V 
 
The person charging this material is re- 
 sponsible for its return on or before the 
 Latest Date stamped below. 
 
 Theft, mutilation, and underlining of books 
 ore reasons for disciplinary action and may 
 result in dismissal from the University. 
 
 University of Illinois Library 
 
 L161— O-1096 
 
■^t/. -.v^Xii^,. cy.^^. ^^^^ 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Stageira, the birthplace of Aristotle, was a town of Chalcidice 
 in Macedonia, whose remains are probably to be seen in old 
 Hellenic masonry about the village of Nizoro on the south side 
 of a wooded mountain, with an outlook on Mount Athos and the 
 ^gean. It had decayed with the Greek colonies in Macedonia 
 when Alexander the Great sought to honour his teacher by 
 restoring it; but it had lost the conditions of life and soon 
 cruMoied again to dust. 
 
 Aristotle was born at Stageira in the year 384 before Christ, 
 His father, Nicomachus, wrote books on science, and was 
 physician to Amyntas H., King of Macedonia. Nicomachus 
 brought his son, while still young, into the king's Court at Pella, 
 where he became acquainted with the king's son, Philip, who 
 was three years younger than himself. 
 
 When seventeen years old Aristotle, who had lost both 
 parents and was well cared for by Proxenus, a faithful guardian, 
 went to Athens, where the great teacher was Plato, then aged 
 sixty-two ; he had been born in the \ ear B.C. 429, and was forty- 
 five years older than Aristotle. Plato had gone to Sicily when- 
 young Aristotle first came to Athens, and did not return for 
 three years. Aristotle, with ample means for study, and a 
 master spirit's appetite for knowledge, remained in Athens, and 
 .upon Plato's return the young philosopher, aged twenty, sought 
 knowledge from the old philosopher, who was then sixty-five 
 ^ and lived until the age of eighty-two. Aristotle's age 
 ^n in the year of Plato's death. 
 
 Aristotle the ablest and most diligent of 
 
6 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 his disciples : he called Aristotle *'the mind of the school," and 
 his house *'the house of the reader." It has been said that 
 when studying late with weariness of body, Aristotle used to 
 hold a brass ball in one hnnd over a brass basin, that if he dozed, 
 the relaxed fingers might let die ball fall and rouse him to go on 
 with his work. Aristotle remained at Athens until Plato died— 
 died, it is said, in the act of writing— in the year B.C. 347. But 
 during this time there remained, of course, the home relations. 
 Philip, the son of AmyntasIL,whom Aristotle had known in youth, 
 had become King of Maccdon eight years after Aristotle went 
 to Athens, and Aristotle was once sent by the Athenians on a;i 
 embassy to him. In the year B.C. 356, when Aristotle had been 
 eleven years at Athens, Philip of Maccdon wTote him a letter, 
 still extant, announcing the birth of his son Alexander, who was, 
 therefore, nine years old in the year of the death of Plato. 
 
 As the disciple of Plato, Aristotle drew strength from a mind 
 unlike his own except in the gift of genius and ardent zeal for 
 knowledge. The genius of Plato was akin to that of the poet, 
 he represented Literature in its noblest form ; but A ristrtle. 
 represented Science. His methods of investigation were entirely 
 scientific. There were few subjects that he left untouched, and 
 whatever he touched he put into clear scientific form. He began 
 at Athens, in Plato's lifetime, to teach Rhetoric, and he laid the 
 foundations of all later study of Rhetoric and Logic, as he laid 
 foundations also for the study of Ethics, and — as in this volume 
 — of Politics. He went on also to so broad a study of the world 
 outside and around man, by experiment as well as reasoning, that 
 he may be said to have left all human science reshaped by his 
 studies, and so well advanced that for centuries men thought it 
 vain to attempt more. In the earlier half of the sixteenth 
 century men' of the old school held by him ; some regarded him 
 even as sent by God for the revelation of the sciences, so that 
 it was almost impious to differ from him, useless to expect to 
 learn more than he had taught. Thus the most energetic -nd 
 wide-reaching man of science that the world has ^- 
 himself eager for advance by the way of 
 very strength was made at last in<^' 
 and advance of science in the ^' 
 
INTRODUCTION, 
 
 7 
 
 ttack upon a dull idolatry of the man by whom, beyond all 
 ther men, the advance of science had been most desired and 
 ided. One of the most go-ahead'' men who ever lived had 
 een transformed, by those who could only swear in the words 
 f a master, into a representative of intellectual stagnation. 
 After the death of Plato, Aristotle left Athens and travelled, at 
 time of much confusion caused by the ambition of King 
 ^hilip. He had married Pythias, the adopted daughter of one 
 f his pupils, Hermias, who became ruler of two cities and was 
 illed by the Persians when he fell into their hands. Aristotle 
 afterwards dedicated a statue at Delphi to his friend Hermias, 
 and showed his love for his wife Pythias, long after her death, 
 by directing that her ashes should be placed beside his own. 
 
 It was in the year B.C. 342, when Aristotle's age was forty- 
 two, that King Philip invited Aristotle to become the teacher 
 of his son Alexander, then aged thirteen. He agreed, and he 
 was treated at Philip's Court with the highest respect. A 
 school was built for him among pleasant groves, where other 
 noble youths were fellow-students with the prince. Alexander 
 studied thus during four years under Aristotle, for whom he 
 acquired the strongest affection. Alexander at seventeen was 
 appointed regent while his father made an expedition to 
 Bithynia, and Aristotle remained at the Macedonian Court until 
 his pupil became king. After that he returned, in the year B.C. 
 335, at the age of forty-nine, to Athens, where a successor to 
 Plato taught in the Academy, and the State assigned to Aristotle, 
 for use as a school, the Lyceum, near the temple of the Lycaean 
 Apollo. There he studied and taught by lectures, winning in 
 their style, and delivered with a little lisp. He was careful in 
 dress, small, thin, dyspeptic, and with a satirical look in his thin 
 face. He wrote much during the next thirteen years and was 
 aided in his studies by the munificence of Alexander, who gave 
 him eight hundred talents as endowment of research, and des- 
 patched to him from India such strange animals as he thought 
 
 I 
 
 master's attention. - 
 
 nder's death, B.C. 323, the reaction against 
 ught Aristotle into trouble with the Greeks as a 
 Macedonians. He was accused of impiety, and 
 
8 
 
 INTRODUCTION, 
 
 withdrew, in 322, to Chalcis in Euboea, where he had relatives 
 and some family property ; where also the Macedonians were 
 strong. The Athenians condemned him to death, in his absence, 
 but he was then dying in the course of nature, of a common 
 ailment among students, a disordered stomach. He died in 
 the same year 322, at the age of sixty-three. 
 
 Aristotle's theory of Politics is based on Ethics. He sr.w 
 clearly the central truth that a State can be no better than the 
 citizens of which it is composed, and aimed at a community of 
 good men. He allowed absolute monarchy only upon condi- 
 tion that the monarch was wiser and better than all the rest of 
 the State. He wrote in a time when slavery was part of the 
 social system, and saw in the slaves w^orkers who left their 
 masters free to grow in knowledge and wisdom rather tha'^ 
 wealth. Great wealth he regarded as, like poverty, a p-r:^ ; . 
 strength and happiness were seated in the mean, that enab. 
 man to maintain body and mind in vigour, and wy. rl ■ ^ nis 
 home and in his city. This treatise on Gove c, in fact, 
 though based upon bygone conditions of citize .^nip, laid the 
 foundation of all subsequent discussions on the constitution of 
 a State. 
 
 The translation here given was first published in 1776 as a 
 quarto volume. It was reprinted in 1778, and has earned praise 
 for clearness and fidelity. 
 
 H. M. 
 
 March 1888, 
 
A Treatise on Government. 
 
 Booft I. 
 
 CHAPTER 1. 
 
 As we see that every city is a society, and every society is 
 established for some good purpose — for an apparent good is 
 the spring of all human actions — it is evident that this is the 
 principle upon which they are every one founded, and this 
 is more especially true of that which has for its object the 
 best possible, and is itself the most excellent, and com- 
 prehends all the rest. Now this is called a city, and the 
 society thereof a political society 3 for those who think that 
 the principles of a political, a regal, a family, and a herile 
 government are the same are mistaken, while they suppose 
 that each of these differ in the numbers to whom their 
 power extends, but not in their constitution : so that with 
 them a herile government is one composed of a very few, 
 a domestic of more, a civil and a regal of still more, as if 
 there was no difiference between a large family and a 
 small city, or that a regal government and a political 
 one are the same, only that in the one a single person 
 is continually at the head of public affairs, in the other 
 that each member of the State has in his turn a share 
 in the government, and is at one time a magistrate, at 
 
lo ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book i. 
 
 another a private person, according to the rules of pohtical 
 science. But now this is not true, as will be evident to 
 any one who will consider this question in the most approved 
 method. As, in an inquiry into every other subject, it is 
 necessary to separate the different parts of which it is 
 compounded till we arrive at their first elements, which are 
 the most minute parts thereof, so by the same proceeding 
 we shall acquire a knowledge of the primary parts of a city, 
 and see wherein they differ from each other, and whether 
 the rules of art will give us any assistance in examining into 
 each of these things which are mentioned. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Now if in this particular science any one would attend to its 
 original seeds and their first shoot, he would then as in 
 others have the subject perfectly before him, and perceive, 
 in the first place, that it is requisite that these should be 
 joined together whose species cannot exist without each 
 other, as the male and the female, for the business of pro- 
 pagation, and this not through choice, but by that natural 
 impulse which acts both upon plants and animals also, for 
 the purpose of their leaving behind them others like 
 themselves. It is also from natural causes that some 
 beings command and others obey, that each may obtain 
 their mutual safety ; for a being who is endowed with a 
 mind capable of reflection and forethought is by nature the 
 superior and governor, whereas he whose excellence is 
 merely corporeal is formed to be a slave ; whence it follows, 
 that the different state of master and slave is equally 
 advantageous to both. But there is a natural difference 
 between a female and a slave, for Nature is not like the 
 artists who make the Delphic swords for the use of the poor ; 
 
CHAP. II.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 
 
 but for every particular purpose she has her separate 
 instruments, and thus her ends are most complete, for 
 whatsoever is employed on one subject only, brings that one 
 to much greater perfection than when employed on many : 
 and yet among the barbarians, a female and a slave are 
 upon a level in the community, the reason for which is, 
 that amongst them there are none qualified by nature to 
 govern, therefore their society can be nothing but between 
 slaves of different sexes. For which reason the poets say, 
 " It is proper for the Greeks to govern the barbarians," as 
 if a barbarian and a slave were by nature one. Now of 
 these two societies the domestic is the first, and Hesiod is 
 right when he says^ " first a house, then a wife, then an ox 
 for the plough," for the poor man has always an ox before 
 a household slave. That society then which Nature has 
 established for daily support is the domestic, and those 
 who compose it are called By; Charondas 'OfMOG-LnvoL, and by 
 Epimenides the Cretan 'OjjLOKaTrvoi ; but the society of many^- 
 families, which was first instituted for their lasting, mutual 
 advantage, is called a village, and a village is most naturally 
 composed of the descendants of one family, whom some 
 persons call 'OfioyaXaKres, the children and the children's 
 children thereof, for which reason cities were originally 
 governed by kings, as the barbarian States now are, which 
 are composed of those who had before submitted to kingly 
 government ; for every family is governed by the elder, as 
 are the branches thereof, on account of their relationship 
 thereunto, which is what Homer says, each one ruled his 
 wife and child," and in this scattered manner they formerly 
 lived. And the opinion which universally prevails, that the 
 gods themselves are subject to kingly government, arises 
 from hence, that all men formerly were, and many are so 
 now ; and as they imagined themselves to be made in the 
 likeness of the gods, so they supposed their manner of life 
 must needs be the same. And when many villages so 
 entirely join themselves together as in every respect to form 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. ^ [book i. 
 
 but one society, that society is a city^ and contains in itself, 
 if I may so speak, the end and perfection of government, 
 first founded that we might live, but continued that we may 
 live happily. For which reason every city must be allowed 
 to be the work of Nature, if we admit that the original 
 society between male and female is ; for to this as their end 
 all subordinate societies tend, and the end of everything is 
 the nature of it. For what every being is in its most 
 perfect state, that certainly is the nature of that being, 
 whether it be a man, a horse, or a house : besides what- 
 soever produces the final cause and the end which we desire 
 must be best ; but a government complete in itself, is that 
 final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident that a 
 city is a natural production, and that man is naturally a 
 political animal, and that whosoever is naturally and not 
 accidentally unfit for society, must be either inferior or 
 superior to man : thus the man in Homer, who is reviled 
 for being "without society, without law, without family." 
 Such a one must naturally be of a quarrelsome disposition, 
 and as solitary as the birds. The gift of speech also 
 evidently proves that man is a more social animal than the 
 bees, or any of the herding cattle : for Nature, as we say, 
 does nothing in vain, and man is the only animial who enjoys 
 it. Voice indeed, as being the token of pleasure and pain, 
 is imparted to others also, and thus much their nature is 
 capable of, to perceive pleasure and pain, and to impart 
 these sensations to others ; but it is by speech that we are 
 enabled to express what is useful for us and what is hurtful, 
 and of course what is just and what is unjust ; for in this 
 particular man differs from other animals, that he alone has 
 a perception of good and evil, of just and unjust, and it is 
 a participation of these common sentiments which forms a 
 family and a city. Besides the notion of a city naturally 
 precedes that of a family or an individual, for the whole 
 must necessarily be prior to the parts ; for if you take away 
 the whole man, you cannot say a foot or a hand remains. 
 
CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 13 
 
 unless by equivocation, as supposing a hand of stone to be 
 made, but that would only be a dead one ; but everything 
 is understood to be this or that by its energetic qualities and 
 powers, so that when these no longer remain, neither can 
 that be said to be the same, but something of the same 
 name. /' That a city then precedes an individual is plain, 
 for if an individual is not in himself sufficient to compose a 
 perfect government, he is to a city as other parts are to a 
 whole ; but he that is incapable of society, or so complete 
 in himself as not to want it, makes no part of a city, as a 
 beast or a god.// There is then in all persons a natural 
 impetus to associate with each other in this manner, and he 
 who first founded civil society, was the cause of the greatest 
 good ; for as by the completion of it man is the most 
 excellent of all living beings, so without law and justice he 
 would be the worst of all, for nothing is so difficult to 
 subdue as injustice in arms; but these arms man is born 
 with, namely, prudence and valour, which he may apply to 
 the most opposite purposes, for he who abuses them will be 
 the most wicked, the most cruel, the most lustful, and most 
 gluttonous being imaginable \ for justice is a political virtue, 
 by the rules of it the State is regulated, and these rules are 
 the criterion of what is right. 
 
14 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book i. 
 
 smallest parts of a family are the master and slave, the 
 husband and wife, the father and child, let us first inquire 
 into these three, what each of them may be, and what they 
 ought to be ; that is to say, the ha-ile, the nuptial, and the 
 paternal. Let these then be considered as the three dis- 
 tmct parts of a family : some think that the providing what 
 
 15 necessary for the family is something different from the 
 government of it, others that this is the greatest part of it • 
 It shall be considered separately ; but we will first speak of a 
 master and a slave, that we may both understand the nature 
 of those things which are absolutely necessary, and also try 
 if we can learn anything better on this subject than what is 
 already known. Some persons have thought that the 
 power of the master over his slave originates from his 
 superior knowledge, and that this knowledge is the same in 
 the master, the magistrate, and the king, as we have already 
 said ; but others think that herile governm.ent is contrary to 
 Nature, and that it is the law which makes one man a slave 
 and another free, but that in Nature there is no difference ; 
 for which reason that power cannot be founded in justice' 
 but in force. ' 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 15 
 
 property is as an instrument to living ; an estate is a multitude 
 of instruments, so a slave is an animated instrument ; but 
 every one that can minister of himself is more valuable than 
 any other instrument, for if every instrument at command, 
 or from a preconception of its master's will, could accom- 
 plish its work (as the story goes of the statues of Daedalus, 
 or what the poet tells us of the tripods of Vulcan, " that 
 they moved of their own accord into the assembly of the 
 gods the shuttle would then weave, and the lyre play of . 
 itself, nor would the architect want servants, or the master *' 
 slaves. Now what are generally called instruments are the 
 efficients of something else, but possessions are what we 
 simply use : thus with a shuttle we make something else for 
 our use j but we only use a coat, or a bed ; since then 
 making and using differ from each other in species, and 
 they both require their instruments, it is necessary that these 
 should be different from each other. Now life is itself 
 what we use, and not what we employ as the efficient of 
 something else ; for which reason the services of a slave are 
 for use. A possession may be considered in the same 
 nature as a part of anything ; now a part is not only a part 
 of something, but also is nothing else ; so is a possession ; 
 therefore a master is only the master of the slave, but no 
 part of him, but the slave is not only the slave of the master 
 but nothing else but that. This fully explains what is the 
 nature of a slave, and what are his capacities ; for that 
 being who by nature is nothing of himself, but totally 
 another's, and is a man, is a slave by nature ; and that man 
 who is the property of another, is his mere chattel, though 
 he continues a man ; but a chattel is an instrument for use, 
 separate from the body. 
 
i6 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book i. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 But whether any person is such by nature, and whether it 
 is advantageous and just for any one to be a slave or no, or 
 whether all slavery is contrary to nature, shall be considered 
 hereafter; not that it is difficult to determine it upon 
 general principles, or to understand it from matters of fact ; 
 for that some should govern, and others be governed, is not 
 only necessary but useful, and from the hour of their birth, 
 some are marked out for those purposes, and others for the 
 other, and there are many species of both sorts. And the 
 better those are who are governed the better also is the 
 government, as for instance of man rather than the brute 
 creation; for the more excellent the materials are with 
 which the work is finished, the more excellent certainly is 
 the work, and wherever there is a governor and a governed 
 there certainly is some work produced ; for whatsoever is 
 composed of many parts, which jointly become one, 
 whether conjunct or separate, evidently show the marks of 
 governing and governed ; and this is true of every living thing 
 in all Nature ; nay, even in some things which partake not of 
 life, as in music ; but this probably would be a disquisition 
 too foreign to our present purpose. Every living thing 
 in the first place is composed of soul and body, of these the 
 one is by nature the governor, the other the governed ; now 
 if we would know what is natural, we ought to search for it 
 in those subjects in which Nature appears most perfect, and 
 not in those which are corrupted ; we should therefore exa- 
 mine into a man who is most perfectly formed both in soul 
 and body, in whom this is evident, for in the depraved and 
 vicious, the body seems to rule rather than the soul^ on 
 account of their being corrupt and contrary to Nature. We 
 may then, as we affirm, perceive in an animal the first 
 principles of herile and political governm.ent; for the soul 
 
CHAP, v.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 17 
 
 governs the body as the master governs his slave ; the mind 
 governs the appetite with a poHtical or a kingly power, which 
 shows that it is both natural and advantageous that the 
 body should be governed by the soul, and the pathetic part 
 by the mind, and that part which is possessed of reason ; 
 but to have no ruling power, or an improper one, is hurtful 
 to all ; and this holds true not only of man but of other 
 animals also, for tame animals are naturally better than wild 
 ones, and it is advantageous that both should be under sub- 
 jection to man, for this is productive of their common 
 safety ; so is it naturally with the male and the female, the | 
 one is superior, the other inferior ; the one governs, the | 
 other is governed ; and the same rule must necessarily hold 
 good with respect to all mankind. Those men therefore 
 who are as much inferior to others as the body is to the 
 soul, are to be thus disposed of, as the proper use of them 
 is their bodies, in which their excelle^nce consists ; and if 
 what I have said be true, they are slaves by nature, and it is 
 advantageous to them to be always under government. He 
 then is by nature formed a slave who is qualified to become 
 the chattel of another person, and on that account is so, 
 and who has just reason enough to know that there is such 
 a faculty, without being endued with the use of it j for other 
 animals have no perception of reason, but are entirely 
 guided by appetite, and indeed they vary very little in their 
 use from each other; for the advantage which we receive 
 both from slaves and tame animals arises from their bodily 
 strength administering to our necessities, for it is the inten- 
 tion of Nature to make the bodies of slaves and freemen 
 different from each other, that the one should be robust for 
 their necessary purposes, the others erect, useless indeed 
 for what slaves are employed in, but fit for civil life, which is 
 divided intu the duties of war and peace; though these 
 rules do not always take place, for slaves have sometimes 
 the bodies of freemen, sometimes the souls; if then it is 
 evident that if some bodies are as much more excellent 
 
1 8 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book i. 
 
 than others, as the statues of the gods excel the human 
 form, every one will allow that the inferior ought to be 
 slaves to the superior ; and if this is true with respect to the 
 body, it is still juster to determine in the same manner 
 when we consider the soul, though it is not so easy to 
 perceive the beauty of the soul as it is of the body. Since 
 then some men are slaves by nature, and others are freemen, 
 it is clear that where slavery is advantageous to any one, 
 then it is just to make him a slave. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 But it is not difficult to perceive that those who maintain 
 the contrary opinion have some reason on their side; for 
 a man may become a slave two different ways : for he may 
 be so by law also, and this law is a certain compact, by 
 which whatsoever is taken in battle is adjudged to be the 
 property of the conquerors; but many persons who are 
 conversant in law call in question this pretended right, and 
 say that it would be hard that a man should be compelled 
 by violence to be the slave and subject of another, who 
 had the power to compel him, and was his superior in 
 strength, and upon this subject, even of those who are 
 wise, some think one way and some another ; but the cause 
 of this doubt and variety of opinions arises from hence, 
 that great abilities, when accompanied with proper means, 
 are generally able to succeed by force ; for victory is always 
 owing to a superiority in some advantageous circumstances, 
 so that it seems that force never prevails but in consequence 
 of great abilities. But still the dispute concerning the 
 justice of it remains, for some persons think that justice 
 consists in benevolence, others think it just that the 
 powerful should govern; in the midst of these contrary 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 opinions _there are no reasons sufficient to convince us 
 that the right of being master and governor ought not to 
 be placed with those who have the greatest abilities. Some 
 persons, entirely resting upon the right which the law gives 
 (for that which is legal is in some respects just), insist upon 
 it that slavery occasioned by war is just ; not that they say 
 it is wholly so, for it may happen that the principle upon 
 which the wars were commenced is unjust; moreover, no 
 one will say that a man who is unworthily in slavery is 
 therefore a slave, for if so, men of the noblest families 
 might happen to be slaves and the descendants of slaves, if 
 they should chance to be taken prisoners in war and sold ; 
 to avoid this difficulty, they say that such persons should 
 not be called slaves, but barbarians only should ; but when 
 they say this, they do nothing more than inquire who is a 
 slave by nature, which was what we at first said, for we must 
 acknowledge that there are some persons, who, wherever 
 they are, must necessarily be slaves, but others, in no 
 situation ; thus also it is with those of noble descent : it is 
 not only in their own country that they are esteemed as 
 such, but everywhere, but the barbarians are respected on 
 this account at home only, as if nobility and freedom were 
 of two sorts, the one universal, the other not so. Thus 
 says the Helen of Theodectes : 
 
 Who dares reproach me with the name of slave? 
 When from the immortal gods, on either side, 
 I draw my lineage. 
 
 Those who express sentiments like these show only that 
 they distinguish the slave and the freeman, the noble and 
 the ignoble, from each other by their virtues and their 
 vices, for they think it reasonable that as a man begets a 
 man, and a beast a beast, so from a good man a good man 
 should be descended \ and this is what Nature desires to do, 
 but frequently cannot accomplish it. It is evident then 
 that this doubt has some reason in it, and that these 
 
20 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book i. 
 
 persons are not slaves, and those freemen, by the appoint-^ 
 ment of Nature, and also that in some instances it is 
 sufficiently clear that it is advantageous to both parties for 
 this man to be a slave, and that to be a master, and that it 
 is right and just that some should be governed and others 
 govern in the manner that Nature intended ; of which sort of 
 government is that which a master exercises over a slave. 
 But to govern ill is disadvantageous to both, for the same 
 thing is useful to the part and to the whole, to the body 
 and to the soul ; but the slave is as it were a part of the 
 master, as if he were an animated part of his body, though 
 separate. For which reason a mutual utility and friendship 
 may subsist between the master and the slave, I mean when 
 they are placed by Nature in that relation to each other ; for 
 the contrary takes place amongst those who are reduced to 
 slavery by the law, or by conquest. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 It is evident from what has been said that a herile and a 
 political government are not the same, or that all govern- 
 ments are alike to each other as some affirm ; for one is 
 adapted to the nature of freemen, the other to that of 
 slaves. Domestic government is a monarchy, for that is 
 what prevails in every house ; but a political State is the 
 \ government of freemen and equals. The master is not so 
 called from his knowing how to manage his slave, but 
 because he is so ; for the same reason a slave and a freeman 
 have their respective appellations. There is also one sort 
 of knowledge proper for a master, another for a slave ; the 
 slave's is of the nature of that which was taught by a slave 
 at Syracuse ; for he for a stipulated sum instructed the boys 
 in all the business of a household slave, of which there are 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, " 21 
 
 various sorts to be learnt, as the art of cookery and other 
 such Hke services, of which some are allotted to some, and 
 others to others, some employments being more honourable, 
 others more necessary, according to the proverb, One slave 
 excels another, one master excels another:" in such like 
 things the knowledge of a slave consists. The knowledge 
 of the master is to be able properly to employ his slaves, 
 for the mastership of slaves is the employment, not the 
 mere po ssession of them ; not that this knowledge contains 
 anything great or respectable, for what a slave ought to 
 know how to do, that a master ought to know how to order; 
 for which reason, those who have it in their power to be 
 free from these low attentions, employ a steward for this 
 business, and apply themselves either to public affairs or 
 philosophy; the knowledge of procuring what is necessary 
 for a family is different from that which belongs either to 
 the master or the slave ; and to do this justly must be either 
 by war or hunting. And thus m.uch of the difference 
 between a master and a slave. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 As a slave is a particular species of property, let us by all 
 means inquire into the na ture of property in gen^r^l^ and 
 the acquisition of money, according to the manner we have 
 proposed In the first place, then, some one may doubt 
 whether the getting of money is the same thing as economy, 
 or whether it is a part of it, or something subservient to it ; and 
 if so, whether it is as the art of making shuttles is to the 
 art of weaving, or the art of making brass to that of statue- 
 founding, for they are not of the same service, for the one 
 supplies the tools, the other the matter; by the matter I 
 mean the subject out of which the work is finished, as 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book i 
 
 wool for the cloth and brass for the statue. It is evident 
 then that the getting of money is not the same thing as 
 economy, for the business of the one is to furnish the 
 means, of the other to use them ; and what art is there 
 employed in the management of a family but economy, but 
 whether this is a part of it, or something of a different 
 species, is a doubt ; for if it is the business of him who is 
 to get money to find out how riches and possessions may 
 be procured, and both these arise from various causes, we 
 must first inquire whether the art of husbandry is part 
 of money-getting or something different, and in general 
 whether the same is not true of every acquisition, and every 
 attention which relates to provision. But as there are many 
 sorts of provision, so are the methods of living, both of 
 man and the brute creation, very various ; and as it is 
 impossible to live without food, the difference in that parti- 
 cular makes the lives of animals so different from each 
 other. Of beasts, some live in herds, others separate, as is 
 most convenient for procuring themselves food ; as some of 
 them live upon flesh, others on fruit, and others on whatso- 
 ever they light on. Nature having so distinguished their 
 course of life that they can very easily procure themselves 
 subsistence ; and as the same things are not agreeable to all, 
 but one animal likes one thing and another another, it 
 follows that the lives of those beasts v/ho live upon flesh 
 m.ust be different from the lives of those who live on fruits ; 
 so is it with men, their lives differ greatly from each other; 
 and of all these, the shepherds' is the idlest, for they live 
 upon the flesh of tame animals, without any trouble, while 
 they are obhged to change their habitations on account of 
 their flocks, which they are compelled to follow, cultivating, 
 as it v/ere, a living farm. Others live exercising violence 
 over living creatures, one pursuing this thing, another that, 
 these preying upon men ; those who live near lakes an 
 marshes and rivers, or the sea itself, on fishing, while other 
 are fowlers, or hunters of wild beasts ; but the greater part 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 23 
 
 mankind live upon the produce of the earth, and its culti- 
 vated fruits ; and the manner in which all those live who 
 follow the direction of Nat are, and labour for their own 
 subsistence, is nearly the same, without ever thinking to 
 procure any provision by way of exchange or merchandise, 
 such are shepherds, husbandmen, robbers, fishermen, and 
 hunters ; some join different employments together, and 
 thus live very agreeably, supplying those deficiencies which 
 were wanting to make their subsistence depend upon them- 
 selves only j thus, for instance, the same person shall be a 
 shepherd and a robber, or a husbandman and a hunter, and 
 so with respect to the rest, they pursue that mode of life 
 which necessity points out. This provision then Nature 
 herself seems to have furnished all animals with, as well 
 immediately upon their first origin, as also when they are 
 arrived at a state of maturity; for at the first of these 
 periods, some of them are provided in the womb with 
 proper nourishment, which continues till that which is born 
 can get food for itself, as is the case with worms and birds; 
 and as to those which bring forth their young alive, they 
 have the means for their subsistence for a certain time 
 within themselves — namely^ milk. It is evident then that we j 
 may conclude of those things that are, that plants are created / 
 for the sake of animals^ and animals for the sake of men ; / 
 the tame for our use and provision ; the wild, at least the / 
 greater part, for our provision also, or for some other advan- \ 
 tageous purpose, as furnishing us with clothes, and the like. 
 As Nature therefore makes nothing either imperfect or in 
 vain, it necessarily follows that she has made all these things 
 for men ; for which reason what we gain in war is, in a cer- 
 tain degree, a natural acquisition ; for hunting is a part of it, 
 which it is necessary for us to employ against wild beasts ; ^ 
 and those men, who being intended by Nature for slavery | 
 are unwilling to submit to it,' on which occasion, such a war \ 
 is by Nature just; that species of acquisition then only 
 which is according to Nature, is part of e conomy ; and this 
 
24 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book i. 
 
 ought to be athaad, or if not, iin'.nediatdy procured — namely, 
 what is necessary to be kept in store to live upon, and 
 which are useful as well for the Stat 3 as the family. And 
 true riches seem to consist in these ; and the acquisition of 
 those possessions which are necessary for a happy life is not 
 infinite, t^nough Solon says otherwise in this verse, 
 
 No bounds to riches can be fixed for man ; 
 
 for they may be fixed as in other arts; for the instruments of 
 no art whatsoever are infinite, either in their number or 
 their magnitude ; but riches are a number of instruments 
 in domestic and civil economy ; it is therefore evident that 
 the acquisition of certain things according to Nature is a 
 part both of domestic and civil economy, and for what 
 reason. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 There is also another species of acquisition, which they 
 particularly call pecuniary, and with great propriety ; and 
 by this indeed it seems that there are no bounds to riches 
 and wealth. Now many persons suppose, from their near 
 relation to each other, that this is one and the same with 
 that we have just mentioned, but it is not the same as that, 
 though not very different ; on e of these is natural , the other 
 is not, but rather owing to some art and sk ill. We will enter 
 into a particular examination of this subject. The uses of 
 every possession are two, both dependent upon the thing 
 itself, but not in the same manner : the one supposing an 
 inseparable connection with it, the other not ; as a shoe, for 
 instance, which may be either worn or exchanged for some- 
 thing else, both these are the uses of the shoe ; for he who 
 exchanges a shoe with some man who wants one for money, 
 or provisions, uses the shoe as a shoe, but not according to 
 the original intention, for shoes were not at first made to be 
 
CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 exchanged. The same thing holds true of all other posses- 
 sions, for barter in general had its original beginning in 
 Nature, some men having a surplus, others too little of 
 what was necessary for them. Hence it is evident that the 
 selling provisions for money is not according to the natural 
 usa of things, for they were obliged to use barter for those 
 things which they wanted ; but it is plain that barter could 
 have no place in the first — that is to say, in family society, 
 but must have begun when the number of those who com- 
 posed the community was enlarged, for the first of these 
 Jl^^"§^ common ; but when they came to be 
 separated they were obliged to exchange with each other 
 many different things which both parties wanted. Which 
 custom of barter is still preserved amongst many barbarous 
 nations, who procure one necessary with another, but never 
 sell anything, as giving and receiving wine for corn, and the 
 like. This sort of barter is not contradictory to Nature, nor 
 is it any species of money-getting, but is necessary in pro- 
 curing that subsistence which is so consonant thereunto. 
 But this barter introduced the use of money, as might be 
 expected ; for a convenient place from, whence to import 
 what you wanted, or to export wha'i you had a surplus of, 
 being often at a great distance, money necessarily made its 
 way into commerce, for it is not everything which is 
 naturally most useful that is easiest of carriage ; for which 
 reason they invented something to exchange with each 
 other, which they should mutually give and take, that being 
 really valuable itself, should have the additional advantage 
 of being of easy conveyance for the purposes of life, as iron 
 and silver, or anything else of the same nature, and this at 
 first passed in value simply according to its weight or size ; 
 but in process of time it had a certain stamp to save the 
 trouble of weighing, which stamp expressed its value. 
 Money then being established as the necessary medium of 
 exchar.ge, another species of money-getting soon took place — 
 namely, by buying and selling, at probably first in a simple 
 
26 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book i. 
 
 manner, afterwards with more skill and experience, where 
 and how the greatest profits might be made. For which 
 reason the art of money-getting seems to be chiefly conver- 
 sant about trade, and the business of it to be able to tell 
 where the greatest profits can be made, being the means of 
 procuring abundance of wealth and possessions ; and thus 
 wealth is very often supposed to consist in the quantity of 
 money which any one possesses, as this is the medium by 
 which all trade is conducted and a fortune made ; others 
 again regard it as of no value, as being of none by Nature, 
 but arbitrarily m.ade so by compact ; so that if those who 
 use it should alter their sentiments, it would be worth 
 nothing, as being of no service for any necessary purpose. 
 Besides, he who abounds in money often wants necessary 
 food, and it is impossible to say that any person is in good 
 circumstances, when, with all his possessions, he may perish 
 with hunger. Like Midas in the fable, who from his insatiable 
 wish, had everything he touched turned into gold. For which 
 reason others endeavour to procure other riches and other 
 property, and rightly, for there are other riches and property 
 in Nature, and these are the proper objects of economy; 
 while trade only procures money, not by all means, but by 
 the exchange of it, and for that purpose it is this which it is 
 chiefly employed about, for money is the first principle and 
 the end of trade, nor are there any bounds to be set to 
 what is thereby acquired. Thus also there are no limits to 
 the art of medicine with respect to the health which it 
 attempts to procure ; the same also is true of all other arts ; 
 no line can be dra»wn to terminate their bounds, the several 
 professors of them being desirous to extend them as far as 
 possible. (But still the means to be employed for that 
 purpose are limited, and these are the limits beyond which 
 the art cannot proceed.) Thus in the art oF acquiring riches 
 there are no limits, for the object of that is money and 
 possessions ; but economy has a boundary, though this has 
 not; for acquiring riches is not the business of that, for 
 
:hap. IX.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 27 
 
 ivhich reason it should seem that some boundary should be 
 set to riches, though we see the contrary to this is what is 
 practised; for all those who get riches add to their money 
 without end, the cause of which is the near connection of 
 these two arts with each other, which sometimes occasions 
 the one to change employments with the other, as getting of 
 money is their common object : for economy requires the 
 possession of wealth, but not on its own account but with 
 another view to purchase things necessary therewith ; but the 
 other procures it merely to increase it ; so that some persons 
 are confirmed in their belief that this is the proper object of 
 economy, and think that for this purpose money should be 
 saved and hoarded up without end, the reason for which 
 disposition is that they are intent upon living, but not upon 
 living well ; and this desire being boundless in its extent, the 
 means which they aim at for that purpose are boundless also ; 
 and those who propose to live well often confine that to the 
 enjoyment of the pleasures of sense ; so that as this also 
 seems to depend upon what a man has^ all their care is to 
 get money, and hence arises the other cause for this art; 
 for as this enjoyment is excessive in its degree, they 
 endeavour to procure means proportionate to supply it ; and 
 if they cannot do this merely by the art of dealing in money, 
 they will endeavour to do it by other ways, and apply all 
 their powers to a purpose they were not by Nature intended 
 for. Thus, for instance, courage was intended to inspire 
 fortitude, not to get money by ; neither is this the end of the 
 soldier's or the physician's art, but victory and health. 
 But such persons make everything subservient to money- 1 
 gettmg, as if this was the only end ; and to the end every- 1 
 thing ought to refer. We have now considered that art of 
 money-getting, which is not necessary, and have seen in 
 what manner we became in want of it, and also that which 
 is necessary, which is diiferent from it; for that economy 
 which is natural and whose object is to provide food, is not \ 
 like this unlimited in its extent, but has its bounds. 
 
28 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book i. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 We have now determined, what was before doubtful, whether 
 or no the art of getting money is his business who is at the 
 head of a family or a State, and though not strictly so, it 
 is however very necessary; for as a politician does not 
 make men, but, receiving them from the hand of Nature, 
 employs them to proper purposes ; thus the earth, or the 
 sea, or something else, ought to supply them with provisions, 
 and this it is the business of the master of the family to 
 manage properly; for it is not the weaver's business to 
 make yarn, but to use it, and to distinguish what is good 
 and useful from what is bad and of no service ; and indeed 
 some one may inquire why getting money should be a part 
 of economy, when the art of healing is not, as it is as 
 requisite that the family should be in health as that they 
 should eat, or have anything else which is necessary ; aad 
 as it is indeed in some particulars the business both of the 
 master of the family, and he to whom the government of 
 the State is intrusted, to see after the health of those 
 under their care, but in others not, but the physician's ; so 
 also as to money ; in some respects it is the business of the 
 master of the family, in others not, but of the servant ; but, 
 as we have already said, it is chiefly Nature's, for it is her 
 part to supply her offspring with food ; for everything finds 
 nourishment left for it, in what produced it; for which 
 reason the natural riches of all men arise from fruits and 
 animals, which may be applied, as we say, to two purposes — 
 the one to make money of, the other for the service of the 
 house ; of which the first is necessary and commendable, 
 the other justly censurable; for it has not its origin in 
 Nature, but amongst ourselves ; for usury is most reasonably 
 detested, as it is increasing our fortune by money itself, and 
 not employing it for the purpose it was originally intended — 
 namely, exchange. 
 
CHAP. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Having already sufficiently considered the general princi- 
 ples of this subject, let us now go into the practical part 
 thereof ; the one is a liberal employment for the mind, the 
 other necessary. These things are useful in the manage- 
 ment of one's affairs ; to be skilful in the nature of cattle, 
 which are most profitable, and where, and how; as, for 
 instance, what advantage will arise from keeping horses, or 
 oxen, or sheep, or any other live stock. It is also necessary 
 to be acquainted with the comparative value of these things, 
 and which of them in particular places are worth most ; for 
 some do better in one place, some in another. Agriculture 
 also should be understood, and the management of arable 
 grounds and orchards, and also the care of bees and fish 
 and birds, from whence any profit may arise ; these are the 
 first and most considerable parts of domestic management. 
 With respect to gaining m.oney by exchange, the principal 
 method of doing this is by merchandise, which is carried on 
 in three different ways : either by sending the commodity for 
 sale by sea or by land, or else selling it on the place where 
 it grows ; and these differ from each other in this, that the 
 one is more profitable, the other safer. The second 
 method is by usury. The third by receiving wages for 
 work done, and this either by being employed in some 
 mean art, or else in mere bodily labour. There is also a 
 third species of improving a fortune, that is something 
 between this and the first; for it partly depends upon 
 Nature, partly upon exchange, the subject of which is, 
 things that are immediately from the earth, or their pro- 
 duce, which, though they bear no fruit, are yet useful, such 
 as selling of timber and the whole art of metallurgy, which 
 includes many different species^ for there are various sorts 
 of things dug out of the earth. These we have now men- 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book i. 
 
 tioncd in general, but to enter into particulars concerning 
 each of them, though it might be useful to the artist, would 
 be tiresome to dwell on. Now of all the works of art, 
 those are the most excellent wherein chance has the least 
 to do, and those are the meanest which deprave the body, 
 those the most servile in which bodily strength alone is 
 chiefly wanted, those most illiberal which require least 
 skill; but as there are books written on these subjects by 
 some persons, as by Chares the Panian, and Apollodorus 
 the Lemnian, upon husbandry and planting, and by others 
 on other matters, let those who have occasion consult them 
 thereon ; besides, every person should collect together what- 
 soever he hears occasionally mentioned, by means of which 
 many of those who aimed at making a fortune have suc- 
 ceeded in their intentions ; for all these are useful to those 
 who make a point of getting money, as in the contrivance 
 of Thales the Milesian (which was certainly a gainful one, 
 but as it was his it was attributed to his wisdom, though the 
 method he used was a general one, and would universally 
 succeed), when they reviled him for his poverty, as if the 
 study of philosophy was useless ; for they say that he, per- 
 ceiving by his skill in astrology that there would be great 
 plenty of olives that year, while it was yet winter, having 
 got a little money he gave earnest for all the oil works that 
 were in Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a low price, 
 there being no one to bid against him; but when the 
 season came for making oil, many persons w^anting them, 
 he all at once let them upon what terms he pleased ; and, 
 raising a large sum of money by that means, convinced 
 them that it was easy for philosophers to be rich if they 
 chose it, but that that was not what they aimed at ; in this 
 manner is Thales said to have shown his wisdom. It 
 indeed is, as we have said, generally gainful for a person to 
 contrive to make a monopoly of anything ; for which 
 reason some cities also take this method when they want 
 money, and monopolize theii commodities. There was a 
 
CHAP. XII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 
 
 certain person in Sicily who laid out a sum of money which 
 was deposited in his hand in buying up all the iron from 
 the iron merchants, so that when the dealers came from 
 the markets to purchase, there was no one had any to sell 
 but himself ; and though he put no great advance upon it, 
 yet by laying out fifty talents he made a hundred. When 
 Dionysius heard this he permitted him to take his money 
 with him, but forbid him to continue any longer in Sicily, 
 as being one who contrived means for getting money 
 inconsistent with his affairs. This man's view and Thales* 
 was exactly the same ; both of them contrived to procure a 
 monopoly for themselves ; it is useful also for politicians to 
 understand these things, for many States want to raise 
 money aad by such means, as well as private families, nav 
 more so; for which reason, some persons who "are em- 
 ployed in the management of public affairs -confine them- 
 selves to this province only. 
 
 CHAPTER ."|KII. 
 
 There are then three parts of domestic government — the 
 masters, of which we have alread^r treated, the fathers, and 
 the husbands ; now the government: of the wife and children 
 should both be that of free persons, but not the same ; for 
 the wife should be treated as a citizen of a free State, the 
 children should be under kingly power ; for the male is by 
 nature superior to the female, except when something 
 happens contrary to the usual course of Nature, as is the 
 elder and perfect to the younger and imperfect. Now in 
 the generality of free States the governors and the governed 
 alternately change place, for an equality without any prefer- 
 ence is what Nature chooses ; however, when one governs 
 and another is governed, she endeavours that there should 
 
32 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book i., 
 
 honours, according to what Amasis said of his aver 
 ihis then should b. the established rule between the 
 
 Z^X^rT'' ^''^ ^^^^^^"-^'^^ children sho d 
 be k ngly ; for the power of the father over the child is 
 ounded .n affection and seniority, which is a spel es I 
 kingly government; for which reason Homer very proTer^ 
 
 both these; for Nature requires that a king should be of the 
 same species with those whom he governs! though sup L o 
 m some particulars, as is the case between the elder ar'd the 
 younger, the father and the son. 
 
 PTER xiir. 
 
 It is evident then that in' the due government of a family 
 greater attention should paid to the several members of 
 it and their virtues than to the possessions or riches of it ; 
 and greater to the freem^^'n than the slaves ; but here some 
 one may doubt whether i^^ere is any other virtue in a slave 
 than his organic services, ^nd of higher estimation than these, 
 as temperance, fortitude justice, and such like habits, or 
 whether they possess onK bodily qualities. Each side^oTthe 
 question has its difficulti(S ; for if they posses^^^lsf^ virtues 
 wherein do they differ ^*om free men ? a^^^^hat they do 
 not, since they are men 'M p artaker^ ^igf reason, is absurd. 
 Nearly the same inquiry '2£^f%^'n-,'ade concerning a woman 
 and a child, whether these also have their proper virtues ; 
 whether a woman ough- to be temperate, brave, and just ; 
 and whether a child is temperate or no ; and indeed this 
 inquiry ought to be general, whether the virtues of those 
 who by nature either govern or are governed are the same 
 or different ; for if it is ^lecessary that both of them should 
 
CHAK XIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 33 
 
 partake of the fair and good, why is it also necessary that, 
 without exception, the one should govern, the other always 
 be governed; for this cannot arise from their possessing 
 these qualities in different degrees 3 for to govern and to be 
 governed are things different in species, but more or less 
 are not. And yet it is wonderful that one party ought to 
 have them and the other not ; for if he who is to govern 
 should not be temperate and just, how can he govern well? 
 or if he is to be governed, how can he be governed well? 
 for he who is intemperate and a coward will never do what 
 he ought. It is evident then that both parties ought to be 
 virtuous ; but there is a difference between them, as there 
 is between those who by nature command and who by 
 nature obey, and this originates in the soul; for in this 
 Nature has planted the governing or submitting principle, 
 the virtues of which we say are different, as are those of a 
 rational and an irrational being. It is plain then that the 
 same principle may be extended farther, and that there 
 are in Nature a variety of things which govern and are 
 governed, for a freeman is governed in a different manner 
 from a slave, a male from a female, and a man from a 
 child ; and all these have parts of mind within them, but in 
 a different manner. Thus a slave can have no determina- 
 tion, a woman but a weak one, a child an imperfect one. 
 Thus also must it necessarily be with respect to moral 
 virtues ; all must be supposed to possess them, but not 
 in the same manner, but as is best suited to every one's 
 employment ; on which account he who is to govern ought 
 to be perfect in moral virtue, for his business is entirely 
 that of an architect, and Reason is the architect ; while 
 others want only that portion of it which may be sufficient 
 for their station ; from whence it is evident that although 
 moral virtue is common to all those we have spoke of, yet 
 the temperance of a man and a woman are not the same, 
 nor their courage, nor their justice, though Socrates thought 
 therwise • for the courage of the man consists in commanding, 
 
34 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book i. 
 
 the woman's in obeying; and the same is true in. other 
 particulars. And this will be evident to those who will 
 examine different virtues separately; for those who use 
 general terms deceive themselves when they say that virtue 
 consists in a good disposition of mind, or doing what is 
 right, or something of this sort. They do much better who 
 enumerate the different virtues as Georgias did,, than those 
 who thus define them ; and as Sophocles speaks of a woman, 
 we think of all persons that their virtues should be applica- 
 ble to their characters, for says he — 
 
 Silence is a woman's ornament, 
 
 but it is not a man's ; and as a child is incomplete, it is 
 evident that his virtue is not to be referred to himself in his 
 present situation, but to that in which he will be complete, 
 and his preceptor. In like manner the virtue of a slave is 
 to be referred to his master; for we laid it down as a maxim 
 that the use of a slave was to employ him in what you 
 wanted; so that it is clear enough that few virtues are 
 wanted in his station, only that he may not neglect his 
 work through idleness or fear. Some person may ques- 
 tion if what I have said is true, whether virtue is not 
 necessary for artificers in their calling, for they often 
 through idleness neglect their work, but the difference 
 between them is very great ; for a slave is connected with 
 you for life, but the artificer not so nearly ; as near there- 
 fore as the artificer approaches to the situation of a slave, 
 just so much ought he to have of the virtues of one ; for 
 a mean artificer is to a certain point a slave ; but then a 
 slave is one of those things which are by nature what they 
 are, but this is not true of a shoemaker or any other artiste 
 It is evident then that a slave ought to be trained to those 
 virtues which are proper for his situation by his master, 
 and not by him who has the power of a master to teach 
 him any particular art. Those therefore are in the wrong 
 who would deprive slaves of reason, and say that they have 
 
CHAP. XIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 35 
 
 only to follow their orders ; for slaves want more instruction 
 than children, and thus we determine this matter. It is 
 necessary, I am sensible, for every one who treats upon 
 government to enter particularly into the relations of 
 husband and wife, and of parent and child, and to show 
 what are the virtues of each and their respective connec- 
 tions with each other ; what is right and what is wrong, and 
 how the one ought to be followed and the other avoided. 
 Since then every family is part of a city, and each of 
 those individuals are part of a family, and the virtue of 
 the parts ought to correspond to the virtue of the whole, 
 it is necessary that both the wives and children of the 
 community should be instructed correspondent to the 
 nature thereof, if it is of consequence to the virtue of 
 the State that the wives and children therein should be 
 virtuous, and of consequence it certainly is, for the wives 
 are one half of the free persons, and of the children the 
 succeeding citizens are to be formed. As then we have 
 determined these points, we will leave the rest to be 
 spoke to in another place, as if the subject was now 
 finished ; and beginning again anew, first consider the 
 sentiments of those who have treated of the most perfect 
 forms of government. 
 
1600ft II. 
 
 CHAPTER 1. 
 
 Since then we propose to inquire what civil society is of 
 all others best for those who have it in their power to live 
 entirely as they wish, it is necessary to examine into the 
 polity of those States which are allowed to be well governed ; 
 and if there should be any others which some persons have 
 described, and which appear properly regulated, to note 
 what is right and useful in them ; and when we point out 
 wherein th^ey have failed, let not this be imputed to an 
 affectation of wisdom, for it is because there are great defects 
 in all those which are already established that I have been 
 induced to undertake this work. We will begin with that 
 part of the subject which naturally presents itself first to our 
 consideration. The niembers of every State must of necessity 
 hayfi.-all things in common7or some things common, and 
 not others, or nothing at all common. To have nothing in 
 common is evidendy impossible, for society itself is one 
 species of community ; and the first thing necessary there- 
 unto, is a common place of habitation— namely, the city— 
 which must be one, and this every citizen must have a share 
 in. But in a government which is to be well founded, will 
 it be best to admit of a community in everything which is 
 capable thereof, or only in some particulars, but in others 
 not? for it is possible that the citizens may have their 
 wives and children and goods in common, as in Plato's 
 
CHAP. II.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 37 
 
 Commonwealth ; for in that Socrates affirms that all these 
 particulars ought to be so. Which then shall we prefer? 
 the custom which is already established, or the laws which 
 are proposed in that treatise ? 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Now as a community of wives is attended with many other 
 difficulties, so neither does the cause for which he would 
 frame his government in this manner seem agreeable to 
 reason, nor is it capable of producing that end which he has 
 proposed, and for which he says it ought to take place ; nor 
 has he given any particular directions for putting it in 
 practice. Now I also am willing to agree with Socrates in 
 the principle which he proceeds upon, and admit that the 
 city ought to be one as much as possible; and yet it is 
 evident that if it is contracted too much, it will be no longer 
 a city, for that necessarily supposes a multitude ; so that if 
 we proceed in this manner, we shall reduce a city to a 
 family, and a family to a single person ; for we admit that a 
 family is one, in a greater degree than a city, and a single 
 person than a family ; so that if this end could be obtained, 
 it should never be put in practice, as it would annihilate the 
 city, for a city does not only consist of a large number of 
 inhabitants, but there must also be of different sorts ; for were 
 they all alike, there could be no city, for a confederacy and a 
 city are two different things ; for a confederacy is valuable 
 from its numbers, although all those who compose it are men 
 of the same calling ; for this is entered into for the sake of 
 mutual defence, as we add an additional weight to make the 
 scale go down. The same distinction prevails between a city 
 and a nation when the people are not collected into separate 
 villages, but live as the Arcadians. Now those things in, 
 
3'8 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book ii. 
 
 which a city should be one are of different sorts, and in 
 preserving an alternate reciprocation of power between 
 these, the safety thereof consists (as I have already 
 mentioned in my treatise on Morals), for amongst freemen . 
 and equals this is absolutely necessary ; for all cannot govern 
 at the same time, but either by the year or according to 
 some other regulation or time, by which means every one in 
 his turn will be in office ; as if the shoemakers and carpenters 
 should exchange occupations, and not always be employed 
 in the same calling. But as it is evidently better that these 
 should continue to exercise their respective trades, so also 
 in civil society, where it is possible, it would be better that 
 the government should continue in the same hands; but 
 where it is not (as Nature has made all men equal, and 
 therefore it is just, be the administration good or bad, that 
 all should partake of it) there it is best to observe a 
 rotation, and let those who are their equals by turns submit 
 to those who are at that time magistrates, as they will in 
 their turns alternately be governors and governed, as if 
 they were difterent men ; by the same method different 
 persons will execute different offices. From hence it is 
 evident that a city cannot be one, in the manner that some 
 persons propose; and that what has been said to be the 
 greatest good which it could enjoy, is absolutely its 
 destruction, which cannot be ; for the good of anything is 
 that which preserves it. For another reason also it is clear, 
 that it is not for the best to endeavour to make a city too 
 much one, because a family is more sufficient in itself than 
 a single person, a city than a family; and indeed Plato 
 supposes that a city owes its existence to that sufficiency in 
 themselves which the members of it enjoy. If then this 
 sufficiency is so desirable, the less the city is one the 
 better, 
 
CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 But admitting that it is most advantageous for a city to be 
 one as much as possible, it does not seem to follow that 
 this will take place by permitting all at once to say, this is 
 mine and this is not mine (though this is what Socrates 
 regards as a proof that a city is entirely one), for the word 
 all is used in two senses ; if it means each individual, what 
 Socrates proposes will nearly take place ; for each person 
 will say, this is his own son and his own wife and his own 
 property, and of everything else that may happen to belong 
 to him that it is his own. But those who have their wives 
 and children in common will not say so, but all will say so, 
 though not as individuals ; therefore to use the word all is 
 evidently a fallacious mode of speech, for this word is 
 sometimes used distributively and sometimes collectively 
 on account of its double meaning, and is the cause of 
 inconclusive syllogisms in reasoning. Therefore for all 
 persons to say the same thing was their own, using the 
 word all in its distributive sense, would be well, but is 
 impossible; in its collective sense it would by no means 
 contribute to the concord of the State. Besides, there 
 would be another inconvenience attending this proposal, 
 for what is common to many is taken least care of, for all 
 men regard more what is their own than what others share 
 with them in, to which they pay less attention than is 
 incumbent on every one ; let me add also, that every one is 
 more negligent of what another is to see to, as well as 
 himself, than of his own private business ; as in a family, 
 one is often worse served by many servants than by a: few. 
 Let each citizen then in the State have a thousand children, 
 but let none of them be considered as the children of that 
 individual, but let the relation of father and child be 
 common to them all, and they will all be neglected. 
 
40 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book 11. 
 
 Besides, in consequence of this, whenever any citizen 
 behaved well or ill, every person, be the number what it 
 would, might say this is my son or this man's or that ; and 
 in this manner would they speak, and thus would they 
 doubt of the whole thousand, or of whatever number the 
 city consisted ; and it would be uncertain to whom each 
 child belonged, and when it was born who was to take care of 
 it ; and which do you think is better, for every one to say this 
 is mine, while they may apply it equally to two thousand, or 
 ten thousand ; or as we say this is mine in our present forms 
 of government, where one man calls another his son, 
 another calls that same person his brother, another nephew, 
 or some other relation either by blood or marriage, and 
 first extends his care to him and his, while another regards 
 him as one of the same parish and the same tribe \ and it is 
 better for any one to be a nephew in his private capacity 
 than a son after that manner. Besides, it will be impossible 
 to prevent some persons from suspecting that they are 
 brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers to each other; for 
 from the mutual likeness there is between the sire and the off- 
 spring they will necessarily conclude in what relation they 
 stand to each other, which circumstance we are informed by 
 those writers who describe different parts of the world, does 
 sometimes happen, for in Upper Africa there are wives in 
 common who yet deliver their children to their respective 
 fathers, being guided by their likeness to them. There are 
 also some mares and cows which naturally bring forth their 
 young so like the male that we can easily distinguish by 
 which of them they were impregnated ; such was the mare 
 called Just, in Pharsalia. 
 
CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 CHAPTER IV. ' 
 
 Besides, those who contrive this plan of community, can- 
 not easily avoid the following evils — namely, blows, murders, 
 ^ in voluntary or voluntary, quarrels and reproaches, all which 
 it would be impious indeed to be guilty of towards our 
 fathers and mothers, or those who are nearly related to us, 
 though not to those who are not connected to us by any tie 
 of affinity ; and certainly these mischiefs must necessarily 
 happen oftener amongst those who do not know how they 
 are connected to each other than those who do ; and when 
 they do happen, if it is among the first of these, they admit 
 of a legal expiation, but amongst the latter, that cannot be 
 done. It is also absurd for those who promote a commu- 
 nity of children, to forbid- those who love each other from 
 indulging themselves in the last excesses of that passion, 
 while they do not restrain them from the passion itself, or 
 those intercourses which are of all things most improper 
 between a father and a son, a brother and a brother, and 
 indeed the thing itself is most absurd. It is also ridiculous 
 to prevent this intercourse between the nearest relations, for 
 no other reason than the violence of the pleasure, while 
 they think that the relation of father and daughter, the 
 brother and sister, is of no consequence at all. It seems 
 also more advantageous for the State that the husbandmen 
 should have their wives and children in common than the 
 military, for they will have less affection for them in that 
 case than when otherwise ; for such persons ought to be 
 under subjection, that they may obey the laws, and not seek 
 after innovations. Upon the whole, the consequences of 
 such a law as this would be directly contrary to those things 
 which good laws ought to establish, and which Socrates en- 
 deavoured to estabhsh by his regulations concerning women 
 
40 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book ll. 
 
 and children ; for we think that friendship is the greatest 
 good which can happen to any city, as nothing so much 
 prevents seditions ; and amity in a city is what Socrates 
 commends above all things, which appears to be, as indeed 
 he says, the effect of friendship, as we learn from Aris- 
 tophanes in the Erotics, who says that those who love 
 / one another from the excess of that passion desire to 
 breathe the same soul, and from being two to be blended 
 into one; from whence it would necessarily follow that 
 both, or one of them, must be destroyed. But now in a 
 city which admits of this community the tie of friendship 
 must, from that very cause, be extremely weak, when no 
 father can say, this is my son ; or son, this is my father ; 
 for as a very little of what is sweet, being mixed with a 
 great deal of water, is imperceptible after the mixture, so 
 must all family connections, and the names they go by, be 
 necessarily disregarded in such a community, it being then 
 by no means necessary that the father should have any 
 regard for him he. called a son, or the brothers for those 
 they call brothers, j | There are two things which principally 
 inspire mankind with care and love of their offspring, 
 knowing it is their own, and what ought to be the object 
 of their affection, neither of which can take place in this 
 sort of community. | \ As for exchanging the children of the 
 artificers and husbandmen with those of the military, and 
 theirs reciprocally with these, it will occasion great con- 
 fusion in whatever manner it shall be done, for of necessity 
 those who carry the children must know from whom they 
 took, and to whom they gave them ; and by this means 
 those evils which I have already mentioned will necessarily 
 be the more likely to happen, as blows, incestuous love, 
 murders, and the like ; for those who are given from their 
 own parents to other citizens — the military, for instance — 
 will not call them brothers, sons, fathers, or mothers. The 
 same thing would happen to those of the military who were 
 placed among the other citizens; so that by this means 
 
CHAP, v.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 43 
 
 every one would be in fear how to act in consequence of 
 consanguinity. And thus let lis determine concerning a 
 community of wives and children. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 We proceed next to consider in what manner property 
 should be regulated in a State which is formed after the 
 most perfect mode of government, whether it should be 
 common or not ; for this may be considered as a separate 
 question from what had been determined concerning wives 
 and children; I mean whether it is better that these should 
 be held separate, as they now everywhere are, or that not 
 only possessions but also the usufruct of them should be in 
 common, or that the soil should have a particular owner, 
 but that the produce should be brought together and used 
 as one common stock as some nations at present do ; or, on 
 the contrary, should the soil be common, and should it also 
 be cultivated in common, while the produce is divided 
 amongst the individuals for their particular use, which is 
 said to be practised by some barbarians ; or shall both the 
 soil and the fruit be common ? When the business of the 
 husbandman devolves not on the citizen, the matter is much 
 easier settled, but when those labour together, who have a 
 common right of possession, this may occasion several 
 difficulties ; for there may not be an equal proportion 
 between their labour and what they consume ; and those 
 who labour hard, and have but a small proportion of the 
 produce, will certainly complain of those who take a large 
 share of it, and do but little for that. Upon the whole, 
 as a community between man and man so entire as to 
 include everything possible, and thus to have all things 
 that man can possess in common, is very difficult, _so js jt 
 particularlv so with respect to property ; and this is evident 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book IL 
 
 from that community which takes place - between those who 
 go out to settle a colony ; for they frequently have disputes 
 with each other upon the most common occasions, and 
 come to blows upon trifles ; we find, too, that we oftenest 
 correct those slaves who are generally.; employed in the 
 common offices of the family; a community of property 
 then has these and other inconveniences attending it. 
 But the manner of life which is now established, more 
 particularly when embeUished with good morals and a 
 system of equal laws, is far superior to it, for it will have 
 the advantage of both ; by both I mean properties being 
 common and divided also ; for in some respects it ought to 
 be in a manner common, but upon the whole private ; for 
 every man's attention being employed on his own particular 
 concerns, will prevent mutual complaints against each other ; 
 nay, by this means industry will be increased, as each 
 person will labour to improve his own private property ; and 
 it will then be that, from a principle of virtue, they will 
 mutually perform good offices to each other, according to 
 the proverb, " All things are common amongst friends : '' and 
 in some cities there are traces of this custom to be seen, so 
 that is not impracticable, and particularly in those which 
 are best governed; some things are by this means in a 
 manner common, and others might be so ; for there, every 
 person enjoying his own private property, some things he 
 assists his friend with, others are considered as in common ; 
 as in Lacedsemon, where they use each other's slaves as if 
 they were, so to speak, their own, as they do their horses and 
 dogs, or even any provision they may want in a journey. 
 It is evident then that it is bestA Q Jiay£^X^rxii:^Jly.„ji^^ 
 but to make the use of it co mmon ; but how the citizens are 
 
 ^ ; ; — ~ ■ — ■- — ^' 
 
 to be brought to it is the particular business of the legis- 
 lator. And also with respect to pleasure, it is unspeakable 
 how advantageous it is that a man should think he has 
 something which he may call his own ; for it is by no means 
 to no purpose that each person should have an affection 
 
CHAP, v.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 for himself, for that is natural, and yet to be a self-lover is 
 justly censured ; for we mean by that, not one that simply 
 loves himself, but one that loves himself more than he ought ; 
 in like manner we blame a money-lover, and yet both money 
 and self is what all men love. Besides, it is very pleasing to 
 us to oblige and assist our friends and companions, as well as 
 those whom we are connected with by the rights of hospitality ; 
 and this cannot be done without the establishment of private 
 property, which cannot take place with those who make a 
 city too much one ; besides, they prevent every opportunity 
 of exercising two principal virtues^ modesty and liberality. 
 Modesty, with respect to the female sex, for this virtue 
 requires you to abstain from her who is another's ; liberality, 
 which depends upon private property, for without that no 
 one can appear liberal, or do any generous action ; for 
 liberality consists in imparting to others what is our own. 
 This system of polity does indeed recommend itself by its 
 good appearance and specious pretences to humanity, and 
 when first proposed to any one must give him great 
 pleasure, as he will conclude it to be a wonderful bond 
 of friendship, connecting all to all ; particularly when any 
 one censures the evils which are now to be found in society, 
 as arising from properties not being common ; I mean the 
 disputes which happen between man and man upon their 
 different contracts with each other ; those judgments which 
 are passed in court in consequence of fraud and perjury, 
 and flattering the rich, none of which arise from properties 
 being private, but from the vices of mankind. Besides, 
 those who live in one general community, and have all 
 things in common, oftener dispute with each other than 
 those who have^ their property separate; from the very 
 small number indeed of those who have their property in 
 common compared with those where it is appropriated, the 
 instances of their quarrels are but fevv^. It is also but right 
 to mention not only the inconveniences they are preserved 
 from who live in a communion of goods, but also the 
 
46 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book ii. 
 
 advantages they are deprived of; for when the whole 
 comes to be considered, this manner of life will be 
 found impracticable. We must suppose, then, that Socrates' 
 mistake arose from the principle he set out with being 
 false ; we admit, indeed, that both a family and a 
 city ought to be one in some particulars, but not 
 entirely ; for there is a point beyond which if a city 
 proceeds in reducing itself to one, it will be no longer 
 a city. There is also another point at which .it will still 
 continue to be a city, but it will approach so near to not 
 being one that it will be worse than none ; as if any one 
 should reduce the voices of those who sing in concert to 
 one, or a verse to a foot. But the people ought to be made 
 one and a community, as I have already said, by edu<£ation ; 
 as property at Lacedaemon and their public tables at Crete 
 weie made common by their legislators. But yet whosoever 
 shall introduce any education and think thereby to make 
 his city excellent and respectable will be absurd, while he 
 expects to form it by that means and not by manners, 
 philosophy, and laws. And whoever would establish a 
 government upon a community of goods ought to know 
 that he should consult the experience of many years, which 
 would plainly enough inform him whether such a scheme is 
 useful ; for almost all things have already been found out, 
 but some have been neglected, and others which have been 
 known have not been put in practice. But this would be 
 most evident if any one could see such a government really 
 established ; for it would be impossible to frame such a city 
 without dividing and separating it into its distinct parts, as 
 public tables, wards, and tribes ; so that here the laws will 
 do nothing more than forbid the military to engage in agri- 
 culture, which is what the Lacedaemonians are at present 
 endeavouring to do. Nor has Socrates told us (nor is it 
 easy to say) what plan of government should be pursued 
 with respect to the individuals in the State where there is a 
 community of goods established ; for though the majority of 
 
CHAP, v.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 his citizens will in general consist of a multitude of persons 
 of different occupations, of those he has determined nothing ; 
 whether the property of the husbandman ought to be in 
 common, or whether each person should have his share to 
 himself, and also whether their wives and children ought t.o 
 be in common ; for if all things are to be alike common to 
 all, where will be the difference between them and the mili- 
 tary, or what would they get by submitting to their govern- 
 ment? and upon what principles would they do it unless 
 they should establish the wise practice of the Cretans? for 
 they, allowing everything else to their slaves, forbid them 
 only gymnastic exercises and the use of arms. And if they 
 are not, but these should be in the same situation with 
 respect to their property which they are in other cities, what 
 sort of a community will there be? In one city there 
 must of necessity be two, and those contrary to each other; 
 for he makes the military the guardians of the State, and 
 the husbandman, artisans, and others citizens; and all 
 those quarrels, accusations, and things of the like sort, which 
 he says are the bane of other cities, will be found in his also ; 
 notwithstanding Socrates says they will not want many laws 
 in consequence of their education, but such only as may be 
 necessary for regulating the streets, the markets, and the 
 Hke, w^hile at the same time it is the education of the miUtary 
 only that he has taken any care of. Besides, he makes the 
 husbandmen masters of property upon paying a tribute, but 
 this would be likely to make them far more troublesome 
 and high-spirited than the helots, the penestiae, or the 
 slaves which others employ; nor has he ever determined 
 whether it is necessary to give any attention to them in 
 these particulars, nor thought of what is connected therewith, 
 their poHty, their education, their laws ; besides, it is of no 
 little consequence^ nor is it easy to determine, how these 
 should be framed so as to preserve the community of the 
 military. Besides, if he makes the wives common while the 
 prope rty conti nues separate, who shall manage the domestic 
 
48 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book ii. 
 
 concerns with the same care which the man bestows upon 
 his fields ? Nor will the inconvenience be remedied by 
 making property as well as wives common ; and it is absurd 
 to draw a com.parison from the brute creation, and say that 
 the same principle should regulate the connection of a man 
 and a woman which regulates theirs amongst whom there is 
 no family association. It is also very hazardous to settle the 
 magistracy as Socrates has done, for he would have persons 
 of the same rank always in office, which becomes the cause 
 of sedition even amongst those who are of no account, but 
 more particularly amongst those who are of a courageous 
 and warlike disposition ; it is indeed evidently necessary 
 that he should frame his community in this manner ; for that 
 golden particle which God has mixed up in the soul of man 
 flies not from one to the other, but always continues with 
 the same ; for he says that some of our species have gold 
 and others silver blended in their composition from the 
 moment of their birth ; but those who are to be husband- 
 men and artists, brass and iron ; besides, though he deprives 
 the military of happiness, he says that the legislator ought 
 to make all the citizens happy ] but it is impossible that the 
 whole city can be happy, without all, or the greater, or some 
 part of it be happy. For happiness is not like that nume- 
 rical equality which arises from certain numbers when added 
 together, although neither of them may separately contain it ; 
 for happiness cannot be thus added together, but must exist 
 in every individual, as some properties belong to every in- 
 tegral ; and if the military are not happy, who else are so ? 
 for the artisans are not, nor the multitude of those who are 
 employed in inferior offices. The State which Socrates has 
 described has all these defects, and others which are not of 
 le^s consequence. 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 CHAPTER VI.. 
 
 It is also nearly the same in the treatise upon Laws which 
 was writ afterwards, for which reason it will be proper in 
 this place to consider briefly what he has there said upon 
 government, for Socrates has thoroughly settled but very few 
 parts of it ; as, for instance, in what manner the community 
 of wives and children ought to be regulated, how property 
 should be established, and government conducted. Now 
 he divides the inhabitants into two parts, husbandmen and 
 soldiers, and from these he selects a third part, who are to 
 be senators and govern the city ; but he has not said 
 whether or no the husbandman and artificer shall have any 
 or what share in the government, or whether they shall 
 have arms and join with the others in war or not. He thinks 
 also that the women ought to go to war and have the same 
 education as the soldiers ; as to other particulars, he has filled 
 his treatise with matter foreign to the purpose ; and with 
 respect to education, he has only said what that of the 
 guards ought to be. As to his book of Laws, laws are the 
 principal thing which that contains, for he has there said 
 but little concerning government; and this government 
 which he was so desirous of framing in such a manner as 
 to impart to its members a more entire community of goods 
 than is to found in other cities, he almost brings round 
 again to be the same as that other government which he 
 had first proposed ; for except the community of wives and 
 goods he has framed both his governments alike, for the 
 education of the citizens is to be the same in both ; they are in 
 both to live without any servile employ, and their common 
 tables are to be the same, excepting that in that he says the 
 women should have common tables, and that ther*^ should 
 be a thousand men-at-arms, in this that there should be five 
 thousand. 
 
50 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [kook ti. 
 
 All the discourses of Socrates are masterly, noble, new, and 
 inquisitive, but that they are all true it may probably be too 
 much to say. For now with respect to the number just 
 spoke of, it must be acknowledged that he would want the 
 country of Babylonia for them, or some one like it, of an 
 immeasurable extent, to support five thousand idle persons, 
 besides a much greater number of women and servants. 
 Every one, it is true, may frame an hypothesis as he pleases, 
 but yet it ought to be possible. It has been said that a 
 legislator should have two things in view when he frames 
 his laws, the country and the people. He will also do well 
 if he has some regard to the neighbouring States, if he 
 intends that his community should maintain any political 
 intercourse with them, for it is not only necessary that they 
 should understand that practice of war which is adapted to 
 their own country, but to others also ; for admitting that 
 any one chooses not this life either in public or private, yet 
 there is not the less occasion for their being formidable to 
 their enemies, not only when ihey invade their country, but 
 also when they retire out of it. It may also be considered 
 whether the quantity of each person's property may not be 
 settled in a different manner from what he has done it in, 
 by making it more determinate ; for he says that every one 
 ought to have enough whereon to live moderately, as if 
 any one had said to live well, which is the most compre- 
 hensive expression. Besides, a man may live moderately 
 and miserably at the same time ; he had therefore better 
 have proposed that they should live both moderately and 
 liberally ; for unless these two conspire, luxury will come in 
 on the one hand, or wretchedness on the other, since these 
 two modes of living are the only ones applicable to the 
 employment of our substance; for we cannot say with 
 respect to a man's fortune that he is mild or courageous, 
 but we may say that he is prudent and liberal, which are the 
 only qualities connected therewith. It is also absurd to 
 render property equal, and not to provide for the increasing 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 51 
 
 number of the citizens ; but to 1-eave that circumstance 
 uncertain, as if it would regulate itself according to the 
 number of women who should happen to be childless, let 
 that be what it would, because this seems to take place in 
 other cities ; but the case would not be the same in such a 
 State which he proposes and those which now actually 
 unite; for in these no one actually wants, as the property is 
 divided amongst the whole community, be their numbers 
 what they will ; but as it could not then be divided, the 
 supernumeraries, whether they were many or few, would have 
 nothing at all. But it is more necessary than even to 
 regulate property, to take care that the increase of the 
 people should not exceed a certain number; and in deter- 
 mining that to take into consideration those children who 
 will die, and also those women who will be barren ; and to 
 neglect this, as is done in several cities, is to bring certain 
 poverty on the citizens, and poverty is the cause of sedition 
 and evil. Now Phidon the Corinthian, one of the oldest 
 legislators, thought the families and the number of the 
 citizens should continue the same, although it should 
 happen that all should have allotments at the first, dispro- 
 portionate to their numbers. In Plato's Laws it is, however, 
 different; we shall mention hereafter what we think would 
 be best in these particulars. He has also neglected in that 
 treatise to point out how the governors are to be dis- 
 tinguished from the governed, for he says that as of one 
 sort of wool the warp ought to be made, and of another 
 the woof, so ought some to govern and others to be 
 governed. But since he admits that all their property 
 may be increased fivefold, why should he not allow the same 
 increase to the country ? He ought also to consider whether 
 his allotment of the houses will be useful to the community^ 
 for he appoints two houses to each person separate from 
 each other; but it is inconvenient for a person to inhabit 
 two houses. Now he is desirous to have his whole plan of 
 government, neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but 
 
AkISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book ii. 
 
 something between both, which he calls a polity, for it is to 
 be composed of men-at-arms. If Plato intended to frame 
 a State in which more than in any other everything should 
 be common, he has certainly given it a right name ; but if he 
 intended it to be the next in perfection to that which he 
 had already framed, it is not so ; for perhaps some persons 
 will give the preference to the Lacedaenionian form of govern- 
 ment, or some other, which may more completely have 
 attained to the aristocratic form. Some persons say that the 
 most perfect government should be composed of all others 
 blended together, for which reason they commend that 
 of Lacedaemon ; for they say that this is composed of an 
 oligarchy, a monarchy, and a democracy, their kings 
 representing the monarchical part, the senate the oligar- 
 chical ; and that in the ephori may be found the deraocra- 
 tical, as these are taken from the people. But some say 
 that in the ephori is absolute power, and that it is 
 their common meal and daily course of life, in which the 
 democratical form is represented. It is also said in this 
 treatise of Laws, that the best form of government must 
 be one composed of a democracy and a tyranny; though 
 such a mixture no one else would ever allow to be any 
 government at all, or, if it is, the worst possible; those 
 propose what is much better, who blend many governments 
 together, for the most perfect is that which is formed of 
 many parts. But now in this government of Plato's there 
 are no traces of a monarchy, only of an oligarchy and 
 democracy ; though he seems to choose that it should rather 
 incline to an oligarchy, as is evident from the appointment 
 of the magistrates, for to choose them by lot is common 
 to both ; but that a man of fortune must necessarily be a 
 member of the assembly, or to elect the magistrates, or take 
 part in the management of public affairs, while others are 
 passed over, makes the State incline to an oligarchy ; as 
 does the endeavouring that the greater part of the rich may 
 be in office^ and that the rank of their appointments may 
 
CHAP. VII.] AkISfOfLE ON GOVERNMENT. 53 
 
 correspond with their fortunes. The same principle 
 prevails also in the choice of their senate, the manner of 
 electing which is favourable also to an oligarchy ; for all 
 are obliged to vote for those who are senators of the 
 first class, afterwards they vote for the same number 
 out of the second, and then out of the third ; but this 
 compulsion to vote at the election of senators does not 
 extend to the third and fourth classes, and the first 
 and second class only are obliged to vote for the fourth. 
 By this means he says he shall necessarily have an equal 
 number of each rank, but he is mistaken, for the majority 
 will always consist of those of the first rank, and 
 the most considerable people; and for this reason, that 
 many of the commonalty not being obliged to it, will not 
 attend the elections. From hence it is evident that such a 
 State will not consist of a democracy and a monarchy, and 
 this will be further proved by what we shall say when we 
 come particularly to consider this form of government. 
 
 There will also great danger arise from the manner of 
 electing the senate, when those who are elected themselves 
 are afterwards to elect others ; for by this means, if a certain 
 number choose to combine together, though not very con- 
 siderable, the election will always fall according to their 
 pleasure. Such are the things which Plato proposes con- 
 cerning government in his book of Laws. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 There are also some other forms of government which 
 have been proposed either by private persons, or philo- 
 sophers, or politicians, all of which come much nearer to 
 those which have been really established or now exist than 
 these two of Plato's; for neither have they introduced* the 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book ll. 
 
 innovation of a community of wives and children, and public 
 tables for the women, but have been contented to set out 
 with establishing such rules as are absolutely necessary. 
 
 There are some persons who think that the first object of 
 government should be to regulate well everything relating 
 to private property, for they say that a neglect herein is the 
 source of all seditions whatsoever. For this reason Phaleas * 
 the Chalcedonian first proposed that the fortunes of the 
 citizens should be equal, which he thought was not difficult 
 to accomplish when a community was first settled, but that 
 it was a work of greater difficulty in one that had been 
 long established, but yet that it might be effected, and an 
 equality of circumstances introduced by these means, that 
 the rich should give marriage portions, but never receive 
 any, while the poor should always receive, but never 
 give. 
 
 But Plato, in his treatise of Laws, thinks that a difference 
 in circumstances should be permitted to a certain degree, 
 but that no citizen should be allowed to possess more than 
 five times as much as the lowest census, as we have already 
 mentioned. But legislators who would establish this prin- 
 ciple are apt to overlook what they ought to consider, that 
 while they regulate the quantity of provisions which each 
 individual shall possess, they ought also to regulate the 
 number of his children; for if these exceed the allotted 
 quantity of provision, the law must necessarily be repealed ; 
 and yet, in spite of the repeal, it will have the bad effect of 
 reducing many from wealth poverty, so difficult is it for 
 innovators not to fall into such mistakes. That an equality 
 of goods was in some degree serviceable to strengthen the 
 bands of society, seems to have been known to some of the 
 ancients ; for Solon made a law, as did some others also, to 
 restrain persons from possessing as much land as they 
 pleased. And upon the same principle there are laws 
 which forbid men to sell their property, as among the 
 Locyans, unless ihey can prove that some notorious misfor- 
 tune has befallen them. They were also to preserve their 
 
CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 
 
 ancient patrimony, which custom being broken through by 
 the Leucadians, made their government too dem.ocratic ; for 
 by that means it was no longer necessary to be possessed of 
 a certain fortune to be qualified to be a magistrate. But if 
 an equality of goods is established, this may be either too 
 much, when it enables the people to live luxuriously, or 
 too little, when it obliges them to live hard. Hence it is 
 evident that it is not proper for the legislator to establish 
 an equality of circumstances, but to fix a proper medium. 
 Besides, if any one should regulate the division of property ' 
 in such a manner that there should be a moderate sufficiency 
 for all, it would be of no use ; for it is of more consequence 
 that the citizens should entertain a similarity of sentiments, 
 than an equality of circumstances j but this can never be 
 attained, unless they are properly educated under the direc- 
 tion of the law. But probably Phaleas may say that this is 
 what he himself mentions, for he both proposes an equality 
 of property and one plan of education in his city.' But he 
 should have said particularly what education he intended, 
 nor is it of any service to have this too much one ; for this 
 education may be one, and yet such as will make the 
 citizens over-greedy to grasp after honours, or riches, or 
 both. Besides, not only an inequality of possessions, but 
 also of honours, will occasion seditions, but this upon con- 
 trary grounds ; for the vulgar will be seditious if there be an 
 inequality of goods, but those of more elevated sentiments, 
 if there is an equality of honours. 
 
 When good and bad do equal honours share. 
 
 For men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only (for 
 which he thinks an equality of goods would be a sufficient 
 remedy, as they would then have no occasion to steal for 
 cold or hunger), but that they may enjoy what they desire, 
 and not wish for it in vain ; for if their desires extend 
 beyond the common necessaries of life, they will be wicked 
 to gratify them ; and not only so, but if their wishes point 
 that way, they will do the same to enjoy those pleasures 
 
56 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book il. 
 
 which are free from the alloy of pain. What remedy then 
 shall we find for these three disorders ? And first, to prevent 
 stealing from necessity, let every one be supplied with a 
 moderate subsistence, which may make the addition of his 
 * own industry necessary ; secondly, to prevent stealing to 
 procure the luxuries of life, let temperance be enjoined ; and 
 thirdly, let those who wish for pleasure in itself, seek for it 
 only in philosophy, for all others want the assistance of 
 men. Since then men are guilty of the greatest crimes from 
 ambition, and not from necessity, no one, for instance, aims 
 at being a tyrant, to keep him from the cold, hence great 
 honour is due to him who kills not a thief, but a tyrant ; so 
 that polity which Phaleas establishes would only be salutary 
 to prevent little crimes. He lias also been very desirous to 
 establish such rules as will conduce to perfect the internal 
 policy of his State, and he ought also to have done the same 
 with respect to its neighbours, and all foreign nations ; for 
 the considerations of the military establishment should take 
 place in planning every government, that it may not be 
 unprovided in case of a war, of which he has said nothing; 
 so also with respect to property, it ought not only to be 
 adapted to the exigencies of the State, but also to such 
 dangers as may arise from without. Thus it should not be so 
 much as to tempt those who are near, and more powerful to 
 invade it, while those who possess it are not able to drive 
 out the invaders, nor so little as that the State should not 
 be able to go to war with those who are quite equal to itself,, 
 and of this he has determined nothing. It must indeed be 
 allowed that it is advantageous to a community to be rather 
 rich than poor ; probably the proper boundary is this, not to 
 possess enough to make it worth while for a more powerful 
 neighbour to attack you, any more than he would those who 
 had not so much as yourself; thus when Autophradatus pro- 
 (posed to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus advised him to consider 
 ;.vhat time it would require to take the city, and then would 
 have him determine whether it would answer, for that he 
 
CHAP. Vii.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 5? 
 
 should choose, if it would even take less than he proposed, 
 to quit the place; his saying this, made Autophradatus 
 reflect upon the business, and give over the siege. There 
 is, indeed, some advantage in an equality of goods amongst 
 the citizens to prevent seditions, and yet, to say truth, no 
 very great one ; for men of great abilities will stomach their 
 being put upon a level with the rest of the- community. 
 For which reason they will very often appear ready for 
 every commotion and sedition ; for the wickedness of man- 
 kind is insatiable. For though at first two oboli might be 
 sufficient, yet when once it is become customary, they con- 
 tinually want something more, until they set no limits to 
 their expectations ; for it is the nature of our desires to be 
 boundless, and many live only to gratify them. But for this 
 purpose, the first object is. not so much to estabfish an 
 equality of fortune, as to prevent those who are of a good 
 disposition from desiring more than their own, and those 
 who are of a bad one from being able to acquire it ; and 
 this may be done if they are kept in an inferior station, and 
 not exposed to injustice. Nor has he treated well the 
 equality of goods, for he has extended his regulation only 
 to land ; whereas a man's substance consists not only in this, 
 but also in slaves, cattle, money, and all that variety of 
 things which fall under the name of chattels. Now there 
 must be either an equality established in all these, or some 
 certain rule, or they must be left entirely at large. It 
 appears, too, by his Laws, that he intends to establish only a 
 small State, as all the artificers are to belong to the public 
 and add nothing to the complement of citizens ; but if all 
 those who are to be employed in public works are to be 
 the slaves of the public, it should be done in the same 
 manner as it is at Epidamnum, and as Diophantus formerly 
 regulated it at Athens. From these particulars any one 
 may nearly judge whether Phaleas' community is well or 
 ill established. 
 
58 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book Ii. 
 
 it 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 HiPPODAMUs, the son of Euruphon a Milesian, contrived 
 the art of laying out towns, and separated the Pireus. This 
 man was in other respects too eager after notice, and seemed 
 to many to live in a very affected manner, with his flowing 
 locks, and his expensive ornaments, and a coarse warm vest, 
 which he wore not only in the winter, but also in the hot 
 weather. As he was very desirous of the character of a 
 universal scholar, he was the first who, not being actually 
 engaged in the management of public affairs, sat himself to 
 inquire what sort of government was best ; and he planned 
 a State consisting of ten thousand persons, divided into three 
 parts, one consisting of artisans, another of husbandmen, 
 and the third of soldiers ; he also divided the lands into three 
 parts, and allotted one to sacred purposes, another to the 
 public, and the third to individuals. The first of these was 
 to supply what was necessary for the established worship of 
 the gods ; the second was to be allotted to the support of 
 the soldiery ; and the third was to be the property of the 
 husbandman. He thought also that there need only be three 
 sorts of laws, corresponding to the three sorts of actions 
 which can be brought — namely, for assault, trespasses, or 
 death. He ordered also that there should be a particular 
 court of appeal into which all causes might be removed, 
 which were supposed to have been unjustly determined 
 elsewhere, which court should be composed of old men 
 chosen for that purpose. He thought also that they should 
 not pass sentence by votes, but that every one should bring 
 with him a tablet on which he should write that he found 
 the party guilty, if it was so, but if not, he should bring a 
 plain tablet ; but if he acquitted him of one part of the in- 
 dictment but not of the other, he should express that also 
 on the tablet, for he disapproved of that general custom 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 59 
 
 already established, as it obliges the judges to be guilty ot 
 perjury if they determined positively either on the one side 
 or the other. He also made a law that those should be 
 rewarded who found out anything for the good of the city, 
 and that the children of those who fell in battle should be 
 educated at the public expense ; which law had never been 
 proposed by any other legislator, though it is at present in 
 use at Athens as well as in other cities ; he would have the 
 magistrates chosen out of the people in general, by whom he 
 meant the three parts before spoken of; and that those who 
 were so elected should be the particular guardians of what 
 belonged to the public, to strangers, and to orphans. These 
 are the principal parts and most worthy of notice in Hippo- 
 damus' plan. But some persons might doubt the pro- 
 priety of his division of the citizens into three parts, for the 
 artisans, the husbandmen, and the soldiers are to compose 
 one community, where the husbandmen are to have no arms, 
 and the artisans neither arms nor lands, which would in a 
 manner render them slaves to the soldiery. It is also 
 impossible that the whole community should partake of all 
 the honourable employments in it ; for the generals and the 
 guardians of the State must necessarily be appointed out of 
 the soldiery, and indeed the most honourable magistrates ; 
 but as the two other parts will not have their share in the 
 government, how can they be expected to have any affection 
 for it? But it is necessary that the soldiery should be 
 superior to the other two parts, and this superiority will not 
 be easily gained without they are very numerous, and if they 
 are so, why 'should the community consist of any other 
 members ? why should any others have a right to elect the 
 magistrates ? Besides, of what use are the husbandmen to 
 this community? Artisans, 'tis true, are necessary, for these 
 every city wants, and they can live upon their business. If 
 the husbandmen indeed furnished the soldiers with provisions, 
 they would be properly part of the community ; but these 
 are supposed to have their private property, and to cultivate 
 
6o ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book ii. 
 
 it for their own use. Moreover, if the soldiers themselves 
 are to cultivate that common land which is appropriated for 
 their support, there will be no distinction between the 
 soldier and the husbandman which the legislator intended 
 there should be, and if there should be any others who are 
 to cultivate the private property of the husbandman, and 
 the common lands of the military, there will be a fourth 
 order in the State which will have no share in it, and always 
 entertain hostile sentiments towards it. If any one should 
 propose that the same persons should cultivate their own 
 lands and the public ones also, then there would be a 
 deficiency of provisions to supply two families, as the lands 
 would not immediately yield enough for themselves and the 
 soldiers also, and all these things would occasion great 
 confusion. Nor do I approve of his method of determining 
 causes, when he would have the judge split the case which 
 comes simply before him, and thus instead of being a judge 
 become an arbitrator. Now, when any matter is brought to 
 arbitration, it is customary for many persons to confer to- 
 gether upon the business that is before them, but when a 
 cause is brought before judges it is not so, and many legis- 
 lators take care that the judges shall not have it in their 
 power to communicate their sentiments to each other. 
 Besides, what can prevent confusion on the bench when one 
 judge thinks a fine should be different from what another 
 has set it at, one proposing twenty minse, another ten, or be 
 it more or less, another four, and another five; and it is 
 evident that in this manner they will differ from each other, 
 while some will give the whole damages sued for and others 
 nothing ; in this situation how shall their determinations be 
 settled? Besides, a judge cannot be obliged to perjure 
 himself who simply acquits or condemns if the action is 
 fairly and justly brought, for he who acquits the party does 
 not say that he ought not to pay any fine at all, but that he 
 ought not to pay a fine of twenty minae. But he that 
 condemns him is guilty of perjury if he sentences him to 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 6i 
 
 pay twenty minae, while he believes the damages ought not 
 to be so much. Now with respect to these honours which 
 he proposes to bestow on those who can give any informa- 
 tion useful to the community, this, though very pleasing in 
 speculation, is what the legislator should not settle, for it 
 would encourage informers, and probably occasion com- 
 motions in the State. And this proposal of his gives rise 
 also to further conjectures and inquiries, for some persons 
 have doubted whether it is useful or hurtful to alter the 
 established law of any country, if even for the better ; for 
 which reason one cannot immediately determine upon what 
 he here says, whether it is advantageous to alter the law or 
 not. We know indeed that it is possible to propose to new 
 model both the laws and government as a common good, 
 and since we have mentioned this subject, it may be very 
 proper to enter into a few particulars concerning it, for it 
 contains some difficulties, as I have already said, and it 
 may appear better to alter them, since it has been found 
 useful in other sciences. Thus the science of physic is 
 extended beyond its ancient bounds, so is the gymnastic, 
 and indeed all other arts and powers ; so that one may lay it 
 down for certain that the same thing will necessarily hold 
 good in the art of government. And it may also be affirmed 
 that experience itself gives a proof of this, for the ancient laws 
 are too simple and barbarous which allowed the Greeks to 
 wear swords in the city, and to buy their wives of each other. 
 And indeed all the remains of old laws which we have are 
 very simple ; for instance, a law in Cuma relative to murder. 
 If any person who prosecutes another for murder can 
 produce a certain number of witnesses to it of his own 
 relations, the accused person shall be held guilty. Upon 
 the whole, all persons ought to endeavour to follow what is 
 right, and not what is established ; and it is probable that 
 the first men, whether they sprung out of the earth or were 
 saved from some general calamity, had very little under- 
 standing or knowledge, as is affirmed of these aborigines ; 
 
62 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book ii. 
 
 so that it would be absurd to continue in the practice of 
 their rules. Nor is it moreover right to permit written laws 
 always to remain without alteration ; for as in all other 
 sciences, so in politics, it is impossible to express every- 
 thing in writing with perfect exactness ; for when we com- 
 mit anything to writing we must use general terms, but in 
 every action there is something particular to itself, which 
 these may not comprehend ; from whence it is evident that 
 certain laws will at certain times admit of alterations. But 
 if we consider this matter in another point of view, it will 
 appear to require great caution ; for when the advantage 
 proposed is trifling, as the accustoming the people easily to 
 abolish their laws is of bad consequence, it is evidently 
 better to pass over some faults, which either the legislator 
 or the magistrates may have committed ; for the alterations 
 will not be of so much service, as a habit of disobeying the 
 magistrates will be of disservice. Besides, the instance 
 brought from the arts is fallacious ; for it is not the same 
 thing to alter the one as the other. For a law derives all 
 its strength from custom, and this requires long time to 
 establish ; so that, to make it an easy matter to pass from 
 the established laws to other new ones, is to weaken the 
 power of laws. Besides, here is another question : if the 
 laws are to be altered, are they all to be altered, and in 
 every government or not, and whether at the pleasure of 
 one person or many? all which particulars will make a 
 great difference ; for which reason we will at present drop 
 the inquiry, to pursue it at some other time. There are 
 two considerations which offer themselves with respect to 
 the government established at Lacedsemon and Crete, and 
 indeed in almost all other States whatsoever; one is, 
 whether their laws do or do not promote the best estab- 
 lishment possible ? the other is, whether there is anything, 
 if we consider either the principles upon which it is founded 
 or the executive part of it, which prevents the form of 
 government that they had proposed to follow from being 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 63 
 
 observed Now it is allowed that in every well-regulated 
 State the members of it should be free from servile labour ; but 
 in what manner this shall be effected is not so easy to 
 determine ; for the penedia have very often attacked the 
 Thessalians, and the helots the Lacedaemonians, for they 
 in a manner continually watch an opportunity for some 
 misfortune befalling them. But no such thing has ever 
 happened to the Cretans ; the reason for which probably is, 
 that although they are engaged in frequent wars with the 
 neighbouring cities, yet none of these would enter into an 
 alliance with the revolters, as it would be disadvantageous 
 for them^ who themselves also have their villains. But now 
 there is perpetual enmity between the Lacedaemonians and 
 all their neighbours, the Argives, the Messenians, and the 
 Arcadians. Their slaves also first revolted from the 
 Thessalians, while they were engaged in wars with their 
 neighbours the Acheans, the Perrabeans, and the Magne- 
 sians. It seems to me indeed, if nothing else, yet some- \ 
 thing very troublesome to keep upon proper terms with 
 them ; for if you are remiss in your discipline, they grow 
 insolent, and think themselves upon an equality with their 
 masters ; and if they are hardly used, they are continually 
 plotting against you and hate you. It is evident then that 
 those who employ slaves, have not as yet hit upon the right 
 way of managing them. As to the indulging of women in 
 any particular liberties, it is hurtful to the end of govern- 
 ment, and the prosperity of the city ; for as a man and his 
 wife are the two parts of a family, if we suppose a city to 
 be divided into two parts, we must allow that the number 
 of men and women will be equal* In whatever city then 
 the women are not under good regulations, we must look 
 upon one-half of it as not under the restraint of law, as it 
 there happened; for the legislator, desiring to make his 
 ^^ hole city a collection of warriors with respect to the men, 
 he most evidently accompHshed his design; but in the 
 meantime the women were quite neglected, for they live 
 
^4 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book n. 
 
 without restraint in every improper indulgence and luxury. 
 So that in such a State, riches will necessarily be in general 
 esteem, particularly if the men are governed by their wives, 
 which has been the case with many a brave and warlike 
 people except the Celts, and those other nations, if there 
 are any such, who openly practise pederasty. " And the 
 first mythologists seem not improperly to have joined Mars 
 and Venus together ; for all nations of this character are 
 greatly addicted either to the love of women or of boys, for 
 which reason it was thus at Lacedaemon ; and many things 
 in their State were done by the authority of the women. 
 For what is the difference ; if the power is in the hands of 
 the women, or in the hands of those whom they themselves 
 govern ? it must turn to the same account. As this bold- 
 ness of the women can be of no use in any common 
 occurrences, if it was ever so, it must be in war ; but even 
 here we find that the Lacedaemonian women were of the 
 greatest disservice, as was proved at the time of the Theban 
 invasion, when they were of no use at all, as they are in 
 other cities, but made more disturbance than even the 
 enemy. The origin of this indulgence which the Lacedae- 
 monian women enjoy, is easily accounted for; from the 
 long time the men were absent from home, upon foreign 
 expeditions against the Argives, and afterwards the Arca- 
 dians and Messenians, so that when these wars were at an 
 end, their military life, in which there is no little virtue, 
 prepared them to obey the precepts of their lawgiver ; but 
 we are told that when Lycurgus endeavoured also to re- 
 duce the women to an obedience to his laws, upon their 
 refusal he declined it. It may indeed be said that the 
 women were the causes of these things, and of course all 
 the fault was theirs. But we are not now considering 
 where the fault lies, or where it does not lie, but what 
 is right and what is wrong ; and when the manners of the 
 women are not well regulated, as I have already said, it 
 must not only occasion faults which are disgraceful to the 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 65 
 
 State, but also increase the love of money. In the next 
 place, fault may be found with his unequal division of 
 property, for some will have far too much, others too little ; 
 by which means the land will come into few hands, which 
 business is badly regulated by his laws. For he made it 
 infamous for any one either to buy or sell their possessions, 
 in which he did right ; but he permitted any one that chose 
 it to give them away, or bequeath them, although nearly the 
 same consequences will arise from one practice as from the 
 other. It is supposed that near two parts in five of the 
 whole country is the property of women, owing to their being 
 so often sole heirs, and having such large fortunes in 
 marriage ; though it would be better to allow them none, or 
 a little, or a certain regulated proportion. Now every one is 
 permitted to make a woman his heir if he pleases ; and if he 
 dies intestate, he who succeeds as heir-at-law gives it to whom 
 he pleases. From whence it happens, that although the 
 country is able to support fifteen hundred horse and thirty 
 thousand foot, the number does not amount to one thousand. 
 And from these facts it is evident that this particular is 
 badly regulated ; for the city could not support one shock, 
 but was ruined for want of men. They say that during the 
 reigns of their ancient kings^ they used to present foreigners 
 with the freedom of their city, to prevent there being a 
 want 01 men while they carried on long wars; it is also 
 affirmed that the number of Spartans was formerly ten 
 thousand; but be that as it will, an equality of property 
 conduces much to increase the number of the people. 
 The law, too, which he made to encourage population 
 was by no means calculated to correct this inequality ; for 
 being willing that the Spartans should be as numerous as 
 possible, to make them desirous of having large families, 
 he ordered that he who had three children should be 
 excused the night-watch, and that he who had four should 
 pay no taxes; though it is very evident that while the 
 land was divided in this manner, that if the people in- 
 
 c 
 
66 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book ii 
 
 creased there must many of them be very poor. Nor was 
 he less blamable for the manner in which he constituted 
 the ephori ; for these magistrates take cognizance of things 
 of the last importance, and yet they are chose out of the 
 people in general ; so that it often happens that a very poor 
 person is elected to that office, who, from that circum- 
 stance, is easily bought. There have been many instances 
 of this formerly, as well as in the late affair at Andros. 
 And these men, being corrupted with money, went as far 
 as they could to ruin the city; and because their power 
 was too great and nearly tyrannical, their kings were 
 obliged to flatter them, which contributed greatly to hurt 
 the State; so that it altered from an aristocracy to a 
 democracy. This magistracy is indeed the great support 
 of the State; for the people are easy, knowing that they 
 are eligible to the first oflice in it; so that, whether it 
 took place by the intention of the legislator, or whether 
 it happened by chance, this is of great service to their 
 affairs ; for it is necessary that every member of the State 
 should endeavour that each part of the government should 
 be preserved and continue the same. And upon this 
 principle their kings have always acted, out of regard to 
 their honour ; the wise and good from their attachment 
 to the senate, a seat wherein they consider as the reward 
 of virtue ; and the common people, that they may support 
 the ephori, of whom they consist. And it is proper that 
 these magistrates should be chose out of the whole com- 
 munity, not as the custom is at present, which is very 
 ridiculous. The ephori are the supreme judges in causes 
 ' of the last consequence ; but as it is quite accidental what 
 sort of persons they may be, it is not right that they should 
 determine according to their own opinion, but by a written 
 law or established custom. Their way of life also is not 
 consistent with the manners of the city, for it is too in- 
 dulgent, whereas that of others is too severe ; 30 that they 
 cannot support it, but are obliged privately to act contrary 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 67 
 
 to law, that they may enjoy some of the pleasures of sense. 
 There are also great defects in the institution of their 
 senators. If indeed they were fitly trained to the practice 
 of every human virtue, every one would readily admit that 
 they would be useful to the government ; but still it might 
 be debated whether they should be continued judges for 
 life, to determine points of the greatest moment, since the 
 niind has its^old age as well as the body j but as they are so 
 brought up that even the legislator could not depend upon 
 them as good men, their power must be inconsistent with 
 the safety of the State ; for it is known that the members 
 of that body have been guilty both of bribery and partiality 
 in many public affairs ; for which reason it had been much 
 better if they had been made answerable for their conduct, 
 which they are not. But it may be said the ephori seem 
 to have a check upon all the magistrates. They have in- 
 deed in this particular very great power ; but I affirm that 
 they should not be entrusted with this control in the 
 manner they are. Moreover, the mode of choice which 
 they make use of at the election of their senators is very 
 childish. Nor is it right for any one to solicit for a place 
 he is desirous of, for every person, whether he chooses it 
 or not, ought to execute any office he is fit for. But his 
 intention was evidently the same in this as in the other 
 parts of his government. For making his citizens am- 
 bitious after honours, with men of that disposition he has 
 filled his senate, since no others will solicit for that office ; 
 and yet the principal part of those crimes which men are 
 deliberately guilty of arise from ambition and avarice. 
 We will inquire at another time whether the office of a 
 king is useful to the State ; thus much is certain, that they 
 should be chose from a consideration of their conduct, and 
 not as they are now. But that the legislator himself did 
 not expect to make all his citizens honourable and com- 
 pletely virtuous is evident from this, that he distrusts them 
 as not being good men ; for he sent those upon the same 
 
 c 2 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book li. 
 
 embassy that were at variance with each other, and thought 
 that in the dispute of the kings the safety of the State 
 consisted. Neither were their common meals at first well 
 established ; for these should rather have been provided at 
 the public expense, as at Crete, where, as at Lacedaemon, 
 every one was obliged to buy his portion, although he 
 might be very poor, and could by no means bear the ex- 
 pense, by which means the contrary happened to what the 
 legislator desired ; for he intended that those public meals 
 should strengthen the democratic part of his government ; 
 but this regulation had quite the contrary effect, for those 
 who were very poor could not take part in them, and it 
 was an observation of their forefathers that the not allowing 
 those who could not contribute their proportion to the 
 common tables to partake of them would be the ruin of 
 the State. Other persons have censured his laws concern- 
 ing naval affairs, and not without reason, as it gave rise 
 to disputes. For the commander of the fleet is in a man- 
 ner set up in opposition to the kings, who are generals of - 
 the army for life. There is also another defect in his laws m 
 worthy of censure^ which Plato has given in his book of 
 Laws, that the whole constitution was calculated only for 
 the business of war ; it is indeed excellent to make them 
 conquerors, for which reason the preservation of the State 
 depended thereon. The destruction of it commenced with 
 their victories ; for they knew not how to be idle or engage | 
 in any other employment than war. In this particular also ^ 
 they were mistaken, that though they rightly thought that 
 those things whicli are the objects of contention amongst 
 mankind are better procured by virtue than vice, yet they 
 wrongfully preferred the things themselves to virtue. Nor M 
 was the public revenue well managed at Sparta, for the« 
 State was worth nothing while they were obliged to carry ■ 
 on the most extensive wars, and the subsidies were veryB 
 badly raised ; for as the Spartans possessed a large extent fl 
 of country, they were not exact upon each other as to| 
 
CHAP, ix.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 69 
 
 what they paid in. And thus an event contrary to the 
 legislator's intention took place; for the State was poor, 
 the individuals avaricious. Enough of the Lacedaemonian 
 government, for these seem the chief defects in it. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The government of Crete bears a near resemblance to this, 
 in some few particulars it is not worse, but in general it is 
 far inferior in its contrivance. For it appears and is allowed 
 in many particulars the constitution of Lacedaemon was 
 formed in imitation of that of Crete, and in general most 
 new things are an improvement upon the old. For they 
 say that when Lycurgus ceased to be guardian to king 
 Charilles he went abroad, and spent a long time with his 
 relations in Crete, for the Lycians are a colony of the 
 Lacedaemonians ; and those who first settled there adopted 
 that body of laws which they found already established by 
 the inhabitants ; in like manner also those who now live 
 near them have the very laws which Minos first drew up. 
 This island seems formed by Nature to be the mistress of 
 Greece, for it is entirely surrounded by a navigable ocean 
 which washes almost all the maritime parts of that country, 
 aiid is not far distant on the one side from Peloponnesus, 
 on the other, which looks towards Asia, from Triopium and 
 Rhodes. By means of this situation Minos acquired the 
 empire of the sea and the islands, some of which he subdued, 
 in others planted colonies : at last he died at Camicus while 
 he was attacking Sicily. There is this analogy between the 
 customs of the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans, the helots 
 cultivate the grounds for the one, the domestic slaves for the 
 other. Both States have their common meals, and the 
 Lacedaemonians called these formerly not ^tStna but Avdpiay 
 
70 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book ii. 
 
 as the Cretans do, which proves from whence the custom 
 arose. In this particular their governments are also alike? 
 the ephori have the same power with those of Crete, who 
 are called koo-/xo£ ; with this difference only, that the number 
 of the one is five, of the other ten. The senators are the 
 same as those whom the Cretans call the council. There 
 was formerly also a kingly power in Crete, but it was 
 afterwards dissolved, and the command of their armies was 
 given to the Kocr/xot. Every one also has a vote in their 
 public assembly, but this has only the power of confirming 
 what has already passed the council and the Koo-/xot. The 
 Cretans conducted their public meals better than the 
 Lacedaemonians, for at Lacedaemon each individual was 
 obliged to furnish what was assessed upon him, which if he 
 could not do, there was a law which deprived him of the 
 rights of a citizen, as has been already mentioned ; but in 
 Crete they were furnished by the community ; for all the 
 corn and cattle, taxes and contributions, which the domestic 
 slaves were obliged to furnish, were divided into parts, and 
 allotted to the gods, the exigencies of the State, and these 
 public meals; so that all the men, women and children, 
 were maintained from a common stock. The legislator 
 gave great attention to encourage a habit of eating sparingly, 
 as very useful to the citizens. He also endeavoured that his 
 community might not be too populous, to lessen the 
 connection with women, by introducing the love of boys : 
 whether in this he did well or ill we shall have some other 
 opportunity of considering. But that the public meals 
 were better ordered at Crete than at Laced sem on is very 
 evident. The institution of the Koo-/xot was still worse than 
 that of the ephori, for it contained all the faults incident to 
 that magistracy and some peculiar to itself ; for in both 
 cases it is uncertain who will be elected, but the Lacedae- 
 monians have this advantage which the others have not, 
 that as all are eligible, the whole community have a share 
 in the highest honours, and therefore all desire to preserve 
 
CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 71 
 
 the State ; whereas among the Cretans the Koc/xot are not 
 chosen out of the people in general, but out of some certam 
 families, and the senate out of the Koo-//ot. And the same 
 observations which may be made on the senate at Lacedae- 
 mon may be applied to these, for their being under no 
 control, and their continuing for life is an honour greater 
 than they merit, and to have their proceedings not regulated 
 by a written law, but left to their own discretion, is 
 dangerous. (As to there being no insurrections, although 
 the people share not in the management of public affairs, 
 this is no proof of a well-constituted government, as the 
 Koo-/xot have no opportunity of being bribed like the ephori, 
 as they live in an island, far from those who would corrupt 
 them.) But the method they take to correct that fault is 
 absurd, impolitic, and tyrannical; for very often either 
 their fellow-magistrates or some private persons conspire 
 together and turn out the Koo-/xot. They are also per- 
 mitted to resign their office before their time is elapsed, 
 and if all this was done by law it would be well, and not at 
 the pleasure of the individuals, which is a bad rule to 
 follow. But what is worst of all is that general confusion 
 which those who are in power introduce to impede the 
 ordinary course of justice, which sufficiently shows what is 
 the nature of the government, or rather lawless force ; for it 
 is usual with the principal persons amongst them to collect 
 together some of the common people and their friends, and 
 then revolt and set up for themselves, and come to blows 
 with each other. And what is the difterence, if a State is 
 dissolved at once by such violent means, or if it gradually 
 so alters in process of time as to be no longer the same 
 constitution ? A State like this would ever be exposed to 
 the invasions of those who were powerful and inclined to 
 attack it ; but, as has been already mentioned, its situation 
 preserves it, as it is free from the inroads of foreigners ; and 
 for this reason the family slaves still remain quiet at Crete, 
 while the helots are perpetually revolting ; for the Cretans 
 
72 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book ii. 
 
 take no part in foreign affairs, and it is but lately that any 
 foreign troops have made an attack upon the island, and 
 their ravages soon proved the ineffectualness of their laws. 
 And thus much for the government of Crete. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 The government of Carthage seems well established, and in 
 many respects superior to others; in some particulars it 
 bears a near resemblance to the Lacedaemonians ; and indeed 
 these three States, the Cretans, the Lacedaemonians, and 
 the Carthaginians are in some things very like each other, 
 in others they differ greatly. Amongst many excellent 
 constitutions this may show how well their government is 
 framed, that although the people are admitted to a share in 
 the administration, the form of it remains unaltered, without 
 any popular insurrections, worth notice, on the one hand, 
 or degenerating into a tyranny on the other. Now the 
 Carthaginians have these things in common with the 
 Lacedaemonians : public tables for those who are connected 
 together by the tie of mutual friendship, after the manner of 
 their phiditia ; they have also a magistracy, consisting of a 
 hundred and four persons, similar to the ephori, or rather 
 selected with more judgment; for amongst the Lace- 
 daemonians all the citizens are eligible, but amongst the 
 Carthaginians they are chosen out of those of the better 
 sort; there is also some analogy between the king and 
 the senate in both these governments, though the Cartha- 
 ginian method of appointing their kings is best, for they 
 do not confine themselves to one family ; nor do they 
 permit the election to be at large, nor have they any regard 
 to seniority; for if amongst the candidates there are any of 
 greater merit than the rest, these they prefer to those who 
 
CHAP. X.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 73 
 
 may be older ; for as their power is very extensive, if they 
 are persons of no account, they may be very hurtful to the 
 State, as they have always been to the Lacedaemonians ; 
 also the greater part of those things which become repre- 
 hensible by their excess, are common to all those govern- 
 ments which we have described. Now of those principles 
 on which the Carthaginians have established their mixed 
 form of government, composed of an aristocracy and 
 democracy, some incline to produce a democracy, others 
 an oligarchy ; for instance, if the kings and the senate are 
 unanimous upon any point in debate they can choose 
 whether they will bring it before the people or no ; but if 
 they disagree, it is to these they must appeal, who are not 
 only to hear what has been approved of by the senate, but 
 are finally to determine upon it ; and whosoever chooses it 
 has a right to speak against any matter whatsoever that may 
 be proposed, which is not permitted in other cases. The 
 five, who elect each other, have very great and extensive 
 powers, and these choose the hundred, v/ho are magis- 
 trates of the highest rank ; their power also continues 
 longer than any other magistrates, for it commences before 
 they come into office, and is prolonged after they are out of 
 it ; and in this particular the State inclines to an oligarchy ; 
 but as they are not elected by lot but by suffrage, and are 
 not permitted to take money, they are the greatest sup- 
 porters imaginable of an aristocracy. 
 
 The determining all causes by the same magistrates, and 
 not one in one court and another in another, as at 
 Lacedsemon, has the same influence. The constitution of 
 Carthage is now shifting from an aristocracy to an oligarchy, 
 in consequence of an opinion which is favourably enter- 
 tained by many, who think that the magistrates in the 
 community ought not to be persons of family only, but of 
 fortune also, as it is impossible for those who are in bad 
 circumstances to support the dignity of their office, or to be 
 at leisure to apply to public business. As choosing men of 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book li. 
 
 fortune to be magistrates make a State incline to an oli- 
 garchy, and men of abilities to an aristocracy, so is there a 
 third method of proceeding which took place in the polity 
 of Carthage ; for they have an eye to these two particulars 
 when they elect their officers, particularly those of the 
 highest rank, their kings and their generals. It must be 
 admitted that it was a great fault in their legislator not to 
 guard against the constitution's degenerating from an 
 aristocracy ; for this is a most necessary thing to provide 
 for at first, that those citizens who have the best abilities 
 should never be obliged to do anything unworthy their 
 character, but be always at leisure to serve the public, not 
 only when in office, but also when private persons ; for if 
 once you are obliged to look among the wealthy, that you 
 may have men at leisure to serve you, your greatest offices, 
 of king and general, will soon become venal; in conse- 
 quence of which, riches will be more honourable than virtue, 
 and a love of money be the ruling principle in the city; 
 for what those who have the chief power regard as honour- 
 able, will necessarily be the object which the citizens in 
 general will aim at ; and where the first honours are not 
 paid to virtue, there the aristocratic form of government 
 cannot flourish ; for it is reasonable to conclude that those 
 who bought their places should generally make an advantage 
 of what they laid out their money for ; as it is absurd 
 to suppose that if a man of probity, who is poor, should be 
 desirous of gaining something, a bad man should not 
 endeavour to do the same, especially to reimburse himself ; 
 for which reason the magistracy should be formed of those 
 who are most able to support an aristocracy. It would 
 have been better for the legislature to have passed over the 
 poverty of men of merit, and only to have taken care to 
 have ensured them sufficient leisure when in office to attend 
 to public afi'airs. It seems also improper that one person 
 should execute several offices, which was approved of at 
 Carthage ; for one business is best done by one person, and 
 
CHAP. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 75 
 
 it is the duty of the legislator to look to this, and not make 
 the same person a musician and a shoemaker, so that where 
 the State is not small it is more politic and more popular to 
 admit many persons to have a share in the government; 
 for, as I just now said, it is not only more usual, but every- 
 thing is better and sooner done when one thing only Is 
 allotted to one person ; and this is evident both in the army 
 and navy, where almost every one in his turn both com- 
 mands and is under command. But as their government 
 inclines to an oligarchy, they avoid the ill effects of it, by 
 always appointing some of the popular party to the govern- 
 ment of cities, to make their fortunes. Thus they consult 
 this fault in their constitution, and render it stable, but this 
 is depending on chance ; whereas the legislator ought to 
 frame his government that there be no room for insurrec- 
 tions. But now, if there should be any general calamity, 
 and the people should revolt from their rulers, there is 
 no remedy for reducing them to obedience by the laws. 
 And these are the particulars of the Lacedemonian, the 
 Cretan, and the Carthaginian governments, which seem 
 worthy of commendation. 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 Some of those persons who have writ upon government had 
 never any share in public affairs, but always led a private life. 
 Everything worthy of notice in their works we have already 
 spoke to. Others were legislators, some in their own cities, 
 others were employed in regulating the governments of 
 foreign States. Some of them only composed a body of 
 laws, others formed the constitution also, as Lycurgus ; and 
 Solon, who did both. The Lacedaemonians have been 
 already mentioned. Some persons think that Solon was an 
 -excellent legislator, who could dissolve a pure oligarchy and 
 
y6 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book ii. 
 
 save the people from that slavery which hung over them, 
 and establish the ancient democratic form of government in 
 his country, wherein every part of it was so framed as to be 
 well adapted to the whole. In the senate of Areopagus an 
 oligarchy was preserved, by the manner of electing their 
 magistrates an aristocracy, and in their courts of justice a 
 democracy. Solon seems not to have altered the estab- 
 lished form of government, either with respect to the senate 
 or the mode of electing their magistrates, but to have raised 
 the people to great consideration in the State by allotting 
 the supreme juHicial department to them; and for this some 
 persons blame him as having done what would soon over- 
 turn that balance of power he intended to establish, for by 
 trying all causes whatsoever before the people who were 
 chose by lot to determine them, it was necessary to flatter a 
 tyrannical populace who had got this power, which con- 
 tributed to bring the government to that pure democracy it 
 now is. Both Ephialtes and Pericles abridged the power of 
 the Areopagites, the latter of whom introduced the method 
 of paying those who attended the courts of justice ; and 
 thus every one who aimed at being popular proceeded 
 increasing the power of the people to what we now see it. 
 But it is evident that this was not Solon's intention, but that 
 it arose from accident, for the people being the cause of the 
 naval victory over the Medes, assumed greatly upon it and 
 enlisted themselves under factious demagogues, although 
 opposed by the better part of the citizens. He thought it 
 indeed most necessary to entrust the people with the choice 
 of their magistrates, and the power of calling them to 
 account, for without that they must have been slaves and 
 enemies to the other citizens ; but he ordered them to elect 
 those only who were persons of good account and property, 
 either out of those who were worth five hundred medimns, 
 or those who were called Zeuyirat, or those of the third 
 census who were called horsemen. As for those of the 
 fourth, which consisted of mechanics, they were incapable 
 
\ CHAP. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 77 
 
 of any office. Zaleucus was the legislator of the Western 
 Locrians, as was Charondas the Catanean of his own cities, 
 and those also in Italy and Sicily which belong to the Cal- 
 cidians. Some persons endeavour to prove that Pnoma- 
 critus the Locrian was the first person of note who drew up 
 laws, and that he employed himself in that business while 
 he was at Crete, where he continued some time to learn the 
 prophetic art; and they say that Thales was his companion, 
 and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were the scholars of Thales, 
 and Charondas of Zaleucus ; but those who advance this, 
 advance what is repugnant to chronology. Philolaus also, 
 of the family of the Bacchiades, was a Theban legislator. 
 This man was very fond of Diodes, a victor in the Olympic 
 games, and when he left his country from a disgust at an 
 improper passion which his mother Alithoe had entertained 
 for him and settled at Thebes, Philolaus followed him, where 
 they both died, and where they sdll show their tombs placed 
 in view of each other, but so disposed that one of them 
 looks towards Corinth, the other does not ; the reason they 
 give for this is that Diodes, from his detestation of his 
 mother's passion, would have his tomb so placed that no 
 one could see Corinth from it, but Philolaus chose that it 
 might be seen from his ; and this was the cause of their 
 living at Thebes. As Philolaus gave them laws concerning 
 many other things, so did he upon adoption, which they call 
 adoptive laws, and this he in particular did to preserve the 
 number of families. Charondas did nothing new except in 
 actions for perjury, which he was the first person who took 
 into particular consideration. He also drew up his laws 
 with greater elegance and accuracy than even any of our 
 present legislators. Philolaus introduced the law for the 
 equal distribution of goods ; Plato that for the community 
 of women, children, and goods, and also for public tables 
 for the women ; and one concerning drunkenness, that they 
 might observe sobriety in their sunposiums. He also 
 made a law concerning their warlike exercises, that they 
 
78 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book ii. 
 
 should acquire a habit of using both hands alike, as it was 
 necessary that one hand should be as useful as the other. 
 As for Dracoes laws, they were published when the govern- 
 ment was already estabHshed, and they have nothing par- 
 ticular in them worth mentioning, except their severity on 
 account of the enormity of their punishments. Pittacus 
 was the author of some laws, but never drew up any form of 
 government ; one of which was this, that if a drunken man 
 beat any person he should be punished more than if he did 
 it when sober, for as people are more apt to be abusive 
 when drunk than sober, he paid no consideration to the 
 excuse which drunkenness might claim, but regarded only 
 the common benefit. Andromadus Reginus was also a law- 
 giver to the Thracian Calcidians. There are some laws of 
 his concerning murders and heiresses extant, but these 
 contain nothing that any one can say is new and his own. 
 And thus much for different sorts of governments, as well 
 those which really exist as those which different persons 
 have proposed. 
 
Book III. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Every one who inquires into the nature of government and 
 what are its different forms, should make this almost his 
 first question : What is a city ? for upon this there is a dispute ; 
 for some persons say, the city did this or that, while others 
 say, not the city, but the oligarchy or the tyranny. We see 
 that the city is the only object which both the politician 
 and legislator have in view in all they do, but government 
 is a certain ordering of those who inhabit a city. As a city 
 is a collective body, and, like other wholes, composed of 
 many parts, it is evident our first inquiry must be what a 
 citizen is, for a city is a certain number of citizens. So 
 that we must consider whom we ought to call citizen, and 
 who is. one, for this is often doubtful ; for every one will not 
 allow that this character is applicable to the same person, 
 for that man who would be a citizen in a republic, would 
 very often not be one in an Oligarchy. We do not include in 
 this inquiry many of those who acquire this appellation out 
 of the ordinary way, as honorary persons for instance, but 
 those only who have a natural right to it. Now, it is not 
 residence which constitutes a man a citizen, for in this 
 sojourners and slaves are upon an equality with him ; nor 
 will it be sufficient for this purpose that you have the 
 privilege of the laws and may plead or be impleaded, for 
 this all those of different nations, between whom there is a 
 
So ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book ill. 
 
 a mutual agreement for that purpose, are allowed, although 
 it very often happens that sojourners have not a perfect 
 right therein, without the protection of a patron to whom 
 they are obliged to apply, which shows that their share in the 
 community is incomplete. In like manner, with respect to 
 boys who are not yet enrolled^ or old men who are past war, 
 we admit that they are in some respects citizens, but not 
 completely so, but with some exceptions, for these are not 
 yet arrived to years of maturity, and those are past service ; 
 nor is there any difference between them. But what we 
 mean is sufficiently intelligible and clear — we want a 
 complete citizen, one in whom there is no deficiency to be 
 corrected to make him so. As to those who are banished 
 or infamous, there may be the same objections made and the 
 same answer given. There is nothing that more charac- 
 terizes a complete citizen than having a share in the 
 judicial and executive part of the government, j; With 
 respect to offices, some are fixed to a particular time, so 
 that no person is on any account permitted to fill them 
 twice, or else not till some certain period has intervened; 
 others are not fixed, as a juryman's, and a member of the 
 general assembly ; but probably some one may say, these 
 are not offices, nor have the citizens in these capacities any 
 share in the government ; though surely it is ridiculous to 
 say that those who have the principal power in the State 
 bear no office in it. But this objection is of no weight, for 
 it is only a dispute about words, as there is no general term 
 which can be applied both to the office of a juryman and a 
 member of the assembly. For the sake of distinction, 
 suppose we call it an indeterminate office, but I lay it down 
 as a maxim that those are citizens who could exercise ito 
 Such then is the description of a citizen who comes nearest 
 to what all those who are called citizens are. Every one 
 also should know that of the component parts of those 
 things which differ from each other in species, after the first 
 or second remove, those which follow have either nothing at 
 
CHAP. I.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 all or very little common to each. Now we see that 
 governments differ from each other in their form, and that 
 some of them are defective, others as excellent as possible ; 
 for it is evident that those which have many deficiencies and 
 degeneracies in them must be far inferior to those which are 
 without such faults. What I mean by degeneracies will be 
 hereafter explained. Hence it is clear, that the office of 
 a citizen must differ as governments do from each other ; 
 for which reason he who is called a citizen has in a demo- 
 cracy every privilege which that station supposes. In other 
 forms of government he may enjoy them, but not necessarily ; 
 for in some States the people have no power, nor have they 
 any general assembly, but a few select men. The trial also 
 of different causes is allotted to different persons ; as at 
 Lacedaemon, all disputes concerning contracts are brought 
 before some of the ephori ; the senate are the judges in 
 cases of murder and so on, some being to be heard by one 
 magistrate, others by another ; and thus at Carthage certain 
 magistrates determine all causes. But our former descrip- 
 tion of a citizen will admit of correction, for in some 
 governments the office of a juryman and a member of the 
 general assembly is not an indeterminate one, but there are 
 particular persons appointed for these purposes, some or all 
 of the citizens being appointed jurymen or members of the 
 general assembly, and this either for all causes and all 
 public business whatsoever, or else for some particular one ; 
 and this may be sufficient to show what a citizen is, for he 
 who has a right to a share in the judicial and executive part 
 of government in any city, him we call a citizen of that 
 place, and a city, in one word, is a collective body of such 
 persons, sufficient in themselves to all the purposes of life. 
 
82 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iii 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 In common use, they define a citizen to be one who is 
 sprung from citizens on both sides, not on the father's or 
 the mother's only. Others carry the matter still further, 
 and inquire how many of his ancestors have been citizens, 
 as his grandfather, great-grandfather, &c. ; but some persons 
 have questioned how the first of the family could prove 
 themselves citizens, according to this popular and careless 
 definition. Gorgias of Leontium, partly entertaining the 
 same doubt, and partly in jest, says, that as a mortar is 
 made by a mortar-maker, so a citizen is made by a citizen- 
 maker, and a Larissaean by a Larissaean-maker. This is 
 indeed a very simple account of the matter ; for if citizens 
 are so, according to this definition it will be impossible to 
 apply it to the first founders or first inhabitants of States^ 
 who cannot possibly claim in right either of their father or 
 mother. It is probably a matter of still more difliiculty to 
 determine their rights as citizens who are admitted to their 
 freedom after any revolution in the State. As, for instance, 
 at Athens, after the expulsion of the Tyrants, when CUsthenes 
 enrolled many foreigners and city-slaves amongst the tribes ; 
 and the doubt with respect to them was, not whether they 
 were citizens or no, but w^hether they were legally so or not. 
 Though indeed some persons may have this further doubt, 
 whether a citizen can be a citizen, when he is illegally 
 made ; as if an illegal citizen, and one who is no citizen at 
 all, were in the same predicament ; but since we see some 
 persons govern unjustly whom yet we admit to govern, 
 though not justly, and the definition of a citizen is one who 
 exercises certain offices, for such a one we have defined a 
 citizen to be, it is evident that a citizen illegally created 
 yet continues to be a citizen, but whether justly or unjustly 
 SO; belongs to the former inquiry. 
 
CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 83 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 It has also been doubted what was, and what was not, the 
 act of the city ; as, for instance, when a democracy arises 
 out of an aristocracy, or a tyranny ; for some persons then 
 refuse to fulfil their contracts ; as if the right to receive the 
 money was in the tyrant, and not in the State, and many 
 other things of the same nature ; as if any covenant was 
 founded for violence, and not for the common good. So in 
 like manner, if anything is done by those who have the 
 management of public affairs where a democracy is estab- 
 lished, their actions are to be considered as the actions of 
 the State, as well as in the oligarchy, or tyranny. And 
 here it seems very proper to consider this question, when 
 shall we say that a city is the same, and when shall we say 
 that it is different? 
 
 It is but a superficial mode of examining into this 
 question, to begin with the place and the people ; for it 
 may happen that these may be divided from that, or that 
 some one of them may live in one place, and some in 
 another (but this question may be regarded as no very 
 knotty one; for as a city may acquire that appellation 
 on many accounts, it may be solved many ways) ; and in 
 like manner, when men inhabit one common place, when 
 shall we say that they inhabit the same city, or that the 
 city is the same ? For it does not depend upon the walls ; 
 for I can suppose Peloponnesus itself surrounded with a 
 wall, as Babylon was, and every other place, which rather 
 encircles many nations than one city, and that they say was 
 taken in three days, when some of the inhabitants knew 
 nothing of it ; but we shall find a proper time to determine 
 this question ; for the extent of a city, how large it should 
 be, and whether it should consist of more than one people, 
 these are particulars that the politician should by no means 
 
84 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book hi. 
 
 Le unacquainted with. This, too, is a matter of inquiry, 
 whether we shall say that a city is the same while it is 
 inhabited by the same race of men, though some of them 
 nre perpetually dying, others coming into the world, as we 
 say that a river or a fountain is the same, though the waters 
 are continually changing ; or when a similar event takes 
 place shall we say, the men are the same, but the city is 
 different : for if a city is a community, it is a community of 
 citizens ; but if the mode of government should alter, and 
 become of another sort, it would seem a necessary con- 
 sequence that the city is not the same ; as we regard the 
 tragic chorus as different from the comic, though it may 
 probably consist of the same performers : thus every other 
 community or composition is said to be different, if the 
 species of composition is different ; as in music the same 
 hands produce different harmony, as the Doric and Phrygian. 
 If this is true, it is evident that when we speak of a city as 
 being the same, we refer to the government there established; 
 and this, whether it is called by the same name or any 
 other, or inhabited by the same men, or different. But 
 whether or no it is right to dissolve t^ community when 
 the constitution is altered, is another question. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 After what has been said it follows that we should consider 
 whether the same virtues which constitute a good man make 
 a valuable citizen or different, and if a particular inquiry is 
 necessary for this matter, we must first give a general 
 description of the virtues of a good citizen ; for as a sailor is 
 one of those who make up a community, so is a citizen. 
 
CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 85 
 
 although the province of one sailor may be different from 
 another's (for one is a rower, another a steersman, a third a 
 boatswain, and so on, each having their several appoint- 
 ments), it is evident that the most accurate description of 
 au)^ one good sailor must refer to his peculiar abilities, yet 
 there are some things in which the same description may be 
 applied to the whole crew, as the safety of the ship is the 
 common business of all of them, for this is the general 
 centre of all their cares : so also with respect to citizens, 
 although they may in a few particulars be very different, 
 yet there is one care common to them all, the safety qf tli e- 
 
 
 community, for the community of the citizens composes the 
 State, foT which reason the virtue of a citizen has necessarily 
 a reference to the State. But if there are different sorts of 
 government, it is evident that those actions which constitute 
 the virtue of an excellent citizen in one community will not 
 constitute it in another, wherefore the virtue of such a one 
 cannot be perfect; bu t we say^g LJ^^^^-^^^^^^-^^^ ^ ^is 
 virtues a re perfect, from whence it f oil 0 ws_ thiit an. excel 1 en t 
 citizen do es not possess that v irtue which constituies.a good 
 rnaiTL Those who are any ways doubtful concerning this 
 question, may be convinced of the truth of it by examining 
 into the best formed States : for, if it is impossible that a 
 city should consist entirely of excellent citizens (while it is 
 necessary that every one should do well in his calling, in 
 which consists his excellence, as it is impossible that all the 
 citizens should have the same qualifications), it is impossible 
 that the virtue of a citizen and a good man should be the 
 same ; for all should possess the virtue of an excellent 
 citizen, for from hence necessarily arise the perfection of 
 the city ; but that every one should possess the virtue ot a 
 good man is impossible, without all the citizens in a well- 
 regulated State were necessarily virtuous. Besides, as a city 
 is composed of dissimilar parts, as an animal is of life and 
 body ; the soul, of reason and appetite ; a family, of a man 
 and his wife ; property, of a master and a slave ; in the 
 
86 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book hi. 
 
 same manner, as a city is composed of all these, and many 
 other very different parts, it necessarily follows that the 
 virtue of all the citizens cannot be the same^ as the business of 
 him who leads the band is different from the other dancers. 
 From all which proofs it is evident that the virtues of a 
 citizen cannot be one and the same. But do we never find 
 those virtues united which constitute a good man and 
 excellent citizen ? for w^e say such a one is an excellent 
 magistrate, and a prudent and good man ; but prudence is a 
 necessary qualification for all those who engage in public 
 affairs. Nay, some persons affirm that the education of 
 those who are intended to command should from the 
 beginning be different from other citizens, as the children 
 of kings are generally instructed in riding and warlike 
 exercises ; and thus Euripides says — 
 
 No showy arts 
 Be mine, but teach me what the State requires. 
 
 As if those who are to rule were to have an education 
 peculiar to themselves. But if we allow that the virtues of 
 a good man and a good magistrate may be the same, and a 
 citizen is one who obeys the magistrate, it follows that the 
 virtue of the one cannot in general be the same as the 
 virtue of the other, although it may be true of some particular 
 citizen, for the virtue of the magistrate must be different 
 from the virtue of the citizen. For which reason Jason 
 declared that was he deprived of his kingdom, he should 
 pine away with regret, as not knowing how to live a private 
 man. But it is a great recommendation to know how to 
 command as well as to obey j^^ and to do both these things 
 well, is the virtue of an accomphshed citizen. If, then, the 
 virtue of a good man consists only in being able to command, 
 but the virtue of a good citizen renders him equally fit for the 
 one as well as the other, the commendation of both of them 
 is not the same. It appears, then, that both he who 
 commands and he who obeys should each of them learn 
 
CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 87 
 
 their separate business, but that the citizen should be master 
 of and take part in both these, as any one may easily 
 perceive. In a family government there is no occasion for 
 the master to know how to perform the necessary offices, 
 but rather to enjoy the labour of others, for to do the other 
 is a servile part. I mean by the other, the common family 
 business of the slave. 
 
 There are many sorts of slaves, for their employments are 
 various ; of these the spinsters are one, who, as their name 
 imports, get their living by the labour of their hands, and 
 amongst these all mechanics are included ; for which reasons 
 such workmen in some States were not formerly admitted 
 into any share in the government ; till at length democracies 
 were established ; it is not therefore proper for any man of 
 honour, or any citizen, or any one who engages in public 
 affairs, to learn these servile employments without they have 
 occasion for them for their own use ; for without this was 
 observed, the distinction between a master and a slave 
 would be lost. But there is a government of another sort, 
 in which men govern those who are their equals in rank, 
 and freemen, which we call a political government, in which 
 men learn to command by first submitting to obey, as a 
 good general of horse, or a commander-in-chief, must 
 acquire a knowledge of their duty by having been long under 
 the command of another, and the like in every appointment 
 in the army : for well is it said, no one knows how to 
 command who has not himself been under command of 
 another. The virtues of those are indeed different, but a 
 good citizen must necessarily be endowed with them ; he 
 ought also to know in what manner freemen ought to 
 govern as well as be governed, and this too is the duty of a 
 good man. And if the temperance and justice of him who 
 commands is different from his who, though a freeman, is 
 under command, it is evident that the virtues of a good 
 citizen cannot be the same, as justice, for instance, but must 
 be of a different species, in these two different situations, as 
 
88 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book hi. 
 
 the temperance and courage of a man and a woman are 
 different from each other ; for a man would appear a coward 
 who had only that courage which would be graceful in a 
 woman, and a woman would be thought a talker who should 
 take as large a part in the conversation as would become a 
 man of consequence. The domestic employments of each 
 of them are also different ; it is the man's business to acquire 
 a subsistence, the woman's to take care of it. But discretion 
 and knowledge of public affairs is a virtue peculiar to those 
 who govern, while all others seem to be equally requisite for 
 both parties ; but with this the governed have no concern, 
 it is theirs to entertain just notions : they indeed are like 
 flute-makers, wJiile those who govern are the musicians who 
 play on them. And thus much to show whether the virtue 
 of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same, or if it 
 is different, and also how far it is the same, and how far 
 different. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 But with respect to citizens there is a doubt remaining, 
 whetlier those only are truly so who are allowed a share in 
 the government, or whether the mechanics also are to be 
 considered as such ? For if those who are not permitted to 
 rule are to be reckoned among them, it is impossible that 
 the virtue of all the citizens should be tlie same, for these 
 also are citizens ; and if none of them are admitted to be 
 citizens, where shall they be ranked ? for they are neither 
 sojourners, nor foreigners. Or shall we say that there will 
 no inconvenience arise from their not being citizens, as they 
 are neither slaves nor freedmen : for this is certainly true, 
 that all those are not citizens who are necessary to the 
 
CHAP, v.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 89 
 
 existence of a city, as boys are not citizens in the same 
 manner that men are, for those are perfectly so, the others 
 under some conditions ; for they are citizens, though im- 
 perfect ones : for in former times, among some people, the 
 mechanics were either slaves or foreigners, for which reason 
 many of them are so now, and indeed the best regulated 
 States will not permit a mechanic to be a citizen ; but if it 
 be allowed them, we cannot then attribute the virtue we 
 have described to every citizen or freeman, but to those 
 only who are disengaged from servile offices. Now those 
 who are employed by one person in them are slaves ; those 
 who do them for money are mechanics and hired servants ; 
 hence it is evident on the least reflection what is their situ- 
 ation, for what I have said is fully explained by appearances. 
 Since the number of communities is very great, it follows 
 necessarily that there will be many different sorts of citizens, 
 particularly of those who are governed by others, so that in 
 one State it may be necessary to admit mechanics and 
 hired servants to be citizens, but in others it may be impos- 
 sible ; as particularly in an aristocracy, where honours are 
 bestowed on virtue and dignity, for it is impossible for one 
 who lives the life of a mechanic or hired servant to acquire 
 the practice of virtue. In an oligarchy also hired servants 
 are not admitted to be citizens, because there a man's right 
 to bear any oftice is regulated by his fortune ; but mechanics 
 are, for many citizens are very rich. There was a law at 
 Thebes that no one could have a share in the government 
 till he had been ten years out of trade. In many States the 
 law invites strangers to accept the freedom of the city ; and 
 in some democracies the son of a freevvoman is himself free. 
 The same is also observed in many others with respect to 
 natural children ; but it is through want of citizens regularly 
 born that they admit such : for these laws are always made 
 in consequence of a scarcity of inhabitants ; so, as their 
 numbers increase, they first deprive the children of a male 
 or female slave of this privilege, next the child of a free- 
 
90 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [rook III. 
 
 woman, and, last of all, they will admit none but those 
 whose fathers and mothers were both free. That there are 
 many sorts of citizens, and that he may be said to be as 
 completely who shares the honours of the State, is evident 
 from what has been already said. Thus Achilles, in Homer, 
 complains of Agamemnon's treating him like an unhonoured 
 stranger; for a stranger, or sojourner, is one who does not 
 partake of the honours of the State; and whenever the 
 right to the freedom of the city is kept obscure, it is for the 
 sake of the inhabitants. From what has been said it is 
 plain, whether the virtue of a good man and an excellent 
 citizen is the same or different ; and we find that in some 
 States it is the same, in others not; and also that this is 
 not true of each citizen, but of those only who take the lead, 
 or are capable of taking the lead in pubic affairs, either 
 alone or in conjunction with others. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Having established these points, we proceed next to con- 
 sider whether one form of government only should be 
 established, or more than one ; and if more, how many and 
 of what sort, and what are the differences between them. 
 T-hc form of government is the ordering jind regulating of 
 the city, and all the offices in it, particularly those wherein 
 the supreme power is lodged, and this power is always 
 possessed by the administration ; but the administration 
 itself is that particular form of government which is 
 established in any State. Thus in a democracy the 
 supreme power is lodged in the whole people; on the 
 contrary, in an oligarchy it is in the hands of a few. We 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 91 
 
 say, then, that the form of government in these States is 
 different, and we shall find the same thing hold good in 
 others. Let us first determine for whose sake a city is 
 established, and point out the different species of rule 
 wliich man may submit to in social life. I have already 
 mentioned in my treatise on the management of a family, 
 and the power of the master, that man is an animal naturally 
 formed for society, and that therefore when he does not 
 "want any foreign assistance, he will of his own accord desire 
 to live with others ; not but that mutual advantage induces 
 them to it, as far as it enables each person to Hve more 
 agreeably ; and this is indeed the great object not only to all 
 in general, but also to each individual. But it is not merely 
 matter of choice, but they join in society also even that they 
 may be able to live, which probably is not without some 
 share of merit, and they also support civil society even for 
 the sake of preserving life, without they are grievously 
 overwhelmed with the miseries of it ; for it is very evident 
 that men will endure many calamities for the sake of living, 
 as being something naturally sweet and desirable. It is 
 easy to point out the different modes of government, and 
 we have already settled them in our exoteric discourses. 
 The power of the master, though by nature equally service- 
 able both to the master and to the slave, yet nevertheless 
 has for its object the benefit of the master, while the benefit 
 of the slave arises accidentally, for if the slave is destroyed 
 the power of the master is at an end ; but the authority 
 which a man has over his wife, and children, and his family, 
 which we call domestic government, is either for the benefit 
 of those who are under subjection, or else for the common 
 benefit of the whole. But its particular object is the benefit 
 of the governed, as we see in other arts, in physic for 
 instance, and the gymnastic exercises, wherein if any benefit 
 arise to the master it is accidental; for nothing forbids the 
 master of the exercises from sometimes being himself one 
 of those who exercises, as the steersman is always one of 
 
92 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book 111. 
 
 the sailors, but both the master of the exercises and the 
 steersman consider the good of those who are under their 
 government. Whatever good may happen to the steers- 
 man when he is a sailor, or to the master of the exercises 
 when he himself makes one at the games, is not intentional, 
 or the object of their power; thus in all political govern- 
 ments which are established to preserve and defend the 
 equality of the citizens, it is held right to rule by turns. 
 Formerly, as was natural, every one expected that each of 
 his fellow-citizens should in his turn serve the public, and 
 thus administer to his private good, as he himself when in 
 office had done for others ; but now every one is desirous of 
 being continually in power, that he may enjoy the advantage 
 which he makes of public business and being in office, as if 
 places were a never-failing remedy for every complaint, and 
 were on that account so eagerly sought after. ' It is evident, 
 then, that all those governments which have a common 
 good in view, are rightly established and strictly just ; but 
 those who have in view only the good of the rulers, are all 
 founded on wrong principles, and are widely different from 
 what a government ought to be, for they are tyranny over 
 slaves, whereas a city is a community of freemen. 
 
 CHAPTER VIL 
 
 Having established these particulars, we come to consider 
 next the different number of governments which there are, 
 and what they are ; and first, what are their excellences, 
 for when we have determined this, their defects will be 
 evident enough. 
 
 It is evident that every form of government or administra- 
 
CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 93 
 
 tion, for the words are of the same import, must contain a 
 supreme power over the whole State, and this supreme 
 "power must necessarily be in the hands of one person, or a 
 few, or many ; and when either of these apply their power 
 for the common good, such States are well governed, but 
 when the interest of the one, the few, or the many, who 
 enjoy this power, is alone consulted, then ill ; for you must 
 either affirm that those who make up the community are not 
 citizens, or else let these share in the advantages of govern- 
 ment. We usually call a State which is governed by one 
 person for the common good a kingdom ; one that is 
 governed by more than one, but by a few only, an aristo- )\ 
 cracy; either because the government is in the hands of the 
 most worthy citizens, or because it is the best form for the 
 city and its inhabitants. When the citizens at large govern 
 for the public good, it is called a State, which is also a 
 common name for all other governments, and these distinc- 
 tions are consonant to reason ; for it will not be difficult to 
 find one person, or a very few, of very distinguished abilities, 
 but almost impossible to meet with the majority of a people 
 eminent for every virtue ; but if there is one common to a 
 whole nation it is valour j for this is created and supported 
 by numbers : for which reason in such a State the posses- 
 sion of arms will always have the greatest share in the 
 government. Now the corruptions attending each of these 
 governments are these : a kingdom may degenerate into a 
 tyranny, an aristocracy into an oligarchy, and a State into a 
 democracy. Now a tyranny is a monarchy where the good 
 of one man only is the object of government, an oligarchy 
 considers only the rich, and a democracy only the poor; 
 but neither of them have a common good in view. 
 
94 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book hi. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 It will be necessary to enlarge a little more upon the nature 
 of each of these States, which is not without some difficulty 
 for he who would enter into a philosophical inquiry into the 
 principles of them, and not content himself with a super- 
 ficial view of their outward conduct, must pass over and 
 omit nothing, but explain the true spirit of each of them. A 
 tyranny then is, as has been said, a monarchy, where one 
 person has an absolute and despotic power over the whole 
 community and every member therein ; an oligarchy, where 
 the supreme power of the State is lodged with the rich ; a 
 democracy, on the contrary, is where those have it who are 
 worth little or nothing. But the first difficulty that arises 
 from the distinctions which we have laid down is this — should 
 it happen that the majority of the inhabitants who possess 
 the power of the State (for this is a democracy) should be 
 rich, the question is, how does this agree with what we have 
 said ? The same difficulty occurs, should it ever happen that 
 the poor compose a smaller part of the people than the rich, 
 but from their superior abilities acquire the supreme power ; 
 for this is what they call an oligarchy; it should seem then 
 that our definition of the different States was not correct ; 
 nay, moreover, could any one suppose that the majority of 
 the people were poor, and the minority rich, and then 
 describe the State in this manner, that an oligarchy w'as a 
 government in which the rich, being few in number, 
 possessed the supreme power, and that a democracy was a 
 State in which the poor, being many in number, possessed 
 it, still there will be another difficulty, for what name shall 
 we give to those States we have been describing? I mean, 
 that in which the greater number are rich, and that in which 
 the lesser number are poor (where each of these possess the 
 supreme power). If there are no other States than those we 
 
CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 95 
 
 have described, it seems therefore evident to reason, that 
 whether the supreme power is vested in the hands of many 
 or few may be a matter of accident, but that it is clear 
 enough that when it is in the hands of the few it will be a 
 government of the rich, when in the hands of the many it will 
 be a government of the poor ; since in all countries there 
 are many poor and few rich ; it is not therefore the cause 
 that has been already assigned (namely, the number of people 
 in power) that makes the difference between the two govern- 
 ments, but an oligarchy and democracy differ in this from 
 each other in the poverty of those who govern in the one, 
 and the riches of those who govern in the other ; for when 
 the government is in the hands of the rich, be they few or be 
 they more, it is an oligarchy, when it is in the hands of the 
 poor, it is a democracy ; but, as we have already said, the 
 one will be always few, the other numerous, but both will 
 enjoy liberty, from whence will arise continual disputes with 
 each other for the lead in public affairs. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Let us first determine what are the proper limits of an 
 oligarchy and a democracy, and what is just in each of these 
 States, for all men have some natural inclination to justice, 
 but they proceed therein only to a certain degree, nor can they 
 universally point out what is absolutely just ; as, for instance, 
 what is equal appears just, and is so ; but not to all, only among 
 those who are equals, and what is unequal appears just, and is 
 so, but not to all, only amongst those who are unequals; which 
 circumstance some people neglect, and therefore judge ill, the 
 reason for which is they judge for themselves, and every one 
 
96 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book in. 
 
 almost is the worst judge in his own cause. Since then 
 justice has reference to persons, the same distinctions must 
 be made with respect to persons which are made with 
 respect to things, in the manner that I have already 
 described in my Ethics. As to the equality of the things, 
 these they agree in ; but their dispute is concerning the 
 equality of the persons, and chiefly for the reason above 
 assigned, because they judge ill in their own cause, and also 
 because each party thinks that if they admit what is right in 
 some particulars they have done justice on the whole; thus, 
 for instance, if some persons are unequal in riches they 
 suppose them unequal in the whole, or, on the contrary, if 
 they are equal in liberty, they suppose them equal in the 
 whole; but what is absolutely just they omit, for if civil 
 society was founded for the sake of preserving and increas- 
 ing property, every one's right in the city would be equal to 
 his fortune, and then the reasoning of those who msist upon 
 an oligarchy would be valid, for it would not be right that 
 he who contributed one mina should have an equal share in 
 the hundred along with him who brought in all the rest, 
 either of the original money or what was afterwards acquired. 
 Nor was civil society founded merely to preserve the lives 
 of its members, but that they might live well ; for otherwise 
 a State might be composed of slaves or the animal creation ; 
 but this is not so, for these have no share in the happiness 
 of it, nor do they live after their own choice, nor is it an 
 alliance mutually to defend each other from injuries or for a 
 commercial intercourse ; for then the Tyrrhenians, and 
 Carthaginians, and all other nations between whom treaties 
 of commerce subsist, would be citizens of one city, for they 
 have articles to regulate their exports and imports, and 
 engagements for mutual protection and alliances for mutual 
 defence ; but yet they have not all the same magistrates 
 established among them, but they are different among the 
 different people ; nor does the one take any care that the 
 morals of the other should be as they ought, or that none of 
 
CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 97 
 
 those who have entered into the common agreements should 
 be unjust or in any degree vicious, only that they do not 
 injure any member of the confederacy. But whosoever 
 endeavours to estabUsh wholesome laws in a State attends to 
 the virtues and the vices of each individual who composes 
 it, from whence it is evident that the first care of him who 
 would found a city truly deserving that name and not 
 nominally so, must be to have his citizens virtuous, for 
 otherwise it is merely an alliance for self-defence, differing 
 from those of the same caste which are made between 
 different people only in place, for law is an agreement and 
 a pledge, as the sophist Lycophron says, between the citizens 
 of their intending to do justice to each other, though not 
 sufficient to make all the citizens just and good ; and that 
 this is fact is evident, for could any one bring different places 
 together, as, for instance, enclose Megara and Corinth in a 
 wall, yet they would not be one city, not even if the inhabit- 
 ants intermarried with each other, though this inter-commu- 
 nity contributes much to make a place one city. Besides, 
 could we suppose a set of people to live separate from each 
 other, but within such a distance as would admit of an inter- 
 course, and that there were laws subsisting between each party 
 to prevent their injuring one another in their mutual dealings, 
 supposing one a carpenter, another a husbandman shoe- 
 maker, and the like, and that their numbers were ten 
 thousand, still all that they w^ould have together in common 
 would be a tariff for trade or an alliance for mutual defence, 
 but not the same city. And why? Not because their 
 mutual intercourse is not near enough, for even if persons so 
 situated should come to one place and every one should live 
 n his own house as in his native city, and there should be 
 dliances subsisting between each party to mutually assist 
 md prevent any injury being done to the other, still they 
 vould not be admitted to be a city by those who think 
 :orrectly, if they preserved the same customs when they 
 [were together as when they w^ere separate. It is evident, 
 
c,8 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iii. 
 
 then, that a city is not a community of place, nor established 
 for the sake of mutual safety or traffic with each other, but 
 that these things are the necessary consequences of a city, 
 although they may all exist where there is no city; but a 
 city is a society of people joining together with thejr families 
 and their children to live agreeably for the sake of havmg 
 their lives as happy and as independent as possible ; )and for 
 this purpose it is necessary that they should live in one 
 place and intermarry with each other; hence in all cities 
 there are family meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and pubUc enter- 
 tainments to promote friendship, for a love of sociability is 
 friendship itself ; so that the end then for which a city is 
 estabUshed is that the inhabitants of it may live happy, and 
 these things are conducive to that end; for it is a com- 
 munity of families and villages, for the sake of a perfect 
 independent life— that is, as we have already said, for the 
 sake of living'well and happily. It is not therefore founded 
 for the purpose of men merely living together, but for 
 their living as men ought; for which reason those who 
 contribute most to this end deserve to have greater power 
 in the city than those who are their equals in family and 
 freedom, but their inferiors in civil virtue, or those who 
 excel them in wealth, but are below them in worth. It is 
 evident from what has been said that in all disputes upon 
 government each party says something that is just. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 It may also be a doubt where the supreme power ought to 
 be lodged. Shall it be with the majority, or the wealthy, 
 with a number of proper persons, or one better than the 
 rest, or with a tyrant ? But whichever of these we prefer 
 
CHAP. X.] Aristotle on government 
 
 99 
 
 some difficulty will arise. For what ? Shall the poor have it, 
 because they are the majority? They may then divide 
 among themselves what belongs to the rich. Nor is this 
 unjust ; because truly it has been so judged by the supreme 
 power. But what avails it to point out what is the height 
 of injustice, if this is not ? Again, if the many seize into 
 their own hands everything which belongs to the few^ it is 
 evident that the city will be at an end. But virtue will 
 never destroy what is virtuous, nor can what is right be 
 the ruin of the State : therefore, such a law can never be 
 right, nor can the acts of a tyrant ever be wrong, for of 
 necessity they must all be just; for he, from his unlimited 
 power, compels every one to obey his command, as the 
 multitude oppress the rich. Is it right, then, that the rich, 
 the few, should have the supreme power ? And what if they 
 be guilty of the same rapine, and plunder the possessions of 
 the majority, that will be as right as the other; but that all 
 things of this sort are wrong and unjust is evident. Well, 
 then, these of the better sort shall have it. But must not 
 then all the other citizens live unhonoured, without sharing 
 the offices of the city; for the offices of a city are its 
 honours, and, if one set of men are always in power, it 
 is evident that the rest must be without honour. Well, 
 then, let it be with one person, of all others the fittest for 
 it. But by this means the power will be still more con- 
 tracted, and a greater number than before continue un- 
 honoured. But some one may say that it is wrong to let 
 man have the supreme power and not the law, as his soul is 
 subject to so many passions. But if this law appoints an 
 aristocracy, or a democracy, how will it help us in our 
 present doubts ? For those things will happen which we 
 have already mentioned. 
 
 D 2 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iiL 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Other particulars we will consider separately ; but it seems 
 proper to prove that the supreme power ought to be lodged 
 with the many, rather than with those of the better sort, 
 who are few; and also to explain what doubts (and pro- 
 bably just ones) may arise : now, though not one individual 
 of the many may himself be fit for the supreme power, yet 
 when these many are joined together it does not follow but 
 they may be better qualified for it Than those, and this not 
 separately, but as a collective body, as the public suppers 
 exceed those which are given at one person's private 
 expense, for, as they are many, each person brings in his 
 share of virtue and wisdom, and, thus coming together, 
 they are like one man made up of a multitude, with many 
 feet, many hands, and many intelligences. Thus is it v/ith 
 respect to the manners and understandings of the multi- 
 tude taken together; for which reason the public are the 
 best judges of music and poetry, for some understand one 
 part, some another, and all collectively the whole ; and in 
 this particular men of consequence differ from each of the 
 many, as they say those who are beautiful do from those 
 who are not so, and as fine pictures excel any natural 
 objects, by collecting the several beautiful parts which were 
 dispersed among different originals into one, although the 
 separate parts, as the eye or any other, might be handsomer 
 than in the picture. But if this distinction is to be made ' 
 between every people and every general assembly, and 
 some few men of consequence, it may be doubtful whether 
 it is true ; nay, it is clear enough that, with respect to a few, 
 it is not, since the same conclusion might be applied even 
 to brutes : and, indeed, wherein do some men differ from 
 brutes? Not but that nothing prevents what I have said 
 being true of the people in some States. The doubt, then, 
 
CHAP. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, loi 
 
 which we have lately proposed, with all its consequences, 
 may be settled in this manner : it is necessary that the 
 freemen who compose the bulk of the people should have 
 absolute power in some things ; but, as they are neither 
 men of property, nor act uniformly upon principles of virtue, 
 it is not safe to trust them with the first offices in the State, 
 both on account of their iniquity and their ignorance ; from 
 the one of which they will do what is wrong, from the other 
 they will mistake ; and yet it is dangerous to allow them no 
 power or share in the government, for when there are many 
 ^oor people who are incapable of acquiring the honours 
 of their country, the State must necessarily have many 
 enemies in it : let them then be permitted to vote in the 
 public assemblies and to determine causes, for which 
 reason Socrates and some other legislators gave them 
 the power of electing the officers of the State, and also 
 of inquiring into their conduct when they came out of 
 office, and only prevented their being magistrates by them- 
 selves ; for the multitude, when they are collected together, 
 have all of them sufficient understanding for these purposes, 
 and, mixing among those of higher rank, are serviceable 
 to the city, as some things, which alone are improper 
 for food, when mixed with others make the whole more 
 wholesome than a few of them would be. But there is a 
 difficulty attending this form of government, for it seems 
 that the person who himself was capable of curing any one 
 who was then sick must be the best judge who to employ 
 as a physician ; but such a one must be himself a physician, 
 and the same holds true in every other practice and art ; and 
 as a physician ought to give an account of his practice to a 
 physician, so ought it to be in other arts. Those whose busi- 
 ness is physic n:iay be divided into three sorts : the first of 
 these is he who makes up the medicines ; the second pre- 
 scribes, and is to the other as the architect is to the mason ; 
 the third is he who understands the science, but never 
 practises it. Now these three distinctions may be found 
 
102 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book ill. 
 
 in those who understand all other arts ; nor have we less 
 opinion of their judgment who are only instructed in the 
 principles of the art than of those who practise it ; and, with 
 respect to elections, the same method of proceeding seems 
 right, for to elect a proper person in any science is the 
 business of those who are skilful therein — as in geometry, 
 of geometricians ; in steering, of steersmen ; but if some 
 individuals should know something of particular arts and 
 works, they do not know more than the professors of them, 
 so that even upon this principle neither the election of 
 magistrates nor the censure of their conduct should be 
 entrusted to the many. But probably all that has been 
 here said may not be right ; for, to resume the argument I 
 lately used, if the people are not very brutal indeed, although 
 we allow that each individual knows less of these affairs than 
 those who have given particular attention to them, yet when 
 they come together they will know them better, or at least 
 not worse. Besides, in some particular arts it is not the 
 workman only who is the best judge — namely, in those the 
 works of which are understood by those who do not profess 
 them. Thus he who builds a house is not the only judge of 
 it, for the master of the family who inhabits it is a better ; 
 thus, also, a steersman is a better judge of a tiller than he 
 who made it, and he who gives an entertainment than the 
 cook. What has been said seems a sufficient solution of 
 this difficulty ; but there is another that follows, for it seems 
 absurd that the power of the State should be lodged with 
 those who are but of indifferent morals, instead of those who 
 are of excellent characters. Now the power of election and 
 censure are of the utmost consequence, and this, as has 
 been said, in some States they entrust to the people ; 
 for the general assembly is the supreme court of all, and 
 they have a voice in this, and deliberate in all public affairs 
 and try all causes, without any objection to the meanness of 
 their circumstances, and at any age ; but their questors, 
 generals, and other great officers of State are taken from 
 
CHAR XII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 
 
 men of great fortune and worth. This difficulty also may 
 be solved upon the same principle ; and here, too, they may 
 be right, for the power is not in the man who is member of 
 the assembly or council, but the assembly itself, and the 
 council, and the people, of which each individual of the 
 whole community are the parts — I mean as senator, adviser, 
 or judge ; for which reason it is very right that the many 
 should have the greatest powers in their own hands ; for the 
 people, the council, and the judges are composed of them, 
 and the property of all these collectively is more than the 
 property of any person, or a few who fill the great offices of 
 the Slate ; and thus I determine these points. 
 
 The first question that we stated shows plainly that the 
 supreme power should be lodged in laws duly made, and 
 that the magistrate or magistrates, either one or more, 
 should be authorized to determine those cases which the 
 laws cannot particularly speak to, as it is impossible for 
 them, in general language, to explain themselves upon every- 
 thing that may arise ; but what these laws are, which are 
 established upon the best foundations, has not been yet 
 explained, but still remains a matter of some question ; but 
 the laws of every State will necessarily be like every State, 
 either trifling or excellent, just or unjust ; for it is evident 
 that the laws must be framed correspondent to the consti- 
 tution of the government, and, if so, it is plain that a well- 
 formed government will have good laws, a bad one bad 
 ones. 
 
 CHAPTER XIL 
 
 Since in every art and science the end aimed at is always 
 good, so particularly in this, which is the most excellent of 
 all, the founding of civil society, the good wherein aimed at 
 
104 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book hi. 
 
 is justice ; for it is this which is for the benefit of all. Now, 
 it is the common opinion that justice is a certain equality; 
 and in this point all the philosophers are agreed when they 
 treat of morals, for they say what is just and to whom, 
 and that equals ought to receive equal; but we should know 
 how we are to determine, what things are equal and what 
 unequal, and in this there is some difficulty, which calls for 
 the philosophy of the politician. Some persons will pro- 
 bably say that the employments of the State ought to be 
 given according to every particular excellence of each 
 citizen, if there is no other difference between them and the 
 rest of the community, but they are in every respect else 
 alike : for justice attributes different things to persons 
 differing from each other in their character, according to 
 their respective merits. But if this is admitted to be 
 true, complexion, or height, or any such advantage will be a 
 claim for a greater share of the public rights. But that this 
 is evidently absurd is clear from other arts and sciences ; 
 for, with respect to musicians, who play on the flute together, 
 the best flute is not given to him who is of the best family, 
 for he will play never the better for that, but the best instru- 
 ment ought to be given to him v/ho is the best artist. If 
 what is now said does not make this clear, we will explain it 
 still further : if there should be any one, a very excellent 
 player on the flute, but very deficient in family and beauty, 
 though each of them are more valuable endowments than a 
 skill in music, and excel this art in a higher degree than 
 that player excels others, yet the best flutes ought to be 
 given to him ; for the superiority in beauty and fortune 
 should have a reference to the business in hand ; but these 
 have none. Moreover, according to this reasoning, every 
 possible excellence might come in comparison with every 
 other; for if bodily strength might dispute the point widi 
 riches or Hberty, even any bodily strength might do it ; so 
 that if one person excelled in size more than another did in 
 virtue, and his size was to qualify him to take place of the 
 
CHAP. XIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 105 
 
 other's virtue, everything must then admit of a comparison 
 with each other; for if such a size is greater than virtue by 
 so much, It IS evident another must be equal to it • but 
 since this is impossible, it is plain that it would be contrary 
 to common sense to dispute a right to any office in the 
 State from every superiority whatsoever ; for if one person 
 IS slow, and the other swift, neither is the one better quali- 
 fied nor the other worse on that account, though in the 
 gymnastic races a difference in these particulars would gain 
 the prize; but. a pretension to the offices of the State should 
 be._faunded on a superiority in those qualifications which 
 aiOsefuLto it; for which reason those of family, indepen- 
 dency, and fortune, with great propriety, contend with "each 
 otHer for them; for these are the fit persons to fill them, 
 for a city can no more consist of all poor men than it can 
 of all slaves. But if such persons are requisite, it is evident 
 that those also who are just and valiant are equally so • for 
 without justice and valour no State can be supported^ the 
 former being necessary for its existence, the latter for its 
 happiness. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 It seems, then, requisite for the establishment of a State, that 
 all, or at least many, of these particulars should be well 
 canvassed and inquired into, and that virtue and education 
 may most justly claim the right of being considered as the 
 necessary means of making the citizens happy, as we have 
 already said. As those who are equal in one particular are 
 not therefore equal in all, and those who are unequal in one 
 particular are not therefore unequal in all, it follows that all 
 those governments which are established upon a principle 
 
io6 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iii. 
 
 which supposes they are, are erroneous. We have already 
 said that all the members of the community will dispute with 
 each other for the offices of the State, and in some particulars 
 justly but not so in general ; the rich, for instance, because 
 they have the greatest landed property, and the ultimate 
 right to the soil is vested in the community, and also 
 because their fidelity is in general most to be depended on. 
 The freeman and men of family will dispute the point witli 
 each other as nearly on an equality ; for these latter have a 
 right to a higher regard as citizens than obscure persons, 
 for honourable descent is everywhere of great esteem; nor 
 is it an improper conclusion, that the descendants of men of 
 worth will be men of worth themselves, for noble birth is the 
 fountain of virtue to men of family; for the same reason 
 also we justly say that virtue has a right to put in her pre- 
 tensions. Justice, for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary 
 to society that all others must yield her the precedence. 
 Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side 
 against the few ; and they may say that if, when collectively 
 taken, they are compared with them they are stronger, 
 richer, and better than they are. But should it ever happen 
 that all these should inhabit the same city — I mean the good, 
 the rich, the noble, as well as the many, such as usually 
 make up the community — I ask, will there then be any reason 
 to dispute concerning who shall govern, or will there not ? 
 For in every community which we have mentioned there is 
 no dispute where the supreme power should be placed, for 
 as these differ from each other so do those in whom that is 
 placed ; for in one State the rich enjoy it, in others the 
 meritorious, and thus each according to their separate 
 manners. Let us, however, consider what is to be done when 
 all these happen at the same time to inhabit the same city. 
 If the virtuous should be very few in number, how then 
 shall we act ? Shall we prefer the virtuous on account of 
 their abilities, if they are capable of governing the city ? or 
 should they be so many as almost entirely to compose the 
 
CHAP. XIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 107 
 
 State? There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions 
 of all those who claim the honours of government ; for those 
 who found them either on fortune or family have nothing 
 which they can justly say in their defence, since it is evident 
 upon their principle, that if anyone person can be found richer 
 than all the rest, the right of governing all these will be 
 justly vested in this one person. In the same manner, one 
 man, who is of the best family, will claim it from those who 
 dispute the point upon family merit ; and probably in an 
 aristocracy the same dispute might arise on the score of 
 virtue, if there is one man better than all the other men of 
 worth, who are in the same community; it seems just, by the 
 same reasoning, that he should enjoy the supreme power. 
 And upon this principle also, while the many suppose they 
 ought to have the supreme command, as being more power- 
 ful than the few, if one or more than one, though a small 
 number, should be found stronger than themselves, these 
 ought rather to have it than they. All these things seem to 
 make it plain that none of these principles are justly 
 founded on which these persons would establish their right 
 to the supreme power, and that all men whatsoever ought to 
 obey them ; for with respect to those who claim it, as due to 
 their virtue or their fortune, they might have justly some 
 objection to make, for nothing hinders but that it may some- 
 times happen that the many may be better or richer than 
 the few, not as individuals, but in their collective capacity. 
 As to the doubt which some persons have proposed and 
 objected, we may answer it in this manner : it is this, 
 whether a legislator, who would establish the most perfect 
 system of laws, should calculate them for the use of the 
 better part of the citizens, or the many, in the circumstances 
 we have already mentioned ? The rectitude of anything 
 consists in its equahty ; that therefore which is equally 
 right will be advantageous to the whole State, and to every 
 member of it in common. Now, in general, a citizen is one 
 who both shares in the government, and also in his turn 
 
io8 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iii. 
 
 submits to be governed; their condition, it is true, is 
 different in different States : the best is that in which a 
 man is enabled to choose and to persevere in a course of 
 virtue during his whole life, both in his public and private 
 state. But should there be one person, or a very few, 
 eminent for an uncommon degree of virtue, though not 
 enough to make up a civil State, so that the virtue of 
 the many or their pohtical abilities should be too infe- 
 rior to come in comparison with theirs, if more than one ; 
 or if but one, with his only ; such are not to be con- 
 sidered as part of the city ; for it would be doing them 
 injustice to rate them on a level with those who are so far 
 their inferiors in virtue and political abilities that they 
 appear to them like a god amongst men. From whence it 
 is evident that a system of laws must be calculated for those 
 who are equal to each other in nature and power. Such 
 men therefore are not the object of law, for they are them- 
 selves a law ; and it would be ridiculous in any one to 
 endeavour to include them in the penalties of a law; for 
 probably they might say what Anthisthenes tells us the lions 
 did to the hares, when they demanded to be admitted to an 
 equal share with them in the government. And it is on this 
 account that democratic States have established the ostra- 
 cism ; for an equality seems the principal object of their 
 government. For which reason they compel all those who 
 are very eminent for their power, their fortune, their friend- 
 ships, or any other cause which may give them too great 
 weight in the government, to submit to the ostracism, 
 and leave the city for a stated time ; as the fabulous 
 histories relate the Argonauts served Hercules, for they 
 refused to take him with them in the ship Argo^ on account 
 of his superior valour. For which reason those who hate a 
 tyranny, and find fault with the advice which Periander 
 gave to Thrasibulus, must not think there was nothing to be 
 said in its defence ; for the story goes that Periander said 
 nothing to the messenger in answer to the business he was 
 
CHAP. XIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 consulted about, but striking off those ears of corn which 
 were higher than the rest, reduced the whole crop to a level ; 
 so that the messenger, without knowing the cause of what 
 was done, related the fact to Thrasibulus, who understood 
 by it that he must take off all the principal men in the city. 
 Nor is this serviceable to tyrants only, nor is it tyrants 
 only who do it; for the same thing is practised both in 
 oligarchies and democracies : for the ostracism has in a 
 manner nearly the same power, by restraining and banish- 
 ing those who are too great ; and what is done in one city is 
 done also by those who have the supreme power in separate 
 States ; as the Athenians with respect to the Samians, the 
 Chians, and the Lesbians ; for when they suddenly acquired 
 the superiority over all Greece, they brought the other States 
 into subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted 
 between them. The King of Persia also very often reduces 
 the Medes and Babylonians, when they assume upon their 
 former power : and this is a principle which all governments 
 whatsoever keep in their eye; even those which are best 
 administered, as well as those which are not, do it ; these 
 for the sake of private utiHty, the others for the public good. 
 The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and 
 sciences ; for a painter w^ould not represent an animal with 
 a foot disprcportionally large, though he had drawn it 
 remarkably beautiful ; nor would the shipwright make the 
 prow, or any other pait of the vessel, larger than it ought to 
 be ; nor will the master of the band permit any who sings 
 louder and better than the rest, to sing in concert with them. 
 There is therefore no reason that a monarch should not act 
 in agreement with free States to support his own power, if 
 they do the same thing for the benefit of their respective 
 communities ; upon which account, when there is any 
 acknowledged difference in the power of the citizens, the 
 reason upon which the ostracism is founded will be 
 politically just; but it is better for the legislator so to 
 establish his State at the beginning as not to want this 
 
no 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book hi. 
 
 remedy, but if in a course of time such an inconvenience 
 should arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such correc- 
 tion. Not that this was the use it was put to ; for many 
 did not regard the benefit of their respective communities, 
 but made the ostracism a weapon in the hand of sedition. 
 It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly 
 just and useful to the individual, though probably it is as 
 clear that it is not entirely just; for in a well-governed 
 State there may be great doubts about the use of it, not on 
 account of the pre-eminence which one may have in strength, 
 riches or connection ; but when the pre-eminence is virtue, 
 what then is to be done ? For it seems not right to turn out 
 and banish such a one ; neither does it seem right to govern 
 fhim, for that would be like desiring to share the power with 
 Jupiter, and to govern him : nothing then remains but what 
 j indeed seems natural, and that is, for all persons quietly to 
 i submit to the government of those who are thus eminently 
 virtuous, and let them be perpetually kings in the separate 
 States. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 After what has been now said it seems proper to change 
 our subject, and to inquire into the nature of monarchies • 
 for we have already admitted them to be one of those 
 species of government which are properly founded. And 
 here let us consider, whether a kingly government is proper 
 for a city or a country whose principal object is the happiness 
 of the inhabitants, or rather some other. But let us first 
 determine whether this is of one kind only or more ; and it 
 is easy to know that it consists of many different species, and 
 that the forms of government are not the same in all : for at 
 
CHAP. XIV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. iii 
 
 Sparta the kingly power seems chiefly regulated by the laws ; 
 for it is not supreme in all circumstances; but when the 
 king quits the territories of the State, he is their general in 
 war ; and all religious affairs are entrusted to him : indeed 
 the kingly power with them is chiefly that of a general, who 
 cannot be called to an account for his conduct, and whose 
 command is for life, for he has not the power of life and 
 death except as a general, as they frequently had in their 
 expeditions by martial law, which we learn from Homer; 
 for when Agamemnon is affronted in council, he restrains 
 his resentment, but when he is in the field and armed 
 ,with this power, he tells the Greeks : 
 
 Whoe'er I know shall shun th' impending fight, 
 To dogs, and vultures, soon shall be a prey ; 
 For death is mine. 
 
 This then is one species of monarchical government, in 
 which the kingly power is in a general for life; and is 
 sometimes hereditary, sometimes elective : besides, there is 
 also another, which is to be met with among some of the 
 barbarians, in which the kings are invested with powers 
 nearly equal to a tyranny, yet are in some respects bound 
 by the laws and the customs of their country ; for as the 
 barbarians are by nature more prone to slavery than the 
 Greeks, and those in Asia more than those in Europe, they 
 endure, without murmuring, a despotic government ; for 
 this reason their governments are tyrannies ; but yet not 
 liable to be overthrown, as being customary and according 
 to law. Their guards also are such as are used in a kingly 
 government, not a despotic one ; for the guards of their 
 kings are his citizens, but a tyrant's are foreigners. The 
 one commands, in the manner the law directs, those who 
 willingly obey ; the other, arbitrarily, those who consent not. 
 The one therefore is guarded by the citizens, the other 
 against them. These, then, are the two different sorts of 
 these monarchies, and another is that, which in ancient 
 
112 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book hi. 
 
 Greece they called ^sumnetes, which is nothing more 
 than an elective tyranny ; and its difference from that which 
 is to be found amongst the barbarians consists not in its not 
 being according to law, but only in its not being according 
 to the ancient customs of the country. Some persons 
 possessed this power for life, others only for a particular 
 time, or particular purpose, as the people of Mitylene 
 elected Pittacus to oppose the exiles, who were headed by 
 Antimenides and Alcaeas the poet, as we learn from a 
 poem of his, for he upbraids the Mitylenians for having 
 chose Pittacus for their tyrant, and with oae voice extolling 
 him to the skies who was the ruin of a rash and devoted 
 people. These sorts of government then are, and ever 
 were, despotic, on account of their being tyrannies ; but 
 inasmuch as they are elective, and over a free people, they 
 are also kingly. A fourth species of kingly government is 
 that which was in use in the heroic times, when a free people 
 submitted to a kingly government, according to the laws 
 and customs of their country. For those who were at first 
 \ of benefit to mankind, either in arts or arms, or by collect- 
 \^ng them into civil society, or procuring them an establish- 
 ri\ent, became the kings of a willing people, and established 
 an\hereditary monarchy. They were particularly their 
 geneV,als in war, and presided over their sacrifices, excepting 
 such (^nly as belonged to the priests : they were also the 
 €uprem^ judges over the people ; and in this case some of 
 them took an oath, others did not ; when they did, the form 
 of swearing Vas by their sceptre held out. In ancient times 
 the power of the kings extended to everything whatsoever, 
 both civil, domestic, and foreign; but in after-times they 
 relinquished sonte of their privileges, and others the people 
 assumed, so that, in some States, they left their kings only 
 the right of presiding over the sacrifices ; and even those 
 whom it were worth while to call by that na'me, had only 
 the right of being commander-in-chief in their foreign wars. 
 These, then, are the four sorts of kingdoms : the first is that 
 
CHAP. XV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 113 
 
 of the^ h eroic times, w hich was a govern ment over a f res 
 people, with its rights in some particu lars marked out ; for 
 the king was their general, their judge, and their higlTpriest 
 The second, that of the barbarians, which is an hereditary 
 despotic government, regulated by laws; the third is that 
 which they call JEsumnetic, which is an elective tyranny. The 
 fourth is the Lacedaemonian ; and this, in few words^ is 
 nothing more than an hereditary generalship : and in these 
 particulars they differ from each other. There is a fifth 
 species of kingly government^ which is, when one person 
 has a supreme power over all things whatsoever, in the] 
 manner that every State and every city has over those things j 
 which belong to the public ; for as the master of a family isj 
 king in his own house, so such a king is master of a famil/ 
 in his own city or State. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 But the different sorts of kingly governments may, if I may 
 so say, be reduced to two, which we will consider more 
 particularly. The last spoke of, and the Lacedaemonian, 
 for the chief of the others are placed between these, which 
 are as it were at the extremities, they having less power than 
 an absolute government, and yet more than the Lacedae- 
 monians, so that the whole matter in question may be- 
 reduced to these two points : the one is whether it is 
 advantageous to the citizens to have the office of general 
 continue in one person for life, and whether it should be 
 confined to any particular families, or whether every one 
 should be eligible ; the other, whether it is advantageous for 
 one person to have the supreme power over everything or 
 
114 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book hi. 
 
 not. But to enter into the particulars concerning the office 
 of a Lacedaemonian general would be rather to frame laws 
 for a State than to consider the nature and utihty of its 
 constitution, since we know that the appointing of a general 
 is what is done in every State. Passing over this question 
 then, we will proceed to consider the other part of their 
 government, which is the polity of the State ; and this it 
 will be necessary to examine particularly into, and to go 
 through such questions as may arise. Now the first thing 
 which presents itself to our consideration is this, whether it 
 is best to be governed by a good man or by good laws? 
 Those who prefer a kingly government think that laws can 
 only speak a general language, but cannot adapt themselves 
 to particular circumstances, for which reason it is absurd in 
 any science to follow written rule ; and even in Egypt, the 
 physician was allowed to alter the mode of cure which the 
 law prescribed to him, after the fourth day ; but if he did it 
 sooner it was at his own peril ; from whence it is evident, 
 on the very same account, that a government of written laws 
 is not the best ; and yet general reasoning is necessary to 
 all those who are to govern, and it will be much more 
 perfect in those who are entirely free from passions, than 
 in those to whom they are natural. But now this is a 
 quality which laws possess, while the other is natural to the 
 human soul. But some one will say in answer to this, that 
 man will be a better judge of particulars. It will be necessary, 
 then, for a king to be a lawgiver, and that his laws should 
 be published, but that those should have no authority which 
 are absurd, as those which are not should. But whether is 
 it better for the community that those things which cannot 
 possibly come under the cognizance of the law, either at all 
 or properly, should be under the government of every 
 worthy citizen, as the present method is, when the public 
 community, in their general assemblies^ act as judges and 
 counsellors, where all their determinations are upon particular 
 cases. For one individual, be he who he will, will be found 
 
CHAP. XV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 115 
 
 upon comparison inferior to a whole people taken collect- 
 ively ; but this is what a city is, as a public entertainment is 
 better than one man's portion ; for this reason the multitude 
 Judge of many things better than any one single person. 
 They are also less liable to corruption from their numbers, 
 as water is from its quantity : besides, the judgment of an 
 individual must necessarily be perverted, if he is overcome 
 by anger, or any other passion ; but it would be hard indeed 
 if the whole community should be misled by anger. More- 
 over, let the people be free, and they will do nothing but in 
 conformity to the law, except only in those cases which the 
 law cannot speak to. But though what I am going to propose 
 may not easily be met with, yet i-f the majority of the State 
 should happen to be good men, should they prefer one 
 uncorrupt governor, or many equally good, is it not evident 
 that they should choose the many? But there may be 
 divisions among these, which cannot happen when there 
 is but one. In answer to this it may be replied, that all 
 their souls will be as much animated with virtue as this one 
 man's. If then a government of many, and all of them good 
 men, compose an aristocracy, and the government of one a 
 kingly power, it is evident that the people should rather 
 choose the first than the last ; and this whether the State is 
 powerful or not, if many such persons so alike can be met 
 with : and for this reason probably it was that the first 
 governments were generally monarchies, because it was 
 difficult to find a number of persons eminently virtuous, 
 more particularly as the world was then divided into small 
 communities; besides, kings were appointed in return for 
 the benefits they had conferred on mankind, but such actions 
 are peculiar to good men : but when many persons equal in 
 virtue appeared at the time, they brooked not a superiority, 
 but sought after an equality, and established a free State ; 
 but after this, when they degenerated, they made a property 
 of the public, which probably gave rise to oligarchies, for 
 they made wealth meritorious, and the honours of govern. 
 
ii6 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book hi. 
 
 ment were reserved for the rich : and this was the origin of 
 tyrannies, and these in their turn gave rise to democracies ; 
 for the power of the tyrants continually decreasing on 
 account of their rapacious avarice, the people grew powerful 
 enough to frame and establish democracies ; and as cities 
 after that happened to increase, probably it was not easy for 
 them to be under any other government than a democracy. 
 But if any person prefers a kingly government in a State, 
 what is to be done with the king's children ? Is the family 
 also to reign ? But should they have such children as some 
 persons usually have, it will be very detrimental. It may be 
 said that then the king, who has it in his power, will never 
 permit such children to succeed to his kingdom. But it is 
 not easy to trust to that ; for it is very hard, and requires 
 greater virtue than is to be met with in human nature. 
 There is also a doubt concerning the power with which a 
 king should be entrusted : whether he should be allowed 
 force sufficient to compel those who do not choose to be 
 obedient to the laws, and how he is to support his 
 government ? For if he is to govern according to law, and do 
 nothing of his own will which is contrary thereunto, at the 
 same time it will be necessary to protect that power with 
 which he guards the law. This matter, however, may not be j 
 very difficult to determine ; for he ought to have a proper | 
 power, and such a one is that which will be sufficient toy 
 make the king superior to any one person, or even a large 
 part of the community, but inferior to the whole, as the ' 
 ancients always appointed guards for that person whom they 
 created ^sumnetes or Tyrant; and some one advised the 
 Syracusians, when Dionysius asked for guards, to allow 
 him such. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 • We will next consider the absolute monarch that we have 
 just mentioned, who does everything according to his own 
 will ; for a king governing under the direction of laws, which 
 he is obliged to follow, does not of himself create any parti- 
 cular species of government, as we have already said ; for in 
 every State whatsoever, either aristocracy or democracy, it is 
 easy to appoint a general for life ; and there are many who 
 entrust the administration of affairs to one person only ; 
 such is the government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the same 
 at Oponte. As for an absolute monarchy, as it is called, that 
 is to say, when the whole State is wholly subject to the will 
 of one person, namely, the king, it seems to many that it is 
 unnatural that one man should have the entire rule over his 
 fellow-citizens, when the State consists of equals ; for Nature 
 requires that the same right, and the same rank, should 
 necessarily take place amongst all those who are equal by 
 Nature ; for as it would be hurtful to the body for those who 
 are of different constitutions to observe the same regimen, 
 either of diet or clothing, so is it, with respect to the honours 
 of the State, as hurtful that those who are equal in merit 
 should be unequal in rank ; for which reason it is as much a 
 man's duty to submit to command as to assume it, and this 
 also by rotation ; for this is law, for order is law ; and it is 
 more proper that law should govern than any one of the 
 citizens ; upon the same principle, if it is advantageous to 
 place the supreme power in some particular persons, they 
 should be appointed to be only guardians and the servants 
 of the laws, for the supreme power must be placed some- 
 where ; but they say that it is unjust that where all are equal 
 one person should continually enjoy it. But it seems 
 unlikely that man should be able to adjust that which the 
 law cannot determine ; it may be replied, that the law 
 
Ii8 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book hi. 
 
 having laid down the best rules possible, leaves the adjust- 
 ment and application of particulars to the discretion of the 
 magistrate ; besides, it allows anything to be altered, which 
 experience proves may be better estabHshed. Moreover, he 
 who would place the supreme power in mind, would place it 
 in God and the laws ; but he who entrusts man with it, 
 gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes 
 make him ; for passion influences those who are in power, 
 even the very best of men ; for which reason, mind is law, 
 without desire. The instance taken from the arts seems 
 fallacious ; wherein it is said to be wrong for a sick person 
 to apply for a remedy to books, but that it would be far 
 more eligible to employ those who are skilful in physic ; for 
 these are not biassed by any passion with respect to their 
 patient to act contrary to the principles of their art, but 
 when the cure is performed receive a pecuniary recompense ; 
 whereas those who have the management of public affairs do 
 many things through hatred or favour. And, as a proof 
 of what we have advanced, it may be observed, that when- 
 ever a sick person suspects that his physician has been 
 persuaded by his enemies to be guilty of any foul practice 
 to him in his profession, he then rather chooses to apply to 
 books for his cure : and not only this, but even physicians 
 themselves when they are ill call in other physicians ; and 
 those v/ho teach others the gymnastic exercises, exercise 
 with those of the same profession, as being incapable from 
 self-partiality to form a proper judgment of what concerns 
 themselves. From whence it is evident that those who 
 seek for what is just, seek for a medium ; now law is a 
 medium. Moreover, the moral law is far superior and con- 
 versant with far superior objects than the written law; for 
 the supreme magistrate is safer to be trusted to than the 
 one^ though he is inferior to the other. But as it is 
 impossible that one person should have an eye to everything 
 himself, it will be necessary that the supreme magistrate 
 should employ several subordinate ones under him; why 
 
CHAF. XVI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 119 
 
 then should not this be done at first, instead of appointing 
 one person in this manner ? Besides if, according to what 
 has been already said, the man of worth is on that account 
 fit to govern, two men of worth are certainly better than 
 one ; as, for instance, in Homer, " Let two together go ; and 
 also Agamemnon's wish : " Were ten such faithful counsel 
 mine ! Not but that there are even now some particular 
 magistrates invested with supreme power to decide, as 
 judges, those things which the law cannot, as being one of 
 those cases which comes not properly under its jurisdiction \ 
 for of those which can there is no doubt; since then laws 
 comprehend some things, but not all, it is necessary to 
 inquire and consider which of the two is preferable, that 
 the best man or the best law should govern ; for to reduce 
 every subject which can come under the deliberation of 
 man into a law is impossible. No one then denies that it 
 is necessary that there should be some person to decide 
 those cases which cannot come under the cognizance of a 
 written law ; but we say that it is better to have many than 
 one; for though every one who decides according to the 
 principles of the law decides justly, yet surely it seems 
 absurd to suppose that one person can see better with two 
 eyes, and hear better with two ears, or do better with two 
 hands and two feet, than many can do with many : for we 
 see that absolute monarchs now furnish themselves with 
 many eyes, and ears, and hands, and feet ; for they entrust 
 those who are friends to them and their government with 
 part of their power; for if they are not friends to the 
 monarch, they will not do what he chooses ; but if they are 
 friends to him, they are friends also to his government ; but 
 a friend is an equal, and like his friend ; if then he thinks 
 that such should govern, he thinks that his equal also should 
 govern. These are nearly the objections which are usually 
 made to a kingly power. 
 
120 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book III. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 Trobably what we have said may be true of some persons, 
 but not of others ; for some men are by nature formed to be 
 under the government of a master, others of a king, others 
 to be the citizens of a free State, just and useful; but a 
 tyranny is not according to Nature, nor the excesses of any 
 other government whatsoever, for they are contrary to it. 
 But it is evident from what ha^ been said, that among equals 
 it is neither advantageous nor right that one person should 
 be lord over all, where there are no established laws, but 
 where his will is the law, or where there are ; nor is it right 
 that one who is good should have it over those who are 
 good; or one who is not good, over those who are not 
 good ; nor one who is superior to the rest in worth, except 
 in a particular manner, which shall be described^ though 
 indeed it has been already mentioned. But let us next 
 determine what people are best qualified for a kingly 
 government, what for an aristocratic, and what for a demo- 
 cratic. And, first, for a kingly; and it should be those who 
 are accustomed by nature to submit the civil governm.ent of 
 themselves to a family eminent for virtue ; for an aristocracy, 
 those who are naturally framed to bear the rule of freemen, 
 whose superior virtue makes them worthy of the mjanage- 
 ment of others : for a free State, a warlike people, formed by 
 Nature both to govern and be governed by laws, which 
 admit the poorest citizen to share the honours of the 
 commonwealth according to his worth. But whenever a 
 whole family, or any one of another, shall happen so far to 
 Gxcel in virtue as to exceed all other persons in the com- 
 munity, then it is right that the kingly power should be in 
 them, or if it is an individual who does so, that he should 
 be king and lord of all; for this, as we have just mentioned, 
 is not only correspondent to that principle of right, v/hich 
 
CHAP. XVII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 121 
 
 all founders of all States, whether aristocracies, oligarchies, 
 or democracies, have a regard to (for in placing the supreme 
 power they all think it right to fix it to excellence, though 
 not the same), but it is also agreeable to what has been 
 already said ; as it would not be right to kill, or banish, or 
 ostracize such a one for his superior merit. Nor would it 
 be proper to let him have the supreme power only in turn, 
 for it is contrary to Nature that what is highest should ever 
 be lowest ; but this would be the case should such a one 
 ever be governed by others. So that there can nothing else 
 be done but to submit, and permit him continually to enjoy 
 the supreme power. And thus much with respect to kingly 
 power in different States, and whether it is or is not 
 advantageous to them, and to what, and in what manner. 
 Since, then, we have said that there are three sorts of regular 
 governments, and of these the best must necessarily be that 
 which is administered by the best men (and this must be 
 that which happens to have one man, or one family, or a 
 number of persons, excelling all the rest in virtue, who are 
 able to govern and be governed in such a manner as will 
 make life most agreeable, and we have already shown that 
 the virtue of a good man and of a citizen in the most perfect 
 government will be the same), it is evident that in the same 
 manner, and for those very qualities which would procure a 
 man the character of good, any one would say that the 
 government of a State was a well established aristocracy, or 
 kingdom ; so that it will be found to be education and 
 morals that are almost the whole which go to make a good 
 man, and the same qualities will make a good citizen or 
 good king. 
 
 These particulars being treated of, we will now proceed 
 to consider what sort of government is best, how it naturally 
 arises, and how it is established ; for it is necessary to make 
 a proper inquiry concerning this. 
 
BooJi IV. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 In every art and science which is not conversant in parts, but 
 in some one genus in which it is complete, it is the business 
 of that art alone to determine what is fitted to its particular 
 genus ; as what particular exercise is fitted to a certain par- 
 ticular body, and suits it best : for that body which is formed 
 by Nature the most perfect and superior to others, neces- 
 sarily requires the best exercise, and also of what one kind 
 that must be which will suit the generality ; and this is the 
 business of the gymnastic arts : and although any one should 
 not desire to acquire an exact knowledge and skill in these 
 exercises, yet it is not, on that account, the less necessary 
 that he who professes to be a master and instruct the youth 
 in them should be perfect therein : and we see that this is 
 what equally befalls the healing, ship-building, cloth-making, 
 and indeed all other arts; so that it evidently belongs to 
 the same art to find out what kind of government is best, 
 and would of all others be most correspondent to our wish, 
 while it received no molestation from without, and what 
 particular species of it is adapted to particular persons ; for 
 there are many who probably are incapable of enjoying the 
 best form, so that the legislator, and he who is truly a poli- 
 tician, ought to be acquainted, not only with that which is 
 most perfect imaginable, but also that which is the best 
 suited to any given circumstances. There is, moreover, a 
 
CHAP. I.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 123 
 
 third sort, an imaginary one, and he ought, if such a one 
 should be presented to his consideration, to be able to 
 discern what sort of one it would be at the beginning : and, 
 when once estabHshed, what would be the proper means to 
 preserve it a long time. I mean, for instance, if a State 
 should happen not to have the best form of government, or 
 be deficient in what was necessary, or not receive every 
 advantage possible, but something less. And, besides all 
 this, it is necessary to know what sort of government is best 
 fitting for all cities ; for most of those writers who have 
 treated this subject, however speciously they may handle 
 other parts of it, have failed in describing the practical parts : 
 for it is not enough to be able to perceive what is best, 
 without it is what can be put in practice. It should also be 
 simple, and easy for all to attain to. But, contrary to this, 
 they invent only the most subtle forms of government, 
 which are very complicated in their part. Others again, 
 choosing rather to treat of what is common, cen-sure those 
 which now exist, and extol the excellence of a particular 
 State, as the Lacedaemonian, or some other ; but every legis- 
 lator ought to establish such a form of government as from 
 the present state and disposition of the people who are to 
 receive it, they will most readily submit to, and persuade 
 the community to partake of ; for it is not a business of less 
 trouble to correct the mistakes of an established govern- 
 ment than to form a new one, as it is as difficult to recover 
 what we have forgot as .to learn anything afresh. He, there- 
 fore, who aspires to the character of a legislator ought, 
 besides all we have already said, to be able to correct the 
 mistakes of government already established, as we have 
 before mentioned. But this is im.possible to be done by 
 him who does not know how many different forms of govern- 
 ment there are ; some persons think that there is only one 
 species both of democracy and oligarchy, but this is not 
 true : so that no one should be unacquainted with the 
 difference of these governments, how great they are, and 
 
124 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book IV. 
 
 whence they arise ; and should have equal knowledge to 
 perceive what laws are best, and what are most suitable to 
 each particular government ; for all laws are and ought to 
 be framed agreeable to the State that is to be governed by 
 them, and not the State to the laws ; for government is a 
 certain ordering in a State, which particularly respects the 
 magistrates in what manner they shall be regulated, and 
 where the supreme power shall be placed, and what shall 
 be the final object which each community shall have in view ; 
 but the laws are something different from what regulates and 
 expresses the form of the constitution : it is their office to 
 direct the conduct of the magistrate in the execution of his 
 office and the punishment of offenders. From whence it is 
 evident that the founders of laws should attend both to the 
 number and the different sorts of government ; for it is 
 impossible that the same laws should be calculated for all 
 sorts of oligarchies and all sorts of democracies, for of both 
 these governments there are many species, not one only. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Since, then, according to our first method in treating of the 
 different forms of government, we have divided those which 
 are regular into three sorts, the kingly, the aristocratical, the 
 free States, and shown the three excesses which these are 
 liable to. The kingly, of becoming tyrannical j the aristo- 
 cratical, oligarchical ; and the free State, democratical ; and 
 as we have already treated of the aristocratical and kingly; 
 for to enter into an inquiry what sort of government is best 
 is the same thing as to treat of these two expressly; for 
 each of them desires to be established upon the principles 
 
CHAP. II.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 125 
 
 of virtue; and as moreover we have already determined 
 wherein a kingly power and an aristocracy differ from each 
 other, and when a State may be said to be governed by a 
 king, it now remains that we examine into a free State, and 
 also these other governments, an oligarchy, a democracy, 
 and a tyranny; and it is evident of these three excesses 
 which must be the worst of all, and which next to it; for of 
 course the excesses of the best and most holy must be 
 the worst; for it must necessarily happen either that the 
 name of king only will remain, or else that the king will 
 assume more power than belongs to him, from whence tyranny 
 will arise, the worst excess imaginable, a government the 
 most contrary possible to a free State. The excess next 
 hurtful is an oligarchy ; for an aristocracy differs much from 
 this sort of government : that which is least so is a demo- 
 cracy. This subject has been already treated of by one of 
 those writers who have gone before me, though his senti- 
 ments are not the same as mine ; for he thought that of all 
 excellent constitutions, as a good oHgarchy, or the like, a 
 democracy was the worst, but of all bad ones the best. 
 Now I affirm, that all these States have, without exception, 
 fallen into excess; and also that he should not have said 
 that one oligarchy was better than another, but that it was 
 not quite so bad. But this question we shall not enter into 
 at present. We shall first inquire how many different sorts 
 of free States there are, since there are many species of 
 democracies and oligarchies ; and which of them is the 
 most comprehensive, and most desirable after the best form 
 of government : or if there is any other, like an aristocracy, 
 well established ; and also which of these is best adapted to 
 most cities, and which of them is preferable for particular 
 persons ; for, probably, some may suit better with an 
 oligarchy than a democracy, and others better with a 
 democracy than an oligarchy ; and afterwards in what 
 manner any one ought to proceed who desires to establish 
 either of these States — I mean every species of democracy, 
 
126 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book iv. 
 
 and also of oligarchy. And, to conclude, when we shall 
 have briefly gone through everything that is necessary, we 
 will endeavour to point out the sources of corruption, and 
 stability, in government, as well those which are common to 
 all as those which are peculiar to each State, and from what 
 causes they chiefly arise. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The reason for there being many different sorts of 
 governments is this, that each State consists of a great 
 number of parts ; for, in the first place, we see that all 
 cities are made up of families : and, again, of the multitude 
 of these some must be rich, some poor, and others in the 
 middle station ; and that, both of the rich and poor, some 
 will be used to arms, others not. We see also that some 
 of the common people are husbandmen, others attend the 
 market, and others are artificers. There is also a difference 
 between the nobles in their wealth, and the dignity in which 
 they live ; for instance, in the number of horses they breed, 
 for this cannot be supported without a large fortune ; for 
 which reason, in former times, those cities whose strength 
 consisted in horse, became by fbat means oligarchies ; and 
 they used horse in their expeditions against the neighbour- 
 ing cities ; as the Eretrians, the Chalcidians, the Magnetians, 
 who lived near the river Meander, and many others in Asia. 
 Moreover, besides the difference of fortune, there is that 
 which arises from family and merit; or, if there are any 
 other distinctions which make part of the city, they have 
 been already mentioned in treating of an aristocracy, for 
 there we considered how many parts each city must neces- 
 sarily be composed of ; and sometimes each of these have a 
 
CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 127 
 
 share in the government, sometimes a few, sometimes more. 
 It is evident, then, that there must be many forms of 
 government, differing from each other in their particular 
 constitution ; for the parts of which they are composed, each 
 differ from the other. For government is the ordering of 
 the magistracies of the State ; and these the community 
 share between themselves, either as they can attain them 
 by force, or according to some common equality which 
 there is amongst them, as poverty, wealth, or something 
 which they both partake of There must therefore neces- 
 sarily be as many different forms of governments as there 
 are different ranks in the society, arising from the superiority 
 of some over others, and their different situations. And 
 these seem chiefly to be two, as they say of the winds — 
 namely, the north and the south; and all the others are 
 declinations from these. And thus in politics there is the 
 government of the many, and the government of the few ; 
 or a democracy and an oligarchy ; for an aristocracy may 
 be considered as a species of oligarchy, as being also a 
 government of the few ; and what we call a free State may 
 be considered as a democracy, as in the winds they 
 consider the west as part of the north, and the east as part 
 of the south ; and thus it is in music, according to some, 
 who say there are only two species of it, the Doric and the 
 Phrygian, and all other species of composition they call 
 after one of these names ; and many people are accustomed 
 to consider the nature of government in the same light; 
 but it is both more convenient and more correspondent to 
 truth to distinguish governments, as I have done, into two 
 species : one, of those which are established upon proper 
 principles, of which there may be one or two sorts ; the 
 other, which includes all the different excesses of these ; so 
 that we may compare the best form of government to the 
 most harmonious piece of music; the oligarchic and 
 despotic to the more violent tunes, and the democratic to 
 the soft and gentle airs. 
 
128 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iv. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 We ought not to define a democracy as some do, who say 
 simply that it is a government where the supreme power is 
 lodged in the people, for even in oligarchies the supreme 
 power is in the majority. Nor should they define an 
 oligarchy a government where the supreme power is in the 
 hands of a few : for let us suppose the number of a people 
 to be thirteen hundred, and that of these one thousand were 
 rich, who would not permit the three hundred poor to have 
 any share in the government although they were free, and 
 their equal in everything else ; no one would say that this 
 government was a democracy. In like manner, if the poor, 
 when few in number, should acquire the power over the 
 rich, though more than themselves, no one would say that 
 this was an oligarchy ; nor this, when the rest who are rich 
 have no share in the administration. We should rather say 
 that a democracy is, when the supreme power is in the 
 hands of the freemen ; an oligarchy, when it is in the hands 
 of the rich; it happens, indeed, that in the one case the 
 many will possess it, in the other the few, because there are 
 many poor and few rich. And if the power of the State 
 was to be distributed according to the size of the citizens, 
 as they say it is- in ^Ethiopia, or according to their beauty, it 
 would be an oligarchy ; for the number of those who are 
 large and beautiful is small. Nor are those things which we 
 have already mentioned alone sufficient to describe these 
 States ; for since there are many species both of a democracy 
 and an oligarchy, the matter requires farther consideration; 
 as we cannot admit that if a few persons, who are free, 
 possess the supreme power over the many, who are not free, 
 that this government is a democracy: as in ApoUonia, in 
 Ionia, and in Thera ; for in each of these cities the honours 
 of the State belong to some few particular families, who first 
 
CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 
 
 129 
 
 founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because they 
 are superior in numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at 
 Colophon, for there the majority had large possessions 
 before the Lydian war; but a democracy is a State where 
 the freemen and the poor, be ing thejuajority, are invested 
 with^th e power of the State. ^ An oligarchy is a State whe re 
 the rich and t h ose of nobl e- fami lies, being fe w, possess it. 
 We have now proved that there are various forms of 
 government, and have assigned a reason for it ; and shall 
 proceed to sliow that there are even more than these, and 
 what they are, and why ; setting out with the principle we 
 have already laid down. We admit that every city consists 
 not of one, but many parts : thus, if we should endeavour to 
 comprehend the different species of animals, we should first 
 of all note those parts which every animal must have as a 
 certain sensorium, and also what is necessary to acquire and 
 retain food, as a mouth and a belly ; besides certain parts to 
 enable it to move from place to place. If, then, these are 
 the only parts of an animal, and there are differences 
 between them — namely, in their various sorts of stomachs, 
 bellies, and sensoriums, to which we must add their motive 
 powers — the number of the combinations of all these must 
 necessarily make up the different species of animals. For it 
 is not possible that the same kind of animal should have 
 any very great difference in its mouth or ears ; so that when 
 all these are collected, who happen to have these things 
 similar in all, they make up a species of animals, of which 
 there are as many as there are of these general combinations 
 of necessary parts. The same thing is true of what are 
 called States ; for a city is not made of one, but many parts, 
 as has already been often said ; one of which is those who 
 supply it with provisions, called husbandmen, another called 
 mechanics, whose employment is in the manual arts, without 
 which the city could not be inhabited ; of these some are 
 busied about what is absolutely necessary, others in what 
 contribute to the elegancies and pleasures of life ; the third 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book iv. 
 
 sort are your exchange-men, I mean by these your buyers, 
 sellers, merchants, and victuallers ; the fourth are your 
 hired labourers, or workmen ; the fifth are the men-at-arms, 
 a rank not less useful than the other, without you would have 
 the community slaves to every invader; but what cannot 
 defend itself is unworthy of the name of a city ; for a city is 
 self-sufficient, a slave not. So that when Socrates, in Plato's 
 Republic, says that a city is necessarily composed of four 
 sorts of people, he speaks elegantly but not correctly, and 
 these are, according to him, weavers, husbandmen, shoe- 
 makers, and builders ; he then adds, as if these were not 
 sufficient, smiths, herdsmen for what cattle are necessary, 
 and also merchants and victuallers, and these are by way of 
 appendix to his first list; as if a city was established for 
 necessity and not happiness, or as if a shoemaker and a 
 husbandman were equally useful. He reckons not the 
 military a part, before the increase of territory, and joining 
 to the borders of the neighbouring powers will make war 
 necessary : and even amongst them who compose his four 
 divisions, or whoever have any connection with each other, 
 it will be necessary to have some one to distribute justice, 
 and determine between man and man. If, then, the mind is 
 a more valuable part of man than the body, every one 
 would wish to have those things more regarded in his city, 
 which tend to the advantage of these, than common matters, 
 such are war and justice ; to which may be added council, 
 which is the business of civil wisdom (nor is it of any con- 
 sequence whether the different employments are filled by 
 different persons or one, as the same man is oftentimes both 
 a soldier and a husbandman), so that if both the judge and 
 the senator are parts of the city, it necessarily follows that 
 the soldier must be so also. The seventh sort are those 
 who serve the pubHc in expensive employments at their own 
 charge : these are called the rich. The eighth are those 
 who execute the different offices of the State, and without 
 these it could not possibly subsist ; it is therefore necessary 
 
CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 that there should be some persons capable of governing and 
 fining the places in the city, and this either for life, or in 
 rotation : the office of senator and judge, of which we have 
 already sufficiently treated, are the only ones remaining. 
 If, then, these things are necessary for a State that it may 
 be happy and just, it follows that the citizens who engage in 
 public affairs should be men of abilities therein. Several 
 persons think that different employments may be allotted 
 to the same person ; as a soldier's, a husbandman's, and an 
 artificer's ; as, also, that others may be both senators and 
 judges. 
 
 Besides, every one supposes himself a man of political 
 abilities, and that he is qualified for almost every depart- 
 ment in the State. But the same person cannot at once be 
 poor and rich : for which reason the most obvious division 
 of the city is into two parts, the poor and rich ; moreover, 
 since, for the generality, the one are few, the other many, 
 they seem of all the parts of a city most contrary to each 
 other ; so that as the one or the other prevail they form 
 different States ; and these are the democracy and the 
 oligarchy. But that there are many different States, and 
 from what causes they arise, has been already mentioned ; 
 and that there are also different species both of dem.ocracies 
 and oligarchies we will now show. Though this indeed is 
 evident from what we have already said, there are also 
 many different sorts of common people, and also of those 
 who are called gentlemen. Of the different sorts of the 
 first are husbandmen, artificers, exchange-men, who are 
 employed in buying and selling, seamen, of which some are 
 engaged in war, some in traffic, some in carrying goods and 
 passengers from place to place, others in fishing, and of each 
 of these there are often many, as fishermen at Tarentum. 
 and Byzantium, masters of galleys at Athens, merchants at 
 ^gina and Chios, those who let ships on freight at 
 Tenedos ; we may add to these those who live by their 
 manual labour, and have but little property, so that they 
 
 E 2 
 
132 A RISTO TLE ON GO VERNMENT. [book iv. 
 
 cannot live without some employ : and also those who are 
 not free-born on both sides, and whatever other sort of 
 common people there may be. As for gentlemen, they are 
 such as are distinguished either by their fortune, their birth, 
 their abilities, or their education, or any such like excellence 
 which is attributed to them. The most pure democracy is 
 that which is so called principally from that equality which 
 prevails in it, for this is what the law in that State directs, 
 that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than the rich ; 
 nor that the supreme power shall be lodged with either of 
 these, but that both shall share it. For if liberty and 
 equality, as some persons suppose, are chiefly to be found 
 in a democracy, it must be most so by every department of 
 government being aUke open to all ; but as the people are 
 the majority, and what they vote is law, it follows that such 
 a State must be a democracy. This, then, is one species 
 thereof Another is, when the magistrates are elected by a 
 certain census ; but this should be but small, and every one 
 who was included in it should be eligible, but as soon as he 
 was below it should lose that right. Another sort is in 
 which every citizen, who is not infamous, has a share in the 
 government, but where the government is in the laws. 
 Another, where every citizen, without exception, has this 
 right. Another is like these in other particulars, but there 
 the people govern, and not the law : and this takes place 
 when everything is determined by a majority of votes, and 
 not by a law, which happens when the people are influenced 
 by the demagogues : for where a democracy is governed by 
 stated laws, there is no room for them, but men of worth fill 
 the first offices in the State; but where the power is not 
 vested in the laws, there demagogues abound, for there thq 
 people rule with kingly power, the whole composing one 
 body ; for they are supreme, not as individuals, but in their 
 collective capacity. Homer also discommends the govern- 
 ment of many ; but whether he means this we are speaking 
 of, or where each person exercises his power separately, is 
 
CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 uncertain. When the people possess this power, they desire 
 to be altogether absolute, that they may not be under the 
 control of the law, and this is the time when flatterers are 
 held in repute. Nor is there any difference between such a 
 people and monarchs in a tyranny, for their manners are 
 the same, and they both hold a despotic power over better 
 persons than themselves. For their decrees are like the 
 other's edicts ; their demagogues like the other's flatterers : 
 but their greatest resemblance consists in the mutual support 
 they give to each other, the flatterer to the tyrant, the 
 demagogue to the people : and to them it is owing that the 
 supreme power is lodged in the votes of the people, and not 
 in the laws ; for they bring everything before them, as 
 their influence is owing to their being supreme, whose 
 opinions they entirely direct, for these are they whom the 
 multitude ©bey. Besides, those who accuse the magistrates 
 insist upon it that the right of determining on their conduct 
 lies in the people, who gladly receive their complaints as the 
 means of destroying all their oflices. Any one therefore / 
 may with great justice blame such a government as being a 
 democracy, and not a free State ; for where the government 
 is not in the laws, then there is no free State, for the law 
 ought to be supreme over all things ; and particular 
 incidents which arise should be determined by the magis- 
 trates or the State. If, therefore, a democracy is to be 
 reckoned a free State, it is evident that any such establish- 
 ment which centres all power in the votes of the people 
 cannot, properly speaking, be a democracy : for their 
 decrees cannot be general in their extent. Thus, then, we 
 may describe the several species of democracies. 
 
134 ARISTOTLE DN GOVERNMENT [bookmv. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of the different species of oligarchies, one is when the right 
 to the offices is regulated by a certain census ; so that the 
 poor, although the majority, have no share in it; while all 
 those who are included therein take part in the manage- 
 ment of public affairs. Another sort is when the magistrates 
 are men of very small fortune, who upon any vacancy do 
 themselves fill it up ; and if they do this out of the com- 
 munity at large, the State approaches to an aristocracy ; if 
 out of any particular class of people, it will be an oligarchy. 
 Another sort of oligarchy is when the power is an hereditary 
 nobility. The fourth is when the power is in the same 
 hands as the other, but not under the control oU law ; and 
 this sort of oligarchy exactly corresponds to a tyranny in 
 monarchies, and to that particular species of democracies 
 which I last mentioned in treating of that State : this has 
 the particular name of a dynasty. These are the different 
 sorts of oligarchies and democracies. It should also be 
 known that it often happens that a free State, where the 
 supreme power is in the laws, may not be democratic, and 
 yet in consequence of the established manners, and customs 
 of the people may be governed as if it was ; so, on the other 
 hand, where the laws may countenance a more democratic 
 form of government, these may make the State inclining to 
 an oligarchy ; and this chiefly happens when there has been 
 any alteration m the government, for the people do not 
 easily change, but love their own ancient customs ; and it 
 is by small degrees only that one thing takes place of 
 another; so that the ancient laws will remain, while the 
 power will be in the hands of those who have brought about. 
 ■f a revolution m the State. 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 135 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 It is evident from what has been said, that there are as 
 many different sorts of democracies and oligarchies as I have 
 reckoned up ; for, of necessity, either all ranks of the people 
 which I have enumerated must have a share in the govern- 
 ment, or som.e only, and others not ; for when the husband- 
 men, and those only who possess moderate fortunes, have 
 the supreme power, they will govern according to law ; for 
 as they must get their livings by their employs, they have 
 but little leisure for public business : they will therefore 
 establish proper laws, and never call public assemblies but 
 when there is a necessity for them ; and they will readily let 
 every one partake with them in the administration of public 
 affairs as soon as they possess that fortune which the law 
 requires for their qualification ; every one, therefore, who is 
 qualified will have his share in the government, for to ex- 
 clude any would be to make the government an oligarchy, 
 and for all to have leisure to attend without they had a sub- 
 sistence would be impossible; for these reasons, therefore, 
 this government is a species of democracy. Another species 
 is distinguished by the mode of electing their magistrates, in 
 which every one is eligible, to whose birth there are no ob- 
 jections, provided he is supposed to have leisure to attend : 
 for which reason in such a democracy the supreme power 
 will be vested in the laws, as there will be nothing paid to 
 those who go to the public assembHes. A third species is 
 where every freeman has a right to a share in the govern- 
 ment, which he will not accept for the cause already assigned; 
 for which reason here also the supreme power will be in the 
 law. The fourth species of democracy, the last which was 
 established in order of time, arose when cities were greatly 
 enlarged to what they were at first, and when the public 
 
136 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book iv. 
 
 revenue became soRiething considerable ; for then the popu- 
 lace, on account of their numbers, were admitted to share 
 in the management of public affairs, for then even the poorest 
 people were at leisure to attend to them, as they received 
 wages for so doing ; nay, they were more so than others, as 
 they were not hindered, by having anything of their own to 
 mind, as the rich had ; for which reason these last very often 
 did not frequent the public assemblies and the courts of jus 
 tice : thus the supreme power was lodged in the poor, and 
 not in the laws. These are the different sorts of democracies, 
 and such are the causes which necessarily gave birth to 
 them. 
 
 The first species of oligarchy is, when the generality of the 
 State are men of moderate and not too large property ; for 
 this gives them leisure for tlie management of public affairs : 
 and, as they are a numerous body, it necessarily follows that 
 the supreme power must be in the laws and not in men; for 
 as they are far removed from a monarchical government, and 
 have not sufficient fortune to neglect their private affairs, 
 while they are too many to be supported by the public, they 
 will of course determine to be governed by the laws and 
 not by each other. But if the men of property in the State 
 are but few, and their property is large, then an oligarchy of 
 the second sort will take place; for those who have most 
 power will think that they have a right to lord it over the 
 others ; and to accomplish this they will associate to them- 
 selves some who have an inclination for public affairs, and 
 as they are not powerful enough to govern without law, they 
 will make a law for that purpose. And if those few who 
 have large fortunes should acquire still greater power, the 
 Oligarchy will then alter into one of the third sort ; for they 
 will get all the ofilces of the State into their own hands by a 
 law which directs the son to succeed upon the death of his 
 father; and, after that, when, by means of their increasing 
 wealth and powerful connections, they extend still further 
 their oppression, a monarchical dynasty will directly succeed, 
 
CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 137 
 
 wherein men will be supreme and not the law ; and this is 
 the fourth species of an oligarchy correspondent to the last- 
 m'entioned class of democracies. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 There are besides two other States, a democracy and an 
 oligarchy, one of which all speak of, and it is always 
 esteemed a species of the four sorts ; and thus they reckon 
 them up : a monarchy, an oligarchy, a democracy, and this 
 fourth which they call an aristocracy. There is also a fiftli, 
 which bears a name that is also common to the other four, 
 namely, a State ; but as this is seldom to be met, with it 
 has escaped those who have endeavoured to enumerate the 
 different sorts of governments which they fix at four only, 
 as does Plato in his Republic. 
 
 An aristocracy, of which I have already treated in the 
 first book, is rightly called so ; for a State governed by the 
 best men, upon the most virtuous principles, and not upon 
 any hypothesis which even good men may propose, has 
 alone a right to be called an aristocracy, for it is there only 
 that a man is at once a good man and a good citizen, while 
 in other States men are good only relative to those States. 
 Moreover, there are some other States which are called by 
 the same name, that differ both from oligarchies and free 
 States, wherein not only the rich but also the virtuous have 
 a share in the administration, and have therefore acquired 
 the name of aristocracies ; for in those governments wherein 
 virtue is not their common care, there are still men of worth 
 and approved goodness. Whatever State, then, like the 
 Carthaginians, favours the rich, the virtuous, and the citizens 
 at large, is a sort of aristocracy ; when only the two latter 
 
138 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iv. 
 
 are held in esteem, as at Lacedsemon, and the State is jointly 
 composed of these, it is a virtuous democracy. These are 
 the two species of aristocracies, after the first, which is the 
 best of all governments. There is also a third, which is, 
 whenever a free State inclines to the dominion of a few. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 It now remains for us to treat of that government which is 
 particularly called a free State, and also of a tyranny ; and 
 the reason for my choosing to place that free State here is, 
 because this, as well as those aristocracies already mentioned, 
 although they do not seem excesses, yet, to speak true, 
 they have all departed from what a perfect government is. 
 Nay, they are deviations both of them equally from other 
 forms, as I said at the beginning. It is proper to mention a 
 tyranny the last of all governments, for it is of all others the 
 least like one ; but as my intention is to treat of all govern- 
 ments in general, for this reason that also, as I have said, 
 will be taken into consideration in its proper place. I shall 
 now inquire into a free State, and show what it is ; and we 
 shall the better understand its positive nature as we have al- 
 ready described an oligarchy and a democracy ; for a free State 
 is indeed nothing more than a mixture of them, and it has 
 been usual to call those which incline most to a democracy 
 a free State ; those which incline most to an oligarchy an 
 aristocracy, because those who are rich are generally men of 
 family and education ; besides, they enjoy those things which 
 others are often guilty of crimes to procure, for which reason 
 they are regarded as men of worth and honour and note. 
 Since^ then, it is the genius of an aristocracy to allot the 
 larger part of the government to the best citizens, they there- 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT ^39 
 
 fore say that an oligarchy is chiefly composed of those men 
 who are worthy and honourable. Now it seems impossible, 
 that where the government is in the hands of the good, there 
 the laws should not be good, but bad ; or, on the contrary, 
 that where the government is in the hands of the bad, there 
 the laws should be good ; nor is a government well consti- 
 tuted because the laws are, without at the same time care is 
 taken that they are observed, for to enforce obedience to 
 the laws which it makes is one proof of a good constitution 
 in the State; another is, to have laws well calculated for 
 those who are to abide by them, for if they are improp^er 
 they must be obeyed ; and this may be done two ways, either 
 by their being the best relative to the particular State, or the 
 best absolutely. An aristocracy seems most likely to confer 
 the honours of the State on the virtuous, for virtue is the 
 object of an aristocracy, riches of an oligarchy, and liberty 
 of a democracy; for what is approved of by the majority 
 will prevail in all, or in each of these three different States ; 
 and that which is esteemed by those who compose the com- 
 munity will have the supreme power, for what is called a 
 State prevails in many communities, which are generally 
 made up of rich and poor, riches and liberty : as for the 
 rich they are usually supposed to be among worthy and 
 honourable. As there are three things which claim an equal 
 rank in the State, freedom, riches, and virtue (for as for the 
 fourth rank^ it is an attendant on two of the others, for virtue 
 and riches are the origin of family), it is evident that the 
 conjuncture of the rich an d the poor make up a free State ; 
 but thaT'air three tend to an aristocracy more than any 
 other, except that which is truly so, which holds the first 
 rank. We have already seen that there are governments 
 different from a monarchy, a democracy, and an oligarchy ; 
 and what they are, and wherein they differ from each other ; 
 and also aristocracies, and States properly so called, which 
 are derived from them ; and it is evident that these are not 
 much unlike each other. 
 
1 40 A RIS TO TLB ON GO VERNMENT. [book i v. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 We shall next proceed to show how that government, which 
 is peculiarly called a State, arises out of a democracy and 
 an oligarchy, and hov/ it ought to be established ; and this 
 will at the same time show what are the proper boundaries 
 of both these governments, for we must mark out wherein 
 they differ from one another, and then from both these 
 compose a State of such parts of each of them as will show 
 from whence they were taken. There are three different 
 ways in which two States may be blended and joined 
 together; for, in the first place, all those rules may be 
 adopted which the laws of each of them have ordered ; as, 
 for instance, in the judicial department, for in an oligarchy 
 the rich are fined if they do not come to the court as jury- 
 men^ but the poor are not paid for their attendance ; but in 
 democracies they are, while the rich are not fined for their 
 neglect. Now these things, as being common to both, are 
 fit to be observed in a free State which is composed of 
 both. This, then, is one way in which they may be joined 
 together. In the second place, a medium may be taken 
 between the different methods which each State observes ; 
 for instance, in a democracy the right to vote in the public 
 assembly is either confined by no census at all, or limited 
 by a very small one, in an oligarchy none enjoy it but 
 those whose census is high ; therefore, as these two prac- 
 tices are contrary to each other, a census between each may 
 be established in such a State. In the third place, different 
 laws of each community may be adopted ; as, for instance, 
 as it seems correspondent to the nature of a democracy 
 that the magistrates should be chosen by lot, but an 
 aristocracy by vote, and in the one State according to a 
 census, but not in the other : let, then, an aristocracy 
 and a free State copy something from each of them ; 
 let them follow an oligarchy in choosing their magistrates 
 
CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 141 
 
 by vote, but a democracy in not admitting of any census, 
 and thus blend together the different customs of the two 
 governments. But the best proof of a happy mixture of a 
 democracy and an oHgarchy is this, when a person may 
 properly call the same State a democracy and an oligarchy. 
 It is evident that those who speak of it in this manner are 
 induced to it, because both these governments are there 
 well blended together ; and indeed this is common to all 
 mediums, that the extremes of each side should be dis- 
 cerned therein, as at Lacedaemon ; for many affirm that it 
 is a democracy, from the many particulars in which it 
 follows that form of government ; as, for instance, in the 
 first place, in the bringing up of their children, for the rich 
 and poor are brought up in the same manner, and their 
 education is such that the children of the poor may partake 
 of it, and the same rules are observed when they are 
 youths and men ; there is no distinction between a rich 
 person and a poor one, and in their public tables the same 
 provision is served to all. The rich also wear only such 
 clothes as the poorest man is able to purchase. Moreover, 
 with respect to two magistracies of the highest rank, one 
 they have a right to elect to, the other to fill ; namely, the 
 senate and the ephori. Others consider it as an oligarchy, 
 the principles of which it follows in many things, as in 
 choosing all their officers by vote and not by lot ; in there 
 being but a few who have a right to sit in judgment on 
 capital causes and the like. Indeed, a State which is well 
 composed of two other, ought to resemble them both, 
 and neither. Such a State ought to have its means of 
 preservation in itself, and not without ; and when I say in 
 itself, I do not mean that it should owe this to the for- 
 bearance of their neighbours, for this may happen to a bad 
 government, but to every member of the community's not 
 being willing, that there should be the least alteration in 
 their constitution. Such is the method in which a free 
 State or an aristocracy ought to be established. 
 
142 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iv. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 It now remains to treat of a tyranny; not that there is 
 much to be said on that subject, but as it makes part of 
 our plan, since we enumerated it amongst our different sorts 
 of governments. In the beginning of this work we in- 
 quired into the nature of kingly government, and entered 
 into a particular examination of what was most properly 
 called so, and whether it was advantageous to a State or 
 not, and what it should be, and how established ; and we 
 divided a tyranny into two species, when we were upon 
 this subject, because there is something analagous between 
 this and a kingly government, for they are both of them 
 established by law; for among some of the barbarians 
 they elect a monarch with absolute power, and formerly 
 among the Greeks there were some such, whom they called 
 ^sumnetes. Now these differ from each other ; for some 
 possess only kingly power regulated by law, and rule those 
 who voluntarily submit to their government; others rule 
 despotically, according to their own will. There is a third 
 species of tyranny, most properly so called, which is the 
 very opposite to kingly power ; for this is the government 
 of one who rules over his equals and superiors, without 
 being accountable for his conduct, and whose object is his 
 own advantage^ and not the advantage of those he governs ; 
 for which reason he rules by compulsion, for no freemen 
 will ever willingly submit to such a government. These are 
 the difterent species of tyrannies, their principles, and their 
 causes. 
 
CHAP. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 CHAPTER XT. 
 
 We proceed now to inquire what form of government and 
 what manner of Hfe is best for communities in general, not 
 aciapting it to that superior virtue which is above the reach 
 of the vulgar, or that education which every advantage of 
 nature and fortune only can furnish, nor to those imaginary 
 plans which may be formed at pleasure, but to that mode 
 of life which the greater part of mankind can attain to, and 
 that government which most cities may establish ; for as to 
 those aristocracies which we have now mentioned, they are 
 either too perfect for a State to support, or one so nearly 
 alike to that State we are now going to inquire into, that we 
 shall treat of them both as one. 
 
 The opinions which we form upon these subjects must 
 depend upon one common principle ; for if what I have 
 said in my treatise on Morals is true, a happy life must arise 
 from an uninterrupted course of virtue ; and if virtue con- 
 sists in a certain medium, the middle life must certainly be 
 the happiest; which medium is attainable by every one. 
 The boundaries of virtue and vice in the State must also 
 necessarily be the same as in a private person ; for the form 
 of government is the life of the city. In every city the 
 people are divided into three sorts ; the very rich^ the very 
 poor, and those who are between them. If this is univer- 
 sally admitted that the medium is best, it is evident that 
 even in point of fortune mediocrity is to be preferred, for 
 that state is most submissive to reason ; for those who are 
 very handsome, or very strong, or very noble, or very rich ; 
 or, on the contrary, those who are very poor, or very weak, 
 or very mean, with difficulty obey it; for the one are 
 capricious and greatly flagitious, the other rascally and mean, 
 the crimes of each arising from their different excesses ; nor 
 
144 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book iv. 
 
 will they go through the different offices of the State, which 
 is detrimental to it ; besides, those who excel in strength, 
 in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know how, nor are 
 willing to submit to command ; and this begins at home 
 when they are boys, for there they are brought up too 
 delicately to be accustomed to obey their preceptors ; as for 
 the very poor, their general and excessive want of what the 
 rich enjoy, reduces them to a state too mean; so that the 
 one know not how to command, but to be commanded as 
 slaves, the others know not how to submit to any command, 
 nor to command themselves, but with despotic power. A 
 city composed of such men must therefore consist of slaves 
 and masters, not freemen ; where one party must hate, and 
 the other despise, where there could be no possibility of 
 friendship or political community ; for community supposes 
 affection, for we do not even on the road associate with 
 our enemies. It is also the genius of a city to be composed 
 as much as possible of equals ; which will be most so when 
 the inhabitants are in the middle state ; from whence it 
 follows that that city must be best framed which is 
 composed of those whom we say are naturally its proper 
 members. It is men of this station also who will be best 
 assured of safety and protection ; for they will neither covet 
 what belongs to others, as the poor do, nor will others 
 covet what is theirs, as the poor do what belongs to the 
 rich ; and thus, without plotting against any one, or having 
 any one plot against them, they will live free from danger; 
 for which reason Phocylides wisely wishes for the middle 
 state, as being most productive of happiners. It is 
 plain, then, that the most perfect poli tical communitj^ 
 must be amongst those who ar e ^n_ the_middl£_rai^^ 
 those States are best instituted wherein these are a larger 
 and more respectable part, if possible, than both the other ; 
 or, if that cannot be, at least than either of them separate ; 
 so that being thrown into the balance it may prevent either 
 scale from preponderating. It is therefore the greatest 
 
CHAP. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 145 
 
 happiness which the citizens can enjoy, to possess a mode- 
 rate and convenient fortune; for when some possess too 
 much, and others nothing at all, the government must 
 either be in the hands of the meanest rabble, or else a pare 
 oligarchy ; or, from the excesses of both^ a tyranny ; for this 
 arises from a headstrong democracy, or an oligarchy, but very 
 seldom when the members of the community are nearly on 
 an equality with each other. We will assign a reason for 
 this when we come to treat of the alterations which differ- 
 ent States are likely to undergo. The middle state is there- 
 fore best, as being least liable to those seditions and 
 insurrections which disturb the community ; and for the 
 same reason extensive governments are least liable to these 
 inconveniences ; for there those in a middle state are very 
 numerous, whereas in small ones it is easy to pass to the 
 two extremes, so as hardly to have any in a medium 
 remaining, but the one half rich, the other poor ; and from 
 the same principle it is that democracies are more firmly 
 established, and of longer continuance than oligarchies ; 
 but even in those, when there is a want of a proper number 
 of men of middling fortune, the poor extend their power 
 too far, abuses arise, and the government is soon at an end. 
 We ought to consider as a proof of what I now advance, 
 that the best lawgivers themselves were those in the middle 
 rank of life, amongst whom was Solon, as is evident from 
 his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was not a king, and Cha- 
 rondas, and indeed most others. What has been said will 
 show us why of so many free States, some have changed to 
 democracies, others to oligarchies ; for whenever the 
 number of those in the middle state has been too small, 
 those who were the more numerous, whether the rich or the 
 poor, always overpowered them, and assumed to themselves 
 the administration of public affairs ; from hence arose either 
 a democracy or an oligarchy. Moreover, when in conse- 
 quence of their disputes and quarrels with each other, either 
 the rich get the better of the poor, or the poor of the rich. 
 
146 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iv. 
 
 neither of them will establish a free State; but, as the 
 record of their victory, one which inclines to their own prin- 
 ciples, and form either a democracy or an oligarchy. 
 
 Those who made conquests in Greece, having all of them 
 an eye to the respective forms of government in their own 
 cities^ established either democracies or oligarchies, not 
 considering what was serviceable to the State, but what was 
 similar to their own; for which reason a government has 
 never been established where the supreme power has been 
 placed amongst those of the middling rank, or very seldom ; 
 and, amongst a few, one man only of those who have yet 
 been conquerors has been persuaded to give the preference 
 to this order of men : it is indeed an established custom 
 with the inhabitants of most cities not to desire an equality, 
 but either to aspire to govern, or, when they are conquered, 
 to submit. Tl^i]s ^wfi hav ^shown what the_bQ5t-Sta,te is, and 
 why. It will not be difficult to perceive, of the many 
 States which there are — for we have seen that there are 
 various forms both of democracies and oligarchies — to which 
 we should give the first place, to which the second, and in 
 the same manner the next also ; and to observe what are 
 the particular excellences and defects of each, after we have 
 first described the best possible ; for that must be the best 
 which is nearest to this, that worst which is most distant 
 from the medium, without any one has a particular plan of 
 his own which he judges by. I mean by this, that it may 
 happen that although one form of government may be 
 better than another, yet there is no reason to prevent another 
 from being preferable thereunto in particular circumstances 
 and for particular purposes. 
 
CHAP. XII,] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 147 
 
 CHAPTER XIL 
 
 After what has been said it follows that we should now 
 show what particular form of government is most suitable 
 for particular persons ; first laying this down as a general 
 maxim, that that party which desires to support the actual 
 administration of the State, ought always to be superior to 
 that which would alter it. Every city is made up of quality 
 and quantity : by quality I mean liberty, riches, education, 
 and family, and by quantity its relative populousness. Now 
 it may happen that quality may exist in one of those parts 
 of which the city is composed and quantity in another; 
 thus, the number of the ignoble may be greater than the 
 number of those of family, the number of the poor than that 
 of the rich ; but not so that the quantity of the one shall over- 
 balance the quality of the other; those must be properly 
 adjusted to each other, for where the number of the poor 
 exceeds the proportion we have mentioned, there a demo- 
 cracy will rise up, and if the husbandry should have more 
 power than others, it will be a democracy of husbandmen ; 
 and the democracy will be a particular species according to 
 that class of men which may happen to be most numerous : 
 thus, should these be the husbandmen, it will be of these, 
 and the best ; if of mechanics and those who hire them- 
 selves out, the worst possible : in the same manner it may 
 be of any other set between these two. But when the rich 
 and the noble prevail more by their quality than they are 
 deficient in quantity, there an oligarchy ensues ; and this 
 oligarchy may be of different species, according to the 
 nature of the prevailing party. Every legislator in framing 
 his constitution ought to have a particular regard to those 
 in the middle rank of life ; and if he intends an oligarchy, 
 these should be the object of his laws ; if a democracy, to 
 these they should be entrusted ; and whenever their number 
 
248 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iv. 
 
 exceeds tliat of the two others, or at least one of them, they 
 give stabiHty to the constitution ; for there is no fear that 
 the rich and the poor should agree to conspire together 
 against them, for neither of these will choose to serve the 
 other. If any one would choose to fix the administration on 
 the widest basis, he will find none preferable to this ; for to 
 rule by turns is what the rich and the poor will not submit 
 to, on account of their hatred to each other. It is more- 
 over allowed that an arbitrator is the most proper person 
 for both parties to trust to ; now this arbitrator is the middle 
 rank. 
 
 Those who would establish aristocratical governments are 
 mistaken, not only in giving too much power to the rich, but 
 also in deceiving the common people ; for at last, instead of 
 an imaginary good, they must feel a leil evil, for the en- 
 croachments of the rich are more destructive to the State 
 than those of the poor. 
 
 CHAPTER Xlll. 
 
 There are five particulars, in which, under fair pretences 
 they craftily endeavour to undermine the rights of the people : 
 these are their public assembHes, their offices of State, their 
 courts of justice, their military power, and their gymnastic 
 exercises. With respect to their public assemblies, in 
 having them open to all, but in fining the rich only, or 
 others very little, for not attending ; with respect to offices, 
 in permitting the poor to swear off, but not granting this 
 indulgence to those who are within the census ; with respect 
 to their courts of justice, in fining the rich for non-attend- 
 ance, but the poor not at all, or those a great deal, and 
 these very little, as was done by the laws of Charondas- 
 In some places every citizen who was enrolled had a right 
 
CHAP. Xiii.J ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 14^ 
 
 to attend the public assemblies and to try causes ; which 
 if they did not do, a very heavy fine was laid upon them ; 
 that through fear of the fine, they might avoid being enrolled, 
 as they were then obliged to do neither the one or the other. 
 The same spirit of legislation prevailed with respect to their 
 bearing arms and their gymnastic exercises, for the poor 
 are excused if they have no arms, but the rich are fined ; 
 the same method takes place if they do not attend their 
 gymnastic exercises, there is no penalty on one, but there 
 is on the other ; the consequence of which is, that the fear 
 of this penalty induces the rich to keep the one and attend 
 the other, while the poor do neither. These are the deceit- 
 ful contrivances of oligarchical legislators. The contrary 
 prevails in a democracy ; for there they make the poor a 
 proper allowance for attending the assemblies and the 
 courts, but give the rich nothing for doing it ; whence it is 
 evident, that if any one would properly blend these customs 
 together, they must extend both the pay and the fine to 
 every member of the community, and then every one would 
 share in it, whereas part only now do. // The citizens of a | 
 
 jl-ee State ^ Q^gh t to rrmgi^t^^f thO^^ nnJyL^lin bfrlT ^rvc\^ '^\\^ / 
 
 with respect to their census it is not easy to determine 
 exactly what it ought to be, but the rule that should direct 
 upon this subject should be to make it as extensive as 
 possible, so that those who are enrolled in it make up a 
 greater part of the people than those who are not ; for those 
 who are poor, although they partake not of the oftices of the 
 State, are willing to live quiet, provided that no one disturbs 
 them in their property ; but this is not an easy matter, for 
 it may not always happen that those who are at the head 
 of public affairs are of a humane behaviour. In time of 
 war the poor are accustomed to show no alacrity without 
 they have provisions found them ; when they have, then 
 indeed they are willing to fight. In some governments the 
 power is vested not only in those who bear arms, but also in 
 those who have borne them. Among the Malienses, the 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book iv. 
 
 State was composed of these latter only, for all the officers 
 were soldiers who had served their time. And the first 
 States in Greece which succeeded those, where kingly power 
 was estabHshed, were governed by the military. First of all 
 the horse, for at that time the strength and excellence of the 
 army depended on the horse, for as to the heavy-armed foot 
 they were useless without proper discipline ; but the art of 
 tactics was not known to the ancients, for which reason their 
 strength lay in their horse ; but when cities grew larger, and 
 they depended more on their foot, greater numbers partook 
 of the freedom of the city ; for which reason what we call 
 republics were formerly called democracies. The ancient 
 governments were properly oligarchies or kingdoms ; for on 
 account of the few persons in each State, it would have been 
 impossible to have found a sufficient number of the middle 
 rank ; so these being but few, and those used to subordina- 
 tion, they more easily submitted to be governed. We have 
 now shown why there are many sorts of governments, and 
 others different from those we have treated of ; for there are 
 more species of democracies than one, and the like is true 
 of other forms, and what are their differences, and whence 
 they arise ; and also of all others which is the best, at least 
 in general ; and which is best suited for particular people. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 We will now proceed to make some general reflections upon 
 all governments, and also to consider each of them in parti- 
 cular, in the order which follows, beginning with those 
 principles which appertain to each. Now there are three 
 things in all States which a careful legislator ought well to 
 
CHAP. XIV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 151 
 
 consider, which are of great consequence to all, and which 
 properly attended to the State must necessarily be happy ; 
 and according to the variation of which the one will differ 
 from the other. The first of these is the public assemblv; 
 the second, the ofticers of the State , that is, who they ought 
 to be, and with what power they should be entrusted, and 
 in what manner they should be appointed ; the third, the 
 judicial department, Now it is the proper business of the 
 public assembly to determine concerning war and peace, 
 making or breaking off alliances, to enact laws, to sentence 
 to death, banishment, or confiscation of goods, and to call 
 the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office. 
 Now these powers must necessarily be entrusted to the 
 citizens in general, or all of them to some ; either to one 
 magistrate or more ; or some to one, and some to another, 
 or some to all, but others to some ; to entrust all to all is in 
 the spirit of a democracy, for the people aim at equality. 
 There are many methods of delegating these powers to the 
 citizens at large, one of which is to let them execute them 
 by turn, and not altogether, as was done by Tellecles, the 
 Milesian, in his State. In others the supreme council is 
 composed of the different magistrates, and they succeed to 
 the offices of the community by proper divisions of tribes, 
 wards, and other very small proportions, till every one in 
 his turn goes through them ; nor does the whole community 
 ever meet together, without it is when new laws are enacted, 
 or some national afiair is debated, or to hear what the 
 magistrates have to propose to them. Another method is 
 for the people to meet in a collective body, but only for the 
 purpose of holding the comitia, making laws, determining 
 concerning war or peace, and inquiring into the conduct of 
 their magistrates, while the remaining part of the public 
 business is conducted by the magistrates, who have their 
 separate departments^ and are chosen out of the whole 
 community either by vote or ballot. Another method is 
 for the people in general to meet for the choice of the 
 
152 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iv. 
 
 magistrates, and to examine into their conduct ; and also to 
 deliberate concerning war and alliances, and to leave other 
 things to the magistrates, whoever happen to be chosen, 
 whose particular employments are such as necessarily 
 require persons well skilled therein. A fourth method is 
 for every person to deliberate upon every subject in public 
 assembly, where the magistrates can determine nothing of 
 themselves, and have only the privilege of giving their 
 opinions first; and this is the method of the most pure 
 democracy, which is analogous to the proceedings in a 
 dynastic oligarchy, and a tyrannic monarchy. These, 
 then, are the methods in which public business is con- 
 ducted in a democracy. When the power is in the 
 hands of part of the community only it is an oligarchy, 
 and this also admits of different customs ; for whenever the 
 officers of the State are chosen out of those who have a 
 moderate fortune, and these from that circumstance are 
 many, and when they depart not from that line which the 
 law has laid down, but carefully follow it, and when all 
 within the census are eligible, certainly it is then an oligarchy, 
 but founded on true principles of government from its 
 moderation. When the people in general do not partake 
 of the deliberate power, but certain persons chose for that 
 purpose, who govern according to law, this also, like the 
 first, is an oligarchy. When those who have the deliberate 
 power elect each other, and the son succeeds to the father, 
 and when they can supersede the laws, such a government 
 is of necessity a strict oligarchy. When some persons deter- 
 mine on one thing, and others on another, as war and peace, 
 and when all inquire into the conduct of their magistrates, 
 and other things are left to different officers, elected either 
 by vote or lot, then the government is an aristocracy or a 
 free State. When some are chosen by vote and others by 
 lot, and these either from the people in general or from a 
 certain number elected for that purpose, or if both the votes 
 a,nd the lots are open to all, such a State is partly an arb- 
 
CHAP. XIV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 153 
 
 tocraq^, partly a free government itself. These are the 
 different methods' in which the deliberative power is vested 
 in different States, all of whom follow some regulation here 
 laid down. 
 
 It is advantageous to a democracy, in the present sense 
 of the word, by which I mean a State wherein the people 
 at large have a supreme power, even over the laws, to hold 
 frequent public assemblies ; and it will be best in this parti- 
 cular to imitate the example of oligarchies in their courts of 
 justice; for they fine those who are appointed to try causes 
 if they do not attend, so should they reward the poor for 
 coming to the public assemblies ; and their counsels will be 
 best when all advise with each other, the citizens with the 
 nobles, the nobles with the citizens. It is also advisable, 
 when the council is to be composed of part of the citizens, 
 to elect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both 
 ranks. It is also proper, if the common people in the State 
 are very numerous, either not to pay every one for his attend- 
 ance, but such a number only as will make them equal to 
 the nobles, or to reject many of them by lot. In an 
 oligarchy they should either call up some of the common 
 people to the council, or else establish a court, as is done 
 in some other States, whom they call pre-advisers or 
 guardians of the laws, whose business should be to propose 
 first what they should afterv/ards enact. By this means the 
 people would have a place in the administration of public 
 affairs without having it in their power to occasion any 
 disorder in the government. Moreover, the people may be 
 allowed to have a vote in whatever bill is proposed, but 
 may not themselves propose anything contrary thereto ; or 
 they may give their advice, while the power of determining 
 may be with the magistrates only. It is also necessary to 
 follow a contrary practice to what is established in demo- 
 cracies, for the people should be allowed the power of 
 pardoning but not of condemning, for the cause should be 
 referred back again to the magistrates ; whereas the contrary 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iv. 
 
 takes place in republics ; for the power of pardoning is with 
 the few, but not of condemning, which is always referred to 
 the people at large. And thus we determine concerning 
 the deliberative power in any State, and in whose hands it 
 shall be. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 We now proceed to consider the choice of magistrates ; for 
 this branch of public business contains many different parts, 
 as how many there shall be, what shall be their particular 
 office, and with respect to time how long each of them shall 
 continue in place, for some make it six months, others 
 shorter, others for a year, others for a much longer time ; or 
 whether they should be perpetual, or for a long time, or 
 neither, for the same person may fill the same office 
 several times, or he may not be allowed to enjoy it even 
 twice, but only once ; and also with respect to the appoint- 
 ment of magistrates, who are to be eligible, who is to choose 
 them, and in what manner ; for in all these particulars we 
 ought properly to distinguish the different ways which may 
 be followed, and then to show which of these is best 
 suited to such and such governments. Now it is not easy 
 to determine to whom we ought properly to give the name 
 of magistrate, for a government requires many persons in 
 office ; but every one of those who is either chosen by vote 
 or lot is not to be reckoned a magistrate. The priests, 
 for instance, in the first place ; for these are to be con- 
 sidered as very different from civil magistrates : to these we 
 may add the choregi and heralds, nay, even ambassadors 
 are elected. There are some civil employments which 
 
CHAP. XV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 belong to the citizens ; and these are either when they are 
 all engaged in one thing, as when as soldiers they obey their 
 general, or when part of them only are, as in governing the 
 women or educating the youth ; and also some economic, 
 for they often elect carn-meters ; others are servile, and in 
 which, if they are rich, they employ slaves. Bat indeed 
 they are most properly called magistrates who are members 
 of the deliberative council, or decide causes, or are in 
 some command, the last more especially, for to command is 
 peculiar to magistrates. But, to speak truth, this question 
 is of no great consequence, nor is it the province of the 
 judges to decide between those who dispute about words ; 
 it may indeed be an object of speculative inquiry; but 
 to inquire what officers are necessary in a State, and how 
 many, and what, though not most necessary, may yet be 
 advantageous in a well-established government, is a much 
 more useful employment, and .this with respect to all States 
 in general, as well as to small cities. In extensive govern- 
 ments it is proper to allot one employment to one person, 
 as there are many to serve the public in so numerous a 
 society, where some may be passed over for a long time, 
 and others never be in office but once : and indeed every- 
 thing is better done which has the whole attention of 
 one person, than when that attention is divided amongst 
 many; but in small States it is necessary that a few of 
 the citizens should execute many employments, for their 
 numbers are so small it will not be convenient to have 
 many of them in office at the same time ; for where shall 
 we find others to succeed them in turn ? Small States 
 will sometimes want the same magistrates and the same 
 laws as large ones ; but the one will not want to employ 
 them so often as the other, so that different charges may 
 be entrusted to the same person without any incon- 
 venience, for they will not interfere with each other, and 
 for want of sufficient members in the community it will 
 
156 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iv. 
 
 be necessary. If we could tell how many magistrates are 
 necessary in every city, and how many, though not neces- 
 sary, it is yet proper to have, we could then the better know 
 how many different offices one might assign to one 
 magistrate. It is also necessary to know what tribunals in 
 different places should have different things under their 
 jurisdiction, and also what things should always come under 
 the cognizance of the same magistrate — as, for instance, 
 decency of manners ; shall the clerk of the market take 
 cognizance of that, if the cause arises in the market, and 
 another magistrate in another place, or the same magistrate 
 everywhere? or shall there be a distinction made of the 
 fact or the parties ? as, for instance, in decency of manners, 
 shall it be one cause when it relates to a man, another when 
 it relates to a woman ? 
 
 In different States, shall the magistrates be different or the 
 same ? I mean, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an 
 aristocracy, and a monarchy, the same persons shall have the 
 same power? or shall it vary according to the different 
 formation of the government? as in an aristocracy the 
 offices of the State are allotted to those who are well 
 educated ; in an oligarchy to those who are rich ; in a 
 democracy to the freemen ? Or shall the magistrates differ 
 as the communities differ? For it may happen that the 
 very same may be sometimes proper, sometimes otherwise • 
 in this State it may be necessary that the magistrate have 
 great powers, in that but small. There are also certain 
 magistrates pecuhar to certain States; as the pre-advisers 
 are not proper in a democracy, but a senate is ; for one such 
 order is necessary, whose business shall be to consider 
 beforehand and prepare those bills which shall be brought 
 before the people, that they may have leisure to attend to 
 their own affairs ; and when these are few in number, the 
 State inclines to an oligarchy. The pre-advisers indeed 
 must alwa} s be few ; for they are peculiar to an oligarchy ; 
 
 / 
 
CHAP. XV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 157 
 
 and where there are both these offices in the same State, 
 the pre-adviser's is superior to the senator's, the one having 
 only a democratical power, the other an oHgarchical ; and 
 indeed the power of the senate is lost in those democracies, 
 in which the people, meeting in one public assembly, take 
 all the business into their own hands ; and this is likely to 
 happen either when the community in general are in easy 
 circumstances, or when they are paid for their attendance ; 
 for they are then at leisure often to meet together and 
 determine everything for themselves. A magistrate whose 
 business is to control the manners of the boys or women, 
 or who takes any department similar to this, is to be found 
 in an aristocracy, not in a democracy ; for who can forbid 
 the wives of the poor from appearing in public ? Neither is 
 such a one to be met with in an oligarchy ; for the women 
 there are too. delicate to bear control. And thus much for 
 this subject. Let us endeavour to treat at large of the 
 establishment of magistrates, beginning from first principles. 
 Now, they differ from each other in three ways, from which, 
 blended together, all the varieties which can be imagined 
 arise. The first of these differences is in those who 
 appoint the magistrates ; the second consists in those who 
 are appointed ; the third in the mode of appointment ; and 
 each of these three differ in three manners ; for either all 
 the citizens may appoint collectively, or some out of their 
 whole body, or some out of a particular order in it, accord- 
 ing to fortune, family, or virtue, or some other rule (as at 
 Megara, where the right of election was amongst those who 
 had returned together to their country, and had reinstated 
 themselves by force of arms), and this either by vote or lot. 
 Again, these several modes may be differently formed 
 together, as some magistrates may be chose by part of the 
 community, others by the whole ; some out of part, others 
 out of the whole ; some by vote, others by lot ; and each of 
 these different modes admit of a fourfold subdivision ; for 
 
158 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iv, 
 
 either all may elect all by vote or by lot ; and when all 
 elect, they may either proceed without any distinction, or 
 they may elect by a certain division of tribes, wards, or 
 companies, till they have gone through the whole com- 
 munity; and some magistrates may be elected one way, 
 and others another. Again, if some magistrates are elected 
 either by vote or lot of all the citizens, or by the vote of 
 some and the lot of some, or some one way and some 
 another ; that is to say, some by the vote of all, others by 
 the lot of all, there will then be twelve different methods of 
 electing the magistrates, without blending the two together. 
 Of these there are two adapted to a democracy j namely, to 
 have all the magistrates chosen out of all the people, 
 either by vote or lot, or both ; that is to say, some of them 
 by lot, some by vote. In a free State the whole community 
 should not elect at the same time, but some out of the 
 whole, or out of some particular rank ; and this either by 
 lot or vote, or both ; and they should elect either out of the 
 whole community, or out of some particular persons in it, 
 and this both by lot and vote. In an oligarchy it is proper 
 to choose some magistrates out of the whole body of the 
 citizens, some by vote, some by lot, others by both : by lot 
 is most correspondent to that form of government. In a 
 free aristocracy, some magistrates should be chose out of the 
 community in general, others out of a particular rank, or 
 these by choice, those by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the 
 magistrates should be chose out of certain ranks, and by 
 certain persons, and some of those by lot, others by both 
 methods ; but to choose them out of the whole community 
 is not correspondent to the nature of this government. It 
 is proper in an aristocracy for the whole community to elect 
 their magistrates out of particular persons, and this by vote. 
 These, then, are all the different ways of electing of magis- 
 trates, and they have been allotted according to the nature 
 of the different communities ; but what mode of proceeding 
 
CHAP. XVI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 159 
 
 is proper for different communities, or how the offices ought 
 to be established, or with what powers, shall be particularly 
 explained. I mean by the powers of a magistrate what 
 should be his particular province, as the management of the 
 finances or the laws of the State ; for different magistrates 
 have different powers, as that of the general of the army 
 differs from the clerk of the market. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 Of the three parts of which a government is formed, we now 
 come to consider the judiciaL; and this also we shall divide, 
 in the same manner as we did the magisterial, into three 
 parts : of whom the judges shall consist, and for what 
 causes, and Iiow. When I say of whom, I mean whether 
 they shall be the whole people^ or some particulars ; by for 
 what causes, I mean how many different courts shall be 
 appointed ; by how, whether they shall be elected by vote 
 or lot. Let us first determine how many different courts 
 there ought to be. Now these are eight. The first of these 
 is the court of inspection over the behaviour of the magis- 
 trates when they have quitted their office ; the second is to 
 punish those who have injured the public ; the third is to 
 take cognizance of those causes in which the State is a party ; 
 the fourth is to decide between magistrates and private 
 persons, who appeal from a fine laid upon them ; the fifth is 
 to determine disputes which may arise concerning contracts 
 of great value ; the sixth is to judge between foreigners, 
 and of murders, of which there are different species, and 
 these may all be tried by the same judges, or by different 
 
l6o ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book iv. 
 
 ones, for there are murders of malice prepense and of 
 chance-medley; there is also justifiable homicide, where the 
 fact is admitted, and the legality of it disputed. There is 
 also another court, called at Athens the Court of Phreattse, 
 which determines points relating to a murder committed by 
 one who has run away, to decide whether he shall return, 
 though such an affair happens but seldom, and in very large 
 cities 3 the seventh to determine causes wherein strangers 
 are concerned, and this, whether they are between stranger 
 and stranger, or between a stranger and a citizen. The 
 eighth and last is for small actions, from one to five drachmas 
 or a little more ; for these ought also to be legally deter- 
 mined, but not to be brought before the whole body of the 
 judges. But without entering into any particulars concern- 
 ing actions for murder, and those wherein strangers are the 
 parties, let us particularly treat of those courts which have 
 the jurisdiction of those matters which more particularly 
 relate to the affairs of the community, and which, if not well 
 conducted, occasion seditions and commotions in the State. 
 Now of necessity, either all persons must have a right to 
 judge of all these different causes, appointed for that purpose 
 either by vote or lot, or all of all, some of them by vote, and 
 others by lot, or in some causes by vote, in others by lot. 
 Thus there will be four sorts of judges. There will be just 
 the same number also if they are chosen out of part of the 
 people only, for either all the judges miUst be chosen out of 
 that part either by vote or lot, or some by lot and some by 
 vote, or the judges in particular causes must be chosen some 
 by vote, others by lot, by which means there will be the 
 same number of them also as was mentioned. Besides, 
 different judges may be joined together, I mean those who 
 are chosen out of the whole people, or part of them, or both ; 
 so that all three may sit together in the same court, and this 
 either by vote, lot, or both. Arid thus much for the 
 different sorts of judges. Of these appointments that which 
 
CHAP. XVI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT i6i 
 
 admits all the community to be judges in all causes, is most 
 suitable to a democracy; the second, which appoints that 
 certain persons shall judge all causes, to an oligarchy ; the 
 third, which appoints the whole community to be judges in 
 some causes, but particular persons in others, to an aris- 
 tocracy or free State. 
 
BooJi V. 
 
 CHAPTER 1. 
 
 We have now gone through those particulars we proposed 
 to speak of ; it remains that we next consider from what 
 causes and how alterations in government arise, and of 
 what nature they are, and to what the destruction of each 
 State is owing ; and also to what form any form of polity is 
 most likely to shift into, and what are the means to be used 
 for the general preservation of governments, as well as what 
 are applicable to any particular State ; and also of the 
 remedies which are to be applied either to all in general, 
 or to any one considered separately, when they are in 
 a state of corruption. And here we ought first to lay 
 down this principle : That there are many governments, 
 all of which approve of what is just and what is analogi- 
 cally equal, and yet have failed from attaining thereunto, 
 as we have already mentioned ; thus democracies have 
 arose from supposing that those who are equal in one thing 
 are so in every other circumstance; as, because they are 
 equal in liberty, they are equal in everything else; and 
 oligarchies, from supposing that those who are unequal 
 in one thing are unequal in all; that when men are 
 so in point of fortune, that inequality extends to every- 
 thing else. Hence it follows that those who in some 
 respects are equal with others, think it right to endeavour 
 to partake of an equality with them in everything; and 
 
CHAP. I.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 163 
 
 those who are superior to others, endeavour to get still 
 more, and it is this mof^e which is the inequality; thus 
 most States, though they have some notion of what is just, 
 yet are almost totally wrong ; and, upon this account, when 
 either party has not that share in the administration which 
 answers to his expectations, he becomes seditious; but 
 those who of all others have the greatest right to be so, are 
 the last that are ; namely, those who excel in virtue ; for it 
 is most reasonable that their superiority alone should be 
 general. There are, too, some persons of distinguished 
 families, who, because they are so, disdain to be on an 
 equality with others, for those esteem themselves noble who 
 boast of their ancestors' merit and fortune ; these, to speak 
 truth, are the origin and fountain, from...whence seditions 
 arise. The alterations which men may propose to make in 
 governments are two ; f or either they may change the State 
 already establis hed into some other , as when they propose 
 to erect an oligarchy, where there is a democracy, or a 
 democracy or free State, where there is an oligarchy, or an 
 aristocracy from these, or those from that; or else, w hen 
 they have j io^ objection Jto Jhe^ establis hej^overnmcnj:, 
 which they like very well, but choose to ha ve the sole 
 management in it themselves ; either in Fhe hands of ajew, or 
 one only. They will also raise commotions concerning the 
 degree in which they would have the established power; 
 as if, for instance, the government is an oligarchy, to have it 
 more purely so, and in the same manner if it is a democracy, 
 or else to have it less so ; and, in like m.anner, whatever 
 may be the nature of the government, either to extend or 
 contract its powers, or else to make some alterations in 
 some parts of it as to establish or abolish a particular 
 magistracy, as some persons say Lysander endeavoured to 
 abolish the kingly power in Sparta, and Pausanias that of 
 the ephori. Thus in Epidamnus there was an alteration 
 in one part of the constitution, for instead of the philarchi 
 they established a senate. It is also necessary for all the 
 
 F 2 
 
J 64 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book v. 
 
 magistrates at Athens to attend in the court of Elaea when any 
 new magistrate is created ; the power of the archon also in 
 that State partakes of the nature of an oligarchy. Inequality 
 is always the occasion of sedition, but not when those who 
 are unequal are treated in a different manner correspondent 
 to that inequality. Thus kingly power is unequal, when 
 exercised over equals. Upon the whole, those who aim 
 after an equality are the cause of seditions. Equality is 
 twofold, either in number or value. Equality in number is 
 when two things contain the same parts, or the same 
 quantity ; equality in value is, by proportion, as two exceeds 
 one, and three two by the same number ; thus by proportion 
 four exceeds two, and two one in the same degree, for two 
 is the same part of four that one is of two ; that is to say, 
 half. Now, all agree in what is absolutely and simply just ; 
 but^ as we have already said, they dispute concerning 
 proportionate value; for some persons, if they are equal in 
 one respect, think themselves equal in all ; others, if they 
 are superior in one thing, think they may claim the 
 superiority in all; from whence chiefly arise two sorts of 
 governments, a democracy and an oligarchy; for nobility 
 and virtue are to be found only amongst a few, the contrary 
 amongst the many ; there being in no place a hundred of 
 the first to be met with, but enough of the last everywhere. 
 But to establish a government entirely upon either of these 
 equalities is wrong, and this the example of those so 
 established makes evident, for none of them have been 
 stable ; and for this reason, that it is impossible that 
 whatever is wrong at the first and in its principles should not 
 at last meet with a bad end, for which reason in some 
 things an equality of numbers ought to take place, in others 
 an equality in value. However^ a democracy is safer and 
 less liable to sedition than an oligarchy, for in this latter it 
 may arise from two causes ; for either the few in power may 
 conspire against each other, or against the people ; but in a 
 democracy only one ; namely, against the few who aim at 
 
CHAP. II.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 165 
 
 exclusive power; but there is no instance worth speaking 
 of, of a sedition of the people against themselves. More- 
 over, a government composed of men of moderate fortunes 
 comes much nearer to a democracy than an oligarchy, and 
 is the safest of all such States. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Since we are inquiring into the causes of seditions and 
 revolutions in governments, we must begin entirely with the 
 first principles from whence they arise. Now these, so 
 to speak, are nearly three in number, which we must first 
 distinguish in general from each other, and endeavour to 
 show in what situation people are who begin a sedition, and 
 for what causes \ and, thirdly, what are the beginnings of 
 political troubles and mutual quarrels with each other. 
 Now, that cause which of all others most universally inclines 
 men to desire to bring about a change in government, is 
 that which I have already mentioned ; for those who aim at 
 equality will be ever ready for sedition, if they see those 
 whom they esteem their equals possess more than they do, 
 as well as those also who are not content with equality but 
 aim at superiority, if they think, that while they deserve 
 more than, they have only equal with, or less than, their 
 inferiors. Now, what they aim at may be either just or 
 unjust ; just, when those who are inferior are seditious, that 
 they may be equal ; unjust, when those who are equal, are 
 so, that they may be superior. These, then, are the situa- 
 tions in which men will be seditious : the causes for which 
 they will be so are profit and honour^ and their contrary ; 
 for, to avoid dishonour or loss of fortune by mulcts, either 
 
1 66 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book v. 
 
 on their own account or their friends, they will raise a com- 
 motion in the State. The original causes which dispose 
 men to the things which I have mentioned, are, taken in 
 one manner, seven in number, in another they are more ; 
 two of which are the same with those that have been already 
 mentioned, but influencing in a different manner ; for 
 profit and honour sharpen men against each other, not to 
 Ret the possession of them for themselves (which was what 
 I just now supposed), but when they see others, some justly, 
 others unjustly, engrossing them. The other causes are 
 haughtiness, fear, eminence, contempt, envy of one who has 
 a fortune beyond his rank. There are also other things 
 which in a different manner will occasion revolutions in 
 governments ; as when very low people combine together to 
 manage the State, neglect, want of numbers, a too great 
 dissimilarity of circumstances. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 What influence ill-treatment and profit have for this pur- 
 pose, and how they may be the causes of sedition, is almost 
 self-evident ; for when the magistrates are haughty, and 
 endeavour to make greater profits than their office gives 
 them, they not only occasion seditions amongst each other, 
 but against the State also who gave them their power ; and 
 this their avarice has two objects : either private property, or 
 the property of the State. What influence honours have, 
 and how they may occasion sedition, is evident enough ; 
 for those who are themselves unhonoured while they see 
 others honoured, will be ready for any disturbance ; and 
 these things are done unjustly, when any one is either 
 
CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 167 
 
 honoured or discarded contrary to their deserts, justly when 
 they are, according to them. Excessive honours are also a 
 cause of sedition, when one person or more are greater than 
 the State, and the power of the government can permit ; for 
 then a monarchy or a dynasty are usually estabhshed, on 
 which account the ostracism was introduced in some places, 
 as at Argos and Athens ; though it is better to guard against 
 such excesses in the founding of a State, than when they 
 have been permitted to take place, to correct them afterward. 
 Those who have been guilty of crimes will be the cause of 
 sedition through fear of punishment j as will those also who 
 expect an injury, that they may prevent it; as was the case 
 at Rhodes, when the nobles conspired against the people, 
 on account of the decrees they expected would pass against 
 them. Contempt also is a cause of sedition and con- 
 spiracies ; as in oligarchies, where there are many who have 
 no share in the administration. The rich also even in 
 democracies, despising the disorder and anarchy which will 
 arise, hope to better themselves by the same means, which 
 happened at Thebes, after the battle of Oenophiton, where, 
 in consequence of bad administration, the democracy was 
 destroyed; as it was at Megara, where the power of the 
 people was lost through anarchy and disorder; the same 
 thing happened at Syracuse, before the tyranny of Galon ; 
 and at Rhodes there was the same seditions before the 
 popular government was overthrown. Revolutions in States 
 will also arise from a disproportionate increase ; for as the 
 body consists of many parts, it ought to increase proportion- 
 ably to preserve its symmetry, which would otherwise be 
 destroyed ; as if the foot was to be four cubits long, and the 
 rest of the body but two palms ; it might otherwise be 
 changed into an animal of a different form if it increase 
 beyond proportion not only in quantity, but also in disposi- 
 tion of parts ; so also a city consists of parts, some of which 
 may often increase without notice, as the number of poor in 
 democracies and free States. They will also sometimes 
 
i68 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book v. 
 
 happen by accident, as at Tarentum, a little after the 
 Median war, where so many of the nobles were killed in a 
 battle by the Japigi, that from a free State the government 
 was turned into a democracy ; and at Argos, where so many 
 of the citizens were killed by Cleomenes the Spartan that 
 they were obliged to admit several- husbandmen to the 
 freedom of the State ; and at Athens, through the unfor- 
 tunate event of the war by land, the number of the nobles 
 were reduced, by their being chosen into the troops in the 
 Lacedaemonian wars. Revolutions also sometimes take 
 place in a democracy, though seldomer; for where the poor 
 increase faster than men of property, they become oli- 
 garchies or dynasties. Governments also sometimes alter 
 without seditions, by a combination of the meaner people, 
 as at Heraea ; for which purpose they changed the mode of 
 election from votes to lots, and thus got themselves chosen, 
 and by neghgence, as when the citizens admit those who are 
 not friends to the constitution into the chief offices of the 
 State, which happened at Orus, when the oligarchy of the 
 archons was put an end to at the election of Heracleodorus, 
 who changed that form of government into a democratic 
 free State. By little and little, I mean by this, that very 
 often great alterations silently take place in the form of 
 government, from people's overlooking small matters ; as at 
 Ambracia, where the census was originally small, but at last 
 became nothing at all, as if a little and nothing at all were 
 nearly or entirely alike. That State also is liable to sedi- 
 tions which is composed of different nations, till their 
 differences are blended together and undistinguishable ; for 
 as a city cannot be composed of every multitude, so neither 
 can it in every given time; for which reason all those 
 republics which have hitherto been originally composed of 
 different people, or afterwards admitted their neighbours to 
 the freedom of their city, have been most liable to revolutions, 
 as when the Achaean s joined with the Traezenians in 
 founding Sybaris ; for soon after, growing more powerful 
 
CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 169 
 
 than the Trsezenians, they expelled them from the city, 
 from whence came the proverb of Sybarite wickedness ; and 
 again disputes from a like cause happened at Thurium, 
 between the Sybarites and those who had joined with them 
 in building the city ; for they assuming upon these, on 
 account of the country being their own, were driven out. 
 And at Byzantium the new citizens, being detected in plots 
 against the State, were driven out of the city by force of 
 arms. The Antisleans also, having taken in those who 
 were banished from Chios, afterwards did the same thing ; 
 and also the Zancleans, after having taken in the people of 
 Samos. The AppoUoniats, in the Euxine Sea, having 
 admitted their sojourners to the freedon of their city, were 
 troubled with seditions ; and the Syracusians, after the 
 expulsion of their tyrants, having enrolled strangers and 
 mercenaries amongst their citizens, quarrelled with each 
 other and came to an open rupture : and the people of 
 Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalusians, were 
 the greater part of them driven out of the city by them. 
 Many persons occasion seditions in oligarchies because 
 they think themselves ill used in not sharing the honours of 
 the State with their equals, as I have already mentioned ; 
 but in democracies the principal people do the same, 
 because they have not more than an equal share with others 
 who are not equal to them. The situation of the place will 
 also sometimes occasion disturbances in the State, when the 
 ground is not well adapted for one city ; as at Clazomene, 
 where the people who lived in that part of the town called 
 Chytrum quarrelled with them who lived in the island, and 
 the Cholophonians with the Notians. At Athens, too, the 
 disposition of the citizens is not the same, for those who live 
 in the Pyrseus are more attached to a popular government 
 than those who live in the city properly so called; for as 
 the interposition of a rivulet, however small, will occasion 
 the line of the phalanx to fluctuate, so any trifling disagree- 
 ment will be the cause of seditions ; but they will not so 
 
I70 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book v. 
 
 soon flow from anything else as from the disagreement 
 between virtue and vice, and next to that between poverty 
 and riches, and so on in order, one cause having more influ- 
 ence than another, one of which that I last mentioned. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 But seditions in government do not arise for little things, 
 but from them, for their immediate cause is something of 
 moment. Now, trifling quarrels are attended with the 
 greatest consequences, when they arise between persons of 
 the first distinction in the State, as was the case with the 
 Syracusians in a remote period ; for a revolution in the 
 government was brought about by a quarrel between two 
 young men who were in office, upon a love affair ; for one 
 of them being absent, the other seduced his mistress ; he in 
 his turn, offended with this, persuaded his friend's wife to 
 come and live with him, and upon this the whole city took 
 part either with the one or the other, and the government 
 was overturned : therefore every one at the beginning of such 
 disputes ought to take care to avoid the consequences^ and 
 to smother up all quarrels which may happen to arise 
 amongst those in power, for the mischief lies in the 
 beginning ; for the beginning is said to be half of the 
 business, so that what was then but a little fault, will be 
 found afterwards to bear its full proportion to what follows. 
 Moreover, disputes between men of note involve the whole 
 city in their consequences ; as in Hestiaea, after the Median 
 war : two brothers having a dispute aboat their paternal 
 estate, he who was the poorer, from the other's having con- 
 cealed part of the effects, and some money which his father 
 
CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 171 
 
 had found, engaged the popular party on his side, while the 
 other, who was rich, the men of fashion. And at Delphos, 
 a quarrel about a wedding was the beginning of all the 
 seditions that afterwards arose amongst them; for the bride- 
 groom, being terrified by some unlucky omen upon waiting 
 upon the bride, went away without marrying her; which her 
 relations resenting, contrived secretly to convey some sacred 
 money into his pocket while he was sacrificing, and then 
 killed him as an impious person. At Mitylene also, a 
 dispute which arose concerning a right of heritage, was the 
 beginning of great evils, and a war with the Athenians, in 
 which Paches took their city, for Tymophanes, a man of 
 fortune, leaving two daughters, Doxander, who was circum- 
 vented in procuring them in marriage for his two sons, began 
 a sedition, and excited the Athenians to attack them, being 
 the host of that State. There was also a dispute at Phocea, 
 concerning a right of inheritance, between Mnasis, the 
 father of Mnasis, and Euthucrates, the father of Onomarchus, 
 which brought on the Phoceans the sacred war. The 
 government, too, of Epidamnus was changed from a quarrel 
 that arose from an intended marriage ; for a certain man 
 having contracted his daughter in marriage, the father of the 
 young person to whom she was contracted, being archon, 
 punishes him, upon which account he, resenting the affront, 
 associated himself with those who were excluded from any 
 share in the government, and brought about a revolution. 
 A government may be changed either into an oligarchy, 
 democracy, or a free State, when the magistrates or any 
 part of the city acquire great credit, or are increased in 
 power, as the court of Areopagus at Athens, having procured 
 great credit during the Median war, added firmness to their 
 administration ; and, on the other hand, the maritime force, 
 composed of the commonalty, having gained the victory at 
 Salamis, by their power at sea, got the lead in the State, and 
 strengthened the popular party ; and at Argos, the nobles^ 
 having gained great credit by the battle of Mantinea against 
 
172 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [rook v. 
 
 the Lacedaemonians, endeavoured to dissolve the democracy. 
 And at Syracuse, the victory in their war with the Athenians 
 being owing to the common people, they changed their free 
 State into a democracy ; and at Chalcis, the people having 
 taken off the tyrant Phocis, together with the nobles, 
 immediately seized the government; and at Ambracia also, 
 the people having expelled the tyrant Periander, with his 
 party, placed the supreme power in themselves. And this 
 in general ought to be known, that whosoever has been the 
 occasion of a State being powerful, whether private persons, 
 or magistrates, a certain tribe, or any particular part of the 
 citizens, or the multitude, be they who they will, will be the 
 cause of disputes in the State. For either some persons, 
 who envy them the honours they have acquired, will begin 
 to be seditious, or they, on account of the dignity they have 
 acquired, will not be content with their former equality. A 
 State is also liable to commotions, when those parts of it 
 which seem to be opposite to each other approach to an 
 equaHty, as the rich and the common people : so that the 
 part which is between them both is either nothing at all, or 
 too little to be noticed ; for if one party is so much more 
 powerful than the other as to be evidently stronger, that 
 other will not be willing to hazard the danger ; for which 
 reason those who are superior in excellence and virtue will 
 never be the cause of seditions ; for they will be too few 
 for that purpose when compared to the many. In general, 
 the beginning and the causes of seditions in all States are 
 such as I have now described, and revolutions therein are 
 brought about in two ways, either by violence or fraud : if by 
 violence, either at first, or compelling them to submit to the 
 change when it is made. It may also be brought about by 
 fraud in two different ways, either when the people, being 
 at first deceived, willingly consent to an alteration in their 
 government, and are afterwards obliged by force to abide 
 by it ; as, for instance, when the four hundred imposed upon 
 the people, by telhng them that the king of Persia would 
 
CHAP, v.] ARISTOTLE OA^ GOVERNMENT, 173 
 
 supply them with money for the war against the Lacedae- 
 monians ; and after they had been guilty of this falsity, they 
 endeavoured to keep possession of the supreme power ; or 
 when they are at first persuaded, and afterwards consent to 
 be governed ; and by one of these methods which I have 
 mentioned are all revolutions in governments brought 
 about. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 We ought now to inquire into those events which will arise 
 from these causes, in every species of government. Demo- 
 cracies will be most subject to revolutions from the dis- 
 honesty of their demagogues ; for partly, by informing 
 against men of property, they induce them to join to- 
 gether through self-defence, for a common fear will make 
 the grea test enemies unite,~ ~and partly by setting'^ie 
 common people against them : and this is what any one 
 may continually see practised in many States. In the 
 Island of Cos, for instance, the democracy was subverted 
 by the wickedness of the demagogues, for the nobles 
 entered into a combination with each other. And at 
 Rhodes, the demagogues, by distributing of bribes, pre- 
 vented the people from paying the trierarchs what was 
 owing to them, who were obliged by the number of actions 
 they were harassed with to conspire together and destroy 
 the popular State. The same thing was brought about at 
 Heraclea, soon after the settlement of the city, by the same 
 persons ; for the citizens of note, being ill treated by them, 
 quitted the city, but afterwards joining together they 
 returned and overthrew the popular State. Just in the 
 same manner the democracy was destroyed in Megara ; for 
 
174 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [boo^c'v. 
 
 there the demagogues, to procure money by confiscations, 
 drove out the nobles, till the number of those who were 
 banished was considerable, who^ returning, got the better of 
 the people in a battle, and established an oligarchy. The 
 like happened at Cume, during the time of the democracy, 
 which Thrasymachus destroyed; and whoever considers 
 what has happened in other States may perceive the same 
 revolutions to have arose from the same causes. The 
 demagogues, to curry favour with the people, drive the 
 nobles to conspire together, either by dividing their estates, 
 or obliging them to spend them on pubhc services, or by 
 banishing them, that they may confiscate the fortunes of the 
 wealthy. In former times, when the same person was both 
 demagogue and general, the democracies were changed into 
 tyrannies ; and indeed most of the ancient tyrannies arose 
 from those States : a reason for which then subsisted, but 
 not now; for at that time the demagogues were of the 
 soldiery, for they were not then powerful by their eloquence; 
 but, now the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers 
 are at present the demagogues, but as they are unqualified 
 to act in a miUtary capacity, they cannot impose themselves 
 on the people as tyrants, if we except in one or two trifling 
 instances. Formerly, too, tyrannies were more common 
 than now, on account of the very extensive powers with 
 which some magistrates were entrusted : as the prytanes at 
 Miletus, for they were supreme in many things of the last 
 consequence ; and also because at that time the cities were 
 not of that very great extent, the people in general living in 
 the country, and being employed in husbandry, which gave 
 them, who took the lead in public affairs, an opportunity, if 
 they had a turn for war, to make themselves tyrants ; which 
 they all did when they had gained the confidence of the 
 people; and this confidence was their hatred to the rich. 
 This was the case of Pisistratus at Athens, when he opposed 
 the Pediaci, and of Theaganes in Megara^ who slaughtered 
 the cattle belonging to the rich, after he had seized those 
 
CHA^VI.] ARISTOT^LE ON GOVERNMENT. 175 
 
 who kept them by the river- side. Theaganes also, for 
 accusing Daphn^eus and the rich, was thought worthy of 
 being raised to a tyranny, from the confidence which the 
 people had of his being a popular man, in consequence of 
 these enmities. A government shall also alter from its 
 ancient and approved democratic form into one entirely new, 
 if there is no census to regulate the election of magistrates; 
 for, as the election is with the people, the demagogues who 
 are desirous of being in office, to flatter them will endeavour 
 with all their power to make the people superior even to the 
 laws. To prevent this entirely, or at least in a great measure, 
 the magistrates should be elected by the tribes, and not by 
 the people at large. These are nearly the revolutions to 
 which democracies are liable, and also the causes from 
 whence they arise. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 There are two things which of all others most evidently 
 occasion a revolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the 
 people are ill use d, for then every individual is ripe for 
 sedition, more particularly if one of the oligarchy should 
 happen to be their leader, as Lygdamis, at Naxus, who 
 was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also which 
 arise from different causes will differ from each other ; 
 for sometimes a revolution is brought about by the rich, 
 who have no share in the administration, which is in the 
 hands of a very few indeed : and this happened at MassiHa, 
 Ister, Heraclea, and other cities ; for those who had no 
 share in the government ceased not to raise disputes till 
 they were admitted to it : first the elder brothers, and then 
 the younger also, for in some places the father and son 
 
176 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book v. 
 
 are never in office at the same time ; in others, the elder 
 and yomiger brother; and where this is observed the 
 oligarchy partakes something of a free State. At Ister 
 it was changed into a democracy; in Heraclea, instead 
 of being in the hands of a few, it consisted of six hundred. 
 At Cnidus, the oligarchy was destroyed by the nobles 
 quarrelling with each other, because the government was in 
 the hands of so few : for there, as we have just mentioned, 
 if the father was in office, the son could not ; or, if there 
 were many brothers, the eldest only ; for the people, taking 
 advantage of their disputes, elected one of the nobles for 
 their general, and got the victory : for where there are 
 seditions, government is weak. And formerly at Erithria, 
 during the oligarchy of the Basilides, although the State 
 flourished greatly under their excellent management, yet 
 because the people were displeased that the power should 
 be in the hands of so few, the^ changed the government. 
 Oligarchies also are subject to revolutions, from those who 
 are in office therein, from the quarrels of the demagogues 
 with each other. The demagogues are of two sorts; one 
 who flatter the few when they are in power, for even these 
 have their demagogues ; such was Charicles at Athens, who 
 had great influence over the thirty; and, in the same 
 manner, Phrynicus over the four hundred. The others are 
 those demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy, and 
 flatter the people : such were the State-guardians at Larissa, 
 who flattered the people because they were elected by 
 them. And this will always happen in every oligarchy 
 where the magistrates do not elect themselves, but are chose 
 out of men either of great fortune or certain ranks, by the 
 soldiers or by the people, as was the custom at Abydos. 
 And when the judicial department is not in the hands of the 
 supreme power, the demagogues, favouring the people in 
 their causes, overturned the government, which happened 
 at Heraclea in Pontus : and also when some desire to 
 contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands, for 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 177 
 
 those who endeavour to support an equality, are obliged to 
 apply to the people for assistance. An oligarchy is also 
 subject to revolutions, when the nobility spend their fortunes 
 by luxury; for such persons are desirous of innovations, 
 and either endeavour to be tyrants themselves, or to support 
 others in being so, as Hypparinus supported Dionysius of 
 Syracuse. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a 
 colony of Chalcidians, and when they came set them to 
 quarrel with the rich ; and at ^gina^ a certain person who 
 brought an action against Chares, attempted on that account 
 to alter the government. Sometimes they will try to raise 
 commotions, sometimes they will rob the public, and 
 then quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who 
 endeavour to detect them, which was the case at Apollonia 
 in Pontus. But if the members of an oligarchy a ^ g ree 
 among themselves, th e State is not very easily destroy ed 
 without some external force. Pharsalus is a proof of this^ 
 
 Whei^"^fHougli^fhT"paceis small, yet the citizens have great 
 power, from the prudent use they make of it. An oligarchy 
 also will be destroyed when they create another oligarchy 
 under it ; that is, when the management of public affairs is in 
 the hands of a few, and not equally, but when all of them do 
 not partake of the supreme power, as happened once at 
 Elis, where the supreme power in general was in the hands 
 of a very few, out of whom a senate was chosen, consisting 
 but of ninety, who held their places for life ; and their 
 mode of election was calculated to preserve the power 
 amongst each other's families, like the senators at Lace* 
 daemon. An oligarchy is liable to a revolution both in 
 time of war and peace ; in war, because, through a distrust 
 in the citizens, the government is obliged to employ mer- 
 cenary troops, and he to whom they give the command 
 of the army will very often assume the tyranny, as Tymo- 
 phanes did at Corinth ; and if they appoint more than one 
 general, they will very probably establish a dynasty, and 
 sometimes, through fear of this, they are forced to let the 
 
178 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book v 
 
 people in general have some share in the government, 
 because they are obliged to employ them. In peace, from 
 tlieir want of confidence in each other, they will entrust the 
 guardianship of the State to mercenaries and their general, 
 who will be an arbiter between them, and sometimes be- 
 come master of both, which happened at Larissa, when the 
 Haleuadse had the chief power at Samos. The same thing 
 happened at Abydos, during the time of the association, of 
 which Iphiades was one. Commotions also will happen in 
 an oligarchy from one party's overbearing and insulting 
 another, or from their quarrelling about their lawsuits or 
 marriages. How their marriages, for instance, will have 
 that effect has been already shown; and in Eretria, 
 Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights upon the 
 same account. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a 
 certain person being condemned by the court ; and at 
 Thebes, in consequence of a man's being guilty of adultery; 
 the punishment indeed which Eurytion suffered at Hera- 
 clea was just, yet was it illegally executed, as was that at 
 Thebes upon Archias ; for their enemies endeavoured to 
 have them publicly bound in the pillory. Many revolutions 
 also have been brought about in oligarchies by those who 
 could not brook the despotism which those persons assumed 
 who were in power, as at Cnidus and Chios. Changes also 
 may happen by accident in what we call a free State and in 
 an oligarchy, wheresoever the senators, judges, and magis- 
 trates are chosen according to a certain census ; for it often 
 happens that what was fixed at first as the highest census, 
 so that a few only could have a share in the government in 
 an oligarchy, and those of moderate fortunes in a free State, 
 when the city grows rich, through peace, or some other 
 happy cause, becomes so little, that every one's fortune is 
 equal to the census, so that the whole community may 
 partake of all the honours of government ; and this change 
 sometimes happens by little and little, and insensibly 
 approaches, sometimes quicker. These are the revolutions 
 
CPIAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 179 
 
 and seditions that arise in oligarchies, and the causes to 
 which they are owing ; and indeed both democracies and 
 oligarchies sometimes alter, not into governments of a con- 
 trary form, but into those of the same government ; as, for 
 instance, from having the supreme power in the law, to vest 
 it in the ruling party, or the contrariwise. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Commotions also arise in aristocracies from there being so 
 few persons in power (as we have already observed they do 
 in oligarchies, for in this particular an aristocracy is most 
 near an oligarchy, for in both these States the administration 
 of public affairs is in the hands of a few ; not that this arises 
 from the same cause in both, though herein they chiefly 
 seem alike), and these will necessarily be most likely to 
 happen when the generality of the people are high-spirited, 
 and think themselves equal to each other in merit; such 
 were those at Lacedaemon, called the Partheniae (for these 
 were, as well as others, descendants of citizens), who being 
 detected in a conspiracy against the State, were sent to 
 found Tarentum. They will happen also when some great 
 men are disgraced by those who have received higher 
 honours than themselves, to whom they are no ways in- 
 ferior in abihties, as Lysander by the kings ; or when an 
 ambitious man cannot get into power^ as Cinadon, who, in 
 the reign of Agesilaus, was chief in a conspiracy against 
 the Spartans ; and also when some are too poor and others 
 too rich, which will most frequently happen in time of war, 
 as at Lacedaemon during the Messenian war, which is proved 
 by a poem of Tyrtaeus^ called Eunomia, for some persons 
 
i8o ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book v. 
 
 being reduced thereby, desired that the lands might be 
 divided; and also when some person of very high rank 
 might still be higher if he could rule alone, which seemed to 
 be Pausanias' intention at Lacedsemon, when he was their 
 general in the Median war, and Anno's, at Carthage. _Eut 
 free States and aristocracies are mostly destroyed from wanj^ 
 < ^a fixed administration of public affairs , the cause of which 
 evil arises at first from want of a due mixture of the demo- 
 cratic and the oligarchic parts in a free State, and in an 
 ' aristocracy from the same causes, and also from virtue not 
 ^eing properly joined to power ; but chiefly from the two 
 first, I mean the undue mixture of the democratic and oli- 
 garchic parts ; for these two are what all free States endeavour 
 to blend together, and many of those which we call aristo- 
 cracies. In this particular these States differ from each other, 
 and on this account the one of them is less stable than the 
 other, for that State which inclines most to an oligarchy is 
 called an aristocracy, and that which inclines most to a 
 democracy is called a free State ; on which account this latter 
 ^ ^ is more secure than the former, fibr the wider the foundation 
 the securer the building^,^ and it is ever best to live where 
 jiAequality prevails. But the rich, if the community gives them 
 '1 rank, very often endeavour to insult and tyrannize over 
 others. On the whole, whichever way a government 
 inclines, in that it will settle, each party supporting their 
 own. Thus a free State will become a democracy, an aristo- 
 cracy an oligarchy, or the contrary, an aristocracy may 
 change into a democracy (for the poor, if they think them- 
 selves injured, directly take part with the contrary side), and 
 a free State into an oHgarchy. The only firm State is that 
 w^here every one enjoys that equahty he has a right to, and 
 fully possesses what is his own. And what I have been 
 speaking of happened to the Thurians, for the magistrates 
 being elected according to a very high census, it was altered 
 to a lower, and they were subdivided into more courts, but in 
 consequence of the nobles possessing all the land, contrary 
 
CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. iSi 
 
 to law, the State was too much of an oHgarchy, which gave 
 them an opportunity of encroaching greatly on the rest of 
 the people j but these, after they had been well inured to 
 war, so far got the better of their guards, as to expel every 
 ^ one out of the country who possessed more than he ought. 
 Moreover, as all aristocracies are free oligarchies, the nobles 
 therein endeavour to have ratjier_too m uch po wer, as at 
 Lacedaemon, where property is now in the hands of a few, 
 and the nobles, have too much liberty to do as they please, 
 and make such alliances as they please. Thus the city of the 
 Locrians was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius, which 
 State was neither a democracy nor well-tempered aristocracy. 
 But an aristocracy chiefly approaches to a secret change by 
 its being destroyed by degrees, as we have already said of 
 all governments in general ; and this happens from the 
 cause of the alteration being trifling, for whenever anything 
 which in the leasT regards The State is treated w^ith contempt, 
 after that something else, and this of a little more conse- 
 quence, will be more easily altered, until the whole fabric 
 of government is entirely subverted, which happened in the 
 government of Thurium ; for the law being that they should 
 continue soldiers for five years, some young men of a martial 
 disposition, who were in great esteem amongst their officer?, 
 despising those who had the management of public affairs, 
 and imagining they could easily accomplish their intention, 
 first endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having 
 it lawful to continue the same person perpetually in the 
 miUtary, perceiving that the people would readily appoint 
 them. Upon this, the magistrates, who are called coun- 
 sellors, first joined together, with an intention to oppose it, 
 but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief 
 that if that law was not repealed they would permit the 
 management of all other public affairs to remain In their 
 hands ; but afterwards, when they endeavoured to restrain 
 some fresh alterations that were making, they found that 
 they cou' i do nothing, for the whole form of government 
 
]82 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book v. 
 
 was altered into a dynasty of those who first introduced the 
 innovations. In short, all governments are liable to be 
 destroyed either from within or from without ; from without, 
 when they have for their neighbour a State whose policy is 
 contrary to theirs^ and indeed if it has great power, the same 
 thing will happen if it is not their neighbour ; of which both 
 the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians are a proof/ for the 
 one, when conquerors, everywhere destroyed the oligarchies, 
 the other the democracies. These are the chief causes of 
 revolutions and dissensions in governments. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 We are now to consider upon what the preservation of 
 governments in general, and of each State in particular 
 depends ; and, in the first place, it is evident that if we 
 are right in the causes we have assigned for their destruc- 
 tion, we know also the means of their preservation, for 
 things contrary produce contraries, but destruction and 
 preservation are contrary to each other. In well-tempered 
 governments it requires as much care as anything whatso- 
 ever) toffiothing^'bT^ contrarjjjo^^ja^ and this ought 
 chiellyloTiel^fenSeS'T^ of small consequence ; 
 
 for an illegality that approaches insensibly, approaches 
 secretly, as in a family, small expenses continually re- 
 peated, consume a man's income, for the understanding 
 is deceived thereby, as by this false argument; if every 
 part is little, then the whole is little : now, this in one sense 
 is true, in another is false, for the whole and all the parts 
 together are large, though made up of small parts. The 
 first, therefore, of anything is what the State ought to guard 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 183 
 
 against. In the next place, no credit ought to be given to 
 those who endeavour to deceive the people with false pre- 
 tences ; for they will be confuted by facts. The different 
 ways in which they will attempt to do this have been 
 already mentioned. You may often perceive both aris- 
 tocracies and oligarchies continuing firm, not from the 
 stability of their forms of government, but from the wise 
 conduct of the magistrates, both towards those who have a 
 part in the management of public affairs, and those also 
 who have not : towards those who have not, by never 
 injuring them, and also introducing those who are of 
 most consequence amongst them into office, nor disgrac- 
 ing those who are desirous of honour, or encroaching on 
 the property of individuals; towards those who have, by 
 behaving to each other upon an equality, for that equality 
 which the favourers of a democracy desire to have estab- 
 lished in the State is not only just, but convenient also, 
 amongst those who are of the same rank : for which reason, 
 if the administration is in the hands of many, those rules 
 which are established in democracies will be very useful ; 
 as to let no one continue in office longer than six months, 
 that all those who are of the same rank may have their 
 turn, for between these there is a sort of democracy, for 
 which reason demagogues are most likely to arise up 
 amongst them, as we have already mentioned; besides, 
 by this means both aristocracies and democracies will be 
 the less liable to be corrupted into dynasties, because it 
 will not be so easy for those who are magistrates for a little 
 to do as much mischief as they could in a long time ; for it 
 is from hence that tyrannies arise in democracies and oli- 
 garchies, for either those who are most powerful in each 
 State establish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the one, the 
 dynasties in the other^ or the chief magistrates who have 
 been long in power. Governments are sometimes pre- 
 
 served, not only by having the means of their corruption 
 at a great distance, but also by its being very near them ; 
 
184 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book v. 
 
 for those who are alarmed at some impending evil, keep a 
 stricter hand over the State ; for which reason it is necessary 
 for those who have the guardianship of the constitution to 
 be able to awaken the fears of the people, that they may 
 preserve it, and not like a night-guard to be remiss in 
 protecting the State, but to make_the distant danger 
 appear at hand. Great care ought also to be used to 
 endeavour to restrain the quarrels and disputes of the 
 nobles by laws^ as well as to prevent those who are not 
 already engaged in them from taking a part therein ; for 
 to perceive an evil at its very first approach is not the lot 
 of every one, but of the politician. To prevent any altera- 
 tion taking place in an oligarchy or free State on account 
 of the census, if that happens to continue the same, while 
 the quantity of money is increased, it will be useful to take 
 a general account of the whole amount of it in former times, 
 to compare it with the present, and to dp this every year in 
 those cides where the census is yearly, in larger com- 
 munities once in three or five years ; and if the whole 
 should be found much larger or much less than it was 
 at the time when the census was first established in the 
 State, let there be a law either to extend or contract it, 
 doing both these according to its increase or decrease, if 
 it increases making the census larger, if it decreases 
 smaller; and if this latter is not done in oligarchies and 
 free States, you will have a dynasty arise in the one, an 
 oligarchy in the other: if the former is not, free States wall 
 be changed into democracies, and oligarchies into free 
 States or democracies. It is a general maxim in demo- 
 cracies, oligarchies, monarchies, and indeed in all govern- 
 ments, not to let any one acquire a rank far superior to the 
 rest cf the community, but rather to endeavour to confer 
 moderate honours for a continuance, than great ones for a 
 short time ; for these latter spoil men, for it is not every one 
 who can bear prosperity : but if this rule is not observed, let 
 not those honours which were conferred all at once, be all 
 
HAP. 
 
 ^^TLE ON GOVERNMENT, 
 
 once t A\ J' vay, b,[t rather by degree sj^/^t, above all 
 lings, le^j^this -eg-Jillion be made by the law, that no one 
 wcr, either by means of his fortune 
 asy for his excess therein, let it be 
 quit the country. Now, as map^ 
 ions, that they may eni^y U^jsiiJir 
 ag, tiiore oughi; V, a. pa^r^naiar 
 
 ) lives, whether it i.iay be ai^Jj^Wa-J^*^'^'' ^^W.^P^')'^^^ 
 y other form of go vo tn c ni ; fWgtj^^^ ^ reason, 
 ose should be guarded against|^^r^re most prosperous 
 
 the city : the means o.' doing which is by appointing 
 ose who are otherwise to tr.,^ business and the offices of 
 e State." I mean, to oppose^ men of account to the 
 mmon people, the poor to the rich, and to blend both 
 ese into one body, and to increase the numbers of those 
 10 are in the middle rank; and this will prevent those 
 ditions which arise from an inequality of condition. But 
 lOve all, in every State it is necessary both by the laws, 
 d every other method possible, to prevent those who are 
 iployed by the public from being venal, and this par- 
 ;ularly in an oligarchy ; for then the people will not be so 
 ach displeased from seeing themselves excluded from a 
 are in the government (nay, they will rather be glad to 
 ve leisure to attend their private affairs) as at suspecting 
 at the officers of the State steal the public money ; then 
 deed they are afflicted with double concern, both because 
 ey are deprived of the honours of the State, and pillaged 
 
 those who enjoy them. There is one method of blend- 
 ^ together a democracy and an aristocracy, if any one 
 ould choose to form such a State ; by which means both 
 e rich and the poor will enjoy what they desire ; for to 
 mit all to a share in the government is democratical, that 
 s rich should be in office is aristocratical. This must be 
 'ne by letting no public employment whatsoever be 
 
 185 
 
 lall have-jl 
 • friendsj 
 mtrived i 
 arsons pr| 
 irticular 
 ficer to i| 
 ese are not contni 
 
i86 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMEJ [book v. 
 
 attended with any emolument ; for the poor wu. \ot desire 
 to b@ in office when they can get nothing by it/ but had 
 rather attend to their own affairs ; but the rich v.ill choose 
 it, as they want nothing of the community. Thu'i the poor 
 will increase their fortunes by being wholly employed in 
 Lheir own conqenis; and the principal part of the people 
 will not be governed by the lower sort. To prevent the 
 exchequer from being defrauded, let public money be 
 delivered out openly in the face of the whole city, and let 
 copies of the accounts be deposited in the different wards, 
 tribes, and divisions. But, as the niagistrates are to execute 
 their offices without any advantages, the law' ought to pro- 
 vide proper honours for those /ho execute them well, fri 
 democracies also it is necessary that the rich should be pro- 
 tected, by not permitting rht ir lands to be divided, nor even 
 the produce of them, wlncU 1.* some States is done unper- 
 ceivably. It would be also better if the people would 
 prevent them, when they offe.^ to exhibit a number of un- 
 necessary and yet expensive public entertainments of plays, 
 music, processions, and the hke. In an oligarchy it is 
 necessary to take great care of the poor, and allot them 
 public employments which are gainful ; and, if any of the 
 rich insult them, to let their punishment be severer than if 
 they insulted one of their own rank ; and to let estates pass | 
 by affinity, and not gift j nor to permit any person to have 
 more than one; for by this means property will be more 
 equally divided, and the greater part of the poor get into ; 
 better circumstances. It is also serviceable in a democracy j 
 and an oligarchy to allot those who take no part in public \ 
 affairs an equality, or a preference in other things; the rich \ 
 in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy : but ,, still all th e:> : 
 pr incipal offic es in the^State to be fille d only by those who 
 are best qualified to discharge them. 
 
CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 187 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 There are three qualifications necessary for those who fill 
 the first departments in government ; first of all, a n affection 
 for Jhe estab lished constitution ; ^second place, ^abili ties 
 every way completely equal to the business of their ofiice ; 
 m the third, virtue and justice correspondent to the nature_ 
 of that particular State they are placed inj^for if justice is 
 not the same in all States, it is evident that there must be 
 different species thereof There may be some doubt, when 
 all these qualifications do not meet in the same persons, in 
 what manner the choice shall be made ; as, for instance, 
 suppose that one person is an accomplished general, but a 
 bad man, and no friend to the constitution ; another is just, 
 and a friend to it j which shall one prefer ? We should then 
 consider of two qualities, which of them the generality 
 possess in a greater degree, which in a less ; for which 
 reason in the choice of a general we should regard his 
 courage more than his virtue, as the more uncommon 
 quality, as there are fewer capable of conducting an army 
 than there are good men : but to protect the State or 
 manage the finances, the contrary rule should be followed ; 
 for these require greater virtue than the generality are 
 possessed of, but only that knowledge which is common to 
 all. It may be asked, if a man has abilities equal to his 
 appointment in the State, and is affectionate to the consti- 
 tution, what occasion is there for being virtuous, since these 
 two things alone are sufficient to enable him to be useful to 
 the public ? It is because those who possess those qualities 
 are often deficient in prudence ; for, as they often neglect 
 their own affairs, though they know them, and love them- 
 selves, so nothing will prevent their serving the public in 
 the same manner. In short, whatsoever the laws contain, 
 which we allow to be useful to the State, contributes to its 
 
i88 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book V. 
 
 preservation; but its first and principal support is (has as 
 i^een often insisted upon) to have the number of those who 
 oesire to preserve it greater than those who wish to destroy 
 |it.\ Above all things that ought not to be forgot, which 
 n^ny governments now corrupted neglect ; namely, to pre- 
 serve a medium. For many things seemingly favourable to 
 a democracy, destroya democracy ; and many things 
 seemingly favourable to an oligarchy, destroy an oligarchy. 
 Those who think this the only virtue, extend it to excess, 
 not considering that as a nose which varies a little from 
 perfect straightness, either towards a hook nose, or aflat one, 
 may yet be beautiful and agreeable to look at ; but if this 
 particularity is extended beyond measure, first of all the 
 properties of the part is lost, but at last it can hardly be 
 admitted to be a nose at all, on account of the excess of 
 the rise or sinking; thus it is with other parts of the human 
 body. So also the same thing is true with respect to States ; 
 for both an oligarchy and a democracy may something vary 
 from their most perfect form, and yet be well constituted ; 
 but if any one endeavours to extend either of them too far, 
 at first he will make the government the worse for it, but at 
 last there will be no government at all remaining. The 
 lawgiver and the politician therefore should know well what 
 preserves and what destroys a democracy or an oligarchy, 
 for neither the one or the other can possibly continue with- 
 out rich and poor ; but that whenever an entire equality of 
 circumstances prevails, the State must necessarily become 
 of another form, so that those who destroy these laws, 
 which authorize an inequality in property, destroy the 
 government. It is also an error in democracies for the 
 demagogues to endeavour to make the common people 
 superior to the laws, and thus by setting them at variance 
 with the rich, dividing one city into two, whereas they 
 ought rather to speak in favour of the rich. In oligarchies, 
 on the contrary^ it is wrong to support those who are in 
 administration against the people. The oaths also which 
 
CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 189 
 
 they take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they 
 now are ; for, at present, in some places they swear, I will 
 be adverse to the common people, and contrive all I can 
 against them ; " whereas they ought rather to suppose and 
 pretend the contrary; expressing in their oaths that they 
 will not injure the people. But of all things which I have 
 mentioned, that which contributes most to preserve the 
 State, is — what is now most despised — to educate you r 
 children for the State : for the most useful laws, and most 
 approved by every state smaUj^ will be of no service if the 
 citize ns are not accustomed ^Q _a nd brought up In t he 
 pr mciples of the constitution ; of a democra c y, if that is b y 
 law established ; of an oligarchy, if that is ; for if there are 
 bad morals in one man, there are in the city. But to educate 
 a child fit for the State, it must not be done in the manner 
 which would please either those who have the power in an 
 oligarchy, or those who desire a democracy, but so as they 
 may be able to conduct either of these forms of governments. 
 But now the children of the magistrates in an oligarchy are 
 brought up too delicately, and the children of the poor hardy 
 with exercise and labour ; so that they are both desirous of 
 and able to promote innovations. In democracies of the 
 purest form, they pursue a method which is contrary to their 
 welfare ; the reason of which is, that they define liberty 
 wrong; now, there are two things which seem to be the 
 objects of a democracy: tha t the peo ple in general should , 
 possess thesup reme power, and all ^rijo y frppdorp ; for that 
 which is justseems to be equal, and what the people think 
 equal, that is a law ; now, their freedom and equahty consists 
 in every one's doing what they please; that is, in such a 
 democracy every one may live as he likes ; " as his inclina- 
 tion guides," in the words of Euripides ; but this is wrong, 
 for no one ought to think it slavery to live in subjection to 
 government, but protection. Thus I have mentioned the 
 causes of corruption in different States^ and the means ot 
 their preservation. 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book V. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 It now remains that we speak of monarchies, their causes - 
 of corruption, and means of preservation ; and indeed 
 ahnost the same things which have been said of other govern- 
 ments happen to kingdoms and tyrannies, for a kingdom 
 partakes of an aristocracy, a tyranny of the worst species of 
 an ohgarchy and democracy^ for which reason it is the worst 
 that man can submit to, as being composed of two, both of 
 which are bad, and collectively retains all the corruptions 
 and all the defects of both these States. These two species 
 of monarchies arise from principles contrary to each other : 
 a kingdom is formed to protect the better sort of people 
 against the multitude, andsj^ings^are appointed out of those 
 who are chosen either for their superior virtue, and actions 
 flowing from virtuous principles, or else from their noble 
 descent; but a tyrant is chosen out of the meanest popu- 
 lace, an enemy to the better sort, that the common people 
 may not be oppressed by them. That this is true experience 
 convinces us, for the generality of tyrants were indeed mere 
 demagogues, who gained credit with the people by oppress- 
 ing the nobles. Some tyrannies were established in this 
 manner, after the cities were considerably enlarged ; others, 
 before that time, by kings who exceeded the power which their 
 country allowed them, from a desire of governing despoti- 
 cally ; others were founded by those who were elected to the 
 superior offices in the State, for formerly the people ap- 
 pointed officers for life, who came to be at the head of civil 
 and religious affairs, and these chose one out of their body 
 in whom the supreme power over all the magistrates was 
 placed. By all these means it was easy to establish a 
 tyranny, if they chose it, for their power was ready at hand, 
 either by their being kings, or else by enjoying the honours 
 of the State \ thus Phidon at Argos and other tyrants enjoyed 
 
CHAP. X.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 191 
 
 originally the kingly power ; Phalaris, and others in Ionia, 
 the honours of the State. Panaetius at Leontium, Cypselus 
 at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and 
 others, acquired theirs by having been demagogues. A 
 kingdom, as we have said, partakes much of the nature of 
 an aristocracy, and is bestowed according to worth, as eitli^r 
 virtue ^ family, beneficej i t actions, or these joined with 
 power ^or those who have been benefactors to cities and 
 States, or have it in their power to be so, have acquired 
 this honour, and those who have prevented a people from 
 falling into slavery by war, as Codrus, or those who have 
 freed them from it, as Cyrus, or the founders of cities, or 
 settlers of colonies, as the kings of Sparta, Macedon, and 
 Molossus. A kin^ desires to be the guardian of his people, 
 that those who have property may be secure in the posses- 
 sion of'TtTand that the people in general meet with no 
 injury ; but a tyrant, as has been often said, has no regard to 
 tliFTomTtion good, except for his own advantage ; his only 
 object is pleasure, but a king's is virtue : what a tyrant there- 
 fore is ambitious of engrossing is wealth, but a king rather 
 honour. The guards, too, of a king are citizens, a tyrant's, 
 foreigners. That a tyranny contains all that is bad, both in 
 a democracy and an oligarchy is evident ; with an oligarchy 
 it has for its end gain, as the only means of providing the 
 tyrant with guards, and the luxuries of life; like that it 
 places no confidence in the people, and therefore deprives 
 them of the use of arms : it is also common to them both to 
 persecute the populace, to drive them out of the city and 
 their own habitations. With a democracy, it quarrels with 
 the nobles, and destroys them both publicly and privately, 
 or drives them into banishment, as rivals and an impedi- 
 ment to the government; hence naturally arise conspiracies 
 both amongst those who desire to govern, and those who 
 desire not to be slaves ; hence arose Periander's advice to 
 Thrasibulus to take off the tallest stalks, hinting thereby 
 that it was necessary to make away with the eminent 
 
192 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book v. 
 
 citizens. We ought, then, in reason, as has been already 
 said, to account for the changes which arise in a monarchy 
 from the same causes which produce them in other States : 
 for,, through injustice received, fear, and contempt, many of 
 those who are under a monarchical government conspire 
 against it; but of all species of injustice, injurious contempt 
 has most influence on them for that purpose : sometimes it 
 is owing to their being deprived of their private fortunes. 
 The dissolution, too, of a kingdom and a tyranny are 
 generally the same, for monarchs abound in wealth and 
 honour, which all are desirous to obtain. Of plots : some 
 aim at the life of those who govern^ others at their govern- 
 ment ; the first arises from hatred to their persons, which 
 hatred may be owing to many causes, either of which will 
 be sufficient to excite their anger, and the generality of 
 those who are under the influence of that passion will join 
 in a conspiracy, not for the sake of their own advancement, 
 but for revenge. Thus the plot against the children of 
 Pisistratus arose from their injurious treatment of Hermo- 
 dius' sister, and insulting him also, for Hermodius resenting 
 the injury done to his sister, and Aristogiton the injury done 
 to Hermodius. Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia, also lost 
 his life by a conspiracy, for some improper liberties he took 
 with a boy in his cups ; and Philip was slain by Pausanias 
 for neglecting to revenge him of the affront he had received 
 from Attains ; as was Amintas the Little, by Darda, for 
 insulting him on account of his age ; and the eunuch, by 
 Evagoras the Cyprian, in revenge for having taken his son's 
 wife away from him. 
 
 Many also who have had their bodies scourged with 
 stripes have, through resentment, either killed those who 
 caused them to be inflicted or conspired against them, even 
 when they had kingly power, as at Mitylenae, Magacles, 
 joining with his friends, killed the Penthelidae, who used to 
 go about striking those they met with clubs. Thus in later 
 times, Smendes killed Penthilus, for whipping him, and 
 
CHAP. X.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 193 
 
 permitting his wife to drag him by the feet. Decamnichus 
 also was the chief cause of the conspiracy against Anchelaus, 
 for he urged others on : the occasion of his resentment was 
 his having deUvered him to Euripides the poet to be 
 scourged ; for Euripides was greatly offended with him, for 
 having said something of the fouhiess of his breath. And 
 many others have been killed or conspired against on the 
 same account. Fear, too, is a cause which produces the 
 same effects, as well in monarchies as in other States : thus 
 Artabanes conspired against Xerxes through fear of punish- 
 ment, for not having hanged Darius according to his orders, 
 whom he supposed he intended to pardon, as they were 
 given without recollection at supper-time. Some kings also 
 have been dethroned and killed in consequence of the 
 contempt they were held in by the people ; as some one 
 conspired against Sardanapalus, having seen him spinning 
 with his wife, if what is related of him is true, or if not 
 of him, it may very probably be true of some one else. 
 Dion also conspired against Dionysius the younger, seeing 
 his subjects desirous of a conspiracy, and that he himself 
 was always drunk ; and even a man's friends will do this if 
 they despise him ; for from the confidence he places in them 
 they think that they shall not be found out. Those also who 
 think they shall gain his throne will conspire against a king 
 through contempt ; for as they are powerful themselves, and 
 despise the danger on account of their own strength, they 
 will readily attempt it. Thus a general at the head of his 
 army will endeavour to dethrone the monarch, as Cyrus did 
 Astiages, despising both his manner of life and his forces ; 
 his forces for want of action, his life for its effeminacy ; thus 
 Suthes, the Thracian, who was general to Amadocus, con- 
 spired against him. Sometimes more than one of these 
 causes will excite men to enter into conspiracies, as contempt 
 and desire of gain; as in the instance of Mithridates, 
 against Ariobarzanes. Those also who are of a bold disposi- 
 tion, and have gained military honours amongst kings, will 
 
 G 
 
194 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book v. 
 
 of all others be most like to engage in sedition ; for strength 
 and courage united inspire great bravery : whenever, there- 
 fore, these join in one person, he will be very ready for 
 conspiracies^ as he will easily conquer. Those who con- 
 spire against a tyrant through love of glory and honour, 
 have a different motive in view from what I have already 
 mentioned ; for, like all others who embrace danger, they 
 have only glory and honour in view, and think, not as some 
 do, of the wealth and pomp they may acquire, but engagt 
 in this, as they would in any other noble action, that they 
 may be illustrious and distinguished, and destroy a tyrant, 
 not to succeed in his tyranny, but to acquire renown. No 
 doubt but the number of those who act upon this principle 
 is small, for we must suppose they regard their own safety 
 as nothing in case they should not succeed, and must 
 embrace the opinion of Dion (which few can do) when he 
 made war upon Dionysius with a very few troops ; for he 
 said that let the advantage he made be ever so little, it 
 would satisfy him to have gained it ; and that should it be 
 his lot to die the moment he had gained footing in his 
 country, he should think his death sufficiently glorious. A 
 tyranny also is exposed to the same destruction as all other 
 States are, from too powerful neighbours ; for it is evident 
 that an opposition of principles will make them desirous of 
 subverting it ; and what they desire, all who can, do : and 
 there is a principle of opposition in one State to another, as 
 a democracy against a tyranny, as says Hesiod, "a potter 
 against a potter;" for the extreme of a democracy is a 
 tyranny ; a kingly power against an aristocracy, from their 
 different forms of government : for which reason the Lace- 
 daemonians destroyed many tyrannies; as did the Syra- 
 cusians during the prosperity of their State. Nor are they 
 only destroyed from without, but also from within, when 
 those who have no share in the power bring about a 
 revolution, as happened to Gelon, and lately to Dionysius ; 
 to the first, by means of Thrasibulus, the brother of Hiero, 
 
CHAP. X.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 195 
 
 who flattered Geo's son, and induced him to lead a life of 
 pleasure, that he himself might govern; but the family 
 joined together, and endeavoured to support the tyranny 
 and expel Thrasibulus ; but those whom they made of their 
 party seized the opportunity and expelled the whole family. 
 Dion made war against his relation Dionysius, and being 
 assisted by the people, first expelled, and then killed him. 
 As there are two causes which chiefly induce men to con- 
 spire against tyrants, hatred and contempt; one of these, 
 namely hatred, seems inseparable from them. Contempt 
 also is often the cause of their destruction ; for though, for 
 instance, those who raised themselves to the supreme 
 power, generally preserved it ; but those who received it 
 from them have, to speak truth, almost immediately all of 
 them lost it ; for falling into an effeminate way of life, they 
 soon grew despicable, and generally fell victims to con- 
 spiracies. Part of their hatred may be very fitly ascribed 
 to anger; for in some cases this is their motive to action : 
 for it is often a cause which impels them to act more 
 powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater 
 obstinacy against those whom they attack, as this passion is 
 not under the direction of reason. Many persons also 
 indulge this passion through contempt, which occasioned 
 the fall of the Pisistrati, and many others. But hatred 
 is more powerful than anger ; for anger is accompanied with 
 grief, which prevents the entrance of reason ; but hatred is 
 free from it. In short, whatever causes may be assigned as 
 the destruction of a pure oligarchy, unmixed with any other 
 government, and an extreme democracy, the same may be 
 applied to a tyranny; for these are divided tyrannies. 
 Kingdoms are seldom destroyed by any outward attack, fo r 
 which reason they are generally very stable ; but they hav e 
 m any causes ot subversion within, of which two are t^ 
 principal ; one is, whe n those who are in pow er excite a 
 sedition, the other wh en they endeav our^ to estabiishj^^a 
 tyrajnyijjy assuming greate r power than th ejaw ^gives them . 
 
 G 
 
196 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book v. 
 
 A kingdom, indeed, is not what we ever see erected in our 
 limes, but rather monarchies and tyrannies ; for a kingly 
 government is one that is voluntarily submitted to, and its 
 supreme power admitted upon great occasions ; but where 
 many are equal, and there are none in any respect so much 
 better than another as to be qualified for the greatness and 
 dignity cf government over them, then these equals will not 
 wilhngly submit to be commanded ; but if any one assumes 
 the government either by force or fraud, this is a tyranny. 
 To what we have already said we shall add the causes 
 of revolutions in an hereditary kingdom. One of these 
 is, that many of those who enjoy it are naturally proper 
 objects of contempt only ; another is, that they are insolent 
 while their power is not despotic ; but they possess kingly 
 honours only. Such a Stat ejs_.saQjxjd^^^rnypd ; f or a k-mg 
 ^ists but while the people are willing to obey, as theif 
 .submission to him is voluntary, but to a tyrant involuntary 
 "These and such like are the causes of the destruction of 
 monarchies. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Monarchies, in a word, are preserved by means contrary 
 to what I have already mentioned as the cause of their 
 destruction ; but to speak to each separately. The 
 stabilitv o£ a kingdom will depend upon the power 
 of the king's being kept witTuiT nToderaTe b ounds ; f or 
 by how much the less extensive his power ~isy— by so 
 much th e longer will his government con tiny ejjfbr he will 
 be less despotic, and more upon an equality of condition 
 with those h e governs ; who, on that account, wilLenvy him 
 jthe less ^ It was on this account that the kingdom of 
 
CHAP. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 197 
 
 the Molossi continued so long; and the Lacedaemonians, 
 from their government's being from the beginning divided 
 into two parts, and also by the moderation introduced into 
 the other parts of it by Theopompus, and his establishment 
 of the ephori ; for by taking something from the power 
 he increased the duration of the kingdom, so that in some 
 measure he made it not less but bigger; as they say 
 he replied to his wife, who asked him if he was not 
 ashamed to deliver down his kingdom to his children 
 reduced from what he received it from his ancestors? 
 " No," says he, " I give it him more lasting." Tyrannies 
 are preserved two ways most opposite to each other, one 
 of which is, when the power is delegated from one to the 
 other, and in this manner many tyrants govern in their 
 States. .Report says that Periander founded many of these. 
 There are also many of them to be met with amongst the 
 Persians. What has been already mentioned is as conducive 
 as~'anything can be to preserve a tyranny; namely, to 
 keep down those who are of an aspiring disposition, to take 
 off those who will not submit, to allow no public meals, no 
 clubs, no education, nothing at all, but to guard against 
 everything that gives rise to high spirits or mutual con- 
 fidence; nor to suffer the learned meetings of those who 
 are at leisure to hold conversation with each other; and to 
 endeavour by every means possible to keep all the people 
 strangers to each other, for knowledge increases mutual 
 confidence ; and to oblige all strangers to appear in public, 
 and to live near the city gate, that all their actions may be 
 sufficiently seen ; for those who are kept like slaves seldom 
 entertain any noble thoughts : in short, to imitate every- 
 thing which the Persians and barbarians do, for they all 
 contribute to support slavery ; and to endeavour to know 
 what every one who is under their power does and says, 
 and for this purpose to employ spies; such were those 
 women whom the Syracusians called noraycoytSes. Hiero also 
 used to send out listeners, wherever there was any meeting 
 
198 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book v. 
 
 or conversation, for the people dare not speak with freedom 
 for fear of such persons ; and if any one does, there is the 
 less chance of its being concealed ; and to endeavour that 
 the whole community should mutually accuse and come to 
 blows with each other, friend with friend, the commons with 
 the nobles, and the rich with each other. It is also 
 advantageous for a tyranny that all those who are under it 
 should be oppressed with poverty, that they may not be 
 able to compose a guard; and that, being employed in 
 procuring their daily bread, they may have no leisure to 
 conspire against their tyrants. The pyramids of Egypt are 
 a proof of this, and the votive edifices of the Cypoclidae, 
 and the temple of Jupiter Olympus^ built by the Pisistra- 
 tidae, and the works of Polycrates at Samos ; for all these 
 produced one end, the keeping the people poor. It is 
 necesary also to multiply taxes, as at Syracuse, where 
 Dionysius in the space of five years collected all the private 
 property of his subjects into his own coffers. A tyrant also 
 should endeavour to engage his subjects in a war, that they 
 may have employment, and continually depend upon their 
 general. A king is preserved by his friends^ but a tyrant 
 is of all persons the man who can place no confidence in 
 friends, as every one has it in his desire, and these chiefly 
 in their power, to destroy him. All these things also which 
 are done in an extreme democracy should be done in a 
 tyranny, as permitting great licentiousness to the women in 
 the house, that they may reveal their husbands' secrets; 
 and showing great indulgence to slaves also, for the same 
 reason; for slaves and women conspire not against tyrants; 
 but when they are treated with kindness both of them are 
 abettors of tyrants, and extreme democracies also, and the 
 people, too, in such a State desire to be despotic. For 
 which reason flatterers are in repute in both these ; the 
 demagogue in the democracy, for he is the proper flatterer 
 of the people ; among tyrants, he who will servilely adapt 
 himself to their humours; for this is the business of 
 
CHAP. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 199 
 
 flatterers. And for this reason tyrants always love the worst 
 of wretches, for they rejoice in being flattered, which no 
 man of a liberal spirit will submit to; for they love the 
 virtuous, but flatter none. Bad men, too, are fit for bad 
 purposes ; Hke to like," as the proverb says. A tyrant also 
 should show no favour to a man of worth or a freeman ; for 
 he should think that no one deserved to be thought these 
 but himself; for he who supports his dignity, and is a friend 
 to freedom, encroaches upon the superiority and the des- 
 potism of the tyrant : such men, therefore, they naturally hate 
 as destructive to their government. A tyrant also should 
 rather admit strangers to his table and familiarity than 
 citizens, as these are his enemies, but the others have no 
 design against him. These and such-like are the supports 
 of a tyranny, for it comprehends whatsoever is wicked. But 
 all these things may be comprehended in three divisions, 
 for there are three object s which a . tyr anny has in view; 
 one of which is, that the citize^ns shnnlH b ^ of poor abj-ect 
 dispositions ; for such men never propose to cogspi re 
 a gainst any one. The second that they should have 
 no confidence i n each other ; for while th <^y V>;:^vp nni- thi^^ 
 the tyrant is safe enough from destruction. For whi€4j^ 
 reason they are always at enmity with those of merit^ as 
 hurtful to their government ; not only as they scorn to be 
 governed despotically, but also because they can rely upon 
 each other's fideUty, and others can rely upon theirs, and 
 because they will not inform against their associates, nor 
 any one else. The third is, that they shall _be_Jotally_ 
 without the means'^oTSQing anyth ing ; for n o one undertakes 
 wha t IS impossibl e i or Jiim to ^perform : so that .w itKni 
 power a tyranny can never be destroyed. These, then, are 
 the three objects which the inclinations of tyrants desire 
 to see accomplished ; for all their tyrannical plans tend 
 to promote one of these three ends, that their people may 
 neither have mutual confidence, power, or spirit. This, 
 then, is one of the two methods of preserving tyrannies j 
 
200 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book v. 
 
 the other proceeds in a way quite contrary to what has 
 been already described, and which may be discerned from 
 considering to what the destruction of a kingdom is owing ; 
 for as one cause of that is making the government approach 
 near to a tyranny, so the safety of a tyranny consists in 
 making the government nearly kingly ; preserving only one 
 thing, namely power, that not only the willing, but the 
 unwilling also must be obliged to submit ; for if this is 
 once lost, the tyranny is at an end. This, then, as the 
 foundation, must be preserved ; in other particulars care- 
 fully do and affect to seem like a king ; first, appear to pay 
 a great attention to what belongs to the public, nor make 
 such profuse presents as will offend the people, while they 
 are to supply the money out of the hard labour of their 
 own hands, and see it given in profusion to mistresses, 
 foreigners, and fiddlers ; keeping an exact account both of 
 what you receive and pay, which is a practice some tyrants 
 do actually follow, by which means they seem rather fathers 
 of families than tyrants : nor need you ever fear the want 
 of money while you have the supreme power of the State 
 in your own hands. It is also much better for those 
 tyrants, who quit their kingdom, to do this than to leave 
 behind them money they have hoarded up; for their 
 regents will be much less desirous of making innovations, 
 and they are more to be dreaded by absent tyrants than 
 the citizens ; for such of them as he suspects he takes with 
 him, but these regents must be left behind. He should 
 also endeavour to appear to collect such taxes and require 
 such services as tlie exigencies of the State demand, that 
 whenever they are wanted they may be ready in time of 
 war ; and particularly to take care that he appear to collect 
 and keep them not as his own property, but the public's. 
 His appearance also should not be severe, but respectable, 
 so that he should inspire those who approach him with 
 veneration, and not fear ; but this will not be easily accom- 
 plished if he is despised. If, therefore, he will not take 
 
CHAP. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 201 
 
 the pains to acquire any other, he ought to endeavour to be 
 a man of political abilities, and to fix that opinion of 
 himself in the judgment of his subjects. He should also 
 take care not to appear to be guilty of the least offence 
 against modesty, nor to suffer it in those under him, nor 
 to permit the women of his family to treat others haughtily, 
 for the haughtiness of women has been the ruin of many 
 tyrants. With respect to the pleasures of sense, he ought 
 to do directly contrary to the practice of some tyrants at 
 present ; for they do not only continually indulge themselves 
 in tliem for many days together, but they seem also to 
 desire to have other witnesses of it, that they may wonder 
 at their happiness ; whereas he ought really to be moderate 
 in these, and if not, to appear to others to avoid them ; for 
 it is not the sober man who is exposed either to plots or 
 contempt, but the drunkard ; not the early-riser, but the 
 sluggard. His conduct in general should also to be 
 contrary of what is reported of former tyrants ; for he ought 
 to improve and adorn his city, so as to seem a guardian 
 and not a tyrant ; and, moreover, always to seem particularly 
 attentive to the worship of the gods ; for from persons of 
 such a chararacter men entertain less fears of suffering any- 
 thing illegal while they suppose that he who governs them 
 is religious and reverences the gods ; and they will be less 
 inclined to raise insinuations against such a one, as being 
 peculiarly under their protection : but this must be so done 
 as to give no occasion for any suspicion of hypocrisy. ^H^ 
 should also take care to show such respect to men of merit 
 in every particular, that they should not think they could be 
 treated with greater distinction by their fellow-citizens in a free 
 State. He should also let all honours flow immediately from 
 himself, but every censure from his subordinate officers and 
 judges. It is also a common protection of all monarchies not 
 to make one person too great, or, certainly, not many ; for 
 they will support each other; but if it is necessary to entrust 
 any large powers to one person, to take care that it is not one 
 
202 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book v. 
 
 of an ardent spirit; for this disposition is upon every 
 opportunity most ready for a revolution ; and, if it should 
 seem necessary to deprive any one of his power, to do it by 
 degrees, and not reduce him all at once. It is also neces- 
 sary to abstain from all kinds of insolence, more particularly 
 from corporal punishment, which you must be most 
 cautious never to exercise over those who have a delicate 
 sense of honour ; for as those who love money are touched 
 to the quick when anything affects their property, so are 
 men of honour and principle when they receive any disgrace ; 
 therefore, either never employ personal punishment, or if 
 you do, let it be only in the manner in which a father would 
 correct his son, and not with contempt; and upon the 
 whole, make amends for any seeming disgrace by bestowing 
 greater honours. But of all persons who are most likely to 
 entertain designs against the person of a tyrant, those are 
 chiefly to be feared and guarded against who regard as 
 nothing the loss of their own lives, so that they can but 
 accomplish their purpose ; be very careful therefore of those 
 who either think themselves affronted, or those who are 
 dear to them ; for those who are excited by anger to revenge 
 regard as nothing their own persons ; for, as Heraclitus says, 
 it is dangerous to fight with an angry man, ' who will 
 purchase with his life the thing he aims at. As all cities are 
 composed of two sorts of persons, the rich and the poor, it is 
 necessary that both these should find equal protection from 
 him who governs them, and that the one party should not 
 have it in their power to injure the other ; but that the 
 tyrant should attach to himself that party which is the i\iost 
 powerful ; which, if he does, he will have no occasion either 
 to make his slaves free, or to deprive citizens of their arm^ ; 
 for the strength of either of the parties added to his own 
 forces will render him superior to any conspiracy. It would 
 be superfluous to go through all particulars ; for the rule of 
 conduct which the tyrant ought to pursue is evident enough, 
 and that is, to affect to appear not the tyrant, but the king ; 
 
CHAP. XII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 203 
 
 the guardian of those he Roverns, not their plunderer , but 
 their protector, and to affect the middle rank in life, not o ne 
 sup erior to all o th^^^^; gTinnlH thprpfnrp associate his 
 nobles with him and soothe his people ; for his government 
 will not only be necessarily more honourable and worthy of 
 imitation, as it will be over men of worth, and not abject 
 wretches, who perpetually both hate and fear him, but it 
 will be also more durable. Let him also frame his life _so 
 that his manners m aybe consentaneous to virtue, or at least^ 
 TeFhalf of them be s o, -that h^ may not alt^g^t^e^^ wi'rke jju 
 but onlyso_in_part. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Indeed an oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments 
 of the shortest duratioii. The tyranny of Syria, it is true, 
 continued longer then Orthagonus and his family existed, 
 a hundred years : the reason for which was, that they used 
 their power with moderation, and were in many particulars 
 obedient to the laws ; and, as Clisthenes was an able 
 general, he never fell into contempt, and by the care he 
 took that in many particulars his government should be 
 popular. He is reported also to have presented a person 
 with a crown, who adjudged the victory to another; and 
 some say that it is the statue of that judge which is placed 
 in the Forum. 
 
 They say also that Pisistratus submitted to be sum- 
 moned into the court of the Areopagites. The second 
 that we shall mention is the tyranny of the Cypselidae, 
 at Corinth, which continued seventy-seven years and six 
 months ; for Cypselus was tyrant there thirty years, Periander 
 forty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Geordius, three 
 
204 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book v. 
 
 years ; the reason for which was that Cypselus was a popular 
 man, and governed without guards. Periander indeed 
 ruled like a tyrant, but then he was an able general. The 
 third was that of the Pisistradidse at Athens ; but it was not 
 continual ; for Pisistratus himself was twice expelled ; so 
 that out of thirty-three years he was only fifteen in power, 
 and his son eighteen ; so that the whole time was thirty- 
 three years. Of the rest we shall mention that of Hiero 
 and Gelo at Syracuse ; and this did not continue long, for 
 both their reigns were only eighteen years ; for Gelo died in 
 the eighth year of his tyranny, and Hiero in his tenth. 
 Thrasibulus fell in his eleventh month, and many other 
 tyrannies have continued a very short time. We have now 
 gone through the general cases of corruption and means of 
 preservation both in free States and monarchies. In 
 Plato's RepubHc, Socrates is introduced treating upon the 
 changes which different governments are liable to ; but his 
 discourse is faulty; for he does not particularly mention 
 what changes the best and first governments are liable to ; 
 for he only assigns the general cause, of nothing being 
 immutable, but that in time everything will alter 
 
 ^ ^ ^ % 
 
 and in this, probably, he is not wrong ; for it is certain that 
 there are some persons whom it is impossible by any 
 education to make good men; but why should this change 
 be more peculiar to what he calls the best- formed govern- 
 ment than to all other forms, and indeed to all other things 
 that exist ? And in respect to his assigned time, as the cause 
 of the alteration of all things, we find that those which did 
 not begin to exist at the same time, cease to be at the same 
 time; so that, if anything came into beginning the day 
 before the solstice, it must alter at the same time. Besides 
 why should such a form of government be changed into the 
 Lacedaemonian? for, in general, when governments alter, 
 
 * A few lines are omitted, as the text is unintelligible. 
 
CHAP. XII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 205 
 
 they alter into the contrary species to what they before 
 were, and not into one like their former.' And this reason- 
 ing holds true of other changes ; for he says that from the 
 Lacedaemonian form it changes into an oligarchy, and from 
 thence into a democracy, and from a democracy into a 
 tyranny : and sometimes a contrary change takes place, as 
 from a democracy into an oligarchy, rather than into a 
 monarchy. fWith respect to a tyranny he neither says 
 whether there will be any change in it, or if not, to what 
 cause it will be owing; or, if there is, into what other State 
 it will alter; but the reason of this is, that a tyranny is an 
 indeterminate government; and, according to him, every 
 State ought to alter into the first and most perfect, 
 thus the continuity and circle would be preserved.! But 
 one tyranny often changed into another: as at Syria, 
 from Muro's to Clisthenes'; or into an oligarchy, as 
 was Antileo's at Chalcas; or into a democracy, as was 
 Gelo's at Syracuse; or into an aristocracy, as was Cha- 
 rilaus' at Lacedsemon, and at Carthage. An oligarchy 
 is also changed into a tyranny ; such was the rise of 
 most of the ancient tyrannies in Sicily; at Leontium, 
 into the tyranny of Pansetius; at Gela, into that of 
 Cleander; at Rhegium, into that of Anaxilaus ; and the 
 like in many other cities. It is absurd also to suppose 
 that a State is changed into an oligarchy because those 
 who are in power are avaricious and greedy of money, 
 and not because those who are by far richer than their' 
 fellow-citizens think it unfair that those who have 
 nothing should have an equal share in the rule of the 
 State with themselves who possess so much ; for in many 
 oligarchies it is not allowable to be employed in money- 
 getting, and there are many laws to prevent it. But in 
 Carthage, which is a democracy, money-getting is credit- 
 able, and yet their form of government remains unaltered. 
 It is also absurd to say that in an oligarchy there are two 
 cities, one of the poor, and another of the rich ; for why 
 
2o6 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book V. 
 
 should this happen to them more than to the Lacedaemonians, 
 or any other State where all possess not equal property, or 
 where all are not equally good ; for though no one member 
 of the community should be poorer than he was before, yet 
 a democracy might nevertheless change into an oligarchy, 
 if the rich should be more powerful than the poor, and the 
 one too negligent, and the other attentive; and though 
 these changes are owing to many causes, yet he mentions 
 but one only, that the citizens become poor by luxury and 
 paying interest-money ; as if at first they were all rich, or 
 the greater part of them ; but this is not so, but when some 
 of those who have the principal management of public 
 affairs lose their fortunes they will endeavour to bring about 
 a revolution ; but when others do, nothing of consequence 
 will follow, nor when such States do alter is there any more 
 reason for their altering into a democracy than any other. 
 Besides, though some of the members of the community 
 may not have spent their fortunes, yet if they share not in 
 the honours of the State, or if they are ill-used and insulted, 
 they will endeavour to raise seditions, and bring about a 
 revolution, that they may be allowed to do as they like, 
 which, Plato says, arises from too much liberty. Although 
 there are many oligarchies and democracies, yet Socrates, 
 when he is treating of the changes they may undergo, speaks 
 of them as if there wflydout one of each sort. 
 
CHAPTER 1. 
 
 We have already shown what is the nature of the supreme 
 council in the State, and wherein one may differ from 
 another, and how the different magistrates should be regu- 
 lated ; and also the judicial department, and what is best 
 suited to what State ; and also to what causes both the 
 destruction and preservation of governments are owing. 
 
 As there are very many species of democracies, as well as 
 of other States, it will not be amiss to consider at the same 
 time anything which we may have omitted to mention con- 
 cerning either of ^them, and to allot to each that mode of 
 conduct which is peculiar to and advantageous for them j 
 and also to inquire into the combinations of all these 
 different modes of government which we have mentioned ; 
 for as these are blended together the government is 
 altered, as from an aristocracy to be an oligarchy, and 
 from a free State to be a democracy. Now, I mean by 
 those combinations of government (which I ought to 
 examine into, but have not yet done), namely, whether the 
 deliberative department and the election of magistrates is 
 regulated in a manner correspondent to an oligarchy, or 
 the judicial to an aristocracy, or the deliberative part only 
 to an oligarchy, and the election of magistrates to an aris- 
 tocracy, or whether, in any other manner, everything is not 
 regulated according to the nature of the government. But 
 
2o8 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vi. 
 
 we will first consider what particular sort of democracy is 
 fitted to a particular city, and also what particular oligarchy 
 to a particular people ; and of other States, what is advan- 
 tageous to what. It is also necessary to show clearly, not 
 only which of these governments is best for a State, but also 
 how it ought to be established there, and other things we 
 will treat of briefly. And, first we will speak of a demo- 
 cracy ; and this will at the same time show clearly the 
 nature of its opposite, which some persons call an oligarchy; 
 and in doing this we must examine into all the parts of a 
 democracy, and everything that is connected therewith ; for 
 from the manner in which these are compounded together 
 different species of democracies arise ; and hence it is that 
 they are more than one, and of various natures. Now, 
 there are two causes which occasion there being so many 
 d"emocracies ; one ot which is that which we have^lrea dy 
 mentio ned \ namely, there being different sorts of peopl e ; 
 toTni one country the majority are husbandmen, in another 
 "mechanics and hired servants ; if the first of these is added 
 to the second, and the third to both of them, the democracy 
 will not only differ in the particular of better or worse, but 
 in this, that it will be no longer the sanie government ; the 
 other is that which we will now speak of. The different 
 things which are connected with democracies and seem to 
 make part of these States, do, from their being joined to 
 them, render them different from others ; this attending a 
 few, that more, and another all. It is necessary that he 
 who would found any State, which he may happen to 
 approve of, or correct one, should be acquainted with all 
 these particulars. All founders of States endeavour to 
 comprehend within their own plan everything of nearly the 
 same kind with it ; but in doing this they err, in the manner 
 I have already described in treating of the preservation and 
 destruction of governments. I will now speak of these first 
 principles and manners, and whatever else a democratical 
 State requires. 
 
CHAP. II.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 209 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 Now, the foundation of a democratical State is liberty, and 
 people have been accustomed to say this, as "TT here only 
 liberty was to be found, for they affirm that this is the end 
 proposed by every democracy. But one part of liberty is to 
 govern and be governed alternately, for, according to demo- 
 cratical justice, equality is measured by numbers ^ ni^rl 
 by worth: and this being just, it is necessary that the 
 supreme power should be vested in the people at large, and 
 that what the majority determine should be final : so that in 
 a democracy the poor ought to have more power than the 
 rich, as being the greater number, for this is one mark of 
 liberty, which all framers of a democracy lay down as a 
 criterion of that State ; another is to live as every one likes, 
 for this they say is a right which liberty gives, since he is a 
 slave who must live as he likes not. This, then, is another 
 criterion of a democracy. Hence arises the claim to be 
 under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any ac- 
 count, any otherwise than by rotation, and that just as far 
 only as that person is, in his turn, under his also. This 
 also is conducive to that equality which liberty demands. 
 These things being premised, and such being the govern- 
 ment, it follows that such rules as the following should be 
 observed in it : that all the magistrates should be chosen out 
 of all the people, and all to command each, and each in his 
 turn all ; that all the magistrates should be chose by lot, 
 except to those offices only which require some particular 
 knowledge and skill ; that no census, or a very small one, 
 should be required to qualify a man for any office ; that 
 none should be in the same employment twice, or very few, 
 and very seldom, except in the army; that all their appoint- 
 ments should be limited to a very short time, or at least as 
 many as possible ; that the whole community should be 
 
2IO ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vi. 
 
 qualified to judge in all causes whatsoever, let the object be 
 ever so extensive, ever so interesting^ or of ever so high a 
 nature, as at Athens, where the people at large judge the 
 magistrates when they come out of office, and decide con- 
 cerning public affairs, as well as private contracts ; that the 
 supreme power should be in the public assembly, and that 
 no magistrate should be allowed any discretionary power, 
 but in a few instances, and of no consequence to public 
 business. Of all magistrates, a senate is best suited to a 
 democracy, where the whole community is not paid for 
 giving their attendance, for in that case it loses its power, 
 for then the people will bring all causes before them, by 
 appeal, as we have already mentioned in a former book. 
 In the next place there should, if possible, be a fund to pay 
 all the citizens who have any share in the management of 
 public affairs, either as members of the assembly, judges, 
 and magistrates ; but, if this cannot be done, at least the 
 magistrates, the judges, the senators, and members of the 
 supreme assembly, and also those officers who are obHged 
 to eat at a common table, ought to be paid. Moreover, as 
 an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of family, 
 fortune, and education, so, on the contrary, a democracy is 
 a government in the hands of men of no birth, indigent 
 circumstances, and mechanical employments. In this State 
 also no office should be for life ; and, if any such should 
 remain after the governm.ent has been long changed into a 
 democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to diminish 
 the power, and also elect by lot instead of vote. These 
 things, then, appertain to all democracies, namely, to be 
 established on that principle of justice which is homogeneous 
 to those governments, that is/1 that all the members of the. 
 
 State, by number, Sh 01l1<^ pnjny nn pgnpihty^ whirh gppnig 
 
 chiefly to , constitute a democracy, or government of the 
 jpeopl ej)for it seems perfectly equal that the rich should 
 have no more share in the government than tlie poor, nor 
 
CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 211 
 
 be alone in power, but that all should be equal, accorduig 
 to number, for thus they think the equality and liberty 
 of the State best preserved. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 In the next place we must inquire how this equality is to 
 be procured. Shall the fortune of five hundred be divided 
 amongst a thousand, and these thousand to have equal 
 power with the five hundred ? Or shall we not establish our 
 equality in this manner \ but divide indeed thus, and after- 
 wards taking an equal number both out of the five hundred 
 and the thousand, invest them with the power of creating 
 the magistrates and judges? Is this State then established 
 according to perfect democratical justice, or rather that 
 which is guided by numbers only ? For the defenders of a 
 democracy say that that is just which the majority approve 
 of ; but the favourers of an oligarchy say that that is just 
 which those who have most approve of, and that v/e ought to 
 be directed by the value of property. Both the propositions 
 are unjust, for, if we agree with what the few propose, we 
 erect a tyranny ; for if it should happen that an individual 
 should have more than the rest, who are rich, according to 
 oligarchical justice, this man alone has a right to the supreme 
 power; but if superiority of numbers is to prevail, injustice 
 will then be done by confiscating the property of the rich, 
 who are few, as we have already said. What then that 
 equality is, which both parties will admit, must be collected 
 from the definition of right which is common to them both,! 
 for they both say that what the majority of the State approves 
 
212 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vi. 
 
 of ought to be established. Be it so, but not entirely : but, 
 since a city happens to be made up of two different ranks 
 of people, the rich and the poor, let that be established 
 which is approved of by both these, or the greater part; but, 
 should there be opposite sentiments, let that be established 
 which shall be approved of by the greater part ; but let this 
 be according to the census ; for instance, if there should be 
 ten of the rich and twenty of the poor, and six of the first 
 and fifteen of the last should agree upon any measure, and 
 the remaining four of the rich should join with the remain- 
 ing five of the poor in opposing it, that party whose census, 
 when added together, should determine which opinion 
 should be law, and should these happen to be equal, it 
 should be regarded as a case similar to an assembly or 
 court of justice dividing equally upon any question that 
 comes before them, who either determine it by lot or some 
 such method. But although, with respect to what is equal 
 and just, it may be very difficult to establish the truth, yet 
 it is much easier to do than to persuade those who have it in 
 their power to encroach upon others, to be guided thereby, 
 for the weak always desire what is equal and just, but the 
 powerful pay no regard thereunto. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 There are four kinds of democracies. The best is that 
 which is composed of those first in order, as we have 
 already said, and this also is the most ancient of any. I 
 call that the first which every one would place so was he 
 to divide the people ; for the best part of these are the 
 husbandmen. We see, then, that a democracy may be 
 
CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 213 
 
 framed where the majority live by tillage, or pasturage ; for, 
 as their property is but small, they will not be at leisure 
 perpetually to hold public assemblies, but will be continually 
 employed in following their own business, not having 
 otherwise the means of living ; nor will they be desirous 
 of what another enjoys, but will rather like to follow their 
 own business than meddle with State affairs, and accept the 
 offices of government, which will be attended with no great 
 profit; for the major part of mankind are rather desirous of 
 riche s than hqnoux. (a proof of this is that they submitted 
 to the tyrannies in ancient times, and do now submit to the 
 oligarchies, if no one hinders them in their usual occupations, 
 or deprives them of their property ; for some of them scon 
 get rich, others are removed from poverty); besides, their I ^ 
 having the right of election, and calling their magistrates to^^ 
 account for their conduct when they come out of office, I 
 will satisfy their desire of honours, if any of them entertain I 
 that passion ; for in some States, though the commonalty 
 have not the right of electing the magistrates, yet it is 
 vested in part of that body chosen to represent them, and 
 it is sufficient for the people at large to possess the 
 deliberative power ; and this ought to be considered as 
 a species of democracy ; such was that formerly at Mantinaea ; 
 for which reason it is proper for the democracy we have 
 been now treating of to have a power (and it has been 
 usual for them to have it) of censuring their magistrates 
 when out of office, and sitting in judgment upon all causes; 
 but that the chief magistrates should be elected, and 
 according to a certain census, which should vary with the 
 rank of their office, or else not by a census, but according 
 to their abilities for their respective appointments. A 
 State thus constituted, must be well constituted ; for the 
 magistracies will be always filled with the best men, with 
 the approbation of the people, who will not envy their 
 superiors, and these and the nobles should be content with 
 this part in the administration, for they will not be governed 
 
214 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book Vi. 
 
 by their inferiors. They will be also careful to use their 
 power with moderation, as there are others to whom full 
 power is delegated to censure their conduct ; for it is very 
 serviceable to the State to have them dependent upon 
 others, and not to be permitted to do whatsoever they 
 choose ; for with such a liberty there would be no check to 
 that evil particle there is in every one : therefore it is 
 necessary and most for the benefit of the State that the 
 offices thereof should be filled by the principal persons in it, 
 whose characters are unblemished, and that the people are 
 not oppressed. It is now evident that this is the best 
 species of democracy, and on what account ; because the 
 people are such, and have such powers as they ought to 
 have. To establish a democracy of husbandmen some of 
 those laws^ which were observed in many ancient States, 
 are universally useful; as, for instance, on no account to 
 permit any one to possess more than a certain quantity of 
 land, or within a certain distance from the city. Formerly 
 also, in some States, no one was allowed to sell their 
 original lot of land. They also mention a law of one 
 Oxylus, which forbid any one to add to their patrimony by 
 usury. We ought also to follow the law of the Aphutaeans, 
 as useful to direct us in this particular we are now speaking 
 of ; for they, having but very little ground, while they were a 
 numerous people, and at the same time were all husband- 
 men, did not include all their lands within the census, but 
 divided them in such a manner that, according to the 
 census, the poor had more..^vver than the rich. Next to 
 the commonalty of husbandmen is one of shepherds and 
 herdsmen; for they have many things, in common with 
 them^ and by their way of life are excellently qualified to 
 make good soldiers, stout in body, and able to continue in 
 the open air all night. The generality of the people, of 
 whom other democracies are composed, are much worse 
 than these ; for their lives are wretched, nor have they 
 any business with virtue in anything they do; these are 
 
CHAP. IV. ] A RISTO TLB ON GO VERNMENT, 2 1 5 
 
 your mechanics^ your exchange-men, and hired servants ; 
 as all these sorts of men frequent the exchange and the 
 citadel, they can readily attend the public assembly; 
 whereas the husbandmen, being more dispersed in the 
 country, cannot so easily meet together ; nor are they 
 equally desirous of doing it with these others. When a 
 country happens to be so situated, that a great part of the 
 land lies at a distance from the city, there it is easy to 
 establish a good democracy, or a free State, for the people 
 in general wdll be obliged to live in the country, so that 
 it will be necessary in such a democracy, though there 
 may be an exchange-mob at hand, never to allow a legal 
 assembly without the inhabitants of the country attend. 
 We have shown in what manner the first and best democracy 
 ought to be established, and it will be equally evident as to 
 the rest, for from these we should proceed as a guide, and 
 always separate the meanest of the people from the rest. 
 But the last and worst, which gives to every citizen without 
 distinction a share in every part of the administration, is 
 what few citizens can bear, nor is it easy to preserve for 
 any long time, unless well supported by laws and manners. 
 We have already noticed almost every cause that can destroy 
 either this or any other State. Those who have taken the 
 lead in such a democracy have endeavoured to support it, 
 and make the people powerful, by collecting together as 
 many persons as they could, and giving them their freedom, 
 not only legitimately but naturally born, and also if either 
 of their parents were citizens, that is to say, if either their 
 father or mother ; and this method is better suited to 
 this State than any other, and thus the demagogues have 
 usually managed. They ought, however, to take care, and 
 do this no longer than the common people are superior to 
 the nobles and those of the middle rank, and then stop ; 
 for, if they proceed still further, they will make the State 
 disorderly, and the nobles will ill brook the power of the 
 common people, and be full of resentment against it ; which 
 
2l6 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vi. 
 
 was the cause of an insurrection at Cyrene, for a little evil 
 is overlooked, but when it becomes a great one, it strikes 
 the eye. It is moreover very useful in such a State to do 
 as Clisthenes did at Athens, when he was desirous of 
 increasing the power of the people, and as those did who 
 established the democracy in Cyren^ ; that is, to institute 
 many tribes and fraternities, and to make the religious rites 
 of private persons few, and those common ; and every 
 means is to be contrived to associate and blend the people 
 together as much as possible; and that all former customs 
 be broke through. Moreover, whatsoever is practised in a 
 tyranny seems adapted to a democracy of this species ; 
 as, for instance, the licentiousness of the slaves, the women, 
 and the children, for this to a certain degree is useful in 
 such a State ; and also to overlook every one's living as 
 they choose; for many will support such a government, for 
 it is more agreeable to many to live without any control, 
 than as prudence would direct. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 It is also the business of the legislator, and all those who 
 would support a government of this sort, not to make it too 
 great a work or too perfect^ but to aim only to render it 
 stable ; for, let a State be constituted ever so badly, there is 
 no difficulty in its continuing a few days : they should there- 
 fore endeavour to procure its safety by all those ways which 
 we have described, in assigning the causes of the preserva- 
 tion and destruction of governments, avoiding what is 
 hurtful, and by framing such laws, written and unwritten, 
 as contain those things which chiefly tend to the preserva- 
 
CHAP, v.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 
 
 217 
 
 tion of the State ; nor to suppose that that is useful either 
 for a democratic or an oligarchic form of government, which 
 contributes to make them more purely so, but what will 
 contribute to their duration ; but our demagogues at present, 
 to flatter the people, occasion frequent confiscations in the 
 courts ; for which reason those who have the welfare of the 
 State really at heart should act directly opposite to what 
 they do, and enact a law to prevent forfeitures from being 
 divided amongst the people or paid into the treasury, but to 
 have them set apart for sacred uses. For those who are of 
 a bad disposition would not then be the less cautious, as 
 their punishment would be the same ; and the community 
 would not be so ready to condemn those whom they sat in 
 judgment on, when they were to get nothing by it. They 
 should also take care that the causes which are brought 
 before the public should be as few as possible, and punish 
 with the utmost severity those who rashly brought an action 
 against any one ; for it is not the commons but the nobles 
 who are generally prosecuted. For in all things the citizens 
 of the same State ought to be affectionate to each other, at 
 least not to treat those who have the chief power in it as 
 their enemies. Now, as the democracies which have been 
 lately established are very numerous, and it is difficult to 
 get the common people to attend the public assemblies 
 without they are paid for it, this, when there is not a 
 sufficient public revenue, is fatal to the nobles, for the 
 deficiencies therein must be necessarily made up by taxes, 
 confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice, 
 which things have already destroyed many democracies. 
 Whenever, then, the revenues of the State are small, there 
 should be but few public assemblies and but few courts of 
 justice : these, however, should have very extensive jurisdic- 
 tions, but should continue sitting a few days only, for by 
 this means the rich would not fear the expense, although 
 they should receive nothing for their attendance, though the 
 poor did, and judgment also would be given much better; 
 
2i8 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book VI. 
 
 for the rich will not choose to be long absent from their 
 own affairs, but will wdllingly be so for a short time ; and 
 when there are sufficient revenues, a different conduct ought 
 to be pursued from what the demagogues at present follow, 
 for now they divide the surplus of the public money amongst 
 the poor ; these receive it, and again want the same supply, 
 while the giving it is like pouring water into a sieve. But 
 the true patriot in a democracy ought to take care that the 
 majority of the community are not too poor, for this is the 
 cause of rapacity in that government ; he, therefore, should 
 endeavour that they may enjoy perpetual plenty, and, as 
 this also is advantageous to the rich, what can be saved out 
 of the public money should be put by, and then divided at 
 once amongst the poor, if possible, in such a quantity as 
 may enable every one of them to purchase a little field, 
 and, if that cannot be done, at least to give each of them 
 enough to procure the implements of trade and husbandry; 
 and if there is not enough for all to receive so much at once^ 
 then to divide it according to tribes, or any other allotment. 
 In the meantime let the rich pay them for necessary services, 
 but not be obliged to find them in useless amusements. 
 And something like this was the manner in which they 
 managed at Carthage, and preserved the affections of the 
 people ; for, by continually sending some of their com- 
 munity into colonies, they procured plenty. It is also 
 worthy of a sensible and generous nobility to divide the 
 poor amongst them, and supplying them with what is 
 necessary, induce them to work, or to imitate the conduct 
 of the people at Tarentum ; for they, permitting the poor 
 to partake in common of everything which is needful for 
 them, gain the affections of the commonalty. They have 
 also two different ways of electing their magistrates, for 
 some are chose by vote, others by lot; by the last, that the 
 people at large may have some share in the administration \ 
 by the former, that the State maybe well governed; the 
 
CHAP. vi.\ ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 219 
 
 same may be accomplished, if^ of the same magistrates, you 
 choose some by vote, others by lot. And thus much for 
 the manner in which democracies ought to be established. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 What has been already said will almost of itself sufficiently 
 show how an ohgarchy ought to be founded ; for he who 
 would frame such a State should have in his view a demo- 
 cracy to oppose it ; for every species of oligarchy should be 
 founded on principles diametrically opposite to some species 
 of democracy. 
 
 The^ first and belt. Jframed oligarchy is that which ap- 
 proaches near to what we call a free State; in which there 
 ought to be two different census, the one high, the other 
 low; from those who are within the latter, the ordinary 
 officers of the State ought to be chosen ; from the former, 
 the supreme magistrates ; nor should any one be excluded 
 from a part of the administration who was within the census ; 
 which should be so regulated that the commonalty who are 
 included in it should, by means thereof, be superior to those 
 who have no share in the government ; for those who are to 
 have the management of public affairs ought always to be 
 chosen out of the better sort of the people. Much in the 
 same manner ought that oligarchy to be established which 
 is next in order ; but as to that which is most opposite to a 
 pure democracy, and approaches nearest to a dynasty and 
 a tyranny, as it is of all others the worst, so it requires the 
 greatest care and caution to ' preserve it ; for as bodies of 
 sound and healthy constitutions, and ships which are well- 
 
220 
 
 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. , {book vi. 
 
 manned and well-found for sailing, can bear many injuries 
 without perishing, while a diseased body, or a leaky ship 
 with an indifferent crew, cannot support the least shock ; so 
 the worst-established governments want most looking after. 
 A number of citizens is the preservation of a democracy : 
 for these are opposed to those rights which are founded in 
 rank; on the contrary, Jhe p reserva ti on of a n oligarchy 
 depends upon the due regulation of the different orders in 
 the society. " - 
 
 As the greater part of the community are divided into four 
 sorts of people : husbandmen, mechanics, traders, and hired^ 
 servants ; and as those who are employed in war mayjike- 
 wise be divided into four : the horsemen, the heavy-armed 
 soldier, the light-armed, and the sailor, where the nature of 
 the country can admit a great number of horse; there a 
 powerful oligarchy may be easily established ; for the safety 
 of the inhabitants depends upon a force of that sort ; but 
 those who can support the expense of horsemen must be 
 persons of some considerable fortune. Where the troops 
 are chiefly heavy-armed, there an oligarchy, inferior in 
 power to the other, may be established ; for the heavy- 
 armed are rather made up of men of substance than the 
 poor; but the light-armed and the sailors always contribute 
 to support a democracy ; but where the number of these is 
 very great, and a sedition arises, the other parts of the com- 
 munity fight at a disadvantage ; but a remedy for this evil 
 is to be learned from skilful generals, who always mix a 
 proper number of light-armed soldiers with their horse and 
 heavy-armed ; for it is with those that the populace get the 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 221 
 
 better of the men of fortune in an insurrection ; for, these 
 being' Hghter, aie easily a match for the horse and the 
 heavy-armed; so that for an ohgarchy to form a body of 
 troops from these is to form it against itself ; but as a city 
 is composed of persons of different ages, some young and 
 some old, the fathers should teach their sons, while they 
 were very young, a light and easy exercise ; but when they 
 are grown up they should be perfect in every warlike 
 exercise. Now, the admission of the people to any share in 
 the government should either be (as I said before) regulated 
 by a census, or else, as at Thebes, allowed to those who for 
 a certain time have ceased from aay mechanic employment, 
 or as at Massalia, where they are chosen according to their 
 worth, whether citizens or foreigners. With respect to the 
 magistrates of the highest rank which it may be necessary 
 to have in a State, the services they are bound to do the 
 public should be expressly laid down, to prevent the 
 common people from being desirous of accepting their 
 employments, and also to induce them to regard their 
 magistrates with favour, when they know what a price they 
 pay for their honours. It is also necessary that the magis- 
 trates, upon entering into their offices, should make 
 magnificent sacrifices, and erect some public structure, that 
 the people partaking of the entertainments, and seeing the 
 city ornamented with votive gifts in their temples and public 
 structures, may see with pleasure the stabiHty of the govern- 
 ment; add to this also, that the nobles will have their 
 generosity recorded ; but now this is not the conduct which 
 those who are at present at the head of an oligarchy pursue, 
 but the contrary ; for they are not more desirous of honour 
 than of gain ; for which reason such oligarchies may more 
 properly be called little democracies. Thus we have 
 explained on what principles a democracy and an oligarchy 
 ought to be estabUshed. 
 
2 2 2 A RISTO TLB ON GO VERNMENT. [book vi. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 After what has been said I proceed next to treat particularly 
 of the magistrates ; of what nature they should be, how many, 
 and for what purpose, as I have already mentioned ; for without 
 necessary magistrates no State can exist, nor without those, 
 which contribute to its dignity and good order, can exist 
 happily ; now it is necessary that in small States the magis- 
 trates should be few ; in a large one, many ; also to know 
 well what offices may be joined together, and what ought to 
 be separated. 
 
 The first thing necessary is to establish proper regulators 
 in the markets ; for which purpose a certain magistrate 
 should be appointed to inspect their contracts and preserve 
 good order ; for of necessity in almost every city there 
 must be both buyers and sellers, to supply each other's 
 mutual wants ; and this is what is most productive of the 
 comforts of life, for the sake of which men seem to have 
 joined together in one community. A second care, and 
 nearly related to the first, is to have an eye both to the 
 public and private edifices in the city, that they may be an 
 ornament, and also to take care of all buildings which are 
 likely to fall ; and to see that the highways are kept in proper 
 repair; and also that the landmarks between different 
 estates are preserved, that there may be no disputes on that 
 account, and all other business of the same nature. Now, 
 this business may be divided into several branches, over 
 each of which in populous cities they appoint a separate 
 person ; one to inspect the buildings, another the fountains, 
 another the harbours, and they are called the inspectors of 
 the city. A third, which is very like the last, and conversant 
 nearly about the same objects, only in the country, is to take 
 care of what is done out of the city. The officers who have 
 this employment we call inspectors of the lands, or inspectors 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 223 
 
 of the woods; but the business of all three of them is the 
 same. There must also be other officers appointed to 
 receive the public revenue, and to deliver it out to those 
 who are in the different departments of the State ; these are 
 called receivers or qusestors. There must also be another, 
 before whom all private contracts and sentences of courts 
 should be enrolled, as well as proceedings and declarations. 
 Sometimes this employment is divided amongst many, but 
 there is one supreme over the rest ; these are called proctors, 
 notaries, and the like. Next to these is an officer whose 
 business is of all others the most necessary, and yet most 
 difficult — namely, to take care that sentence is executed 
 upon those who are condemned, and that every one pays 
 the fines laid on him, and also to have the charge of those 
 who are in prison. This office is very disagreeable, on 
 account of the odium attending it, so that no one will engage 
 therein without it is made very profitable, or, if they do, will 
 they be willing to execute it according to law ; but it is most 
 necessary, as it is of no service to pass judgment in any 
 cause without that judgment is carried into execution; for 
 without this human society could not subsist^ for which 
 reason it is best that this office should not be executed 
 by one person, but by some of the magistrates of the other 
 courts. In Hke manner, the taking care that those fines 
 which are ordered by the judges are levied, should be 
 divided amongst different persons. And, as different magis- 
 strates judge different causes, let the causes of the young be 
 heard by the young; and as to those which are already 
 brought to a hearing, let one person pass sentence, and 
 another see it executed ; as, for instance, let the magistrates 
 who have the care of the public buildings execute the 
 sentence which the inspectors of the markets have passed, 
 and the like in other cases; for by so much the less odium 
 attends those who carry the laws into execution, by so much 
 the easier will they be properly put in force ; therefore, for 
 the same persons to pass the sentence and to execute it, 
 
224 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book vi. 
 
 will subject them to general hatred ; and, if they pass it apon 
 all, they will be considered as the enemies of all. Thus, 
 one person has often the custody of the prisoner's body, 
 while another sees the sentence against him executed, as the 
 eleven did at Athens, for which reason it is prudent to 
 separate these offices, and to give great attention thereunto 
 as equally necessary with anything we have already mentioned ; 
 for it will certainly happen that men of character will decline 
 accepting this office, and worthless persons cannot properly 
 be entrusted with it, as having themselves rather an occasion 
 for a guard, than being qualified to guard others. This, 
 therefore, ought by no means to be a separate office from 
 others ; nor should it be continually allotted to any 
 individuals but the young men ; where there is a city guard 
 the youths ought in turns to take these offices upon them. 
 These, then, as the most necessary magistrates, ought to be 
 first mentioned ; next to these are others no less necessary, but 
 of much higher rank, for they ought to be men of great skill 
 and fidelity. These are they who have the guard of the city 
 and provide everything that is necessary for war; whose 
 business it is, both in war and peace, to defend the walls 
 and the gates, and to take care to muster and marshal the 
 citizens. Over all these there are sometimes more officers, 
 sometimes fewer ; thus in little cities there is only one, whom 
 they call either general or polemarch \ but where there are 
 horse and light-armed troops, and bowmen and sailors, they 
 sometimes put distinct commanders over each of these \ 
 who again have others under them, according to their 
 different divisions ; all of which join together to make one 
 military body ; and thus much for this department. Since 
 some of the magistrates, if not all, have business with the 
 public money, it is necessary that there should be other 
 officers, whose employment should be nothing else than to 
 take an account of what they have, and correct any mis- 
 management therein. But besides all these magistrates 
 there is one who is supreme over them all, who very often 
 
CHAP, viii.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 225 
 
 has ill his own power the disposal of the public revenue and 
 taxes, who presides over the people, w^hen the supreme 
 power is in them, for there must be some magistrate who 
 has a power to summon them together, and to preside as 
 head of the State. These are sometimes called pre-advisers, 
 but, where there are many, more properly a council. These 
 are nearly the civil magistrates which are requisite to a 
 government ; but there are other persons, whose business is 
 confined to religion, as the priests, and those who are to 
 take care of the temples, that they are kept in proper repair, 
 or if they fall down, that they may be rebuilt, and what- 
 ever else belongs to public worship. This charge is some- 
 times entrusted to one person, as in very small cities ; in 
 others it is delegated to many, and these distinct from the 
 priesthood, as the builders or keepers of holy places, and 
 officers of the sacred revenue. Next to these are those who 
 are appointed to have the general care of all those public 
 sacrifices to the tutelar god of the State which the laws do 
 not entrust to the priests, and these in different States have 
 different appellations. To enumerate in few words the 
 different departments of all those magistrates who are 
 necessary ; these are either religion^ war, taxes, expenditures, 
 markets, public buildings, harbours, highways. Belonging 
 to the courts of justice there are scribes, to enrol private 
 contracts ; and there must also be guards set over the 
 prisoners, others to see the law is executed, council on 
 either side, and also others to watch over the conduct of 
 those who are to decide the causes. Amongst the magis- 
 trates also may finally be reckoned those who are to give 
 their advice in public affairs. But separate States who are 
 peculiarly happy and have leisure to attend to more minute 
 particulars, and are very attentive to good order, require 
 particular magistrates for themselves; such as those who 
 have the government of the women, who are to see the laws 
 are executed, who take care of the boys, and preside over 
 their education. To these may be added those who have 
 
 H 
 
226 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [.300K vi. 
 
 the care of their gymnastic exercises, their theatres, and 
 every other public spectacle which there may happen to be. 
 Some of these, however, are not of general use, as the 
 governors of the women ; for the poor are obhged to employ 
 their wives and children in servile offices for want of slaves. 
 As there are three magistrates to whom some States entrust 
 the supreme power — namely, guardians of the laws, pre- 
 advisers, and senators — guardians of the laws suit best to an 
 aristocracy, pre-advisers to an oligarchy, and a senate to a 
 democracy. And thus much briefly concerning all magis- 
 trates. 
 
Book VIL 
 
 CHAPTER 1. 
 
 He who proposes to make that inquiry which is necessary 
 concerning what government is best, ought first to determine 
 what manner of living is most eligible, for while this remains 
 uncertain it will also be equally uncertain what government 
 is best; for, provided no unexpected accidents interfere, Jt_ 
 is highly prob able th ay those who enjoy the best gover n- 
 ment will live the most happily according to th eir circum- 
 stance^VH e^ought, theref ore, first to kn ow w hat_manr|f;^TW])f 
 life is mfast desirable for all, and afterwards whether this 
 life is the same to the man and the citizen, or different. As I 
 imagine that I have already sufficiently shown what sort of 
 life is best, in my popular discourses on that subject, I 
 think I may very properly repeat the same here, as most 
 certainly no one ever called in question the propriety of 
 one of the divisions — namely, that as what is good relative 
 to man may be divided into three sorts, what is exte rnal. 
 ^^^JllL-ZTP^^^^il^^^ tv>f^ hnf=\y^ and w^iat to the soul— it is 
 evident that all these must conspire to make a man happy ; 
 for no one would say that a man was happy who had no 
 fortitude, no temperance, no justice, no prudence, but was 
 afraid of the flies that flew round him ; nor would abstain 
 from the meanest theft, if he was either hungry or dry, or 
 would murder his dearest friend for a farthing ; and also 
 was in every particular as wanting in his understanding as 
 
 H 2 
 
228 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vii. 
 
 an infant or an idiot. These truths are so evident that all 
 must agree to them, though some may dispute about the 
 quantity and the degree ; for they may think that a very 
 little virtue is sufficient for happiness, but for riches, 
 property, power, honour, and all such things they endeavour 
 to increase them without bounds; but to such we reply, 
 that it is easy to prove from what experience teaches us in 
 these cases that these external goods produce not virtue, 
 but virtue them. As to a happy life, whether it is to be 
 found in pleasure or virtue, or both, certain it is that those 
 whose morals are most pure, and whose understandings are 
 best cultivated, will enjoy more of it, although their fortune 
 is but moderate, than those do who own an exuberance of 
 wealth, are deficient in those, and this utility any one who 
 reflects may easily convince himself of ; for whatsoever is 
 external has its boundary, as a machine, and whatsoever is 
 useful in its excess is either necessarily hurtful, or at best 
 useless to the possessor, but every good quality of the soul, 
 the higher it is in degree, so much the more useful it is, if it 
 is permitted on this subject to use the word useful as well as 
 noble. It is also very evident that the accidents of each 
 subject take place of each other, as the subjects themselves, 
 of which we allow they are accidents, differ from each other 
 in value, so that if the soul is more noble than any outward 
 possession, as the body, both in itself and with respect to 
 us, it must be admitted of course that the best accidents of 
 each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it is for the 
 sake of the soul that these things are desirable, and it is on 
 this account that wise men should desire them, not the soul 
 for them. Let us therefore be well assured that every one 
 enjoys as much happiness as he possesses virtue and 
 wisdom, and acts according to their dictates, since for this 
 we have the example of God Himself, who is completely 
 happy ^ not from any external goody but in Himself ^ and because 
 such is His fiature. For good fortune is something different 
 from happiness, as every good which depends not on the 
 
CHAP. II.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 
 
 229 
 
 mind is owing to chance or fortune; but it is not from 
 fortune that any one is wise and just, hence it follows that that 
 city is happiest which is the best and acts best;/ibr no one 
 can do well who acts not well, nor can the deeds either of 
 man or city be praiseworthy without virtue and wisdom, for 
 whatsoever is just or wise or prudent in a man, the same 
 things are just, wise, and prudent in a city. // 
 
 Thus much by way of introduction, for I could not but 
 just touch upon this subject, though I could not go through 
 a complete investigation of it, as it properly belongs to 
 another question ; let us at present suppose so much, that a 
 man's happiest life, both as an individual and as a citizen, 
 is a life of virtue, accompanied with those enjoyments 
 which virtue usually procures. If there are any who are not 
 convinced by what I have said, their doubts shall be 
 answered hereafter ; at present we shall proceed according 
 to our intended method. 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 It now remains for us to say whether the happiness of any 
 individual man and the city is the same or different ; but 
 this also is evident, for whosoever supposes that riches will 
 make a person happy, must place the happiness of the city 
 in riches if it possesses them ; those who prefer a life which 
 enjoys a tyrannic power over others will also think that the 
 city which has many others under its command is most 
 happy; thus, also, if any one approves a man for his 
 virtue, he will think the most worthy city the happiest. 
 But here there are two particulars which require considera- 
 tion, one of which is, whether it is the most eligible life to 
 be a member of the community and enjoy the rights of a 
 
230 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vil. 
 
 citizen, or whether to Uve as a stranger, without interfering 
 in pubhc affairs ; and also what form of government is to be 
 preferred, and what disposition of the State is best ; whether 
 the whole community should be eligible to a share in the 
 administration, or only the greater part, and some only. As 
 this, therefore, is a subject of political examination and 
 speculation, and not what concerns the individual, and the 
 first of these is what we are at present engaged in, the one 
 of these I am not obliged to speak to, the other is the 
 proper business of my present design. It is evident that^ 
 government must be the best which is so established^ that 
 every one therein may have it in his power to act virtuously 
 and live happily ; but some who admit that a life of virtue 
 is most eligible, still doubt which is preferable, a public hfe 
 of active virtue, or one entirely disengaged from what is 
 without and spent in contemplation, which some say is the 
 only one worthy of a philosopher ; and one of these two 
 different modes of life both now and formerly seem to have 
 been chose by all those who were the most virtuous men ; I 
 mean the public or philosophic. And yet it is of no little 
 consequence on which side the truth lies ; for a man of 
 sense must naturally inchne to the better choice^ both as an 
 individual and a citizen. Some think that a tyrannic govern- 
 ment over those near us is the greatest injustice, but that a 
 political one is not unjust ; but that still is a restraint on the 
 pleasures and tranquillity of life. Others hold the quite 
 contrary opinion, and think that a public and active life is 
 the only life for man ; for that private persons have no 
 opportunity of practising any one virtue more than they 
 have who are engaged in public life, the management of the 
 State. These are their sentiments ; others say that a 
 tyrannical and despotical mode of government is the only 
 happy one ; for even amongst some free States the object 
 of their laws seems to be to tyrannize over their neighbours, 
 so that the generality of political institutions, wheresoever 
 dispersed, if they have any one common object in view, 
 
CHAP. II.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 231 
 
 have all of them this to conquer and govern. It is evident, 
 both from the laws of the Lacedaemonians and Cretans, as 
 well as by the manner in which they educated their children, 
 that all which they had in view was to make them soldiers ; 
 besides, among all nations, those who have power enough 
 and reduce others to servitude, are honoured on that 
 account^ as were the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and 
 Gauls. With some there are laws to heighten the virtue of 
 courage ; thus they tell us that at Carthage they allowed 
 every person to wear as many rings for distinction as he had 
 served campaigns. There was also a law at Lacedsemon, 
 that a man, who had not himself killed an enemy, should 
 be obliged to wear a halter; among the Scythians, at a 
 festival, none were permitted to drink out of the cup which 
 was carried about who had not done the same thing. 
 Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, they fixed as many 
 columns upon a man's tomb as he had slain enemies ; and 
 among different nations different things of this sort prevail, 
 some of them established by law, others by custom. Pro- 
 bably it may seem too absurd to those who are willing to 
 take this subject into their consideration, to inquire whether 
 it is the business of a legislator to be able to point out by 
 what means a State may govern and tyrannize over its 
 neighbours, whether they will or will not ; for how can that 
 belong either to the politician or legislator which is un- 
 lawful ? For that cannot be lawful which is done not only 
 justly, but unjustly also ; for a conquest may be unjustly 
 made. But we see nothing of this in the arts, for it is the 
 business neither of the physician or the pilot to use either 
 persuasion or force, the one to his patients, the other to his 
 passengers ; and yet many seem to think a despotic govern- 
 ment is a political one, and what they would not allow to be 
 just or proper if exercised over themselves, they will not 
 blush to exercise over others; for they endeavour to be 
 wisely governed themselves, but think it of no consequence 
 whether others are so or not. But a despotic power is 
 
232 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vii. 
 
 absurd, except only where Nature has framed the one party 
 for dominion, the other for subordination ; and therefore 
 no one ought to assume it over all in general, but those only 
 which are the proper objects thereof; thus no one should 
 hunt men either for food or sacrifice but what is fit for those 
 purposes, and these are wild animals which are eatable. 
 
 Now a city which is well governed might be very happy 
 in itself while it enjoyed a good system of laws, although 
 it should happen to be so situated as to have no connec- 
 tion with any other State, though its constitution should 
 not be framed for war or conquest; for it would then have 
 no occasion for these. It is evident therefore that the 
 business of war is to be considered as commendable, not 
 as a final end, but as the means of procuring it. It is the 
 duty of a good legislator to examine carefully into his 
 State, and the nature of the people, and how they may 
 partake of every intercourse, of a good life^ and of the 
 happiness which results from it; and in this respect some 
 laws and customs differ from others. It is also the duty of 
 a legislator, if he has any neighbouring States, to consider 
 in what manner he shall oppose each of them, or what 
 good offices he shall show them. But what should be the 
 final end of the best governments will be considered here- 
 after. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 We will now speak to those who while they agree that a life 
 of virtue is most eligible, yet differ in the use of it, address- 
 ing ourselves to both these parties ; for there are some who 
 disapprove of all political governments, and think that the 
 life of one who is really free is different from the life of a 
 
CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 233 
 
 citizen, and of all others most eligible : others again think 
 that the citizen is the best, and that it is impossible for him 
 who does nothing to be well employed, but that virtuous 
 acdvity and happiness are the same thing. Now both 
 parties in some particulars say what is right, in others what 
 is wrong ; thus, that the life of a freeman is better than the 
 life of a slave is true, for a slave, as a slave, is employed in 
 nothing honourable, for the common servile employments 
 which he is commanded to perform have nothing virtuous 
 in them ; but, on the other hand, it is not true that a sub- 
 mission to all sorts of governments is slavery, for the govern- 
 ment of freemen differs not more from the government of 
 slaves than slavery and freedom differ from each other in 
 their nature, and how they do has been already mentioned. 
 To prefer doing; of nothing to virtuous a ctivityjs als o wrongs 
 for h appiness c onsists in actio n, and many noble ends are 
 produced by the actions of the just and wise. From what 
 we have already determined on this subject, some one pro- 
 bably may think that supreme power is of all things best, as 
 that will enable a man to command very many useful services 
 from others ; so that he who can obtain this ought not to 
 give it up to another, but rather to seize it ; and, for this 
 purpose, the father should have no attention or regard for 
 the son, or the son for the father, or friend for friend j for 
 what is best is most eligible, but to be a member of the 
 community and be in felicity is best. What these persons 
 advance might probably be true, if the supreme good was 
 certainly theirs who plunder and use violence to others ; 
 but it is most unlikely that it should be so, for it is a mere 
 supposition, for it does not follow that their actions are 
 honourable who thus assume the supreme power over others, 
 without they were by nature as superior to them as a man 
 to a woman, a father to a child, a master to a slave ; so that he 
 who so far forsakes the paths of virtue can never return back 
 from whence he departed from them; for amongst equals 
 whatever is fair and just ought to be reciprocal, for this is 
 
234 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book vil. 
 
 equal and right ; but that equals should not partake of what 
 is equal, or like to like, is contrary to Nature : but whatever 
 is contrary to Nature is not right ; therefore, if there is any 
 one superior to the rest of the community in virtue and 
 abilities for active life, him it is proper to follow, him it is 
 right to obey ; but the one alone will not do, but must be 
 joined to the other also ; and, if we are right in what we 
 have now said, it follows that happiness consists in virtuous 
 activity, and that both w^ith respect to the community, as 
 well as the individual; ^an active li fe is the happiest : not that 
 an active life must necessarily refer to other persons, as some 
 think, or that those studies alone are practical which are pur- 
 sued to teach others what to do, for those are much more so 
 whose final object is in themselves, and to improve the 
 judgment and understanding of the man, for virtuous activity 
 has an end, therefore is something practical ; nay, those who 
 contrive the plan which others follow are more particularly 
 said to act, and are superior to the workmen who execute 
 their designs. But it is not necessary that States which choose 
 to have no intercourse with others should remain inactive, 
 for the several members thereof may have mutual intercourse 
 with each other, for there are many opportunities for this 
 among the different citizens ; the same thing is true of every 
 individual : for, was it otherwise, neither could the Deity or 
 the universe be perfect, to neither of whom can anything 
 external separately exist. Hence it is evident that that very 
 same life which is happy for each individual is happy also 
 for the State and every member of it. 
 
CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 23s 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 As I have now finished what was introductory to this 
 subject, and considered at large the nature of other States, 
 it now remains that I should first say what ought to be the 
 establishment of a city, which one should form according to 
 one's wish ; for no good State can exist without a moderate 
 proportion of what is necessary. Many things, therefore, 
 ought to be forethought of as desirable, but none of them 
 such as are impossible ; I mean relative to the number of 
 citizens, and the extent of the territory ; for as other 
 artificers, such as the weaver and the shipwright, ought to 
 have such materials as are fit for their work, since so much 
 the better they are, by so much superior will the work itself 
 necessarily be; so also ought the legislator and politician 
 endeavour to procure proper materials for the business they 
 have in hand. Now the fir st and principal instrument of the_ 
 pc^tician is the number_ofthe people : he should therefore 
 know how many and what they naturally ought to be ; in 
 like manner, the country, how large, and what it is. Most 
 persons think that it is necessary for a city to be large to 
 be happy ; but, should this be true, they cannot tell what is 
 a large one, and what a small one; for according to the 
 multitude of the inhabitants they estimate the greatness of 
 it; but they ought rather to consider its strength than its 
 numbers; for a State has a certain object in view% and from 
 the power which it has in itself of accomplishing it, its great- 
 ness ought to be estimated; as a person might say that 
 Hippocrates was a greater physician though not a greater 
 man than one that exceeded him in the size of his body ; 
 but if it was proper to determine the strength of the city 
 from the number of the inhabitants, it should never be 
 collected from the multitude in general who may happen to 
 be in it ; for in a city there must necessarily be many slaves, 
 
236 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book vii. 
 
 sojourners, and foreigners ; but from those who are really 
 part of the city and properly constitute its members ; a 
 multitude of these is indeed a proof of a large city, but in a 
 State where a large number of mechanics inhabit and but 
 few soldiers, such a State cannot be great ; for the greatness 
 of the city, and the number of men in it, are not the same 
 thing. This too is evident from fact, that it is very difficult , 
 if not imp ossible, to govern properly a very numerous body 
 of men ^; for of all the State s which appear well gov erned we 
 fiiid not one where the rights of a citizen are open to an 
 i n d is cr iminat e „,m ultit_u^ e . And this is also evident from 
 the nature of the thing ; for as law is a certain order, so 
 gcod law is of course a certain good order; but too large a 
 multitude are incapable of this, unless under the govern- 
 ment of that divine power which comprehends the universe. 
 Not but that, as quantity and variety are usually essential to 
 beauty, the perfection of a city consists in the largeness of 
 it as far as that largeness is consistent with that order 
 already mentioned ; but still there is a determinate size to 
 all cities as well as everything else, whether animals, plants- 
 or machines, for each of these, if they are neither too little 
 nor too big, have their proper powers ; but when they have 
 not their due growth, or are badly constructed, as a ship a 
 span long is not properly a ship, nor one of two furlongs 
 length, but when it is of a fit size, for either from its small 
 ness or from its largeness it may be quite useless; so is it 
 with a city ; one that is too small has not in itself the power 
 of self-defence, but this is essential to a city : one that is 
 too large is capable of self-defence in what is necessary ; 
 but then it is a nation, and not a city ; for it will be very 
 difficult to accommodate a form of government to it ; for who 
 would choose to be the general of such an unweildy multi- 
 tude, or who could be their herald but a Stentor ? The 
 first thing thereforejiecessary is,_that a_city should consist 
 
 Trf^^fuch numbers as will be s ufficient to e nable the 
 
 inhabitants to live happily in their political commu- 
 
CHAP, v.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 237 
 
 nitj^; and it follows that the more the inhabitants exceed 
 that necessary number, the greater will the city be ; but 
 this must not be, as we have already said, without 
 bounds ; but what is its proper limit experience will easily 
 show, and this experience is to be collected from the 
 actions both of the governors and the governed. Now, as 
 it belongs to the first to direct the inferior magistrates, and 
 to act as judges, it follows that they can neither determine 
 causes with justice, or issue their orders with propriety with- 
 out they know the characters of their fellow-r.iti'zens ; so 
 that whenever this happen^ not to be done in^tl iese tw o 
 particulars, the State m ust of necessity be badly managed ; 
 ioF uTboth of them it is not right to determine too hastily, 
 and without proper knowledge, which must evidently be the 
 case where the number of the citizens is too many ; besides, 
 it is more easy for strangers and sojourners to assume the 
 rig^hts of citizens, as they will easily escape detection in so 
 great a multitude. It is evident, then, that the best boun- 
 dary for a city is that wherein the numbers are the greatest 
 possible, that they may be the better able to be sufficient in 
 themselves, while at the same time they are not too large to 
 be under the eye and government of the magistrates. And 
 thus let us determine the extent of a city. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 What we have said concerning a city may nearly be 
 applied to a country ; for as to what soil it should be, every 
 one evidently will commend it, if it is such as is sufficient in 
 itself to furnish what will make the inhabitants happy ; for 
 which purpose it must be able to supply them with all the 
 necessaries of life; for it is the having these in plenty, 
 
238 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vii. 
 
 without any want, which makes them content. As to its 
 extent, it should be such as may enable the inhabitants to 
 live at their ease w^ith freedom and temperance. Whether 
 w^e have done right or wTong in fixing this limit to the 
 territory shall be considered more minutely hereafter, when 
 we come particularly to inquire into property, and what 
 fortune is requisite for a man to live on, and how and in 
 what manner they ought to employ it ; for there are many 
 doubts upon this question, while each party insists upon 
 their own plan of life being carried to an excess, the one of 
 severity, the other of indulgence. What the situation of the 
 country should be it is not difficult to determine, in some 
 particulars respecting that we ought to be advised by those 
 who are skilful in military affairs. It should be difficult 
 of access to an enemy, but easy to the inhabitants ; and, as 
 we said, that the number of inhabitants ought to be such as 
 can come under the eye of the magistrate, so should it be 
 with the country ; for then it is easily defended. As to the 
 position of the city, if one could place it to one's wish, it is 
 convenient to fix it on the sea-side ; with respect to the 
 country, one situation which it ought to have has been 
 already mentioned — namely, that it should be so placed 
 as easily to give assistance to all places, and also to re- 
 ceive the necessaries of life from all parts, and also wood, 
 or any other materials which may happen to be in the 
 country. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 But with respect to placing a city in the neighbourhood of 
 the sea there are some who have many doubts, whether it 
 is serviceable or hurtful to a well-regulated State ; for they 
 say that the resort of persons brought up under a different 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 239 
 
 system of government is disserviceable to the State, as well 
 by impeding the laws as by their numbers ; for a multitude 
 of merchants must necessarily arise from their trafficking 
 backward and forward upon the seas, which will hinder the 
 well governing of the city : but if this inconvenience should 
 not arise, it is evident that it is better, both on account of 
 safety and also lor the easier acquisition of the necessaries 
 of life, that both the city and the country should be near the 
 sea \ for it is necessary that those who are to sustain the 
 attack of the enemy should be ready with their assistance 
 both by land and by sea, and to oppose any inroad, both 
 ways if possible, but if not, at least where they are most 
 powerful, which they may do while they possess both. A 
 maritime situation is also useful for receiving from others 
 what your own country will not produce, and exporting 
 those necessaries of your own growth which are more than 
 you have occasion for ; but a city ought to traffic to supply 
 its own wants, and not the wants of others ; for those who 
 themselves furnish an open market for every one, do it for 
 the sake of gain, which it is not proper for a well-established 
 State to do, neither should they encourage such a commerce. 
 Now, as we see that many places and cities have docks and 
 harbours lying very convenient for the city, while those who 
 frequent them have no communication with the citadel, and 
 yet they are not too far off, but are surrounded by walls 
 and such-like fortifications, it is evident that if any good 
 arises from such an intercourse the city will receive it, but 
 if anything hurtful, it will be easy to restrain it by a law, 
 declaring and deputing whom the State will allow to have 
 an intercourse with each other and whom not. As to a 
 naval power, it is by no means doubtful that it is necessary 
 to have one to a certain degree ; and this not only for the 
 sake of the city itself, but also because it may be necessary 
 to appear formidable to some of the neighbouring States, or 
 to be able to assist them as well by sea as by land ; but to 
 know how great that force should be, the health of the State 
 
240 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book vii. 
 
 should be inquired into, and if that appears vigorous and 
 enables her to take the lead of other communities, it is 
 necessary that her force should correspond with her actions. 
 As for that multitude of people which a maritime power 
 creates, they are by no means necessary to a State, nor 
 ought they to make a part of the citizens ; for the mariners 
 and infantry, who have the command, are freemen, and upon 
 these depends a nav^al engagement; but when there are 
 many servants and husbandmen, there they will always have 
 a number of sailors, as we now see happens to some States, 
 as in Heraclea, where they man many triremes, though the 
 extent of their city is much inferior to some others. And 
 thus we determine concerning the country, the port, the 
 city, the sea, and a maritime power; as to the number 
 of the citizens, what that ought to be we have already 
 said. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 We now proceed to point out what natural disposition the 
 members of the community ought to be of; but this any 
 one will easily perceive who will cast his eye over the States 
 of Greece, of all others the most celebrated, and also the 
 other different nations of this habitable world. Those who 
 live in cold countries, as the north of Europe, are full of 
 courage, but wanting in understanding and the arts, there- 
 fore they are very tenacious of their liberty ; but, not being 
 politicians, they cannot reduce their neighbours under their 
 power ; but the Asiatics, whose understandings are quick, 
 and who are conversant in the arts, are deficient in courage, 
 and therefore are always conquered, and the slaves of others ; 
 
CHAP VII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 241 
 
 but the Grecians, placed, as it were, between these two 
 boundaries, so partake of them both as to be at the same 
 time both courageous and sensible; for which reason Greece 
 continues free and governed in the best ma,nner possible, 
 and capable of commanding thp whole world, could thev 
 agree upon one system of policv . Now this is the difference 
 between the Grecians and other nations, that the latter 
 have but one of these qualities, whereas in the former they 
 are both happily blended together. Hence it is evident 
 that those persons ought to be both sensible and courageous 
 who will readily obey a legislator, the object of whose laws 
 is virtue. As to what some persons say, that the military 
 must be mild and tender to those they know, but severe and 
 cruel to those they know not, it is courage which makes any 
 one lovely ; for that is the faculty of the soul which we most 
 admire : as a proof of this, our resentment rises higher 
 against our friends and acquaintance than against those we 
 know not : for which reason Archelaus, accusing his friends, 
 says very properly to himself, " Shall my friends insult me ? " 
 The spirit of freedom and command also is what all inherit 
 who are of this disposition ; for courage is commanding 
 and invincible. It also is not right for any one to say that 
 you should be severe to those you know not ; for this be- 
 haviour is proper for no one : nor are those who are of a 
 noble disposition harsh in their manners, excepting only to 
 the wicked ; and when they are particularly so, it is, as has 
 been already said, against their friends, when they think 
 they have injured them, which is agreeable to reason ; for 
 when those who think they ought to receive a favour from 
 any one do not receive it, beside the injury done them, they 
 consider what they are deprived of: hence the saying. 
 Cruel are the wars of brothers:" and this, Those who 
 who have greatly loved do greatly hate." And thus we 
 have nearly determined how many the inhabitants of a city 
 ought to be, and what their natural disposition, as also the 
 
ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vti. 
 
 country how large, and of what sort is wecessary; I say 
 nearly, because it is needless to endeavour at as great 
 accuracy in those things which are the objects of the senses, 
 as in those which are inquired into by the understanding 
 only. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 As in natural bodies those things are not admitted to be 
 parts of them without which the whole would not exist, so 
 also it is evident that in a political State everything that is 
 necessary thereunto is not to be considered as a part of it, 
 nor any other community, from whence one whole is made ; 
 for one thing ought to be common, and the same to the 
 community, whether they partake of it equally or unequally, 
 as, for instance, food, land, or the like ; but when one thing 
 is for the benefit of one person, and another for the benefit 
 of another, in this there is nothing like a community, 
 excepting that one makes it and the other uses it ; as, for 
 instance, between any instrument employed in making any 
 work and the workmen, as there is nothing common 
 between the house and the builder, but the art of the 
 builder is employed on the house. Thus ^ proper ty,_is, 
 ' necessar y for StaL^§^-bul-4iri^^ the Stat 
 
 though many species of it have life ; but a city is a 
 community of equals, for the purpose of enjoying the best 
 life possible ; but the happiest life is the best which consists 
 in the perfect practice of virtuous energies ; as therefore 
 some persons have great, others little or no opportunity of / 
 being employed in these, it is evident that this is the cause \ 
 of the difference there is between the different cities and 
 communities there are to be found : for while each of these 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 243 
 
 endeavour to acquire what is best, by various and different 
 means, they give rise to different modes of living and 
 different forms of government. We are now to consider 
 what those things are without which a city cannot possibly 
 exist ; for what we call parts of the city must of necessity 
 inhere in it : and this we shall plainly understand, if we 
 know the number of things necessary to a city : first, 
 the inhabitants must have food ^ ^econdly, arts, fo r many 
 instruments are necessary in life ; thirdly, arm s^ for it is 
 necessary that the community should have an armed force 
 within themselves, both to support their government against 
 ^hose of their own body who might refuse obedience to itr^ 
 
 and also to defend it from those who might attempt tO" 
 attack it from without ; fourthly, a certain Revenue, as well 
 for the internal necessities of the State as for the business 
 of war; fifthly, which is indeed the chief concern, a religious^ 
 establ ishmenjt_; sixthly, in order, but first of all in necessity, 
 ^XQiilLto determine both criminal and civil causes. These 
 things are absolutely necessary, so to speak, in every State ; 
 for a city is a number of people, not accidentally met 
 together, but with a purpose of ensuring to themselves 
 sufficient independency and self-protection ; and if any- 
 thing necessary for these purposes is wanting, it is impossible 
 that in such a situation these ends can be obtained. It is 
 necessary therefore that a city should be capable of acquiring 
 all these things : for this purpose a proper number of 
 husbandmen are necessary to procure food, also artificers 
 and soldiers, and rich men, and priests, and judges, to 
 determine what is right and proper. 
 
244 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vii. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Having determined thus far, it remains that we consider 
 whether all these different employments shall be open to 
 all ; for it is possible to continue the same persons always 
 husbandmen, artificers, judges, or counsellors; or shall we 
 appoint different persons to each of those employments 
 which we have already mentioned ; or shall some of them 
 be appropriated to particulars, and others of course com- 
 mon to all ? But this does not take place in every State, 
 for, as we have already said, it is possible that all may be 
 common to all, or not, but only common to some ; and this 
 is the difference between one government and another ; for 
 in democracies the v/hole community partakes of every- 
 thing, but in oligarchies it is different. 
 
 Since we are inquiring what is the best government 
 possible, and it is admitted to be that in which the citizens 
 are happy; and that, as we have already said, it is im- 
 possible to obtain happiness without virtue, it follows that 
 in the best governed States, where the citizens are really 
 men of intrinsic, and not relative, goodness, none of them 
 should be permitted to exercise any mechanic employment 
 or follow merchandise, as being ignoble and destructive to 
 -virtue; neither should they be husbandmen that they may 
 be at leisure to improve in virtue and perform the duty 
 they owe to the State. With respect to the employments 
 of a soldier, a senator, and a judge, which are evidently 
 necessary to the community, shall they be allotted to 
 different persons, or shall the same person execute both ? 
 This question too is easily answered ; for in some cases the 
 same persons may execute them, in others they should be 
 different, where the different employments require difierent 
 abilities, as when courage is wanting for one, judgment for 
 the other, there they should be allotted to different persons ; 
 
CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 245 
 
 but when it is evident that it is impossible to oblige those 
 who have arms in their hands, and can insist on their own 
 terms, to be always under command, there these different 
 employments should be trusted to one person ; for those 
 who have arms in their hands have it in their option 
 whether they will or will not assume the supreme power; 
 to these two — narnely^^ those whn havp rm irngp ^nH judgri 
 ment — the government must be entrusted ^ but not in the 
 same manner, but as Nature directs ; what requires courage | 
 to the young, what requires judgment to the old ; for with the 
 } oung is courage, with the old is jvisdom ; thus each will be 
 allotted the part they are fit for according to their different 
 merits. It is also necessary that the landed property should ^ 
 belong to these men; for it is necessary that the citizens 
 should be rich, and these are the men proper for citizens ; 
 for no mechanic ought to be admitted to the rights of a 
 citizen, nor any other sort of people whose employment is 
 not entirely noble, honourable, and virtuous ; this is evident 
 from the principle we at first set out with ; for to be happy 
 it is necessary to be virtuous ; and no one should say that 
 a city is happy while he considers only one part of its 
 citizens, but for that purpose he ought to examine into 
 all of them. It is evident therefore that the landed pro- 
 perty should belong to these, though it may be necessaiy 
 for them to have husbandmen — either slaves, barbarians^ or 
 servants. There remains of the different classes of the 
 people whom we have enumerated the priests, for these 
 evidently compose a rank by themselves; for neither are 
 they to be reckoned amongst the husbandmen or the 
 mechanics; for reverence to the gods is highly becoming 
 every State ; and since the citizens have been divided into 
 orders, the military and the council, and it is proper to 
 offer due worship to the gods, and since it is necessary 
 that those who are employed in their service should have 
 nothing else to do, let the business of the priesthood be 
 allotted to those who are in years. We have now shown 
 
246 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vii. 
 
 what is necessary to the existence of a city, and of what 
 parts it consists, and that husbandmen, mechanics, and 
 mercenary servants are necessary to a city; but that the 
 parts of it are soldiers and sailors, and that these are 
 always different from those, but from each other only 
 occasionally. 
 
 - CHAPTER X. 
 
 It seems neither now nor very lately to have been known 
 to those philosophers who have made politics their study, 
 that a city ought to be divided by famihes into different 
 orders of men, and that the husbandmen and soldiers 
 should be kept separate from each other, which custom is 
 even to this day preserved in Egypt and in Crete ; also 
 Sesostris having founded it in Egypt, Minos in Crete. 
 Common meals seem also to have been an ancient regula- 
 tion, and to have been established in Crete during the 
 reign of Minos, and in a still more remote period in Italy, 
 for those who are the best judges in that country say that 
 one Italus, being King of ^notria, from whom the people, 
 changing their names, were called ItaUans instead of 
 ^notrians, and that part of Europe was called Italy which 
 is bounded by the Scylletic Gulf on the one side, and the 
 Lametic on the other, the distance between which is about 
 half a day's journey. This Italus, they relate, made the 
 ^notrians, who were formerly shepherds, husbandmen, and 
 gave them different laws from what they had before, and to 
 have been the first who established common meals, for 
 which reason some of his descendants still use them, and 
 observe some of his laws. The Opici inhabit that part 
 which lies towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, who both now are 
 
CHAP. X.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 
 
 and formerly were called Ausonians. The Claonians in- 
 habited the part towards lapygia and the Ionian Sea, 
 which is called Syrtis. These Claonians were descended 
 from the ^notrians. Hence arose the custom of common 
 meals, but the separation of the citizens into different 
 families from Egypt ; for the reign of Sesostris is of much 
 higher antiquity than that of Minos. As we ought to think 
 that most other things were found out in a long, nay, even 
 in a boundless time (reason teaching us that want would 
 make us first invent that which was necessary, and, when 
 that was obtained, then those things which were requisite 
 for the conveniences and ornament of life), so should we 
 conclude the same with respect to a political State. Now 
 everything in Egypt bears the marks of the most remote 
 antiquity, for these people seem to be the most ancient of 
 all others, and to have acquired laws and political order j we 
 should therefore make a proper use of what is told us of them, 
 and endeavour to find out what they have omitted. We 
 have already said that the landed property ought to belong 
 to the military and those who partake of the government of 
 the State, and that therefore the husbandmen should be a 
 separate order of people, and how large and of what nature 
 the country ought to be. We will first treat of the division of 
 the land, and of the husbandmen, how many, and of what 
 sort they ought to be, since we by no means hold that 
 property ought to be common, as some persons have said, 
 only thus far, in friendship it should be their custom to let 
 no citizen want subsistence. As to common meals, it is in 
 general agreed that they are proper in well-regulated cities ; 
 my reasons for approving of them shall be mentioned 
 hereafter. They are what all the citizens ought to partake of, 
 but it will not be easy for the poor, out of what is their own, 
 to furnish as much as they are ordered to do, and supply 
 their own house besides. The expense also of religious 
 worship should be defrayed by the whole State. Of 
 necessity, therefore, the land ought to be divided into two 
 
243 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vii. 
 
 parts, one of which should b elong to the community in 
 ggneral, the other to the individuals separatel y ; and each of 
 these parts should again be subdivided into two ; half of 
 that which belongs to the public should be appropriated to 
 maintain the worship of the gods, the other half to support 
 the common meals; half of that which belongs to the 
 individuals should be at the extremity of the country, the 
 other half near the city, so that these two portions being 
 allotted to each person, all would partake of land in both 
 places, which would be both equal and right, and induce 
 them to act in concert with greater harmony in any war 
 with their neighbours ; for when the land is not divided in 
 this manner, one party neglects the inroads of the enemy 
 on the borders, the other makes it a matter of too much 
 consequence, and more than is necessary ; for which reason, 
 in some places there is a law which forbids the inhabitants 
 of the borders to have any vote in the council when they 
 are debating upon a war which is made against them, as 
 their private interest might prevent their voting impartially. 
 Thus, therefore, the country ought to be divided, and for the 
 reasons before mentioned. Coul d one have one's choice ^ 
 the husba ndmen should by all means be slaves, not of the 
 same nation, or men of any spirit, for thus they would be 
 laborious in their business and safe from attempting any 
 novelties ; next to these, barbarian servants are to be 
 preferred, similar in natural disposition to these we have 
 already mentioned. Of these, let those who are to cultivate 
 the private property of the individual belong to that 
 individual, and those vvho are to cultivate the public terri- 
 tory belong to the public. In what manner these slaves ought 
 to be used, and for what reason it is very proper that they 
 should have the promise of their liberty made them as a 
 reward for their services, shall be mentioned hereafter. 
 
CHAP. XI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 249 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 We have already mentioned that both the city and all the 
 country should communicate both with the sea and the 
 continent as much as possible. There are these four things 
 which we should be particularly desirous of in the position 
 of the city with respect to itself : in the first place, health is 
 to be consulted as the first thing necessary. Now a city 
 which fronts the east and receives the winds which blow 
 from thence is esteemed most healthful ; next to this that 
 which has a northern position is to be preferred, as best in 
 winter. It should next be contrived, that it may have a 
 proper situation for the business of government, and for 
 defence in war; that in war the citizens may have easy 
 access to it, but that it may be difiicult of access to, and 
 hardly to be taken by the enemy. In the next place 
 particularly, that there may be plenty of water, and rivers 
 near at hand ; but if those cannot be found, very large 
 cisterns must be prepared U) save rain-water, so that there 
 may be no want of it in case they should be drove into the 
 town in time of war. And as great care should be taken of 
 the health of the inhabitants, the first thing to be attended 
 to is that the city should have a good situation, and a good 
 position ; the second is that they may have good water to 
 drink, and this not be negligently taken care of ; for what 
 we chiefly and most frequently use for the support of the 
 body must principally influence the health of it ; and this 
 influence is what the air and water naturally have, for which 
 reason in all wise governments the waters ought to be 
 appropriated to different purposes, and if they are not 
 equally good, and if there is not a plenty of necessary 
 water, that which is to drink should be separated from that 
 which is for other uses. As to fortified places, what is 
 proper for some governments is not proper for all ; as, for 
 
250 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. [book vii. 
 
 instance, a lofty citadel is proper for a monarchy and an 
 oligarchy, a city built upon a plain suits a democracy ; 
 neither of these for an aristocracy, but rather many strong 
 places. As to the form of private houses, those are thought 
 to be best and most useful for their different purposes which 
 are distinct and^separate from each other, and built in the 
 modern manner, after the plan of Hippodamus ; but for 
 safety in time of war, on the contrary, they should be built 
 as they formerly were; for they were such that strangers 
 could not easily find their way out of them, and the method 
 of access to them such as an enemy could with difficulty 
 find out, if he proposed to besiege them. A city therefore 
 should have both these sorts of buildings, which may easily 
 be contrived, if any one will so regulate them as the planters 
 do their rows of vines ; not that the buildings throughout 
 the city should be detached from each other, only in some 
 parts of it; thus elegance and safety will be equally 
 consulted. With respect to walls, those who say that a 
 courageous people ought not to have any, pay too much 
 respect to obsolete notions ; particularly, as we may see 
 those who pride themselves therein continually confuted by 
 facts. It is indeed disreputable for those who are equal, or 
 nearly so to the enemy, to endeavour to take refuge within 
 their walls ; but since it very often happens that those who 
 make the attack are too powerful for the bravery and courage 
 of those few who oppose them to resist, if you would not 
 suffer the calamities of war, and the insolence of the enemy, 
 it must be thought the part of a good soldier to seek for 
 safety under the shelter and protection of walls, more 
 especially since so many missile weapons and machines 
 have been most ingeniously invented to besiege cities with. 
 Indeed to neglect surrounding a city with a wall would be 
 similar to choosing a country which is easy of access to an 
 enemy, or leveUing the eminences of it ; or as if an individual 
 should not have a wall to his house, lest it should be 
 thought that the owner of it was a coward : nor should this 
 
CHAP. XII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 251 
 
 be left unconsidered, that those who have a city surrounded 
 with walls, may act both ways, either as if it had, or as if it 
 had not.; but where it has not, they cannot do this. If 
 this is true, it is not only necessary to have walls, but care 
 must be taken that they may be a proper ornament to the 
 city, as well as a defence in time of war, not only according 
 to the old methods, but the modern improvements also ; 
 for as those who make offensive war endeavour by every 
 way possible to gain advantages over their adversaries, so 
 should those who are upon the defensive employ all the 
 means already known, and such new ones as philosophy 
 can invent, to defend themselves; for those who are well 
 prepared are seldom first attacked. 
 
 CHAPTER XIL 
 
 As the citizens in general are to eat at public tables in 
 certain companies, and it is necessary that the walls should 
 have bulwarks and towers in proper places and at proper 
 distances, it is evident that it will be very necessary to have 
 some of these in the towers : let the buildings for this pur- 
 pose be made the ornaments of the walls. As to temples 
 for public worship, and the hall for the public tables of the 
 chief magistrates, they ought to be built in proper places, 
 and contiguous to each other, except those temples which 
 the law or the oracle orders to be separate from all other 
 buildings ; and let these be in such a conspicuous eminence 
 that they may have every advantage of situation, and in the 
 neighbourhood of that part of the city which is best fortified. 
 Adjoining to this place there ought to be a large square, 
 like that which they call in Thessaly the Square of Freedom, 
 
252 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book vii. 
 
 in which nothing is permitted to be bought or sold, 
 into which no mechanic or husbandman, nor any such 
 person, should be permitted to enter, unless commanded by 
 the magistrates. It will also be an ornament to this place 
 if the gymnastic exercises of the elders are performed in it. 
 It is also proper that for performing these exercises the 
 citizens should be divided into distinct classes, accord- 
 ing to their ages, and that the young persons should have 
 proper officers to be with them, and that the seniors should 
 be with the magistrates \ for having them before their eyes 
 would greatly inspire true modesty and ingenuous fear. 
 There ought to be another square separate from this for 
 buying and selling, which should be so situated as to be 
 commodious for the reception of goods both by sea and land. 
 As the citizens may be divided into magistrates and priests, 
 it is proper that the public tables of the priests should be in 
 buildings near the temples. Those of the magistrates who 
 preside over contracts, indictments, and such like, and also 
 over the markets, and the public streets near the square, or 
 some public way ; I mean the square where things are bought 
 and sold ; for I intended the other for those who are at 
 leisure, and this for necessary business. The same order 
 which I have directed here should be observed also in the 
 country, for there also their magistrates, such as the sur- 
 veyors of the woods, and overseers of the grounds, must 
 necessarily have their common tables and their towers, for 
 the purpose of protection against an enemy. There ought 
 also to be temples erected at proper places, both to the 
 gods and the heroes ; but it is unnecessary to dwell longer 
 and most minutely on these particulars \ for it is by no 
 means difficult to plan these things ; it is rather so to carry 
 them into execution, for the theory is the child of our wishes, 
 but the practical part must depend upon fortune ; for which 
 reason we shall decline saying anything further upon these 
 subjects. 
 
CHAP, xiil.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 253 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 We will now show of what numbers and of what sort of 
 people a government ought to consist, that the State may 
 be happy and well administered. As there are two parti- 
 culars on which the excellence and perfection of every- 
 thing depends, one of these is that the object and end pro- 
 posed should be proper; the other, that the means to 
 accomplish it should be adapted to that purpose ; for it 
 may happen that these may either agree or disagree with 
 each other ; for the end we propose may be good, but in 
 taking the means to obtain it we may err ; at other times we 
 may have the right and proper means in our power, but the 
 end may be bad, and sometimes we may mistake in both : 
 as in the art of medicine, the physician does not sometimes 
 know in what situation the body ought to be to be healthy, 
 nor what to do to procure the end he aims at. In every art and 
 science, therefore, we should be master of this knowledge — 
 namely, the proper end, and the means to obtain it. Now 
 it is evident that all persons are desirous to live well and be 
 happy ] but that some have the means thereof in their own 
 power, others not ; and this either through Nature or 
 fortune : for many ingredients are necessary to a happy life ; 
 but fewer to those who are of a good than to those who are 
 of a bad disposition. There are others who continually 
 have the means of happiness in their own power, but do 
 not rightly apply them. Since we propose to inquire what 
 government is best — namely, that by which a State may be 
 best administered — and that State is best administered where 
 the people are the happiest, it is evident that happiness is a 
 thing we should not be unacquainted with. Now, I have 
 already said in my treatise on Morals (if I may here make 
 any use of what I have there shown) that happiness con- 
 sists in the energy and perfect practice of virtue; and this 
 
/254 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vii. 
 
 not relatively, but siaiply; I mean by relatively what is 
 necessary in some certain circumstances ; by simply, what 
 is good and fair in itself ; of the first sort are just punish- 
 ments and restraints in a just cause ; for they arise 
 from virtue, and are necessary, and on that account are 
 virtuous ] though it is more desirable that neither any State 
 or any individual should stand in need of them ; but those 
 actions which are intended either to procure honour or 
 wealth are simply good ; the others eligible only to remove 
 an evil; these, on the contrary, are the foundation and 
 means of relative good. ^ A worthy man indeed will bear 
 poverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents, with a 
 noble mind ; but happiness consists in the contrary to these 
 (now we have already determined in our treatise on Morals 
 that he is a man of worth who considers what is good 
 because it is virtuous, as what is simply good ; it is evident, 
 therefore, that all the actions of such a one must be worthy 
 and simply good) ; this has led some persons to conclude 
 that the cause of happiness was external goods, which 
 would be as if any one should suppose that the playing well 
 upon the lyre was owing to the instrument, and not to the 
 art. It necessarily follows from what has been said, that 
 some things should be ready at hand and others procured 
 by the legislator ; for which reason, in founding a city, we 
 earnestly wish that there may be plenty of those things 
 which are supposed to be under the dominion of Fortune 
 (for some things we admit her to be mistress over) ; but 
 for a State to be worthy and great is not only the work of 
 fortune, but of knowledge and judgment also. But for a 
 State to be worthy, it is necessary that those citizens which 
 are in the administration should be worthy also ; but as in 
 our city every citizen is to be so, we must consider how 
 this may be accomplished ; for if this is what every one 
 could be, and not some individuals only, it would be more 
 desirable ; for then it would follow that what might be done 
 by one might be done by all. Men are worthy and good 
 
CHAP. XIV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 255 
 
 three ways : by nature, by custom, by reason. In the first 
 place, a man ought to be born a man, and not any other 
 animal; that is to say, he ought to have both a body and 
 soul ; but it avails not to be only born with some things, 
 for custom makes great alterations ; for there are some 
 things in Nature capable of alteration either way, which are 
 fixed by custom, either for the better or the worse. Now, 
 other animals live chiefly a life of nature, and in very few 
 things according to custom; but man lives according to 
 reason also, which he alone is endowed with ; wherefore he 
 ought to make all these accord with each other, for if men 
 followed reason, and were persuaded that it was best to 
 obey her, they would act in many respects contrary to 
 nature and custom. What men ought naturally to be, to 
 make good members of a community, I have already 
 determined ; the rest of this discourse therefore shall be 
 upon education ; for some things are acquired by habit, 
 others by hearing them. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 As every political community consists of those who govern 
 and of those who are governed, let us consider whether 
 during the continuance of their lives they ought to be the 
 same persons or different ; for it is evident that the mode 
 of education should be adapted to this distinction. Now, 
 if one man differed from another as much as we believe 
 the gods and heroes differed from men ; in the first place, 
 being far their superiors in the body ; and, secondly, in the 
 soul, so that the superiority of the governors over the 
 governed might be evident beyond a doubt, it is certain 
 that it would be better for the one always to govern, the 
 
256 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vii. 
 
 other always to be governed; but as this is not easy to 
 obtain, and kings are not so superior to those they govern, 
 as Scylax informs us they are in India, it is evident that 
 for many reasons it is necessary tliat all in their turns 
 ^should both govern and be governed; for it is just that 
 those who are equal should have everything alike, and it 
 is difficult for a State to continue which is founded in 
 injustice; for all those in the country who are desirous 
 of innovation, will apply themselves to those who are under 
 the government of the rest, and such will be their numbers 
 in the State that it will be impossible for the magistrates to 
 get the better of them. But that the governors ought to 
 excel t he governe d is beyond a doubt; the legislator 
 therefore ought to consider how this shall be, and how it 
 may be contrived, that all shall have their equal share in the 
 administration. Now, with respect to this, it will be first 
 said that Nature herself has directed us in our choice, laying 
 down the self-same thing when she has made some young, 
 others old^ the first of whom it becomes to obey, the latter 
 to command ; for no one when he is young is offended at 
 his being under government, or thinks himself too good for 
 it; more especially when he considers that he himself 
 shall receive the same honours which he pays when he 
 shall arrive at a proper age. In some respects it must be 
 acknowledged that the governors and the governed are the 
 same, in others they are different ; it is therefore necessary 
 that their education should be in some respects the same, in 
 others different; as they say that he will be a good 
 governor who has first learnt to obey. Now, of govern- 
 ments, as we have already said, some are instituted for the 
 sake of him who commands ; others for him w^ho obeys ; 
 of the first sort is that of the master over the servant ; of the 
 latter, that of freemen over each other. Now, some things 
 which are commanded differ from others ; not in the 
 business, but in the end proposed thereby; for which 
 reason many works, even of a servile nature, are not 
 
CHAP. XIV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 257 
 
 disgraceful for young freemen to perform ; for many things 
 which are ordered to be done are not honourable or dis- 
 honourable so much in their own nature as in the end 
 which is proposed, and the reason for which they are 
 undertaken. Since, then^ we have determined that the 
 virtue of a good citizen and good governor is the same as 
 of a good man, and that every one before he commands 
 should have first obeyed, it is the business of the legislator 
 to consider how his citizens may be good me n, what_ 
 education is necessary to that purpos e^nd what is the final 
 object of a good life. The soul of man may be divided 
 into two parts : that which has reason in itself, and that 
 which hath not, but is capable of obeying its dictates, and 
 according to the virtues of these two parts a man is said to 
 be good ; but of those virtues, which are the ends, it will not 
 be difficult for those to determine who adopt the division I 
 have already given, for the inferior is always for the sake of 
 the superior : and this is equally evident both in the works 
 of art, as well as in those of Nature, but that is superior 
 which has reason. Reason itself also is divided into two 
 parts, in the manner we usually divide it : the theoretic and 
 the practical ; which division therefore seems necessary for 
 this part also. The same analogy holds good with respect to 
 actions, of which those which are of a superior nature 
 ought always to be chosen by those who have it in their 
 power ; for that is always most eligible to every one which 
 will procure the best ends. Now life is divided into labour 
 and rest, war and peace ; and of what we do, the objects are 
 partly necessary and useful, partly noble; and we should 
 give the same preference to these that we do to the diftei ent 
 parts of the soul and its actions, as war to procure peace, 
 labour rest, and the useful the noble. The politician, 
 therefore, who composes a body of laws ought to extend his 
 views to everything, the different parts of the soul, and 
 their actions, more particularly to those things which are of 
 a superior nature and ends ; and, in the same manner, 
 
 I 
 
t 
 
 ^S8 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vil. 
 
 to the lives of men and their different actions. They 
 ought to be fitted both for labour and war, but rather 
 for rest and peace; and also to do what is necessary 
 and useful^ but rather what is fair and noble. It is to 
 those objects that the education of the children ought 
 to tend, and of all the youtFs~~who want instruction. All 
 the Grecian States which now seem best governed, and the 
 legislators who founded those States, appear not to have 
 framed their polity with a view to the best end, or to every 
 virtue, in their laws and education, but eagerly to have 
 attended to what is useful and productive of gain ; and 
 nearly of the same opinion with these are some persons who 
 have wrote lately, who by praising the Lacedaemonian State, 
 show they approve of the intention of the legislator in making 
 war and victory the end of his government. But how 
 contrary to reason this is, is easily proved by argument, and 
 has already been proved by facts (but as the generality of 
 men desire to have an extensive command, that they may 
 have everything desirable in the greater abundance, so 
 Thibron and others who have wrote on that State seem to 
 approve of their legislator, for having procured them an 
 extensive command by continually inuring them to all sorts 
 of dangers and hardships) ; for it is evident, since the Lace- 
 daemonians have now no hope that the supreme power will 
 be in their own hand, that neither are they happy, nor was 
 their legislator wise. This also is ridiculous, that while they 
 preserved an obedience to their laws, and no one opposed 
 their being governed by them, they lost the means of being 
 honourable; but these people understand not rightly what 
 sort of govenmient it is which ought to reflect honour on the 
 legislator; for a government of freemen is nobler than 
 despotic power, and more consonant to virtue. Moreover, 
 neither should a city be thought happy, nor should a legis- 
 lator be commended, because he has so trained the people 
 as to conquer their neighbours ; for in this there is a great 
 inconvenience ; since it is evident that upon this principle 
 
CHAP. XV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 every citizen who can will endeavour to procure the supreme 
 power in his own city; which crime the Lacedaemonians 
 accuse Pausanias of, though he enjoyed such great honours. 
 Such reasoning and such laws are neither political, useful, or 
 true j but a legislator ought to instil those laws on the minds 
 of men which are most useful for them, both in their public 
 and private capacities. The rendering a people fit for war 
 that they may enslave their inferiors, ought not to be the 
 care of the legislator ; but that they may not themselves be 
 reduced to slavery by others. In the next place, he should 
 take care that the object of his government is the safety of 
 those who are under it, and not a despotism over all ; in the 
 third place, that those only are slaves who are fit to be only 
 so. Reason indeed concurs with experience in showing that 
 all the attention which the legislator pays to the business of 
 war, and all other rules which he lays down, should have for 
 their object rest and peace ; since most of those States 
 (which we usually see) are preserved by war, but, after they 
 have acquired a supreme power over those around them, are 
 ruined ; for during peace, like a sword, they lose their 
 brightness ; the fault of which lies in the legislator, who 
 never taught them how to be at rest. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 As there is one end common to a man both as an individual 
 and a citizen, it is evident that a good man and a good 
 citizen must have the same object in view ; it is evident that 
 all the virtues which lead to rest are necessary, for, as we 
 have often said, the end of war is peace, of labour rest ; 
 but those virtues whose object is rest, and those also whose 
 
 I 2 
 
26o ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book vi!. 
 
 object is labour, are necessary for a liberal life and rest; for 
 we want a supply of many necessary things that we may be 
 at rest A city therefore ought to be temperate, brave, and 
 patient ; for, according to the proverb, "Rest is not for slaves ; 
 but those who cannot bravely face danger are the slaves of 
 those who attack them. Bravery, therefore, and patience 
 are necessary for labour, philosophy for rest, and temper- 
 ance and justice in both, but these chiefly in time of peace 
 and rest ; for war obliges men to be just and temperate, but 
 the*' enjoyment of pleasure, with the rest of peace, is more 
 apt to produce insolence : those indeed who are easy in 
 their circumstances, and enjoy everything that can make 
 them happy^ have great occasion for the virtues of temper- 
 ance and justice. Thus, if there are, as the poets tell us, 
 any inhabitants in the Happy Isles, to these a higher degree 
 of philosophy, temperance, and justice will be necessary, as 
 they live at their ease, in the full plenty of every sensual 
 pleasure. It is evident, therefore, that these virtues are 
 necessary in every State that would be happy or worthy ; 
 for he who is worthless can never enjoy real good, much 
 less is he qualified to be at rest, but can appear good only 
 by labour and being at war, but in peace and at rest, the 
 meanest of creatures. For which reason virtue should not 
 be cultivated as the Lacedaemonians did, for they did not 
 differ from others in their opinion concerning the supreme 
 good, but in imagining this good was to be procured by a 
 particular virtue. But since there are greater goods than 
 those of war, it is evident that the enjoyment of those which 
 are valuable in themselves should be desired, rather than 
 those virtues which are useful in war \ but how and by what 
 means this is to be acquired is now to be considered. We 
 have already assigned three causes on which it will depend, 
 nature, custom, and reason, and shown what sort of men 
 Nature must produce for this purpose ; it remains, then, that 
 we determine which we shall first begin by in education, 
 reason or custom, for these ought always to preserve the 
 
CHAP. XVI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 261 
 
 most entire harmony with each other ; for it may happen 
 that reason may err from the end proposed, and be corrected 
 by custom. In the first place, it is evident that in this, as 
 in other things, its beginning or production arises from some 
 principle, and its end also arises from another principle, 
 which is itself an end. Now, with us, reason and intelli- 
 gence are the end of Nature ; our production, therefore, and 
 our manners ought to be accommodated to both these. In 
 the next place, as the soul and the body are two distiact 
 things, so also we see that the soul is divided into two 
 parts, the reasoning and not-reasoning, with their habits, 
 which are two in number, one belonging to each, namely, 
 appetite and intelligence ; and as the body is in production 
 before the soul, so is the not-reasoning part of the soul 
 before the reasoning : and this is evident ; for anger, will, 
 and desire are to be seen in children nearly as soon as they 
 are born, but reason and intelligence spring up as they 
 grow to maturity. The body, therefore, necessarily de- 
 mands our care before the soul ; next the appetites, for 
 the sake of the mind ; the body, for the sake of the 
 soul. 
 
 CHAPTER XV 1. 
 
 If, then, the legislator ought to take care that the bodies of 
 the children are as perfect as possible, his first attention 
 ought to be given to matrimony ; at what time and in what 
 situation it is proper that the citizens should engage in the 
 nuptial contract. Now, with respect to this alliance, the 
 legislator ought both to consider the parties, and their time 
 of life, that they may grow old at the same part of time, 
 and that their bodily powers may not be different; that is to 
 
262 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book vii. 
 
 say, the man being able to have children, but the woman 
 too old to bear them ; or, on the contrary, the woman be 
 young enough to produce children, but the man too old to 
 be a father ; for from such a situation discords and disputes 
 continually arise. In the next place^ with respect to the 
 succession of children, there ought not to be too great an 
 interval of time between them and their parents ; for, when 
 there is, the parent can receive no benefit from his child's 
 affection, or the child any advantage from his father's 
 protection ; neither should the difference in years be too 
 little, as great inconveniences may arise from it; as it 
 prevents that proper reverence being shown to a father by 
 a boy, who considers him as nearly his equal in age, and 
 also from the disputes it occasions in the economy of the 
 family. But, to return from this digression, care ought to be 
 taken that the bodies of the children may be such as will 
 answer the expectations of the legislator \ and this also will 
 be affected by the same means. Since the season for the 
 production of children is determined (not exactly, but to 
 speak in general), namely, for the man till seventy years, 
 and the woman till fifty, the entering into the marriage state, 
 as far as time is concerned, should be regulated by these 
 periods. It is extremely bad for the children when the 
 father is too young ; for in all animals whatsoever the parts 
 of the young are imperfect, and are more likely to be pro- 
 ductive of females than males, and diminutive also in size ; 
 the same thing of course necessarily holds true in men ; as 
 a proof of this you may see in those cities where the men 
 and women usually marry very young, the people in general 
 are very small and ill-framed ; in childbirth also the women 
 suffer more, and many of them die. And thus some persons 
 tell us the oracle of Traezenium should be explained, as if it 
 referred to the many women who were destroyed by too 
 early marriages, and not their gathering their fruits too soon. 
 It is also conducive to temperance not to marry too soon ; 
 for women who do so are apt to be intemperate. It also 
 
CHAP, xvi.j ARIS20TLE ON GOVERNMENT. 263 
 
 prevents the bodies of men from acquiring their full size, if 
 they marry before their growth is completed ; for this is the 
 determinate period, which prevents any further increase ; 
 for which reason the proper time for a woman to marry is 
 eighteen, for a man thirty-seven, a little more or less ; for 
 when they marry at that time their bodies are in perfection, 
 and they will also cease to have children at a proper time ; 
 and moreover with respect to the succession of the children, 
 if they have them at the time which may reasonably be 
 expected, they will be just arriving into perfection when 
 their parents are sinking down under the load of seventy 
 years. And thus much for the time which is proper for 
 marriage ; but, moreover, a proper season of the year should 
 be observed, as many persons do now, and appropriate the 
 winter for this business. The married couple ought also to 
 regard the precepts of physicians and naturalists, each 
 of whom have treated on these subjects. What is the 
 fit disposition of the body will be better mentioned 
 when we come to speak of the education of the child ; we 
 will just slightly mention a few particulars. Now, there is no 
 occasion that any one should have the habit of body of 
 a wrestler to be either a good citizen or to enjoy a good 
 constitution, or to be the father of healthy children ; neither 
 should he be infirm or too much dispirited by misfortunes, 
 but between both these. He ought to have a habit of 
 labour, but not of too violent labour ; nor should that be 
 confined to one object only, as the wrestler's is, but to such 
 things as are proper for freemen = These things are equally 
 necessary both for men and women. Women with child 
 should also take care that their diet is not too sparing, and 
 that they use sufiicient exercise ; which it will be easy for 
 the legislator to effect if he commands them once every day 
 to repair to the worship of the gods who are supposed 
 to preside over matrimony. But, contrary to what is proper 
 for the body, the mind ought to be kept as tranquil as 
 possible : for as plants partake of the nature of the soil, so 
 
264 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book vli. 
 
 does the child receive much of the disposition of t1ie 
 mother. ' With respect to the exposing or bringing up of 
 children, let it be a law that nothing imperfect or m aimed 
 shall be brought up. /. i' ... As the proper timehas been 
 pointed out for a man and a woman to enter into the 
 marriage-state, so also let us determine how long it is 
 advantageous for the community that they should have 
 children; for as the children of those who are too young 
 are imperfect both in body and mind, so also those whose 
 parents are too old are weak in both ; while therefore the 
 \ body continues in perfection, which (as some poets say, who 
 \reckon the different periods of life by sevens) is till fifty 
 "^^'^--V lyears, or four or five more, the children may be equally 
 perfect ; but when the parents are past that age, it is better 
 they should have no more. With respect to any connection 
 between a man and a woman, or a woman and a man, when 
 either of the parties are betrothed, let it be held in utter 
 detestation on any pretext whatsoever; but should any one 
 be guilty of such a thing after the marriage is consummated, 
 let his infamy be as great as his guilt deserves. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 When a child is born it must be supposed that the strength 
 of its body will depend greatly upon the quality of its food. 
 Now whoever will examine into the nature of animals, and 
 also observe those people who are very desirous their 
 children should acquire a warlike habit, will find that they 
 feed them chiefly with milk, as being best accommodated to 
 their bodies, but without wine, to prevent any distempers ; 
 those motions also which are natural to their age are very 
 
CHAP. XVII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 265 
 
 serviceable ; and to prevent any of their limbs from being 
 crooked, on account of their extreme ductility, some people 
 even now use particular machines that their bodies may not 
 be distorted. It is also useful to inure them to the cold 
 when they are very little, for this is very serviceable for 
 their health ; and also to inure them to the business of 
 war; for which reason it is customary with many of the 
 barbarians to dip their children in rivers when the water is 
 cold, with others to clothe them very slightly, as among the 
 Celts ; for whatever it is possible to accustom children to, 
 it is best to accustom them to it at first, but to do it by 
 degrees ; besides boys have naturally a habit of loving the 
 cold, on account of the heat. These, then, and such-like 
 things ought to be the first object of our attention; the 
 next age to this continues till the child is five years old, 
 during which time it is best to teach him nothing at all, not 
 even necessary labour, lest it should hinder his growth ; but 
 he should be accustomed to use so much motion as not to 
 acquire a lazy habit of body, which he will get by various 
 means and by play also ; his play also ought to be neither 
 illiberal nor too laborious, nor lazy. Their governors and 
 preceptors also should take care what sort of tales and 
 stories it may be proper for them to hear, for all these 
 ought to pave the way for their future instruction : for which 
 reason the generality of their play should be imitations of 
 what they are afterwards to do seriously. They, too, do 
 wrong who forbid by laws the disputes between boys and 
 their quarrels, for they contribute to increase their growth, 
 as they are a sort of exercise to the body ; for the struggles 
 of the heart and the compression of the spirits give strength 
 to those who labour, which happens to boys in their disputes- 
 The preceptors also ought to have an eye upon their 
 manner of life, and those with whom they converse ; and to 
 take care that they are never in the company of slaves. 
 At this time and till they are seven years old it is necessary 
 that they should be educated at home. It is also very 
 
266 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book vii. 
 
 proper to banish, both from their hearing and sight, every- 
 thing which is illiberal, and the like. Indeed it is as much 
 the business of the legislator, as anything else, to banish 
 every indecent expression out of the State ; for, from a 
 permission to speak whatever is shameful, very quickly arises 
 the doing it, and this particularly with young people ; for 
 which reason let them never speak nor hear any such 
 thing ; but if it appears that any freeman has done or said 
 anything that is forbidden, before he is of age to be thought 
 fit to partake of the common meals, let him be punished by 
 disgrace and stripes ; but if a person above that age does 
 so, let him be treated as you would a slave, on account of 
 his being infamous. Since we forbid his speaking everything 
 which is forbid, it is necessary that he neither sees obscene 
 stories or pictures ; the magistrates therefore are to take 
 care that there are no statues or pictures of anything of 
 this nature, except only to those gods to whom the law 
 permits them, and to which the law allows persons of a 
 certain age to pay their devotions for themselves, their 
 wives, and children. It should also be illegal for young 
 persons to be present either at iambics or comedies before 
 they are arrived at that age when they are allowed to partake 
 of the pleasures of the table ; indeed a good education will 
 preserve them from all the evils which attend on these 
 things. We have at present just touched upon this subject ; 
 it will be our business hereafter, when we properly come to 
 it, to determine whether this care of children is unnecessary? 
 or, if necessary, in what manner it must be done ; at present 
 we have only mentioned it as necessary. Probably tlie 
 saying of Theodorus, the tragic actor, was not a bad one — 
 that he would permit no one, not even the meanest actor, 
 to go upon the stage before him, that he might first engage 
 the ear of the audience. The same thing happens both in 
 our connections with men and things : what we meet with 
 first pleases best ; for which reason children should be kept 
 strangers to everything which is bad, more particularly 
 
CHAP. XVII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 267 
 
 whatsoever is loose and offensive to good manners. When 
 five years are accompHshed, the two next may be very 
 properly employed in being spectators of those exercises 
 they will afterwards have to learn. There are two periods 
 into which education ought to be divided, according to the 
 age of the child : the one is, from his being seven years of 
 age to the time of puberty ; the other, from thence till he is 
 one-and-twenty ; for those who divide ages by the number 
 seven are in general wrong ; it is much better to follow the 
 division of Nature ; for every art and every instruction is 
 intended to complete what Nature has left defective ; we 
 must first consider, if any regulation whatsoever is requisite 
 for children ; in the next place, if it is advantageous to make 
 it a common care, or that every one should act therein as he 
 pleases, which is the general practice in most cities ; in the 
 third place, what it ought to be. 
 
Book VIIL 
 
 CHAPTER 1. 
 
 No one can doubt that the magistrate ought greatly to 
 interest himself in the care of youth ; for, where it is 
 neglected, it is hurtful to the city, for every State ought to 
 be governed according to its particular nature ; for the form 
 and manners of each government are peculiar to itself ; and 
 these, as they originally established it, so they usually still 
 preserve it. For instance, democratic forms and manners a 
 democracy; oligarchic, an oligarchy; but, universally, the 
 best manners produce the best government. Besides, as in 
 every business and art there are some things which men are 
 to learn first and be made accustomed to, which are 
 necessary to perform their several works, so it is evident 
 that the same thing is necessary in the practice of virtue. 
 As there is one end in view in every city, it is evident that 
 education ought to be one and the same in each ; and that 
 this should be a common care, and not the individual's, as 
 it now' is, when every one takes care of his own children 
 separately ; and their instructions are particular also, each 
 person teaching them as they please ; but what ought to be 
 engaged in, ought to be common to all. Besides, no one 
 ought to think that any citizen belongs to him in particular, 
 but to the State in general ; for each one is a part of the 
 State, and it is the natural duty of each part to regard the 
 good of the whole ; and for this the Lacedaemonians may 
 
CHAP. II.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 269 
 
 be praised ; for they give the greatest attention to educa- 
 tion, and make it public. It is evident, then, that there 
 should be laws concerning education, and that it should be 
 public. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 What education is, and how children ought to be in- 
 structed, is what should be well known; for there are 
 doubts concerning the business of it, as all people do not 
 agree in those things they would have a child taught, both 
 with respect to their improvement in virtue and a happy 
 life ; nor is it clear whether the object of it should be to 
 improve the reason or rectify the morals. From the present 
 mode of education we cannot determine with certainty to 
 which men incline, whether to instruct a child in what will 
 be useful to him in life, or what tends to virtue, and what 
 is excellent; for all these things have their separate de- 
 fenders. As to virtue, there is no particular in which they 
 all agree; for as all do not equally esteem all virtues, it 
 reasonably follows that they will not cultivate the same. 
 It is evident tkat what is necessary ought to be taught to 
 all, but that which is necessary for one is not necessary for 
 all ; for there ought to be a distinction between the employ- 
 ment of a freeman and a slave. The first of these should 
 be taught everything useful, which will not make those who 
 know it mean. Every work is to be esteemed mean, and 
 every art and every discipHne which renders the body, the 
 mind, or the understanding of freemen unfit for the habit 
 and practice of virtue ; for which reason all those arts which 
 tend to deform the body are called mean, and all those 
 employments which are exercised for gain ; for they take 
 
2 70 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book viii. 
 
 off from the freedom of the mind, and render it sordid. 
 There are also some liberal arts, which are not improper 
 for freemen to apply to in a certain degree ; but to 
 endeavour to acquire a perfect skill in them is exposed to 
 the faults I have just mentioned ; for there is a great 
 deal of difference in the reason for which any one does 
 or learns anything; for it is not ilUberal to engage in it 
 for one's self, one's friend, or in the cause of virtue ; while, 
 at the same time, to do it for the sake of another, may 
 seem to be acting the part of a servant and a slave. The 
 mode of instruction which now prevails seems to partake of 
 both parts. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 \ There are four things which it is usual to teach children : 
 \ reading, gymnastic exercises, and music, to which (in the 
 ; * fourth place) some add painting. Reading and painting are 
 j both of them of singular use in life, and gymnastic exercises 
 / as productive of courage. As to music, some persons may 
 doubt, as most persons now use it for the sake of pleasure ; 
 but those who originally made it part of education did it 
 i because, as has been already said. Nature requires that we 
 I should not only be properly employed, but to be able to 
 \ enjoy leisure honourably ; for this (to repeat what I have 
 already said) is of all things the principal. But though 
 both labour and rest are necessary, yet the latter is prefer- 
 able to the first ; and by all means we ought to learn what 
 w^e should do when at rest, for w^e ought not to employ that 
 time at play ; for then play would be the necessary business 
 of our lives. But if this cannot be, play is more necessary 
 for those who labour than those who are at rest : for he who 
 
CHAP. III.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 271 
 
 labours requires relaxation, which play will supply ; for as 
 labour is attended with pain and continued exertion, it is 
 necessary that play should be introduced under proper 
 regulations, as a medicine ; for such an employment of the 
 mind is a relaxation to it, and eases with pleasure. Now 
 rest itself seems to partake of pleasure, of happiness, and an 
 agreeable life; but this cannot be theirs who labour, but 
 theirs who are at rest ; for he who labours, labours for the 
 sake of some end which he has not ; but happiness is an end 
 which all persons think is attended with pleasure, and not 
 with pain ; but all persons do not agree in making this 
 pleasure consist in the same thing; for each one has his 
 particular standard, correspondent to his own habits; but 
 the best man proposes the best pleasure, and that which 
 arises from the noblest actions. But it is evident that to 
 live a life of rest, there are some things which a man must 
 learn and be instructed in; and that the object of this 
 learning and this instruction centres in their acquisition ; but 
 the learning and instruction which is given for labour has 
 for its object other things, for which reason the ancienjs 
 made music a part of education ; not as a thing necessary, 
 for it is not of that nature, nor as a thing useful, as reading, 
 in the common course of life, or for managing of a family, 
 or for learning anything as useful in public life. Painting also 
 seems useful, to enable a man to judge more accurately of 
 the productions of the finer arts ; nor is it like the gymnastic 
 exercises, which contribute to health and strength ; for 
 neither of these things do we see produced by music ; there 
 remains for it then to be the employment of our rest, which 
 they had in view who introduced it ; and, thinking it a 
 proper employment for freemen, to them they allotted it ; as 
 Homer sings : 
 
 How right to call Thalia to the feast : 
 and, of some others, he says : 
 
 The bard was called, to ravish every ear : 
 
272 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book viii. 
 
 and, in another place, he makes Ulysses say the happiest 
 part of man's life is 
 
 When at the festal board, in order placed, 
 They hear the song. 
 
 It is evident, then, that there is a certain education in which 
 a child may be instructed, not as useful, nor as necessary, 
 but as noble and liberal ; but whether this is one or more 
 than one, and of what sort they are, and how to be taught, 
 shall be considered hereafter; we are now got so far on our 
 way as to show that we have the testimony of the ancients 
 in our favour, by what they have delivered down upon 
 education — for music makes this plain. Moreover, it is 
 necessary to instruct children in what is useful, not only on 
 account of its being useful in itself, as, for instance, to learn 
 to read, but also as the means of acquiring other different 
 sorts of instruction; thus, they should be instructed in 
 painting, not only to prevent their being mistaken in 
 purchasing pictures, or in buying or seUing of vases, but 
 rather as it makes them judges of the beauties of the human 
 form ; for to be always hunting after the profitable ill agrees 
 with great and freeborn souls. As it is evident, whether a 
 boy should be first taught morals or reasoning, and whether 
 his body or his understanding should be first cultivated, it is 
 plain that boys should be first put under the care of the 
 different masters of the gymnastic arts, both to form their 
 bodies and teach them their exercises. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Now those States which seem to take the greatest care of 
 
 J their children's education bestow their chief attention on 
 wrestling, though it both prevents the increase of the body, 
 
CHAP. IV.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 273 
 
 and hurts the form of it. This fault the Lacedaemonians 
 did not fall into, for they made their children fierce by 
 painful labour, as chiefly useful to inspire them with 
 courage ; though, as we have already often said, this is 
 neither the only thing nor the principal thing necessary to 
 attend to ; and even with respect to this they may not thus 
 attain their end, for we do not find either in other animals, 
 or other nations, that courage necessarily attends the most 
 cruel, but rather the milder, and those who have the 
 dispositions of lions ; for there are many people who are 
 eager both to kill men, and to devour human flesh, as 
 the Achaeans and Heniochi in Pontus, and many others 
 in Asia, some of whom are as bad, others worse than 
 these, who indeed live by tyranny, but are men of no 
 courage. Nay, we know that the Lacedaemonians them- 
 selves, while they continued those painful labours, and 
 were superior to all others (though now they are in- 
 ferior to many, both in war and gymnastic exercises), 
 did not acquire their superiority by training their youth to 
 these exercises, but because those who were disciplined 
 opposed those who were not disciplined at all. What is fair 
 and honourable ought then to take place in education of 
 what is fierce and cruel ; for it is not a wolf, nor any other 
 wild beast, which will brave any noble danger, but rather a 
 good man. So that those who permit boys to engage too 
 earnestly in these exercises, while they do not take care to 
 instruct them in what is necessary to do, to speak the real 
 truth, render them mean and vile, accomplished only in one 
 duty of a citizen, and in every other respect, as reason 
 evinces, good for nothing. Nor should we ^form our 
 judgments from past events, but from what we see at 
 present ; for now they have rivals in their mode of educa- 
 tion, whereas formerly they had not. That gymnastic 
 exercises are useful, and in what manner, is admitted; for 
 during youth it is very proper to go through a course of 
 those which are most gentle, omitting that violent diet and 
 
274 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book viii. 
 
 those painful exercises which are prescribed as necessary^ 
 that they may not prevent the growth of the body ; and it is 
 no small proof that they have this effect, that amongst the 
 Olympic candidates we can scarce find two or three who 
 have gained a victory both when boys and men, because 
 the necessary exercises they Vv^ent through when young 
 deprived them of their strength. When they have allotted 
 three years from the time of puberty to other parts of educa- 
 tion, they are then of a proper age to submit to labour and 
 a regulated diet ; for it is impossible for the mind and body 
 both to labour at the same time, as they are productive of 
 contrary evils to each other ; the labour of the body 
 preventing the progress of the mind, and the mind of the 
 body. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 With respect to music we have already spoken a little in a 
 doubtful manner upon this subject. It will be proper to go 
 over again more particularly what we then said, which may 
 serve as an introduction to what any other person may 
 choose to offer thereon ; for it is no easy matter to distinctly 
 point out what power it has, nor on what accounts one 
 should apply it, whether as an amusement and refreshment, 
 as sleep, or wine, as these are nothing serious, but pleasing, 
 and the killers of care, as Euripides says ; for which reason 
 they class in the same order, and use for the same purpose 
 all these — namely, sleep, wine, and music, to which some 
 add dancing ; or shall we rather suppose that music tends to 
 be productive of virtue, having a power, as the gymnastic 
 exercises have^ to form the body in a certain way, to 
 influence the manners, so as to accustom its professors to 
 
CHAP, v.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 275 
 
 rejoice rightly? Or shall we say that it is of any service in 
 the conduct of life, and an assistant to prudence ? For this 
 also is a third property which has been attributed to it. 
 Now that boys are not to be instructed in it as play is 
 evident, for those who learn do not play, for to learn is 
 rather troublesome ; neither is it proper to permit boys at 
 their age to enjoy perfect leisure, for to cease to improve is 
 by no means fit for what is as yet imperfect; but it may be 
 thought that the earnest attention of boys in this art is for 
 the sake of that amusement they will enjoy when they come 
 to be men and completely formed; but if this is the case, 
 why are they themselves to learn it, and not follow the 
 practice of the kings of the Medes and Persians, who enjoy 
 the pleasure of music by hearing others play, and being 
 shown its beauties by them ? For of necessity those must be 
 better skilled therein who make this science their particular 
 study and business, than those who have only spent so much 
 time at it as was sufficient just to learn the principles of it. 
 But, if this is a reason for a child's being taught anything, 
 they ought also to learn the art of cookery; but this is 
 absurd. The same doubt occurs if music has a power of 
 improving the manners. For why should they on this 
 account themselves learn it, and not reap every advantage 
 of regulating the passions, or forming a judgment on the 
 merits of the performance by hearing others, as the Lacedae- 
 monians ? For they, without having ever learnt music, are yet 
 able to judge accurately what is good and what is bad. The 
 same reasoning may be applied if music is supposed to be 
 the amusement of those who live an elegant and easy life, 
 why should they learn themselves, and not rather enjoy the 
 benefit of others' skill ? Let us here consider what is our 
 belief of the immortal gods in this particular. Now we find 
 the poets never represent Jupiter himself as singing and 
 playing; nay, we ourselves treat the professors of these arts 
 as mean people, and say that no one would practise them 
 but a drunkard or a buftoon. But probably we may con- 
 
2 76 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book viii. 
 
 sider this subject raore at large hereafter. The first question 
 is, whether music is or is not to make a part of education ? 
 And of those three things which have been assigned as its 
 proper employment, which is the right ? Is it to instruct, 
 to amuse, or to employ the vacant hours of those who 
 live at rest ? Or may not all three be properly allotted to 
 it? For it appears to partake of them all; for play is 
 necessary for relaxation, and relaxation pleasant, as it is a 
 medicine for that uneasiness which arises from labour. 
 It is admitted also that a happy life must be an honourable 
 one, and a pleasant one too, since happiness consists in 
 both these, and we all agree that music is one of the most 
 pleasing things, whether alone or accompanied with a 
 voice, as Musaeus says, Music's the sweetest joy of man 
 for which reason it is justly admitted into every company 
 and every happy life, as having the power of inspiring joy. 
 So that from this any one may suppose that it is necessary 
 to instruct young persons in it ; for all those pleasures which 
 are harmless are not only conducive to the final end of 
 life, but serve also as relaxations, and, as men are but 
 rarely in the attainment of that final end, they often cease 
 from their labour, and apply to amusement, with no further 
 view than to acquire the pleasure attending it. It is there- 
 fore useful to enjoy such pleasures as these. There are 
 some persons who make play and amusement their end, 
 and probably that end has some pleasure annexed to it, 
 but not what should be ; but while men seek the one, they 
 accept the other for it, because there is some likeness in 
 human actions to the end ; for the end is pursued for the 
 sake of nothing else that attends it, but for itself only; and 
 pleasures like these are sought for, not on account of what 
 follows them, but on account of what has gone before them, 
 as labour and grief, for which reason they seek for happiness 
 in these sort of pleasures; and that this is the reason any 
 one may easily perceive. That music should be general, 
 not on this account only, but also as it is very serviceable 
 
CHAP, v.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 277 
 
 during the hours of relaxation from labour, probably no one 
 doubts ; we should also inquire whence this arises, for it is 
 too noble in its nature to be ultimately intended for this 
 purpose ; and we ought not only to partake of the common 
 pleasure arising from it (which all have the sensation of, 
 for music naturally gives pleasure, therefore the use of it 
 is agreeable to all ages and all dispositions), but also to 
 examine if it tends anything to improve our manners and 
 our souls. And this will be easily known, if we feel our 
 dispositions any way influenced thereby; and that they 
 are so is evident from many other instances, as well as the 
 music at the Olympic games, and this confessedly fills the 
 soul with enthusiasm ; but enthusiasm is an affection of the 
 soul which strongly agitates the disposition. . Besides, all 
 those who hear any imitations sympathize therewith, and 
 this when they are conveyed even without rhythm or 
 verse. Moreover, as music is one of those things which 
 are pleasant, and as virtue itself consists in rightly enjoying, 
 loving and hating, it is evident that we ought not to 
 learn or accustom ourselves to anything so much as to 
 judge right, and rejoice in honourable manners and noble 
 actions. But anger and mildness, courage and modesty, 
 and their contraries, as well as all other dispositions of the 
 mind, are most naturally imitated by music and poetry, which 
 is plain by experience, for when we hear these our very 
 soul is altered ; and he who is affected either with joy or 
 grief by the imitation of any objects, is in very nearly the 
 same situation as if he was affected by the objects them- 
 selves ; thus, if any person is pleased with seeing a statue 
 of any one on no other account but its beauty, it is evident 
 that the sight of the original from whence it was taken would 
 also be pleasing ; now it happens in the other senses there 
 is no imitation of manners, that is to say, in the touch and 
 the taste ; in the objects of sight a very little ; for these are 
 merely representations of things, and the perceptions which 
 they excite are in a manner common to all. Besides, statues 
 
278 ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book viii. 
 
 and paintings are not properly imitations of manners, but 
 rather signs and marks, which show the body is affected by 
 some passion. However, the difference is not great, yet 
 young men ought not to view the paintings of Pauso, but of 
 Polygnotus, or any other painter or statuary who expresses 
 manners. But in poetry and music there are imitations of 
 manners ; and this is evident, for different harmonies differ 
 from each other so much by nature, that those who hear 
 them are differently affected, and are not in the same dis- 
 position of mind when one is performed as when another is ; 
 the one, for instance, occasions grief, and contracts the 
 soul, as the mixed Lydian ; others soften the mind, and as 
 it were dissolve the lieart; others fix it in a firm and settled 
 state ; such is the power of the Doric music only, while the 
 Phrygian fills the soul with enthusiasm, as has been well de- 
 scribed by those who have wrote philosophically upon this part 
 of education ; for they bring examples of what they advance 
 from the things themselves. The same holds true with 
 respect to rliythm ; some fix the disposition, others occasion 
 a change in it; some act more violently, others more 
 liberally. From what has been said it is evident what an 
 influence music has over the disposition of the mind, and 
 how variously it can fascinate it ; and if it can do this, most 
 certainly it is what youth ought to be instructed in. And 
 indeed the learning of music is particularly adapted to their 
 disposition, for at their time of life they do not willingly 
 attend to anything which is not agreeable; but music is 
 naturally one of the most agreeable things, and there seems 
 to be a certain connection between harmony and rhythm, 
 for which reason some wise men held the soul itself to be 
 harmony ; others, that it contains it. 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 279 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 We will now determine whether it is proper that children 
 should be taught to sing and play upon any instrument, 
 which we have before made a matter of doubt. Now, it is 
 well known that it makes a great deal of difference when 
 you would qualify any one in any art, for the person himself 
 to learn the practical part of it ; for it is a thing very difficult, 
 if not impossible, for a man to be a good judge of what he 
 himself cannot do. It is also very necessary that children 
 should have some employment which will amuse them ; for 
 which reason the rattle of Architas seems well contrived, 
 which they give children to play with to prevent their 
 breaking those things which are about the house; for at 
 their age they cannot sit still ; thie; therefore is well adapted 
 to infants, as instruction ouglit to be their rattle as they 
 grow up ; hence it is evident that they should be so taught 
 music as to be able to pjraizaise it. Nor is it difficult to say 
 what is becoming or untecoming of their age, or to answer 
 the objections which some make to this employment as 
 mean and low. In the first place, it is necessary for them 
 to practise that they may be judges of the art, for which 
 reason this should be done when they are young ; but when 
 they are grown older the practical part may be dropped; 
 while they will still continue judges of what is excellent in 
 the art, and take a proper pleasure therein, from the know- 
 ledge they acquired of it in their youth. As to the censure 
 which some persons throw upon music, as something mean 
 and low, it is not difficult to answer that, if we will but con- 
 sider how far we propose those, who are to be educated so as 
 to become good citizens, should be instructed in this art, and 
 what music and what rhythms they should be acquainted 
 with, and also what instruments they should play upon ; 
 for in these there is probably a difference. Such then is the 
 
28o ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT [book viii. 
 
 proper answer to that censure ; for it must be admitted that 
 in some cases nothing can prevent music being attended, to 
 a certain degree, with the bad effects which are ascribed 
 to it; it is therefore clear that the learning of it should 
 never prevent the business of riper years, nor render the 
 body effeminate and unfit for the business of war or the 
 State; but it should be practised by the young, judged 
 of by the old. That children may learn music pro- 
 perly, it is necessary that they should not be employed 
 in those parts of it which are the objects of dispute between 
 the masters in that science, nor should they perform such 
 pieces as are wondered at from the difficulty of their execu- 
 tion ; and which, from being first exhibited in the public 
 games, are now become a part of education ; but let them 
 learn so much of it as to be able to receive proper pleasure 
 from excellent music and rhythms ; and not that only which 
 music must make all animals feel, and also slaves and boys, 
 but more. It is therefore plain what instruments they 
 should use ; thus, they should be never taught to play upon 
 the flute or any other instrument which requires great skill, 
 as the harp, or the like, but on such as will make them good 
 judges of music, or any other instruction ; besides, the flute 
 is not a moral instrument, but rather one that will inflame 
 the passions, and is therefore rather to be used when the 
 soul is to be animated than when instruction is intended. 
 Let me add also that there is something therein which is 
 quite contrary to what education requires, as the player on 
 the flute is prevented from speaking ; for which reason our 
 forefathers very properly forbid the use of it to youth and 
 freeman, though they themselves at first used it, for when 
 their riches procured them greater leisure, they grew more 
 animated in the cause of virtue ; and both before and after 
 the Median war their noble actions so exalted their minds 
 that they attended to every part of education, selecting no 
 one in particular, but endeavouring to collect the whole ; for 
 which reason they introduced the flute also, as one of the 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, 281 
 
 instruments they were to learn to play on. At Lacedoemon 
 the choregus himself played on the flute ; and it was so 
 common at Athens that almost every freeman understood it, 
 as is evident from the tablet which Thrasippus dedicated 
 when he was choregus ; but afterwards they rejected it as 
 dangerous, having become better judges of what tended to 
 promote virtue and what did not. For the same reason 
 many of the ancient instruments were thrown aside, as the 
 dulcimer and the lyre ; as also those which were to inspire 
 those who played on them with pleasure, and which required 
 a nice finger and great skill to play well on. What the 
 ancients tell us, by way of fable, of the flute, is indeed very 
 rational — namely, that after Minerva had found it, she threw 
 it away j nor are they wrong who say that the goddess dis- 
 liked it for deforming the face of him who played thereon ; 
 not but that it is more probable that she rejected it, as the 
 knowledge thereof contributed nothing to the improvement 
 of the mind. Now we regard Minerva as the inventress ot 
 arts and sciences. As we disapprove of a child's being 
 taught to understand instruments, and to play like a master 
 (which we would have confined to those who are candidates 
 for the prize in that science, for they play not to improve 
 themselves in virtue, but to please those who hear them and 
 gratify their importunity), therefore we think the practice 
 of it unfit for freemen ; but then it should be confined to 
 those who are paid for doing it, for it usually gives people 
 sordid notions, for the end they have in view is bad ; for the 
 impertinent spectator is accustomed to make them change 
 their music : so that the artists who attend to him. regulate 
 their bodies according to his motions. 
 
282 Aristotle on government, [book vm. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 We are now to enter into an inquiry concerning harmony 
 and rhythm ; whether all sorts of these are to be employed 
 in education, or whether some peculiar ones are to be 
 selected; and also whether we shc)uld give the same 
 directions to those who are engaged^ in music as part of 
 education, or whether there is something different from 
 these two. Now, as all music consists in melody and 
 rhythm, we ought not to be una'tequainted with the power 
 which each of these have in education, and whether we 
 should rather choose music in which melody prevails or 
 rhythm ; but when I consider how many things have been 
 well wrote upon these subjects, not only by some musicians 
 of the present age, but also by some philosophers, who are 
 perfectly skilled in that part of music which belongs to 
 education, we will refer those who desire a very particular 
 knowledge therein to those writers, and shall only treat of 
 it in general terms, without descending to particulars. 
 Melody is divided by some philosophers, whose notions we 
 approve of, into moral, practical, and that which fills the 
 mind with enthusiasm ; they also allot to each of these 
 a particular kind of harmony w^hich naturally correspond 
 therewith ; and we say that music should not be applied to 
 one purpose only, but many, both for instruction and 
 purifying the soul (now I use the word purifying at present 
 without any explanation, but shall speak more at large of it 
 in my Poetics) ; and, in the third place, as an agreeable 
 manner of spending the time and a relaxation from the 
 uneasiness of the mind. It is evident that all harmonies 
 are to be used, but not for all purposes, but the most 
 moral, in education ; but to please the ear, when others 
 play, the most active and enthusiastic ; for that passion 
 which is to be found very strong in some souls, is to be met 
 
CHAP. VII.] ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT 283 
 
 with also in all; but the difference in different persons 
 consists in its being in a less or greater degree, as pity, fear, 
 and enthusiasm also, which latter is so powerful in some 
 as to overpower the soul ; and yet we see those persons, by 
 the application of sacred music to soothe their mind, 
 rendered as sedate and composed as if they had employed 
 the art of the physician ; and this must necessarily happen 
 to the compassionate, the fearful^ and all those who are 
 subdued by their passions ; nay, all persons, as far as they 
 are affected with those passions, admit of the same cure, 
 and are restored to tranquillity with pleasure. In the same 
 manner, all music which has the power of purifying the soul 
 affords a harmless pleasure to man. Such therefore 
 should be the harmony and such the music which those 
 who contend with each other in the theatre should exhibit ; 
 but as the audience is composed of two sorts of people, the 
 free and the well-instructed, the rude, the mean mechanics, 
 and hired servants, and a long collection of the like, there 
 must be some music and some spectacles to please and 
 soothe them ; for as their minds are as it were perverted 
 from their natural habits, so also is there an unnatural 
 harmony and overcharged music^ which is accommodated 
 to their taste ; but what is according to Nature gives pleasure 
 to every one, therefore those who are to contend upon the 
 theatre should be allowed to use this species of music. 
 But in education ethic melody and ethic harmony should 
 be used, which is the Doric, as we have already said, or any 
 other which those philosophers who are skilful in that music 
 which is to be employed in education shall approve of 
 But Socrates, in Plato's Republic^ is very wrong when he 
 permits only the Phrygian music to be used as well as the 
 Doric, particularly as amongst other instruments he banishes 
 the flute; for the Phrygian music has the same power in 
 harmony as the flute has amongst the instruments; for 
 they are both pathetic and raise the mind ; and this 
 the practice of the poets prove ; for in their bacchanal 
 
28^ ARISTOTLE ON GOVERNMENT, [book viii.. 
 
 songs, or whenever they describe any violent emotions of 
 the mind, the flute is the instrument they chiefly use ; and 
 the Phrygian harmony is most suitable to these subjects. 
 Now, that the dithyrambic measure is Phrygian is allowed 
 by general consent, and those who are conversant in studies 
 of this sort bring many proofs of it; as, for instance, when 
 Philoxenus endeavoured to compose dithyrambic music for 
 Doric harmony, he naturally fell back again into Phrygian, 
 as being fittest for that purpose ; as every one indeed 
 agrees that the Doric music is most serious and fittest to 
 inspire courage ; and, as we always commend the middle as 
 being between the two extremes, and the Doric has this 
 relation with respect to other harmonies, it is evident that 
 is what the youth ought to be instructed in. There are two 
 things to be taken into consideration, both what is possible 
 and what is proper ; every one then should chiefly endeavour 
 to attain those things which contain both these qualities; 
 but this is to be regulated by difi'erent times of life ; for 
 instance, it is not easy for those who are advanced in years 
 to sing such pieces of music as require very high notes, for 
 Nature points out to them those which are gentle and 
 require little strength of voice (for which reason some who 
 are skilful in music justly find fault with Socrates for for- 
 bidding the youth to be instructed in gentle harmony ; as if, 
 like wine, it would make them drunk, whereas the effect of 
 that is to render men bacchanals, and not make them 
 languid) ; these therefore are what should employ those who 
 are grown old. Moreover, if there is any harmony which is 
 proper for a child's age, as being at the same time elegant 
 and instructive, as the Lydian of all others seems chiefly to 
 
 be These then are as it were the three boundaries of 
 
 education, moderation, possibility, and decorum. 
 
 PRINTKD BY BAI.LANTYNE, HANSON AND Ca 
 LONDON AND EDINBURGH 
 
George Routledge & Sons' Catalogue. 
 
 NATURAL HISTORY— ZOOLOGY. 
 
 Routledge's Illustrated Natural History. By the Rev. J. G. 
 
 Wood, M.A. With more than 1500 Illustrations by Oileman, Wolf, 
 Harrison Weir, Wood, Zwecker, and others. Thiee Vols., super-royal, 
 cloth, price £-2 2s. The Volumes are also sold separately, viz. : — Mammalia, 
 1 with 600 Illustrations, i^s. ; Birds, with 500 Illustrations, 14^. ; Reptiles 
 Fishes, and Insects, 400 Illustrations, 14J. 
 
 Routledge's Illustrated History of Man. Being an Account 
 
 of the Manners and Customs of the Uncivilised Races of Men. By the 
 Rev. J. G. WooD^ M.A., F.L.S. With more than 600 Original Illustrations 
 by Zwecker, Danby, Angas, Handlev, and others, engraved by the 
 Brothers Dalziel. Vol. I., Africa, 14^.; Vol. II., Australia, New Zealand, 
 Polynesia, America, Asia, and Ancient Europe, 14^. Two Vols., super- 
 royal 8vo, cloth, 28f. 
 
 The Imperial Natural History. By the Rev. J. G. WOOD. 
 
 1000 pages, with 500 Plates, super-royal 8vo, cloth, 15^. 
 
 An Illustrated Natural History. By the Rev. J. G. Wood. 
 
 With 500 Illustrations by William Harvey, and 8 full-page Plates by 
 Wolf and Harrison Weir. Post 8vo, cloth, gilt edges, 6s, 
 
 A Picture Natural History. Adapted for Young Readers. By 
 the Rev. J. G. Wood. With 700 Illustrations by Wolf, Weir, &c. 4to, 
 cloth, gilt edges, . 7*, 6d, 
 
 The Popular Natural History. By the Rev. J. G. Wood. 
 
 With Hundreds of Illustrations, price yj. td. 
 
 The Boy's Own Natural History, By the Rev. J. G.Wood. 
 
 With 400 Illustrations, 35. 6d. cloth. 
 
 Sketches and Anecdotes of Animal Life. By the Rev. J. G« 
 
 Wood. Illustrated by Harrison Weir. Fcap. 8vo, cloth, 3*. 6d, 
 
 Animal Traits and Characteristics. By the Rev. J. G. Wood. 
 
 Illustrated by H. Weir. Fcap., cloth, jx. 6d. 
 
 The Poultry Book. By W. B. Tegetmeier, F.Z.S. Assisted 
 
 by many Eminent Authorities. With 30 full-page Illustrations of the 
 different Varieties, drawn from Life by Harrison Weir, and printed in 
 Colours by Leighton Brothers ; and numerous Woodcuts. Imperial 8vo, 
 half- bound, price 2 if. 
 
 The Standard of Excellence in Exhibition Poultry, By 
 W. 1*. Ibgetmhihr, F.Z.S, Fcap., cloth, 2*. 6<^. _ , 
 
GEORGE ROVTLEDGE ^ SONS' 
 
 Natural Histort, continued. 
 Pigeons. By W. B. Tegetmeier, F.Z.S., Assfsted by many 
 
 Eminent Fanciers. With 27 Coloured Plates, drawn from Life by Harrisom 
 Wkir, and printed by Lkighton Brothers ; and numerous Woodcuts. Ini!- 
 penal 8vo, half-bound, loi. td. 
 
 The Homing or Carrier Pigeon: Its History, Management, 
 and Method of Training. By W. B. Tegetmeiek, F.Z.S. xs, boards. 
 
 My Feathered Friends, Containing Anecdotes of Bird Life, 
 
 more especially Eagles, Vultures, Hawks, Magpies, Rooks, Crows, Rrivens, 
 Parrots, Humming Birds, Ostriches, &c., &c. By the Rev. J. G. Wooix 
 With Illustrations by Harrison Weir. Cloth gilt* td, 
 
 British Birds* Eggs and Nests. By the Rev. J. C. Atkinson. 
 
 With Original Illustrations by W. S. CoLSMAN, printed in Colours. Fcapwt 
 cloth, gilt edges, price 3X. 
 
 The Angler Naturalist. A Popular History of British Fresh- 
 water Fish. By H. Cholmondblby Pennbll. Post 8vo, 3^. ^d. 
 
 British Conchology. A Familiar History of the Molluscs of 
 
 the British Isles. By G. B. Sowkrby. With 20 Pages of Coloured Plate«» 
 embracing 150 subjects. Cloth, 5*. 
 
 The Calendar of the Months. Giving an Account of the Plants, 
 
 Birds, and I nsects that may be expected each Month. With 100 lUustrap 
 tions. Cloth gilt, 3^. td. ; Cheap Edition, 2*. 
 
 White's Natural History of Selborne. New Edition. Edited 
 by Rev. J. G. Wood, with above 200 Illustrations by W. Harvby. Fcap. 8vo, 
 cloth, 3^. td. 
 
 Dogs and their Ways. Illustrated by numerous Anecdotes 
 from Authentic Sources. Bjr the Rev. Charles Williams* With Illus- 
 trations. Fcap. 8vo, cloth, ^r. (id» 
 
 Sagacity of Animals. With 60 Engravings by HARRISON Weik. 
 
 Small 4to, 3*. td% ^ 
 
 The Young Naturalist^^i By Mrs. Loudon. i6mo» cloth. 
 
 Illustrated, ix. td. 
 
 The Child's First Book of Natural History* By Miss BoNix 
 
 With xoo Illustrations* x6mo, doth, i«. td* 
 
 The Common Objects of the Country. By the Rev. J. G. 
 
 Wood. With Illustrations by Coleman, containing 150 of the "Objects* 
 
 beautifully printed in Colours. Cloth, gilt edges, price 3J. td» 
 
 Also a Cheap Edition, price xx., in fancy boards, with Plain Plates. 
 
 Common British Beetles. By the Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A. 
 
 With Woodcuts and Twelve pages of Plates of all the Varieties, beautifully 
 printed in Colours by Edmund Evans. Fcap. 8vo, doth, gilt edges, pric« 
 y,td. 
 
 Wcstwood's (Professor) British Butterflies and their Trans- 
 
 formations. With numerous Illustrations, beautifully Coloured by Hand* 
 Imperial 8vo, cloth. lai. td. 
 
ROUTLEDGE'S WORLD LIBRARY. 
 
 Edited by the Rev, H. R. HA WEIS, M.A. 
 EACH VOLUME 3d., i6o pages, Paper Cover ; or in Cloth 6d 
 
 List of the Series : 
 
 Goethe's Faust- Translated by John Anster, LL.D. 
 
 Life of Liord Nelson. 
 
 Goldsmith's Plays and Poems. 
 
 Memoirs of Baron Trenck. 
 
 White's Natural History of Selborne. 
 
 Captain Cook's Third and Last Voyage. 
 
 Longfellow's Popular Poems. 
 
 Life of the Duke of Wellington. 
 
 Gulliver's Travels. 
 
 De Foe's J ournal of the Plague. 
 
 JEsop's Fables. 
 
 British Birds' Eggs and Wests. 
 
 The Mutiny of the " Bounty." 
 
 Lamb's Tales from Shakespeare. 
 
 O. W. Holmes' Professor at the Breakfast Table. 
 
 Chinese Gordon. 
 
 Addison's Spectator (Selections). 
 
 Travels of Dr. Livingstone. 
 
 Comic Poets of the Nineteenth Century. 
 
 Poe's Tales of Mystery. 
 
 Mrs. Bundell's Cookery— Meats. 
 
 Ditto Ditto Sweets. 
 
 Common Objects of the Seashore. 
 
 Ditto Ditto Country. 
 
 Frankenstein. By Mrs. Shelley. 
 Henry Ward Beecher in the Pulpit. 
 Essay-Gems of Emerson. 
 Napoleon Buonaparte. 
 Old Ballads. 
 
 Pet. By the Rev. H. R. Haweis, M.A. 
 Select Poems. 
 
 The Siege of Jerusalem. By Josephus. 
 Gems of Byron. 
 
 Dickens' Christmas Carol and the Chimes. 
 
 Bret Harte's Poems. 
 
 Tales from Chaucer. Mrs Haweis. 
 
 The Innocents Abroad. By Mark Twain. 
 
 The New Pilgrim's Progress. By Mark Twain. 
 
 Essays of Elia. By Charles Lamb. 
 
 Life of Queen Victoria. 
 
 GEORGE ROUTLEDGE AND SONS* 
 
ROUTLEDGE'S 
 
 POCKET LIBRARY. 
 
 • In MONTHLY VOLUMES, Cut or Uncut Edges, i^. ; 
 Uncut Edges, with Gilt Tops, is. 6d. ; or Paste Grain, 2s. 6d. each. 
 
 " A series of beautiful little books, tastefully bound." — Times. 
 " Deserves warm praise for the taste shown in its production. The 
 * Library ' ought to be very popular." — Athen^um. 
 
 "Beautifully printed and tastefully bound." — Saturday Review. 
 "Choice and elegant."— Daily News. 
 Routledge's Perfect Pocket Library." — Punch, 
 
 Volumes Already Issued : 
 Bret Harte's Poems. 
 Thackeray's Paris Sketch. Book. 
 Hood's Comic Poems. 
 Dickens's Christmas CaroL 
 Poems by Ohver Wendell Holmes. 
 Washington Irving's Sketch Book. 
 Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome. 
 Goldsmith's Vicar of Wakefield. 
 Hood's Serious Poems. 
 The Coming Race, by Lord Lytton. 
 The Biglow Papers, by J. R. LowelL 
 Manon Lescaut, by the Abbe Prevost. 
 The Song of Hiawatha, by H. V/. Longfellow. 
 Sterne's Sentimental Journey. 
 Dickens's The Chimes. 
 Moore's Irish Melodies. 
 Fifty ''Bab" Ballads, by W. S. Gilbert. 
 Poems, by Elizabeth Barrett Browning. 
 The Luck of Roaring Camp, by Bret Harte. 
 Poems by Edgar A. Poe. 
 Milton's Paradise Lost. 
 Scott's Lady of the Lake. 
 Campbell's Poetical Works. 
 Lord Byron's Werner. 
 Humour, Wit, and Wisdom. 
 Longfellow's Hyperion. 
 Dickens's Cricket on the Hearth. 
 Gray's Poetical Works. 
 Willis's Poetical Works. 
 Thackeray's Cornhill to Grand Cairo. 
 Frankenstein, by Mrs. Shelley. 
 Tales from Pickwick, by Charles Dickens. 
 
 GEORGE ROUTLEDGE AND SONS, 
 
 BROADWAY, LUDGATE HILL, LONDON, E.G. 
 
UNIVERSmr OF ILLIN0I8-URBANA 
 
 3 0112 058021111