jilijlii mm mm UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES Ir^ KNOWLEDGE, LIFE AND REALITY KNOWLEDGE, LIFE AND REALITY AN ESSAY IN SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY BY George Trumbull Ladd, LL.D. AUTHOR OF "philosophy OF MIND," "PHILOSOPHY OF CONDUCT," "a THEORY OF REALITY," "philosophy OF RELIGION," ETC. NEW HAVEN YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS MDCCCCXVIII Copyright, 1909 DODD, MEAD & CO. Copyright, 1918 YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS ^ c" "From the unreal lead me to the real. From darkness lead me to light. From death lead me to immortality." Brihad Aranyaka Upanishai), 1, 3, 27< " Intellect relies on Reason, Faith on Author- ity; opinion defends itself by prohability alone. These two comprehend the sure truth; hut faith, in closed and involuted, intelligence, in exposed N and manifest, form." ^ Bernard. 160171 PREFACE The service which it is hoped that this book may in some measure accomplish, can best be explained by a reference to the life-work and life-purpose of its author. For more than a generation it has been his daily duty to observe, read, teach, and reflect, within the field covered by problems which are somewhat vaguely grouped together under the word, " philos- ophy." During this period the conviction has been growing that Plato, when he remarked a likeness between tlie fitting attitude of the soul toward these problems, and the most ten- der, absorbing, and important, of human personal relations, spoke to the world of men something more valuable than a taking, but extravagant hyperbole. I am well aware that tills is not the popular estimate of philosophy at the present time; and the fact that it is not, is by no means wholly due to an adverse spirit in the age. It is almost equally due to the way in which its interests have been "exploited" (I use the word intelligently and deliberately) by many to whom the care of philosophic culture has been especially entrusted. Formerly, the teachers and writers in the field of philosophy, — especially of ethics and the philosophy of religion, but also of general metaphysics, and even of the allied subjects of psy- chology and logic, — were chiefly, and indeed almost exclusively, the presidents of our colleges and others who had received an education in theology. Many, and perhaps the majority, of their pupils and readers, were either intending to enter the ministry, or were already enjoying the opportunities, and bound by the duties, of the ministerial office. What they had to gain from the class-room, or from the reading of books on philosophy, was expected to be useful, in an important and im- PREFACE mediate way, as preparation for their professional life. The others, and indeed all, who were having what was then called a " liberal education," were required to study the same sub- jects; and thus to get at least some dim and inchoate conception of the nature of philosophy, and some appreciation, either fav- orable or unfavorable, of its application to the ideals and the conduct of a truly successful life. Now, however, for a consid- erable time, it has been quite the fashion to complain of the work done in this way, as dull and depressing; and to dis- credit the results, as tending to discourage, rather than elicit and encourage, a taste for prolonged reading and serious study of the issues and the problems of reflective thinking. And doubtless, there is much truth of fact to warrant this lowered estimate of a now old-fashioned regard for, and use of, the discipline of philosophy as an essential for making a noble manhood, and for imparting a truly liberal and fine culture. But I am inclined to think that there is also much misunder- standing and even misrepresentation as to the real facts. I believe tliat the maturer impressions are more favorable as to the results actually achieved by these now abandoned methods. But, however this may be, about one thing there can be no doubt. The intention of the age was to make reflection a duty, and its results an important factor in the better and nobler life. And in very truth, the study of philosophy, however con- ducted or however far carried, cannot be safely undertaken with either intellectual or moral indifi^erence. Indeed, I am willing to adopt Plato's figure of speech and to put its state- ment into Tuore modern, but not more genuinely devout terms. Problems liaving to do with the validity of human Knowledge, the ideals of human Life, and the ultimate nature of Reality, are "not by any to be entered into unadvisedly or lightly; but reverently, discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the fear of God." In the case of these problems, most emphatically, truths arrived at by speculation on a basis of experienced facts, cannot be separated from truths that demand from us the guid- PREFACE ance of our practice and the control of life. Such truths are, indeed, something more than " pragmatic," in the present, cur- rent conception of this uncertain and much-ahused word. On the one hand, they require the profoundest use of reason for their discovery, defence, and elaboration; on the other hand, they exercise the profoundest influence upon the satisfactions, the character, and tlie destiny, of the soul. The age, therefore, which neglects philosophy is sure to be sensuous and vulgar. The age which treats philosophy flippantly is sure to be shallow and, at the end, dissatisfied with its achievements. The age that takes its philosophy seriously, and even passionately, gains thereby an enormous accession of motive power for either evil or good results. It is a matter, then, which the author has upon his heart and conscience, to make this book of .^ome help to its readers by way of appreciating and illumining those ques- tions which every rational being ought to ask himself; and which are here brought together under the title : " Knowledge, Life, and Eeality." That our common purpose may be attained the better, I have two requests to make of my readers. The first of these is that they will not assign me to any so-called " school," or to any master as his pupil, — at least, not prematurely. I have learned, indeed, from many sources; and not in smallest meas- ure from my own pupils; who, being themselves educated under varying intellectual and social influences. Occidental and Oriental, have discussed with me and with one another, all the major, and most of the minor problems of philosophy. In do- ing this we have, of course, made use of the writings of the great masters both in ancient and in modern times. But, so far as I am aware, I have never allowed myself to do, what I have earnestly striven to prevent them from doing, — namely, form an uncritical and fixed attachment for any system of re- flective thinking, taken as a whole. The motto of tlie class- room aiid of the private study has ever been : NuUius jvrare in verba magistri. Besides this, my own development of any at- PREFACE tempt at systematic results, whicli has been rather abnormally slow, has been preceded by prolonged study of the separate problems, the solutions of which need to be combined in the total result. However all this may be, my request is simply this : " Let us both, reader and author, abjure all deference to the ' idols of the theater,' as well as to the ' idols of the cave,' and try to frame and judge our philosophical opinions according to the harmony of the truths that are expressed in them." One other request seems to me equally reasonable. It is that a fair amount of candid reflection shall determine the mean- ing, and the truth of the meaning, which has been put into the words. There is no inherent reason why philosophical opinions should not be made intelligible to any intelligent and thought- ful, not to say educated, reader. But this desirable end can- not be reached without a genuine effort at co-operation. Pro- found philosophy may be taught in poetry, drama, and even in the novel. But if it is to be got out of these captivating forms of its presentation, the author cannot do all the work. In this book I have, for the most part, carefully avoided all technical language; and I have taken pains to make my meaning clear. But the very subject — since philosophy is the product of re- flective thinking — requires the studious and reflecting mind on the part of those who make use of the book. If in any places it shall seem more difficult to understand — not to say, essen- tially obscure, — than the nature of the discussion itself makes reasonable, I shall stand ready to confess my failure and to bear the blame. But I cannot promise or hope to be under- stood by those who care only to be, for the moment, entertained ; or who have neither the inclination nor the leisure to give to my efforts any measure of careful and thoughtful attention. To those who are already at all familiar with the other writ- ings on philosophy by the same author, as well as to those who may possibly be attracted to some of those writings by reading this book, a further word of introduction may prove helpful. During the last twenty-five years, I have treated of the leading PREFACE questions, the more prominent aspects of philosophy, in a series of monographs. Several of these have been designedly techni- cal and elaborate treatises of particular departments of gen- eral philosophy. But in this one volume I am putting into semi-popular form the system of reflective thinking which has been evolved and published previously in separate volumes. The reader who desires a more detailed exposition and defense of this system should study it in these monographs. To them, however, not infrequent reference is made in the present vol- ume. GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New Haven, August, 1909. CONTENTS PAGE CHAPTER I Philosophy: Its Conception and its Prob- lems 1 II Philosophy : Its Method and its Divisions . 21 III Schools of Philosophy 33 IV Philosophy of Knowledge: The Psycholog- ical View 57 V Kinds, Degrees, and Limits of Knowledge . 78 VI Principles and Presuppositions of Knowl- edge • 101 VII Scepticism, Agnosticism, and Criticism . . 125 VIII Metaphysics, as a Theory of Eeality ... 154 IX Nature and Significance of the So-called "Categories" 171 X Philosophy of Nature 195 XI Philosophy of Mind 225 XII Matter and Mind : Nature and Spirit . . . 253 XIII Ethics, or Moral Philosophy: Its Sphere and Problems 2G8 XIV The Moral Self 278 XV The Morally Good: Its Kinds (the Virtues) AND its Unity 314 XVI Schools of Ethics 336 XVII yEsTHETICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 365 CONTENTS CHAPTEB PAGE XVIII The Arts: Their Classification and Nature 384 XIX The Spirit of Beauty 409 XX Philosophy of Religion : Its Origin in Expe- rience 430 XXI The World-Ground as Absolute Person . . 456 XXII God as Ethical Spirit 478 XXIII God and the World 504 XXIV Summary and Conclusion 526 CHAPTER I PHILOSOPHY: ITS CONCEPTION AND ITS PROBLEMS In its more general and vague, but most adequate and human meaning, the word " Philosophy " may be made to include all the products of man's reflective thinking. And since man, as we know him in history, has always been given to reflection, fragments of thought which bear the characteristic marks of the philosophical interpretation of experience, exist from the beginning. Indeed, if we discard all uncertain conjectures with regard to that mythical being, the so-called " primitive man," and the yet more uncertain conjectures as to some order of beings half-human, half-animal, we must agree with Aristotle: " All men by nature reach after knowledge." But this sentence occurs at the beginning of his work on Metaphysics, or First Philosophy; and the kind of knowledge to which he refers is the distinguishing pursuit of the philosopher. To philosophize, then, is to be human. For in the words of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson : " The need to philosophize is rooted in our nature as deeply as any other of our needs." As a matter of course, however, men began at first to reflect upon those facts of external nature, and those inner experi- ences, which seemed of most immediate and pressing interest. As a matter of course, too, both the method used and the results of their reflection, were vague, confused, and indecisive. But in saying this, we must be careful not to do discredit to the intellectual acumen and intellectual interests of the most unde- veloped races or barbarous and uncivilized peoples. Modern research seems rather to be widening than closing up the gap between the least civilized known races of men and the most intelligent of the lower animals. And at the same time, it is 2 KNOWLEDGE, LIFE, AND REALITY increasingly emphasizing the essential spiritual unity of the human race. Their language, customs, folk-lore, and attempts at scientific explanation and philosophical interpretation, show these so-called primitive peoples to be lacking, not so much in intellectual quality or ethical sensitiveness, as in the enjo}^- ment of the accumulated resources of a long line of ancestral efforts, under the more favorable physical and social circum- stances — which we at present enjoy. Nor are they altogether deficient in power to make some of the most essential philosoph- ical distinctions. The untutored man, the member of a some- what isolated savage tribe, has little inducement, and less oppor- tunity, for cultivating any of the particular sciences after the modern method of experiment and induction. He attributes the direction and flight of his arrow to the strength of his bow and the pull of his arm ; the grateful sensations of warmth to the sun or to the fire; the birth of children to the act of pro- creation; the drift of his canoe to the currents of water and wind. But to him the wind, the sun, the fire, are themselves mysteries too deep and high for solution by any formula that summarizes facts of invariable or customary sequence; there- fore he naively and instinctively resorts at once to the meta- physical interpretation of his experience; he makes gods out of these natural objects, who must be propitiated or obeyed. How, indeed, should he arrive at a scientific explanation of phenomena which are increasingly difficult and baffling even for modern physics to explain? Why, also, should he not, failing of modern science, recognize at once what this science itself is compelled to recognize — namely, that, back of all its formulas, there is a Being of the World, which the human mind is compelled to interpret as like itself, and yet superior to itself? And as to the phenomena of birth, and life, and death, this need of the philosophical interpretation, as something additional and yet working, as it were, in and through the scientific explanation, is surely no less great for the savage than it is for the most learned of modern biologists. PHILOSOPHY: ITS CONCEPTION AND PROBLEMS 3 It is not strange, tlierefore, that even among the most gifted and progressive peoples, philosophy did not earlier separate itself from other cognate forms of human endeavor, as a sort of independent discipline. It was, at first, the rather, all inter- mixed with literature, in the form of myth, legend and poetry; with crude attempts at history, and with the uncertain begin- nings of the particular sciences; but above all with theology and religion. Indeed, a large proportion of the philosophizing done at the present time, and that by no means the least im- portant, does not recognize in any practical Avay the necessity for making this separation. In India, which has been charac- terized for centuries by a kind of speculative genius, philosophy is chiefly an attempt at a deductive theology, which may be made a matter of science resting upon personal experience for the more profound thinkers, but v/hich is given to the people in the form of religious myth. In China, philosophy is either a science of politics, as related to heavenly powers and to the spirits of deceased ancestors; or else it is a conglomerate of geomancy or other forms of divination, based upon a crude and antiquated conception of nature. In Japan, apart from the importations of Western speculative thought, philosophy consists either of hair-splitting distinctions in the pantheistic systems of the various sects of Buddhism, or in the distinctive development given in that land to the Confucian ethics by the demands of its feudal system. While all over the Muhammadan world, philosophy is a rigid and uncompromising doctrine of either practical or mystical monotheism. But these countries com- prise, not only the majority of the civilized races, but also some of the most interesting and choice developments of re- flective thinking. It is customary to say that the Greeks were the first to culti- vate philosophy as an independent discipline. Hence we flatter ourselves by deriving our descent from these gifted ancients, along the lines of reflective thinking and its product in the form of systematic philosophy. This is largely, and yet only 4 KNOWLEDGE, LIFE, AND REALITY partially, true. But as Zeller has shovm, even the indefinite- ness of the term " philosophy " among the classical Greeks, and yet more among their degenerate successors, proves that the thing itself had scarcely as yet appeared as a " specific form of intellectual life." When the earliest Greek writers sepa- rated so-called philosophy from its traditional form of religious myth and poetry, they made of it a sort of crude metaphysics of physics. The term "natural philosophy," which persisted down to the more recent times, has, therefore, a legitimate birthright. There was no attempt among the Greeks, however, to distinguish between science and philosophy. Indeed, in the modern meaning of the words, there was as little science as philosophy. And the moment— as was inevitable — that the in- sufficiency of any material principle like water, air, fire, or the " unlimited " of Anaximander, " The infinite mass of matter out of which all things arise," became apparent, something spiritual in the way of a Divine Being, or Mind, was assumed as necessary to interpret the sum-total of phenomena. That is to say, the need of something super-sensible, if not strictly super- natural, in order to complete the explanation, was fully recog- nized. Even Plato and Aristotle did not hold a conception of metaphysics favorable to its claim to a domain distinct from the particular sciences. The former did, indeed, recognize a system, or kingdom, of " ideas," which under the supremacy of the Idea of the Good was to furnish an explanation of all that men esteem actual in occurrences, or real in existence, as tested by their daily experiences. But this doctrine supersedes by abol- ishing all that the modern man considers essential to the con- ceptions and working methods of the particular sciences. Plato's definition of philosophy makes it a certain attitude of mind rather than any systematized collection of the fruits of reflective thinking as guided by the principles and discoveries of the particular sciences. With Aristotle, however, philosophy, or as he sometimes called the same thing "wisdom" (<70