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 Cornell University Library 
 B839 .L88 1893 
 
 Elementary course of Christian phiiosoph 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 029 060 354 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029060354 
 
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
ELEMENTARY COURSE 
 
 OP 
 
 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OP 
 
 The Best Scholastic Authors 
 
 ADAPTED PROM THE PBBNCH OF 
 
 BEOTHER LOUIS OP POISSY 
 
 ■SHE BKOTHEES OF THE CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS 
 
 SECOND EDITION, REVISED. 
 
 O'SHEA & CO. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
Bntered according to Act ot Congress, In the year 1893, by 
 
 PETBE MUTH 
 la the Office of the Librarian ot Congress, at Washington 
 
 4?i 
 
yihiJ- Obsiat. 
 
 D. J. McMAHON, an 
 amprimatur. 
 
 •{• MICHAEL AUGUSTINE, 
 
 Archbishop of New 7aHv 
 
 New Tobk, Aug. 11. 1893. 
 
WORKS TO CONSULT. 
 
 GoTJDiiT, — Phllosophie suivant les principes de Saint Thomas. Paris, 
 
 ohez Poussielgne. 
 Kleutqbn, — LaPhilosophie scolastique, exposfee et def endue. Paris, 
 
 chez Gaume. 
 Sansevbrtno, — Philosophia Christiana cum antiqua et nova compa- 
 rata. Paris, chez Lethielleux. 
 '• — Manuel de la Philosophic chretienne. Idem. 
 
 LiBERATOBE, — Institutiones philosophicse ad triennium accommo- 
 datse. Romse, uffioio della Civilta Catolica. 
 " — Elementa ethicae et juris naturse. Idem. 
 
 " — ^Le compose humain. Lyon, chez Briday. 
 
 " — Theorie de la connaissance intellectuelle. Paris 
 
 chez veuve Casterman. 
 Pkisco, — Elementi di filosofias speculativa. Paris, chez Lethielleux. 
 
 " Metafisica della morale. Idem. 
 Tapabblli, — Essai theorique de droit naturel. Paris, chez veuVe 
 
 Casterman. 
 Gonzalez, — Estudios sobre la filosofia de S. Thomas. Madrid, im- 
 prenta de Lopez. 
 " — Filosofia elemental. Idem. 
 Frbdault, — Traite d'anthropologie physiologique et philosophiqn*. 
 
 Paris, chez Cr. Bailliere. 
 ZiGLiABA, — Bumma Philosophica. Lyons, chez Briday. 
 De Salinis et de Scobbiac, — Precis de I'histoire de la philo- 
 
 Sophie. Paris, ohez Hachette. 
 
 All these works are worthy of high esteem ; hut we commend 
 especially those of Liberatore, who was among the first to recall and 
 restore Christian Philosophy, and of Cardinal Zigliara, who is emi- 
 nently trained and skilled in the teachings of St. Thomas. 
 
 To these may be added the following excellent works in English : 
 
 Harper, — Metaphysics of the School. London, Macmillan & Co. 
 " — Manuals of Catholic Philosophy (Stonyhurst Series). 
 New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago, Benziger Bros. 
 StOckl, — Handbook of the History of Philosophy (Pt. I.). 
 
BRIEF OF OUE HOLT FATHER, POPE PHIS IX. 
 
 VOeeU} FUio, Fr. Aloisio de Poissy, To <mr Bekmed Son, Brother Louis 
 Congregationu Fratrum Sclw- of Poissy, of t?is Congregation of 
 hrum Ghristianarum, BiUrras. the Brotliers of tlie Christian 
 
 Schools, Beziers. 
 PIUS PP. IX. PIUS IX., POPE. 
 
 DiLBCTB FiLi, Salutem et Beloved Son, Health and 
 Apostolicam Bbnedictionbm. Apostolic Benediction. 
 
 Si sedulo cavendum est in quali- If in any art or science whatever 
 bet arte ant scientia, ne quoquo special care must be taken thai 
 modo principia deflectant a vero, principles may in no way conflict 
 id maxime profecto curandum est with truth, this is above all neces- 
 in philosophia earum duce, prse- sary in philosophy, the queen 
 sertim vero in tanta errorum col- and moderatrix of the arts and 
 luvie, quae ab ipsius nimirum cor- sciences. But especially must we 
 ruptione manavit. be on our guard in the great flood 
 
 of errors, of which the corruption 
 of philosophy has been the un- 
 failing source. 
 Gratulamnr itaque te, Dilecte We, therefore, congratulate 
 Pili, scientise hujus elementa tra- you. Beloved Son, on the manner 
 dltnrum, rejectis recentiorum in which you have treated of the 
 commentis, Angelicum Doctorem elements of this science. Setting 
 et ceteros fuisse sequutum, qui, aside the false systems of more 
 Ecclesia veritatis magistra prselu- recent writers, you have followed 
 cente, sapientia et operositate sua the Angelic Doctor and those whc, 
 philosophiam miriflce illustra- guided by the light of the Church, 
 
vi BRIEF OF OUR BOLT FATBER, POPE PIUS IX 
 
 runt ; et ex iis deprompsisse doc- the Mistress of truth, have, by 
 trinas, quibus mentes fingeres their wisdom and diligent labor, 
 commissornm tibi adolesoentium. wonderfully illustrated philoso- 
 phy. From their works you have 
 drawn the doctrines by which to 
 form the minds of the young men 
 confided to your care. 
 Gaudemus autem, Elementarem We are glad that the Elementary 
 Ourmm PhUosopTim Christianm, a Course of Christian Philosophy, 
 te editum, probatum f uisse egregio which you have published, has 
 Episcopo tuo; et cum ipso tibi received the approbation of a 
 ominamur, ut illud in plurimo- Bishop so distinguished as yours ; 
 rum utilitatem vergat. and with him we earnestly wish 
 
 that it may prove beneficial to 
 many. 
 Interim vero divini favoris au- in the meantime, as a presage 
 spicem et paternse Nostras benevo- of the divine favor and a pledge 
 lentiae pignus Apostolicam Bene- of our paternal love, we very af- 
 dictionem tibi Dilecte Fill, pera- fectionately impart to you, Be- 
 manter impertimus. jgyed Son, the Apostolic Benedic- 
 
 tion. 
 Datum Bomse apud S. Petrum Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, 
 Jie 13 Martii, anno 1876, Pontifi- March 13, 1876, in the thirtieth 
 eatus Nostrl anno tricesimo. year of Our Pontificate. 
 
 PIUS PP. IX. PIUS IX., POPE. 
 
APPEOBATION OF THE BISHOP OF MONT- 
 PELLIEE. 
 
 ' MONTPELLIEK, Aug. 15, 1875. 
 
 It is with pleasure tliat we authorize Brother Louis, 
 Sub-Director of the Boarding-School of Beziers, to 
 publish for the use of his pupils his Course of Chris- 
 tian Philosophy hased 07i tJie Principles of the best 
 /Scholastic Authors, which by our order he submitted 
 to a careful examination. The learned priest to 
 whom we entrusted the revision of the work has re- 
 turned it with a flattering testimonial of its merit. 
 We shall, therefore, be glad to see it in the hands of 
 the young men of our schools, and to learn that its 
 principles have been made familiar even to the pupils 
 of our first classes. For it is these old philosophical 
 teachings which prepared our fathers to become such 
 good theologians, and which rendered their faith so 
 enlightened and their reasoning so sound. 
 
 •i" Fk. M. Anatole, 
 £p. of Montpellier. 
 
TEANSLATOE'S PEEFACE. 
 
 This manual of philosophy has been translated 
 into English, with a view to meet the needs of a 
 growing- class of youth of both sexes. On all sides 
 they are beset with doubt and error concerning even 
 the primary truths that are the foundation of both 
 science and religion. Their critical position was 
 clearly perceived by the eagle glance of Pope Leo 
 Xni., when he penned his immortal encyclical 
 "Aeterni Patris." The impatient exclamation ut- 
 tered by a graduate of a noted American University : 
 " I cannot endure philosophy ; its professors are ever 
 wrangling about principles," is re-echoed by all who 
 are "carried about with every wind of doctrine." 
 Upon all such the illustrious pontiff who to-day 
 teaches the world from the chair of Peter, has urged 
 the study of the "wisdom of St. Thomas," whose 
 keen analysis of the fundamental principles of phi- 
 losophy and the opposite errors are an inexhaustible 
 mine for the students of all succeeding ages. In this 
 translation it is hoped that our youth will find a sure 
 vantage ground, whence, as far as time and talent 
 will allow, they may make excursions into the grand 
 and inspiring depths of philosophy. 
 
 Such changes have been introduced into the origi- 
 nal text and such additions made as the experience 
 of the class-room for some years past, and the phases 
 of thought of the last decade, especially in. this coun- 
 
X TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 try, have rendered either necessary or advisable. 
 With the earnest desire that in the pages of this book 
 may be found a sure guide for the intellect and an 
 ennobling incentive for the will, the work is placed 
 as an offering of love at the feet of Mary Immaculate, 
 
 New Yoke, Feast of the Purification, 1893. 
 
PEEFACE. 
 
 The aim of this work is to present, in as brief an 
 outline as possible, a complete course of philosophy. 
 Besides questions of direct utility for examinations, 
 we have endeavored to introduce, at least summarily, 
 many others of real importance, and without which 
 there can be no philosophy properly so called. 
 
 A few words will suifice to explain our mode of pro- 
 cedure and the use which may be made of this work. 
 Each paragraph contains an abridged formula in- 
 tended to be learned verhatim, and a short develop- 
 ment which may serve as a basis for the explanation 
 of the professor. The formulas will prove of great 
 utility to the student who takes pains to memorize 
 them : they classify in the mind distinctly and logi- 
 cally all that is indispensably required in philosophy ; 
 they render the preparation for an examination easy ; 
 and very often they are a brief, precise, and full 
 answer to the questions proposed. The development 
 usually gives in their essential outlines the principal 
 proofs of the foregoing formula. Comparisons, mul- 
 tiplied examples, detailed comments, have been pur- 
 posely retrenched. We have confined ourselves to 
 simple summaries, which will enable the student to 
 follow and remember the instructions of the professor. 
 Experience has proved that this method, apparently 
 somewhat abstract and barren, is, in reality, very ad- 
 vantageous, since it obliges the student to have re- 
 
Xii PBEFAOB. 
 
 course to that direct and personal work without which 
 there can be no true intellectual formation. 
 
 Some, doubtless, may think that this work intro- 
 duces questions too difficult for beginners, such, for 
 instance, as ideas, universals, matter and form, spacp, 
 time, and others, which are attended with serious 
 difficulties even in treatises which deal with them in 
 detail. But, these questions being so important, it 
 seems to us that they cannot be altogether omitted 
 without leaving philosophy destitute of foundation 
 and consistency. This remark applies especially to 
 the treatise on General Metaphysics. In its present 
 concise form, it will, perhaps, be found too abstruse ; 
 still we have thought it proper to retain it, though it 
 should prove of no other use than to serve as a sum- 
 mary for those who wish to make a more profound 
 study of the subject. 
 
 Another charge may be brought against this course, 
 that of being based on the method and doctrine of the 
 Schoolmen. For we have, in fact, everywhere en- 
 deavored faithfully to reproduce the principles of the 
 Thomistic school, as interpreted by Goudin, Sanse- 
 verino, Liberatore, Kleutgen, Priseo, Gonzalez, Tapa- 
 relli, and others, whose text we have often merely 
 summarized and sometimes embodied in full. But 
 this reproach, were it really merited, would be assur- 
 edly in our eyes the best eulogy that could be be- 
 stowed on this modest work. The Scholastic philos- 
 ophy, which was adopted during many centuries by 
 all the universities of Europe, and the abandonment 
 of which has been attended with such fatal results, 
 has undeniably in its favor not only the prestige of 
 time and the authority of the greatest geniuses, but 
 that which to the Christian is of more value, the 
 sanction of the Church. Following this philosophy 
 
PBEFAOB. xiii 
 
 we are sure never to stray from Catholic teaching; 
 while away from it we find only discordant, unsub- 
 stantial doctrines, often evidently erroneous or pro- 
 scribed. 
 
 But some may object that we must pay due defer- 
 ence to the necessities of the times, that therefore the 
 wisest course nowadays is, indeed, to avoid manifest 
 errors, but still not to return, at least openly, to these 
 old doctrines, which would expose us to be regarded 
 as not only not progressive but even retrogressive. 
 To this we reply that to reject the false without affirm- 
 ing the true is to leave the mind in suspense, not 
 knowing where to rest ; it is to take from it all energy 
 and vitality by depriving it of its proper and neces- 
 sary element ; it is, in fine, to deliver it over without 
 power or defence to the seductions of error. 
 
 May this humble work be free from that vagueness, 
 or, rather, absence of doctrine, too often met with in 
 certain elementary works on philosophy ; and may it 
 contribute, in its own modest way, to the diffusion of 
 the beautiful and fruitful teachings of Scholastic Phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 Shortly after the publication of the firSt edition of 
 this work, a Latin translation of it was made at Rome 
 by Mgr. Amoni, canon, at present secretary of the 
 Apostolic Nunciature at Vienna. 
 
 We give below the preface' of the learned trans- 
 lator : 
 
 " I will be brief, kind reader, but I wish that you 
 should know the two principal motives which have 
 led me to consider the publication of this 'Elemen- 
 tary Course of Philosophy ' as eminently opportune. 
 First, though distinguished by an admirable brevity, 
 it omits nothing necessary to a full knowledge of the 
 subject ; secondly, and this is much more important at 
 
XIV PREFACE . 
 
 the present time, the method of teaching adopted<by 
 the French author is conformable to that of the old 
 Schoolmen, and his doctrines agree on all points with 
 those of St. Thomas of Aquin. Now, however little 
 you consider with what earnestness the learned Bo- 
 maij Pontiff Leo XIII. recommends to all the faith- 
 ful of Jesus Christ the philosophy of the holy Doctor, 
 you will easily understand that, in our day especially, 
 this work merits the preference over all others. 
 
 " In fact, if the love of truth should always and 
 everywhere move the minds and hearts of men, and if 
 every one should direct all his efforts to acquiring 
 truth, since its possession constitutes man's happi- 
 ness, we must apply ourselves so much the more 
 earnestly to the task, now that the war against 
 truth has become more active, and we are exposed 
 to greater danger of falling into error. Although 
 charged during seventeen years with the duty of 
 teaching philosophy to young men, I shall never 
 regret having undertaken this translation, because, in 
 my opinion, there can be found in no other work any- 
 thing more methodical, more exact, or more useful." 
 
 At the tiifie of the publication at Rome of the Latin 
 translation, the Osservatore Romano recommended the 
 work in a lengthy article, from which we extract the 
 following : 
 
 " He who desires to procure this work, either for 
 his 'own use or that of others, must not expect to find 
 therein anything new in matter or form. We assure 
 him, however, that he will find in it as pecial advan- 
 tage : it contains an abridged and lucid exposition 
 of all the parts of a sound philosophy — principles, 
 method, doctrine — all are conformable to, or rather 
 borrowed from, the most accredited and safe sources, 
 whether ancient or modern, of a sound philosophy. 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 In short, errors are briefly exposed and so success- 
 fully refuted as to make young men certain of the 
 truth and competent to defend it against Eationalism 
 and Naturalism, which, in our day more than in any 
 other age, infect society. 
 
 "Students of philosophy should feel thankful to 
 the author, as well as to the learned translator, who 
 has favored Italy, and especially institutions of sci- 
 entific education, with a book entirely safe on all 
 points. It is also extremely useful on account of 
 the principles which it contains and expounds, the 
 matter for reflection which it offers to young men, 
 and the opportunity of making a fuller exposition 
 which it furnishes to professors of philosophy. We 
 believe, in fact, that it is neither useful nor advisable 
 to put into the hands of young students a book which 
 fatigues by its copiousness and the unnecessary diffi- 
 culties introduced, and which, moreover, renders the 
 oral instruction of the teacher superfluous." 
 
 A Vienna journal, the Vaterland, in the issue of 
 April 9, 1882, concludes in these words an article 
 upon the same work, translated by Mgr. Amoni : 
 
 " This work, by reason of the richness of matter 
 presented, must take its place among the best works 
 on Christian Philosophy which have appeared in 
 these latter times. "We do not possess in German any 
 manual of philosophy which, in 416 pages, contains 
 such a large amount of matter so happily and per- 
 fectly elaborated." 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Brief of His Holiness, Pope Pius IX r- 
 
 Approbation of the Bishop of Montpellier, . . . . vii 
 
 Translator's Preface, ix 
 
 Preface . . . xi 
 
 Works to Gonsulti xvi 
 
 INTKODTJCTORY. 
 
 Definition of Philosophy.— Its Excellence, Utility, and Division, xxix 
 
 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Its Division, i 
 
 LOGIC. 
 
 Definition of Logic. — Its Utility.— Its Division, ... 1 
 
 PART FIRST.- DIALECTICS. 
 
 Reasoning and Its Constituent Elements, 3 
 
 Chapter I. — Simple Apprehension. 
 
 Article I. — Nature of Simple Apprehension, .... 3 
 
 " II. — Ideas and Oral Terms, 4 
 
 " III. — Division of Terms, 5 
 
 " rV.— Universals, 8 
 
 , " V. — Predicaments or Categories, 10 
 
 " VI. — Properties of Terms in a Proposition, ... 12 
 
 " VII. — Means to Insure Propriety of Terms. — Definition, 15 
 
 " Vni.— Division, 16 
 
Xviii TABLE OF 00NTENT8. 
 
 Chapter IL— Judgment. 
 
 CASB 
 
 Article I. — Nature of Judgment, 18 
 
 " II. — The Proposition and Its Elements, ... 19 
 
 " III. — Division of Propositions, 21 
 
 " rV. — Properties of Propositions, 25 
 
 Chaptbb in. — Reasoning. 
 Article I. — Definition and Elements of Reasoning, . 
 
 . 30 
 
 *' II. — Division of Reasoning 31 
 
 " III. — Categorical Syllogisms and Their Rules, . . 32 
 
 " IV. — Modes and Figures of the Syllogism, ... 35 
 
 " v. — Hypothetical Syllogisms and Their Rules, . . 38 
 " VI. — Abridged and Compound Syllogisms, or Enthy- 
 meme, Prosyllogism, Epichirema, Sorites, and 
 
 Dilemma 40 
 
 " VII.— Induction, 43 
 
 " VIII. — Probable or Dialectic Syllogism, .... 44 
 
 " IX. — Sophistical Syllogism, 45 
 
 " X.— Utility of the Syllogism, 48 
 
 PART SECOND.— TRUTH AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Chapter I. — Truth and the DrppBBBNT States of 
 THE Intellect in Respect to It. 
 
 Article I.— Truth, 49 
 
 " II. — In what Operation of the Intellect Logical Truth 
 
 is Found, 50 
 
 " III. — Different States of the Intellect in respect to Truth, 51 
 
 " IV. — Ignorance, Error, and Their Causes, ... 54 
 
 Chapter II. — Demonstration, ... 57 
 
 Chapter III. — Science. — Division op Science. — Clas- 
 sification OF THE Sciences, ... 60 
 
 PART THIRD.— METHODOLOGY. 
 
 Chapter I. — Method m General and Its Laws. 
 
 Article I.— Method, 63 
 
 " II. — Analysis and Synthesis, ... . . 64 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xix 
 
 Chapter II. — Different Knros of Method and 
 Their Laws. 
 
 FAOE 
 
 Article I. —Different Kinds of Method, 66 
 
 " II.— Special Laws of Each Method, .... 67 
 
 Chapter III. — Processes Proper to Certain Methods. 
 
 Article I. — Hypothesis, 69 
 
 " II. — Experimentation . 70 
 
 " III. — Classification, 73 
 
 IDEOLOGY. 
 
 GENERAL IDEOLOGY. 
 
 Chapter I. — Ideas in General. 
 
 Article I. — Nature of Ideas, . . > 75 
 
 " II. — Characteristics of Ideas, 77 
 
 Chapter II. — Systems concerning the Origin of 
 Ideas. 
 
 Article I. — Principal Systems concerning the Origin of Ideas, 78 
 
 " II.— Sensism, 78 
 
 " ni. — Critique, or Transcendentalism, .... 81 
 
 ■ " IV.— The System of Innate Ideas, .... 83 
 
 " v.— Ontologism, 84 
 
 " VI. — Intermediarism, 86 
 
 " VII.— Traditionalism, 87 
 
 " VIII.— The Scholastic System, 89 
 
 Chapter III. — TJnivbrsals. 
 
 Article I. — Nature of Universals, 94 
 
 " 11. — Different Opinions on the Nature of Universals, . 96 
 
 SPECIAL IDEOLOGY. 
 
 Chapter I. — How Human Knowledge is Acquired. 
 
 Article I. — The First Operation of Intellect and the Psrcep- 
 
 tion of Essences, 99 
 
XX TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAOE 
 
 Article II. — How the Intellect Knows Individual Bodies, . 103 
 " III.— The Soul's Knowledge of Itself, . . . .104 
 «' IV.— How the Human Soul Knows God, ... 104 
 " V. — Necessity of Sensible Images for Intellection in 
 
 Our Present Life, 107 
 
 Chapter II. — Knowlbdqe of First Principles. 
 
 Article I. — Nature of Principles of Knowledge, . . . 109 
 " II.— The Principle of Contradiction, . . . .110 
 " in.— The Principle of Causality Ill 
 
 Chapter III. — Language in relation to the Ac- 
 quisition OP Knowledge. 
 
 Article I. — Utility of Language in Developing the Mind, . 114 
 " II. — Origin of Language, 115 
 
 CEITEBIOLOGT ; OR, THK MOTIVES OP CEETITUDB. 
 
 Chapter I. — The Mental Faculties as Means of 
 Attaining Truth. 
 
 Article I.— The Cognitive Faculties, 117 
 
 " IL— The Veracity of the Senses, 118 
 
 " III. — The Veracity of Consciousness 119 
 
 " IV. — The Veracity of Intellect and Reason, . . . 130 
 
 Chapter II. — Scepticism. 
 
 Article I. — Nature of Scepticism. — Its Different Kinds, . 133 
 " II. — Refutation of Scepticism, . ... 134 
 
 Chapter III. — The Ultimate Criterion op 
 Certitude. 
 
 Article I. — What is meant by the Ultimate Criterion of Cer- 
 titude, 136 
 
 " II.— The Intrinsic Principle of Certitude, . . . 126 
 " III.— The Extrinsic Principle of Certitude, . . .130 
 '" IV. — Means by which Testimony is Transmitted, . 133 
 " V. — Authority of Common Sense and of the Learned, 135 
 " VI. — Importance of Authority as a Criterion of Certi- 
 tude 137 
 
TABLE OV CONTENTS. XXI 
 REAL PHILOSOPHY ; OR, METAPHYSICS. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Definition of Metaphysics.— Its Utility and Division, . , 139 
 
 GENERAL METAPHYSICS ; OR, ONTOLOGY. 
 
 Definition and Division of General Metaphysics, . . . 141 
 
 BEING AND ITS PROPERTIES. 
 Chapter I.— Idea and Analogy of Being. 
 
 Article I. — Idea of Being 141 
 
 n.— Analogy of Being, 142 
 
 Chapter II. — The Transcendentals. 
 
 Article I. — Number of Transcendentals, .... 144 
 
 " U.— Unity, 144 
 
 " IIL— Truth, 150 
 
 " IV.— Goodness 151 
 
 " V. — Beauty. — Sublimity. — Gracefulness, . . . 156 
 
 PRINCIPLES AND CAUSES OF BEING, . .161 
 Chapter I. — Metaphysical Principles of Being. 
 
 Article I. — Potentiality and Actuality; or, Power and Act, . 162 
 
 " II. — Essence and Existence, 167 
 
 Chapter II. —Causes of Being. 
 
 Article I. — Division of Causes, 169 
 
 " II.— Material Cause and Specific Formal Cause, . . 170 
 
 " III. — Exemplar or Ideal Cause, 170 
 
 " IV.— Efficient Cause, 171 
 
 " v.— Final Cause 179 
 
 DIVISION OF BEING, ... 184 
 
 Chapter I. — Real Being and Logical Being. 
 
 Chapter II. — Uncreated or Infinite Being and 
 
 Created or Finite Being. 
 
 Finite Being, • 187 
 
xxu TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Chaptek III. — Substance and Accidbnt. 
 
 Article I. — Nature of Substance and Accident, 
 
 " II. — Different Kinds of Substance, 
 
 " III. — Subsistence, Supposit, and Person, 
 
 " IV. — Accidents. — Quantity, . 
 
 " v.— Eelation, 
 
 " VI.— Quality, . . . 
 
 " VII. — Action, Passion, Time, and Place, 
 
 189 
 193 
 193 
 194 
 196 
 199 
 201 
 
 SPECIAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Its Division, 205 
 
 COSMOLOGY, . . . .205 
 
 Chapter I. — The World in General. 
 
 Article I.— Origin of the World 206 
 
 " II.— Perfection of tlie World, 308 
 
 " III.— Order of the Universe, . . . . . .211 
 
 Chapter II.— The World in Relation to Non- 
 living OR Inorganic Bodies. 
 
 Articlb I. — Primitive Elements of Bodies, .... 214 
 
 II. — Properties of Matter and Form, .... 218 
 
 " III.— The Natural Composite, 222 
 
 " IV. — Substantial Changes of Bodies, or Generation and 
 
 Corruption, 224 
 
 " V. — Properties of Bodies, 225 
 
 " VT.— Space and Time, 238 
 
 Chapter III. — The World : Living Bodies. 
 
 Article I. — Life in general 232 
 
 " II. — The Soul, or Life-Principle of Living Com- 
 posites, 234 
 
 " III. — The Bodies of Living Composites, .... 240 
 " IV.— Vegetative Life, or the Life of Plants, . . .242 
 
 " V. — Sensitive Life, or the Life of Animals, . . 243 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. Xxiii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY ; OR, ANTHROPOLOGY. . . 249 
 
 Chapter L — Thb Human Soul and Its Faculties. 
 
 Article I. — Faculties of tRe Human Soul, .... 250 
 " II. — The Cognitive Sensitive Faculties. — Sensibility in 
 
 general, 251 
 
 " III. — External Sensibility in general, .... 258 
 
 " IV. — The External Senses in particular, . . . 263 
 
 " v.— Internal Senses 264 
 
 " VI. — The Appetitive Faculties. — Sensitive Appetite, . 273 
 
 " VII.— The Intellective Faculties.— The Intellect, . . 275 
 
 " VIII.— Consciousness, 282 
 
 " IX.— Attention and Reflection, 284 
 
 " X. — The Principal Functions of the Intellect. — Judg- 
 ment, . 285 
 
 " XI. — Speculative Intellect and Practical Intellect, 287 
 
 " XII.— Reason 287 
 
 " XIIL— Intellective Memory, 288 
 
 " XIV.— Intellective Appetite, or Will, . . . .290 
 
 " XV.— Freedom 291 
 
 " XVI.— Relations of the Will to the Other Faculties of the 
 
 Soul, 297 
 
 " XVII.— Habit 299 
 
 Appendix. 
 Sleep and Insanity, 802 
 
 Chapter II. — The Human Soul Considered in Itself. 
 
 Article I. — Origin of the Human Soul, 305 
 
 " IL— Spirituality of the Human Soul, . . . .306 
 " III. — Immortality of the Human Soul, .... 311 
 
 Chapter III.— The Human Soul in Relation to 
 its Body. 
 
 Article I. — Union of Soul and Body, 315 
 
 " II. — Unity of Human Soul as Substantial Form of the 
 
 Body, .319 
 
xxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PASS 
 
 Article III. — Seat or Locus of the Soul, ..... 333 
 ' IV.— The Resurrection of the Body, . . , . 334 
 
 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 DEPrftlTION AND DIVISION. 
 
 Chaptek I. — Existence and Unity op God. 
 
 FAGB 
 
 Article I.— Proofs of the Existence of God, .... 337 
 
 n.— Atheism 331 
 
 •' UL— Unity of God, 333 
 
 " IV.— Dualism 338 
 
 Chapter II. — Attributes op God in General. 
 
 ABSOLUTE attributes. 
 
 Article I. — Attributes of God in general, .... 335 
 " IL— Absolute Attributes of God.— Aseity, . . .337 
 " in. — Infinity, Eternity, Immutability, Simplicity, and 
 
 Immensity, ....... 338 
 
 IV.— The Divine Intelligence, 339 
 
 " v.— The Divine Will 341 
 
 " VI.— The Divine Power, 343 
 
 Chapter III. — Relative Attributes op God. 
 
 Article I.— God the Creator 347 
 
 " II.— Pantheism, 350 
 
 " III.— God the Preserver, 355 
 
 " IV. — The Divine Concurrence with the Actions of 
 
 Creatures, 358 
 
 " V. — Omnipresence of God, 359 
 
 " VI.— Providence of God, 360 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Definition of Moral Philosophy. — Character of the Science. — Its 
 
 Excellence, Method, and Division, , . . 367 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xxv 
 
 ETHICS. 
 
 DITIBION. 
 
 Chafteb I. — The End op Human Actions. 
 
 PAQX 
 
 Article I. — Good in general as the End of Every Being, and 
 
 the First Principle of Its Operations, . . 370 
 
 " II.— The Supreme Good as the Last End of Man, . 37S 
 " III. — The Supreme Good in relation to Man's Life upon 
 
 Earth, 376 
 
 Chapter II. — Sttbjective Principles of Human 
 Actions. 
 
 Article I. — The Faculty by which Human Actions are Elicited, 378 
 
 " n.— The Passions, 383 
 
 " III.— Virtues and Vices, 385 
 
 Chapter III. — Morality of Human Actions. 
 
 Article I. — On what the Morality of Human Actions Depends, 388 
 " II. — Constituent Principles of the Morality of Human 
 
 Actions, 391 
 
 " ni.— Imputability 393 
 
 " IV.— Merit and Demerit, 394 
 
 Chapter IV. — Law, the Eulb of Human Actions. 
 
 Article I.— Moral Duty, 396 
 
 " IL— Right 399 
 
 " III. — Law in general, . 403 
 
 " IV.— The Eternal Law 404 
 
 •' V. — The Natural Law of Conscience, .... 404 
 
 «' VL— Sanction of Moral Law, 407 
 
 " VIL— The First Precept of the Natural Law, . . 410 
 " VIII. — False Systems of Morality as Derived from Their 
 
 First Moral Precept, 411 
 
 " IX Conscience, 415 
 
 Natural Law, .... 418 
 
XX /i TABLE OF 00NTENT8. 
 
 PART I.— INDIVIDUAL LAW. 
 
 PASS 
 
 Chaptbe I. — Man's Duties to God, . . 419 
 
 Chapter II. — Man's Dtttibb to Himself. 
 
 Article I. — The Foundation of Man's Duties to Himself, . 435 
 
 IL— Man's Duties to His Soul, ..... 425 
 
 " IIL— Man's Duties to His Body 437 
 
 Chapter III. — Man's Duties to His Fellow-Men. 
 
 Article I. — Love of One's Neighbor 480 
 
 " II.— The Right of Self-Defenoe, and Duelling, . . 434 
 
 " III. — Rights and Duties in Relation to Social Good, . 436 
 
 " IV.— Contracts, 446 
 
 PART II.— SOCIAL LAW, . . .450 
 
 Chapter I. — Domestic Society. 
 
 Article I. — Nature of Marriage, .... . 451 
 
 " II. — Unity and Indissolubility of Marriage, . . 453 
 
 " III. — Reciprocal Duties of Husband and Wife, . . 454 
 
 " IV. — Duties of Parents and Children, .... 455 
 
 " V. — Duties of Masters and .Servants^ .... 457 
 
 Chapter II.— Civil Society. 
 
 Article I. — Nature of Civil Society, 459 
 
 " II.— The Social State in Relation to Man, . . .459 
 " III. — The Primitive Fact that Reduces to Act the Nat- 
 ural Sociability of Man, ..... 461 
 
 " IV.— End of Civil Society, ...... 462 
 
 «' v.— Elements of Civil Society, ..... 463 
 
 " VI.— Nature of Civil Authority, ..... 465 
 
 " VII.— Origin of Civil Authority, ..... 466 
 
 " VIII.— Diverse Polities, 468 
 
 " IX. — Manner of Transmitting Supreme Power, . . 470 
 
 " X. — Exercise of Supreme Power, 471 
 
 » XI.— Duties of the Ruler and His Subjects, . . .476 
 
TABLE OF CONTENT a. XXV ii 
 
 PART III.— THE COMMON LAW OP NATIONS. 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Chaptbk I. — Natural Relations existing be- 
 tween Different Nations, . . . 478 
 
 Chapter II. — Peaceful Relations between Dif- 
 ferent Nations. 
 
 Article I. — The Duties Prescribed by the Love of One Nation 
 
 for Another, 480- 
 
 " II.— Commerce, 480 
 
 ■' III. — Treaties and the Right of Embassy, . . . 481 
 
 Chapter III. — War. 
 
 Article I. — Nature and Justice of War 483 
 
 " II. — Duties during and after War, .... 484 
 
 Chapter IV. — The Society of Nations, . . 486 
 
 Appendix on Religious Society. 
 
 Article I. — Nature and Organization of the Church, , . 488 
 
 " II.— Rights of tlie Church, 490 
 
 " III. — Mutual Relations of Church and State, . . 492 
 
 " IV. — Relations between the Church and International 
 
 Society, 493 
 
 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, . . .495 
 
 Ancient Philosophy. 
 
 Oriental Philosophy, . 496 
 
 First Period of Ancient Philosophy, . . . „ . 498 
 
 Second Period of Ancient Philosophy, 499 
 
 Third Period of Ancient Philosophy, ..... 503 
 
 Medlsital Philosophy. 
 
 First Period .605 
 
 Second Period, 
 
 1. Arabian Philosophy, 505 
 
Xxvili TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 FAQS 
 
 2. The Philosophy of .the Schools before St. Thomas, . 507 
 
 3. Apogee of the Scholastic Philosophy, .... 510 
 Third Period. 
 
 Decline of Scholastic Philosophy, 512 
 
 MODBKN PhTT.OSOPHY. 
 
 First Period. 1. Epoch of Transition, ... 
 Second Period. 2. Philosophy of Bacon, Descartes, and Leib' 
 nitz, . .... 
 
 3. The Schools of Bacon, Descartes, and Leib- 
 
 nitz, ...... 
 
 4. The Scotch School and the German School, 
 
 5. Present Schools in France, 
 
 6. Philosophy in England and America, 
 
 Index of Subjects, 
 
 Index of Authors referred to, 
 
 514 
 
 515 
 
 518 
 520 
 522 
 523 
 525 
 536 
 
INTEODUCTOET. 
 
 DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. — TIB EXCELLENCE AND UTIL= 
 ITY.— ITS DIVISION. 
 
 1. Philosophy is the science of things through their 
 highest or ultimate causes, so far as it may be attained 
 by the light of reason. — Whatever exists may be known 
 in two ways : the first is by a spontaneous, common 
 knowledge of things, such as every man may acquire ; 
 the second is by a reflex knowledge, peculiar to minds 
 desiring to account for things and to know them in 
 their principles and ultimate causes : this latter is 
 philosophic knowledge. But the principles of things 
 are partly confined to special sciences, and partly un- 
 derlie all human knowledge ; the former constitute 
 the philosophy of this or that science ; the latter 
 alone are the object of philosophy properly so called. 
 These principles or ultimate causes are investigated 
 by the light of reason ; and so philosophy is divided 
 off from Sacred Theology, which rests on divinely 
 revealed principles. 
 
 2. ITie excellence and utility of philosophy are mani- 
 fest, whether it be considered in itself, or in its relations 
 with the other sciences. — Since philosophy treats of 
 things in their highest causes, it is in itself the noblest 
 object that can engage the mind of man ; it teaches 
 him the knowledge of truth and enables him to attain 
 his greatest natural perfection. Eelatively to the 
 other sciences, it is evident that since philosophy lays 
 
XXX INTBODUOTORT. 
 
 down their first principles, it is their foundation, and 
 exercises the most direct influence over their develop- 
 ment, as experience besides has shown. 
 
 3. Philosophy may he divided into real, rational, and 
 moral philosophy. — Every science may be divided into 
 as many parts as there are different aspects under 
 which the object of which it treats may be viewed. But 
 the object of philosophy in general is heiTig, which may 
 be considered under three aspects : as real and pos- 
 sessing attributes independent of our cognition ; as 
 ideal and having attributes which result from our men- 
 tal action ; or as moral when regarded as the term * of 
 voluntary action. Philosophy, then, may treat of the 
 ultimate principles of things either in the order of re- 
 ality, or of cognition, or of morality ; its divisions are, 
 therefore, called physical, logical, and ethical ; or, if we 
 use the Latin equivalents, natural or real, rational, and 
 moral. The ontological order, or order of existence 
 would require us to begin with real philosophy or 
 metaphysics ; we must, however, first study rational 
 philosophy, because it points out the laws of the hu- 
 man mind in acquiring knowledge, and trains it to 
 discern the true from the false, thus furnishing the 
 means to study real being more easily and securely. 
 
 * " Term in general is a boundary or limit. lu Logic, it denotes 
 the subject and predicate of a judgment ; the major, minor, and 
 middle of a syllogism. In Metaphysics, it denotes the limit of a 
 cause, more particularly of an efficient cause. In Ethics, the final 
 cause is the term, because the limit of desire." — Harfer, Metaphys- 
 ice of the School, vol. i. , p. 589. 
 
RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ITS DIVISION^ 
 
 Rational Philosophy is divided into Logic, Ideology, 
 and Criteriology. — As rational philosophy considers 
 entities in respect to the knowledge which we have of 
 them, it ought (1) to investigate the laws which govern 
 the intellect, the instrument by which we know ; (2) to 
 treat of ideas, the means by which we know ; (3) to 
 determine the value of the knowledge acquired by the 
 intellect. Hence rational philosophy is divided into 
 three principal parts : 1. Logic, or the science of the 
 laws of thought ; 2. Ideology, or the science of ideas ; 
 3. Criteriology, or the science of the criteria of certi- 
 tude. 
 
 LOGIC. 
 
 DEFINITION OF LOGIC— ITS OTILITY. — ITS DIVISION. 
 
 1. Logic is the science of tJie laios which the intellect 
 must obey in order to acquire readily and surely the hnowl- 
 edgi truth. — The human mind in its search after 
 tru1 s subject to laws imposed on it by its very 
 nature. The ascertainment of these laws constitutes 
 Logic. Logic is a science rather than an art, because 
 it considers the laws of the mind in their intrinsic 
 
2 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 principles and general applications, and is not con- 
 fined to an enumeration of practical rules.* 
 
 2. Logic is of great utility for advancing in the cogni- 
 tion of truth, for guarding against error, and acquiring 
 proficiency in any science whatever. — As Logic habitu- 
 ates the intellect to classify and co-ordinate knowl- 
 edge, it gives us great facility for progressing still 
 further in the acquisition of truth; moreover, by 
 familiarizing the mind with the nature and structure, 
 as also the artifices, of reasoning, it enables us easily 
 to discern the vices of a sophism a;nd the false appear- 
 ances by which error seeks to seduce the mind. 
 Finally, it is evident that, as the sciences can advance 
 only by means of reasoning, nothing is more con- 
 ducive to their progress and easy acquisition than 
 Logic, which is, in fact, the science of reasoning itself. 
 
 3. Logic is divided into three principal parts : the first 
 investigates tJie nature and laws of reasoning ; the second 
 expounds the general conditions of science ; the third deter- 
 mines the general rules of method. — The object of logic 
 is reasoning ; but in reasoning three things may be 
 considered : the nature of reasoning, the end of reason- 
 ing, which is science, and, lastly, the process or 
 method followed to reach this end more easily. Logic, 
 therefore, is divided into three parts, corresponding 
 to the three aspects under which reasoning may be 
 considered. 
 
 * Considered as " an enumeration of practical rules " for the detec- 
 tion and refutation of error, logic is an art. Hence, while logic is 
 chiefly and primarily a science, it is dependently and secondarily an 
 art. — Aristotle defines art as "science employed in production.'' 
 
PART FIRST. 
 
 DIALECTICS. 
 
 Reasoning and its Constituent Elements. 
 
 4. Dialectics, the first part of Logic, has reasoning for 
 its olyect, and treats : 1. of Simple Apprehension ; 2. of 
 Judgment ; 3. of Reasoning. — Reasoning is a complex 
 operation, whose elements are judgment and simple 
 apprehension. Every reasoning supposes several 
 judgments, and every judgment supposes the appre- 
 hension of two ideas. Hence, before considering 
 reasoning in itself, we must treat of judgment and 
 simple apprehension. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Simple Appeehension. 
 
 AET. I. — ^NATUEE of SLMPLE APPEEHENSION. 
 
 5. Simple Apprehension is that first operation ofthein- 
 tellect hy which it seizes or perceives an object without any 
 affirmation or negation concerning it. — The first act of 
 the mind is a simple view by which it apprehends ob- 
 jects presented to it, without affirming or denying 
 anything of them. The result of this operation is an 
 
4 RATIONAL PBILOSOPHT. 
 
 ideal reproduction of the object perceived ; this re- 
 production is called a mental term, concept, notion, 
 or idea. If the mental term is expressed orally, 
 it is called an oral term or word. 
 
 ABT. n. — IDEAS AND OEAL TEEMS. 
 
 6. An idea is a mere intellectual representation of an ob- 
 ject, by ivhich that object is known. — The human intellect 
 is not necessitated by its nature to know any one de- 
 terminate object. Now, since it is indifferent in this 
 respect, it must, when it actually knows an object^ 
 be determined to know by that object. But this ob- 
 ject can determine the intellect to know only by being 
 united to it in some way. The intellect, eyidently, 
 cannot go out of itself to effect this union, nor can the 
 object in its physical reality enter the intellect. The 
 union of object and intellect, therefore, must be 
 effected by a species, form, or likeness of the object. 
 It is this medium of union, and therefore of knowl- 
 edge, that we call an idea.* It must be carefully dis- 
 tinguished from the sensible image or phantasm, 
 which is proper to sense only, and is therefore mate- 
 rial ; whereas the idea is spiritual and proper to in- 
 tellect, and represents not the sensible qualities of an 
 individual object, but its nature as one of a class of 
 objects. 
 
 1. An oral term is a conventional word which expresses 
 an idea. — Unlike the idea or mental term, which from 
 its very nature represents the object, the oral term 
 has a meaning only in virtue of the usage and agreer 
 
 * When viewed as the product of the joint action of object and in- 
 tellect, it is called a concept, and the action producing it is called 
 conception. 
 
SIMPLE APPBEBENSION. 5 
 
 ment of men. It directly expresses the idea, and 
 througli this the object itself ; but habit leads us usu- 
 ally to unite the idea of the word with the idea of 
 the thing. 
 
 ART. m. — DIYISION OF TEBMS. 
 
 8. Ideas are concrete or abstract, clear or obscure, dis- 
 tinct or confused, convplete or incomplete. — Considered 
 with reference to the manner in which the object is 
 presented to the intellect, an idea is concrete when the 
 object is apprehended in its physical reality with all 
 its belongings ; as the idea of a " learned man " or a 
 " marble statue." It is abstract when the object is ap- 
 prehended apart from its real existence or its phys- 
 ical connections ; as the idea of " learning " or of 
 " whiteness." 
 
 In respect to the degree of perfection with which 
 the object is apprehended, an idea is clear or obscure 
 according as the object perceived through it can or 
 cannot be distinguished from other objects. The idea 
 we have of a "brother" or " sister," or of "virtue," 
 V. g., is clear. 
 
 An idea is distinct or confused according as it does 
 or does not exhibit the marks by which the object is 
 distinguished from other objects ; the idea of " vir. 
 tue,".v. g., is distinct when by it we know not only 
 that virtue is an acquired habit, but also that it inclines 
 the will to act rightly. 
 
 An idea is complete and adequate or incomplete and in- 
 adequate according as all or only some of the con- 
 stituent elements of the object are known ; the idea 
 of " man " as a rational animal is complete. 
 
 9. An oral term is significant or insignificant, fixed or 
 vague, univocal or equivocal, analogous by attribution or 
 analogous by proportion. — An oral term is significant if 
 
6 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it means something, as " man ;" it is insignificant if it 
 has no meaning, as "tervoc." 
 
 An oral term is/a;ed if it has a settled meaning, as 
 " God;" it is vagtie if its meaning varies at the will of 
 him who uses it, as " Nature," which sometimes means 
 the visible universe, sometimes the essence of a thing, 
 etc. 
 
 An oral term is univocal when it has but one mean- 
 ing for the several objects to which it is applied, as 
 " man," which signifies the same thing when applied 
 to Peter and to Paul ; it is equivocal when its meaning 
 varies for each of several things, as " dog," when ap- 
 plied to a star and an animal. An oral term is anal- 
 ogous, if it signifies several things which are not of the 
 same nature, but have some similitude, as "foot," 
 which is applied to a part of the animal body and to 
 the base of a mountain. A term is analogous by anal- 
 ogy of attribution when it denotes one thing, primarily 
 and intrinsically, and applies to others only on ac- 
 count of the relation which they have to the first, 
 either extrinsically, as when " healthy " is predicated 
 of food and of the animal organism ; or intrinsically, 
 as when " being " is predicated of God and creatures, 
 of substance and accident. A term is analogous by 
 proportion when it is applied to several things which 
 differ, in reality, but which bear a certain proportion 
 to one another ; as " principle," which has a propor- 
 tionate resemblance when applied to source, heart, 
 and point. 
 
 10. Mental and oral terms are significant by themselves 
 or with another term, positive or negative, concrete or 
 abstract, real or logical, absolute or connotative, incom- 
 plex or complex, transcendental or predicamental, con- 
 nexed or disparate, predicable or subjective, antecedent or ' 
 consequent, collective or distributive, singular or universal. 
 
SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 1 
 
 — ^A term, whether mental or oral, is significant by 
 itself when by itself it has a meaning, and there- 
 fore may be the entire subject or attribute of a 
 proposition, as " hero ; " it is significant with another 
 when by itself it has no meaning, and therefore can- 
 not alone be subject or attribute of a proposition, as 
 " some." 
 
 A term is positive when it signifies some entity, as 
 " light ; " it is negative when it denotes the absence 
 of some entity, as " blindness." 
 
 A term is concrete when it denotes a thing with its 
 belongings as it really exists, as " Peter ; " it is 
 abstract when it denotes a thing viewed apart from 
 the subject to which it belongs, and from which it has 
 no separate existence, as " whiteness." 
 
 A term is real when it signifies something having 
 existence outside the intellect, as " God ; " it is logical 
 when it signifies a thing which has no existence 
 except what intellect gives it, as " species," " genus." 
 
 A term is absolute or substantive when it denotes a 
 thing as existing in itself, whether the thing be really 
 substance, as " man," or accident, as "prudence ; " it 
 is connotaiive or adjective when it denotes something 
 accessory to another, whether the thing be accident, 
 as "good," or substance, as "philosopher." 
 
 A term is incomplex when it denotes one thing by a 
 single sign, as " angel ; " it is complex when it denotes 
 several realities or consists of several words, as 
 " poet," which denotes the man and his art ; " Julius 
 Caesar," which consists of two words ; the " Emperor 
 Charlemagne," which is complex in word and in 
 reality, for it embraces two words and two realities. 
 
 A term is transcendental when it signifies something 
 applicable to all things, as "being," "something," 
 " one," " true," " good ; " it is predicamental when it 
 
8 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 signifies something which applies only to certain 
 beings, as " brute." 
 
 Terms are connexed when one includes or excludes 
 the other, as " man and animal," "white and black; " 
 they are disparate when they have no relation of 
 exclusion or subordination, as " white and learned." 
 
 A term is predicable when it can be affirmed of an- 
 other ; it is subjective when another can be afi&rmed of 
 it ; thus, in the proposition, " God is just," God is sub- 
 ject and Jms^ predicate. 
 
 An antecedent term is that which another follows, as 
 " man " in respect to animal ; a consequent term is that 
 which follows another, as " animal " in respect to man. 
 If terms are deduced from each other, they are called 
 reciprocal, as " man and rational." 
 
 A term is collective when it denotes several things 
 taken conjointly, as " people," " nation ; " it is distrib- 
 utive when it denotes several things in such a manner 
 that it may be applied to each in particular, as 
 " man." 
 
 A term is singular when it signifies one thing deter- 
 minately, as " Aristotle ; " it is universal when it ap- 
 plies to several things univocally and distributively, 
 as " animal." In treating of universal terms, we may 
 consider : 1. Universal terms in themselves, and the 
 five Species into which they are divided ; 2. The divi- 
 sion of universal terms into different Supreme Genera, 
 called Categories. 
 
 AET. IT. — XTNTVEESALS. 
 
 11. Vniversals are terms ivhich are applied univocally 
 and distributively to many things. — ^When the intellect 
 perceives the essence of an object abstracted from the 
 individual characteristics of that object, it may con- 
 
SIMPLE APPREHBN8I0N. 9 
 
 sider the mental term representing' the essence as 
 applicable to every being which has the common 
 essence ; the term is then called universal, as " man." 
 Its opposite is the singular term, which is applicable 
 to one determinate thing only, as " Socrates." A par- 
 ticular term is a universal affected by the sign of par- 
 ticularity, which limits it to a part of what the term 
 denotes, as " some men." 
 
 12. Universal terms have two properties : comprehen- 
 sion and extension, ivhich are in inverse ratio to each 
 other. — The essence represented by a universal term 
 is made up of one or of many elements ; thus, the es- 
 sence of man consists of " animality and rationality ; " 
 the comprehension or intension of a universal term is 
 the sum 6f the elements which it contains. The es- 
 sence represented by a universal term is found in a 
 greater or less number of subjects; thus, the essence 
 of man is found in every man ; the extension of a uni- 
 versal term is the number of beings to which it ap- 
 plies. The greater the comprehension of a term, the 
 less its extension, and vice versa. 
 
 13. There are five modes according to ivhich a universal 
 term may be applied to individuals of like nature ; there 
 are, therefore, five classes of universals, viz., genus, spe- 
 cies, difference, property, and accident. These universals 
 are also called predicables.—A universal term expresses 
 either the essence of a thing or something added to 
 the essence. In the former case, it expresses either 
 the whole essence or only a part of it. If it denotes 
 the whole essence, it is a species, and the beings to 
 which it is applied are called individuals, as " man." 
 
 If the universal denotes only a part of the essence, 
 it denotes either the part common to other species, or 
 the part by which the essence differs from them : in 
 the first case it is called genus, and in the second spe- 
 
10 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 dfic difference; thus, " animal " expresses what is com- 
 mon to both man and brute, and " rational " expresses 
 the specific difference which distinguishes man from 
 brute. 
 
 If the universal denotes what is added to the es- 
 sence, either this attribute cannot be separated from 
 the essence, but is a necessary attendant of it, so that 
 it is always found in the whole species and in that 
 species only, in which case it is a property; or it can 
 be separated without changing the essence, and then 
 it is an accident ; thus, " free will " is a property, 
 "learning" is an accident of man. Genus, species, 
 and difference are divided into highest, intermediate, 
 and lowest or proximate, as may be seen in the fol- 
 lowing diagram. 
 
 Substance 
 
 / \ 
 
 Corporeal Incorpored 
 
 \ 
 
 Body 
 
 / \ 
 
 Organic Inorganic 
 
 Living 
 
 Sentient Non-sentient 
 
 \ 
 
 Animal 
 
 „ / \ 
 
 Rational Irrational 
 
 \ 
 
 Man 
 
 AET. T. — PEEDICAMENTS OE CATEGORIES. 
 
 14. Predicaments or categories are the highest genera ii 
 which all real entities are classified ; or, ihey are the high' 
 est genera of all things.—'Wh.en the intellect examines 
 an object, it seeks what attributes or predicates it can 
 
SIMPLE APPREHENSION: 11 
 
 affirm or deny of that object. These predicates all 
 have their place under the predicables. But all the 
 different objects which the intellect can know, have 
 been arranged in logic under certain supreme genera ; 
 these genera are called predicaments or categories. 
 
 15. There are ten predicaments or categories : substance, 
 quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, time, place, pos- 
 ture, habiliment. — Every being exists either in itself or 
 in another. If it exists in itself, it is called substance; 
 if it exists in another as its subject, it is called acci- 
 dent. Accident is divided into nine genera ; for, if we 
 wish to know the accidents of a substance, Pope Leo 
 XIII., for instance, we may put the following ques- 
 tions : 1. How large a man is he ? the answer to which 
 gives quantity ; 2. Whose father or son is he ? which 
 implies relation; 3. What are his qualifications? qual- 
 ity ; 4. What does he do ? action ; 5. What does he 
 suffer ? passion ; 6. In what age does he live ? time ; 
 7. Where is he ? place ; 8. Is he sitting or standing ? 
 posture ; 9. How is he clad ? hahit or habiliment. 
 
 16. Comparing with one another the things arranged 
 under the predicaments, we may consider their opposition, 
 priority, simultaneity, motion, and mode of having ; these 
 are called post-predicaments. — Opposition is the repug- 
 nance of one thing to another. It may be in four 
 ways : as Contrary, when the two things, falling under 
 a common genus, are mutually incompatible in the 
 same subject, as " heat and cold " under the genus 
 temperature ; as Relative, when the repugnance arises 
 from a mutual relation, as " father and son ; " as 
 Privative, when the repugnance arises between a 
 thing and its privation, as " sight and blindness ; " as 
 Contradictory, when the repugnance is between being 
 and not-being, as " man and not-man." 
 
 Priority is that by which one thing precedes an- 
 
12 RATIONAL PHILOSOPBT. 
 
 other. It is of five kinds: 1. Priority of duration, 
 as " an old man is prior in existence to a youth ; " 2. 
 Of consequence, as " man precedes rational ; " 3. Of or- 
 ier, as in the study of language " grammar precedes 
 literature;'' 4. Of dignity, as "king and subjects;" 
 5. Of nature, as the " sun and its rays." — Simulta- 
 neity is opposed to priority, hence it is also of five 
 kinds. 
 
 Motion is the passage from one state to another. It 
 is of six kinds : 1. Generation, or the passage from 
 non-being to substantial being ; 2. Corruption, or the 
 passage from being to non-being ; 3. Augmentation, 
 or the passage from a less to a greater quantity ; 4. 
 Diminution, which is the opposite of augmentation ; 
 5. Alteration, or the passage from one quality to an- 
 other ; 6. Locomotion, or the passage from one place 
 to another. — The modes ofJiaving are five : 1. Inherence, 
 as " a man has knowledge ; " 2. Containing, as " a de- 
 canter has wine ; " 8. Possession, as " a man has a 
 field ; " 4. Belation, as " a father has a son ; " 5. Juxta- 
 position, as " a man has a garment on." 
 
 AET. VI. — ^PEOPEETIES OF TEEMS IN A PEOPOSITIGN. 
 
 17. Terms have six properties : supposition, appellation, 
 state, amplification, restriction, alienation. — Supposition is 
 the particular signification of a word in a given prop- 
 osition, as, " Angel is a word." Angel here signifies 
 merely the word, not the nature of which the word is 
 the sign. 
 
 Appellation is ^e application of one term to another, 
 as " God is good ;" here good is applied to God. 
 
 State is the acceptation of a term for the time indi- 
 cated by the verb, as, " Peter sings." 
 
 Amplification is the acceptation of a term for a wider 
 
SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 13 
 
 time than that indicated by the verb, as, " The dumb 
 speak." 
 
 Bestridioii is the limitation of the signification of a 
 term to a narrower sphere ; as, " Eve is the mother of 
 the living." Here the word living is restricted to men. 
 
 Alienation is the acceptation of a term in a met- 
 aphorical or figurative sense, as " Sun of Justice," 
 used to designate the Saviour. " All nature smiles," 
 is also an instance of the alienation of a term. 
 
 18. Supposition is material or formal, real or logical, 
 particular, collective, or distributive. — The supposition 
 of a term is material when the term signifies itself ; as, 
 " Man is a word." It informal when it denotes an ob- 
 ject, as, " Man is rational ; " and then it is real, if it 
 expresses an object as it exists in itself independently 
 of any mental consideration ; as, " Man is a living be- 
 ing:" or logical, if it denotes an object abstracted 
 from its individual characteristics ; as, " Man is a spe- 
 cies." Real formal supposition is particular when 
 the term signifies some only of the beings which it 
 can represent; as, "Some men are deceitful." It is 
 co^hctive when it signifies all the beings which it can 
 r( resent, taken conjointly; as, "The Apostles are 
 t^ slve ; " and distributive when it expresses all and 
 each of the beings which it can represent ; as, " Man 
 is mortal." 
 
 19. Supposition is subject to the folloiuing 7'ules : 1. A 
 term affected by a universal sign has a distributive or 
 collective supposition according to the requirement 
 of the predicate ; as, " All the Evangelists are saints," 
 " All the Evangelists are four." 2. A term affected 
 by a particular sign has a particular supposition ; as, 
 "Some men are just." 3. When the subject of a 
 proposition is not affected by any sign, it has a uni- 
 versal supposition in necessary matter ; as, " Man is 
 rational ; " it has a particular supposition in con- 
 
U BATIONAL PSILOSOPHT. 
 
 tingent matter ; as, " Men are wise." 4. In an affirma- 
 tiye proposition, the supposition of the predicate is 
 always particular ; as, " Man is mortal ; " in a negative 
 proposition, the supposition of the predicate is uni- 
 versal ; as, " Man is not a plant." 5. In every prop- 
 osition, the supposition of the subject is according 
 to the requirement of the predicate ; hence a numerical 
 term requires a collective supposition ; as, " The 
 Apostles are twelve ; " a necessary term requires a 
 distributive supposition; as, "Animals are sensi- 
 tive ; " a contingent term requires a particular sup- 
 position ; as, " Men are wise." 
 
 20. Appellation is material or formal. — Appellation is 
 material when the predicate is applied to the matter 
 of the subject, without regard to the form which de- 
 nominates the subject ; as, " The physician sings." It 
 is formal when the predicate is applied to the form of 
 the subject, i.e., to the quality or form which denomi- 
 nates the subject; as, " The physician cures." * 
 
 21. Appellation is subject to the follovnng rules : 1. 
 When the subject is a concrete term, the appellation 
 is material ; as, " Man is a living being." 2. When 
 the subject is qualified, the predicate is affirmed of the 
 subject only, and the appellation is material ; as, " St. 
 Thomas of Aquin was a disciple of Albertus Magnus." 
 3. When the predicate is qualified, the predicate with 
 its qualifier is affirmed of the subject, and the appella- 
 tion is formal ; as, " Thomas of Aquin was a saintly 
 disciple of Albertus Magnus." 
 
 *In the first example the predicate sings must be applied, not to 
 the form or quality of physician, but to the subject man, which the 
 form denominates. In the second example, cures naturally belongs 
 to the physician as such, and therefore is applied to the form. Form, 
 in general, is any determination whatever by wJmh a subject is affected. 
 
SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 15 
 
 AET. Til. — MEANS TO INSURE PEOPEIETY OF TEEMS. — DEFI- 
 NITION. 
 
 22. Terms, to he perfect, must be clear and distinct. 
 To obtain this result, we have recourse to definition and 
 division. — The aim of these two processes being to 
 clear up what is obscure or confused, it is evident that 
 they should not be employed upon what is already 
 sufficiently clear and distinct. 
 
 23. Definition is a brief explanation of the meaning of 
 a term or the nature of a thing. — Whence it follows that 
 there are two kinds of definition, nominal and real; the 
 first explains the meaning of the word, the second ex- 
 plains the nature of the thing signified by the word. 
 It should be observed: 1. That the nominal defini- 
 tion ought to precede the real, when the nature of a 
 thing is in question and the meaning of the word ex- 
 pressing it is not understood; 2. That the nominal 
 definition, in reasoning, must never be considered 
 tantamount to the real definition'; 3. That the real 
 definition only is scientific. 
 
 24. There are three kinds of nominal definition : 1. 
 According to etymology ; 2. According to usage ; 3. Ac- 
 cording to the meaning which the person using it wishes to 
 attach to it. — A real definition is either causal or essen- 
 tial. — ^A nominal definition may be given according 
 to etymology ; as, " Intelligence (from the Latin intus 
 legere, to read within) signifies intimate knowledge." 
 We may also define a term according to usage; as, 
 " By the word God, all understand the Infinite Being." 
 Finally, we may attach to a term lohatever meaning loe 
 choose. In this case, however, care should be taken: 
 1 . Not to be so arbitrary in our choice as to become 
 
16 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 unintelligible to others ; 2. Not to use the word in a 
 different sense during the discourse. 
 
 A causal definition explains a thing by means of the 
 principle which produces or generates it ; as, " A sphere 
 is a solid generated by the revolution of a semicircle 
 about its diameter." An essential definition explains a 
 thing by giving its essence ; as, " Man is a rational ani- 
 mal." This is the most perfect kind of definition. A 
 thing is sometimes explained by describing it ; such a 
 description is called a descriptive or oratoi'ical defini- 
 tion. 
 
 25. Definition should contain the proximate genus and 
 specific difference. — By definition the thing defined 
 should be distinguished from every other thing, and 
 should be known in its characteristics. But without 
 the proximate genus the characteristics of the thing 
 are not known ; and without the specific difference the 
 species to which the thing belongs is not known. In 
 this definition, "Man is a rational animal," animal de- 
 termines the proximate genus, and rational the specific 
 difference. This rule includes that laid down by 
 modern logicians, viz.. Definition must apply to the 
 whole of the thing defined and to nothing else. 
 
 Three rules are ordinarily given for a definition : 1. 
 The definition should be clearer than the thing defined ; 
 2. It should be convertible M'ith the thing defined ; 3. 
 The thing defined should not enter into the definition. 
 
 AET. VII. — DIVISION. 
 
 26. Division is the distribution of a whole into its parts. 
 Division is actual * or potential. — As division is the 
 
 * An actual whole is either phymal or metaphysical ; physical 
 when composed of really distinct parts, as body and soul in man ; 
 metaphysical when composed of parts that are only logically dis- 
 tinct, as auimality and rationality in man. 
 
SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 17 
 
 separation of a whole into its parts, there are as many 
 kinds of division as there are different kinds of whole. 
 But a whole may be actual or potential ; hence divi- 
 sion may be actual or potential : actual when the whole 
 is divided into parts which it really has ; as, " Man is 
 composed of body and soul ; "potential or logical when 
 the whole is divided into parts which it has in virtue 
 of its extension ; as, " Substance is corporeal or in- 
 corporeal." 
 
 27. Division should be adequate, it should he made 
 through the more universal members, and the members 
 should exclude one another. — 1. The division should be 
 complete, and hence equal to the whole thing divided ; 
 thus, we should not divide triangles into isosceles and 
 equilateral. 2. It should proceed from the more gen- 
 eral parts to those which are less general ; thus, the 
 division of living things into plants, animals, and men 
 would be defective ; they should first be divided into 
 sentient and non-sentient. 3. The dividing members 
 should in some way exclude one another; that is, 
 one should not contain another, much less all, so as 
 to be equal to the whole divided ; thus man should 
 • not be divided into soul, body, and arms. To these 
 three rules may be added a fourth: The division 
 should be brief, that is, the members should be few in 
 number. 
 
CHAPTEE n 
 
 Judgment, 
 abt. i. — ^nature oe judgment. 
 
 28. Judgynent is the second operation of the intellect, hy 
 which it predicates the agreement or disagreement of the 
 attribute with the subject* — By simple apprehension 
 tlie intellect perceives the subject and attribute sepa- 
 rately ; but after this operation it compares them, 
 and affirms or denies their agreement, that is, it forms 
 a judgment. The intellect, by this second operation, 
 perfects the first, which is initial and imperfect. 
 
 The chief division of judgments is that based on 
 their nature, and embraces the two classes of a priori 
 and a posteriori judgments. 
 
 An a priori judgment is one in which the agree- 
 ment or disagreement of the ideas compared is neces- 
 sary, and either is manifest or can become so from 
 their mere consideration ; as, " God is infinite." 
 
 An a posteriori judgment is one in which the agree- 
 ment or disagreement of the ideas compared is not 
 necessary, and can be known from experience alone ; 
 as, " Columbus discovered America." 
 
 A priori judgments are also called necessary, analyt- 
 ical, pure, metaphysical, absolute. A posteriori judg- 
 
 * Or with St Thomas : That action of the intellect hy which it 
 compounds or divides hy affirming or denying. 
 
JUDGMENT. 19 
 
 ments are styled contingent, syntlietical, empirical, physi- 
 cal, hypothetical. 
 
 29. The a priori synthetical judgment of Kant must be 
 rejected. — In Ms " Critique of Pure Reason," Kant lays 
 down this third kind of judgment, the a priori synthet- 
 ical. He holds rightly that all a priori or analytical 
 judgments must fulfil three conditions : 1. The attri- 
 bute must be included in the subject ; 2. It must be 
 necessary ; 3. It must be universal. But he further 
 maintains that such judgments as, " Every effect must 
 have a cause," or " 7 and 5 are 12," are wanting in the 
 first condition. Now, every judgment implies the 
 perception by the mind of the identity or diversity 
 of the ideas compared. This identity or diversity 
 can be apprehended either from the consideration of 
 the ideas, and in this case the judgment is a priori or 
 analytical ; or from some extrinsic source, i.e., expe- 
 rience, and then the judgment is a posteriori or syn- 
 thetical. Between these there is, therefore, no middle. 
 Moreover, if the second and third conditions are ful- 
 filled, evidently the first must also be fulfilled, since 
 from it the other two result. 
 
 AET. II. — THF, PEOPOSmON AND ITS ELEMENTS.* 
 
 30. A proposition is the expression of a judgment in 
 words spoken or written. The elements of a proposition 
 may he reduced to two, noun and verb. — A proposition, 
 as being the expression of a judgment, must contain 
 as many terms as the judgment. But the judgment 
 
 * As Logic has to do with mental operations and their signs only 
 in so far as they contain or express truth or falsity, so of all the 
 kinds of sentence of which the grammarian treats, it is concerned 
 with the declarative alone. This kind of sentence is called in logic 
 a proposition. 
 
20 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is composed of three elements : subject, attribute, and 
 copula. To these three elements of the judgment 
 correspond the three elements of the proposition : two 
 terms, which express the subject and predicate or at^ 
 tribute, and the copula, which unites them. The sub- 
 ject is generally a noun, the attribute an adjective; the 
 copula is a verb. The copula is called a verb, because 
 the word (verbum) of our mind is not complete with- 
 out a judgment, and judgment is formally constituted 
 only by the copula. The verb " to be " is explicitly 
 or implicitly the copula in every judgment and prop- 
 osition, because by it identity of subject and attri- 
 bute, or want of identity, is expressed, and every prop- 
 osition predicates one or the other. The terms con- 
 stitute the matter of the proposition ; the copul-a, 
 which gives being to the proposition, is its form. 
 
 The verb "to be, " or the copula, is often contained 
 in the predicate, as " I love God," which is equivalent 
 to "I am loving God." * 
 
 Besides the noun and the verb, Grammar recog- 
 nizes other parts of speech, as the pronoun, adverb, 
 conjunction, etc.; but Logic is not concerned with 
 these terms, because they do not constitute an essen- 
 tial element of the proposition, and because they serve 
 only to represent, modify, or connect nouns or verbs. 
 
 * The use of the term predieate in Logic must be carefully distin- 
 guished from its use in Grammar. In logic the attribute never in- 
 cludes the copula. Moreover, the copula, as the formal element of 
 the judgment, must be in the present tense, indicative mood. 
 Hence such propositions as, "The Martyrs suffered for the Faith," 
 must be resolved into the equivalent, " The Martyrs are persons who 
 suffered for the Faith." 
 
JUDGMENT. 21 
 
 AET. m. — DIVISION OP PEOPOSITIONS. 
 
 31. T/ie division of propositions is the same as that of 
 judgments. Hence a proposition is simple or compound 
 according to the nature of the judgment expressed. A 
 simple proposition is either simple incomplex or simple 
 complex. — A proposition being regarded in logic sim- 
 ply as tlie expression of a judgment, there are as 
 many kinds of propositions as of judgments. But a 
 judgment is simple or compound : simple when the 
 relation is established between only one subject and 
 one attribute ; compound when there are several sub- 
 jects or several attributes. When a judgment is sim- 
 ple, the attribute or the subject may be absolutely 
 simple, or simple hy reason of the connection between the 
 parts which compose it ; in the first case, the judgment 
 is simple incomplex or categorical ; as, " God is good : " 
 in the second, it is simple complex; as, "He who loves 
 not his neighbor, whom he sees, does not love God, 
 whom he does not see." Propositions, then, con- 
 sidered logically, are simple or compound. Gram- 
 marians who consider in propositions chiefly the 
 words of which they consist, divide them into simple, 
 complex, and compound ; but Logic is not concerned 
 with these divisions, since it contemplates proposi- 
 tions solely in their relation with thought. 
 
 32. A categorical proposition, considered in respect to 
 its quantity, is universal, particular, or singular, definite 
 or indefinite; in respect to its quality, it is affirmative, 
 negative, or infinitating ; in respect to the mode or manner 
 in which it asserts that the predicate belongs to the subject, 
 it is modal. — A categorical proposition may be divided 
 in the same manner as the judgment which it ex- 
 
22 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 presses. Hence according to its quantity, that is, ac- 
 cording to the extension of its subject, it is universal 
 if the subject is universal; as, "All men are mortal: " 
 particular if the subject is particular ; as, " Some men 
 are just;" singular ii ihe subject expresses only one 
 individual determinately ; as, " Peter is just." A prop- 
 osition may sometimes appear universal without in 
 reality being so ; as, " Men are deceptive." Proposi- 
 tions are called indefinite* when the subject is not 
 affected by a determinate sign ; as, " The Americans 
 are enterprising ; " and definite when the subject is 
 affected by a determinate sign ; as, " Some men are 
 deceptive." 
 
 According to its quality, that is, according to the 
 affirmation or negation indicated by the copula, a 
 proposition is affirmative ; as, " God is good : " or nega- 
 tive ; as, "The soul is not mortal." If the negation 
 does not affect the copula, but the predicate, the prop- 
 osition is then said to be infinitating ; as, " The human 
 soul is not-mortal." 
 
 A proposition is absolute when it merely affirms the 
 agreement or disagreement of subject and attribute; 
 as, " God is just : " it is modal when it expresses the 
 mode or manner in which the attribute is predicated 
 of the subject ; as, " God is necessarily just." The 
 attribute may be predicated of the subject according 
 to four modes : necessary, contingent, possible, and impos- 
 sible. There are, then, four kinds of modal proposi- 
 tion: as, "Man is necessarily rational;" "Man may 
 be good ; " " Man can be bad ; " " Man cannot be an 
 angel." The truth of a modal proposition depends 
 
 * A singular proposition is the most limited case of the particular 
 proposition. An indefinite proposition is universal or particulai 
 according as it expresses a necessary or a contingent truth. 
 
JUDGMENT. 23 
 
 on the mode according to whicli the attribute is pre- 
 dicated of the subject ; thus the proposition, " Man is 
 necessarily bad," is false.* 
 
 33. A compound proposition is either explicit or implicit. 
 An explicit compound proposition is copulative, causal, 
 adversative, relative, or hypothetical. A hypothetical 
 proposition is conditional, disjunctive, or conjunctive. An 
 implicit or exponible compound proposition is exclusive, ex- 
 ceptive, comparative, or reduplicative. — A compound prop- 
 osition consists of several propositions expressing 
 several judgments which make but one by virtue of 
 some logical bond established between them ; as, " If 
 you are good, you will be rewarded." The truth of a 
 compound proposition depends not upon each of the 
 judgments, but upon the connection between them ; 
 as, " If the soul is material, it is not immortal." A 
 compound proposition is copulative when it has sev- 
 eral categorical propositions united by the conjunc- 
 tion and or the like, expressed or understood ; as, 
 " Time and Truth are friends." 
 
 It is causal when it states the reason why the ante- 
 cedent contains the consequent, by means of the par- 
 ticle because or a word of similar import ; as, " He is 
 proud, because he is rich." 
 
 It is adversative when it expresses some opposition 
 between its members, by means of the particles hut, 
 nevertheless, etc.; as, " Yirtue is persecuted, but it will 
 be rewarded." 
 
 It is relative when it expresses some similitude 
 
 • The mode always affects the copula in true modal propositions. 
 They are always capable of being reduced to another proposition of 
 which the word or words expressing the mode is the predicate. 
 Thus, "Man can be bad " is equivalent to "That man be bad is 
 possible." 
 
24 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 between the propositions that compose it ; as, "As 
 life is, so death shall be. " 
 
 It is hypothetical when it states something not abso- 
 lutely, but with the proviso that something else be 
 verified ; as, " If you love me, you are my disciple." 
 
 A hypothetical proposition is conditional when, by 
 means of the particle if, it unites two categorical 
 propositions, one of which contains the reason or 
 condition of the other ; as, " If you will live piously, 
 you will suffer persecution." The proposition that 
 contains the reason is called the antecedent, the other 
 is the consequent. When the several component mem- 
 bers of a hypothetical proposition are united by the 
 particles either — or, or by or only, the proposition is 
 disjunciive ; as, " It is either day or night.'' But when 
 a hypothetical proposition denies that two or more 
 predicates can be affirmed of the same subject at the 
 same time, it is conjunctive ; as, "No man can serve 
 both God and Mammon." 
 
 Besides these compound propositions proper, there 
 are others really compound, though apparently cate- 
 gorical, and called exponihles. They are of four 
 kinds : exclusive, exceptive, comparative, and reduplica- 
 tive. The first is affected by an exclusive particle, as 
 only, alone, or the like ; as, " Virtue alone is praise- 
 worthy ;" and is expounded by the compound propo- 
 sition : " Virtue is praiseworthy ; nothing else is 
 praiseworthy." The second is affected by an excep- 
 tive particle, besides, except ; as, " All is lost except 
 honor;" which is expounded thus: "Honor is not 
 lost ; all else is lost." The third is affected by a com- 
 parative particle, expressed or implied ; as, " Gentle- 
 ness effects more than violence ;" which is equivalen 
 to : " Gentleness effects something ; violence effect 
 sometMng; the effect of gentleness is greater than 
 
JUDGMENT. 25 
 
 that of violence." The fourth is a proposition whose 
 subject is affected by a particle which repeats it, 
 inasmuch as, as such, etc.; as, "Fire, inasmuch as it is 
 fire, burns ;" which is equivalent to this : " Fire 
 burns, because such is its nature." 
 
 34. Tlie propositions forming a compound proposition 
 maybe all principal, or some principal and otJiers inci- 
 dental. — A compound proposition contains several 
 independent judgments which may be expressed in 
 several propositions; as, "Patience and meekness 
 are virtues ;" " Charity is meek and patient." That a 
 compound proposition be true, all the parts which 
 compose it must be true ; thus the proposition, 
 " Men and angels are mortal," is false. 
 
 A compound proposition may be resolved into sev- 
 eral grammatical propositions either co-ordinate, i.e., 
 simply in juxtaposition, as in the foregoing example, 
 or into propositions some of which are principal and 
 others incidental and explicative; as, "Sin, detested by 
 God, sullies the soul ; " which is equivalent to the 
 two independent judgments, " Sin is detested by 
 God," and " Sin sullies the soul." If the propositions 
 joined to the principal one are restrictive, the whole 
 proposition is not compound but simple. 
 
 AET. rV. — PBOPEETIES OF PEOPOSITIONS. 
 
 35. There are three properties of propositions : oppo- 
 sition, conversion, and equipollence. 
 
 36. Opposition is the affirmation and negation of the 
 same thing in the same respect. 
 
 37. Opposition is twofold, contradictory and contrary. 
 — Contradictory opposition is the repugnance be- 
 tween two propositions, one being universal and the 
 other particular, or both being singular. 
 
26 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Contrary opposition is the repugnance between two 
 universal propositions. 
 
 Some recognize what is called Subcontrary opposi- 
 tion, which holds between two opposite particular 
 propositions ; but this is not true opposition, since 
 the subjects of the two propositions may express dif- 
 ferent things. Still less can we consider as opposi- 
 tion that which is called Subaltern, and which holds 
 between two affirmative or two negative propositions, 
 the one being universal and the other particular. In 
 this case there is no opposition, since there is no affir- 
 mation and negation of one and the same thing in one 
 and the same respect. Of the four propositions : 
 "All men are wise," "No man is wise," " Some men 
 are wise," " Some men are not wise," the first and sec- 
 ond are contraries; the first and fourth, the second 
 and third, contradictories ; the third, and fourth, sub- 
 contraries ; the first and third, the second and fourth, 
 subalterns. 
 
 Eepresenting the universal affirmative proposition 
 by A, the imiversal negative by E, the particular 
 affirmative by I, and the particular negative by O, we 
 bave the following diagram : 
 
 CONTRARrES 
 
 
 SUBCONTRARIES 
 
JUDGMENT. 27 
 
 38. Neither contrary nor contradictory propositions can 
 both be tnie, for one of the contraries or contradictories 
 affirms wkat the other contrary or contradictory 
 denies. 
 
 Of two contradictories one must be true and the other 
 false, since each affirms or denies just enough to make 
 the other false. 
 
 Contraries can both be false in contingent matter, be- 
 cause one not only affirms what the other denies, but 
 states its extreme opposite. 
 
 Subcontraries can both be true, but cannot both be false, 
 for then their contradictories would be true, and thus 
 two contrary propositions would be true. 
 
 Subalterns can both be true or both false in necessary 
 matter ; as, " All men are mortal. Some men are mor- 
 tal ; " " All bodies are infinite, Some bodies are in- 
 finite ; " or one may be true and the other false in con- 
 tingent matter ; as, " All men are rich, Some men are 
 rich." 
 
 39. Equipollence is the reduction of a proposition to 
 another equivalent in meaning. — Two propositions, 
 though apparently different, may have the same 
 meaning ; as, " Every man is a rational animal ; No 
 man is not a rational animal." These two proposi- 
 tions are said to be equipollent. 
 
 40. When the subject of a proposition is affected by a 
 negation, the proposition becomes equivalent to its contra- 
 dictory ; as, "All men are wise; Not all (some) men 
 are wise, and therefore, Some men are not wise." 
 
 When the predicate of a proposition is affected by a 
 negation, the proposition becomes equivalent to its con- 
 trary; as, " All men are wise ; All men are not wise, 
 or. No man is wise." 
 
 When the predicate of a particular proposition is af- 
 fected by a negation, the proposition becomes equivalent 
 
28 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 to its suhcontrary ; " Some men are wise ; Some men 
 are not-wise, or Some men are not wise.'' 
 
 When both s^cbject and predicate of a pivposifion are 
 affected hy a negation, the piy'oposition becomes eqiiivalent 
 to its subaltern ; " All men are wise : Not-all men are 
 not-wise, or Some men are wise." — Tliese rules re- 
 sult from what has been said concerning the nature 
 and rules of opposite propositions. 
 
 41. Conversion is that change in a proposition by which, 
 icithout altering its truth, the predicate is made the subject, 
 and the subject the predicate. — The proposition to be 
 converted is called the convertend; the proposition 
 resulting from conversion, the converse. 
 
 42. Conversion is simple, per accidens, w by contraposi- 
 tion. — The conversion is simple when, the predicate 
 being made the subject, the proposition retains its 
 quantity ; as, " No man is a plant ; No plant is man." 
 
 It is /ler accidens, when, the predicate being made 
 the subject, the proposition changes its quantity; as, 
 "The Americans are men; Some men are Americans." 
 
 It is by contraposition when, the predicate being 
 made the subject, finite terms are changed into infini- 
 tating; as, "All men are animals; All not-animals are 
 not-men ; Only animals are men." 
 
 In effecting a conversion, the quality of the proposi- 
 tion must not be changed, otherwise there would be 
 no conversion, but simply opposition. — The following 
 are the rules for conversion : Universal negative propo- 
 sitions and particular afirmatives are converted simply; 
 as, " No man is an angel; No angel is a man." 
 
 Universal affirmative propositions and universal nega- 
 tives are converted per accidens ; as, " All men are mor- 
 tal. Some mortals are men." 
 
 Particular negative and universal affirmative proposi- 
 tions are converted by contraposition, that is, by obvert- 
 
JUDGMENT. 29 
 
 ing- or infinitating the proposition, and then convert- 
 ing simply ; as, " Some men are not just ; Some unjust 
 beings are not not-men ; Some unjust beings are 
 men. * 
 
 * The rules of conversion are expressed In the mnemonic couplet : 
 
 Simpliciter fEcI convertitur, EvA per aocid (ens), 
 
 Ast O per con trap (ositionem). Sic fit conversio tota. 
 
 The capital letters in the words fEcI and EyA of the first line and 
 
 of the second line stand for the different kinds of proposition to bp, 
 
 oonverted, as explained on page 26. 
 
CHAPTEE m. 
 
 Eeasoning. 
 abt. i. — definition aot) elements of beasoning, 
 
 43. Reasoning is the third operation of the intellect, bij 
 which, from the relation existing between tiuo judgments, 
 it infers a third as the result of tJw other two. — There are 
 two kinds of judgments. Some are self-evident, and 
 on that account are called analytical or immediate. 
 Others are not self-evident, and are called deductive or 
 mediate ; the relation between the predicate and the 
 subject cannot be perceived without comparing them 
 with a third idea. The act by which we seek to deter- 
 mine the relation of two terms by comparing them 
 with a third is reasoning. The verbal expression of a 
 reasoning is called an argument, and is, therefore, de- 
 fined as a discourse in which one proposition is in- 
 ferred from another. 
 
 44 Tlie elements of reasoning are three ideas and three 
 judgments, and the relation existing between the^e ideas 
 and judgments. — Every reasoning must contain three 
 ideas, since its end is to establish the relation between 
 subject and predicate by means of a third idea. 
 Again, it must contain three judgments : two to show 
 the relation of the subject and predicate with a middle 
 term, a third to point out the relation of the predicate 
 with the subject. The three ideas and the three judg- 
 ments constitute the matter of reasoning, their conneo 
 tion constitutes its form. 
 
REASONING. 31 
 
 45. Tlie truth of a reasoning may he considered in re- 
 spect hotJi to matter and form. — That a reasoning may be 
 materially true, it suffices that the premises and the 
 conclusion be separately true ; but that it he formally 
 true, the connection between conclusion and premises 
 must likewise be true ; hence it is clear that a reason- 
 ing may be materially true and formally false, and vice 
 versa. Thus the reasoning, " Every man is mortal ; 
 every man is an animal : therefore every animal is 
 mortal," is materially true, but formally false ; while 
 the reasoning, " All substances are spiritual ; color 
 is a substance : therefore color is spiritual," is ma- 
 terially false, but formally true. 
 
 46. All reasoning is based on one of tJiese tioo axioms : 
 1. Tivo things which agree with a third wholly or in part, 
 agree with each other wholly or in part ; 2. Two things, 
 one of which agrees wholly or in part with a third, loith 
 lohich the other does not agree, do not agree with each other. 
 — The first axiom is the principle of affirmative reason- 
 ing ; the second is the basis of negative reasoning. 
 
 AET. II. — DIVISION OP EEASONING. 
 
 47. Reasoning considered in respect to its form, is de- 
 dv£.tive or inductive ; in respect to its matter, it is categor- 
 ical or hypothetical. — In every reasoning a predicate is 
 affirmed or denied of a subject, because, after compar- 
 ing each of them with a middle term, we know whether 
 or not the middle term contains the other two. Now, 
 as one thing may be in another as a part in the whole, 
 or as the whole in the sum of its parts, reasoning is of 
 two kinds, according as we proceed from the whole to 
 its parts, or from the parts to the whole ; that is, ac- 
 cording as we proceed from genera to species and from 
 species to individuals, or from individuals to species 
 
32 RATIONAL PMIL0S0P3T. 
 
 and from species to genera. The first is dedtwtive 
 reasoning, the second is indiictive. Reasoning is also 
 deductive if it proceeds from effects to their cause, as 
 from signs to the thing signified, and it is thus we at- 
 tain to a knowledge of God. 
 
 Eeasoning considered in respect to the judgments 
 entering into it, is categorical or hypothetical according as 
 the judgments are categorical or hypothetical. But 
 whether reasoning be inductive or deductive, categor- 
 ical or hypothetical, the truth of the conclusion is 
 always mediate and deduced. Hence the regular form 
 of all reasoning is deduction, or the syllogism. 
 
 AET. m. — CATEGOBICAL SYLLOGISMS AOT) THEIB EDLES. 
 
 48. The syllogism is thatfoo'm of argument in ichich the 
 two extremes of a proposition are compared affirmatively 
 or negatively ivith a third term in order to conclude their 
 agreement or disagreement. — -It is easily seen from this 
 definition that the syllogism must contain three terms 
 and three propositions. The subject of the deduced 
 proposition is called the minor term or minor extreme ; 
 the predicate is called the major term or major extreme, 
 because the predicate, when not identical with the sub- 
 ject, has always a greater extension than the subject. 
 The term with which the extremes are compared is 
 called the middle term. The two propositions in which 
 the two extremes are compared with the middle term 
 are called pi~emises or antecedent ; that which contains 
 the major term is called the major premise ; that which 
 contains the minor term is called the minor premise. 
 The proposition which is deduced from the other two, 
 and in which the minor term is compared with the 
 major, is called the conclusion or consequent. 
 
 49. Syllogisms are subject to the following eight rules : 
 
REASONING. 33 
 
 I. A syllogism should contain only three terms. 
 
 II. No term should have a greater extension in the 
 conclusion than it has in the premises. 
 
 m. The middle term should be taken universally 
 at least once in the premises. 
 
 IV. The conclusion should not contain the middle 
 term. 
 
 V. Nothing can be concluded from two negative 
 premises. 
 
 VI. Two aflSrmative'premises cannot give a negative 
 conclusion. 
 
 VII. The conclusion always follows the weaker 
 part. 
 
 Vin. From two particular premises nothing can 
 be concluded. 
 
 I. The first rule is derived from the very essence of 
 the syllogism, which consists in establishing the re- 
 lation between two terms by means of- a third. This 
 rule is commonly violated by using one of the terms 
 in two different senses ; as, " Every spirit is endowed 
 with intelligence ; but alcohol is a spirit ; therefore 
 alcohol is endowed with intelligence." 
 
 H. The conclusion should not be more extended 
 than the premises ; otherwise, we should have a con- 
 sequent not contained in the antecedent, an effect 
 which exceeds its cause ; as, " Eagles are animals ; but 
 eagles fly in the air ; therefore all animals fly in the 
 air." 
 
 III. The middle term must be taken at least once 
 universally ; otherwise, being twice particular, it 
 would be equivalent to two different terms, and we 
 should have a syllogism containing four terms ; as, 
 " Some animals are endowed with reason ; but a horse 
 is an animal ; therefore a horse is endowed with rea- 
 son." 
 
Si RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 IV. The middle term slioTild not be found in the 
 conclusion ; because, being used as a term of com- 
 parison, for the purpose of finding agreement or 
 disagreement between the other two terms, its proper 
 place is in the premises, where this relation is estab- 
 lished. Its appearance in the conclusion either repeats 
 what has already been expressed ; as, " All crimes are 
 detestable ; treason is a crime ; therefore crime is 
 detestable : " or sometimes introduces a fourth 
 term into the syllogism ; as, " English Catholics 
 were persecuted by Queen Elizabeth ; Shakespeare 
 was an English Catholic ; therefore Shakespeare 
 was an English Catholic persecuted by Queen Eliza- 
 beth." 
 
 V. Two negatives give no conclusion ; for in that 
 case we simply see that the term chosen for the middle 
 cannot serve to establish any relation between the 
 extremes ; hence the antecedent is null, and no con- 
 sequent can be drawn from it; as, "Shepherds are. 
 not learned ; but Peter is not a shepherd." It cannot 
 be concluded that Peter is «r is not learned. 
 
 VI. A negative cannot b^ '\nf erred from two affirma- 
 tives, for two things identical with a third cannot but 
 be identical with each othei-. 
 
 VII. The conclusion always follows the weaker or 
 worse part ; that is, if one of the premises is negative 
 the conclusion must be negative; if particular, the 
 conclusion must be particular. In the first place, it 
 is evident that, if one of two things is identical with 
 a third, and the other is nol, the two things cannot 
 be identical with each other ; thus, in the syllogism, 
 " No spiritual substance is moi-tal ; the human soul is 
 a spiritual substance," we must conclude, " The human 
 soul is not mortal." In the second place, if one of 
 two premises is particular, the conclusion cannot be 
 
BEASONma. 35 
 
 nniversal, otherwise it will have a term more extended 
 here than in the premises; as in the syllogism, 
 " Some men are rational animals ; some men are 
 poets ; therefore all rational animals are poets." 
 
 Vm. Two particulars afford no conclusion; because 
 if both are affirmative, the middle term is necessarily 
 twice particular ; as, " Some students are industrious ; 
 some industrious persons are successful ; therefore 
 some students are successful." If one of the two is 
 negative, the conclusion must contain a universal 
 term, which is particular in the premises ; as, " Some 
 heroes are young men ; some young men are not 
 pious ; therefore all heroes are not pious, or. No 
 heroes are pious." 
 
 All these rules may be reduced to the following 
 Bule of Modern Logicians : Tlie conclusion must be con- 
 tained in one of the premises, and the other premise must 
 show that it is contained therein. 
 
 AET. IV. — MODES AND FIGUKES OF THE SYLLOGISM. 
 
 50. The mode of a syllogism is its form according to 
 the quantity and quality of the three propositions which 
 enter into it. — Propositions considered in respect both 
 to their quantity and quality, are of four kiuds : 1. 
 Universal affirmative ; 2. Universal negative ; 3. Par- 
 ticular affirmative ; 4. Particular negative. Logicians 
 have designated these four kinds of propositions by 
 the letters A, B, I, O, respectively. It is evident that 
 these four propositions, combined in threes, give 
 sixty-four possible combinations; but applying to 
 these the rules of the syllogism, there will be found 
 only ten valid modes. These are : AAA, AAl, AEE, 
 All, AOO, EAE, EAO, EIO, lAI, OAO. 
 
 51. The figure of a syllogism is its form according to 
 
36 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the position of the middle term in the premises.— Yhe mid- 
 dle term may be : 1. Subject of major and predicate 
 of minor ; 2. Predicate of botli ; 3. Subject of botti ; 
 4. Predicate of major and subject of minor. There 
 are, then, four figures ; but many logicians mate no 
 account of the fourth, or turn it into the first. Each 
 figure is susceptible of the ten modes, if no regard is 
 had to the rules of syllogism, because the proposi- 
 tions may preserve their quality and quantity without 
 changing the place of the middle term. 
 
 52. There are only nineteen conclusive modes ; they are 
 designated by the follotving lines : 
 
 Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioqne prioris ; * 
 Oesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco secundse ; 
 Tertia Darapti, Disamis Felapion, Datisi, 
 Bocardo,t/eri5ow habet. Quarta insuper addit 
 Bramantip, CaTuenes, Dimaris, Fesapno, Fresison. 
 
 Applying the rules of the syllogism to these modes, we see that the 
 first figure, in which the middle term is subject of the major and 
 predicate of the minor, excludes : 1. Modes whose minor is nega- 
 tive ; 2. Modes whose major is particular ; 3. AAI, BAO as use- 
 less. The second figure, in which the middle term is used twice as 
 predicate, excludes : 1. Modes whose two premises are affirmative ; 
 3. Those in which the major is particular ; 3. EAO as useless. The 
 third figure, in which the middle term occurs twice as subject, ex- 
 cludes : 1. Modes in which the minor is negative ; 2. Modes in 
 which the conclusion is universal. The fourth figure, in which the 
 middle term is predicate of the major and subject of the minor, ex-- 
 cludes: 1. Modes having an affirmative major with a particular 
 minor; 2. Modes having an affirmative minor with a universal 
 conclusion ; 3. OAO as contrary to the second rule. There remain 
 only the following nineteen valid modes : 
 
 1st Figure, AAA, EAE, All, BIO. 2d Figure, EAB, ABB, BIO, 
 AOO. 3d Figure, AAI, lAI, All, BAO, OAO, BIO. 4th Figure, 
 AAI, AEE, lAI, EAO, BIO. 
 
 • Or Fakofo. \ Or Dokamok. 
 
REASONING. 37 
 
 All these modes may be converted into the four 
 modes of the first figure, which on that account are 
 called perfect. They are summed up in the four lines 
 already given, which, by a happy disposition of vowels 
 and consonants, designate at once a particular mode, 
 the perfect mode into which it may be reduced, and 
 the divers operations by which the reduction is ef- 
 fected. The three vowels of each word indicate the 
 mode ; the in:itial consonant shows to what mode of 
 the first figure this mode may be reduced, to that, 
 namely, which begins with the same consonant ; the 
 consonants, S, P, C, M, denote the operation to be per- 
 formed in order to effect the reduction. S indicates 
 that the proposition designated by the vowel before 
 it must be converted simply ; P, that it must be con- 
 verted per accidens ; C, that the syllogism must be re- 
 duced per impossihile; F, by infirdtation or obversion; 
 M signifies that the order of the premises must be 
 reversed ; P in Bramantip, that from the premises a 
 universal conclusion may be drawn.* 
 
 Thus the syllogism, "No material being is sim- 
 ple ; some simple beings are human souls ; therefore 
 some human souls are not material ; " is designated 
 by Fresison of the fourth figure ; for the mode is 
 seen from the three vowels E I O, and the figure is 
 known by the position of the middle term. This 
 mode may be reduced to that mode of the first figure 
 that begins with F, viz., Ferio. The letter S follow- 
 ing E and I in Fresison indicates that the premises 
 represented by these two letters are to be converted 
 simply. Hence the syllogism becomes : " No sim- 
 
 * These rules are contained in the couplet: 
 
 8 vult simpliciier verti ; P vero per aceid ; 
 M vult transponi; Cper impossibile duci. 
 
38 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pie being is material ; some human souls are simple ; 
 therefore some human souls are not material." 
 
 Other modes are similiarly reduced except Baroco 
 and Bocardo, which must be reduced per impossibile. 
 
 AKT V. — HYPOTHETICAIj SYLLOGISMS AND THEIB RULES. 
 
 53. A hypothetical syllogism is that in ivhich the major 
 premise is hypothetical. — If the major premise is a 
 disjunctive proposition, the syllogism is called dis- 
 junctive. If the major premise is a conjunctive prop- 
 osition, the syllogism is conjunctive ; if it is con- 
 ditional, the syllogism is conditional. A syllogism of 
 whatever kind, besides the rules peculiar to it, is 
 subject to the eight rules of the categorical syl- 
 logism. 
 
 54. A disjunctive syllogism is subject to the two follow- 
 ing rules : 1. One of tJie incompatible predicates beinCf 
 affirmed in the minor, all the otJiers must be denied in 
 the conclusion; 2. All tJie predicates but one being denied 
 in the minor, that one must be affirmed disjunctively in 
 the conclusion. — It is evident that, for the legitimacy 
 of the conclusion of a disjunctive syllogism, the dis- 
 junctive premise must make a complete enumeration 
 of all the predicates that can agree with the subject. 
 Hence this syllogism is false : " The rich must either 
 squander their money or hoard it ; but they should 
 not hoard it; therefore they should squander it." 
 The disjunction is not complete ; it has omitted a 
 third member, which is " to expend money pru- 
 dently." 
 
 55. A conjunctive or copulative syllogism, from the af- 
 firmation of one of the members, infers the negation of all 
 the others ; but not vice versa. — It is clear that the con- 
 
BEASONINO. 39 
 
 clusiveness of this syllogism requires that the mem- 
 bers enumerated in the conjunctive proposition be 
 opposed to one another in such a way that they can- 
 not agree with the same subject at the same time ; as, 
 "No one can serve Qod and Mammon; but many 
 serve Mammon ; therefore many do not serve God." 
 From this example it is clear that if the minor were 
 negative, as, "But the spendthrift does not serve 
 Mammon," we could not infer the affirmative : 
 "Therefore he serves God,"* unless the opposition 
 be contradictory. 
 
 56. A conditional syllogism concludes in two ways : 1. 
 From the affirmation of the antecedent it infers the affir- 
 mation of the consequent ; 2. Frcmi the negation of the 
 consequent it infers the negation of the antecedent ; but not 
 vice versa. — In fact, the antecedent contains the rea- 
 son of the consequent ; therefore the affirmation of 
 the first implies that of the second, as the negation 
 of the second implies that of the first ; as, " If Christ 
 arose from the dead. He is God ; but He did arise from 
 the dead ; therefore He is God." But since an effect 
 may depend on several causes, the reverse of the 
 rules laid down would not give a logical conclusion ; 
 as, "If Peter is studious, he merits a reward ; but he 
 is not studious ; therefore he does not merit a re- 
 ward." It is clear that a reward may be merited for 
 some other reason than that of being studious. If the 
 antecedent is always the sole reason of the conse- 
 quent, then we may conclude from the affirmation or 
 negation of the consequent; as, "If he is a man, he 
 is endowed with reason ; but he is endowed with rea- 
 son ; therefore he is a man." 
 
 * The minor of a conjunctive syllogism always afiBrma one of the 
 two incompatibles expressed in the major. 
 
40 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 AET. TI. — ^ABEIDGED AND COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS, OE EN- 
 THYMEME, PEOSYLLOGISM, EPIGHIEEMA, SOEITES, AND 
 DILEMMA. 
 
 57. An entliymeme is an abridged syllogism, (ym pre- 
 mise ofiohicli is understood ; as, "God is Just; there- 
 fore God will reward the good." 
 
 '58. A prosyllogism is a syllogism composed of tioo 
 syllogisms, the conclusion of the first becoming the 
 major of tJie second; as, "Every act of virtue will 
 be rewarded by God ; but humility is a virtue ; there- 
 fore every act of hamility will be rewarded by God ; 
 but the bearing of injuries is an act of humility; 
 therefore the bearing of injuries will be rewarded by 
 God." 
 
 59. An epichirema is a syllogism in which at least one 
 of the pj-emises is accompanied with proof ; as, " God 
 should be adored; but Jesus Christ is God, as His 
 life and miracles attest ; therefore Jesus Christ 
 should be adored." * 
 
 60. A sorites is a form of reasoning composed of several 
 propositions so connected that the predicate of the first 
 becomes the subject of the second, and so on, until the 
 predicate of the last is joined to the subject of the first. — 
 This form of reasoning may be separated into as 
 
 * In the days of Aristotle an enthymeme was a " syllogism drawn, 
 fromprobalnlities and signs of the conclusion ; " and an epichirema, a 
 dialectical syllogism in which the conclusion is reached after a care- 
 ful examination of objections and difficulties. See Logic, Stonyhurst 
 Series, pp. 356, 359. 
 
REASONING. 41 
 
 many syllogisms as there are propositions less two. 
 It rests on the principle that whatever is said of 
 the predicate may be said of the subject ; as, " Sin 
 offends God; whatever offends God separates us 
 from Him ; whatever separates us from God deprives 
 us of the sovereign good; whatever deprives us of 
 the sovereign good is the greatest of evils ; therefore 
 sin is the greatest of evils." To be conclusive : 1. 
 There» should be no negative premise with the affirm- 
 ative premises ; otherwise in the resolution of the 
 sorites there would be a negative premise with an 
 affirmative conclusion, or the conclusion would have 
 a greater extension. The middle term may be nega- 
 tive, and hence one of the premises may be appar- 
 ently negative ; 2. The premise immediately preced- 
 ing the conclusion can be negative, and then the 
 conclusion will be negative; 3. All the premises ex- 
 cept the first must be universal, otherwise one of the. 
 middle terms would be taken twice particularly. If 
 the first premise is particular, the conclusion will be 
 particular. 
 
 61. A dilemma is a compound syllogism in lohich each 
 member of a disjunctive major premise is iahen in a minor 
 consisting of several conditional propositions, and serves 
 to conclude against the adversary. — In this form of 
 reasoning care must be taken : 1. That the disjunction 
 of the major be complete ; 2. That no member of the 
 minor can be retorted in an opposite sense. Ex. " A 
 general said to a soldier who had allowed the enemy 
 to pass : ' Either you were at your post or you were 
 not ; if you were, you deserve death for neglecting to 
 give notice of the enemy ; if you were not, you de- 
 serve death for breach of discipline.'" A dilemma 
 may also have for major a proposition with a disjunc- 
 tive consequent, the minor denying each member oi 
 
42 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the consequent, the conclusion, therefore, denying 
 the antecedent. 
 
 62. To tliese arguments may be added the Example, a 
 species of reasoning in which one proposition is drawn 
 from aTwther. to lohich it has a relation of resemblance, 
 of opposition, or of superiority. — This argument may 
 be reduced to a syllogism whose major is confirmed 
 by a particular fact bearing on the conclusion which 
 we wish to infer. Ex. 1. " Our Lord pardoned St. 
 Peter on account of his repentance ; therefore He will 
 pardon you, if, having imitated St. Peter in his fault, 
 you likewise imitate him, in his repentance." — 2. 
 " Louis XIV. and Napoleon I. caused great evils on 
 account of their love of war ; it is therefore desirable 
 that a people have a sovereign who loves peace."^3. 
 " Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, 
 neither do they reap, nor gather into barns ; yet your 
 
 , heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much 
 more value than they?" (St. Matt. vi. 26.) In the 
 first example we conclude a pari ; in the second, a 
 contrario or ah opposito ; in the third, a fortiori. 
 
 When the example is drawn from the words and 
 actions of an adversary and is used against him, it is 
 called argumentum ad hominem. 
 
 ART. VII. — INDUCTION. 
 
 63. Induction is that process in luhich the mind, after 
 affirming or denying an attribute of each part of a lohole, 
 pronounces the same Judgment of the ivhole. — As has been 
 said already, the reasoning process is twofold : it pro- 
 ceeds either from the whole to the parts which com- 
 pose it, or from the parts to the whole which they 
 constitute. In the first ease we have deduction, in 
 the second induction. " The Gospel has penetrated 
 
REASONIWa. 43 
 
 into Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Oceanica ; 
 but these five Grand Divisions make up the whole 
 known world ; therefore the Gospel has penetrated 
 into all the known world," is an example of induc- 
 tion; whence it becomes manifest that the middle 
 term in an inductive syllogism is simply the enumer- 
 ation of the parts. These parts united are in reality 
 identical with the whole, though logically distinct 
 from it ; they can, consequently, perform the func- 
 tion of a middle term. 
 
 64. The legitimacy of an inductive syllogism rests on 
 the principle that, the sum of the parts being identical with 
 the whole, whatever is affirmed or denied of all the parts 
 may he affirmed or denied of the whole. — Hence that the 
 inductive syllogism may be rigorously conclusive, it 
 is essential that the enumeration of the parts com- 
 posing the whole be complete. But this enumeration 
 may be actually or virtually complete : actually, when 
 what has been predicated of the whole has been veri- 
 fied in each of its parts ; virtually, when the predicate 
 has been verified only in a certain number of the parts, 
 and we regard it as applicable to the others on the 
 principle that natural causes always produce the same 
 effects, since they operate necessarily, or on the prin- 
 ciple that the laws of nature are constant, universal, and 
 uniform. In virtue of this principle, the mind re- 
 gards that which is constant in a certain number of 
 beings as essential to their nature. Hence, knowing 
 that whatever proceeds from the nature of a being is 
 always verified in that being and in all others having 
 the same physical nature, we conclude that a quality 
 which has been verified in some beings must be found, 
 under the same circumstances, in all beings having 
 the same physical nature. 
 When induction is really incomplete and inade- 
 
44 RATIONAL PHILOSOPSY. 
 
 quate, it does not authorize a universal and absolute 
 conclusion* It gires only a greater or less degree of 
 probability, in direct ratio to tlie number of parts in 
 wbich the predicate has been verified. 
 
 ART. Vm. — PEOBABLE OK DIALECTIC SYLLOGISM. 
 
 65. A probable syllogism is that in ivhich at least one of 
 tJie premises is only probable, and luhicli, tJierefore, gives 
 only a probable conclusion. — Apart from the sciences 
 and in the affairs of life, we cannot ordinarily arrive 
 at complete certitude ; we must be satisfied with 
 probability. The argument which is thus concerned 
 with contingent matter and with things known only 
 in part is called a probable argument, and its expres- 
 sion, a probahle syllogism. 
 
 66. Wliilst ive argue in probable matter, we must en- 
 deavor to attain the highest possible degree of probability. 
 — Hence : 1. We must be assured of the possibility of 
 the thing ; 2. We must, as far as we can, establish the 
 certainty of all the circumstances ; 3. We must ascer- 
 tain that there are more and better reasons on one side 
 than on the other. Used in this way, the probable 
 syllogism often prepares the way to complete certi- 
 
 * " In spite of this, these methods [of incomplete induction] cannot 
 be passed over in the present day. They are too important a factor" 
 in the present condition of human society to admit of our neglecting 
 them. . . . Besides, we must understand and appreciate them in 
 order to protest against their abuse. . . . Mill and his followers 
 drag down all the a priori laws to the level of the a posteriori, or 
 rather deny the existence of a priori laws at all. This is the fatal 
 result of the neglect of Bcholastic methods, which began at the Ref- 
 ormation, and has been carried further day bv day." Logic Stqny- 
 hurst Series, j. 387. 
 
BEASONINQ. 45 
 
 tude and to science properly so called ; at all events^ 
 it gives solidity to the mind, prevents it from advan- 
 cing anything rashly, and from judging before the 
 fact be well ascertained. 
 
 ABT. rs. — SOPHISTICAL SVLLOGISM. 
 
 67. A sophism is a syllogism lohich leads into error, 
 and yet has tlie appearance of truth. — The better to ena- 
 ble us to arrive at truth by means of reasoning, logic 
 not only lays down the rules to which a syllogism 
 must conform to be conclusive, but, moreover, exposes 
 the artifices by which our minds are liable to be led 
 into error, and thus enables us the better to defend 
 ourselves against them. These artifices are called 
 sophisms when they suppose in him who makes use of 
 them the desire to deceive ; they are called paralo- 
 gisms when they are employed through inadvertence 
 or through ignorance of the rules of reasoning ; in 
 either case they may be called fallacies. Taken to- 
 gether, they constitute the art of sophistry, which 
 was particularly taught and practised by Greek ora- 
 tors, in order that, by enabling them to support at 
 pleasure all causes and parties, it might be to them a 
 means of acquiring wealth and influence. 
 
 68. Fallacies are divided into those in diction and 
 those extra-diction, according as they lead into error hy 
 an abuse of words or by other captious arguments. — Falla- 
 cies in diction are six in number : (a) Equivocation, (b) 
 Amphibology, (c) Fallacy of composition, (d) Fallacy of 
 division, (e) Fallacy of accent, (f) Fallacy of figure of 
 diction. — Fallacies extra-diction are seven in number: 
 (a) Fallacy of accident, (b) Passing from the absolute to 
 the relative and vice versa, (c) Pretended cause, (d) 
 ^ coding the question, or Irrelevant conclusion, (e) Fai- 
 
46 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 lacy of consequent, (f) Begging the question and vicwus 
 circle, (g) fallacy of many questions. 
 69. The principal fallacies in diction are six : 
 (a) Equivocation, wliicli consists in using tlie same 
 term with different meanings ; as, " The dog barks ; 
 but the dog is a constellation ; therefore a constella- 
 tion barks." 
 
 (&) Amphibology, which consists in making use of a 
 phrase in a twofold sense ; as, "I say, Pyrrhus, you 
 the Eomans will conquer."^ — " And thus the son his 
 aged sire addressed." 
 
 (c) The fallacy of composition, which arises when 
 things which are separately true are taken as collec- 
 tively true ; as, " The Gospel says the blind see ; but 
 that the blind should see is a contradiction ; therefore 
 the Gospel contains contradictions." 
 
 (d) The fallacy of division, which is the reverse of 
 the preceding ; as, " According to the Scriptures, the 
 impious shall not enter the kingdom of heaven; 
 therefore it is useless for the impious to repent." — 
 " Five is one number ; two and three are five ; there- 
 fore two and three are one number." 
 
 (e) The fallacy of accent, which changes the mean- 
 ing of a word by changing the accent ; as, " He con- 
 jured me not to betray my country; therefore he 
 practised the black art." * 
 
 (/) The fallacy of figure of diction, which consists 
 in assuming to be true literally that which is true 
 only figuratively ; as, " That is a babbling brook ; 
 but only children babble ; therefore that brook is a 
 child." 
 
 * The fallacy of accent also includes the mistaking of one word for 
 another having the same proniinciation but a different spelling; as 
 if I should say that " there were small islands in the church, because 
 it has many aisles." 
 
BEA80NINQ. il 
 
 The principal fallacies extra-diction are seven : 
 (a) The fallacy of accident, which attributes or de- 
 nies to an individual a real accident that is rightly af- 
 firmed or denied only of the species ; as, " Spaniards 
 are haughty ; therefore, St. Theresa was haughty." 
 With this fallacy may be classed that which is called 
 imperfect enumeration. 
 
 {b) The fallacy of passing from the absolute to the 
 relative, and vice versa, which occurs when we argue 
 from what is true absolutely to what is true only in 
 some respect, and vice versa; as, "We must obey 
 our parents; but my parents command me not to 
 adore God ; therefore," etc. : or, " John is a good 
 penman ; therefore he is good." 
 
 (c) The fallacy oi pretended cause, which occurs when 
 we assign as the cause of an effect what is not really 
 such ; as, " Inebriety is bad ; but wine inebriates ; 
 therefore wine is bad." 
 
 (d) Evading the question, or irrelevant conclusion, 
 which occurs when we prove something which is not 
 in question ; as would be the case if " a minister of 
 state, being pressed to modify certain laws, should 
 demonstrate the necessity of law." 
 
 (e) The fallacy of consequent, which occurs when in 
 a conditional syllogism the consequent is not inferred 
 from the antecedent, but the antecedent from the con- 
 sequent; as, "If that is a man, it is an animal ; but it 
 is not a man ; therefore it is not an animal." 
 
 (/) Begging the question, which occurs when we as- 
 sume, in fact or in principle, the thing in question, or 
 that which requires to be proved; as would be the 
 case if we should undertake to prove that the earth 
 revolves about the sun thus : " The sun is at rest ; 
 therefore the earth revolves about it." When this 
 fallacy proves two disputed propositions, each by the 
 other, it is called a vicious circle; as if "after rely« 
 
48 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ing on the veracity of a witness to prove a fact, 1 
 should rely on the truth of the fact to prove the 
 veracity of the witness." 
 
 {g) The fallacy of many questions, or of interrogation, 
 occurs when several questions requiring- different 
 answers are asked, and the answer given to one is as- 
 sumed as applicable to the others ; as, " Are virtue 
 and vice good or evil ? " Whether we answer yes or 
 no, we fall into error. 
 
 We may also classify among fallacies all reasonings 
 in which any one of the rules of the syllogism is 
 violated. 
 
 AET. X.— UTILITY OP THE SYLLOGISM. 
 
 70. The use of the syllogism gives clearness, strength, and 
 flexibility to the mind. — By the use of the syllogism the 
 mind discerns more readily the value of a reasoning 
 and detects more easily the vices of a fallacy. As 
 gymnastics strengthens the body and makes it supple, 
 so the use of the syllogistic art gives solidity, flexi- 
 bility, and precision to the mind. For if the errors 
 that are rife to-day be stripped of their wordy cover- 
 ing and reduced to this severe form of reasoning, they 
 will appear as the rankest sophisms. It is evident, 
 however, that, though the use of the syllogism pre- 
 sents these great advantages, its abuse may easily 
 generate stiffness and subtlety, and impede the prog- 
 ress of intelligence iustead of aiding it. 
 
LOGIC 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 TEUTH AND SCIENCE. 
 
 71. The second part of logic, which has for its object thb 
 end of reasoning, thai is, science in general, treats : 1. of 
 the different states of the intellect in respect to truth ; 2. 
 of demonstration ; 3. of science in general and of its di- 
 visions. — Before treating of science in itself, and the 
 ■way in which the sciences are divided and co-ordi- 
 nated, it is well to examine : 1. What truth is, which 
 is the object of science, and what are the different 
 states of the intellect in respect to truth ; 2. What 
 produces science, viz., demonstration. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 Tbuth and the Diefeeent States op the Intellect 
 m Respect to it. 
 
 AET. I. — TEUTa 
 
 72. Truth is the conformity bettveen the intellect and the 
 thing known by it. — ^I judge that God is good; this judg- 
 ment corresponds to what God is in reality ; hence it 
 is true. In the same way, every creature corresponds 
 to the idea which God has of it ; that is, every creature 
 is true. 
 
 4 
 
50 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 73. Truth is metaphysical, logical, or moral. — Truth is 
 in the thing-, in our cognition of the thing, or in 
 our expression of a cognition. In the first case, it is 
 the conformity of the thing to the divine intellect ; 
 this is ontological or metaphysical truth. In the second 
 case, it is the conformity of our intellect to the thing 
 known ; this is truth of cognition or logical truth. 
 
 Logical truth, according to its object, is of the spir- 
 itual or corporeal order, general or particular, nat- 
 ural or supernatural. To metaphysical and logical 
 truth is added moral truth or veracity, which is the 
 conformity of speech or other external sign to the 
 thought in one's mind. The opposite of moral truth 
 is a lie. Moral truth depends on logical truth, as the 
 latter depends on metaphysical truth. 
 
 74. Tlie opposite of logical truth is falsity ; metaphys- 
 ical truth has no opposite. — Our intellect is not the 
 cause of creatures, and the knowledge which it ac- 
 quires of them may represent them differently from 
 what they are. There may, therefore, exist in our 
 intellect logical falsity or error. The divine intellect, 
 on the contrary, being the cause of everything that is, 
 every being is necessarily such as God knows it ; 
 every being, therefore, must necessarily be metaphys- 
 ically true. Hence being and metaphysical truth are 
 convertible and may be affirmed of each other ; and it 
 may be said that whatever is is true, and whatever is 
 true is, and that God, the absolute Being, is also the 
 absolute Truth. 
 
 ART. n.— IN WHAT OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT LOGI- 
 CAL TRUTH IS FOUND. 
 
 75. Logical truth is, properly speaking, found only in 
 the act of Judgment. — Logical truth is a correspondence 
 
TRUTH AND INTELLECT. 51 
 
 between the intellect and the thing known by it ; it 
 can, therefore, strictly speaking, be found only in 
 that operation of the intellect which perceives and 
 expresses this correspondence, that is, in the act of 
 judgment. Moreover, truth is the perfection of cog- 
 nition, and therefore is not, strictly speaking, to be 
 found in simple apprehension, which is imperfect and 
 inchoate cognition. 
 
 76. Truth is not properly in simple apprehension nor in 
 sensation. — Every cognitive faculty, put in presence of 
 its object, must apprehend the object as it is. Hence 
 by simple apprehension and by sensation, things are 
 known as they are, and this knowledge is materially 
 true or conformed to the thing. But as the intellect 
 has no cognition of this conformity, since there is no 
 judgment, it follows that there is not, in simple ap- 
 prehension or sensation, formal truth or truth prop- 
 erly so called. 
 
 AET. in. — ^DIFFERENT STATES OF THE INTELLECT IN RE- 
 SPECT TO TRUTH. 
 
 77. Tliere are three different states of the intellect in re- 
 spect to truth : 1. Certitude, 2. Opinion or probability, 3. 
 Doubt. — Certitude is that state of the intellect in which 
 it firmly adheres to a known truth without fear that 
 the contrary may be true. 
 
 Opinion is that state of the intellect in which it ad- 
 heres to something known, but with fear that the 
 contrary may be true. 
 
 Doubt is that state of the intellect in which it is in 
 suspense and adheres neither to the affirmative nor 
 the negative of the thing proposed. Doubt is negative 
 when the intellect perceives no motive to adhere 
 either to the affirmative or the negative.- doubt ia 
 
62 RATIONAL PHILOSOPET. 
 
 positive wlien the intellect has as strong motiTss foi 
 adhering to the affirmatiye as to the negative. 
 
 78. Probability, whatever its degree, is specifically dis- 
 tinct from certittcde. — Probability holds a middle place 
 between doubt and certitude ; it is susceptible of in- 
 crease and diminution and may have several degrees ; 
 but none of these degrees, however great, will consti- 
 tute certitude. This latter, on the contrary, cannot 
 admit of degrees; it is or it is not. The calculation 
 of probabilities has its foundation in the ascertained 
 relation existing between the probable thing and its 
 contrary. This calculation confined within proper 
 bounds may become a legitimate source of knowl- 
 edge, on which are based certain social institutions, 
 such as insurance companies.* 
 
 79. ITie elements of certitude being, 1. the truth of the 
 object, 2. the firmness of adherence, 3. the motive which 
 
 * The following are the rules for the calculation of probabilities : 
 " I. A single probability of any uncertain event is ascertained by di- 
 viding the number of chances favorable to the event by the total 
 number of chances favorable and unfavorable. II. The probability 
 of the independent recurrence of an event is found by multiplying 
 together the fractions expressing the single probabilities. III. In 
 order to calculate the probability that an event already observed will 
 be repeated any given number of times, divide the number of times 
 the event has been observed, increased by one, by the same number 
 increased by one. and the number of times the event is to recur. 
 IV. In case of mutually dependent probabilities, or probabilities of 
 probabilities, the total probability is reached by multiplying together 
 the several single probabilities. V. In case of independent proba- 
 bilities the total probability is reached by subtracting each separate 
 probability from unity (which gives the probability of the opposite 
 event in each case or the probability of a probability), multiplying 
 the separate results together (according to Rule 4th), and subtracting 
 this product from unity (thus arriving at the probability of the 
 original compound event). "—Gregory's Practical Logic, pp. 183, 183. 
 
 See also Jevona' Principles of Science, Bk. II., pp. 234-249. 
 
TRUTH AND INTELLECT. 53 
 
 produces this adherence, it may be divided according to 
 the particular element in reference to lohich it is con- 
 sidered. — Relatively to the truth of the object, certi- 
 tude is common or philosophical, immediate or mediate, 
 according as it is without, or with explicit cognition 
 of the motive of adherence, known by intuition or by 
 means of reasoning. 
 
 In respect to the firmness of adherence, it is to be 
 remarked that while this adherence always excludes 
 doubt, it may be more or less perfect according to the 
 perfection of the motive producing it ; we have, there 
 fore, certainty of evidence, which is produced by an 
 intrinsic motive, and certainty of faith, which is pro- 
 duced by an extrinsic motive. 
 
 Certainty of evidence is metaphysical, physical, or 
 moral ; for the intrinsic motive which produces it is 
 nothing more than the perception of the connection 
 existing between a subject and its attribute. But this 
 connection belongs either to the metaphysical order, 
 that is, is absolutely necessary, as, "Every effect 
 must have a cause ; " or to the physical order, as, 
 " Fire burns ; " or to the moral order, as, " Mothers 
 love their children." In other words, the agreement 
 oi disagreement of subject and attribute is necessary 
 according to (1) the very nature of the things, or ac- 
 cording to the laws (2) of the physical or (3) of the 
 moral world, established by God. 
 
 Of these three kinds of certainty, the most excellent 
 is metaphysical certainty, which being founded on the 
 very nature of things, whose archetypes are the divine 
 essence, allows of no exception. Physical certainty 
 is not absolute, since it is based on the supposition 
 that in this particular case God has not suspended 
 the effect of the physical laws which He freely estab- 
 lished. It, therefore, is perfectly consistent with 
 
54 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 miracles. Moral certainty implies tlie condition tliat 
 the moral laws have been fully observed by the sub- 
 ject ; but as the subject is a free agent, moral cer- 
 tainty cannot of itself generate certitude as to the 
 individual, but only as to the class or species. Cer- 
 tainty of faith is divine or human, according as it rests 
 on divine authority, as the Scriptural revelation, or on 
 human authority, as the/acfe of history. 
 
 AET. IV. — IGNORANCE, EEEOE, AND THEIE CAUSES. 
 
 80. Ignorance is the absence of truth from the intellect. — 
 Ignorance and error have not been reckoned among 
 the states of the intellect in respect to truth, since, 
 instead of being cognitions of truth, they are respec- 
 tively its absence and its negation. 
 
 81. ITie causes of ignorance are : 1. the limited nat- 
 ure of our intellect ; 2. a want of intellectual culture. — 
 The first cause of ignorance arises from the very 
 nature of man, who is essentially a finite being. 
 To this cause may be referred the organic defects 
 which, in certain men, impede the cognition of 
 truth. 
 
 The second cause is the absence of intellectual cult- 
 ure. Truth is not infused into man ; he must acquire 
 it either by instruction from others or by his own ef- 
 forts. If he has not been taught and does not himself 
 labor to develop his intellectual faculties, he must 
 remain in ignorance of many truths. 
 
 82 i Error is the adhesion of the intellect to a false judg- 
 ment, or a ivant of conformity between intellect and object. 
 — Since error is an adhesion to a false judgment, it 
 can be found neither in the senses nor in simple ap- 
 prehension, but solely in the intellect in an act of 
 
TRUTH AND INTELLECT. 55 
 
 judgment. It would be wrong to regard error, with 
 Cousin (1792-1867), as incomplete trutli. What he 
 calls incomplete truth is none the less a truth ; 
 whereas error is the opposite of truth. 
 
 83. The principal causes of error are : 1. Precipitancy 
 of judgment ; 2. Liveliness of imagination ; 3. Prejudice ; 
 4. Passion. — Precipitancy of judgment consists in 
 judging of a thing not suJSiciently considered. It is 
 remedied by attention and reflection. 
 
 The imagination often obscures truth by present- 
 ing too lively images of sensible things. Its excesses 
 are corrected by keeping it under a severe control of 
 reason. 
 
 Prejudices are judgments adopted without exami- 
 nation. A prudent man will weigh his prejudices in 
 the balance of reason ; he will not rashly reject them, 
 neither will he blindly follow them. 
 
 The passions are the most fruitful source of our 
 errors ; they obscure the intellect and present things 
 to it in the borrowed light of a badly regulated will. 
 The remedy for this evil is found in virtue alone. 
 
 To these internal causes may be added external 
 ones, as education, the school, the vices of language ; 
 all of which are remedied by a prudent scrutiny and 
 a sincere love of truth. Bacon (1561-1626) has di- 
 vided our errors into four classes : 1. Idols of tJie 
 tribe, errors arising from the weakness of our common 
 nature ; 2. Idols of the den, errors arising' from our 
 individual character ; 3. Idols of the market-place, er- 
 rors resulting from the vices of language ; 4. Idols of 
 the theatre, errors of the school. Evidently the 
 causes assigned by Bacon for our errors may be re- 
 duced to those already indicated.* 
 
 * See Meta/physics of the School, vol. i., p. 461. 
 
66 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 84. Man in Ms present condition cannot invariably 
 avoid all error. — If man always made use of his facul- 
 ties in conformity with the laws imposed on him, he 
 would not err. But, owing to his natural weakness, 
 he is incapable of always conforming to these laws, 
 and, consequentliy^, of avoiding all error. 
 
CHAPTEE H 
 
 Demons TEAT I ON. 
 
 85. Demonstration is a syllogism ivJiich jyroduces 
 science, or it is a reasoning ivhich, by the aid of premises 
 evidently true, gives a certain and evident conclusion. — 
 The sophistical syllogism is a source of error; the 
 probable syllogism gives only verisimilitude; the 
 demonstrative syllogism alone produces science, that 
 is, certain and evident knowledge of a truth. 
 
 86. Demonstration is necessarily preceded hy that spe- 
 cies of doubt called methodical, and lohich is defined as 
 Doubt which is supposed to attend a thesis before it is 
 demonstrated. — A truth to be demonstrated is first 
 proposed in the form of a question, and the intellect 
 is supposed to be in suspense between its affirmation 
 and its negation; that is, it is supposed to doubt. 
 This doubt, called methodical, bears only on the truth 
 or truths to be demonstrated, and not on the inde- 
 monstrable principles. Unlike the systematic doubt 
 of sceptics, or real doubt, methodical doubt is not 
 actual, permanent, or universal ; unlike the Cartesian 
 doubt, it not only admits the veracity of conscious- 
 ness, but also that of all the cognitive faculties, and 
 does not touch self-evident truths. 
 
 Methodical doubt may bear on one of these four 
 questions : 1. Does the thing exist ? 2. What is its 
 essence ? 3. Wliat are its accidents ? 4. Why does it 
 exist? The first question presupposes at least the 
 
58 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nominal definition of the thing ; the question regard- 
 ing its essence supposes that of its existence already 
 answered ; the third question presupposes at least the 
 notion of attribute ; and the question of the where- 
 fore of a thing can find its answer only in the prin- 
 ciples or reasons of the thing ; hence it is this last 
 question that properly comes under the head of sci- 
 ence. 
 
 87. All demonstration presupposes three notions : 1. 
 that of the subject ; 2. that of the predicate ; 3. that of 
 the middle term. — All demonstration has for its end to 
 show that a certain predicate agrees or disagrees 
 with a certain subject by comparing both with a third 
 term ; hence it is clear that, prior to all reasoning, we 
 must have the notion of these three terms. 
 
 88. The middle term of demonstration must fulfil three 
 conditions : 1. It must contain the reason of the thing; 2. 
 It must ie Tcnoiun as tlie reason ; 3. This reason must he 
 certain. — Demonstration produces scientific knowl- 
 edge by means of a middle term ; but to know a thing 
 scientifically, we must know the reason of it, know 
 that it is the reason of it, and know it with certainty ; 
 hence, the middle term must comply with these three 
 conditions of science. 
 
 89. Demonstration is divided into a priori and a pos- 
 teriori ; direct and indirect or ad absurdum A priori 
 
 demonstration is that which descends from cause to 
 effect, as when " from the existence of Providence we 
 infer the order of the universe ;" a posteriori demon- 
 stration ascends from effects to their cause, as when 
 " from the order of the universe we infer the exist- 
 ence of Providence." 
 
 Direct demonstration proves not only that a thing 
 is, but, moreover, why it is ; as, " The soul is immor- 
 tal, because it is a spirit." Mathematics abounds in 
 
DEMONSTRA TION. 69 
 
 examples. Indirect or apogogic demonsfcra'ion simply 
 shows that we must admit the thing on account of the 
 absurdities which would flow from its denial ; as, " If 
 the soul is not immortal, there can be no mortal 
 order." This kind of demonstration serves to pre- 
 pare the way for science and to defend it, but it does 
 not constitute science. 
 
 To indirect demonstration may be referred the ar- 
 gument called ex datis, so designated because from 
 the concessions of an adversary we draw conclusions 
 which are evidently against him ; as, " You grant 
 that the world could not make itself ; then God must 
 have created it." The demonstration called circular 
 or regressive is at the same time a priori and a posteri- 
 ori; a posteriori, since it ascends from effect to cause; 
 a priori, since from the cause better known, it returns 
 to the effect for a better knowledge of it ; as, " The 
 order we behold in the world proves the existence of 
 Providence ; and as there is a Providence, we are cer- 
 •■/ain that even events unknown to us are ordained by 
 .t." 
 
 A demonstration is pure when the premises are ana- 
 lytical ; as, " An infinitely perfect being is necessary 
 being ; but a necessary being is eternal ; therefore 
 an infinitely perfect being is eternal." It is empirical 
 when the premises are experimental ; as, " Water 
 seeks its level; but this stream is water; therefore 
 this stream seeks its level." It is mixed when one 
 premise is analytical and the other synthetical ; as, 
 " There can be no effect without a cause ; but this 
 building is an effect ; therefore it must have a cause." 
 
CHAPTEE in. 
 
 Science. — Division of Science. — Classification ob 
 THE Sciences. 
 
 90. Science considered subjectively, is a certain and 
 evident cognition of truths deduced from certain principles 
 by means of demonstration ; considered objectively, it is a 
 complete system of demonstrated truths deduced from the 
 same common principles. — Science considered as exist- 
 ing in tlie intellect, that is, subjectively, must be certain 
 cognition, otherwise it would not be perfect ; it must 
 be evident cognition, otherwise it would not account 
 to the mind for the subordinate truths deduced from 
 the principles. Finally, it must be cognition of the 
 truths deduced from certain principles, for the conclu- 
 sions cannot be stronger than the premises. Science 
 considered objectively, is a body of co-ordinated truths 
 deduced from the same principles and constituting 
 what is called a scientific system. It is in this latter 
 sense that the word science is usually understood. 
 
 91. A science must be both one and multiple ; one in re- 
 spect to tJie same set of principtles whence floio the truths 
 embraced under the science ; multiple in respect to the de- 
 ductions made from the principles. — Those principles 
 from which the mind deduces the truths contained 
 therein, are, as it were, the foundations of the science 
 and constitute its unity. This unity is formal and 
 not material ; for, though a science treats of objects 
 materially multiple, yet these objects are considered 
 
SOIENOE. 61 
 
 under an aspect by whicli they are referred to one 
 and the same set of principles, and hence the science 
 is one. 
 
 92. Every science is specified by its object. — The formal 
 object of a science constitutes its unity and makes it 
 this or that science ; hence the sciences are distin- 
 guished from one another by the diversity of their 
 formal objects. Thus, a science is natural or supernat- 
 ural according- as its object is natural or supernat- 
 ural truth ; it is speculative or practical according as 
 its object is purely theoretical truth or a truth the 
 knowledge of which may serve as a rule of action. 
 
 Two sciences are said to be distinct when the ob- 
 ject of one has certain relations to that of the other, 
 as, " Geometry and Astronomy." They are said to be 
 separate when their objects have no relation to each 
 other, as, " Algebra and Morals." 
 
 93. Philosophy is the science that governs all the other 
 sciences, which may, tJierefore, be divided and classified 
 according to the divisions instituted in philosophy. — Phi- 
 losophy is the fundamental science and ranks next to 
 Sacred Theology ; for it treats of being in itself and 
 in general. But as every other science treats of 
 being under some particular aspect, it follows that 
 each has its foundation in philosophy, and from it 
 derives its first principles. 
 
 The division of philosophy furnishes the basis for 
 the general division of the other sciences, whose dig- 
 nity and classification should be established according 
 the greater or less degree of abstraction of their ob- 
 ject from matter. Thus, to real philosophy or meta- 
 physics the physical or natural sciences and mathemat- 
 ics are related ; to rational philosophy the philological 
 sciences ; to mOral philosophy, jurisprudence, (Esthetics, 
 and the political sciences. 
 
62 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 But if philosophy may justly claim superiority 
 over all other human sciences, it is itself surpassed 
 by the divine science of theology, which is as far 
 above philosophy as the divine intelligence is above 
 human reason^ 
 
ILOGIC. 
 PART THIRD. 
 
 METHODOLOGY. 
 
 94. The third part of logic, which has for its direct the 
 several processes by which the human intellect arrives at 
 knowledge by reasoning, treats : 1. of method in general 
 and its laws ; 2. of the different kinds of method and 
 their laws ; 3. of the processes peculiar to certain methods. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 Method in Geneeal and rrs Laws. 
 
 A5T I. — METHOD. 
 
 95. Method is the direction given to the cognitive facuU 
 ties, according to their nature, to enable us easily and 
 surely to arrive at knoioledge. — It does not suffice for 
 the acquisition of knowledge that we know the laws 
 gOTeming the intellect, and what constitutes, science 
 itself ; we must also know the way by which science 
 is acquired, the particular path by which we may 
 easily and surely attain to this or that science. This 
 way or path which leads to science is method. 
 
 96. Both reason and experience prove the great impor- 
 tance of metJwd. — As we speedily and surely reach the 
 
64 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 end of a journey wlien we know the road, in like man', 
 ner we easily and surely arrive at the knowledge of a 
 science when we know the process which the mind 
 should pursue. Ignorance of method necessarily 
 causes much loss of time and often leads into error, a 
 truth which experience likewise confirihs. To good 
 method is due the rapid progress of the natural 
 sciences in late years ; to a faulty method followed in 
 philosophy in our own day, we owe the false systems 
 which retard its progress. 
 
 97. Metliod should he neither artificial nor arbitrary, 
 hut should he founded on the nature of the mind and of 
 the object lohich it studies. — As method has for its aim 
 the directing of the mind in the acquisition of knowl- 
 edge, it must be based upon the very nature of the 
 mind and of the object to be known. This is the 
 fundamental law of all method. It gives rise to sev- 
 eral others, which may be reduced to the two follow- 
 ing : 1. We must in every method proceed from the better 
 known to the less known ; 2. We must proceed with order 
 from one cognition to anotlier. 
 
 AET n. — ANALYSIS AND , SYNTHESIS. 
 
 98. Tloo processes are common to all methods ; 1. 
 Analysis, which resolves a tohole into its parts ; and 2. 
 Synthesis, which reconstructs the lohole from the parts. — 
 The mind must perform two processes in order to ar- 
 rive at knowledge. For either it seeks the nature of 
 the whole by studying its parts, and thus proceeds 
 from effect to. cause, from the concrete to the abstract, 
 from the multiple to the simple, as in abstraction and 
 induction ; or it studies the parts in the whole, pro- 
 ceeding from the cause to the effe<!t, from the abstract 
 to the concrete, from the simple to the multiple, as in 
 
METHOD IN GENERAL AND ITS LAWS. 65 
 
 deduction. The first process is analysis ; tlie second, 
 synthesis. 
 
 But a method can be neither purely analytical, as 
 the Experimental and Sensualistic school pretends, 
 nor purely synthetical, as the Idealistic school holds. 
 It cannot be purely analytical, since, to constitute 
 science, it does not suffice that we know by analysis 
 the whole through its parts, or the cause through its 
 effects ; we must, moreover, know by synthesis how 
 the whole contains the parts, how the cause produces 
 the effect.* On the otjier hand, method cannot be 
 purely synthetical, since it belongs to the nature of 
 the mind to know the whole in its parts and the cause 
 in its effects. "We must, therefore, conclude that all 
 method, to be good, ought to be analytico-synthetical. 
 
 99. The rules for analysis are : 1. It should he com- 
 plete ; 2. It should he as extensive as possible. — The rules 
 for synthesis are : 1. It should omit nothing in the con- 
 sideration ofthetuhole; 2. It should add nothing. — Anal- 
 ysis makes known the whole in the parts, the sim- 
 ple in the multiple, the cause in the effect, only in so 
 far as it investigates each of the parts and each of the 
 effects. If it neglect to consider any one, it is liable 
 to overlook one of the essential elements of the whole. 
 In the second place, it must divide and subdivide the 
 whole into a reasonable number of parts, since the 
 less complex a thing is, the better the mind knows it. 
 
 Synthesis should neither omit nor add anything : 
 for in the former case it would give only a partial or 
 incomplete view of the object; in the latter, it would 
 introduce foreign elements, and thus alter our notion 
 of that object. 
 
 * Our knowledge in particular oases is, however, often limited te 
 the mere fact that the cause produces the effect. 
 5 
 
CHAPTEE n. 
 
 DiPFEBENT Kinds op Method and Theib Laws. 
 
 AET. I. — DIFFEEENT KINDS OF METHOD. 
 
 100. There are two hinds of method, tJie Inventive and 
 the Didactic. — The mind first endeavors to find the 
 truth, and afterwards to demonstrate it or communi- 
 cate it to others. There must, therefore, be two meth- 
 ods : (1) that of invention, which guides the mind in 
 its search after truth ; (2) that of demonstration or doc- 
 trine, which guides it in imparting to others the 
 truth that has been found. 
 
 101. The method of invention is of three hinds : 1. Ra- 
 tional or a priori ; 2. Experimental or a posteriori ; 3. 
 Mixed. — The a />Hon method seeks to discover truth 
 by the sole light of reason, to the exclusion of expe- 
 rience ; this is the method of German Idealism, 
 which shapes facts to ideas and transforms the most 
 absurd conceptions of the mind into realities. 
 
 The a posteriori method is the reverse of the fore- 
 going; it is exclusively adopted by the Sensist 
 school and ends in materialism. 
 
 The mixed method is a combination of the other 
 two ; it is the only sound philosophic method, as it 
 brings to the aid of science all the means of acquir- 
 ing knowledge. Although this is the only legiti- 
 mate method, it is none the less true that the a 
 
DIFFERENT KINDS OF METHOD. 67 
 
 priori method ought to predominate in mathe- 
 matics, and the a posteriori method in the natural 
 sciences.* 
 
 102. The method of demonstration or doctrine is of 
 three kinds : 1. Deductive ; 2. Inductive ; 3. Mixed. — 
 The deductive method descends from axioms or princi- 
 ples to their consequences, from laws to phenomena. 
 The inductive method is the reverse of the preceding 
 and makes the mind of the learner pass through the 
 same process as is followed in arriving at truth. 
 The mixed method is a union of these two. The de- 
 ductive method is the easiest, the inductive the most 
 effectual ; the mixed method, being adapted to the 
 ordinary requirements of students, is the one most 
 frequently followed. 
 
 AET. n. — SPECIAL LAWS OF EACH METHOD. 
 
 103. Tlie laws of the inventive method require : 1. A 
 determination, at least vaguely, of the end in view ; 
 2. An attentive examination of known truths ; 3. A 
 classification of these known truths ; 4. A careful use 
 of definitions and divisions ; 5. Elimination of what- 
 ever is useless or foreign to the end in view ; 6. An 
 affirmation of thing^s as certain or doubtful accord- 
 ing as they are really certain or doubtful ; 7. Care to 
 avoid all rash induction ; 8. Prudence to advance 
 
 . nothing resting on what is doubtful or on inconsistent 
 hypotheses. 
 
 104. The laws of the didactic method require : 1. The 
 
 * As to the founders of these schools and the tenets which they 
 held, see Sensism, Transcendentalism, and the Scholastic Theory 
 of the Origin of Ideas, Ideology, chap. ii. ; also History of Philosophy, 
 passim. 
 
68 RATIONAL PHIL080PHT. 
 
 use of clear terms fully explained and defined ; 2. 
 Care to take as a starting point only clear and evi- 
 dent principles ; 3. A gradual advancement from one 
 conclusion to another ; 4. Care to avoid digressions 
 which make us lose the concatenation of ideas. 
 
CHAPTEE m. 
 
 li^ocESSES Peopee to Geetain Methods. 
 
 AET. I. — hypothesis. 
 
 105. Hypothesis is a probable assumption which is in- 
 tended to explain the cause and nature of a fact, but is not 
 as yet verified by experience or demonstrated by reason. — 
 The mind often cannot ascertain with certainty the 
 reason of facts ; it then finds it necessary to adopt 
 conditionally a principle that is probable. If expe- 
 rience and reason afterwards verify this principle, it 
 ceases to be a supposition or hypothesis, and becomes 
 a thesis. 
 
 106. In all the sciences hypotheses mthin certain limits 
 are useful ; in all the natural sciences tliey are necessary. 
 — Some philosophers maintain, with Reid (1710-1796), 
 that hypotheses must necessarily be detrimental to 
 science. This is an assertion contradicted by good 
 sense and experience. Others, like Condillac (1715- 
 1780), admit the use of hypotheses in the mathemati- 
 cal sciences only. But it is evident that, with the_ 
 greatest philosophers and naturalists, we ought to 
 admit them, at least within certain limits, in all the 
 sciences, since in them there are facts not yet ex- 
 plained and for the explanation of which we may very 
 conveniently resort to hypotheses, which subsequent 
 observation will often transform into certain and 
 scientific principles. But hypotheses are useful only 
 
70 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in so far as they conform to certain laws ; otherwise 
 they are hurtful, and, by originating false systems, 
 are fruitful sources of error. 
 
 107. Hypotheses are subject to two sorts of rules, one 
 regarding the formation of the hypothesis, the other its 
 verification. — The rules to be observed in the forma- 
 tion of an hypothesis are three : 1. It must rest on the 
 knowledge of a great number of facts ; 2. From 
 among the circumstances which accompany a fact we 
 should select one or more, and see if they do not suf- 
 fice for the explanation of the fact ; 3. The circum- 
 stances selected ought to be such as to account for 
 all the others. 
 
 There are four rules to be observed in verifying an 
 hypothesis : 1. It should not be opposed to the fact 
 which it is intended to explain ; 2. It should be such 
 as to explain all the facts for which it has been made ; 
 3. An hypothesis supported by certain facts should 
 be preferred to one not supported by any fact; 4. 
 From among the hypotheses presented we should 
 choose the simplest. It is evident that if an hypothe- 
 sis conflicts with a truth known as certain, it is, by 
 tke fact, proved false. 
 
 ART. 11. — EXPERIMENTATION. 
 
 108. Experimentation is the act or art of producing or 
 modifying at will the phenomena of nature in order to 
 study them. — In all the sciences, and especially in the 
 physical or natural sciences, it becomes necessary to 
 make an attentive study of the phenomena of nature. 
 The more easily to account for these phenomena, we 
 modify or produce them at pleasure ; this process is 
 called experimentation. If we confine ourselves to 
 
PB00BS8ES PROPER TO CERTAIN METHODS. 71 
 
 studying a phenomenon as presented in nature, we 
 simply make an observation. 
 
 109. The conditions of good experimentation relate, some 
 to what is produced in the phenomenon, others to the person 
 who experiments. — In regard to the phenomenon, it is 
 necessary to keep an exact record of all the accom- 
 panying circumstances, however minute ; and when it 
 can be done, these circumstances should be noted by 
 figures and exact quantities. The person who is ex- 
 perimenting should (1) vary the experiments ; (2) 
 extend them ; (3) reverse them. Above all, he should 
 guard in experimentation against the spirit of system, 
 which would make him see not what is, but what he 
 wishes should be. 
 
 110. As experimentation is employed to determine the 
 cause of a phenomenon, we must carefully look out for in- 
 dications which may point to the cause. — These indica- 
 tions are four in number : 1. When one event inva- 
 riably precedes another, except when the latter is 
 counteracted or prevented by some circumstance ; 2. 
 When, one event undergoing a modification, another 
 undergoes a corresponding modification; 3. When,, 
 one fact being absent, another is also absent, unless 
 the latter may also be produced by a different cause ; 
 4. When, one fact disappearing, another also disap- 
 pears, unless the latter can exist without the contin- 
 ued action of the former.* 
 
 * Compare these indications with the following experimental meth- 
 ods of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) : 
 
 (a) Method of Agreement. — "If two or more instances of the phe- 
 nomenon under investigation have one circumstance in common, the 
 circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or 
 effect) of the given phenomenon." 
 
 (&) Method of Difference. — " If an instance in which the phenome- 
 non under investigation occurs and another in which it does not 
 
72 RATIONAL PBIL080PHT. 
 
 111. Experimentation of itself does not constittde 
 science ; it only enables us to establish principles by induc- 
 tion. — As experimentation does not go outside the 
 order of facts, it cannot of itself constitute science ; 
 but when well conducted, it enables us to establish 
 principles of experience, as, " Water slakes thirst." These 
 principles, to be such, must fulfil two conditions : 1. 
 The fact which we wish to transform into an experi- 
 mental principle must have been found the same in 
 many cases ; 2. This fact must not be accidental, but 
 a natural effect. 
 
 112. Saving by experimentation discovered points of 
 agreement among several objects, we are enabled by the 
 principle of analogy to infer other points of agreement : 
 experimentation thus abridges scientific investigations and 
 even makes up for impossible investigations. — When sev- 
 eral objects are known to agree in certain points, the 
 principle of analogy enables us to conclude other points 
 of agreement. This conclusion may be based either 
 upon the simple relation of qualities, or the relation 
 of means to an end, or the relation of cav^e to effect 
 or effect to cause. But it can be considered legiti- 
 mate only inasmuch as it rests not upon fortuitous 
 or accidental resemblances, but upon important re- 
 occur tave every circumstance in common save one, that one oocur- 
 ing only in tlie former, the circumstance in which alone the instances 
 differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the 
 cause of the phenomenon." 
 
 (c) Method of Conannitant Variation. — "Whatever phenomenon 
 varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some 
 particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, 
 or is connected with it through some fact of causation." 
 
 id) Method of Meddues. — " Subduct from any phenomenon such 
 part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain an- 
 tecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the 
 remaining antecedent." — Mill's Logic. 
 
PROOESSBS PROPER TO CERTAIN METHODS. 73 
 
 semblances, or, in the absence of these, upon many 
 resemblances.* 
 
 ART. ni. — CLASSIFICATION. 
 
 113. Classification is the distribution of Entities into 
 genera and species. — In every science it is necessary to 
 proceed with order both in the discovery and in the 
 communication of truth ; in this sense, then, classifi- 
 cation is requisite in every science. But the term is 
 especially applied to the distribution into genera and 
 species adopted in natural history. 
 
 114. The advantages of this classification are : 1. It 
 aids the memory and facilitates the knowledge of the ob- 
 jects classified ; 2. It in a ivay initiates us into the divine 
 plan, hy showing us the admirable order which reigns 
 among all creatures. — Classification, by the fact that it 
 puts order into the objects which we study, enables us 
 to know them better and to apprehend their relations ; 
 but, above all, it elevates the mind, by enabling it to 
 penetrate the admirable harmony of the divine plan. 
 This last result can be obtained only in so far as the 
 classification is based upon nature itself. An arti- 
 ficial classification serves only to put a certain order 
 into our knowledge, and is not in itself of any scien- 
 tific value. 
 
 115. Tlie laws of classification are : 1. It must be 
 complete ; 2. It must be based on the law of the subordi- 
 nation of characteristics. — Evidently the first condition 
 requisite for a good classification is that it comprise 
 all the objects for which it is made. But it is also 
 necessary, if we desire a natural or scientific classi- 
 fication, to base it on tlie law of the subordination of 
 characteristics. In virtue of this law objects in nature 
 
 "S^e Logic, §64. 
 
74 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 have eacli a primary characteristic, to wliicli other 
 secondary characteristics are subordinate ; to these 
 latter still others are subordinate, until we finally 
 reach the least important characteristic. We classify 
 according to this law when we establish the principal 
 divisions according to the principal characteristics, 
 then subdivide according to subordination of char- 
 acteristics. It is easily seen that such a classification 
 is nothing else than the science of the objects classi- 
 fied. Hence, if we know to what division an object 
 belongs, we immediately know its nature and char- 
 acteristics.* 
 
 The great progress made in the natural sciences since the Kef- 
 ormation by the application of the experimental or a posteriori 
 method has led many of its advocates to bring the same method into 
 the iield of philosophy in its different divisions and of theology. 
 Bnt such a proceeding has invariably been followed by results not 
 only most disastrous ^o all positive religion, but even suicidal to hu- 
 man thought. The Church is the "pillar and ground of truth,"- 
 and has nothing to fear and much to gain from the daily advances 
 of scientific research. " Grammar, philology, archaeology, history, 
 ethnography, erudition, topography, aesthetics, all that makes up the 
 long line of rationalistic criticism, have in turn paid her a forced 
 homage." t The well ascertained results of science, the well-founded 
 hypotheses, are all in harmony with her teaching. But when any 
 rash conclusion is foisted on the public, the divine guardian of the 
 truth sounds the alarm. 
 
 * See Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., pp. 508-514, 515, 534. 
 t Apologie Scieniifique de la Foi Chretienne, by Canon Duilhd de 
 Saint-Projet, p. 105. 
 
IDEOLOGY. 
 
 1. Ideology is a science which treats of ideas. — As 
 rational philosophy - treats of entities as known by 
 intellect, it must treat alsQ of that in which and by 
 which they are known, viz., ideas. Ideas 'constitute 
 the object of Ideology. 
 
 2. Ideology may he divided into General and Special 
 Ideology. — Ideology may be concerned simply with 
 the nature and origin of ideas in general ; then it 
 is General Ideology ; or it may treat of the special 
 nature of certain fundamental ideas and the manner 
 in which our mind acquires them ; then it is Special 
 Ideology. 
 
 GENERAL IDEOLOGY. 
 CHAPTBE I. 
 
 Ideas in Geneeal. 
 aet. i. — nature of ideas. 
 
 3. In every heing tve must distinguish the essence from 
 the particular conditions which individuate the essence. — : 
 God has given being to every creature according to 
 an eternal type existing in his infinite mind, and ac- 
 cording to which he can create an unlimited number 
 
76 RATIONAL PHIL080PHT. 
 
 of similar beings* But each being, in realizing by 
 its existence the divine type, is thereby invested with 
 individuating conditions which make it that being 
 and not another. But that which reproduces the 
 divine type in a being and constitutes it in a determi- 
 nate species, that which makes it specifically what it 
 is, is called the essence of the being. This essence 
 cannot really exist without being individualized; 
 but it is, nevertheless, distinguishable from the con- 
 ditions which individualize it. These conditions are 
 seven in number : Form, figure, place, time, name, fam- 
 ily, and country. 
 
 i. An idea is a mere intellectual representation of the 
 essence of an object, by which that object is Jcnoivn. — ^We 
 not only know the concrete individual notes of sensible 
 objects, but we may also know their essence. The 
 intellect naturally perceives this essence abstracted 
 from its particular conditions, and forms in itself an 
 image or similitude which mentally reproduces the 
 essence. This image formed in and by the intellect 
 is called an idea. 
 
 5. The idea is not that which the intellect immediately 
 knows, but that by which it Icnoios the object. — As the 
 image of an object formed in the eye is not that which 
 the eye perceives, but that by which the visible ob- 
 ject becomes known, So that which the intellect im- 
 mediately knows by the idea is the objective essence. 
 But as the intellect is capable of reflecting upon 
 itself, it may, by a second act, perceive the idea or 
 mental representation by which it knows the essence. 
 
 ♦ Bee MetapJiyms of the School, vol. ii., pp. 518, 519. 
 
IDEAS IN GBNEBAL. 77 
 
 AET. n. — CHAEACTERISTICS OP IDEAS. 
 
 6. An idea is subjective inasmiccJi as it resides in the 
 Bvhject knowing. — The formation of an idea is a vital 
 and immanent act which not only proceeds from the 
 intellect, but is accomplished and exists in the intel- 
 lect itself. Now an idea considered as residing in 
 the subject knowing, is said to be subjective. 
 
 7. An idea is objective inasmuch as that luhicli it imme- 
 diately makes knoiun to us is an object.^Thai which an 
 idea immediately manifests to the subject knowing, is 
 not the idea itself, but the object perceived. Hence 
 an idea considered as the representation of an object, 
 a representation by which the object is immediately 
 known, is said to be objective. 
 
 8. The characteristics of an idea vary according as we 
 co7isider it subjectively or objectively. — An idea consid- 
 ered subjectively participates in the conditions of the 
 intellect that has the idea. Thus, if the intellect is 
 infinite and uncreated, the idea considered subjec- 
 tively is infinite and uncreated ; it is finite and created, 
 if the intellect is finite 'ajid created. In the same way, 
 an idea, considered subjectively, is singular like the 
 intellect itself ; but, considered objectively, it is uni- 
 versal like the essence which it represents. 
 
CHAPTEE II. 
 
 i 
 
 Systems conceening the Oeigin of Ideas, 
 abt. i.— pkincrpal systems conceening the oeigin 
 
 OF IDEAS. 
 
 9. The principal systems concerning the origin of idea& 
 are the folloioing : 1. Sensism ; 2. Criticism or Cri- 
 tique ; 3. The System of Innate Ideas ; 4. Ontologism, ; 
 5. The System of Impersonal Reason ; 6. The Scholastic 
 System. — All other systems may easily be reduced to 
 one or other of these six ; because the formation of 
 ideas is explained either by the senses or by the in- 
 tellect. If explained by the intellect, only one of the 
 following hypotheses can be made ; either the soul 
 produces ideas from itself ; or God, in creating it, has 
 engraven them on it ; or God communicates them to it 
 directly ; or a substance intermediate between it and 
 God communicates them to it ; or, finally, God gives 
 it the power to form them itself in giving it the fac- 
 ulty of abstracting the essence of sensible objects 
 from the conditions which individualize it. 
 
 AET. n. — SENSISM. 
 
 10. Sensism is a system, wliich affirms sensation to he 
 the only origin of ideas. — According to this system, all 
 knowledge is merely a modification or transformation 
 of sensation. 
 
SrSTBMS CON€EBNINa THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 79 
 
 11. The principal sensists among ancient philoso- 
 phers are Leucipptis, Democritus, and Epicur'us ; among 
 modern philosopJiers, Locke, Condillac, and Laromiguiere, 
 are most prominent. — ^The ancient sensists taught that 
 all bodies throw off subtle particles analogous to the 
 exhalations of odoriferous bodies ; these particles, 
 scattered through space, faithfully represent the ob- 
 jects from which they have been detached ; by means 
 of the senses they find an entrance to the soul, and 
 by their impressions produce sensation, memory, and 
 thought. This system was taught by Leucippus 
 (about B.C. 450.), Democritus (b.c. 470-361 ?), and Epi- 
 curus (B.C. 342-270). Modern Sensism holds sensa- 
 tion to be the only primitive act of the soul, an act 
 which by successive transformation produces all the 
 other acts of the soul and all its faculties, nay, the 
 sensitive faculty itself. This system, taught in an- 
 cient times by Protagoras (b.c. 480^11 ?), was renewed 
 in the seventeenth century by Locke (1632-1704), and 
 received its last complement from Condillac. 
 
 Besides sensation, Locke admits reflection in the 
 soul ; but, according, to him^ reflection is simply ob- 
 servant of sensitive facts, and acts only on the in- 
 ternal operations which had for their object external 
 material things. 
 
 Condillac (1715-1780) denies that reflection or atten- 
 tion is distinct from sensation, and regards it simply 
 as a more lively sensation than the others. He con- 
 siders memory as a twofold attention, — on the one 
 hand, to a past sensation, on the other, to a present 
 sensation. Finally, he asserts that judgment is noth- 
 ing more than a comparison between two sensations. 
 
 Laromiguiere (1756-1837) maintains the sense origin 
 of ideas ; but he considers as necessary for their for- 
 mation an activity distinct from sensation. 
 
80 RATIONAL PEILOSOPHT. 
 
 Augiiste Comte (1798-1857) is the founder of that 
 form of Sensism which is styled Positivism. He 
 teaches that the object of science is the positive and 
 real, that only that is positive and real, which is ex- 
 perimental. Hence his system is the foundation of 
 the varied forms of unbelief that to-day infect men's 
 minds.* 
 
 12. Sensism, under whatever form it is considered, is 
 false, both because it destroys intellectual facts, and be- 
 cause it renders even the fact of sensation inexplicable. — 
 The operation and object of the intellect cannot be 
 reduced to the operation and object of the senses ; 
 for the intellect reflects on its acts, judges, and 
 reasons, which the senses cannot do. The object of 
 the intellect is the immaterial, the universal ; the ob- 
 ject of the senses is the material, the particular. Now, 
 Sensism, by identifying intellection with sensation, 
 destroys the true notion of the intellect and of intel- 
 lectual acts. It is to no purpose that Locke admits 
 reflection in addition to sensation ; for he limits re- 
 flection to the perceiving of sensations, and hence it 
 does not essentially differ from sensation itself. 
 
 Sensism, moreover, renders the fact of sensation in. 
 explicable, as is evident in the theory professed by 
 the ancients. It is also manifest in the modern theory, 
 which by asserting that sensation is the principle of 
 the sensitive faculty, becomes essentially contradic- 
 tory. Sensism is also sufficiently refuted by its con- 
 sequences : experience shows that it leads directly to 
 the negation of all science and all morality. As to Pos- 
 itivism, if no a priori principle is certain, no experi- 
 ment is possible or scientific, since it must rest upon 
 the certainty of some axioms, or a priori principles. 
 
 * Cf. Liberatore, vol. ii., p. 381. 
 
SrSTEMiS OONOEBNINQ THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 81 
 
 AET. m. — OBITIQDE, OE TBANSCENDENTALISM. 
 
 13. Transcendentalism asserts that ideas are the product 
 of the activity of the thinking subject alone. — In this sys- 
 tem, which is the opposite of Sensism, thought does 
 not require for its exercise an object outside the mind 
 itself. 
 
 14. Transcendentalism originated with Kant, whose 
 principal disciples ivere Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.* — 
 Kant (1724-1804) teaches that we have within us a pri- 
 ori necessary forms or concepts both of the supersensi- 
 ble and of the sensible order ; all our cognitions re- 
 sult from the application of these forms to the objects 
 of experience. But as, according to the German, 
 philosopher, the a priori forms are purely subjective, 
 it follows that the object of knowledge, as it is in 
 itself, remains unknown to us. 
 
 Fichte (1762-1814) allows only one principle of 
 knowledge, the pure Ego, from which he evolves 
 all things, — God, the world, and the human mind, — 
 all which he considers as only conceptions of the 
 Ego. 
 
 Schelling (1775-1854) maintains very nearly the same 
 system ; instead of the pure Ego, however, he substi- 
 tutes an abstraction, the absolute, from which every- 
 thing, both mind and matter, emanates ideally. 
 
 Finally, Hegel (1770-1831) regards as the principle 
 
 * In America, Transcendentalism, according to its founders and 
 leaders, Dr. Channing, Alcott, and Emerson, is rather an emancipation 
 and reaction from the teachings of Calvinism, that man's nature is to- 
 tally depraved, and that he has no liberty. It received very little, if 
 any influence from the German system, and is rather the outgrowth of 
 the principle of the American Constitution, that man is capable of 
 self-government. 
 
82 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of all tilings the pure idea, in whicli the subject think- 
 ing- and the object thought, the ideal and the real, 
 entity and non-entity, are identified, and from which 
 all proceeds, — God, the world, and the human mind. 
 
 15. Transcendentalism is absurd ; because, if ideas are 
 purely sulyective,.it follows either that the directs known do 
 not exist, or that we can affirm nothing concerning their 
 reality. — In fact, if ideas are pure modifications of the 
 Ego, produced by the mind itself, we must hold ei- 
 ther that nothing exists outside the Ego, which is Nihil- 
 ism, or at least that we know nothing of what is with- 
 out us, which is Scepticism. These consequences 
 were vainly repudiated by Kant ; his disciples glory 
 in them, and with Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, re- 
 gard all existing things, even God himself, as a pure 
 creation of the human mind, or of the idea. 
 
 ABT. rV. — THE SYSTEM OF INNATE IDEAS. 
 
 16. T/ie system of Innate Ideas considers ideas as in- 
 fused by God into the soul from the moment of its creation. 
 — This system, regarding thought as constituting the 
 essence of the soul, supposes that the soul must always 
 have been engaged in thought, even from the first 
 instant of its creation ; and as the soul cannot think 
 without ideas, it also holds that ideas are innate in the 
 soul. 
 
 17. The upholders of this system are Plato among the 
 ancients ; Descartes, Leibnitz, and Bosmini, among mod- 
 ern philosophers. — In Plato's system ideas are the 
 eternal types according to which God -has ordained 
 all things ; they exist not only in the divine mind, but 
 also in the human mind, in which they are innate. 
 Some think that Plato held these prototype ideas to 
 
SYSTEMS CONGEBNING THE ORIGIN' OF IDEAS. 83 
 
 be eternally existing- apart from the divine mind and 
 independent of it. The human intellect, Plato (b.c. 
 429-348) teaches, existed before the body, and recalls 
 these ideas according as it perceives copies made in 
 their likeness, that is, sensible things. 
 
 Descartes (1596-1650) holds that innate ideas are 
 perfect in the soul ; but besides these ideas he ad- 
 mits factitious ideas, or those formed by an eifort of 
 the imagination, as the idea of a " gold mountain ; " 
 and adventitious ideas, or those which come from with- 
 out, as the idea of the " sun." 
 
 Leibnitz (1646-1716) teaches that all these ideas are 
 innate, but are in our intellect in their germs ; and as, 
 according to Descartes, innate ideas become present 
 to the mind only through sensations, so, according to 
 Leibnitz, these germs become perfect ideas only by 
 occasion of sensation. 
 
 Eosmini (1797-1855), laying it down as a principle 
 that we ought to suppose as innate in the soul only 
 that which is requisite to explain the fact of cog- 
 nition, believed that he had found this sufficient ele- 
 ment in the idea of being; he admits, therefore, no 
 other innate idea than that of possible being. In his 
 system, all ideas represent nothing but being differ- 
 ently determined^ Hence it follows that all our ideas 
 are formed from the idea of being by the same means 
 by which we are enabled to perceive the different de- 
 terminations of which being is susceptible, that is, by 
 sensation. 
 
 18. The system of Innate Ideas, besides not accounting 
 for the fact of cognition, is absurd in its principles, and 
 leads to the same conclusions as the system of Transcen- 
 dentalism. — In this system the close dependence on 
 the senses which is shown by experience to exist on 
 the part of the intellect becomes inexplicable, and man 
 
84 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 appears no longer to act, in the order of cognition, ac- 
 cording to the laws of his nature, which is both spirit- 
 ual and corporeal, but rather in accordance with the 
 laws of angelic nature. Hence all those who advo- 
 cate the doctrine of Innate Ideas err regarding the 
 human soul and its relations with the body. More- 
 over, the principle of their theory is that the essence 
 of the human soul consists in thought. But if 
 thought constitutes the essence of the soul, the act 
 of intellection is confounded with the essence of the 
 human soul; but in God alone is essence identical 
 with intellection. Hence there would be no need of 
 adding to the essence of the soul the ideas infused by 
 God. Finally, the system of Innate Ideas, in admit- 
 ting fundamentally the same principle as Transcen- 
 dentalism, viz., a priori subjective forms, leads to the 
 same consequence ; that is, it renders all knowledge 
 purely subjective, and thus ends naturally in Ideal 
 ism. 
 
 AET v. — ontologism:. 
 
 19. Ontologism regards ideas as seen in God by direct 
 and immediate intuition. — This system loses sight of 
 the subjective character of ideas ; it considers them 
 as the object of knowledge and as direct manifesta- 
 tions of God himself to our intellect. 
 
 20. ITie cJiief defenders of Ontologism are Malebranche 
 and Gioherti* — According to Malebranche (1638-1715), 
 man perceives all things by his ideas, which are only 
 the divine idea viewed under different aspects. And 
 
 * Some of the writings of the illustrious O. A. Brownson (1803-1876) 
 are unmistakably ontologistic. He accepted the primary principle of 
 Gioberti, Being creates exiatencea, ^nd thence deduced his argument 
 for the existence of God. 
 
SYSTEMS OONGERNINO THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 85 
 
 this idea we know only in so far as God directly 
 manifests Himself to our mind. By our ideas we ap- 
 prehend the contingent, the imperfect, the finite, which 
 are conceived only as the privation of the necessary, 
 the perfect, the infinite. Hence our soul sees all in 
 God, even the material world. Gioberti (1801-1851) 
 starts with the principle of Malebranche, that ideas, 
 being universal and absolute, must be a direct, though 
 partial, intuition of absolute being, that is, of God 
 Himself ; he regards ideas, not as the means, but as 
 the very object of knowledge. He teaches that what 
 we see are the divine ideas themselves, that we have a 
 constant intuition of God, but that we are conscious 
 of this intuition only by reflection, which he calls on- 
 tological reflection. 
 
 21. Ontologism is false in its principles, contradicted by 
 "experience, and fatal in its consequences. — 1. Ontologists 
 teach that the intellect has a direct intuition of God ; 
 but to see the being of God is to see His essence. 
 We must then affirm that in perceiving ideas our in- 
 tellect is in a state similar to that of the blessed, who 
 see the divine essence directly, a conclusion which is 
 absurd and contrary to faith. 2. Ontologism renders 
 the operation of the intellect independent of that of 
 the senses. Such a supposition is opposed to the 
 nature of man, and is contradicted by experience, 
 which sufficiently proves that the idea is formed in 
 us and by us and is not derived from an intuition of 
 God. 3. If we must admit that ideas are not the 
 medium, but the objects of knowledge, it follows that 
 the ideal order is not distinct from the real, and as 
 the real order alone exists, we must conclude that 
 knowledge is impossible. Again, if the intellect 
 does not form ideas, but sees them in God, it is, 
 by the very fact, deprived of all activity of its own. 
 
86 BATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Hence Ontologism leads directly to Fatalism and 
 Pantheism.* 
 
 ABT. TI. — INTEEMEDIABISM. 
 
 22. Tntermediarism, or the system of Impersonal Reason, 
 supposes between God and man an intermediate imper- 
 sonal reason, hy ivliich our intellect acquires universal 
 ideas. — According to this system, ideas are not innate 
 in the intellect, they are not acquired by the mind, 
 they are not seen in God ; but they are seen in an 
 impersonal reason intermediate between God and man. 
 
 23. Theprincipal defender of Tntermediarism is Cousin, 
 who has done nothing more than reneiu an error of Aver- 
 roes. — The reason of man, says Cousin, is individ- 
 ual and variable, and therefore cannot acquire of 
 itself universal and immutable ideas. Hence man can 
 form his ideas only in so far as they are revealed to 
 him by a reason which, not being personal to him, is 
 called impersonal. This reason is revealed to him 
 from the very beginning, and the knowledge which the 
 mind then has is said to be spontaneous. In this 
 state man knows, but does not know that he knows ; 
 when he begins to reflect on his spontaneous knowl- 
 edge, he acquires reflex knowledge. The former 
 knowledge is always true ; not so the latter, for in it 
 man may fix his attention exclusively on one part of 
 
 * Nor does the fact that God is eminently intelligible, and that we 
 are intimately connected with Him, give support to Ontologists. For 
 God is eminently intelligible in Himself, and the bond by which we 
 are united to Him arises not from our knowledge of Him, but from 
 our dependence on Him. Even though we see all things through 
 God, forasmucli as the light by which we know is from Him, it is 
 Still not necessary to behold His essence, just as for perceiving any 
 sensible object, it is unnecessary to see the substance ojE the au«. 
 
SYSTEMS aONGEBNINO THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 87 
 
 the truth, and thus confound the part with the whole ; 
 thence arises error, which, however, Cousin asserts to 
 be only incomplete truth. An almost analogous sys- 
 tem was taught by Averroes (1120-1198) in the middle 
 ages. 
 
 24. Intermediarism is false in its principle, in its na- 
 ture, and in its conseqiiences. — This system starts with 
 the principle that our intellect, as being individual, 
 cannot form a universal idea ; but thi-s is to lose sight 
 of the twofold aspect, subjective and objective, under 
 which we may consider the idea, viz., the idea itself 
 and that which it represents. Again, if Impersonal 
 Keason is anything, it must be individual, and hence 
 it is incapable, according to Cousin himself, of form- 
 ing a universal idea. Finally, this system easily gen- 
 erates Pantheism, since it destroys all activity proper 
 to the intellect of man. 
 
 AET. Vn. — ^TKADITIONALISM. 
 
 25. Traditionalism teaches that our ideas are formed 
 by means of speech. — This system, devised to combat 
 those philosophers who hold that human reason is 
 suificient for itself, exaggerates the impotency of 
 reason and asserts its dependence on speech and 
 tradition. 
 
 26. The principal representatives of Traditionalism are 
 De Bonald, Bonnetty, and Ventura. — De Bonald (1754- 
 1840) teaches the absolute necessity of speech for the 
 existence of thought, so that without speech man can 
 have no idea, no general notion, but only sensible 
 perceptions. 
 
 Bonnetty (1798- ) and Ventura (1792-1861) con- 
 cede the power of forming ideas of sensible things 
 without the help of speech, but maintain that, inde- 
 
88 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pendently of social teacHng, man cannot acquire 
 notions of the spiritual and moral order, as those of 
 God, the soul, duty, etc. Other philosophers admit 
 that man can think without speech, but they deny 
 that without it he can form clear and distinct ideas 
 and that he can reflect on his thoughts. 
 
 27. It is false to assert that speech is absolutely neces- 
 sary for the formation of ideas either of sensible or of 
 spiritual things, or for refecting on ideas already formed. 
 — Speech, being simply a sign, can make known an 
 object to the intellect only through the idea which 
 the intellect already has of the object ; therefore, be- 
 fore the intellect is fixed on the essence of a thing by 
 the word, it has already the idea of it. The idea of 
 sensible things being formed, we cannot, without 
 contradiction, deny to reason the power to attain to 
 ideas of spiritual things ; for, granting that reason 
 can form ideas of sensible things in virtue of the ab- 
 stractive power natural to it, wo cannot deny it the 
 power to ascend from these ideas to those of spiritual 
 things, since the power of deduction is not less natural 
 to reason than that of abstraction. Tet it is true that, 
 owing to the feebleness of man's reason and the diffi- 
 culties that beset his actual condition, but few men 
 could, without the aid of speech, attain to those truths 
 which regard God and His attributes, and even then 
 only after much time and labor, with an admixture 
 of many errors and great uncertainty. Besides, it is 
 certain that, without speech, man would never arrive 
 at complete intellectual and moral development. 
 
 But, if the intellect has the power of forming its 
 ideas without the aid of speech, evidently it may re- 
 flect on its ideas without speech, for the intellect is 
 essentially a reflective faculty, and requires for the 
 exercise of its power of reflection only the idea, the 
 
SrSTBMS OONOEBNING THE OBIOIN OF IDEAS. 89 
 
 object of reflection. It will not do to cite in proof of 
 the necessity of speech for the formation of ideas 
 instances of deaf-mutes and savages abandoned in 
 forests. A more attentive examination has shown 
 that these facts have been imperfectly observed or 
 have never existed. 
 
 AET. Vin.— THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM. 
 
 28. The Scholastic system explains the origin of ideas 
 by the poiver which the intellect has of abstracting from 
 sensible images or phantasmata. — The Schoolmen 
 teach that sensible objects first impress the external 
 senses. The impression, passing from the external 
 senses to the imagination,, gives rise to an image of 
 the object, which, though more perfect, is individual 
 and material, and represents the object with the sen- 
 sible and concrete conditions which make it that ob- 
 ject and no other. As soon as this image is formed, 
 the intellect adverts to it, and calling into exercise its 
 abstractive power, which constitutes what is called 
 the active intellect, it illumines this sensible image, 
 strips it of its sensible and individual conditions, and 
 manifests the essence of the thing without its material 
 determinations. Thus the object becomes actually 
 intelligible, or the intelligible species is formed. The 
 active intellect, or abstractive power, having thus sepa- 
 rated the intelligible, that is, the proper object of the 
 intellect, the intellect proper, called the possible intel- 
 lect, receives the intelligible species into itself and 
 elicits the word of the mind (verbum mentis), or forms 
 the idea. These operations, though distinct, are ac- 
 complished at the same time in virtue of the unity 
 of the soul, and one cannot take place without the 
 other. As we shall see later, this system of the origin 
 
90 RATIONAL PHIL080PHT. 
 
 of ideas is very closely connected witli the Scholastic 
 system concerning the nature of the human soul, and 
 follows from it as a consequence. 
 
 29. The Scholastic system has recourse to fewer a priori 
 principles than any other system. — It is an axiom among 
 philosophers that nature is as fruitful in effects as she 
 is sparing in causes ; hence the simplicity of a system 
 is a strong argument in its favor. But while the 
 other systems concerning ideas assume gratuitously 
 one or many a priori elements which may easily be 
 dispensed with, the Scholastic system requires for the 
 formation of the idea only that which is absolutely 
 indispensable, viz., the abstractive power, or the act- 
 ive intellect. This abstractive power cannot be dis- 
 pensed with, and it alone suffices for the solution of 
 the problem. 
 
 30. Tlie Scholastic system is true, because it is in per- 
 fect harmory with the essential laws of human nature. — 
 Since the formation of ideas is an effect whose cause 
 is the nature of our soul, a system concerning the for- 
 mation of ideas is true, if it is in perfect harmony 
 with the iiature of the soul, if it refers the effect to 
 its proper and adequate cause. But while the other 
 systems do not take into account the nature of the 
 human soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual, 
 the Scholastic system explains the concurrence of 
 sensible images in the formation of ideas. 
 
 It is also in accord with experience, which shows 
 that we do not possess innate ideas, that we do not 
 intue ideas in God, but that we form the idea of a thing 
 from its sensible perception. Thus the Scholastic 
 system follows as a simple consequence from the true 
 theory of the nature of man. According to that the- 
 ory, man is neither a mere animal nor an angel, but 
 stands, so to say, midway between them ; for if, on the 
 
STSTEMS OONOEBNINQ THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 91 
 
 one hand, his intellect, like that of the angel, does 
 not intrinsically depend on an organ, on the other 
 hand, being the faculty of a soul substantially united 
 to a body, it can form the idea only after the senses 
 have presented the matter for its operations. Hence 
 the Scholastic system preserves the unity of man's 
 being, and yet maintains a distinction between the 
 soul and body ; the other systems, on the contrary, 
 either make the soul and body two distinct beings, 
 or destroy one of these two elements of man. 
 
 31. The Scholastic system rests on the authority of the 
 greatest philosophers. — This system, first taught, though 
 with a mixture of error, by Aristotle (b.c. 384-322), was 
 held by all the great philosophers of the middle ages, 
 and especially by St. Thomas, who brought it to its 
 full perfection. Up to the seventeenth century, it 
 alone was admitted by all the great Catholic univer- 
 sities, and after having been for two centuries almost 
 universally rejected, to the great detriment of philos- 
 ophy, it is now accepted by the most distinguished 
 philosophers of the present day without restriction or 
 modification. 
 
 82. The Scholastic system gives a satisfactory solution 
 to all the difficulties connected with the problem of the 
 origin of ideas, and in no way contradicts the facts of 
 common sense. — The principal difficulty connected with 
 the problem of the origin of ideas is the necessity of 
 reconciling elements apparently contradictory and 
 yet evidently attested by experience, in the formation 
 of ideas. On the one hand, there is the sensible, par- 
 ticular, contingent element ; on the other hand, the 
 intelligible, universal, necessary element. These con- 
 tradictory elements cannot be united. But, while 
 other systems avoid the difficulty by denying one of 
 the two elements, and thus disregard both the nature 
 
92 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of man and facts of experience, the Scholastic system 
 shows how the two elements co-exist without being 
 confounded ; how the sensible image furnishes the 
 intellect with matter for its operation ; and how the 
 idea, while excluding the sensible image, cannot be 
 formed without its concurrence. This system, ex- 
 plaining what is immutable and necessary in the idea 
 by the nature of the essence perceived and not by the 
 nature of the perception itself, accounts for the divine 
 prototype of the object of the idea without deifying 
 the idea itself; finally, by attributing to man the 
 power of forming his own ideas, it makes them depend- 
 ent on him both for their causality and their very 
 existence. At the same time, it enables us to com- 
 prehend the grandeur of the intellect, by showing 
 that its intelligible light, its abstractive power, is a 
 sort of participation in the light of God Himself. 
 Thus, everything finds its proper place in this sys- 
 tem, and far from excluding a single fact of expe- 
 rience or of common sense, it admits them all, and 
 explains their mutual relations. 
 
 33. Tlie ScJiolastic system entails none of the conse- 
 quences with ivhich its adversaries reproach it ; the objec- 
 tions raised against it rest on false explanations. — By rec- 
 ognizing the reality of the essence perceived, the 
 Scholastic system avoids Subjectivism and Idealism, 
 and it avoids Pantheism by making the idea a con- 
 tingent production of our intellect. Those who object 
 that it borders on Sensism in admitting a sensible 
 element in the formation of the idea, forget that this 
 element does not make part of the idea, but is simply 
 the matter on which the intellect operates in forming 
 the idea. The reproach that this system is contradic- 
 tory in making the universal proceed from the par- 
 ticular, can be uttered by those only who do not ob- 
 
SYSTEMS OONOBBfTINQ THE OBIOIN OF IDEAS. 93 
 
 serve that particular beings have each a proper es- 
 sence, which, abstracted by the active intellect, is 
 capable of being considered, by another operation of 
 the intellect, under the relation of uiuTeraality. 
 
CHAPTER m. 
 
 Univebsals. 
 aet. i. — natuee of univeesals. 
 
 34. A universal is that which is found in many or 
 may be affirmed of many ; it is the essence of a being or 
 tJie intelligible object perceived by the intellect. 
 
 35. The question of the nature of universals is closely 
 connected tuith that of the origin and nature of ideas. — 
 Ideas are uniTersal ; by them we apprehend the uni- 
 versal. The solution of the problem of ideas is, 
 therefore, closely connected with that of the problem 
 of universals, nor is the latter problem less important 
 than the former. As universals are the proper object . 
 of our intellectual knowledge, we can easily under- 
 stand the lively controversy to which the question 
 of universals has given rise in the history of phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 36. To account for the true nature of universals, we 
 must distinguish : 1. the direct universal, luhich is the 
 essence considered merely in itself, by a direct act of the 
 intellect ; 2. the reflex universal, which is the essence con- 
 sidered by a reflex act of the intellect, as common to many 
 individuals. — The essence of a material being ab- 
 stracted from its individuating conditions is the 
 proper object of the intellect. But the intellect may 
 perceive the essence by a direct act, or it may return 
 to consider the idea of this essence by a reflex act. In 
 
UmVERSALS. 95 
 
 the first case, the intellect merely perceives the es- 
 sence with its intrinsic characteristics, without con- 
 sidering whether it is single or multiple, real or ideal. 
 Thus the intellect, by a direct act, represents to itself 
 the essence of man, conceives him as a rational ani- - 
 mal, but does not consider whether this essence is 
 found in a single individual or in many individuals, 
 whether it exists really or ideally. 
 
 Evidently the direct universal is not, strictly speak- 
 ing, a universal ; it is said to be so as opposed to in- 
 dividuals, and also as being the basis of the reflex uni- 
 versal, which is the universal, strictly speaking. _ In 
 order to form this universal, the intellect reflects upon 
 the essence which it has apprehended directly; it 
 views the idea as representing an essence common to 
 many individuals. Thus, after the perception of the 
 essence of man as a rational animal, the intellect 
 reflects upon the idea of this essence, and recognizes 
 that it expresses the human nature in v^hich all men 
 are alike. This distinction arms us with a ready an- 
 swer to the objection that the universal cannot be 
 drawn from the particular, since the greater cannot 
 proceed from the less. If the reflex universal is meant, 
 evidently it is not found in the particular ; but if it 
 be the direct universal, the answer is that this uni- 
 versal is actually in the particular, inasmuch as the 
 essence of the particular may be considered in itself 
 and abstractly. But, once the direct universal is ap- 
 prehended, nothing prevents the intellect from adding 
 to it the consideration of its relation to individuals, 
 and thus arriving at the reflex universal. 
 
 37. To perceive the direct universal, mere abstraction 
 by the intellect is sufficient ; to form the rejkx universal, 
 the intellect must regard the essence as common to all the 
 individuals possessing it. — The consideration of the 
 
9<! RATIONAL PEIL080PHT. 
 
 essence in itself involves no scrutiny as to whetter 
 it exists in one individual or in many individuals, 
 whether it is real or ideal ; for its perception, the 
 intellect need only abstract it from the individual 
 characteristics. But the reflex universal contains a 
 relation to individuals, and hence supposes a com- 
 parison by the intellect as well as abstraction. 
 
 38. The direct universal has a real existence in the thing 
 perceived, hut not in the manner in tohich it is perceived ; 
 the reflex universal as such has only an ideal existence. — 
 The essence apprehended by the intellect in the 
 direct act exists really in the individuals, but not ia 
 the manner in which it is apprehended, that is, as 
 abstracted from individual characteristics ; evidently 
 this abstraction is the work of the intellect. In the 
 same way, the color of fruit is really in the fruit, but 
 any consideration of it apart from the taste is due to 
 the sight, which perceives color, and not taste. The 
 reflex universal as such exists solely in the intellect, 
 since it is universal only in virtue of the reflection of 
 the intellect, and this mental operation can be exer- 
 cised on the ideas of things, but not on the things 
 themselves. 
 
 ABT II. — DIFFEEENT OPINIONS ON THE NATUKE OF UNI- 
 VEESALS. 
 
 39. The different opinions on the nature of universals 
 may he reduced to three principal heads : Nominalism, 
 Conceptualism, and Realism. — It may be said that there 
 have been as many different opinions on the nature 
 of universals as there have been diverse systems on 
 the origin and nature of ideas. All, however, may be 
 reduced to the three opinions which gave rise to so 
 much cpntroversy in the middle ages. 
 
UmVERSALS. 97 
 
 The Nominalists, headed by Eoscelin (d. 1122), and 
 later by Ockham, the Invincible Doctor (d. 1347), main- 
 tained that universals were mere words ; the Concep- 
 tualists, represented by Abelard (1079-1142), made uni- 
 rersals merely conceptions ; the Realists, however, 
 gave to universals a real existence outside the min'i. 
 But of this last class some confined themselves to 
 attributing reality to the essence perceived, in so far 
 only as it is individual and concrete ; these are the 
 Moderate Realists, and have St. Thomas of Aquin (1225- 
 1274) at their head. Others attributed reality to the 
 essence as qualified by the very abstraction and uni- 
 versality under which it is regarded ; these are the 
 Ultra-Realists, such as "William of Champeaux (d. 1121) 
 and Joannes Scotus Erigena (d. 875). Thus, according 
 to the Moderate Realists, the essence " man " really 
 exists outside the mind in individual men, but not 
 with that abstraction and universality under which the 
 mind considers it ; according to the Ultra-Realists, 
 the essence "man "really exists in an abstract and 
 universal manner. 
 
 Nominalism is manifestly the negation of all science 
 and the fruitful parent of Scepticism ; Conceptualism 
 being nothing more than disguised Nominalism, leads 
 to the same consequences ; Ultra-Realism directly 
 produces Pantheism. With Nominalism are connected 
 the systems of Epicurus, Locke, Condillac, Hume 
 (1711-1776), in a word, of Materialists, Sensists, and the 
 Empiricists of the Scotch school. With Conceptual- 
 ism the systems of the Stoics of old, of Descartes, 
 Berkeley (1684^1753), Kant, and all the Idealists, stand 
 in close relation. Finally, to Ultra-Realism belong 
 the systems of Plato, Averroes, Malebranche, Hegel, 
 and Gioberti, that is, the systems of the Oatologista 
 
 and Pantheists. 
 7 
 
98 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The chief exponents of Nominalism and Conceptualism in our As,y 
 are respectively John S. Mill (1806-1873) and Sir W. Hamilton (1788- 
 185ft). The latter explains apprehension or the formation of ideas 
 as a bundling together of attributes not the same, but called similar, 
 because, though observed in different individuals of the same class, 
 they produce in us the same effect as when first observed in a partic- 
 ular individual of that class. From this it follows in the teaching of 
 Sir W. Hamilton: 1. That ideas convey not absolute but relative 
 truth, relative, namely, to the object first perceived ; hence certitude 
 is impossible ; 2. Ideas are merely subjective. Here the door is 
 opened to Scepticism. 
 
 John Stuart Mill, following Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), holds that 
 the ideas of individuals belonging to the same class have nothing in 
 common but the name. When the mind perceives an object, in 
 virtue of its power of abstraction, it fixes its attention on certain 
 qualities to the exclusion of others, the qualities selected being those 
 that are recalled to us whenever we perceive another object belong- 
 ing to the same class. Hence it follows : 1. That the idea has no 
 foundation in reality, and all positive belief in the most fundamental 
 truths of religion is undermined; 2. That the common name ik 
 merely a convenience, and does not express any corresponding idea. 
 Hence this system is even more radically sceptical than the other. 
 
 From these principles it is easy to gather the doctrines of Moder> 
 Goncoptualists and Nominalists with regard to Universtils. 
 
SPECIAL IDEOLOGY. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 How Human Knowledge is Acquired. 
 
 AET. I.— THE FIBST OPERATION OP THE INTELLECT AND THE 
 PERCEPTION OP ESSENCES. 
 
 40. In (he first development of knowledge analysis pre- 
 cedes synthesis, that is, the first operation of the intellect is 
 not judgment, hut simple apprehension of essence. — Some 
 pMlosophers, as Eeid, Kant, and Cousin, teach that 
 the intellect 'first pronounces instinctive judgments, 
 and afterwards arrives at ideas, by abstracting- the ele- 
 ments contained in these judgments. But this is an 
 error. For (1) any power which, by its nature, is only 
 gradually developed, does not acquire its full perfec- 
 tion in its first act ; but judgment is an act of perfect 
 knowledge, whereas simple apprehension is merely an 
 act of initial knowledge ; therefore, simple apprehen- 
 sion precedes judgment. Moreover, (2) a judgment 
 presupposes a knowledge of the agreement or dis- 
 agreement of two terms ; but, in order to perceive this 
 relation, evidently we must first know the two terms. 
 It is (3) also a mistake to assert that the intellect 
 by one and the same act perceives the two terms and 
 their agreement or disagreement ; for, in order to per- 
 ceive the agreement or disagreement of two thingSj 
 
100 BATIOMAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 we must first have ideas of them, and then compare 
 these ideas by a reflex act. Hence one and the same 
 act would be both direct and reflex, which is contra- 
 dictory. We must, therefore, conclude that the mind 
 begins hj analysis, and that it first apprehends the es- 
 sence, separating it by abstraction from the conditions 
 by which it is affected in nature ; then follows synthesis, 
 which it effects by judgment, when it establishes a 
 union between the terms perceived. 
 
 41. The proper object of the intellect in our present life 
 is the essence of material things. — As the intellect, in our 
 present life, can form an idea only when the imagina- 
 tion has presented to it a sensible image, and as this 
 image must have for its object something material, the 
 proper object of the intellect, in our mortal life, must 
 be the essence of material things. 
 
 42. Among the essences of material things, some are 
 immediately knoion, while others are Tcnown mediately, or 
 by means of deduction. — Certain essences, as those of 
 " rest, motion," etc., are self-evident ; this must be the 
 case, since otherwise human knowledge would be im- 
 possible. But, on the other hand, many essences, 
 even of sensible things, are known to us only by 
 means of reasoning; for example, the essence of 
 "life." 
 
 43. In the cognition of material objects there are three 
 degrees of abstraction employed by the human intellect ; in 
 the first degree, it abstracts from the individuality of the 
 objects and considers them only as sensible ; in the second, 
 it abstracts also from their sensible and mutable qualities 
 to regard only their quantity ; in the third, it abstracts 
 from matter altogether to contemplate tJie immaterial. — 
 The first objects of cognition in this life are individual, 
 sensible, material things. The intellect abstracting 
 Irom the individuality or thisness of the objects about 
 
sow HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 18 AOQUIBED. 101 
 
 US in the visible M^orld, such as " stones, plants, and 
 animals," contemplates them merely as sensible. 
 
 It may further abstract from all the modifications 
 that qualify sensible objects, to regard their quantity, 
 and then it considers continuous quantity, as " lines, 
 surfaces, solids," and discrete quantity, as " number." 
 
 Lastly, it may abstract altogether from matter, and 
 regard only the immaterial. What is immaterial may 
 he negatively so, as the nature of "being, substance, 
 accident," etc., which though realized in sensible ob- 
 jects, may be abstracted from them ; or it may he posi- 
 tively immaterial and exclude all matter from its 
 nature, as the "human soul" and "God." Of these 
 three degrees of abstraction, the first is the limit of 
 the physical sciences, the second of mathematics, the 
 third of metaphysics. 
 
 44. In the immediate perception of essences, the intel- 
 lect begins luith the most universal concepts. — Although 
 adapted by nature to acquire knowledge, the intellect 
 at first knows nothing. It proceeds gradually in the 
 act of cognition, and does not, by its first effort, attain 
 to perfect knowledge. Thus, before possessing a de- 
 terminate and distinct cognition, it begins with a very 
 universal notion. It is the same with the intellect as 
 with the senses, which, in perceiving an animal, for 
 example, first perceive it as a body, then as an animal, 
 and afterwards as this or that animal. Experience also 
 confirms this truth : for the less perfect the language 
 of a people, the more is it wanting in precise and 
 definite terms ; the more perfect the language and the 
 more civilized the people who speak it, the richer is 
 it in exact and well-defined expressions. 
 
 45. The first idea formed by the intellect is that of 
 being. — The intellect first perceives that which is most 
 universal ; but since the most universal idea is that of 
 
102 RATIONAL PBIL080PHY. 
 
 being, the first thing perceived by the intellect is the 
 essence of being ; other things are known only as 
 some determination of being. It must not, however, 
 be supposed that, when the intellect is once developed, 
 it must begin by perceiving the idea of being before 
 any other essence whatever, for this occurs only in 
 the first development of intellect ; eventually, it first 
 perceives some determinate essence, and afterwards 
 attains to more universal ideas by an analysis of its 
 reflections. 
 
 AET. II. — HOW THE INTELLECT KNOWS INDIVIDUAL BODIEa 
 
 46. The intellect perceives particular bodies by perceiv' 
 ing its own act of abstraction of the intelligible object from 
 the phantasm, which is always representative of an individ- 
 ual material entity. — The intellect judges and reasons 
 about particular bodies ; it must, therefore, know 
 them. But, as the universal alone can be the proper 
 object of the intellect, the knowledge which it has of 
 the individual is not direct, but indirect (per accidens) ; 
 that is, it. does not know the individual as its proper 
 object, but it knows it only through the act of a fac- 
 ulty which has the individual for its proper object. 
 The intellect thus apprehends the act of an inferior 
 power or faculty on account of the unity, of the soul,' 
 in virtue of which one faculty cannot act without the 
 next higher being apprised of its action. Hence par- 
 ticular bodies are known by the soul in two ways : 
 directly, through the senses and the imagination ; in- 
 directly, by the intellect, which perceives its own act 
 of absttacting the intelligible species from the phan- 
 tasms of the imagination. This manner of knowing 
 is called per accidens by the Schoolmen, which they 
 compare to that of knowing substance by sense. The 
 
HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS AOQUIBBD. 103 
 
 eye sees color per se, the colored object per accidens. 
 The intellect knows the universal directly {per se), the 
 individual indirectly {per accidens). 
 
 47. The reflection of the intellect upon its act of simple 
 apprehension is both consciousness of that act and the per- 
 ception of the essence apprehended by the act. — The intel- 
 lect in reflecting on the act by which it has perceived 
 the essence of a sensible object must know both 
 the act and the object perceived by the act. Thus, 
 when it has the idea of a " flower," it may turn to 
 this idea, and then know both that it has this idea 
 and that the object from which it has abstracted 
 the essence is a flower. This reflex act of the in- 
 tellect receives the name of psychological conscious- 
 ness when it is viewed as a modification of the intel- 
 lect, but when it is considered as an expression of 
 the object known, it is called ontological conscious- 
 ness, or the intellective perception of the material 
 and individual. 
 
 48. Man knows the material and individual through 
 the senses ; but intellect adds something to the sensitive 
 cognition, since it regards the individual not rnerely as a 
 fact, but as the concrete realization of the essence which it 
 has abstracted from the individual. — When the intellect 
 is directed to the consideration of the individual, it is 
 already in possession of the idea which it has ab- 
 stracted from it ; hence it cannot prevent the light of 
 this idea from being reflected upon the individual ob- 
 ject, nor the individual from being presented to the 
 intellect as the concrete realization of the essence 
 perceived through the idea. 
 
 The reason of this fact is not only subjective, inas- 
 much as the senses and imagination have their seat 
 in the same soul as the intellect ; but also objective, 
 since the individual perceived by the senses is truly 
 
104 RATIONAL PMIL080PHT. 
 
 the same as tliat from whicli the intellect has ab- 
 stracted the universal. 
 
 AET. m. — THE soul's KNOWLEDGE OP ITSELF. 
 
 49. The soul does not knoio itself immediately by its 
 essence, but only by its operations. — The soul has no 
 innate idea ; it does not, therefore, know itself from 
 its very origin, through its essence. But since its 
 essence is present to it, the soul is capable of perceiv- 
 ing its own existence easily without reasoning. And 
 it attains to this perception as soon as it becomes 
 conscious of any one of its operations. 
 
 50. TJie soul does not know the. nature of its essence im- 
 mediately, but by reasoning. — ^In order that the soul may 
 perceive its own existence, it suffices that it be pres- 
 ent to itself and perceive an act of which it is the 
 principle. This is not the case with the knowledge 
 which the soul acquires of its essence, for it attains 
 this by means of deduction. For in perceiving an- 
 other being, the soul perceives that the idea by which 
 it apprehends the being is immaterial ; thence it con- 
 cludes that the principle whence the idea proceeds is 
 also immaterial. From this property of immateriality 
 the soul afterwards deduces the other properties 
 which it possesses. 
 
 AET. rv. — HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS GOD. 
 
 51. The soul does not know God immediately, but it 
 rises from, created things to a knowledge of His existence. 
 — The intellect perceives directly the essences ab- 
 stracted from sensible things. From the perception 
 of these essences follows immediately a cognition of 
 the first principles of reason. By reflection on these 
 
HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS AOQUIBBD. 105 
 
 acts of tlie intellect, we at once perceive our own exist- 
 ence and by our senses that of corporeal individuals 
 distinct from us. In this all other knowledge, includ- 
 ing that of God, has its source, and is, consequently, 
 only mediate knowledge. 
 
 52. 2%e first notion wjiich we acquire of Ood is that of 
 His existence, under the relation of first cause. — Creatures 
 present themselves to us as contingent beings, which, 
 consequently, must have a cause ; thus, by the prin- 
 ciple of causality we are led to assign them a first un- 
 created cause. 
 
 53. TJie knoivledge of God as first cause of all created 
 beings contains in germ all the other notions which we can 
 acquire of Him. — A cause must contain all the perfec- 
 tions which it produces in the effect and it must 
 exclude those imperfections of the effect which are 
 not due to its causality. But the First Cause, being 
 independent and therefore infinite, extends His power 
 to all possible beings, and immeasurably surpasses 
 all the perfections of creatures. Now, there are three 
 ways by which we may know the divine attributes : (1) 
 by the relation of cause to effect, (2) by the exclusion of 
 the imperfections of creatures, (3) by pre-eminent pos- 
 session of every perfection. By the first, that of cau- 
 sality, we know that God is the efficient, final, and 
 exemplar cause of all things, that He is their pre- 
 server and ordainer; by the second, that of exclu- 
 sion, we deny of God whatever in creatures implies 
 some defect, as "limitation, dependence, mutability;" 
 by the third, that oi pre-eminence, we attribute to God 
 in an infinite degree all perfections, such as " goodness, 
 wisdom, beauty." The union of these two ways of pre- 
 eminence and exclusion enables us to form the most 
 exalted idea that we can have of God, by conceiving 
 Him as absolutely pure Being, that is, as the Being 
 
106 RATIONAL. PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that simply is, without any augmentation or super- 
 added determination to the simple and pure nature 
 of being. 
 
 54. The idea of the finite is formed hy the union of the 
 idea of being with that of privation.— The finite is that 
 which exists, but with limits,, that is, it is affected 
 by a privation of being. When the intellect " looks 
 out upon an object external to itself," it forms the 
 idea of being. On instituting a comparison between 
 this object and objects which it knows already, it 
 observes what is wanting in each, and thus conceives 
 the idea of privation. The union of these two ideas 
 gives the concept of the finite. From this explana- 
 nation we see the error of Descartes and Malebranche, 
 who assert that the idea of the finite is deduced from 
 that of the infinite. 
 
 55. The idea of the infinite follows as a conseqiience 
 from the idea of first cause. — The intellect, .having 
 already the idea of the finite and the idea of God as 
 first cause, easily perceives that ■ the First Cause can- 
 not be limited by itself or by any other cause, and 
 thus conceives it without limits, that is, as infinite. 
 Locke and Condillac, confounding the idea of the 
 infinite with that of the indefinite, assert that the idea 
 of the infinite is obtained by constantly adding to a 
 given finite perfection yet another finite perfection. 
 But this hypothesis is absurd ; for the infinite, being 
 essentially without limits, is not susceptible of in- 
 crease or diminution ; the finite, on the contrary, is 
 essentially limited, and however much it may be 
 increased ever remains limited and, therefore, finite, 
 since its increment is, according to Locke, always 
 finite. 
 
 56. From the idea of tJie finite is derived that of the 
 conditional or contingent, that is, of being which does not 
 
sow HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRED. 107 
 
 contain in itself the reason of its existence. — By the finite 
 is meant limited being ; but that which is ever tend- 
 ing to being and not to the absence of being cannot 
 limit itself ; it must, therefore, be limited by an ex- 
 ternal agent. But the external agent which gives it 
 limits must also give it its existence, in which those 
 limits are found. In other words, the , being is con- 
 tingent, since the contingency of a being consists 
 precisely in this, that it receives existence from an- 
 other, as from its cause. As the opposite of the finite 
 is the infinite, so the opposite of the contingent is the 
 necessary and absolute, or that which exists in virtue 
 of its own essence, and in which all is pure act. 
 
 AET. v.— NECESSITY OF SENSIBLE IMAGES FOE INTEL- 
 LECTION IN QUE PEESENT LIFE. 
 
 57. The human intellect in its present state of union ivith 
 the body, can apprehend no object without the aid of a sensible 
 representation in the imagination. — Experience teaches 
 uS that when the imagination is disturbed or incap- 
 able of acting, as in sickness or lethargy, the intellect 
 is likewise disturbed or powerless to produce any 
 idea. It further shows that when we wish to think of 
 anything, even if it be spiritual, we always form a 
 .sensible representation ; and likewise, when we com- 
 municate our ideas to another, we make use of figures 
 and sensible images. Besides this proof from ex- 
 perience, reason demonstrates a priori that, in our 
 present life, we cannot, without the concurrence of 
 sensible images, either form ideas or even make use 
 of the ideas which we already possess. For action 
 fdlloivs being, that is, the action is always conformed 
 to the essence and mode of existence of the being 
 that acts. But the essence of man is a soul substanti- 
 
108 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ally miited to a body and the intellect's present mode 
 of existence is in union with the sensitive faculties. 
 In order, then, that man may act as man, he must do 
 so with the concurrence of the two elements of which 
 he is composed ; and the action of intellect naturally 
 requires the co-operation of the senses. We thus see 
 the admirable harmony existing between the subject 
 that operates, the faculty by which he operates, and 
 the object of the operation. The subject is a com- 
 posite of soul and body ; the faculty is the intellect 
 united to sensitive 'acuities ; the object is an essence 
 realized ia an individual and sensible body. 
 
CHAPTBE II. 
 
 Knowledge of Fikst Pkinciples. 
 aet i. — natube of pbinciples of knowledge. 
 
 58. A principle of knoiuledge is that by tuhich something 
 is knoion. — A principle, in general, is that from which 
 something proceeds. Principles aire of three kinds : 
 metaphysical principles, physical principles, and logi- 
 cal principles. The last named include all those 
 principles which when known lead to the knowledge 
 of something else. In a more restricted sense, first 
 priQciples of knowledge, or simply first principles, 
 are those propositions which are so clear and evident, 
 that they do not require proof. Hence they are also 
 called axioms or self-evident truths. 
 
 59. After the perception of essences, the intellect imme- 
 diately perceives frst principles. — The intellect proceed- 
 ing gradually in the act of knowing, first perceives 
 what is most elementary, viz., essences. This imper- 
 fect knowledge it immediately develops in observing 
 the relations, properties, and accidents of essences, 
 thus calling judgment and reason into action. Of the 
 judgments which it pronounces, some are formed 
 immediately and others mediately. The former are 
 called Jlrst principles. 
 
110 KATIOMAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 AET n.— THE PEINCIPLE OF CONTBADICTION. 
 
 60. The first principle known hy the intellect is : It is 
 impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same 
 time. Tliis is called the principle of contradiction. — A.& in 
 the simple perception of essences there exists a first 
 universal idea, viz., the idea of being, which precedes 
 all others and serves as their basis ; so there must be 
 a first principle, on which all reasoning rests, and to 
 which the intellect must assent under penalty of be- 
 ing unable to accept any other truth whatever. This 
 first truth is the principle of contradiction, and is formu- 
 lated thus : " It is impossible for the same thing to be 
 and not to be at the same time and in the same re- 
 spect ; " or, in a more didactic form, " Being is incom- 
 patible with non-being." Evidently this is the first 
 principle which the intellect knows. For, in perceiv- 
 ing being, it cannot but perceive the negation of being, 
 or non-being. In comparing these two concepts, there- 
 fore, it compares its two primary concepts ; and in dis- 
 covering and afiirming their absolute incompatibility, 
 it aflirms the principle which in the order of knowl- 
 edge precedes all others. This principle is so evident 
 that it is immediately known by every intellect, and 
 cannot rationlly be denied.* 
 
 61. Tlie principle of contradiction is implicitly con- 
 tained in all other principles, even in those lohich are self- 
 
 I i 
 
 * Kant denies to the principle of contradiction all objective reality 
 and puts forth his doctrine of Antinomies, or the principle that con- 
 tradictories mayexist side hy side. The repugnance of the mind to 
 assent to such a principle is due, he asserts, to the limited circle of 
 our experience, within which contradictories exclude each other. 
 But in the nature of things, he maintains, there is no reason why two 
 and two should not make five. 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF FIRST PBIN0IPLE8. Ill 
 
 evident ; it may he used to explain them or render them 
 more evident, hut can itself he proved by no other principle. 
 — ^Besides the principle of contradiction, there are 
 many other self-evident principles; but, though the 
 mind arrives at these by the simple perception of es- 
 sence, and is not obliged to recur to a higher principle, 
 yet in formulating them it must adhere, at least im- 
 plicitly, to the principle of contradiction. Thus it is 
 with the principle of identity, " Every being has its own 
 essence ; " with the principle of excluded middle, " A 
 thing either is or is not ;" with the principle of causality, 
 " There is no effect without a cause ; " with the prin- 
 ciple of sufficient reason, " There is nothing without a 
 sufficient reason." So, too, is it with all the axioms ; 
 as, "The whole is greater than any of its parts," 
 " Two things equal to a third are equal to each other," 
 etc. Although these principles do not require demon- 
 stration, still they are made more evident by means 
 of the principle of contradiction. Thus, for example, 
 we demonstrate that the whole is greater than any of 
 its parts, from the fact that otherwise the whole would 
 and would not be the whole. 
 
 AET. rn. — THE PEINCIPLE OP CAUSAUTy. 
 
 62. The intellect forms the idea of cause in general when 
 it ascends by abstraction from the knoioledge of a particu- 
 lar effect and a particular cause to the idea of effect and 
 cause in general. — In the act of sensation, of intellec- 
 tion, or of volition, we necessarily distinguish two 
 things : the sensitive, intellective, or volitive act, and 
 the agent which produces the act ; this is nothing but 
 the cognition of a particular effect produced by a par- 
 ticular cause. But from this particular cognition the 
 intellect can by abstraction form the idea of effect and 
 
112 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of cause in general, that is, the idea, first, of some- 
 thing which exists only in virtue of the action of an 
 agent, and the idea, secondly, of an agent by the 
 action of which this thing is produced. Hence the 
 idea of cause comprehends two elements : the percep- 
 tion of an agent as producing an effect by its action, 
 and the perception of an effect as produced by this 
 action. 
 
 63. When the intellect has the idea of cause and effect, 
 it immediately perceives the principle of causality, tohich 
 is expressed in the formula : There is no effect without a 
 cause. — This principle expresses nothing more than 
 the essential dependence of every effect on some 
 cause. But this dependence is known from the very 
 idea of effect ; for an effect is something that begins 
 to be, or that has a being that it had not. It must, 
 then, have received its being from itself or from 
 another. But it could not receive its being from it- 
 self, since in that supposition it would both exist in 
 order to give being, and not exist in order to receive 
 being. It must then have received its being from 
 another, on which, therefore, it depends, and which 
 is called a cause. The intellect, therefore, analyzing 
 the idea of effect, immediately perceives its depend- 
 ence on a cause ; it expresses this dependence in the 
 proposition : " There is no effect without a cause." * 
 
 64. To the principle of causality is referred the prin- 
 ciple of sufficient reason, lohich may he thus formulated : 
 
 * The word cause here means efficient cause, and is marked by tw« 
 characteristics, " immediate inflaence and. active in&nence." Mr. Mil] 
 ignores these marks when he defines cause as an invariable, uncondi- 
 tional antecedent. When, too, he tries to establish, by means of the 
 principle of causality, the Uniformity of Nature as the fundamental 
 principle of his Experimental school, he implies the existence of this 
 Tery uniformity, and thus falls into a vicious circle. 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF FIRST PBINOIPLES. 113 
 
 Whatever is, must have a sufficient reason why it is what 
 it is. — This principle is only an extension of the prin- 
 ciple of causality, but it has a more general applica- 
 tion ; while the principle of causality properly ap- 
 plies only to things which are effects or had a begin- 
 ning, that of sufficient reason is applicable to the 
 First Cause who had no beginning. The principle of 
 sufficient reason has this limit, however, that with 
 regard to free will, it is not true if taken ohjectively 
 only ; for not the object but the election made by the 
 will is the reason why the will determines itself to the 
 exercise of its act. 
 
 65. The principle of causality is analytical, and not 
 synthetical, as Kant maintains. — A judgment is syn- 
 thetical when the idea of the predicate is not con- 
 tained in that of the subject ; as, " This wood is green." 
 A judgment is analytical, when the analysis of the 
 subject enables us to find the predicate in it. Hence 
 the mere analysis of the idea of effect suffices to give 
 the idea of dependence on a cause. 
 
 66. Hie principle of causality has an objective value, 
 notwitJistanding the assertion to the contrary of many 
 philosophers, among others Kant and Hume. — Many 
 philosophers, recognizing that to destroy the principle 
 of causality is to destroy all science, accept the prin- 
 ciple, but deny its objective or real value, and give it 
 only a subjective or ideal value. It is evident, how- 
 ever, that the quality of dependence on a cause, which 
 the effect possesses, results from its nature as effect, 
 and, consequently, is as real as the effect itself. 
 
CHAPTEE in. 
 
 Language in Eelation to the Acquisition of 
 Knowledge. 
 
 AET. I. — UTILITY op LANGUAGE IN DEVELOPING THE MIND. 
 
 67. As men are composed of body and soul, they require 
 an exterior sign to communicate their thoughts to one an^ 
 other ; the most perfect sign is that of language. — Man is 
 made to live in society ; but, since tis intellect is 
 joined to a body, he must make use of a sensible sign 
 to communicate his thoughts. This sign may be of 
 several kinds ; of these the easiest and most perfect is 
 language ; by it he can communicate the greatest 
 number of things with the greatest clearness. 
 
 68. Language is not absolutely necessary either for the 
 direct or the rejkx action of the intellect. — The intellect 
 has in itself the power, by abstracting ideas from sen- 
 sible images, of immediately perceiving first principles 
 and of deducing the consequences of its first cog- 
 nitions ; therefore, it is not absolutely necessary that 
 these cognitions and their consequences should be 
 communicated to the mind by language.* 
 
 69. Language is very useful, and even morally neces- 
 sary, for the development of the intellect and for the ac- 
 
 • Speech or language may be defined as " the communication of 
 our thoughts to others by means of words or articulate sounds used by 
 consent as signs of our ideas. " 
 
LANGUAGE IN A0QUT8ITI0N OF KNOWLEDGE. 115 
 
 quisition of the greater part of our Icnowledge, especially of 
 that which relates to spiritual things and to moral truths. — 
 If we consider tlie intellect in itself, we see tliat it re- 
 quires a sensible image for the formation of the idea. 
 But, as experience proves, this image formed by the 
 imagination may also be an obstacle in speculative 
 operations. But speech performs the essential func- 
 tion of the sensible image without having its incon- 
 veniences ; for it furnishes a very simple sign not sus- 
 ceptible of being confounded with the idea, and eas- 
 ily concentrating the attention, since the words of a 
 language are uniform and constant. Hence speech is 
 very useful in the development of the intellect viewed 
 in itself. But if we consider it in relation to other in- 
 tellects, we must allow that speech is the principal 
 means by which the greater part of knowledge is 
 communicated in a prompt and easy manner, especial- 
 ly that knowledge which relates to spiritual things 
 and to moral truths. Besides, every science requires 
 the efforts and labors of many ages for its formation. 
 How, then, could it be transmitted or enlarged, if 
 language were not at the service of the savant to en- 
 able him to communicate to others the result of his 
 labors ? 
 
 AET. II.— OEIGIN OP LANGUAGE. 
 
 70. Speech is of divine origin. — This is proved : (1) 
 by Holy Scripture and the traditions of nations ; (2) 
 by the silence of profane history about the invention 
 of language and the time of its invention ; (3) by 
 facts of philological science. The fact of the origin 
 of language is settled, but several hypotheses are of- 
 fered to explain how man received the gift of speech. 
 Among these hypotheses, the simplest and most ra- 
 
116 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tional is, that man received from God the faculty of 
 speech as he received reason and the organs of 
 speech. 
 
 71. The invention of language would not have heen ab- 
 solutely impossible to man.— Rationalistic philosophers, 
 especially of the Sensist school, maintain the possi- 
 bility of the invention of language, but in the sense 
 in which they explain it, it is an absurdity. Other 
 philosophers, as J. J. Eousseau (1712-1778), De Bonald 
 and Ventura, have maintained the absolute impossibil- 
 ity of the invention of language. But of the reasons 
 which they give some are false, and others are not 
 wholly conclusive.* Hence many eminent philoso- 
 phers see no metaphysical impossibility in the hu- 
 man invention of language. 
 
 * These are grounds on which they base their theory : 1°. Lan- 
 guage is absolutely necessary for thought, and therefore for the inven- 
 tion of language. But since language implies society, man cannot 
 acquire ideas without society. 2°. Language is the eficient cause of 
 ideas, or at least the occasion of perceiving innate ideas. 3°. Man 
 cannot of himself acquire ideas and language ; he needs a revelation. 
 
 But to this we reply that the invention of language is morally, per- 
 haps even physically, impossible, since words have an arbitrary, not a 
 natural meaning. Men should indeed unite to form a language, but 
 language is an indispensable condition of their being united. Even 
 if it be granted that one man may make himself understood by oth- 
 ers who do not speak his tongue, it is yet true that this Is effected by 
 natural signs only. Since God has willed man to live in society, He 
 must have given him the indispensable medium of intellectual com- 
 munication, viz., language. This is the opinion of Humboldt and of 
 Cardinal Wiseman. 
 
CRITERIOLOGY ; 
 
 OK, 
 
 The Motives of Cebtitude. 
 
 1. Oriteriology, or a treatise on the motives of certitude, 
 investigates the value of our faculties as means of acquir- 
 ing knowledge and determines the ultimate criterion of 
 certitude. — It would be of little use to the intellect to 
 have ideas and sensible images if it were not certain 
 that these corresponded to objective reality. Hence, 
 after Ideology has determined how the intellect forms 
 its ideas and acquires its cognitions, Oriteriology 
 shows : 1. That the faculties by which we know afford 
 us certain knowledge ; 2. That there is an ultimate 
 principle, which constitutes a solid foundation of the 
 certitude of our knowledge. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 The Mental Faculties as Means op Attaining 
 Tedth. 
 
 aet i. — ^the cognitive faculties. 
 
 2. The cognitive faculties are : 1. the senses ; 2. the 
 intellect, including consciousness and reason. — ^We know 
 two kinds of objects, viz., sensible and intelligible. 
 The senses perceive the sensible; the intellect, the 
 
lis RATIONAL PHILOSOPMT. 
 
 intelligible. When the intellect is considered as hav- 
 ing for its object the soul and its affections, or the 
 internal facts of the soul, it is called consciousness ; 
 when it is considered as inferring one truth from 
 another, it is called reason. 
 
 AET. II. — THE VEEACITY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 3. Sensation, considered as a modification of the sentient 
 svlyect, is not an illusion but a reality.— This is a primary 
 fact which cannot reasonably be called in question. 
 To say that the soul is in a state of illusion as to its 
 own sensation is equivalent to asserting that it feels 
 a sensation when there is no sensation, or that it feels 
 when there is nothing to feel, which is a contradiction 
 in terms. Sensation considered as representative of 
 something else may be regarded as a mere represen- 
 tation of an object, or as participating in the nature 
 of a judgment. Considered in the former way, sen- 
 sation cannot deceive us as to the disposition of the 
 sense, since it does not judge but only perceives ; and 
 perception, from its very nature, cannot disagree with 
 the thing perceived, though it may occasion error in 
 the intellect as to the disposition of objects. Consid- 
 ered in the second way, the senses are veracious, as 
 will be established in the following paragraphs. 
 
 4. The senses, lohen in their normal state and exercised 
 upon their proper sensible object, cannot deceive us. — No 
 cognitive faculty can be deceived in regard to its 
 proper object, when the conditions required for the 
 exercise of the power are fulfilled ; otherwise, it would 
 be a power that could effect nothing, which implies a 
 contradiction. These conditions are (1) that the faculty 
 be in its normal state, (2) that the proper object be suit- 
 ably disposed, (3) that the medium between the faculty 
 
MEITTAL FACULTIES FOB ATTAINING TRUTH. 119 
 
 and the object be not modified. But if only one sense 
 be exercised upon a common sensible, i. e., upon a 
 quality tliat is perceived by several senses together, 
 then error may arise, since an integral power is not 
 directed to the object. An accidental sensible, i. e., 
 the substance which supports the sensible qualities, 
 demands, in addition to sense, the action of intellect. 
 
 5. Tlie errors arising from tJie senses are not properly 
 attributable to the senses, but to the intellect. — Error is 
 found only in the judgment ; but the senses do not 
 judge ; therefore, the senses, properly speaking, do 
 not deceive us. When they are diseased, or when any 
 cause modifies or impairs the sensation, the senses 
 cannot but receive the sensation so modified or im- 
 paired, and transmit it as they receive it to the in- 
 tellect. Hence the intellect should not be precipi- 
 tate in judging, and should take into accdunt any 
 abnormal conditions under which the sensation may 
 be produced. 
 
 6. TJie Idealism of Berkeley is absurd ; it admits no 
 reality but that of spirits. — The senses operating in their 
 normal condition cannot deceive us ; but the senses 
 attest the existence of bodies ; therefore, bodies really 
 exist. 
 
 ART. ni. — THE VERACITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 7. The veracity of consciousness is a primary fact, 
 ivhich is affirmed even ivhen it is doubted or denied. — He 
 who doubts or denies the veracity of consciousness 
 either does not know that he doubts or denies it, and 
 therefore cannot say that it deceives him ; or else 
 he does know that he doubts or denies the veracity 
 of consciousness. But then, by what other faculty 
 does he know this than by consciousness, the only 
 
120 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ■witness of tlie internal facts of the soul % Therefore, 
 he makes use of consciousness to deny consciousness, 
 and is guilty of evident contradiction. 
 
 8. It is absurd to hold with Transcendental philoso- 
 phers, that the testimony of consciousness is a rnere illu- 
 sion. — The ancient Sceptics never questioned the ve- 
 racity of consciousness ; the German Transcendental 
 philosophy alone has dared to do so, and it has thus 
 arrived at absolute Scepticism. According to Fichte, 
 " Keality all merges into a marvellous dream, without 
 life to dream about or spirit to dream — a dream which 
 is gathered up into a dream of itself." But if our 
 life is a dream, if the existence of spirit is an illu- 
 sion, there must be a subject which dreams or which 
 is under illusion. And this subject must, by the very 
 consciousness by which it knows that it dreams, know 
 also a spirit, which pronounces as an illusion the 
 knowledge of the spirit that dreams. Thus the contra- 
 diction of the system is evident. Moreover, since 
 Fichte denies all reality but the Ego, he makes con- 
 sciousness essentially impossible ; for every cognition 
 requires three realities, the knower, the known, and 
 the relation between them. 
 
 ART. IT. — ^THE TEEACITY OF INTELLECT AND EEASON. 
 
 9. The intellect cannot deceive us in immediate Judg^ 
 ments luhich relate either to the rational or to the experi- 
 mental order. — The intellect cannot be deceived in re- 
 gard to its proper object, when this object is pre- 
 sented to it in such a way as to necessitate assent ; 
 otherwise, it could not know anything with certainty, 
 and thus it would be a faculty unable to effect any- 
 thing. Hence the intellect cannot be deceived in the 
 perception of essences ; nor can it be deceived in the 
 
MBNTAL FACULTIES FOR ATTAINING TRUTH. 121 
 
 cognition of first principles of either the rational or 
 the experimental order. For these principles are self- 
 evident : the former, because the attribute which is 
 affirmed of the subject is found in the very idea of 
 the subject; as, "The whole is equal to the sum of all 
 its parts : " the latter, because they are only the ex- 
 pression of what this intellect sees distinctly in a sen- 
 sible perception. Thus in the judgment, " The sky is 
 blue," the intellect, by its abstractive power, separates 
 blueness from the sky, and then predicates blue of 
 the sky. Therefore, it is impossible for the intellect 
 to be deceived in regard to first principles, whether 
 rational or experimental. 
 
 10. Reason cannot deceive us in regard to conclusions 
 easily deduced from first principles. — The whole art of 
 reasoning consists in deducing from two given or 
 known judgments a third judgment, which is found 
 to be contained in them. Hence there is a necessary 
 connection between the conclusion and the premises. 
 But if the truth of the conclusion is based on its nec- 
 essary connection with the truth of the premises, 
 reasoning evidently cannot deceive us, since a truth 
 cannot both be and not be necessarily connected with 
 another truth. Hence arises the repugnance which 
 the intellect experiences to dissent from the conclu- 
 sions which follow from a principle ; also that secret 
 displeasure which we feel when an adversary, hav- 
 ing accepted certain principles, is unwilling to 
 allow the conclusions which are logically drawn 
 from them. But, on the other hand, when the con- 
 clusions are derived from a first principle only by 
 long and intricate argumentations, the reason may 
 be deceived, not because the reasoning in this case 
 deceives, but because the natural weakness of the 
 mind is such that it easily allows the attention to 
 
122 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 wander and thus overlooks some of the laws of 
 reasoning-. 
 
 11. TJie objection raised against the veracity of reason 
 on account of the errors of philosophers only proves their 
 abuse of reason. — From the fact that the abuse of 
 reason gives rise to error, we must not infer that 
 reason cannot in any case apprehend truth with cer- 
 tainty. This affirmation of La Mennais (1782-1854) is 
 contrary to good sense and sound logic. Error should 
 be ascribed to lack of attention, to the violation of 
 the laws of reasoning, by interweaving some fallacy 
 with this operation, and to the abuse of reason ; but not 
 to the faculty itself, which by its natural act is never 
 in fault. 
 
CHAPTEE 11. 
 
 Scepticism, 
 abt. i. — ^natuee of scepticism. — its duterent kinds. 
 
 12. Scepticism is a denial of the existence of truth or of 
 the possibility of knowing it with certainty. 
 
 13. Scepticism is partial or complete, modified or abso- 
 lute. — Partial Scepticism rejects the truth or certitude 
 of only a certain class of cognitions. Thus, Ideal- 
 ists, siich as Berkeley, reject the truth of sensible 
 cognitions, while Materialists or Empiricists, with 
 Locke and Condillac, admit as certain only facts per- 
 ceived . by the senses. Rationalists, like Descartes, 
 accept as certain only what appears evident to reason ; 
 the Sentimentalists, with Keid, consider as certain 
 only what is not repugnant to instinct, to natural 
 sentiment ; the Traditionalists and Fideists, repre- 
 sented by La Mennais and Huet (1630-1721) respec- 
 tively, regard as certain only traditional or revealed 
 truths. Partial Scepticism, as experience shows, leads 
 logically to complete Scepticism. Complete Scepti- 
 cism rejects the truth or certitude of all knowledge, 
 and is either absolute or modified. It is absolute 
 when it denies the existence of objective or ontologi- 
 cal truth, admits that contraries may co-exist, and 
 regards all things as phenomena or illusions. This 
 kind of Scepticism was taught in ancient times chiefly 
 by Gorgias (b.c. 426) and Protagoras (b.c. 440) ; in 
 
124 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 modern times it has been disseminated hy Kant, Fichte, 
 Schelling, and Hegel. Scepticism is modified when it 
 admits the existence of truth, but rejects the veracity 
 of the means at our disposal to apprehend truth. The 
 principal representatives of this phase of Scepticism 
 in ancient times were Pyrrhus (b.c. 380) and Sextus 
 Empiricus (b.c. 200) ; in modern times, Bayle and 
 Hume (1647-1706) are the most noted. 
 
 AET. n. — EEFDTATION OF SCEPTICISM. 
 
 14. Scepticism is contradictory ; it is logically and 
 practically impossible. — The consistent Sceptic ought 
 not to reason nor even to think ; for, in thinking of his 
 doubt, he affirms his doubt, and consequently is no 
 longer a Sceptic. Above all, a Sceptic should not 
 attempt to propagate his Scepticism, for in doing so 
 he simply uses reason against itself. The consistent 
 Sceptic should no longer act, for all action proceeds 
 from an affirmation of the mind, and thus involves the 
 Sceptic in self-contradiction. 
 
 15. Scepticism is absurd, since its consequence is the 
 negation of all science and all virtue. — Scepticism denies 
 truth or the possibility of attaining truth with certi- 
 tude, and thereby renders science impossible, for 
 science is nothing more than the certain knowledge 
 of truth. Scepticism subverts all morality, for it is a 
 truth that every action is either good or bad ; but if 
 we must deny or doubt all truth, evidently it is a 
 matter of indifference whether we do this or that act. 
 History, moreover, shows that the ages of Scepticism 
 have always been ages of intellectual and moral decay. 
 
 16. Scepticism is contrary to the nature of man. — Cer- 
 titude is the life of the intellect, as air is the life of 
 the body ; thus. Scepticism is a state contrary to 
 
SCEPTICISM. 125 
 
 nature, an abnormal, exceptional state, in which the 
 mind can be placed only by an abuse of reason. 
 
 17. The facts brought fonvard by Scepticism against 
 certitude prove nothing — Sceptics bring forward in 
 support of their system the great variety of human 
 opinions and the errors into which our faculties lead 
 us. But if men differ in opinion on certain truths, 
 they all agree on fundamental truths, and our facul- 
 ties do not deceive us when we apply them to their 
 proper object and when they act under the requisite 
 conditions. 
 
CHAPTEE m. 
 
 The Ultimate Oeiteeion of Ceetitude. 
 
 art. i. — what is meant by the ultimate ceiterion 01 
 'ceetitude. 
 
 18. The principle of certitude is the motive which pro- 
 duces the adhesion of the intellect to a known truth. — Every 
 cognitive faculty attains to a knowledge of the truth 
 in regard to its proper object. But truth, properly 
 speaking, resides solely in the intellect, which adheres 
 firmly to a truth only by reason of some motive. 
 This motive is called the principle or criterion of this 
 certitude. That principle on which all the others de- 
 pend is the ultimate criterion of certitude. It is with 
 this principle only that the present chapter is con- 
 cerned. 
 
 19. The p^'inciple of certitude is twofold, intrinsic and 
 extrinsic. — The intellect adheres to a proposition either 
 because the intrinsic truth of the proposition is in it- 
 self manifest, or because an extrinsic motive produces 
 conviction, though the intellect does not perceive the 
 truth of the proposition in itself. In the former case 
 the principle of certitude is intrinsic ; in the latter, it 
 is extrinsic. 
 
 AET. n. — the inteinsic peinciple oe ceetitude. ' 
 
 20. Tlie intrinsic pjrinciple of certitude is the objective 
 evidence of the thing. — That which causes the intellect 
 
THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF OERTITUDE. 127 
 
 to know the truth, of an entity is that the entity mani- 
 fests itself to the intellect. But that which produces 
 in us the knowledge of truth also produces certitude, 
 since certitude is only the state of the intellect con- 
 sequent on the possession of its proper object ; in 
 other words, it is the repose of the intellect in the 
 possession of truth to which it firmly adheres. The 
 intrinsic principle of certitude, therefore, is the entity 
 itself as manifesting itself to the intellect and deter- 
 mining its adhesion. This manifestation of the entity 
 to the intellect is what is called objective evidence. 
 This evidence is immediate, or evidence of intuition, 
 when the thing becomes manifest to the intellect 
 immediately and by its own light ; as, " The whole is 
 greater than any one of its parts," " The sun is shin- 
 ing;" it is mediate, or evidence of deduction, when it 
 becomes manifest only after some mental process, and 
 by means of another truth. 
 
 21. Huet bases all certitude on revelation ; La Mennais, 
 on the authority of the common consent of mankind, or 
 common sense; Reid and the Sentimentalist school, on 
 instinct and internal sentiment ; Descartes, on the clear 
 and distinct idea of an object ; Leibnitz and Arnauld, on 
 the principle of contradiction ; Cousin, on the imperson- 
 ality of reason ; Oalluppi, on the testimony of conscious- 
 ness ; Kant, on practical reason ; Rosmini, on the idea of 
 possible being ; Oioberti and the Ontologists, on the intui-) 
 tion of the divine essence, or on the intuition of the divine 
 ideas. All these systems must be rejected as erroneous. — 
 If, with Huet (1630-1721), we doubt that which we 
 know by the senses, by consciousness, or by the intel- 
 lect, and of which we are certain only by the intrinsic 
 evidence of the thing, it is manifest that we must also 
 doubt that which is known to us by divine revelation 
 itself, since we can know what divine revelation 
 
128 RATIONAL PEILOSOPHT. 
 
 teaches only by means of our senses and our intel- 
 lect. 
 
 Our knowledge of the consent of mankind to a 
 truth is obtained through the senses and the intel- 
 lect ; therefore, according to the very principles of La 
 Mennais, we are necessitated to doubt our knowledge 
 of this consent. Besides, mankind is made up of 
 individuals ; but, if certitude is impossible to the in- 
 dividual as such, the mere collection of the uncertain 
 cognitions of individuals can never produce certain 
 cognition. 
 
 The adhesion of the intellect, as being the state of a 
 rational being, cannot be determined without a mo- 
 tive. But the instinct and internal sentiment of Reid 
 are blind causes which do not make known the motive 
 of adhesion ; therefore, they cannot be the principle 
 of human certitude. Instinct is peculiar to the ani- 
 mal and not to an intelligent human being ; far from 
 explaining anything, it requires explanation itself. 
 
 Descartes regards evidence as the foundation of cer- 
 titude ; but, according to him, evidence consists in the 
 clear idea of the thing, and is purely subjective ; that 
 is, it is merely an act of the mind, and not the mani- 
 festation of the object to the mind. It is, consequent- 
 ly, variable and changing. But the certitude which 
 puts us in possession of truth must proceed from an 
 immutable and objective principle, like truth itself.- 
 The clear idea of Descartes, being a pure modification 
 of the cognitive act, cannot be the principle of certi- 
 tude.* 
 
 7 
 
 * Descartes held, when his faculties were developed, that as much 
 of his knowledge had not been scientifically acquired, he should 
 doubt of everything that was not evidently certain. Though doubt- 
 ing of the veracity of his faculties, he professed to be unable to 
 doubt the principle, " I think, therefore I exist." Prom this he de- 
 
THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF CERTITUDE. 129 
 
 "We cannot, with Leibnitz and Arnauld (1612-1694), 
 base certitude on the principle of contradiction ; for 
 our assent to this principle must be determined by a 
 motive, and this motive is its intrinsic evidence. 
 
 Besides the manifest absurdity that would result 
 from admitting the Impersonal Reason of Cousin and 
 his school, we must remark that this reason, even if 
 supposed to be real, could not produce certitude, un- 
 less in virtue of some motive distinct from itself. 
 
 We cannot agree with Galluppi (1770-1846) in found- 
 ing certitude on the testimony of conciousness. For 
 consciousness testifies only to internal acts and states, 
 and is a purely subjective witness; hence it cannot 
 produce certitude regarding objects outside the mind. 
 
 The practical reason of Kant must necessarily have 
 speculative reason for its basis ; therefore, if the 
 speculative order is uncertain, the practical order will 
 share the same fate. 
 
 Eosmini err^i in placing the principle of certitude in 
 the idea of possible being ; for, aside from the falsity 
 of the innateness of this idea, it cannot produce certi- 
 tude regarding entities in the real order, since it is 
 purely subjective. 
 
 According to Ontologism, the intellect does not form 
 to itself a representation of the object known ; hence 
 the ideal order is destroyed, and consequently, all 
 knowledge a,lso. Thus, direct vision of the divine es- 
 
 rived his principle that the criterion of certitude is a clear and dis- 
 tinct idea. Thence he deduced the existence and veracity of God, 
 and consequently the veracity of man's faculties. But his " me- 
 thodical doubt" is contradictory, since he must rely upon intellect 
 for his fundamental principle. Moreover, he falls into a vicious 
 circle, for from the veracity of his intellect he proves God's existence, 
 and from the existence and veracity of God, he infers the veracity of 
 man's faculties. 
 9 
 
130 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sence or of tlie divine ideas, far from being the prin- 
 ciple of certitude, is tlie negation of all knowledge 
 and of all certitude. 
 
 AST. m. — THE EXTEmSIC PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 
 
 22. The ultimate extrinsic principle of certitude is the 
 authority of him who affirms tlie fact. 
 
 23. An extrinsic principle or criterion of certitude is ei- 
 ther divine or human authority : the latter is mere human 
 authwity, if there be question of fact ; or the authority of 
 scientists, if there he question of scientific truths ; or the 
 autlwrity of common scTise, if there he question of the prin- 
 cipal truths necessary for our intellectual or moral life. 
 
 24. Divine authority or revelation is a perfect criterion 
 of certitude and superior to all others. — God neither can 
 deceive us nor can be deceived Himself. His infalli- 
 bility and veracity give us the most perfect certitude 
 regarding the truths which He has revealed to us. 
 
 25. Human testimony produces certitude in us when we 
 know that tlie witnesses cannot he deceived and do not ivish 
 to deceive. — The knowledge and veracity of the witnesses 
 are, therefore, the two essential conditions on which 
 human authority is based. 
 
 26. Tlie absolute impossibility of the facts testified to, 
 and in certain cases the improbability of the facts, argve 
 against the validity of the testimony. — If a fact is abso- 
 lutely impossible, evidently the testimony borne to it 
 is false. If the fact is improbable, the testimony re- 
 quires more careful examination. But it is sometimes 
 difficult to determine whether the fact is impossible ; 
 hence we should rely mainly on the positive indica- 
 tion of the knowledge and veracity of witnesses. 
 
 27. We have a certain indication of the knowledge and 
 veracity of witnesses, when they agree in r porting afani 
 
THE ULTIMATE ORITEBION OF OEBTITUDE. 131 
 
 in the same way. — The testimony of a single witness 
 does not, of itself, afford a guarantee of truth ; but if 
 the witnesses are numerous and if they agree in their 
 testimony, we cannot call their testimony in question ; 
 for then we must suppose either that all are deceived 
 in the observation of the same fact, or that they all 
 agree to deceive in reporting the fact. But, on the 
 one hand, it cannot happen that many, men should at 
 the same time be subject to the same defect in their 
 senses ; and on the other hand, many men cannot 
 maintain the same error in the same way, since a lie 
 is produced by the passions, and the passions vary 
 with individuals. 
 
 But if the witnesses report facts humiliating to them- 
 selves ; if they are very numerous, of different ages 
 and conditions ; if they endure torments and even 
 death in support of their testimony; if they report 
 public facts of great importance, which are not con- 
 tradicted, but rather confirmed by the very persons 
 whom these facts condemn, then their testimony pro- 
 duces perfect certitude. Such is the testimony in 
 support of the facts on which Christianity rests. 
 
 The certitude produced by human authority is often 
 only moral, so that its opposite is not absolutely im- 
 possible but only against the laws by which the moral 
 world is governed ; but cases occur in which it passes 
 into absolute certitude, when the opposite is plainly 
 contradictory ; as, for example, when there is question 
 of a matter wherein it belongs to the providence of 
 God to see that no error creep in. The certitude is 
 also absolute when the witnesses are many and could 
 not, if they would, deceive in relating a fact that is 
 important and obvious to the senses of all. 
 
132 RATIONAL PHILOSOPMT. 
 
 AET. rV. — MEANS B¥ WHICH TESTIMONY IS TRANSMITTED. 
 
 28. The three means by which human testimony is 
 transmitted are : tradition, history, and monuments.-^ 
 Tradition is an oral account transmitted from moutli 
 to moutli. History is a written record of past events. 
 Monuments are all tlie works of men which, may serve 
 as signs of accomplished facts ; they comprise pillars, 
 inscriptions, medals, charters, etc. Their testimony 
 is indirect, if they afford knowledge which they were 
 not intended to convey ; thus, the magnitude of the 
 pyramids indirectly testifies to the power of the 
 Egyptian kings. It is direct when they make known 
 the fact which they were designed to transmit ; thus, 
 the medal commemorative of a victory bears direct 
 testimony to that event. 
 
 29. JVJien tradition is continuous, constant, and relates to 
 a public and important fact, it is a source of certitude. — 
 Oontemporaneous witnesses of an event give certain 
 information of it to those who come after them. The 
 latter may weigh the value of the testimony, but they 
 will find deception and error impossible, if the wit- 
 nesses to the fact are numerous. Hence, they can, in 
 their turn, produce in those who succeed them a certi- 
 tude equal to their own, and so the knowledge of the 
 events may be carried down to the most remote ages. 
 We thus see the falsity of the opinion of Locke, who 
 holds that a tradition gradually loses its value by the 
 lapse of time. It should be constant or uniform ^t 
 least in substance and in leading circumstances, 
 though it may vary in minor details. The fact should 
 be public and important, attested by many witnesses 
 and brought to the knowledge of many. 
 
 30. It is absurd to object against the value of tradition 
 
TEE ULTIMATE OEITEBION OF CERTITUDE. 133 
 
 the errors current during many ages among different 
 nations. — These errors or fables have come down to us 
 devoid of consistency and universality, and destitute 
 of the essential notes of authority ; and the fact that 
 it has at all times been easy to show their falsity is a 
 proof that they cannot be confounded with true tradi- 
 tion. 
 
 31. Monuments are a source of certitude when we can 
 establish their authenticity. — A monument testifies that 
 at the time when it is erected, the fact whose memory 
 it is intended to perpetuate is certain and universally 
 believed. It is impossible for a counterfeit fact to 
 be generally believed by those who are its contem- 
 poraries. But if it is to make known the truth, evi- 
 dently the monument must really belong,to the epoch 
 to which it is referred, or be erected by a people to 
 whom a constant and well attested tradition of the 
 fact has come down. Doubt as to the authenticity 
 of a monument projiuces doubt concerning the fact 
 which it attests. 
 
 32. History is a source of certitude lohen it is authentic 
 and entire. — A historical narrative, when published, is 
 equivalent to a public testimony of its contemporaries. 
 If these receive such a work as truthful, and if it has 
 undergone no alteration in the lapse of ages, it merits 
 equal credence in all times, and is a criterion of cer- 
 tainty. 
 
 33. We are certain that a writing is authentic : 1. 
 When, by an unbroken tradition, it is recognized as such; 
 2. When it is in harmony with the manners and customs 
 of the time to which it is referred, and with the character 
 and the genius of the author to tohom it is ascribed; 3. 
 When by its nature it makes imposition impossible. — If 
 from the epoch to which it is referred a writing has al- 
 ways been recognized by the tradition of the common 
 
134 RATIONAL PEIL080PET. 
 
 people or of the learned as the production of a partic- 
 ular author, if the contents of the writing be in har- 
 mony with the known customs of the age, and with the 
 life and genius as well as with the style of the author, 
 its authenticity cannot be disputed. For this is es- 
 pecially guaranteed by the moral impossibility of 
 publishing the writing without the immediate dis- 
 covery of imposture. 
 
 34. We are certain that a loriting is entire : 1. When 
 its component parts mutually agree both in matter and in 
 form ; 2. When the copies which have been made of it in 
 different times and places are identical ; 3. When, on ac- 
 count of its importance and the great number of persons 
 interested in it, alteration becomes impossible. — The in- 
 trinsic proof of the integrity of a writing is found ia 
 the perfect harmony of the different parts which com- 
 pose it : the extrinsic proof consists in the identity of 
 the extant copies of the writing, even though made at 
 different times and in different places. Finally, if the 
 writing interests a great number of persons, and if 
 they have never protested against any alteration, the 
 integrity of the work reaches its highest degree of 
 certainty. 
 
 35. The veracity of a history is established from the 
 very nature of the ivriting and from the knowledge and 
 veracity of the ivriter. — The intrinsic indications of the 
 veracity of a history are the notoriety of the facts re- 
 corded, their importance, and their relation to other 
 facts which occurred at the same time. The knowl- 
 edge and veracity of the writer are established in ac- 
 cordance with the rules of ordinary testimony. We 
 should examine whether he is unbiassed by passion 
 or prejudice, whether he could easily have ascertained 
 the facts, and especially whether he agrees with other 
 writers recording the same facts. To some extent, 
 
THE ULTIMATE OmTEBION OF GEBTITUDE. 135 
 
 these rules apply in examining tlie veracity of a mon- 
 ument. 
 
 36. Tlie objections of Scepticism against the value of his- 
 toric testimony serve only to establish it more firmly. — It 
 is objected that many books, once received as authen- 
 tic, have proved later to be forgeries. But if we have 
 means of detecting the spuriousaess of certain writ- 
 ings, evidently the authenticity of others, in which 
 nothing of the kind can be detected, only remains the 
 more firmly established. In like manner, it is true 
 that many copies of ancient works have come down 
 to us with alterations. But if the parts in which 
 these copies do not agree prove that alteration has 
 taken place, the other parts, in which they do agree, 
 prove that the original text has been preserved in- 
 tact. 
 
 AET. V. — AUTHOBITY OF COMMON SENSE AND OP THE 
 LEAENED. 
 
 37. By the testimony of common sense is meant the gen- 
 eral and constant assent of mankind to some truth. — To 
 know this general assent, it is not necessary to ques- 
 tion all men ; it suffices to know the views of en- 
 lightened men and the opinion of nations in general. 
 
 38. Common sense is a criterion of certitude in regard 
 to the truths to which it bears testimony. — That men in 
 different times and in different places be unanimous 
 in affirming a thing, it is necessary that this affirma- 
 tion be founded in nature itself. But that which is 
 the effect of nature cannot deceive ; we must, there- 
 fore, admit the- testimony of common sense. 
 
 39. The truths affirmed by common sense are : 1. Prin- 
 ciples which are easily known by the use of natural rea- 
 son; 2. Thosemoral and religious truths the knowledge of 
 
136 RATIONAL PHIL080PBY. 
 
 which is necessary to the moral life of man. — ^Tliere are 
 both immediate and mediate principles the cognition 
 of which is easy and requires only the natural de- 
 velopment of reason : as, " The whole is greater than 
 any of its parts." These principles, therefore, are 
 known by all men. The principal moral and religious 
 truths, however, the knowledge of which is indispens- 
 able to man, are not so easily known. But few minds 
 could have attained to them, and even then only after 
 much time, with an intermixture of error, and in an 
 uncertain manner. Consequently, if they are known 
 and accepted by all men, it is in virtue of a primitive 
 revelation made by God to the first man, and handed 
 down to. his descendants by unbroken tradition. 
 
 40. It is vain to object against tJie authority of common 
 '^ense the coo-ruption of primitive traditions among nations 
 <,n the course of time and the almost universal diffusion of 
 certain errors. — The alterations produced in primitive 
 traditions are neither constant nor universal ; they 
 are then without value. Thus, polytheism was pro- 
 fessed only during a certain period among different 
 aations, and it was not universal ; therefore it must 
 be attributed to the corruption of men and not to 
 their nature. While admitting the reality of certain 
 errors, like that of the revolution of the sun around 
 the earth, we must also observe that they are rather 
 the result of ignorance ; but ignorance should not 
 be confounded with error. Besides, to determine the 
 revolution of the heavenly bodies was beyond the 
 sphere of the commonalty, and therefore beyond the 
 common sense of mankind, of which exclusively is 
 the present question. , 
 
 41. The authority of the learned in matters relating to 
 their specialties demands our prudent assent. — The au- 
 thority of the savant in his peculiar domain, should 
 
THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF CERTITUDE. 137 
 
 be respected by the unlearned, since be wbo by the 
 culture of his mind is fitted to apprehend a truth may 
 impose it on him who could not of himself attain to 
 its knowledge. But as the learned themselves are 
 competent to examine the particular truths in ques- 
 tion, they should judge the authority of other scien- 
 tists by their own reason. Hence we may formulate 
 the following three rules : 1. The authority of scien- 
 tists should be accepted so long as there is no reason- 
 able ground to believe it false or to suspect it ; it 
 should be rejected, if it is known to be false ; 2. Every 
 scientist is a competent judge only in the science of 
 which he is master ; 3. One scientist may accept the 
 affirmations of another, when he cannot himself as- 
 certain their truth or demonstrate their falsity ; * yet 
 he may reject them if the opposite arguments are of 
 equal weight. 
 
 AET. VI. — IMPOKTANCE OF AUTHOEITY AS A CBITERION 
 OP CEKTITUDE. 
 
 42. Authority is necessary for the complete develop^ 
 ment of our mind and is the source of most of our knowl- 
 edge. —Wiihont the aid of authority, man could, 
 indeed, acquire the knowledge of some truths ; but, 
 if we except those which are sensible and elementary, 
 they would be very limited and bound up with many 
 errors. Authority develops his mind promptly and 
 without fatigue, enriches it with a store of knowledge 
 which it could never acquire by itself, either on ac- 
 count of its elevation or of the time required for their 
 
 * For a clear exposition of the harmony between the positive re- 
 sults of science and the truths of faith, consult Apologie de la Foi 
 Chr&Uen/ne. 
 
138 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 acquisition or of insurmountable material difficulties. 
 It is because authority is necessary for the normal 
 and complete development of the intellect, that the 
 mind is naturally inclined to accept authority, espe- 
 cially during the early years of Ufe. 
 
REAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 OR 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Definition of Metaphysics — Its Utility and Division. 
 
 1. Real Philosophy, or Metaphysics, is that part of Phi- 
 losophy luhich treats of that which is immaterial and super- 
 sensible in real being. — Eational Philosopliy treats of 
 entities as they are in the order of cognition ; Meta- 
 physics studies them as they are in themselves. 
 
 2. The excellence of Metaphysics is seen both from its 
 own nature and from its relations to other sciences. — The 
 natural sciences, mathematics, and other sciences treat 
 only of this or that being and under a particular 
 aspect ; they are, therefore, subordinate to metaphys- 
 ics, which studies being in its highest or ultimate 
 causes or reasons. Although, relatively to the end of 
 man, moral philosophy excels all the other sciences, 
 and rational philosophy claims pre-eminence as a 
 necessary condition for advancing in any science 
 whatever; yet, considered absolutely, metaphysics 
 excels both, for it is their foundation.* Metaphysics 
 yields in excellence to Sacred Theology alone. 
 
 * The inferior sciences neither prove their first principles nor de- 
 fend them against attack; this they leave to a superior science, i.e. 
 ivutaphysics. Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Th. i, q. i, a. 8. 
 
140 BEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 3. Metaphysics is divided into General Metaphysics, or 
 Ontology, and Special Metaphysics. Special Metaphysics 
 is further divided into Cosmology, Psychology, and Natu- 
 ral Theology. — Being, in its most general sense, when 
 considered in itself as Being simply, is the object of 
 General Metaphysics, or Ontology. "When contem- 
 plated in its concrete reality, it is the object of Special 
 Metaphysics. But Being is either created or uncreat- 
 ed. Cosmology treats of the created world in its most 
 general principles, leaving to the subaltern sciences 
 the study of particular things. Yet as man occupies 
 a place apart in creation, the study of the human soul 
 forms a separate branch of special metaphysics, and 
 is called Psychology. Lastly, the study of God and 
 His attributes is the object of Natural Theology, 
 
GENEEAL METAPHYSICS 
 
 OE 
 
 ONTOLOGY. 
 
 Definition and Division of Genekal Metaphysics. 
 
 4. Oeneral Metaphysics is a science tvJiich treats oj^ 
 ieing in general, and the common properties of being. 
 
 5. General Metaphysics treats : 1, of being and its com- 
 mon properties; 2, of the principles of being ; 3, of the 
 divisions of being. 
 
 BEING AND ITS PROPERTIES. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Idea and Analogy of Being. 
 
 AET. I. — idea of being. 
 
 6. Being, as the object of general metaphysics, is that 
 which is, or at least can be. — Being * as the object of 
 
 * The term Being may be used as a participle or as a noun. The 
 former use implies existence, the latter need suppose only fitness to 
 exist. In the t§xt Being is used as a noun. As the term Being, there- 
 fore, means sometimes Essence only, sometimes Existence, so the 
 term Nothing, the negation of Being, may be used to signify Nothing 
 of essence, i.e., absolute nothing, or to signify nothing of existence 
 
142 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 general metapliysies, cannot properly be defined, for 
 there is no more general idea than that of being. 
 Whatever is, whatever can be conceived, comes under 
 the name of being. Therefore every attempt to define 
 being presupposes the knowledge of its meaning, 
 Yet being may be described as Whatever in any way is 
 hnoivn in itself (per se) and positively, or, Whatever is in 
 itself intelligible. 
 
 7. Being is an essential predicate of everything to which 
 we attribute it. — ^For that which we first perceive as 
 belonging to the essence of any thing is that it is 
 a being. 
 
 8. Being is not one of the distinct formalities composing 
 a thing, but it is inherent in all that goes to make up the 
 thing. — Man, for example, is composed of " animality 
 and rationality ; " but being is inherent in these two 
 formalities ; " animality " is being, " rationality " is 
 being. There is nothing that may not be called being. 
 
 AET. n. — ANALOGY OF BEING. 
 
 9. Being is predicated of God and of creatures not 
 univocally but analogically. — A term is predicated of 
 several things univocally, when it has the same mean- 
 ing with respect to each of them ; as, the word animal 
 relatively to " dog and horse." A term is predicated 
 of several things analogically when these things have 
 only a certain proportion to one another; as, when 
 healthy is predicated of "man," of his "pulse," and of 
 the " food " which he eats. From this it is evident that 
 ms rationis, or logical being, and real being are not 
 
 \hough the existence of tlie object he possible. Of a square triangle 
 we must predicate nothing of essence, for it is an absolute impossi' 
 bility : of the mm of the twenty-first century, we predicate aotliins 
 ai existence. 
 
IDEA AND ANALOGY OF BEING. 143 
 
 nw^vocal ; since the one exists solely in the apprehen- 
 sion of the intellect, the other is independent of our 
 cognition. It is also evident that created being and 
 uncreated being are not univocal, for God is pure be- 
 ing, infinite and eternal, while the creature has only- 
 participated being, is finite and has a beginning of 
 existence. 
 
 10. Being is predicated analogically of substance and 
 ■accident. — Substance is being to which it belongs not 
 to be in another in which it iqheres ; accident, on the 
 contrary, is being to which it belongs to be in another 
 as subject.* 
 
 11. Being is predicated analogically of the different 
 things to which it is applied. — Since the term being may 
 be predicated, under a certain respect, of everything, 
 of logical being and real being, of God and creatures, 
 of substance and accident, the term is analogous. 
 
 *See § 111. 
 
CHAPTEE n. 
 
 The Teanscendentals. 
 abt. i. — ^number op tbanscendenta18. 
 
 12. We distinguish Jive transcetidentals : Being, Some- 
 tliing, Unity, Truth, and Goodness. — They are called 
 transcendentals, because they may be affirmed of every 
 thing.* The transcendental properties add nothing 
 to being, but present it under a special aspect. Thus 
 a being is called one, because it is undivided in itself ; 
 trv£, because it is knowable ; good, because it is de- 
 sirable. Though all these properties are essential to 
 every being, yet three — Unity, Truth, and Goodness — 
 are the most important, and are those of which meta- 
 physics treats more particularly. 
 
 AET II. — UNITY. 
 
 13. Unity is indivision of being. Whatever can be 
 called one is a being undivided in itself. — Every being' is 
 necessarily one, otherwise it would not be a being, but 
 several beings. A being continues to exist so long as it 
 retains its unity, but ceases to exist when its unity 
 is lost. But unity adds nothing to being ; it merely 
 
 * In other words, they transcend or lie beyond all genera and 
 species. But the term is by no means to be understood ia the 
 Kantian sense of exceeding the powers of man's mind. 
 
THE TRAN8CENDENTAL8. J 45 
 
 indicates its entity's indivision, and denies division. 
 Since unity is the indivision of entity, it means first 
 and directly, the negation of division, secondarily and 
 indirectly, positive entity. 
 
 14. Unity is of three kinds : generic, specific, and 
 numerical. — Since unity is indivision of being, there 
 are as many kinds of unity as there are kinds of di- 
 vision. But things are divided chiefly according to 
 genus, or species, or individuals. There are then 
 three kinds of unity : generic unity, which denies the 
 division of genus ; specific unity, which denies the di- 
 vision of species ; and individual unity, which denies 
 the division of number. 
 
 "We may also classify unity as metaphysical or abso- 
 lute, and physical or relative: the former not being 
 really separable into parts, as the " human soul ; " the 
 latter being divisible though not yet actually divided 
 into parts, as a "stone." But this second kind of 
 unity is not properly unity ; it should rather be called 
 union or unity of imitation. To these may be added 
 artificial unity, or that effected between things which, 
 though not naturally ordained for this union, are now 
 actually united, either physically, as are the " parts of 
 a building," or morally, as in " society, domestic or 
 civil." 
 
 15. Tlie merely individual or numerical unity and 
 multiplicity of substances arise from matter. — The prin- 
 ciple of individuation, which must not be confounded 
 with the seven individuating notes that serve to 
 distinguish one individual from another, is that by 
 virtue of which certain perfections belonging to the 
 same species differ from one another and are mul- 
 tiplied numerically. But this principle of individua- 
 tion can be nothing else than matter. For natural 
 composites are constituted of matter and form. Now, 
 
 10 
 
146 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 numerical multiplicity comes originally from that 
 which renders a form numerically multipliable ; but 
 that which renders a form numerically multipliable is 
 proximately divisibility, a property of quantity ; but 
 quantity is an accident of matter ; therefore, matter 
 determined by quantity is the ultimate principle of 
 the individuation of material substances. Hence it is 
 evident that angels, being pure spirits, are not suscep- 
 tible of individual multiplicity, and that each angel 
 constitutes a distinct species.* 
 
 16. Accidents derive their numerical unity and multi- 
 plicity from the subject as acted upon by some cause which 
 produces the accident. — ^With respect to accidental form, 
 the subject holds the place of matter ; it must, there- 
 fore, individualize it, as explained in the preceding 
 article. There are, for instance, as many impressions 
 of the American eagle as there are pieces of bullion 
 impressed by the die. 
 
 17. The unity of a being brings with it a distinction 
 from every other being then existing. Distinction is of 
 three kinds, real, logical, and virtual. — From the very 
 fact that a being is one, it is necessarily incapable of 
 being confounded with any other being ; hence it is 
 distinct from it. Distinction is real, if it exists in 
 beings independently of any mental consideration; 
 as the distinction between "Peter and Paul." Dis- 
 tinction is logical, if the intellect separates, into 
 various concepts a thing which in itself is one; 
 as the distinction between " animality and ration- 
 
 * This opinion of the Thomistic school is rejected by the Scotists,^ 
 who hold that in each individual there is a limcceity or tJiisness, 
 which renders the individual such apart from matter. Again, some 
 Schoolmen consider the whole concrete nature of the thing, whether 
 matter and form together, or form only, as the principle of Individ- 
 nation. 
 
THE TRANSCENDENTAL8. 147 
 
 ality " in man, or between " man and rational ani- 
 mal." 
 
 Real distinction is subdivided into major or entita- 
 tive, into module and virtual. Eeal major distinction 
 is the " distinction of thing from thing," whether the 
 things be substances, or substances and accidents, or 
 accidents only. Modal distinction is the " distinction 
 of a thing from the mode by which it is affected," as 
 of a " line from its curvature." " Virtual distinction 
 is the distinction of the perfections of a thing by rea- 
 son of its power to exercise many functions, so that 
 while the thing is one it gives us a foundation for dis- 
 tinguishing in it several formalities according to its 
 different functions." Such is the .distinction of the 
 "vegetative and sensitive functions" of the human 
 soul from its " purely rational functions." 
 
 18. Metaphysical degrees are distinguished not actually 
 hut only by a mental operation. — By metaphysical de- 
 grees is meant that hierarchy of formalities * which 
 can be observed in everthing ; for example, in General 
 Sherman, the formalities of " rational being, of ani- 
 mal, of living being, of substance,'' etc. But before 
 the operation of the intellect these realities are not 
 distinguished actually but only virtually. For these 
 metaphysical degrees constitute only one and the 
 Same reality, which is multiple not actually but vir- 
 tually. The rational soul in man is not a triple soul 
 composed of several souls in orte ; it is one and sim- 
 ple, and can only virtually be called multiple. But 
 since one soul is equivalent in its operations to sev- 
 eral inferior souls, the intellect represents it actually 
 by several different concepts. Thus it distinguishes 
 
 * A formality is the manner in which a thing is conceived or con- 
 stituted by an act of the intellect. 
 
148 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in the human soul three degrees — vegetative, sensi- 
 tive, and rational.* 
 
 19. Besides transcendental unity there is also quantita. 
 iive 01- numerical unity. Several quantitative or numeri- 
 cal unities make a multitude or number properly so-called, 
 which is defined as Multitude measured by unity. — Nu- 
 merical unity is transcendental unity with relation to 
 number added. Unlike transcendental unity, which 
 is not any thing really distinct from entity, numeri- 
 cal unity is an accident of things which are numbered. 
 In other words, it is transcendental unity determined 
 to the category of quantity, and bears to transcenden- 
 tal unity " the relation of contained to the containing, 
 of the determined to the undetermined." For though 
 discrete quantity is divided in itself, it is not essen- 
 tial whether it be numbered or not ; this unity then 
 is accidental. Several quantitative unities form a 
 multitude or number properly so-called.f Number 
 
 * This distinction is sometimes called virtual, sometimes conoep- 
 tional, the foundation of which exists in the perfection of the sub- 
 ject. It is also known as distinction of the "mind motived" (ra- 
 tianis raiiocinatoe:) to mark it ofE from distinction of the ' '■ mind motiv- 
 ing " {rationis ratiocinaniis), where the distinction exists in the 
 mind only. See Metaphysics of i?ie School, vol. i., p. 354. 
 
 f " If Transcendental Unity adds nothing to Being but actual Indi- 
 vision, it is manifest that the Transcendental Unity of continuous 
 Quantity will consist in undivided continuity within the one common 
 limit. If that continuity be broken, Quantitative Unity is broken. 
 . . . . To take an illustration : There is a worm crawling before 
 our feet. It is cue Substance and one continuous Quantity, whose 
 limit gives the animal its sensible configuration. Now cut it in two. 
 There are two distinct living Substances ; but there are also two dis- 
 tinct continuous Quantities under two limits, which give to the two 
 animals respectively their axternal form. So separate are they now, 
 that one may remain in England, and the other find its way to China. 
 Thus, after the operation, the previous Substance (i.e. the worm) has 
 lost its Transcendental Unity, and has become two Entities and two 
 
THE TBANSOMNDENTALS. 149 
 
 must not necessarily be composed of unities of the 
 same kind specifically. Hence it is not inaccurate, as 
 some affirm, to speak of " two cardinal virtues," " two 
 angels," etc., for one cardinal virtue and another car- 
 dinal virtue, one angel and another, etc., make two 
 numerically as well as do one line and another line 
 make two lines. 
 
 20. From the unity of being is derived its identity, 
 which is defined as The sameness of an entity luith itself. — ■ 
 Being considered as one and undivided without ad- 
 dition or diminution, must be regarded as the same 
 with itself. This relation of a being with itself is 
 called identity. When several beings numerically dis- 
 tinct have the same essence, they are said to be specifi- 
 cally identical, because there is among them an iden- 
 tity of essence. Identity is physical when the being 
 remains really unchanged in itself ; it is moral when 
 the object is the same only in the estimation of men. 
 The mineral kingdom abounds in examples of the first 
 kind ; living bodies afi'ord instances of the second, for 
 though, as physiology teaches, the constituent mole- 
 cules are periodically changed, yet the plant or ani- 
 mal is reputed by man to be the same. To this iden- 
 tity of essence diversity stands opposed; thus, two 
 beings of different species, as " a tree and a horse," 
 are called diverse. If several beings agree in quan- 
 tity, they are called equal; if they have the same 
 quality, they are said to be like. To equality is op- 
 posed inequality, to likeness unlikeness. 
 
 Unities. The continuous Quantity wliioh infornaed it has lost its 
 Transcendental Unity, as well as Entity ; and has hecome two Enti- 
 ties, two Unities. Consequently, the Unity which it conferred on the 
 Substance of the worm has ceased, and is replaced by two Unities, 
 extraneous and accidental to the substantial Essence of the two 
 worms." — Metaphysics of tJie School, vol. i., p. 205. 
 
150 REAL PEILOSOPHT. 
 
 AET in. — TETJTH. 
 
 21. Truth is the conformity between the intellect and itt 
 object. — The truth of a being is not an entity distinct 
 from that being : by the very fact that a being is, it 
 is true. Nevertheless, truth is the being viewed not 
 precisely as such, but considered in its relation to in- 
 tellect. For truth appertains properly and primarily 
 to the intellect, as health belongs properly and pri- 
 marily to the animal ; and just as nothing is styled 
 healthy but with respect to the animal, so nothing is 
 said to be true but relatively to the intellect. But 
 the object of the intellect is being ; therefore every 
 being can be called true, because there is none that is 
 not placed in relation to the divine intellect. But an 
 object is necessarily in relation to the intellect if it de- 
 pends on it for its being ; it is accidentally in relation 
 if it is simply known by the intellect. And since 
 every thing depends for its being on the divine in- 
 tellect, its truth is found chiefly in relation to this 
 intellect. The conformity of beiug to the divine 
 intellect is called metaphysical truth. The conformity 
 of the human intellect to being is called logical truth. 
 Hence truth is not mutable nor progressive, except 
 in so far as man's knowledge is capable of increase. 
 For all creatures realize their divine prototype, and 
 our ideas represent the immutable essences of things. 
 
 22. The truth of the intellect taken simply is prior to 
 the truth of beings ; but tJie truth of the created intellect 
 follozvs the truth of beings. — A being is said to be true 
 only in as far as it is conformed to the divine intel- 
 lect ; therefore truth is found primarily in the divine 
 intellect. On the contrary, the created intellect is 
 said to be true, when it is conformed to the being 
 
THE TRAIT8GENDENTAL8. 151 
 
 which is its object ; therefore the truth of being pre- 
 cedes the truth of the created intellect. 
 
 23. Falsity is the non-conformity hetiueen an object and 
 intellect. — Since every being is necessarily conformed 
 to the divine intellect, it is always true with respect 
 to God. With respect to the human intellect, a being 
 is said to be false when it is of such a nature as to 
 appear what it is not, or under a character which it 
 does not possess ; as for example, a " dream."* But 
 the object always remains true in itself. It is only 
 relatively that it is said to be false. Properly speak- 
 ing, falsity exists only in a judgiiient which is pro- 
 nounced by the human intellect, and which is not 
 conformed to the object. 
 
 AET. rv. — OOODNESS. 
 
 24. Goodness is the conformity of a thing to the will, 
 especially to the divine ivill. The good is defined as Being 
 considered as appetihle. — Every being,t as such, has a 
 
 * " Properly speaking, there can be no such thing as Ontologioal 
 Falsity. For all being is i/pso facto conformed to the Divine Intel- 
 ligence, both practical and speculative. Neither can it properly be 
 called, in a secondary sense, false, in regard of the human intellect. 
 For there is no Being, as such, which is not apt to generate in our 
 minds a just estimate and conform representation of itself. Bnt it 
 may be sometimes improperly called false, according to analogy of 
 attribution of the first class, inasmuch as it allures the human mind 
 to form a false Judgment. This arises from no defect in Being ; but 
 partly, by reason of the similarity of the sensible accidents of an en- 
 tity with those of other entities distinct from itself ; partly, by reason 
 of the imperfection of the human intellect, which depends in -great 
 measure on sensible accidents for its cognition of "Bems,.^'— Metaphys- 
 ics of the School, vol. i., pp. 467, 468. 
 
 f Real being includes both actually existent and possible being. 
 Possible being is included under real being because it is not a mere 
 mental creation ; moreover, it involves no intrinsic contradiction, 
 
152 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 real existence, and is good and in some sense perfect; 
 since the nature of any thing is so much perfection. 
 But a thing is appetible by reason of its perfection, 
 and whatever is desirable is referred to the will. But 
 since the perfection of any thing depends on the 
 nature of that thing, its goodness can have no other 
 measure than its being, the good and being are one 
 and the same thing, and differ only in that the good 
 expresses a relation of conformity to the will, which 
 being does not express. Every being is not only good 
 in itself as having the perfections essential to its 
 nature, but also good for others, since every creature 
 bears some relation to some other creatures. 
 
 25. A thing is good only in so far as it refers in some 
 way to existence ; possible things, as such, are not good. — 
 Unlike the intellect which contains ideally in itself 
 whatever it knows, and consequently prescinds from 
 their existence, the will is borne toward things and 
 thus can properly seek them only when existing. 
 Hence a merely possible thing can only be called 
 good in a certain way, viz. , as about to exist really, 
 and as now existing ideally. 
 
 26. Goodness belongs to a being in its relation to its fined 
 came or end. — As the trath of a being is its conform- 
 ity with the idea which is its exemplar formal cause, 
 the goodness of a being is its conformity with its end 
 or final cause. Thus, a house is said to be good, not 
 because it realizes the plan of the architect, but be- 
 cause it offers a secure and commodious shelter to 
 those who live in it. 
 
 27. Goodness is divided into transcendental and moral. 
 — The transcendental or metaphysical goodness of an 
 
 and there are now existing beings capable of giving it physical ex- 
 istence. (See note, § 6.) 
 
THE TBANSOENDENTALB. 153 
 
 entity is its capability of drawing the appetite tow- 
 ard itself. Moral goodness is the conformity of the 
 thing willed to the rules of morality. 
 
 The good is also divided into useful, honorable, and 
 pleasurable. For the objects sought by a rational nat- 
 ure are desired as a! means to some end, and then are 
 called useful; or for their own sake, in which case 
 they are called honorable ; or, finally, as giving repose 
 to the appetite of him who possesses them, and then 
 they are caMed. pleasurable. 
 
 . Good is also tru£ or apparent, according as it suits 
 the special tendency of the whole being, or some par- 
 ticular tendency not in harmony with the whole nat- 
 ure of the being. 
 
 28. live highest degree of the good is the perfect. — Good- 
 ness consists in the conformity of a being with its 
 end ; but because the end of a being can be attained 
 more or less completely, there are degrees of good- 
 ness. A being is said to be perfect when it has 
 attained its end in all its plenitude ; i.e. when " none 
 of the conditions requisite for its existence are want- 
 ing, when it possesses all the power necessary for the 
 exercise of its proper operation, and is thus fitted to 
 attain its proper end by its own operation." (Jouin.) 
 
 29. Evil, the opposite of goodness, is the privation of a 
 good due to a being. — Since every thing, inasmuch as it 
 is, is good, it follows that evil is not being, but a pri- 
 vation of being or of good, and that it is real only so 
 far as the privation of the good is real. Still, as every 
 privation is necessarily referred to a being, for that 
 which does not exist cannot be deprived of any thing, 
 it is said that evil is in being as in its subject. 
 
 30. Evil is divided into metaphysical or nor/iinal, phys- 
 ical or natural, and moral evil. For voluntary agents, it 
 it divided simply into the evil of sin and evil of punish- 
 
154: REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 menl— Created beings, from tlie very fact that they 
 are created, are deprived of some perfections. But' 
 since this privation belongs to their very condition as 
 creatures, it is not a true evil, but only a nominal 
 evil. All the creatures in the world have not the 
 same perfections ; but this inequality by which some 
 beings are deprived of perfections possessed by 
 others, far from being an evil is a true good, since it 
 is a condition of the admirable hierarchy of creatures 
 and of the order of the universe. Moreover, it is part 
 of the order of the universe that, besides incorrupti- 
 ble creatures, there should be others that may lose 
 some of the perfections proper to their nature. This 
 explains why God, though not the author of real evil, 
 yet permits evil in the world in view of a greater 
 good. 
 
 Physical or natural evil is the privation of a good re- 
 quired by the nature of a physical being, as " the want 
 of wings in a bird." * Moral evil consists in the pri- 
 vation of a moral good ; it is a non-conformity to the 
 rules of morality. This non-conformity to the rules 
 of morality, which can happen only in creatures en- 
 dowed with free will, is called the evil of sin or sinful 
 evil. The evil in creatures which destroys the integ- 
 rity of their being is the consequence of the evU of 
 sin, and has the character of punishment ; it is, there- 
 fore, called the evil of punishment or penal evil. And 
 because this evil is found in a special manner in 
 
 * Even pain implies the existence of a natural good, for it warns 
 the sufferer of tlie presence in his system of some obstacle to perfect 
 health ; besides, as a feeling it is a perfection, being an exercise of 
 sensibility. In both these senses it exemplifies the axiom, "Good 
 and being are convertible." It is only as being a defect in the phys- 
 ical integrity of man or brute that it is an evil, an absence of due 
 perfection. 
 
THE TBAN8GENDMNTALS. 155 
 
 creatures endowed with free will, and because the 
 good of which evil is the privation- is the absolute 
 object of the will, it follows that, strictly speaking, 
 there are but two kinds of evil, the evil of sin and the 
 evil of punishment ; the latter is a privation of integ- 
 rity of being, the former of justice of action. It is 
 further to be remarked that the evil of punishment is 
 an evil only in its subject ; in its cause it is a good ; 
 for from a moral standpoint the order of the universe 
 is founded on justice, and justice requires the punish- 
 ment of the evil of sin. 
 
 31. Evil has no direct efficient cause, it has an (cccidental 
 cause, which is the^good. — Evil necessarily has a cause. 
 But there can be no cause without being, and every 
 being, inasmuch as it is, is good ; therefore the good 
 alone can be the cause of evil. But, although it be 
 the cause of evil, it is not a direct efficient cause, but 
 merely an accidental cause. For if the evil, as, for 
 instance, a " boiler explosion," is produced by a natural 
 agent, it is owing to some defect in the agent, as " un- 
 skilfulness in an engineer," or in that on which its 
 power is exercised, as "the thin walls of the boiler of 
 a steam-engine." If the evil is moral, and therefore 
 produced by a voluntary agent, it is owing to some de- 
 fect in the will. Therefore it is not the good directly 
 and as such that is the cause of evil, but the good acci- 
 dentally and as susceptible of defects. 
 
 32. Since God is the infinitely perfect Being, it is onlij 
 by permitting evil that He can he said to he its cause. — It 
 is consonant with the order of the universe that there 
 be certain beings which can be defective. Therefore 
 God, in causing the good which agrees with the 
 general order, causes, as it were, in certain beings, by 
 permitting it, bhe defect of which evil is the conse- 
 quence. Hence whatever of being and perfection 
 
156 REAL PSILOSOPHT. 
 
 there is in created things should be referred to God 
 as to its cause ; but whatever is defective has not God 
 for its cause ; it is the result of the imperfection of 
 second causes. God is, however, the author of the 
 evil of punishment, by which sinners receive the 
 chastisement which they merit. But this evil is a' true 
 good, for it helps to satisfy the justice demanded by 
 the order that should reign in the universe. 
 
 33. It is a gross error to maintain, ivitJi the Gnostics 
 and Manicheans, the existence of two contrary supreme 
 principles, the pi-inciple of good and the principle of evil. 
 — A supreme evil, the cause of all evil, is an abso- 
 lute impossibility, for evil is nothing but a privation 
 of being ; if, then, any absolute evil existed, it would 
 be a privation of all being, and hence would be abso- 
 lutely nothing. The believers in two first principles 
 have allowed themselves to be drawn into this error 
 by the sight of two particular contrary effects, one 
 good, the other evil, which they attributed to two 
 particular contrary causes, but which they knew not 
 how to refer to a common and universal cause. 
 
 AET v. — BEAUTY. — SUBLIMITY. — GEACEFULNESS. 
 
 34. The beautiful is that ivhich pileases tvhen hnoion. — 
 The good is that which satisfies when possessed, the 
 beautiful is that which pleases when known. Hence 
 the good is referred to the appetite, the beautiful to 
 the cognitive faculties ; but because an object when 
 known pleases only in so far as it has harmony of 
 proportion, it follows that the beautiful consists essen- 
 tially in harmony of proportion, just as the ugly, its 
 opposite, consists in the absence of this harmony. 
 
 35. The means of discerning the beautiful are the cog- 
 nitive faculties, viz., the senses and intellect. — In treating 
 
THB TBANS0ENDENTAL8. 157 
 
 of the beautiful, the faculties that perceive it must 
 first be noted ; these are the intellect and the inter- 
 nal and external senses. Among the external senses 
 sight and hearing are, strictly speaking, the only ones 
 that perceive the beautiful. The other senses are, so 
 to say, immersed too deeply in matter ; they help to 
 perceive the beautiful, not of themselves, but by 
 transmitting their impressions to the internal senses. 
 Of the internal senses only the common sense (sensus 
 communis) and imagination perceive the beautiful, the 
 former by receiving the image, the latter by preserv- 
 ing it. The union of these senses and the intellect 
 forms what is known as the cestlietic faculty commonly 
 called taste. 
 
 36. The elements of tlie beautiful are truth, order, and 
 life. — Two conditions are necessary to a beautiful 
 thing, truth and proportion ; a third condition should 
 be added to make the beauty perfect ; viz., life. All 
 beauty is founded on truth,* the natural object of the 
 intellect ; hence beauty is not arbitrary, but, like 
 truth, immutable ; for it has its eternal type in God, 
 the supreme beauty as well as the substantial truth. 
 But that a thing be beautiful, it must have not only 
 truth, but also unity in variety, or order and harmony 
 of proportion. Since splendor is the perfection of 
 this order, Plato could say with justice that the 
 beautiful is the splendor of the truth.f Lastly, 
 
 * " It is impossible that anything be beautiful in itself, if it he not 
 also true and good, or if it be dishonorable ; for, Order must neces- 
 sarily exist, inordinateness must cease to exist. . . . But there is 
 no being that is not true and good ; . . . and what is dishon- 
 orable is morally defective, and therefore repugnant to the idea of 
 beauty." — Zigliara, Summa Philosophica, O. 19, vii. 
 
 f "The three elements that constitute beauty are (1) the complete- 
 ness or perfection of the object ; for what is maimed and defective is 
 
168 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 when life is joined to order* the beauty is perfect; 
 for the true, the foundation of the beautiful, is 
 chiefly in the intelligible. But a thing is the more 
 intelligible the higher its grade of being; and the 
 higher its grade of being, the higher the life that it 
 possesses. Since life is the perfection of beauty, ac- 
 tion, whether physical or spiritual, which is the man- 
 ifestation of life, must be the source of beauty. And 
 since life perfects beauty, the higher the life is, the 
 more perfect the beauty. Now, there are five kinds 
 of life : the vegetative, the sensitive, the intellectual, 
 the life of grace, and the life of glory. The last con- 
 stitutes the highest grade of created beauty, because it 
 is the most perfect reflection of the divine life, the 
 eternal type of all beauty. As beauty is capable of 
 degrees of perfection, it follows that when beauty of 
 an inferior order is opposed to that of a superior 
 order, it is really only deformity, because the su- 
 perior order prevails over the inferior. 
 
 37. Beauty is either ideal or real, natural or artijicial 
 — The ideal beautiful is that which is conceived by 
 the intellect as a model to realize. The real beau- 
 tiful is that which is found in the object itself, and is 
 sensible if it exists in material things, spiritual if it 
 is in a spiritual thing. The latter kind of beauty is 
 defined by Zigliara as "the order of virtual parts 
 with due spiritual lustre," and is intellectual or moral 
 according as the virtual parts are referred to an intel- 
 lectual or a moral standard. The natural beautiful 
 
 disagreeable or ugly ; (2) due proportion, Tmrmony, or order of parts, 
 for if the parts do not harmonize the object does not please but of- 
 fends ; (3) lustre, by which the object manifests itself wholly to the 
 mind." — Zigliara, S^im. Ph., O. 19, ii. 
 
 * " Order results from the subordination of particular ends to a 
 eommon end." See Cosmology, § 8. 
 
THE TRANSOENDEMTALS. 169 
 
 is that whicli is presented by nature.* The artificial 
 beautiful is that which is an effect of art. To produce 
 the beautiful, art must imitate nature. Yet not every 
 imitation of nature, merely because it is an imita- 
 tion, is therefore beautiful, as realism pretends. The 
 reality imitated by art must also be beautiful, or art 
 must add to it the idea that will give it beauty. 
 
 38. The mUime is that which exceeds the intuition of 
 our faculties. —A. thing is called sublime subjectively 
 because of the weakness of our faculties, and objec- 
 tively because of the excellence of the thing itself. It 
 is the excess of light in the object that produces 
 obscurity in our weak mental vision. The foundation 
 of the sublime is the infinite, which we can never 
 seize in any other than a limited and imperfect 
 manner. As the deformed or ugly is opposed to the 
 beautiful, so is the mean or contemptible opposed to 
 the sublime. 
 
 39. The sublime is ontological, dynamical, or mathe- 
 Tnatical. — The sublime is ontological when its excel- 
 lence lies in the nature of the being known ; thus 
 the " angelic nature " may be styled sublime. The 
 sublime is dynamical when its excellence is in the 
 physical or moral virtue of the being known ; thus the 
 " falls of Niagara " are sublime, " certain acts of the 
 saints " are sublime. The sublime is muthematical 
 when it consists in the vastness of the object; thus 
 the " immensity of space " is sublime. The sublime 
 is found also in the productions of art when they 
 
 * " Natural beauty is found in eoAih species ; for since God is the 
 author of created nature, it is impossible that there should be either 
 absence of any constituent principle or of harmony among the prin- 
 ciples. But if we regard the essences as realized in individuals by 
 particular marks, they may be beautiful or ugly. For natural causes 
 may be impeded by one another. "^ — Sanseverino. 
 
160 REAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 surpass tlie ordinary conceptions of man and reveal 
 something of the infinite. 
 
 ' 40. Gracefulness is that quality which renders its pos- 
 sessor pleasing. — Gracefulness consists especially in the 
 excellence of the sensible, as the sublime lies in the 
 excellence of the intelligible. It is found in the ob- 
 ject that pleases and attracts us, not in that which Kes 
 above and beyond our grasp ; for the sublime is not 
 graceful. Gracefulness is various and changeable, for 
 it resides chiefly in the sensible, which is various and 
 changeable. From this point of view, then, it is true 
 to say that there is no disputing about tastes. 
 
PRINCIPLES AND CAUSES OF BEING. 
 
 41. A principle is that from which anything proceeds. 
 Tt is also denned as That ly which a thing is, is made, 
 or is known. — From the latter definition it is evident 
 that there are three kinds of principles : principles of 
 composition, those of which a thing is constituted ; 
 principles of production, those which concur in the 
 making of things; principles of cognition, those by 
 which we attain to a knowledge of things. The last 
 mentioned are treated of in rational philosophy, and 
 the others in metaphysics ; ontology studies the prin- 
 ciples of composition or metaphysical principles ; cos- 
 mology investigates the principles of production or 
 physical principles. 
 
 42. Cause is defined as That on which another depends 
 for its heing. — This definition applies both to depend- 
 ence of reason or order ; as, " One proposition de- 
 pends on another " (but not to mere external connec- 
 tion, as in the proposition, "Day succeeds night"); 
 and to dependence of nature ; as, " The fruit depends 
 on the tree." The definition of cause is further ex- 
 plained by that of efi'ect. An effect is that which is 
 produced, or that which passes from non-existence 
 into existence ; but that which is not yet existing can- 
 not receive existence except by the action of some- 
 thing else, and to this agent the name of cause is 
 given. Hence two conditions constitute a cause prop- 
 erly so called : (1) its distinction from the effect, and 
 (2) the dependence of the effect upon it ; distinction, 
 
 11 
 
162 MEAL PHIL080PHT. 
 
 because that wliich is ushered into existence cannot 
 be the same as that which has given it existence ; de- 
 pendeiice, because to be brought by something from 
 non-existence into existence implies a dependence on 
 that thing. Hence it is manifest that principle is 
 more general than cause. For every cause is a prin- 
 ciple, but not every principle is a cause : that which 
 proceeds from the principle is very often not produced 
 by it ; that which begins with the cause is at the same 
 time produced by it. Principle implies priority of 
 origin only, or, as St. Thomas calls it, " order of ori- 
 gin ; " cause implies also priority of time, or, at least, 
 priority of nature, for priority of nature consists in 
 this that one thing depends on the nature of another 
 and proceeds from it. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 Metaphysical Peinciples oe Being, 
 aet. i. — potentiality and actuality, or power and 
 
 ACT.* 
 
 43. The first metaphysical principles of every created 
 heing, those hy which it is constituted, are potentiality and 
 actuality. — Every created being was, before its exist- 
 ence, in the series of possible beings ; it had only a 
 possibility to exist ; it was in potentiality. Afterward 
 
 * Althougli Potentiality and Act do not generally receive so full a 
 treatment in text books as is given in the present manual, yet they 
 ire of prime importance in Scholastic philosophy, and without them 
 essence and existence, matter and form, soul and body, and the 
 origin of ideas, cannot be understood, while they underlie the prin- 
 tiplas of moral philosophy. 
 
METAPHYSIOAL PBIN0IPLE8 OF BEING. 163 
 
 it existed ; then it was in actuality* The possibility 
 to exist and the act of being- are, therefore, the two 
 constituent principles of every created being. God 
 alone is not composed of potentiality and actuality. 
 Having always existed, He is pure act. 
 
 44. Act'\ is a perfection ; a thing is said to he in act 
 when it has its perfection. — The actuality of a thing is 
 that perfection by which it is not in potentiality but 
 in reality, not in the ideal order but in the ontologi- 
 cal order. Hence act gives a new being to the thing, 
 realizes its possibility, fills up its capacity. There- 
 fore, a thing is in act when it has its perfection. 
 
 45. Act is pure or not pure according as it excludes 
 all potentiality or is united with potentiality. — Act may 
 be joined to potentiality in two ways : (1) When it is 
 the act of some potentiality ; thus the " soul " by 
 which the body exists is the act of the body ; (2) 
 When it is itself in potentiality relatively to an ul- 
 terior act ; as an " angel," whose nature was at first 
 in potentiality relatively to existence. Act is called 
 pure when it is not joined to potentiality in one of 
 these two ways ; otherwise it is not-pure. In the lat- 
 ter case it is called formal act, or act of essence, if 
 it determines the essence to a species of being ; as 
 the " form of a plant," which makes it such a species 
 of plant ; and act of heing or of existence if it is the 
 being or existence itself. 
 
 46. Not-pure act is divided into first act and second 
 act, and either excludes or supposes another previous act. 
 — JFirst act is that which does not suppose any other 
 before it, but which prepares the entity for subse- 
 
 * The term actus originally signified operation; then by extension 
 it came to signify also the principle of operation. 
 
 \ " Act is the reduction of a possibility to a reality, of a power 
 active or passive to its complete reality." — Harper. 
 
164 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 quent acts ; in this sense tlie soul is tlie first act of 
 the body. Second act supposes a first ; thus the 
 " operation of a faculty or power" is a second act, be- 
 cause it supposes the existence of that faculty from 
 the first act. 
 
 47. First act is divided into subsistent and non-subsist- 
 ent act according as it can or cannot subsist alone. — Sub- 
 sistent first act either subsists alone, as "ang-el," or 
 can subsist alone, as the " soul of man." JVon-stcb- 
 sistent act cannot subsist alone, as the " soul of a 
 brute." 
 
 48. Subsistent act is divided into complete and incom- 
 plete act according as it has its j>erfection in itself in 
 such a manner that it cannot be received into any poten- 
 tiality ; or though it can subsist alone, is yet destitute of 
 its perfection if it be without the potentiality in which it 
 ought to exist. — Complete subsistent act is of such a 
 nature that it cannot be received into any potential- 
 ity ; as an " angel." Incomplete subsistent act can 
 exist alone, but to havo its perfection it requires the 
 potentiality in which it can and ought to exist ; as the 
 '' human soul." 
 
 49. Non-subsistent act is divided into substantial act, 
 xohich gives being simply to its potentiality, and acci- 
 dental act, which presupposes being in its potentiality. — 
 Substantial act gives being simply to its potentiality ; 
 such is the " brute soul." Accidental act supposes 
 being already in the potentiality which it informs ; 
 as the " whiteness of paper," which supposes the ex- 
 istence of the paper before its whiteness. 
 
 50. Potentiality * is the aptitude to receive actuality ; 
 
 * Potentiality is a capability ; if acUrc, a capability of ' ' doing, 
 acting, energizing, working. . . . Such are the forces of nature, 
 bodily power, the faculties of intellect and will." If passive, it is a 
 capacity of " receiving, of being perfected by another . . , as ths 
 
METAPHYSIOAL PRINCIPLES OF BEING. 165 
 
 to he tn potentiality is to he apt to receive the act which 
 does not yet exist. — Potentiality, a metaphysical prin- 
 ciple of being, is that by virtue of which a thing, 
 which as yet does not exist, can receive existence from 
 an efficient cause. The word potentiality is here a 
 synonym for the words possibility, capability. 
 
 51. Potentiality is logical or real according as it means 
 siTnply the absolute possibility of existing, or signifies that 
 a being already existing in some way can exist in another 
 way. — Logical potentiality is only the exclusion of the 
 impossibility of existing, and is so called because it 
 is only in the mind of the cause that is to bring it 
 into existence. Such was the state of all created 
 things before the power of God drew them from 
 nothingness. This possibility or potentiality is also 
 called intrinsic or metaphysical or absolute, to dis- 
 tinguish it from the active power that makes it 
 ?ome into existence. In respect to this active 
 power it is called extrinsic or relative possibility — ■ 
 ^trinsic, because it is to be reduced to act by some 
 one beyond and distinct from itself; relative, be- 
 cause it is referred to the cause that makes the pos- 
 sible entity actual or real. In respect to creatures 
 this relative potentiality is either physical or moral, 
 according as the power which it implies is considered 
 according to the laws of the physical world or accord- 
 ing to those to which moral agents are subject. — Peal 
 potentiality supposes the being already existing in a 
 determinate manner ; it is therefore the possibility of 
 yassing from one mode of existence to another. 
 Metaphysical potentiality, regarded as about to . 
 
 capacity of water for receiving the form of heat. ' The Infinite, be- 
 ing most pure Act, has no potentiality; primordial matter being 
 simply and exclusively a passive potentiality', has no act.'" — Meta- 
 physics of the School, vol, i. , p. 585. 
 
166 BSAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 come into existence by the action of some efficient 
 cause, is called objective. To this, subjective potential- 
 ity is opposed, which is nothing but real potentiality, 
 and is so called because only a subject already existr 
 ing can have it. Real or subjective pobentiality is 
 pure if it has no act ; and of this " primary matter " 
 {materia prima) is the sole example. It is not-pure if 
 it has a beginning of act, but tends to an ulterior 
 act ; as a " substance " relatively to its accidents. 
 
 52. Potentiality is divided also into proximate potenti- 
 ality and remote potentiality ; the former needs only the 
 action of the agent to pass into act, the latter needs other 
 active principles to render this action possible. — A man 
 with good eyesight is in proxiTnate potentiality with 
 regard to vision, for he needs only the light to see. 
 A blind man is in remote potentiality with regard to 
 vision, because before the light can act on his vision 
 he must be cured of his blindness. 
 
 53. An entity is absolutely and intrinsically possible 
 because it implies no contradiction ; it is relatively and 
 extrinsically possible because God is omnipotent. — A 
 thing is not absolutely impossible because it cannot 
 be done by God, but it cannot be done by God be- 
 cause it implies a contradiction or is absolutely im- 
 possible. Therefore the possible is so primarily be- 
 cause it implies no contradiction. But if an entity is 
 absolutely possible because it implies no contradic- 
 tion, it is relatively possible because it can proceed 
 from its cause. And since God is the cause of all 
 being, it is from Him that the relative possibility of 
 every being is derived, and, furthermore, everything 
 that is absolutely or intrinsically possible is also rela- 
 tively or extrinsically so. 
 
 54. From the definition of act and of potentiality this 
 axiom follows : A thing is perfect so far as it is in ad, 
 
METAPBT8I0AL PBIN0IPLE8 OF BEING. 167 
 
 it is imperfect so far as it is only in potentiality.— ^ince 
 act is a perfection, that which is in act is perfect, and 
 that which is in potentiality is imperfect. From 
 this axiom is derived the consequent : An act ab- 
 solutely pure is also absolutely perfect. From the 
 definition of act and of potentiality the following 
 axioms are derived: 1. Being acts inasmuch as it is 
 in act ; on the other hand, it is acted upon inasmuch as 
 it is in potentiality ; 2. Potentiality cannot of itself re- 
 duce itself to act, but requires a being already in act ; 
 3. Every changeable being is composed of act and po- 
 tentiality. — For it changes, that is, it begins to be what 
 it was not, or ceases to be what it previously was, 
 only because it had the possibility to be or not to be 
 what it became or ceased to be.* 
 
 AET. II. — ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE. 
 
 55. In every created being we should distinguish as 
 constituent principles, which are conceived as actuality 
 and potentiality respectively, essence and existence, or the 
 act of existing and that which has this act. — Every thing 
 that is either is being itself or has being, that is, par- 
 ticipates in being. In that which has only participated 
 being we notice, when it is in act, two distinct things : 
 (1) that it is, or the act of being; (2) that which it 
 is,' or that which has the being. The former is called 
 existence,f the latter essence. Essence is also called 
 
 * There is also an operatise power or faculty, such as intellect and 
 will, which may be defined a capacity and aptitude to elicit opera- 
 tions. Power again is distinguished as actiiie or passive. Thus the 
 " vegetative powers " are active because capable of changing that on 
 which they act. " Marble " has a passive power of receiving the 
 form of a statue from an agent. See Psychology, § 3. 
 
 f According to Hume, " whatever we conceive, we conceive to be 
 existent ; " therefore our mere thinking gives it existence. He denies 
 
168 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nature, because it is the source of a being's properties 
 and operations ; reason of the thing, because it is the 
 reason .why the thing is what it is ; form, because it 
 determines the thing in its species. Tet there are 
 essences which are not pure forms ; such are essences 
 composed of matter and form, and in these the form 
 is not the whole essence. 
 
 56. In every finite and created being essence is really 
 distinct from existence as a potentiality from its act. — 
 In God, who is Being by excellence, essence is not 
 distinct from existence but is identical with it. But 
 finite and created beings are composed of essence and 
 existence, as of two principles of being. In fact, no 
 creature has being simply, for this is peculiar to God. 
 All created beings are composed necessarily of po- 
 tentiality and act. For if essence were not distinct 
 from existence in them, they could be said to exist by 
 their essence. But this is false, for creatures haviag 
 been drawn from nothing by the creative act of God, 
 have their existence not necessarily and essentially, 
 but accidentally and contingently.* 
 
 the reality of essence, as Locke had done before him. Mill, too, ap- 
 proves the teaching of Locke that essences are merely ' ' the signifi- 
 cations of their names." Kant, though aiming to refute the scepticism 
 of Hume, strays even further from certitude, for he denies that we 
 can know things in themselves. The eifect of such doctrines on 
 science, morals, and religion, can readily be inferred. See also § 96. 
 * See Zigliara, Summa PhilosopMca, O. 13, v. 
 
CHAPTEE n. 
 
 Causes of Being. 
 
 aet. i. — division of causes. 
 
 57. There are in general four hinds of oauses : the ef' 
 fident, the final, the formal or exemplary, and the mate- 
 rial. — If any effect be considered in relation to its 
 causes, we can distinguish tlie agent that has pro- 
 duced it, the end proposed by the agent, the form by 
 which the being is constituted in a determined spe- 
 cies, and the matter out of which the being is made. 
 The agent that produces the effect is called the effi- 
 cient cause; the end proposed is the^XnaZ cause ; the 
 form by which the being is constituted in a deter- 
 mined species is \he formal cause, which is also styled 
 specific if it is considered as intrinsic in the effect, 
 and exemplar if it is extrinsic to it and is considered 
 as the idea to the likeness of which the effect is pro- 
 duced. Finally, the matter upon which the agent 
 works to produce the effect is called th^ material 
 cause. This cause is found in corporeal entities only 
 in the various changes which they undergo after 
 creation, not in creation itself ; in pure spirits there 
 is potentiality as a principle of being, but no material 
 cause. 
 
170 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 AET. n. — MATEEIAIi CAUSE AND SPECIFIC FOEMAL CAUSE. 
 
 58. The requisite conditions that matter and form, he 
 causes are : (1) the influence of an efficient cause apply- 
 ing the form to the meatier, and (2) the dispositions of the 
 matter hoth preparatory to the reception of the form, and 
 concomitant with its reception to render the matter capable 
 of retaining the form. — Since the matter is the subject, 
 and the form is the term of the agent's action, it is ev- 
 ident that they cannot act as causes without the agent. 
 The dispositions also are manifestly necessary, be- 
 cause the matter being indifferent to all kinds of 
 form, needs something to determine it and fit it for 
 one form rather than for another, and this can be 
 found only in the dispositions.* 
 
 59. The proper effect of the rnatter and the form is the 
 entire composite. — This is evident since the matter and 
 the form are the causes from whose union the being 
 results. 
 
 AET. m. — ^EXEMPLAR OE IDEAl CAUSE. 
 
 60. The exemplar cause is necessary. It is defined as 
 That which the agent Jceeps in view in his work. — An 
 intelligent agent must possess in himself the idea, 
 the reason of his work; otherwise he would act 
 blindly, and this is contrary to his nature. This idea, 
 this reason of his work, which the agent has in view 
 in acting, is a cause, inasmuch as it is imitated by the 
 agent in doing the work. The idea thus understood 
 is no longer that by which an object is known, as is 
 the " idea of a flower which I have when beholding 
 a flower;" but it is that which the intellect by 
 
 ^See Cosmology, § 36. 
 
CAUSES OF BEING. 171 
 
 thought forms in itself to be imitated ; as the " idea 
 of a house, which the architect forms in his mind, and 
 according to which he has the house built." 
 
 61. The exemplar cause is properly reduced; to the 
 formal cause, 'but it may also, in some manner, he re- 
 duced to the efficient cause and to the final cause. — The 
 form is that which determines a thing to a special 
 kind of being. Now the idea determines the intelli- 
 gent agent from whom the thing represented pro- 
 ceeds ; therefore it determines the work also, not in- 
 deed in an intrinsic manner, by composing it, but in 
 its source or origin. The exemplar cause is also re- 
 duced to the efficient cause, inasmnch as it is by the 
 idea that the agent, who is the efficient cause, is ulti- 
 mately determined and directed in his work. Finally, 
 the exemplar cause may also be reduced to the final 
 cause, because the idea, like a model, is what the agent 
 intends to execute, and what the work is to reproduce. 
 
 AET. rV. — EFFICIENT CAUSE.* 
 
 62. An efficient cause is an extrinsic principle from 
 which the production of a thing proceeds. — ^The efficient 
 cause is styled an extrinsic principle, to distinguish 
 it from the matter and form, which are intrinsic prin- 
 ciples. Unlike the final cause, it does not merely 
 move to produce the thing, but is itself the agent 
 that produces it. 
 
 63. In respect to the effect the efficient cause is perfect- 
 ing, disposing, ■ helping, or counselling. — The efficient 
 cause is a perfecting cause when it completes the work ; 
 as, "when a sculptor gives the marble the artificial 
 form of the statue." It is disposing when it prepares 
 
 ' See Special Ideology, | 67. 
 
172 BEAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 the matter to receive tlie last perfective form ; as, 
 " wlieii a sculptor prepares the marble out of which 
 he is to make a statue." It is said to be helping when it 
 aids the principal cause ; as, " a student who helps the 
 artist to execute his masterpiece." . And under these 
 three aspects the efficient cause is a, partial cause. It 
 is counselling when it points out to the agent the form 
 and the end, and may then be called a Tnoral cause. 
 
 64. The efficient cause may he a cause in itself or hy acci- 
 dent, principal or instrumental, first or second, universal 
 or particular, univocal or equivocal. proxi'inate or remote, 
 free or necessary, total or partial, physical or moral, a 
 cause which or a cause hy which, cause in potentiality 
 or cause in actuality. — It is a cause in itself (per se) 
 when by virtue of its own power it produces the effect ; 
 as, " fire produces heat." It is a cause iy accident (per 
 accidens) when by its own nature it neither produces 
 the effect, nor is connected with it ; thus, " if a sculp- 
 tor is deformed, it is accidentally that a deformed 
 man has carved a statue." With the cause by accident 
 may be classed occasion, which is that on the presence 
 of which the cause is induced to act, or acts with 
 greater ease and perfection ; as, a " feast-day may be 
 the occasion of granting an amnesty;" "a bright 
 sunny day is an occasion of having one's photograph 
 taken." * 
 
 A principal cause acts by its own power ; thus " a 
 tree is the principal cause of another tree." An in- 
 strumental cause acts by the power of its principle ; 
 thus " the painter's brush produces the picture." 
 
 • A condition is fhat which disposes the power of the cause to act, 
 or removes impediments to its action; thns, "if a man wishes to 
 write, it is a necessary condition that the ink flow freely from his 
 pan." 
 
OAUSEB OF Bsma. 173 
 
 The first cause is tliat which receives neither its 
 .power nor the exercise of its power from another; 
 " God alone is first cause." A second cause receives 
 both its power and the use of it from another, that is, 
 from the first cause ; " all creatures are second causes." 
 
 A universal cause is that whose virtue is extended 
 to different species of effect ; as, " the earth which pro- 
 duces different species of plants." K particular cause 
 produces only one species of effect ; thus " the oak 
 produces an oak." 
 
 A univocal cause produces an effect specifically like 
 itself ; thus " a lion begets a lion." An equivocal cause 
 produces an effect of a different species ; thus " the 
 painter produces a picture." 
 
 A pTOaa'mafe cause produces its effect immediately; 
 thus "fire generates heat." A remote cause produces 
 its effect by means of another cause ; thus " the heart 
 produces heat by means of the blood." 
 
 A free cause has dominion over its actions, as 
 " man ; " a necessary cause acts from natural impulse, 
 as a " plant." 
 
 A total cause is that which by itself produces the 
 effect ; as, " when one horse draws a wagon." A par- 
 tial cause is that which in conjunction with others 
 of the same species produces the effect ; as, " when 
 several horses together draw a wagon." 
 
 A physical cause is that which by its own action 
 directly produces the effect ; thus " an assassin is a 
 physical cause of homicide." A moral cause is that 
 which produces the effect by persuasion, threats, or 
 other moral means ; as, " he who counsels or com- 
 mands the assassination." 
 
 A cause which is that supposit which produces the 
 effect ; thus " a workman is the cause which of his 
 work ; " a cause iy which is the power by which the 
 
174 SSAL PSIL080PET. 
 
 cause which acts ; as, " the skill of the workmaii,'' 
 "the science of the teacher." * 
 
 A cause is in potentiality or is a cause materially 
 viewed, when, although able to produce its effect, it 
 does not produce it ; as, " when, though able to write, 
 one does not do so." A cause is in act, or is a cause 
 formally viewed, when it really produces its effect ; as, 
 " when one writes." 
 
 65. Substances, even corporeal, are really active and are 
 true causes. — Several ancient and some modem philos- 
 ophers, and among them Descartes and Malebranche, 
 have maintained that God alone is truly causative 
 and active, that He is the author of all the effects 
 which are commonly referred to created beings, but 
 which are simply the occasions of producing the effect. 
 Hence the name of occasionalism given to this system. 
 The absurdity of this system is manifest. For every 
 creature is produced by the Supreme Being, of whose , 
 perfections it is an imitatiori ; but it is the property 
 of the First Being to be sovereignly active, because 
 He is wholly in act ; therefore it is the property of 
 
 * The Schoolmen speak of the radical cause, cause in remote first 
 act, in proximate first act, and in second act. " A cause is said to be 
 in its second act when it aotuall3- produces its efEect. It is said to be 
 in its proximate first act if no one of the conditions necessary for the 
 production of the effect is wanting. It is said to be in its remote first 
 act if either all or some of the conditions are wanting. Thus, for ex- 
 ample (to borrow the illustration of Taparelli), when a steam-engine 
 is actually propelling the vessel over the waves, it is in its second act. 
 When the steam is up — the cables on board — the anchor weighed — 
 the helmsman at the wheel— the captain on the paddle-box — the 
 plauk removed, but the machine not yet set in motion, it is in its 
 proximate first act. When the steam has been let off — the fires out — 
 the vessel moored — the ship's company ashore — it is in its remote firtt 
 act." — Metaphysics of the ScJwol, vol. ii., p. 155. The radical cause 
 in the example cited is merely the steam-engine as such. 
 
CAUSES OF BEING. 175 
 
 creatures to be active, each in its own degree, because 
 in their own degree they are in act, and thus action 
 follows being as its property. Whoever denies even 
 to material substance the power of acting, " detracts 
 from the Creative Virtue of the Creator," since the 
 perfection of the effect determines the perfection of 
 the cause [as cause] ; more particularly when the 
 cause is only known by its effect." * He would attack 
 the divine Goodness, which, being diffusive of itself, 
 Jias made all things to imitate some perfection exist- 
 ing in Him eminently, not only in their mode of being 
 but also in their mode of acting. He would assail the 
 divine Liberality, which grants nothing by halves, and 
 which would produce only useless creatures if it did 
 not give them, together with existence, the active force 
 which is its complement. In a word, either God would 
 be limited in His perfections, or pantheism would 
 necessarily be admitted. For if it is God alone that 
 acts in His creatures, it is easy to conclude also that 
 He alone exists in them, and consequently, that God 
 and the world are fundamentally but one being.f 
 
 66. The two kinds of action, the immanent and the 
 transient, exist in corporeal sulistance. — An imhnanent 
 action is that whose effect remains in the agent ; a 
 transient action is that whose effect passes out beyond 
 
 * Metaphysics of the SqIwoI, vol. iii. , p. 35 J see also pp. 26, 27. God 
 in creating does not exhaust His creative power, The degree of 
 power manifested is determined hy His free will. 
 
 t The teachings of occasionalism have little weight to-day ; but 
 Hume's denial that we have an idea of efficient cause should be 
 flatly contradicted ; for (1) we have, as is attested by consciousness, 
 some idea, though generic, of efficient cause ; (2) every cause must 
 precontain in itself whatever perfection it gives to its effect ; (3) ex- 
 perience proves that no finite cause can act upon a pre-existing sub 
 ject unless it be mediately or Immediately present to it. Cf. Busf^ 
 Swmma Philosophiaa, p. 192. 
 
176 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the agent. Thus, " when the soul elicits an intellec- 
 tual act, that action is called immanent^ and " when 
 the sculptor carves his statue, the action is called tran- 
 sient." Although immanent action is the property of 
 spiritual substances, yet as a superior being of a 
 secondary order should have some of the perfections 
 of an inferior being of a higher order, immanent action 
 is found, in a certain measure, in the higher living 
 corporeal substances. Thus animals, besides exter- 
 nal action, have also internal action, as in sensitive 
 cognition and appetition. 
 
 67. The substantial form is the first source of all 
 action in cor'poreal substances. — ^Action and being have 
 the same source and origin ; but the substantial form 
 is the first source of being; therefore it is also the 
 first source of action. Although some accidents are 
 principles of action, yet they derive their efficiency 
 from the substantial form, just as second acts proceed 
 from the first act. 
 
 68. Substantial form has only a radical and principal 
 power f 07' the production of another substantial form.— 
 A substantial form is that which, by itself, gives a 
 being the power to produce a substantial effect. Acd- 
 dental forms affect the substance only by participat- 
 ing in the substantial form. Therefore the substantial 
 form alone can be called the principal power for the 
 production of another substantial form. The acci- 
 dents are only secondary powers. 
 
 69. When an accidental form produces another simi- 
 larform, the substantial form on which the former de- 
 pends is the radical power, and the accidental form 
 the principal power in this production. — The accidental 
 form fulfils the conditions of a principal power with 
 regard to a similar accidental form, as " heat with re- 
 spect to the heat which it produces." This is evident, 
 
OAUSES OF BBINQ. 177 
 
 Bince, in this case, the accidental form is the reason of 
 the production of the effect and contains the effect. 
 
 70. The faculties capable of producing immanent ac- 
 tions Tnay he regarded as principal powers in their pro- 
 duction. — A. faculty is defined as the proximate principle 
 of the operation to which it is naturally ordained. It is 
 a proximate principle, since the substance qualified 
 by the faculty is a remote principle from which the 
 facalty itself derives its efficacy. It is the principle 
 of the operation only to which it is naturally ordained, 
 for not all faculties are capable of producing the 
 same operations. Immanent actions are effects which 
 do not pass outside the faculties from which they 
 proceed ; therefore they may simply be attributed to 
 their proper faculties as to principal powers, and to 
 the substantial form as to their radical principle. 
 Thus the " act of understanding is attributed to the 
 intellect as to its principal power." 
 
 71. JVb created substance is immediately operative; 
 but in every creature the operative power is an accident 
 distinct from the substance. — In God alone operative 
 power is not distinct from substance. In the crea- 
 ture, these two elements are really distinct, the sub- 
 stantial form being the principle of operation, not 
 because it operates immediately, but because it is the 
 source of the operative forces which proceed from it 
 as properties. Thus the soul which is the principle 
 of the acts of the intellect, does not elicit them imme- 
 diately, but only by the means of the intellective 
 faculty. Now, the act of the faculty or power is an 
 accident ; this power, therefore, being ordained to its 
 operation, will be itself an accident ; but if it is an 
 accident, it is distinct from the substance in which it 
 inheres. Therefore this substance will operate not 
 immediately by itself, but by a virtue distinct from it- 
 
178 BEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 self. This truth is also proved by experience. We see, 
 indeed, the virtue that has emanated from the plant 
 and is in the seed, produce its effect, although the 
 substance of the plant has disappeared. Therefore it 
 is by virtue of properties communicated to them by 
 the parent-plant that the accidents evolve the sub- 
 stantial form and generate the new plant.* 
 
 72. Action is not exerted at a distance.^ — This truth, 
 which is confirmed by experience, is also proved by 
 reason. For action follows being ; % but the being of 
 
 * " In all instances, without exception, of tlie generation of living 
 things, — whether they be plants or animals, — accidents (that is to 
 say, things that are accidental relatively to the principal agent) are 
 the proximate and direct causes of the eduction of the form out 
 of the potentiality of the matter." — "Allowing . . . that the 
 accidents, in instances [as in the pollination of plants] such as have 
 been just detailed, effect the evolution of the substantial form and 
 the generation of the new living body in a state of physical iso- 
 lation and separation from the principal agent, how is it to be 
 explained, that the accidents so circumstanced can of themselves 
 operate an effect that is thoroughly disproportioued to their nature ? 
 . . . It is to be borne in mind that in the generation of living 
 bodies the instrumental cause (which in relation to the principal 
 agent is justly denominated an accident, since it forms no part of 
 the essence of the said agent) is in itself absolutely a substance with 
 its own substantial form." . . . This form, "though only pro- 
 visional, ... by virtue of its procession from' the principal 
 agent ... is endowed with the properties which continue in 
 their essential nature throughout the successive substantial changes 
 up to the ultimate development, and gradually organize the matter 
 for higher and higher forms of life. They have no sooner produced 
 by their action a more perfect organism, than tlie matter grows im- 
 patient of the lower form ; and the form next in order is educed by 
 the virtue originally impressed on the instrumental cause. " — M^ta^ 
 physics of the Sclwol, vol. iii., Prop, ccxlvi., coxlviii. 
 
 f See Metaphysics of the School, vol. iii., pp. 352-363. 
 
 X That is, natural operation, or the second act of being, must aj 
 aa effect be in accordance with the first act of being, which is " oon- 
 
CAUSES OF BEING.. 179 
 
 a natural agent exists in a determinate place ; there- 
 fore the action of the agent ought to be in the same 
 place, and it can act upon those things only which 
 are locally united either with itself or with the me- 
 dium which it modifies, and to which it communicates 
 its action, in view of the things which it is to modify. 
 
 AET. v.— FINAL CAUSE. 
 
 73. Final cause rnay ie defined as That on account of 
 which something is done. — The final cause is that which 
 moves the agent to act ; consequently it is that on 
 account of which the agent acts.* 
 
 74. TJie end is a true and real cause.— ^'he end really 
 infiuences the effect, since it moves the agent to act, 
 and since without it the effect would .not take place ; 
 it is, therefore, a true and real cause. 
 
 75. The end may he objective or suhjective, ultimate or 
 intermediate, objective or formal, tlie end of the work or 
 the end of the agent, principal or secondary, natural or 
 supernatural. — The objective end is the good which we 
 desire ; and the subjective end is the person for whom 
 we wish the good. " When a father works to enrich 
 
 stitnted existence. " " ^Natural operation is the whole course of ac- 
 tion by which a being tends towards the natural end of its exist- 
 ence ; and connotes all those faculties by means of which the said 
 being is enabled to energize with this intent." — Metaphysics of. the 
 School, vol. iii. , p. 411. 
 
 * Some scientists of a materialistic tendency loudly declaim 
 against the doctrine of final causes or teleology, on the ground that 
 it is destrtictive' of all the natural sciences. But against these views 
 we argue that creatures, being the effect of a Supreme Intelligence, 
 must have an end, and that the knowledge of this truth should stim- 
 ulate man, the lord of creation, to search for the particular end of 
 the various species. 
 
180 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 his son, riches are the objective end, and his son the 
 subjective end of his labor." 
 
 The ultimate end is that for which we wish all the 
 rest, while we wish it only for itself ; * the intermediate 
 end is that which we do not seek for its own sake, 
 but for something else to which it leads. "When 
 a man prays to acquire virtue, God is the last end of 
 his prayer ; virtue is only an intermediate end." 
 
 The objective end, or finis qui, is the thing which 
 we desire ; i'hej'o'nnal end, ox finis quo, is the act by 
 which we possess the thing desired. Thus "riches 
 are the objective end, and the possession of riches 
 the formal end of the miser." 
 
 The end of the work {finis operis), is that to which 
 the work naturally tends ; the end of the agent (fini» 
 operoMtis), is that which he determines according to his 
 liking. Thus " the end of the work in almsgiving is 
 the relief of the poor ; the end of him who gives the 
 alms is sometimes God, sometimes vain glory." The 
 end of the work and the end of the agent may coin- 
 cide, since it is manifest that the agent may intend 
 that to which the work intrinsically tends. 
 
 The principal end is that which is intended prima- 
 rily and directly by the agent ; a secondary end is that 
 which is intended as a consequence. Thus " the 
 good education of children should be the principal 
 end of a professor ; the receiving of a fee may be a 
 secondary end." 
 
 The natural end is that which does not surpass nat- 
 ural powers ; a supernatural end can be attained by the 
 
 * The ultimate end may be so absolutely or relatively. Thus the 
 relatively ultimate end of a student umlergoing examination is to 
 " pass." The absolutely ultimate end is that which " the will seeks as 
 the last complement of every desire and of all life," viz., supreme 
 felicity. 
 
0AU8E8 OF BEING. 181 
 
 aid of grace alone. Thus " health is the natural end 
 of medicine ; the beatific vision is the supernatural 
 end of man." 
 
 76. Only the good can have the character of end, 
 never the evil apprehended as evil. — There are two sorts 
 of good, the true good, which is really such, and the 
 apparent good, which though evil in itself yet seema 
 to be good. Now, a thing can be desired as an end 
 only in so far as it is regarded as good. For a thing 
 has the character of end in so far only as it is desir. 
 able ; but the good alone is desirable ; therefore it 
 alone has the character of end. Thus, " when a vin- 
 dictive man revenges himself on his enemy, he wishes 
 it, not because it is evil, but because it satisfies the 
 craving of his passion." 
 
 77. The goodness of the end has the character of causal- 
 ity ; the apprehension of the goodness is only a requisite 
 condition. — In the final cause the character of causing 
 consists in this, that the thing which is the end is 
 agreeable to the agent ; but this belongs to goodness, 
 and not to apprehension ; therefore not the appre- 
 hension, but the goodness of the end has the charac- 
 ter of cause. 
 
 78. The end is truly a cause, not merely from the fact 
 that it m,akes known its goodness, but because it moves to 
 act by the desire or love which it excites. — The end does 
 not move the will by simply making its own good- 
 ness known ; for knowledge appertains to the intel- 
 lect, and we often omit what is good, although we 
 both know and approve it. It is by the love which it 
 excites that the end moves and inclines the will 
 toward itself; therefore the love of the end is that 
 by which it actually causes. 
 
 79. Beings without intelligence, such as stones and 
 plants, act passively and executively for an end. — A being 
 
182 SEAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 acts for an end when, in its works, all the marks of a 
 cause which acts for an end are discernible, and there 
 appears no trace of chance or disorder ; but such is 
 the mode of action observed in beings destitute of in- 
 telligence, as the contemplation of nature abundantly 
 proves. But as these beings cannot know their end, 
 they are ordained to it by Him who does know it. If 
 in some rare cases nature seems not to act for an end, 
 as in the production of monsters, this is not due to 
 nature itself, but to an accidental defect in the subject 
 by which it acts. 
 
 80. Animals tend to their end iy a certain knowledge 
 which they have of it, when they perceive its goodness, 
 and are moved to act iy this perce2}tio7i ; hut they do not 
 act directly and electively for the end, for they do not 
 know its connection with the means; their knowledge and 
 their ax>petites are ruled hy instinct only. — Descartes 
 denies to animals all life and knowledge, and con- 
 siders them machines set in motion by secret springs, 
 like a clock. But this opinion is in manifest opposi- 
 tion to good sense. Indeed, experience clearly proves 
 to us that animals tend to their end, not only because 
 Providence directs them to it, but also because they 
 have some apprehension of this end, representing it to 
 themselves in their imagination, desiring to possess 
 it if it be absent, and delighting in it if it be present. 
 
 But, though animals have a certain knowledge of 
 their end, it would be false to assert with some phi- 
 losophers, as Pythagoras (b.c. 580-500 ?), that they have 
 reason, and differ from man only in bodily form. For 
 animals do not perceive the relation of the means to 
 the end. As they are incapable of abstracting, they 
 do not know the end as such; therefore they are 
 guided in their acts by instinct, that is, by a natural 
 judgment, which is determined to a single object, and 
 
CAUSES OF BEING. 183 
 
 is not the result of reasoning, but is the gift of the 
 Author of nature. It is the vis cestimativa, or esti- 
 mative faculty, of the Schoolmen. 
 
 81. Man acts for an end not only executively and ap- 
 prehensively hut also, directively and electively. — Since 
 man is endowed "with reason, he knows the proportion 
 of the means to the end ; he chooses the means which 
 seem good and rejects the others; therefore he acts 
 for an end, not only executively, like a stone, nor ap- 
 prehensively, like the brute, but also directively. 
 
 82. Fortune and chance are accidentally efficient causes, 
 that is, they produce an effect beyond the order and inten- 
 tion of the agent. — These two terms differ only in this, 
 that fortune, properly speaking, is specific, and predi- 
 cated of free causes only, while chance is generic, and 
 predicated also of natural causes. Fortune may even 
 be affirmed of the angels, since some things may hap- 
 pen beyond their intention ; but not of God. For God 
 as universal cause directs all particular causes, and 
 therefore no effect can transcend the order of His effi- 
 ciency nor can any second cause prevent its exercise. 
 
 83. Fate is a reality in the sense of a divine preordi- 
 nation or a certain disposition given to contirigsnt things 
 hy which God executes the decrees of His Providence. — 
 The Stoics denied Providence, and therefore meant by 
 fate a series of determinate causes which necessarily 
 produce their effects. Other philosophers regarded 
 fate as a necessity superior to all else, even to the 
 gods, which it was irpipossible to modify. In these 
 two senses fate is evidently an absurdity. But fate 
 understood as a preordination of God, or as a certain 
 disposition given to contingent beings, by which God 
 executes the decrees of His Providence, is a reality. 
 If the preordiiiation be regarded as in God, it is not 
 fate but providence, , 
 
DIVISION OF BEING. 
 
 84. JBeing is divided, 1. into real and logical ; 2. into 
 uncreated or infinite and created or finite ; 3. into sub- 
 stance and' accident. — Being exists either in the mere 
 apprehension of the mind, or out of the intellect ; in 
 the former case it is logical or ens rationis ; in the 
 latter, it is real. Heal being is either uncreated or 
 created. Created being is either substance or acci- 
 dent. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Eeal Being and Logical Being. 
 
 85. Real heing is that which has existence outside of 
 the intellect. — Eeal being has a true existence inde- 
 pendently of our thought ; it exists in its proper nat- 
 ure ; as a " tree," a " stone." 
 
 86. Logical being is that which has no objective ex- 
 istence, tohich eadsts only in the intellects — This being 
 
 * A thing may be in intellect as subject, effect, or object. It exists 
 in it as subject if it inheres in it as an accident in Its subject ; it is 
 in intellect as effect if it is produced as a vital action proceeding 
 physically from it ; it is in intellect as object if it is merely appre- 
 hended by it. Of the first mode of existence, " intelligible species, or 
 'jrst intentions," and "intellectual habits" are examples; of the 
 «cond, "intellection " is an illustration. Both these modes are real. 
 
REAL BEING AND LOGICAL BEING. 185 
 
 neither has nor can have any existence in nature ; it 
 exists in the intellect only; as "darkness," "chi- 
 meras." 
 
 87. Logical heing is either founded in reality- or not ; 
 in the former case it is a negation or a relation. Some 
 negations are properly called privations. — Logical he,- 
 ing founded in reality is that which has a foundation 
 in the very nature of real things ; as, " when we judge 
 the idea of animal to be more extensive than that of 
 rational." Logical being not fowided in reality com- 
 bines arbitrarily things which really have no connec- 
 tion ; as a " centaur." Logical being founded in real- 
 ity is a negation when it apprehends through being 
 the absence of being ; as "c^eailA," " darkness." Logi- 
 cal relations are all those agreements which the reason 
 conceives in things known ; as " the agreement of 
 subject and attribute." Negation is the absence in a 
 subject of a quality which it is not required to pos- 
 sess; as "absence of sight in a stone." k.privatio7i 
 properly so called is the absence in a subject of a per- 
 fection which it can and should possess ; as " blind- 
 ness in man." 
 
 88. Only the intellect can produce logical Heing. — Log- 
 ical being is produced when we consider non-being 
 after the manner of being; therefore it can be pro- 
 duced by that faculty only which apprehends the 
 quality of being, that is, by the intellect. The imagi- 
 nation forms images, fictions, but not logical beings. 
 Nor does the divine intellect form them, for their pro- 
 of the last mode, " second intentions" are an example, and hence 
 logical being (eras rationis) is said to constitute the formal object of 
 Logic. " Darkness " is logical being because it has no existence ex- 
 cept that which intellect gives it. " Light" is logical being if it be 
 regarded as abstracted from the luminous body, for an abstraction has 
 only an ideal existence. 
 
186 REAL PHILOSOPET. 
 
 duction would imply a knowledge of a thing other 
 than it is in reality. But such cognition is imperfect, 
 and cannot be predicated of God, since He is infinitely 
 perfect 
 
CHAPTEE n. 
 
 Unceeated oe Infinite Being and Oeeated oe Finite 
 
 Being. 
 
 finite being. 
 
 89. Uncreated Being is tliat which exists of itself ; 
 a'eated ieing, that which holds its heing from another. — 
 Uncreated Being- is none else tlian God, wlio gives be- 
 ing to everything and receives it from none ; He is 
 Being by essence, whereas the others are being by 
 participation. He is also called Necessary Being, be- 
 cause He cannot but exist, while creatures are called 
 contingent beings, because their non-existence is pos- 
 sible. 
 
 90. Uncreated Being is actually infinite, that is, it is 
 bounded iy no limit. — The infinite is of two kinds : the 
 actual infinite, which really and indeed is bounded by 
 no limit, and the potential infinite or the indefinite, 
 which is only the finite to which something can al- 
 ways he added. God alone is actually infinite. In 
 creatures there is only potential infinity. For they 
 cannot be actually infinite in perfection of being, 
 since they have being only by participation; more- 
 over, it is possible for them not to exist, and this im- 
 plies a great imperfection in their essence. No crea- 
 ture can be actually infinite in magnitude, because no 
 property of a finite substance can be infinite. Neither 
 can there be an actually infinite number, because a 
 
188 REAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 multitude that can ever be increased is not infinite ; 
 but however great the multitude be supposed, it can 
 always be increased. Lastly, no creature can be in- 
 finite in the intensity of any of its qualities, because 
 it is impossible for a finite subject to contain an infi- 
 nitely perfect quality. 
 
 91. There is a potential infinity in creatures. — ^No 
 quantity is so great that it cannot be further in- 
 creased ; no creature has all perfections, since it is 
 essentially contingent. 
 
 92. Material entities have a limit to their STnallness, 
 living ieings have also a limit to their largeness. — A nat- 
 ural form requires a certain quantity in the matter 
 which it determines. A quantity may be so small 
 that a smaller one would not suffice for the operations 
 of any form whatever ; therefore such a quantity can- • 
 not be informed, or determined by form. With regard 
 to living beings, experience shows that they have cer- 
 tain limits as to maximum and minimum size.* 
 
 * See also Metaphymn of the School, vol. iii. , pp. 307, 314-316. 
 
CHAPTEE in. 
 
 Substance and Accident. 
 aet. i. — ^natube of substance and accident. 
 
 93. Substance is heing existing in itself ; accident is 
 being existing in another as its subject. — Being is known 
 either as something which subsists in itself without 
 needing to be sustained by another, or as something 
 which needs a subject in which and by which it may 
 exist. In the former case, being is called substance ; 
 in the latter, it is called accident. Thus " Peter " is 
 a substance, because he exists in himself ; " white " is 
 an accident, because it does not exist without a sub- 
 stance in which it inheres. Substance is also defined 
 negatively as that which is not in ajwther as its subject ; 
 or descriptively as that which sustains accidents. But 
 from the fact that a substance exists in itself, we are 
 not to infer that it excludes the idea of a cause which 
 produces it, but only that of a subject in which it 
 inheres. To define substance, with Descartes, as " that 
 which exists in such a way as to need nothing else for 
 its existence," is to open the door to pantheism. 
 
 94. The idea of szibstance is formed from a sensible 
 concrete object by abstraction, by which the intellect per- 
 ceives in the object that xohich exists in itself and not in 
 another as its subject. — When the intellect contemplates 
 a sensible concrete object as existing, it has the power 
 of abstracting from it existence in itself and not in 
 
190 REAL PHIL080PHT. 
 
 anotlier as its subject. But this perception of exist., 
 ence in itself includes tliat of substance, viz., of that 
 which is in itself, without requiring any thing- else as 
 its subject ; and it is obtained by abstracting from all 
 the characteristics which accompany the substance 
 and cannot exist by themselves in the order of reality. 
 For when the intellect has formed the idea of sub- 
 stance by abstraction from a sensible concrete object, 
 it contemplates this idea as it is in itself, and per- 
 ceives that it is applicable not only to corporeal be- 
 ings, but also to spiritual beings that exist in them- 
 selves and not in another as their subject. 
 
 95. When the intellect has the idea of substance and 
 of accident, it immediately perceives the truth of the 
 proposition : Ever^y accident supposes a substance. — With 
 the idea of accident, the intellect possesses implicitly 
 that of substance. The comparison of these two ideas 
 results in the immediate perception that accident 
 cannot naturally exist without substance, since that 
 which does not exist in itself can exist only in an- 
 other being which has existence in itself. Hence the 
 proposition given above expresses an analytical judg- 
 ment. 
 
 96. The Phenomenalism of Hume, who denies the 
 reality of substance, is absurd, because by denying sub- 
 stance he maJces accident impossible. — Locke, by admit- 
 ting no other source of ideas than the senses, was led 
 to deny the reality of substance and to hold that 
 what is so called is in reality only a number of quali- 
 ties held together by a common bond. But this is 
 an absurd hypothesis ; for, if the bond is not sub- 
 stance, it must be accident, and hence, in its turn, 
 requires a substance to support it. The principle of 
 Locke led Berkeley (1684-1758) to denj' all corporeal 
 substance, and Hume to deny all substance, corporeal 
 
SUB8TAN0S AND AOGIDENT. 191 
 
 and spiritual, and to assert that only qualities exist 
 and are known to us. The Phenomenalism of Hume, 
 which rejects the "very idea of substance, is absurd. 
 For an accident exists either in itself, or in some^ 
 thing else ; it cannot exist in itself, for it would 
 then be no longer an accident ; therefore it exists in 
 something else. But this latter cannot be itself an 
 accident, for we should then have to proceed from 
 one accident to another ad infinitum, thus postulat- 
 ing an infinite series of accidents, resting on nothing, 
 which is absurd. Therefore eVery accident must be 
 supported by something wliich is not accident, that 
 is, by substance. 
 
 97. Accidents are absolute or modal. Some absolute 
 accidents can by divine power exist apart from, their con' 
 natural substance. — Absolute accidents are those that 
 directly affect substance ; modal accidents are the 
 various ways in which the absolute accidents affect 
 substance. The quantity or mass of matter of a 
 bullet moving through the air is an absolute acci- 
 dent ; the velocity of its motion is a modal accident. 
 Actual inhesion in their connatural subject is essential 
 to modal accidents, whereas most absolute accidents 
 demand only aptitudinal inherence. Vital actions 
 are an exception, however, not because of their 
 generic nature as absolute accidents, but because of 
 their specific nature requiring the actual influx of the 
 life principle.* 
 
 Some absolute accidents of corporeal substance can 
 by divine power exist apart from their substance ; for 
 an effect depends more on the first cause than on its 
 second cause. God, who is the first cause of both 
 substance and accident, can by His infinite power 
 
 'csofilie 8ehool, vol. ii., pp. 343, 584. 
 
192 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 preserve the accidents after He has withdrawn the 
 substance by which, as by their proper cause, they 
 were sustained. Even then the accidents do not 
 cease to be accidents, since they retain their natural 
 aptitude to inhere in substance. 
 
 AET. n. — DIFFEEENT KINDS OF SUBSTANCE. 
 
 98. Substance is complete or i'licomplete, first or second. 
 — ^A complete substance is one that is not destined to 
 be united to another to form a substantial composite ; 
 as a " man," a " tree." An incomplete substance is one 
 that must be united to another to form a substantial 
 whole or specific nature ; as the " body of man." 
 First substance is individual; as "John," "James." 
 It is so called because it is that which first and by 
 itself sustains the accidents, and because it is the 
 first thing perceived by the intellect. Second sub- 
 stance comprises genera and species ; as " man," 
 " animal." It is so called because it subsists only in 
 the individual with which it is identified, and because 
 it is known by the intellect subsequently to the in- 
 dividual. 
 
 AET. m. — SUBSISTENCE, SUPPOSIT, AND PERSON. 
 
 99. Subsistence is a perfection hy which a nature is 
 master of itself and incommunicaile to anotlier. — Com- 
 plete substance differs from accident and incomplete 
 substance, because it belongs to itself, while accident 
 and incomplete substance belong to another. Now, 
 subsistence is that perfection which makes the sub- 
 stance complete, and by which the substance so 
 belongs to itself as not to require union with another 
 in order to be and to act. 
 
SUBSTANOE AND AOOIDENT. 193 
 
 100. Supposit is the concrete entity that answers to the 
 abstract subsistence. Person adds the character of in- 
 telligent nature to the supposit. — When considered as 
 having concirete existence in a complete substance, 
 subsistence is called supposit, just as life considered 
 in the concrete in a living thing is called a living 
 being. Therefore supposit is subsistence itself con- 
 sidered as existing concretely in a particular individ- 
 ual. When the supposit is endowed with reason it 
 is called person, which Boethius defines as "an in- 
 dividual substance of ,a rational [intelligent] nature." 
 A " stone " and a " horse " are supposits ; " George " 
 and " Joseph " are persons.* f 
 
 101. Subsistence is a positive entity really distinct from 
 nature. — It is a great perfection for a nature to have 
 no need of another as subject in which to inhere. 
 Since subsistence means this perfection, it is some- 
 thing positive. The distinction of. subsistence from 
 nature is proved by the mystery of the Incarnation, 
 in which the subsistence of the human nature is 
 wanting to this nature. J Subsistence may also be 
 said to differ from existence, since subsistence belongs 
 
 * An infinite teing is necessarily personal because it has all per- 
 fections. 
 
 f Personality is not consciousness, as Locke asserted, Tor then 
 personality would cease with the interruption of consciousness. But 
 consciousness supposes personality. 
 
 X In the Incarnation Christ's human nature, being perfected by its 
 hypostatic or substantial union with the divine nature, has no per- 
 sonality of its own. The divine nature of Christ, being infinite, 
 must, according to the preceding note, be infinite, and therefore 
 Incapable of losing its personality. Hence in our Lord there are 
 two natures, one human and the other divine, but there is only 
 one person, and that is divine. Hence the purely human actions 
 of Christ have an infinite merit as proceeding from an infinito 
 person. 
 
 13 
 
194 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to complete substance only, while existence is com- 
 mon to both accident and substance. 
 
 AET. rv. — ACCIDENTS. — QUANTITY. 
 
 102. The first accident of material substance or hody 
 is quantity, which consists in extension of parts hey and 
 parts. — When we perceive extension of parts in a sub- 
 stance, we perceive clearly that it has quantity, which 
 is defined an accident extensive of substance. Occupa- 
 tion of a determinate place, divisibility into parts, 
 and mensurability, are properties that belong to sub- 
 stance by reason of its quantity ; but they do not 
 constitute the essence of quantity, for a body must 
 have parts before these parts occupy place, and are 
 divisible and mensurable. 
 
 103. Quantity is really distinct from suistance. — Ex- 
 tension no more implies existence in itself than does 
 heat or color. For just as we conceive a body as ex- 
 isting in itself before being hot or white, so also do we 
 conceive that it should have existence in itself before 
 having extension. And just as a body is not changed 
 essentially when it is more or less heated, more or 
 less white, so there is no essential change when by 
 expansion it acquires a greater extension than it had 
 before. Since, then, corporeal substance is shown by 
 experience to be indifferent in its essence to that de- 
 terminate quantity which it actually has at any given 
 moment of its existence, quantity must be really dis- 
 tinct from substance. Descartes held the essence of 
 material substance to consist in extension ; but this 
 is a great error. For that to which corporeal sub- 
 stance is manifestly indifferent is not really of the 
 essence of such substance ; but physicists establish 
 the fact that the dimensions may and do vary with 
 
SUB8TAN0E AND AOOIDENT. 195 
 
 changing external influences, and chemists prove that 
 the substantial nature of bodies perseveres under 
 these changes. Therefore the essence of material 
 substance does not consist in extension. 
 
 104. Quantity is permanent or successive ; permanent 
 quantity is either continuous or discrete. — Permanent 
 quantity is that whose parts can exist simultaneously, 
 as a "line." Successive quantity is that whose parts 
 do not exist simultaneously, but follow one another in 
 a continuous series ; as " time," " motion." This kind 
 of quantity is improperly so called ; motion and time 
 have no extension in themselves, but time has exten- 
 sion by reason of motion ; and motion, by reason of 
 the medium between the term whence {terminus a quo) 
 and the term whither {terminus ad quern). Continuous 
 quantity is that whose parts are contained within a 
 common limit ; as a " line," a " surface," a " solid." 
 Discrete quantity is that whose parts are not naturally 
 united ; as " numerical quantity, or number." 
 
 105. In the hypothesis that God preserves the accidents 
 of a iody after withdrawing the substance, the divine 
 power will he the principle of individuation of the acci- 
 dents; directly, of the mensurable quantity or extension, 
 and through this, of all the other accidents. — The sub- 
 stance is the principle of individuation for the acci- 
 dents ; when the substance is withdrawn, the divine 
 power supports the accidents, and is therefore their 
 individuating principle. It directly sustains the 
 mensurable quantity which now just as when the sub- 
 stance is present, is the principle of individuation of 
 the other accidents, because they are individuated 
 only inasmuch as they are in a subject divided off 
 from any other, and because division is referred to 
 quantity. 
 
196 REAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 AET. V. — RELATION. 
 
 106. Relation in general is the respect that one entity 
 has to another. Relation is real or logical. Real rela- 
 tion is created or uncreated. Created relation is either 
 a relation of ieing or a relation of indication. — Real 
 relation is the respect or order wMcli exists among 
 things themselves ; thus " effect is referred to cause," 
 " a part to the whole." Logical relation is the respect 
 established between entities by our intellect; thus 
 " an attribute is referred to its subject." Uncreated 
 relation is the respect which one divine Person has to 
 another. There are four uncreated relations : pater- 
 nity, filiation, active spiratio7i, and passive spiration. 
 Created relation is the respect which one created en- 
 tity has to another created entity or to th"e Creator.* 
 It is a relation of being when it is a pure respect to a 
 term ; as " paternity," which indicates a pure order 
 of one thing to another. Created relation is said to 
 be of indication when it is something not merely rel- 
 ative, but absolutely containing a respect ; as " the 
 arm," which indicates a respect to the whole body. 
 
 107. Relation considered as an accident or predica- 
 mental relation is a real created relation, which consists 
 
 * Created relation is also called transcendental, and relation of be- 
 ing is known as predicamental. ' ' A Predicamental relation exercises 
 no other office tlian tliat of simply looking to its term ; while Tran- 
 scendental relation' besides and primarily exercises some other ofice 
 in respect of its term ; for instance, of producing, of depending, etc. 
 Thus there is a relation between knowledge and the truth known be- 
 cause of the cognosoibility of the latter. As all finite being is in some 
 such way dependent on some other, such relation runs through all 
 the categories and beyond. Hence it is called Transcendental "— 
 Metaphysics of the School, voL i., p. 587. 
 
SUBSTANOE AND AOOIDENT. 197 
 
 in a pure respect.— Bj this deiinition logical relations, 
 uncreated relations, and relations of indication are 
 excluded from relation considered as an accident. 
 
 108. Pi'edicaraental relation requires a real suhject, a 
 real foundation, a real term, and a real distinction ietween 
 the foundation and the term. — The subject of a relation 
 is the thing in which the relation is ; the foundation 
 is that which causes the relation ; the term is that to 
 which there is reference. Thus, in the relation of " pos- 
 session," the " man who possesses " is the subject, the 
 " object possessed " is the term, and the " purchase 
 that gives possession " is the foundation. Predicamen- 
 tal relation requires a real subject, else there would 
 be no real accident, and a real foundation; a cause, 
 namely, that produces the relation, because a real ef- 
 fect requires a real cause. There must be a real term, 
 because relation consists in respect to a term, and it 
 would not be real if the term were not real. Finally, 
 there must be a real distinction between the founda- 
 tion and the term, because there cannot be a relation 
 of a thing to itself. 
 
 109. The relation is really distinct from the founda- 
 tion and from all that is absolutely in the thing. — Two 
 things are really distinct when their entities are not 
 identical. But the entity of the foundation is not 
 really identical with the entity of the relation, since 
 the former is absolutely in the thing, while the latter 
 is a mere respect ; moreover, the entity of the founda- 
 tion remains when the relation perishes. Relation, 
 therefore, is really distinct from its foundation. It is 
 also distinct from all that is absolutely in the thing. 
 
 110. Relation is of three kinds, for it may be 
 founded, (1) on measure and the measurable ; (2) 
 on action and passion ; (3) on agreement and disagree- 
 ment. — Since the relation is caused by the foundation, 
 
198 BEAL PHIL080PET. 
 
 there are as many kinds of relation as there are kinds 
 of foundation. Now, there are as many foundations 
 of relation as there are modes of referring one thing 
 to another. These are three : (1) As to being, when 
 one entity is considered the measure of another's per- 
 fection ; thus " a copy is referred to the model ; " (2) 
 As to operation, when one is cause or effect of the 
 other ; thus " a father bears relation to his child ; " 
 (3) As to agreement or disagreement ; and thus " one 
 white surface is referred to another white surface." 
 Hence there are three kinds of relation. And as the 
 agreement or disagreement is especially remarked in 
 three things, viz., substance, quantity, and quality, 
 this kind of relation is subdivided into relations of 
 identity or diversity, if the entities be substance ; into 
 relations of equality or inequality, if they be quantity; 
 and into relations of resemhlance or difference, if they 
 be quality. Relation is also classified as mutual or 
 non-mutual according as it implies reciprocity or not. 
 Thus there is mutual relation between "father and 
 son," and a non-mutual relation between " creature 
 and Creator." * These various kinds of relation are 
 further subdivided into several species. That which 
 constitutes two relations in the same species is unity 
 of foundation and of term ; that which makes them of 
 different species is diversity of foundation or of term.f 
 
 *"A mutual relation is tliat wliereiu there Is a real foundation 
 for the relation in each of the two terms ; as, for instance, in the 
 relation between ^father and son,' or between ' Tang and subject.' A 
 non-mutual relation is that wherein the foundation is real in one term 
 only, while it is purely logical in the other. . Such is the relation 
 between ' science, subjectively understood, and its object ; ' or, again, 
 between the ' Creator [as God] and His creature. ' " — Metaphysics of 
 the Sclwol, Tol. li. , pp. 157, 158. 
 
 \ The properties of relations are, says Zigliara (Art. 40) : 1°, to hare 
 
8UBSTAN0E AND AOOIDENT. 199 
 
 111. It is impossible to know one correlative without 
 the other. — The knowledge of two correlatives is nec- 
 essarily simultaneous ; it is impossible, for instance, 
 to know a servant as servant without knowing also 
 his master as master. 
 
 AET. TI. — QTJALiry. 
 
 112. Quality is that accident which tells of what kind a 
 substance is. — Quality may be more exactly defined with 
 St. Thomas as That accident which tnodifies or deter- 
 mines a substance in itself. The other accidents effect 
 no modification of the substance in itself ; even quan- 
 tity extends the substance in parts, but does not 
 modify them ; quality, on the contrary, does modify 
 them, and gives them this or that manner of being, 
 this or that figure. 
 
 113. There are four species of quality : 1. habit and 
 disposition ; 2. power and impotence ; 3. passion and the 
 passible quality ; 4. form and figure. — There are four 
 species of quality, because the substance can be modi- 
 fied or disposed in four ways. The substance can be 
 disposed: (1) As to its state so as to be well or ill ;* 
 hence we have the species of habit and disposition ; (2) 
 As to its operation, hence the species oi power and im- 
 potence ; (3) As to the sensible alteration that consti- 
 tutes it in a new mode ; hence the species of passion 
 
 no contrary, but only to exclude identity of subject as subject and 
 of term as term ; 2°, not to be susceptible of more or less ; 3°, to be 
 mutually convertible, i.e., one correlative is explained only by ref- 
 erence to the other correlative ; 4°, to be simiiltaneous in nature ; 
 5°, to be simultaneous in cognition. 
 
 *That is, " well or ill," relatively to the end which by its nature 
 it is destined to attain ; thus man is well disposed by nature to at- 
 tain everlasting happiness. 
 
200 REAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 and ■passible quality ; (4) As to its quantitative parts, 
 and hence the species oiform and ^figure. 
 
 114.' Habit is a quality inhering intimately in the sub- 
 ject and determining it to a good or evil state either in it- 
 self or its operation. When this qxiality inheres slightly 
 in the subject, or is easily removed, it is called disposition. 
 —Ordinarily a substance is indiiferent to a g'ood or 
 bad state either in itself or in its operation. Thus 
 the body is indifferent to health or sickness, the hand 
 to painting or not painting, the will to doing good 
 or evil. No>v, it is " health " that determines the body 
 to a good state, and " sickness " to a bad state. It is 
 the " ability to paint " that puts the hand in a good 
 disposition with regard to the work, and the "inabili- 
 ty " that maintains it in a bad state. It is " virtue " 
 that disposes the will to do good, and " vice " that-dis- 
 poses it to do evil.* 
 
 115. Potoer f is a quality that disposes the substance to 
 action or resistance. When this qiudity is feeble, it is 
 called powerlessness or impotence. — While habit deter- 
 mines a faculty to a good or bad state, the faculty 
 gives the substance that has it a power. Thus the 
 " faculty of intellect " gives the soul the power of com- 
 prehending, and " science " disposes it toward truth. 
 
 116. Passion is a quality which causes or follows a 
 sensible alteration.X When permanent it receives the 
 
 * See Psychology, § 77. 
 
 f Harper (Metaphysics of the School, vol. iii., p. 300,) renders the 
 potentia of the Schoolmen by natural power or faculty ; passio by 
 affection, and qualiias patibilis by affective quality. He Is calling at- 
 tention to the fact that all the species of quality but the last may be 
 efficient causes. 
 
 I " Material entities are subject to two intrinsic changes ; in one of 
 which all th^t is universally recognized as substantial remains, but 
 certain accidental modifications, such as sine, colour, shape, and the 
 Kke are changed, — that is to say, these are not the same as they were 
 
ce 
 
 SUBSTANCE AND AOOIDENT. 201 
 
 name of passible quality.— Va-ssion, taken in this sense, 
 comprises the whole series of sensible qualities. 
 Thus "heat," "taste," and "smell" are passions. 
 
 117. Form or figure is a quality which results from 
 diverse dispositions of the parts of a quantity.— li is that 
 quality by which the parts of a quantity are disposed 
 and determined in this or that way, for instance, as a 
 
 pyramid" or a "triangle." For7n is applied more par- 
 ticularly to artificial products ;^5'wre to natural objects. 
 
 AET. VII. — ACTION, PASSION, TIME, AND PLACE. 
 
 118. Action is an accident hy which a cause is consti- 
 tuted in the act of producing its effect. Passion is an 
 accident hy which a thing is constituted in the act of re- 
 ceiving an effect. — In the production of an effect three 
 things are to be noted : (1) its proceeding from the 
 efficient cause ; (2) its reception into a subject ; (3) 
 its production or its passage from the state of pure 
 potentiality to that of act. The proceeding of an effect 
 from its cause is the accident that is called action. 
 The reception of the effect into a subject is the acci- 
 dent that is called passion, which must not be con- 
 founded with the quality that causes or follows a 
 sensible alteration ; the production of the effect is 
 called motion, which, however, is not an accident, but 
 is classified with that in which it terminates. Thus 
 the " motion productive of heat " is reduced to the 
 accident of heat.* 
 
 before. In the other, every thing is seen to change, — substance, nat- 
 ure, properties, as well as Accident ; as in the instance of sugar, 
 when submitted to tJie chemical action of sulphuric acid. The former 
 species of change goes by the name of alteration ; the latter is known 
 as generation." — Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., p. 275. 
 
 * "That reality which is called action is included under three Cate- 
 gories. According to its formal signification, by which the effect in 
 
202 REAL PHILOSOPBT. 
 
 119. Action is transient or immanent ; immanent action 
 is cognitive or appetitive; transient action is artificial 
 or natural. Passion is divided according to the various 
 divisions of action. — Transient action produces some- 
 thing outside the agent ; as " burning : " immanent ac- 
 tion produces an effect which remains wholly within 
 the agent ; as, "understanding," " imagining." Imma- 
 nent action is either cognitive, and then it is divided 
 into sensitive and intellective, or appetitive, the subdivi- 
 
 the subject denotes the Efficient Cause, by an extrinsic denomination, 
 as that on which it depends ; it is in its own Category of Action. Con- 
 sidered as connoting a consequent relation between cause and effect, 
 or Subject and effect ; it is included under the Category of Kelation. 
 Considered as an accidental perfection really inherent in agent as 
 well as In Subject, it belongs to the Category of Quality. . . . 
 ' Action, according to its formal meaning [says St. Thomas], does not 
 express its being m the agent, but /roOT the agent.' . . . Though 
 action materially denotes motion, and passion materially denotes 
 motion ; yet action formally connotes the Efficient Cause, while 
 passion formally connotes the Subject. . . . But motion for- 
 mally denotes the efEect in fari only ; materially, however, it con- 
 notes its two terms. . . . Motion, therefore, is an intermediate 
 between agent and Subject, but formally including neither. By the 
 medium of the motion, agent and Subject are united together ; be- 
 cause they meet in one and the same motion. The motion is truly 
 affirmed to be in the agent as an accident, no less than from the 
 agent as the termintis a quo ; because the accidental form, from 
 which the action proceeds and by which it is initiated, is inherent 
 in the agent. The terminus a quo of the transient action, as trandent, 
 is the body which is the Efficient Cause ; and the terminus ad qtiem, 
 under the same respect, is the body that is Subject of theoausal ac- 
 tion. The terminus a quo of the transient action, as action, is the acci- 
 dental form in the agent, as proximately disposed for producing the 
 effect ; the terminus ad quern is the completed effect. The motion is 
 the effect in fieri. In bodily motion there are two principal condi- 
 tions, or rather, elements, — to wit, continuity and succession. The 
 former is measured by place ; the latter, by time." — Metapliydc% qf 
 the Selwol, vol. iil. , pp. 877-379. 
 
8UB8TA1TGE AND AOOIDENT. 203 
 
 sions of which are volition and sensitive appetition. Ar- 
 tificial action is the result of art, and natural action 
 the work of nature. For every action there is a corre- 
 sponding passion.* 
 
 120. When {quando) is an accident supervening on 
 lodies, inasmuch as they are in a certain period of time.^ 
 — A body is of itself indifferent to time ; to be in one 
 time rather than in another, it requires an accidental 
 determination which is called quando, or the when of 
 it. This accident in bodies results from the fact that 
 they are dependent on time or are measured by time ; 
 as, to be " present," " past," or " future." 
 
 121. JJUcation, or uhiety {ubi), is that accident of lody 
 iy which it is determined to he in one place rather than in 
 another. X — ^A body is of itself indifferent to place ; to 
 be in one place rather than in another, it needs an 
 accidental determination called uhication ; as, to be 
 " above " or " below," to be " in Washington." 
 
 Place is defined by Aristotle as " the superficies of 
 the containing body considered as immovable and 
 immediately contiguous to the body located." The 
 place, for instance, of a man standing in a stream is 
 partly the river-bed on which he stands, partly the 
 watery surface in immediate contact with his body, 
 and the atmosphere about his head. This bounding 
 surface is considered immovable, for though the con- 
 tiguous particles of air and water are successively 
 displaced, the circumscribed limits remain the same. 
 The universe has no extrinsic place, since there is no 
 body outside it ; its intrinsic place is determined by 
 its own superficies. 
 
 The category luhere is said to be circumscriptive, be- 
 
 ' See Psychology, § 3, 6, 43, 70. t See Cosmology, § 36-39. 
 
 X Ibid., § 83-35. 
 
204 BEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cause it so determines a thing tliat it is whole and 
 entire in the whole place, and each of its parts is 
 measured by a corresponding part of place. Hence 
 this category is an accident of bodies only. A sub- 
 stance is in place definitively when it is whole and 
 entire in the whole place and in each part of that 
 place. This is proper to created spiritual beings, like 
 human souls and the angels, but not to God, who is 
 whole and entire in each and every place simultane- 
 ously. 
 
 122. Posture, or situation (situs), is that accident of 
 body resulting from the disposition of its parts in a place. 
 — The same body is susceptible of various disposi- 
 tions in the same place ; the accident that determines 
 it to one disposition rather than another is called 
 posture ; as, " standing up," " sitting down," " kneel- 
 ing." 
 
 123. Habiliment is that accident of hodies resulting 
 from the m,anner in which they are covered. — This acci- 
 dent is not the covering itself, but the disposition 
 supervening on the body from the manner in which it 
 is covered by the garment ; as, " to have on a mitre 
 or a stole," " to wear slippers." 
 
SPECIAL METAPHYSICS. 
 
 1. Special Metaphysics treats of tlie world, of man, and 
 of God ; it is therefore divided into Cosmology, Psy- 
 chology, and Natural Theology. — While General Meta- 
 physics studies being in its general characteristics, 
 Special Metaphysics studies beings in particular. 
 Now, on the one hand, there is the Uncreated Being, 
 and, on the other, there are created beings, among 
 whom man, as occupying a privileged place, claims 
 also a special study. That part of philosophy which 
 treats of created beings other than man is called Cos- 
 mology ; that which treats of man is called Psychol- 
 ogy, or Anthropology, and lastly, that which treats of 
 God is called Natural Theology. 
 
 COSMOLOGY. 
 
 2. Cosmology is the science of the corporeal world in 
 
 its first or ultimate principles. — Cosmology is defined, 
 
 according to its etymology, as a discourse about the 
 
 world, and thus understood would embrace also a 
 
 discourse about man. But because man occupies a 
 
 place apart in creation, philosophers make him the 
 
 object of a special science, and in Cosmology study 
 
 only the first principles of the world, considered at 
 
 first in general, and then in particular with reference 
 
 to non-living and living beings, or to inorganic and 
 
 organic beings. 
 14 
 
CHAPTEE I 
 
 The "World in General. 
 
 art i. — origin of the world. 
 
 3. It is a gross error to admit with Democritus, Epi= 
 curios, Lucretius, and the materialists of all times, that 
 matter is eternal, and that the world was formed iy the 
 fortuitous concourse of atoms, i.e., of indivisible particles 
 of matter, diverse in figure and size, and endowed with 
 motion. — -The theory of atomism has at all times pro- 
 voked the contempt of philosophers, and has always 
 been rejected by common sense, for its absurdity is 
 manifest. For, if the world has been produced by 
 the fortuitous concourse of atoms, we must admit 
 that it is the product of chance. But chance cannot 
 be the cause of the admirable order that reigns 
 throughout the universe among the various beings 
 whose special ends are all co-ordinated and all made 
 subordinate to one supreme and general end. 
 Chance* is of itself blind and indifferent ; it never 
 works according to universal and constant laws. How 
 then could the constancy and harmony of the universe 
 spring from such a cause ? Chance, moreover, is an 
 empty word which we use to hide our ignorance ; it 
 is because of our limited knowledge, that not know- 
 ing their true cause, we refer certain things to chance. 
 
 * See Ontology, § 82. 
 
THE WORLD IN GENERAL. 207 
 
 But even supposing the production of the world pos- 
 sible by the fortuitous meeting of atoms, atomism 
 would be none the less absurd, because it is impossi- 
 ble to admit the eternity and independence of matter. 
 For such matter would necessarily be infinite. But 
 that cannot be, because matter is composed of parts, 
 each of which is finite, and no addition of finite to 
 finite can make the infinite. 
 
 4. It is absurd to admit, with Plato and Aristotle, an 
 eternal and indeterminate matter out of which Ood pro- 
 duces the world when He clothes it with determinate 
 forms.— 'Fxova. the very fact that matter cannot be 
 eternal and independent, the falsity of this system is 
 manifest. But it appears equally so if we grant the 
 possibility of eternity and independence in matter. 
 For that which is independent in its being must be 
 independent also in its operation, since operation 
 follows being ; therefore, if matter were independent 
 of God in its being, it would still be so when, by its 
 transformations, the world would be made ; whence it 
 would follow that God could not even have put order 
 in the universe. 
 
 5. God is the absolute and universal cause of the 
 world. — If matter is not' eternal and independent, and 
 if the world is not the result of the fortuitous con- 
 course of atoms, it is evident that it was made by the 
 action of God alone. ^It will not do to say that the 
 world made itself, for it must have being before it 
 can give it. Much less, in order to dispense with God 
 as its necessary cause, can it be asserted that the 
 world, though it did not make itself, yet proceeded 
 from an infinite series of contingent causes, i.e., from 
 an infinite series of beings, each of which can exist 
 only by the action of another being. Such a series is 
 only a chain of effects without a cause, and is mani- 
 
208 REAL PHILOaOPHT. 
 
 festly absurd.* Nor can it be asserted that the world 
 was made out of some pre-existing subject ; for this 
 subject must have been either uncreated matter or the 
 divine substance, God Himself. But the first hypoth- 
 esis has been shown to be untenable and contra- 
 dictory. The second is equally absurd, since the 
 divine substance, as being infinitely perfect, is spir- 
 itual and therefore incapable of division. Since, then, 
 the teaching of both materialists and pantheists as to 
 the origin of the world, must be rejected, we must 
 admit that the world was created by God, that is, that 
 by His divine power He gave it its whole existence. 
 
 AET. n. — PERFECTION OE THE WOEU). 
 
 6. The world is relatively perfect, i.e., it has all that is 
 necessary to attain the end proposed hy its Author. — The 
 perfection of a work is measured by the end which 
 the agent proposes, and the manner in which the 
 means answer to the end. In both these respects the 
 world may be called perfect ; it is perfect as to its 
 end, which is none other than the glorification of 
 God; and perfect as to the means of attaining its 
 end, since the world, being the work of infinite wis- 
 dom and power, must have all that is suited to the 
 integrity of its nature, in order to attain the end 
 intended by its Author. Hence when the world is 
 said to be perfect, there is no question of absolute 
 perfection, but only of a perfection relative to its 
 nature and end. This is true optimism, and has been 
 embraced by the greatest philosophers, such as 
 Plato, St. Augustine (354-430), St. Thomas, Bossuet 
 (1627-1704), and Fenelon (1651-1715). 
 
 * On Creation and the End of Creation, see Natural ThecHogu, 
 § 27-39. 
 
THE WORLD IN GENERAL. 209 
 
 7. It is false to maintain, with Malebranehe and Leib- 
 nitz, that the present world is absolutely the best possible. 
 — This form of optimism was held by the Stoics, by 
 Abelard, and by Descartes. It is founded by Male- 
 branehe on the almost infinite perfection which has 
 been imparted to the present world by the mystery of 
 the Incarnation. It is based by Leibnitz on the prin- 
 ciple that God, who does nothing without sufficient 
 reason, could not have preferred the present world to 
 the other possible worlds, if this were not the best 
 possible, and therefore this is the most perfect pos- 
 sible. But both these forms of optimism are absurd. 
 (1) For even though it is metaphysically impossible 
 for God to raise a creature higher than He has raised 
 the created human nature of Christ, or even, as high 
 as He has raised that nature, yet this world remains 
 intrinsically finite, and therefore is not in every respect 
 the most perfect possible. (2) It is true that God, who 
 is sovereignly intelligent, wise, and free, does noth- 
 ing without a sufficient reason ; but this sufficient 
 reason is to be found not in the object, the term 
 of divine action, but in the agent, God himself; 
 otherwise God would not be sovereignly free and in- 
 dependent. 
 
 8. The world is not eternal. — I. If the world were 
 necessarily eternal, it would follow that, since it is 
 created (§ 5), God was from all eternity necessitated 
 to create it. But since God is infinitely perfect and 
 therefore sovereignly free, as will be shown in JVat- 
 ural Theology (§ 21), this hypothesis must be rejected. 
 II. The world is not contingently eternal, for the 
 traditions of all peoples point to its beginning. More- 
 over, the generally accepted nebular hypothesis, the 
 different strata of the earth's crust, and the fossil 
 remains of the animal and the vegetable kiagdom, all 
 
210 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 imply succession, and therefore a beginning. The 
 exact duration implied in the nebular hypothesis is, 
 however, only matter of speculation ; for it must be 
 granted that the agencies then at work were much 
 more powerful than those of the present time. The 
 periods, also, assigned' by geologists for the forma- 
 tion of the earth's strata, with their embedded fossils, 
 are based in general upon the assumption that the 
 forces employed were the same, and energized with 
 no greater momentum and velocity than they do to- 
 day. But it is possible, and even probable, that in 
 the world's primeval age they were far greater in 
 momentum and efficiency. 
 
 Although the possibility of an eternal creation of the 
 universe is affirmed by St. Thomas, it is denied by 
 St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) and Petau (1583-1651), 
 Toletus (1532-1596) and Gerdil (1718-1802), on the 
 ground that thereby creation is confounded with 
 preservation, and that the succession of changes in 
 the world necessitates a beginning. Both parties 
 agree that the world is not actually eternal. As to 
 the days of creation there are three leading schools : 
 the Allegorical school of Alexandria, made illustrious 
 by the names of Clement (150-220 ?), Origen (186-253), 
 and St. Athanasius (296-373), taught that all creation 
 was simultaneous, and that the succession of the 
 Scriptural record is one of order only. The school of 
 Cappadocia held that the elements only were created 
 simultaneously, and that the successive transforma- 
 tions were real. This was the opinion of St. Basil 
 (329-379), and in the Latin Church of SS. Ambrose 
 (340-397), Hilary (300-367), Augustine (354-430), and 
 Gregory the Great (542-604). Finally, there was an- 
 other school, of which St. Ephraim of Edessa (d. 378), 
 and St. John Chrysostom of Antioch (347-407), were 
 
THE WORLD IN GENERAL. 2H 
 
 exponents, that interpreted literally the Mosaic record 
 of creation. 
 
 As to the age of man no attested discoveries of 
 geology have yet invalidated the authority of the 
 Sacred Text, nor can they do so, since the genealogi- 
 cal tables of Scripture are not complete, generations 
 being omitted here and there, the one purpose of the 
 Inspired Writers being " to follow the direct line." * 
 
 ABT III. — OEDEE OP THE UNTVEESE. 
 
 9. The order of the universe has its source in the subor- 
 dination of the special ends of the various kinds of being 
 to a common end, and in the manner in which each ieing 
 constantly attains its own end, and thereby the common 
 end. — Experience proves that every being works for an 
 end, and reason also tells us that God, who is infinite 
 wisdom, must appoint an end for each of His creatures. 
 But experience further shows us that the special ends 
 of the various kinds of being tend to one universal 
 end ; and reason likewise shows that God, having cre- 
 ated the world after one single protobype, must by the 
 very fact have given it one single end. On the other 
 hand, the subordination of ends presupposes a subor- 
 dination of the agents that concur to these ends ; for 
 since the end is reached by the action of the agent, 
 the ends that are subordinated must necessarily be 
 attained by the action of agents subordinated one 
 to another. All creatures are, therefore, bound to- 
 gether by this double subordination of end and ac- 
 tion ; and this' bond constitutes the order and har- 
 mony of the universe. 
 
 10. There is a natural gradation in created entities, so 
 
 * See Avologie de la Foi Chritienne, pp. 416-433. 
 
212 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 thit what is highest in an inferior order horders on what 
 is lowest in a superior order, and all < beings form as it 
 were a ladder iy which even from the lowest we ascend to 
 God. — Since all creatures are subordinated to one 
 another, it is evident that they must constitute a 
 hierarchical order and a natural gradation. Thus 
 man by his intellectual life is associated to the angels, 
 and by his sensitive life to mere animals ; brutes ap- 
 proach to man by sensitive life, and to plants by 
 vegetative life ; plants are allied to brutes by vegeta- 
 tive life, and to minerals by their purely chemical and 
 physical properties. (See Special Ideology, § 51-55). 
 
 11. The law of continuity, as set forth by Leibnitz, is 
 false, viz., that to unite one S2)ecies with another there 
 must be a species which possesses the qualities of the other 
 two. — These intermediate species, destined to unite 
 one class of beings with another, would have the 
 qualities essential to both, and would necessarily be 
 self-contradictory. Thus an animal-plant would be 
 both sensitive and not sensitive ; sensitive as an 
 animal, and not sensitive as a plant ; but such a bemg 
 is impossible. Without doubt, among the species of 
 the same genus there is such a gradation that the 
 intermediate serve to join the lower with the higher 
 species. So also the less perfect species of a higher 
 genus help to connect it with a genus of a lower 
 order. Yet in spite of these links there is always an 
 essential difference between one species and another, 
 between one genus and another; and this essential 
 distinction of beings is not less necessary than their 
 gradation, to constitute the admirable order of the 
 universe. 
 
 12. It is false to assert, with Geoffry SaintSilaire, 
 that there is unity of composition among entities, so that, 
 in spite of multitudinous individual differences, all are 
 
THE WORLD IN GENERAL. 213 
 
 referred to one and tlie saw^ prototype. — Since the sys- 
 tem of unity of composition is only a consequence of 
 the law of continuity, its falsity is demonstrated with 
 that of the law on which it depends. Besides, the 
 consequences of this law suffice to show its error. 
 For the doctrine that there is no other than an acci- 
 dental difference among beings, and that all substances 
 are really identical, leads by logical sequence to pan- 
 theism. On the other hand, if there is but one proto- 
 type which exists in all beings, materialists are not in 
 error when they regard life, nay, intelligence itself, 
 as differing from brute matter only as the greater 
 from the less. 
 
CHAPTEK n. 
 
 The World in Eelation to Non-Living oe Inorganic 
 Bodies. 
 
 art. i. — pkimitite eliements of bodies. 
 
 13. All the theories relative to the primitive elements of 
 hodies are necessarily reduced to three : Atomism, Dy- 
 namism, and the Scholastic system of Matter and Form. 
 — Bodies manifest themselves to us as endowed with 
 force and extension. But certain philosophers, regard- 
 ing- the latter as the only essential property, admit 
 only one principle in bodies, that of extension, and 
 look upon force as an accident superadded to this 
 principle. They are called Atomists. Others, called 
 Dynamists, will have it that extension is produced 
 by the active principle of bodies. Lastly, the School- 
 men, avoiding equally these two extremes, have ad- 
 mitted two distinct principles in bodies, matter and 
 form. Whatever other opinions are held as to the 
 principles of bodies may easily be reduced to one of 
 these systems. For either the body is composed of 
 extended atoms, or it is constituted of active forces, or 
 it has within it both a principle of extension and a 
 principle of activity. 
 
 14. Atomism is false iecause it destroys i,he substan- 
 tial difference hetween hodies. — The atomic theory was 
 taught in ancient times by Epicurus, Democritus, 
 
NON-LIVING OR INORGANIO BODIES. 215 
 
 and Leucippus, and more recently by DescarteSj 
 Gassendi (1592-1655), and Newton (1642-1727). It 
 considers extended atoms, i.e., indivisible substances, 
 to be the sole constituent elements of bodies. (1) 
 Whether the supporters of this system hold that 
 the atoms are homogeneous or that they are hetero- 
 geneous, whether they endow the atoms with such or 
 such qualities, it is still evident that their theory makes 
 force in bodies an impossibility, since it views them as 
 purely passive entities without any energy of their own. 
 This is equally opposed to reason and experience. (2) 
 It is also manifest that ijx this theory there is no sub- 
 stantial difference among bodies. For, if all the atoms 
 are of the same nature, bodies will differ from one an- 
 other only by a greater or less degree of condeiisation 
 or rarefaction. Water, for instance, will differ from fire 
 only by a greater or less condensation of its constit- 
 uent atoms. If the atoms are not of the same nature 
 they will never constitute substantial units, and bodies 
 will be only accidental aggregations of atoms, which 
 are united by attraction or by chance. To illustrate, 
 water will be only the reunion of two volumes of hy- 
 drogen and one of oxygen ; it will have no substantial 
 nature, no properties of its own, but will possess only 
 the united substances and properties of hydrogen 
 and oxygen. 
 
 15. Dynmnism is false iecause it makes extension an 
 impossibility. — The dj'namic theory, proposed ages 
 ago by Pythagoras and adopted in modern times by 
 Leibnitz (1646-1716), Boscovich (1711-1787), and Kant 
 (1724-1804), maintains that the only elements of bodies 
 are monads, i.e., simple inextended active substances. 
 This theory is manifestly absurd. For by regarding 
 monads as simple substances it suppresses a funda- 
 mental property of bodies, viz., extension. For in 
 
216 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 extension there are two elements, viz., multiplicity 
 and continuity of parts. But if it be maintained with 
 Leibnitz that the monads are placed side by side, ex- 
 tension is impossible, because two indivisible ele- 
 ments cannot come in contact without penetrating 
 each other. If, again, it be stated with Boscovich 
 that the monads are endowed with the forces of at- 
 traction and repulsion, extension is equally impos- 
 sible ; for two inextended points can never produce 
 extension, whatever be the relation in which they 
 exist. Given two points at a determinate distance, 
 we can never say that we have a line ; nor can any 
 number of separate points make a line. 
 
 16. The Scholastic system ofTnatter and form is demon- 
 strated hy the study of the very nature of bodies ; and it 
 alone explains the extension and force with which iodies 
 are endowed. — The system taught by Aristotle and 
 Plato in ancient times, and in the Christian era by 
 St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and generally by all the 
 philosophers of the Schools, admits two distinct prin- 
 ciples as the ultimate constituents of bodies: one 
 called mutter, or, as it is tevmedL, primordial ov primary 
 matter, to distinguish it from that out of which some- 
 thing is made by art, and which is called secondary 
 matter; the other called form, and more precisely, 
 substantial ^orin, to distinguish it from that which is 
 added to the subject after it is already complete in its 
 substantial entity, and which is known as accidental 
 form,. According to the Schoolmen, matter is nothing 
 but a reality indeterminate as body, and incapable of 
 existing by itself ; because it is not a principle of 
 unity and activity, but only the basis of extension. 
 As by reason of its indetermination it presents only a 
 pure aptitude to become by virtue of the form this or 
 that body, it is defined as a substantial potentiality, i.e., 
 
NON-LIVING OR INOBGANIO BODIES. 217 
 
 such a principle as though not yet a corporeal sub- 
 stance, is still apt to become any corporeal substance 
 whatever. The /brm is a simple principle and in it- 
 self inextended ; it constitutes each body in its own 
 species, and is the principle of unity and operation. 
 It is defined as ihejirst act of matter, because by it the 
 matter which has already an aptitude to become this 
 or that body, really becomes this or that body. An 
 easy proof of the existence of matter and form is 
 drawn from the substantial changes of bodies. For 
 everybody is subject to the law of change; but a 
 body changes "vyhen it becomes what it was not before, 
 and ceases to be what it was.* Hence in every change 
 we observe: (1) The subject which changes, and 
 which, not having at the beginning of the change 
 that which it is found to have at the end, may be 
 conceived as really distinct from the state that it 
 acquires after the change; (2) The determination 
 to be such a body before, and the determination to 
 be such a body after the change, determinations 
 which by their subtraction and addition produce the 
 change. The subject that changes is the matter 
 when the change is substantial, otherwise the sub- 
 ject of the change is the substance; the determina- 
 tion to be actually such a body is the substantial 
 form. The truth of this system of rnatter and form is 
 also proved by the fact that it alone reconciles what is 
 true in the arguments put forth by the atomists and 
 dynamists in favor of their theories, and is free from 
 the absurd and contradictory consequences of their 
 doctrines. For in it the imatter accounts for the ex- 
 
 * Thus, to borrow the example of Father Harper, an atom of car- 
 bon may be traced from the air to the grass of the field, thence to 
 the sheep, and later to the human body, from which it returns totho 
 air. 
 
218 BEAL PEIL080PHT. 
 
 tension of bodies ; and ih.eform for their substantial 
 unity and their active forces.* 
 
 AET. II. — PEOPEETIES OS MATTER AND FOEM. 
 
 17. Primary matter has no existence of its own ; it is 
 indifferent to all modes of corporeal leing ; it indimdual- 
 izes the form from which it receives its perfection ; it is 
 the same for all hodies ; it tends naturally to the form ; 
 it is incapable of generation or corruption. — -Primary 
 matter cannot have an existence of its own, because it 
 has being in potentiality only ; whereas it is being in 
 act that really exists. It is indifferent to all inodes of 
 corporeal being, for if it were determined to receive a 
 particular form, the substantial changes that we see 
 in nature would be impossible. The matter individ- 
 ualizes the form ; for as the matter, although suscep- 
 tible of several forms, is yet limited by the form that it 
 receives, so the form, which, considered in itself, may 
 be applied to a multitude of beings, is determined by 
 the matter. The matter is the same for all bodies, as 
 experience shows, for we observe the same subject 
 passing through all the varieties of corporeal being.f 
 The matter tends naturally to the form, for, as a poten- 
 tiality, it is naturally ordained to an act. Lastly, the 
 matter is incapable of generation or corruption; for as 
 primary matter is the first subject of all substantial 
 changes, it excludes by that very fact every previ- 
 ously existing material subject. It can proceed from 
 nothing else, and is therefore incapable of generation, 
 and must be produced by creation. And as the mat 
 
 * See Metaphysics of tlie School, vol. ii., pp. 315-371, for adetailed 
 account of these theories with the various arguments for and against. 
 
 f Only primary matter and informing form are meant in these 
 two articles. 
 
NON-LIVING OR INOBOANIO BODIES. 219 
 
 ter remains always the same from its origin, viz., by 
 itself a mere potentiality, it suffers no alteration, it 
 is incorruptible ; and as it could begin only by creation, 
 so it can end only by annihilation. 
 
 For a better understanding of the nature and prop- 
 erties of primary matter, we need only compare them 
 with the nature and properties of secondary matter. 
 Thus, when we see secondary matter, a mass of 
 bronze, for example, disposed to take on all artistic 
 forms, to become a statue, a table, or a basin, we can 
 conceive how primary matter is disposed to assume 
 all substantial forms, to become a stone, a plant, or 
 an animal. When we observe that this mass of 
 bronze cannot exist without some kind of form from 
 which it is really distinct, we understand how pri- 
 mary matter can have no existence of its own apart 
 from every substantial form, and how to the eyes of 
 reason it is still distinct from all substantial forms. 
 When we consider also that the bronze is indifferent to 
 being round or square, we infer the indifference of 
 primary matter to receive this or that substantial 
 form. And as the mass of bronze makes concrete the 
 round or square figure that terminates it, so we per- 
 ceive how the primary matter individualizes the form 
 by which it passes into act. Finally, the mass of 
 bronze remains always the same during the various 
 changes of form which it is made to undergo, and is 
 always the subject of these changes ; and so we con- 
 clude that the primary matter is the same for all 
 bodies, and that it can neither be generated nor cor- 
 rupted.* 
 
 18. All forms, except those that are intellective, are capa- 
 
 * Compare Metaphysics of tTie Selwol, vol. ii., pp. 187-215, a»d pp. 
 385-505. 
 
220 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 hie of generation and corruption. — Substantial forms are 
 of two kinds, subsisting and informing. The former 
 exist alone without being united with matter, and of 
 thiese are the " angels ; " the latter have existence 
 only when united with matter; as, the form of an 
 "animal" or a "plant." The "human soul" shares 
 the nature of both these forms, because it can exist 
 with the body or without the body. But it is evi- 
 dent that all other forms than the angels and the 
 human soul are capable of generation and corruption. 
 For siuce it is by virtue of its form that a body is 
 this or that substance, it follows that in substantial 
 changes what was one kind of substance becomes 
 another kind, because the matter loses one form and 
 receives another. Hence, in substantial changes, the 
 old form is corrupted and the new one is generated ; 
 and as every form, except an intellective one, is sub- 
 ject to perish and give place to another form, every 
 one, except an intellective form, must be capable of 
 corruption and generation. * 
 
 To understand better the nature and properties of 
 the substantial form, we have only to compare them 
 with the nature and properties of the accidental form. 
 Thus when we consider the figure or accidental form 
 of a mass of bronze which, although it cannot exist 
 without being united to the bronze, is still distinct 
 from it, we understand how the informing substantial 
 form, although it cannot exist without the matter, is 
 still distinct from the matter. From perceiving how, 
 by the form given to it, the bronze becomes a statue 
 or a vase, we learn how the substantial form causes 
 
 * Intellective forms are inoapaole of eduction from the potentiality 
 of the matter, because they are spiritual, and spiritual being cannot 
 be the term of material action, since no effect can exceed the power 
 of its cause. 
 
NON-LIVING on INOBGANIO BODIES 221 
 
 the matter to be actually this or that substance. If, 
 moreover, we observe that when a new form is given 
 to the bronze the old one passes away, we understand 
 something- of how substantial forms are corrupted 
 and generated. 
 
 19. The cori'uptible forms of bodies are not created, hut 
 they are educed hy the action of the agent from the poten- 
 tiality of the matter. — Corruptible forms are contained 
 potentially in the matter ; hence, when they are pro- 
 duced by the action of the agent, they cannot be said 
 to be made out of nothing ; but they are educed from 
 the potentiality of the matter, just as the form which 
 the sculptor gives to the marble is not said to be 
 drawn from nothing, but from the potentiality of the 
 marble to become a statue. * Of corruptible forms 
 only the first that informed matter have been created ; 
 since matter cannot exist without form, these first 
 forms cannot have been educed from the potentiality 
 of the matter. Matter and the first forms of matter 
 were concreated.t 
 
 * ' ' No Form strictly speaking can be corrupted. It is the com- 
 iposite that is corrupted ; and corruption is metonymioally predicated 
 of the Form. By the corruption of the substantial composite the 
 Form ceases to be in act. But it is not annihilated, just as it was 
 not created or made. It recedes then into the potentiality of the 
 matter ;^in other words, it is no longer actual, but virtually exists in 
 the matter after such sort that, should the requisite dispositions 
 recur, it can again be educed out of the matter." — Metaphysias of the 
 School, vol. ii., p. 486. 
 
 f "It is plain that the composite element was the primary and 
 adequate term, the matter and Form partial and secondary terms, of 
 the Divine act of creation. 
 
 " We say, then, with St. Thomas, that the two constituents were 
 concreated and that the composite was created ; — or, more accurately, 
 that the constituents, Form and Matter, were concreated in the crea- 
 tion of the composite." — See Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., prop. 
 184, p. 495. 
 
222 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 AET. III. — THE NATUEAL COMPOSITE. 
 
 20. Bodies in nature are called natural composites, he- 
 cause they are constituted hy the natural union of matter 
 and form. — Neither the matter alone nor the form alone 
 constitutes the complete being ; but this consists in 
 the whole resulting from their union, which is there- 
 fore called a natural composite. This composite, which 
 is a product of nature, differs from an artificial com- 
 posite, which is a work of art, for the parts of the 
 natural composite form a unity of being and of sub- 
 stance, while the parts of the artificial composite pre- 
 serve each its own being and substance., The " stones " 
 in a building retain their own being and nature, and 
 are natural composites; the "building'' is artificial. 
 
 21. T?ie tnatter and form of the natural composite are 
 united immediately hy the action of the agent, without re- 
 quiring any intermediate Itond of connection.*' — The mat- 
 ter and form of the natural composite are not united 
 by means of a third object, as two stones are united 
 in a building by means of the mortar ; for potentiality 
 united with act is potentiality in act. Since, there- 
 fore, the form is united to the matter as act to poten- 
 tiality, nothing intervenes to unite them except the 
 action of the agent by which the matter is constituted 
 in act ; just as no medium is necessary to unite the 
 marble and the form of a statue given to it, the labor 
 of the sculptor alone being sufficient. 
 
 22. The natural compodte is not a mere collection of 
 two entities, matter and form ; it is a third entity distinct 
 from these. — The matter and form separately cannot 
 be called substances ; the substance is the composite 
 
 * Compare Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., pp. 616-627. 
 
NON-LIVma OR INORGANIO BODIES. 223 
 
 that results from their union. Therefore the composite 
 is not a mere contact of the two entities, matter and 
 form, as a dozen of pens would be a collection of twelve 
 pens ; but it is a new entity, distinct from the matter 
 and form, and resulting from their union. Thus we 
 understand how the agent truly produces something, 
 although he makes neither the matter nor the form ; 
 for by the very fact that he unites the form to the 
 matter, he produces that which before did not exist, 
 the composite. 
 
 23. The form of a compound iody in nature, at least 
 when the combination is perfect, is not a Tnere mechanical 
 mixture of elements ; it is a substantial reality or entity 
 which is distinct from, the elements. — A compound (or 
 mixed) body * is that which is formed by the union of 
 several elements, as "water," which is formed by 
 uniting hydrogen and oxygen. When the union is 
 perfect — that is, when the elements are so united as to 
 form a substance specifically distinct, as in the case 
 
 * The phrase, mixed, liodies, as employed by the Scholastic philoso- 
 phers, " is specially applied to those compound bodies which are the 
 result of chemical combination. — Avicenna, against whom the pres- 
 ent Thesis is mainly directed, maintained that the substantial Forms 
 of the elements, or simple bodies, remain actually in the compound 
 substance, and that the mixture is accidental — that is to say, that 
 these compounds are a mere combination of the qualities proper to 
 the respective elements." According to Averrhoes, " the greatest of 
 the Arabian Peripatetics, — the forms of the elements are the most 
 imperfect of all substantial Forms. Wherefore, they are half-way, as 
 it were, between substantial and accidental Forms, so as to admit of 
 increase and diminution. Accordingly, in the compound they be- 
 come relaxed in energy by mutual reaction, and conspire toward the 
 production of the substantial Form of the compound." — Metaphysics 
 of tlie School, vol. ii., p. 675; consult entire proposition. — The dis- 
 tinction of modem chemists between mechanical mixture and chemi- 
 cal combination is clearly gathered from the statement of Avicenna's 
 opinion and the thesis which it opposes. 
 
224 BBAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of " water," the compound body does not consist in a 
 simple combination of elements, but has a proper sub- 
 stantial form, since from the mixture there results a 
 new substance, and every substance is constituted by 
 its proper form. 
 
 24. The substantial forms of the elements do not re- 
 main in compound bodies. — Two substantial forms 
 cannot exist together in the same matter, as may be 
 seen from the very nature of substantial form, which, 
 being the first act of matter, implies that all the 
 supervening forms will only give the matter a second 
 being after the first, and that, consequently, they will 
 be only secondary forms. But a compound (or mixed) 
 body has its own substantial form ; hence the sub- 
 stantial forms of the elements cannot remain in the 
 body. Yet, although the forms of the elements no 
 longer exist actually in compound bodies, they re- 
 main virtually, and the properties of the elements 
 survive the destruction of the forms which made the 
 elements what they were.* 
 
 AET. IV. — SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES OF BODIES, OB GENEEA- 
 TION AND COKEDPTION. 
 
 25. Generation and corruption are changes as to sub- 
 stantial forms ; generation is the gaining of a new sub- 
 stantial form, which with matter makes a new substance ; 
 and corruption is the losing of a substantial form, and 
 the consequent destruction of the substance. — Whenever a 
 substantial change takes place in a natural com- 
 posite, a new form is produced or generated, and the 
 old form passes away or is corrupted. Hence, i& 
 every substantial change, as matter cannot be with- 
 
 *See§19, Note 1. 
 
NON-LIVING OR INOBGANIO BODIES. 225 
 
 out form, the corruption of ont form is the generation 
 of another. More strictly speaking, generation takes 
 place when the matter of an inferior form becomes in- 
 vested with a superior form ; and corruption takes 
 place when the matter loses a superior form and as- 
 sumes an inferior one. 
 
 26. In substantial corruption the substantial form of the 
 previous composite does not rsmain, the accidental forins 
 also disappear.^ Since there is only one substantial 
 form in the composite, when the new form supervenes, 
 the form of the previous composite no longer re- 
 mains. And because the subject which supports the 
 accidents ceases to exist, the accidents also pass away. 
 
 27. The accidents which precede a generated form dis- 
 pose the matter for the reception of this form. — The 
 matter cannot naturally receive the form without cer- 
 tain accidents which dispose it for this form. Acci- 
 dental forms are of two kinds : some are preparator')/ 
 and precede the form ; others are concomitant and ac- 
 company the form. Thus the " degree of heat which 
 the wood reaches before bursting into flames, imme- 
 diately precedes the form of fire, and the intensity of 
 the heat is an accident which accompanies the form." 
 The preparatory dispositions cease at the moment of 
 generation, and are immediately replaced by the 
 others ; and just as the former make way for the re- 
 ception of the form, so the others tend to preserve its 
 existence in the matter.* 
 
 AET. V. — PEOPEETIBS OF BODIES. 
 
 28. There are two kinds of qualities in bodies : primary 
 and secondary qualities. — Experience makes known 
 
 ♦ See Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., prop. 146, p. 278. 
 15 
 
226 RMAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 to US two kinds of qualities in bodies : one constant, 
 permanent, and common to all bodies ; as, " extension, 
 figure, diyisibility, and motion ; " the other varied in 
 different bodies and in different states of the same 
 body ; as " color, sound, taste, smell, and resistance." 
 The former are styled primary, because they are the 
 basis and condition of the others. The latter are also 
 called secondary, because they have their foundation 
 •in the primary qualities. 
 
 29. The fundamental property of bodies is extension, 
 which results from, tlie multiplicity and continuity of the 
 parts. — Bodies are first manifested to us as composed 
 of many and continuous parts. This multiplicity and 
 this continuity of parts constitute the extension of 
 bodies. It is the property that first flows from their 
 essence. Tet although it is false to make it, with the 
 Dynamists, something merely apparent, not real, it is 
 none the less absurd to hold, with Descartes, that it is 
 the very essence of bodies. For before extension can 
 be had there must be the extended substance ; hence 
 extension, far from constituting the corporeal sub- 
 stance, rather presupposes it. Besides, with extension 
 alone the substantial unity of bodies and their active 
 principle cannot be explained. 
 
 30. Bodies are naturally impenetrable, that is, two 
 bodies cannot be in the same place at the sajne time, un- 
 less by th^e power of God. — This is a truth attested by 
 experience. Besides, impenetrability is a consequence 
 of extension ; for if a body in virtue of its extension 
 occupies a particular space, it must for that reason pre- 
 vent another body fiom occupying the same space.* 
 
 * Compare Russo's proposition, Sum. PhU., pp. 345-352, that "rea- 
 son cannot evidently demonstrate any intrinsic contradiction in 
 the compenetration or the multl- location of bodies, so that not even by 
 divine power would it be possible either for several bodies to be in 
 
NON-LIVING OB INORGANIO BODIES. '2i'2,1 
 
 31. It is essential to the extension of hodies to have 
 parts that, nuxthematically considered, are always d/i- 
 visible. — The indivisible is inextended ; but the inex- 
 tended added to the inextended will never produce 
 the extended. Hence, metaphysically and mathemat- 
 ically considered, the parts that constitute the exten- 
 sion of a body are necessarily divisible ad infinitum. 
 Still this is true mathematically, not physically ; for 
 a part may become so small as to be insufficient for 
 the operations of any natural form (p. 188). It is also 
 to be noted that this divisibility is infinite not actu- 
 ally, but potentially. 
 
 32. Every hody is subject to motion. Motion is the 
 actual tendency of a Tnovable entity to its term. — Expe- 
 
 tte same place at the same time, or the same body to be in several 
 adequate places." The first part of the proposition the author proves 
 from the fact that a body does not cease to be a body, though it be 
 prevented by God from exerting its power of resistance, or from pro- 
 ducing any effect by that power. This is important when applied to 
 the miracle of Christ's resurrection and His entrance into the closed 
 supper-room. The second part he establishes by showing that the 
 unity and indivision of the body remain when the body Is present in 
 many places at the same time ; that its quantity is not lost, nor in- 
 creased, nor diminished, but its external relations are multiplied. 
 A contrary view is that of St. Thomas, who reasoning from the fact 
 that a body is in place ciroumscriptively, i.e. , so in place that ijt is 
 bounded by the dimensions of that place, and that no part of it is 
 outside the place, concludes that it is impossible even by miracle for 
 a body to be locally in two places at once. ^Sup. q. 85, art. 3, ad 
 3.] The question concerns certain facts in the lives of a few saints, 
 St. Alphonsus Liguori, for instance, but does not touch the presence 
 of Christ upon our altars. For in heaven the body of our Savloijr 
 exists locally or circumsoriptively, i. e. , the parts of His body cor- 
 respond to the parts of the place, since a body is in place by means 
 of its extension ; but in the Holy Eucharist His body, by the words 
 of consecration, is present after the manner of substance, the nature 
 of which is entire in the whole dimensions and in each part of the 
 dimensions that contain it. [iSum. Th. , iii. , q. 86. art. 3, ad 6.] 
 
228 SEAL PHILOSOPnT. 
 
 rience proves that every body is subject to motion. 
 This quality undoubtedly supposes an agent that 
 gives an extrinsic impulse; but it also supposes in 
 the body an intrinsic principle of passivity in virtue 
 of which it receives and retains the force of the im- 
 pulse given and continues to move. Motion is de- 
 fined by Aristotle as " the act of an entity existing in 
 potentiality." It is an act relatively to the past and 
 present, but in potentiality relatively to the " future." 
 The meaning of this definition can be readily under- 
 stood, if for the moment we limit it to locomotion, 
 the principal species of motion. Let the movement 
 of a body be represented by a line, between whose 
 initial and final points is virtually contained " an 
 indefinite number of potential points." The initial 
 point will represent the term whence {temminus a quo), 
 and the final point the term whither {terrrdnvs ad 
 quern) ; the line itself will represent motion. At any 
 one of the potential points " the body in motion is 
 in act up to this imagined point, but is in potentiality 
 to the remainder of the line." * 
 
 AET VI. — SPACE AND TIME. 
 
 33. Seal space is real extension ofiodies with an added, 
 relation of container to contained. — Every body is ex- 
 tended. Now, when abstracting from bodies, we 
 conceive their e:^ension, we form the idea of space in 
 general, w;hence it is evident that real or positive 
 space is not in itself distinct from the extension of 
 bodies. And since the extension of a body is con- 
 stituted by the relative distance of its parts, just as 
 the extension between two bodies is constituted by 
 
 *See MekipTiysics of the School, vol. iii., pp. 375-280 ; 310-313, 411. 
 See Logic, § 16. 
 
NON-LIVING OR INOBQANIO BODIES. 229 
 
 the relative distance of their surfaces, space cannot 
 be conceived without extension. Yet it by no means 
 follows that space is identical with extension ; it sup- 
 poses real extension, says Zigliara, "but it adds a 
 certain relation to extension, not indeed a relation of 
 existing corporeal things with one another and with 
 possible bodies, as Leibnitz holds, but a relation or 
 order of the parts of extension with one another. 
 This relation is founded on extension, and immedi- 
 ately arises from the distance of the continuous 
 parts," which space contains. 
 
 34. It is erroneous to admit with Epicurus and-Demo- 
 critus that vacuous space is substance. — Yacuous space 
 is a mere negation ; fey: we call that a vacuum which 
 is occupied by no body. But a pure negation is noth- 
 ing ; vacuous space, therefore, cannot be anything 
 really existing in nature. Besides, a vacuous space 
 distinct from bodies would necessarily be extended. 
 But whatever has extension needs space to contain it ; 
 and thus we should be forced to admit an infinite series 
 of spaces contained one in another, which is absurd. 
 
 35. It is an error to hold, with Newton and Clarke, 
 that space is the immensity of God. — Space cannot be 
 conceived otherwise than as extended ; therefore, were 
 it an attribute of God, we would be forced to admit that 
 God has extension. Besides, if space were an attri- 
 bute of God, it would be God Himself, since the divine 
 essence and attributes are really identical ; therefore 
 we would be obliged to conclude that the bodies that 
 fill space occupy a part of the divine essence.* 
 
 36. Time is the number or sum, of Tnotion with refer- 
 ence to before atid after. — Motion consists essentially in 
 
 * The source of this error is a confounding of vacuous or imagin- 
 ary space with real space. But the latter is essentially /miie ; tha 
 former is not infinite, but indefinite. 
 
230 BISAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a continuous succession of parts, one of whicli is be. 
 fore and the other after; that which numbers the 
 extent of this succession is time. But time measures 
 the succession in so far as it expresses the relation 
 of the changes which constitute the succession, and 
 this relation is nothing but the order of the succes- 
 sion. Hence time is defined as the number of motion 
 with reference to hefore and after. 
 
 37. Time is neither present nor existing in reference to 
 hefore and after, hut only in reference to the present in- 
 stant. — The present instant, the now, is the indivisible 
 that connects the hefore and after, and with them con- 
 stitutes the essentials of time ; and all three are ele- 
 ments of motion, which is implied in time. Motion 
 implies a substance that moves or is changed. The 
 now (nunc)' which always accompanies the moving 
 entity as its accident, cannot be considered otherwise 
 than as moving without destroying the very -idea of 
 time and going away from the truth. Mere succes- 
 sion is not time ; it is the number of the motion caus- 
 ing succession, with reference to before and after, that 
 constitutes time. Time resembles a sphere in constant ' 
 motion ; if in its motion we consider it as present in a 
 place, disregarding the distance over which it has 
 passed and that which it has yet to traverse, there is 
 no motion, but an indivisible point of motion ; if, on 
 the other hand, we consider the constant motion of 
 the sphere from one place to another, we see existing 
 or rather passing motion. Hence the idea of time, as 
 formed by the mind when it considers succession and 
 abstracts from the successive things, is ohjective as to the 
 indivisible present which alone is real ; it is subjective 
 in regard to the past, which no longer exists, and the 
 future, which does not yet exist except in our mind. 
 
 38. They err who, with Cicero and Gassendi, regard 
 
NON-LIVING OR INOBGANIO BODIES. 231 
 
 tinw as an incorporeal entity apart from successive things. 
 — Time implies siiccessive duration ; but duration in- 
 dependent of the things that endure is a mere ab- 
 straction, as is motion independent of the things that 
 move.* 
 
 39. Newton, Clarke, and the French Eclectic School 
 e?T in regarding time as the eternity of God. — Time 
 implies succession, and succession implies change ; 
 therefore if time is a divine attribute, God is subject 
 to change.f 
 
 * Duration Is of three kinds: eternity, which is, according to Boe- 
 thius, the "simultaneous, complete, and entire possession of life that 
 can never end " ; aevum, the everlasting existence of created spirits, 
 i.e., of angels and human souls; and time, which is proper to 
 material entities. 
 
 f Immanuel Kant, styled by admiring disciples the " Aristotle of 
 modern thought," will have it that our ideas of space and time are 
 not derived by abstraction from daily experience. In his own words : 
 " Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatso- 
 ever. Space, as the pure form of external intuition, is limited as a 
 condition a priori to external phenomena alone." Kant's principles, 
 as given in his Critique of Pure Reason, imply the rejection of pre- 
 viously established habits and laws of thought, and the setting up in 
 their stead ot forms of tliougM, i.e., subjective. conditions that are 
 prior to all experience, and so modify all phenomena that we can 
 never know essences [noumena] as they are in themselves, but only 
 as affected by these subjective forms. "Kant undertook the task of 
 constructing a foundation for scientific knowledge amid the chaotic 
 heap of ruins which the scepticism of Hume had left." "Xethe 
 utterly fails to bridge over the chasm which Hume made between 
 the subjective and the objective, — between thought and reality, — be- 
 tween human intelligence and that external world whose objective 
 existence is assured to us by the general voice of mankind in all ages, 
 by the safe instincts of common sense, and by that cogent argu- 
 ment of a practical necessity which scatters to the winds all mere 
 dreams of the study, however geometrical in construction." See 
 Summary of Kant's Doctrine in Metaphysics of the Sc7iool,yo\. ii., pp. 
 lM-135. 
 
CHAPTEK in. 
 
 The Woeld: — ^Living Beings, 
 aet. i. — ^life in geneeal. 
 
 40. A living heing is one that produces or is capable of 
 producing immanent action. — Immanent action is action 
 which proceeds from a principle intrinsic in the sub- 
 ject, and which does not go outside the subject. But 
 life, considered as the principle of operation in a liv- 
 ing being, manifests itself by immanent action ; and 
 considered as a substantial element of a living being, 
 it produces, or is capable of producing, immanent 
 action. 
 
 41. The lowest degree of life is found in plants, a higher 
 degree in anim^als, a still higher degree in rational be- 
 ings, and the highest degree in God. — Two things are 
 necessary to constitute immanent action. First, the 
 action must proceed from an intrinsic principle ; sec- 
 ondly, it must not go out of the subject from which it 
 proceeds. From these two points of view the life of 
 plants is the least perfect. For in action we may 
 consider (1) the execution ; (2) the form which 
 determines the agent ; and (3) the end to which the 
 operation tends. Now a plant is active in itself in 
 regard to the first only of these three things; but 
 it does not predetermine the end of its action, nor 
 does it acquire by its own power the form which im- 
 mediately influences it to" act. It is God who has 
 assigned its end, of which, however, the plant has no 
 
THE WORLD :— LIVING BEINGS. 233 
 
 knowledge ; and nature gives the form by which it is 
 determined to act, although it cannot direct the influx 
 of that form. If we regard immanence of action un- 
 der the second aspect, the action of the plant, it is 
 true, remains in the plant ; but not in the faculty that 
 acts. The nutritiye molecules absorbed through the 
 roots and leaves do not remain in the roots and leaves, 
 but feed the whole plant. — The life of animals is 
 higher than that of plants. On the one hand, since 
 brutes act in virtue of a knowledge acquired through 
 the senses, they in some sort give themselves the 
 form that immediately determines their action; on 
 the other hand, the act of sensation, which is proper 
 to them, remains not only in the subject, but also in 
 the faculty that produces it. Still, on account of the 
 necessary concurrence of the, material organ, this act 
 does not remain in the vital principle only, but in the 
 sense or organ, that is, in the composite, to which 
 sensation properly belongs. — In rational and intellect- 
 ual beings immanence of action is perfect. The end 
 of the action is not imposed on them by nature as in 
 the case of anitoals ; but they determine it and choose 
 it themselves. Besides, the intellectual act not being 
 exercised with the concurrence of a material organ, it 
 belongs entirely to the intellectual faculty alone. — 
 Nevertheless, it is only in God and not in created in- 
 telligences, that action attains the highest degree of 
 immanence. For the action of a created intelligence 
 proceeds from a substantial principle that holds its 
 being from God. Besides, in created intelligences the 
 action and the faculty are distinct from the essence of 
 the agent. God alone is exempt from all these imper- 
 fections. He has no end proposed to Him by an- 
 other ; but He is Himself the last end of all things. 
 In Him action, the power of acting, and essence are 
 
234 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 identified. He is not only living in tlie highest de- 
 gree, He is life itself, the source and principle of all 
 life. 
 
 AET. n. — ^THE SOUL OE LIFE- PRINCIPLE OF LIYING COM- 
 POSITES. 
 
 42. The principle of life in living composites is the soul. 
 The soul is the first act of aphy.m.cal organic iody suit- 
 ably disposed to receive life. — The living composite can 
 have life only through its substantial form. The 
 animating form is called the soul. The soul is said 
 to be the first act of a body, because it is the substan- 
 tial form of the body, that which gives it first being 
 and animates it. The term physical shows that .the 
 soul is proper only to natural bodies, and not to arti- 
 ficial and mathematical bodies. The soul is called 
 the first act of an organic body, because the functions 
 of the soul being different, and each of them requiring 
 an organ of its own, every body united to a sotilmust 
 necessarily have different organs. Finally, the words, 
 suitably disposed to receive life, imply that the soul 
 cannot be the form of every body in any condition 
 whatever, but only of a body so disposed that it can 
 have life and remain in the condition necessary to 
 life. These words also convey the meaning that the 
 property of the soul is to give life actually to the 
 body which has only the potentiality of receiving it, 
 and to render it capable of the operations of life, 
 though not to constitute it always actually in opera, 
 tion. 
 
 43. There are three kinds of soul : vegetative, sensitive, 
 and rational. — T^iere are as many kinds of soul as there 
 are kinds of life. But as life exceeds the ordinary 
 powers of matter, there are as many kinds of life as 
 
TSE WORLD :— LIVING BEINGS. 235 
 
 there are degrees in which vital operations surpass the 
 powers of matter. These degrees are^hree in number. 
 For there is (1)_ such action as exceeds the powers 
 of matter in this, that it proceeds from a principle 
 intrinsic in the subject in which it is manifested, 
 although it is produced dependently on matter and its 
 qualities ; this is vegetative operation. For example, 
 nutrition and the other actions related to it are pro- 
 duced not simply by means of corporeal organs, but 
 also by means of the physical and chemical forces 
 of nature. (2) There is also an operation which is 
 exercised by means of a corporeal organ, but not in 
 virtue of any quality proper to matter ; this is sen- 
 sitive operation. Thus, although moisture, heat, and 
 other corporeal qualities are required for the operation 
 of the senses, still the act of sensation is not produced 
 by means of these qualities, which are requisite merely 
 that the organ of sensation may be suitably disposed. 
 Lastly, there is (3) an operation which surpasses 
 corporeal nature in this, that it is not exercised 
 in virtue of any quality proper to matter, like veg- 
 etation, nor through the concurrence of material 
 organs, like sensation ; this is the operation of the 
 rational soul. As there are but three kinds of soul, so 
 there are three mpdes of life — the vegetative, the sen- 
 sitive, and the intellectual. Locomotion, it is true, is 
 not, strictly speaking, common to all creatures hav- 
 ing sensitive life. A distinction may, then, be made 
 between those animals that have only the sense of 
 touch, and perfect animals that are made aware by 
 their senses not only of what is near them, but also of 
 what is far removed, that direct themselves to these 
 distant objects, and consequently have also progres- 
 sive motion. Yet all animals have at least a power of 
 contraction and dilatation, and therefore some form of 
 
236 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 locomotion. H^nce there is no need to classify loco« 
 motion as a special mode. 
 
 44. In all living composites, even in those that possess 
 several kinds of life, there is only one soul that performs 
 all the functions of life. — In every living being, as 
 in every composite, tliere is only one substantial 
 form.* But experience proves that it is the soul that 
 in the case of living composites gives first being to 
 the body, and is, consequently, its substantial form ; 
 therefore the soul must be one. In composites having 
 several kinds of life, there is a superior soul which 
 performs the operations of inferior souls, just as a 
 greater number contains the smaller numbers, or as 
 a superior active power contains in its unity the in- 
 ferior active powers. But, although one in itself, the 
 soul of the living composite is virtually multiple 
 and informs all the parts of the body, enabling them 
 to exercise the various functions of life, as the same 
 blowing (blast) in the different pipes of an organ pro- 
 duces various sounds, according to the dispositions of 
 the pipes. 
 
 45. The soul is indivisible. — The indivisibility of the 
 soul is a truth attested by experience. For when a 
 member of a living body is amputated, it ceases to 
 be animated — that is, in dividing tiie body, the soul 
 has not been divided, and as the soul cannot follow 
 the amputated member, it ceases to inform that part 
 of the body, which is thenceforth deprived of life. 
 In a great number of plants, however, and in the im- 
 perfect animals, the soul is accidentally divisible,! 
 
 * What gives being to an entity also gives it unity ; but the sub- 
 stantial form gives being to bodily substance ; therefore, if the 
 substantial form were not one, the body would not be one. 
 
 f In these plants and animals the specific functions are few and 
 the organism is simple and diffused; "but with a complex and 
 
THE WORLD :— LIVING BEINGS. 237 
 
 like the form of minerals, whioli thomgh not divisible 
 in itself, is yet divisible accidentally — that is, in virtue 
 of the matter in which by its imperfection it is too 
 deeply immersed. Touching such a life principle 
 and such a form, the same remarks may be made as of 
 the affinity and the resistance of bodies, that although 
 inextended in themselves, they nevertheless become 
 extended and accidentally divisible by their entire 
 dependence on bodies for their being. 
 
 46. The soul does not act directly hy itself, hut through 
 the medium of its faculties. They are distinct from its 
 essence and tnay he defined as The proximate and im,- 
 mediate principles of the action to which tliey are natur- 
 ally ordained. — The essence of the soul does not 
 operate immediately by itself, for then it would ever 
 be actually producing all its vital actions, since 
 essence is unchangeable. Therefore, the operations 
 of the soul have not the essence of the soul for their 
 immediate principle, but faculties distinct from the 
 essence. In God alone the power, the operation, and 
 the essence are the same.* 
 
 47. Yital faculties are distinguished accwding to their 
 proper acts and objects. — Whatsoever entities are es- 
 sentially related to other entities have distinctions 
 corresponding to those found among the latter ; but 
 the vital faculties are essentially related to their 
 proper acts, and through these acts to certain ob- 
 jects ; therefore they are specified by these acts and 
 
 multifarious organism the case is very different. It takes but little 
 to supply the acranial head and the tail of a worm, but it would re- 
 quire a far more elaborate process to develop the eyes, ears, nose, a 
 vertebrate structure, heart, lungs, etc., out of the hoof of an ox." — • 
 Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., p. 654, and prop. 314. 
 
 * See Metaphysics of the Sclwol, vol. iii., pp. 305-219, and more 
 particularly, pp. 214^317. 
 
238 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 these objects. Thus the eyes are intended by nature 
 for seeing ; they are specified by the act of seeingj 
 and more remotely by the objects to be seen. 
 
 48. Although the powers of the soul are multiple, 
 the soul itself is simple. — The powers of the soul are 
 necessarily multiple ; for the soul produces opera- 
 tions which are not reducible one to the other, and 
 which, consequently, require distinct faculties. But 
 these faculties, although multiple, do not destroy the 
 simplicity of the soul's essence, whence they proceed ; 
 for, since they are distinct from the essence, they do 
 not enter into it as component parts ; they are not 
 parts of its essence, but diverse powers determining 
 the activity of the soul's essence, which of itself is 
 undetermined. Nevertheless, these faculties, though 
 distinct, are not independent of one another; since 
 the soul is one, its faculties must be subordinated 
 one to another, that this unity may not be de- 
 stroyed.* 
 
 49. Thepovjers of the soul are hy their nature inclined 
 to their proper operations. — ^As each power has been 
 given to the soul for -the accomplishment of a special 
 order of actions, it must naturally be inclined to per- 
 form these actions. This natural inclination of the 
 power does not refer to this or that individual action, 
 but to the whole species of actions which the power 
 can produce. Since the action is the effect of the 
 power inclined to produce it, it is evident that the 
 more intense the inclination of the power the more 
 perfect will the action be. But this peculiar intensity 
 
 * That tliere is a real distinction between the essence and the 
 powers of the soul is manifest from our mode of speaking of them, 
 from the very nature of the powers and their actions, and from the 
 testimony of consciousness. 
 
TH'E WORLD :—LIVINa BEINGS. ■ 239 
 
 in the inclination of one power impairs the exercise , 
 of another power. For example, he who exercises 
 his imagination to excess will do injury to his power 
 of judgment. This is easily explained, because the 
 activity of the faculties is a participation of the activ- 
 ity of the soul. But since the soul is one and indi- 
 visible and of limited power, the concentration of its 
 activity with particular intensity on one faculty must 
 be prejudicial to the other faculties. 
 
 50. There are Jive cliff erent faculties in the soul : vege- 
 tative, sensitive, intellectual, appetitive, and locomotive. 
 —The faculties of the soul are divided according to 
 their formal objects and actions. Now some powers 
 have for their object only the body to which the soul 
 is united ; these are vegetative powers. The soul of 
 the plant, for instance, acts only on its material or- 
 ganism. Other powers have for objects not only the 
 body to which the soul is united, but everything sen- 
 sible. Finally, there are powers that have for object 
 not only everything sensible, but all being what- 
 soever. When the soul has for the object of its oper- 
 ations other beings than its own body, it may attain to 
 them in two ways : (1) in so far as the soul knows 
 them and is united to them by their image or species ; 
 (2) in so far as the soul is borne toward these objects. 
 But the soul knows sensible objects through the me- 
 dium of its sensitive faculties, and universal natures 
 by its intellectual faculties. — There are two kinds of 
 faculties by which the soul is united to the objects to 
 which it tends : the sensitive appetite and the rational 
 appetite, by which it is inclined to seek its connatural 
 good. It has also a locomotive faculty, by which it 
 moves the body which it informs to seek what, is use- 
 ful and to avoid what is hurtful. 
 
240 REAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 AET. in. — THE BODIES OF LIVING COMPOSITES. 
 
 51. Ijivitig bodies differ from others in organism, ori- 
 gin, development, duration, mode of conservation, and re- 
 production. — Living bodies differ from non-living 
 bodies : (1) In their material constitution, because they 
 have organs of different conformation for the special 
 functions to be performed, and, therefore, they re- 
 ceive the name of organic hodies ; while non-living 
 bodies have a substance homogeneous in all its parts, 
 and are therefore called inorganic. An organism is 
 essential to the living composite, because diversity of 
 vital functions calls for diverse organs. (2) In their 
 origin, because living bodies proceed from constant 
 causes, to which they are at iirst substantially united 
 as germs ; while, on the contrary, non-living bodies 
 are produced by the accidental intervention oi causes 
 entirely external. (3) In their development, because 
 living bodies truly grow, developing in themselves 
 their proper type ; while non-living bodies simply 
 increase by external accretion or the addition of 
 parts. (4) In their duration, because living bodies 
 have an existence limited by their very nature ; while 
 the existence of non-living bodies is indefinite, and 
 can be destroyed only by an external cause. (5) In 
 their mode of conservation, because living bodies re- 
 pair their losses by the conversion of fresh nutriment 
 into their own substance, and are thus renewed with- 
 out losing their own individuality ; while non-living 
 bodies do not repair their losses, but remain such as 
 they were at first until they are resolved into other 
 substances. (6) In reproduction, because living bodies 
 are perpetuated in their species by their own virtue •, 
 
THE WORLD :— LIVING BEING8. 241 
 
 while non-living bodies are multipled only by the in- 
 tervention of external causes.* 
 
 52. The hodies of animals differ from those of plants, 
 first, in having a more perfect vegetative organism.; sec- 
 ondly, in having sensation ; thirdly, in having a special 
 organism adapted to the functions of sensitive life. — Ani- 
 mals perform two functions, one, called vegetative, 
 by which, like plants, they act upon their own bodies 
 and grow, nourish, and perpetuate themselves ; the 
 other, called sensitive, by which they perceive the ob- 
 jects that produce a sensible impression upon them, 
 and determine themselves to locomotion. For the 
 functions of the first kind, they have organs generi- 
 cally like those of plants, but differing in this, that 
 they produce effects more varied and above those to 
 which the activity of plants can attain. For the funC' 
 tions of the second kind animals have special organs : 
 the nervous system as the proper instrument of sensa- 
 tion, and the muscular system for spontaneous motion. 
 
 * Since living bodies differ essentially from non-living bodies, 
 spontaneous generation in the sense of the production of life from 
 no pre-existing germs and by the sole agency of physical and chemi- 
 cal forces is an utter impossibility. Traces of this theory are found 
 in ancient Greek philosophy, and, in a modified form, in many of 
 the Schoolmen, among whom are St. Bonaventure and apparently 
 St. Thomas ; but the latter merely believed that God the Creator 
 had given to matter the power, on the presence of certain conditions, 
 of producing the lowest and simplest forms of life, like infusoria. 
 But the apparatus at the disposition of modern science and the per- 
 severing experiments of Flourens, Dumas, Quatrefages, and espe- 
 cially Pasteur, hare proved that when air and water, in which the 
 germs are disseminated, have been excluded no generation occurs. 
 Of the result of Pasteur's experiment Tyndall says, " There is no 
 conclusion in experimental science more certain than that." The 
 obstinate persistency of Tiedemans, Brenser, Poncet, and Brooa, in 
 asserting the truth of spontaneous generation, has only served to 
 bring out its falsity more clearly. 
 16 
 
242 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 '^rhese organs are more or less perfect according to 
 the species in which they are found. In man the 
 animal organism attains a special perfection, because 
 in him sensibility is the minister and aid of the intel- 
 lect. This perfection is resplendent in the beauty of 
 man's form, in the upright posture of his body, in the 
 extreme delicacy of the nervous and muscular sys- 
 tems, and in the regularity and symmetry of all the 
 parts of his body. 
 
 AET. IV. — ^VEGETATIVE LIFE, OB THE LIFE OF PLANTS. 
 
 53. Tlie principal functions of the vegetative life are re- 
 duced to three: Nutrition, grotuth, and reproduction. — By 
 means of its organs, a plant exercises several func- 
 tions, such as absorption, circulation, secretion, florifi- 
 cation, fructification, etc.; but all these operations 
 are reduced to the three principal ones of nutrition, 
 growth, and reproduction. These three operations 
 are necessary to the plant and to -every living body. 
 The third is necessary that the body may be produced ; 
 the second, that it may attain its natural development ; 
 and the first, that it may preserve its being. 
 
 54. It is an error to attribute the life of plants to a 
 purely mechanical princijjle. — This opinion, which re- 
 duces the vital principle to physical and chemical 
 forces, easily leads to materialism. It is opposed to 
 the judgment of the greatest naturalists, who prove 
 that the vital principle is distinct from the forces of 
 matter, whether from the impossibility of obtaining a 
 living Substance 'by mere chemical combinations, or 
 from the diversity that exists between the laws 
 governing organic bodies and those governing inor- 
 ganic bodies. 
 
 55. It is an error to attribute sensation fojoZawfe.— This 
 
THE WORLD :— LIVING BEINGS. 243 
 
 error has been embraced by several philosophers, as 
 Plato and Leibnitz, and by several naturalists, as 
 Darwin (1809-1882) and Bichat (1771-1802). But it is 
 evident that plants are destitute of sensation: (1) 
 because they should then have organs of sensation, 
 but of these we see they are deprived ; and (2) be- 
 cause plants are rooted in the soil whence they spring, 
 and therefore sensation would serve no purpose. 
 
 ART. T. — SENSITIVE LIFE, OE THE LIFE OF ANIMALS. 
 
 56. Every animal has the faculty of sensation and of 
 spontaneous locomotion. — Besides vegetative life, every 
 animal possesses sensation and motion. But this 
 motion is not only a change of place, produced by an 
 intrinsic principle, of which the plant is destitute, but 
 it is spontaneous ; it is not determined by nature, but 
 proceeds from a previous perception, and is deter- 
 mined by an instinctive appetition of the subject that 
 moves. Hence, unlike motion proceeding from nature 
 only, spontaneous motion is varied, multiple, without 
 fixed rule, and is modified according to the different 
 perceptions and appetitions of the animal. Spontane- 
 ous motion is seen in every animal ; in the imperfect 
 animals it consists in contraction and dilatation ; in 
 perfect animals it is progressiva and complete. But 
 because the faculty of locomotion is only a conse- 
 quence of Sensation, it follows that sensibility alone 
 suffices to specify the animal. 
 
 57. 7%e faculties of the anim,al are sensitive, appeti- 
 tive, and locomotive. The sensitive faculties are external 
 m' internal.' The external senses are five : Sight, hearing, 
 smell, taste, and touch. The internal senses are four : 
 Com/mon sense, imagination, the estimative faculty, and 
 memory. Appetite is concupisdble or irascible. — External 
 
244 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sensible bodies act on the animal. It is then neces- 
 sary, first, that these bodies be united to it by the act 
 of cognition, which takes place through the sensitive 
 faculties both external and internal. For the animal 
 at first knows sensible objects through one or more 
 of the five external senses ; the sensible species or 
 representations are transmitted to the internal sense 
 called common sense, and then to the imagination, 
 vyhich preserves them ; the estimative faculty per- 
 ceives what is useful or hurtful in the object, and its 
 perceptions are retained by the sensitive memory. 
 According to its knowledge of the object as useful or 
 as hurtful, is the animal inclined by the concupiscible 
 appetite to seek it or shun it. If difficulties arise in 
 seeking or shunning it, the irascible appetite strives 
 to overcome them. Incited by the appetite, the loco- 
 motive faculty enters into action, and, in one way or 
 another, the animal moves. All these faculties are 
 found in a state of perfection and completeness in 
 perfect animals. In the imperfect animals, which 
 have no external sense but that of touch, locomotion 
 is very imperfect, because motion, being the conse- 
 quence of sensation, is more or less developed accord- 
 ing to the development of sensation itself. In man 
 the sensitive faculties are found in admirable har- 
 mony and with a special perfection which they re- 
 ceive from the intellect. Hence it is in man that 
 these faculties should be more particularly studied ; 
 and so much the more as they cannot be well known 
 by him, but so far forth as he experiences them him- 
 self. 
 
 68. The faculties of the brute animal are organic, that 
 is, belonging to the composite and not to the soul only. — Sev- 
 eral modern philosophers, following in the footprints 
 of Plato, consider sensation as an act of the soul only, 
 
TME WORLD: — LIVING BEINGS. 245 
 
 to which the body concurs only occasionally. But 
 this error would liken the brute soul to that of man. 
 For if sensation has no need of organs for its produc- 
 tion, it is a spiritual act, and the sensitive soul is 
 spiritual, which is absurd. Besides, the diversity of 
 the organs answering to the diverse sensitive facul- 
 ties, and the necessity of these organs and their 
 modifications for their respective sensations, prove 
 sufficiently that these faculties belong to the compos- 
 ite and not to the soul alone. 
 
 59. The principle of sensitive life in the hrute animal is 
 identical with the principle of vegetative life. — 1. Al- 
 though sensitive life and vegetative life really differ 
 from each other, and though in the body of the ani- 
 mal there are parts that do not possess both kinds of 
 life, yet it is one soul that causes the functions of 
 both in the organism which it informs. For, although 
 the animal grows and perceives through the senses, 
 it constitutes but one living being. Hence the formal 
 principle from which its being and its life proceed 
 must be one and identical. It is true that this formal 
 principle should have the power of communicating, 
 according to difference of disposition and aptitude in 
 the parts of the organism, either vegetative faculties 
 alone or both vegetative and sensitive faculties ; but 
 if it were not one and identical, it could never con- 
 stitute a subject one and identical. Now, nothing is 
 more evident than the unity and identity of every 
 animal. 2. This identity of the principle of the two 
 kinds of life in the animal is confirmed by the fact of 
 the cessation of vegetative life in an organism which 
 has become incapable of sensitive life, and vice versa. 
 It is further confirmed by the admirable harmony 
 that exists between the vegetative and the sensitive 
 organs, a harmony which makes of them but one or- 
 
246 BEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ganic system, although varied in its different parts 
 according to the different functions that it exercises, 
 and which explains the intimate correspondence of 
 the two kinds of life and the reciprocal influence 
 which they exert. 3. The identity of the sensitive 
 and the vegetative principle in the animal is also 
 proved by the elevation which the sensitive principle 
 gives to the functions of the vegetative life. For, 
 although they are of the same genus in the plant 
 and the animal, they are more perfect in the animal. 
 60. Tke hruie soul, though simple and immaterial, is 
 not immortal. — The indivisibility and immateriality 
 of the sensitive soul are proved (1) not only from ex- 
 perience, (2) but also by the unity of the brute's being, 
 which can proceed only from a principle itself one ; 
 (3) from the nature of sensation, which perceives the 
 whole object by a single act ; (4) from the remem- 
 brance which the sentient subject keeps of the differ- 
 ent and often contrary modifications which it has ex- 
 perienced, and which could not be explained if the 
 principle were not immaterial. But the immaterial- 
 ity ;of the brute soul by no means implies its spiritu- 
 ality and immortality. For spirituality and immor- 
 tality suppose a soul subsisting and operating by 
 itself, independently of any material organ. But the 
 being and operation of the animal are neither of the 
 soul alone nor of the body alone, but of the whole 
 composite. Therefore the soul of the animal does 
 not operate without the body, and perishes with the 
 body. But since it is simple, it does not perish by 
 decomposition, nor does God annihilate it, for He 
 annihilates none of His works. The soul of the ani- 
 mal perishes in some sort indirectly, forasmuch as 
 the .subject is wanting without which it cannot exist. 
 Moreover, it is thus that all forms perish, that all 
 
THE WORLD :— LIVING BEINGS. 247 
 
 forces and all the modifications of inorganic bodies 
 and of plants perish. 
 
 61. Brutes are not automata, as Descartes maintained. — 
 This doctrine leads to materialism, for if a mechanism 
 more or less perfectly constructed can produce in the 
 animal the marvellous acts of sensation, a few addi- 
 tional degrees of perfection of mechanism could pro- 
 duce the marvellous acts of intelligence. It is in 
 vain to urge in support of this doctrine that, if any 
 iiamaterial soul be attributed to animals, we must 
 thereby acknowledge in them a spiritual and im- 
 mortal soul. The immateriality of a soul includes 
 neither its spirituality nor its immortality. It is 
 equally vain to invoke certain analogies with the 
 motions of certain bodies like the magnet, or to have 
 recourse to divine intervention to explain the opera- 
 tions of the animal. These motions of bodies bear 
 no resemblance to the spontaneous motions of ani- 
 mals, , and to have recourse to the intervention of 
 God is to accept all the pantheistic consequences 
 of the system of occasional causes. 
 
 62. Epicurus and all otJier materialists err in ascribing 
 reason and intelligence to brides. — This system,, which 
 makes a man of the brute only to make a brute of 
 man, is contrary to experience and the unanimous be- 
 lief of the human race. It puts forward two argu- 
 ments in its favor : (1) that brutes perform their acts 
 in a suitable manner, as man does ; (2) that externally 
 they resemble man both in their organs and in most 
 of their actions. But these are pure sophisms. 
 From the fact that brutes are like man in something, 
 it does not follow that they are like him in all re- 
 spects. If brutes know, they do not understand; if 
 they form images, they do not attain to ideas ; if they 
 distinguish what is suitable to them from what is not 
 
248 REAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 suitable, they are yet incapable of any moral notion. 
 Finally, if they are guided by natural instinct with 
 admirable rectitude, it is certain that they can neither 
 invent nor perfect anything.* 
 
 * The question is not whether the acts of brutes could not proceed 
 from a rational principle, but whether they cannot and should not 
 be traced to a sensitive principle. The instances of wonderful in- 
 dustry and constructive skill to be found in the animal kingdom are 
 not to be compared with similar habits and works of man, for the 
 brute acts by instinct, and acquires no experience, properly so called, 
 and shows no increased perfection in process of time. Father Harper 
 cites three classes of facts to disprove the conclusion that the brute 
 has the same faculties as man, " only under a, rudimentary form : " 
 " 1, The judgment of brutes as to what is or is not conducive to their 
 good is not free ; for on the apprehension of what is useful or harm- 
 ful their impulse is the result of natural operation ; 2, Uniformity of 
 operation observable in animals of the same species ; 3, Brute ani- 
 mals at the beginning of their life receive a natural estimation iu 
 order to know that which is hurtful and that which is useful, because 
 they cannot attain to this by their own investigation ; but man is left 
 to form his judgments gradually by the practical experience of life.'' 
 — Metaphysics of the School, vol. ii., pp. 666-672. 
 
 Its importance to day justifies the quotation of the following : "It 
 is not possible to discover a link between man and the brute in any 
 supposed order of men possessing a specific nature half-way between 
 spirit and matter ; for such a hypothesis is a contradiction in terms. 
 A spirit cannot be more or less spirit after the manner that matter 
 can be more or less organized. A form must be wholly spiritual or 
 wholly unspiritual ; though its faculties may be partly the one, 
 partly the other. Neither is it possible, for the same reason, that 
 there should be a common ancestry."— iJwi., p. 551. 
 
PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 OB, 
 
 ANTHROPOLOGY. 
 
 1. Psychology is a science ivhich treats of the human 
 soul, its faculties, its properties, and its relations with the 
 body. — ^Man is, as it were, a compendium of all crea- 
 tion ; for in him are found being, life, sense, reason, 
 and corporeal nature united to spiritual nature. 
 Therefore the study of man specially pertains to 
 philosophy. That part of philosophy which treats of 
 man is called Psychology or Anthropology. The name 
 psychology more particularly signifies the study of 
 tJie soul ; but because it is almost impossible to know 
 the soul rightly without considering it in its relations 
 with the body, it is necessary for psychology to study 
 the whole man. 
 
 2. The method to he followed in psychology is analytico- 
 syrdhetical, a method that joins observation to reason. — 
 Some philosophers, as Bacon, Locke, Reid and his 
 disciples, admit only the experimental method in 
 psychology ; but this method can never give psycho- 
 logical science, because it regards only facts ; it can- 
 not, therefore, solve problems concerning the essence, 
 origin, and end of the soul. Other philosophers, as 
 Schelling and Hegel, hold that the science of man 
 should be constructed a priori; but this method is 
 also false, because by observation the operations of 
 
250 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the soul are known, and by reasoning, its nature. 
 Hence it is by observation together with reasoning 
 that the philosopher should construct the science of 
 psychology. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 The Human Soul and Its Faculties. 
 
 art. 1. — faculties of the human soul. 
 
 3. The human soul has vegetative, sensitive, and intellec- 
 tive faculties. TJie sensitive and intellective faculties are 
 divided into cognitive and appetitive faculties. — Since the 
 human soul has vegetative, sensitive, and intellective 
 life, it must have the faculties of these three kinds of 
 life. Cosmology treats of the faculties of vegetative 
 life, but only in a general way, leaving to subordi- 
 nate sciences the psychological investigation of these 
 faculties. Rational Psychology treats of the sensitive 
 and the intellective faculties, but in the consideration 
 of the former omits the physiological development 
 of their organs, which belongs properly to Empirical 
 or Physiological Psychology. Both the sensitive and 
 the intellective faculties are primarily joas.s{?;e, since 
 they must first be acted upon before they operate ; 
 but they are also secondarily active, because they are 
 vital powers. Strictly speaking, a power is active 
 when it modifies, or, so to say, makes its object, and 
 of this kind are the vegetative faculties ; it is passive 
 when it must be acted upon and moved by its object ; 
 and such are the senses and intellect. A faculty, 
 whether sensitive or intellective, is called cognitive, 
 when it can know an object ; it is appetitive, when it 
 tends to union with the object known. 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIES. 251 
 
 4. In the cognitive faculties the object known shares in 
 the perfection or imperfection of the subject knowing ; in 
 the appetitive faculties the subject shares in the perfection 
 or imperfection of the object to which the faculties are 
 directed. — The object of a cognitive faculty assumes 
 the conditions of the subject knowing before its union 
 with that subject. A stone in its physical reality is 
 material; but when it becomes known by the senses, 
 it has in them an immaterial existence; a circle is 
 always united to matter in the real order, but when 
 abstracted by the intellect, it has not only an imma- 
 terial, but a universal existence. But as objects in- 
 ferior to the subject knowing receive a new perfection 
 when by cognition they exist in the subject, so objects 
 superior to it share in its imperfection in so far as 
 they are objects known. It is far otherwise with the 
 appetitive faculties : through these the subject acted 
 upon tends to union with the objeqt, and in a certain 
 sense to be transformed into it ; through these, there- 
 fore, the subject shares in the perfection or imperfec- 
 tion of the object. The soul, for instance, is elevated 
 by union with the will of God, but is degraded by 
 attaching itself to creatures. 
 
 AET. n. — THE COGNirrVE SENSITIVE FACULTIES. 
 — SENSIBILITY IN GENEKAL. 
 
 5. Cognition in general is an operation hy which a 
 living being perceives itself or some object present to it. — 
 By cognition in general a living being perceives and 
 discerns itself, or some object present to it. Since 
 cognition is wholly contained within the subject 
 knowing, it follows that it becomes aware of external 
 things in so far as they are in some way present with- 
 
252 BEAL FEILOSOPHT. 
 
 in it. But external things cannot in their own nature 
 enter the subject knowing, but solely through the 
 medium of certain forms representing them and 
 called intentional Si^ecies* It is, therefore, by these 
 species that things are known. 
 
 6. The senses are 2^assive powers hy which, the sensitive 
 heing perceives sensible objects. — The senses are passive 
 powers, because they do not act until some sensible 
 object has determined them to act, and principally be- 
 cause they do not form their object, but are informed 
 by it. By them the sensitive being perceives all that 
 is comprised under the name of sensible object. This 
 perception is called sensation. 
 
 7. The senses are classified as external and, internal, 
 according as they perceive external objects or the modi- 
 fications produced in the sensitive subject. — The action 
 of the external object on the sentient subject pro- 
 duces a modification in the sense, and thus deter- 
 mines it to perceive its object. By the internal senses 
 the subject perceives its external sensations. 
 
 8. Tlie senses, both external and internal, 1. reside in 
 a corporeal organ ; 2. cannot reflect on their sensations ; 
 3. can have nothing but what is materml for their ob- 
 ject. — 1. The senses, as is attested by experience, 
 are moved to act by corporeal objects. But what is 
 corporeal cannot act on the senses, if they are not 
 themselves corporeal yet vital, that is, organic. For 
 bodies must act according to their nature and can 
 produce only a material modification, since other- 
 wise the effect would exceed the power of its cause ; 
 
 * They are named species, because they are likenesses or forms of 
 the object ; they are called intentional, either because they intend, aa 
 it were, to represent the object, or because they tend from the object 
 to the various faculties that receive the impressions. — See Sum. Th., 
 i., q. 78, a. 3. 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 253 
 
 but the senses could not receive this modification 
 if they had not a material organ. No sense, there- 
 fore, can be without an organ fitted to receive the 
 material impression which is produced by an object 
 external to it, and which determines the sense to act. 
 This material organ, because informed by the soul, 
 can serve the soul in the act of sensation. 2. No sense 
 can reflect on its own operation, because a faculty can- 
 not reflect on its own action, unless it wholly and en- 
 tirely return upon itself. But this is impossible to 
 the senses, for they depend on material organs, one 
 part of which might indeed return upon another part ; 
 but what is extended can never in its entirety return 
 upon itself. 3. Since every sense consists of a ma- 
 terial vital organ, it must necessarily have something 
 material for its object. This is equally true of the 
 internal senses, for they are put into exercise by 
 sensations received through the external senses and 
 accompanied by a material modification. Thus, al- 
 though the object of internal sensibility is not abso- 
 lutely material like that of external sensibility, yet 
 it has in it something material that enables it to re- 
 duce the internal senses to action. 
 
 9. The cause of sensation is not the mere activity of the 
 soul, as was held by LeihnitB and Fichte. — Leibnitz 
 maintained that the soul is the only and necessary 
 cause of sensation. But if the soul has sensations 
 necessarily, evidently it must have them always, an 
 assertion which is contradicted by experience. Be- 
 sides, if the soul alone has sensations in virtue of its 
 nature, how does this nature which is ever the same, 
 become sensible of things which are contrary to one 
 another or which have no bond of union ? How, if it 
 is sentient in itself alone, can it by sensation perceive 
 bodies outside itself ? Let it not be said that the pres- 
 
254 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ence of the external body is necessary as the condition 
 or occasion of sensation ; for, either the body does 
 not of itself really determine the soul to sensation, and 
 then its presence is useless ; or it does of itself deter- 
 mine the soul to sensation, and then the soul is not 
 the only cause of sensation. 
 
 Fichte, while admitting the soul to be by itself 
 alone the cause of sensation, considered it not a nec- 
 essary, but a free cause. But this is plainly con- 
 tradicted by experience, which shows us that our 
 sensations do not depend on our will ; that, on the 
 contrary, we often experience sensations which we 
 would wish not to have, and are deprived of others 
 that we desire. 
 
 10. The only cause of sensation is not, as JBerkeley 
 asserted, the action of God on the soul. — Berkeley 
 (1684-1753) taught that the soul, being immaterial, 
 could not be affected by the action of a material ob- 
 ject, but that since the representations of bodies in the 
 faculties of the soul are an undoubted fact, they can- 
 not otherwise be explained than by the action of God 
 on the soul ; he added that only spiritual beings, 
 exist, and that bodies are but a simple succession of 
 ideas formed in us by God. This theory is evidently 
 erroneous, for, were it true, God would be constantly 
 deceiving us by creating within us representations of 
 bodies that do not exist. Should any one insist with 
 Malebranche, that God by His omnipotence can pro- 
 duce in us the perceptions of bodies, although the 
 bodies do not exist, then would the omnipotence of 
 God be placed in contradiction to His veracity, and 
 God Himself would be made contradictory. Besides, 
 in this system it is absolutely impossible to account 
 for the diversity of sensations among men in reference 
 to the same object, as also to explain the connection 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND li'S FACULTIES. 255 
 
 that exists between certain sensations ; for example, 
 between the sensations produced by an animalcule 
 according as it is or is not seen under the microscope. 
 Lastly, this system is based on the principle that " like 
 can be known only by like." But this principle is 
 manifestly false,* for in accordance with it materi- 
 alists could deny the existence of spirits, since the 
 perception of matter is incontestable ; and idealists 
 might question the existence of bodies, since the 
 nature of the soul is immaterial. 
 
 11. The only cause of sensation is not, as materialists 
 maintain, the ijnpression of the material object on the 
 sentient subject. — Broussais held that the impression 
 constitutes the whole sensation, and regarded the 
 brain as the sentient subject. Now, the brain is ma- 
 terial, and what is material is composed of parts dis- 
 tinct one from another. If, therefore, what is mate- 
 rial has sensations, we must conclude that each part 
 has either the whole sensation or only a part of it. 
 In the former case, there would be as many sensations 
 as there are parts in the sentient subject ; in the 
 latter, the sensation would never be entire, for each 
 part would have for itself only that part which it had 
 received. Now, on the one hand, experience attests 
 that sensation is one and indivisible, and, on the 
 other hand, that in its indivisible unity it represents 
 the entire sensible that is its object. 
 
 Cabanis (1757-1808), while agreeing with Broussais 
 (1772-1838) that the impression constitutes the whole 
 
 * This principle must not be confounded with the principle of as- 
 similation in the Scholastic theory of cognition: "Whatever, is 
 received is received according to the nature of the receiver." It 
 follows from this principle that all objects known are in the act of 
 cognition, which is an immanent act, assimilated to the subjact 
 knowing. 
 
256 SEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sensation, regarded the soul alone as the subject of 
 sensation. But this cannot be, for the sensible ob- 
 ject can produce an impression only on the organ ; 
 but sensation is something very dilferent from this 
 purely material impression. Sensation results from 
 the action of the sense, whereas the impression is 
 passive. 
 
 12. Sensation is produced hy two causes : the mate- 
 rial object and the activity of the serise. — There can be 
 no sensation if the activity of the sense is not exer- 
 cised ; but, since the senses have a material object 
 for their term, it must be this object that' calls forth 
 their action. Hence sensation is both active and pas- 
 sive ; it is passive in so far as it presupposes the 
 action of a sensible object ; it is active so far as, given 
 this action, sensation follows from the activity of the 
 sentient subject. 
 
 13. The sensible object is joined to the sentient subject 
 by Tneans of a certain representation of itself, which is 
 called the sensible species. — Sensation is an immanent 
 action which is produced in the sentient subject, is 
 proportioned to it, and remains wholly within it ; but 
 it does not take place without a material object which 
 acts upon the sentient subject, and is perceived on 
 cognized by it. 
 
 For the production of sensation, the material ob- 
 ject must in some way be joined to the sentient sub- 
 ject. But evidently it cannot enter in its physical 
 reality ; it must, therefore, enter through something 
 which represents it ; and this is called the sensible in- 
 tentional species. This sensible species produced by 
 the object is not a simple excitation which is caused 
 in the sensitive faculty by its contact with the object ; 
 but, since it makes known the object, it is necessarily 
 a representation of it which renders it present to the 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 257 
 
 sensitive faculty. Thus the image formed on the ret- 
 ina of the eye by a body is not merely a motion, an 
 excitation, which leads the sight to perceive the body, 
 but it is a representation of it by which it is con- 
 joined to the sense of sight. 
 
 14. The sensible species is not the ohject of sensation, 
 hut the medium hy which sensation is effected. — The sen- 
 sible species in the subject knowing is the immediate 
 principle that determines the act of sensation ; hence 
 it could not be perceived by the sensitive faculty ex- 
 cept by a reflex act, which sense cannot perform. Now, 
 not only does reflex action suppose a previous act, 
 but it cannot even be effected by the senses. There- 
 fore the sensible species is not that which the sense 
 perceives ; it is the medium by which the sense cog- 
 nizes its object. While it informs the sense, the ob- 
 ject is perceived ; if, then, for any cause it remains in 
 the sense, though the object be absent, perception 
 will be had just as if the object were present, as is 
 the case with the insane. 
 
 15. Between the serusMe species and sensation tliere ii, 
 a relation of causality. — The sensible species is not 
 sensation, but it determines the act of sensation, so 
 that the senses do not act unless determined by the 
 sensible species. When, however, this determination 
 has been effected, the senses must act and thus per- 
 ceive the object that impressed them. Hence a rela- 
 tion of causality exists between the sensible species 
 impressed and the sensible species expressed, or sensa- 
 tion.* 
 
 * These vicarious species, considered as acting on tlie sense, were 
 called impressed species ; considered as actually received into the 
 sense, a§ informing it, and producing a corresponding reaction 
 which we call sensation, they were termed expressed, species ; " their 
 intention being thus far realized." 
 
258 REAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 AET. m. — EXTERNAL SENSIBILITY IN GENERAL. 
 
 16. The object of the external senses is the external sen- 
 sihle which is present to sense and suitdbly disposed. — 
 The external senses are those to which the species of 
 external objects are referred ; hence they have mate- 
 rial external things for their object. But this object 
 must be present ; for only the internal senses can pre- 
 serve sensible species, and, consequently, they alone 
 can apply themselves to absent things. Finally, the 
 object should also be suitably disposed, otherwise it 
 could not impress the sense, that is, form in it the 
 sensible species. 
 
 17. There are three hinds of sensible objects : the proper, 
 the common, and the accidental. — Of the qualities of 
 bodies which we perceive, some are perceived by one 
 sense only, as " color " by the sight, and these are 
 called pro2yer sensibles. Others are the object of sev- 
 eral senses, as " figure," which is perceived by both 
 sight and touch, and these are common sensibles. 
 Others, again, are not perceived directly, because 
 they are implicitly contained in the sensible quali- 
 ties, as " substance," and these are accidental sensi- 
 bles. There are five kinds of proper sensibles, the 
 objects respectively of the sight, the hearing, the 
 sm,ell, the taste, and the touch. There are likewise 
 five kinds of common sensibles : " motion, rest, num- 
 ber, figure, and dimension." To these five common 
 sensibles, " time, posture, unity, distance, and proxim- 
 ity," are referred. The accidental sensible is what- 
 ever is implicitly contained in the sensible appear- 
 ance, and as it were naturally connected with it: 
 as " anger, love, hatred," etc. The proper sensible 
 impresses the species, the common sensible modifies 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 259 
 
 this ; thus each is represented by its own species, one 
 unmodified, the other modified. The accidental sen- 
 sible neither impresses nor modifies a species ; it is 
 merely connected with the objects represented by the 
 species, as with natural signs. 
 
 18.' Some senses need a medium through which they 
 receive the species iynpressed. — Sensitive knowledge is 
 attained only by means of a species which represents 
 the object in the sentient subject. In some of the 
 senses the production of the species is not aided but 
 hindered by contact of the object with the organ of 
 sense. Thus, for instance, an image of the object is 
 not formed on the retina when the object touches the 
 eye. 
 
 19. When the senses act in their norm,al condition, 
 they do not deceive us as to their proper sensibles ; hut 
 they may iecome an occasion of error as to common or 
 accidental sensibles. — Nature has given us senses that 
 they may each make known to us their proper sen- 
 sibles; hence they cannot deceive us as to these 
 sensibles unless there is some defect in the organ, or 
 the sensible is too distant, or the medium is acciden- 
 tally modified. But as nature has not charged one 
 sole external sense to cognize the common sensible 
 and the accidental sensible, a single external sense 
 may deceive us in regard to these sensibles. Thus, 
 in perspective, the eye deceives us in regard to the 
 common sensible, distance. That the common sen- 
 sible may be known with certainty, it must be known 
 through the concurrence of several senses. 
 
 20. Proper sensibles actually perceived by the external 
 senses, are only virtually in bodies ; they are actually in 
 the sentient subject. — Taste, smell, and the other proper 
 sensibles are not actually in bodies as they are in the 
 senses, otherwise the bodies would have sensations. 
 
260 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 They exist actually in the sentient subject only. 
 Thus the sweet or bitter is a modification of the 
 organ of taste, in consequence of which it experiences 
 the sensation of sweetness or bitterness. Yet, al- 
 though these qualities which are called proper sen- 
 sibles are not found actually in bodies, they exist in 
 them yirtually, since bodies really have qualities by 
 which they are apt to produce corresponding sensa- 
 tions in the organs of sense. Thus bodies are not 
 sonorous, savory, or odoriferous ; but they are apt to 
 produce in our senses the sensation of sound, of taste, 
 or of smell. 
 
 21. TJie object of external sensation consists primarily 
 and immediately in sensible qualities, but mediately and 
 secondarily in the subject in which the qualities exist. 
 Hence the external senses perceive bodies through the 
 medium of their proper sensibles which exist in the bodies. 
 — Sensible qualities or sensibles are not, as some 
 affirm, mere modifications of the organs of sense, but 
 the object perceived by sense. But since the senses 
 cannot perceive their own perceptions or sensations, 
 being organic faculties, these must be perceived by 
 the internal sense called common sense (sensus com- 
 munis). As inhering in a substance, sensible quali- 
 ties are perceived by the external senses. But as 
 they cannot exist apart from the bodies of which they 
 are qualities, the senses cannot apprehend them 
 apart from their subject except by the process of 
 abstraction; but of this act they are incapable, for 
 they are organic faculties. Therefore they must ap- 
 prehend the sensible qualities in the corporeal sub- 
 ject in which they exist ; but this is equivalent to 
 saying that they apprehend both the qualities and 
 their subject, though not in the same way. The 
 qualities are their proper object ; the substance, their 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 261 
 
 object ^er accidens. From this two consequences fol- 
 low. The first is that the external senses perceive 
 bodies by perceiving- their qualities. By the sense 
 of sight we do not become cognizant of the impres- 
 sion made in the sense : this is known to be there by 
 reason ; while colnmon sense, or sensitive conscious- 
 ness, perceives the sensation ; but by the sight we 
 perceive color, and through it the colored body other 
 than ourselves. The second consequence is that the 
 perception of bodies is immediate, but not per se, but 
 per accidens; because, the external senses requiring 
 the qualities of bodies in order to perceive bodies 
 themselves, this perception takes place indirectly. 
 
 22. It is erroneous to hold with Condillac that sensa- 
 tions heing mere modifications of the sentient subject, tlie 
 soul has no perception of an object other than itself except 
 through the msdimn of totich. — The philosophers who 
 have denied that the external senses perceive bodies 
 immediately, have been compelled to seek by what 
 means the soul perceives an object distinct from it- 
 self. Condillac, starting with the hypothesis of the 
 "man-statue," says that so long as this statue is en- 
 dowed with only the senses of sight, hearing, taste, 
 and smell, it perceives nothing more than that it is 
 itself affected in this or that way ; but when the 
 statue moves and by active touch feels something that 
 resists it, it then perceives an object distinct from 
 itself, and is led to believe that the perceptions of 
 the other four senses also relate to an object external 
 to the sentient subject. Thus the touch would be a 
 medium by which the soul would pass to something 
 distinct from itself. 
 
 It is easy to see the absurdity of such a theory to 
 explain the perception of bodies. Besides, it rests 
 on an hypothesis essentially contradictory. For ac' 
 
262 BEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cording to this theory bodies produce sensations, and 
 the sensations produce the sensitive faculties. But 
 on the one hand, sensation must be elicited by a sen- 
 tient subject ; on the other hand, sensation, far from 
 producing the sensitive faculty, supposes its exist- 
 ence. 
 
 23. We cannot admit with Heid, that the soul cognizes 
 hodies iy means of certain instinctive judgments. — Reid, 
 like Condillac, holds that the senses do not perceive 
 bodies, but merely the sensible qualities, and that 
 moreover sensation is purely subjective ; for, he tells 
 us, as soon as the senses have perceived the sensible 
 qualities, the intellect pronounces this instinctive 
 judgment : " There are no sensible qualities without 
 an existing material subject." But if this judgment is 
 instinctive, it proceeds from the natural constitution 
 of the soul, and consequently is purely subjective. 
 But a purely subjective judgment applied to subjec- 
 tive sensations cannot manifest an objective reality. 
 
 24. We cannot admit, with Fichte, that the soul per- 
 ceives hodies, not as objective realities, hut as repre- 
 sentations which the soul forms at will within itself. — 
 Deducing the ultimate consequences of the subjec- 
 tivism of Kant, Fichte holds that when the soul 
 perceives bodies, it perceives nothing more than its 
 own representations formed by an exercise of its will. 
 This theory is essentially absurd and contradictory. 
 For the will cannot be the cause of the representation 
 of bodies ; it cannot will their representation unless 
 they be already known. Besides, if the representa- 
 tion of bodies is purely the effect of the will, why is 
 it that the soul cannot experience at will a sensation 
 that it desires ? 
 
 25. It is false to assert with Cousin that sensation is 
 purely subjective, and that from it the soul infers with 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 263 
 
 tJve aid of the principle of causality that hodies exist. — ■ 
 With these two premises, viz., sensation is an effect, 
 and every effect must have a cause, we can draw no 
 conclusion but that sensation must have a cause. But 
 there is nothing to assure us that this cause is the 
 body, or, as Berkeley maintained, God Himself. 
 
 ART IV. — THE EXTERNAL SENSES IN PARTICULAR. 
 
 26. The external senses are foe in number: Sight, 
 hearing, smell, taste, and touch. — A sensitive being must 
 have as many senses as are required for the preser- 
 vation of its existence. But for this five senses are 
 necessary ; for by means of sight it perceives the dis- 
 position of the surrounding objects; by means of 
 hearing, the motion of those which it does not see ; 
 by means of smell, it perceives the character of the 
 aliments that are not yet within its reach ; by the 
 taste it judges of them with more care before taking 
 them as food ; lastly, by the toioch it oversees the 
 state of its own body and its relation to external 
 things. These five senses should be found in every 
 perfect sensitive being. — Again, our senses are five, 
 because there are five formally distinct material ob- 
 jects to be cognized, viz., the different qualities of 
 bodies ; and our senses are given to us for such 
 cognition. 
 
 27. Among the five senses, sight is the most intellective, 
 touch the most necessary. — Sight is the most intellec- 
 tive sense, that which plays the chief part in the cog- 
 nition of bodies: for its exercise it requires only 
 light, the most subtile of material things. Hearing, 
 although in itself inferior to sight, yet possesses two 
 advantages over it : the first is that it perceives sounds 
 from every direction ; the second is that it operates 
 
264 BEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 even in the absence of light. Hearing is the sense 
 most important to man, for it is especially through it 
 that the intellect acquires the cognitions necessary to 
 its natural development. And divine faith comes by 
 hearing. Smell perceives even an absent body by 
 means of the emanations which it sends forth, and 
 thus it informs us where bodies are when sight and 
 hearing fail. This sense is necessary to the animal 
 to find food ; it is useful to point out what food is 
 suitable for it and what is not. Taste is a sense dis- 
 tinct from touch, its organ being the tongue in con- 
 nection with the palate ; for savor differs formally 
 from the other tactile qualities; and their objects 
 specify the faculties. Touch is a sense having its 
 organ in the whole body, especially the ends of the 
 fingers. Its purposes are manifold. This is the most 
 material of all the senses ; it is also the most neces- 
 sary to animal life. To preserve life, the animal must 
 by the medium of touch guard against what can harm 
 its body, just as by the taste it must perceive what 
 food is proper for the support of its body. 
 
 AET V. — INTERNAL SENSES. 
 
 28. The internal senses are four in nuniber : the com- 
 mon sense, imaghiation, the estimative faculty, and sensi- 
 tive mennory. — A sensitive being not only perceives the 
 sensible qualities of bodies, but it distinguishes them 
 from one another by a single act, it perceives the acts 
 of the senses and the sensitive state that accompanies 
 them whether of pleasure or pain. But for this a 
 sense is requisite to which the perceptions of all 
 the external senses are referred as to their common 
 centre, an internal sense which can thus cognize the 
 acts of the senses. This internal sense is called the 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIES. 265 
 
 comrtion sense. But the sensible being must apprehend 
 the sensible object, not only when it is present, but 
 also when it is absent. Hence it stands in need of a 
 faculty which can preserve and reproduce the image? 
 already received. This faculty is imagination. The 
 sensitive being might be able to seek or to shun not 
 only those things that produce agreeable or disagree- 
 able sensations in it, but also those that may be ad- 
 vantageous or hurtful to it in other respects. Henca 
 it must be able to cognize their useful or harmful 
 properties;, to preserve and reproduce the perceptioij 
 of these properties, so that in the absence of usefu? 
 objects they may direct themselves towards thenj 
 This it does by means of the estimative faculty which 
 perceives these properties, and the sensitive memjory 
 which preserves this perception. Memory recalls 
 all past sensations and their objects just as they oc- 
 curred, in which it differs from imagination. 
 
 29. It is an error to deny the com/mon sense and say, 
 with Hosrnini, that the soul has through its essence the 
 feeling of its sensations ; or, with Oondillac, that each 
 sense perceives its own sensations ; or, with other philos- 
 ophers, that the sensations of each sense are perceived hy 
 the intellect. — The opinion of Bosmini (1797-1855) is 
 false, for the soul operates through its faculties and 
 never directly through its essence. The x)pinion of 
 Condillac is also false, because a simple sensation 
 and the perception of the sensation are two things 
 essentially distinct and cannot be referred to a single 
 sense ; also because supposing each sense can per- 
 ceive its own sensations, it can neither perceive the 
 sensation of another sense nor its proper sensible. 
 Now, the fact that the sensations of all the senses are 
 perceived by a single faculty cannot be denied, for we 
 compare our various sensations. Lastly, those philos- 
 
266 SEAL PHILOSOPST. 
 
 ophers who say that man has no need of an internal 
 sense, because his intellect can perceive the acts of 
 the external senses, are also in error ; for sensation is 
 a sensitive act ; the perception of the sensation, there- 
 fore, supposes a sensitive operation, and consequently, 
 a sensitive faculty. The existence of the internal 
 sense called sensus communis is shown not merely 
 by reason, but also to some extent by physiology ; 
 for it testifies that the nerves of all the external 
 senses diverge from a common source, where they 
 unite as in their centre. This one point of reunion 
 of the sensitive nerves may be regarded as the or- 
 gan of common sense. 
 
 30. Tlie com/mon sense * lias three functions : 1. It 
 perceives and distinguishes the perceptions of the different 
 senses ; 2. It perceives the different states of the sentient 
 being, whether of pleasure or pain, accompanying or fol- 
 lowing these pe7'ceptions ; i.e., it acts the part of sensitive 
 consciousness ; 3. It p)erceives thepii'oper and flie common 
 sensihles. — 1. The perceptions of all the senses are re- 
 ferred to the.common sense as to their proper faculty. 
 Since, then, they must all be cognized by this central 
 sense, it must evidently be capable of distinguishing 
 them from one another, but it cannot know them as 
 different. As each sense can perceive only its own 
 proper sensible, it cannot distinguish it from the 
 other sensibles ; for to distinguish two things, both 
 must be known. 2. The second function of the com- 
 mon' sense is to perceive the act of the senses and the 
 state that accompanies and follows the act. The object 
 of each sense is one ; but the objects of the external 
 senses are outside the sentient subject ; these senses, 
 
 * This faculty must be carefully distinguished from that intellect- 
 ual habit, or. " Saculty of .ftret principles," explained on p. 135. 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 267 
 
 moreover, cannot perceive their ovrn sensations. For 
 the species impressa, or form of the object impressed 
 on sense and through which it perceives the object, is 
 too close to sense to be seen by it or perceived. To 
 perceive the sensation of each sense is proper to the 
 common sense, just as to perceive the objects that 
 impress the senses is proper to the external senses. 
 3. The common sense has a third function, which is 
 to perceive the common sensible. Since this sensible 
 should be apprehended by several senses to be duly 
 known, it is manifestly the proper object of common 
 sense, since the latter perceives the sensations of all 
 the particular senses. For instance, to know motion 
 accurately, we must perceive both by touch and by 
 sight : but these distinct perceptions can be perceived 
 by the common sense alone. 
 
 31. Imagination or fancy is an internal sense which 
 preserves the images or sensible species of objects already 
 perceived iy the external senses, and reproduces them in 
 the absence of their objects. — The existence of this faculty - 
 is attested by experience, which shows us the sensitive 
 subject reproducing images of the sensible objects 
 which it once perceived ; but this it could not do if it 
 had hot preserved the images of these objects. By 
 this faculty the soul retains the images of whatever 
 was perceived by the external senses. They are like 
 the glass of the camera obscura, which preserves the 
 images only as long as the objects are present ; imagi- 
 nation is like the photographic plate, which pre- 
 serves the images indefinitely. As this faculty only 
 preserves images of objects already perceived, it is 
 evident that where a sense is wanting, the correspond- 
 ing image in the imagination will also be wanting. 
 Hence a man born blind can form no image of color. 
 
 Some philosophers, and among them Cousin, have 
 
268 SEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 wrongly regarded imagination as an inventive faculty 
 that can produce images of objects not previously 
 perceived. Although imagination can, it is true, 
 form images of objects not existing in nature, yet it 
 can do so only by means of objects already perceived 
 by the senses whose images it can divide or multiply, 
 contract or distend, arrange or disturb, in various 
 ways. But imagination not only preserves the sensi- 
 ble images, it can also reproduce them, and in these 
 images it then contemplates the objects themselves, 
 not in the state of immobility as on a photographic 
 plate, but as they are in realitj', moving, acting, and 
 living, though not in the same exactitude with which 
 they were first perceived ; for this belongs, to memory. 
 In the animal, the reproduction of the images cor- 
 responds exactly to the reality perceived before by the 
 senses ; man can besides unite or separate the images 
 in his imagination and combine them in diverse 
 ways. Thus, from the' image of gold and the image 
 of a mountain, he forms the one image of a mountain 
 of gold. In this way the artist becomes capable of 
 producing masterpieces, the poet creates his fictions, 
 the scientist conceives hypotheses by which he sup- 
 plies the facts which nature hides from him. This 
 special power of imagination man possesses, not as 
 properly belonging to the sensitive life, but in conse- 
 quence of the perfection which the sensitive life in 
 him receives from the intellectual life, a redundancy 
 flowing over, as it were, from the higher faculty to 
 that which is immediately beneath it. 
 
 32. Association of images is subject to taws which 
 refer partly to the nature of the soul and partly to the 
 nature of the vmages. — Association of images, which 
 modern philosophers improperly name association of 
 ideas, depends partly on the nature of the soul. Thus 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 269 
 
 in. virtue of the unity of the soul, just as the phan- 
 tasm, through the action of intellect in man, influences 
 his free will and necessarily determines the sensi- 
 tive appetite in the animal, so does the will in man, 
 and the sensitive appetite in the animal, call up the 
 image or phantasm in the imagination. 
 
 Association of images depends also partly upon the 
 nature of the images, which, accordiiig to the relations 
 existing among them, are reduced to three categories : 
 those of mnilarity, contrast, and contiguity whether of 
 space or time. These relations are at times unper- 
 ceived, but for all that they are real. 
 
 33. The imagination in man should he regulated, and 
 prudently directed iy the will, and this hy intellect. — 
 The imagination plays a very important part in man, 
 since it furnishes his intellect with material for its 
 operations. Hence it is necessary so to regulate it 
 that it may be of great service in the acquisition of 
 truth. In the first place, since it is an organic faculty 
 having a corporeal organ, it is evidently more or less 
 perfect according to the physical organism of the 
 individual and the external influences that modify 
 that organism. Hence man should guard against 
 all those influences which injure the orderly exercise 
 of the imagination and from which he can withdraw 
 himself. In the second place, since the will exercises 
 a direct action on the imagination, man should guide 
 his imagination by his will enlightened by reason, and 
 constantly subject it to the control of the real ; other- 
 wise the imagination may by compounding and divid- 
 ing images give a factitious existence to deceitful 
 phantoms, and thus become the source of many errors 
 for the intellect, and consequently of much wrong- 
 doing for the will. 
 
 34. TTie estimative faculty is an internal sense which 
 
270 BEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 perceives and distinguishes things not perceived hy the 
 other senses, such as the useful or hurtful. — The existence 
 of this sense is attested by experience, for we see that 
 animals seek what is useful to them and avoid what is 
 hurtful. It is also proved by reason. In order to 
 preserve its being the animal must perceive not only 
 what is agreeable or disagreeable, but also what is 
 useful or harmful. It is by this faculty that the sheep 
 knows that the wolf is his enemy, that the bird 
 chooses the straw required for its nest. To this 
 faculty, also, must be ascribed the marvellous skill 
 and sagacity shown by animals in self-preservation 
 and self-defence. 
 
 Man possesses the estimative faculty as well as the 
 brute ; but in man it is more perfect because influ- 
 enced by intelligence. The animal perceives the use- 
 ful or the hurtful in a thing by natural instinct; 
 man, as an effect of a sort of comparison. Thus the 
 estimative faculty, which in the brute is analogous to 
 reason, is in man called particular reason, the cogita- 
 tive faculty, or passive intellect. 
 
 35. Sensitive memory is an iyiternal sense that preserves 
 and reproduces tlie cognitions acquired through the senses, 
 and reproduces the sensible images with the knowledge of 
 their perception in past time. — A sensitive being does 
 more than perceive in sensible objects what is useful 
 or hurtful, for it also preserves these perceptions. 
 Thus a dog shuns the places where he was beaten. 
 This faculty of preserving and reproducing the per- 
 ceptions of the other sensitive faculties is called sensi- 
 tive menwry.* It differs from imagination, for it re- 
 produces the cognitions of sensible objects with the 
 condition of past time in which they took place, and 
 
 * Also, and more properly, sensile, memory. 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 271 
 
 also recognizes now as once perceived the percep- 
 tions recalled ; while the imagination reproduces im- 
 ages simply and neither with any determination of 
 time nor in the order of' their first appearance. For 
 an act of memory, therefore, it does not suffice that 
 the image perceived in time past be reproduced, but 
 there must be also the knowledge that it was per- 
 ceived in past time. This apprehension of time, 
 though more noble than that of sensible qualities, is 
 yet limited by two points * of a given time, and is de- 
 terminate and particular. Hence it cannot be the ob- 
 ject of intellect, which perceives only the universal as 
 its proper object or object per se, the individual per 
 accidens. Sensitive memory exists both in the brute 
 and in man, as experience proves ; but in man, sensi- 
 tive memory, besides recalling the past, may also de- 
 duce from what it recalls a series of connected events. 
 And, as a child holding one end of the thread easily 
 unwinds the spool, so man sees in his memory a long 
 series of events and consequences which a first 
 thought has recalled. This operation is called remi- 
 niscence, and demands also the exercise of reason. 
 
 36. The efficiency of memory depends partly on nat- 
 ure and partly on the tnnemonic art. This art has 
 four laws : 1. The representation hy similitudes of the 
 objects to be retained ; 2. A methodical classification of 
 the objects; 3. An effort to retain them; 4. Continued 
 reflection on the objects. — Beadiness of memory de- 
 pends first of all on nature. Since memory is an or- 
 ganic faculty, it is evident that the more perfect the 
 organ, the more perfect also will be the faculty. 
 Hence in men the degrees of perfection of memory 
 
 * That Is, by that moment in the past in which the object was per- 
 ceived, and by the present moment in wliioh it is recalled. 
 
272 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 are as various as the organisms themselves, and these 
 degrees vary even in the same individual according 
 to diversity of age and of organic conditions. But 
 man's memory may also be cultivated and helped by 
 art. For, unlike the brute, which remembers only 
 from natural means, and is determined by physical 
 causes, man remembers not merely in consequence of 
 physical causes, but also with the help of artificial 
 means, which he uses at will. 
 
 The first of these means is the representation by 
 similitudes of the objects to be retained. The use of 
 these similitudes will be the more eflicient in propor- 
 tion to their more striking character. Thus in order 
 to recall a great grief, it may be fixed in the memory 
 under the image of a sword. — The second means is 
 a methodical classification of the objects which we 
 wish to recall. This means is based on the very 
 nature of the mind, which passes from one remem- 
 brance to another in virtue of the numerous relations 
 existing among things. Nothing in the universe is 
 isolated; so also in the mind, all its cognitions are 
 bound together, and form by their connection a sort 
 of network, so that one thread cannot be touched 
 without affecting all the others through their rela- 
 tion more or less direct with the part affected. 
 Thus is explained the extreme ease with which the 
 mind passes from one object to another without the 
 bidding of the will, and even in spite of the will. 
 But, if the association of images often takes place 
 in an involuntary manner, it may also be regulated 
 by reflection and directed by the will. This asso- 
 ciation is based either on purely accidental rela- 
 tions or on logical relations. The former are chiefly' 
 those of similarity, contrast,, and contiguity in space 
 and time. It is especially by these that children re- 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 273 
 
 tain, and hence they have a very superficial memory. 
 The principal logical relations are those of principle 
 and consequence, of cause and effect, of means and 
 end, of substance and accident. By these relations 
 the memory brings back within itself the real nat- 
 ural connections of things, it acquires consistency, 
 strength, and unity, and the collection of its recol- 
 lections is raised to the dignity of science. This, 
 however, is the effect, not of sensitive but of in- 
 tellectual memory. — The third mnemonic means is 
 attention to the object and an effort to fix it in the 
 mind. This effort impresses things deeply in the 
 memory, and thus enables it to recall them with ease. 
 — The fourth means is continued reflection on the 
 object to be retained. We easily recall what we have 
 well considered. Reflection makes our recollection 
 clear and more distinct ; it supplies in advanced 
 years the force and intensity which the newness of 
 the object gives to the recollections of the early years 
 of life. 
 
 AET. YI. — THE APPETITIVE FACULTIES. 
 — SENSITIVE APPETITE. 
 
 37. Sensitive appetite is a tendency to good perceived 
 hy the senses. — The tendency of a being is proportioned 
 to its nature. A sensitive being knows through 
 the senses the sensible objects necessary for preserv- 
 ing its existence. Hence it has a natural tendency to 
 seek sensible goods and be united with them. This 
 tendency is called sensitive appetite. 
 
 38. Sensitive appetite is divided into two distinct fac- 
 ulties : Concupiscible appetite and irascible appetite. — 
 Goncupiscible appetite is a faculty by which the animal 
 is led to seek what is useful to it, and to shun what is 
 
 18 
 
274 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 harmful. Irascible appetite is a faculty by which the 
 animal is roused to acquire a good that is difficult to 
 attain, and to remove any evil that would destroy this 
 good or prevent its attainment. By his concupis- 
 cible appetite, a dog seeks proper nourishment and 
 avoids what is injurious ; by his irascible appetite he 
 is angered and attacks the animal that tries to de- 
 prive him of his food. 
 
 These are two distinct faculties, for it often happens 
 that they are opposed to each other. Thus anger 
 takes away the need of sleep, as, in turn, the want of 
 rest lessens the heat of anger. At times the closest 
 relations exist between the irascible appetite and the 
 concupiscible ; the former may even be regarded as 
 the defender of the latter, since it combats whatever 
 opposes the good sought by the concupiscible ap- 
 petite, or whatever causes the evil that it shuns. 
 Hence all the movements of the irascible appetite 
 begin from those of the concupiscible, and are re- 
 ferred to the same. 
 
 39. A sensitive being when urged on by its appetite 
 transports its body from one place to another. The faculty 
 by which it does this is called locomotive facidty. — Des- 
 cartes and his school denied this faculty. He attrib- 
 uted locomotion in the animal to the perfection of 
 its bodily mechanism,* and in man to the action of the 
 will. But reason and experience prove the existence 
 of this faculty. For when an animal apprehends a 
 useful or a hurtful object, it has need of a power to 
 approach the one and withdraw from the other ; and, 
 in fact, we see i that this does happen. It is evident 
 
 * The opinion that brutes are mere automata is refuted on p. 247. 
 With this falls also the deduction that animals have no power of 
 locomotion. 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 275 
 
 that this faculty is distinct both from the sensitive 
 appetite and the will, for we often shun the sensible 
 good which the appetite craves, and, again, are often 
 unable to produce the motion which the will desires. 
 Like all the other sensitive faculties, it is organic, 
 that is, it resides in an organ and Cannot operate with- 
 out the organ. 
 
 AET. VII. — THE INTELLECTIVE FACULTIES. 
 — THE INTELLECT. 
 
 40. The proper object of the intellect, the intelligible, 
 is the immaterial, the essence of things-^Ks the proper 
 object of the intellect is such because of its relation to 
 the intellect, it is rightly called the intelligible. It is 
 the immaterial, the essence of things. For intellect, 
 as the name indicates, is a faculty which penetrates 
 the inner nature of things, that by which they are 
 what they are, viz., their essences. It is without reason 
 that certain philosophers have denied the possibility 
 of knowing the essences of things, and by essences 
 have consequently understood whatever is unknown 
 to us in things. The essences of things are known 
 to us, since we define things and specify them ; for 
 they can be defined and specified by their essences 
 
 . only. More than this, essence cannot be known 
 merely in part, for it is indivisible ; to know only a 
 part of it, is to be ignorant of it.* 
 
 41. J'he proper object of intellect is the immaterial and 
 universal. Its adequate object is entity, whatever is or 
 can be. Its proportionate object, in its actual condition, is 
 the essence of sensible things. — Every faculty is sp^ified 
 
 * Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, and Hegel have all either denied 
 the ohjectiye reality of essence or at least wrongly defined essence. 
 
276 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 by its actions and its object. Since the intellect per- 
 forms operations that exceed the power of matter, 
 since they attain to the immaterial and the spiritual, 
 it must itself as the cause of these operations be spir- 
 itual. The adequate object of intellect is that which 
 it can apprehend, if it be considered in its own nature. 
 Now, since the intellect is a spiritual faculty and can 
 have a mode of existence independent of matter, it 
 can know every entity, that is, truth. But if the 
 intellect be viewed as a faculty that requires a pre- 
 vious operation of the sensitive powers in order to 
 act, its proportionate object is the essence of sensible 
 things. 
 
 42. The intellect is an inorganic faculty, and Tience 
 needs no organ for its action. — Since the object of the 
 intellect is the essence of things, and essence is al- 
 ways immaterial, we know the intellect must likewise 
 be immaterial * and independent in its operation of 
 any bodily organ. 
 
 43. 8i7ice the intellect is an inorganic faculty, the 
 system of phrenology must he considered ahsurd.—Vhxe- 
 nologists, headed by Gall (1758-1828) and Spurzheim 
 (1776-1832), regard all the faculties of the soul, sensi- 
 tive, intellectual, and moral, as residing in bodily or- 
 gans. They teach that protuberances exist on the 
 surface of the brain and the skull, that each of these 
 is the organ of one of the soul's faculties, and that in 
 proportion as the protuberances are more or less de- 
 veloped, the faculty is also more or less developed. 
 The number of these faculties varies with each phre- 
 nologist. Gall allows twenty-seven ; Spurzheim, 
 
 * Essence is said to te immaterial, not tliat it is not sometimes 
 joined to matter, but in that it is not necessarily joined to it, and is 
 viewed apart from the individual conditions that determine it in any 
 individual body. 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIISS. 277 
 
 thirty-seven. This theory, if consistent, must end in 
 materialism and fatalism. It is, furthermore, contra- 
 dicted by experience, which time and again has shown 
 how slight is the relation between this or that pro- 
 tuberance and the corresponding faculty. It is con- 
 tradicted by science, which proves that there is no 
 constant relation between the protuberances of the 
 skull and the surface of the brain.* 
 
 44. An abstractive power must he allowed in the soul. 
 — Every being must have in its nature whatever is 
 required for its proper operation. But the proper 
 operation of the human intellect in its present con- 
 dition has for its first and immediate object the 
 essence of sensible things. Now, since this essence 
 is individualized in the concrete conditions that en- 
 viron it, it cannot be apprehended by the intellect, 
 which is an inorganic faculty, unless it be stripped of 
 its individuating conditions. Therefore, that the soul 
 may apprehend the essence of sensible things, it must 
 have a faculty capable of ideally separating the es- 
 sence from its individuating notes. This faculty is 
 called active intellect {intellectus agens). 
 
 45. The abstraction of the essence from its individual 
 conditions does not entail any ei^or in cognition. — A cog- 
 
 * "The fundamental error of the phrenological school lay in the 
 idea that a science of mind can be founded in any shape or form 
 upon the discoveries of anatomy. Their error lay in the notion that, 
 physiology can ever be the basis of psychology ; and this is an error 
 and a confusion of thought that survives phrenology." — Duke of 
 Argyll, quoted in American Caf/iolic Q;u.arterly Beview, vol. 11., p. 
 134. 
 
 Tet the influence of body on soul cannot be denied any more than 
 that of soul on' body. The most that can be granted is that phre- 
 nology may point out certain tendencies in man. These tendencies 
 may be due to heredity or to environment. It fails to appreciate 
 the spirituality of man's soul and his freedom of will. 
 
278 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nition is false when we affirm of an object what does 
 not belong to it, or deny of it what belongs to it. 
 Thus the intellect, viewing the essence in itself 
 abstracted from individual conditions, would err were 
 it to affirm that the essence actually exists in the 
 object separated from these individual conditions. 
 But, since it is restricted to contemplating the es- 
 sence by itself without any affirmation, and not con- 
 sidering it as really apart from its individuating 
 notes, the abstraction which it makes no more implies 
 error than does silence imply deceit. 
 
 46. The abstraction of the essence is possible, whether 
 we consider the abstracted essence in itself, or the condi- 
 tion of the intellect making the abstraction. — Although 
 the essence cannot exist physically without an in- 
 dividual determination, yet in itself it does not imply 
 a necessary existence in this or that individual ; 
 otherwise it could never be found in any other than 
 this individual, and consequently there could be but 
 one individual in each species. But this is evidently 
 false in regard to sensible objects. Therefore there 
 is nothing in the essence to prevent its being ab- 
 stracted from the individual in which it subsists, that 
 is, its being considered apart. As to the intellect, if 
 in the act of intellection it must be conformed to the 
 object which it cognizes, it is by no means necessary 
 that it be conformed to it as to the mode of cogniz- 
 ing. Thus, if the mode of existence of the essence is 
 concrete in the real order, nothing prevents its being 
 abstracted in the ideal order. 
 
 47. The act of abstraction is prior in nature, but not in 
 time, to that of intellection. — ^When two forces concur 
 to the production of one effect, their operation must 
 be simultaneous ; for every concurrence, while it does 
 not exclude priority of nature, yet implies simulta- 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIES. 279 
 
 neity of time. But the abstractive faculty and the 
 faculty that perceives essence concur in the produc- 
 tion of the single effect of intellective knowledge of 
 the essence of material things : the first faculty ab- 
 stracting the essence, and the second perceiving it. 
 Therefore the act of abstraction is only in nature 
 prior to the act of intellection. 
 
 48. The power that abstracts the esseiice is distinct 
 from that which perceives the essence. — When two ac- 
 tions are exercised upon a single object in two ways 
 specifically distinct, these two actions must be spe- 
 cifically distinct, arid consequently not reducible to 
 the same power ; but to abstract the essence and to 
 perceive it are two acts specifically distinct ; there- 
 fore they demand two distinct powers. Besides, the 
 essences of sensible things are not actually intelli- 
 gible ; but it is only actual beiiig" that can effect the 
 passage of an entity from potentiality to act ; hence 
 the soul requires besides the faculty by which it 
 comprehends the intelligible, and which is necessarily 
 in potentiality with respect to all intelligibles, a fac- 
 ulty which when in act renders the essences of sensi- 
 ble things actually intelligible, by disengaging them 
 from the material conditions in which they exist. 
 The Schoolmen call this faculty the active intellect 
 {intellectus agens) ; the other faculty, the possible intel- 
 lect {intellectus possibilis). 
 
 49. For the production of the act of intellection, intel- 
 ligible species are required; or likenesses of the intelligible 
 object, which inform the cognizing intellect. — Intelligible 
 sp)ecies {species intelligibilis) is a likeness of the intel- 
 ligible object, which informs the intellect, and by 
 means of which it can cognize the object. It is with- 
 out ground that modern philosophers have denied 
 the existence of intelligible species. To acquire 
 
280 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 knowledge, it is necessary tliat the object known enter 
 in some way the subject knowing. But it cannot be 
 said that the subject knowing contains already in 
 itself the object known, and in the act of cogni- 
 tion does nothing but contemplate it : for this would 
 identify the subject knowing and the object known. 
 Hence it must be admitted that the object known is 
 communicated to the subject knowing. But it cannot 
 be communicated in its physical substantiality, be- 
 cause it exists outside the subject knowing. Hence 
 it can be communicated to the subject knowing only 
 by means of a representation erf itself, and this is 
 called the intelligible species. The intelligible species 
 is named by the Scholastic philosophers the impressed 
 species {species impressa), if it is considered as simply 
 received by the intellect, and as the medium by which 
 the object determines the intellect to the cognitive 
 act. It is called the expressed species {species expressa), 
 if it is considered as the effect in the intellect of the 
 action of intellect after perceiving the impressed spe- 
 cies, which action produces complete cognition. 
 
 50. T/ie intelligible species is not that which the intel- 
 lect hiows, but that by which it knows. — If the intelligi- 
 ble species were the object known, it would neces- 
 sarily constitute the term of the intellective act ; but 
 since it is a form inhering in the intellect, it must be 
 apprehended by a reflex act ; therefore it is only in 
 reflex cognition that it is the object known. In direct 
 cognition it is the means by which the intellect 
 knows.* 
 
 * ' ' The main root of difference between adversaries and ourselves 
 [as to the objective validity of ideas in general], is that they will in- 
 sist contrary to us, in regarding knowledge as primarily not a knowl- 
 edge of things but of ideas. They imagine that what we first of all 
 know are always subjective affections as such — signa ex qiiihis and 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIMS. 281 
 
 51. The act of intellection resulting after the itnpression 
 of the intelligible object on the intellect by means of the 
 impressed species, is always the proper act of intellect 
 itself. — The intellect is called passive or possible, 
 because it is in itself indifferent to this or that act, 
 and consequently requires some determination to be 
 given to it by the object before it can act. Its act is 
 called immanent because it remains in the acting sub- 
 ject and modifies it. It is easily seen (1) that the in- 
 tellect is first passive, because it is in itself indifferent 
 to knowing this or that object ; and (2), because it 
 
 , knows an object only when determined to it by the 
 object, that it is also active, because it is the intellect 
 that knows. The intellective act must be elicited by 
 an intrinsic vital principle. But a faculty is active 
 when it elicits its own acts, and (3) that intellection 
 is an immanent act, because it remains in the faculty, 
 which it ennobles and perfects, and does not change 
 or modify the object. It must be noted that the con- 
 ditions that make the possible intellect passive are 
 not found in the acting intellect. Hence that intel- 
 lect is exclusively active. 
 
 52. The term of the act of intellection is called the 
 mental word. — The intellect, after receiving the im- 
 pressed species, the intelligible species that determines 
 it to action, produces as its term the mental word. 
 This does not really differ from the idea. Yet the 
 word idea expresses the concept of the mind in 
 
 aigna quibus. . . The mind perceives through ideas, not in the 
 
 sense that it looks at ideas first, and then passes on to infer things ; 
 but in the sense that the mind, at least under one aspect, begins as a 
 tabula rasa, and only in proportion as it stores itself with ideas is it 
 rendered by them cognizant of objects. . . A world of miscon- 
 
 ception would be saved if \he right view of the office of ideas were 
 acquired." — First Principles, Stonyliurst Series, pp. 335, 336. 
 
282 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 its relation with the object, while the mental word 
 points out in addition the relation of the concept to 
 the principle whence it proceeds, affirming to itself, 
 as it were, the truth it knows. In its word the intel- 
 lect perceives the object, just as in a mirror the eye 
 beholds not. the mirror, but the object reflected by 
 the mirror. The term of the act of vision, considered 
 as an action, is truly the mirror ; but considered as 
 cognition, it is the object. So too the term of the 
 act of intellection considered as the effect of the intel- 
 lect, is the mental word ; but, under the aspect of 
 cognition, it is the object of which the word is as it 
 were the image. 
 
 AET. Tin. — CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 53. Consciousness is the knowledge which the soul has 
 of its present affections. — Man not only has sensitive 
 and intellective cognitions, but he also knows that he 
 has them. The faculty by which the soul is cog- 
 nizant of its sensations, is the common sense, some- 
 times called sensitive consciousness. But the knowl- 
 edge which the soul has of its intellective affections 
 and of itself is properly called consciousness. And 
 because these affections- may be viewed either in 
 themselves or in their moral character of goodness or 
 malice, a distinction must be made between psycho- 
 logical consciousness, which perceives the existence of 
 the affections, and moral consciousness, which tells 
 whether the acts are good or bad. This latter is 
 generally called conscience. It is only with the 
 former that psychology is concerned. The cognition 
 afforded by consciousness, which is of a special kind, 
 should not be confounded with intellective cogni- 
 tion in general. For by intellective cognition the in- 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FA0ULTIE8. 283 
 
 tellect apprehends an essence, or by judgment or 
 reasoning affirms or denies something- of an essence ; 
 while consciousness has for its object this very act 
 of apprehension, judgment, or reasoning, that is, the 
 present affections of the thinking subject. Besides, 
 the operation of consciousness depends entirely on 
 the soul's activity. To confound it with cognition in 
 general would therefore be to fall into the error of 
 Fichte, who from the simple act of consciousness 
 drew the creation of all intelligible objects, the Ego, 
 the world, and even God. 
 
 54. Consciousness is habitual or direct, actual or re- 
 flex. — Habitual consciousness is the disposition of 
 the soul to see its own affections by the mere fact 
 of being present to itself. Actual consciousness is 
 the knowledge which the soul here and now has of 
 its affections. The former accompanies all the intel- 
 lective acts of the soul, because the soul is always 
 present to itself; the latter is consciousness now 
 exercised upon its present affections. "Direct con- 
 sciousness," says Balmes, " is the presence of a phe- 
 nomenon to the mind, whether that phenomenon be a 
 sensation or an idea, an act or an impression, in the 
 intellectual or the moral order." Reflsx consciousness, 
 which alone is consciousness properly so called, is 
 the act whereby the intellect explicitly adverts to the 
 phenomenon present in it. 
 
 55. Consciousness suffices to make us certain of the 
 existence of the soul, but not to mahe known its nature. 
 — Many philosophers, and among them Hume and 
 Kant, have attacked the testimony of consciousness. 
 Others with Reid have admitted the value of con- 
 sciousness, but have maintained that the existence of 
 the soul cannot be known except by means of an 
 distinctive judgment. Cousin pretended that the 
 
284 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 existence of tlie soul can be perceived in no other 
 way than by reasoning made by the intellect conse- 
 quent on the testimony of consciousness. But, what- 
 ever philosophers may assert, it is evident that, as 
 the soul is present to itself in its operations, it must 
 by consciousness perceive itself operating. Again, 
 consciousness in perceiving the acts of the soul, can- 
 not but perceive them as in the soul ; therefore 
 in perceiving these acts it perceives the existing 
 soul itself. Yet though consciousness is competent 
 to perceive the existence of the soul, it is not comp'e- 
 tent to perceive its essence. For it is one thing to 
 perceive the soul in action, and quite another thing 
 to know that it has this or that nature. This latter 
 knowledge is the result of reasoning, and is proper to 
 the learned, while the former pertains to all men. 
 
 56. Gonsciousness is not a faculty distinct from, intel- 
 lect — Several modern philosophers, with Descartes 
 and Eeid, make of consciousness a special and dis- 
 tinct faculty. But it is easy to prove that it is not 
 distinct from the intellect. That two faculties be dis- 
 tinct, their acts or their objects must be not reducible 
 one to the other. But the object of consciousness is 
 reducible to that of intellect, for consciousness being 
 an intellectual faculty can apprehend its object only 
 under the form of its immateriality. In like manner, 
 the act of consciousness is reducible to that of intel- 
 lect ; for consciousness properly so called is nothing 
 else than the intellect knowing its own operations 
 here and now. 
 
 AET. IX. — ATTENITON AND REFIjECTION. 
 
 57. Attention is an act iy which, the intellect is con- 
 centrated on a single object. Reflection is an act of con 
 
THE HUMAJV SOUL AND ITS FAOWLTIES. 285 
 
 centrating the intellect on itself and its own acts. — Sev- 
 eral philosophers, following in the footsteps of "Wolf 
 (1679-1754), have distinguished between attention and 
 reflection, saying that by the former the mind is fixed 
 on a single object, while by the latter it passes suc- 
 cessively from one object to another. But this dis- 
 tinction is false, for it is a necessary condition of 
 every cognitive act tTiat it can perceive but one object 
 at a time, and that it can know several objects only 
 successively. If a distinction be made between other 
 cognitive acts and the acts of intellect, it must be 
 made in accordance with the different modes in which 
 they are accomplished. Hence we must say that at- 
 tention is an act by which the intellect considers one 
 object alone among many ; and that reflection is an 
 act by which the intellect concentrates its power as 
 itself and its own acts, or reconsiders an object. 
 
 AET. X. — THE PEINCIPAIi FUNCTIONS OF THE INTELLECT. 
 — JUDGMENT. 
 
 58. Judgment is an act of the intellect iy which it 
 predicates the agreement or disagreement of two ideas ; or 
 ly which it affirms or denies that something is. — The in- 
 tellect may perceive an object without affirming or 
 denying anything of it, or it may proceed to affirm 
 or deny something of that object. In the latter 
 case it is said to judge. This act of judgment does 
 not, as is evident, require a distinct faculty. It is an 
 effect of the imperfection of our intellect, which, un- 
 like the understanding of the angels, does not attain 
 its perfection immediately in passing from potential- 
 ity to act, but acquires complete cognition only by 
 compounding or dividing different ideas or concepts. 
 
 59. Every judgment is necessarily comparative. The 
 
286 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 instinctive judgments of Reid must he rejected. — Judg- 
 ment is a complete cognition, since by it the intellect 
 cognizes not only the essence, but also what does or 
 does not belong to the essence. It must, therefore, 
 be performed in the manner required by a complete 
 cognition. But the perfection of intellectual cogni- 
 tion in a judgment requires not only that the attri- 
 bute be affirmed or denied of the subject, but also that 
 the reason of this affirmation or negation be likewise 
 known. But this reason consists in the agreement or 
 disagreement of the attribute with the subject, and 
 hence they must be compared to find the reason. 
 Therefore every judgment necessarily implies a com- 
 parison. The impulse which nature has given to 
 intellect can be nothing else thaii a tendency to act, 
 but not a tendency to perform an act of perfect and 
 complete cognition like that of judgment. 
 
 60. The comparison instituted preparatory to a judg- 
 ment is between the idea of the attribute and that of the 
 S2ibject. — The intellect cannot compare attribute and 
 subject unless it knows them ; consequently it must 
 compare the idea of the attribute with that of the 
 subject. Besides judgment is an immanent act which 
 is accomplished in the soul that judges ; but the soul 
 cannot judge of things external to itself unless they 
 are in some way present in it ; this can happen only 
 through their concepts. Therefore a judgment is 
 formed by a comparison of the concepts of subject 
 and attribute. This, however, does not deprive the 
 judgment of objective validity, because the concepts 
 of the subject and attribute are themselves objective, 
 since they have for their immediate term the subject 
 and attribute as they are in themselves. 
 
THE HUM AW SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIES. 287 
 
 AET. XI. — SPECUIiATIVE INTELLECT AND PEACTICAL 
 INTELLECT. 
 
 61. The speculative intellect is that which contemplates 
 the true without any reference to its practical application. 
 The practical intellect is that which, regards the true as the 
 rule of action. — The human intellect may stop at the 
 mere consideration of the true ; but it may also apply 
 the known truth to action, considering it as the di- 
 rective rule of action. In the former case, it is called 
 speculative ; in the latter, practical. 
 
 62. Tke speculative intellect and the practical intellect 
 are not two distinct faculties, but only two functions of 
 the same intellect. — The object of the intellect is the 
 true. But whether truth be speculative or practical, 
 it is still truth, and does not constitute a specifically 
 distinct object of intellect. The whole difference be- 
 tween the act of knowing- speculative truth and that 
 of knowing practical truth consists in this, that the 
 consideration of practical truth is as it were an exten- 
 sion of the consideration of speculative truth. 
 
 ABT Xn. — EEASON. 
 
 63. lieason is that act of the intellect iy which it 
 deduces otve truth from another. — An angel perceives 
 truth at once without amy need of reasoning; but 
 man comes to the knowledge of most truths step by 
 step, passing from one truth to another. When the 
 intellect compares the attribute with the subject and, 
 perceiving their agreement or disagreement, predi- 
 cates the same, it judges ; when it perceives their 
 agreement or disagreement by means of a third term, 
 and concludes the same, it 7'easons. 
 
288 SEAL PBILOSOPRT. 
 
 64. Season is not a faculty distinct from intellect.—' 
 Modern philosophers make reason a distinct faculty ; 
 but it is evidently only a function of intellect. For to 
 deduce one truth from another, an act of reflection 
 is sufficient, by which the intellect, considering atten- 
 tively a cognition, perceives there a greater or less 
 number of truths. But the intellect is an essentially 
 inorganic faculty, and hence suffices to accomplish 
 this act. Thus, in passing from one truth to another, 
 reason is to intellect what motion is to rest ; and since 
 it is the same body that is in motion or at rest, so it 
 is one and the same faculty that understands and 
 reasons. 
 
 AET. XIII. — INTELLECTIVE MEMORY. 
 
 65. Intellective memory is tJie poioer which the intellect 
 has to preserve and reproduce intellective cognitions tJiat 
 have already been acquired. — When the intellect has 
 perceived its object, it ought to be able to preserve it 
 in memory, and, if need be, reproduce it. This is 
 necessary both for science and for practical life : for 
 science, because no conclusions can be drawn from 
 truths already known unless memory actually re- 
 produces their cognition ; for our daily Hfe, because 
 it is guided by the history of the past, and that 
 history memory alone can preserve. 
 
 Three conditions are requisite for an act of intellec- 
 tive memory : (1) That the intellect be able to pre- 
 serve an intellective cognition acquired in the past ; 
 (2) That the intellect be able to distinguish the time 
 when the cognition was formed; (3) That the in- 
 tellect be able to recognize the cognition that is now 
 reproduced as having been acquired in the past. 
 Now, it is evident that the intellect can preserve its 
 intellectual acts, for they are immaterial and inherent 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIES. 289 
 
 m an immaterial subject, and hence are not subject to 
 corruption; secondly, the intellect, as being an in- 
 organic power can apprehend not merely the intellec- 
 tive acts, but also the time when they took place; 
 thirdly, the intellect can recognize a particular cog- 
 nition as had in past time, because, as it preserves a 
 knowledge of its intellective acts just as they were 
 elicited, that is, in the past, and is endowed moreover 
 with the power of comparison, it can in their repro- 
 duction recognize them as elicited in past time. 
 
 66. Intellective memory is not a distinct faculty from 
 the possible intellect. — A power which by its nature is 
 referred to a general object cannot be diversified by 
 the particular differences of the object. Thus the 
 faculty of sight, which is referred in general to color, 
 is not different from the faculty that perceives green 
 or orange. But the object of the intellect is the in- 
 telligible in general or the universal. Consequently, 
 a power like memory which has for its object the in- 
 telligible perceived in the past, cannot be different 
 from the intellect itself. 
 
 67. Intellective memory differs essentially from sensitive 
 memory. — In the first place, sensitive memory re- 
 produces sensitive perceptions ; intellective memory 
 reproduces intellective cognitions. Secondly, sensi- 
 tive memory reproduces the past as its proper and 
 immediate object ; intellective memory reproduces it 
 only so far as, in perceiving the intellective act, it 
 perceives also the time when the act was elicited. 
 
 Several modern philosophers make no distinction 
 between these two kinds of memory.* This is a 
 
 * With tiiese may be reckoned Dr. Maudsley and Herbeit Spencer. 
 But all conceptualists and nominalists, all, in fact, who fail to 
 divide off accurately the sensible image from the idea, must, if con- 
 Bistent, identify the sensitive memory with the intellective. 
 19 
 
290 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 gross error, as even experience can show, because one 
 man may often recall sensible things with ease, but 
 intelligible objects with difficulty, while the contrary 
 is true of another individual. The same phenomenon 
 is manifest also in the same individual at different 
 periods of his life under different conditions. 
 
 68. The laws of the development and exercise of 
 intellective memory are the same as those of the devel- 
 opment and exercise of sensitive m,emory. — The sole 
 difference is that sensitive memory resides in an 
 organ, and depends for its perfection on that of the 
 organ ; intellective memory is an inorganic faculty, 
 and has only indirect dependence on the state of or- 
 ganism, in so far, namely, as the intellect requires the 
 concurrence of the sensitive faculty to furnish matter 
 for its operation. 
 
 ABT. XIV. — THE INTELLECTIVE APPETITE, OR WILL. 
 
 69. The will is an intellective appetite, or a tendency 
 toward the good as apprehended hy the intellect. — When 
 the intellect has apprehended the good, the soul seeks 
 to be united with the good. The faculty by which it 
 tends to the good is called the will. But whatever is 
 may be apprehended as good ; therefore whatever 
 exists, the reprobate excepted, may become the ob- 
 ject of the will, /ind as the will and its act are good, 
 they too may become the object of the will. Thus we 
 can love not only external creatures, but also our 
 own will and the love to which it determines us. 
 
 70. The ivill differs from the sensitive appetite in its 
 object and its made of action. — The sensitive appetite 
 depends oathe senses, and has for its object the sen- 
 sible and material ; the will depends on the intellect 
 and has for its object the universal good, and seeks 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 291 
 
 either material objects under their universal charac- 
 ter of good, or immaterial objects. Secondly, the 
 sensitive appetite acts like the will so far as it is the 
 intrinsic principle of its own act, but it cannot pro- 
 pose to itself an end. That an agent may propose to 
 itself an end, it is necessary that it be able to return 
 upon itself and consider itself in relation to its end. 
 Now the sensitive appetite depends on material 
 organs, which are incapable of reflection ; but the in- 
 tellect, as being intrinsically independent of organs, 
 and, therefore, capable of complete return upon itself, 
 can both present the good to the will, and cause it to 
 consider the good as its end and perfection. Lastly, 
 the sensitive appetite is incapable of choice and is 
 necessarily determined to its act ; but the will can 
 choose its own means to attain its end. 
 
 AET. XV. — FEEEDOM.* 
 
 71. Freedom is divided into freedom from coaction, 
 freedom from necessity, and freedom from law. Freedom 
 from, necessity is divided into freedom of contradiction, 
 freedom of contrariety, and freedotn of specification. — 
 Frfeedom from coaction excludes all external constraint ; 
 thus a prisoner in his cell is without this freedom, 
 which is possessed by the beasts of the forest. Free- 
 dom from necessity excludes all internal constraint ; 
 of this the insane man and the beast are destitute. 
 Freedom from law excludes all dependence on a law 
 
 * "Preedom is used where emphasis is laid upon large opportunity 
 given for the exercise of one's powers ; or where the previous or 
 iiossible restriction has been or is legal or moral. . . . Liberty 
 has more in mind protection from external constraint or from the ag- 
 gressions of power ; hence, in civil affairs, liberty is freedom as out 
 lined and protected by law. " — Century Dictionary. 
 
292 REAL PEILOSOPST. 
 
 imposed by a superior ; God alone enjoys this free= 
 dom. Man naturally possesses freedom from coac- 
 tion ; but to constitute free choice, by whicli the "will 
 chooses the means to attain its end, freedom from 
 necessity suffices. This is called freedom of contra- 
 diction, when one is free either to will something or 
 not will it. It is called freedom of co7itrariety, when 
 one is free to will either good, or evil under the ap- 
 pearance of good. It is called freedom of specifica- 
 tion, when one is free to will this, that, or some other 
 object or act. It is to be remarked that freedom of 
 contrariety, far from being necessary to constitute 
 free will, is rather an imperfection ; and just as it is 
 a defect in the reason to draw false conclusions from 
 principles, so it is an imperfection in the free will not 
 to choose the means proper to attain the end. 
 
 72. Free choice belongs essentially to ths will of man ; 
 it is the power of the, will to choose the means iy directing 
 them to the end. — The will is necessarily determined by 
 its nature to universal good, and when the intellect 
 points out to it this good, it cannot but love and seek 
 it. But the same is not true of particular goods : the 
 will may or may not seek any one of them as a means 
 to attain its end, which is universal good ; it is free to 
 choose between them.* Some philosophers, with 
 Locke, make this freedom consist in the physical 
 power of the will to execute what it desires ; but this 
 is an accident of freedom which may be wanting, 
 while freedom of the will properly so called still ex- 
 ists; as is the case with the paralytic who is unable to 
 move his arm. Other philosophers, following Ock- 
 ham, have maintained that the will may or may not 
 
 * Consult the valuable article by J. Gardair, Le Libre Arbit/fC 
 /Lnncdes de la PhUosopJde OhrStienne, April and June, 1889. 
 
THE HCTMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 293 
 
 desire a tiling without any necessity of its being ap- 
 prehended as good. But this is tantamount to saying 
 that the will is free because it is free. Moreover, such 
 a doctrine contradicts the true nature of the will, which 
 is a blind faculty, and cannot desire any object unless 
 the intellect points it out as good. Others, again, as- 
 sert that the apprehension of good, which is the mo- 
 tive of an act of the will, is a mere condition ; that, 
 given this condition, the will may still elicit an act 
 or not, may desire one thing rather than another. 
 According to these philosophers, freedom is the prop- 
 erty of the will to act or not act, or to act in one way 
 rather than in another, when the necessary conditions 
 for acting are present. This view is correct. 
 
 To apprehend the nature of the will, one must keep 
 well in mind that it is a blind faculty and can never act 
 until the good, which is its object, has been shown to 
 it by the intellect. But since the will is directed tow- 
 ards this or that particular good by the intellect, it 
 follows that the free exercise of the will requires as a 
 necessary condition a previous act of intellect. Now, 
 reason and experience prove that the intellect is really 
 indifferent to knowing this or that particular good, 
 since every thing that is good for the will is also 
 true for the intellect. "When, therefore, the intellect 
 has pronounced this or that to be a particular good, 
 the will is free to choose whichever particular good 
 pleases it. Hence freedom may not, as some affirm, 
 be defined as the free judgmeivt of reason ; for it is a 
 property, not of reason, but of the will ; and the judg- 
 ment of the intellect regarding a particular good 
 imposes no necessity on the will of choosing that par- 
 ticular good rather than another. 
 
 73. The existence of this freedom is proved frem tTie 
 mrv nature of the will, from the testimony hoth of con/- 
 
294 REAL PB1L080PHY. 
 
 sdousness and of conscience, from the common sense of 
 mankind, and from, the absurd consequences of its denial. 
 — 1. The will has for its proper object the absolute 
 good, and as to this good it is not free ; thus man 
 cannot but will to be happy. But as to the particular 
 goods which are the means of attaining the absolute 
 good, the will is necessarily free ; because if the abso- 
 lute good, as completely satisfying the tendencies oj' 
 the will, inevitably determines it, particular goods, 
 as lacking some perfections, may under this aspect 
 be viewed as evil, and so be rejected by the wiU. 
 Thus, while we necessarily will to be happy, we 
 may yet, according to our liking, choose virtue or 
 riches as a means to attain happiness. 2. Conscious- 
 ness attests the existence of freedom. For we clearly 
 distinguish in ourselves indeliberate movements fropa 
 those that depend for their existence on our will and 
 reason. In a multitude of cases we not only recog- 
 nize a principle of activity which we can determine 
 at will, but we also exercise it at pleasure ; it is thus, 
 for example, that 1 move my arm or my hand for the 
 mere pleasure experienced in exercising my freedom. 
 The reality of free will and its constant exercise are 
 so evident, that we may say with Feneloii that no man 
 in his senses can practically doubt it. 3. We have 
 the irresistible conviction of being the responsible 
 cause of certain actions which we regard as our own, 
 and which we esteem worthy of praise or blame. 
 Before performing these actions we examine whether 
 we can do them ; and we experience remorse if they 
 are criminal. On the other hand, conscience re- 
 proaches us for moral evil, but never for physical evil. 
 4. The freedom of the will is a truth universally ad- 
 mitted by men, as is attested by all languages, by the 
 civil and religious institutions of all peoples, and the 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 295 
 
 means employed in every age to instruct and educate 
 man. 5. Finally, if the freedom of the will be denied, 
 it must be admitted as a consequence that there is 
 neither good nor evil, that remorse is a mere fiction, 
 that laws are useless and absurd, that deliberation is 
 nonsensical, and that God is the cause of all existing 
 evil. 
 
 74. It is absurd to urge against free will, as do fatal- 
 ists, the action of God upon Tnan, His foreknowledge of 
 events. His goodness and power, and the influence of mo- 
 tives and temperament. — In ancient times fatalism 
 formed the basis of every religion and every philo- 
 sophical system. It was continued in some of the 
 heretical doctrines of the first ages of the Ch\irch, 
 and Mahometism inoculated it into the manners of 
 the Oriental peoples. In modem times it has been 
 renewed as a doctrine by Protestantism, and later by 
 Jansenism ; it is an immediate consequence of the 
 two chief errors that in our day divide non-Catholic 
 philosophy, namely, materialism and pantheism. 
 
 The objection drawn from the action of God upon 
 the will of man has no weight ; for although God, as 
 the first cause of all motion, moves man's will also, 
 yet the will, as second cause, is a real cause of its 
 own actions. Moreover, the action of God upon the 
 will is so far from destroying its liberty that it rather 
 protects it ; for He always intervenes in the actions of 
 all creatures in a manner conformable to their nature. 
 Therefore He does not prevent their action, but pre- 
 serves it to them together with its proper character- 
 istics, that is, freedom in man's action. If the par- 
 ticular action of grace be cited, it is evident that^ as 
 grace is simply a help, it does not destroy our liberty ; 
 on the contrary, it perfects it, since it is an aid to 
 avoid moral evil, which is an abuse of our liberty. 
 
296 SEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 When grace proposes to the will the means it should 
 choose to attain its end with certainty, it does for the 
 freedom of the will what the skilled teacher does for 
 the reason of his pupils when he enables them to 
 draw true conclusions from given principles. To 
 those who put forth the divine foreknowledge as an 
 objection, the reply is that God is infallible, and hence 
 the particular free act which He has foreseen will 
 happen infallibly, not necessarily. To God the 
 future is present, and His foreknowledge influences 
 our acts no more than our vision changes the nature 
 of the objects which we see. Nay, this foreknowledge 
 rather confirms our liberty than destroys it, for if God 
 foresees that such an act will be done freely, and His 
 foreknowledge is infallible, the act will be done not 
 otherwise than freely. 
 
 Some philosophers have pretended to see a con- 
 tradiction between God's goodness and the existence 
 of evil which results from free will ; but it is evident 
 that a world in which free creatures are subjected to 
 trial, and personally merit happiness, cannot be op- 
 posed to the divine goodness. Besides, although God 
 has permitted the evil, He has not willed it ; He has 
 set fixed limits to it, and in His wisdom He knows 
 how to draw greater good from it. — The objection 
 that the power of God in its government of the world 
 would be restricted by the liberty of man, is refuted 
 by answering that God, like a wise king, knows how 
 to attain His ends by leaving to each man his liberty. 
 He reserves to Himself certain extraordinary events 
 to show forth His power ; but He ordinarily conceals 
 His action under the general laws by which He 
 directs all things, and He makes the very exercise of 
 liberty by intelligent creatures concur in the accom- 
 plishment of His will. 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FAOULTIBS. 297 
 
 The philosopher Collins (1676-1729) pretended that 
 motives necessitate the will, just as the weights placed 
 in the scales of a balance bear down the side in which 
 the heavier weight has been placed. Undoubtedly 
 the will does not act without some motive proposed 
 by the intellect, but the motive imposes no necessity 
 on the will, as has been shown. — The influence exerted 
 on the will by climate, temperature, the conformation 
 of the brain, and other similar causes, cannot be con- 
 tested, but it can be easily explained by the union of 
 soul and body; besides, the will has power to resist 
 their influence, and often acts contrary to it. 
 
 AET. XVI. — EELATIONS OF THE WILL TO THE OTHER FACUL- 
 TIES OF THE SOUL. 
 
 75. The will has a certain dominion over all the 
 oilier faculties of the soul. — The will has the universal 
 good of the person for its object, while the other fac- 
 ulties have each its own particular good for theirs. 
 Thus the good of the imagination is restricted to 
 sensible images by which it is perfected ; that of the 
 intellect, to the true, which is its life and nutriment ; 
 the will has, on the contrary, for its object whatever is 
 good for the whole being, for all the faculties, and 
 hence it can wish the particular good of each faculty 
 as contained in the universal good. Therefore, that 
 the will may be enabled to seek the particular good 
 proper to each faculty, it must exercise a certain con- 
 trol over that faculty, and consequently over all the 
 faculties. This control is attested by experience. It 
 is exerted, (1) over the external senses in either fur- 
 nishing them with their object, or directing them to 
 it; (2) over the internal senses in rousing them to 
 action, and in taking complacency in their action ; (3) 
 
298 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 over the sensitive appetite, which, although it in- 
 clines the will to this or that action, may in its turn 
 be ruled and repressed by the will; (4) over the 
 motive faculty, which executes the motion ordered 
 by the will. — If the intellect moves the will when 
 it presents to it the good as its object, it is in turn 
 moved by the will, inasmuch as the true, the object 
 of the intellect, is a good, and the will excites the in- 
 tellect to seek this good. Thus the intellect exerts 
 on the will a determination of specification when it 
 presents the object to it, and the will has over the 
 intellect a dominion of exercise by applying it to its 
 action. 
 
 76. Considered absolutely, the intellect is more noble 
 than the will ; hut relatively, the act of the will may he 
 more noble than that of the intellect. — 1. The nobility of 
 a faculty is in proportion to that of its object; but 
 the object of intellect is the true. Now, the true is 
 good, and the good is our end, and our end is happi- 
 ness. Therefore, as the truth must be perceived 
 before the will can tend to it as a good, so the per- 
 ception of the supreme ' truth is the attainment of 
 supreme happiness ; and consequently that faculty by 
 which we attain this is the noblest of aU. But this, 
 faculty is the intellect. 2. It is more noble also, if 
 considered as to the mode in which the two faculties 
 are moved. For the intellect, it is true, is moved by 
 the will to exercise ; but it, on the other hand, deter- 
 mines the will as to its specification, it enlightens 
 and directs it, so that the will depends for its act 
 upon the intellect. 3. The intellect is more noble, be- 
 cause it brings its object in some way to itself and 
 keeps it there, whereas the will tends outward toward 
 its object, and moves the whole man to it. Still, as 
 some things have a nobler mode of being in them- 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 299 
 
 selves than in our intellect, it is better to will them 
 than to know them ; thus in this life it is better to 
 love God than merely to know Him.* Will is more 
 noble than intellect also in that it has dominion over 
 the other faculties, and moves them to act. 
 
 AKT. XVII. — HABIT. 
 
 77. Habit is a permanent quality inherent in the intel- 
 lective powers and inclinitig them to act well or ill. — 
 Habit is a kind of supplement added to a faculty, 
 enabling it to acqomplish acts of the same kind with 
 ease. It must be permanent in the faculty, otherwise 
 it would not incline it constantly to produce the same 
 kind of acts. It can be found in the intellective fac- 
 ulties only, for beings that by their nature are neces- 
 sarily determined to their operation cannot modify 
 or change it ; therefore only such beings and faculties 
 as are masters of their own acts are susceptible of 
 habit. Still, as in man the sensitive nature is subject 
 to the intellective, and he can impress on the sensitive 
 faculties a certain constant mode of acting ; so, in vir- 
 tue of his dominion over animals, he can by training 
 form habits in them which may eventually become 
 hereditary instincts. Lastly, habit has the effect of 
 inclining the faculty to act well or ill according as it 
 imparts a good or a bad quality. Thus virtue per- 
 fects the will, while vice degrades it. 
 
 78. Every habit, whether good or bad, produces ease, 
 constancy, and pleasure in acting. — Constancy in pro- 
 ducing the same kind of acts results from the fact 
 that habit is a permanent quality. Tet it must be 
 observed that this constancy never develops into 
 
 See page 251. 
 
300 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 necessity, because habit is but a quality superadded 
 to the faculty, and hence has less extension than the 
 faculty itself. Therefore the faculty can always per- 
 form an act to which the habit does not concur, and 
 consequently can even act contrary to the habit. 
 Facility and promptitude result from the fact that 
 the habit inclines the power to action. Lastly, the 
 pleasure experienced by the agent is owing to the 
 fact that habit is a second nature, and the conformity 
 of the action with the nature of the agent is the very 
 cause of his pleasure. 
 
 79. Habits are natural, infused, or acquired. — A nat- 
 ural habit is one bestowed in the natural order by 
 the Author of nature. Thus the disposition of the 
 intellect to know first principles is a natural habit. 
 This is sometimes called the "habit of first princi- 
 ples." Others admit no natural habit, but call it 
 disposition. An infused habit is one given by God in 
 the supernatural order ; thus " faith, hope, and 
 charity" are supernatural and infused habits. An 
 acquired habit is one formed by man's activity ; thus 
 " science " is an acquired habit. The difference be- 
 tween these three kinds of habits is, that natural 
 habits are simple dispositions ; but, far from deter- 
 mining the faculty to the act, they 'must themselves 
 be determined by some external principle. The other 
 habits, on the contrary, of themselves dispose the fac- 
 ulty to act easily and promptly. 
 
 80. Acquired Tiabits are formed hy repeated acts of the 
 same kind ; they are weakened and lost hy the cessation 
 of the acts that have forvfied the habit or by eliciting con- 
 trary acts. — Experience affords sufficient proof that 
 acquired habits are formed only by a repetition of 
 the same acts. The destruction or weakening of 
 habit is the result of a long cessation of the acts that 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES. 301 
 
 formed it, and of a repetition of acts proper to form a 
 contrary habit. It may also be a consequence of 
 obstacles to a natural disposition ; but, in the case of 
 the intellective faculties, it is to be noted that the 
 obstacle to their disposition must be indirect. Thus 
 insanity puts a stop to the habit of knowledge, by 
 affecting not the intellect, but the sensitive faculties, 
 which supply the intellect with matter for its opera,- 
 tious. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Sleep and Insanity. 
 
 81. Sleep is a repose of the senses intended for the 
 Tiealth of animals. — Sleep is a cessation of action in 
 tlie senses ; but the mere inaction of one or several of 
 the senses is not sleep, for this may be the effect of 
 disease. Sleep is produced when the sensitive 
 faculty called the common sense is impeded in its 
 operation. Since the common sense (sensus com- 
 munis) depends on the activity of the external senses 
 for its object, when they are no longer active it too 
 is at rest. Sleep is necessary for animals, because 
 the sensitive faculties, being limited by their nature, 
 cannot continue always active, but require rest at 
 stated intervals. 
 
 82. The cause of sleep is the exhaustion and fatigue of 
 the sensitive nature hy which communication through the 
 nervous system is interrupted. — After excessive or pro- 
 longed labor, and above all during the process of di- 
 gestion, the senses must rest, that all the vital energy 
 may be given to the digestive and recuperative action 
 then going on; from this results the repose of the 
 senses, or sleep. First the sense of sight ceases to 
 act, then that of taste, of smell, of hearing, and last 
 of all, the sense of touch. The senses also awake 
 successively, but in a reverse order. 
 
 83. 8omnamhulism is an imperfect sleep in which all 
 communication hetween the common sense and the exter- 
 
SLEEP AND INSANITY. 303 
 
 nal senses, is not interrupted. It happens in those per- 
 sons in whom there is a s^iperdbundance of vital spirits. 
 — In this state, in consequence of an abnormal con- 
 dition of the system, if the individual has an abun- 
 dance of vital spirits, the images produced in his 
 imagination can act as in a waking state. But as he is 
 in a state of sleep, he is not conscious of his acts, and 
 though he may recall the images that troubled him, 
 he will forget the consequent motions, because they 
 have left no trace in him. 
 
 84. Dreams and deliria have three causes : tJie activity 
 of the imagination, the state of the iody, and physical 
 impressions received from without. — Dreams and de- 
 liria are produced in the imagination, and hence the 
 matter of dreams and deliria has always previously 
 been in some way present to the external senses. 
 
 Dreams " are in some respects akin to states of 
 reverie which occur during waking life. In dreaming 
 the imagination assumes the part played in waking 
 life by the external senses. During sleep the activ- 
 ity of these , latter falls into abeyance ; volitional 
 control over the course of thought ceases ; the power 
 of reflexion and comparison is suspended ; and the 
 fancy of the dreamer moves along automatically 
 under the guidance of association." The chief char- 
 acteristics of the dream are " (a) its seeming reality, 
 (b) its incoherehce and extravagance, (c) its posses- 
 sion of a certain coherence amid this inconsistency, 
 and (d) the exaggeration of actual impressions."* 
 
 * " (a) The apparent reality of the dream is, in great part, a conse- 
 quence of the cessation of the action of the external senses. In 
 sleep the images of the fancy which may arise within us are not sub- 
 ject to the correction which the presentations of the senses are ever 
 furnishing during waking life. . . (b) The inconsistency of the 
 dream seems to be due to its course being left entirely to the guid- 
 
304 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 85. Insanity and its different degrees, as Jvallucination,, 
 monomania, etc., are nothing hut a derangement of the 
 organ of imagination, in consequence of which it sees 
 images that correspond' to no reality. — Insanity is a sort 
 of waking dream. Its cause is to be sought either in 
 the disorder of the brain functions, due to poisonous 
 materials present in the blood, or in some organic 
 disease of the brain. 
 
 86. Insanity affects the intellect indirectly through the 
 itnagination. — Insanity injures only the sensitive fac- 
 ulties ; yet, as these faculties supply the intellect with 
 matter for its operations, insanity reaches the intel- 
 lect indirectly. But just as the sight is not injured 
 when we look through a colored glass, although it is 
 deceived as to the color of the objects, so in cogniz- 
 ing and in reasoning from a false image, the intellect, 
 although deceived, suffers no injury in itself. 
 
 anoe of the fortuitous associations modified by the interference of 
 accidental sensations at the moment. The absence of control over 
 our thoughts disables us from reflecting upon the ideas which arise 
 spontaneously, and prevents us from comparing them with past ex- 
 perience or with each other. . . (c) The coherence of the dream, 
 in so far as it occasionally exists, probably results in part from an 
 orderly succession of previously associated ideas, in part from a faint 
 power of selection exerted by a dominant tone of consciousness at 
 the time, which may be able to reject striking eccentricities. — (d) 
 The exaggeration of occasional real impressions is accounted for by 
 the fact that while the great majority of external sensations are ex- 
 cluded, those which do find entrance are thereby in a, peculiarly 
 Tavorable position. They are in novel isolation from their surround- 
 ings ; their nature is vaguely apprehended ; and they cannot b» 
 confronted with other experiences. . . . Another striking feat- 
 ure of dreams is the extraordinary rapidity with which trains o\ 
 thought sometimes pass through the mind." — (Psychology, Stonyhursl 
 Series, pp. 176-170.) 
 
CHAPTEE n. 
 
 The Human Sotil Consideeed in ItselE; 
 
 abt. i. — oeigin of the human soul. 
 
 87. The human soul comes im,mediately from God h^ 
 creation. — A produced substance is either drawn from 
 nothing- by creation, as in the case of the first man and 
 of all substances at the beginning of the world ; or it 
 comes from another substance by suhstantial change, 
 as in non-living beings, when, for instance, wood is 
 converted into ashes, then into clay ; or it comes from 
 alike substance by generation, as in living beings, such 
 as the plant, which comes from a like plant. Some 
 both of the old and of the more recent philosophers, 
 to explain more easily the transmission of original 
 sin, taught that the human soul is produced by gen- 
 eration. But this by no means explains the trans- 
 mission of original guilt, for, if this opinion were 
 admitted, we would have to conclude that every man 
 inherited likewise by transmission the sins of all his 
 ancestors. Again, this opinion is evidently false ; for 
 the soul being independent of matter, cannot come 
 from the body, which is material. Nor can it come 
 from another soill, because the soul is indivisible and 
 therefore incapable of communicating a part of itself. 
 It is evident, therefore, that the soul of each man 
 comes from God immediately by creation. 
 
306 REAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 AET. II. — SPIRITUALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL. 
 
 88. The soul of man is not only simple and indivisible, 
 like that of plants and hrutes, hut it is also spiritual ; 
 that is, it is in itself independent of mutter and can sub-, 
 sist apart from the body. — The spirituality of the soul, 
 that is, its intrinsic independence of matter and its 
 power of subsisting apart from the body, is demon- 
 strated by its specific operations, which are intellec- 
 tion and volition. The operation of a being is accord- 
 ing to the nature of the being itself. Now, a faculty 
 that depends on a material organ for its exercise, can 
 attain to that only which impresses this organ, and is, 
 therefore, concrete and material. But intellect and 
 will may attain to the abstract and immaterial ; there- 
 fore the soul itself must also be independent of matter. 
 Another argument is furnished by exp erience. For. the 
 organs of the sensitive faculties are impaired by im- 
 pressions that are too lively or too prolonged, and 
 their alteration involves that of the corresponding 
 faculties ; but the intellect and the will become more 
 perfect as the truth is better known and the good 
 ;more loved. In the second place, the very nature of 
 intellective acts proves their independence of all 
 material organs. For our ideas and their correspond- 
 ing appetitions are universal, and independent of time 
 and place ; and the intellect and the' will have a sort 
 of infinity in virtue of which they are always capable 
 of knowing and loving yet more ; but if the intellective 
 faculties were exercised in concurrence with organs, 
 they would be limited and determined in their power 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL 00N8IDERED IN ITSELF. 307 
 
 and their acts by the organs themselves, which by 
 their nature are always limited.* 
 
 * According to the tenets of evolutionism, the spirituality of the 
 human soul is an impossibility. " The real initiators of this system 
 were Lamarck (1744-1829), who was the most profound, Goethe the 
 boldest, and Darwin the most ingenious and popular." They teach 
 that in the beginning there were but one or two types, " possessed of 
 marvellous creative energies," and tending to develop into a higher 
 state. In his PMlosopMe Zodlogique, which appeared in 1809, just 
 fifty years before Darwin's Origin of Species, Lamarck adopts three 
 conditions as factors of evolution, — adaptation, heredity, and time. 
 Darwin accepts the same principles, but gives them a more scientific 
 form. Observing the variations attested in the history of cultivated 
 plants and domestic animals, he compiled his laws of adaptation, 
 correlation, growth, divergence of characteristics, etc. As a second 
 element he places the struggle for life, which is most violent among 
 the species most closely related, whereas the most opposite varieties 
 have the best chance to live and tend to depart more and more from 
 the common type. Holding that the vegetable and the animal king- 
 dom increase in geometrical progression, while their means of sub- 
 sistence increase in arithmetical progression, he concludes that only 
 the best and strongest individuals survive and are perpetuated by 
 natural selection, the marvellous results of which are preserved to 
 future generations by Jieredity. Lastly, time is an essential condition. 
 
 But this theory is metaphysically impossible. For, says St. 
 Thomas i^Swm. Th. i. , q. 118, a. 3 ad 2), "No substantial form 
 receives either more or less, but the superadditiou of a greater per- 
 fection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity 
 makes another species in number. But it is impossible that a form 
 numerically one and the same should belong to diverse species." It 
 is also contradictory in its process. External circumstances, says 
 Lamarck, produce wants, wants create desires, desires generate cor- 
 responding faculties ; and these in turn develop a suitable organism. 
 Now, in the words of Cardinal Zigliara {Psycliologia, 10, iv.), "That 
 circumstances may produce wants, desires, etc., they must affect a 
 subject capable in itself of such wants and desires, that is, a subject 
 which either experiences all these things or is in potentiality to ex- 
 perience them ; therefore our adversaries tacitly but necessarily 
 suppose a vital subject in all these circumstances." 
 
 Although a general view of the earth's history seems to favor 
 
308 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 89. Materialism is refuted as absurd in its methods, 
 its principles, and its consequences. — The spirituality of 
 the soul is an evident truth universally recognized. 
 Many philosophers have, indeed, attempted to defend 
 the cause of materialism, but it is only to the practi- 
 cal consequences that flow from it they have gained 
 disciples. Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and 
 Lucretius were the principal supporters of material- 
 ism in ancient times. Bacon, Locke, and Condillac 
 have favored it by their doctrines, and it has been pro- 
 fessed with all its consequences by several philoso- 
 phers, as Hobbes (1588-1679), d' Holbach (1723-1789), 
 
 Darwinism, yet an analytical and searcliiiig study of each epoch 
 tends to remove this impression. Thus, in geology, the more per- 
 fect forms of animal organism, as the trilobite, are found among the 
 primitive fauna, and are preceded by no transitional forms ; among 
 the secondary fauna appear the cephalopods. Again, the physiologis' 
 asks, Why is it that species of diverse structure exist in the same 
 surroundings ? " How could a fish sustain the struggle for life, or 
 even live, during the slow and gradual transformation of branchial 
 respiration into pulmonary, since at that time and for long genera- 
 tions it was neither aquatic, nor terrestrial, nor amphibious ? " 
 Again, the supporters of evolutionism ' ' have practically ignored the 
 formal and efficient causes by which, according to a different order 
 of causality, each nature is essentially constituted, and have based 
 their theories exclusively on the material cause." They seem 
 " wedded to the strange hypothesis that the organism constitutes the 
 Form (the species), rather than that the Form constitutes the organ- 
 ism. . . . They do not account for Ufe. They begin with 
 organism ; but organism connotes life. ... If matter evolves 
 itself spontaneously into life without the aid of formal or efficient 
 cause , why have not the metamorphio ro oks through all these eons 
 of time shaken ofE the incubus of their primitive passivity, and 
 wakened up into protoplasm, and thus secured to themselves the 
 privilege of self-motion, internal growth, reproduction?" — Meta- 
 physics of the School, vol. 11., p. 747. 
 
 See also ApoUgie Scientifigue de la Foi Chreiienne, by Canon F. 
 Dnllhfi de Salnt-Projet, pp. 264-308. 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL 00N8IDEBED IN ITSELF. 309 
 
 Helvetius (1715-1771), Lamettrie (1709-1751) ; by sev- 
 eral physiologists, as Bichat (1771-1802), Cabanis 
 (1757-1808), Broussais (1772-1838); and in our own 
 day materialism finds many adepts in the schools of 
 philosophy and medicine. 
 
 This error, already refuted indirectly by the argu- 
 ments that prove the simplicity of the brute soul, 
 and especially by the argument that demonstrates the 
 spirituality of the human soul, is also refuted directly 
 by showing the falsity of its method and its prin- 
 ciples. For materialists pretend that experience alone 
 is sufficient to build up the structure of science, and 
 that nothing should be admitted that does not rest on 
 observation. But, on the one hand, experience, as has 
 been seen in Methodology,* is insufficient to constitute 
 science ; on the other hand, materialists contradict 
 themselves when they assert a priori that man has 
 only sensations. They know very well that if they 
 observed the human soul faithfully, they would find 
 acts tha tare by no means reducible to sensations. 
 
 The absurdity of materialism is further revealed by 
 the falsity of its principles. They may be reduced to 
 three : (1) That it is possible for matter to think ; (2) 
 that the development of thought corresponds to that 
 of the organs ; (3) that there is an analogy between 
 the organism and the acts of man, and the organism 
 and acts of the brute. The capability of matter to 
 think, although admitted by Locke, cannot be sus- 
 tained, because contrary properties cannot exist in 
 the same subject. Thought, in its indivisible unity, 
 embraces the whole object ; but if thought were a 
 property of matter, it would follow that the material 
 thinking subject, because extended and composed of 
 
 ' See page 66. 
 
310 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 many parts, would with each part think either a por- 
 tion of the object or the whole object. In the former 
 case, there would no longer be any unity in the 
 thought ; in the latter case, there would be as many 
 whole thoughts as there are parts in the njatter, 
 which is absurd. It is of no avail to urge with Locke 
 that it is possible for God to endow matter with the 
 faculty of thinking, although this faculty is distinct 
 from the properties of matter ; for, if God were to 
 give matter the power of thinking without making 
 this a property of matter, this faculty would then nec- 
 essarily exist in an intelligent substance that is dis- 
 tinct from matter and independent of it. 
 
 The refutation of Locke's hypothesis avails also 
 against the theory of those physiologists who pre- 
 tend that all the intellective acts of man are nothing 
 but a secretion of the brain. In support of this absur- 
 dity they appeal to the evidence of experience, which, 
 it is true, attests how much the state and develop- 
 ment of the organism affect also the development of 
 the intellect. But they are greatly in error ; for (1) 
 Many facts prove that there is not a constant de- 
 pendence between the state of the organism and that 
 of the intellect ; (2) Even if this dependence were 
 admitted, we cannot conclude the identity of the 
 organism and the intellect any more than we can in- 
 fer an identity of the musician with the instrument 
 on which he depends for his art ; (3) The influence 
 of the organism on the intellect is easily explained 
 by the union of the soul and body, and by the need 
 which the intellect has of sensible images for the 
 matter of its operations. 
 
 The analogy between man and brute cannot furnish 
 an argument to the tnaterialist who denies even the 
 simplicity of the soul, since, as has been shown, the 
 
THE HITMAN SOUL CONSIDERED IN ITSELF. 311 
 
 soul of the animal is also simple and indivisible. 
 Besides, this analogy does not really exist. Physi- 
 ologists agree in recognizing in the organism of man 
 specific characters proper to him alone, and experi- 
 ence proves that the brute has not freedom, and if at 
 times it acts in a marvellous way, it is still incapable 
 of progress and of invention, which are properties of 
 man's intellect. 
 
 Lastly, materialism is again refuted by its conse- 
 quences ; for, if there be nothing but matter, there is 
 no longer any God, any liberty, any moral law, any 
 eternal life ; there remain only the fatal laws of mat- 
 ter. But such consequences are rejected by the good 
 sense and moral conscience of all men, for in all times 
 they have had a horror of materialism in its doctrines 
 and its consequences. 
 
 AET. III. — IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL. 
 
 90. Ths spirituality of the human soul implies also its 
 immortality. — 1. The spirituality of the human soul 
 requires that it subsist in itself independent of the 
 body; hence the dissolution of the body does not 
 entail that of the soul, which is therefore extrinsically 
 {per accidens) incorruptible. It is true that in this 
 life the soul stands in need of the sensitive faculties, 
 for they supply it with matter for its operations ; but 
 when once the bond which unites it to the body has 
 been broken, it possesses the existence proper to 
 separate forms and operates with the intellect alone. 
 2. Nor is the soul of man intrinsically corruptible, for 
 not being composed of parts, it is simple and con- 
 tains in itself no germ of dissolution. It is idle to 
 object to the incorruptibility of the soul the fact that 
 God who has made it from nothing can also annihi- 
 
312 REAL PHILOaOPHY. 
 
 late it. This is merely an absolute possibility, which 
 will never be reduced to act. God does not contra- 
 dict Himself, and, as creator of all things. He does 
 not deprive them of what their nature demands. It 
 was possible for Him not to have created the soul ; 
 but having created it with an immortal and incor- 
 ruptible nature. He cannot consistently with His in- 
 finite perfection annihilate it, and, so to say, by an 
 act of His power destroy the work of His wisdom. 
 
 91. The iTumortality of the soul is also proved : (1) Jiy 
 its inborn desire of happiness ; (2) by its desire of per- 
 petuating its memory ; (3) by the idea which we have of 
 vibe and virtue ; (4) by the unanimous consent of aU 
 nations. — The end of man is happiness, and happiness 
 without limit ; hence his desire of happiness is inborn 
 and necessary. Since this desire is natural to man, it 
 has been given him by the Author of nature. But 
 man cannot find here below the happiness that he 
 desires ; we must therefore conclude that he will find 
 this happiness in an immortal life, unless we wish to 
 say that God deceives man, that He proposes to him 
 an end impossible to attain, and that while all other 
 creatures reach their end, man cannot arrive at his. 
 Secondly, all men, not excepting those that reject the 
 doctrine of immortality, wish to perpetuate their 
 memory. But this desire would be inexplicable with- 
 out a conscioiisness of our immortality ; for who 
 would desire to live in the memory of others if he 
 will himself be a mere nothing ? Thirdly, we are all 
 persuaded that virtue merits a reward, and vice a 
 punishment. But, in this life, the just man is often 
 persecuted, while the wicked man triumphs ; there 
 must, therefore, be another life where the moral 
 order is reestablished. Undoubtedly, peace of con- 
 science is even now a reward of virtue, and remorse a 
 
THE BUMAN SOUL 00N8IDEBED m ITSELF. 313 
 
 punishment of vice; but, besides the fact that the 
 virtuous man is often troubled in soul, and the 
 wicked man succeeds in stifling all remorse, it is 
 certain that this peace and this remorse have no 
 other foundation than faith in the immortality of the 
 soul. Lastly, the unanimous belief of the human 
 race at all times in the immortality of the soul con- 
 firms all the proofs that have been given. The tradi- 
 tions of all nations, and in particular the honor paid 
 to their dead, manifest this belief, which, besides, has 
 been held not only by the vulgar, but even by the 
 greatest geniuses of mankind.* 
 
 92. The two pnndpal errors regarding the immortal- 
 ity of the soul are palingenesis and metempsycJiosis. — 
 Pantheistic philosophers, whether of ancient or mod- 
 em times, regard the soul as a part of God's substance, 
 and hold that it is immortal, because, on the dissolu- 
 tion of the body, it loses its personality and identifies 
 its life with that of God. This error is called palin- 
 genesis. Other pantheistic philosophers, considering 
 the soul as too imperfect to be identified immediately 
 with God, have not hesitated to declare that after this 
 life it passes through a series of transformations and 
 probations, migrating from one body to another until 
 it is sufficiently perfect to be identified with God. 
 
 * still it must be granted that not all Catholics admit that the 
 arguments of pure reason adduced to prove the soul's immortality 
 are conclusive. They say that for this effect you must first establish 
 the evidence of faith, which teaches that the soul is truly immortal ; 
 the other arguments they regard as merely confirmatory of the 
 teaching of faith. With these men may be named the illustrious 
 Alfonso Muzzarelli, the friend of Pius VII. , and F, Casto Ansaldi, 
 the eminent Dominican. Even Cajetan and Suarez will not pro- 
 nounce the demonstration of St. Thomas to be rigorously conclusive. 
 —See Immortality of the Soul, by Monsignor Corcoran, American 
 Catholic Quarterly Review, vol. ii., p. 347. 
 
S14 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 This is the error of metempsychosis, taught of old by 
 Pythagoras and in our own days by J. Eeynaud. 
 
 93. The absurdity of palingenesis appears from the 
 two principles on which it is hased, mz., that the human 
 soul is part of the divine substance, and that to obtain 
 immortality it must lose its personality. — It is absurd 
 to affirm that the substance of God and the substance 
 of man are identical, because, in that case, the divine 
 attributes also should pertain to man, thus identify- 
 ing the absolute and necessary with the contingent. 
 On the other hand, man is a person, and the immor- 
 tality of his soul springs from his personality ; other- 
 wise we would accept the doctrine of palingenesis. 
 If his personality is destroyed, his immortality is 
 also destroyed. 
 
 94. The doctrine of metempsychosis ignores the sub- 
 stantial union of soul and body ; it renders expiation 
 impossible ; it cannot harmonize with the true idea of 
 immortality. — In the hypothesis of metempsychosis 
 the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose 
 of expiating the faults of a previous existence ; there- 
 fore its union with the body is contrary to its nat- 
 ure. But this is refuted both by reason and expe- 
 rience. Again, this hypothesis pretends to explain 
 the miseries of this life by representing the soul as 
 united to the body solely to expiate the faults of a 
 previous life. But to make atonement one must be 
 conscious of the evil for which he is atoning; now it 
 is evident that no one remembers having sinned in 
 a previous life ; under these conditions, therefore, no 
 expiation is possible. Lastly, as this series of atone- 
 ments must have an end, the soul will either survive 
 or not survive its last body. In the latter case, it has 
 no immortality ; in the former, we ask why it could 
 not have made atonement in its first body. 
 
CHAPTEE III. 
 
 The Human Soul in Eelation to its 'Body, 
 aet. i. — union of soul and body. 
 
 95. Since the intellective soul is the substantial form 
 of the body, it constitutes with it a substantial and per- 
 sonal union, so that from this union there results a single 
 substance and person. Hence, as the soul without the 
 body is not perfect in its operations, so the body without 
 the soul has no subsistence of its own. — ^In living- com- 
 posites the soul is the substantial form of the body; 
 that is, the soul is so united to the body that through 
 it the body receives and possesses subsistence and life, 
 and that from the union of these two principles there 
 results a single substance. So it is with man. From 
 the union of his body and soul, from their intimate 
 compenetration, there results a third substance which 
 is neither body alone, nor soul alone, nor a simple 
 contact or mixture of the two, as in a mixture of silver 
 and gold. Still the soul in this union does not lose its 
 own essence : although united to the body in unity of 
 substance, it nevertheless remains distinct from the 
 body ; and since it performs certain acts indepen- 
 dently of the body, it follows that it preserves its 
 spiritual nature intact. The union of soul and body 
 does not, then, mean a confusion of the two, but re- 
 quires only that they complete each other. And as 
 the single substance that results from the union of 
 
316 BEAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 soul and body constitutes an individual of a rational 
 nature, we must conclude that the union constitutes 
 not only a substantial unity, but also a personal unity. 
 The person is, therefore, not the body alone, not the 
 soul alone, but the soul united to the body, as is 
 further witnessed by language, which permits us to 
 say: /hear, /understand, /desire, /run. 
 
 96. There are four striking errors regarding the union 
 of soul and hody : 1. The system of occasional cazises ; 
 2. That of preestablished harmony ; 3. That of plas- 
 tic medium ; 4. That of physical influence. — Several 
 philosophers, and among them Plato of the ancient 
 school, and Descartes of the modern, have denied the 
 substantial unity of body and soul, and the reciprocal 
 and immediate action of the soul on the body, and of 
 the body on the soul. But as evidence shows the in- 
 timate relations existing between the soul and body, 
 they have attempted to explain these relations. Now 
 if, instead of regarding the soul and body as one 
 clock, the hands and wheels of which are parts of one 
 and the same mechanism, we regard them as two dis- 
 tinct clocks that go in accord, we may form four 
 hypotheses analogous to those that would be formed 
 for the two clocks. For either the clockmaker is 
 always present to keep up the accord between these 
 two clocks; or he may wind them up once for all, 
 so that thenceforth there is perfect agreement be- 
 tween them ; or this may be maintained by the aid 
 of an intermediate mechanism ; or, lastly, it may be 
 the result of a physical influence exerted by one 
 clock over the other in virtue of some secret power. 
 Thus four systems have tried to explain the relations 
 between the soul and body : the system of occasion- 
 alism, of preestablished harmony, of plastic medium, 
 and oi physical influence. 
 
THE HUMAN SO UL IN RELA TION TO ITS BODY. 317 
 
 97. It is false to hold with Malehranche that soul and 
 iody form, two distinct substances ; that God takes oc- 
 casion from the motions of the iody to produce corre- 
 sponding acts in the soul, and takes occasion from the acts 
 of the soul to produce corresponding '^notions in the body. 
 This system hads to pantheism, fatalism, idealism, and 
 scepticism. — -Tlie system of occasionalism, advocated by 
 Malebranche, is a consequence of his false principle, 
 that God alone is a true cause and that creatures of 
 themselves produce no effect. It results also from the 
 false notion which, after Descartes, he had formed of 
 the human soul and body ; for he regarded them as two 
 distinct substances forming only an accidental union. 
 To hold with Malebranche that God alone establishes 
 relations between soul and body, is to assign Him 
 a ridiculous office, opposed equally to His holiness 
 and His wisdom. For if God alone acts, we are des- 
 titute of all entity ; this is downright pantheism. 
 Now, if man be not the principle of his actions, we 
 must admit that his acts are not free, and this is 
 fatalism. Lastly, if all our thoughts are but the play 
 of God upon our intelligence, if they have no direct 
 relation with external reality, the material world and 
 our bodies are for us as though they did not exist, 
 and this is idealism. And since in invincibly believ- 
 ing ourselves to be the principle of our acts we are 
 in a constant illusion, we can no longer be certain of 
 anything ; this is scepticism. 
 
 98. We cannot admit with Leibnitz that . God, at the 
 mmnent of their union, secures the constant relations 
 existing between body and soul, in virtue of a preestab- 
 lished harmony. — This system involves nearly the 
 same consequences as occasionalism. Leibnitz has 
 not denied to second causes an activity of their own, 
 but, like Malebranche, he has failed to recognize a 
 
318 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 true reciprocity of action between body and soul. 
 According to him, before God united the soul to the 
 body, He so constituted them that the motions of the 
 body would be constantly in harmony with the actions 
 of the soul. This system ascribes to God a less ridic- 
 ulous office ; for it does not destroy all action on the 
 part of the creature. But as it asserts that all acts, 
 whether of soul or body, are invariably predeter- 
 mined by an inevitable law, it is manifest that it leads 
 directly to fatalism, idealism, and scepticism. 
 
 99. It is absurd to admit vdth certain philosophers 
 something intermediate hetween soul and body,. called the 
 plastic medium, hy which the soul acts on the hody and 
 the hody on the soid. — This theory to explain the rela- 
 tions of soul and body, attributed to the English phi- 
 losopher Cudworth (1617-1688), supposes that there 
 exists as a bond of union between soul and body a 
 substance that is at once material and immaterial, 
 which holds communication with the body through 
 its material part, and with the soul through its imma- 
 terial part. But, in the first place, such a substance 
 is metaphysically impossible ; and, in the second 
 place, the reciprocal action of matter on spirit and 
 spirit on matter in this intermediate substance re- 
 mains to be explained. 
 
 100. The system of physical influence either is noth- 
 ing but materialism or it explains nothing. — The Eng- 
 lish school, in setting up this system oi physical influ- 
 ence, considers the soul as extremely subtile matter, 
 and from this infers that the action of the soul on the 
 body is analogous to that of fire on wood. But this 
 is evidently pure materialism. Those philosophers 
 also who, while admitting physical influence, defend 
 the spirituality of the soul, are likewise at fault ; for 
 they regard the soul and body as two distinct beings. 
 
THE HUMAN SO UL IN BEL A TION TO ITS BOD Y. 319 
 
 Moreover, their system explains nothing, for it sim- 
 ply teaches that the soul exerts an influence on the 
 body and the body on the soul. 
 
 ABT. n. — UOTTY OF THE HUMAN SOUL AS SUBSTANTIAL 
 FOEM OF THE BODY. 
 
 101. There is hut one human soul, which is the sub' 
 stantial form of the iody. This soul is intellective, and, 
 besides intellective life, possesses also sensitive life and 
 vegetative life. — By the very fact that in eveiry natural 
 composite it is the substantial form that gives being 
 to the composite, this form must be unique ; for, if 
 there 'wrere a plurality of forms, there would also be a 
 plurality of beings, and the composite would lose its 
 substantial unity. Hence in the living composite, 
 and more particularly in man, the rational soul must 
 be the unique form of the body, since it is its sub- 
 stantial form. Without doubt, the difference be- 
 tween the acts performed by one and the same living 
 being, would seem to necessitate the referring of 
 them to distinct principles. But it is with forms as 
 with numbers : just as any number includes the units 
 of a lower number, and one or more units besides, so 
 every form has, besides its own specific virtue, that 
 of the inferior forms also. Thus it is with the human 
 soul, which is at once vegetative, sensitive, and in- 
 tellective. This truth is confirmed by experience and 
 common sense : by experience, which testifies that in 
 each individual it is always the same person that 
 wills, sees, and is nourished; by common sense, 
 which as expressed in language does not point to 
 distinct principles of action in man. But it must be 
 observed that when the intellective soul is called the 
 form of the body, we thereby mean simply that the 
 
320 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 three kinds of life — ^vegetative, sensitive, and intellec. 
 tive — have in man a single principle ; not that the 
 soul communicates all its powers to the body. It 
 communicates those only that require organs for their 
 exercise, and reserves to itself the intellect and will, 
 which are independent of the body. Hence the 
 human soul is the form of the body inasmuch as it 
 contains the virtue of the vegetative and the sensi- 
 tive principle : not as being the rational principle in 
 man. 
 
 102. A plurality of souls, taught iy several ancient 
 philosophers, makes the unity of the human composite 
 iruexplicdble. — Several ancient philosophers, disregard- 
 ing the substantial union of soul and body in man, 
 were forced .to attribute several souls to him. For if 
 the soul is united to the body as the motor to the mov- 
 able object, there is nothing to prevent the existence 
 of many media between the motor and the object, 
 even of many motors, especially if the movable object 
 be impelled in different ways. By such reasoning 
 was Plato drawn into distinguishing three souls in 
 man — a vegetative, a sensitive, and an intellectual 
 soul. 
 
 But this system is erroneous ; for, as each soul has 
 a distinct life and distinct operations, it should be 
 independent of the other souls in its operations, and 
 thus the unity of man would be destroyed. Besides, 
 experience contradicts this doctrine ; for it shows us 
 that the acts of the vegetative and the sensitive life 
 affect those also of the intellective life, and vice versa. 
 
 It is useless to assert that the union of the three 
 souls would be established by the body which would 
 contain them in itself, as a bookcase holds many 
 TOlumes. Since the body has its being only through 
 the soul, it is the soul that contains the body, and not 
 
THE HUMAN SOUL IN RELATION TO ITS BODY. 321 
 
 the. body that contains the soul. Nor can it be said 
 that one soul is the substantial form of the body, and 
 that the others are united to it accidentally. For this 
 were tantamount to asserting that man is accidentally 
 intelligent, or sentient, or "vegetative, just as he is 
 accidentally tall, learned, or courageous ; but this is 
 absurd.* 
 
 103. The modern theory of the " vital principle " is in 
 substance only a reproduction of the error of a plurality of 
 souls. The proofs and experiments on which it is based 
 are valueless. — The different systems by which it has 
 been attempted in modern times to explain the life- 
 principle in man refer to the question of the unity of 
 the human soul. The three principal theories are, (1) 
 the Animism of Stahl (1660-1734), according to whom 
 the intellective soul through its inferior forms pre- 
 sides over the organic functions ; (2) Organicism, held 
 by Descartes, who regarded the organs themselves as 
 the cause, through their physical forces, of the vital 
 acts ; (3) I>uodynamism, formulated by Barthez (1734- 
 1806), propagated by the school of Montpellier, and 
 advocated in Germany by Giinther (1785-1863) ; it is so 
 called because it supposes two distinct principles in 
 man, the soul to preside over intellectual functions, 
 and the vital principle to regulate organic life. 
 
 In his system Stahl only reproduces, though with 
 some errors, the doctrine of the substantial union of 
 
 * The doctrine of Photius that man has two souls, one rational, 
 the other irrational, and that sin is the act of the latter, was con- 
 demned by the Fourth General Council of Constantinople (869). In 
 the middle ages the error was revived by Ockham, and only thirty 
 years ago by a German Catholic, Dr. Gtlnther. — The General Council 
 of Vienne condemned as erroneous and un-Catholic the denial that 
 "the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is truly and in 
 Itself the form of the human body. " 
 21 
 
322 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 soul and body. The materialistic system of organ- 
 icism is too much opposed to the data of physiology 
 to claim disciples any longer. 
 
 The same is not true of the vitalism of Montpellier, 
 which has seduced many by a specious appearance of 
 elevated spiritualism. The duodynamists rest their 
 arguments, first, upon the corruptibility of the sensi- 
 tive life, which they claim cannot be referred to the 
 intellective principle, for the intellective as such is 
 incorruptible. This difficulty is removed by saying 
 that nothing prevents an incorruptible substance from 
 exercising corruptible functions ; just as a king may 
 for the nonce be soldier or judge. But if vital acts 
 and intellectual operations must be ascribed to dis- 
 tinct principles, owing to the essential difference be- 
 tween them, we must still further multiply the num- 
 ber of souls in man ; for the act of understanding 
 differs essentially from that of willing, the act of per- 
 ceiving from that of moving, and so of many other 
 acts. The duodynamists also argue that, as the vital 
 acts are accomplished without the knowledge of the 
 intellective soul, therefore the intellective soul cannot 
 be the principle of said acts. But though nature has 
 willed that the vital functions be performed uncon- 
 sciously, in order to their more secure fulfilment, it is 
 none the less certain that the soul is made aware of 
 these functions when they are attended with suffering. 
 Lastly, the duodynamists invoke experience and bring 
 forward certain phenomena, as, for example, the con- 
 tractions sometimes observed in individuals imme- 
 diately after death. But these phenomena are very 
 rare, and may easily be explained by purely physical 
 causes. Besides, if it were necessary to admit the 
 conclusions drawn by these philosophers, we should 
 eventually be compelled to allow that the body can 
 
THE HUMAN 80 UL IN BEL A TION TO ITS BOD T. 323 
 
 continue to live after its separation from tlie souL 
 Sucli an issue no duodynamist would dare to sustain. 
 
 ART. III. — SEAT OE LOCUS OF TEIE SOXJL. 
 
 104. The soul is in its essetice entire in tlie whole hody 
 and in every part of the hody ; hut it does not exercise all 
 its functions through corporeal organs, and it does not 
 esxrcise the same functions in each corporeal organ. — 
 Several modern philosopjiers, from denying the sub- 
 stantial union of soul and body, bave been led to ex- 
 amine what part of tbe body is the seat of the soul. 
 Some have asserted that it is the brain, others that it 
 is the heart, and still others that it is this or that part 
 of the brain. All these statements fall wide of the 
 mark. For (1) the soul is the principle of life in the 
 body ; now all the parts of the body are living ; there- 
 fore the soul is in every part of the body. (2) The 
 same conclusion is drawn from the fact that the soul 
 is the principle of sensation, and that it is sentient in 
 each part of the body. 
 
 On the other hand, as the soul is indivisible, it 
 must be entire wherever it is ; therefore the soul is 
 entire in every part of the body. But, although the 
 soul is in its essence entire in:every part of the body, 
 it does not exercise all its functions through bodily 
 organs, because the functions that require the con- 
 currence of an organ necessarily vary with the differ- 
 ent nature of the organs themselves. The peculiar 
 action of the soul experienced in the brain and in the 
 heart is easily explained by the fact that these two 
 parts of the body are the principal organs of sensibil- 
 ity and life, respectively. 
 
 Some philosophers object that if the soul be in 
 every part of the body, it is extended, and therefore 
 
324 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 material. This is readily answered. Bodies are m 
 place circumscriptively, since they "are circumscribed 
 in their dimensions by the place which they occupy ; 
 immaterial creatures are in place determinatively, 
 since they are not measured by it but only so deter- 
 mined that they exercise their power in this place, 
 and cannot be at the same time in another place. 
 Thus the soul is in the body, not because the body 
 contains it, measures it, or circumscribes it, but be- 
 cause the body is the subject of its operations, and 
 because the soul contains it, so to say, by giving- it 
 being and unity. 
 
 AET. lY. — THE EESUEKECTION OE THE BODY. 
 
 105. Since the soul is made to he united with the hody, 
 it will again ie united to it after having heen separated 
 from it for a time. This reunion is demanded not only 
 Jy the very nature of man, hut likewise iy the moral order, 
 according to which the body will share in the reward or 
 'punishment of the good or evil of which it shall have heen 
 the instrument. — Man is neither soul alone nor body 
 alone ; his being is complete only when his soul -is 
 substantially ijnited to his body. Undoubtedly the 
 human soul is subsistent in itself ; but God has placed 
 it lowest in the order of intelligences, and on account 
 of its weakness it requires the body for the perfec- 
 tion and integrity of its specific operations. Since, 
 then, the body is an integral part of man's nature, it 
 must be resuscitated ; otherwise we should be obliged 
 to say that man, the work of divine predilection, 
 would remain forever in a state contrary to nature. 
 But this cannot be. God has allowed sin to subvert 
 for a time the order of His Providence, but not to 
 triumph forever over the laws that He has established. 
 
TRE HUMAN SOUL IN BELA TION TO ITS BODY. 325 
 
 To this reason, derived from man's nature, may be 
 added another, drawn from the end for which the 
 body was originally created immortal. "When God 
 made the soul subsistent in itself, in order to propor- 
 tion the matter to the form He willed, by a special 
 gift, to make the body share in the soul's immortality. 
 But, if by the fall the body has become mortal, the 
 soul is none the less immortal, and therefore the 
 cause for which an immortal body had at first been 
 given to it still exists. 
 
 Therefore, in order hot to change the end for which 
 He first made the body immortal, God in a manner 
 owes it to Himself to restore to it for the soul's sake 
 the primitive privilege of incorruptibility. Hence 
 it is evident that the resurrection of the body is not 
 something outside the laws of the natural order ; but 
 that it is, on the contrary, the restoration of the 
 order originally establishjid by God. If there is any 
 miracle in the resurrection, it is only in view of the 
 cause that will work it, which can be nothing but the 
 power of God, and not in view of the natural exigency 
 which we have just explained. These arguments foi 
 the resurrection of the body are confirmed by reasoni» 
 drawn both from the moral order, which require* 
 that the body, the instrument of the good or evil 
 wrought by the soul, should share in its reward O] 
 punishment ; and from the order of nature, wher« 
 everything is unceasingly dying to resume a ne^n 
 life, and where man would be an exception withoui 
 explanation, if he should die to live no more. 
 
 106. It is absurd to object against the resurrection of 
 the body that it is impossible for the scattered elements of 
 the body to be reicnited, or that it is impossible for the soul 
 to resume its former body, which will have been trans- 
 formed into an infinity of other substances : for in the 
 
326 BEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 former case, we put limits to God's power ;' in the latter, 
 we forget that identity of molecules is not necessary to 
 constitute identity of hody. — To assert with materialists 
 that when the elements of the body have once been 
 separated, it is impossible to unite them again to re- 
 constitute the body, is to put limits to the power of 
 God, who was able to draw the body out of nothing- 
 ness, and who a fortiori can reform it with its primitive 
 elements. But some philosophers raise the objection 
 that since the body is transformed into an infinity of 
 other substances, it can no longer be reconstituted 
 with molecules numerically the same, and that, as 
 God thus gives a new body to the soul, all the reasons 
 alleged in support of the resurrection lose their value. 
 The objection falls ; for, in the first place, it is not im- 
 possible for God to reconstitute the body with the 
 same molecules that it had before ; and, in the second 
 place-, identity of molecules is by no means necessary 
 to secure identity of body. For science has shown 
 that the body, properly so called, is not constituted of 
 the molecules that enter into it, since these molecules 
 are renewed day by day and are all changed in the 
 space of about seven years, while the body remains 
 ever the same. 
 
NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 Definition and Division. 
 
 1. Natural Theology is tliat part of philosophy wMcTi 
 treats of God and His attributes, as far as they can he 
 known iy the light of reason. It differs from Sacred 
 Theology, in that this latter studies God and His attri- 
 butes by the light of divine revelation. 
 
 2. Natural Theology is divided into three principal 
 parts: the first treats of the existence and unity of God, 
 the second treats of the attributes of God in Himself; 
 the third treats of the attributes of God in relation to the 
 world or to creatures. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 Existence and Unity of God. 
 art. i. — peoofs of the existence of god. 
 
 3. The esnstence of God is not immediately evident to 
 us ; but it can be demonstrated by the effects which He 
 has produced. — The existence of God is not immedi- 
 ately evident, because we do not behold the divine 
 nature ; but it can be proved by the effects which we 
 know, for from any effect whatever we can prove the 
 existence of a cause. 
 
 4. The existence of God is first proved by a metaphysi- 
 cal argument, which consists in deducing the existence of 
 
328 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a Necessary Being from the existence of contingent heings. 
 — The beings in the world are contingent, that is, 
 they have not given themselves existence. Eor it is 
 manifest by experience that the human soul, as wel! 
 as the beings that compose the sensible world, have 
 had a beginning. Now, that which begins to exist 
 must owe its existence to its own action, or to the 
 action of another, or to nothing. Bat it cannot owe 
 its existence to its own action, because before acting 
 it must first exist ; it cannot owe its existence to noth- 
 ing, because that which is without existence cannot 
 give it ; therefore it must receive existence from a 
 being distinct from itself. But this being, in turn, 
 either is or is not contingent. If it is contingent, it 
 also must have received existence by the action of 
 another being ; and so on indefinitely, until we arrive 
 at a being that holds its existence from itself. Among 
 the contingent beings of the world is man, who is in- 
 telligent and free, as has been proved in Psychology. 
 Therefore the self-existent Being frOm whom man 
 holds his existence and perfections must also be in- 
 telligent and free. But such a being is not only 
 necessary but personal ; he is God ; therefore the ex- 
 istence of the world proves the existence of God. It 
 is to no purpose to urge the possibility of an infinite 
 series of contingent beings which would produce one 
 another without the existence of a necessary being as 
 their cause. This hypothesis is absurd, because con- 
 tingent being is an effect; but an infinite series of 
 effects without a cause is a contradiction ; by multi- 
 plying the number of effects we make the existence 
 of the cause more necessary. Equally futile are the 
 arguments of materialists, pantheists, and evolution- 
 ists against the personality of God. The spirituality 
 of man's soul being once established, the Christian 
 
EXISTENCE ANB UNITY OF OOD. 329 
 
 dogma of a personal God is a necessary consequence 
 of the application of the principle of causality to the 
 existence of contingent intelligence. 
 
 5. The existence of God is also proved T)y a physical ar- 
 gument, which consists in deducing from the order that 
 eosists in the world the existence of a supreme Ordaining 
 Cause. — Order reigns in the world, as is proved by 
 the relations existing between objects the most diverse, 
 and by the subordination of the special end of each 
 being to one single and supreme end. Now, order is 
 an effect which supposes an ordaining cause. This 
 cause, it is evident, cannot be found in the series of 
 ordered beings, because then it would be itself an 
 orderly effect. Moreover, the inherent forces of mat- 
 ter are utterly inadequate not only to produce the 
 phenomena of life, as has been proved in Psychology, 
 but even to account for the order reigning in the inor- 
 ganic world ; for every material force requires a pre- 
 vious adaptation of the particles of matter in order to 
 produce an orderly effect. But if it is outside this 
 series it must have a different nature. Since, then, 
 they are contingent, their ordaining cause must be 
 necessary Being. By the argument given in § 4, 
 this necessary Being is shown to be" a personal God. 
 The existence of evil is sometimes opposed to this 
 physical argument. But, admitting for the moment 
 that evil constitutes a disorder, it would be only ac- 
 cidental, and would not destroy the general order. 
 Therefore the argument remains in all its force. 
 When God has thus been proved existing as ordaining 
 cause, reason then tells us that it is only because of 
 our ignorance that any thing appears to constitute a 
 real disorder. 
 
 6. The third principal argument in favor of the exist- 
 ence of God is a moral argument, drawn from the assent 
 
330 REAL PBILOSOPHY. 
 
 given to this truth iy all men in all times. — There is no 
 truth in favor of which the unanimous consent of the 
 human race is more explicit or striking than that of 
 the existence of God. Civilized peoples as well as the 
 most barbarous, modern as well as the most ancient, 
 have all believed the existence of God, as is proved 
 by the history, the traditions, and the monuments of 
 all ages and of all countries. Now, this universal be- 
 lief cannot be a fiction of men, nor an invention of 
 priests or princes. If it were a creation of men, evi- 
 dently we should know the time and the place in 
 which it arose ; but no one has been able to discover 
 this. On the contrary, the oldest traditions of man- 
 kind represent the world as coming from the hands, of 
 God, and all accounts attest that the nearer we draw 
 to Asia, the cradle of the human race, the more clearly 
 is the existence of God professed. Neither can it be 
 said that belief in the existence of God is an invention 
 of princes or priests ; for princes could not have given 
 religious sanction to their laws if the people did not 
 already believe in God ; as to priests, the exercise of 
 their functions evidently supposes this belief. Since, 
 then, the unanimous assent to the existence of God is 
 not of human origin, we must conclude that it is the 
 result of a primitive tradition, and can have only God 
 for its author. Even if some barbarous tribe should 
 be discovered without religious ideas, which, however, 
 has not as yet happened, it would no more invalidate 
 the moral argument for God's existence than does the 
 denial of atheists, materialists, pantheists, evolution- 
 ists, and the so-called progressive minds of to-day. 
 The argument is based upon the fact that the belief 
 has been professed by the great mass of mankind of 
 all ages and nations. 
 
EXISTENCE AND UNITY OF OOD. 331 
 
 AET. n. — ATHEISM. 
 
 7. Atheism is either positive or negative; positive 
 atheism is either theoretical or practical. — The doctrine 
 which denies the existence of God is called atheism. 
 Atheism is positive when it denies directly the real- 
 ity of the supreme and divine Being ; it is negative 
 when it consists merely in ignorance of this divine 
 Being. 
 
 Positive atheism is either theoretical or practical ; 
 the former teaches doctrinally either that God does 
 not exist, or that we cannot know that He exists, and 
 is therefore distinguished as dogmatic and sceptical 
 atheism, or agnosticism, ; the latter is manifest in the 
 conduct of those who live as if there were no God. 
 Practical atheism is professed by a great number of 
 men ; but the same is not true of theoretical atheism 
 and negative atheism. History and the accounts of 
 travellers prove that there is no people, however 
 ignorant and savage, that does not admit the exist- 
 ence of some divinity. It is manifest that those 
 philosophers and writers who have gloried in teach- 
 ing and professing atheism have not been sincere, 
 and that they have proposed no other end than to 
 favor the corruption of morals and to overthrow social 
 order. 
 
 8. Atheism is a most absurd doctrine, most degrading, 
 and TTWst fruitful in fatal consequences. — The partisans 
 of atheism are wont to call themselves freethinkers 
 {esprit forts). Yet their doctrine is the very annihila- 
 tion of intelligence, for the consistent atheist, not 
 finding in his system the explanation of either his 
 own existence or that of the sensible world, falls 
 necessajAy into the most complete scepticism ; and 
 
332 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 this is the negation of all thought. Moreover, if God 
 does not exist, there is no longer either good or evil, 
 man may follow at will his most perverse inclina- 
 tions, society is without foundation, and the law of 
 might alone prevails. History, besides, bears witness 
 that all the epochs of atheism have been epochs of 
 intellectual debasement, of moral corruption, and of 
 great social upheavals. As for the agnostic who says, 
 " Git)d may or may not exist, I cannot know His ex- 
 istence with certainty," his position is shown to be 
 untenable by the first, or metaphysical, argument for 
 the existence of a Supreme Intelligence. The objec- 
 tion that any attributes of God that we may learn 
 from the consideration of creatures are too imperfect 
 to be possessed by Him, only serves to bring out in 
 stronger relief the excellence of His perfections and 
 personality. Moreover, the Christian theist is con- 
 tent to know of many of God's perfections that they 
 are, without attempting to fathom them. As to the 
 manner in which we rise from creatures to a knowl- 
 edge of God, see pp. 104, 105. 
 
 AET. m. — UNITY OP GOD. 
 
 9. The unity of God is clearly inferred from the very 
 notion of God. — The unity of God may be shown by 
 three principal arguments. 1. God being a pure act,* 
 His individuality is identical with His nature; but 
 individuality is intrinsically incommunicable ; there- 
 fore it is impossible that there be several gods. 
 2. God 'has all perfection ; but if there were many 
 gods, there would necessarily be some difference 
 among them, and one would be deprived of what 
 
 * See page 163. 
 
EXISTENCE AND UNITY OF GOD. 333 
 
 another would possess ; but he who would be want- 
 ing in something would not have all perfection, and 
 therefore would not be God. 3. All creatures are 
 ordained for one another. As they differ one from 
 another, they would not conspire to effect unity of 
 order, if they were not governed by a being at least 
 morally one : therefore the first Being who directs all 
 to one and the same end must be absolutely one. 
 
 ART. rV. — DUALISM. 
 
 10. Dualism is a useless hypothesis ; it is ahsiird in 
 itself, and it does not explain the fact for which it was 
 assumed. — The unity of God is a truth so evident that 
 no philosopher dares to-day call it in question ; it 
 has been denied only in ancient times by polytheists 
 and dualists, or Manichees.* Polytheism is so gross 
 an error that it is superfluous to refute it. Dualism 
 consists in admitting two principles, one good, the 
 other evil, and is equally absurd. Tet it has led many 
 minds astray, at different times, especially at the 
 beginning of the Christian era and during the middle 
 ages. But considered as a mere hypothesis, this sys- 
 tem is destitute of all the characters that an hypothe- 
 sis should have to be accepted. For an hypothesis 
 should be necessary ; it should not be absurd ; it 
 should explain the fact for which it was assumed. 
 Now, (1) the hypothesis of dualism is useless, for its 
 
 * Mani or Manes (Babylon, third cent.) derived from tlie Persians 
 the doctrine of two principles, and from the Gnostics that of the^ 
 hatefulness of matter. His sect observed three seals : that of the 
 mouth, for his followers were forbidden to eat meat or eggs, to drink 
 wine or milk ; of the hands, for they were forbidden to kill any 
 animal or destroy any plant ; that of the bosom, for they were for- 
 bidden to marry. 
 
334 . REAL PBILOSOPHT. 
 
 partisans formed it only because they thouglit tlie 
 existence of evil irreconcilable with the goodness of 
 God ; but it is easy to prove that the existence of 
 evil is not repugnant to the idea of an infinitely good 
 God. (2) This hypothesis is absurd, for evil inasmuch 
 as it is a privation of good, is also a privation of be- 
 ing, since good and being are convertible; therefore 
 absolute evil would be absolute nothingness. (3) The 
 hypothesis of dualism, far from explaining, on the 
 contrary, destroys the fact for which it was assumed ; 
 for the Manichees had recourse to a twofold prin- 
 ciple to explain by one the existence of good, and by 
 the other the existence of evil. But these two prin- 
 ciples either possess equal power or they do not ; in 
 the latter case, the possessor of the less power would 
 not be God ; in the former, the two principles would 
 destroy each other's work, and the result of their 
 reciprocal action would be nothingness. 
 
CHAPTEE n. 
 ATTRIBUTES OF GOD IN GENERAL. 
 
 Absolute Atteibutes. , 
 aet. i. — attbibutes op god est geneeal. 
 
 11. There are two kinds of attributes in God, absolute 
 and relative. — Although human reason cannot compre- 
 hend God, it can, however, acquire a knowledge not 
 only of His existence, but also of some of His attri- 
 butes. These attributes are of two kinds : some be- 
 long to God considered in Himself, and these are 
 absolute attributes ; the others belong to Him as Cre- 
 ator of the world, and. these are relative attributes. 
 
 12. The divine attributes are not known by us directly, 
 but we attain to a knowledge of them from the perfections 
 which we discover in creatures. — The cause must pos- 
 sess, if not in a superior degree, at least in an equal 
 degree, all the perfections of the effect; otherwise 
 the effect would excel its cause, which is absurd. 
 Hence, as we infer the existence of the cause from the 
 existence of the effect, so from the perfections of the 
 effect we ascend to those of the cause. Therefore, 
 since God is the absolute cause of all the perfections 
 in cteatures, it is from the knowledge of these perfec- 
 tions that we come to know those of God. Now, as 
 creatures possess finite being, their perfections are 
 also finite or limited ; but as God, on the contrary, is 
 
336 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 infinite in being, His perfections must likewise be in- 
 finite. It is, therefore, necessary, before attributing 
 to God any one of the perfections of His creatures, 
 to take from it all limit and to consider it then as 
 found in God in an eminent manner, as absolutely 
 infinite. 
 
 13. As God is pure act, infinite Being, and perfectly 
 sitnple, the divine attributes are identical witTi one an- 
 other, and with the divine essence. If we distinguish them, 
 it is because of the limitations of our mind. — In creatures 
 the attributes arise from the essence, but are not 
 identified with it. Thus man's liberty, though hav- 
 ing its principle in his essence, is really distinct from 
 it. In like manner, in creatures one attribute is dis- 
 tinct from another; in man intellect is one thing, will 
 is another. These distinctions are not found in God. 
 For since God is perfectly simple, to admit any dis- 
 tinction whatever between His attributes and His 
 essence would be to destroy His perfect simplicity, 
 since all distinction supposes a certain composition 
 in that in which it exists. Now, if the divine sub- 
 stance were composed of parts, either each of these 
 parts would be infinite, and then there would be as 
 many gods as there would be parts, which is con- 
 trary to the divine unity already proved ; or the in- 
 finite would result from a collection of finite parts, 
 the perfect from the imperfect, which is absurd. 
 Moreover, if the divine perfections were really dis- 
 tinct, as are thosp of creatures, they would no longer 
 exist in an infinitely perfect manner in God ; for, that 
 two things be distinct, it is necessary that one be 
 without some quality that the other has, and conse- 
 quently all distinction is necessarily a principle of 
 limit and imperfection. From this, however, it would 
 be wrong to conclude that as the plurality of divine 
 
ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES. 337 
 
 attributes depends on the mode in whicli our intel- 
 lect knows God, these attributes do not really exist in 
 Him. It is one thing to say that the perfections 
 which we attribute to God do not exist in Him, and 
 it is quite another thing to assert that in Him they 
 are not distinct as our intellect conceives them. The 
 perfections which we predicate of God are really in 
 Him, but not with that distinction which our limited 
 intellect establishes among them. 
 
 AET. II.— ABSOLUTE ATTBIBUTES OF GOD. — ASEITY. 
 
 14. Aseity is an attribute hy which God is of Himself 
 or from Himself. It is the primitive attribute from 
 which we can deduce all the others. — The divine attrib- 
 utes are manifold. But among them we can distin- 
 guish one to which all the others may, in our way of 
 thinking, be reduced. This is aseity, that is, the per- 
 fection by which God is the absolute and indepen- 
 dent Being who holds from Himself all that He has 
 and all that He is. It is by this attribute that God 
 defined Himself when He said, " I am who am." In 
 this attribute philosophers have placed the meta- 
 physical essence of God, because it is the principle 
 and foundation of all the other perfections attributed 
 to Him. For if we could conceive anything in God 
 prior to aseity, we could conceive a self-existent being 
 as dependent on another being. Since, then, God is 
 independent in His being, and since He holds His 
 essence from Himself alone, we very easily perceive 
 that He possesses all possible perfections. Aseity, 
 further, affords the primary reason for which God is 
 distinct from every other being ; for other beings have 
 finite perfections, while God possesses infinite per- 
 fections. But it is evident that other beings than 
 2% 
 
338 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 God liave finite perfections, for the very reason that 
 they do not hold their being from themselves ; and 
 that the perfections of God are infinite because He is 
 the absolute Being who holds all from Himself and 
 depends on none. 
 
 AET. m. — ^nraiNiTY, eteenity, immutability, simplicity, 
 
 AKD immensity. 
 
 15. God is infinite, that is, He has all possible perfec- 
 tions, and without limit. — If God is of Himself, He 
 must have all possible perfections, and there can no 
 more be a limit in His being than in His perfections. 
 All perfections are either self-existent or contingent; 
 that is, either uncaused or capable of being caused. 
 The former God possesses formally, or in their own 
 specific nature ; the latter He as First Cause must be 
 able to produce, and therefore possesses virtually or 
 equivalently with His creatures, and also eifmnently as 
 being an infinitely perfect cause. 
 
 16. Ood is eternal, that is. He had no beginning and 
 will have no end ; He lives in a perpetual present. — 
 Since God is of Himself, He never began to be ; He 
 is eternal, and eternity excludes not only beginning 
 and end, but all succession as well ; for God possesses 
 all perfections, and without limit. In God there is 
 neither past nor future ; there is nothing that has 
 been, nothing that will be ; all is in an indivisible and 
 perpetual present. Moreover, since eternity implies 
 existence which is essentially without beginning, it is 
 proper to God alone ; for even could a creature have 
 existence without beginning, such existence would be 
 always contingent. 
 
 17. Ood is immutable, that is. His perfections can 
 neither be increased nor diminished ; He is subject to 
 
ABSOLUTE ATTBTBtJTES. 339 
 
 no alteration or change. — Since there is no succession 
 in God, there can be no change in Him. Besides, if 
 He changed, He would acquire or lose some quality, 
 and this is contrary to His infinity. 
 
 18. God is absolutely simple, that is, there cannot he 
 in Him any kind of composition.— God is absolutely 
 simple, because all composition supposes an imper- 
 fection. Thus God is not merely exempt from all 
 material composition, but His perfections are identi- 
 fied with one another and witli His essence. If in 
 God there were attributes distinct from one another, 
 each of these attributes would necessarily be limited 
 and therefore finite ; but the finite added to the finite 
 can never give the infinite. 
 
 19. God is immense, that is. He is in His essence pres- 
 ent to all things. — Since God is infinite or without 
 limits, He is everywhere infinitely — in Himself, in the 
 world, and even outside the world — in that He can 
 fill all possible space extended ad infinitum, without 
 the least circumscription of His being.* 
 
 AET. IV. — THE DIVINE INTELLIGENCE. 
 
 20. Ood knows Himself perfectly ; He knows all things 
 outside Himself, all future contingent and possible things. 
 — The intelligence of God is infinite like His being. 
 God knows Himself and eternally affirms Himself 
 It is this eternal and unchangeable affirmation oi 
 Himself that constitutes truth in itself, absolute and 
 essential truth, the prototype and supreme norm of 
 all truth. God in knowing Himself perfectly, knows 
 through His essence all other beings. He knows 
 them in their eternal types, which are nothing but 
 
 * See page 203. 
 
340 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 His knowledge of the various degrees in whicli His 
 divine essence can be imitated and represented out- 
 side Himself, none of whicli, however, is adequate to 
 the divine essence itself. God has a perfect knowl- 
 edge of all real beings, because it is He who created 
 them with their essences and perfections. Since God 
 by His knowledge is the cause of all things, His 
 knowledge and His power have the same extent ; and 
 since He is the cause of all that exists in every in- 
 dividual, it follows that His knowledge embraces all 
 beings also in their individuality. God knows all 
 things possible, for, knowing His own power, He 
 knows all its terms, both real and possible. He knows 
 the good, and with it the evil that is its privation. As 
 He knows all that can exist either by an effect of His 
 power, or by the action of creatures. He knows all 
 future contingencies, and this from all eternity and 
 with certitude, because all things are eternally present 
 to God. Lastly, as there is no succession in God, His 
 knowledge is not discursive, but He comprehends all 
 things simultaneously ; and since His knowledge is 
 nothing else than His essence, it is absolutely im- 
 mutable.* 
 
 * Since God's knowledge Is Infinite, He knows not only all actions 
 of all creatures, but also all possible actions and all possible con- 
 sequences of those actions. This knowledge does not, however, 
 destroy man's freedom. It is because man will do an action that 
 God, whose knowledge is infallible, foresees it. But since His 
 knowledge is infinitely perfect, He must foresee not only the action, 
 but also its nature, viz.,/reeif proceeding from free agents, necessary 
 if produced by a necessary cause. Otherwise God's knowledge 
 would destroy what His creative act had effected, He would contra- 
 dict Himself, be no longer immutable, and therefore no longer 
 God. 
 
ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES. 341 
 
 AET. T. — ^THE DIVINE WILL. 
 
 21. God has a perfect will ; He loves Himself neces- 
 sarily, all else He loves freely. — Intelligence supposes 
 will ; therefore God has a perfect will, as He has an 
 infinite intelligence. God primarily loves Himself 
 absolutely as His own proper end; He loves His 
 divine goodness absolutely and necessarily, just as 
 we necessarily desire happiness ; therefore God has 
 no free will in this respect. As it enters into the per- 
 fection of the will to communicate the good which one 
 possesses, so it is consonant with the divine good- 
 ness to be in some way diffusive of itself to others. 
 But God does not will this absolutely and necessarily, 
 because, being infinitely perfect. He needs nothing 
 external to Himself ; therefore as regards creatures 
 He has free will. To say that God gives them exis- 
 tence by a necessity of His nature, would be equiva- 
 lent to affirming that He is not self-sufficient, or that 
 He created without intelligence and will ; in a word, 
 that He is not God. Yet, though God's decrees in re- 
 gard to His creatures are free, they are eternal, since 
 there is no sufficient reason for delay ; and irrevocable, 
 since God's knowledge is infinite, and therefore more 
 perfect knowledge or " a fuller consideration of the 
 matter and circumstances " as motives of repeal, is an 
 utter impossibility. 
 
 22. The divine will is immutable ; yet it does not make 
 contingent effects necessary. — The divine will is immut- 
 able, as are the divine substance and intelligence ; and 
 it is always accomplished in all that it desires. But 
 from this it does not follow that it renders necessary 
 all that it wills. It renders necessary the effects that 
 it has made dependent on necessary causes, and it 
 
342 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 leaves contingent tlie effects that it has made de- 
 pendent on contingent causes ; for, as the divine will 
 is sovereignly efficacious, whatever God wills is ac- 
 complished and in the way in which He wills. Hence 
 God, in willing effects to be contingent, has subjected 
 them to contingent causes which may or may not 
 produce them. Among these contingent causes there 
 are some that do moral evil, which consists in choos- 
 ing a good which is forbidden in preference to another 
 good that is enjoined by the moral law, and of which 
 consequently one deprives himself. It is evident that 
 God can in no way will moral evil, because it is opposed 
 to His goodness, and because there is no other good 
 that He can will more than His goodness. Yet it is 
 not repugnant that God should sometimes will physi- 
 cal evil, which is an imperfection of nature or a pun- 
 ishment ; this evil He wills indirectly, and only in view 
 of the good to which it is attached. 
 
 23. God toves Himself with a love equal to Himself, 
 that is, infinite as He is; He loves all otJier heings in so 
 far as they are good, and because they come from Him. — 
 Since God has a will, He loves, for love is the first act 
 of the will, and without it the will cannot be even 
 thought of. God loves Himself first with a love equal 
 to Himself, a love which has absolute goodness and 
 holiness as its object, the source and type of all good- 
 ness and holiness. Secondly, God loves all existing 
 creatures, because they are good and come from Him ; 
 and He loves them the more the better they are, for 
 they are better simply because God wills them to 
 have more good. So while with us it is the goodness 
 of things that determines us to love them, with God 
 it is His love that is the cause of their existence and 
 of the measure of goodness that He imparts to them. 
 
ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES. 343 
 
 ART. VI. — ^THE DIVINE POWEB. 
 
 24. God is omnipotent, that is, He can do every thing 
 that does not imply a contradiction. — The power of any 
 being to operate has its principle in the essence of 
 that being ; consequently this power is always pro- 
 portionate to the nature of the being. But God is 
 infinite in essence ; therefore He is infinite in power. 
 Since He is omnipotent, He can do all that is intrin- 
 sically possible ; for whatever is intrinsically possible 
 can be, and divine power requires only this possibility 
 in order to give existence to being. The disciples of 
 Descartes hold that God by His omnipotence can also 
 produce what involves a contradiction, as a " square 
 circle." This doctrine is essentially absurd, for a con- 
 tradiction being the affirmation and negation of the 
 same thing at the same time, is equivalent to nothing. 
 As God cannot produce a contradiction, so He cannot 
 do evil ; for the possibility of doing evil is only the 
 possibility of a defect in acting, and this is repugnant 
 to omnipotence. 
 
 25. God alone can work m,iracles. — A miracle is a 
 sensible, unusual, and supernatural work, exceeding 
 the powers of created nature. It is evident that God, 
 who freely established the order of nature, can dero- 
 gate from it when He wishes, either by producing 
 directly, without the concurrence of second causes, the 
 effects proper to those causes, or by producing effects 
 of which secondary causes are not capable. The 
 angels of themselves cannot work true miracles ; they 
 can do extraordinary things, but only those that 
 are preternatural, not supernatural. A miracle is 
 defined a " sensible " work, because the' change which 
 it implies must be perceptible by the senses ; an 
 
344 BEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 " unusual " work, because it is opposed to the ordi- 
 nary course of nature ; a " supernatural " work, because 
 although a divine work, it is not required to com- 
 plete the natural existence of either man or any in- 
 ferior creature. Thus in the raising to life of the 
 widow of Nairn's son, there is a sensible change from 
 a dead body to a body in the vigor of health ; an 
 " unnsual " work, in that the dead youth is restored 
 to life ; a " supernatural " work, since it was by no 
 means due to the young man's natural existence ; 
 and it "exceeded the powers of created nature," 
 since God alone could work it, though often God's 
 servants are intercessors or instruments. 
 
 26. Animal magnetism is the art of producing wonder- 
 ful pJienomena, especially in man, by either physical or 
 moral means. — This theory is called mesmerism from 
 its author, Mesmer (1733-1815), and magnetism because 
 he first used this influence to produce the phenomena, 
 which, occurring chiefly in sentient beings, gave tc 
 this art the epithet animal. Its aim is to deny the 
 existence of miracles, or at least to weaken their 
 evidence.* 
 
 27. Magnetism is common, transcendental, or hypnotic. — 
 The first species of magnetism makes use of sensible 
 means, such as gestures, fixed gaze upon a bright ob- 
 ject, stroking the limbs, etc. The second is also called 
 spiritism. It provokes the intercourse of men with 
 spirits, with angels, or departed souls, who are called 
 up by determinate signs, or of their own accord pre- 
 sent themselves to the magnetizer. The third species 
 originated with Braid (1843), and differs from the first 
 in this only, that the magnetic sleep or hypnotism is 
 
 * These four numbefs have been abridged from Zigliara, Sum 
 Phil., C. 34, 35. 
 
ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES. 345 
 
 produced by fixing the eyes intently upon some 
 bright object. 
 
 28. The phenomena of magnetism are m,echanical, physi- 
 ological, cognitive, and transcendental. — The mechanical 
 phenomena are rotations, attractions, elevations, and 
 other motions of bodies. The physiological phe- 
 nomena are : (1) spasm or tremor, and convulsion of 
 the members in the subject operated on by the mag- 
 netizer; (2) dilation and contraction of the pupil and 
 nerves ; (3) magnetic sleep in which the subject holds 
 exclusive communication with the operator and obeys 
 him in all things; (4) lucid somnambulism, in which 
 the subject has extraordinary powers, such as seeing 
 with closed eyes, with his stomach, hands, or feet. 
 The phenomena of cognition comprise the power of 
 knowing the inner affections of the soul, of predict- 
 ing future contingent free events, of examining the 
 internal structure of the human body, of discovering 
 remedies for disease, of treating of scientific matters, 
 speaking all languages, etc. The transcendental 
 phenomena include all those already mentioned, but 
 they are effected by the conjuring of spirits, who 
 speak to men through a person called a medium, and 
 who is only a passive instrument of 'their operations. 
 These phenomena include apparitions, voices, writ- 
 ings, scientific dissertations, etc. 
 
 29. Five theories have been framed to explain these 
 phenomena : the theory of material causes, of imagination, 
 of animism, of spiritism, and spiritualism. — The first 
 theory ascribes the phenomena of mesmerism to a 
 certain magnetic fluid which issues from the body of 
 the operator and enters that of the subject. But such 
 a cause is purely material, and is therefore incapable 
 of producing spiritual phenomena. Nor can such 
 phenomena be the effect of imagination, which is also 
 
§46 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 material, and is common to man and oeast. — The 
 theory of animism is a disguised materialism, whether 
 we say that vibrations in the ma^netizer's soul are 
 communicated to external objects and thereby to the 
 soul of the subject, or that a subtile matter, Od, is 
 communicated to the soul of the subject, and thus 
 produces the phenomena. — Of those who ascribe the 
 effects to spirits, some are spiritists and hold the doc- 
 trine of metempsychosis, or transmigration of human 
 souls. Their assumption is gratuitous, and has been 
 refuted in Psychology (§ 94) ; moreover, they can as- 
 sign no valid reason why departed souls should be 
 subject to the will of man. — Lastly, spiritualists are 
 they who attribute the phenomena, not to departed 
 souls, but to angels. But manifestly these angels 
 cannot be good spirits, since their answers often in- 
 flame the passions and attack revealed truths. They 
 must, therefore, be evil spirits or demons. 
 
CHAPTEE in. 
 
 Eelatite Atteibutes op God. 
 
 aet. i. — god the cbeatob. 
 
 30. God has created, that is, draiun from nothing, all 
 that exists, ivJiether spiritual or corporeal. — God being 
 infinitely perfect, is eminently sufficient for Himself. 
 Yet it was fitting His goodness that others, viz., 
 creatures, participate in His perfections ; and there- 
 fore He created, that is, He drew out of nothing, 
 all that exists.* When God is said to have made 
 the uniyerse out of nothing, the meaning is, that He 
 caused the universe, which was not yet existing, to 
 receive existence. Therefore it is by no means to be 
 inferred, as some philosophers maintain, that nothing 
 is the source out of which God brought all creatures ; 
 for then we could well apply the axiom : " From noth- 
 ing nothing comes." But although creatures did not 
 always actually exist, yet they were from all eternity 
 in the divine intellect, which knew them in their es- 
 sence and their individuality. Therefore, when God 
 wished to actualize these beings which He knew, the 
 world, in virtue of the divine power, passed from the 
 state of pure possibility to the state of actuality; 
 
 * " Creation is a production of a thing according to its whole sub- 
 stance, nothing being preBupposed, whether created or increate." 
 Sum. Th., i.,q. 65, a. 3. c. 
 
348 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it is precisely in this that creation consists. Hence 
 by creation God does not, like man, bring- about a 
 mere modification of substances : by His infinite 
 power He makes the substance itself. As to the time 
 of creation, it would be vain to ask why God created 
 the world so late ; for time began with creation. In 
 God there is no time, because there is no succession ; 
 there is no early, no late, no when, no hefore, no after 
 in the divine eternity, which is a single and indivis- 
 ible now. Moreover, God alone can create; for as 
 St. Thomas argues {Contra Gent, ii. 21) : " Since the 
 order of actions is according- to the order of agents, 
 because a nobler action is proper to a nobler agent, 
 the primary action must be proper to the primary 
 agent. But creation is the primary action, because it 
 presupposes no other action, and all others presup- 
 pose it. Therefore creation is an action proper to 
 God alone, for He is the primary agent." 
 
 Another proof may be drawn from God's absolute 
 independence of all creatures. As He alone possesses 
 an absolutely independent existence, to Him alone 
 can that action be referred which requires no pre- 
 existing subject on which to operate for the produc- 
 tion of an effect. But such action is creation. There- 
 fore creation is proper to God alone. 
 
 31. The act of creation is an essentially free act of 
 the divine will. As God is eminently sufficient for Him- 
 self He is in this act hoxcnd l)y no necessity, whether ex- 
 ternal or internal. — To hold that God made the world 
 not by an act of His free will but from an irresistible 
 impulse, is virtually to hold that God does not suffice 
 for Himself, that He is not infinite, that He is not 
 God. Moreover, this opinion would imply that every 
 thing in the world is as necessary as the principle 
 whence it emanated, and that, consequently, there is 
 
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOO. 349 
 
 no liberty either in man or in God. The objection 
 that it is impossible to reconcile a free creation with 
 the simplicity and immutability of God is idle, for 
 the impossibility exists only in appearance. The 
 act by which God wills creatures may be considered 
 either in regard to Him or to creatures. In reference 
 to Him, the act is eternal ; therefore it does not affect 
 His immutability ; and since this act exists in God 
 before He creates. He receives no new quality on the 
 passage of creatures from non-existence into existence. 
 Creatures alone acquire a new perfection by creation. 
 32. The end which God proposes to Himself in creat- 
 ing the world is the manifestation of His perfections, or 
 His own glory. — God, being infinite wisdom, must have 
 had an end in the act of creation, and this end must 
 be the manifestation of Himself and His perfections, 
 particularly His power, His wisdom, and His good- 
 ness. But since God is infinite, He can acquire noth- 
 ing further for Himself, and the glory that accrues to 
 Him from creation is purely accidental and extrinsic. 
 It is fitting, therefore, that in the series of created 
 beings there be some that can recognize this manifes- 
 tation of God in the world. Such creatures must be 
 intelligent. Undoubtedly irrational creatures oper- 
 ate for an end, which, however, they cannot know ; 
 nor can they raise themselves to Him who leads them 
 to that end. Only intelligent creatures can propose 
 to themselves an end in their acts, and only they can 
 know the end which God proposed to Himself in 
 creating. From this it is evident that intelligent 
 creatures should hold the foremost rank among cre- 
 ated beings, all other creatures having been made for 
 them. Man is, therefore, the true king of the visiblo 
 creation ; everything in the visible world was made 
 for him, since he alone can refer all to God. 
 
350 REAL PMILOSOPHT. 
 
 AET. II. — ^PANTHEISM. 
 
 33. Pantheism is the negation of creation ; it consists in 
 recognizing no substance hut God, and in identifying the 
 world ivith Him. — Those philosopliers who, while re- 
 jecting the truth of creation, are yet unwilling to 
 accept the absurd system of independent eternal 
 matter, have been constrained to regard the world 
 as an emanation from the very substance of God. 
 This error, which is called pantheism, is as old as 
 philosophy itself. It is the last term to which every 
 philosophical and religious error necessarily and 
 logically leads> 
 
 34. There are two principal forms of pantheism, realistic 
 pantheism and idealistic pantJieism. — In the most dis- 
 tant times pantheism was professed in India, where 
 it infected not only the minds, but likewise the relig- 
 ion and morals of a whole nation. Later on panthe- 
 ism was openly taught by several schools of Greek 
 philosophy — ^by the Pythagorean, for example, and 
 also by the Stoics, who declared that God was the 
 soul of the world. In the first centuries of the Chris- 
 tian era it was propagated by many Neo-Platonic 
 philosophers ; in the twelfth and thirteeth centuries, 
 by Arabian philosophers ; in the fourteenth and fif- 
 teenth centuries, by false mystics, and especially by 
 Scotus Erigena (d. 875), and Giordano Bruno (d. 1600). 
 In recent times it has been renewed and reduced to a 
 system by Spinoza and the German philosophers, 
 who have propagated it in Europe, where it infects a 
 great number of minds. Although they teach one- 
 ness of substance in God and the world, yet panthe- 
 ists, one and all, seek to reconcile their system with 
 the variety of phenomena which nature presents, and 
 
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF aO£>. 551 
 
 have fabricated divers modes in whicli the world has 
 emanated from God. The multiplicity of these modes 
 has given rise to the different forms of pantheism, 
 which may, however, be reduced to two : realistic 
 pantheism, invented chiefly by Spinoza, and idealistic 
 pantheism, taught by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. 
 
 The pantheism of Spinoza originated in a false 
 definition of substance. Descartes had said that sub- 
 stance is that which has need of nothing else in order 
 to exist. Adhering to this definition Spinoza easily 
 demonstrated that there can be no other substance 
 than the divine substance, because that alone needs 
 no other being for its existence. Whatever we now 
 consider as existing outside of God 'is, according to 
 Spinoza (1632-1677), only a mode of the divine attri- 
 butes. And as all that is in the world manifests it- 
 self to us as endowed either with thought or exten- 
 sion, thought and extension are, in Spinoza's system, 
 the essential attributes of the infinite substance. This 
 substance, it is said, acts necessarily. As a thinking 
 substance it produces the different series of intellect- 
 ual operations which constitute the minds of men ; 
 as an extended substance it produces bodies with all 
 their various modifications. Therefore the aggre- 
 gate of finite things is, he asserts, a necessary devel- 
 opment of the attributes, thought and extension, 
 which belong to the infinite substance. 
 
 Fichte (1772-1814), applying certain principles of 
 Kant to the pantheism of Spinoza, endeavored to 
 ■ prove a jyriori how mind and matter, which he calls 
 the Ego and the non-Ego, originate in the successive 
 development of a single substance. To reach this 
 he rises by abstraction to the pure Ego, that is, to 
 thought, having no relation either to the thinking 
 subject or the object thought of. This pure Ego is 
 
352 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the infinite, or God. But, says Fichte, the pure Ego 
 is necessarily conscious of itself. In virtue of this 
 necessity it thinks or posits itself, and in thinking or 
 positing itself it distinguishes seK as subject from self 
 as object. As subject, it is the human mind ; as ob- 
 ject, it is matter. This development of the Absolute 
 under the form of mind and matter is accomplished 
 by an internal operation, and this is consciousness. 
 Mind and matter are only the internal representation 
 which the Absolute or the pure Ego makes of itself to 
 itself. — Schelling (1775-1854) adopted the pantheism 
 of Fichte, and considering God as the sole substance 
 from whom mind and matter emanate ideally, he de- 
 fined it as the indifference of the differentiated. Lastly, 
 Hegel (1770-1831) set forth the whole system with 
 scientific method and with all the appurtenances of a 
 theory rigorously demonstrated. He substituted the 
 Idea for the pure Ego of Fichte, and explained the 
 origin of all creatures by the ideal motion of the Ab- 
 solute. 
 
 As is evident, realistic pantheism teaches that the 
 world exists by a necessary emanation from the divine 
 substance, in much the same way as the web comes 
 from the spider. Idealistic pantheism considers the 
 world as emanating from God by an internal and im- 
 manent action. The former admits an Absolute in 
 act, containing in itself all the various beings of the 
 world, which it produces by necessary and external 
 evolution of itself. In the latter system, the Absolute 
 is in potentiality, and, in developing and completing 
 itself by an internal and necessary motion, it mani- 
 fests itself now under the form of matter, and again 
 under that of mind, and so begets the series of exist- 
 ing things, which are not realities, but mere appear-^ 
 ances, pure phenomena. But, whatever may be thft 
 
RELAl'IYB ATTRIBUTES OF OOD. 353 
 
 - diTergencies of the pantheistic systems, the essential 
 characters may be reduced to two : (1) oneness of sub- 
 stance between God and the world ; (2) negation of all 
 liberty in the act by which God creates the world.* 
 
 35. Pantheism refutes itself , first, because the principle 
 of a single substance is contradicted hoth by reason and 
 experience ; secondly, because the denial of the liberty of 
 the creative act is the destruction of tlie very notion of 
 the Absolute ; and, lastly, because it leads to fatal con- 
 sequences. — The fundamental principle of pantheism 
 is that there is but one substance, and that divine. 
 Now, on the one hand, experience tells us that there 
 are many substances ; on the other, reason finds in 
 the idea of substance nothing requiring it to be 
 unique. Without doubt, he who admits, with Spinoza, 
 that substance is that which depends on no cause for 
 its being, must hold that there is no other substance 
 than the divine. But this is not implied in the true 
 idea of substance, which should be defined: "That 
 which does not require another as subject in which to 
 inhere." Thus the idea of substance does not imply 
 independence of another subject, but excludes in- 
 herence in another as its subject. — It may also be 
 shown that if only one substance, God, the Absolute, 
 exists, this substance necessarily entails a contradic- 
 tion. For if the Absolute contains many beings in 
 itself, it lacks that unity which we conceive to be an 
 essential quality of an infinitely perfect being ; if, on 
 
 * " The historical development of pantheism shows that it was the 
 product of religious imagination in the Orient, that it ^ras abstract 
 with the Greeks, and physical with the Roman stoics, was couched in 
 the mysticism of mediaeval times, became ontologioal in Spinoza, 
 ethical and subjective in Fichte, objective and ideal in Schelling, 
 and attained its consummation in the dialectical processes of Hege- 
 U»n metaphysics." — American Encydopcedia, sub. Pantheism. 
 
354 BEAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 the other hand, it does not contain the collection of 
 the various beings in the world, they could never have 
 oome forth froih it.— Finally, if God and the world 
 are but one substance, it follows that God is the world 
 and the world is God ; or, in other words, that the 
 infinite is the finite and the finite is the infinite. The 
 contradiction is even more manifest in the Absolute 
 as understood by the German philosophers. For this 
 Absolute, which, as Absolute, should actually possess 
 all perfections, has them only potentially, and acquires 
 them by successive developments. Moreover, the 
 manifestation which the Absolute makes of itself in 
 creatures is deceitful, and these creatures are only 
 appearances or phenomena. But an Absolute which 
 deceives and a potential Absolute are pure contradic- 
 tions. Therefore contradiction is the term to which 
 every system of pantheism necessarily leads. And 
 pantheists are far from denying it ; for they admit as 
 a principle the identity of contraries* and make this 
 principle the foundation-stone of their logic and of 
 all their science. 
 
 The absurdity of regarding the world as a neces- 
 sary emanation of the divine substance may from this 
 be easily perceived, The Absolute, if Absolute, ought 
 to be most perfect and wholly sufficient for itself. 
 But to assert that the creation of the world is neces- 
 sary, is to admit that the Absolute has need of the 
 world ; and thus the very idea of the Absolute is de- 
 stroyed. 
 
 But the absurdity of pantheism is manifest not 
 only from the falsity of the principles on which it rests, 
 but also from the fatal consequences to which it leads. 
 
 * Or, as Kant expressed it, the doctrine of Antinomies (See note, 
 110). 
 
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 355 
 
 For the God of pantheists is an imperfect God, subject 
 to blind necessity ; therefore he is not God, and pan- 
 theism is atheism in disguise. 
 
 With equal logical consistency is fatalism deduced 
 from pantheism. If man has no substance of his own, 
 he has no liberty, no activity of his own ; all his act? 
 are illusory phenomena, which a blind Absolute fatally 
 performs ; there is no longer either good or evil, and 
 the whole moral law is destroyed. Likewise, if the 
 principle of the identity of contraries, the foundation 
 of the logic of pantheists, be admitted, there is no 
 longer either true or false, and the most complete 
 scepticism becomes the sole rule of the human mind.* 
 
 AET. III. — GOD THE PEESERTEE. 
 
 36. The creatures of Ood stand in need of His contin- 
 ual active preservation. — Every effect depends on its 
 cause for all that it has from it. Now, the efficient 
 cause either creates, or simply gives a new form to 
 what is already existing. Therefore, if the effect is 
 nothing but a new form informing pre-existing mat- 
 ter, it will be referred to the cause for this form only. 
 But if the effect be the whole existence of a being. 
 
 * Pantheism is the real principle of rationalism, which in turn has 
 given birth to positivism and agnosticism. Positivism, inaugurated 
 by Comte, was propagated in the name of reason and science by 
 Llttre, Taine, Kenan, Sainte-Beuve in France, by Lewes and Harrison 
 in England, by Emerson in America. Rejecting the supernatural as 
 unknowable, it studies only positives, i.e., natural phenomena with 
 their " relations of coexistence and succession." It may be traced to 
 three causes : " metaphysical scepticism, due to the Critique of Kant," 
 the "too exclusive use of the experimental method," and the 
 " material tendencies of the age." Littr6 died in 1881, a convert on 
 his bad of death. 
 
356 REAL PSILOSOPHT. 
 
 I 
 
 matter and form, it will depend on the cause for its 
 whole existence, for both matter and form. But God 
 is the first cause of all the beings of the universe, 
 since He has given them existence by creating them ; 
 therefore they cannot cease to depend on Him for 
 their existence ; and they continue to exist only so 
 long as He preserves it to them. For if creatures 
 cannot come into existence of themselves, it is because 
 they are contingent ; as they do not cease to be con- 
 tingent, they require for the continuance of their 
 existence a divine act of the same nature as that 
 which drew them forth from nothing. The necessity 
 of this divine act is such that God Himself could not 
 make creatures capable of preserving themselves by 
 their own nature ; because unless God created a con- 
 tradictory being He could not make a creature not 
 contingent. 
 
 37. God preserves His creatures hy a positive act, which 
 does not differ actually from that hy ivhich He created 
 them ; so that p7'eseroation may ie called a continued 
 creation. — The preservation of a being is of two kinds : 
 it is positive and direct, if the being continues in 
 existence by a positive and direct act of God ; it is 
 negative and indirect, if the being merely continues 
 to exist, inasmuch as God does not destroy it, and 
 removes the causes that could effect this. Now as to 
 the act by which God preserves creatures, only posi- 
 tive and direct preservation can be meant ; and so all 
 the great philosophers have understood it. Evidently 
 it could not be otherwise, for creatures are always 
 contingent, and consequently always in need of that 
 which was needful at the first moment of their exist- 
 ence. God has drawn the world from nothing by an 
 act of His will ; He continues to will that the world 
 exist, and so the world continues to exist. Therefore 
 
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 357 
 
 the act by wMch. God created the world and the act 
 by which He preserves it, are identical ; and in all 
 truth we can say that the divine preservation is a 
 continual creation. The difference between the crea- 
 tion and the preservation of creatures consists not in 
 the act but in .the term of the act : by creation God 
 draws things out of nothing ; by preservation He 
 keeps from nothingness the things He has made. If 
 one were to accept the opinion of some philosophers, 
 that God preserves creatures by a negative and indi- 
 rect act, he would be obliged to admit that creatures 
 could not return to nothing except by a positive act 
 of God. But it is impossible for nothing to be the 
 term of any act whatever. Therefore, to admit the 
 indirect preservation of creatures is to deny to God 
 the power of annihilating the things He has made: 
 But in the doctrine of direct preservation the annihi- 
 lation of creatures is easily explained by the cessation 
 of the act which keeps them in existence. 
 
 38. Although God can annihilate creatures, yet it is 
 certain that Me will never annihilate even one of them. — 
 Since God has created freely, He can also, if He wills 
 it, annihilate His creatures. But this is only a meta- 
 physical possibility which will never be realized ; for 
 the gifts of God are without repentance, and having 
 willed to give being to creatures, God, in a sense, owes 
 it to His wisdom, His immutability, and His glory, 
 to preserve them. The existence of creatures is a 
 proof of the power of Him who made theru ; but that 
 a thing after having existed should return into noth- 
 ing, would be contrary to the manifestation of God's 
 power, which shines forth especially in the preserva- 
 tion of creatures. The world will doubtless undergo 
 transformations and does undergo them every day ; 
 but it will not cease to exist. It is certain also, as we 
 
358 REAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 daily see, that the accidents of things and the very 
 forms of living beings other than man, do cease to 
 exist; but these accidents and these forms are not 
 complete beings, since they are not substances. The 
 name of being is imperfectly applied to them ; and 
 yet, such as they are, they are not absolutely annihi- 
 lated, not that any part of them subsists, but because 
 there is always a potentiality in the subject or in the 
 matter, from which they can be educed. 
 
 AET. IV. — THE DIVINE CONGUEEENCE WITH THE ACTIONS 
 OP CBEATUEES. 
 
 39. God concurs directly in all the acts of creatures. — 
 God not merely exerts an influence on creatures in- 
 asmuch as He preserves their being ; He also influ- 
 ences their operations. For just as the creature as 
 second being depends on God as first being, so the 
 creature as second cause depends on God as first cause. 
 
 40. There are two prijicipal systems to explain the 
 divine influence on the actions of creatures : the sys- 
 tem of physical premotion and the system of simul- 
 taneous coTicurrence. — Physical premotion or predeter- 
 mination, is an influence by which God applies the 
 cause to action, firstly, actively, and intrinsically. 
 The divine influence on the actions of creatures as 
 explained by physical premotion has been taught by 
 the Scholastic philosophers generally, and particu- 
 larly by St. Thomas. They regarded God as moving 
 and applying secondary causes, actively and physi- 
 cally, by an internal inclination which determines 
 them definitively to their action, as the heart gives to 
 the other members of the body a predetermining force 
 that stimulates them and makes them thoroughly 
 capable of their functions. 
 
RBLATirE ATTBIBUTMS OF GOD. 359 
 
 Simultaneous concurrence is the influence by which 
 God helps second causes, producing with them one 
 and the same effect. This system originated with 
 Molina (1535-1600) toward the end of the sixteenth 
 century. He taught that the entire effect is to be 
 ascribed to God and creatures ; but that neither God 
 nor second causes are the total cause of the effect, but 
 each is a partial cause requiring the concurrence of 
 the other — just as a boat ^owed by two men receives 
 its entire motion from both together. In this system 
 is also admitted, particularly in the order of grace, 
 that concurrence of God called moral motion, which 
 consists in a moral influence exercised on the will, 
 either external, as by preaching and good example, 
 or internal, as by inspiration and good thoughts. 
 Still, in whatever way the divine influence upon the 
 action of creatures be explained, it by no means 
 destroys free will; for although God concurs with 
 free acts. He never concurs with what is defective 
 in them. Similarly, although the motion of a lame 
 man's leg must be attributed to the soul, the defect 
 in his walk is due to the defect in his leg.* 
 
 AET. v.— OMNIPEESENCE OF GOD. 
 
 41. Omnipresence is an attrxbute'hy which God is pres- 
 ent in all creatures. — The attribute of omnipresence 
 differs from that of immensity, for the latter is that 
 perfection by which God is present by His infinite 
 essence in all things that exist, and can be in all pos- 
 sible worlds ; while the former is merely that perfec- 
 fection by which He is actually present in all places 
 and in all creatures. This is, therefore, a relative at- 
 tribute ; the other is absolute. 
 
 *Cf. Zigliara, Summa Philotophiea, T., § 30. 
 
360 REAL PHILOSOPET. 
 
 42. Ood is in all creatures in three ways: hy His 
 pmuer, iy Sis presence, and hy His essence. — God is m 
 all creatures by His power, for He acts in them ; by 
 his presence, for He actually knows them ; by His es- 
 sence, for His essence is not distinct from His powei- 
 and His knowledge. — God is in all beings by His 
 power, because He has created them and continues 
 the creative act by preserving them. God is in all 
 creatures by His presence, for all that He produces 
 outside Himself He produces freely according to 
 eternal prototypes ; therefore, as creative and pre- 
 serving cause of all things, He must have them ever 
 present to His intelligence. Lastly, God is in ail be- 
 ings by His essence. Wherever God's power is exer- 
 cised, there is His essence whole and entire ; but God 
 is in all places by His power ; therefore He is also 
 there by His essence.* Our imagination, accustomed 
 as it is to represent to itself material things, cannot 
 represent the divine substance present in all things 
 without picturing it as mingled with their sub- 
 stances; but reason rejects such a representation. 
 The essence of God is no more confounded with the 
 essences of creatures with which He is present than 
 the soul is identified in its substance with that of the 
 body to which it is substantially united. 
 
 AET. VI. — PKOVIDENCE OF GOD. 
 
 43. The Providence of God is the care thai He take» 
 of creatures, especially rational creatures. — Considered 
 in God, providence is the reason of the order by which 
 
 * " He is in all things by His power in that all depend npon 
 Him, and by His presence, inasmuch as all things are ' naked and 
 open to His eyes ; ' He is in all by His essence, because He is with 
 all as the cause of their existence." — Sum. Th., i., q. 8, art. 3. 
 
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF OOD. 361 
 
 all things are conducted to their end; and in this 
 sense providence is exercised immediately over all 
 things. Considered in its eifects, providence is the 
 execution of the order which God conceived in creat- 
 ing the world, and in virtue of which all things an- 
 swer their end. In this sense providence is exercised 
 only mediately, for it governs the inferior by the 
 superior, not that it needs an intermediary, but that 
 in the exercise of its goodness it may give the dignity 
 of cause to creatures. 
 
 44. The existence of Providence is proved hy an a priori 
 argument drawn from the very idea of God. — An intelli- 
 gent and free agent must operate with a view to some 
 end. God must have proposed some end in creating 
 the world, and this can be no other than the manifesta- 
 tion of His goodness. But this end could not have 
 been attained, if at the same time God had not put 
 order into the world when He created it. And since 
 order implies the disposition of beings in view of an 
 end, the order of the world supposes a providential 
 design. Therefore, if the idea of God as cause of the 
 world be once admitted, the attribute of providence 
 cannot be denied him. This attribute may also be 
 deduced from the other divine perfections. For God 
 is essential goodness ; but it pertains to the good- 
 ness of a being to care for the effects that it has pro- 
 duced. Why, then, should the government of the 
 world be denied to God ? Not from want of power ; 
 if He could create the world and determine its end, 
 with greater reason can He direct it to its end. Not 
 from want of will ; if He willed the end, it is absurd 
 to say that He does not will the means. Not from 
 want of wisdom ; for what would then become of the 
 infinite wisdom of God? To deny providence is, 
 therefore, to deny God Himself. 
 
362 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 45. The existence of Providence is also proved iy an a 
 posteriof'i argument drawn from the admirable order 
 that 7'eigns in the universe. — ^The universe presents to 
 us a multitude of beings whicli, though essentially 
 different, are all governed by constant laws. It shows 
 us also the ensemble of the particular ends of these 
 beings conspiring toward a supreme, single, and uni- 
 versal end ; so that each being taken separately pur- 
 sues a particular end, which in turn is subordinate to 
 another end, and so on to the supreme end toward 
 which all others converge. But the admirable con- 
 stancy of the world's physical laws, the subordination 
 of particular ends to a general end, which gives so per- 
 fect a unity to the world, must be the effect of blind 
 necessity, of chance, or of a supreme reason. But 
 necessity cannot govern creatures, since they are evi- 
 dently contingent ; nor can chance direct them, for it 
 cannot make constant and invariable laws. There- 
 fore the order of the world must be the effect of an 
 ordaining reason, and is nothing else than divine 
 Providence. The evidence of this conclusion will be 
 more striking when we bear in mind that many creat- 
 ures are destitute of reason, others are of opposite nat- 
 ures, and yet all concur to the supreme end assigned 
 to the world. How can beings destitute of intelli- 
 gence tend to an end, if they are not directed by an 
 intelligent cause ? How can those whose particular 
 ends are opposed to each other concur to the general 
 order, if they are not subjected to a supreme Being 
 who disposes all things at will ? It is of no avail to 
 object that we know but a small part of the creatures 
 of the world. What we know suffices to demonstrate 
 rigorously the necessity of Providence, and the neces- 
 sity of Providence once shown, it is easy to infer 
 order even in that portion that is unknown to us. 
 
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF OOD. 363 
 
 46. The existence of Providence is also proved by a 
 moral argument drawn from the unanimous consent of 
 all peoples in all ages. — The truth of a Providence has, 
 under one form or another, constituted a fundamental 
 dogma in all ages. The greatest geniuses have pro- 
 claimed the trutlj, and not a few have written excellent 
 works describing the admirable care that God takes 
 of His creatures, and especially of man, the lord of 
 creation. 
 
 47. The principal objection against God's providence 
 is drawn from the existence of evil. — If God is just and 
 good, He cannot but detest evil; if He is infinite- 
 ly wise, He knows how to prevent evil; if He is 
 almighty, he can actually prevent evil. Believing it 
 impossible to reconcile the existence of God with 
 that of evil, some men have denied the existence of 
 God, and are, therefore, atheists; while others have 
 denied the existence of evil, and are fatalists. Others 
 again have referred the evil to an evil principle dis-, 
 tinct from God and independent of Him ; of this class 
 are the Manichees. And yet others, seeing that all 
 these systems, far from settling the difficulty, only 
 increased it and added glaring absurdities, believed 
 it the wiser course to doubt the existence both of 
 God and of evil ; these are sceptics. — All these, errors 
 spring from false notions of the nature and origin of 
 evil, and of the divine plan in permitting it. If evil 
 is not being, but a privation of being, evidently it 
 cannot be found in God, who possesses being in all 
 its plenitude. It has also been proved that there 
 can be no absolute evil, no supreme principle of evil.* 
 It is idle for fatalists and sceptics to deny or doubt 
 the existence of evil in the world; it is, indeed, a 
 
 *Seep. 156. 
 
364 REAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fact that we cannot understand, but not all our nega- 
 tions and all our doubts together are able to destroy 
 it. 
 
 48. The objection against Providence drawn from the 
 existence of evil may lie refuted indirectly hy showing, 
 first, that these two truths must he held as certain, even 
 though they cannot he reconciled with each other ; and 
 secondly, that the existence of evil cannot he explained 
 without admitting a divine Providence. — When reason 
 recognizes two truths as certain we may affirm, on the 
 principle that truth never contradicts itself, that 
 these two truths harmonize. Now, the existence of 
 Providence is a truth demonstrated by reason ; the 
 existence of evil is a fact attested by experience. If, 
 then, we are unable to discover their connecting link, 
 we must ascribe it to the imperfection of our minds ; 
 for it would be as absurd to deny the one or the 
 other as it would be foolish to deny the existence of a 
 circle or a square, because one could not point out 
 their common measure. Besides, it can be shown 
 that the existence of evil in the world is so far from 
 destroying divine Providence, that it can have no ex- 
 planation without Providence. What, indeed, is evil ? 
 A privation of good, a deviation from order. There- 
 fore evil is not possible unless the existence of good 
 and of order be granted. But good is the effect of a 
 good cause, and order presupposes Providence ; there- 
 fore evil, far from militating against the goodness and 
 providence of God, rather proves their existence. 
 Therefore, instead of saying : Evil exists in the world, 
 therefore there is no God ; we should rather say : 
 Evil exists in the world, therefore there is a God and 
 a Providence. 
 
 49. The objection against Providence drawn from the 
 existence of evil may he refuted indirectly hy showing 
 
BBLATIVE ATTBIBUTEa OF GOD. 365 
 
 that eml only serves to manifest in a more striking 
 way the wisdom and goodness of divine Providence. — 
 There are, according to some, three kinds of evil- 
 metaphysical, physical, and moral. But metaphysi- 
 cal, evil cannot be an objection against Providence, 
 for it is nothing but the necessary imperfection of 
 every creature. Therefore, properly speaking, it is 
 not evil at all, and is reduced to the axiom, "The 
 finite is not infinite." Only pantheists have been 
 able to deny this nominal evil. — Physical evil has 
 been denied by the Stoics. But the physical dis- 
 orders that do not depend on the libertjr of man are 
 either a particular effect of the general laws that give 
 harmony to the world, or they are destined to afford 
 man an occasion of gaining merit, or, lastly, they are 
 a consequence and a punishment of moral evil. — The 
 only difficulty, then, with regard to Providence, must 
 come from moral evil. This evil consists in the in- 
 ordinate act of a free agent, and is denied particularly 
 by fatalists.- The principle of chis evil is liberty. 
 But how can we suppose, some will ask, that a good 
 God can have endowed His creatures with a privilege 
 which for a great number results, on the one hand, in 
 a resistance to the divine will, and consequently, in 
 an attack upon the glory and holiness of the infinite 
 Being ; and, on the other hand, entails such chastise- 
 ments that nothingness would be a benefit to the 
 creatures subjected to them ? Since God knew those 
 who would break His law, why did He draw them 
 from nothing and grant them a liberty that was to 
 render them so guilty and so unfortunate ? * 
 
 * This objection really comes from disguised anthropomorphism. 
 It likens God to a bungling artisan, who begins a work but fails to 
 fit It for its destined purpose, and then throws it aside to make 
 another attempt with new material. Whoever says that God should 
 
366 REAL PEIL080PST. 
 
 These difficulties are such as to move the imagina- 
 tion and the sentiment, but they are not founded in 
 reason. For that God has created a world in which 
 free creatures are subjected to trial and personally 
 merit their happiness, is not contrary to God's good- 
 ness. If in consequence of this trial evil becomes 
 possible, God first in His goodness places limits to 
 evil, and by His wisdom and His power triumphs over 
 it, and even draws good out of it. If to this be added 
 the teachings of faith on the dogma of original sin and 
 on that of the Incarnation, the moral evil that abounds 
 in the world is easily explained, and the good, in a 
 sense infinite, that results from the permission of evil, 
 is better understood. 
 
 create those only whom He knows will be saved, thereby limits His 
 power, His knowledge even, and His wisdom. He supposes that 
 God has decreed to create A, for instance, but foreseeing that his 
 career will end in eternal misery, He changes His decree and de- 
 termines to create B. If He foresees that B will not prove a failure, 
 He will create B. The objection is then plausible and insidious, 
 but if sharply scrutinized becomes most absurd. When God creates 
 He sees not only the actual career that will be lived by His creature, 
 but likewise all possible contingencies. To suppose that He can fail 
 in His work ^s to assert that He is not God ; to say that He changes 
 His decrees is to deny that He knows from all eternity the whole 
 life of creatures, and to attack both His wisdom and His Immutability. 
 God gives to every creature the means to attain its epd ; more than 
 this it cannot Of right demand. The creative act, creatures, and the 
 end of creatures are all good ; eternal woe is the legitimate conse- 
 quence of the creature's perversion of free will. See A Skeptical 
 Difficulty against Greation, by R. F. Clarke, S. 3., American Catlwlio 
 Quarterly Eemew, vol. ii., p. 278. 
 
MOEAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Definition of Moral Philosophy. — Charactee of the 
 Science. — ^Its Excellence. — Its Method. — Its Di- 
 vision. 
 
 1. Moral philosophy is a science which treats of the free 
 actions of man, and directs them to his final end. 
 
 2. Moral philosophy is a practical science, because it 
 serves to direct the luill. — Unlike Logic and Metaphy- 
 sics, whicli require only acts of intellect, Moral Phi- 
 losophy requires, besides, acts of the will. Hence, 
 while they- are speculative sciences, it is called a 
 practical science. 
 
 3. The excellence of Tnoral philosophy follows from its 
 very nature, and from its relatione luith the other sciences, 
 particularly tvith the practical sciences, lohich it furnishes 
 with their first principles. — In itself moral philosophy 
 is conversant about all that regulates and relates to 
 man's will. Now, what is of greater importance to 
 man than the proper direction of his will, since it is 
 by this faculty that he is to attain the end of his exist- 
 ence ? As to the relations of moral philosophy with 
 the other sciences, on the one hand, it is manifestly * 
 the end of the speculative sciences, ■ since the true 
 should be known only with a view of thereby better 
 practising the good ; and, on the other hand, it lays 
 down for the practical sciences, like jurisprudence, 
 political economy, and aesthetics, those fundamental 
 
368 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 principles without which they become deceitful and 
 hurtful. 
 
 4. The method of moral philosophy is to seek out the 
 laws of tnorality hy the light of reason guided hy faith 
 and history. — The principles of moral philosophy 
 should be founded on the natural light of reason aided 
 and sustained by the teachings of faith. Revelation, 
 which directs our feeble intelligence in the way of 
 truth, is the more necessary in the study of morals, as 
 the tumult of passions often so disturbs the judgment 
 that the good is not duly esteemed, and the will is 
 weak in putting that good into practice. 
 
 Moral science receives great help also from the 
 study of history, which shows that the leading prin- 
 ciples of justice and honor, in spite of many errors, 
 have been maintained constant and uniform, through- 
 out all ages and among all people. 
 
 There are three principal errors as to the method 
 to be followed in the study of morals. Rationalism 
 will have no other basis than independent reason. 
 Such a pretension is opposed to the native imperfec- 
 tion of reason, and even to affirmations of experience. 
 Traditionalism, going to the other extreme, holds that 
 reason is unable to discover the moral laws, and 
 knows them only by a primitive revelation from God, 
 which has been handed down by tradition. This at- 
 tacks the natural powers of reason, and thus does 
 injury to God, from whom both reason and revela- 
 tion proceed. In the last place, the historical scliool 
 whose principles are illustrated in the writings of 
 Savigny (1779-1861), Mebuhr (1776-1831), Eichhorn 
 1781-1854), instead of seeking the rule of morality 
 in the nature of things, pretends to find it by induc- 
 tion in the study of history ; " and therefore," says 
 Liberatore, "they hold that the equity of all laws is 
 
DEFINITION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 369 
 
 to be judged from the times, inclinations, instincts, 
 and different development of powers, and other cir- 
 cumstances that led to their enactment." * By this 
 very fact it gives to morality a basis without consist- 
 ency, and takes away from justice those characteris- 
 tics of absolute and eternal which are its distinguish- 
 ing property. 
 
 5. Moral Philosophy is divided into two parts, Ethics 
 and Natural Law ; or, according to some, into General 
 Ethics and Special Ethics. — A human action may be 
 viewed under two aspects, either abstractly and under 
 the general conditions that constitute its morality, 
 or concretely and in relation to the particular obliga- 
 tions that result from the order established by nature. 
 The study of human actions from the former stand- 
 point belongs to Morals or General Ethics ; from the 
 latter, to Natural Law or Special Ethics. Although 
 distinct, the two sciences are closely united, standing 
 in the relation of principles to their application. 
 
 * Inititutiones Philosophicm, vol. iii., p. 17. 
 U 
 
ETHICS. 
 
 Division. 
 
 6. Ethics examines the moral goodness of huTnan acts, 
 and therefore should study : 1, the external objective 
 cause of human actions, that is, their end ; 2, the in- 
 ternal suhjective cause, that is, the faculty that elicits 
 them ; 3, the constitutive principles of the morality of 
 human actions ; 4, the rale of human actions. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 The End of Human Actions. 
 
 ibt. i. — good in geneeal as the end op eyeey being, 
 and the eikst pbinciple of its opekations. 
 
 7. Every being has an end, which is the first principle 
 of its operations. — Every being has received from God 
 with its existence a power to operate, a tendency to 
 action, in harmony with its nature. This power can- 
 not exist withoiit an end or term ; otherwise it would 
 be a tendency tending to nothing. The term of the 
 operations of a being is called its end. Such a term, 
 such an end, has necessarily been given to every creat- 
 ure by the Supreme Ruler of the world ; for He is 
 infinite wisdom, arid, therefore, cannot create any- 
 
THE END OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 371 
 
 thing without fixing- its end and giving it the means 
 to attain that end. The end of a being is, therefore, 
 the first principle, the external objective principle, of 
 all its operations. 
 
 8. The end of each being is one, as its nature is one. — 
 Unity is an essential property of every being. Since 
 the end is proportionate to the nature, every being 
 has, strictly speaking, but one end. When a being is 
 thought to have several ends, then its last end has 
 been confounded with the subordinate ends, which 
 are rather to be called means. 
 
 9. The operative poiuer of a being is in perfect agree- 
 ment with its nature ; hence, as tlve nature varies, so luill 
 there be a difference in the manner of attaining the end. — 
 Whatever is destitute of intelligence tends to its end 
 by a blind impulse. Animals tend to it through sen- 
 sitive perception ; but, being unable to abstract, and 
 consequently to know the relations of things, they 
 cannot consider the object of their operation as an 
 end ;, their appetite is moved, not by a judgment on 
 the fitness of the act, but by mere natural inclination. 
 Man, on the contrary, can know the relations of 
 things, considers the object as the end of his opera- 
 tions, and chooses freely the means of attaining his 
 end. 
 
 10 The good of each being is in its end. — The opera- 
 tive power of a being is imperfect so long as the end 
 is not attained ; but when that is compassed it is in 
 repose, because it has obtained its natural perfection. 
 The natural perfection of a being is its good ; there- 
 fore the good of each being is found in its end. But 
 since the idea of good is intimately connected with . 
 that of end, the true good of a being does not consist 
 in this or that subordinate end, but in the one end 
 properly so called ; and this good is but one, as ths 
 
372 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 end is but one. This, however, is so far as it is ob- 
 jectively considered.* 
 
 11. Good is honorahle, pleasurable, or useful. — The 
 good if considered as end is called honoraile or virtic- 
 ous if it is sought for its own sake and agrees with 
 right reason ; if considered in respect to the satisfac- 
 tion which it affords its possessor, it is caXleA. pleasur- 
 able ; if considered as the means of attaining the end, 
 it is called useful. Hence the useful is willed as 
 means, the pleasurable as a consequence, but the 
 honorable alone for itself. The same good may un- 
 der different aspects be at the same time useful, 
 pleasurable, and honorable. A useful good should 
 be sought only as leading to an honorable good ; a 
 pleasurable good, only as resulting from an honora- 
 ble good. 
 
 12. Order, as being a participation of the divine in- 
 telligence and will, is the last reason explaining the good. 
 — The true good of a being is always the good of 
 order, because it is this good that befits the being ac- 
 cording to its nature, that is, according to the place 
 which God has assigned it in the general order of the 
 universe.f Now, the order of the universe which re- 
 sults from the subordination of the special ends of 
 each being to a single end is essentially good be- 
 cause it is the realization of the essentially good idea 
 of the divine intelligence. Thus the last reason for 
 which a being attains good in attaining its end is 
 
 * " Good takes the nature of end Inasmuch as it objectively moves 
 the will to act. . . . Whence end is only mentally distinguished 
 ft-om good " (Russo, Pradectiones Philoaophicm, p. 10, § 13). But good 
 as a means is not end ; therefore not every good has the nature of 
 end. 
 
 f See Metaphysics of the School, vol, i. , pp. 500, 501, 506. 
 
THE END OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 373 
 
 found in the intelligence and will of God, tlie infinite 
 Good* 
 
 ABT. II. — THE SUPKEME GOOD AS THE LAST END OP MAN. 
 
 13. Rational good is the good proper to man's nature. 
 — Man is composed of body and soul, and hence there 
 are for him two kiiids of good. By his sensitive ap- 
 petite he is drawn toward sensible good ; by his in- 
 tellectual appetite, toward spiritual good. But as 
 these goods are often opposed, and as everything 
 should conform to the order established by the 
 Author of nature, the sensitive appetite should be 
 subject to the intellectual appetite. Therefore the 
 good proper to man is intellectual good. The sensi- 
 ble good is a true good if it is in conformity with 
 reason ; otherwise, although it be a good with regard 
 to the body, it is an evil to the whole man, inasmuch 
 as he is a being disposed with order ; ■ and if man 
 tends to good not conformable to right reason, he 
 does evil. 
 
 14. The supreme good is man's last end. — The lasi 
 end of a being is but one ; therefore the last end of 
 man and the good that constitutes that end are but 
 one. It is easily seen that this good can be nothing 
 else but the supreme good, since it must be pro- 
 portioned to man's nature. For as the intellect tends 
 not to the particular true, but to the universal true, 
 so the will tends not to the particular good, but to 
 
 * The end of a being "depends on the divine wisdom and good- 
 ness. For the natures and relations of things are dictated by the 
 divine intellect contemplating the divine essence. Therefore, be- 
 cause the morality of human actions depends immediately on the 
 order of things, it depends mediately on the divine wisdom and 
 goodness." Liberators. Institutiones Philoaophicm, iii., p. 50. 
 
374 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the universal, unlimited good. This tendency is 
 so powerful in the will, that it always subsists, even 
 when the will seems to follow a particular good. 
 Besides, the repose, the happiness, which results 
 from the end obtained, i. e., the good possessed, shows 
 clearly what that good is whose possession procures 
 perfect happiness. Now, perfect happiness should 
 (1) fully satisfy the innate desires of the heart ; (2) be 
 immutable ; (3) be eternal. But what good is there 
 the possession of which can confer such happiness 
 except the supreme good, the good than which noth- 
 ing greater can be conceived ? 
 
 15. Pleasure cannot be man's supreme good.* — Plea- 
 sure is either corporeal or spiritual. Corporeal pleas- 
 ure is not proportionate to man's intellectual nature. 
 Spiritual pleasure or joy may be either limited and 
 imperfect, or perfect. In the latter case it must result 
 from the possession of the supreme good, but is not 
 the supreme good itself; for pleasure or joy is sub- 
 jective, the good that causes it objective. 
 
 16. Knowledge and virtue attamable in this life cannot 
 he man's supreme good. — Knowledge and virtue in this 
 life are great blessings and to be sought with dili- 
 gence, but, aside from the imperfect way in which 
 they are always possessed, they demand much labor 
 and many sacrifices ; hence they cannot be man's 
 supreme good. 
 
 17. Neitlier can hnoidedge and virtue together ivith pleas- 
 ure he man's supreme good. — In the first place, expe- 
 rience proves that this union is never complete and 
 permanent in this life. In the second place, a col- 
 lection of limited goods can never give more than a 
 
 * The contrary would be true were there no error in the dictum of . 
 Paley, ' ' Pleasures difEer in nothing but in continuance and intensity." 
 
THE END OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 375 
 
 limited good, and therefore cannot satisfy the bound- 
 less desires of man. 
 
 18. God alone is the supreme good. — If the supreme 
 good be not an empty abstraction, if man's desire for 
 it be not an illusion of nature, we must admit that' 
 the supreme good is God, who alone is infinite, im- 
 mutable, and eternal, and the knowledge and posses- 
 sion of whom can alone confer upon man supreme and 
 perfect happiness. 
 
 19. The supreme good is possessed radically hy an act 
 of the intellect. — The will enjoys the good because it 
 is present and possessed, but it is not possessed 
 because the will takes complacency in it. It is the 
 intellect that directly apprehends and possesses the 
 object that constitutes the good; the enjoyment is 
 the consequence of possession, not the possession 
 itself. 
 
 20. The human soul dedres to enjoy the supreme good 
 in union with the hody. — The human soul is made to 
 be united to a body ; hence it has a natural desire of 
 resuming the body after being separated from it. 
 Therefore, when the soul possesses the sovereign good, 
 though it is then fully satisfied as to the object pos- 
 sessed, it is not so as to the manner in which it 
 desires to possess it, which is in union with the body. 
 And as this ' desire comes from nature, it will be 
 satisfied. This argues for the resurrection of the 
 body. 
 
376 MORAL PHILOSOPSr. 
 
 ART. III. — THE SUPREME GOOD IN RELATION TO MANS 
 LIFE UPON EARTH. 
 
 21. Man cannot possess the supreme good in this life, 
 but he ought to tend to attain it in the life to come. — The 
 knowledge that man has of God in this life is imper- 
 fect; hence his love of God and his happiness are 
 also imperfect. But as his end cannot change its 
 nature, man should so subordinate this life to the 
 future as to attain in the latter the perfect possession 
 of the supreme good. 
 
 22. Man in this life must tend to the supreme good iy 
 his will. — In this life man cannot possess the supreme 
 good; but he should tend to it unceasingly, and in 
 this his real perfection consists. But it is chiefly by 
 the will that actions tend a,nd are directed to an end. 
 Therefore it is especially by the will that man attains 
 his perfection in this world ; as it is especially by the 
 intellect that he will possess the supreme good in the 
 other. 
 
 23. The tendency of the will ought to he directed hy the 
 moral law. — God, having created the world, must have 
 proposed to Himself an end. The realization of this 
 end constitutes the order of the world. This order, 
 which is styled physical or moral, according as it 
 refers to irrational or to rational beings, consists in 
 this, that every being should remain in its place, act 
 according to the laws imposed on it by God, and regu- 
 late its motions in harmony with those of other beings. 
 Therefore the observance of this order constitutes 
 the natural perfection of each being. As the physical 
 order is fixed, irrational beings cannot disturb it ; but 
 the moral order man can depart from by the free elec- 
 tion of his will. But because God cannot but will 
 
THE END OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 377 
 
 that the order established by Him be maintained, it 
 follows that if man wishes hereafter to possess God, 
 the supreme good, he ought to direct and regulate his 
 will according to the laws of the moral order. 
 
 24. Conformity to the moral order constitutes for man 
 an imperfect happiness in this life* — Order for man 
 consists chiefly in knowing and loving God. Now, as 
 he will one day enjoy perfect happiness by the perfect 
 knowledge and love of God, so by the knowledge and 
 love of God which he will acquire in this life will he 
 enjoy a sort of participation of the happiness of the 
 other life, a happiness which hope will enable him to 
 possess by anticipation. 
 
 * Yet for the enioyment of the imperfect happiness attainable in 
 this life man needs also not only a certain perfection of body and 
 external goods as well, but naturally the society of friends. Of. 
 . Zigliara, SumTna PhUosophiaa, M. 7, v. vi. 
 
CHAPTBE II. 
 
 SUBJECTIYE PeINCIPLES OP HUMAN ACTIONS. 
 
 AET. I. — THE FACULTY BY WHICH HUMAN ACTIONS ABE 
 ELICITED. 
 
 25. A human action is one that proceeds from a delib- 
 erate will. — Intelligence and liberty constitute the 
 specific difference between man and the rest of the 
 visible creation. But since the actions by which a 
 being attains its end are in harmony with the consti- 
 tutive principles of its nature, human actions are, 
 strictly speaking, those which proceed from a delib- 
 erate will, those which are elicited freely and with 
 knowledge of the end. Actions that are not free are 
 called actions of vfian, not human actions.* 
 
 26. Twelve successive steps may ie distinguished in 
 huTnan actions : 1, a sim,ple apprehension of the good ; 
 2, a simple volition to acquire it ; 3, a judgment that the 
 good is possible ; 4, an intention of taking the msans to 
 attain it ; 5, an examination of these means ; 6, consent 
 of the will to these means ; 7, discernment of the fittest 
 means ; 8, a choice of this msans ; 9, an indication of 
 what is to he done for the execution of the action ; 10, 
 an impulse given to the faculties or powers destined to 
 
 * A voluntary action is done with knowledge of tlie end ; a free 
 action is done so that the same conditions remaining it need not 
 have been done. A human action is therefore both voluntary and 
 free. Man's desire of happiness is voluntary, but not free. 
 
SUBJEOTIYB PBINGIPLE8 OF ACTIONS. 379 
 
 eooecute the action ; 11, the exercise of these faculties or 
 powers ; 12, delectation of the will. — The first principle 
 from which every human action proceeds is a neces- 
 sary tendency of the will to good in general, just as 
 every demonstrated truth is derived from a first inde- 
 monstrable truth. This natural impulse of the wiF 
 being presupposed, the following order obtains among 
 the successive steps of the intellect and will which con- 
 stitute a human act : 1. The intellect proposes under 
 the general form of good the end to be attained. 2. 
 The will takes complacency in this good as good, 
 and bids the intellect see whether the good is suit- 
 able and possible. 3. The intellect judges of its 
 possibility. 4. The will is borne toward the end to 
 be attained, really desires it, and bids the intellect 
 seek the mean's. 5. The intellect points out the 
 ■means. 6. The will approves of them and orders the 
 fittest to be sought. 7. The intellect points it out. 
 8. The will chooses it and commands the intellect to 
 prepare the means of executing the action. 9. The 
 intellect indicates these means. 10. The will moves 
 the faculties or powers that elicit the action. 11. 
 These faculties or powers execute the command of the 
 will. 12. The will rests in the completion of the 
 action and in the end attained. 
 
 Of these subordinate actions the first four refer to 
 the end of the action, considered, first, in a general 
 way, then determinately and particularly ; the next 
 four have as their object the means, which are first 
 examined in general, and then the best is chosen ; the 
 last four have for their object the execution of these 
 means, and the repose and pleasure of the will in the 
 accomplished action. In these subordinate actions, 
 five judgments influence the will, which thereupon 
 applies the intellect to new researches. To the fifth 
 
380 MORAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 action of the will the action of the eliciting power 
 responds, and to this, in turn, the repose of the will 
 In this series of subordinate actions liberty is exer- 
 cised every time the will acts. The human action 
 subsists in all its essence when the will is making its 
 election, its free determination ; but it subsists in all 
 its integrity only when the action willed is executed. 
 To sum up these results, every human action may be 
 resolved into three principles : (1) An impulse of the 
 will to good in general ; (2) knowledge of a particu- 
 lar good ; (3) liberty in the choice of this good. 
 Without the first condition the will could not act ; 
 without the second, it would have no direction ; with- 
 out the third, it would not act conformably to its 
 nature. 
 
 27. A voluntary actio?i is perfect of imperfect, direct 
 or hidirect, express or tacit, elicited or im.perate. — A 
 voluntary action is perfect if it proceeds from an en- 
 tire inclination of the will ; it is imperfect if it is 
 done with a certain repugnance, or without a perfect 
 knowledge of what is done. It is direct if it is 
 actually produced by the will ; it is iixdirect if it 
 happens through the omission of an action. It is 
 formal or express if it proceeds from a proper action 
 of the will ; it is virtual or tacit if it is willed not in 
 itself but in something else. It is elicited if it is the 
 action of the will itself ; it is imperate if it is elicited 
 by other faculties at the command of the will. 
 
 28. Violence, when absolute, renders the action invol- 
 untary ; when conditional, it maJces it less voluntary. — 
 Since a voluntary action must be produced by an in- 
 trinsic principle, it no longer exists when the action 
 proceeds from an extrinsic principle, such as absolute 
 violence. Violence is defined as " an action proceed- 
 ing from an extrinsic principle and opposed by the 
 
SUBJECTIVE PBINOIPLEa OF ACTIONS. 381 
 
 subject."* If the Tiolence is only conditional or moral, 
 it is absolutely possible not to do what is demanded, 
 and hence the action is voluntary, though only par- 
 tially so. Violence, be it noted, can be exercised only 
 over imperate actions and never over actions elicited 
 by the will. 
 
 29. Fear makes the action less voluntary, hut not ab- 
 solutely involuntary. — Fear is an impression resulting 
 from a threatening evil difficult to avoid. This evil, 
 it may indeed be said, does us a sort of violence, but 
 the violence is purely conditional ; free will is not 
 destroyed, but only lessened. 
 
 30. Ignorance, when invincible, and opposed to the 
 action of the will, renders the action involuntary. — There 
 is no voluntary action without knowledge ; an action 
 is, therefore, more or less voluntary according to the 
 less or greater degree of ignorance. Ignorance is of 
 three kinds : antecedent if it is in nowise willed and 
 the action would not be done if there were knowledge ; 
 consequent if it is willed either expressly or implicitly ; 
 concomitant when knowledge is wanting, yet so that 
 the action would be done if there were knowledge. 
 Antecedent ignorance excludes all exercise of the 
 will, because no knowledge is had of the object ; con- 
 sequent ignorance is willed implicitly, and hence 
 does not entirely exclude knowledge ; and the same 
 is to be said of concomitant ignorance. Consequent 
 ignorance is either affected i:, by a direct act, one 
 chooses to remain in ignorance, or crass if the means 
 of acquiring the knowledge necessary to act with pro- 
 priety are neglected, f 
 
 *Liberatore, Instttutiones Philosophias, lib. iii., p. 66. 
 
 ■f Antecedent ignorance is called invincible, "because though all 
 the means be employed which can humanly speaking be employed it 
 cannot be dispelled." Hence consequent ignorance is vincible, since 
 
382 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 31. Concupiscence does not make the action involun- 
 tary, hut rather makes it more voluntary. If it precedes, 
 it diminishes the free will, hut not if it follows. — Concu- 
 piscence is a movement of the sensitive appetite 
 toward a pleasurable good ; therefore it inclines the 
 will to this good and gives greater intensity to the 
 voluntary action. But when concupiscence precedes 
 the voluntary action, it does a sort of conditional 
 violence to the liberty of the trill and consequently 
 diminishes it ; when, on the contrary, it follows the 
 voluntary action, liberty remains, since the action 
 ha,s been freely elicited. Concupiscence even aug- 
 ments the moral value of the action if the will calls 
 it expressly and intentionally to its aid. 
 
 AET. 11. — THE PASSIONS. 
 
 32. Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, 
 proceeding from, an apprehension of good or evil, and 
 accompanied with some alteration of the hody. — The 
 human soul, being substantially united to a body, 
 possesses, besides the will or intellective appetite, 
 sensitive appetite or an inclination to sensible goods. 
 The sensitive appetite is the seat of the passions. 
 The cause which actually produces a passion is the 
 good or evil apprehended by imagination: The par- 
 ticular note or character that accompanies it and dis- 
 tinguishes it from a purely voluntary motion is a 
 physical, bodily change, which is due to the fact 
 that the sensitive appetite resides in a corporeal 
 organ. 
 
 33. There are six passions of the coneupiscible appe- 
 
 it can be dispelled when those means are employed which can and 
 should be employed. Cf. Zigliara, Summa Philosophica, M. 19, vi. 
 
SUBJECTIVE PBINGIPLE8 OF ACTIONS. 383 
 
 tite: Love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and 
 sadness. There are five passions of the irascible appe- 
 tite : Hope and despair, daring and fear, and anger. — 
 The passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, 
 the divisions of which they therefore follow. Now, 
 the sensitive appetite is concupiscible if it has for its 
 object sensible good and evil taken absolutely ; and 
 irascible if it seeks good and evil as being arduous and 
 difficult, in the one case to gain, in the other to avoid. 
 The passions of the concupiscible appetite are six in 
 number : Love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and 
 sadness. For when good is present, we love it ; love 
 begets desire if the good be absent; joy is repose 
 in the possession of good. So, in the presence of 
 evil, we first experience hatred; hatred engenders 
 aversion, if the evil be absent ; and when the evil here 
 and now affects us, we feel sadness. There are five pas- 
 sions of the irascible appetite: Hope and despair, 
 daring and fear, and anger. Hope lifts the mind 
 toward a good that is difficult of attainment ; de^air 
 casts it down at sight of the difficulty ; daring faces 
 the evil ; fear shrinks from it ; anger inflames us 
 against the cause of the evil. All the passions of the 
 irascible appetite proceed from a passion of the con- 
 cupiscible part, and end in it. These two kinds of 
 passion differ from one another, for those of the con- 
 cupiscible appetite are all opposed in their object, but 
 not all those of the irascible appetite. Anger has no 
 opposite. All the secondary passions may be re- 
 duced to these eleven principal ones.* 
 
 * ' ' Modern Psychology is accustomed to treat of several species of 
 Feeling and Feelings in its theory of the third Facnlty. We accord- 
 ingly have discussions regarding the sympathetic, intellectual, aes- 
 thetic, moral, and religious emotions ; and also of the feeling or 
 sense of right, of the beautiful, of the noble, and of moral good, o( 
 
384: MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 34. The passiotis are in themselves morally neither 
 good nor had ; these qualities depend on their subjection 
 to the empire of reason. — The passions are movements 
 of the irrational appetite, and hence are without either 
 reason or liberty, the two conditions of all morality. 
 If, however, the passions be considered as subject to 
 
 of aesthetic, moral, and religious feeling. If we admit no special 
 Feeling-power, besides the faculties of Cognition and Conation [Ap- 
 petite], where shall we dispose of these states ? It is not very diffi- 
 cult to find a place for them, if we only get a clear notion of what is 
 meant by these names. The sympathetic emotions are, in general, 
 joy or sorrow over the weal or woe of others. Those feelings are 
 styled '.Esthetic ' which are awakened in the soul in the presence of 
 the aesthetic excellence of the creations of human genius. Under 
 the phrase 'Intellectual Feelings' are signified those agreeable or 
 disagreeable affections, the cause and object of which is an activity 
 of our intelligence in harmony or confiict with that intelligence. 
 Finally, Moral and Religious Feelings are the appetencies of the soul 
 in the presence of ethical good and ill with reference to the super- 
 natural order. . . The sense of the Beautiful and the Good, or 
 .aesthetic and Moral Sentiment, is not a (special) energy, not a faculty 
 of the soul, but simply the first attribute of every created spirit, 
 Raiionaliiy. Rationality embraces a two-fold element. Our soul is 
 rational on the one hand because its understanding is necessarily de- 
 termined by Eternal Wisdom's laws of knowledge ; on the other, be- 
 cause there is impressed upon Its appetency a natural bent towards 
 what agrees with these laws of knowledge and with Uncreated Good- 
 ness, that is, towards the physically perfect and the ethically good, 
 and therefore towards the Beautiful. This rationality, for reasons 
 assigned elsewhere, does not manifest itself in all men in equal per- 
 fection, but in its essence it is present in all. Accordingly, in so far 
 as no other agencies interfere, every man naturally knows and 
 recognizes the Good, the Right, the Noble, the Beautiful, and the 
 Great ; towards these he is impelled, these he embracss, these he 
 loves these he enjoys. On the other hand, Wickedness, Meanness, 
 Ugliness, are for every man the object of aversion and displeasure." 
 — Jungmann, Das Oemuth und das OefuTdsvermogen, cited in Pty- 
 chology, Stonyhurst Series, pp. 417, 418. 
 
SUBJEOTIVE PRINGIPLES OF ACTIONS. 385 
 
 tiie empire of the reason and the will, they share In 
 the morality of voluntary actions. 
 
 35. Tlie passions of man should he controlled hy rea- 
 son. — Order requires that the sensitive part of man's 
 being should be directed by the intellect, which is 
 superior. Therefore the passions should be subject 
 to reason. Besides, the passions of themselves are 
 blind, and in man, because of the help they receive 
 from intellect and will, have a tendency to possess 
 their object indefinitely in intensity and duration. 
 Therefore reason should control them that it may 
 establish them in order, whether as to their object or 
 as to the manner in which they tend to it. Thus con- 
 trolled, the passions attain their natural end, which 
 is to facilitate the practice of virtue, and to excite and 
 sustain man in the accomplishment of good. 
 
 ART. ni. — VIRTUES AND VICES. 
 
 36. Mahit is a permanent quality residing in the powers 
 of the soul, and inclining them to certain determinate 
 actions. — The will is not only roused to action by the 
 apprehension of good and by the passions, it is also 
 powerfully stimulated and aided by habit, i.e., a per- 
 manent quality which inclines the powers of the soul 
 to certain determinate actions. Experience shows that 
 habit gives not only perspicacity to the intellect, and 
 promptitude to the memory, but likewise a great facil- 
 ity to the will in eliciting its acts. 
 
 37. Good habits are called virtues ; had habits, vices. — 
 As the will is free, it can form habits inclining it 
 either to good or to evil ; in the former case, the habits 
 are said to be good ; in the latter, to be bad. Good 
 habits constitute what are known as virtues ; bad 
 habits are called vices. Therefore virtue is defined 
 
 2a 
 
386 -MORAL PniLOSOPHT. 
 
 as " a perfection by which the will is constantly in- 
 clined to good actions ; " and vice as " an imperfec- 
 tion of the will constantly inclining it to bad actions." 
 
 38. Man needs virtue to act perfectly. — ^To be disposed 
 with perfect order to the accomplishment of good, 
 man must be able to do it constantly, promptly, and 
 with pleasure. Now, so to act is the property of 
 habit. Therefore vixtue, which is merely a good 
 habit, is necessary to man for the accomplishment of 
 good in a perfect manner. 
 
 39. Virtues are naturally acquired only by frequent 
 acts. — The will is of itseK indifferent to this or that 
 particular good. Therefore, to incline it by prefer- 
 ence to the moral good, there must be a special in- 
 clination added to its nature, forming, as it were, a 
 second nature. This inclination is acquired only by 
 a repetition of acts, as experience proves. 
 
 40. Virtue lies in the mean. — Virtue is such when it 
 maintains human actions in conformity with right 
 reason ; but this conformity lies in the mean between 
 excess and deficiency ; therefore every moral virtue 
 lies in a mean. 
 
 41. There are four principal moral virtues : Prudence, 
 justice, temperance, and fortitude. — ^As in man there are 
 two principles of action, so there are also two gen- 
 eric classes of virtue. Every virtue that perfects the 
 intellect, as " wisdom " and " science," is called an in- 
 tellectual virtue. Every virtue that perfects the ap- 
 petite, whether rational or sensitive, is a moral virtue. 
 There are as many principal moral virtues as there 
 are faculties that concur in the moral action and may 
 be the subject of habit in reference to the action. 
 But these faculties areiour in number: reason, will, 
 and sensitive appetite, which latter is divided into the 
 concupiscible and the irascible appetite. Hence there 
 
SUBJECTIVE PRINOIPLES OF A0TI0N8. 387 
 
 are four principal virtues : prudence, whicli enligM- 
 ens the reason as to what should be done ; justice, 
 which inclines the will to render to everyone his due ; 
 — ^for in what regards himself man does not need this 
 virtue, since he naturally always desires his own 
 good sufficiently ; temperance, which regulates the 
 concupiscible appetite and checks the inordinate 
 pursuit of sensible goods ; fortitude, which perfects 
 the irascible part when there is difficulty either in 
 acquiring good or avoiding evil. 
 
CHAPTEE in. 
 
 MOEALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 
 
 4ET. I. — ON WHAT THE MOEALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS DE« 
 FENDS. 
 
 42. The morality of human actions consists in their rela- 
 tion to the end of man. — Human actions are morally 
 good when they lead man to his end ; they are 
 morally bad when they turn him from that end. For 
 it belongs to every moral agent to act according to 
 order, that is, with due subordination of means to its 
 ultimate end.* 
 
 43. The ultimate external criterion of morality is the 
 good of order apprehended hy reason. — Man's perfection 
 consists in attaining his end, and his actions are the 
 means by which he tends to that end. But, since God 
 has given man both his being and his end, and since 
 there is an intimate connection between the end and 
 the means to attain it, it follows that these means are 
 also given to man, and do not, in their relation to his 
 end, depend on his free choice. But this close depend- 
 ence of the means on the end constitutes the good of 
 order, which, however, does not become the term 
 
 * Pantheists must logically deny the existence or the possibility of 
 moral action, for they assert that God alone acts in creatures. Men, 
 therefore, can he neither responsihle nor free. A like conclusion 
 must be drawn from the doctrines of those materialists who teaoh 
 that morality is but a function of the brain. 
 
MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 389 
 
 of a voluntary action until apprehended by reason. 
 Therefore a human action is morally good when it 
 is conformed to the good of order apprehended by 
 reason, and it is morally bad in the contrary case. 
 What constitutes the morality of an action is, then, 
 something independent of man, and there is an in- 
 trinsic and objective difference between good and 
 evil.* 
 
 44. T/ie ultimate criterion of morality is not education, 
 as Montaigne held ; nor the opinion of peoples, as /Saint- 
 Lambert pretended ; nor human laws, as Hobbes asserted ; 
 nor the good pleasure of Ood, as Puffendorf taught. — 
 The good of order which requires that each being 
 should tend to an end conformable to its nature, is 
 immutable like God himself, who being infinite wis- 
 dom cannot create a being destitute of an end, or with 
 an end contrary to its nature. Therefore morality 
 is immutable in its fundamental principles. But edu- 
 cation, the opinion of peoples, and human laws are 
 changing and variable ; therefore they cannot be 
 sources of morality. Besides, we judge of opinions, 
 laws, and systems of education as to whether they are 
 good or bad ; therefore opinions, laws, and educa- 
 tional systems imply a higher principle on which 
 they depend. As to the good pleasure of God, it is 
 evident that, whatever Descartes (1596-1650) and Puf- 
 fendorf (1632-1694) may say, what God could have 
 willed otherwise than He does will, cannot be the 
 source of morality, which is essentially immutable, 
 since God having created man for a determinate end 
 cannot but will honorable actions as leading to that 
 
 * This conclusion overthrows the doctrine of Antinomies, set fortt 
 by the Transcendental School of Germany in its application to 
 moral science. 
 
390 MORAL PHILOSOPET. 
 
 end, and detest sinful actions as averting from that 
 end.* 
 
 45. The judgment of the Tuorality of actions helongs to 
 intellect and reason alone. — Trutli is the proper object 
 of intellect and reason ; but, whether truth be spec- 
 ulatiye or practical, its nature does not change, 
 since the difference is only accidental. Since, then, 
 the judgment of the morality of actions is only a 
 judgment about practical truth, it belongs to in- 
 tellect and reason. Whatever sceptics may say, rea- 
 son cannot be deceived as to first practical prin- 
 ciples and their immediate consequences, any more 
 than it can be deceived as to first speculative prin- 
 ciples and the truths derived from them directly. 
 The greater opposition manifested to first practical 
 principles is explained by their end, which is to con- 
 trol the passions and subject them in all things to 
 right reason. 
 
 46. It is absurd to say, with the Scotch school, that the 
 judgment of the morality of actions helongs to a spiritual 
 sense ; still less is it to he admitted, with the 'materialists, 
 that it helongs to a corporeal sense. — The spiritual sense, 
 as understood by the Scotch, philosophers, Eeid (1710- 
 1796), Hutcheson (1694-1747), and Adam Smith (1723- 
 1790), is a blind inclination that makes us judge spon- 
 taneously of moral good or evil. But man is intel- 
 ligent and free, and can by no means be absolutely 
 subject to the impulse of blind instinct. It is evi- 
 
 * " No power in heaven above, nor on earth beneath, can dispense 
 from any portion of the Natural Law. For the matter of the nega- 
 tive precepts of that law is . . something bad in itself and 
 repugnant to human nature, and accordingly forbidden by God ; 
 while the matter of the positive precepts is something good and 
 necessary to man, commanded by God." — Moral PhUoaophy, Stony 
 hurst Series, p. 149. 
 
MORALITY OF HUMAN A0TI0N8. 391 
 
 dent that the corporeal sense of the Sensists, Locke 
 (1632-1704), Helvetius (1715-1771), Bentham (1748- 
 1832), etc., cannot form moral judgments that are in 
 themselves immutable and universal, for every sen- 
 sation is essentially variable and particular. 
 
 ABT. n. — CONSTITUENT PRINCIPLES OP THE MOEALITY OP 
 HUMAN ACTIONS. 
 
 47. Tlie ohject of volition * apprehended hy reason is the 
 first principle of the morality of an action. — The good of 
 order is the foundation of morality. But the object 
 presented to the will by reason, and viewed not simply 
 but as agreeing with right reason, is the term of the 
 action and specifies it. Therefore, according as this 
 object is conformed to good order or not, the action 
 will be good or bad, and the object will be the first 
 constituent principle of the morality of the action, 
 and by it the objective intrinsic difference between a 
 good action and a bad one will be established. There- 
 fore the object may be called ih.e formal principle of a 
 moral action, since it is, as it were, its substantial 
 form; the free act or election of the will may be 
 called the matter of a moral action. 
 
 48. The circumstances of an action are the constituent 
 principle of its accidental morality. — The object of the 
 action and the unchatigeable relation of the object to 
 absolute order constitute the substance of the moral- 
 ity of an action ; the accompanying circumstances are 
 as the accidents of that morality. The perfection of 
 the nature of beings depends not only on their sub- 
 stance, but also on their accidents ; so, too, will the 
 
 * The object of volition includes both the end willed and the 
 means to the end. 
 
392 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 moral action be more or less perfect not only from its 
 substance, but also from the accidents tliat accom- 
 pany it, i.e., the circumstances. The principal circum- 
 stances are : The person who acted, what he did, hy what 
 means, in what manner, in what place, and at what time.* 
 
 49. The end of the subject operating is causally the con- 
 stituent principle of the suhjective morality of the action. 
 — ^Besides the natural end of the action (finis opsris), 
 there is the end depending on the subject operating 
 (finis opefrantis), which may be identical with the 
 former or different from it. If the object of the ac- 
 tion is conformed to order, but the end of the subject 
 is opposed to order, the end vitiates the action by the 
 evil that it contains ; in the contrary case it perfects 
 it. If the object of the action is opposed to order, the 
 end of the subject operating, even if it be conformed 
 to order, will never make good what is intrinsically 
 bad. This end, depending only on the will of the 
 subject operating and distinct from the natural end of 
 the action, determines the subjective morality of the 
 action; the object and the circumstances constitute 
 its Directive morality. 
 
 50. That an action may he good, it must he without de- 
 fect in its object, in its ch^cum,stances, and in its end. — The 
 three constituent principles of the morality of an ac- 
 tion are the object, end, and circumstances ; hence an 
 action is good when each of these three principles is 
 conformed to order (Bonivm ex integra causa). If even 
 
 * It must be borne in mind that these circumstances are not ele- 
 ments essential to the physical integrity of a human action, for such 
 elements are contained in its olyect ; but they are accidentaUy con- 
 nected with the causes of the action. The priestly character of a 
 person, for example, may affect the morality of an action. So, too, 
 theft acquires a new species of malice when the object stolen is one 
 consecrated to God. 
 
MORALITY OF BUM AN ACTIONS. 393 
 
 one of these principles is contrary to order, the action 
 will be bad, at least in part (Malum ex quocumque de- 
 fectu). 
 
 51. Although abstractly there may he indifferent ac- 
 tions, in the concrete there can he nons. — It is the object 
 that specifies the action. Now, as there are objects 
 indifferent in themselves, i.e., presenting neither 
 agreement nor disagreement with order, there are, 
 therefore, actions indifferent in themselves. But in 
 the concrete every action is vested with morality be- 
 cause of its circumstances, or, at least, of its end 
 For every action elicited with advertence of reason * 
 is either ordained to an end or it is not. If it is so 
 determined, it will necessarily be either good or bad. 
 If it is not determined, it will in so far be bad, because 
 every action ought to be in the order of reason, and 
 reason demands that everything be conducted to its 
 proper end. The external act that follows the action 
 of the will, though in itself not free, and therefore not 
 possessing a morality of its own, may yet accidentally 
 affect the morality of the action of the will, since it 
 gives to it greater intensity, implies a greater affec- 
 tion, for it, and a fuller advertence to it. 
 
 AET. in. — IMPUTABILITY. 
 
 52. Imputability is that qiuility in virtue of tvhich 
 every free action is attributed to some one as its author, 
 just as an effect is referred to its cause. — The man who 
 acts freely is the true cause of the action ; it is, there- 
 fore, with reason that every free action is attributed 
 
 * The discussion turns solely upon human actions, and therefore 
 actions that are indeliherate, or necessary, or supernatural are ex- 
 cluded. 
 
394 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to him who does it. This attribution is called im- 
 putability, and although always joined to morality is 
 yet distinct from it, since it does not constitute the 
 morality of an action, but is rather a consequence 
 of it. 
 
 53. From the imputahility of human actions arises the 
 reason of praise or blame. — When a moral action is im- 
 puted to a man, he is considered as the author of the 
 resultant g-ood or evil, and is therefore judged worthy 
 of esteem or contempt, of praise or blame. To praise 
 or blame anyone is nothing but to impute to him the 
 goodness or malice of his action. 
 
 ART. IV. — MERIT AND DEMERIT. 
 
 54. Merit is that iy which an action desej'ves recom- 
 pense ; demerit is that hy which it dese7'ves punishment. 
 — Conscience testifies to us that according as an ac- 
 tion is good or bad it deserves to be rewarded or 
 punished. Merit and demerit are, therefore, quali^ 
 ties that flow from an action as a consequence of its 
 morality. The good merited is called a reward if 
 preceded by no compact, otherwise it is pay. The 
 evil merited is punishment, which, however, not all 
 men may inflict upon those who injure them, for in 
 most cases recourse should be had to the tribunals 
 lawfully established foi- that purpose.* 
 
 55. Man hy his actions may merit or demerit from his 
 
 * Merit is condign (de condigno) if it is founded in the very work 
 that is freely done, or in some compact. It is congruous if founded 
 In the benevolence or liberality of him who bestows the reward. 
 
 The conditions requisite for acquiring merit or demerit are : 1 ° 
 That the action be free ; 2° that It benefit or Injure some other person 
 than the agent ; 3° that it be not obligatory from some previous 
 contract 
 
MORALITY OF HITMAN ACTIONS. 395 
 
 fellow-man. — Man may do a good action tliat profits 
 his fellow-man, or an evil action that injures him. 
 Order requires that in the former case he receive a 
 recompense in return ; and, in the latter case, a pun- 
 ishment, that there may be a proportion between 
 what he gives and what he receives. 
 
 56. Man hy Ms actions may meiit or demerit from 
 society. — Every man is a member of society. There- 
 fore whoever does good or evil to his neighbor 
 should receive a reward or a punishment not only 
 from him, but from society, because to benefit or in- 
 jure a member is to benefit or injure the whole body. 
 If one does good or evil directly to society, he should 
 first be rewarded or punished by it, and afterward by 
 its members. If one even does good or harm to him- 
 self, he should likewise receive recompense or incur 
 penalty from society, because he is a member. 
 
 57. Man m^ay hy his actions acquire merit or demerit 
 lefore God. — It is a duty for man to tend to God. 
 Therefore if by his actions he departs from God, he 
 deprives God of the glory due Him as the supreme 
 good, and consequently he should be punished. 
 Again, God is the sovereign legislator of the universe. 
 Therefore an action merits or demerits before Him in 
 proportion to its conformity or non-conformity to the 
 universal order. 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 Law, a?HE Edle of Human Actions. 
 
 ART. I. — MOEAL DtTTY. 
 
 58. Moral duty is the moral oUigation resulting from 
 the connection of the last end vnth the means necessary to 
 attain it. — Man is obliged to tend to his last end. But 
 as it is necessary to take means to reach this end, it 
 follows that these means are imposed on him as well 
 as the end. The obligation of employing these means 
 constitutes moral duty. If the means are conformed 
 to the end, but not necessarily bound up in it, they 
 are not imposed by an obligation in the strict sense of 
 the word ; if a man uses them he does a moral action, 
 but he does not perform a duty, properly so called. 
 Therefore a moral action is honorable when it is not 
 commanded ; it is just when it is obligatory. If the 
 action be indifferent to the attainment of the end, it is 
 then called lawful. 
 
 59. Moral duty is primitive or derivative, negative or 
 'positive. — Primitive duty is that which is founded in 
 man's necessary and essential relations to his end; 
 such is the obligation "to love God." Derivative 
 duty is that which arises from a primitive duty in 
 consequence of some fact dependent on our liberty ; 
 as the duty " to fulfil an engagement one has made." 
 Negative duty is that which forbids something ; thus 
 are we bound "not to lie." Positive duty is that 
 
LAW, THE BULB OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 397 
 
 which commands something ; as the duty of " loving 
 our parents." When a duty answers to some one's 
 right, it is called juridical ; such is the duty of " pay- 
 ing our debts." 
 
 60. The obligation of duty harmonizes with free will, 
 because it is moral and n/jt physical. — A being is not 
 free when subjected to physical violence ; but when 
 man apprehends by reason the necessary connection 
 between means and end, he preserves' in his will 
 the power to employ these means or not. There- 
 fore he remains free, and is under a moral obligation 
 only. 
 
 61. Duty is absolute, im,mutable, and universal. — Duty 
 is absolute like man's end, since it is the necessary 
 means of attaining the end. But though absolute as 
 to the obligation that it imposes, it has degrees rel- 
 atively to the greater or less moral perfection which 
 it imparts to man. Thus duties to God are more 
 perfect than any others; and duties to ourselves take 
 precedence of those that we owe our neighbor. By 
 the very fact that duty is absolute, it is clear that it 
 must be universal and immutable; for all men have 
 the same nature, which can no more change in its 
 end than in its essence. 
 
 62. When several duties conflict, the most perfect is 
 binding. — Thus if, in a given case, a duty to God and a 
 duty to ourselves cannot be accomplished without the 
 sacrifice of one of them, it is patent that the second 
 should be sacrificed. So, too, if a duty to ourselves 
 conflicts with a duty to our neighbor, the latter should 
 be sacrificed ; for the bond of identity with ourselves 
 is more intimate than that of likeness with our neigh- 
 bor, which is the basis of our duties to him. Hence, 
 in general, the perfection of a duty is determined 
 from the dignity of the power that imposes it, or 
 
398 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 from the gravity of its matter, or tlie strength of ii» 
 motive.* 
 
 63. In certain cases, necessity excuses from duty. — 
 The necessity is extreme, grave, or common, accord- 
 ing as a man cannot fulfil the duty without exposing 
 himself to an extreme evil, as death, or a grave evil, 
 as loss of health, or an ordinary evil, as a slight loss 
 of fortune. This last necessity never excuses from 
 duty. The other two necessities do not excuse from 
 a primitive and negative duty, because the natural 
 law forbids what is essentially evil ; and as no circum- 
 stance can change the nature of the evil, so is it 
 equally incapable of rendering it lawful.f But if a 
 duty is positive, an extreme or grave necessity may 
 entirely exempt from it if the transgression of a nega- 
 tive dut^r is not thereby involved,! or allow one to 
 put off fulfilling it to a more suitable time, because a 
 positive duty does not always oblige us to perform 
 the action commanded, but only in a fitting time and 
 occasion. When the duty is derivative, excepting a 
 few cases that are easily recognized,§ necessity ex- 
 
 * Cf. Russo, Be PMlosopliia Morali Prcelectiones, p. 106, § 145. 
 
 + "Therefore negative precepts oblige always and at ail times {sem- 
 per et ad semper), as the Schoolmen expressed it, that is, in every 
 place, at all times, and in every circumstance ; . . . positive 
 precepts oblige always . . . but not at all times, so as thereby 
 to oblige a man, for instance, at all times, in all places and circum- 
 stances to perform a prescribed act of virtue." — Zigliara, Sum. Phil., 
 M. 30, v: 
 
 X For valid exemption, however, the necessity must be "a) inde- 
 pendent of our will, . . . b) extreme or at least grave, . . . 
 such as a notable loss of reputation, health, or material goods." — 
 Russo, De Pm. Mot. Prm., p. 107, § 147. 
 
 § As included in these few cases Liberatore mentions neglect of 
 duty when the public welfare or the security of the state would be 
 menaced or impaired thereby ; or the breaking of a contract the ob- 
 
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 399 
 
 cuses from fulfilling it, because then the matter is in- 
 different in itself, and is binding only by reason of a 
 circumstance freely posited by man. 
 
 AET. n. — EIGHT. 
 
 64. The obligation of duty implies an inviolable moral 
 power in respect to the actions and things necessary to ful- 
 fil the duty. This rnoral power is a right. — If the obli- 
 gation of attaining his end imposes a duty on man, it 
 thereby grants him a right, that is, a moral power in 
 respect to the necessary actions or things to fulfil the 
 duty. This power is called moral, because it is found 
 in moral beings only, and also to distinguish it 
 from physical force. It is called inviolable, because 
 as it rests upon order, no one can prevent its exercise. 
 Lastly, this power is said to be exercised upon actions 
 or things to indicate what the right is applied to, 
 viz., action or the matter of action. Four things en- 
 ter into the consideration of every right : a " subject in 
 which that power is moral and inviolable ; a term in 
 respect to which that power is inviolable and which 
 is bound not to injure it ; a title which both produces 
 that power in a subject and manifests it to others, by 
 whom it is to be respected ; " and the matter.* 
 
 65. Absolutely, right precedes duty ; 7'elatively, duty 
 precedes right. — Considered in itself right precedes 
 duty, for it is from God's sovereign right over us 
 that every duty flows. But if right and duty are con- 
 sidered relatively, i.e., as both are found in man, 
 then we must say that duty precedes right, because 
 
 servance of which would involve some danger, provided this diffi' 
 culty had heen supposed as reasonably included in the contract. 
 * Russo, He Philosophia Morali PrcAeetionea, p. 99, § 134. 
 
400 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 man enjoys rights only in so far as lie is bound to at- 
 tain an end, for tlie gaining of whicli he must have 
 the power to exercise his activity and to make use of 
 many things.* When a duty is obligatory only be- 
 cause a right is actually exercised, then actual right 
 precedes actual duty. 
 
 66. Right is necessary or arbitrary, connatural or 
 acqxdred, negative or positive, rigorous or not rigorous, 
 personal or delegated or real. — Eight is necessary or in- 
 alienable when it is the sole indispensable means of 
 fulfilling a duty ; such is the " right of a father to the 
 respect of his son," corresponding to the father's duty 
 of educating his son. Eight is arbitrary or alienable 
 when one may or may not exercise it without violat- 
 ing duty ; as the " right of a creditor to be paid by his 
 debtor." Right is connatural when it is founded in 
 the very nature of man ; as the " right to defend one's 
 life." — Connatural rights, says Eusso (p. 102, § 139), are 
 chiefly four: Man's right of tending to his ultimate 
 end, arising from his personal dignity ; the right to 
 preserve his life unharmed; the right to indepen- 
 dence in the lawful exercise of his faculties ; the right 
 to his own perfection. Right is acquired when it is 
 founded on a fact freely caused either by one's own 
 action, as the " right of dominion arising from occu- 
 pation," or by the action of another person, as the 
 " right of a child or minor," or from both together, as 
 a " master's right to be served by his domestics." — 
 Negative right is that which imposes on others no 
 obligation but that of not violating it, as the " right 
 
 * This statement allows some exceptions. " A man may haye a 
 right conjoined with a duty not of justice, of course, but of some 
 other virtue — not to use that right. Such are sundry rights of the 
 rich trenching on the poor."— jKflra/, PMosophy, Stony hurst Series, 
 p. 248. 
 
LAW, TMB RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 401 
 
 of property." Positive right is that which imposes 
 an obligation of doing or giving something, as the 
 "right to be paid by one's debtor."— ^t^oraws oi per- 
 fect right is that which rests on an evident title and 
 has determinate matter ; such is the " right to be paid 
 a definite sum acknowledged by the debtor." If the 
 matter be not determinate, the right is imperfect, as 
 the " right to pity or friendship." A right is more 
 or less rigorous according to the greater or less deter- 
 mination of the title and matter of the right. — Eight 
 is personal when it is inherent in the person of its 
 possessor. It is delegated when it has been communi- 
 cated to another. It is real when it is considered as 
 inherent in some thing which a person possesses. 
 
 67. Every right is essentially coactive. — If intellect 
 and will can act in virtue of right, they can likewise 
 move the inferior powers to operate. Therefore, if in 
 virtue of some right the will of a person can be mor- 
 ally compelled to some thing, so can the executive 
 powers residing in the organism be compelled to 
 some thing, and this is nothing else than coaction. It 
 is to be noted, however, that coaction can be exer- 
 cised only when the right is perfect ; but very often in 
 civil society it cannot be exercised by the possessor of 
 the right, and then recourse should be had to the law- 
 fully appointed guardian of the rights of the citizens. 
 
 68. In a conflict of rights * the less right yields to the 
 
 * Viewed abstractly jights cannot conflict, but in their actual ex- 
 ercise one may impede another. If the conflict has been caused vol- 
 untarily, then its author loses his right. If the conflict is invol- 
 untary and the rights are equal, then he whose right is oldest 
 prevails ; if the rights were acquired at the same time, then might 
 decides the conflict, unless the matter of the rights be divisible. If 
 the rights are unequal, the more perfect should prevail. Cf. Russo^ 
 DePliU. Mm-. Prod., pp. 104, 105. 
 26 
 
402 MORAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 greater. — Thus, as divine right excels human, so 
 should it prevail. But when the conflict ceases, the 
 less right regains its power, because the order whence 
 it is derived also exists. 
 
 69. Every right surpassing its natural limits is sub- 
 versive of order. — Absolutely, duty is the foundation 
 of human right ; if, therefore, a right passes the 
 limits fixed by duty, which is its foundation, it is no 
 longer according to order. Whence it happens that 
 a right may have for its matter, (1) the means without 
 which the end cannot be attained ; (2) the means that 
 lead to the end of the law, but not those that avert 
 from the end and are evil ; (3) finally, everything that 
 one is bound by another person to preserve.* 
 
 ABT. III. — LAW IN GENEEAL. 
 
 70. To the idea of right and of duty answers the idea 
 of law. — ^Where duty is, there also is necessarily a 
 law which imposes it ; just as where right is present, 
 there is a moral power over an action or a thing, there 
 also is necessarily a law which gives this right and 
 commands it to be respected by others. 
 
 71. Zaw in general is a rule hy which ieings are di- 
 rected to their proper end. — ^In every created being 
 there is a necessary connection between its nature and 
 its end. Therefore, for every creature the directing 
 of itself toward its end constitutes the rule of its per- 
 fection or its law. 
 
 72. Moral law is the direction toward its end im~ 
 parted to a rational creature hy his superior. — The term 
 law is applied to the tendencies flowing from the nat- 
 ure and constitution of irrational creatures and man- 
 
 * Cf. Zigliara, 8umma PJiUosophica, M. 28, viii. 
 
LAW, THE BULW OF SUM AN ACTIONS. 403 
 
 ifested, except on occasion of divine interference, in an 
 invariable uniformity of " coexistence and succession, 
 connecting certain effects with certain causes, so that 
 when the conditions are present the effect invariably 
 follows ; " this is physical law. But the term has an 
 application special to Ethics ; for, besides the con- 
 dition of all law, which is to direct any being what- 
 ever to its end, moral law implies, first, the idea of 
 obligation, and this idea supposes superiority in him 
 who binds and dependence in him who ought to 
 obey ; secondly, moral law implies freedom in the 
 subject, who is bound to obey not by physical neces- 
 sity but by moral obligation. 
 
 73. Imw is divine or human. Divine law is eternal, 
 natural, or positive. Human law is ecclesiastical or 
 civil. — The eternal law is the imprescriptible order of 
 what is to be done, such as it exists from all eternity 
 in the divine mind. Natural law is a participation of 
 the eternal law, by which the reason of man is enlight- 
 ened and can discern good from evil. Positive law de- 
 termines certain things that are according to the nat- 
 ural law indifferent.* It is defined as A prescription 
 of reason for the common good proTnulgated hy him who 
 has the care of the community. When positive law is 
 made by man it is called hum,an, and is either ecclesi- 
 astical or civil according as it proceeds from the au- 
 thority of Church or State. 
 
 74. The necessity of law for men arises from two 
 causes : one objective, the creative act ; ths other subjec- 
 tive, the nature of man. — Every creature, by the fact 
 that it has received its nature from God, has also re- 
 ceived its law from Him. But besides his nature of 
 
 * Those actions are said to be indifferent which are " not deter- 
 mined by the natural law, and are in conformity with it." Zigliara. 
 
404 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mere creature, man has a rational principle, by which 
 he perceives the intimate connection existing between 
 his nature and his end, and his obligation of tending 
 to that end by means that really lead thereto. 
 
 ART. IV. — THE ETEENAL LAW. 
 
 75. Above all otiier laio is the eternal law ; from it 
 all other laws derive their force. — Since all law implies 
 direction to an end, and since God is above all other 
 ends, being the supreme end to which all others are 
 subordinate, it follows that there is also a law on 
 which all other laws depend. This is the eternal or 
 divine law. 
 
 76. Tlie eternal law is the imprescriptible order of 
 what is to he done, as it exists from all eternity in the di- 
 vine mind.*—Ovdi.eic exists in the world ; but this order 
 supposes the intelligence of God which conceives it, 
 and His will which causes it to persist. The eternal 
 law is only the order so conceived and willed by God 
 from all eternity. 
 
 77. The eternal law is the first fundamental principle 
 oftnorality. — -The distinction between good and evil is 
 founded on the unchangeable relations of things ; but 
 these relations are only the external realization of 
 order as it exists from all eternity in the divine mind 
 and will. 
 
 ART. v. — ^THE NATURAL LAW OF CONSCIENCE. 
 
 78. The natural law of conscience is a participation of 
 the eternal law in a ratio7ial creature, enabling him to 
 discern good from evil. — Man no sooner perceives or- 
 
 * St. Augustine defines it: " The reason or will of God bidding 
 the natural order to be kept, and forbidding it to be disturbed." 
 
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 405 
 
 der than he conceives it to be the expression of a will 
 essentially right and just, and so he rises to a knowl- 
 edge of God as the supreme legislator of this order. 
 Therefore, as the law of order considered in God is 
 the eternal law, so viewed as it is in human reason it 
 is the natural law of conscience. These two laws dif- 
 fter as to the intellect that knows them, and as to their 
 object ; that of the eternal law being universal, that 
 of the natural law being particular because referred 
 exclusively to man. 
 
 79. Tke law of conscience has three princijml marks : 
 it is necessary, absolute, and universal. — It is necessary 
 because it rests on the necessary relation of nature to 
 end, which has been determined from all eternity by 
 the divine mind. It is dbsohite and immutable, be- 
 cause the ideal relations of things, being founded on 
 the very essences of such things, are absolute and 
 immutable. It is universal, because it is imposed 
 upon all intelligent and free creatures, applies to all 
 their free actions, extends to all times and places ; for 
 being founded on the very nature of rational beings 
 it must prevail wherever that nature exists. 
 
 80. Conscience and the universal assent of mankind 
 attest the existence of the natural law. — Every man 
 hears within him a voice telling him that such an 
 action is good or evil ; this voice he may disregard, 
 but he can never completely silence. So all peoples 
 in all times have admitted a distinction between jus- 
 tice and injustice, and upon it have based all their 
 legislation. 
 
 81. T/ie existence of the natural lata is also proved 
 from the nature of the human will and from our idea of 
 divine wisdom. — A faculty cannot act unless it be de- 
 termined to action by its object. But the determin- 
 ing principle of the will must be a law or moral obli- 
 
406 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 gation' that moves it without doing it violence. But 
 since the will can be determined by law only, this 
 law must necessarily be in reason, the faculty that 
 directs the will. Besides, since God wishes man's 
 good, He must have given him the means of attaining 
 it ; but in view of man's free will this means must be 
 the command to do what is right and shun what is 
 wrong. 
 
 82. It is an error to sustain, with rationalists, the 
 autonomy of reason. — If God exists, we must neces- 
 sarily depend on Him. But if we are unwilling to 
 admit the existence of God, evidently our reason can- 
 not impose an obligation on us, since it is not above 
 us; for an obligation, says Li'beratore, implies an 
 exercise of jurisdiction and power on the part of him 
 who obliges, and therefore supposes a real distinction 
 between superior and subject. Therefore, to admit 
 the autonomy of reason is to destroy all morality.* 
 
 83. The natural law is known naturally iy reason and 
 conscience.— ^o oblige, a law must be known and pro- 
 mulgated. But the natural law has for its proper ob- 
 ject the first principles of morality, and for its second- 
 ary object the consequences of these principles. The 
 first principles of morality, like the first principles of 
 thought, are known by the intellectual light of which 
 the human intellect is possessed, and which is a re- 
 flection of the intellectual light of God Himself. The 
 application of these first principles to particular ac- 
 tions is made by reason. To aid his reason God has 
 given man an interior voice that approves his conduct 
 
 * This theory has been styled Independent Morality, and hy Kant, 
 who professes it, the Oategorical Imperative. Kant's doctrine makes 
 the human intellect absolutely independent of all law, and henoa 
 man is no longer a creature, but is identified with God. 
 
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 407 
 
 when lie does good and reproves him when he does 
 evil. This interior voice is called conscie?ice. 
 
 84. The natural law is the foundation of the positive 
 law. — The positive law is of force only when it obligee 
 to the observance of the positive precepts of God oi 
 those that proceed from lawful human authority and 
 are not contrary to the commandments of God. Now, 
 it is a principle of the natural law that we must obey 
 God and those to whom He has communicated a share 
 in His authority. Besides, the precepts of the posi- 
 tive law are most frequently only particular applica- 
 tions of some precept of the natural law,. or determi- 
 nations of what is undetermined by the natural law. 
 
 AET. VI.— SANCTION OP MOKAl LAW. 
 
 85. Sanction of moral law is the reward determined hy 
 the lawgiver for those who observe the law, and thepvn- 
 ishment decreed for those who transgress it.* 
 
 86. Moral law necessarily has some sanction.^Susiice 
 demands that for the merit inherent in good, and the 
 demerit inherent in evil, there should be a correspond- 
 ing recompense or penalty. Moreover, the sanctity 
 of God requires that He should practically distin- 
 guish good from evil by rewarding the former and 
 punishing the latter. Fiually, the wisdom of God de- 
 mands that He have means for securing the fulfill- 
 
 * "It is true that human law specifies no particular reward for 
 obedience to it, because obedience to the law is sufficiently rewarded 
 hv the good which it does for the whole community and for every 
 one in the community ; nor is it possible for human government 
 otherwise to reward obedience to its laws. It is, perhaps, from this 
 oircumstance that some authors are led to conceive that the whole 
 sanction of law consists in punishment." — Hill, Moral Philosophy, 
 pp. 154, 155. 
 
408 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ment of the law ; but this can be effected only by re- 
 wards and punishments. 
 
 87. The sanction of the Tuoral law is of three kinds : 
 that of conscience, that of society, and that of God. — The 
 free actions of man refer to himself, to society, and 
 to God ; therefore sanction must be of three kinds. 
 In the individual order there is remorse or peace of 
 conscience ; in the social order there are rewards and 
 punishments established in society ; and in regard to 
 God there is the reward or punishment that He re- 
 serves for those that keep or break His law. 
 
 88. An adequate sanction of the natural law can he 
 found only in the life to come. — It is evident that neither 
 the testimony of conscience nor the punishments and 
 rewards of this life are a sanction proportionate to 
 moral good and evil. For this good or evil has a 
 direct or indirect reference to the infinite good ; there- 
 fore the reward or punishment must be in some way 
 infinite ; but this cannot be here below. Besides, it is 
 often necessary to give up one's life in the practice of 
 good, or to expose one's self to great sufferings ; there- 
 fore there must be another life where good receives 
 its recompense. So, too, the commission of evil often 
 brings temporal goods in its train ; therefore it must 
 be punished in a life to come.* 
 
 89. The sanction of the law consists chiefly in the pos- 
 session or the loss of the sovereign good. — Good actions 
 are so many steps by which man tends to the sover- 
 eign good ; whereas by evil actions he withdraws far- 
 ther and farther from this good. Therefore it is meet 
 that the just attain the end to which they tend, and 
 
 ' A perfect sanction should always correspond to the degree of 
 virtue or vice, and should outweigh both the evil incurred in observ- 
 ing the law and the good to be gained in breaking it. Cf. RussOi 
 De Mar. PhU. Prcd., p. 87, § 119. 
 
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 409 
 
 rejoice in its possession, and that the wicked be de- 
 prived of that good. Since there are different degrees 
 in the goodness of the former and in the malice of the 
 latter, it is also just that there should be a diversity in 
 their rewards and punishments respectively. 
 
 To those who object that everlasting punishment 
 is unjust, the answer may be given that punishment 
 is not merely " medicinal," or for the amendment of 
 the culprit, but it is also detetreni, an example to the 
 community, and retributive, as affording satisfaction 
 to the injured party. Now, eternal punishment is 
 the reparation due to God for a grievous transgres- 
 sion of His law. The justice of punishment is not 
 to be estimated by its duration, but by its propor- 
 tion to the offence. But the gravity of the offence 
 is determined by its nature and by the dignity of the 
 offended party. Now, God is the greatest of all 
 beings, and sin is the greatest of evils. For, says St. 
 Thomas,* " In the judgment of God the will is taken 
 for the deed ; for as men see what is done externally, 
 so God beholds the hearts of men. Now, he who for 
 a temporal good has turned away from his ultimate 
 end, which is possessed forever, has preferred the 
 temporal enjoyment of that temporal good to the 
 everlasting enjoyment of his ultimate end. Whence 
 it is evident how much more he would have wished 
 to possess that temporal good everlastingly/. There- 
 fore in the judgment of God he ought so to be 
 punished as if he had sinned everlastingly. But it 
 is unquestionable that an everlasting sin merits an 
 everlasting punishment. Therefore everlasting pun- 
 ishment is due to him who has turned away from his 
 ultimate end." 
 
 * Contra Oentes, \. iii., o. cxliv., n. 4; cf. Russo, De Mor. PhU. 
 PraU., p. 90 et seq. 
 
410 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 AET. VII. — THE FIRST PRECEPT OF THE NATURAL LAW. 
 
 90. AU the precepts* of the inoral law are reduced to 
 07ie fundamental precept called the Oategoi'ical Impera- 
 tive.^ — All the precepts of the moral law Ijave a com- 
 mon element in which they are identified, and from 
 which they draw all their force. This element, this 
 first principle, must be known to give order and unity 
 to moral science. 
 
 91. The first principle of the moral law mMst he irre- 
 ducible ; it must be evident and universal. — The first 
 moral precept must be irreduciMe, otherwise it would 
 be neither the first nor the supreme principle. It 
 must be evident, for it is destined to account for all 
 other moral precepts. It must be universal, since it 
 must include what all other moral principles implicitly 
 contain, and serve as their foundation. 
 
 92. The first precept of the moral law is. Do good and 
 avoid evil. — As whatever is apprehended by the intel- 
 lect has the note of being, so whatever is sought by 
 the will has the nature of good. Every agent acts for 
 an end, and this end is good. Therefore tl^e first 
 principle of practical reason is founded in the good, 
 and is this : " Good is that to which all things tend." 
 
 * Law differs from precept in that tlie former looks to the common 
 good ; the latter to some individual benefit. Again, law refers to the 
 end to be attained, whereas a precept refers only t,o means to that 
 end. Cf. Zigliara, Sum. Phil., M. 33, vl. 
 
 f The Categorical Imperative, as here understood, is the funda- 
 mental principle of the moral law which obliges all men. Hence it 
 is not exposed to the absurdities of Kant's Categorical Imperative, 
 which, in the words of Joseph Rickaby, S. J., "makes the reason 
 within a man not the promulgator of the law to him, but his own 
 legislator.'' 
 
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN AOTIONS. 411 
 
 The first precept of the law is, therefore, "Do good 
 and avoid evil." This principle cannot be reduced to 
 any other principle, it is evident and universal. From 
 it is derived the norm of moral excellence. Since man 
 is constituted with reason, and order answers to 
 reason, human good lies especially in order. From 
 the first precept of the law is derived the precept of 
 observing order. 
 
 ART. Vm.— FALSE SYSTEMS OP MOEALITY AS DEEIVED FEOM 
 THEIE FIRST MORAL PRECEPT. 
 
 93. Since the first moral precept is the basis of the 
 whole moral science the various systems of morality may 
 he classified according to their first precept. — Every sys- 
 tem is determined by its principle ; therefore an ex- 
 act division of the systems of morality can be made 
 according to the principle on which each rests. But 
 ihe first moral precept is to do good ; therefore sys- 
 tems of morality vary according to the diverse ways in 
 which they understand the nature of that good to 
 which man should tend. All subjective systems, says 
 Zigliara,* are based on the principle that man is the 
 measure of morality as he is the measure of the truth of 
 things. 
 
 94. Utilitarianism,, the system of interest, in which the 
 only good is the useful, is false, because it excludes a con- 
 stituent element of the good, i.e., the absolute. — In Utili- 
 tarianism the only good is the useful, whether with 
 respect to the individual or to society. The system 
 of personal interest or individual utilitarianism was 
 taught of old by Aristippus (e.g. 425), and in modem 
 times by La Rochefoucauld (1613-1680) and Bentham 
 
 * Summa Philosophica, M. 11, i. 
 
412 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (1748-1832).* The System of general interest has had 
 Hume (1711-1776) for its principal master. It is evi- 
 dent that these systems lack the essential marks of 
 moral duty, i.e., universality and immutability, since 
 both public and private interest are relative and vari- 
 able. In these systems, therefore, there is no duty, 
 no moral law, and it is impossible to account for great 
 deeds of disinterestedness. Egotism and might be- 
 come the sole rule of human actions, and anarchy or 
 despotism will be the normal state of society. The 
 criterion of Utilitarianism is, therefore, inadequate 
 vague, and arbitrary. 
 
 95. Hedonism, or the moral systein of pleasure, in 
 which the sole good is tlis pleasurable, is false, because it 
 confounds a consequence of the good with the good itself. 
 — Materialistic and sensistic schools base morality 
 upon love of pleasure and fear of pain. Epicurus 
 (B.C. 340-270), among the ancients, Hobbes * (1588- 
 
 * other utilitarians of a recent date are the two Mills, father and 
 son, John Austin, and George Grote. Against the principle which 
 they advocated it may be argued : (a) It takes the sign and indication 
 of moral evil for the evil itself. . . It places the wickedness 
 of an act in the physical misery and suffering that are its conse- 
 quences, (b) " Mill tells us that ' utilitarian moralists have gone be- 
 yond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do 
 with the morality of the action. ' " (c) It does away with the distinc- 
 tion between harm and injury, "injury being wilful and unjust 
 harm ; " it confounds physical and moral evil, and ignores the mean- 
 ing of a human action, (d) It " sees in virtue a habit of self-sacrifice 
 useful to the community but not naturally pleasant," .... in 
 fact, " a natural evil, inasmuch as it deprives him of pleasure, which 
 natural evil by habit is gradually converted into a factitious and arti- 
 ficial good." — Moral Philosophy, Stonyhurst Series, pp. 177-189. 
 
 * " If every thought," as Hobbes holds, "is but a compound of 
 sensations, then good and evil can be only expressions for agreeable 
 or disagreeable sensations ; they have no absolute character, but 
 mean simply personal pleasure or pain, and the highest motive of 
 
LAW, TBS MULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 413 
 
 1679), Helvetius (1715-1771), and Saint-Lambert (1716- 
 1803), among modern moralists, are tlie most faithful 
 interpreters of this system. To confound duty with 
 pleasure is to reverse the very notion of good, of 
 which pleasure is a consequence, but not the essence. 
 It is to contradict reason and conscience as well as 
 the common sense of mankind. Besides, materialists 
 generally understand by pleasure only what is sensi- 
 ble and material, and despise those higher pleasures 
 that have their source in the culture of the true and 
 the exercise of virtue, and those also Tvhich we ex- 
 perience at the sight of good in our fellow-men. 
 
 96. The moral system of sentiment, in wMcTi good or 
 evil is that which is perceived as such iy a moral sense, is 
 false, hecause the existence of such a sense as a distinct 
 faculty is a mere hypothesis, and iecause a sentiment of 
 sympathy for good, far from heing a principle of that 
 good, presupposes its idea. — The Scotch school, design- 
 ing to combat those who place morality in interest or 
 pleasure, sought the basis of morality in a disinter- 
 ested principle. This it claimed to have found in a 
 certain instinct or moral sense, which in man would 
 be a special faculty ordained to judge what is good 
 and what is evil, not only in general but also in par- 
 ticular. Shaftesbury (1671-1713), Adam Smith, Hutch- 
 eson, and Eeid, are the principal upholders of this 
 system. To admit their doctrine is to assert that man 
 is led by instinct, by a blind principle ; but this is 
 unworthy of a rational being. Besides, it bases mo- 
 rality on a variable and uncertain principle, takes 
 
 life must be to attain the one and avoid the other. Moreover, as 
 man does not determine for himself the law of sensation and the 
 conditions of pleasure and pain, it follows that he is absolutely sub- 
 ject to circumstances, and the creature of necessity." American En- 
 cydopmdia, sub. Hobbes. 
 
. 414 MORAL PHIL080P3T. 
 
 away from good and evil their essential distinction, 
 and eliminates their objective nature. In a word, it 
 confounds effect with cause, since the sentiment ex- 
 perienced in presence of good or evil is only a conse- 
 quence of our idea of good and evil. 
 
 97. The moral system of rationalists which exaggerates 
 the idea of honorable or virtuous good, and excludes the 
 notion of useful and pleasurable good, is false, because it 
 is exclusive. — The Stoics of old, Kant* in modern 
 times, and the philosophers of the contemporary 
 French school; in their efforts to frame a purer code, 
 have perverted the nature of morality. Their first 
 moral principles are all subjective, because the specu- 
 lative principles of which they are the application 
 are subjective. Kant said, " So act that the rule of 
 your actions may be a law for all men." This princi- 
 ple is defective, because it does not apply to good 
 actions that are not obligatory, and because it points 
 out rather what is to be avoided than what is to be 
 done. Moreover, Kant fails to state the principle 
 in virtue of which man should impose a law on his 
 will, and even why man should be guided by law.f 
 Jouffroy (1796-1842) and Damiron (1794-1862) took as 
 their first principle: "Perfect yourself." They for- 
 got that human perfection is an effect of morality, 
 and does not produce it ; besides, their principle is 
 too vague, obscure, and comprehensive. Cousin laid 
 down as his primary principle, " Follow the light of 
 your reason." Now, reason is either personal or im- 
 personal. In the former case we are led into the in- 
 consistencies of Kant's system ; in the latter case, 
 the principle is an abstraction, a creation of reason, 
 and therefore incapable of imposing an obligation, 
 
 * See pp. 81,83. \ Cf. Zigliara, Summa Philosophica, M. 12, vi. 
 
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 415 
 
 Fichte adopted for the basis of his moral system the 
 principle of absolute independence, and for the basis of 
 his social system the principle, " Love thyself above 
 all things, and other men for thy own sake." 
 
 AET. rx. — CONSCIENCE. 
 
 98. Conscience is a practical judgment of reason, de- 
 termining in a given case what is good and what is evil. 
 — It is not suiScient to consider the natural law the- 
 oretically, it must be applied practically. To do this 
 is the work of conscience. It is a judgment upon an 
 action to be done or to be avoided. This judgment is 
 the conclusion of a syllogism, of which the law is the 
 major, and the action to be done the minor. For in- 
 stance, it is a law that " evil should not be done ;" if, 
 therefore, this particular action, as perjury, be evil, 
 practical reason dictates the judgment, " This action 
 of perjury should not be done." This syllogism is 
 not always explicitly made by the intellect, but it is 
 none the less real. 
 
 69. The judgment of conscience, though not an objective 
 norm, is the subfective norm of a?i agent's moral actions. 
 Therefore it is necessary to conform to the dictates of 
 conscisnce. — Conscience is not the moral law, but sup- 
 poses it, as a consequent supposes its antecedent. 
 To make conscience the sole foundation of the moral- 
 ity of obligations, as do rationalists, is to confound 
 the application of the law with the law itself. It is 
 even to attribute infallibility to conscience, and thus 
 to contradict both faith and reason. It is certain that 
 conscience is a subjective rule to which man is bound 
 to conform, for law would be useless if not applied. 
 But it can be applied by conscience only, and there- 
 fore the judgments of conscience should be followed. 
 
416 MOBAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 100. Since conscience viewed as a faculty does not 
 really differ from intellect, its various states in respect to 
 its matter will correspond to the various states of the in- 
 tellect in respect to truth. — Conscience, says Zigliara,* 
 is true when its judgments are true ; otherwise it is 
 false or erroneous. It is right when it dictates what 
 reason would prudently judge to be good, though the 
 judgment may be materially false ; otherwise it is not 
 right. It is invincibly erroneous when it judges ac- 
 cording to principles which it holds to be true, and 
 which, morally speaking, it could not have known to 
 be false. But if it could have examined the principles 
 more attentively, and ought to have done so, then con- 
 science is vincibly erroneous in its judgment. It is 
 certain when its judgment is free from doubt or fear 
 of error. It is probahle when its judgment rests on 
 reasons which, though solid, do not exclude all danger 
 of error. It is doubtful if it remains in suspense be- 
 tween two decisions. Conscience is scrupulous when it 
 fears for trivial and groundless reasons that an action 
 is wrong. It is perplexed when it fears evil whether 
 an action be done or omitted. A lax conscience seeks 
 to justify to itself an evil action ; a rigorous conscience, 
 on the contrary, tries by refined reasoning to persuade 
 itself and others that a good action is evil. 
 
 The rules of conscience are : " We are bound to obey 
 a conscience that is true and certain, or even an invin- 
 cibly erroneous conscience. We are not to act if con- 
 science is doubtful as to the morality of the action 
 viewed concretely. If we are bound to attain a cer- 
 tain end, and doubt as to the means to be taken, we 
 may use those means that most avert the danger of 
 not gaining the end." f 
 
 * M. 13, iy. \ Russo, De Morali PhUosophia Prmlectiones, § 110 
 
LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 417 
 
 In the case of vincible error it is forbidden both to 
 follow one's conscience and act against its judgment. 
 We miist suspend the action and examine to rectify 
 the error, provided, however, that the thought or sus- 
 picion of such an obligation occurs to our mind. But 
 if there be no such thought or suspicion, conscience 
 is actually invincibly erroneous, and therefore must 
 ^be obeyed. 
 27 
 
NATUEAIi LAW. 
 
 1. Natural Law is the study of the rights and dutieo 
 that are derived from the law of conscience. — Law {jus) 
 in its widest meaning- is in tlie moral order all that is 
 conformed to law. So considered, it is divided into 
 moral obligation and moral power ; because the law 
 in permitting or imposing an action gives the power 
 to take means to do the action. Moral obligation is 
 called duty, and moral power right. If the term 
 " law " just defined, be taken in its widest meaning, 
 and the term of the definition in its most restricted 
 sense, natural law, the science that considers human 
 actions in the concrete, includes not only the rights 
 but also the duties that are derived from the law of 
 conscience. 
 
 2. Natural Law is divided into Individual Law, So- 
 cial Law, and the Common Law of Nations. — The 
 rights and duties of man are derived simply from 
 his nature, or they arise from society, where man is 
 no longer considered alone, but as united with his 
 fellow-men in the pursuit of a common end. Individ- 
 ual Law treats of rights and duties under the first 
 aspect ; Social Law and the Common Law of Natiomg 
 consider them from the second point of view. 
 
FART I. 
 
 INDIVIDUAIi LAW. 
 
 o. The rights and duties pertaining to individual law 
 refer to God, to our neighbor, and to ourselves. — Man in 
 his own regard, and apart from society, has moral re^ 
 lations with God, with himself, and even with his fel- 
 low-men, inasmuch as they are united to him by a 
 likeness of specific nature. Hence the three kinds of 
 right and duty for man outside his social life. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 Man's Duties to God. 
 
 4. Natxiral Law obliges man to acknowledge his de- 
 pendence on God as the Supreme Being, Sovereign Truth 
 and Goodiiess, and to ex2wess by external actions this in- 
 terior and voluntary acknowledginent of his dependence. 
 — The sum of the duties by which man acknowledges 
 interiorly his dependence on his Creator and ex- 
 presses this dependence in external actions is called 
 Religion. 
 
 5. Man depending on God as Necessary Being owes 
 Him adoration. — Man is a contingent being, and there- 
 fore depends by nature on God, who is Necessary 
 Being. And since this dependence is natural, man 
 
420 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 should acknowledge it by adoration, whicli consists 
 in attributing excellence of Being to God. 
 
 6. It is morally evil either to refuse to adore God, or 
 to adore Him in an unfitting manner, or to adore another 
 ieing. — To refuse to adore God is impiety ; to adore 
 Him in a manner that expresses false relations be- 
 tween God and man is superstition ; to ador6 false 
 gods is idolatry. Impiety, superstition, and idolatry 
 are not only moral disorders, but are based on meta- 
 physical absurdities ; for it is intrinsically absurd 
 that there be no Supreme Being, or that the Supreme 
 Being be without the attributes proper to such a 
 being, or that there be more than one Supreme 
 Being. 
 
 7. Man depending on God as absolute Truth owes 
 Him the homage of faith. — Man as an intelligent being 
 is bound by his nature to adhere to the known truth 
 and to tend to a fuller possession of that which is but 
 imperfectly known. "When, therefore, God, who is 
 truth itself, speaks, man owes Him faith, that is, 
 he should assent to God's word. So, too, if man, 
 though aware that a divine revelation has been 
 made, yet does not know the truths revealed, he 
 is bound to make the necessary efforts to attain this 
 knowledge. 
 
 8. The assertion- of some philosophers that revelation is 
 impossible is intrinsically ahsurd. — Some philosophers 
 pretend that God cannot speak to us ; others, that so 
 to do would be contrary to His dignity ; some declare 
 that He cannot reveal mysteries to us ; others, that He 
 cannot deny us the right to examine what He reveals ; 
 others, again, that if He makes a revelation He ought 
 to make it in this or that way. All these pretensions 
 are as absurd as they are impious. For why should 
 God, the Almighty, be unable to do what a child can 
 
MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD. 421 
 
 do, that is, manifest its ideas ? How would He debase 
 Himself by enlightening our minds, since He it was 
 who moulded the clay of which our bodies were 
 formed? And since our intellect is so limited that 
 besides the mysteries of nature that meet us at every 
 step, all is mystery in the supernatural order, why 
 cannot God reveal to us these truths called mysteries, 
 which although in themselves incomprehensible to 
 us, yet enrich and elevate our intellect ? But to say 
 that if God reveals mysteries, we have the right to 
 examine them by our reason, — is not this admitting 
 the absurdity that truth can be erroneous ? Lastly, 
 if God wills to speak to man, is it not unreasonable 
 to assign Him this or that means of revelation, and to 
 pretend, for instance, that He ought to speak to all 
 diredtly and not to most men indirectly through 
 others ? All these pretensions of rationalistic philos- 
 ophers are manifestly absurd, even from the stand- 
 point of reason. 
 
 9. The assertion of some philosophers that revelation is 
 useless is ielied hoth iy experience and hy reason. — Be- 
 sides the truthg which the human intellect can know 
 naturally, there are others to which it cannot of itself 
 attain. Since man has been raised to a supernatural 
 state, it was necessary that God reveal supernatural 
 truths. But it was also fitting that He should reveal 
 even certain natural truths ; for otherwise but few 
 men would have become acquainted with them, the 
 greater portion of mankind being prevented by their 
 wants, their occupations, and particularly by their 
 lack of intellectual aptitude. And even the privi- 
 leged few would attain to a knowledge of these 
 truths only with a great admixture of doubt and er- 
 ror, and after long and difficult studies. Moreover, 
 history shows into what moral and religious darkness 
 
422 MORAL PSILOSOPHT. 
 
 those nations, and even great geniuses, fell who were 
 either deprived of the light of revelation or had re- 
 jected it.* 
 
 10. Man, depending on God as absolute Goodness, 
 owes Him love. — The good is amiable ; but God is 
 sovereignly good ; therefore He is amiable above 
 all other good. Besides, all other good is referred to 
 God as the supreme good ; therefore man should 
 refer to God all other good that he loves. Lastly, 
 man's happiness and perfection proceed from God as 
 the supreme good ; but man should seek his own per- 
 fection and happiness ; therefore man should, love 
 God. If he loves God as supremely good in Himself, 
 his love is perfect ; but if he loves Him chiefly as the 
 source of his own perfection and happiness, his love 
 is imperfect.f % 
 
 11. Man owes God ioth internal and external worship. 
 — Man is composed of body and soul ; therefore, to 
 the interior homage of his soul he should add the ex- 
 terior homage of his body. This exterior homage is 
 
 * The objection that the revelation of mysteries to be believed 
 impedes the progress of the human intellect must be categorically 
 denied. Since the object of the intellect is truth, the progress of 
 the human intellect must be measured by the fulness and perfec- 
 tion in which it possesses the truth. Though the nature of mysteries 
 is beyond man's comprehension, yet the facts or truths so revealed 
 often throw much light upon truths of the merely natural order. 
 
 f Kant aflirms that God is transcendental being, meaning thereby 
 to insinuate that He is beyond the reach of human reason ; whence 
 he infers that man cannot possibly love God. But he fails to dis- 
 tinguish between comprehensive or adequate love and adhesive or 
 inadequate love. Cf. Zigliara, M., 33, viii. 
 
 :j; The love that man owes to God does not impose on him an obli- 
 gation of always actually thinking of Him, but only of acting in 
 virtue of that first intention that has God and eternal happiness in 
 view. 
 
MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD. 423 
 
 a necessity because of man's twofold nature; hence 
 at all times this external worsliip has been paid by 
 all people. In the second place, man has received 
 from God his body as well as his soul, therefore he 
 should do homage for both. Lastly, the external 
 actions favor the accomplishment of the internal 
 actions which they intensify ; therefore we should 
 perform them as a help and stimulus to internal 
 worship. Some philosophers have said that God 
 being a pure spirit demands the homage of the heart 
 only ; but they have not reflected that the necessity 
 of external worship is founded in the inviolable order 
 of nature, the maintenance of which God must neces- 
 sarily require. In other words, it is a necessity not 
 for God, who is self-existent, but for man, who is 
 essentially dependent.* 
 
 12. Public worship is due to God. — Society, or the 
 union of men for a common good, must necessarily be 
 directed to the sovereign good. But to labor to- 
 gether for the acquisition of the sovereign good; men 
 must so act that all the members of society seek to 
 possess it. For this end it must be made known to 
 them and revered by them ; to make known the 
 supreme good is to praise it ; to have it revered is to 
 have all depend on it, subjecting all things to it, and 
 sacrificing to it all sensible good. Therefore a 
 public worship consisting chiefly in praise and sacri- 
 fice is due to God from society. Besides, as without 
 external worship internal homage soon fails for want 
 of support, so without public worship religion fast 
 
 * The Manichees rejected external worship, on the ground that the 
 human body proceeds from a supreme principle of evil. A like op- 
 position to external worship has been manifested by some members 
 of the Eclectic French school, and is consistent with the principles of 
 German Tranicendentalism. Gf. Zigliara, M., 84, iii. 
 
424 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 disappears from society and its constituent members. 
 Since, then, society cannot subsist without religion, 
 public worship is a duty no less from the stand-point 
 of social order than from that of our relations with 
 God. 
 
CHAPTEE II. 
 
 Man's Duties to Himself. 
 
 ART. I. — ^THE FOUNDATION OF MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF. 
 
 13. The foundation of man's duties to himself is in 
 the excellence and perfectibility of his nature. — God has 
 giTen man a nature of great excellence ; therefore 
 man is bound, in order to conform to order, to respect 
 the excellence and dignity of his nature. And since 
 God has made this nature capable of perfection, man 
 is bound to tend to perfection. 
 
 14. The supreme p^'inciple of all man's duties to him- 
 himseJf is. Love thyself with a well regulated love. — 
 Man should love himself, but with a love that con- 
 forms to order. This precept of well-ordered love of 
 self may be expressed thus : Man is hound to presei've 
 and perfect himself in order to his last end. 
 
 ART. n. — man's duties to HIS SOUL. 
 
 15. Man is hound to cultivate his intellect, to apply 
 himself to the study of those truths the knowledge of 
 which is necessary to him for attaining his , last end. — 
 Man is made to know truth; but he cannot attain 
 truth without labor and the cultivation of his intel- 
 lect ; therefore he is bound to this labor and culti- 
 vation. There are some truths that every man should 
 know in order to reach his end ; there are others 
 
426 MORAL PHILOSOPMY. 
 
 more abstract and more difficult, which are necessary 
 under certain conditions. Every man is bound to 
 the acquisition of the former; the latter must be 
 known so far as is required by one's employment or 
 duties. The obligation of cultivating the intellect 
 also imposes the duty of cultivating the sensitive fac- 
 ulties, the concurrence of which is necessary for the 
 development of the intellect itself. From the obliga- 
 tion of man to cultivate his intellect we conclude that 
 it is false to hold with J. J. Eousseau that the progress 
 of the arts and sciences naturally leads to the deprav- 
 ity of man. But it is equally absurd to look to the 
 progress of the arts and sciences for the remedy of all 
 the evils of humanity. Experience and reason show, 
 on the contrary, the fatal consequences of intellectual 
 development without equal moral development. 
 
 16. To the duty of cultivating the intellect correspond 
 the rights of being instructed and of teaching. — Intel- 
 lectual culture is acquired only by instruction, which 
 is gained chiefly from teaching. Therefore the right 
 of teaching is derived from that of being instructed, 
 and this in turn springs from the duty of cultivating 
 the intellect. But these, like all rights, should be 
 kept within the limits of order. If they pass these 
 limits they degenerate into pretended liberties, such 
 as the so-called liberty of thought, liberty of the 
 press, liberty of examination, liberty of conscience, 
 liberty of worship, etc., which, in the sense intended 
 by several modern philosophers, constitute not a 
 right, but a veritable violation of right, and therefore 
 should be punished by civil magistrates as soon as 
 they manifest themselves in any overt act prejudicial 
 to the good of society.* 
 
 * Cf. Eusso, De Phihsophia Morali Prcdectmies, pp. 372, 273. 
 
MAWS DITTIES TO HIMSELF. 427 
 
 17. 3Ian is hound so to perfect his will as to render it 
 strong and constant in the practice of duty. — The will 
 should always act conformably to order, whatever it 
 may cost, because order is absolute and immutable. 
 But it is evident that the will can remain inflexible in 
 the practice of duty only in so far as it is endowed 
 with strength and constancy, in a word, as it is per- 
 fected by virtue. And since there are four kinds of 
 moral virtue necessary to the perfection of the will, 
 man should strive to acquire them, so that by pru- 
 dence he may judge justly what should be done or 
 avoided, and this is an intellectual operation; hy jus- 
 tice he may give every one his due ; by fortitude 
 he may strengthen the sensitive appetite to over- 
 come difficulties ; by temperance he may hold it in 
 check and regulate its tendencies. The pretension 
 of such modern reformers as Fourier (1772-1837) 
 and Saint-Simon (1760-1825), that man may freely 
 follow all his inclinations, is as immoral as it is con- 
 trary to reason. 
 
 ART. in. — man's duties to his body. 
 
 18. Man is hound to watch over tlie preservation of his 
 body. — Man cannot fulfil his destiny in this life with- 
 out his body ; therefore he should watch over its 
 preservation. And since health of body is necessary 
 for the development of the soul's faculties and the 
 fulfilment of many of man's duties, it follows that 
 man should have a prudent care of his health, that he 
 should preserve it by conforming to the rules of tem- 
 perance and sobriety, and restore it when it has been 
 impaired. 
 
 19. Suicide is a crime against nature, against society, 
 and against God. — Every creature naturally shrinks 
 
428 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 from death. This dread of death is, therefore, a uni- 
 Tersal instinct. Man consequently violates the laws 
 of nature when he takes his life. At the same time 
 he injures the rights of society, which he deprives of 
 the help afforded by one of its members, and he tres- 
 passes on the domain of justice, to which alone the 
 punishment of crime pertains. Lastly, suicide vio- 
 lates the rights of God, who is the sole master of life 
 and has constituted it a means of attaining man's des- 
 tiny. Therefore the man who destroys his life sub- 
 verts the designs of God in his regard, and arrogates 
 to himself the supreme dominion of the Master of 
 Ufe. 
 
 20. TJie arguments in favor of suicide are groundless. 
 — Some philosophers, and among them J. J. Bous- 
 seau (1712-1778) and d'Holbach (1723-1789), have at- 
 tempted to offer an apology for suicide. They say 
 that at times life is such a misfortune that instinct 
 prompts us to make away with it ; that society is not 
 injured when he who takes his life is a useless mem- 
 ber ; that invariably it loses its right over the wretch 
 who is weary of life ; and that God Himself provides 
 a remedy against misfortune in the possibility for 
 each man to take his own life. Passing over the 
 absurdities contained in these assertions, we may re- 
 fute them by saying : (1) Life is never a misfortune, 
 since even in the greatest adversities man can always 
 tend to the sovereign good and increase the sum of 
 his merits and their corresponding rewards ; (2) 
 Conceding to one unfortunate the right to take his 
 life is conceding a like power to all ; and thus all 
 order would be destroyed by the natural law it- 
 self. 
 
 21. The natural law does not ahoays forbid an action 
 that leads indirectly to death, for in certain cases this is 
 
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF. 429 
 
 an act of virtue and even of duty.^ — The natural law 
 forbids any action that leads indirectly to death, 
 when the action is willed positively as destroying- 
 one's life. But when such an action is willed in view 
 of a good superior to life, then one does not so much 
 will to take his life as allow it to be taken, and he 
 does not break the natural law. Moreover, to expose 
 one's self to death is often a duty imposed by justice, 
 or at least an act of heroism inspired by charity, and 
 redounds to the glory of its author. 
 
 22. It is in conformity with the natural law to prac- 
 tise mortification, in order to repress the passio7is and 
 facilitate the control of reason over the senses. — Some 
 philosophers have stigmatized the austerity of life 
 and the mortification of the saints as contrary to the 
 natural law;. But this is false, for experience proves 
 that moderate austerities do not injure health ; on 
 the contrary, they help greatly to preserve it. Again, 
 even though austerities should shorten life, they 
 would still be commendable, because they enable 
 man to attain a greater moral perfection, and because 
 life is but a means that should be referred to man's 
 last end. 
 
 * In these cases man does not dispose of his life against the will of 
 God, who must approve what is nobler. If one cannot fulfil his 
 duty otherwise than at the sacrifice of his life, then duty must be 
 preferred to life ; but if duty requires ona to preserve his life, then 
 33 it unlawful for him to lay it down. 
 
CHAPTEE III. 
 
 Man's Duties to His Fellow-Men. 
 
 ART. I. — LOVE OP one's NEIGHBOE. 
 
 23. Even apart from civil society tnen are hound to 
 reciprocal duties in virtue of tJie likeness of their specific 
 nature and tJie identity of their end. — All men have the 
 same specific nature, the same orig-in, and the same 
 end. This establishes a kind of affinity among them 
 which, apart from civil society, imposes on them re- 
 ciprocal duties. 
 
 24. The foundation of all duties to one^s neighior is 
 the precept, TJiou shall love thy neighbor as thyself. — 
 Love of one's neighbor is not a mere natural inclina 
 tion resulting from likeness of specific nature, but it 
 is a precept of reason. For order demands that as 
 other men have the same human nature as ourselves, 
 we should wish them the blessings that we desire for 
 ourselves. Yet because the bond of identity or sub- 
 stantial unity is stronger than that of likeness of 
 specific nature, we should indeed love our neighbor as 
 ourselves, but not as much as ourselves. — The pre- 
 cept of loving our neighbor imposes both negative 
 and positive duties. The former are contained in the 
 maxim, " Do not to others what you would not h'ave 
 them do to you ; " the latter, in the maxim, " Do to 
 others as you would that they should do to you." 
 
 25. From love of one's neighbor results the duty of 
 
MAJ^'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. 431 
 
 doing nothing that injures his moral dignity, or wnpedes 
 or perverts the lawful exercise of his free will. — The 
 moral dignity of one's neighbor is impaired by scandal, 
 which gives him an occasion of falling into evil ; by 
 seduction, which deceives him in order to draw him 
 into evil ; in a word, by whatever turns him from his 
 duty. All these acts are a manifest violation of the 
 love of justice due to our neighbor. But if a man of 
 evil habits have a good name, and thereby take occa- 
 sion to injure the rights of others, it is lawful to reveal 
 his true character, but so far only as is necessary to 
 protect the innocent. Hence, adds Eusso pertinently, 
 we may judge how far are justifiable the revelations 
 made by newspapers, at the time of elections, of a 
 man's public and private character. 
 
 26. From the love of one's neighbor arises the duty of 
 doing no violence to his intellect hy deceitfully leading him 
 into error. — Veracity is indispensable to society. Take 
 away from speech its nature as sign of thought and 
 you destroy all intercourse among men. Besides, even 
 if lying would not harm society, it would still be an 
 evil, for God has given speech to man as a means of 
 expressing his thoughts and communicating with his 
 equals ; therefore, to use it to deceive is to oppose 
 nature. Hence lying is never permitted. But when 
 the matter is such that it is unlawful to reveal 
 it, then is it not only justifiable but obligatory to 
 use equivocal terms, provided the following condi- 
 tions enumerated by Busso * are present : " (1) that 
 the questioner have no right to know the matter 
 which we conceal ; (2) that equivocal words, whether 
 such in themselves or in their circumstances, are 
 used only when there is a proportionately grave 
 
 *De Phil. Mor. Prcd., p. 140. 
 
432 MORAL PHIL0S0P3T. 
 
 cause for uttering them ; (3) that the speaker intend 
 the true sense, though the hearer attach another 
 meaning to them, when he could avoid this erroi 
 by attending to the existing circumstances." And 
 the author further explains : " When there is a pro- 
 portionately grave cause for concealing the truth, 
 and a question is proposed concerning it which must 
 be answered, because one's very silence would be a 
 manifestation of the truth ; two rights come into 
 conflict : in one person, the right and at times even 
 the duty, of concealing the truth, and in the other 
 the right to keep his intellect free from the infection 
 of error. One of these rights must be suspended; 
 but which? Certainly the right of him who is the 
 cause of the conflict. But the hearer is the one 
 who by unlawful questioning caused the conflict; 
 therefore his right must be suspended." The author 
 further distinguishes between words essentially equiv- 
 ocal and words which though having in themselves 
 but one determinate signification may from certain 
 circumstances acquire another. Of this latter kind 
 of equivocation he cites two instances : if a man be 
 questioned as to something which he knows by incom- 
 municable knowledge {sub secreto) and answers, " I do 
 not know," his reply means ignorance simply, but if 
 the circumstances be considered, it means ignorance 
 of incommunicable matter. If a prisoner answers the 
 judge, " Not guilty," though his words taken by them- 
 selves signify innocence, yet viewed in connection 
 with the circumstances they signify that he has not 
 committed a crime of which he is bound to make him- 
 self his own accuser.* 
 27. From love of one's neigJihor results the duty of not 
 
 * Cf. Rusao, pp. 144, 145. 
 
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. 433 
 
 attempting his life or maltreating his hody. — Life is a 
 most precious boon to man, for it enables him to work 
 out his present destiny and to prepare for his future 
 state ; hence homicide is one of the greatest crimes 
 that can be committed. The interdict laid upon 
 homicide extends to every action that impairs the in- 
 tegrity of the human organism, such as mutilations, 
 wounds, and blows. 
 
 28. From love of one's neighbor arises the duty not 
 merely of doing him no harm, hut even of doing him 
 good. — ^We ought to love our neighbor as ourselves ; 
 now, we wish not only that others do us no evil, but 
 also that they do us good. Hence besides negative or 
 perfect duties, we have also positive or imperfect duties 
 toward our neighbor. We should enlighten his 
 mind, strengthen his will in the practice of good, 
 help him in need, and defend his good name. Posi- 
 tive duties are either humane or 'beneficent. They are 
 duties of humanity if they are rendered our neighbor 
 without any personal sacrifice ; they are duties of 
 beneficence if, they involve some personal incon- 
 venience or loss. They are, therefore, more merito- 
 rious than the former class. Yet though both kinds 
 of positive duty are commanded in a general way, 
 they do not constitute a determinate obligation in this 
 or that particular case ; their obligation being only 
 moral and not juridical, no one can be forced to ful- 
 fil them. They become a strict and imperative duty 
 only in case of our neighbor's extreme need, owing to 
 the presence of imminent and deadly evil to soul or 
 body. 
 
 29. Both negative and positive duties of loving our 
 neighbor oblige us in regard to our enemies. — The love 
 due to our neighbor is not founded in his personal 
 merit, but in his dignity and specific nature as man 
 
 28 
 
434 1 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Hence, although it is permitted to detest the wrong' 
 done us by an enemy and to demand satisfaction, it is 
 not lawful to pursue with hate the author of this evil 
 and to neglect in his regard the duties that bind us 
 toward other men as such.* 
 
 AKT. II. — THE BIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE, AUD DUELLING. 
 
 30. It is lawful to repel force iy force, even to the Tail- 
 ing of the unjust aggressor, provided the moderation of 
 blameless defence he observed. — The moderation of 
 blameless defeace has five conditions : (1) that there 
 be no other means of defence from the aggression 
 but force ; (2) that violence be offered only in the act 
 of aggression ; (3) that no more evil be done the ag- 
 gressor than is here and now necessary to nullify the 
 aggression ; (4) that the evil done the aggressor be 
 proportionate to the good that is the object of aggres- 
 sion ; (5) that the evil be done in self-defence and not 
 in revenge. When these conditions are present, it is 
 evidently lawful to repel an unjust aggression by 
 force even to the killing of the aggressor. For he 
 who has the right to possess a good has also the right 
 to remove even by force the obstacles to the posses- 
 sion of that good. Undoubtedly, in the case of ag- 
 gression, the aggressor suffers loss when violently re- 
 pulsed ; but since one of the two adversaries must 
 suffer loss, it is just that he should suffer who exposed 
 himself to this risk and in a measure willed it. Besides, 
 man is not bound to love his neighbor more than 
 
 * Although, brutes as being irrational creatures have no rights, yet 
 man is forbidden, says St. Thomas, to exercise cruelty upon them, 
 both because such action disposes him to act similarly to his fellow- 
 men, and because it opposes the order and end established by God i» 
 treating brutes. 
 
MAIL'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEW. 435 
 
 himself ; but this he would do were he to lose his own 
 goods in order to save his neighbor's. Yet though 
 man has the right to repel by force an unjust aggres- 
 sion, he may forego its exercise, and he will then at 
 times perform an act of heroic virtue ; but he is bound 
 to use his right, says Liberatore, when he knows that 
 he is himself in mortal sin, or that his own death will 
 imperil the common safety. 
 
 31. DuelUtig is a violation of the natural law. — ^The 
 natural law forbids duels, or single combats in which 
 two persons engage of their own private authority, 
 after previously agreeing upon weapons, judges, and 
 the time and place of combat. For by duelling (1) One 
 exposes himself without lawful motive to give or re- 
 ceive a mortal wound, and is thus guilty of both 
 homicide and suicide ; (2) He commits a crime against 
 society, since he deprives it of one of its members and 
 contemns its laws; (3) He sins against reason and 
 justice, since there is no proportion between death 
 and the vain motives invoked by adversaries, and no 
 relation between the honor at stake and the skill or 
 chance on which the issue of the duel depends. — It is 
 idle to object that honor should be preferred to life, 
 and that when challenged one should always accept in 
 order not to pass for a coward. For it is evident that 
 while real honor is preferable to life, it cannot be kept 
 by the duel, the issue of which depends not on jus- 
 tice, but on skill or force or chance. He that refuses 
 a duel does not prove himself a coward, for there can 
 be no cowardice in not doing a bad action ; and be- 
 sides, it is not courage, but skill, force, or chance that 
 decides a duel. Reasonable men find as miioh cour- 
 age as good sense in him who rejects a challenge to 
 combat. 
 
436 MORAL PSIL0S0PH7. 
 
 AET. m. — BIGHTS AND DUTIES IN EELATION TO SOCIAL 
 GOOD. 
 
 32. Social good is that which a man enjoys as a mem- 
 her of a constituted community. — Man is composed of 
 soul and body. The social blessings that pertain to 
 the life of his soul are honor and reputation, and 
 consist in the good opinion in which he and his 
 qualities are held ; those that benefit the life of his 
 body are property or wealth.* 
 
 33. Man is hound to guard his honor and reputation. 
 — Man ordinarily must live in society to attain the 
 end of his existence. But if his reputation be in- 
 jured, he loses a part of that benefit which he would 
 otherwise derive from society ; therefore he must see 
 to it that he does not compromise his reputation. 
 Tet his care for his good name should have a just 
 limit, and so far is one from being obliged always to 
 make known his good parts, that he often proves his 
 virtue by concealing them. 
 
 34. Man has a natural right to Ms honor and reputa- 
 tion. — No man may of right demand to be honored 
 by others with positive marks of consideration unless 
 in virtue of some legitimate dignity added to that of 
 his nature as man ; but every man may demand that 
 no one shall injure his natural dignity. 
 
 35. From love of one's neighbor arises the duty of not 
 injuring his honor. — Honor or reputation is one of 
 
 * Wealth is here taken to inchide " all useful things that can be 
 appropriated and exchanged." Its sources are God's bounty and 
 man's labor. It is Tiater'aZ if it supplies man's natural wants; as do 
 food, clothing, and lodging. It is artificidl if it is merely an inven- 
 tion of human skill to facilitate interchange of commodities ; as, for 
 instance, money. 
 
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. .437 
 
 man's most precious possessions ; to injure it without 
 lawful motive is to violate one of his dearest rights. 
 Therefore does the natural law forbid unjust sus- 
 picion, rash judgment, contempt, false testimony, 
 detraction, and calumny. 
 
 36. Every man is hound to procure for himself the 
 material goods necessary for life. — Since man is bound 
 to preserve his life, and cannot live without the mate- 
 rial means of food, clothing, and lodging, it is evident 
 that he must provide himself with these means. 
 
 37. Every man is oiliged to labor. — The obligation of 
 procuring the goods necessary for life imposes the 
 law of labor, since it is by labor only that we can 
 procure these goods. Labor is also a duty for this 
 reason, that it is an essential condition of man's moral 
 and intellectual development. Again, labor is obli- 
 gatory on every man, because in no other way can he 
 render himself useful to society, in which he is called 
 to live. 
 
 38. Man is permitted to acquire riches. — Riches sup- 
 ply food to man's activity ; therefore their acquisi- 
 tion is a condition favorable to the development of 
 his faculties. They enable him to satisfy his wants 
 more perfectly, and are therefore conformed to order, 
 which requires him to have care of his existence, 
 Eiches are also useful to society ; they afford a means 
 of remedying the inevitable inequality of the fortunes 
 of its members ; they are an element of public pros- 
 perity, and, by exciting the intellectual activity as 
 well as the labor of individuals, they contribute to 
 order and the general well-being. Yet one should 
 not forget that they are but a means of attaining 
 man's end. When pursued immoderately, and when 
 turned from their true end, they produce idleness, 
 Inxury, and all kinds of evil. 
 
438 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 39. To man's duty of preserving his life and promot- 
 ing his well-being, there is the correspondent right of 
 property, which originates in nature. — Viewed abstractly, 
 property is exclusive dominion over some corporeal 
 thing- ; * viewed concretely it is the object possessed. 
 Its possession supposes that the object can confer 
 some advantages, and the exclusion of every other 
 person from its possession supposes that the benefits 
 to be derived are limited in nature. If the object can 
 serve all equally and without detriment, it cannot be- 
 come property. Dominion is perfect or imperfect ac- 
 cording as it implies the possession of the object and 
 the enjoyment of its fruits, or the possession of the 
 object without its fruit, or the fruits without the ob- 
 ject. Dominion is transitory or permanent, according 
 as it is temporary or lasting. 
 
 Transitory dominion evidently arises from nature. 
 It is man's duty to procure whatever is necessary for 
 his life and well-being ; but these things cannot serve 
 him and others also; therefore he has the right to 
 their exclusive use. It is also certain that permanent 
 property is of natural right. For by the conditions 
 of his nature man is obliged to provide for the future ; 
 otherwise he would fall a victim to the inevitable vicis- 
 situdes of life, such as sickness, old age, and the ca- 
 prices of fortune, and, moreover, being restrained by 
 his material wants, he could not give himself up to 
 the nobler occupation of intellectual pursuits. Sec- 
 
 * Dominion over a person is called jurisdiction. Russo (§ 209) 
 distingnishes between the right to property, which he defines as " a 
 general moral power by which man is made capable of acquiring do- 
 minion, the matter of it being indeterminate ; " and the right of 
 property, " the moral power of disposing of any determinate thing to 
 the exclusion of others." The former right springs from nature ; 
 the latter is founded in some contingent fact. 
 
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEW. 439 
 
 ondly, man is naturally active and industrious ; it 
 would be unjust tliat the fruits of his labors should 
 fall to others. Thirdly, the family, which is an insti- 
 tution of nature, cannot subsist, if the father or head 
 does not by permanent property provide for the future 
 wants of his children. Fourthly, the social state, or 
 civil society, is morally necessary for human nature ; 
 but without -respect for property society cannot pros- 
 per, cannot even exist. Lastly, stability of property 
 is characteristic of all nations and of all times ; so 
 universal a fact must rest upon a law of nature. 
 
 40. The nght of permanent property extends not only 
 to the necessaries of life, hut also to its liixuries. — ^AU the 
 arguments establishing the right of property show 
 also the legitimacy of man's right to the luxuries of life. 
 Besides, to put limits to the right of property is to 
 destroy it, because, since it is impossible to determine 
 these limits, the denial of the right to the necessaries 
 of life becomes a natural consequence. To attack the 
 right of property, whatever its object be, is to attack 
 man's liberty and to arrest all development, all indi- 
 vidual and social progress. It is idle to object that 
 all men being equal, all have a right to an equal share 
 of property. Men are indeed equal in their specific 
 nature, but not in their individual natures ; and as 
 inequality of possessions arises from the natural in- 
 equality of individual men, their equality in specific 
 nature demands not that every rhan should have 
 equal wealth with his fellows, but that all men's 
 justly acquired possessions should be equally re- 
 spected. 
 
 Man's ownership of objects is always subject to 
 God's supreme dominion, and extends only to their 
 use as means of attaining his destiny both in the 
 natural and in the supernatural order. In this sense 
 
440 MORAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 it is true tliat man has only tlie usufruct of these 
 objects. It is also true that in the beginning all 
 material things were, negatively, in common ; that is, 
 the natural law does not determine them to any 
 individual, but leaves them open for his appropriation 
 by impressing his personality upon them and so mak- 
 ing them his own. "Private property," says St. 
 Thomas,* " is necessary to human life for three rea- 
 sons : first, because every one is more solicitous to 
 look after what belongs to himself alone than what is 
 common to all or many; . . . secondly, because 
 human affairs are handled more orderly when on each 
 individual is the care of managing something ; . . . 
 thirdly, because thereby a peaceful state of society 
 Is secured, while each one is content with his own." 
 
 Even landed property does not belong to govern- 
 ment, since, as will be shown farther on,f the State 
 naturally originates in the propagation of families 
 from a common stock, and therefore its right, if any, 
 of property must preexist in the head of the family. 
 But the State has the right of eminent domain, or 
 dominion " over all the property within the State, by 
 which it is entitled by constitutional agency to any part 
 necessary to the public . good, compensation being 
 given for what is taken. "J Since, then, landed prop- 
 erty is not apportioned by the natural law, and it does 
 not belong naturally to government, it must be divided 
 by " positive convention." Since, moreover, for men 
 as now constituted, in a fallen state, the division of 
 landed property is morally necessary to enable them 
 to tend to their due perfection as members of society, , 
 this apportionment must be made by public authority, 
 to which alone it belongs, to determine the just con- 
 
 * Sum. Th., i-ii., q. 66, a. 3. f § 74. % Century Dictionary. 
 
MAJY'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW- MEN. 441 
 
 ditions that establish a legal title to land, since to 
 civil government pertains the office of securing the 
 temporal good of the community.* Communism, the 
 doctrine that forbids all private property and would 
 vest all dominion in government alone, must be re- 
 jected. 
 
 An equally pernicious theory is Socialism, "the 
 quintessence of which is the double proposition that 
 inequality of conditions — the distinction of rich and 
 poor, masters and servants — is the principal cause of 
 misery and crime ; and secondly, that the maximum of 
 temporal welfare will be gained by the State becom- 
 ing the owner of all means of production, reducing all 
 industries to branches of the public services, and all 
 workers to be public servants paid by the State, "f 
 Such a doctrine fails to consider that civil authority 
 is vested in human beings, who as such are liable to 
 err ; that man's highest end is not to produce, but to 
 contemplate the truth. Besides, it means stagnation 
 of art, science, and literature, and precludes the de- 
 velopment both of political life and industrial arts." J 
 
 Mr. Henry George also ascribes vice and misery to 
 inequality of conditions, but " attacks only one class 
 of rich people, not all, and would confiscate not every 
 kind of difference, but only one." His scheme is the 
 nationalization of the land, the taking by the State of 
 " all difference due to the law of diminishing returns 
 from land." " He assumes, like the Socialists, a won- 
 derful piety and moderation among those who would 
 have the handling of the goods taken from the rich ; 
 but he has to extend his piety and moderation to the 
 
 * Cf . authorities cited in Hill's MorM Philosophy, pp. 339-246. 
 f Devas, Political Economy, p. 478. 
 % Ibid., p. 393. 
 
M2 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 delicate relations of buyers and sellers, of masters 
 and workmen ; and thus he combines the delusions 
 of those who worship competition and those who ex- 
 ecrate it. Finally, his proposal bids us do what is 
 impossible. For we have seen that in all old coun- 
 tries, owing to long continued cultivation and use of 
 land, and to the frequency of the realization of differ- 
 ences, it is practically impossible to ascertain the 
 amount of the difference (or rent, as he calls it), or if 
 the amount could be ascertained, to ascertain who is 
 getting it. Hence this scheme of social reform is a 
 scheme of taking nobody knows how much from 
 nobody knows whom." * 
 
 Inequality of condition is a law of nature. Hence 
 every scheme of social reform should aim not at the 
 destruction of either the poor class or the rich, but 
 at the permanent establishment of harmonious rela- 
 tions between them, so that they may, " as it were, 
 fit into one another, so as to maintain the equilibrium 
 of the body politic. Each requires the other ; capital 
 cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital." 
 The most powerful means of securing this happy 
 result is religion. It " teaches the laboring man and 
 the work man to carry out honestly and well all equita- 
 ble agreements, freely made, never to injure capital, 
 nor to outrage the person of an employer ; never to 
 employ violence in representing his oavq cause, nor 
 to engage in riot and disorder ; and to have nothing 
 to do with men of evil principles, who work upon 
 the people with artful promises, and raise foolish 
 hopes which usually end in disaster and in repentance 
 when too late. Religion teaches the rich man and 
 the employer that their work-people are not theii 
 
 * Devas, p. 483. 
 
MART'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MSN. 443 
 
 slaves ; that they must respect in every man his 
 dignity as a man and as a Christian ; that labor ia 
 nothing to be ashamed of, if we listen to reason and 
 to Christian philosophy, but is an honorable employ- 
 ment, enabling a man to sustain his life in an upright 
 and creditable way ; and that it is shameful and in- 
 human to treat men like chattels to make money by, 
 or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or 
 physical power." It imposes upon him likewise the 
 duty of seeing that the workman have time for " the 
 duties of piety ; that he be not exposed to corrupting 
 influences and dangerous occasions ; and that he be 
 not led away to neglect his home and family or 
 squander his wages. Then, again, the employer must 
 never tax his work-people beyond their strength, nor 
 employ them in work unsuited to their sex or age. 
 His great and principal obligation is to give to every 
 one that which is just ; ... to make one's profit 
 out of the need of another is condemned by all laws, 
 human and divine." * 
 
 The State is bound to protect the rights of all its 
 citizens ; but because the rich have many means of 
 self-defence, of which the poor are deprived, it is 
 particularly bound to safeguard the rights of. the 
 poor, of the workman and laborer. These are in 
 truth the bone and sinew of the nation, and without 
 their cooperation the State cannot prosper. Hence 
 it should see to it that the hours of labor are not too 
 long whether in relation to the workman or the nature 
 of the work or the season of the year ; that the work 
 is not too hard ; and that the wages are sufficient. 
 Now "a man's labor has two notes or characters. 
 First of all, it is personal ; for the exertion of indi- 
 
 * Bncyolical Letter ou the Condition of Labor. 
 
4M MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 vidual power belong'S to the individual who puts it 
 forth, employing' this power for that personal profit 
 for which it was given. Secondly, man's labor is 
 necessary ; for without the results of labor a man can- 
 not live." Wages, therefore, should be sufficient 
 for the support of the workman, his wife, and two 
 or three children. " As a rule, workman and em- 
 ployer . . . should freely agree as to wages; 
 . nevertheless, there is a dictate of nature more imperi- 
 ous and more ancient than any bargain between man 
 and man, that the remuneration must be enough to 
 support the wage earner in reasonable and frugal 
 comfort."* Whenever these rights of the workman 
 are trespassed on by the employer, the workman has 
 the right to strike, and further, is entitled to the active 
 support of the State, to which it belongs to institute 
 tribunals of arbitration. 
 
 41. It is absurd to hold with ITeinecius (1681-1741), 
 Gh-otius (1583-1645), and Puffendorf (1632-1694), that 
 the right of permanent property arises from compact. — 
 Some philosophers have maintained that by the di- 
 vine law all things were at first held in common by 
 men, but that when the human race increased in 
 numbers they were divided by common compact. 
 This assertion is contradicted by history, which has 
 preserved no record of this agreement ; it is opposed 
 to reason, since, were it true, the savage state would 
 be more conformed to nature than the civilized state. 
 Finally, this assertion favors communism ; for, if all 
 things are held in common by the natural law, the 
 compact of our ancestors cannot be binding on us, 
 and we have the right to return to the primitive state 
 of mankind. 
 
 * Eno/olioal Letter on the Gondiiion of Labor. 
 
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. 445 
 
 42. It is equally absurd to hold, with Hobhes, Benthain, 
 and Montesquieu (1689-1755) that the right of permanent 
 property arises from civil laws. — Some philosopliers 
 derive the rig-lit of property from civil laws. This 
 opinion is based on the false hypothesis that the 
 savage state was the primitive state of man ; it makes 
 the civil laws on property the rale of justice, and it 
 leads easily to communism, for if civil law has es- 
 tablished the right of property, it can also destroy it. 
 
 43. The primitive fact determining the right of prop- 
 erty is the exercise of ■?nan's activity. — Man's action is, 
 as it were, a development of his personality, and what 
 results from his action is thus stamped with the seal 
 of his personality. He who first takes possession of 
 a thing that belongs to no one, and declares his 
 intention of keeping it, thereby contracts with it a re- 
 lation that makes it his. A fortiori, should such an 
 object belong to him if, while in possession of it, he 
 improved it by his labor ; to deprive him of it would 
 be robbing him of the product of his activity. 
 
 44. A father has the right to will his property to his 
 children. — The right of property evidently gives the 
 right to use it and dispose of it ; therefore a father 
 has the right to transmit his property to his children. 
 Again, a father owns an object, because he has im- 
 pressed upon it the seal of his personality ; but his 
 personality is continued in his children ; therefore 
 the right of property is alro continued in them 
 Liberatore adds that a will drawn up to this effect 
 is unnecessary, that children may succeed to their 
 father's possessions ; yet Blackstone seems to judge 
 it a civil right. 
 
 45. From, love of one's neighbor arises the duty of not 
 injuring his property. — Theft is an injustice to the in- 
 dividual, whom it deprives of a lawful possession ; it 
 
446 MORAL PBILOSOPHT. 
 
 is an attack upon society, of which respect for prop-' 
 erty is one of the firm foundations, for men are unit- 
 ed in society as well for the protection of their prop- 
 erty as for the defence of their lives. The natural 
 law in forbidding theft forbids also all that is dis- 
 guised theft, as fraud and usury. It also forbids one 
 to keep stolen goods, and commands them to be re- 
 stored.* 
 
 ABT. IV. — CONTEACTS. 
 
 46. A contract is a " consent of two or more wills to iht 
 sarae object, manifested iy some sensible sign and produc- 
 tive of an obligation in at least one of the consenting par- 
 ties." '\ — No man can suffice for himself, hence the 
 necessity of an exchange of goods and services among 
 men, a necessity imposed as well by love of self as by 
 love of one's neighbor. But to effect an exchange 
 among two or more persons, their consent is neces- 
 sary ; this consent is called a bargain. When the 
 bargain produces an obligation in at least one of the 
 consenting parties, it is called a contract. 
 
 47. The validity of a contract depends on five condi- 
 tions : (1) knowledge of the object ; (2) liberty of the con- 
 tractants ; (3) thsir mutual consent ; (4) the possibility 
 of the ojbect of contract ; (5) its moral goodness. — That 
 
 * In extreme need one may take as much, of another's goods as is 
 necessary to sustain life ; for God, who is the Supreme Lord of the 
 earth and all it contains, has commanded man to preserve his life. 
 But the following conditions should be present : (1) The need should 
 he absolutely or relatively extreme ; (3) There should he at hand no 
 other means of satisfying it ; (3) Only so much should be taken as is 
 really necessary ; (4) He from whom it is taken should not thereby be 
 placed in the same need. Gf. Liberatore, Instituiiones PhUosopliioOf 
 vol. iii., p. 179. 
 
 f Zigliara. 
 
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. 447 
 
 a contract be valid, its object must be known, be- 
 cause an action done in ignorance is not voluntary ; 
 hence deceit and fraud render a contract null. Sec- 
 ondly, it must be free, else it cannot be considered 
 an effect of the will ; hence drunkenness, insanity, 
 childhood, and violence, nullify a contract. Thirdly, 
 there must be mutual consent, and this is of the very 
 essence of contract ; hence he who promises is legally 
 boimd only when his promise is accepted. Fourthly, 
 the object-of contract should be possible, for no one 
 is bound to the impossible. Lastly, the object should 
 be lawful, for no contract can ever remove man's ob- 
 ligation of shunning moral evil. 
 
 48. Colfitracts are unilateral or synallagmatic, commu- 
 tative or aleatory, gratuitous w onerous, consensual or 
 real, principal or accessory, solemn or not solemn, explicit 
 or hnplicit. — A unilateral or unequal contract is one in 
 which only one of the contractants assumes an obli- 
 gation. A " loan of money " and a " promissory note " 
 are instances. A synallagmatic, Mlateral, or equal 
 contract is one in which both the parties are bound to 
 fulfil some obligation toward each other, as in " pur- 
 chase and sale," " rent and hire." A contract is com- 
 mutative when each of the contractants makes an en- 
 gagement which is considered an equivalent for what 
 he receives, as in " purchase and sale ; " it is aleatory 
 when the equivalent consists in the mutual chance of 
 gain or loss owing to some uncertain event ; of this 
 the " lottery " is an instance. A contract is gratuitous 
 when one of the parties confers some advantage on 
 another without requiring a corresponding recom. 
 pense, as a " simple promise ;" it is owerows when eacl 
 of the contractants assumes an obligation. 
 
 A consensual contract is one that is perfected by the 
 mere consent of the parties ; a real contract requires 
 
448 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in addition the delivering' over of something, as a 
 "deposit." A principal contract is one that exists 
 independently of any prior .contract ; an accessory 
 contract is one made to assure the fulfilment of a 
 prior contract, without which it could not have been 
 made, as a " mortgage." 
 
 A contract is soleinn or rwi solemn according as it 
 is or is not subject to certain particular forms. An 
 explicit or fm^mal contract is one wherein the par- 
 ties state their obligations in precise terms ; an 
 implicit or virtual contract is one in which from a 
 purely voluntary action of one party there results 
 an obligation to a third party, and sometimes a 
 reciprocal obligation of the first and second parties ; 
 when, for instance, one person receives the money or 
 goods of another he is virtually bound to deliver 
 them to the owner. 
 
 49. The obligation arising from a contract ceases : (1) 
 Wlien the engagement Tnade has been fulfilled ; (2) Wh^n 
 he in whose favor the contract was made consents, if the 
 contract is unilateral, or if the contract is bilateral, when 
 both parties consent ; (3) When the object of contract be- 
 comes impossible ; (4) When one of the contractants does 
 not fulfil the stipulated conditiotis. — The dbligation of a 
 bilateral contract ceases on the consent thereto of the 
 parties, unless the contract be indissoluble either in 
 itself or by the law. If the impossibility that nullifies 
 a contract originates in the will of one of the contract- 
 ants, he is bound to make a proportionate compensa- 
 tion to the other party. 
 
 A loan is " an onerous contract whereby one party 
 so transfers something of his to another, that it im-- 
 mediately becomes the receiver's with the obligation 
 of afterwards giving back the same, not numerically, 
 but in kind and quality " (Zigliara). It immediately 
 
MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN. 449 
 
 becomes the borrower's, because it is consumed in its 
 use, and it must be returned in kind, because other- 
 wise the contract would be, for example, " purchase 
 and sale." 
 
 The grounds on which the demanding of interest is 
 lawful are four : the loss of the lender in loaning the 
 money ; the profit that he might make by retaining 
 the money, and which he foregoes by making a loan ; 
 the risk to which he exposes himself of not having 
 the sum repaid ; and the benefits thereby accruing to 
 Bommerce and to society in general ; hence the State 
 should fix a legal rate of interest. Yet it is unlawful 
 not only to demand a rate of interest higher than 
 that fixed by civil law, but even to demand any inter- 
 est at all in virtue only of the money loaned- For as the 
 use of the thing is here not really distinct from the 
 thing itself, were the lender of the money to require 
 in addition to the repayment of the principal the pay- 
 ment of a sum for its mere use, he would virtually sell 
 the same thing twice. 
 
 " Usury is properly interpreted to be the attempt 
 to draw profit and increment without labor, without 
 cost, and without risk, out of the use of a thing that 
 does not fructify " (Leo X., in Fifth Council of Vati- 
 can, 1615). 
 
PAKT II. 
 SOCIAL LAW. 
 
 50. Human society is a union of minds, wills, and 
 powers for a common good. — Human society should 
 contain all that is proper to man in his specific nat- 
 ure and in his relations with his fellow-men. But 
 man is essentially a being having mind and will con- 
 joined in unity of person with a material organism. 
 On the other hand, minds do not unite without a 
 common truth, which being proposed to their wills, 
 impels them with common accord to the same good. 
 For the acquisition of this good men are morally 
 united only when they join their moral forces by the 
 help of material means, as language, cohabitation, 
 etc. Therefore human society unites minds and wills 
 which concur to the common good by the help of ma- 
 terial means. 
 
 51. The essential elements of society are multitude, 
 unity, end, and meaois. — Multitude constitutes the 
 quasi-material part of society; unity, which is ef-. 
 fected by authority, is the formal part. Society is 
 the more perfect, the more numerous the elements 
 that are united, the more complete their union, the 
 more universal the good sought after, and the more 
 efficacious the means of attaining it. 
 
 52. The foundation of all society lies in the good 
 which its Tnemhers should wish one another. — The obli- 
 gations upon men which result from association, are 
 
DOMESTIO SOOIETY. i51 
 
 only the confirmation, the determination of these 
 general obligations which result from their likeness 
 in nature. But the foundation of the latter consists in 
 this, that each is bound to love the others and to wish 
 them whatever good he wishes for himself. Such, 
 then, must also be the foundation of society. Hence 
 society should never depart from the moral order, 
 for the good that we should wish for ourselves 
 or others should be no other than the honorable 
 good. 
 
 53. Perfect society is divided into domestic, civil, and 
 religious society. — Society is either perfect or imper- 
 fect. It is perfect when it has for its end the general 
 good of its members and all that can procure their 
 perfection. Society is imperfect if it pursues a par- 
 ticular good ; as literary and industrial societies, etc. 
 Perfect society is of three kinds : domestic, civil, and 
 religious, according as it seeks the perfection and 
 propagation of individuals, or has for special end the 
 good proper to this life, or the life to come. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 Domestic Society. 
 
 akt. i. — natdee oe mabeiage. 
 
 54. Marriage"^ is the society of man and woman united 
 in a community of existence and life. — Marriage is a 
 natural contract by which the spouses engage to give 
 themselves to each other. The society which results 
 
 * The one marriage may, according to the different aspects in 
 which it is viewed, be called a natural contract, a social or c/iml con- 
 tract, a religious contract, and a sacrament. 
 
452 MORAL PBILOSOPST. 
 
 therefrom is not transitory, but it is a stable union, 
 whicli has for its end : (1) the propagation and edu- 
 cation of the human species ; (2) the mutual hap- 
 piness of the married couple. Before Christianity 
 marriage was only a natural association, though of 
 divine institution; in the Church of Christ it is a 
 sacrament. 
 
 55. Marriage is one of the most important acts of 
 inan's life. — In ordinary engagements man stipulates 
 for his private interests, as arbiter of his fortune ; in 
 marriage he stipulates not for himself only, but for 
 others. He engages to become, as it were, a second 
 providence for the new family to which he will give 
 existence ; he stipulates for the State and for human- 
 ity. Hence the multiplicity of protective forms sur- 
 rounding it in both the civil and the religious order ; 
 hence likewise the religious law consecrating among 
 almost all peoples the nuptial tie. 
 
 56. Marriage derives from civil authority only its- 
 purely civil effects ; for the rest it is indebted to religion. 
 — rCivil society supposes domestic society, whose 
 rights it does not create, but recognizes and safe- 
 guards. Hence what regards the constitution of the 
 family does not depend on the State. Such is the 
 case with marriage, which is the foundation of the 
 family. Secondly, civil society supposes religion, 
 which is essential to man as man ; now marriage is 
 matter of religion, for it is consecrated by its end, 
 which is to give existence to a being made in the like- 
 ness of God and destined to glorify Him. Therefore, 
 among all peoples, even among barbarians, marriage 
 has always been attended with sacred rites. Besides, 
 marriage has been raised by Jesus Christ to the dig- 
 nity of a sacrament ; and since the sacraments come 
 from ecclesiastical authority, it follows that marriage 
 
DOMESriO 800IETT. 453 
 
 can depend on the State for none but its purely civil 
 effects.* 
 
 57. Celibacy kept from love of virtue is a more ele- 
 vated state than marriage. — By celibacy kept from 
 love of virtue, man attains a very great intellectual 
 and moral perfection, and puts himself in a condition 
 to reach his last end more surely and more perfectly. 
 The nobility of virtuous celibacy is also manifest from 
 the admiration felt by the people and sages of all 
 times.f 
 
 ABT. n. — UNITY AND INDISSOLUBILITY OF MABEIAGE. 
 
 58. Nature wills that marriage should he a union be- 
 tween one man and one woman.X — It is manifest that 
 unity of marriage is demanded by the good of the 
 married couple and by that of society ; therefore it is 
 consonant with nature. Besides, it is rigorously de- 
 manded in the law of Christ, where marriage has been 
 brought back to its primitive perfection.§ 
 
 * " The dependence [of marriage on the State] is entirely extrin- 
 sic and presupposes a marriage already contracted and a family, or 
 domestic society, already constituted ; for if there were no marriage, 
 it could have no relations to civil society " (Zigliara, Summa Philo- 
 mphica, M. 44, iv.) ; but " the marriage tie is in no way subject to 
 civil power." (vii.) 
 
 f Marriage is of precept for mankind in general, but not for the 
 individual unless the human race be in imminent danger of becoming 
 extinct. It is beyond question that Christian celibacy gives the in- 
 dividual greater liberty for the contemplation and pursuit of truth 
 and the practice of virtue, and thereby confers untold blessings 
 upon society. (Zigliara, § M. 42, viii.) 
 
 X Polyandry opposes the principal end of marriage ; polygamy 
 breeds jealousy, strife, and dissension. Cf . Zigliara, M. 43, x. , xi. 
 
 § The polygamy of the patriarchs of the old law is an apparent ex- 
 ception ; bat two explanations may be given in harmony with the 
 natural law from which God cannot dispense without contradicting 
 
454 MORAL PHILOaOPBT. 
 
 59. Divorce is absolutely contrary to the perfection of 
 marriage. — The dissolubility of the marriage tie would 
 despoil, so to say, those who are united, of the glo- 
 rious titles of husband and wife, father and mother. 
 It is opposed to the children's interest and to the 
 well-being of the State. In the evangelical law mar- 
 riage having been raised to the dignity of a sacra- 
 ment and signifying the indissoluble union of Christ 
 and Hi|S Church, has been re-invested with a stability 
 such as nothing can destroy. 
 
 AET. m. — EECIPEOCAIi DUTIES OP HUSBAND AND WIPE. 
 
 60. The authority in domestic society resides in the 
 husband. — Marriage is a society in which an authority 
 is necessary. But to whom can it belong but to him 
 on whom the Author of nature has bestowed the 
 double authority of physical strength and of reason ? 
 Civil legislations have acknowledged this superiority 
 
 Himself. One explanation " would suppose that mankind beginning 
 in monogamy, from passion and ignorance leaped quickly into polyg" 
 amy ; that the patriarchs in good faith conformed to the practice of 
 their time ; and that God, in their case as with the rest of mankind, 
 awaited His own destined hour for the light of better knowledge 
 to break upon the earth. Whether, meanwhile, by some darkly 
 intelligible stretch of His power He legitimized their unions, who 
 can tell ? " Or again, " God by His supreme dominion can dissolve 
 any marriage. By the same dominative power He can infringe 
 and partially make void any marriage contract without entirely un- 
 doing it. The marriage contract, existing in its fulness and integ- 
 rity, is a bar to any second similar contract. But what, on this 
 theory, the Lord God did with the marriages of the patriarchs was 
 this : He partially unravelled and undid the contract, so as to leave 
 room for a second contract, and a third, each having the bare essen- 
 tials of a marriage, but none of them the full integrity." — Moral Phi- 
 losophy, Stonyhurst Series, p. 273. 
 
DOMESTIC SOCIETY. 455 
 
 by imposing upon the wife the duty of listening to 
 her husband and following him ; and in this they are 
 in accord with the Sacred Scriptures. 
 
 61. In domestic society the wife is not the slave, hut the 
 aid and associate of her husiand. — "Woman has a nat- 
 ural dignity equal to that of man, and although she 
 is subject to him, she yet retains all her natural 
 rights. She is the indispensable aid of man, and 
 shares with him the family cares and duties. She is 
 his associate, because she is one of the contracting 
 parties, and by the matrimonial contract she has been 
 provided with a husband and protector, not a despot. 
 
 ABT. IV. — DUTIES OF PARENTS AMD CHILDREN. 
 
 62. Education is the principal duty that results from 
 paternity ; this duty is common to father and inother. — 
 Education, in its most extended meaning, comprises 
 all the cares whether corporal or spiritual, by which 
 the child is developed, physically, intellectually, and 
 morally. Thus understood, it is certainly a duty im- 
 posed on parents by nature, by society, by God Him- 
 self; by nature which, making the child incapable 
 of preserving and perfecting itself, charges with this 
 care those who have given it existence ; by society, 
 which can be preserved and can prosper only on con- 
 dition that its members have received a suitable 
 physical and moral development ; by God, who by 
 giving children to parents evidently charges them 
 with the duty of making them useful members of 
 civil society and of the Church. The duty of educa- 
 tion is common to father a*id mother, because both 
 concur in giving existence to the child, and because 
 this is required by the very end of education, the 
 harmonious development of body, mind, and heart. 
 
456 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The duties of parents to their children also oblige 
 masters, who are the representatives of parental au- 
 thority. As to moral education, it is essential that 
 parents and those who in any way represent them, 
 offer in their own person models worthy of imitation, 
 for children follow more readily what they see than 
 what they hear. 
 
 63. From the duty of educating follows the right of 
 parents to direct this education personally. — The right 
 of parents to direct the education of their children is 
 founded in the natural law and is therefore inviolable. 
 Hence it is without reason that some moralists con- 
 \ine to the State the right of education. It is in- 
 deed true, that as the children of the family are 
 one day to be members of society, the State has in 
 self-defence and pursuance of its end, which is the 
 temporal good of the community, the right to de- 
 mand that they be suitably trained to fulfil their future 
 duties as citizens. But this by no means implies that 
 education, or even secular instruction, belongs to the 
 State exclusively. The right of the State in this re- 
 gard is limited to affording parents ample facilities 
 for the proper training of their children ; its inter- 
 ference can be justified only in individual cases of 
 manifest neglect. For the rest, the natural love of 
 parents for their offspring will more effectually pro- 
 vide for their education than State control, which in 
 itself is purely temporal, and often with no higher 
 end in view than utility. 
 
 64. The child owes its parents obedience, respect, love, 
 and assistance. — The voice of nature, of religion, and 
 of gratitude, unite in bidding man honor those who, 
 after God, are the authors of his life. Children owe 
 obedience, respect, and love to those also who in 
 their regard represent their parents. 
 
DOMESTIC SOOIETT. 457 
 
 65. The authority of parents over their children is 
 limited in the extent and duration of its exercise. — Edu- 
 cation is the end for which nature gives parents 
 authority over their children. What is required by 
 this education should therefore regulate the exercise 
 of this authority, which, in consequence, will be less 
 exercised as the child advances in years. The child 
 may even withdraw entirely from it when he becomes 
 of age, yet ever fulfilling toward his parents the 
 duties of love, respect, and gratitude. He may also 
 be released from obedience to them in the choice of a 
 state of life ; for in this matter his parents may direct 
 and counsel him, but not oppose or constrain him. 
 
 66. The children of a family owe one another affection 
 and assistance. — Consanguinity and community of ed- 
 ucation and life produce among brothers and sisters 
 those sweet and lasting bonds which cannot be 
 broken without violating the law of nature. 
 
 AET. v. — DUTIES OF MASTEBS mj> SEEVANTS. 
 
 67. The society of masters and servants is lawful:- — 
 This society is founded in the inequality of the condi- 
 tions of life and the reciprocity of social needs. It is 
 indeed constituted by the free consent of man; but 
 though not directly derived from nature, it is never- 
 theless in perfect conformity with the natural law. 
 
 68. The society of masters and servants is an extension 
 of the family, and thus, in a measure, gives rise to the 
 same series of duties. — Servants owe their masters re- 
 
 * A servant " is one bound by an onerous contract to do work useful 
 to another and determined by Ms will ; =• master is one who has a 
 personal right of exacting from another work useful to himself and 
 determined according to his own will, with the obligation of paying 
 him in return the wages agreed upon." — Eusso, § 316. 
 
458 MOBAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 spect, obedience, service, and fidelity ; masters, in turn 
 owe tlieir servants aiFection, care for their spiritual 
 and temporal interests, and fidelity to tlieir contracts. 
 The extent of these reciprocal duties is determined by 
 the nature of the engagements. 
 
 69. Slavery is not absolutely in contradiction to nature. 
 — The state of domestic service is free ; slavery, on 
 the other hand, is a state of perpetual subjection in 
 which a man in exchange for the necessaries of life is 
 bound to give all the profit of his labor to him who 
 supports him. Such a state, though less suited to 
 man's dignity, is not, strictly speaking, contradictory 
 to his nature ; for man has the right to serve his fellow- 
 man under the reserve of his essential rights. But if 
 slavery be understood to deprive a man of all his 
 rights, to degrade him to the level of the brute, and 
 to give to his master the power of life and death over 
 the slave, then is it absolutely opposed to the natural 
 law, since it is essentially destructive of the slave's 
 inalienable rights. 
 
CHAPTEE n 
 
 Civil Society, 
 aet. i. — natuee of civil society. 
 
 70. Civil society is the permanent union of independent 
 families associated to enjoy in comTnon the same rights 
 and privileges. — Man does not find in the family com- 
 plete satisfaction of his wants. , He needs a more ex- 
 tended society comprising the family itself, in which 
 he may find the necessary assistance to enable him to 
 attain the perfection proper to his nature. This union 
 of families is called civil society, or if viewed in rela- 
 tion to the ruling power, political society. 
 
 ABT. II. — THE SOCliL STATE IN EELATION TO MAN. 
 
 71. The social state is natural to man. — 1. This truth 
 is proved by history, which teaches that in all times 
 and in all places men have lived in society ; now, so 
 universal a fact must be due to a law of nature. 2. 
 Unlike the brute, man is not equipped by nature with 
 all that is necessary for the preservation and develop- 
 ment of his being ; it is only society that can satisfy 
 his physical, intellectual, and moral needs. 3. Man 
 is naturally endowed with the faculty of language, 
 but this faculty would be useless were men not called 
 to live in society. 4. Man is naturally inclined to 
 communicate with his kind, to share their sentiments, 
 
460 MOBAL PHILOSOPHr. 
 
 and to help tliem in need. 5. Man is naturally per- 
 fectible ; now, it is manifest that without society he 
 cannot attain the perfection of which he is capable, 
 particularly in the intellectual and the moral order. 
 6. Reason bids man realize, as far as in him lies, the 
 good of order ; now order, both in the culture of sci- 
 ence and the practice of virtue, is most resplendent in 
 society. 
 
 72. It is absurd to say with Hobbes that the natural 
 state of man is perpetual war, and that inen united in 
 society only to free themselves from this state. — The so- 
 cial system of Hobbes is a consequence of his mate- 
 rialistic principles touching the nature of man. "Were 
 his system true, we must necessarily grant that man 
 is inferior to brutes, which are never seen in strife 
 with those of the same species. But experience proves 
 that man is inclined to show benevolence to his 
 neighbor, unless his passions have perverted his in- 
 stincts ; again, reason bids us keep order. Order is 
 manifestly peace and not war. The falsity of Hobbes's 
 system is also proved by its fatal moral and social 
 consequences ; for it legalizes all crime and des- 
 potism. 
 
 73. The opinion of Rousseau, that Tnan is anti-social, 
 and that by force of circumstances he passes froTn the 
 savage to the social state, is false. — This theory is based 
 on an absurd hypothesis. (1) Nowhere has man lived 
 in the solitary and savage state. (2) Rousseau aflSrms 
 that man is born good, that he is endowed by nature 
 with sensitive faculties and with liberty,* and that 
 society depraves him by giving him the use of reason 
 and the development of intelligence ; but these are 
 
 * Liberty, however, as Liberatore observes, cannot even be con' 
 •eived without reason. 
 
OIVIL SOCIETY. 461 
 
 absurdities so manifest that it is needless to refute 
 them. (3) The hypothesis of the compact makes so- 
 ciety impossible; for how could men in the savage 
 state have the notions necessary to comprehend the 
 nature of the social state and realize it by the help of 
 a contract ? (4) This contract would be without 
 force ; whence it follows that men would be free to 
 Jjreak it when it seemed good to them. 
 
 ART. ni. — THE PEIMITIVE FACT THAT BEDUCES TO ACT 
 THE NATUEAL SOCIABILITY OP MAN. 
 
 4. By the very fact of his existence man is constituted 
 in society. — Since men have the same end, the same 
 law, they form a universal society under the authority 
 of God. Yet this society is too general, too abstract ; 
 individuals need for the satisfaction of their wants a 
 less extensive society, having a visible sanction and a 
 positive form. This society is civil society. 
 
 75. The natural and primitive fact that gives rise 
 to civil society is the multiplication of families coming 
 from the same stock. — The causes which actually pro- 
 duce a political association vary according to time, 
 place, and person. In one place it may be a con- 
 tract between several families of different origin ; 
 again, it may result from the domination of some 
 powerful man. But these are fortuitous and variable 
 events. The fact which naturally gives rise to civil 
 society is the multiplication of families coming from 
 a common source. For as families are multiplied, 
 their homes must also be multiplied ; as new rela- 
 tions are established, the city is formed, and with it 
 civil society is constituted, at least in its essentials. 
 
462 MORAL PHILOaOPHT. 
 
 AET. IV. — END OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 
 
 76. The end of civil society is the common external good, 
 regulated so as to procure the individual internal good qf 
 all the Tnembers, and subordinated to their last end. — 
 Nature always furnishes tlie means to fulfil the duties 
 which she imposes ; but she does not give society the 
 means to know and to act directly upon the interior ; 
 therefore society can procure only the common exter- 
 nal gpod of its members. But this is a good only so 
 far as it is a means of arriving at their internal good 
 and future good. Therefore society ought to procure 
 their external good so as to facilitate the acquisition 
 of their internal and future good. When it is said 
 that society should pursue a common good, such a 
 good must be understood as may be shared by all 
 the members of the society. Social justice would be 
 violated if even one member were excluded from par- 
 ticipating in the common good.* 
 
 77. It is an error to hold with Kant that the end of 
 •political society is the reciprocal limitation and harmony 
 of the liherty of its members. — This principle, which is 
 only a consequence of the theories of rationalism on 
 the native independence of man, is false, because it 
 gives society rather a negative than a positive end, 
 and leads directly to egotism and despotism. 1. For 
 if society is limited to preventing any one from using 
 his liberty to the detriment of that enjoyed by others, 
 
 * Russo (§ 330) places the end of civil society in the easier and 
 fuller attainment of the security, well-being, and perfection of 
 the citizens. By security he means immunity from the evils pro- 
 ceeding from physical and moral causes ; by weU-heing, an abun 
 dance of material goods ; by perfection, the development of the Intel, 
 lectual and moral faculties of the citizens. 
 
CIVIL 800IETT. 463- 
 
 it will not unite individual forces for the pursuit of a 
 common good, and each one will act in isolation from 
 the others ; or if it unites its forces for the pursuit of 
 a determinate good, it can do so only by the help of a 
 despotic power. 2. The principle of Kant, besides, 
 results in the ruin of public morality and in indiffer- 
 entism of the State in religious matters; for many 
 crimes, such as blasphemy, suicide, etc., etc., do not 
 encroach upon the liberty of others, and to prescribe 
 a public profession of faith would be to restrain the 
 liberty of each one more than is demanded by respect 
 for the liberty of others. Besides, though liberty in 
 the abstract is not limited, yet in the concrete it is 
 limited both by its object, whose order and end it may 
 not change, and by the duties of the person who is to 
 exercise liberty.* 
 
 AET. V. — ELEMENTS OE OmX SOCIETY. 
 
 78. The essential elements of society are Tuultitude 
 and authority, i.e., subjects and superiors. — Society forms 
 a moral body ; but in every body there must be the 
 members that compose it and the principle that unites 
 them. In the social body, the members are the per- 
 sons that enter into it ; they are called the rnultitude ; 
 the principle which produces unity and order among 
 these members is authority. ■\ Multitude and authority 
 considered in the concrete are the subjects and supe- 
 riors. 
 
 * See Liberatore, p. 335. 
 
 f " Civil authority consists in the right of establishing order in a 
 multitude with a view to attain the end of the state ; civil subjection 
 lies in obedience and in the duty of following the direction given by 
 authority for the attainment of the end. Hence it follows that 
 authority differs widely from dominion, and civil subjection from 
 
464 MORAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 79. The social multitude results proximately from the 
 family, not from the individual. — Kousseau, basing 
 his statement on tlie hypothesis of the state of nature 
 and on the social contract, conceived society to be a 
 union of individuals, and not of families. This asser- 
 tion is contrary to the progress of nature, which pass- 
 ing from the imperfect to the perfect, first gives birth 
 to domestic society and then produces civil society. 
 Domestic rights are anterior to civil rights ; they are 
 more restricted, more indissoluble. Civil society is 
 bound to protect them, but it cannot modify them. 
 Since, then, individuals belong to the family before 
 they become members of civil society, they form civil 
 society only inasmuch as they are already constituted 
 in the family. Besides, the laws are here in accord 
 with reason, since they admit the child to the full 
 enjoyment of his civil rights" only when he has at- 
 tained his majority and has thus passed from domes- 
 tic to civil society. 
 
 80. The natural constitution of society should he or- 
 ganic and not Tnechanical. — Society is a whole whose 
 
 servitude. For dominion . . . consists in the power of dispos- 
 ing at will of something for one's own use. Now dominion is con- 
 cerned with things, not persons ; its use proceeds from liberty, not 
 duty ; its end is the utility not of others, hut of the owner. Au- 
 thority, on the contrary, is directly concerned with persons ; its 
 exercise is prescribed by reason ; it regards not the profit of the 
 superior, but the good oi the whole community. Now the slave as 
 such is compared to things ; he depends absolutely on the will of his 
 master ; in his actions he intends not his own profit, but that of his 
 master. But nothing of this is found in the subject, who even as 
 such retains his personal dignity and right, is directed not by the 
 caprice of another but by law, . . and acts not for the private 
 
 good of the ruler, but for the common good of the whole social body 
 of which he is a part." — Liberatore, Insidtutiones EtMoB ei Jiiiii 
 Xfaturalii, p. 341. 
 
CIVIL SOaiETT. 465 
 
 parts are not inert beings having only the artificial 
 movements imparted to the whole, but intelligent 
 and free beings, each with his own activity and end. 
 And not only of individuals severally is it true that 
 they have their own life and activity, but also of par- 
 ticular associations entering into civil society, such 
 as industrial or scientific unions, and especially those 
 which originate in the family. Therefore the consti- 
 tution of society should be organic. Hence it is 
 easily seen how contrary to the order of nature is 
 that exaggerated centralism which robs individuals 
 and societies of all spontaneity, and makes all social 
 activity proceed from a single principle. 
 
 AET. VI. — NATURE OF CIVIL AUTHOEITY. 
 
 81. Civil authority is the moral power, one and inde- 
 pendent, to direct the actions of the citizens to the com- 
 mon good. — 1. The civil authority is called moral to 
 distinguish it from purely physical force, and also to 
 mark the fact that it is founded in the rational order 
 of things. 2. This authority should be one, other- 
 wise it would not establish unity and order in the so- 
 cial body. Nevertheless, this unity of authority does 
 not exclude a multiplicity of instruments by which 
 the authority functions ; thus, under the supreme 
 head, there are ministers, magistrates, officers, etc. 
 3. The civil authority should be independent; if it 
 were dependent on those whom it governs, it could 
 not direct them toward the common end. But this 
 independence of authority does not imply that it be 
 unlimited; it is necessarily subjected to the moral 
 order and circumscribed in its sphere of action by its 
 proper object. 4. The authority should direct the ac- 
 tions of the subjects toward the common good. Yet, as 
 30 
 
466 MORAL PHILOSOPBT.. 
 
 in the man clothed with public authority we must 
 distinguish the individual from the authority with 
 which he is vested, it is certain that this individual 
 as such can also seek his particular good. 
 
 AET. TII. — ORIGIN OF CIVIL AUTHORITY. 
 
 82. Civil authority in itself proceeds directly from 
 God. — Civil society is natural to man, and authority 
 is an essential element of this society. Therefore su- 
 preme power is a right proceeding from nature itself. 
 But what proceeds from nature has God for its imme- 
 diate author; therefore supreme power in society 
 proceeds immediately from God. Besides, in virtue 
 of the natural law, God wills the maintenance and 
 observance of order. But order is maintained in so- 
 ciety only by authority. Therefore authority is willed 
 by God and proceeds directly from Him. 
 
 83. The cause that primarily determines tJie subject of 
 supreme power is accidentally the consent of the memiers 
 of society ; hut, naturally, it is found in the pre-existent 
 authority of domestic society. — In certain cases, the 
 consent of society determines the man who is to pos- 
 sess civil authority, a power that in itself has pro- 
 ceeded directly from God. This happens when, for 
 example, a society is suddenly formed by the union 
 of several independent families,* or when, a dynasty 
 becoming extinct, society is for the time without a 
 ruler. But these cases are purely accidental ; accord- 
 ing to the order of nature the supreme power is of it- 
 self constituted in civil society by the very principle 
 of the society. For civil society cannot be conceived 
 without the authority that directs it ; therefore the 
 
 — *■ « 
 
 * As in some of the early settlements in America. 
 
OiriL SOCIETY. 467 
 
 principle ot this authority is identical with the princi- 
 ple of civil society. But civil society is, so to say, 
 only a development of domestic society ; for the state 
 supposes towns or villages, which in their turn have 
 originated in the septs or clans that are the develop- 
 ment of the family ; therefore civil authority itself is, 
 as it were, a kind of development of domestic author- 
 ity. 
 
 84. It is an error to say, with Hohhes, that war hdng 
 the natural condition of mankind, they have established 
 among them to stop it a supreme power, invested with all 
 their rights and with unlimited jurisdiction. — Accord- 
 ing to Hobbes, civil power is of purely human institu- 
 tion, like society ; the latter, inasmuch as it is a moral 
 person, is absorbed, and ceases to be anything, while 
 the monarch is all. This theory sanctions the most 
 degrading despotism.* 
 
 85. It is an error to say, with Rousseau, that the civil 
 authority, de jure and de facto, has its origin in social 
 compact. — This theory is false in its principle that 
 human liberty is inalienable, i.e., incompatible with 
 civil subjection, and it makes society radically -im- 
 possible. For, on the one hand, since all men enjoy 
 the same rights, the collective will which establishes 
 public authority should be unanimous ; but this 
 unanimity is absolutely impossible of realization. 
 On the other hand, even if unanimity of particular 
 wills were possible, it would never be other than 
 momentary and transitory, because fathers cannot 
 contract for their children, and also because the right 
 
 *From the principle of Hobbes enunciated in §95 (Moral Philoso- 
 phy), p. 412, it follows that " Nature dictates to every man the right 
 to seek his own happiness, the highest end of his being, at what- 
 ever expense to his fellow-njen. The state of nature, therefore, !s a 
 state of warfare among men." — New American Gyclop(Bdia. 
 
468 MORAL PHILOaOPHT. 
 
 of the multitude being inalienable, according to Rous- 
 seau's teaching, it can break the contract when such 
 action seems good to it. Therefore, the theory of 
 Kousseau, as experience has indeed proved, is pro- 
 ductive of only anarchy and disorder. 
 
 It is replete with absurdities. It puts forth as a 
 means of preserving liberty intact the spoliation of 
 all individual and personal rights. It destroys moral- 
 ity, since it recognizes no law superior to the multi- 
 tude, and it leads to socialism and communism. 
 
 AKT. Vin. — DrVEESE POLITIES.* 
 
 86. The three forms of government to which all others 
 may l)e reduced are monarchy, ansloeracy , and democ- 
 racy. — Supreme power is essential to society ; but 
 the subject of this power varies with the times, the 
 places, and the persons. But the subject of supreme 
 power is either a physical person, i.e., an individual ; 
 or a moral person, i.e., a union of several individuals 
 for a common end. In the former case, it is a mon- 
 archy ; in the latter it is an aristocracy if those 
 banded together to govern are the most notable in- 
 dividuals of the society ; or it is a democracy \ if the 
 people govern themselves by representatives whom 
 they name. To these three forms of government all 
 others may be reduced. 
 
 87. Every polity that rests upon a just title is in it- 
 self legitimate and capable of procuring the happiness 
 of the people. — The civil power, although primarily 
 
 * " The distribution of power in the state, and especially of the 
 sovereign power, is called the polity.'' (Aristotle.) 
 
 f This is representative democracy as opposed to pure democracy. 
 The latter is rarely workable, for it implies that all the mejnbers of 
 the community share directly in the government. 
 
OiriL 800IETT. 469 
 
 derived from domestic power, is yet susceptible of 
 several modifications. Reason demands a polity for 
 every society, but not this or that particular polity. 
 "Therefore, if the power resides justly in one or in 
 many, it is legitimate. It is also suited to procure 
 the happiness of the people, because to this end three 
 things suflice : light of intellect, rectitude of will, and 
 strength of execution ; but these three things may, be 
 present, whether the power resides in a single in- 
 dividual or in many persons. 
 
 88. With respect to a particular people, the polity 
 which suits it iest is that which corresponds most per- 
 fectly to its inanners, its character, and its degree of 
 civilization. — It is with the happiness of society as 
 with that of individuals ; the same kind of rule does 
 not suit all. The best for each is that which is most 
 adapted to his age, his temperament, and his situa- 
 tion. 
 
 89. The polity that best suits a people is the most 
 legitimate for it. — The happiness of a people lies 
 chiefly in order and peace. But that there may be 
 order, everyone must know with certainty who has 
 the right to govern. Nothing will better produce 
 this certitude than evidence of legitimate title in him 
 who governs. In general, says Zigliara, "that polity 
 is best which best secures the end of society and is 
 shown by history to be most firm and lasting." 
 
 90. The goodness of a polity depends not so much 
 upon the form of government, as upon the probity of 
 those ivho govern. — The form of government is like an 
 instrument which by force or skill may be used for 
 good or evil. This is proved by experience ; and 
 hence the great political problem should be to seek 
 out the moral means to hold those who govern to 
 integrity of conduct, rather than the material force 
 
470 MORAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 that is to keep tliein to duty. Such a means is 
 religion. 
 
 91. Absolutely speaking, simple monarchy is the most 
 perfect polity ; yet in view of human weakness, monarchy 
 with aristocracy, or monarchy with democracy, is more 
 advantageous. — It is evident that the more a govern- 
 ment is one, the more perfect it is, because greater 
 order reigns in the State. But no unity can be more 
 perfect than that of an absolute monarchy. But, on 
 the other hand, the most advantageous polity is that 
 which pleases the people most, and which offers the 
 most safeguards against abuse. But, in view of 
 human weakness, such a polity is monarchy when 
 tempered with aristocracy or democracy ; for, on the 
 one hand, all have the pleasure of sharing more or 
 less in the jjower, and on the other hand, the ruler 
 is less exposed to act unjustly, being limited in his 
 authority and aided by many counsellors. 
 
 AET. IX. — MANNEE OF TEANSMITTING SUPEEME POWER. 
 
 92. The supreme power is possessed iy right of heredity, 
 by right of election, or by right of victory. — 1. Transmis- 
 sion by right of heredity is well adapted to procure 
 the good of the people. It admits modifications ac- 
 cording to the usages of the country, which should be 
 respected ; thus, in certain lands, women are entitled 
 to succeed to power, and in itself this is not contrary 
 to the natural law. 2. When the power is communi- 
 cated by election, the election should be made by those 
 only whose knowledge and prudence fit them to make 
 a good choice. 3. Lastly, the acquisition of power 
 by right of victory, is legitimate only when it is the 
 result of a just war, and when the good either of the 
 conquered or of the other nations demands a change 
 
OIVIL 80GIETT. 471 
 
 of government, or a forfeiture of their independence 
 by the conquered people. In all other cases, he who 
 would take possession of the power, would be a 
 usurper. 
 
 93. A usurper cannot acquire hy force either legitimate 
 possession or political authority ; iut he ought to he 
 obeyed in the exercise of his civil mdhorly. It may even 
 happen that a Mnd of prescription in the usurpation ren- 
 ders the expulsion of the usurper illegitiTnate. — It is evi- 
 dent that a usurper cannot by force render the pos- 
 session of power legitimate, for "usurper" means 
 one who unjustly has possession. Neither has he 
 right to distribute political powers among different 
 social bodies, for, not possessing the rights, how can 
 he dispose of them? But although a usurper pos- 
 sesses civil authority illegitimately, the authority is 
 just in itself, since society cannot exist without it ; 
 therefore society should obey this authority, which, 
 in the case of usurpation, can have no other organ 
 than the usurper. And if it should happen that with 
 time he would so strengthen himself that his expul- 
 sion would involve the subversion of social order, it 
 would then be unlawful to atterhpt to drive him out. 
 This the good of society demands ; and in such a case, 
 the legitimate head ought to forego his rights, or at 
 least to suspend their exercise, because evidently he 
 ought not to sacrifice the general good to his private 
 interest. 
 
 ABT. X. — ^EXERCISE OF SUPREME POWER. 
 
 94. Supreme power includes three powers which are es- 
 sential to it : legislative power, executive power, and judi- 
 ciary power. — Legislative power is the right to impose 
 on subjects rules of conduct to instruct them in what 
 
472 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ihej ought to do and what not to do in the interest 
 of social order. Executive power is the power to 
 oblige the members of society to observe the laws im- 
 posed on them. Judiciary power is the right to 
 judge what is in conformity with justice and what is 
 not, and to apply the law to particular cases. These 
 three powers are essential to supreme power ; with- 
 out the first it cannot give direction to the social 
 body ; without the second this direction would be de- 
 prived of all efficacy ; without the third it would re- 
 main abstract and without application. Although 
 both executive and judiciary power are subordinate 
 to legislative power, yet each of these three powers 
 is absolute in its sphere. 
 
 95. The legislative power cannot touch the constitution of 
 the State ; it can he exercised over all those external ads 
 which may he necessary or useful to the public good. — 
 Since the legislative power can be exercised qnly in 
 virtue of the rights which it holds from the constitu- 
 tion of the society, evidently it cannot touch the con- 
 stitution itself. Existence, says the axiom, precedes 
 action. Constitutive right belongs both to the people 
 and to the supreme power ; therefore every change 
 in the constitution must be made by the whole social 
 body and not bj^ the power alone. Outside of what 
 affects the constitution of the State, the legislative 
 power extends to everything that can procure the 
 good of the society. But it is clear that it can be ex- 
 ercised directly upon external acts only, for purely in- 
 ternal acts do not come under human authority ; nor 
 can it, as civil authority, interfere in what concerns 
 religious authority, except to give concurrence and 
 support. 
 
 96. The laws enacted hy the legislative power should 
 he honorable, useful, universal, and suitable. For this 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY. 473 
 
 end the legislative power should know the wants of the 
 people and choose wise and prudent men to judge of the 
 fitness and goodness of the laws. — The laws enacted by 
 the legislative power should be honmable, otherwise 
 they would deviate from the universal end of man, 
 which is the moral good. They should be useful, for 
 they would not otherwise refer to the particular end 
 of society, which is the external good of its members. 
 They should be universal, i.e., they should embrace all 
 the individuals, not excepting the law-giver himself in 
 his capacity of private person. They should be su'it- 
 able, i.e., they should be adapted to the customs of the 
 people for whom they are made. Hence he who ex- 
 ercises legislative power, must have the means of 
 knowing the wants of the people and must be sur- 
 rounded by men whose wisdom and probity will be a 
 help to him in judguig of the fitness and morality of 
 the laws. 
 
 97. The executive power should he faithful, strong, and 
 prudent. — (1) The executive power should he faithful, 
 i.e., subject to the laws.* If it were used arbitrarily 
 and against the law, it would be despotism. (2) It 
 should be strong, otherwise it would be without effi- 
 cacy. The force with which it should be endowed, 
 requires, first, that there be a perfect subordination in 
 all those who concur in the administration of the 
 State, so that the movement proceeding from the su- 
 preme power may be communicated promptly and 
 faithfully even to the last instruments of power. On 
 the other hand, the executive power should be able to 
 exercise sufficient coercive power to repress or pre- 
 vent the resistance offered to the law. (3) The execu- 
 
 ' But this fidelity is perfectly consistent with reprieve or even par- 
 don In individual oases, if such exception tend to the common good. 
 
474 MOBAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tive power should he prudent, lest it becqme odious. 
 Since the subjects enjoy liberty, they should be di- 
 rected not by violence, but with such wisdom that 
 they will voluntarily obey the law. 
 
 98. The judiciary power _ is divided into civil and 
 criminal. The former should he easy of access and such 
 that the judgment may he given surely, promptly, and with 
 the least possihle expense to the parties. The latter should 
 punish evil in such a way that the penalty he as expiatory, 
 medicinal, exemplary, and moderate as possible. — The ju- 
 diciary power, which, rigorously, may be regarded as 
 part of the executive power, is divided into civil and 
 criminal. The civil judiciary power judges the col- 
 lisions of rights which arise among the members of 
 society. That it may answer the needs of society, it 
 is evident (1) that it should be of easy access, particu- 
 larly to those of the lowest ranks in society. (2) 
 There should be certainty in the judgment, and for, 
 this purpose there must be several judges, who should 
 be capable and honest ; within certain limits, appeal 
 to higher tribunals should be possible. (3) It is 
 necessary that justice be administered promptly. and 
 with the least possible expense to the litigants, be- 
 cause order demands that a violated right should be 
 restored as soon as possible, and that the reparation 
 should not be too onerous to the litigants. 
 
 The criminal judiciary power punishes crime as 
 being a disturbance of the social order. The punish- 
 ments which, it inflicts should be necessary and suf- 
 ficient : necessary, otherwise they would not safeguard 
 the rights of all nor even those of the guilty ; suf- 
 ficient, otherwise they would not establish society in 
 security. They will be such if they are reparatory of 
 the troubled order, medicinal for the guilty, or at 
 least exemplary for others, and lastly, as moderate as 
 
OiriL SOCIETY. 475 
 
 possible. But this moderation does not furnish an 
 argument against capital punishment. For whatever 
 several modern philosophers, as Beccaria (1738-1794), 
 Bentham, and Ahrens (1808-1874) say against this 
 punishment which has been inflicted at all times and 
 among all peoples, it is not only just, but very often 
 necessary ; because certain crimes are of such a nat- 
 ure that the punishment of death is just and propor- 
 tioned to their enormity, and this punishment is de- 
 manded by the public security to impress a salutary 
 fear upon the wicked. On the other hand, if author- 
 ity has the right to punish, even with the penalty of 
 death, it has also the power to grant pardon. This 
 power is limited only by the rights of the injured 
 persons or those of social order. 
 
 99. The three functions of supreme authority consid- 
 ered in their exercise demand different sxibjects ; consid- 
 ered in their source and principle, they require hut one 
 subject. — The three principal functions of supreme 
 authority are operations of different nature and 
 demand diverse qualities, which can with difficulty 
 be found in the one individual. Besides, in view of 
 human weakness, the union of these functions in a 
 single person would easily occasion great abuses. It 
 is, therefore, necessary that they be exercised by dif- 
 ferent persons. But it is with these functions as with 
 the operations of the soul, which, although necessarily 
 performed by different faculties, are, nevertheless, one 
 in their principle, which is the soul. In like manner, 
 the functions of the supreme power must be one in 
 the principle from which they emanate, otherwise 
 there would be disorder in society. Those who, fol- 
 lowing Montesquieu, have boasted so much of the di- 
 vision of powers, have paid too much attention to 
 possible abuses and not sufficient to society's absolute 
 need of order and peace 
 
476 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 AET. XI. — DUTIES OF THE EULEE AND HIS SUBJECTS. 
 
 100. The ruler ought: 1. To know th^ art of govern- 
 ing ; 2. To practise the art with an upright loill ; 3. To 
 choose for office instructed and prudent men ; 4. To pro- 
 tect the rights of the citizens, especially of the loeak and 
 poor; 5. To increase daily the public prosperity ; 6. To 
 assure intellectual and, above all, moral and religicas 
 progress ; 7. To remove the causes of material calamity 
 and, in particular, those that favor tlie propagation of 
 error, vice, or irreligion. — These duties are derived from 
 tlie very nature of supreme authority. Since public 
 authority exists in society only to maintain it in order, 
 and to enable it to attain all the perfection of which it 
 is capable, it is evident that the ruler, both in himself 
 and through those whom he has associated with him- 
 self in the exercise of his power, should do all that is 
 possible to procure the threefold perfection, physical, 
 intellectual, and moral, of his subjects both as indi- 
 viduals and as a social body. To this end he will 
 establish an efficient system of police for the preven- 
 tion of crime ; he will enact salutary laws prohibiting 
 the spread of doctrines opposed to the primary truths 
 of religion, and the publication of aught that offends 
 good motals. He will protect the national industries, 
 and try to secure to all a moderate competence, al- 
 ways tempering the rigor of the law with the clem- 
 ency befitting his dignity and the occasion. 
 
 101. TTie duties of subjects are : 1. Resped for their 
 ruler ; 2. Obedience to the laws and to the magistrates 
 charged with their execution ; 3. Love of country. — The 
 authority of the ruler is a participation of God's 
 authority ; therefore it must be honored and respect- 
 ed. Authority is always sacred and inviolable ; the 
 
CIVIL 800IETT. 477 
 
 qualities of the person who is its depository may dim 
 6r enhance its lustre, but they do not change its nat- 
 ure. Secondly, subjects should obey the laws and 
 the magistrates charged with their execution. Power 
 holds from God the right to command and to make 
 laws ; therefore, not to obey the laws is to resist God. 
 But when the laws are evidently opposed to the divine 
 will, the right to command ceases, and obedience, far 
 from being obligatory, would be sinful. In the doubt 
 the presumption is in favor of the power.* The Ihird 
 duty of subjects is love of country. The social body 
 to live and prosper demands the services of those who 
 compose it. Therefore the State has the right to de- 
 mand these services in order to attain its end ; but 
 love of country is a duty common to all, without being 
 the sa,me for all. In the love of country a twofold 
 error is to be avoided : the one is seen in those who 
 not limiting themselves to finding their country dearer 
 to their heart than any other, exalt it beyond measure 
 and believe that they should attribute to it all kinds 
 of perfection. The second is the error of pagans, who 
 make their country a kind of divinity to which they 
 must sacrifice everything, even the personality of the 
 individual, all duty and justice. 
 
 * On resistance to de facto government, Balmez {History of Euro- 
 pean OivUization, chap. 54), writes : 1. " We cannot, under any circum- 
 stances, obey the civil power when its commands are opposed to the 
 divine law. 3. When laws are unjust, they are not binding in con- 
 science. 3. It may become necessary to obey these laws from mo- 
 tives of prudence ; that is, in order to avoid scandal and commo- 
 tions. 4. Laws are unjust from some one of the following causes : 
 When they are opposed to the common weal — when the legislator 
 outsteps the limits of his faculties— when, although in other respects 
 tending to the good of the common weal, and proceeding from com- 
 petent authority, they do not observe suitable equity ; for instance, 
 when they divide unequally the public imposts." See also Zigliara, 
 M. 55, xvii. 
 
PART III. 
 
 THE COMMON LAW OF NATIONS. 
 
 102. Nations attain the perfection proper to them only 
 when they constitute a universal society. — Man tends nat- 
 urally at all times to enlarge the circle of his social 
 relations ; the ultimate term of this tendency is the 
 universal association of people. The collection of 
 rights and duties resulting from this universal asso- 
 ciation constitutes the common law of nations, which, 
 like individual and social law, has its foundation in 
 nature itself. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 Natural Eelations existing between Dippeeent 
 Nations. 
 
 103. Among independent societies, considered abstractly, 
 there exists a perfect equality of rights and duties ; in- 
 equality can arise only from concrete facts. — Indepen- 
 dent societies, considered abstractly, are only the so- 
 cial nature reproduced many times ; but reproduction 
 is not change ; therefore they are perfectly equal. 
 But three kinds of concrete fact, viz., origin, consent, 
 and right, may produce inequality among the socie- 
 ties. Thus, colonies depend on the mother country 
 by origin ; the weak consent from need to submit to 
 
NATURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS. 479 
 
 the powerful ; those who have acted unjustly are 
 punished in virtue of violated right.* 
 
 104. International love is the hasis of all the duties of 
 nations to one another. — If nature imposes on individ- 
 uals the duty of loving one another, with much 
 greater reason does it impose this duty on nations, 
 who represent man in a state of greater perfection. 
 But while the love that we owe others must be recon- 
 ciled with that which we owe ourselves, the love 
 which one nation owes another must be in harmony 
 not only with that which it owes itself, but also with 
 that which is due to its citizens. 
 
 105. The mutual relations hetween nations hind their 
 rulers directly, and all the individuals mediately. — This 
 results from the fact that rulers represent the societies 
 which they govern. 
 
 * ' ' The common law of nations, or t\iejus gentium of the old schools, 
 comprised certain principles or rules of justice, which were recognized 
 as laws in all or nearly all nations; not, however, by any compact either 
 expressed or implied which they entered Into. These laws were 
 common to nations . . . not by convention but by coincidence 
 of judgment. To this kind of law was referred the division of prop- 
 erty ; also, the introduction of slavery ; the transferring of supremo 
 authority from the multitude, to which it is primitively and naturally 
 given, to a ruler, who, for the ends of government. Impersonates 
 the multitude ; the punishment of certain enormous crimes with 
 death, etc. This common right of nations was understood to include 
 not only general laws regulating internal order among the citizens of 
 each nation ; but other laws also which governed the intercourse of 
 nations with each other. . . . International law as a special and 
 complex department of jurisprudence, is of more recent origin."— 
 Hill, Moral Pliilosophy, pp. 327, 338. 
 
CHAPTEE II. 
 
 Peaceful Eelations between Dipfeeent Nations. 
 
 art. i. — ^the duties peesceibed by the love of one 
 nation foe anothee. 
 
 106. Nations are hound in justice to respect the inde- 
 pendence and the territory of other nations, and to put no 
 ohstacle to their perfectio7i. — A nation as such lives in 
 virtue of its own independence ; to deprive it of 
 this is to cause its death politically. So, to violate 
 its territory is to violate its right of property, a right 
 more sacred in a nation than in an individual. Last- 
 ly, to foment discord in the bosom of another people 
 and to propagate vice or error in it, is also opposed 
 to the law of nations. 
 
 107. Nations ought in benevolence to aid one another, 
 but only in so far, hoivever, as will not injure themselves. — 
 The duties of benevolence bind nations no less than 
 individuals. Therefore they ought to aid one another 
 to acquire intellectual and moral perfection, and to 
 oifer assistance in civil troubles and public calamities. 
 
 ART. II. — COMMEECE. 
 
 108. Commerce is necessary to procure the good which 
 nations ought to wish one another. — Nature produces 
 different products in each country ; therefore, that 
 every country may have all that is necessary or use- 
 ful to it, the different nations should exchange their 
 
PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS. 481 
 
 products with one another. This exchange not only 
 develops the material prosperity of nations, but also, 
 as experience shows, singularly favors their progress 
 in civilization.* 
 
 109. Every nation has the right to establish commerce 
 with those nations who may wish to exchange their 
 products with it; it has also the right to prohibit the 
 exportation of its own merchandise or the importation of 
 foreign merchandise and to subject the latter to^ imposts. 
 — It would consequently be contrary to international 
 law if one nation should arrogate to itself the right to 
 establish commerce to the exclusion of other nations. 
 It would also be contrary to international law if one 
 nation should be denied its right of prohibiting the 
 importation or the exportation of merchandise and.of 
 subjecting them to various taxes. This right has its 
 foundation in the independence of the nation and in 
 its duty of warding off whatever may injure its ma- 
 terial or moral well-being. 
 
 AET. III. TREATIES AND THE EIGHT OF EMBASSY. 
 
 110. Treaties are contracts between nations, and are 
 subject to the same laws as contracts between indi- 
 viduals. — 
 
 * Commerce "develops intelligence by the number and variety of 
 the objects which it examines, the sight of distant places to which, 
 thanks to interchange of commodities, it conducts man by land and 
 8ea, by its constant incentive to the intellect to contrive new ways 
 of extending trade, by the mutual communication of minds which 
 it brings about, by contact with diverse manners, whence arise 
 mutual moderation and greater development of resources." Yet 
 care should be taken that the liberty given to commerce have just 
 limits; that the rich and powerful do not oppress the weak and 
 Indigent; that occasion be not taken to introduce evil morals and 
 overstock the market with useless articles; that exportation hi 
 not excessive. Cf. Liberatore, vol. iii., p. 344* 
 
 31 
 
482 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Treaties are valid only in so far as their object and 
 end are conformed to justice and good order ; they 
 are dissolved by the same causes that remove the ob- 
 ligation of contracts between individuals. Treaties 
 are equal or unequal according as the terms are equiv- 
 alent or not. They are personal or real according as 
 they directly and primarily regard the ruler himself 
 or the State. 
 
 111. The right of embassy is necessary to p^-eserve the 
 relations that sTwuld exist among nations. — Peoples and 
 their rulers cannot preserve the relations which they 
 should have with one another without the aid of 
 persons to represent them ; therefore the right of 
 embassy is founded in nature, as are also the relations 
 which the nations should preserve with one another. 
 
 112. The principal duty of embassadors is loyalty ; 
 their principal prerogative is inviolaiility. — Since the 
 mission of the embassador is to maintain the peaceful 
 relations existing between two nations, he can do 
 nothing that would be a subject of legitimate com- 
 plaint, and should strive unceasingly to strengthen 
 the bonds that unite them. On the other hand, the 
 nature of his office claims the privilege of inviola- 
 bility and the liberty of communicating at will with 
 the government that he represents. Hence he is not 
 subject to the nation to which he is sent. 
 
CHAPTEE m. 
 
 Wab. 
 abt. i. — ^nature and justice op war. 
 
 113. War is a state of two or more nations contending 
 hy violence to maintain their right. — Nations have 
 rights as well as individuals ; therefore, as individ- 
 uals may maintain their rights by force, so also inay 
 nations ; yet with this difference, that individuals 
 may through virtue sacrifice their right, while nations 
 in most cases cannot do so without failing in their 
 duty to the citizens. War is said to be a state, because 
 it includes the whole period of hostile feeling 
 and action between the two nations. It is called a 
 conflict of nations, for they are the subject and term 
 of war. The definition adds iy violence, to distinguish 
 war from peaceful contention ; and to maintain tJieir 
 right, to mark the end of just war. 
 
 114. War is either offensive or defensive. — It is offen- 
 sive when it attacks an enemy in peace ; it is defen- 
 sive when it repels the invasion of an enemy that has 
 first attacked. 
 
 115. 7%at a war he just, it is necessary : 1. that the 
 cause he just f 2. that the war he truly inevitable ; 3. 
 that it be made hy puhlic authority ; 4. that it he made 
 with the purpose of procuring an honorable peace ; 5. 
 that it he puhlicly proclaimed ; 6. that it he lawful in 
 the means which it employs. — 1. The motive of war 
 should be the repairing of an important right vio- 
 
484 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lated in a determinate manner, and not a motive of 
 glory or utility. 2. It should be inevitable: the evils 
 brought on by war are so great that to make it legiti- 
 mate all means ought to have been employed previ- 
 ously to settle the dispute peacefully. 3. Since war 
 is a social act, it should be made by the authority 
 of him who represents the society. 4. It should be 
 made only in view of peace, since it is itself a state 
 contrary to nature, and hence lawful only as a neces- 
 sary means of restoring harmony between nations. 
 5. It should be preceded by a public proclamation, 
 at least on the part of the aggressor, otherwise -he 
 would act as a pirate and not as a civilized man. 6. 
 War should employ none but legitimate means.* 
 
 ART. II. DUTIES DURING AND AFTER WAR. 
 
 116. During the war'no more damage should he done 
 than is necessary to repulse the enemy and oblige him to 
 repair the violated right j the laws of justice and humavr- 
 ity should he observed not only ivith neutral peoples, hut 
 also with the enemy.— 1. No violence should be used 
 upon neutral States, unless they are bound by some 
 preceding treaty. 2. The license of soldiers should 
 be held in check, so that they may cause no harm to 
 inoffensive individuals, nor give themselves up to pil- 
 lage and conflagration, nor outrage morality or relig- 
 ion.f 3. Faith should be kept in conventionsj armis- 
 tices, etc. 4. Peace should always be proposed as 
 
 * War begun to spread religion is unjust, but not war under- 
 talien to defend it against evU aggressors. 
 
 t Hence it is forbidden to use means not necessary to repel the 
 enemy and affecting those also who offer no violence; as the poi- 
 soning of water and food supplies, and the causing of pestilence. 
 
WAR. 485 
 
 end, and should not be rejected when it can be 
 granted on jnst conditions. 
 
 117. After the war, the conq%eror shovid demand 
 nothing more than is necessary to assure an honorable 
 peace and to compensate for the damage caused hy the 
 war. — The conqueror should be quided by the rules 
 of justice and equity, and should not forget the ties 
 of mutual love that still bind nations, even when one 
 of them has been unfaithful to its duty.* Yet if the 
 peace of his own nation or of other states require it, 
 he may, if the war has been just, deprive the con- 
 quered nation of its independence. 
 
 * Killing in war is always indirect, as in cases of self-defence. 
 Consequently, a similar train of reasoning is to be applied. In 
 capital punishment only is the killing direct 
 
CHAPTEK IV. 
 
 The Society of Nations. 
 
 118. 'I%e nations are destined iy nature to unite under 
 « new and more extended form of society. — The nations, 
 finding themselves in contact with one another, are 
 obliged to aspire to a common good, which consists in 
 order ; it is, therefore, the design of nature that they 
 form a universal society. The same conclusion is 
 drawn from the need which nations experience of 
 associating for their material, intellectual, and moral 
 development. 
 
 119. The universal society of nations, far from injur- 
 ing their independence, is its surest guarantee. — As civil 
 society is the most powerful protection of the domes- 
 tic order, s6 the universal society of nations is des- 
 tined to assure the national independence and upright 
 government of each of the associated peoples. 
 
 120. The authority destined to rule this universal 
 society is naturally polyarchical, hut it may also he mon- 
 archical. — Nations are in themselves equal, therefore 
 they all naturally share the authority in the person 
 of their representatives who are united in a general 
 assembly. Yet it depends on their will to delegate 
 the whole power to one, as happened in the empire of 
 the middle ages. 
 
 121. The associated nations should apply themselves to 
 the gradual formation of a government endowed in the 
 highest degree with unity and efficacy ; and this govern- 
 
THE 800IETT OF NATIONS. 487 
 
 ■ment should have threefold power, legislative, executive, 
 and judiciary. — The goYernment of this universal 
 society should possess the conditions of all govern- 
 ment. The more it is one and efficacious, the more 
 will harmony reign among the nations. If all inter- 
 national controversies and all the abuses of power by 
 those who govern could legitimately be summoned to 
 its tribunal, there would soon be an end of all inter- 
 national or civil war. 
 
APPENDIX ON EELIGIOUS SOCIETY. 
 
 ABT. I. — NATUEE AKD OEGAOTZATION OF THE CHURCH. 
 
 122. Besides domestic and civil society man also needs 
 religious society. — Just as man is impelled by the in- 
 stinct of his nature and by his reason to form domes- 
 tic and civil society, so also is he solicited to place 
 himself in religious society. For there lies upon all 
 men a necessity to meet together to manifest the in- 
 most sentiment of their hearts, namely, the religious 
 sentiment, and to help one another both in the belief 
 and the practice of religion. To this natural inclina- 
 tion there is added the precept of reason, which pre- 
 scribes to man to pay worship to the divinity in his 
 totality as an individual and as a social being. If 
 from the natural order one rises to the supernatural, 
 then the necessity of religious society appears even 
 more evident. For man cannot attain his super- 
 natural end if he is not a member of that visible 
 society, the Church, which Christ established to unite 
 within its pale all the peoples of the earth. 
 
 123. jReligious society has for end to render God the 
 worship due to Him and to enable men to arrive at eternal 
 happiness. — Eeligious society has no other end than 
 that of religion itself, i.e., divine worship and the 
 happiness of man in the other life. This end, which 
 belongs necessarily even to natural religion, is, in the 
 Church of God, of a more elevated order, the order of 
 grace. But religion enables us to attain not only the 
 
RELIGIOUS SOOIJBTT, 489 
 
 happiness of the other life, but, as appears from both 
 reason and experience, it is the most certain means of 
 assuring in the present life the happiness of the in- 
 dividual and of society. 
 
 124. Since the end of religious society depends neither 
 on persons nor on places, hut solely on the immutable and 
 universal relation of men loith God, it is in its nature one 
 and universal. — This unity and universality, though 
 resulting from the very essence of religion, yet, in 
 view of the diversity of the character and manners of 
 nations, would be impossible to the unaided powers 
 of nature. But God by His grace has remedied the 
 defect of nature, and has established unity and uni- 
 vorsality in His Church. 
 
 125. The form of government in the Church of God 
 is a simple monarchy, tempered in the exercise of its 
 power with aristocracy and democracy. — The form of 
 government in the Church is a simple monarchy, since 
 the supreme power resides in a single person, who is 
 the Sovereign Pontiff. It is tempered in the exercise 
 of its power by a kind of aristocracy ; for, in the 
 councils, the bishops, in union with the Pope, exercise 
 supreme jurisdiction, and in their own dioceses they 
 are true spiritual princes, making laws and exercising 
 all the other functions of power. But, besides this, 
 there is in the Church an element of democracy, in 
 this sense that no one is excluded from even the 
 highest ecclesiastical functions. Thus, even from a 
 rational point of view, the Church may be styled the 
 most perfect of governments : it has the unity of 
 monarchy, the expansive action of democracy, and 
 with all this the temperament of a strong aristocracy. 
 
 126. The Church is a true spiritual kingdom, established 
 by God among men, entirely distinct from the civil power, 
 and of a much nobler order. — The Church is distinct from 
 
490 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the civil power. For its members are spread over the 
 whole world, its end is supernatural, the form of its 
 government proceeds directly from God, it exercises 
 a direct influence on the moral order ; while civil 
 society is. restricted to a particular country, its end 
 is temporal and natural, its actual polity depends on 
 the liberty of men, its influence is exercised directly 
 only upon the external order of things. Hence it is 
 evident, that the Church is of a more elevated order 
 than civil society. 
 
 ABT. n. — BIGHTS OF THE CHUECH. 
 
 127. The Church has the right to spread through the 
 whole world and does not need the consent of the civil 
 power. — This right evidently arises from the duty 
 which Christ has imposed upon the Church of preach- 
 ing the Gospel in the whole world. 
 
 128. The Church has the right to constitute itself 
 wherever there are faithful, and to establish mijiisters as 
 the organs of its spiritual authority. — The faithful are 
 the subjects of the Church, whom it should direct 
 and govern wherever they are to be found. It can 
 accomplish this duty in so far only as it has the right 
 to constitute itself according to the order of its divine 
 hierarchy in every place where the faithful are. 
 
 129. The power of the Church is threefold — legislative, 
 executive, and judiciary. — Since this triple power ap^ 
 pertains necessarily to every society, it should belong 
 also to the Church. But because this power in the 
 Church is of divine institution, it possesses this triple 
 power without division, and nothing can prevent its 
 exercise. 
 
 130. , The Church has the right to use coercive power, 
 and even material force. — If the Church had not 
 
EELiaiOUS SOOIETT. 491 
 
 this right, its authority would be vain. Eecourse to 
 material force is often necessary to the Church to 
 repress culpable external acts of men. Moreover, 
 because the swerving of the will takes its rise in the 
 senses, it is necessary to act upon the senses to restore 
 the equilibrium of man's moral nature. 
 
 131. The Church has the right of permanent property 
 and can possess temporal goods. — This right belongs 
 naturally to every society; therefore it belongs to 
 the Church. Without permanent property, it could 
 not provide for its subsistence and would lack the 
 necessary means to attain its end.* Hence in the 
 designs of Providence the Temporal Power acquired 
 by the Popes was a means to secure "the free 
 and undisturbed development of their sublime pre- 
 rogative." t Ever since they were despoiled of their 
 possessions in 1870, they have not ceased to claim 
 " that freedom be again restored to the Holy See by 
 the recovery of the temporal power." J 
 
 132. The Church has the right to institute religious 
 orders or associations, in which the faithful profess a 
 m,ore perfect life with determinate rules, under the gov- 
 ernment of a special authority lohich is dependent on the 
 Church. — This right is only a consequence of that in 
 virtue of which the Church develops freely within the 
 limits of its proper activity and its proper end. This 
 belongs to the Church, just as to the State appertains 
 the right to establish particular associations, such as 
 armies, academies, etc., which serve to defend it and 
 make it prosperous. To impair this right of the 
 
 * See Propositions xxvi., xxvii., of the Syllabus. 
 
 f American Catlwlics and the Temporal Power of the Pope, by 
 Joseph F. Schrofeder, D.D., American Gatholic Quarterly Bemew, ToL 
 xvii., p. 72. 
 
 X Encyclical Inscrutabili, April 21, 1878. 
 
492 MORAL PMILOSOPHT. 
 
 Church is to impair the rights of the citizens, whom 
 no human authority can prevent from taking- the 
 means to attain their end with the greatest security. 
 
 AET. ni. — MUTUAL EELATIONS OF CHUECH AND STATE. 
 
 133. The Church is entirely independent of the State. — 
 The Church has for its object the supernatural and 
 divine order, while the State has for its object the 
 natural and human order. Therefore, unless it be 
 granted that the divine order is subordinate to the 
 human, the Church cannot be subordinate to the 
 State. Secondly, the Church is immutable ; therefore 
 it cannot be subject to the State, which by its nature 
 is various and changeable. 
 
 134. In the present condition of society the temporal 
 power is necessary to tlie independence of the Church. — 
 To protect the independence of the Church, it is in- 
 dispensable that the Pope reside in a place where no 
 other power reigns ; otherwise he could be harassed 
 in the exercise of his ministry, or at least doubts could 
 be raised as to the full liberty of his acts. And since 
 there is no middle term between prince and subject, 
 it follows that the Pope can be independent in that 
 place only in which he is also temporal prince. 
 
 135. The State cannothe separated from the Church. — 
 The end of the State cannot be separated from the 
 end of the Church, since the former is a means to at- 
 tain the latter. Secondly, were the State to separate 
 from the Church, there would be great embarrassment 
 for the conscience of subjects if the State should 
 impose laws contrary to those of the Church, which 
 would not fail to happen frequently. Hence as the 
 Church comes to the aid of the State in maintaining 
 the citizens in the love of duty and in obedience to 
 
BBLIQIOUS SOCIETT. 493 
 
 leg-itimate authority, so the State should lend support 
 to the Church in defending its rights, in facilitating 
 the exercise of its ministry, and in repressing those 
 who might wish to impede its action. 
 
 136. AWiougli the State is independent in the exercise of 
 the power proper to its institution and end, yet absolutely 
 it is subordinate to the Church.— Just as the Church 
 should be supreme in the order of religion, so the 
 State should be supreme in the civil order, because 
 it also constitutes a perfect society, distinct in its 
 origin, end, and means. Men should, therefore, obey 
 the State in temporal matters, but the Church in spi- 
 ritual matters. But because the end of the Church is 
 much more elevated than that of the State, the State, 
 absolutely, should be subordinate to the Church. If 
 there be a collision of rights, that of the Church 
 should prevail. 
 
 4.ET. IV. — BELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND INTEB- 
 NATIONAL SOCIETY. 
 
 137. 77ie Church naturally gives rise to a universal so- 
 ciety among nations. — Without religious association 
 the universal society of nations is impossible, because 
 union cannot exist among men differing in belief and 
 customs. Besides, owing to the passions of men, union 
 cannot long subsist where the powerful restraint of 
 religion is wanting to keep them in bounds. Kelig- 
 ious association, on the contrary, leads naturally to 
 temporal association. Thus, from the religious com- 
 munion which the Church establishes among the na- 
 tions subject to her, there naturally follows a union 
 of even temporal interests. But the universal society 
 which the Church naturally establishes, although es- 
 sentially united to the Church and subsisting in the 
 
494 MORAL PHIL080PEY. 
 
 Church, is, nevertheless, a society distinct from the 
 Church in nature, formation, end, and means. 
 
 138. Although the authonty in this universal society 
 is naturally poly archie, yet from its nature it is fitting 
 that it should he vested in the person of the Sovereign 
 Pontiff. — The temporal rights of nations remain com- 
 pletely independent of the Church; therefore each 
 has a right to share in the authority which is to- 
 govern the universal society. But this authority 
 naturally tends to revert to him who is the best fitted 
 to secure the social good ; therefore it will be f oiind 
 especially in the person of the Sovereign Pontiff, who 
 on account of the influence of his religious authority 
 and the moral power inherent in his office, is the most 
 proper person to secure order, peace, and mutual as- 
 sistance among the nations. 
 
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The history of philosophy goes back to the very 
 origin of the human race. In all times man has 
 sought to know the cause of the phenomena of which 
 he was witness. Neviertheless, if we except the monu- 
 ments of Oriental philosophy, to which it is difficult 
 to assign a precise date, authentic works are not older 
 than the sixth century before the Christian era. It is 
 only from this date that we can follow without inter-i 
 ruption the progress and succession of philosophical 
 •Yorks down the ages. The long intervening period 
 may be divided into three general epochs : the first 
 epoch, that of ancient philosophy, begins with Thales 
 (B.C. 600) and ends with the death of Proclus (a.d. 
 485). Oriental philosophy, though anterior by some 
 centuries, is included in this epoch ; the second, that 
 of the middle age, extends from Boethius (a.d. 500) to 
 Gerson (1395) ; the third, that of modern philosophy, 
 begins with the movement of the Benaissance in the 
 fifteenth century. 
 
AliTCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 
 Oeiental Philosophy. , 
 
 Oriental Philosopliy comprises all that is known af. 
 tiie speculations of the human mind in the Orient, and 
 principally in India, China, and Persia. The oldest 
 writings in which we can trace the primitive philoso- 
 phy of India are the sacred books known as the 
 Vedas, the compilation of which is attributed to 
 Vyasa about the twelfth century before Christ. 
 
 Pantheism is the basis of the religious system con- 
 tained in these books, yet it is especially in the 
 Vedanta, a philosophical work also attributed to 
 Vyasa, that it is presented in its greatest metaphysi- 
 cal precision and accepted with its most exaggerated 
 consequences. Ancient India has likewise produced 
 a great number of philosophical works in which the 
 most contradictory systems are in turn exposed. 
 The strangest theories of our days — materialism, ide- 
 alism, scepticism, and others — have thqir counterpart 
 in the Hindoo philosophy. The rules of reasoning, 
 those of the syllogism in particular, are presented 
 with such precision and detail that we know not 
 whether it is to Greece or to India that the priority 
 of the science of logic belongs. Yet, in spite of this 
 variety of philosophical systems, it is pantheism that 
 predominates in the Hindoo religion and literature, 
 and from it several sects have deduced not only ideal 
 but even moral arid practical consequences. 
 
ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 497' 
 
 It is likewise in the Kings, the sacred books of 
 China, that we must seek the first traces of its phi- 
 losophy. The Kings date back to the remotest anti- 
 quity ; they contain principles that deviate little from 
 the true primitive traditions, and embody remarkable 
 ideas of God, of man, and of the relations existing 
 between Creator and creature. About the sixth cen- 
 tury before the Christian era these books gave rise to 
 two schools of philosophy, which at the same time 
 constitute two religious sects. One is metaphysical, 
 that of Lao-Tseu : his doctrines greatly resemble 
 those of Pythagoras and Plato. The other school, 
 founded by Confucius, is chiefly moral. It is the 
 peculiar character of his doctrine that it reduces all 
 the virtues to filial piety, from which, again, it derives 
 all duties, whether toward family, country, or God 
 Himself. This doctrine, apparently so beautiful, has 
 exerted a fatal influence upon China. By confounding 
 family and country, Confucius has made the Chinese 
 nation a race of children, blindly subject to their sov- 
 ereign. About the thirteenth century of the Christian 
 era a new school was formed in China, and by this 
 materialistic pantheism was propagated. 
 
 The doctrines of ancient Persia are contained in 
 the writings known as the Zend-Avesta and attributed 
 to Zoroaster. The dominant idea of the Zend-Avesta 
 is dualism ; it bases everything in the universe on the 
 antagonism between Ormuzd, the principle of good, 
 and Ahriman, the principle of evil ; men are good or 
 bad according as they follow the one or the other of 
 these principles. 
 
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PiKST Period (e.g. 600-400). 
 
 Greek Philosophy may be divided into three pe- 
 riods. The first (e.g. 600-400) extends from Thales to 
 Socrates. It comprises five distinct ■ schools : the 
 Ionic, the Italic, the two Eleatic schools, and the 
 school of Sophists. All the philosophers of these 
 different schools proposed to themselves above all 
 else to solve the problem of the origin of things. 
 
 The Ionic school, of which Thales of Miletus (B.C. 
 587) is the founder, studied the universe from a phys- 
 ical stand-point and began with the observation of 
 phenomena. Thales said that water was the origin 
 of things, that God was the intelligence who together 
 with water forms beings; Anaximander (e.g. 560) de- 
 rived all things from the slime of the earth ; Anaxi- 
 manes (e.g. 530) assigned the air as their principle ; 
 whereas Heraclitus (e.g. 500) asserted that it was fire. 
 According to Anaxagoras (e.g. 475) the primitive 
 elements of bodies are of several different species, 
 but attract one another in proportion as they are 
 like in nature. He returned to the idea of God, which 
 Thales had taught, but his successors had cast into 
 oblivion. — Empedocles (e.g. 450) combined all these 
 systems ; he admitted four elements, water, earth, air, 
 and fire, and a motive principle to unite and divide 
 them. 
 
ANGIENT PHILOSOPHY. 499 
 
 The Italic school was founded by Pythagoras (b.c. 
 540). He taught that numbers were the principle 
 of all things, and as all numbers begin from unity, he 
 concluded that absolute unity is the first principle. 
 In his doctrine, he did not, like the Ionic school, con- 
 fine himself to the physical order, but included the 
 moral order and established the subordination of 
 matter to spirit. — The principal, disciples of Pythag- 
 oras were Timseus of Locris, Ocellus of Lucania, and 
 Archytas of Tarentum. 
 
 The two schools of Elea followed the steps of the 
 Ionic and the Italic school. One of these, the atom- 
 istic, had for its leaders Leucippus and Democritus 
 (B.C. 590), who explained everything by eternal atoms 
 infinite in number. The other, the metaphysical 
 school, had three chief representatives : Xenophanes 
 (B.C. 536), Parmenides (B.C. 465), and Zeno of Elea 
 (B.C. 450), who denied finite realities and professed 
 the most formal pantheism. 
 
 The last school is that of the Sophists, the most 
 celebrated of whom are Gorgias (b.c. 430), and Pro- 
 tagoras (B.C. 422). These sceptics, in presence of the 
 contradictions of the philosophers who had preceded 
 them, concluded that there was no absolute truth and 
 that man could not arrive at any certain knowledge. 
 
 Second Period (b.c. 400-200). 
 
 In the fourth century before Christ, Socrates (B.C. 
 399) opened a new era of philosophy. Eejecting the 
 speculations and systems of preceding schools, he 
 aimed to give philosophy a practical end, and ap- 
 plied himself to the study of man and of the moral 
 world. He taught that the soul contains the germs 
 of truth, but so choked up by the vain opinions to 
 
500 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPBT. 
 
 wHcli tlie passions give birtli, that for their de- 
 velopment it is necessary to begin by freeing it 
 from these false notions. And such was the method 
 adopted by Socrates in teaching, and since called 
 Socratic induction. 
 
 Immediately after Socrates come four schools of 
 little importance : 1° The Cynical school, founded by 
 Antisthenes (b.c. 380), which placed virtue in a haughty 
 independence of external things. — Diogenes (B.C. 324) 
 was the most complete representative of this school ; 
 2° The Cyrenaic school, founded by Aristippus (b.c. 
 380), which taught that the end of life consists in the 
 pleasures of sense ; 3° The Sceptical school, founded 
 by Pyrrho (B.C. 288), who referred all philosophy to 
 virtue, inferred the inutility of science, and sought 
 to prove its impossibility; 4° The Megaric school, 
 founded by Euclid (b.c. 400), whose philosophy was 
 the doctrine of Xenophanes modified by Socratic 
 influence. 
 
 These schools had little power ; but not so the 
 four great schools that produced the philosophic de- 
 velopment promoted by Socrates : 1° The school of 
 Plato, or the Academy ; 2° The school of Aristotle, or 
 the Lyceum ; 3° The school of Epicurus ; 4° The 
 school of Zeno, or the Portico. 
 
 Plato (B.C. 388) is one of the greatest geniuses of 
 antiquity. In his numerous works he has developed 
 great and sublime truths whenever he takes the tra- 
 ditional beliefs for his basis, but he falls into error 
 when he accepts no other guide than his own reason. 
 Thus he has erred upon most of the great questions of 
 philosophy : on the origin of ideas, on the criteria of 
 certitude, on the nature of the union between soul and 
 body, on the unity of the soul, its origin and destiny. 
 The principal writings of Plato are : Orito, on the duty 
 
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHT. 501 
 
 of the citizen ; Phmdo, on immortality ; the First Ald- 
 iiades, on the nature of man ; the Second Alcibiades, on 
 prayer ; Gorgias, on the end of rhetoric and of justice ; 
 Protagoras, on sophists ; the Republic, on the plan of an 
 ideal city ; and the Laws. As to form, the works of 
 Plato display an admirable perfection ; it is through 
 this especially that the philosopher has exercised so 
 profound and extensive an influence both in ancient 
 and in modern times. 
 
 Aristotle of Stagyra (b.c. 331), a disciple of Plato, 
 surpassed his master in the depth and extent of his 
 knowledge. Metaphysics and natural history, logic 
 and physics, and poetry, he has embraced all. The 
 theory of the syllogism comes from him, and has re- 
 ceived from him a complete exposition. His works 
 on physics and natural history were for centuries a 
 recognized authority. On the nature of bodies, on 
 the soul and its faculties, on ideas, he has taught 
 doctrines that are full of deep truths and were the 
 basis of the great labors of the Scholastic philoso- 
 phers. Nevertheless, he has fallen into very grave 
 errors, especially in morals and politics, for he was 
 buried in the darkness of paganism. — Of the Peri- 
 patetics, or disciples of Aristotle, the chief are The- 
 ophrastus (b.c. 322) and Straton (b.c. 289). 
 
 Epicurus (B.C. 309) professed the atomistic doctrine 
 of Democritus. Egoism and skilfully calculated 
 pleasures — such is the summary of his morality, 
 which all ages have justly branded with disgrace. 
 When introduced into the Roman empire, Epicurean- 
 ism found an eloquent interpreter in the poet Lucre- 
 tius (B.C. 50), who contributed not a little to propa- 
 gate its tenets. 
 
 Zeno (B.C. 300), the founder of Stoicism, taught a 
 doctrine which, in its physical theories, touched on 
 
502 HISTORY OF PHIL080PHT. 
 
 Epicureanism, and, ia its morals, on Platonism. In' 
 his opinion there is nothing but body ; everything is 
 subject to the laws of fatality ; all cognition is derived 
 from sensation. As to ethics, justice should be the 
 sole motive of man's actions ; to be truly wise, one 
 must repress all the emotions of the soul ; .justice is 
 the only good, injustice is the only evil ; sickness and 
 death are neither good nor evil. From this it is evi- 
 dent that Stoicism is contradictory in its principles 
 and in its morality. — The principal Stoics were Chry- 
 sippus (B.C. 230) ; and later Seneca (b.c. 30), Epictetus 
 (B.C. 50), and the emperor Marcus Aurelius (a.d. 161). 
 
 The school founded by Plato had been styled the 
 Academy. By the name of the Old Academy that 
 epoch has been designated during which Plato's dis- 
 ciples respected his doctrines ; by that of the Second 
 or Middle Academy, the epoch that witnessed the first 
 reform of Plato's teaching' ; and by that of the New 
 Academy, the epoch in which a second reform was 
 attempted. — Arcesilas (b.c. 260) was the founder of 
 the Middle Academy^ : he reduced all human certitude 
 to probability under the name of acatalepsy. — Carne- 
 ades (B.C. 180) founded the New Academy. According 
 to him, objective truth exists, but man is incapable of 
 attaining anything beyond a more or less probable 
 conjecture. The principles of the New Academy were 
 spread in the Roman world, and found their most il- 
 lustrious exponent in Cicero (b.c. 43), who formulated 
 no system of his own, but faithfully reproducied the 
 doctrines of the Greek philosophy. In his philo- 
 sophical writings he has treated all the great ques- 
 tions, sometimes with positiveness, and again with 
 doubt. 
 
 About this same epoch there was a g^asi-resurrec- 
 tion of the old school of Pyrrho ; doubt was again 
 
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHT. 503 
 
 systematized and presented as the necessary term of 
 all philosophic labors. — ^nesidemus (b.c. 20) pro- 
 fessed a positive and rigorously formulated scepti- 
 cism. But it was Sextus Empiricus (a.d. 180) who, 
 of the ancients, exposed scepticism with most science 
 and extensiveness ; he attacked all the doctrines of 
 his predecessors and strove to convict them of un- 
 certainty. 
 
 Thibd Peeiod (a.d. 200-500). 
 
 The third period of ancient philosophy begins with 
 Christianity and ends with the invasion of the barba- 
 rians. It, may be divided into three distinct schools : 
 1° The Gnostic school ; 2° The Neoplatonic school ; 
 and 3° The Christian school. 
 
 Gnosticism is a mixture of Oriental doctrines and 
 Christian dogmas ; it gave birth to divers systems, all 
 of which, however, may be reduced to two, pantheism 
 and dualism. Pantheism is seen in the systems of 
 Apelles (150), Valentinus (160), and Carpocrates (170). 
 The speculations of Saturninus (120), of Bardesanes 
 (160), and of Basilides (130), spring from the principle 
 of dualism. The Gnostic ideas developed by these 
 systems concurred to produce the doctrine of Manes 
 (274) or Manicheism, a combination of Persian dual- 
 ism and Hindoo pantheism with the dogmas of Chris- 
 tianity: this doctrine exercised a powerful influence 
 for several centuries. Eventually the Gnostic systems 
 were transformed, and their principles became the 
 basis of various heresies, such as Arianism, Nestori- 
 anism, and Eutychianism. 
 
 The Neoplatonic school, called also the school of 
 Alexandria, from the name of the city which was its 
 chief asylum, had for its leading professors : Ammo- 
 
504 HISTOBT OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nius Saccas (200), Plotinus (245), Porphyry (290), Jam- 
 blicus (300), Hierocles (400), and Proclus (450). These 
 philosophers undertook to unite Oriental and Greek 
 philosophy. A like attempt had been made in the 
 first century by Jewish philosophers, among others by 
 Philo (40) ; but, properly speaking, the head of the 
 Neoplatonic school was Plotinus. These Alexandrians 
 devoted themselves for the most part to occult prac- 
 tices of theurgy ; they were the sworn enemies of 
 Christianity, from which, however, they borrowed not 
 a little. 
 
 The principle Christian philosophers of the first 
 centuries are : St. Denis the Areopagite (95), St. Justin 
 (160), St. Irenseus (200), Athenagoras (200), Tertullian 
 (240), Clement of Alexandria (210), Origen (250), Lac- 
 tantius (320), and St. Augustine (480). These writers, 
 grounding their teachings on the dogmas of religion, 
 attained to the highest and best founded speculations. 
 Their ideas, even in purely philosophical matters, far 
 excel all the conceptions of their predecessors among 
 the philosophers. Moreover, they gave a practical 
 end to their vast labors, for, on the one hand, they 
 combated the false doctrines of the pagan and heret- 
 ical philosophers ; and on the other, they always 
 contemplated science in its relation to virtue. Most 
 of them had been disciples of the Greek philosophy ; 
 they borrowed thence whatever was true, and strove 
 to apply it to the truths of religion. Their writings 
 have served as a preparation and groundwork for the 
 labors of Christian philosophy. 
 
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 FiBST Peeiod (6th to 9th Centuey). 
 
 The disordered state of society which followed the 
 invasions of the barbarians interrupted the great 
 philosophic movement of the first ages of Christianity. 
 From the sixth to the ninth century there were few 
 philosophers : in the West, Boethius (525), Cassio- 
 dorus (575), Claudian Mamertus (474), Isidore of 
 Seville (636), and Bede (735) ; in the East, John Philop- 
 onus (650), and especially St. John Damascene (754). 
 Boethius forms the link between ancient and medise- 
 val philosophy. He sought to reconcile whatever was 
 true in the Greek philosophers with the dogmas of 
 Christianity. He became a high authority for the 
 following centuries ; his writings, and among others 
 his book On the Consolation of Philosophy, were for a 
 long period used in the school-room. St. John Dam- 
 ascene, like Boethius, united the study of philosophy 
 to that of theology ; at a later date his works also had 
 great credit in the schools of the East. 
 
 Second Peeiod (9th to 13th Century). 
 
 aeabian philosophy. 
 
 Under the reign of the caliphs Haroun-al-Easchid 
 and Al-Mamoun, the Arabs bisgan to cultivate the 
 science of philosophy. The principal masterpieces of 
 
506 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 Greece were translated into their tongue ; the books 
 of Aristotle in particular were much studied. — The 
 most ancient of the Arabian philosophers is Alkendi 
 (800), who merely commented upon Aristotle. Al- 
 Farabi, who lived about a century later, made logic 
 the principal object of his labors. — In the tenth cen- 
 tury appeared Avicenna, who was long counted in the 
 first rank of the masters of medicine, and is still re- 
 garded by the Orientals as one of their chief philoso- 
 phers. He commented on the logic and metaphysics 
 of Aristotle, but considerably modified several of the 
 Stagyrite's important theories. — Al-Gazel, who lived 
 in the eleventh century, employed his entire resources 
 in dialectics to destroy all systems of philosophy ; he 
 held that one could escape doubt only by having re- 
 course to the revelation of the Koran. In the East 
 the attempt of Al-Gazel infiicted a blow on philosophy 
 from which it could not recover. But this was the 
 very time when it was cultivated with more eagerness 
 than ever in. the Academies which the caliphs had 
 founded in most of the cities subject to the Saracens. 
 Far difierent from Al-Gazel was Avempace (1138), a 
 native of Saragossa, who taught that philosophic 
 speculation was the sole means by which man could 
 know himself; his doctrine tended to exclude the 
 supernatural. Avempace had among his disciples 
 Thofail (1185), whose system is pantheism. — But of all 
 the philosophers that Islamism has given to Spain, 
 the most celebrated is unquestionably Averrhoes 
 (1168). He made extensive commentaries on jail the 
 works of Aristotle. He composed, besides, several 
 original treatises, of which the substance is Peripa- 
 teticism, but carried to consequences which Aristotle 
 would have disclaimed. In the opinion of Averrhoes, 
 there is none but a universal intelligence, in which all 
 
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. 507 
 
 intelligent beings share without haying an intelli- 
 gence of their own. By this and other doctrines he 
 opened the way to pantheism, so that even the -Mus- 
 sulmans condemned his works. Some of his Peripa- 
 tetic ideas were developed by a disciple of his, Moses 
 Maimonides (1209), a Jewish philosopher and the 
 greatest light of the Hebrew people since the preach- 
 ing of the Gospel. A century previous, another Jew, 
 Avicebron, also gained great renown as a philosopher ; 
 he taught doctrines whose consequences were panthe- 
 istic. 
 
 The Philosophy of the Schools befoee St. Thomas. 
 
 With Charlemagne the culture of the sciences and 
 literature was begun anew with ardor in the West. 
 Alcuin (804) was the principal instrument in the hands 
 of the emperor to create new schools and make them 
 prosper. Under Charles the Bald, Scotus Erigena 
 (886) became famous ; he was of Irish birth, but passed 
 the greater part of his life in France. His doctrines 
 are pantheistic, and he labored in vain to reconcile 
 them with the Christian dogmas. About the middle 
 of the eleventh century great philosophic works began 
 to be published. St. Anselm (1033-1109) wrote his 
 two treatises, the Monologium and the Prosologium, in 
 which, with no aid but reason, he rose to the highest 
 conceptions of the divine essence. 
 
 It was at this epoch that philosophy was brought 
 back to a problem with which it had formerly been 
 engaged, the problem of universals, of genera and 
 species. Plato had thought that universals had an 
 existence in themselves apart from particular indi- 
 viduals ; Aristotle had regarded them as concepts of 
 the intellect corresponding to the essences contained 
 
508 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 in the existing- entities ; however, he did not present 
 his opinion with sufficient clearness, and it may re- 
 ceive different interpretations. Toward the end of 
 the eleventh century, Eoscelin, a canon of Compiegne, 
 revived the question. He maintained that the univer- 
 sals contained in generic and specific ideas were mere 
 words and consisted in names only : hence the desig- 
 nation of nominalism given to his theory. St. Anselm 
 was one of his most ardent adversaries, and victo- 
 riously combated the heterodox consequences which 
 Eoscelin drew from his system. William of Cham- 
 peaux (1121) considered the universals as essences 
 common to several individuals, which were, therefore, 
 distinguished from one another by merely accidental 
 differences. This doctrine, which gave an objective 
 reality to universals as such, was called ultra-realism. 
 Abelard (1142) attacked the theory of his former 
 teacher, William of Champeaux, and invented a third 
 system, conceptualism, which regarded universals as 
 mere concepts of the mind, and was, after all, only 
 disguised nominalism. Nominalism and conceptual- 
 ism tended to serious errors, even to atheism and 
 materialism ; hence they were generally rejected by 
 the Catholic schools. As to realism, it is of two 
 kinds : one considers the essence as having an indi- 
 vidual subsistence apart from the mind and receiving 
 its universality in the intellect ; the other regards the 
 essence as possessing an abstracted and universal 
 reality apart from any mental operation. The former 
 is m,oderate realism, and was accepted and defended by 
 St. Anselm and the other great philosophers of the 
 Schools ; the latter is ultra-realism, which was sus- 
 tained by several, among others by Gilbert of Porree 
 (1154), bishop of Poitiers, and has been solemnly con- 
 demned by the Church. 
 
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. 509 
 
 One of those who shone with greatest lustre in 
 these philosophic disputations was Peter Lombard 
 (1159). His chief work is the book entitled The Mas- 
 ter of the Sentences, in which he has collected the sen- 
 timents of the Fathers on the principal points of the- 
 ology and philosophy. This book exerted a powerful 
 influence ; it was for a long period a text-book which 
 the professors explained in their schools. 
 
 At this epoch the dissemination of the complete 
 works of Aristotle within the universities, which till 
 then had known them only in part, and the appear- 
 ance of the Arabian philosophy, gave a new impulse 
 to philosophic studies. Unfortunately the ardor which 
 then carried minds away, and the enthusiasm for Aris- 
 totle' and his Arabian commentators which then fired 
 them, weakened religious faiith and submission to the 
 authority of the Church. Amaury of Chartres (1209) 
 and David of Dinant (1220) taught, the one, idealis- 
 tic pantheism, the other, materialistic pantheism, and 
 thus drew upon themselves the anathemas of the 
 Church. But while the works of Aristotle and the 
 Arabian philosophers brought trouble into the schools, 
 two religious orders sprang up destined to furnish 
 illustrious defenders of the truth. The Franciscan 
 Alexander of Hales (1245) and the Dominican Albert 
 the Great (1280) became celebrated as much by the 
 depth and extent of their learning as by the orthodoxy 
 of their teaching. Their works, together with those 
 of "William of Auvergne (1248), bishop of Paris, were 
 a preparation for the immortal masterpieces to be 
 produced by Bonaventure and Thomas of Aquia. 
 
510 HI8T0RT OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Apogee op the Scholastic Philosophy (13th Cek- 
 
 tuby). 
 
 Around William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, 
 and Albert the Great was grouped a great number of 
 illustrious philosophers and theologians, as Vincent 
 of Beauvais (1264), whose Speculum Majus (General 
 Mirror) was a kind of encyclopaedia of all the sciences ; 
 Henry of Ghent (1295), sumamed the " Solemn Doc- 
 tor," from the authority of his doctrines ; and Roger 
 Bacon (1294), whose vast intellect foresaw some of 
 the most important discoveries of modern science. 
 But among all these, two men became especially 
 famous in the thirteenth century; they soared by 
 their genius above all their contemporaries; they 
 are St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas of Aquin. 
 
 St. Bonaventure was bom in Tuscany in 1221. He 
 entered the order of Franciscans and studied at Paris 
 under Alexander of Hales ; by his sanctity, as well as 
 by his science, he merited to become the general of 
 his order. He was made bishop and cardinal by 
 Gregory X., and assisted at the second council of Ly- 
 ons, where he died in 1274. St. Bonaventure's princi- 
 pal philosophic work is his commentary on The Master 
 of the Sentences. He teaches that all science comes 
 from God and should lead to God; therefore he 
 makes all the cognitions of reason concur to the ser- 
 vice of the divine science, and in all things he seeks 
 the hidden element by which they are referred to 
 God ; hence the elevation and sublimity to be re- 
 marked in his writings, and that have won for him 
 the surname of " Seraphic Doctor." 
 
 His rival in learning was St. Thomas of Aquin, 
 sumamed the "Angel of the Schools." He was born 
 
MEDIEVAL PniLOSOPHT. 511 
 
 in the kingdom of Naples in 1227, and embraced the 
 religious life in the order of St. Dominic. After 
 studying philosophy and theology at Bologna under 
 Albert the Great, he followed him to Paris, where 
 he subsequently taught with great distinction. He 
 died in a monastery of Italy in 1274. His philo- 
 sophic ideas are embodied chiefly in the Theological 
 Sum, the 8um against the Gentiles, the Commentaries 
 on all the parts of Aristotle's philosophy, and several 
 special treatises on questions of metaphysics and 
 morals. Pope John XXII. declared that St. Thomas 
 of Aquin diifused more light in the Church than all 
 the other doctors together. In fact, in his numerous 
 works are to be found arguments to defend all truths 
 and to combat all errors. Hence they have at all 
 times possessed the greatest authority in the schools 
 and among the learned, and the Theological Sum, 
 merited a place on the same table with the Bible at 
 the Council of Trent. By his vigorous attacks on 
 the Arabian philosophy, St. Thomas destroyed its 
 credit and reduced it to complete impotence. He 
 took from Aristotle whatever was true, refuted his 
 errors, rectified what was defective and incomplete ; 
 by thus enlisting the philosophy of the Stagyrite in 
 the defence of the truth, he put an end to the perni- 
 cious influence which it had long exercised in the 
 schools. By a luminous distinction he cleared up 
 the difficult problem of universals. He showed that 
 the essence has a different manner of being accord- 
 ing to whether it is considered as having a real ex- 
 istence or as having an ideal existence, and thus he 
 avoided the error of both nominalists and realists. 
 He threw light upon the most difficult questions of 
 metaphysics ; and his doctrines on God, the nature 
 of spirits, the composition of bodies, the origin of 
 
612 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 ideas, the rights and duties of man, have even to this 
 day lost none of their authority. Moreover, it is 
 from St. Thomas of Aquin that philosophers as well 
 as theologians most frequently borrow their argu- 
 ments for the defence of truth. 
 
 Thied Peeiod (14th and 15th Centuries), 
 decline of scholastic philosophy. 
 
 The teaching of St. Thomas was continued by his 
 disciples, among others by Egidio Oolonna (1316). 
 But in the face of this body of doctrine, which had its 
 principal defenders in the Dominican order, there 
 arose another in the Franciscan order whose solutions 
 differed on several points. Its founder was Duns 
 Scotus (1308), called the "Subtle Doctor," whose 
 numerous works give proof of his remarkable power 
 and his great subtility in dialectics. But this subtil- 
 ity was nowhere carried further than in the Com- 
 hinatory Art of Eaymond LuUy (1315), who pre- 
 tended that by logical procedures a mechanical 
 means is given to the intellect for the solution of 
 all questions. 
 
 While Durand de Saint-Pour§ain (1334) appeared 
 in the order of St. Dominic as the adversary of St. 
 Thomas, Will? am Ockham (1347) among the Francis- 
 cans opposed both St. Thomas and Duns Scotus, and 
 revived the nominalism of Eoscelin, in which action 
 he was followed by John Buridan (1360) and Peter 
 d'Ailly (1420). Thus it happened that lively discus- 
 sions were raised in the universities, and they led to 
 such errors that many a time the Holy See was 
 obliged to interfere. 
 
MEDIEVAL PHILOaOPHT. 513 
 
 ,0n the decline of scholasticism several philoso- 
 phers made a name for themselves by remarkable 
 ■works ; among them should be noted the chancellor 
 Gerson (1429), who in some of his writings restored 
 intuitive and mystic philosophy. 
 
 3S 
 
MODEEN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 1. FiBST Period (End of 15th, and 16th Centubt). 
 
 EPOCH OP TRANSITION. 
 
 At the end of the fifteenth century, and during the 
 sixteenth, many writings were published relating' to 
 philosophy without strictly constituting a system. 
 The Greeks, Theodore of Gaza (1478), George of 
 Trebizonde (1486), and Cardinal Bessarion (1472), 
 published commentaries on the books of the ancient 
 philosophers ; Angelo Poliziano (1474) in Italy, Ulric 
 Ton Hutten (1523) and Erasmus (1536) in Germany, 
 attacked the Scholastic philosophy ; Marsilio Fici- 
 no (1499), the Florentine," became the panegyrist of 
 Plato; Pico della Mirandola (1494) in Italy, and 
 Reuchlin (1522) in Germany, taught doctrines that 
 were a mixture of theology and cabalistic ideas. 
 
 Yet some philosophers gave a systematic form to 
 their conceptions. Cardinal Nicholas de Cusa (1464) 
 distinguished himself by his depth and originality. 
 He restored certain Pythagorean ideas to honor and 
 anticipated the exposition of the Copernican system 
 of the earth's motion. Paracelsus (1541) taught a 
 kind of illuminism which was subsequently professed 
 by Van Helmont (1664) and Boehme (1&25). All three 
 derived the science of the physical world from theos- 
 ophy. Telesio (1588), on the contrary, excluded God 
 from his theory of the world. Thomas CampaneUa 
 
MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 615 
 
 (1639) was one of Bacon's precursors, and explained 
 the whole man by the faculty of sensation. Pom- 
 ponazzi, or Pomponatus (1526), taught among other 
 errors that the soul is mortal and destitute of all 
 liberty. Jerome Cardano (1576) became noted by his 
 most extravagant doctrines. Giordano Bruno (1600) 
 professed a pantheistic system and prepared the way 
 for Spinoza ; he regarded the world as an infinite or- 
 ganism, of which God was the soul. Vanini (1619) 
 was burned at Toulouse as an atheist. Peter Ramus 
 (1572) undertook a reform of logic, and combated to 
 the last extremity the philosophy of Aristotle. Mon- 
 taigne (1592) regarded the reason of man as naturally 
 incapable of arriving at certitude ; in this he was in 
 part followed by his disciple Charron (1603). 
 
 2. Second Period. 
 
 philosophy of bacon, descabtes, and leibnitz. 
 
 Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, was born at London 
 in 1561. He played an important part in the affairs 
 of his country and was made baron of Verulam by 
 James I. He died in 1626. His principal work is 
 Novum Organum Scientiarum. In this work he as- 
 sails the philosophy of Aristotle, and seeks to replace 
 it by a new system. After a criticism of the syl- 
 logism, he gives a classification of the sources of 
 errors, dividing them into four categories, which in 
 bis own quaint language he designates as idols of the 
 tribe, the prejudices common to all men ; idols of tJve 
 den, individual prejudices; idols of the Tnarket-place, 
 prejudices due to language and the commerce of men ; 
 and idols of (he theatre, prejudices due to the authority 
 
516 HISTOBT OF PSILOSOPET. 
 
 of masters. Bacon then assigns a practical end to 
 science ; he lays down the laws of experimentation, 
 and gives the method of observation and induction 
 as the means of progress in the sciences. The soul 
 of Bacon's philosophy is the principle that sensations 
 are the only constituent in the formation of human 
 cognitions. This principle, developed by his disciples, 
 was destined gradually to insure the triumph of ma- 
 terialistic doctrines. 
 
 Descartes was bom in 1596 at La Haye, in Tou- 
 raine. He at first embraced the military state ; then, 
 after travelling in several countries of Europe, he 
 withdrew to Holland, where he devoted himself ex- 
 clusively to works, the plan of which he had already 
 conceived. He made important discoveries in phys 
 ics and mathematics. In philosophy he desired to 
 effect a reform, and he made a vigorous attack on the 
 theories of Aristotle. Having drawn persecution upon 
 himself by his doctrines, he sought refuge with Queen 
 Christina, at Stockholm, where he died in 1650. His 
 principal philosophical work is the Discourse on 
 Method. It contains six parts. The first comprises 
 his criticism of the science handed down by the 
 schools. In the second, after proclaiming the insuf- 
 ficiency of the syllogism, he formulates his method, 
 which he reduces to the famous four rules : 1° Ac- 
 cept as true only what is evidently such ; 2° Divide 
 every question into as many parts as possible ; 3° 
 Proceed from the easy to the difficult, from the simple 
 to the composite ; 4° In enumerations take care to 
 omit nothing. These rules have been much praised 
 for depth and originality, but they are pointed out 
 by nature, and were known and put in practice long 
 before Descartes published his Discourse. In the 
 third part, while awaiting the solutions which hia 
 
MODERN PHILOSOPHY. ' 517 
 
 reason was to furnish him, he makes provisional rules 
 of thought and conduct. In the fourth part, he re- 
 jects by the methodical doubt all his previous opin- 
 ions, and formulates the celebrated enthymeme : 1 
 tJmik, therefore I am, on which he pretends to raise 
 the structure of science. In the fifth part, he de- 
 scribes the leading ideas in his system of cosmology ; 
 and in the sixth, he indicates by what means the 
 sciences may effect new progress. In this discourse, 
 the value of which has been greatly exaggerated, 
 and also in his other works of philosophy, Descartes 
 teaches many errors, which have been made the foun- 
 dation of most of the modern false systems. And so, 
 while aiming to create a new philosophy, he has 
 fallen into error on the great questions of certitude, 
 of substance, of the union between soul and body, 
 and others of equal importance. It is to be remarked, 
 however, that Descartes did not shape his conduct by 
 these systems, for he showed himself a good Chris- 
 tian, though his doctrines have been the occasion of 
 bitter attacks upon the Church. 
 
 Leibnitz was born at Leipsic in 1648. His vast in- 
 tellect embraced all the sciences. In mathematics he 
 established the basis of infinitesimal calculus, and he 
 wrote extensively on history, constitutional law, phi- 
 losophy, and theology. He died in 1716. His prin- 
 cipal philosophical works are his Essays on Theodicy 
 and his New Essays on the Human Understanding. 
 Leibnitz holds that all substances, even material, are 
 forces ; that matter has its principle in simple and ir- 
 reducible forces, perfectly analogous to the simple 
 and irreducible forces that constitute spirits : these 
 forces he calls monads. The monads cannot act upon 
 one another ; however, they correspond exactly in 
 their evolutions in virtue of a harmony pre-established 
 
518' HISTORY OF PHIL080PHT. 
 
 by God. In theodicy, he professes optimism, and be- 
 lieves that this world is the best possible. 
 
 3. The Schools of Bacon, Descaetes, and Leibnitz. 
 
 The principal disciples of Bacon's school are: 
 Hobbes, Gassendi, Locke, Condillac, Helvetius, d'Hol- 
 bach, and Hume. Hobbes (1679) in his works, and more 
 particularly in the Leviathan, denies the existence of 
 spirits, reduces the end of man to pleasure, and in pol- 
 itics acknowledges no rights but those of power and 
 force. Gassendi (1655) is celebrated on account of the 
 apology which he makes in various works for the 
 philosophy of Epicurus. — Locke (1704), in his Essay on 
 the Human Understanding, recognizes two sources 
 of ideas : sensation, which furnishes all the elements, 
 and reflection, which forms from them various com- 
 posites ; he asserts that it is impossible to demon- 
 strate the spirituality of the soul, and that perhaps 
 matter is capable of thought. — Condillac (1780) de- 
 velops the theories of Locke in his Essay on the Origin 
 of Human Knowledge and in his Treatise on Sensation. 
 He takes away reflection as a source of ideas and ad- 
 mits only sensation. He explains all the operations 
 of the soul by transformed sensations. From his doc- 
 trines it is easy to deduce the negation of liberty, of 
 the soul, and of the existence of God — in a word, scep- 
 ticism. — Helvetius (1771) applied the principles of 
 sensism to morals, and reduced virtue to self-interest. 
 D'Holbach (1789) in his System of Nature supported 
 the opinion that only material beings exist. — Hume 
 (1776) drew from sensism a complete system of scep- 
 ticism. 
 
 The principal philosophers of Descartes' school 
 are : Malebranche, Arnauld, Bossuet, Fenelon, Pascal, 
 
MODEBN PEIL080PHT. 519 
 
 Berkeley, and Spinoza. The most noted works of 
 Malebranclie (1715) are the Search for Truth, the 
 Chnstian and Metaphysical Meditations, and the Con- 
 versations on Metaphysics. In these he proves himself 
 a superior writer and at times a profound philosopher, 
 but at the same time he teaches erroneous systems 
 which have justly discredited his works. For in- 
 stance, it is his theory that we see all in God, even 
 the material world ; that the soul is only the occasional 
 cause of the movements of the body. His philos- 
 ophy tends to idealism and contains the germs of 
 pantheism. — Antoine Arnauld (1694) made a great 
 name by his Art of Thinking, commonly known as the 
 Port-Royal Logic, which he wrote in a week with Ni- 
 cole (1695), each writing half. — Bossuet (1704) has left 
 but one work that treats specially of philosophy, the 
 Treatise on the Knowledge of God and Oneself, in which 
 he summarizes what is most useful in the science of 
 God and of the soul. — Fenelon (1715) wrote the Dem- 
 onstration of the Existence of God, in which he dis- 
 plays his great depth and originality : in the first 
 part, he proves the existence of God by final causes ; 
 in the second, he deduces it from the idea of the infi- 
 nite. — Pascal (1662), in his Thoughts, aims alternately 
 to exalt and to humble man at the sight of his great- 
 ness and his miseries. — Berkeley (1753), in the attempt 
 to destroy materialism, falls into an opposite excess ; 
 he denies the existence of the material world and 
 sinks into complete idealism. — Spinoza (1677), in his 
 Ethics, revives materialistic pantheism. He gives an 
 exposition of his system according to the geometrical 
 method, and forms his theories into a closely linked 
 chain of reasoning, but he begins with an unsound 
 principle. It is the false definition of substance given 
 by Descartes, " Substance is that which exists by it- 
 
520 HISTORY OP PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 self (par soij." In his work, Spinoza (1677) sets him- 
 self to demonstrate : 1° That there is but one sub- 
 stance, the Infinite Being; 2° That all finite beings 
 are only modes or attributes of this Infinite Sub- 
 stance. The famous sceptic Bayle (1706) may also 
 be placed in the school of Descartes ; in his Critical 
 Dictionary he impugns the certainty of all human 
 knowledge. 
 
 The influence of the philosophy of Leibnitz was 
 felt by nearly all the German schools of his epoch, and 
 inclined them to idealism. Thomasius and Wolf are 
 its leading exponents. The doctrine of Thomasius 
 (1655) presents a singular combination of sensism and 
 mysticism. Wolf (1764.) was the continuator of Leib- 
 nitz, whose doctrines he coordinated into one great 
 system of philosophy. 
 
 4. The Scotch School and the Geeman School. 
 
 Even in England the doctrines of Hobbes and 
 Locke had encountered marked opposition. Hut- 
 cheson (1747) strove to banish sensism from the 
 domain of morality, though he allowed it to remain 
 as the basis of psychology. But Eeid (1710-1796) at- 
 tacked it as a false theory not only of morality, but 
 likewise of the human mind. He taught for a long 
 period in the University of Glasgow, in Scotland, and 
 he is regarded as the founder of the Scotch school. 
 His chief work is the Essay on the Intellectual Poioers 
 of Man. He there demonstrates with much justice 
 and sagacity the insufficiency of sensation to explain 
 all psychological phenomena, but he also inculcates 
 some errors on method, certitude, the faculties of 
 the soul, etc. One of the special characteristics of 
 his philosophy is his doctrine of instinctive judg- 
 
MODERN PHILOSOPHY. {>91 
 
 ments, the truth of which, though not intellectual- 
 ly perceived is necessarily to be admitted under 
 pain of drifting into scepticism. Dugald Stewart 
 (1828), a pupil of Eeid's, continued in his teaching 
 and his works to apply the method of his master. 
 He distinguished himself by his spirit of obser- 
 vation in the study of the phenomena of the human 
 mind. - 
 
 Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) was the founder of th« 
 German school. He taught for many years at Koenigs- 
 berg. The most celebrated of his works is the Cri- 
 tique of Pure Reason, wherein he establishes the prin- 
 ciples of the philosophical reform which he had begun. 
 Although he proposed to combat scepticism, yet in 
 his works he lays the foundations of a complete scep- 
 ticism and of the most monstrous errors ; but he is 
 inconsistent with his system and admits the g-reat 
 truths of the existence of God, the liberty and immor- 
 tality of the soul.* The chief philosophers connected 
 with his school are Fichte (1814), Schelling (1854), 
 and Hegel (1831) ; all three, pushing the ideas of their 
 master to their utmost limit, drew the logical conse- 
 quence of an idealistic pantheism which numbers 
 many adherents in Germany to-day. f 
 
 * That is, as postulates of practical reason and because of practical 
 necessity ; but he affirms that they are unattainable by theoretical or 
 speculative reason. 
 
 f Prom the denial of philosophic certitude, Strauss went a step 
 farther and denied the historic certitude of the books of the Bible. 
 In his Life of Jesus (1835) he asserts that Christ is but a myth, his 
 Gospel but a bundle of myths, embellished by poetic Imagination^' 
 called miracles. It is from him that Beuan has borrowed most w 
 his blasphemies 
 
522 HISTOBT OF PBTLOSOPBT. 
 
 5. Present Schools m Feance. 
 
 Besides tlie German school, strictly so called, there 
 are many schools at present : 1° The eclectic ration- 
 alistic; 2° The progressiye; 3° The positivistic and 
 materialistic ; 4° The ontologistic ; 5° The tradition- 
 alistic ; 6° The Thomistic. The founder of eclecticism 
 is Victor Cousin (1866). Among those who prepared 
 the -way for him are Laromiguiere (1837), Maine de 
 Biran (1824), and Eoyer CoUard (1825). His principal 
 disciples are Jouffroy (1842) and Damiron (1864). The 
 eclectics adopt in general spiritualistic doctrines, but 
 they reject the supernatural and recognize no au- 
 thority but that of reason. — The progressive school is 
 so called because it professes to believe in indeiinite 
 progress. Its leaders are La Mennais (1854) and Pi- 
 erre Leroux (1871), whose tenets lead to pantheism. To 
 this school may be referred the humanitarian and 
 socialist systems of Fourier (1837), Saint-Simon (1825), 
 and others, whose utopian schemes have excited the 
 contempt of all sensible persons. The positivistic 
 and materialistic school is chiefly represented by Au- 
 guste Oomte (1857), Littre (1881), and Taine (b. 1828), 
 who have striven, but in vain, to make the progress 
 of modern science subservient to the defence of the 
 degrading doctrines of materialism. — The ontologis- 
 tic school, renewing the error of Malebranche, has 
 overlooked the distance that separates man from 
 God, and teaches that all our ideas are but partial 
 intuitions of God. This error, which logically ends 
 in pantheism, has been specially inculcated by Gio- 
 berti (1852) and Eosmini (1855). — The traditionalistic 
 school exaggerates the feebleness of human reason, 
 in the belief that the authority of tradition ahd reve- 
 
MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 523 
 
 lation is strengthened thereby ; it has exposed itself 
 to the attacks of incredulity and atheism, which it 
 aimed to combat. Its leaders were De Bonald (1840)j 
 La Mennais (before his fall), and Ventura (1861). 
 
 6. Philosophy in England and Ameeica. 
 
 The great impetus given to the study of the natural 
 sciences in this century has led many philosophers, 
 so called, to give undue importance to the methods 
 of observation and experiment, and even to apply 
 them to the solution of some of the gravest questions 
 in philosophy. Thus, " Mill and his followers drag 
 down all a pnori laws to the level of the a posteriori, 
 or rather deny the existence of the a priori laws at 
 all."* The manifold errors of English philosophy 
 to-day may be traced more or less directly to this 
 deplorable confusion of principles. In the domain of 
 logic, the conceptualism of Sir W. Hamilton and the 
 nominalism of John Stuart Mill are the result of a fail- 
 ure to discriminate between the intellectual idea and 
 the sensible image in the imagination. Both men have 
 attacked the fundamental principles of knowledge : 
 Ha;milton asserts that not the principle of contradic- 
 tion, but the principle of identity, which he formu- 
 lates as A is A, is the first of all ; Mill declares that 
 the principle of contradiction is " one of our first and 
 most familiar generalizations from experience," and 
 reduces the principle of causation to " invariable and 
 unconditioned antecedence." In psychology empir- 
 icism prevails and is supported by Mill, Lewes, 
 Spencer, and Bain, in England ; by Draper and Fiske, 
 in America. Now it takes the form of positivism, and, 
 
 * Logic, Stonyhurst Series, p. 387. 
 
524 HIST OUT OF PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 as its name indicates, accepts as positive only what is 
 attested by scientific observation and experiment. Of 
 this school George H. Lewes is the exponent in Eng- 
 land. Again, it becomes evolutionism and teaches 
 that "all material and spiritual substances are but 
 force, or a collection of correlated forces." Herbert 
 Spencer is the father of this system ; with him Darwin 
 and Huxley may be associated. In ethics and poli- 
 tics the same spirit is at work, as may be seen in the 
 utilitarianism of Mill, the moral system of Herbert 
 Spencer, and the religion of humanity inculcated by 
 the school of Comte. As for general metaphysics, it 
 is all but absolutely rejected as being a series of un- 
 intelligible, unprofitable, and often unmeaning specu- 
 lations. Agnosticism is but the negative side of 
 positivism, for it defines that " the ultimate cause and 
 the essential nature of things are unknowable, or at 
 least unknown " — a sad commentary on the enlight- 
 enment of a Huxley and a Romanes, who profess such 
 ignorance of what it most intimately concerns man to 
 know. The German transcendental school has also a 
 following in England and America. 
 
 Since the condemnation of ontologism and tradi- 
 tionalism by the Church, the Thomistic school alone 
 remains among Catholic philosophers. This school, 
 which has never wanted illustrious representatives in 
 Catholic universities, counts among its prominent sup- 
 porters, Sanseverino (1873), Kleutgen (1883), Liberatore 
 (1898), Gonzalez, and Cardinal Zigliara (1893). By their 
 learned works, these philosophers and their disciples 
 have repulsed the attacks of error and restored to honor 
 the grand Scholastic philosophy, justly styled Chris- 
 tian or Catholic, because as a course it has been 
 praised, encouraged, and, it may be said, sanctioned 
 by the Church herself, the infallible guardian of truth. 
 
INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Numbers refer to pages. 
 
 Abhorrence (see Aversion). 
 
 Absolute — term, 7 ; proposition, 22 ; 
 scepticism, 123 ; accidents, 191, 
 really distinct from substance, 191, 
 194. 
 
 Abstraction, 89 f., 95, 100 f., 277 f. 
 
 Abstractive faculty, 89, 100, 277 f. 
 
 Academy, 502. 
 
 Accent, Fallacy of, 46. 
 
 Accessory contract, 448. 
 
 Accident, predicable, 9; predica- 
 ment, 11, 143, 155, 189 f. ; abso- 
 lute and modal, distinct from sub- 
 stance, 191, 194; fallacy of, 47. 
 
 Act, 163, 163 ; pure and not-pure, 
 163; first and second, 160; sub- 
 sistent and non-subsistent, 164 ; 
 complete and incomplete subsist- 
 ent, 164 ; substantial and acci- 
 dental non-subsistent, 164 ; po- 
 tentiality and, 167 ; of being, 167, 
 and formal, 163 ; remote and prox- 
 imate first, 174 (note) ; first, of 
 matter, 217 ; first, of body, 234 ; 
 pure, 163, 333. 
 
 Action, predicament, 11, 135, 164, 
 201 (note), 202 (note); transient 
 and immanent, 175, 177, 202 ; hu- 
 man, 378 f . ; voluntary, 380 ; elic- 
 ited and imperate, 380. 
 
 Activity, Principle of (see Soul), 314. 
 
 Actuality (see Act). 
 
 Adversative proposition, 23. 
 
 ./Esthetics, 61 ; eesthetic sense, 157. 
 
 .^vum, 231 (note). 
 
 Affirmative proposition, 22. 
 
 Age — of man, 211 ; of the world, 
 209 f. 
 
 Aggressor, Unjust, 434. 
 
 Agnosticism, 331, 534. 
 
 Agreement, Method of, 71 (note). 
 
 Ahriman, 497. 
 
 Aleatory contract, 447. 
 
 Alienation, 13. 
 
 Alteration, 13, 201. 
 
 Amphibology, 46. 
 
 Amplification, 12. 
 
 Analogy — of attribution and of pfi» 
 portion, 6 ; of being, 143. 
 
 Analysis, 64, 99 f . ; rules of, 65. 
 
 Analytical judgment, 18. 
 
 Anger, 383. 
 
 Animals, 232 f., 241 ; faculties of, 
 243 f., 247. 
 
 Animism, 331. 
 
 Antecedent — of proposition, 34 ; of 
 judgment, 32. 
 
 Anthropomorphism, 365 (note). 
 
 Antinomies, 110 (note). 
 
 Appetible, 151. 
 
 Appetite, 373, 374 ; sensitive, 373 f. ; 
 rational, 290, 291 ; passions and 
 sensitive, 383. 
 
 Apprehension, Simple, 3, 51, 99, 103. 
 
 Ajrgument, 30, 43. 
 
 Aristocracy, 468, 470. 
 
 Art, 3 (note). 
 
 Aseity, 337. 
 
 Association of images, 368. 
 
 Atheism, 331. 
 
 Atom, 306. 
 
 Atomic system, 214 f . 
 
 Attention, 284 f. 
 
 Attribute (property), 10, of proposi- 
 tion, 18 ; divine, 335 ; absolute 
 and relative, 335 ; not known di- 
 rectly, 335; identical with divine 
 essence, 336. ' 
 
 Attribution, analogy of, 6. 
 
 Augmentation, 12. 
 
 Authenticity, 133. 
 
 Authority — of common sense, 135, 
 136 ; as a criterion of certitude, 
 137 ; of parents over children, 457 ; 
 in conjugal society, 454; element 
 of society, 463 ; in the society of 
 nations, 486. 
 
 Autonomy of reason, 466. 
 
 Automata, Brutes not, 247, 
 
 Axioms, 109 ; of reasoning, 31. 
 
526 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Beatitude, 373 f. 
 
 Beauty, ] 56 ; elements of, 157 ; real 
 and ideal, natural and artificial, 
 moral, 158. 
 Being, Idea of, 100 ; first formed, 101 ; 
 being in general, 141 f.; real and 
 logical, 184 f . ; uncreated and 
 created, infinite and finite, 187 ; 
 unity and, 144 ; truth and, 150 ; 
 goodnesB and, 151 ; contingent and 
 necessary, 328 ; mutable, ai7, 230 ; 
 immutable, 338 f. 
 BUocation, not absolutely impossible, 
 
 227 (note). 
 Blame, 394. 
 Blessed Sacrament, substance and 
 
 Accident, 191, 195, 325 (note). 
 Bodies, Cognition of , 100 f . ; cognition 
 of individual, 102 ; accidents of, 
 194 f. ; first elements of, 214 f . ; 
 properties of, 225 f.; animate and 
 inanimate, 240 : animal and plant, 
 241. 
 Body, Human, Union of soul and, 
 315 f.; unity of, 319 f.; resurrec- 
 tion of, 324 f.; duties of man 
 toward his, 437 ; suicide, 427 f . ; 
 mortification benefits, 438 f.; du- 
 ties toward the bodies of others, 
 432 f. 
 Book (see Writing). 
 Brain, not the sentient subject, 2.55 ; 
 Irregularities of surface, indicative 
 of aptitudes and character, 276. 
 Brutes (see Animals). 
 Cartesian Doubt, 128 (note). 
 Categorical proposition, 21 ; kinds 
 
 of, 21, 22 ; syllogism, 32. 
 Categories, 10 f. 
 
 Causality, Principle of, 111 f.; ob- 
 jectivity of principle, 113. 
 Causal proposition, 33. 
 Cause, 113, 161; species of, 169; 
 First, 105, 173, 179 f; of creation, 
 349 (see End) ; formal, 170 (see 
 Form); efficient, 11 3 (note), 171 f.; 
 species of : per se a>ndper accidens^ 
 principal and instrumental, 172 ; 
 first and second, universal and 
 particular, univocal and equivo- 
 cal, proximate and remote, free 
 and necessary, total and partial, 
 physical and moral, cause which 
 and cause hy which^ cause in po- 
 tentiality and cause in act, 172 
 f.; exemplar, 170 f.; material, 
 170 (see Primary Matter) ; final 
 cause, 179 f . ; species of : subjec- 
 tive, objective, and formal, ulti- 
 
 mate and intermediate, end ot 
 work and end of agent, principal 
 and secondary, natural and super- 
 natural, 179 f.; causes of igno- 
 rance, 54 ; of error, 55 ; fallacy of 
 pretended cause, 47. 
 
 Celibacy, 453. 
 
 Certainty (see Certitude). 
 
 Certitude, Species of : common, phil- 
 osophical, immediate, mediate, of 
 evidence, of faith, metaphysical, 
 physical, moral, 53 ; sources of, 
 117, 133 f . ; ultimate criterion of, 
 126 ; intrinsic criterion, 126 f. ; ex- 
 trinsic criterion, 130 f. 
 
 Chance, 183, 206. 
 
 Change (see Mutation and Motion, 
 Generation and Corruption). 
 
 Children, Duties of, to parents, 456 
 f . ; to one another, 457. 
 
 Chinese philosophy, 496 f. 
 
 Christian philosophy, 504. 
 
 Church, 488 ; end of, 488 ; indepen- 
 dent of, 489; polity of, 489; a 
 spiritual kingdom, 489 ; rights of, 
 490 f . ; relations with State, 492 f . ; 
 with nations, 493 f. 
 
 Circle, Vicious, 47. 
 
 Circumscriptively in place, 303. 
 
 Circumstances of human actions, 
 391 f . 
 
 Classification 73 ; advantages of, 
 73 ; laws of, 73. 
 
 Coaotion, property of right, 401 ; 
 freedom from, 291 ; voluntary 
 actions and, 380. 
 
 Cognition, 351 ; faculties of, 117 ; 
 begins from material objects, 100 
 1, 103 ; of individual bodies, 103 ; 
 the soul's, of itself, 104 ; of God, 
 104 ; principle of, 109, 161 ; direct 
 and refiex, 285 (see Universals, 
 Consciousness ; also Idea, Judg- 
 ment, and Reason). 
 
 Commerce, 480 f. 
 
 Communism, 440 f. 
 
 Commutative contract, 447. 
 
 Compact, Rousseau's Social, 460. 
 
 Comparative — proposition, 24 ; judg- 
 ment, 385. 
 
 Comparison 386. 
 
 Composite, Natural, 332 ; not a me- 
 chanical mixture, 323; has only 
 one substantial form, 233 ; if liv- 
 ing, has only one soul, 336. 
 
 Composition, Fallacy of, 46 ; prin- 
 ciples of, 161 (see Potentiality and 
 Act, Essence and Existence, Mat- 
 ter and Form). 
 
INDEX OF saBJEOTS. 
 
 527 
 
 Compound—proposition, 31, 33 f.; 
 syllogism, 40 i. 
 
 Comprehension of idea, 5. 
 
 Concept, 4 (note) (see Idea). 
 
 Conceptualism. 96 f. 
 
 Concomitant Variation, Method of, 
 73 (note). 
 
 Concord School, 81. 
 
 Concrete idea, 5. 
 
 Concupiscence, 382. 
 
 Concurrence of efficient cause, 172; 
 Divine, 359. 
 
 Condition, 172 (note). 
 
 Conditional proposition, 34. 
 
 Conflict of rights, 401. 
 
 Conscience, 41.5 f. ; proves free will, 
 394; rules of, 416 f. 
 
 Consciousness, 282 ; object of, 383 ; 
 Veracity of, 119 f.; not ultimate 
 criterion of certitude, 129 ; psy- 
 chological and ontological, 103, 
 282 ; habitual and actual, 283 ; 
 testifies to existence, not nature 
 of human soul, 283 ; not really dis- 
 tinct from intellect, 284. 
 
 Consensual contract, 447. 
 
 Consent of mankind, not ultimate 
 criterion of certitude, 137 ; nature 
 of, 135 ; as criterion, 135 ; of what 
 truths, 136, 294, 313, 329, 363; 
 objections against, 136. 
 
 Consequence (see Syllogism). 
 
 Consequent of conditional proposi- 
 tion, 24 ; of syllogism, 34 ; fallacy 
 of, 47. 
 
 Conservation of creatures (see Pres- 
 ervation); of living bodies, 240. 
 
 Constitution of society, 464 ; of 
 bodies, 314 ; of living bodies, 240. 
 
 Contiguity, Kelation of, 272. 
 
 Contingent being, 107, 337 ; element 
 of ideas, 91 f . 
 
 Continuity, Law of, 313. 
 
 Continuous quantity, 195 ; 
 
 Contract, 446 ; conditions of, 446 ; 
 species of, 447; obligations of, 
 448. 
 
 Contradiction, Principle of, 110; 
 liberty of, 392. 
 
 Contradictory opposition, 11, 25, 36. 
 
 Contrariety, Liberty of, 392. 
 
 Contrary opposition, 11, 25, 26. 
 
 Conversion of propositions, 88; 
 modes of, 38. 
 
 Copula, 30. 
 
 Copulative proposition, 33. 
 
 Correlatives, 199. 
 
 Corruption, 12; substantial, 334 f.; 
 of books, 133 f . 
 
 Created — relation, 196; being, 187. 
 
 Creation of the world, 306 f . ; a free 
 act, 348 ; end of, .349 ; possibility 
 of eternal creation, 210; creation 
 and pantheism, 350 f . 
 
 Creatures, 337 f.; lead us to Grod, 104 
 f . ; preservation of, 355 f . ; concur- 
 rence with Creator, 358. 
 
 Criteriology, 117. 
 
 Criterion of certitude, 136 f.; intrin- 
 sic, 136 f . ; extrinsic, 130 ; of mo- • 
 rality, 388 f . 
 
 Critique, 81. 
 
 Cult (see Worship). 
 
 Culture, Intellectual, 435 ; want o^ 
 54. 
 
 Cynical School, 500. 
 
 Cyrenaic School, 500. 
 
 Daring, 383. 
 
 Deduction, 33. 
 
 Definite proposition, 23. 
 
 Definition, 15 ; species of : nominal 
 and real, etymological, essential, 
 genetic, and 'descriptive, 15, 16 ; 
 rules of, 16. 
 
 Definitively in place, 204, 324. 
 
 Delectation, 379. 
 
 Delight, 383. 
 
 Deliria, 303. 
 
 Demerit, 394 f. 
 
 Democracy, 468, 470. 
 
 Demonstration, 57 ; preceded by 
 methodical doubt, 57 ; presup- 
 poses three notions, 58 ; conditions 
 of middle term, 58 ; species of : 
 a priori and a posteriori, direc** 
 and indirect or apogogic — pure, 
 empirical, and mixed, 58 ; method 
 of, 66 f. 
 
 Desire, 383. 
 
 Despair, 383. 
 
 Development — of man's facultic»s 
 (see Duty) ; of memory, 271 f. 
 
 Dialectic syllogisms, 44. 
 
 Dialectics, 3. 
 
 Diction, Fallacies in, 46 ; species of : 
 equivocation, amphibology, fal- 
 lacy of composition, fallacy of 
 division, fallacy of accent, fallacy 
 of figure of diction, 46. 
 
 Didactic method, 66 f. 
 
 Difference, Specific, 10 ; methoi o^ 
 71 (note). 
 
 Dignity, 12. 
 
 Dilemma, 41 . 
 
 Diminution, 12. 
 
 Discrete quantity, 195. 
 
 Disjunctive proposition, 34 
 
 Displeasure, 383. 
 
528 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJE0T8. 
 
 Disposition, 200, 300. 
 
 Distinction, 146 ; species of : real 
 and logical, of mind motived and 
 mind motiving, 147 f. 
 
 Division, 16 ; species of, 16 f ; rules 
 of, 17 ; fallacy of, 46. 
 
 Divorce, 454. 
 
 Dreams, 303. 
 
 Dualism, 333. 
 
 Duel, 435. 
 
 -Duration, 231 (note); of bodies, 240. 
 
 Duty, 396 ; species of : primitive 
 (natural) and derivative (adventi- 
 tious), negative and positive, 396 ; 
 free will and, 397 ; properties of, 
 397 ; conflict of, 397 ; necessity 
 exempts from, 398 ; to God, 419 f . ; 
 to oneself, 425 f. ; in soul and 
 body, 425 f. (see Suicide, Labor); 
 to one's neighbor, 430 ; founda- 
 tion of, 430 ; nature, 430, 431 1, 
 436, 445 ; of husband and wife, 
 
 454 f.; of parents and children, 
 
 455 f. ; of masters and servants, 
 457 f . ; of ruler and subject, 476 ; 
 of nations, 480 ; during and after 
 war, 484. 
 
 Eclectic School, 522. 
 
 Education, 455 ; not criterion of 
 morality, 389 ; right of parents to 
 direct their children's, 456. 
 
 Effect (see Cause, Efficient), 111, 
 112. 
 
 Efficient cause (see Cause). 
 
 Ego, 81, 351 f. 
 
 Eleatic School, 499. 
 
 Election, 378; determining subject 
 of civil authority, 470. 
 
 Elements of judgment, 18 ; of prop- 
 osition, 19 ; of reasoning, 30 ; of 
 beauty, 157 ; of society, 450 ; of 
 civil society, 463. 
 
 Elicited action, 380. 
 
 Emanation from Divine Substance 
 {see Pantheism). 
 
 Embassy, 482 ; duties and privileges 
 of, 482. 
 
 Eminently, 105, 175, 338. 
 
 Emotion, 333 (note). 
 
 Empirical — judgment, 19 ; school, 
 97. 
 
 End (see Final Cause), 179; only 
 Good can be, 181, 371 ; all beings 
 act for an, 181 f., 370 f.; unity of, 
 371 ; operative powers differ ac- 
 cording to mode of attaining, 371 ; 
 Supreme Good is man's ultimate, 
 373 f.; of agent as principle of 
 morality, 393 £.; duty and, 396 ; 
 
 of civil society, 462 ; of Church, 
 
 488 f . 
 
 Enthymeme, 40. 
 
 Epichirem, 40. 
 
 Equal contract, 447. 
 
 EquipoUence, 27 f. 
 
 Error, 50, 54 ; causes of, 55. 
 
 Essence 9, 167 ; distinct from exist' 
 ence, 168; origin of ideas and, 
 91 ; cognition of, 99 f., 295 ; di- 
 vine, and ontologism, 84 ; soul 
 does not directly know its, 104. 
 
 Estimative faculty, 265, 269. 
 
 Eternal, World, not, 209 f., 231. 
 
 Eternity of God, 231, 338. 
 
 Ethics, 369 (see Moral Philosophy) ; 
 division of, 370. 
 
 Eucharist (see Blessed Sacrament). 
 
 Evidence, criterion of certitude, 
 126. 
 
 Evil, 153 ; Species : metaphysical or 
 nominal, physical or natural, and 
 moral, 154; of sin and of punish- 
 ment, 1.54 ; cause of, 155 ; not God 
 155 ; no supreme principle of. 156 
 Divine Providence and, 360 f. 
 actions, 391 f. 
 
 Evolution, 307, 308 (note) (see Law 
 of~Continuity ) . 
 
 Examination of means to end, 378 f. 
 
 Example, 42. 
 
 Excellence of polities, 469. 
 
 Exceptive proposition, 24. 
 
 Exclusive proposition, 24. 
 
 Exemplar cause (see Cause). 
 
 Exercise, Liberty of (see Contradic- 
 tion, Liberty of) ; dominion of, 
 298 ; of sovereign power, 471. 
 
 Existence, 167; distinct from es- 
 sence, 168 (see First Act) ; of 
 God, 104 f.; proofs of God's, 
 327 f . 
 
 Experience, Judgment from, 72; 
 method of, 66, 74 (note). 
 
 Experimentation, 70 ; conditions of, 
 71 f.; methods of, 71,72 (note); 
 not science, 72 ; principle of anal< 
 ogy and, 72. 
 
 Explicit contract, 448. 
 
 Extension of ideas, 9; of bodies 
 195, 326. 
 
 Extra-Diction, FaUaoies, 47. 
 
 Extreme, Major and Minor, 32. 
 
 Eutychianism, 503. 
 
 Faculty, 167 (note) ; as producing 
 immanent action, 177; distinct 
 from substance, 177 (see Power, 
 Operative) ; distinguished by its 
 action and object, 337 : in relation 
 
INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 529 
 
 to soul's simplicity, 238; and its 
 natural operation, 238; species of: 
 vegetative sensitive, intellectual, 
 appetitive, and locomotive, 239; 
 of brute anipal, 243 f . ; of human 
 soul, 250; cognitive and appeti- 
 tive, 251 ; cognitive, as source of 
 certitude, 117 f . ; sensitive appeti- 
 tive, 273; and functions, 273 f. ; 
 locomotive, 274 ; organic (see Veg- 
 etative and Sensitive Faculties) ; 
 inorganic (see Intellect and Will) ; 
 relation of will to other, 297 f. 
 
 Faith due to God, 420. 
 
 Fallacy, 45 ; species of, 45 ; of dic- 
 tion, 46; of extra-diction, 47. 
 
 Falsity, 50; no metaphysical, 50, 
 151 (see Error). 
 
 Fatalists, 295; and pantheism, 355; 
 objections of, against Providence, 
 360 f. 
 
 Fate, 183. 
 
 Fear, 381, 383. 
 
 Figure of syllogism, 35 f. ; species 
 of quality, 199 f. 
 
 Filiation, 196. 
 
 Finite, 187 f . ; cannot produce the 
 Infinite, 106; leads to knowledge 
 of Infinite, 105 ; and contingent 
 being, 106 f. (see Infinite). 
 
 Form, 14 (note), 170 f. ; species of, 
 176, 216 ; species of quality, 201 ; 
 substantial, first source of action in 
 bodies, 176,217, productive of an- 
 other substantial form, 176; sepa- 
 rate, 145 ; Scholastic theory of 
 matter and, 216; every, except 
 intellective, capable of generation 
 and corruption, 219 f . ; corruptible, 
 and substantial change, 221 ; in 
 natural composite, 222 f . ; in chem- 
 ical compounds, 224; generation 
 and corruption of substantial, 224 
 f . ; substantial, of human Isody, 
 234, 319 f. (see Soul) ; of govern- 
 ment (see Polity). 
 
 Formal cause, 170. 
 
 Formality, 147 (note). 
 
 Formally, 338. 
 
 Fortitude, 387. 
 
 Fossils, 209. 
 
 Foundation of relation, 197 ; of every 
 society, 450; of man's duties to 
 himself, 425 ; to his neighbor, 
 430; of morality, 404; of positive 
 law, 407; of the reciprocal ' duties 
 of nations, 479. 
 
 Free Will, 291 f.; proof of, 293 f.; 
 objections against, 295 (see Will, 
 
 Liberty, Voluntary Action, Vio- 
 lence). 
 
 Freedom (see Liberty). 
 
 Functions — of plant life, 242; of 
 animal life, 242 (see Sensation) ; 
 of intellect (see Abstraction, Ap- 
 prehension, Consciousness, Judg- 
 ment, Memory, Reason). 
 
 Fundamental attribute of God (see 
 Aseity) ; principle of morality, 
 410. 
 
 Future (see Time). 
 
 Generation, 12, 201 (note) ; pri- 
 mary matter incapable of, 218; of 
 forms, 219 f. 
 
 Genus, 9. 
 
 Gnostics, 503. 
 
 Good, 144; and being, 151; possibla 
 being not, 152; and end, 152, 
 181, 371; species of, 152 f. (sea 
 Evil) ; indirectly cause of evil, 
 155 ; supreme, and supreme evil, 
 156; sensible, 273; rational, 290; 
 rational, suited to man, 373; su- 
 preme, man's end, 373 f. ; su- 
 preme, possessed by act of intellect, 
 375; enjoyed by soul and body, 
 375 ; will should tend to supreme, 
 876 (see Virtue) ; the common, 
 end of civil society, 462. 
 
 Goodness, God's, moved him to cre- 
 ate, 348. 
 
 Government (see Power, Civil, and 
 Polity). 
 
 Gracefulness, 160. 
 
 Gratuitous contract, 447. 
 
 Greek philosophy, 498. 
 
 Growth, 240, 242. 
 
 Habit— predicament, 11, 204; qual- 
 ity, 200, 299, 385; properties of, 
 299; species of, 300; acquired, 
 300 (see Virtue and Vice). 
 
 Harmony — of world, 211 f. ; pre6s- 
 tablished, 316 f. 
 
 Hatred, 383 (see Enemy). 
 
 Having, Modes of, 12. 
 
 Hearing, 263 f. 
 
 Hedonism, 412. 
 
 Hindoo philosophy, 496. 
 
 History, 132; criterion of certainty, 
 133; veracity of, 134; objections 
 against, 135 ; of Philosophy, 495. 
 
 Honorable Good, 153. 
 
 Human — actions, 378 f. ; law, 403; 
 not a criterion of morality, 389. 
 
 Hypothesis, 69 ; necessity of, 69 ; 
 rules .-f, 70; Nebular, 209. 
 
 Hypothetical proposition, 24; syllo- 
 gism (see Conditional Syllogism). 
 
530 
 
 INDEX OF 8UBJE0T8. 
 
 Idea, 75 f . ; species of, 5 ; properties 
 of, 9 ; characteristics of, 77 ; origin 
 of, 78 (see Sensism, Transcendeu- 
 ' talism. Innate Ideas, Intermediar- 
 ism, Traditionalisni, Scholastic 
 system; also, Universals, Knowl- 
 edge, Mental Term, Concept). 
 
 Ideal being, xxx. (see Logical being). 
 
 Idealism, 119, 530 (see Transcenden- 
 talism). 
 
 Identity, 149 ; principle of. 111. 
 
 Ideology, General, 75 ; Special, 75, 
 99. 
 
 Ignorance, 54 ; causes of, 54 ; species 
 of, affecting morality : antecedent, 
 consequent, concomitant, vincible, 
 and invincible, 381 and note. 
 
 Images, Necessity of sensible, 107 ; 
 association of, 268. | 
 
 Imagination, 265, 267 f . ; control of, 
 269. 
 
 Immensity, Divine, 339 ; not omni- 
 presence, 359. 
 
 Immortality of human soul, 311 ; 
 proofs of, 312 ; errors concerning, 
 313 f. (see Materialism and Sens- 
 ism). 
 
 Immutability of God, 338. 
 
 Impenetrability, 226. 
 
 Impossibility (see Possibility). 
 
 Impotency, 200. 
 
 Incarnation, 193 (note 3), 209. 
 
 Incidental proposition, 25. 
 
 Incomplete term, 5. 
 
 Incomplex term, 5. 
 
 Incorruptibility (see Immortality). 
 
 Indefinite proposition, 32. 
 
 Indication, relation of , 196. 
 
 Indifference of primary matter, 318 ; 
 and liberty, 293 ; of differentiated, 
 3.53 ; of human actions, 393. 
 
 Indissolubility of marriage, 454. 
 
 Individuating notes, 76. 
 
 Individual 9; bodies, cognition of, 
 102 f.; law, 419 f. 
 
 Individuation, principle of, 145. 
 
 Inductive — reasoning, 32 ; syllogism, 
 43 (Experimentation). 
 
 Infinitatirig proposition, 23. 
 
 Infinite, 165 (note) ; idea of, how 
 formed, 106 (see Finite) ; species 
 of, 187 JE. ; quantity cannot be, 187 ; 
 God is, 338. 
 
 Influence — of efficient cause, 170; 
 mutual, of soul and body, and 
 erroneous theories, 315 (see Simul- 
 taneous Concurrence and Physical 
 Promotion). 
 
 Inherence, 12. 
 
 Innate Ideas, Theory of, 82. 
 
 Insanity, 304. 
 
 Instinct, 182, 248, 269 (see Estima- 
 tive Faculty). 
 
 Intellect, Nature and ^object of, 100 
 f., 275 f.; powers of (Intellectui 
 I aqens and Intellectus p ossibilis) , 89, 
 377 f., 279 1; veracity of, 120 (see 
 Abstractive Faculty, Cognition, 
 Cognitive Faculty ; Ideas, Origin 
 of, and Universals). 
 
 Intellection, 379 f . ; analysis precedes 
 synthesis in, 99. 
 
 Intelligible, 275 ; species, 279 f, (see 
 Species). 
 
 Intelligence — faculty of cognizing 
 first principles, 109 ; divine, 339. 
 
 Intentions, First — ideas as consid- 
 ered in Ideology and Psychology, 
 75, 89. 
 
 Intentions, Second — ideas as cousid^ 
 ered in Logic, 4 f . 
 
 Interest, 419. 
 
 Interpolation of books, 134. 
 
 Intuition (see Principles, First). 
 
 Inventive method, 66. 
 
 Ionic School, 498. 
 
 Italic School, 499. 
 
 Judgment, 18, 285 £; species of: 
 aprioriy a posteriori^ necessary, 
 analytical, pure, metaphysical, 
 absolute, contingent, synthetical, 
 empirical, physical, hypothetical, 
 a priori synthetical, 19; logical 
 truth found in, 50 ; instinctive, 99, 
 286 ; practical (see Conscience). 
 
 Judiciary Power, 472 ; species of, 
 474 ; subject of, 475 ; of Church, 
 490. 
 
 Justice, 387. 
 
 Juxtaposition, 13. 
 
 Kings, 497. 
 
 Kingdom, Church a spiritual, 489 
 (see Monarchy). 
 
 Knowledge, Order of human, 99 f.; 
 of individual bodies, 102 ; soul's, of 
 itself, 104 ; of God, 104 ; of finite 
 and contingent being, 106 f.; of 
 first principles, 109 f . ; relation of 
 language to, 114 f. 
 
 Labor, 437. 
 
 Land, 440. 
 
 Language, Utility of, 114 £; origin 
 of, 115 f. 
 
 Law, 402 ; species of, 403 ; species of 
 divine, 403 f. ; species of human, 
 403 ; necessity of, 403 ; eternal, the 
 foundation of morality, 404 ; notes 
 of natural, 405; existence of 
 
INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 631 
 
 natural, 405 f. ; foundation of posi- 
 tive, 407 ; sanction of natural, 407 
 f . ; primary precept of natural, 410 ; 
 false precepts, 411 ; human, not a 
 criterion of morality, 389 ; division 
 of natural, 418; individual, 419 ; so- 
 cial, 450 ; common, of nations, 478. 
 
 Legislative power, 473 f. ; of Church, 
 490. 
 
 Liberty, 291 ; species of : from coac- 
 tion, from necessity, from law, 
 291 (see Free Will) ; of contradic- 
 tion, of contrariety, of specifica- 
 tion, 292 ; existence of, 293 ; ob- 
 jections against, 295 ; of God's love 
 for creatures, 341 ; of creation, 348 
 (see Human Action and Violence) : 
 harmony of, not end of political 
 society, 462. 
 
 Lie, 50 ; morally evil, 431. 
 
 Life, 100, 1,57, 233 ; degi-ees of, 232 ; 
 principle of, 234 ; and species, 234 
 f. (see Soul); vegetative, 242; sensi- 
 tive, 243 f . ; unity of, in animal, 245 
 (see Psychology) ; rational, 833 ; 
 man's supreme good in this, 376; 
 complete sanction of natural law in 
 another, 408 ; of grace and of 
 glory, 158. 
 
 Limits of right, 403. 
 
 Living and non-living beings com- 
 pared, 240. 
 
 Loan, 448. 
 
 Locomotion, 12, 234, 243, 374. 
 
 Locus of soul, 323. 
 
 Logic, 1 f. ; division of, 2 ; compared 
 with Metaphysics, 139 ; and Moral 
 Philosophy, 367. 
 
 Logical — being,184 f. (see Litentions, 
 Second); principles, 109; term, 7; 
 truth, 50 f.; potentiality, 165; re- 
 lation, 196. 
 
 Love (see Will) — Grod's, of Himself 
 and others, 341 f., 383 (see Pas- 
 sions); of God, 433; of oneself, 
 374; of others, 430 (see Duty); 
 foundation of society, 450; of 
 children for parents, 456 ; of chil- 
 dren for one another, 4.57 ; of na- 
 tions for one another, 479. 
 
 Luster, 158 (note). 
 
 Lyceum, 500 f. 
 
 Magnetism, Animal(see Mesmerism), 
 344 f. 
 
 Magnitude cannot be actually infi- 
 nite, 187. 
 
 Major — extreme, 33 ; premise, 33 ; of 
 hypothetical syllogism, 38; of pro- 
 syllogism, 40 ; of dilemma, 41. 
 
 Malice (see Evil and Morality of AO" 
 tions). 
 
 Man, 140, 305, 349 (see Body and 
 Soul, Senses, Intellect, and WiU); 
 actions of, 378 ; rational good of, 
 373 ; ultimate end of, 373, 376 ; im- 
 perfect happiness of, 377 ; duties 
 of— to God. 419 f.; to himself, 435 
 f.; to his neighbor, 430 f.; social 
 state natural to, 459 ; right of, to 
 material goods, 437. 
 
 Marriage, 451 f . ; relation of, to civil 
 power, 453 ; celibacy and, 453 ; 
 unity of, 453 ; indissolubility of, 
 454; duties consbquent on, 454 
 (see Duties of Parents and Chil- 
 dren). 
 
 Masters and Servants, 457. 
 
 Material — element of idea (see 
 Genus) ; of society (see Multi- 
 tude). 
 
 Material Things, Essence of, proper 
 object of intellect in this life, 150, 
 27.5 ; how known, 100 ; degrees of 
 abstraction in cognition of, 100. 
 
 Materialism, 97 f., 388 (note), 522 ; 
 refutation of, 308 (see Hedonism, 
 Sensism, Utilitarianism). 
 
 Mathematics, 61, 101, 139, 187. 
 
 Mathematical Sublime, 159. 
 
 Matter — primary, 166, 216, 318 (see 
 Composite, Matural; Generation 
 and Corruption); of reasoning, 30. 
 
 Mean, Virtue in the, 386. 
 
 Mediate judgment, 30. 
 
 Megario School, 500. 
 
 Memory, Sensitive, development of, 
 265, 270 f.j intellective, 288— not 
 really distinct from possible in- 
 tellect, 289 ; but essentially from 
 sensitive memory, 389 ; develop- 
 ment of intellective, 290. 
 
 Merit, 394 ; with other men, society, 
 and God, 394 f. 
 
 Mesmerism, 344 f. ; species^ of ; com- 
 mon, transcendental, and hyp- 
 notic, 344 f. ; criticism of, 345. 
 
 Metaphysical degrees, 147. 
 
 Metaphysics, 101, 139 ; compared 
 with other parts ' of philosophy, 
 139 ; division of, 140 ; General, 140 
 (see Ontology) ; Special, 140. 
 
 Metempsychosis, 313 f. 
 
 Method, Treatise on, 63 ; impor- 
 tance of, 63 ; general laws of, 64 ; 
 processes in, 64 ; species of, 66 ; 
 special laws of, 67 f. ; of Psy- 
 chology, 249 ; of Moral Philosophy, 
 368 ; of agreement, of difference. 
 
532 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 71 (note) ; of concomitant varia- 
 tion, of residues, 72 (note). 
 Methodical Doubt, 57 ; of Descartes 
 
 (see Cartesian Doubt). 
 Middle term, 30 f., 35. 
 Minor — extreme, 33 ; premise, 33. 
 Miracle, 343. 
 
 Mixture — Mechanical, 233 (note) ; 
 perfect, 233 (see Chemical Com- 
 pound and Natural Composite). 
 Modal — proposition, 22 : accidents 
 
 191. 
 Mode — of syllogism, 35 f.; of hav- 
 ing, 12 (see Modal Accident). 
 Moderate — realism, 97 ; scepticism, 
 
 133. 
 Molecule, constituent of atom (see 
 
 Atom). 
 Monarchy, 468, 470 ; in Church, 489. 
 Moral — Philosophy, 367 ; being, xxx. ; 
 truth, 50 ; certainty, 53 ; urity, 
 145 ; goodness, 153 ; evil, 154 ; 
 cause, 172 f.; order, 376 f.; action 
 (see Human Action) ; systems, 
 false, 411 f.; consciousness (see 
 Conscience). 
 Morality of human actions, 388; 
 false criteria of, 389; judgment 
 on, 390 ; constituent principles of, 
 393 ; object, end, and circum- 
 stances of, 391 f. 
 Motion — species of, 13; of atoms, 
 206 ; of bodies, 195, 202 (note), 337 
 f. (see Time). 
 Multitude, 145, 148; elements of, 
 450, 463 ; results from families, 
 464. 
 Mutual relation, 198. 
 Mysticism, 520. 
 Name, 76. 
 
 Nations, Common Law of, 478 ; re- 
 lations of, 478 f. (see Commerce, 
 War) ; society of, 486. 
 Natural — science, 61, 74 (note), 101, 
 139 ; hypotheses in, 69 (see Classi- 
 fication) ; beauty, 158 ; end, 180 ; 
 composite (see Composite) ; The- 
 ology, 327 ; Law, 368, 73, 78, 418 ; 
 primary precept of, 410 ; state of 
 man, 4.59 f., 467 ; origin of so- 
 ciety, 461 j constitution of society, 
 464 ; relations of nations, 478 f . 
 Nature, 168; foundation of logical 
 being in, 185 (see Relation) ; or- 
 der of, 306, 211. 
 Necessary — modal proposition, 23 ; 
 efficient cause, 173 ; action, 183, 
 347 ; being, 107, 327 ; love of Him- 
 self, God's, 341. 
 
 Necessity, Liberty from, 391; of 
 speech, 114 ; of creation (see Fate, 
 Pantheism). 
 
 Negation, 185 (see Nothing) ; of 
 propositions, 27. 
 
 Negative — ^idea, 7 ; proposition, 23 ; 
 duty, 396, 433 ; right, 400. 
 
 Neoplatonism, 503. 
 
 Nerves, 266. 
 
 Nestorianism, 503. 
 
 Nihilism, 83. 
 
 Nominalism, 97 f., 508, 513. 
 
 Notes of ideas, 76, 145. 
 
 Nothing, 141 (note). 
 
 Noumena (see Transcendentalism). 
 
 Now, 230 (see Time). 
 
 Number, 148, 499. 
 
 Numerical Unity, 145. 
 
 Objectivity of Knowledge (see Ve^ 
 racity). 
 
 Object — formal, 61, specifies faculty, 
 275 f.; material, 60 f. (see Sensi- 
 ble, Intelligible) ; of moral action 
 (see Morality). 
 
 Obligation of contract, 448. 
 
 Observation, 71. 
 
 Occasionalism, 174, 317, 519 (see 
 Ontologism). 
 
 Omnipotence (see Power, Divine ; 
 Miracle, Possibility). 
 
 One (see Unity). 
 
 Onerous contract, 447. 
 
 Ontological — sublime, 159 ; con- 
 sciousness, 103. 
 
 Ontologism, 84, 97, 522. 
 
 Ontology, 141. 
 
 Opinion, 51. 
 
 Opposition, 25 ; species of, 25 ; re« 
 lation of, 373. 
 
 Optimism, 308 f. 
 
 Order— of world, 306, 211 f., 329, 
 361, 373 f , 376 f. (see Divine Prov- 
 idence); priority of, 11 f. 
 
 Organs of sense, 252 r. 
 
 Oriental philosophy, 496. 
 
 Origin — of ideas (see Ideas) ; priority 
 of, 162. 
 
 Ormuzd, 497. 
 
 Pantheism, 97, 350 f., 388 (note), 
 496 f., 503, 506, 519, 521 ; forms of, 
 350 f.; refutation of, 353 ; of Spin- 
 oza, 351 ; of Pichte, 351 ; of Sohel, 
 ling, 353 ; of Hegel, 353. 
 
 Paralogism, 45. 
 
 Parents, Duties of, 455 (see Educa- 
 tion); rights of, 456 ; authority of, 
 457. 
 
 Particular proposition, 22. 
 
 Passion, quality, 300 ; act of sensi- 
 
INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 533 
 
 tive appetite, 383 f. (see Affection 
 
 and Sensitive Appetite). 
 Passive faculties, 852. 
 Passivity, 328 (see Potentiality). 
 Past, 339 f . 
 Paternity, 196. 
 Perfection, 153; of God, 105 (see 
 
 Divine Attributbs); of polities, 
 
 469 f . 
 Permanent quantity, 195. 
 Person, 193; of Christ, 193 (note); 
 
 of God, 838 ; relation of divine 
 
 (see Relation). 
 Phantasm (Sense-image), 103, 256 f . 
 Phantasy, 103, 367 (see Senses and 
 
 Imagination). 
 Phenomena, 70 f. 
 Phenomenalism, 190. 
 Philosophy, xxix ; excellence of, 
 
 xxix. ; schools of, 495 ; division 
 
 of XXX. 
 
 Phrenology, 376. 
 
 Physical — term, 6 ; cause, 173 ; iden- 
 tity, 149; evil, 154 (see Natural 
 Sciences ; Potentiality, Real). 
 
 Physics, 61 (see Experimentation); 
 method in, 67 ; hypothesis in, 69. 
 
 Place, 303. 
 
 Pleasure, not man's end, 374 (see 
 Hedonism). 
 
 Polity, Species of, 468 ; excellence 
 of, 469 f . 
 
 Polyarchy, 494. 
 
 Polygamy, 453 (note). 
 
 Poor, 443. 
 
 Portico, 500 f. 
 
 Position (see Posture). 
 
 Positivism, 80 f., 533. 
 
 Possession (see Property). 
 
 Possibility, intrinsic and extrinsic, 
 165. 
 
 Possible things as such notgood,153. 
 
 Post predicament. 11. 
 
 Posture, 11, 204. ' 
 
 Potential Infinite, 187. 
 
 Potentiality, 164; species of, 165 f.; 
 an imperfection, 167 ; cause in, 
 174 (see Essence and Existence, 
 Faculty and Operative Power). 
 
 Power, quality, 300; operative, 167 
 (see Faculty); passive (see Senses 
 and Intellect); divine, 343 f. ; civil, 
 465 ; origin of civil, 466 ; theories 
 of Hobbes and Rousseau on civil, 
 467; transmission of civil, 470 f.; 
 exercise of civil, 473 ; legislative, 
 472 ; executive, 473 ; judiciary, 
 474 f. 
 
 Precept, 410 (note); primary, of 
 
 natural law, 410 ; false primary, 
 411 (see Utilitarianism, Hedonism, 
 Sensism, Rationalism). 
 
 Predicable, 9. 
 
 Predicament, 10 f. (see Substance 
 and Accident). 
 
 Predicate, 18, 31, 36 ; supposition of, 
 13 f. (see Conversion). 
 
 PreSstablished Harmony, 316 f. 
 
 Premise, 33 f., 36, 40. 
 
 Premotion, 358. 
 
 Prescience, 339 (see Intelligence, 
 Divine). 
 
 Presence of God, 360 (see Place and 
 Omnipresence). 
 
 Present, 339 f. (see Time). 
 
 Principal— proposition, 25 ; contract, 
 44S. 
 
 Principle, 161 ; species of, 161. 
 
 Priority, 11 ; species of, 13. 
 
 Privation, 185 ■ of good (see Evil). 
 
 Probability, 53 (see Opinion, Hypo- 
 thesis). 
 
 Probable syllogism, 44. 
 
 Production, Principle of, 161. 
 
 Progressive school, 533. 
 
 Property — attribute, 10 ; of ideas, 
 9 ; of terms, 13 ; transcendental, 
 144 ; of natural law, 405 ; of duty, 
 397 ; right of, and right to, 438 f. ; 
 origin of right to, 444 f. 
 
 Proposition, 19 ; species of, 30 f. 
 
 Propriety of terms, 15. 
 
 Prosyllogism, 40. 
 
 Proximate — potentiality, 166 ; effi- 
 cient cause, 173; first act, 174 
 (note) ; principle (see Facility) ; 
 end (see Cause, Pinal). 
 
 Providence, 360 ; proofs of, 361 f . ; 
 objections against, 363 f. 
 
 Prudence, 387. 
 
 Punishment, Evil of, 154 ; sanction 
 of, 408 ; everlasting, 409. 
 
 Quality, 11, 199 ; species of, 199. 
 
 Quando, 203. 
 
 Quantity, 11, 1 94 ; really distinct 
 from substance, 194 ; species of, 
 195. 
 
 Quiddity, 168 (see Nature or Es- 
 sence). 
 
 Rational — good, 373 ; Philosophy, 
 
 XXX. 
 
 Real — term, 7; being, 184 (see On- 
 tology) ; distinction, 135, 146 ; 
 beauty, 158 ; potentiality, 165 ; 
 relation, 196 f. 
 
 Realism, 97 ; species of, 97, 508. 
 
 Reason, 387 ; not really distinct from 
 intellect, 288. 
 
534 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJEGT8. 
 
 BeaiSoning, 30 ; elements of, 80 ; 
 truth of, 31 ; axioms of, 31 ; divi- 
 sion of, 31 (see Syllogism). 
 
 Reduplicative proposition, 25. 
 
 Reflection, 284. 
 
 Relation, 11, 196 ; species of, 196 ; 
 properties of, 198 (note). 
 
 Religion, 419. 
 
 Religious society, 488 ; end of, 488 ; 
 polity of, 489; rights of, 490 f.; 
 independent of state, 492. 
 
 Reminiscence, 271. 
 
 Renaissance, 514. 
 
 Residues, Method of, 73 (note). 
 
 Restrictive proposition, 25. 
 
 Revelation, Possibility of, 420 ; util- 
 ity of, 421. 
 
 Roman Pontiff, Temporal power of, 
 493 ; authority of, 494. 
 
 Ruler, 466, 471 (see Usurper) ; duties 
 of, 476. 
 
 Sanction of natural law, 407 f. (see 
 Punishment Everlasting). 
 
 Scepticism, 84, 123, 499 , species of, 
 133 ; refutation of, 134 (see Cogni- 
 tive Faculties and Criteria of Cer- 
 titude) ; school of, 467. 
 
 Scholastic philosophy, 507-613. 
 
 Science, 2 60 ; specified by its ob- 
 '" ' Heetrol (see Method, Hypothesis, 
 Experimentation) . 
 
 Selection, Natural (see" Spontaneous 
 Generation). 
 
 Sensation, 118; cause of, 253 f.; 
 medium of, 857 (see Cognitive Fac- 
 ulty, Senses, Sensitive Appetite, 
 Passion, Emotion). 
 
 Sense, Common, 865 ; functions of, 
 266 ; of mankind, 135 f. 
 
 Senses, 118, 353 ; external, 358 f.; in- 
 ternal, 853, 264; veracity of, 118 f. 
 
 Sensibility, Intensity of, 259 ; ob- 
 ject of, 261. 
 
 Sensible, 118, 253, 256 ; joined by 
 species to sense, 256 ; external, 
 258 f. 
 
 Sensism, 78, 518, 520 ; species of, 79 ; 
 refutation of, 80 ; morality of, 413. 
 
 Sensitive appetite, 373 f. 
 
 Sight, 263 f . 
 
 Sign of Thought (see Idea, Oral 
 Term, Speech). 
 
 Simple— proposition, 31 ; conversion, 
 38. 
 
 Simplicity (see Unity, Metaphysical); 
 of soul, 336, 338; of brute soul, 
 346 ; of human soul, 306. 
 
 Singular — term, 8 ; proposition, 83. 
 
 Bleep, 303. 
 
 SmeU, 263 f. 
 
 Socialism, 441. 
 
 Society, 450 ; elements of, 4.50 ; foun- 
 dation of, 450 ; division of, 451 ; 
 domestic, 454 (see Marriage) ; 
 herile, 457 (see Master and Ser- 
 vant) ; civil, 459 f . ; universal, 
 478 f.; religious, 488 f. 
 
 Somnambulism, 303. 
 
 Sophism, 45 (see Fallacy). 
 
 Sophist, 45, 497. 
 
 Sorites, 40. 
 
 Soul, 334 ; species of, 234; vegetative, 
 243; sensitive, 243 ; rational, 350, 
 305 ; simplicity of, 236 ; spiritual- 
 ity of human, 306 f.; immortality 
 of human, 311. 
 
 Space, 328 t ; vaenous, 229. 
 
 Species, 9 ; intentional, 256 ; sensible, 
 356 f . ; expressa and impressa, 257 ; 
 intelligible, 279 f . 
 
 Speech — and traditionalism, 88 ■ ori- 
 gin of, 115. 
 
 Spiritism, 346. 
 
 Spiritualism, 346. 
 
 Spiritual (Incorporeal), 10, 306. 
 
 Spirituality of human soul, 306 f. 
 
 Spontaneous generation, 241 (note). 
 
 State, 12 ; Church superior to, 489 t. 
 (see Civil Society). 
 
 Stoics, 97, 183, 501. 
 
 Strata of earth's crust, 309. 
 
 Subaltern — opposition, 26 ; rules of, 
 37; propositions, equivalence of, 28. 
 
 Subject — of proposition. 80 ; suppo- 
 sition of, 13 f. (see Conversion) ; 
 of accidents, 143. 
 
 Subjectivism (see Idealism). 
 
 Subordination of sciences, 61. 
 
 Subsistence, 193 f. ; distinct from 
 nature, 103 ; of Word, 193. 
 
 Substance, 11, 189 f.; first and sec- 
 ond, 193 (see Subsistence, Suppo- 
 sit. Body, Person) ; absolute acci- 
 dents may by divine power exist 
 apart from their connatural, 191 ; 
 idea of, 190 ; created, a cause, 174 ; 
 no created, immediately operative, 
 177. 
 
 Suicide, 427 £ (see Duel). 
 
 Supposit, 193. 
 
 Supposition, 12 ; species of, 13 ; rules 
 of, 13. 
 
 Syllogism, 31 ; species of, 31 ; rules 
 of, 33 ; modes of, 35 ; figures of, 
 35 f.; hypothetical, 38; disjunc- 
 tive, 38 ; conjunctive, 39 ; con- 
 ditional, 39 ; imperfect and 
 abridged, 40 f. 
 
INDEX OP SUBJECTS. 
 
 536 
 
 Syndereais, 410. 
 
 Synthesis, 64 ; rules of, 65 (see Judg- 
 ment). 
 
 Synthetical judgment, 18, 131 ; a 
 priori, 19. 
 
 Taste, 263 f.; aesthetic, 160. 
 
 Teleology, 179 (note) (see Pinal 
 Cause). 
 
 Temperance, 387. 
 
 Term, 4 ; mental- (see Idea) ; oral, 4 ; 
 species of oral, 5 f . ; properties of, 
 12 ; middle, 32 f . ; of intellection, 
 281 ; of creation and of preserva- 
 tion, 356 ; whence and whither, 
 195, 202 (note) (see Relation). 
 
 Theology, Natural, 337. 
 
 Thomistic school, 510. 
 
 Touch, 263 f. 
 
 Tradition, 132; a source of certi- 
 tude, 133. 
 
 Traditionalism, 87, 532 ; forms of, 
 87 ; refutation of, 88 (see Lan- 
 guage, Origin of) . 
 
 Tnith, 49 ; species of, 50 ; opposite 
 of, 50 ; logical, found in judgment, 
 50 ; not m simple apprehension, 
 51 ; states of intellect in respect 
 to, 51 f.; metaphysical, 150; di- 
 vine, 150 ; logical, 150 (see Lie)-, 
 
 Tyranny (see Traiismission of Civil 
 Power, Duties of Ruler). 
 
 Ubioation, Ubiety, 203. 
 
 Ubiquity, 359. 
 
 Union, 145. 
 
 Unity, 144 ; species of, 145 ; of acci- 
 dents, 146 ; and distinction, 146 ; 
 principle of, 148; and identity, 
 149. 
 
 tJniversal— term, 8 f., 13, 94 ; prop- 
 erties of, 9 ; kinds of (see Predi- 
 cable, Predicament, Transcenden- 
 tal) ; proposition, 23 ; and opposi- 
 
 tion, 26 ; middle term, 33 ; premise 
 of sorites, 41 ; element of idea, 91 
 f . ; direct and reflex, 94 f . ; opin- 
 ions on, 94 f. (see Idea, Intellect, 
 Conceptualism, Nominalism, Real- 
 ism) ; object of intellect, 101 f. 
 
 Usury, 449. 
 
 Variation, Method of concomitant, 
 72 (note). 
 
 Veda, 496. 
 
 Vedanta, 496. 
 
 Vegetation, 232, 234, 239, 243; and 
 sensation, 241 f.; not produced by 
 mechanical principle, 242. 
 
 Veracity of senses, 118; of conscious- 
 ness 119 ; of intellect and reason, 
 120. 
 
 Verbum mentis, 281. 
 
 Vice, 385 (see Habit). 
 
 Virtually, 338 (see Distinction, Vir- 
 tual) ; voluntary action, 380. 
 
 Virtue, 385 (see Habit) ; necessity 
 of, 386 ; how acquired, 386 ; lies in 
 the mean, 386 ; not man's end, 374. 
 
 Vital faculties, 237. 
 
 Vitalism (see Duodynamism). 
 
 Voluntary action, 380 ; species of, 
 380 ; -violence affects, 380 ; fear 
 and, 381 ; ignorance and, 381 ; con- 
 cupiscence and, 383 (see Human 
 Action, Wm). 
 
 When, 203. 
 
 Whole, 16 f. ; species of, 16. 
 
 Will, Human, distinct from sensitive 
 appetite, 290 (see Liberty, Good- 
 ness, Evil) ; relation of, to other 
 faculties, 297 f. ; divine. 341 f. 
 
 Word, 4 (see Tf/M, Oral ; Lan- 
 guage). 
 
 Writing, authentic, l}k ■ entire, \Zi. 
 
 Zend-Avesta, 497, 
 
EfDEX OF ATJTHOES EEFEEEED TO 
 
 Numbers refer to pages. 
 
 Abelard, 97, 209, 508. 
 
 AeneBidemus, 503. 
 
 Ahrens, 475. 
 
 d'AiUy, Peter, 513. 
 
 Albert the Great, 509. 
 
 Alcott, 81 n. 
 
 Alouin, 507. 
 
 Alexander Hales, 509. 
 
 Al-Farabi, 506. 
 
 Al-Gazel, 506. 
 
 Alkendi, 506. 
 
 Aniaury of Cbartres, 509. 
 
 Ambrose, 210. 
 
 Anaxagoras, 498. 
 
 Aaaximander, 498. 
 
 Ansaldi, 313 n. 
 
 Anselm, St., 507. 
 
 Antisthenes, 500. 
 
 Apelles, 503. 
 
 Arceriilas, .503. 
 
 Archytas, 499. 
 
 Aristippus, 411, 500. 
 
 Aristotle, 3 n., 9, 40 n., 307, 316, 501, 
 
 511. 
 Arnauld, 139, 519. 
 Athanasius, St., 210. 
 Athenagoras, 504. 
 Augustine, St.. 208. SJIO, a6, 404 n., 
 
 504._ 
 Aurehus, Marcus, 503. 
 Avempace, 506. 
 ATerroes, 87, 97, 223 n. 596. 
 Avicebron, 507. 
 Avicenna, 333, 506. 
 Bacon, Francis, 55, 349, 308, 515. 
 Bacon, Roger, 510. 
 Bain, 533. 
 Bardesanes, 503. 
 Barthez, 3S1. 
 Basilides, 503. 
 Bayle, 134, 520. 
 Beccaria, 375. 
 Bede 505 
 
 Bentham,'391, 411, 445, 475. 
 Berkeley, -97, 123, 190, 254, 519. 
 
 Bessarion, 514. 
 
 Biohat, 2431,309. 
 
 Biran, Maine de, 532. 
 
 Boehme, 514. 
 
 Boethius, 193, 231 n., 505. 
 
 Bonald, de, 87 116, 533. 
 
 Bonaventure, St., 210, 215 n., 51C 
 
 Bonnetty, 87. 
 
 Bosoovich, 315. 
 
 Bossuet, 519. 
 
 Braid, 344. 
 
 Brenser, 315 n. ^ 
 
 Broca, 341 n. 
 
 Broussais, 355, 309. 
 
 Brownson, 84 n. 
 
 Bruno, 350, 515. 
 
 Buridan, 512. 
 
 Cabanis, 355, 309. 
 
 Cajetan, 313 n. 
 
 Campanella, 514. 
 
 Cardano, .515. 
 
 Carneades, 503. 
 
 Carpocrates, 503. 
 
 Cassiodorus, 505. 
 
 Champeanx, William of, 97, 506. 
 
 Channing, 81 n. 
 
 Charlemagne, 507. 
 
 Charles the Bold, 507. 
 
 Charron, 515. 
 
 Chrysippus, 503. 
 
 Chrysostom, St. John, 310, 
 
 Cicero, 230, 503. 
 
 Clarke, 239, 331. 
 
 Clarke, R. P., 366 n. 
 
 Claudian, Mamertus 505. 
 
 Clement, 310, 504. 
 
 CoUard, Royer, 523. 
 
 Collins, 297. 
 
 Comte, 80, 355 n., 533. 
 
 Condillac, 69 79, 97, 106, 133, 518. 
 
 Confucius, 497. 
 
 Corcoran, Mgr., 213 n. 
 
 Cousin, 55, 86, 99, 129, 368, 267,383, 
 
 414, 532. 
 Cusa, Nicholas de, 514. 
 
INDEX OF AUTHORS REFERRED TO. 637 
 
 Damiron, 414, 532. 
 
 Darwin, 243, 534. 
 
 David de Dinant, 509. 
 
 Democritus, 79, 214, 339, 308 499. 
 
 Denis, St., the Areopagite, 504. 
 
 Xescartes, 57, 83, 97, 106, 123, 138, 
 174, 182, 189, 194, 309, 315, 336, 
 347, 343, 351, 889, 516. 
 
 Diogenes, 500. 
 
 Draper, 523. 
 
 Dumas, 341 n. 
 
 Egidio, Colonna, 513. 
 
 Eichhorn, 368. 
 
 Emerson, 81 n., 355 n. 
 
 Empedooles, 498. 
 
 Empiricua, Sextus, 124, 503. 
 
 Bphraim, St., 210. 
 
 Epictetus, 503. 
 
 Bpionrns, 79, 97, 314, 229, 347, 308, 
 413, 501. 
 
 Erasmus, 514. 
 
 Brigena, Sootus, 97, 350, 507. 
 
 Euclid, 500. 
 
 Fe'nelon, 308, 394, 519. 
 
 Piohte, 81, 134, 254, 363, 283, 351, 
 531. 
 
 -Fioino, Marsilio, 514. 
 
 Piske, 523. 
 
 Elourens, 241 n, 
 
 Fourier, 437, 522. 
 
 Gall, 376. 
 
 GaUuppi, 139. 
 
 Gardair, 292 n. 
 
 Gassendi, 215, 518. 
 
 George of Trebizond, 514. 
 
 Gerdil, 210. 
 
 Gerson, 513. 
 
 Gilbert of Porre, 508. 
 
 Gioberti, 85, 97, 129, 523. 
 
 Gonzalez, 534. 
 
 Gorgias, 123, 499. 
 
 Gregory, 52 n. 
 
 Gregory, St., the Great, 210. 
 
 Grotius, 444. 
 
 Gunther, 321 n. 
 
 Hamilton, 98, 523. 
 
 Harper, 55 n., 74 n., 76 n., 148 n., 
 151 a, 163 n., 164 n., 174 n., 175 
 n., 188 n., 191 n., 196 n., 198 n,, 
 200 n., 303 n., 217-219 n., 221- 
 233 n., 225 n., 228 n., 231 n., 237 
 n., 248 n., 307 n 372 n. 
 
 Haroun-al-Raschid, 505. 
 
 Harrison, 355 n. 
 
 Hegel, 81, 97, 124, 349, 351, 531. 
 
 Heinecius, 444. 
 
 Helvetius, 309, 391, 413, 518. 
 
 Henry of Ghent, 510. 
 
 Hierooles, 504. 
 
 Hilary, St., 310. 
 
 Hill, 407 n. 
 
 Hobbes, 308, 389, 413, 445, 460, 467, 
 
 518. 
 d'Holbach, 308, 428, 518. 
 Huet, 124. 
 Humboldt, 116 n. 
 Hume, 97, 113, 124, 167 n., 175 n., 
 
 190, 331 n., 383, 518. 
 Hutcheson, 390, 413, 530. 
 Huxley, 524. 
 Irenaeus, St., .504. 
 Isidore, St., 505. 
 Jamblicus, 504. 
 Jevon, 53 n. 
 
 John Chrysostom, St. , 310. 
 John Damascene, St., 505. 
 John Philoponus, 505. 
 Jouffroy, 414, 522. 
 Jungmann, 384 n. 
 Justin, St., 504 n. / 
 
 Kant, 19, 81, 97, 99, 110 n., 113, 
 
 134, 168 n., 215, 231 n., 862, 351, 
 
 3.55 n., 4l4, 462, 521. 
 Kleutgen, 524. 
 Lactantius, 504. 
 Lamarck, 307 n. 
 La Mennais, 123, 138, 622 f. 
 Lamettrie, 309. 
 Lao-Tseu, 497. 
 La Rochefoucauld, 411. 
 Laromiguiere, 79, .532. 
 Leibnitz, 83, 129, 209, 213, 215, 229, 
 
 243, 2.53, 317, 517, 520. 
 Leroux, 532. 
 
 Leucippus, 79, 215, 308, 499. 
 Lewes, 355 n., 524. 
 Liberatore, 80 n., 369 n., 373 n., 381 
 
 n.,524. 
 Littre, 355 n., 523. 
 Locke, 79, 97, 106, 133, 167 n., 190, 
 
 193 n., 349, 293,308,391,518. 
 Lucretius. 308, 501. 
 Lully, Raymond, 513. 
 Maimonides. Moses, 507. 
 Malobranohe, 84, 97, 106, 174, 309, 
 
 354, 317, 519, 522. 
 Maudsley, 389 n. 
 AIsBinsT 344 
 Mill, J. Stuart, 44 n., 71 u., 98, 113 
 
 n.. 168 n., 523. 
 Molina, 359. 
 Montaigne. 389, 515. 
 Montesquieu, 44.5, 475. 
 Muzzarrelli, 313 n. 4 
 Newton, 315, 229, 231. 
 Niebuhr, 368. 
 Ocellus, 499. 
 Oekham, 97, 293, 331 n., 5131 
 
538 
 
 INDEX OF AUTHORS BEFEBBED TO. 
 
 Origen, 210, 504. 
 
 Paley, 374 n. 
 
 Paracelsus, 514. 
 
 Parmenides, 499. 
 
 Pascal, 519. 
 
 Pasteur, S41 n. 
 
 Petau, 210. 
 
 Peter Lombard, 509. 
 
 PhUo, 504. 
 
 Photius, 321 n. 
 
 Pico della Mirandola, 514. 
 
 Plato, 82, 97, 157, 207 f., 216, 243, 
 
 316, .500. 
 Plotinus, 504. 
 Poliziano, Angelo, 514. 
 Pomponazzi, 515. 
 Poncet, 241 n. 
 Porphyry, 504. 
 Proclus, 495, 504. 
 Protagoras, 123, 499. 
 Puffendorf, S89, 444. 
 Pyrrho, 124, 500, 502. 
 Pythagoras, 182, 215, 314, 499. 
 Quatrefages, 241 n. 
 Ramus, 515. 
 Reid, 69, 99, 123, 128, 249, S62, 283 
 
 f., 286, 390, 413, .520. 
 B6uan, 355n.,521 n. 
 ReuchUn, 514. 
 Reynaud, 314. 
 Romanes, 534. 
 Roscelin, 97, 508. 
 Bosmini, 83, 129, 265, 522. 
 Rousseau, 116, 428, 460, 464, 467. 
 Russo, 175 n., 226 n., 372 n., 398 n., 
 
 399 n., 401 n., 408 n. 
 Saccas, Ammouius, 503. 
 Sainte-Beuve, 355 n. 
 Saint-Hilaire, 212. 
 Saint-Lambert, 389, 413. 
 Saint-PourQain, 512. 
 Saint-Projet, de, 74 n., 137 n., 311 n. 
 Saint-Simon, 437, 522. 
 Sanseverino, 159 n., 524 n. 
 Satuminus, 503. 
 3avigay, 368. 
 
 Schelling, 81, 124, 249, 353, 531. 
 
 Scotus Erigena, 97, 350, 507. 
 
 Seneca, 502. 
 
 Shaftesbury, 413. 
 
 Smith, Adam, 390, 413. 
 
 Socrates, 499. 
 
 Spencer, 289 n., 524. 
 
 Spinoza, 350 f 519. 
 
 Spurzheim, 276. 
 
 Stahl, 321. 
 
 Stewart, 521 
 
 Straton, 501. 
 
 Strauss, 521 n. 
 
 Suarez, 313 n. 
 
 Taine, 355 n., 523. 
 
 Telesio, 514. 
 
 Tertullian, 504. 
 
 Thales, 495, 498. 
 
 Theodore of Gaza, 514. 
 
 TheophrastUB, 501. 
 
 Thofail, 506. 
 
 Thomas Aquinas, St., 18 n., 91, 97, 
 
 129 n., 146 n., 162, 308, 210, 316, 
 
 226 n., 227 n., 241 n., 352 n., 347 
 
 n., 360 n. 
 Thomasius, 520. 
 Tiedemans, 241 n. 
 Timseus, 499. 
 Toletus, 210. 
 Valentinus, 503. 
 Van Helmont, 514. 
 Vanini, 51.5. 
 Ventura, 87, 116, 523. 
 Vincent of Beauvais, 510. 
 Von Hutten, 514. 
 Vyasa, 496. 
 
 William of Auvergne, 509. 
 William of Champeaux, 97, 50a 
 Wiseman, 116 n. 
 Wolf, 285, 520. 
 Xenophanes, 499. 
 Zeno, 500, 502. 
 Zigliara, 168 n., 198 n., 329, 344 n.. 
 
 359 n., 377 n., 382 n., 398 n., 40£ 
 
 n., 403, 524. 
 

 
 
 
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