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PLATO CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 PLATO 
 
 AGAINST THE ATHEISTS; 
 
 OR, THE 
 
 TENTH HOOK OP THE DIALOGUE ON LAWS, 
 
 ACCOMPANIED WITH 
 
 CRITICAL NOTES, 
 
 AND FOLLOWED BY 
 
 EXTENDED DISSERTATIONS 
 
 ON SOME OF 
 
 THE MAIN POINTS OF THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE- 
 OLOGY, ESPECIALLY AS COMPARED WITH THE 
 HOLY SCRIPTURES. 
 
 BY TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., 
 
 PROFESSOR OF THE GREEK LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN THE UNIVERSITY 
 IN THE CITY OF NEW-YORK. 
 
 rnrv-'n 
 
 As the Lord livetli, and as thy soul liveth. 
 
 Hebrew Oath. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, 
 FRANKLIN SQUARE. 
 
 1870 . 
 
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1845, by 
 Harper & Brothers, 
 
 afi the Clerk’s Office of the Southern District of New-Yor&. 
 
TO l lfB 
 
 UEV. ELIPHALET NOTT, D.D„ 
 
 THE VENERABLE -VTVci \ PRESIDENT OF UNION COLLEGE 
 
 * *' . f,ȣRED alma mater, 
 
 THIS WORK 
 
 s most respectfully XnscrtfieT), 
 
 IN REMEMBRANCE OF THOSE LESSONS, BOTH OF THEORET 
 ICAL AND PRACTICAL WISDOM, WHICH HAVE AIDED 
 IN FORMING THE MINDS AND CHARACTERS 
 OF SO LARGE ^A PORTION 
 
 OF 
 
 THE EDUCATED MEN OF OUR LA^ t* 
 
o'ri^x rx isSs ^33 nox 
 
 • v: I •* • : t t - r 
 
 Psalm x iv., 1. 
 
 'lirr 0 X 3 xbo ’ 3 x ynxrrnxi o’nssrrnx xVi 
 
 Jeremiah , xxiii., 24 
 
 *Ei> avrCp yap £ ti/uev, Kal KivovpeOa, nai kofiev. 
 
 Acts , xvii., 28. 
 
 HiGTEVGac yap del rov TrpoGepxopevov rfi Qe<p f ot> 
 S JJ2TI, Kal Tolg EK£nraii?Lv avTov pcGdanodoTTjg ytv* 
 
 rat. 
 
 • Hebrews , XI., 6 
 
K\ 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 It is generally agreed among those who hold The 
 Laws of Plato to be a genuine production, that it was 
 a treatise written in his old age. If so, it may be re- 
 garded as containing his most matured and best-set- 
 tled opinions on many of the great subjects discussed 
 in his other dialogues. Some have thought that they 
 discovered many contradictions between this work and 
 the Republic. One has even gone so far as to say that 
 they are opposed in every page. In this opinion, how- 
 ever, we cannot concur ; although it must be admitted 
 that they differ in respect to style, and, notwithstand- 
 ing the near relationship which would seem to be in- 
 dicated by their titles, are very dissimilar in design. 
 In the one, the State is the main subject of discussion ; 
 in the other it is a secondary part, subordinate to what 
 the writer evidently regards as a higher and more 
 philosophical investigation into the nature of right or 
 righteousness. The practice of contrasting these two 
 works has arisen from a wrong view of the true title 
 of the one generally styled the Republic. Its most 
 appropriate designation is nep£ A maiov, or, An Inquiry 
 into the Nature of Right . The imaginary State is ev- 
 idently made subservient to this, or, as he expressly 
 tells us in the second book, intended only as a model 
 of the human soul, so magnified that we might read 
 therein, in large letters, what would not be distinct 
 enough for the mental vision when examined in the 
 smaller characters of the individual spirit. Vide lib. 
 ii., 369, A. This comparison of the soul to a com- 
 monwealth has been a favourite, not only with Plato, 
 
 A 2 
 
VI 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 but with the most philosophical minds in all ages. We 
 find it on a much smaller scale in the eleventh book of 
 •The Laws, where the Nightly Conference, or the most 
 solemn legislative and judicial body in the state, is com- 
 pared to the head in thQ human system. In the Re- 
 public it is the great idea, to which the construction of 
 the fancied State is altogether secondary. Sometimes, 
 however, it must be admitted, the author seems so 
 taken up with this imaginary commonwealth, that he 
 unconsciously, perhaps, brings it into the primary 
 place, and thus distorts his plan. It is this occasional 
 forgetfulness of his main design that has introduced into 
 Plato’s Republic those incongruities which, in all ages, 
 have been so much complained of. Sometimes the con- 
 sistency of the under or fictitious part is overlooked, or, 
 in other words, the State is utterly forgotten, while we 
 are carried away to some of the most abstruse of all 
 metaphysical discussions, such as may be found in the 
 sixth and seventh books. Again, his attention seems 
 to be so occupied with the outward drapery that he 
 loses sight of his main theme, and, pleased with the 
 efforts of his own fancy, dwells at great length on 
 what, in reality, is merely externa] to the higher and 
 inner sense. In the third, fourth, and last three books, 
 the harmony of primary and secondary is well pre- 
 served. In the sixth and seventh he seems to lose sight 
 of the commonwealth almost wholly, while in some 
 parts of the second he appears to have nothing else 
 before him. The fifth may be regarded as a sort of 
 hybrid production, arising from a confusion of both 
 views. Some of its arrangements are altogether too 
 unnatural to allow the supposition that they were ever 
 intended for a real State ; and yet it is very diffi- 
 cult to discover what bearing they can have upon the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Vli 
 
 higher philosophy to which the whole scheme was in- 
 tended to be subservient. The least we can say is, 
 that Plato here lost himself, and produced something 
 which was neither allegory nor reality, neither philos- 
 ophy nor legislation. 
 
 It is on the subject of the domestic relations, which 
 are supposed to be assailed in this fifth book, that there 
 exists the greatest contrariety between the Republic 
 and The Laws. Plato seems, even in his own day, to 
 have been so reproached with this apparent blot in his 
 philosophy, that he was led to take special pains to do 
 it away in this work of his old age ; and hence the 
 great desire he shows in The Laws to set in their high- 
 est light the sanctity of the family, or parental and fil- 
 ial relations. We have adverted to this at some 
 length in the first of the dissertations appended to the 
 text. In other respects, the discrepancies between the 
 Republic and The Laws have been greatly exaggera- 
 ted. Differing, however, as they may in some of their 
 minor details, no one can attentively study both with- 
 out discovering evidences that they are productions of 
 the same mind, and that, in the main elements of that 
 higher philosophy on which all legislation and morals 
 depend, they are substantially the same. 
 
 The Treatise on Laws is undoubtedly intended for a 
 really practicable , if not a really existing State. In 
 discussing, however, the primary principles of legisla- 
 tion, the author takes a very wide range, occupying 
 far more time in what he styles the preambles, or rec- 
 ommendatory reasonings about the laws, than in the 
 laws themselves. Hence there are but few points in 
 the Platonic philosophy and ethics, as exhibited in the 
 other dialogues, but what have some representative 
 here. We find the same questions started respecting 
 
via 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the nature and origin of virtue — whether it is didafcrrj , 
 or capable of being taught as a science or not ; wheth- 
 er it is one or many — that is, whether the virtues are ah 
 so essentially connected that one cannot exist without 
 the others. We find the same views in regard to the 
 end and origin of law — the importance in all things oi 
 looking to the idea, the ev ev 7 rohXoig, or one in many. 
 There is the same reverence for antiquity and ancient 
 myths, the same disposition to regard religion as the 
 beginning and foundation of every system of civil pol- 
 ity, and the same method of representing the ideas of 
 a God, of his goodness, his providence, of a present 
 and future retribution, as lying at the foundation of all 
 morals and all religion. Even in the departments of 
 psychology and ontology we find many things in The 
 Laws which remind us of the author of the Phaedon, 
 the Parmenides, and the These tetus. The favourite 
 doctrines and methods of reasoning contained in the 
 Gorgias are exhibited everywhere ; and perhaps there 
 is no other part of Plato’s works more in the style and 
 spirit of the Timseus than this very tenth book of The 
 Laws, which we have selected as the ground of our 
 comments in the present work. 
 
 It was on this account chosen as forming, in our 
 judgment, one of the best central positions from whence 
 to make excursions over a large part of the Platonic 
 philosophy. We may perhaps be charged with hav- 
 ing sometimes used the text as a mere thread on which 
 to hang our own discussions ; but even should it be 
 admitted that there is some truth in this, still might it 
 be maintained that those discussions are all closely 
 connected with the Platonic philosophy and theology, 
 and that from this field we never depart, unless, per- 
 haps, to dwell on kindred subjects suggested by the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 IX 
 
 Holy Scriptures. Our object has not been merely to 
 make a classical text-book, but to recommend Plato to 
 the student or reader by every means through which 
 attention could be drawn to our favourite author ; be- 
 lieving that in no other way could we render a better 
 service to the cause of true philosophy and religion. 
 Some may say that, in our great partiality, Plato is 
 made to talk too much like a Christian. It may be 
 that we have found senses higher and more Scriptural 
 than are contained in the letter of the passages to 
 which reference is made ; yet even if this is, to some 
 extent, the case, it only shows the suggestive nature 
 of his philosophy ; how it is capable of carrying the 
 earnest reader to more spiritual views than the author 
 himself, perhaps, ever entertained, and how he differs, 
 in this respect, from all other profane writers of an- 
 cient or modern times. We think it will be found 
 that the views in which we have indulged are thus 
 naturally suggested ; that they are not hunted for, or 
 brought from afar, but are such as, if not always con- 
 tained in the precise letter of our text, do most easily 
 present themselves in connexion with it, especially to 
 one who reads Plato by the light of the Christian Rev- 
 elation. On this subject, of what may be called the 
 Platonic Spiritual Sense , or capability of accommoda- 
 tion to higher views, the reader is referred to Disserta- 
 tion LX., where it is treated of at some length. 
 
 In pursuance of this favourite plan of recommending 
 Plato and the Platonic philosophy, the method follow- 
 ed in the present work was adopted. The text and 
 critical notes form by much the smallest part, and 
 even these accompanying annotations frequently ex- 
 hibit as much of a philosophical and theological as of 
 a critical character. The longer dissertations an 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 nexed, and which, for the reader’s convenience, we 
 have divided into numbered sections, with general and 
 running titles, are devoted almost entirely to the eluci- 
 dation of some of the main points of the Platonic phi- 
 losophy, in their connexion with other systems of an- 
 tiquity, to a comparison, whenever there was occasion 
 for it, with the sentiments of Aristotle, illustrations 
 drawn from the Grecian poets, together with a con- 
 tinual reference to the Holy Scriptures, by way of 
 resemblance, contrast, agreement, or condemnation. 
 For these purposes, there have been introduced, from 
 almost all the other Platonic dialogues, very frequent 
 and extended quotations of the most striking passages ; 
 h ing such as, besides having a natural connexion with 
 the subject discussed, would promote our main design, 
 by producing in the reader a desire to have a deeper 
 knowledge of Plato than is generally possessed by the 
 greater part of our philosophical and theological wri- 
 ters. To these quotations, in almost every case, full 
 translations have been given, sometimes literal, and 
 sometimes paraphrastic. The exceptions to this course 
 are, when the nature and substance of the quotation 
 were sufficiently indicated by the manner of its intro- 
 duction. The main references are to the Timaeus, 
 the Republic, the Phaedon, Gorgias, Theaetetus, Par- 
 menides, Philebus, Protagoras, Symposion, Politicus, 
 Cratylus, Sophista, and the other books of The Laws, 
 with occasional citations from most of the minor dia- 
 logues having any claims to be regarded as genuine. 
 
 The work has been the result of a careful examin- 
 ation of the Platonic writings ; in which we have 
 sought to interpret Plato mainly by himself, and by 
 the aid, on the one hand, of his jealous rival, Aris- 
 totle, and on the other, of his enthusiastic admirer 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 XI 
 
 Cicero. Of modern critical and philosophical helps, 
 whether English or German, we make little display, 
 because, in fact, we have made but little or no use of 
 them. In regard to the text, we have followed that 
 of Bekker and Ast, who hardly differ at all, either in 
 words or punctuation. Wherever there has been a 
 departure from them, the reasons are assigned, mainly 
 in the shorter notes. The critical means within our 
 power have been very limited, and we therefore, in 
 this department, ask indulgence for any errors which 
 may have been committed. For the philosophical opin- 
 ions advanced no such plea is interposed. By their 
 own merit, and their accordance with the true inter- 
 pretation of the Platonic system, they stand or fall. 
 
 One design of the work is to serve as a text-book 
 for senior classes in college, not so much by way of 
 furnishing an exercise in the study of the Greek lan- 
 guage, as for the higher object of exhibiting, in connex- 
 ion with the Platonic, the other systems of Greek phi- 
 losophy, and their bearing upon the Christian theology. 
 On the same grounds, it is supposed that it may be found 
 useful to students in our theological seminaries, and 
 form no unprofitable addition to the libraries of cler- 
 gymen, besides commending itself generally to the at- 
 tention of our scholars and literary men. 
 
 We believe that in this age there is a peculiar call 
 for a deeper knowledge of Plato. Some acquaintance 
 with his doctrine of ideas seems needed as a correct- 
 ive to the tendency, so widely prevalent, to resolve all 
 knowledge into an experimental induction of facts, not 
 only in physical, but also in ethical and political 
 science. If the Good, to adopt our author’s own 
 style,* is something more than pleasure or happiness 
 
 * See The Cratylus. 440, B. ; also Dissertation XX., p 163. 
 
Xll 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 either present or anticipated — if the True is something 
 higher than past, present, or future facts — if the Beau- 
 tiful is something more than a generalization from 
 pleasing individual sensations — if the Just and the 
 Right involve inquiries far above those endless logoma- 
 chies, and questions of casuistry, which form the main 
 features of modern ethics — if the State is a reality 
 transcending a present aggregation of flowing and 
 perishing individuals — if Law is a spiritual power dis- 
 tinct from the muscular force of a majority of present 
 wills — if God is something more than gravitation, or 
 the eternal development of a physical fate, which is 
 only another name for an eternal succession of inex- 
 plicable phenomena — if there is a real foundation for 
 the moral and religious, as distinct from, and not em- 
 braced in, the natural , or, in other words, if penalty 
 and retribution are terms of far more solemn import 
 than the modern jargon about physical consequences — 
 then surely is it high time that there should be some 
 disturbance of this placid taking for granted of the 
 opposing views ; then surely should Plato be stud- 
 ied, if for no other purpose, as a matter of curiosity, 
 to see if there may not possibly be some other philoso- 
 phy than this noisy Baconianism, about which there is 
 kept up such an everlasting din, or that still more noisy, 
 because more empty, transcendentalism, which some 
 would present as its only antidote. In place of all this, 
 we want the clear, simple, common sense philosophy of 
 Plato, commending itself, when rightly understood, to 
 all the aoival evvoiat , or universal ideas of the race, in 
 distinction from that miscalled common sense which is 
 only the manufactured public opinion of the moment — 
 a philosophy most religious — most speculative, and yet 
 most practical — most childlike in its primeval simpli- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 xia 
 
 city, and yet most profound. We speak with confi- 
 dence on this point. The young man who is an en- 
 thusiastic student of Plato can never be a sciolist in 
 regard to education, a quack in literature, a dema- 
 gogue in politics, or an infidel in religion. 
 
 Our main object, then, is to recommend this noble phi- 
 losopher to the present generation of educated young 
 men, especially to our theologians. The present work 
 by no means professes to set forth his system as a 
 whole, but merely to present some of its attractive 
 points, to allure other minds among us to a more thor- 
 ough examination. The main doctrine of ideas, al- 
 though alluded to in almost every dissertation, is not 
 discussed under its own title, because we had formed 
 the design, if permitted to accomplish it, and if the 
 present work should be acceptable to the public, of 
 treating it by itself in ah*examination of another of the 
 most interesting of the Platonic dialogues. 
 
 We conclude with the remark that, in a moral and 
 practical, as well as in a speculative point of view, the 
 particular subject of the dialogue selected has some 
 claim to attention. He who thinks most deeply, and 
 has the most intimate acquaintance with human na- 
 ture, as exhibited in his own heart, will be the most 
 apt to resolve all unbelief into Atheism. Especially 
 will this be the case at a time when physical science, 
 in league with a subtle pantheism, is everywhere sub- 
 stituting its jargon of laws, and elements, and nebular 
 star-dust, and vital forces, and magnetic fluids, for the 
 recognition of a personal God, and an ever wakeful, 
 ever energizing special providence. Theism, we ad- 
 mit, is everywhere the avowed creed, but it wants 
 life. It is too much of a mere philosophy. There 
 
 B 
 
XIV 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 are times when the bare thought tnat God is, comes 
 home to the soul with a power and a flash of light 
 which gives a new illumination, and a more vivid in- 
 terest to every other moral truth. It is on such occa- 
 sions the conviction is felt that all unbelief is Atheism, 
 or an acknowledgment of a mere natural power cloth- 
 ed with no moral attributes, and giving rise to no 
 moral sanctions. We want vividness given to the 
 great idea of God as a judge, a moral governor, a 
 special superintendent of the world and all its move- 
 ments, the head of a moral system, to which the ma- 
 chinery of natural laws serves but as the temporary 
 scaffolding, to be continued, changed, replaced, or 
 finally removed, when the great ends for which alone 
 it was designed shall have been accomplished. Just 
 as such an idea of God is strong and clear, so will be 
 a conviction of sin, so will be a sense of the need of 
 expiation, so will be a belief in a personal Redeemer, 
 and so will follow in its train an assurance of all the 
 solemn verities of the Christian faith, so strong and 
 deep, that no boastful pretension of that science which 
 makes the natural the foundation of the moral, and no 
 stumbling-blocks in the letter of the Bible will for a 
 moment yield it any disquietude. There is a want of 
 such a faith, as is shown bv the feverish anxiety in re- 
 spect to the discoveries of science, and the results of 
 the agitations of the social and political world. This 
 timid unbelief, when called by its true name, is Athe- 
 ism. The next great battle-ground of infidelity will 
 not be the Scriptures. What faith there may remain 
 will be summoned to defend the very being of a God, 
 the great truth involving every other moral and reli- 
 gious truth — the primal truth, that HE IS, and that he 
 is the rewarder of all who diligently seek him . 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Png « 
 
 Introduction .......... v 
 
 Statement of the Argument ....... 
 
 Greek Text and Critical Notes . . . . 1 to 84 
 
 EXCURSUS I. 
 
 The Platonic View of the Parental and Filial Relations, and 
 the Ancient Doctrine generally on this Subject . . .87 
 
 II. 
 
 The Words npooifuov and Uapa/j,v6tov . — The Preamble, the Ad- 
 visory or Argumentative Part of the Law . . . .95 
 
 III. 
 
 Subjective Sense of the Word ’A ?i7j6ev(j 97 
 
 IV. 
 
 The Orphic Poetry 99 
 
 y. 
 
 Plato’s Regard for Antiquity and the Ancient Mythology. — His 
 Use of the Word QeoI 102 
 
 VI. 
 
 Philosophy and Character of Anaxagoras .... 105 
 
 VII. 
 
 The Divine Justice the Ground of Human Law . . .110 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Universality of the Belief in a God Ill 
 
 IX. 
 
 Antiquity of Atheism 114 
 
 X. 
 
 Principle of Authority 116 
 
 XI. 
 
 Degrees of Atheism. — Peculiarity of Plato’s Style . . .117 
 
 XII. 
 
 Ancient Doctrine of the Four Elements 119 
 
 XIII. 
 
 Atheistical Doctrine of $v(ng, Tvxv, and T exvrj . . .130 
 
XVi 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 XIV. Mfi 
 
 Atheistical Doctrine that Law and Religion were not by Na- 
 
 ture, but by Art . 
 
 XV 
 
 . 135 
 
 The Figure Aposiopesis . 
 
 XVI. 
 
 139 
 
 Argument for the Existence of a God from Motion . 
 
 XVII. 
 
 . 141 
 
 Soul Older than Body 
 
 XVIII. 
 
 . 144 
 
 Remarkable Comparison of the Dangerous Flood . 
 
 . 146 
 
 XIX. 
 
 Invocation of the Divine Aid in the Argument. — Striking Ex- 
 amples of this from other Dialogues 148 
 
 XX. 
 
 The Great Question of the Ancient Schools, Do all Things 
 flow 1 &c. ; with a Sketch of some of the principal Mate- 
 rializing or Atheistical Philosophers who belonged to the Ion- 
 
 ic, and to the Physical School of Elea .... 152 
 
 XXI. 
 
 Mathematical Use of the Word A oyog 164 
 
 XXII. 
 
 Paradox of Circular Motion -166 
 
 XXIII. 
 
 The words QOLo ig, Teveatg, UaOog, and $6opd . . . .167 
 
 XXIV. 
 
 Philosophy of the Verb TO BE. — Platonic use of E Ifii and 
 Ytyvopac .......... 170 
 
 XXV. 
 
 Ancient Divisions of Motion. — According to Plato. — According 
 to Aristotle. — Distinction between Teveaig and ’A/iXolucig. 
 ^-The Atomic Theory more favourable to Theism than the 
 Doctrine of Occult Qualities 184 
 
 XXVI. 
 
 A vroKLvijGig, or Self-motion of Soul. — Energy or Action be 
 longs to the Essence of the Deity. — Whether on this View 
 God must have created Worlds from Eternity. — Aristotle’s 
 Misrepresentations of Plato on this Point. — His own Doc- 
 trine. — Aristotle’s Immoveable Essence. — Moral Reasons 
 the first of Moving Causes 190 
 
 XXVII. 
 
 The Words A oyog, EMo$-, and ’Idea . . . . . .195 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 XVII 
 
 XXVIII. 
 
 Distinction between A oyog and v O voua 
 
 XXIX. 
 
 Infinite Distance between Self-motion and Motion by Impulse. 
 —Impassable Chasm between' Spirit and Matter. — Ideas of 
 Change, Cause, and Spirit inseparable. — The Word IIoA- 
 loarfj . — Principle of Euphonic Attraction . 
 
 XXX. 
 
 Argument of Ancient Atheists that Apparent Evidences of 
 Design were only Evidences of subsequent Accommodation. 
 — Things (they said) older than Knowledge of Things, and 
 therefore older than Soul 
 
 XXXI. 
 
 Platonic Doctrine of the Evil Principle. — Of ’Av&yKq, or Ne- 
 cessity 
 
 XXXII. 
 
 Platonic Analogy between the Motion of N ovg and and 
 
 that of a Sphere, or of the Heavens 
 
 XXXIII. 
 
 The Motions of the Evil Soul Irregular and Disorderly. — The 
 nearer an Approach to the Pure Reason, the more of Fixed- 
 ness and Uniformity. — Heaven a State of Eternal Rest. — 
 Atheistic Objection from the unvarying Regularity of the 
 Heavens, from whence was inferred the Absence of Will and 
 Reason 
 
 XXXIV. 
 
 Platonic Doctrine of the Animation of the Heavenly Bodies. 
 — Ancient Belief that each Nation had its own peculiar 
 Guardian Daemon or Genius 
 
 XXXV. 
 
 Three Hypotheses in respect to the Animation of the Heav- 
 enly Bodies 
 
 XXXVI. 
 
 Ff)g v O xw a -> or Vehiculum Mundi. — Examination of a Remark 
 able Passage from Euripides 
 
 XXXVII. 
 
 Second Grand Division of the Argument. — Doctrine of a 
 Special Providence. — Mistake of Cudworth .... 
 
 XXXVIII. 
 
 The Greek Words for Blessedness, Happiness, Fortune, &c. . 
 
 XXXIX. 
 
 Atheistic Argument against Providence drawn from the Pros- 
 perity of the Wicked. — Plato’s Language compared with 
 
 that of the Scriptures . 
 
 B 2 
 
 Page 
 
 196 
 
 201 
 
 204 
 
 207 
 
 219 
 
 224 
 
 229 
 
 233 
 
 235 
 
 237 
 
 239 
 
 243 
 
XV111 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 XL. Pug 9 
 
 The Singular Word ’ AnodLOTro/LiTreoftcu, and the Remarkable 
 Use made of it by Plato 245 
 
 XLI. 
 
 'Defect of Plato’s Theology in regard to the Doctrine of Atone- 
 ment and the Necessity of Expiation 249 
 
 l 
 
 XLII. # 
 
 Highest Proof of the Divine Goodness, the a priori Convic- 
 tion of the Moral Sense 253 
 
 XLIII. 
 
 Sublime Mode in which the Bible represents the Divine Provi- 
 dence and Omniscience as contrasted with all mere Philos- 
 ophizing on these Attributes. — Analysis of the Greek Word 
 ’A vSpeia, as denoting one of the Cardinal Virtues of Soul. — 
 Piety of Epicureanism 255 
 
 XLIV. 
 
 The true Dignity of Man his Religious Nature. — Analysis of 
 the Greeek Words Sefiaf, E vaebtLa, &c. .... 259 
 
 XLV. 
 
 Men Compared to Sheep of the Divine Pasture. — Language of 
 Plato on this Subject in Harmony with that of the Scriptures 261 
 
 XLVI. 
 
 Peculiarity of certain Negative Forms of Greek Verbs . . 262 
 
 XLVII. 
 
 Great Things cannot Exist without Small. — Application of the 
 Maxim to the Doctrine of a Special* Providence, to Educa- 
 tion, and to Politics 264 
 
 XLVIII. 
 
 Gentleness of Plato’s Mode of Argument, and its peculiar 
 Adaptation to the Minds of the Young .... 267 
 
 XLIX. 
 
 The Machinery of Physical Events controlled by Invisible Spir- 
 itual Agencies. — The Doctrine of Plato and of the Bible. . 268 
 
 L. 
 
 The Ancient Maxim De Nihilo Nihil. — Greek Ideas in Respect 
 to Creation. — Language of the Fathers. — Plato defended 
 against the Charge of teaching the Eternity of the World 
 and of Matter. — Platonic Sense of the Maxim. — Comparison 
 of Hebrews, xi., 3, with the Language of Plato. — Difficulties 
 of Reason when the Doctrine of Cieation is examined apart 
 from Revelation 272 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 XIX 
 
 LI. Page 
 
 Doctrine that the Parts are made for the Whole as set forth 
 by Plato, and as viewed by Modern Rationalists and Semi- 
 Infidels. — The Converse Doctrine, that the Whole is also for 
 the Parts, examined with Reference to the Mutual Harmony 
 of both 286 
 
 LII. 
 
 Atheistic Objection drawn from the Extent of the Universe . 292 
 
 LIII. 
 
 Explanation of a Difficult Passage. — Remarks on those Views 
 that resolve Morality into an Obedience to Physical Laws, 
 and regard all Punishment as Consequential instead of Penal 294 
 
 LIV. 
 
 The Word ’Av^eOpog as distinguished from A luvioc. — Remark- 
 able Passage in the Timaeus 300 
 
 LV. 
 
 The Greek Words for Eternity, A I6v and A lovloq . . . 302 
 
 LVI. 
 
 Plato’s Doctrine of the Freedom of the Will, viewea in Con- 
 nexion with the Law of Cause and Effect in Nature . . 307 
 
 LVII. 
 
 Explanation of a Difficult Passage 312 
 
 LVIII. 
 
 The Greek Word "kidrjg and the Hebrew and 1 — iSvp jy 3 316 
 
 LIX. 
 
 Similar Views of a Future State, and Similar Fears of Hell 
 in all Ages 318 
 
 LX. 
 
 The Word "kytog . — Exceeding Spirituality of some of Plato’s 
 Views. — Many of his Thoughts capable of being fairly ac- 
 commodated to p Spiritual Sense higher than the Author him- 
 self had ever intended to convey. — Difference in this Re- 
 spect between his Writings and those of all other Philoso- 
 phers, Ancient and Modern 322 
 
 LXI. 
 
 Mythical Sense of the Word Quvarog 331 
 
 LXII. 
 
 Omnipresence of the Divine Justice. —Remarkable Resem- 
 blance of Plato’s Language to some Passages from the Bible 333 
 
 LXIII. 
 
 Doctrine of a Final Judgment.— Use of the Word Iwreketa 334 
 
XX 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 LXIV. Pag* 
 
 Platonic Use of the Word Tvnog ..... 338 
 
 LXV. 
 
 Explanation of a Difficult Passage, in which Plato seems to 
 assert that our Evils in the Present State exceed our Good 339 
 
 LXVI. 
 
 M.axv ’AOavarog, or Battle of the Universe, between the Pow- 
 ers of Good and Evil. — Sin, therefore, no Light Matter, be- 
 cause it is Treason against the Cause of Good, for which 
 God is contending with the Evil Soul 342 
 
 LXVII. 
 
 Plato’s Doctrine of the A atiioveg, or Genii .... 347 
 
 LXYIII. 
 
 Beauty and Accuracy of the Ancient and Platonic Division of 
 the Four Cardinal Virtues. — Deep Moral Significance of the 
 Four Greek Words, ’ knokaaia , ’A Kpareia, ’Ey/cpdma, and 
 
 'Zutypoavvri, as indicating the Four Moral Degrees . . 35 
 
 LXIX. 
 
 Peculiar Use of the Indicative Mode in certain Cases. — Com- 
 parison of Passages from the New Testament . . . 355 
 
 LXX. 
 
 Use of the Word YUeovE^ia. — Aristotle’s Distinction between 
 Arithmetical and Geometrical Equality .... 356 
 
 LXXI. 
 
 Impiety and Folly of attempting to bribe Heaven . . . 357 
 
 LXXII. 
 
 Different Species of Atheists. — Morality of Atheists not found- 
 ed on Principle. — First Species styled A inaiog by Plato, and 
 invested by him with too Good a Character. — Second Species, 
 the Magician or Juggler. — The Atheist often in Secret the 
 Victim of Superstition. — Hobbes. — The Ironical Species of 
 Atheist, a Character peculiar to the Ancient World. — Ely- 
 mas the Sorcerer. — Apollonius of Tyanea .... 359 
 
 LXXIII. 
 
 The Nightly Conference, or Areopagus of Plato’s State. — 
 
 The Athenian Areopagus 363 
 
 LXXIV. 
 
 Common Law against all Private Religions. — Examination of 
 Plato’s Doctrine in respect to Changes in the Public Wor- 
 ship and Religion of the State 364 
 
 LXXV. 
 
 Belief in Apparitions, Ghosts, Spectres, Dreams, &c., the same 
 in all Ages 
 
 369 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 As a dramatic work, The Laws is far inferior to the Republic. 
 The speakers are three : namely, Clinias, a Cretan, Megillus, a 
 Lacedaemonian, and a stranger, who passes by no other name than 
 the Athenian. The latter is the Socrates of the dialogue. The first 
 two are either mere listeners, or only brought in as suggestive helps 
 in the various transitions of the discourse. After nine books occu- 
 pied with varied and extended schemes of legislation, and wffiere 
 laws are mingled with reasonings and introductory preambles, which 
 need not here be specified, the author comes, in the tenth book, to 
 treat of offences against the public worship and religion, which it 
 is supposed, of course, the State must possess, if it would be a state 
 indeed, and not a mere herding together of men and women in a 
 political congregation, having no other bond of union than the tem- 
 porary consent of individual wills. Previously, however, to the en- 
 actment of laws for the punishment of sacrilege and other offences 
 against religion, the chief speaker proposes that there should be 
 laid down, by way of foundation, a preamble or hortatory statement, 
 containing the reasons of the laws ; which preamble, although con- 
 cisely expressed at first (page 3), is subsequently expanded into an 
 argument which occupies nearly the whole book, the few last pages 
 only being taken up with the laws and the penalties annexed. 
 
 The argument is divided into three parts ; 1. Against those who 
 denied the Divine existence ; 2. Against those who, while they ad- 
 mitted the existence of a God, denied a providence ; and, 3. Against 
 those who, while they admitted both a God and a providence, main- 
 tained that the Deity was easily propitiated, or would not punish 
 sin severely. The first part is introduced by a declaration of Clini- 
 as, that it must be easy to prove the existence of the Deity. He 
 appeals at once to the most obvious phenomena of nature, the sun, 
 the earth, and stars, &c., as conclusive evidence, especially if taken 
 in connexion with the universal sentiments of mankind. This gives 
 occasion to the chief speaker to suggest that the subject is involved 
 in greater difficulties than the other, in his simplicity, had imagined ; 
 difficulties, however, not intrinsic, but arising from the perverseness 
 of those who imposed upon themselves by the words chance , nature , 
 art , &c., referring to the old Atheists of the Ionic or Materializing 
 school ( page 4 to page 15). After a short digression, in which it is 
 
XXII 
 
 STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 debated whether it is best at once to apply the law to such men, 
 without argument (15 to 19), the Athenian devotes himself to the 
 work of refutation, and commences a most subtle disquisition re- 
 specting the nature of soul as implying self-motion involved in its 
 very essence. Hence he proves that matter cannot possess this 
 power, and, therefore, soul being more ancient than body, the prop- 
 erties of soul must also be older than the properties of body. From 
 this it is inferred that nature is the child, and not the mother of Art, 
 as the Atheists said, and that, therefore, law , and will, and design , 
 and thought , must have been before hard , and soft , and heavy , and 
 light , and all the adaptations of the natural world. The Atheists 
 had held that religion, and the belief in the existence of Gods, being 
 the production of human law, which was a production of art, and 
 art itself being the offspring of Nature, therefore religion and all 
 ideas of the just and right were conventional among men, and had 
 no other foundation. This argument is refuted by the Athenian 
 by showing the superior antiquity of soul, and, therefore, of these 
 ideas as essential parts of its constitution (25). In proving the self- 
 energy of soul, he goes into a very minute examination of the differ- 
 ent kinds of motion, summing them all up, however, under two gen- 
 eral heads ; namely, motion by impulse , and that which moves some- 
 thing else by commencing motion in itself. This latter he identifies 
 with psyche, or soul , by a species of logical necessity, or an argu- 
 ment drawn from the force of terms and the innate ideas involved 
 in them. The next step is to determine whether it is one or more 
 souls which are engaged in the affairs of the universe ; the result 
 of which inquiry is, that there are two, the one good and the other 
 bad ; the one constant, uniform, and ever exhibiting the highest 
 reason in all its motions, which he compares to those of a sphere, 
 the other irregular, disorderly, without reason, and full of madness 
 (36). After this, there are stated three methods by which soul may 
 guide the motions of the heavenly bodies ; namely, by an indwell- 
 ing spirit, or by a soul with an aethereal body, or entirely destitute 
 of body, and external to the object of its guidance (42). 
 
 This brings the Athenian to the second grand division of the sub- 
 ject, namely, the arguments of those who deny a Providence. Af- 
 ter premising that men are led to this opinion by seeing the appa- 
 rent impunity and prosperity of the wicked (45), he shows that it is 
 utterly derogatory to any right views of the Divine Nature. For if 
 we admit that God is possessed of every virtue, indolence and indif- 
 ference can form no part of his character. Neither can it be tliat 
 there is in him any want of power. Therefore we cannot suppose 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 XX11I 
 
 that he will neglect anything, either great or small. Next is shown 
 the importance of small things as parts of a whole , absolutely essen- 
 tial to its totality, and that, without small things, the great could 
 not exist. Hence the doctrine of a minute special providence, un- 
 less the Deity is to be regarded as inferior in wisdom to human art- 
 ists (56). The method of this special providence is shown to be by 
 such arrangements in the sovereignty of God (but not by any inhe- 
 rent necessity of things), that every agent finds its fitting place 
 namely, virtue rises and wickedness descends, until the one reaches 
 The Most Holy Place, and the other sinks down to the most painful 
 retributions of Hades (61). This Eternal Justice, or fixed law of 
 God’s government, no one can escape, and, unless it is kept in view, 
 t will be impossible to form any right opinion respecting a blessed 
 or miserable life (64). 
 
 The third grand division of the argument respects those who 
 view sin as a trifle, and who confide in the general mercy of God 
 as capable of being easily moved by prayers and sacrifices. He 
 contrasts their views of the Deity with such as are entertained of 
 the lowest class of human guardians, as though God could be bribed 
 by the wages of iniquity, when dogs could not be prevailed upon by 
 similar motives to admit the wolf into the flock. Arguments against 
 those views which would regard sin as a small matter, and God as 
 easily appeased, are drawn from the [idxrj dddvarog , the battle of 
 the universe, or everlasting conflict between good and evil, in which 
 God and all good influences are contending for the victory, and 
 where, of consequence, the least taking part with the enemy, or the 
 least neutrality is treason against the cause of good throughout the 
 universe (69, 74). 
 
 There are then enumerated six classes of offenders ; namely, two 
 to each of the three divisions of Atheists or semi- Atheists, differing 
 in their degrees of guilt, and therefore requiring different gradations 
 of punishment. The book closes with a specification of the various 
 penalties, and a law against private chapels and private religious 
 rites ; in the course of which a very striking description is given of 
 that class of Atheists who, while they had no religious belief them- 
 selves, made it their business to excite the superstitious fears of 
 mankind for their own unnatural pleasure or profit. 
 
 N.B. — All references to any of the dialogues of Plato, except the 
 text of the present work, are made according to the pages and let- 
 ters of the alphabet, as given in the standard edition of Stephanus, 
 
 * and as they may be found in the margin of the Leipsic. 
 

 i'LlNO^ 
 
 PLATO CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 DE LEGIBUS LIBER X. 
 
 META tie rag altitag , irepl navrdg 1 ev elprjoOo) roiovde 
 tl vdfJLCfjiov fliaiojv irept • tgjv aXhorpLUv pijdsva prjdev 
 (pepeiv pL7]ds ayecv - 2 prjd’ av %pri ( idat prjdevl rcov rov ite- 
 
 1. He pi navrdg. In reference to the whole subject discussed in 
 the preceding book (ix.), namely, vdpeig, or wrongs committed wil- 
 fully and with some degree of violence, of which ahcia , treated of 
 at the close of the ninth book, is one species, and sacrilege another. 
 
 2. <bepecv — ayuv. A collective phrase. “To take and carry away by 
 violence.” Compare Thucydides, i., 7 : V E pepov yap uMjlovg. y A yeiv 
 kciI (bepeiv is a phrase derived from the earliest times, and is always 
 employed in reference to acts of violence. Hence, because personal 
 courage was anciently regarded as the chief part of human virtue, 
 some have supposed that from ayeiv, in this sense, came ayadog, 
 and from (ftepeiv , its comparative and superlative, (peprepog , (piprarog, 
 or (pepiGTog . Such a view encounters etymological difficulties in 
 the termination of ayaOdg. Besides, it can only be maintained on 
 the false theory that the savage life was the original state of men, 
 and that moral terms partake of the ideas most prevalent in such a 
 condition. We much prefer the derivation of Plato, although, in 
 general, he is entitled to but little deference as a philologist. Ac- 
 cording to him, to ayadov is to aycurrov, “ the wonderful, the admi- 
 rable,” from ayapai ayaopai , “ to wonder at,” also “to admire with 
 great delight.” See the Cratylus, p. 412. The force of this will be 
 better felt by comparing what the philosopher says in the sixth book 
 of the Republic, of the wondrous idea of the ayadov , or The Good , as 
 surpassing all human comprehension. No one, on reading it, will 
 be at a loss as to what led him to this etymology, whatever we may 
 think of its philological correctness. It must be remarked, however, 
 that, in reading the Cratylus, it is difficult to determine in what 
 parts the writer is sincere, or how far he may be indulging in the 
 severest satire against certain false systems of philosophy. 
 
 A 
 
2 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 Xag, eav prj TTeCorf rov nenrrjpevov. en yap di) rov roiov « 
 tov navra i]prr\peva rd re elprjpeva Hand yeyove , nod 'eon 
 nal ear at. peyiora de drj rCov XoarCdv at rcvv veojv anoXa* 
 olai re nal vbpeig ,4r elg peyiora de, orav elg iepd ytyvcjv. 
 rat, nal diatyepovnvg av peydXa, orav eig dr\pooia nal 
 dyia rj nard peprj noivd tyvXerCdv rj rivcov aXXuv roiovrcdv 
 nenoivivvrjnonvv * elg iepd de idea nal racjjovg , devrepa nal 
 devrepcog . 3 4 5 6 elg de yoveag , 6 rpira , x^P^ T( * )V epTcpooOev 
 elprjpevcvv , 7 orav v6ptfy rig. reraprov de yevog vdpecog , 
 orav atypovnorcbv ng 8 rcbv apxovnvv dyxi rj (f>epxi rj XP1 T ai 
 r ivi 9 rdjv eneivcov , prj ireioag avrovg. rrepn rov de, rd no- 
 Xinnov av eirj enaorov rtiv TtoXir&v vbpioOev, dinrjv em- 
 naXovpevov. olg d?) doreov 10 11 elg noivov vopov enaoroig. 
 iepoovXCa pev yap eiprjrai £ vXXrjddrjv , (dialog re nal XaOpa 
 eav yiyvr\rai, ri xprj rraoxsiv. oaa de Xoycp nal ooa epyep 
 uepi tieovg vdpi^ei ng Xeycjv rj Trparrojv , u to napapvdiov 
 vnoOepevcp 12 prjreov a del naox^iv. eoro) dij rode • deovg 
 
 3. ’E av prj neioy, “unless he get the consent.” 
 
 4. "Y Speig, “violent wrongs committed wilfully and with malice 
 prepense, whether by act or speech.” The writer now proceeds to 
 specify five different grades into which offences of this kind might 
 be divided : 1st, against sacred things public ; 2d, against sacred 
 things private ; 3d, against parents ; 4th, against magistrates ; 5th, 
 against private political rights of individual citizens. 
 
 5. A evrepog has respect to diaQepovrug above, referring not, like 
 devrepa, to numerical rank, but to the grade of enormity. 
 
 6. Eif de yoveag. See Note I., App. 
 
 7. Xoplg tuv epnpooOev elpypevuv, namely, those mentioned in the 
 ninth book. 
 
 8. "Orav u$povtlotC)v Tig, “ when any one who is reckless of the 
 authority or respect due to magistrates.” 
 
 9. The case of tlvI is determined here grammatically by the iast 
 verb, xp^rcu, although in sense it is the common object of them all. 
 
 10. T 0 Xg drj doreov, “ for all which cases there must be a common 
 law,” or “a law in common containing provisions applicable to 
 each respectively.” 
 
 11. Tieyov i) nparrov, “by speech or action.” 
 
 12 See Note II., App. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 3 
 
 rjyovpevog elvai nard vopovg ovdelg ncbnore ovre epyov 
 aoedeg elpyacaro encbv ovre Xbyov af)r\nev avopov. aXXa 
 ev 13 6rj ri rd)v rpicov naox^v, rj rovro onep elrcov ov% 
 ijyovpevog, rj to devrepov , ovrag , ov (ppovri^eiv dvGpc ottcjv , 
 rj rpirov , eimapapvGrjrovg elvai , 'Gvoiaig re nal evxalg na- 
 oayopevovg. 
 
 KA. Tl ovv drj dplppev av rj nal Xeyoipev rrpog avrovg ; 
 
 A0. T £2 ’ yaOe , enanovocopev avrebv Trpcbrov a rep naraeppo- 
 veiv rjptiv 1 * npoanal^ovrag avrovg Xeyeiv pavrevopai. 
 
 KA. TLola drj ; 
 
 A0. Tavra rdpf civ epeox^Xovvreg ehroiev. T £2 i-ev e ’A Gr\- 
 vale nal Aanedaipovie nal K.vdj oie, dXrjGrj Xeyere. rjpcbv 
 yap ol pev ronapdnav Geovg ovdapcog vopi^ovoiv • ol de , 
 prjdev rjpojv (ppovri^eiv * ol de, evxalg napayeaGai, oiovg 
 vpeig Xeyere . a^iovpev drj, naQdnep vpeig rj^icbnare nepl 
 vopojv, rrplv aneiXelv rjpiv onXrjpdjg, rjpdg nporepov eni- 
 X^ipelv 7 relOeiv nal didaoneiv (bg elol deol, 15 renprjpia Xe- 
 yovreg inavd, nal on j QeXriovg rj rrapd ro dinaiov vno 
 rivijjv dbopcov iraparpeireoGai nrjXovpevoi. vvv pev yap rav- 
 ra dnovovreg re nal roiavG ’ erepa rcbv Xeyopevcov apioruv 
 elvai 7TOi7]rcbv re nal prjropcov nal pavreejv nal lepecov , nal 
 
 13. akla ev. Supply as follows: “but when he has done thus, 
 he has done it — ev drj tl t&v rpibv ndex^v — being in one or the other 
 of these three states.” 
 
 14. rb eara^poveiv ypbv, “in their contempt for us.” npocrTrai- 
 fyvrag is best rendered adverbially, “ sportively .” 
 
 15. bg elol &eoi. This example furnishes an excellent illustration 
 of the general difference between the particles bg and on. Both 
 follow nearly the same class of verbs, and are frequently regarded 
 and rendered as though they were nearly, if not quite, synonymous. 
 The difference, however, in this and similar cases, is obvious. "On 
 would simply refer to the fact ; bg, to the manner or reason of it. As, 
 for example, didaoneiv on, “ to teach us the fact , that there are 
 Gods didaoneiv bg, “to teach us how that is, “ in what manner, and 
 for what necessary reasons, there are Gods.” And so in the follow- 
 ing sentence : nal on (SeXrlovg rj, n. t. h., “ and also the fact that they 
 are better than,” &c., or “ that they are too good.” 
 
4 
 
 CONTRa atheos. 
 
 aXXcov TroXXatetg pvpicjv, ovte enl to pi) dpav rd ddttea 1 rps- 
 rzopeQa ol TiXelorot, dpdoavreg 6’ e^ateelodai irecpdopeda. 
 napa di dr/ vopoOerCov (^aoteovrcjjv eivai pi) aypicov, aXXd 
 r/pspcov, a^iovpev ttelOoi npdjrov xpr/oOac i rpdg r/pdg, el pi) 
 7roA/L<h \ SeXrto) 2 twv dfXcov Xeyovrag rrepl fteCdv (hg eloiv , 
 dAA’ ovv p eXtlg) ye tt pog afr/Oeiav. teal rd%a ireiQoipeO ’ 
 av lacjg vplv. a A A’ emxeLpelre, eln perpiov Xeyopev, el- 
 irelv d rtpoteaXovpeda. 
 
 KA. Ovreovv , d> %eve, doteel padiov eivai dXr/devovrag 3 
 , Xeyeiv d)£ elol d eoi ; 
 
 A0. ITw^ ; 
 
 KA. IT pedrov pev yi) teal r/Xiog, aorpa re rd gypnavra, 
 teal rd rcov djpcdv diateeteoopr/peva teaXddg oyrcog, eveavroeg 
 re teal pr/ol dieiXr/ppeva * teal ore ndvreg f 'E XXr/veg re tea ) 
 Pdpdapoi vopi^ovoiv eivai deovg. 
 
 A0. Qodbvpai ye, d) patedpie, rovg poxOr/povg, ( ov yap 
 drj 7 Tore elnoip f av &oye aldovpai) pr/Te^g yptiv tearaeppovrj- 
 c(j)olv . vpelg pev yap ovte lore avrebv irepi ri/v rr/g diacpOo- 
 pdg 4 alriav , a/ IA’ r/yeloOe dtepareia povov i/dovedv re teal 
 
 1 . ovk km to [ir/ dp$v tcl adLKa. This may be freely rendered thus : 
 “ Instead of being turned away from the commission of sin, the most 
 of us are wholly occupied in attempts to avert its consequences .” In 
 this there is most concisely, yet most forcibly expressed, the essen- 
 tial difference between two things that are often mistaken the one 
 for the other, namely, between true religion , consisting in right views 
 of the Divine Nature, or that true “ fear of the Lord which is to de- 
 part from evil ” (Tpeneadai km to pr/ 6pq,v Ta adma), and superstition , 
 which is wholly occupied, not in the avoidance of sin, but in vain 
 attempts to cure the evils and terrors which it brings upon the soul, 
 (dpaoavTeq 6’ kZaneZodai ireip&peOa). This superstition, or false reli- 
 gion, as Plato elsewhere shows, is nearly allied to Atheism. See 
 Note LXXX. and LXXXI., App. 
 
 2. TcoTihti peTiTiu. The antithesis here is between noMu (3e?LTitj 
 and peTiTLo ye , “ better, indeed, in respect to truth, if not far better.” 
 
 3. dTir/devovrag. See Note III., App. 
 
 4. diacpdopag. We have adopted this instead of the common read- 
 ing, diatyopuq. It is supported by the authority of Cornarius and 
 Stephanus, although Ficinus seems to have read diaQopag, and is in 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS, 
 
 5 
 
 imOvpitbv sm rov dosbr] f3tov oppaoOat 5 rag 'ijjvxag av - 
 ru)V. 
 
 KA. To 6s Tt npog rovrotg alrtov av , gj gsvs, sir] ; 
 
 A0. 'Zxsdov 6 navraTraoLV vpslg s%G) ^tivrsg ovk av st- 
 dsirjrs, dXXa vpag d,v XavOavot. 
 
 KA. T i 6i) tovto (ppd^stg ravvv ; 
 
 A0. ’Aji tadta rig 6 paXa x a ^ 87T ^ 6otcovoa slvat psytorrj 
 (ppovrjotg. 
 
 KA. lUbg Xsyetg ; 
 
 A0. E lolv rjptv sv ypappaot Xoyot Kstpsvot , ol reap* 
 vplv ovk, slot 6t 9 apsrijv noXtrstag , wg sytb pavOavco • ol 
 I usv, sv not psrpotg , 7 ol 6s, nai dvsv psrpcov, Xsyovrsg 
 nspt fistiv, ol psv TraXatorarot , ysyovsv rj irpcbr r\ cpvotg 
 
 ovpavov, row rs dXXcjv • tt potovrsg 9 6s rijg apx^]g ov ttoXv 
 bbsoyovtav bts^spxovrat, ysvopsvot rs (bg repdg aXXrjXovg 
 (bptXrjoav. a rolg anovovotv si psv slg aXXo rt reaXebg r] pi) 
 
 far better accordance with all the words of the context — morum cor - 
 ruptio atque depravalio — rottenness of soul. In the same way are the 
 same class of persons characterized by the Psalmist : “ The foot 
 hath said in his heart , there is no God;" nS’ , S# 
 
 corrupt are they , and abominable in their deeds. Psalm xiv., 1 . :)p; l 7 v 
 
 9 vr;( 
 
 corrupti , perditis moribus sunt. They are altogether become futhy. 
 
 5. oppaoOai, “ to rush impetuously or violently.” Admirably de 
 scriptive of the headlong course of those to whom it is here appiieo 
 
 6 . ’ApaOla tlq. A more perfect description of this disease of Athe 
 ism (SiafOopag) could not be given. It sets forth the malady with it , 
 cause, and is equally applicable to ancient and to modern times : 
 “ an invincible ignorance , fancying itself the highest vnsdom .” ’A paOia 
 here has no reference to speculative or scientific knowledge, but is 
 used in the usual Platonic sense for “ ignorance of one’s self.” 
 
 7. ol pev hv perpoig. See Note IV., App. 
 
 8 . liyovreg . . . 6g . See remarks on ug and on, page 3, 15. 
 
 9. TTpolovreg dr, “ Advancing, or going on from the discussion of 
 the origin {rrjg upxrjg) of the first nature ( 17 )g tt purrjg (jivaeog), which 
 was the subject of the most ancient (or Orphic) writings (rtiv nahae- 
 otutuv), they treated next of the theogony, that is, the individual 
 births and generations of the Gods, with their actions and mutual 
 intercourse,” as set forth by Homer and Hesiod. 
 
 A 2 
 
6 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 naXCog e^oi , ov padiov kiunpav naXatolg ovoiv. 10 elg pevroi 
 yovicov re dspanelag nal npag 11 ovn av eyo)ye ttote enai- 
 vd)v ehrotpi, ovte (hg <b(j)£?upa , ovre tig ronapanav dpdcog 
 Elpryrai , 12 ra j usv ovv di) rCov ap^alcov tt E pt pedetoO(x) nal 
 yaipETM, nal oirrj 'dsoloc (ptXov XsyEoOo) ravrxj * 13 ra 6e 
 Tcov veo)v rjplv nal ooeptiv 1 * alriaOrjrcov otttj nantiv alna. 
 t66e OVV Ol TUV TOLOVTCOV E^Epya^OVrai XoyOL. EpLOV yap 
 nal gov , orav rEnprjpca XiycdpEV (bg eIoI $£ 01 , ravra avia 
 77poG(j)£povT£g, 7}Xiov te nal GEXrjvrjv nal aorpa nal yrjv, (bg 
 ftEovg nal $ da ovra , vtto rejv oocbcbv tovtcjv dvaTTETTEio- 
 uevol av XlzyoLEV (bg yrjv te nal Xcdovg ovra avrd , nal ov- 
 6 ev rcbv av0p(O7TELG)v upayparcov (ppovr l^elv dvvdpEva , X 6- 
 yoLGt 6 e ravra ev rroog sig ro mOavov TTEpilTETTEppEva , 15 
 
 10. tv aXaiotg ovoiv . See Note V., App. 
 
 11. yovecdv 'd-epaTvetac nal ripac;. He alludes here to the poetical 
 fables respecting the treatment of Saturn by his son Jupiter. This, 
 to Plato, was the most offensive part of the Grecian mythology, and 
 he often alludes to it, as a sort of standing example, whenever he 
 attacks the poets in other portions of his works. See the Republic, 
 ii., 377, P : ra 6s 6rj rov K povov epya nal tvuOtj vtvu tov vliog, k. t. X 
 Tt interfered with his high views respecting those duties which grow 
 out of the domestic relations, especially the duty of filial obedience. 
 Hence it furnishes his constant example, whenever he would con- 
 demn the demoralizing and irreligious tendency of some of the an- 
 cient poetry. 
 
 12. ovte tie TOTvapaTvav opdfig eiprjTcu. These and similar portions 
 of the mythology he would altogether expunge, as being utterly in- 
 capable of any improved allegorical meaning, however gently he 
 might deal with the system as a whole. See Note V., App. 
 
 13. nal ovv t] deoLCL fthov , “ May what we have said respecting these 
 ancient and venerable matters be thus said as may be agreeable to 
 Heaven,” as it may be paraphrased. We see, from this expression, 
 with what a gentle, pious, and cautious hand he touches the ancient 
 mythology ; how he seems to implore forgiveness for venturing to cast 
 away anything that might have claims to reverence for its antiquity, 
 and which, under all its deformity, might yet, perhaps, contain the 
 corrupted and disguised remains of some primitive or anciently-re- 
 vealed truth. 
 
 14. veov GO(j)tiv. See Note VI., App. 
 
 15 TTEfn-FTTEptiEva — tc spLTVETT s iv Tliis is a term of cookery, and 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 7 
 
 KA. Xahenov ye Xoyov , w ^eve, elpr\ntbg rvyx&veu d 
 ye elg <Jjv ptovov • de ore ndunoXXot rvyxdvovatv, eri 
 Xahencorepov dv elrj. 
 
 A0. <5tj ; Xeyupev ; XPI $pdv rjpdg ; irorepov 
 
 anoXoyr]od)pLEOa olov KarrjyopfjoavTog rtvog tv aosdecuv 
 avOpGJTzoig fjpojv (jxevyovot, * 1 rrepl rrjg vopodeatag , Xeyovaiv 
 
 signifies to crust over — crustare. Compare Seneca, De Provid., 6, 
 non cst ista sincera felicitas — crusta est. Also Aristophanes, Plutus, 
 159: 
 
 A laxvvopevoi yap apyvpiov alrelv love, 
 
 ’Ovopari nepnriTTOVGi rrjv poxdrjplav. 
 
 “ With a name they crust over their depravity .” The metaphor here 
 suggests the thought of vile doctrines, like pernicious and unhealthy- 
 dishes, crusted over with some specious disguise to allure the eye 
 and tempt the appetite. Socrates was ever fond of drawing com 
 parisons from the body to the soul, from the health of the one to the 
 moral soundness of the other, and from the sciences and arts that 
 pertain to the one, to that higher philosophy which is concerned with 
 the wants and relations of the other. The use of this word here 
 corresponds well with his ordinary similes, and especially those 
 made use of in the Gorgias, in which false philosophy {go^lgtlkj]) 
 holds the same relation to the soul that the unhealthy confectionary 
 art (oipoTToiucy) bears to the body. See the Gorgias, pages 28, 29, 
 Leip. : art y Kopporucy npoq yvpvaGTtnyv, tovto go^lgtlkt] npoq vopo- 
 derucyv, kul otl y biponouKy npog larpLKyv tovto pyTopmy • irpog diKaio- 
 cvvyv. 
 
 1. (pevyovGL. This is rendered by some aver sari , non tolerare. So 
 Ast, qui nos aversantur. It also, as a term of the Athenian courts 
 of law, signifies to be defendant in a suit or prosecution , as diuuov sig- 
 nifies the plaintiff, pursuer, or prosecutor ; both terms being derived 
 from the ancient custom of the pursuit of the homicide by the aven- 
 ger of blood, and from thence transferred to other legal contests both 
 of a civil and criminal kind. Ficinus, in accordance with this idea, 
 renders — in judicium pertractos. To warrant this, however, the read- 
 ing should be tyevyovreg or tyevyovTag, with a change in the construc- 
 tion of the Greek. The first version seems so far fetched, that we 
 would prefer combining the two ideas by translating tyevyovot, “whe 
 put us on our defence .” This agrees well with cnroXoyyotopeda, and 
 with the whole context. The speaker is complaining of the hard- 
 Bhip of being compelled to assume the attitude of apologist or de- 
 
s 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 &>g deiva epya^dfxeda vopoderovyreg dog ovtcov $ecov ; r/ 
 XacpELV eaoavTEg , ettl rovg vopovg rpEntipEda ndXiv, urj 
 teal to npooiptov * 2 rjplv panpOTEpov yiyvr]Tat rcov vopa>v; 
 ov yap fipaxvg o Xoyog kuraOElg av ytyvotro , eI toZoiv 
 
 ETiiOvpOVOtV aOEdELV, T& f. LEV dlTodElljaipEV, 3 4 pETptCOg TOlg 
 Xoyotg , cbv E(j)patjov 6eIv TTEpi XiyEiv • rd 6s, Elg cj)66ov t ps- 
 xpaipsv * ra 6s, dvoftEpaLVELV nocrjoavrEg, oaa irpETtsi^ psra 
 ravra rj6r] vopodsTolpsv . 
 
 KA. ’AA/l’, d) tjsvs, TzoXXdtag psv coays 5 £t> bXiy cp %po- 
 T’G) rovr’ a^TO siprjfcapsv, d)g ovdsv ev rep rrapovre 6sl 
 TtpoTipav ppaxvXoytav pdXXov ff prjteog. ovdslg yap rjpdg, 
 to Xsyopsvov, ETcstycov didwEL. ysXolov dr} teal (jyavXov to 
 TTpo tg)v I3eXtlgto)v Ta Ppa^vTSpa alpovpsvovg (patVEoOat. 
 6iacj)EpEi 6 ’ ov epuepov apejaysneog 6 * * mOavoTrjTa Tiva Tovg 
 Xoyovg rjpCbv exslv, cog foot t 9 slot teal dyadot, d'uirjv Tip de- 
 
 fendant in such a cause, and of being required to give reasons for 
 the belief in the existence of the Deity, especially before profane and 
 ungodly men. 
 
 2. Trpooipiov. See Note II., App. 
 
 3. rd pev drzobei^aipev , k. t. 7i., “ Should in some things demonstrate 
 by arguments , &c. — rd 6e, elg epobov rpeipaipev, should in others excite 
 their fears — rd be, five x e P 0iveiv i k. t, A., and in others making them 
 dislike , or appealing to their prejudices ,” Ac. Or it may be para- 
 phrased still more generally : If we should address ourselves to their 
 reason, their fears, or their tastes , namely, their moral sentiments, of 
 which they cannot wholly divest themselves, or their wholesome 
 prejudices. 
 
 4. oaa npetret. In most editions there is a comma after npenei. 
 It is clear, however, that these words are connected with vopoOerol- 
 pev which follows, and that the comma should be after Troiijoavreg. 
 
 5. haye ev oliyu, “ for so short a time as we have been together.” 
 
 6. apocryenug. A difficult particle to analyze, so as to show the 
 
 force of each part. It may be rendered “ in some one way or other, at 
 
 least;” apug, in some way, expressing the certainty that there is 
 such a way ; 7 vug (indefiniteness), whatever that way may be ; ye, that 
 there is one such way at least, if no more, ye always, whether alone 
 
 or in composition, implies that the writer chooses to limit the mean- 
 ing of a word, although intimating that he could say more if it pleas* 
 ed him. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 y 
 
 reg dta^ epovrcog avOpcorrov. c%edbv yap tovto 7 8 fjp.lv vrrep 
 andvTG)v tgjv vopo)v tcdXXcoTov te teal apiorov i rpoolptov 
 dv elrj. prjdev ovv dvox^pdvavTeg prjde eTTeixOcvreg, rjvrt- 
 vd 7 Tore exopev dvvaptv elg ttelOco tgjv tolovtgjv Xoycjv, 
 urjdev arcoOepevot , dte^eXOG)pev elg to dvvarbv hcav&g. 
 
 AO. E vxfj v pot, doted napatcaXelv* 6 Xeyopevog vtto gov 
 vvv Xoyog , ETtEidfj npodvpG)g ovvTEiveig * peXXetv de ovketl 
 eyx^pd Xeyetv. (f)epe dfj, 7 rcbg dv Tig pfj 'dvpcp Xeyoc nepl 
 $eCdV , dog eioev ; dvdyurj yap dfj x^XenGog rjoepetv teal ptoelv 
 etceivovg ol tovtgov fjplv alrioi tgov Xoytov yeyevrjvTai teal 
 ytyvovrat vvv , dv rteidopevot 9 rolg pvdoig, ovg etc vegjv nal- 
 
 7. oxeSov yap tovto. See Note VII., App ? 
 
 8. YiVxv v TrapaKaheiv, “ to invite the wish,” that is, to second one’s 
 wishes — to invite one to do what he already desires to do. 
 
 9. yiyvovTai vvv , ov rrstdojuevoi. In the common text this stands 
 thus : ylyvovrac. Nvv ovv TceiOopevoi : the great objection to which 
 is, that it is impossible to make any suitable sense out of it. Fici- 
 nus felt the difficulty, and therefore made a paraphrase rather than 
 a translation. The correction was made by Stephanus, partim (as 
 he says) veteris exemplar is ope , partim conjectura mea. In fact, the 
 exigenlia loci absolutely requires the reading of Stephanus, which we 
 have given, although not altogether free from objections. It is fol- 
 lowed by editors generally in their notes and translations, although 
 the other reading is retained in their text. The words ov neidopevoi 
 may therefore be regarded, not as a commencement of the follow- 
 ing, but as the conclusion of the preceding sentence, which runs on, 
 without coming to a close, until it terminates in ovk hoi iSteol, some 
 distance below. The whole passage being the language of justly- 
 indignant feeling against those who would ruthlessly destroy all the 
 religious reminiscences of youth, and all the hallowed associations 
 of domestic instruction, is, on this account, rather involved and pa- 
 renthetical. The thoughts and emotions outrun the expressions, 
 leaving much to be supplied to bring out the meaning in all its ful- 
 ness. This we attempt in the following free paraphrastic transla- 
 tion : “ For we must feel indignant, and dislike those who have ever 
 been and are now the causes of such discussions ; who believe not 
 the myths, which, when yet children, they heard of nurses and 
 mothers in soothing strains of sportive or serious song, as they lis- 
 tened to the prayers and gazed upon those attending spectacles (of 
 
10 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 do)v art ev yaXa^t rpecpopevot, rpocpcov re rjfcovov nai prjre- 
 pcjv , olov ev empdalg pera re rtaididg nal pera onovdrp ; 
 Xeyopevovg , teat pera 'dvotebv, ev ev^atg avrovg ateovovreg 
 re y teat oipetg optivreg enopevag avrotg , ag Tjdtora o ye veog 
 opa re teat ateovet rrparropevag , bhjovrGJV ev onovdjj r r q pe- 
 yiGTTj rcbv avrebv yovecjv , vnep avrtbv re teat eteetv g)v eo - 
 rcovdateorcov , cbg on paXtora ovot tieolg evffiug npoodtaXe- 
 yopevcov teat iteeretatg * avareXXovrog re rjXtov teal oeXrj- 
 vrjg nai irpog dvopdg iovrcov, repotevXtoetg apa teat rrpootev- 
 vrjpetg ateovovreg re teal optivreg 'EXXrjvcov re teal j3apda- 
 pG)v 10 ndvrcov ev ovpcpopatg iravrotatg e^opevcov teal ev ev- 
 repaytatg , oi>x &g ovte ovruv, aXX ’ o)g on paXtora ovrcjv, 
 teal ovdaprj vno'iptav evdidovrcov djg ovte elol 'Seat, rov - 
 rcov dfj rravruv boot tearaeppovrjoavreg ovde ei; evog Iteavov 
 Xoyov , wc (patev av boot nai optKpov vov teeterrjvrat , vvv 
 avayted^ovotv rjpag Xeyetv a, Xeyopev , nebg rovrovg av rtg 
 ev rrpaeot Xoyotg dvvatro vovdercov apa dtdaoteetv nepl 
 'detiv TTpojrov d>g eiot ; roXprjreov de. ov yap apa ye del 
 pavrjvat , n rovg pev y vtto Xaipapytag rjdovrjg, rjptiv, rovg d’ 
 
 religious worship) which the young soul hears and sees so joyfully 
 — their parents sacrificing with solemn earnestness for themselves 
 and their families, and by their vows and supplications conversing 
 with the Gods as the most real of existences — who too, at the ri- 
 sings and settings of the sun and moon, have often seen and heard 
 the prostrations and adorations both of Greeks and Barbarians, in 
 every diversified situation of prosperity and adversity appealing to 
 the Gods, not as unreal fancies, but as existing in the highest sense, 
 and without any suspicion to the contrary.” It is a strain of elo- 
 quence fervid and indignant, yet not unkind or harsh, against those 
 who, trampling under foot the most sacred associations, demand 
 proof for that which never should have been doubted, and which 
 seldom again finds a secure resting-place in that soul in which false 
 reasoning, the result of licentious passions, has taken the place of 
 wholesome religious authority. 
 
 10. '’EiXXrjvidv re nai j3ap6dpuv. See Note VIII., App. 
 
 11. Ov yap apa ye Sec pavf/vai , rove pev . . . rjpuv, rove de, &c. Ste- 
 phanus, Cornarius, Ast, and most of the commentators, would here 
 reieet qpfiv, although without the authority of any manuscripts. We 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 11 
 
 vito rov 'dviiovoQai Tolg roiovroig , ltg) d?j TTpopprjGLg tol - 
 tide ng advpog rolg ovto) tt)v diavoiav dLELpOdppsvoLg • tcdi 
 XeyupEV npdcjg, 12 odeaavreg rov ftvpov, cog evl dcaXeyope- 
 VOL T( OV TOLOVTG)V, T £2 TTdl, VEOg EL * TTpolCdV ds GE 6 XP° V0( > 
 TTOLTjGEL TToXXd d)V VVV do^d^ELg pLETdddXoVTd , ETTL TdVdVTLd 
 TlOegOcU . T TEpipELVOV OVV Elg TOTE fCpLTljg TTEpl TG)V pLEytG- 
 tg)v yiyvEoOai . piyiGTOv de, o vvv ovdkv r] y ov , to, 
 TTEpl Toi)g tiEOvg opOtdg diavor^EVTa , $ 7 v tcaXtig rj prj. Trpdj- 
 TOV ds TTEpl CLVTLdV EV TL pLEya GOl p7]VVG)V OVfC dV TTOTE (f)d- 
 VEL7]V XpEvdpg, TO TOLOvds • OV OV povog ovds ol Gol (j)iXoi 
 TTpd)TOL Kal TTpCOTOV TGVT7JV d6%dV TTEpl $ E(OV EG^ETE * JLJ- 
 VOVTCLL d£ GEL 13 TT^ELOVg 7] kX&TTOVg TGVTTjV T7]V VOGOV e%ov~ 
 T£g. Tods tolvvv gol TTdpdyEyovog gvt&v TToXXolg (j)pd- 
 £ OLfl * dV , TO prjdEVd TT(x)TTOTE XddoVTd EH VEOV TGVT7JV TT\V 
 do^dv TTEpl 'decdv <dg ovtc eIg'l , dLdTsXsodL Trpog yrjpdg l4: pEL- 
 would, however, by all means retain it, as essential to the full sense 
 intended to be conveyed. “ It must not be that some of us (yp&v) 
 become frantic through the ravenings of licentiousness, and others 
 (of us) through indignation at such persons.” The passage would 
 lose all its tender charity in the loss of yptiv. It binds together. the 
 two classes here described, by representing the fault of either ex- 
 treme as arising out of that deep-seated depravity which is the com- 
 mon inheritance of the race. It may be thus paraphrased : “ All 
 ultraism, into which all of us are so apt to run, must be avoided ; 
 whether it be the ultraism of sensuality, or of harsh and denuncia- 
 tory religious zeal.” No man can be truly charitable who is not a 
 firm believer in the common depravity of the race. Every other 
 appearance of charity is only a spurious liberality or a hollow indif- 
 ference. 
 
 12. Kal heyopev tt paog. Nothing can be more in accordance with 
 the very spirit of charity than this most gentle and exquisitely ten- 
 der address : “ But let us say unto them, meekly quenching all angry 
 feeling, as though we were now conversing with one of this class, 
 ‘My child, you are young, and time, as it rolls on, will produce 
 many a change in opinions once formed,” &c. Compare with it 
 some of the tender expostulations of the Bible : “ My son, forget not 
 my law. Hear , 0 ye children , the instruction of a father .” 
 
 13. yiyvovTat de del. See Note IX., App. 
 
 14. diarehecrai Trpog yrjpag. The sentiment is that speculative athe- 
 
12 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 vavra ev ravrorj ry dtavorjOEt. ra dvo pevTot iraBij rrepi 
 &£ovg fielvat , rcoXXolat psv ov, peivat de ovv not , to tov g 
 tisovg elvat psv , cppovTt^etv de ovdev tov avOporttvov , /cat 
 rd pera tovto , og (ppovTt^ovot pev, EvnapapvOrjTot ds elot 
 dvpaot /cal ev%alg. to dfj cacpeg liv yevopevov col nepl 
 avTOV /card dvvaptv doypa, dv kpol TretOrj , n ep/pevelg avao- 
 icottov Eire ovTog eite dXXog £%££, rcwdavopevog napd re 
 tov dXXov, /cal dfj /cal pdXtOTa /cal 15 napa tov vopoOeTov. 
 ev ds dfj tovto Tip XP° V( P FV ^oXpfja^g nepl fteovg prjdev 
 aoedfjoat. TtEipaTEOv yap to Tovg vopovg oot tlOevtl vvv, 
 /cal elg avOtg dtdao/CEtv nepl avTov tovtov og ex £i - 
 
 KA. K aXXtoO’ fjplv, o £eve, pexpt ye tov vvv 1 EtprjTat. 
 
 A0. HavT&TcaoL pev ovv , 2 o M eytXXe te /cal K?i£tvta • 
 XeXrjOapev 6’ fjpdg avTovg elg fiavpaoTov Xoyov epnenro- 
 KOTEg. 
 
 KA. Tov rtolov dfj Xeyetg ; 
 
 A0. Tov rrapd noXXotg do%a%op£vov elvat oocpOTaTOV 
 anavTOv Xoyov. 
 
 KA. <J>pa£’ ETt oacpEOTEpov. 
 
 ism does not often continue in old age, but that, although a specu- 
 lative theism may take its place, the other accompaniments, name- 
 ly, unbelief in a special Providence, or an indifferent trust in the 
 Divine placability, may continue to the latest period. We think that 
 this remark of Plato would be abundantly confirmed by an actual 
 observation of life. It is seldom that we find an old man a specu- 
 lative Atheist, whatever he may have been in his youth. It is, 
 however, much more common to meet with those whose insensi- 
 bility in respect to the reality of the Divine anger against sin is in 
 direct proportion to the years in which they have experienced the 
 special care and sparing mercy of Heaven. 
 
 15. /cal 61} nai paktara ical. The combination of particles here is 
 worthy of notice. K at drj generally denotes an application of a pre- 
 vious assertion, and is commonly used a fortiori , “learning from 
 others, and, therefore, If from others {a- fortiori), from the lawgiver 
 also, and in the highest degree.” The second kcll is to be taken 
 with pak/cra, and the third with vopoOerov. See Note X., App. 
 
 1. pexpi ye tov vvv , “ so far at least.” 
 
 2. navTaTccKn pev ovv. See Note XI., App. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 13 
 
 A0. A eyovot nov rev eg cjg ndvra earl rd 7 jpdypara yiy- 
 vopeva, nal yevopeva , nal yevrjoopeva, rd pev, (pvoet, rd 
 fie, re%vy, rd de did rvxd v - 
 
 KA. Ovnovv naXcdg ; 
 
 A0. E Inog ye rot nov 3 4 oocpovg avdpag opQtig Xeyetv. 
 enopevoi ye urjv> avrolg , oneipcjpeda rovg enelOev f ri nore 
 nal Tvy%avovoL diavoovpevoi. 
 
 KA. Udvrcjg. 
 
 A0. "E ouce, c pact , rd pev peytora avrcdv teal naXXcora 
 anepyd&oOai (pvoev nal rvxd v i rd de aptnpdrepa, rexvrjv • 
 rjv dfj napd (pvaecjg Xapdavovaav rr\v rtiv j ueyaXcov teal 
 npd)ro)v yeveenv epycov , nXarretv nal renratveoOai ndvra 
 rd opinporepa, a drj rexvtnd navreg npooayopevopev . 
 
 KA. IIw^ Xeyeig ; 
 
 A0. T £2d’ eri oaepearepov epoj . nvp real vdo)p nal yrjv nal 
 depa , 5 (pvoet ndvra elvac teal rvxd * Text'd de ovdev 
 rovreov. 6 nal rd perd ravra av ocapara , yrjg re nal rjXlov 
 nal oeXrjvrjg , aorpejv re nepi , did rovrtov yeyovevai nav- 
 reX&g ovrcov aipvxMV. Tvxd de (pepopeva rjj rr]g dvvdpecjg 
 enaqra enaorcov, rj £ vpnenreonev appdrrovra olneicog ncog , 
 
 3. ’Eikoc ye rot nov. This is the usual Socratic or Platonic irony. 
 “ It may be likely, at least, that these wise people talk correctly.” 
 E Uog ye, “ likely, plausible, probable, at least, if not certain .” Te rot 
 nov is a combination of particles deserving special notice. Te has 
 its usual limiting sense as given above ; rot, like $7, confirms and 
 strengthens the limitation, while nov seems in the usual manner to 
 diminish the positiveness of the expression by way of appeal to the 
 party addressed. “ Surely (rot) may we say, may we not (nov), that 
 these wise men talk plausibly at least (ye), to use no stronger term.” 
 
 4. rovg eKeldev. Haud dubie (says Ast) scribendnm est, to eKeldev, 
 quod ex illo consequitur. We have but little doubt, on the other hand, 
 that Ast is wrong. The old and established reading, rove, eKeldev, 
 may be rendered “ those from, or of that school,” namely, their fol- 
 lowers, those who expand and explain the doctrine more fully, as in 
 the next answer. 
 
 5. nvp Kcii vdcjp Kal yrjv. See Note XII., App. 
 
 6. (j>v<jei . . . rexvy. See Note XIII., App. 
 
14 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 deppa \pvxpoig, rj %r]pa npog vypd , teal paXaKa re pog OKXrjpd^ 
 real 7 ravra birooa rq rdrv evavriorv Kpaoei Kara rvx'ijv £% 
 avdyn7]g ovvenepaodr ], ravr q nai Kara ravra ovra> yeyev- 
 vrjKEvai rov re ovpavov oXov nai iravra breboa nar ’ ovpa - 
 vov • teal oa av teat (pvrd %vpiT avra, dptiv iraotiv Etc rov - 
 rojv yevopevcov , ov did vovv, (paoiv , ovde did rtva tieov 
 ovde did rex'V'rjVi aXXd, o Xeyopev, cpvoei teal rvxxi • T ^X m 
 vrjv ds vorepov Etc rovrcov vorepav yevopev'qv , avrrjv fivT]- 
 rr\v he '&V7]rdjv, vorepa yeyevvrjKevai iraididg nvag , dXrj- 
 Oeiag ov oepodpa perexovoag , dXXd Eldar) 1’ drra £ vyyEvrj 
 eavrdrv, oV fj ypacpiterj yevva teal povoiK? ), teal boat ravraig 
 slot ovvepiQoi rbxvai • aZ (5’ em /ecu oreovdalov apa yevvdj- 
 oi rdv rExvcbv, eivai ravrag onboai ryj (pvoEi E/coivcooav 
 rrjv avrdrv dvvapiv • olov av larpiKrj teal yeorpyiKij teal 
 yvpvaoriKi j. teal drj teal rrjv noXiriKrjv opiKpov ri pbpog eh 
 vat (paoi tcoivcovovv (pvoei, rex^Xl to ttoXv. ovrar ds teat 
 rrjv vopodeoiav irdoav , 7 8 ov (pvoei , rexv^j de * rjg ovtc aXip 
 Oelg Eivai rag 'deoeig. 
 
 KA. II tig Xeyeig ; 
 
 A0. Oeovg , 0 ) paKapie, Etvai irpdrrov (paoiv ovroi rexvrj, 
 ov (pvoEi , dXXd, not vopoig • teal rovrovg aXXovg aXXoig, 
 otttj Etcaoroi eavroioi ovvcrpoXbyrjoav vopoOsrovpevoi • teal 
 drj teal rd teaXa, (pvoei pev dXXa eivai, vopep ds erepa • rd 
 de drj dtteata ovd 5 Eivai ronapanav (pvoei , d/L/l’ ap(pto6rjrovv- 
 rag diareXeiv aXXrjXoig teal peraridepevovg del ravra • 
 a <3’ dv psraOcovrai teal orav, rors tevpia Eteaora Eivai, yiy - 
 vbpEva rEXvy teat rotg vopoig , a/M/ ov drj nvi cpvoEi . Tadr' 
 EorLv, d) c p'iXoi , are avra dvdpcbv oocpcbv napa vioig avOpd)- 
 Txoig, idt(x)rd)v re teal iroirjrddv , (paoteovrcov Eivai rd dueaio- 
 rarov o, rl rig dv vitea (dia^opEVog. oOev aoibEial re av- 
 0pd)TTOig epniiTrovoi veoig, d)g ovtc ovrcov $ed)V oiovg o vo - 
 pog npoorarrei diavoeioOai delv * oraoeig re did ravra, 
 eXteovrG)v s repog rov Kara (pvoiv opdov (3iov, og eon ry 
 
 7. voftodeolav naoav. See Note NIV., App. 
 
 8. kTiKovTov. The article rtiv would seem to be required here be- 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 15 
 
 dXrjdEta uparovvrd £ rjv r&v aX/ io)v, nal pbrj SovXevovra 
 eTEpoiOi Kara vopcov . 
 
 KA. 0 iov disXrjXvOag, gj %eve , Xoyov , 60772 ; Xibbrjv 
 
 avOpdoncov veo)v drjpoGta ttoXegl te teal idioig olnoig. 
 
 A 0 . 'AXrjOrj piivTOL Xsystg, o) K Xsivla. tl ovv oIel XPV~ 
 vac dpav rov vopoOsrrjv , ovtg) tovtg)v tt&Xcu napEGnsvaG - 
 p,ev G)v ; rj piovov dixsiXslv ordvra ev t'q t:6Xei gvpinaGi rolg 
 av0pd)7TOLg , (bg, el per/ (frrjGovoLV 9 stvai tisovg acil diavorjOrj- 
 Govrai , do^d^ovrsg roiovrovg olovg cfirjGlv 6 vopiog ; /cat 
 TTEpi naXCbv teal ducaitev, nal nspl andvrcov rtiv psyLGTGJv , 
 6 avrog Xoyog , oaa re 7 rpd$* dpsrrjv telvel nal nantav , 
 deZ ravra ovtg) nparrsiv, dtavoovpsvovg burjirsp dv 6 vopo- 
 0sT7]g v(p7]y'rjGrjrac ypd(j)cov • <5’ av ptfj rrapEx^rai savrov 
 
 rolg vopoig evttelO? 7 , rov psv dslv rsOvavcu, rov 6s nva 
 nXrjyalg nai bsGpolg , rov 6e , dripiicug, dXXovg 6s 'nsviaig 
 noXa^EGOcu real (bvyalg * ttelOg) 6e rolg dvQpbbnoig, 10 apa 
 
 fore eA/cwrcjv, although there is no authority of manuscripts for it, 
 It seems to refer to (pacKovruv above. “ Hence factions or quarrels 
 arise by reason of these things, while they violently drag (the young) 
 to that mode of life which is right by nature (that is, in their opin- 
 ion), which consists, in reality, in so living as to have power over 
 others, and to be in subjection to none by virtue of law.” In this 
 metaphorical expression, ehwvruv, Plato seems to have had an eye 
 to some of those violent contests which Homer so vividly describes 
 as taking place over a dead body, in which both sides are pulling 
 with all their might, the one to carry off, the other to rescue ; as in 
 the battle over the body of Patroclus, in the sixteenth book of the 
 Iliad. He rises, however, infinitely above Homer in his subject. 
 It is not the dead body of the slain hero which is here the object of 
 contention, but the living soul of the young man that the atheistic 
 crew are seeking to drag down to their own kingdom of darkness ; 
 or, to accommodate the language of the Grecian poet to a sense far 
 beyond his highest conceptions, we may say, with a slight change 
 of the verse, Iliad, xxii., 161 : 
 
 ’A/UA 7 repi X V XVC pdpvavrai dSavaroio. 
 
 9. See Note NV., App. 
 
 10. t teiOcj de rolg uvftpi'oTcoig. Connect this with rj piovov dnei7^eh\ 
 about ten lines back ; and then, by leaving out all that is explanatory 
 
16 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 riQevru avrolg rovg vopovg, prjdeplav ex^iv TOi C hoyoig 
 irpooamovra eig dvvapiv ?fpepovv ; 
 
 KA. Mrjdapcbg, oj %eve • dAA’ einsp rvyxdvei ye ovoa 
 nal opinpd ttslOg) rig rrepl ra roiavra , del prjdaprj napveiv 
 rov ye d^iov nal opinpov vopoOerrjv, dAAa naoav , to Ae- 
 yopevov, (jrcjvrjv ievra , * 11 rep rcaXaicp vopep enucovpov yiy- 
 veodai Aoyo), d)£ eiol deot, nal boa vvv dr) dirjXOeg ov , nal 
 d?) nal vopep avrep fiorjOrjoai nal rexv^l ' eorov (ftvoei rj 
 (pvoecog ovx rjrrov, ehrep vov ye eon yevvr\para , nard Ao- 
 y ov opOov ov ov re Xeyeiv poi (paivy nal eycb ooi morevet 
 ravvv. 
 
 A0. T £2 7 jpoQvporare KXeivla, ri d 9 ; ov ^aAerrd re eon 
 %vvanoXovQelv A byoig eig TrXrjOr) A eyopeva, prjnrj re av 12 
 nenrrjrai duoXvyia ; 
 
 Dr parenthetical, the contrast may be exhibited thus : “ Or ought he 
 to threaten them only, that unless they shall say, &c. ; but not, by 
 attaching it to his arguments, exercise persuasion towards men at 
 the same time that he lays down the laws, so that (by such persua- 
 sive arguments) he may render them as mild, or as well-disposed to- 
 wards the laws as possible.” As here may be rendered “ and,” 
 which, in a similar connexion in English, is sometimes a disjunctive 
 particle : “ Shall he threaten, &c., and shall he not persuade!” Or 
 the disjunctive force of 6e may be better brought out, and the con- 
 nexion with the first part of the sentence at the same time preserv- 
 ed, by rendering it “ instead of,” thus : “ Ought he only to threaten 
 instead of using persuasion!” &c. In this construction, exeiv, as 
 well as aTZELlelv, will depend on olei xpyvat, about twelve lines back. 
 
 11. Tzuaav (povTjv levra, “ letting out all his voice,” that is, omitting 
 nothing which may tend to produce conviction. A proverbial ex- 
 pression, for which see Erasmus, Adag., p. 788. It seems some- 
 what to resemble a nautical metaphor, of which the Greek poets 
 were very fond, and of which we have a striking example, Eurip., 
 Medea, 280 : 
 
 ’Ex^poc yap k^lacn izdvra 6rj k&Xov. 
 
 “ For my enemies let out all their rope,” that is, “ are attacking me 
 under full sail, and straining every nerve.” 
 
 12. firjKrj re av. There is a harshness here in consequence of the 
 sudden change from the participle to the indicative mode KEicrTjrai. 
 
CONTRA ATIIEOS. 
 
 17 
 
 KA. T l 6s, co t-eve ; nspl psOrjg 13 psv nal povoncfjg ovrco 
 imnpd Xeyovrag rjpdg avrovg irsptspLStvdpLSv , 14 nepl tisoov 6s 
 feat rcbv rotovrov ovx VTcopLSVoiyisv ; nal pfjv real vopoOs - 
 old ys sort irov r q psrd (ppovrjosog ptsyLorr} porjOstd, 6 lotl 
 rd nspl vopovg npooraypara sv ypdppdoc rsOsvra , cog 6co- 
 aovra slg iravra xpovou sXeyxov , rtdvrcog fjpspsl * 15 coots 
 ovt 1 si x a ^ £1T d tear 7 dpxdg dnovstv sort (jyobrjTsov , a y ’ so • 
 Tdi Kdi TCO 6vOpddsl TroXXdfCLg STTdVLOVTL 1 OfCOTTSLV * OVTS 
 si pd/cpd, cocbsXipd 6s, 6id Tdvrd Xoyov ov6dpr] sx £ ^ ov6e 
 ooiov spotys slvdt cpdivsTdi to prj ov (3or)0slv rovroig rdig 
 Xoyotg ndvTd dv6pd tedTd 6vvdptv. 
 
 MEr. v kpiOTd, co gsvs, 6onsl Xsystv K Xsiviag. 
 
 A0. Kdl j udXd ye, co MsytXXs * ttoltjtsov re d)g Xsyei. 
 
 This, however, must be rendered as though it were KEKTypeva, if, 
 indeed, this is not the true reading. 
 
 13. 7 TF.pl peOyg. This refers to discussions in the first and third 
 books of this treatise, which had been continued at great length. 
 
 14. Trepipevo, “ to linger around a subject — to wait one’s own lei- 
 sure.” vnopevG), “ to endure, to wait with patience.” After vnope- 
 vovpev supply TZEpipevEiv, thus : ov% vnopEvovpev TZEpipevEiv, “ shall 
 we not endure to wait]” or, taken adverbially, “ shall we not wait 
 patiently]” There is evidently a case of paronomasia, or play upon 
 words here. 
 
 15. ypepel. “ Are altogether silent .” Compare this with the myth 
 respecting the God Theuth in th.e Phaedrus, 275, D., where oral in- 
 struction is commended, as better than that of books, and doubts 
 are suggested, whether, after all, the art of writing has been of real 
 service to mankind : ug dhyOtig bpocov (ypaQy) faypatyia • Kai yap ra 
 tKeivyg EarrjKEv uev ug gCivra, edv 6’ dvepy tl, aepvcjg navv ciyp. ravrov 
 6e nai 7] ypa<py. edv tl spy (3ovX6pevog paOelv , Iv tl cypaiveL pbvov rau- 
 rbv del. Kai ovk entararaL XeyeLV olg del ye nai py • T:\yppi\ovpEvog de 
 Kai ovk tv bit cy TioLdopyQeig rov naTpog dei Seltol fioydov. avrog yap 
 ovt ’ upvvaoOaL ovte [loyOyaaL dwaToq avT(p. In the Gorgias, 525, B., 
 this term ypepel is applied, in a somewhat different manner from 
 this, to the victorious party or argument that holds its gronnd in 
 quietness , after the rest have been silenced : dW ev roaovToig "koyoig 
 rtiv dTJiov kTieyxopevav ovTog ypepel 6 Tibyog. 
 
 1 . ETzavLovTi. Like a gerund, “ Scepius animo agitando .” 
 
 B 2 
 
18 
 
 CONTRA ATIIEOS. 
 
 Kal yap el pfj KareonappevoL fjoav ol roiovrot XoyoL ev 
 roli g TiaoLV (bg enog elnelv avOpunoig, ovdev dv e det tCjv 
 euapvvovvrcdv Xoycvv (hg slot deot • vvv 6s dvaynr}. vopoig 
 ovv diatyOeipopevoLg rolg peylorotg vuo natctiv dvOpcbncov 
 rlva nal paXXov npoafjKet j3orj0elv fj vopoOerrjv ; 
 
 KA. 0 VK ZGTIV. 
 
 A0. 5 AXkd dfj Xeye pot tt&Xlv KA eivla, Kal ov. kolvgj- 
 vov yap del oe zivai r<bv Xoyuv. Kivdvvevei 2 yap 6 Xeyo)v 
 ravra , nvp Kal vdup Kal yfjv ical aepa , npcbra fjyeloQai 
 t(x)v 7ravTG)v zivai , Kal rfjv (pvocv ovopa^eiv ravra avrd , 
 i pvxfjv de zk rovrcjv vorepov. zolkz de ov Kivdvveveiv aXka 
 dvr cog or\paiveLV ravra fjplv rep Xoycp. 
 
 KA. II aw pev ovv. 
 
 A0. y Ap’ ovv , 7 rpog A cog olov irrjyfjv nva avorjrov doi-rjg 
 dvzvprjKapzv dvOpcbncov ottoool reebnore rcbv nzpl cpvoecog 
 ecbfjxpavro £ rjrrjparcov ; okottzl , irdvra Xoyov e^era^cov. ov 
 yap dfj opuepov ye ro deaepepov, el (pavelev Xoycov anrope - 
 vol aoedcov, aXXoig re e^apxovreg, 3 prjde ev rolg koyoig, 
 dAA’ eipTjpaprrjpevcog xp&pevoi. doKel rotvvv poc ravra ov- 
 rcog exeev. 
 
 KA. E v Xeyetg 1 dAA 5 orrrj , rreLpco cppa^eLV. 
 
 A0. ’'FiOLKe roivvv arjOeorepcov anreov 4 zivai Xoycov. 
 
 2. Kivdvvevei. The primary sense of this word is “ to be in dan- « 
 ger the secondary and quite as frequent sense is “ to seem.” The 
 connexion between them is not obvious. In its secondary meaning 
 it is not synonymous with doKei, and the primary may be preserved 
 with tolerable distinctness in many of those places in which it is ren- 
 dered “ to seem.” As, for example, in this passage, — “ ventures to 
 regard,” or “ is in danger of regarding.” It implies that the senti- 
 ment is a bold one, and one which, probably, he would not adopt, if 
 he could trace all the consequences of this dogma, viz., “ that fire, 
 and water, and earth, and air, were the first of all things.” In con- 
 firmation of this view, compare what follows a few lines below : ov 
 yap opiKpov ye to diadepov, el <j>avelev Tioycov anropevoi daeOoVf 
 
 “ for it would make no small difference if they should appear,” &c 
 This sense of Ki.vdvvevo is quite a favourite with Plato. 
 
 3. e^dpxovreQ — auspicantes — qui aliis auctores sunt. 
 
 4. dr)6earepa)v. See Note XVI., App. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 19 
 
 KA. Ovn 6kv7]teov , (b %eve. pavdavo) yap (bg vopoOsctag 
 EKTog oh'jorj patvstv, sav rcbv tolovtcjv dnrcbpEda Xoycov. 
 eI ds egtl prjdapr) STEporg GvpcfroJvrjGat 5 rolg vvv Kara vopov % 
 XsyopsvoLg ■dsolg (bg opOtig exovglv i) ravrrj , a eicteov, cb 
 •dav pacts, teat ravrrj . 
 
 A0. A syotp? dv, (bg sotnev , rjdrj cx^ddv ova slorOoTa Xo- 
 yov Ttvd rovds. o TTpcbrov ysvEGEorg teal (pOopag alrtov 
 dr:dvro)v, rovro ov uptirov aXXa vorspov anE(f>r)vavTO sl- 
 vat ysyovog oi tt)v rtbv aosdcbv 'ijrvx'rjv dnEpyaodpsvot Ao- 
 yot * 6 o ds vorspov , TTpoTspov. 7 8 oOsv rjpaprrjtcaGt irspl dstbv 
 TTjg bvTG)g ovotag. 
 
 KA. Ovtcg) pavdavo). 
 
 A0. 'kvx'rjv, c b sratps, rjyvorjnsvat ntvdvvEvovot psv oXt- 
 yov i-vpnavTEg olov te ov rvyxdvst /cat dvvaptv fjv sxet * 
 r(bv te aXXorv avrrjg irspi, nat dr) real ysvEGsarg, (bg sv nptb- 
 roig egtl Gorparcov EpnpooOev 9 irdvrorv yEvopsvrj , nat psra - 
 doXrjg te avTtbv nat p£Tanocpr)GEG)g aTTdcrjg apx m rtavTog 
 paXXov . si ds egtl TavTa oviorg, apa ovtc eg avdyurjg rd 
 GvyyEvrj TrpOTEpa dv sir) ysyovoTa T(bv GtbpaTt 
 7i pog7]k6vtg)v, ovG7]g TavTrjg rcpEGdvTEpag rj G(bpaTog ; 
 
 KA. ’A vaynr). 
 
 A0. A 6%a dr) 9 teal EntpsXEta nat vovg nat texvt) nat vo- 
 pog , G/tXrjpcbv nat paXanebv nat ftapEorv nat noveporv npoTE- 
 pa dv sir) * nat dr) nat Ta psyaXa nat irpcbTa spy a nat irpai f- 
 
 5. ovptyMvrjoat. Plato was very fond of metaphorical expressions 
 derived from the science of music. Similar terms in similar con- 
 nexions are found throughout all the dialogues, such as gwclSelv, 
 ovvudy, kizqidEiv, kneidy, &c. 
 
 6. ol rrjv rtiv dosbivv Tpvxyv uTVEpyaadpEvot hoyoi, “ which render 
 the soul of the impious what it is.” Equivalent to this other ex- 
 pression, UTTEpyaGapEvot rrjv rrjg avrCrv Tpvxvc uGE&stav. 
 
 7. o de vorspov ( arr Efo'jvavro ) 7r porspov. They are guilty of the 
 fault which logicians style hysteron proteron , that is, putting the ef- 
 fect for the cause, and the cause for the effect ; which they did, in 
 making rexvrj posterior to dvotg and rvx rj. 
 
 8. 9. Guudrtov epTrpooOEv. See Note XVII., App. 
 
20 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 eig , 7 sx vr J^ ^v ytyvoLTo, ovra ev Trpcoroig • ra de cf)vasi 
 nal cj)vcng (jjv ovtc opQtig ei rovopa^ovaiv avrb' 0 tovto) vg- 
 * rspa real apxopeva av etc Texvrjg eh] nal vov, 
 
 KA. ITwf ; 
 
 A0. Ov/c opOtig (f>voiv povXovraL Xeyeiv yevsoiv rfjv 
 rrepl rd npdjra. el 6s (fravrjoerai 'ipvx'rj nptirov, ov ttv p ovde 
 drjp, 'ipvx'rj < 5 ’ ev npuroig yeyevrjpevrj , oxedov * 11 opdorara 
 Xeyoir’ av elvai dLacpepovTCog, ore (pvoei 12 ravr ’ eoO ’ ovTCog 
 exovra, av 'ijjvx'fjv reg emdei^ irpeodvrepav ovoav o bbpa- 
 rog , aXXcog de ovdap&g. 
 
 * KA. ’A XrjOeoTara Xeyeig. 
 
 A0. Ovtcovv rd perd ravra en' f avro 6rj tovto otsXXo)* 
 
 ueOa ; 
 
 KA. T t prjv ; 
 
 A0. QvXaTTCjpev drj navTanaoLV dnaTr]Xbv Xbyov , prj 
 
 10. avro tovto, “ which they incorrectly call this very thing,” 
 namely, “ this first thing, which we call iftvxTr, they call $vgls” vg- 
 Tepa nal, &c., “Nature and its works would be posterior to and ruled 
 by art and reason, or mind.” 
 
 11. ox^bbv, here, does not qualify opdorara , but \eyoiTo , — “ it might 
 almost be said with the highest degree of correctness.” It, in fact, 
 renders the whole declaration stronger instead of weakening it. It 
 seems to be often used as a sort of apology for a bold expression, 
 and thus, instead of diminishing or impairing its force, as the com- 
 mon rendering ( almost ) would imply, it has directly the contrary 
 effect. 
 
 12. pvGEi. “ It might then be said with the highest degree of cor- 
 rectness, that these things are thus by nature , if any one should show 
 that soul is older than body, but otherwise not.” Plato seems some- 
 how to have changed the sense of the word upon the atheist. He 
 evidently here makes tyvGig the same with the truth of things , what- 
 ever that may be, and, therefore, if soul is o.der than body, then in 
 the highest sense may this be said to be the order of nature. If any 
 should regard it as a mere play upon words, it certainly should be 
 deemed pardonable in a contest with those whose whole strength 
 consists in the dexterous use of such words as tvxv, <f>voi(;, chance , 
 nature , &c. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 21 
 
 itt] npeadvrag rjpag ovrag veonpenrjg cov uapa7T£LO / q y /cal di- 
 a(j)vycbv naTaysXaOTOvg Trotrjo'd * teal dd^cjpev, pet^ova em- 
 baXkdpevoi™ /cat rtiv cpuip&v anorvxeZv. u icon sire ovv , 
 Kadanep ei 1 * irorapov rjpag edec rpelg ovrag biabaivEiv ps- 
 ovra o(j)6<5pa , vetbrarog 6’ eyob rvy^avoov vptbv aai ttoXXcov 
 epiretpog pevpdro)v , elnov on irplorov epe xprjvat ixeipaQi]- 
 vac 15 icar^ epavrov , KaraXcnovra vpag ev aoeptiXel, OKS'ipao- 
 Ocu el diabarog eon TtpeobvTEpoig ovot real vplv , rj irtig 
 £%££, teal (j)avevTog pev ravr y, ttaXelv vpag tots aal ovv- 
 dtabtba^Etv epnEipia , el be abarog fjv (bg vplv , ev epoi rov 
 Kivdvvov yeyovivai • perplcjg av eddfcovv Xeyeiv. nai Srj 
 real vvv 6 peXXw eon Xoyog ccfrodpoTEpog, nai oxedov loug 
 
 13. emSaXXopevoi. “Lest, aiming at things too great, we should 
 fail even of the small.” 
 
 14. Kadanep el. The common reading is el Kadanep. We have 
 ventured to make the change from the exigency of the place, and on 
 the authority of Stephanus ; “ as if we three had to cross a violent- 
 ly-flowing river.” — See Note XVIII., App. 
 
 15. neipadijvai. Whenever a verb is used only in the middle 
 voice to the entire exclusion of the active, or when the middle is the 
 predominant form — or when the active has a causal signification, 
 thus giving rise to what in the middle is seemingly an independent 
 sense — in all such cases, the passive aorists and passive perfect do 
 not denote the receiving of an action, or, in other words, are not the 
 passive of the active, even when it is in use, but are strictly middle 
 tenses. Thus, neipdu , “ to tempt another ;” neipdopai , “ to tempt 
 one’s self, or to attempt, to try ;” neipadrjvai , not to be tempted , but 
 “ to attempt, or try ;” same as the middle. So, also, 7rAa£b, “ to 
 cause to wander ;” nhdfypai, “to wander;” nXayxdrjvai, not “ to be 
 made to wander,” but to wander ; same as the middle. Such cases 
 are very frequent in Greek. Nothing seems to us to be gained by 
 calling them deponent, a term which would seem to belong peculiarly 
 to the Latin where there is no middle form, except as it is supplied 
 by the passive. In Greek no good reason can be assigned why such 
 verbs should be regarded as essentially different from others of the 
 middle voice. This peculiarity does certainly exist in cases where 
 there is an actual middle beyond all doubt, as shown in the use both 
 of the middle and passive aorists with the same sense. 
 
22 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 a6arog l 2 (bg 737 ocp&v p(bpq • pi] 6i) onorodivlav iXiyyov* rs 
 vplv epiroirjorj, napacpepopevog 3 4 re nai epcjrdjv arjOecg ovrag 
 airoKpLoeuv , elr' dox'rjpoovvrjv airperxeidv re evreay] arjdr], 
 done! 6rj pot xp^l vai 17 oielv ovro)al ravvv epe * avepurav 
 TTpGjrov epavrov cuiovovTGdv vpibv ev docpaXel, ical pera 
 ravra dirouptvaodai TrdXtv epe • teal rov Xoyov duavra 
 ovto) diegeXOelv, axpcnep dv 'ipvxijs ^cept dianepavij-cu, nal 
 deify 71 porepov ov 'ijwxijv O(bparog. 
 
 KA. V A pior\ (b fyve, frorcelg rjplv elprjicevat • ixolet re (bg 
 Xeyetg. 
 
 A0. "Aye fy* dedv elnore uapanXrjreov rjplv, vvv eo~G) 
 tovto ovtg) yevopevov * enl ye anodeii-tv (bg elol rijv av- 
 
 1 . (jxedov u jug a6arog. See page 20 , 11 . Here also, Gxebov, instead 
 of impairing, increases the force of the expression, and may be re- 
 garded as an apology for not using a stronger term. “ We might 
 almost say aSarog” &c. 
 
 2 . oxoTobcvlav ITuyyov re vplv spnoLr/Gri. These are favourite terms 
 with Plato to express that state of intellectual dizziness with which 
 the soul approaches the contemplation of those great truths, which 
 may he regarded as the apxal or foundations of all others. Compare 
 the language used in the beginning of the seventh book of the Repub- 
 lic, as applied to those who are supposed suddenly to emerge from the 
 dark cave of error and phenomena into the upper world of light and 
 truth. Compare, also, the Gorgias, 527, A. ; Theaetetus, 155, D. 
 That this language was common with Socrates himself, and that 
 Plato in this, as well as in almost everything else, truly represents 
 his peculiarities, not only of reasoning, but of style, may be inferred 
 from the manner in which Aristophanes joins together these two 
 terms in evident allusion to Socrates, whose philosophy and favourite 
 modes of speech he omits no opportunity to ridicule, not only in the 
 Clouds, but also in many places of his other comedies. Vide the 
 Acharnenses, 1218. 
 
 ITuyyuo Kapa Xldtp 7rEn?i7jyphogy 
 Kal GKOTodiviib. 
 
 3. 'KctpatyepopEvog. In this word the metaphor of the rushing 
 stream is still sustained, although, in a critical point of view, it is 
 rather awkwardly dropped in tporuv. T^oyog is to be supplied for 
 both. See Note XVIII., App. 
 
 4. See Note XIX., App. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 23 
 
 rwr, onovd'Q iraorf napaKeuXrjoOuv . exoperoi de 6 tig nvog 
 aGcfraXovg netGparog, Emdacvoopev elg rov vvv Xoyov. icaZ 
 poi eX eyxopbvcp 1 nepl rd rocavra , epojrrjOEGL roialode da- 
 (paXeorara dnonpivEoda c 8 (paLverai. Kara ds, d) Z-eve , ono - 
 rav (pr\ rtg, dpa EorrjKE pev navra , 9 KiveZrai de ovdev ; rj 
 rovrcp 7T av rovvavrtov ; ?] rd pev avrtiv tuveZrat , rd de 
 pevEL ; Ta pev ntveZrai nov , 10 (prjGU ), rd ds psvei. Mwv 
 otw Tm to re eortira egttjue , /ecu to Kivovpeva 
 
 tuveZrat j 11 IIw^ ydp ov ; Ka£ to ye ev edpa nov av 
 
 5. See Note XIX., App. 
 
 6. kxopevoL 6e &g tivoq do^akovg neerparog. “ Holding fast as by 
 some sure cable.” There is still preserved here the metaphor of 
 the dangerous flood, and there can be no doubt, that by this sure 
 cable is meant that Divine strength and guidance for which he had 
 just prayed. See Notes XVIII. and XIX., App. 
 
 7. ElEyxopeva). This word is generally rendered “ refuted,” or 
 “convicted of error.” It here, however, means simply “engaged 
 in an argument.” It is thus frequently used in the Gorgias and 
 elsewhere. 
 
 8. dnoKpLVEGdcLL, “ to take the part of respondent” as well as that 
 of interrogator. Kara ds . — See Note XX., App. 
 
 9. egttjke psv navra. See Note XX., App. 
 
 10. nov. This particle, of so frequent use in the Platonic dia- 
 logues, in its primary sense implies doubt or hesitation, and is, there- 
 fore, generally said to take away from the positiveness of a declara- 
 tion, in a manner directly the opposite of drj. It is, however, often 
 employed, when nothing of this kind is really intended, but only an 
 appearance of it, in those familiarities of the colloquial style, to which 
 this particle is so admirably adapted. It is a term of courtesy, by 
 which the speaker, to avoid being thought dogmatic or positive, ap- 
 peals to the other party for his assent, without, however, intending 
 any doubt of the proposition advanced. If connected here with 
 <f)rjco) , it should be rendered, “I will say, shall I not?’ Or if with 
 KivELTcu, it comes nearly to the same thing, “ some things move, do 
 they not 1” 
 
 11. EGTcjra egtijke . .. . KLvovpEva kiveItcu. Perhaps a better ex- 
 ample could not be found in Greek to illustrate the essential differ- 
 ence between the present and the perfect. From its very nature 
 .he idea of rest is finished and complete, and is therefore denoted 
 
24 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 rovro dpcbrj, ra de , ev TcXetoot. Td tt)v rtiv eorurcjv 1 * ev 
 peocp Xap6avovra dvvaptv Aeyeig, (brjoopev, ev evl Kivelo- 
 Ocu , KaOdnep r\ rtiv eoravai Xeyopev cov kvkXoov orpecperai 
 izeptcpopa ; N at. MavOavopev de ye d)g ev ravrpj rfj nepupo- 
 pa rov peytorov teal rov optKporarov kvkXov apa irepid- 
 yovoa 7] roiavTTj KtvrjOig. ava Xoyov 13 eavrrjv diavepei opiK- 
 polg re /cal pei^ooiv, eXarrcov re ovoa Kai nXelcov Kara 
 Xoyov. did drj r&v fiavpaortiv 14 airavrcov irrjyri yeyovev, 
 dpa peyaXoig Kai optKpolg KVKXocg (dpadvriqrdg re nai raxp 
 opoXoyovpeva 15 n opevovoa, advvarov (bg av rig eXntoeie 
 yiyveoOai naOog. ’A XrjOeorara Xeyetg. ra de ye Ktvovpeva 
 ev rroXXolg 1 (palvp\ pot Xeyeiv , boa (popa Kivelrat peradat- 
 vovra elg erepov del rorrov • Kai rore pev , eonv ore fiaoiv 
 evog KeKrrjpeva nvog Kevrpov , rore de nXecova, rw nepu 
 KvXivdeloOai. npoorvyxdvovra 2 d’ eKaorore eKaoroig , rolg 
 
 by the latter tense. Motion, on the other hand, is necessarily 
 continued or incomplete action, and is therefore expressed hy the 
 present. Such verbs, however, as tt avo, navopai , Arjyv, do not so 
 much express positive rest , as a ceasing of previous action, which, 
 being a continuous idea, admits of a present form. 
 
 12. Td tt]v rtiv karurov. “ You mean, then, we will reply (to out 
 imaginary interlocutor) that those which receive the faculty or prop 
 erty ( dvvaptv ) of things at rest in the centre (another mode of say 
 mg, the properly of being at rest, &c.) move in one, just like the- 
 revolutions of those wheels that are said to stand.” Another, and 
 perhaps a better way would be to take piatp with hapSdvovra, in 
 stead of kardruv, after this order, ra kv peotp ’kapbdvovra rrjv rfiv 
 kardrov dvvaptv. Ficinus renders — quee in medio stare possunt 
 
 13. See Note XXI., App. 
 
 14. See Note XXII., App. 
 
 15. opu^oyovpeva, to be taken adverbially for opoTioyovphtjq. 
 Advvarov . . . nddog, “a state of things (nuOoq) which, as one would 
 expect, could not possibly take place.” 
 
 1. kv i toXXolc, the opposite of kv hi. “ On many centres of mo- 
 tion.” Or rolling on a plane, instead of revolving on a fixed point, 
 such as Sextus Empiricus styles romayv perdSaatv. Sext, Emp., 
 Pyrrh. Hypot., iii., 8 and 64. 
 
 2. 7t poorvyxdvovra. “As they meet continually *Vith individual 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 25 
 
 korCxu pev diaofti&Tai, Tolg d’ dXXrjXocg e£ evavrtag anav - 
 TUCK nal (pepopevoig elg ev yiyvopeva peoa re nal pera^v 
 t£)v tolovtcvv ovyupivercu. Xeyo) yap ovv ravra ovrcog 
 s^ovra (hg ov Xeyscg . real prjv nal ovynpivopEva pev av$;d- 
 verac , dianpivopeva 6s (pdtvei * * 3 * tote OTav 7] naOeoTTjnvla 
 kndoTCJV E^tg diapev^ • pr) pevovGijg de avTrjg , di 9 dpcpOTepa 
 anoXXvTai. ylyvETaf dr) navT(ov yevEGig , tjvlk av tl n a- 
 $ ; drjXov d>g onoTav ap%r) Xadovoa av^rjv, 5 elg ttjv dev- 
 TEpav eXOrj peTadaoiv, nal and TavTrjg , elg ttjv nXrjoiov, 
 nal pEXpt Tpitiv eXOovoa , aloOrjfUv oxzi r olg aioOavopEVotg. 
 pETadaXXov pev ovv ovtoj nal peTamvovpevov ytyvETac 
 nav. eotl 6e ovTug ov, s onoTav pevrj • peTabaXbv de elg 
 dXXrjv egiv, diecpOapTai 1 * 8 navTeXtig. dp ’ ovv nivrjGEig naoag 
 elprjnapEV (bg ev e16egi Xadelv j uet’ aptOpov, nXrjv ye, cb (pt- 
 Xol , dvolv ; 
 
 KA. II oiaiv drj ; 
 
 A0. X^edov, cb 9 yaOe , eneivatv , cov evena naoa rjpZv eg- 
 rlv t] Gne'iptg Tavvv, 
 
 KA. Aeye GacpeOTEpov . 
 
 A0. vxTjg fjv evena nov ; 
 
 KA. Jlavv j uev ovv . 
 
 A0. "E (7T6) TOtVVV 7] j UEV ETEpa dwapEVrf niVElv niV7]Gl 
 EavT7)v de adwaTOvoa alel pea Tig • d’ eavTrjv r’ aZet 
 Am erepa dvvapevr] naTa te GvynpiGEtg 9 ev re dianptGEGcv , 
 av^acg te nal Tcb evavTicp, nal yeveoeot nal cpOopatg , a X Xr\ 
 ata Ttg av tg5v nao&v ntvrjGEtiv . 
 
 KA. ’Kcrrct) yap ovv. 
 
 opposing objects, by those that stand they are divided, while with 
 others that meet them (being borne from opposite directions) they 
 unite, so that the centres and intervening parts come together into 
 
 one.” 
 
 3, 4, 5. See Note XXIII., App. 
 
 6. See Note XXIV., App. 
 
 7. dieQOaprac. “ It is utterly destroyed,” that is, “ the thing which 
 
 before was, no longer is” See Notes XXIII. and XXIV., App., on 
 
 the words tyOioLg, avt-rjOLQ, (fiQopa , eipi, and yiyvopai . 
 
 8. 9. See Note XXV., App. 
 
 O 
 
26 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 A0. Ovkovv rrjv pev erepov dec mvovoav , teal peradaX- 
 Xopevrjv v(p 9 erepov , 'drjoopev evarrjv av , 10 rrjv re eavrrjv 
 mvovoav teal erepa , evapporrovoav Trace pev rrocrjpaoc, 
 rraoc de iraOrjpaoc , tcaXovpevrjv de ovrcog rcov ovrcov n av. 
 rcov peradoXrjv teal mvrjocv, ravrrjv de detcarrjv o%eddv 
 epovpev. 
 
 KA. UavraTraoi pev ovv. 
 
 A0. Tcov dr) dena pdXcora rjplv mvrjoecov reva rrpoKpc- 
 vaepev * 11 opOorara rraccdv eppcopeveordrrjv 12 re elvac nat 
 Trpatcrcicrjv deaepepovreog ; 
 
 KA. M vpccp 13 avdyterj i rov (jravac dcacjrepecv rrjv avrrjv 
 dvvapevrjv mvelv , rag de aXXag 7rdoag, vorepag. 
 
 A0. Ev Xeyecg. dp’ ovv rjplv rcov vvv ova dpQcdg prjdev- 
 rcov peraOereov 14 ev fj teal dvo ; 
 
 KA. Hoc a cpxig ; 
 
 A0. To rrjg detearrjg prjQev oftedov ova dpOcdg elprjrac . 
 KA. Urj; 
 
 A0. Upcdrov 15 yeveoec re eon teal pcdpyp teard Xoyov 
 to de pera rovro e%opev rovrov devrepov , apre prjQev aro- 
 rrcog evarov. 
 
 KA. nc5$* Xeyecg ; 
 
 A0, T £2de. orav erepov aXXo rjplv peraddXyj , nal rovro 
 aXXo erepov dec , rcov rocovrcov apa eorac rrore rc irpcdrov 
 peradaXXov ; teal rrcdg, orav vn’ aXXov mvrjrac , rovr ’ eoTat 
 
 10. See Note XXV., App. 
 
 11. riva TTpoKpivaifiEV. This is the common reading. It is evi- 
 dent, however, that dv should be supplied. 
 
 12. See Note XXVI., App. 
 
 13. pvpiG). Hyperbolical measure of excess. “ By ten thousand 
 times.” 
 
 14. /LcsTaderiov. “ Must we change the order in one or two par- 
 ticulars V } 
 
 15. npcorov. The meaning of this is, that what was last or tenth 
 in the order of the previous investigation, becomes first in the order 
 of nature and in the degree of importance ; and that which we be 
 fore wrongly called the ninth, becomes now the second. See Notes 
 XXV. and XXVI., App. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 27 
 
 irore rtiv aXXoiovvTO)v rrpCdTov ; advvarov yap, dAA’ orav 
 apa avro avrd tuvrjcrav erepov dXXoitior], to d ’ erepov aX- 
 Xo , nat ovtg) dfj x^ ia pvpioig ytyvrjrai rd /avrjOevra , 
 I ucbv apx'f] rcg avrtiv ear at rrjg mvrjoeojg dndorjg aXXr], 
 7 tXt)v i] Ti]g avTrjg avTrjv mvr\odG7\g peTadoXrj ; 
 
 KA. K aXXiOTa elnsg • Gvyx^p'ijrea te TOVTOig. 
 
 A0. ,7 E tl dr) real Tode ehrcjpev, nai dnofcptvcjpeOa irdXiv 
 rjplv avToloiv. el GTairj ncjg rd rravTa opov yevopeva , na- 
 Oanep oi nXeloTOt t&v tolovtgjv toX pd)Gi Xeyeiv , tlv ’ apa 
 ev avTOtg avay/crj 7rpd)Trjv Ktvrjoiv yevsoOai tcov eiprjpsvG)v $ 
 
 KA. T rjv avT7]v dr] rrov mvovaav . in’ aXXov yap ov prj~ 
 7 tots spnpoaOev psTanso'y , prjdepidg ye ev avTOtg ovorjg 
 epirpoaOev psTanTuaecog. 
 
 A0. ’A pxv v apa 1 Kivrjosojv naotiv teal Trpd)T7]v ev ts eg- 
 tgjgl yevopevrjv teal ev tuvovpevoig ovGav tt)v avTrjv mvov~ 
 Gav , tyrjGopev dvaynaiatg elvai TTpeGdvTaTrjv ical KpaTiGTTjv 
 peTaboXfjV naGtiv • tt)v de dXXoiovpevrjv veff ETepov , klvov- 
 GaiPds eTspa , devTepav. 
 
 KA. ’A Xr}OeGTaTa Xeyetg. 
 
 A0. ' Ottote d 7} TOivvv evTavda EGpev tov Xoyov , 2 Tode 
 dnorcpivtipeOa. 
 
 KA. To 7 Tolov ; 
 
 A0. 5 E av ldo)pev 7 tov TavTTjv 3 yevopevrjv ev tgj yrjivcp , 
 rj evvdpG), rj Trvpoeidei, nexupiopevcp rj teal ^vppiyel , tl ttotg 
 (frrjGopev ev tgj tolovtg) tt aOog elvai ; 
 
 KA. Mtiv apa pe epo)Tag el £?/ v 4 avro npoGepovpev OTav 
 avTO avTO mvf \ ; 
 
 1. apxvv apa klvt/ceov. “ Seeing, then, that it is the principle of 
 all motions, the first among things that stand, and being self-mo- 
 ving among things that move, we will say that it is *he oldest and 
 strongest,” &c. 
 
 2. hravda Xoyov. “In this part of our argument.” Compare 
 such expressions as 7 tov yr/c — 7r oi yijc — ek rod’ anoplag — Iv* el naKov — 
 we opyrjg 
 
 3. TttVTIJV. Supply KLVTJOLV. 
 
 4. Cyv npooEpovfjiEV orav avro avro tavrj ; “ Shall we call it life (of 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 A0. N at, tfjv. 
 
 KA. Hug yap ov ; 
 
 A0. T L de ; onorav 'i/jvxrjv ev tloiv optipev, ptiv aXko f t 
 ravrov TOVTCp $q v opoAoyrjreov ; 
 
 KA. 0 vtc aXXo. 
 
 A0. "E %e dr\ 5 irpog ktog * ap ’ oi>/£ av eOeXoig nepl enao- 
 tov rpia voelv ; 
 
 KA. Hug Xeyetg ; 
 
 AO. *'Ev pev, rrjv ovolav * 6 ev de , rrjg ovoiag rov Xoyov • 
 ev de, ovopa. t cal dr) Kal 7 epcorrjoetg eivai nepl to ov anav 
 dvo. 
 
 KA. IIw^ dvo ; 
 
 A0. Tore pev 8 rjpojv enaorov rovvopa nporecvopevov 
 avro , rov Aoyov airairelv • tots de rov Xoyov Tcporeivope- 
 vov, epcorav av rovvopa. apa ye to rotovde av fiovXopeda 
 vvv Xeyeiv ; 
 
 KA. To 7 toIov ; 
 
 ♦ — 
 
 to Live) when a thing itself moves itself'?” £««, to live , and to 
 
 boil , to bubble , to bubble up , are unquestionably of the same radical 
 idea. Effervescence or fermentation from the action of heat, taking 
 place in matter otherwise apparently motionless, would be the phe- 
 nomenon which of all others would most readily suggest to the 
 primitive mind the idea of self-motion , and would thus be taken as a 
 symbol of life. 
 
 5. v E^£ drj tt poc A Log. “ Hold there by Jove.” An important posi- 
 tion is gained. Let us secure it, and then advance to another view 
 of the subject. Compare Gorgias, 490, A. The usual rendering ot 
 this phrase, age dum , does not seem to us to give its peculiar sig- 
 nificance. 
 
 6. ev pev , ttjv ovolav, k. t. X. “ One thing the essence, one the 
 Xoyog or reason of the essence, and one the name.” See Note 
 XXVII., App. 
 
 7. Kal dq Kal l This phrase generally denotes an application of a 
 preceding proposition. “And accordingly, respecting every such 
 essence, there must be always two questions.” 
 
 8. tote pev tote de. “ At one time, the name being present • 
 
 ed, we demand the loyoq, reason or definition ; at another time, the 
 Tibyog or reason being given, we ask the name.” 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 29 
 
 A0. V E otl 7 tov dix a dtaipovpevov 9 ev aXkotg re nai h 
 aped pep, Tovrcp drj rep nar ’ dptdpov , ovopa pev, apnov • Ad 
 yo^ de, aptOpog dtatpovpevog elg loa dvo peprj. 
 
 KA. N al. 
 
 A0. To tolovtov (ppa^G). pdrv ovv ov ravrov enarepodg 
 Trpooayopevopev, 10 av re tov Xoyov epo)T(x)pevot, Tovvopa 
 anodtdcbpev, av re Tovvopa, tov Xoyov * apTiov dvopaTij 
 nai \oy<p, dtxa dtatpovpevov dpiOpov i t poo ay opevovT eg, 
 TavTov ov ; 
 
 KA. HavTairaoL pev ovv . 
 
 A0. T ttt dr) 'ipvxv 11 Tovvopa, Ttg tovtov A oyog ; exopev 
 
 9. c Ylxcl diaipovpevov. This may be taken impersonally. “ It is 
 divided into two,” or generally, “ there is or there may be this divis- 
 ion into two, both in other things and also in respect to number.” 
 tovtu drj. “ To this thing, that is, this division” — r& /car’ apidpov, 
 “ namely, that which has respect to number, the NAME ( ovopa ) is 
 apnov ; but the ’koyog (notion, reason, or definition) is a number di- 
 visible into two equal parts.” And this is the koyog or notion given 
 in the eighth book of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, in these very 
 words. 
 
 10. pfiv ovv ov ravrov knaripwg tt poeayopevopev. The whole pas- 
 sage may be thus freely rendered : “ Do we not in both respects sub- 
 stantially predicate the same, if, being asked in respect to the notion, 
 we give the name (of the thing of which it is the notion), and being 
 asked in respect to the name, we give the notion (to which the name 
 belongs) — predicating of the name as subject, apnov , and of the 
 notion as subject, a number divided , &c., being substantially the 
 same.” After all, there seems no little confusion in the sentence. 
 The two questions may be thus stated : 1st. What is the name of 
 that whose notion is a number divided , &c. 1 To this the answer is 
 apnov. 2d. What is the notion of that whose name is apnov or 
 even! To this the answer is apiOpog elg lea Svo peprj bLaipovpevog— 
 a number divided or divisible , &c. We have placed a comma after 
 ovopan , although differing in this respect from the editions of Bekkei 
 and Ast. The following seems to us to be the order of the lattei 
 part : Tzpoaayapevovreg ovopan, apnov , kuc ( npoeayopevovreg ) Aoy<p, 
 dixa biaipovpevov dpiOpov , ravrov ov ( kv dp^orepoig TTpoeayopevopevov). 
 See Note XXVIII., App. 
 
 11. See Note XXVIII., App. 
 
 C 2 
 
30 
 
 CONTRA ATIIEOS. 
 
 dXXov nX'qv tov vvv dr) prjOevra , rrjv dvvapEvrjv avT7)V 
 avrrjv klveIv fdvrjoiv ; 
 
 KA. To eavrd klvelv 12 ^g Xoyov e%piv tt)v avrr\v ovgl- 
 av rjvnep Tovvopa o dfj navTEg 'ipvx'rjv npoGayopEvopev ; 
 
 A0. §r\pi ye. eI 6’ egti tovto ovrcog exov, apa etc no - 
 OovpEv 13 prj inavdjg dEdslxOai 'ijwx'rjv ravrov ov nal t rjv 
 npcjrrjv yEVEOiv nal nivrjGtv rtiv te ovtcov nal yEyovorcov 
 real EOopsvG)v , teal navrcov av t&v evavTiuv TOVTOig ; Ensi- 
 6rj ye dv£(j)dvri peTaboXrjg re nal /avrjoEG)g dndorjg alrla 
 anaav ; 
 
 KA. Ovn • dXXd ltcavd)rara didEtnTai 'ipvx^J tov nav- 
 tcjv npEobvrdrrjj yEvopEvrj te apx'Zj mvrjGECog. 
 
 A0. r Ap’ ovv ovx f] di 9 ETEpov 14, ev dXXco ytyvopEvrj nt - 
 vrjGig, avrd 6e ev avrd) prjdEnoTE napEXOvoa mveloOcu prj- 
 6 ev, dEvrepa te nal onoccov dpiOptiv (3 ovXolto av Tig apiQ - 
 PEIV aVT7]V noXXoGTTJV , 15 TOGOVTO)V , GGOpaTOg OVGa OVTCVg 
 d'lpvxov peTaboXf ) ; 
 
 KA. ’0 pOojg. 
 
 A0. ’Opdcbg apa nal nvp'uog aXrjOEGTaTa te nal TEXEUTa- 
 Ta elprjnoTeg av elpEv 1 'ipvx'rjv p&v npoTEpav yEyovivai G(o~ 
 
 12. See Note XXVIII., App. 
 
 13. apa Itl 'jtoOov/j.ev prj Uavtiq dedelxOat. JloOovpev praegnantem 
 sensum habet, est enim: num quid adhuc desideramus {existiwantes) 
 non salis demonstratum esse , SfC. — Ast. We see no necessity for this 
 explanation of Ast, but would prefer directly connecting 'Kodovpev 
 with dedetxdai , without resorting to any ellipsis or praegnant con- 
 struction. “Do w T e yet feel the want of its being sufficiently 
 shown,” &c. here occurs in the usual manner, and with the 
 usual force which it has after verbs containing in themselves the 
 sense of a negative either expressed or implied, such as those of /or- 
 bidding , preventing, want , &c. ; and in such cases it is not to be 
 rendered by itself, but regarded as strengthening the quasi denial of 
 the governing word. Uodov/zev may be ranked in this class, and, al- 
 although a verb of want or desire, invariably takes an accusative. 
 
 14. See Note XXIX., App. 
 
 15. 7 ToTikoarrjv. For remarks on this word, see Note XXIX., App. 
 
 1. el/iev. The common reading is r/pev, but as the optative is clear- 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 31 
 
 l iarog rjplv • ctipa be, devrepov re nal varepov '^vx'dg dp* 
 XOVG7]g y apxopevov nara (jjvaiv. 
 
 KA. ’AXrjOeorara pev ovv. 
 
 A0. M epvrjpeOd ye prjv opoXoyrjGavreg ev rolg epnpoo - 
 6ev , (bg el ipvxi tyavecrj npeadvrepa ocbparoq ovoa , real rd 
 ipvX^q ~°v oebparog eaoiro irpeodvrepa . 
 
 KA. Haw pev ovv . 
 
 A0. Tponoc dr) real i]0r] nal povXrjaeLg nal Xoyiopol nal 
 bo%ai aXrjOelg, empeXeiat re nal pvrjpac, reporepa * 2 prjnovg 
 GG)pdro)v nal nXarovg nal fiadovg nal pcbprjg elrj yeyovora 
 av, e’inep nal 'ipvx'rj ouparog. 
 
 KA. ’A v ay nip 
 
 A0. y Ap’ ovv to per a rovro opoXoyetv dvaynalov , tCjv 
 re ayadebv airiav eivai 'ipvx'tjv 3 4 nal rcov naXbbv nal nancov 
 nal alcxp&v, dinaioyv re nal adinuv, nal redvrayv tgjv evav- 
 tig)v ; elnep rcbv navroiv ye avrrjv # rjoopev airiav ; 
 
 KA. Udjg yap ov ; 
 
 A0. •kvx'tiv dr) bioinovoav nal evoinovoav* ev airaoc rolg 
 navrrj ncvovpevoig ptiv ov nal rov ovpavov dvdynrj dcoc - 
 nelv <\>avai ; 
 
 KA. T l prjv ; 
 
 ly required, we have with Ast substituted elpev, which is used for 
 elrjpev, the rj in this form being often dropped in the dual and 
 plural. K vpicog is a stronger word than bpQtig. It means “ by au- 
 thority^as an established truth — or as something which we may 
 now assert with confidence.’’ 
 
 2. See Note XXX., App. 
 
 3. tu)v re dyaQ&v airiav eivai ipvxyv Kai rtiv nahuv. “ Soul is the 
 cause of the good, and fair, and right.” It is not, however, simply 
 the efficient cause regarded objectively, but the very subjective 
 ground of their existence, without which they could have no being, 
 whether there was a universe of matter or not. Where soul is not, 
 there can be no harmony, no beauty, no right, no good. And so, 
 also, it not only makes its own paradise, but its own earth, and its 
 own hell. Without it there is no discord, no deformity, no evil. 
 
 4. diouiovcav — evoinovoav , “pervading — inhabiting — indwell- 
 ing.” 
 
32 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 A0. Miav.rj nXecovg ; 5 HXetovg • £yfi) vt rep o (f) 0 )lv arro - 
 Kptvovpcu. Avolv 6 i lev ye irov eXarrov prjdev rtOtipev, rrjg 
 t£ evepyendog , /cat ravavria Svvapevrjg ei-epya^eodcu. 
 
 KA. X<p66pa dpdcXg etprjKag. 
 
 A0. Efev. ay££ pev dfj 'ipvxr) 7 8 navra r'd /car' ovpavov 
 real yrjv teal $ aXarrav , rat$* avrrjg klvtjoegiv, alg ovopara 
 eari, fiovXeoQai , otconeToOcu, empeXeloOcu , I3ovXeveg0cu, 
 do%a£eiv opOtig, e'lpevGpevcjg • x al P ovaav Xvnovpevrjv • 
 dappovGav, (j^odovpevrjv • picovoav , GrepyovGav • /cat 7rd- 
 <ra/£ 9 oaat tovtcjv %vyyevelg rj 7rpG)rovpyol lavrjGEig, rag 
 
 5. 7ivle/ovf. The general sense of the passage is best preserved by 
 rendering this word, not many, but more than one. 
 
 6. <5vo/v. See Note XXNI., App., on the Platonic doctrine of the 
 evil principle. 
 
 7. aye/, ipvxv Travra. ‘fvxv is here used collectively as the 
 
 antithesis of matter, for all souls, including the spirits of men and 
 angels (or daipoveg), as well as the Divine soul, which he regards as 
 the principium or fountain of the whole genus. The doctrine, that 
 even the human soul was older than body, was taught by Plato, yet 
 not in the sense in which it is commonly understood. It has, how- 
 ever, no necessary connexion with his present argument against the 
 atheists. 
 
 8. x aL P 0V(jav ‘ The sudden change here from the infinitive to the 
 participle seems made on purpose for variety. Xalpovoav, however, 
 if any should choose so to regard it, may be taken with ipvxyv as the 
 accusative before these infinitives. The order would be thus : alg 
 ovopara, egti (to) ipvxyv x a ' L P 0VGav XvTrovpevyv , k. t. X. povXeadai 
 GKOTTELodai, K. T. X. 
 
 9. Tcuccug, connect with klvjigeoiv alg above. II piorovpyol KivrjGEig , 
 “first working motions,” viz., those of soul — such as povXecdat 
 c Kon tied a/, &c. A evrepovpyovg av, “second working motions,” cor- 
 responding to order second of motion described some ways back — 
 “ second causes,” or “ motions of matter produced by impulse” (ef 
 dXXov Fig dXXo peraSoXy). The author has in view the classification 
 made page 27, line 16, and also 30, line 15. This we believe to be 
 the true sense of the passage, but a glance at the position of the 
 participles and infinitives above suggests another division, which, 
 although it may not have been intended, is yet most important and 
 true. It will be seen that these participles all express feelings of the 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 33 
 
 devrepovpyovg av rrapaXapdavovaat KLvr\ceiq coopdrojv, 
 ayovoi iravra elg av^rjatv nai tyQioiv, teal dtanpioLv teal 
 ovyupiocv • teal rovrotg eiropevag , i ^epporrjrag, 'ipvi-eig * j 8a- 
 pvrrjrag , Kovcporrjrag • aicXrjpbv Kal paXattov • Xevnov nal 
 peXav • avorrjpov , /sat yXvKv , /cat Tuttpov • /cat Tract iv olg 10 
 'ipvx'rj XP Mpevrj, vovv pev irpooXapbavovoa alel 'deov, deog 
 ovoa , 6/o0d /cat evdatpova iratdaytvyel iravra • avota 6e 
 % vyyevopevrj , 7 ravra av ravavrta rovrotg arrepya^erat. 
 rtOcbpev ravra ovrcog ex eiV \ V ETl btora^opev el erepejg 
 7TG)g exec ; 
 
 KA. 0 vdapeog. 
 
 A0. ndrepoi/ 1 oi’V dz) 'ipvx'ijg yevog eynpareg ovpavol) 
 
 moral nature, while the infinitives denote the motions or exercises 
 of the intellect. Now the passions or feelings being the most essen- 
 tial part of the soul, and that which excites the intellect to action, 
 may, in respect to the latter, be styled npuTovpyol ( first working ), 
 just as the exercises of soul generally are npurovpyol, or first work - 
 ing , when compared with the secondary motions of matter. IT apaX- 
 apSavovacu , “ taking along with themselves (as co-operatives or 
 auxiliaries) the devrepovpyovg KtvrjGELg copdrov,” namely, second 
 causes , or the laws of nature. 
 
 10 . nal 7r dav olg. 7 0 ig, although neuter, refers to the above re- 
 cited devrepovpyovg Kivijoeig of matter. K al> if judged according to 
 the English idiom, would be redundant as a connective. It may, 
 however, retain its place as an intensive particle. Ka/' tcugiv olg 
 is to be rendered as olg Kal tzclglv. So Cornarius regards it — quibus 
 omnibus si anima, quee Dea est , utitur , &c. Or it may be taken in 
 the order of the words, only regarding Kal as intensive instead of 
 connective, so that rraGcv is not additional, but only a collective term 
 for all the things mentioned before — “ And all which,” or “ even all 
 (those second working motions) which the soul using — itself being 
 Divine, and taking along with it that Divine thing vovg — rightly and 
 happily guides all things ; but when conversant with folly, it ever 
 doeth the contrary,” &c. Qeog here, according to a common Pla- 
 tonic usage, is equivalent to tielog. 
 
 11. rrorepov ovv dq Tpvxrjg yevog , “which of the two souls (lately 
 mentioned), do we say, has the control of the heavens, &c. — the 
 one wise and full of virtue, or the one that hath neither of these 
 qualities'!” 
 
34 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 i cal yrjg nai irdarjg rrjg nepiodov yeyovsvcu (pdpEV ; to 0po* 
 vcpov , teal apsrrjg nXrjpEg ; ?j to prjdETEpd Kenrrjpsvov ; 
 QovXegOe ovv npog ravra (1 j6e GTTOfcpivGjpedG ; 
 
 KA. IIg5$* ; 
 
 A0. E l pkv, gj ftavpaoLe, (pcbpEv, rj £ vpndoa ovpavov odog 
 dpa nal (popd nal tgjv ev dvreb ovtgjv anavruv, vov fuvrj- 
 o el nal 7 T£pL<popa l * Kdi Xoytopolg opotdv (pvotv nai 
 
 %vyy£V(bg epxsrai, djjXov (bg rrjv apLorrjv 'ipvx'fjv (pdriov 
 ETUpE^ELGdaL TOV HOGpOV TTdVTOg , Kdt dyELV dVTOV TT\V TOL- 
 dVT7]V ddbv EKELV7JV. 
 
 KA, ’OpOtbg. 
 
 A0. E l 6 e pdviitcbg te Kdt drdicrGjg spiral, ttjv icainjv. 
 
 KA. Kdt rdvra opOibg. 
 
 A0. T evd ovv 6rj vov KLvrjGig (pvotv e^el ; tovto rjdrj x a ~ 
 XeTTOV, GJ (piXot^ EpGJTrjpa dUOKpiVOpEVOV eItTELV EpcjjpOVGJg. 
 dco 6rj Kdt kps rrjg dironpiGEGjg vplv dtimtov tgvvv npoG - 
 XapddvELv . 13 
 
 KA. Ev XsyELg. 
 
 A0. Mt) tolvvv e% EVdvriag olov Elg rjXiov 14 dnobXEirov- 
 TEg , vvtcra ev pEG7]p6pta knayopEVot , 7TOLr]O(bpE0a rrjv airo- 
 KpLGLV , Gjg VOVV TCOTE ^Vl^TOLg OppdGLV O'lpOpEVOL TE Kdt 
 yvGJoopEVOL inavcbg • npog ds shidva rov kpGJTGjpsvov {3Xe- 
 novTdg &<7(j)dX,£OTepov opdv. 
 
 KA. Ucbg hkysig ; 
 
 A0. T Hi npooEOME /uvrjGEL vovg , 15 tgjv ds/ca ehelvgjv kl- 
 
 12. N ov klvt](J£l Kal nspL^opa . See Note XXXII., App. 
 
 13. 7r pocrhapSaveLv here has nearly the sense of !;vXXap6aveiv, “to 
 take part with, to assist you in the answer.” 
 
 14. e% kvavriag olov elg fyliov. Compare with this the similitudes 
 in the sixth book of the Republic, intended to illustrate the idea of 
 the ayaOov ; also, the comparison of the dark cave in the beginning 
 of the seventh book, and the representation of the demeanour of 
 those who, after coming out of its obscurity, are supposed to look 
 directly at the sun, without making use of such helps as are furnish- 
 ed by the reflections of mirrors and of water. 
 
 15. 7 H* TcpooeoiKE klvtjgel vovg. “ Let us take as an image (since 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 35 
 
 vfjoecov tt)v elnova Xabatpev • zjv ovvavapvr]oQetg vplv iyu), 
 kolvxi rrjv duoKpiocv Tcoi'rjoopai. 
 
 KA. KdXXiOTa av Xeyoig. 
 
 A0. Me / livrjfieOa tolvvv* Toys r oaovrov rtiv tots etc, oti 
 tcov dnavTOJv tu pev tuveladat , rd tie j ueveiv eQepev . 
 
 KA. NaL 
 
 A0. Ttiv 6’ av tuvovpsvmf Td pev ev evl tottg) tuvelo 
 Oat , Ta 6 y ev ttXelogl epepopeva. 
 
 KA. *E art TavTa. 
 
 A0. T ovtolv 6rj toZv Ktvrjoeotv * 1 tt)v ev evl (pepopevrjv 
 del rrepL ye ti peoov avaytcr) tuveloOai tgjv evTopvcjv ov - 
 
 oav pipirjpd Ti KVK,X(i)V, slva'i TE aVTT]V T%j TOV VOX) TtEpi66(xX 
 7ravTG)g (bg dvvaTdv oitcELOTaTrjv te teat opotav. 
 
 KA. Xeyeig ; 
 
 A0. To 2 3 * * * * /card TavTa drjnov teal cooavTug teal ev tgj av- 
 to), teal Kept Ta avTa , teal npog Ta avTa y tcal eva Xoyov teal 
 Tat-iv ptav apcj)(i) tavEloOai XeyovTeg , vovv , ttjv te ev evl 
 (pspopsvrjv KivrjGiv, ocpaipag evTopvov aTTEinaopeva 8 (popalg, 
 
 we cannot look upon vovg directly with our mortal vision) that one 
 of the ten motions to which mind or reason bears a resemblance.” 
 These motions are called seven in the similar place of the Timaeus, 
 page 34, A. The ancient writers, when treating of physics, all varied 
 in the enumeration, and sometimes the same writer varies from him- 
 self, as Plato does in this, and in the passage of the Timaeus re- 
 ferred to. 
 
 1. tovtolv drj toZv KLvrjoeoiv. The Attic connects masculine ad- 
 jectives and pronouns in the dual, with feminine nouns — a rule, 
 however, which is not universal. The common reading here has 
 rolv ev hi (pspophotv : also, below, ovo&v instead of ovaav. We have 
 made the corrections on the authority of Eusebius, Ficinus, Ste 
 phanus, and the Cod. Voss., besides being alsolutely required by the 
 exigentia loci. 
 
 2. to belongs to vovv Kiveiodatj several lines below. 
 
 3. an eiKacTfieva is neuter, because it refers both to vovv and Kivrjmv. 
 
 The order of this rather complicated sentence would be as follows : 
 
 'kiyovTEQ (to) vovv rrjv te ev hi (pepophyv Kivrjatv , (d/Kporepa) arret- 
 
 Kaopeva (popatg hropvov ccpatpac, kiveIgQcli Kara ravra teal (orravreo^ 
 
 teal h tgj avrfi, teal n epi, &c. . . . ovtc dv tcote (pavetpev , &c. That 
 
36 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 gvk av nore (pavelpev tyavkot, drjpcovpyol Aoym naXCdv el 
 
 KOVCJV. 
 
 KA. ’O pdorara Xeyeig. 
 
 A0. Ovkovv av fj y£ * * * 4 prjdsTTors^cooavrcjg, prjde fcard r a 
 avrd , prjdi av ravrcp , prjds rtepl ravrd , prjds tt pog ravrd 
 (pepopevrj, f. it]6 ’ ev Kocrpcp, prjd’ ev ra^ei, prjde ev nvi Aoyo) 
 Kcvrjcug, avotag av dnao7]g elr] gvyyavrjg. 
 
 KA. E??7 yap av dXrideorara. 
 
 A0. Nvv dr) xaXeirbv ovdev etc diapprjdrjv 5 elrtelv , cog, 
 eiretdri 'ipvx'rj pev eonv rj nepcayovoa rjplv rcavra , rfjv de 6 
 
 which is here styled motion in one, is not to be regarded as the same, 
 in all respects, with the motion of a sphere, otherwise it would not 
 
 be said to be likened to it. It is rather to be taken as a general 
 
 term, the opposite of motion in many , Kivyaiq ev no^oiq, or motion 
 accompanied by change of place. This, then, would be that higher 
 species of motion, which, without change in the cause, produces 
 motion in other things, itself remaining wholly in one, and is there- 
 fore likened to the motion of a sphere, »which of all others presents 
 to it the best similitude. It is the tenth of the above-mentioned 
 enumeration, or the avroKivyaiq of soul. 
 
 4. ovkovv av 7] ye. See Note XXXIII., App. 
 
 5. diapfiydyv. The way is now prepared for answering clearly the 
 great question, whether it is the good or the evil soul which governs 
 the universe. 
 
 6. T7jv de ovpavov 7r epi<f)opav. Ast here would substitute ryv ye for 
 the common reading ryv de. By such a change the pev preceding 
 would be left alone, and tyareov, with all that follows, made dependant 
 upon dq. In which case it must be taken as the proposition which 
 the speaker thinks can now be so clearly affirmed — all from en etdy 
 to rcavra inclusive, being brought in by way of parenthesis as a 
 preamble to the sentiment. The order in that case would be thus : 
 vv v drj, enetdy 'ipvxy pev eartv y neptdyovaa yptv ndvra, x a ^en ov ovdev 
 In eirelv dq tyareov ryv ye ovpavov nept(f)opdv, &c\, “but now, since 
 it is soul that directs all things for us, there is no longer any diffi- 
 culty in asserting, that we must say, that soul, &c., either the best 
 soul or the contrary, conducts the revolutions, at least, of the 
 heavens.” This proposition, however, besides being a mere un- 
 meaning repetition of the first clause, had been clearly asserted be- 
 fore. We would, therefore, prefer the common reading (ryv de), by 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 37 
 
 ovoavov neptcjyopdv e% dvdytcrjg neptayeLv cbareov empeXov- 
 pevrjv nai tcoapovoav fyroi tt\v apLorrjv 'ipvx'rjv, rj rfjv evav- 
 rtav — 
 
 KA. T £2 give, aXXd etc ye tCjv vvv elprjpevcov, ovd ’ oatov 
 
 which this part of the sentence, with its principal or governing word 
 < pareov , is referred directly to ertetdr] by the connective force of pev 
 and de, leaving uq without any dependant clause expressed ; so that 
 the whole sentence might be regarded as unfinished or designedly 
 abrupt, for the purpose of introducing with more effect the answer 
 of Clinias, in which the proposition designed is brought out. This 
 is no uncommon device in the Platonic writings, by which the most 
 important truths are evolved from the person with whom Socrates 
 or the chief speaker is conversing; thus furnishing a fine illustra- 
 tion of that maieutical process in which Socrates so gloried as his 
 peculiar method. The whole passage, in accordance with this view, 
 may be thus presented : vvv dr/, eneidr/ i pvxv pev egtiv r/ nepidyovaa 
 r/plv 7r dvra, tt/v de ovpavov nept(j)opdv Qclteov kg dvdyKijg ijjvxyv tjtul 
 TT jv doL(jT7]v rj ttjv kvavTiav eTTLpeXovpevTjv nal Koopovcrav nepidyeiv , 
 Xaherrov ovdev en dcapprjdrjv eirzelv , d)g — KA. T £2 give, &c. “But 
 now, since soul (as had been shown) is that which guides all things, 
 and since, also, we are compelled (from this premise) to say that 
 therefore soul, either the best soul or the contrary, carefully and 
 orderly conducts the revolution of the heavens, there is no longer 
 any difficulty in affirming clearly that” — he would have said, as the 
 the apodosis to wf, which had been suspended — “that it is the best 
 soul which doeth this,” and that we are shut up to this conclusion ; 
 but at this point Clinias takes the proposition out of his mouth, and 
 impatiently announces it in his own words : w give, ( there is no need 
 of so long a preamble) (a/lAa), but ( from what has been said ) it would be 
 impious to affirm otherwise than that the soul which hath all virtue 
 guides , &c. This impatience of Clinias, for what seemed to him 
 the inevitable conclusion, is finally expressed by the word dAAd, 
 which often, like yap, refers to something supposed to pass rapidly 
 through the mind of the speaker, although not expressed — as in this 
 case, in the negative words we have supplied before dXkd, or some- 
 thing equivalent. The great objection to Ast’s substitution of ye 
 for de is, that it makes the whole proposition merely a repetition of 
 what had been clearly affirmed before, and does not prepare the way 
 naturally for the abrupt answer of Clinias. 
 
 D 
 
88 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 . aXXo)g "Xe^eiv rj n aoav dperijv e%ovoav 'ipvx'tjv piav rj n Ae> 
 ovg neptayetv ojvra. 
 
 A0. K aXXtora, ch KA eivta, vmpiovoag rolg Aoyoig • rode 
 de npoovnanovoov ert. 
 
 KA. To uolov ; 
 
 A0. "HA lov /cal oeX'fjvrjvf nal rd dXXa dor pa , elnep 
 ipvXV neptayet navra , dp' ov nal ev eKaorov ; 
 
 KA. T t prjv ; 
 
 A0. Uepl evog 8 drj noirjocbpeOa A oy ovg, ol nal enl navra 
 rjplv dor pa dpporrovreg (pavovvrai. 
 
 KA. T ivog; 
 
 A0. f HAA>v nag avOpunog otipa 9 pev opa, tyvxrp* 
 de ovdeig • ovde yap aXXov odoparog ovdevog ovre %£)V- 
 rog ovre anodvrjofcovrog rcbv £g)G)v • dAAd eXnlg 10 7 roAAf/ 
 ronapanav to yevog rjplv rovro avaioOrjrov ndoaig ralg 
 rov cojparog aloOrjoeoi, nepinetyvnevai, 1 ' vorjrov d’ elvat. 
 
 7. "H 7uov nal cE’krjvrjv. See Note XXXIV., App. 
 
 8. IIep4 hog. Supply d GTpov, which, in Greek, is often used for 
 the sun and planets, as well as the fixed stars. 
 
 9. "H/l lov 7r dg dvOpuTcog cdpa pev opp, &c. Compare the well- 
 known passage Xen., Memorabilia, iv., c. 3, 14. 
 
 10. hlnlg. This word in Greek has a much larger signification 
 than hope in English. It means here, and in many other places, 
 expectation , or, rather, ground of expectation , or belief. So, also, the 
 verb ropai. 
 
 11. dvalodrjrov — TrspiTceQvKEvai. This should be rendered not 
 simply, “ is not by nature an object of perception,” but rather, that 
 “it is so in consequence of being above the nature of the sense,” 
 being of a higher order of essence. Such is the force of nepl. Ast 
 would amend as usual, and read TzepnretyvKhcu votjtov povov. vti 6%, 
 &c., placing a comma after aioOrjGEOL , rejecting elvat , and connect- 
 ing TTEpuz£(j)VKEvaL with votjtov, There is, however, no need of this. 
 UcptnetyvKhai bears more naturally upon dvatGdijTov aiGdrjGEGt,, or, 
 rather, upon aiGdrjGEov understood. y Eivat, which Ast wholly re- 
 jects, is far better adapted to the word votjtov. See Note XXIV., 
 App., on the difference between hpl and the other substantive verbs, 
 such as ylyvopai and (j)vco , when used with philosophical correctness. 
 Such an expression as TrepLTrecpvKevai votjtov would be at war with 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 39 
 
 v<p pcovcp dr] nal diavorjfian 18 hadcoptEV avrov n£pi to 
 tolovSe. 
 
 KA. 170^ ; 
 
 A0. "HA cov elnep ay el 'ipvx'rj, rptcdv avrrjv ev Xeyovreq 
 dpav, cxedov ova dnoTEV^optEOa. 
 
 KA. T lvg)v ; 
 
 A0. '£lg fj evovoa 13 evroq rep nEpupspEL rovrep (paivoptEvep 
 ocoptaTL, navTrj SiafcopiL^EL to tolovtov , naOdnep fjpag rj nap ’ 
 fjplv 'ipvx'fj ndvTT] nepKpepei, * rj noOev e^coOev Gcopa avTT] 
 nopicapevr] nvpog n\ Tivog aepog , cog Xoyog egtl tlvoov , 
 ( 1)6eI fica GcofjiaTL otipia • fj TpLTOV , avr?) 'ipi/if] ocoptaTog ovoa , 
 ExovGa 6e dvvdptEtg aXkag Tivag vnEpba’khovoag davfiaTi , 
 nodrjyEL. 1 * 
 
 KA. Nat' 
 
 A0. Tovro pLEV avdyurp tovtcov ev y£ tl dp&oav 'ipvx.fjv 
 navTa StayEiv . avTov 6fj aptEcvov 15 TavTrpv ttjv ipvxfl v , sIte 
 ev appcaoiv ^ovGa 1 fjpriv tjXlov ayEi (pedg Tolg anaotv, elt ’ 
 
 some of the best-established Platonic distinctions, although it might 
 perhaps be used by the author in a careless manner. Uepi gives 
 this word the sense of superiority, in the same way as in n epleifu 
 and irepiyiyvopcu. The whole may be thus freely rendered : “ We 
 have great reason for believing that this whole genus, being imper- 
 ceptible to all the senses of the body, is above (the nature of) the 
 senses, or is by nature above the senses, and is peculiarly an ob- 
 ject of intelligence ( votjtov dvai). Let us, therefore, apprehend by 
 mind alone,” &c. 
 
 12. diavorjpcLTi. For a most philosophical and acute discrimina- 
 tion between vovg and bidvoia, vorjpa and dLavorjpa, vorjeng and dia - 
 vorjcig , see the Republic, close of the sixth book. They seem to be 
 used here for the sake of amplification, and with little apparent dif- 
 ference of meaning between vorjpa and dtavorjpa. 
 
 13. dig rj kvovaa. See Note XXXV., App. 
 
 14. nodrjyec. As the second was represented as impelling or push- 
 ing, so this purely spiritual un embodied influence is more properly 
 described as guiding , monstrans viam. 
 
 15. avrov dp upstvov. “ The better part of it,” namely, this soul ; 
 if, with Stephanus, we read to apetvov, sed queers. 
 
 1. Iv appamv ex ov(ja ' See Note XXXVI., App. 
 
40 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 egudev, eld ’ onojg* eld ’ on?], deov rjyelodcu XP £ ^ V navra 
 dvSpa . 7 / ; 
 
 KA. N aC, 2 3 4 rov ye nov fir] enl to eo^a-ov acpiypevov 
 dvotag. 
 
 A0. "A orpo)v Se Sr] nipt ndvroyv nal oeXrjvrjg , evtavrCov 
 re nal prjvtiv, nal naocov dpdbv nepi , rlva aXkov Xoyov 
 epovpev f] rov avrov tovtov , dg eneiSr] 'ipvx'd jttev rj 'ipvxal 
 navTGJv tovtgiv alrtat ecjxzvrjoav , dyadal Se ndoo.v dperrjv, 
 'deovg avrag elvac (jjrjoopev ; elre ev o&paoLV evovoat , %cba 
 ovra, noopovoi navra ovpavov , elre onrj re teal oncog ; eld’* 
 
 2. oncog, quomodo ; bnrj , qua parte, i S-eov here is equivalent to 
 delov. See Remarks, page 33, 10. We must not, at all events, in- 
 terpret the term by our own theology, which attaches to Deity and 
 Divinity the highest sense of an uncreated intelligence. In the 
 Greek usage, as we have seen, the word includes all above man, 
 and Plato even applies it to the daipoveg. 
 
 3. KA. N ai, rov ye nov prj. Whatever excellences (and they are 
 certainly of a very high kind) this treatise on laws may possess, it 
 is undoubtedly, as a dialogue, inferior to many of the others in point 
 of dramatic skill. Clinias and Megillus are too much men of straw ; 
 although, perhaps, it was one part of the author’s design to con- 
 trast their simplicity and unreasoning faith with the philosophical 
 acuteness of the chief speaker. They seem, however, to us, to as- 
 sent too readily, and sometimes before we can well suppose from 
 their characters, as here delineated, that they fairly understand 
 some of the propositions presented. While involved in these con- 
 tinuous abstract discussions, with the argument all managed by one 
 person, we would gladly find relief in one of those vigorous logical 
 contests, of which we have so fine a specimen in the Gorgias, as 
 exhibited in the long-protracted struggle of the unprincipled yet bold 
 Callicles against the most powerful reasoning that Socrates could 
 command. In respect to dramatic excellence, the Gorgias, Phsedon, 
 and Protagoras are unrivalled by any similar productions of ancient 
 or modern times. 
 
 4. eld ' bong ravra opoloyeZ. The common reading is eld ’ bong, 
 which seems to have been introduced from the two preceding ex- 
 amples of that word. We have not hesitated to follow Boeck in 
 reading eld\ Ast would substitute ecO 1 bang. “We will say that 
 they are Gods, whether being in bodies, and being animated, they 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 41 
 
 bong ravra dpoXoyel, vnopevsi pi) fte&v elvcll nXrjprj 
 navra ; 
 
 KA. 0 vk, ear tv ovrcog, co give, napacbpovcdv 5 ovdetg. 
 
 A0. Tgj pev TOivvv pr) vopi^ovn dsovg ev rep npooOev 
 %povcp, 6 co MeytXXe re aal KXetvta , einovreg opovg 7 anaX- 
 XarrcopeOa . 
 
 order the whole Heaven, or in whatever way and manner it may be — 
 and then ( eld ’), or, in the second place, can any one who admits these 
 things adhere (to the opinion) that all things are not full of Gods or 
 Divine powers'?” The last clause is a consequence or inference 
 from the first, and therefore well introduced by elra, which is an 
 inferential particle, used when the conclusion is so plain, that sur- 
 prise is expressed that any one should think it could be otherwise. 
 It is on this account generally, as in the present case, brought in 
 abruptly and interrogatively without any connective ; as, for exam- 
 ple, Aristophanes, Acharn., 311 : 
 
 ravra drj roApag Aeyeiv 
 
 epepaveog ijdrj rzpbg rjpdg ; sir’ kyu gov dpEiaopai ; 
 sometimes in the very beginning of the sentence : 
 sir, el diKata, rovrov elttelv avr y kxpyv. 
 
 Acharn., 561. 
 
 It is easy to see how much more force and vividness is given to the 
 passage in this way, than by the tame reading which Ast proposes. 
 It may be thus paraphrased : “ What else can we do, but to say 
 that they are Gods ; and then, if this is admitted, who will have any 
 difficulty with the necessary conclusion (a fortiori ) that they are 
 everywhere!” 'Ynopevec may be well rendered by the vulgar Eng- 
 lish phrase, “will any one stick to it!” that is, obstinately persevere 
 in the denial! This declaration, that “ all things are full of Gods,” 
 was a saying of Thales, and is thus referred to by Aristotle, De 
 Anima, lib. i., 8 : Kal kv rep ofap de nvtg 'ijjvxqv pepixOat tyaoCv, oOev 
 loog Kal Qa’Afjg rtdvra rzAripr] '&ecjv elvai cpridrj. Compare, also, the 
 treatise De Mundo, ascribed by some to Aristotle, and generally 
 published among his works, ch. vi. : KaOoAov de, onsp kv vrjl Kvdep - 
 vr/rrjg, kv dppan de rjvioxog, kv ttoAel de NOMOS, kv orparoTredep d2 
 yyspcjv — rovro i9ebg kv Koapep. 
 
 5. 7r apatypovtiv. “ Beside one’s self,” — deranged. 
 
 6. kv rep rpoedev XP° VCJ ‘ This does not refer to time absolutely, 
 but to the state of the argument. 
 
 7. EiTzovreg opovg. “Imposing terms,” viz., those that follow. 
 
 D 2 
 
42 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 KA. T ivag ; 
 
 A0. V H diddonsLV rjpdg dog ov/c opOCog Xeyopev, Tidepevoi 
 *pvXV v ydveoiv anavTCOv elvat TTpdoTrjv , /cal ToXka orcooa 
 tovtoov igWEnopeva elnopev , rj prj dvvapevov peXnov Xe- 
 yeiv rjpdov, rjp.lv ttelOeoOcu , /cat %xjv deovg rjyovpevov Elg 
 rov ettlXoltcov filov. opdopev ovv elte hcavoog rjdrj rolg ovx 
 bjyovpevocg tieovg slprj/capev dog elol deol, elte emdeCog. 
 
 KA. f/ H /clot a ye , do gsvs, ndvrcov 8 emdeCog. 
 
 A0. Tovroig pev roivvv rjplv to Xoycov* riXog ex^tgo • 
 rov 6e rjyovpEVOv pkv dsovg elveu , prj (jopovrl^Eiv 10 Se av- 
 rovg dvOpcojTLveov irpayparcov , tt apapvOrjreov. 11 T £2 apiore 12 
 drj, (pdopEv , otl pev rjyyj $£ovg, ovyyevEid rig tocog oe deia 
 rrpdg to i; vp<pVTOv ay el Tipav /cal vopt^Etv Eivai • /ca/cdov 6e 
 avOpboTTGOV /cal adi/cGov tvxcll 13 Idea /cal drjpoota , dXrjOeia pev 
 
 8. 7T(1vtg)v, connect with tj'kigtu, ye. A very strong negative. 
 
 9. to Xoyov reTiog exero. Equivalent to oi Xoyoi reTiog exeroaav. 
 Compare to loycov with rd tuv c hanovuv, for oi didnovoi, Soph., Philoct., 
 497 ; and to t&v ‘dr/ptov, for rd ti-T/pia, Plat., Republic, viii., 563, c. 
 
 10. See Note XXXVII., App. 
 
 11. 7r apapvOrjTeov. “We must give him also a word of exhorta- 
 tion.” 
 
 12. T £2 upiGTe — oti pev riyy $ eovg. “That you believe in the ex- 
 istence of Gods,” that is, “ as far as the fact of your belief to that 
 extent is concerned, we may say, that a certain kindred or innate 
 feeling ( Gvyyeveid Tig), imparted by or derived from the Divinity 
 ( &eia ), leads you,” &c. Or, cvyyeveia deia may mean what the phi- 
 losopher elsewhere styles the Divine part jof man, or the Divine in 
 the human — a Divine affinity or kinsmanship — as we style conscience 
 the immediate representative of the Divine nature in the human 
 soul. gvptyvTov should be connected with Tipav and vopi^eiv, “ a 
 natural honouring,” &c., which, however, is supposed to be suffi- 
 ciently rendered by acknowledging their existence, like Epicurus 
 and his followers, who pretended greatly to magnify and honour the 
 Gods, when they assigned them a life of perfect repose, extra mundum, 
 
 Semoti ah rebus nostris longeque sejuncti. 
 
 13. Tvxai. “ The fortunes of wicked and unjust men, both in pub- 
 lic and private life.” Compare the speech of Polus in the Gorgias, 
 471, A. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 43 
 
 ovtt EvdaipovEg, dogcug 1 * de Evdaipovi^d\iEvai ocpodpa dXX 
 ovu EppiEXtig ayovoi oe rtpog aoebsiav , ev te [lovoaig ovic 
 dpdcog vpvovpsvai 15 afia nai ev iravroioig Xoyotg. i) nai 
 7 rpog reXog locvg dvooiovg avOpcjirovg 1 optiv kXQovrag yrj- 
 pacovg, naidag naidcov naraXcnovrag ev ripiaig ralg psyla- 
 Taig , raparry ravvv ev anaoi rovroig id G)v* rj dt 1 anor]g 
 aloOopLEVog , r\ teal navrairaGiv avrog avrdTtrr\g TrpoorvxGov 
 iroXXtiv doE6rjjJidTG)v nai dsiv&v yEVOfxsvcjv not, di avrd 
 
 14 . For the common reading dogai, we read, with almost all the 
 commentators, doijaig, which is not only necessary to the sense, but 
 required as the antithesis of alyOela. v ’EppeXug, “ considerately , or- 
 derly, methodically, with a proportionate regard to all the circum- 
 stances of the case.” 
 
 15 . vpvovpsvai. This was one of the charges made against the 
 poets in the third book of the Republic : ug a pa nai noir/ral nai Xoyo- 
 noLoi nanug Tieyovoi rzepi uvOpdrov rd peyicra, on eiaiv ddinoi pev 
 evdalpoveg de reoXko'i * dlnaioi 61 aOXioi. Repub., 392, A. The same 
 charge is made by the prophet against the Israelites. “And now 
 we call the proud happy, yea, those who do iniquity are exalted .” Mala- 
 chi, iii., 15 . On the words evdalpoveg evdaipovi&pevai, see Note 
 XXXVIII., App. 
 
 1 . 7r pog rehog dvooiovg. See Note XXXIX., App. 
 
 2. rapdrry ravvv ev dnaoi rovroig iddv. The common reading 
 places a comma after rovroig, and connects idiov with what follows. 
 In this state, it has given a good deal of trouble to some of the com- 
 mentators, especially to Ast. The difficulty, however, may be re- 
 moved, as we think, by the reading adopted, although the location 
 of the word would be rather unusual. Tapdrry Idcov is equivalent to 
 rapdrry idelv, “you are troubled at the sight.” Xoronryg npoorv- 
 %cjv, “happening to be an eyewitness.” The whole may be thus 
 freely rendered : “ Or — when beholding men growing old, who con- 
 tinue unholy even to the end of life, leaving children and children’s 
 children in the highest honours, you are troubled at the sight ; or, 
 when hearing by the ear, or happening to be an eyewitness of the 
 impious and dreadful deeds which have occurred in the lives of cer- 
 tain persons, you yet behold them, by reason of these very crimes, 
 advancing from a low condition to the highest power, then it is evi- 
 dent that you blame,” &c. Some editions omit opdg altogether as 
 redundant; but by the disposition we have made of Ldcov, it # is not 
 only admissible, but necessary. 
 
44 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 ravra dpdg etc ofUKp&v slg Tvpavvldag re nal ra psytOTA 
 dcptnopsvovg • tots 6ia navTa toiclvtcl 6rjXog el 3 4 j uipcfrsoOaL 
 usv tieovg, cog ah Zovg ovTag tgjv toiovtcov , did % vyykvstav 
 ovk av* sOsXcov • dyopsvog 6s vi to Tivog akoyiag apa, nal 
 ov dvvapsvog dvoxepaZvetv 5 6 tieovg, slg tovto vvv to nddog 
 sXrjXvdag, coot 9 slvat psv donelv avTOvg , tcov 6s avOpconi- 
 vcov naTacppovslv nal apsXsZv npaypaTCOv. tva ovv prj ent 
 psZ^ov sXO'O ooi iraOog 6 rrpbg aosbsiav to vvv rrapov 66ypa, 
 aXX 9 sav 7 8 Ticog olov dnodionopnrjoaoOaL* Xoyoig avTO npoo- 
 ibv yevcbpeOa dvvaTOt , TreipcbpeOa, ovvd'ipavTeg 9 tov s^rjg 
 
 3. drjhog A peculiar Graecism, equivalent to drjlov eotl oe 
 fie/MpEodcu. It would be good Greek, and perhaps still more Attic, to 
 say dfj’hog el peptybpevog. 
 
 4. did Zvyyiveiav ovk. dv eOeXov. dv is joined to participles as well 
 as to verbs, when the participle can be resolved into a subordinate 
 clause. “When you would not be willing, if you followed that 
 natural feeling.” See Remarks on £ vyyevsia ( 12 ), page 42. 
 
 5. dvoxepaivELv. A most significant term, although not easily 
 transferred to the English. It means, literally, to disrelish , that is 
 (in this connexion), “to get rid of the innate moral sense or taste 
 spoken of above, under the term ^vyyEveiaV Or it may refer to the 
 wholesome prejudices mentioned in note on 8 , 3. 
 
 6 . 'izdQog. Some would reject this word as having crept in as a 
 repetition of the nddog above. It may, however, be taken as in ap- 
 position with to vvv napov doy/ua. 
 
 7. dlK kdv. This place may be freed from its difficulties if we 
 read olov te , regard y understood as subjunctive to kav, and refer 
 ysvdpeda to Iva, instead of kdv , as is generally done. Ordo, Iva ovv 
 py kldy . . . akXJ ( kav nog olov r’ y) Iva yevdpeQa dvvarol dnodcono/inr]- 
 oaodai . . . 7 r eipdpEOa, &c “ That it may not increase, but that (if 
 possible) we may be able, &c. . . let us try.” 
 
 8 . dTvodtoTro/iTTjGadai. On the peculiar force and significance of 
 this remarkable word, see Note XL., App. 
 
 9. owd^avreg. “ Having connected our next argument with that 
 which we so thoroughly (did) concluded (diETrEpavdpeda) against the 
 man, who did not hold that there were Gods.” c 5 is to be referred 
 to die7rEpavd/j.£da, although in the dative by the attraction of ovv in 
 ovvdtyfLVTEg. Connect 7 TELpdpsOa with Tpoaxpr/oaodai. “ Let us en- 
 deavour to use as an additional argument.” 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 45 
 
 \dyov, Gi irpog rov ronapanav ovx rjyovpevov tieovg e% dp - 
 \r]g diSTTEpavdpeda, rovrcp ravvv npoaxp^ciodai. av d’, w 
 K Xelvlcl re teal MeycXXe, vnep rov veov naOdirep ev rolg 
 epirpoadev dnoftpevopevot, ScaSex^aOe * av Se n SvanoXov 
 ep,' 7 TiiTT'Q rolg Xoyoig, eyd) acpcpv ejanep vvv Srj Set-dpevog 
 Siadcdd) rov norap^ov. 10 
 
 KA. ’OpOtig Xey eig • nal av ovro) ravra Spa * notrjaopev 
 re rjpelg elg to Svvarov d Xeyeig. 
 
 MEr. ’A/l/l’ ovSev ratf av lacog * 11 elr\ x^^tcov evdell-aa- 
 Oai rovro ye , (bg erupeXelg apinptiv elal deot ovx V TT0V V 
 tgjv peyedei Sia<pep6vrG)v. tjicovov yap ttov real Tcaprjv rolg 
 
 10. 6ia6i6C) rov norapov. There is yet an allusion to the strong 
 flood mentioned, 21 (14) : KaOdnep el tt orapov r/pdg tdec rpelg ovrag 
 dcadaLveiv. In that place it was figurative of the dark and profound 
 argument respecting self-motion ( avTOKivr/Gig ), the depths of which 
 had to be so carefully sounded by the Athenian before the others 
 could venture to follow’ him. Here there is an allusion to a like 
 difficult argument soon to follow, respecting a special Providence. 
 A lafhSti is Attic future for diadidaGu. 
 
 11. akV ovdev ratf uv Iggh;. The common reading gives this to 
 the Athenian. The words r/novov and napr/v below, show beyond 
 doubt, that it belongs to Megillus. There are, it is true, several 
 various readings, but they have all evidently arisen from a desire to 
 accommodate some ancient error, which gave this passage to the 
 Athenian, rolg vvv dr/ keyopevoig, “just now spoken,” referring to 
 the argument by which it was shown that it was the best soul (ijjvxv 
 dpcGTr/) which moved and guided the heavens and the earth. What 
 is said reminds us of the speech of Clinias, 4 (3). Here, as well 
 as in that place, surprise is expressed that it should be thought ne- 
 cessary to resort to laboured and recondite arguments to prove so 
 plain a thing as the doctrine of a special Providence. “ Do this,” 
 Clinias says, “ and we, as far as is possible, will do what you tell 
 us.” And then Megillus, the simple-minded Spartan, breaks in, 
 “ But it could not be any very difficult affair to show,” &c. From 
 the position just proved, namely, that it was the best soul that 
 moved, &c., they, in their simplicity, directly infer, or, as we might 
 say, leap at once to the truth of a special Providence, although the 
 Athenian or Socrates, having in view more stubborn disputants, 
 wishes to enter more minutely into the argument. 
 
46 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 vvv drj Xeyopevotg, (bg dyadot ye ovreg rcdaav aper^v i rjv 
 tC)V navrcov empeXetav olKetorarrjv avrcbv ovoav nett- 
 rrjvrat. 
 
 KA. Kcu ocpodpa ye 12 ei rrjuovov. 
 
 A0. To per a tovto tolvvv notv^j ovve^erd^G)pev, 13 rtva 
 Xeyovreg aperijv avrtbv, opoXoyovpev avrovg ayaOovg el- 
 vat. (f)epe , to aocppovelv , vovv re nertTijoOai, fyapev dperrjg, 
 ra 6’ evavrta , tcantag ; 
 
 KA. Qapev. 
 
 A0. T t de ; dperr]g pev avdpetav elvat y detXtav de, natdac ; 
 
 KA. II aw pev ovv. 
 
 A0. K at ra pev , aloxpd , rovrcdv , ra de, naXd Qrjoopev 
 
 KA. 9 A vdytcrj. 
 
 A0. Ka£ tgjv pev TTpoorjrcetv rjplv, ehrep , 14r onooa cj)Xavpa 
 fieolg de ovre peya ovre opinpov rdjv rotovrcdv perov epov - 
 pev . 
 
 12 . nal a (podpa ye. Ast thinks that this also is the language of 
 Megillus : Megilli sunt verba, egregie in Spartanum convenientia. We 
 cannot see why they do not agree as well with the character of 
 Clinias. Besides, had it been the same speaker, we can hardly be- 
 lieve that he would have used h ttjkovov so soon after tjkovov. The 
 word kolv\ 7 , in the following answer of the Athenian, seems to im- 
 ply that both the others had uttered their assent to what had been 
 said. Te, when connected with such words as atyoSpa, pdTucrra, 
 axcbov, &c., seems not so much to qualify the sense as the force or 
 vehemence of the expression ; by which we mean, that it makes a 
 sort of apology for the term, implying that a stronger one might per- 
 haps have been used, but that the speaker means to keep within 
 bounds. Thus, Clinias says : c(j>66pa ye, “ earnestly to say no more, 
 or to use no stronger expression, did I give heed to it.” In this 
 w*ay, although a limiting particle, it does, in an indirect manner, in- 
 crease the force of the term to which it is attached. 
 
 13. ovvef-eT&gupev. The common reading here is cwe^era^ovrov, 
 which neither suits the vulgar text preceding it, nor any of the vari- 
 ous readings proposed. The change is made on the authority of the 
 best commentators, and the Latin versification of Ficinus — commu • 
 niter inves tig emus. 
 
 14. Kai tcov pev irpootiKeiv rjplv. Twv and ijplv are neither of them 
 
CONTRA ATIIEOS. 
 
 47 
 
 KA. Ka£ ravQ ’ ovrcog bfioXoyoi nag av. 
 
 A0. T C 6s, apsXeiav re /cal apyiav /cal rpv(f)7]v elg ape - 
 rrjv 'ipvxrjg ^rjc/opev ; rj nojg ’ksyeig ; 
 
 KA. K at ntig ; 15 
 
 A0. ’A/l/l’ Tovvavriov. 
 
 KA. Nat. 
 
 governed by n pocrjueiv, but by psrbv below, which may have a dative 
 of the person and a genitive of the thing. Ast regards tCjv as gov- 
 erned by npoarjKeiv , but he is clearly wrong, psrbv is used for ps- 
 TEivai ; and thus taken for the infinitive, there is no anomaly in the 
 neuter plural ottogu. In this use of the participle for the infinitive, 
 the Greek resembles the English more than the Latin. Compare 
 the Philebus, 22, E. : ovd’ av rfiv devrepecuv j/dovrj lletov aTir/Q&g av 
 tcote T^eyoLTo. There should be a comma after eItzep, which is not 
 to be connected with orbaa dfkavpa, but is to be taken elliptically, or 
 with the ellipsis supplied, thus : shrEp ( nvlg eIglv olg petegtl). orbaa 
 (p?iavpa is to be referred to t&v pbv. The order of the whole, with 
 the ellipsis supplied, would be as follows : Kal rjplv.plv kpovpEv tt poGrj- 
 kelv pETElvai tuv bizbaa (J>?iavpa — Ecnsp (rivsg eIgIv olg petegtl). “ And 
 we will say, that to us (if to any beings) it pertains to have a share 
 in those things that are bad, but to the Gods there is not the least 
 participation,” &c. For this use of sinsp, compare Aristotle’s Politi 
 ca, ii., 6 : xpr/Gipov bs ovcr/g ^pacvTi/Tog Trpbgovbsv rtiv eyKVKTiicjv, aKX 
 EiTcsp — npog tov no^Epov. Aristot., Ethic. Nicomach., v., 9, 9 : ov 
 blv yap tt apd tt/v avTov n ugxco ^ov^tjglv, cjgte ovk aduiElrat, bid y 
 tovto, a?i/ 1’ ELTcsp — fi'X.d'KTETai povov. Aristophanes, Nubes, 227 : 
 ETZEif dro Tafijbov Tovg fisovg VTTEpcppovEtg, 
 aTCK ovk dno Tijg yfjg ; Elrsp. 
 
 15. KA. Kat nug ; “And how should we I” A0. ’A XX slg tov- 
 vavTiov. ’A/Md, like yap , frequently refers to something understood, 
 supposed to pass rapidly through the mind of the speaker. It also 
 always implies a negative, if not expressed. This use of these lit- 
 tle particles gives singular beauty as well as force to the Greek 
 language. They thus carry along with them variety and fulness of 
 meaning, at the same time without encumbering or weakening the 
 sentence with too many words. By silent implication they keep 
 us from losing sight of previous propositions. Thus, bXkd here 
 carries along with it, or keeps in mind, the whole of the precedi-ng 
 sentence, being pregnant with a denial of the question. “ No, we 
 cannot assign dpe^Eiav apyiav , &c., to the virtue of soul, but (aTM) 
 to the contrary.” 
 
48 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 A0. T avavrta apa tovtolc; 1 eig rovvavrlov . 
 
 KA. T ovvavTiov. 
 
 A0. T i ovv 6rj ; Tpv(ptiv 2 teal apehrjg dpyog te ( ov 6 ixoi^ 
 7]T7]g KT](j)rjGL KoOoVpOLGL paXiOTCL ELUeXoV E(paOKEV Aval) 
 yiyvoir ’ dv 6 rotovrog rcaoiv rjplv. 
 
 1. Tavavna apa tovtolc, that is, “ the opposites of Tpv<prj apyia , Ac. 
 must be assigned elg tovvclvtlov ; that is, etc dpETyv ipvxvc- 
 
 2 . TpvQtiv teal apelrjc apyoc te . . . naoiv fjp.Lv. Ast, as usual, is for 
 emendation here, and thinks this could be made better by inserting 
 after ylyvoif dv the word tyOpoc or plgtjtoc, for which he deduces an 
 argument, not very intelligible, from pLael below. It may, however, 
 be read as it stands, and regarded as an application, to human af- 
 fairs, of the previous sentiment, by supposing &eoc understood after 
 tolovtoc , and by taking away the interrogation which is found in 
 most editions. The order would be thus : tolovtoc (&eoc) nacnv fjplv 
 yiyvoLT ’ dv Tpvtytiv nal dpeTiijc apyoc te , ov 6 tcoltjttjc E(f>aGKEV elkeTlov 
 elvaL , Ac. “ Such a Deity would be to us all Tpvtytiv, dpEhrjc, Ac. ; 
 in short, one whom (ov), or just such a one as the poet said was 
 like,” Ac. The only real difficulty in the passage is in ov, which, 
 as it stands, is somewhat harsh. The relative we should expect 
 would be olov, corresponding to tolovtoc. From its position, how- 
 ever, in the order of the words before its correlative, it may be re- 
 garded as affected, through a species of attraction, .by the words im- 
 mediately preceding. Had it followed tolovtoc, it would probably 
 have been olov, in which case the sentence would have presented 
 no difficulty. The form of words in Greek is frequently affected by 
 distance or contiguity, so as to be different from what would be re- 
 quired by strict grammatical depend ance. See remarks on the w ? ord 
 7 toXXogttjv, Note XXIX., App. The view taken in respect to dv is 
 confirmed by similar examples which occur a few lines below : ov 
 pTjTsov tyeLv rjdoc tolovtov 6 ys, instead of tolovtov olov ys. So, also, 
 page 49 ( 5 ), in the words d 6rj ttoogtjkel , Ac. The poet here refer 
 red to is Hesiod : 
 
 76 J Se &EOL VEpEGCOGL KCU CLVEpEC, OC KEV CLEpyOC 
 gdy, K7](j)fjVEGGL Kodovpoic elkeIoc bpyrjv. 
 
 Works and Days, 278 . 
 
 It may be that we have dv, instead of olov, to accommodate it to 
 the language of the verse quoted ; a circumstance which often in- 
 terferes with the strict grammatical dependence of a sentence 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 49 
 
 KA. ’0 pOorard ye elntiv. 3 
 
 A0. 0 vkovv tov. ye tieov* ov prjreov e%etv rjOog tolovtov 
 o ye roi avTog pLoel • rep re n tolovtov (pOeyyeoOat, neipG)- 
 pevcp ovfi emTpenTeov. 
 
 KA. Ov pev 6rj. ntig yap av ; 
 
 A0. T £h 6rj npoorjneL 5 pev rcpaTTecv nai empefelodaL dca- 
 (pepovTCjg Ttvog , 6 6e tovtov ye vovg tgjv pev peyaXuv em- 
 peXelTaL, t&v opwptiv 6e apeXel , tcaTa Tiva eixaivovvTeg 
 tov tolovtov Xoyov , ovfc av navTanaoL nXrjppeXolpev ; Guo- 
 'S. bpOoTard ye elrrdv. Ast would subjoin these words to e(paonev, 
 and make them a part of what was said by the Athenian. They un- 
 doubtedly refer to e^aanev, yet it is perfectly agreeable to the Greek 
 idiom to regard them as the answer of Clinias. There is a great 
 deal of vivacity in such an elliptical reply. It is equivalent to tyaa- 
 tcev, opdorard ye elndv. Our own language admits of it ; as, e. g ., 
 when it is asserted that one said so and so, the reply may be, and 
 most correctly too. 
 
 4. ovkovv tov ye fieon. A most important truth. God hates that , 
 and that only , which is unlike himself. The Divine character is the 
 ground and sanction of the Divine Law. It must never be called in 
 question : r<p TreLpopivtp tolovtov QdiyyeoOat ova entTpenTeov. “ No 
 allowance is to be made to him whd would even attempt to utter 
 such a thought.” 
 
 5. T £2 l 6rj irpoorjueL. T2 l is the relative of tolovtov some distance be- 
 
 low. If it had immediately followed it in the construction of the sen- 
 tence, it would perhaps have been more properly oil j drj. The same 
 reasons apply here that were given in respect to ov a few lines 
 above. The order of the sentence would be as follows : koto, tlvu 
 ’koyov ova dv nhyppehoTpev enaLvovvTeg tov tolovtov <p (olcp) <5y Tzpoor}- 
 Kei, &c. “ By what reason (or why) should we not act absurdly in 
 
 praising such a being as the one to whom it belongs to act and to 
 exercise care in a special manner, and yet the mind of this being 
 should care only for the great, while it neglects the small.” When 6e 
 occurs a number of times in a sentence, there is a difficulty in putting 
 it into anything like tolerable English, without too much circumlo- 
 cution. The first 6e indicates an opposition between the two main 
 members of the sentence ; the second, between two subordinate 
 clauses. In such cases the subordinate 6e is best rendered by our 
 word while , in order to avoid the awkward repetition of the conj mic- 
 tion but. 
 
 E 
 
50 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 ntipev de ojde • dp ’ ov Kara dvo eldrj to tolovtov nparrsL 9 
 6 7Tpdrro)v sere ffedg, sir 5 av6po)nog ; 
 
 KA. II olg) df] ; 
 
 A0. A eyopev • fj dtaepepov ovdev olopevog elvat rw oXcp 
 apeXovpevuv rtiv opuipCdv, rj padvpta teal Tpvcpfj, el dta- 
 (j)epec, d de aueXel . 6 7 fj eonv dXXcog rratg ytyvopevr] dpeXeta ; 
 ov yap 770V orav ye advvarov y tg)v drrdvTCxtv empeXelo - 
 $ai, rore dpeXeta eorac rcov opcupCdv fj peydXcdv prj h npe- 
 Xovpevcp, 8 d)v dv dvvapec ffeog fj (pavXog rig &v eXXcTrfjg nal 
 pfj dvvarog empeXeloOai yiyvrjrac. 
 
 6. to tolovtov TtpuTTEL , namely, neglects small things. 
 
 7. o de dpeXEt. Stephanus here would read ode. Else, he says, 
 de must be regarded as redundant, or otherwise the sentence would 
 remain suspended. According to this view of Stephanus, the fol- 
 lowing would be the order : ode ape^el, fj dca^epov ovdev olopevog 
 elvcu to 62, o, &c., fj ftadvpia teal Tpv(jty el diatyepeL. “ He neglects, 
 either thinking that it makes no difference, &c., or through sloth and 
 effeminacy, if it does make a difference.” We think, however, there 
 is no need of this supposition, or of regarding the de as redundant. 
 There is a pev implied (if it is not rather lost by a corrupt reading) 
 after or before dta^epeL. In that case, de has its usual force of oppo- 
 sition or contrast, and should be rendered while, as above. The al- 
 ternative intended, and also the antithesis made by the de in the sub- 
 ordinate member — el ( pev ) diatyepei, 6 de dpe2el — would be clearly ex- 
 pressed thus : “ We say, then (o n paTTov npaTTec), the doer doeth 
 thus, either supposing that it makes no difference to the whole, 
 when small things are neglected, or else (he doeth thus) through 
 indolence and effeminacy, if, in fact, it does make a difference, while 
 yet he neglects them.” 
 
 8. prj empe2,ovpdv(p d)v dv. This is appended by way of explana- 
 tion or epexegesis of the preceding oTav ye dbvvaTov, &c. The order 
 would be thus : ov yap n ov oTav ye advvaTOv, &c., tote dpe2,eia egtol 
 tov epuepdv ij peyakov (to) prj E'KLpe2.ovpEvo (tovtov) ov dv dvvapei 
 dedg fj (ftavkog Ttg dv ycyvrjTaL ekkiitfig teal prj dvvaTog kmpEXEZoOai, 
 which may be freely rendered thus : “ When it is impossible to take 
 care of all things, then no one, whether it be a God or any inferior 
 being, can be justly charged with neglect of those things, be they 
 great or small, in respect to which, he is wanting in the requisite 
 power for a special Providence.” Or, in other words, there can be 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 51 
 
 KA. IT tig yap av ; 
 
 A0. Nw 6rj 6v’ ovrsg 9 rptolv rjplv ovoiv anoKpcvdodoj - 
 oav oi -dsovg psv apcporspot 10 opoXoyovvrsg slvai * rrapairr]- 
 rovg * 11 6s drspog, 6 6s , apsXslv rtiv opiKptiv. i rptirov psv, 
 tisovg dpcporspot (pars yiyvtioKstv Kai opav Kal anovsiv 
 iravra , XaOslv 6s avrovg ov6sv 6vvarov slvai rtiv onoocjv 12 
 elalv ai aioOrjosig re Kal sTUorr\pai, ravrq Xsysrs sx^iv 
 ravra ; rj ntig ; 
 
 KA. Ovrcog. 
 
 A0. T t 6ac ; 13 6vvao0ai iravra ottogcov av 6vvapig son 
 ^v^rolg rs teal adavdroig ; 
 
 KA. Ilwf yap ov Gvyx^p^ovrai nal ravra ovrcog sxsiv ; 
 
 A0. Keu pijv dyaOovg rs Kal dplorovg 14: tipohoyrjKapsv 
 avrovg slvat nsvre ovrsg. 
 
 KA. 2(f)66pa ys. 
 
 A0. T Ap’ ovv ov paOvp'ia psv Kal rpvcpq a6vvarov av - 
 
 no neglect where there is no power. In such a case, prj empeTieia- 
 Oai is not the same with apehelv. See Note XLVI., App., On the 
 Peculiarities of certain Negative Forms of Verbs, deoc; f) tyavTiog rig dv 
 is equivalent to rig elrs fi-edg sirs (j>av?iog dv. So, also, opiKpdv fj pe- 
 yaTiav may be viewed as equivalent to dre apiKptiv dre psyahov, 
 “whether small or great.” Or, it may be regarded as understood, 
 as in the Republic, vi., 486, B. : ov pyv ovds rode TTapaTisiibEig. to 
 ttolov ; Evpo.0r)g fj dvopaOrjg. “ Surely you will not omit this (circum- 
 stance). What circumstance! Whether docile or dull.” 
 
 9. dv’ ovtec. The two supposed objectors. 
 
 10. oi dsovg psv uptyorspoc. “ Who admit, both of them, that the 
 Gods exist, while the one says that they are easily propitiated, and 
 the other, that they are regardless of small things.” 
 
 11. TTapaiTijTovg. See Note XLI., App. 
 
 12. Tdv onooov eiaiv ai aiaOrjceu ; rs Kai ETnoTrjpaL. “ All such 
 things as are capable of being perceived by the sense and by the un- 
 derstanding.” 
 
 13. tl dal\ A ai has the same analogy to 6rj that vai has to vrj. It 
 differs from 6r] only in a prolongation and sharpening of the voice to 
 express surprise or wonder, which is its usual office. “ But real* 
 ly!” 
 
 14. dyaOovg te Kai dptarovg. See Note XLII., App. 
 
52 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 rovg opoXoyeiv Tcparrecv otlovv ronapanav, bvrag ye otovg 
 opoX&yovpev ; decXcag yap 15 e/cyovog ev ye 7]plv dpyca • pa- 
 Ov/iia de , apycag /cat rpvcprjg. 
 
 KA. ’ A^rjOearara Xeyetg. 
 
 A0. ’A py 'ta pev drj /cat paOvpca ovdetg dpeXel fietiv. ov 
 yap pereonv avrcp rcov detXiag. 
 
 KA. ’O pOorara Xeyetg. 
 
 A0. Ovkovv to Xotnov, * 1 elrcep apeXovct t&v optrcptiv 
 /cat oXtycov rtiv nept to nav , rj ytyvdxj/covTeg d)g Toirapa - 
 nav ovdevog tg)V tocovtgjv empeXetodat del, dpcpev dv rov- 
 to * rj Tt to Xotnov nXfjv to ytyvcbo/cetv TOvvavTtov ; 
 
 KA. Ovdev. 
 
 A0. TLorepov ovv , d) aptOTe /cat (3eXTtOTe , 'dtipev ce Ae- 
 yorra, 2 ayvoovvTag re, fmt deov empeXetodat, dt’ ay- 
 voiav apeXovvTag , 7/ ytyvdo/covTag otl del, icaOanep oi (pav- 
 XoTaTOi tg)v avOpuncov XeyovTat notetv , etdores* aAAa £?- 
 vai /3eXTLG) npaTTetv 3 gjv drj npaTTOvai dm rjTTag 
 
 rjdovtiv ij Xvi rcov, ov notetv ; 
 
 15. 6 tag yap. Connect this with what is said page 46, 10 : 
 aperfjg pev avdpeiav elvai, deikiav be, Katdag. See Note XLIII., App. 
 
 1. to Xoitcov. “ For the rest of our argument.” tuv Tcepl to nav. 
 “ Which have a relation to the whole.” 
 
 2. dtipev ce leyovTa. “ Shall we put you down as saying that 
 the Gods are ignorant, and that even when they ought to exercise 
 a care, they through ignorance neglect it ; or, that knowing that 
 they ought, yet still, as the meanest of men are said to do, who know 
 better, &c. ; so they (the Gods), through the overpowering influence 
 of pleasures and griefs, do not do what they ought 1” A eov etz ipe- 
 Tieiadai. A mode of expression very common with the nominative 
 neuter participle of del and of the compounds of the substantive verbs. 
 It is nearly equivalent to the genitive absolute, being, however, 
 more closely connected with the reasoning of the sentence in which 
 it stands, instead of denoting, like the latter, a mere accessory cir- 
 cumstance of time or place. “ It being necessary,” or “ when they 
 ought,” &c. 
 
 3. peTiTiu 7rpa,TT£Lv. Stephanus, -on the authority of Eusebius, 
 would here read \3e7iTLov npaTTecv, melius esse alia facere. /3e7iTiG) 
 npaTTEiv , however, is more strictly in accordance with the purest 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 53 
 
 KA. Utig yap av ; 
 
 A0. Ov/covv 6rj rays dvOpcbmva rr pay par a* rrjg re kp- 
 ipvxov perexEL (pvo£G)g apa , teal 'dEOGedecrarov 5 avro eotl 
 navjcjv %G)G)v dvOpomog. 
 
 KA. f, E owe yovv. 
 
 A0. Qegjv ys pr\v nr^para 6 (frapEV uvai iravra onooa 
 $vr]Ta £oja, uvnEp /cat rov ovpavov oXov 7 
 
 KA. II tig yap ov ; 
 
 A0. "H 6rj Totvvv oputpa fj pEyaXa rig tyarG) ravra elvai 
 rolg dEolg. ovdETEpug 8 yap rolg HE/crripEVotg rjpag dpsXElv 
 av EL 7 ] TTpoorpiov , empEXEGTaroig ye ovoi /cal dpiarotg. o/co- 
 7 rtipEV yap dfj /cat to6e eti rrpog rovroig. 
 
 KA. To 7 rolov ; 
 
 A0. To 7 TEpt te aloOrjGEGjg nal dvvapEug, dp ’ ovtc kvav- 
 tlCi )g 9 dXXrjXoLV irpog paordbvrjv /cal %aAe7rdT?yTa egtov 7re- 
 
 ( pV/COTE ; 
 
 Greek idiom. Compare the examples, ^a/leTrd or x^sir urepa opav ; 
 also such phrases as padta paOelv , uaha ideiv, Aoyof dwarog KCiravorj- 
 cat , T/diorr/ niveiv , at-ia ftavpaocu, and others, which are generally ex- 
 pressed in Latin by the supine, difficile visu, mirabile dictu, &c. In 
 such cases, of an infinitive dependent on an adjective, the Greek 
 usage of the active, instead of the passive, corresponds to the Eng- 
 lish idiom. As we say, hard to learn , cruel to behold, better to do, in- 
 stead of better to be done, although some might regard this last ex- 
 ample as hardly admissible. 
 
 4, 5. dv6pd)mva Tzpaypara deoGeSeoTarov. See Note XLIV., 
 
 App. 
 
 6. fietiv KTr/para. See Note XLV., App. 
 
 7. ovpavov olov. This is here evidently put for the whole ani- 
 mated universe, like Paul’s naoa tj ktlgiq, Rom., viii., 22, “ the whole 
 creation, the whole creature world." GpuKpa 7 } peyaXa, “be they great 
 or small.” See page 50, (8.) 
 
 8. ovderepug. “ In neither respect,” that is, whether you take the 
 ground that we are small or great. empeleardTotg ye ovgi. The 
 participle, in such connexions as this, often has the force of a con- 
 ditional clause, “ if they are most provident," &c. 
 
 9. dp’ ova evavTiog. “ Have they not (that is, have not sense and 
 power) reciprocally an opposite nature in respect to ease and diffi- 
 
 E 2 
 
54 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 KA. XIoj^* Xeyeig ; 
 
 A0. 'Opav pev nov Kal aKoveiv ra opiKpd 10 ftaXeirurepov 
 fj ra peyaXa • <pepeiv 6 ’ av Kal Kparelv Kal emfieXelodaL 
 rcbv opuipCdv Kal oXiyov rravrl paov f) rdbv evavricov. 
 
 KA. Kal noXv ye. 
 
 A0. ’I arpti. dr) it poorer ay [levov * 11 oXov tl 'depaneveiv , 
 
 eulty 1 ” to Trepl alodrjoEog is equivalent to to tt}q alaOjjoecjc, or rj 
 o,lo6rjGig ; and both taken together constitute a nominative for the 
 dual verb egtov . 
 
 10. ra Gfiinpa. We may say in Greek, x a ^ £ ^ torepov egtl ra opLKpu 
 opav , or ra, apiKpa ken x^EnuTEpa opav. See Remarks, page 52, 
 (3), on the words (3e?itig) np&TTEiv. 
 
 11. ’larpti 6 tj npoGTEraypEvov . Ast would place a comma after drj, 
 
 and render according to the following order : larpc 5 6rj fiovlopEvu Kal 
 dvvapEvcp dEpaTTEVEiv tl TTpoGTETayphov , &c. “ To a physician who is 
 
 willing and able to heal something committed to his care,” &c. In 
 this view avT& below is made redundant. This interposition of the 
 pronoun, it is true, is not unusual in a long and complicated Greek 
 sentence ; yet still it seems to us in this place more natural and easy 
 to regard TcpoGTETaypivov as the nominative (some would call it the 
 accusative) neuter impersonal absolute, like diov, page 52 (2). It is 
 true, this usage generally takes place with the neuter participle of 
 Sel, or of the impersonal compounds of the substantive verb, such as 
 e£ov, TrpoGov , napov , and the kindred vnapxov , yet we not unfrequent- 
 ly find it extended beyond these limits. The same usage occasion- 
 ally prevails in respect to 7r apaaxov, tvxov , dotjav, sometimes with 
 6 okovv, TzpoGrjKov , and now and then with passive participles gener- 
 ally ; as, Thucyd., i , 125, dsdoy^Evov ds avTolg , “ when it was de- 
 termined by them.” So, also, with slpppivov and ov joined with ad- 
 jectives; as, aiGxpov ov , “it being base,” or, quum turpe sit — ubrjTiov 
 ov, dvvaTov ov, &c. See Kuhner, 312. If the rule may in this case 
 admit of being extended to npoGTETaypivov, which is somewhat akin 
 to do^av dEboypEvov and Elpppivov, the sentence may be thus render- 
 ed, and according to the following order and punctuation : Tarp<5 6rj 
 3ov?io[iEV(p Kal dwapivip 'xpoGTETayp.Evov, oXov tl tiEpaTTEVEiv, e^el tcote 
 K aXtig to nuv avTti T(bt plv [lEyaXav ETTLjiE^ovpEvip, tCjv popiuv dfi Kal 
 GfUKptiv apElovvTL ; “When, to a physician who is both willing and 
 competent, it is appointed to heal any whole, will his work, as a 
 whole, be in a condition creditable to him, attending, or if he attends 
 only to the great portions while he neglects the small?” Take 
 
CONTRA ATIIEOS. 
 
 (SovXofXSVG) KGL fiwapLEVG), TG)V [LEV p£ydX(i)V ETUfieXoVUEVCt), 
 TG)V pL 0 pLG)V 6 e Kdt GflLKpdjv G\lEXoVVTi , 12 £%eI 7T0TE fCaXojg 
 dVTU) TO 7TGV ; 
 
 KA. 0 vda/itig. 
 
 A0. Ov p,r\v ovde nvdepvrjrdig , ovde OTpdrrjyolg , ovtf ol- 
 tcovofiotg , ov c5’ av tlgI noXLTUiolg, ovd’ g) iXcp twv tolovtgjv 
 ovdevc, T ^ v oXlyoiv nai opu/cptiv, itoXXg rj peydXa. 
 
 ovde ydp dvev oputip&v 1 * rovg pteyaXovg (f>aotv oi XiOoXoyoi 
 XiOovg ev kelgOgl. 
 
 KA. Hug yap dv ; 
 
 A0. M?) roLvvv tov ye fteov ai;id)OG)p,£v 14: nore 'Svtjtgjv 
 dripLLOvpy&v (pavXorepov, oi tg npoorjtcovTa avrolg epya, 
 docpnep dv dpeivovg gjgl, roocp dupideGTepa tc ai TeXeojTEpa 
 pud TEXvrj Gpjh'pa nai p,eydXa dnepya^ovrat • tov 6e 'deov 
 ovTa 15 te GocpdjraTOV, ftovXopievov t* empLeXelodaL teal dvva- 
 
 bmpe^ovpevcp as a conditional clause, like empeTieGTaTOig ye ovoi , on 
 which we remarked a short distance back. In this way deparzeveiv 
 is governed by npooTeTaypevov. and avrip comes in easily in the 
 order of the sense. 
 
 12. h Ttpekovpevid . . . upehovvTi. See Note XLVI., App. 
 
 13. dvev (j/u/eptiv. See Note XLVII., App. 
 
 14. 7 A ZiuGcopev. Some would here prefer the reading uZi&pev on 
 account of the particle pfi], which, it is contended, cannot be joined 
 with the 1st aorist subjunctive active. To this rule of the gramma- 
 rians there are, however, so many cases in direct opposition, that it 
 may well be doubted whether the common reading should be chan- 
 ged on account of it. See many of these cases, Matthiae, Gr. Gram., 
 728, and the emendations by which he proposes to make them con- 
 form to this rule. 
 
 15. tov 6e deov ovtcl. This is to be connected with drjpuovpyCiv 
 
 (pavlorepov above. Had it immediately followed, it would have re- 
 quired only the connective re in prjre, and would probably have read 
 thus : prjre to'lvw tov ye d-eov d^ioiGupev tzote -d-VTjTCjv 6r)fuovpyC)v 
 <f>av?ioTepov elvat, prjTe -deov ovtcl (a ^LGiGopev), &c. “ Let us not deign 
 
 to think that the Deity, of all others, is inferior to mortal workmen, 
 nor that, being a God most wise, with the will and the power, &c\, he 
 should take no charge of those small things, the care of which is sc 
 
56 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 .jiEvov, gjv pev paov rjv empsXrjdrjvat opiKptiv ovrcSv , prjda- 
 arj empeXelcdat, aaOdnep apybv rj detXov riva did irovovi * 
 padvpovvra , tg)V 6e peyaXw 1 — 
 
 KA. Mrjdapcog dogav rotavrrjv irepi detiv, G) %eve, ano * 
 dexrifieOa • ovdaprj yap ovre ooiov ovr 9 aXrjOeg dtavorjpa 
 dtavooiped ’ av. 
 
 A0. A onovpev 6e pot vvv 7]6rj paXtora perp'uog 2 dieiXex- 
 6 at rep (j)iXatTt(p rfjg dpeXetag nept tietiv. 
 
 easy,” &c. The 6s in this case is occasioned by the parenthetical 
 or explanatory clause, ol tu npocyKovTa, &c. There is an opposition, 
 or, rather, contrast between this clause and what follows, and this 
 contrast is denoted by de, which, in consequence of its position and 
 relation to a subordinate part, appears harsh and difficult to be 
 rendered. It is a rule in English composition, that there should be 
 no grammatical dependence between a parenthesis and the other 
 members of a period ; or that it should be so introduced, that it may 
 be taken out without altering the grammatical relation of the other 
 parts. The propriety of such a rule may be doubted. At all events, 
 the Greek writers allowed themselves much more freedom in the 
 construction of their periods ; and hence the frequent occurrence of 
 what grammarians style anakoloutha , and suspended sentences. Per- 
 haps, on the whole, it would be better thus to regard the passage be- 
 fore us as suspended, for the sake of the stronger impression. After 
 speaking parenthetically of the exact care exercised by human artists, 
 the writer breaks out in the following unfinished contrast: “But 
 that God, being most wise, possessed of power and will, &c-., should 
 neglect small things like some idle and cowardly being, while he 
 concerns himself about the great” — The impatient and characteris- 
 tic interruption of Clinias then comes in with admirable effect — No, 
 we can hold no such opiniem ; we can entertain no such false and unholy 
 sentiment. In this way far more power is given to the sentence than 
 could be imparted by the most perfect regularity. 
 
 1. Ttbv <5£ ysfalov. “While he does concern himself about the 
 greater.” See the remarks on the best mode of rendering^ in cer- 
 tain cases, page 49, 5 and 50, 7. 
 
 2. psrplog. “ Properly, both in manner and degree.” r<5 (j>i?icuTup 
 rye apsldag irepL ftstiv. “ The one who loves to impute neglect to 
 the Gods — who querulously arraigns the Divine Providence.” Ordo 
 — < i>ihaLTL(p ds&v nspl ryg aps^slag. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 57 
 
 KA. N at. 
 
 A0. Tg5 ye pid&oOai 3 rolg Xbyoig opoXoyelv avrov pi) 
 Xeyecv . 
 
 KA. ’OpOtig. 4 
 
 A0. ’Encpddjv ye prjv rcpoodelodai pot done l pvOcov en 
 
 TLVU)V. 
 
 KA. II 0 L 6 )v, d) ’y aOe ; 
 
 A0. Ueldojpev rov veavi'av rolg Xoyoig, dig rep rov tt av- 
 rog empeXovpevcp rrpog rrjv ocjTTjpiav nal dperrjv rov oXov 
 f ndvr > earl ovvreraypeva , 5 d)v nai to pepog elg dvvaptv 
 enaorov to npoorjfcov nao^ei Kal noiel. rovroig d’ eiolv 
 dpxovreg TTpooreraypevoi 6 endorotg ent to opL/cporarov 
 del ndOrjg real rcpa^ecog, elg pepiopov rov eoxarov reXog 
 direipyaopevoi - 7 d)v ev teal to gov, d) o^erAte, popiov elg 
 
 3. rtj ye pidgeadat. See Note XLVIII., App. 
 
 4. bpOtiq. Stephanus, whom Ast follows, and whom Eusebius and 
 Ficinus seem to countenance, would connect opOibq with the pre- 
 ceding leyeiv , making the whole, from rw ye to en tivuv, the lan- 
 guage of the Athenian. Alioque Xeyeiv, sine hoc adverbio quern usum 
 hie haberet ? STEPH. Xeyeiv itself, however, in the sense of 
 “ speaking improperly,” or of “ saying nothing to the purpose,” is so 
 common in Greek, that we much prefer the vulgar text, which gives 
 opd&q to Clinias, making it very similar to the reply of the same 
 speaker, page 49 (3), bpOoTara ye elndv, on which we have remark- 
 ed. There is great vivacity, and much that is characteristic of the 
 simple-hearted Clinias in this interrupting assent. It is principally 
 directed to the word Pia&oOai, and intimates that, in his view, the 
 argument had been perfectly irresistible, so that nothing more need 
 be added. As much as to say — you are most correct in declaring 
 that you have forced him ; your argument is, indeed, most triumphant. 
 And then this brings on very naturally the subsequent reply of the 
 chief speaker : “ And yet there seems to me to be need in addition 
 of something of a more persuasive kind.” tlv&v errudfiv. 
 
 5. owreraypeva. Not simply “appointed by” (although this sense 
 is included), but “ so arranged as to co-operate (gw) with the uni- 
 versal guardian.” 
 
 6. upxovreq. See Note XLIX., App. 
 
 7. uTetpyaGpevoi. This word must have here the sense of consh • 
 
58 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 to nav gvvTELvei /3Xenov* aei, na'tnsp navoptnpov ov. os fie 
 X sXrjOs nspi rovro avro cog yevsotg 9 svsna snstvov yiyvs- 
 tcu 10 naoa , oncjg fj rj rep rov navTbg [ 3io ) vnapxovoa svfiat- 
 pux)v ovoid , ovx evsna oov 11 y tyvopsvrj, ov fie svsna snsi- 
 vov. nag yap iarpog nai nag svrsxvog firjptovpyog navrog 
 pev svsna navra spya^erai, npog to noivrj £ vvrelvov 12 [3eX- 
 tlotov • pspog prjv svsna oXov nai ovx o^ ov pepovg svsna 
 dnspya^srai. ov fie dyavanrslg , dyvoebv on?]' 3 to nspi os 
 apiorov rip navTL ^vpbaivst nai ooi naTa fivvaptv 14 ttjv 
 Trjg noivrjg yevsoscog . snsi fie del ^vx?) ovvTSTaypsv'rf 5 oco- 
 paTL tots psv aXXcp, tots fie dXXcp, psTabdXXsi navTotag 
 psTadoXag fit’ eavTTjv * 1 rj fid erspav 'ipvx'fjv, ovfisv aXXo sp - 
 
 tuted, appointed, or organized, although such an application is some- 
 what unusual. Efc pepiapov rov £o x arov , “ to the most minute di- 
 vision.” TeAof must be taken abverbially, as equivalent to teIeoq. 
 *£lv must be referred to rovroig and Gwreraypeva. 
 
 8. t-wreivei pTLeirov. “ Looking tends.” The participle, being a 
 favourite part of speech with the Greeks, is often thus used in con- 
 nexion with a verb ; in this manner becoming equivalent to two 
 verbs in English, as though it were (3X£n ei nai reivei. 
 
 9. Yeveaig. See Note L., App. 
 
 10. 11, 12, 13. See Note LI., App. 
 
 14. Kara dvvapiv, &c. “According to the power of the common 
 generation,” that is, as far as it is possible for both these ends to be 
 jointly accomplished, viz., the good of the individual and the good 
 of the universe at the same time. 
 
 15. GvvTeraypsvrj. The common reading here is Emreraypevip 
 We have, however, followed Eusebius and Stephanus, who refers 
 to several old manuscripts as authority. 'Lwreraypevr) makes a 
 much better sense, and is much better adapted to the context. It 
 may be rendered here, “ soul appointed to act in co-operation with 
 body.” 
 
 1. 6i’ kavrrjv. “By its own internal action.” bi’ erepciv \pvxyv 
 “ Through the influence of another soul.” This is one of those 
 cases in which bid with the accusative would be said to signify the 
 instrumental cause, a sense which it generally has with the genitive. 
 Even here, however, we may perceive a difference. It denotes a 
 spiritual instrumentality, either of soul upon itself, or of one soul upon 
 
 another, and may, perhaps, be more appropriately rendered by reason 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 59 
 
 yov T<X TCETTEVT^j XeLTTET at TrXfjV fjLETaTiOsvaL TO fjLEV CL[IEL- 
 vov y'yvopEVov 7]0og Eig /3eXtlc o tottov , x e ^P 0V ^ £ eig tov 
 XEipova, nard to npEirov avTcbv EizaoTcp, Iva Trjg rrpoo 77 - 
 K,ovor\g potpag Xayx^v'Q. 
 
 KA. U?j Xb/Eig ; 
 
 A0. T B.L7T£p dv Exot Xoyov 2 paoTtvvT] ETUfiEAEiag $£olg tcov 
 navTG)v , tclvttj pioi doted) (ppa^ELV. el pitv yap Trpog to 
 oXov 3 * 5 6 aEi /3 Xettg)v irXaTToc Tig , pETaox^pctTi^ov Ta TravTa , 
 olov ek, rcvpbg v6(i)p kpipvxovf teat prj % vpixoXXa e% Evog 7 ) 
 ek noXXcbv ev, Trp(OT7]g fj dsvTEpag rj ital TpiTrjg yEVEOEog 
 uETEiXrjfpOTa, nXrjOEOiv dnEtg ,5 dv eitj t rjg \L£TaTiQ£\i£V7]gs 
 KooprjOECjg • vvv 6’ eotl OavpaoTT) paoTGjvT 7 r<5 tov navTog 
 ETUpEXovpEVG). 
 
 KA. av XiyEig ; 
 
 of, than by means of, although the two expressions sometimes come 
 nearly to the same thing, means reason and motive , in regard to spirit- 
 ual agencies, having often the like relation. The sentiment is this : 
 “ The adaptation of the soul to its appropriate state is its own work. 
 Nothing, then, is left to the chess-player but to transfer the pieces 
 thus adapted to their proper stations.” M eraridhaL — calculum quasi 
 retractare , “to take back or change a piece.” We render ireTTEVTfj , 
 chess-player , by way of accommodation to a well-known game, in 
 order to give more force to the simile, 'ipvxv here means more 
 properly vis animee , than the substance of soul itself. 
 
 2. 7 Ht7rep dv ex 01 , & c - See Note LII., App. 
 
 3, 4. E l yev yap npoc to olov. For an extended explanation of 
 this difficult passage, and of what follows for some distance, see 
 
 Note LIII., App. 
 
 5. UTZELpa. Supply pETaTXyyCLTi(5[iaTa. 
 
 6. M.ETaTideyEvrjQ KocryrjGEog. “ Displaced arrangement,” that is, 
 requiring a new arrangement at every act of providential inter- 
 ference ; a displacing of the whole order of the chess-board at each 
 move. See the comparison of the n ettevtt/c a short distance back, 
 
 where we have also the verb [ leraTidevaL . M ETanxyparigo would 
 mean here, to transform immediately , without intermediate means 
 (media) or successive generations of cause and effect. M eraSd/ilsi, 
 on the other hand, although active in form, has an intransitive or 
 middle meaning, signifying a change from internal causes in the 
 things themselves, whether innate or implanted. 
 
60 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 A0 r tt&£. eneLdr) Kareldev rjpojv o fiaou levg epxpvxovg 
 ovoag rag npa^Etg anaaag , nal uoXX^v pev dperrjv ev av - 
 ralg ovoav , 'noXXrpv 6e naniav , dvdtXeOpov 1 6e ov yevope- 
 vov dXX y ovk al(bviov , 'ipvxrjv teal otipa, KaOanep ol Kara, 
 vopov ovreg deoi, ( yevemg yap ovk av n ore fjv %u)cov ano- 
 Xopevov tovtolv tiarepov) Kal to pev b)(peXelv ayaftov del 
 rrEcpvKog, ooov ayaOov 'ipvx'^g, dievorjOr), to 6e KaKov (3Xan- 
 telv • ravra rcavra gvvidcbv EprjxavrjoaTO* nov neipevov 
 EKaOTOV TG)V p£pb)Vj VLKAdOaV dpETTJV , 7]TTG)pEV7)V 6e KUKtaV 
 ev tg) Tiavrl TTapexoi paXior ’ av Kal paora nal apiora. 
 peprjxdvrjrcu 7 8 9 6rj repog ixav rovro , to, ttolov tl yiyvopevov 
 del Tioiav edpav del peraXap6dvov olKL^eoOai y Kal rivag 
 TiOTE Tonovg * rrjg 6e ysveoEGjg rov iroiov nvog 10 d<prjKE ralg 
 
 7. av6?i eOpov . . . aiuviov. See Notes LIV. and LV., App. 
 
 8. £fi7]x av V (ja To- Excogitavit. This word savours somewhat of 
 Plato’s peculiar doctrine of the necessary existence of evil, arising 
 out of that depravity which was connected with matter, in the con- 
 stitution of things. It seems to represent the Deity as struggling 
 with this disorder, and employing all the resources of his wisdom in 
 devising plans to counteract its influence. See Note XXXI., App., 
 on the doctrine of the good and evil principle. Uov nupevov. “In 
 what situation lying,” ubi queeque pars sita est, or “in what manner 
 each part might be so disposed as in the best and easiest manner to 
 give the victory to virtue, and the least advantage to wickedness or 
 evil.” 
 
 9. peprixavriTai. A change is here made from the aorist to the 
 perfect tense, to intimate that it is a finished, settled, or established 
 mode of proceeding, employed at the present time as well as in the 
 first origin of things. The aorist eprixavTjGaTo had reference to single 
 and individual parts and acts ; pepTjxdvTjrac has regard to the whole, 
 irpog Tzav tovto. It is best rendered here as a present : “ He con- 
 trives this in reference to the whole, namely, what kind of a situa 
 tion everything which becomes of a certain quality must receive and 
 inhabit.” See Note LVI., App. 
 
 10. T7jg yeveeeug rov ttolov nvog. This expression is equivalent 
 to tov ytyvecdcu ttolov tl. In the words edpav, oLKL&cdaL , and tottovq 
 above, we may yet discover the metaphor of the stones and the build- 
 er, made use of page 55 (13). Like the comparison of the dark and 
 dangerous flood, it lingers long in the writer’s mind, and affects, un- 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 61 
 
 povXrjOEOLV enaoTCJV rjpcjv Tag air tag. oirr] yap a,v ettlOv - 
 j ufi, nal bnolog rig wv rrjv 'ifwxrjv, ravrrj cr%e<5dv ek&otote 
 ical TOiovrog ytyvErat dnag rjpcjv cjg to ttoXv. 
 
 KA. To yovv slnog . 
 
 A0. METabdXXEi psv roivvv navO’ ooa psTOfta eotc i/jv- 
 Xrjg, ev kavrolg KEtcrrjfiEva 11 rfjv rrjg pETaboXrjg alriav * ps- 
 TabaXXovTa 6 e (jjspETai Hard rfjv T7\g Eipappsvrjg 12 ra^iv 
 nal vopov. cpiKpOTEpa psv tcjv rjdcov 13 pErabdXXovra kXaT- 
 to, Kara to TTjg %cj pag ettltte6ov pETanopEVETac, ttXelo 6e 
 nal admoTEpa pETanEOOVTa, Etg paOog Ta te naTO XEyopEva 
 tcjv tottov , ooa r/ At6rjv l4c te nal Ta tovtcjv E^ppEva tcjv bvo- 
 paTCJv Enovopa^ovTEg o<po6pa (pobovvTac nal bvEiponoXov 
 ol 15 £ cjVTEg diaXvOEVTsg te tcjv oopaTOv • pEt^ov 6e brj 
 xpvXV nanlag rj apETrjg onoTav pETaXaby, did ttjv avT7\g 
 j3ovXr(OLV te nal opiXiav yEvopsvrjv lo^vpav, ottotov psv 
 apETTj 'dELa Tcpooplgaoa 1 ytyvrjTat diaejjEpovTog t oiavTT], 
 dtacjjEpovTa 2 nal pETibaXE totcov ayiov oXov , pETanopiodEi- 
 oa Eig apEivcj Tiva tottov ETEpov , OTav 6e TavavTia, ettI 
 TavavTta pEdidpvoaoa tov avTTjg (3iov. 
 
 consciously perhaps, his language, even where there was no design- 
 ed reference to it. This method of carrying along metaphors con- 
 tained, yet half concealed, in single words and phrases, is a peculiar 
 beauty of Greek composition, by no means confined to their poetry, 
 although this abounds with the richest examples of it. 
 
 11. ev kavrolg. See the close of Note LVI., App. 
 
 12. Kara rd^tv elpappevrjg. See Note LIV., App. 
 
 13. cfiuiporepa pev rtiv yOtiv. For an extended explanation of this 
 difficult passage, and of what follows, see Note LYII., App. 
 
 14. "Aidrjv enovopd^ovreg. See Note LVIII., App., on the Greek 
 
 *Ai8r)g, compared with the Hebrew and rT3- 
 
 15. (j)o6ovvrat nal bveiponoXovoi. See Note LIX., App., on the 
 similar fears of Hell which have existed in all ages. 
 
 1. apery deta 7rpoopi^aaa. Compare this with 2 Peter, i., 4 : Iva 
 y'lyvrjcQe 'deiag kolvuvol tyvoeug. 
 
 2. diatyepovra. Connect this with ronov, although such a con- 
 struction is rather harsh and unusual. On this passage, and espe- 
 cially the word ayiov , see Note LX., App., on the spirituality of some, 
 
 F 
 
62 
 
 CONTRA ATIIEOS. 
 
 kvTij tol 6Lkt] egti tietiv ot ’'OAvynov ex°vglv s * * 3 4 
 gj nai nai veavione, aueXeloQai doncbv in to $£G)V * nanfxo 
 li8v ytyvopevov , npog rag nantovg 'ipv%dg i apeiva) 6e . 7rpo^ 
 rd^* apeivovg nopevopevov , sv re nai sv n dot davarotgf 
 
 7t&c>x£Lv ts nai notslv a npoorjnov dpav eon rolg npoocpe- 
 pECL rovg npooepspslg . 5 ravrrjg rrjg dtnrjg ovre ov prjnore 
 ovre el aXXog arvxrjg 6 yevopevog in ev^rjrac nepiyeveodai 
 'ftecov. fjv nacrtiv dtnCav diatyepovrcog eraijav re oi rai-avreg, 
 
 of the Platonic views in regard to the future blessedness of the soul , and 
 the capability , which many parts of the Platonic writings possess , of be- 
 
 ing accommodated to a higher system of truth. 
 
 3. kvrr} tol diKrj earl detiv ol v OAiyz7 tov cxovgl. This is an un- 
 doubted hexameter line, evidently intended as a quotation. What 
 immediately follows, although the language of the writer, and de- 
 signed only for prose, is yet capable of being reduced to the same 
 measure by a slight transposition, and by pronouncing tietiv in one 
 syllable, as must frequently be done in the Greek poetry, 
 
 7 £2 nai nai veavioKE, Sokcjv vtco -&eC)v apeTiEioOaL. 
 
 The Platonic writings furnish many examples of a similar kind, 
 which by slight changes, and sometimes with no change at all, may 
 be reduced to a pleasing rhythm. They were, in all probability, not 
 designed, but flowed spontaneously from the well-tuned ear and har- 
 monized spirit of this poetical philosopher. Nothing could more 
 perfectly describe the exquisite softness and polish of his own Greek, 
 than what he says of Theaetetus, in the dialogue of that name, page 
 144, B. : olov eXaiov fisvpa aipoc^yri fisovTog. 
 
 4. h TcdGL tiavaroLg. See Note LXI., App., on the mystical senses 
 of this word. 
 
 5. npoGcpepcGL rovg npootyspeig. “ Like to like.” 
 
 6. urvxyg. Ficinus here evidently read evrvxyg without ri, for 
 he renders the passage thus : Quare nec tu neque ullus alius optet 
 confidatquc se adeo felieem fore ut judicium hoc Decorum effugiat atque 
 exuperet. It is capable, however, of a very good sense according to 
 the common reading. “Neither do you expect, nor if any other is 
 in like unfortunate condition (that is, exposed to the Divine jus- 
 tice), let him ever boast he shall escape (or survive) the justice of 
 Heaven.” TlepLyeveodaL — superesse. The same lemarks apply to 
 el here, as to ehrep, page 46 (14). It is equivalent to ovre dXXog 
 arvx^g yevopevog , elnep egtl roiovrog, knev^yraL, &c. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 63 
 
 Xp£& v e^evXa6elodai rortapdirav. ov yap dpeXrjOrjGrf 
 irore vtt’ avrrjg. ovx ovtcj op,ucpog cov dvoq /card to rljg 
 yrjg (3a0og , ovd’ viprjkog yevopsvog, elg rov ovpavov avan - 
 rr/Gy ' riGEig ds avrtdv rrjv TrpoGrjtcovGav npcopiav, eit’ ev * 
 Odds* i uevojv, site /cal ev "Albov dianopEvOsig , eite real tovtgjv 
 Elg aypiG)TEpov eti dia/copiGdEig 7 8 9 totcov. o avrog ds Xoyog 
 GOl fiat TTEpl EKEIVG)V aV Ell], TG)V, OVg GV KaTldojV E/C Gpi- 
 uptiv psyaXovg ysyovorag , dvoGiovpyrjGavrag, f\ ri toiov- 
 rov npd^avrag, (brjdTjg aOXitov svdaipovag ysyovevai , 
 Kara, w$* ev /caronTpoig, 10 avrtiv raig npd&Giv, rjyrjGG) aa - 
 
 7. ov yap dpeTiijdfjGri ttote vn' avTjjg. ’Avryg refers here to AUcrj, or 
 the Divine Justice or Law personified. See Note LXII., App., on the 
 Divine Omniscience , and the remarkable resemblance between this passage 
 and certain declarations of the Scriptures. 
 
 8. hOade. “In this world , or in Hades after having passed 
 through ( bia — tt opevdelg) this world.” In the same way, ekei is often 
 used for the other world. There is a power in these brief adverbs, 
 when thus employed, that no descriptive terms could equal. They 
 are several times used in this manner in the Gorgias, especially in 
 the passage where Socrates is pointing Callicles to that final and 
 Divine tribunal, where he will stand so much more in need of a de- 
 fence and of an advocate, than in the Athenian courts — x aa M G V Kat 
 i'kiyyiaoeiq ovdev yrrov rj hyd ’EN0AAE, ov ’EKEI — No less than 1 
 would HERE ( that is, before a human bar), will you be speechless and 
 dizzy THERE. Gorgias, 527, A. With how much effect are they 
 employed by Euripides, when Medea, in making her last address to 
 her children, says so concisely, yet with such fulness of meaning : 
 
 E vdaipovolrov • ’EKEI • rd S’ EN0AAE. 
 
 Uaryp a^eOier’ : 
 
 Would that ye might be blessed, but THERE ; all HERE 
 
 Your father’s hand hath ruined. 
 
 Medea , 1069. 
 
 9. dianofucdeig. The intensive sense of bid comes directly from 
 its primitive local sense : through, thorough, significant of complete- 
 ness. Here both offices unite : “ carried through all intervening states 
 to the remotest bounds .” 
 
 10. 6g ev KaronTpoir, &c. “ In the events of their lives, as in 
 
 mirrors, you think you have seen (reflected) the neglect of all things 
 by the Gods.” This fine simile is exceedingly descriptive of these 
 
64 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 OeGjpcucevai rr\v ndvrcov apeXetav tiecov • ova elddog avrcov 
 rr\v GwreXetav, 11 orcrj rcore rep rravrl tjvpddXXercu. Tcy - 
 vd)Gnetv de avrrjv , d) navrcov dvdpeiorare, ndog ov delv do- 
 tcelg 5 r\v rig pi] ytyvd)GHG)v ovd' dv rvnov 12 idol nore , ovde 
 Xoyov ijvpdaXXeoOat, nepl j3cov dvvarog dv yevoiro eig ev- 
 daipovtav 13 re nal dvGdatpova rvx^v. ravra el pev gs m'l- 
 
 who look only upon the surfaces of things, superficial men , dvdpeg 
 imnd’kaioi. It suggests the similar comparison, by the Apostle 
 James, of those “ who behold their natural faces in a glass hv 
 kGOTTTpG), James i., 23. Upa^eciv avr&v. Not “their deeds,” but 
 rather, “ the events of their lives,” namely, “ their seeming or super- 
 ficial prosperity in the midst of all their crimes.” II paijig sometimes 
 has almost the sense of nddog, and may mean a condition or state, thus 
 differing from the derivatives of tzoleio, and even from most verbals 
 of a similar form terminating in ig. As in the Trachiniae of Sopho- 
 cles, 151 : 
 
 Tor’ dv rig daidoiTO, tt\v avrov cnconfiv 
 IIPAaIN, naKolaiv olg kyw f3apvvopai. 
 
 Tlpu^ig is also a technical term, used in reference to the stage or 
 tragedy. It is so applied by Aristotle, in his Art of Poetry, to that 
 event which constitutes the leading action of the drama. There 
 may be some such allusion here to human life, and especially the 
 life of such as are here referred to, in the light of a drama, a tragic 
 Trpc^cg, which has not yet been wound up, or come to its catastrophe, 
 and the issue of which has not yet been seen. T rjv navrov dpeXeiav 
 tiEtiv. The genitive, having a much more extensive significance in 
 Greek than the corresponding possessive case in English, and em- 
 bracing many more relations, frequently gives rise to constructions 
 which appear to us very harsh. Thus here, ti-Efiv bears to dpekuav 
 the relation of agent, while ndvruv has to it the relation of ob- 
 ject. Instead, however, of governing them both by dpekeiav, it 
 would, perhaps, be better to regard dew as an ellipsis for the more 
 usual expression of the cause or agent, vtco tuv dew. 
 
 11. Ovk eidcog avrejv ttjv awTeheiav. See Note LXIII., App., on 
 the doctrine of a final judgment. 
 
 12 . tvtzov. On the use of this word, see Note LXIV., App. 
 
 13. evdaipoviav . . . dvedatpova. The location and context of these 
 words in this passage, and a few lines above (e£ adXiov evdaipoveg 
 yeyovevai), furnish an admirable illustration of the remarks made Note 
 XXXVIII., App., on the difference between happiness , in the usual 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 65 
 
 Oei K Xeivlag ode real ^vfinaoa rjfxtiv rjde r\ yepovoia , nepl 
 ftetiv (bg ovtc oloOa o, ri keyeig, naXfbg dv ooi 6 tieog av- 
 rog l4= ^vXXapdavoi • el d’ emderjg Xoyov rivog eri dv eirjg , 
 Xeyovrcov v\\L(bv tt pog rov rpirov eiranove , 15 el vovv nal 
 ottojgovv e^eig . on p,ev yap deoi re eloi nal avOpoyruv 
 empieXovrai, eycoye ov rcavranaoi (pavXug 1 dv (pairjv rjpZv 
 
 worldly sense of the term, and blessedness. The passage may be 
 paraphrased : “ Without giving heed to this type of life, that is, with- 
 out keeping in mind this general notion (see Note LXIV., App., on 
 the word rvnov) of their contribution (ovvr&eiav) to the good of the 
 whole, you will be able to form no right judgment respecting blessed- 
 ness or its opposite.” Or, if we take the other view of Gwreksba, 
 adopted in Note LXIII., App., and regard it as including the idea of 
 end, consummation , final reckoning , &c., we then have a sentiment 
 almost the same with the famous declaration of Solon to Croesus, 
 related by Herodotus, lib. i., 32, and which sometimes appears in 
 the tragic poets as an ancient saying ; as in the beginning of the 
 Trachiniae of Sophocles : 
 
 A oyog fiev egt ’ ’APXAIOS avOptinov (pavelg 
 tig ovk dv aitiv * EK/idOoig fiportiv, npiv dv 
 d-dvoi rig .... 
 
 14. 'O dsog avrog. There cannot be a doubt but that this is to be 
 taken here in its purest and highest sense, as referring to the One 
 Ineffable Supreme — the One True God of Socrates and Plato. “ The 
 Deity himself, the very being whose existence and Providence we 
 have been proving — may he assist you.” Had he referred in any 
 way to the local Divinity of Athens or Pallas, he would have used 
 the feminine avr 
 
 15. Tzpog rov rpirov enuKove. “ Keep listening (as the present im- 
 perative here most impressively signifies) while we address our- 
 selves to the third head of our argument.” This is evidently spoken 
 not to the two companions who, with the speaker, formed the 
 yepovoia mentioned above, but to the imaginary young disputant so 
 frequently referred to. It has been shown, 1st, that GOD IS ; 2d, 
 that he exercises a special Providence ; which two propositions 
 are almost equivalent to what the apostle assigns as the objects of 
 faith, Heb., xi., 6. It now remains to be shown that he is not 
 easily propitiated, or turned away from the right, by the offerings 
 and sacrifices of the wicked. 
 
 1. ov ravrdnaoi QavTiog. Tne speaker evidently looks back witb 
 
 F 2 
 
66 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 anodedelxOai, * rd 6e napaLrrjrovg av rovg Beovg elvcu rol - 
 glv adiKOVGi de^opevovg dCopa, ovre tlvI ovy^coprjrsov 
 ttclvtl * 2 r 9 av Kara dvvapuv rponcp eXey/creov. 
 
 KA. KaXXtoF elneg • TroiCbpiv re chg Xeyeig. 
 
 A0. $eps 6rj 3 4 * * * * npog tietiv avrtiv, riva rponov TrapaLTrjrol 
 ylyvoiVT 9 av 4 fjplv, el yiyvoiv-o av ; teal riveg f( ttoIol ti- 
 
 a good deal of satisfaction, to what he regards as his master-piece 
 in this argument : the subtle disquisition about self-motion. On the 
 word TrapaiTrjTovg , see Note XLI., App. 
 
 2. tzclvtI rpoTru. He seems to regard this as the most important 
 position of the three, as being, in fact, more vital to the soul’s highest 
 interests than any speculative belief in the Divine existence, or in 
 a Providence without it. Hence, he says, “ there must be no yield- 
 ing here, and no pains must be spared in the refutation of this per- 
 nicious error,” namely, that the wicked can easily propitiate the 
 Deity by gifts. 
 
 3. $epe by. Ay never wholly loses its force as an inferential par- 
 ticle. It has, however, much less strength as an illative than ovv 
 or apa. It imports in such a connexion as this, a going on of the 
 argument, a transition to another head, with an implication that 
 something previous had been proved in a solid and satisfactory man- 
 ner. It implies, therefore, when thus employed in argument, a con- 
 sciousness of strength, and an anticipation of victory. Hence, when 
 joined with aye, <j>epe, 7 l eye, or with imperatives generally, it has been 
 most appropriately styled 6y hortativa. 
 
 4. ylyvoivr’ av. “Would they become propitiated or placable!” 
 
 The use of yiyvoivTo instead of elev implies that they are to be re- 
 garded as previously angry. There is in the Protagoras, 340, c., a 
 still more striking example, in which the true sense wholly depends 
 on the distinction between these two substantive verbs. It is there 
 shown that the two propositions yevbodat, ayaOov, and 
 
 ttov elvcu ayadov, instead of being the same, as Protagoras rashly sup* 
 
 posed, are, in fact, so widely distinguished, that one is true and the 
 other false. For a bad man to become good in his own strength is not, 
 only difficult , but impossible. For one who has become, or who has been 
 
 made good, or who is so by nature, TO BE good, is not only not diffi- 
 cult, but delightful. Ov yap tovto 6 I IcrraKog b?ieye to TF.- 
 
 NE20AI ecd'hov, cboTrep 6 2 ipuovtbyg, uTiXu, to 'EMMENAI. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS„ 
 
 67 
 
 veg* ovreg ; dp^ovrag pev avaynalov nov yiyveoOai rovg 
 ye diOLfirjGovrag 6 rov drcavra evreXeyfag 1 ovpavov. 
 
 KA. OvTcog. 
 
 5. rives fj noZoi rives. “Who being, or of what kind being'!” In 
 these two questions rives refers to the offices the Gods are supposed 
 to hold to men, and noZoi rives to the nature of those offices, or the 
 manner in which they are discharged. The answer to rives is con- 
 tained in the word apxovras below. The answer to rcoZoi rives is 
 suggested in the specification of the several kinds of rulers set forth. 
 
 6. diOLKrjGovras. “ Who are going to administer.” The future 
 here is used, not in reference to the actual state of things, but sub- 
 jectively, to the state of the argument. “ Who on our scheme are 
 going, &c., or whom we are going to represent as actually adminis- 
 tering.” So, also, the mathematician employs eo rat and eaovrai in 
 the statement of his demonstration, although there is no sequence 
 or futurity, except in the mode in which the mind conceives of the 
 relations of truths, which in themselves are older than time or space. 
 Subjectively, to the demonstrator, they may appear, and be stated 
 as consequences yet future. 
 
 7. evrehextis- “ Actually , as opposed to potentially .” Correspond- 
 
 ing to ev evepyeia , as opposed to ev Svvagei. Hence the noun ev - 
 relexeia, so much used by Aristotle, as contrasted with <5 vvagis- 
 Philologists have differed much about the etymology of this word. 
 The derivation, however, from evrelys, perfect , complete , and fyw, 
 seems satisfactory, both as respects form and meaning. That which 
 exists only ev Svvdpe i is inchoate and imperfect : activity , energy ( avro - 
 KivrjGLs) is its completion and perfection. The word actually , in Eng- 
 lish, has come to signify not much more than truly , as matter of fact, 
 and is therefore not a good representative of evrehex&s, although it 
 is difficult to find any other substitute for it. There is another word, 
 evSeTiex^ia, continuance , duration , which some confound with this, as 
 is done by Cicero, Tusc. Disp., i., 22 : Quintum genus adhibet, 
 vacans nomine ; et sic ipsum animum evrelex^tav (evdel exetav) ap- 
 pellat, quasi quamdam continuatam motionem. The etymology of ev - 
 Selexeia is very uncertain. Tov arcavra ovpavov i*s here put for the 
 whole universe — the Heavens and all things they contain. It is 
 very much like the Hebrew expression Sd nnrb as 
 
 xxviii., 24: He looketh under the whole Heaven , or — CD'S# 
 
 the Heaven of Heavens, that is, all space — the universe. 
 
68 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 AO. ’AA/l’ apa rtot npoaepepelg tg>v apxbvrcov • }} rivtg 
 rovrotg^ cjv 8 dvvarbv rjplv arteuia^ovoi rvyxaveiv psi^oatv 
 eXarrovag ; norepov rjvcoxoi nveg av elev tolqvtol ^evycov 
 apiXk copevcov, 7 / nXoicdv Kvdepvrjrat ; raxa de Kav aitemaa 
 Oelev Grparonedcov dpxovot tlglv . elrj < 5 ’ dv teal vogojv no - 
 Xepov 9 evXadovpevoig larpolg eoucevat nepl Gcopara, rj ye - 
 (opyotg nepl (pvrdjv yeveoiv elojOvtag c opag x a ^ £7T dg did 
 i bo6(j)v X0 npoodexopevoig • rj tzal noipvicov eniGTaraig. h tel- 
 drj yap Gvytcex^prjtcapev * 11 rjplv avrolg elvai pev rov ovpa - 
 vov noXXtiv peorov ayaOtiv, elvai de teal rtiv evavricov , 
 n Xeiovoov 12 de rcbv prj , pax?} 13 dfp (j)apev, adavarog egtiv rj 
 
 8. gjv is genitive by reason of rvyxaveiv — quos assequi possimus, or, 
 quorum compotes esse possimus. 
 
 9. vogov 7 Tolepov. The language employed above respecting con- 
 tending chariots and commanders of camps, suggested the repre- 
 sentation of the physician in the same style, as carrying on a war 
 with diseases. In all this, however, he has in mind the allusion 
 which soon follows to what he styles pdxv dOuvaroq , the grand and 
 universal conflict between the powers of good and evil, on which 
 we have dwelt at length, Note LXVI., App. E vlabeopae. “ To be 
 careful , circumspect , cautious .” Hence to be timid, fearful , especial- 
 ly to be occupied with religious dread, to be devout towards God; al- 
 though in this last sense, as Prof. Hacket, in his Notes to Plutarch, 
 De Sera Numinis V indicta, has well observed (page 92), it is seldom, 
 if ever, found in classic usage. The primary conception of the w r ord, 
 from ev and TirjSu, A apdavo, is to handle carefully, to touch with caution. 
 
 10. did <f)66(ov. An adverbial phrase similar to did (fuliag, di' 
 alaxvvrjg, &c., with fear or timidly. It sometimes has the form did 
 (j>66ov. The common reading is did <f>66ov, which is certainly incor- 
 rect. Compare the phrase <5t’ dnexOsiag, ASsch., Prom. Vine., 121. 
 
 11. kneidy ydp GvyKcxopyKapev. This admission could only have 
 referred to the fact of the mixture of good and evil in the world, and 
 which may be regarded as expressed in what is said page 32, line 3. 
 Plato has in no other part of this book, except in the present passage, 
 told us which he thought had the preponderance. 
 
 12. 7 tIelovwv de t&v prj. For an extended examination of this 
 passage and the doctrine contained, see Note LXV , App. 
 
 13. pdxv adavarog. On this remarkable expression, see Note 
 LXVI., App. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 69 
 
 roiavTT] , nal cpvXanrjg a ^avpaarrig x4= deofievrj • f vppaxoi 6e 
 rjplv ftsoL re a\ia nal 6aipovsg^ rjpslg 6’ av nrrjpara dstiv 
 nal 6atpovo)v • (pQeipec 6s rjpdg a6inla nal v&ptq psrd deppo- 
 ovvrjg • (jd)£ei 6s dtnatoavvif nal OGXppoavvr] psra (ppovrj- 
 osevq, sv ralg rtiv tistiv sp'ipvxotg olnovoat 6vvapsoi. * 1 2 /3pa - 
 %v 6s n nal rdyds av rtg tgjv rotovrcov svotnovv r\\uv cra- 
 (psg l6ot, ipv%al 6rj rtvsg 3 4 sm yr]q oinovoat , nal a6tnov A rj* 
 pa nsnrrjpsvat , drjXovorf ^pidjdstg, 5 npog rag r&v (pvX a< 
 
 14. See Note LXYI., App. 
 
 15. 'deol nal dalpoveg . . . icrypara ■deuv. See Note LX VII., App. 
 
 1. g ufri dLKcuoGvvri. See Note LXVIII., App., on the ancient 
 
 division of the four cardinal virtues. 
 
 2. efj.ipvx°tg dwapecL. “Animated, spiritual, or moral powers and 
 faculties,” in distinction from physical agencies, or what he else- 
 where styles second working motions, or second causes. 
 
 3. xfjvxal dy nveg km yrjg. Ay, as an inferential particle, relates 
 back to what precedes sir eidy yap, &c. What followed came in by 
 way of parenthetical ejaculation, suggested by the previous meta- 
 phorical allusions and mention of nohe/xog calling up to mind the 
 great conflict of the universe, as presenting a bold and striking con- 
 trast with the petty conceptions of the men whose doctrine he is 
 disproving. He now returns to them, and resumes the more natural 
 order of the argument, which had been interrupted. “ There are , 
 then, (it seems), certain souls dwelling upon the earth,” &c., name- 
 ly, such as would measure the Gods by themselves, and attribute to 
 them all those imperfections and weaknesses which pertain to such 
 earthly guardians and rulers as we have mentioned by way of com- 
 parison. 
 
 4. dyTiovon. This is generally given as two words, dylov on. 
 The construction, however, seems to require that it be taken and 
 written as one : drj?i ovotl — as is clear, evidently, &c. 
 
 5. dypiudeig. There should, we think, be a comma after this 
 word. The usual rendering, ferocious, would not here be in har- 
 mony with such expressions as we have below — netdovGc dun date 
 Tioyuv, nal kv evKTaiaig knudalg. It might much better be translated 
 brutal, or, rather, brutish , referring not so much to the wildness and 
 fierceness of their dispositions, as to the stupidity and beastly gross- 
 ness of their conceptions. It is meant by these terms to indicate 
 men who have no right notions, any more than the beasts, of theii 
 
70 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 K(*)v 'iftvx&g apa kvvgjv , ?) ra^ rCbv vopicov, rj npdg rag rcov 
 iravranaocv anporaroov deonorow npoGntirrovaat , ttelQov- 
 
 true relations to God and the universe. Aristotle, in his Ethic. 
 Nicomach., vii., 1 , seems to use the term in this sense, to denote a 
 state as much below what is properly human as the Divine is above 
 it ; although he applies the epithet to a class of men : wore rj ti-ela 
 E^ig av eItj 6it}\ov6ti Trj 'ftypiufiELa uvtlOe[aevt). It would seem here to 
 correspond well to the Hebrew ^ 3 , as used Psalm xlix., 11 ; 
 lxxiii., 22 ; xcii., 7. Proverbs, xii., 1 ; xxx., 2 . The sentiment, 
 Psalm xcii., 7, is strikingly in harmony with the whole train of 
 thought in which Plato here indulges respecting the views such 
 men entertain of the Divine justice. The brutish man (-^ 3 , ■&r}pi66rjg) 
 
 knoweth not , and the gross man ( l 7 ' , D 3 fr° m carnosus pin guis fuit) 
 
 understandeth not this , that when the wicked flourish , it is that they may 
 be destroyed forever. To make 'ftypiudEig agree with Tpvxuc would be 
 exceedingly harsh, not only in respect to the construction, but also 
 as regard the sense. 
 
 apa icwtiv. There is a peculiar force and elegance in this particle 
 apa, when thus employed. The rj, which follows twice, justifies, as 
 in similar cases, the supplying of another rj, or, rather, an eIte, be- 
 fore it, and then it will be in all respects parallel to the Iliad, i., 65 : 
 
 "Ejt’ ap' by EvxcoXfjc ETUfiEfityErai, eW’ EKaropbrjc- 
 
 Hogeveen styles it, in such cases, apa conjecturalis. This, how- 
 ever, is but little, if any, significant of its real force. Even in such 
 an example it does not wholly lose its power of concluding. Neither, 
 as he supposes, does it denote the reason why Apollo was angry. 
 That he had reason for anger was taken for granted from the fact. 
 Since he was angry, therefore the prophet was to tell the cause, 
 wT.ether it was on account of a vow or a hecatomb. So, in this 
 passage, we may render : “ Being evidently brutish, and approaching 
 (or falling upon) their keepers, be they dogs or shepherds, or rulers 
 of the highest grade, they would persuade them by flatteries, n &c. 
 That is, since they are brutish ( therefore apa), it matters not to them 
 whether they be dogs or shepherds, &c. : because they are of this 
 gross and animal nature, they make no distinction between the 
 highest and the lowest class of guardians, but'Stupidly imagine that 
 they all may be influenced alike. Thus the inferential force of apa 
 is felt in giving vividness and a great addition of meaning to the 
 sentence, while yet it is free from the encumbrance and clogging ef- 
 
CONTRA ATIIEOS. 
 
 73 
 
 cl * * * * * 6 reiaig Xoycov, xal ev evxTaiaig tigIv enipdaig (chg at 
 (jyrjpat (j)aocv al tu>v xaxtiv) e^eivai TrXeovexTovoi oepioiv 
 ev dvOpdonoig rraoxeiv prjdev ^aAenw. (f)apev d’ elvai ttov 
 to vvv ovopa^opevov apdpTrjpa rrjv nXeove^iav 7 ev pev 
 oaprdvoig GivpaGi voarjpa xaXovpevov , ev de c5 paig erCov 
 xai eviavT&>v Xoipov , ev de uoXeoi xal uoXiTeiaig , tovto 
 av to prjpa peTea^paTLopevov , adixiav. 
 
 KA. HavT&TtaoL pev ovv. 
 
 A0. Tovto v dr} tov Xoyov avayxalov Xeyeiv , tov Xeyov - 
 Ta <bg eioi ovyyvcopoveg del fieol Tolg tcjv dvOpojmx)v add 
 xoig xal adixovGiv, av avToig 8 9 tuv adixrjpaTCOV Tig anove- 
 pxj, xaOdnep xvgI Xvxoi tgjv dprcaopaTCdv opixpd dnove - 
 poiev , ol de , rjpepovpevoi Tolg dcopoig , Gvyx^polev Ta 7 ro- 
 ipvia diapnd^eiv. dp’ ovx ovTog 6 Xoyog 6 t&v cpaGxovTGdv 
 7TapacT7]Tovg elvai deovg ; 
 
 KA. OvTog pev ovv. 
 
 A0. Tig iv ovv d?j to)V tt popped evTGiv arreixa^cov opoiovt, 
 (bvXaxag elvai fteovg ovx av xaTayeXaGTog yiyvoiTO av - 
 Opd)TCG)v ogtigovv ; rroTepov xvdepvrjTaig , Xoidq ye olvov 
 xvigg \ 7 re napaTpenoaevoig 9 avTOig, dvaTpenovGi de vavg 
 t€ xal vavTag ; 
 
 feet of a formal argumentative statement. This use of upa, yap, 
 alia, &c., when employed with reference to what is supposed to 
 
 exist in the mind, rather than in the expression, is one of the most 
 striking beauties in the Greek language. If -&r)pid6eig here must 
 have the sense of ferocious, or, like a wild beast in respect to dispo- 
 sition, it should be taken in connexion with npog rag \ pvxag, and in 
 that case would imply, that having been ferocious towards their 
 keepers, they afterward seek reconciliation by flatteries, &c. Ast 
 
 connects ftripiddeig with npog ipvxag, although he gives it the com- 
 
 paratively weak sense, agrestes. A?iimos igitur quosdam, fyc,, patet 
 agrestes ad custodum animos. Whatever view, however, we may 
 
 take of tiripiddeLg, its relation to upa will remain the same. 
 
 6. tt eiOovoi. See Note LXIX., App. 
 
 7. rz'keovei'iav. See Note LXX., App. 
 
 8. av avroig, &c. See Note LXXI., App. 
 
 9. TzapaTpenopevoig. “ Turned aside from the path of right ” The 
 
72 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 KA. Mrjdaptig. 
 
 A0. 'AAA’ ovtl fxfjv fjvLoxoiGL 10 ye ev dpLXXxi owreray 
 pevoig, neioOelocv vno dcopedg erepoiOL rrjv vinrjv £ evyeoi 
 n podovvac . 
 
 KA. A ecvrjv yap elnova A eyoig av A eyo)v rov Xoyov 
 
 TOVTOV. 
 
 A0. Ov p,r\v ovde orpar^yolg ye , ovd 9 larpolg, ovde ye - 
 c opyoig • ovde vopevoi prjv, ovde tlol aval K,en7\k7\pevoig vno 
 
 ?iVKG)V. 
 
 KA. E vcfrrjpei. * 11 ndjg yap dv ; 
 
 A0. ’AAA’ ov navr(x)v (pvXancov elol peyiorot, real nepi 
 ra pbeyiora i]pZv oi navreg fteot ; 
 
 KA. HoXv ye . 
 
 metaphor in the word suggests the conception of a deviation from 
 a right line. It is evidently intended to furnish a case of parano- 
 masia with avaTpenovcn. 
 
 10. TivioxotGi . All these datives are to be referred to 6/iocovg 
 above. It is not the reinsman here who offers the prayer, but who 
 is supposed to be prayed unto ; and yet, although in this respect 
 the cases are not similar, we cannot help thinking that Plato had in 
 mind some of those prayers which Homer occasionally puts into the 
 mouth of his heroes, for aid not only in the accomplishment of wick- 
 ed purposes, but also in very trivial circumstances. As, when they 
 pray for assistance in the games, in the horse-race, and especially 
 when the goddess Pallas, in aid of her favourite knight Diomed, as- 
 sumes the reins and overturns the chariot of Admetus. Iliad, xxiii., 
 390. 
 
 11. E v(j>7/pec. A strong and earnest word of caution. “Be care- 
 ful how you speak — speak words of good omen.” It was employed 
 in the sacrifices to caution the people against the utterance of any 
 inauspicious words during the religious rites. There is a very fine 
 and impressive example of its use in the Republic, lib. vi., 509, B., 
 where, at the suggestion of Glaucon, that 'H dovij, or Pleasure, might 
 be The Good, Socrates cries out, EvtyTjpei,, “ utter words of good 
 omen, or be cautious in your language intimating that there might 
 be blasphemy in the very conception. The same feeling is excited 
 here by the bare thought, that the course of the argument had re- 
 quired him, however necessarily, to connect the mention of the 
 Deity with such comparisons as had been used 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 73 
 
 A0. T ovg dr) ndXXiord re repay par a (j) vXdrrovrag , <5ia- 
 <pepovrdg re avrovg ^vXatczj npog dperrjv , tcvvtiv x ei povg 
 Kdl dv 0 pd) 7 T(x)v j ueacov 12 elvai (prjoopev, oi to dittatov ova av 
 rrore 7 rpodolev evena dcbpcov napa ddi/corv dvdptiv avootcog 13 
 dedopevcjv ; 
 
 KA. Ovdaptig • ovre dvettrog b Xoyog . tw v re 14 reepi red- 
 
 12. Meow. “ Men holding a middle rank between Gods and the 
 biute animals.” Ast’s rendering, mcdiocribus , is a very poor one, 
 because it would denote those who held a middle rank among men 
 themselves, or ordinary men. M eoog, however, may perhaps have 
 here the same sense with pirpioc, just , equitable , although we do not 
 recollect any example of such usage. This meaning of pirpiog un- 
 doubtedly came from that old system of ethics founded on the say- 
 ing prjdev dyavj and which Aristotle afterward made the foundation 
 ol his doctrine of Ethical Means. 
 
 13. dvoolug dedoftevov. Compare Proverbs, xxi., 27 : the sacrifice 
 oj the wicked is an abomination. 
 
 14. tCjv re 7 xepl irdoav ovrov. Ast would read t£>v ye , and 
 
 connect this (to ovrov ) with the preceding sentence. In accordance 
 with which view he renders : Neque tolerabilis est haec oratio liomi - 
 num in quovis impietatis genere versantium. There is no difficulty, 
 however, in connecting rov (as in the common reading) with doebov 
 following, if we may regard the repetition as arising from the length 
 of the intervening clause, and also as intended to add force and . 
 vehemence to the whole sentence. “ Of all those who are con- 
 versant with every species of impiety, this man who so tenaciously 
 holds to this opinion would, of all wicked men , most justly seem to 
 be esteemed the worst and most impious.” ’ Avrexopevog , “ holding 
 firmly to,” like one who braces himself against something for the 
 purpose of giving tenacity to his grasp. The word implies that men 
 cling much more obstinately to this doctrine than to Atheism, or 
 even the denial of a Providence. By connecting rov re , or rov ye, 
 with the preceding, we should also destroy the fine effect of the pas- 
 sionate burst of indignation which is so characteristic of Clinias, and 
 which is so forcibly expressed by the words ovdapoq, &c., when 
 standing by themselves. K ivdvvevei, in this passage, may be regard- 
 ed in the same light as at page 18 (2). See remarks on the word in 
 that place. So, also, here the primary sense appears through the 
 secondary. ‘‘ He is in danger of being judged, he runs a risk of be- 
 ing thought, or he is liable to the imputation,” Ac. 
 
 G 
 
74 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 oav aoebetav oi tgjv ntvbvvevet Trojg o ravrrjg rr\g bofrjg av- 
 rexopevog navrcov av rcov aoedcbv nefcpioOat butaiorara 
 Hantorog re elvat nai aoebeorarog. 
 
 AO. Td pev 6?) nporeOevra rpta , deot re cog slot, nai <hg 
 empeXelg, nai Trapa to btaatov (hg rravranaotv anapatrrj - 
 rot , (fxppev itcavc og anobebetxOat 15 nov. 
 
 KA. U(bg yap ov ; nai ovpxprjcpot ye rovrotg rolg Xoyotg 
 eopev. 
 
 AO. K at i urjv etprjrat ye ncog ocpobporepov 1 bid (ptXovet - 
 ftlav r£)v natt&v avOpcbncov. rovrov ye prjv even, a , d) cpihe 
 K Xetvia, Tce^tXoveiurjrai, prj rcore Xoyotg 7]yd)vrat npa- 
 rovvreg efovoiav elvat ocptotv a (bovXovrat irpdrretv oi Ha- 
 noi, a dfj nai ooa 2 nai ola nepi deovg btavoovvrat. irpoQv- 
 pia [Lev brj did ravra vecorepug elnetv rjplv yeyovev. el be 
 n nai (3paxv npovpyov TrercoirjKapev elg ro neiOeiv nrj rovg 
 dvbpag , eavrovg pev piorjoat, rd d’ evavria irug rjdrj orep- 
 %at, naXCog rjplv eiprjpevov av elrj ro rtpooipiov aoedetag nept, 
 vopo)v. 
 
 KA. ’A/l/l a eXntg • el be prjj ro ye rov Xoyov yevog ovh 
 alrtaoerat rov vopoder7]v. 
 
 15 (j)C>pEv hcavtig dnodE^elxOai nov. This is something like the 
 • mathematician’s onsp eSel deigai, quod erat demonstrandum. It is the 
 formal conclusion of the long argument or preamble to the law 
 which is now to follow against those impious men, who have given 
 the lawgiver so much trouble. 
 
 1. cQodporepov. This is said in reference to the apparently harsh 
 epithets which have been used in this third branch of the discus- 
 sion against those who abused the doctrine of the Divine placability, 
 and especially to the strong language a few lines above. The other 
 parts of the argument, instead of needing apology in this respect, 
 were marked by a peculiar mildness towards his supposed perverse 
 opponents. 
 
 2. a drj teal oca teal ola. “ Whatever things, and however enor- 
 mous, and however bad.” 'Oca often, when the context requires it, 
 is to be taken in a bad sense, implying not simply the number or 
 quantity, but the enormity of the things referred to. So, also, ola 
 not only imports quality, but sometimes a bad quality, of whatevci 
 kind , that is however wicked. 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 75 
 
 AO. Merd to irpooipiov rocvvv Xoyoqf olog av two vo - 
 poov epprjvevg, opOtiq yiyvoiTo fjpZv, npoayopevcjv e%Lorao- 
 Oai iraoi rolg aoebeoi rponcdv tCov avrojv eig rovg eva edeZg. 
 roZg de pi) rceidopevoig. doedeiag ode eoro) nepi vopog * ’E av 
 rig aoeby Xoyoig sir ’ epyoig , 6 TraparvyxdvGJv apvveTG), orj- 
 paZvcov 7 rpdg ap^ovrag • rtiv de dpxbvTO)v oi f npCi)TQi ttvOo - 
 (. levoi , TTpog to nepi 4, tovtgjv anodedeiypevov npiveiv ditiaa- 
 Trjpiov elaayaydvTCOv KaTa Tovg vopovg . eav de Tig anov- 
 oaaa ap^rj pi] dpa TavTa , avTrj doede'iaq viroduwg yiyvecr- 
 6o) Tip edeXovTi TipoopeZv 3 4 5 vnep tcov vopcjv, eav de Tig cxpXq, 
 TipaTG) to dmaoTrjpiov ev enaoTip 6 tcov naO’ ev aGedovvTCjv 
 Tiprjpa. deapog pev ovv virapx^ro) navi, dec po)T7]piG)v de 7 
 
 3. pera to npootpiov ’koyog. The whole law is regarded as con- 
 sisting of three parts : the preamble or argument, the declaration or 
 exhortation, and the penalty. The first has occupied nearly the 
 whole of the book, the second is despatched in a single sentence, 
 and then all that remains is to specify briefly the several punish- 
 ments for the several grades of impiety. 
 
 4. Tcpog to nepi. Ordo — etoayayovTov npog to dmacTripiov dnode- 
 deiypevov Kpiveiv nepi tovtov. The tribunal here referred to may be 
 found described in the ninth book of the Laws, 855, D. 
 
 5. Tipopelv vnep. “ To avenge the law.” It sometimes has this 
 same sense with the dative : Tipupelv tivi , “ to avenge any one.” 
 In the middle voice, “to take revenge, or to avenge one’s self.” 
 The noun npopia, as well as Ttotg , generally has reference to vin- 
 dictive, in distinction from preventive or remedial punishment. 
 
 6. ev enaaTip. Ast would read here ev e/caorov. The construc- 
 tion, in the common reading, is somewhat unusual, but not suffi- 
 ciently so to justify the correction proposed. Tiprjpa would mean, 
 originally, an estimate , a fine ; but it is applied to any species of pun- 
 ishment, and may be rendered here, generally, pocnam or pcenas. 
 Ordo — TipuTG) to dmaGTrjpiov Tiprjpa ev eKaoTcp tuv /cad’ ev acjedovvTav , 
 equivalent to saying — in each individual case of each, or according to 
 each particular offence. 
 
 7. deopoTrjpiov de. This is the common reading. Stephanus and 
 Ast would put a comma after navi, read ye for de, and thus connect 
 the whole of this, down to tyrjprjv tivu, as an appendage to the pre- 
 ceding short sentence. Without this, it is said, the sense must re* 
 main suspended. It may be a question, however, whether this con 
 
76 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 OVTGJV EV TXf noXet TpitiV, kvog fJLSV, ttotvov 9 rocg nXsiOTOig 
 Tcepl ayopav , ourrjpLag evekcl rotg rtoXXolg rcov dcopdrojv, 
 kv'og 6e , nepl rov rco v vvtcroop ovXXeyop,evG)v %vXXoyov, oco- 
 c ppoviorrjpiov 9 ETrovopa^opEvov , kvog 6s av Kara pkorjv tt)v 
 %o )pav, omjTTEp av sprjpog te teat oyg on paAtora aypccjjra- 
 rog q Tonog , rtpcoptag e^^v kncovvptav cjirjprjv * 11 rtva. nspl 
 
 sideration alone is sufficient to justify the change, although so 
 slight. Such cases of suspension do occur in the Platonic writings, 
 in places where all efforts at correction fail ; and in the present case 
 some might suppose even the irregularity to be more tolerable than 
 the attaching so long an appendix to so short a clause, and by so 
 feeble a connective. We would suggest, moreover, whether it 
 would not be better to connect this with 7r ept aoebetav ds dvrov be- 
 low. There is, it is true, something awkward in making the enu- 
 meration of offenders an apparent inference from the number of 
 prisons, yet still there is something of a natural connexion between 
 the two ideas, so that the one might easily suggest the other, al 
 though in an inverted order. 
 
 8. koivov rots 'kAelotols. “ Common to the people at large,” that 
 is, to the ordinary class of offenders. 'ZcoTr/ptag h>Ena rcov ooparov. 
 This is precisely the phrase of the English common law — -for the safe 
 keeping of the body- — in corporis custodiam. 
 
 9. GutypovioTripLov. The police prison , or, more properly, the house 
 of correction, the place where lawless people are sobered. 
 
 10. oTzrf'KEp. “ In the very spot in which.” (!>? on paAtora ayptd- 
 rarog. These particles, thus combined, form the strongest superla- 
 tive in the power of the Greek language. The three are seldom 
 found in this manner in one expression. It may be styled a double 
 super-superlative. 
 
 11. ETzovvyiav Qrjpyv. ^ypijv here may be regarded as having the 
 force of an adjective— famosam. Or it may be rendered, “ having in 
 common fame (Kara tyrjpriv), or by common report, the appellation,” 
 &e. The first prison was for safe custody ; the second for correc- 
 tion, discipline, or reformation ; the third, the prison of vengeance 
 (npwpiac), of strictly penal restraint, intended for examples, and not 
 for the good of the offender. Plato seems to have in mind the de- 
 partments in Hades, which he specifies in the Gorgias, and to rep- 
 resent human laws as proceeding by the same grades with their 
 brethren of the other world : oi yperepot adeAQoi, oi hv Atdov NOMOI, 
 as he styles them in the Crito, 54, C. This prison would be analo- 
 gous to that division in Hell to which the avia-rot, or incurable , are 
 
CONTRA. ATHEOS. 
 
 77 
 
 aoedeiav 6e ovtuv , 12 alriaig psv rpioiv, alonep real dirjXOo- 
 pev, dvo d’ eg kndarr\g rr]£ roiavrrig alrtag y evopsvcov, Sl- 
 av yiyvoivro , a real dianpioecog a$ia yevrj rcbv irepl rd dela 
 dpapravovrcov , ovtc torjg oi>d’ opo'iag dittrjg deopeva. olg yap 
 dv prj vopi^ovoi deovg elvai ronapanav , fjdog cpvoei rrpocr- 
 yevrjrai duiaiov , piGovvreg re y'lyvovrai rovg nanovg , nal 
 to dvo^epaiveiv 13 rrjv aditdav , ovre rag roiavrag npa^eig 
 npoatevrat nparreiv , tov^* ts prj dinacovg tgjv avOpcbnoiv 
 < pevyovot , /eat TOt>£ duiaiovg crepyovoiv • olg 6 ’ av 7rpd^ tt/ 
 <56^ r?/ $£65^ eprjpa 1 * elvai irdvra, anpdreiai 15 re rjdovcov 
 
 consigned as everlasting admonitions, and spectacles of the Divine 
 vengeance : drexvug napaSetypara dvyprypevovg ticet tv A ISov tv ru 
 AE2M12THPK2I, dsapara teal vovderrjpara. Gorgias, 525, C. 
 
 12. nepl dasSetav St ovreov. An elliptical mode of expression, which 
 may be thus rendered : “ Those who are conversant with impiety, be- 
 ing so from three causes which we have described, and there being 
 two classes from each such cause, there would be, of those who of- 
 fend against Divine things, six kinds worthy of discrimination, and 
 requiring neither an equal nor a similar sentence.” 
 
 13. r<5 Svg xepaivstv. “ By having a disrelish for wrong doing,” 
 that is, a dislike arising from habit, prejudice, or an early bias of 
 the mind remaining in spite of their Atheism. 
 
 14. $efiv epypa. Nothing could convey a more vivid idea of the 
 horrors of Atheism than this expression. Every meaning of the 
 word Iprjpa crowds at once into the serious mind ; a universe de- 
 serted , lonely , solitary , waste, forsaken — a wilderness full of horror and 
 desolation in proportion to its boundless extent. Probably the best 
 antidote to Atheism, when it happens to invade the mind, and more 
 effective than any speculative argument, would be to yield up the 
 soul for a season to the deep gloom of so insupportable a thought. 
 Of course we mean not the hardened and scoffing Atheist, but one 
 to whom the most transient shade of skepticism on this point is a 
 source of pain. To quote again the line of Empedocles, we may 
 well say, in reference to such a one, 
 
 detkog d’ c5 oKOTosccra tiefiv nipi dofa peprjlev. 
 
 The expression $e£)v eprjpa seems used here by Plato as an an- 
 tithesis to that of Thales, referred to page 41, tietiv elvai nTiypy navra. 
 
 15. i iKpuretat . See remarks on this word in connexion with au* 
 typoGvvy cacohaGLa, &c., Note LXVIII., App. 
 
 G 2 
 
78 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 teal Xvtx£)v irpoGnsGcoGi, pvrjfiat ts la^vpal teal paOrjastg 
 o^slai napcoGL, to psv pi) vopi^siv tisovg apepolv 1 dv sv 
 vnap^OL teoivov naOog * Tyj 6 s to )v akXcov av 0 pd) 7 TG)v Xd) 6 xj, 
 to psv eXaTTG), to 6 s tcXslg) teatea spya^oiT 1 av. 6 psv yap 
 Aoycp* ts av nspl tisovg napprjoiag sir] psGTog teal nspl tiv- 
 otag ts teal opteovg , teal c bg tcov a/ iXcjv teaTaysXcbv tci %* 
 dv sTspovg TOiovTOvg anspya^oLTO, dltcrjg pi) Tvyxdveov • 6 
 6 s 6 r) 6 o%d£(i)v 2 psv teaOansp aTspog , sv(j)vi)g 6 s snueaXovps- 
 vog , 60 H 0 V 6 s teal svs 6 pag nX rjprjg, s% &v pavTstg ts teaTaa- 
 Ksva^ovTat noXXol teal nspl ndoav tt)v payyavsiav testeevr)- 
 psvoc . 3 yiyvovTai 6 s s£ avTtov sgtlv ots teal Tvpavvot teal 
 6 rjprjy 6 poi teal OTpaTrjyoL, teal TsXsTalg 6 s I 6 iaig smbsbov- 
 XsvteoTsg , 4 GoepiGTcbv ts snueaXovpsvGiv prjxavae . 5 6 7 tovtcjv 
 6 i) noXXd i usv sl 6 r] ysvoiT 9 dv • rd 6 s vopcjv a^ta tisosug 
 6 vo , &v to psv sipG)viteov 6 to ovx evog ov 6 s 6 volv a^ta 
 'davcLTOiv 1 dpapTavov , to 6s vovOsx'rjGscog dpa teal 6 sGpcbv 
 
 1. ujLLcpolv. This word relates back to the preceding sentence, not- 
 withstanding it had been apparently fully closed and takes in both 
 classes, as far as they hold the atheistic sentiment in common al- 
 though with different practical results. 
 
 2. 6 pev yap loyu. See Note LXXII., App., on the different spe- 
 cies of Atheists, according to the Platonic division. A o£d&v .... 
 EV(j)vr/g. See Note LXXII., App. 
 
 3. KEKivripivoL. “ Who are most strenuously and violently en- 
 gaged in every species of juggling or legerdemain.” 
 
 4. ettlSeSovTievkote^. Not simply “ those who attempt private 
 mysteries,” mysteria privata molientes , as some render it, but, rather, 
 “those who, by means of such mysteries, plot to deceive other 
 men.” We would, therefore, regard TsXEraig as the dative of the 
 instrument. 
 
 5. p7ix avai cotyLGT&v. The abstract is used here for the concrete. 
 It is an expression equivalent to ol ralg pr)x ava go^lgtcjv xpdpEvoi, 
 “ those who use sophistical arts.” 
 
 6. to psv EipidviKov . See Note LXXII., App. 
 
 7. ovx &OQ ovd e dvolv tiavaToiv. That is, either one or two deaths 
 would be too small a punishment for him. No one will think this 
 sentence too severe, who has carefully studied those specimens of 
 
CONTRA ATHE08. 
 
 7'J 
 
 ( hopEVov. coodVTug 6 e* /cal to dsovg vopi&iv a^eXelv 6v ’ 
 erepa yevva , nai to TTdpdLTTjTOvg dXXd dvo. tovtcov 6t) 
 tclvtxi 6l£Ott]ic6tg)v, Toi)g p£V vn ’ avotag , avev ndurjg dpyrjg 
 te ^ yeyevrjpevovg, eig to ococppoviOTrjpiov 6 diK.ao- 
 
 Ti)g TiOepevog vdj pep, tlOeoOco prjdev eXclttov etlov ttevte. 
 ev tovtg) d's tgj XP° VC P p^Elg tcov ttoXltc)v dVTolg dXXog 
 ovyyiyvEodo), TrXfjv oi tov vvKTEpivov %vXXoyov 9 kolvgj- 
 
 VOVVTEg , E7TL VOvPeTT[GEI TE KCLL T%f TTjg 'IpVX^ 0(0T7]ptd Opi- 
 XovvTEg . 10 otclv (T 6 XP° V0 S a vToZg e^eXO^ tCov dEoptiv, kciv 
 piv 60 KXI ri S OG)(j)pOV£CV dVTGJV , olfCELTG) p£Td T(x)V OGXj)pO - 
 
 this abominable character to which we have referred, Note LXXII., 
 App. 
 
 8. tJGavTuc tie. The doctrines, that there was no special Provi- 
 dence, and that the Gods were easily propitiated, gave rise also, 
 each respectively, to two species of offenders, distinguished by 
 characters analogous to those above presented, and. requiring each 
 a different mode and gradation of punishment ; the mildest form of 
 which was to be imprisonment in the GoQpovLGTrjpLov, or house of 
 correction, for a term not less than five years. Such a law, among 
 us at the present day, would be thought greatly to infringe on men’s 
 religious liberties — on the precious right to be an Atheist or blas- 
 phemer. 
 
 9. wfcrepivov guXXoyov. See Note LXXIII., App. 
 
 10. ki n vovOerriGec re Kal ry ryg 'ipvxyg Gurypta ofuhovvreg. “ Con- 
 versing with them for admonition, and for the salvation of the soul.” 
 It is interesting to meet thus in a heathen writer with that very 
 expression with which from infancy we have been accustomed to as- 
 sociate the most sacred ideas of Christianity. We may, perhaps, have 
 given it too much of a Scriptural aspect in our rendering of Gorypia , 
 — the term, as thus presented by Plato, being undoubtedly to be taken 
 in a somewhat lower sense — yet still, with all qualifications, what an 
 immense difference does such language, employed in such connex- 
 ions, make between him and all other philosophers and legislators 
 either of ancient or modern times. The phrase Gurypca Tpvxyc seems 
 also to have been intended by way of antithesis to the expression 
 GtdTrjpLCLQ cuparog, some distance back, page 76 (8). In this view, the 
 aucfipoviGTTjpiov was not only intended, in corporis custodio.m lor the 
 safe keeping of the body , but also for the well-beings health , m salva- 
 tion of the soul. 
 
80 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 vg)v • eav 6s firj , depstXxi & avQig rrjv rotavr7]v dlfcrjv , tiavd- 
 rep £ rjfuovoQu ). ogol d’ av '&7]pLd)6sig 11 ysvcjvrat npog rep 
 &£oi)g i ill) vopi^stv rj apEXslg rj 7TapatT7]rovg elvai , nara- 
 (ppovovvreg 6s tgov avQp g)tto)v 'ipvxayuytiGt, 10 psv noXXovg 
 tQ)v (juvrcjv rovg 6s rsdvscdrag <j> aanovreg 'ipyx^yo^yslv^ 
 nal tieovg vmGxvovpsvoi Ttsidsiv , <bg dvotatg re teat evxalg 
 nal ETTcpdalg yorjrEvovrEg, I6td)rag te nal oXag olniag teal 
 rtoXstg xpr)p,aTG) v x^P LV smxstpfoc n tear ’ anpag 11 stjaipslv, 
 tovtg)v 6s og av ocpXcov sivat 66 rtparG) to 6uiaorrjpiov 
 avrep Kara vopov, 6s6sGdat psv sv rep rCbv pEGoysiodv 6eg- 
 fjiG)rr]pL(p * irpoGLEvai 6s avrtp pi^Eva sXEvdspov pr)6snoTE y 
 raicrrjv 6s vjto ro)v vopopvXdnenv avrovg Tpocprjv napa rcbv 
 oitcETCov Xapdavstv, airodavovra 6s e£g) tgjv dptcjv snbaX- 
 Xelv ara<pov. sav 6s ng EXsvOspog GwOdirr ^ , 6tnag clge6el- 
 
 11. ti-ypLudeig. See remarks on this word, page 69 (5). The man- 
 ner in which it is used here seems to confirm the view that was 
 there taken. In this place reference is had to the character de- 
 scribed, page 78, as dolov nal kvtdpag n^prjg, which corresponds 
 poorly to { typiddeig in the sense of ferocious. Guile and jugglery, 
 which are the leading traits, are not in keeping with such a mean- 
 ing, although perfectly consistent with such beastly views of the 
 Divine nature as may be entertained by an Atheist, or a Simon 
 Magus, or such a one as is described Note LXXII., App. 
 
 10. 'tpvxayuycjffc. This term, in its primary sense, is applied to 
 Mercury as conductor of the souls of the dead to Hades. In a second- 
 ary sense, it is employed of those who pretended to raise ghosts by 
 magic arts : qui imprccando et cantando animas ex inferis in terrain 
 cvocabant. A third meaning is to cajole or allure the soul by flatteries 
 or sophistry. It is thus applied by the buffoon Aristophanes to 
 Socrates himself, in the Comedy of the Birds, 1551 : 
 
 A ipvrj Tig £gt’ ahovrog, ov 
 ipvxayoyel 'Zcokpa.TTjg. 
 
 Plato uses the word here in both the two latter senses. 
 
 • 11. /car’ anpag. Compare the Iliad, N., 772. : 
 
 Ntfv &7ieto Tzaoa tear’ atcpiyg 
 v \7uog ciiTzeivrj. 
 
 Sometimes it is written as one word, KaraKpag , as in Soph-., Antig.* 
 200 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 81 
 
 ag tg) eQeXovtl Xayx&veiv vn e^erG). naldag 6e dv fxev na - 
 raXiTix) 12 t%i ttoXel Inavovg , oi tcgv opcpavCbv ETnpeXovps- 
 vol 13 nal tovtg)v, d)g ovtgjv opepavtiv, etupeXeloOg)v prjdbv 
 XElpov tg)v aXXo)v, and Tijg rjpEpag ?]g dv 6 naTrjp ai)TG)v 
 o<pfo] rrjv dtnrjv. notvov 14r (5’ knl rovroig naoc vopov nElodai 
 XpSG)v, og EXaTTG) te slg dEovg avTcbv rovg noXXovg epyrn 
 nai Xdyep ttXtjppeXeIv dv noiol , nal di) nal dvorjrovg ylyvecr- 
 Oat tjttov , Sea ro p,fj et-elvai $ eottoXelv napa vopov. egtg) 
 yap vopog obs rolg ^vpnaGi HEtpEvog dnXtig • f I spa prjds 
 sig ev idtatg olniatg EicrrjoOG). 'dvEtv 6’ orav ettl vovv I'q 
 T tvt, npbg ra drjpoGta ltg) dvoGiv • real rolg lEpsvGi te nal 
 LEpEtatg Eyx^p^TG) ra ftypara, olg.ayvEta tovtgov etu\le - 
 Xr\g • GWEv^aodG) 6e avrog te nal og dv eOeX^j i ust’ avTOv 
 GWEvx^odai. TavTa 6e ytyvopsva tgjv tolgjv6e x^9 iV egtg). 
 lepa 15 nal tiEovg ov padtov IdpvEoOat, j UEydXrjg ds diavolag 
 Tivog dpO&g dpav to toiovtov • bOog te yvvai^t te drj dta- 
 (pspovTGjg ndoatg nal Tolg aodEvovoi ndvTTj nal nivdvvEv- 
 ovgi nal anopovoiv , onrj Tig dv anopyj, nal TOvvavTiov , 
 OTav Evnoptag Tivog Xa6G)VTat , naOiEpovv te to napov asl 
 
 12. 7r aldag be dv (lev naraXiny. This to others must have been 
 intended as the most solemn and impressive part of the law, much 
 more so than the casting of the unburied body beyond the boundaries 
 of the state. The children of the Atheist were to become orphans 
 immediately after his sentence to solitary imprisonment, that is, 
 after his civil death. The domestic relations were to be regarded as 
 no longer existing in the case of the man who had sundered, as far 
 as in him lay, his relations to God. In the language of the Jewish 
 law, he was to he utterly cut off from his 'people. 
 
 13. oi tuv optyavtiv empe’kov[Levoi. These were to be the fifteen 
 oldest Nomophulakes, who were to have the general charge of all 
 matters relating to orphans, wills, wards, and wardship. They are 
 mentioned book eleventh of the Laws, 924, C. They were to be 
 divided into five classes of three each, to serve successively, each 
 class for one year. 
 
 14. kolvov ’em tovtolq ttclgl vopov. See Note LXXIV., App. 
 
 15. 'lepa nal -d-eovg ov padiov IdpveoOai. See Note LXXIV., App., 
 on private innovations in religion. 
 
82 
 
 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 /cal dvGtag evx^odac /cal IdpvGeig imax^eladac deoZg /cal 
 datpoGi 1 2 /cal Ttatoi decoy, ev re (fodapaatv eyprjyoporag 2 did 
 cj)66ovg /cal ev ovetpoig , cog d’ avrcog bxfjeig iroXXag airopvrj- 
 povevovrag, e/caGratGi 3 re avrebv a/crj rrotovpevovg ficopovg 
 /cal lepd , redoag pev ohdag , ixdoag tie iccopag, ev re icada - 
 polg 4 5 6 tdpvopevovg epiriir’kavai, /cal onr] rig ervxs rcbv roiov- 
 rcov. cov eve/ca XP'U 77 dvrcov iroieZv /card rov vvv Xeyope- 
 vov vopov * irpbg rovrotg de eve/ca rcbv aoebovvrcov , Iva 
 prj /cal ravra tcXercrovreg irpa^eGtvf lepd re /cal ficopovg ev 
 Idtatg oi/datg idpvopevoi, XaOpa rovg deovg IXecog olopevot 
 iroieZv dvGtatg re /cal evx^Zg, elg drretpov rrjv adi/dav av%- 
 avovreg , avroZg re ey/cXrjpara irpog deebv iroicbvrai , /cal 
 rolg emrperrovGiv , ovglv avrebv fieXriooc • /cal iraGa ovrcog 
 ?} iroXtg airoXavtf rcbv daebcov rponov nvd ducatcog. rbv 
 
 1. deoeg kclI daipoai teal natal detov. See Note LXVII., on the doc- 
 trine of the Daemons or Genii. 
 
 2. eypr/yoporag. When awake , vigilantes , as opposed to ev oveipoig. 
 This presents a case of anakolouthon } and is to be referred to the 
 datives yvvai^i and aodevovoi above. A id cpoSovg here, as Ast ob- 
 serves, is to be taken as equivalent to ne^oSrjyevovg, perterritos. 
 
 3. endcTaioi. The feminine is used in reference to oipeig, the 
 last mentioned, although the word belongs equally to cpdcrpaoiv and 
 oveipoig. 
 
 4. ev re uadapotg. Sub dio , in the open air. 
 
 5. tclenrovreg npatjeaiv. In this expression the verbal noun 
 npd^eaiv has the force of the verb, and the participle Kkenrovreg is 
 used like a qualifying adverb, as though it had been laOpa npdr- 
 rovreg. 
 
 6. Kal ndoa ovrcog rj nokig dno\avy. We have here the ancient 
 universal doctrine of The State as an organic whole or body , with a 
 national conscience, in distinction from the very modern notion of a 
 mere mass or aggregate of individual wills. As an organic whole , it 
 was morally responsible for every part. Crime unpunished not only 
 infected the moral health, but brought also justly imputed guilt upon 
 the entire corporate organization. No reader of the Old Testament 
 can doubt that this doctrine was taught there in all its apparent 
 severity. We need only refer in proof to the case of Achan, Josh, 
 vii., 25, and other striking examples of those who troubled , ox wrought 
 
CONTRA ATHEOS. 
 
 83 
 
 uev dr) vopoOerrjv o deog ov pep'i/jerat. kelgOo yap 6 vopog 
 ovrog, pi) KEKTTjodac &eov ev Idiatg obcla/g lepd • rov de 
 ( pavevra /ce/crrjpevov erepa /cal opyta^ovra Trkrjv rd drjpo- 
 aia, eav pev aducov prjdev rov peyaXov /cal avoaiov elp~ 
 yaapevog avr)p i] /cal yvvrj /ce/CTryral rig , 6 pev aloOopevog 
 /cal eloayyeXXsTG) rolg vopo$v\a%iv , ol de tt poor arr ovr ov 
 elg ra drjpoGia dicoepepeiv lepd rd Idia, pi) nelOovreg de 
 ^rjpcovvrov, eog av direvexO'Q . eav de rig aoebrjoag pi) 
 itaidlov aAA’ avdpov daedrjpa avoGtov yevryrai (pavepog , 
 elre ev Idcotg idpvoapevog , eh 9 ev drjpooloLg ftvaag lepd $e- 
 olg oloriGivovv , og ov tcadapog ov *&vov, davaro typtovG- 
 6o* to de, rcaidiov r\ prj, Kptvavreg vopocpvXa/ceg, elg to 
 ducaorrjpiov ovrog elaayayovreg, ri)v r r\g aoebetag dhcrjv 
 Tovroig emreXovvTOV. 
 
 folly in Israel. The same sentiment may often be found io the 
 Greek poets. Compare, especially, Hesiod, Works and Days, 223 : 
 UoUclki Kal ^vpieana n o?.tg kclkov avdpog anijvpa, 
 bong akirpaivei Kal drdoOaXa prixavdarai. 
 
 Tolmv d’ ovpavoQe v p£y* eTrrjXaoe irrjpa Kpovlov , 
 
 Xtpov opov Kal TiOipov * aTzotydivvOovoi de Tiaoi. 
 ovde yvvaiKeg tlktovglv * pivvQovcu de ohoi, 
 
 Zrjvbg (ppadpoavvyc nv ’O XvpnLov * uXXore 6’ avrt 
 fj tljv ye crparov evpvv dmoXeaev , r) bye rec^og > 
 r) viag ev novrep Kpovidr/g anoTtvvrai avr&v. 
 

 .^AA 
 
 EXTENDED NOTES 
 
 AND 
 
 DISSERTATIONS, 
 
 SUGGESTED BY PASSAGES IN THE TEXT, ON SOME OP THE PRINCIPAL 
 POINTS OF THE 
 
 PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY, 
 
 ESPECIALLY AS COMPARED WITH THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ; 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 SOME EXPLANATIONS OP DIFFICULT PASSAGES AT GREATER LENGTH THAN 
 WOULD BE CONVENIENT IN MARGINAL OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 vwnaa vwvyv . 
 
 \ 
 
EXTENDED NOTES 
 
 AND 
 
 DISSERTATIONS. 
 
 r. 
 
 The Platonic View of the Parental and Filial Relations , and 
 the Ancient D.octrine generally on this Subject. 
 
 Page 2, Line 8. ’E^ 6e yoveag. A misconception of 
 the end and scope of the Republic, or, as it should be more 
 properly styled, The Dialogue on the Nature of Right or 
 Righteousness (rtepl dutaiov ), has subjected the name of 
 Plato to great reproach. He has been charged with main- 
 taining, in the fifth book of that dialogue, sentiments which, 
 if carried out, would result in the utter overthrow of all the 
 domestic relations. A defence, had we space for it here, 
 might be derived from the peculiar parabolical or allegorical 
 nature of that work, and from the evident absence of any 
 design that it should serve as the model of any actual ex- 
 isting polity. Whether, however, this be regarded as a 
 right view of the Republic or not, and whatever we may 
 think of the justice of the charge to which he may there be 
 thought to have exposed himself, there can be no doubt 
 that in this treatise (nepl vopwv), in which he means to ap- 
 pear in the character of a serious legislator for a really 
 practicable , if not existing state, he takes special pains to 
 remove the reproach to which, even in his own day, he 
 had been subjected on account of the passages referred to 
 This long dialogue on legislation was the work of his old 
 age, and in it he strives to set in the highest light the 
 sanctity of the domestic, and especially the filial and pa- 
 
88 
 
 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE 
 
 rental relations. For the strongest proof of this, we might 
 refer, among many other passages, to what is said in the 
 ninth book, 881 , A., and especially to that most striking 
 and beautiful passage, lib. xi., 931 , A., in which he speaks 
 of the veneration of children towards their parents as a re- 
 ligious. rather than a merely moral or political duty, and 
 not only this, but also as involving acts partaking of the na- 
 ture of religious worship. We would recommend to the 
 student the close study of the whole argument, not only for 
 its exceeding moral beauty, but also as a most triumphant 
 refutation of the charge that Plato, like some modern re. 
 formers, would have destroyed the family state. Tovscjv 
 6s dfisXelv, ovrs $£ o g ovrs avOpconog vovv e%G)v ^vpibovXog 
 7TOTG ysvoir ’ dv ov6sig ovdev'i. (j)povr]aai 6s xprj rrepi tietiv, 
 tc. r. X. In this passage he not only sets in the highest 
 light the sanctity of the relation, and of the duties resulting, 
 but would deduce from it a method of indirectly reforming 
 the grossness of some parts of religious worship, by sub- 
 stituting the holy feeling of filial veneration for the idola- 
 trous adoration household images of the Gods. He 
 would have their place occupied by the venerable living 
 form of the aged sire or grandsire, as the household ayaX- 
 pa, or image of the Eternal Father. UarTjp ovv orcp real 
 fXTjTTjp rj tovtcov narspeg rj [irjrspsg sv oIklcl uslvrai fcstfirj- 
 Xlol CLTTSCpTjKOTsg yijpa, prjbslg 6iavo7]drjTG) n otg ayaXpa 
 
 aVTCO, TOLOVTOV S(j)SGTLOV l6pV\LCL SV olu'iCb pLCbXXoV 
 
 Kvpcov sgsgOcu, sdv 6ij Kara rponov ye opOcbg avro depa- 
 7 tsvxi b Keurriiievog . “ If any one hath a father, or mother, 
 
 or grandparents worn out with age, and laid up as sacred 
 relics in his house, let him never suppose, as long as he 
 possesses this altar of the domestic hearth, that any other 
 dyaXpa or sacred image is more worthy of his adoration, 
 provided he knows how to worship it aright.” And again, 
 931, D., ’0 vkovv biavorjOtifiev d>g ov6sv TTpog 'Sscov 
 repov ayaXfjia dv KTrjGaifJLsda rrarpog real rrpondropog n a- 
 
FILIAL RELATION. 
 
 89 
 
 peifievcov yrjpa na) prjrepcov rrjv avrrjv dvvaiuv ex ov(7( ^ v — 
 ov( ; ogov ayaXX't] rig npalg yeyrjQev o $ eog. “Let us, 
 then, believe that we can have no religions image more pre- 
 cious in the sight of Heaven than a father, or grandfather, 
 or mother worn out with age, and that in proportion as we 
 honour or delight in them with a religious joy (so ayaX- 
 Xq, whence ayaXfia, may be rendered here , as in Pindar , 
 Olymp ., i., 139), in the same proportion does God himself 
 rejoice.” If this is idolatry, it is certainly far more inno- 
 cent than that which is practised by the professedly 
 Christian Church of Rome. What a beautiful and affect- 
 ing picture is here presented ! The aged and infirm parent 
 not only revered in the secret sanctuary of the heart, but 
 actually regarded, if not as the very household deity of the 
 secluded domestic temple, yet, in truth, as the best visible 
 representation or eltccov , through whom homage was to be 
 rendered to the Invisible God. Sophocles seems to have 
 had in mind something of this same beautiful conception in 
 the Antigone, 703 : 
 
 T t yap narpog '&aXXovrog, svtcXeiag tskvolq 
 
 ’'ATAAMA j uel^ov ; 
 
 There is not the same high meaning to dyaXpa here as 
 in Plato, although in other respects the language is striking- 
 ly similar. It more strongly resembles Proverbs, xvii., 6 : 
 □nnx lZPJS mXDn> where the Hebrew word mxsn has 
 
 r — ; • r V V : • t t • # 
 
 a striking affinity to the Greek ayaXpa, being like it, too, 
 used in a religious sense, as in Psalm lxxviii., 61, where 
 it is applied to the ark of the covenant. 
 
 As a consequence of this religious relation, Plato attaches 
 great importance to the blessing and curse of a parent, and 
 in this he is in accordance with one of the most ancient 
 and universal doctrines that have ever prevailed among 
 mankind. After reciting the examples of Theseus, CEdipus, 
 and Amyntor, he thus proceeds : apalog yap yovevg knyovoig 
 
 H 2 
 
90 
 
 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF TIIE 
 
 dig ovdeig erepog aXkoig dLnaiorara, 931, C. “For the 
 curse of a parent (to give a free rendering) comes loaded 
 with calamity to children in a way that is true of no other 
 relations.” Wherefore, as he says in another passage, 
 nag drj vovv (frodelrai teal npa yoveuv ei>xdg, eldcbg 
 
 noXAoig nai noXXdmg emreXelg yevopevag , 931 , A. “ Every 
 one that hath reason both fears and honours the prayers of 
 parents, knowing well that often, and to many, have they 
 been fulfilled.” How deeply this sentiment was impressed 
 upon the minds of the Grecian poets, and how important an 
 element it forms of their most tragic representations, we 
 may learn from the dismal effects and long train of calam- 
 itous consequences which they set forth as following the 
 imprecations of CEdipus upon his unnatural sons. The 
 sad story of Hippolytus, who, although innocent, is repre- 
 sented by Euripides as perishing under a father’s impreca- 
 tion, exhibits the same doctrine, although in a most pervert- 
 ed and distorted form. The dying cry which the poet puts 
 into the mouth of the wretched young man, 
 d) narpog epov dvarrjvog dpa , 
 
 shows how awful was the calamity which the ancient world 
 universally regarded as involved in a parent’s curse. The 
 converse doctrine, namely, the importance of the parental 
 blessing, is certainly one of the most clearly taught truths 
 of the Old Testament. How consonant it is, both with the 
 language and spirit of Scripture, no one need be told who 
 recollects the value attached to the blessing of the Patriach 
 Isaac, and the declarations of the dying Jacob to the twelve 
 heads of Israel, besides many other passages which are 
 founded upon the same idea. 
 
 It was a prominent principle in all the ancient systems 
 of law and religion that the relation of parent and child 
 gave rise to religious , rather than merely civil obligations. 
 Hence Aristotle says, eotc d’ rj pev npog yovelg (\uXia tek- 
 voig tig avOpunoig npog fieovg * rov yap elvat nal Tpacprjvai 
 
FILIAL RELATION. 
 
 91 
 
 cm.ot, teal yevofievotg rov tt cudsvOrjvcu. Ethic , Nicomach . , 
 viii., 12, 5. They belonged to the class of duties styled 
 '6(ua, in distinction from those that were only diicaia , and 
 their violation was regarded among offences committed 
 directly against Heaven. Something of this feeling has 
 come down and affected even modern languages. Hence 
 we speak of filial piety or impiety. On this account the 
 Bible makes this relation the subject of the first command- 
 ment immediately following the direct duties we owe to God, 
 and hence, too, the Jewish law punished the crime with 
 such unrelenting severity, as though, if permitted to pass 
 with impunity, it would be the fruitful source of every viola- 
 tion, both of the laws of Heaven and Earth. The filial and 
 parental tie seems to have been regarded as a continuation 
 of that which bound us to God, and hence, in strictest har- 
 mony with this view, Plato regards the man who had sun- 
 dered the latter as having utterly annihilated the duties and 
 obligations of the former. On this account, as we have 
 seen in a passage on which we have already commented, 
 page 8 1 , the children of the Atheist were to be regarded as 
 orphans, and placed under the care of the state. 
 
 The importance of this relation in a political point of 
 view, may be inferred from the fifth commandment itself. 
 The promise annexed has generally been referred to indi- 
 viduals. It appears to us, however, to have more of a po- 
 litical aspect, and to be addressed to the nation collective- 
 ly. The language certainly seems to favour this idea : 
 “ that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy 
 God giveth thee intimating that the long continuance of 
 their national polity in the land of Canaan would depend, 
 more than on anything else, on the preservation of this fund- 
 amental conservative article ; on the reverence with which 
 this duty should be regarded, as forming the connecting 
 link between the civil and the more purely religious, and 
 as being the source and guarantee of every inferior domestic 
 
92 
 
 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF TIIE 
 
 and political obligation. For undoubted examples of the 
 same and similar language, used in the national instead of 
 the individual sense, see Deuteronomy, iv., 2G, 40 ; v., 30 ; 
 vi., 2. 
 
 In accordance with this universal sentiment of antiquity, 
 Plato, in the passage at the beginning of these remarks, 
 and in other places in the Laws, enumerates duties to 
 parents as immediately succeeding those which are owed 
 to God, and ranks their violation as next in enormity to 
 public and private sacrilege. Compare the fourth book of 
 the Laws, 717, B., and especially a most remarkable pas- 
 sage in the ninth book, 881, A. : Ilarpc^ yap rj prjrpbg i) 
 rovrcov ere 7 Tpoyovcov bang roXprjoet a\pao0ai u ore /3ca%o- 
 pevog alicta tlvc, prjre tgjv avo) deioag 'deebv prjviv, prjre 
 tCjv vtto yrjg npopiCdv Xeyopevuv, dXXd tearaeppovtiv rcbv 
 7 raXatcov nai vno irdvrov elprjpevov rrapavopel , rovrep del 
 TLVog anoTponrjg eoxdrrjg. $ avarog pev ovv ovk eonv 
 eax^TOV, oi de ev f/ A idov tovtolol Xeyopevoi ttovol , &c. 
 ‘‘If any one shall dare to treat with violence father or 
 mother, or any one of his or their progenitors, having before 
 his eyes neither the fear of the powers above, nor of the 
 vengeance of the world beneath, but, despising the ancient 
 and universal traditions of mankind, shall break through all 
 law, for such a one there is need of some most extreme 
 remedy. Death, then, is not this greatest or most extreme 
 remedy, but something still beyond this, even those pains 
 of Hell which are said to await these enormous offenders.” 
 The whole passage is full of dreadful meaning, which can 
 with difficulty be transferred to the English. We have no 
 word which comes up to the Greek dnorponf. It is ap- 
 plied to the most solemn religious act by which we may 
 avert the wrath of Heaven for some enormous wickedness, 
 and hence the terms anorponaiog , drcorpomaGpog , inauspi- 
 cious , that which is to he averted hy sacrifice , an expiation 
 or turning aivay of the Divine wrath , and, in a secondary 
 
FILIAL RELATION. 
 
 93 
 
 sense, whatever is most odious or an utter abomination. In 
 all lists of great crimes, as presented to us by the poets, 
 one of the worst abodes in Tartarus is ever assigned to of- 
 fenders of this description, and thus Paul classes those who 
 are guilty of violence towards their parents among the un- 
 holy and 'profane : dvoaioig nai fiebrjXoig TrarpaXtiaig nal 
 pyrpaAcpaig. 1 Timothy, i., 9. 
 
 The holiness of the family relation is intimated, in the 
 ancient mythology, by the worship of Vesta; and the per- 
 petual cherishing of the domestic affections, as affording 
 the vivifying and fructifying warmth by which all social 
 and political institutions must be preserved, is represented 
 in the Eternal Fire. Well did Cicero say, in aris et focis 
 est Respublica. This intimate connexion is set forth by the 
 Greek and Latin poets in almost every form of expression. 
 Virgil presents the holy alliance in one line : 
 
 Sacra Deum sanctique patres. 
 
 Georg., ii., 473. 
 
 And this seems but a reiteration of the precept, Leviticus, 
 xix., 2, and of the order in which the religious and family 
 duties are there given. Speak unto all the congregation of 
 Israel , and say unto them , Ye shall be holy , for I the Lord 
 your God am holy. Fear ye every man his father and his 
 mother . I am the Lord your God. 
 
 The obligation of filial obedience, as the fountain of all 
 moral and political virtues, is thus beautifully set forth in a 
 fragment of Euripides from Stobaeus : 
 
 *'E yco o pev MEIT2TON ap^opai Xeyeiv 
 
 etc rovde upCorov • narpl TteWeoOai XP £ ^ V 
 naldag, vopi&LV r’ avro rovF dvai diicrjv. 
 
 Eurip. Alopa. 
 
 So, also, in a still more striking fragment of the same 
 poet, in which duties to parents are ranked next after those 
 due the Gods, and before mere political obligations: 
 
94 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FILIAL RELATION. 
 
 rpslg holv aperal ag XPV clokeIv go teuvov, 
 
 0EOY2 re rtpav, rovg re dpsipavrag T0NEI2, • 
 N0M0T2 re Kotvovg f E XXadog - teal ravra dptiv 
 k&XXlotov e^eig ore(j)avov evtcXeiag aei. 
 
 Eurip. Antiope. 
 
 W e have dwelt the longer on this, because we think 
 that Plato’s views here, and in many other places in the 
 Laws and other dialogues, furnish a complete refutation of 
 the charge, which might otherwise be drawn from the fifth 
 book of the Republic ; and because, at the present day, 
 even with all the declarations of the Bible, the relation 
 seems to be becoming divested of that sanctity which it 
 anciently possessed. In the theories of some, it is placed 
 even below civil duties. So far from being thought to pos- 
 sess any religious character, it is denied that it forms a sub- 
 ject even for political legislation. It is ranked among im- 
 perfect obligations , and is never with us, except in some few 
 cases of pauperism, enforced by law. Why, when so 
 many inferior subjects are made matters of legislation, this 
 fundamental and all-conservative relation should have so 
 little space assigned to it in our jurisprudence, it would be 
 difficult to say. The effects, however, which will inevita- 
 bly result, in loosening the whole political structure, can be 
 far more easily and with more certainty predicted. The 
 relation and the duties resulting are also attacked by spuri- 
 ous reformers, who, under the name of a cold and heart- 
 hardening universal benevolence, or love to being in general, 
 would utterly break up all the family ties, and destroy all 
 the associations connected with that holy word, Our Home. 
 These men sometimes, in their ignorance, make stale second- 
 hand quotations from Plato, and we would wish to rescue 
 him from their profane’ grasp. 
 
PREAMBLE, OR ADVISORY PART OF THE LAW. 95 
 
 II. 
 
 The Words Trpootptov and i rapapvOcov. The Preamble , 
 
 the Advisory or Argumentative Part of the Law . 
 
 Page 2, Line 16. To tt apapvOiov vnodepevcp prjreov a 
 dec Ttaoxti'V- “ The lawgiver (vopoOerq, understood ) must 
 declare what each one must suffer, after having put under, 
 by way of hypothesis or foundation, an exhortation or pre- 
 amble.” Another reading has tt pooiptov, which is followed 
 by Ficinus. They both, however, would possess nearly 
 the same significance. II poolfuov would literally mean 44 a 
 preface or preamble tt apapvOiov, 44 an exhortatory ex- 
 
 ordium,” containing the ground or reason of the law. This 
 the philosopher deemed essentially and peculiarly neces- 
 sary in those institutions that related to religion. Such an 
 exhortation or argument, by way of preamble, nearly the 
 whole of this tenth book may be considered, as only the 
 last few pages are devoted to the preceptive declaration, 
 and the penal statute founded upon it. In a more limited 
 sense, however, the TrapapvQiov here intended is contained 
 in what immediately follows. In like manner, Cicero, in 
 evident imitation of Plato, introduces in his treatise De 
 Legibus a similar Tcpooipcov , in which he makes religious 
 belief and reverence the only true foundation of law and 
 of every form of civil polity. It may be found in that noble 
 passage, lib. ii., sec. vii. : Sit igitur hoc a principio per- 
 suasion civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores 
 Deos, eaque quae gerantur, eorum geri judicio ac numine, 
 eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri, et, qualis 
 quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua 
 pietate colat religiones, intueri, piorumque et impiorum 
 habere rationem. His enim rebus imbutae mentes, haud 
 sane abhorrebunt ab utili ac vera sententia. Quid est enim 
 verius, quam nemincm esse oportere tarn stulte arrogantem, 
 ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in coelo m undo quo 
 
96 PREAMBLE, OR ADVISORY PART OF THE LAW. 
 
 non putet ? aut ut ea, quae vix sumraa ingenii ratione compre- 
 hendat, nulla ratione moveri putet ? Utiles esse autem 
 opiniones has, quis neget, quum intelligat, quam multa fir- 
 mentur jurejurando, quantae salutis sit foederum religiones, 
 quam multos Divini supplicii metus a scelere revocarit, 
 quamque SANCTA SIT SOCIETAS civium inter ipsos, 
 Diis immortalibus interpositis turn judicibus , turn testibus. 
 Habes legis PROCEMIUM : sic enim hoc appellat Plato. 
 
 What a striking contrast between the sentiments of these 
 noble heathen, and those of many modern political theories, 
 constitutions, and boasting bills of rights, from which the 
 very names of God, religion, Christianity, or the least allu- 
 sion to any bond ( religio ) by which the visible state is 
 connected with the invisible world, are as carefully ex- 
 cluded, as though they were the deadliest foes to the po- 
 litical happiness of mankind. 
 
 On this subject we may compare also the sublime npool * 
 jjuov in the Timasus, or the Dialogue in which Plato at- 
 tempts to set forth the universal code of laws which govern 
 both the physical and intelligible universe. The preamble 
 or TTpoolfUov there, is found in that remarkable passage, in 
 which he divides all things into what he styles, to 5/ ON 
 /l lev del yevecnv de ovk s%ov * ual to riTNOMENON per, 
 ov de ovdenoTE. to pev di) vorjoec pETa Xoyov nepiXprcTov, 
 del Kara Tavra ov • to de do^rj peT ’ aloOrjoecog aXoyov , 
 do^aorov, yiyvopevov, real dnoXXvpevov. ovTog de ovdenoTE 
 ov. That which eternally IS and hath never generation , 
 and that which is ever BECOMING or being generated , and 
 never truly IS ; the one received by the intelligence with 
 reason, always BEING in the same relations, the other re- 
 ceived by opinion with irrational sense, ever becoming, perish - 
 ing, and never truly , and in the highest sense, having a sub - 
 stantive being. — Timwus, 27, P. This he evidently intends 
 as a preamble to the system of physical and psychological 
 legislation contained in that wonderful dialogue; for after 
 
SUBJECTIVE SENSE OF THE WORD aXrjOeVG). 97 
 
 dwelling upon the above distinction at some length, pre- 
 paratory to the statement of the universal laws of mind and 
 matter, Timaeus is thus addressed by Socrates : to pev ovv 
 IIPOOIMION davpaoicog arced e^apeOd gov , rov de 6?) NO- 
 MON rjplv ecpe^g rcepatve, “ Since in such a wonderful 
 way we have received from you the 'preamble , next in order 
 propound to us the law” Timaeus, 29, C. 
 
 III. 
 
 Subjective Sense of the Word aXrjOevG). 
 
 Page 4, Line 9. 0 v/covv, cj %eve, do/cel padcov eivai 
 dXrfevovrag Xeyetv cog eioi tieoi ; “ Does it not, then, seem 
 to be an easy matter to affirm, in all truthfulness, that there 
 are Gods, or that the Gods exist ?” ’A XrjOevo), although it 
 includes in its signification the utterance of truth, and there 
 are many passages in which it must be so rendered, has 
 yet reference rather to truth of feeling than to truth of ex- 
 pression, to that which belongs to the subjective state of 
 the soul or the moral diathesis, rather than to that which is 
 the result of scientific, or speculative, or casuistical argu- 
 ment — what the Psalmist styles, “ truth in the in ward parts ” 
 Paul seems to include much of this sense as he uses the 
 term, Ephesians, iv., 15 — aXrjOevovreg ev ayarcr) : not so 
 much “ speaking the truth,” as our translation has it, but 
 rather, as is shown by the context, and especially by the 
 word ayarcr], “ being truthful, or of a true heart in love” 
 So, also, Galatians, iv., 16 — chare exOpog vpdjv yeyova aXrj- 
 Oevcov vflv ; “ Have I become subject to your hatred while 
 I am true (in heart) to you It may refer, in this last ex 
 ample, to the declaration of truth, but even if that is sup- 
 posed to be included, the subjective sense of the word is 
 still predominant. Hence we may best render aXrjdevov- 
 rag , in the passage at the head of these remarks, adverbial- 
 
 I 
 
98 SUBJECTIVE SENSE OF THE WORD dXrjOeVG). 
 
 ly, thus : “ In all sincerity, in all truthfulness, in consistency 
 with the truest and purest sentiments of our nature.” The 
 other rendering, which would refer it merely to the declara- 
 tion of truth, would be comparatively tame, besides pro- 
 ducing a pleonasm in A eyeiv. Our translation is also in 
 perfect keeping with the character of the honest and truth- 
 ful Clinias, as he is, with great dramatic skill, represented 
 to us throughout this whole argument. He uses the lan- 
 guage of a man who never had felt a doubt on the subject. 
 This is a favourite word with Plato, and frequently to be 
 found in his writings in this subjective sense. For a very 
 excellent example, see the Theaetetus, 202, B. : orav pev 
 ovv dvev Xoyov rr]v dXr\d7j do^av rivog ng Xa6rj, ’AAH- 
 0ETEIN pev avrov tt\v 'i/jvx'rjv rrepl avro , yiyv&otteiv 6’ 
 ov. The sentiment is, that the soul may be subjectively in 
 harmony with the truth, so as cordially to embrace it in its 
 creed before scientific knowledge, or an objective presenta- 
 tion of it to the speculative reason. It may have the life 
 before it possesses a clear apprehension of the doctrine . 
 This may be, and often undoubtedly is, the case in religion ; 
 but those who would, on this account, undervalue logical 
 and doctrinal statements, or what they rather disdainfully 
 style systematic theology, are in danger either of a mysti- 
 cism, in which all clear perceptions of truth are utterly lost, 
 or of taking opinions upon the mere testimony of others, or 
 on the credit of a blind tradition, without either light in the 
 reason, or any true warmth in the affections 
 
 We have an illustration of this truthful state of mind in 
 the course which Clinias pursues in the next reply — npiorov 
 pev yr\ nal rjXiog, &c. He enters upon the argument with 
 all the confidence of an easy victory. He appeals at once 
 to the most obvious phenomena, not so much as scientific 
 proofs of the Divine existence, but rather as visible repre- 
 sentations of a manifest Divine power. “ The Heavens de- 
 clare (to all whose souls are prepared for it) the glory of 
 
THE ORPHIC POETRY. 
 
 99 
 
 God.” But as though this had too much the appearance 
 of speculative reasoning, he retreats again to his strong- 
 hold, the feelings of his own nature, and appeals to the 
 common and universal sentiments of mankind. This, with 
 the bare aspect of the heavens, he deems enough for those 
 who were true-hearted (akrjdevovreg) concerning the Gods. 
 We are taught in the Holy Scriptures, that not only a true 
 belief, but also unbelief in respect to the Divine existence, 
 has its seat primarily in the affections rather than in the 
 intellect. “ The fool hath said in his heart , there is no 
 God.” The Hebrew word here is sometimes used for the 
 understanding ; still, like the Greek (ppeveg, with all its 
 cognates, such as (frpoveo), (frpovrjocg, typovrjpa, &c., it gen- 
 erally refers to the intellect, not so much in a speculative 
 or scientific aspect, but rather as modified by the state ol 
 the affections or moral powers. 
 
 IV. 
 
 The Orphic Poetry. 
 
 Page 5, Line 12. 0/ pev ev not perpoig, ol ds nal avev 
 I usrpcov. “ Some in poetry and some in prose.” It is very 
 uncertain what prose writings are here referred to. Those 
 in poetry must have been the works of Homer, Hesiod, and 
 perhaps of Orpheus. The term n aXaioraroi ( most ancient) 
 would seem to refer to some productions older than the 
 Iliad and the Theogonia. These might be styled n aXaia, 
 in comparison with the period of Grecian literature in which 
 Plato lived, which, although many centuries posterior in 
 time, was not separated from them by any distinct literary 
 epoch prior to the Persian wars. They could not, how- 
 ever, be well entitled to the epithet iraXaiorara , which, as 
 it is introduced, and as the context shows, is meant to des- 
 ignate the most remote of two distinct periods, in reference 
 
100 
 
 THE ORPHIC POETRY. 
 
 to which it is intimated, there was a progression, if we may 
 so style it, from the cosmological to the theogonic or my* 
 thological. The first, or most ancient class, were of the 
 former description. They were more philosophical than 
 the latter, more taken up with the origin of things, that all- 
 absorbing question which so engrossed the early mind : 
 yeyovev rj IlPftTH <1>Y2I2 ovpavov rcov re aXXcdv. They 
 were pantheistic rather than polytheistic, manifesting a de- 
 parture, but still a less departure from the primitive reli- 
 gion than is denoted by the latter stage. (See Note 9, 
 page 5.) All these marks correspond well with the nature 
 of some of the hymns styled Orphic, under which name a 
 few fragments, whether spurious or not, have survived to 
 our own day. Although these are generally regarded as 
 productions of a much later age, yet, from the frequent refer- 
 ence made to Orpheus by the Greek poets, it would seem 
 almost certain that a collection of hymns under this name 
 existed in the most ancient times, forming that copious 
 fund or storehouse of rich poetical appellations, from which 
 Homer, and subsequently Aeschylus, were supplied, besides 
 being the source of whatever is pantheistical or mystical 
 in the Grecian tragedies. The existence of forgeries is 
 evidence that there must have been originals in imitation 
 of which they were composed, and an ancient philosophy 
 and theology, which had once exerted great influence on 
 the human mind, to serve as their plausible and probable 
 foundation. 
 
 In connexion with the passage before us, compare lib. 
 iv., 716, A.: f O pev dr) deog , tjonep nal 6 nahaiog Xoyog, 
 dpx'fjv re teal reXevrrjv nal p,eoa rtiv ovtgtv andvrejv ex^v. 
 This is almost the very language of one of the so-styled 
 Orphic fragments now extant, and is directly referred to 
 Orpheus by the scholiast on the place : — 0 eov pev rov dr}- 
 puovpyov ocKptig, naXcuov de Xoyov Xeyei rov OP<I>IKON, 
 bg eanv ovroq, 
 
THE ORPHIC POETRY. 
 
 101 
 
 Z evg apxrj, Z evg peaoa, A tog d’ en iravra rervurar 
 Z evg 7tv0[jLtjv yairjg re aal ovpavov aarepoevrog . 
 
 Should any one say that this resembles very much the 
 language of Thales, or some of the philosophers of that 
 period, and that, therefore, the ignorant old scholiast had 
 been imposed upon by one who had affixed a fabulous name 
 and given a poetical dress to some of their dogmas, — why, 
 we would reply, may not Thales and others have derived 
 this peculiar mode of expression from a still earlier source, 
 and why this disposition to charge the scholiasts and 
 Christian fathers with combining to produce such useless 
 and yet elaborate forgeries as some critics are constantly 
 connecting with their names ? We say useless, because a 
 philosophy and theology, such as appears in these hymns, 
 did, beyond all question, exist at a very early period, and 
 the poetical dress, had it not been real, would have added 
 nothing to the argument they sought to derive from them. 
 For places in the ancient writings, in which reference is 
 made to Orpheus and his poems, the reader is referred to 
 Plato, Ion, vol. iii., p. 134, Leip. ; Convivium, vii., 219 ; De 
 Legibus, vi., 230 ; Cratylus, ii., 263 ; Aristotle, De Anim., 
 i, 8 ; Euripides, Rhesus, 947 ; Hippolytus, 967 ; Cicero, De 
 Nat. Deor., i., 38 ; Diod. Sic., iv., 25 ; Just. Mart., Co- 
 hortat. ad Graecos, p. 17 ; Athenagoras, Legat. pro Christ., 
 xv., 64, 65. 
 
 12 
 
102 plato’s regard for the ancient myths. 
 
 V. 
 
 Plato's Regard for Antiquity and the Ancient Mythology . — 
 His Use of the Word Qeoi. 
 
 Page G, Line 1. Ov padcov emrtpav n aXaiolg ovclv, 
 “ It is hard to find fault with them, seeing they are ancient 
 things.” We discover, in this and similar expressions, 
 Plato’s conservative spirit and reverence for antiquity, 
 struggling with his conviction of the importance of having 
 the minds of the young imbued with higher notions of the 
 Divine Nature than could be obtained from the ancient 
 poets. The same feelings are manifested in that passage 
 in the Republic, in which he dismisses Homer, with the 
 rest of the poets, from his imaginary City of the Soul, al- 
 though, at the same time, he sends him away with a garland 
 of honour on his head. “ Should such a one (he says) 
 come to our city, wishing to exhibit his poems, we would, 
 indeed, reverence him as something sacred, and wonderful, 
 and delightfully pleasant, yet still would we say that no 
 such man could abide with us : aTTonepnoLfiev re av elg 
 dXXrjv ttoXlv , pvpov Kara rr\g /csdtaXijg Karajfavreg real 
 eptCi) ore^avreg, and we would send him away to another 
 state, having poured myrrh upon his head and crowned him 
 with a wreath.” Republic, 398, A. We find, however, 
 everywhere, in his works, a strong attachment to the an- 
 cient myths, wherever they contained nothing gross or of- 
 fensive to his views of morality ; a number of which, and 
 those, too, distinguished for the feeling of awe and sublimity 
 with which they inspire the reader, he has himself present* 
 ed in some of the most important and philosophical of his 
 dialogues. 
 
 It is exceedingly interesting to contemplate the peculiar 
 condition of this philosopher, endeavouring to reform what 
 he felt he had no power or commission to abolish. Having 
 no Divine warrant, like the Hebrew prophets or the apostles 
 
plato’s regard for the ancient mytiis. 103 
 
 ot Christ, he did not dare to enter upon an exterminating 
 crusade against ail the rites, opinions, and traditions held 
 sacred in the Athenian worship. The Grecian reformer 
 was too well acquainted with human nature not to fear lest, 
 in destroying the monster Superstition, he should call up 
 another of a still more horrid aspect — Atheism. He did 
 not wish utterly to pull down existing institutions, while he 
 had no new revelation, whose authority might replace, with 
 increased vigour, the departed reverence for those ancient 
 myths, the probable remains of truths once communicated 
 from Heaven, yet mysteriously abandoned to all the cor- 
 ruptions and distortions of the human mind. He probably 
 thought that out of some of the better parts of the Grecian 
 mythology there might be constructed a system, which, 
 while it recognised the One Eternal Supreme, placed at 
 an immense distance from all things created by him or ema- 
 nating from him, might, at the same time, admit of inferior 
 powers, retaining the individual names at least, (if not the 
 characters), which had been consecrated by the popular 
 superstition. That he did believe in such an Eternal and 
 Ineffable Supreme (6 yevvrjoag a'idioq rcarrjp , Timseus, 38, 
 A., — 6 KoXkioroq teal dptoroq pevcjv del dnXtig ev ry 
 avrov pop(j)rj , Rep., 381, C., — 6 Trdvrcjv rjiaora rrjq eavrov 
 Ideaq ka&aivwv, 380, D.), every reader of his works must 
 admit. He undoubtedly erred in supposing that the pure 
 worship of such a glorious Being could be consistent with 
 any kind of religious homage paid to inferior powers ; yet 
 we should remember that the same error has been com- 
 mitted by the largest portion of the professedly Christian 
 Church, and that we are to judge Plato, not as a Christian 
 under the light of revelation, but as a heathen philosopher 
 struggling with difficulties, of the magnitude of which we 
 have no just conception. These remarks are deemed ne- 
 cessary in reply to the charge often made against Plato, of 
 countenancing the polytheism of his countrymen, and which 
 
104 
 
 plato’s use of the word $eol. 
 
 w 
 
 may be found set forth in its strongest light in a tract by 
 Jacob Zimmerman, contained in the ninth volume of the 
 Amcenitates Literaria. 
 
 A misconception in regard to the Platonic theology has 
 arisen from his use of the word deoi. The Greek writers, 
 whether poets or orators, generally meant by it nothing 
 more than supernatural beings of a higher order than men. 
 The word, in itself, had attached to it none of those more 
 metaphysical conceptions which belong to our term Divine, 
 as significant of the uncreated and eternal. There was, 
 therefore, no philological inconsistency in its being applied 
 to those beings whom Plato elsewhere calls datfioveg, and 
 who, in his scheme, may be regarded in the same light with 
 the angels or sons of God, mentioned in the Holy Scriptures. 
 
 In respect to the objection which might be made to his 
 use of the plural, it may be remarked, that throughout this 
 whole argument with the atheist, tiedg may be substituted 
 for tieoi, without at all affecting its validity, and we should 
 by so doing come nearer to the philosopher’s true meaning, 
 than by retaining the common term, with the misconception 
 arising from our modern notions ; that is, we should better 
 translate his spirit by adopting a slight mistranslation of 
 the letter. Qeoi is often to be taken collectively for the 
 whole of the superhuman Genus, however inferior and de- 
 pendent some parts of it may be in respect to another, and 
 is equivalent, in the discussions which follow, to to tielov 
 or to d(U[i6mov. Another suggestion, which it may be 
 proper to make here, is, that by the phrase tieot Kara voiiovg, 
 the writer means not directly the Theogony and worship 
 established by law at Athens (although even this he would 
 touch with the hand of a wise reformer, and not of a reck- 
 less destructionist), but rather the cultus of the Supreme 
 and inferior Divinities, as it should be set forth by the law- 
 giver in that pure system of polity which he contemplates 
 in the present treatise. 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS. 
 
 105 
 
 VI. 
 
 Philosophy and Character of Anaxagoras. 
 
 Page 6, Line 6. veoov oo(p(hv. “ Of our modern 
 
 wits, or wise men that is, comparatively modern, although 
 all to whom he refers did not live in Plato’s own time. He 
 seems chiefly to have had in mind Anaxagoras, who, not- 
 withstanding his speculative theism and his boasted doc- 
 trine of the N ovg, was yet regarded by Plato as giving an 
 atheistical tendency to the age in which he lived. In re- 
 gard to his theology, Anaxagoras is best known by the po- 
 sition, in which he so much gloried, “ that mind was the 
 cause of all things,” and in physics, by the unpopular 
 dogma, “ that the sun was nothing but a mass of ignited 
 stone, instead of an animated being,” as was commonly be- 
 lieved, and as Plato seems to teach in this book. The 
 character of this philosopher may be understood from the 
 boasting he himself made, and which his friends made for 
 him, in regard to the first of these doctrines ; as though, in 
 this respect, he had in any way advanced beyond the more 
 modest Thales, or had discovered a truth which had been 
 concealed from the beginning of the world to his own day. 
 Socrates seems to have had a right view of him in the 
 Phsedon, where he charges him with setting out with the 
 doctrine that N ovg was the cause of all things, as a mere 
 speculative tenet, and then making no use of it in subse- 
 quent parts of his philosophy ; that is, never ascending 
 above second causes, or rising from the physical to the 
 moral (to f3eXri(JTOV ), but ever assigning, as the chief mo- 
 tive powers, aepag ts ual alOepag nai v6ara y gases , and 
 fires , and fluids, as the words may be rendered in accom- 
 modation to the same spirit in modern physical philosophy. 
 “ Having once (says he) heard one reading a book of Anax- 
 agoras, and saying, that Nous was the disposer and the effi- 
 cient cause of all things, I was highly delighted with the 
 
106 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS. 
 
 declaration, and it seemed to rne to be admirably said ; and 
 I thought* that if Novg (or Mind) thus arranged all things, 
 everything must be placed in that position in which it was 
 best for it to be ; so that no other study remained for man, in 
 regard to both himself and other things , but the investigation 
 of that which was (morally) most excellent and best (or. in 
 other words, moral causes), and that this was the only true 
 science of things. But in this wonderful hope (of discover- 
 ing the universal science, or science of sciences) I was 
 greatly disappointed ; for as I read on I find the man 
 making no farther use of his boasted N ovg, nor assigning 
 any other cause in the disposal and arrangement of the 
 world, than airs, and aethers, and waters, and other similar 
 things many and strange. And he seemed to me to act 
 precisely as if any one saying, that Socrates doeth whatso- 
 ever he doeth by mind’or reason , should then, in attempt- 
 ing to assign the causes of my actions, assert that I now 
 sit here for these reasons , namely, that my body is com- 
 posed of bones and nerves, that my bones are solid and 
 have joints, and that my nerves contract and relax ; where- 
 fore that the bones being raised up in their joinings, the 
 nerves, by reason of tension and relaxation, make me to bend 
 my limbs, and that for this reason I now sit here : and so, 
 also, in respect to our conversing, should assign other similar 
 causes of the phenomena of speech, such as voices, and 
 aerial vibrations, and sounds (( pcovag re nal aepag nal anoag ), 
 and ten thousand other such agencies, all the while neglect- 
 ing to assign the true reason (of reasons), that because it 
 seemed good (j3 eXriov) to the Athenians to condemn me, 
 therefore it seemed better to me to sit here, and more just 
 to submit to the sentence they had imposed. Since, as I 
 verily believe, had it not been for the last-mentioned reasons, 
 these nerves and bones would long before this have had me 
 away to Megara or among the Boeotians, being set in mo- 
 tion by an opinion of the best ( rov PeXriarov), if I had not 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS. 
 
 107 
 
 thought it more just and better to remain than to fly.” 
 Phaedon, 97, 98. We recommend the close study of this 
 whole passage, and the admirable sketch it presents of such 
 theists as Anaxagoras, to every student who wishes to 
 know the essential difference, on this most vital point, be- 
 tween the Socratic and other ancient systems of philosophy. 
 How strongly does it remind us of many modern books of 
 physical science, in which the name of God may, perhaps, 
 appear in a preface or some introductory note, while all the 
 rest is not merely silent, but directly adapted to produce an 
 atheistic turn of thought, by suffering the mind to dwell on 
 nothing else than aepag re ual alQepag nal vdara , gases, 
 and fluids, and fires, or imponderable agents. The opinion 
 which Plato entertained of this philosopher is also signifi- 
 cantly expressed, although he does not mention his name, 
 in the eleventh book of the Laws, 967, A. B. C., a passage 
 which is more freely examined in Note XIII., on the athe- 
 istic doctrine of (pvoig, rvx 7 ]* and x vr ] • 
 
 The Noi)^ of Anaxagoras can hardly be regarded as a 
 personal being, or as a 'ipvx^j vnepnoagitiy distinct from the 
 world, of which it might be considered the informing law. 
 The atheist may admit the dogma without changing his 
 creed. La Grange undoubtedly believed that there was 
 N ovg, or reason, in the Heavens, even a science so profound, 
 that all the powers of his highest mathematical analysis 
 could barely follow the laws of motion in which it was dis- 
 played ; and yet La Grange was an atheist. The Heavens 
 had no interest for him except as they formed a splendid 
 diagram for the illustration of his calculus, and as long as 
 the moral element was wanting it made no difference what 
 name was inscribed upon it, whether Noi;^ or (ftvoig, or a 
 God possessed of mere intelligence, to whom we were no- 
 thing, and who was nothing to us, except as affording subjects 
 for the exercise of the speculative intellect. This Noi)c of 
 Anaxagoras had no respect to moral as final causes, which 
 
108 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS. 
 
 as Socrates shows, were studiously excluded from his philos- 
 ophy. It was only another name for the physical truth of 
 things, in which the atheist contends there may be science on 
 his hypothesis, as well as on any other. It was an abstract 
 intelligence, displayed wholly in physical adaptations, with- 
 out either a general or special providence. It might be 
 regarded as the instinct of the universe , working in the 
 great whole, as some of its emanations in minute portions, 
 blindly, unconsciously, without personality, and knowing 
 everything but itself. However incomprehensible this may 
 be, it is still the highest reach of that philosophy which 
 makes no account of any moral attributes in the Deity, but 
 regards him as a mere impassible intelligence. We have 
 no hesitation in preferring pantheism if it embrace, although 
 inconsistently, that moral element, without which there can 
 be no true personality, either to Novg or 'ibvxf 
 
 Plato evidently regarded this philosophy as no better 
 than practical atheism, notwithstanding it sets out so pom- 
 pously, and apparently so religiously, with the dogma afore- 
 said. He seems here to condemn its modern advocates, 
 the veot cofiol, as he styles them, equally with that ancient 
 superstition which they so much derided. Anaxagoras was 
 of a spirit the very opposite of that which pervades all the 
 teachings of Socrates. He was inclined rather to insult 
 and shock the popular superstitions than gently to remove 
 them, or turn to good account whatever of truth they might 
 possess, and that, too, not in the spirit of enthusiastic reli- 
 gious zeal, which we cannot help respecting even when we 
 are compelled to condemn, but in the mere conceit of a 
 little fancied progress in physical science. Like the 
 modern Galileo, whose name is so frequently in the mouths 
 of the scientific enemies of religion, he evidently rejoiced 
 more in the thought, that this very small advance raised 
 him somewhat above the religious notions of his country- 
 men, than in any honest wish or desire to elevate those 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS. 
 
 109 
 
 popular views which placed him, as he supposed, in such 
 egotistical contrast. He seems to have been a regular 
 priest and poet hater, and there is, therefore, no cause for 
 surprise that he should have called forth the enmity and 
 prejudices of those whom he had, from no higher motive 
 than vanity, attacked. 
 
 This spirit was manifested in the declaration, a few lines 
 below referred to, that the heavenly bodies were only 
 masses of earth and stones, and that the sun was a ball of 
 melted ore. For this he was charged by the Athenians 
 with atheism, and justly too ; for he who assails the com- 
 mon belief of any people, without putting anything better in 
 its place, or who attempts to destroy false notions of the 
 Deity, without teaching, as Socrates and Plato did, the doc- 
 trine of the one eternal and ineffable, yet personal Supreme, 
 the head of a moral government, and directing all things 
 with final reference to moral ends, is in heart no better 
 than an atheist, whatever refined speculative notions he 
 may have in the abstract about N ovg or intelligence being 
 the cause of all things. It is probable that the condemna- 
 tion of Socrates was mainly effected in consequence of 
 his views having been misunderstood by the unthinking 
 Athenian mob, and confounded with those of Anaxagoras. 
 
 Plato did undoubtedly hold that the Heavenly bodies 
 were animated personal beings ; but when here and in sub- 
 sequent passages he styles them deoi, it is only in the sense 
 of beings superior to men. The simple doctrine, there- 
 fore, for it goes no farther, that the Heavenly bodies were 
 animated beings, was no greut heresy either in philosophy 
 or religion. (See Note XXXIV., where this subject is 
 more fully discussed.) It was far better than the specula- 
 tive semi-atheism of Anaxagoras, or even of some modern 
 naturalists, who have only substituted for the abstract Novg 
 of the Grecian philosopher the symbols and equations of 
 the differential and integral calculus. One religious com 
 
 K 
 
110 DIVINE JUSTICE GROUND OF HUMAN LAW. 
 
 ception of God as a moral governor, the light in which 
 Plato and Socrates chiefly regarded him, and which may 
 exist in connexion with the most absurd notions of the 
 physical universe, does yet belong to a philosophy almost 
 infinitely removed above the mere scientific theism of such 
 men as Anaxagoras, Galileo or La Place. 
 
 VII. 
 
 The Divine Justice , the Ground of Human Law . 
 
 Page 9, Line 1. Ex^ddv yap tovto rjpiv virep anavrcov 
 
 TO)V VOflOJV K&XhiOTOV TE Kal dpLOTOV TipOOLpLOV CiV £L7)« 
 
 “ For this is just the fairest and most excellent 'preamble to 
 all laws, or to every system of law,” namely, fteoi r’ 
 eld nal dyaOot , dhcrjv rtpcovreg diacpepovrcog dvdp&irov. 
 “ That the Gods not only are , but that they are also good, 
 and that, moreover, they have an esteem for justice beyond 
 anything that is felt among men.” deol here, as we have 
 remarked before, is used as a collective term for the whole 
 of the Divine Nature, being equivalent to to 'Selov , or to 
 daipoviov, and should be rendered in the singular, if we 
 would do full justice to the thought. See Note V. The 
 sentiment is this : It is not enough simply to believe in the 
 Divine existence. God is something more than the dynamic 
 principle of the universe. Neither is it enough to connect 
 with this the notion of infinite knowledge. God is some- 
 thing more than the N ovg of Anaxagoras, something more 
 than mere intelligence. The law should present him to 
 us in the far sublimer idea of a Being clothed with the 
 moral attributes of justice, and of a special, or, rather, moral 
 providence. It is this, and not a merely speculative or 
 scientific theism, which must lie at the foundation of every 
 true system of legislation. We may talk as loftily as we 
 please of The Supreme Intelligence, or The First Cause, or 
 
UNIVERSALITY OF THE BELIEF IN A GOD. Ill 
 
 The Great Idea, it is still practical atheism, until along with 
 this there is recognised The Lawgiver, The Judge, and The 
 Moral Governor, the constant and interested Witness of our 
 every act, the ground and sanction of the solemn appeal of 
 the oath. “ That such views (says Cicero) are useful and 
 necessary, who will deny, when he reflects how many things 
 must be confirmed by an oath, how much safety there is in 
 those religious rites that pertain to the solemnization of con- 
 tracts, how many the fear of the Divine punishment keeps 
 back from crime ; in short, how sacred and holy a thing So- 
 ciety becomes when the Immortal Gods are constantly pre- 
 sented (in the Law) both as judges and witnesses.” Cic., 
 De Leg., ii., vii. We would even venture to assert, that 
 a gross anthropopathy or anthropomorphism, if it retain 
 such views of the moral attributes of the Deity as a God of 
 Law, is every way to be preferred to the most metaphysical 
 or philosophical notions of the Divine Nature and its im- 
 passibility, which reject them, or do not even assign to 
 them the most prominent place. 
 
 Mill 
 
 Universality of the Belief in a God. 
 
 Page 10, Line 10. f E/l Xrjvcov re teal (3ap6dpo)v ndvrcov 
 ev ovpzpopalg Tzavroiatg. Compare with this what Clinias 
 says, page 4*, line 14 : nal oti irdvreg f/ E XXrjver re izal 
 f3ap6apot vopi^ovoiv elvcu deovg. By Greeks and Bar- 
 barians, the former always meant all mankind, and, there- 
 fore, the belief in a God is here declared to be coextensive 
 with the race. If any man might rely on his own unaided 
 reason, who will venture to say that Plato would not have 
 been justified in thus trusting himself to it ? And yet, pro- 
 found as he was in the investigation of truth beyond the 
 most, if not all, of his fellow-men, he never hesitates to ap- 
 
112 UNIVERSALITY OF THE BELIEF IN A GOb. 
 
 peal to the common sentiments, the noival Ivvoiai of man- 
 kind, and to throw himself upon them often with a confidence 
 which he yielded to no speculative argument. Hence his 
 fondness for those ancient myths, under which were con- 
 cealed, in various forms, the opinions universally held re- 
 specting the moral government of God and the doctrine of 
 future retribution. This was not, as Warburton supposed, 
 a mere accommodation of himself to those vulgar dogmas, 
 which he did not wish to destroy, because he deemed them 
 useful. All that has been said by writers of that school, 
 and by the ancient authorities on whom they pretend to 
 rely, respecting the exoteric and esoteric teaching, we be- 
 lieve to be wholly unsupported by any parts of the genuine 
 dialogues of Plato. No man was farther from his true 
 spirit than Warburton, and, without an appreciation of this, 
 his learning only led him to misunderstand the philosopher 
 in some of his most serious discussions. If ever Plato is 
 deeply earnest, it is when he gets engaged in the discus- 
 sion of a traditionary myth, which he can regard in some 
 measure as standing in the place of primitive revelation, or 
 can find relief from the uncertainties of his own specula- 
 tions, in what he could trace as the universal voice of hu- 
 manity. We need no stronger proof of this, than is found 
 in the manner in which he closes the long discussion in the 
 Gorgias (in some respects the most perfect and rigidly con- 
 ducted argument to be found in his works), with the mythi- 
 cal representation of the final judgment ; as though, without 
 this appeal to the authority of ancient and universal tradi- 
 tion, human reason could never freely and satisfactorily 
 prove that a life of sensual pleasure, or of worldly ambition, 
 was not better than one spent in acts of virtue and the culti- 
 vation of philosophy. He was the last man to spurn such 
 aid, in order to gratify that pride of intellect, that would 
 adopt no conclusions to which it had not arrived through 
 the independent exercise of private judgment. He knew 
 
UNIVERSALITY OF THE BEFIEF IN A GOD. 113 
 
 too well the direct tendency of such a spirit to darken the 
 understanding, and to lead to error instead of truth. 
 
 We would not, however, confound this with a modern 
 affectation which has sought to support itself by the au- 
 thority of our philosopher. Plato, it should be ever borne 
 in mind, had no Bible, and he did well, therefore, and ex- 
 ercised his highest reason in seeking for a Divine revelation 
 in those universal sentiments of all people and nations, 
 which were as ancient in time as they were extended in 
 space, and which could most truly be said to be, semper, 
 ubique, et ah omnibus. This object of his reverence was 
 something far different from the vox populi of the dema- 
 gogue, who is often most successful when he can array the 
 artificial and transient feeling of one generation, or one na- 
 tion, against what he would style the antiquated prejudices 
 of mankind. It was rather that vox humanitatis, which, by 
 its universality at all times and in all regions, gave evi- 
 dence of having been once the voice of God , remains of a 
 primitive inspiration, however darkened it may have been 
 by human depravity — opinions which had not been the prod- 
 uct of the speculative reason, but which, under the con- 
 serving influence of a higher principle, had maintained their 
 ground in spite of the opposition of human depravity, and 
 the consequently superinduced darkness of the human un- 
 derstanding. It was this vox humanitatis to which Hesiod 
 seems to allude : 
 
 < prjyr] d ’ ov rig 7rd[j,nav diroXXvrai, rjv nva iroXXol 
 Xaol (prjfi^ovoL * fteog vv rtg eg tl teal avrrj. 
 
 Works and Days , 709. 
 
 Compare, also, Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, i., 43 : Solus 
 enim videt, primum esse Deos, quod in omnium animis 
 eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quae est enim 
 gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doc - 
 trina anticipationem quamdam Deorum? quae rpohppig 
 
 K 2 
 
114 
 
 ANTIQUITY OF ATHEISM.. 
 
 appellatur, &c. Quum enim non instituto aliquo aut more 
 aut lege sit opinio constituta, rnaneatque ad unum omnium 
 firma consensio, intelligi necesse est esse Deos, quoniam 
 insitas eorum vel potius innatas cogitationes habemus. De 
 quo autem omnium riatura consentit, id verum esse necesse 
 est. And again, lib. ii., 12: Itaque inter omnes omnium 
 gentium sententia constat. Omnibus enim innatum est et 
 in animo quasi insculptum esse Deos. 
 
 Still more to the same effect, Tusc. Disp., i., 30, where 
 we find the best definition of the Law of Nature that has 
 ever been given. Ut porro firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, 
 cur Deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tarn fera, nemo 
 omnium tarn sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit De- 
 orum opinio. Multi de Diis prava sentiunt (id enim vitioso 
 more effici solet), omnes tamen esse vim et nature m Di- 
 vinam arbitrantur. Nec vero id collocutio hominmn aut 
 consensus efficit : non institutis opinio est confirmata, non 
 legibus. Omnis autem in re consensio omnium gentium 
 LEX NATURiE putanda est. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Antiquity of Atheism. 
 
 Page 11, Line 12. Tiyvovrai 6s del nXecovg rj eXarrovg 
 ravT7]v rrjv vooov exovreq. “ There have always been 
 more or less who have had this disease of atheism.” It has 
 been maintained that there were no philosophical atheists, 
 professedly so, before Democritus and Leucippus. Plato, 
 however, asserts that some such have existed from a very 
 early period, and in this he is borne out by Aristotle, who 
 tells us that most of the earliest philosophers, especially 
 those of the Ionic school, assigned only material causes of 
 the universe : rdv irpcorcov (piXoaocftrjadvTOJv oi uXeloroi 
 rag ev vXpg eldei j uovov (brjOpoav apxdg elvac iravrov. 
 
ANTIQUITY OF ATHEISM 
 
 115 
 
 Aristotle, Metaph., i., 3. A distinction, however, should 
 be made between those who were professed atheists, such 
 as Democritus and Diagoras, and those who were inclined 
 to an atheistical mode of philosophizing, while they yet pro- 
 fessed to be theists, although of an impure and inconsistent 
 species. In this latter class the world has always abound- 
 ed. On the other hand, it is most conclusively shown by 
 Cudworth, that, although this materializing school was an- 
 cient, the first philosophy was spiritual , and that the sub- 
 sequent atheism arose from a perversion of the atomical 
 theory, which, when truly held, and according to the views 
 of those who originated it before Democritus, was not only 
 favourable to, but one of the firmest supports of a pure theism. 
 Plato, in this passage, styles atheism a disease , as though it 
 were something unnatural, a corruption, diacpOopa (see page 
 4, line 18), a departure from those innate sentiments orirpo- 
 Arjxpetg, of the race of which he and Cicero speak so em- 
 phatically. So, also, the apostle treats it as a degeneracy 
 from a primitive better state, Rom., i., 28. He speaks of 
 this tendency as a darkness of the spirit , nai eonorioOrj rj 
 dovverog napdia avr&v, Rom., i., 21 : as a reprobate mind 
 or reason , adoiapov vovv , 28, to which men “ had been 
 given up, because they did not like to retain God in their 
 knowledge.” We cannot read these Scriptures without 
 calling to mind a similar sentiment expressed in a fragment 
 of the old poet Empedocles : 
 
 A eiXog d’ gj GKoroeooa tt epi 6o^a peprjAev. 
 
 Ah wretch ! whose soul dark thoughts of God invade. 
 
 If the light that is in thee be darkness , how great is that 
 darkness ! 
 
116 
 
 PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 
 
 X. 
 
 Principle of Authority, 
 
 Page 12, Line 6. civ epoi n elOtj, nepipEVElg avao/tonQv 
 elre ovrog Eire aXXcog e^el, nwOavopEVog napa te rtiv aX 
 Xcjv, teal 6rj icai pdXiora nai napa tov vopoOerov. “ If 
 you will take my advice, you will patiently wait, repeated 
 ly examining whether it is thus or otherwise, learning from 
 others, and therefore, and in a most especial manner, from 
 the Lawgiver.” Notwithstanding the earnest recommenda- 
 tion to most diligent study and inquiry, and in perfect con. 
 sistency with it, Plato holds that the acceptance of establish- 
 ed opinions must go before and guide the exercise of pri- 
 vate judgment ; not to supersede or dispense with the ne- 
 cessity of the latter in its proper time and place, but be- 
 cause the state of mind which submits to lawful authority 
 affords the surest guarantee of subsequent mental independ- 
 ence, instead of that counterfeit which is often nothing 
 more than a slavish fear of a creed, and which loses all 
 true independence, in its premature efforts to avoid what 
 the best and wisest of mankind have long regarded as 
 established. 
 
 The next sentence contains a thought of the highest 
 practical importance : iv de di) rovrcp rep XP° V( ? M ToXpr}- 
 cyjg nepl 'deovg p7]dev aaEdrjoai, “ but during this, period see 
 to it that you venture upon nothing impious or unholy.” 
 That is, religious obligation must be revered, and pious 
 emotions cherished, before the young soul can reason about 
 them, and there is no period, however short, that we have 
 a right to remain atheists until we are able to prove by in- 
 duction the existence of a God. He who thus honours 
 reason , by following its first dictate, submission to authority 
 which God himself has established, will doubtless leave 
 those who have been taught to pursue a different course, far 
 behind him in all the severer and more abstruse depart. 
 
DEGREES OF ATHEISM. 
 
 117 
 
 ments of philosophy and theology. Throughout this whole 
 treatise, it should be borne in mind that vofXQOsrrjg means 
 rather the ancient founder of a state or of a religion, than 
 a temporary or subordinate magistrate ; so that “ to learn 
 of the Lawgiver,’’ is to consult with deference and respect, 
 as one great means of forming right opinions, the civil and 
 religious constitution of the state in which we may be born. 
 
 XI. 
 
 Degrees of Atheism . — Peculiarity of Plato's Style. 
 
 Page 12, Line 13. Tlavranaoi j uiv ovv , &c. The 
 author now proceeds to the discussion of speculative and 
 practical atheism in its three degrees, which may be thus 
 stated : 
 
 1st. An absolute denial of the existence of a Deity. 
 
 2d. The opinion that, if a Deity exists, he does not con- 
 cern himself about us, or in other words, the denial of a 
 Providence. 
 
 3d. A sentiment clearly allied to the second ; that if a 
 Deity exists, and if he even exercises a physical care or 
 providence over the world regarded as a physical produc- 
 tion, still he is in a great measure, if not wholly, indifferent 
 to moral conduct, and that, therefore, his displeasure, should 
 it be ever excited, is easily appeased, not by repentance, 
 nor by an atonement that God himself has provided, but by 
 self-imposed votive offerings and superstitious services 
 
 We expect a direct argument on the first head, conduct- 
 ed in the usual manner by an appeal to evidences of design 
 in the phenomena around us. This mode of proceeding is 
 adopted in the discourses recorded in the Memorabilia, and 
 there is, also, an admirable specimen of it in Cicero’s 
 treatise De Natura Deorum. Such a line of argument, 
 however, although quite a favourite with modern theolo- 
 
118 
 
 DEGREES OF ATHEISM. 
 
 gians, was not that which would first suggest itself to the 
 ancient mind, but a more abstruse speculation, and one which 
 had a more intimate relation to the great question about the 
 first origin of things, the first life and motion in matter, 
 whether to be regarded as eternal, or as having had a dis- 
 tinct origination from some older essence. This, also, we 
 fully believe, is the way in which the subject would present 
 itself to such a mind as Socrates, notwithstanding it is gen- 
 erally considered that the plain and practical mode of 
 reasoning ascribed to him by Xenophon is more in accord- 
 ance with the truth, than the metaphysical character in 
 which he appears in the Dialogues of Plato. At all events, 
 this is the mode adopted here by the Athenian, who un- 
 doubtedly represents Socrates, and he also takes a very 
 peculiar method of introducing it. In the commencement 
 of his reasoning on the first head, he takes his hearers by 
 surprise, by suddenly suggesting that they had unawares 
 fallen upon the discussion of a most important principle, 
 which deserved to be disposed of before going on with 
 those more popular views which had just been mentioned. 
 It has, at first, the appearance of being accidental, but one 
 familiarly acquainted with the Platonic method will rec- 
 ognise here the usual ironical resource the author employs 
 when he wishes to enter upon a discussion more than 
 usually subtle — namely, the apparently undesigned eliciting 
 of a question in relation to it from the one with whom the 
 dialogue is maintained. The chief speaker seems, or af- 
 fects, suddenly to remember something essential to the argu- 
 ment, and which they were in danger of having entirely 
 forgotten, although it is evident that it is the main thing 
 which has been kept in view from the beginning, notwith- 
 standing its seeming incidental introduction. Frequent ex- 
 amples of this may be found in the Protagoras, Republic, 
 and Theaetetus, especially the last. It is, in fact, so purely 
 Platonic, that it may be regarded as one of the best signs, 
 
ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 119 
 
 as far, at least, as the style is concerned, by which we may 
 distinguish a genuine from a spurious dialogue. 
 
 XII. 
 
 Ancient Doctrine of the Four Elements . 
 
 Page 13, Line 15. Hvp feed v6cop uai yr\v teal aspa . It 
 is generally assumed that in the use of these terms all the 
 ancient philosophers meant four simple, indestructible, and 
 incomposite elements ; being the primordia , or apyal , by the 
 union or composition of which all other things were con- 
 stituted. Hence many a superficial sneer by popular lec- 
 turers at the ignorance of the ancients in respect to chem- 
 istry and the number of simple substances. This view of 
 the matter, however, is far from being correct. Some, it is 
 true, maintained the above doctrine nearly in the terms 
 which we have employed, and as it would be stated by a 
 modern chemist. Among these, if we understand Aristotle 
 aright, was Empedocles. ’EpnsdorcXrjg psv yap ra psv gco- 
 parircd rsooapa , rd 6s ndvra perd tw v klvovvtcov , ef tov 
 aptdpov . Aristotle, De Gen. et Corrup., i., 1. By the two 
 moving powers here are intended his poetical personifica- 
 tions of Love and Discord, ’'Epog and *E peg, or, as they 
 would be styled in the language of modern science, Attrac- 
 tion and Repulsion, which, together with the four elements, 
 made the number of original principles or primordia to be 
 six. Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus maintained 
 that the elements were infinite, not only in number, but in 
 form. ’A va^ayopag 6s dnsipa, nal Asyrannog, ual Arjpo- 
 Kptrog * ravra 6s arcstpa uai to tt X rjOog sivat ual rag pop - 
 < pag . The doctrine which the first of these held respect- 
 ing the homoeomerice, or similar parts, is well known. Aris- 
 totle represents him, on this subject, as in every respect the 
 direct opposite of Empedocles. ’E vavrloyg 6s fyaivoviai 
 
120 ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 
 
 XeyovTeg ol nepl ' kva^ayopav rolg nepl ^pnedonXea. 'O 
 pev yap §t\gl nvp nal vdcjp teal aepa teal yr\v OTOi%eia teg- 
 Gapa , nal dnXd elvat paXXov fj oapna teal ogtovv nal ra 
 roiavra tcjv opotopepebv • 6 de ravra pev anXa nal Groix^la, 
 yrjv de teal nvp nal aepa Gvvdera . De Gen., &c., i., 1. 
 “ For the latter says that fire, and water, and air, and earth 
 are four elements, and more simple than flesh and bone, and 
 others of the liomceomerice , while the former contends that 
 these are simple elements, but that earth, and air, and fire 
 are compounds.’’ See Aristotle, De Generatione et Cor- 
 ruption, lib. i., where there is a long, but not very clear 
 account of some of the ancient opinions on this subject. 
 Compare, also, lib. iii., 3. 
 
 In general, however, we are quite satisfied that, even 
 when they used the term <7TO£%ehz, most of the ancient 
 writers on physics had in view elemental states of bodies, 
 without reference to their composition, rather than simple 
 substances or elements in the sense in which modern chemis- 
 try would define the term — that is, as substances incapable 
 of being changed, or of passing one into the other from a 
 change of state. It was in this sense of elemental states 
 that Parmenides held to two, nvp and yrjv, or the solid and 
 the cetliereal , regarding the fluid and the aerial as only mix- 
 ed modifications : ol de evdvg dvo noiovvTeg, tjoirep Jlap- 
 pevidrjg nvp nal yrjv , ra pera^v plypara tcolovgl tovtcjv , 
 olov aepa nal vdcop. Arist., De Gen., &c., ii., 3. In like 
 manner, Aristotle himself declares that they are not simple 
 substances as actually found in nature, but ever compound- 
 ed of one another, although in their ultimate state he seems 
 to regard them as pure : ovn egti de to rrvp, nal 6 afjp, nal 
 enaoTOV tcov elprjpevcov, anXovv, dXXa pucTOV, n. r. X 
 Lib. ii., 3. 
 
 At all events, we have no doubt, from several very de 
 cided passages, as to the manner in which these terms are 
 employed by Plato, whatever meaning may be attached to 
 
ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 121 
 
 them in the sentence at the head of these remarks, as the 
 supposed language of the atheistical philosophers. He was 
 so far from regarding them as strictly elements {aroix^Za) 
 in the modern chemical, or even ancient Greek sense of 
 the word, that he would not even rank them in that second 
 stage of combination which he styles ovXXadrj. See the 
 Timaeus, 48, B. : T i)v 6e rrpd rrjg ovpavov yeveceog irvpog 
 vdarog re nai y r\g (pvacv $ eareov , nal ra irpo rovrcdv n ad?]. 
 Nvv yap cjg eldooi nvp 6 n ixore eon, real enaorov avrtiv, 
 Xeyopev apx&g, avra TtOepevoi croixela rov navrog • Trpoo- 
 rjrcov avrolg ovd ’ (hg sv 2TAAABH2 elded aTTetfcaadrjvac. 
 “We must contemplate the nature of fire, water, air, and 
 earth, before the generation of the Heavens ; for now, as 
 though we spoke to those who well knew what fire is, and 
 each one of the rest, we talk of principles, and regard them 
 as the elements ( aroix £ Za , also used for the letters of the 
 alphabet) of the universe, when they ought not to be liken- 
 ed even to the species of the syllable.” It is very clear 
 likewise, from other passages, that Plato views them not as 
 elements, but as elementary states ( Karaordoeig ), in which 
 all bodies must exist, however varied in other respects 
 their compositions ; namely, as solid, fluid, gas , or that fourth 
 condition which the ancients generally denoted by the term 
 fire (nvp), but which modern chemistry would style the 
 class of imponderable agents. These are heat , light, the 
 electric, the galvanic, and the magnetic influence, which, al- 
 though having five different names, are coming to be more 
 and more regarded by our most scientific men as only modi- 
 fications of one and the same principle. In other words, 
 earth (y^), as used by Plato and many others of the Greek 
 philosophers, was simply their scientific term for solid (to 
 arepeov, to which it is sometimes equivalent), whether the 
 substance was earth, or wood, or precious stones, — v6o)p for 
 liquid or fluid , &c., and nvp for all that modification more 
 subtle than air, of which they had some tolerably clear 
 
 L 
 
122 ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 
 
 views, as the seat of higher agencies than were usually 
 cognizable by the senses, and of which they regarded the 
 visible lire as the lowest representative form. 
 
 Whoever wishes to see the views of Plato on these sub- 
 jects more fully stated may consult that portion of the 
 Timaeus, where he treats at great length of the primary 
 constitution of bodies, and which, although erroneous in the 
 details of its numerical ratios (as every a priori or theo- 
 retical attempt of the kind must be), contains evidently the 
 germ of the modern chemical theory of definite 'proportions . 
 These four states , or naraoraGSig , with all other interve- 
 ning compound modifications, were, in fact, regarded but as 
 varied manifestations of one simple essence (vXrj), which 
 receives all forms, itself having no form, and is therefore 
 ( ayvodorov ) unknown and incapable of being known : since 
 all physical knowledge is possible only in respect to those 
 things which have number and Xoyog, ratio or reason ; and 
 therefore elements, which are strictly such, are in their 
 very nature ak oya, or incapable of being objects of scien- 
 tific contemplation, except in their binary or trinary com- 
 binations. As he says in the Thesetetus, 202, B., ovro.) dr) 
 rd psv GTOix^ia aXoya teal ayvcoora elvai , oXadryrd ds , rag 
 6s GvXXabag yvoGrag rs nal prjrag nal dXrjOsl do^rj do%- 
 aGrdg. 
 
 All modifications of this simple essence were ( (paivopsva ) 
 phenomena or appearances, having nothing absolute except 
 in the idea manifested by them, no indestructible material 
 nature of their own, but continually passing into and out of 
 each other, or, in other words, ever becoming (yiyvopeva 
 not yev7]Gopeva), instead of absolutely being ( ovra ) in them- 
 selves distinct and imperishable substances. Thus, in the 
 Timaeus, 49, C. : Uptirov psv o dr) vvv vdoop (bvopdnapsv , 
 Tcrjyvvpevov, &g donovpsv, Xtdovg nal yrjv TirNOMENON 
 optipsv • rrjnopsvov d’ av teal dtanpivopsvov ravrov rovro , 
 rcvevpa nal aspa • (ovynavOevra ds tov aspa , nal tt vp) ava - 
 
ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 123 
 
 iraXcv de avynpiOev nal naraadeadev, eig ’IAEAN re amov 
 avOig depog nvp * nal naXiv aepa % vviovra nal nvnvovpevov, 
 vefpog nal opi'xXrjv • in 6i tovtov etl paXXov gvpmXovpe- 
 vcov, peov vdojp * i^vdarog de, yr\v nal XWovg avOig * nvnXov 
 re ovtg) diadidovra eig dXXrjXa, cog tpaiverat , tt)v yeveaiv. 
 “ For, in the first place, what we call water ( fluid ), when 
 condensed, we behold becoming earth (or solid). Again, 
 dissolved and separated, we behold this same thing becoming 
 air [or gas). The air (gas), heated or being burned together 
 (if ovynavOevra be a right reading ), becomes nvp, and nvp 
 again having its particles more closely united and condensed 
 by cold (naraadeadev), departs back again into the idea of 
 air. Again, we see the air, when condensed, becoming cloud 
 or vapour, and from them, when still more compressed, 
 converted into flowing water. Finally, from water we be- 
 hold again earth or solids, thus in a circle appearing suc- 
 cessively to give birth or generation to each other.” 
 
 Of the unknown elementary vXr] he thus speaks : did 
 rr\v rov yeyovorog bparov nal navrog aiaOrjrov MHTEPA 
 nal vnodo%f)v, prjre yrjv, prjre aepa, prjre nvp, prjre vdcop 
 Xeycopev, prjre baa in rovrcov , j urjre it; cbv ravra yeyovev • 
 aXX* aoparov eldog n nal ap,opcpov, navde^ig . p^eraXapda^ 
 vov de anopebrara nr] rov vorjrov nal dvaaXcororarov avro 
 Xeyovreg, ov 'ipevaopeOa. “ But as for the mother and re- 
 cipient of everything which becomes an object ©f sight and 
 sensation, let us call it neither solid, nor air, nor fire, nor 
 fluid, nor anything which springs from these, nor anything 
 from which these are (directly or immediately) generated, 
 but the invisible species, having no form of itself, yet capa- 
 ble of receiving all. Should we say that it is something 
 which partakes in some most obscure way of the intelligi- 
 ble, and that it is most difficult to be apprehended, we 
 should not mistake.” Timgeus, 51, A. The term aoparog 
 is not confined to the sense of sight, but is employed gen- 
 erally for all that region which is beyond the sphere of 
 
124 ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 
 
 sensation, or does not come under the cognizance of any 
 of the senses. Sometimes, in its Platonic import, it is used 
 for the intelligible , and is equivalent to vorjrov , but that does 
 not seem to be the case here. There is, no doubt, an allu- 
 sion in the above to Thales and Anaximenes, the former of 
 whom held that water, and the latter that air, was this ele- 
 mental principle, or mother of all things. 
 
 The Greek philosophers and poets generally regarded 
 nvp as a modification of matter more subtle than air, and 
 nearer to that simple elementary substance or vXr] which 
 was the basis of them all. Modern chemistry has experi- 
 mentally developed this a priori idea of the ancient mind, 
 in the discovery of that class of agents styled impondera- 
 ble. Most abundant proof could be given, that by this term 
 7n)p was not meant merely the element, as commonly un- 
 derstood, which goes by that name (although this was in- 
 cluded), any more than by the term y?/, when thus philosoph- 
 ically used, was intended only the earthy matter beneath 
 our feet. Another name for this fourth modification was 
 aWrjp. Some, indeed, made this a higher form than tti ;p, 
 as the author of the treatise De Mundo once ascribed to 
 Aristotle : Xeyoj de yr\g pev ev vdan , vdarog ev aepi , aepog 
 ev TTVpl , 7 rvpdg de ev aiOepc , k. t. A. Ch. iii., p. 143. In 
 general, however, all who held to but four modifications 
 regarded the two last mentioned as one and the same. The 
 peculiar region of the aether or fourth state was supposed to 
 be all of space above the atmosphere, although at the same 
 time interpenetrating and diffused through all below it. 
 There seems to be an allusion to this in iEsch., Prom. 
 Vine., 1090 : 
 
 d) ndvrcov 
 
 aWrjp kolvov (j)dog elXicocjv, 
 
 where the poet clearly regards it as the source of vision, 
 and seems to have held respecting it something like the 
 modern undulating theory of light. At least, we can make 
 
ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 125 
 
 no other sense of elXcaaov, which, in connexion with alOfjp 
 and (j)dog , suggests at once to the mind that waving or en- 
 larging spiral motion that the air undergoes in the propaga- 
 tion of sound, and which, in the theory referred to, is sup- 
 posed to take place in that universal fluid whose vibrations 
 or undulations give rise to the phenomena of vision. In 
 respect to the antiquity of this opinion, there is a remarka- 
 ble passage in Aristotle’s Meteorologica, lib. i., c. 3. On 
 account of its length, we give only a very concise version. 
 “We have already (he says) spoken respecting the first 
 element, what power it hath, and how that the whole uni- 
 verse above us is full of that substance ( euecvov rov ocbpa- 
 rog). And this opinion is not only entertained by us, but 
 seems to have been a very ancient supposition, and to have 
 been held by the primitive men ; for that which is called 
 aether received of old the appellation which Anaxagoras 
 seems to me to have regarded as the same with the fire. 
 For he says that all the upper regions are filled with fire 
 (rd avo nXrjprj irvpog elvai ), and yet he calls the same 
 power, or the influence which pervaded that portion of 
 space, the aether. And in this he was right ; for that sub- 
 stance which remains forever unchanged men very natural- 
 ly suppose to be a God, and Divine in its nature (to yap 
 ’AEI c&pa 0EON dpa re 0EION, ac. t. A.), and they ac- 
 cordingly defined such a substance by the name alOfjp 
 (equivalent to del deog, or del decor), as though it had no 
 identity with anything that pertains to us. Thus must we 
 say , that not once, or twice, or a few times, hut with almost 
 infinite repetitions, the same opinions come round in a circle 
 (( dvativnXelv ) among men .” We think little of Aristotle’ 
 etymology of alOfjp in this passage, but if this doctrine of 
 the universal aether was, as he says, so ancient, and if it 
 was held to be the cause of light and vision, it is certainly 
 a remarkable confirmation of the closing sentiment, that 
 ♦his same opinion should now be becoming everywhere a 
 
 L 2 
 
126 ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 
 
 favourite with our most scientific men, especially when 
 modem wits had for so long a time made themselves merry 
 with what they styled the ancient absurdities respecting a 
 plenum and a vacuum. 
 
 There is no doubt that Aristotle himself held light to be 
 an undulating motion in a fluid affecting the sensorium of 
 vision, as the undulations of the air affect that of the ear. 
 This fluid he styles to diacjjaveg, and says that colour af- 
 fects it, olov rov aepa , as the air ; vno tovtov tie ovvexovg 
 bvrog, mvelrai to aloOrjrrjpiov • ov yap icaXtig tovto /ley ei 
 ArjpdfcpiTog, oiopevog , el yevoiTO nevov to peTa^v, opaodac 
 av aKptdu )g, teal el pvpprji; ev tgj ovpav (p eh j, tovto yap 
 eoTiv advvaTOv. “ But by this fluid being continuous the 
 sensorium is affected ; for Democritus is not right in the 
 supposition, that if all the intervening space were a vacuum, 
 we might see so sharply as to discover an ant in the sky. 
 This, however, is impossible without an intervening me- 
 dium,” &c. Aristot., De Anima, ii., 7. 
 
 In the Pantheistic Orphic hymn, quoted by the author 
 of the treatise De Mundo, and by the scholiast on Plato, De 
 Leg., iv., 716, A., to which we have already referred, the 
 sether is represented as the seat of the Divine intellect, or, 
 rather, as the Divine or universal sensorium : 
 
 vovg de oi d^evdrjg paoiXrjiog atyOiTog ’AIOHP 
 gj drj navTa nXvec aai (ppa^eTat. 
 
 Whether this fragment be spurious or not, it is unques- 
 tionably of a very respectable antiquity. We have a simi- 
 lar sentiment, although, in a style less pantheistic, in that 
 common Homeric line, 
 
 Zev , avdiOTe, peyiOTe KeXaivecfreg ’AI0EPI NAIS2N, 
 
 and which, although immeasurably inferior, can hardly fail 
 to call to mind the Scriptural declarations, Who alone dwell - 
 eth in light inaccessible — Thou coverest thyself with light 
 as with a garment. The sublimity of this is heightened 
 
ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 127 
 
 by the thought that light, or, rather, the universal undu- 
 latory aether which causes the sensation, is itself invisible. 
 The Greek conception has a tinge of pantheism, and of the 
 doctrine of the anima mundi . The Hebrew, besides its 
 inexpressible sublimity, represents God as separated from 
 the universe and veiled in thick darkness by the interven- 
 tion of that very substance, which is the cause of light and 
 knowledge to every portion of the worlds he has created. 
 The Orphic and Homeric expressions, it is not absurd to 
 suppose, arose from perversions of that purer idea which 
 we find in the Bible. Similar language is frequently .to be 
 met with in the tragic poets, and sometimes a knowledge 
 of its Orphic application and origin is absolutely necessary 
 in illustrating passages which would be otherwise most 
 obscure. As when Sophocles, in one of the sublimest 
 choral odes in the (Edipus Tyrannus, speaking of the an- 
 tiquity of Law, represents it as born of the heavenly tether, 
 
 ovpaviav aldepa 
 renvoodevreg, 
 
 or, in other words, the offspring of that universal sensorium 
 or Divine Noi;^, which, according to the Orphic hymn, 
 hath its peculiar dwelling-place in the aether. From this 
 manner of employing the term, it became one of the names 
 of Jove himself, being regarded as his peculiar province in 
 the division of Saturn’s kingdom, as to Juno was allotted 
 the air or lower atmosphere, and to Neptune the water. 
 
 ’A rjp and aiOrjp are sometimes confounded by the poets, 
 although the distinction between them is, on the whole, tol- 
 erably well observed. ’A rjp is regarded as the source of 
 respiratory , and of the lowest animal life ; aldrjp of -the 
 higher life of sensation, and even of the intellect — the life 
 of the spirit. Hence, as the one is from aco, arjpi, to 
 breathe, the other is from atOco (old root ato)), to burn , to be 
 hot ; in the same manner as the first expression of the idea 
 
128 ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 
 
 of life (£aco, t$v) was most naturally associated with the 
 appearance of self-motion in fermentation or ebullition. 
 (See page 27, note 4, on the words and ^eco.) Hence 
 we cannot help thinking that there is some connexion be- 
 tween aWfjp, aiQo), and the verb atoOopcu , aloOdvopai. On 
 this matter, some of the old poets and materializing philoso- 
 phers may have indulged in views similar to what are now 
 held by not a few modem savans, respecting the influence 
 of an aethereal magnetic or galvanic fluid in the production 
 of motion, sensation, and even thought. Hence Aristoph- 
 anes, in the Clouds, 570, styles the aether fiioOpetipova : 
 
 5 Aidspa ospvoraTov flioOpsppova ndvrcjv. 
 
 The scholiast thinks that it is here used for arjp. The 
 higher sense, however, best accords with the term oepvo- 
 rarov and other expressions of this writer, who, when he 
 chooses to lay aside his buffoonery, is the most philosophical 
 of all the Grecian poets, although much inclined to a ma- 
 terializing pantheism. In another place, in the style of the 
 Orphic hymn and Homer, he calls it the dwelling-place of 
 Jove, 
 
 "Oj uvvpi TOtvvv aWep’ olnrjcnv Aiog. 
 
 Thesmoph ., 279. 
 
 A Wrjp or nvp, on the one hand, and yrj on the other, be- 
 ing the two extremes, are frequently spoken of together as 
 the cogenerating causes, or male and female parents of all 
 material existences. As in .ZEsch., Prom. Vinct., 88 : 
 
 T £2 dlog cdOrjp 
 
 — TTapprjTop re yrj. 
 
 v j? \fj- pjy *■>:'*>* T) ft, A \ p -4 * * \ ? ' [ ' v fTOr ; > O i f * ’ \ */• v* 
 
 So, also, in a fragment of Euripides, from the drama of 
 Chrysippus, 
 
 yala peyiorrj nal A Log alfffjp. 
 
 On like grounds, in the dissolution and death of animate 
 objects, this semi-materializing philosophy and poetry 
 taught that the more refined or spiritual parts returned to 
 
ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 129 
 
 the higher element from which they derived their origin, 
 while the denser returned to the earth The Trvsvpa 
 (spiritus) ascended to its kindred aidrjp. the fluids and 
 grosser matter sank into the bosom of their mother yala, 
 as in the line of Euripides which so strongly calls to mind 
 Ecclesiastes, xii., 7 : 
 
 ’E dear’ rjdrj y%j naXvcjiOrjvai VEKpovg, 
 oOev 6’ ercaorov slg to dcbinsro 
 kvravO* aTTEXOelv • TINETMA pev Trpog ’AI0EPA 
 to otipa 6 ’ slg THN. 
 
 Supplices , 533. 
 
 Compare Orestes, 1085, and Helena, 1023: 
 
 6 vovg 
 
 TG)V KdTOaVOVTCJV pEV OV , yVGjpTJV d’ E%El 
 aOdvcLTOV Eig aOavaTOV AI0EP’ EpnEouv. 
 
 Compare, also, the line of the fragment of the Hypsipyle 
 from Stobseus, 108, in which we have the very language of 
 the English Church burial service ; earth to earth — dust to 
 dust : 
 
 axOovTai (3pOToi 
 elg yrjv (j)ipovTEg yv\v. 
 
 In the case of the more gross and animal, it was supposed 
 that the nvsvpa , being borne down by the attraction and 
 weight of the earthy and sensual, and being unable to ex- 
 tricate itself from it, sank into still lower forms, until puri- 
 fied and set free by the penetrating and cleansing fires of 
 Hades. See the Phsedon, 81, D. 
 
 We cannot conclude this long and yet, as we trust, not 
 altogether irrelevant excursus, without giving an extract 
 from a fragment of Euripides, in which there is most beau- 
 tifully expressed this departure of the elements to their 
 native homes, and which we cannot help thinking to be 
 genuine, notwithstanding it is strongly controverted by 
 Valckenaer : 
 
130 ATHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF (pVGig^ ~VXV> AND T ^X V7 \' 
 
 Xciipei 6 ’ 0776(76), rd /i£T eu yatag 
 ( pvvr 5 £$• yalav , Ta d’ a7r’ aiOepiov 
 fiXaoTOvra yovrjg elg ovpaviov 
 iroXov fjXOe iraXiv • i9 vtjgicec d’ ovdev 
 tgjv ycyvopevcov • diaKpcvopevov d ’ 
 dAAo irpog aXkov 
 j uopfpfjv Idlav airsdsi^ev. 
 
 Valckenaer , Dlairib. in Eurip Frag. 
 
 XIII. 
 
 Atheistical Doctrine of (f>vGLg,rv^ 9 and re^v?]. 
 
 Page 13, Line 16. <I>i;(7£6 navra elvat teal rvxv (paGt* 
 rex v XI de ovdev tovtcjv. 44 They say that all these things 
 are by nature and chance , none of them by art ” That 
 
 is, these first four states, namely, 7ri;p, a??p, &c., were the 
 production of rvx 7 ] and <pvGig, whatever meaning they might 
 have attached to these terms : the second stage, which re- 
 sulted in the larger compounded bodies (arising from the 
 composition of these four elements, or from their mixed 
 combinations, when considered as states or conditions of 
 existence), was regarded as chiefly the work of rvx'd- 
 TvxV d£ (pepopeva r y ryg dvvapecog EnaGra ercaGrcov, y 
 %vpiT£7TT(OKEV apporrovra ol/tELOjg iroog, deppa 'ipvxpolg , fj 
 Zypa irpog vypd, it. t. X. In this department tvx 7 ] was the 
 presiding power, although its influence was modified by 
 those adaptations which belonged to (pvGtg , and to which 
 reference is made in the above expression, apporrovra 
 olitELug 7T6 )g; that is, although the original impulses and 
 motions were the result of chance, a (pvGtg or natural neces- 
 sity directed everything to its most fitting place, so that, 
 after long wanderings in this wide domain of a plenum 
 
 at length found its rest in a vacuum , warm was neutralized 
 by cold, convex adapted itself to concave, hard things found 
 
ATHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF (ftvOLg^ TV%7), AND 131 
 
 their repose in soft, influences constantly tending on all sides 
 to an equality, at last brought many bodies to a spherical 
 shape and to a circular motion, until finally in this way a 
 universe was formed : uoopog apporrcov rag dvvapeig rr\g 
 (pvoeutg avrov oitcetoxg nog ; these various adaptations or 
 fittings , after they had once happened to take place, be- 
 coming more and more stable by nature (cbvotg), and a cer- 
 tain habit (e%tg), which everything had a tendency to main- 
 tain when once assumed. 
 
 After this immense region of cjxvotg and rvx 7 ! came the 
 small province of re^yr], or art , which was itself supposed 
 to grow out of ( [(pveoQai ) and to be long posterior to the two 
 first ; according to the atheistic dogma, that mind, of which 
 art or rex vr ] is the offspring, is the last production of the 
 generative power of the universe. Here we have the doc- 
 trine of progress in all its consistency; and why might not 
 a God be the last result or consummation of this ascending 
 scale, instead of being the beginning, as he is in that a 
 priori view, which commences with the idea of the perfect, 
 and from thence descends to the lower and the imperfect ? 
 We see not how, even on this scheme most ingenious as 
 it is, the atheist can expect to find relief from his torment- 
 ing theophobia, or escape that object of his greatest dread, 
 a superhuman being, whether he styles him a God or a 
 Daemon. 
 
 If nature, (jxvotg and rvx'f], have thus, after ages spent in 
 lower productions on our earth, finally worked out the soul 
 of man (or whatever else they may style that peculiar mat- 
 ter in us which wills, and thinks, and feels), why may not 
 these agencies, during the long cycles of eternity, and in 
 the infinitude of space, have given birth to a being excelling 
 us in power as much as we surpass the lowest orders of 
 vegetation ? And what security have they as to his moral 
 character, or what grounds for supposing that he would 
 possess any moral character at all. The same progressive 
 
132 ATHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF (jiVOC^TV^tjy AND 
 
 influences which, on our narrow scale, have called into being 
 ichthyosauri , and megatheria , and mammoth monsters, such 
 as sometimes now affright us by their exposed relics, may 
 have given birth, on the immense field of the universe, to 
 Gorgons, Hydras, and Chimaeras dire, 
 to a God or Gods of a more horrid nature than ever crossed 
 the imagination of the Gnostic, or than ever figured in the 
 wildest legends of Thibet or Hindostan. Indeed, we have 
 every reason to believe that this monstrous Hindoo system, 
 which should be styled a theogony rather than a theology, 
 sprang in this very manner from an ancient atheism, which 
 had been the offspring of a still earlier pantheism. It seems 
 evidently to recognise such an older (pvaig as Plato’s 
 atheists talked about, and the history of its Gods is only a 
 history of successive generations from this primeval nature, 
 each of a more horrid species than its predecessor. 
 
 We say the atheist has no security against this, unless 
 he takes shelter in that a priori idea of God which comes 
 from the necessities of our own minds, inseparably con- 
 necting with it the notion of goodness, and of infinite perfec- 
 tion of every kind. But, then, this is a very different being 
 from that last production of nature, which can never rise 
 above its parent, or possess any other than physical attri- 
 butes. Should they startle at the idea of such a superhu- 
 man being, whose malevolence might be commensurate 
 with his power, and assert that it is improbable or impossi- 
 ble, the declaration proceeds only from an instinctive revert- 
 ing to those ideas which belong to a directly opposite sys- 
 tem, commencing with the moral instead of the natural, and 
 making the necessary idea of God the ground of all truth. 
 We are confined to so minute a portion of the universe, 
 that no a posteriori induction, aside from any such neces- 
 sary a priori idea, or some special revelation, can ever 
 produce a firm conviction or a confiding trust in the Divine 
 benevolence. 
 
ATHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF TU%?7, AND t£%V7]. 133 
 
 Neither has the atheist any security against a Hades or 
 unseen world, filled with the most ghastly apparitions ; and 
 it is a fact, as has been remarked by Bayle, who was him- 
 self a skeptic, that many of this unhappy class have had 
 most horrid fears of ghosts and hobgoblins. Their great 
 champion Hobbes furnishes a noted example of this. Some 
 might regard it as an inconsistency, and yet their system 
 can allege nothing against the position that such appear- 
 ances are not the mere fictions of a diseased imagination, 
 but have a real existence in rerum natura. Who can as- 
 sign any bounds to the working of (pvag and rvx 7 ] ? The 
 atheist cannot even be sure that he may not, on his own 
 hypothesis, live again. Eternity is very long, and viewed 
 in reference to it, everything ceases to be improbable, ex- 
 cept what is inconsistent with the attributes of an a priori 
 God. But remove this idea, and what hinders us from sup- 
 posing that, in the endless changes of matter, the same 
 atoms which now form the atheist’s body, and give rise to 
 the energies of his soul, may again come into the same 
 combinations, may recreate a brain with the same particles, 
 having the same figure, site, and order, and, of course, pro- 
 ducing the same thoughts and sensations, or, in short, re- 
 new an existence, in all respects identical, which may rec- 
 ollect all the misery of the past, and can only indulge the 
 same awful anticipations for the hopeless and godless 
 future. 
 
 Plato seems to have already had in mind a class of semi- 
 theists or semi-atheists, such as we have been considering, 
 who might believe in a kind of Deity younger than Nature, 
 and yet possessed of vast power and intelligence. After 
 alluding to the common opinion that astronomers must be 
 atheists, because they are so in the habit of resolving all 
 the phenomena of the Heavens into necessities ( avayuaig ) 
 and natural laws, he mentions a class who acknowledged 
 the existence of mind in the motions of the celestial bodies 
 
 M 
 
134 ATHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF (^VOtg^ F^XVi AND TE^VTj . 
 
 but who strangely regarded this mind as itself the result, 
 and not the author of Nature : Aeyovol nveg cog vovg elr\ 6 
 diaK£KOG[i7]KG)g ndvd ’ boa hut' ovpavov • ol 6s avrol ird?uv 
 apapravovreg 'i/jvx^g (pvoecjg, on npeodvrepov elrj oupdruv, 
 StavorjOevreg de cbg vecjrepov , airavO ’ b)g einslv eirog ave- 
 rpe'ipav irdhcv, kavrovg 6e noXv paXXov 9 k. t. A. “ Some 
 say that it is Nous, or Mind, that orders all things in the 
 Heavens. But, then, these same persons, erring as to the 
 nature of soul, in that it is older than bodies (or matter), 
 and supposing it to be younger, they again, as we may say, 
 upset all things, and especially themselves. For all these 
 things appear to them to be full merely of earth, and stones, 
 and other inanimate bodies, dividing among themselves (or 
 to which they assign) the causes of the universe. This is 
 what has produced so many atheistic impieties, and so 
 many difficulties in the treatment of these matters. Hence, 
 also, have come those abusive charges which the poets 
 have made against philosophers, comparing their declara- 
 tions and dogmas to the confused yelping of dogs.” De 
 Legibus, xii., 967, A. There is one important inference to 
 be drawn from this passage. Plato evidently maintains 
 that no one can be a consistent theist who does not hold 
 that spirit is older than matter. The position that matter 
 is eternal would be in direct opposition to this, and there- 
 fore he could not himself have maintained that doctrine, 
 whatever appearance of it there may be in some obscure 
 passages in the Timseus. See this more fully examined, 
 Note L., on the ancient dogma, De nihilo nihil Jit. On this 
 subject of tvx V an ^ cf>votg , compare Aristotle, Physic. Ausc., 
 lib. ii. , ch. 4. 
 
RELIGION AND LAW, NOT BY NATURE, BUT BY ART. 135 
 
 XIV. 
 
 Atheistical Doctrine that Law and Religion were not by Na- 
 ture, but by Art. 
 
 Page 14, Line 10. Ovtu 6s teal rrjv vopodsotav ndoav , 
 ov (pvoei, tsxvxi 6s. This is simply mentioned as one of 
 the inferences from their doctrine, namely, “ that legislation 
 or law was not by nature, but by art.” It was, however, just 
 the inference that Plato deemed of the most dangerous con- 
 sequence, and against which he directs all the strength of 
 his reasoning, both here and in many other parts of his dia- 
 logues. Compare the Gorgias, and especially that long 
 argument of Callicles (482, C.), in which he advances this 
 same doctrine, namely, that law, and right (to 6Uaiov ), and 
 religion are not by nature, but by human appointment, 
 which is equivalent to what the atheist here is supposed to 
 mean by ts^vt]^ as something junior and posterior to nature : 
 d)£ rd noXXa de ravra svavrla dXXfXoig sgtlv , tj ts (f>vcug 
 teal 6 vdfiog, k. t. X. Gorgias, 483, A. 
 
 It is a doctrine which in all ages has had its advocates, 
 and in modern times has been specially revived by Hobbes 
 and his followers. It is this inference that gives atheism 
 all its interest. As a speculative tenet for the intellect 
 merely, it would have no charms even for the darkest mind. 
 If this creed be true, then not only religion, but also all 
 morality, and all right views of law, are without any founda- 
 tion either in God, or in any nature of things proceeding 
 from him, or in any nature at all implying a moral sanction 
 and which necessarily suggests the idea of something older, 
 and higher, and stronger than itself. They are all, in that 
 case, the offspring of T s^vt], or Art. That is, they have 
 only a human origin ; since, in this creed, Art is the result 
 of the junior production, Mind ; or, in the language which 
 Plato ascribes to the atheist, vorspav etc tovtwv yevofisvrjv 
 0NHTHN sk ONHTS2N. They can, therefore, have only 
 
136 RELIGION AND LAW, NOT BY NATURE, BUT BY ART. 
 
 human sanctions, and it is this conclusion which, to the 
 depraved soul, gives atheism all its value, while, if the in- 
 tellect alone were concerned, it would shrink from it as 
 from the very “ blackness of darkness” itself. 
 
 The ancient atheists saw that there could be no true nat- 
 ural morality without the belief in a God, and they did 
 not pretend it. As in the moral and political philosophy 
 of Plato, the Deity was the beginning, middle, and end : 6 
 pev 6?) deog (cjonep 6 iraXaiog Xoyog) apx'fjv re real te\ev- 
 rr)v Kal peoa ru)v ovrtov andvruv £%6)T, lib. iv., 715, or, 
 as he says in another place, 6 dr) -dedg rjplv ndvruv perpov 
 av Etrj paXiara, 717 ; so, on the other hand, he justly rep- 
 resents those against whom he is here contending, as hold- 
 ing to no conscience, no law, no right and wrong, as well 
 as no religion and no God. They reasoned, however,- like 
 their modern followers of the school of Hobbes, in a vicious 
 circle. From an atheistic assumption, they proved that law 
 was not by nature, but by art, and then from this latter posi- 
 tion, taken as established, they argued that Divine worship, 
 being enjoined by law, was also by art, and*not by nature : 
 fieovg eivai irpCdrov (paoiv ovtoi rex^V °v (pvoet, aXXa tlol 
 vopoig. Page 14, line 20. 
 
 We see the absurdity of the thing in the way Plato states 
 their positions and their irpcbrov 'ipevdog ; yet, by conceal- 
 ing this vicious and circular mode of reasoning, such writers 
 as Hobbes have seemed to make out a most formidable 
 argument. This atheistical dogma, that religion is the 
 creation of law and the civil magistrate, is most strikingly 
 set forth in the following fragment attributed by Sextus 
 Empiricus (Advers. Matliem., lib. ix., sec. 54) to Critias, 
 one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, and by Plutarch (De 
 Placit. Philosoph., i., 6 and 7) to Euripides, who, he says, 
 utters these sentiments in the character of Sisyphus instead 
 of his own, through fear of the Areopagus. We give these 
 verses in full, because of their intrinsic interest as one of 
 
RELIGION AND LAW, NOT BY NATURE, BUT BY ART. 137 
 
 the most remarkable remains of antiquity, because they set 
 forth in all its strength the substance of all that has ever 
 been said on this head from that time down to the present, 
 and because they furnish a specimen of most finished poetry, 
 of a higher stamp than atheism could have been supposed 
 to employ in the utterance of its dark oracles : 
 
 ’TL> xpovoc OT* 7]V LLTCLKTOQ avdptOTCCOV /3£og 
 YLal ftypLudyg, ioxvog vnypETyg, 
 
 "Or’ ovdev aeQlov ovre ToZg egOTioZglv yv , 
 
 O vf av noTiaapa ToZg kclkolq kylvero. 
 
 KanELTa poL doKovaiv dvdpcjnoL vopovg 
 Qeodcu KohaoTag, Iva diny Tvpavvog y 
 Tsvovg Pporelov , Tyv vfipiv 6ov\yv EXVi 
 
 ’E £rj[LLOVTO 6\ EL TLQ E^apapTUVOL. 
 
 *E KELT ETCELdrj Tup^aVT] [1EV 0L VOpOL 
 
 ’AnsZpyov avTovg epya py npdoGELv (3ia, 
 
 AaOpa 6’ snpaGGOV, rrjvLKavrd pot 6 okel 
 $ vv<u nvfcvog rig nal oo(j)bg yvupyv dvyp , 
 
 Tv&vcu c$’ ETZog fivyrolaiv k^EvpZbv, onog 
 Ely tl dsZpa rolg na/coZoL , nav TiaOpa 
 IIpdoocoGLv, y T^Eyctoiv, y fypov&GL tl. 
 
 ’E vtevQev ovv TO OEION Eloyyymrro , 
 
 *Jlg £.otl Aalpuv, atyfrlnp ’daXkuv j3Z(p 
 N06> r’ UKOVCOV KCLt (37 lE 7CG)V (j)povtiv t’ del, 
 m IT pooExuv ts ravra t cal (pvGiv tislav <poptiv, 
 
 Udv pev to XexOev ev flporoig lmovgetcu , 
 
 ’Ef dpupEvov 6 e nav ISeZv dvvyGSTac. 
 
 ’Eav 6 e gvv Gtyy tl (3ov?i£vyg nanov, 
 
 To£r’ ovxl ^t/gel Tovg fisovg * to yap (f>povovv 
 " Ev egtl '&e'lg)v. tovgSs TLg oyovg Pisyov 
 A LdaypaTuv ytiiGTOv eloyyyGaTo , 
 
 'Tevcki Kakvtyag Tyv dlyOsLav Xoyc j. 
 
 N ateiv 6’ E(j)aoK£ Tovg i Jsovg svTavO’, Iva 
 M dTiLGTu y y EKnTiy^sLsv dvOpunovg, ayuv 
 "OOev n Ep Eyvcj Tovg (j>66ovg elvaL ppoToZg 
 K.al Tag ovyoEig tc 5 TaTiaLnupu (3Z(p , 
 
 ’E/c Tyg vnspde nspityopag, Iv * aoTpanyg 
 KaTsZd’ kvavGEig , Selvcl 6’ av nTvnypaTa 
 B povTyg, to t’ uoTspunov ovpavov denag r 
 Xpovov Kahbv noiniTipa, TEKTOvog GO(j>ov. 
 
 M 2 
 
138 RELIGION AND LAW, NOT BY NATURE, BUT BY ART. 
 
 * OQev re Xa/urpog darepag onepx^i pvdpog, 
 
 O #’ vypog tig yrjv opdpog EttTtopL&Tai. 
 
 Toiovode 7r epLEGrrjGEv avdpcoTroig tyodov 
 'Zrotxovg, tcaTi&g re tcj Xoycp kcltguclgc 
 T ov Aalpov’ oyn&v, kv 7rpenovTL x^pi V- 
 
 A most masterly refutation of this atheistic dogma, espe- 
 cially as it was, in more modern times, advanced by Hobbes, , 
 may be found in Cudworth’s Intellectual System of the 
 Universe, in which there is a most thorough and conclusive 
 examination of the general doctrine, that morality and reli- 
 gion are not by nature, or from the Divine mind, but are 
 strictly conventional, that is, by human law. Plato also 
 touches upon this subject in the Theaetetus, 172, B., where 
 he sets forth the unavoidable conclusions of that flowing 
 philosophy, which, rejecting ideas , and making man, or, in 
 other words, sensations the measure of all things ( perpov 
 rravrojv), utterly sweeps away all morality, all religion, all 
 law, in short, all foundations whether of a civil or religious 
 kind : Ovnovv nal nepl TzoXinnCbv (cpaa), naXd pev nal 
 alo%pa, Sinaia nal dSina , nal baa nal p?], ola av enaorr] 
 rcoXzg ozrjOezoa (t-vp^epovra elvai) # r\rai vopipa eavrirj, 
 ravra real elvai rfi akrfleia enaarxj * nal ev rovrozg pev 
 ovSev ooepebrepov ovre ISabrrjv ISubrov, ovre rroXtv noXecog 
 elvai . nal ev rolg Scnaiozg nal dSznozg, nal ooiozg nal avo- 
 GiOig , edeXovozv loxvpi^eoOai, d>g ovn eon (pvoez avrebv 
 ovSev ’0Y2IAN eavrov aXXd to nozvyj So^av, rovro 
 
 yiveraz aXrjdeg rore, orav So^. Theaetetus, 172, B., C. 
 
 They assigned a rather higher rank to the idea of the 
 beautiful (to naXov) than to that of the right . Ka£ 6?) nal 
 rd naXa, (pvoei pev aXXa elvai , vopep de erepa * ra Se Srj 
 dinaza odd’ elvai rorrapdirav (pvoez. Page 14, line 23. 
 
 “ The beautiful , they said, was partly by nature and partly 
 by law (that is, conventional agreement or custom), but the 
 Just (or Right) had no foundation at all in nature,” or, in 
 other words, was the creation alone of arbitrary enactment. 
 
THE FIGURE APOSIOPESIS. 
 
 139 
 
 The doctrines of an immutable standard of morals and of 
 an immutable standard of taste must go together. Both are 
 necessarily and consistently rejected by the atheist, and 
 both should be strenuously maintained by all consistent 
 theists. Physical, moral, intellectual, and religious beauty, 
 although not the same, can all be traced to one common 
 foundation. All are harmonies ; all spring from one root, 
 and all are alike unmeaning notions, unless connected with 
 that idea of God in which the Beautiful, the Righteous, and the 
 Good (to fcaXdv , to ayadov , to diuacov) are all embraced 
 and regarded, not only as older than human art ( $vr)T7 ) tex - 
 vrj), but also than (pvvig, or Nature itself. Compare the 
 argument of the atheist Callicles, in the Gorgias, 485 : a 
 (pvOEL [lev ova eotl naXa vdfuo ds, k. t. X. 
 
 XV. 
 
 The Figure Aposiopesis. 
 
 Page 15, Line 8. E i prj (frrjoovoiv. The apodosis here 
 # is wanting, or, rather, interrupted in a manner, which, al- 
 though frequent in Greek, would not be admissible in the 
 English. This silent omission has sometimes a much 
 more powerful effect than any expression of the apodosis, 
 especially in the case of threatening and admonitions. The 
 answer, in such examples, seems to be left entirely to con- 
 science, as though it could not possibly mistake the proper 
 response. There are very powerful and numerous in- 
 stances of this in the Hebrew of the Old Testament, and 
 from thence in the Hebraistic Greek of the New. One of 
 the most striking may be found, Luke, xiii., 9 : nav pev 
 TTOLrjorj rcapnov — eI 6e prjye. Compare, also, Luke, xix., 
 42 ; xxi /., 42 ; Acts, xxiii., 9; Romans, ix., 22 ; John, vi., 
 62. There is a very fine example, Iliad, i., 135 : 
 
140 
 
 THE FIGURE APOSIOPESIS. 
 
 akA? el [j,ev d&oovoi yepag f. leyaOvuoc ’AxaioX— 
 el 6e tie pi) 6 g)g)olv . . . 
 
 See, also, the ninth book of the Laws, 854, C., aal eav 
 j uev ooi dptivTL ravra Aco</>a n to vooppa • — el 6e pr), &c. 
 We have also an example very similar to the present in 
 the Protagoras, 325, D., teal eav pev e^ioy Tcetdrjrai — el 6e 
 I ui), &c., where, in the same manner, the answer is left to 
 the inward voice, and the writer hurries on to the second 
 condition as the principal clause. See, also, the Republic, 
 ix., 575, I)., ovuovv eav pev enovreg vneirccjOLV — eav 6e 
 pi), &c. ; Thucydides, iii., 3, teal fjv pev £ vpdirj , rj rceipa • — el 
 6e pi], &c. ; Plato, Symposion, 220, D., el 6e fiovXeode, n. 
 7. A. This has been most appropriately and beautifully 
 styled by grammarians aposiopesis, or an omission arising 
 from an excitement of the feelings, in which a gesture or 
 a look is supposed to supply the place of the voice. Al- 
 though these and similar cases- may by some be regarded 
 as defects or irregularities in the Greek language, every 
 scholar who has any claim to taste or philosophy must re- 
 gard them as its highest beauties. It is a great pity that 
 our own tongue had not more of this flexibility, and did not 
 admit more licenses of a similar kind, instead of being so 
 stiffly confined in that strait jacket which has been put 
 upon it in the rules imposed, for the most part, by pedantic, 
 unphilosophical, and unclassical writers on English Gram- 
 mar ; for such, with some few exceptions, have been the 
 great mass of those who have taken upon themselves to 
 lay down the laws of this science, and to sit in judgment 
 on Lowth and Murray. To return, however, to the sentence 
 before us : if it is desired to avoid the aposiopesis, this may 
 be done by taking all from nal nepl to ypacjxov inclusive, 
 as a parenthesis, and then bringing in what follows as a 
 repetition with an apodosis to el pi) (prjoovoiv. The only 
 thing in the way of this is the particle de, the insertion of 
 which, however, may be regarded as occasioned by the 
 
ARGUMENT FROM MOTION. 
 
 141 
 
 prodosis having been, in a measure, lost sight of in conse- 
 quence of the length of the intervening parenthesis. 
 
 XVI. 
 
 Argument for the Existence of a God from Motion . 
 
 Page 18, Line 22. ’A rjdsGrepcov Xoyuv. “ Unusual , or 
 out of the common track” Reference is had to those subtle 
 disquisitions respecting motion which are soon to follow. 
 They are so called, because differing from the common 
 and more obvious arguments generally made use of, such 
 as those arising from evidence of design, and the more 
 striking phenomena of the visible world, to which Clinias 
 had so readily alluded in the commencement of the discus- 
 sion. Plato thinks it best to begin at the beginning, or, as 
 he elsewhere styles it, the fountain-head of the error : rr\v 
 7ir\yr\v avoiyrov dogrjg. If the least power or property of 
 motion is conceded to matter, or to the least particle of 
 matter per se, all is given up to the atheist, at least as far 
 as the physical world is concerned. The whole cause is 
 surrendered to the enemy. If this is granted, or not de- 
 nied, then it would not be hard to admit that matter may 
 also have an adaptive as well as a moving property, a 
 tendency to an accommodation of itself to the circumstances 
 in which it is placed, or, according to the doctrine just 
 taught, a disposition to fit itself to those conditions in the 
 universe into which it may be thrown by its own self- 
 moving power, acting only under the direction of rv^r], or 
 chance : £ vpnenrojfcev navra apfiorrovra olue'nog rrcog, 
 
 paXaua npog GfcXrjpa, u. r. X. Here we are in the dark 
 ‘region of occult qualities, and we can as well conceive of 
 the one property as of the other. In fact, it is easier for 
 the mind to admit this doctrine of an adaptive power, after 
 conceding that of motion, than to receive the latter first as 
 
142 
 
 ARGUMENT FROM MOTION. 
 
 an independent starting-point. In this view, then, all ar- 
 guments from fitness fall to the ground, unless the first mo- 
 tion is shown to be the offspring of rexvr], and not of tvx^i 
 or even of (pvcug. If we only give the atheist time enough 
 — and eternity is very long — he may fancy that, on his 
 theory, everything will at last fall into its proper place 
 ^vpirlnreL oineiog ncog), and commence the natural dis- 
 charge of its only and long-sought appropriate office 
 
 Plato, therefore, takes his stand on the first position, 
 namely, that the mere motion of matter implies the existence 
 of Spirit as an older and higher essence, or, in other words, 
 that Spirit alone is self-moving, because it alone possesses 
 that duality which resolves itself at the same time into sub- 
 ject and object . The term avroidvrjGLg is not to be con- 
 fined to local motion, but may refer to any change in the 
 state or condition of a thing. It may, therefore, be pred- 
 icated of mind, or pure spirit, independent of space. In 
 this sense volition is avTontv7]Gtg , or self-motion, even al- 
 though it may never be exhibited outwardly. That matter 
 cannot possess this, in either acceptation of the term, is an 
 affirmation rendered necessary by the very laws of mind. 
 It is involved in the term itself, or rather in the idea of 
 which the term is the real, and not merely arbitrary rep- 
 resentative, and may therefore be called a logical necessity. 
 Although the argument may have something of the a pos- 
 teriori form, it is nevertheless strictly a priori. It is a con- 
 clusion not derived from experience ; for in truth, aside from 
 the essential idea which the laws of our minds compel us 
 to create, all our mere experience of matter is directly op- 
 posed to it. As presented to our senses, it seems to be evei 
 in motion, and this phenomenon exhibits itself more con 
 stantly the more closely and minutely it is examined ; so' 
 that if experience alone were to be consulted, or, to use the 
 language of some of our Baconians, if nature alone were to 
 be interrogated, motion would appear to be the law, and rest 
 
ARGUMENT FROM MOTION. 
 
 143 
 
 ' v if absolute rest were ever to be discovered) the exception. 
 Notwithstanding all this, the mind cannot divest itself of 
 that idea (whether innate, or acquired, or suggested) which 
 it hath of body, as distinguished from space ; and whenever 
 this idea is clearly called out, the soul doth affirm of neces- 
 sity, and in spite of all the phenomena of experience to the 
 contrary, that matter cannot move itself. The same ne- 
 cessity compels it, also, to declare that matter cannot con- 
 tinue motion by virtue of any inherent power, any more 
 than it can commence it, and this, too, notwithstanding the 
 opposing dogma so confidently laid down in all our books 
 of natural philosophy. We have the constant observation 
 of ten thousand motions, commenced and continued with- 
 out the visible intervention of any spiritual agent, and ap- 
 parently the result of innate properties, and yet, when the 
 mind remains sound and true to itself, all this does not at 
 all weaken the innate conviction, that every KLvrjOLg implies 
 the existence of an originating will or spirit somewhere, 
 however many the impulsive forces that may seem to have 
 intervened between that will and its ultimate object. When 
 the mind >3 in a healthy state, we say it is compelled to 
 affirm, and does affirm this, with the same confidence as 
 the proposition that the three angles of every triangle are 
 equal to two right angles, or that two bodies cannot occupy 
 the same space. Even this, notwithstanding it lies at the 
 foundation of mechanical and dynamical physics, is ulti- 
 mately to be resolved into a logical necessity , that is, a ne- 
 cessary affirmation into which the mind is driven by those 
 laws of its own, that form not only our highest, but our only 
 idea of truth. Hence, having the idea, or that notion un- 
 der which it is forced to think of matter, the soul affirms 
 that two bodies occupying the same space are one bod)r 
 because the last differentia , or erepotOTriq, is destroyed. 
 
(44 
 
 SOUL OLDER THAN BODY. 
 
 XVII. 
 
 Soul Older than Body. 
 
 Page 19, Line 16. 2 a) par cov epnpooOsv Tcavrcjv yevo - 
 fievrj. Compare with this Timaeus, 34, B. : T rjv 6s 6?) 
 ibvx?] v ov% 6)g vvv vorspav smx^povpsv Xsysiv , ovrcog 
 eprjxdvrjaaro uai o dsog vscorspav. ov yap av apx^Oai 
 rcpsadvrspov vi to vecorspov ovvsp^ag etaosv. b 6s real ys- 
 vsesi uai apery nporspav uai npeodvrepav 'ipvx'rjv ocoparog, 
 fog 6sgtt6tlv teal dp^ovoav ap^opsvov ovveoryoaro. “ God 
 did not create soul, as we now speak of it (in the order of 
 our argument), posterior and junior ; for he would not have 
 suffered an elder thing to be ruled by a younger. Where- 
 fore he constituted soul, both by virtue and by birth, to be 
 prior to and older than body, as the mistress and ruler 
 thereof.” The term ijn’XV is used here in a less sense 
 than in the tenth of the Laws, where it includes all that is 
 immaterial, and is employed in a peculiar manner for God 
 as distinguished from (pvoig . It, however, means much 
 more, in this passage of the Timaeus, than the soul of man. 
 The philosopher is speaking of soul collectively, the animus 
 mundi , or Soul of the Universe, as distinct from, inferior to, 
 and dependent upon, the Deity who had constituted it (ovv- 
 eoTrjGaro , ep7]x av V aaT0 )’ and yet as the source, and fountain 
 from which all other souls emanate or are generated, 
 whether of men or of the inferior Divinities, according to 
 that verse of Pindar, Nem., Carm. vi., 2., a., 1, 2 : 
 
 n Ev ay6pfov, sv ftefov ysvog • eu 
 ptdg 6s rcvsopsv 
 parpog apfporepoL. 
 
 If soul is older than body or matter, then the properties 
 or innate powers (cvyyevr]) of the former must be also be- 
 fore those of the latter. Wherefore, as he says below, 
 661-a 6rj real smpsXeia ual vovg ual rsxv?] ual vopog ( rd 
 
SOUL OLDER THAN BODY. 
 
 145 
 
 ovyyevrj ipvxVG)* TTporspa av etrj anXrjpcbv nal j uaXantiv nal 
 /3ap£G)v nal novcpcov (rtiv TTpoarjnovTUv Gupan). “ Thought, 
 and providence, and reason, and art , and law , must have 
 been before hard, and soft, and heavy, and light.” It is 
 evident that the term otipa here is not taken for organized 
 substances, but is in all respects equivalent to our word 
 matter ; for he mentions only those elementary properties 
 which belong to it, or were supposed to belong to it as 
 matter, such as hardness or resistance, weight, &c. So 
 that there is nothing in this word against the inference we 
 have drawn respecting Plato’s opinion on the eternity of the 
 material world, whether regarded as organized or unor- 
 ganized. It seems to us perfectly clear that in every sense 
 of the word, as used by the modern philosophy, he held 
 matter to be junior to soul. 
 
 The order of the argument, it should be observed here, 
 is the direct opposite of what is commonly styled the a 
 posteriori. In the latter, we proceed from evidences of fit- 
 ness in matter to a soul or art , which, for all that this method 
 can oppose to the contrary, may have been the offspring of 
 an older tyvoig, of whose adaptations its designs may be 
 only an imperfect imitation, whether regarded as proceed- 
 ing from the soul of man, or of some superhuman being. 
 In the other, the older existence of spirit is first establish- 
 ed, and then it is inferred, even before experimental induc- 
 tion, that there must be such evidences of design, because 
 art and law, which are properties of soul, must be older 
 than the material structures in which they are exhibited. 
 On the scheme of the atheist, or the naturalist (the worship- 
 per of (pvotg ), only some of the smaller and latest produc- 
 tions were the work of tex vt ] making its appearance in the 
 latter cycles of the universe. In the other view, which the 
 author here presents, ra peyaXa nal npebra epya nal npa %- 
 eig rexvrjg av yiyvoiro, ovra ev irptiroLr, ra 6e (\>vaei nal 
 iiVGiq varepa nal apxopsva av en rexvrjg ecrj nal vov 
 
 N 
 
146 COMPARISON OF THE DANGEROUS FLOOD. 
 
 “ The great and first works would be the works of arl t 
 while the things of nature, and even nature herself, would 
 be posterior to, and ruled by art and mind.” 
 
 There is likewise another view which is essential to the 
 full interpretation of the passage, namely, that not only was 
 it impossible that these phenomena of matter should exist 
 objectively , without the previous existence of soul as an effi- 
 cient cause of that substance of which they are phenomena, 
 but also that they could not exist subjectively without a soul 
 of which they constitute the sensations. In this sense, 
 also, is it true that spirit must be older than hard , and soft , 
 and visible , &c. Compare the passage in the Phsedon, in 
 which he refutes the doctrine that the soul is only a har- 
 mony, by showing that its pre-existence is essential to har- 
 mony itself, and that, where the former is not present, the 
 latter is nothing more than dead strings, and chords, and 
 tensions, and relaxations, and vibrations of the air, but has 
 as harmony no real or true being. It is clear that the same 
 reasoning may be carried down through all the elementary 
 properties of matter. 
 
 XVIII. 
 
 Remarkable Comparison of the Dangerous Flood. 
 
 Page 21, Line 3. hrconelre ovv , uaddnep el norayov 
 rjyag edei rpelg Hvrag diabatveiv peovra otyodpa , k. t. A. 
 The common reading is el tcaddnep. We have ventured 
 to make the change from the exigency of the place, and on 
 the authority of Stephanus. “ Consider, then, as if we three 
 had to cross a violently flowing river,” &c. The Athenian 
 here most graphically compares himself and his two com- 
 panions, just entering upon this most profound and difficult 
 argument respecting motion, to men who are about to plunge 
 into a deep and rapid torrent, and who, therefore, need the 
 
COMPARISON OF THE DANGEROUS FLOOD. 147 
 
 utmost caution in the examination of every step, lest, if at 
 any point they should lose a firm foothold, they might be 
 overwhelmed in floods of darkness, and carried down the 
 stream of doubt, without any chance of recovery. The 
 comparison is admirably sustained, and even when it seems 
 to be dropped, does nevertheless continue to affect the dis- 
 course, and tinge the style with a metaphorical hue for 
 many sentences ; as in the expressions, A oyog otpodporepog 
 teal abarog — napacpepopevog, page 22, and exopevoc cog n - 
 vog aocpaXovg neioparog , page 23. Cicero was very fond 
 of imitating Plato, and we cannot help thinking that he had 
 this passage in his eye, and meant to institute a similar 
 comparison in respect to himself, when placed in like cir- 
 cumstances in reference to another great truth. Itaque du - 
 bitans , hcesitans , circumspectans , multa adversa reverens, 
 tamquam in rate in mari immenso , nostra vehitur oratio. 
 Cicero, Tusc. Disp., i., 30. 
 
 So, also, in the Phaedon, after exhausting the direct ar- 
 guments for the immortality of the soul, Socrates “ trusts 
 himself to the best of human reasons (that is, to the old and 
 unbroken tradition respecting the doctrine) as the safest 
 vessel to which the soul could be committed, and on which 
 alone, although in continual danger of shipwreck, it could 
 be expected to outride the storms of doubt ; unless , perhaps , 
 it might hereafter find a surer vehicle in some Divine reve- 
 lation , or Xoyog tielog, which Heaven might yet condescend to 
 make known to men We do not know which to admire 
 most, the sound philosophy, the unaffected humility, or the 
 striking imagery, with which the whole passage abounds. 
 A elv yap nepl avra ev ye n tovtcjv bcanpa^aodcu, iq pa- 
 Oelv onrj iq evpelv , fj, el ravra advvarov rbv yovv 
 QeXriOTOV rtiv avOpconivcov Xoyo)v Xadovra enl tovtov 
 dxovpevov, toonep enl ox^dcag, luvdvvevovra dianhevoai 
 rbv j3iov • el prj rig dvvatro aacpaXearepov ttal cuavdvvore 
 pov, £nl fiedaiorepov bxppcLrog rj AOrOT 0EIOT rtvog 
 
148 
 
 INVOCATION OF DIVINE AID. 
 
 dtanopevOrivat,. Phaedon, 85, E. We take avOpumvo $ 
 X oyog, in this passage, not in the sense of reason or argu- 
 ment, but rather as it is used in the Gorgias, 523, A., at the 
 introduction of the mythical representation of the judgment 
 after death : atcove paXa uaXov Xoyov, ov av pev fjyrjO'Q pv- 
 Oov , 6e Xoyov. In the word ox^biag above, Plato 
 
 seems to have had an eye to Homer’s account of the ship- 
 wreck of Ulysses, in his voyage on such a vessel from the 
 island of Calypso, and thus to intimate that this /3eX rtorog 
 tcjv avOpG)nivG)v Xoyov could be regarded as at best only 
 a temporary support, until the coming of that more sure 
 ( 'fiebaLorspog ) word of Revelation. Can we doubt that the 
 soul of our philosopher would have rejoiced in the an- 
 nouncement that there was even then in the world a “ sure 
 word of prophecy, like a light shining in a dark place” and 
 that he would have surrendered all his speculative reason- 
 ing for the security and comfort of such an assurance ? 
 
 XIX. 
 
 Invocation of the Divine Aid in the Argument. Striking 
 Examples of this from other Dialogues . 
 
 Page 22, Line 11. *Aye 6rj, Oeov elnoTe rcapauXriTeov 
 rjplv, vvv sotg) tovto ovrco yevopsvov. “ If ever we ought 
 to call upon God , let it he done now” Many professed 
 Christian writers, both metaphysicians and theologians, 
 might here take a lesson from the heathen philosopher. 
 What more sublimely appropriate than this petition for Di- 
 vine aid in an argument against those who denied the Divine 
 existence ? The dark, violent, and almost impassable tor- 
 rent upon which they are about to embark is yet kept in 
 mind, and in view of this the soul is led to seek for some 
 aid out of itself. There is, we think, an allusion to some 
 of those prayers which Homer puts into the mouths of his 
 
INVOCATION OF DIVINE AID. 
 
 149 
 
 heroes, as they are about to engage in some arduous and 
 perilous contest ; it may be to the prayer of Ajax for light 
 in that desperate battle (lib. xvii., 645) in which Jove covers 
 the whole held of conflict with thick darkness ; or, perhaps, 
 in still greater consistency with the metaphorical imagery 
 here employed, to the prayer of Achilles, in the twenty-flrst 
 book of the Iliad (273), when in danger of being over- 
 whelmed by the rising floods of the angry and turbulent 
 Scamander : 
 
 Zev rrdrep , dog ovrtg pe ftecov eXeecvov vneor? ], 
 
 etc TTorapolo oaoooai. 
 
 Whether this be so or not, it is in this case a prayer 
 which the purest Christianity need not blush to acknowl- 
 edge and admire. There are several interesting examples 
 of similar invocations in others of the Platonic dialogues, 
 either put into the mouth of Socrates or of some speaker 
 by whom he is evidently represented. We have but little 
 doubt, too, that in these remarkable peculiarities of charac- 
 ter, Plato accurately represents the model he so closely ob- 
 served, and with whom his own intellectual existence may 
 almost be regarded as identified. We may note, among 
 others, the invocation in the fourth book of the Laws, at the 
 commencement of his system of positive legislation for the 
 state ; a work which certainly, of all others, should never 
 be attempted without a deep feeling of the necessity of 
 Divine assistance. Qedv 6rj 7Tpdg rr\v rr}g noXecog uarao- 
 tcevrjv emuaXcopeOa * 6 de auovaeie re, ttai vnatcovcrag IXe- 
 cog evpevrjg re rjplv eXOol, ovvduncooprjGcov rrjv re ttoXlv 
 teal rovg vopovg , 712, B. “ Let us invoke the aid of God in 
 the construction of our state. May he hear us, and when he 
 has listened to our requests , may he kindly and propitiously 
 come to our assistance, that he may jointly with us arrange in 
 order the state and the laws” How much higher a light 
 than this is boasted of by those modern law-makers who 
 
 N 2 
 
150 
 
 INVOCATION OF DIVINE AID. 
 
 have endeavoured, as far as they could, to banish the voice 
 of prayer from our legislative halls ! Compare, also, the 
 Philebus, 25, B : Beog j uev ovv (rjplv cppacrei) av 7r ep ye 
 epalg ev%aig knrjfcoog ycyv^rai. Here, too, the subject, in 
 the discussion of which the Divine aid is invoked, is of the 
 very highest importance, being no less than a most profound 
 analysis of the radical difference between physical or sen- 
 sual, and spiritual pleasure ; a theme, in his estimation, so 
 holy, that, when again alluding to it in the sixth book of the 
 Republic, he utters the same word (evcprjpei,) which was 
 employed in driving all profanation, whether of speech or 
 action, from the sacrificial altar, Rep., vi., 509, B. 
 
 Perhaps, however, the most striking example of an invo- 
 cation of this kind may be found in connexion with that 
 sublime prooemium of the Timseus, to which we have al- 
 ready alluded. That too, it should be borne in mind, is a. 
 treatise on law, or, in other words, the legislation of the 
 physical and intellectual universe, embracing equally the 
 laws of mind and matter : 'AXXa, rovro ye dij navreg oool 
 nal nara Ppaxv OGXppoovvrjg psrexovoiv, eirl ndo^ dppfj nal 
 opuepov nal peyaXov irpayparog tieov del irov naXovav • 
 rjpdg 6e rovg irepl navrog Xoyovg TcoieloOaC mj peXXovrag, 
 el yeyovev , rj nal dyeveg ectlv , avaynr} fteovg emnaXovpe- 
 vovg evxeoOai ndvrag Kara vovv enelvotg pev paXiora , 
 eiropevcjg 6e rjplv elnelv, 27, C. “ Even those who have 
 but little of sobriety, in the undertaking of any affair, wheth- 
 er of small or great consequence, always call upon God. 
 Much more, then, when about to engage in a discussion re- 
 specting the universe, whether it is generated or eternal , 
 ought we to invoke God by prayer, that what we say may 
 be, first of all, according to his mind, and then consistent 
 with ourselves.” 
 
 • # 
 
 Page 23, Line 1 . Irrovd^j irdaq TTapanenXrjoOGiv. The 
 prayer on the present occasion has all the conciseness and 
 simplicity that characterize all the recorded petitions of 
 
INVOCATION OF DIVINE AID. 
 
 151 
 
 Socrates. Compare the last he ever uttered, for an easy 
 death, just before taking the cup of poison in the prison, 
 Phaedon, 117, B : ’AA/C evx^Oal ye ttov rolg tieolg eijeorL 
 re nal xpf rrjv pETo'utr\oiv rrjv evOevSe eicelge evtvx ?} ye - 
 vegQcll • a dr) teal eyd> evxopai re, nal jevolto ravr^j. The 
 longest specimen is that remarkable prayer at the end of 
 the Phaedrus, or the dialogue on Spiritual Beauty, which 
 we cannot resist the temptation of quoting in full : T £2 $IAE 
 IIAN re nal aXkoi deoL, doirjrs pot naXip yEVEoOat rdvdo- 
 6ev , ra^coOev 6e ooa rolg Evrog elva'i pot, (ptXia * ttXov- 
 giov 6e vop'foipi rov coepov * to 6e xP V(J ov nXfjOog elrj 
 (lot ogov fjirjTE (pEpEcv prjre dyeiv dvvairo aXXog rj 6 erw- 
 < ppo)v , 279, B. “ Oh thou beloved Universal Numen , and ye 
 other Divinities , grant that I may become beautiful within , and 
 that whatever of externals I may possess may be all in har- 
 mony icith my inward ( spiritual ) being. May I regard the 
 wise alone as rich ; and may I have just so much of gold as 
 no other would, take from me but the virtuous man” The last 
 sentence is somewhat obscure, but the whole petition ap- 
 proaches the spirit of the Gospel, although lacking some of 
 the essential requisites of a Christian supplication. It may 
 justify us in hoping that its author, had he received the rev- 
 elation for which he longed, would not have remained “ far 
 from the kingdom of Heaven but it furnishes no grounds 
 for the extravagant language of one who said, in his enthu- 
 siastic admiration of the heathen sage, sancte Socrates ora 
 pro nobis. He is represented here, however, as receiving 
 a strengthening of his confidence, and some degree of as- 
 surance from his supplication ; for he says immediately, 
 u holding fast to this ( that is, the hope of Divine aid) as by 
 some sure cable , let us embark ,” <fcc. ; still keeping up the 
 metaphor of the dangerous Hood. 
 
152 THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 
 
 XX. 
 
 The Great Question of the Ancient Schools , Do all Things 
 flow ? fyc. ; with a Sketch of some of the principal Mate- 
 rializing or Atheistical Philosophers who belonged to the 
 Ionic , and to the Physical School of Elea. 
 
 Page 23, Line 4. Kara 6e, d> %eve, onorav (pq rig, apa 
 eorrjfce pev navra, fctvelrat, 6e ovdev ; fj tovtg) nav tov- 
 vavrlov ; For the common reading nara 6e, established 
 by the concurrence of all the manuscripts, Ast would 
 substitute Kara rads, connecting it with (paiverai in the 
 preceding sentence ; and in this he follows Eusebius and 
 the version of Ficinus. We think the common reading is 
 correct, and that Ast and Ficinus have mistaken the spirit 
 of the passage. The Athenian, entering alone in this dan- 
 gerous flood, to try, as he says, its depth and strength, be- 
 fore calling upon his companions to follow, assumes for a 
 time the parts both of interrogator and respondent. He con- 
 sequently supposes an objector from the atheistic or Ionic 
 school, adopting some of the peculiar phraseology or cant 
 terms of that sect, and taking him up in the midst of his 
 positions in some such way as this, “ And so , then (teal elra 
 de), answer me, if you please, one of these three questions : 
 Do all things stand, and does nothing move ? or is the op- 
 posite of this the case, namely, that all things move and 
 nothing stands ? or do some things move and some things 
 stand ? Give me, I say, an answer to these old queries, 
 which have so long perplexed our schools of philosophy.” 
 To which supposed objector the Athenian replies by taking 
 the third hypothesis as his starting position in this argu- 
 ment. There is much vivacity in this mode of introducing 
 ‘he discussion about motion, and Kara ( nal elra) is the 
 very particle by which it is best effected ; it being used to 
 introduce a sudden inference, and implying a previous ar- 
 
THE ANCIENT dUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 153 
 
 gument, in the midst of which the objection is supposed to 
 be made. If any alteration of the established text is to be 
 allowed, we think it should consist in changing de into 6t]. 
 On the particle elra , see note, page 40. 
 
 Whatever else may be intended, there can be no doubt 
 that there is here an allusion, at least, to the same ques- 
 tions which are so fully discussed in the Thesetetus, and 
 stated there several times in nearly this same language. 
 See, especially, Theaetetus, 180, D. These were the fa- 
 mous problems which so divided, first the Ionic and Italian 
 schools, and afterward the physical and metaphysical 
 schools of Elea ; embracing, however, a much wider 
 range than the merely dynamical points to which Plato, in 
 the present argument, confines himself. There is an allu- 
 sion to them in the Memorabilia, lib. i., c. i., 14 : teal rolg 
 l iev del fuveloOat, navra , rolg 6e ovdev av rrore mvrjOfjvai . 
 In this language was stated the great debate between those 
 who referred all things to sensation, making it the measure 
 of all reality, or what Plato styles tt)v (pepofievrjv ovoiav 
 (Theaetetus, 179, C.), and those who held to a higher and 
 immutable world of ideas ( tt)v ditlvrjrov ovoiav , the immove- 
 able essence ), the real and only dXrjOtig ovrcjg ovra , while 
 they regarded the objects of sense as continually moving, 
 changing, never for a moment remaining the same, and 
 having nothing about them (aside from the idea, or Xoyog , 
 which, by its connexion alone, imparted to them a temporal 
 reality) that could constitute real being ( ovoiav ) in the 
 highest and truest senses of the word. They formed, as 
 we have elsewhere observed,* the grand line of separation 
 between two ever opposing systems of philosophy, and 
 right *views, in almost every department of knowledge, are 
 more or less connected with these subtle inquiries when 
 viewed in their widest relations. Their odd phraseology 
 may be more fully interpreted thus : What constitutes real 
 
 * Discourse on the True Idea of The State, Andover, 1843. 
 
154 THE ANCIENT GlUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW ? 
 
 ity ? Are all things in a perpetual flux ? Is there nothing 
 in the universe but phenomenal facts and sensations, or is 
 there a world of truth and being separate from, and inde- 
 pendent of, the perceived and apparent — not merely as gen- 
 eralizations of the mind, but as realities, more stable than 
 the earth, more permanent than the old rolling heavens — 
 ideas fixed, immoveable ( dtdvrjra ), eternal, which were nev- 
 er born, and which can never die — the del Kara ravrd nai 
 daavrcog e^ovra, the dig aXpOdg ovrcog ovra, from which 
 all individual things derive reality, and by partaking alone 
 of which they become the true objects of science, or emor- 
 ijgai instead of do^ai. 
 
 There is quite a full account of the systems of philosophy, 
 of which these questions were the symbols, to be found in 
 the dialogue Theaetetus. Plato there makes Homer (wheth 
 er sportively or not, it is difficult to determine) the head 
 and founder of that Ionic school which held that all tilings 
 flowed ; and this because the poet represents Oceanus and 
 Tethys as the original and mother of Gods and men. We 
 greatly doubt whether in this Homer had any philosophical 
 or mythical sense at all. If, however, anything of the kind 
 was intended, there would seem to be nothing more than 
 an allusion to the doctrine afterward advanced by Thales, 
 that water was the apx^Jy or originating element of the uni- 
 verse, and so the matter is viewed by Aristotle, Metaph ., 
 i., 3. This doctrine of Thales was, in all probability, deri- 
 ved from a corrupt and perverted tradition of the Mosaic 
 account of the creation, where it is said that “ The Spirit 
 of God ivas brooding over the waters ,” and the succeeding 
 hypotheses of Anaximander and Anaximenes, one of whom 
 held that air , and the other that infinite space was the first 
 principle of the universe, were only attempts to refine upon 
 what seemed to them the grosser element of Thales. 
 
 In the later writers, however, who may be regarded as 
 being in the line of this school, these speculations, and the 
 
THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALE THINGS FLOW? 155 
 
 phraseology employed in reference to them, assumed a dif- 
 ferent aspect, and were applied to the moral and mental, as 
 well as the physical world. In the Thesetetus, Socrates is 
 represented as thus setting forth their doctrine : (hg apa ev 
 pev avro tcaO’ avro ovdev eortv • etc be Srj (popag re teal tei- 
 v 7 ]OEG)q teal tepdoeevg irpoq aXXrjXa y iyverai navra a bfj (pa- 
 pev EINAI ovte opOcbg Trpooayopevovreg * ’E2TI pev yap 
 ovbenor ’ ovdev , del de riPNETAI • teal rcepl rovrov ixav- 
 reg e%rjq ol oo(pol, rcXrjv Uappevidov , %vp(pepeodov, IT pora- 
 yopag re teal f llpdieXetrog teal ’ EpnedotcXrjg ■ teal rtiv TTOtrj- 
 Tcbv ol atepot rrjg Ttoir\oe<vq etearepag • tccvpcpbiaq pev ’E7U- 
 Xappog , rpaycobtag be r/ Op7jpog eIttgov, 
 
 ’titceavov re Oetiv yeveotv teal prjrepa TtjOvv, 
 
 7 r dvra elpr]ieev etcyova porjg re teal Kcvrjaecog , 153, A. 
 “ That there was nothing absolute, or which existed per se 
 but that from impetus, and motion, and mutual mixture arise 
 all things of which we predicate the verb TO BE, not cor- 
 rectly predicating, because, in truth (to use terms aright), 
 nothing really IS, but all things are ever BECOMING. 
 And in this all our wise men successively agree except 
 Parmenides, namely, Protagoras, and Heraclitus, and Em- 
 pedocles ; and of the poets, the chief in each kind, namely, 
 Epicharmus in comedy, and Homer in tragedy, when he 
 says that Oceanus is the origin of the Gods, &c., by which 
 he means that all things are the offspring of flowing and 
 motion.” 
 
 The distinction here is clearly stated. This school very 
 consistently refused to apply to things the higher term of 
 being, eort, but preferred the word ytyverai . Nothing, 
 they said, really and truly IS, but all things are ever becom- 
 ing ; and this was correct, if there existed nothing else ex- 
 cept matter, sensation; and their joint phenomena. In an- 
 other place, Thesetetus, 1G0, D., Plato gives us more par 
 iicularly their individual opinions, or, rather, the favourite 
 
156 TIIE ANCIENT QUESTION DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 
 
 and peculiar terms in which each expressed the common 
 doctrine of their flowing philosophy. In the language of 
 Homer, Heraclitus, and all that Ionic tribe, rcav to tolov - 
 rov cpvXov, as Plato styles them, oiov pevpara mveloQai ra 
 uavra, all things were ever flowing like water. Others of 
 them, of whom he sportively makes Theaetetus the repre- 
 sentative, were fond of saying, aloOrjoiv eruorrjprjv yiyveo- 
 6ai , that knowledge and sense were the same , or only differ- 
 ent names for the same thing. The favourite expression 
 of Protagoras was, Travrcov xprjpdrcov avOpcoirov perpov el - 
 vac, that man was the measure of all things , by which he 
 meant to refer all things to sensation, or to the present feel- 
 ings and opinions, or present remembrances, of the individ- 
 ual man. On the other hand, Sextus Empiricus (Adv. 
 Logic., i., 8) tells us that Heraclitus was noted for taking 
 ♦he collected reason of the race (as the representative of 
 the universal and Divine reason) for the criterion of truth ; 
 but this is utterly inconsistent with the account Plato here 
 gives, and the manner he associates him with those sensu- 
 alists of the flowing school who allowed of nothing fixed or 
 eternal. 
 
 If the account of Heraclitus, given in the Theaetetus, be 
 correct, he was well entitled to the appellation f O Z/coreivog, 
 not for his profundity, as some would represent it, but be- 
 cause he maintained the darkest system of sensual philoso- 
 phy that ever shed night over the human intellect. Well 
 might he weep, as Lucian represents him, over his ever- 
 flowing universe of perishing phenomena, where nothing 
 stood — ovdev epnedov, aXX 1 otzcog eg nvicecova iravra avveiXe- 
 ovrai, uai eon tcovto repifrcg drep'iplrj , yvcboiq ayvcoalrj, 
 ueya pcnpov , avco narco irepixopevovra, nal apecdopeva ei 
 TXj rov alcovog naidcrf, “ nothing was fixed, but, as in a mix- 
 ture, all things were confounded ; where pleasure and pain, 
 knowledge and ignorance, great and small, were the same ; 
 where all things up and down were circling round in a 
 
THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 157 
 
 choial dance, and ever changing places as in the sport of 
 eternity.” Lucian , Vi/arum Audio , 303. There was some- 
 thing in the hard atoms and dry mechanical theory of the 
 laughing Democritus which left room for a spiritual world, 
 although he himself was an atheist ; but the soft, flowing, 
 sentimental, and, as some modern cant would absurdly style 
 it, transcendental sensualism of Heraclitus (if he is not 
 grossly misrepresented), was atheism in its darkest form. 
 And yet there are other accounts which make him talk 
 very piously about the Supreme Numen and the immortality 
 of the soul. 
 
 Parmenides was a man of a very different stamp from 
 all the others mentioned by Socrates. He, however, with 
 Melissus, seems to have gone much too far in the opposite 
 direction. In his famous doctrine of the one and all , if 
 Plato rightly represents him, he maintained that all things 
 stood. In other words, not content with saying that the 
 world of immutable or ideal truth was a reality, he con- 
 tended that it was the only reality, and that sense, instead 
 of being knowledge, was wholly delusion ; thus verging 
 round to that point where some species of sensualism and a 
 hyperspiritualism apparently meet ; of which, in modern 
 times, we have had a remarkable example in Hume and 
 Berkeley. A uoxvpl^ero c og ev re rcdvra earl nal eorpnev 
 avro ev avrd), Thecetetus, 180, D. ’A tdiov fiev yap to nav 
 nai dfCLvrjrov dftotyaiveraL Happevidrjg, Kal rag aioOrjoeig 
 enddXXei etc rrjg aXrjOecag. Euseb., Prcep. Evang ., i., 8. 
 “For Parmemdss represents the whole as immoveable, and 
 utterly banishes; he senses from the realm of truth.” 
 
 He was a man who seems to have made a very deep im- 
 pression upon the mind of Socrates when young, and to 
 have exerted a strong influence over his opinions. At least, 
 we may so judge from the following passage in the The®, 
 tetus, which has every appearance of truth, as presenting a 
 real incident in the life of Socrates, and a real expression 
 
 O 
 
158 THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 
 
 of admiration towards one whom he seems to have* most 
 highly esteemed : II appevidrjg ds poi (f> acverai , to tov 
 'O firjpov* aioolog re poi apa dtivog re. Gvpnpoasp^a yap 
 6rj to avdpi navv veog 7:dvv 'npeodvr'q, teat poi e<pdvrj f3a- 
 Qog n ex eiV ^dvrairaoi ysvvalov. “ Parmenides, to apply 
 to him the language of Homer, seems to me at once revered 
 and awful : for 1 enjoyed his company once when I w T as 
 very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me in 
 all things to possess a noble depth of soul.” Thecetelus, 
 184, A. This biographical incident alone seems to us suf- 
 ficient proof that Plato more correctly sets forth the philos- 
 ophy of his master than Xenophon, notwithstanding the 
 general opinion the other way ; and that the most meta- 
 physical dialogues of the former give a truer representation 
 of the mind and manner of Socrates, than the more plain 
 and practical Memorabilia. We infer this on the ground 
 that there could not have been so warm, so unaffected, and 
 so long- cherished an admiration, had there not been a great 
 congeniality of soul ; and we have, therefore, every reason 
 to believe, that much of what formed the peculiar features 
 of the mind of Socrates may perhaps be traced to the deep 
 impression made upon him by the idealistic and metaphys- 
 ical Parmenides. Compare, also, the Sophista, 237, A., 
 where he styles him Uappevidrjg 6 peyag, The Great Par- 
 menides. In a similar manner, in the beginning of the Ce- 
 betis Tabula, he is ranked with Pythagortis, and his name 
 is used as descriptive of the profoundest wisdom : epcppojv 
 ical deivog nepl oocj)iav Xoycp re nal epy(*> UvOayopSLOv nva 
 nal II appevideiov efyXoyittig (3lov. From this passage in 
 the Thesetetus some have inferred that Plato was guilty of 
 an anachronism in the circumstances mentioned in the be- 
 ginning of the dialogue Parmenides. A careful examina- 
 
 * Iliad, iii., 172 : 
 
 Mdolog t£ pot kooi, <j>LXe knvpe, deivog re. 
 
THE ANCIENT aUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 159 
 
 lion, however, will show, as we think, that such an infer- 
 ence is without any real foundation. 
 
 We would remark generally respecting some of the phi- 
 losophers of the Ionic school, that we cannot accurately sit 
 in judgment on their doctrines, or decide whether they were 
 really, and in the grossest sense, atheistic materialists or 
 not, unless we can determine what they included in their 
 term iravra, when they said that all things flowed. If they 
 merely meant thereby that the material world was ever 
 flowing, this might have been consistent with a pure the- 
 ism, and they might have even drawn arguments from this 
 view of things in favour of a higher attention to the spirit- 
 ual and supernatural. Such may possibly have been the 
 case with Heraclitus. The sophist Protagoras, we have 
 reason to believe on other grounds, was an unqualified athe- 
 ist. Of Empedocles, who is also in Plato’s list, we hope 
 better things, judging from many of the fragments of his po- 
 etry that have been preserved, and especially that line which 
 we have already referred to, pages 77, 115. 
 
 They have doubtless suffered in the extravagances of 
 their followers, some of whom carried their doctrines to a 
 most ridiculous extent. One of them, as we are told by 
 Aristotle ( Metaph ., iii., 5), heraclitized ( 'jipafcXeiTi&Lv ) to 
 such an extent, that he denied that any one could leap twice, 
 or even once, over the same stream, or that it was possible 
 to speak the truth in any case whatever, because the terms 
 of every proposition were changing and becoming false in 
 the very process of articulation. Hence he finally conclu- 
 ded not to open his lips, but, to every question, made no 
 other reply than simply to move his finger : og to reXevralov 
 ovdev g ')£to 6etv Xeyetv, aXXd rov daurvXov e/rivet govov. 
 Some, on the other hand, carried the propositions that sense 
 was knowledge, and that man was the measure of all things, 
 to such an extreme, as to affirm that everything was true, 
 and that there could be nothing false ; the seeming oppo- 
 
160 THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 
 
 site of the former, but, in reality, only the same absurdity 
 in another shape. This last extravagance, however, brought 
 its own antidote along with it ; for, if all things were true, 
 the proposition which denied this dogma was equally true 
 with all the rest, and so, like the famous syllogism respect- 
 ing Epimenides the Cretan, the result was an everlasting 
 circle of alternate contradictions. See Aristot., Metaph ., 
 iii. (iv.), 5. Cicero , Academ . Posieriorum , i., 12. 
 
 This school of sophists, as Socrates tells us in the Theae- 
 tetus, were likewise famous for a quibbling and eristic logic, 
 yet had a great aversion to that sober and truth-evincing 
 system of dialectics which was carried on by question and 
 answer. A somewhat ludicrous account of this may be 
 found page 180, A., B., &c. Their logic was like their 
 philosophy, ever flowing, and incapable of being reduced to 
 any firm and fixed conclusions. “ You can do nothing with 
 them (says Socrates), nor can they among themselves ar- 
 rive at anything certain and satisfactory, but take special 
 care that, neither in their language nor in their philosophy, 
 shall there be anything which has firmness or stability 
 ( oraoifiov ) ; but against this they are continually warring, 
 and, as far as they can, would banish all rest from the uni- 
 verse. This, although not the same, has some resem- 
 blance to the modern doctrine of eternal progress, which, 
 of course, is eternal imperfection, and which allows of no- 
 thing fixed or established, any more than the ancient tenet 
 that all things flowed , and that nothing stood. This phi- 
 losophy, too, like some of the sophisms of our own day, had 
 “ a wonderful alacrity at sinking” down into the vulgar 
 mind, and of inspiring the masses with the most exalted 
 opinion of the doctrine and its teachers ; “ so that the very 
 coblers (ot ouvrordfioi), when they had imbibed or become 
 inspired with this profound system of fluxions, abandoned 
 at once that foolish old notion, that some things stand (enav- 
 oavro 7]Xidi(oq olopsvoL ra pev karavai ra 6s mvsloOai 
 
THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 161 
 
 tg)V ovtgjv), and when they were told that all things were 
 moving , they greatly honoured those who taught them this,” 
 as being a most comforting and democratic doctrine. See 
 Thesetetus, 180, A., B., &c. 
 
 In the Cratylus, which, although, in the main, a sportive 
 jeu d'esprit, does yet abound in very many most important 
 and serious views, Plato dwells at some length on two the- 
 ories of language which may be derived from these two 
 systems of philosophy, in one of which the idea of motion, 
 and in the other that of rest, are made respectively the ba- 
 sis of an inquiry into the primitive etymological structure 
 of words. After most ridiculously deriving ovolav (< tboiav ), 
 or essence, from to (bOovv ( pushing or impulse ), because, 
 on this hypothesis of Heraclitus, rd ovra ievai re rcavra 
 nal pevetv ovdev, “ all real existences were ever moving- 
 on, or pushing ahead, and nothing stood still” (401, C.), he 
 comes to speak of Kronus and Rhea (pea), when Socrates, 
 in his old ironical method, suddenly affects that in this 
 name there is suggested to him this whole flowing philos- 
 ophy. “ Oh, my good sir (he exclaims), I have just dis- 
 covered a whole hive of curious lore, oprjvog tl oocpiag — 
 A eyei yap nov f H panXeirog on rravra %u>pel aal ovdev pe- 
 vet, nal norapov porf dnetfca^cov ra ovra Xeyec, (bg dig eg 
 rov avrov irorapov ovtc av epdalrjg, k. r. A.” “ Heraclitus 
 somehow says that all things are moving, &c,, and, in his 
 comparison of existences to the course of a stream, he even 
 says that one could not twice enter into the same river.* 
 Do you suppose, then, that he who originally gave names 
 to Rhea and Kronus, the progenitors of the other Gods, had 
 any other philosophy than this of Heraclitus ? or do you 
 
 * He would seem to mean something more here than a mere illus- 
 tration. Since all being is compared to one ever-moving stream, 
 the expression, that we cannot twice enter the same river, would 
 signify, that neither our own personal identity, nor the identity of 
 the universe, can remain for two consecutive moments. 
 
 O 2 
 
162 THE ANCIENT aUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 
 
 think that through mere accident he gave these flowing 
 names to both? Just as Homer makes Oceanus and Te- 
 thys the original and mother of the Gods, and I think He- 
 siod also. But Orpheus surely says, 
 
 ’12 Keavdg np&TLora tcaXippoog fjpge ya\ioio • 
 
 og pa fca(uyvr}T7)v dfiopirjTopa T rjOvv onviev. 
 
 See how all these things accord with one another, and how 
 they tend to these doctrines of Heraclitus.” Cratylus , 402, 
 A., B. 
 
 At the conclusion of the first part of this etymological 
 excursus, in which he sportively finds the origin of so many 
 words in this ancient flowing theory, he assigns as the 
 cause of it all the want of stability in their own brains (to 
 adopt a modern phrase), which they mistook for the ever- 
 lasting change of things and truths themselves. “ I think 
 (says Socrates, with grave irony) that I indulged in no bad 
 surmise, when I just now supposed that the very ancient 
 men ( ol navv naXaiot), who gave names to everything, 
 just like many of our modern wits (rtiv vvv ootfitiv), in 
 consequence of their getting frequently turned round in their 
 search into the real nature of things, became dizzy, and 
 then things themselves appeared to be whirling around, and 
 to be borne in every direction. Wherefore they blame not 
 the internal state of their own souls as the real cause, but 
 say that this is the very nature of things , that there should 
 be nothing firm or stable, but that all things flow (n avra 
 pelv), and are full of motion, change, and generation.” 
 Cratylus, 411, C., D. And again, 439, C., he thus char- 
 acterizes the whole school under an ironical allusion to the 
 old authors of language : “ They seem to me to have thus 
 thought (namely, that all things are in motion), but, in real- 
 ity, it is not so. For the fact is, that they themselves are 
 utterly confounded, like men who have fallen into a whirl 
 pool, and would wish to drag us in after them. For con 
 
THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 163 
 
 sider this, O most excellent Cratylus, of which I am often 
 dreaming,* can we in truth affirm that there are such real- 
 ities as the Beautiful, the Good,” &c. ? 3 eyd) noAhaiug 
 
 ovecpojTTG), norepov (jiojpev tc elvat avro TO KAAON uat 
 ’AFAOON ual ev ercaorov tcjv ovtgjv ovrcog 
 
 In this philosophy, too, he shows that there could be no 
 true moral or political science, no law, no real State, no so- 
 cial or civil rights, with their corresponding obligations. See 
 the Theaetetus, 172, B., and the remarks thereupon, page 
 138. There could be no science, he affirms, of any kind, 
 for it must necessarily be grounded on the eternal and im- 
 mutable. A coOrjocg would take the place of emoTrjprj, and 
 nothing could be really known : ’A/lAd prjv ovd’ civ yvoo- 
 0si7] ye vtt ’ ovdevdg ovdev • apa yap av emovrog rov yvco- 
 oouevov aXXo teal aXXolov ycyvocro • nai etc rovrov rov 
 Xoyov ovre to yvooopevov ovre to yv(oo0r]o6pevov av eerj. 
 Hence he draws the sublime conclusion, that, since the very 
 laws of our being compel us to affirm the real, and not mere- 
 ly relative existence of these ideas, therefore there is some- 
 thing which is eternal and immutable, or, in the language 
 of the ancient schools, all things do not flow, but some things 
 stand. EZ de eon pev dec to ytyvCbouov, eon 6e to del 
 ycyvcoouopevov, eon de to KAAON, eon de to ATAOON, 
 eon de TO AIKAION, ov poc (pacverac ravra op.ota ovra 
 po^\ ovdev ovde cj)opa. “ But if there is something which 
 eternally knows , and something which is eternally known — if 
 there is THE BEAUTIFUL, and THE GOOD, and THE 
 JUST, then things do not all seem to me to be similar to mo- 
 tion or a flowing stream .” Cratylus , 440, B. 
 
 * bveipuTTo. No word could better express that peculiar state of 
 mind in which Socrates (or Plato) often contemplated his favourite 
 doctrine of ideas. Sometimes he seems to be perfectly assured of 
 the real existence of the nakov, &c., the Fair, the Just, and the 
 Good. Again, he appears perplexed with doubt, and, at other times, 
 seems to have but a glimpse, as in a dream, of some such bright rem- 
 iniscences of a better state. 
 
164 MATHEMATICAL USE OF THE WORD Xoyog 
 
 XXI. 
 
 Mathematical Use of the Word Xoyog. 
 
 Page 24, Line 6. ava Xoyov . The common reading is 
 avdXoyov ; the other, however, is unquestionably to be 
 preferred. It would signify here 'proportionally , certa qua - 
 dam ralione. This is called in Latin ratio , and in Greek 
 Xoyog (especially in all mathematical writings), because a 
 simple quantity or magnitude, irrespective of the relation it 
 bears to another as a multiple or a divisor, cannot be an ob- 
 ject of science, or be contemplated by the mind. It remains 
 only an object of sense, aloOrj-rov , being, to the intellect, 
 dXoyov , and therefore ayvcoorov. See the Theaetetus, 
 202, B. It is this relation or ratio which becomes the true 
 votjtov , or real object of the mind, while the sensible figure 
 serves only as the diagram by which it is exhibited. 
 Hence it is styled the Xoyog, ratio, or reason . It is that 
 which is predicated of its subject, and hence is its Xoyog, 
 or word , as well as reason ; because, when viewed as sim- 
 ple quantity or magnitude, nothing can be said about it, no 
 truth affirmed respecting it. 
 
 This Xoyog, or reason , ever implies a third thing or mid- 
 dle term, namely, the common measure or divisor to which 
 both quantities must be referred, and by which we are ena- 
 bled to predicate the one as a part, or multiple, or any cer- 
 tain ratio of the other. The Xoyot or ratios are absolute 
 and immutable verities of science, as all voTjra must be, 
 while the alaOrjrd by which they are suggested are muta- 
 ble, flowing, and without anything which can be styled ab- 
 solute. They likewise are capable of being compared 
 among themselves, and thus give rise to others — ratios of 
 ratios, ad infinitum. In modern works the simple radical 
 meaning of the term is lost sight of, because we use the 
 Latin ratio without any reference to its primary sense, as 
 
MATHEMATICAL USE OF THE WORD Xoyog. 165 
 
 the same with the Greek koyog, and hence the great vague- 
 ness which prevails in most minds respecting this plain 
 mathematical idea. In some of our older mathematical 
 works, such as the English editions of Euclid’s Elements 
 by Dee and Barrow respectively, our own word reason is 
 everywhere properly employed instead of ratio. By this 
 means the metaphysical notion of ratio is kept before the 
 mind as the intelligible, by which what would otherwise be 
 merely, as magnitude, an object of sense, becomes known 
 to the intellect as an object of science. See Proclus, Com- 
 mentary on Euclid’s Elements, lib. i. 
 
 All mathematical truths, and especially the geometrical, 
 are ultimately to be resolved into a comparison of ratios. 
 For even parallelism, and other properties which would 
 seem to have no connexion with it, do, after all, depend 
 upon certain equalities or correspondences, from which 
 they derive their Xoyoq, notion, or definition. So that all 
 mathematical science is finally brought down to those in- 
 nate ideas of the to loov , &c., which are discussed in the 
 Phsedon, and of which visible magnitude is only suggestive. 
 Even a straight line involves this idea of the to loov, or 
 simplest ratio. It is that which lies evenly, equally, or, as 
 it is expressed by Euclid, e^toov, between its extreme 
 points ; that is, having nothing capable of being predicated 
 of the one side and not of the other. Playfair and others 
 seem to have entirely misunderstood the expression, and to 
 have greatly bungled in their efforts to amend, by substitu- 
 ting a far more complex idea for this old and perfect defini- 
 tion of Euclid. Any one who is capable of consulting his 
 own consciousness, must acknowledge that the language of 
 Euclid best expresses that innate idea of straightness, which 
 we ever apply, as the perfect ideal exemplar, to the deter- 
 mination of visible figure. 
 
 From this use of the word Xoyog it is, that those magni- 
 tudes and numbers whose ratio cannot be expressed by 
 
166 
 
 PARADOX OF CIRCULAR MOTION. 
 
 other numbers — that is, which have no common divisor by 
 which one may be predicated as any arithmetical part or 
 multiple of another — are called aXoya, and in modern 
 works, irrational. Two magnitudes, however, may be 
 arithmetically incommensurable or irrational, like the side 
 and diagonal of the square, the circumference and diameter 
 of the circle, or what are styled surds among numbers ; and 
 yet, in all these cases, there may be, and often is, a geomet- 
 rical representation which renders them rational, and may 
 be styled the expression of the ratio, Xoyog, or reason, just 
 as well as though they were embraced by some common 
 numerical divisor. 
 
 Much on this subject of quantities, styled dXoya , or irra- 
 tional, may be found in Euclid’s Laws of the Musical Can- 
 on, as contained in Meibomius. All concords, let it be re- 
 marked, are founded on rational numbers, while the irra- 
 tional ever produce discords under all circumstances. The 
 first have a Xoyog or reason, and the soul, when the sounds 
 suggest it, perceives this reason in its supersensual being, 
 although unconscious of the intellectual process on which 
 it depends ; and hence a delight which mere sense could 
 never furnish. Where this process is made objective, and 
 thus presented to the mind, it is called science. It would 
 net be difficult to refer to the same ideas of equality and 
 ratio all the fundamental elements of the beauty of figure 
 and motion. 
 
 XXII. 
 
 Paradox of Circular Motion. 
 
 Page 24, Line 8 . A/A 6i) rcov 'davfiaoTGjv andvrcov Trrjyrj 
 yeyovev. This is stated as a sort of strange paradox, that 
 one motion should be at the same time greater and less, or 
 should give rise to different velocities, according as the rev- 
 
the words (pOloig, yevEOig^ naOog , and (pOopa . 167 
 
 elution was nearer to, or more remote from, the centre, 
 while there was but one impulse distributing itself propor- 
 tionally, ava Xoyov, to every part. The paradox, however, 
 arises from confounding circular, or angular, with rectilineal 
 motion. The idea of the latter arises from a compound 
 comparison of two elements, namely, the space passed over, 
 and the time employed in the passage. Hence, there being 
 no absolute measure of space, there can be nothing absolute 
 about rectilineal motion. The other must be always refer- 
 red to the centre of motion, and the time occupied in one 
 revolution ; or, in other words, one must be referred to 
 space and time, the other to time only. The latter may 
 also be said to have something absolute about it, since there 
 is an absolute standard of angular space. Hence the mo- 
 tions of the inner concentric circles of the same great cir- 
 cle, moving on one centre, identical with the centre of the 
 circle, are all the same when thus measured, although va- 
 rying infinitely when referred to other points. The veloci- 
 ty of the hour hand of a watch, that revolves once in twen- 
 ty-four hours, is the same with that of the earth on its axis. 
 If the same hour hand could be conceived of as extending 
 to the moon, the tangential velocity of its extremity would 
 be greater than the orbit motion of that body — exceeding 
 many thousand miles a minute — and yet its absolute velo- 
 city, taken as a whole, would be that same slow and almost 
 imperceptible motion which apoears in our timepieces. 
 
 XXIII. 
 
 The Words cpdtmg, yeveoig , tt ddog, and (pOopa. 
 
 Page 25, Line 5. cpOivei . . apicpoTepa diroXXvrai. This 
 word (pOivei (<pQioig) is applied to a diminution of the num- 
 ber of parts or particles of which a body is composed, with- 
 out a change of the essential idea, law, or nature. It is 
 
168 the words (ftOcoig, yeveoig , TraOog, and (j>0opd . 
 
 the opposite of avt-dvercu, av^rjocg. ’AnohXvraL is used 
 where the very law, nature, or idea of a thing (that which 
 makes it what it is) is taken away. It is the opposite of 
 ytyverat. The one would express the difference between 
 a fat man and a lean one, the other between a living man 
 and a dead body. <J>0mo is generally intransitive, but is 
 sometimes used in a transitive sense, as in the Iliad, vi., 
 407 : 
 
 A aijjiovie (pdioeL a e to gov pevog. 
 
 $6lvg) and (f>0tpevog are applied by the poets to the dead, 
 but more in a metaphorical than a strictly philosophical 
 sense. When thus poetically used, they still retain some- 
 thing of their primary meaning, and suggest the conception 
 of the wasted , the emaciated , the weak ( apevrjvd tcap7]va), as 
 though the ghostly state were but a diminution of their for- 
 mer life. In the same manner the poets use /tapovTeg , the 
 wearied , the deceased. The Hebrews seem to have had 
 something of the same metaphorical conception in their 
 word CD'KSn 
 
 • T l 
 
 Mere increment or diminution is said to take place as 
 long as the naOeGTrjKvla ei-tg , the constituting state , remains 
 (diapevy, continues through , or survives the change ). But it 
 may be destroyed both ways ( 'dp&orepa ), that is, by (pOiotg , 
 or av^rjotg, when carried so far that the law of the body 
 becomes affected. No increment or decrement which does 
 not take away that £§tg^ or state, which makes a thing what 
 it is, can ever amount to that great change denoted by cj)6opd, 
 and the verb dnoXXvpt. Until this takes place, the real or 
 essential identity remains, although that phenomenal iden- 
 tity may have been affected, which depends on the numer- 
 ical sum or aggregate. So that we may say, that, if every 
 particle of matter has been removed and replaced by others, 
 still, if during the process the KaOeoTTjuvla e^tg is preserv- 
 ed, it is the same body, although not the same matter ; and 
 if, on the other hand, no single material particle be lost, yet 
 
the words (pdioig , yeveoig, naOog , and (pOopa. 169 
 
 if, in any way, tliis e%ig has been destroyed, it is no longer 
 tKe same, but there has taken place the yeveoig of some- 
 thing else, having a different name, a different law, and a 
 different identity, or, as is said a few lines below, perada- 
 Xdv elg dXXrjv e%iv diecpOaprai navreXkg, “ passing into 
 another state, it is utterly destroyed the thing which be- 
 fore was, no longer is, whatever may have taken its place. 
 See Note XXV., on the difference between yeveoig and 
 aXXoiuoig. 
 
 The next question is, What is yeveoig, or generation ? It 
 is rather abruptly put by the supposed interlocutor, yet still 
 is naturally enough suggested by what precedes : Tiyverai 
 6rj navriov yeveoig tjvik 1 dv r'l naOog ; to which the suc- 
 ceeding answer is given : A fXov kg onorav ap%r\ XaOovoa 
 av^rjv, k. t. A., “ It is evident (that generation takes place , 
 or that the peculiar naOog under which it takes place is) when- 
 ever a principle here put for the originating idea , the 
 
 principium, or law of life to anything ) receiving growth, 
 (that is, being developed in the outward or material ) passes 
 into the second change, and from this into the next, and so 
 on, until, coming as far as to three, it arrives at such a state 
 as to become an object of sensation.” This is certainly 
 rather obscure, but perhaps as well expressed as was pos- 
 sible, in the attempt to set forth the transition from the law 
 of life to its material organic development. Tpikv would 
 seem to refer to the three mathematical dimensions, length, 
 breadth, and thickness, which every object of sense must 
 possess in some degree ; or it may be intended as an in- 
 definite number, representing the stages, be they more or 
 less, through which the thing generated must pass, until it 
 become an object of sensation, visible, tangible, &c. 
 
 P 
 
170 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB to be. 
 
 XXIV. 
 
 Philosophy of the Verb TO BE. Platonic Use of dpi and 
 
 ylyvopai. 
 
 Page 25, Line 11 . MeradaXXov pev ovv ovro aai pera- 
 uvovpevov ylyverai ndv. eon de bvrcog ov onorav pev^j * 
 perabaXov de elq aXXrjv egtv dtecpdaprai navreXtiq. The 
 tenses here are emphatic, and must have their precise 
 meaning. “ While thus changing and moving, it is in the 
 act of being generated. It really is, when it becomes fixed 
 and stands ; but after it has passed into another state, it 
 (that is, the former thing) is utterly destroyed.” M evyf is 
 to be taken here in its philosophical sense, as opposed to 
 perabdXXei, and for eorr}iie, in the language of the schools, 
 as opposed to tavelrai , or to that which is in a constant flux 
 or motion. This, however, can only strictly be applied to 
 the law or idea, and in this sense it includes what Plato so 
 often expresses by the phrase del tiara ravra, &c., as that 
 which remains unaffected amid the material mutations to 
 which it is constantly subject. 
 
 It may be, however, that ovrcoq ov is not to be taken here 
 in the highest philosophical sense, as opposed to yiyvope- 
 vov , but more according to the vulgar usage of the substan- 
 tive verb, as signifying the real being, not simply of the 
 law or idea, but of the generated material object itself, du- 
 ring that period in which it suffers no n dOog, or change of 
 state. It is because they are always suffering change or 
 flux, like a river ever passing away, and never for two suc- 
 cessive moments preserving the same numerical or aggre* 
 gate identity, that even some of the ancient philosophers 
 who were theists denied that generated material things 
 were at all entitled to the epithet ovrcoq ovra. Plato, how- 
 ever, clearly regards their identity as not depending upon 
 number and the aggregate mass ; but as long as they suffer 
 
171 
 
 TLATONIC USE OF elflL AND J lyVOgai. 
 
 no naOog by which rj fcaOeoTrjitvia e%ig is taken away, he 
 does not hesitate to apply to them this higher substantive 
 verb, although entitled to it only by partaking for a time of 
 that idea, to which it truly and in itself belongs. Modern 
 scientfic men seem to be making rapid advance to this 
 position of some of the ancients, that, in the material world, 
 all things are ever flowing, and nothing stands. Would 
 that we could say, that they all held as firmly as Pythago- 
 ras, Plato, and Parmenides, to a higher and far more real 
 universe of truth, in which all was stable, immutable, and 
 eternal as the throne of God. 
 
 There is a most important distinction between the verbs 
 h[ii and ylyvopai , on which we would here dwell at some 
 length, although almost every page in Plato’s dialogues 
 might have given occasion for such an excursus. In fact, 
 many portions of this writer are not fully comprehensible, 
 in their highest intended meaning, unless the philosophical 
 distinctions between these words are kept constantly in 
 mind. They are often emphatic, and used antithetically, 
 when the careless reader little suspects it ; and thus sen- 
 tences most pregnant in meaning seem frequently to con- 
 tain mere truisms, or propositions of a most unmeaning 
 character. In defining the Platonic sense of these words, 
 we rely directly on the authority of the philosopher him- 
 self, in the Timaeus, 27, P., 28, A. From this passage 
 alone, had there been no other, we are justified in saying, 
 that elpi, in its highest sense, expresses essential , eternaJ- 
 necessary, self-existent, independent, uncaused being or es- 
 sence, having no dependence on time and space. The other, 
 ytyvofiai, expresses phenomenal, temporal , contingent , de- 
 pendent being, generated in time and space. 
 
 This philosophical distinction is more clear in Plato than 
 in any other Greek writer, because the subjects he discuss- 
 ed led him to be more precise in the application of those 
 primary meanings of the terms in question, which grew not 
 
172 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB to be . 
 
 out of philosophy, but must have been coeval with the first 
 roots of this most spiritual language. Whatever his nom- 
 inal themes may be, whether ethical, sesthetical, physical, 
 or metaphysical, they are, in his treatment, almost always 
 made ultimately to turn, in a greater or less degree, on the 
 distinctions in the modes of being expressed by these two 
 verbs. However he may commence, the argument seldom 
 proceeds far before we are engaged in the consideration of 
 the eternal, the immutable, the one in the many (to ev ev 
 noXXolg), the del ovra , in contrast with the temporal, the 
 changeable, the individual, and the generated. The differ- 
 ence between the classes of ideas expressed by these two 
 verbs must be kept in mind everywhere in reading his more 
 serious dialogues ; and in many parts it may be said to 
 form the key to some of his most valuable thoughts. The 
 key passage, in which they are placed in most remarkable 
 contrast, is one which we have already partly quoted for 
 another purpose (page 96), but whose importance will jus- 
 tify its being presented again. In the Timaeus he defines 
 the two grand departments into which all being or substance 
 is divided, namely, on the one hand, the sensible world , with 
 its phenomena , and, on the other, the intellectual world , in- 
 cluding soul as the oldest essence, and also those eternal 
 truths, ideas, or principles, which Plato seems to have re- 
 garded as entitled to the name of entities — as existences, in 
 fact, even more real than matter itself, although their dwell- 
 ing was not in the world of time and space : "E otlv ovv 
 drj npCdrov dtaipereov Tade- tl to ’'ON pev del, TENE2IN 
 de ovk exov , ml tl to TITNOMENON per, v ON de ovdeno- 
 Te * to pev drj vorjaeL peTd Xoyov nepL^rjnTbv, del mra 
 TavTa v ON. nav de av to yvyvopevov vtt > clItlov Tivoq e% 
 dvdynpg y lyveodat. navTl yap ddvvaTOV x^pl? clItlov ye- 
 veav oxelv. And again, in continuation of the same dis- 
 tinction : haenTeov ovv drj uepl rravTog, re OTepov T HN del 
 yevecrecjg dpx^ v ex^v ovdeplav fj PETONEN an’ apx^g 
 
platonic use of elfiL and yiyvopai, 173 
 
 tlvoc ap^dfievog. Timceus, 28, A., C. In another part of 
 this same passage he contrasts ovoid (or essence) with ye- 
 veotg, as knowledge with opinion, 29, C. It must not be 
 expected always to find these two verbs used with this phil- 
 osophical precision even in Plato. In mere narration, con- 
 fined simply to the assertion of facts, without reference to 
 the nature of the objects, fjv and eyevero are often con- 
 founded, and used one for the other. In such cases the 
 substantive verbs simply perform the office of an asserting 
 copula, without any respect to the mode of being. Even 
 here, however, we often find in careful writers a marked 
 difference in their application. The plain historian He- 
 rodotus, whenever his subject requires it, presents the con- 
 trast strongly, as in lib. iii., 53 : evOev 6e eyevero etcaorog 
 rcbv decor, errs tie del rjoav. In the dialogues of Plato, 
 however, the distinction, whenever important, is ever care- 
 fully preserved ; and we may say, generally, from a review 
 of the Platonic writings, that in all cases which require 
 care in the use of terms, eori is the appropriate word to ex- 
 press that which IS necessarily, such as the existence and 
 attributes of the Deity, the independent existence of incor- 
 poreal substance, the eternal truth of a moral distinctions. 
 Thus, for example, the sentence eon ro ayaOov, would 
 imply far more than simply the assertion of a fact. In this 
 expression, when used with philosophical strictness, eori 
 performs the office of a predicate as well as of a copula, and 
 that predicate, moreover, includes the mode as well as the 
 fact of being. There is expressed by it, without the aid 
 of any other words, a general and most important proposi- 
 tion, namely, that the idea of goodness is not merely rela- 
 tive or accidental, or the result of the mind’s generalization 
 from outward acts, but an absolute, eternal verity; that it 
 has an absolute existence in the Divine mind, and that 
 there is a fixed foundation for the absolute, and not merely 
 relative nature of moral distinctions. In the sciences, this 
 
 P 2 
 
174 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB to be. 
 
 term would be peculiarly appropriate to the enunciation of 
 the truths of geometry and numbers. In mathematical prop- 
 ositions the ideas of cause and effect have no place. There 
 is no ysvEOiq. One truth is essentially connected with an- 
 other, or, rather, seen in it as eternally abiding. The ap- 
 pearance of sequence arises from the necessities and im- 
 perfections of our own minds, compelling us to state them 
 in time ; and yet it is strictly true, that every property of 
 every mathematical figure, and every corresponding mode 
 of generating, contains in itself every other property, and 
 that, as far as theory, irrespective of convenience, is con- 
 cerned, any one of them might, with equal truth, be made 
 the fundamental Xoyog, or definition from which all the rest 
 should be evolved. Mathematical propositions, strictly 
 speaking, have no relation to time, being eternally true, 
 without past, succession, or future. We may, without con- 
 tradiction or absurdity, conceive of a period when it may 
 cease to be true, that bodies attract in the inverse ratio of 
 the squares of their distances, but never when it shall be no 
 longer a truth, that the square of the hypotenuse is equal 
 to the* sum of the squares of the two sides. To make use 
 of the verb ylyvojicu, therefore, in the enunciation of a 
 mathematical theorem, would be introducing a foreign and 
 altogether heterogeneous idea. This latter substantive verb 
 would be most appropriate to physics or natural philosophy, 
 to the ever- moving phenomena of nature regarded as under 
 the law of cause and effect, as having a beginning and an 
 end, as yiyvofieva nal dno^v^eva ; although even these 
 may be stated as absolute truths, and, generally, are thus 
 stated when the mind conceives of them as involving ulti- 
 mately something that is necessary and eternal. It is by 
 reason of some such d 'priori conception, whether it be cor- 
 rect or not, that the primary laws of physics come to be ex- 
 pressed in the same language with the axioms of the pure 
 mathematics. 
 
175 
 
 platonic use of elpl and yiyvopai. 
 
 Even the etymological origin of these two verbs may, 
 without any extravagance of fancy, be supposed to betoken 
 the vast difference between them. The primary elements 
 of the one (ew e el) are found in the most aethereal of the 
 vowels. The other (yaw y) has for its ultimate radical the 
 hardest, and, we might almost say, the most earthly of the 
 guttural mutes ; for it is the origin of the term for earth 
 (y//), and, of all letters, is most easily associated with the 
 conceptions of the sensible or tactual. Plato, although a 
 very poor philologist, seems to recognise the connexion : 
 y r\ yap yevvrjTEipa av eirj opOtig KEuXrjpEvrj, tog (prjOLv "O \ir\- 
 pog * to yap yeydaoc yeyevvTjoOai Xeysi. Cralylus , 410, 
 D. Trjg yXo)TT7jg 6e dXioOavovorjg avriXapbaverat rj rov 
 r dvvapcg. Ib., 427, B. 
 
 These distinctions clearly exist, and are probably coeval 
 with the first elements of the language. They do not, how- 
 ever, as we have remarked, appear so obvious in ordinary 
 use ; their full power being evinced only in the discussion 
 of those truths, in which are involved the very ideas that 
 are radical in the words themselves. On this account they 
 are so distinctly marked in many passages in Plato. The 
 spirit of the difference, however, is diffused throughout the 
 Greek literature, and is probably to be found, to some ex- 
 tent, and under various forms of expression, in almost every 
 known language. May we not believe that, in this way, 
 God, who may be regarded as the author of language as 
 well as of everything else, has provided an antidote against 
 that materialism to which our depraved nature is so contin- 
 ually tending. It is surely no small protection against this, 
 that there are to be found (and perhaps in every tongue) 
 terms which, whatever may have been their origin, must 
 ever be irreconcilably at w T ar with the sensual or atheistic 
 hypothesis. 
 
 The great truth of the real existence of incorporeal sub - 
 stance , as something independent of, and not posterior to, or 
 
176 PHILOSOPHY OP THE VERB to be. 
 
 a result of matter, lies at the foundation of all faith and all 
 religion. We verily believe, too, that whosoever will care- 
 fully examine his own consciousness must admit, that a 
 latent doubt of this lies at the bottom of all skepticism, in 
 all its various forms. It is all to be resolved into material- 
 ism, a system into which such a verb as eotl, in its purest 
 philosophical sense, could not consistently enter. The ex- 
 istence of an Eternal Spirit, independent of the organization 
 of the world by which he manifests himself — the real ex- 
 istence of our own souls as something in the order of na- 
 ture, if not of time, prior to, and independent of, the organi- 
 zation of our bodies ; the consequent immateriality and im- 
 mortality of the soul ; the eternal existence of all which are 
 styled necessary truths ; the eternity of moral distinctions ; 
 the existence of moral attributes as the highest part of the 
 Divine character, and the solemn verities of the Christian 
 faith and the Christian redemption, as flowing necessarily 
 from the above truths in their relation to man — all these are, 
 in every thinking and well-balanced mind that has receiv- 
 ed a religious or Christian education, parts of one system ; 
 all are inseparably connected together, so that a doubt of 
 one is a doubt of all, and a firm conviction of one brings 
 with it a satisfactory belief in all the rest. The prime ele- 
 ment which runs throughout, is a firm faith in the reality of 
 incorporeal substance , or that there is something in the uni- 
 verse besides the sensible world and its phenomena, some 
 other God or soul than that pantheistic power which is only 
 another name for their combined manifestation — in short, 
 some vnepKoofila, as the origin and cause of the ipvxi] 
 eyrcoofiia , as well as of the material world in which its en- 
 ergies are displayed. Yet it must be confessed, that there 
 is a downward tendency in our fallen race to atheism. We 
 do not like to retain God in our knowledge. We find this 
 tendency (unless checked, as it ever has been, by Divine 
 interpositions at special times of grace) gradually infecting 
 
177 
 
 PLATONIC USE OF Elfll AND ylyVOgai. 
 
 individuals and nations, giving an atheistic tinge to Ian- 
 guage, and corrupting and finally destroying religious belief. 
 There is, at the beginning of this, the opposite of the con- 
 viction before mentioned — a secret and almost unconscious 
 skepticism, a suspicion, a fear, and in some, perhaps, a 
 hope, that all is nature , that all is generation (yeveaig), or 
 the mere succession of phenomena ; that there is nothing 
 naO' eavTijv, absolute, necessary, eternal, self-existent, or, 
 in other words, d)$* ovdsv earrjiie , that nothing stands . 
 
 Now we cannot help indulging the thought, however ex- 
 travagant it may appear to some, that the Divine Author of 
 our race, “ who careth for us,” and who arranges all things 
 to bring about his own eternal decrees, does exert a provi- 
 dential control over so important an instrument as speech, 
 and that in these two substantive verbs, so distinctly mark- 
 ed in their primary sense, their philosophical applications, 
 and their numerous derivative and kindred terms, he has 
 stamped upon the noblest language of earth, an indelible im- 
 pression of the eternal distinction between the classes of 
 substances denoted by them, and of the real existence of 
 those great truths so fundamental to all others, the chief of 
 which is, u that HE IS , and that he is the rewarder of those 
 who diligently seek him” Especially would this seem to be 
 a sober conclusion, when we consider how, in the provi- 
 dence of God, this same language was intended to be the 
 medium of a Divine revelation, and the teaching of a wide- 
 spread Christian theology. The modern tongue which 
 comes the nearest to it in this respect is the German. And 
 may we not regard this, too, as intended, by its high spirit- 
 ual character, to resist effectually the neology and natural- 
 ism which have been attempted to be conveyed through it ? 
 May we not hope, that, after all the extravagances of the 
 German mind, the conservative, religious, and spiritual in- 
 fluences which in this and other respects exist in their na- 
 tive Teutonic, will yet hold them firm to those great truths 
 
178 f HILOSOPHY OF THE VERB to be. 
 
 which are the foundation of all faith. Materialism can a 
 best only babble in other languages : it cannot speak at all 
 in Greek or German, without the use of words which must 
 continually remind it of its absurdities and contradictions. 
 
 The English, and most of the modern languages of Eu- 
 ope, are very deficient in the expression of the distinction 
 conveyed by these verbs. Words, it is true, may be found, 
 which may be forced into a sort of awkward correspond- 
 ence ; but they want that unction, that naturalness, that di- 
 rect and easy contrast with the opposing terms, which 
 would show that they are in harmony with the genius and 
 spirit of the language. Hence the almost impossibility of 
 a faithful and yet lively translation of Plato into the French 
 and English. If we needed proof how poorly the Latin is 
 aapted to this purpose, it may be found in the version of 
 the Timeeus by Ficinus, and even in the translation of the 
 same dialogue by Cicero, of which a large fragment yet 
 remains.* 
 
 We may trace the distinction between elfit and ytyvofjtat, 
 even where we may not suppose it to have been directly in 
 
 * Among all modern authors, there is no one in whose writings 
 these Greek words seem more wanted than in those of the English 
 Plato, Ralph Cudworth. He often seems to labour with the stiff 
 Latin, and the still more clumsy English, when the Greek sljui and 
 ytyvoyai would have helped him at once out of all difficulty. As, 
 for example, when speaking of the eternity of truth, and of its inde- 
 pendence even of the creating or generating power of the Divine 
 will, he says, that “it cannot be made, but is he means just what 
 Flato'would have expressed by the words, ovderzors kyevero i] dM/deca, 
 alX dec eon. Intellectual System of the Universe , vol. iii., p. 376, 
 Eng. ed. And again, vol. iii., p. 405, where he wishes to tell us in 
 English, that “ the perfect triangle, &c., really is, although it never 
 yet existed, and never may exist in rerum natural As we feel for 
 our imperfect language, and for the difficulties of our most admira- 
 ble author, we cannot help thinking how easily the Greek enables 
 Aristotle to express the same thought by the same words, del kart, 
 ovd^Trore kyevero. 
 
179 
 
 PLATONIC USE OF elflL AND J lyvopai. 
 
 the mind of the writer, but to have arisen (perhaps uncon- 
 sciously) from its adaptedness to the truth intended to be 
 conveyed. Thus, for example, in the first verses of the 
 Gospel of John, the one is applied to the Eternal A oyog, the 
 other to the sensible world, which derived its yeveoig from 
 him. We might, in defence of this position, say at once, 
 that the terms were specially suggested by the Holy Spirit, 
 the *eal author of the passage, without supposing John him- 
 self to have had any acquaintance with the Platonic wri- 
 tings, or to have intended any philosophical contrast. But 
 without this, we can recognise the distinction as growing 
 directly out of the genius of the language, although, in the 
 expression of truths in which it did not enter, either verb, 
 or both, might have been used, without anything special to 
 attract observation. But John was treating of a subject 
 which, of all others, called for the contrast ; and that, too, 
 whether Xoyog is used here for a personification of the Su- 
 preme Reason, or for the Eternal Son of God, the second 
 Person in the Trinity. There is, then, no absurdity and no 
 extravagance in* supposing that the words are here used, 
 not in their ordinary narrative sense, but with special re- 
 gard to their primary differences, when employed in phil- 
 osophical strictness. This may be more clear of one of 
 them- than of the other. r Hv or kart may be applied to the 
 lower class of existences — and it is this that has rendered 
 necessary the qualifying adverb, ovrojg, which we find so 
 frequently in the Platonic phrase, ovrcog ov — but eyevero 
 cannot well be used for the higher. One the least familiar 
 with the genius of the Greek language must feel the impro- 
 priety of the expression, ev apxy eyevero 6 Qeog ; unless it 
 had been actually intended to teach the fabulous generations 
 of such gods as Hesiod treats of in his Theogonia, who all 
 came from an older <\>voig , and were generated out of Chaos 
 and the broad-bosomed Earth : 
 
180 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB to be. 
 
 ’TI tol [lev Tcpcortara Xaog TENET’, avrap eneira 
 YaV evpvorepvog , Travroiv edog aocbaXeg alec. 
 
 Hesiod, Theog ., 117. 
 
 A much more clear and striking example from the Scrip- 
 tures may be found John, viii., 58. Here we have the 
 most remarkable antithesis, and here we feel confident in 
 saying, not only that the philosophical distinction was in- 
 tended, but that, without it, the designed idea could not Jiave 
 been expressed : ’Aprjv dprjv Aeyw vplv rrplv ’A dpaap TE- 
 NE20AI eyed EIMI . — Before Abraham came into being , or 
 received his yeveotg , I AM, eternally and essentially AM, 
 WAS, and ever SHALL BE : for dpi, here, like the He- 
 brew rynx, Exodus, iii., 14, seems to include all tenses. 
 To be convinced that this juxtaposition of words was not 
 accidental, or used merely for the sake of variety, let us 
 compare the other modes that might seem to be equivalent, 
 namely, irplv 9 A 6paap dvai eyco d\u, or n piv ’Abpaap ye- 
 veoOat eyd) eyevoprjv ; and the difference is not only to be 
 perceived, but felt. In consequence of our using the soli- 
 tary verb to be for both modes of existence expressed by 
 elpt and y iyvopai, the English fails, and ever must fail, in 
 setting forth the truth in all its fulness. It is not extrava- 
 gant to suppose that our Saviour here intended, and the 
 Jews understood, a direct reference to Exodus, iii., 14 — I 
 AM that I AM — where the Septuagint employs the partici- 
 ple of elpi as a name or personal appellation of the Deity, 
 corresponding to the Hebrew rrnx, or DUV, namely, f O 
 "I2N hath sent me unto you. There seems, also, good rea- 
 son for the opinion that this term, f O "QN, may, in some 
 other passages, have the force of a descriptive appellation 
 (as one of the Divine names), instead of being a mere par- 
 ticipial copula. As in the noted passage, Rom., ix., 5 — f O 
 T2N, ent ndvrcov tiedg, evXoyyrog elg roi)g aitivag. — Of 
 whom, according to the flesh ( Kara oaptca), was Christ, The 
 Tehovah , God over all, blessed forever . The Hebraism, 
 
181 
 
 PLATONIC USE OF ELflL AND ylyVOgUi. 
 
 Kara capita (wsn 'D 1 ?), is the only form of expression in 
 that language, which at all corresponds to the Greek Kara 
 ysveciv ; and, by keeping this in mind, we find that there 
 is the same contrast, Rom., ix., 5, as in John, i., 1, 2, 14 : 
 Kal o Xoyog cap% eyevero . Transfer the Hebraistic idiom 
 to more philosophical Greek, and this contrast would be 
 thus set forth : Kar ’ ovciav , ev apxxj fjv 6 Xoyog — Kara ye - 
 veav , cap £ Eyevero. Compare, also, Rev.,i., 8, ’E ytb Eipu 
 o cbv Kal o i]v. We are aware of the objections to all this, 
 and have no expectation that it will have much force with 
 those who entertain different views in theology ; but some 
 such impression of a reference to Exodus, iii., 14, is very 
 naturally left on the mind of one who believes, on other 
 grounds, in the Divinity and eternal self-existence of the 
 being here styled The Logos. This impression receives 
 strength, also, from the supposition that the language of the 
 Septuagint version of Exodus, iii., 14 (6 cbv ), had already 
 passed into a descriptive appellation, and been ranked 
 among the Old Testament names of the Deity. 
 
 Should it be thought that we are too much inclined to 
 represent Paul and John as Platonizing, or as indulging in 
 the use of philosophical language, we would simply refer, 
 in the case of the former, to Acts, xvii., 28 : ’Ev avrcp yap 
 £ g ) gev, Kal KivovgeOa itat eogev. — “ In him we live , and 
 move, and are The allusion here, as well as in other 
 parts of that chapter, to the language of the Greek schools 
 is too plain to be mistaken ; and it does not seem extrava- 
 gant to suppose, that the Apostle had in mind the Greek 
 and Hebrew names respectively of their Supreme Deity 
 The etymology of Jehovah is suggested at once by Exodus, 
 iii., 14. It may be called the proper name of God, or, as 
 he styles it himself, his memorial to all generations — The 
 Essentially Existent one (6 ojv) ; the Being who has life in 
 himself, and who is the source of existence to el^rything 
 else. In spiritual substances, life and being are the same. 
 
 Q 
 
182 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB to be. 
 
 The two roots in Hebrew expressive of these two ideas, 
 namely, rrn and rrn, are so nearly alike, that they may be 
 regarded as from one source, and, in some cases, as nearly 
 synonymous. Hence the appellation so common in the 
 Old Testament, The Living God . To say that this is in- 
 ended merely to distinguish the God of the Jews from the 
 dead idols of the Heathen, or from their deified dead men, 
 is not to give it half its meaning. None of the Heathen 
 nations, any more than the Romanists of modern times, 
 were ever so besotted as to worship their idols without re- 
 garding them, in some measure, as the representatives of 
 living and immortal beings. The epithet, therefore, must 
 have had a higher significance, and seems to refer to this 
 name Jehovah — The Being that not only exists, but exists 
 necessarily — who has life in himself, unoriginated and un- 
 caused — that Divine existence which the mind is compelled 
 to admit a priori, as the ground of the belief in all other ex- 
 istences, or as a necessary truth, the contrary of which, 
 when fairly presented, cannot be admitted without bringing 
 darkness over every other truth. Hence the appeal so oft- 
 en found in the Old Testament, 61 As I live , saith the Lord,” 
 is used to denote the highest ground of certainty. Gese- 
 nius and other German critics, indulging their propensity 
 ever to undervalue the testimony of the Scriptures, and to 
 lessen our reverence for their antiquity and sacred author- 
 ity, assign an Egyptian origin to this name, and deduce it 
 from an inscription upon the temple at Sais, as given by 
 Plutarch : ’Eyc5 el[U to yeyovbg teal ov teal eodyevov . — “ 1 
 am that which has been, is, and shall be.” This inscrip- 
 tion, although, perhaps, itself comparatively modern, may 
 have contained an old Egyptian sentiment; and yet such 
 an admission would not militate at all against the pure He- 
 brew origin of the name, and its derivation from ideas ex- 
 isting in the patriarchal ages, or in that common early the- 
 ology which was transmitted pure to the Jew, while it w^as 
 
183 
 
 PLATONIC USE OF EL[H - AND yiyV0\iai. 
 
 corrupted by every other nation. To the same early source 
 must we look for the notion on which was grounded the 
 etymology of the Greek Z evg, and which presents so strong 
 a contrast with the corruptions of the subsequent mythology. 
 Although it may not be precisely the same with the prim- 
 itive idea of the Hebrew term, there certainly seems some 
 approach to it. There is no need of travelling, as some 
 have done, to the Sanscrit for the origin of this term. It 
 seems as purely Greek as Qeog and A aipojv, and nothing 
 can be more simple, or less liable to the charge of being 
 forced, than the etymology which Plato gives us in the Cra- 
 tylus. He derives Zevg , Zrjva, from t'q v , to live : Ov yap 
 lonv rjplv teal rolg aXXoig Traotv bong eorlv alnog paXXov 
 tov rj 0 apx^ v ts fiaoiXevg tCjv navreov . — “ For to 
 
 us, and to all other beings, there is no one who is more prop- 
 erly the cause of life than the ruler and king of all things.” 
 At all events, it is sufficient for our present argument, that 
 this was the received and probably well-known philosoph- 
 ical etymology in Paul’s time, and we have every reason, 
 therefore, to suppose that he alludes to it in this famous 
 passage of his sermon at Athens. In the words ^bjpev and 
 eopev, we have the radical Greek and Hebrew ideas com- 
 bined in one description, composed of terms severally sig- 
 nificant of motion , life , and essence ; as though Paul had 
 said, he is our Zevg and our Jehovah: “For in him we live 
 and are , as some of your own poets have said,” <fcc. We 
 are no more required, by this view, to suppose that the Apos- 
 tle meant to exercise any false liberality towards the cor- 
 rupt polytheism or idolatry of Athens, than that his most 
 evident allusion to the language of their schools was de- 
 signed as any sanction to the follies and monstrosities of 
 some parts of their philosophy and poetry. 
 
 For some of the more striking of the many passages in 
 Plato’s dialogues, in which there is this marked antithesis 
 between elpt and yiyvopai , see the Thesetetus, 153, E., 
 
184 
 
 ANCIENT DIVISIONS OF MOTION. 
 
 155, A., 157, D. : keys tolvvv el ooe apeouee to prj tl el- 
 vac, akkd ycyveoOac del ayaOov teal uakov, &c. ; Republic, 
 525, C. : (j)ckooo(j)(t) be, bed ro rrjg ’OTHIA2 anreov elvac, 
 rENE2E£2 efavabvvn : 526, P., 527, A., 527, B., T?jg del 
 ’0NT02 yvcboeg eon p yecopeTpeurj, ak) l’ ov rov tt ore re 
 nrNOMENOT, 508, E., P. ; Parmenides, 138, E., 141, 
 C., 154, C., D., 161, 162, A., B. ; Philebus, 53, C., where 
 he defines physical pleasure, or the pleasure of sense, as 
 ever yeveoeg, but never ovo'ea : (bg del yeveoeg earev , ovoea 
 be ovk eon Tonapanav rjbovrjg ; Phaedrus, 247, C., D., E.; 
 Hippias, Maj., 294, B. C. ; Timaeus, 28, A., B., &c., 29, 
 37, C., D., E. ; together with passages from the Sophista, 
 too numerous for citation, and the Phsedon, everywhere 
 
 XXV. 
 
 Ancient Divisions of Motion. According to Plato. Accord - 
 ing to Aristotle. Distinction between Yeveoeg and ’A kko'e- 
 cjocg . The Atomic Theory more favourable to Theism 
 than the Doctrine of Occult Qualities. 
 
 Page 25, Line 22. "E oro) tolvvv tj pev erepa bvvapevrj 
 ucveZv KLVTjoeg, eavrrjv be abvvarovoa del pea Tig. He 
 speaks now of the two orders of motion, taking the word 
 uevrjocg in its most extensive sense, as including all the spe- 
 cies before alluded to, namely, circular , rectilineal or tot: mi), 
 separation, concretion , augment , diminution , generation , and 
 corruption ; or, generally, all that is expressed by the word 
 peTadokrj, or change , internal or external, according to that 
 definition of Aristotle, rraoa uevrjoeg ei; dkkov elg akko eorl 
 peTabokrj, ual yeveoeg teal cpdopa (boavTCjg, Arist., Metaph., 
 x. (xi.), 12. From this it may be seen how much more 
 extensive it is than the corresponding English term. The 
 two kinds of motion here spoken of are not so much to be 
 regarded as species distinct from the others, but rather as 
 
ANCIENT DIVISIONS OF MOTION. 
 
 185 
 
 two general ideas, each embracing all the specific varieties 
 mentioned. Plato here, however, must be regarded as un- 
 usually careless in his specifications, since, according to 
 the fair import of the language, these two must be consid- 
 ered as species reckoned with the rest, and yet it is evi- 
 dent that this was far from being his intention. 
 
 Page 26, Line 2. evdr?]v. It is not obvious, at first, why 
 this is called the ninth, since there are but six mentioned 
 just before it. It would, however, be the ninth according 
 to the following enumeration, taking opposites together : 
 
 1 . Tlepicpopu. 
 
 3. 'ZvyKpiGLg. 
 
 5. kv^rjaig. 
 
 7. Teveaig. 
 
 9. Kivrjcnc srepov kivovgcl kcll 
 i)(p’ Srepov KLvovpevrj. 
 
 2 . Totukt) peTu6aGL£. 
 
 4. A L&KpLGig. 
 
 6 . 4 }6tGig. 
 
 8 . $0opd. 
 
 10. KlV 7)GLC kdVTTJV KlVOVGd KCLL 
 erepa. 
 
 The last two, however, as we have remarked, are not strict- 
 ly species , but genera , including, respectively, all the rest ; 
 and so, in what follows, the writer proceeds to regard them. 
 
 Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrii ., Hypotyp iii., 8, § 64, enu- 
 merates but six species : 1. ronucrj peradaoig ( localis trans- 
 iius) ; 2. (pvGiKr) peradoXrj (naturalis mulatto ), or dXXotooig ; 
 3. av^rjGtg {augmentum) ; 4. peiooLg ( decrementum ) ; 5. ye- 
 veoig ( generatio ) ; 6. (pOopa (corruplio) . Compare Aris- 
 totle, Phys. Auscult ., vii., 2, where he enumerates three 
 genera, which he afterward divides into a great variety of 
 species, many of which have hardly any other differences 
 than their names : ’Erat tie rpelg eioi KLvrjoeu r\ re Kara 
 tottov, aai Kara ro ttolov , Kal Kara ro ttogov , avayfcrj Kal 
 ra Kivovpeva rpia. f H pev ovv Kara tottov , (popa • r] 6e 
 Kara ro ttolov , aXXolocug • rj 6e Kara rb ttogov , av^rjocg 
 Kai (pOioig. “ Since, then, there are three causes of motion, 
 namely, in respect to space, in respect to quality, and in re- 
 spect to quantity, there must be three corresponding mo- 
 tions or movements. The first of these is called (popa , the 
 
 Q 2 
 
186 distinction between yeveotg and aWoiuGtg. 
 
 second, aXXoi(OGig (or change), the third, increment and 
 diminution.” ‘The scholiast on the passage of Plato before 
 us has a much better division ; first, into corporeal and 
 psychical , and then into the subdivisions of space, quality, 
 quantity, and essence, on the one hand, and into the last 
 two enumerated by Plato, and here called the ninth and 
 tenth, on the other : T?jg nivr\GE(og rj lev ocoparinrj, Kara 
 tottov, Kara TtotOTrjTa, /card TroooTrjra , nar * ovolav • r] 6e 
 ipvXifcrj, rj aXXo nivovoa im' dXXov 6 e nLvovpevrj , 7 / eavrrjv 
 te mvovoa nal srepa dvvapevr]. Compare, also, Aristotle, 
 Phys. Auscult ., v., 3, viii., 7 ; Be General, et Corrup ., i., 1, 4. 
 
 In this last-cited treatise Aristotle endeavours to present 
 the distinction between yeveoig and aXXoicooig. His gen- 
 eral statement is clear enough : ’ AXXotcoGtg [lev egtlv , orav 
 vnopevovrog rov vnonetpevov, aloOrjrov ovrog, psTadaXX^ 
 kv rolg avrov TtaOeoiv • olov to Gcbpa vyiaivei nal 1 raXiv 
 napvet, vnopsvov ye ravro • nal o %aXnog GrpoyyvXog , ore 
 6 e ycovioEidfjg, 0 avrog ye &v . orav 6s oXov p.ETabdXXrj, pr) 
 vnopevovrog aioO^rov rivog , d>g vnonetpevov rov avrov , 
 vXP olov e% vdarog aijp, rj el; aspog vdcjp, rov pev 7]Sr) ye - 
 VEGig to toiovtov , rov 6e cpdopa , paXtara 6e dv rj peradoXrj 
 yivErai e% dvatoQrjrov elg aloOrjrov. “ Alloiosis takes 
 place when the subject (some object of sense) remains the 
 same, while there is a change in its passions. As, for ex- 
 ample, the body is healthy, and again is sick, yet remains 
 the same body ; or the brass is at one time round, and at 
 another angular, yet still the same. But when there is an 
 entire change, the subject no longer remaining the same, 
 but it being as though from water air, or from air water 
 snould arise, such a change is, in respect to the one thing, 
 a generation, and, in respect to the other, a (pdopa , or cor- 
 ruption,” &c. 
 
 In applying this, however, it will be found to be only a 
 matter of degrees, unless it is determined what constitutes 
 totality, or an entire change, as also what is meant by not- 
 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN yeVEGig AND dXXoLUGLg. 187 
 
 orrfg, properly, or quality. This must be viewed in refer- 
 ence to two theories, one of which, or the atomic, considers 
 all iroiOTTjT ag, or qualities of bodies, as arising from the site, 
 figure, motion, and order of the atoms of which they are 
 composed (d)g AryxoupiTog real Aevtannog <paoi , deaei uai 
 Tagei tovt(»)v eg d)v slot, Arist., De Gen. et Cor., i., 1), and 
 the affections they produce in us ; according to which, all 
 change of quality is ultimately to be resolved into topical 
 motion, producing a change in the situation, order, and nu- 
 merical combination of the particles ; such as modern chem- 
 istry shows when, the constituent atoms remaining the same 
 in kind, a new substance arises from the difference in their 
 arrangement and proportion ; so that, for example, what 
 once was common atmospheric air becomes nitric acid, &c. 
 The other was the theory of occult qualities, in which Aris- 
 totle was a believer. This maintained that the figure, site, 
 motions, and order of parts or particles remaining the same, 
 or being identically the same in two respective bodies, they 
 might differ greatly in their properties ; and there being no- 
 thing in the matter in respect to locality, number, propor- 
 tion, magnitude, motion, or any sensible phenomena, to 
 which this difference could be assigned, it was styled oc- 
 cult. Hence, in one place, Aristotle endeavours to show 
 that two bodies might both be absolutely full, or a plenum, 
 and yet one might have a property of heaviness or weight, 
 the other of lightness ; one might have a property of hard- 
 ness and the other of softness, and that the one might even 
 be compressible while the other was incompressible ; since 
 the phenomena of thinness (yavorpg) or density ( tcvicvo - 
 T7jg) were no proof of a vacuum, or the contrary. 
 
 In this view, dXXoLUOig and yeveoig can only be regarded 
 as differing in degree, Kara to ttogov, unless yeveoig is ta- 
 ken for the change uard to itoiov, or a change of the oc- 
 cult quality itself, which was entirely independent of the 
 disposition and motions of the parts of the matter. On the 
 
188 
 
 ATOMIC THEORY. 
 
 other theory, there is a marked distinction between them, 
 as the one (d/LAotcua^) would refer to such a change of par- 
 ticles as would only affect the aggregate sum, the other (ye- 
 veacg) to such a change in site, order, motion, and combi- 
 nation, as would destroy the former e£i$, and give rise to a 
 new one, constituting a new law or nature. ’A XXoiooig 
 would be a change in the aloOrjrd , addressing itself solely 
 to the sense ; yeveotg, a change in the vor\r6v , or idea, ad- 
 dressing itself to the intelligence, and constituting the ob- 
 ject of science. 
 
 The atomic theory has been charged with being atheist- 
 ical, because atheists have held it. Cudworth, however, 
 very conclusively shows that it is, on the contrary, most 
 favourable to theism, because, allowing to matter nothing 
 but atoms, figure, site, &c., the mind that thinks rigidly is 
 compelled to bring in something to set these atoms in mo- 
 tion, and, since it discards all occult qualities as unmean- 
 ing, it is obliged to resort to Spirit as the direct author of 
 all those original impulses of matter which are generally 
 styled properties. See The Intellectual System , chapter i., 
 38-45. On the other hand, this other doctrine, which, at 
 first view, seems more spiritual, as apparently maintaining 
 the existence of a secret something besides the matter, and, 
 therefore, as more favourable to religion than the dry theory 
 of atoms, is, in reality, the great hot-bed of atheism, ever 
 dispensing with the presence of the Deity, as long as these 
 blind occult qualities can be brought in to justify what would 
 fain seem a jealous reverence for the Divine honour. 
 
 Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus. 
 
 This doctrine seems to have given rise, in the minds of 
 Aristotle and others, to this distinction between romrcrj [is- 
 TaboXrj, local change , or change in space , and j usradob) Kara 
 ttolov , or change of quality, as the two great and distinct 
 orders embraced under the term KLVrjoig, or motion in its 
 largest sense ; whereas, if the other view be correc t, the 
 
DOCTRINE OF OCCULT QUALITIES. 
 
 189 
 
 second is as jnuch local motion as the first, that is, local 
 motion internally, although there may be no departure from 
 the circumscribing space in which the whole body is con- 
 tained ; so that all change would be motion in the modern 
 sense of the word, and there would remain only the two 
 genera which Plato numbers as the ninth and tenth, and 
 which the scholiast has styled owfiarutr} and 'ibvxLfcrj ; all 
 the rest being mere differences arising from direction, de- 
 gree, separation, or concretion. Plato’s division, although 
 somewhat affected by this doctrine of occult qualities, is far 
 less dependent upon it than the others we have mentioned, 
 and what he says of the naOeorrjKvla e^tg and its change 
 savours most strongly of the other theory. On other 
 grounds, we are persuaded that Plato’s view was more in 
 accordance with the atomic doctrine, which resolved all 
 7 TOLorrjTag into the motions, figures, sites, &c., of ultimate 
 particles. This seems to agree best with the spirit of the 
 Timaeus ; and, indeed, there are some parts of that dialogue 
 which are unintelligible on any other supposition. Cud- 
 worth maintains that Plato, as well as Aristotle, was a be- 
 liever in the occult theory ; and that he was led to adopt it 
 because he saw that the other had been held by atheists. 
 We are satisfied, however, from a very careful examination, 
 which cannot be here presented, that this is a mistaken 
 view of his philosophy. It is sufficient to say, that nothing 
 would be so fatal to his main argument in this very treatise, 
 as the admission of any occult quality, which is neither to 
 be resolved into the combination and disposition of the par- 
 ticles, nor into the higher power of spirit ultimately moving 
 upon them. The atheist would ask for no better auxiliary, 
 to resist successfully all that might be advanced about the 
 necessity of that older and self-moving essence, soul . “ Give 
 me a place to stand,” said Archimedes, “ and I will move the 
 world.” “ Give me occult qualities,” the atheist might say, 
 “ and I ask the aid of no God in constructing a universe.” 
 
190 
 
 SELF-MOTION OF SOUL. 
 
 # ^ 
 
 XXVI. 
 
 A vronivrjOLg, or Self-motion of Soul . Energy or Action be- 
 longs to the Essence of the Deity. Whether on this Vieio 
 God must have created Worlds from Eternity. Aristotle's 
 Misrepresentations of Plato on this Point. His own Doc- 
 trine. 
 
 Page 26, Line 9. Haotiv EppcopeveoTaTrjv /cat 'irpanri- 
 urjv dtacpepovrcog. Such strong expressions as these gave 
 occasion to Aristotle to assert, that Plato taught the doc- 
 trine that the first cause was an eternal energy or activity 
 ever employed, that is, evepyeia , in distinction from dvva- 
 ptg. He even most unjustly seeks to confound Plato’s 
 Eternal Spiritual Mover with the everlasting agitation of 
 the self-moving atoms of Democritus and Leucippus : Aid 
 evioc noiovoiv del evepyeiav , olov Aev/annog teal ITA arcov. 
 del yap elvai (f>aot KtvrjGiv • dAAd Sea tl, teat riva , ov Ae- 
 yovoev. “ Some make it an everlasting activity, as Leucip- 
 pus and Plato. For they say that there is an eternal mo- 
 tion, but by reason of what, and what, they do not tell us.” 
 Aristot ., Metaph., xi. (xii.), c. 6. This disparagement of 
 Plato, by associating him with the atheists, Leucippus and 
 Democritus, is merely done to set off his own dogma, that 
 “ the first essence was immoveable on dvdyftrj elvai at- 
 diov nvd ova lav, dfdv7]rov ; in which proposition, taken in 
 its true sense, we shall see that Plato most fully agreed 
 with him. In another part of this same chapter, he infers, 
 that if there be an eternal rdv?]Oig , its very essence must be 
 activity (evepyeia), in distinction from power ( dvvapig ) : E£ 
 yap pij evepyrjoei , ovre eorai tdvrjoig • ert ovd ’ el evepyrjoei, 
 i] 6' ovGta avrrjg dvvapig • ov yap eorai nivrjoig atdiog • ev - 
 Several yap to dvvapei ov, prj dvai. A el apa elvai dpxrjv 
 roiavrrjv, fjg ij ovoia evepyeia— u For if it should not ener- 
 gize, there will be no motion ; neither if it should energize, t 
 
ARISTOTLE MISREPRESENTS TLATO. 19l 
 
 while yet its essence was only (dvvapcg) power or poten- 
 tiality. Even in that case, there will be no eternal motion ; 
 for that which exists, tv dvvapec, in potentiality, admits of 
 not-being. Therefore there must he some such principle, 
 whose very essence is energy .” 
 
 In stating the objections to the doctrine, he misrepresents 
 Plato in his usual manner, by drawing the unsound infer- 
 ence, that the Phrst Cause must have been ever engaged, 
 from its very nature, in the work of creation, and that, there- 
 fore, the universe must have been eternal : (hare ova av fjv 
 dnecpov xpovov %ao£ i) vv%, dXXa ra avra dec, rj rrepcodcp, 
 ?] dXXcvg, ehrep nporepov tvepyeca dvvapecog, el de to avro 
 del Trepcodcp, dec re dec peveev tvepyovv — “ So that there 
 could have been no chaos or night for an infinite (or indef- 
 inite) time ; but the same things must have been ever taking 
 place, either in a circuit or in some other manner, if activ- 
 ity ( tvepyeca ) is older than dvvapcg. But if the same eter- 
 nally took place in a circuit, then there must have ever been 
 something continually energizing, or putting forth active 
 power.” Metaph., xi. (xii.), c. 6. 
 
 Aristotle was never careful to do Plato justice ; although 
 it would be easy to show — the modern declamation to the 
 contrary notwithstanding — that their philosophy was sub- 
 stantially the same ; the main difference arising from the 
 Stagyrite’s studious care to adopt, in many cases, a different 
 phraseology, for the purpose of creating the appearance of 
 a wider disagreement than really existed, and from his con- 
 tinual disposition to pervert and misstate Plato's real mean- 
 ing. His misrepresentation here, whether wilful or not, 
 arises from his utterly confounding the two aspects under 
 which our philosopher defines his tenth species of teevrjoeg, 
 as eavrrjv re teevovoa — teal erepa dvvapevrj. In the first only 
 did he hold it to be eternal and essential. In this respect, 
 too, however much it may be above our comprehension, he 
 regards it as purely spiritual, or, as the scholiast defines it f 
 
192 IN GOD, THE VERY ESSENCE IS ENERGY. 
 
 psychical, in distinction from topical motion ; as something 
 ever energizing within itself, and only presenting the sec- 
 ond aspect when exercised, tiara ronov, in the generation, 
 creation, and changes of the topical universe. What Plato 
 meant was this, that the First Cause was something more 
 than dvvapig ; an eternal activity constituting its very es- 
 sence, yet by no means necessitating it to act out of itself, 
 until, by an exercise of will, it should give rise to an out- 
 ward universe, which, although actuated by, remains clear- 
 ly distinct from, this everlasting energy. 
 
 We have likewise an example of the gross manner in 
 which Aristotle misstates Plato, in another assertion of this 
 same chapter, wherein he charges him with inconsistency 
 in respect to his first Mover or Eternal Soul : ’AAAd firjv 
 ovde UX arcovi ye olov re Xeyeiv fjv olerai apxrjv elvat evi- 
 ote to avro kavro ntvovv. vorepov yap teal apa rep ovpavcp 
 7) ipvrxrj, cog (j>rj(u — “ But, surely, neither is Plato able to 
 tell us what he means by that which he sometimes thinks 
 to be the first principle, namely, his self- moving power ; for 
 soul, he says (in a certain place), is cotemporary with the 
 heavens, or the material universe.” Aristotle undoubtedly 
 would convey the inference, that this is inconsistent with 
 the doctrine of the Eternal Spiritual Mover as laid down in 
 the tenth book of The Laws. The position which he cites 
 is from the Timaeus, but the careful reader can hardly fail 
 to see that there, by ^vx^j, Plato means the anima mundi , 
 which he expressly represents as the direct production of 
 the Eternal Father, who formed it together with the body 
 of which it was to be the plastic power ; whereas through- 
 out this book, and especially the present argument respect- 
 ing motion, he employs the term soul for the immaterial 
 principle which was prior to all creation and generation of 
 matter — in fact, as another name for the Eternal Deity him- 
 self — and this wide difference could hardly have been un- 
 known to one. who must have been familiar with the dia- 
 
Aristotle’s immoveable essence. 193 
 
 logues of Plato, especially such important portions of them 
 as the Timseus and this argument* against the atheists. 
 
 One cause of Aristotle’s misconception may have been 
 his own unsound definition of motion, which necessarily 
 excluded this tenth species, which Plato makes the ground 
 of all the rest : ixaaa yap ntvrjatg £% akXov slg aWo sorl 
 peradoXrj. Metaph., x. (xi.), c. 12. In other places, how- 
 ever, he seems to mean the same with our author, and even 
 to go beyond him in the sublimity of some of his ideas re- 
 specting the first Mover. Compare, for this purpose, the 
 last chapter of the last book of Physics, and the seventh 
 chapter of the eleventh book of the Metaphysics. The 
 First Cause he styles a/cLvrjrov, not, as we think, in the 
 sense of inactivity or quiescence, but as incapable of being 
 moved, or of deriving its motion from anything external or 
 antecedent. This, instead of being 6vvapig alone, he him- 
 self describes as essentially an Eternal Energy : errel 6s 
 eon to Ktvovpsvov teal tavovv , peoov eotl n , o ov Kivovpe- 
 vov Kivsly aidiov , nal ovoia nai sv spy eta ovoa . Metaph ., 
 xi. (xii.), c. 7. He sometimes even transcends Plato, and 
 seems to intend the energy of vovg as something higher 
 than a merely psychicalf first mover, if he does not rather 
 mean an apx'fj, or principle of a still higher nature even 
 than this, namely, the moral and final cause of the heaven- 
 ly motions. We allude especially to that most remark- 
 
 * There cannot be a doubt, that, in the passages we have quoted, 
 Aristotle has reference to this tenth book of The Laws ; for nowhere 
 else does Plato talk in the same style about motion and the first mo- 
 ver, unless it be in some of the subsequent books of this very trea- 
 tise. In the Timaeus, the argument is conducted in a manner alto- 
 gether different. This, then, together with other references which 
 Aristotle makes to the Laws, as a production of Plato well known 
 in his day, ought to be conclusive evidence of their genuineness. 
 
 t Plato, however, in this argument, evidently uses 'tpvxv for all that 
 is incorporeal, including intellect (vov-c) as well as life and motive 
 power. 
 
 R 
 
194 MORAL REASONS, THE FIRST OF MOVING CAUSES. 
 
 able passage, where he says “ that this dpx% or First 
 Cause, moves the heavens, as being loved — tuvel 6e epd>- 
 
 pievoi’ ,” c. 7. By this, Cudworth supposes that he meant to 
 represent a second moving power, or soul of the world, 
 which, “ enamoured with this supreme, immoveable Mind, 
 did, as it were, in imitation of it, continually turn round the 
 heavens.” Intellectual System , vol. ii., p. 313, Eng. ed. 
 We cannot, however, discover any solid grounds for this 
 opinion, and would rather regard this as a mode of expres- 
 sion, by which the Stagyrite would give the first place in 
 the series of moving causes to moral reasons — what he 
 himself so tersely styles, to ev nal tzaX&g, or the well and 
 fit , and what Socrates was fond of denominating to PeXtio- 
 tov , the best. It was this principle which produced that 
 motion of the Highest Heavens or sphere, on which all in- 
 ferior motions depend : etc Toiavrr\g apa apx^g TjpTTjrat, 6 
 ovpavog nal rj (pvoig. In this language we think there can 
 be discovered some allusion to Homer’s golden chain ; and, 
 indeed, the whole style and sentiment of the passage seems 
 far more in accordance with the semi-poetical philosophy 
 of Plato than with that of the dry and rigid Aristotle. No- 
 thing could be more Platonic than this conception of the 
 universe eternally moving on through love of/rhe First 
 Fair and The First Good, attracted rather than impelled, 
 and ever tending to the object of its admiration, as though 
 it were striving to develop, in the harmony of its varied 
 physical influences, that all-perfect idea with which it was 
 enraptured. 
 
 We may compare with all this a splendid passage from 
 the Phaedrus, of which Cicero has given a version in the 
 first book of the Tusculan Disputations, sect, xxiii. : “All 
 soul is immortal, for that which ever moves must be eter- 
 nal ; while that which moves another, and yet is moved by 
 something else, since it hath cessation of motion, may have 
 cessation of life. But that alone which moves itself, seeing 
 
195 
 
 the words hoyog, eldog, and Idea. 
 
 that it never leaves itself, not only never ceases energizing, 
 but is also the fountain and beginning of motion to all other 
 things. This can never either be bom or perish, or all the 
 heaven and earth collapsing must stand still, and never 
 again find a renewed source and origin of motion. For, 
 since it is evident that that which is self-moving is eternal, 
 we need not fear to say that this is the very essence and 
 reason (Xoyog) of soul, or, in other words, its very nature,” 
 cjg ravrrjg ovor]g (pvoeog i pvxVS* Phcedrus , 245, D. We 
 need not remind the reader that in this passage, as well as 
 in the tenth of The Laws, the term sow/ is taken collective- 
 ly for the oldest soul, as the source of all animation, and in- 
 cluding all other souls as in some way proceeding from it. 
 
 XXVII. 
 
 The Words Xoyog, eldog, and idea. 
 
 Page 28, Line 9. j uev, rrjv ovaiav ev 6e, rrjg ovoiag 
 
 rov Xoyov • ev 6e ovoya. “ One thing the essence, one 
 the X oyog, reason, definition, or notion of the essence, and 
 one the name.” A oyog, when rendered reason , is not to be 
 taken for the faculty of the mind to which we give that ap- 
 pellation. It more properly signifies the reason of a thing ; 
 the reason as existing in a thing, perceived, or, rather, un- 
 derstood by the mind, or the rationale. It is not the reason 
 why the thing exists, or the final cause, as we often use the 
 term, but, rather, the constituting cause , what Aristotle calls 
 to tl fjv elvat , that which makes anything what it is ; a, 
 particular modification of the general idea of existence. The 
 X oyog is that which is the object of the mind’s intellection 
 ( notio ) ; that which binds together (primary sense of Xeyco) 
 or gathers into a unity for the soul’s contemplation — that to 
 which alone the ovoga , or name, belongs, and without which 
 the thing itself is only an object of sensation. 
 
196 DISTINCTION BETWEEN Xoyog AND OVOpa. 
 
 In reading Plato, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
 between X oyog, eldog, and I6e a. The conclusion to which 
 we have arrived, but which we would state with some de- 
 gree of hesitation, is as follows : A oyog is the notion or 
 reason of a thing viewed in relation to the mind contem- 
 plating it, yet having an existence separate from such a 
 mind ; eldog , the notion in reference to the thing itself — as 
 the ev ev noXXolg, or one in many, residing in it ; Msa, the 
 same, regarded as self-subsisting, apart from mind, and also 
 from the individual things through which it is manifested. 
 The absolute existence of the last is the great question in 
 philosophy. In respect to the second term, which is the 
 one Aristotle is most fond of using, there is no real dis- 
 agreement between him and Plato. If we reject the third 
 hypothesis, there is still a wide difference between that, 
 philosophy which was common to Aristotle, Plato, and Ba- 
 con, and that which is now styled the system of Locke. 
 
 XXVIII. 
 
 Distinction between Xoyog and ovopa. 
 
 Page 30, Line 3. To eavro Kivelv cpqg Xoyov exeiv'rrjv 
 *lvtt)v ovoiav , rjVTcep rovvopa, o 6?] iravreg , ipvxrjv irpooa - 
 yopevopev. The order of this rather complicated sentence 
 would seem to be this : rrjv avrrjv ovoiav (/caff) rjvnep 
 
 rd ovopa TTpooayopevopev , o drj iravreg (jrpooayopevovoi) 
 xpvx'rj'Vy Xoyov exew — to eavro Kivelv. “ You say, then, 
 that that very essence, of which we predicate that name 
 which all men predicate, namely, vxrj , or soul , hath for 
 its Xoyog self-motion, or avroKivrjoig .” See the notes and 
 explanations accompanying the text. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be objected, that Plato is resting these 
 important positions on mere words, to which he assigns his 
 own arbitrary definitions or notions. But what is meant by 
 
distinction between Xoyog AND ovoya 197 
 
 the sneering expression, mere words , which is such a fa- 
 vourite with a certain class of modern declaimers ? What 
 are words — we speak not now of sounds or articulate enun- 
 ciations, dvopara or pryiara, but of the higher term Xoyoi 
 - — what are words, in this sense, but outward expressions 
 of the inward logical necessities of our own minds ? And 
 what can be higher proof for us than those affirmations, 
 which the immutable laws of our own souls compel us to 
 make, in respect to what is included or not included in a 
 certain idea ? Whatever belongs to the idea is necessary ; 
 so, on the other hand, whatever is necessary pertains to 
 an idea, and the exclusion of any part involves, for our 
 minds, a logical contradiction. 
 
 The naming of them, therefore, cannot be arbitrary, ex- 
 cept so far as the mere outward sound is concerned. There 
 are certain ideas which are not dependent on language, as 
 some of the nominalists of the school of Locke would hold, 
 but language on them. So far, human speech may be re- 
 garded as something supernatural, although its outward 
 dress or vocal forms may have been the result of conven- 
 tional or accidental usage, instead of any natural adapted- 
 ness of sound to sense. We may give to the A oyog, or no- 
 tion, any ovopa we please. We may call it 'ipvxrj , nvevfia, 
 nn» animus , anima , ©etj!, or soul ; we may etymolo- 
 gically associate this ovopa with any such sensible phe- 
 nomenon as we may fancy comes the nearest to the con- 
 ception, such as air, breaLli, fire, (Ether, &c. ; and in this 
 way the ovopa may continually change ; but the Xoyog is 
 not conventional. In all languages, even from the earliest 
 periods, it has had a distinct vocal sign — as much so as 
 that of body — and we expect, as a matter of course, to find 
 it in every tongue we may investigate. The idea which 
 calls for the name is implanted by God as one of the fixed 
 parts of our being. The metaphysical notion of soul is 
 self-motion, self-energy , avrordvyaiq. Of this notion we 
 
 R 2 
 
108 DISTINCTION BETWEEN Xoyog AND QVOfld. 
 
 cannot divest ourselves. Hence, after proving, even from 
 physical premises, that there must be somewhere self-mo - 
 tion , the mind attaches this Xoyog to its ovo[ia, and affirms 
 that this self-motion is soul, 'ipvx'rji ©etjl:, &c. — being the 
 same unchanging notion, whatever be the name — and that 
 this name, although affixed to the flowing and varying sen- 
 sible phenomenon from which it may have been etymologi- 
 cally derived, ultimately represents the immutable Xbyog 
 of which that sensible* phenomenon is the symbol. 
 
 * To dwell on this distinction between ovopa (or pfjpa) and loyog 
 at greater length, we may say, that the former simply represents a 
 sensible perception or action ( aloOrjTov ), or what Plato sometimes 
 calls eldolov ; the latter, a thought, an idea (idea), the intelligibile, in- 
 tellcctum, or votjtov , being no part of the sensible image or action, 
 but suggested or symbolized by it. All words, being a communica- 
 tion from mind to mind, through matter , must array the thought, du- 
 ring its passage, in the garments of the flesh, or, in other words, 
 must originally represent something sensible. The ovopa, then, in 
 reality, goes no farther than this sensible image or action, which it 
 primarily presents. There are but two stages in the process. The 
 Xoyoc, on the other hand, goes beyond this, and represents the intel- 
 ligibile, or votjtov, of which that image, action, or aiodrjTov, is but the 
 symbol. Here, then, are, in fact, three stages, and the eiduXov, or 
 action, which the word, as ovopa , presents, does itself re-present 
 something still behind it. The life of language is gone, when, with 
 respect to abstract terms, the primary sensible images have faded 
 away and become unknown, or, in other words, when this second 
 stage in the process has been left out, and the word stands for the 
 thought, in the same way that x and y represent quantities in algebra. 
 
 The same term may be regarded both as ovopa and Aoyof. For 
 example, the word circle, as a name, merely presents that round, 
 sensible image, which, as far as the elduhov is concerned, is the same 
 to the vision of an animal as of a Newton ; as Tioyog, it suggests that 
 cardinal idea, involving all the properties of the figure, which is pres- 
 ent to the mind of the mathematician, and of which this eldulov is 
 itself the word or representative. This cannot be better expressed 
 than in the language of Plato himself, if the Epistles can in any way 
 be regarded as genuine : kv/c^oc, to km to pkoov ek tuv eox^tov lgov 
 arrexov 7r avTrj, AOrOS av elrj ekelvov tyrrep GTpoyyvhov Kal tt Ept^epki 
 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN Xoyoq AND OVOJia. 199 
 
 It is not a vain support to rely upon language. We may 
 say, in the words which Plato puts into the mouth of Cra- 
 tylus, OlfJLCU fiev tlvcl dvvapiv elvat r\ dvOpomeiav , 
 
 rrjv 'depevrjv rd npdjra dvopara rolg irpaypaoiv. Cratylus, 
 438, C. As is shown in this last-cited dialogue, it follows, 
 in its origin and progress, an inward necessity, and must, 
 therefore, possess inward truth and necessary correctness.* * 
 It is a striking proof of its Divine origin (we mean in the 
 bounding, defining, classifying, and combining of ideas, and 
 not in the outward vocal sounds affixed to them), that the 
 atheist or materialist cannot use it as it is, but must change 
 the meaning of its terms to suit non-existent notions, to 
 which it never has been and never can be adapted, without 
 introducing confusion extending far beyond the particular 
 cases of amendment. He must have an entire new dialect, 
 and that, too, one which will ever destroy itself by the con- 
 tradictions, discords, and jarring inconsistencies which must* 
 exist between its parts, in every attempt to express the doc- 
 trine of death in words necessitated to glow with a life which 
 no efforts can wholly quench. 
 
 It has been well observed, that there is no language un- 
 der heaven in which the atheist, the pantheist, or the man 
 who denies the reality of moral distinctions, can talk five 
 minutes without a logical contradiction, or, in other words, 
 a war of ideas. Should they form a new one, and take the 
 utmost pains to adapt it to their philosophy of darkness, it 
 will be found to be built on a disarrangement of the neces- 
 sary and logical elements of speech, and must soon perish 
 by reason of its own innate contradictions. No such Babel, 
 formed in opposition to the high decree of Heaven, can ever 
 
 ovoya kcll kvkTioq. “ The word circle, representing the idea of equal- 
 ity in every direction, from extremities to a central point, is the lo- 
 yog of that to which roundness, and periphery, and circle, are the 
 names.” Plat., Epist ., vii., 342, B. Compare, also, the Theceteius , 
 201, 202; Sophista, 221, A. 
 
 * See Schleiermacher’s Introduction to the Cratylus. 
 
200 DISTINCTION BETWEEN Xoyog AND .OVOpa. 
 
 stand. The ideas of incorporeal substance, of eternal ves 
 ities, of moral distinctions, cannot be separated from lan 
 guage. The proof of soul and of God is stamped upon it as 
 indelibly as it is written on the firmament of heaven itself. 
 
 Some of the views we have been endeavouring to set 
 forth may be found admirably stated in Varro’s account of 
 the Platonic or Socratic philosophy, especially in respect to 
 the importance it attached to innate notions and words as 
 representatives of them, in Cicero, Acad. Poster ., viii. : 
 Tertia deinde philosophise pars, quse erat in ratione et in 
 disserendo sic tractabatur ; quanquam oriretur a sensibus, 
 tamen non esset judicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem 
 (vovg) volebant rerum esse judicem : solam censebant ido- 
 neam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod semper es- 
 set, ( ra del ovra ), simplex et unius modi ( del Kara ravra 
 Kal d)oavTG)g) et tale quale esset. Hanc illi ideam appella- 
 bant, jam a Platone ita nominatam : nos recte speciem (el- 
 dog) possumus dicere. Sensus autem omnes hebetes et 
 tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo eas res 
 quae subjectae sensibus viderentur, quse essent ita mobiles 
 (psovTa) et concitatse, ut nihil unquam unum esse constans, 
 ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur et Jluerent om- 
 nia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem (do^acr- 
 tov) appellabant. Scientiam autem nusquam esse cense- 
 bant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus (Aoyoi), qua 
 de causa dejinitiones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de 
 quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. Yerborum explicatio pro- 
 babatur, qua de causa quceque essent ita nominata , quam 
 etymologiam appellabant. Arguments et quasi rerum notis 
 ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id quod 
 explanari volebant, in qua tradebatur omnis dialectics dis 
 ciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae. 
 
IMPASSABLE CHASM BETWEEN SPIRIT AND MATTER 201 
 
 XXIX. 
 
 Infinite Distance between Self-motion and Motion by Impulse. 
 
 Impassable Chasm between Spirit and Matter. The Word 
 
 ttoXXogttj. Principle of Euphonic Attraction. 
 
 Page 30, Line 13. T Ap’ ovv oi>x erepov .... 7roA- 
 Xogttjv, k. r. A. This is a very complicated and awkward 
 sentence, with several anomalies, although the general 
 meaning is quite clear. The following is a very free ren- 
 dering : t£ Is not that motion, which takes place in one 
 thing by reason of another, but which never effects that 
 anything shall have motion in itself, by itself — is not such a 
 principle of motion, we say, justly styled second , and even 
 the most remote in degree of all such numbers, however 
 great, as any one might choose to use in the computation ? 
 being, in truth, that kind of motion or change which is pe- 
 culiar to a soulless body.” The order of the latter part (in 
 which, however, we are compelled to use ttoXXogtt] for 
 TToXXoGrrjv, in consequence of the change of position) would 
 be as follows : devrepa re nal noXXoGrrj togovtcov apiOytiv 
 6tt6gg)v rig dv fiovXoiro avr'fv dpiSpslv. The general 
 sense is, that motion by impulse, or the motion of matter, 
 although it may be next in order ( devrepa ), is yet almost 
 infinitely removed from self-motion, or the motion of soul ; 
 that is, by a distance greater than any limit assignable in 
 numbers. 
 
 It is another mode of saying that there is an impassable 
 chasm between them, by which they are forever parted and 
 assigned to two distinct worlds of being. Materializing 
 naturalists have ever been striving to fill up or bridge this 
 chasm, either by a direct connexion through some most sub- 
 tle matter, or imponderable agent, or occult quality, or by 
 some tertium quid which might identify in one common es- 
 sence these two motions, or, rather — the great object £>f all 
 
202 IDEAS OF CHANGE, CAUSE, AND SPIRIT, INSEPARABLE* 
 
 their strivings — to make the higher a result of the lower 
 These efforts, however, from the days of Plato to the pres- 
 ent, have been all in vain. The distance between the nat- 
 ural and the supernatural, or between the spiritual and ma- 
 terial, must ever remain impassable by any uniting essence. 
 The most aethereal motions of matter, even of that class of 
 substances which the ancients included under the general 
 names rrvp and alOrjp , and which the moderns have styled 
 imponderable agents, make no approach to the self-motion 
 or avroKLvrjOLg of Spirit. However subtile and attenuated 
 they may be, yet, as matter, and falling under that one idea • 
 of matter to which we have before alluded (page 142), the 
 laws of our minds (from which we cannot escape, and aside 
 from which there is, to us, no such thing as truth) compel 
 us to regard them as destitute of all motion and all property 
 of motion in themselves — in fact, as much so as the most 
 ponderous mass of lead or iron. Plato was deeply sensible 
 of the importance of this fundamental position, and there- 
 fore he labours so earnestly, even at the hazard of being 
 thought tedious and prolix, to maintain it. We have made 
 the remark before, and yet its importance and its adapted- 
 ness to our present subject will justly warrant its repetition. 
 This point being conceded to the atheist, namely, that self- 
 motion may in some way be an occult property of matter in 
 itself, or that the least and most aethereal atom in the uni- 
 verse could ever get in motion without the aid of that older 
 and higher something to which he has here assigned the 
 Xoyog and the ovopa ; or that there is the distance of a hair’s 
 breadth between the ultimate ideas of change , cause , and 
 the action of spirit — this, we say, being conceded to the 
 atheist, all is lost. If this can be conceived of, or is not at 
 war wkh the idea, or Adyo^, of matter, as given u§ by the 
 laws of our own minds, then may it also be conceived of as 
 having an occult adaptive property, and the conclusion can- 
 not be resisted, which would alike establish materialism in 
 
EUPHONIC ATTRACTION. 
 
 203 
 
 respect to man, and pantheism (which is, in fact, the same 
 doctrine) in respect to the universe. 
 
 UoaXogttjv, as it appears in this sentence, is a very pe- 
 culiar word. It signifies one of many, a fraction whose de- 
 nominator is a very large number, and hence its name — an 
 infinitesimal part. Compare the Philebus, 44, P. : ra 7ioA- 
 Xogtcl mc?i7]p6rrjTL ; where it is put in direct contrast with 
 otckrjpoTara, as an infinitesimal fraction opposed to a su- 
 perlative. There is also a peculiar grammatical anomaly 
 in this word. According to the order of its construction in 
 the sentence, it should be tcoXXogt? /, since it regularly re- 
 fers to devrepa , and must be taken in connexion with it. It 
 is, however, made accusative, in consequence of its position 
 after the infinitive, apcOpelv , and by the attraction of avrrjv. 
 This differs from the ordinary case of attraction which ex- 
 ists between the relative and antecedent. It may be styled 
 euphonic, because it seems to affect words solely for the 
 sake of euphony, or, rather, homceophony, and on the mere 
 ground of contiguity in location, although very remotely re- 
 lated in all other respects ; so much so, that, in this way, 
 great violence is sometimes done to the true grammatical 
 construction. There is no need of resorting to any various 
 reading, or to any conjectural emendation. We have no 
 doubt, from the location of the word, that Plato wrote ttoX- 
 XoGrrjv, however harsh the construction may appear to us. 
 
 The position of togovtov also seems very awkward, and 
 yet (although we cannot well keep it in that place when 
 we adopt the order for a literal translation) it is easy to see 
 that, by standing where it does, it has a much stronger em- 
 phasis than though it had occurred in the beginning of the 
 clause ; as though we should thus paraphrase it in English : 
 “ However great the number , carry it as high as you please , 
 still by so much (togovtov) is it remote ,” &c. This princi- 
 ple of local or euphonic attraction, although it sometimes 
 interferes with grammatical smoothness, is undoubtedly in 
 
204 
 
 ATHEISTIC ARGUMENT AGAINST DESIGN. 
 
 accordance with the genius of the language ; and no true 
 scholar can endure the attempts which are sometimes made 
 to divest it of this peculiarity by means of pretended emen- 
 dations. - 
 
 XXX. 
 
 Argument of Ancient Atheists , that Apparent Evidences of 
 Design were only Evidences of Subsequent Accommodation. 
 Things {they said) older than Knowledge of Things , and 
 therefore older than Soul. 
 
 Page 31, Line 8. Tporcot, 6rj nai ijOrj nai (3ovXrjaecg teal 
 XoyLopoi Tcporepa aoparov, ti. r. X. The full force of this 
 unnot be appreciated unless we keep in mind the objection 
 against which it was directed. The ancient atheists said 
 that soul was the offspring or result of matter, and conse- 
 quently younger. Hence what theists would call evidences 
 of design , or of mind’s preceding matter, they would regard 
 as merely subsequent accommodations to an accidental ex- 
 isting state of things, which, had it been any other, would, 
 in like manner, have drawn after it the only uses and ac- 
 commodations to which it could be adapted ; and which, in 
 that case, would have carried w T ith them like appearances 
 of previous design, or, as Lucretius has most concisely ex- 
 pressed it, 
 
 Nil adeo natum est in corpore, ut uti 
 Possemus, sed quod natum est, id procreat usum. 
 
 Lucretius , iv., 832. 
 
 Thus, for example, they would say, in accordance with 
 their theory, that teeth were not made of a certain shape 
 with the previous design that the animal should eat herbs, 
 but that, because they happened to be of a certain form (and 
 there was no reason in themselves why they should be of 
 one form rather than another), therefore nature applied them 
 
ATHEISTIC ARGUMENT AGAINST DESIGN. 205 
 
 9 
 
 to the use, and the only use, adapted to their accidental 
 structure. Again, if certain bodies had, in the course of 
 ages, received from tv%7] elongated projections from the 
 main trunk, or an attenuated and flexible shape, or a round- 
 ed form, in all these cases, they would have said, and did 
 say, that that animation residing in them (which was itself 
 but a junior art, the production of an older tyvocg ), when it 
 found itself thus circumstanced , made the best of its condi- 
 tion, by accommodating the one to a walking, the other to 
 a crawling, and the other to a rolling locomotion. So, also, 
 had they been acquainted with some of the arguments of 
 our modern natural theology, they would have denied that 
 the revolution of the earth on its axis was adjusted to twen- 
 ty-four hours, with any design that such a period should 
 correspond to designed circumstances in the alternating 
 • changes which occur in the economy of the animal and 
 vegetable tribes. On the contrary, they would have con- 
 tended that, in the eternal and fortuitous dance of tv%7], the 
 earth having received such an accidental impulse as just 
 produced the aforesaid period, nature, in time, accommoda- 
 ted to it the intervals for the exercise and relaxation of hu- 
 man bodies, together with „all the periodical vicissitudes 
 which seem to have relation to such a revolution ; and that, 
 had this accidental period been of any other length, the 
 same adapting (pvcug and rv^r] would, long before this, have 
 brought all the earthly economy into perfect harmony with it. 
 
 This argument, of which we have given an imperfect 
 outline, they carried to great length, and it is easy to see 
 that it is capable of a most extensive and subtle application. 
 It is difficult, if not impossible, for any one who admits the 
 doctrine of occult properties to any extent in matter, to give 
 a direct answer to the objections drawn from it ; and yet we 
 believe that not a vestige of any skeptical doubt which it 
 may produce can remain upon the mind, after reading Pa- 
 ley’s most valuable work on natural theology. As a specu- 
 
 S 
 
206 THINGS OLDER THAN KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS. 
 
 lative argument, this doctrine of subsequent accommodation, 
 as opposed to a previous designed use, may have a formi- 
 dable appearance, but it vanishes on a close observation of 
 nature, because the soul, in such observation, instead of re- 
 ally relying on a 'posteriori facts, cannot divest itself of that 
 a priori view which believes in design, and looks for de- 
 sign, and carries along the preconception of design as in- 
 volved in those ideas of God and truth with which it enters 
 upon the investigation. 
 
 Plato, as we have seen, overcomes the difficulty by be- 
 ginning with motion instead of evidences of design ; thence, 
 from this more remote point of view, proving the higher an- 
 tiquity of soul, then of the acts or exercises of soul, one of 
 which is /3ov?i7](7Lg , purpose , or design . 
 
 Another subtle objection from this same school was, that 
 knowledge, being the knowledge of things , must, therefore,, 
 have been posterior to things ; hence that mind was young- 
 er than matter. In this they, of course, rejected the doc- 
 trine of any other knowledge than that of things, or that the 
 mind or intellect contained, in any sense, its own ideas or 
 intelligibles {yoryra) ; making it to be all from without by 
 way of impression from the external world.* If this be 
 
 * Should it be said that the objection may be stated in the same 
 way in respect to ideal or eternal truth, and that there must have 
 been vo7]T& before vovg , or truth before knowledge, the only reply is, 
 that God is at the same time, and from eternity, both vovq and votjtov , 
 intclligens and inlelligibile , or intellectual. It is the absolute neces- 
 sity of some such view which suggested to the most profound 
 minds of antiquity the idea of a plurality in the Divine nature, a dis- 
 tinction of two hypostases, at least, with a third, ipvxv, to which 
 they were related, and in which they were united. Instead of being 
 contrary to reason, it was the highest result to which she arrived 
 (if the truth w r as not rather obtained from some primitive revela- 
 tion), as her only refuge against the cheerless and incomprehensible 
 conception of an eternal, solitary monadity, or the equally difficult 
 conception of a necessary, eternal, outward universe, towards which 
 the Divine love and the Divine intelligence might be directed. 
 
PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 
 
 207 
 
 atheism, as it most assuredly is, when held in relation to 
 the Divine Mind, what shall we think of the corresponding 
 doctrine when applied to the human soul ? If we start from 
 the conclusions to which such inquiries lead us, it should 
 be borne in mind, that the only possible defence against 
 them must be found in that ideal philosophy which supposes 
 a knowledge belonging to mind, as mind , whether it be Di- 
 vine or human, entirely independent of things , or of any out- 
 ward world. The above atheistic objection is also express- 
 ed by Lucretius, with far more of poetry than piety : 
 
 Exemplum porro gignundis rebus, et ipsa 
 Notities hominum Divis unde insita primum, 
 
 Quid vellent facere, ut scirent, animoque viderent'? 
 
 Quove modo est unquam vis cognita principiorum, 
 
 Quidnam inter sese permutato ordine possent, 
 
 Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi 1 
 
 Lucretius, lib. v., 132. 
 
 XXXI. 
 
 Platonic Doctrine of the Evil Principle. Of ’ AvdjK ? /, or 
 
 Necessity. 
 
 Page 32, Line 2. A volv yev ye irov eXarrov yrjdev nOti- 
 yev, Trjy re evepyendog real rrjg ravavrla dvvayevjjg e^ep. 
 ya&oOai — “ Nothing less than two, at least, the one that 
 does us good, and the one that is able to do the contrary.” 
 We have here presented, in the most unequivocal terms, 
 that grand defect in Plato’s theology, which occasionally 
 mars, by its presence, almost every part of his otherwise 
 noble system. It is most clear, from this and other passages 
 in his dialogues, that he held the doctrine of two uncreated 
 principles or souls, one good (or the benefactor, as he styles 
 him), the other evil. Neither Plato, however, nor Zoroas- 
 ter, can be charged with the absurdity of believing in two 
 Supremes. They avoided this by running into the incon- 
 
208 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 
 
 sistency of supposing that the evil principle, although un- 
 created, was under the dominion of the good, constantly 
 controlled, and ultimately to be completely conquered by it. 
 This doctrine, likewise, made harsh discord with almost 
 every other part of his philosophy, especially his views of 
 the origin of the universe, as set forth in the Timaeus, where 
 no mention is made of a distinct evil soul ; and yet, when 
 we examine the matter closely, it is difficult to see how he 
 could have come to any other conclusion. Plato had no 
 other guide than reason, aided, perhaps, by a dim and cor- 
 rupted tradition of primitive truth ; and reason can account 
 in no other way for the existence of evil, without charging 
 it upon God as its immediate author. It is evident, from 
 the manner in which he ever speaks on this subject, that 
 he had a deep conviction of the essential goodness of the 
 Deity, and that he felt himself sorely pressed by the diffi- 
 culty of reconciling with this goodness the evil which he 
 saw everywhere existing in the world. On this point, 
 compare what he says in the second book of the Republic , 
 379, B., C. : ovuovv ayaOog 6 ye tieog rep ovti re , teat Xek- 
 tsov ovro) — “ Wherefore is not God really good, and must 
 we not thus ever affirm?” "0 6e ye p?]dev nanov iroiel, 
 ovd' av rivog eh] nanov ’AJTION. ovk apa uavrcov ye acri- 
 ov to ayaOov, aXXa rcbv pev ev exovrcov alriov , tcov be 
 nancov avatnov. ovd ’ apa 6 deog IIANTI2N av elrj ’AJTI02, 
 cog oi noXXol Xeyovoiv • dAA’ oXiycov pev rolg avOpamocg 
 alriog , iroXXcbv 6e avalnog • noXi) yap eXdrrco rayaQa tgjv 
 uancov rjplv — “ But he doeth nothing evil (evidently taking 
 nanbv here in the sense of physical evil), nor could he be 
 the cause of anything evil. The Good cannot, then, be the 
 author of all things, but only of those that are good, while 
 he is never the author of the bad. God cannot, therefore, 
 be the author of all things, as the many say, but only of 
 few things is he the cause to men, &c .,for our good things 
 are much fewer in number than our evil things .” He does 
 
PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 20G 
 
 not, in this place of the Republic, directly speak of the evil 
 principle, but leaves it to be plainly inferred : Tow 6e na- 
 n6)V aXXa arra del tyrelv rd atria , dXX' ov rov 'deov — 
 
 Of the evils, then, must we seek some other cause, and 
 not the Deify.” After this, he proceeds to censure Homer 
 for his myth of the two casks which lie in the court of Jove, 
 one filled with good and the other with evil, from which he 
 dispenses to mortals severally as he will.* When we read 
 the impressive application of this great truth which Achilles 
 makes to the case of Priam, we cannot help recognising 
 the poet as far more orthodox than the philosopher, and as 
 coming much nearer to the true teaching of revelation. He 
 was so, however, because, instead of yielding his mind to 
 the perplexing and insurmountable difficulties which attend 
 every merely speculative view of the matter, he simply 
 gives utterance to one of those universal and unvarying sen- 
 timents of the human soul, which could have come from no 
 other source than a tradition of the primeval fall and the 
 woes consequent upon it. 
 
 Revelation removes this difficulty respecting the origin 
 of evil, not by solving the mystery, and bringing it down to 
 the level of our understandings, but by imposing silence 
 upon reason, in her attempt to investigate a subject alto- 
 gether beyond her powers. The Bible does not shrink 
 from the solemn declaration, I form the light and I create 
 the darkness ; I make peace and I create evil ; I the Lord 
 do ALL these things and yet, at the same time, it sternly 
 
 A oiol yap re ttlOoi KaraKeiarai hv A log ovdei, 
 dopov, ola dtdoGi, nantiv, erepog de, eucov. 
 d [lev k ’ apfii^ag 6oltj Zevg, k. t. X. — Iliad , xxiv., 527. 
 
 t Isaiah , xlv., 7. There can be no doubt, from the mention here 
 of the light and the darkness , and from the connexion of this remark- 
 able declaration with the prophecy respecting Cyrus, that there must 
 have been intended a special reference to the Zoroastrian or Persian 
 doctrine. 
 
 S 2 
 
210 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 
 
 forbids the impious thought, that the Divine Essence can 
 hold any communication with sin. Thou art of purer eyes 
 than to behold iniquity. Evil shall not dwell with thee. The 
 caviller may say that this is cutting, instead of untying the 
 Gordian knot ; and that, according to this, revelation teach- 
 es the apparent contradiction, that God creates evil, and yet 
 is not the author of sin, without which there could be no 
 evil. It is even so. There is a contradiction to our un- 
 derstandings, but it is a contradiction to which we must 
 submit, or receive all the contradictions, mysteries, absurd 
 ities, and total darkness of atheism. It has been well ob- 
 served, that this great difficulty lies, in some form, at the 
 very threshold of every system which has the least title to 
 be styled religious, in order to teach us that, some things 
 must be received as matters of faith. This, instead of be- 
 ing at war with reason, is, in fact, its highest dictate. It 
 presents an incipient faith as the only condition on which 
 everything else is to be understood, and declares that we 
 are shut up to it by something higher and stronger than 
 reason itself, even the necessities of our moral being . 
 
 Let those who, in such a case as this, will not take the 
 Bible as their only guide, devise, if they can, a better sys- 
 tem than the one which Plato and Zoroaster felt themselves 
 compelled to adopt, although they must have been well 
 aware of the difficulties, and war of ideas, or first princi- 
 ples, in which it involved them. They could not believe 
 in two Supremes on account of the logical contradiction, 
 and yet, if they held that the evil soul was inferior to, and 
 capable of being controlled by, the Good (as they unques- 
 tionably did), the same old objection comes back with all 
 its force. The position to which our philosopher manifests 
 so strong a repugnance is only so changed as to make God 
 the permissive , instead of the positive author of evil. Small 
 consolation in this ; especially when taken in connexion 
 with that melancholy declaration just quoted by us from the 
 
TLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 211 
 
 second book of the Republic, that “ our good things are 
 much fewer in number than our evil things.” 
 
 It should be remarked, however, that Plato’s evil princi- 
 ple differed, in some most important respects, from the evil 
 spirit made known to us in the Bible. The former, al- 
 though recognised by him as a 'ipvxv, or soul, was not so 
 much a moral or spiritual, as a physical power. It was 
 the dark, foolish, disorderly, intractable, chaotic, evil spirit 
 of matter (if we may use so paradoxical a term), on which 
 the Good God was ever exerting an influence, in bringing 
 it from chaos into harmony, although that influence was 
 ever resisted, and sometimes exercised with great difficulty. 
 It is to this he alludes in the Timaeus, although in this lat- 
 ter work we find no trace of that animation and personality 
 which is assigned to the evil principle in the tenth of The 
 Laws. In the Timaeus, too, although possessed of motion 
 and a sort of blind activity, it is a hinderance, or an obstacle, 
 rather than an enemy : BovXrjOeig yap 6 $ ebg ayaOa psv 
 navra , (f)Xavpov 6s pr]6sv elvat , ovro) 6f] rtdv ooov rjv opa- 
 rov napaXadcov oi>x rfOvx^ v ciyov , aXXa tuvovpevov* rrXrjp- 
 psXtig teal ardteredg, Kara 6vva\av slg rd^tv avro rjyaysv 
 etc rrjg ara^iag. Qsjug yap our’ rjv ovr ’ son T12I ’APIU- 
 T£2I 6pav aXXo TrXrjv to KAAAI2T0N — “For God, wish- 
 ing that all things should be good, and that there should be 
 
 * On this and some few similar expressions in the Timaeus has 
 been grounded the argument for the common position, that Plato 
 held to the eternity of matter, and that it possessed a principle cf 
 its own, independent of the creating and constantly energizing pow- 
 er of the Deity. Should it be admitted that our philosopher is justly 
 chargeable with inconsistency, still we contend that the positions 
 assumed in the Laws in respect to the inertness of matter, and the 
 superior antiquity of soul, should have the greater weight, inasmuch 
 as the extracts from the Timaeus are merely incidental declarations, 
 whereas the latter form the very heart and substance of one of his 
 most studied and elaborately-prepared arguments. See farther, on 
 this subject, Note L., On the Ancient Doctrine , Dc Nihilo Nihil jit. 
 
212 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 
 
 nothing bad, thus taking in hand the visible (or material), 
 never at rest, but ever moving about in a strange and disor- 
 derly manner, as far as he could reduced it from disorder 
 to order. For it is not permitted (ov tiefug, it is morally 
 impossible) for the Best Being to do anything else than the 
 best” Timceus, 30, A. So, also, in that trinity about which 
 so much has been said, and which but faintly appears in 
 any parts of his authentic dialogues, the or third hy- 
 
 postasis, seems to be rather a benign physical influence, 
 than to make any approach to that renovating moral power 
 which is revealed in the Scriptures. If we should dare to 
 institute any comparison, we would say that it has more 
 resemblance to the nn of Genesis, i., 2, and Psalms, civ., 
 30, than to the Ttvevfia of Paul and John. 
 
 The truth is, that, on this great and difficult subject of 
 the existence and origin of evil, the mind of Plato seems to 
 have wavered, and to have had different opinions at differ- 
 ent times. Here he very briefly, yet very distinctly, avows 
 his belief in a 'personal evil soul . In the Republic he leaves 
 it as a matter of inference, contenting himself with the dec- 
 laration, that God is the author of good, and of good only, 
 while, at the same time, he asserts that the evil predomi- 
 nates, at least in the present state. In the Timaeus, it is a 
 lower order of being, the dark and chaotic principle of mat- 
 ter, possessing something of a positive character, yet still 
 without anything psychical or animate in its nature. In the 
 Politicus, or Statesman, there is a view, in some of its fea- 
 tures, allied to this, yet capable of being resolved into what 
 modern theologians would call a mere permission of evil, 
 as a negative principle, deriving its power from occasional 
 withdrawals of the Divine presence and superintendence. 
 This we gather from that most singular myth, in which he 
 represents the universe as subject to alternate revolutions 
 of immense length, during one of which good and perfection 
 predominate, while, in the other, although the good, for a 
 
PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 213 
 
 long time, exerts an influence, through habit, even after the 
 withdrawal of the Divine Presence, yet evil and disorder, 
 being introduced by degrees, increase more and more, until, 
 finally, Old Chaos comes again, and total destruction would 
 ensue, did not God once more resume the long-abandoned 
 helm. It is a portion of Plato’s works on which but little 
 attention has been bestowed, and yet, in consequence of its 
 always having seemed to us to possess a deep theological 
 interest, we give the passage to our readers at some length, 
 and in a very free version : “ God himself, at one time, 
 guides this universe (fvyi Todrjyel), and turns it round. 
 Again, he abandons it to itself, when the periods of its des- 
 tined times have received their full complement ; when, be- 
 ing animate, and having had wisdom implanted in it from 
 him who harmonized it at the beginning, it commences of 
 its own accord to move in a contrary direction ; and this 
 tendency to a retrograde motion arises from an innate ne- 
 cessity of its nature. For to be ever in the same relations 
 [nard ravra ), and uniform, and the same, pertains alone to 
 those things which are most divine ; but the nature of mat- 
 ter has no share in this dignity. What we name, therefore, 
 the heavens or the universe ( ovpavov real nooyov), hath par- 
 taken of many blessed things or qualities from him who 
 generated it ; still, it has communion with matter, and, on 
 this account, it is impossible that it should be altogether 
 exempt from change, although, as far as it is capable, it 
 moves on in one regular course, in the same and according 
 to the same relations. It is in this way that it gets this 
 property of unrolling, or rolling back, consisting, at first, in 
 the slightest conceivable change or parallax of its previous 
 motion. For anything always to turn itself is impossible, 
 except for Him who is the supreme controller of all moving 
 things ; but for this Being to act in a changeable manner, 
 or to turn things, now in this direction, and now in the con- 
 trary, is impossible ( ov fiefur, is morally impossible ). For 
 
214 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 
 
 all these reasons must we say, that the world neither turns 
 itself forever, nor that it is forever turned by God in con- 
 trary circuits. N either must we suppose that two Gods * with 
 opposing purposes conduct its revolutions {prjp avrov orpe- 
 (j)£tv eavrov del, prjr' av oXov imo deov orpecpeodai del 6 lt- 
 rd g real evavrtag TrepLaycoyag, j upp av 6vo rive tied) (f>po- 
 vovvre eavrotg evavria Grpecpeiv avrov), but, as has been 
 said (and which, in fact, is the only supposition left), that, 
 at one time, it is guided by a Divine cause ; during which 
 period it receives again the acquired power of life, and an 
 immortality not innate, but imparted to it from the Demiur- 
 gus ; and then, again, that it goes by itself, being abandon- 
 ed so long, that even many ten thousand years may be oc- 
 cupied in the revolution.” Politicus, 269, P. 
 
 The myth then proceeds to describe the alternate pe- 
 riods. The first, or that which is under the direct care of 
 the Deity, is represented as the golden age, during which 
 time the earth produces all things spontaneously, without 
 cultivation, and, in general, the order of all things is from 
 death to life.f This was the reign of Saturn. Good was 
 
 * This is in direct opposition to the doctrine laid down in The 
 Laws, where he maintains that there are at least two souls, one 
 good and the other bad, occupied in the movements of the universe. 
 Here, however, he seems to be very much averse to such an opin- 
 ion, as inconsistent and unnatural. Some would say that this fur- 
 nishes conclusive evidence that the one or the other, or both of 
 these dialogues, are spurious. If such an argument could be held 
 legitimate, the conclusion would certainly be against the Politicus, 
 since the doctrine of The Laws was followed by all the subsequent 
 Platonists, and regarded as an undoubted position of their master ; 
 but, in truth, instead of invalidating either, it only show’s how a great 
 mind wavered on the deepest question in philosophy and theology. 
 
 f It might, however, seem, to some, to be rather a species of in- 
 verted death, as during this period the order of all things is so chan- 
 ged, that the old commence a process of return to the vigour of mid- 
 dle age, manhood returns to youth, youth to boyhood, boyhood to 
 infancy, infancy to entire disappearance from the stage of life. In 
 
PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 215 
 
 predominant, although there is no little confusion in the ac- 
 count which this splendid myth, in other respects so clear, 
 gives of this period. It at last, however, comes to an end, 
 and when the complement of the times had been filled up, 
 and the change must take place, then, it is said, the Divine 
 Pilot , letting go the helm , retires to his secret place of obser- 
 vation , and destiny and innate tendency are left to turn hack 
 the revolutions of the world : tots 6i) tov rravTog 6 [isv nv- 
 depvrjTpg , olov rrrjdakiGiv olanog acpepevog slg tt)v clvtov 
 TT spLCJTTrjv aTTsoT?) • tov 6s dij uoopov rtdXtv dvsoTpscj)SV 
 Kipappsv7] ts uai ^vpcpVTog smOvp'ia , 272, E. At the same , 
 time, the other A aipovsg, to whom, as presiding divinities, 
 or angels,* -the various parts of the universe had been al- 
 lotted in subordination to the Supreme Ruler, hear the sig- 
 nal, and retire from their respective provinces. Then com- 
 mences the predominance of evil. Nature, through all her 
 works, gives signs of wo. First, a strange tremour or com- 
 motion ( osiopbg TTohvg) is felt in every part of the aban- 
 doned world. After a while, however, to employ Plato’s 
 imagery, the vessel ceases from the tumultuous surging 
 which at first ensues, and enjoying a calm, gets at length 
 into the new course in which it is destined to proceed. 
 The world goes on for a season with some degree of regu- 
 larity, in consequence of influences being yet exerted by 
 those laws and principles to which it had been accustomed 
 in that previous state when it was directly under the Divine 
 
 continuation of the same wild and strange fancy, the dead are said 
 to come out of their graves, and thus to be born again from the 
 earth : ek, rtiv TETETievTrjtiOTov av, kel/j,£v(*)v 6e ev yy } tt a?uv ekel %vvig- 
 rafjLEVovg Kal avafiiooicopEVOvg, ETTEodaL ry rpoTrrj — ovvavanvK?iOVfj,Evrjg 
 slg Tavavrca rf/g ysvicrEog. We can hardly help thinking that in this 
 singular myth may be traced the rudiments of an ancient doctrine 
 of a resurrection. The general idea intended by Plato is clear 
 enough, and yet so much confusion rests upon the details, that it 
 sometimes is difficult to decide to which period they in fact belong. 
 
 * See Note XXXIV., on the Platonic Doctrine of the Animation of 
 
216 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 
 
 care. # By slow degrees the former motion, with the order 
 and harmony by which it was accompanied, is diminished, 
 until, having passed the minimum point, it makes a transi- 
 tion to the contrary direction with a constantly accelerated 
 momentum. 
 
 It is then that the greatest deteriorations and corruptions 
 take place ; first, of the vegetable, next, of the animal 
 world, and, finally, of the human race, until here and there 
 a small and wretched remnant alone survive. The old har- 
 mony, the remembrance of which had not before been en- 
 tirely quenched, is now utterly extinct. The former laws 
 of nature are all reversed, until, finally, when on the very 
 verge of utter ruin — tot’ TjSrj o Beog, naOopCov avrov ev dno- 
 otatg bvra, KTjdopevog Iva p?) ^Bipaodelg imo rapa)(f\g bta- 
 XvOelg elg rov rrjg avopotorprog auetpov ovra rorrov dv'qj 
 ttclXlv eepedpog avrov rcbv nrjdaXiojv ytyvopevog , ra voorj- 
 oavra teal XvOevra orpBifjag , Koopel re teal enavopOtiv, aOa- 
 varov avrov nal ayrjpG) anspya^eraL — “ God, beholding it 
 in great extremity, and being concerned, lest, being over- 
 whelmed in disorder and utterly dissolved, it should plunge 
 again into the limitless, formless region of dissimilitude and 
 chaos, once more seats himself at the helm ( from which he 
 had before returned to his secret place of observation , elg ri)v 
 avrov rrepiOJTcrjv), and having arrested its weak and dissolv- 
 ed parts in their course to ruin, arranges it again in order, 
 rectifies it, and thus renders it immortal,” 273, D. 
 
 the Heavenly Bodies ; and Note LXVII., on the Platonic Doctrine of 
 tlic Demons or Genii. 
 
 * Or, in the expressive language of the original, ttjv tov narpog 61- 
 daxrjv anopvrjfiovEvuv dg dvvapiv — “ Still, as well as it could, remem- 
 bering the teaching of its father.” The allusion seems to be to the 
 fable of Phaeton striving in vain to remembe^and follow the direc- 
 tions given him by his father, when he so rashly undertook to drive 
 the chariot of the Sun. 
 
 t Lest it should plunge again into the limitless place of dissimilitude. 
 That is, back again to old chaos. The language strongly ceJJ? fo 
 mind the JiriDl n °f Genesis, i 2 . 
 
217 
 
 of avdynTj , or necessity. 
 
 We find occasionally in Plato, especially in the Timaeus, 
 mention made of dvdynr] , or necessity , as some strong and 
 apparently opposing power, on which the Divine energy 
 was constantly exercised, not so much in directly overcom- 
 ing, as in controlling and directing it to the accomplishment 
 of the Divine purposes. Thus, in the Timaeus, 48, A., he 
 speaks of the generation of the world having proceeded 
 from the combined operation of vovg and avdynr] , mind and 
 necessity. To the former, however, he ascribes a species 
 of authority, yet of a persuasive rather than of a violent na- 
 ture : Nov 6s avdyrcrjg dp^ovrog, rep rtdduv avrrjv rtiv 
 yeyvopevov ra nXelora enl to /3sXtigtov ayetv , ravr'q 6i 9 
 avdyurjg rjTTCjpevrjg vi to iruOovg epeppovog, ovro) % vvioraro 
 rode to nav — “ But, since Mind rules Necessity, by per- 
 suading her to bring to the best results the most of things 
 as they are generated ; thus, in this way, through necessity 
 overcome by rational persuasion, this universe received its 
 construction.” 
 
 By dvdyfcrj, here, Plato does not mean his evil soul , nei- 
 ther does he generally intend any physical necessity ari- 
 sing from motion as a property of matter (although he and 
 the Greek poets* do sometimes apply the term to what we 
 style the laws of nature, and it has something of this aspect 
 in the present passage from the Timaeus), but rather a met- 
 aphysical or logical necessity, a necessity existing in the 
 idea of a thing, in its constituting cause , or that which makes 
 it what it is — in its Xoyog , or notion — in short, a necessity 
 of the mind, by which it is compelled to include certain 
 principia in the very definition of any existing or conceiv- 
 able thing; and hence he employs in respect to it such 
 terms as rcdOecv, and iretOovg epeppovog, words which would 
 have little or no meaning as applied to a purely physical 
 necessity. 
 
 * As, for example, Euripides, Troades, 893 : 
 
 Zfik, elr y avayurj tyvoeoQ , elre vovq pporuv. 
 
 T 
 
218 of avdyicrj, on necessity. 
 
 For example, in the idea of matter, or rather body, im- 
 penetrability necessarily enters. Hence, also, the impos- 
 sibility that two bodies should ever occupy the same space ; 
 which we have shown (page 143) to be more of a logical 
 than a physical necessity. God cannot make matter with- 
 out this. It is no more irreverent thus to speak, than to say 
 that God cannot make matter or body, which is not body, 
 or in any case go contrary to the idea of anything, and yet 
 have it remain the same. Motion is not a necessary prop- 
 erty of matter ; and when we say this, we mean that there 
 is no law of our minds, as in the above cases, which com- 
 pels us to predicate it of matter. Other species of logical 
 necessity (that is, a necessity in the ideas of things ) are the 
 mathematical avdyuai. Hence, the laws of motion, being 
 partly mathematical and partly physical, are necessary, so 
 far as they partake of the former character. It is not ne- 
 cessary that bodies should attract each other in the inverse 
 ratio of the squares of their distances : had it been the or- 
 dinance of God, it would have been in the ratio of their 
 cubes. When, however, the Deity establishes such a mo- 
 tion as a fact, it must conform to all the necessities of num- 
 bers involved in, and which grow out of, the first simple 
 formula or statement of the law. So, also, in morals, the 
 idea of good may, perhaps, necessarily include the contin- 
 gency of evil ; sin may be necessarily associated, in idea, 
 with misery. In all such cases, Plato would speak of the 
 Deity not as violently overcoming necessity, but as ruling, 
 directing, controlling it, to bring about the purposes of his 
 moral government, or, in other words, using towards it “ a 
 kind of rational persuasion.” 
 
MOTION OF VOVg COMPARED TO THAT OF A SPHERE. 219 
 
 XXXII. 
 
 Platonic Analogy between the Motion ofNovg and ^v%7] ana 
 that of a Sphere, or of the Heavens. 
 
 Page 34, Line 5. E l pev rj t-vpnaoa ovpavov bdog apa 
 nal (popa vov Kivrjoei real nepiepopa Kai Xoyiopolg opoiav 
 (pvotv ex et Kai %vyyevtig epxsrai, k. t. A. — “ If the whole 
 way and course of the heavens hath a nature similar to the 
 course, and period, and reasonings of mind, and proceeds 
 in a kindred manner, we must certainly affirm that the best 
 soul ( [rrjv evepyenda) takes care of the universe.” We 
 may compare with this the expressions, nepiodog vov — 7T£- 
 piodog 'ipvx'ijg, which occur so frequently in the Timaeus : 
 Tdf rr\g aOavdrov ipv%$jg nepiodovg evedovv elg emppvrov 
 nal anoppyrov owpa. Timceus, 43, A. So, also, 39, where 
 there is the same allusion in the expression, rj rijg ptag nal 
 (ppompojrdrrjg KVK^rjoecog nepiodog. 
 
 After the description of the visible animal (£g3op oparov), 
 or material universe in which the new-created soul of the 
 world was to reside, he thus says : KivrjOiv yap anevetpev 
 avTtp rrjv rov odparog pa’kiora oiKeiav, rcov ejira rr\v nepi 
 vovv nai (ppovrjoiv paXiora ovoav. did drj Kara ravra, ev 
 rep avrep Kai ev avrep rtepiayayebv avro, enotrjoe kvkXco 
 K ivelodai orpeepopevov — “ For he gave to it a peculiar mo- 
 tion of its own, namely, that one of the seven which has 
 the nearest relation (or analogy) to mind and wisdom. 
 Wherefore, guiding it so as to move always in the same 
 relations, in the same place, and within itself, he made it 
 revolve in a circle.” Timceus , 33, P. We have the same 
 idea a little farther on in this tenth book of The Laws, page 
 35, line 15 : To Kara ravra diyrtov Kai ehoavreog Kai ev tgj 
 avrep, Kai nepi ra avrd, Kai npog ra avrd , Kai eva Xoyov 
 Kai ra%iv piav apepeo Kivelodai Xeyovreg, vovv, rrjv re ev 
 kvi (pepopev7]v KivrjOiv, oepatpag evropvov aneiKaopeva <po - 
 
220 MOTION OF vovg COMPARED TO THAT OF A SPHERE. 
 
 palg, ovtt dv nore, n. r. X. — “ If we say this, namely, that 
 mind and motion in one, &c., being both of them capable 
 of being likened to the revolutions of a sphere, do both of 
 them ever move Kara ravrd , preserving the same relations, 
 in a uniform manner, in the same, around the same, and 
 according to one analogy and one order, we should not in- 
 stitute an inferior or imperfect comparison.” 
 
 This was one of the favourite speculations of Plato, and 
 is kept prominently in view in the Timaeus ; so much so, 
 that, without attending to it, it is impossible to understand 
 many passages in that most profound, yet strange and diffi- 
 cult dialogue. He there describes the soul of the world as 
 being constituted of two essences — rrjg apep'iGrov nal del 
 nard ravrd exovG^g ovoiag nal rr\g av rrepl rd G&para 
 yiyvo\ievT]g pepiGrr\g — the one conversant with eternal, un 
 changeable, and necessary truth, vorjGei pera Xoyov nepi- 
 Xiyrrov ; the other, with facts or phenomena, or, as he here 
 styles them in The Laws, the second-working motions of 
 matter, physical laws, or second causes. Corresponding to 
 these, he frequently speaks of two periods, which, in very 
 strange phraseology, he describes as rj rfjg ravrov (f>vGeojg 
 nal rrjg rov erepov. The first he likens to spherical or 
 circular motion (<£ epopevrjv ev evi), and finds its symbolical 
 expression in the steady, unvarying, and eternal revolution 
 of the sphere of the fixed stars or highest heavens (wheth- 
 er regarded as phenomenal or not makes, in this respect, no 
 difference). The other, which he elsewhere styles a bas- 
 tard reason (vodog XoytGpog ), is conceived as represented 
 by the irregular, variant, and sometimes retrograde motions 
 of the lower bodies, and especially of the terrestrial phe- 
 nomena. Matter and the external world being in a con- 
 tinual flux, he regarded sensation, and that exercise of rea- 
 son which takes sensation and phenomenal facts for its 
 necessary hypotheses , as partaking of all the instability of 
 its ever-flowing foundation. See the Tim<zus,from 28, A., 
 to 43, B. 
 
MOTION OP vovg COMPARED TO THAT OF A SPHERE. 221 
 
 There are many things which would suggest this com- 
 parison to such a mind as Plato’s, combining so much of 
 the imaginative and poetical with the philosophical ; and 
 there are also some things to justify it to the soundest rea- 
 son. Above all other figures, the sphere, in itself, may be 
 regarded as the symbol oi perfection, unity, immutability, 
 and eternity. Complete both in sensible and intellectual 
 beauty, its form delights the eye, while its idea perfectly 
 satisfies the mind. In the contemplation of its motion we 
 find the analogy still more striking. If regarded as repre- 
 senting the psychical self-energy of soul, or of God, it pre- 
 sents a perfect resemblance in the fact, that it is motion oi 
 energy, without any change of the place which it occupies 
 as a whole, or, in other words, combining simultaneously 
 and harmoniously the opposite phenomena of motion and 
 rest — rest relative throughout, or taken as a whole, and rest 
 absolute in the centre, while yet it is the source from which 
 motion is diffused outward through every part; as Aristotle 
 describes it, did Kcvelrac aal rjpepel ttgjc rj crcpalpa. Physic . 
 Auscult ., viii., 9. 
 
 By a higher and more perfect analogy, it may be regard- 
 ed as representing the intellectual energy of vovg , or reason, 
 when engaged in the contemplation of immutable truth. 
 Both may be perfectly described by those favourite terms 
 of Plato which occur so often in the Phrndon, and that, too, 
 without being regarded as tropical in the one case more 
 than in the other. The everlasting, unchanging motion of 
 the “ old rolling heavens,” like the perfection, uniformity, 
 and immutability of the eternal ideas, may also be said to 
 be, del Kara ravra — (baavrcog — ev rep avrep — Trepi ra avra 
 — npdg ra avra — eva Xoyov teal piav rd^iv e%ovoa. The 
 argument here is, that that motion of the heavens, whicl} in 
 so many points is analogous to the intellectual energy of 
 the best soul, must have been its direct and first production, 
 and the object of its continual care. When stripped of its 
 
 T 2 
 
222 MOTION OF vovg COMPARED to that of a sphere. 
 
 sublime imagery (if we may so regard it), the sentiment is 
 equivalent to that of the Timseus, already quoted : f O pev 
 yap (tcoopog ovpavog) naXXiorog rwv yeyovorov , o de 
 (deog) dptorog rwv airlwv. Qepcg de odt’ rjv ovr 3 eotl rep 
 apiorep dpav aXko ttXtjv to naXXiorov. So, also, in the 
 same dialogue, he represents the soul of the world, after its 
 creation by the “ Everlasting Father,” as commencing its 
 spiritual and rational life (eptypovog {3lov ) with the revolu- 
 tion of the heavens : f H de en peoov npog rov eop^arov ov- 
 pavov TTavTT] dtaixXaneloa^ icvtcXcp re avrov e£c oOev irepma- 
 hv'ipaoa, avTTj re ev avrx\ orpecpopevri, delay ap%7]v rjp^aro 
 anavorov nal epcj)povog /3lov tt pog rbv f vpnavra xpovov. 
 After this follows that most sublime passage which sets 
 forth the delight of the Eternal Generating Parent at be- 
 holding this glorious work of his hands, the e^wov oparov , 
 or visible universe, with its informing soul, living and mo- 
 ving on in the most perfect harmony, and the celestial revo- 
 lutions taking place with all the order and exactness of a 
 creation fresh from the hands of its Maker ; at sight of 
 which he is said to have admired, even with astonishment, 
 this image of the eternal powers, and to have rejoiced in it 
 as exceedingly fair and good : 'Qg de tavrjOev re avro nal 
 £(x)V evevorjoe rwv aidiwv dewv yeyovog ayaXpa r O PEN- 
 NH2A2 PTATHP, TjydoOrj re nal evcppavOeig ert 6?) pa) l- 
 Xov opocov npog ro napadecypa enevoTjoev direpydoaoQai. 
 On reading this passage, one can hardly help feeling that 
 some of the Christian fathers were right in supposing that 
 Plato, in his travels, had had access to the books of Moses ; 
 so strongly does it call to mind the declaration, Genesis, i., 
 31 : And God looked upon all which he had made , and behold , 
 it was good , very good. Perhaps in some such view as. 
 this may we take that remarkable expression of Aristotle, 
 Kivel de wg epwpevov, on which we have remarked, page 
 194. If there were any proof that he held to Plato’s soul 
 of the world, we might, with Cudworth, suppose him to 
 
MOTION OF VOVg COMPARED TO THAT OF A SPHERE. 223 
 
 have meant that The Eternal Novg turned round the heav- 
 ens, not by a direct action upon them, but by virtue of some 
 sympathizing attraction of a pervading plastic soul by which 
 their motions were regulated. 
 
 On this subject we may compare what is said by Proclus 
 in his commentary on the Timssus : 6 xpovog did tt)v npog 
 rov alcbva piprjaiv nvnXeloQai feyerai, (bg teal o ovpavbg 
 did rrjv irpbg rbv N ovv fiiprjoiv cr<paip(boOai — “ Time, by 
 reason of its imitation of eternity, is said to move in a cir- 
 cle, as the heaven, on account of its imitation of mind, is 
 spherical, or moves in a sphere.”* In this he is comment- 
 ing on the same analogy presented by Plato, Timceus , 37, 
 P., where he tells us that as the visible rolling heavens 
 correspond to that soul of the world of which it is the out- 
 ward ehccbv, or image, so is time an image of eternity. As 
 the revolving mirror seems to set in motion the heavens, the 
 earth, the trees, and all the objects of the really immove- 
 able landscape, so time is a revolving image or reflection of 
 the fixed eternal state, and so also the visible moving heav- 
 ens are the sensible and temporal representative of the 
 Eternal Mind : E luova d’ emvoel tavrjrrjv riva altivog rroi«‘ 
 7]oai , nai diatcoayibv d\ia ovpavov , noiel, pievovrog ahbvog 
 ev evt, (car 9 apiOpov iovoav aiibviov einbva , tovtov ov 6i] 
 Xpovov (bvopatcapev — “ He thought to make a moving image 
 of th q fixed eternity; and as he arranged the heavens, eter- 
 nity itself remaining forever in unity (that is, without suc- 
 cession), he made an image of eternity to proceed by num- 
 ber, the same which we call time.” In the same way, 
 while the Eternal Mind or Reason remains in everlasting 
 
 O 
 
 unity ( ev kvi ), the visible rolling universe, proceeding by 
 number, may be regarded as its temporal and moving im- 
 
 * This comparison of mind to a sphere seems to have been an an- 
 cient Egyptian notion ; as Iamblichus tells us that they pictured 
 God sitting upon the lote-tree, because its leaves and fruit are round 
 like the motion of intellect . 
 
224 
 
 MOTIONS OF THE EVIL SOUL IRREGULAR. 
 
 age : elucbv xpovLnrj uai mvr\Tr\ rov aloviov nal ev evi pe- 
 vovrog N ov. From some such idea as this came probably 
 the Latin scholastic term iini-versum, involving the ideas 
 of totality and unity, of motion in every part, and yet rest 
 in the centre and as a whole. So, in another place, speak- 
 ing of the motion of the stars, Plato says, boa dt y ovpavov 
 nopevopeva, tva rod’ opoiorarov rj rep reXecorarcp, nal 
 NOHTI2I (jcbcp TTpdg r fjv rrjg diauoviag piprjoiv (bvoecjg 
 Timceus , 39, E. 
 
 XXXIII. 
 
 The Motions of the Evil Soul Irregular and Disorderly. The 
 nearer an Approach to the Pure Reason , the more of Fix- 
 edness and Uniformity. Atheistic Objection from the Un- 
 varying Regularity of the Heavens ; from whence was in- 
 ferred the Absence of Will and Reason . 
 
 Page 36, Line 4. 0 vuovv av rj ye pTjdenore (boavrug, 
 urjde Kara rd avrd, prjde ev ravrep , . . . pife ev tlvi Xoycp 
 /dvrjoig, avolag av andorjg etrj % vyyevrjg . As uniform, reg- 
 ular, immutable, spherical motion, is akin to mind, truth, 
 and wisdom, so the opposite of all these (that of which, a 
 short distance back, it is said, pavuccbg uai ardurcog ep%e- 
 rat) is allied to that error, folly, and disorder, which, in 
 Plato’s view, were the chief characteristics of the dark and 
 evil soul. How admirably does he, in the Phaedon, teach 
 this same doctrine in respect to the human spirit, although 
 in somewhat different language, and with different imagery. 
 How strikingly does he describe it as reeling and stagger- 
 ing like a drunken man ( fXavopevr] uai raparropevrj /cat 
 lAtyyicboa tbonep peOvovoa) while occupied solely with the 
 animal life of the visible world ; until it withdraws from the 
 turbulence of sense, and becomes assimilated (rep deico, teal 
 dOavarcp , teal vorjrcp , uai povoetdei teal ddiaXvrcp) to the 
 
HEAVEN, A STATE OF ETERNAL REST. 225 
 
 Divine, the immortal, the intelligible, the moniform, the in- 
 dissoluble, the del d)oavru)g nal Kara ravra iftovn eavrco ; 
 or, in other words, that state of everlasting energy , yet ever- 
 lasting rest , of ever-active contemplation, yet eternal quiet- 
 ism, which is reserved for the just in the spiritual world. 
 In this, Plato most certainly agrees with the Scriptures. 
 He differs, however, from no small portion of the modern 
 Christian Church, with whom it is a favourite theory, that 
 the future condition of the saved soul will present a scene 
 of activity in almost every respect similar to the present, 
 and who would transfer to the heavenly state all the bustle, 
 all the action, and even all the physical science of this 
 lower world. One of our most popular religious writers 
 indulges, at great length, in a consideration of the superior 
 advantages which the celestial world will present for the 
 study of the sciences of astronomy and trigonometry ; as 
 though the healed spirit could find its everlasting rest in 
 those pursuits that even here had failed to yield it any solid 
 and permanent satisfaction. This modern doctrine would 
 carry all the mutations of sense into ihdX fixed and eternal 
 state of which time is but the moving image. We cannot, 
 however, find it in the Scriptures any more than in Plato. 
 The ideas which revelation most prominently presents of 
 the heavenly world, and which, we also think, must be most 
 precious to the truly pious soul, are those of repose from 
 the agitations of the present scene of probation ; of assu- 
 rance, of light, of absolute certainty or freedom from all 
 doubt, of eternal rest ; and yet all this in perfect consistency 
 with the most intense moral emotion and the most energetic 
 contemplation of fixed and everlasting truth. We may be- 
 lieve in a progress of the soul, but in a very different sense 
 from that in which the doctrine is commonly taught, and 
 which holds out an ever-restless, never-satisfied accumula- 
 tion of outward knowledge, as the spirit’s employment 
 throughout eternity ; a progress which seems to necessitate 
 
226 CONSTANCY IN THE CELESTIAL MOTIONS, 
 
 eternal doubt and eternal imperfection, and in which, after 
 all, no real advance is ever made, because the position of 
 the soul in regard to the highest truths remains as unchan- 
 ged as in the present flowing world. We find but little, if 
 any, trace of this doctrine of progress in the Scriptures. 
 Revelation seems rather to intimate that, instead of this 
 eternal moving on in the acquisitions of science, the per- 
 fection of the soul will rather consist in the beatific vis- 
 ion of those fixed, established truths, which are fundamental 
 in the scheme of our redemption, and in the swelling moral 
 emotions of the heavenly ayamj — that charity to which all 
 mere yvchaig holds only the relation of a means which is to 
 vanish away, and to be regarded as naught when its great 
 end shall be accomplished. Nothing seems more clearly 
 taught in the Bible than that one of the essential elements 
 of the eeonian state is fixedness and certainty. “ Now we 
 see through a glass darkly, but then face to face.” 
 
 In the Divine Soul these two apparently opposite ideas 
 of repose and energy meet in their highest perfection ; and 
 whatever may be thought of the philosophical truth of Pla- 
 to’s comparison, it must certainly be admitted that there is 
 a sublime, and even an almost divine beauty in thus taking 
 as the symbol of the Eternal Mind the steady revolution of 
 the “ old rolling heavens,” ever presenting to us the images 
 of power, of calm yet resistless motion, of an ever-wakeful, 
 ever- energizing Providence, and of everlasting rest. 
 
 Plato, in the Epinomis, or Appendix to his dialogue on 
 Laws, adverts to a very common prejudice, which would 
 draw an atheistic objection from the unvarying regularity of 
 the celestial courses. “ It should be proof to men,” he 
 says, “ that the revolutions of the heavenly bodies are un- 
 der the direction of reason, because they ever do the same, 
 even those things which had been planned and counselled 
 ages beyond our conception. Yet the many think different- 
 ly, and infer, from the fixedness and uniformity of their mo- 
 
NO PROOF OF THE ABSENCE OF WILL AND REASON. 227 
 
 tions, that they have not soul ; and so they come to think 
 that the human is rational and animated, because they ob~ 
 serve in it variant and irregular motions (which seem to be 
 the result of will), but that the divine is destitute of reason, 
 because it ever abides in the same fixed courses : citppov dig 
 fievov kv ralg avralg (popalg. And yet on this very account 
 should we believe that there is a rational nature in the stars, 
 because it ever doeth the same, and in the same manner, 
 and preserving the same relations : to icarti ravra ual 
 (baavTG)g ual ra avrd tt parrel del. 1 ' Epinomis , 982, D., E. 
 In this passage, of which we have given a very free ver- 
 sion, he seems to be aiming to show that the stars them- 
 selves are animated, yet still the argument is independent 
 of that particular hypothesis. It is equally valid, whether 
 they are regarded as under the control of the Supreme or 
 subordinate intelligences ; and the remarks apply with all 
 their force to the position we have in hand, namely, that 
 soul and reason must be steady, uniform, and immutable, in 
 proportion as they are above the turbulence and irregulari- 
 ties of the sensible world ; and that this, instead of being- 
 hostile to the doctrine of a minute and special providence, 
 is absolutely essential to its perfection. This sublime and 
 beautiful view of the everlasting constancy of the heavenly 
 motions, as representative of the calmness, immutability, 
 and absolute certainty in the operations of that Divine Will 
 which is ever one with the Divine Reason , is thus admirably 
 presented by Balbus the Stoic, in Cicero’s second book De 
 Natura Deorum, sec. 22 : Nulla igitur in caelo nec fortuna 
 nec temeritas nec erratio nec varietas inest ; contraque om 
 nis ORDO, VERITAS, RATIO, CONSTANTLY Quae- 
 que his vacant ementita et falsa plenaque erroris, ea circum 
 terras, infra lunam, quae omnium ultima est, in terrisque 
 versantur. 
 
 In the Timaeus, Plato gives us a most vivid picture of 
 the converse of this truth, namely, the turbulence and rest- 
 
228 STRANGE COMPARISON FROM THE TIMiEUS. 
 
 lessness of the soul under the overpowering influence of 
 the world of sense and matter. We refer to that remark- 
 able passage in which he represents the inferior divinities, 
 or sons of God, first introducing into the ever-flowing mate- 
 rial universe those newly-formed human spirits which had 
 just been generated from the anima mundi ; if, rather, some 
 parts of the description do not better apply to the infant soul 
 of the world itself : K al 6 psv drj (6 atdcog nar^p) ravra 
 TrdvTa dtara^ag epevev ev rep eavrov 7 ]Qei. pivovrog 6e, oi 
 rcaideg T7jv tov narpdg rdigiv vorjoavreg , teal Xafiovreg add - 
 varov dpxr\v dvrjrov £d)ov, . . . rag rrjg aOavarov 'ipvxw 
 nepcodovg evedovv elg enLppvrov otipa nai dTroppvrov — 
 “ And he (the Eternal Father) having arranged all these 
 things, abode in his accustomed place (or mode of being), 
 hut the sons, having observed the method of the Father, 
 and having taken the immortal principle of the mortal ani- 
 mal, bound the periods of the immortal spirit into the in- 
 flowing and outflowing body.” Timeeus , 42, P. This world 
 of sense he compares to an ever-moving river, or, rather, to 
 a wild and stormy torrent {naratiXv^ov nai anoppeov nvpa), 
 ever ebbing and rising, agitated by tempestuous winds (flaXrj 
 nvEvparcJV vrf aspog (pepopevcov), constantly surging, and 
 bearing about with all violence the young spirit doomed to 
 commence upon its ever-restless billows the morning of an 
 eternal existence. 
 
 In this condition, while the infant soul is the almost pass- 
 ive subject of impressions, which, through this sea of mat- 
 ter, invade it from without, it is tossed about — tots pev 
 evavriag (popag , tote nkayiag, tote vnriag , aXoycog, dran- 
 T(og — “ sometimes in an adverse direction, sometimes ob- 
 liquely, now erect, now supine, and, again, like one stand- 
 ing upon his head ( olov orav rig imriog EpEioag rrjv nE(pa- 
 Xr\v pEV eul r r)g yrjg , rovg 6e nodag irpoc^aXdv dvo)), and 
 seeing all the phenomena of nature strangely inverted, with- 
 out reason and without order ; until (as is the case with 
 
ANIMATION OF TIIE HEAVENLY BODIES. 229 
 
 some), through, the exercise of the rational principle con- 
 stantly gaining the victory, and aided by right instruction — 
 eav pev emXapbdvrjTai Tig dpOfj rpocj . >77 naidevcrsog — it ac- 
 quires calmness, abstraction, and stability ; and having thus 
 escaped from this most fearful disorder, comes at length un- 
 der the abiding influence of immutable truth as exhibited in 
 the eternal ideas of which matter presents only the flowing 
 and varying diagrams. The whole passage is too long for 
 insertion continuously, and some parts are quite difficult. 
 We would, however, earnestly recommend its perusal to 
 the student, not only for its most sublime imagery, but also 
 for the profound philosophy of human nature which is con- 
 tained beneath it. See the Timceus, from page 42, P., to 
 page 44, D. 
 
 XXXIV. 
 
 Platonic Doctrine of the Animation of the Heaveiily Bodies . 
 
 Ancient Belief that each Nation had its own 'peculiar 
 
 Guardian Daemon or Genius. 
 
 Page 38, Line 6. r/ H/l tov real oeXrjvrjv teal ra aWa do- 
 rpa. The next question, after deciding the nature of the 
 governing soul, is, whether it is one supreme, or many sub- 
 ordinate (plav rj tt X etovg), engaged in these offices. Here 
 is another point in Plato’s theology which has given offence 
 to some of his warmest admirers. It has also been the sub- 
 ject of peculiar animadversion by Warburton and others, 
 who have been as far as possible removed from the Platon- 
 ic spirit. They would charge our philosopher here with 
 an absurd polytheism, in making each one of the heavenly 
 bodies either a divinity in itself, or, at least, under the con- 
 trol of a separate divinity. If by this is meant that he did 
 not t believe in one Supreme Ineffable Power, the generator 
 and creator of all other existences, whether divine (in the 
 
 U 
 
230 ANIMATION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 
 
 Greek sense of deoi, as we have explained it, page 104) or 
 human, the answer is found in places of his dialogues too 
 numerous to mention ; and especially might we refer to the 
 remarkable passage in the TimaBus (41, A.), in which the 
 Eternal Parent thus addresses the inferior divinities to 
 whom he had given being : Oeot fteCdv cjv eyd) drjptovpyog 
 Trarrjp re epyo)v, k . t. X. His great object here is to show, 
 in opposition to the atheist, that soul, or instead of 
 
 tvxtj, guides the motions of the heavenly bodies. Indeed, 
 throughout the whole argument, he evidently regards the 
 being of a God, and of soul generally, distinct from, and not 
 a result of, bodily organization, as facts which involve each 
 other, and which are shown by similar and equivalent 
 proofs. He appears to have considered even a belief in 
 the real entity of the human soul as inseparable from an 
 acknowledgment of the Divine existence ; so that the one 
 was, as it were, the ground and guarantee of the other. In 
 this respect, the language of the Hebrew oath, “ as the Lord 
 liveth , and as thy soul liveth ,” expressed the true spirit of 
 his philosophy. In consequence, therefore, of his constant- 
 ly using these terms for each other, we cannot be certain, 
 when he speaks of soul or souls as guiding the motions of 
 the heavenly bodies, whether he means that this was done 
 by the direct agency of the Supreme Soul, or whether it 
 was delegated to inferior spirits ; and whether these dele- 
 gated conducting powers resided severally in the bodies as 
 an animating life, or were separate from them. All these 
 are points which do not affect his main argument. With- 
 out making a division into those distinct hypostases which 
 appear in the Timaeus, he here uses ipvxrj as a general col- 
 lective term for all that is immaterial, or, at least, as a name 
 for the Deity, and all celestial or superhuman powers deri- 
 ved from, and dependent upon, him. This was enough for 
 his argument, without any farther precision or explanation, 
 when dealing with the atheist, who denied all powers above 
 man, be they one or many. 
 
ANIMATION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 
 
 231 
 
 We may even go still farther in our apology, and main- 
 tain, that if he did hold that the heavenly bodies were ani- 
 mated, or that they were severally under the care of dis- 
 trict spirits, there was, in the latter opinion at least, no se- 
 rious error, even when viewed in the light of revelation it- 
 self. The Bible not obscurely teaches that the personal 
 destinies of individual men are, in a measure, under the di- 
 rection and guardianship of supernatural beings. Churches 
 are said to have their guardian angels, according to Reve- 
 lations, ii., 1, which we prefer to take in this literal sense, 
 rather than to adopt any other interpretation which has been 
 forced upon it in the controversy respecting ecclesiastical 
 government. The same doctrine is pretty clearly intimated 
 in respect to nations, Daniel, x., 20, 21, where Greece and 
 Persia are said each to have their invisible champion, 
 whether of a good or of an evil nature. There is also a 
 remarkable passage, Deuteronomy, xxxii., 8, which, if taken 
 according to the Septuagint version, would directly estab- 
 lish the same doctrine : When the Most High divided the 
 nations , when he separated the sons of Adam, he appointed 
 the hounds of the people according to the number of the chil- 
 dren of Israel , nsprp 1 ?, as it is in the Hebrew, but, 
 
 according to the number of the angels of God — uara aptOpov 
 dyyeX G)v deov — as it stands in the Greek of the Septuagint. 
 We cannot account for the difference, but it certainly seems 
 as though the Greek version was more consonant with the 
 context which follows, and which asserts that Israel is the 
 Lord's peculiar inheritance , in distinction from the other na- 
 tions, who seem to have been left to the subordinate care 
 of other directing powers. This very passage, too, it should 
 be remarked, is quoted by Eusebius, Frcep. Evang., xi., 26, 
 to prove that Plato obtained his doctrine of the A acpoveg 
 from Moses. That such an idea prevailed among the 
 heathen nations, especially the Persians, is evident from 
 Herodotus, vii., 53 : rot Hepolda ypv XeXoyxaoi. 
 
232 ANIMATION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 
 
 The Bible teaches us also that even the ordinary courses 
 of physical events are under the controlling agency of an- 
 gelic beings. He maketh his angels winds , his ministers a 
 flaming fire ; as the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews 
 renders it. Science, with all its modern boasting, can af- 
 firm nothing in opposition to this. It is a view which in- 
 terferes not at all with the regularity and the apparent laws 
 of physical phenomena, and, as we have seen, the Bible 
 quite plainly reveals it. Nay, more, may there not be 
 found some countenance there to this very doctrine of Pla- 
 to ? If individuals, and churches, and nations, and every 
 department in nature, have their presiding invisible powers, 
 why not the heavenly bodies ? Why not an angel of the 
 sun, of the moon, and of each planet ? Did the ancient 
 Hebrew writers mean only physical instead of psychical 
 powers, when they spoke of the hosts of heaven, and used 
 that most sublime epithet, m'NDV Hi ri], Jehovah Tsehhaoth, or 
 Lord of Hosts ? The Septuagint, by rendering it nvpioq 
 6vvd[ie(ov, have seemed to refer it to physical rather than 
 to spiritual agencies ; but it is a serious question, whether 
 much more than this is not contained in the Hebrew. Was 
 it simply a sublime personification, when it was said, He 
 bringetli out their host by number ; he calletli them all by 
 name or when we are told that, at the creation of our 
 earth, the stars of the morning sang together, and all the sons 
 of God shouted for joy ?\ We have no hesitation in prefer- 
 ring this, extravagant as it may appear, to that modern ex- 
 treme, which would leave such an immense, unanimated 
 solitude between man and the Deity, instead of filling it up, 
 as the old Patristic theology did, with datgovec, angels, 
 thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers : 
 
 With helmed Cherubim, 
 
 And sworded Seraphim, 
 
 and all that array of invisible beings, whose existence the 
 
 * Isaiah, xl., 26 . 
 
 t dob, xxxviii., 7. 
 
ANIMATION OF THE HEAVENLY liODIES. 
 
 233 
 
 Bible does seem to take for granted, although some, in for- 
 mer times, may have carried it to an extravagant extent. 
 
 Surely we may still maintain the precious Protestant 
 doctrine, that no one but the Supreme Lord of Hosts is en- 
 titled to any the least species of religious adoration, and yet 
 believe in many an order of being, which, although of far 
 higher rank, yet constitute, with man, an immense brother- 
 hood of created intelligences, all intended for the manifest- 
 ation of the glory of Him, by whom, and for whom, all 
 things were created, whether visible or invisible, whether 
 in the earth or in the heavens. There is some reason to 
 fear that Protestants, under the guise of a hyperspirituality, 
 have gone too far in the opposite direction, to what is real- 
 ly a materializing and physical hypothesis. When we dis- 
 cover a disposition to banish in our minds all intermediate 
 spiritual agencies, and, by magnifying natural causes, to 
 place the Deity at the most remote distance possible, it 
 does really seem as though, if we could or durst, we would 
 dispense with his presence also in the regulation of the 
 universe. In all ages, a tendency to that sadduceeism 
 which barely saves the doctrine of the soul’s existence in 
 anothe'r state, has been held, and justly held, to be near of 
 kin to infidelity, if not to downright atheism. Far better to 
 believe too much on this subject than too little, even if we 
 cannot agree, with Plato, that there is a presiding spiritual 
 superintendence assigned to each celestial body. 
 
 XXXV. 
 
 Three Hypotheses in respect to the Animation of the Heavenly 
 
 Bodies. 
 
 Page 39, Line 7. 'Qg rj kvovoa evrog tgj Tcepu^spel rov- 
 r G), n. r. A. We have here three hypotheses. The first 
 would make the sun itself an animated being ; the second 
 
 U 2 
 
234 
 
 ANIMATION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 
 
 would regard it as under the direction of an external angel, 
 or A ai[iG)v, having a material yet highly arthereal body, and 
 making use of a sort of impulsive motion ; the third would 
 represent it as under the care of a pure, unimbodied spirit 
 or intellect (' ipiXrj ocj^arog ovoa ), either the Universal Nu- 
 men, or some delegated power specially assigned to that 
 office. If by the last is meant only a particular exercise of 
 the energy of the Universal Soul (which view is perfectly 
 consistent with his present argument against the atheist, 
 although it does not fully agree with some things he says 
 elsewhere), there would be no need of any defence of Plato 
 against the charges to which we have referred. The sec- 
 ond, however, as we have seen, may be held by a firm be- 
 liever in the Christian revelation. The first is only the 
 doctrine of the anima mandi applied to particular parts of 
 the universe. It may be maintained, as Plato did maintain 
 it, in perfect consistency with a pure theism, or a recogni- 
 tion of an Eternal Spirit, not only above the anima mandi , 
 but regarded, also, as its creator and constant guide. There 
 is most abundant proof of this in the Timaeus, and, indeed, 
 we have every reason to believe that Plato meant no more 
 by his soul of the world, whether in respect to the universe 
 or to particular parts, than Cudworth intends by his famous 
 Plastic Nature, to which, in some places, he seems inclined 
 to ascribe a species of obscure animate existence.* In fact, 
 some such hypothesis must be adopted by those who would 
 make nature a distinct thing from the Deity, or a subordi- 
 nate cause under the Divine reason and wisdom ; as all 
 must do who are averse to the doctrine that God does all 
 things by his own immediate agency, or the systematic in- 
 tervention of angelic or spiritual beings. The only escape 
 from one or the other of these is in that philosophy of oc- 
 cult qualities, which is a mere play upon words, a mere 
 apology for ignorance, and which, when carried to its le- 
 Cudworth's Intellectual System , vol. i., page 346, Engl. ed. 
 
ypg &X r H JLa > or yehiculum mundi. 235 
 
 gitimate results, is, as vve have seen, the most favourable of 
 all hypotheses to atheism. 
 
 The independent, unoriginated essence ( avroOeog ), which 
 is above nature and above the soul of the world , is called, in 
 the Timaeus, ’AtStog Harrjp , and represented as the genera- 
 tor of and even of No£f. Elsewhere, and especially 
 
 in the Republic, Plato is fond of styling him To ’ AyaOov , 
 The Good. 
 
 XXXYI. 
 
 1% ”C )xrj[ia, or Vehiculum Mundi. Examination of a Re - 
 markable Passage from Euripides. 
 
 Page 39, Line 17. ev dppaocv e%ovoa rjplv r\kiov. This 
 cannot be rendered, having the sun in a chariot or vehicle ; 
 for the sense evidently requires that the sun itself be re- 
 garded as the vehiculum of the indwelling spirit. ’Ev here 
 is equivalent to in loco — ev appaoiv — cog dppara — in loco 
 currus—for a vehicle* By a similar phraseology, the body 
 is elsewhere styled o^/m, vehiculum ; as in the Timaeus, 
 41, C. : eptibaGag cog elg oxrjpa. In that place, however, 
 Plato has reference, not to the animating souls of the heav- 
 enly bodies, but to human souls, placed, or, as he says, 
 sown there previous to their more intimate connexion with 
 matter in their earthly existence, that they might learn those 
 universal truths which were to be recalled to recollection 
 in their subsequent stage of being. f 
 
 In the Troades of Euripides the same term is applied, in 
 a manner directly the opposite of this, to signify, not the 
 corporeal vehiculum , but the animating, moving power. On 
 account of its deep, intrinsic interest, we give the passage 
 in full, and dwell upon it at some length : 
 
 * So, also, Laws , xi., 913, C. : kv ovcrta nenTfjoOaL. 
 t Compare Origen contra Celsum, ii., 60. From this came those 
 doctrines which Origen held respecting the pre-existence of souls. 
 
236 yrjg bx^j(ia, 0R vehiculum mundi. 
 
 T £2 yrjg oxqiia, team yfjg ex^v edpav 
 "OoTig nor’ el cv dvaroTraGTog eldevcu , 
 
 Zn;f, elf avdynr) (pvaeog, tire vovg (Sportiv^ 
 
 UpOG7]v^dp,7]v Ge • ndvra yap di tajjotyov 
 B aevov tceTievdov , rcara Alktjv to, fivijr* uyeig. 
 
 0 Thou who guid’st the rolling of the earth, 
 
 And o’er it hast thy throne, whoe’er thou art, 
 
 Most difficult to know — the far-famed Jove, 
 
 Or nature’s law, or reason, such as man’s — 
 
 1 thee adore, that, in a noiseless path, 
 
 Thy steady hand with justice all things rules. 
 
 Euripides , Troades, 890. 
 
 We do not know which to admire most, the philosophy 
 or the poetical beauty of these remarkable lines. The ex- 
 pression, kccttl yr\g exuv edpav, relieves them, in our view, 
 from all liability to the charge of pantheism. These words, 
 in the connexion in which they appear, are only applicable 
 to what Plato styles 'ipvx'^l vnspicoofifa ; a soul which, al- 
 though pervading, is also, at the same time, above , and dis- 
 tinct from , the world or universe which it moves ; for yrj 
 here is evidently to be taken in this large sense. The last 
 line, also, can only be referred to a moral power, not only 
 far above pantheism, but also that view which delights in 
 contemplating a God of mere intelligence. It indicates a 
 special moral providence, looking to ends and varied by 
 events, yet at the same time general, administered by un- 
 broken and harmonious laws, pervading all nature, silent in 
 their operation, traversing a noiseless path (dp d'lpocjyov (3al- 
 vcov ueXevQov) ; the universal moving power of earth ( mun - 
 di veliiculum ) ; influencing and controlling all things, and 
 yet in its secret springs unsearchable ( dvaronaorog etde- 
 vat) ; ruling in the earthquake, the fire, and the tempest, 
 yet, in itself, not the earthquake, nor the storm, but the still 
 small voice of mind, specially and for special ends control- 
 ling matter. 
 
 So Plutarch, writing of the Divine Logos, or Reason, in 
 
SECOND TART, DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE. 237 
 
 the government of the world, uses almost the very woids of 
 Euripides, if he did not rather intend a quotation : (ptvvrjg 
 yap f O 0EIO2 AOrOS dnpooderjg eon nal dd axjjo^ov f3al - 
 vg)v keXevOov rd i9 vrprd dyEi rcara 61ktjv. Plutarch , De 
 Iside et Osiri. We may compare with this a passage from 
 Seneca, Nat. Q., lib. ii., 14 : Deum ilium maximum poten- 
 tissimumque, qui ipse vehit omnia (rnundi vehiculum ), qui 
 ubique et omnibus prsesto est. Compare, also, a passage 
 of one of the lost tragedies of Euripides, as it is quoted by 
 Eusebius, Proep. Evang ., xiii., page 681 : 
 
 tov avro^vfj, tov kv aWeptcp 
 P v/j,6(p ndvrcov Qvolv e/mheZavO’ . 
 
 Thou self-sprung Being that dost all infold , 
 
 And in thine arms heaven’s whirling fabric hold. 
 
 The idea expressed by such phrases as those on which we 
 have been just commenting, may have been more ancient 
 than Plato or Euripides, and may have given rise to the 
 mythological representation of the chariot and horses of the 
 sun. It is more likely, however, that the poetical repre- 
 sentation may have^suggested the language here employed. 
 We have also in the Phsedrus (246, A.) this same compar- 
 ison, by which man, in his compound being, is likened to a 
 chariot and horses, with their charioteer, representing re- 
 spectively his animal and his rational nature. 
 
 XXXVII. 
 
 Second Grand Division of the Argument. Doctrine of a 
 Special Providence. Mistake of Cudworth. 
 
 Page 42, Line 10. Tov 6e rjyovpEvov p.ev deovg Eivai , 
 I ur) (ppovrl^Eiv tie, k. r. X. We come now to the second 
 grand division of the subject, and one, the treatment of 
 which will probably be more satisfactory to the reader, pre 
 
238 SECOND PART, DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE. 
 
 senting, as it does, less of subtle physico-metaphysical dis- 
 cussion, and more that is in strictest harmony with the Holy 
 Scriptures. The author is now to prove the doctrine of a 
 special providence against those who speculatively admitted 
 the existence of a Deity, and yet could not believe that he 
 concerned himself with the ordinary afFairs of human life ; 
 especially, what seemed to them of so little consequence — 
 human sins. Cud worth asserts that “ Plato, in his tenth 
 book of Laws, professedly opposing the atheists, and under- 
 taking to prove the existence of a Deity, does, notwithstand- 
 ing, ascend no higher than to the Psyche, or Universal 
 Mundane Soul, as the self-moving principle, and the imme- 
 diate or proper cause of all the motion which is in the 
 world. And this (he says) is all the God he there under- 
 takes to prove.” This very learned man must have strange- 
 ly overlooked the latter part of this book, upon which we 
 are now entering, or he could not have made so incorrect 
 an assertion. It is true, that all which his previous argu- 
 ment has required as yet has been the existence of such a 
 Psyche ; but he now advances not only above self-motion, 
 or psychical power, to the second hypostasis of intelligence, 
 or Noi^ (as it may be regarded when viewed according to 
 the statements and divisions of the Timaeus), but also to 
 that still higher degree which is above mind or intelligence, 
 and which he elsewhere styles To ’A yaOov ; including, in 
 the idea, all moral attributes — justice and severity, as well 
 as benevolence and compassion. 
 
 It is of this higher degree, or hypostasis, as we think it 
 may be styled, that Plato, or some later Platonist, thus 
 speaks, in that remarkable passage, contained in what is 
 styled the second epistle to Dionysius, 312, E. : Uept rov 
 Trdvrcjv paoiXea ixdvr > sari, nai efcetvov evetca navra * /cai 
 enelvo clltlov diravrcvv rcov KaX&v devrepov 6e nepl rd 
 devrepa , nal rpirov Trepl ra rptra — “ All things relate to 
 the King of all, and on his account are all things, and he is 
 
GREEK WORDS FOR BLESSEDNESS, HAPPINESS, ETC. 239 
 
 the cause of all things beautiful ; but the second honours 
 pertain to the second, and the third to the third.” In othei 
 words, He is the final , or moral , as w r ell as the designings 
 and the efficient or psychical cause of all things ( evena ov 
 iravra ) ; for the manifestation of whose moral glory all 
 things are created, moved, and constantly governed. 
 
 Every reader must admit that the admirable arguments 
 which follow in the remainder of the book are generally in 
 strict accordance with the Holy Scriptures, and that Plato 
 even reasons on this part of his subject in a more religious 
 manner than many nominally Christian writers ; much of 
 whose theology and science might fairly be ranked with 
 the very atheism with which he is here contending. 
 
 XXXVIII. 
 
 The Greek Words for Blessedness , Happiness , Fortune , fyc. 
 
 Page 42, Line 14. akrfiua psv ovtz evdatpovegs do^atg 
 de evdcupovi^opevcu, u. t. A. The words evdacpcov, evdcu- 
 povca , do not refer simply to a state of present pleasure or 
 enjoyment ; for, in that sense, the poets and others were 
 right in asserting, and the philosopher could not deny, that 
 wicked men are often happy. E vdacpcov, in its primitive, 
 etymological import, has a much higher sense than this ; a 
 sense derived to it at that time, when A aipcov remained un- 
 impaired in its significance as one of the Divine names, 
 and had not yet been corrupted into that atheistic sense of 
 Fortune which it subsequently acquired in the natural de- 
 generacy of man and of language. From ev and A aipo)v, it 
 would etymologically signify one who had the favour of 
 Heaven ; and its purest meaning would be best expressed 
 by our good old Saxon word blessed. It refers not simply 
 to a man’s present state of feeling or enjoyment, but to the 
 whole of his being and his relation to the whole ; so that 
 
240 GREEK WORDS FOR BLESSEDNESS, HAPPINESS, ETC. 
 
 one in the midst of the most acute pain, like the martyrs in 
 the flames, might be evdacficdv ; while another, in the pres- 
 ent enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, might be aQXc- 
 og : as Socrates, in the Gorgias, describes the life of the 
 sensualist as bsivog teal alaxpog feat aOXiog, and asks if any 
 one would dare to call such Evdaiptovag, or blessed, eav 
 d(pd6v cjg e%u(5LV cjv beovreu — “ even if they have in the 
 greatest abundance all that their souls may desire.” Gor- 
 gias, 494, E. This is also the meaning of Solon in that 
 most celebrated account which Herodotus gives of his in- 
 terview with Croesus ; although he sometimes uses oXdtog 
 instead of Ev6atp,G)v, out of accommodation to the language 
 of the sensual Phrygian. 
 
 Plato himself clearly gives this as the radical idea of the 
 word, and seems evidently to allude to its etymology when 
 he says, ov yap "ANEY TE 0E£2N prjnore rig evdatpedv 
 eotlv — “ Without the Gods no man can be called evdaifiuv, 
 blessed , or happy” So, also, in the Timceus , 90, D. : AeZ 
 61 depanevovra ro 'delov , exovra rs T ET j uaXa KEKoaprjpi- 
 vov rov AA1MONA %vvouzov ev avrep 6ia(j)Ep6vTG)g ’EYAAI- 
 MONA Etvai — “ He must be blessed beyond all others who 
 cultivates the divine, and who has ever in harmony within 
 him the indwelling God.” The juxtaposition of terms here 
 leaves no doubt that there was intended an allusion to the 
 radical sense and etymology of the word. There is the 
 same allusion in the Orestes of Euripides : 
 
 "O rav 6’ 6 AAIMS2N T EY dtdti t'l del Q'iTujv ; 
 
 dpnel yap avrog *0 GEOS, btyeXeZv ftelcdv. 
 
 When God his blessing grants, what need of friends'? 
 
 A friend above supplies the soul’s desire. 
 
 Euripides , Orestes , 660. 
 
 These lines are quoted by Aristotle in the discussion of the 
 question, norEpov evdaipejv dErjaErat (j)tXo)v fj prj ; Ethic. 
 Nicomaclu, ix., 9. Even this cold and passionless writer 
 tells us that happiness ( Evdaipovia ) is a divine thing ( delov 
 
GREEK WORDS FOR BLESSEDNESS, HAPPINESS, BV<1, 241 
 
 t i), and without the favour of Heaven cannot grow on the 
 soil of earth: E l pev ovv nai dXXo tl detiv eotl dupTjpa 
 avOpdonoig, evXoyov nai T7\v evdacpoviav {tedodorov elvac 
 — “ If, therefore, there is any other thing which is the gift 
 of the Gods, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is 
 Heaven’s own peculiar boon.” Ethic. Nicomach ., lib. i., 9. 
 For similar passages, the reader is referred to his Ethic. 
 Eudern ., lib. i., 8 ; Ethic. Nicomach ., lib. i., 12 ; and espe- 
 cially to lib. x., 8, where, treating of evdaipovia in its other 
 aspect, as an active exercise of the soul, instead of simply 
 a state of well-being, he defines it to be a contemplative 
 energy — deop^nni) evepyeia — such as we have supposed 
 (page 225) to form the chief element in the bliss of the 
 heavenly world. It is this which, in his view, constitutes 
 the happiness of the Deity, and of that human state which 
 is nearest to the divine. In proof of it, he asserts that no 
 one of the inferior animals can ever be styled evdaipojv, be- 
 cause the term implies a state possible only in relation to a 
 religious and rational being, or one who could be sensible 
 of the blessedness of the Divine favour : T<5 pev yap 'deep 
 7 rag 6 /3log evdaipcov * rolg d’ dvOpunoig eft ooov opoccopa 
 rt rrjg Totavrrjg evepyetag vTrapx^ * rwr <5’ aXkiov feuam 
 ovdev evdaipovel , eireidi) ovdapov aocvcovel fteupLag * nai gj 
 aaXkov VTxapXEL to 'deojpelv, nai evdatpovelv . Wherefore, 
 as he says in what follows, every such a one is fteoftXeo- 
 rarog, or most beloved of Heaven. It will be seen how 
 visibly, in all these extracts, can be traced the radical, ety- 
 mological idea of the term, as it was exhibited in the most 
 primitive Greek, and how very similar it is to the corre- 
 sponding one presented in the Bible, although the former 
 may not be taken in so elevated a sense, and perhaps nev- 
 er comes up to the full etymological import which may 
 fairly be supposed to be contained in its component parts. 
 The Scriptures speak of it as the blessedness of that rnan 
 who enjoys the Divine favour : Blessed is the man (or peo - 
 
 X 
 
242 GREEK WORDS FOR BLESSEDNESS, HAPPINESS, ETC. 
 
 pie) whose God is the Lord ; blessed are they who dwell in 
 thy house ; who remain in the secret place of the Most High ; 
 who abide under the shadow of the Almighty. Thy favour is 
 life, and thy loving kindness is better than life . 
 
 Ava6ai[io)v and dvodaifiovia as clearly express the oppo- 
 site view, namely, not merely present misery, but the state 
 of one visited by the displeasure of Heaven. It is thus re- 
 peatedly used by CEdipus, in the Phcenissae of Euripides, 
 when lamenting his wretched condition as one pursued 
 from his earliest years by the wrath of the Gods, on account 
 of his own sins and his father’s impious disobedience to 
 the oracle : 
 
 ’APA2 napaTiabkv Aatov nal natal dovg. 
 ov yap , . . . 
 
 uvev ftetiv rov, ravr’ kfiTJxavTjad/Ltrjv. 
 etev • Tt dpdao) drjO ’ 6 AY2AAIMS2N ky6. 
 
 Phoenissce , 1626 . 
 
 In its later applications, evdaiiiovia loses much of its old 
 religious sense, and degenerates into a synonyme of svrv- 
 %ia, or good fortune, losing almost entirely its etymological 
 reference to the favour of an overruling divinity. In this it 
 shares the corruption of its principal component part, dal- 
 For a most striking illustration, however, of the rad- 
 ical primitive difference between evdalficov and evrvxrjg, 
 Ave may refer to Euripides, Medea, 1225 : 
 
 Qvijtu)V yap ovdelg karlv ’EYAAIM12N <pvoet' 
 oUov (5’ kmhpvivTog, ’EYTYXE2TEP02 
 aXkov yevotT * av aXXog, ’EYAAIM&N 6’ civ ov. 
 
 By nature none of mortal race are blessed 
 
 When wealth flows in, one man may be more happy 
 
 Than others of his race, but none are blessed. 
 
 The contrast between this beautiful Greek word and the 
 one by which it is generally rendered in our own tongue is 
 very striking. The Saxon happiness is from hap, signifying 
 luck, fortune, or chance ; a sense to which the Greek, as we 
 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PROSPERITY OF THE WICKED. 243 
 
 have seen, subsequently degenerated. The true etymolo- 
 gical meaning, therefore, of happy, is that given by Web- 
 ster, namely, u receiving good from something that comes to 
 us unexpectedly , or by chance , that is, fortunate, or lucky” 
 The same lexicographer says afterward, that “ he only can 
 be called happy who enjoys the favour of God but this is 
 an idea which was subsequently ingrafted on the pagan 
 root by the Christian theology. The original Saxon word 
 had nothing of the to delov or divine about it. 
 
 XXXIX. 
 
 Atheistic Argument against Providence drawn from the Pros- 
 perity of the Wicked. Plato's Language compared with 
 that of the Scriptures. 
 
 Page 43, Line 3. r H teal npog reXog toog avoalovg av- 
 Opbonovg optiv eXOovrag yrjpaiovg, k. t. A. — “ When you 
 behold men growing old, who continue unholy even to 
 the very end of life, leaving children and children’s chil- 
 dren in the highest honours — then are you disturbed at the 
 sight,” &c. In what striking language is this same diffi- 
 culty set forth in the Holy Scriptures, not only as perplex- 
 ing the mass of mankind, but also as occasioning, at times, 
 painful doubts even to the acknowledged people of God. 
 Compare the complaint of Asaph in the Ixxiii. Psalm : 
 But as for me, my feet were almost gone, my steps had well- 
 nigh slipped. For I was envious at the foolish, when I saw 
 the prosperity of the wicked. Wherefore his people backslide ;* 
 
 * We prefer this rendering for the Hebrew 3^1, as it may mean 
 
 T 
 
 to turn lack, as well as to turn to, or return ; although the latter is 
 the most usual sense in this conjugation. It may also mean, they 
 turn themselves with astonishment and perplexity, as to some wondrous 
 spectacle ; in which sense it would well correspond to the Greek ra - 
 oarry, as used here by Plato. 
 
244 ARGUMENT FROM THE PROSPERITY OF THE WICKED. 
 
 and they say , Doth God know ? And is there a providence 
 in the Most High ? So, also, Job, with still more resem- 
 blance to the passage before us : Wherefore do the wicked 
 live , become old , yea , are mighty in power ? Job , xxi., 7. 
 The sentiment may be frequently met with in classic an- 
 tiquity. It has formed the constant complaint of the virtu- 
 ous when desponding, and the standing objection of the 
 skeptic. As in Cicero, De Natura Deorum , lib. iii., 33-36, 
 where the doubting Cotta goes into a long enumeration of 
 the virtuous men who had been neglected of Heaven, and 
 of the impious who had been blessed, apparently, with the 
 highest prosperity. Speaking of the tyrant Dionysius (sec. 
 35), he says, Hunc igitur nec Olympius Jupiter fulmine 
 percussit, nec iEsculapius misero diuturnoque morbo tabe- 
 scentem interemit. Atque in suo lectulo mortuus, in rogo 
 illatus est ; eamque potestatem quam ipse per scelus erat 
 nactus, quasi justam et legitimam, hereditatis loco, filio tra- 
 didit. In the same strain, sec. 32 : Dies deficiat, si velim 
 numerare quibus bonis male evenerit, nec minus si comme- 
 morem quibus improbis optime. And then he proceeds to 
 relate the cases of Marius, Cinna, Dionysius, together with 
 the saying of the snarling Diogenes respecting Harpalus : 
 Diogenes quidem cynicus dicere solebat, Harpalum, qui 
 temporibus illis prsedo in Pamphylia felix habebatur, contra 
 Deos testimonium dicere , quod in ilia fortuna tam diu vive - 
 ret. Cic ., De Nat. Deor ., iii., 34. 
 
 Some minds, otherwise serious and thoughtful, have been 
 almost driven to atheism by it; as is represented in those 
 desponding lines with which Claudian commences one of 
 his poems : 
 
 Saepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem, 
 
 Curarent Superi terras, an nullus inesset 
 Rector, et incerto fluerent mortalia casu. 
 
 Nam cum dispositi quaesissem fcedera mundi, 
 Praescriptosque mari fines, annisque meatus, 
 
 Et lucis noctisque vires : tunc omnia rebar 
 
245 
 
 the word aTtodionofmeoficu. 
 
 Consilio firmata Dei — 
 
 Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi 
 Aspicerem, laetosque diu florere nocentes, 
 
 Vexarique pios , rursus labefacta cadebat 
 lleligio. — Claudian. in Rufinum , i., 12. 
 
 But, while it has disturbed the pious in their desponding 
 moods, it has formed the standing jest of the scoffer ; as in 
 the story of the atheist Diagoras, Cicero , De Nat. Deor ., 
 iii., 37 : At Diagoras quum Samothraciam venisset, Atheos 
 ille qui dicitur, atque ei quidam amicus, “ Tu, qui Deos pu- 
 tas humana negligere, nonne animadvertis, ex tot tabulis 
 pictis, quam multi votis vim tempestatis effugerint in por- 
 tumque salvi pervenerint ?” .Ita fit, inquit. Illi enim nun- 
 quam picti sunt qui naufragia fecerunt, in marique perierunt. 
 So, also, that malignant buffoon Aristophanes puts a similar 
 profane jest in the mouth of the travestied Socrates : 
 
 Kal rctig c5 pupe ov Kai Kpovtuv o£cjv Kal (3£KKeoe?i7]V£, 
 ehrep fdaXhei rovg kmopnovg , n tig ovxi hvenpr\aev ; 
 
 ovds K ?^euvvpov, ovde Qeupov ; kciltol o<j)6dpa y’ do' kniopKoi. 
 uXha tov avrov ye veuv (daHei, Kal 'Zovviov aKpov ’A dqveov, 
 
 Kal rag dpvg rag peydTiag * tl paOuv ; ov yap dpvg kvuopKel. 
 
 Nubes, 398. 
 
 If either Xenophon or Plato are entitled to the least credit, 
 nothing could be more directly opposed to his real and most 
 cherished sentiments. 
 
 XL. 
 
 The Singular Word ’ATTodcGTcofineofiai, and the Remarkable 
 Use made of it by Plato. 
 
 Page 44, Line 9. ’AAA’ eav i uog olov dTTodLOTrofinrjoaa- 
 Oat. This is a very peculiar and significant word, used by 
 Plato, in the few cases in which it occurs, to express the 
 strongest abhorrence, and generally employed in reference 
 to some wickedness of peculiar enormity. It signifies, ta 
 
 X 2 
 
246 the word dnodionofmeo^ai. 
 
 avert the Divine wrath by expiatory sacrifices or religious 
 rites of the most solemn kind ; from and, Aiog, and Trop,nrj, a 
 solemn religious procession . In accommodation to the lan- 
 guage of a later age, it might be rendered, to exorcise ; since 
 this term also comes from another part of a similar cere- 
 mony, performed for a similar purpose, namely, to avert , or 
 send away , evil . We may compare with this the derivative 
 noun, dirodioirogn^oeig, as used, Laws, lib. ix., 854, B., C. 
 That passage is deserving of attention, as being, in some 
 respects, one of the most deeply impressive, for its moral 
 bearings, of any to be found in the Platonic dialogues. The 
 subject is sacrilege, and during the discussion the legislator 
 introduces a law against it with this most solemn Trpoolpiov, 
 or preamble : “ One conversing with, and exhorting the 
 man, whom some evil desire, enticing by day and exciting 
 by night, was tempting to the commission of this horrid 
 crime of sacrilege, might thus say — O, sir, it is no evil mere- 
 ly human, nor any temptation sent from Heaven, that urges 
 you on to this sin, but a certain innate phrensy which grows 
 in men from old and unexpiated sins ( olorpog rig ep,(pvopevog 
 ek na?Miojv aai dtcaOdprcov rolg avOpuTroig ddiiirjpdTcov), 
 ever restless (nepupepopevog d?UT7]pid)6rjg), and calling for 
 vengeance on itself ” He seems to have had in view a class 
 of men who would be styled, in modern phraseology, given 
 over — almost, if not wholly, past their day of grace, or the 
 reach of any reforming means — men in whom sin had be- 
 come an olorpog, a raging disease,* or phrensy, urging them 
 on by a sort of maddening impulse, without the ordinary 
 inducements of gain or sensual pleasure — men under the 
 goadings of a keenly-sensible, yet utterly-depraved con- 
 science, which could only find ease in the commission of 
 greater and still greater enormities drowning the recollec- 
 
 * Such as, in the Gorgias, he styles vrc ovhog, namely, apparently 
 healed upon the surface, but ulcerating in the bones below — an old 
 and neglected sore. 
 
the word diroStoTiopneopaL. 247 
 
 tioii of the lesser, as though driven to wander about (aXirp- 
 pidxdrjg) by an ever-restless internal Erinnys. 
 
 To such a one he gives this most earnest and solemn ad- 
 vice : f/ 0 rav gol rrpOGncTTrxj n tgjv tolovtojv Soypdrcov, 16 1 
 eixl rag ’AXIOAIOnOMIIHIlEII], IOl ern rtiv anorpo - 
 
 naicov lepd luerrjg, 16 1 em rag r&v avdpcov dyadtiv %vvov- 
 < ilag , rag be rojv Karctiv cjyevye dperaGrpenrl , it. r. X. — 
 “ When even such a thought should invade your mind, be- 
 take yourself at once, to the most solemn modes of expia- 
 tion (d7ToScoiTO[i7TrjGeig) ; go as a suppliant to the shrines of 
 the wrath-averting divinities; resort, without- delay, to the 
 assemblies of the good ; and fly, without turning or looking 
 back, from all the associations of the bad ; if, peradventure, 
 thy wretched disease may be rendered lighter.” One is 
 strongly reminded of the angel’s urgent and alarming ex- 
 hortation to Lot and his family, when he bids them fly from 
 the impending doom of Sodom : Up ! get thee out of this 
 place ; escape for thy life ; look not behind thee ; tarry not in 
 all the plain ; haste to escape , lest thou be swept away . 
 
 We may compare, in respect to this most impressive 
 word, another passage in the ninth book, 878, A., where 
 the legislator is speaking of a house that has been defiled 
 with murder, and of the restoration of a family that has, in 
 consequence, been rendered childless : rovrov irpdjrov pev 
 Ka6r]paoQai ml dTro6conopnr)Gao6ai rov olnov XP e & v EGrto 
 uard vopov. See, also, the Cratylus , 396, E. : avpiov be 
 diTobtorcopTcrjGopedd re avrrjv , feat rca6apovpeda , e^evpovreg 
 oGrtg rd)V iepecjv rd rocavra beivbg Ka6atpeiv. It is ap- 
 plied by Plutarch to an obnoxious person whom they would 
 wish to send away — to exorcise as a troublesome spirit . 
 This strong language Csesar is represented as using in ref- 
 erence to Cato : YLarovog pev ov uapovrog • entrrjdeg yap 
 avrov elg K vnpov a^ebieTTopTTrjGavro. Plutarch , Cws., 2 1 . 
 
 The verb dironopTreo) has the same meaning, and from 
 this we have a similar word, with the same solemn reli- 
 
248 THE WORD a7T0Sl07T0p,TT£0pat. 
 
 gious import, which is used by the Septuagint to translate 
 the Hebrew or scapegoat. ’ ATronopnalog signifies a 
 
 victim to be sent away , with solemn religious rites , as an ex- 
 piation ; and is very similar to aXe^inanog and anorponaiog, 
 which are the more common terms in classic Greek. See 
 Leviticus , xvi., 8 : nXrjpov eva r <p Kvpco) teal nXrjpov eva tgj 
 anoTropiraLG) ; so, also, in the tenth verse of the same chap- 
 ter : rov e^tXdoaoOat £7r’ avrov ware dirooreiXat avrov eig 
 rfjv d7T07rop,nrjv. Clemens Alexandrinus uses it in the 
 same peculiar sense : em povrj rq dioTcopirrjoet rtiv Katctiv, 
 Strom., vii., 850.* 
 
 Plato could not have selected a stronger word to express 
 his utter abhorrence of atheism. By such language, he 
 represents it as that abominable spirit of all evil (if we may 
 use the word spirit in so strange a connexion), which he 
 had been endeavouring to averrnneate, or exorcise, from the 
 souls of the young persons whom he fancies himself so ten- 
 derly, yet solemnly, addressing. Some of the expressions 
 used in this passage, and in the parallel place quoted from 
 the ninth book, would almost come up to the Scripture doc- 
 trine of demoniacal possession or Satanic influence upon 
 the soul. The word Trpooiov, which almost immediately 
 follows, preserves the metaphor contained in dnodioiropn? /« 
 oaodat, and is in admirable keeping with the spirit of the 
 whole passage. It suggests here the idea of sudden evil, 
 violently invading , and which can only be prevented by the 
 most speedy and efficacious remedies. Viger and Ast 
 would, most absurdly, substitute tt poibv for irpooiov, thereby 
 
 * It is thus defined by Timaeus in his Lexicon of peculiar Platonic 
 phrases : dnoTzipnecdai nai diodeicdai ra dpapTr/para, cvpTvpdKTopi 
 Xpupzvoq t£) A it. The latter part of the compound may have the 
 general sense of izepiru, but more probably has reference to nopnij 
 as significant of a solemn religious procession, or ceremony, by 
 which evil was supposed to be averted, and which is alike common 
 to paganism and a corrupted species of Christianity. 
 
PLATO DEFICIENT IN THE DOCTRINE OF EXPIATION. 249 
 
 utterly spoiling the metaphor, and weakening the force of 
 the whole declaration. One proof that irpocubv is the prop, 
 er reading here may be derived from the parallel passage 
 in the ninth book, where we have the same image convey- 
 ed by a very similar word : orav ooi TTpooTTLirry r c rtiv tol- 
 ovtcov 6oyparo)v — “ when any such thought shall invade 
 you,” Sic 
 
 XU. 
 
 Defect of Plato's Theology in regard to the Doctrine of Atone- 
 ment and the Necessity of Expiation. 
 
 Page 51, Line 3. TrapatrrjTovg. The true sense of Plato 
 here, and in the subsequent argument, wherever this word 
 is used, is best given by rendering it easily propitiated , as 
 though it had been evnapaLrrjTOvg. In translating an au- 
 thor, we must take into view not only the peculiar circum- 
 stances by which he was surrounded, and the peculiar phi- 
 losophy and theology by which his mind was influenced, 
 but we are bound to consider, likewise, how far modem 
 philosophy and theology have affected certain terms in our 
 own tongue, which otherwise would have been true repre- 
 sentatives of his meaning, instead of conveying — as, under 
 such circumstances, they will be very likely to convey — an 
 idea which was never intended. A due regard to this will 
 sometimes require what may, perhaps, seem a paradox, 
 namely, a slight mistranslation of the letter in order to do 
 justice to the spirit ; or, in other words, to depart a little 
 from the etymological sense in order to preserve the sub- 
 stance of the writer’s thought. Thus, here, for example, 
 we shall certainly do Plato injustice, if we carry our Chris- 
 tian theology along with us in the interpretation, and give 
 to TrapaLTTjTOvg that sense which, standing alone, it would 
 suggest to a Christian mind. The philosopher knew no 
 
250 r la To !) [•: r i c i u n t 
 
 THE IX.CTRJNE OF EXPIATION. 
 
 thing of that groat atonement which forms the basis of the 
 Christian scheme. His argument is therefore directed 
 against those who held that the Divine displeasure, even 
 for the greatest offences, could be averted by sacrifices, 
 processions, vows, and the mere ritual performances of re- 
 ligion, without repentance, or (which is of still greater mo- 
 ment) without any sense of that need of expiation which 
 was signified by the sacrifices they blindly offered. This 
 feeling of the need of expiation was in some obscure way 
 expressed in all the religions of antiquity. The true and 
 perfect mode forms that peculiar doctrine of Christianity 
 which distinguishes it from all others, and the belief of 
 which, either in the substance or the type, has been, in all 
 ages, the essential element of the righteousness which is hy 
 faith. 
 
 Could we trace anything of this in the lives or writings 
 of Plato and Socrates, we should indulge more hope of 
 their salvation from it than from any of those moral lessons 
 — truly beautiful and sublime as they are — which have 
 been left to us in their immortal dialogues. We are told, 
 both by Plato and by Xenophon, that Socrates advised his 
 friends to be diligent in offering their sacrifices upon the al- 
 tars of their country's religion. For this he has been gen- 
 erally condemned (at least by Christian writers), as giving 
 a sanction to idolatry ; but we have no hesitation in ex- 
 pressing the opinion, that in no part of his philosophy did 
 he come nearer to Christianity and its central truth, and 
 that on no other grounds could we entertain such hopes of 
 his salvation ; provided we can only believe that, in giving 
 this advice, he had even the most faint allusion to the great 
 and saving doctrine which all sacrifice was primitively in- 
 tended to represent. 
 
 We find, however, but little reference to this need of ex- 
 piation in the writings of Plato, except, it might be, in the 
 case of such great and almost incurable sinners as are men* 
 
PLATO DEFICIENT IN THE DOCTRINE OF EXPIATION. 251 
 
 tioned in the passage lately quoted (page 247) from the 
 ninth book of the Laws. A life of ascetic virtue was the 
 remedy which he would in general propose ; although, in 
 the pride of philosophy, he was but little aware how utterly 
 defective is any thing which bears the name of human 
 virtue, when laid by the side of that Holy Law which 
 44 pierces even to the di viding asunder of the soul and the 
 spirit, and is a discerner of all the thoughts and intents of 
 the heart.” To a Christian mind this silence in regard to 
 an atonement is the second great fault in Plato’s theology. 
 The other is his doctrine of an original independent evil 
 principle. This being closely connected with the dogma 
 of the innate evil of matter, through which the soul was 
 tainted, led him naturally to teach an ascetic mode of puri- 
 fication to the exclusion of any external, forensic, and vica- 
 rious atonement. He preached much and most eloquently 
 against the lusts of the flesh as the cause and essence of all 
 depravity ; but his philosophy contains but slight recogni- 
 tion of those sins of the spirit in which the much-denounced 
 body has no share, and which may be supposed to belong 
 to a purely spiritual being as well as to one who is enclosed 
 in the grossest robes of matter. Hence it is easy to see 
 how these two errors, although apparently so remote, have 
 a common origin and a common seat in depraved and blind- 
 ed human nature ; and how all, whether out of the Church 
 or in the Church, who have endeavoured to rectify it in a 
 manner different from that pointed out in the Bible, have 
 ever stumbled on this same point, namely, the teaching of 
 an ascetic mode of purification, through the penances and 
 mortification of the flesh, not as auxiliary and disciplinary, 
 but as remedial and savina*. 
 
 In respect to the doctrine of an atonement, the Greek 
 poets are more often in accordance with the Bible, and 
 those traditions which had come down from a remote an- 
 tiquity, than our philosopher. Even in the very practices 
 
252 PLATO DEFICIENT IN THE DOCTRINE OF EXPIATION. 
 
 whose superstitious observances he condemns, and justly 
 condemns, there may be manifested that deep sense of the 
 need of expiation which has been felt in all ages — which 
 has formed a part of all false religions, and of all corruptions 
 of the true — and which only finds repose in a believing and 
 intelligent view of the doctrine of the cross. His argument, 
 however, is sound, as directed against some of the practices 
 which prevailed in the Greek religion, and which operated 
 equally with atheism in encouraging the most abominable 
 licentiousness ; for their great design was not so much to 
 take away sin, or the consciousness of sin, as to avert its 
 consequences.* 
 
 It is the glory of the Gospel that God is TrapcurrjTog — 
 that he can be propitiated ; while the awful sacrifice by 
 •" ilich it is accomplished levels in the dust all the pride of 
 human virtue, and all the lofty aspirations of human philos- 
 ophy. It relieves the penitent and believing spirit from 
 that gloomy sentiment of the Grecian poet, which has ever 
 weighed so heavily on the dark heathen mind — 
 
 Aiog yap SvGTrapaLrrjTOL (ppeveg t — 
 
 while yet it gives no countenance to that false, presumptu- 
 ous belief in the Divine placability, against which Plato is 
 here contending, and on which some in our own day would 
 lay so much stress. With such, whether ancient or mod- 
 ern, it is not the Divine mercy which they would exalt — 
 for that has no meaning separate from the Divine justice — 
 but, rather, that idol attribute of their own imaginations, 
 which is so well expressed, in this very argument, by the 
 Greek word paOvpUa ; that sluggish indolence, indifference, 
 or good-nature, to use a common expression, which con- 
 stitutes the prime attribute of the Deity of the ancient Ep- 
 icurean and the modern sentimentalist. 
 
 * See remarks on this distinction, note 1, page 4. 
 
 f ^schylus, Prom. Vinct., 34. 
 
HIGHEST PROOF OF THE DIVINE GOODNESS. 253 
 
 XLII. 
 
 Highest Proof of the Divine Goodness , the a 'priori Conviction 
 * of the Moral Sense. 
 
 Page 51, Line 13. ’A yaOovg re nai aptorovg. The ap- 
 peal is here directly to the moral sense. The intelligence 
 and power of the Deity may be matters of inductive reason- 
 ing, although even for these, and especially the former, 
 there may be as good a ground of belief in the a priori con- 
 viction which every man possesses. But we may safely 
 say that no one really ever resorts to external induction for 
 his own private individual satisfaction in the belief that God 
 is good ; although on other grounds, and from other motives, 
 it may sometimes be made the subject of speculative argu- 
 ment. We cannot bear the contrary opinion. Just as by 
 the laws of our minds we are compelled to assert that mat- 
 ter has in itself no inherent property of motion, notwith- 
 standing all mere inductive experience of an ever-restless, 
 ever-moving world is in opposition to such an a priori con- 
 viction ; so, likewise, are we compelled to believe and feel 
 that God is good, however much inductive argument from 
 all the facts around us, in this world of disorder, might go 
 towards maintaining the contrary dogma. Even those who 
 assert most strenuously that the Divine benevolence is 
 proved from the observation of external nature carry along 
 with them this a priori conviction, without, perhaps, being 
 aware of the fact, that from it is derived, to their own minds 
 and the minds of others, the main force of every argument 
 by which they would sustain their preconceived hypothesis. 
 Let this innate conviction be utterly banished from the soul, 
 and we might then see, if it were possible to put ourselves 
 in that condition, what is the real strength, or, rather, real 
 weakness of the a posteriori proof. Should even the great 
 mass of facts which fall within the sphere of our observa- 
 
 Y 
 
^54 HIGHEST PROOF OF TIIE DIVINE GOODNESS. 
 
 tion be favourable to such a position, yet what right would 
 we have to extend this to the immense* scale of the uni- 
 verse, unless impelled to it by the unconscious working of 
 this innate law of our moral nature ? If this world w T ere 
 filled with happiness to overflowing, how could so narrow 
 an induction dare to step beyond its limits 1 What is our 
 position, with infinite space all around us, and two illimita- 
 ble eternities, before and behind us, that we should draw 
 any inferences from a mere induction of facts as to the moral 
 attributes of the Deity, unless in the soul itself there is 
 some sure foundation for faith in their existence ? If, how- 
 ever, on the other hand, we are actually compelled to re- 
 verse the picture, and to assert that misery, in our w~orld at 
 least, forms the rule, and happiness the exception — if the 
 Bible tells us that man is born to sorrow — if Plato declares 
 that our good things are muck fewer in number than our evil 
 things — and if the true voice of humanity has responded in 
 all ages to these assertions both of profane and Holy Writ 
 — on what ground can we yet cling to the belief in the Di- 
 vine benevolence, except by relying on the deep conviction 
 of that moral sense, which tells us, and, even though worlds 
 on worlds should exhibit facts to the contrary, would still 
 tell us, that God is good. 
 
 If no induction can prove it, neither can any induction 
 strip us of the belief as long as the soul remains true to her- 
 self. There is within us something higher than the spec- 
 ulative or the inductive reason, which exclaims, as the 
 spontaneous sentiment of the soul, which she can neither 
 demonstrate nor reject, If there be a God , he must be good , 
 and must delight in goodness. The Judge of all the Earth 
 must do right. In proof of this, Plato does not hesitate to 
 appeal here to the consciences even of his supposed oppo- 
 nents, and therefore he says, nevre ovreg — all five of us, 
 namely, the three parties to the dialogue, and the two ima- 
 ginary disputants who speculatively deny a providence ; as 
 
STYLE OF THE BIBLE ABOVE THAT OF PHILOSOPHY. 255 
 
 much as to say, Here we all agree — here there is no need 
 of argument ; we all admit that, if there is a God, he must 
 be good, however much we may differ as to that in which 
 his goodness consists. 
 
 XLIII. 
 
 Sublime Mode in which the Bible represents the Divine Prov- 
 idence and Omniscience as contrasted with all mere Philos- 
 ophizing on these Attributes. Analysis of the Greek Word 
 \ Avdpela , as denoting one of the Cardinal Virtues of Soul . 
 
 Page 52, Line 2. A eiXlag yap e/cyovog, tc. r. X. By con- 
 necting this with what is said, page 46, line 10, aperijg pev 
 avdpelav elvai , deiXlav 6e , naulag, we get the whole argu- 
 ment, which may be thus stated : We admit the Gods to he 
 good : avdpela is a part of virtue ; deiXta is its opposite ; 
 apyla is the offspring of detXta : therefore it cannot be through 
 apyta and paOvpla that the Gods neglect the affairs of men. 
 He had before proved that it could not be from want of 
 power. This is conclusive. As a matter of reasoning, it is 
 admirably stated, and is in itself unanswerable. And yet 
 in a manner how different from all this parade of argument 
 do the Scriptures treat this subject of the Divine providence 
 and omniscience. How sublimely do they assume all these 
 positions, without reasoning at all about them. The Lord 
 looks down from heaven. His eyes behold , and his eyelids try 
 the ivays of the children of men. He knoweth our sitting down 
 and our rising up. He under standeih our thought afar off. 
 He never slumbereth nor sleepeih that keepeth Israel. As the 
 mountains are round about Jerusalem , so the Lord is round 
 about his people from henceforth and for evermore. The eyes 
 of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and. the good. 
 This is the style worthy of a Divine revelation ; and how 
 poor aoes our cold philosophizing, even in its best, and loft- 
 
256 the word dvdpeia, as applied to the deity. 
 
 iest, and most religious efforts, appear in the comparison. 
 Who can turn from the Grecian poets and philosophers, 
 with all their acknowledged excellences — yea, even from 
 the almost divine Plato himself — to the Holy Scriptures, 
 without feeling, for the time, a conviction amounting to the 
 full assurance of absolute certainty, that the latter is indeed 
 from Heaven — the voice of God, and not of man ? 
 
 The term dvdpeia, here used, would seem, if etymologi- 
 cally considered, to be improperly applied to the Deity. 
 This objection, however, is entitled to but little weight. 
 The word is applicable to spiritual energy of any kind, as 
 well as to that which is properly human. It denotes, strict- 
 ly, energy of sou! , or strength of will ; not merely in the 
 sense of physical power, outwardly to execute its volitions, 
 but rather as a pure, internal , spiritual force, by which one 
 man or one being may differ from another. There may be 
 a good will, yet weak ; but when this moral strength is add- 
 ed to the other cardinal virtues, the manly character is said 
 to be complete, and hence the name. It is what the Apos- 
 tle means by the word dperrj (the same with the Latin vir- 
 tues, from a similar etymology), when he says, Add to your 
 faith virtue . In the Laches, 192, D., Plato defines it as 
 uaprepta ng rrjg ^vxijg. Elsewhere, connecting it with all 
 the virtues, he describes the truly brave man as one who 
 fears nothing which ought not to be feared, while , at the same 
 time , he fears everything which ought to be feared ; thus view- 
 ing it as in unison with the highest wisdom, and as utterly 
 opposed to that blind, counterfeit foolhardiness which has 
 no relation to the rational soul, but belongs as much to the 
 beast as to a human being. Hence he shows that “ the 
 truly brave, since he must know what is truly good, must 
 necessarily partake of righteousness, temperance, and holi- 
 ness ; because to him alone it pertains, by reason of this 
 virtue, to have a true fear in regard to God and man, so as 
 to fear what ought to be feared, arid to be ever bold when 
 
THE WORD avdpELCb , AS APPLIED TO THE DEITY. 25 1 / 
 
 engaged in right and duty” (vide the Laches , 199, D.) ; thus 
 making dvdpda the support and life of all the other virtues, 
 according to a favourite theory, that they are all, when gen- 
 uine, essentially connected ; that, where one exists, all exist 
 in a greater or less degree ; and that, where one is want- 
 ing, all are to be suspected of spuriousness. 
 
 In this sense of energy of will* it is properly applied to 
 the Deity, notwithstanding the apparent etymological incon- 
 sistency. It strikingly suggests that definition of the Divine 
 nature which Aristotle ascribes to Plato, namely, “ that 
 whose very essence is energy ” — rj apxr) r\q ovcia Evepyetd eg - 
 tiv ; that which must act with an intensity of energy pro- 
 portioned to an infinite nature, ever in harmony with itself, 
 and ever in the most vehement and burning opposition to all 
 that is unlike. See remarks on this passage of Aristotle, 
 page 190. 
 
 A Etkla is the opposite of avtipsla. In some respects it 
 is nearly synonymous with paOvgia , easiness, fickleness, or 
 weakness of will . Tpvcftr], effeminacy, the result of sensuality . 
 No terms, certainly, could be more remote from any right 
 conception of a spiritual God. To such as those with whom 
 Plato supposes himself contending, and to all who deny a 
 special providence (although they may not see the logical 
 consequences as the philosopher has analyzed them), may 
 be applied the language of the Bible : Ye thought that I was 
 altogether such a one as yourselves. And yet men of this 
 description often assume to be under the teaching of a high- 
 er philosophy than those weak and simple ones, who ima- 
 gine that their smallest sins and their lightest cares are the 
 objects of God’s special regard. 
 
 Philosophical theism often seems to talk very piously, 
 
 * We would ever use the term will, in such a connexion as this, in 
 its highest import, as distinguished from animal wilfulness , or mere 
 volition, and as ever conjoined with reason ; or, as Cicero defines it, 
 Voluntas est quae quid cum rations desiderat. 
 
 Y 2 
 
258 
 
 THE PIETY OF EPICUREANISM. 
 
 and to claim the merit of being very religious, because .i 
 graciously admits the Divine existence and intelligence* 
 while yet it denies everything which could make that ex- 
 istence an object of love, or fear, or of any interest of any 
 kind beyond what might be felt in the contemplation of a 
 mathematical theorem. The ancient Epicureans some- 
 times affected this kind of sentimental religionism, # some 
 specimens of which we find admirably set forth, in all their 
 hollowness, in Cicero’s treatise De Nalura Deorum , lib. i., 
 s. 41 : Ac etiam de sanctitate, de pielaie scripsit Epicurus. 
 At quo modo in his loquitur ? Ut Coruncianum aut Scaevo- 
 lam pontifices maximos te audire dicas : non eum, qui sus 
 tulerit omneni funditus religionem ? Quid est enim, cur 
 Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, quum Dii non modo ho- 
 mines non colant, sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant? 
 Sec. 42 : Horum enim sententise omnium non modo super, 
 stitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis Deorum ; sed 
 etiam religionem, quae Deorum cultu pio continetur. ' Sec. 
 43 : Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicibus 
 religionem , quum Diis immortalibus et opem et gratiam sus- 
 tulit. Quum enim optimam et praestantissimam naturam Dei 
 dicat esse, negat idem esse in Deo gratiam. Tollit id quod 
 maxime proprium est optimee praestantissimaeque naturae. 
 
 How well, also, might what follows apply to those sen- 
 timental followers of Spinoza, who, rapt in philosophical 
 adoration of “ the holiness of nature and of the awe of the 
 infinite,” do yet, in their* high and transcendental spiritual- 
 ity, so vehemently condemn the sensual philosophy of Epi- 
 curus. At enim liber est Epicurei de sanctitate. Ludimur ab 
 homine non tarn faceto, quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. 
 Quce enim potest esse sanctitas , si Dii humana non curant ? 
 
 * This word cannot probably be found in any English dictionary, 
 And yet nothing seemed so well adapted to the idea we wished to 
 express, namely, that species of scientific piety which abounds so 
 much in such modern books as Nichols’s Architecture of the Heav- 
 ens, and in the lectures of l)r. Dionysius Lardner. 
 
rRUE DIGNITY OF MAN IIIS RELIGIOUS NATURE. 259 
 
 XLIV. 
 
 The True Dignity of Man his Religious Nature. A nalysis 
 of the Words E voedeia, fyc. 
 
 Page 53, Line 2. Ovtcovv 6rj rdye avOpumva npayptara 
 rrj g re epx/jvxov perex^t (pvoe cog apta, ual 'deoGedeararov, u. 
 t. X. This is said by way of magnifying the importance 
 of man ; although, even when regarded as one of the least 
 parts of the universe, he would not, as has been shown, be 
 beneath the care of a special providence. Two things are 
 said to enhance his dignity. He partakes of an animated 
 nature, and he is of all animals the most religious. Com- 
 pare the Protagoras, 522, A. : ''Etrretdrj 6e 6 avOpconog 'deiag 
 pierexet ptotpag, irptirov p lev did rrjv rov $ eov £ vyyevetav , 
 %d)G)v pidvov deovg evopaoe , uai emxcipst fluptovg re Idpveo- 
 Oai uai aydXpiara 'detiv — “ And since man shares in the 
 divine, he alone, of all animals, through his relationship to 
 the Deity, believes in the existence of Gods, and undertakes 
 to establish altars in their honour.” Compare, also, Ovid, 
 Metamorpli lib. i., 70 : 
 
 Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altee 
 Deerat adhuc — 
 
 Pronaque quum spectant animalia caetera terram, 
 
 Os homini sublime dedit, ccelumque tueri 
 Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus. 
 
 'A vOpumva Tcpaypiara is equivalent here to ol avOpconot ; 
 the form of the words being probably affected by the neuter 
 %Cjov. For the same reason we have avro instead of avrog 
 which we should have expected. It is by the attraction of 
 £c5 ov, understood or implied in See remarks on this 
 
 peculiarity of the Greek language, page 203. It is, how- 
 ever, to be used here as if connected with avQpcjnog ; and 
 is the same as though we should say in English, the animat 
 man itself is the most religious, &c. 
 
260 TRUE DIGNITY OF MAN HIS RELIGIOUS NATURE. 
 
 The words $ eoaebeorarov , '&sooe6sta, are etymologically 
 formed on the same idea with the Hebrew phrase, narv 
 HUT, the fear of the Lord, which is the Old Testament 
 term for religion or piety. Asiaidaipovia contains etymolo. 
 gically the same radical conception, but is almost always 
 used in a lower and somewhat bad sense, as, for example, 
 by Paul, Acts, xvii., 22. It partakes of the degeneracy of 
 its component, dacpcov ; and as that became only another 
 name for Fortune, so this sinks down into superstition, or 
 that fear and worship of Fortune, Destiny, and other ima- 
 ginary personifications, which is closely allied to atheism. 
 AeiOidaipovia is seldom, if ever, taken for the pure and 
 reverential fear of God ; while, on the other hand, 'Seoos- 
 6eia , or its equivalent, svoedeia, is made the parent of all 
 the other virtues, and the first in the estimation of Heaven. 
 Thus Plato speaks of it in the Epinomis, or whoever was 
 the author of that dialogue : psl^ov yap popiov aperrjg pr\- 
 6slg rjpdg rears nelOy rrjg evosdeiag tgj 'dvrjTcp ysvsi . Epi- 
 nomis , 989, B. To the same effect Sophocles, in the Phi- 
 loctetes, 1442: 
 
 E vgeSsIte TTpog ■&eovq * 
 
 (jg ruXiJ unavra devrep’ r/yelrai JlaTrjp 
 ZEvg. ov yap ijvoiSeia GvvdvfjGKEL pporolg * 
 nav &gl, kuv -duvoGiv, ovk anollvTcu ; 
 
 or, in other words, all virtues arising out of mere earthly re- 
 lations are temporary , arid must perish. Piety alone survives 
 the grave . The primary root, oedag, signifying wonder , as- 
 tonishment, awe, is sometimes used for the very Numen or 
 Divinity himself, examples of which are frequently to be 
 found in Pindar and iEschylus. The verb is sometimes 
 apparently employed for repav, to signify reverence towards 
 human magistrates. This, however, is only a secondary 
 sense, and the primary still holds its place in the ancient 
 idea that magistrates represented the Divine authority, and 
 that judges stood to us in the place of the Elohim. The 
 
MEN COMPARED TO SHEEP OF THE DIVINE PASTURE. 2G1 
 
 ultimate radical may be the Hebrew , juravit, and this 
 perhaps remotely connected in meaning with y2U/, the sa- 
 cred number seven. 
 
 XLV. 
 
 Men compared to Sheep of the Divine Pasture. Language 
 of Plato on this Subject in Harmony with the Scriptures. 
 
 Page 53, Line 6. Oetiv ye firjv urTyiard tyapev elvai, k. 
 r. X. This comparison is quite a favourite with Plato. 
 Thus Socrates says in the Phsedon, 62, B. : ’A XXa rode 
 ye \ioi dotcel ev XeyeoOai to fteovg elvai, ryi&v rovg enipe- 
 Xovpevovg, teal ryiag rovg avOpdirovg ev tcov UTrjpdrcov rolg 
 tieolg elvai — “This seems to me to be well said, that the 
 Gods are our keepers, and that we are among their flocks 
 or possessions from which he deduces an admirable ar- 
 gument against the lawfulness of suicide. It is worthy of 
 note, too, that this is evidently referred to as a saying which 
 had come down from the olden time ; and in this light it 
 furnishes a pleasing evidence of the piety and sound reli- 
 gious philosophy of the primitive or patriarchal ages. The 
 same comparison may be found in Plato’s romance of At- 
 lantis, where he speaks of the care which the Gods took of 
 the inhabitants of that blessed isle, and in which he repre- 
 sents them as forming a perfect theocracy : ual fcaroudoav- 
 reg olov vopelg KTryiara ual rcolpvia ual Dpeppara eavrcov 
 rjpdg erpeepov. Critias , 109, C. Compare the present trea- 
 tise, page 69, line 2 : tjvppaxoi 6e i]flv tieot re dpa ual 
 daipoveg * rjpelg d’ av KTrjpara tietiv real daipovov — “ The 
 Gods and Genii are our helpers, for we are the flocks or 
 possessions of the Gods and guardian divinities.” 
 
 Whatever may have been the origin of the sentiment and 
 of the expression, it is, with the exception of the use of the 
 plural tietiv, not only purely Scriptural in its conception, 
 
262 PECULIARITY OF NEGATIVE FORMS OF GREEK VERBS* 
 
 but also in the very language. For proof of this, compare 
 Psalm c., 3 : For we are his people and the sheep of his pas- 
 ture. He hath made us, and his are we ; as the Hebrew, 
 \ in accordance with the Keri, should be translated. 
 He will feed his flock like a shepherd. Isaiah, xl., 11. From 
 this ancient idea of the resemblance which the Divine as 
 well as kingly authority bore to the pastoral relation, came 
 the noun noifJLrjv, in that frequent Homeric meaning of rulei 
 or shepherd of the people — 
 
 ’AyapefJLVOva, noipeva Xativ — 
 
 as also the verb 7r oipaivo), in that sense of ruling which we 
 find in the Septuagint version of Psalm ii., 9 ; Matthew, ii., 
 6 ; Rev., ii., 27 ; vii., 17 ; xii., 5 ; xix., 15. 
 
 XL VI. 
 
 Peculiarity of certain Negative Forms of Greek Verbs . 
 
 Page 55, Lines 1,2. ’ETupekovpevG) . . . apekovvTi. Why 
 does the positive, in this word, take the middle or deponent, 
 and the negative or privative the active voice ? It may be 
 difficult to explain the philosophy of this and of many other 
 matters in the Greek, yet we would simply advert to the 
 fact, that this is the case with a very large number of verbs ; 
 and even to such an extent as to entitle it to be justly re- 
 garded as one of the peculiarities, or well- settled idioms of 
 the language. Indeed, we seldom, if ever, find a word 
 strictly negative or privative of the middle form. The ac- 
 tive form of the privative, it is true, sometimes slightly va- 
 ries from what would be the analogical active of the middle 
 or deponent positive in use ; yet still, not to such a degree 
 as to affect the principle to which we have adverted. The 
 former is generally in co pure, while the middle or deponent 
 may be in opai ; and sometimes the latter is compounded 
 with a preposition, while the former has only the simple 
 
PECULIARITY OF NEGATIVE FORMS OF GREEK VERBS. 263 
 
 radical. Sometimes the positive is strictly deponent, while 
 in other cases it has an active voice in use ; but even then 
 the privative form in o) is the privative, not of the active, 
 but of the middle ; as, for example, ttelOg), to 'persuade ; 
 rreldopai , to obey or trust ; dneideo). to be disobedient. 
 
 In illustration of this peculiarity, we may mention, as 
 some of the most usual cases, although by no means the 
 whole, rceidopaL , to obey , dnecdeo) (not dneldopac), to be 
 disobedient ; pdopat, to be glad , arjdeo), to feel disgust , or 
 displeasure ; ftypeopai EvOvpeopac, to be angry , or under 
 mental excitement , dOvpso), to be without spirit , or discour- 
 aged ; fcrjdopac, to be concerned about anything , dupdeo), to 
 be careless or unconcerned ; tcoopECO, to put in order , to regu- 
 late . , uoopEopai , to iceep one's self in order , or to act in a 
 comely manner , drcoc jyeo), the negative, not. of the active, 
 but of the middle or passive, namely, to be without order , or 
 to act in a licentious or disorderly manner ; eXttg), to raise 
 hopes , eXnopai, to hope , deXirco, or deXirreo), to despair ; 
 peXopai, or pEXeopai, knipeXeopai, to take care of or be con- 
 cerned for, dpeXe a), to neglect; pr\x av dopai, or p7]x av £°[ mi > 
 to plan , to invent , dprjxavEC °, to & e without plans , to be at a 
 loss ; (dovXopat, to be willing , ddovXeo), to be unwilling , or 
 refuse — although this word has oftener, perhaps, the sense 
 of inconsiderateness , or want of refection , as though it were 
 the privative of (3ovXevg) — rpopiopat, to tremble , arpopio), 
 or drpepeG), to be undisturbed ; (pEtdopat, to spare , acpEidEG), 
 to be lavish , or prodigal. Compare, also, x a pi^°l iai i 
 piOTEG) — ipEvdopat, d'lpEvdEO, d'lpEvorec*) — dvvapai, ddvva 
 teg) — oedopac, daedso), &c. 
 
 It may be observed, that in most of these cases the form 
 with a privative is not the direct negative either of the ac- 
 tive or the middle ; that is, is not simply the denial of a re- 
 flex action , but expresses rather a negative state of mind. 
 As, for example, arcEiOEiv , besides being wholly different 
 from pi] tteIOelv, is not even equivalent to prj nEiOeoOat , to 
 
264 GREAT THINGS CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT SMALL, 
 
 which it seems to have the nearest alliance, but expresses 
 rather that positive condition of the soul from which all acts 
 of disobedience do proceed. So, also, in the passage from 
 the text, apEXelv is not the same as j urj emiieXelodat , but 
 rather expresses that sluggish, indifferent, careless disposi- 
 tion, which is so utterly opposed to all right views of the 
 Divine nature. Mr) empeXeZoOaL may or may not involve 
 criminality, as may be seen from the manner in which it is 
 used page 50, lines 8, 10. It may result from want of pow- 
 er, or a variety of other justifying reasons. ’ApeXeZv al- 
 ways implies fault, and is always to be taken in an unfa- 
 vourable sense. So, also, pi) ttzlOegOcu, or pi) tuotevelv , 
 may be consistent with freedom from all blame, according 
 to the presence or absence of other circumstances ; but. 
 cliteiOeIv must always be associated with condemnation, as 
 implying an unbelieving and guilty condition of the soul. 
 This is the force of the word as used by our Saviour, John, 
 iii., 36 : 6 6s clttelOCjv ovx oxpErat farjv — The unbelieving 
 shall never see life , but the wrath of God abideth on him . 
 
 For these reasons, perhaps, these verbs fell into an in- 
 transitive sense, leaving the denial of the action of the pos- 
 itive form to be expressed by the negative particles. And 
 perhaps, «also, because they differ somewhat from the mere 
 negation of the reflex action of the middle, they retain, for 
 distinction’s sake, the active form ; although, at first view, 
 such privative words would seem, of all others, the most 
 foreign to the ordinary use of that voice. 
 
 XL VII. 
 
 Great Things cannot Exist without Small. Application of 
 the Maxim to the Doctrine of a Special Providence , Edu- 
 cation , and to Politics. 
 
 Page 55, Line 5. Ov pi)v ovde Kvdepvrjratg, ovde orpa- 
 rrjyolg ovd 9 av noXtritcoZg X^P 1 ^ optHptiv pevaXa. ov6e 
 
GREAT THINGS CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT SMALL. 265 
 
 yap avev ojurcptiv rovg p,eydXovg (paoiv ol XiOoXoyoi XiOovg 
 ev fceloOac — “ Neither to pilots, nor to commanders, nor to 
 political men, can great things exist without small things ; 
 for, as the stone-masons say, neither do large stones lie 
 well together in a structure without the small.” This max- 
 im is capable of the widest range. It is not only applica- 
 ble to stone-masons, and politicians, and to the sublime ar- 
 gument of Plato here in favour of a special providence, but 
 is also of the highest importance in respect to education, 
 and well worthy the attention of all teachers of youth. For 
 want of a patient and laborious care in respect to what may 
 seem the more minute elements of science, a structure is 
 often erected without cohesion or symmetry, and destined, 
 through the looseness of its parts, to fall to pieces almost 
 as soon as completed. 
 
 As Plato applies the maxim here to politicians, so, also, 
 Aristotle, in his Politico, lib. ii., 2, institutes a similar com- 
 parison in respect to government, and shows that it is es- 
 sential to the very constitution of a sound and healthy state 
 that its individual elements should be small things mingled 
 with great, in such a way as to give coherence and sym- 
 pathy to the whole. In pursuance of this same idea, he 
 condemns those theorists who, even in his day, advocated 
 the impracticable doctrine of perfect equality, and charges 
 them with being the greatest enemies to that very idea of 
 unity which they would be thought so zealously to main- 
 tain. The levelling dogma, he admits, is plausible, and ap- 
 parently most philanthropic — evirpoaconog ical (pcXavOpcjirog 
 av elvai So^etev — but, in the end, instead of being produc- 
 tive of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, it is 
 fraught with the seeds of all evil both to individuals and to 
 the state. As unity implies plurality and variety, so, he de- 
 clares, there can be no true unity in sameness. There can 
 be no binding sympathy except in a community of higher 
 and lower, lesser and greater interests. As well might one 
 
 Z 
 
266 GREAT THINGS CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT SMALL. 
 
 attempt to construct a wall with round, smooth pebbles, all 
 of the same size and fashion, or produce harmony from 
 strings all of the same length and tension ; which, as he 
 justly remarks, might furnish an insipid homophony, but 
 never a true symphony : coanep nav el ng rrjv ovpupGiviav 
 TroLrjoeiev dfjiO(po)vcav, rj rov pvOpov (3aoiv plav, Politica , 
 ii., 2. 
 
 There is a singular passage in the Ajax of Sophocles, in 
 which we think there is had in view this same comparison 
 of great and little stones, although the word is not expressly 
 mentioned in the Greek. He also applies it, in the same 
 manner, to those wild and disorganizing doctriftes of gov- 
 ernment, which would destroy all confidence and all mutual 
 support, by exciting an unholy jealousy between the rich 
 and the poor. The passage is interesting, if for no other 
 purpose, to show how precisely the same, in temper and in 
 argument, have been the demagogues of all ages : 
 
 IIpo^ yap rov exovO’ 6 (j)6ovoc £pnet. 
 
 Kalroi cpuipoi peyahuv x^P^ 
 
 C(j>a?iep6v nvpyov pvpa nehovTai. 
 pera yap peyd^cjv /3aidg apicr 9 dv , 
 nal psyag opOoW’ vtzo pLKporipov. 
 
 ’A/U/ ov dvvarov rovg avorjTovg 
 
 tovtcov yv6pag TTpodidaoKELv. — Ajax , 151. 
 
 Which we would thus attempt to render, by way of improve- 
 ment on Potter’s version, in which, we think, he has over- 
 looked the implied simile, and thus failed to bring out its 
 principal beauty : 
 
 Thus envy secretly assails the rich. 
 
 And yet small stones, unmingled with the great, 
 
 Build up a dangerous tower — a frail defence* 
 
 The high and low in mutual sympathy 
 Sustain each other ; yet this truth is one 
 Which fools can never learn. 
 
 No one, we think, can fail to admire the still higher and 
 yet most just application which Plato makes of this striking 
 
GENTLENESS OF PLATO S MODE OF ARGUMENT. 267 
 
 comparison to the government of the Divine Architect, and 
 to the doctrine of a special providence. 
 
 XL VIII. 
 
 Gentleness of Plato's Mode of Argument , and its Peculiat 
 Adaptation to the Minds of the Young. 
 
 Page 57, Line 2. Tgj ye pca^eadat rolg Xoyoig, k. t. A. 
 The propriety of this word will best appear in a paraphrase 
 of the spirit of the whole passage. It suggests some such 
 train of thought as this : “We have now addressed his rea- 
 son, and by a summary yet conclusive syllogism, forcibly, 
 as it were, compelled him to admit the incorrectness of his 
 positions. Still, although his reason is silenced, his feel- 
 ings or imagination may yet refuse to surrender, and may 
 revolt at the idea that the Deity is concerned in all the ap- 
 parently trivial and minute operations of the universe. 
 There seems, therefore, in addition, to be need of some 
 soothing charms (eTTudtiv), some gentle persuasions, to 
 overcome those prejudices or distastes which will not 
 yield to reason.” 
 
 ’E nadetv (encod?]), with its derivatives, is a favourite 
 word with Plato. What a sublime beauty does it possess 
 in the Phsedon, where Socrates, after having gone through 
 the strongest and most recondite arguments that reason 
 could array for a future life, makes, as his ground of con- 
 fidence, the cheering hope which the belief produces in 
 the soul, and those sweet persuasions of a moral kind, 
 which surpass in power all the deductions of the intellect ; 
 “ for noble is the prize (he says), and great the hope” — rca- 
 Adv yap to aOXov uai rj eXnlg peydkrj. And then, after 
 having gone through the mythical representations of the 
 unseen world, he tells us that the soul must ever chant 
 these to itself as some soothing incantation ( roiavra %pr\ 
 
268 PHYSICAL EVENTS CONTROLLED BY SPIRITUAL AGENTS. 
 
 coonep enadeiv eavrd), Phced ., 114, D.), and like the dying 
 swan, to which, in another part of this dialogue, he com- 
 pares himself, sing this song of immortality more sweetly 
 and more clearly the nearer it approaches that period which 
 is to test the great question forever. 
 
 Nothing can be more admirable than the tender care 
 which, throughout this discussion, the Athenian is made to 
 exercise towards his supposed youthful disputant. The 
 philosopher knew that very often little direct influence of 
 a moral kind was produced by means of dialectical argu- 
 ment, however excellent it might be as preparatory to the 
 application of other remedies. He knew that, even where 
 it silenced, it not unfrequently hardened the vanquished 
 disputant to a more tenacious hold upon former prejudices. 
 He therefore, in what succeeds, endeavours to make him 
 feel that this is no matter of mere speculation, like any mere 
 scientific theorem, but that he has a deep personal interest 
 in the great arrangements of Providence, and to impress 
 him with the fact, that as a part (although a very small one) 
 of an immense whole, the importance and dignity of his own 
 position, instead of being diminished, is magnified by this 
 very circumstance. See remarks, notes 1 1 and 12, page 1 1 ; 
 also, explanation of the word dvoxepaiveiv, note 3, page 8. 
 
 XLIX. 
 
 The Machinery of Physical Events controlled by Invisible 
 Spiritual Agencies . The Doctrine of Plato and of the 
 Bible . 
 
 Page 57, Line 12. V A pxovreg tt poorer ay pevoi. The 
 form and gender of the word ap%ovreg will not permit us 
 to regard it as referring to any inanimate influences. It 
 can only mean beings of a higher order than man, to whom 
 the lower parts of the universal administration were thought 
 
PHYSICAL EVENTS CONTROLLED BY SPIRITUAL AGENTS. 269 
 
 to be committed. This doctrine, somewhat modified, we 
 believe to be taught in the Holy Scriptures, without suppo- 
 sing that the Jewish writers, any more than Plato, did not 
 hrmly hold to that regular and orderly succession of events 
 and phenomena which we style the laws of nature. They 
 manifestly believed in a connexion of cause and effect, ex- 
 tending in a chain from the throne of God to the minutest 
 operations of the visible world and yet all along down 
 this golden chain of celestial influences, and in all its vibra- 
 tions throughout its immense extent, they constantly recog- 
 nised the control and guidance of supernatural or angelic 
 beings. 
 
 Besides revealing the doctrine, the Scriptures sometimes, 
 as matters of historical fact, draw aside the veil from the 
 invisible world, and lay open to us this constant supernatu- 
 ral agency ; as in the account of the angel who descended 
 
 * We find this idea in Hosea, ii., 23, which is commonly thus ren- 
 dered : And it shall come to pass in that day , I will hear , saith the Lord , 
 I will hear the heavens ; and the heavens shall hear the earth, and the 
 earth shall hear the corn, and the wine, and the oil ; and they shall hear 
 Jezreel. The word HJjP, here used, means, in its primary sense, to 
 sing. Hence, secondly, to pronounce with a measured and solemn 
 voice ; thirdly, to respond ; fourthly, to hear ; having, however, no ref- 
 erence to the auricular sensation, which is expressed by another 
 word. It resembles the Greek pehno, pehnopaL, or, rather, apetGo- 
 pai, and conveys the idea of responsive or choral singing. Hence 
 the passage would be more literally, and at the same time more ex- 
 pressively, rendered thus : And it shall come to pass in that day, 1 
 will sing , saith the Lord, I will sing to the heavens ; and the heavens 
 shall sing (or respond) to the earth ; and the earth shall respond to the 
 corn, and the wine, and the oil ; and they shall respond to Jezreel. There 
 seems here a reference to that doctrine of the choral harmony of 
 nature, with which the ancient mind was so filled ; as though the 
 touching a chord in heaven, when the great Coryphaeus or leader of 
 the universal orchestra gives the starting tone, sounds and vibrates 
 down through all the compass of the notes, until it makes its closing 
 cadence in the end designed to be accomplished. 
 
 Z 2 
 
270 PHYSICAL EVENTS CONTROLLED BY SPIRITUAL AGENTS. 
 
 into the pool of Bethesda, or of the destroying angel that 
 appeared with a drawn sword standing over the devoted 
 city of Jerusalem, 2d Samuel, xxiv., 16, 17. In this latter 
 instance, there is no intimation that it differed in any way 
 from the ordinary method by which God sends pestilence 
 upon the earth, except that here the curtain is withdrawn 
 and the supernatural machinery disclosed. No doubt, sec- 
 ond causes were here also at work, and the philosopher of 
 that day, had there been any such to investigate the ante- 
 cedents and consequents connected with the event, might 
 have bid the Jew 
 
 Take heart and banish fear ; 
 
 yet still, all this would not change the fact, so clearly re 
 vealed, that behind them all, however far they may have 
 extended beyond the utmost bounds of scientific research, 
 there stood the spiritual power of God, and his delegated 
 minister, directing them, without any violation of their vis- 
 ible order, to the production of the decreed result. Let 
 science cease her babble. We all know, the most igno- 
 rant as well as the most learned, that second causes are 
 employed in these visitations. The writers of the Bible 
 were no more ignorant of this, as a general principle, than 
 our most scientific savans, although they may have known 
 less of the steps of the process in its minute details. Even 
 here we surpass them only in having traced a few more 
 links in a chain, in which what is yet unknown sinks all 
 differences of the known into insignificance. These links, 
 in the series of natural sequences, may reach back to any 
 extent short of the infinite, and yet leave on the other shore 
 room enough for the supernatural , in perfect consistency 
 with them. We have, therefore, no reason at all for infer- 
 ring that the Scriptures meant to represent this as a mirac- 
 ulous intervention. In every case of pestilence, they would 
 have us believe that the destroying angel is abroad in the 
 air, but. in this one, for special reasons, the eye of man was 
 
PHYSICAL EVENTS CONTROLLED BY SPIRITUAL AGENTS. 271 
 
 permitted to behold him.* He maketh his angels winds , his 
 ministers a fiery flame, as the inspired Apostle renders it, 
 Heb., i., 17 ; all not, as it would be explained by the ra- 
 tionalizing interpreter, he maketh the winds his messengers , 
 and the flaming fire his servants. The angels of the Lord 
 are ever encamped round about the righteous, although we 
 have but one example in the Bible of the glorious vision 
 being revealed to mortal eyes. See 2 Kings, vi., 17. 
 
 The great objection to this view, as it would present 
 itself to some minds, would spring from the prejudice to 
 which Plato alludes in the Epinomis, 982, D., E., and on 
 which we have remarked, pages 226, 227. Men are so 
 much inclined to associate undeviating regularity and con- 
 stancy in physical motions with a nature implying the ab- 
 sence of a special will and reason ; as though an animated 
 personal agency must necessarily be sometimes freaky and 
 capricious in its operations as evidences of the exercise of 
 a personal volition. One answer to such an objection is 
 furnished at once by maintaining that all such intermediate 
 spiritual powers are under the constant control of the Su- 
 preme Will and Reason, producing the regularity of natural 
 sequence, not as though it needed such sequences at all as 
 indispensable helps to itself, but for our sakes , that by means 
 of them, as signs, we might be able to exercise faith in the 
 general constancy of the Divine operations, and regulate our 
 own conduct in accordance with it. When, however, this 
 feeling becomes practical atheism, prevailing to any great 
 extent among mankind, we have reason to believe that God* 
 will come forth, as Plato says in the Politicus, from his re- 
 tired place of observation, break up the long repose of nal- 
 
 * There are also in the Bible intimations that evil supernatural 
 agents, under the dominion of the Prince of the Powers of the Air, 
 are sometimes permitted to exercise a physical influence in the af- 
 fairs of our globe, and thus to afflict men with disease both of mind 
 and body. See Luke, xiii., 16 ; Job, i., 12 ; ii., 6, 7. 
 
272 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIH1L0 NIHIL. 
 
 ural laws, and again astonish the world, as in the early 
 times, by displays of super - natural power. 
 
 Nemesius, in his treatise on the Nature of Man, alluding 
 to Plato’s doctrine of providence, describes it as recogni- 
 sing three divisions. The first province is assigned directly, 
 or without media, to the Deity himself, or, as he styles him, 
 the first God. This has respect to the world of ideas, and 
 the general care of the universe as a whole — n porjyovpEVcog 
 pev t(ov Idetiv eireira 6e % ypnavrog rov uaOoXov uoapov. 
 The second department is given in charge of the second or 
 inferior divinities, and has relation to those things which 
 are said to be under the law of generation and corruption — 
 7rdvTG)v tgjv £V yEvioci ual (pOopa — or, in other words, or- 
 dinary physical events. The third relates to the conduct 
 of life, and to the distribution of what he styles organic 
 good and evil. Nemesius , Be Nat. Horn ., p. 345. We 
 know not in what part of Plato’s dialogues authority can be 
 found for this precise division, as Nemesius states it, al- 
 though for the second some warrant may be discovered in 
 the passage which has furnished the ground of this excur- 
 sus. For farther information on the ancient views in re- 
 spect to a special providence, we may consult Cicero , Be 
 Leg., ii., 7 ; Plutarch., Be Fato, 572, E. ; Eusebius, Prczp 
 Evang ., 630. 
 
 L. 
 
 The Ancient Maxim, Be Nihilo Nihil. 
 
 Page 58, Line 2. (bg ysveoig evena ekeivov ylyvErai 
 rrdaa onog, k. r. X . — “ That all generation, or every gener- 
 ation, takes place for this purpose, and in such a way,” 
 &c. This argument would be better accommodated to mod- 
 ern ideas, and, at the same time, lose none of its force or 
 intended meaning in this place, by rendering y EVEOig ere 
 
THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 273 
 
 # 
 
 ation. According to the view we have taken of this word, 
 page 187, it would always signify the bringing into being 
 of what did not exist before, so far as the law or idea was 
 concerned ; as when from a different disposition of the 
 same matter an entirely new substance is produced — nitric 
 acid, for example, from what before was atmospheric air. 
 Here there is the creation of a new being , although not of 
 any new matter. It would not, however, be quite fair to 
 regard it, in this way, as synonymous with our phrase, cre- 
 ation out of nothing. The word yevsoig, it is true, does 
 generally imply, in Greek writers, a production in some 
 way out of something pre-existent ; and yet this something 
 is not necessarily, or e vi terminorum , to be regarded as pre- 
 existent matter. Many held to a metaphysical phantom 
 which they styled hyle (yXrj), and which the more spiritual 
 philosophers may have adopted to save their favourite max- 
 im, de nihilo nihil. From some such idea as this the Sep- 
 tuagint gave the name Teveoig to that book which treats of 
 the generations of the heavens and the earth ; and in this 
 they had some countenance from the Hebrew word m'lbin- 
 Gen., ii. , 4. Thus, also, they render the Hebrew substan- 
 tive verb VP, in the account of the origin of light (Gen., i., 
 3), not eoTG) (j)d)g, but yevrjOrjTG) tyug. In the same way, 
 Psalm xc., 2 — npo rov oprj yev7\0r\vai — although, in this 
 case, it is no more than a faithful rendering of the Hebrew 
 nb\ a word of precisely similar import, implying successive 
 generation from something pre-existent — nV tDVH 
 bnni ^binm — before the mountains were generated , and 
 
 the earth was born or brought forth. In this way do the 
 Scriptures, both Greek and Hebrew, speak of the formation 
 of the present earth , or of what may be styled the Mosaic 
 creation. 
 
 In regard, however, to that originating act which took 
 place in the beginning, mentioned Gen., i., 1, a different 
 language is employed in many parts of the Bible. It is 
 
274 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIIllLO NIHIL. 
 
 + 
 
 represented as proceeding from a word or fiat — a calling of 
 something from a state of non-existence both in respect to 
 matter and form — as Romans, iv., 17 : uaXovvrog ra pi) 
 ovra cog ovra ; where there seems to be a reference to Isa- 
 iah, xlviii., 14.— HIT npjP 'JK *np — My hand hath 
 
 founded the earth , and my right hand hath spanned the heav- 
 ens ; when I called to them they stood up. So, also, Isaiah, 
 xli., 4 — nrnn *Op — who called the generations from 
 the beginning . To such passages we may trace the similar 
 language of Philo, De Create 728 : ra pi) ovra enaXeaev 
 elg to elvai. Notwithstanding the clear declarations of the 
 Bible, the Greek ideas of origination, connected with the 
 words yeveoig and eyevero , maintained their ground for 
 some time, and continued to affect the expressions, if not 
 the intended meaning, of some of the earliest fathers. Even 
 the Jewdsh Philo, at times, uses language which seems to 
 imply the eternity of matter, if not of the organized world. 
 As when he gives us this account of what he styles the 
 philosophy of Moses, in his treatise De Mundi Opificio , page 
 2, B. : “Moses, who had attained the highest summit of 
 philosophy, knew that it was most necessary {avaytzaibra- 
 rov ) that in existing things ( [kv rotg ovoi) there should be, 
 on the one hand, the efficient ( dpaorrjpiov ), namely, the 
 universal mind, most pure and unmixed with anything else, 
 and, on the other hand, something inert, passive, or passible, 
 destitute of soul and motion (a'tpvxov real dnivrprov ), which 
 when moved, endowed with form, and animated by the mind 
 aforesaid, should be converted into this most perfect work, 
 the world.” Although in this very argument he is dispu- 
 ting against the eternity of the world, yet he seems to re- 
 gard the ultimate element of matter as one of the two ne- 
 cessary existences, almost as much so as mind itself ; and 
 his language greatly resembles that in which Cicero de- 
 scribes the doctrine of one of the ancient schools : De nat- 
 ura autem ita dicebant, ut earn dividerent in res duas : ut 
 
THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 275 
 
 altera esset -effipiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, 
 eaque efliceretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse 
 censebant : in eo autem, quod efliceretur, materiam quam- 
 dam : in utroque tamen utrumque. Neque enim materiam 
 ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque 
 VIM SINE AL1QUA MATERIA. Cic., Acad. Post ., 6. 
 In other places, however, he contends clearly and strongly 
 that even the hyle , or unformed principle of matter itself, had 
 been created in the beginning by the direct act of God. 
 
 In general, the Christian fathers, with some wavering 
 arising from the systems of philosophy in which they had 
 been first instructed, assert pretty clearly an absolute cre- 
 ation from a state in which there was no pre-existent mat- 
 ter (which we prefer to the expression, out of nothing) ; al- 
 though, in stating the Scriptural doctrine, they often use lan- 
 guage which was more congenial with the opposite system. 
 The words yeveaig and yevr]r6v were employed for cre- 
 ation, and dyevTjrov was used as synonymous with anna- 
 tov. In consequence, however, of discussions growing out 
 of the Nicene controversy, and the doctrine of the eternal 
 generation of The Son, they made a distinction between 
 yevrjrog and yevvyrog, and dyevryTog and dyevvrjrog , which 
 is far from being so evident in classical Greek as in the Pa- 
 tristic writings. Christ, they said, was yevvrjrog , but not 
 yevrjrog ; or, in other words, he was ayevrjrog and annorog , 
 but not dyevvrjrog. So, also, the first progenitor of any or- 
 ganized species was dyevvrjrog , although nothing was dye- 
 vrjrog which was beneath the Divine hypostases. Vide 
 Cyril. Alexand ., Be Sancta Trinit., 8, page 37. 
 
 The Greek philosophers have been, almost all of them,- 
 charged with teaching the eternity of matter, and of having 
 been universally agreed in the tenet, that nothing could be 
 created or generated out of nothing, or, as it is expressed 
 by Lucretius, 
 
 De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti. 
 
276 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 
 
 No doubt this was the doctrine of many, if not%iost of them, 
 even in the modern acceptation of the terms ; that is, they 
 believed in no creation or generation except from pre-exist- 
 ent matter with all the properties of matter as it now exists ; 
 or, in other words, the visible material universe was eter- 
 nal, whatever changes or modifications it might in the lapse 
 of ages have undergone. It was thus held by the Ionic 
 school in all its branches, by some of the Italian, and by 
 all who were atheistically inclined. It was also maintain- 
 ed, however inconsistently, by some who were undoubted 
 theists, as by Plutarch, and a few others who have been 
 styled Platonists. 
 
 We cannot, however, charge any of them with these 
 consequences simply from the language of the maxim, as it 
 x.iay be taken in different senses; in some of which it is 
 not only consistent with the purest theism, but absolutely 
 essential to its proper explanation and defence. It is by no 
 means clear that the eternity of matter was ever held by 
 Plato ; and, although some things in the Timaeus may look 
 that way when only partially considered, yet are they all 
 capable of a consistent interpretation on a different hypoth- 
 esis. His doctrine of the inherent evil of matter does not 
 at all, by any necessity, involve its eternity. It was not 
 connected with any necessary existence of matter, but with 
 certain necessary properties which it must possess if cre- 
 ated — without which it could not be matter, and without 
 which God could not cause it to exist. Vide remarks on 
 the Platonic doctrine of avdyrcrj, pages 217, 218. In The 
 Laws, as w T e have seen, his evil principle is spiritual, and 
 has, therefore, nothing to do with the dogma against which 
 we are defending him. Even if he had held it, it would 
 not have been a heresy fatal to his claim to be regarded as 
 a pure theist, although an inconsistent one ; and the cir- 
 cumstances in which he was placed would have presented 
 the same palliation as we have offered for his doctrine of 
 
THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 277 
 
 evil. But, indeed, we know of no system of philosophy to 
 which the tenet in question, in this gross form, would have 
 been more foreign. To have allowed any necessary self- 
 existence to matter would have been directly in the face of 
 some of his most favourite notions, and especially opposed 
 to that grand division in the Timreus, in which, under the 
 general name to oparov, it is expressly excluded from the 
 class of the tgjv ovrcog ovtgjv , and assigned to that of the 
 yiyvoyevcov icat ovSettote ovrwg ovtcov. Vide page 172, 
 and the remarks on the distinction between the verbs dpi 
 and ytyvopac. Nothing can be more express than the dec- 
 laration that matter — not as organized, but in the most ex- 
 treme or lowest state in which it can be matter, or, as he 
 defines it in the most general terms, the tangible, the visi- 
 ble, the extended — belongs to the class of generated, in dis- 
 tinction from eternal existences : oparog yap dirrog re teal 
 otipa yiyvopevog teal ysvrjrog ecpdvrj. Tim., 28. And 
 when we connect this with another proposition in the same 
 passage — rrav 6e av to yiyvopevov in 9 alriov nvog el; 
 avdyterjg yiyveoQai — “ that everything which is yiyvopevov 
 must have been produced by some cause” — it seems impos- 
 sible any longer to maintain that Plato regarded matter in 
 any state as belonging to the world of necessary entities ; and 
 if not necessary , then not eternal in its nature ; for he ever 
 uses the two terms as mutually implying one another. It 
 would also be in opposition to that high and even hyper- 
 spirituality which runs through all his writings, and which 
 would warrant us in giving to them collectively, as their 
 compendious title, “ The SOUL , its eternal nature ; its infi- 
 nite value ; its superior antiquity to matter ; the immense pre- 
 eminence of incorporeal when compared with corporeal sub- 
 stances, and the utter worthlessness of the whole material uni - 
 verse in itself, or when not viewed as subservient to the higher 
 wants of the spirit .” 
 
 It is true that, in conformity with this ancient maxim, 
 
 A A 
 
278 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 
 
 De nihilo nihil — cue ov dvvarai ovdsv en rov pif ovrog ye - 
 veodcu — which, as it stands in the Greek, unmarred by any 
 attempt to transfer it to a more imperfect language, is one 
 of the clearest axioms of reason — he held to an elementary 
 principle, or apxv, more ancient than matter, even in its 
 lowest organized state, and which he and others styled hyle 
 (yXrj). Although he sometimes seems to use this term in 
 the sense of material or source, yet he could not have mean* 
 by it matter itself as something solid, extended, or resisting, 
 since he expressly denies to it any of these properties, or, 
 indeed, any connexion in itself with the sensible world ; 
 regarding it, in fact, as belonging to the vorjrd , rather than, 
 in any sense, to the aloOrjrd. No sublimation or refine- 
 ment of the conception of resisting substance, even when 
 carried to its most aethereal limits — not even the nebular 
 star dust* or rudimentary fluid of the universe, which some 
 modern writers find so convenient an aid in the construc- 
 tion of planetary systems — made the least approach to it ; 
 for it was not a mere difference of degree, but a metaphys- 
 ical entity altogether distinct. It is very difficult to under- 
 stand precisely what idea Plato and other Greek philoso- 
 phers attached to this elementary hyle , without form, exten- 
 
 * This is a favourite term with those scientific men who are ever 
 talking about the progression of the universe from the lower to the 
 higher, from the imperfect to the more perfect, from the unorgani- 
 zed to the organized, and, as they ought to say if they would consist- 
 ently follow out their theory, from matter to mind, and, finally, to a 
 God. But, on another hypothesis of occasional retrogradations 
 (which no one who considers the vast extent of the universe can 
 deny to be possible, probable, and in perfect consistency with some 
 unfathomable designs of its Eternal Author), the peculiar celestial 
 appearances indicated by this phrase may be, in fact, the floating 
 remains of worlds going out, and in the last stages of their approach 
 to inanity. We are too much in the condition of the fly on the Pyr- 
 amids, to determine with any satisfaction, unless we resort to rea- 
 sons drawn from revelation, which theory is correct, or whether we 
 are physically nearer our descending or ascending node. 
 
THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 279 
 
 sion, parts, or divisibility. Some ap%h or principle seems 
 to have been in his mind as the origin of matter, which 
 was not matter ; and yet something separate from the Deity, 
 and existing with him before the formation of the outward 
 material universe.* We are confident, for the reasons as- 
 signed, that he did not hold to its necessary eternity, but it 
 is not easy to determine whether he regarded it as an em- 
 anation, a generation, or a creation, in the more modern 
 sense of the word. Whether it was merely space regarded 
 as an apx?h or first principle, like the aneipov , or infinite of 
 Anaximander ; or something similar to the unextended 
 points in the modern theory of Boscovitch ; whether it was 
 the manifestation of the Divine power in space, so that vis- 
 ible outward matter would be only those impressions upon 
 soul, of resistance, figure, &c., which are the result of the 
 action of the Divine immaterial principle — a theory which, 
 although ridiculed as Berkleian and absurd, gives us all the 
 results or properties of matter, which is matter enough for 
 all substantial purposes, while yet it leaves spirit, in reality, 
 the only ovoid , or essence in the universe — or whatever 
 else we may suppose, it is certain that Plato did not teach 
 the necessary self-existence of matter according to the 
 common idea, that is, as a substance composed of solid, ex- 
 tended parts or particles, whether regarded as existing in 
 an organized or a chaotic state. 
 
 The axiom De nihilo nihil , or others similar to it, may be 
 found in his writings and those of Aristotle. They both 
 regarded it as a self-evident truth ; and the latter, in the first 
 book of his Physics, c. 4, asserts that it was the common 
 
 * In the passage of the Timaeus which we have cited page 123, he 
 uses language which seems to describe it as the matter or material 
 from which matter was formed, yet still without any of its sensible 
 properties. He also styles it there the mother of the sensible world, 
 as though it were the passive or negative principle, while God was 
 the father, or positive power, which produced its manifestations in 
 time and space. 
 
280 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 
 
 opinion of all the ancient naturalists, that nothing could come 
 tnto being from that which was not — uolvt) 6o^a rchv cj)Vot- 
 utiv, chq ov rirNOMENOY ovdevdq etc rov grj ,7 0NT02. 
 This is capable, it is true, of being taken in the atheistic 
 or materializing sense by those who lay no emphasis on 
 the contrast between the two substantive verbs, or who re- 
 gard the latter, in this expression, as significant of the ma- 
 terial, or of the terminus a quo . If, however, we keep in 
 mind the radical distinction between elgc and yly voficu, as 
 explained page 171, and which is generally maintained by 
 Plato in all important propositions, we shall find this sen- 
 tence divested at once of all objectionable features, and 
 presented, as it really is, as one of the clearest dictates of 
 reason. This language may be, and has been, used by the 
 atheist ; but it is capable of being employed with far more 
 power against him. Aristotle gives us the key to this high 
 er sense in another place, where he says, with his usual 
 conciseness, chore eorai nplv yeveodcu — that essential or 
 necessary being must be before generation ; or, in other 
 words, that there must be a being before a becoming. Vide 
 Arista Phys . Ausc ., i., 9. The position, thus understood, 
 is that which forms the very sold of Plato’s philosophy, 
 namely, the superior rank and antiquity of incorporeal sub- 
 stance in respect to all derived or generated things. It is 
 the very position which he so strongly maintains in this 
 tenth book of The Laws, to wit, “ that soul (in its largest 
 sense, and including the Divine Soul, as the source from 
 whence all other spirits proceed, and in which they may 
 be said to pre-exist) must, of necessity, have existed eter- 
 nally, or that mind is necessarily older than matter.” In- 
 stead of being favourable to atheism, it is, when thus held, 
 the grand conservative principle which ever stands in di- 
 rect opposition to it. The English fails properly to express 
 the axiom, in this sense, from the want of two words ex- 
 actly corresponding to elfii and yiyvopai ; and when care- 
 
THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 281 
 
 lessly rendered it seems to favour the eternal existence of 
 matter. The Latin has the same defect ; and hence the 
 atheistic perversion by Lucretius to a purpose so different 
 from that intended by Plato and the Grecian theists. This 
 aiises from referring the term ovrog , as well as yiyvopevov, 
 to generated and phenomenal being, to which, when used 
 in this higher sense, and especially when placed in such 
 direct antithesis, it has no application ; and we are thus led 
 into the mistake that all the ancient philosophers taught 
 that matter could only proceed from pre-existent matter. 
 
 The idea conveyed by the proposition, ovdev etc rov pr) 
 ovrog yeveoOai , or, if the positive form is preferred, 7 ravra 
 etc rov ovrog yeveoOac, may be shown to be very similar to 
 that of the Apostle, Hebrews, xi., 3 : By faith we understand 
 that the worlds were made by the Word of God , so that the 
 things that are seen were not made ( yeyovevat ) from things 
 ichich do appear , etc (paivopevov. There is another reading 
 given by Griesbach, namely, etc prj < paivopevw ; on what 
 authority, however, we know not. This would change the 
 sentence to the positive form, and bring it nearer to the 
 Greek maxim when taken in the higher sense to which we 
 have alluded, but would not essentially vary its meaning. 
 It would then be rendered, By faith we understand that the 
 worlds were formed , so that the things which are seen were 
 made from things which are not seen ; or, in other words, that 
 the visible or phenomenal was made from the invisible . A 
 slight attention will show a resemblance to the Greek maxim 
 which does not at first, sight appear, and that the language of 
 the Apostle is in several respects similar to the Platonic. 
 Besides the distinctions so frequently conveyed by ovra 
 and yiyvopeva , the same ideas are variously expressed in 
 Plato by the terms opara or (patvopeva (the visible, or phe- 
 nomenal), used in place of yiyvopeva ; and aopara, aetdrj, 
 or pi) (patvopeva , used as synonymous with rd ovra. By 
 these and kindred terms he ever opposes the visible to the 
 
 A a 2 
 
282 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 
 
 invisible, the phenomenal to the essential, the ever- chan- 
 ging objects of sense (t« aloOrjra) to the vorjra, or those 
 necessary, eternal things which are the objects of the in- 
 tellect alone. It is not supposed that Paul had any direct 
 reference to Plato or to Platonic language ; but we cannot 
 doubt that he uses these words in a similar philosophical 
 sense, especially when we compare the many coincidences 
 of expression, and remember that, although originally deri- 
 ved from Plato, these terms, in the Apostle’s time, had be- 
 come a part of the current scholastic phraseology, with 
 which he must have been familiar. So, also, the words 
 rd pi) fiXsnopEva ( the unseen things ), which we find He- 
 brews, xi., 1, and which are equivalent to pi) f^aivopEva in 
 the third verse, are elsewhere used by the Apostle to ex- 
 press the same class of substances which are so frequently 
 styled by Plato, rd ovra , ra opara , ra aetdrj , rd del Kara 
 ravrd nai cooavroyg Exovra. Compare 2d Coruithians , iv., 
 18 : i urj OKonovvrcov rjptiv rd pXEnopEva aXXa rd pi) /3Ae- 
 t Togeva * rd yap fiXenopEva upoonaipa , rd ds j pi) PXetto- 
 psva alcbvta — while ice aim not at the things which are seen , 
 hut at the things which are unseen ; for the things which are 
 seen are temporal (belong to time ) ; the things which are un- 
 seen are eternal . The striking resemblance which this 
 bears to some passages in the Phaedon cannot be mistaken : 
 Q&pev ovv 6i) 6vo Eidrj, rd pen oparov , rb be aEideg * nai 
 to pev deibeg del Kara rd avrd exov , rb 6e oparov u 7 ) 6 e - 
 nors Kara ravrd — “ Let us lay down two classes of being, 
 the seen and the unseen : the unseen, eternal in their rela- 
 tions ; the seen, never the same, but ever changing.” Phw- 
 don, 79, A. The terms are nearly, if not quite, synony. 
 mous. IT pooKatpa is that which exists in time, temporal, 
 or, rather, temporary — liable to change — the opposite of del 
 Kara rd avrd exovra. On the other hand, alcjvia is that 
 which is eternal, not simply in duration, but in its very na- 
 ture, as not belonging to time — fixed, unchangeable, and ne- 
 
THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 283 
 
 cessary — del nard ravrd exovra. In these passages, nei- 
 ther Paul nor Plato mean by the unseen things a mere ne- 
 gation of sense, namely, that which is simply concealed 
 from view as a present fact, or not seen because belonging 
 to a future untried state of existence ; but rather those 
 things that are in their very nature invisible , that is, which 
 belong not to the sensible w r orld — either the present or any 
 one to come — the vorjrd as distinguished from the aioQrjrd , 
 or the objects of faith and reason as distinguished from the 
 objects of sense. See, also, Rom., i., 20. 
 
 We find the doctrine of the hyle in the apocryphal book 
 entitled The Wisdom of Solomon, ch. xi., 18 : ual urtoaoa 
 rov fcoofiov d[iop(j)OV vXrjg — “ having built the earth out 
 of the unformed, or, rather, formless hyle.” Compare, also, 
 the Septuagint. version of Genesis, i., 2 : rj 6e y r\ fjv aopa- 
 rog nal duaraonevaorog. The word aoparog here could 
 only have been used in reference to the Greek doctrine, 
 which represented the hyle not only as invisible, but as 
 incapable of being seen ; in fact, as not belonging at all to 
 the sensible world, even if it could not be ranked among 
 the vorjrd. It may be doubted whether we ever ought, in 
 translating the more strict philosophers, to render vXrj by 
 our term matter, unless we can conceive of it as an essence 
 abstracted from qualities, figure, and extension. That God 
 may have created such an essence we have no right to 
 deny, merely because our minds can form no conception of 
 it ; and if it may exist as the originally created ground of all 
 subsequently generated or created material things when 
 manifested in time and space and clothed with qualities by 
 that Eternal Spirit, which, we are told in Genesis, hovered 
 over the chaotic deep, then may the doctrine of Plato and 
 of the more spiritual writers of the ancient world be in ac- 
 cordance with the philosophy of Paul, Hebrews, xi., 3. 
 
 Our only safety here is in clinging to the Bible, and to 
 the fair interpretation of Genesis, i., 1. Human reason left 
 
284 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 
 
 to itself, finds tremendous difficulties in both views ; and 
 when she rejects the aid of revelation, must shrink from 
 taking a decided position on either. The belief that mat- 
 ter in any form, as an independent principle, is eternal, or 
 that anything is such apart from God, carries us to atheism, 
 although it may be maintained by an honest yet inconsist- 
 ent theist. On the other hand, the doctrine that God once 
 existed alone , or that there was a time when God was all , 
 seems to draw after it the strange consequences that he 
 never could have ceased to be all , or have become less than 
 all , and that therefore creation is but an extension of his 
 being ; or, in other words, we are in danger of a pantheism 
 seemingly more philosophical, yet less favourable to piety 
 than the inconsistent theism which we have condemned. 
 Reason reels and staggers here like a drunken man, and if 
 she will walk alone, finds a dark abyss on each side of her 
 narrow path, into which she is perpetually in danger of 
 stumbling. There may possibly be a way between these 
 two conclusions, but her eyes are too dim to discover it. 
 The Scriptures most solemnly declare that God did call 
 into being things that were not , and yet denies the conse- 
 quence which reason, if she will trust herself alone, can 
 hardly avoid deducing from it. We must, therefore, on 
 this subject, as on the doctrine of evil, keep close to reve- 
 lation, ready at a moment’s warning, and without a mur- 
 mur, to give up our most darling philosophy, if it comes at 
 all in collision with any truth which a sound and unforced 
 interpretation would elicit. Neither should we be afraid 
 for our Protestantism, even if we are reluctant to adopt any 
 interpretation which differs from that long received by the 
 Church ; by which we ever mean that line of the good, and 
 pious, and learned in the Scriptures, in all ages, which no 
 spiritually-minded reader of ecclesiastical history can ever 
 fail to trace. In such a case as this, too, we should feel 
 that the most pious interpretation is most likely to be true. 
 
THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 285 
 
 even if it should not seem to be the most philosophical. If 
 we cannot comprehend a positive enunciation of the great 
 truth, we must be content with a negative one, better adapt- 
 ed, perhaps, to the present state of our faculties, and believe 
 by faith that the worlds were not made of things which do 
 appear. 
 
 There is a passage in the Sophista in which Plato speaks 
 plainly of a creation by the direct act of God, and that, too, 
 from things which before were not. It is very much in 
 the style of the Scriptures, and no better refutation of some 
 of the charges against him could be given than this clear 
 declaration from this undoubted dialogue : Zci oa dij Travra 
 ' dvrjra nai <pvra , boa r’ erd yrjg etc onepparejv nai pi^ebv 
 (pvsrat, nai boa a'lpvxa cv yy £ vviorarat — ptiv aXXov n- 
 vog rj tieov brjpiovpyovvrog tyrjoopev vorepov TirNESGAI 
 Trporepov ovk, ’GNTA — “ In regard to all mortal animals 
 and plants, whatever things grow from roots and seeds, 
 whatever inanimate organizations exist in the earth — can 
 we say that from any other cause than the creating God 
 they come into being which before icere not ?” Sophista, 
 265, B. 
 
 Page 58, Line 3. orreog rj rep rov iravroq fUcp vndpxov- 
 oa evdaipov ovoia — “All generation, or every generation, 
 is taking place in such a manner that the essence which 
 pertains to the universal life (or life of the whole) may be 
 blessed.” This is the best rendering we can give of this 
 obscure passage. Ast translates it, ut universes vitcefelix 
 obtmgat status. It is not clear what Plato means by the ex- 
 pression, rj ovoia vnapxovoa rep navrdg /3icp ; whether the 
 life of the universe taken collectively as the sum of all 
 which exists — in which case it would seem that (3iog rov 
 navrog would have been sufficient — or whether he intends 
 by ovoia something higher than this, namely, that essence 
 from which the life of the universe proceeds, or, in other 
 words, the Universal Numen or Deity himself. If the last 
 
286 DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 
 
 view be the true one, Plato approaches a higher doctrine 
 than has ever been supposed to be taught in his pages. 
 
 LI. 
 
 Doctrine that the Parts are made only for the Whole , as set 
 forth by Plato , and as viewed by Modern Rationalists and 
 Semi-inf dels . The Converse Doctrine , that the Whole is 
 also for the Parts , examined with reference to the Mutual 
 Harmony of both. 
 
 Page 58, Line 4. ova eveica gov yiyvo\ievr \ , ov 6e evstca, 
 euecvov. The doctrine that the parts are made for the 
 whole is unquestionably true, especially when viewed in 
 reference to physical ends alone. It is, however, only a 
 portion of the truth, and when, as in Pope’s Essay on Man, 
 and in the writings of many scientific religionists, it is un- 
 qualified by any other views of the system of the universe, 
 it may be very far from any true religious tendency. In- 
 deed, in some minds, it might easily coalesce with atheism ; 
 and although its advocates may sometimes seem to talk de- 
 voutly, it has much more of the appearance of philosophy 
 than of piety about it. It is a speculative tenet, not much 
 dwelt upon in the Scriptures, and, instead of being directly 
 expressed there, is rather implied in a higher truth, to 
 which, as we have intimated, Plato might have been darkly 
 aiming in the language referred to in the close of the pre- 
 ceding dissertation, namely, the doctrine that the whole it- 
 self with all its parts severally and collectively , is made, not 
 for itself, but for a manifestation of the Divine glory and 
 blessedness ; a doctrine, the object of most bitter dislike to 
 the frigid rationalist, but which contains an inexpressible 
 moral sublimity to the mind that will have no philosophy 
 which is not in accordance with the teachings of the Sacred 
 Volume. 
 
DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 287 
 
 Irrespective, however, of this higher truth, the proposi 
 tion here set forth has a converse which is also equally 
 true, namely, that the whole is made for the 'parts. This is 
 not the opposite of the other, for in that case they could not 
 both be true, but, as we have styled it, its converse. It might 
 be maintained even on physical grounds. “ An organized 
 product,” says Kant, “ is that in which all the parts are mu- 
 tually ends and means” that is, not merely in respect to 
 those below them in the scale, but each severally and re- 
 ciprocally in respect to all the rest. In a much higher 
 sense is this true of that organized product so appropriately 
 styled by the scholastic name The Universe. Even on 
 physical grounds, then, may we say, that the whole is as 
 much necessary to make each part what it is, and without 
 which it could not have been what it is, as the parts are 
 for the completion and harmony of the whole. 
 
 It is chiefly, however, in a moral point of view that this 
 converse doctrine assumes a most glorious and thrilling in- 
 terest. There are some seemingly most inconsiderable 
 portions of the creation for which we are assured that all 
 things are working together for good : rolg ayairtioL rov 
 Qsdv IIANTA ovvepyel elg ayaOov. Romans, viii., 28. 
 So, also, 1 Corinthians, iii., 21, 22: IIANTA vptiv eoriv 
 — ALL things are yours ; whether THE WORLD,* or life, 
 or death, or the present, or the future, ALL are yours — nav- 
 ra vpcov eonv. There are again, on tj^e other hand, other 
 parts, of no higher rank, for which all things are working 
 together for evil. “ If nothing else,” says one of the ablest 
 writers of modern times, “if nothing else, our sins shall 
 give us consequence.” Although the other doctrine may be 
 speculatively correct, yet these latter are the views which 
 have the greatest prominence given to them in revelation. 
 The Author of the Bible does not intend that man shall hide 
 himself in an affectation of insignificance, or cover up his 
 
 * Here Koayog must certainly be taken in its largest sense. 
 
288 DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 
 
 individualism in what the sentimental humility of his phi- 
 losophy might style his subserviency to the interests of the 
 universal life. The proposition, against the abuse of which 
 we are contending, might seem, at first view, to be ground- 
 ed on more enlarged and comprehensive notions of exist- 
 ence. It has so much to say of the great' whole, and of a 
 kind of Strauss-ian immortality, which belongs to the race 
 rather than to the individual parts. It is, however, mainly 
 true in a physical aspect ; and when it occupies the mind 
 alone, or the moral importance of the individual is not held 
 up as a corrective, it becomes a cold and speculative fatal- 
 ism — a physical fatalism , in the worst sense of the term, 
 which would bind both matter and spirit, not by the decrees * 
 of a moral governor, founded on moral reasons, but in the 
 adamantine chain of law viewed as something apart from 
 God. — a fatalism which would regard even the Deity him- 
 self, should it graciously admit his existence, as included 
 in the machinery of the universe. Such a doctrine pos- 
 sesses but little, if any, superiority over the creed of the 
 atheist. 
 
 Akin to this is that profession of abstract benevolence 
 which loses sight of individuality in the contemplation of 
 masses or of the great whole, and affects to regard individual 
 happiness only as contributing to the general happiness of 
 the universe. This, although it may be agreeable to the 
 speculative intellec^, or to those whose theology is but a 
 philosophy, is nevertheless most chilling to all the moral 
 and religious affections. Its concrete selfishness is only 
 hardened and rendered darker, while, at the same time, it 
 is more and more concealed from the conscience, by the 
 false warmth and glow of an abstract benevolence. Its 
 love to God is only a pantheistic rapture, instead of a feel- 
 ing of gratitude to a personal Redeemer, Its affection to 
 man is not that love to one’s neighbour which the Bible en- 
 
 * This unquestionably was the primitive sense of the word fatum. 
 
DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 
 
 289 
 
 joins, commencing with the domestic and social relations, 
 from whence, as from a centre, it radiates on every side, 
 ever filling, but never attempting to overflow the limits of 
 its practical capabilities for good. Those of whom we are 
 speaking — and these declaimers on the greatest good of the 
 greatest number are becoming quite numerous — have really 
 no neighbour, no vicinus , no vicinage. The word is alto- 
 gether too narrow in its meaning to suit their expanded 
 views. The individual man who fell among thieves would 
 Have been too small and too contiguous an object for such 
 as can only aim at promoting some great scheme for higher 
 developments of the race. Children, family, home, coun- 
 try, friends, all are but fetters to that reforming zeal which 
 leads them to pant so earnestly and so incessantly for the 
 welfare of being in the abstract. Such a philosophical the- 
 ology may make a selfish mystic or pantheist, luxuriating 
 in some fancied vision of universal good ; it may make, 
 under certain circumstances, a raving fanatic, furious in de- 
 nunciation in proportion to the self-righteousness of his ab- 
 stract philanthropy ; but it never has produced, and never 
 will produce, an humble, devoted, and warm-hearted Chris- 
 tian. 
 
 Plato does, indeed, teach this doctrine of the parts for the 
 whole, and we have admitted it to be true when rightly 
 qualified by its converse. Other writings, however, of our 
 philosopher, furnish most abundant evidence that he did 
 hold this converse proposition as equally sound with the 
 one he is now presenting, and which was called forth by 
 the peculiar nature of the objection against which he is here 
 contending. He tells the profane scoffer that this Special 
 Providence will not overlook him, because, though small, 
 he is yet important as a part of the great whole. When 
 presenting, however, in other places, the moral aspect of 
 the doctrine, he adopts a very different line of argument. 
 Poverty, sickness, health, life, death, ALL THINGS, he 
 
 B B 
 
290 
 
 DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 
 
 tells us, are for the righteous man beloved of Heaven. Hia 
 language possesses a striking resemblance to some parts of 
 the Scriptures : T<5 de 0EO4>IAEI ov% bpLoXoyrjoopLev ITAN 
 TA ylyveoOai (bg olov re dpcora ; Qvrcog dpa vno^Tjnreov 
 Kept tov dmaiov dvdpog edv re ev nevta yiyvrpTai lav rs 
 ev voootg rj tlvl aAAo) rtiv donovvrcov natitiv • tovtgj 
 ravra elg dyaOov n reXeyrrioei ££jvtl fj teal dnodavovrt. 
 ovrcovv Tzepi rov adltcov ravavrla rovrcov del dtavoelodac. 
 Republic , 613, A., B. Physically , he would teach us, man 
 is but an atom, subserving the interests of the great whole ; 
 morally , all things, even a universe of mind and matter, is 
 working together for his individual exaltation or degrada- 
 tion. Instead of dwindling into the insignificance of an in- 
 finitesimal, he rises in proportion to the magnitude of that 
 universe of which he is a member, or, in other words, be- 
 comes of the greatest individual importance as a rational 
 part of the greatest whole. 
 
 These apparently opposite yet strictly consistent views 
 are likewise equally true in science. The whole cannot 
 be fully understood without the parts, and it is an axiom no 
 less important, that some a priori knowledge of a whole as 
 a whole, that is, as a unity, and not merely an arithmetical 
 sum, is necessary to an understanding of the parts. It is 
 by the mutual action, reaction, and introaction of such a 
 mental synthesis and analysis, that any true progress is 
 made in science. When either is neglected, or the balance 
 
 destroyed, science becomes, on the one hand, an ep,nei- 
 
 h aXoyog* an irrational empiricism , or evaporates, on the 
 other, into empty a priori speculation. 
 
 Page 58, Line 5, Ila^ yap larpog nal nag evre^vog drj- 
 puovpyog. The comparison adopted shows that Plato views 
 the doctrine which the present state of his argument re- 
 quires him to advance, namely, that the parts are made for 
 the whole, rather in its physical than its moral aspect. It 
 
 * Gorgias, 464, D r 
 
DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 291 
 
 is not the KvdEpvrjTrjg , the orparrjyog , the commander, the 
 governor, the pilot — comparisons so often employed by him 
 in illustration of moral and political relations — but the phy- 
 sician, the artist, all of whose efforts are directed to the 
 physical perfection of the work in which they are engaged, 
 or that physical harmony which consists in the subservien- 
 cy of the parts to the whole irrespective of any moral con- 
 siderations. 'This is the order of physical production, and 
 of those arts and sciences that copy from it — pipog evena 
 oXov. It forms the parts for the whole, and not the whole, 
 in any sense , for the parts. 
 
 Line 6. n pdg to fcoivq f vvrelvov (3 eXtlotov. Ast and 
 Stephanus would both read ^vvte'lvcov in this place, and 
 refer it to the artist. The common reading, however, al- 
 though the literal version in English is very harsh, seems, 
 on the whole, to be deserving of preference. It more prop- 
 erly has for its subject the work than the workman ; as in 
 the example a few lines back — popiov eig to rcdv %vvtelvei. 
 It may here be taken with (3eXtlotov 9 and the sentence 
 would be freely translated, doeth all things for the whole , in 
 respect to that best end which aims at the common good ; that 
 is, in this case, the physical good , the good of the machine 
 or structure as a structure, moral reasons, strictly such, not 
 being here brought into view. The argument, then, when 
 carried no farther, would be this : God will not overlook 
 you ; his special providence is ever directed towards you, 
 because, however insignificant you may be, physically, in 
 yourself, you are wanted to fill up some place or some va- 
 cancy in the great structure, for which nothing else is so 
 well adapted. You may therefore seem to be laid aside, 
 but you are not forgotten — his eye is upon you. 
 
 Line 8. dyvocov onrj to tt E pl oe aptOTOV tco ttovtI %vp- 
 baivEi Kal oot. It is somewhat uncertain whether apLOTOV 
 here is to be taken with to i zEpl oe , or with tco ttovtI , or 
 i-vudaivei. ^vpbalvei 9 however, may be rendered, to con 
 
292 OBJECTION FROM THE EXTENT OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 tribute to the good of anything, or to the accomplishment of 
 any purpose , without any such qualifying word as apiorov. 
 It makes but little difference, in the general sense, what 
 view we take of it, and, on the whole, we prefer the follow- 
 ing version : You are vexed , not knowing how that , in relation 
 to yourself which is best for the whole , contributes also to your 
 own good ; or, if we connect dptorov with ^vpbalvec, it may 
 be read, not knowing how that which relates to ’ thee best con- 
 tributes to the good both of the whole and of thee. At the 
 hazard, then, of a little repetition, we would give the fol- 
 lowing free paraphrase of the substance of the whole pas- 
 sage ; the latter part, however, or converse doctrine, being 
 rather implied than expressed, although it may be clearly 
 found ia other parts of the Platonic dialogues : Physically, 
 thou art but an insignificant pebble in the great rcrlopa, or 
 building of the universe (see the comparison of the XlOol 
 and XtdoAoyoi , page 55), yet forming a necessary part in 
 the joinings and compactness of the whole, even absolutely 
 essential to the whole as a whole, and which the builder 
 and keeper cannot neglect without risking the ruin of the 
 whole : morally, the great universe is also all made for 
 thee, and reciprocally for each of its rational parts ; it was 
 intended, with all its other parts, to have a bearing upon thy 
 blessedness or misery, according as thou violatest or re- 
 mainest in concord with its moral harmony ; its physical 
 harmony thou shalt ever subserve, whatever may be thy 
 condition or thy course. 
 
 LII. 
 
 Atheistic Objection drawn from the Extent of the Universe. 
 
 Page 59, Line 6 . r Hin£p av e^oi Xoyov paor&vr] deoTg 
 . ^ )v ndvrcdv, TavTy) pot 6okg) (frpa&tv — “ I think that I am 
 explaining in what way ease in the administration of tho 
 
OBJECTION FROM THE EXTENT OF THE UNIVERSE. 293 
 
 Divine providence may have reason, that is, may be shown 
 to be in accordance with reason.” The Epicureans and 
 semi-atheists, in all ages, have been much concerned les‘„ 
 the physical and moral government of the universe should 
 be burdensome to the Deity. Lucretius was unable to see 
 how it could consist with the happiness of the Gods. He 
 therefore most reverently relieves them of all share in so 
 troublesome a business, and, with pious concern for their 
 ease and quiet, commits the world into the hands of Nature : 
 
 Quae bene cognita si teneas, Natura videtur 
 Libera continuo, dominis privata superbis , 
 
 Ipsa sua per se sponte omnia Diis agere expers. 
 
 Nam, pro saneta Deum tranquilla pectora pace 
 Quae placidum degunt aevom, multumque serenum ! 
 
 Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi 
 Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas? 
 
 Quis pariter ccelos omneis convortere, et omneis 
 Ignibus aetheriis terras subfire feraceis ; 
 
 Omnibus inve locis esse omni tempore praesto, 
 
 Nubibus ut tenebras faciat, ccelique serena 
 Concutiat sonitul turn fulmina mittat, et aedeis 
 Ipse suas disturbet ; et in deserta recedens 
 Saeviat, exercens telum ; quod saepe nocenteis 
 Praeterit, exanimatque indignos, inque merenteis 1 
 
 Lucretius , lib. ii., 1089. 
 
 Horace entertained the same very elevated notions in re- 
 gard to -natural laws and the abstraction of the Deity from 
 all the concerns of this world, until he was frightened into 
 a little unphilosophical piety by happening to hear it thun- 
 der on a clear day. See Ode xxxiv. of the first book, com- 
 mencing 
 
 Parcus Deorum cultor et infrequens, 
 
 Insanientis dum sapientiae 
 Consultus erro — 
 
 He seems to have been brought by his fright into quite a 
 religious fit, and the sentiment with which the ode con- 
 clude? is not only a devout acknowledgment of a special 
 
 B b 2 
 
294 EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 
 
 providence, but is expressed in language bearing a striking 
 resemblance to some of those many passages in the Bible 
 which speak of depressing the proud and elevating the 
 lowly : 
 
 Valet ima summis 
 Mutare et insignem attenuat Deus, 
 
 Obscura promens : bine apicem rapax 
 Fortuna cum stridore acuto 
 Sustulit ; hie posuisse gaudet. 
 
 His use, however, of the word Fortuna shows that he could 
 not altogether divest himself of his old atheistic habit, even 
 when he attempts to talk religiously. Some of our modern 
 scientifico-religious works occasionally exhibit a similar 
 mixture of the Jew’s language with the dialect of Ashdod. 
 
 LIII. 
 
 Explanation of a Difficult Passage. Remarks on those Views 
 which resolve Morality into an Obedience to Physical Laws, 
 and regard all Punishment as Consequential instead of 
 Penal . 
 
 Page 59, Line 7. E i pev yap repoq to oXov , k. t. A. 
 This obscure passage may be thus paraphrased : “ For if 
 any Power, having constantly regard only to the whole, 
 should ever fashion his work by suddenly transforming all 
 things — as, for example, by forming at once frozen water 
 from fire — and should not* proceed by (analyzing) many 
 things out of one, or (compounding) one thing out of many, 
 so that they might thus partake of a first, a second, and 
 even a third generation — in that case, the transformations 
 of each displaced arrangement would be infinite in number ; 
 blit now (that is, in the actual established course of things) 
 
 * Ast, by taking, in this place, tj for the common reading, yy, has 
 completely changed and perverted the whole meaning of the passage* 
 
EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 295 
 
 there is a wonderful ease in the administration of the Uni- 
 versal Guardian.” 
 
 We will proceed to give what seems to us the general 
 sense of the passage, and of what follows it for some dis- 
 tance, before going into any particular comment on words 
 and phrases. It seems to be this : the speaker is showing 
 that the Divine administration, even when extended to the 
 most minute particular, is conducted with ease, in conse- 
 quence of being a special superintendence carried on by 
 general laws or media, whatever they may be, or by the in- 
 ternal operation of powers which he lias implanted in things 
 themselves ; so that there is no necessity for supposing any 
 great or general change, or sudden transformation in the 
 state of things (what would be called, in modern phraseol- 
 ogy, a miraculous interposition), for the rectification of nat- 
 ural or the punishment of moral evil — a transposition which, 
 if it took place in every case, would call for an infinite 
 number of changes, differing in every instance, and as mi- 
 raculous as the immediate production of cold water* or ice 
 
 * In the text, we have given vdop e/i'ipvxov. The common read- 
 ing is epipvxov, and those who maintain it would render vdop e/iipv- 
 Xov, aquam animatam ; to make any sense of which they refer us to 
 the doctrine of Thales and Heraclitus, that water was the first prin- 
 ciple of all things, and who also said something about fire, changed 
 into water, being the universal semen. What is told us here about 
 the changes and transformations of matter has, it is true, some little 
 resemblance to the flowing philosophy of Heraclitus. Still, this re- 
 semblance is only verbal. The illustration would be too far-fetched 
 and obscure to suit the present place, in which the Athenian is la- 
 bouring to give his hearers as clear an idea as possible of this diffi- 
 cult position. It would also be giving a sanction to Heraclitus which 
 Plato could never have intended ; and besides all this, it is very dif- 
 ficult to perceive how it would present any illustration at all of the 
 subject he has in hand. We therefore altogether prefer the other 
 reading, which only requires the change of an accent, and which has 
 some authority of manuscripts in its favour. ’E ju’ipvxov would be a 
 participle of the verb epijjvx «, to cool , to freeze, and may be taken as 
 
296 PUNISHMENT OF SIN HOW FAR CONSEQUENTIAL. 
 
 from fire, without any of the intervening generations ; thus 
 giving to rational beings no grounds for physical science, 
 or a knowledge of the Divine operations, and making every 
 act of Providence, instead of moving in harmony with, tc 
 jar and displace every preceding and temporary arrange- 
 ment. Instead of this, as we are told in what follows, he 
 has so constituted things, not by any innate necessities of 
 physical laws, but by his own absolute fiat, that good and 
 evil will find in themselves, both in this world and in the 
 pre-arrangements of Hades, their appropriate reward, and 
 will each seek and find its proper place and level ; namely, 
 vice will diverge, at first slightly, from the level plane, and 
 thence descending with constantly-accelerated velocity ( 'elg 
 / 3dGog ), will find its ultimate place in the terrors of Hades ; 
 while virtue, mingling with the Divine nature, will ascend 
 to a purer region, and through different degrees of blessed- 
 ness will at last arrive at a perfectly holy or separate state, 
 totcov ayiov oXov. 
 
 This doctrine of Plato, and the mode in which he states 
 it, is indeed sublime. Still, it needs a qualification similar 
 to the one we applied to a previous view — a qualification 
 for which there may be found abundant support in other 
 portions of his writings where he maintains the strictly 
 penal nature of punishment, as in the close of the Gorgias 
 and the Republic. The doctrine which seems to be here 
 presented is the truth, but not the whole truth. Standing 
 thus alone, and without the corrective influence of any high- 
 er views, it is a favourite scheme with many of our modern 
 semi-infidels, who would resolve all morality into an obe- 
 equivalent to the adjective frigidus. We doubt if Plato meant any- 
 thing more by it than a strong example derived from substances ap- 
 parently so remote, although capable of passing into each othei 
 through a succession of physical media and generations. The othei 
 and more common reading probably arose from some ignorant tran- 
 scriber, who did not understand the passage, and to whom £/u'ipvxov l 
 animatam, appeared more philosophical. 
 
PUNISHMENT OF SIN HOW FAR CONSEQUENTIAL. 297 
 
 dience to, or a co-operation with, physical laws, and all 
 punishment into natural consequence. We do not wonder 
 at the partiality with which it is entertained by such. 
 They feel that it has no terror for a sinning soul, and that 
 it utterly takes away all the moral power which belongs to 
 the ideas of penalty and retribution. At the same time, they 
 are pleased with it as a wonderful discovery of the nine- 
 teenth century, when, in fact, they have merely revived a 
 doctrine of some of the old heathen philosophers, who held 
 that it was the great duty and chief end of man to live ac- 
 cording to nature — Vivere secundum naluram. Vide Cicero , 
 De Finibus , v., 9. 
 
 With writers of this stamp it is the whole. When em- 
 ployed by Plato and Bishop Butler, it is only held in sub- 
 serviency to higher qualifying views of the Divine govern- 
 ment, with which it is entirely consistent. Those to whom 
 we allude would confine the maxim, vivere secundum natu - 
 ram , entirely to the nature without us ; whereas, in obedi- 
 ence to the law of a higher nature, man is often called to 
 contend with the external world. The perfection of his 
 moral being requires that he should often contemn the law 
 of gravitation, and sometimes even submit that most exqui- 
 site handiwork, his body, with all its most wonderful nat- 
 ural laws, to be disfigured, ruined, and utterly broken up in 
 the flames of martyrdom. Still, there is a truth in this mo- 
 rality of nature, and it is only by refusing to associate with 
 it any higher principle that such writers convert it into a 
 most pernicious falsehood. 
 
 So, also, may we admit, that the doctrine, that the pun- 
 ishment of sin is the physical consequence of sin itself, is 
 found in the Bible. “ What a man soweth , that shall he also 
 reap.” “ He that soweth to the flesh , shall of the flesh reap 
 corruption : he that soweth to the Spirit , shall of the Spirit 
 reap everlasting life.” Revelation declares all this, but it 
 also teaches with much more frequency and with more sol- 
 
298 PUNISHMENT OF SIN HOW FAR CONSEQUENTIAL. 
 
 emn emphasis, that the punishment of sin is, in the strictest 
 sense, a penalty pronounced by a sovereign judge. “ The 
 wicked shall go away into everlasting fire, PREP ARED for 
 the devil and his angels” Physical consequences, even 
 when they are strictly such, may be regarded as but pre- 
 appointed executioners, deriving their powers, and their 
 connexion with the sin, from no inward necessities, but 
 from the sovereign pre-arrangements of God ; while the 
 law of which they may thus form the penalty is anterior, 
 both in the order of nature and of time, to all the laws of 
 the natural world. The great absurdity of this scheme, 
 when it thus stands alone, consists in this, that it is the 
 penalty which creates the sin. It is wrong to eat too much, 
 because it will be followed by a pain in the stomach ; and 
 men are punished with a pain in the stomach, because they 
 have been guilty of a breach of its physical law. Remove 
 the pain, and you remove the sin. Can any one bring him- 
 self to feel that anything like this would be true in regard 
 to a breach of the law of charity, or that malevolence would 
 change its moral character, though it could be followed by 
 an eternity of pleasure ? If the violation of a physical law 
 proceeds from a disposition to contemn a known arrange- 
 ment of God, whatever may have been the object of that 
 arrangement, it belongs to another department, and must be 
 transferred to a tribunal higher than the natural. 
 
 It is by overlooking the nature of punishment as strictly 
 retributive, notwithstanding the mode of its infliction, that 
 this doctrine of consequential suffering strips the Divine 
 law of all its majesty, and becomes such a favourite with 
 infidels and neologists. There is no terror in it ; and when 
 employed, as it sometimes is even in the pulpit, without the 
 qualifications to which we have adverted, its immediate ef- 
 fect is ease and stupefaction of the conscience, rather than 
 any alarm or true conviction of sin. There is, however, no 
 inconsistency in the belief of both views. The punishment 
 
PUNISHMENT OF SIN IIOW FAR CONSEQUENTIAL. 299 
 
 inflicted by human government would be no less the retrib- 
 utive penalty of positive law, although its preordained ar- 
 rangements were such, that the path of every transgressor 
 was literally beset with snares, or that it finally brought 
 him, without arrest or the aid of the executioner, directly to 
 the prison or the gallows. 
 
 Page 59, Line 7. npog to oXov del pXenuv — “ Looking 
 continually to the whole.” There is implied here a nega- 
 tive assertion. It is equivalent to saying, “ and having no- 
 thing else in view.” The meaning seems to be, that the 
 process here mentioned might perhaps be adopted, if no re- 
 gard was had to the parts, as parts, or except in their rela- 
 tion to the whole. In that case, the Divine administration 
 might perhaps proceed by these sudden transformations. 
 But as in each act of Providence avast number of purposes, 
 direct and collateral, are to be kept in view, and no one to 
 be effected by disturbing or displacing another, there is 
 need of an arrangement that shall be carried on by media, 
 so that one move on the great chess-board (see note 6, p. 
 59) may accomplish many ends, instead of requiring separ- 
 ate transpositions in every case. 
 
 The philosopher evidently perceives a great difficulty at- 
 tending any explanation that can be given. We can never, 
 perhaps, fully understand the harmonious connexion be- 
 tween a providence carried on by general laws, operating, 
 in the main, with uninterrupted regularity, and a minute at- 
 tention to those individual cases which may be made the 
 subjects of special prayer and special judgments. It be- 
 longs to that same class of mysterious truths, and presents 
 the same apparent contradictions, as the doctrine of the Di- 
 vine foreknowledge or foreordination, when viewed in con- 
 nexion with the freedom of the human will, or of the Divine 
 goodness, when attempted to be reconciled with the exist- 
 ence of evil. Why should men be so clamorous for the 
 rights of reason in religion, when, in so many cases, she 
 
300 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN dvd)Xe0pOg AND aubviog. 
 
 herself declares her own insufficiency as the highest lesson 
 she can teach us, and delivers us over, either to total skep- 
 ticism, or to that faith by which we receive truths appa- 
 rently opposed, or whose point of connexion is beyond our 
 radius of mental vision ; because, without this, we must 
 give up other truths which our moral nature can only yield 
 at the price of total darkness on all that most concerns us 
 to know. 
 
 LIV. 
 
 The Word ’A vtiXedpog as distinguished from Aluviog. Re- 
 markable Passage in the Timceus. 
 
 Page 60, Line 3. avddXeOpov de ov yevopevov aXX’ ovu 
 aicjviov. There is intended here an important distinction 
 between alibvtov and av&XeQpov. The former means that 
 which is in its very nature eternal, not subject, in any sensfe, 
 to generation or decay, and, in fact, having no reference to 
 %povog, or time regarded as proceeding by succession. 
 ( See the definition of time as given in the Timceus, 37, E., 
 and remarks upon it, page 223.) ? A v&XeQpov, on the other 
 hand, suggests, from its etymology, the idea of something 
 composite, although, when used without precision, it may 
 be applied to that which is possessed of a higher nature. 
 It signifies indestructible, not in itself, but because the thing 
 of which it is predicated is upheld and maintained in being 
 by the Supreme Power, and thus rendered capable of en- 
 during through an endless succession, although never strict- 
 ly ald)VLov or eternal in its essence. Kara vopov $eoi, says 
 Ast, has respect to aluviov alone, and not to av&XeOpov. 
 He would read according to the following order and punc- 
 tuation : i/jvftTjv teal ocbpa, avibXedpov yevopevov, ov, 
 Kadtinep ol Kara vopov ovreg deoi, aiibvtov — indestructible , , 
 yet not eternal as the Gods are. This contrast between 
 
REMARKABLE PASSAGE FROM THE TIM^IUS. 301 
 
 Gods and men seems plausible, and yet we are satisfied 
 that Ast is wrong. Our opinion is founded upon that pas- 
 sage of the Timaeus, in which the Eternal Father thus ad- 
 dresses the inferior deities to whom he had given being : 
 0 eol tietiv, G)v eyd) drjpcovpyog, narrjp re epycov, a 6l ’ epov 
 yevopeva , dXvra , epov ye deXovrog. to pev ovv dr) deOev 
 uav , Xvtov. to ye prjv tcaXtig dppooOev aal e%ov ev Xvetv 
 eOeXeiv, Hanoi). 6l 9 a teal eneiirep yeyevifoOe , ’A0ANATOI 
 pev ovn £(7T£, ovd’ aXvroi to Tzapirav. ovrt pev dfj XvOrj - 
 oeoOe ye, ovde rev^eode Zavarov poipag , TH2 ’EMHS 
 BOYAHDE£22 pei^ovog en deopov teal tevpiorepov Xa^ov- 
 reg, erceivov olg ore eyiyveode cvvedeloOe — “ Ye Gods of 
 Gods, of whom I am the Maker and the Father, as of 
 works which, deriving their existence from me, are indis- 
 soluble as long as I will it. Everything bound (or compos- 
 ite) is capable of dissolution : nevertheless, to choose to 
 dissolve that which is well harmonized, and works well, is 
 the part of an evil being. For which reasons, and since 
 ye were made (or had a beginning of your existence), ye 
 are not immortal (in yourselves), nor in every respect in- 
 dissoluble. Still, ye shall not be dissolved, nor shall ye 
 experience the doom of death, partaking, IN MY WILL, 
 of a bond of life stronger and more powerful than those 
 things by which ye were bound (or of which ye were com- 
 posed) when ye received your being.” Timceus, 41, A. 
 That is, the permanence of all created things, from the 
 highest to the lowest, rests on the moral attributes of the 
 Deity. In his goodness they have a stronger bond than in 
 all the laws or necessities of nature and of things. On this 
 depends the continued existence not only of man, but of 
 Gods, or, in the more sublime language of Scripture, of 
 Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, and Powers. 
 
 Kara vopov ovreg Qeoc : According to the decree or fate 
 ( fatum ) on which their existence depended. Compare, also ; 
 the similar expression, page 61, line 7 : tiara ttjv rrjg eipap • 
 
 C c 
 
302 GREEK WORDS FOR ETERNITY, ai(OV AND ald)VLOg . 
 
 pevyg t&I-lv nal vojjlov. This confirms the view we have 
 taken above in respect to $eof. They were dependent on 
 this iaw, and not on any innate immortality. No^o^* here 
 has about the same meaning with [iolpa, which, according 
 to the more ancient creed of the Greeks, meant simply the 
 Divine decree. This, we are prepared to show, is its sig- 
 nification in Homer, and not a physical fate, as many con- 
 tend. The wor^s nal ocbpa are to be taken col- 
 
 lectively for all animated beings thus constituted. The 
 continued existence of soul and body, severally or united, 
 whether in the present state or in any one to come, is de- 
 pendent on the Eternal Father, who is thus represented as 
 speaking in this sublime passage from the Timaeus — who 
 alone is strictly aluviog in the highest sense of that epithet, 
 or, as the Apostle declares, 1 Timothy , vi., 16, 6 pbovog 
 aQavaotav — who alone hath immortality . 
 
 LV. 
 
 The Greek Words for Eternity , A ld)v and A Icbvcog. 
 
 Ald)V is compounded of del cov (see Aristotle , De Coelo, 
 lib. i., c. ix., 10). 9 A el, ever, is from aco, deco, or drjpt , sig- 
 
 nifying, primarily, to blow, to breathe, secondly, to live, to 
 pass or spend time. v A(o seems also related to dlo), to feel 
 life, to be conscious ; from whence some would derive alcbv 
 in the general sense of existence. Homer uses ao or aeo) 
 in the second of the above meanings, as in the Odyssey, 
 iii., 151, and 490: v EvOa 6s vvnr 9 aeoav. Because this 
 verb is thus used, in several places in the Odyssey, in con- 
 nexion with vv%, some lexicographers absurdly render it to 
 sleep . It is, however, only thus employed, because by 
 night the flow or succession of time becomes a matter of 
 distinct observation and consciousness more than by day. 
 Hence, as the context shows, it is generally used of wake- 
 ful and anxious nights : 
 
GREEK WORDS FOR ETERNITY, aiuv AND al&VLOg. 303 
 
 N v/cra pev deaauev, xaherr a cppsalv oppatvovreg. 
 
 Odyssey , iii., 151. 
 
 ’Ael, from this derivation, would present the idea of contin- 
 uous being, of a going on, or succession ; and as a particle of 
 time, is ever used of that which is boundless or undefined ; 
 not so much that which cannot be bounded as that which 
 is not bounded — which is not attempted to be defined, but 
 is always considered as going on, on, on. ’A et, therefore, 
 alone, would not express the true idea of eternity , but only 
 of endless or unbounded time. This flowing word must be 
 connected with, and, as it were, anchored upon another of 
 more stability ; since stability and fixedness enter into the 
 essential idea of eternity. This other word is the partici- 
 ple of that verb of existence which expresses, in its philo- 
 sophical sense, the highest mode of being. One part of the 
 compound, then, is boundless and unconfined ; the other 
 chains it to an eternal present, or, rather, since dov is of all 
 tenses, altogether excludes the idea of time. It is thus that 
 the Greek term approaches as near the true notion of eter- 
 nity as it is in the power of language to bring us. 
 
 Although the human mind may fail to take in all that 
 idea which alcdv aims to express, still an apprehension of 
 it may exist, sufficient, at least, to convince us that it con- 
 tains nothing unreal, but has a solid foundation in the truth 
 of things. We may approach it by negatives. Aidov is not 
 time long or short, bounded or endless. It is not the oppo- 
 site of time, but that of which xpo vo Si or time, in our pres- 
 ent state, is the moving image. ( See remarks , page 223, 
 and the comparison there referred to.) It may more proper- 
 ly be said to be the opposite of tcaipog, or upoonatpog ; be- 
 ing thus used by the Apostle, 2 Corinthians , iv., 18, and in 
 such a way as to exclude all cavil as to its extent, at least 
 in that place. It is there the direct antithesis of temporal 
 or temporary. 
 
 However difficult it may be for beings who can only 
 
304 GREEK WORDS FOR ETERNITY, aUx OV AND ClloVLOg. 
 
 think in a series, to form a conception of that which neces- 
 sarily excludes succession of thought, we are nevertheless 
 driven, by the clearest decisions of that reason which often 
 goes where the conceptive faculty cannot follow, to affirm 
 that this is the state in which all things must be present to 
 the Divine mind. If to this we apply the term alcov, we 
 have its perfect definition. We may be certain of its real- 
 ity, although utterly unable to comprehend it. The idea 
 of time is connected with an imperfection necessarily be- 
 longing to our present state, namely, an inability to enter- 
 tain in the mind more than one thought at once. This 
 gives rise to what is called the succession of ideas, consti- 
 tuting the measure of time ; and this succession we apply 
 even to those truths which, as reason plainly assures us, 
 have no relation to time or the sequences of cause and ef- 
 fect. Nothing, on these abstruse points, could be more sat- 
 isfactory than Plato’s comparison and definition, to which 
 we have before referred, and which may be found Timceus , 
 37, E. 
 
 Almost all our difficulties on the subject of endless being, 
 and especially endless future punishment, arise from con- 
 sidering eternity, or alcov, as time infinitely prolonged, as end- 
 less succession or duration. This addresses itself to the 
 imagination or conceptive power rather than to the reason, 
 and hence this weak faculty of the soul faints and staggers 
 under the attempt to realize what, as a conception of the 
 sense, never can be realized. But the whol-e subject pre- 
 sents itself under quite a different aspect when we regard 
 the future state not as the beginning of a prolonged period, 
 having its own past and future, but as a transition into eter- 
 nity — as a condition differing not merely in degree, but in 
 its very nature, from the present world of time. When the 
 revolving mirror of Chronos, which now represents all 
 things in motion, has ceased its revolutions, either in re- 
 spect to the whole or each man individually, the landscape 
 
GREEK WORDS FOR ETERNITY, ald)V AND ald)VLOg. 305 
 
 of eternity, with all its fearful states, becomes in experience, 
 as it ever had been in reality, fixed and motionless — cuzlvt ]- 
 ra , dperdozara, del Kara ravrd e^ovra. There will be 
 no endless succession of years and periods, which, in ev- 
 ery effort of the mind to grasp them, only present, over and 
 over again, the same difficulties of comprehension, and, in- 
 stead of a true idea , give rise only to a painful* and imper- 
 fect conception of the sense. “ For days, and nights, and 
 months, and years, and all other successions of time,” says 
 Plato, “ were not before the heaven existed. The past, the 
 present, and the future are but temporal forms, which we 
 ignorantly and incorrectly attribute to the eternal ovaca , or 
 essence. For we say was, and is, and will be, when IS 
 ( eon ) alone pertains to aeonian being, while was and will 
 be belong to that flowing yeveoig, or generation, which exists 
 in time. For they are motions ( mvijaecg ), but the eternal 
 is, in respect to these, immoveable ; never younger, never 
 older, having no past and no future” — to 6 e del Kara ravra 
 e\ov aiavrjrog, ovre npeodvrepov, ovre ve&repov irpoarjUSL 
 ylyveodai ttote , ovds yeyovevat, ovd’ eloavdcg eoeoOai 
 Timceus, 38, A. 
 
 Change and succession may be said to form the predom- 
 inating characteristics of the present flowing phenomenal 
 world. In eternity, all is just the reverse. There, to use 
 language derived from the old Ionic problem, all things will 
 stand. The things which are seen are temporal, probation- 
 ary, preparatory ( Ttpoonaipa ). The things which are un- 
 seen are eternal (alwwa), fixed, immutable, without succes- 
 sion. The word ah ov is undoubtedly used in the Greek 
 
 * In nothing is this more fully realized than in the efforts some- 
 times made by preachers and others to convey what they call an 
 idea of eternity; as, for example, from an ocean of drops, or the 
 space of the solar system filled with grains of sand, and those mul- 
 tiplied by myriads and millions of centuries. By such immensities 
 of numbers the mind is wearied and exhausted, but never brought a 
 hair’s breadth nearer the object at which it aims. 
 
 C c 2 
 
306 GREEK WORDS FOR ETERNITY, ald)V ^ ND aid)ViOg. 
 
 poetry in the indefinite sense of life, existence, or state of 
 being ; and there are also some passages in the Scriptures 
 where it is taken figuratively in a lower signification of age 
 or dispensation, although even these are grounded on the 
 higher and radical import ; but this we affirm with confi- 
 dence, that the restorationist can derive no aid from these 
 specimens of Platonic usage, and, in fact, nothing could be 
 more utterly opposed to all his views of change, reforma- 
 tion, or restoration in the eternal state. We conclude with 
 a definition of alcov, derived from the high authority of Aris- 
 totle. It contains more reference to succession than that 
 of Plato, but yet is directly in the way of all attempts to 
 limit the meaning of this illimitable word. He is speaking 
 of the super-celestial, or extra-mundane state, and what- 
 ever we may think of its reality, there can be no doubt 
 about the force of the Greek terms by which he attempts to 
 set it forth. “ Time,” he says, “ is the number of motion, 
 but above the heaven it has been shown that time cannot 
 exist. There, there is no growing old, neither is there any 
 change, but all is immutable, all is impassible, and having 
 the best and most satisfying life (fa )fjv apioTrjv nal tt)v av- 
 TapKeGTdrrjv ), continues for all eternity (tov aixavra aiti- 
 va ) ; and this its name is divinely declared to us from the an- 
 cients ('detcog EtyOeynraL napa rtiv apxatcov). For that end 
 which contains the period of each existence is called its 
 alcjv ( cevum , age , or being). According to the same reason 
 or definition — tcard tov avrov Xoyov , nal to tov navrog 
 ovpavov reXog, nal to tov navTCOV aneipov xpovov nal tt)v 
 ansiplav i repisxov TeXog, ’AIS2N egtiv, duo tov ’AEI ’EI- 
 NAI eiXr)(j)d)g tt\v err covvpiav, aOavaTog nal delog — that 
 which constitutes the enclosing limit of the whole heaven 
 or universe, that which embraces the infinite period , and the 
 infinity of all things — that is alcov , ETERNITY, taking its 
 name from EVER BEING, immortal and divine.” Arist., 
 De Coelo, lib. i., c. ix., 10. Compare, also, The Laics , iv., 
 
PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 307 
 
 715, P., where Plato speaks of the Eternal Justice, which 
 always follows as an avenger of crimes committed against 
 the Divine law ( rov &eiov vopov npopog), and in com- 
 menting on which the scholiast thus defines the word n epi- 
 7TopEvop,evog , namely, to aiovlcog — to ’A el (boavrog ttai 
 Kara ra avra * rj yap irepi(j)Opd rovro 
 
 LYI. 
 
 Plato’s Doctrine of the Freedom of the Willy viewed in Con- 
 nexion with the Law of Cause and Effect in Nature . 
 
 Page 60, Line 11 . M eprjxdvrjrat 6rj Trpog nav rovro , k. 
 r. A. — “ He devises this in reference to the whole, namely, 
 what kind of a situation everything which becomes of a cer- 
 tain quality must receive and inhabit.” That is, the itoio- 
 rr\g or quality which, in the course of generation, anything 
 assumes, must determine the quality of its final habitation. 
 The establishment and enforcement of this law God has 
 reserved to himself as his peculiar prerogative, while, as we 
 are told in the following sentence, he has left to our own 
 wills, rag alriag rr\g yeveoeug rov ttolov rivog — the causes 
 of becoming such or such. (See note 10 , page 60 .) In 
 other words, he has so ordered the course of nature, by a 
 sort of pre-established harmony, that it constantly enforces 
 this law, while the power of becoming the subjects of its 
 rewards or penalties is left to the freedom of our own wills. 
 The sentiment is about the same with that of Pope : 
 
 And binding nature fast in fate, 
 
 Left free the human will. 
 
 We cannot find much fault with this in the heathen Plato, 
 and the doctrine is undoubtedly true of man viewed as un- 
 fallen, and in that primitive state when his will was truly 
 free, because it was one with the will of God. The Chris- 
 tian theology, however, does require us to modify the prop- 
 
308 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 
 
 osition as regards our present condition, and to believe that, 
 in some way, man by the fall subjected his will to nature ; 
 that, therefore, although it has a wide prison-house within 
 which to rove, and where it may be said to be free in its 
 choices of objects before it, still it can never, by any voli- 
 tion, rise above this state of nature, or escape its adaman- 
 tine chain of cause and effect, until a stronger than nature 
 shall interpose for its deliverance and perfect freedom. The 
 sick man may turn from side to side upon his weary couch, 
 but he cannot rise, take up his bed, and walk. We may 
 exercise all kinds of choices (a term which in the strife of 
 words on this subject so many have confounded with will) 
 within the limits of the sphere into which we have fallen, 
 but we cannot will to be holy, to love God with all our souls, 
 and to live to his glory. If the Scriptures were not clear 
 on the subject, it is so plainly a matter of personal experi- 
 ence that we may well wonder how, in the light of an awa- 
 kened conscience or consciousness, there could be any room 
 for cavil about it. 
 
 There is no doubt, however, that Plato was rather Pe- 
 lagian on this great question ; although places could be 
 cited which show that his mind was unsettled, and that 
 there were very great difficulties attending any view he 
 could take of the matter. We may find this same doctrine 
 that is here advanced more fully set forth in the Republic, 
 x., 617, P., where, after a long argument, in which he in- 
 troduces that wild mythical legend respecting the Destinies, 
 Lachesis, Clotho, and Atrope, he concludes in the follow- 
 ing most concise and remarkable manner : Ov% vpag dai- 
 pcjv Xr\^erai dA/l’ vfieig daiptova atprjoeoOe • aperr) 6e ddecr- 
 7 totov • atria eAoptevov * deog avairtog — “ Virtue is free 
 from control : the fault is in the chooser : God is blame- 
 less,” or, rather (since avairtog and atria do not in them- 
 selves imply blame), God is not concerned in the causation 
 of sin or the production of virtue. Notwithstanding this. 
 
PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 309 
 
 there are several striking passages in which he asserts,, 
 without qualification, that virtue is a Divine gift, and that, 
 in the present state of man, its attainment is hopeless with- 
 out the Divine aid. As, for example, in the Meno, 99, P. : 
 ’A peri) ovv dv elrj ovre (pvoet ovre dcdatcrov , dXXd deia 
 poipa Trapaycyvopevrj olg dv TrapayiyvrjTcu — “ Wherefore 
 virtue would be neither by nature nor by science or teach- 
 ing, but by a Divine gift, bestowed upon those by whom it 
 is possessed.” So, also, a few sentences below, to the 
 same effect. (Meno, 100, B.) Nothing can be clearer 
 than this declaration, and yet, when we take into view 
 other parts of that same dialogue, it is extremely difficult to 
 determine what he really thought about the cause and 
 source of true virtue. Whether it was by nature, by sci- 
 ence, or directly from God, were questions to which his 
 mind often reverts, and which he seems never to have sat- 
 isfactorily solved. The student may find it discussed at 
 great length in the Protagoras. In the Republic, again 
 (lib. vi.), where he is led to draw as strong as possible a 
 picture of human depravity, he declares most expressly that 
 the acquisition of virtue is impossible without the Divine as- 
 sistance. “ Do you think,” says Socrates, “ that any soph- 
 ist” — by which he means one of the ancient lecturers on 
 moral philosophy who undertook to teach virtue for pay 
 — “ do you think that any sophist, or any instructions of 
 private persons, can control or even withstand such an in- 
 fluence for evil ? No one ; yea, even to attempt it would 
 only be evidence of folly.” And then he concludes in this 
 most solemn and impressive manner : Ovre yap yiyverat , 
 ovre yeyovev ovre ovv prj yevrycai aXkolov rjOog npog ape- 
 ttjv rrapa rijv tovtcov 'natdelav. avOpcbneiov , cb eralpe * del- 
 ov e^aipcb Xoyov . ev yap XP?1 eldevai , o ri nep dv ooO^j re 
 ual yevryrai olov del ev roiavr \ 7 naraoraoei , Qeov polpav 
 avro oCdo at Xeycov ov aanCdg epelg — “ For it neither is the 
 case, nor has been, nor ever can be, that any character (or 
 
310 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL 
 
 state of soul) should undergo a change to virtue in opposi- 
 tion to the corrupt training of these influences. At least 
 nothing human, my friend ; the Divine I lay out of the ac- 
 count. For we may be well assured that he speaks most 
 truly who asserts that if anything, under such circumstan- 
 ces, is saved, and becomes such as it ought to be, a Divine 
 dispensation alone hath saved it.” Republic , vi., 493, A. 
 In another part of this same passage he pronounces the 
 case absolutety desperate — eav firj rig avry /3orjdrjoag detiv 
 tvxV — “ unless some God should come to the aid of the 
 soul.” Repub., vi., 492, A. 
 
 Surely, if this be a true picture of human nature,* Plato 
 may be justly charged with inconsistency, yet no greater 
 than many have manifested on this subject who possessed 
 the higher light of revelation. If these representations be 
 correct, how can virtue be said to be without restraint ? 
 How can that be free which has so many impediments, to 
 say the least? If there is no accountability when these 
 impediments are supposed utterly to surmount the strength 
 of the will, why is not this same accountability diminished 
 pro rata when they exist in a less degree, although falling 
 short of an absolute inability ? and how, then, can we avoid 
 the conclusion, that the more vicious the disposition, and, 
 
 * There is a most remarkable declaration of Thucydides on the 
 subject of human depravity, which is the more worthy of attention, 
 because it comes from one who, without any philosophical or reli- 
 gious theory, was as cool and keen an observer of human nature as 
 ever lived. “ It is the nature of man to sin (says this sagacious his- 
 torian) both in public and private. No law can restrain him from 
 it. All modes of punishment have been exhausted in the attempt.” 
 Lib. iil, 45. And again, in the same section : an k&g re, advvarov , 
 Kal nokkfjg svijOetag, bang olerat , Trig avdpaneiag tyvaeog oppcdpivrjg 
 npoOvpwg tl npa^ai, anoTponrjv riva e^etr, rj vopiov rj ok k(p T(p 
 
 deivtp — “To speak plainly, it’is impossible ; and it is a proof of great 
 simplicity for any one to suppose that, when human nature rushes 
 eagerly to the attainment of any gratification, it can be turned aside 
 either by force of law or any penalty, however fearful.” 
 
PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 311 
 
 consequently, the more difficult the practice of virtue, the 
 less the degree of guilt, and the nearer an approach to a 
 state of perfect innocence. 
 
 Jacob Zimmerman, in his tract Be Proestantia Religionis 
 Christiana collata cum Philosophia Socratis, finds fault with 
 this doctrine that virtue is a Bivine gift , and thinks that, in 
 the contest of Socrates with the sophist Protagoras, on the 
 question whether virtue could be taught, the latter has great- 
 ly the advantage. He also charges the views of Socrates 
 with leading to licentiousness, while he seems to regard 
 his most corrupt antagonists as the friends of the public 
 morals : Et hac ratione Socrates vel invitus efiecit, ut illi 
 qui jam vitiis immersi sunt aliquod presidium inde caperent. 
 Nihil enim libentius ejusmodi homines audiunt, quam ea, 
 quae summam difficultatem in virtuti colenda probare pos- 
 sunt ; ita enim necessario inferri posse putant in sua potes- 
 tate situm haud esse virtutem sequi. Vide Amcenitates Lit - 
 erarice , vol. xi., p. 187. That the doctrine of Bivine grace 
 — for such is substantially the declaration that virtue is the 
 gift of God — should be charged with licentiousness is not 
 surprising, since it has thus been characterized in all ages, 
 even by men themselves as utterly corrupt as those Gre- 
 cian sophists with whom Socrates contended even unto 
 death ; but it certainly is a matter of exceeding wonder, 
 that a professed Christian writer should censure him for 
 that very sentiment in which, of all others, he approaches 
 the nearest to the Bible. See some of these questions most 
 acutely argued in Cicero’s treatise De Fato, s. v., vi. It is 
 worthy of an attentive perusal, if for no other reason, to see 
 how very similar, in all ages, have been the discussions 
 which have arisen on these most ancient queries respect- 
 ing fatalism, causality, co-causes, conditions, moral agency, 
 and the freedom of the will. Jonathan Edwards himself 
 does not distinguish with more keenness than Cicero and 
 the persons whose opinions he has introduced in the tract 
 referred to. 
 
312 EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 
 
 Page 61, L. 6. ev eavrolg ne/crrjpeva tt)v rr\g per aboXrjg 
 airiav — “Possessing in themselves the cause of change.” 
 That is, without, or to the exclusion of external causes, yet 
 still not, as those maintain who contend for the self-determi- 
 ning power of the will, without being under the law of cause 
 and effect existing within them ; the cause being the inter- 
 nal result of their present state at any one time, or the com- 
 bined sum and product of all the influences, from within 
 and from without, then existing in their physical, intellect- 
 ual, and moral constitution, and the effect being the one 
 single following state which the laws of our minds compel 
 us to affirm must result from it. So Cicero, De Fato, s. 
 xi. : Sic quum sine causa animum moveri dicimus, sine ex- 
 terna causa moveri, non omnino sine causa , dicimus. 
 
 LVIT. 
 
 Explanation of a Difficult Passage. 
 
 Page 61, Line 8. opiKporepa, pev rtiv i]d gjv, k. t. a. 
 There is a good deal of difficulty about this sentence, and 
 yet we think a very good sense may be made of the com- 
 mon reading, without resorting to those conjectural emenda- 
 tions which some commentators would propose. The ver^ 
 sions of Ficinus and Cornarius both proceed upon the idea 
 that the main contrast is between opucporepa pev and nXeio 
 de, which view, it must be confessed, seems to have ap- 
 pearances strongly in its favour. Neither translator, how- 
 ever, adheres to the Greek text as it now stands. Yiger 
 proposes amendments grounded upon the same view of the 
 passage. He would read eXarro) pev nai ducatorepa , that 
 it might be more directly opposed to ttXelg) teal adiK&repa, 
 just below. Ast thinks there is no need of any other change 
 than to expunge eXarro, and would render as follows : 
 Quae minus depravata sunt, ea per terrae planitiem ingredi- 
 untur, quae vero in majorem depravationem inciderunt in 
 
EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 313 
 
 profundum, &c., detruduntur. It seems to us, however, 
 that almost all difficulty is removed by regarding the main 
 contrast as intended between opuiporepa pev and pel^oov 6 e 
 five or six lines below, and a subordinate contrast between 
 eXarro) and ttXsig) tie. We would place a comma after 
 eXarr 6), and regard a.. pev as implied in connexion with it ; 
 the omission being nothing strange, seeing that the particle 
 had just been used to mark the main antithesis. In this 
 view of the matter, pera6dXXovra is to be taken with eXar- 
 to), and there will also be a contrast of degree between this 
 participle and peraTreadvra ; the former, from its being in 
 the present tense, implying a slight beginning of a change, 
 either for good or evil ; the latter, a more sudden and rapid 
 descent. ~Elg is to be taken with peranopeveraL understood 
 as though repeated, and not with perarcEGovra . In this 
 view, eXarrcOj instead of being required to be expunged, 
 becomes an important word, and the only real defect in the 
 sentence is a mere want of verbal symmetry in having no- 
 thing to correspond to aduuhrepa, together with the harsh, 
 ness which is felt in connecting this word with peraixeGov- 
 tcl. On the other view, it is not easily explained how opc- 
 uporepa tg)v i]Q(x)v can be made to mean those who are less 
 depraved , as the phrase is regarded by Ficinus, Cornarius, 
 and Ast. Another objection to their version is, that there 
 is nothing with which we can contrast pel^cov 'ipvxv below, 
 when the whole following context shows that a very strong 
 antithesis was most certainly intended. This, we think, 
 can only be effected by regarding it as in opposition to opi- 
 Kporepa, tgjv rjOojv, a phrase equivalent to opiKporepa rfO?], 
 or ol exovreg opiKpoTEpa, rfO?], and which we would consid- 
 er as synonymous with what Plato elsewhere styles opwpa 
 (pvoLg, the small nature , the less marked or inferior char- 
 acter or habit of soul, in distinction from the psi^cov ipyx^i ; 
 neither expression in itself implying depravity, but, on the 
 other hand, each including the good as well as the bad. 
 
 D D 
 
314 EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 
 
 With these preliminaries, we proceed to state the order 
 of the whole passage, according to the view above taken, 
 enclosing in brackets the implied words which are deemed 
 essential to a full interpretation : opiKporepa pev tojv 7 ] 0 d)v, 
 eXarrco \jpsv~\ psrabdXXovra^ peranopeverat Kara to rrjg 
 X<- opag entnedov , ttXslo) 6 s perarcsGovra teal d6tKd)repa, sig 
 paOog [peTaTTOpeveTCu] rd re itaro), n. r. X. — psc^cov 6s 6rj 
 'ipvX'h Kairiag rj dpsrr]g onorav psraXdb 37, k. t. X. Of which 
 there may be given the following free translation : “ The 
 smaller natures, to wit, those possessed of none of the 
 greater traits of soul, whether for good or evil, undergoing 
 less change, or as long as they undergo less change, pro- 
 ceed with a slight deviation (change being implied in psra) 
 along the apparently level plain of life ; but when they de- 
 cline more rapidly, and with greater degrees of wickedness 
 (the metaphor being carelessly lost sight of in aduuorepa), 
 they change their course (slg fiaOog) into a steep descent, 
 and to those regions commonly spoken of as being below, 
 which, under the name of Hades, men fear and dream 
 about, &c. ; but as for the greater soul, whenever it par- 
 takes of vice or virtue, by the exercise of its own will or 
 by association, &c. — such a soul, we say, whenever, by 
 mingling with the Divine excellence, it becomes in a re- 
 markable degree similar, makes a transition, also, into a 
 surpassingly holy place, being continually carried into an- 
 other still better region ; but when contrariwise, then trans- 
 ferring the seat of its life in a contrary direction and to a 
 contrary abode.” From ooa to ouparuv inclusive, may be 
 regarded as a parenthetical clause, explanatory of ra narco 
 tojv roucov. In the second member of the principal antith- 
 esis, had there been preserved a perfect correspondence, 
 we should have had psc^G) 6 s rtiv rjOtiv ; from some idea 
 of wdiich in the mind of a transcriber probably arose the 
 other reading preferred by Ast, namely, pst^co 6s 6rj i/> rj, 
 &c. In this way, sXdrrco (/i£F) and tcXsig) 6s indicate two 
 
EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 315 
 
 different stages in the course of those denoted by opiKpo- 
 repa 7 ] 0 r ] : the first, a gentle deviation, almost level, and 
 therefore called ettctte6ov ; the second, a rapid descent. 
 There is also a great propriety in the use of the present 
 pera6d?i?iOVTa , which Ast would change into the second 
 aorist — while , or as long as , they undergo less change. 
 
 In the words entnedov and j3a6og there may be one of 
 those geometrical allusions of which Plato was so very 
 fond, and which he so frequently employs. An evil course 
 may be compared to the three dimensions of magnitude. It 
 is first a mere point, then extends itself into a line, then 
 spreads out into superficial space ( Eninedov ), and, finally, 
 grows into the solid dimensions of iniquity in all theii 
 length, breadth, and depth ; that is, in the fixed and immu- 
 table condition of the sinful nature — a state from which 
 Plato would admit that it was not in the power of the will 
 to return. 
 
 There are, in a critical point of view, several defects 
 about both members of this antithesis and the subordinate 
 contrasts. It is, however, far better to admit that Plato 
 sometimes writes carelessly than to hazard so many con- 
 jectural emendations. The whole passage strongly sug- 
 gests a similar thought from the Republic : e^el 6fj Xoyov , 
 rrjv dpLOrrjv (pvav kv aXXorpLCOTEpa ovoav Tpocpy, Kamov 
 diraXX&TTEiv r?jg (pavXyg — Kal rag 'ijjvxag rag EV(pvEOT&- 
 rag , KaKijg Traidayoytag rvxoverag , diacpEpovroig KaKag yiy- 
 vEoOat — “ It is reasonable to suppose that the best nature, 
 being in a condition adverse to its proper development, 
 turns out worse than the meaner ; and that the most high- 
 ly-gifted souls, partaking of evil instruction, become surpass- 
 ingly wicked.” Republic, vi., 491, D. ^avXrj 'ipvx'f] here 
 is equivalent to opiKporepa rjdrj in the passage before us. 
 Compare, also, the Republic, vi., 495, B., where the simi- 
 larity of the expression tends greatly to confirm the view 
 we have here taken : OfUKpa de (j>voig ovdsv psya ovdenors 
 ovdeva ovte 16 l(x)tt]v ovte ttoXiv dpa. 
 
316 
 
 GREEK WORD HADES, 
 
 After all, however, it must be confessed that there is no 
 little difficulty about the passage. Had the first member of 
 the principal antithesis been double, like the second, or had 
 it specified two distinct courses in opposite directions, we 
 should have had no doubt about the correctness of the ver- 
 sion we have given. Such a view, however, may be im- 
 plied, and thus opacporepa rjdrj may be taken of virtue and 
 vice both, as well as j in the second member ; 
 the change either way, in respect to the meaner nature, be- 
 ing at first so slight as not to call for the distinction ; and, 
 in the second stage, the acceleration of velocity being more 
 naturally associated with the ideas of descent and sin than 
 with that of virtue ; so that it is the metaphor which seems 
 to have led the writer astray from the symmetry and con- 
 sistency of the thought he intended to express. Hence, 
 too, we may perhaps account for the introduction of adt/cd)- 
 repa , which seems otherwise to mar the harmony of the 
 passage. Yiger proposes as an emendation eXarrco pev /cal 
 di/caiorepa , as opposed to 7 rXeto) tie Kdl adirccbrepa. This 
 would favour the idea contained in our version more than 
 his own. A better course, however, would be to regard 
 the words /ca/clag rj dperrjg, &c., as implied after opucporepa 
 t(ov rjOcbv, in the first member, as they are expressed after 
 pel^cov ds dr) 'ipvx'ij , in the second. The passage has given 
 great difficulties to all commentators. 
 
 LVIII. 
 
 The Greek Word "A idrjg, and the Hebrew and rP3 
 
 oSty. 
 
 Page 61, Line 11 . "Aidrjv enovopa^ovreg. This word 
 is most clearly from deidrjg , invisible. Thus it is explained 
 by Plato, although he is no great authority in etymological 
 matters : ev adov — to aeideg dr) Xeycov, Gorgias , 493, B. 
 It may therefore mean the invisible world , that is, unseen , in 
 
AND HEBREW SHEOL AND BETH OLAM. 
 
 31 ? 
 
 the sense of concealed from present vision , or it may be con- 
 nected with the more philosophical import of aeidijq, as 
 used by Plato in the Phaedon, namely, the ideal , the intelli- 
 gible world , in distinction from the visible world of sense and 
 matter. The first, however, is doubtless the most common 
 acceptation of the word — the unseen , the unknown region 
 which the grave hides from our view, and whither we can- 
 not follow the departed. It strongly suggests the old ety- 
 mologies given for the Hebrew 'lisp (sheol), and to which 
 we cannot help being partial, notwithstanding they are so 
 contemptuously rejected by Gesenius. They make it from 
 to ask , to demand , to inquire; as though intimating the 
 deep anxiety of men in all ages to penetrate the dark mys- 
 tery concealed by the veil of death, as in the wailing lan- 
 guage of Job : “ Man dieth, and wasteth away ; he giveth 
 up the ghost, and where is lie?” Job , xiv., 10. 
 
 The common poetical expression, olnoq *. AiSov , corre- 
 sponds, both in form and sense, to the Hebrew IV5> 
 
 as used Ecclesiastes, xii., 5 : Man goeth to the house of 
 his eternity , or to his eternal house , instead of our very de- 
 fective translation, his long home , which suggests the grave 
 for the body, rather than that abode of departed spirits 
 which is undoubtedly meant by the Hebrew as well as the 
 Greek phrase. Compare Xenophon’s Life of Agesilaus, 
 near the close : “ And thus this man spent his life in the 
 service of his country, and, having at length died, was 
 transferred to his eternal home ” — elq tt)v ’AIAION "OIKH- 
 2IN uarrjydyeTO. So, also, Diodorus Siculus, in his ac- 
 count of the Egyptians, says, “ They call the habitations 
 of the living, lodging-places (fcaraXvoetq), or inns, because 
 we dwell in them but for a short time ; but the abodes of 
 the departed they style eternal houses , because they con- 
 tinue in Hades during the boundless eternity ” — aldiovq ol- 
 Kovq TzpoaayopevovGiv, ev f/ A idov diareXovvriov tov 
 •AJIEIPON ’AIS2NA. Diod. Sic ., lib. i., 51. 
 
 D d 2 
 
318 
 
 SIMILAR FEARS OF HELL IN ALL AGES. 
 
 The Hebrew oSty corresponds more closely to the 
 Greek ''Aidrjg than SiKBh It signifies hidden, unknoivn , 
 boundless in time, and undefined in space. The composition 
 of the phrase is the same in both languages : rrs — 
 
 oixog r/ Aidov- — the house of Olam—the house of Hades — the 
 invisible state, the abode of unseen spirits. These terms 
 suggest conceptions of vastness, of dread sublimity, while 
 the inquiring word sheol calls up the unknown world, and 
 presents it to the mind as 
 
 That undiscovered country, from whose bourn 
 No traveller returns. 
 
 The expression olnog "Acdov must have been common 
 in the most ancient Greek. Its antiquity is proved by the 
 ellipsis, elg r 'A idov, which afterward came into such fre- 
 quent use by the poets. Hence we conclude that it must 
 have been an early Orientalism, derived from this very 
 phrase with which we have compared it. Had it not been 
 so very common in classical Greek, some critics would 
 doubtless have pronounced it a Hebraism. 
 
 LIX. 
 
 Similar Views of a Future State, and Similar Fears of Hell 
 
 in all Ages. 
 
 Page 61, Line 11 . ooa r/ A tdrjv rs teal rd tovtojv e^dfieva 
 twv ovoparcov enovofad^ovreg ofiodpa (bodovvrac ual ovet- 
 pomXovoi ty7)vreg diaXvOevreg re twv owparwv — “ which, 
 under the name of Hades and similar titles, men greatly 
 fear ( valde horrent) and dream about, both when living and 
 when separated from the body.” This may be compared 
 with a similar passage from the Republic : Fv yap loOi, cb 
 EuKpareg, otl eneidav rig eyyvg % rov oleoOai reXevTr}- 
 oetv, elaep^eraL avrd 3 deog ual (f)povrlg. olre yap Xey opevoi 
 uvOol TCEpt t(ov ev "A idov, &>g rov evOade dduerjoavra 6ei 
 
SIMILAR FEARS OF HELL IN ALL AGES, 319 
 
 ekeI didovcu dlfcrjv, orpetyovoc rrjv i/jv%7]v 6 pkv ovv 
 
 evpLGico)v kavTOv kv rw (3ccp iroXXd aSL/crjpara, etc tg>v im- 
 vo)v, cjouep oi tt aldeg, dapa eyeipopevog, deipaivei , ual £rj 
 pera nanfjg eXiridog — “For be well assured, O Socrates, 
 that when any one is near that time in which he thinks he 
 is going to die, there enter into him fear and anxiety. For 
 then the old stories about hell, how that the man who has 
 here been guilty of wrong must there suffer punishment, 
 torture his soul. Wherefore he who, in the retrospect of 
 his life, finds many crimes, like frightened children starting 
 from their sleep, is terrified, and lives in evil forebodings.” 
 Republic , 330, E. Nothing could give us a surer glimpse 
 into the ancient conscience than such a passage as this. 
 We are very apt to think that the fears of the future world 
 are almost wholly derived from the Bible, and that the an- 
 cient mythology respecting Hades was the mere picture of 
 the poet, without possessing any very strong hold upon 
 the common mind. This declaration, however, of the 
 aged Cephalus, is undoubtedly meant by the writer to be 
 characteristic of the class and age to which the speaker 
 belonged. In this most dramatic of all the dialogues of 
 Plato, nothing of the kind would have been put in the 
 / mouth of such a character, had it not truly expressed a sen- 
 timent deeply grounded in the popular creed and feeling. 
 It testifies more strongly to the ancient universal belief in 
 a retributive hell and a coming judgment, than all the ab 
 stract reasonings of our philosopher, and all the mytholo- 
 gical allusions of the poets. 
 
 The doctrine of a hell for the wicked, as we have else- 
 where observed,* is one of the oldest articles in the reli- 
 gious creed of all ages and nations. Such incidental pas- 
 
 * See the Biblical Repository, No. xix., Art. 3d, where this and 
 kindred topics are dwelt upon at some length ; also a discourse de- 
 livered at Burlington, Vermont, 1839, entitled Natural Religion, the 
 Remains of Primitive Revelation. 
 
320 SIMILAR FEARS OF HELL IN ALL AGES. 
 
 sages as these refute all the reasonings of Warburton, in 
 his attempt to prove that the doctrine of future punishment 
 exerted but little influence in the ancient systems of legis- 
 lation and religion. The very efforts of the Epicureans to 
 ridicule the vulgar fears, and to make light of the terrors of 
 the unseen Hades, show how deeply these awful truths, 
 whatever may have been their origin, had penetrated the 
 human soul. Even the style in which Lucretius speaks of 
 them betrays a secret trepidation, and instead of philosophic 
 indifference, manifests that bitter hatred which, as in the 
 case of most modern infidels, proceeds from a mind once 
 deeply troubled, anxious, and yet unable to shake off those 
 fears which its philosophy affects to despise. This exhi- 
 bition of a soul ill at ease, and of an interested hostility to 
 the very idea of future retribution, is apparent in those 
 lines in which he thus sets forth that monster of horrid as- 
 pect, with whose gloomy frown the timid Epicurean was 
 ever haunted : 
 
 Humana ante oculos quom vita jaceret 
 In terris, obpressa gram sub Religione ; 
 
 Quae caput a cceli regionibus obtendebat, 
 
 Horribili super adspectu mortalibus instans. — Lib . i., 63. 
 
 The same thing is manifested when (to use Plato’s com- 
 parison), like a child who has awaked from some dream of 
 terror, he seems to exult in the timid hope of deliverance 
 from the fears of a future hell : 
 
 Et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agundus, 
 
 Funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo , 
 
 Omnia subfuscans mortis nigrorc ; neque ullam 
 Esse voluptatem liquidam, puramque, relinquit. 
 
 Lib. iii., 37. 
 
 Such strong language most clearly shows, that the doctrine 
 and fears against which it was directed were no light or 
 laughing matter, either to the poet or to those for whom he 
 wrote 
 
 We have every reason, therefore, for believing that much 
 
SIMILAR FEARS OF HELL IN ALL AGES. 
 
 321 
 
 the same views of death, and the same apprehensions of 
 future retribution as now prevail, have ever existed among 
 mankind ; coming not from reason or philosophy, but hand- 
 ed down by tradition from some revelation made in the most 
 ancient time. In all ages, too, and in all creeds, the rep- 
 resentations of the nature of this future punishment have 
 been of the most terrific kind, as though the imagination, 
 for this purpose, had been taxed to its utmost powers. Fire, 
 and chains, and utter darkness, and similitudes of ever-un- 
 gratified desire and of ever-raging passion, have always 
 formed a part of the dread machinery of Hades. The reli- 
 gious poet Pindar describes it as that from which the eye 
 of the soul turns away, as from scenes too full of horror to 
 contemplate for a moment : 
 
 rol d’ anpoGoparov oh^ovtl novov — * 
 
 and, in reference to it, a still more religious poet, even the 
 inspired prophet and leader of Israel, asks with dread so- 
 lemnity,! “ Who knoweth the power of thine anger V * Or, as 
 it has been most admirably paraphrased, 
 
 Thy dreadful wrath exceeds our thought, 
 
 And burns beyond our fear. 
 
 Leaving out of the account the solemn confirmation of the 
 doctrine which may be derived from the fearful imagery 
 employed by our Saviour, and taking into view only the 
 heathen world, we may well ask the question, Whence came 
 all this ? The great problem is for them to solve who as- 
 sert that the doctrine of future punishment is contrary to 
 the Scriptures, the reason, and the feelings. Whence, 
 then, came it, in the face of all these opposing influences ? 
 Men are not fond of what is irrational for its own sake, and 
 they certainly do not love their own misery. Whence, 
 then, came this rptyepcov pvdog^ these fears of Hades, of 
 
 * Find Olymp. Carm ii., J., d. f Psalm xc., 11. 
 
 t JEschylus , Choeph 312. 
 
322 the word ayioq. 
 
 Tartarus, of Gehenna, and those other names which, as 
 Plato says in the passage before us, men have applied to 
 this state ? Why, if this be all false, and without founda- 
 tion in any view of the moral government of God, have the 
 human race thus ever .tortured themselves for naught ? 
 Why have they indulged in these terrific inventions of fan- 
 cy, handing down, from age to age, and from generation to 
 generation, a useless, yet most tormenting anxiety ? And 
 above all, how is it, if sin be such a trifle, that men, by 
 these inventions, have ever persevered in passing a sen- 
 tence so unjustly severe on their own depravity ? Compare 
 the Gorgias , 525, C. ; Phcedon, 114, A. ; Republic , 616, A. 
 
 LX. 
 
 The Word "Ay tog. Exceeding Spirituality of some of Pla- 
 to's Views. Many of his Thoughts capable of being fairly 
 accommodated to a Spiritual Sense higher than the Author 
 himself had intended to convey . Difference in this respect 
 between his Writings and those of all other Philosophers , 
 Ancient or Modern . 
 
 Page 61, Line 17. uai perebaXe tottov ayiov oXov — “Is 
 transferred, or passes into a place all holy.” Purity , or 
 holiness , is generally given as the primary sense of the 
 Greek aytog and of the Hebrew or tyYp. This, how- 
 ever, besides being incapable of accounting for the other 
 meanings, some of which are almost directly opposite, does 
 of itself require some ultimate, and, at the same time, more 
 simple conception into which it may be resolved. This 
 more simple and primary idea is that of separation * or of 
 
 * This will account for those other senses of the root which seem 
 almost the opposite of holy , since it may also refer to that which is 
 purely wicked , or separated from all good. Hence ayo<;, or ayof, may 
 signify an abominable crime. So, also, uytog may sometimes denote 
 
the word ayiog . 
 
 323 
 
 leing set apart. In proof of this we may compare the use 
 of the word throughout the Pentateuch, in its application to 
 places, sacrifices, and to the whole nation of Israel, as sep- 
 arated from the rest of mankind, to be a holy , that is, a sep- 
 arate people. In the same manner are Christians charac- 
 terized, in the New Testament, as ayioi , separate , peculiar ; 
 although in the world, yet not of the world. Thus God is 
 styled ayiog, in the highest sense, to distinguish him, on 
 the one hand, from the earthly and impure conceptions of 
 polytheistic idolatry, and, on the other, from the apparently 
 more philosophical, but no less degrading views of the pan- 
 theist. He is holy, separate from the universe he has call- 
 ed into being, and, although filling all things , yet, in his es- 
 sence, inhabiting the high and holy place. 
 
 As here used by Plato, ayiog roirog means a place set 
 apart from everything that is sinful and vile — the end of a 
 course of purification, during which there has been a con- 
 tinual ayiaopog , that is, a continual separation of the pure 
 from the impure, leaving at last nothing that defileth or ren- 
 ders unfit for this exceedingly separate region. Compare 
 the description of this holy place in the Phsedon : “ When 
 thus the soul is occupied, it goes away to the pure, to the 
 
 that which is accursed , execrable. On the same principle, the Hebrew 
 may mean one devoted to the most beastly wickedness, as in 
 Deuteronomy, xxiii., 18. In a similar manner, the kindred Latin 
 word sacer may signify blessed or cursed . The Hebrew ^3 has the 
 
 same peculiarity, but derives it from a different source. Some would 
 make ayiog, or dyvog, which occurs in the tragedians ( ayiog being 
 found mostly in later Greek), from a£cj, ufoyai, to revere, to stand in 
 awe of. Even here, however, the mind is led to the same original 
 or ultimate sense of separation, as the ground of the feeling express- 
 ed by it, whether that feeling be one of admiration and awo of the 
 pure and holy, or of fearful astonishment at enormous crime. The 
 same primary idea undoubtedly exists in the Latin purus, from the 
 Greek nvp, fire, the penetrating and separating element which has, 
 in all ages, been regarded as the means and emblem of purification. 
 See the Timseus, 56, A. 
 
324 
 
 PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 
 
 ever-being, to the immortal, the unchangeable, and, being 
 of a kindred nature with it, always would abide there, and 
 ceases from its restless wandering — ual uenavrai rov i:Xa- 
 vov — and is ever engaged in the contemplation of the eter- 
 nal. Phcedon, 79, D. Elsewhere he tells us, in almost 
 Scriptural language, that holiness becomes those who would 
 enter this holy place ; whether by the term he means a lo- 
 cality in space, or an exceedingly separate state of the 
 soul : E Ig 6e delov yevog \jlt\ tt avreXwg KaOapcp amovn ov 
 tiefug acpuiveloOcu — “ To enter into the family of the Di- 
 vine,’’ or, in other words, to become a partaker of the Di- 
 vine nature, “ can only be for him who departs wholly 
 pure.” Ibid ., 82, B. Without irreverence may we com- 
 pare this with Hebrews, xii., 14 : dycaopov ov ov- 
 
 Idg o'lpETcu rov K vpiov — Holiness , without which no one 
 shall see the Lord. 
 
 We are very far from saying, or even imagining, that 
 Plato attached to these expressions the same high sense in 
 which they are used by Paul, and yet there are many such 
 passages which, without any violation of the spirit of his 
 language, are capable of a comparison, to say the least, with 
 some of the most precious truths of revealed religion. He 
 was evidently directing his vision to a region of reality, far 
 beyond the aim of any of the heathen philosophers who 
 preceded, or were cotemporary with him. May he not 
 have had some faint glimpses of those higher truths which 
 his words, without any violence in their interpretation, fre- 
 quently suggest to one who reads him by the light of the 
 Christian revelation ? Almost everything depends upon the 
 state of mind with which his writings are studied. To the 
 materialist and the skeptic he will often appear visionary 
 and unmeaning. Jefferson, in a manner most characteris- 
 tic, pronounced him a foggy intellect. Many of the Chris- 
 tian fathers, and a succession of the most learned and pious 
 in the Church throughout its whole history, have ever re* 
 
PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 
 
 325 
 
 garded him with enthusiastic fondness, and esteemed his 
 dialogues as ranking next to the Scriptures, although at a 
 distance which forbade any comparison with the latter as 
 an inspired message from Heaven. We w^ould not be so 
 extravagant as to assert that Plato has a spiritual or esoter- 
 ic sense, as these terms are used by the allegorist or the 
 mystic. No violence need be done to the letter, or to the 
 ordinary laws of interpretation, and yet, by a species of ac- 
 commodation most easy, and, at the same time, most natu- 
 ral, a higher elevation, and a new and almost divine beauty, 
 may be imparted to many passages, causing them to glow 
 with a radiance that seems derived from the same source 
 with the inspiration of the Sacred Volume. Whatever may 
 be the cause, whether it be that lower truths are ever types 
 of higher, which shine through them when examined by a 
 peculiar light and in a peculiar state of the soul, so that 
 there may be truly a lower and a higher sense equally well 
 conveyed by the same letter (a principle which undoubted- 
 ly prevails to some extent in what the soundest expositors 
 regard as the double sense of Scripture) ; or whether there 
 is a spiritual power in language considered in its essence, 
 if not in its forms, as an emanation from the Universal 
 Reason, so that at times, and when happily employed, it 
 may so manifest its own inherent light as to transcend the 
 mind and intended meaning of the writer himself, while the 
 reader, under more favoured circumstances, is admitted to 
 a higher region of thought, and to a deeper participation of 
 that Spirit which dwelleth in the words — or whatever may 
 be the explanation of the fact, most certain it is, that the 
 language of Plato is often thus easily adapted to a spiritu- 
 ality of meaning, in the Christian sense of the term, beyond 
 that of any uninspired writings, ancient or modern, and to an 
 extent which, we may suppose, would transcend anv con 
 ception of the philosopher himself. 
 
 Any one may understand what is meant by this, by keep 
 
 E E 
 
326 
 
 PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 
 
 ing these thoughts in mind while reading some of the more 
 striking passages to which reference is made. In those 
 parts of the Phaedon, for example, where the true philoso- 
 pher is represented as daily dying to the world and sense 
 (tuvdvvevovoL boot ivy^dvovoiv opOcbg anropEvot tyiXooo- 
 (pcag keXrjOEvai rovg aXXovg, on ovdev avrol emrrjdevovoLv 
 fj anoOvrjo/ceiv te /cal TEdvavai ), let the reader think of the 
 Christian instead of the philosopher, and what a close af- 
 finity does the style at once assume with some of the ex- 
 pressions of the apostle. What language could more truly 
 set forth that hidden aim in the life of the follower of Christ, 
 in which he is so unknown to the great mass around him. 
 The world knoweth him not. “ The rest of mankind/’ says 
 Socrates, “ understand not that he lives to die a saying 
 which Cicero, although he but imperfectly comprehended 
 even its Platonic sense, has imitated in the declaration, 
 Tota philosophorum vita commentatio mortis est. Tusc. Disp ., 
 i., 74. Again, in the same dialogue, take the description of 
 that wisdom for which everything else must be exchanged, 
 and without which all other apparent virtues are but splendid 
 cheats — o/uaypacptac — mere shadows of a shade, consisting 
 only in a wretched barter of one passion for another (rjdovag 
 npog rjdovag , /cat Xvnag npog Xvnag, /cal (j)66ov npog (j)66ov , 
 /cal pEc^oj npog EXarrco, coonep vopiopara /caraWaTTEaQai), 
 “ the exchanging of pleasure for pleasure , grief for grief 
 fear for fear, and greater for less, like the coin of traffic 
 let any one, we say, in reading this, and its most instructive 
 context, think of the Scriptural Wisdom in place of the 
 Platonic (ppovrjcng , and how vividly arise to mind our 
 Saviour’s parable of the pearl of great price, and the sub- 
 lime personifications of wisdom in the books of Job and 
 Proverbs. Plato may not have exactly meant by (ppovrjoig 
 that fear of the Lord which is the beginning of all right un- 
 derstanding, but he was certainly aiming far above any 
 philosopher of his day, or any modern moralist who docs 
 
PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 
 
 327 
 
 not draw directly from the fountain of inspiration. Ex- 
 amples of a similar kind may be taken from a great variety 
 of passages everywhere meeting us in his most important 
 dialogues. In the first half of the sixth book of the Re- 
 public, for philosophy, and the philosopher, keep in mind 
 Christianity and the Christian, and how sublimely does the 
 sense, so sublime before, mount up to a new region of 
 spiritual light ; and yet, in all this, no violence is done to 
 the language ; every argument, every epithet, every metaphor 
 retains its native force and its relative harmony, while the 
 mind can hardly resist the impression, that this glowing 
 description of the true philosophy and the true philosopher 
 was intended for a higher meaning than, at first, appears upon 
 its face. The incongeniality of this spirit, be it philosophy 
 or be it religion, .with the selfish, debasing, and corrupting 
 influences in the midst of which we live — its struggles with 
 sense, the contempt poured upon' it by the world, its de- 
 pendence upon that Divine aid which Plato, in this passage, 
 so expressly acknowledges, its continual aspirations after 
 the fixed and eternal, the rest which it bestows where all 
 else is changing and flowing, the exceeding joy with which, 
 at times, it inspires that small number who, in every age, 
 have tasted and experienced how sweet and blessed is this 
 gift of Heaven, while they contemplate the madness which 
 rules the multitude — ol oXtyot yEvopEVoi nal yevodfievoi 
 rjdv nal panaptov to nrrjpa , nal rcbv noXXtiv Idovreg rrjv 
 (laviav* — the elevation of soul which is produced by a re- 
 ligious contemplation of the whole of our being , leading, not 
 to a contempt of our present human life, but to a just esti- 
 mate of it as an exceeding small portion of our entire ex- 
 istence, and of the boundless field of being which lies 
 around us, as when he says, advvarov ry 6/avota , (] 
 vtt&pxel avTTj i\ pEyaXonpETCEia nal 'dECopia iravrog j ilev 
 
 * Republic, vi., 496, C. 
 
328 
 
 PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 
 
 Xpovov , TraGrjg 6s ovotag , peya tl 6ouslv elvac rov avOptim* 
 vov piov* all these, as they are presented in this warm and 
 eloquent description of philosophy and the philosophic life, 
 rise at once to a more elevated meaning, while, at the same 
 time, how admirably does every sentence, thought, and 
 word accommodate itself to this higher sense, as though it 
 had formed the main and only design of the writer. When, 
 with that mild pathos w T hich he sometimes uses with 
 so much effect, he tells us what difficulties the 'philosophic 
 nature has to encounter in maintaining its ground against 
 the unfriendly influences of a foreign, uncongenial clime 
 (cjoirsp %svikov onsppa sv yxf aXX'q onsLpopevov e^irrjXov 
 (ptXel uparovpevov Isvai elg to smx&piov),] we can hard- 
 ly help thinking that we hear the spiritual and plaintive 
 Leighton declaring, that “ the grace of God in the heart of 
 man is like a tender plant sown in a strange, unkindly soil,” 
 where its fruit would inevitably wither and degenerate into 
 affinity with some base native weed, unless he that planted 
 it should exercise that constant care, without which it must 
 perish. 
 
 In the hands of no other writer, ancient or modern, does 
 philosophy ever assume this heavenly aspect. Should it 
 be supposed that this is all the effect of a partial imagina- 
 tion, let the experiment be tried with others. Let any one, 
 with a similar purpose, read Aristotle, or Bacon, or any of 
 the moderns who treat of the philosophy of the soul, and 
 ascertain if he can, without violence, extract from them any 
 such higher sense, or any such easy accommodation to an 
 elevated Christian spirituality. A faint resemblance of this 
 peculiar Platonic unction may be traced in some of the 
 philosophical tracts of Cicero, especially those that were 
 written during the latter years of his life, and in the sub- 
 dued spirit of his adverse fortunes ; but even with Cicero, 
 
 * Republic, vi., 486, A. 
 
 f Ibid., 497, B. 
 
PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 
 
 329 
 
 they are mere imitations of the style and manner of one 
 whom he professedly takes as his model, and whom he so 
 affectionately styles “his master Plato.’’ 
 
 Let these thoughts be carried with us in reading, in the 
 seventh book of the Republic, the description of the dark 
 cave, and of the poor prisoners who are there confined, 
 with their backs to the light, and their intent gaze ever fix- 
 ed upon those shadowy appearances which so strangely 
 flit across the walls of their chamber of imagery. What 
 thoughtful mind can fail to recur to the higher truths of 
 the Christian revelation, or avoid being struck with the al- 
 most perfect parallelism, as, in Plato’s most truthful picture, 
 he contemplates the fondness of those miserable bonds- 
 men for their gloomy abode, their first aversion to the daz- 
 zling splendour of the world of reality, and the strong grasp 
 with which they cling to their prison house, when some 
 kind hand attempts to draw them forth, through the rough 
 and steep ascent (rpaxeiag real avavrovg avadat Jscog), into 
 the light of life. How graphic, too, the description of the 
 science and philosophy of that narrow world (rrjg steel 
 aoeplag). How admirably does he depict the interest with 
 which these subterranean savans are occupied in the study 
 of what they style nature, in tracing the law of cause and 
 effect, antecedents and consequents, as the dim shadows 
 pass across their contracted scene of observation — the petty 
 pride with which they dignify this pursuit with the exclu- 
 sive name of science, their stinging jealousy of others who 
 are ambitiously aiming at the distinctions and honours of 
 the same most intellectual life, the laborious earnestness 
 with which they are engaged in thus building up from these 
 inductions a science of shadows , which might astonish their 
 more vulgar companions, by its seeming vaticinations of the 
 periods and returns of those (jiaLvopeva, with which their 
 minds are daily occupied, to the exclusion of any study of 
 themselves or of their true position — while all this time the 
 
 E e 2 
 
330 
 
 PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 
 
 real world , in which shines the real sun , where may be 
 seen the real heavens , and where alone exists the real 
 science , are as much and as utterly unknown as are the 
 high hopes of the Christian, and the sublime truths which 
 occupy his soul, to the most grovelling and sensual world- 
 ling. T cpal 6s teal snaivoi el Ttvsg avrolg rjoav tots reap’ 
 dXkfkuv teal yspa tco ot-vTaTa tcaOapcbvTL Ta napiovra teal 
 avrjpovevovTC paXiora oca ts nporspa avTcbv teal oca 
 vcTspa siuOsi teal apa nopsvscOac , teal ste tovtojv 6?) 6vva- 
 TGdTaTa anopavTevopsvG) to psXXov fj^stv, 6otcsig dv avTov 
 (tov npog to cpcog sXOovTa ) smdvprjTiucbg avTibv s%siv teal 
 f 7\kovv Tovg nap ’ steslvoig Ttpcjpsvovg ; Republic, vii., 516, 
 D. The resemblance between this and the spirit and tenor 
 of the Scriptural representations need not be pointed out. 
 One might almost fancy it an expansion of the striking, yet 
 concise description of the Psalmist : #'*r:]bniy 0^3“^, 
 Man walketh in a shadow , a land of images, A VAIN 
 SHOW. 
 
 Wish this philosopher even politics assumes a divine and 
 religicms aspect, and, in all his speculations, the political 
 closely connects itself with the theological. How easy and 
 natural would it be, in pursuance of the same method, to 
 adapt what he says of the heavenly paradigm in the close 
 of the ninth book of the Republic, and his seventh kingdom in 
 the Politicus, to the Christian Church : sv r %f npd)TX) 6s noAv 
 npcoTov ts teal apiCTOV /3lo)tsov , nXrjv Tr\g f EBA0MH2. 
 naoojv yap skslvtjv ys snnpiTSOv, oiov 'Ssov s £ dvOpunoiv, 
 sre t(a)v dXXcov noXuTSiCdV. Politicus , or Statesman, 303, A. 
 
 From such an accommodation of Plato’s rich and won- 
 drous fancy, how many most valuable thoughts, or rather 
 illustrations, might be suggested, which would not be un- 
 worthy even of the pulpit — thoughts which, while they 
 claimed the closest affinity with the Scriptures, might be 
 brought to bear upon the soul and conscience with all the 
 power of illustration drawn from the language of the divin- 
 
MYTHICAL SENSE OF THE WORD 1 Mvarog. 331 
 
 est of philosophers. We know of no profane writer who, 
 in this way, might be so useful to the preacher as Plato, 
 and no one whom we would so earnestly recommend to all 
 young men who are aiming at the Christian ministry. Let 
 them not read Plato to understand the Bible — although, 
 even with this in view, they would receive no small assist- 
 ance — but let them read the Bible in close connexion with 
 our philosopher, and they will understand Plato better than 
 he ever understood himself. 
 
 LXI. 
 
 Mythical Sense of the Word Qavarog. 
 
 Page 62, Line 4. ev re %G)yj nal kv naoc ftavaroig. This 
 evidently refers to the deaths of one individual, and not of 
 many. But why, then, the plural ? We think Plato keeps 
 in mind here his doctrine of the transition of the soul, or 
 its {jL£T£fj,\ljvx(oo£i,g, into various states, either in an ascend- 
 ing or a descending series ; the passage from one to the 
 other of which he styles a death and a birth. See the Phse- 
 don, 114, B., also 70, C. : uaXaiog jt i£v ovv korl ng 6 Ao- 
 yog, (hg elalv £v6iv6£ d(bino\i£vai Znti , nal tt&Xlv ye d£vpo 
 acpuivovvTCU , nal ylyvovrac kn rCdv t£0v£O)tc»)v — u It is an 
 ancient tradition that souls go there from hence, and again 
 return hither and arise from the dead.” Compare, also, 
 what is said respecting the purgations and metempsycho- 
 ses of the soul, in the remarkable myth at the end of the 
 Republic. Thus, also, in the Gorgias, 493, A., he speaks 
 of the present life as though, when compared with some 
 preceding state, it might in reality be a death, to which, for 
 reasons arising out of some former relations, we may have 
 been doomed. “ As you say,” continues Socrates, “ life is 
 an awful thing (duvog 6 (3log ), and I should not wonder if 
 Euripides spoke the truth when he said, 
 
332 MYTHICAL SENSE OF THE WORD tiavaTOg. 
 
 Tig 6' oldev , el to v pev eon rcarOavelv , 
 
 to rcarOavelv 6e ^ v ; 
 
 Who knows but life is death, and death is life ? And per- 
 haps we are now dead, as I have heard of the wise, and 
 that the body is our monument ( orjpa ) or sepulchre in which 
 the soul is buried.” 
 
 The context of this strange declaration in the Gorgias 
 affords strong reasons for believing, that it may have been 
 spoken mystically and mythically of that spiritual death 
 which is so prominent a subject of the Scriptures. In this 
 most exquisite analysis of the nature of physical pleasure, 
 and its utter want of all claim to be considered The Good, 
 the sensualist is regarded as “ dead while he lives.” His 
 soul is said to be rotten and leaky, like a perforated cask 
 (d)£ rdOog rerpr^evog). His pleasure is described as a 
 continual inflowing to supply a constant outflowing ; a “ bro- 
 ken cistern,” requiring a constant and laborious filling, in 
 distinction from that spring which Socrates represents as 
 ever full, and which so strongly suggests our Saviour’s 
 “ well of living water, bubbling up to everlasting life.” In 
 this description, physical pleasure is regarded as a pro- 
 tracted dying, because it can only exist as the gratifying of 
 an ever-craving want, the removal of an ever-tormenting 
 pain, the vain attempt to quench an ever-burning thirst, or 
 to fill an ever-empty void. In the language of the sensual- 
 ist himself : ev rovrcp earl to rjdecog ev rep <bg nXelcr- 
 tov emppelv — real dt'ip'ijv ye real dL'iptivra rriveiv — “ In this 
 is pleasure, namely, to have the greatest inflowing (as into 
 a vacuum), to drink while ever thirsting, and ever to thirst 
 while drinking.” See the whole passage, from 492, D., to 
 495, A. In the declaration in our text, Plato probably uses 
 i davarog in the first of these interpretations. Ast renders it 
 quolibet mortis genere. 
 
OMNIPRESENCE OF THE DIVINE JUSTICE. 333 
 
 LXII. 
 
 Omnipresence of the Divine Justice . Remarkable Resem - 
 blance of Plato's Language to some Passages from the 
 Bible . 
 
 Page 63, Line 1. ov yap dpeXpOrja^ tt ore vn ’ avrijg. 
 In this passage avrr\q refers to A tier], the Divine Justice or 
 Law, which is so frequently personified by the Grecian 
 poets as ever sitting on the right hand of Jove and sharing 
 his throne. There is a very strong resemblance between 
 these declarations and Psalm cxxxix., 7. “ You shall never 
 be neglected by it. You cannot, being small, so descend 
 into the depths of the earth, nor, being raised on high, so 
 fly up into Heaven, but that you shall pay the fitting penalty, 
 whether remaining in this world, or having passed through 
 life into Hades, or having been borne to a region still more 
 wild than these.” The expressions of the Psalmist are 
 strikingly similar, although not directly applied to the trans- 
 gressor. Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, and whither 
 shall I flee from thy presence ? If I ascend up into Heaven, 
 behold, thou . art there . If I make my bed in Hades, behold, 
 thou art there. If I should take the wings of the morning, 
 and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall 
 thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me. More 
 in accordance with the spirit, although with less similarity 
 of expression, is thew passage, Job, xxxiv., 21: His eyes 
 are upon the ways of man, and all his steps he beholdeth. 
 There is no darkness, no land of the shades of the dead (yio 
 or terra umbrarum), where the workers of iniquity 
 
 * Is there not some reason to believe that this word, which is 
 generally rendered shadow of death , may, more properly, mean the 
 spiritual world itself, the land of the shades , as though it had been 
 plural feminine of obtf* instead of having the punctuation 
 
 t ; V V 
 
 which it has received from the Masorites 1 
 
334 
 
 DOCTRINE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
 
 may hide themselves. Compare, also, Amos , ix., 2 : If they 
 dig down into Sheol (or Hades), from thence shall my hand 
 take them . If they ascend up into Heaven , from thence will 
 I bring them down. If they be hidden in the top of Carmel , 
 from thence will I discover and take them. If they would 
 conceal themselves from mine eye in the bottom of the sea , 
 from thence will I command the serpent , and it shall bite 
 them. 
 
 How vividly, too, is this doctrine of an ever wakeful, 
 retributive justice presented by Sophocles : 
 
 yytlode de 
 
 fihsTceiv [ilv avrovg 7 vpog tov evgeOt) fiportiv, 
 phe-KELv ds npbg rove 6 vgg sbsig • )yrjv 6 e 7 tov 
 prjntj -yevEoOat (jxjrbg uvoglov ftportiv — 
 
 Bethink you, then ; 
 
 Heaven hath its eye upon the pious man, 
 
 Its eye upon the sinner. Flight there’s none, 
 
 No hiding-place to which the unholy wretch 
 Can e’er escape. — CEdip. Col, 278. 
 
 LXIII. 
 
 Doctrine of a Final Judgment . Use of the Word hvvre- 
 
 X eia. 
 
 Page 64, Line 1 . ovu elddbg avrCbv rfjv owreXeiav onrj 
 noTs rep Tzavrl ^vptaXXerac. Ast translates this, nesciens 
 eorum collatio quomodo, universo conducat, 66 not knowing 
 their contribution,” &c. He takes avvreXeta in what is 
 perhaps the more usual signification in classic Greek, name- 
 ly, a contribution by members of a society , a share or assess- 
 ment, and which agrees well with ^vp6dXXerat. The other 
 sense., however, of termination , consummation , &c., suits far 
 better with the context of this most important and solemn 
 passage. It recommends itself, too, to us by its striking 
 resemblance to the use of the word in certain declarations 
 
DOCTRINE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
 
 335 
 
 of tlie Scriptures. Both the ideas, however, may be united 
 in our word reckoning , or final settlement of an account 
 which has been long deferred. We prefer this, because the 
 whole passage has reference to a judgment or final dispo- 
 sition of the wicked, and would, therefore, render it, “ not 
 knowing their end or consummation, in what way it con- 
 tributes to the whole,” that is, in what way the present 
 suspension of punishment, and their final doom, sustain the 
 universal government. Probably both senses were present 
 to the mind of the writer, and both seem necessary to com- 
 plete the harmony of the conception. 
 
 Viger, in his Latin version of Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 
 page 635, D., prefers this second sense, which, although 
 the least used, comes the nearest to the radical and etymo- 
 logical meaning of the compound. He translates the pas- 
 sage, ignorans videlicet qui tandem aut qua parte istorum 
 FINIS et EXITTJS cum universi rationibus cohcereret. The 
 reader may find this deeply interesting subject of the delay 
 of God in the punishment of the wicked treated at great 
 length by Plutarch in his treatise, TLepl tcov vtto tov Qelov 
 Ppadecoq Ti[iG)povg,evG)v ; a very excellent edition of which 
 has been lately edited by Professor Hackett of the Newton 
 Theological Seminary. The work is accompanied by 
 notes, chiefly of a theological character, exhibiting much 
 real and useful learning, with no display of that philologi- 
 cal pedantry which deforms so many modern editions of 
 ancient writers, and, on the whole, forming one of the most 
 valuable additions to our theological and classical literature. 
 
 HwreXeta, in the sense of completion , summing , or wind- 
 ing up , and in a connexion impressively similar to the pas- 
 sage in our text, is found in the explanation of the parable 
 of the tares and the wheat, in which the former are said to 
 be permitted to grow for the sake of the latter, and where, 
 as is here intimated by Plato, all things are referred to some 
 final period of decision and development : r O 6e dspiopoq 
 
336 
 
 DOCTRINE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
 
 avvreXeia rov aitivog ear tv — The harvest is the end ( the 
 day of reckoning) of the world. So shall it he in the end of 
 the world (the winding up , the conclusion , the final account , 
 the catastrophe of the great irpa^ig, or drama of life) ; they 
 shall gather out all things that ojfend and all that do iniquity. 
 Matthew , xiii., 39, 41. The same remarkable word is 
 found, Hebrews, ix., 26 : airai; enl awreXeia t£)v alcjvuv 
 — once in the winding up of the ages. 
 
 2 vvreXeta signifies not only an end , like reXog, but an 
 ending together , a con-clusion , an accomplishment of great 
 purposes brought about by a long series of means, which, 
 although, at times, ever so apparently divergent , have all, 
 finally, converged to one grand result. 
 
 On this doctrine of the Divine delay in the punishment 
 of sin, compare Job, xxi., 29 : The wicked is reserved (Heb. 
 !jt£TT, hack) unto the day of doom: unto the day of wrath 
 shall they he brought forth. No text in the Old Testament, 
 as is shown by the context, points more clearly to a future 
 judgment of a general and concluding kind. Very similar 
 language is held respecting the fallen angels, Jude, 6 : Re- 
 served in chains to the judgment of the great day. Compare, 
 also, Prov., xvi., 3: All things (to nav , to oXov) hath the 
 Lord made for himself yea , the ivicked for the day of evil; 
 which is almost equivalent to the declaration in our text : 
 ovvreXeia avrtiv tg5 tt avri i; vp6aXXerat . In like manner, 
 the Psalmist, when he ceased to look upon appearances, or, 
 in the language of our author (page 63, line 10), d)^ ev na - 
 TOTrrpoig rag rrpa^eig rchv avOpconcov nadopav — when he 
 “ entered into the sanctuary,” into the study and contem- 
 plation of the higher counsels of the Divine government — 
 “ then saw he their end” — rrjv awreXecav avrtiv. As a 
 dream when one awakctli , so, O Lord, when they * awake, or 
 
 * Psalm lxxiii., 20. Thus, we are satisfied, should the Hebrew 
 be rendered, as applying to the sinner, and not to God ; or it 
 may, perhaps, be translated, “ When their image {shade, umbra , manes. 
 
DOCTRINE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
 
 337 
 
 in the awaking ( that is, in the resurrection morning, at the 
 great day of account ), wilt thou despise their image (cddS^), 
 their ghost or umbra (LXX., to elSgjXov avr&v). 
 
 We would not engage in the superfluous work of endeav- 
 ouring to prop, by the supports of human reason and human 
 feelings, any truth clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures. 
 There is, however, no one which, if it were necessary, 
 might be more safely trusted to such a defence than this 
 doctrine of a general final judgment. Here the long and 
 steady voice of humanity may be safely appealed to. From 
 the time when the smoking blood of Abel invoked the Di- 
 vine justice, there has ever been something in the human 
 breast which has declared the necessity of a judgment, of 
 a fixed time, when there shall be a GvvreXeia, or winding 
 up ; when it will be found that the Judge of all the Earth 
 has done right, and must do right ; when every wrong which 
 has been seemingly neglected s^ali be made right ; when 
 “ all that is crooked shall be made straight / 5 and every- 
 thing that is dark and mysterious shall be made clear. The 
 alarmed conscience, even while it dreads, demands it. We 
 cannot read a poor work of fiction without experiencing a 
 painful feeling when the termination of the story crosses 
 these instinctive sentiments of the soul, or, in common par- 
 lance, does not end well, has no proper GvvreXeca ; when 
 virtue (even the poor, miserable, low virtue which is held 
 in repute by the world) is not rewarded, and vice does not 
 receive its fitting punishment. The reader, in such cases, 
 feels that a wrong has been done to his moral sense — that 
 the universal instinct of justice, which even bad men pos- 
 sess, has been violated. How, then, can the thought be 
 
 or ghost) arises , thou wilt reject it.” We would also suggest, although 
 with much diffidence, whether there may not be a similar idea in the 
 parallel Hebrew word as applied to a different character, 
 
 Psalm xvii., 15 : “ When thine image awakes ,” that is, the new spir- 
 itual form which thou wilt bestow. See, also, Job, iv., 6. 
 
 F F 
 
338 
 
 PLATONIC USE OF THE WORD TVTCOg. 
 
 endured, that there will be no set time when the great 7 rpaf. 
 ig, or drama, of this world shall be brought to a fitting close 
 and every act receive its just recompense of reward ? The 
 wicked shall not stand in the judgment. Instead, however, 
 of bringing forward such Old Testament texts in proof of 
 the doctrine as a revealed truth, we would rather see in 
 them a taking for granted of what the universal voice of hu- 
 manity has ever proclaimed as the voice of God, uttered in 
 the conscience as well as declared in his Word. 
 
 LXIV. 
 
 Platonic Use of the Word rvnog. 
 
 Page 64, Line 4. fjv rig prj ytyvdtGuojv ovd’ dv tvttov 
 Idol ttots, k. r. A . “ Which, unless one knoweth, he can 
 never know the type (the dorm) of life.” That is, without 
 this doctrine of the end of the wicked, and of the manner in 
 which the present suspension and the final infliction of their 
 doom contribute to the universal harmony, life would have 
 no meaning. It would be Tohu and Bohu (Genesis, i., 2), 
 a moral chaos, on which no intelligible form had been im- 
 pressed ; or, to take a comparison from Job, xxxviii., 14, it 
 would be like a confused mass of clay, which had received 
 *>e stamp (rimog) of no significant seal. Tvnog , also, in a 
 ccondary or metaphorical sense, means a summary descrip - 
 .o/i, or, in philosophy, a general idea , an outline , or model , 
 requiring a correspondence or general conformity in the 
 filling up of the more minute parts which are not specified. 
 Hence the common phrase, ev tvttg) Xeyecv, to say in gen- 
 eral terms. 
 
 This use of the word may be found in the Republic, ii., 
 379, B., and the following pages, where Plato lays down 
 what he styles tvtcol nepl '&EoXoyiag, types in theology , or 
 first principles respecting the Divine Nature, which are 
 
EVIL IN THE PRESENT STATE EXCEEDS THE GOOD. 339 
 
 ever to be kept in mind in forming a right estimate of God’s 
 character and government. In a similar application, we 
 have rvnog , Romans, vi., 17 : 6s tw $£<p, vtt7)kov- 
 
 oars etc nap6lag slg ov napedodrjTS tvttov didaxrjg — But , 
 thanks be to God , ye have obeyed, from the heart , that form 
 of doctrine in which ye were instructed. So, also, the de- 
 rivative vnoTimojoig , 2 Timothy, i., 13 — vttotvttgwlv s%s 
 vyiaivovrcov Aoyuv, Holdfast the form of sound words ( or 
 doctrines) — doubtless referring to some symbol, creed, or 
 catechism which Timothy had received from Paul, or had 
 heard recited by him, containing an outline of the Christian 
 faith, and which he was to use as a preacher and instructer 
 in the Gospel. This Paul enjoins upon him to hold in 
 faith and love (or, as he says in the passage in Romans, 
 sk napdiag ), instead of regarding it as a mere speculative 
 scheme, into which, without care, such a rvnog or vnorv- 
 ncdocg might degenerate. 
 
 Without understanding this type of life, we are told in 
 the text, there could be no right judgment formed respect- 
 ing happiness or blessedness, and their opposites. It is an 
 expansion of the sentiment of Solon. A complete knowl- 
 edge of what constitutes the blessed man depends, not only 
 upon the end of his individual life, but also upon his rela- 
 tion to the great end, or ovvrsXsia, of the world or dispensa- 
 tion of which he forms a part. See Dissertation xxxviii., 
 on the Greek Words for Happiness and Blessedness . 
 
 LXV. 
 
 Explanation of a Difficult Passage, in which Plato seems to 
 assert that our Evils, in the Present State, exceed our 
 Good . 
 
 Page 68, Line 11. nXstovcvv 6s tgjv prj. It is not easy 
 to determine the true meaning here, or to decide with abso- 
 
340 EVIL IN THE PRESENT STATE EXCEEDS THE GOOD. 
 
 • 
 
 lute certainty, whether the speaker intends to give the prey 
 ponderance to good or evil in the present state ; although 
 there can be no doubt to which party, in this severe con- 
 flict, he would assign the final triumph. Ast renders it, 
 pluribus vero quee non sint bona , pugna , dicimus, immortalis 
 est , &c. ; to authorize which, he must supply dyadcov after 
 arj. In the Latin version to Clemens Alexandinus, Stro - 
 mat., v., 593, it is translated, pluribus qui non sunt ejusmodi , 
 which is as ambiguous as the Greek, and leaves it utterly 
 uncertain whether ejusmodi is meant to refer to dyadcov or 
 evavricov. Viger, in his Latin version of Eusebius, Prcep. 
 Evang., xi., 549, gives an entirely different rendering, by 
 reading nvcov for rcov — quibuscum tarnen genus aliud nul- 
 lum misceatur — a sense which even his emendation, if it 
 convey any meaning at all, would not yield. It might be, 
 on the contrary (and the supposition has much intrinsic 
 plausibility, if we lay aside all considerations drawn from 
 other passages), that the writer meant, by rcbv prj, things 
 neither good nor bad, or what some would style adiafyopa. 
 Ficinus renders concisely, et quidem plurium, meaning 
 thereby the evils ; which construction, it may be supposed, 
 he derived from supplying after prj the word evavricov, and 
 regarding irXeiovcov as governing rcov, instead of agreeing 
 with it — as though the whole expression had been equiva- 
 lent to evavria rrXeiova eivai rcov prj evavricov. The great 
 objection to this is the exceeding awkwardness of the con- 
 struction arising from thus piling negatives upon negatives. 
 
 II Xeiovcov would most naturally be referred to what just 
 precedes it, namely, evavricov. It might, however, be sup. 
 posed that Plato wrote carelessly, and actually meant to 
 connect it with dyadcov, farther above. In this case it 
 would correspond to the clumsy English sentence, “ full of 
 good, and full of the contrary , but of more than what is not;” 
 which, notwithstanding its harshness, would leave little 
 doubt as to the meaning, although it would require us to 
 
EVIL IN THE PRESENT STATE EXCEEDS THE GOOD. 341 
 
 regard TrXecovcov as governing rtiv instead of agreeing with 
 it. This view, namely, that rcov fir] agrees with dyadtiv 
 understood, and is governed by nXecovcov, or which would 
 regard the sentence as assigning a preponderance to the 
 good, might likewise be strengthened by an inference very 
 naturally drawn from his having so expressly given the 
 superiority in the moving and control of the heavens to the 
 beneficent soul ; as where Clinias is made to say (page 38, 
 line 1), ovft oolqv dXXcog Xeyeiv fj Traaav aperfjv exovoav 
 'ifwxfjv nepiayeiv avrd. Especially might it be deduced 
 from that subtle and beautiful disquisition on the resemblance 
 of the heavenly motions to the motion of vovg , or intellect, 
 or of the best soul in distinction from that evil one which 
 ever moves, pavitctig re nal ardnrog, in madness and dis- 
 order. But, as we conceive, we are estopped from this in- 
 terpretation, and compelled to acquiesce in the contrary, by 
 the fact, that Plato, in the Republic, most expressly asserts 
 that our evils exceed our good — dXX ’ oXiyoyv (6 deog) 
 alriog, t:oXv yap eXarro) ray add rcov itantiv. We cannot, 
 therefore, help thinking that he suffered a morbid feeling 
 of the immediate evils of the world directly around him, 
 and which were magnified by contiguity, to cause him to 
 forget the legitimate inferences from his own beautiful ar- 
 gument, and to make a declaration which would seem to 
 imply that, on the whole, there is more evil than good. We 
 may also indulge the supposition, that he refers merely to 
 the present time, and believed that the great battle of the 
 universe , or the fia^T] aOdvarog , of which he soon speaks, 
 would eventually bring out an opposite preponderance of 
 good, and a final triumph of the beneficent over the evil and 
 disorderly soul. 
 
 F f 2 
 
342 Maxrj aOdvarog , or battle of the universe. 
 
 LXVI. 
 
 Max?] ’ AOdvarog , or Battle of the Universe , between the 
 Bowers of Good and Evil . Sin , therefore , 7io Light Mat - 
 £er, because it is Treason against the Cause of Good, for 
 which God is contending with the Evil Soul. 
 
 Page 68, Line 11. MAXH drj, (paper, ’A0ANATO2 egtlv 
 rj roiavjT], nal (pvXafcrjg tiavpaarrig deopevrj. “ Such, 
 would we say, is an immortal conflict, and needing most 
 wonderful care or vigilance.” The simile which was com- 
 menced in 7 joXepog, several lines back, is here preserved 
 and brought out in a style which it would be no extrava- 
 gance to call sublime. All things are most vividly repre- 
 sented as engaged in an everlasting conflict between the 
 powers of Good and Evil. This is the great aycov which, 
 as he elsewhere says, is avrl Travrov ayd)VG)v, in the place 
 of, or before, all other conflicts. In the description of this 
 battle of the universe, the author seems inspired with a more 
 than Homeric grandeur of imagination. The images in 
 the Theomachia of the Iliad may have more tendency to ex- 
 cite and arouse the passions, but they are far inferior in the 
 power of producing that swelling, yet calm feeling of moral 
 sublimity with which the soul is filled in reading this noble 
 passage. Not Gods alone 
 
 descending swell the fight, * 
 
 but all nature and all worlds rise into deeply interested 
 parties to this universal strife. Order is everywhere 
 struggling with disorder. Light is contending with dark- 
 ness, truth with error, knowledge with ignorance. The 
 science of medicine is fighting with disease, agriculture 
 with the hostile stubbornness of the earth, art and science 
 of every kind with the rude and savage life. On a higher 
 
 * Iliad, xx., 47. kvrap hnel ueO’ opikov , 0?.vpmoL rjTivdov avdptiv 
 
Max?] aOavarog , or battle of the universe. 343 
 
 scale, the virtues are personified as in conflict with our 
 sins. Righteousness is engaged in a strife which knows 
 no compromise with unrighteousness. Temperance main- 
 tains an unintermitting struggle with her most powerful and 
 unyielding antagonist. To crown all, God himself and the 
 celestial powers are represented as everywhere contending 
 with the forces of the Evil Soul, and with the dark, mind- 
 ess,* disorderly Spirit of Matter. 
 
 All this, too, seems to be for our sakes, and for our aid, 
 in a strife of which we are so little able to appreciate the 
 immortal issues. The Gods and daipoveg are our allies. 
 They fight for us as their nrryiara ; as shepherds for their 
 flocks. We do not wonder, then, that this passage sug- 
 gested to some of the Fathers that strikingly similar declara- 
 tion of the Apostle, Ephesians , vi., 12 — Ova eonv rjp.lv rj 
 n dXrj npog ai[ia ical oapua , aX Ad npog rag apxdg , n pog rag 
 e^ovolag, npog rovg uoopouparopag rov cuorovg rov alcoyog 
 rovrov , npog rd nvevparmd rrjg novrjplag ev rolg enovpa - 
 vioig — “ Our wrestling is not until flesh and blood only , but 
 with principalities , with powers, with the rulers of darkness 
 of this world, with the spiritual powers of evil in the Heavens 
 Compare Clemens Alex., Stromat., 593, B., and Eusebius , 
 Prcep. Evang ., xi., 2G, p. 559. Both of them institute a 
 comparison between this passage and Ephesians, vi., 12, 
 and both regard Plato as having derived his doctrine of 
 evil powers in conflict with the good from the Old Testa- 
 ment, especially from such passages as Job, i. , 6, 7, and 
 Deut., xxxii., 8. 
 
 Invisible beings are contending for»us and against us. 
 It is to something like this, and not to a physical strife only 
 (although such a warfare, too, is included), that the philoso 
 pher alludes, when he says, ^vfipaxoi 6s rpiiv $soi re ual 
 datpoveg, 7]pslg 6’ av urryiara Decoy real datfiovcov. Such, 
 too, is the constant style of the New Testament. Life is 
 a ndXrj, an aycov, a struggle, a battle, a race, in which we 
 
3x4 M ax?) aOavarog , or battle of the universe. 
 
 are earnestly called upon “ to press forward to the mark of 
 the prize of the upward calling ,” rrjq avco tcXrjoecoq ;* as 
 though God from above was uttering aloud the neXevopa^ 
 or cheering battle-cry, to the contending host, and saying to 
 each faithful combatant, avabrjOi code, “ come up hither and 
 I will give thee the crown of life ;Ӥ or, as it is admirably 
 paraphrased in that noblest of hymns, 
 
 ’Tis God’s all animating voice 
 That calls thee from on high ; 
 
 ’Tis his own hand presents the prize 
 To thine uplifted eye. 
 
 A cloud of witnesses around, 
 
 Hold thee in full survey ; 
 
 Forget the steps already trod, 
 
 And upward urge thy way. 
 
 K aXov yap to ddXov nal rj eXmq peyaXrj — “ For noble is 
 the prize, and the hope is great,” as Socrates tells us in the 
 Phaedon.|| We may learn even from Plato that our present 
 existence is no vain thing, no 
 
 fleeting show 
 
 For man’s illusion given — 
 
 according to the mawkish sentimentalism of a modern poet, 
 but a most solemn and dread reality, connected with the 
 whole scheme of the universe, and in which not only man, 
 but angels and devils, powers visible and invisible, are in- 
 tent and deeply interested actors. “Life, in itself,” says 
 Socrates, in the Republic, “ may be insignificant, but think 
 you,” he continues, “that an immortal thing ought to be 
 concerned, and in earnest for so short a part alone, and not 
 for the whole of its existence” — old ovv dOavarcp rcpaypart 
 vnep xpouou ovrcoq oXtyov povov dslv eonovdaKsvai, aX/ 1’ 
 ovx vnep TOT IIANT02. Lib . x., 608, E. 
 
 Page 69, Line 23. (f)vXatcrjq tiavpaorrig deopevrj, “ Re- 
 
 * Philippians, iii., 14. 
 t Revelations, xi., 12. 
 
 t Thessalonians, iv., 16. 
 
 $ Ibid., ii., 10. I! Phaed., 114, C. 
 
M dx'r] aOdvarog , or battle of the universe 34 1 
 
 quiring a wonderful watch or vigilance.” QvXclict] may 
 mean, first, the act of watching ; or, secondly, a watch or 
 guard ; or, thirdly, a slate of mind , watchfulness, or vigilance . 
 Here, perhaps, the first impression would be that it is to be 
 referred to the soul of man. A careful consideration, how- 
 ever, of the whole argument, and-especially of what is said, 
 page 72, line 11, compels us to refer the term to the Deity, 
 as intimating the intense interest and watchful care with 
 which God regards the progress of this great battle be- 
 tween Good and Evil. 
 
 The precise point of the argument, as a whole, is not ob- 
 vious without considerable attention ; but when that atten 
 tion is bestowed, it strikes the mind with more force, in 
 consequence of not having been obtruded upon its notice. 
 The substance of it seems to us to be this: those who 
 speak and think of sin as of little moment, and who imagine 
 that God is easily propitiated by their poor offerings, are 
 asked to what class of mere earthly rulers they would liken 
 the Divinities who have charge of us. The absurdity is 
 afterward shown (although somewhat out of its regular 
 place in the argument), of supposing that even these lower 
 guardians could be influenced to do acts injurious to their 
 respective charges, by gifts filched from the very treasury 
 of those to whom they are presented ; as though dogs 
 should be seduced to let wolves ravage the flock, by the 
 offering of a small share of the spoils of the robbery, or the 
 governor of a vessel, tempted, by presents of wine and in- 
 cense from the sailors, to destroy both the ship and them. 
 How much less, then, should it be thought that the Divini- 
 ties could be induced to be placable to offenders, because 
 they make offerings to them of the very fruit of their own 
 crimes — dv avrolg rtiv aSucrjiidrcov a\impd dnoveuoiev. 
 These considerations being borne in mind, although in part 
 subsequently introduced, and we feel the force of this sub- 
 lime allusion to the j ud%y ddavarog — the great strife to 
 
346 M axq aOdvarog , or battle of the universe. 
 
 which we are parties, the immense theatre on which we 
 are actors, and the almost infinite relations we bear to the 
 universe of rational and immortal beings. Our actions, 
 therefore, are not unimportant, nor are they, when evil, to 
 be atoned for by any light sacrifice. Moreover, this con- 
 test, it should be remembered, is between the powers of 
 Good and Evil. God himself is leading on the one host to 
 the battle, and is personally striving for the victory. There 
 can, therefore, be no neutrality allowed in this warfare, 
 much less any actual taking part with the enemy by those 
 for whose sake, mainly, the contest is waged. On this ac- 
 count, the Deity, by a species of anthropopathy, is represent- 
 ed as exercising the utmost vigilance and circumspection 
 in behalf of a charge so immense, engaged in a conflict 
 and exposed to perils so tremendous. He is compared to 
 the commander of a mighty army, who is ever awake and 
 watching for the slightest irruption of the enemy — 
 
 Ov %prj TTavvv^iov evdeiv PovXrj^opov avdpa , 
 
 G) Xaoi t 9 emrerpa^araL /cat roooa fiepbrj/ lev* 
 
 In an infinitely higher sense do. both the Scriptures and 
 Plato assert the ever-sleepless vigilance of the physical and 
 moral Guardian of the universe : “ He never sleejpeth or 
 slumber eth that keepeth Israel .” “ The eyes of the Lord are 
 
 in all the eart-li , beholding the evil and the good." It is a strug- 
 gle of life and death. Resistance is to be made at every 
 point to the advance of the kingdom of darkness. Final 
 triumph is to be secured at every cost. No quarter is to 
 be allowed to the foe, and especially when any of those 
 moral agents, for whom the battle is fought, are guilty of 
 forming an unnatural alliance with the enemy. This con- 
 stitutes the intrinsic odiousness and wickedness, the ex- 
 ceeding sinfulness of sin. It is treason against the univer- 
 sal Cause of Good. It is direct opposition to the very na- 
 
 * Iliad, ii., 24. 
 
plato’s doctrine of the datfioveg , or genii. 347 
 
 ture of God, and a base and treacherous aiding of his ma- 
 lignant foe. When these considerations are kept in mind, 
 we are prepared to feel the force of the concluding decla- 
 ration, that God will never be propitiated by offerings from 
 unholy men, and to sympathize with Clinias in his passion- 
 ate burst of indignation at the. very thought: O vdaptig' 
 ovre ave/crog 6 Xoyog — “ By no means ; it cannot be ; the 
 declaration is never to be tolerated.” 
 
 LXVII. 
 
 Plato's Doctrine of the Aaifioveg, or Genii. 
 
 Page 69, Line 2. Qeoi teal datfioveg. There are clearly 
 three distinct grades of superhuman beings presented to us, 
 not only in the theology of Plato, but also in the Grecian 
 mythology as set forth by the poets. These are Z evg, Qeoi , 
 and Aatpoveg. Qeoi, however, includes both the others, or, 
 rather, we should say, when the first two are mentioned, as 
 in that invocation so common in the poets, T2 Zev teal Qeoi, 
 the term fteot contains daifioveg ; and, again, in such ex- 
 pressions aiS the above from our text, it includes Z evg. See 
 the Timceus, 41, A. 
 
 We have several times alluded to Plato’s doctrine of the 
 Aaifioveg, or Genii, and would dwell upon it in this place 
 more at length. The passage in which we find the most 
 express and the clearest mention of them is in the Epino- 
 mis, or Appendix to The Laws, 984, D. : j uera de rovrovg 
 teal imo rovrotg e^rjg, AAIM0NA2, deptov be yevog e^ov 
 edpav rpirrjv ev^atg rtfiav fiaXa %peo ov, tc. r. X. — “ Next to 
 these, and under these, the Genii (as we prefer to render it, 
 because of the bad sense that the New Testament has at- 
 tached to the word demons), an aerial* race, having the 
 
 * According to a division which he makes of all beings below the 
 Supreme Deity, and corresponding to the four states or elements. 
 
348 plato’s doctrine of the dalpoveg, or genii. 
 
 third seat, must we honour by prayers,” The reader is re- 
 ferred to the entire passage, which is too long for insertion 
 here. They are spoken of as possessing wonderful intelli- 
 gence, as feeling a deep sympathy in human affairs, as lov- 
 ing the good, hating the bad, and, in consequence of their 
 middle position in the air, acting as interpreters and medi- 
 ators between God and man. To the same effect Socrates 
 speaks of them in the Symposion, 202, E. : nal yap retiv to 
 /Xaipoviov pera^v eon Oeov re nal dvTjrov , epp7]vevov de- 
 olg rti reap ’ dvdpcdreojv, nal avQpumoiq rti reapd 'detiv. did 
 rovrov i] pavniCTj retioa nal rj rti)v lepecov re^vr) • 
 
 Oeog de avOpti) nep ov piyvvrai , aXXa did rovrov retied eo- 
 nv 7} opu Ala deolg evv avOpcdreoig nal eyprjyopooi nal na- 
 Oevdovoi — “ For the whole demonial race is between God 
 .^iid mortals, acting as interpreters or messengers to both. 
 Through this passes all divination, and the whole prophet- 
 ical art ; for God mingles not directly with the human race, 
 but through these media is ever carried on the intercourse 
 between Heaven and men, both when awake and wdien 
 asleep.” See, also, Apuleius, De Deo Socratis , 674 : Hos 
 Graeci nomine A aipovag nuncupant, inter terricolas caeli- 
 colasque vectores, hinc precum inde donorumJ* Compare ^ 
 with the above, Hesiod, Works and Days, 233 : 
 
 iyyvg yap kv dvdp&veoLGLV eovreg 
 dOdvaroi ?i£vggovglv. 
 
 For, close at hand, 
 
 Immortal eyes behold us evermore. 
 
 So, also, a few lines below, where he represents the number 
 of these invisible beings as amounting to thirty thousand : 
 
 T pig yap pvpcoi elalv knl xOovl Trov^vdorelpy 
 dOdvaroi Zrjvog <£YAAKE2 'd'vrjr&v dvOpdi ruv, 
 rjipa kcGapevoi, 7r dvrrj (poiTtivrsg kn’ alav. 
 
 For thrice ten thousand wait upon our earth ; 
 
 Jove’s everlasting guards for mortal men, 
 
 Who roam the world in robes of air concealed. 
 
Plato’s doctrine op the dafioveg, or genii. 349 
 
 Milton must certainly have had in mind this passage from 
 Hesiod, and perhaps, also, 2 Kings, vi., 17 : 
 
 Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth, 
 
 Unseen, both when we sleep and when we wake. 
 
 In one of Plato’s strange myths, which may be found in 
 the fourth book of The Laws, 713, C., the Aafioveg, or Genii, 
 are represented as having been anciently (in the reign of 
 Saturn) the political governors of mankind, ruling them as 
 man rules the inferior animals. It w r as intended, probably, 
 to indicate the Divine origin of law and government, in op- 
 position to the absurd paradox that they derive, not only 
 their forms and practical administration, but also their in- 
 herent authority, solely from the consent of the governed. 
 It is, however, a paradox which it is difficult to refute by 
 arguments capable of being appreciated by the mass of 
 mankind, and therefore Plato, as is usual with him in such 
 cases, does not surrender the truth, or leave it out of his 
 scheme of legislation, but throws himself back upon an an- 
 cient myth. The length of the passage compels us to omit 
 the Greek. On account, however, of its intrinsic value, as 
 exhibiting the origin and ancient mode of presenting certain 
 ideas, a version is given in full : “ We have received a tra- 
 dition of the blessed life of the men of those days, how 
 abundantly and spontaneously it had all things. And this 
 is said to have been the cause of it : Saturn, knowing, as 
 we have related, how that human nature , in the absolute 
 self-control of human affairs , can never avoid being filled with 
 violence and unrighteousness , appointed as rulers and magis- 
 trates to our cities, not men, but beings of a Divine and no- 
 bler race, namely, the Genii. Just as we now conduct to- 
 wards the flocks and all tame herds, in that we do not con- 
 stitute oxen as rulers over oxen, nor goats over goats, but 
 we ourselves retain the dominion, the same thing did the 
 Deity, because he was a lover of men. He appointed over 
 us a better race than ourselves, namely, the Aafioveg ; who, 
 
 G G 
 
350 plato’s doctrine of the dalpoveg, or genii. 
 
 taking the oversight with much ease, both to themselves 
 and us, and giving to us peace, and reverence, and true 
 freedom, and an abundant supply of right and justice, ren- 
 dered the families of men most blessed, and free from all 
 tumult and sedition. This myth (he proceeds), when ac- 
 commodated to the truth (dXrjOsia xpcjpevog), or truly inter- 
 preted, really means, that in whatever states, not God, but 
 some mere earthly power, has the ultimate sovereignty, there 
 there can be no escape from evils ; that we ought, as far as 
 possible, to imitate that mode of life which existed in the 
 time of Saturn ; and that, giving earnest heed to whatever 
 principle of immortality may yet remain in human institu- 
 tions, we should, in public and private, administer both our 
 families and our states in accordance with it ; naming Law 
 (yoyov) the dispensation (Nov Aiavoprjv), or government of 
 Mind or Reason.” The specimen of Plato’s philology ex- 
 hibited in this last sentence is poor enough ; but the senti- 
 ment corresponds precisely to Aristotle’s definition of Law, 
 as Nov£* avev dpegecog, or Mind without passion. 
 
 We find the same mythical statement in the Politicus, 271, 
 P. 272, A. It may also be connected with the doctrine 
 to which there was an allusion (page 231) as having some 
 support in the Sacred Volume, namely, of guardian or super- 
 intending angels having the care of particular nations. As 
 we have already said, this is regarded by Eusebius, Prcep . 
 Evang., xi., 26, as maintained in the Septuagint version of 
 Deuteronomy, xxxii., 8 — ore dcegspL^ev f O r/ Ti piorog eOvrj, 
 d)g SieoneLpev vlovg ’A Sag, eorrjoev opia eQv&v Kara apiOpov 
 ’ATrEAQN 0EOT — “When the Most High divided the 
 nations, when he dispersed the sons of Adam, he establish- 
 ed the boundaries of the nations according to the number 
 of the angels of God. But Jacob was the Lord’s portion ; 
 Israel was the line of his inheritance.” 
 
THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES. 
 
 351 
 
 LXVIII. 
 
 Beauty and Accuracy of the Ancient and Platonic Division 
 of the Four Cardinal Virtues . Deep Moral Significance of 
 the Four Greek Words , ’ AuoXaola , ’A uparela^ 'VyupareLa, 
 and 26 )(f>poovvrj, as indicating the Four Moral Degrees. 
 
 Page 69, Line 4. oco&l 6e dutaioovvrj ical oocbpoavvr] 
 I uera (ppovrjcrecjg : “ Righteousness and temperance, or so- 
 briety, with wisdom, save us.” There was something very 
 admirable in the ancient classification of the virtues under 
 the four cardinal heads, ducaioovvrj, oco(ppoovvrj , avdpeta , 
 and oo(j)ia — righteousness , temperance , fortitude (a term 
 which we use for want of a better), and wisdom. A most 
 philosophical analysis of them all may be found in the 
 Republic, lib. iv., commencing 427, P., and continued 
 through several pages. They may be briefly defined thus : 
 /Xiuaioavvrj has immediate reference to the duties w T e owe 
 our fellow beings, although it is used by Plato, in the Re- 
 public, in a more extensive sense, for the state of soul from 
 whence all right actions proceed, and in the composition of 
 which all the other virtues do more or less enter. 26)</>po- 
 ovvT ] , more properly, relates to duties we owe ourselves, or, 
 according to Plato’s favourite allegorical comparison of the 
 soul to a state, diuaioovvr] would have regard to its foreign 
 relations, OGXftpoovvrj to its internal police. ’A vdpela is that 
 strength of soul or will which gives to all the virtues ac- 
 tivity and efficacy. See remarks on avdpeia, Dissertation 
 xliii., p. 257. 2o0/a, when ranked among the virtues, is 
 
 practical wisdom , as distinguished from the scientific or 
 speculative moral insight of the mere casuist. It is what 
 Plato elsewhere frequently styles (frpovrjoig — a wisdom — not 
 grounded on scientific calculations of utility deduced from 
 antecedents and consequents, but rather an innate percep- 
 tion of right, the result of a pure heart clearing the under- 
 
352 
 
 THE FOUR MORAL DEGREES. 
 
 standing ; being, in fact, a sense or taste , rather than science 
 In its highest import, it would be an innate discernment of 
 our relations to God and the universe, and the same with 
 the Scripture ho(j)La. 
 
 Cicero has attempted the same distinctions of the four 
 cardinal virtues, without the names, in his Offices, lib. i., 5. 
 He most clearly imitates Plato. Sed omne, quod est hon- 
 estum, id quatuor partium oritur ex aliqua. Aut'enim in 
 perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur ; aut in hominum 
 societate tuenda, tribuendoque suum cuique, et rerum con- 
 tractarum fide ; aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magni- 
 tudine et robore ; aut in omnium quae fiunt, quaeque dicuntur, 
 ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Quas 
 quatuor, quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, 
 tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur. 
 
 The etymology of this beautiful word ccdcppoavvrj is put 
 before us in this very passage from our text : OGXppoovvr] 
 212ZEI. It is clearly from 060 , ooog, ou)£g), and (pprjv , 
 (f)pov ; and would, accordingly, signify the setting or healing 
 virtue of the soul , soundness of the spirit or spiritual health , 
 in distinction from that dissipation , corruption , or internal 
 war which is the result of the opposite. 
 
 The division into what are styled the four cardinal vir- 
 tues may be regarded as made icara TTOiorrjra , in respect 
 to quality. There is another arrangement, which, to use a 
 term of Aristotle, is made Kara irooorrpa, in respect to quan- 
 tity. This expresses what may be styled the moral de- 
 grees , ascending, by way of climax, from the lowest stage, 
 or total privation of all virtue, to the highest condition, or 
 perfect health of the soul. They are represented by four 
 Greek terms, namely, anoXaoca, duparda , eyupareia , and 
 co)(j)poovvr}. The etymological analysis alone of these 
 words contains, in itself, volumes of morality of a purer and 
 more practical kind than is to be found in many a frigid 
 treatise of modern casuistry. The first of two them, as 
 
THE FOUR MORAL DEGREES. 
 
 353 
 
 Aristotle tells us, Ethic. Nicomach ., vii., 1, belong to the 
 domain of vice, the last two to that of virtue. According 
 to another classification, the two extremes denote respect- 
 ively the perfection of moral excellence and of moral de- 
 pravity, the complete separation* of all heterogeneous ele- 
 ments from both, or, in other words, the purely wicked and 
 the purely virtuous ; while the two means would represent 
 those mixed states wherein the one or the other moral 
 quality may have a temporary superiority, yet neither can be 
 said to be triumphant . 
 
 ’A noXaaia ( from a, privative , and uoXaotg, restraint ) 
 would denote uncontrolled licentiousness — the N ovg (to use 
 Plato’s anthropological division) in utter darkness, the -&vp,og 
 in complete subjection to the emOvptia ; or, in other words, 
 the will not simply overpowered, but the consenting slave 
 of appetite and lust. Compare Plato’s description of the 
 dpyoKparucbg avrjp, or the man whose soul is a perfect 
 democracy of ungoverned propensities, Republic , lib. viii., 
 559, 560. Such a character is free to sin ; or, to adopt a 
 mode of speech directly opposite, yet equally correct, he is 
 hound in the iron chain of that free will f for which some 
 so strenuously contend as the highest prerogative of man, 
 a will which is its own tyrant, cursed with its own self- 
 determining power, and utterly unrestrained by any fear of 
 man, or any grace of God. 
 
 ’ AKpareiais want of moral power. The soul is awaking, 
 and has some sense of its bondage. It feels the chain which 
 
 * See Remarks on the two senses of the word dyioq, p. 322, 323, 
 and note. 
 
 t All the seeming paradoxes and contradictions connected with 
 this expression arise from the different points of view from whence 
 the subject is contemplated. See Romans, vi., 20, ore yap dovlou 
 7jTe rfjg dyapriag ehsvdepoi tjte rrj dwaLoovvTp k. t. X. “ For when yo 
 were the servants of sin ye were free from righteousness, but now, 
 being freed from sin, and having become subject to God,” &c. 
 
 G G 2 
 
354 
 
 THE FOUR MORAL DEGREES. 
 
 the first character mistakes for freedom. The rational will 
 is overpowered, but unreconciled to its degradation, and 
 struggling feebly against it. 
 
 ’E yrcpdreia, temperance , or inward power , would denote 
 the rational will a conqueror, yet holding the sceptre over 
 a turbulent and rebellious foe ever seeking to regain the 
 supremacy, and requiring constant watchfulness and re- 
 straint. 
 
 Zoxfipoovvrj is the spiritual Hygeia, and signifies the will 
 not only superior, but triumphant — in perfect harmony with 
 the reason, and presiding, with ever-unresisted sway, over 
 appetites and propensities in cheerful submission to its true 
 and rational authority. In its highest Platonic sense it is 
 the spirit healed — in harmony with itself, and only falling 
 short of the Scriptural idea of harmony with Heaven. 
 
 Such are the thoughts suggested by the very terms, a 
 faint outline of which may be found in Aristotle, Ethic. 
 Nicomach ., lib. vii., c. i., 5, 6, c. ix. Almost, if not quite, 
 all the words derived from (bprjv (0pov), such as (frpovrjoig, 
 (ppovipog, go) ( j)p(ov, otocppoGvvT], (ppovio), although generally 
 rendered wise , wisdom , prudent ia, &c., partake more of a 
 moral than of an intellectual quality, or, rather, may be said 
 to express a combination of both. They refer to what may 
 be styled practical wisdom , in distinction from speculative 
 knowledge even of the science of morals. This moral wis- 
 dom formed a peculiar trait both in the life and philosophy 
 of Socrates. Xenophon has most admirably said of him, 
 % 0 (pLav nal G(xKpp0Gvv7jV ov dicopL^sV) Memorabilia , iii., 9 
 
PECULIAR USE OF THE INDICATIVE MODE. 355 
 
 LXIX. 
 
 Peculiar Use of the Indicative Mode in certain Cases . Com- 
 parison of Passages from the New Testament. 
 
 Page 70, Line 2. ttelOovol 'dconEiatg Xoywv — “ Would 
 persuade by flatteries.” We thus render, because the con- 
 text, in this place, requires it, and because other examples 
 justify us in thus sometimes taking the indicative mode sub- 
 jectively, as expressing desire , disposition, tendency, or na- 
 ture of a thing — what it ought to do, or would do, rather 
 than what it actually does ; thus seeming to occupy the 
 place of the subjunctive. This is probably the case, to 
 some extent, in all languages, and there is no great diffi- 
 culty in determining by the context when it is thus em- 
 ployed. The usage occurs a number of times in the New 
 Testament, as, for example, John, 1st Epist., iii., 9 : nag 6 
 yeyewTifiEvog Etc rov Qeov dpaprlav ov notEt — Whosoever 
 is horn of God commitleth not sin ; that is, it is not his nature, 
 tendency, or disposition — he would not sin. A much clearer 
 example, and one about which there can be no question, 
 although very similar to the preceding, may be found, Ro- 
 mans, ii., 4 : ayvocov on to xp^otov tov Qeov Elg \ietclvoi - 
 dv os dyEi — not knowing that the goodness of God leadetli 
 thee to repentance. Such is its tendency or nature, that is, 
 what it would do, although wicked men often furnish the 
 most striking proof that the actual effect does not always 
 take place. Compare, also, Mark, xiv., 21 : uaXov fjv avrd) 
 — It would have been better for him , <5rc. ; 2 Peter, ii., 21 : 
 icpEcrrov rjv avrolg pij EnsyvwKEvai — It would have been 
 better for them not to have known , &c. 
 
356 ARITHMETICAL AND GEOMETRICAL EQUALITY. 
 
 LXX. 
 
 Use of the Word UXsovegta. Aristotle's Distinction between 
 Arithmetical and Geometrical Equality . 
 
 Page 71, Line 4. nXeove^cav. This is a very general 
 term, and, although usually rendered covetousness wherever 
 it occurs in the New Testament, may be applied to any 
 case in which one seeks to Lave more than others, be it in 
 respect to wealth, worldly honours, or sensual enjoyment. 
 Plato, as well as the Scriptures, would place them all in 
 the same low scale, and regard the passion, whatever may 
 be its immediate object, as in all cases alike opposed to 
 the harmony of the universe ; that is, to the good of the 
 whole, the good of the parts, the good of the individual who 
 exercises the feeling, besides being intrinsically, or irre- 
 spective of consequences, an evil, and a disease in the spir- 
 it. It comprehends all that is included under our term am - 
 bition , and, when directed to personal distinction, is pre-em- 
 inently “ a lust of the mindf in distinction from those bodily 
 propensities which some moralists would regard as the only 
 sources of sin. 
 
 Plato here compares it to a plethora, or a tendency in 
 one member to absorb into itself more than its share of 
 what belongs to the whole body : rfjv TrXeove^tav ev yev 
 oapidvoLg ocoyaot vooiyia naXovyevov. We may call it, 
 generally, a violation of the law of equality ; not simply of 
 that arithmetical equality which would reduce all ranks of 
 being, be it angels, men, or the lower animals, to the same 
 undistinguishing level, but of that geometrical equality with- 
 out which harmony could not exist, or would become only 
 a dead and monotonous unison. A violation of this equal- 
 ity would consist in the desire or tendency of any member 
 to grow out of its natural proportions. Those who have it 
 may call it a lofty ambition ; the Scriptures, however, and 
 
FOLLY OF ATTEMPTING TO BRIBE HEAVEN. 357 
 
 true philosophy, represent it as a low and selfish passion, 
 utterly blind to that infinitely nobler sentiment which, while 
 it causes the soul to acquiesce, and even rejoice in ranks 
 and distinctions, as necessary parts of the Divine scheme, 
 yet enables it to lose sight of them all in its aspirations 
 after “ that honour which cometh from God only.” 
 
 For the distinction alluded to between arithmetical and 
 geometrical equality, or laoTTjg (from which, we can hardly 
 help thinking, comes the Latin jus, justus, justitia), see Ar- 
 istotle, Ethic. Nicomacli., lib. v., c. iii. and iv. ; also, the 
 sixth book of The Laws, 757, A., at the passage commen- 
 cing, dvolv yao Iootvtolv ovaatv. 
 
 LXXI. 
 
 Impiety and Folly of Attempting to Bribe Heaven. 
 
 Page 71, Line 11 . av avrolg rtiv aducryidruv nq ano- 
 vsp'q. ’AducrjpaTGiv is an elliptical expression, and may be 
 rendered, of the fruit of their wrong doings. There cannot 
 be a baser conception than this, that God could be bribed 
 by a share of the product of iniquity ; and yet, in all ages of 
 the world, and under all religions, men have been both 
 weak enough and wicked enough to entertain it ; that is, if 
 they can disguise it under some delusive name and appear- 
 ance, since, in its gross, naked form, it would revolt even 
 the most brutish soul. Instead of making clean hands and 
 a clean breast by giving up the gains of iniquity, we often 
 find men, even in Christian lands, endeavouring to make 
 atonement, and to purchase ease of conscience, by devoting 
 a part of their ill-gotten wealth to religious uses. How in- 
 dignantly, in the fourth book of The Laws, does Plato re- 
 pudiate the very thought that God, or even a good man, can 
 receive gifts from the wicked : napa tie piapov dcopa ovr 1 
 avdo* ayaOov ovre Oeov earl ttote roye opOov dexeodai. 
 
358 FOLLY OF ATTEMPTING TO BRIBE HEAVEN. 
 
 pdrrjv ovv nspl deovg 6 i joXvg eoti novog rolg avooloic , , 
 717, A. Compare Cicero, De Legibus, lib. ii., 41 : Donis 
 impii ne placare audeant Deos : Platonem audiant, qui ve- 
 tat dubitare qua sit mente futurus Deus, quum nemo bonus 
 ab improbo se donare velit. Also, Plautus, Rudens : 
 
 Atque hoc scelesti in animum inducunt suum, 
 
 Jovem se placare posse donis, hostiis ; 
 
 Sed operam et sumptum perdunt, quia 
 Nihil Ei acceptum est a perjuris supplicii. 
 
 To refer to all the passages in the Scriptures where the 
 same sentiment is strongly expressed would be to quote no 
 small portion of the Sacred Volume. I will not receive a 
 bullock from thine house , nor goats from thy fold ; for all the 
 beasts of the wood are mine , the cattle upon a thousand hills. 
 Psalm 1., 9. Bring no more vain oblations ; your incense is 
 an abomination unto me. Isaiah , i., 13. Nothing could be 
 more absurd than to suppose that, by such declarations, the 
 God both of the Old and New Testament meant to under- 
 value his own most solemnly. appointed institution of sacri- 
 fice. It is most clear that he intended, rather, to guard it, 
 by denouncing, in most indignant terms, that gross abuse 
 which would pervert the ritual avowal of the need of expia- 
 tion, and the ritual acknowledgment of the Great Atonement 
 through its type, into the miserable conception of a bribe to 
 the Almighty — an offering of flesh and fat as to a hungry Baal. 
 And yet this is the only view which some, who would be 
 styled theologians, can take of this institution, so ancient 
 and so universal, not only as it regards the heathen nations, 
 but even in respect to those who were expressly taught of 
 God. 
 
 The sentiment which we have quoted froaa Cicero and 
 Plautus is most admirably expressed by Shakspeare. No- 
 thing can be finer than the contrast he presents between 
 Divine Justice and the imperfections of human courts. It 
 is also rendered peculiarly striking by being put into the 
 mouth of the guilty King of Denmark : 
 
DIFFERENT SPECIES OF ATHEISTS. 
 
 359 
 
 Forgive me my foul murder ! 
 
 That cannot be ; since I am still possessed 
 Of those effects for which I did the murder. 
 
 My crown, mine own ambition, and my queen. 
 May one be pardoned, and retain the offence 1 
 In the corrupted currents of this world , 
 
 Offence's gilded hand may shove by justice ; 
 
 And oft ’ tis seen , the wicked prize itself 
 Buys out the law. But ’ tis not so above. 
 
 There is no shuffling ; there the action lies 
 In its true nature ; and we ourselves compelled, 
 Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults, 
 
 To give in evidence. — Hamlet , Act III. 
 
 LXXII. 
 
 Different Species of Atheists. Morality of Atheist nos 
 Founded on Principle. First Species , styled 6'ucaioq by 
 Plato , and invested by him with too good a Character. 
 Second Species , the Magician or Juggler. The Atheist 
 often in Secret the Victim of Superstition. Hobbes. The 
 Ironical Species of Atheist , a character peculiar to the 
 Ancient World. Elymas the Sorcerer . Simon Magus. 
 Apollonius of Tyanea. 
 
 Page 78, Line 4. 6 pev yap Aoyw, tc. r. X. This is 
 the first and most harmless kind of atheist, the one who, 
 although honest and just in his private relations, does not 
 hesitate boldly to avow his atheism in speaking against re- 
 ligion with its oaths and rites, while, at the same time, he 
 ridicules those who respect them. Such a one Plato thinks 
 may have a dislike for wrong doing (rw dvoxepaivEtv, page 
 77, line 7), that is, a dislike founded on habit, prejudice, 
 or an early bias of the mind, remaining in spite of his 
 atheism ; for the diaaiov rjOoq he is there represented as 
 possessing could not be the result of anything like princi- 
 ple, seeing he rejects the principium of all morals and all 
 law in denying the existence of a Deity. That such indi* 
 
360 DIFFERENT SPECIES OF ATHEISTS. 
 
 viduals may be found here and there in the midst of a so- 
 ciety holding to a different belief, may, perhaps, be admit- 
 ted. Their virtue, however, is only the effect of outward 
 pressure. How long anything like morality would remain 
 in a nation of atheists is a question of far more fearful mag- 
 nitude. Although the experiment has never yet been fully 
 tried, there can be but little doubt as to what would be the 
 horrid result. 
 
 We can hardly help thinking that Plato, in what is said 
 page 77, line 5, has given altogether too good a character 
 to this man. Such persons may be found putting on a show 
 of morality, and making their lives a lie for the sake of 
 giving support to the falsehood of their creed, yet still, it is 
 exceedingly difficult for them to disguise their deep hatred 
 of all who are righteous from religious principle. This, 
 however, was probably less apparent in Plato’s time. 
 Christianity has brought out many a malignant trait in the 
 human character, which, although deep seated in the heart, 
 never made its appearance in the dusky twilight of the 
 heathen systems of religion. Notwithstanding the laboured 
 chapters of Gibbon, he who reads human nature in the light 
 of the New Testament will have little difficulty in under- 
 standing why, Christianity kindled such a flame of persecu- 
 tion on its first entrance into the world, or in realizing the 
 truth of Christ’s declaration, that he “ came, not to send 
 peace upon the earth, but a sword.” 
 
 Page 78, Line 8. 6 6e drj do%a&v j uev evcpvrjg de, 
 
 n. r. A. This is a very different character from the other. 
 He has no ambition to be thought above vulgar prejudices. 
 His grand object is to turn to the best account, in promoting 
 his own interests, the prejudices and the superstitions of other 
 men. Hence he carefully conceals his atheism, while he 
 makes the most abominable abuse of the religious fears of 
 mankind. Having none of that fear of the invisible which 
 would deter ordinary men, he resolves upon playing a bold 
 
DIFFERENT SPEOtES OF ATHEISTS. 
 
 361 
 
 game in the assumed character of fanatic, magician, con- 
 jurer, fortune-teller, oracle-monger (a character, as we learn 
 from Aristophanes, quite common among the Athenians), 
 Sophist, public lecturer, or whatever may best suit his un- 
 holy purposes. It is on this account he is styled evtyvrjg,' 
 acriori ingenio prcedilus, a man of great resources , having a 
 nature well adapted to any scheme of impiety. Sometimes, 
 however, the character may not be all affected. Gross as 
 is the apparent inconsistency, atheism is often found con- 
 nected with superstition. The absence of the fear of God 
 may sometimes give rise to most alarming fears of a devil. 
 The religious instinct, to which atheism has done violence, 
 but has not been wholly able to destroy, may yet live in 
 the most painful terrors of a superstitious and darkened 
 imagination. The soul of man must have, in some way, 
 its supernatural world It cannot long endure the desolating 
 void of atheism, and would even find relief in the most 
 horrid imaginings of malevolent superhuman powers. It 
 must believe in something stronger and higher than itself. 
 Hence, if a God is denied, the moral vacuum must be filled 
 with some personification of Fate, Fortune, or Destiny, or 
 peopled with the Gorgons and Chimmras of a diseased and 
 troubled fancy. See page 133, where we have shown that 
 the atheist, even on his own theory, has no security against 
 an unknown world of horrible superhuman beings. 
 
 No man ever furnished a stronger proof of the truth of 
 these positions than Hobbes. However seemingly bold he 
 may have been in his writings, we are told on the best au- 
 thority* that during a large portion of his life he was in 
 
 * Vide Bayle’s Dictionary, vol. iii., 471, N. Bayle loved some- 
 times to expose the skeptic as well as to sneer at the believer, and 
 he says, most justly, that “ the principles of philosophy (meaning ma- 
 terialism) are not sufficient to rid a man of the fear of apparitions ; 
 for, to reason consequentially, there are no philosophers who have 
 less right to reject magic and sorcery than the atheists.’’ 
 
 H H 
 
362 DIFFERENT SPECIBS OF ATHEISTS. 
 
 constant terror of ghosts and hobgoblins, and that he could 
 never sleep without a light burning in his chamber ; not 
 daring to trust himself to that darkness which presented so 
 true a picture of his own depraved and gloomy mind. 
 
 • Page 78, Line 15. to j uev elpumtcov. The first impres- 
 sion would be that this refers to the first character, who is 
 described as ridiculing (tcarayeXtiv, line 6) and making a 
 mock of sacred things. It is clear, however, that a more 
 serious and develish kind of irony is intended. It is the 
 irony of the laughing and juggling fiend, secretly triumph- 
 ing in the ruin which he is accomplishing in weak and 
 wicked human nature. The second character is undoubt- 
 edly meant — 6 doXov Kcd evedpag tt Xrjprjg — “ the man full 
 of guile and stratagem. 5 ' Nothing could more perfectly 
 correspond to some parts of Plato’s representation, than the 
 description of that magician and false prophet who is men- 
 tioned, Acts, xiii., 6, 10, under the name of Elymas the 
 Sorcerer, and whom Paul addresses in a style remarkably 
 similar, in some of its terms, to that which is here used : 
 T £2 7 jXr]p7]g tt avrog dohov nai tt darjg padiovpyiag , vie Aca- 
 66Xov, exOpe Trdorjg duiatoovvrjg. 
 
 We can hardly appreciate, at the present day, the de- 
 scription of this character, as given by Paul and Plato ; 
 but there can be no doubt that heathenism furnished many 
 an example, exhibiting a hideousness of depravity of which 
 it is now difficult to form a conception. It was a charac- 
 ter which combined, in their most revolting forms, the bold- 
 est and most Heaven-daring atheism with all the devilism 
 (if we may use such a term) that existed in some of the 
 most horrid rites of the heathen religions. Most faithfully 
 drawn specimens of these last productions of the expiring 
 reign of Satan may be found in two tracts of Lucian ; one 
 entitled The History of Alexander, and the other, The 
 Death of Peregrinus. The first was a follower of the fa- 
 mous Apollonius Tyanseus, who has often been blasphe* 
 
THE NIGHTLY CONFERENCE, OR AREOPAGUS, OF PLATO. 36S 
 
 mously compared by infidels to our Saviour, and who him- 
 self exhibited, in a most remarkable degree, this abominable 
 combination of transcendental sophistry, mystic pantheism 
 or disguised atheism, and Satanic magic. Whether this 
 last was wholly pretended, or to what extent it may have 
 been real, it is very difficult now to determine. 
 
 LXXIII. 
 
 The Nightly Conference , or Areopagus , of Plato's State. The 
 Athenian Areopagus . 
 
 Page 79, Line 7. oi rov wurepivov gvXhoyov koivgj* 
 vovvreg. As far as we can recollect, no description of this 
 body, styled The Nightly Conference, is given in any of 
 the preceding books of this dialogue. The reader, how- 
 ever, will find its composition and offices subsequently set 
 forth in the twelfth book of The Laws, 961, A., B. It was 
 to be formed by a careful selection from the body of the 
 magistrates, and of those who had travelled abroad for the 
 purpose of learning the morals and legislation of foreign 
 lands, together with some of the more choice young men 
 who might be thought worthy of so distinguishing an hon- 
 our. This court, which he styles the anchor of the state, 
 was to assemble very early, either at, or just preceding, 
 daybreak ; a season which, besides presenting the most 
 leisure from other necessary employments, was also most 
 favourable to clear thought, and calm, impartial deliberation. 
 
 In a subsequent part of the twelfth book (968, B.) it is 
 again spoken of under the same title. It is not expressly 
 mentioned, we think, in the Epinomis, or Appendix to the 
 Laws, and yet the whole of that obscure book seems to be 
 intended to point out a peculiar mode of education for the 
 members of this conference, and a certain higher philoso- 
 phy, into which, as into sacred mysteries, they were to ba 
 
364 COMMON LAW AGAINST PRIVATE RELIGIONS. 
 
 initiated before they could enter upon this most responsible 
 trust. Perhaps in this Plato hoped to realize one of the 
 dreams of the Republic, namely, that union of the characters 
 of the statesman and the philosopher, in the combination of 
 which he found the perfection of the political structure. 
 
 This body was intended to uniter civil with religious and 
 spiritual functions. It was to be the high ecclesiastical 
 court of equity and conscience. The members were not 
 only to perform the duties of judicial magistrates, but also 
 of public censors. They had, besides, the still more sa- 
 cred and spiritual office of counsellors and instructers to 
 those who were undergoing the discipline of the Sophro- 
 nisterion , but had not yet been sent to the prison of the in- 
 curable ; thus acting, in short, not only as judges, but also 
 as chaplains and ghostly advisers of the wretched criminals, 
 especially of such despisers of God and blasphemers of 
 Providence as the characters treated of in this book. In 
 addition to all this, they were intrusted with the censorship 
 of the laws themselves. 
 
 In this court or conference, Plato seems to have had in 
 his mind the Athenian Areopagus, which, in like manner, 
 was the guardian of the laws and public morals. It was 
 also of a religious nature, and was regarded with so much 
 religious awe that, as iEschines informs us, it was not al- 
 lowed for any one to laugh within its precincts. 
 
 LXXIV. 
 
 Common Law against all Private Religions. Examination 
 of Plato’s Doctrine in respect to Changes in the Public 
 Worship and Religion of the State . 
 
 Page 81, Line 5. noivov d’ em rovroig iraoi vopov, k. 
 t. X. The law here set forth was intended not only for 
 the three kinds of offenders which have been mentioned# 
 
COMMON LAW AGAINST PRIVATE RELIGIONS. 365 
 
 • 
 
 but for all the people of the state. It was to be a law of 
 'prevention , intended to reach the origin of the evil, namely, 
 that private superstition which led weak men and women 
 (yvvahtag nai rovg aoOevovvrag irdvrag) to have private 
 chapels and rites of their own, while they neglected the 
 administrations of the public temples and altars. This 
 seems, in Plato’s time, to have been carried to a great ex- 
 tent, and to have produced, and been produced by, the very 
 class of atheists against whom he has been legislating ; es- 
 pecially those of the third division, who held that God was 
 easily propitiated by peculiar rites and offerings. These 
 men were also interpreters of dreams, expounders of omens, 
 and, in short, the priesthood of a private superstition, which 
 became more extensive and more iniquitous in proportion 
 as it shunned the notice of the legal guardians of the public 
 religion. To prevent this evil, with its irreligious and de- 
 moralizing consequences, this law was to be established for 
 the common weal — lepd prjde elg ev Idiaig ohiiaig eurpodco. 
 
 The same law is given by Cicero in his treatise De Le- 
 gibus, lib. ii., 8, as cited from the twelve tables : Separatim 
 nemo habessit Deos ; neve novos, sed ne advenas, nisi pub- 
 lice adscitos, privatim colunto. Clemens Alexandrinus re- 
 fers with approbation to this law of Plato,* although there 
 can be no doubt that the similar statute in Rome was the 
 proximate, if not the remote, exciting cause of the cruel per- 
 secution Christianity had to undergo as, at first, a foreign, 
 and, in a great measure, a private religion. There was, 
 however, one most beautiful species of family religion, 
 which Plato not only allowed in his scheme of legislation, 
 but even encouraged by the warmest commendation. We 
 allude to the sacred domestic altar, which he would have 
 dedicated to the paternal and filial affections, and to the 
 worship of the aged living parent or grandparent, as the 
 
 * Stromata, lib. v., 584, D. 
 H h 2 
 
366 COMMON LAW AGAINST PRIVATE RELIGIONS. 
 
 • 
 
 best representation of the invisible God. See remarks on 
 the passages referred to, Dissertation I., pages 88, 89. 
 
 Page 81, Line 15, iepa teal deovg ov padiov iSpveoOai, 
 peyaXrjg 6 e diavolag rivdg dpOCjg 6 pav to tolovtov — “ It is 
 no easy thing, or it is no small matter, to establish (or con- 
 secrate) chapels and Divinities. Such a work requires no 
 ordinary intelligence.” The phrase ISpveoOai lepa /cal $£- 
 ovg may be taken generally for the introduction of new re- 
 ligious rites and the adoration of new Divinities. The pri- 
 mary reference is to private innovation, but it has respect, 
 likewise, to all changes attempted in the public worship, 
 either by private individuals or by magistrates. We may 
 compare with this a passage from the fifth book of The 
 Laws, 738, D. : rcepl ftetiv re teal ieptiv drra re ev rrj 7 to- 
 Xei e/cdoroig ISpvoOai del, ovdelg emx^p'fioei tcivelv vovv 
 exojv, boa etc A eheptiv, rj Awdc ovrjg, rj reap ’ V A/ upcjvog, rj n - 
 veg erzeioav n aXaiol Xoyoi, (paoparcjv yevopevcov, rj emn- 
 voiag XexOeiorjg tietiv — “ In respect to the Gods and sacred 
 things and places, &c., no one who has reason should at- 
 tempt to change or unsettle anything which has come from 
 Delphos, or Dodona, or Ammon, or which ancient traditions 
 have recommended to us on the authority of supernatural 
 appearances, or of a Divine afflatus or inspiration.” In an- 
 other place (Laws, vi., 772, D.) he condemns all innova- 
 tion in religion, or in any of the fundamental laws of the 
 state, unless there shall be the threefold consent, first, of 
 all the magistrates ; secondly, of all the people (by which 
 he means, at least, a large majority) ; and, thirdly, of all the 
 oracles of the Gods : izdoag pev rag apxdg XPV %vp6ovXovg, 
 iravra 6e rov 6r\pov , /cal redoag tietiv pavrelag eneXOovrag * 
 eav ovpcpoJVGjoi navreg, ovtgj tcivelv , aXXug 6e prjdenoTe 
 prjdaptig. 
 
 When we regard Plato as without any special revela- 
 tion from Heaven, or any Divine commission to change 
 the religion of his country, we cannot severely condemn his 
 
COMMON LAW AGAINST PRIVATE RELIGIONS. 367 
 
 solicitude in this matter. He may have wished to preserve 
 all the forms of religion, and yet have been influenced by a 
 sincere and earnest desire to introduce a thorough reforma- 
 tion into its spirit. He had not the experience of a thou- 
 sand years, such as is now spread before us in the history 
 of the Christian Church, to convince him that this thing 
 was impossible. We, however, with such a special revela- 
 tion in our hands, cannot approve the doctrine or the law 
 here laid down, however much we may respect the motive 
 which gave rise to it in his peculiar circumstances.* The 
 Oxford theologians would hail Plato as inculcating here 
 their favourite dogma of authority and tradition. Professor 
 Sewal, of that University, has made every effort to turn his 
 language to such a use, sometimes with a tolerable degree 
 of fairness, and sometimes by giving to Plato a sense of 
 which he never dreamed ; although we do not think that the 
 professor has ever referred to the passage before us. Every 
 attempt, however, to bring to their aid the divine philoso- 
 pher of Greece must fail them, when it* is remembered that 
 to him tradition was all the revelation he possessed, and 
 that when this tradition became corrupted, he had no higher 
 standard (such as we possess) by which he might correct 
 it. Plow much he would have prized such a special written 
 revelation, and how joyfully he would have put away from 
 him any inferior guide, may be learned from his famous 
 declaration in the second Alcibiades : “ That we must wait 
 patiently until some one, either a God, or some inspired 
 man, teach us our moral and religious duties, and, as Pallas, 
 in Plomer, did to Diomed, remove the darkness from our 
 eyes ” — and rwv 6(j)0aXfi(x)v rr\v a%Xvv acfreXelv. Alcibiades , 
 ii., 150, D. A like inference may be drawn from that most 
 remarkable passage in the Republic, where he indulges the 
 
 * See a more extended discussion of this subject, Diss. v., p. 102, 
 x., 116, and Note 13, page 6. 
 
368 COMMON LAW AGAINST PRIVATE RELIGIONS. 
 
 hope that the true heavenly philosophy (etc rtvog Jelag emir 
 voiag aXrjdivrj (j)iXooo(j)ta ), and a people in possession of it as 
 a gift from above, either had existed in the immense past 
 time, or might now exist in some obscure 'part of the Bar- 
 barian or Oriental land — ( ev nvt (3ap6apuc(p tottg) tt oppcj 
 7T0V OVTL T7]g pperepag EndxJjecog), or might at some future 
 period be revealed to the rest of the human race. Lib. vi., 
 499, B. Can we suppose that he would have preferred 
 his myths and his traditions, had he known assuredly that 
 just such a people, with just such a Heaven -inspired philoso- 
 phy, then existed in the mountains of the barbarian Judea, 
 and that it had been most solemnly declared, even then, 
 that “ A Law should go forth from Zion , and the Word of the 
 Lord from Jerusalem.”* 
 
 Without fearing at all for our Protestantism, we may in- 
 deed admit, as Plato says, that it is a most important matter 
 to establish new religious rites, or to attempt a change in 
 religious doctrines or modes of worship which have long 
 prevailed, and which, even when most erroneous, can sel- 
 dom be suddenly and violently taken away without danger, 
 to say the least, of tearing up something which may be vital 
 to the soul. The sentiment of Plato may have some truth, 
 even in reference to times and countries possessing a per- 
 manent revelation from God, and to which resort may be 
 had in bringing men back from those deviations from it 
 which are the natural results of human depravity. Admit- 
 ting that there are such seasons when doctrine and worship 
 must be reformed, and when private men under the general, 
 if not special, revelation may be regarded as lawfully call- 
 ed to engage in this most responsible work, still may we 
 say, with Plato, that it does, indeed, require no ordinary in- 
 telligence. Such occasions call for souls of the highest 
 order — rrjg pLEytorpg dtavo'iag — and no vulgar instrument, 
 
 * Isaiah, ii., 3. 
 
BELIEF IN GHOSTS, ETC., THE SAME IN ALL AGES. SOU 
 
 no brawling, fanatical reformer should be regarded as 
 Heaven’s agent in so solemn an undertaking. When such’ 
 men as Luther and Calvin arise, it is not easy to mistake 
 the evidences of their peculiar mission, or their fitness for 
 the great work to which they are called, 
 
 LXXV. 
 
 Belief in Apparitions, Ghosts, Spectres, Dreams , Spc., the 
 same in all Ages. 
 
 Page 82, Line 2. ev re (paopaocv eyprjyoporag did <po- 
 6ovg nal ev oveipotg — “ Startled, when awake, by appari- 
 tions, and in sleep by dreams.” Nothing would present a 
 more interesting subject of investigation than the nature and 
 extent of the ancient belief in ghosts and apparitions. That 
 it prevailed extensively, that it was most deeply rooted, and 
 that it had existed from the most remote antiquity, is be- 
 yond all doubt. If ever there was a doctrine of which it 
 could be said that it was held semper, ubique, et ab omnibus 
 this is one. There can be no greater mistake than to sup- 
 pose that this is a consequence of Christianity, and that its 
 revelations of the spiritual world have quickened the ima- 
 gination to impressions and terrors unknown to the ancient 
 times. The belief in ghosts and supernatural appearances 
 is as old as the belief in a hell, or in any existence after 
 death, and all of them may be traced back to a period where 
 profane history wholly fails us. It was the creed alike of 
 Jew and Gentile, of the East and the West, of Greek, 
 Chaldean, and Idumean. The account of Saul and the 
 Witch of Endor incidentally discloses the extent and depth 
 of the common Jewish belief in the ghostly world, and that, 
 too, much more strongly than would have been done by any 
 express declarations. Whatever may be thought of the si- 
 lence of the Old Testament in other parts, the fact of a nu* 
 
370 BELIEF IN GHOSTS, ETC., THE SAME IN ALL AGES. 
 
 merous and well-known class of persons, whose profession 
 it was to maintain intercourse with the dead, whether such 
 intercourse was deceptive or not, does prove, beyond all 
 cavil, that the ancient Israelites were no Sadducees, and 
 that, if they did not get their belief in a spiritual world from 
 Moses, they must have derived it from some still more an- 
 cient source common to all mankind. 
 
 That it existed as a part of the patriarchal religion, we 
 have direct evidence from the vision of Eliphaz, Job, iv., 
 13 : A spirit (a (pdoya) stood before my face. The manner 
 in which the appearance of this ghost is described, bears a 
 striking resemblance to all representations of the kind in 
 ancient or in modern times. The (j)dGfia, or shadowy ap- 
 pearance under which the mind is always led to contem- 
 plate the departed yet restless soul — the changing and flit- 
 ting motion, so admirably expressed by the Hebrew rjblV’ 
 the formless form, the silence, and the voice, present the 
 same marked features that are to be found in almost all 
 ghostly narrations. It is not spoken of as a phenomenon 
 until then unknown, but as something in the possibility of 
 which all his hearers are supposed to believe. It is no an- 
 swer to say it was a dream. How came the nightly world 
 of the imagination to be peopled with representations from 
 an unseen state, if a belief did not universally prevail 
 which brought such representations before the soul ? As 
 an example far less sublime than this, but with many of the 
 same points of resemblance, we may cite the apparition of 
 the shade of Patroclus to Achilles, as described in the twen- 
 ty-third book of the Iliad, v. 100 : 
 
 ijjvxy ds Kara x6°vd£, ? )vre Kanvog, 
 
 &X eT0 TETptyvla. TCKpcov 6’ avopovcrev ’A^tAAevf, 
 
 X^pai re GVfnrTuiTaytjcrev, ettoc 6’ dXofivdvov eeittev * 
 
 7 £2 ttottoc, rj /3 d rig Eotl ical elv ’Atdao doyoiGiv 
 ipvxy teal eldto'Aov • ardp typkvEC ovk evl rrdfmav. 
 
 We may sometimes find ancient accounts of this kind 
 
BELIEF IN GHOSTS, ETC., THE SAME IN ALL AGES. 371 
 
 that may compare with any of the narratives of the Middle 
 Ages. Take, for example, Plato’s myth at the end of the 
 tenth book of the Republic. His wild and fiery beings 
 [aypioi nai diaTrvpoi), that torment the wicked, one might 
 almost suppose had been copied from some saint’s legend. 
 When Socrates tells us, in the Phaedon, of the ghosts that 
 haunt the tombs and monuments — auoeidfj (pavraopara 
 ola TTdpexovTcu -oiavTCU 'ipvxal ecduXa, at pi] icaQaptig ano - 
 XvOsloat — the shades of the impure departed — we might al- 
 most fancy it the language of some German ballad. The 
 story of the apparition which so solemnly summoned Brutus 
 to his last meeting at Philippi presents another striking in- 
 stance of the same kind. A still more remarkable case is 
 recorded by the younger Pliny ( Epistolce , lib. vii., 27), of a 
 frightful spectre which appeared in a certain house at Ath- 
 ens. The details are given with such an air of truth and 
 sobriety, that we cannot help thinking that the writer, ma- 
 terialist as he was, did really believe it, or, at least, was 
 seriously affected by the account. It is, however, mainly 
 interesting, by reason of its presenting features so very 
 much resembling some of those that are to be found in the 
 ghost stories of modern times. The old, spacious, desert- 
 ed, and suspected house ; the clanking of chains, first faint- 
 ly heard at a distance, and becoming louder and louder as 
 the spectre approaches at the dread hour of midnight ; the 
 silent and fixed position ; the waving of the hand ; the 
 pointing with the finger ; the motion to follow ; the solemn 
 tread with which the apparition leads the spectator through 
 the lonely passages of the building until it finally disappears 
 in the courtyard, and the result, which the reader of mod- 
 ern legends can almost anticipate, namely, the finding the 
 bones of a murdered man, as they are dug up in the very 
 spot where it had vanished — all these are of such a nature 
 as to make us feel for a moment as though, instead of read - 
 ing Pliny and a story of the ancient Athens, we had actu- 
 
372 BELIEF IN GHOSTS, ETC., THE SAME IN ALL AGES. 
 
 ally been occupied with some of the wild creations of 
 Shakspeare’s fancy in Hamlet or King Richard the Third. 
 Whatever may be thought of its truth, it is of value as 
 showing that the imagination, in all ages of the world, has 
 been filled with the same images, and that there must be 
 some deep ground of reality to which all such incidents, 
 however deceptive in outward appearances, are to be re- 
 ferred. 
 
 How much even the Epicurean age of Horace was af- 
 fected by these preternatural terrors, may be learned from 
 the great variety of frightful names he presents in two lines 
 of one of his Epistles, in which he would describe a mind 
 raised above the superstitious imaginings of the multitude ; 
 although, from some evidences he has left us, it was not a 
 state to which he himself could lay claim : 
 
 Caret mortis formidine et iral 
 Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas, 
 
 Nocturnos lemures, portentaque Thessala, rides'? 
 
 Hor., Epist.y lib. ii., 2, 206. 
 
 <&dopa, is nearly, if not quite, synonymous with (pavrao- 
 pa. The latter term is the one employed in the New Tes- 
 tament, Matthew, xiv., 20 ; Mark, vi., 49. In another pas- 
 sage, to express the same idea, the word rcvevpa is used ; 
 as where Christ says, A spirit hath notjlesli and hones , as ye 
 see me have . Although he asserts that he himself appears 
 in his risen body, yet, at the same time, he seems clearly 
 to sanction the belief in the existence of ghosts or spirits, 
 and to treat it as a well-known fact. We cannot bear, in 
 this passage, the doctrine of accommodation. Let any one 
 think for a moment of those solemn circumstances which 
 so strongly demanded the utmost sincerity and truth on this 
 very point. Would Christ have used such language to his 
 anxiously-inquiring disciples, after having himself just re- 
 turned from the world of spirits, if their belief had been a 
 mere popular delusion? Would he thus have trifled with 
 
BELIEF IN GHOSTS, ETC., THE SAME IN ALL AGES. 373 
 
 them, while their minds were intent upon the solemn real- 
 ities of the spiritual state, and occupied with those thoughts 
 which were suggested by his own death and resurrection ? 
 If, under these circumstances, he spoke the language of 
 accommodation to a false belief, we know T not when and 
 where we may expect the literal truth. 
 
 Ii 
 
INDEX 
 
 OF PASSAGES QUOTED AND EXPLAINED FROM THE OTHER 
 WRITINGS OF PLATO. 
 
 Page 
 
 Alcibiades II 367 
 
 Cratylus . 1, 101, 161, 162, 163, 
 175, 183, 199 
 
 Critias 261 
 
 Crito 76 
 
 Epinomis 226, 227, 260, 271, 363 
 Epistles . . . .198, 199, 238 
 
 Gorgias 7, 17, 22, 28, 42, 62, 77, 
 135, 139, 147, 240, 246, 
 290, 316, 322, 331, 332 
 
 Hippias Mai 184 
 
 Ion 101 
 
 Laches 256 
 
 Laws 75, 88, 92, 100, 101, 107, 
 126, 134, 136, 140, 149, 
 219, 235, 246, 247, 306, 
 347, 349, 357, 358, 363, 
 365, 366 
 
 Meno 309 
 
 Parmenides .... 184, 246 
 
 Phaedon 17, 107, 129, 147, 151, 
 165, 224, 261, 268, 282, 
 322, 324, 326, 331, 344, 371 
 
 Page 
 
 Phaedrus . > . 151, 184, 195 
 
 Philebns . 47, 150, 184, 203 
 
 Politicos 214, 215, 216, 330, 350 
 Protagoras . 66, 140, 259, 309 
 Republic . 6, 42, 43, 51, 72, 102, 
 103, 140, 150, 184, 208, 
 290, 308, 309, 310, 315, 
 318, 319, 322, 327, 328, 
 329, 330, 338, 341, 351, 
 353, 368, 371 
 Sophista .... 158, 199, 285 
 Symposion . . . . 101, 140 
 
 Theaetetus . 22, 62, 98, 122, 138, 
 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 
 160, 161, 163, 164, 183, 
 184, 199 
 
 Timaeus . 35, 96, 102, 121, 122, 
 123, 144, 150, 171, 172, 
 173, 184, 211, 212, 217, 
 219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 
 228, 229, 230, 234, 235, 
 240, 277, 279, 300, 301, 
 304, 305, 323, 347 
 
 INDEX 
 
 OF CITATIONS FROM OTHER ANCIENT AUTHORS. 
 
 Page 
 
 TEschines 364 
 
 iEsciiYLus : 
 
 “ Choeph 321 
 
 “ Prom. Vine. 68, 88, 128, 252 
 
 Apuleius • 348 
 
 Aristophanes : 
 
 “ Acharn 22, 41 
 
 “ Aves 80 
 
 “ Nubes ... 47, 128, 245 
 
 “ Plutus 7 
 
 “ Thesm. . • . . ’128 
 
 Page 
 
 Aristotle : 
 
 “ De Anim. . . 41, 101, 126 
 
 “ De Ccelo . . . 302, 3G6 
 
 “ De Mundo . . 41, 124 
 
 “ De Gen. 119, 120, 186, 187 
 
 “ Ethic. Eud 241 
 
 “ Ethic. Nic. 47, 70, 91, 240, 
 241, 353, 354, 357 
 “ Metaph. 115, 154, 159, 160, 
 184, 190, 191, 192, 
 193, 194, 222 
 
376 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Aristotle Pase 
 
 “ Meteorol 125 
 
 4 Physic. 134, 185, 186, 193, 
 221, 279, 280 
 “ Politic. . 47, 265, 266, 349 
 
 Athenagoras 101 
 
 Cicero : 
 
 44 Acad. Post. 160, 200, 275 
 44 De Fato . . . 311,312 
 
 44 De Fin 297 
 
 44 De Leg. 95,111,272,358 
 44 DeNat. Deor. 101,113,227, 
 244, 245, 258 
 
 44 Offic 352 
 
 “ Tusc. Disp. 114, 147, 194, 
 
 326 
 
 Claudian' 244 
 
 Clemens Alex. 248, 340, 343, 365 
 
 Cyril Alex. 
 Diodorus Siculus 
 Empedocles . . 
 
 ... 275 
 . 101, 317 
 77, 115, 159 
 
 Euripides : 
 
 44 Helena 
 “ Hippolytus 
 44 Medea . . 
 
 44 Orestes 
 44 Phcenissae 
 44 Rhesus 
 44 Supplices . 
 44 Troades . 
 44 Fragments 
 13 
 
 Eusebius : 
 
 .... 129 
 . . 90, 101 
 
 . 16, 62, 242 
 
 . . 129, 240 
 
 .... 242 
 .... 101 
 .... 129 
 . . 217, 235 
 
 93, 128, 129, 
 i, 137, 237, 332 
 
 44 Prasp. Evang. . 157, 231, 
 272, 340, 3^3, 350 
 Herodotus . . .65, 173, -231 
 
 Hesiod : 
 
 44 Works and Days . 48, 83, 
 113, 348 
 
 44 Theog 180 
 
 Homer : Pa<re 
 
 44 Iliad . 15, 70, 72, 80, 139, 
 149, 158, 168, 208, 
 
 209, 342, 346, 370 
 44 Odyssey . . 147, 302, 303 
 
 Horace : 
 
 44 Ars Poet 18S 
 
 44 Epist 372 
 
 44 Odae .... 293, 294 
 
 Iamblichus 223 
 
 Justin Mart 101 
 
 Lucian 157, 362 
 
 Lucretius 204, 207, 275, 293, 320 
 
 Nemesius 272 
 
 Origen, Contra Celsum . . 235 
 
 Ovid 259 
 
 Philo 274 
 
 Pindar .... 89, 144, 321 
 Plautus, Rudens .... 358 
 
 Pliny, Epist 371 
 
 Plutarch, Caes 247 
 
 44 De Fato 272 
 
 44 De Isid. et Osir. 182, 236 
 44 De Placit. Philos. . . 136 
 
 Proclus, Com. Euc. . . . 165 
 
 Seneca 7, 237 
 
 Sext. Empir. 24, 136, 156, 185 
 Sophocles : 
 
 44 Ajax 266 
 
 44 Antigone . . . . 80, 89 
 
 44 (Ed. Col 334 
 
 44 (Ed. Tyr 127 
 
 44 Philoc. ... 42, 260 
 
 44 .Trach 64, 65 
 
 Thales 41, 77 
 
 Tim^eus, Lex 248 
 
 Virgil, Georg 93 
 
 Xenophon : 
 
 44 Agesil 317 
 
 44 Mem. ... 38, 153, 354 
 
INDEX 
 
 OF PASSAGES CITED FROM* TIIE OLD AND 
 
 Genesis. 
 
 Pape 
 
 i., 1 . . 212, 273 
 
 i., 2 216, 283, 338 
 
 i., 3 .... 273 
 
 1., 31 . . . , 222 
 
 11., 4 .... 273 
 
 Exodus. 
 
 111., 14 ... 180 
 
 Leviticus. 
 
 xvi., 8 .... 248 
 xix., 2 . . . .93 
 
 Deuteronomy. 
 
 iv., 26 ... . 
 
 92 
 
 v., 30 . . . . 
 
 92 
 
 vi., 2 . . . . 
 
 92 
 
 xxiii., 18 . . . 
 
 323 
 
 ^xxxii.,8, 231,343, 
 
 ,350 
 
 Joshua. 
 
 vii., 25 ... 
 
 82 
 
 2 Samuel. 
 
 xxiv., 16, 17 . . 
 
 270 
 
 2 Kings. 
 
 vi., 17 . . 271, 
 
 348 
 
 Job. 
 
 i„ 6, 7. . . . 
 
 343 
 
 iv., 6 . . . . 
 
 337 
 
 iv., 13 ... . 
 
 370 
 
 xiv., 10 . . . 
 
 317 
 
 xxi., 7 . 
 
 244 
 
 xxi., 29 . . . 
 
 336 
 
 xxviii., 24 . . 
 
 67 
 
 xxxiv., 21 . . 
 
 333 
 
 xxxviii., 7 . . 
 
 232 
 
 xxxviii., 14 . . 
 
 338 
 
 Psalms. 
 
 ii., 9 . . . . 
 
 262 
 
 xiv., 1 . . . . 
 
 51 
 
 xvii., 15 . . . 
 
 Page 
 
 337 
 
 xxxix., 7 . . . 
 
 330 
 
 xlix., 11 . . . 
 
 70 
 
 1., 9 . . . . 
 
 358 
 
 lxxiii. , 2, 3, 10, 
 
 243 
 
 “ 20 . . . . 
 
 336 
 
 “ 22 . . . . 
 
 70 
 
 lxxviii., 61 . . 
 
 89 
 
 xc., 2 ... . 
 
 273 
 
 “ 11 . . . . 
 
 321 
 
 c., 3 . . . . 
 
 262 
 
 civ., 2 ... . 
 
 126 
 
 “ 30 . . . . 
 
 212 
 
 cxxi., 4 . . . 
 
 346 
 
 cxxxix., . . . 
 
 333 
 
 Proverbs. 
 
 
 xii., 1 . . . . 
 
 70 
 
 xvi., 3 . . . . 
 
 336 
 
 xvii., 6 . . . 
 
 89 
 
 xxi., 27 . . . 
 
 73 
 
 xxx., 2 . . . 
 
 70 
 
 Ecclesiastes 
 
 
 xii., 5 ... . 
 
 317 
 
 Isaiah. 
 
 i., 13 . . . . 
 
 358 
 
 ii., 3 . . . . 
 
 368 
 
 xl., 26 ... . 
 
 232 
 
 xiv., 7 ... . 
 
 209 
 
 xlvii., 14 . . . 
 
 274 
 
 Daniel. 
 
 
 x., 20, 21 . . . 
 
 231 
 
 Hosea. 
 
 
 ii., 23 ... . 
 
 269 
 
 Amos. 
 
 
 ix., 2 ... . 
 
 334 
 
 Habakkuk. 
 i., 13 . . . . 210 
 
 Malachi. 
 
 iii., 15 .... 43 
 
 I 
 
 NEW TESTAMENTS. 
 
 Pago 
 
 Wisdom of Solomon. 
 xi., 18 .... 283 
 Matthew. 
 
 ii., 6 . . . . 
 
 262 
 
 xiii., 39, 41 . . 
 
 336 
 
 xiv., 26 . . . 
 
 372 
 
 xxv., 46 . . . 
 
 293 
 
 . Mark. 
 
 vi., 49 ... . 
 
 372 
 
 xiv., 21 . . . 
 
 355 
 
 Luke. 
 
 xiii., 9 . . . . 
 
 139 
 
 xix., 42 . . . 
 
 139 
 
 xxii., 42 . . . 
 
 139 
 
 John. 
 
 i., 1 . . . . 
 
 179 
 
 iii., 13 ... . 
 
 181 
 
 viii., 58 . . . 
 
 180 
 
 Acts. 
 
 xiii., 6, 10 . . 
 
 362 
 
 xvii., 28 . . . 
 
 181 
 
 xvii., 22 . . . 
 
 260 
 
 xxiii., 9 . . . 
 
 139 
 
 Romans. 
 
 i., 21, 28 . . . 
 
 115 
 
 i., 20 . . . . 
 
 283 
 
 ii-, 4 . . . . 
 
 355 
 
 iv., 17 ... . 
 
 271 
 
 vi., 17 ... . 
 
 339 
 
 vi., 20 ... . 
 
 353 
 
 ix., 5 . . 180, 
 
 181 
 
 viii., 28 . . . 
 
 287 
 
 ix., 5 ... . 
 
 180 
 
 ix., 22 ... . 
 
 139 
 
 1 Corinthians. 
 
 iii. , 21, 22 . . 287 
 
 2 Corinthians. 
 
 iv. , 18 . . 282, 303 
 
378 
 
 INDEX 
 
 / 
 
 Galatians. 
 
 Page 
 
 iv., 16 .... 97 
 
 vi., 8 .... 297 
 
 Ephesians. 
 iv., 15 .... 97 
 vi., 12 .... 343 
 Philippians. 
 
 111., 4 .... 344 
 
 1 Thessalonians. 
 iv., 16 ... . 344 
 
 1 Timotiiv. 
 
 1., 9 .... 93 
 
 vi., 16 . . 126, 302 
 
 2 Timothy. 
 
 Page 
 
 1., 13 . . . 339 
 
 Hebrews. 
 
 1., 7 232 
 
 ix., 26 . . ... 336 
 
 xi., 3 . . 281, 283 
 
 xi. , 6 .... 65 
 
 xii. , 14 . . . . 324 
 
 James. 
 
 i., 23 . . . . 64 
 
 2 Peter. 
 
 i., 4 .... 61 
 
 iu 21 .... 355 
 
 1 Epistle John. 
 
 Pags 
 
 iii., 9 .... 355 
 Jude. 
 
 6 336 
 
 Revelations. 
 
 i., 8. . 
 
 ... 181 
 
 ii., 10 . 
 
 ... 344 
 
 ii., 27 . 
 
 ... 262 
 
 vii., 17 
 
 ... 262 
 
 xi., 12 . 
 
 ... 344 
 
 xii., 5 . 
 
 ... 263 
 
 xix., 15 
 
 . . 263 
 
 THE KKD. 
 
A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 /