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Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont fiim«s in commenpant par la premiere page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la derniire page qui comporte une telle empreinte. Un des symboies suivants apparaitra sur la dernlAre image de cheque microfiche, selon Ie cas: Ie symbols — ► signifie "A SUIVRE" Ie symbols V signifie "FIN". Les cartes, plenches, tebleaux, etc.. peuvent dtre film*s A des taux de reduction diff^rents. Loisque ie document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul clich«. il est film« d partir de I'angle sup«rieur geuche, de gauche d droite. et de haut en bas. e.< prenent Ie nombre d'images n6cessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mAthode. 1 2 3 4 5 6 wmppp^'wi^i P # €'' PHILOSOPHY OF KAIT :;M IN EXTRACTS. 6BLECTBD BT j'^ v- -.*■ W ^ JOHJ^ WATSON, LLD., PROFESSOR OP MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN QDBEN'a UNIVBRSITT. KINGSTON. CANADA. KINGSTON : WILLIAM BAILIE, PRINTER. 1882. K 6->lS5.uJ3 "^""^ -.2^ -at- J !*%'" .« W A.. A. 51 7Hi^^ THE KRITIK OF PURE REASON. * We do possess corfoln a priori Cognitions, and even Common Sense is never without such. It is easy to show that there actually are in our know- ledge necessary and, in the strictest sense, universal (con- seqnontly piire a priori) judgments. Would we have an example from science, we have only to turn to any propo- sition in mathematics; while, as for the most ordinary com- mon sense, there is obviously to hand, by way of instance, the proposition that every change must have a cause, where the very notion cause so manifestly implies necessity (of connexion with an effect) and strict universality (of rule), that it would be altogether lost did we derive it, like Hume,' from our conjoining what simply follows with what simply precedes, through the mere habit of the experience, and the consequent simple custom of connecting ideas (where the necessity coul(| be only subjective). Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall determine the Possibility, the Principles, and the Limits of all a priori Cognition. But, to go still further, it is a fact that there are cog- nitions which even quit the bounds of all possible experience, and actually, by means of ideas for which, so far as expe- rience goes, no correspondent object can be found, assume to extend the range of our judgments beyond any experience whatever. And just in these latter cognitions, transcending as they do the world of sense, and unac'companied by experience to guide and correct them, there lie interests of reason which we hold to be of far greater consequence and loftier aim than anything or all that understanding can teach us in the domain of experience. In these cognitions, indeed, even at the risk of failure, we rather venture everything than, for any reason of doubt, or carelessness and indifference, con- sent to forego what is of such an import. Such unavoidable problems of pure reason's own are God, Free Will, and Im- mortality. The science, again, which, as well in the end it contemplates, as in all its complement of means, is alone Hft' Common II our know- ersal (con- B have an iny propo- Inary com- i' instaiice, use, where icessity (of ' (of rule), ke Hume, lat simply e, and the J\rhero the II lermine the Cognition. ) are cog- [perience, p as expe- I, assume xperience g as they srience to on which ►ftier aim us in the I, even at than, for nee, con- ivoidable , and Im- he end it is alone !l directed to tlie solution of these, we name metaphysic a science that, in its procedure, starts as yet only dogmat- ically ; that is, having instituted no previous inquiry into sufficiency or insufficiency on the part of reason for so great an enterprise, it yet confidently undertakes completion of it. Now, it seems no more than natural that, once we have left the solid ground of experionce, we should not forthwith proceed to build, without having carefully assured ourselves first of all, in regard to a foundation, and that, too, all the more, should we find ourselves provided only with prin- ciples which are unauthenticated, and have come to us we know not whence It is, however, an ordinary fate of speculative reason, to complete its edifice at the soonest, and only then to examine whether the foundations are well laid or not. Of the difference between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments. In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to a predicate is thought (affirmatives alone considered— appli- cation to negatives being afterwards easy) this relation is possible in two ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that (covertly) is contained in it ; or B lies completely outside of the notion A, though possessing connexion with it. In the first case I cpII the judgment analytic; in the second synthetic. Analytic judgments (the affirmative ones) are therefore those in which the connexion of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity ; synthetic, again, those in which this con- nexion is thought without identity. We m s\\t name them also, the former, judgments of explication ; the latter, judg- nients of extension. The former, namely, add, in the pre- dicate, nothing to the notion of the subject, but only separ- ate this notion into its subnotional parts, which parts are already (obscurely) thought in the notion. The latter, on the other hand, add to the subject a predicate which was not at all thought in it, and could not by any analysis have been extracted from it. For example, if I say, AH bodies It are extended, this is an analytic judgment. For, in order that I may find extension as connected with it, T need not leave what notion itself I attach to body. I have only to analyze it, or open my eyes to what complex I think in it, to become aware of this predicate as contained in it. The judgment, therefore, is analytic. On the other hand, if I say, All bodies are heavy, in that case the predicate is some- thing quite different from anything I think in the mere notion of a body as such. The addition of such a predicate produces, therefore, a synthetic judgment. * Judgments of experience, as such, are all synthetic. For it were absurd to have recourse to experience for an analytic judgment, seeing tliat I need not go out of my notion itself to get the judgment, nor require, therefore, any testimony of experience in the case I know the notion body already analy|;ically, say, through the characters extension, impenetrability, figure, etc., which the notion simply im- plies. But now I extend my knowledge, and in once more consulting experience (from which I had derived this notion of body), I find, always conjoined with the said characters, that also of weight, which, as a predicate, therefore, I add synthetically to the notion in question. It is, therefore, on experience that the possibility is founded of the synthesis of the predicate heavy with the subject body. But, in the case of a priori synthetic judgments, this ex- pedient (of experience) is altogether inapplicable. If, in such reference, I am to go beyond the notion A in order to recognise another B, as connected with it, on what do I support myself, and by what is the synthesis made possible, seeing that I have not the advantage in this case of looking about me for it in the field of experience ? Let us take the proposition. All that happens has a cause. In the notion of something that happens (an effect), I think something come to be, which therefore, had a certain time before it, etc., and from this something, as it is there before me, it is possible for me to deduce various analytic judgments. But the notion cause lies quite out of this notion. Denoting or, in order , T need not ive only to think in it, in it. The ir hand, if I ate is some- 1 the mere a predicate thetic. For an analytic lotion itself T testimony lotion body \ extension, simply im- once more • this notion characters, jfore, I add lerefore, on lynthesis of its, this ex- ile. If, in in order to what do I ie possible, of looking as take the the notion something B before it, re me, it is lents. But Denoting something quite different from that which happens (the effect), it is not at all implied in it. How do I come, then, to say of any fact in event something quite different from the fact itself, and to recognise the notion cause, though not contained in said fact, nevertheless as belonging to it, and that, too, necessarily ? What is the unknown x on which the understanding supports itself, when it believes itself to dis- cover from the notion A a predicate B, alien to it, but which it judges, nevertheless, to be connected with it? It cannot be experience, because the relative proposition adds the lat- ter to the former, not only with a greater universality than experience can supply, but even with the expression of ne- cessity, and consequently wholly a priori or through mere notions. Well now, the entire end and aim of our specu- lative cognition a priori concern such synthetic principles, or judgments of extension. In all the Rational Theoretic Sciences, Synthetic a priori Judgments are present as Principles. 1. Mathematical judgments are all synthetic We might be apt to think at first that the proposition 7 + 5 =]12 is merely an analytic proposition, which follows from the notion of a sum of 7 and 5, according to the principle of contradiction. But if we look closer, we shall find that the notion of the sum of 7 and 5 implies nothing but the uniting of the two numbers into one, there being no thought, at the same time, of what this one number itself is which comprehends the two. The notion of 12 is not thought in this, that I think to myself the uniting of 7 and 5 ; and I may analyze my notion of such possible sum as long as I please without finding the 12 in it. We must go out of these notions, and take help from perception. We must assist ourselvof , hat is, by such objective representation as corresponds to one of the two numbers (say five points or the five fingers), and, so assisted, add the units of the num- ber perceived (5), one by one, to the notion of the number thought (7). I take first the number 7; next, for the no- 8 tion of the 5, I refer to mj fingers as perceived ; and then I add the units (which together constitute the number 5), one by one, in guidance of the representation perceived, to the number 7. In this way, for result, I see the number 12 emerge. That 7 should be added to 5, I have indeed thought in the notion of a sum 7 + 5, but not that this sum is equal to the number 12. An arithmetical proposition is, therefore, always synthetic, as we may more distinctly dis- cern, should we assume somewhat larger numbers; in which case it will clearly appear that, let us turn and twist our notions as we may, we never can, by mere analysis of no- tions, and unassisted by perception, discover their sum. Just as little is any proposition of pure geometry analytic. That the straight line between any two points is the short- est, is a synthetic proposition. For my notion of straight includes in it nothing of quantity, but only a quality. The notion shortest is wholly something adscititious, something added to it, and cannot by any analysis be derived from the notion straight line. Perception, then, must be here called in to assist, and only by its intervention is the synthesis possible. 2. Natural philosophy possesses synthetic a priori judg- ments as principles. I will only adduce a couple of propo- sitions in example ; as that in all changes of the corporeal world the quantity of matter remains the same, or that in all communication of motion, action and reaction are always alike. In both, not only the necessity is clear, and by con- sequence their a priori origin, b\it also the fact that they are synthetic propositions. For in the notion of matter I do not think its permanence, but only its presence in space as filling it. That is, I actually go beyond the notion of matter in order to think a priori to it something that I did not think in it. The proposition, therefore, is not analytic, but synthetic, and yet a priori; so it is with the other propositions of the pure part of the science. 3. In metaphysic synthetic cognitions a priori simply must be. For it is not its business merely to unravel no- 1 ; and then I number 5), >erceived, to the number lave indeed lat this sum oposition is, atinctly dis- '8 ; in which d twist our iljsis of no- iir sum. ry analytic. s the short- of straight ality. The somethinff id from the here called J synthesis I I riori judg- B of propo- 5 corporeal or that in are always fid by con- that they •f matter I !e in space notion of that I did k analytic, the other ri simply ravel no- 9 tiona which wo a priori form of tilings. On the contrary, the business liere is to extend our a priori cognition ; and to that we must avail ourselves of such propositions as add on something beyond the given notion, something not con- tained in it; and in this way, by means of synthetic a j!;nV;W judgments alone, advance indeed so far that experience it- self is unable to follow us. For example, there is the propo- sition, among others, that the world must have a beginning. And by this we see that metaphysic, at least in its aim, con- sists of pure a priori synthetic propositions. General Problem of Pure Reason. The problem proper of pure reason is comprised in the question, How are a /?mW synthetic judgments possible? In the solution of this problem there is involved, at the same time, the possibility of an application of pure reason in foundation and completion of a!) the sciences in which any theoretical a priori cognition of objects is concerned ; that is, an answer to the questions. How is pure mathematic possible? How is pure natural philosophy possible? Of these sciences, inasmuch as they once for all are, we may certainly with propriety ask, how they are possible ; for that they must be possible is demonstrated by their ac- *"aJity We cannot remain satisfied with a mere natural capability for metaphysic, or with the mere faculty of reason itself, in possession of which there is always that necessity of a metaphysic of some kind, be it what it may. It must be possible, rather, to bring matters relatively to some cer- tainty as concerns either the knowing or the not knowing of the objects in question, either the ability or the inability of reason to judge in their regard. That is, it must be possible for us either confidently to extend, or else duly limit, reason. This last question, which flows from the gen- eral problem, were rightly put thus: How is metaphysic as a science possible ? A criticism of reason leads, therefore, at last necessarily to science; while, r^"-ho\it criticism, dogmatically to set to 10 work with reason, results only in groundless allegations, to which others equally specious may be opposed, and the end, consequently, is scepticism. Idea and Division of a Special Science under the Name of a Critique * of Pure Reason. There results from all this, now, the idea of a special sci- ence, which may be named critique of pure reason Only in such critique as basis have we a sure and certain touchstone whereby to try the philosophical worth of earlier or later works in this department ; otherwise, we have only an unaccredited historian and judge pronouncing on the groundless opinions of others solely through opinions of his own which are equally groundless. As concern's division, then, this our science will, on the usual general principles of such, consist of a theory, firstly, of the elements, and secondly, of the method of pure reason. Each of these parts, again, will have its own sub-parts, the conditiono of which, however, we do not discuss here. Only, it may be of advantage, perhaps, to be, introductorily, or prefatorily, reminded, that there a'-3 two stems of human cognition, sprung, both, it may be, from a common but unknown root, namely, sense and understanding, by the former of which objects are given to us, and by the latter thought. Even sense, then, if it be found to possess for us intimations a priori^ which constitute conditions under which alone objects can be perceived by us, will, for that reason, enter as a constituent into a philosophy that is tran- scendental. And, accordingly, the transcendental sense- elements will necessarily constitute the first part of our theory of elements, inasmuch as the conditions under which objects are given precede those under which they are thought. legations, to md tho end. of a Critique . special sci- ,8on and certain til of earlier '^e have only cing on the Inions of his will, on the jory, firstly, pure reason, b-parts, the here. Only, iictorily, or of human )mmon but ng, by the y the latter ssess for us ions under ill, for that ;hat is tran- ntal sense- aart of our nder which L they are 11 Transcendental yEsTiiExio. I call all intimations pure (in transcendental sense) in which there isnotliing found that belongs to sensation. The pure/orm of sensuous perception, consequently, will be met with a priori in the mind, wherein all units of impression are perceived in certain relations. This pure form of sense or sensibility, accordingly (as without sensation), may be legitimately named pure perception. Thus, when I with- draw from what makes up my consciousness of a body, what elements in it belong to the understanding, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and again what elements in it belong to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc., still, of this empirically perceived object, there remains some- thing over, namely, extension and figure. These belong to pure perception which, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any actual object of sense or sensation, exists in the mind a priori. A science of all the a priori principles of sense, I call Transcendental Esthetic. There must, therefore, be such science which, constituting the first part of the transcend- ental theory of elements, will oppose itself to the second part, which is devoted to the principles of pure understand- ing, and is named Transcendental Logic. In the transcendental ffisthetic, we shall isolate sense, first, by withdrawal of all that the understanding thinks into it through its notions, and second, by further with- drawal, from the bare empirical sense-presentation that then remains, of all that belongs to sensation. For result we shall have nothing but pure perception and the mere form that adds itself to sense-matter; and that is all that the sensibility can a ^w* yield. But, through such investi- gation, it will be found that, as principles oi a priori cog- nition, there are two pure forms of sensuous perception, namely Space and Time, with the consideration of which we shall now occupy ourselves. i flM 12 Section I. — Of Space. § 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Notion. I understand by discussion or exposition the distinct state- ment (if not at full) of what belongs to a notion. Such exposition is metaphysical, moreover, when it demonstrates the notion to be given a priori. 1. Space is not an empirical notion which has been de- rived from external experience. For, that certain sensa- tions are referred to something out of jne (that is, to some- thing in another part of space than that in which I am), and further, that I can perceive them as out of and near each other, consequently, then, not merely as diflferent them- selves, but as in different places : to that the perception of space must be already presupposed. Accordingly the cog- nition 8p8,ce cannot be derived from the relations of external impression, th^ugh experience ; but contrariwise, this ex- ternal experience is itself only possible through said cog- nition. 2. Space is a necessary perception a priori^ which is pre- supposed by, and underlies, all external perceptions. We can never realize to ourselves the conception of there beintr no space, though we can perfectly well think of no objects being found in space. It is taken for granted, therefore, as condition of the possibility of the appearance of objects to external sense, and not as an affection or form dependent upon objects: it is an a priori perception, which is necess- arily presupposed as ground (or canvas) for the reception of all external consciousness. 3. Space is not a discursive or, as we say, general notion of the relations of things, but a pure perception. For, firstly, we can conceive only a single space, and when we speak of spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same sole space. These parts cannot precede, either, the one all-comprehend- ing space as though they were the particulars from which it is generalized : but, on the contrary, they are only thought in it. It is essentially one ; any plurality of parts or units stinct Btate- ;ion. Such jmonstrates as been de- rtain sensa- is, to some- hich I am), f and near srent them- irception of ;ly the eog- of external se, this ex- it said cog- lich is pre- ions. We here beincr no objects lerefore, as objects to dependent I is neces6- 3ception of jral notion •"or, firstly, e speak of 3ole space, nprehend- •om which ly thought ts or units II iihi 1 iil-iil! \i 13 in it (consequently, also, the general notion of spaces) rests solely on limitations of itself. From this it follows that a [perception a priori underlies all notions of it. This is the reason why every geometrical proposition, as, for example, that any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third side, is never by any possibility to be deduced from mere general notions of triangle, line, etc., but from percep- tion, and a priori^ with apodictic certainty. 4. Space is conceived as an infinite magnitude there be- fore us. Now a notion must be conceived, indeed, as com- mon to an infinite number of different possible individuals (it is their common type), which individuals, therefore, it holds under it ; but no notion as such can be so thought as though it contained an infinite number of individuals in it. But it is thus that space is thought (for all the parts of space are at one and the same time together in it ad inji/nitum). Consequently the original of space is perception apriori, and not notion. § 3. Transcendeutal Exposition of the Notion of Space. By transcendental exposition I understand the demon- stration of any notion as a principle such, that through it or from it, the possibility of other a priori synthetic cog- nitions may be understood. The requisites here, then, are : 1, that such cognitions actually do derive from the given notion ; 2, that these cognitions are only possible on pre- supposition of a certain mode of interpreting or explaining the given notion. Geometry is a science determinative of the properties of space, synthetically, but yet a priori. What must space itself be, then, that such cognition is possible of it ? It must be originally perception ; for no propositions that, as is the case in geometry (see Introduction), exceed (contain more than) a notion, can possibly be derived from that no- tion. The perception, again, must be a priori, or found in us before any special sense-perception ; pure, therefore, or non-empirical For geometrical propositions are all ai^o- n ; , : i ifi' 14 dictic ; that is, they bring with them their own necessity ; as the proposition, for example, that space lias only three dimensions. Bnt such propositions cannot be empirical judgments (judgments of experience); neither can they be inferred i qm these (see Introd.) How, now, can there be in the mind an external percep- tion, which yet precedes any perception of objects, and in which (from its nature, namely) the notion of these may be a priori determined ? In no other way, plainly, than that this perception has its seat only in the subject, as mere form of general external sense, or as mere formal susceptivity of the subject in assumption of objects when ai.ected by them; through (and with) which, then, there is obtained imme- diate cognition, that is, perception, of these objects. Inferences from these Ideas. a. Space ekhibits no property of things in themselves, nor yet themselves in their own mutual relations. For neither absolute nor relative attributes can a priori be per- ceived, that is, before existence of the things themselves in which they are found. h. Space is nothing else than merely the form of all pre- sentations in external sense. It is that subjective condition, under which alone external perception is possible for us. Only, then, from the point of view of a human being is it that we can speak of space, of extended substances, etc. Directly we discount the subjective condition under which alone external perception is possible to us (so far, namely, as we may happen to be affected by objects), the expression' space is without meaning. This term is referred to things only in so far as they appear to us, only in so far as they are objects of sense Inasmuch as we cannot make the peculiar conditions of sense, conditions as well of the very possibility of things, but only of their appearance to setise, it is impossible for us to say that space contains all things as they are in themselves, no matter what subject perceives them, and no matter whether they are perceived vn necessity; ^H i i las only three be empirical ' can tliey be ;ernal percep- yects, and in these may be ly, than that as mere form isceptivity of ted by them ; ;ained imme- jects. themselves, ations. For riori be per- lemselves in m of all pre- 'e condition, e for us. lan being is stances, etc. mder which far, namely, 3 expression 3d to things far as they innot make well of the oearance to jontains all liat subject 3 perceived I 15 lor unperceived by any subject, but only that it contains all things 80 far as, externally, they sensuously appear^ and to us. For, as regards the perceptions of other thinking beings, we cannot at all judge whether they are confined to the same conditions which limit our perception and are universally binding for us Our exposition asserts, therefore, the reality of space in regard to everything that may come externally before us as an object, but no less the ideality of this same space in regard to things when these things mean things in themselves as taken up in their truth by reason and without reference to the special nature of our sensibility. We maintain, therefore, the empirical reality of space in regard of all possible external experience, but also its transcendental ideality^ in this respect, that it is nothing so soon as we cease to regard it as condition of the possibility of all experience for us, and assume it, rather, to be something that is involved in the very nature of things in themselves. Section II. — Of Time. § 4. Metaphysical Exposition of the Notion of Time. 1. Time is not an empirical notion which has been de- rived from any experience. For co-existence and succession would not themselves be found in the things perceived, were not time a priori implied. Only on the presupposition of time is it conceivable that some things are at one and the same time (together) or that others are in different times (after one another), 2. Time is a necessary cognition which is implied in all perceptions. We cannot suppress time as in regard to things, but we may very well suppress things as in regard to time. Time, therefore, is a datum a priori. Only in it is all actuality of things possible. These may fall away bodily, but it (as the universal condition of their possibiiity) cannot be dispensed with. 'Mil ■li 16 3. On thi8 a priori necessity, the possibility of apodictic propositions in regard to relations of time, or axioms in re- gard to time generally, is established. It has only one di- mension : different times are not together, but after one another (just as different spaces are not e^er one another but together). These propositions cannot bo derived from experience, for exp' -ience would yield neither strict univer- sality nor apodictic certainty. Were experience the source, we should only be able to say : That is what common ob- servation tells us ; but not : That is what, of necessity, must be. These propositions are binding as rules, under which experience, generally, is possible, and advise us before it, not through it. 4. Time is not a discursive or, as we say, general notion, but a pure form of sense-perception. Different times are only parts of precisely the same time. The cognition which can be yielde'd only by a single object is perception. The proposition, also, that different times are never co-existent cannot be deduced from a general notion. It is a synthetic proposition, and not dependent on mere notions. It is di- rectly implied, therefore, in the simple perception and con- ception of time. 5. The infinitude of time amounts to no more than that every particular magnitude of time is possible only througii limitations of a one universal underlying time. Hence the original cognition time must be given as unlimited. That object, however, the parts and every magnitude of which can be conceived as determined only through limitations, cannot, as a totality, be given through notions (for notions only contain subnotions which, as particulars, precede their principals), but must involve a direct perception. § 5. Transcendental Exposition of the Notion of Time. I may refer in this connexion to § 4, No. 3, where, for the sake of brevity, I have introduced into the metaphysical exposition, what, properly, is transcendental Y of apodictic axioms in re- j only one di- but after one • one another, derived from strict nniver- ice the source, common ob- eeessity, must under which ; before it, not • I moral notion, 3nt times are jnition which option. The er co-existent is a synthetic )ns. It is di- bion and con- 3re than that only through Hence the nited. That ide of which limitations, J (for notions precede their >n. Df Time. , where, for netaphysical 17 § 6. Inferences from these Ideas. a. Wore abstraction inado from all subjectivo conditions I of perception, time would not be found to remain, whetber as sometbing self-sulwistent and on its own account, or as an objective quality inberent in tbings tbemselves. For, in tbo first case, it would be somotbing wbicb, witbout actual I object, were, nevertbeiess, itself actual. And, in tbe second case. It would be impossible for it, as a quality or order be- 'longing to tbings, to precede tbeso tbings, as tbeir very con- j dition indeed, and be, tbrougb synthetic propositions, a \ priori cognised and perceived. If. Time is notbing but tbe form of internal sense, tbat is of tbe perception of our own self and of our own inner state. For time results not from any determination of outer objects • it is not referred to anything tbat lias bodily sbape or place,' etc. ; on tbe contrary, it is time tbat, for all presentations in our inner consciousness, determines tbeir relation. c. Time is tbe formal condition a priori of all sense- perceptions. Space, as tbe pure form of all outer percep- tion, is limited, in its function o^ a priori condition, merely to external objects. On tbe otber band, because all cog- nitions, whether due to external tbings or not so due, do, so far as they themselves are concerned (in that they are affections of mind), belong to our inner state— further, be- cause this inner state must come under the formal condition of inner perception which is time— it follows that time is an a priori condition of all sense-perception, immediately of internal (the soul) and mediately {i.e., through it) of exter- nal perception. As, in the external reference, I can say, All external perceptions are in space and a ^non deter- mined according to the relations of space ; so, in the internal reference, I can equally say, All perceptions whatever (all objects of the senses) are in time, and fall necessarily under relations of time. Time, therefore, is solely a subjective condition of our (human) perception rwbip.li is in e^vc^vxr naaa opn^'ii^i-- oi^i—^ta ( I .nil !■!■ t^ •' lul 1 If' rf-! f F 18 being conceived to act on us) ; and in itself, apart from the subject, nothing. In regard of all perceptions, however, consequently of all things which may appear *n experience time is no less necessarily objective. We cannot say, All things are in time : for such expression bears to consider things as they are in themselves, and apart from the mode and conditions of the perception of them ; whereas it is pre- cisely the mode and conditions of perception from which it follows that time adds itself to all objects in consciousness. But subjoin now the mode to the proposition, and say, All things are, as objects of sense-perception, in time ; then the judgment has its own good objective truth and universality a priori. Our doctrine asserts, then, the empirical reality of time; that is, its objective validity in regard of all objects which may, on any occasion, be offered to our senses. And as our perception is i at all times one of sense, there never can be given us an object in experience which is not submitted to the condition of time. But, again, we deny time all claim to absolute reality, if r<^2;arded as intrinsic condition inherent in things themselves, irrespective of the form of our sen- suous perception. Such attributes as belong to things in themselves can never be made known to us by the senses. In this, then, consists the transcendental ideality of time. § 7. Further Explanations. Against this theory, whicl\ grants empirical but denies absolute or transcendental reality to time, I have heard an objection so common on the part- of intelligent men, that I infer it must occur naturally to every reader, to whom such speculations are unusual. It runs thus : Changes are actual, as is demonstrated by the vicissitude of our own mental states, even should we leave out of view all external percep- tions (together with their changes). But changes are only possible in time. Therefore time is something actual. The reply has no difficulty. I grant the entire argument. Time is undoubtedly something actual ; it is the actual form, i '■ 'i part from the ns, however, 1 experience, not say, All J to consider jm the mode reas it is pre- I'om which it Dnsciousness. and say, All le ; then the universality lity of time; bjects which And as our lever can be submitted to 3 all claim to ion inherent of our sen- to things in 1^ the senses. ty of time. il but denies ve heard an men, that I » whom such ?s are actual, own mental ;rnal percep- ^es are only a,ctual. The (lent. Time ictual form, 1 1 t 19 namely, of internal perception. Tt has therefore subjective reality in regard of inner experience ; i.e., I have actually the consciousness of time, and of my determinations in time. It is actual, consequently, not as an object, but as the mode of my perception of myself as an object. But if I (or an- other) could perceive lyself without this condition of sense, the same states, which we now call changes, wmild yield a cognition into which no idea of time, or consequently of change, would at all enter. There remains to it, therefore, its empirical reality as condition of all our experiences. Only absolute reality, in accordance with what has been said, cannot be allowed it. But the reason w^hy this objection is so universal, and on the part of those, too, who have nothing decided to advance against the doctrine of the ideality of space, is this. The absolute reality of space they could not hope apodictically to demonstrate in vi«jw of idealism, according to which the actuality of external things is incapable of rigorous proof. Whereas the actuality of the object of our internal ; nses (my own self, my own state) is immediately clear in con- sciousness. The former may, possibly, be a mere show, while the latter is, in their opinion, something undeniably actual. They do not consider that both, without our pre-, suming to deny their actuality in consciousness, are never- theless, only appearances to sense, which has always two sides. Time and space, accordingly, are two sources of cognition, from which, a ^r ^'o/•^, various synthetic propositions may be derived, as is especially exemplified in pure mathematic with regard to space and the relations of space. Taken to- gether, namely, they are both pure forms of all sense-per- ception, and thereby render synthetic propositions a ^priori possible. But these cognitive sources a priori determine their own limits just by this reference to their being con- ditions (forms) of sense : they concern objects, that is, only so far as objects are considered perceptions of sense, and not things in themselves. Valid only for the former tlic" at 20 once cease to have objective application directly we go be- yond them,. Such reality of space and time leaves, for the rest, the certainty of our empirical knowledge unaffected ; for in Its regard we have an equal certainty, whether these forms are of things in themselves, or only of our perception Whereas they who maintain the absolute reality of space and time must, whether they assume subsistence or only in- herence, be at variance with the principles of experience itself. For, say they assume the former, as the mathematical in- quirers mostly do, then they have before them two eternal infinite, and self-subsistent non-entities (space and time) which, without being themselves anything actual, are there, for all that, for no other purpose than just to embrace all that 18 actual ! Or say they assume the latter (inherence), as is, in effect, the case with certain metaphysical dogmatists, then' inasmuch as space and time are for them relations of things (the heside one another, the after one another) derived from experience, biit necessarily only confusedly so, they (these dogmatists) must impugn the validity, or at least the apo- dictic certainty, of any mathematical assignments a priori in regard of actual things {e.g., in space). For such cer- tainty IS not possibly to be obtained from experience ; and any a priori notions of space and time can, under such sup- positions, be no more than creations of imagination. Lastly, that the transcendental aesthetic cannot include more than these two elements, is evident from this, that all other notions which hold of sense (even motion, which is a union of both) presuppose something empirical (as subjects or objects of them). Motion, for example, presupposes per- ception of something that is movable. In space, however, taken by itself, there is not anything that is movable! Therefore w hat is movable must be something that is only found in space by experience, or that is only an empirical datum. For the same reason also, the transcendental aesthetic cannot count among its a priori data the notion of change; for time itself undergoes no change ; only what is in time undergoes change. For that notion there is re- ectly we go be- leaves, for the ige unaffected ; whether these aur perception, eality of space snce or only in- cperience itself, fcthematical in- tn two eternal, ace and time) tual, are there, mbrace all that lerence), as is, gmatists, then, tions of things ) derived from »o, they (these least the apo- nents a priori For such cer- ierience ; and i ider such sup- nation. mnot include 1 this, that all n, which is a .1 (as subjects ^supposes per- ace, however, is movable. that is only an empirical anscendental the notion of only what is there is re- 21 u aired, therefore, the observation of some actual existence [and of the succession of its states, i.e.j of experience. § 8. General Remarks on the Transcendental Esthetic. In natural theology where what is thought is not only [for us no object of perception, but never can be even to its lown self an object of sensuous perception, wo are careful to jremove the conditions of time and space from all percep- Ition on the part of such object But with what right Ishould we do this, if we have first of all assumed both time and space as forms of things in themselves, and such as [would continue to be aprori conditions of things, even if [these things themselves were once for all annihilated ; for, as conditions of existence as a whole, they must necessarily [be conditions of the existence of God? But if we are not [to make them objective forms of all things, then there is [nothing left us but to make them subjective forms of our own mode of perception, whether outer or inner— a mode of perception, further, which is to be recognized as sensuous [for the reason that it is not original. An original percep- tion, namely, is such that through it the very being of its object is given ; and this is a perception which, so far as we see, can only belong to God. A sense-perception, such as ours, on the contrary, is dependent on, and subservient to, the object, and is consequently only possible by this, I that the perceptivity of the subject is by said object affected. It is not necessary, either, that we should confine a per- I ception in space and time to the sensibility of man. It may I be that all finite thinking beings must, in that respect, ne- cessarily be identical with us (though we cannot decide as much) ; buc it would not follow, from this universality, that [such a mode of perception were not still sense. It would I still be a derivative perception (intuitus derivativus), and not original {intuitus originarius). That is, it would not be an intellectual perception, such as, for the reason alleged, appears to belong to God only, and never to a being that is dependent as well in its existence as in its perception. I S2 Conclusion of the Trunscendental ^Esthetic. In resolution of the general problem of our transcenden- tal philosophy (How aro synthetic propositions a priori possible ?) we now possest. here one of the required resour- ces We have now, namely, pure a priori perception, as such resource, the forms of which are space and time In these, when, in an « pWon judgment, we would go beyond a given notion, we have the means of finding what can be a prion discovered (not, indeed in the notion, but very cer- tainly m the perception correspondent to it), and may be synthetically united with it (the notion). That however amounts to certain judgments ; which judgments can at the same time, never extend further than to objects of' the senses nor possess validity for any others than those of possible experience. Transcendental J^ogio. I. Of Logic in General. 1. As general logic, it abstracts from all diversity of ob- jects m cognition, and fror: these themselves; it has to do with nothing but the mere form in thinking. 2. As pure, it has no empirical principles, and conse- quently, does not (as has been sometimes supposed) take anything from psychology, wHich, in reality, has no infln- ence upon a canon of the unders.tanding. It is a demon- strated doctrine, and everything in it must be quite «2>mn certain. ^ II. Of Transcendental Logic. General logic abstracts, as we have shown, wholly from the matter of cognition, that is, from any reference of co- mtion to an object of it ; and regards alone the logical form in the relation of the cognitions the one to the other, or the letio. t r transcenden- tions a priori jquired resour- perception, as and time. In aid go beyond * what can be , but very cer- , and may be hat, however, nents can, at objects of the than those of ^ersity of ob- it has to do J, and conse- pposed) take lias no infln- is a demon- [uite a priori ivholly from ence of cog- logical form )tlier, or the 28 form of thought quite generally. Inasmuch, now, as there I are (according to the transcendentnl SBsthetic) as well pure as empirical perceptions, it is possible that a like difference I may be found between the pure and the empirical thinking ' of objects. In that case we should have the possibility of a I logic in which abstraction from all matter of cognition would not be necessary. For there might be a logic, ex- eluding, indeed, empirical matter, but admitting all that could be a priori cognised (through perceptions or notions) in reference to objects even as experienced in actual fact. Such logic would relate, consequently, to the origin of our actual perception and other cognition of objects of expe- rience, so far as that origin did not, or could not, lie in these objects themselves. In the expectation, then, that there are possibly notions a priori^ entrant into objects, not in the manner of percep- tions, indeed, whether pure or sensible, but merely as pure thought functions — notions, consequently, which are in origin neither empirical nor aesthetic — we prefigure the idea of a science of pure cognition which, though exclu- sively holding of understanding and reason, will enable us to think facts of actual experience even wholly a priori. A science, determinative of the origin, limits and objective actuality of such cognitions, would necessarily take the name of Transcendental Logic. It would have to do, namely, only with the laws of understanding and reason, and this expressly in an objective application a priori; and not indifferently, like general logic, in reference to interests whether emprical or pure. III. Of the division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic. General logic resolves the whole formal business of un- derstanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits these as the principles of all logical judgment in cognition. This part of logic may be called an Analytic^ therefore, and is, at least the negative touchstone of truth In respect 24 of objects, no one with mere logic can venture to pronounce or maintain anything Nevertheless, however poorly off, or quite void, we may be as regards matter, the possess- ion of such plausible art to bestow on all our cognitions the form c "the, understanding proves so seductive that said gen- eral logic, though a simple canon in judging, has, at least I for the mere blind show of objective affirmations, been used or, in effect, misused, as an organon of actual production. Now, general logic, as such supposititious organon, is what we name Dialectic. K I rV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into the " Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic. In a transcendental logic, we isolate the understanding, as already in the aesthetic, sense, and make prominent I merely the share of thought in our perceptive experience, I which is alone derived thence. The necessary condition I for action of such principles is, that objects be given us in I sense-perception, to which then they may be applied. For I without such perception, experience, as wanting objects, I remains altogether void. That part of transcendental logic I therefore, which propounds the elements of pure under- 1 standing in experience, and the principles without which I no object can anywhere be thought into perception, is the I transcendental analytic, and at the same time a logic of I truth. For no cognition in experience can contradict it, I without losing at the same time all its matter, that is, all I its conjunction into an object, and consequently its truth. I It is, however, very tempting and misleading to make use I of these pure principles by themselves, and even beyond I the limits of experience, which can alone furnish the mat- I ter or objects whereon to apply them. In this way, conse- | quently, understanding runs risk of making, through mere I cobwebs of reason, a material use of its own simply /orma^ I principles, and without discrimination judging of objects B which are neither given us, ^lor in any way, perhaps, can I be given us. Specially calculated to yield only a canon of e to pronounce, however poorly ter, the possees- • cognitions the e that said gen- g, has, at least ons, been used, lal production, ganon, is what c into the ic. understanding, ke prominent v^e experience, jary condition )e given us in applied. For Siting objects, iendental logic r pure under- v^ithout which 'eption, is the me a logic of contradict it, ;er, that is, all titly its truth. 5 to make use even beyond nish the mat- is way, conse- ;hrough mere imply formal ig of objects perhaps, can ly a canon of i Ik |i^ i: 25 judgment m experience, they are merely misuBsd, when appljmg them universally and without restriction, we ven! ture, m respect of objects generally, with pure understand- ing alone, synthetzcally to judge, pronounce, and decide. Such use of pure understanding were dialectical. The second part of transcendental logic, therefore, must consist of a en ique of this dialectical show, and be named Tran- scendental DialecUc. We are not to expect in it, however an art dogmatically to produce such show, which, alas ^ is a very current art of manifold metaphysical juggleries OuitP on the contrary, it shall be a critique of undlZing 1 reason in their hyperphysical use, in order to detect the false show of their groundless pretensions. Transcendental Analytic. This part of transcendental logic will consist of two books he one appropriated to the notions of pure understanding,' as the other to itQ judgments, ^' Book I.~The Analytic of Notions. Chapter I. Section 1. Of Understanding in its Logical Function Generally. The understanding has been already merely negatively described as a non-sensuous intellectual faculty. Now apart l.-om sense, we are insusceptible of any perception proper The understanding, consequently, is no faculty ofpercep: but that through notions. Cognition of all, more especially human, understanding, is, as through notions, not intuitive b discursive. All perceptions, as of sense rest on afe! tio. s , notions, therefore, on functions. But by function I understand that unity of act wh^r^K. fi.. „„.:!/. f.T ^ - — V '^^"^ faiiuuis uiiiib in a 26 . ! 'I cognition are ordered into a single common one. Notions found, therefore, on the 8pontaneity.(8eIf-action) of thought ; as sense-perceptions on the receptivity of impressions. No- tions, now, can be used by understanding only in so far as \t judges by them Judgment, therefore, is the me- diate cognition of an object, and consequently the cognition of a cognition of it But all acts of understanding may be reduced to judgments, and understanding itselt; therefore, may be defined a faculty to judge The functions of the understanding, accordingly, will be capable of being exhaustively discovered, if we can but exhaustively enumerate the functions of unity in judgments. Section 2 (§ 9). Of the Logical Function of Uunderstanding in Judging. If we abstract from all matter of a judgment, and con- sider only the precise form of the understanding that is man- ifested in it, we readily find that the functions of thought, in any such, may be reduced to four titles, with three mo- ments under each. This may, not inaptly, be exhibited in the following table : — 1. Quantity of Judgments: Universal, Particular, Sin- gular. 2. Quality : Affirmative, Negative, Infinite. 3. I\ elation : Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive. 4. Modality : Problematic, Assertoric, Apodictic. 1. When I consider, a singular proposition, not merely in its inner validity, but also, as simply a cognition, in the magnitude which it possesses as compared with others, then certainly it is difierent from universal propositions, and deserves a place of its own in a complete table of the moments of thought as such (though not, naturally, in a logic that is merely addressed to the functions of judgments in their mutual relations). 2. Just in the same way, infinite propositions must, in a one. Notions on) of thought ; pressions. No- °<>k« for perceptions to be given to It from elsewhere, in order to convert these into no- tions ; and tins process proceeds analytically. Transcend- ental logic on the other hand, already has the^matter olred .t by the transcendental esthetic (the composites, namely of time and space m apriori sensibility), as a material fo «^e notions a pr^ori in understanding; and without it, plain.,, these would be devoid of all contents and conse qnently, altogether blank , . But the native eXv (spontaneity) of our thought demands that this a priori p!l SoTan t^''"™ "'""i ^'""^ '"'° '"'^g-^'tio'.) should, ftrs of all, be run over, taken up, and conjoined, in order hat a cognition (or so far, a perception) should b^ made of It. This process (of imagination), now, I term synthesis. By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the uniting of the various units in a consciousness the one to the other, and the combining of their complex into a single cognition (perception). Such synthesis is pure when the I 8 a whole, inas- tire import of al function of ibutes notliing entity, quality, of the matter of the copula judgments are tion as merely Assertoric are alternative as ere the alter- derstanding )stract8 from ptions to be these into no- Transcend- latter offered ites, namely, material for without it, i and, conse- tive energy I priori per- ion) should, Bd, in order be made of synthesis, erstand the the one to nto a single ! when the in' ■ nmloriaU in it are fnrniel.ed for it, not empirically, b„t a imon (as those that are furnished l.y time and space) Pure synthesis, ,,„ito gone.ally conceived, is to be further un,Ierstood as unphed in, or exemplified l.y, each of the pure or a pnoH notions of the understanding. I under- stand by th,s pure) synthesis, a synthesis that rests on a ground of synthetic unity o^/orj. • o" a The same functions which variously give unitv to thn several terms in judgments, extend a varLs unity'a so to he mere syntheses of the difterent units in perceptions! lleso lat er „n,t,es, or source, of unity, are the ap.Ci notions of he understanding (the categories). The san« fnncfons of understanding, therefore, which, by means rf the analytic unity, brought about the logical form of a judgment m notions, do also, by means of the synthetic nn,y (winch they ikewise involve), bring about a transect dental o^ecfv.ty of union) in the complexions of percep- t.on. These fanctions, in this latter application, may. cl seqnently be .nte ligibly named pure notions of the under- standmg categories): they have, intelligibly also, said a Tgrrr;;:;:: ""^^"^^ "-' "'^'' '"^'"'^■' '' - - ^^^^ Now, just in this way we may conceive to arise exactly «sn,any ju-re notions of undctanding (with necessary i K«„ action on the objects of perception) as there are ogcal functions of all possible judgments in'the preceding able. For, through said functions, the undei-standing as .ndei-standing is completely exhausted, and its powers as a acuity duly gauged. We call these notions categories, as to lowing Aristotle, seeing that our intention with the,;, i 01 igmally the same as his, however widely different it will be found in the carrying of it out. Table op the Categoeies. 1. Quantity ; Unity, Plurality, Totality. 2. Quality : Reality, Negation, Limitation. 30 3. Relation : Inherence and Subsistence (Substance .. '1 Accident), Causality and Dependence (Cause ..:;.. EflFect), Communion (Reciprocity of Action and Passion). 4. Modality : Possibility — Impossibility, Existence (Ac- tuality) — Non-existence, Necessity — Contingency. This, now, is the catalogue of all the primitive pure no- tions of synthesis which understanding a priori possesses, and only by reason of which, too, it is a pure understand- ing, seeing that it is by them alone that it can understand something on occasion of a complex of perception, that is, think an object of perception (or, simply, perceive). The classification is systematically constructed in obedience to a common principle, namely, the faculty to judge (which just means the faculty to think) To ask after such primitive hotions was, on the part of Aristotle, an idea worthy of an acute-minded man. As he had no guiding principle, however, he could only pick them up as they came in his way. In this manner he got together at fint ten of them, and these he called categories (predicaments). In the end, however, he believed himself to have dicovered other five, which were consequently named post-predica- ments. Nevertheless his table still remained defective and incomplete. Thus some of its articles {quando^ ubi, dtus, prius, aimul) are modi of sense, as another (motus) is em- pirical, and these ought to have^no place in a genealogical tree of pure underBtanding. Others, again, are mere deri- vatives {actio, passio\ while of the primitives themselves there are several wanting. §11. 1. The four classes In our table may be thrown into two divisions : one directed to objects of perception (no matter whether pure or empirical), and the other to the existence of these objects, (so far as they are referred to the under- standing, or the one to the other). 5ubstancG .. d !e (Cause ..::^ ' Action and Existence ( Ac- ontingency. itive pure no- iori possesses, •e understand- in understand ption, that is, srceive). The obedience to judge (which To ask after stotle, an idea d no guiding I up as they aether at finit )redicaments). lave dicovered post-predica- defective and do^ ubij situs, notus) is em- genealogical re mere deri- es themselvGB own into two n (no matter the existence ;o the under- '.I'M 81 I would c°ll the classes in the first division mathematical, and those in the second dynamical categories. TI<3 latter alone have correlates, the former have none ; and tb . diflFer- ence must, presumably, have its sufficient reason *n the nature of the understanding. 2. Each of the four classes of categories has under it three sub-classes ; and this gives to think, the rather, indeed, that all otber division a priori through notions is necessarily a dichotomy. Again, under each class, the third category owes it} origin to the union of the second with the first. Thus totality is nothing else than 'plurality regarded as unity ; limitation is reality in union with negation ; reci- procity is substances exchangeably causal ; and ne essity, lastly, is actuality given, as it were, by possibility itself. Chapter II. — Deduction of the Categories. Section 1 (§ 13). Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in General. I call the explanation of how a priori notions can have an application to objects of experience the transcendental deduction. We have now found two quite diverse elements, which, however, agree in being both a priori constituents of ob- jects of experience ; namely, on the one hand, space and time as forms of sense, and, on the other, the categories as forms of intellect. To require an empirical deduction of these would be a futile want ; for what is distinctive of their nature lies precisely in this, that they connect themselves with objects without Dwing anything to experience for the idea of these objects. At the same time, iu the case of these notions, as in that of all cognitions, we can rightly enough inquire, not for the principle of their possibility, but for the occasions of their appearance in experience. It is certainly the impres- sions of the senses which give the first stir to the production of experience, and the movement of cognition in every re- \ 8d n TJf. ' ^^PfJ'^"^';* or cognition generally, includes n It elf two very dissimilar factors, namely, a 'rLatter de- rived from the senses (sensation), and a certain/^r;/i(for the ordenng and arranging of this matter) which is due to the inner source of understanding and pare perception. Now It 18 on occasion of the former element (sensation) that the atter faculties of form are moved to bring forward and ul troduce their a priori contributions. We have, with little difficulty, made intelligible above how space and time, thougli cognitions a priori, join them- selves, nevertheless, necessarily to objects, and render, in independence of all experience, a synthetic cognition or per- ception o; objects possible. The categories of understanding, on the other hand, have nothmg to do with conditions of perception (in the strict sense), and there certainly may very well be presentations ot objects so far p sense is concerned, without there being ^my necessity to refer them to functions of the understand ing at all. Understanding, so far, need not involve, in formation of objects, any a priori influence whatever. In this relation, indeed, there shows a difficulty which we did iiot find when employed on sense. How, namely, can sub- jective conditions of thought conceivably at all exert an ohJect^ve function-that is, how can they furnish conditions of the v^ry possibility of all perception and experience of objects ?. ..... .1 take, for example, the notion of cause, ^hich imp les a particular sort of synthesis, where on some- thing A there ensues, by necessity of a law, a something else, B, tliat is quite different from A. It is useless to refe? to experience in proof of any such notion, which, as con- XT "''^'''^•^^' ''^^ ^^ i'"^^^^ objectively valid only a Did we think to rid ourselves of the difficulty of such in- quiries by saying. Experience affords continual ei^amplesof amples furnish abundant occasion for abstracting the notion cause, and thereby ratifying at the same time the obje "^ ally, includes a matter de- form (for the is due to the )tion. Now, ion) that the vard and in- ligible above h join thern- i render, in lition or per- r liand, have n the strict resentations there being understand- involve, in atever. In lich we did ,y, can sub- II exert an I conditions perience of 1 of cause, •e on some- somethins: ess to refer 3h, as con- lid cnlj a 3f such in- camples of which ex- he notion, objective 88 validity of such a notion, then we forget to observe that the notion cause, cannot arise in this way, but that it must either be based completely aprioH in the understanding or else utterly abandoned as a mere chimera. For this no' tion demands absolutely that something, A, be of such a nature that something else, B, ensues from it, necessarily and by virtue of an unconditionally universal law Sense certainly, however, gives examples from which we may in- fer a rule of what usually happens, but never of what Les- mnly happens. Hence there belongs to the synthesis of cause and effect a dignity which can never be empiricallv ex pressed ; name y, that the effect not merely comes after the cause, but is gi /en by it, and ensues from it. The rieoroua umversality of the rule, too, is not at all a possession of em- pirical rules which, as through induction, can have no more than comparative universality, that is, a certain extended application. The validity of the categories would be com- pletely changed, then, were we to regard them as merely empirical products. ^ § 14. Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. The transcendental deduction of all a priori elements has, therefore a prmciple directive of the whole enquiry, this namely, that they must be recognised to be a priori con' ditions of the possibility of experience (whether as of sense or of understandir.g). Elements which furnish the objective ground of the possibility of experience are for that very reason necessary. An analysis, however, of the experiences in which they occur, would not constitute their deduction, but, as m that way they would still remain contingent only their ilhistration. Without this primary reference to possible experience, which holds of all objects in perception the application of these a priori elements to any object could not be possibly understood. I begin with the definition of the categories. They are notions of objects generally, by which the sense-elements of these objects are conceived to be determined in respect of r-i'^jii 84 one or more of the various logical functions of judgment. But by the category of substance, now, it is determined of the notion body, when subjected to it, that its empirical perception in experience must be always regarded only as subject, and never as predicate. And so of all the other categories. Section 2. Transcendnntal Deduction of the Categories. § 16. Of the Possibility of a Conjunction in General. ^ The constitutive units may be given in a perception which 18 merely sensuous, or nothing but receptivity, and the form of this perception may lie a priori in our faculty, without being anything else, however, than how the subject is pass- ively affected. But the conjunction of these or any units 18 not possibly an affair oi sense, and cun, therefore, not be found as an element or action involved even in the pure form of sense-perception (space, etc.) For it is an actus of the mind's own faculty, and as in contradistinction to sense we must name this faculty understanding, it follows that all conjunction, conscious or unconscious, in percopiions or in notions, in elements pure or in elements empirical, is an act of the understanding to which we would give the gen- eral appellation oi synthesis Xt is easy to be under- stood here that this actus must be originally 7nonome (strictly one), and of force for all conjunction, as also that the resolu- tion [analysis) which seems to be opposed to it, does yet, for all that, always presuppose it'; for where understanding has not already conjoined, neither can it disjoin, inasmuch as only through it can anything, as conjoined, be offered to our perception. But the notion of conjunction carries with it, besides those of the complex of sense-units and their synthesis, that of their unity as well. Conjunction is synthetic unity of a complex. The cognition of this unity can, therefore, not arise from the conjunction ; rather, by adding itself to the cognition of the complex, it first makes the notion itself of I ludgment dotermined of its empirical arded only as all the other ategories. Qeneral. jeption which and the form ulty, witliout ibjeot is pass- or any units efore, not be in the pure B an actus of ition to sense Hows that all opiions or in 3irical, is an ;ive the gen- to be under- iome (strictly at the resolu- it, does yet, iderstanding n, inasmuch be offered to I it, besides n thesis, that c unity of a lerefore, not itself to the ion itself of !< :ii w ™nj„„ction po8,iWo. This nnity, «.l,id, p„ccdoa aprioH ] ""'" « '2°"J"'"-'"»"' '•« not pcsibl^ said caLory "'""7 (^ .")l Wo must, tl.erefbrc, seeic this umt, (as .,„al,tafve § U still further baclc ; we must Ti .t, namely, ■„ what ,s the ground „f that unity in the jud.^. .nenlB themselves or .„ what, eonsequently, is the ground o» the understandmg itself in its very logical funetion § Ki, Of J Original or-Primary isynthulic Unity of Apporcoption. The /M.n* mnst be capable of accompanying all my perceptions ; ior otherwise there v. uld be something placed m my .onsc.ousness which could not be thon^ht ; and that .s a. «„.ch as to say that the perception itsel? would ei he be u„pos.,Me or se nothing for me. All the units, there- fore, ot a perceptive complex i» , .cssarily conjoined with the Itlunk of the subject holding, them. This, l,.,wever IS an act of spontaneity, and cannot be thought as due to t Zn Ir *■"" "■■ f "" ^^>'P''-P'-". to distingni h thorn the empirical. It may be named also the Original (Primary) Appercertion, inasmuch as it is that self con soio.isnes, winch, while it produces the all-attendant and vor-idontical consci, .isness l tkmk, cannot be accompanied by any hirthor one. I call also tb unity in it the tran cendenta Unity of self-,.o„scio„sne , ,„ consideration (or md^itiorO o as being a source . possible cognition I le tivelv ^,y perceptive units, did they not collectively be- ong ,1 „„gle self-conseiousno Only by this, therefore, a I can co ,joi„ the „ni,. „f given inti.nations '. a .^.nl comcwu^ness, is it possible for m. to conceive the id. Vu ofcomoiouenesB in these Utimatwm themselves. The an- P09 tion of u certain syntheti- one. The thought, These units given in perception are collectively mine, l.'aceod- !m' r '""•"" "^ " '"^ ^ " '" *''™' " "'l'^'^' <^an unite liiem, 111 a 8inc;ie consciousness and tl'-""h t'^-' -^— ' - • Fiiil ii not yet itself the consciousness of the syntliesis of the units It yet prosuppoaes the possibility of this. That is, only by comprehending the complex of units in a single conscious- ness, do I make them singly and collectively mine. Other- wise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have units in consciousness. Synthetic unity of the com- plex of perceptions as given a priori, k the ground, there- fore, of that identity of apperception itself which a priori precedes any definite act of thinking on my part. Synthesis, however, is not in the objects, and cannot possibly be bor- rowed from them, or only first of all taken up into con- sciousness, through perception : it is an act of understanding alone, which itself, indeed, is nothing but the faculty whose single function it is, a pri(yri to conjoin, and to bring the complex of given perceptions under the unity of appercep- tion. This principle is the ultimate principle in all human cognition. § 17. The Axiom of the Synthetic Unity of Apperception is the Ultimate Principle of the Understanding. The ultimate principle of the possibility of all perception m relation to sense, was, according to the transcendental aesthetic, this. That the units of every such complex must stand under the formal conditions of space and time. The ultimate principle of the possibility of all perception, in re- lation to the understanding, is, That the units of every per- ceptive complex must stand under conditions of the original- synthetic unity of apperception.' All units of perception stand under the former, so far as they are given to us; and under the latter, so far as they must be capable of being conjoined in a single consciousness. For without such con- junction there would bo nothing thinkingly cognised or recognised (as in experience), inasmuch as the units given by sense would not have the actus of apperception, I think, m common, and would not be brought together thereby into a single consciouswess It is on the unity of Con- sciousness, consequently, that the possibility of the under- standing itself rests. I I of the units, it is, only by le conscious- line. Other- orse a self as / of the corn- round, there- ich a priori . Synthesis, libly be bor- ip into con- iderstunding iculty whose to bring the of appercep- 1 all human ption is the I perception nscendental nnplex must time. The )tion, in re- f every per- he original- perception to us ; and le of being it such con- iognised or units given, ►n, I think, lereby into Ity of Con- the under- rH Tin is not a prio ceptioi I must tain p£ given), the sai line). for an synthet conditi< Not on: but just it. In of the J gether i § The 1 through are unit For that distingui This latt perceptii Whether complex to the ot ditions. ] associatic quite con ception ii consequei original ii necessary one single it 80 8tan( Thus the mere form of external sense-perception, space, IS not yet a finished perception : so far, it only supplie; the aprwrt perceptire complex towards a possibte finished per- ception But actually to discern something in space a line must dra^ it. That is, I must synthetically effect' a el tain particular conjunction of the space-units (a, yet only given), and in „,ch manner that the unity of this act is at lie same time the unity of consciousness (in the idea of a line). Only ,„ this way, plainly, is it first of all possible for an object (a marked off space) to be discerned The synthetic unity of consciousness, therefore, is an objective condition of all formed or finished perception in experience! Not only ,e it necessary to enable me to perceive an object; but just to Ic object every sense-perception must stand under It. In any other way, or without this synthesis, the units of the perceptive complex would not unite themselves to- gether m a single consciousness. § 18. What Objeotire Unity of Self-Oonsoionsneis ii thr^^^h'^vTirf*' ™"y "*■ W«'-'=«P«o» iB that unity brough which all the complex units given in a perception are united into a notion of the object constituted by them. For that reason this unity is called objective, and must be disinguished from the subjective unity of' conciousness Ihis latter is only the inner affection of sense whereby a ^rceptive conaplcx is (for such union) empirically given. Whether I shall be empirically conscious of theuniis in the implex as given together, or as given the one in succession to the other, depends on oircum^tanoee, or empirical con- as ciation of the units) is itself a sense-appearance, afd qui contingent. On the other hand, the pure form of per ception in time, merely as such perception, and involvL consequently, a given complex of units, stands under the original unity of consciouaness, solely ir consequence of the necessary conjunction of the unite of perception --nto the one single / tkink (or, it u ItKat an. Lnklg). T .att .t 80 stands, solely in consequence of the pure synthesis of |i|i ' i^:J 4 M A 88 understanding, which synthesis (as relating only to an a priori complex), is evidently presupposed a priori to under- lie any empirical synthesis. § 19. The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of the Notions they contain. I find that a judgment is nothing else than the method of bringing given ideas into the objective unity of appercep- *^^" Take, for example, the proposition, Bodies are heavy. Here, I do not mean to say that these ideas belong in the empirical perception necessarily the one to the other, but that they belong the one to the other by vir- tue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of sense-perceptions. That is, they belong the one to the other according to principles of the objective determination of all cognitive elements, so far as they are competent to yield an objective perception ; which principles derive all of them from that of the transcendental unity of apperception. § 20. All Perceptions of Sense stand under the Categories as Con ditions under which alone the Units of their Complex can unite together and coalesce into a single Consciousness. The complex of units given in a perception of sense falls necessarily under the original synthetic unity of appercep- tion, inasmuch as through this unity alone is the unity of the perception possible (§ 17). But that act of the under- standing through which the units of a complex (whether perceptive or notional) becomes i*educcd into a single ap- perception, is the logical function of the technical judgments (§ 19), Every complex, therefore, so' far as it is given in a single empirical perception, has been determined by one of the logical functions of judgment, or by this function of judgment it has been brought into a single consciousness. But now the categories are nothing else than precisely these functions to judge, so far as gome given complex of percep- tion comes to be determined of them (§ 13). Hence all given perceptive complexions stand necessarily under cate- gories. to an a ;o under- Objective ethod of ppercep- Bodies 90 ideas B one to • by vir- S^n thesis ? to the lination stent to ve allot' jeption. as CoD- an unite se, falls percep- nity of under- hether :le ap- jments sn in a one of ion of isness. f these ercep- ce all ■ cate- § 22. T TotL and the factors. object i sense-ek correspo would b sequent! cognitioi 80 far as thing, wl tion pose an object come for gory is hi of sense i is perceiv and time tain (in only in tl are possil Biich fori quently r less there being rea' said pure however, tion, or sc companiei in applies iifford per far as th« through t to empiric 39 § 22. The Categories have no other Application in Cognition than to Objects of Experience. To think an object, and to perceive an object, are not one and the same thing. There are, namely, in perception two factors. ^ There is, first, the notion (category) whereby an object is thinkingly perceived ; and tliere is, second the sense-elements whereby it is given. For if to the notion no corresponding sense-presentation could be given, the former would be only a formal thought without an object, and con- sequently, not possibly capable of afi'ording perceptive re- cognition of anything whatever. There might be, indeed, 80 far as I could know, not anything, not even possibly any- thing, whereto my thought might apply. Now, all percep- tion possible for us is sensuous (Esthetic) ; the thinking of an object, therefore, by means of a category, can only be- come for UB a perceptive recognition in so far as this cate- gory IS brought to bear on objects of the senses. Perception of sense is either pure (space and time), or empirical (what 18 perceived, through sensation, as directly actual in space and time). Through determination of the former, we ob- tain (in mathematic) a priori perceptions of objects, but only in ihcir form as presentations to sense ; whether there are possibly also actual thiogb which are to be perceived in Buch form, remains, so tar, still undetermined. Conse- quently no mathematical notion is in itself perception, un- less there be presupposed things, also, which are capable of being realized by us only as in accordance with the form of said pure sensuous perception. Things in space and iivif, however, are only realized by us through empirical percep- tion, or so far as they are sense-perceptions, perceptions ac- companied by sensation. The categories, consequently, even in application to a priori perceptions (as in mathematic), attord perceptive cognition or recognition, strictly, only so iar as these a i)m^^ perceptions, and consequently also through them the categories, are capable of being applied to empirical objects. 40 » § 23. The above proposition is of the greatest importance; for it just as much determines the limits of the share of the cat- egories in objects, as the Esthetic similarly determined in regard to the pure form of our sense-perception. Space and time function, as conditions of the possibility of how objects can be given us, no further than as regards objects of sense, or no further than as regards experience. Beyond these limits they stand for nothing ; for they are only in the senses and have no reality apart from them. The categories are free from this restriction, and apply to objects of perception as such, if only sensuous and not intellectual, let it be like to ours or not like. This extension beyond our sense helps us, however, as on their part, to nothing. For they are then void notions of objects, of which objects, whether they are even possible or impossible, these notions themselves cannot possibly enable us to judge. Let us suppose ourselves to assume, for example, an ob- ject that is an object of a perception which is non-sensuous. Such an object we may determine, of course, by all the pre- dicates which the assumption itself involves— the assump- tion that it has nothing of a sense-perception in it. It is not, therefore, extended or in space ; its duration is not a time ; there is no time-succession of modi^ no such thino- as change, in it, etc. But that is not an objective cognition proper, in regard to which I only .name how the perception of the object is not^ and remain unable to say anything that it positively is. I have not then done anything to indicate the possibility of an object for my category ; or I have not been able to assign a perception which should correspond to it. Nay, the most important distinction here yet is this : that to any such supposed object, there cannot be applied even any one single category. § 24. Of the Application of the Categories to the Objects of Sense, The categories bear, through the mere understanding, on UHi fi! nee; for 'the cat- lined in )ace and ' objects )f sense, d these e senses ries are ception be like 36 helps ley are er they nselves an ob- isuous. he pre- ssump- Itis I not a ling as ;nition ieption ig that idicate ve not ond to 3 this : pplied Sense, ag,on ter ours thought actual howevei rests on is t( units of with the standing appercej the cond eeption that the ive realii may be ^ But, Ej as bear in or on the tlie cate| merely in of imagi: of sponta merely d priori ae action of : of the for the direct § We car not cognii which CO tions are of it is gh 41 I ob]\ / 18 of perception as perception, if onlj F^nsnoug, no mat- ter ours nr another; but are, for that very ren on, , i-e thmght-forms, tlirongh which (as such) there is not u.iy actual ol,,ect - ^ni.^ Tiiere is basally presupposed ii us, however, a ct n , nu of sense-perception a priori wliich rests on the receptivity or susceptivity of impressions (a .d;^-' hty as such). Now, understanding., as spontaneity, 18 t( conceived capable of determinatively actinrr on the units of complex in inner sense, under and in acc^'ordance with the synthetic unity of apperception. That is, under- standing may be conceived to think synthetic unity of the apperception of * ' e complex of a priori sense-perception as the condition uhuer which all objects of our (human) per- ception must necessarily stand. In this wise, then, it is that the categories, though ih ;re thought-forms, get UjecU ive reality, or actual presence as factors in objects which may be given us in sense. 13nt, again, the figural synthesis must, when considered as bearing on the original synthetic unity of apperception or on the transcendental unity, that is, which functions in the categories, be named, as in contradistinction to the merely intellectual conjunction, the transcendental synthesis of imagination. So far, again, as its synthesis is an action of spontaneity, which is determinant, and not, like sense, merely determinable— imagination is a faculty which a priori acts upon sense. This synthesis is the result of an action of understanding on sense, and is the first application of the former (ground, too, of all itf other applications) in the direction of objects of what perception is possible to us. § 27. Result of this Deduction of the Categories. We cannot think an object without categories; we can- not cognise any object thought, unless through perceptions which correspond to these notions. Now all our percep- tions are in sense, and such cognition, so far as the object of It 18 given, is empirical. But empirical cognition (or re- ^, IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) fe f/ ^0 1.0 I.I lis i|5£ 2.2 « Itt m Si £ US 112.0 L25 i 1.4 im Photographic Sciences Corporation ^ ,v ^v [V »" '^\^ "% ^^^ 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4&03 '^ .^^ iV ?^^ 43 cognition-perception) is experience. Consequently there 18 no objective cognition a priori possible tons, but one solely of objects of possible experience. But such cognition, though confined merely to obiecis of expenence IS not therefore all borrowed from experience. On the contrary, even such cognition has elements which ongmater ^^,.^ within ourselves; firstly, the pure per- ceptions (time and space), namely, and, secondly, the pure notions of understanding (the categories). Now, there are only two ways in which we can think a necessary agree- ment of expenence with notions of objects in it : eithe? ex- penence mnkes these notions, or these notions make expe- rience possible. The one alternative is not true of the cat- jon^^ {pure perception ^^^vt)- for they are a priori no- tions and consequently independent of experience (the assertion of an empirical origin would be a .ovt oi generatio 2l'^oca) There remains, therefore, only the second al- ternative (as It were a system of the Ipigenesis of pure reason) : that the categories, on the part of the understand- ing, namely, possess the grounds of the possibility of all our experience. "^ A Brief Idea of this Deduction. It is the exposition of the pure notions of the understand- ing (and with them of all a />nm theoretical objective cog- nition) asprmciples of the possibility of experience,-of these again, as determination of sense-'appearances in space and time ^.^,m%,_of these, lastly, from the principle of the onon^al synthetic unity of apperception as form of the understanding lu a connecting reference to space and time, and to them, for their parts, as original forms of sense. y there ut one ieots of rience. which •e per- e pure ;re are agree- ler ex- expe- le cat- '^ no- I (the eratio nd al- pure itand- II our tand- iCOg- ,-of ipace le of fthe ime, ml 48 Book II. — The Analytic of Judgments. Introduction. — Of Transcendental Judgment Generally. If understanding be considered the faculty of rules, jud ment will be the faculty that subsumes under rules, the faculty that distinguishes whether something stand {casus daicB legis) iiider a given rule or not. General logic neither has, nor can have, any prescripts for judgment. For, ab- stracting from all matter of cognition, there can remain to it no business but the setting out analytically of the mere form of cognition in terms, propositions, and syllogisms, and the production, consequently, of rules in the general use of the understanding that are simply formal. But, though general logic has no prescripts for judgment, transcendental logic is quite otherwise. Nay, it would seem the precise business of the latter just, through niles, to guide and safe-guard judgment in \t: "ntromiasions with the pure understanding. Now this is the peculiarity of the transcendental phil- osophy, that, besides the rule (or rather the universal con- dition to rules) which the category represents, said philos- ophy can at the same time a /?Wori notify the case on which the rule is to be applied. The reason of this advantage over all the other theoretical sciences (mathematics alone except- ed) lies in this, that the notions on which transcendental philosophy is engaged are such as to connect themselves a priori with objects. It is not a posteriori^ then, that such notions can have their objective applicability proved ; for they possess a dignity beyond that standard. This transcendental doctrine of judgment, now, will com- prise two chapters : the first treating of the sense-conditions under which the categories can be alone applied (of the schematism, therefore, of pure understanding) ; and the second of the synthetic propositions (judgments) which a priori result from the categories under these conditions and underlie all other a priori cognitions ; that is, of the ground- propositions of the pure understanding. 44 C.urT.R l._T„. Sc„EM*™„ OP THE C*t™oh,.s possible! for nobody «ill Z tLuZ f "'. "^ '™'« gory aXn lirJle wr^™'""",'; ""■' '''^'^'"^' "'^ O"*"" of the one :.i^.t .re' %Z':^-'"f''"' '''^•'0'"'^«'>n * "1 ii8 luiity, so far homogeneous • Hkp tl,o i«f* pI.cat,on of category to ingredients of sense, ti* will" tion of tbe'ctrirs "'^''^'^^ '"^ ™^™"p- tion'-'bulTV' "'".?" ;'" "'^''""'y " P^'J"-' of i-a-ina. tion but, as tbe synthesis of the latter thon has not in"' any single perception, but only the nlifv^f , ^"^ ces8 in determin,.tiou of scn!e the !r ^ fa general pro- founded with the^ Jo 2af If W h' ""'i" *" "''"■ the one after the:Ier Z^^ ' ^J^l'7" P""" ture or representation (figu're h„a-eW 1 T */"■ ■Rnf I'fT*!' 1 • v"&"i«j image) or the number five But .f I th.nk just a number, any number at all, let it te 46 five or lot it bo a hnndrcd, tlion tliis tliinking ig rntlior tl i'onccj.tion of a method towardrt tho iMcturo of le Hotno Muin or a certain notion that tliis picture itself, which pic^tu re und in this latter case, it would hardly ho poBHihl'o to realize and compare with the notion. Thi» id(»a now of a ^roporal pro- cess of imagination for providing a notion with its corres- pondent picture or image, I call the schema to this notion. In effect there underlie our pure sense-notions not pic- tures of tho objects, but schotnata. There (tan never be an adequate picture for tho notion of a triangle in general. For it would never attain to that gmerality which enables the notion to hold good of any triangle, right-angled, ob- lique-angled, etc., but would bo limited always to a part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere but in thought, and signifies a rule of tho syn- thesis of imagination in regard of certain pure figures in space. The schema of a category, again, is sometldng that cannot be brought into any image, but is only the pure syn- thesis, in agreement with a rule of unity through notions generally (which notions are expressed in the categories), and is a transcendental product of imagination, which con- cerns tho determination of inner sense generally m-cording to conditions of its form (time) in regard of all cognitions, 80 far as these, under the unity of apperception, are sup- posed a priori to cohere into one notion. . e pure picture of all magnitudes {quantorum) in outer sense is space ; but that of all objects of sense generally, time. The pure schema of magnitude {quantitatia), as no- tion of the understanding, again, \% number; and number is a cognition which represents the successive addition of homogeneous unit to homogeneous unit. Number, then, is nothing else than unity of synthesis in a complex of homo- geneous perception in general— by this, namely, that I gen- erate time itself in the apprehension of the perception. lieality in the category is what corresponds to sensation ; any sensation, as such : that, then, the notion of which in itself indicates a beingness or fact of some kind or other in 46 tinio. Nro, a rolation or connexion ho- twocn roalitv and negation, or a transition, ratlior, from the one to the other, whidi transition oxhihits every reality an H 3. Analogies of Experience. 4. Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General. 1. Axioms of Pure Perception. The principle of these is : All perceptions are extensive magnitudes. Proof, All objects involve in form a perception in space and time ; and this influence of space and time is presupposed as a priori universal cqndition that precedes and underlies Rll objects. These, therefore, cannot be otherwise appre- hended (taken up, that is, into empirical consciousness) than through synthesis of the complex of constitutive units, by which synthesis there are brought about perceptions of a determinate space or a determinate time. This synthesis, then, is a putting together of homogeneous elements, and results in a consciousness of the synthetic unity of just such complex. Now consciousness of any homogeneous complex m perception, so far as it is conceived necessary for render- ing possible the idea of an object, is the notion of magni- tude {quantwn). Consequently even tile perception of an object, as phenomenon in our sense, is only possible throuo>h the same synthetic unity of the given sensuously perceptive complex, by means of which the unity of homogeneous syn- thesis IS, in the notion of quantity, thought. That is, the phenomena of our sense are all quantities— all extensive magnitudes, indeed—because, as perceptions in space and time, they must come before us in or through precisely the same synthesis as is determinative of space and time them- selves. der- uve md 3ed lies re- lan by fa iis, nd ch ex Br- ni- Fin ve n- tie ve id le 49 It is on tliis successive synthesis of productive imagination in the generation of figures that the mathematic of exten- sion (geometry) founds. Its axioms express the a priori conditions of sense-perception ; and under these conditions only is a scliema possible of any pure notion of external perception : as, for example, between any two points only one straight line is possible, two straight lines cannot in- clude a space, etc. These are axioms which apply properly to magnitudes {quanta) as such. This tiMnscendental ground-proposition of the mathe- matics of sense greatly enlarges our a priori knowledge. For it, and it alone, renders pure mathematic applicable in its complete precision to objects of experience. And this latter fact without it, indeed, is so far from being of itself evident, that it has given rise to much controversy. Per- ceptions of sense are not things in themselves. Empirical perception is only possible through pure (space and time). What geometry says of the latter, therefore, is necessarily true of the former ; and such allegations in resistance as that objects of sense need not be submitted to the laws of construction in space (the infinite divisibility of lines and angles, for example), must sink of themselves. For object- ive truth were thereby denied to space, and along with it to all mathematics, so that it would be impossible for us any longer to know why and how far the latter were to be held applicable of the objects of sense. The synthesis of spaces and times it is, that, as synthesis of the essential form of all perception, is what renders possible at the same time em- pirical apprehension, and consequently all external expe- rience and all perception of any of its objects ; and what holds of mathematics in application to the former synthesis is neceessarily true also of this latter. 2. Anticipations of Sense. The principle of these is. In all perceptions of sense, the reale i\\At is matter of sensation has intencive magnitude— that is, degree. 50 Proof. Sense-perception is empirical consciousness, or such that it has at the same time sensation in it. Sense-affections, as objects cf sense-perception, are not pure (merely formal) per- ceptions, like space and time (which, for their parts, can, in themselves, not be perceived of sense). They contain, there- fore, over and above the element of pure perception, the material elements towards an object (that element or those elements whereby something is cognised as existent in space or time). These material elements are constituted by the reale of sensation, as mere subjective feeling of which there can only be the consciousness that the subject is so affected, and which is then referred to some object. Now, from em- pirical to pure consciousness there is a gradual transition possible, in the course of which the reale that is present in it at fii-st may, in the end, completely disappear, and there will remain at last a merely formal consciousness (now a priori) of the complex proper to space and time alone. Contrariwise, consequently, there is the possibility of a syn- thesis in the amount of a sensation, up from its beginnino-, as nothing in pure perception, until it reaches any conceiv- able magnitude of feeling in consciousness. Sensation, now, being in itself not an objective consciousness, and involving, as such, neither the perception of space nor of time, is in- capable of constituting an extensive magnitude. Still it is a magnitude, and a magnitude such that, in the apprehen- sion of it, empirical consciousness increases, from the nothing of it in a certain time, up to the given actual amount. This, then, is intensive magnitude ; and such magnitude, degree, that is, of influence on sense, must be correspondingly at- tributed to all perceptive objects so far as they involve sen- sation. that 18, as per- m,in hore- , the those ipace ^ the there cted, I ern- ition nt in :here ow a lone. syn- ceiv- now, nng, 3 in- it is ihen- hing rhis, ?ree, 1 at- seu- 61 3. Analogies of Experience. The principle of these is, That experience is only possible through consciousness of a necessary connexion in the per- ceptions (objects) of sense. Proof, KxptTience is empirical cognition, i.e., cognition that, thrcugh perceptions of sense, determines an object. Ex peri(ince, therefore, is synthesis of said perceptions, a syn- thesis that is not given by perception, but that rather gives to its implied sense-complex, the synthetic unity of a certain single act of consciousness. This synthetic unity constitutes what is essential to a perceptive recognition of objects, i.e. to experience. Experience, nov/, is a completed cognition and recognition of objects through perceptions of sense. It is on sense-perception becoming experi'^nr.p, therefore that there is effected a relation of the units of the complex in regard of their existence mutually. The complex is regard- ed now, that is, not as it merely presents itself at first hand in time, but as at last it is experienced ohjectively in time. But time, again, is not itself perceived ; the ultimate de- termination of existential objects in time, then, is no pro- duct of time itself, but must result from the synthesis in time. But such synthesis, so placed, can only take place through a priori notions of connexion. These notions, now, for their part, lastly, must, as such, or being a priori^ bring always necessity along with them. Experience, then, can only possibly result from a recognition of necessary con- nexion in our various perceptions. The three modi of time tccQ persistence, sequence or suc- cession, and simultaneity. Hence three laws o f all relations of objects in time will precede experience, and as conditions, indeed, of its very possibility. These laws will determine for every object its relative existential place in regard of unity (connexion) always or at any time (A being, B will I » ■ 09 These analogies have this peculiarity, that they do not have in regard the objects or the synthesis of their empirical perception as it is in space, but merely their existence, or rather their relation inntually in regard of their existence. But the existence of objects (not their mere per- ceptive form as due a priori to that of space) cannot be de- termined or cannot come to be known a priori ; and, though vire might in this way {a priori) be able to reason or infer in regard to some certain existence, we should be quite unable, nevertheless, literally to cognise or perceive that existence. We should be quite unable, that is, to anticipate that whereby, as an actual empirical object, said existence were distinguishable from others. A. First Analogy. Priiuary Proposition of the Permanence of Substance. In all mutation of the objects of sense, substance remains (is permanent), and the quantum of these objects is, in na- ture, neither increased nor lessened. Proof. All objects of sense are in time, in which, » substrate (permanent form of inner sense), simultaneity/ as well as sequence can alone be conceived or represented. Time, therefore, in which all vicissitude of objects is to be thought, remains and does not itself alter, because it is that in which succession or simultaneity can be conceived or represented only as determinations of itself. Time,*now, can, per se, not be perceived — strictly and properly perceived as though it were an object per ae. Consequently, in the elements of sense must lie that substrate which is to relieve (exhibit) time, and by reference to which, through the relation of objects to it, all alternation or all simultaneity can be recog- nised. But sulstance^ now, is the substrate of all that, as real, constitutes the existence of things, and in such manner that whatever takes t)lace in existence- or comes to exist not 'ical J, or noe. per- de- ind, n or uite that )ate ince ling na- ■ate as me, jht, iich ted se, igh J of bit) I of og- , as ner o t] 11 a n 8( 81 C< Hi 53 can only be thought as a determination of it That per- manent element, consequently, in relation to which all time- relations of objects can alone be determined, is thes'ubstance in all the shows of sense; it is that reale of these which, as substrate of all alteration, ever remains the sa ne. Inas- much, therefore, as substance enters not into the alteration of existence, neither can the quantum of it in nature be either lessened or increased. Our apprehension of any sensible complex is always suc- cessive, and, consequently, always in alteration. We can never determine in this way alone, then, whether this com- plex (that is, the units in it), as object of experience, exhibits a case of co-existence or of sequence. For that there must be presupposed to lie under the all of things, something that always is, something permanent and persistent, in regard of which all alteration and all simultaneity are but so many modes (time-modes) in which it itself —this that is always permanent and persistent— exists. Only in this permanent element, therefore, are time-relations possible (for simul- taneity and succession constitute all the relations' in time); i.e., this permanent element is the substratum of the em- pirical perception of time itself, and only by reference to it is any determination as in time at all possible. By reason of a permanent element alone does existence, necessarily in different and only successive parts of time, acquire, never- theless, a magnitude, which we name duration. For in the mere succession existence is always only going and coming, and cannot be said to possess even the smallest magnitude. Without this permanent element, therefore, there is not rtny relation of time. Now time cannot in itself be perceived. This permanent element, consequently, is, for the object'i of sense, the substrate of all their determinations in time. This substrate, further, therefore, is the condition of the possi- bility of all synthetic unity in our perceptions, i.e., in ex- perience ; and, by reference to this permanent element, all co-existence or alteration in time can be regarded as mere modus of the existence of that which reiuaius and perBists. 54 The permanent element in all intimations to sense is thus the object itself, i.e., substance (phsenomenon); while all that alters or can alter holds only of the mode in which this sub- stance or these substances exist, only, consequently, of their mere determinations. Permanency, then, is a necessary condition under which alone atfectione of sense are determinable as things or ob- jects in a possible e: perience. B. Second Analogy, 1 Primary Proposition of Time-Sequence on the Law of Causality. All changes follow from the law of the connexion of cause and eflFect. ' Proof. I perceive that perceptions of sense follow one another, i.e.y that there is a state of things at one time, the opposite of which preceded. I connect, properly, therefore, two per- ceptions in time. Connexion, now, is no deed of sense or the perception (general) of sense, but is the product of a synthetic act of imagination in that it determines inner- sense in regard of the time-relation. But imagination can connect said two states in two ways, either as that this shall precede that, or that this ; for time oannot itself be per- ceived, or so, therefore, that, in its reference, as it were empirically, what precedes and what follows may, in the object, be determined. I am thus only conscious that my imagination puts the one first and the other second, not that in the object the one precedes and the other follows. In other words, the mere perception of sense leaves the objective re- lation of the consecutive affections of sense undetermined. In order, now, that this relation should be perceived as de- termined, the relation between the two states must be so LxAvu^uv trxKOiv xu jjtT^\^uooai 11 Y ucb\7iiiiiiics Tviixv^ii Di^aic cixaii uc; m \^ til el is fo m (o til qi hi ol pc ev of he fr( an th ce of ap set th foi In pr th Tl th( »g thi pr 55 necessarily set first, and which second ; and not reverse-wise. WJiat notion, however, brings with it a necessity of syn- thetic unity can only be a category, and a category is no element of the perception of sense as such. That here, now, is tlie notion of the relation of cause and eflfect, in which the former determines the latter in time as its consequent, and not as something that in imagination merely might precede (or even, indeed, not at all be). Only by this, therefore, tliat we subject the sequence of perceptions (and conse- quently all change) to the law of causality, is experience itself (empirical recognition of these perceptions) possible. These perceptions are themselves, then, only possible as objects of experience by virtue of this very law. Said apprehension of an event, then, is an empirical perception such that it ensues on another. Inasmuch, how- ever, as this, so far, is but a succession, or, with all synthesis of apprehension, only so situated as the complex of a house is, there is no distinction so far of the one thing from the other. But I perceive also that if, in the case of an event, I call the first state empirically perceived A, and the subsequent one B, B can in the apprehension only follow A, while, for its part, A cannot follow, but only precede B. I see, for example, a ship driving down stream. My per- ception of its position down stream follows my perception of its position up stream ; and it is impossible that, in the apprehension of these appearances, the ship should be first seen down stream, and afterwards again up. The order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is here, there- fore, fixed, and ♦^o this order these perceptions are bound. In the example of the house, my perceptions in the ap- prehension of it could begin with the top and end with the bottom, or, equally well also, begin here and end there. They might, for that matter, quite as well also, apprehend the complex of the empirical object from right to left, or, again, from left to right. In the series of these perceptions, then, there was no fixed order— no order which necessarily prescribed where, in the apprehension, I should make niv - — - ^ . ^ 66 beginning, in order to convert its complex into the due em- pirical Bynthesis. Such necessity of rule, however, is always present in any case of an event, and the order of the con- secutive perceptions (in the apprehension of the sensible facts) is thereby rendef^d necessary. When we experience, then, something that happens, we always presuppose something to precede from which it follows according to a rule. For without this I should bo unable to say of the object that it follows, inasmuch as the mere succession in my apprehension, if undetermined in connexion with something that precedes, through a rule, is no warrant for a ''onsecution in the object. Consequently, therefore, it is always by reason of a rule that I make my subjective synthesis (as in mere apprehension) objective; and wholly nnder this presupposition alone is there even the possibility of the experience of something that happens. It is important, tl^en, to demonstrate that, never even in experience, do we attribute (in the case of an event, where something comes to be which previously was not) the sequence to the object, and accordingly distinguish it from the subjective sequence of our mere apprehension, unless there be presupposed an underlying rule which com- pels us to observe this order in our perceptions rather than another. J^ay, it is properly that compulsion (necessity) which alone makes possible the perception of a succession in the object. For all experience and its very possibility, understanding is necessary, and its first respective action is, not to make the perception of an object clear, but siipply possible. It efiects this in this way, that it assigns the time-order to things and their existence, even in assigning to each of them, as a consequent, an a priori determinate place in time (it mwQt follow) in regard of what (relatively) precedes. That something happens, therefore, is a perception be- longing to a possible experience, which experience becomes actual when what happens is regarded as determinately placed in time, and, consequently, as an object which can ! em- ways con- si ble (, we ;h it d l)G the d in le, is itly, my ;ive; 3ven ens. jven ent, not) iiish ion, om- han nty) 3ion ling ake It • to em, (it be- lies ely can always be found in the context of perceptions as in accord- ance with a rule. This rnle, now, determinative of some- thinj; conBeqiientially in time, is, that, in what precedes the condition 18 to be found, by virtue of which the effect always {?.e necessarily) follows. And so the proposition of a sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience, namely ot the objective recognition of events as regards their rela- tion, consequentially, in the series of time. C. Third Analogy. Primary Proposition of Simultaneity in accordance with the Law of Reciprocity or Community. All substances, so far as they may simultaneously be per- ceived in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity. Proof. Things are simultaneous when, in empirical fact, the per- ception of the one can follow on the perception of the other, and vice versa. Simultaneity, now, is the existence of the whole of a complex at one and the same time. But it is not possible to perceive time itself, in order to infer from the fact of things being in the same time, that the percep- tions of these may reciprocally follow one another. There is consequently required a notion of understanding for the reciprocal series of the determinations of things existent there, apart from each other, and yet simultaneously, in order to say that the reciprocal succession of the perceptions >8 one that takes place in the object, and thereby demon- strate the simultaneity as objective. But now that relation ot substances, in which the one is the subject of determina- tions that have their ground in the other, is the relation of influence— R relation that, where this determines that and that this, is known as the relation of community or recip- rocity. The simultaneity of substances in space, therefore, is not capable of being otherwise cognised in experience than iinHpi* rkr^taiii-kT-k^nU;^.^ ,.x» xi. _;_ _•_ i . « — ^ .^^.jt'i'vo.ii^/M ut luvir reciprocal mnueuce Uie 68 one on the other, and, consequently, just such reciprocal in- fluence is the condition of the possibility of things them- selves as objects of experience. Let us suppose now, that, in a complex of substances as units of sense, each were absolutely isolated, and not one among them the Hubject of action and reaction in regard of the others, then I say vhat the sinniltaneity of these would be no object of a possible perception, and that the existence of the one could not by any path of empirical synthesis con- duct to the existence of the other. For, when it is con- sidered that they would, in effect, be subjects of a separa- tion absolute, it will be understood also that perception, still conceived capable of passing from the one to the other in time, would successively, indeed, determine the existence of each, but be wholly unable to distinguish whether the one were objectively after the other or objectively along with it. There must, therefore, be something besides mere exist- ence that enables A to determine for B its place in time> and as well, at the same time, B so to determine A ; for only under such a condition is it possible to conceive of sub- stances as empirically coexistent. Now, only that deter- mines for something else its place in time which for this latter is cause, or cause of its modes. Every substance, therefore, must (as it is a consequent only on account of what is determined in it) be the subject at once of the caus- ality of certain determinations in the other, and of the effects of that other's causality in determination of its own self, i.e.y they must (directly or indirectly) stand in dynamical unity, if ever the fact of their co-existence is to be possibly per- ceived in experience. Now, in regard of the objects of ex- perience, every condition is necessary without which ex- perience of these objects themselves would be impossible. It is necessary, then, for all substances in perception, so far as they are simultaneous, to stand, one with the other, in a thoroughgoing community of reciprocity. These, then, are the three anftloirien of exnerienfte. Thev 1 in- em- ) as one iof »uld ince jon- MU' ara- itill • in e of one hit. :ht' me> for mb- ster- this nee, t of aus- ects • per- ex- ex- ble. far n a hftv — J c 69 are nothing but principles determinative in regard to the existence of objects in time, of which they follow the three modi: the relation to time itself as a magnitude (the mag- nitude of existence, i.e., duration) ; the relation in time as .1 consecution ; and lastly, the relation of time as a sum of all existence at once. This unity of time-determination is altogether dynamical, i.e., time is not regarded as so.nething in which experience directly determines for each existence Its own place, which is impossible, inasmuch as absolute time 18 not an object of the perception of sense, whereby things might, as it were, be kept together ; but the rule of understanding, by which alone it is possible for the exist- ence of objects to get synthetic unity in accordance with the relations of time, determines for each of these olyects Its relative place in time, and that, too, a^rtWt and as valid always. By Nature (in an empirical sense) we understand tho context of existent objects as submitted to necessary rules or laws. There are, therefore, certain law3, a priori, which alone render a nature possible. Empirical laws can only be found (or exist) by means of experience, and that, too, as submitted to said primary laws which alone render it possible. Our analogies, therefore, exhibit, properly, the unity of nature in the connexion of all things under certain exponents, which exponents express nothing else than the re- lation of time (so far as it is sum of all existence) to the unity of appei-ception, which unity can exist only in a synthesis on rules. They collectively eay, then. All things are, and must be, in a one nature, for without such a priori unity there would be no unity of experience, and consequently no de- termination of objects in experience. 4. The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General. 1. That \Q possible^ which coincides with the/r)rma^ con- ditions of experience (in pure perception and categories). 2. That is actual, which is in the context of the ma,teriure understanding), is not self- contradictory, because we cannot maintain that sensibility is the only form of perception. That notion is also neces- sary, to prevent sensuous perception from extending to things by themselves But, after all, we cannot un- derstand the possibility of such noumena, and whatever lies beyond the sphere of phenomena is (to us) empty ; that is> we have an understanding which problematically extends beyond that sphere, but no perception, nay not even the conception of a possible perception, by which, outside the field of eensibility, objects could be given to us, and our in ei 8t; ti( he in undorstanding could extend beyond that sonflihility in its w«ertory u«e. The notion of a nouinenor. is tlieretbro meroly hmitative, and intended U> koop the claims of sen Hil.dity M'ithin proper hounds, therefore of negative use only Hut It IS not a mere arbitrary fiction, hut closely connected' with the Innitation of sensihility, though incapable of adding anything positive to the sphere of the senses. A real divisicn of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of thewoHd into a sensible and intelligible world is therefore quite inadmissable, although notions may very well be divided into sensuous and intellectual. No objects can be assigned for intellectual notions, nor can they be represented as objectively valid With all this the notion of a noumcnon, if taken as problematical oidy re- mains not only admissable, but, as a notion to limit' the sphere of sensibility, indispensable Our understand- ing thus acquires a kind of negative extension, that is it does not become itsek' limited by sensibility, but, on the contrary, limits it, by calling things by themselves (not con- sidered as phenomena) noumena. In doing this, it imme- diately proceeds to prescribe limits to itself, by admitting that it cannot kuow these noumena by means of the cate- gories, but can only think of them under the name of some- thing unknown. I,' Mt Tkansckndkntal Dialkctic. Introduction. 1. Of Transcendental Appearance (illusion). It is not at present our business to treat of empirical, for instance, optical appearance or illusion, which occurs in the empirical use of the otherwise correct rules of the under- standing, and by which, owing to the influence of imagina- tion, the faculty of judgment is misled. We have to deal here with nothing but the transcendental illusion, which mvolves principles never even intended to be aDolied to 66 experience, which might give U8 a test of their correctness, — an illusion which, in spite of all the warnings of criticism, tempts us far beyond the empirical use of the categories, and delud'^3 us with the mere dream of an extension of the pure understanding. All principles the application of which is entirely confined u'ithin the limits of possible experience, we shall call immanent; those, on the contrary, which tend to transgress those limits, transcendent. I do not mean by this the transcendental use or abuse of the categories, which is a mere fault of the faculty of the judgment, not being rs yet sufficiently subdued by criticism nor sufficiently atten- tive to the limits of the sphere within which alone the pure understanding has full play, but real principles which call upon us to break down all those barriers, and to claim a perfectly new territory, which nowhere recognises any de- marcation at all. Hence transcendental and transcendent do not mean the sjjime thing. The principles of the pure understanding, which we explained. before, are meant to be only of empirical, and not of transcendental application, that is, they cannot transcend the limits of experience. A principle, on the contrary, which removes these landmarks, nay. insists on our transcending them, is called transcendent. Logical illusion, which consists in a mere imitation of the forms of reason (the illusion of sophistic syllogisms), arises entirely from want of attention to logical rules. It disap- pears at once, when our attention is roused. Transcen- dental illusion, on the contrary, does not disappear, although it has been shown up, and its worthlessness rendered clear by means of transcendental criticism, as, for instance, the illusion inherent in the proposition that the world must have a beginning in time. The cause of this is, that there exists in our reason (considered subjectively as a faculty of human knowledge) principles and maxims of its use, which have the appearance of objective principles, and lead us to mis- take the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our notions in favour of the understanding for an objoctive ne- cessity in the determination of things by Viiemselves. 67 Transcendental Dialectic must, therefore, be content to lay bare the illusion of transcendental judgments and guard- ing against its deceptions— but it will never succeed in re- moving the transcendental illusion (like the logical) and putting an end to it altogether Tfiere exists, there- fore, a natural and inevitable Dialectic of pure reason, that is inherent in, and inseparable from human reason' and which, even after its illusion has been exposed, will never cease to fascinate our reason, and to precipitate it into mo- mentary errors, such as require to be removed again and again. 2. Pure Roason as the seat of Transcendental Illusion. Reason in general. In the first part of our transcendental logic we defined the understanding as thQ faculty of rules, and we now dis- tinguish reason from it, by calling it the faculty of prin- ciples. It is impossible for the understanding to supply us with synthetical knowledge from notions, and it is really that kind of knowledge which I call principles absolutely ; while all general propositions may be called principles relatively. Knowledge from principles (by itself) is something totally diflferent from mere knov ledge of the understanding, which, in the form of a principle, may no doubt precede other knowledge, but which by itself (in so far as it is synthetical) is not based on mere thought, nor contains anything gen- eralj according to notions. If the understanding is a faculty for producing unity among phenomena, according to rules, reason is the^'aculty for producing unity among the rules of the understanding, according to principles. Reason therefore never looks di- rectly to experience, or to any object, but to the understand- ing, in order to impart a priori through notions to its man- ifold kinds of knowledge a unity that may be called the unity of reason, and is very different from the unity which can be produced by the understanding. I ' 68 The Purk Use ok RRAaow. i Tlio question is, whether reason in itself, that is pure reason, contains s^vntlietical principles and rules a priori, and wliat those principles are ? It is easy to see that it is the peculiar principle of reason (in its logical use) to find for every conditioned knowledge of the understanding the unconditioned, whereby the unity of that knowledge may be completed. This logical maxim, however, cannot become a principle of pure reason, unless we admit that, whenever the con- dition is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another, a series, whi(;h consequently is uncondition- ed, is likewise given (that is, is contained in the object and its connection). Such a princplo of pure reascm, however, is evidently synthetical ; for analytically the conditioned refers no doubt to some condition, but not to the unconditioned. From this principle several other synthetical propositions also must arise of M'hich of which the pure understanding knows nothing; because it has to deal with objects «»f a possible exi>erience only, the knowledge and syntiiosis of which are always conditioned. The unconditioned, if it is really to be admitted, has to be especially considered with regard to all the determinations M-hich distinguish it from whatever is conditioned, and wiP thus supply material for many a syn- thetical proposition a priori. The principles resulting from this higlu>8t principle of pure reason will however be transcendent, witli regard to all plienomena ; that is to say, it will be impossible ever to make any adequate empirical use of such a principle. It will thus be completely different from all principles of the understanding, the use of which is entirely immanent and directed to the possibility of experience only. The task that is now before us in the transcendental Dialectic which has to be developed from sources deeply hidden in the hu- man reason, is this : to discover the correctness or otherwise 69 of tho principle that the boHc-h of oonditiorm (in tho Byntl.e- BI8 of phononiona, or of objective thought in general) ex- cndB to the uncon^iitioned, and what con«e<,ueneeH r su t therefrom w.th regani to tho en.pirieai nse ofthe under- Htand.ng:_whethcr, by «omo u.i«conception, a ,nere ten- 'lon.y of rea»on ban r.ot been rnintaken for a tranneendental l>n nc.ple of pure roanon, poHtubUing, without sufficient ro- ttoction, abKoluto co.npIotonoHH in the «erie« of conditiouB in the objects theniHolves, and what kind of niiHeoncoptionn »'yl ilIuHioUB may in tiiat case have crept into thesylhL-HmB of reanon, tho major proposition of which has boon token over rom puro reason, (boir.g j-erhaps npetUio rather than ^poMatnv.) and which ascend from oxporionce to its con- d.t.ons Wo shall divide it into two parts, of which tho hrst will treat of tho tran.cen tions) If they contain tho unconditioned, they refer to Hometh.ng to which all experience may belong, but which itsel can never become an object of experience :-son.ething to which reason in its cot.clusions from experien(.e leads up and by winch it estimates and measures the degree of its own empirical use, but which never forms part of empirical synthesis. ^ First Skction.— Ideas in Genkral. From the way in which Plato uses the term idea, it is easy to see that he meant by it something which not only was never borrowed from the senses, but which even far transcends the notions of the understanding, with which Aristotle occupied himself, there beinL' nothinrr in P.peri- i 70 ence corresponding to them. According to his opinion they flowed out from the highest reason, and were impart- ed thence to human reason, which however exists no longer in its original state, but has to recall, with difficulty, the old but now very obscure ideas, which it does by means of reminiscence, commonly called philosophy. Second Section. — Transcendental Ideas. Reason is only concerned with the use of the understand- ing, not so far as it contains the basis of possible experience (for the absolute totality of conditions is not a notion that can be used in experience, because no experience is uncon- ditioned), but in order to impart to it a direction towards a certain unity of which the understanding knows nothing, and which is meant to comprehend all acts of the under- standing, with regard to any object, into an absolute whole. On this account the objective use of the pure notions of reason must always be transcendent : while that of the pure notions of the understanding must always be immanent^ being by its very nature restricted to possible experience. By idea I understand the necessary notion of reason, to which the senses can supply no corresponding object. The notions of reason, therefore, are transcendental ideas. They are notions of pure reason, so far as it regards all empirical knowledge as determined by an absolute totality of con- ditions. They are not mere fancies, but supplied to us by the very nature of reason, and referring.by necessity to the whole use of the understanding. They are, lastly, tran- scendent, as overstepping tlie limits of all experience which can never supply an object adequate to the transcendental idea. If we speak of an idea, we say a great deal with re- spect to the object (an object of the pure understanding) but very little with respect to the subject, that is, with re- spect to its reality under empirical conditions, because aji idea, being the notion of a maximum, can never be ad- nion )art- iger the 8 of ind- 3nce that Bon- irds der- ole. 3 of )iire entf e. ,to rhe hey ical !on- ; by tlie ran- lich ntal re- ng) re- al) ad- 71 equately given in concreto. In the practical use of tlie un- derstanding, on the contrary, where wo are only concerned with practice, according to rules, the idea of practical reason can always be realised in concreto, although partially only ; nay, it is the indispensable condition of all practical ut»e of reason. The practical idea is therefore in this case truly fruitful, and, with regard to practical conduct, indispensable and necessary. In it pure reason becomes a cause and active power, capable of realising what is contained in its notion. Although we must say that all transcendental notions of reason are ideas only, they are not therefore to be consider- ed as superfluous and useless. For although wo cannot by them determine any object, they may nevertheless, even un- observed, supply the understanding with a canon or rule of its extended and consistent use, by which, though no ob- ject can be better known than it is according to its notions yet the understanding may be better guided onwards in its knowledge, not to mention that they may possibly render practicable a transition from physical to practical notions, and thus impart to moral ideas a certain strength and con- nection with the speculative knowledge of reason. Thikd SECTioN.—SyBTEM OF Tkansoendental Ideas. All transcendental ideas can be arranged in three classes : XhQ first containing the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject ; the second the absolute unity of the series of conditions oi phenomena ; the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general. The thinking subject is the object-matter oi psychology the system of all phenomena (the world) the object-matter of cosmology, and the being which contains the highest con- dition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the Being of all Beings), the object-matter of theology. Thus it is pure reason which supplies the idea of a transcendental 72 science of the sonl {paychologia rationalts), of a transcen- dental science of the world {cosmologic rationalis), and, lastly, of a transcendental science of God {theologia iran- scevdentalis). We can easily perceive that pure reason has no other aim but the absolute totality of synthesis on the side of con- ditions (whether of inherence, dependence or concurrence), and th'^tit has nothing to do with the absolute completeness on the part of the conditioned. It is the former only which is required for presupposing the whole series of conditions, and thus presenting it a priori to the understanding. Finally, we can perceive, that there is among the tran- scendental ideas themselves a certain connection and unity by which pure reason brings all its knowledge into one sys- tem. There is in the progression from our knowledge of ourselves (the soul) to a knowledge of the world, and through it to a knowledge of the Supreme Being, something so nat- ural that it looks like the logical progression of reason from premisses to a conclusion. Book II. — The Dialectical conclusions of Puse Reason. One might say that the object of a purely transcendental idea is something of which we have no notion, although the idea is produced with necessity according to the original laws of reason It would be bettor, however, and less liable to misunderstandings, to say that we can have no knowledge of an object corresponding to an idea, but a problematic notion only. The transcendental (subjective) reality at least of pure notions of reason, depends on our being led to such ideas by a necessary syllogism of reason. Of these dialectical syllogisms of reason there are three classes only, that is as many as the ideas to which these syllogisms lead. In the syllogism of the Jirst class, I con- 78 [ihide m the transcendental notion of the subieef ,rlof contar.unoihu^ man^.ia^ the absolute un t.'f ^ u^ ject Itself, of which however I have no nn I r^? Jale^tical s.llogi.n I shall call the ^ZZ.Z ,1^1 The Becond class of the so-called sophistical svllo^ism« aims at the transcendental notion of an absolute l^XZ the series of conditions to any given phenomenon ; and ? conclude from the fact that my notion of thp nn« J-** \ ..nthetiea. n„Hy of the .H J. 2^:^^^:^^ on one side, the correctneBS of the opposite unitv „f »K- k nevertheless I have no notion eithe^ The I^of rllt m th,B d»«s of dialectical syllogisms, I shall cauVhe a^" nomy of pure reason. ™* L«stly, according to the third class of sophistical svllo g.sms I conclude from the totality of conditionT , nder which objects in general, so far as they can be -riven 1?™! must be thought, the absolute synthetLl unu/o7ai „on^ d.fons of the possibility of things in general • thri. T say I conclude from things which I do not k" Vt^o Lg to he,r mere transcendcRtal notion, a Being of all bein" winch I know still less through a transcendelit not on afd of the unconditioned necessity of which I can form n^ no Chacter L-The Pabalooism of Pdbe Reasok. The logical Paralogism consists in the formal .fanltiness of a conclusion, without any reference to its contents. S 1 eTh iT '""■*'""'"" *™" '■™" " t™-cendentL cause whch drives us to a formally false conclusion. Such Xe Tr* '^°''' '^'P^"'*' ""'^' "'«'y O" 'he ™ry ,W?I , r*","'"""' *"^ P'"""*"'*' «» "'»«»'' which is inevitable, though not insoluble. 74 There is a pretended science founded on the single propo- sition of I think, and the soundness or unsoundness of which may well be examined in this place, according to the prin- ciples of transcendental philosophy. I think is the only text of rational psychology, out of which it must evolve all its wisdom. It is easily seen that this thought, if it is to be applied to an object (my self), cannot contain any but transcendental predicates, because the smallest empirical predicate would spoil the rational purity of the science, and its independence of all experience. "We shall therefore follow the thread of the categories, with this difference, however, that as here the first tiling which is given is a thing, the I, a thinking being, we must begin with the category of substance, by which a thing in itself is represented, and then proceed backwards, though without changing the respective order of the categories, as given before in our itable. The topic of the rational science of the soul, from which has to be derived whatever else that science may contain, is therefore the following. I. The Soul is »ub»tance. II. HI. As regards its qu&Iity, sivijple. As regards the different ' times in which it exists, numerically identical, that ^ is unity (not plurality). IV. It is in relation to possible objects in space. To these notions refer four paralogisms of a transcenden- tal psychology, which is falsely supposed to be a science of pure reason, concerning the nature of our thinking being. "We can, however, use as the foundation of such a science nothing but the single, and in itself perfectly empty, repre- sentation of the /, of which we cannot even say that it is a opo- hich )rin- it of that elf), anse onal nee. ries, ling nust r in wgh iy as jnee that stent cistSr that )' den- le of ipi^. jnce pre- is a B 1 \ "V, ^^^^li ^^Hi 75 notion, but merely a consciousness that accompanies all no- tions. By this /, or he, or it, that is the thing which thinks nothing IS represented beyond a transcendental subject of thoughts = 0., which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from them we can never have the slightest notion, so that we are really turnmg round it in a perpetual circle, having already to use Its representation, before we can form any iudament about It. And this inconvenience is really inevitable be- cause consciousness in itself is not so much a representation distinguishing a particular object, but really a form of re- presentatic n in general, in so far as it is to be called know- ledge, of w iich alone I can say that I think something by it As the proposition I think (taken problematically) con- tains the form of every possible judgment of the understand- ing, and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it must be clear that the conclusions to be drawn from it can only contain a transcendental use of the understanding, which declines all admixture of experience, and of the achieve- ments of which, after what has been said before, we cannot form any very favourable anticipations. We shall there- lore follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predica- ments of pure psychology. 1. In all judgments I am always the determining mhject only of the relation which constitutes the judgment That I, who think, can be considered in thinking as auljectonU and as something not simply inherent in the thinking as predicate, is an apodictical and even identical proposition • but It does not mean that, as an object, I am a self-depend- ant being or a substance. 2. That the Ego of apperception, and therefore the Ego in every act of thought, is a si?igular which cannot be dissolved into a plurality of subjects, and that it therefore signifies a logically simple subject, follows from the very notion of thinking and is consequently an analytical proposition, l.ut this does not mean that a thinking Ego is a simple sub- stance^ which w«iild inHppd h« " o„„4.i._i.:--i , ..• — u — viccu 1.^ o Djutwciicai proposition. I *! if m- 7fl The notion of substance always relates to perceptions which, with me, cannot be other but sensuous, and which therefore lie completely outside the field of the understanding and its thinking, which alone is intended here, when we say that the Ego, in thinking, is simple. 3. The proposition of the identity of myself amidst the manifold of which I am conscious, likewise follows from the notions themselves, and is therefore analytical ; but the iden- tity of the subject of which, in all its representations, I may become conscious, does not refer to the perception by which it is given as an object, and cmnot therefore signify the identity of the person, by which is understood the con- sciousness of the identity of one's own substance, as a think- ing being, in all the changes of circumstances. In order to prove this, the mere analysis of the proposition, I think, would avail nothing; but different synthetical judgments would be required, which are based on the given perception. 4. To say that I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from other things outside me (one of them being my body) is likewise an analytical proposition ; for other things are things which I conceive as different from myself. But, whether such a consciousness of myself is even possible without things outside me, whereby represen- tations are given to me, and whether I could e/^ist merely as a thinking being (without being a man), I do not know at all by that proposition. Nothing therefore is gained by thg analysis of the con- sciousness of myself, in thouiTjht in general, towards the knowledge of myself as an object. The- logical analysis of thinking in general is simply mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object. It would be a great, nay, even the only objection to the whole of our critique, if there were a possibility of proving a priori that all thinking beings are by themselves simple substances, that as such (as a consequence of the same ar- gument) personality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as distinct from all matter. lich, fore d its that the^ the ien- tnay iiich the con- ink- >r to ink, snts ioti. ,t of lein for rom I 18 3en- rely low jon- the 8 of ical the ing iple ar- hey ter. 77 For we aliould thus have made a step beyond the world of scnao and entered into the flold of noumena, and after tha", no one could dare to question our right of advancing fur- ther, of settling in it, and, as oaeii of us is favoured by luck, taking possession of it. Hence synthetical propositions a priori would be not only admissible, as we maintained, in reference to objects of possible experience, and then only as principles of the possibility of that experience, but could be extended to things in general and to things by themselves, H result which would put an end to the whole of our critique' and bid us to leave everything as we found it. In this process of rational psychology, there lurks a par- alogism, which may be represented by the following syllo- gism. That which cannot be conceived otherwise than as a sub- ject, does not exist otherwise than as a subject, and is there- fore a substance. A thinking being, considered as such, cannot be conceived otherwise than as a subject. Therefore it exists also as such only, that is, as a sub- stance. In the major they speak of a being that can be conceived in every respect, and therefore also as it may be given in perception. In the minor, however, they speak of it only so far as it considers itself as a subject, with respect to the thinking and the unity of consciousness onlj', but not at the sa/ne time in respect to the perception whereby it is given as an object of thinking. The conclusion, therefore, has been drawn by a sophism, that is, by sophisma figure dic- tion is. If now we take the above propositions in synthetical con- nection, as indeed they must be taken in a system of rational psychology, as valid for all thinking beings, and proceed from the category of relation, with the proposition, ai: hink- ing beings, as such, are substances, backwards through the series till the circle is completed, we arrive in the end at their existence, and this, according to that svsf«m th^v or.. i mi 78 not at all conscious of, independently of external things, but are supposed to be able to deternaine it even of themselves (with respect to that permanence which necessarily belongs to the character of substance). Hence it follows, that in this rationalistic system idealism is inevitable, at least problematic idealism, becau 3, if the existence of external things is not required at an for the determination of one's own existence in time, their existence is really a gratuitous assumption of which no proof can ever be given. If, on the contrary, we proceed analytically^ taking the proposition, I think, which involves existence (according to the category of modality) as given, and analyse it, in order to find out whether, and how, the Ego determines its exist- ence in space and time by it alone, the propositions of rational psychology would not st^rt from the notion of a thinking being, in general, but from a reality, and the in- ference would consist in determining from the manner in which that reality is thought, after everything that is em- piricrl in it has been removed, what belongs to a thinking being in general. This may be shown by the following Table. I. I think. II. as Subject. III. as simple Subject as in everj IV. identical Subjecfr, ^ state of my thought. As it has not been determined in the second proposition, whether I can exist and be conceived to exist as a subject only, and not also as a predicate of something else, the no- tion of subject is here taken as logical only, and it remains undetermined whether we are to understand by it a sub- stance or not. In the third proposition, however, the ab- solute unity of apperception, the simple I, being the repre- sentation to which all connection or separation (which con- \^ 79 stitutc thought) relate, aesumes its own importance, although nothing is determined as yet with regard to the nature of the subject, or its subsistence. The apperception is some- thing real, and it is only possible, if it is simple. In space, however, there is nothing real that is simple, for points (the only simple in space) are limits only, and not themselves something which, as a part, serves to constitute space. From this follows the impossibility of explaining the nature of my self, as merely a thinking subject, from the materialistic point of view. As, however, in the first proposition, my existence is taken for granted, for it is not said in it that every thinking being exists (this would predicate too much, namely, absolute necessity of them), but only, 1 exist, as thinking, the proposition itself is empirical, and contains only the determinability of my existence, in reference to my representations in time. But as for that purpose again I require, first of all, something permanent, such as is not given to me at all in internal perception, so far as I think myself, it is really impossible by that simple self-conscious- ness to determine the manner in which I exist, whether as a substance or as an accident. Thus, if materialism was inadequate to explain my existence, spiritualism is equally insufticient for that purpose, and the conclusion is, that, in no way whatsoever can we know anything of the nature of our soul, so lar as the possibility of its separate existence is concerned. There is, therefore, no rational psychology, as a doctrine, furnishing any addition to our self-knowledge, but only as a discipline, fixing unpassable limits to speculative reason in this field, partly to keep us from throwing ourselves into the arms of a soulless materialism, partly to warn us against losing ourselves in a vague, and, for this life, baseless spiritualism. We see from all this, that rational psychology owes its origin to a mere misunderstanding. The unity of conscious- ness, on which the categories are bounded, is mistaken for a perception of the subject as object, and the category of . ^ 80 substance applied to it. Bat that unity is only the unity in thought, by which alone no object is given, and to which therefore the category of substance, which always presup- poses a given /wrce/>^iV», cannot be applied, and therefore the subject cannot be known. The subject of the categories, therefore, cannot, 'by thinking them, receive a notion of it- self, as an object of the categories ; for in order to think the categories, it must presuppose its pure self-consciousness, the very thing that had to be explained. In like manner the subject, in which the representation of time has its original source, cannot determine by it its own existence in time ; and if the latter is impossible, the former, as a deter- mine. Jon of oneself (as of a thinking being in general) by means of the categories is equally so. The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our confounding an idea of reason (that of a pure intelli- gence) with the altogether indefinite notion of a thinking being in general. What we are doing is, that we conceive ourselves for the sake of a possible experience, taking no account, as yet, of any real experience, and thence conclude that we are able to become conscious of our existence in- dependently of experience and of its empirical conditions. We are, therefore, confounding ihe possible abstraction of our own empirically determined existence with the im- agined consciousness of a possible separate existence of our thinking self, and we bring ourselves to believe that we know the substantial within us as the transcendental sub- ject, while what we have in our thoughts is only the unity of consciousness, on which all determination, as the mei-e form of knowledge, is based. aity in which resiip- sreforo ^orieg, of it- tiktho isness, anner as its ice in deter- il)by from itelli- iking ceive g no ;;liide 5, in- ions. m of im- ' our ; we 8ub- nity nei-e 81 Chapter II.-The Antinomy of Pure Reason. The second class of tU dialectical arguments in anaWv with the hypothetical syllogisms, takes for its object the un- conditioned unity of the objective conditions in phenomenal appearance. ^ It should be remarked, however, that a transcendental paralogism caused a one-sided illusion only, with regard to our Idea of the subject of our thought. The case is totally different when we apply reason to the ohjeatwe synthesis of phenomena; tor here we are met by a new phenomenon in human reason, namely, a perfectly natural Antithetic, which is not produced by any artificial efforts, but into which reason falls by itself, and inevitably. I shall call all transcendental ideas, so far as they relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena, cos- mzcal notions, partly, because of the unconditioned totality on which the notion of the cosmical universe also rests which IS itselt an idea only), partly, because they refer to the synthesis of phenomena only, which is empirical, while the absolute totality in the synthesisof the conditions of all possible things must produce an ideal of pure reason, totally differen from the cosmical notion, although in a certain sense related to it. As therefore the paralogisms of pure reason formed the foundation for a dialectical psychology the antinomy of pure reason will place before oureyes the transcendental principles of a pretended pure (rational) cos- mology, not m order to show that it is valid and can be ac- cepted, but, as may be guessed from the very name of the antinomy of reason, in order to expose it as an idea sur- rounded by deceptive aad false appearances, and utterly irreconcjlable with phenomena. Section I.-Ststem of Oosmological Ideas. Before we are able to enumerate these ideas according to i 82 HI,: i a principle and with systematic precision, we must bear in mind, let, That pure and transcendental notions arise from the understanding only, and that reason does not in reality pro- duce any notion, but only frees, it may bo, the notion of the understanding of the inevitable limitation of a possible experience, and thus tries to enlarge it, beyond the limits of experience, yet in connection with it. Reason does this by demanding for something that is given as conditioned, ab- solute totality on the side of the conditions (under which the understanding subjects all phenomena of a synthetical unity). It thus changes the category into a transcendental idea, ^n order to give absolute completeness to the empirical synthesis, by continuing it as far as the unconditioned (which can never be met with in experience, but in the idea only). In doing this, reason follows the principle that, if the con- ditioned is given, the lohole sum of conditions, and there- fore the absolutely unconditioned must he given likewise, the former being impossible without the latter. Hence the transcendental ideas are in reality nothing but categories, enlarged till they reach the unconditioned, and those ideas must admit of being arranged in a table, according to the titles of the categories. 2ndly, Not all categories will lend themselves to this, but those only in which the synthesis constitutes a series, and a series of subordinated (not of co-ordinated) conditions. Ab- solute totality is demanded by reason, with regard to an ascending series of conditions ouly,'not therefore when we have to deal with a descending lineof consequences, or with an aggregate of co-ordinated conditions. Thus we necessarily conceive time past up to a given moment, as given, even if not determinable by us. But with regard to time future, which is not a condition of ar- riving at time present, it is entirely indifferent, if we want to conceive the latter, what we may think about the former, whether we take it, as coming to an end somewhere, or as going on to infinity. 5ar in nthe ^pro- m of isible its of is by I, ab- ^hich itical antal rical hich con- here- mse, 5 the Ties, dcas the , but nd a Ab- > an we rtrith iven But ' ar- i^ant ner, r as 83 I «Imll call tl,« ,ynthc6i8 0fu series on tl>c leof tJ.e con <1. .ons, heg,nn,ng wi.h the one nearest to a gi.en p «„„! r;-. '""' ,'«'™»-»K to the n,„re re,„„te ondi-fon? " S^emr ,u. .ther, which on the side of the .onU, one ;~ ■ "'"'t''''' """'-' ^"■-' '" '"« '""- -"- on": . o "pt liti y;""'--,''":."'''''*'''™' "eas therefore, being n r / , """'"•^ ""^ '<^^^<^\y» synthesis, proceed n " W««m, not in «,„«,y„«<;„. If the latter shmdd ^ pure reason, because (or a con>p]ete comprehension of bnr:.:f,rrc.':: ^^"^'^'^ ^^ """' '""-^ "•« --! thi'LweV;; ■"'"^' * ^'''''" "f '<'«'« '" accordance with the table of the categories, w, 'nust take,/M<, the two or ■gmal .uanta of all our perception, time and space! -S..v,«% reahty in space, that is, matter, is so.rethin^ cond, ,oned, the parts of which are its inter ,al condUiZ and the parts of its parts, its remoter conditions. We te ^c^ ore here a reg,-essive synthesis the absolute tota i lo f which ,s demanded by reason, but wi.ich cannot take pLe except by a «„nplete division, whereby the reality of nit er dwmdles away into nothing, or into that at lea'^^t wh c . no onger matter, namely, the simple ; consequently we imiSd"; ''''' "' -'''"-' -' ^ ™' - 1!^ r/urdl!,, wl.en „« come to the categories of the real re- la .on between phenomena, we find That the categ l^f subsn.nce w,th .ts accidents does not lend itself to^a fan «cende..tal .dea ; that is, reason has here no inducemen t„ proceed regressively to conditions. We know thlt aj" dents so far as they inhere in one and the samerbst iTre co-ord,nated w.th each other, and do not constitute a sTAcs and with reference to the substance, they are not proper J ^Unce .tself The same applies to substances in community which are aggregates only, without having an exponent of "! IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) & A A' <; ^4^ / z< 1.0 I.I bilM |2.5 Hf »£ 12.0 IL25 i 1.4 iiiiim 6" 1.6 V] / Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 .\ qv a>^ \ :\ % .V ^ ^ ^/-^^ ;\ 'Ck' 84 a series. There remains therefore only the category of causality, which offera a series of causes to a gi^ren e4ct, enabling us to ascend from the latter, as the conditioned, to the former as the conditions, and thus to answer the ques- tion of reason. ^ Fourthly, the notions of the possible, the real, and the necessary, do not lead to any series, except so far as the ao- ctdmial in existence must always be considered as con ditioned, and point, according to a rule of the understand- ing to a condition which makes it necessary to ascend to a higher condition, till reason finds at last, only, in the totality ot that series, the unconditioned necessity yf\wh it requires If therefore we select those categories which necessarily imply a series in the synthesis of tl.e manifold, we shall have no more than four cosmological ideas, according to the four titles ot the categories. » I. Absolute completeneiM of composition in the given whole of all phenomena. II. Absolute completeness of division in a given whole in phenomenal appearance. III. Absolute completeness of origination in a phenomenon in general. IV. Absolute completeness of the dependence of existence in the changeable in phenomenaLappearance. We have two expressions, wcyrld and nature, which fre- quently run into each other. The first denotes the mathe- matical total of all phenomena and the totality of their syn- thesis, whether by composition or division. That world, however, is called nature if we look upon it as a dynamical whole, and consider not the aggregation in space and time, whi jh produces quantity, but the unity in the existence of ory of effbfitj led, to I ques- id the he ac- con jtand- i to a tality uires. sarily have ! four /■I ess fre- the- syn- .rld, ical me, s of 86 M Skotiok IT.-ANnrnifiio of Pdek Bbason. r/irr^ ""i'""*'"", **^ ^"g'""""'! doctrine, is called 7%.* », I may denote by AnHt/utic, not indeed dognrntieal aBsen,ons of che opposite, but the conflict between C kinds of apparently dogmatical knowledge (thesis cu„. anfthes,), to none of which we can ascribe I superior cl»im to our assent. The transcendental antithetic is' in fac- ." ■ts results. It we apply our reason, not only to objects of e penence. according to the principles of the undeCand g, but venture to extend it beyond the limit of experience there anse rationalising or sophistical propositions, whM,' can nether hope for confirmation nor need fear re nratio rom experience. Every one of them is not oni;t te ree from contradiction, but can point to conditions of H elvL'" ""'»»'"-»f ™»-" "-»•. only that unfor Transcendental reason adn.its of no other criterion but an attempt to combine conflicting assertions, and therefore previous to this, unrestrained conflict betwe;n them ' The antmomies fbllow each other, according to the order ot the transcendental ideas mentioned before (p. 84). 86 The Antimony of Pure Reason. FIRST CONFUCl OK THB TRAN8CKNDBNTAL IDBA8. THE8I8. The world has a beginning In time, and is limited also with re- gard to space. Proof. For if we assumed that the world has no beginning In time, then an t'ternity must have elapsed up to «very given point of time, and therefore an infinite series of sue "ossive states of things must have |)a8sed in the world. The infinity of a series, however, consists in this, that it never can be completed by means of a successive synthe- ws. Hencean infinite series of past worlds is impossible, and the be- ginning of the world a necessary (X>ndition of its existence. This was what had to be proved first. Witli regard to the second, let us assume again the opposite. In that case the world would be given as an infinite whole of coexisting things. Now we cannot conceive in any way the extension of a quan- tum, which is not given within certain limits to every perception, except through the synthesis of its parts, nor the total of such a quan- tum in any way, except through a completed synthesis, or by the repeated addition of unity to itself. In order therefore to conceive the world, which fills all space, as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world would have to be looked upon as com- pleted ; that is, an infinite time would have to be looked upon as ANTITHESIS. The world has no beginning and no limits in space, but is infinite, in respect both to time and space. Proof. For let us assume that It has a beginning. Then, as beginning is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing is not, it would follow that antecedently there was a time in which the world was not, that is, an empty time. In an empty time, however, it is impossible that anything should take its beginning, because of such a time no part possesses any condition of existence or non- existence to distinguish it from another (whether produced by it- self or through another cause). Hence though many a series of things may take its beginaing in the world, the world itself can have no beginning, and In refer ence to time past is infinite. With regard to the second, let us assume again the opposite, namiily, that the world is finite and limited in space. In that case the world would exist in an empty space without limits. We should therefore have not only a relation of things in space, but also ol i\nnf^» to spacf,. As however the world is an absolute whole, out- side of which no object of percep- tion, and therefore no correlate of the world can be found, the rela- tion of the world to empty space would be a relation to no object. ng and ait«, in ,ce. has n linj; iH 1«(I by not, it. lently ll tllH impty 'ever, tiling cauM^ leases non- from \iy it- luse). B8 of g 'n can •efer- I, let «ite. inite case ipty )Ul(i tion ) ol the out- Bep- ) of ela- ace eet. 87 THESIS. elapsed, during the enumeration of all co-exlBtlnff things. This Is impossible. Hence an infinite ag- Kreffate of real things cannot be regarded as a given whole, nor aa a whole given at the same time. Hence it follows that the world is not infinite, as regards (extension in space, but enclosed in limits. This was the second that had to be proved. ANTITHffSIS. Such a relation, aud with it the limitation of the world by empty space, is nothing, and therefore the world is not limited with re- gard to space, that is, it is unlimit- ed in extension. SECOND CONFMCT Oir THE TRAN8CKNDRNTAL IDEAS. THESIS. Every compound substance in the world coneists of simple parts, and nothing exists anywhere but the simple, or what is composed of it. Proof. For let us assume that compound substances did not consist of simple parts, then, if all composition is removed in thought, there would be no compound part, and (as no simple parts are admitted) no simple part either, that is, there .vould remain nothing, and there would therefore be no substance at all. Either, therefore, we cannot possibly remove all composition in thought, or, after its removal, there must remain something that exists without composition, that is the simple. In the former case the compound could not itself consist of substances (because with them composition is only an accidental relation of substances, which sub- stances, as permanent beings, must subsist without it). As this con- ANTITHESIS. No compound thing in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nowliere in the world any- thing simple. Proof. Assume that a compound thing, a substance, consists of simple parts. Then as all external rela- tion, and therefore all composition of substances also, is possible in space only, it follows that space must consist of as many parts as the parts of the compound that occupies the space. Space, how- ever, does not consist of simple parts, but of spaces. Every part of a compound, therefore, must oc- cupy a space. Now the absolutely primary parts of every compound are simple. It follows therefore that the simple occupies a space. But as everything real, which oc- cupies a space, contains a manifold, the parts of which are by the side of each other, and which there- fore is compoundad, and com- 88 THCtlt. tradicta the floppoiiHion, there re- inainB only the sdcond view, name- ly, that the sabetantial conipoundH In the world consist of simple parts. It follows as an immediate con sequence that all things in the world are simple beings, that their composition is only an external condition, and that, though we are unable to remove these elementary substances from their state of com- imsition and isolate them, reason must conceive them as the first Bubjects of all composition, and therefore, antecedently to it, as simple beings. 11^ Bill IHi «an more of the ab- Je proved erceptlon, )rnal, and iple is a realltj of vn in any tat in the sna it is or object, an object lea might he empir- Qe object ks to con- manifold and com- from our sh a man- tny valid re Impos- ;tive per- ' this no be estab- h sinipli- rom any ^8 there- e object poesible irorld of n as the }erience, mple ex- H 89 THIRD CONFLICT OF THE THAN8CENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS. Causality, accordinj? to the laws of nature, is not the only causality from which all the phenomena of the world can be deduced. In order to account for these phenomena it is necessary also to admit another causality, that of freedom. Proof. Let (8 assume that there is no other causality but that accordinir to the laws of nature. In that case everything that takes place, presupposes an anterior state, on which it follows inevitably accord- ing to a rule. But that anterior 8tate must itself be something which has taken place (which has come to be in time, and did not exist before), because, if it had al- ways existed, its effect too would not have only just arisen, but have existed always. The causality, therefore, of a cause, through which something takes place, is Itself an etent, which again, ac- cording to the law of nature, pre- supposes an anterior state and its causality, aud this again an ante- rior state, and so on. If, therefore, everything takes place according to mere laws of nature, there will always be a secondary only, but never a primary beginning, and therefore no completeness of the series, on tho side of successive causes. But the law of nature con- sists in this, that nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently determined a prion. Therefore the proposition that all causality is possible according to the laws of ANTITHESIS. There, is no freedom, but every- thing in the worid takds place en- tirely according to the laws of nature. Proof. If we admit that there is freedom, m the transcendental sense, as a particular kind of causality ac- cording to which the events in the world could take place, that is a faculty of absolutely originating a state, and with it a series of con- sequences, it would follow that not only a series would have its abso- lute beginning through this snon- taniety, but the determination of that spontaneity itself to produce the series, that is. the causality, would have an absolute beginning, nothing preceding it by which this act is determined according to per- manent laws. Every beginning of an act. however, presupposes a state in which the cause is not yet active, and a dynamically primary beginning of an act presupposes a state which has no causal connec- tion with the preceding state of that cause, that is. in no wise fol- lows from it. Transcendental free- dom is therefore opposed to the law of causa ity. and represents such a connection of successive states of effective causes, that no unity of experience is possible with it. It is therefore an empty fiction of the mind, and not to be met with in any experience. We have, therefore, nothing but nature, in which we must try to find the connection and order of 90 THE8I8. nature only, contradict i Itself, if taken in unlimited jrenerality, and it is impossible, therefore, to admit that causality as the only one. We must therefore admit an- other causality, through which something takes place, without its cause being further determined ac- cording to necessary laws by a pre- ceding cause, that is ar ahaolute spontaneity of causes, by which a series of phenomena, proceeding according to natural laws, begins by itself; we must consequently admit transcendental freedom, without which, even in the course of nature, the succession of phe- nomena on the side of causes, can never be perfect. ANTITHESIS. cosmical events. Freedom (inde- j endonce) from the laws of nature is no doubt a deliverance (row re- straint, but also from the guidanee of all rules. For we cannot say that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom may enter into the causality of the course of the world, because, if determined by laws, it would not be freedom, but nothing else but nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental free- dom diflfer from each other like le- gality and lawlessness. The for- mer, no doubt, im|)OBes upon the understanding the difficult task of looking higher and higher for the origin of events in the series of causes, because their causality io always conditioned. In return for tljis, however, it promises a com plete and well-ordered unity of ex- perience ; while, on the other side, the fiction of freedom promises, no doubt, to the enquiring mind, rest in the chain of causes, leading him np to an unconditioned causality, which begins to act by itself, but which, as it is blind itself, tears the thread of rules by which alone » complete and coherent esperienc«- is possible. n (Inde- f nature froro re- uidanee not say nature, ter into le of the ined by om, but Nature, tal free- like le- rhe for- [)on the i task of for the eries of lality if* turn for a com- y of ex- ler side, lises, no nd, rest \n)e him usality, elf, but ears the alone a )erienc«? - ill 1 , if! ! Sug \ 1 t 1 H 4 H 91 FOURTH CONKi^iCT OK THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS. There exiHts an absolutely neces- Hary Being belonffinpr to the world, either as a part or as the cause of it. Proof. The world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a series of changes without which evun the representation of a series of time, which forms the condition of the possibility of the world of sense, would not be given us. But every change has its condi- tion which precedes it in time, and renders it necessary. Every- thing that is given as conditioned presupposes, with regard to its existence, a complete series of con- ditions, leading up to that which is entirely unconditioned, and alone absolutely necessary. Some- thing absolutely necessary there- fore must exist, if there exists a change as its consequence. And this absolutely necessary belongs itself to the world of sense. For if we supposed that it existed out- side that world, then the series of changes in the world would derive its origin from it, while the neces- sary cause itself would not belong to the world of sense. But this is impossible. For as the beginning of a temporal series can be deter- mined only by that which pre- cedes it in time, it follows that the highest condition of the beginning of a series of chr n. -if must exist in the time when that series was not yet (because the beginning is an existence, preceded by a time in ANTITHESIS. There nowhere exists an abso- lutely necessary Being, either within or without the world, as the cause of it. Proof. If we supposed that the world Itself is a necessary being, or that a necessary being exists in it, there would then be in the series of changes either a beginning, unconditionally necessary, and therefore without a cause, which contradicts the dynamical law of the determination of all phenom- ena in time ; or the series itself would be without any beginning, and though contingent and con- ditioned in all its parts, yet entire- ly necessary and unconditioned as a whole. This would be self-con- tradictory, because the existence of a multitude cannot be neces. sary, if no single part of it possess- es necessary existence. If we supposed, on the contrary, that there exists an absolutely necessary cause of the world, out. side the world, then that cause, as the highest member in the seriM of causes of cosmical changes, would begin the existence of the latter and their series. In that case, however, that cause would have to begin to act, and its caus- ality would belong to time, and therefore to the sum total of phen- omena. It would belong to the world, and would therefore not be outside the world, which is con- trary to our supposition. Thera- fore, oeithor in the world, nor out- •8 THE8I8. which the thlnj^ which bpRlns wan notyot). Hunco tho cauBallty of the nocewiHry caime of clian^ua and that cauao Itaoif behmjr to time and to phunonivua (in which alone time, as their form, la posBiblo), and It cannot thereforo bo conceiv- ed aH aeparated from tlic world of aonae, as tlie aura total of all plie- nomena. It follows therefore that aomothinff absolutely necesBary is contained in tho world, whether it bo tho whole coBmlcal at lies itself, or only a part of it. ANTITHESIS. Hide tho world (yot in causal con ncctlon with it) does there exlat anywhere an abaalutely ueceasary Being. Skction IV.— Thk transokndkntal Problkmr of Puuk RkASON, and TI^E AlkSOLUTK NF.CK881TY OFTIIKIR 80LDTI0N. Transcendental philosopliy lias this peculiarity anion^r all speculative knowledjre, that no question, referring to an object of pure reason, can be insoluble for the same human reason ; and that no excuse of inevitable ignorance on our side, or of unfathomable depth jn tho side of tho problem, can release us from the obligation to answer it thoroughly and completely ; because the same notion, which enables us to ask the question, must qualify us to answer it, con- sidering that, as in the case of right and wrong, the object itself does not exist, except in the notion. Tiie cosmological ideas alone possess this peculiarity that they may presuppose their object, and the empirical synthe- sis required for tho object, as given, and the question which they suggest refers only to the i)rogre88 of that synthesis, 80 far as it is to contain absolute totality, such absolute to- tality being no longer enipirical, because it cannot be given in any experience. As we are here concerned solely with a thing, as an object of possible experience, not as a thing M 1>.V itself, it is impoMiblo timt the answer nf .!,„.. cause it refer, to no object by ij^ " '"" '" ""' '^"■' **• Sj^ON Vir.-C«„,CAL SOLCT,ON or THE CoKruoT or K.Aso» wm, .™,„„ ,„ ™, CosMo.oo.ox. Pr;:;. the whole -ieso'rrditt 'a o ::wl'''°r rr- t.l si^t^eai^'at :„::r:r::.f "^ *"" ' ''•"'•"'«^--" t).o reg.essus in the seHes of allltSs'l t'.""" "" "' «ress«s o the latter is not o„l, re^mred. but s^ eal I len synthesis of the conditioned with its eonditln s" a s™ he^ «'•«, without asking whether and how we can arrive at the k-w edge of them. But if I have to deal with p enome„a wh h, as mere representations, are not given af all unZ hemXs forT'^'^'^ "' ',".""' <"'^' "' '» *"« >"'™- - then I anlr "^ T """""^ ""■' ""^'"'^^ knowledge), s 2ivL r l'*^ '"."^' """' ^"^« *'""- "'the conditioned Ind LnVf ? T*^'"""' '"' phenomena) are also given .•tv of the . "^ I' "' ""'"' «<"'<=''"'« "'« absolutettal- ty of the series. For phenomena in their apprehension are themselves nothing but an empirical svnthcsirrin T^ "d M ! 1 III time), and are given therefore in that sjfnthesit only. Now it follows by no means that, if the conditioned (as phenom- enal) is given, the synthesig also that conBtitntos its empir- ical condition should thereby be given at the same time and presupposed ; for this takes place in the regressus only, and never without it. What W3 may say in such a case is this, that a rtgressuH to the conditions, that is, a continued em- pirical synthesis in that direction is required, and that con- ditions cannot be wanting that are given through that re- gressus. Henc:^ we see that the major of the cosmological argu- ment takes the conditioned in the transcendental sense of a pure category, while the minor takes it in the empirical sense of a notion of the understanding, referring to mere phenomena, so that it contains that dialectical deceit which called Sophisma figursB dictionis. Nor does there exist in the connection o^ the conditioned with its condition any order of time, but they are presupposed in themselves as given together. It is equally natural also in the minor to look on phenomena as things by themselves and as objects given to the understanding only in the eame manner as in the major, as no account was taken of all the conditions of perception under which alone objects can be given. But there is an important distinction between these notions, which has been overlooked. The synthesis of the condition- ed with its condition, and the whole series of conditions in the major, was in no way limited by time, and was free from any notion of succession. The ei^ipirical synthesis, on the contrary, and the series of condli,i«.vu' in phenomena, which was subsumed in the minor, i' - '%jjixAy successive and given as such in time only. Therefore I had no right to assume the absolute totality of the synthesis and of the series represented by it in this case as well as in the former, "fhing remains therefore in order to settle the quarrel ct* ^ir all, and to the satisfaction of both parties, but to :^i i.y convince them that, though they can refute each other so eloquently, they are really quarrelling about nothing, and . Now lienom* empir- ne and ly, and U this, ed em- lat con- hat re- I argu- ise . '< a ipirical o mere which xist in )n any Ives as inor to objects r as in ions of . But otions, dition- ons in m free esis, on 3m en a, cesiiive right of the brmer. luarrel but to her so g, and 95 that .certain transcendental illnsion has mocked them with a reality where no reality exists. m»^^l!"f r'^*r*"" "PP'''^'^ '" *""'' '"•'«'• dialectically both may be (alse, because the one does not only contradict 2 :ri:i'^ti„"n'. "'^ "'""""^ ""^ *"■""■ '^ -1"-'^ ^» a -! If we regard the two statements that the world is infinite .n extension, and that the world is finite in extemion L contradic ory opposites, we assume that the worlT/tl!^ whole series of phenomena) is a thing by itself for it 1 mams, whether I remove the infinite !r the mte ZLl m the senes of its phenomena. But if we remove tW 3 posifon, or this transcendental illusion, and deny tha ul » thmg by itself, then the contradictory oppositin of 1 ! two statements becomes purely dialectical, a'Ta^X wo.M does not exist by itself (independently of the regressive ITr^ of my representations), it exists neither as a whole ilZTf -/« «, nor as a whole l, UselffiniU. It exists onlf in *{ by Itself. Hence, if that series is always conditioned, it can never exist as complete, and the world is thercfo^lt 1 conditioned whole, and does not exist as such, either wth infinite or finite extension. What has here been said of the first cosmological idea namely, that of the absolute totality of extension n pht' .8 to be found only in the regressive synthesis itself, never as a phenomenon or as an independent thing, existinr p!br ber ot parts m any given phenomenon is by itself neither Itself "h"!""'' "^"""""^ * phenomenon do^s not exist by tself, and its parts are only found through the regres..us o^' he decomposing synthesis through and in the regrcL„t and that regressus can never be given as absolutety com tt Lls'of'" " *"'■'' "l " '"*■"'«• "^'^ -">« "Pl^ie " erlr / r''- °'" ''*'"« P™' to tl>« other, and to the series leading from conditioned to unconditioned „«,.».,..,. 'If {ill 9d existence, which can never be regarded either by itfielf finite in its totality or infinite, because, as a series of subordinated representations, it forms a dynamical regressus onl^', and cannot exist prior to it, as a self-subsistent series of things, or by itself. The antinomy of pure reason with regard to its cosmo- logical ideas is removed by showing that it is dialectical only, and a confiict of an illusion produced by our applying the idea of absolute totality, which exists only as a coiidition of things by themselves, to phenomena, which exist in our representation only, and if they form a series, in the succese- ive regressus, but nowhere else. We may, however, on the other side, derive from that antinomy a true, if not dogmat- icaly at least critical and doctrinal advantage, namely, bv proving through it indirectly the transcendental ideality of phenomena, in case anybody should not have been satisfied by the direct proof given in the transcendental ^Esthetic. Section VIII. — The regulative Principle of Pure Reason with regard to the Cosmolooical Ideas. As through the cosmological principle of totality no real maximum is given of the aeries of conditions in the world of sense, as a thing by itself, but can only be required in the regressus of that series, that principle of pure reason, if thus amended, still retains its validity, not indeed as an axiom^ requiring us to think the totality in the object as real, but as a prohlem of the understanding, and therefore for the subject, encouraging us to undertake and to con- tinue, according to the completeness in the idea, the re- gressus in the series of conditions of anything given as con- ditioned. The principle of reason is therefore properly a rule only, which in the series of conditions of given phe- nomena postulates a regressus which is never allowed to stop at anything absolutely unconditioned. It is merely a principle of the greatest possible continuation and extension Ifiinito linated ly, and thinsffi, cosmo- lectical plying idition in our iiccess- on the agmat- ^ly, by ,lity of itisiiod etic. ORE s. 10 real world red in son, if as an ject as srefore > con- ;he re- L8 con- erly a n phe- ved to rely a ^nsion lillfl 97 object (the phei J :rb;it3e rt ;;r; "^ °"'"" - "■« coomologicHl principle, the i 1 olnelo wW l" tT'"'""™ to indicate by tliis very distinctim, f ''"™ *"<"1 wl.ich is to serve as a n t ', "° ^"""'"'"'g «" idea, jective reality """'' ™'^' l-^'ng invested with ob COSMOLOGICAL IdEAS. No transcendental use as wp l.oxr^ u oasions,ca„ be >n.Se ouLlZrlmtlfT 7""' "• -^- «/.».««; and the absol te tftTl fv o/ Z ""''; conditions in the worl.l nf . • locality ot the series of seendentHl use ot rla^in whird " "t '^""'^ '" ' *™"- corapletenes. from wZ'.Tt '^' ""' '".conditioned W., we can neverTpeak L^ T/f^f '," '^' """" "^ different series in it ri,\i^ , '''''°'""' J5'Xr are^ti:'^ '"^ ~^i*^ "/ ^^^ the extent of « , •• , '^ ^''^ continuation and for CO s t e .nSe o''?'"™"-' ^ft- "' "'validity, as a suffieien ; i ;:, ,td ^Trr '', ""'""''=^' ''-"-' conflict -itr r„::d"icr :ii^::!;;- '^i-- 98 place the sense in wliich reason agrees with itself and the misapprehension of which was the only cause of conflict, has been clearly exhibited, and a principle formerly di- alectical changed hi to a doctrinal one. I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the totality of the composition of phenomena in an universe. For the solution of the first cosmological problem, nothing more is wanted than to determine whether, in the resressus to the unconditioned extension of the universe (in time and in space), this nowhere limited ascent is to be called a re- gressus in infinitum, or a regressus in indefinitum. The mere general representation of the series of all past states of the world, and of the things wjiich exist together m space, is itself nothing but a possible empirical re<»;ressus, which I represent' to myself, though as yet as indefinite, and through which alone the notion of such a scries of con- ditions of the perception given to me can arise. Now the universe exists for me as a notion only, and never (as a whole) as a perception. Hence the quantity of the whole of phenomena is not absolutely determined, and we cannot say therefore that it is a regressus in infinitum, because this would anticipate the members which the regressus has not yet reached, and represent its number as so large that no empirical synthesis could ever reach it. To the cosmological question, therefore, respecting the quantity of the world, the first and negative answer is, that the world has no first beginning in time, and no extreme limit in space. From this follows at the same time the afiirraative answer, that the regressus in the series of the phenomena of the ■world, intended as a determination of the quantity of the world, goes on in indefinitum, which is the same, as if we say, that the world of sense has no absolute quantity. Every beginning is in time, and every limit of extension in space. Space and time, however, exist in the world of nd the onjflict, rly di- he lothina: wressua ne and d a re- ill past )gether ;res8us, Bfinite, of con- ;)w the r (as a wliole cannot ise this as not liat no ng the IS, that streme nswer, of tlie of the \ if we r ension >rld of 99 sense only. Hence phenomena only are limitwl .V il. ij, eonditionally, tl,e world itself, however TsI^.t.rfT,'^ conditionally nor unconditionally ' '"' ""'"'" For the same reason, and because the world can nev.r !,„ given compute, and even the series of conditions of some thing given as conditioned cannot, as a eOMnioJ Z.i I ym„ us oomplet., the notion of the ouanti y of t hT ' M ««. be given through the regreesnsonly a, d not if T any collective perception. ^That regiS: holet":™" sists only in the dekrmining of the ai.Rnfl.l "^"f ' '^'"'■ give, therefore, any definite loZ^^ZZ' Zi^l ""' q..«ntity which, with regard to a certain asur o„ d be called infinite. It docs not therefore proceed to tli.Tfi •, - .f given), but only into an indefinL dTst "ce 'o, d' : to give a quantity (of experience) which has first to b^ re ahsed by that very regressus. II. Solution of the Co.mologio.1 He. of tho totally of th, divwion of a whole given in perception. If I divide a whole, given in perception, I proceed from tlie conditioned to the conditions of its pos ibiiUy The dT vision ot the PHrts(subdivisioordecomi;ositio) U are~ L-fl""" "m''T ""''''"''"''■ Tiie absolute otll ty of « regressus in indefinitum,8nch as was alone allowed bv tl,« former cosmological idea, where from the c^ndiTroned we had to proceed to conditions outside it, and therefore Z given a, .,.e same time through it. but'first to be added ,„ he empirical regressns. It is not allowed, however even n the case of a whole that is divisible in i, fi,°iZ ^o sT UatU co,.^su of infinitely many parts. For all. «h di 'IlXr ""' ■" "" P^'-^^I-"™ °f "- whole, ;ft the w^^le dimnon is not contained in it, because it consists in the eontmuons decomposition, or L the regressus Llf which first makes that series real. ^ ^'^' 100 It IB easy to apply this remark to space. Every space, perceived within its limits, is such a whole the parts of which, in spite of all decomposition, are always spaces again, and tiierefore divisible in infinitum. From this follows, quite naturally, the second application to an external phenomenon, enclosed within its limits (body). The divisibih'ty of this isfou^^led on the divisibility of space, which constitutes the possibility of the body, as an extended whole. This is therefore divisible in infinitum, without consisting of an infinite number of parts. What applies to a thing hy itself, represented hy a pure notion of the understanding, does not apply to what is called substance, as a phenomenon. This is not an absolute sub- ject, but only a permanent image of sensibility, nothing in fact but perception, in which nothing unconditioned can ever be met with. Remarks on the Solution of the Transcendental-mathematical Ideas. When exhibiting in a tabular form the antinomy of pure reason, through all the transcendental ideas, and indicating the ground of the conflict and the only means of removing it, by declaring both contradictory statements as false, we always represented the conditions as belonging to that which they conditioned, according to relations of space and time, this being the ordinary supposition of the common under- standing, and in fact the source from which that conflict arose. In that respect all dialectical representations of the totality in a series of conditions of soiftething given as con- ditioned, were always of the same character. It was always a series in which the condition was connected with the con- ditioned, as members of the same series, both being thus homogeneous. If not always the object, that is, the con- ditioned, yet the series of its conditions was always consid- ered according to quantity only, and then the diflSculty arose, which could not be removed by any compromise, but only by cutting the knot, that reason made it either too long or space, >art8 of I agtiin, ioation (body). ' space, tended irithout % pure \ called IQ sub- ling in 3d can 1 Ideas. •f pure eating loving se, we which 1 time, under- onflict of the IS con- ilways e con- r thus 5 con- onsid- arose, ; only ng or 11 101 ing, which re«,r rie t ;at "" '°'? "'"'^ ""d-stand- aceording to the above table rfthr,'"'- '^™ '"' *'"""' ematical, the romawL two """'T'"^, ""P'r » ""oM- -^."^meW no,i'orofl^e,„l :";""■" '" •'""^'■'''"- "'« should be rendered ade»o 2 "e'"^/ '" *'"' "" "'^^ tinction becomes important »„H "' ''"'"'"' """ '>''• -w insight into tLe^rc ;; r:.: in" vr'""' 18 implicated. "^ '" ^^"^^^ reason <-itl'„r r^thittrtht r^r <"• '"« -- »' - whethortheidea:: : ,S:t: 3f; 'V"" J'""' »' are no doubt homogeneonf V", T ■' *^"'' »!'« ^o'ies standing on which thesT 1 I """"" "^ "'« '"'der- ■n the composi.ion as well TtTX! \\f"^''PPo^'i quantity) or of the i.t decomposition of every a causal connecfion a„d •„ H ''"""'™' '^""'«™- •""'' '" with the contingent ' """"'"""'' °^«'« "^''-^ary enS i^o Irs:::: ":r '"* """""^ ■=<""«"»- «» nomena, that i condkio ? TuT"" "'''^'^""^ of phe- admit; also tf a he X: : Lr^itt"":"? ""'"""°"^ of the series l.■,^ ». " , . """"ition, whichisnotanart a certain alfa'io^ T ' r""^"''^' "'"'''''' '' ^ - «'«» being plaed before te^r '"''"" "^^ "'" ""-"ditioned -ne: If the phe :L ' S mL"; :""°"V*»'-'""g «'« -easing it o, .nt;:;t r^fc^ ^ Of SirolatrrlZlTJl^.-"'!""^."' « -dition •'™ "^rccif, mat IB, a condition ^ I'M ■ fey I ill 102 which itself is not a phenomenoji^ something arises, which is totally different iVom the result of the mathematical an- tinomy. The result of that antinomy was, that both the contradictory dialectical statements had to he declared false. The throughout conditioned character, however, of the dy- namical series, which is inseparable from them as phenom- ena, if connected with the empirically luiconditioned, but at the same time not sensuous condition, may give satisfac- tion to the understanding on one, and the reason on the other side, because the dialectical arguments which, in some way or other, required unconditioned totality in mere phe- nomena, vanish ; while the propositions of reason, if thus amended, may loth he true. This cannot be the case with the cosmological ideas, which refer only to a npathematically unconditioned unity, because with them no condition can bo found in the series of phenonu la which is not itself a phenomenon, and! as such constitutes one of the links of the series. III. Solution of the Conmological Ideas with regard to the totality of the derivation of Cosmical Events from their cause. The lav of nature, that everything which happens has a cause, — that the causality of that cause, that is, its activity ^ as it is anterior in time, and, with regard to an effect which has arisen^ cawnot itself have plways existed, but must have happened at some time) must have its cause among the phe- nomena by which it is determined, and that therefore all events in the order of nature are empirically determined, this law, I say, through which aloiie phenomena become nature and objects of experience, is a law of the understand- ing, which can on no account be surrendered, and from which no single phenomenon can be exempted ; because in doing this we should place it outside all possible experience, separate from all objects of possible experience, and change it into a mere fiction of the mind or a cobweb of the brain. But although this looks merely like a chain of causes, which in the regressus to its conditions admits of no abso- 1, wliicli ical an- oth the 3d false, the dy- henoin- ed, but iatisfac- on the in some jre plie- if thus Be with aticallj ion can itself a 8 of the totality 18 has a ctivityy t which ist have he phe- fore all rmined, become jrstand- »d from tause in arience, change Q brain. causes^ o abso- 108 lufe totality, tl.m (Jifflculty (1„08 not dotnir. .i« fn .1 i tl.orofore i», wl,t.tl,„r, it w„ r,.c„„ni„^ „ ? ''"""'"" «vo.,t- „.„,„•„, ,.,, ;, ,,„„ ::r,; 'v^:: :':,rf "f >» onl.y a l>=nom- «m«n, ««or,lii,« to th« laws „f eiimirica ,'''n ' wl hA «-,th ro,pect to pl.enoinona, i, oriRiiial, and i "„oT »t phenomenal, hut, with ■•espcct to tL facn'tv ntom .1;=: :,?:;£;: t^T:r>tr;: 104 njitnral evonts. Tf tliis is rtdmitted and not weakened bv any exceptions, tlio uJulerHtandinj?, which in its empirical ei!jph)yui(Mit rcco^iiiwcH in till cvciitni nothinjjf hut nature, and is quite justified in doin^ so, luis really all that it can deniaixi, and the explanations of physical phenomena may proceed without let or hindrance. Tiie understandiui; wojild not 1)0 wronjijed in the least, if we assumed, though it ho a niero liction, that sow '>ory t/ia natural cautica have a faculty which is intelli^,*- »* nly, and whose determination to activity does not re8„ on empirical conditions, hut on mere grounds ot tins intellect, if only the phenomenal ao- f ivi ft/ oi' that cause is in accordan(!e with all the laws of em- pirical causality. . . .This intelligihle f^round does not touch the empirical questions, hut (HUicernsonly, as it would seem, the thouf^ht in the pure understaiuling ; and although the elic;!ts of that thought and action of the pure understanding nuiy be discovered in the })henomena, these have neverthe- less to bo com})letely explained from their phenomenal cause, according to the laws of mituro, by taking their em- pirical eluvracter as the highest ground of explanation, and passing by the intelligible character, which is the transcen- dental cause of the other, as entirely unknown, excejit so far as it is indicated by the empirical, as its sensuous sigri. Let US apply this to experience. Man is one among the phenomena of the world of pense, and in so far one of the natural causes the causality of which must bo subject to emi)irical laws. As such ho must therefore have an em- pirical character, like all other objects of nature. We per- ceive it through the forces and facidties which ho sliowa in his actions and eti'ects. In the lifilcss or merely animal nature we see no ground for admitting any faculty, except as sensuously conditioned. Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature through his senses only, knows himtidf through mere apperception also^ and this in actions and in- ternal determinations, which ho cannot ascribe to the im- pressions of the senses. Man is thus to himself partly a phenomenon, partly, however, namely with reference to :ene(l bv Mn|>iri(Mil ; nature, tit it can omi iniiy I it bu ii » liavo ft iiination but on letuU ac- vf, of cm- ot toucli lid Hoein, •u'""""". N„w it i. ,,„ii„ ,r,u ,,,.'■'■" ''" » "I tlio will itsdi; l,„t .,„lv it, ,.»;.,. "'« 'l"t<''"iinHtr„n ltl.o,:„ (,l.j,«t„f,|,„ ,„„»„„ ,„„,„| (,,l„,,,,,/„f „,„."''''"' i""««" (the K,„,ci). ,.c..„o„ ,i„., not ji. I „•„".?' ":;"■! ■" K vu. c.„,,i,.ic„l|^, ,u„l ,l„„« „„t . ,1 m . ,„ , Jl ' ; "' tuk„ ,,|„co. lot,t« p«upp„„„d ,l.ut ro«,on maj- laave 106 causality with respect to tliera, for otherwise no effects in experience could be expected to result from these ideas. Now let us take our stand hore and admit it at least as possible, that reason really juissesses causality with refer- ence to phenomena. In that case, reason though it be, it must show noverthelcsa an empiricjal character, because every cause presupposes a rule according to which certain phenomena folh>w as effects, and every rule requires in the effects a homogeneousnesa, on which the notion of cause (as a faculty) is founded. This, so far as it is derived from mere phenomena, may be called the empirical character, which \% permanent^ while the effects, according to a diver- sity of concomitant, and in part, restraining conditions, ap- pear in changeahle forms. Every man therefore has an empirical character of his (arbitrary) will, which is nothing but a certain causality of his reason, exhibiting in its phenomenal actions and effects a rule, according to which one may infer the motives of reason and its actions, both in kind and in degree, and judge of the siibjective principles of his will. If we could invest- igate all the manifestations of his will to the very bottom, there would be not a single human action which we could not predict with certainty and recognise from its preceding conditions as necessary. There is - o freedom therefore with reference to this empirical character, and yet it is only with reference to it that we can consider man, when we are inerely ohservmg^ and, as is the case in anthropology, try- ing to investigate the motive causes of his actions physio- logically. If, however, we consider the tame actions with reference to reason, not with reference to speculative reason, in order to explain their origin, but solely so far as reason is the cause which produces them ; in one word, if we compare actions with reason, with reference to practical purposes, we find a rule and order, totally different from the order of nature. For, from this point of view, everything, it may be, ought not to have happened, which according to the jffectB in Ideas. least as th rutbr- it be, it bocjiuse i certain 08 in tiio [sause (as ed from liaracter, a diver- ions, ap- 3r of his sality of d effects )tive8 of id judge i in vest- bottom, i^e could •eceding ore with Illy with 1 we are >g.y, try- physio- eference in order n is the jompare urposes, le order , it may J to the 107 really proved tl.cV ch.LX' w^ ' ^ I^:! " T""" " 1« willed fr™ in tlmt cue ». i,^ , """"" "' '''""""» ct'Hsarv Uv it » Ti * i «'«l>«>8ition) unci renderod no- eve, we do „„t i<""wj>,.t dct!!;; t,/ ,: :'r;, J' >nen« which i„ reality ^ivo u, .^.....ed>„ dy a k owl ' 1'"^ the d,.p„.iti„„ (e,„piH„„| eharaetor, on y A, ,! T '' of the int.rnnl eense i>. I 7 the phonomcnHl form 'iini Bense. l uro reason, as a s tnolo intolliml.u ■"'ts i..te„i«ih,e eha^r rjirrtiiire? tuin tune in order to produce an «ffppt . f • ^ i wonhl he ..hjeet .„ I .lLTl:^„ 'ptnl ^ X,! detenn.nes all causal aenes i„ time, and t, caZli.y wo d 8a> 19, that 1 reason eao possess causality with reference to rtition of an empirical series of effects first begins For H,« .jondition that lies in reason is not sens.io, isfrd th Ifo ! z: :: ?"' '"'"• /'t "« ««'- ^'«" -« miss i:^^ ^. p.iic^.1 series, namely that the onditwn of a successive Fo ■: "Z^n'r-" "-'^''.-■"P'""'^"^ uneonTZrd ror Here the condition is really outeide the series of nl,« "oiaena (in the intelligible), and therefore not ".If " t/\ 0, n * ' 108 any sensuous condition and temporal determination through any preceding cause. Nevertheless the same cause belongs also, in anotlier re- spect, to the series ofplienomena. Man himself is a phe- nomenon. Hip will has an empirical character, which is the (empirical) ause of all his actions. There is no con- dition, determining man according to this character, that is not contained in the series of natural effects and subject to their law, according to which there can be no empirically unconditioned causality of anything that happens in time. Reason is therefore the constant condition of all free ac- tions by which man takes his place in the phenomenal world. With regard to the intelligible character, however, of which the empirical is only the sensuous schema, there is neither before nor after; and every action, without re- gard to the temporal relation which connects it with other phenomena, is the immediate effect of the intelligible char- acter of pure reason. That reason therefore acts freely, without being determined dynamically, in the chain of nat- ural causes, by external or internal conditions, anterior in time. That freedom must then not only be regarded neg- atively, as independence of empirical conditions (for in that case the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of phe- nomena), but should be determined positively also, as the faculty of beginning spontaneously a series of events. In order to illustrate the regulative principle of reason by an example of its empirical application, not in order to con- firm it (for such argutnents are useless for transcendental propositions), let us take a voluntary action, for example, a malicious lie, by which a man has produced a certain con- fusion in society, and of which we first try to find out the motives, and afterwards try to determine, how far it and its consequences may be imputed to the offender. With re- gard to the first point, one has first to follow up his empir- ical character to its very sources, which are to be found in wrong education, bad society, in part also in the viciousness of a natural disposition, and a nature, insensible to shame, through itlier re- is a phe- vliich is no con- *, that is ibject to pirically I time, free ac- lomenai owever, », there lout re- ;h other le char- freelj, of nat- 3rior in ed neg- in that of phe- as the 3. fison by to con- 1 dental mple, a in con- out the and its '^ith re- em pir- und in )usncss shame, He lilf l;l|| ■ f l:!i Hi f » 109 or ascribed to frivolity and heedlessness, not omittin^r the occasioning causes at the time In all Ihia ', '"*"« **^o natuml d.spos.tion, not on account of inflnencl ctS stancoa, not oven on account of l,U former course of 1^1^ ca««, one suppoaee one might leave entirely out of amlu^ wl,at tlmt course of life may have been, and c<^.sider tha past series of conditions as Imvinz never bxI,T I ! -t itself as totally "..conditione7.,rp viou st'atL '■ , ?iSr 'T?.'r" -'"' '; " ■- -HereKqite by lumsc t. Th.s blame is founded on a law of reason reason bemg considered as a cause which, indept d^of a I the before-mentioned empirical conditions, would and ^.oiild have determined the behaviour of the m^n ot lise Nay, we do no regard the causality of reason as a concur: rent agency only, but as complete in itself, even thoilh the scsuous motives did not favour, but even oppose It" The action IS imputed to a man's intelligible charrctor. At the moment when he tells the lie, the gtilt is entirely his tliat s. we regard reason, in spite of all empirical condition of tlic act, as completely free, and the acl has to be !« entirely to a fault of reason. "npuiea Rjason,it is supposed, is present in all the actions of man, n a 1 circumstances of time, and always the same; but U IS I. el never in time, never in a new state in which it wa no before ; it is determinini;, never determined. We can' not ask therefore why reason h,« not determined itself differently, but only why it has not differently determined .ey.„««»„ ,,y its causality. And here 'no answer is really possible For a different intelligible character would mve given a different empirical character, and if we say tlmt, m spite of the whole of his previous course of life, the offender could have avoided the lie, this only means thit it was in the power of reason, and tb»t r„..„„ :„ ;. .-.„ 110 1*8 subject to no phenomenal and temporal conditions, and lastly, that the diflference of time, though it makes a great difference in phenomena and their relation to each other, can, as these are neither things nor causes by themselves produce no difference of action in reference to reason. It should be clearly understood that, in what we have said, we had no intention of establishing the r«aZ% of free- dom, as one of the faculties which contain the cause of the phenomenal appearances in our world of sense. We have here treated freedom as a transcendental idea only, which makes reason imagine that it can absolutely begin the series of phenomenal conditions through what is sensuously un- conditioned, but by which reason becomes involved in an antinomy with its own laws, which it had prescribed to the empirical use of the understanding. That this antinomy rests on a mere illusion, and that nature does not contradict the causality of freedom, that was the only thing which we could prove, and cared to prove. IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the totality of the dependence of phenomena. We are concerned here, not with the unconditioned can- eality, but with the unconditioned existence of the substance itself It is easy to see, however, that as everything compre- hended under phenomena is changegible, and therefore con- ditioned in its existence, there cannot be, in the whole series of dependent existence, any unconditioned link the existence of which might be considered as absolutely necessary, and that therefore, if phenomena were things by themselves, and their condition accordingly belonged with the condi- tioned always to one and the same series of perceptions, a necessary being, as the condition of the existence of the phenomena of the world of sense could never exist. The dynamical regressus has this peculiar distinction, as compared with the mathematical, that, as the latter is only Ill ooncernod with the composition of n.r». !„ r. i w:.olo,„rthodivieio„ofawhoiri„t„r . ■™'"*^ " longing to a givf JwholT^LTJurillTr if I" "' f^' "^ fiom its cau«,, or of the'contilgl '",1 ^ '^"f "t ""? stance itself from the necessary 8ul,st»ml •. ' "'''' that the condition should or7 on an^The " ""' '^-'".'^ series with the conditioned. " '"'"" "'"I""""' There remains tliereforo to us another escaoe frnn, ,!.• That is, all thin,, of the 4or d of se e mil^rt T'.-'T' contingent, and have therefore an empTricat c^^ r? J existence onl,, though there might no' e",^l,"e'rn empirical condition of the whole snnV. ,, . . »« » "on- .Uionall, neccssar, hcing. "-"^ZZ ":^:^:Z d.fon, would not belong to the series, as a link !f U fno even as the highest link), nor would It render any li^ko that senes empirically unconditioned, but would leave the who e worW of sense, in all its members, in it, emplTcaUv conditioned existence. This manner of admittTg an „„ ccmdmoned existence as the ground of phcnom na wou"d differ from the empirically conditioned cLality (frUom) treated of in the preceding article, because, with resect t' freedom the thing itself, as cause (substantiV phlrenl) belonged to the series of conditions, and its causamy onlv was represented as intelligible, while here, on the contrary the necessary being has to be conceived as lyingouts.dedfo ZT rr-u "'r^'^'^ <=™ earamundaC) andt purely ntelligible, by which alone it could be guarded «ga.n.t Itself becoming subject to the law of contLency and dependence applying to all phenomena. ^ ^ the rc!,uiativ> principle of reason, with regard to our present problem i- tb <•— 'i • i "o"'" lo our r j'.ij.em, i„ tii»,<,,u,c ii,^^ tbat everything in the 112 world ofecnsobas «n empirically conditioned existonce, and that in it there is never any unconditioned necessity •with reference to any quality ; that there is no member in the series of conditions of which one ought not to expect, and as far as possible to seek, the empirical condition in some possible experience ; and that we are never justified in deriving any existence from a condition outside the em- pirical series, or in considering it as independent and self- Bubsistent in the series itself; without however denying in the least that the whole series may depend on some intelli- gible being, which is free therefore from all empirical con* ditions, and itself contains rather the ground of the possi- bility of all those phenomena. Concluding Bemark on the whole Antinomy of Pure Reason. So long as it ist only the totality of the conditions in the world of sense and the interest it can have to reason, that form the object of the notions of our reason, our ideas are no doubt transcendental, but yet oosmological. If, however, we place the unconditioned (with which we are chiefly con- cerned) in that which is entirely outside the world of sense, therefore beyond all possible experience, our ideas become transcendent : for they serve not only for the completion of the empirical use of the understanding (which always re- mains an idea that must be obeyed, though it can never be fully carried out), but they separate themselves entirely from it, and create to themselves objects the material of which is not taken from experience,. and the objective re- ality of which does not rest on the completion of the em- pirical series, but on pure notions a priori. Nevertheless that cosmological idea which owes its origin to the fourth antinomy, urges us on to take that step. For the condi- tioned existence of all phenomena, not being founded in itself, requires us to look out for something different from all phenomena, that is, for an intelligible object in which there should be no more contingency. Thus the first step cigtonce, lecessity iiibor in • expect, lition in juBtified the ern- nd Belt- lying in ) intelli- 3al con- e possi- lason. B in the >n, that leas are owover, jfly con- )t' sense, become ipUnion vays re- ever be entirely erial of tivc re- the em- rtlieless I fourth condi- ided in It Irom which rst step 118 necessary Boin^, and to derive fro,,,^. „ ,• "'"."'""'"'o'y of ai. thing., .„ r„ ^ ,,„^ z tZngi j;:'r:;."'" """"-" Sootlon I._Tte Ide.1 in genonj. nomenon n whMi thpv nm,u v. "" "° P*»e- 8orvc8 as tl.e arcAetj/pe for tho pormarfent determinution of In its ideal reason aims at a perfect determinnfl^^ eord,ng to rules a^ioH, and it clJLt:^::'^::;^^: ; I 114 out determinable according to principles, though without the sufficient conditions of experience, so that the notior itself is traLscendent. Section II. — The Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon transoendentale). Every notion is, with regard to that which 'm not contain- ed in it, undetermined and subject to the principle of deter- minabiliti/, according to which of every two contradictorily opposite predicates, one only can belong to it. This rests on the principle of contradiction, and is therefore a purely logical principle, taking no account of any of the contents of our knowledge, and looking only to its logical form. Besides this,' everything is subject, in its possibility, to the principle of complete determination, according to which one of all the possible predicates of things, as compared with their opposites, must be applicable to it. This does not rest only on the principle of contradiction, for it regards every- thing, not only in relation to two contradictory predicates, but in relation to the whole possibility, that is, to the whole of all predicates of things, and, presupposing these as a con- dition a priori, it represents everything as deriving its own possibility from t!ie share which it possesses in that whole possibility. The proposition, that everything which exists is com- pletely determined, does not signify only that one of every pair of given contradictory predicates, but that one of all possible predicates must always belong to a thing, so that by this proposition predicates are not only compared with each other logically, but the thing itself is compared tran- scendentally with the sum total of all possible predicates. The proposition really means that, in order to know a thing completely, we must know everything that is possible, and thereby determine it either affirmatively or negatively. This li without the notior, AL )t contain- le of deter- radictorily This rests e a purely le contents form, isibility, to g to which pared with )e8 not rest rds every- predicatea, ' the whole 56 as a con- ng its own that whole ^ta is Gom- le of every one of all ig, BO that )ared with pared tran- predicates. low a thing (ssible, and vely. This 115 comp'3te determination is tlierefore a nnf;«« «,!,• i. • cre..o,a„ never be represented i„t tott ^^d f f^^ed therefore on an idea which belongs to rewo „„Tv SS. '" "^ — /the;ror i:'-;z tion of everything, is i Jf stTu L S l^^^^^^^^^ its predicates, and is conceived hv .T , ^^'^ *" of all possible P-^dicaterrld^nrthelro: T '""" amination that this idea as a fundamentaUotr„„ Tf " a number of predicates Uich, bZ dertat" v"' 7 "^ If w* consider all possible predicates not only Wicallv bii ranscendentally, that is, according to their !lt„^' which may be thought in ihem . X^, w fi„T that lot being . ... A transcendental negation signifies not being by itself, and is ,pp„sed to transcendental affirmation or a eomedimg thenotion of which in itself expressrbeZ' It .s called, therefo,^ reality (from m, a thL), because ^.rough u alone, and so far only as it r;aches, te obwl ^nething, while the opp^ite negation indicates a S e?e:^ti:"ng: " ""'^ "' """"' ""^'"^""^ "'« «"»--" All negative notions are therefore derivative, and it is the eahies which contain the data and, so t» sp^ak, he ma! terial, or the transcendental content, by which aconnUt, determination of all tilings becomes 'pZm ^ " It, therefore, our reason postulates a transcendental sub- as It were, the whole store of material whence all poss'hla predicates of thi«gs may be taken, we shall fi„' h^ f^l' If i 116 a Bubstratuuat is nothing but the idea of the sum total of re- ality (omnitudo realitatis). In that case all true negations are nothing but limitations, which they could not be unless there were the substratum of the unlimited (the All). By this complete possession of all reality we represent the notion of a thing hy itself as completely determined, and the notion of an ens realissimum is the notion of an indi- vidual being, because of all possible opposite predicates one, namely that which absolutely belongs to being, is found in its determination. It is therefore a transcendental ideal, which forms the foundation of the complete determination which is necessary for all that exists, and which constitutes at the same time the highest and complete condition of its possibility, to which all thought of objects, with regard to their content, must be traced back. It is at the same time the only true ideal of which human reason is capable, be- cause it is in thift case alone that a notion of a thing, which in itself is general, is completely determined by itself, and recognised as the representation of an individual. The transcendental major of the complete determination of all things is nothing but a representation of the sura total of all reality, and not only a notion which comprehends all predicates, according to thair transcendental content, under itself, but within itself ; and the complete determination of everything depends on the limitation of this total of re- ality, of which some part is ascribed to the thing, while the rest is excluded from it, a procedure which agrees with the aut aut of a disjunctive major, and with the determination of the object through one of tlie members of that division in the minor. It is self-evident that for that purpose, namely, in order sinjply to represent the necessary and complete determina- tion of things, reason does not presuppose the existence of a being that should correspond to the ideal, but its idea only, in order to derive from an unconditioned totality of complete determination the conditioned one, that is the to- tality of something limited. Reason therefore sees in the )tal of re- negations be unless 111). resent the ned, and r an indi- cates one, found in tal ideal^ •mination institutes ion of its regard to ame time pable, be- ig, which tself, and mination »nm total hends all nt, under mination tal of re- «rhile the with the mination division in order Jtermina- steuce of . its idea )tality of is the to- es in the 117 ideal theprototypon of all thing, which, a, imperfect copies (ectjpa), denve the material of their possibility CI TIT proachmg more or less nearlv fn it . . • . ' P" far from feachingit^^ '' y«' """"-ing always denVative ana the pofsiM,?^^^^ ir , ''"''i'^ "" ""«""''• ^»' »» "Vions (which really are the only predicates by which everything else fe d.st.ng„,shed from the truly real being), are limitatiLs only of a greater and, m the last instance, of the highest reTtv ZTTlIll' "•"''.?-'<""=" "> their contttdrt/d from It. All the raan.foldness of tilings consists only of so many modes of limiting the notion of the highest feali; t mt forms their common substratum, in the same way ll a^l figures are only different modes of limiting endless soaco Hence the object of its ideal which exists in'reas n only U ailed he «nyeW Being (ens originariam), and so fer L has nothing above it, tlie highest Being (en sumlm Id so far as everything as conditioned is sub ect to it, thTBe „g of all beings (ens entium). All this however doe^ not mean he objective relation of any real thing to other tirgsTbu" of the tdea to nohon,, and leaves us in perfect ignorance Z to the existence of a being of such superlative excellence many derivative beings, because these in realUy presuppose the ideronL '=''.'"!°\f "™ "'°'"""'"' "• it follows th" the deal of the original being must be conceived as simple The derivation of all other possibility from that origina being cannot therefore, if we speak accurately, be considered .IwfT "^■';, •"«'-' -"ty. and,^'it were,; J' come to us a mere aggregate of derivative befn-rs, which according to what we have just explained, is im^ol bl ,' though we represented it so in our first rou^h sketch. On SsibU tT^f n ;;?''"' "'"'^ """'"^ ^°™ *« l^-'' of *« possibility of all thinsrs as a caufie. nnrl n^f oo „ .,.^ ._._, • 7 "v-u wo C4 atAflt, C'lftUC/, 118 The manifolJncBS of things would not depend on the h'rn- itation of the original beinpj, but on its complete effect, and to thia alpo w^uld belong all our sensibility, together with all realiiT ia phenomenal appearance, which could not, as an ingredioat, belong to the idea of a supreme being. If we follow up this idea of ours and hypostasise it, we shall be able to detovmine the original being by means of the notion of the highest reality as one, siinj !e, all sufficient, eternal, &c., in omi3 word, determine it in it unconditioned completeness through all predicaments. The notion of such a being is the notion of God in its transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the object of a tran- pcenaenta) theology. l^y SI* h an employment of the transcendental idea, how- ever, we should be overstepping the limits of its purpose and admissibility, i^eason used it only, as being the notion of all rcHiity, for a foundation of the complete determination of things, without requiring that all this reality should be given objectively and constitute itself a thing. This is a mere fiction by which we comprehend and realise the man- ifold of our idea in one ideal, ss a particular being. We have no right to do this, not even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis ; nor do all the consequences which flow from such an ideal concern the complete determination of things in general, for the sake of which alone tiiu idea was necessary, or iniiuence it in the least. It is not enough to describe tlie procedure of our reason and its dialectic, we must try also to discover its sources, in order to be able to explain that illusion itself as a phenom- enon of the understiiading. The ideal of which we are speaking is founded on a natural, not on a purely :irbitrary idea. I ask, therefore, how does it happen that reasoi con- siders all the possibility of things as derived from one fun- damental possibility, namely, that of the highest reality, and then presupposes it as contained in a particular original being % 1 the li'm- sffect, and ther with lid not, as ing. sise it, we means of sufficient, mditioned on of such tal sense, of a iran- idea, how- irpose and notion of rmination should be This is a the man- ling. We possibility jes which rmination ! the idea )ur T'^^son sources, ifl phenom- h we are irbitrary 3aB0 con- 1 one fun- Bt reality, ir original -■mumm;- 119 ^rr Trr 'f "f'"^ '*"""* '" thodiseuMions of tho tran- "^"^s : ' f ' °- '"" •""""'"''y "' "'" obioc of' o," (namely tl,o emp.ncal form) can be thought a priori whZ w« constitutes the matter, the reality in the^I^m na (all that correBponds to sensation) must be .rivm, V without it it eould not even be though a rT poesibZ be represented An object of the seL can te eomS determined only when it is compared with all nblT . Z^ -l7--ed by thLniir rllTv^;: s\:'^apht:o'ro:;„t7yttr!:rf and as without this, the thin^ 'co.'.W To ZllZZi all, and as that in which the real of all phenomenal f^ven .8 what we call the one and all comprehending "xperen'^eTt ■s necessary that the material for the possibilify oTaTl o2 ts of our senses should be presupposed as given^n one who e on the l>m,tat.on of which alone the possibility ofaUem p.r.cal objects, their difference from e'ach otheland thS comple e determination can be founded. And since no other objects can be given us but those of the sen e" and nowhere but in the context of a possible experienr„othin^ can be an o^ect to us, if it does'not presuppose ^l/a^^^^f of all empirical reality, as the condition of its possibility Irihr r ""'t' '"r "> "« "« '«" '» insider 2; tiple which applies only to the objects of ow senses as « prmc p e valid for all things, and thus to take he e np'irTcal principle of our notions of the possibility of thinias pl^ priZle „Ytr'"'"f •['" "■■"■""■■»'•' - ^ transfendena, principle of the possibility of things in general reahtf r"'^' ^° bypostasise this idea of the whole of all trn™;^;! •? °T^ '" "'"■ "''""S'-S <"»'«eti»ally the dis- n toTe ";"^,.°^"^«.«»l'i"'-' ™e of our understanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole, ,nd th.n represent onrselves this whole of phenomena as an ndi- vidual thing containing in itself all empirical reality. Afterwards, by means of the aforementioned transcendental € m^'ii >! i'l l| 120 snbreption, this k taken for the notion of a thing standing at the head of the possibility of all things, and supplying the real conditions for their complete determination. Section III. — Th"i arguments of speculative keason IN PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SuPBEME BeiNG. If we odmit the existence of something, whatever it may be, we must also admit that something exists by necessity. For the contingent exists only under the condition of some- thing else as its cause, and from this the same conclusion leads us on till we reach a cause which is not contingent, and therefore unconditiox^ally necessary. This is the argu- ment on which reason founds its progress towards an or- iginal being. \ Now reason looks out for the notion of a being worthy of such a distinction as the unconditioned necessity of its ex. istence, not in order to conclude a priori its existence from its notion, (for if it ventured to do this, it might confine itself altogether to mere notions, without looking for a given existence as their foundation), but only in order to find among all notions of possible things one which has nothing incompatible with absolute necessity. For, that something absolutely necessary must exist, is regarded as certain after the first conclusion. And after discarding everything else, as incompatible with that necessity, reason takes the one being that remains for the absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity can be comprehended, that is, derived from its notion alone, or not. Now the being the notion of which contains a tlierefore for every wherefore, which is in no point and no respect defective, and is sufficient as a condition everj'where, seenib, on that account, to be most compatible with absolute necessity, because, being in possess- ion of all conditions of all that is possible, it does not re- quire, nay is not capable of any condition, and satisfies at standing supplying on. IEA80N BINO. er it may necessity. L of some- on elusion (Utingent, the argu- ds an or- w^orthy of of its ex. snce from it confine )r a given r to find 3 nothing omething tain after ling else, the one y being, I, derived e notion which is iient as a be most 1 possess- 8 not re- tisfieg at 'nil! IfH '' •tii :Hi mi it! lii m 121 It is true tl,at we oX^ItTo T, !," ^""" '»"'''"»"''- contain the hi.host a^d ir. '"'"''^ *''»' «"''»» do^e "ot does not exhibit the o„K dlrlcter .'''''""°' ^«' " existence, by which reason •"I?'''''™"'' "^ '"i<»nditioned eonditioned^b, .er^ rio!: r^T- ""^ ^^'"^ ^ - .n«4Vr,:the:e&l:'^'">l'"'V (ens rea.i.i. things to be the most comoatihL -.T ,""' "^ "" P«»^'We conditionally neeessaybd'ttdTl ■"•"""'"" "'' "" ""- that notion altogether v^^l t ""?'' " '"''•>' "<" ^"t^fy are forced to keep to ^ Li ** " ^"^'^ '» «'• ""d ^-e e.ice of a necesfary beL and'ir "'"^' ""' "^'^ "'^ -■•^'- pendent ofall condition .l/r." "'"* '^'"'"'"■^ '"de. f;esn,«eient rdtlrof^f, ^er'^ 'f t.:!:;''-'' '• T wJiich contains all realitv N^w , "^"'/^'^^ ^«. ^- that -lute unity, and i-npliefthe Z^ o? Ttf""" "" '-"^ supreme, reason concludes that tl,e S, T^' *""= *"<» on-ginal cause of all thinl ml •!?''"""' ^"'"^^ <« "'e If we accept ever;!,; f^C^re il j "'"'T^ 7' '^"^• we may infer rightlv from o. ■ ' '""«'='>''>»<, timt even my own onfv he^J , ^ ^7"" "^'*"'"«' (P<"-l».ps cessary being, 2 J' f ! t"" "' "" """'"'^'tioZuy „1 contaiL all f;:: ;;t'« ert o;:'ir"M'^^'','^^"'« -■-'' solutely unconditioned amUlt .- / T^"'""' "' ""^ tlm.K which is comSue i f * ?f' "'" """»» <"^ "'« •.een found, it follow vn!'*:'!"': "r^*^ "- '"» a notiOn 122 of a limited being, which does not possess the highest re- ality, is therefore contradictory to absolute necessity. For, thon^'h I do not find in its notion the unconditioned which carries the whole of conditions with it, this does not prove thatf for the same reason, its existence must be conditioned ; for I cannot say in a hypothetical argument, tliat if a cer- tain condition is absent (here the completeness according to notions), the conditioned also is absent. On the con- trary, it will be open to us to consider all the rest of limited beings as equally unconditioned, although we cannot from the seneral notion which we have of them deduce their necessity. Thus this argument would not have given us the least notion of the qualities of a necessary being, in fact it would not have helped us in the least. This argument, though it is no doubt transcendental, as based on the internal insufficiency of the contingent, is nevertheless so Simple and natural, that the commonest un- derstanding accepts it, if once led up to it. We see things change, arise and perish, and these, or at least their state, must therefore have a cause. Of every cause, however, that is given in experience, the same question must be asked. Where, therefore, could we more fairh place the last caus- ality, except where there exists also the supreme causality, that is in that Being, which originally contains in itself the sufficient cause for every possible effect, and the notion of which can easily be realised by the one trait of an all-com- prehending perfection ? That sjipreme cause we afterwards consider as absolutely necessary, because we find it absolute- ly necessary to ascend to it, while there is no ground for going beyond it. There are only three kinds of proofs of the existence of God, from speculative reason. • All the paths that can be followed to tliis end begin either from definite experience and the peculiar nature of the world of sense, known to us through expn, at first i familiar, ita intelll- ry propo- iangle has began to •ur under- it, by that is not the ["he above ibsolutoly istence of r. Never- powerful 1 notion a istence in with cer- to the ob- the thing warily be that the Y, because jpted vol- ccept the te and re- I hence, I ily. But IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I 1^12^ 115 Mli 2.0 ■^ y^ 112.2 u: us IM Ul liU 11.6 P> <^ /i .^ Photographic Sciences Corporation 73 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. M5«0 (716) 872-4503 125 if I reject the subject as well as the predicate, there is no contrad.ct.on, because there is nothing left that can be con- tradicted. To accept a triangle and yet to reject its three angles is contradictory, but there is no contradiction at all in admitting the non-existence of the triangle and of its three angles. The same applies to the notion of an abso- lutely necessary being. Remove its existence, and you re- move the «iing itself, with all its predicates, s^ that"^ con- tradiction becomes impossible. There is nothing external to which the contradiction could apply, because tiie thing IS not meant to be externally necessary ; nor is there any hing internal that could be contradicted, for in removing the thing out of existence, you have removed at the same ime all its internal qualities. If you say, God is almighty, that 18 a necessary judgment, because almightiness cannot be removed, if you accept a deity, that is, an infinite Being with the notion of which that other notion is identical. Butifyousay,God is not, then neither his almightiness nor any other of his predicates is given ; they are all, to- gether with the subject, removed out of existence, and there- fore there is not the slightest contradiction in that sentence Against all these general arguments (which no one can object to) you challenge me with a case, which you repre sent as a proof by a fact, namely, that there is one, and tliis one notion only, in which the non-existence or the removal of Its object would be self-contradictory, namely, the noiion ot the most real Being (ens realissimum). You say that it possesses all reality, and you are no doubt justified in ac- cepting such a Being as possible. Now reality comprehends existence, and therefore existence is contained in the notion of a thing possible. If that thing is removed, the internal possibility of the thing would be removed, and this is self- contradictory. I ask you, whether the proposition, that this or that thing (which, whatever it may be, I grant you as possible) exists, 18 an analytical or a synthetical proposition ? If the former then by its existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing; but in that case, either the thought within you ■i H 196 would be the thing itself, or yon have admitted existence, as belonging to possibility, and have thus apparently de- duced existence from internal possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The mere word reality, which in the notion of a thing sounds different from existence in the notion of the predicate, can make no difference. For if you call all accepting or positing (without determining what it is) reality, you have placed a thing, with all its predicates, within the notion of the subject, and accepted it as real, and you do nothing but repeat it in the predicate. If, on the contrary, you admit, as every sensible man must do, that every proposition involving existence is synthetical, how can you say that the predicate of existence does not admit of removal without contradiction, a distinguishing property which is peculiar to analytical propositions only, the very character of which depends on it ? The illusion, in mistaking a logical predicate for a real one (that is the predicate which determines a thing), resists all correction. Determination^ however, is a predicate, added to the notion of the subject, and enlarging it, and it must not therefore be contained in it. Being is evidently not a real predicate, or a notion of something that can be added to the notion of a thing. It 18 merely the admission of a thing, and of certain determi- nations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judg- ment. The proposition, God is almighty, contains two no- tions, each having its object, namely God, and almightiness. The small word is, is not an additional predicate, but only serves to put the predicate in relation to the subject. If, then, I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (in- cluding that of almightiness), and say, God is, or there is a God, I do not put a new predicate to the notion of God, but I only put the subject by itself, with all its predicates, in relation to my notion, as its object. Both must contain exactly the same kind of thing, and nothing can have been added to the notion, which expresses possibility only, by my thinking its object as simply given and saying, it is. existence, rently de- ls nothing ity, which cistence in 56. For if ning what predicates, 8 real, and If, on the it do, that itical, how not admit r property , the very for a real ig), resists predicate, ; it, and it notion of thing. It a determi- of a judg- is two no- lightiness. , but only bject. If, icates (in- there is a f God, but iicates, in jt contain have been ' only, by nng, it is. I 127 And thna the real does not contain more than the possible. tlnZrZ ''''\''''r'^ -1-"^-" a penny more than a hundred possible dollars. For as the latter signify the notion the former the object and its position by ifaelf it is clear that, in case the former contained more than the lat- ter, my notion would not express the whole object, and would not therefore be its adequate notion. I„ rny fi„an- c.a position no doubt there exists more by one hundred rea dollars, than by their notion only (that is their possi- bil. y , because m reality the object is not only contained analytically m my notion, but is added to my notion (which 18 a determination of my state), synthetically ; but the con- ceived hundred dollars are not in the least increased thro»<.h the existence which is outside my notion. ° By whatever and by however many predicates I may think a thing, (even in completely determining it), nothing 18 really added to it, if I add that the thing exists. If, then. I try to conceive a being, as the highest reality (without any defect), the question still remains, whether it exists or not For though in my notion there may be wanting nothing of the possible real content of a thing in general something is wanting in its relation to my whole state of thinking namely, that the knowledge of that object should be possible apostenori also. And here we perceive the cau^e of our difficulty. If we were concerned with an ob- ject of our senses, I could not mistake the existence of a thing for the mere notion of it ; for by the notion the object 18 thought as only in harmony with the general conditions of a possible empirical knowledge, while by its existence it 18 thought aa contained in the whole content of exoerience. Through this connection with the content of the whole ex- perience, the notion of an object is not in the least increased • our thought has only received through it one more possible perception. If, however, we are thinking existence through the pure category alone, we need not wonder that we can- not find any characteristic to distinguish it from mere possibility. ■■ 138 The notion of a Supreme Being is, in many respectB a very useful idea, but, being an idea only, it is quite incap- able of increasing, by itself alone, our knowledge with re- gard to what exists. It cannot even inform us further as to its possibility. Thus we see that the celebrated Leibniz is far from having achieved what he thought he had, namely, to understand a priori the possibility of so sublime an ideal Being. Time and labour therefore are lost on the famous onto- logical (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a Supreme Being from mere notions ; and a man might as well imagine that he could become richer in knowledge by mere ideas, as a merchant in capital, if, in order to improve his position, he were to add a few noughts to his cash account. Section V. — The impossibility op a Cosmologicai. Proof OF THE Existence of God. The cosmologicai proof retains the connection of absolute necessity with the highest reality, but instead of concluding, like the former, from the highest reality necessity in exist- ence, it concludes from the gi'^en and unconditioned ne- cessity of any being, its unlimited reality. We shall now proceed to exhibit and to examine this cosmologicai proof which Leibniz calls also the proof a contingentia mundi. It runs as follows: If thore exists anything, there must exist an absolutely necessary Being also. Now I, at least, exist ; therefore there exists an absolutely necessary Being. The iiiiaor contains an experience, the major the conclu- sion from experience in general to the existence of the necessary. This proof therefore begins with experience, and is not entirely a priori^ or ontological ; and, as the object of all possible experience is called the world, this proof is called the cosmologicai proof. As it takes no account of any peculiar pro}^?rty ot the objects of experience, by which ospects a te incap* with re- Lirther as I Leibniz , namely, an ideal lis onto- Supreme imagine re ideas, position, I. Proof absolute eluding, in exiet- 'ned ne- a\\ now al proof undi. re must at least, ' Being, conclu- of the nee, and J object proof is ount of Y which 129 this world of onre may differ from an^ «*u ie is distinguished, in^.s nT„oX "LI :hi'T'''''' "f''' logical proof, which employs as 2„,nZ, V^'"'"'!'^'^- the peculiar property oAhl TJZ^^'J^^^''''^"' "' -il Pos^ble opposite predicaL^i!;', s " i. ^C K termined completely by its own notion Th! • , ^"' notion ofathingpLL, ^rX:^o^:ZT erm,nes ,t, namely, that of thcensiClissi n^ra it fil therefore, that the notion of the ens realTs Zl • M ,'' one by which a necessary Being can be t „T Vj' Z^ fore .t ,s concluded that a Highest Being exisf by netX m„i!Ti'"'^"° "ony sophistical propositions in this cos- mological argument, that it reallv sPiTm.. .. -r , ° reason had spent all'herdialecSsWU o;derr:::^'d'"™ the greatest possible transcendental illusion Be ore' exam ining .t, we shall draw up a list of them hv „i • , has put lorward an old argument^Se ^ tw le" ■n order to appeal to the agreement of two witness el one realty there >s only one, namely, the first, who changes his dress and voice, ■„ order to be taken for a second. Wder to have a secure foundation, this proof takes its stand o„ experience, and pretends to be different from tie out Jog" cal pu :, which places its whole confidence in purenot^n. a pru,.. only The cosmological proof; howeve uses Z experience only in order to make one step, namdv t„ Vhl ex^tence of a necessary Being in general. VllTp'fope.u': hat Being may have, can never be learnt from the \mZ .cal argument, and for that purpose reason takes leave of t aUogether, and tries to find out, from among notions on ! «hat properties an absolutely necessary Being ousht I possess ..e. which among all possible things fontain n self t^ereqniste conditions (requisita) of aLlute n"ei on of an T V ''^^""^ ^^ '■^'^™ '° «"'«' '» *••« no- tion of an ens reahssimum only, and reason concludes at ■ 130 once, thftt this must bo tlie absolutely necessary Being. In this conclusion it is simply assumed that a notion of a being of the highest reality is perfectly adequate to the notion of absolute necessity in existence ; so that the former might be concluded from the latter. This is the same proposition aa that maintained in the ontological argument, and is simply taken over into the cosmological proof, nay made Its founda- tion, although the intention was to avoid it. It is clear that absolute necessity is an existence from mere notions. If then I say that the notion of the ens realissimum is such a notion, and is the only notion adequate to mcossary exist- ence, I am bound to admit that the latter may bo deduced from the former. The whole conclusive strength of the so- called cosmological proof rests therefore in reality on the ontological proof from mere notions, while the appeal to experience is quite superfluous, and, though it may lead us on to the notion 9f absolute necessity, it cannot demonstrate it with any definite object. If the proposition is right, that every absolutely necessary Being is, at the same time, the most real Being, (and this is the nervus probandi of the cosmological proof), it must, like all affirmative judgments, be capable of conversion, at least per accidens. This would give us the proposition that some entia realissima are at the same time absolutely ne- cessary beings. One ens realissimum, however, does not differ from any other on any point, and what applies to one, applies also to all. In this case, therefore, I may employ absolute conversion, and say, that every ens realissimum is a necessary being. As this proposition is determined by its notions a priori only, it follows that the mere notion of the ens realissimum must carry with it its absolute necess- ity ; and this, which was maintained by the ontological proof, and not recognised by the cosmological, forms really the foundation of the conclusions of the latter, though in a disguised form. We thus see that the second road, taken by speculative reason, in order to prove the existence of the highest Being, ieing. In )f a being notion of miglit be osition aa is simply ts foiinda- clear that tions. If is Buch a ary exist- ) deduced of the 80- ty on the appeal to ly lead us nonstrate necessary (and this , it must, ersion, at lition that lutely ne- does not ies to one, ly employ Bsimum is mined by notion of te necess- ntological *ms really ough in a jeculative [jst Being, t t e 6 131 but after a short cir u^S! ui k T ^ t "^" P*""' wh,-oh wohad abandoned for fts fake "^ '" ""^ "'" »"«' I said before, that a whole nest of H!=i„, »• . was hidden in that oosmolotic!^ 1„V 'ri'''™™'''"'''"* dental eriticism might e..^'2l!^'i Ztl't "TTn here enumerate them only, leaving h,^?u . ^ '*'*" .he reader to folW „p td'IZZV^Z^S^'' "' We find, first, the transcendental prinoinlplf • f ■ cause from the ^cidental. This prino nle If '^? * cple of causality has no meanin'-ty of a no. tt^ / i ""^ '■""'"^ <"''"'<"" ""J- internal oontrad^c ton) for he transcendental, which requires a princip e for' the practicability of such a synthesis, such princip ^how -er being applicable to the field of po sible e^peS t on.;" 132 Discovery and Explanation of the dialectical illusion in all trunsoendental proofs of the existence of a Necessary Being. Both proofs, hitherto attempted, were transcendental, that is, independent of empirical principles. What then in these transcendental proofs is the cause of the dialectical, but natural, illusion which connects the notions of necessity and of the highest reality, and realises and hypostasises that which can only be an idea ? If I am obliged to think something necessary for all ex- isting things, and at the same time am not justified in thinking of anything as irijtself necessary, the conclusion is inevitable : that necessity and contingency do not concern things themselves, for otherwise there would be a contra- diction, and that therefore neither of the two principles can be objective; but that they may possihly be subjective principles of reaston only, according to which, on one side, we have to find for all that is given as existing, something that is necessary, and thus never to stop except when we have reached an a priori complete explanation ; while on the other we must never hope for that completion, that is, never admit anything empirical as unconditioned, and thus dispense with its further derivation. In that sense both principles as purely heuristic and regulativey and afiecting the formal interests of reason only, may well stand side by side. For the one tells us that we ought to philosophise on nature as if there was a necessary first cause for everything that exists, if only in order to introduce systematical unity into our knowledge, by always looking for such an idea as an imagined highest cause. The other warns us against mistaking any single determination concerning the existence of things for such a highest cause, i. e. for something abso- lutely necessary, and bids us to keep the way always open for further derivation, and to treat it always as conditioned. It follows from this that the absolutely necessary must \ be accepted as outside the wo'dd^ because it is only meant to serve as a principle of the greatest possible unity of phen- , tAia I, a »» /Ut< '^u^^^^y,il,jj^^ a^^ u^j^^^f^ ^;,^nJL^^ u^a iC) **n *V u4l '*'**^ K-)^'£*^ (N C/A.h^-,f JU^*, i,> 133 omena of which it is the highest cause, and that it can never be reached in the world, because the second rule bids derivtr^'' ^'^ '°"'''^^' *" ^""^'"'^^ '*'"'"' ^^ *^^* ""^tj ^ The ideal of the Supreme Being is therefore, according to these remarks, nothing but a regulative principle of rea wo";iJ ff ^^'\"' *" '°"'^^'' "" composition in the world as If It arose from an all-sufficient necessary cause, in order to found on it the rule of a systematical unity neces- sary accord mg to general laws for the explanation of the world ; It does not involve the assertion of an existence necessary by itself. It is the same here, and as this sys- tematical unity of nature can in no wise become the prin- ciple of the empirical use of our reason, unless we base it on the Idea of an ens realissimum as the highest cause, it hap- pens quite naturally that we thus represent that idea as a real object, and tha' object again, as it is the highest con- dition, as necessary. Thus a regulatvoe principle has been changed into a constUutvve principle, which substitution becomes evident at once because, as soon as I consider that highest Being, which with regard to the world was abso- lutely (unconditionally) necessary, as a thing by itself, that necessity cannot be conceived, and can therefore have ex- isted m my reason as a formal condition of thought only and not as a material and substantial condition of existence Section VI.-— The impossibility of the Physico- theological proof. If, then, neither the notion of things in general, nor the experience of any existence in general can satisfy our de- mands, there still remains one way open, namely, to try whether any definite experience, and consequently that of things m the world as it is, their constitution and disposi- tion, may not supply a proof which could give us the certain I Ii 184 conviction of tlio existonoo of a Snproino Being. Such a proof wo should call physioo-theologioal. ' After wliat has boon said already, it will be easily under- stood that wo may oxpoct an easy and coniploto answer to this question. For how could there ever be an experience that should be adequate to an idea? It is the very nature of an idea that no experience can over be adequate to it. The transcendental idea of a necessary and all sufficient original Being is so overwhelming, so high above everything empirical, which is always conditioned, that we can nover find in experience enough material to fill such a notion, but can only grope about among things conditioned, looking in vain for tlio unconditioned, of which no rule of any empir- ical synthesis can over give us an example, or even show the way towards it. This proof will always deserve to be treated with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and most in conformity with human reason. It gives life to the study of nature, deriv- ing its own existence from it, and thus constantly acquiring new vigour. But although we have nothing to say against the reason- ableness and utility of this lino of argument, but wish, on the contrary, to commend and encourage it, we cannot approve of the claims which this proof advances to apodictic certainty, and to an approval on its own merits, requiring no favour, and no help from any other quarter. I therefore maintain that the physico-theological proof can never es- tablish by itself alone the existence of a Supreme Being, but must always leave it to the ontological proof (to which it serves only as an introduction), to supply its deficiency ; so that, after all, it is the ontological proof which contains the only possible argument (supposing always that any specula- tive proof is possible), and human reason can never do without it. The principal points of the physico-theological proof are the following. Ist. There are everywhere in the world clear indications of an intentional arrangement carried out Snoh A ]y under- mswer to Kporienco y nature ate to it. Bufliciont ^orything an never )tion, but )oking in \y enipir- sliow the 1 respect, lity with e, deriv- icquiring reason- wish, on ) cannot [ipodictic 'equiring therefore lever es- uing, but which it )ncy ; so tains the specnla- lever do roof are e world *ied out 18S hen, contingently only; timl is, the na „re of d fffre ^ nf r '"""' 'P™"'"~"«'^. I>y the combination of r„ had not been selected and arranged on pnrpo e by a ration. disposing principle, according to certain f,mdan,en™at Srdly. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (or many), which must be the cause of the worM not "„' /«o»«*"«8pond to our pure Idea though no e.,perience can ever be adequate to it IZ cording to our former proofs, all syntlieticdknowledi ^ ^or^ IS possible only, if it conforms to thettmaf con ditions of a possille experience. All these prinries „ere" fore are of immanent validity only that is ^^^l main within the sphere of o^cts'of ": i 'c^'lLT.'edgT or of phenomena. Nothing, therefore, can be achieved by a transcendental procedure with refer;nce to the heolo.y of a purely speculative reason. neology Although then reason, in its purely speculative annlica u>n IS utter y insufficient for this great undertakin^Tamt y, to prove the existence of a Supreme Being it has ne!er Knowledge of it, it ,t can he acquired from elsewhere to n ake It ..onsistent with iUelf and every intelligiMe ^^w ti „ 7'"T ' *Tn "'"'•' """S incompatible with thetiol Mk imm 138 In spite of its insuflSciency, therefore, transcendental the- ology has a very important negative use, as a constant test of our reason, when Ovjcupied with pure ideas only, which, as such, admit of a transcendental standard only. For the purely speculative use of reason, therefore, the Supreme Being remains, no doubt, an ideal only, but an ideal without a Jlaw^ a notion which finishes and crowns the whole of human knowledge, and the objective reality of which, though it cannot be proved, can neither be disproved in that way. If then there should be an Ethico-theology to supply that deficiency, transcendental theology, whii!h before was problematical only, would prove itself indispensable in determining its notion, and in constantly testing reason, which is 80 often deceived by sensibility, and not even al- ways in harmony with its own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, extra-mundane existence (not as a world-soul), eter- nity, free from conditions of time, omnipresence, free from conditions of space, omnipotence, &c., all these are tran- scendental predicates, and their purified notions, which are required for every theology, can be derived from transcend- ental theology only. antal the- Jtant test y, which, 3fore, the r, but an d crowns reality of iisproved eology to t ;h before nsable in g reason, even al- infinitj, »ul), eter- free from are tran- rhich are •anscend- KRITIK OF PRACTICAL REASON. Preface. and^Zr r'^'"''"yP™f<='''. itproveBit, own reality and that of ,t8 notions by fact, and all disputation against the possibihty of its being real futile. With this fa!X IvTth r K <"'*" " "•" "'^'•"'•'^ ■' fr-""", name! Iy,m that absolute sense in which speculative reason re- qu.red ,t ,n ,ts use of the notion of causality in order To escape the antmomy into which it inevitably falls, when n the chain of cause and effect it tries to think the uneZ d^t^oned Speculative reason could only exhibit thta nS (of freedom) problematically as not impossible to though Freedom, however, is the only one of all the ideas of the peculative reason of which we know the possibility a JoH dTt'ion"" ' .r'™'*, r '^'■"^"""""S ■■')• •'-""- " i« thf con dition of the moral law which we know. Freedom is the raho e,se,ult of the moral law, while the moral law is th! raUo cogno^cendi of freedom. For had not the moral law been previously distinctly thought incur reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in mmming such a thin^ as freedom, although it be not contradictory. But werf there no freedom it would be impomUe to t^ace the moral W m ourselves at all. The ideas of Goi and 7„™^. Mtty, however, are not conditions of the moral law but miLT !^™^ "^ "f """"''^'•y "•'J^'" »<' » "'» deter- mined by this law; that is to say, conditions of the prao twal use of our pure reason. Hence with respect to these .dens we cannot affirm that we know and undermnd, I will not say the actuality, but even the possibility of them However they are the conditions of the application of .he 140 morally determined will to its object, which is given to it a priori^ viz., the summum bonum. Consequently in this practical point of view their possibility must be as8umedj although we cannot theoretically know and understand it. To justify this assumption it is sufficient in a practical point of view that they contain no intrinsic impossibility (contra- diction). Here we have what, as far as speculative Reason is concerned, is a merely subjective principle of assent, which, however, is objectively valid for a Reason equally pure but practical, and this principle, by means of the notion of free- dom, assures objective validity and authority to the ideas of God and immortality. Nevertheless the theoretical know- ledge of reason is not hereby enlarged, but only the possi- bility is given, which heretofore was merely & problem, and now becomes assertion, and thus the practical use of reason is connected with the elements of theoretical reason. Book I. — Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. Chapter I. — The Principles of Pure Practical Reason. /'ti ! §1. Practical Principles are propositions which contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or Maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or practical laws, when the con- dition is recognised as objective, that is, valid for the will of every rational being. § 2. Theorem 1. All practical principles which presuppose an object (mat- ter) of the faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will, are empirical, and can furnish no practical laws. By the matter of the faculty of desire I mean an object tlie actual existence of which is desired. Now if the desire for this object precedes the practical rule, and is tlie condition iven to it ly in this assumed^ }r8tand it. tical point ;y (contra- ire Reason nt, which, pure but )n of free- le ideas of cal know- the possi- iblem, and of reason 3n. ISON. \ Reason. contain a it several when the ly for his n the con- r the will ject (mat- rmination tical laws, abject the desire for condition 141 of o„r making it a principle, then I say, in the first place th.8 pnnc.p e is n that case wholly empirical, for thenV^^Ti iXTT^i ":TT *'' ^'^^ ^'^" «^i^^*' -d that re- lation of th,8 ,dea to the subject by which its faculty of de- ire IS deternjmed to its realization. Such a relation to the 81 bject IS called the^^.a^.. in the existence of an object Th.8 tneu must be presupposed as a condition of the possi- bihty of determination of the will. But it is impossible to coZclTTI ; ""' '^'^ '' '" ^'J^^* "^^ther it will be connected with pleasure or pain, or be indifferent. In such ^ase8, therefore, the determining principle of the choice 2 8t be empirical and, therefore, also the practical mate- rial principle which presupposed it as a condition. Jn the second place, since susceptibility to a pleasure or pam can be known only empirically, and cannot hold in the same degree for all rational beings, a principle which is based on this subjective condition may serve indeed as a ^a^mforthe subject which possesses this susceptibility but not as a law even to him, (because it is wanting in ob- jective necessity, which must be recognised a priori); it follows, therefore, that such a principle can never furnish a practical law. § 3. Theorem 2. All material practical principles as such are of one and the same kind, and come under the general principle of self- love or private happiness. ^ Pleasure arising from the idea of the existence of a thing in 80 far as it is to determine the desire of this thing, is founded on the smceptibilUy of the subject, since it depends on the presence of an object ; hence it belongs to sense teeling), and not to understanding, which expresses a re- lation of the idea to an object according to notions, not to the subject according to feelings. It is then practical only in 60 far as the faculty of desire is determined by the sensation of agreeableness which the subject expects from the actual existence of the object. Now a rational being's conscious- 142 ness of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompany- ing his whole existence is happiness, and the principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of the will is the principle of self-love. Corollary. ^ • All material practical rules place t!. ; determining prin- ciple of the will in the lower desireSy and if there were no purely formal laws of the will adequate to determine it, then we could not admit any higher desire at all. § 4. Theorem 3. A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal laws, unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will, not by their matter, but by their form only. ' By the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the will. This object is either the determining ground of the will or it is not. In the former case the rule of the will is subjected to an empirical condition (viz., the relation of the determining idea to the feeling of pleasure and pain), consequently it cannot be a practical law. Now, when we abstract from a law all matter, i.e., every object of the will (as a determining principle) nothing is left but the mere form of a universal legislation. Therefore either a rational being cannot conceive his subjective practical principles, that is, his maxims as being at tlie same time universal laws, or he must suppose that their mere form by which they are fitted for universal legislation is alone what makes them practical laws. § 5. Problem 1. Supposing that the mere legislative form of maxims is alone the sufficient determining principle of a will, to find the nature of the will which can be determined by it alone. Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by ompany- >le which ' the will ng prin- were no rmine it, jractical es which sir form le object : ground e of the relation id pain), vhen we the will le mere rational inciples, ml laws, they are 33 them ixims IS , to find it alone, sived by 148 reason, and is therefore not an object of the Benses, and con- Bequontly does not belong to the cla88 of phenomena, it follows that the idea of it, which doterminea the will, is dis- tinct from all the principles that determine events in nature according to the law of causality, because in their case the deternunmg principles must themselves be phenomena. Wow !f no other determining principle can serve as a law for the will except that universal legislative form, such a will must be conceived as quite independent on the natural law of phenomena in their mutual relation, namely, the law of causality; such independence is c^Wed freedom in the strictest that is in the transcendental sense; consequently, a will which can have its law in nothing but the mere Wis- lative form of the maxim is a free will. § 6. Problem 2. ^ Supposing that a will is free, to End the law which alone 18 competent to determine it necessarily. Since the matter of the practical law, i.e., an object of the maxim, can never be given otherwise than empirically and the free will is independent on empirical conditions (that 18 conditions belonging to the world of sense) and yet 18 determinable, consequently a free will must find its principle of determination in the law, and yet independently ot the matter of the law. But, besides the matter of the law, nothing is contained in it except the legislative form. It is the legislative form, then, contained in the maxim, which can alone constitute a principle of determination of the will. Fundamental law of the pure Practical Reason. Act 80 that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation. Corollary. Pure reason is practical of itself alone, and gives (to man) a universal law which we call the Moral Law. 144 ifil § 8. Theorem 4. The Autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws, and of all duties which conform to them ; on the other hand, heteronomy of the will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, on the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof, and to the morality of the will. In fact the sole principle of morality consists in the independ- ence on all matter of the law (namely, a desired object), and in the determination of the will by the mere universal legis- lative form of which its maxim must be capable. Now this independence is freedom in the negative sense, and this self- legialation of the pure, and, therefore, practical reason, is freedom in the positive sense. Thus the moral law expresses nothing else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason that is, of freedom ; and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, an^d on this condition only can they agree with the supreme practical law. If therefore the matter of the volition, which can be nothing else than the object of a desire that is connected with the law, enters into the prac- tical law, as the condition of its posmbility, there results heteronomy of choice, namely, dependence on the physical law that we should follow some impulse or inclination. In that case the will does not give itself the law, but only the precept how rationally to follow pathological laws ; and the maxim, which, in such a case, never contains the univer- sally legislative form, not only produces no obligation, but is itself opposed to the principle of'a pure practical reason, and, therefore, also, to the moral disposition, even though the resulting action may be conformable to the law. Deduction of the fundamental principles of the pure Practical Rer,son. This Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical, that is, can of itself determine the will independently of anything empirical; and this it proves by a fact in which pure reason in us proves itself actually practical, namely. pie of all them ; on cannot be ^ opposed I will. In independ- ject), and Tsal legis- Now this I this self- reason, is expresses al reason, condition ley agree matter of bject of a the prac- re results I physical Ltion. In only the ; and the 3 univer- ition, but il reason, n though [re practical, lently of n which namelv- us u'b L» I^ I " '"'?'"'•""■'"« "'" will t., „;,i„„. it snows at tlio aumo t mn tl...f *i ; *• . . . cnnucted with tl,o cI»oi 1' ' '? '" '"""■|'"™'''y nay, is idonticul with ^ , '''*"■''"'" "* ""> "-i" ; "iHos itaelf H» ,,c,.e.«urily ^mI L ,, , ^ " ''™"«- lik« utl,„r offidct cuuBCB vc ' 1 '"■" "* """""'"y oo„B„i„u»'„ot h, vinuo :^ , ii s ;,;;: r:;l "i;"f • i:r.:^;riirddfr^^^^^ proved that if freedom i, Zji .'atcd If T • T" '""''"'"'™ into an i„.elligi,,le order of tldlg^ "' "' " '"""^•"" '« ;:rr==-f-~iSi the,r ox.»teneo nnder laws e..,piri,»lly eonditio ,S will rum the ,,„i„t of view „f real, i, L J l^' tI .' cn,ensd,e nature of the sa,„o l,ei„g,,„„ „,„ J,, ^/' tl.e.r existence according t„ law, which are inde Id""^;! e c.ry e„,p,nc„l condition, and, therefore, belong to tie aW««„«y „, ,,„„ reason. And, since the law, iTy wh d! he existence of thing, .lepen.l, on co.nitio Ire ,.,ta uporscnsihle nature, ,o far as we can form any no io J,'!' .s nothing else than a «j.Um of nature nn -"-"'U^i of the action for in this case it is not the object, but the law Theonr i-'": '%"" ''^"'™''"'"« P"-'P'o o*" the action The only objects of practical Reason are therefore those of good and mi. For by the former i. meant an ob ecTne cesaanly desired according to a principle of Reason ; by tTe Since pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any idea of a, _bject aprM, the philosopher who thought hLself obliged to make a feeling of pleasure the foundation of hL mora judgments would call that good which is a m«rto the ple,.ant,and eWi what is a cause of nnpleasantnerid pain. The prac ,cal maxwns which would follow from the aforesaid principle of the good being merely a means, wonW never contain as the object of the will anything Lod i„ Itself but only something good /„r .m^^iw ; the good would always be merely the useful, and that tor whiclun useful must always lie outside the will, in sensation. WeU or iU always implies only a i-eterence to our con- dition, as ^eaeant or unpleasant, as one of pleasure or pain and ,t w, desire or avoid an object on this account, it is onl^ BO far as it is referred to our sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or pain that it produces. But good or eml aK way, implies a reference lo the will, as determined by the law of reason, to make something its object. Good and evil herefore are properly referred to actions, not to the sensations of the person, and if anything is to be good or evil absolutely, or ie to be so esteemed, it can onl/be th« 148 manner of acting, the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil man that can be 80 called, and not a thing. Either a rational principle is already conceived, as of it- self the determining principle of the will, without regard to possible objects of desire (and therefore by the mere legis- lative form of the maxim), and in that case that principle is a practical a priori law, and pure reason is supposed to be practical of itself. The law in that case determines the will directly ; the action conformed to it is good in itself; a will whose maxim always conforms to this law is good ab- solutely in every respect, and is the supreme condition of all good. Or the maxim of the will is consequent on a deter- mining principle of desire which presupposes an object of pleasure or pain, something therefore i\\?it pleases or dis- pleases, and the maxim of reason that we should pursue the former and avoid the latter, determines our actions as good relatively to our inclination, that i>*, good indirectly {i.e, relatively to a different end to which they are means), and in that case these maxims can never be called laws, but may be called rational practical precepts. The notions of good and evil, as consequences of the a priori determination of the will, imply also a pure practical principle, and therefore a causality of pure reason ; they are all modes {modi) of a single category, namely, that of caus- ality, the determining principle of which consists in the rational conception of a law, which as a law of freedom reason gives to itself, thereby a, priori proving itself prac- tical. However as the actions on the one side come under a law which is not a physical law, but a law of freedom, and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in the world of intelligence, yet on the other side as events in the world of sense they belong to phenomena; hence the determina- tions of a practical reason are only possible in reference to the latter, and therefore in accordance with the categories of the understanding ; not indeed with a view to any the- oretical employment of it, i.e., so as to bring the manifold of qnently t can be aa of it- }gard to re legis- rinciple )08ed to ines the itself; food ah- n of all !i deter- )ject of or dia- '8116 the aa good ^y {i.e, la), and ut may f the a ractical hey are )f caus- in the reedora If prac- i under )in, and i world } world srmina- mce to egories i\y the- ifold of ■ 149 (eensible) perception under one i^omciox^meBB a priori • but only to Bubject the manifold or desires to the unity of eon. 8c.ou8ne88 of a practical ro,«on, giving its commands in the moral law, i.e., to a pure will a priori, Typio of the Pure Practical Judgment. It is tlie notions of good and evil that first determine an object of the w,ll. They themselves, however, are subject to a practical ru o of reason, which, if it is pure reason, de- termines the will a priori relatively to its object. Now >vhether an action which is possible to us in the world of sense, comes under the rule or not, is a question to be de- cided by the practical Judgment, by which what is said in the rule universally (in abstraoto) is applied to an action in ooncreto. The moral law has no faculty but the understanding to aid Its application to physical objects (not the imagination) • and the understanding for the purposes of the Judgment can provide for an idea of the reason, not a schema of the sen- Bibility but a law, though only as to its forms as law ; such a law, however, as can be exhibited in concreto in objects of the senses, and, therefore, a law of nature. We can there- tore call this law the Type of the moral law. The rule of the Judgment according to laws of pure prac- tical reason is this : ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the system of nature of which you were yourself a part, you could regard it as possible by your own will. Everyone does, in fact, decide by this rule whether actions are good or evil. It is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as the type of a supersensible system of things, pro- vided I do not transfer to the latter the perceptions, and what depends on them, but merely refer to it the form of law in general. For laws, as such, are so far identical no matter from what they derive their determining prin- ciples. 150 Chatter TIT. — The Motives op Pure Practical Hbabok. Whut is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral law should directly determine the will. If the de- termination of the will takes place in conformity indeed to the moral law, but only by d sans of a feeling, no matter of what kind, which has to be presupposed in order that the law may be sufficient to determine the will, and therefore not,/<9r the sake of the law^ then the action will possess le- gality but not morality. Now, if we understand by motive the subjective ground of determination of the will of a being whose Reason does not necessarily conform to the objective law, by virtue of its own nature, then it will follow, first, that no motives can be attributed to the Divine will, and that the motives of the human will (as well as that of every created rational being) can never be anything else than the moral law, and consequently that the objective principle of determination must always and alone be also the subject- ively sufficient determining principle of the action, if this is not merely to fulfil the letter of the law without containing its spirit. Pure practical reason only checks selfishness, looking on it as natural and active in us even prior to the moral law, BO far as to limit it to the condition of agreement with this law, and then it is called rational aelf-love. But vanity Reason strikes down altogether, since all claims to sell- esteem which precede agreement with the moral law are vain and unjustifiable. Therefore, tlie moral law breaks down self-conceit. But as this law is something positive in itself, namely, the form of an intellectual causality, that is, of freedom, it must be an object of respect ; for by opposing the subjective antagonisms of the inclinations it weakens self-conceit, and since it even Ireaks down^ that is, humili- ates vanity, it is an object of the highest respect, and con- sequently is the foundation of a positive feeling which is not of empirical origin, but ie known a priori. Therefore, respect for the moral law is a feeling which is ^ oduced by ISASON. that the the de- deed to atter of hat the lerefore 38688 le- motive a being )jective T, first, ill, and f every lan the 3iple of lubject- f this is taining mg on al law, ith this vanity to selt- aw are breaks itive in that is, •posing eakena lumili- id con- hich is irefore, ced by 151 an intellectual cause, and this feeling is the only one that we know quite a priori, and the necessity of which we can perceive. While the moral law, therefore, is a formal determining principle of action by practical pure reason, and is moreover a material though only objective determining principle of the objects of action as called good and evil, it is also a sub- jective determining principle, that is, a motive to this ac- tion, inasmuch as it has influence on the morality of the subject, and produces a feeling conducive to the influence of the law on the will. The respect for the law is not a mo- tive to morality, but ^s morality itself subjectively consid- ered as a motive, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by re- jecting all the rival pretensions of self-love, gives authority to the law which now alone has influence. Now it is to be observed that as respect is an efi'ect on feeling, and there- fore on the sensibility of a rational being, it presupposes this sensibility, and therefore also the finiteness of such beings on whom the moral law imposes respect ; and that respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being or to any being free from all sensibility, and in whom there- fore this sensibility cannot be an obstacle to practical reason. Respect for the moral law is therefore the only and the undoubted moral motive, and this feeling is directed to no object, except on the ground of this law. Critical examination of the analytic of Pure Practical Reason. In order to remove the apparent contradiction between freedom and the mechanism of nature in one and the same action, wo must remember what was said in the Kritik of Pure Reason, or what follows therefrom ; viz., that the ne- cessity of nature, which cannot co-exist with the freedom of the flubject, appertains only to the attributes of the thing that is subject to time- conditions, consequently only to those of the acting subject as a phenomenon ; that therefore in this respect the determining principles of every action of 152 the same reside in what belongB to past time, and is no longer in his power (in wliich mnst be included his own past actions and the character that these may determine for him in his own eyes as a phenomenon). But the very same subject being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing in himself, considers his existence also in so far as it is not subject to time-conditions, and regards himself, as only determinable by laws which he gives himself through reason ; and in this his existence nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will, bnt every action, and in gen- eral every modification of his existence varying according to his internal sense, even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being, is in tiie consciousness of his supersen- sible existence nothing but the result, and never to be re- garded as the determining principle, of his causality as a noumenon. In this view now the rational being can justly say of every unlawful action that he performs, that he could very well have left it undone ; although as appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past, and in this respect is absolutely necessary ; for it, with all the past which deter- mines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of his char- acter which he makes for himself, in consequence of which he imputes the causality of those appearances to himself as a cause independent on sensibility. There still remains a difiiculty in the combination of free- dom with the mechanism '^f nature in a being belonging to the world of sense. The difficulty is as follows :—EvenMf it is admitted that the supersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action, although as a subject also belonging to the world of sense, he is under mechanical conditions with respect to the same action, still, as soon as we allow that God as universal first cause is also the cause of the existence of substance it seems as if we must admit that a man's actions have their determining principle in something which is wholly out of his power— mmely, in the causality of a Supreme Being distinct from himself, and on whom his own existence and id 18 no bis own termiue ;ie very mself as ^far as tiself, as through dent to in gen- cording tistence persen- ) be re- ity as a 1 justly e could )ce it is spect is 1 deter- is char- ' which aself as of free- zing to id that 1 given orld of to the iversal mce it } their out of Being CQ and ^mJ ^^^^S^^ BB bI^B • • 153 .he whole determination of hi, ca„s.Iit, are absolutely de- ?..ecre^,t1::7Sl X^aZl^^^^^^^^^^^ Belves, since the notion of creation r" flT '" ""™- eensible form of represen.lZ f ^ ""' ^^""^ '<> «'« but can only be referX ""''"""" "' '» ««"»»'''«y. I BO far regaM them as noum n " A " t tnirb:""''"' ances, so also it is a eontrnr1i'nf;«« *^ .i »HP*5»r- « the cause of actiontttt h"o I farr"?'' as appearances alH.nna.], it • .1 ' ^' therefore of the acti„r^r„t^Lc^\:tr:r i'^ ""'•"•' possible to affirm freedom in «T "^"f^^na). It now it is ofactionsasap^IiltV^^ something that belonc.« .17 , ^^"^"^'"^ existence in time as ■nmmg principle of the appearances. '^''""'• DiALEo™ OF Pbbe Peaottoal Eeaso.,. , Chaptee I.-D,ALHcr.o ok P™e Pbactioal Eeasok GENERALLY. LmscTvef ^' ""' "'" """ ""'^ "^ 'o-d '" "'-gB in • It maj be been in detail in tb^ v^un. -i-« -r. — ""^ -^xitiiv ui r ure Eeasou how ^ 164 in its speculative employment tins natural dialectic is to bo solved, and how the error which arises from a very natural illusion may be guarded against. But reason in • its prac- tical use is not a whit better off. As pure practical reason it likewise seeks to find the unconditioned for the practically conditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural wants), and this not as the determining principle of the will, but even when this is given (in the moral law) it seeks the un- conditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason under the name of t\\Q 8 ummum Bonum. The moral law is the sole determining principle of a pure will. But since this is merely formal (viz : as prescribing only the form of the maxim as universally legislative) it ab- stracts as a determining principle from all matter, that is to say, from every object of volition. Hence though the sum- mum homim may be the whole ohject of a pure practical reason, i.e., a pure will, yet it is not on that account to be regarded as its determining principle ; and the moral law alone must be regarded as the principle on which that and its realization or promotion are aimed at. If we assume any object under the name of a good as a determining prin- ciple of the will prior to the moral law, and then deduce from it the supreme practical principle, this would always introduce heteronomy and crush out the moral principle. Chapter II. — The Dialectio of Pure Reason in definino THE conception OF THE 8UMMUM BONUM. The conception of the sammum itself contains an am- biguity which might occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it. The summum may mean either the su- preme {aupremum) or the perfect {consummatum). The former is that condition which is itself unconditioned, i.e.^ is not subordinate to any other {originarium) : the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the same kind {perfectisaivium). It has been shown in the An- to bo latural I prac- reason tically vantB)) ill, but be un- reason a pure jribing ) it ab- at is to e 8um- ■actical t to be al law at and assume g prin- dednce always iple. CFININO an am- we did the su- ). The ed, i.e.^ second J of the the An- |^H||. IB ilH '* wm H i m 1^ m I Mil 1 m ■-i! MM) 9 It 165 .lytic that virtue (^, worthiness to be happy) is the srcpreme condUton of ^\\ that can appear to m des:ral,le, and conse- quently of al our pursuit of happiness, and is therefore the Hupreme good. But it does not follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the desires of rational finite beings: for this requires happiness also, and that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes himself an end • but oven lu the judgment of an impartial reason, wliich re- gards persons in general as ends in theinselveB. Now inas- much as virtue and happiness together constitute the poss- ession of the summum bonum in a person, and the distri- bution of happiness in exact proportion to morality (which 18 the worth of the person, and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world ; hence this summum bonum expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which, however, virtue as the condition is always the su- preme good, since it has no condition above it; whereas liappiness, while it is plensant to the possessor of it, is not of Itself absolutely and in all respects good, but always pre- supposes morally right behaviour as its condition. I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason. In the summum bonum which is practical for us ie to be realised by our will, virtue and happiness are thought as necessarily combined, so that the one cannot be assumed by pure practical reason without the other also being attached to It; consequently either the desire of happiness must bo the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The first is abso- lutely impossible, because (as was proved in the Analytic) maxims which place the determining principle of the will in the desire of personal happiness are not moral at all, and no virtue can be founded on them. But the second is aUo impossible, because the practical connexion of causes and effects in the world as the result of the determination of the will, does not depend upon the moral dispositions of the 156 will, but on the knowledge of tlie laws of nature and the; physical power to use them for one's purposes. II. Ctitical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason. The first of the two propositions : That the endeavour after happiness produces a virtuous mind, is absolutely false ; but the second : That a virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness, is not absolutely false, but only in so far as virtue is considered as a form of causality in the sensible world, and consequently only if I suppo-^e existence in it to be the only sort of existence of a rational being; it is then only oonditionally false. But as I am not only justified in think- ing that I exist also as a noumenon in a world of the un- derstanding, but even have in the moral law a purely in- tellectual determining principle of my causality (in the sen- sible world), it is npt impossible that morality of mind should have a connexion us cause with happiness (as an effect in the sensible world) if not immediate yet mediate (viz : through an intelligent author of nature), and more- over necessary. .■'.'■[• • IT. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason. The realization of the summum bonum in the world is, the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law. But in this will i\\Q perfect accordance of the mind with the moral law is the supreme condition of the summum bonum. This then must be possible, as^well as its object, since it is contained in the command to promote the latter. Now the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is holiness^ a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only be found in a progress in infinitum towards that perfect Jlccordance, and on the principles of pure prac- tical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical pro- 4-Vi-W«» t»»1 :n the • vonr ( Use ; uces irtue orld, ethe only link- B nn- f in- > sen- mind 48 an diate nore- •Id is noral mind mnih bject, atter. 1 law f the ence. isary, vards prac- pro- :^£ 15T Now, this endless ^rogress is only possible on the suppo-' sition of an etidless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summumbonum then practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality being inseparably connected with the moral law is a Postulate of pure practical reason : (by which I mean a theoretical proposition, not demonstrable as such, but which is an inseparable result of an uncon- ditioned a priori j^z-ac^icanaw). V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason. The moral law must also lead us to affirm the possibility of the second element of the sumraum bonum, viz., Hap- piness proportioned to that morality, and this on grounds as disinterested as bv^fore, and solely from impartial reason; that is, it must lead to the supposition of the existence of a^ cause adequate to this eflfect, in other words it must postu- ' late the existence of God^ as the necessary condition of the possibility of the summum bonum (an object of the will which is necessarily connected with the moral legislation of pure reason.) Happiness is the condition of \ rational being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and will ; it rests therefore on the harmony of physical nature with his whole end, and likewise with the essential determining principle of his will. Now the moral law as a law of freedom commands by determining principles which ought to be quite independent on nature and on its haf- mony with our faculty of desi.'e (as springs). But the act- ing rational being in the world is not tlie cause of the \^orld and ot nature itself. There is not the least ground . therefore in the moral laW for a necessary connexion be- tween morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as part of it, and therefore dependent on it, and which for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature, nor by his own power make it thor- \ 158 oughly harmonise, as far as his happiness is concerned, with his practical principles. Nevertheless, in the practical problem of pure reason, *.«., the necessary pursuit of the Bummum bonum, such a connexion is postulated as neces- sary: we ought to endeavour to promote the suramum bonum, which therefore must be possible. Accordingly the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature it- self and containing the principle of this connexion, namely, of the exact harmony of happiness with morality, is also postulated. Now this supreme cause must contain the principle of the harmony of nature not merely with a law of the will of rational beings, but with the conceptibn of this law in so far as they make it the supreme determin- ing principle of the will, and consequently not merely with the form of morals, but with their morality as their motive, that is, with their moral character. Therefore the Bummum oonum i^ possible in the world only on the supposition of a supreme Nature having a causality corresponding to moral character. Now a being that is capable of acting on the conception of laws, is an intelh- gence (a rational being) and the causality of such a being according to this conception of laws is his will; therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed as a condition of the summum bonum, is a being which is the cause of nature by intelligence and will, consequently its author, that is God. VI. The Postulates of Pure Practical Rbason in General. These postulates are not theoretical dogmas, but suppos- itions practically necessary ; while then they do not ex- tend our speculative knowledge, they give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their reference to what is practical), and give it a right to notions, the possibility even of which it could not otherwise venture to affirm. These postulates are those of immortality, freedom pos- •f.v^w nr.r^o.\(\t^Tf^A (m the causalltv of a being so far as he with 3tical ►f the leces- mum J the re it- tnely, ) also n the 1 law )fthi8 rmin- lerely their refore )n the isality bat iB nielli- being refore •8ed as is the tly its 1. nppos- ot ex- peality ans of ght to erwise n pos- ' as he 159 belongs to the intelligible world), and the existence of Ood. ^\iQ first refiults from the practically necessary condition of a duration adequate to the complete fulfilment of the moral law; the *«c«>nc? from the necessary supposition of independ- ence on the sensible world and of the faculty of determining one's will according to the law of an intelligible world, that is, of freedom ; the third from the necessary condition of the existence of the summum bonum in such an intelligible world, by the supposition of the supreme independent good, that is, the existence of God. YIII. Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason. A requirement of pure practical reason is based on a duty^ that of making something (the summum bonura) the object of ray will so as to promote it with all my powers ; in which case I must suppose its possibility, and consequently also the conditions necessary thereto, namely, God, freedom, and immortality ; since I cannot prove these by my speculative reason, although neither can I refute them. This duty is founded on something that is indeed quite independent on these suppositions, and is of itself apodictically certain, namely, the moral law ; and so far it needs no further sup- port by theoretical views as to the inner constitution of things, the secret final aim of the order of the world, or a presiding ruler thereof, in order to bind me in the most per- fect manner to act in unconditional conformity to the law. KRITIK OF JUDGMENT. PBEFAdS. The object of this work is to make a critical examination of Judgment, the faculty which forms the connecting link between Understanding and Reason. The questions to be considered are these : Are there a priori principles of Judg- ment ? Arc these constitutive or merely regulative ? Does Judgment give rules a priori to the feeling of pleasure and pain, as Understanding prescribes laws to knowledge and Beason to desire ? From the nature of tiie case it is easy to see how very difficult it must be to show that there is any principle pe- culiar to judgment. For such a principle cannot be derived d priori from notions of the understanding, since judgment does not originate such notions, but merely applies them. Judgment must rather supply a notion which serves as a rule for its own guidance, without adding anything to our knowledge of things. The difficulty of finding any principle of judgment, whether it be su])jective or objective, is felt most keenly in the case of aesthetic judgments, — those, faamely, which are concerned with the beautiful and the uablime, either in na- ture or in art. And indeed the critical search for the prin- ciple of aesthetic judgment is the main object of the Kritik of Judgment The case is different with the logical judgment in its application to nature. Here experience shows that things are under law, and yet cannot be ade- quately understood or explained by the general notions of the understanding. Judgment, however, can find in itself a principle by which the sensible world may be brought ation link to be "udg. Does )and and very e pe- rived ment hem. as a ) our lent, ly in 1 are 1 na- prin- ritik gical ence ade- 18 of itself ught ! i 1«1 into relation with the unknowable supersensible, but only as a means to the knowledge of nature needed for its own ends. In thig way that principle may, and indeed must, be applied a priori in the knowledge of tho world, and so applied it is of service to the practical reason in opening up a wider pros- pect. Introddction. I. Divii i of PhiloBophy. Formal Logic deals only with the principles of thought m general, apart from any distinction of the objects of thought. Philosophy, on the other hand, i so iav as it contams principlcH of the rational knowledge of things, is quite r'orrectly ir ided into Theoretical and Practical phil- osophy. At the san .. time Jie notions which assign an ob- ject to these principles of rational knowledg , mubt be spe- cifically (istinct, for there can be no authority for the dis- tinction of a science into different parts unless the principles on which each rests are themsel /os oppoR&d. Now there are two kinds of notions making possible their respective objects, namel. , nutions of nature and the notion of freedom. The Ivrmer make theoretical knowledge pos- sible in accordance with principles, the latter in regard to theoretical knowledge is merely the condition fa negative principle, but is yet the source of fiindamenta nropositions which enlarge the sphere of the will, and are t^ . efo. e called practical. Philosophy is therofore properly divided into Theoretical philosophy or the Philosophy of Nature, and I'ractical or Mt i philosophy. Hitherto gross misappli- cation of these terras h « prevailed, both in the division o*' the principles and in the division of phil -.ophy. It has been supposed that the practical resting on notions of Na- ture and the practical resting . i the notion of Freedom are identical, and hence a ..[vision into theoretical and practical pliilosophy has been made which is really no division at all, since both parts may have one and th. ^ame principle. :U!l 162 The will as a faculty of desire is simply one of the many :iatural causes in the world, namely, that which acts from notions Everything which is possible or necessary by vo- lition is said to be practically possible or practically neces- sary, and with this is contrasted the physically possible or necessary, i.e., whatever is the effect of a cause which acts, not by means of notions, but by the mechanism of lifeless matter or by animal instinct. Thus the question is in no way settled, ^'hether it is a notion of Nature or a notion of Freedom which gives the rule when the will acts as cause. The distinction however is of the greatest consequence. For if a notion of Nature determines the will the principles are technically-practical, whereas if it is the notion of Free- dom the principles are morally-practical. And as the di- visions of a science of reason are determined by the nature ot the principles on which either rests, the former will belong to Theoretical philosoptiy (science of Nature), the latter to Practical philosophy (science of Morals). All technically-practical rules of art and skill, or of that practical sagacity which gives us a command overmen and enables us to influence their wills, so far as their principles rest on notions, must be regarded as corollaries of Theoret- ical philosophy Only as standing under the notion of freedom is the will free from Nature, and the laws of freedom together with their consequences alone constitute Practical philosophy. The practical arts of surveying housekeeping, farming, statesmanship,^ dietetics, &c. and even the precepts by which happiness may be attained are merely technically-practical rules. Only those rules which rest on the notion of freedom are morally practical. 1 hey are laws which do not, like those of Nature, rest on sensu- ous conditions, but on the contrary on a supersensible prin- ciple, and hence they form a separate branch of philosophy, under the name of Practical philosophy. any rom vo- jces- ie or actB, elesB n no m of ise. 3nce. liples Free- e di- ireof elong ter to : that n and ciples eoret- lotion iW8 of stitute eying, 1., and Bd, are which They sensu- e prin- (sophy, ..oivJhK't 168 II. The Realm of Philosophy. The term field simply defines the general relation of an object to our faculty of knowledge, no matter whether the notion of that object makes knowledge of it possible or not. That part of a field in which knowledge is possible, is a solid ground or territory (territoriam) for notions and their appropriate faculty. That part of the territory, again, for which laws are prescribed in notions, is the domain or realm (ditio) of these notions and their correspondent faculty. Empirical notions have therefore nature as the sura of sen- sible objects for their territory ; but that territory is for them not a realm but merely 2^ dwelling-place (domicilium), for although they are under law they are not themselves the source of law, and hence the rules based upon them are em- pirical or contingent. Although Understanding and Reason operate on the same territory of experience, their laws are distinct and do not interfere with one another. The notions applicable to na- ture have as little influence on the law of freedom as the latter on the former. In the sensible world each realm is perpetually limited by the other, but in their laws they are perfectly independent. The reason why they do not con- stitute one realm is that the notion of nature has a meaning only in relation to objects of perception or phenomena, not to things in themselves, whilst the object of freedom is in- telligible as a thing in itself, but cannot be given in a percep- tion. There can, therefore, be no theoretical knowledge of either realm as a thing in itself or supersensible object. The whole unlimited field of the supersensible thus lies entirely beyonu our knowledge, and afibrds no solid ground, and therefore no realm, either for understanding or for rea- son. This field we must indeed occupy with Ideas m the interest of theoretical as well as of prac^tical reason, but we can produce no other warrant for our occupation of it than a practical one, and so far as theoretical knowledge is con- cerned the supersensible remains as far beyond our reach as ever. 164 I Between the sensible realm of nature and the supersen- sible realm of freedom a gulf is fixed, as impassable by the- oretical reason as if there were two separate worlds. Never- theless it lies in the very idea of freedom to realize in the world of sense the end presented in its laws, and hence na- ture in its formal aspect as conformable to law must at least be capable of harmonising with that end. There must, then, be a principle which unites the supersensible substrate of nature with the supersensible contained practically in the notion of freedom. And although that principle does not lead to a knowledge of the supersensible, and hence has no realm peculiarly its own, it yet enables the mind to make the transition from the theoretical to the practical point of view. III. The Kritik of Judgment as connecting link between the two divisions of Philosophy. There are three absolutely irreducible faculties of the mind, namely. Knowledge, Feeling and Desire. The laws governing the theoretical knowledge of nature as a phe- nomenon the Understanding supplies in its pure a priori notions. The laws to which desire must conform are pre- scribed a priori by Reason in the notion of freedom Between knowledge and desire stands the feeling of pleasure and pain, just as judgment mediates between understanding and reason We must therefore suppose judgment to have an a priori principle of its own as well as under- standing and reason. And as pleasure or pain is necessarily associated with desire, either preceding it as in the lower desires or following it when desire is determined by relation to the moral law, we must further supv>ose that judgment makes possible at once the transition from mere knowledge or the realm of nature to the realm of freedom, and in its logical use the transition from understanding to reason. IV. Judgment as a Faculty of a priori laws. Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the par- If ii: ;: 166 ticnlar as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then the judgment which subsumes the particular under it is determining. But if only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, the judgment is merely refiective. The determining judgment subsumes particulars under the universal transcendental laws supplied by the under- standing, and has no need to seek for a law of its own by means of which the particulars of nature may be brought under the universal. But nature has many forms, or modi- fications of the universal transcendental notions, as we may call them, and these are unaffected by the a priori laws of the understanding, which are but the general conditions, without which nature as a sensible object would not be possible at all. There must, therefore, be laws for those forms also, and such laws as empirical may be contingent so far as our intelligence is concerned, and may yet be re- garded as following necessarily from a principle, which is the condition of the unity of the multifarious forms of nature, although it is unknown to us. The reflective judg- ment, which is compelled to ascend from the particular to the universal, therefore requires a principle of its own ; and that principle it cannot borrow from experience, because it is to unite all empirical principles under higher ones, and 80 to make their systematic connexion pot«ible. The principle of judgment as reflective must therefore be conceived as if it were a unity imposed on nature by an in- telligence different from our ours, to enable us to reduce our knowledge of nature to a system of particyilar laws. "We cannot, however, assert that there actually is an intelli- gence of this kind, for judgment does not give a law to na- ture but only to itself. l^ow a notion which contains the ground of the actuality of an object is an ewe?, and the agreement of a thing with a character which is only possible in accordance with ends, is the adaptation of its form to an end. The principle of judgment, in its relation to the forms of things which come i ' » i i » J mm 166 under empirical laws in general, is thus the adaptation of nature in its manifold variety to an end. That is to say, nature is conceived as if the unity of its manifold empirical laws were due to an intelligence. V. Formal adaptation in Nature a Transcendental Principle of Judgment. A transcendental principle of judgment is one which en- ables us to think a priori the universal condition without which things could not be objects of our knowledge at all. A metaphysical principle, on the other hand, is one through which we think a priori the condition without which ob- jects, the notion of which must be given empirically, can- not be further determined a priori. Thus the principle that the changes of empirical substances must have a cause is transcendental ; but if we say that their changes must have an external cause,! the principle is metaphysical. In the former case, such merely ontological predicates or pure notions as substance are employed ; in the latter case, the empirical notion of a body as a movable thing in space is re- quired, although when this is once obtained the predicate of motion by external causes may be deduced quite a priori. Now the principle of nature's adaptation to an end is a trans- cendental principle. For the notion of objects, so fr>r as they are thought as standing under this principle, is merely the pure notion of objects of possible experience in general, and contains nothing empirical. But the principle of practical ad- aptation to an end, as implied in the Idea of the determina- tion of a tree willy is a metaphysical principle, because the no- tion of desire must be given empirically. At the same time neither principle is empirical but a priori^ for the predicate may be connected with the empirical notion forming the subject of the judgment completely a priori, and without any new experience. That the notion of nature's adaptation to an end is a transcendental principle is sufficiently obvious from the a prio:^ maxims of judgment employed in scientific enquiries m into n - ecific law^ of nature. Such maxims are contin ually npin- up, as occasion demands, in the shape of ax of metaphyBlcal wisdom : " Nature takes the shon est ay {lex paraimoniae) , "Mature makes no leaps (lex con m innatura "; "Natn* ^as many laws, but few principles [principia p; asUat&m non aunt multi- plii mday \ ^ % 1.0 I.I 2.2 2.0 IL25 i 1.4 1.6 Ftiotpgraphic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 M A ^ \\ i.\^" ^ "<^. ^^^ <* ^.^. F!.^ ^'^ ^ ^^ 6"^ ^ 4^' '^ '\^I^^ ^ ^ U.x t 168 have its own necessary rule or law, although we may be unable to comprehend the necessity of the rule, from the nature and limits of our knowledge. We must therefore suppose the empirical laws of nature to be possibly infinitely various, and to be for us contingent or incapable of being known a priori. So far as these empirical laws are con- cerned nature, as a possible unity of experience or system of laws, must accordingly be regarded as contingent. At the same time we must presuppose and assume such a unity, for otherwise the thoroughgoing connexion of empirical knowledge in a whole of experience would be impossible. The universal laws of nature no doubt enable us to connect things in a system so far as they are viewed as belonging to nature in the most general sense of the term, but not to connect them in their specific character as particular modes of nature. Judgment must therefore assume a priori, as a principle required fo^ its own use, that what in the em- pirical laws of nature is from our human point of view contingent, yet involves a unity in the connexion of the multifarious laws of nature capable of being experienced, a unity which is certainly thinkable although it cannot be com- prehended by us. Now a unity which is demanded by our intelligence, but which as known is contingent, is conceived of as the adaptation of objects to an end. Judgment, in relation to things that may stand under empirical laws not yet discovered, is merely reflective, and is compelled to think of nature in its special laws according to the principle of adaptation as regards our knowledge,' a principle which is expressed in the maxims of judgment cited above. This transcendental notion of adaptation in nature is neither a notion of nature nor i, notion of freedom, for it attributes nothing to nature as an object, but merely represents the way in which we must necessarily proceed in reflecting on natural objects with a view to a thoroughly connected ex- perience. It is therefore a subjective principle or maxim o^ judgment. ay be m the refore nitely being con- jTstem . At inity, irical sible. Qnect Dg to lot to aodes rif as ) em- view f the ied, a cora- your eived it, in 8 not )d to ciple rhich This ler a ^utes \ the g on i ex- mm 169 VI. The Feoling of Pleasure connected with the notion of Adaptation. The reduction of the epecial laws of nature to unity of principle is an end which understanding necessarily seeks *^. «®^»^® With the attainragnt of that end there arises a feeling of )lea{mre which is determined by a ground a priori, for everyone, aid indeed from the mere adaptation of the object to our faculty of knowledge The d is- covery that two or more heterogeneous laws of nature may be combined in a common principle gives rise to a very marked pleasure and often to a feeling of wonder that even familiarity does not destroy. VIL The Aesthetic Aspect of Adaptation in Nature. The aesthetic character of a representation is determined solely by its relation to the subject; its \q^' x\ validity has reference to the object as capable of being known. In the apprehension of a sensible object both relations are implied. In th > presentation of objects as outside of me, their spacial quality is merely a subjective element of my perception and they are accordingly thought of simply as phenomena.' But space is also an integral element in the knowledge of phenomena. Sensation, again, while no doubt it is a purely subjective element in perception of things as without us, yet affords the matter (reale) of that which is given as existing, and hence it is essential to the knowledge of ob- jects without us. But the feeling oi pleasure or pain which accompanies our knowledge of sensible objects does not enter as an ingredient into knowledge ai all, for although it may be the result of cognition, it has nothing to do with our knowledge of an object. The adaptation of an object of perception to an end is therefore no property of the object. Such an object is therefore only said to display adaptation to an end when a feeling of pleasure is immedi- ately connected with its representation. Here therefore we have the aesthetic representation of adaptation When .'I 170 the imagination, as the faculty of perception a priori^ is found to be in harmony with tlie understanding, and a feel- ing of pleasure is thereby awakened, the object must be regarded as adapted for the reflective jucigment. . . The object is then said to be beautiful, and the faculty which judges it to be so is ci Jled Taste. The sensibility to pleasure arising from reflection on the forms of things (whether of nature or of art) indicates not only an adaptation for reflective judgment of objects to the notion of nature in the subject, but conversely an adapta- tion of the subject in virtue of the notion of freedom to the form or even formlessness of objects. Hence it is that the aesthetic judgment is related to the emotion of the aublim« as well as to the feeling of the beautiful. The Kritik of Aes^'hetic Judgment has therefore two main divisions. yill. Logio&l Representation of Adaptation in Nature. Subjective adaptation in an object of experience rests upon the mere harmony of the form of an object with our faculty of knowledge, as directly apprehended without the intermediation of any notion. Objective adaptation, again, implieu that the form of a thing, as given in a notion which is its ground, agrees with the possibility of the thing itself. The former rests upon the pleasure immediately felt in mere reflection on the form of an object ; the latter, as requiring a definite cognition of an object through a notion, is 4 te independent of any feeling of pleasure^ in it and implies a judgment of the understanding. When the notion of an object is given, the work of judgment lies iil the presentation (exhibitio) of a perception corresponding to it. And we may either, as in art, endeavour to realize in perception a notion set up by our own imagination as end, or we may make use of our notion of end in judging of certain natural objects (e. g. organized bodies). In the latter case not merely the form of a thing implies adaptation, but the thing itself as a product is regarded as a natural end. Now ?rt, IB I foel- ist be .The nrhich n the B not ;o the lapta- ;o the .t the blinM tik of rests li our t the kgain, vhich itself, mere liring 4 te lies a of an latton id we ion a may itural 3 not thing Now m although subjective adaptation does not imply any notion of an object, we may still, by analogy with the notion of aa end, attribute to nature as it were a regard for our faculty of knowledge ; hence we may look upon natural beauty as the presentation of the notion of a formal or subjective adaptation, and end in nature as the presentation of the notion of a real or objective adaptation ; the former being the object of aesthetic judgment or Taste, the latter being judged logically by understanding and reason through no- tions. The Kritik of judgment has accordingly two parts, dealing respectively with the aeatheiio judgment and the teUological judgment. LX. Connexion of Understanding and Reason through Judgment. Understanding prescribes a priori the laws which make experience or a theoretical knowledge of nature as an object of sense possible. Reason prescribes a priori the laws of freedom, and as itself a supersensible cause in the sub- ject, it gives rise to an unconditionally practical know- ledge. The realm of nature as under the laws of under- standing, and the realm of freedom as under the laws of reason, are entirely removed from all mutual influence by the great gulf which sunders the supersensible from the phenomenal. The notion of freedom has nothing to say to the theoretical knowledge of nature, or the notion of nature to the practical laws of freedom, and so far there is no possibility of throwing a bridge from the one realm to the other. But although it lies in the notion of a free cause to be independent of nature, and the sensible cannot determine that which in the subject is supersensible ; yet the converse is not impossible in a certain sense, and in fact is implied in the very notion of a free cause the eflTect of which ought to be an event in the worid. The word cause^ when applied to the supersensible, signifies merely the ground which de- termines tlie causality of things to an effect in accordance with uatural law, and while the possibility of causality w 172 in this sense cannot be understood, it can be conclusively shown that it is not, as some have asserted, self-contradic- torj. The effect of freedom is the ultimate end which ought to exist as a phenomenon in the world of sense, and the condition of its possible realisation is presupposed in the nature of man as a sensible being. Judgment, as presup- posing this condition a ;prion^independently of the practi- cal, supplies us wit)i the notion of natural adaptation, a notion which mediates between nature and freedom, and makes possible the transition from the notion of conformity to law to the notion of ultimate end. The fact that understanding prescribes laws a priori to nature shows that nature is known merely as a phenomenon, and at the same time points to a supersensible substrate of nature ; which, however, is left quite indeterminate. Judg- ment by its principle a priori for estimating nature accord- ing to possible particular laws gives us the Gapability of de- termining the supersensible substrate (both in us and with- out us) by our intellect. Reason, again, by its practical law a i>r/ori actually determines it; and thus judgment enables us to make the transition from the realm of nature to that of freedom. As to the higher faculties of the mind, i.e., those which contain an autonomy, understanding contains the constitu- tive principles of knowledge ; judgment those for the feeling of pleasure and pain ; reason those relative to desire. The notion supplied by judgment of the adaptation of nature to an end is one of the notions of nature, but it is merely a regulative principle of knowledge. The' aesthetic judg- ment, as concerned with certain objects of nature or art, which are the occasion of that principle being applied, is a constitutive principle in relation to the feeling of pleasure or pain. The spontaneity of the faculties of knowledge, from the harmonious operation of which that pleasure arises, by intensifying the susceptibility of the mind for the moral feeling makes the notion of adaptation the fit connecting sively radic- [fUght d the 1 the esup- racti- bn, a , and •mity rt to anou, ite of rudg- cord- fde- with- llaw ables that hich titu- The re to ily a udg- art, is a sure dge, iseSy oral ting I 173 link between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom in its eflfects. The following table exhibits all the higher faculties in their systematic connexion : — Faculties of the Mind. Enowledipfe. Feeling of Pleasure and Pain. Desire. Principles a priori. Subordination to Law. Adaptation to End. Ultimate End. Faculties of Knowledge. Understanding. Judgment. Reason. Application to Nature. Art. Freedom. Paet II.— Kbitik of Teleolochoal Judgmbnt. First Section.— Analytic of Teleological Judgment. § 62. Formal Objective Adaptation. Geometrical figures drawn on a principle often show a remarkable objective adaptation to the purpose for which they are employed, namely, the solution of several problems by a single method, or of one problem in an infinite variety of ways. The adaptation is here evidently objective and mtehectual, not subjective and aesthetic. But although such figures are adapted to the end in view, namely, the pro- duction of a variety of geometrical forms, they are regarded as possible independently of the particular use made of them, and hence their adaptation to that end is not the con- dition of their very existence in thought This in- tellectual adaptation to an end is therefore no doubt object- ive (not subjective, like aesthetic adaptation), but it is not real but merely formal : it can be conceived as adaptation m general without the notion of end being presupposed, and hence it is not an instance of teleology. It is quite dififerent when a number of things are pre- sented as without me and enclosed within definite limits as e.g. trees, flowers and walks disposed in regular order in a garden j for these are actuallv existing thin^ra whi^b 174 mu8t be known empirically, and not merely an idea of my own determined a priori according to a principle. The adaptation in this case is empirical or real, and presupposes the notion of an end. § 63. Relative as contrasted with Internal Adaptation. Experience leads our judgment to the notion of an objec- tive material adaptation, i.e.^ to the notion of an end in nature, only when we find ourselves compelled to presup- pose the activity of a cause as the necessary condition of the existence of a given effect. This may occur either when the effect is regarded as itself a product of art, or when it is regarded merely as material for the art of other pos- sible natural beings ; in other words it is either an end, or a means for the ends of other causes. Adaptation of the latter kind is called utility in relation to man, advantage when we are speaking of other creatures, and is merely relative ; while adaptation of the former kind is an internal adaptation of a natural being. A sandy soil is most advantageous for the growth of pine trees. Now when the sea withdrew from the land it letlt large tracts of sand on our northern shores, on which pine forests have grown up. Shall we then say that the original deposit of these tracts of sand is evidence of an end of na- ture, because it is of advantage to pine trees ? Manifestly if this is an end of nature, so also must the sand be re- garded as a relative end, for which the withdrawal of the sea was a means. So also if cattle, sheep, horses, &c., are to exist, grass must cover the earth The objective adap- tation in such CMes is therefore not an adaptation of things themselves to an end, but merely a relative or contingent adaptation. From all this it is quite plain that such adaptation can be regarded as an external natural end, only on condition that the existence of that for which something else is imme- diately or remotely advantageous is in itself an end of nature. But as this can never appear from a mere contemplation of >f my The )po8e8 objec- nd in reaup- on of Bither when r po8- id, or )f the ,ntage lerely ternal fpine t left pine iginal )f na- festly )e re- 3fthe "> are adap- hings agent 1 can iition mine- iture. on of 17» nature, relative adaptation, although it points hjpotheti- cally to natural ends, does not of i-self justify an absolute teleological judgment. § 64. The Properties of Things which are natural ends. To see that a thing is really a natural end, or cannot be explained in a mechanical way, its form must be incapable of explanation by the ordinary laws of nature known by the understanding in its application to objects of sense ; in other words, it must be of such a nature that it cannot be even known in experience as an effect except on presup- position of notions of reason. Even to comprehend the conditions required for the production of a natural object, reason must see that the form of the product is necessary. Now the very fact that in the present case the form ot the object is not necessary but accidental so far as ordinary laws of nature are concerned, is itself a ground for regard- ing that form as possible only through reason. And as reason is the faculty of acting from ends (a will), an object which is regarded as possible only through reason must be conceived as an end. To know a thing, however, not only as end, but as nat- ural endj more than this is required. A thing exists as natural end only when it is (in a double sense) its own cause and its own effect. This may be illustrated by an example. In the first place, a tree produces another tree according to a well-known natural law. The tree so produced is of the same species; hence a tree, as continually self-produced, is on the one hand its own effect, and on the other hand its own cause, and by such continual self-production it perpet- uates itself as a species. In the second place, a tree is self- productive even as an individual. The effect is no doubt in this case known simply as growth, but it must be observed that growth is quite different from any increase in size by mechanical laws. The maf '> which the tree incorpo- rates, it previously works up into a specifically peculiar quality which is not due to any natural mechanism outside :| ! 176 of it, and 'thus it developea itself by means of a material which as assimilated is its own product. No donbt the tree, so far as the constituents obtained from external na- ture are concerned, must be regarded as an ednct ; but on the other hand it displays a power of separating, recom- bining and shaping this raw material, which human art is utterly incapable of imitating. In the third place, each part of the tree is self-productive, so that the preservation of one part is dependent on the preservation of all the rest. A bud inoculated on the twig of another tree produces a plant of its own kind, and so also a scion engrafted on a for- eign stem. We may therefore regard each twig or leaf of the same tree as engrafted or inoculated on it, or as an in- dependent tree attached to another afid parasitically nour- ished by it. And while the leavcB are a product of the tree, the tree is in turn dependent for its growth upon their effect on the stem, for if it is repeatedly denuded of its leaves it dies. ' § 65. Things which are natural ends are Organised Beings. Causal connexion as thought by the understanding always constitutes a regressive series of causes and effects This sort of causal connexion we call that of efficient causes {nexus effectivus). But another kind of causal connexion resting on the notion of ends is conceivable, which if it is considered as a series can be taken either backwards or for- wards, and in this case that which has been named effect is with equal propriety termed the cause of that whereof it is the effect Such causal connexion we name that of final causes {nexuafinalis). For a thing to be a natural end, in the first place its parts must be possible only in relation to the whole. As an end the thing itself is comprehended under a notion or idea, which must determine a priori all that is to be contained in it. This however does not distinguish a natural product from an artificial product, in which the cause is an intelli- gent being distinct from the material parts brought together terial t the il na- it on !Com- 1 art each ation rest. 368 a afor- ftf of a in- lonr- 'the bheir iaves way6 • • • • inses xion it IB ' for- ictis it 18 Qnal )artB end «^ea, ined duct ;elli- ther 177 «nd combined in accordance with the idea of a whole dom ible by means of them. P^^ Hence in the second place, a natural product must in it- «e f or ,„ ,t8 inner possibility imply relation to an end „ o her words ,t must be possible as a natural end irresptdve of any .ntelhgent cause external to it. Accordingly the parts ofsachnatnral product which combine in the unity of a whole must be reciprocally cause and effect of each other's form. Only in this way can the idea of the whole determine conversely the form and combination of allX parte, not mdeed aa canse-for then we should have an artificial pr«luct_but as the ground on which the thing is known, by the subject judging of it, to be a systematic unity ofform and a combination of many parts. ^ A body is therefore a natural end only when all its parts mutually depend on each other both as to their formC «.e,r combination, and are thus themselves the cause of the whole while conversely the notion of the whole may be re- garded as the cause of the body in acordance with a prin- ciple. In such a body, accordingly, the conjunction oUj/Ment c«»J.is at the same time regarded as an effect tfrSl jcnal causes. ^ of the other parte, but is conceived as existing for tke «^' of he others and of the whole i.e. asan instrument (Zg^y and not only so, but ite parte are all organs reciprocally producing each other, which is never the case with artificial .nstruments. Only a product of this kind, one which fa In organised and self-organising being is called, and just b^ cause It 18 such, a natural end. fh?r!l!f"^^ ^f""^" "''" '''" ^"'^ '^"'"g« ^» "^^"'•e which in themselves and apart altogether from their relation to other tl.mgs can be conceived to exist at all only as ends. The en7fir! T '^v'''^" " ^•^^^"^"-h.d from .practical e d first obtams objective reality from a consideration of fi'.ch being., and apart from them, the teleolo^V,.! .nn.;^.«_ 178 ation of nature as a epecial principle of judgment would hare no juBtification whatever. § 66. The Principle by which the Internal Adaptation of Organised BeingB is Judged. The principle of internal adaptation, which is at the same time a definition of it, is this : An organised product of nature is one in which all the parts are reciprocally end and means. Nothing in it is useless, purposeless or ascrib- able to blind natural mechanism. This principle finds its occasion in the methodical obser- vation of experience, but as it aflSrms the adaptation to be of universal necessity it cannot be derived from experience but must be a priori. But as ends exist only as an idea in the judging subject, not in any efficient cause, it is merely a regulative principle or maxim forjudging of the internal adaptation of organised ibeings. § 67. The Teleoiogical Judgment in regard to Nature as a System of Ends. As has been shown above exte-'nal adaptation does not justify us in saying that things can be known to exist only as ends of nature, or in employing the principle of fine' cause to account for the adaptation which may seem to be implied in their effects When there is no reason for regarding a thing as in itself end, the external relation can be only hypothetically judged to imply adaptation to an end. To regard a thing as a natural end on aocount of its in- ternal form is a very different thing from holding the exist- ence of that thing to be an end of nature. The latter assertion is justifiable only if it can be shown, not merely that we have the notion of a possible end, but that we have a knowledge of the ultimate end {scopus) of nature. But this requires the relation of such knowledge to something which as supersensible far transcends all our teleoiogical knowledge of nature, since the end of nature must be 179 Bought beyond nature. The internal form of a simple blade of f^rasB Ih sufficient to show that for our human faculty of judgment its origin is possible only according to the rule of ends. But if we change onr poinfof view and look merely at its external adaptation for tlie use of other natural beings, we get no categorical end, but firiding always a new con^ dition of such adaptation, we are led to the idea of the un- conditioned existence of a thing as ultimate end, and so entirely beyond the physico-teleological consideration of the world. So conceived the thing is not even a natural end, for Jt is no longer regarded as a natural product. Only organised Matter, as in its specitic form a product of nature, necessarily demands the application of the notion of natural end. But this notion when once obtained necess- arily leads to tlie idea of the whole of nature as a system of ends, and to this idea all natural mechanism must be subor- dinated in accordance with principles of reason. It is manifest that this is not a principle of the determining but of the reflective judgment, that it is regulative and not constitutive, and that it supplies us with a guiding concep- tion by means of which natural objects already determined may be considered according to a new law and order, and our knowledge of them extended by the principle of final cause. But this principle in no way interferes with the principle of mechanical causality already applied to them, nor does it entitle us to regard anything whatever as a pur- posive end of nature. Even the beauty of nature, i.e., its harmony with the free play of our faculties of knowledge as apprehending and judging of its appearance may be regarded as a sort of ob- jective adaptation of nature as a systematic whole of which man is a member, after the teleological judgment by natural ends as applied to organised beings has brought us to the idea of a great system of ends of nature. m 180 Second Section.— Dialectic of Teleological Judgment. § 70. Antinomy of Judgment. In dealing with nature as a complex of sensible objects reason may either rest on laws prescribed a priori to nature by understanding, or on laws which are capable of indefi- nite addition as experience is gradually extended. In ap- plying the former sort of laws, i.e., the universal laws of material nature, judgment needs no special principle of re- flexion ; for as an objective principle is given to it by un- derstanding it is merely determining. But so multifarious and diverse are the particular laws which have to bo learned from experience that judgment must here supply its own principle if it is to conduct its investigations into the phe- nomena of nature in an orderly way. Without sucba guid- ing thread there is not the least hope that our empirical knowledge may form ^ thoroughly connected and orderly system, reducing the empirical laws of nature to unity. Now in a contingent unity of this kind it may very well happen that judgment in its reflexion proceeds from either of those principles,— that given to it a priori by the under- standing, and that which on occasion of particular exper- iences calls reason into play to estimate corporeal nature and its laws by a special principle. Hence it comes that these two maxims seem to be mutually exclusive, and there arises a Dialectic which leads judgment to err in applying the principle of reflexion. The first maxim of judgment is the position: All pro- duction of material things and the forms of .material things must be judged as possible on purely mechanical laws. The second maxim is the counterposition : Some pro- ducts of material nature cannot be judged as possible on purely mechanical laws (but require a quite difterent law of causality, namely, that of final cause). Now if these regulative principles in the investigation of nature are converted into constitutive principles, determin- ing the possibility of objects themselves, they will run tlai-^ : jects itnre defi- I ap- '8 of f re- un- ious •ned Dwn phe- uid- 'ical erly lity. (veil ;her der- per- ure hat I ere ing )ro- ng8 >ro- on aw of in- 181 Position: All production of material things is possible " on purely mechanical laws. ' Counterposition : Some prodnction of material things is not possible on purely mechanical laws. If we take the last pair of propositions as objective prin- ciples of the determining judgment, each is contradictory of the other, and hence one of them must be false. We shall then no doubt have an antinomy, but it will be an antinomy not of judgment but of reason. Reason however can prove neither the one proposition nor the other, for there can be no principle a priori determining the possibility of things as regards purely empirical laws of nature. The first two propositions, on the other hand, regarded as maxims of reflective judgment are not really contradic- tory at all. For to say that all events in the material world, and therefore all the forms which are natural products, must ^judged to be possible on purely mechanical laws, is not to say that they are poaaihle in this way alone (apart from any other sort of causality). All that is implied is that I ought in all eases reflectively to judge them by the principle of natural mechanism, and making this principle the founda- tion of all my investigations to apply it as far as I can, since without it there can properly speaking be no knowledge of nature at all. But this in no way hinders me, when occa- sion is given for it, from following the guiding-thread of the second principle in my reflection on certain natural forms (and even by instigation of these on the whole of nature), the principle, namely, of final cause, which is quite distinct from that employed in the explanation of natural mechan- ism. The value of reflection of the kind indicated in the first maxim is not thereby denied, but rather I am bidden to follow it as far as I can. Nor is it said that those forms are not possible at all on the principle of natural mechan- ism : all that is said is that by following this path human reason will never be able to discover any ground of the 8f>ecific character of natural ends, although it will certainly gain increased knowledge of natural laws. Thus it is left " ! ii m ' 183 nndetrmined whether in the inner gronnd of nature, which to 118 18 unknown, conjunction by pliysical mechanism and conjunction by ends may not themselves be connected to- gether in the same thing by one principle. We must con-* elude, however, that our reason is not in a position to unite the two principles, and that judgment, not as determining but as reflective^ is compelled to think another principle than thatof natural mechanism in order to explain the possibility of certain forma of nature. § 76. Note. "Without notions of the understanding to which objective reality must be given, theoretical reason can make no ob- jective or synthetical judgments and in itself contains no constitutive principle whatever, but merely regulative prin- ciples Now the very nature of our intelligence compels us to distingijiish between the possible and the ac- tual. Such a distinction would not be made, did not our knowledge involve the exercise of two heterogenous facul- ties, — understanding for notions and sensible perception for objects corresponding to notions. Were our intelligence perceptive,. its objects would always be actual The distinction of things into possible and actual is therefore a subjective distinction, which is valid for human reason merely because we can always think something that is not, or suppose something to be given as an object of which we have no conception. That possible things may not be actual, and as a consequence that l9,ctuality cannot be deduced from possibility, is certainly true when wo are speaking of human reason, but it does not follow that such a distinction applies to things themselves. That it has no such application is plain from the irrepressible tendency of reason to suppose some unconditionally necessary existence (original ground), in which the distinction of possible and actual no longer holds good. The notion of an absolutely necessary being is thus an in- dispensable Idea of Reason, but for human intelligence it is n ill I 183 problematical and unrealisable. As arising from the pe- culiar nature of our faculties of knowledge, it is valid sub- jectively not objectively : hence it is not essential to every intelligence, because we have no right to assume that in all thinking beings there are two diverse conditions of know- ledge, namely, thought and perception, and no right there- fore to suppose that in them all the conditions of possibility and actuality are different. An intelligence for whom this distinction did not exist, might say : All objects which I know are (exist) ; and such a being could never suppose some objects to be possible that have no existence, and there- fore to be contingent when they do exist, nor could it in con- trast thereto represent others as necessary. Just as theoretical reason must assume as an idea the unconditioned necessity of the original ground of nature, so practical reason presupposes its own unconditioned causality or freedom, implied in the consciousness of its own moral commands. Here the objective necessity of an act, as duty, is. opposed to the necessity which it would have as event, if its ground lay in nature and not in freedom {i.e in the causality of reason). The morally necessary act is regarded as physically perfectly contingent, since that which ought necessarily to take place, often does not take place. It is evidently owing to the subjective constitution of our prac- tical faculty, that moral laws must be represented as com- niands (and the acts conforming to them as duties) and that reason expresses this necessity not as being (happening) but as ought to he. This would not be the case, were rea- son considered in its causality apart from sensibility (the subjective condition of its application to objects of nature), and therefore as cause in an intelligible world, completely accordant with moral laws ; for in such a world there would be no distinction between being and doing, between a practical law of that which is possible through us and the theoretical law of that which is actual through us. A purely intelligible world, then, would be one in which wljatever is possible (as something good) is at the same i'li i 184 time actual. But even freedom, as the formal condition of an intelligible world, is for U8 a transcendent notion incapable of serving as a constitutive principle for determ- ining an object and its objective reality. . Nevertheless from the character of our (partly sensuous) nature and fac' ulty, for us and all rational beings related to the sensible world, freedom, so far as we can represent it in accordance with the nature of our reason, serves as a i i versal regulative principle. This principle does not objectively determine the nature of freedom, as form of causality, but it makes the rule of actions in accordance with that idea imperative on every one, and that as absolutely as if it were a constitutive principle. Let us see the bearing of these considerations on the topic immediately in hand. Between natural mechanism and the technic of nature, i.e., its toleological connexion, there would be for us no distinction, were it not that our intelligence is compelled by its very nature to go from the universal to the particular. There can therefore be no knowledge of the adaptation of the particular to an end, and consequently no determmmg judgments in this connexion, unless judgment has a universal law under which it may subsume the par- ticular. Now the particular as such has a certain contin- gency with respect to the universal, and y : : reason demands the conformity with law in the reduction of particular laws of nature to unity. Conformity with law in the case of the contingent is called adaptation to an end, and from such a universal particular laws, so far as they imply a contin- gent element, cannot be derived a priori. Hence the no- tion of the adaptation of natural products to an end, neces- sary as it is for our judgment, does not enable us to deter- mine the objects themselves. It is a subjective or regulative principle of reason, although for our human judgment it has the same validity as if it were an objective or constitu- tive principle. ditioni lotion, )tenn- ^eless, id fac- nsible dance lative •mine B8 the re on utive topic dthe ^onld ice is othe ' the lyno nent par- itin- inds lawa e of inch itin- no- cea*- iter- tive t it itu- 18S fi 77. The notion of Natural End as ( of our Intelligence. to the peculiar character There are certain peciiliarities of our higher faculty of knowledge which it is very natural to transfer as ohjoct- ive predlcate8 to things, but which really appertain to ideas only there being no possible object of experience corres- ponding to such ideas. This holds good even of the notion of natural end which as a predicate can exist nowhere but in the Idea. But as the effect corresponding to this idea (the product itselt) is a real object in nature, the notion ot nature as a being acting from an end seems to make the Idea of a natural end a constitutive principle. In this re- spect the idea of natural end is different from all other ideas. Ihe difference however lies in the fact that this Idea is not a principle of reason for the understanding, but for the judgment, and is merely the application of an intelligence m general to possible objects of exper ience. For here judg- ment 18 not determining but merely reflective, and hence although the object is given in experience, judgment can- not determine it by the idea, but can only reflect on it. It is therefore a peculiarity of our human intelligence that m It judgment, in regard to natural things, takes the form of reflection. And this leads to the idea of an intelli- gence different from ours and presupposed in it, just as in the Kritik of Pure Reason it was by supposing the possi- bility of a perception different from ours, that we were able to define our perception as by its nature limited to phenom- ena. It 18 then by reference to that capposed intelligence that we are able to say : Certain natural products, from the very nature of our intelligence, must he considered by us as If they could not exist at all unless they had been produced purposely or from conceived ends. But we can- not venture to say that there actually is a particular cause which acts from such ends, or that an intelligence higher than ours may not find in the mere mechanism of nature, as a sort ot causality wmceivable apart from intelligence, a sufficient expl.mation of the possibility of such natnrRl nm^.w.f- 186 11 V "We mast therefore look out for a certain contingency in the nature of our intelligence as related to its faculty of judgment, by the discovery of which we may learn how' our intelligence differs from other possible intelligences. --The contingency is readily fonndin the particular which >dgment is t©. bring under the univer.il supplied by no- tion? of the^inderstanding; for the universal of our under- standing does -not determine the particular, and it is con- tingent in how -many ways different things which agree in a common markf may present themselves to our observation. But as perception is also required for knowledge, a perfectly ftpmitaneoui faculty of perception would be a faculty of kuowledge different from sensibility and quite in- dependent of it ; in other words, an intelligence in the most ' *" general sense of tine term. Thus we are able to conceive of ^perceptive intelligence (negatively, that is, simply as not discursive), which does not go from the universal to the par- ticular, and so to^the^individual. For such an intelligence there would not ^ be th/t contingency in the adaptation of particular laws of nature to understanding which makes it 80 hard for us to reduce the multiplicity of n..ture to the unity of^knowledge. ^ ' ^ ^ In order, then, to think at least the possibility of such an adaptation of, natural things to our faculty of judgment, we must at the same time conceive of another intelligence, by reference to which, and apart from any end attributed to it, we may represent as necessary that harmony of natural laws with our faculty of judgment, which for our intelli- gence can be thought only thrcjOgh the medium of ends. It is the nature of our intelligence to proceed in know- ledge from an analytical univerml or notion to the particular as given in empirical perception. The multiplicity of the latter thus remains undetermined, until judgment shall have determined it by bringing the perception under the notion. We may,, however, conceive of an intelligence different in kin^ from ours, one that as perceptive and not discursive proceeds from a synthetical universal to the particular, i.e.^ rration. svledge, Id be a [uite in- ^ (le most eeive of as not he par- IM 187 from a perceived whole to the parts. For such an intellil gence the connexion of the parts forming a determinate whole would not be or appear contingent as it is for us But from the peculiar character of our intelligence a real whole in nature is regarded only as the effect of the com- bined motive forces of the parts. We may, however, instead of viewing the whole as dependent on the parts, after the manner of our discursive intelligence, take a perceptive or archetypal intelligence as our standard, and seek to com- prehend the dependence of the parts on the whole, both in their specific nature and in their interconnexion. And as it is a contradiction in terms to say of a discursive intelli- gence that the connexion of the parts necessarily presup- poses the whole, it must be the idea of the whole that for such an intelligence explains the form of the whole and the connexion of its parts. Now such a whole is an effect or product, the idea of which is treated as the cause that makes it possible, and such a product is called an end It there- fore arises solely from the peculiar character of our intelli- gence that we regard certain natural products as due to a different so t of causality from that of the material laws of nature, namely, that of ends and final causes. This prin- ciple, therefore, does not determine the manner in which things themselves, even when they are regarded as phe- nomena, are capable of being produced, but merely the manner in which our intelligence can alone judge them to be produced. And this is the reason why in our scientific investigations we are so dissatisfied with an explanation of natural products by final causes. In such investigations our sole object is to judge of natural products, so far as we are capable of doing so conformably to the nature of our judgment, i.e., our reflective judgment, not to determine them by judgment as things in themselves. The correctness of the view here taken does not require us to show that an intellectus archetypus may possibly be ; it is enough that the idea is not self-contradictory, and that a perceptiye or archetypal intelligence is the natural counterpart of our ' 188 discursive intelligenc - {inUllectm ectypus\ with the con- tingency attaching to it, as by its very nature dependent on individual representations. If we think of a material whole as in its form a product of the parts, their forces and power of combinin- themselves with one another, we get the notion of a mechanical mode of production. B in this way we do not obtain any no- tion of a whole as end, such as we are compelled to suppose an organised being to be,-a whole the inner possibility of which 18 utterly inconceivable apart from the Idea of it and on which depend the very nature and mode of operation of the parts. It does not follow, as we have just seen, that the mechanical production of such a body is impossible; for to say so would be to say, that no intdligeriGe can possibly think such a unity in the connexion of different parts un- less the Idea of the unity is at the same time the cause of its production ; unles^, in other words, the production is purposive. For then the unity which is the necessary ground ot the form of natural products would be solely that of space ; and space is not a real ground of products but merely their formal condition, although no doubt it has this in common with the real ground, that no part of it can be determined except in relation to the whole. Now it is at least possible to regard the material world as a mere phe- nomenon, and to conceive of its substrate as a thing in itself to which an intellectual perception corresponds. ^Thus we get the idea of a supersensible and real ground of the world -r nature to which we ourselves belong, although that ground is not for us an object of knowledge. Accordingly, we may apply mechanical laws in explanation of that which m the sensible world is necessnry, but the harmony and unity of the particular laws and lorms of nature— which re- latively to the mechanism of nature must be regarded as contingent— we shall view as an object of reason to which teleological laws are applicable. Nature thus comes to be judged on two distinct principles, the mechanical and the teleological, which in no way conflict with each other. B con- enton •oduct selves mode ij no- ppose ity of t^and ion of at the for to ssiblj 3, un- ise of on is ssarj ' that } but 3 this n be is at phe- itself 8 we rorld that hich and h re- d as hich o be the 18» From th i point of view we can aee, what even in other ways might readily be guessed but in no other way could be asserted with any certainty and proved, that the prin- ciple of a mechanical derivation of natural products exhib- iting adaptation is quite consistent with the teleological, but by no means enables us to dispense with it. In the investi gation of a thing which we are forced to regard as a natural end (an organised being), we may try all the known and yet to be discovered laws of mechanical production, and may even hope to make good progress in that direction, but we need never hope to get rid of the quite different principle of causation by ends in our explanation of natural products. No human intelligence, and indeed no finite intelligence however it may surpass ours in degree, need expect to com- prehend the production of even a blade of grass by purely me- chanical causes. The teleological connexion of causes and effects is absolutely indispensable in judging of the pos- sibility of such an object. There is indeed no adequate reason for regarding external phenomenon as such from a teleological point of view ; the reason for it must be sought in the supersensible substrate of phenomena. But as we are shut out from any possible view of that substrate, it is im- possible for us to find in nature grounds for an explanation of nature, and we are compelled by the constitution of our intellectual faculty to seek for the supreme ground of tele- ological connexions in an original Intelligence as cause of the world. Appendix on Method. § 87. The MoMl Proof of the Existence of God. Theoretical reflective judgment is quite justified in sup- posing the existence of an intelligent cause of the world on the ground of a physical teleology. Now in our own moral consciousness, and still more in the general notion of a rational being endowed with free causality, there is implied a moral teleology; but as the relation to ends, together with 190 the laws connected therewith, is determined a priori in our- selves, and therefore is known as necessary, this internal conformity to law does not require for its explanation the supposition of an intelligent cause outside of ourselves. At the same time moral teleology has to do with man as a being in the world, and therefore with man as connected with other things in the world. For in the conception of ourselves as beings under moral law we find the standard by reference to which those other things are judged either to be ends or to be objects subordinate to ourselves as the ultimate end. Moral teleology, then, has to do with the relation of our own causality to ends, and even to an ultimate end necessarily set up by us as our goal in the world, as well as with the possibility of realising that end, the external world being what it is. Hence the question necessarily arises, whether reason compels us to seek in a supreme intelligence outside of the world for a principle which shall explain to us even the adaptation of nature to an end relatively to the law of mor- ality within us. There is therefore a moral te'eology which is concerned, on the one hand with the nomothetic of free- dom, and on the other hand with that of nature. If we suppose certain things, or even certain forms of things, to be contingent, and therefore to depend upon something else which is their cause, we may scf k for this supreme cause or unconditioned ground of the conditioned either in the physical or in the teleological order. That is to say, we may either ask, what is the supreme produc- tive cause of those things, or what their supreme (abso- lutely unconditioned) end, i.e., the ultimate end of that cause in its production of those or of all things ? In the * latter case it is plainly implied that the cause in question is capable of setting an end before itself, i.e., is an Intelligence, or at least must be thought of as acting in accordance with the laws of an Intelligence. From the teleological point of view, it is & primary pro- position admitted by every one, that there can be no ultimate end at all presupposed hj reason a priori, unless in our- iternal )n the «. At being I other ves as jrenco nds or > end. r own sarily h the being lether ideof in the 'raor- rhich free- ns of upon this oned That >duc- abso- that the' on is jnce, with pro- no ilees tl of te til vt be to ai in b» ei ei] th di en \U th be O; ac 118 OM as «i ou 8ih hii ha wc aB of iiH of 191 that end is vian aa under moral laws. A world consisting of mere lifeless beinjfs, or even containing living but unin- telligent beings, would have no meaning or value, because there would be in it no intelligent being to appreciate its value. Again, suppose that in the world there are intelligent beings, whose reason enables them to value existing things for the pleasure they bring, but who have not themselves any power of imparting a value to things originally by means of freedom ; then, there will indeed be relative ends, but there will be no absolute or ultimate end, for the exist- ence in the world of such intelligent beings can never have an end. Mo'-al laws however are of this peculiar character, that they prescribe for reason something as end without any con- dition, and therefore exactly as the notion of an ultimate end requires. The existence of a reason which may be for itself the supreme law in the relation of ends, in other words the existence of rational beings under moral laws, can alone be conceived as the ultimate end of the existence of a world. On any other supposition its existence does not imply a cause acting from any end, or it implies ends but no ultimate end. The moral law, as the formal condition in reason of the use of our freedom, lays \U commands on us entirely on its own authority, without appealing to any material condition as an end ; but it nevertheless determines for us, and indeed a priori, an ultimate end as the goal to which our eflforts ought to be directed ; and that end is the highest good pos- sible in the world through freedom. The subjective condition which entitles man to set before himself an ultimate end subordinate to the moral law is happiness. Hence the highest physical good possible in the world is happiness, and this end we must seek to advance as far as in us lies, but always under the objective condition of the harmony of man with the law of morality as worth- iness to be happy. But it is impossible, in consistency with all the faculties of our intelligence, to regard the two requisites of the ulti- 192 niate end presented to ns through the moral law as conneoUd bj merely Datura, causes, and yet as conforming to the idea of that ultimate end. If therefore nature is the only cause which IS connected with freedom as a means, the notion of the practical necessity of the rltimate end through applica- tion of our powers does not harrr. )nise with the theoretical no- tion of i\ie physical possibility of the realisation of that end Accordingly we must suppose a moral cause or author of the world m order to set before ourselves an ultimate end conformable with the moral law ; and in so far as the latter IS nec^sary, so far, i.e., in the same degree and on the same ground, the former also must necessarily be admitted; it must, m other words, be admitted that there is a God. § 88. Limitation of the Moral Proof. The ultimate end, as merely a notion of our practical rea- son, 18 not an inference from data of experience for the theo- retical explanation of nature, nor can it be applied in the knowledge of nature. Its only possible use is for practical reason m relation to moral laws ; and the ultimate end of creation is that constitution of the world which harmonises with the end which we can alone present determinately ac- cording to law, namely, the ultimate end of our pure practical reason in so far as it is to be practical. Now we have in the moral law, which enjoins on us practically the application of our powers to the realisation of the ultimate end, a ground for supposing the possibility and practicability of that end, and tHeretore also aground for supposing a nature of things har- monious therewith. Hence we have a moral ground for representing in the world an ultimate end of creation. So far we have not advanced from moral teleology to theology, i.e., to the existence of a moral author of the world, but have merely concluded to an ultimate end of creation determined in that way. But that to account for this creation, i.e., for the existence of things adapted to an ultimate end, in the first place an intelligent being and in the second place not only an intelligent but a mora, being nneoted the idea y cause )tion of ipplica-, ieal no- at end. ithor of te end 3 latter esame ted; it d. al rea- 5 th co- in the ictical nd of onises ly ac- ctical in the ion of id for I, and jhar- d for ?y to ' the id of tfor 3 an d in eing t L I i li fl t< 11 Cl r< Ci B ¥ ki til re Pt W( 193 or author of the world, i.e., a God, must be admitted is a second conclusion which must be drawn. And this conclu- sion is of the peculiar cliaracter that it holds good merely for the judgment according to notions of practical reason, and as such for the ref ective not the determining judgment It is true that in us the morally-practical reasonjs essentially dilterent m its principles from the technically-practical rea- son. But we cannot assume that in the Supreme Cause of the world, conceived of as an intelligence, the same con- trast exists, and ihat a peculiar kind of causality is required tor the ultimate end, which is different from that which is re •luired merely for ends of nature. We cannot assume, there- tore, that in an ultimate end we have a reason for admitting not merely a moral ground ov ultimate end of creation (as etiect), but also a moral being as original ground of crea tion But we may certainly say, tliat according to the constitution of our reason we cannot make intelligible to our selves the possibility of an adaptation relative to the moral law, and to its object as it is in this ultimate end, apart rom an author and ruler of the world, who is also a moral lawgiver. Physical teleology sufficiently proves for theoretical re- flective judgment an intelligent cause of the world ; moral teleology proves it for the practical judgment, through the notion of an ultimate end, which must be attributed to creation in a practical regard. It is true that the obiective reality of the idea of God, as the moral authorof the world cannot be shown from a consideration of physical ends alone. Uut It IS a maxim of pure reason to secure unity of princi- ples so far as that is possible; hence the knowledge of physical ends, when it is brought into relation with the knowledge of the moral end, greatly aids us in connecting the practical reality of the idea of God with its theoretical reality as already existing for judgment. To prevent a very natural misunderstanding these two points should be carefully borne in mind. In the first place we can think the attributes of the Supreme Being only by 194 analogy. How, indeed, should we attempt to investigate directly the nature of a Being to whom nothing similar is given in experience ? Secondly, in thinking the Supreme Being through those attributes we do not thereby know him, nor, can we theoretipally predicate them of him ; for to con- template that Being as he is in himself remon as speculative must take the form of determining judgment. r \ I o ;igate lar is n*eine hiiii, ) con- ative