to do this ; but it cannot be fuppofed our 
 duty. For I afk, if fome power, which 
 we are unable to refill, fhould affume the 
 command over us, and give us laws which 
 axe unrighteous and unjuft, Ihould we be 
 under any obligation to obey him ? fhould 
 we not rather be obliged to fliake off the 
 yoke, and to refift fuch ufurpation, if it 
 were in our power? However then we 
 might be fwayed by fear or hope, it is 
 plain that we are under an obligation to 
 right, which is antecedent, and in order 
 and nature fuperior, to all other. Power 
 may compel, intereft may bribe, and 
 pleafure perfuadej but reafpn only can 
 oblige: this is the only authority which 
 rational beings can owp, and to which 
 they can owe obedience. 
 
 But, fecondly, virtue, though expofed 
 to many crofles and diftrefles, is yet not 
 
 left 
 
[ 15 1 
 1^ fo deftitute and friendlefs as this ob- 
 jedlioH fuppofes. If it implies trial and 
 difficulty, it implies too viftory in the 
 trial, and a rational joy and triumph in 
 its own integrity. Whatever we lofe or 
 fufFer in the caufe of virtue, our moral 
 worth and excellence are increafed in the 
 fame proportion. And this is no fahtaftic, 
 chimerical good, but the moft real and 
 fubftantial we can poffefs, All other 
 goods perifli in the ufing; all other 
 pleafures are loft in the enjoyment : but 
 for thefe we are the happier and better 
 for ever. Every improvement in virtue, 
 is an acquifition made, which time can- 
 not impair, nor rapine invade : and the 
 virtuous triumph, with which the mind 
 exults that has flood fuperior to tempta- 
 tion, is for the moft part a fufficient com- 
 penfation for the difficulties that attend it, 
 
 I might here add the confeious fenfe 
 that all other intelligent beings muft 
 approve fuch a condudl; the charadter, 
 efteem, and love, that' belong to it; 
 which, though they carr/ Ho obligation 
 in them, may yet be confidfered as natural 
 fanftions of virtue, andou^t to be laid 
 
 ia 
 
[ i6 ] 
 
 in the ballance againft the motives of 
 pleafure and intereft, that would feduce 
 us from our duty. 
 
 On the other hand, whatever is gained 
 by deferting our .duty is dearly paid for 
 in that fhame and rcmorfe that attend it; 
 which are real evils, and as feverely felt 
 as bodily pain and torture. " Whoever," 
 fays Tullyy " violates the law of reafon, 
 " renounces his nature, and will be ri- 
 " goroufly chaftifed for his difobedience, 
 " though he may efcape what we com- 
 ^' monly call punifliment." * 
 
 Thus far then moral and natural good 
 go together. We are made not blindly 
 to love ourfelves, but to love what is 
 amiable, good, and worthy in ourfelves. 
 The mind delights in its own perfection, 
 and can acquiefce in nothing elfe as art 
 end or objedt worthy of its purfuit. In 
 proportion as it. advances towards this end, 
 it furveys itfelf with joy and gratulatipn : 
 and, on the other hand, it cannot forgive 
 or be at peace with itfelf, while it ads 
 unworthily: it neceflarily laments every 
 
 * Apud LaSant. Inft. Div. lib.^'6. cap. S. 
 
 fall 
 
t /7 ] 
 fall frotii virtue; as a proof of weaknef^ 
 ind degeneracy, and, in proportion to this 
 ienfe and feeling of ill-defertj becomes thd" 
 obje'd: of its own contdmpt a:rid hatreds 
 
 The pleafureg ■^hich I have ttiefitioned, 
 of felf-efteem and joy iii our ow^n vv'orthi 
 which" are peculiar to virtue, feem to be 
 purely rktionJtl, --^ not to proceed from 
 palflioh, or any inferior principle iii our 
 nature, but from reafon only : and there^ 
 fore, though thdy cannot be the ground. 
 of virtue, or come within the n<)tion of" 
 obligatioil, yet are thdy pleafiires of thd 
 pureft kind, arid feem much lefs tharl any 
 External tnotive to takcfrom the merit of 
 virtue'. The love of virtue is the purefi 
 |»rinciple of virtue ; and therefore the love 
 of virtiid in ourfelves is fo far a virtubusf^ 
 felf-love. 
 
 But it rtiuft be confelted, that, as thefd 
 pleafures are purely rational, fo, con- 
 fidered as an adequate fanftiori' to virtue, 
 they are adapted only to beirigs that ard 
 purely rational/ Man, to return to thd 
 objeftion, is a fenfible as well as fntel- 
 k(^Vlal Jieingj fubjecSt, as fuch, to many 
 JD wants 
 
[ i8 ] 
 
 wants and infirmities, to much pain ana 
 mifery : and virtue is not only left expofed 
 to thefe, but they are fometimes the cer- 
 tain effeft and confequence of it. The 
 befl of men therefore, however cheared 
 by the confolations of virtue, may be un- 
 liappy in a great degree tmder the com- 
 mon wrants and fufFerings of life. In 
 thefe eircumftances it feems neceiTary to 
 give up the obligations of virtue, or to 
 allowr that man is an ill-conftituted being j 
 thofc who defervc beft being neceflarily 
 miferable, either by forfeiting, their virtue,, 
 and incurring the reproach of their own 
 hearts, or expofing themfelves by their 
 adherence to it to the evils of life. 
 
 But here, thirdly, religion comes in to 
 our aid : which teaches us, that we arc 
 under the government of a wife and good 
 being ; that virtue is his will, a neceflary, 
 but fure title to his favour? that/ what- 
 ever inequalities appear- in this life, asll 
 will be adjufted in another, in which 
 every one ihall receive according to his 
 deeds. This, which reafon alone might 
 teach to the wife and prudent, God has 
 revealed alfo unto babesw Here then the 
 
 objection 
 
[ 19 1 
 
 otijed^^ion before us vaniihes: virtue and 
 -feppinefs are found at laft to coincide, 
 and the fcheme of moral duty and ob- 
 ligation to be confiftent with the nature 
 •and conftitution of man. 
 
 But, if thefe principles are neceflary to 
 the fupport of virtue, are they not, it 
 will be inquired, the proper ground and 
 obligation of it ? Are not the authority 
 of God, his right to give laws to his 
 creatures, and his power of difpenling 
 eternal rewards and punifhments, the 
 fureft foundation to build morality upon ? 
 To this it muft be anfwered, that" the 
 fovereign perfections of- God are undoubt- 
 edly a reafon for the higheft reverence 
 and homage we can pay him, the loweft 
 proftration of heart and mind that we can 
 exprefs before him. The moft perfed 
 fubmiffion is due to bis will, who is 
 wifdom and goodnefs itfelf ; the moil en- 
 tire devotion to his fervice, who made us 
 what we are^ and gave us all that we 
 poflefs. But thefe duties derive their obr- 
 : ligation from the principle we have been 
 cftablifhing. It is in the higheft degree 
 ffafonable, that we refiga our will, and 
 P 2 fven 
 
{ 20 ] 
 
 even our reafon, to his will, who, we are 
 previoufly affured, pan ordain nothing but 
 what is right ap4 good : and therefore all 
 his commands, even though we fhould 
 not be able to dilcern the reafon and 
 equity of them, have a claim to our obe- 
 dience. It is meet and right, that we 
 pay a chearful fubmiffion to his will, to 
 vvhom we owe our very felves, and all 
 our powers of adling and thinking. Gbcr 
 dience then to the will of God, when 
 revealed or known, is upon this principle 
 the firft and higheft duty of all created 
 beings. The authority of God, as our 
 creator and governor, his wifdom and 
 goodnefs, are fo many additional obligaT- 
 tions to virtue. But, however thefe obr 
 ligations are multiplied, they are flill one 
 in kind, deriving all their force fron^ 
 reafon and right. 
 
 With refpe<3: to the laft principle here 
 jnentioiied, the fandtions of rewards and 
 punifhment? which God has annexed tp 
 his laws, thefg have not in any . proper 
 fenfe the nature of obligation. They are 
 only motives to virtue, adapted to the ffcate 
 and condition, the weaknefs and inferi- 
 
 fibility 
 
[ 21 ] 
 
 fibility of man. They do not make or 
 ponftitute duty, but prefuppofe it. To 
 aft againft them is not fo properly fin, 
 ^s folly and madnefs. It wili follow lil^e- 
 wife, as I am forced to acknowledge, that 
 to adt merely from thefe motives, without 
 any regard to reafon or eonfeience, if this 
 were poflible, is not virtue, however it 
 might be thought prudence or intereft. 
 Thefe arp, however, the beft helps to 
 virtue, as they ferve to awaken the atten- 
 tion of thoughtlefs mankind, to call them 
 off from the cares and pleafures in w|iich 
 they are immerfed, and from fenfible to 
 Spiritual objedis. When the mind is turned 
 to contemplate virtue, its obligations will 
 appear with it j wp fhall neceffarily ap- 
 prove it for its own fake ; and our reafon 
 and underflanding will be brought into 
 paptivity to it. JBeiides, the nature of 
 man is fuch, that, by whatever means he 
 is brought into a certain courfe and tenor 
 pf aftion,, it will foon become his pleafure 
 and choice. An uniform pradice of duly 
 will make it natural and habitual to u§, 
 and will foon induce a love of it. We 
 ihall irifenfibly adopt the true principle of 
 
 virtue^ 
 
[ 22 ] 
 
 ivirtue, and learn to be Aibjed: for con^K 
 fcience fake. 
 
 The conclufions, that moft deferve our 
 notice, from what Has been faid, are, 
 
 Firft, that virtue, and the obligation of 
 it, are not founded in will, or power, or 
 in the arbitrary appointment of any being 
 whatfoever; that the laws of God him- 
 felf are not therefore righteous, merely 
 becaufe they are commanded, but are 
 therefore commanded, becaufe they are 
 antecedently and in their own nature 
 righteous. Reafon and right are the eter- 
 nal rule of aftion by which the will of 
 God himfelf is direfted. To adl inva- 
 riably by this rule is infinite goodnefs, 
 righteoufnefs, and moral perfedlion : and 
 therefore to afcribe this to God is to pay 
 him the honour due unto his name. This 
 univerfal rule applies itfelf differently to 
 the different ranks and fyflems of intelli- 
 gent beings, and will call for very different 
 duties, according to their different capa- 
 cities, relations, and circumflances. The 
 end and defign of revelation is to give the 
 hlgheft explicit authority to this rule, a? 
 
E 2s } 
 
 well a& to adapt it to the nature and con-, 
 ^ition of man, and to provide for hjs^ 
 infirmities and wants in the prad^ice of" it. 
 By its aptitude to this end every religion 
 rauft be tried. To this tcft tjie fcripture& 
 appeal, a& a neccffary propf of their truth.. 
 And.this is the charadteriftic excellence 
 arid the great internal evidence of Chri- 
 ftianity, .that all its precepts, dodtrines, 
 and inftituted duties are carlculated in" the 
 highefh manner to promote moral righte- 
 oufnefs. Upon this principle are founded 
 all the ckims of merit and excellence 
 which it afferts to itfelf; that its Jiatutes: 
 are rights and rejoice the heart \ that theyt 
 are jujl and true and righteous altogether ; 
 that the righteoufnefs of its tejiirnqnies. is 
 everlajiingj and its law is truth. 
 
 A fecond confequenpe from what has, 
 been faid is, that virtue and, its obligation 
 are not founded in any ,good affediions, 
 fuch as benevolence, conipaffion, and the 
 like i nor in any blind impulfe, inftind, 
 or moral ienfe. By this latter indeed if 
 we underftand.the different fentiments to- 
 wards right and wrong in the underftand- 
 ing, this will coincide with the principle 
 
 which 
 
which wfe have been explaining, fiat, if 
 ( be meant by it (Jnly an inftindtive appro- 
 bation of victue, and a certain refinecJ 
 tafte for the! beauties and excellencies of 
 it, as it is '^etierally explained by thofe 
 who defend it, this is to tiiafie the nature 
 of virtue wholly precarious and arbitrary, 
 to fuppofe that men might ha"Ve been in- 
 telligent beings without any attachment to' 
 it, or even with ferttiments and affedlions 
 wholly inverted, and diredled to the con- 
 trary objedfa } fince the pleafing fenfatioiis, 
 which are now the incitement and fanc- 
 tion of virtue, might confiftently with this 
 hypothefis have been given to its contrary. 
 
 There is a third opinion not lefs re- 
 pugnant t6 the principles we have been 
 aflerting, which places the eflence of vir- 
 tue in a conforniity of our anions and 
 affedlions to the publick gbod, and the 
 obligation or fole motive to the pradtice 
 of it in the prefent feeling or future pro- 
 fpedt of private happinefs. But, not to 
 mention that thefe principles' of adlion 
 feem but ill to agree together, piety and 
 temperance, two very comprehenfive du-* 
 ties, will have but a very precarious fovm-i 
 
 dation 
 
[ ^5 J 
 
 datibn in this fyftem: and of tlie rtibi'i^ 
 fbcial duties, juftiee, fidelity, gratitude,- 
 We may furely affirm, that thefe appeat' 
 to the confcience of every mah to be ift^ 
 difpenfible and neceffary, without inquirihg 
 ilito their confequences, either on Our 
 own, or the happiftefs of others. It is 
 true, that- God has fo wifely ofdefed thd 
 frame and conftitution of things, that th^ 
 pratSicfe of virtue has the riiofl hatural 
 and general tendericy to prcmidte happi-' 
 nefs among men. But this connedlion is 
 not neceffairy, nor in many particular cafeS 
 certain ; and the foundation of virtue can* 
 not be any thing that is precarious and 
 Contingent.' 
 
 ; If men are left to infer their dilty front 
 any fuch relation, they will find many 
 ready expedients to evade it. Single in-s 
 fiances of duty will be tholight of littld 
 influence to the publick : it wilJ appeat* 
 fair and right to commute for pri^^ate vices 
 by piiblick benefits: and frawd add im* 
 poflure will be authorized, a-s oft s& the 
 common good is^ thought promoted bf 
 ki In faft, upon this principle it Certain^ 
 ly is, that .men have allowed themfelvef 
 
 , . ,^ E i^' 
 
[26 1 
 
 in the praftice of pious forgeries; tliat 
 perfecution is juftified in the caufe of re- 
 ligion ; and that publick faith and truth 
 are fo often and openiy Sacrificed to pub- 
 lick utility. And it is therefore againft 
 this fpecies of felf-deceit that the Apoftle 
 has addrefled a very particular caution — 
 not ta do evily that good may come. 
 
 I have juft obferved, that the WfO prin- 
 ciples here laid dow^n, inftead of bearing 
 fo clofe an affinity, feem rather to have 
 an unfriendly afped: towards 6ach other. 
 A love of ourfelves is not in its natu- 
 ral influence any motive to the good of 
 others: nor is the good of others any 
 diredl means of procuring ha:ppinefs to 
 ourfelves. But, however thefe may be 
 reconciled by religion, and fclf-love and 
 focial be made at laft the lame, we ftiajal 
 ftill by the firft of thefe principles be 
 bound in duty to confult our prefcnt hap- 
 pinefs, as far as it can confiit with the 
 publick good. It wiU be not only inno- 
 cent and prudent, but virtue, to do fo, and 
 immoral to negledl it. And, on the other 
 hand, the duties of life which expofe us 
 to moil trouble and felf-denial, inftead of" 
 
 having 
 
t 2^ 1 
 
 fiavmg the greater, will have the lefs vir- 
 tue in them : for, as far as they interrupt 
 ,<nir happinefs, wc fliall ad contrary to 
 our obligations in performing them. Thefe 
 confequcnces muft fgllow: for, if our 
 own happinefs he the only reafon for con^r 
 folting that of others, it muii be this 
 reafon that makes it duty ; and, confe- 
 <|uently, to confult our own happinefs 
 mufl be of prior obligation, and a more 
 indifpenfible duty. 
 
 The advocates of this new fyftem have 
 with great force of rCafon and eloquence 
 demonstrated, that no other motive but a 
 profped of final happinefe can effedually 
 excite to the pradice of virtue : but, un- 
 happily, the difference betwixt motive and 
 ofeligation has been oyertook<idj v/hich are 
 fo far from bejng the fame, that the for^ 
 mer are chiefly addreffed, and owe their 
 jnftiiencfe, to the paffions > while the latter 
 applies itfelf folely, and owes' all its .au- 
 thority, to the underilanding. The v^ifr- 
 dom and expediency of religious fandions, 
 as motives to virtu?, muft with all reve- 
 rence and thankflilnefs be acknowledged j 
 ^4 t^at virtue, too little pradifed under 
 E 2 th?fQ 
 
[ 28 ] 
 
 tbefe influences, would be ill-fupported 
 without them. But flill thefe are but 
 fubfidiary to virtue ; the nature and duty > 
 of which muft be firft fuppofed ; and 
 then thefe are added, not to give authority ■ 
 cr obligation, but force and influence, or 
 to procure that attention and obedience 
 v/hich are due to it. 
 
 A fourth concluCon, which I fhall 
 prefume to offer, from what has been 
 faid, is, that, when virtue is faid to con- 
 fifl: in a conformity to truth, in acting 
 agreeably to the truth of the cafe, to the' 
 reafon, truth, or fitnefs of things, there 
 is, if not inaccuracy, yet fomething of 
 obfcurity in the exprefllion. It is certain, 
 tlaat, in every virtuous adlion, truth, or 
 a convidion that the aftion is right, is 
 the principle or reafon upon which we 
 Hvt, But the charadter of the adion, and, 
 confequently, the meafure and flandard 
 of it, is not truth, but right: nor docs 
 the virtue of it confifl in a conformity to 
 ^ruth, as fuch, though it may be faid to 
 confift in a conformity to fome particular 
 ^ruth, or rule of duty, prefcribing what 
 4S right, Truth is a term of wider extent 
 
 thaq 
 
[ 29 1 
 than right. The charafter of wifdom or 
 prudence, of fkill in any art or profeffion. > 
 are as well founded in a regard to truth, 
 and imply the acting agreeably to the 
 nature and reafon of things: yet are thefe". 
 ideas certainly diftindl from that of good- : 
 nefs, or moral redtitude. The man who 
 builds according to the principles of geo- 
 metry acSts as agreeably to truth, and he 
 who fhbuld tranfgrefs the rules of archi- 
 tefture as much violates truth, as he who 
 afts agreeably to the duty of gratitude, or 
 contrar5r to it : but in the former of thefc 
 inftances the conformity to truth is not 
 virtue, but fkill ; the defledtion from it • 
 is not vice, but ignorance or folly. la 
 every truth, Vv^hich carries moral obliga- 
 tion, right or duty, or fomething fyno- 
 nimous, muft be expreffed or underftood. 
 If virtue therefore be defined a conformity ' 
 to truth, it is to fuqh moral truth only 
 as points out what is right. It is the 
 conforrrjity to what reafon dictates as 
 right, not what it teaches for true. And 
 this charadter of adtions depends not on 
 any previous truth or reafon of things; 
 hut its connedtion wfth every fpecies of 
 adtion, or contrariety to it, is, as I have' 
 ' ^t)ove 
 
C 30 ] 
 
 fflfcove intimated, immediately fecn by its 
 own light,. 
 
 There is yet another fenfe, very different 
 from this, in which morality has been 
 refolved into truth ; which fuppofes every ~ 
 adtion to be direftly affirming or denying 
 fome truth, and accordingly, as it exprefles 
 what is true or falfe, to be right or wrong. 
 Thus the man who injures or defigncdly 
 hurts another unprovoked, is therefore 
 guilty of a crime, bccaufe he virtually 
 affirms the man to be his enemy, when 
 he is not. But, befide that this language 
 of a^Sions is often very equivocal and un-r 
 certain, it is plain that in this; and the 
 Jike majr be faid of every oth^r cafe that 
 can be put, the a<Stion muft be fuppofed 
 preyionfly wrong, before it can by any 
 conflru(3:ion be made out to be falfe. For 
 why is this affirming the injured perfon 
 tp be an enemy, but becaufe an innocent 
 perfon deferves not.fuch treatment, or, iri 
 other words, it is contrary to right to treat 
 him thus ? It is this laft truth hj whkl?. 
 the adion is condemned, and by the vio^ 
 I'ation of which alone it has the charadter. 
 pf guilt derived upon it, 
 
t 3> 1 
 
 I am unwilling to difmifs this fubjefi 
 iN'ithout pointing out fome of its ufes in 
 jbmdice. 
 
 Firft then, let us leartt from htince td 
 f everence virtue wherever we find it ; not 
 only among thofe of our own perfuafion, 
 fedt, or party, but wherever by the forc^ 
 of reafon it breaks thro' the impreffionS 
 of a falfe, or rejoices in the light of trud 
 religion. The feed and prineiple of vir- 
 tue, the Apoftle has taught us in the 
 text, is fown alike in all ; and he feemsf 
 *s' plainly to intimate that the poorciil 
 Heatheft is born to the hke hopes arid 
 txpe^ations with ourfelves. He here tells 
 tis, that the Genlfiies, which have not thtf 
 few, may do by nature, by natural reafort 
 only, the things contained in, or thef 
 imoral duties of, the law; that, where' 
 thi& is the t2i(c, their lineircumcifion JhaB 
 be counted for eirc^ntcifioni that is, thofe. 
 stmong the Heathen, who live up to th^ 
 fight which God has given them, iff 
 ftilfiUing the moral duties of religion,- 
 fliall be acdepted of Gdd, though they^ 
 afe not in covenant with him as member^ 
 
 of 
 
t 30 
 fef his church. They may even by a 
 lower degree of obedience give equal prOof 
 of virtue vi^ith thofe who are favoured with 
 higher lights and advantages, ai)d fhall 
 accordingly be judged hereafter according 
 to what they have< and not according to 
 what they have not; — thofe who have 
 lived under the law, by the lawj and 
 thofe who have lived without the law,- 
 without the law. They fet out behind 
 us, if I may fo exprefs myfelf, in the 
 great race of virtue, happinefs, and per- 
 fedlion, which lies for ever and without 
 end before us : but they may by their 
 diligence or our flothfulnefs overtake us 
 in this world, and be placed, for their 
 reward, far before us in the next^ Thus 
 our Saviour has told us, there are firft 
 which fhall be laft, and laft which fhall 
 be firft : Many, faijh he, Jhall come in that 
 day from the Eaji and from the Wejl, and 
 Jhall ft down "with Abraham and Ifaac and 
 Jacob in the kingdom of heaven j and the 
 children of the kingdom Jhall be cajl outt 
 Inftead therefore of dcfpifing the error 
 and ignorance of others, let their virtue 
 father provoke us to jealoufy and emu-^ 
 lation. Inftead of placing a vain fecurity 
 
 in 
 
;C 33 ] 
 In our fuperior knowledge, and in the 
 prefent favour of God, let us take heed 
 to ourfelves that we make the beft ufe 
 of the advantages we enjoy, that we lofe 
 not the things which we have gained, 
 and that no man take our crown from us. 
 
 Secondly, let us ever remember that 
 the defign of religion is to promote the 
 practice of moral righteoufnefs, and to 
 give weight to the eternal duties of mo- 
 rality. This is the one end of all its 
 doftrines and ordinances, as well as of 
 its precepts. In applying its dodtrines to 
 ourfelves, or addrefling them to others, 
 we fljould therefore inquire to what ufes 
 of piety and virtue they are diredted, 
 how the heart may be amended, as well 
 as the mind inftruded, by themj in the 
 inllituted duties of it, what was the end 
 and defign of their appointment, v^^hat 
 leflbn were they intended to teach, us, 
 what motives and incitements to godllnefs 
 to bring to our minds. By thus applying 
 them to their proper ends, and giving 
 them their due force and direction, we 
 fhall find them very powerful inftruments 
 in the fupport and advancement of our 
 F virtue, 
 
[ 3 4 1 
 virtue, of great ufe and efficacy in fpi- 
 ritualizmg our affeftions, and weaning 
 them from the things of this world. But 
 to reft in the belief of opinions, or the 
 pradice of ceremonies, as an end, is to 
 miftake their nature, and to lofe their ufe 
 and benefit. To fubftitute them in the 
 place of real rightdotifnefs, is to pervert 
 them into grofs fuperftition. 
 
 Laftly, if we would Increafe in virtue 
 and true piety, let us carefully examine 
 our adiohs by their true ftandard, and 
 ' endeavour to ftrengthen and improve the 
 virtuous' principle within us. Let us re- 
 member, that to have kind affections, to 
 be fmit with the beauty and eJ^cellenCe 
 of virtue, is not virtue : but to cherilh 
 and encourage thefe within their prbper 
 limits, to attend to the ends and ufe^ for 
 which ^ey were given us, and to enter 
 into the wifdom and defign of God 4n 
 giving them, this is virtue. Every at- 
 tention to improvement, every endeavdur 
 after virtue, is virtue itfelf. In like man- 
 ner, to have the jiifteft fenfe of right and 
 wrong, to have the cleateft convictions of 
 duty in the mind, is not virtue : buf to 
 
 endeavour 
 
[ 35 ] 
 crideayour to improve this fenfe by reafpn 
 and reflection, to keep tji,e vjrt^ous prin- 
 ciple eyer.aw^e. and, adlive in our breafts, 
 this, is virtue j and a. duty of the greateft 
 irapojrlance. The icnperfedt^dn of oiir na- 
 tura Requires it, Iji.'adive life w^e are 
 expofed. to fo many terhplationjs, that, if 
 we attend not to thisj our virtue will be 
 ever in danger. In retirement temptations 
 will he fewer : but this may be the more 
 neceflary, as it. is then perhaps the only 
 proof we can give, of bur obedience. For 
 what affurance can wq. have in our virtufe, 
 when it is neY.er. called to the trial, ujilef^ 
 we frequently examjne our heartSj and 
 root thf ptinciples of it deep in the mind? 
 A life of adion is the" fchool and theatre 
 of. virtue. But, when we have not the 
 opportunity of forming good difppfitions 
 into habits by exercife and practice, we 
 may do it in a good degree by contem- 
 plation, and efpecially by the exercifes of 
 devotion and religion j which, befides that 
 they are duties indifpenfible and neceffary 
 in all, are alfb the direft means to fandify 
 the heart. In this fituation we ought 
 ftudioufly to embrace, and even feek out, 
 all opportunities of doing good, Thofe 
 F 2 who 
 
[36] 
 who have no temptations to ill Ihould be 
 active to their power in well-doing, and 
 not fpend their days in indolence and 
 thoughdeflhefs, which will infallibly ener- 
 vate the mind, rob it of all its virtue, and 
 leave it expofed in the day of trial. Thus, 
 by attending carefully to the improvement 
 of the mind, and by obferving a proper 
 difcipline and oeconomy in the govern- 
 ment of ourfelves, we fhall, whether we 
 mix with the world, be armed againft its 
 temptations, or, whether fheltered from 
 thefe in retirement, fhall ftrengthen and 
 increafe the virtuous principle within us. 
 In both we fliall fecure the bleffing of 
 God on our endeavours, (hall proceed 
 from ftrength to ftrength in virtue, fhall 
 attain to the things that are more ex^ 
 cellent, and go on to perfection. 
 

 APPENDIX. 
 
 TH E fubjea of the foregoing dif- 
 courfe being clofely connedled with 
 many queftions of difEculty and impor- 
 tance, fome of the principal of thefe it 
 is the defign of the following notes to 
 illuftrate. 
 
 Note to page 9. " We fay not of the 
 5' divine Being, that he is virtuous. — The 
 " reafon is, that it implies trial and coh- 
 " flidt. Virtue in every aftion is meafured 
 y by the difficulty that attends it." 
 
 But will it not follow from thefe prin- 
 ciples, that virtue and moral perfedtion 
 are quite different things, fince the latter 
 may certainly and muft be afcribed to the 
 Deity, though the former, as is here af- 
 ferted, caanot ? And again, if the mea- 
 fure of virtue be the difficulty encountered, 
 will it not feem, that, as men increafe in 
 
 moral 
 
[ 3^ 1 
 morale petfaflioq, they rnay decrcafe in, 
 virtue, fince the difficulty of virtue by ufe 
 and habit becomes lefs ? 
 
 To remove thefe difficulties, let it be 
 obferved, that virtue is not properly the 
 character of adlions, but reftitude. The 
 virtue of aftions is, properly. Ipeaking, 
 only that degree of virtue in the agept, 
 which is exerted in performing them : 
 and this mui^ be meafured by. the diffi:- 
 culty. encountered and fubdued. But the 
 whole or fum of virtue in the agent, is 
 not to be meafured by the difficulties that 
 are furmounted, but by thofe which it is 
 able to furmount, by the power and fuffi- 
 ciency of the agent to overcome difficul- 
 tiesj trials, and temptations ; and there- 
 fore may be fuppofed in any degree, 
 w^here it is not tried by any difficulty at 
 all : for the habit and charader of virtue, 
 or the ftrength of the virtuous principle, 
 may be incrcafed, not only by aftual ex- 
 ercife and trial, but, as before obferved, 
 by refledtion, attention to moral truths, 
 or a right ufe of our reafoning powers. 
 The force of this principle, as it refides 
 in the hidden man of the heart; can 
 
 be 
 
[^3'9 ] 
 he known o'nly'to God, the fearch^r of 
 fearts. To men the virtue of others can 
 te known and eftimated only by their 
 '4ftions; which, though not an accurate 
 'nieafure of virtue, is the only meafure 
 thfey can a^ppiy : and, the virtue of thefe 
 bding meafured by the' difficulties attend- 
 ing ' them, hence in common language 
 virtue always implies trial arid difficulty, 
 "and is affirmed only "of fuch beings, as 
 are fuppofed liable ' to temptatidn, and 
 capable of fin. But virtue, confiderbd 
 fimply in itfelf, as a moral- power of re- 
 fifting and conquering difficulties, this is 
 throughout the fame with moral per- 
 fcdtion, righteoufnefs, or goodnefs, and 
 may be equally afcribed to the fupreme 
 Being, whofe moral reftitude is m'oi-e 
 than fufficienrto conquer all difficulties. 
 
 With refpetft to the other difficulty 
 mentioned, it is' certain, that, as the habits 
 of virtue increafe, the difficulty of it in 
 every fingle inftance will decreafe. But 
 it is as certain, that the virtue of thefe 
 habits-'will bear exadt proportion to the 
 difficulties encountered in forming them. 
 ■ And if, in the feveraP repeated afts by 
 
 which 
 
[ 40 ] 
 which any habit of virtue is formed, the 
 laft ad: of virtue be attended with lefs 
 difficulty than the former, this facility is 
 itfelf to be confidered as a diftindt proof 
 of the prevalence of virtue in the agent ; 
 and, in eftimating the force of the vir- 
 tuous principle, is to be added to the 
 difficulty of the adlion. Thus, if to ab- 
 ilain |iom any unlawful pleafure be twice 
 as eafy, the fame circumftances of tempta- 
 tion and the fame natural advantages or 
 abilities fuppofed, as it was formerly, this 
 is a proof of twice the virtue in the agent ; 
 in like manner as, in trying the natural 
 ftrength of men, he that can lift or re- 
 move a given weight with twice the eafe 
 that another can, has twice the ftrength. 
 Thus then the matter feems to ftand : 
 when it is faid, that the virtue of aftions 
 is meafured by the difficulty that attends 
 them, this is as near the truth, as in 
 common fpeaking we do, or need to go : 
 for the facility of performing duty, ac- 
 quired by ufe and habit, cannot be known 
 or eftimated by us. But it is not accu- 
 rately true, unlefs all external circum- 
 ftances, and all the circumftances of the 
 agent likewife, that is, all his acquired 
 
 as 
 
[ 41 1 
 as Well as natural abilities, be fupp6re(i 
 the fame ; or unlefs to the difficulty of 
 the adtion, limply conlidered, be added 
 the facility with which it is performed. 
 
 Note II. 
 
 P. 17. " The pleafdres, which I iidve 
 *' mentioned, of fejf-efteem and joy in our 
 " oWn Worth, are liiotives of the pu'reft 
 " kind, &t:' 
 
 But, if virtue be always attended witli 
 prefent pleafure, will not our bed adions 
 at laft be founded in felf-Iove ? And hoW 
 fliall we reconcile this with that difin-s 
 tereftedncfs. Which', upon the principle we 
 have laid down, feems almofl necelTary 
 and elTential to it ? 
 
 In anfwer to tills, it ma'y perKaps bei 
 enough to obferve, that we cannot con- 
 ceive the moft perfedt reafon, afting Uport 
 the pureft principled, riot to receive plea- 
 f!jre from virtue. To &&. againft reafon 
 or duty muft give pain and regret to 
 every intelligent being ; and, for the fame 
 reaifon, to conform to right or duty muft 
 give pkafure. The enjoyment therefore? 
 G 4 
 
[42 ] 
 
 of this pleafure, if there be any fuch 
 thing as virtue, muft be conliftent with 
 the higheft perfedlion of it. But, to trace 
 this matter as far as we can, it will be 
 proper to confider the feveral fenfes in 
 which an agent or adion may be faid to 
 be difinterefted. To be abfolutely difin- 
 terefted, in the largeft fenfe of the word, 
 or to be indifferent to pleafure and pain, 
 is plainly incompatible with tlie nature of 
 any being whatfoever, and therefore can- 
 not be necelTary to virtue. To prefer 
 mifery, or to love it equally with happi- 
 nefs, is a contradidlion in terms. An 
 agent is then difinterefted, in the ftridlefl 
 polTible fenfe of the word, when in any 
 particular aftion his own intereft is in no^ 
 degree the motive, end, or objedl of it: 
 and, fecondly, in a loofer fenfe, when the 
 adlion or intention of the agent does not 
 interfere with the intereft of others; or 
 more fo, when their intereft is at leaft in 
 part confulted by it; and ftill in a higher 
 degree, when any part of his own intereft 
 is voluntarily facrificed to it. 
 
 In the latter of thefe fenfes t'le difin- 
 
 Icrcflednefs of virtue 7,iil be ealily madef 
 
 out. 
 
[ 43 ] 
 s®ut. The pleafures that belong to it can 
 never interfere with the pleafure or hap- 
 pinefs of another ; and to intend in- 
 jury to any is totally inconfiftent with it. 
 In mod cafes the intereft of others is at 
 leaft in part the immediate objed: of it, 
 and ufually at fome expence of eafe, hap- 
 pinefs, or prefent intereft of our own. 
 There is a chapter in * AriJiotle\ Ethics, 
 in which this fubjedl is profefledly treated, 
 and with the ufual acutenefs of that phi- 
 lofopher : " The mind," fays he, " is our 
 " proper felf : and he that follows this 
 " governing principle may therefore be 
 *' faid to gratify and love himfelf, more 
 *' properly than he who obeys his appe- 
 " tites and paffions, which are at beft but 
 " an inferior part of our nature. The 
 •' man who divides his fortune with his 
 *' friend is the greater benefadtor to him- 
 " felf: he makes his friend only the 
 *' richer by his bounty, but makes him^ 
 " felf the better man. In like manner, 
 " the man who gives up his life for hi^ 
 ^' friend or his country, prefers the fatis^ 
 " fadtidn of being greatly good to all thq 
 f' pleafures that an inglorious Jife can 
 
 f Ad Nkomach. lib, 9. cap. 8. 
 
 Q Z " give 
 
[ 44 1 
 f give him: he chufes to enjoy virtue 
 ^' for a year or for a day, rather than a 
 " whole life that is ufelefs, or fpent in 
 " vicious pleafures." There is then, ac- 
 cording to this excellent reafoner, a vir- 
 tuous as well as a vicious felf-love: and 
 to prefer the pleafures of virtue to every 
 other intereft is all that is necefTary. to the 
 higheft degree of virtue. 
 
 But we may, I think, go farther, and 
 aflert the difintereftednefs of virtue in 
 the firft and ftridleft fenfe. For, i, the 
 pleafures of felf-approbation and efteem, 
 ■which follow virtue, certainly arife from 
 a confcious fenfe of having made virtue, 
 and not pleafure, our choice ; not from 
 preferring one intereft or pleafure to an- 
 other, but from adling according to right, 
 without any other confideration whatfo- 
 ever. It feems eflential to this pleafure, 
 that no motive of intereft have any part 
 in the choice or intention of the agent. 
 And, 2, to make this pleafure an objedl 
 to the mind, the virtue, whofe principle 
 we are feeking after, muft be already 
 foi-med. For let it be obferved, that the 
 pleafures we are ipeaking Qf are them- 
 
 l^lve^ 
 
[ 45 ] 
 felves virtuous pleafuresj fueh as none but 
 virtuous minds are capable of propofing 
 to theoifelves, or of enjoying. To the 
 fenfual and voluptuary the pleafures that 
 arife from denying our appetites or paffions 
 have no exiftence, Thefe cannot there- 
 fore be the motive to that virtue which 
 is already prefuppofed. On the contrary, 
 they ow^e their rife and exiftence to the 
 fame principle or caufe with virtue itfelE 
 It is the fame love of virtue which makes 
 it firft the objeft of. our purfuit, anqt, 
 when acquired, the fubjedl of our triumph, 
 and joy. fo do a virtuous action for the 
 fake of thefe virtuous pleafures, is to chulb 
 virtue for the fake of being virtuous; 
 whicK is to reft in it as an end, or to 
 purfue it without regard to any other ob»' 
 jedl or intereft. 
 
 Note III. 
 
 P. 20. " The fandlions of rewards and 
 ff punifhments, which God has annexed 
 f ' to his laws, have not in any proper fenfe 
 f' the nature of obligationj &c." 
 
 The belief of a God and a future, ftate, 
 
 ^hough nQ way neceflary to the nature, or 
 
 '' 5 pbligatioQ 
 
[ 46 ] 
 .^ligation of virtue, is yet, without quCB- 
 ftion, of abfolute neceflity to fupport it 
 in pradtice. This hath been already fo 
 fully allowed, and is fo univerfally ac-r 
 knowledged, that I need not enlarge upon 
 it. But is not this then a motive of in- 
 tereft ? And will not an objedt of fuch 
 infinite concern as the profpeft of eternal 
 rewards and punifhments, be apt to en- 
 grofs our whole attention, and, by ex- 
 cluding or fuperfeding the virtuous prin- 
 ciple, annihilate that virtue which it is 
 faid to fupport ? As this has been thought 
 a queftion of great difficulty, it will dcr 
 ferve a particular attention. 
 
 Firft then, it is certain, that the force 
 ■of this motive is by no means fo great as 
 is here fuppofed. Were thefe momentous 
 pbjedts prefent to our view, or had we 
 any fenfible experience of them, our lU 
 berty", it might be thought, would be 
 .pverruled : our paffions would be fo 
 ilrongly excited, that there would be no 
 room for reafon or virtue to aft. But, 
 with refpeft to the things of another life, 
 we walk by faith, not by fight. The 
 jiiilance of thefe in profoeft, and the 
 
 d^knef^ 
 
i 47 i 
 
 ^afknefs in which they are involved, 6i-- 
 tninifh th^em to our view, and reduce 
 their influence on the lives of men, m 
 comparifon, to very little. As they can- 
 not be objeiled to our fenfes, fo neither 
 can they be pictured out by the imagi- 
 nation, the only inflrument by which 
 4iftant objefts excite and move the paf- 
 lions. Hence our attention is left opea 
 to all the folicitatlons of fenfe and ap* 
 petite, and there is ample room left for 
 the exercife and trial of our virtue. Oa 
 the other hand, we are not only at 11-- 
 berty to attend to the purer principles 6$ 
 virtue, but it feems a principal end and, 
 effed: of thefe external motives to awakea 
 and turn our attention to thefe principles^ 
 and to give them their full force on the 
 ttiind: and whoever is by the joint in- 
 fluence of thefe motives reclaimed from 
 vice, and not only entered upon a courfe 
 of virtuous adtion, but confirmed in the 
 fteady pradice and habit of it, will, I 
 doubt not, owe more of his virtue to the 
 latter of thefe principles, than to the 
 former. I am perfuaded, that no one 
 ever repented of the folly of fin, with- 
 out repenting at the fame time of the 
 
 guilt. 
 
[ 48 ] 
 
 guilt, and feeling the fliamc of having 
 a<fted unworthily; and that we never 
 forfake, without abhorring, that which 
 is evih 
 
 Secondly, if we have any idea at all of 
 the happinefs of a future ftate, it is that 
 of virtuous exercifc and virtuous enjoy- 
 ment. We can form no other conception 
 of the happinefs of angels, but that of a 
 more exalted piety and benevolence, ex-' 
 erting themfelves in a more exalted and 
 extended fphere. But to make this our 
 6bjed: and aim is, as we have feen, en- 
 tirely confiflent with virtue. It is a mo- 
 tive only to virtuous minds ; and, as it 
 owes its force to the principle of virtue 
 already rooted in the mind, fo it will re- 
 ciprocally flrengthen this principle within: 
 us. Indeed, our hopes and fears in ano- 
 ther life, whatever be fuppofed the objedt 
 of them, will be found in great part to 
 derive their force from the love of God 
 and goodnefs. It is a love of goodnefs' 
 that makes us attribute this as a per- 
 fedlion to the Deity ; and it is from this^ 
 perfeftion alone that we exped: a reward- 
 to virtue. And again, in proportion as 
 
 we 
 
l49 ] 
 Ive love virtue ouffelves, we fhall think 
 it the objedt of th6 love and favour of 
 God J and, in pfroportipn As we. hate fins, 
 we fhall think it the objedt of his dif* 
 pleafure. 
 
 Thirdly, Ouf hopes in another life, a§ 
 far as they have no certain or determinate 
 objed:, will be found to be nothing more 
 than a pious truft or implicit faith in the 
 goodnefs of God : for It is on this at laft 
 that bxir future expeftations are built. 
 And even our future fears, as far as they 
 are a motive of adtion, and lead to repen- 
 tance; will refolve into the fame prirtcipld, 
 afid muft imply a bisHef in the goodnefs 
 of God, and truft in his mercy. But this 
 fruft or fkith in God is a duty we owe 
 him, and aia adt of piety and true virtue. 
 To believe iri him whom we have not 
 fe^ftj to rcfigrt all dur cares ahd interefls 
 into his hands J ' io commit our fbiils unto 
 hira in well-doing, as unto a fiithful 
 CfeatOr', UnfmoVed by pleafure, tinlfiaken 
 by' pain'j tb maintain our allegiance to 
 heavefl, when We feem moft foffaken 
 by ir, under torture of body, and de- 
 jeftion of mindj this is the virtue of 
 'I H faith. 
 
[ 50 1 
 fakh, and is doing the greateft honoitf 
 we can to the goodnefs and truth of God : 
 and, as it is the higheft chirafter to 
 which human virtue, or perhaps any 
 o^er, can afpire, fo, whatever there 
 may be of intereftednefs, there is certainly 
 more of the love of God and goodnefs, 
 than of any other principle, in it. 
 
 Should the laws of our country incul- 
 cate virtue, and threaten vice with punifh- 
 ment ; and fhould a righteous and perfeft 
 adminiftration infure ■ favour and reward 
 to the good, and the merited inflidlion 
 of punilhment on the badj a good fub- 
 jedl, who wanted not thefe motives or 
 reftraints, would love his duty the more : 
 and, when he confiders virtue as the 
 principle in the lawgiver or prince, from 
 whidi thefe falutary laws derive their 
 exiftence and their force, as that which 
 gives peace and order to the fociety in 
 which he lives, his love and efteem for 
 virtue will ftill increaic : he will love his 
 prince for the charafter of goodnefs that 
 belongs to him, will delight in pleafing, 
 and fear to difpleafe him j which is ano- 
 ther addition of ftrcngth to the virtuous 
 
 principle* 
 
. _ , [ 50 . 
 
 principle.. His love for virtue then, coij- 
 iidered as an objedt in itfelf, and his at- 
 tachment to his duty, will be greatly, in- 
 creafed, at the fame tjme that his hopes 
 and fears have another obje^ prefented tQ 
 them, which has a diftind: weight arid 
 force. In the m^an time the bad under 
 jfuch a government will be reclaimed. If 
 he h^s incurred guilt, and the penalty 
 annexed to it, his only refuge will be, In 
 goodnefsj in the goodnefs of his prince^, 
 and in his own reformation, or a new 
 principle of goodnefs vvrought in his mind. 
 In the end true virtue only will be re- 
 warded, and the incorrigible offender 
 alone punifhed. In like manner, the vir- 
 ,tuous mind, when it confiders virtue as 
 the law of God, and as the ob]c(^ of 
 his love, will naturally love it the more j 
 and, when he.jconfiders goodnefs or redi- 
 tude as a law to God himfelf, as the 
 ruling principle of the Deity, as the foun- 
 tain of eternal order and harmony thro' 
 the urjiverfe, his love will rife into, ado-r 
 ration : he will hearken with pipre re- 
 verence and devotion to tlje everlaft.in,g 
 lavy of reafoHj^ which rei|n§. with fuch fp^ 
 vereign authority over heaven and earth ; 
 B-^ his 
 
[ 5* 1 
 
 his duty whl appear ftill more die glojfy 
 of his nature; and fin will feem more 
 exceeding finful : and when, farther, he 
 confiders this fupreme Judge of merit as 
 a witnefs not only to his outward adtions, 
 but to the fecret motions of the heart, he 
 will be more careful to purify the inner 
 man, and to eftabliih the true principle 
 of virtue there, The belief therefore of 
 a righteous Providence and a future ftate 
 is fo far from extinguiihing or debafe- 
 ing the virtuous principle, that it highly 
 ftrengthens and exalts it. 
 
 And therefore, laftly, if revelation gives 
 new evidence to thefe doftrines, it fo far 
 contributes to the advantage and improve- 
 ment of virtue : and thefe are indeed 
 every-where confulted, and provided for, 
 by it. If it has fet the profpedts of a 
 future ftate in a clearer light, it has at 
 the fame time more ftrongly reprefented 
 the reafonablenefs of our duty, and thct 
 excellence and god-like nature of virtue. 
 It has fet the love of God before us in 
 many new and more engaging lights, and 
 in return calls for all our love and grati- 
 fud?,, and every generous siffe&ion of the 
 
 heart. 
 
E 53 1 
 
 heart, in his fervice. The promiles it 
 makes are not to the outward adl and ap- 
 pearance, but to the habit and charadler of 
 virtue. We are required to give God the 
 heart ; to love him, and, of confequence, 
 to love our duty, v^ith all our heart, 
 with all our foul, with all our ftrength; 
 we are taught that, if we give all oui; 
 goods to feed the poor, without the true 
 principle of charity, it will be nothing 
 worth. If it commands our attention to 
 the recompence of reward, it is to raife 
 us above the weaknefs of human nature j 
 it is to keep the love of God and virtue 
 alive under the fevereft trials ; to prepare 
 us to cut off a right hand, and to pluck 
 out a right eye, to part with houfes and 
 lands, with wife and children, for con- 
 science and virtue's fake. In thefe cir- 
 cumftanccs it is a neceffary help and ad- 
 vantage to the caufe Df virtue, and en- 
 tirely confiftent with all its interefts, to 
 have our duty, on the one hand, clearly 
 marked out in its full extent, that we 
 may not by the delufions of felf-love be 
 led to contradl the fphere, or foften the 
 rigour of iti and, on the other hand, 
 that wifdom may be juftified of her 
 
 children. 
 
[ 54 1 
 children, to be aflUred th?t merit and 
 happinefs, virtue and prudence, will at 
 lail coincide. 
 
 Upon the whole, the belief of a God 
 and a future ftate are fo clofely connected 
 with the firft principles of reafon, that it 
 may be reckoned almofl infeparable from 
 h: and hence, in fadt, thefe dodtrines 
 have been almoft univerfally received 
 among men. And It is as certain, that a 
 fenfe of merit and good-defert in virtue 
 is likewife univerfal and infeparable from 
 reafon. Thefe doftrines therefore muft 
 be confiflent, and ftand in the faireft 
 agreement together. To do what is right, 
 becaufc it Is right, and to believe that the 
 Governor of the world will do fo too, are 
 principles that can never thwart or oppofe, 
 but muft mutually ftrengthen and confirm 
 each other : they are in reafon and nature 
 united, and make up jointly the fourc? 
 and perfection of virtue. 
 
 Note IV. 
 
 P, 28. " When virtue is fald to con-^ 
 " fift in a conformity to truth, to the 
 " truth of the cafe, to the reafon and 
 
 " nature 
 
[ 55 3 
 " nature of things, there Is, if not im- 
 " propriety, foniething of obfcurity or 
 " inaccmracy in the expreffion." 
 
 Obligation in morals is not indifcrimi- 
 nately any reafon for adtlng, but fuch a 
 reafon only, as makes the adion duty, 
 and the performance of it virtue. ; This 
 reafon muft be an immediate or more 
 remote connexion betweeri the aftion and 
 ,duty or right. For, when; you afk whe- 
 ther any particular adibn is duty, or ob- 
 liges a.s fuch; how can this be provedi 
 but by fhewing its connexion with fome 
 known , duty, or in the laft refort, as iii 
 the cafe of all firfl truths, appealing to 
 the confcience and reafon of every man f 
 It feems therefore too general and loofe 
 a way of fpeaking to make virtue confift 
 in an agreement with truth, or the reafon 
 of things i when the only reafon that car- 
 ries obligation in it is in all cafes the 
 reiftitude or goodnefs q^. the ad:ion, and 
 the only truth which binds to adion Is 
 that which points out the? connexion be- 
 Iwixt the adlion and this redlitude ; and 
 this relation betwixt the aftion and right* 
 and no «ther, is that foundation in th« 
 
 reafoiji 
 
teafon and nature of things, upon which 
 ail tnoral obligation is built. To explain 
 this more fully, let us fee what is properly 
 meant by the reafon and nature of things, 
 and by adtmg agreeably to them. 
 
 There is an did maxim in the fchools, 
 v/hkh 18 full of good fenfe: Effentta 
 rerum funf aterna. The nature of man 
 is for ever the fame; that is, the ideas 
 which make up the definition of a man 
 will be always the fame, whether any 
 fuch being actually exift, or not. The 
 third book of Euclid would be equally 
 true, if no fuch thing as a perfedt circle 
 ever exifted. The exift ence of any thlngf, 
 as a triangle or circle, only fuppofed, a 
 number of properties, relations, and truths 
 depending on thefe, will refult with it. 
 The real connexion or relation betwixt 
 things or ideas is truth or reafon in the 
 objeft, or what we mean by the reafort 
 or truth of things. Reafon is the faculty 
 of perceiving, comparing, and obferviog 
 the connection betwixt thefe idfeas. Right 
 reafon is this faculty free frofti- and un* 
 corrupted hij prgudice, &c. and feeing 
 thefe connexions as they reaUy are. 
 
 Here 
 
i $7 ] 
 
 Here then it is plain, that from the 
 relations and habitudes of things and per-- 
 fons to each other affcions take a different 
 ftame and charadteri What is in fome 
 cafe,s jufcice, will in others be called mur--^ 
 der or parricide: of confequcnce, as the 
 lituation or circumftances of the agent 
 Vary, his obligations will vary with them^ 
 But the rule of duty never varies. The 
 conne6iion between every fpecies of adtion 
 and the ideas of right and wrong is 
 always the fame : for in the idea of every , 
 moral ddtion the circumftances of ■ the 
 agent are always included^ And this eon- 
 neftion is as much founded in the nature 
 of things, as any truth, whatfoever. Were 
 there but one agent in the univerfe, and, 
 confequently, nO fuch thing as giving or 
 receiving benefits, the nature of gratitude 
 would be the fame that it is now: it 
 would be as true then, as it is now, that 
 the party who receives a benefit ought to 
 ■requite it with love and kindnefs to his 
 benefadlor. It is then an eternal truth, 
 that gratitude is right or duty. Hence it 
 is rightly faid, that this duty is founded 
 in the nature and, relation of things, or 
 that there is a reafon in nature for , pe»»- 
 I forming 
 
[ 58 1 
 forming it. But this reafon I fuppofe to? 
 be nothiag elfe but the agreement betwixt 
 the idea of gratitude and right, or the 
 conformity of the action to the idea of 
 right. The relation betwixt the party 
 obliged and his benefadlor makes the 
 adtion gratitude, and, by confequenee, bringa 
 him under obligation ; becaufe gratitude 
 is duty : but the immediate ground of 
 obligation is not this relation, but the 
 connexion betwixt gratitude and right. 
 Hence^ in all language, the man who a(3:$ 
 virtuoully is faid to aft xight, or agreeably 
 to what is right aiid duty. And this 
 appears to me more proper, than to fay 
 that he adls according to truth ; and more 
 clear and diftindl, than to fay that he ads 
 according to the reafon and nature of 
 things ;' the meaning of which will, I 
 think, in all cafes be found to be only 
 this, — that he afts according to what 
 reafon, in the prefent circumftantes of 
 the agent, and the relation he ftands ia 
 to the 'obje<ft before him, i pronounces to 
 be right. . f;.;j , ,d 
 
 Note V. 
 
 P. 2g. " And this chara<Ser of z&\(mt 
 
 ^ dejpaids not on any previous truth or 
 
 •' " -l ** rcaioL 
 
r 59 ] ^ 
 
 ** reafbn of things ; but its connexion 
 " with every fpecies of adion, or con- 
 " trariety to it, is immediately feen by 
 " its own light," 
 
 Right is a fimple uncompoundcd idea, 
 and, confequently, cannot be explained but 
 by example. In confidering the adlions 
 of men, the mind forms to itfelf general 
 abftrad:ed ideas of gratitude, juftice, mer- 
 cy, temperance, and the contrary to thefe. 
 Again, in comparing, thefe, it finds other 
 more general charafers, in which they 
 agree or difagree. Such are thofe of right, 
 wife, good, and the contrary. The laft 
 of thefe charaSers being an equivocal 
 term, and fignifying cither the goodnefs 
 of the adtion in itfelf, or its relative good- 
 nefs to the agent or others, the firft, of 
 theie fenfes is what we mean, and is better 
 expreffed by the word right. The con- 
 nection betwixt which and the feveral 
 ipecies of adtion abovcr mentioned beigg 
 intuitively feen, the feveral truths rcfulting 
 from it, fuch as, gratitude is right, &c. 
 will form fo many general rules of ad:ion ; 
 3.nd thefe are felf-evident or firft truths, 
 ■from which there can lie no appeal, and 
 im the tfuth of which thefg ii no pre^- 
 I a vious 
 
[ 6o ] 
 vious truth to appeal to. Hence the rule 
 of duty in all common cafes is clear to 
 every underftanding, and will be found, 
 if 1 miftake not, in all its complications 
 to depend upon a very few principles, 
 which are fimple, eafy, and obvious to all 
 capacities. 
 
 We know from our own fexife and 
 feeling in what the happinefs or good of 
 others confifts. Then, that every man's 
 life, health, eafe, (Sc. are his own, and 
 not another's — that he has a right to 
 defend them againft every invader — that 
 to invade them without provocation is 
 wrong-— that to contribute to thefe, or 
 any other way to promote the good or 
 happinefs of others, is right — thefe truths 
 are fo clofely connetfied, that they run 
 into each other, ^nd feem almoft the fame. 
 It is then a felf-evident truth, that to do 
 good, or to communicate happinefs, is 
 right or duty ; and to have done it is 
 virtue or merit j that is, deferves love and 
 gratitude from the party who receives the 
 benefit, and efteem from every other. 
 But in the firft of thefe principles are 
 included all the duties of charity ; comr- 
 paffion, forgiv^nefs, G?f,-rein the latter all 
 
 the 
 
[,6i ] 
 the duties of piety ; adoration, thanks^ 
 giving, relignatibti, &c. For thefe are in- 
 feparable from that gratitude which we 
 owe to God, and the efleem which is due 
 to his moral perfedlions, to tl\at goodnefs 
 and mercy which are fl;ed oyer all his 
 works. 
 
 Piety and benevolence are duties equal- 
 ly incumbent on all intelligent creatures. 
 Temperance is a duty refpedling only 
 fuch rational .beings as have appetites and 
 paffions to govern, and confifts in govern- 
 ing them as reafon requires. A great part 
 of this duty "may be refolved into that of 
 charity or benevolence, the principal obr 
 ilacle to which is the gratification of our 
 appetites and paffions : but the whole of 
 it is not, as it is neceflary to obfprve, comr- 
 prized in this duty, 
 
 The paffions and appetites were many 
 of them given, and in their natural teur 
 dency lead us, to promote the good of 
 others J others to fecure and increafe our 
 own private happinefs. The firft of thefe 
 jTjay be fafely indulged, care only bfing 
 J:aken that no particular affedion tpwards 
 ^y pbjedt intsffpfe with ^ more -general 
 
 goqd. 
 
[ 62 ] 
 good. In the government of the latter 
 5ie virtue of fuch mixed beings as we ar? 
 principally cx)nfifts. They are thefe felfifli 
 paffions chiefly, which fuggeft the motives 
 to vice, and feduce us from our duty. 
 Thefe are, firft, to be controuled by the 
 great principle above-mentioned. When 
 the general good requires it, they are to 
 be refigned and facrificed. Even the love 
 of life itfelf will be intemperate, if in- 
 dulged to the hurt of othiersj and there 
 are certainly many cafes in which it is 
 right apd duty to refign it. 
 
 In this felf-command, this power of 
 controuling our paffions and appetites 
 by reafon, confifts the principal part of 
 human virtue. Hence every adtion that 
 fhews this power over ourfelves, tho' not 
 in itfelf virtuous, is looked upon with ad- 
 miration and applaufe, Hence the honour 
 paid to courage, intrepidity, &c. Hence 
 too all fuch voluntary adls of difclpline as 
 are intended to gain the maftery over our 
 paffions, and to get the habit of felf- 
 <:ommand, abftinence from lawful plea- 
 lures, alas of felf-denial and mdtification, 
 are ftfi<3:ly virtuous, 
 
 But 
 
[ 63 ] 
 
 But there Is another duty of temperanc6' 
 entirely independent of this iirft principle j 
 which is that of directing the paflions and 
 appetites of the body tp their proper ufe, 
 and not indulging therh beyond the end$ 
 for which they \yere. intended. TVs, thcfe 
 were given us chiefly tp maintain and 
 preferve the, health and activity both- of 
 mind and body, to indulge them Co, far 
 as tp impair this health or flrength, is 
 plainly contrary to reafon and,natU're. Tfi 
 inflame thofe paffipns, which it is the 
 buflnefs of reafi^. to. controul^ to give the 
 reins to appetite, and tp deprive ourfelves 
 of :the ufe of our reafon by intemperance^ 
 4s to abandon our iijoral charafter, and t^ 
 expofe purfelyes wilfully, tp the incurfipii 
 of all manner of. guilty apd, fin, Bijtj 
 without appealing tp tl'iefe cpnfequep.ce?, 
 it is certain that intemperajjge, in, . the 
 higher degree of it, drunkennefs, profti- 
 tution, &c. appear at fight to be criminal 
 and wrong, and tp cafry moral pollution 
 along withrthem. -,.^ndT if r«very endea- 
 vour by diFcfpline and" exerci^tp improve 
 our virtue be itfelf virtuous, it is certain 
 that every felf-indulgence by which the 
 
 paflions 
 
[ 64 ] 
 paffions are inflamed, the appetites quick- 
 ened, orxeafon impaired, muft be in the 
 fame degree vicious. The rule or dutj^ 
 then confifting of thfe three great heads, 
 piety, charitj', and temperance, is reduci-^ 
 hie to a few of the plaineft principles, 
 fuch as are not only eafy, but felf-evident, 
 and confpicuous to all Capacities. Who- 
 ever has reafon, muft have confcience, of 
 a rule by which to judge of his ow^n 
 adions here, and to make him capable of 
 being judged hereafter. Hence ignorance 
 is never allow^ed an excufe for negledling or 
 violating the common duties of life. And 
 hence a moral fenfe has been thought 
 neceflary to account for that fudden ap- 
 probation of virtue, and natural antipathy 
 to vice, by which the mind as readily 
 diftinguifhes the beauty and deformity of 
 aftions, as the eye of the body does ex- 
 ternal objeds. 
 
 F I JV I S, 
 
 . .3